Title: Elections Board of the State of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP000596
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0596 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Elections Board of the State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, WMC Issues 
Mobilization Council, Inc., ABC Corporation and 
XYZ Corporation,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O’Brien 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Prossser, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
 
 
  (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. joins 
 
Not Participating: Wilcox, J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Cynthia R. Hirsch, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs (in the Court of Appeals) was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
(in the Court of Appeals) by Robert J. Dreps, Brady C. Williamson 
and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison and oral argument by Brady C. 
Williamson, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief (in the Court of Appeals) was 
filed by Jan Witold Baran, Kirk Lincoln Jowers and Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, Washington, D.C.; Robert C. Burrell, R. Jeffrey Wagner 
and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee; of 
counsel, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad and National Chamber 
Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Jan Amundson and 
National Association of Manufacturers, Washington, D.C. for the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the National Association of 
Wholesaler-Distributors, Food Distributors International and the 
Association for Manufacturing Technology. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief (in the Court of Appeals) was 
filed by Glenn Moramarco and Brennan Center for Justice, New 
York, NY and Elizabeth Adelman and Adelman & Hynes, S.C., 
Milwaukee for Senator Charles Chvala. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief (in the Court of Appeals) was 
filed by Dan Conley, Brian D. Winters, Michael Fischer and 
Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee and Peter M. Koneazny, legal director, 
Milwaukee for the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin, 
Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief (in the Court of Appeals) was 
filed by Lillian BeVier and University of Virginia Law School, 
Charlottesville, VA and Paul W. Schwarzenbart and  Lee Kilkelly, 
Paulson & Kabaker, S.C., Madison for the Wisconsin Grocers 
Association, Inc. 
 
No. 
98-0596 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0596 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Elections Board of the State of  
Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, WMC  
Issues Mobilization Council, Inc., ABC  
Corporation and XYZ Corporation,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Sarah B. O'Brien, Circuit Court Judge.  
Affirmed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is before the court 
as a result of the parties' joint petition to bypass pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (1995-96).1  The issue presented is 
whether the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint of 
the Elections Board of the State of Wisconsin (the "Board") 
charging the respondents with various violations of the campaign 
finance laws contained in Wis. Stat. ch. 11 following the 
respondents' broadcast of several advertisements.  The Board 
contends that respondents are subject to ch. 11 regulation 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version.  
No. 
98-0596 
 
2 
because their ads had the "political purpose of expressly 
advocating" the defeat or re-election of the incumbent state 
senators and representatives named in the ads.  We conclude that 
the respondents, when they broadcast the advertisements, lacked 
fair warning that the ads could qualify as express advocacy in 
Wisconsin under a context-based approach.  The Board, in effect, 
engaged in retroactive rule-making in attempting to apply such 
an approach.  
¶2 
Since 
this 
violation 
of 
due 
processfundamental 
fairnessis determinative 
of 
the 
issue of 
whether 
these 
respondents can be prosecuted for the ads involved, there is no 
need for us to decide whether the ads are express advocacy.   We 
therefore affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the Board's 
complaint.   
¶3 
We also determine that the definition of the term 
express advocacy is not limited to the specific list of "magic 
words" such as "vote for" or "defeat" found in Buckley footnote 
52.  A context-based approach to defining express advocacy may 
present an attractive alternative, but we note that several 
courts have rejected such an approach.2  If there is to be a 
further attempt to fashion a rule governing express advocacy 
advertisements, leaving that task is appropriately left to the 
legislature or the Board, consistent with this opinion.   
I. 
                     
2 As counsel for the respondents descriptively stated at 
oral argument, "A voyage into the question of context is not 
only a swamp for the judiciary, it's a voyage without end."  
Several cases, set forth later in this opinion, have discussed 
the issue of a context-based standard and voiced somewhat 
similar criticism.  
No. 
98-0596 
 
3 
¶4 
The respondents in this action are four Wisconsin 
corporations.  Respondent WMC Issues Mobilization Council, Inc., 
(IMC), is a non-stock, non-profit corporation which receives 
financial support from respondents ABC Corporation and XYZ 
Corporation.  To protect their privacy, IMC has refused to name 
ABC and XYZ.  Respondent Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, a 
non-profit corporation, also provides financial support to IMC. 
        
¶5 
The Board is the state agency responsible for the 
administration of the campaign finance laws in Wis. Stat. ch. 11 
and other laws related to elections and campaigns.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 5.05(1), 15.61.  In the event of a ch. 11 violation 
involving a statewide election or the filing of a required 
report or statement, the Board may bring a civil forfeiture 
action under Wis. Stat. § 11.60.  § 5.05(1)(c).  The Board may 
seek injunctive or other relief to enforce laws governing 
elections and campaigns.  § 5.05(1)(d).  The Board also has the 
power to enact rules pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 227 to interpret 
and 
administer 
the 
election 
and 
campaign 
laws. 
 
See 
§ 5.05(1)(f).  
¶6 
In late October, 1996, IMC produced advertisements 
referring to six incumbent state legislators who were hoping to 
be re-elected in the November 5, 1996, general election.  Each 
ad described a legislator's vote on specific issues and 
encouraged viewers or listeners to call the legislator to 
express approval or disapproval of the legislator's position.3  
                     
3 Following is the full text of the advertisements:  
 
No. 
98-0596 
 
4 
                                                                  
[1]  State Senator Lynn Adelman is standing in the way 
of reform.  Voting against curbs on frivolous lawsuits 
that cost Milwaukee jobs.  What's worse, Adelman's 
made a career of putting the rights of criminals ahead 
of the rights of victims:  Voting to deny employers 
the right to keep convicted felons out of the 
workplace.  That's wrong.  That's liberal.  But that's 
Lynn Adelman.  Call Lynn Adelman.  Tell him honest 
working people have rights, too. 
 
[2]  You-make-the-call!  Senator Chuck Chvala voted to 
increase income taxes, sales taxes, and capital gains 
taxes by over a billion dollars.  Then he voted 
against the largest property tax cut in Wisconsin 
history.  Is he:  "A," A liberal?   "B," A big 
spender?  "C," Out of touch?  Or "D," All of the 
above?  If you said "D" all of the above, you made the 
right call!  Make another right call to Chuck Chvala . 
. . He never met a tax he didn't hike. 
 
[3]  The following message is paid for by WMC Issues 
Mobilization Council, Inc. --- Businesses working in 
the public interest.  There's still one team in 
Wisconsin with a perfect record.  It's the tax team of 
State Representatives Dave Plombon and Mike Wilder.  
They agree on most everything, voting with the Madison 
liberals nearly l00% of the time.  In the State 
Assembly, Plombon and Wilder voted against cutting 
property 
taxes 
for 
Chippewa 
Valley 
homeowners.  
Working together, they voted against spending controls 
on local government.  Plombon and Wilder even voted 
against millions in additional state aid for Chippewa 
Valley schools.  State Representatives Dave Plombon 
and Mike Wilder.  The tax team of the Chippewa Valley. 
 Liberal on taxes and spending.  Wrong on education.  
If you don't like the way the tax team is playing with 
your money, call them at 1-800-362-9472.  Tell them 
Chippewa Valley homeowners deserve lower taxes and our 
kids deserve better schools. 
 
[4]  Representative Dave Plombon voted against the 
largest property tax cut in Wisconsin history.  More 
than 15% for the average Chippewa Valley homeowner.  
Then Plombon voted against an additional 21 million 
dollars in state aid for schools right in his own 
district.  Dave Plombon.  Less money for our children. 
 Higher taxes for us.  Call Dave Plombon today.  
Because if he's consistently voting against the 
Chippewa Valley, just who is he voting for? 
 
No. 
98-0596 
 
5 
The ads aired on television and/or radio stations in the 
relevant state senate and assembly districts.   
¶7 
The 
legislators 
featured 
by 
the 
ads 
filed 
administrative complaints with the Board against IMC, contending 
that the advertisements subjected IMC to regulation under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 11.  When the Board did not immediately address their 
complaints, the legislators sought injunctive relief under Wis. 
Stat. § 11.66 in circuit courts around the state.  On October 
31, 1996, the Dane County Circuit Court ordered a temporary 
                                                                  
[5]  State Representative Mike Wilder has a problem 
with taxes.  He doesn't like to . . . cut them.  When 
it came to a 14% cut in property taxes for the average 
Chippewa Valley homeowners, Mike Wilder said "No."  
And when it came to an additional 33 million dollars 
in state aid for schools right in his own district, 
Mike Wilder turned his back on us again.  Give Mike 
Wilder a call.  Tell him you've got a problem with 
high taxes, too. 
 
[6]  What has Gary Drzewiecki done for Northeast 
Wisconsin?  Homeowners will see their property taxes 
cut by an average of 11.5%  Our children's schools 
will receive millions in additional state aid.  And 
taxpayers 
will 
get 
spending 
controls 
on 
local 
government.  
Lower 
taxes, less 
spending, 
better 
schools.  It's a record we can all be proud of.  Call 
Gary Drzewiecki and tell him thanks. 
 
[7]  This year, Wisconsin homeowners received their 
property taxes cut by almost 17%.  No thanks to 
Senator Alice Clausing.  She voted against the largest 
property tax cut in Wisconsin history.  Then Clausing 
voted against an additional 36 million dollars for 
schools -– right in her own district.  Alice Clausing. 
 Liberal on Taxes . . . Wrong on education.  Call 
Senator Clausing.  Tell her to stop voting with those 
Madison liberals. 
 
Compl., Attach. 1-7. 
 
 
No. 
98-0596 
 
6 
injunction restraining IMC from broadcasting its advertisements. 
 The circuit courts involved in the related suits swiftly did 
the same.  IMC filed an emergency petition for a supervisory 
writ with the court of appeals.  The court of appeals granted 
the writ in part and denied it in part, leaving the injunctions 
in place. 
¶8 
On March 14, 1997, the Board issued its order 
regarding the legislators' administrative complaints.  The Board 
found that  IMC had engaged in express advocacy and ordered IMC 
to comply with the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 11 by April 15, 
1997.  Specifically, the Board ordered IMC to file a campaign 
registration statement and a campaign finance report detailing 
all contributions made or received, and all disbursements made 
or  obligations incurred, during 1996.    
¶9 
IMC refused to comply with the Board's order.  The 
Board responded by filing the present action in Dane County 
Circuit Court on June 26, 1997.  In its complaint, the Board 
alleged that IMC's advertisements had the "political purpose of 
expressly advocating" defeat or re-election of the named 
legislators. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
Board 
asserted, 
the 
four 
respondents (collectively, 
"WMC") were 
subject 
to various 
regulations under the campaign finance laws.  The Board alleged 
that WMC failed to comply with the March 14, 1997, order4 and had 
                     
4 Like the circuit court, we are unable to discern from the 
allegations in the complaint which of the four respondents the 
Board deems responsible for failing to comply with its March 14, 
1997, 
order. 
 
Although 
the 
complaint 
alleges 
that 
all 
respondents failed to comply with the order by filing the 
required reports, it also states somewhat inconsistently that 
its order was issued only against respondent IMC.  See Compl. 
¶¶61-65; Decision and Order at 6 n.3.    
No. 
98-0596 
 
7 
violated Wisconsin's campaign finance laws by:  (1) failing to 
register in violation of Wis. Stat. § 11.05(1);5 (2) failing to 
file financial reports regarding contributions in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1)(a);6 (3) failing to file financial reports 
required by Wis. Stat. § 11.20(1) and (2);7 and (4) making 
contributions and/or disbursements for purposes unrelated to a 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 11.05(1) provides: 
Registration 
of 
political 
committees, 
groups 
and 
individuals.  (1)  COMMITTEES AND GROUPS. . . . [E]very 
committee other than a personal campaign committee . . 
. 
which 
makes 
or 
accepts 
contributions, 
incurs 
obligations or makes disbursements in a calendar year 
in an aggregate amount in excess of $25 shall file a 
statement with the appropriate filing officer giving 
the information required by sub. (3). . . .    
  
6 Wis. Stat. § 11.06(1) states: 
Financial report information; application; funding 
procedure.  (1)  CONTENTS OF REPORT. . . . [E]ach 
registrant under s. 11.05 shall make full reports, 
upon a form prescribed by the board and signed by the 
appropriate 
individual 
under 
sub. 
(5), 
of 
all 
contributions received, contributions or disbursements 
made, and obligations incurred.  Each report shall 
contain the following information . . . : 
 
 
(a)  An itemized statement giving the date, full 
name and street address of each contributor who has 
made a contribution in excess of $20 . . . .   
 
7 Wis. Stat. § 11.20 provides: 
Filing requirements.  (1)  All reports required by s. 
11.06 which relate to activities which promote or 
oppose candidates for state office . . . shall be 
filed with the board. . . . 
 
(2)  Preprimary and preelection reports under s. 
11.06(1) shall be received by the appropriate filing 
officer no earlier than 14 days and no later than 8 
days preceding the primary and the election.  
  
No. 
98-0596 
 
8 
referendum, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 11.38(1).8  The Board 
sought per diem civil forfeitures as provided in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 11.60 and 11.38(4), costs, and an injunction requiring WMC to 
comply with the applicable statutory provisions.  
¶10 WMC moved to dismiss the Board's complaint for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On January 
16, 1998, the Dane County Circuit Court, Judge Sarah B. O'Brien 
presiding, granted WMC's motion.  In a 29-page decision, the 
court determined that the Board could adopt a definition of 
express advocacy other than the one set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per 
curiam), as long as that definition met the requirements of the 
First 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  According to the court, the standard for express 
advocacy urged by the Board was a case-by-case determination 
based on the five-factor test of Crawford v. Whittow, 123 
Wis. 2d 174, 183, 366 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1985),9 and could not 
                     
8 Wis. Stat. § 11.38 provides: 
Contributions and disbursements by corporations and 
cooperatives.  (1)  (a)  1.  No foreign or domestic 
corporation . . . may make any contribution or 
disbursement, 
directly 
or 
indirectly, 
either 
independently 
or 
through 
any 
political 
party, 
committee, group, candidate or individual for any 
purpose other than to promote or defeat a referendum . 
. . .   
 
9 In Crawford v. Whittow, 123 Wis. 2d 174, 183, 366 N.W.2d 
155 (Ct. App. 1985), the court of appeals adopted the Board's 
five-factor test for determining whether an act was for 
"political purposes" under Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16).  The court 
stated that the following factors should be considered:  "(1) 
the distributor's intentions as to political office; (2) the 
content of the materials; (3) the manner of distribution; (4) 
the pattern and frequency of distribution; and (5) the value of 
the distributed materials."  Crawford, 123 Wis. 2d at 183.    
No. 
98-0596 
 
9 
fairly be applied to WMC because the Board had not previously 
published or formally adopted it.  Further, the court reasoned, 
the Board's standard was unconstitutionally vague and was not 
sufficiently narrow to serve compelling governmental interests. 
 Based on its conclusions, the court dismissed the Board's 
complaint with prejudice. 
II.  
¶11 We apply a de novo standard when reviewing a circuit 
court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.  
Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 378, 572 N.W.2d 855 
(1998); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 
(1987).  In our review, we must accept as true all facts in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from 
them.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 512.  See Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 
378.  Dismissal is proper only when it is clear that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any facts which 
could be proved.  Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 378; Watts, 137 
Wis. 2d at 512; Crawford, 123 Wis. 2d at 178.  
¶12 In its complaint, the Board alleges that WMC is 
subject to regulation because its ads had the "political purpose 
of expressly advocating the defeat" or re-election of the 
featured legislators.  Under Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16)(a)1, "[t]he 
making 
of 
a 
communication 
which 
expressly 
advocates 
the 
election, defeat, recall or retention of a clearly identified 
candidate . . ." is an act for "political purposes."  A payment 
made for "political purposes" may qualify as a "contribution" 
No. 
98-0596 
 
10
under § 11.01(6)(a)1 or a "disbursement" under § 11.01(7)(a)1.10 
 It is the respondents’ contributions and/or disbursements that 
the Board asserts triggered the sections of ch. 11 allegedly 
violated by WMC.  Accordingly, whether the Board's complaint has 
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted would seem to 
depend upon whether WMC's advertisements constitute express 
advocacy as provided in § 11.01(16)(a)1. 
¶13 Statutory interpretation is a question of law which 
this court reviews de novo, although we are benefited in this 
case by the analysis of the circuit court.  See Peters v. 
Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 184, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999); 
Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 579 N.W.2d 715 
(1998).  The main goal of statutory interpretation is to 
determine the legislature’s intent.  Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 663; 
UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  
Our first step is to examine the plain language of the statute. 
 Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 184; Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 663.  If the 
language is susceptible to only one meaning, we adopt that 
meaning and our analysis ends.  Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 663; UFE, 
201 Wis. 2d at 281-82.  If, on the other hand, reasonable minds 
could interpret the statutory language to mean more than one 
thing, the statute is ambiguous and we look to other sources to 
                     
10 “Disbursement” is defined by Wis. Stat. § 11.01(7)(a)1 to 
mean 
“[a] 
purchase, payment, distribution, 
loan, advance, 
deposit or gift of money or anything of value . . . made for 
political 
purposes.”  
Similarly, 
§ 11.01(6)(a)1 
defines a 
“contribution” as “[a] gift, subscription, loan, advance, or 
deposit of money or any thing of value . . . made for political 
purposes . . . .” Section 11.01(6)(a)4 states that “[a] transfer 
of funds between candidates, committees, individuals or groups 
subject to a filing requirement under this chapter” is also a 
“contribution.”      
No. 
98-0596 
 
11
decipher the legislature's intended meaning.  Peters, 224 
Wis. 2d at 184-85.   
¶14 Express advocacy is not defined in the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  The meaning of the term has not been clarified in any 
published Wisconsin case, and the Board has not published a 
definition of express advocacy.11  We turn, therefore, to other 
sources for aid in interpreting the term.  
¶15 The express advocacy language was added to Wis. Stat. 
ch. 11 after the United States Supreme Court handed down its 
                     
11 The Board's corresponding administrative regulation, like 
Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16)(a)1, refers to express advocacy without 
defining it.  Wis. Admin. Code ElBd § 1.28 (Apr., 1998) provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) Definitions.  As used in this rule: 
. . . 
 
 
(b) "Contributions for political purposes" means 
contributions made to 1) a candidate, or 2) a 
political committee or 3) an individual who . . . 
makes disbursements for the purpose of expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of an identified 
candidate. 
 
 
(2) Individuals 
other 
than 
candidates 
and 
committees other than political committees are subject 
to 
the 
applicable 
disclosure-related 
and 
recordkeeping-related requirements of ch. 11, Stats., 
only when they: 
 
 
(a) Make contributions for political purposes, 
or  
 
. . . 
 
 
(c) Make 
expenditures 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of an 
identified candidate.    
 
No. 
98-0596 
 
12
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).12  
See § 27, ch. 328, Laws of 1979.  In Buckley, the Court 
discussed the constitutionality of several provisions of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA").13  Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 6.  The Court emphasized that protection of political 
speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment, stating,  
"Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of 
government established by our Constitution.  The First Amendment 
affords the broadest protection to such political expression. . 
. ."14  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.   
                     
12 Similarly, Wis. Admin. Code ElBd § 1.28 (Apr., 1998) was 
created by an emergency rule promulgated after Buckley.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code ElBd § 1.28 (Jan., 1977).  See also 65 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 145, 152, 154 (1976) (advising the Board to enact 
emergency rules adopting a narrow interpretation, consistent 
with Buckley, of the political activity regulated by certain 
sections of Wis. Stat. ch. 11).     
13 The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per 
curiam) actually considered the FECA as amended in 1974.  See 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6 n.1.  The relevant portions of the FECA 
are set forth in the Appendix to the Buckley opinion.  See 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 144-235.  
14 The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The First 
Amendment 
applies 
to 
the 
states 
through 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 
336 n.1 (1995). 
Free speech is also guaranteed by Art. I, § 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which provides, "Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects . . . 
and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty 
of speech or of the press."  Art. I, § 4 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution addresses free association:  "The right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common good, 
and to petition the government, or any department thereof, shall 
never be abridged."   
No. 
98-0596 
 
13
¶16 The 
Court 
explained 
in 
Buckley 
that 
the 
First 
Amendment right of association is closely related to the right 
of free speech.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.  "[E]ffective advocacy 
of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial 
ones, 
is 
undeniably 
enhanced 
by 
group 
association."  Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 
(1958)).  The right to associate includes the right to band 
together for the purposes of advocating political ideas or 
beliefs.  See id. at 15, 22.  See also FEC v. National 
Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 494 
(1985) [hereinafter NCPAC].      
¶17 Based on these principles, the Court held in Buckley 
that it could avoid invalidating two provisions of the FECA, the 
expenditure 
limit 
in 
§ 608(e)(1)15 
and 
the 
disclosure 
requirements of § 434(e),16 on grounds of vagueness only if it 
limited their reach to funds paid for political communications 
that constituted express advocacy.  Id. at 44, 80.  More 
precisely, the Buckley court held that §§ 434(e) and 608(e)(1) 
could only be constitutionally applied to regulate payments "for 
communications that in express terms advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office."  
Id. at 44.  In discussing § 608(e)(1), the Court observed: 
                     
15 Section 608(e)(1) limited expenditures "relative to a 
clearly identified candidate" to $1,000 per year.  Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 39 (quoting § 608(e)(1)).    
16 Section 434(e) required an individual or group (other 
than a political committee or candidate) that made more than 
$100 in contributions or expenditures in one year "'for the 
purpose of . . . influencing' the nomination or election of 
candidates for federal office" to file a statement disclosing 
the amount contributed or spent.  Id. at 77 (quoting § 434(e)). 
   
No. 
98-0596 
 
14
 
[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and 
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of 
candidates 
may 
often 
dissolve 
in 
practical 
application.  Candidates, especially incumbents, are 
intimately tied to public issues involving legislative 
proposals and governmental actions. 
Id. at 42.  Therefore, to “clearly mark the boundary between 
permissible and impermissible speech,” id. at 41, the scope of 
political activity regulated by § 608(e)(1) must be “limited to 
communications that include explicit words of advocacy of 
election or defeat of a candidate,” the Court held.  Id. at 43.  
¶18 Later in the opinion, the Court determined that the 
§ 434(e) disclosure requirement "shares the same potential for 
encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political 
result" as the expenditure limit in § 608(e)(1).  Id. at 79.  
The Court explained that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can 
seriously 
infringe 
on 
privacy 
of 
association 
and 
belief 
guaranteed by the First Amendment."  Id. at 64.  Accordingly, 
the Court stated: 
 
To 
insure 
that 
the 
reach 
of 
§ 434(e) 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, we construe "expenditure" for 
purposes of that section in the same way we construed 
the terms of § 608(e)to reach only funds used for 
communications that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.  This 
reading is directed precisely to that spending that is 
unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular 
federal candidate. 
 
. . .  
 
As narrowed, § 434(e), like § 608(e)(1), does not 
reach all partisan discussion for it only requires 
disclosure 
of 
these 
expenditures 
that 
expressly 
advocate a particular election result. 
Id. at 80 (footnote omitted).   
No. 
98-0596 
 
15
¶19 In footnotes, the Court elaborated on the meaning of 
its construction of §§ 434(e) and 608(e)(1) as applying only to 
speech which "expressly advocate[s] the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate."  Id.  In footnote 52, the Court 
stated that such a construction "would restrict the application 
of § 608(e)(1) to communications containing express words of 
advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 
'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote 
against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.'"  Id. at 44 n.52.  Following its 
discussion of the express advocacy standard as applied to 
§ 434(e), the Court included a footnote referring back to 
footnote 52.  See id. at 80 n.108.  
¶20 Although the United States Supreme Court has cited 
Buckley in several cases, our research discloses only one in 
which the Court applied the Buckley express advocacy standard:  
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 
(1986) [hereinafter MCFL].17  Massachusetts Citizens for Life 
(MCFL) had distributed a newsletter entitled, "Special Edition," 
and stating in bold-faced type, "EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO 
VOTE PRO-LIFE," "VOTE PRO-LIFE," and "No pro-life candidate can 
win in November without your vote in September."  MCFL, 479 U.S. 
                     
17 The United States Supreme Court recently considered the 
constitutionality of a FECA expenditures provision, but none of 
 the opinions delivered by the fractured Court addressed the 
application of Buckley’s express advocacy standard.  See 
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 
(1996).  We note that the Court has granted certiorari but has 
not yet heard argument in a case in which the Eighth Circuit 
court of appeals held that Missouri’s campaign contribution 
limits violate the First Amendment.  See Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. 
Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. 
Ct. 901 (1999).  
No. 
98-0596 
 
16
at 243 (emphasis in original).  Also printed on the newsletter 
were the names and photographs of 13 candidates in the upcoming 
state and federal elections which had voting records consistent 
with MCFL's position on certain issues.  Id. at 243-44.  The 
newsletter contained a coupon listing the names of the "pro-
life" candidates, to be detached and taken to the polls by 
readers, as well as a disclaimer stating that "[t]his special 
election edition does not represent an endorsement of any 
particular candidate."  Id. at 243.  
¶21 The issue in MCFL was whether, by distributing the 
newsletter, MCFL had violated § 441b of the FECA,  which 
prohibits 
corporations 
from 
using 
treasury 
funds 
for 
expenditures "in connection with" federal elections.  Id. at 
241.  The Court determined that, under Buckley, § 441b would be 
overbroad unless the term "expenditure" in § 441b were construed 
as applying only to express advocacy.  Id. at 248-49.  Utilizing 
this narrowing construction, the Court held that MCFL was in 
violation of § 441b because its newsletter constituted express 
advocacy.  Id. at 249-51.  In reaching this holding, the Court 
interpreted Buckley as follows: 
 
Buckley adopted the "express advocacy" requirement to 
distinguish discussion of issues and candidates from 
more pointed exhortations to vote for particular 
persons.  We therefore concluded in that case that a 
finding of "express advocacy" depended upon the use of 
language such as "vote for," "elect," "support," etc., 
Buckley, supra, at 44, n.52.   
 
Id. at 249.  The Court then applied the Buckley standard to 
MCFL’s newsletter: 
 
Just such an exhortation appears in the "Special 
Edition."  The publication not only urges voters to 
No. 
98-0596 
 
17
vote for "pro-life" candidates, but also identifies 
and 
provides 
photographs 
of 
specific 
candidates 
fitting that description.  The Edition cannot be 
regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by 
their nature raise the names of certain politicians.  
Rather, it provides in effect an explicit directive:  
vote for these (named) candidates.  The fact that this 
message is marginally less direct than "Vote for 
Smith" does not change its essential nature.  The 
Edition goes 
beyond 
issue discussion 
to 
express 
electoral advocacy.  The disclaimer of endorsement 
cannot negate this fact.  
Id.  The Court concluded that MCFL’s newsletter constituted 
express advocacy within the purview of § 441b.  Id. at 249-50. 
¶22 As stated previously, Buckley and MCFL comprise the 
entire volume of cases in which the United States Supreme Court 
has applied the express advocacy standard.  We do not read 
Buckley and MCFL as requiring that a communication contain any 
specific "magic words" in order to constitute express advocacy. 
 The words listed in footnote 52 of Buckley are merely examples 
of words which undoubtedly constitute "express words of advocacy 
of election or defeat," as evidenced by the Court's use of the 
phrase "such as" immediately preceding the list of words.  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.  Consistent with Buckley, when the 
Court summarized footnote 52 of Buckley in MCFL, it again 
introduced the words with the phrase "such as."  MCFL, 479 U.S. 
at 249.  The Court in MCFL also suggested that the list of words 
in Buckley's footnote 52 was exemplary, not exhaustive, when it 
stated, "The fact that this message [in the newsletter] is 
marginally less direct than "Vote for Smith" does not change its 
essential nature."  Id.  "Vote for" was one of the phrases used 
in footnote 52.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. 
¶23 Further, it would be absurd to hold that those 
particular "magic words" of advocacy which the Buckley Court 
No. 
98-0596 
 
18
chose to mention in footnote 52 qualify as express advocacy 
while other, equally explicit words of advocacy do not.  We can 
think of no reason to adopt an approach which would regulate an 
ad which said, "Defeat Smith," but not an ad which said, "Unseat 
Smith."  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.  Consistent with the 
well-established rule that we should avoid absurd results when 
interpreting a statute, see Campenni v. Walrath, 180 Wis. 2d 
548, 560, 509 N.W.2d 725 (1994), we hold that no particular 
"magic words" are necessary for a communication to constitute 
express advocacy.   
¶24 In our view, Buckley stands for the proposition that 
it 
is 
unconstitutional 
to 
place 
reporting 
or 
disclosure 
requirements on communications which do not "expressly advocate 
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.  Any standard of express advocacy must 
be consistent with this principle in order to avoid invalidation 
on grounds of vagueness and/or overbreadth.  See MCFL, 479 U.S. 
at 248-49; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 80.  We are satisfied that 
for a political communication or advertisement to constitute 
express advocacy under Buckley and MCFL, it must contain 
explicit language advocating the election or defeat of a 
candidate who is clearly identified.18  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 
                     
18 It has been argued that language used by the United 
States Supreme Court in MCFL suggests that contextual factors 
are relevant in identifying express advocacy.  In MCFL, the 
Court stated that a newsletter was express advocacy because it 
"in effect" instructed readers to vote for certain candidates.  
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249.  In addition, the Court commented that 
the "essential nature" of the language is not changed even 
though it "is marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith.'"  
Id.   
No. 
98-0596 
 
19
249-50; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43, 44 & n.52, 80 & n.108.  The 
explicit terms used need not have been chosen from a specific 
list of "magic words."  
¶25 As stated previously, there is no Wisconsin case, 
statute, or regulation clarifying the meaning of the term 
express advocacy as used in Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16)(a)1.  Buckley 
and MCFL constitute the only authority which binds Wisconsin 
courts on the subject.19  It follows, then, that if WMC's 
advertisements contained explicit words "advocating the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate," the ads would be 
express advocacy subject to ch. 11 regulation, pursuant to the 
rule of Buckley and MCFL. 
¶26 However, 
the 
Board 
does 
not 
assert 
that 
WMC's 
advertisements include any "magic words.”  Likewise, the Board 
                                                                  
The FEC made this argument in Maine Right to Life Committee 
v. FEC and the court in that case rejected it. See Maine Right 
to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 11 n.2 (D. Me. 1996), 
aff’d per curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 52 (1997).  The court recognized that the presence of 
express terms of advocacy in MCFL’s newsletter, such as “vote 
for,” undermined the contention that MCFL “loosened the Buckley 
requirement.”  Id.  The Court in MCFL did not discuss any 
particular contextual factors in holding that the newsletter was 
express advocacy.  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249-50.  Also of 
significance is the Court’s indication in another case that 
timing the political advocacy of a “no” vote on a controversial 
referendum to occur “in the heat” of the vote “only strengthens 
the protection afforded” by the First Amendment to the advocacy. 
 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.   
19 On federal questions, this court is bound only by the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  Thompson v. 
Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 307, 340 N.W.2d 704 
(1983) (citing United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 
1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970)).  The value of the opinions of 
federal courts of appeals and district courts is limited to 
their persuasiveness.  See id. 
No. 
98-0596 
 
20
does not point to any specific words or phrases in the 
advertisements which might qualify as explicit words which 
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate.20  To get around this, the Board urges us to find that 
WMC's advertisements are express advocacy based upon the context 
in which they were broadcast.  The Board argues that we should 
evaluate communications on a case-by-case basis, labeling a 
communication express advocacy whenever its context suggests 
that it is "unambiguously related to the campaign of a 
particular . . . candidate."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.  Among 
the factors the Board contends that we should consider are the 
proximity in time of the communication to an election, the 
underlying intent of the communication, the effect of the 
communication, 
the 
audience, 
and 
the 
proximity 
of 
the 
geographical area in which the communication is disseminated to 
the voting district of the featured candidate.21  
                     
20 Unlike the newsletter in MCFL, the advertisements in this 
case contain no explicit references to an election, no express 
language suggesting that viewers or listeners should vote in a 
particular 
way, 
and 
no 
wording 
identifying 
the 
featured 
incumbent legislators as candidates in the November election.  
See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243.  We point out this distinction only 
for purposes of clarifying the basis of the Board's argument.  
For the reasons made clear in the text, we do not find it 
necessary to determine whether WMC's advertisements qualify as 
express advocacy.      
21 Despite the position to the contrary taken by the 
dissent, it appears to us to be beyond dispute that the central 
premise of the Board's position was that this court should adopt 
a context-based definition of express advocacy.  One need only 
glance at the following examples from the Board's briefs in 
order to grasp the Board's clear argument in favor of a standard 
based on context: 
 
Not only must the analysis include the character and 
unambiguity of the words, but the context within which 
No. 
98-0596 
 
21
                                                                  
the words are spoken.  Justice Holmes noted in his 
opinion in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919), that "the character of every act depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is done."  Schenck, 249 
U.S. at 52.  In Schenck the court did not ignore the 
fact that "in many places and in ordinary times" the 
defendants' circulating pamphlets which argued against 
conscription in the United States Army during the 
first World War and urged the readers to assert their 
rights under the Constitution and told them "[y]ou 
must do your share to maintain, support and uphold the 
rights of the people of this country" would have been 
within their constitutional rights.  Id.   
 
The court's earlier decisions on First Amendment 
speech issues, and the Buckley decision itself, affirm 
what every speaker or listener knows:  the meaning of 
speech 
cannot 
be 
determined 
without 
at 
least 
considering its immediate context, e.g., whether the 
theater was empty or crowded when the speaker yelled 
"fire."  See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.   
 
Board's Br. at 15-16. 
The state submits, however, that it is permissible in 
this case, as with other First Amendment standards, to 
look at the context in which the speech was made.  
Looking at context does not mean changing the standard 
to a subjective standard or inappropriately examining 
intentions 
or 
motives 
as 
respondents 
suggest.  
(Respondents' brief at 23-24.)  Context is time, place 
and audience and is often relevant in examining First 
Amendment speech.    
 
Board's Reply at 7.  
This court should consider context by examining the 
effect particular speech has on its audience given the 
particular time and place.   
 
Consideration of the context of speech is acceptable 
in other First Amendment venues.  The doctrines of 
subversive speech, "fighting words[,"] libel, and 
speech in the workplace and in public fora illustrate 
that when and where speech takes place can determine 
its legal significance.  In these instances, context 
is one of the crucial factors making these kinds of 
speech regulatable [sic].  First Amendment doctrine 
has long recognized that words take part of their 
No. 
98-0596 
 
22
                                                                  
meaning and effect from the environment in which they 
are spoken.  See Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 863. 
 
While the Furgatch court concluded that the weight 
given to the context of speech may be lessened when 
the constitutional standard is express advocacy, it 
recognized that context is relevant to a determination 
of express advocacy.  
 
Board's Reply at 8.  At oral argument, the Board shifted its 
position slightly, but continued to argue for a context-oriented 
standard of express advocacy: 
There is nothing in the U.S. Supreme Court that says 
express advocacy is the opposite of implied advocacy 
or express advocacy is the opposite of an issue ad.  
What we have to do is read these ads as a whole, look 
at their essential nature, look at their entire 
content, and decide whether they unambiguously relate 
to the campaign of a particular candidate. . . . 
 
I don't think there's any authority that prevents us 
from looking at context; in fact, on the contrary, 
there's a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases that 
suggests what every school child knows:  whether you 
say "fire" in an empty theater or a crowded theater 
makes a significant difference.  If we make a very 
limited reference to context in this case, and I 
submit time, place, and audience is the context, then 
it clearly affirms ourourthe clear answer that 
these are express advocacy ads.  The ads were aired 
shortly before the election, they were aired in a 
geographical area in which each of the targeted 
candidates were running and they were aired to an 
audience of voters who were about to vote for those 
candidates. . . .   
 
I think in determining whether an ad is unambiguously 
related to a campaign, a court may make a limited 
consideration of time, place and audience.  I am not 
suggesting to you that context is a replacement for 
the Buckley standard . . . . 
 
I would say the standard is what the Buckley court 
stated, that it is spending that is unambiguously 
related to the campaign of a particular federal 
candidate.  I would then go on to say that in 
determiningmaking that determination, certain factors 
No. 
98-0596 
 
23
¶27 It may well be appropriate to consider context in 
determining 
whether 
a 
communication 
constitutes 
express 
advocacy.  It should be remembered that Buckley developed its 
definition of express advocacy while interpreting a specific 
federal statute.  In FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 
                                                                  
can be considered, and I would draw from the language 
of the MCFL case and the Furgatch decision. . . . 
 
During oral argument in this court, Justice Bradley, the 
author of the dissent, characterized the Board's argument as one 
requiring a review of the context of each individual ad.  
Justice Bradley commented to counsel for the Board: 
There's something to be said about bright-line tests 
if we're dealing with large numbervolumes.  People 
have to have notice of what's expected in order to 
proceed.  Your proposal talks about, "Let's look at 
the essential nature of each individual ad and review 
it in the context."  Well, you know, that's one of 
those things that, after the fact, you might know if 
you've made ahave a problem earlier on.  What kind of 
definition or contour are you proposing that is akin 
to a bright line so that people can have notice of 
what's expected and not expected, rather than, "Let's 
take a look at each one individually?"  
 
(Emphasis added).  Counsel for the Board replied, "I understand 
your question and much is to be said for a bright-line test in 
that it's more convenientit's simpler, it's easier to follow.  
I submit to you that there are other constitutional standards 
such as obscenity and minimum contacts that are not precisely 
defined, that we are often in constitutional law asking courts 
to interpret, we are asking courts to exercise judgment, and I 
think that is precisely why the U.S. Supreme Court put the 
examples in a footnote . . . ."   
We also note that the circuit court determined that the 
Board was attempting to apply the five-factor Crawford test for 
"political purpose" in this case.  The Board claims in its brief 
in this court that it never argued that the five Crawford 
criteria should be used in determining whether the ads were 
express advocacy.  In any event, we are thoroughly satisfied 
that in this court, the Board argued in favor of a context-based 
standard unrelated to the five-factor test of Crawford.  See 
Crawford, 123 Wis. 2d at 183.       
No. 
98-0596 
 
24
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987), the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a broader definition of express advocacy when it held 
that context is relevant in determining whether a political 
communication is express advocacy.  The Furgatch court took the 
following approach, which presents an attractive alternative: 
 
We conclude that speech need not include any of the 
words listed in Buckley to be express advocacy under 
the Act, but it must, when read as a whole, and with 
limited reference to external events, be susceptible 
to no other reasonable interpretation but as an 
exhortation 
to 
vote 
for 
or 
against 
a 
specific 
candidate. 
 
Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864.  The court explained that under this 
standard, the message of the speech must be "unmistakable and 
unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning," it must 
"present[] a clear plea for action," and it "must be clear what 
action is advocated."  Id.  Context remains an “ancillary” 
consideration, the court stated, one “peripheral to the words 
themselves.”  Id. at 863.  The court specifically relied on the 
timing of an advertisement (within one week of the election) in 
concluding that the ad was express advocacy.  Id. at 865.  
¶28 It should be noted, however, that Furgatch makes no 
mention of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in MCFL, 
even though MCFL preceded Furgatch by nearly one month.  See FEC 
v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1053 n.4 (4th 
Cir. 1997).  It is also significant that at least two courts 
have held that an FEC regulation adopting the context-based rule 
No. 
98-0596 
 
25
of Furgatch is an invalid attempt to regulate issue advocacy.22  
See Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 
248, 249-50, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Maine Right to Life Comm. 
v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d per curiam, 98 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997).  Other 
courts have rejected similar attempts to broaden the definition 
of express advocacy.  See, e.g., Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 
471-72 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 820 (1991); FEC v. 
Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 
53 (2nd Cir. 1980)(en banc); FEC v. Christian Action Network, 894 
F. Supp. 946, 958 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff’d per curiam, 92 F.3d 
1178 (4th Cir. 1996).   
¶29 Regardless of whether it might be permissible to 
consider context in defining express advocacy, we conclude, for 
the reasons which follow, that WMC had insufficient warning 
before broadcasting its advertisements that a context-based 
standard could be used to determine that the ads were express 
advocacy which would subject WMC to regulation under the Wis. 
Stat. ch. 11 provisions at issue. 
¶30 "Because we assume that [persons are] free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give 
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
                     
22 Courts 
have 
deemed 
it 
"obvious" 
that 
11 
C.F.R. 
§ 100.22(b) "comes directly from" the language of FEC v. 
Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 850 (1987).  Maine Right to Life Comm., 914 F. Supp. at 11. 
 See also Kansans for Life, Inc. v. Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d 928, 
937 (D. Kan. 1999).  The FEC regulations provide that a 
communication is express advocacy if it either meets the 
Furgatch-based test of § 100.22(b) or contains explicit language 
of advocacy.  See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1999).   
No. 
98-0596 
 
26
know what is prohibited, so that he [or she] may act 
accordingly."  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 
(1972).  Such notice is a basic requirement of due process.  
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.  When First Amendment interests are 
implicated by laws which may result in criminal penalties,23 
imprecise standards "may not only 'trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning' or foster 'arbitrary and discriminatory 
application' but also operate to inhibit protected expression by 
inducing 'citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . 
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked.'"  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting Grayned, 408 
U.S. at 108-109).  See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 
372 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).  
"Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to 
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow 
specificity."  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (quoting NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
¶31 The Board’s attempt to apply a context-based standard 
to the ads involved in this case amounts to an after-the-fact 
effort to create a standard of express advocacy which is broader 
                     
23 Criminal penalties may result from intentional violations 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 11, although the Board did not opt to seek 
such penalties in this case.  See Wis. Stat. § 11.61(1).  
No. 
98-0596 
 
27
than the standard existing in Wisconsin when WMC ran its ads.24 
Unlike the Board, the FEC has promulgated and published its 
interpretation of the statutory term express advocacy, which 
includes a context-based test, as an administrative rule.25  By 
                     
24 We find it interesting that the Board's Executive 
Director did not apply a context-based standard in evaluating 
transcripts of WMC's ads prior to their broadcast.  In response 
to a request by counsel for IMC, the Executive Director, in an 
October 2, 1996, letter, stated unequivocally, "It is the 
opinion of the Elections Board staff that these communications 
are not subject to regulation under Wisconsin's campaign 
disclosure law."  Respondents’ App. at 50; R. 15 at 4.  The 
Executive Director’s opinion followed a detailed analysis of the 
wording of the advertisements, with no consideration of context-
oriented factors.  The letter only briefly mentioned that "[t]he 
timing of the broadcast of the ads, in the midst of a political 
campaign, could raise the suggestion that these are essentially 
candidate advocacy ads."  Id.   
The circuit court apparently opted to treat WMC's motion as 
a straight motion to dismiss rather than a motion for summary 
judgment, and therefore, did not consider this letter.  The 
letter was referred to by counsel in briefs and oral argument in 
this court.  We mention it only as background material.   
25  The FEC rule provides:  
§ 100.22 Expressly advocating (2 U.S.C. 431 (17)). 
 
Expressly advocating means any communication that-- 
 
(a) Uses phrases such as "vote for the President," 
"re-elect your Congressman," "support the Democratic 
nominee," 
"cast 
your 
ballot 
for 
the 
Republican 
challenger for U.S. Senate in Georgia," "Smith for 
Congress," "Bill McKay in '94," "vote Pro-Life" or 
"vote Pro-Choice" accompanied by a listing of clearly 
identified candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-
Choice, 
"vote 
against 
Old 
Hickory," 
"defeat" 
accompanied by a picture of one or more candidate(s), 
"reject the incumbent," or communications of campaign 
slogan(s) or individual word(s), which in context can 
have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the 
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified 
candidate(s), 
such 
as 
posters, 
bumper 
stickers, 
advertisements, etc. which say "Nixon's the One," 
"Carter '76," "Reagan/Bush" or "Mondale!"; or 
No. 
98-0596 
 
28
creating and attempting to apply its new, context-oriented 
interpretation of the statutory term express advocacy, the Board 
has, in effect, engaged in retroactive rule-making.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 227.01(13), 227.10(1); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 
U.S. 
204, 
208-09 
(1988) 
(stating, 
"Even 
where 
some 
substantial 
justification 
for 
retroactive 
rulemaking 
is 
presented, courts should be reluctant to find such authority 
absent an express statutory grant").  See also Schoolway Transp. 
Co. v. DMV, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 236-37, 240 N.W.2d 403 (1976); 
Frankenthal v. Wisconsin R.E. Brokers' Bd., 3 Wis. 2d 249, 253-
                                                                  
 
(b) When taken as a whole and with limited reference 
to external events, such as the proximity to the 
election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable 
person as containing advocacy of the election or 
defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s) 
because-- 
 
(1) The electoral portion of the communication is 
unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one 
meaning; and  
 
(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether 
it encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more 
clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages some 
other kind of action. 
  
 
11 C.F.R. § 100.22.  The Wisconsin Elections Board has 
never promulgated any comparable rule setting forth its 
interpretation of "express advocacy" as that term is used 
in the Wisconsin Statutes.  As stated in footnote 10 of 
this opinion, Wis. Admin. Code ElBd § 1.28 (Apr., 1998), 
refers to express advocacy but does not attempt, in any 
way, to define it. 
 
 
As we noted earlier (see footnote 22), the language of 
11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) comes from the language of FEC v. 
Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 850 (1987).  Subsection (a) of that same 
regulation is clearly from Buckley.  See, Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 80 n.52. 
No. 
98-0596 
 
29
54, 88 N.W.2d 352 (1958), on motion for reh'g, 3 Wis. 2d 257a, 
257b-257c, 89 N.W.2d 825 (1958).  We agree with the circuit 
court that it would be "profoundly unfair to apply a previously 
unarticulated 
test, 
retroactively, 
to 
these 
defendants."  
Decision and Order at 25. 
¶32 The United States Supreme Court has held that a 
deprivation of the due process right of fair warning can occur 
not 
only 
from 
vague 
statutory 
language, 
but 
also 
from 
unforeseeable and retroactive interpretation of that statutory 
language.  See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352, 355 
(1964).  The Court indicated that a due process violation 
resulting from retroactive interpretation of statutory language 
is actually worse than a vague statute because it "lulls the 
potential defendant into a false sense of security, giving him 
no reason even to suspect" that he might be subject to the 
statutory prohibition.  Id. at 352.   
¶33 Further, we decline the Board's invitation to craft a 
new standard of express advocacy for the state of Wisconsin.  
The creation of such a standard is properly the role of the 
No. 
98-0596 
 
30
legislature and the Board, not this court.26  See Wagner Mobil, 
Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 585, 594 n.4, 527 N.W.2d 
301 (1995)(recognizing the well-established principle that the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
requires 
“the 
separation 
of 
the 
legislative and judicial powers.”)  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.05(1)(f).  The level of regulation desirable in this area 
depends upon public policy considerations more appropriately 
explored in a forum other than this court.  We have described 
our role in areas “peppered with political perceptions and 
emotionally laden views,” as one restricted to interpreting the 
scope of constitutional requirements.  Kukor v. Grover, 148 
Wis. 2d 469, 504-505, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).  
¶34 We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, 
WMC, when it broadcast its advertisements, had insufficient 
warning that the ads could qualify as express advocacy under 
Wisconsin's campaign finance law.  The Board’s after-the-fact 
attempt to apply a context-oriented standard of express advocacy 
                     
26 The dissent argues that Buckley obligates this court to 
supply a definition for the term "express advocacy" in Wis. 
Stat. § 11.01(16)(a)1 to save the statute from invalidation on 
grounds of vagueness.  This argument misinterprets the question 
before us.  We are not faced with the question of whether the 
language 
concerning 
express 
advocacy 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.01(16)(a)1 and  Wis. Admin. Code ElBd § 1.28 (Apr., 1998) 
is unconstitutionally vague.  These statutory and code sections 
parrot the language used in Buckley.  As we have already 
explained, express advocacy has been defined in both Buckley and 
MCFL.  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 & 
n.52, 80 & n.108.  In contrast, the problem in this case is that 
the Board is attempting to retrospectively apply to the 
respondents a context-oriented standard of express advocacy 
which has heretofore been unknown in Wisconsin law.  We are 
under no obligation to adopt such a standard, where the lack of 
fair warning and, in effect, retroactive rulemaking amount to a 
violation of due process, and are determinative of the issue 
presented.        
No. 
98-0596 
 
31
must fail, since, in effect, it was an unfair attempt27 at 
retroactive rule-making, without any express statutory grant of 
authority, and thus, a violation of due process.  Because this 
conclusion prevents the Board from prevailing in this action 
under any factual conditions, we affirm the circuit court's 
dismissal of the Board's complaint. 
III. 
¶35 Based on our conclusion that the Board may not 
regulate WMC under the campaign finance laws in ch. 11 on the 
basis of the retrospective application of a context-based 
standard of express advocacy, we affirm the circuit court's 
dismissal of the Board's complaint.  We stress that this holding 
places no restraints on the ability of the legislature and the 
Board to define further a constitutional standard of express 
advocacy to be prospectively applied.  We encourage them to do 
so, as we are well aware of the types of compelling state 
interests which may justify some very limited restrictions on 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  See Gard v. State 
Elections Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 28, 36, 51-52, 65, 456 N.W.2d 809 
(1990), 
cert. 
denied, 
498 
U.S. 
982 
(1990) 
(upholding 
a 
contribution limit which was found by this court to be narrowly 
tailored to serve the compelling state interest in preventing 
actual or apparent corruption of the political process).  See 
also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-
60 (1990); NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; FEC v. National Right to 
                     
27 "[T]he concern of due process is fundamental fairness."  
State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 177 N.W.2d 
106 (1970).  See In re D.H., 76 Wis. 2d 286, 296-97, 251 N.W.2d 
196 (1977)(quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 
(1971)); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.   
No. 
98-0596 
 
32
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-208 (1982); First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978).  Consistent 
with this opinion, we note that any definition of express 
advocacy must comport with the requirements of Buckley and MCFL 
and may encompass more than the specific list of "magic words" 
in Buckley footnote 52, but must, however, be "limited to 
communications that include explicit words of advocacy of 
election or defeat of a candidate."28   
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
¶36 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
                     
28 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43.  The United States Supreme 
Court, as noted previously, required that the candidate must be 
"a clearly identified" one.  Id. at 80.  In regard to the 
requirement of explicit language, we are mindful that words in 
one context may take on different meaning in another.  We 
recognize that a number of courts have rejected a context-based 
approach, finding that it did not comport with the holdings in 
Buckley and MCFL.  (See footnote 18 and paragraph 28 herein.)  
No. 
98-0596 
 
33
 
No. 98-0596.wab 
 
1 
¶37 WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J. 
(concurring).   Nobody, 
including the Elections Board, is attempting to stop WMC from 
saying anything they want to say during the election season.  
What is at stake here is whether the public has a right to know 
who is paying for whatever it is WMC wants to say during the 
election season. 
¶38 The spin surrounding this case has been that the 
Elections Board is trying to stifle free speech.  Not true.  
It’s all about the public knowing who is saying what. 
¶39 An informed electorate is essential to a healthy 
democracy.  If people are told that a Ford is a great car, it is 
important for people to know whether Consumer Reports or Ford is 
saying so.  Similarly, if the electorate is being told that a 
candidate is a great friend of education, it is important for 
people to know whether the teachers union or Common Cause is 
saying so.  The answer to “Who paid?” answers a lot of 
questions. 
¶40 That is what is at stake here, and no amount of spin 
should be able to hide that fact. 
¶41 Having said the above, I join the majority opinion.  I 
agree that WMC should be dismissed from the case for lack of 
notice regarding what constitutes “express advocacy.”  I would 
have preferred that a majority could have found its way to 
expressing a standard by declaring that, in the future, ads such 
as these constitute “express advocacy.”  I would have joined 
that result.   
No. 98-0596.wab 
 
2 
¶42 Nevertheless, a half loaf in this instance is far 
better than no loaf at all.  The dissent presents a well 
reasoned and persuasive case as to why these ads constitute 
“express advocacy.”  Does the dissent express an acceptable 
standard?  For me, yes.  Are there the votes for it?  No.   
¶43 If I joined the dissent, the result would be a 3-3 
vote.  Guidance is needed and a tie vote does not provide 
guidance.  A tie vote results in no opinion and therefore no 
standard or guidance from this court on the very issue that 
needs resolution.  Because there is at present no appellate 
decision on the issue, we would have to remand to the court of 
appeals for their decision, then consider yet another appeal.  
Meanwhile, at least one or more election cycles would come and 
go.  Wisconsin would continue to have no standard as to what 
constitutes “express advocacy.”  The legislature and the 
Elections Board, as well as potential advocates such as the 
Wisconsin Manufacturers Association, would be left completely in 
the dark as to whether ads that do not contain any “magic words” 
can be regulated.  Drafters of a standard would not know whether 
they should even consider a context based approach.   
¶44 The majority opinion, despite the words of the 
dissent, does provide some needed guidance.  It does not provide 
No. 98-0596.wab 
 
3 
all the guidance the dissent wants, but in this instance some 
guidance is better than none.29   
¶45 By my joining the majority, the legislature or the 
elections board is now free to craft a standard for “express 
advocacy,” knowing that at the least there is no requirement for 
“magic words,” and 
that 
the court 
will 
consider 
as an 
alternative a context based approach.  I invite one or the other 
or both to craft a standard . . . posthaste.  
 
 
 
                     
29 I would have preferred a decision that more closely 
echoed the dissent in some respects, but that it is not to say 
that the majority opinion voices a decision with which I 
disagree.  It is of utmost importance to provide guidance in 
this case, which the majority does effectively, and does 
correctly.  That is why I join it.  It does not go as far as I 
would prefer, but most judges have joined opinions that go a bit 
farther or less far than we would like.  See Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See also Daniel A. Farber, et 
al., Constitutional Law: Themes from the Constitution’s Third 
Century 50-52 (1993); Leo Katcher, Earl Warren, A Political 
Biography (1967). 
Judicial decision-making necessarily involves a variety of 
choices.  Would that the best choice be always clear, but it is 
not.  Some choices may, at first blush, appear to be preferable, 
but, looked at it in the perspective of the whole, are not.  
That is what happened here.  I compromised.  Most appellate 
judges do.  Sometimes the best choice, for a variety of reasons, 
is not one’s first choice. 
Judicial opinions are filled with compromise, and we should 
not deny it.  As Benjamin Cardozo said, judges “do not stand 
aloof on chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the 
cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do.”   
No. 98-0596.wab 
 
4 
 
No. 98-0596.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶46 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (Concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).   The First Amendment is not what it used to be.  It 
is fashionable today to protect deviant speech30 and expressive 
conduct.31  But pure speech which discusses public issues and 
public officials is vulnerable to the impulse for government 
regulation.  While I join that part of the court's decision 
dismissing the suit against the respondents, I dissent from much 
in the majority opinion. 
¶47 Little is made of the fact that the respondents in 
this case went to the State Elections Board for guidance before 
broadcasting their ads.  Majority op. at 28, n.24.  Only after 
they received government acquiescence did they go forward.  
Thereafter, several circuit courts enjoined the broadcast of 
these pure speech ads while the ads were on the air.  Then the 
Elections Board reversed its position and tried to compel the 
filing of various reports. 
¶48 The present case is a new episode in this saga.  The 
majority opinion appears to encourage government rule-making to 
extend the boundaries of "express advocacy."  Rule-makers are 
encouraged to march through the quicksand of "context" en route 
to a more correct and perfect political order.  The dissent 
                     
30 See State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 589 N.W.2d 370 
(1999).  
31 See Lounge Management v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 
580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 580 
N.W.2d 260 (1998).  
No. 98-0596.dtp 
 
2 
can't wait for others to act; it wants the court to impose its 
own rules here and now.  Both opinions soar into pronouncements 
about speech regulation after a clear majority of this court 
decided that we have no viable case before us. 
¶49 Wisconsin Statutes regulating political expression 
must be very narrowly construed.  65 O.A.G. 145 (1976).  If the 
term "express advocacy" encompasses more than the magic words 
enumerated in footnote 52 of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 
(1976) (per curiam), the additional words and phrases should be 
explicitly disclosed.  Those words and phrases must advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate by urging 
citizens how to vote or directing them to take other specific 
action unambiguously related to an election. 
¶50 The First Amendment is inconsistent with rules that 
leave people in doubt whether their expression is regulated.  It 
does not countenance enforcement against speech on a case by 
case basis where government regulators are permitted to draw 
inferences from circumstances or guess about people's motives. 
¶51 It is probably ill-advised to make any comment about 
"express advocacy" in this case because it really amounts to an 
advisory opinion. 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
1 
 
¶52 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    (Dissenting).   The majority 
cannot have it both ways:  it cannot both uphold the law while 
at the same time decline to enforce it.  Either it must 
acknowledge and apply the standards already established by the 
only two United States Supreme Court cases that have addressed 
express advocacy or, if that standard is unclear, it must do the 
business of a court and articulate a constitutional standard.  
Because I believe that it should do the former, and in the end 
it dodges the issue accomplishing neither, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶53 At the outset I want to note my agreement with the 
majority.  Like the majority, I agree that no particular magic 
words are necessary for a communication to constitute express 
advocacy.  Majority op. at 18.  Like the majority, I agree that 
the contextual setting may assist in the consideration of 
whether an ad is express advocacy.  Id. at 2, 21-22.  Like the 
majority, I agree that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per 
curiam), and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986), constitute the only authority which 
binds Wisconsin courts on the issue.  Majority op. at 20.  The 
majority and I part company, however, when it declines to 
acknowledge and apply the already established definition of 
express advocacy. 
I. 
¶54 In dodging the issue and relegating the task of 
defining express advocacy to the legislature or Elections Board, 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
2 
the majority charts a solitary course.  It appears to be the 
only court in the nation that requires the legislature or 
administrative agency to take the lead in adding further 
definition to express advocacy.  Other courts have seen fit to 
tackle the express advocacy issue that the majority sweeps aside 
even though the statutes those courts were interpreting did not 
have a codified definition before them.  See, e.g., Faucher v. 
FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1991); FEC v. Furgatch, 807 
F.2d 857, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1987); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax 
Reform Immediately Committee, 616 F.2d 45, 52-53 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
(en banc); FEC v. NOW, 713 F. Supp. 428, 433-34 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
¶55 Examining the contours of the High Court’s definition 
of 
express 
advocacy 
is 
quintessentially 
a 
constitutional 
inquiry.  Constitutional inquiries are ultimately the business 
of courts.  Thus, I find it difficult to understand why the 
majority washes its hands of the matter.  
¶56 The majority’s error is further illustrated by its 
laudatory comments of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
rule-making process.  It sees fit to hold up for high praise the 
FEC’s adoption of a definition for express advocacy, while at 
the same time castigating the inaction of the Elections Board.  
Majority op. at 28-30.  
¶57 However, the majority fails to recognize that the FEC 
rule is not the product of that agency’s creative juices but is 
little more than permissible plagiarism of various court 
decisions:  subsection (a) is taken from Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
3 
43-44, 79-80; subsection (b) is taken from Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 
864.  See Maine Right to Life Committee, 914 F. Supp. at 11.  
Had these other courts traveled the path of the majority, the 
FEC rule that the majority finds so noteworthy would not have 
come into existence.  The FEC rule followed court decisions and 
is based on those decisions.  The courts lead and the agency 
rules follow.  The majority errs when it reverses the equation 
and relegates its business to others. 
¶58 If, however, the majority really believes that it 
could not apply the term express advocacy as found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 11.01(16)(a)1, or in Wis. Admin. Code ElBd § 1.28 (Apr. 1998), 
because those provisions are too imprecise to give notice, then 
the majority should find that enforcement would be a denial of 
due process because they are unconstitutionally vague.  Instead, 
the majority takes the tack of mischaracterizing the Board’s 
position and based on that mischaracterization dismisses the 
complaint finding a denial of the due process right of fair 
warning. 
¶59 The majority opinion’s conclusion that the complaint 
should be dismissed is based on a faulty foundation.  It is 
built on the premise that the Board’s definition of express 
advocacy is context based.  It needs this premise in order to 
arrive 
at 
its 
conclusion. 
 
Such 
a 
foundation, 
however, 
mischaracterizes the Board's position.  
¶60 The majority ignores the repeated statements of the 
Board that its position adopts the Buckley definition as applied 
by MCFL and that only as a fall back position does the Board 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
4 
address a context-based definition.  Instead, the majority 
selects excerpts from the briefs and oral arguments that advance 
only the fall back position and then concludes based on those 
excerpts that the Board is attempting to apply an after-the-fact 
context-oriented standard.  Majority op. at 28. 
¶61 This flies in the face of the actual position the 
Board advanced in its brief and at oral argument.  In its brief 
the Board takes the position that the definition of express 
advocacy has been established by the United States Supreme Court 
and no further definition or explanation of the standard is 
required.   All that the court is required to do is apply that 
definition to the advertisements at issue in this case.  State’s 
br. at 9. 
¶62 Similarly, at oral argument the Board repeatedly 
stated the position that sufficient definition of the standard 
could be found by applying the already established Supreme 
Court’s definition of express advocacy.  It argued that there 
was no need to apply a context-based definition.  
¶63 In arriving at its misguided conclusion, the majority 
must, and does, ignore the following exchange and repeated 
statements of the Board setting forth its primary position.   
 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  What's the test in your opinion? 
 
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD:  The test that I'm suggesting 
is the Buckley test.  The Buckley court sets forth 
express advocacy and it explains express advocacy by 
saying it's precisely related to the spending that is 
unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular 
candidate.  
 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
5 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  Doesn't it also say expressly 
advocates a particular election result? 
 
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD:  Right and in discussing what 
express advocacy means, it says, "This reading is 
directed 
precisely 
to 
that 
spending 
that 
is 
unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular 
candidate."  
That's 
at 
page 80. 
 I 
think in 
determining whether an ad is unambiguously related to 
a campaign, a court may make a limited consideration 
of time, place and audience.  I am not suggesting to 
you that context is a replacement for the Buckley 
standard.  I'm not asking you to apply anything but 
the Buckley express advocacy standard. 
And the Board's attorney again stated: 
 
I submit that the content of these ads by themselves 
are express advocacy.  It is not necessary for us to 
make limited reference to external events . . . . 
And repeated: 
 
I think, and I want to be very clear about this.  
These 
ads 
are 
express 
advocacy 
in 
and 
of 
themselves . . . . 
 
They 
are 
express 
advocacy 
regardless of when they are run . . . . 
And repeated: 
 
I don’t think it’s important to draw a line because 
I’m not suggesting to you that context is the 
test . . . . 
And repeated: 
 
The Buckley standard prevails; the Buckley standard is 
express advocacy.  We are not asking you to change 
that standard . . . . 
And repeated: 
 
[This court] has to use the language in Buckley and 
the language in MCFL and apply the express advocacy 
standard . . . . 
¶64 Contrary to the repeated requests of the Board, the 
majority prefers to wait for the legislature or the Elections 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
6 
Board to craft a definition of express advocacy.  That has 
already been done sufficiently by the United States Supreme 
Court.  If the majority finds that definition wanting for 
specificity, then it should not relegate the task of further 
definition to some other entity.  Crafting a definition is the 
business of this court.  Whatever it chooses to do, it most 
certainly should not attempt to cloak its inaction with a 
pervasive mischaracterization of the Elections Board’s argument. 
II. 
¶65 Unlike the majority, I would address the issue rather 
than dodge it.   There is no need to invite the legislature or 
the Elections Board to craft a new standard because the standard 
already exists.  We need not rely on a “previously unarticulated 
test,” majority op. at 30, or an “after-the-fact effort to 
create a standard of express advocacy,” majority op. at 28.  
Rather, I would acknowledge and apply the already established 
standards of express advocacy set forth in Buckley and MCFL. 
¶66 The Buckley Court concluded that government could 
regulate the disclosure of contributors when the spending is  
used for communications “that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
80.  The Court then precisely defined the express advocacy test 
as follows: 
 
This reading is directed precisely to that spending 
that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a 
particular . . . candidate. . . .  Id. at 80. 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
7 
¶67 Buckley, of course, was a facial challenge to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) so the Court did not have 
occasion to apply its test for express advocacy at that time.  
However, in MCFL the Court was faced with, to date, its sole 
opportunity to do just that.   
¶68 In MCFL, a group incorporated to “foster respect for 
human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, 
born and unborn” produced a “Special Edition” of its newsletter 
setting forth “everything you need to know to vote pro-life” in 
the upcoming November elections.  MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241, 243.  
Though its usual newsletter was sent to approximately 3,000 
persons, MCFL printed over 100,000 copies of the “Special 
Edition.”  
¶69 The newsletter listed the candidates for each federal 
and state office in every voting district in Massachusetts and 
indicated whether that candidate’s position on three issues 
corresponded with that of MCFL.  Id. at 243.  While over 400 
candidates were listed, only 13 had their picture included in 
the “Special Edition” and all 13 were candidates whose positions 
aligned entirely with that of MCFL on the issues listed. 
¶70 The Court determined that the “Special Edition” was 
express advocacy.  In doing so, the Court first noted that in 
Buckley the Court had “concluded . . . that a finding of 
‘express advocacy’ depended upon the use of language such as 
‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ etc.”  MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249.  
The Court then stated that the “Special Edition” included 
“[j]ust such an exhortation.”  Id.   
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
8 
 
The publication not only urges voters to vote for 
“pro-life” 
candidates, 
but 
also 
identifies 
and 
provides photographs of specific candidates fitting 
that description.  The Edition cannot be regarded as a 
mere discussion of public issues that by their nature 
raise the names of certain politicians.  Rather, it 
provides in effect an explicit directive:  vote for 
these (named) candidates.  The fact that this message 
is marginally less direct than “Vote for Smith” does 
not change its essential nature.  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
¶71 Were Buckley the Supreme Court’s only statement on the 
matter, I might be more inclined to agree with those courts that 
have concluded that express advocacy requires the “magic words” 
appearing in the opinion or their synonyms.  However, to read 
MCFL and to see how the High Court actually applied the Buckley 
test, I do not believe that the test is so limited in 
delineating what types of speech constitute express advocacy.   
¶72 If the MCFL Court had seen fit to restrict the 
appropriate inquiry into only the words of the “Special Edition” 
it would have limited its discussion to the “dangerous” language 
of the flyer:  “Everything you need to know to vote pro-life,” 
“Vote Pro-Life,” and “No pro-life candidate can win in November 
without your vote in September.”  MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243.  
However, the Court did not.  Id. at 249. 
¶73 Instead, the Court noted that the flyer contained more 
than merely words.  As part of its message it contained 
photographs of certain pro-life candidates.  Id.  The Court 
determined that the Buckley express advocacy test is not 
restricted to a list of possible examples set forth in a 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
9 
footnote.  Rather, the Buckley express advocacy test looks to 
the essence of the advertisement’s purpose. 
¶74 In applying the test the Court focused on the 
"essential nature" of the flyer.  It noted that the flyer could 
not reasonably be regarded as a “mere discussion of public 
issues” 
that 
necessarily 
“raise[s] 
the 
names 
of 
certain 
politicians.”  Id.  The Court noted that the flyer “in effect” 
provided the “explicit directive” to “vote for these (named) 
candidates.”  Id.  Finally, the Court noted that even if the 
flyer’s message was “marginally less direct than ‘Vote for 
Smith’” its “essential nature” constituted express advocacy.   
¶75 In light of these writings, I cannot conclude that the 
Supreme 
Court 
intended 
express 
advocacy 
to 
be 
limited 
exclusively to a narrow band of exhortative words.  Instead 
based on the MCFL discussion, we are to look at the “essential 
nature” of the advertisement:  Is it one that merely discusses 
issues, and in the process discusses candidates inextricably 
linked to those issues, or is it one that advocates some action 
for or against a candidate but does so under the guise of 
discussing issues?  Ultimately, the question is whether the 
advertisement is unambiguously advocating the election or defeat 
of a named candidate.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. 
¶76 This approach, labeling advertisements as express 
advocacy when their essential nature unmistakably advocates for 
the election or defeat of a candidate, is more congruous with 
the realities of both advertising and speech.  The accuracy of 
this statement is reinforced with even the most superficial 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
10
observations of advertising in general.  Few advertisements will 
directly say “Buy Nike rather than Reebok” or “Drink Maxwell 
House coffee.”  Be they in the print or electronic media, 
advertisements normally do not include a call for action or use 
“magic words” to relay their message.  Yet every reader, 
listener, or viewer knows that “Less filling, tastes great” is 
an unambiguous exhortation to purchase a particular type of 
Miller beer, and “They’re Gr-r-reat!” is Tony the Tiger’s 
unambiguous appeal to buy a box of sugar-coated corn flakes. 
¶77 The approach delineated by the Supreme Court does not 
stand for semantic shrewdness.  Rather, its approach is to look 
at the essential nature of the advertisement.  Such an approach 
does not open Pandora’s box either, for it only applies to those 
advertisements susceptible to no other reasonable interpretation 
than advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.  This 
does not encompass every attempt at influencing the issues of 
debate through issue advertisements.  It only recognizes that 
those advertisements’ essential natures must be on issues, not 
on candidates. 
¶78 Under such a standard, there can be no doubt that the 
advertisements at issue here are really “exhortation[s] to vote 
for or against . . . specific candidate[s].”  The essential 
nature of these advertisements is candidate advocacy, not issue 
advocacy.  These advertisements mention issues only as a vehicle 
of propping up or tearing down a particular candidate.  Take 
away references to the candidates and precious little, if 
anything, would remain of the advertisement.   
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
11
¶79 These advertisements are about vilifying or venerating 
a candidate; they are not about issues.  There is a picture of a 
candidate and a name of a candidate that predominates each 
advertisement. 
 
Consider, 
for 
example, 
the 
following 
advertisement sponsored by WMC: 
 
This 
year, 
Wisconsin 
homeowners 
received 
their 
property taxes cut by almost 17%.  No thanks to 
Senator Alice Clausing.  She voted against the largest 
property tax cut in Wisconsin history.  Then Clausing 
voted against an additional 36 million dollars for 
schoolsright in her own district.  Alice Clausing.  
Liberal on Taxes . . . Wrong on education.  Call 
Senator Clausing.  Tell her to stop voting with those 
Madison liberals. 
¶80 While 
issues 
such 
as 
taxes 
and 
education 
were 
discussed in the advertisement, they could not reasonably be 
considered the advertisement’s essential nature.  Rather, the 
essential nature of this advertisement was a directive to the 
public to vote against Senator Clausing in the upcoming 
election.  It unambiguously advocates the defeat of a named 
candidate.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. 
¶81 WMC also sponsored the following advertisement: 
 
What has Gary Drzewiecki done for Northeast Wisconsin? 
 Homeowners will see their property taxes cut by an 
average of 11.5%  Our children’s schools will receive 
millions in additional state aid.  And taxpayers will 
get spending controls on local government.  Lower 
taxes, less spending, better schools.  It’s a record 
we can all be proud of.  Call Gary Drzewiecki and tell 
him thanks.   
Again taxes, education, and spending were issues mentioned in 
this advertisement.  However, it is unreasonable to consider the 
essential nature of this ad to be anything other than express 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
12
advocacy for the candidate.  This was clearly not a “mere 
discussion of public issues” that necessarily “raise[d] the 
names of certain politicians.”  MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249.  While a 
directive to call a candidate and thank him may be “marginally 
less direct than ‘Vote for Smith,’” its essential nature is 
nonetheless express advocacy. 
¶82 Finally I address the concurrence of Justice Bablitch. 
 I am perplexed by the “half loaf is better than no loaf” 
analysis.  I submit that whether we are left with a half loaf, a 
whole loaf, or no loaf at all should not drive our legal 
analysis and conclusions.  Our job is to interpret and apply the 
law based on legal precedents, reason, and common sense.  I 
agree with the concurrence as it addresses the essence of this 
case but disagree with its bottom-line approach. 
¶83 Such an approach undermines rather than achieves the 
expressed goals of the concurrence.  As noted at the outset the 
majority and dissent are in agreement that no particular magic 
words are necessary for a communication to constitute express 
advocacy, that the contextual setting may assist in the 
consideration of whether an ad is express advocacy, and that 
Buckley and MCFL constitute the only authority which binds 
Wisconsin courts on the issue.   
¶84 We should decide those issues as to which we agree, 
acknowledge a divided court on the remaining issues, and remand 
the case to the court of appeals for a decision on the issues 
that divide us.  The court of appeals may then apply the 
standard already defined by Buckley and MCFL and adopted by the 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
13
majority.  By joining the majority’s mandate but endorsing the 
dissent’s  rationale, the concurrence effectively eliminates the 
possibility that the standard will ever be applied in this case. 
¶85 Additionally, although the concurrence asserts that 
its decision is driven by a desire to get a speedy answer, the 
route that it has chosen will delay rather than achieve a prompt 
resolution.  The concurrence invites the Elections Board or the 
legislature to establish rules, a time-consuming venture that 
they might not undertake.  Most assuredly, any rules would be 
challenged and again the issue would end up before us to decide. 
 The path espoused by the concurrence results only in further 
delay.   
¶86 I end where I began.  The majority errs in its attempt 
to have it both ways.  It upholds the law but then turns around 
and declines to enforce it.  It was required this day to choose 
which path it wished to follow:  apply the express advocacy 
standard defined by the Supreme Court or, if that standard is 
too vague, craft a better standard instead.  It chose to do 
neither.  I would have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and 
assessed 
these 
advertisements 
under 
the 
essential 
nature 
standard of Buckley and MCFL.  Because under such a standard 
these advertisements are 
express 
advocacy, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent.  
¶87 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
 
No. 98-0596.awb 
 
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