Title: Clark v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 359, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEVON CLARK,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 359, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID Nos. 0806025325  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
0902000788 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 22, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
December 9, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 9th day of December 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26 (c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On April 9, 2009, the appellant, Devon Clark, pled guilty to 
Robbery in the Second Degree and Criminal Impersonation.  On June 12, 
2009, the Superior Court declared Clark to be a habitual offender and 
sentenced him to fifteen years at Level V for Robbery in the Second Degree 
 
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and to one year at Level V suspended for probation for Criminal 
Impersonation.1  This is Clark’s direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
On appeal, Clark’s defense counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a brief 
and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 
26(c)”).  The standard and scope of review of a motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is two-fold.  First, the Court must be 
satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record 
and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal.2  Second, the 
Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the 
appeal is so devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be 
decided without an adversary presentation.3 
 
(3) 
Counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Counsel 
states that he provided Clark with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the 
accompanying brief and appendix.  Counsel also advised Clark that he had a 
right to supplement Counsel’s presentation.  Clark responded with a written 
submission raising issues concerning his sentencing.  The State has 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2007). 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
3 Id. 
 
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responded to Clark’s submission as well as the position taken by Counsel 
and has moved to affirm the Superior Court judgment. 
 
(4) 
In his written submission, Clark claims that there were defects 
in the proceedings leading to his sentencing as a habitual offender.  
Specifically, Clark alleges that the State failed to file a habitual offender 
motion, and that the Superior Court failed to conduct a habitual offender 
hearing.   
 
(5) 
Clark’s claims are belied by the record.  Contrary to Clark’s 
claims, the record reflects that the State filed a habitual offender motion on 
May 22, 2009, and that the Superior Court addressed the motion as well as 
Clark’s habitual offender status prior to sentencing on June 12, 2009.  More 
to the point, however, the record reflects that Clark agreed in his written plea 
agreement “to sentencing pursuant to 11 Del. C. [§] 4214(a) as [a] habitual 
offender,” and that he confirmed the agreement and his understanding of it 
during the plea colloquy and at sentencing.    
 
(6) 
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Clark’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Counsel made a conscientious 
effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that Clark 
could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger  
 
 
 
 
Justice