Title: James v. City of Falls Church
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090444
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2010

PRESENT:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Lacy, S.J.  
 
KATHERINE E. JAMES, TRUSTEE OF THE COLUMBIA 
BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL. 
  
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090444 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
June 10, 2010 
CITY OF FALLS CHURCH, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal involves a landowner's application to 
consolidate three lots of real estate into one lot.  The primary 
issue we decide is whether a zoning administrator's 
interpretation of an applicable zoning ordinance was binding, 
pursuant to Code § 15.2-2311(C), on a planning commission's 
decision whether to approve a consolidation application.  
Because a planning commission is not an "administrative officer" 
and because the zoning administrator did not issue a "written 
order, requirement, decision or determination," we conclude that 
Code § 15.2-2311(C) is not applicable in the situation before 
us.  For these and other reasons, we will affirm the circuit 
court's judgment that the planning commission's denial of the 
consolidation application was based on the applicable 
ordinances, and was not arbitrary or capricious. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The trustees of Columbia Baptist Church (Columbia Baptist)1 
seek to consolidate seven contiguous lots of real estate located 
in the City of Falls Church (the City) into one lot containing 
approximately 5.7 acres.  The seven lots range in size from 
7,500 square feet to 156,791 square feet and are zoned either R-
1A (low density residential district) or T-1 (transitional 
district) under the City's zoning ordinances.  Three of the lots 
contain historic structures subject to the City's Historic and 
Cultural Conservation District (HCC) ordinances.2 
Initially, Columbia Baptist, in a letter to the City's 
zoning administrator, requested "a zoning interpretation" to 
determine whether Columbia Baptist could consolidate the seven 
lots.  In a letter dated October 3, 2006, the zoning 
administrator responded that the consolidation would be 
permissible under applicable ordinances.  The zoning 
                     
1 The appellants in this appeal are the trustees holding 
legal title to Columbia Baptist's real estate and the church's 
director of administration.  Those individuals, along with the 
church, will be collectively referred to as "Columbia Baptist." 
2 See Falls Church City Code § 48-204 (providing 
descriptions of R-1A, T-1, and HCC districts).  
The City re-codified its code subsequent to the submission 
of briefs in this appeal.  For purposes of clarity, this opinion 
will refer to the current sections rather than the former 
sections cited by the circuit court and the parties.  The re-
codification did not involve substantive changes to the sections 
at issue in this appeal. 
2 
administrator stated that although "the actual consolidation 
process is a Planning Commission function[,] the Zoning Code 
does provide for the circumstances arising out of an approved 
consolidation."  Quoting Falls Church City Code (City Code) 
§ 48-800(a), which states that a lot in the R-1A district on 
which an HCC-designated structure is located "shall not be 
reduced in size such that it no longer meets the minimum lot 
size, frontage, and setback requirements of a lot in the R-1A 
district," the zoning administrator concluded that Columbia 
Baptist's consolidation plan "results in a much larger lot and 
does so without reducing setbacks," thus satisfying the 
requirements of that ordinance.  The zoning administrator 
further concluded that, pursuant to the applicable zoning 
districts, "there is a by right use available for the existing 
structures after a consolidation." 
After receiving the zoning administrator's response, 
Columbia Baptist prepared its consolidation application and 
plat, which it filed with the City's Planning Division in 
January 2007.  Several months later, a senior planner from the 
Planning Division submitted a report to the City of Falls Church 
Planning Commission (Planning Commission) regarding Columbia 
Baptist's consolidation application.  According to the senior 
planner, the proposed consolidation would constitute a 
"subdivision" as that term is defined in City Code § 38-1 and, 
3 
pursuant to City Code § 38-34(4), building sites must have the 
dimensions and areas required by the City's zoning ordinances. 
Continuing, the senior planner concluded that the 
consolidation "would be reducing the size of several lots 
subject to the HCC district regulations to zero."  The lot 
lines, therefore, would be "extinguished and a building site 
containing the minimum lot area for R-1A lots would not be 
provided for each of the designated structures," thus violating 
City Code § 48-800(a).3  Since one of the HCC designated lots was 
already below the minimum lot size required in the R-1A 
district, the senior planner further concluded that any 
additional reduction in size would also violate the provisions 
of City Code § 48-800(a) prohibiting a "lot existing at the time 
of designation of the structure which is substandard with 
respect to the minimum lot size . . . requirements of a lot in 
the R-1A district" from being "further reduced in size."  For 
these reasons, the senior planner recommended that the Planning 
Commission deny the consolidation application. 
The Planning Commission subsequently considered Columbia 
Baptist's consolidation application along with the senior 
                     
3 The senior planner believed the zoning administrator's 
contrary interpretation was "based on 'circumstances arising out 
of an approved consolidation,' and therefore set[] forth zoning 
information under the scenario that a subdivision ha[d] already 
occurred." 
4 
planner's report.  Columbia Baptist argued that its proposed 
consolidation would not reduce the lot sizes to zero, but rather 
would increase the size of the lots to one larger lot.  During 
the hearing, one of the Planning Commission members commented 
that the zoning administrator seemed to assume that a 
consolidation had already been approved.  Some members also 
expressed concerns about the lack of information concerning what 
plans Columbia Baptist had for the property if the seven lots 
were consolidated.  After discussion, the Planning Commission 
unanimously denied the application "for the reasons set forth in 
the [s]taff report and as stated in the [s]taff recommendations 
on Page 4 of the [s]taff report." 
Pursuant to Code § 15.2-2260(E), Columbia Baptist filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, appealing 
the Planning Commission's decision.  Columbia Baptist alleged 
that the Planning Commission's denial of "the consolidation 
application was not properly based on the applicable ordinances 
and was arbitrary and capricious."  Therefore, Columbia Baptist 
asked the circuit court to approve its application or direct the 
Planning Commission to do so. 
At a hearing before the circuit court, Columbia Baptist 
presented testimony from, among others, the zoning 
administrator, who stated that part of his job included 
"rendering interpretations of the zoning ordinance."  The zoning 
5 
administrator also testified that he understood the 
consolidation had not been approved and that his interpretation 
of City Code § 48-800(a) was "for a potential application to 
consolidate."  He further explained that he reviewed his 
response to Columbia Baptist's request for a zoning 
interpretation with the City's attorney and the general manager 
of the City's Development Services Department before sending it 
to Columbia Baptist, and noted that no one appealed his 
"determination" to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals.  The 
zoning administrator reiterated his conclusion that, "[f]rom a 
zoning standpoint, there is no prohibition against a 
consolidation." 
On cross-examination, the zoning administrator, however, 
conceded that subdivision of property is the responsibility of 
the Planning Commission.  And, when asked if his conclusion 
"assumed a consolidation had been approved," the zoning 
administrator replied, "Yes."  On re-direct, the zoning 
administrator then again stated that at the time of his 
response, he understood a consolidation of Columbia Baptist's 
seven lots had not taken place. 
At the conclusion of Columbia Baptist's evidence, the City 
moved to strike the evidence.  According to the City, Columbia 
Baptist failed to establish that the Planning Commission's 
disapproval was not properly based on the applicable ordinances, 
6 
or was arbitrary or capricious.  The City argued that the 
provisions of City Code § 38-34(4) require building sites to 
have the dimensions and area required by the applicable zoning 
designation.  The proposed consolidation, the City asserted, 
violated not only City Code § 48-800(a) by eliminating the lots 
on which the HCC-designated structures are located, but also 
City Code § 38-34(4) by reducing the lot sizes such that they no 
longer met the minimum lot size required in the R-1A zoning 
district. 
Columbia Baptist responded, arguing that although the 
Planning Commission was charged with approving consolidations, 
the zoning administrator was charged with interpreting zoning 
ordinances.  Thus, according to Columbia Baptist, the Planning 
Commission was required to follow the zoning administrator's 
interpretation that the proposed consolidation would not violate 
the zoning ordinances, specifically City Code § 48-800(a).  In 
addition, Columbia Baptist stated that it was not seeking to 
eliminate either the historic designations or the historic 
buildings. 
The circuit court granted the motion to strike.  The court 
concluded that although Columbia Baptist relied upon the zoning 
administrator's interpretation, the Planning Commission had "the 
authority and the right" to deny the application based on its 
7 
interpretation of the applicable zoning ordinances and that its 
decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Columbia Baptist filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that 
while the circuit court decided whether the Planning 
Commission's decision was arbitrary or capricious, it failed to 
determine whether the Planning Commission's decision was 
properly based on the applicable ordinances as required by Code 
§ 15.2-2259(D).  Columbia Baptist further asserted that the 
Planning Commission based its decision on erroneous facts, i.e., 
that the church intended to demolish the historic structures, 
and that the zoning administrator believed consolidation had 
already occurred when he responded to Columbia Baptist's request 
for a zoning interpretation.  Finally, Columbia Baptist argued 
that the zoning administrator's October 2006 letter was a 
decision or determination under Code § 15.2-2311(C) and 
consequently a "thing decided" since an appeal of that 
"determination" was not taken. 
The circuit court subsequently entered a final order 
granting the motion to strike, holding that Columbia Baptist 
failed to carry its burden to prove that the Planning 
Commission's decision was not properly based on the ordinances, 
or was arbitrary or capricious.  The court dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice, and this appeal followed. 
8 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Columbia Baptist challenges the circuit court's 
judgment on three grounds.  First, it asserts the circuit court 
applied the wrong standard of review in granting the City's 
motion to strike the evidence.  Next, Columbia Baptist contends 
the circuit court erroneously concluded that it failed to meet 
its burden of proof to show that the Planning Commission's 
decision was not properly based on the applicable ordinances, or 
was arbitrary or capricious.  Finally, Columbia Baptist argues 
the circuit court erred in finding that "the Planning Commission 
had the right and authority to disregard" the zoning 
administrator's interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a).  We 
will address the issues in that order. 
With regard to the first issue, Columbia Baptist correctly 
notes that a trial court is required to accept as true all 
evidence favorable to a plaintiff and any reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from such evidence when ruling on a motion to 
strike the plaintiff's evidence.  Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 
Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1997).  "The trial court is 
not to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence, and may 
9 
not reject any inference from the evidence favorable to the 
plaintiff unless it would defy logic and common sense."4  Id. 
Columbia Baptist argues that the circuit court failed to 
apply these principles because it did not accept as true the 
evidence favorable to the church when granting the motion to 
strike.  Instead, according to Columbia Baptist, the court 
accepted as true two factually incorrect assumptions upon which 
the Planning Commission purportedly based its decision: (1) that 
Columbia Baptist would destroy the historic structures if the 
consolidation were approved, and (2) that the zoning 
administrator based his interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a) 
on the belief that consolidation had already taken place.  
According to Columbia Baptist, its evidence demonstrated both 
that it had no plans to demolish the historic structures and 
that the zoning administrator did not think consolidation of the 
seven lots had already occurred.  Columbia Baptist thus argues 
that if the circuit court had accepted its evidence as true, it 
would have denied the motion to strike.  
Contrary to Columbia Baptist's assertions, the record 
contains no evidence that either the senior planner or the 
Planning Commission based their respective decisions on an 
                     
4 When reviewing a trial court's decision to strike a 
plaintiff's evidence, this Court likewise views the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Lee v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Va. 279, 284, 497 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1998). 
10 
assumption that the zoning administrator believed consolidation 
of the seven lots had already occurred.  Although the senior 
planner noted in her report that the zoning administrator's 
response was "based on 'circumstances arising out of an approved 
consolidation,'" she did not recommend denial of the 
consolidation application for that reason.  Rather, the senior 
planner explicitly stated, in both the analysis and 
recommendation portions of her report, that the proposed 
consolidation would eliminate the existing lot lines of the R-1A 
lots on which the historic structures are located, thereby 
reducing the size of those lots to zero in violation of City 
Code § 48-800(a).  The Planning Commission denied the 
consolidation application "for the reasons set forth in the 
[s]taff report and as stated in the [s]taff recommendations on 
Page 4 of the [s]taff report." 
Similarly, the Planning Commission did not base its denial 
of the consolidation application on the assumption that Columbia 
Baptist would demolish the historic structures if the 
consolidation were approved.  As Columbia Baptist notes, some 
citizens thought the historic buildings would be destroyed and, 
at the Planning Commission hearing, voiced their disapproval of 
the application for that reason.  And, some members of the 
Planning Commission expressed general concerns because they did 
not know Columbia Baptist's future development plans for the 
11 
lots.  Any concern about destruction of the historic structures, 
however, did not form the basis of the Planning Commission's 
decision, and Columbia Baptist's contention otherwise is 
inaccurate.  See West v. Mills, 238 Va. 162, 168, 380 S.E.2d 
917, 921 (1989) (finding insufficient evidence that a planning 
commission's decision was influenced by citizen pressure). 
In the absence of evidence showing that the Planning 
Commission based its decision on incorrect factual assumptions, 
the circuit court necessarily did not fail to accept as true the 
evidence favorable to Columbia Baptist as well as all reasonable 
inferences drawn from that evidence.  See Austin, 254 Va. at 
138, 486 S.E.2d at 287.  In sum, this assigned error has no 
merit. 
In its second assignment of error, Columbia Baptist asserts 
the circuit court erred in finding that it failed to meet its 
burden of proof to demonstrate, pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-2259(D) 
and -2260(E), that the Planning Commission's decision was not 
properly based on the applicable zoning ordinances, or was 
arbitrary or capricious.5  Citing Seymour v. City of Alexandria, 
273 Va. 661, 643 S.E.2d 198 (2007), Columbia Baptist first 
                     
5 Columbia Baptist filed its consolidation application as 
both a preliminary and final subdivision plat, see Code §§ 15.2-
2259(D) and –2260(E), respectively.  The circuit court's final 
order, however, references only Code § 15.2-2260(E).  The 
operative language in both sections is identical. 
12 
argues that the Planning Commission failed to base its decision 
on the applicable ordinances "but instead [relied] on a 
misinterpretation of the ordinance and upon the Planning 
Commission's desire to have before it an application showing 
[Columbia Baptist's] (as yet undetermined) development plans for 
the properties' future use."  As already explained, the Planning 
Commission's determination was not based on concerns regarding 
Columbia Baptist's future development plans, or the lack 
thereof, for the property.  Although some Planning Commission 
members voiced concerns about the absence of such plans, the 
Planning Commission's denial of the consolidation application 
was based on the senior planner's report and the conclusion that 
the proposed consolidation would violate City Code § 48-800(a). 
In Seymour, the public as well as planning commission 
members voiced concerns about future use of certain property, 
and the commission actually stated those concerns as one of the 
reasons for disapproving an application for a preliminary 
subdivision plat.  273 Va. at 665-66, 643 S.E.2d at 200.  In 
contrast, the Planning Commission here did not rely upon future 
development plans as a basis for denying Columbia Baptist's 
consolidation application. 
Columbia Baptist further argues that although the circuit 
court concluded the Planning Commission's denial of the 
consolidation application was not arbitrary or capricious, it 
13 
failed to address whether that denial was "properly based on the 
applicable ordinance."  Our review of the record reveals that 
the circuit court did not fail to determine whether the Planning 
Commission's decision was properly based on the applicable 
ordinances.  In granting the motion to strike, the circuit court 
stated that "the [P]lanning [C]ommission [had] the authority and 
the right to do what [it] did."  That statement necessarily 
reflects the circuit court's conclusion that the Planning 
Commission's decision was properly based on the applicable 
ordinances. 
Finally, with regard to the second assignment of error, 
Columbia Baptist contends that since the zoning administrator 
concluded the consolidation would be permissible under City Code 
§ 48-800(a), the Planning Commission's interpretation to the 
contrary was arbitrary or capricious.  Columbia Baptist asserts 
not only that the Planning Commission misinterpreted the zoning 
administrator's position,6 but also that there was no evidence 
the zoning administrator's interpretation was wrong.  In sum, 
Columbia Baptist argues it carried its burden to demonstrate 
that the Planning Commission's denial of its consolidation 
                     
6 As already explained, the Planning Commission did not base 
its denial of the consolidation application on erroneous factual 
assumptions. 
14 
application was not based on the applicable ordinances, and was 
arbitrary or capricious. 
A trial court must sustain a planning commission's decision 
approving or disapproving a preliminary or final subdivision 
plat unless the decision "was not properly based on the 
ordinance applicable thereto, or was arbitrary or capricious."  
Code §§ 15.2-2259(D) and -2260(E); see also Board of Supervisors 
of Culpeper County v. Greengael, L.L.C., 271 Va. 266, 277, 626 
S.E.2d 357, 363 (2006).  On appeal, "the trial court's judgment 
is presumed correct and will not be set aside unless the 
judgment is plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence."  
Greengael, 271 Va. at 277, 626 S.E.2d at 363. 
The ordinance at issue, City Code § 48-800(a), states:  
A lot in the R-1A . . . district on which a 
designated structure is located shall not be reduced 
in size such that it no longer meets the minimum lot 
size, frontage, and setback requirements of a lot in 
the R-1A district.  A lot existing at the time of 
designation of the structure which is substandard with 
respect to the minimum lot size, frontage, or setback 
requirements of a lot in the R-1A district shall not 
be further reduced in size, unless any substandard 
feature remains unaffected. 
 
Further, according to City Code § 38-1, a "[s]ubdivision" 
includes, inter alia, "the consolidation of two or more lots or 
parcels." 
We agree with the circuit court that the Planning 
Commission's decision was properly based on the applicable 
15 
ordinances, and was not arbitrary or capricious.  Columbia 
Baptist's application proposed, in part, to consolidate three 
lots containing historic structures into one, larger lot.  
According to City Code § 48-800(a), each of those lots cannot 
"be reduced in size such that it no longer meets the minimum lot 
size, frontage, and setback requirements."  Consolidating the 
three lots upon which the historic structures are located 
necessarily requires the elimination of lot lines, meaning the 
lots would no longer satisfy the frontage and setback 
requirements.  In addition, as the senior planner explained in 
her report, extinguishing the lines for three lots means that "a 
building site containing the minimum lot area for R-1A lots 
would not be provided for each of the designated structures."  
(Emphasis added.) 
We have defined an act as "arbitrary and capricious" when 
it is " 'willful and unreasonable' and taken 'without 
consideration or in disregard of facts or law or without 
determining principle,' " School Bd. of the City of Norfolk v. 
Wescott, 254 Va. 218, 224, 492 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1997)(citation 
omitted), or when the deciding body "departed from the 
appropriate standard in making its decision."  Johnson v. Prince 
William County Sch. Bd., 241 Va. 383, 389 n.9, 404 S.E.2d 209, 
212 n.9 (1991).  In denying Columbia Baptist's consolidation 
application on the basis of City Code § 48-800(a), the Planning 
16 
Commission did not disregard facts, applicable law, determining 
principles, or the appropriate standards.  In sum, Columbia 
Baptist failed to show that the Planning Commission’s denial of 
its consolidation application was not properly based on the 
applicable ordinances, or was arbitrary or capricious.  Thus, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding that 
Columbia Baptist failed to satisfy its burden of proof under 
Code §§ 15.2-2259(D) and -2260(E). 
Finally, in the third assignment of error, Columbia Baptist 
asserts the circuit court erred in ruling that the Planning 
Commission had the authority to ignore the zoning 
administrator's interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a).  
According to Columbia Baptist, the provisions of Code § 15.2-
2311(C) prohibited the Planning Commission from rejecting the 
zoning administrator’s interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a) 
because that interpretation was not appealed within 60 days.  
Columbia Baptist further argues that the zoning administrator 
alone has the authority to administer and enforce the zoning 
ordinances and his interpretation was made in that official 
capacity.  The Planning Commission, although given the power to 
approve consolidation of lots, does not have the authority to 
administer zoning ordinances and was required, according to 
Columbia Baptist, to accept the zoning administrator’s 
interpretation. 
17 
We agree with the City that Code § 15.2-2311(C) is not 
applicable in this case.  That section states:  
In no event shall a written order, requirement, 
decision or determination made by the zoning 
administrator or other administrative officer be 
subject to change, modification or reversal by any 
zoning administrator or other administrative officer 
after 60 days have elapsed from the date of the 
written order, requirement, decision or determination 
where the person aggrieved has materially changed his 
position in good faith reliance on the action of the 
zoning administrator or other administrative officer 
unless it is proven that such written order, 
requirement, decision or determination was obtained 
through malfeasance of the zoning administrator or 
other administrative officer or through fraud. The 60-
day limitation period shall not apply in any case 
where, with the concurrence of the attorney for the 
governing body, modification is required to correct 
clerical or other nondiscretionary errors. 
 
Code § 15.2-2311(C).   
By its terms, the statute only limits the subsequent 
actions of a "zoning administrator or other administrative 
officer."  Id.  The Planning Commission, however, is neither.  
Because "administrative officer" is not defined in the statute, 
we give the term its ordinary meaning.  Thompson v. 
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 280, 289, 673 S.E.2d 469, 473 (2009).  The 
term "administrative officer" is singular.  In contrast, a 
planning commission consists of five to fifteen members who are 
appointed by the governing body and must be residents of the 
locality.  Code § 15.2-2212. 
18 
Furthermore, Code §§ 15.2-2309(1) and –2311(A) refer to 
"administrative officer[s] in the administration or enforcement 
of this article," i.e., Article 7 pertaining to zoning.  In 
contrast, Article 2 contains the statutory provisions regarding 
local planning commissions, which "serve primarily in an 
advisory capacity to the governing bodies."  Code § 15.2-2210.  
Thus, the Planning Commission is not an "administrative 
officer." 
In addition, the provision in Code § 15.2-2311(C) 
prohibiting "change, modification or reversal" pertains only to 
a zoning administrator's or other administrative officer's 
"written order, requirement, decision or determination."  In 
this case, however, the zoning administrator merely provided an 
interpretation of City Code § 48-800(a).  In its letter to the 
zoning administrator, Columbia Baptist requested "a zoning 
interpretation."  And in his reply letter, the zoning 
administrator made clear that he was responding to "a request 
for an interpretation."  He further stated: "While the actual 
consolidation process is a Planning Commission function[,] it is 
my interpretation" that the ordinances permit the consolidation.  
(Emphasis added.)  That "interpretation" lacked the finality of 
an "order, requirement, decision or determination" under 
Code § 15.2-2311(C).  See Board of Supervisors of Stafford 
County v. Crucible, 278 Va. 152, 160-61, 677 S.E.2d 283, 287-88 
19 
(2009) (finding that Code § 15.2-2311(C) did not apply to a 
zoning verification letter because the letter did not 
affirmatively approve the project at issue and establish a 
vested right, but merely interpreted the definition of "school" 
under the then-current zoning laws); see also Code § 15.2-
2286(A)(4) (discussing a zoning administrator's decision on an 
application for modification from an ordinance and stating that 
"[t]he decision of the zoning administrator shall constitute a 
decision within the purview of [Code] § 15.2-2311). 
Regardless of the applicability of Code § 15.2-2311(C), 
Columbia Baptist, nevertheless, maintains that the Planning 
Commission has no authority to interpret zoning ordinances 
because that responsibility lies exclusively with the zoning 
administrator by virtue of Code § 15.2-2286(A)(4).  However, 
pursuant to City Code § 38-4 and City Charter § 17.29 as well as 
Code § 15.2-2259, the Planning Commission has the authority to 
approve subdivision plats.  See also Code § 15.2-2258 (requiring 
landowner to submit a proposed subdivision plat to a planning 
commission).  Further, the Planning Commission is required to 
provide specific reasons for disapproving a plat by 
"identify[ing] deficiencies in the plat that cause the 
disapproval by reference to specific duly adopted ordinances, 
regulations, or policies."  Code § 15.2-2259(A); see also City 
Charter § 17.29 (the Planning Commission must consider a 
20 
subdivision plat in "the light of the regulations and 
restrictions applicable to the same and approve or disapprove 
the plat in accordance therewith").  The Planning Commission 
thus necessarily must interpret and apply relevant zoning 
ordinances in approving or disapproving a proposed subdivision 
plat.7  The Planning Commission was not obliged to adopt the 
zoning administrator’s "interpretation" of City Code § 48-
800(a).  Thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that the 
Planning Commission could disregard the zoning administrator's 
interpretation in deciding whether to approve or disapprove the 
consolidation application. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
                     
7 Columbia Baptist also argues that City Code § 38-89 makes 
the approval of its subdivision application a "ministerial" act.  
That section, however, deals with the consolidation of vacated 
plats and is inapplicable to this case. 
21