Title: People  v. Milward
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: s182263
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2011

1 
Filed 8/18/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S182263 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C058326 
GEORGE MILWARD, 
) 
 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 02F05876 
 
____________________________________) 
 
While serving a life sentence, defendant attacked another inmate with a 
deadly weapon.  He was convicted of two crimes:  (1) assault with a deadly 
weapon or by means likely to inflict great bodily injury by a prisoner serving a life 
sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500; hereafter aggravated assault by a life prisoner),1 and 
(2) assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by means likely to inflict 
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); hereafter aggravated assault).  
Defendant argues that the conviction for aggravated assault must be 
reversed because that offense is lesser than, and necessarily included within, the 
offense of aggravated assault by a life prisoner.  We agree.  Because the Court of 
Appeal reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse that court’s judgment. 
                                              
1  
All statutory citations are to this code. 
 
2 
I 
On June 16, 2001, Donald Jones, a correctional officer at Folsom State 
Prison, saw two life prisoners — Ernesto Torres and defendant George Milward 
— attack inmate Ricardo Gonzales.  When the attackers ignored Jones’s order to 
lie down, he fired nonlethal rubber bullets at them, but they continued their attack 
on Gonzales.  After Jones’s fourth shot appeared to have hit defendant’s leg, 
defendant backed away from Gonzalez and lay on the ground, as ordered by Jones.  
When defendant was allowed to get up, he threw something over the wall.  Jones 
retrieved the item, which he described as an “inmate-manufactured razor-type 
weapon.”  Another inmate-made weapon, which had a cylindrical end that was 
sharpened like an ice pick, was found in the grass near the scene of the attack on 
inmate Gonzales.  Gonzales had slash wounds (consistent with the weapon thrown 
by defendant) as well as puncture wounds (consistent with the weapon found in 
the grass).   
Defendant was charged in count one with aggravated assault by a life 
prisoner (§ 4500), in count two with possession of a sharp instrument by a prisoner 
(§ 4502, subd. (a)), and in count three with aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. 
(a)(1)).  As a sentence enhancement to count one, it was alleged that defendant had 
personally inflicted great bodily injury on inmate Gonzales (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).  
It was further alleged that defendant had two prior serious felonies (§ 1192.7) that 
were “strikes” under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12).  A jury 
found defendant guilty of counts one and three, but the jury was unable to reach a 
 
3 
verdict as to count two.2  Thereafter, a separate jury found the prior felony 
allegations to be true.   
The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment with 27 years of 
parole ineligibility on count one (aggravated assault by a life prisoner), plus a 
consecutive term of five years for one of the two prior serious felony convictions, 
both sentences to run consecutively to the life term that defendant was already 
serving when he committed the crimes in this case.  On count three (aggravated 
assault) the court imposed a concurrent term of 25 years to life, plus five years on 
the other prior conviction.   
On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction for aggravated assault 
should be vacated because it is a lesser offense included within the greater crime 
of aggravated assault by a life prisoner, of which he was also convicted.  The 
Court of Appeal, rejecting the concession of this issue by the Attorney General, 
upheld the conviction.   
The Court of Appeal noted our decision in People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 
469, 477 (Noah), which held that aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (a)) was a lesser 
offense included within the crime of aggravated assault by an inmate not serving a 
life sentence (§ 4501).  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that “Noah applies to 
section 4500 [aggravated assault by a life prisoner] equally as it applies to section 
4501 [aggravated assault by a non-life prisoner]; that is, Noah compels the 
conclusion that aggravated assault by a life prisoner could not be committed 
without committing aggravated assault as then proscribed by section 245, 
subdivision (a).”  The Court of Appeal pointed out, however, that in 1982, 11 
                                              
2  
Like defendant, codefendant Torres was charged with aggravated assault by 
a life prisoner and with aggravated assault, but the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict on either charge.  
 
4 
years after Noah, an amendment by the Legislature “materially changed” the 
version of section 245’s subdivision (a) at issue in Noah.  Thus, the Court of 
Appeal held, Noah’s interpretation is “no longer . . . binding.”   
The Court of Appeal concluded that the 1982 amendment created two 
separate crimes:  the offense of aggravated assault, which is committed with “a 
deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm” (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), italics 
added) and assault “with a firearm” (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)).  The Court of Appeal 
reasoned:  “[A]ggravated assault as provided by section 245, subdivision (a)(1) 
cannot be committed with a firearm, because assaults with firearms are explicitly 
excluded from that offense.  However, aggravated assault by a life prisoner as 
provided by section 4500 can be committed with a firearm, a type of deadly 
weapon.  Therefore, if a life prisoner committed an assault with a firearm, she or 
he would violate section 4500, but would not violate section 245, subdivision 
(a)(1).  Therefore, the latter is not included within the former.”  We granted 
defendant’s petition for review. 
II 
As mentioned earlier, defendant, a life prisoner, attacked fellow inmate 
Gonzales.  A jury found him guilty of the crime of aggravated assault by a life 
prisoner and the crime of aggravated assault.  Both convictions were based on the 
same conduct, namely, defendant’s attack on Gonzales.  At issue is whether 
defendant could lawfully be convicted of both of these crimes or only one of them. 
Generally, there is no limit to the number of convictions arising from a 
defendant’s act or course of conduct.  (§ 954.)  But an exception exists for lesser 
included offenses.  “[I]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily 
committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the 
former.”  (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.)  In such cases, a defendant 
may not be convicted of both the greater and the lesser offense.  (People v. Reed 
 
5 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227.)  Whether defendant’s two convictions — for 
aggravated assault by a life prisoner (§ 4500) and for aggravated assault (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(1)) — violates that rule is at issue here. 
Section 4500 sets forth the elements as well as the punishment for the crime 
of aggravated assault by a life prisoner:  “Every person while undergoing a life 
sentence . . . who, with malice aforethought, commits an assault upon the person 
of another with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury is punishable with death or life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole [if the victim dies as a result of the attack within a year and a 
day after it occurs, and otherwise by] imprisonment . . . for life without the 
possibility of parole for nine years.”   
As to the crime of aggravated assault, section 245’s subdivision (a)(1) 
states:  “Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a 
deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year 
. . . .”  (Italics added.)  And section 245’s subdivision (a)(2) provides:  “Any 
person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a firearm shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a 
county jail for not less than six months and not exceeding one year . . . .”  (Italics 
added.)  As noted earlier (see pp. 3-4, ante), subparagraphs (1) and (2) were 
enacted by a 1982 amendment of section 245 (Stats. 1982, ch. 136, § 1, p. 437). 
Previously, the Legislature had made no distinction between aggravated 
assaults committed with a firearm and those committed by other means.  Back 
then, section 245’s subdivision (a) provided:  “Every person who commits an 
assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument or by any 
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is punishable by imprisonment 
 
6 
in the state prison for two, three or four years, or in a county jail not exceeding one 
year . . . .”  (Stats 1976, ch. 1139, § 152.5, p. 5105.)  In amending that provision in 
1982 to create subparagraphs (1) and (2), the Legislature’s apparent purpose was 
to require a minimum punishment of six months’ imprisonment in county jail for 
aggravated assaults committed with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), but not for 
aggravated assaults committed by other means (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).  
Defendant asserts that the offenses described in section 245’s subdivision 
(a)(1) (assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by means likely to 
inflict great bodily injury) and subdivision (a)(2) (assault with a firearm) should be 
considered not in isolation but together as constituting one crime, that of 
aggravated assault, and that so construed the “crime” is a lesser offense 
necessarily included within the crime of aggravated assault by a life prisoner 
(§ 4500).  (See generally People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 694-699 [the 
traditional crime of theft, including both petty theft and grand theft, is necessarily 
included within the crime of robbery]; People v. Ryan (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 
360, 364 [when the Legislature divided § 470, defining the traditional crime of 
forgery, into subdivisions, it described “different ways of committing a single 
offense, i.e., forgery”].)  We need not decide whether defendant’s assertions are 
correct, because we conclude that the offense described in section 245’s 
subdivision (a)(1), which defendant was convicted of violating, is by itself 
necessarily included within the greater crime of aggravated assault by a life 
prisoner (§ 4500). 
As explained earlier (see p. 4, ante) a crime is a lesser offense necessarily 
included within a greater crime only if it is impossible to commit the greater crime 
without also committing the lesser.  The Court of Appeal here reasoned that if a 
life prisoner committed an aggravated assault with a firearm, the prisoner would 
be guilty of the crime of aggravated assault by a life prisoner (§ 4500) without 
 
7 
also being guilty of violating section 245’s subdivision (a)(1), because the latter 
provision states that it applies to an aggravated assault committed by a deadly 
weapon “other than a firearm.”  Therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded, the 
latter offense is not a lesser offense necessarily included within the greater offense 
of aggravated assault by a life prisoner.   
The Court of Appeal would be right if the statutory phrase “other than a 
firearm” appearing in section 245’s subdivision (a)(1) were an element of the 
aggravated assault described in that subdivision.  But we do not so construe the 
statutory language, as explained below. 
Pertinent here is our decision in People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450 
(Rios).  The defendant in that case was initially charged with murder.  At his first 
trial, the jury acquitted him of that crime, but it could not reach a verdict on the 
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.  Because of the acquittal on the 
murder charge, the defendant could not be retried for that offense (U.S. Const., 5th 
Amend. [“nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy”]), but he could be, and was, retried on the charge of voluntary 
manslaughter. 
Whereas murder is an “unlawful killing . . . with malice aforethought” 
(§ 187, italics added), manslaughter is an “unlawful killing . . . without malice” 
(§ 192, italics added).  Malice is negated when the defendant kills as a result of 
provocation or in “imperfect self-defense.”  (Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 467.)  At 
the retrial in Rios, the trial court did not instruct the jury on provocation or 
imperfect self-defense.  The jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter.  On appeal, the defendant in Rios argued, in essence, that because 
the jury was never instructed on provocation and imperfect self-defense, it never 
determined whether he had acted without malice, and that absence of malice was a 
 
8 
necessary element of manslaughter.  The Court of Appeal in Rios rejected the 
defendant’s contention, and we granted review.  
In Rios, we agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial court was right in 
not instructing the jury that the absence of malice, as shown by provocation or 
imperfect self-defense, was an element of voluntary manslaughter.  We explained:  
“[T]he People must establish malice . . . as an essential element of murder.  
However, they need not prove the absence of malice, the issue to which 
provocation and imperfect self-defense are relevant, in order to convict the 
defendant of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.”  (Rios, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 469, italics added, original italics deleted.)  Otherwise, Rios said, 
juries would face a dilemma:  “A fact finder doubtful that provocation or 
imperfect self-defense was lacking, but also not persuaded beyond reasonable 
doubt that either was present, could convict the defendant of neither murder nor 
voluntary manslaughter, even though it found the defendant had killed 
intentionally, without justification or excuse.  Such a result would turn the law of 
criminal homicide on its head.”  (Id. at p. 462.) 
Although section 192 defines manslaughter as an “unlawful killing . . . 
without malice” (italics added), the statutory phrase “without malice” is, under 
Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 469, not an element of manslaughter, for the 
reasons explained in the preceding paragraph; rather, it serves only to distinguish 
manslaughter from the greater crime of murder.  Therefore, a defendant who 
commits an unlawful killing with malice can be convicted of manslaughter.   
For similar reasons, here the statutory phrase “other than a firearm” is not 
an element of section 245’s subdivision (a)(1), which punishes an assault with a 
deadly weapon “other than a firearm” or by means likely to inflict great bodily 
injury; a defendant who commits an assault with a firearm violates that 
subdivision.  To conclude otherwise could create for juries a dilemma similar to 
 
9 
the one noted in Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 462, and discussed by us here at 
page 8, ante. 
For instance, if a defendant committed an assault with a deadly weapon, 
and the jury was uncertain (because of conflicting evidence) whether the weapon 
was a firearm, that jury could not convict the defendant of assault with a deadly 
weapon other than a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), because it had not been 
established “beyond a reasonable doubt” (the prosecution’s burden of proof) that 
the weapon used was “a deadly weapon . . . other than a firearm” (the phrase used 
in section 245’s subdivision (a)(1)).  Nor could the jury in our hypothetical convict 
the defendant of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), because of the 
conflicting evidence on whether the weapon was actually a firearm. 
To avoid placing a jury in that quandary, we conclude as follows:  The 
statutory language in section 245’s subdivision (a)(1) that pertains to an assault 
with a deadly weapon “other than a firearm” is not an element of the crime there 
described (aggravated assault).  The quoted statutory phrase serves simply to 
distinguish an assault so committed from the slightly more serious offense of 
assault “with a firearm,” as set forth in section 245’s subdivision (a)(2).  
Consequently, when, for instance, a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant assaulted the victim with a deadly weapon, but because of 
conflicting evidence is uncertain whether the weapon was indeed a firearm, the 
jury can convict the defendant of aggravated assault, the crime set forth in section 
245’s subdivision (a)(1). 
Having just concluded that the phrase “other than a firearm” in section 
245’s subdivision (a)(1) is not an element of the crime defined in that subdivision, 
we further conclude that the crime defined in that subdivision is an offense 
necessarily included within the greater offense set forth in section 4500, which 
punishes a defendant who, “while undergoing a life sentence [and] with malice 
 
10 
aforethought, commits an assault . . . with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by 
any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.”  (Italics added.)  Our 
reasons follow. 
Earlier, we mentioned (see ante, at p. 4), that a crime is necessarily 
included within a greater crime if the greater crime “cannot be committed without 
also necessarily committing” the lesser offense.  By its terms, section 245’s 
subdivision (a)(1) is violated when the defendant commits an “assault,” either 
“with a deadly weapon or instrument,” or by “force likely to produce great bodily 
injury.”  That language is identical to the language in section 4500 punishing a life 
prisoner for committing “an assault . . . with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by 
. . . force likely to produce great bodily injury.”  (§ 4500 is the greater offense 
because the minimum sentence for a defendant who violates that section is a term 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for nine years, whereas the 
maximum sentence for a violation of § 245’s subd. (a)(1) is a four-year prison 
term.)  Thus, every element of the crime described in section 245’s subdivision 
(a)(1) is also an element of the crime set forth in section 4500, and consequently 
every defendant who violates section 4500 necessarily also violates the lesser 
offense described in section 245’s subdivision (a)(1).   
The law prohibits simultaneous convictions for both a greater offense and a 
lesser offense necessarily included within it, when based on the same conduct.  
(People v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)  “When the jury expressly finds 
defendant guilty of both the greater and lesser offense . . . the conviction of [the 
greater] offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be 
reversed.”  (People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763.)  Here, the jury convicted 
defendant of violating — based on the same conduct —section 4500 and section 
245’s subdivision (a)(1).  Because, as explained earlier, the latter is a lesser 
 
11 
offense necessarily included within the former, the Court of Appeal erred in not 
reversing the conviction for the lesser offense (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to reverse defendant’s conviction for assault 
with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by means of force 
likely to inflict great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KING, J.*
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Milward 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 182 Cal.App.4th 1477 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S182263 
Date Filed: August 18, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Patricia C. Esgro 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French, David A. Rhodes and 
Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Valerie G. Wass 
556 South Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 9 
Pasadena, CA  91105 
(626) 797-1099 
 
Ivan P. Marrs 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-0069