Title: Cindy Prill, as administratix of the estate of Michael David Prill, deceased v. Sean W. Marrone et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050332
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 2009

Rel 02/20/2009 Prill
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1050332
____________________
Cindy Prill, as administratrix of the estate of Michael
David Prill, deceased
v.
Sean W. Marrone et al.
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court 
(CV-04-1175)
PER CURIAM.
Cindy Prill, as the administratrix of the estate of
Michael David Prill, her deceased son, appeals from a summary
judgment entered in favor of Sean Marrone ("Sean"), John
Marrone ("Mr. Marrone"), and Justin R. Beams in Ms. Prill's
wrongful-death and negligent-entrustment action against them.
1050332
2
Procedural History
On July 15, 2004, Ms. Prill sued Justin, Sean, and Mr.
Marrone, alleging wrongful death against Justin and Sean and
negligent entrustment against Mr. Marrone.  Ms. Prill also
sought to hold Sean and Justin civilly liable for Michael's
death on a conspiracy theory.  Mr. Marrone is Sean's father.
Sean and Mr. Marrone filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, which the trial court denied.  Separately, Justin
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, which the trial court also
denied. 
On August 17, 2004, Sean and Mr. Marrone filed their
answer to Ms. Prill's complaint, denying the material
allegations of the complaint and pleading the affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk.  On August 2, 2005, Justin filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  On August 8, 2005, Sean and Mr. Marrone filed a
motion for a summary judgment.  On November 8, 2005, the trial
court granted the motions for a summary judgment.  Ms. Prill
appealed.
1050332
3
Facts
This case is based on the events that led to Michael's
death from a single gunshot wound to the head, which was
inflicted by a .38 Special Smith & Wesson brand handgun owned
by Mr. Marrone.  Michael was 20 years old at the time of his
death; Sean and Justin were 17 years old.
On July 21, 2002, Sean entered Mr. Marrone's bedroom
closet, while Mr. Marrone was asleep in the bedroom, and
removed four guns, including the .38 handgun that later killed
Michael and a .45-caliber Glock brand handgun, and some
ammunition from a closet.  Sean did not have Mr. Marrone's
permission to remove any guns from the closet.  Mr. Marrone
testified that neither the closet nor the guns in the closet
were secured with locks. 
On at least one prior occasion, Sean had removed a gun
from his father's closet without permission.  On that
occasion, Mr. Marrone warned Sean not ever again to remove any
guns from the closet, and it appears that Mr. Marrone grounded
Sean for having done so on that occasion.  This incident
happened at least six months before the events here.
1050332
4
Shortly after Sean removed the guns from his father's
closet, Justin arrived at Sean's house.  Sean and Justin
placed the guns and ammunition in Justin's vehicle and then
drove to Michael's mobile home to "go shooting" with him.  Two
days before this event, Sean, Justin, and Michael had gathered
at Michael's mobile home and shot a shotgun that belonged to
Michael.  
Upon arriving at Michael's mobile home, Sean placed the
.38 handgun and some bullets for it in the front pocket of his
pants, and Justin concealed the Glock in his hand.  They
knocked on the front door of the mobile home at around 3:30
p.m., and Ms. Prill allowed Sean and Justin to enter the
mobile home.  Ms. Prill did not know that they brought guns
into her house until after the shooting.  Also present in the
mobile home were Michael and Ms. Prill's boyfriend, Lance
Smelley.  Smelley was asleep in the master bedroom when Sean
and Justin arrived.  
After Sean and Justin woke Michael from a nap, Sean,
Justin, and Michael went into the dining room of the mobile
home and played a game with the .38 handgun, which was
unloaded.  The game consisted of each of the boys taking turns
1050332
5
placing the gun in his "wallet" and then pulling the gun out
of his wallet and acting like he was robbing a store.  Ms.
Prill, who was in another room, asked the boys to quiet down.
The boys then returned to Michael's bedroom.  
After returning to Michael's bedroom, all three boys took
turns handling the .38 handgun.  Each boy would take a turn
putting a bullet into one chamber of the handgun, spin the
cylinder, and close the cylinder to see where the bullet had
landed.  These actions were meant to imitate Russian roulette,
but the boys did not point the .38 handgun at anyone,
including themselves. 
At some point, Sean began loading bullets into all but
one of the chambers of the .38 handgun and spinning the
cylinder to see where the empty chamber would land.  While
Sean was doing this, Ms. Prill knocked on the bedroom door.
Before Ms. Prill entered the bedroom, Sean laid the loaded gun
beside Michael, who was lying on his bed.  Ms. Prill stuck her
head in the bedroom door and asked Michael if he had a piece
of paper with a neighbor's telephone number on it.  Michael
responded that he did not have the piece of paper, so Ms.
Prill left the room.  According to Sean, shortly after Ms.
1050332
Ms. Prill testified that Michael was left-handed and that
1
he was uncoordinated using his right hand but no more so than
a typical left-handed person would be.  Ms. Prill acknowledged
that Michael had broken his left hand in October 2001 and that
he was required to use his right hand more while his left hand
was in a cast.
6
Prill left the room, Michael, who was left-handed, picked up
the .38 handgun with his right hand  and said, "[L]et's play
1
Russian roulette."  Michael immediately pointed the gun at his
head and pulled the trigger.  The gun fired once, and a bullet
struck Michael in his right temple, killing him.  
Justin testified that he was walking out of the bedroom
door when the gun was fired.  Justin said that he turned
around and saw Sean standing near the foot of the bed where he
had been sitting moments before.  Ms. Prill testified that
only 15 or 20 seconds elapsed from the time she left Michael's
bedroom until she heard the shot.  Ms. Prill further testified
that it did not occur to her that anything odd or unusual was
going on in the bedroom when she spoke to Michael.  Justin and
Sean agreed that Michael did not know that the gun was loaded
before he picked it up, placed it to the right side of his
head, and pulled the trigger.
Dr. William Shores, a forensic pathologist for the
Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, performed an autopsy
1050332
7
on Michael.  Dr. Shores testified that he could not determine
whether the gun was fired by Michael or by someone else.
Justin testified that Michael had said that he had played
Russian roulette before, but Justin did not believe him.
According to Justin, Michael was reckless and seemed always to
be depressed.  Justin further testified that Michael had
wrecked his sister's automobile because he was upset and he
said that he had wanted to kill himself.  Sean testified that,
at some time before the day Michael died, Sean had asked
Michael if he would ever play Russian roulette and he
responded that he would play.
Ms. Prill acknowledged that she did not have any personal
knowledge that either Sean or Justin had handled the gun that
caused Michael's death or that either Sean or Justin had
coerced or tricked Michael into handling the gun or pulling
the trigger himself.  Ms. Prill testified that she had no
knowledge, personal or otherwise, as to who actually pulled
the trigger.
Ms. Prill described Michael as a kindhearted, fun-loving
person, who loved to make people smile.  Ms. Prill testified
that Michael was "doing okay" psychologically around the time
1050332
8
of the shooting, that he had never had any psychological
treatment or counseling, and that she had never known him to
express any suicidal thoughts or to have any suicidal
tendencies.  Ms. Prill further testified that Michael had gone
through "some typical teenage stuff with girls breaking up
with him" but nothing that caused her great concern.  Ms.
Prill indicated that Michael was very responsible with guns,
and she testified that he had taken a hunter's safety course.
Standard of Review
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.
"'In reviewing the disposition of a
motion for summary judgment, "we utilize
the same standard as the trial court in
determining whether the evidence before
[it] made out a genuine issue of material
fact," Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d
860, 862 (Ala. 1988), and whether the
movant was "entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Wright v. Wright, 654 So.
2d 542 (Ala. 1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence
creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust
Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 
(Ala. 
1989). 
Evidence 
is
"substantial" if it is of "such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment 
can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact
1050332
9
sought to be proved." Wright, 654 So. 2d at
543 
(quoting 
West 
v. 
Founders 
Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further
subject to the caveat that this Court must
review the record in a light most favorable
to the nonmovant and must resolve all
reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma
Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc.,
613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993) [overruled on
other grounds, Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47
(Ala. 2003)]; Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie,
Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1990).'"
Pittman v. United Toll Sys., LLC, 882 So. 2d 842, 844 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.
2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1997)).
Issues and Analysis
First, Ms. Prill asserts that she presented substantial
evidence indicating that Justin's and Sean's negligence caused
Michael's death.  Specifically, Ms. Prill alleges that Sean
and/or Justin negligently concealed handguns on their person
and brought the guns into her house, in violation of § 13A-11-
73, Ala. Code. 1975, and that they negligently handled the
guns.  In their motions for a summary judgment, Justin, Sean,
and Mr. Marrone argued that, as a matter of law, Justin's and
Sean's allegedly negligent conduct was not the proximate cause
of Michael's death because, they said, Michael's unforeseen
1050332
10
actions intervened and were the superseding cause of the
injury. 
"The elements of a negligence claim are a duty, a breach
of that duty, causation, and damage." Armstrong Bus. Servs.,
Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679 (Ala. 2001).  "It is
settled law in Alabama that even if one negligently creates a
dangerous condition, he or she is not responsible for injury
that results from the intervention of another cause, if at the
time of the original negligence, the intervening cause cannot
reasonably be foreseen." Sims v. Crates, 789 So. 2d 220, 224
(Ala. 2000) (citing Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272
(Ala. 1993)).  "In such cases, we have held that the
defendant's negligence is not the 'proximate cause' of the
plaintiff's injury, and, therefore, that the defendant is not
liable." Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275.  "Such an unforeseen
agency, which breaks the chain of causation that otherwise
might 
have 
linked 
the 
defendant's 
negligence 
to 
the
plaintiff's injury, has been referred to as an 'intervening
efficient cause.'" Id.  "In order for conduct to be considered
an intervening efficient cause, it must (1) occur after the
defendant's negligent act, (2) be unforeseeable to the
1050332
11
defendant at the time he acts, and (3) be sufficient to be the
sole cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury." Id.
"In 
Gilmore, 
an 
employee 
at 
a 
gasoline
station/convenience store kept a loaded handgun on
a shelf beneath the counter in the store. The
plaintiff's son, Michael Gilmore, was a friend of
another employee. On the day he died, Michael had
gone to the store to visit his friend. The employee
who owned the handgun testified that on that day, he
had inadvertently left the handgun on the shelf
beneath the counter. Michael went behind the counter
to make a telephone call; while there, he took the
handgun from underneath the counter. His friend
testified that Michael 'opened the chamber of the
handgun and removed all the bullets. Michael then
replaced one of the bullets, closed the chamber, put
the handgun to his head, and pulled the trigger.'
613 So. 2d at 1274. The shot killed Michael. This
Court held that his conduct was an efficient
intervening cause that negated any liability of the
defendants for any negligence on their part in
leaving the handgun on the shelf.
"'The death of Michael Gilmore is also
an 
unexplainable 
tragedy. 
We 
do 
not
understand, 
nor 
do 
we 
attempt 
to
rationalize, 
his 
deliberate 
and 
destructive
final act. However, we recognize that such
acts are not the ordinary and naturally
flowing consequences of the defendants'
negligent conduct in leaving the handgun
under the cashier's counter where it was
accessible to those persons who might find
themselves behind the cashier's counter.
What 
relieves 
the 
defendants 
of 
any
liability for Michael's death is that
Michael, 
by 
his 
own 
hands, 
acted
intentionally and deliberately in a manner
that was calculated to result in his own
death.'
1050332
12
"[613 So. 2d] at 1278."
Sims, 789 So. 2d at 224-25.
In Sims, the father of a teenager who shot himself while
attending a party at the home of a friend's stepfather brought
a wrongful-death action against the stepfather and the friend,
alleging that the teenager's death was the proximate result of
negligent, willful, or wanton acts on their part.  The
stepfather kept handguns in his bedroom in an unlocked cabinet
that was built into the headboard of his bed.  However, all
the handguns were stored unloaded, and the ammunition was kept
in a separate locked cabinet.  The teenager obtained a .357
handgun from the cabinet, but he obtained ammunition for the
handgun from another teenager who attended the party and not
from the stepfather's locked cabinet.  The teenager was taking
cartridges in and out of the chamber of the handgun and
spinning the chamber around.  Some girls told him to stop
playing with the gun.  The teenager stated that he could not
die, put the gun to his head, and pulled the trigger, but
nothing happened.  One of the girls left to get someone who
would take the gun away from the teenager, but while she was
gone he again put the gun to his head and pulled the trigger.
1050332
13
The gun discharged, killing the teenager. Sims, 789 So. 2d at
222-23.  This Court held that the teenager's own actions were
sufficient to break any chain of causation between the
stepfather's actions and the teenager's death. 789 So. 2d at
224. 
Likewise, in the present case, Michael's own negligent
and unforeseeable actions were sufficient to break any chain
of causation between Justin's and Sean's actions and Michael's
death.  Michael intentionally and suddenly picked up the .38
handgun, pointed it at his head, and pulled the trigger.
There is no evidence indicating that Justin or Sean coerced or
tricked Michael into handling the gun or pulling the trigger
or that they could foresee that Michael was about to take
these actions.  At the time of the shooting, the three friends
had been playing for approximately an hour without incident,
there had been no discussion of suicide, and they had not
actually played Russian roulette or pointed the gun at anyone
or at themselves.  Justin and Michael had simply gathered at
Michael's house to "go shooting" with him, as they had done
two days earlier.  
1050332
14
Furthermore, the fact that Michael may not have known
that the gun was loaded is irrelevant.  Ms. Prill testified
that Michael, who was 20 years old, had taken a hunter's
safety course, and there was evidence indicating that Michael
had some familiarity with guns.  As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated: "Any gun safety
course teaches and any reasonable gun user should know that no
gun, loaded or unloaded, should ever be pointed at [a] human,
much less pointed and mockingly fired." Davis v. McCourt, 226
F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 2000).  Therefore, even if Sean and/or
Justin negligently created a dangerous condition with their
actions, they are not responsible for Michael's death, which
resulted from the intervention of his unforeseeable conduct.
Michael's actions were unforeseeable as a matter of law and
were the proximate cause of his death.
Ms. Prill next argues, as an exception to the general
rule that suicide is an intervening cause that serves to break
all causal connections between the alleged negligent acts and
the death, that, assuming Michael committed suicide, Justin
and Sean "created an uncontrollable impulse in Michael which
led to suicide or caused a mental condition which resulted in
1050332
15
his suicide." (Ms. Prill's brief, at 30.)  In Vinson v. Clarke
County, Alabama, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1303-04 (S.D. Ala.
1998), the court stated:
"Under Alabama law, suicide generally functions
as an efficient intervening cause which serves to
break all causal connections between the alleged
wrongful or negligent acts and the death at issue.
See Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272,
1275-76 (Ala. 1993). Consequently, a defendant
cannot be found liable for the suicide of another
unless 'the relationship between a decedent and a
defendant is such that we expect the defendant to
take reasonable steps to protect the decedent from
deliberate and self-destructive injury.' Id. at
1278."
Furthermore, the court noted that "the Alabama Supreme Court
has indicated that liability for suicide might result in one
other circumstance, namely where a defendant created an
uncontrollable impulse in another which led to suicide, see
Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1276 ...." Vinson, 10 F. Supp. 2d at
1304.  Finally, the court recognized that "[w]here there is
neither a custodial relationship which would indicate the
foreseeability of suicide, or a claim of irresistible impulse,
Alabama law provides that 'suicide ... is unforeseeable as a
matter of law, and civil liability will not be imposed upon a
defendant for a decedent's suicide.'" 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1304
n.21 (quoting Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1278).  
1050332
16
This Court has not elaborated on what type of conduct by
a 
defendant 
might 
cause 
a 
victim 
to 
experience 
an
"uncontrollable impulse," so that the act of suicide is
considered to be the last link in the chain of causation from
the defendant's alleged wrongful act to the suicide and, thus,
the defendant's act is the proximate cause of death.  However,
other jurisdictions have explained that an "uncontrollable
impulse" consists of "a delirium, frenzy or rage, during which
the deceased commits suicide 'without conscious volition to
produce death.'" McMahon v. St. Croix Falls School Dist., 228
Wis. 2d 215, 225, 596 N.W.2d 875, 880 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Bogust v. Iverson, 10 Wis. 2d 129, 138, 102 N.W.2d
228, 232 (1960)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 455
(1965) (actor liable if actor's negligent conduct causes
another's insanity, making it impossible for the other to
resist an impulse caused by her insanity).  The key to finding
an "uncontrollable impulse" is finding that "the defendant
actually causes the suicide." McMahon, 228 Wis. 2d at 225, 596
N.W.2d at 880.  
In the present case, Ms. Prill has not presented any
evidence indicating that Justin or Sean caused Michael to
1050332
17
enter a "delirium, frenzy or rage" during which he committed
suicide.  In fact, Ms. Prill did not present any expert or
circumstantial evidence of Michael's state of mind at the
moment he shot himself.  Ms. Prill testified that she talked
to Michael seconds before he shot himself and that at that
time it did not occur to her that anything odd or unusual was
going on.  There is no evidence indicating that Justin's or
Sean's conduct caused Michael to surrender his own free will.
All the evidence presented to the trial court leads to the
conclusion that, with conscious volition, Michael recklessly
and without warning picked up the gun, pointed it at his head,
and pulled the trigger.  Ms. Prill failed to present
substantial evidence indicating that Justin and/or Sean
created an uncontrollable impulse in Michael that led to his
suicide.  Therefore, Ms. Prill has failed to present
substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact
in response to the properly supported summary-judgment
motions, and, thus, the summary judgment in favor of Justin
and Sean on her wrongful-death claim is affirmed.
Next, Ms. Prill alleges that she presented substantial
evidence to support her claim of negligent entrustment against
1050332
18
Mr. Marrone.  "'The essential ingredients of a cause of action
for negligent entrustment are: (1) an entrustment; (2) to an
incompetent; (3) with knowledge that he is incompetent; (4)
proximate cause; and (5) damages.'" Halford v. Alamo
Rent-A-Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409, 412 (Ala. 2005) (quoting
Mason v. New, 475 So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis
omitted)).  Mr. Marrone responds that he is not liable under
the theory of negligent entrustment because, he says, he did
not entrust the .38 handgun to Sean.  
This Court has not specifically defined the element of
entrustment in the context of a claim that alleges the
negligent entrustment of a gun.  However, in Edwards v.
Valentine, 926 So. 2d 315 (Ala. 2005), this Court discussed
the element of entrustment in the context of a claim alleging
the negligent entrustment of an automobile:
"'In Alabama, when one person drives a car
belonging to another, a rebuttable presumption of
entrustment, i.e., that the car was being operated
by the driver with the permission of the owner,
arises when ownership is established .... Thus, the
owner of a vehicle is faced with a substantial
burden in order to disprove an entrustment.' Note,
Negligent Entrustment in Alabama, 23 Ala. L. Rev.
733, 738 (Summer 1971) (emphasis added; footnote
omitted); see also Thompson v. Havard, 285 Ala. 718,
721, 235 So. 2d 853, 856 (1970). 'Entrustment can
include 
either 
[1] 
actual 
entrustment, 
[2]
1050332
19
continuing consent to use the vehicle, or [3]
leaving the vehicle available for use.' Note, supra,
at 738. A case of entrustment by 'leaving the
vehicle available' may occur, even though 'the
entrustor has not given ... permission [to use the
vehicle on a particular occasion] and may even have
expressly refused it.' Id. at 739 (emphasis added;
footnote omitted). 'In order to establish that there
has been an entrustment by leaving the vehicle
available, it must be shown that the entrustor knew
or 
had 
reason 
to 
know 
that 
the 
particular
incompetent involved in the accident was likely to
use the vehicle without authorization and that the
entrustor failed to take reasonable precautions to
prevent such unauthorized use.' Id. (emphasis added;
footnote omitted); see also Redmond v. Self, 265
Ala. 155, 90 So. 2d 238 (1956); Paschall v. Sharp,
215 Ala. 304, 110 So. 387 (1926). In this case, the
evidence was sufficient for the court to conclude
that 
Edwards 
left 
the 
vehicle 
available 
for
Garrison's use on the date of the accident."
Edwards, 926 So. 2d at 320-21.
In Edwards, a motorist was struck from behind by a pickup
truck while it was being operated by the brother-in-law of the
owner of the truck.  The motorist and his wife sued the owner,
asserting a claim of negligent entrustment of a vehicle.
Following a nonjury trial, the trial court awarded the
motorist $115,000 in compensatory damages and awarded the
motorist's wife $35,000 on her loss-of-consortium claim.
Edwards, 926 So. 2d at 319. 
1050332
20
At the time of the accident in Edwards, the owner and the
brother-in-law had lived in adjacent mobile homes for
approximately 10 years.  The owner testified that he "left"
his truck for his brother-in-law's wife, who was the owner's
sister and had four small children, to use "in case of an
emergency." 926 So. 2d at 321.  The brother-in-law testified
that he took the truck on the day of the accident to go to the
store.  The keys were not in the truck, so the brother-in-law
entered the owner's home and got the keys from the dresser or
the table, as he had occasionally done in the past.  The
parties stipulated to the admission of the deposition of Billy
Ray Cochran, who testified that he had seen the brother-in-law
driving the owner's truck on occasions before the accident.
He also stated that, on numerous occasions -- both before and
after the accident -- he had seen the owner give the brother-
in-law the keys to the owner's truck, accompanied by the
instructions that if the brother-in-law, his wife, or one of
their children ever had a wreck in it, they should claim that
they had stolen the truck. Edwards, 926 So. 2d at 321.
Based on these facts, this Court held that "the evidence
was sufficient for the court to conclude that [the owner] left
1050332
21
the vehicle available for [the brother-in-law]'s use on the
date of the accident." Edwards, 926 So. 2d at 321.
Furthermore, "[t]he trial court's conclusion that [the owner]
entrusted his vehicle to [the brother-in-law] is not palpably
erroneous." Id. But see Penland v. Allsup, 527 So. 2d 715
(Ala. 1988) (holding that the owner of a sports car, who had
been drinking with the passenger and who had left the keys in
the car so the passenger could listen to the radio while the
owner got out of the car for a brief delivery, did not entrust
the car to the passenger and was not liable for negligent
entrustment, even though the passenger had used the car on
three prior occasions; the passenger had always used the car
with the owner's express permission, had not previously used
the car at will, and was not drunk on previous occasions).
Also, in the context of construing a provision in an
insurance policy that excluded coverage for property entrusted
to an insured for storage or safekeeping, this Court quoted
with approval the following language: "'The word entrust has
been defined by both lay and legal authorities in substance to
mean to commit something to another with a certain confidence
regarding his care, use or disposal of it.'" Ho Bros. Rest.,
1050332
22
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 492 So. 2d 603, 606 (Ala. 1986)
(quoting Pacific Indem. Co. v. Harrison, 277 S.W.2d 256, 261
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (emphasis omitted)).  This Court also
noted that "[u]nder Pacific Indemnity Co., supra, and its
progeny, in order for there to be an 'entrustment' of an
automobile, there basically has to be a voluntary and actual
delivery of keys and/or the vehicle to the thief by the
insured." Ho Bros. Rest., 492 So. 2d at 606.  Furthermore,
this Court held: 
"We hereby adopt the Pacific Indemnity Co.,
supra, 
construction 
of 
'entrustment' 
as 
the
construction which ordinary men would place on the
word 'entrustment.' Implicit in this holding is the
requirement of some expectation on the part of each
party as to how each will act with respect to the
'entrusted' property."
492 So. 2d at 606.
In the present case it is undisputed that, unlike the
owner of the automobile in Edwards, Mr. Marrone never gave
Sean express or implied permission to remove the .38 handgun
from the bedroom closet.  In fact, Mr. Marrone explicitly told
Sean not to remove the gun from the closet.  As was the case
with the owner of the vehicle in Penland, there is no evidence
indicating that Mr. Marrone ever intended for Sean to use the
1050332
23
.38 handgun on the day that Michael died.  Mr. Marrone did not
have any expectation as to how Sean would handle the gun if he
removed it from the closet because Mr. Marrone did not have
any expectation that the gun would be removed from the closet.
Mr. Marrone did not actively aid, assist, or facilitate Sean's
removal of the gun from the closet.  Ms. Prill did not present
substantial evidence indicating that Mr. Marrone knew that
Sean was likely to use the .38 handgun without authorization
and that Mr. Marrone failed to take reasonable precautions to
prevent such unauthorized use.  It is undisputed that Mr.
Marrone stored the unloaded guns in a closet in his bedroom
and explicitly told Sean not to remove the guns.  The fact
that, at least six months before Michael's death, Sean had
removed a gun from Mr. Marrone's closet without his permission
is not substantial evidence indicating that Mr. Marrone
entrusted the .38 handgun to Sean on the day Michael died.
Moreover, even assuming that Mr. Marrone did negligently
entrust the .38 handgun to Sean, Mr. Marrone's negligence was
not the proximate cause of Michael's death.  As discussed
earlier, 
Michael's 
own 
negligence 
was 
a 
superseding
intervening cause that attenuated any negligence on the part
1050332
24
of Mr. Marrone from the ultimate injury to Michael.
Therefore, Ms. Prill did not present substantial evidence to
support her negligent-entrustment claim.
Finally, Ms. Prill appears to seek civil liability for
certain criminal acts allegedly committed by Justin and Sean.
Specifically, Ms. Prill alleges that "since suicide is a
felony at common law, if [Justin] or Sean either induced or
caused, aided or abetted, or failed to prevent [Michael] from
committing suicide, both are criminally liable for his death."
(Ms. Prill's brief, at 20.)  To support this allegation, Ms.
Prill cites § 13A-2-23, Ala. Code 1975, which sets forth
criminal liability based upon the behavior of another.  Ms.
Prill also alleges that "[s]ince suicide is murder at common
law, an agreement encompassing it is criminal conspiracy."
(Ms. Prill's brief, at 21.)  Ms. Prill does not elaborate on
either of these allegations, and it is unclear how they relate
to the summary judgment.  In her complaint, Ms. Prill did
allege that "[Sean] and [Justin] were co-conspirators and
entered the home of [Michael] with concealed weapons knowing
that if weapons had been shown when [Sean and Justin] entered
the home of [Michael], they would have been denied entry into
1050332
25
the home."  However, Ms. Prill scarcely mentions the
conspiracy claim in her responses to the summary-judgment
motions or in her briefs to this Court.
In Martinson v. Cagle, 454 So. 2d 1383 (Ala. 1984), this
Court held that, although an act that constitutes a crime can
also be the basis of a civil action, civil liability will
exist "only if the acts complained of violate the legal rights
of the plaintiff, constitute a breach of duty owed to the
plaintiff, or constitute some cause of action for which relief
may be granted." 454 So. 2d at 1385.  This Court found that
counts alleging "only that the criminal acts were committed
and that the [plaintiffs] were thereby injured" did not state
a civil cause of action. Id.
Like the plaintiff in Martinson, Ms. Prill alleges only
that Justin and Sean committed criminal acts and that those
acts caused injury to Michael.  The language of the Alabama
Code does not create a private right of action for criminal
complicity or criminal conspiracy, nor does Ms. Prill show
where this Court has recognized that a civil cause of action
exists under the criminal statutes proscribing this conduct.
To the extent that the allegedly criminal conduct of Justin or
1050332
26
Sean also constitutes a legitimate civil cause of action, such
as a cause of action for negligence, that claim has been
pursued.  However, Ms. Prill may not maintain a separate or
additional cause of action under the criminal-complicity or
conspiracy statutes.  Therefore, the motions for a summary
judgment were properly granted as to these allegations of
criminal conduct.
To the extent that Ms. Prill's conspiracy claim may be
construed as a civil-conspiracy claim, she has not presented
substantial evidence to support such a claim.  "A plaintiff
alleging a conspiracy must have a valid underlying cause of
action." Callens v. Jefferson County Nursing Home, 769 So. 2d
273, 280 (Ala. 2000).  As discussed earlier, Ms. Prill's
wrongful-death claim fails because she cannot prove causation.
Therefore, she does not have a valid underlying cause of
action to support her conspiracy claim.
It should also be noted that is unnecessary to address
the arguments set forth by the parties concerning the
affirmative 
defenses 
of 
assumption 
of 
the 
risk 
and
contributory negligence.  A summary judgment is proper for the
defendants in this case on the wrongful-death claim because
1050332
27
Michael's conduct broke the chain of causation that otherwise
might 
have 
linked 
the 
defendants' 
negligence 
to 
the
plaintiff's injury.  The conduct of Justin and Sean was simply
not the proximate cause of Michael's death.  A summary
judgment is likewise proper for Mr. Marrone on the negligent-
entrustment claim.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's judgment is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.