Title: Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC18696
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: September 11, 2012

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BARBARA O. MURPHY ET AL. v. EAPWJP, LLC, ET AL.
(SC 18696)
Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Harper, Js.*
Argued April 24—officially released September 18, 2012
Thomas P. Moriarty, for the appellant (named
defendant).
John R. Fitzgerald, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Edward B. O’Connell, for the appellees (defendant
Steven Dodd et al.).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The named defendant, EAPWJP, LLC
(EAP),1 appeals from the judgment of the Appellate
Court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting
the plaintiffs, Barbara O. Murphy, Bruce Jablonski,
Geoffrey B. Corkhill, Aline T. Pollard, and Donald L.
Kooken, and the defendants-cross claimants, Steven
Dodd and Marion Dodd,2 a prescriptive easement over
a pathway crossing property owned by EAP that the
plaintiffs and the Dodds had used for many years to
access a nearby beach. The pathway traversed pro-
tected tidal wetlands and was covered in part by a
wooden walkway installed without appropriate per-
mits. On appeal, EAP initially asked this court to
address whether the Appellate Court improperly con-
cluded that the plaintiffs and the Dodds ‘‘had acquired
a prescriptive easement on a pathway over [EAP’s] tidal
wetlands even though the wooden walkway over which
they traveled was in violation of [General Statutes §§]
22a-32 and 22a-361 during the prescriptive period’’ and
was ‘‘deemed a public nuisance under [General Stat-
utes] § 22a-362 . . . .’’ Thereafter, in granting certifica-
tion to appeal, we reframed the certified question to
omit reference to the statutory provisions and to ask
‘‘[w]hether the Appellate Court properly concluded that
construction and use of a walkway deemed to be a per
se public nuisance can establish a prescriptive ease-
ment over the underlying tidal wetlands . . . .’’ Mur-
phy v. EAPWJP, LLC, 298 Conn. 930, 5 A.3d 489 (2010).
We now conclude that the issue raised by the certified
question, in both its original and revised form, goes
beyond the scope of the record below, and, therefore,
the issue has not been properly preserved. Accordingly,
we conclude that certification was improvidently
granted and dismiss the appeal.
The record reflects the following relevant facts and
procedural history. All of the parties own residential
property in the ‘‘White Beach’’ section of Lord’s Point
in the town of Stonington. Unlike EAP, however, neither
the plaintiffs nor the Dodds own beachfront property.
Instead, the plaintiffs and the Dodds accessed the beach
for many years by traversing EAP’s property using a
pathway over the tidal wetlands, which was partially
covered by the wooden walkway and a wooden bridge.3
By 1972, all of the plaintiffs and the Dodds, or their
predecessors in interest, had begun using the pathway
to access the beach for recreational purposes, which
included activities such as swimming, sunbathing and
boating.4 The plaintiffs and the Dodds did not seek
permission from EAP to use the pathway. Several of
the plaintiffs and the Dodds also undertook activities
to maintain the walkway. Neither the plaintiffs nor the
Dodds, however, sought permits from the department
of environmental protection (department) before con-
structing,
repairing
or
otherwise
maintaining
the
walkway.
In 2007, in response to notification by the department
that the walkway was in violation of permitting require-
ments, EAP removed it and informed the plaintiffs and
the Dodds that it was revoking its consent for them to
use the pathway. The plaintiffs and the Dodds nonethe-
less continued to use the pathway to access the beach.
On or about May 8, 2007, the plaintiffs brought this
action against EAP and the Dodds. In their complaint,
the plaintiffs first sought to establish prescriptive ease-
ment rights to property owned by EAP and the Dodds5
over which a portion of the pathway crossed. In sepa-
rate counts that later were withdrawn, the plaintiffs also
sought damages and injunctive relief for restoration of
the wooden walkway.6 The Dodds filed a cross claim
against EAP on similar grounds, seeking a prescriptive
easement over the same portion of EAP’s property pro-
viding access to the beach.7 The Dodds also sought
damages and injunctive relief.
In its answers to the plaintiffs’ complaint and the
Dodds’
cross
claim,
EAP
raised
several
special
defenses, one of which was that it had removed the
walkway because it was in violation of §§ 22a-32 and
22a-361 and was adversely affecting statutorily pro-
tected tidal wetlands.8 EAP based this assertion on a
letter it had received from Susan L. Bailey, an environ-
mental analyst with the department, in which she stated
that EAP would be required to remove the unauthorized
walkway before the department could grant EAP per-
mission to make other improvements that it desired to
undertake. In a motion in limine, however, the plaintiffs
challenged the proffered testimony of Bailey and that
of John B. Lust, EAP’s permitting agent, regarding these
alleged environmental violations, arguing that such tes-
timony was no longer relevant following the withdrawal
of their claim of a property right in the walkway. The
trial court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion
in limine and excluded the testimony.9 EAP did not
challenge this ruling on appeal.
On August 17, 2007, EAP filed a counterclaim against
the plaintiffs, asserting trespass with respect to the
pathway and the installation of certain mooring poles
on or near the beach, and nuisance with respect to the
mooring poles. Several weeks later, EAP filed a cross
counterclaim against the Dodds, asserting one count of
trespass with respect to the pathway. In these pleadings,
EAP did not allege either private or public nuisance
with respect to the walkway.
On May 7, 2009, before testimony began on the first
day of the two day bench trial, the plaintiffs informed
the trial court that they had withdrawn the second and
third counts of their complaint seeking injunctive relief
and damages, respectively. The Dodds also withdrew
that part of their cross claim seeking injunctive relief
and damages on similar grounds.
On May 29, 2009, after the trial had concluded and
the parties had submitted simultaneous trial briefs but
before the trial court issued its memorandum of deci-
sion, EAP filed a motion for leave to amend its counter-
claim against the plaintiffs to include a count of public
nuisance with respect to the plaintiff’s unauthorized
use and maintenance of the walkway.10 EAP also sought
to add an analogous public nuisance count to its cross
counterclaim against the Dodds. Considering ‘‘factors
of fairness, injustice, negligence and delay,’’ the trial
court denied both requests on June 10, 2009, a ruling
from which EAP did not appeal.
On June 17, 2009, the trial court issued its memoran-
dum of decision. The trial court concluded that the
plaintiffs and the Dodds had acquired a prescriptive
easement over the portion of EAP’s property where the
pathway ran and rendered judgment accordingly. The
court also concluded that ‘‘[t]he plaintiffs shall have
the [right] to maintain and improve the [pathway] as
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of its intended
purpose, subject to whatever regulation, if any, may be
imposed by a governmental authority hav[ing] jurisdic-
tion over such activity.’’ In addition, the trial court deter-
mined that ‘‘[n]o rights are established in favor of the
plaintiffs as to the unauthorized wooden walkway,
which has since been removed,’’ and that, ‘‘as the plain-
tiffs, their predecessors, and [the Dodds had] main-
tained, modified and replaced the wooden walkway
over the years, they were in violation of . . . § 22a-361
and § 22a-32.’’ With respect to the Dodds’ claims, the
trial court concluded that the Dodds also had estab-
lished a prescriptive easement over the pathway and
incorporated its decision regarding the plaintiffs’ ease-
ment to define ‘‘[t]he scope, description, use and loca-
tion’’ of the Dodds’ prescriptive easement.
Thereafter, EAP appealed to the Appellate Court,
asserting that the trial court improperly concluded that
the plaintiffs and the Dodds had established an ease-
ment over its property to access the beach.11 See Mur-
phy v. EAPWJP, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 316, 318, 1 A.3d
1171 (2010). In its brief to the Appellate Court, EAP
argued, inter alia, that the lack of a permit for the
installation and maintenance of the walkway should
render it a public nuisance under § 22a-362 and should
nullify the prescriptive easement because the trial court
had found that the walkway was in violation of § 22a-
361. See Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, Conn. Appellate
Court Records & Briefs, May Term, 2010, Named Defen-
dant’s Brief pp. 6–7. In their appellate briefs, the plain-
tiffs and the Dodds countered that such claims
addressed whether the plaintiffs and the Dodds had a
property right in the unauthorized walkway—a claim
that both the plaintiffs and the Dodds had withdrawn
at or immediately before trial—rather than whether
they could establish a prescriptive easement over EAP’s
property. Id., Plaintiffs’ Brief pp. 2–3, 7–10; id., Brief of
Defendant Steven Dodd et al. pp. 14–17. The plaintiffs
also argued that EAP was seeking to apply an inapplica-
ble statute, as § 22a-362 applies only to activities water-
ward of the high tide line. Id., Plaintiffs’ Brief pp. 3–5.
The plaintiffs maintained that the pathway was ‘‘not
waterward of the high tide line but [was] landward of
the high tide line.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., p. 4. EAP
did not expressly challenge, on appeal to the Appellate
Court, the trial court’s denial of its request to add a
public nuisance count to its counterclaim against the
plaintiffs and its cross counterclaim against the Dodds,
nor did it challenge the trial court’s failure to address
whether the walkway constituted a public nuisance.
The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court
properly determined that the plaintiffs and the Dodds
had established an easement over EAP’s property. See
Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, supra, 123 Conn. App. 322–23.
The Appellate Court also upheld the trial court’s conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs and the Dodds had ‘‘no right to
maintain the wooden walkway over the pathway
. . . .’’ Id., 322. On this basis, and without addressing
the application of §§ 22a-361 and 22a-362 to the present
case, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judg-
ment, thereby upholding the plaintiffs’ and the Dodds’
prescriptive easement claims. See id., 322–23, 335. This
appeal followed.
As previously explained, EAP, in its petition for certi-
fication to appeal to this court, asked this court to
certify the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court
err in concluding that the plaintiffs and the [Dodds]
had acquired a prescriptive easement on a pathway
over [EAP’s] tidal wetlands even though the wooden
walkway over which they traveled was in violation of
. . . [§§] 22a-32 and 22a-361 during the prescriptive
period . . . and deemed a public nuisance under . . .
§ 22a-362?’’ In reframing the certified question, we omit-
ted any reference to § 22a-362 and simply stated that the
question was ‘‘[w]hether the Appellate Court properly
concluded that construction and use of a walkway
deemed to be a per se public nuisance can establish a
prescriptive easement over the underlying tidal wet-
lands . . . .’’ Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, supra, 298
Conn. 930. Significantly, neither version of the question
adequately reflects the record of this case because nei-
ther the trial court nor the Appellate Court relied on
the plaintiffs’ or the Dodds’ use of the walkway in con-
cluding that a prescriptive easement had been estab-
lished. Indeed, the trial court took pains to separate
the withdrawn claims of a property right in the walkway
from the claims of a prescriptive easement over EAP’s
land, an approach that the Appellate Court respected
and followed.
It is well established that a claim must be distinctly
raised at trial to be preserved for appeal. Practice Book
§ 60-5; see, e.g., Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn.
483, 498–99, 43 A.3d 69 (2012); New Haven v. Bonner,
272 Conn. 489, 498, 863 A.2d 680 (2005); River Bend
Associates, Inc. v. Conservation & Inland Wetlands
Commission, 269 Conn. 57, 82, 848 A.2d 395 (2004). In
the present case, EAP attempted to amend its counter-
claim and cross counterclaim to add public nuisance
claims after the trial had concluded, but before the
court rendered judgment, which the trial court denied
for reasons of ‘‘fairness, injustice, negligence and delay
. . . .’’ EAP, however, never challenged the trial court’s
denial of its eleventh hour attempt to amend its counter-
claim and cross counterclaim, and, thus, the issue was
not preserved for appeal and is not appropriately before
this court.
Accordingly, after examining the entire record on
appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments
of the parties, we have determined that the appeal
should be dismissed on the ground that certification
was improvidently granted.
The appeal is dismissed.
* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
1 EAP, a limited liability company, is the successor in interest to Eunice
A. Pasqualini and William J. Pasqualini. The Pasqualinis transferred their
interests in the property at issue in this case to EAP, of which they were
the only members. At the time of trial, following the death of Eunice A.
Pasqualini, William J. Pasqualini was the sole member of EAP.
2 Steven Dodd and Marion Dodd, who were named as defendants in the
plaintiffs’ complaint, filed a cross claim against EAP. EAP and the Dodds
had both claimed title to a certain triangular shaped parcel over which a
portion of the pathway passed. The trial court rendered judgment quieting
title to that parcel in favor of the Dodds, a conclusion that the parties do
not challenge on appeal. Like the plaintiffs, the Dodds also claimed that they
have established a prescriptive easement over the portion of the pathway
crossing EAP’s property.
3 The wooden bridge crossed over a stream or salt marsh drainage ditch
and was attached to the wooden walkway. Hereinafter, all references in
this opinion to the walkway include the bridge.
4 Under Connecticut law, a party claiming a prescriptive easement may
tack on the statutory period of predecessors in interest when there is privity
of estate. See, e.g., Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn. 297, 310 n.14, 12 A.3d 984
(2011); Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530, 531–32 (1863). Thus, in the interest
of simplicity, and because the propriety of tacking is not disputed in the
present case, references to the activities of the plaintiffs and the Dodds on
the pathway include the activities of their predecessors in interest.
5 See footnote 2 of this opinion.
6 The plaintiffs withdrew these claims on the first day of trial, leading the
trial court to consider only the plaintiffs’ prescriptive easement claim.
7 The trial court also found that the plaintiffs and the Dodds had established
an easement to use a portion of the beach for recreational purposes, which
EAP does not challenge on appeal.
8 EAP also asserted a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, alleging trespass
with respect to the pathway and the installation of certain mooring poles
on or near the beach, and alleging nuisance with respect to the mooring
poles. EAP asserted an analogous cross counterclaim against the Dodds,
alleging trespass with respect to the pathway.
9 Bailey’s letter ultimately was admitted into evidence for other purposes
during testimony introduced by EAP regarding its claim concerning the
installation of the mooring poles. See footnote 8 of this opinion.
10 In its brief to the trial court, EAP, using an argument similar to that
which it used in trying to persuade the trial court to deny the plaintiffs’
motion in limine, specifically sought to connect the unauthorized walkway
to the establishment of the prescriptive easement. EAP then sought to amend
its counterclaim and cross counterclaim to include public nuisance claims.
The trial court thereafter denied EAP’s request.
11 EAP also raised three other issues on appeal to the Appellate Court,
which were related to the installation of the mooring poles; see footnote 8
of this opinion; and an implied easement claim asserted by the Dodds. See
Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 316, 318–19, 1 A.3d 1171 (2010).
None of these issues is germane to the present appeal.