Title: Shaw v. The Titan Corporation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971921
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1998

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
DONALD P. SHAW 
 
v.  Record No. 971921 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
April 17, 1998 
TITAN CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
UPON QUESTIONS OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED  
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
Under the provisions of Rule 5:42, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified to this Court two 
questions of Virginia law.  The first question concerns the 
adequacy of jury instructions given on the issue of causation in 
a common law action for wrongful termination of employment.  The 
second question involves the availability of punitive damages in 
such an action.  The facts as stated in the certification order 
are set forth below. 
Donald P. Shaw, a Caucasian male, was employed by Titan 
Corporation (Titan), a “government contracting” firm, from 1987 
until March 1994, when Titan terminated Shaw’s employment.  Shaw 
was 62 years old at the time of his discharge. 
Early in 1994, Titan concluded that it would have to reduce 
its workforce to remain profitable.  To accomplish this 
“reduction-in-force” (RIF), Titan created a committee (the 
Committee) that established criteria to evaluate Titan’s 
employees for the purpose of identifying which employees should 
be discharged. 
During its evaluation process, the Committee considered 
Titan’s status under prior “conciliation agreements” with the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance and Programs (OFCCP), 
which had determined that Titan had a significant “under-
representation” of women and minority employees.  Some Committee 
members expressed concern that a disproportionate number of 
women and minority employees were being “targeted” for discharge 
in the pending workforce reduction.  Albert E. Knauf, Jr., 
president of Titan’s eastern division, asked a Committee member 
“if the mix changed, what the impact of that change would be.  
For example, if we had another white male in the mix, what would 
be the numbers or our representation?”  Later, a company 
memorandum analyzed the impact of “identify[ing] a ‘sacrificial 
lamb’” Caucasian male, and concluded that “our representation 
[of women and minority employees] is so low that we still have a 
disparity. . . . [W]e are ‘damned if we do and damned if we 
don’t.’” 
In March 1994, Richard Leadbetter, Shaw’s supervisor, 
informed Shaw that his employment would be terminated the next 
day.  When Shaw asked why he was being discharged, Leadbetter 
responded that the RIF process had failed to perform properly.  
John Eddlemon, an officer of Titan, terminated Shaw’s employment 
the following day and offered Shaw “a world class corporate 
apology for the way that [the termination] was handled in your 
 
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case.”  Eddlemon also told Shaw that “the company is really 
vulnerable. . . . [W]e are letting go 10 to 1 women and 
minorities and we have to have an ace to throw on the pile.”  
Another Titan employee was told that Titan chose Shaw as the 
“ace on the pile” because of Shaw’s age. 
In April 1995, Shaw filed a motion for judgment against 
Titan and Eddlemon (Titan) in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County alleging that Titan wrongfully terminated Shaw’s 
employment.  Shaw alleged that he was terminated from his 
employment because of his race, gender, and age in violation of 
the public policy embodied in the Virginia Human Rights Act, 
Code §§ 2.10-714 through –725.  Titan removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia based on diversity of citizenship, and the case was 
tried before a jury.  At trial, Titan maintained that Shaw’s 
employment was terminated lawfully based on the RIF. 
In the course of the proceeding, Titan requested that the 
jury be given the following instructions: 
DEFENDANT’S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
 
 
If you find that Titan discriminated against 
plaintiff because of his age, sex, and/or race, you 
must nonetheless return a verdict for Titan on 
plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim unless you find 
that such discrimination was the only reason Titan 
selected plaintiff for discharge.  In other words, if 
you find that Titan terminated plaintiff only because 
of his age, his sex, or his race, you must return a 
verdict for the plaintiff.  However, if you find that 
 
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Titan’s reasons for discharging plaintiff included a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, you must return 
a verdict for Titan. 
 
DEFENDANT’S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
 
 
If you find that Titan discriminated against 
plaintiff because of his age, sex, and/or race, you 
must nonetheless return a verdict for Titan on 
plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim unless you find 
that such discrimination was the determining factor in 
Titan’s selection of plaintiff for discharge.  In 
other words, if you find that Titan would not have 
terminated plaintiff but for his age, his sex, or his 
race, you must return a verdict for the plaintiff.  
However, if you find that Titan’s reasons for 
discharging plaintiff included a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason, you must return a verdict 
for Titan. 
 
The district court refused the above instructions and 
charged the jury as follows: 
Titan claims that Mr. Shaw was fired because it 
determined that there wasn’t sufficient work for which Mr. 
Shaw was the appropriate employee and that Mr. Shaw was, 
for that reason, included in the reduction in force.  It is 
not illegal to include an employee in a reduction in force 
for that reason.   
 
Merely firing an employee or including an employee in 
a reduction in force for non-discriminatory reasons is not 
against the public policy of Virginia 
 
. . . . 
 
The question before you is what motivated the 
termination of Mr. Shaw’s employment or his inclusion in 
the reduction in force. 
 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Titan intentionally terminated Mr. Shaw’s employment or 
included him in the reduction in force because of his race, 
because of his gender, because of his age, or because [of] 
any combination of those factors, then you shall return 
your verdict in favor of Mr. Shaw 
 
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. . . . 
 
If, on the other hand, you do not find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Titan intentionally terminated Mr. 
Shaw’s employment because of his race, because of his 
gender, because of his age, or because of a combination of 
those factors, then you shall return your verdict in favor 
of Titan. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Shaw, awarding $65,000 
in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages.1
After the verdict, Titan filed a “motion for judgment as a 
matter of law” and a motion for a new trial, under Rules 50(b) 
and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Titan argued 
that because it had produced evidence that Shaw’s employment was 
terminated as a result of the RIF, the district court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with Defendant’s 
Requested Instruction Nos. 17 and 18.  Titan also asserted that 
the public policy of Virginia does not permit the award of 
punitive damages in actions for wrongful termination of 
employment.  The district court denied these post-trial motions 
and Titan appealed the judgment to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
Following Titan’s appeal, the certifying court presented 
the following questions to this Court: 
                     
 
1 The district court later reduced the punitive damages 
award to $350,000 to comply with Virginia’s statutory limit on 
recovery of punitive damages.  See Code § 8.01-38.1. 
 
 
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1.  Whether, under the common law of Virginia, the 
district court erred in refusing to give the jury an 
explicit but-for causation, sole-cause, or mixed-
motive instruction, and instead instructing the jury 
that it could find for Shaw on his claim of wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy if Shaw 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, “that Titan 
terminated him because of his race, his gender, his 
age, or because of a combination of those factors.” 
 
2.  Whether, under the common law of Virginia, punitive 
damages may be recovered for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy, where the public policy 
violated is embodied in the Virginia Human Rights Act which 
expressly prohibits the award of punitive damages. 
 
 
Titan argues before this Court that since Shaw’s action 
sounded in tort, the district court was required to give the 
jury an explicit instruction under either a “but-for” causation 
standard or a “sole” causation standard.  Titan also asserts 
that the district court erred in permitting Shaw to recover 
punitive damages because the Virginia Human Rights Act presently 
prohibits awards of punitive damages in actions brought under 
its provisions, and no other Virginia statute specifically 
authorizes the recovery of such damages in wrongful termination 
actions.  We disagree with Titan’s arguments. 
 
The first certified question effectively asks whether, as a 
matter of law, the district court was required to give the jury 
explicit instructions addressing a “sole” causation standard, a 
“but-for” causation standard, or a “mixed motive” causation 
standard.  We conclude that the district court did not err in 
failing to give such instructions. 
 
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As stated above, the district court told the jury it was 
required to find in favor of Shaw if he proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Titan intentionally 
terminated his employment because of his race, gender, age, or a 
combination of these factors.  However, the court also 
instructed the jury that if Titan fired Shaw for non-
discriminatory reasons, even if Titan used a flawed process or 
made a wrong decision, the jury was required to return a verdict 
in favor of Titan.  These instructions, considered in the 
context of all the instructions in the record before us, fully 
and fairly stated the common law of Virginia in effect on the 
date Shaw’s cause of action accrued. 
 
In Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 539-40, 
331 S.E.2d 797, 800-01 (1985), we recognized a common law cause 
of action in tort for wrongful termination of employment under 
an exception to the common-law doctrine of employment-at-will.  
This exception applies to terminations from employment which 
violate the public policy of this Commonwealth.  Bradick v. 
Grumman Data Sys. Corp., 254 Va. 156, 159, 486 S.E.2d 545, 546 
(1997); see Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 125, 
480 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1997); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. 
Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98-99, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996); Miller v. 
SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 468, 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1987). 
 
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We have held that this exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine is applicable, among other instances, when an employee 
is terminated from employment “because of discrimination based 
upon gender or race.”  Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Systems 
Corp., 247 Va. 98, 106, 439 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1994)(emphasis 
supplied); see Bailey, 253 Va. at 126-27, 480 S.E.2d at 505; 
Lawrence, 251 Va. at 98, 465 S.E.2d at 809.  Using equivalent 
language, we also have held that based on the exception 
recognized in Bowman, the common law of Virginia provides an 
employee a remedy for wrongful termination from employment when 
“the employee is discharged on account of his disability or the 
employer’s perception of his disability.”  Bradick, 254 Va. at 
160-61, 486 S.E.2d at 547 (emphasis supplied). 
 
These holdings require a plaintiff who asserts a cause of 
action for wrongful termination under Bowman to prove that the 
discharge occurred because of factors that violate Virginia’s 
public policy.  A plaintiff is not required to prove that the 
employer’s improper motive was the sole cause of the wrongful 
termination. 
 
In asserting a contrary position, Titan mistakenly relies 
on Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 480 S.E.2d 502 
and Jordan v. Clay’s Rest Home, Inc., 253 Va. 185, 483 S.E.2d 
203 (1997).  In Bailey, our inquiry was limited to determining 
whether an employee stated a cause of action for wrongful 
 
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termination based on allegations of gender discrimination.  We 
stated that the employee’s allegations, if true, “would support 
a reasonable inference by the finder of fact that [the employer] 
terminated [the employee] solely because of her status as a 
working mother.”  253 Va. at 126-27, 480 S.E.2d at 505. 
 
Since the issue before us in Bailey was whether the trial 
court properly sustained the defendant’s demurrer, our 
conclusion addressed only the content of the employee’s 
pleadings and did not establish a requirement that an employee 
prove that a discriminatory motive was the sole cause of the 
termination.  We also stated in Bailey that the employee’s 
allegations, if proved, “could support a jury finding that [the 
employee] was discriminated against because of her gender.”  253 
Va. at 126, 480 S.E.2d at 505 (emphasis supplied).  This 
language reiterates the standard of causation set forth in 
Lockhart.  See 247 Va. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332. 
 
Our decision in Jordan also fails to support Titan’s 
position.  There, in deciding whether a plaintiff presented 
prima facie evidence to establish that she was fired “solely” 
because she intended to file a workers’ compensation claim, our 
determination was governed by the language of Code § 65.2-308.  
253 Va. at 193, 483 S.E.2d at 207.  This statute specifically 
forbids an employer from discharging an employee “solely because 
 
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the employee intends to file or has filed” a workers’ 
compensation claim.  Code § 65.2-308(A). 
 
The language in Jordan cited by Titan is inapplicable here 
because that discussion pertains to the statutory cause of 
action under Code § 65.2-308, not to a common law claim of 
wrongful termination.  Thus, we conclude that the district court 
did not err in refusing to give the jury an explicit “sole-
cause” instruction. 
 
Titan also contends that the district court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury under the “but-for” analysis set 
forth in Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E.2d 422 (1966).  
We stated in Wells that, “[g]enerally a person is not liable to 
another [in tort] unless but for his . . . act the harm would 
not have occurred.”  207 Va. at 622, 151 S.E.2d at 428. 
 
We first observe that Titan failed to offer a jury 
instruction that properly stated a proximate causation standard 
under the “but for” language of Wells.  Titan’s requested 
Instruction No. 18 improperly required the jury to return a 
verdict for Titan if the jury found that “Titan’s reasons for 
discharging [Shaw] included a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason.”  This directive was an incorrect statement of Virginia 
law, because that language would have required Shaw to prove 
that he was fired solely because of a discriminatory reason. 
 
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We also conclude that the district court’s instructions in 
the present case incorporated Virginia’s common law standard of 
proximate causation by requiring Shaw to prove that he was 
discharged because of his race, gender, age, or any combination 
of these factors, rather than because of any non-discriminatory 
reasons.  Thus, we conclude that the common law of Virginia did 
not require the district court to give the jury an explicit 
instruction setting forth the “but for” language of Wells. 
 
We also note that the common law of Virginia has not 
presently adopted the “mixed motive” causation standard 
applicable to claims for wrongful termination of employment 
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701 et seq., 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1994).  Further, Titan did not argue 
that Shaw’s discharge was based on a “mixed motive.”  Therefore, 
we conclude that the district court did not err in failing to 
give the jury an explicit instruction on this principle.2  For 
these reasons, we answer the first certified question in the 
negative. 
 
We next consider the question whether the common law of 
Virginia permitted Shaw to recover punitive damages from Titan 
for the wrongful termination of his employment.  Initially, we 
                     
 
2 In light of the conclusion we reach here, we need not 
consider whether Virginia would adopt the “mixed motive” 
causation standard applicable to Title VII claims. 
 
 
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note that Shaw was terminated from his employment and filed this 
action against Titan before the 1995 amendments to the Virginia 
Human Rights Act became effective.  Thus, when Shaw’s cause of 
action against Titan arose, the Virginia Human Rights Act did 
not contain any language limiting a plaintiff’s right to recover 
punitive damages in an action for wrongful termination of 
employment.3
 
Titan argues, nevertheless, that Shaw was not entitled to 
recover punitive damages because neither the Virginia Human 
Rights Act nor any other Virginia statute specifically 
authorized the recovery of such damages at the time Shaw was 
discharged and filed this action.  We find no merit in this 
argument because the cause of action for wrongful termination of 
employment asserted by Shaw derives solely from the common law.  
Bowman, 229 Va. at 539-40, 331 S.E.2d at 800-01; see Bradick, 
254 Va. at 159, 486 S.E.2d at 546; Bailey, 253 Va. at 125, 480 
S.E.2d at 504; Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331. 
 
As we stated in Bowman, the common law cause of action for 
wrongful termination of employment sounds in tort.  229 Va. at 
540, 331 S.E.2d at 801; see Bailey, 253 Va. at 125, 480 S.E.2d 
at 504; Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331-32.  Titan 
                     
 
3 Since the 1995 and 1997 amendments to the Virginia Human 
Rights Act became effective after this cause of action arose, we 
express no opinion on whether a plaintiff may recover punitive 
 
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conceded in the district court that this cause of action is an 
intentional tort.  When a plaintiff pleads and proves an 
intentional tort under the common law of Virginia, the trier of 
fact may award punitive damages.  Foreign Mission Bd. v. Wade, 
242 Va. 234, 241, 409 S.E.2d 144, 148 (1991); see Kamlar Corp. 
v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 706-07, 299 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1983).  
Thus, we conclude that, under Virginia law, Shaw was entitled to 
recover punitive damages in the present action, and we answer 
the second certified question in the affirmative. 
        First Certified Question Answered in the Negative. 
Second Certified Question Answered in the Affirmative. 
                                                                  
damages in any action for wrongful termination of employment 
asserted after the effective date of these amendments. 
 
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