Title: Huffman v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 76, 2019
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FRED HUFFMAN, 
 
Defendant Below– 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below– 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 76, 2019 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1112004258 (N) 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 7, 2019 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 7, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
 Fred Huffman appeals two Superior Court orders: (i) the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for credit for time served; and (ii) the Superior Court’s 
denial of his petition for redesignation of tier assignment or, in the alternative, 
removal from the sex offender registry (“the petition for relief”).  The State has filed 
a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Huffman pleaded guilty in September 2012 to 
one charge of unlawful sexual intercourse in the second degree.  After a presentence 
 
2 
investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Huffman to twenty years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after ten years for decreasing levels of supervision.  A 
condition of his sentence was to register as a Tier III sex offender.  Huffman did not 
file a direct appeal. 
(3) 
On June 26, 2014, Huffman filed a motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The Superior Court denied the 
motion, concluding that Huffman was challenging his sentence rather than his 
conviction and, therefore, Rule 61 was not applicable.  We affirmed on appeal, 
finding that many of Huffman’s claims fell outside the scope of Rule 61 and that the 
remaining claims were procedurally barred.1  In March of 2017, Huffman filed a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 
35”).  The Superior Court denied the motion and we affirmed.2   
(4) 
On January 24, 2019, Huffman filed the petition for relief, which the 
Superior Court denied on the record after a February 4, 2019 hearing.  The following 
day, Huffman filed a motion for credit for his time spent outside of prison after 
posting bail.  The Superior Court considered the motion to be a motion to modify 
filed under Rule 35(b) and denied it, finding: (i) the sentence was imposed pursuant 
to a negotiated plea agreement; (ii) no extraordinary circumstances existed to excuse 
                                                 
1 Huffman v. State, 2015 WL 4094234 (Del. July 6, 2015). 
2 Huffman v. State, 2017 WL 2686552 (Del. June 21, 2017). 
 
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the 90-day deadline for filing a Rule 35(b) motion; (iii) the motion was repetitive; 
and (iv) the sentence remained appropriate for all the reasons stated at sentencing.  
This appeal followed. 
(5) 
On appeal, Huffman asserts a number of repetitive and somewhat 
confusing claims that can be summarized as follows: (i) the Superior Court erred in 
denying his petition for relief and, in so doing, denied Huffman the opportunity to 
present constitutional challenges to his sentence and the sex offender registry 
requirements; (ii) the Superior Court exhibited bias in denying his motion for credit 
for time served as untimely filed under Rule 35(b); (iii) the Superior Court erred in 
considering his motion for credit for time served as a motion to modify his sentence; 
and (iv) the Superior Court incorrectly denied him credit for the time period when 
he was free on bail. 
(6) 
With respect to Huffman’s challenges to the Superior Court’s order 
denying his petition for relief, his failure to include the transcript of the Superior 
Court’s order precludes our review of his claims related to that hearing.3  In any 
event, Huffman’s claims as to the Superior Court’s ruling are unavailing.  Huffman 
is barred from seeking relief from the sex offender registry until twenty-five years 
                                                 
3 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987) (“This Court can only evaluate issues raised on 
appeal by reviewing the facts that actually appear in the record.  The failure of the defendant to 
include in the record adequate transcripts of the proceedings, as required by the rules of this Court, 
precludes appellate review of his claim….”). 
 
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have elapsed since the last day of his Level V sentence was imposed.4  To the extent 
Huffman argues that the sex offender registry requirements and conditions violate 
his constitutional rights, the proper procedural vehicle for a challenge to the legality 
of a sentence is a motion for correction of illegal sentence.  We have already upheld 
the legality of Huffman’s sentence.5  We have also upheld the constitutionality of 
the sex offender registry and its community notification requirements.  The 
assignment of a convicted sex offender to a statutorily-mandated Risk Assessment 
Tier does not implicate a protected liberty interest under the Delaware or United 
States Constitution.6  The requirement is not punitive and does not run afoul of ex 
post facto protection.7  Nor does the community notification component of the 
registry violate the offender’s constitutional right to privacy.8  Huffman’s contention 
that the dissemination of his tier registration information violates the Delaware Code 
is also without merit.  Community notification and dissemination of information 
                                                 
4 11 Del. C. § 4121(e)(2)a. (“Any sex offender designated to Risk Assessment Tier III may petition 
to the Superior Court for redesignation to Risk Assessment II if 25 years have elapsed from the 
last day of any Level IV or V sentence imposed at the time of the original conviction … and the 
offender has successfully completed an appropriate sex offender treatment program certified by 
the State, [and] has not been convicted of any crime (other than a motor vehicle offense) during 
such time.”).  Huffman also claims that 11 Del. C. § 4122 “unambiguously asserts” that the sex 
registration legislation does not apply to defendants convicted of offenses that occurred prior to 
1994.  A prior version of § 4122 applied only to defendants convicted after June 27, 1994.  The 
statute was amended to remove that limitation in 2008, prior to Huffman’s sentencing.  
5 Huffman, 2017 WL 2686552. 
6 Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1064 (Del. Nov. 7, 2001). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1072-74. 
 
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related to public judicial proceedings are exempt from the definition of “criminal 
history record information” protected by Title 11 of the Delaware Code9 and 
criminal prosecutions are public proceedings by their very nature.10  Finally, and as 
we have observed previously in Huffman’s case, Huffman had “fair notice” of the 
sex offender registry requirements when he pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual 
intercourse in the second degree and, as part of that plea agreement, agreed to 
register as a Tier III sex offender. 
 
(7) 
The remainder of Huffman’s claims concern the Superior Court’s 
denial of his motion for credit for time served.  The Superior Court considered 
Huffman’s motion as a motion for modification of sentence filed under Rule 35(b).  
Rule 35(b) provides that a court may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion 
made within ninety days of sentencing.11  A court may consider a motion for 
reduction of sentence made more than ninety days after the imposition of a sentence 
in “extraordinary circumstances.”12  We review the Superior Court’s denial of a 
motion for modification of sentence under Rule 35(b) for abuse of discretion.13  This 
standard is highly deferential.14 
                                                 
9 11 Del. C. § 8502(4)c. 
10 Helman, 784 A.2d at 1071. 
11 Del. Super. Ct. Cr. R. 35(b). 
12 Id. 
13 Benge v. State, 101 A.3d 973, 976-77 (Del. 2014). 
14 Id. at 977. 
 
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(8) 
 Huffman argues the Superior Court exhibited bias against him by 
denying his motion to modify as untimely filed because the Superior Court amended 
Huffman’s sentencing order outside of the time frame of seven days provided for in 
Rule 35(c).15  This is an entirely conclusory allegation.  “To be disqualified the 
alleged bias or prejudice of the judge must stem from an extrajudicial source and 
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned 
from his participation in the case.”16  There is simply no evidence in the record that 
the Superior Court harbored any bias or prejudice against Huffman. 
 
(9) 
Huffman’s final two arguments are intertwined and we consider them 
together.  Huffman posits that the Superior Court improperly treated his motion for 
credit for time served as a motion to modify his sentence.  Here, any distinction is 
one without a difference because Huffman is simply not entitled to credit for time 
served while he was free on bail.17  A defendant is entitled to credit for time served 
                                                 
15 In 2016, the Superior Court amended its sentencing order to reflect the fact that the sentence 
was subject to the Truth in Sentencing Act, which it was as a matter of law because the Truth in 
Sentencing Act applies to all crimes committed after June 29, 1990. Huffman v. State, 2017 WL 
773587, at *1 (Del. Feb. 27, 2017).  
16 Wiggins v. State, 2017 WL 2290943, at *2 (Del. May 22, 2017) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
17 Barrett v. State, 2015 WL 4510717, at *2 (Del. July 23, 2015). 
 
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for any period of actual incarceration.18  By definition, a defendant not in prison is 
not serving a period of incarceration. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
18 11 Del. C. § 3901(c); Anderson v. State, 2006 WL 3931460, at *1 (Del. Dec. 5, 2006) (an inmate 
is entitled to Level V credit for time served at Level V incarceration or at a Level IV violation of 
probation center).