Title: Black v. Arizala
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S49774
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2004

FILED:  August 12, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MURRAY L. BLACK;
MELRHEA E. BLACK; JACK BOERSMA and BARBARA J. BOERSMA
as Trustees for the Boersma Family Trust;
J.K. (KELLY) HOLA; JEANNIE HOLA;
ALBERT F. LAURIE and MARLENE D. LAURIE
as Trustees of the A. F. Laurie Trust;
DONALD J. MEIS and NADINE E. MEIS,
as Trustees for the Meis Family Trust UTA 8/22/95;
JOEL E. COLLEY; MICKELL A. COLLEY; RICHARD MELOY;
SEATTLE ATC PARTNERSHIP,
a partnership consisting of
DAVID ANDREWS, JOHN MITCHELL, THOMAS PARKS,
DONALD STOBIE and GERALD TRAYNOR,
Plaintiffs,
and
JOHN J. LENAHAN;
MARILYN S. LENAHAN; WILLOWRUN, L.P.,
an Oregon limited partnership;
Respondents on Review,
v.
GARY H. ARIZALA;
QUENTIN L. BREEN; BREEN FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN DUFFY; ANTHONY EASTON; FRANK R. GOLDSTEIN;
ED JANOWSKI; JAVIER O. LAMOSO;
MORGAN, LEWIS &amp; BOCKIUS, LLP,
a limited liability partnership;
FRED H. MARTINEZ; THERESA MILLER; MARGARET W. M. MINNICH;
LAWRENCE ODELL; JAMES T. PERRY; MOHAMMAD RAHMAN;
ROMULUS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation;
ROMULUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
a Puerto Rico corporation;
ROMULUS ENGINEERING, INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
UNICOM CORPORATION,
a Puerto Rico corporation;
SUPERTEL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
a Puerto Rico corporation,
and CLEARCOMM L.P.,
a Delaware limited partnership,
formerly known as PCS 2000, L.P.,
Petitioners on Review,
and
SUSAN D. EASTON;
SDE TRUST; and GARY NORTH,
Respondents.
BROWN AND BOSTON PCS 2000,
a partnership consisting of
CONRAD BROWN and NIXON RAY BOSTON;
KENNETH BROWN, as Trustee for the Brown Family Trust;
WILLIAM SEAN CONWAY; LISA M. CONWAY; GREG DOWNING;
DONALD F. ESCHER and SHIRLEY P. ESCHER,
Trustees for the Escher Daughters Trust;
HARVEY A. GILBERT and DEANNE E. GILBERT,
as Trustees for the Gilbert Family Trust;
KURT GRUEN; REYNA GRUEN; JOSEPH M. HA;
JOHN F. JOHNSON and ANNE R. JOHNSON,
Trustees for the John F. and Anne R. Johnson Trust;
HAROLD E. JONES as Trustee for the
Harold E. Jones Profit Sharing Trust;
VIRGINIA J. JONES; CAROLINE B. KAZMANN,
Trustee for the Belle M. Beem Trust;
HOLLIS KAZMANN; INGRID KLUK;
KNOXVILLE IVDS GROUP,
a partnership consisting of
ROBERT SEAMAN and others;
DONALD C. LINKEM; DONALD J. MEIS; NADINE E. MEIS;
EDMUND J. MOONEY, Trustee for the
Edmund J. Mooney Trust;
J. RAY  O'CONNOR and MAURINE O'CONNOR,
Trustees for the J. Ray O'Connor Revocable Family Trust;
BILL OHMAN; COLLEEN OHMAN; JAMES POPA;
RPM2 GROUP LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a partnership consisting of
MICHAEL SUENRAM, PAMELA SUENRAM,
MELBURN E. SUENRAM and ROSE M. SUENRAM;
NANCY L. RYAN; THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR J. RYAN;
S&amp;L PROPERTIES,
a partnership consisting of
DOUGLAS A. SHINSTINE and ERIC A. LUTHER;
ELIZABETH J. SEAMAN; SHELLEY A. MCCOY;
RALPH L. STEAN, Trustee for the
Ralph L. Stean Revocable Living Trust U/A APRIL 14, 1992;
JAMES F. STENGEL, Trustee for the
James F. Stengel Living Trust dated 9/28/94;
GRETCHEN B. STENGEL as Trustee for the
Gretchen B. Stengel Living Trust Dated 9/28/94;
and RUSSELL S. WUNSCHEL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GARY H. ARIZALA;
QUENTIN L. BREEN; BREEN FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN DUFFY; ANTHONY EASTON; SUSAN D. EASTON;
SDE TRUST; FRANK R. GOLDSTEIN; ED JANOWSKI;
JAVIER O. LAMOSO; MORGAN, LEWIS &amp; BROKIUS, LLP,
a limited liability partnership;
FRED H. MARTINEZ; THERESA MILLER; MARGARET W. M. MINNICH;
GARY NORTH; LAWRENCE ODELL; JAMES T. PERRY; MOHAMMAD RAHMAN;
ROMULUS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation;
ROMULUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
a Puerto Rico corporation;
ROMULUS ENGINEERING, INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
ROMULUS ENGINEERING (MAS) INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
DATALINK NETWORK, INC.,
a purported corporation;
ROMULUS ENGINEERING (IVD), INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
WIRELESS EXPRESS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Delaware limited partnership,
fka IVDS Auction Consortium Limited Partnership;
IVDS MANAGEMENT, INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
UNICOM CORPORATION,
a Puerto Rico corporation;
SUPERTEL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Puerto Rico corporation,
and CLEARCOMM L.P.,
a Delaware limited partnership,
formerly known as PCS 2000 L.P.,
Defendants.
(CC 9611-09017; 9708-06851; CA A104791; SC S49774)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 10, 2003.
Timothy R. Volpert, Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause for petitioners on review.  On the briefs were
Darleen Darnall, Robert D. Newell, and Jeffrey J. Schick, Davis,
Wright Tremaine, LLP, Portland; Joseph C. Arellano, Kennedy Watts
Arellano &amp; Ricks LLP, Portland; Bruce L. Campbell and Thomas C.
Sand, Miller Nash Wiener Hager &amp; Carlsen, LLP, Portland; Steven
K. Blackhurst, Ater Wynne Hewitt Dodson &amp; Skerritt, Portland; and
Michael D. Kennedy, Kennedy Bowles, PC, Portland.
Helen T. Dziuba, The Law Office of Helen T. Dziuba, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause for respondents on review.  With her on
the briefs were Roger K. Harris, Harris, Berne, Christensen, LLP,
Portland. 
Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Durham, Riggs, and
De Muniz, Justices.**
DURHAM, J.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Nely L. Johnson, Judge. 182 Or App 16, 48 P3d 843 (2002).
**Balmer and Kistler, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
DURHAM, J.
This is an action for damages alleging securities law
violations and related torts.  The principal issue on review is
whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action on the
ground that the parties' limited partnership agreement required
plaintiffs to file their claims in San Juan, Puerto Rico.  The
Court of Appeals reversed.  For the reasons set out below, we
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The trial court consolidated two actions by two groups
of plaintiffs against two overlapping groups of defendants.  On
review, the only claims before the court are those of three
parties to the Black v. Arizala action, John J. Lenahan,
Marilyn S. Lenahan, and Willowrun, L.P. (plaintiffs), who are
Oregon residents.
Plaintiffs filed their claims after they had invested
money in PCS 2000, L.P. (PCS), a Delaware limited partnership
headquartered in San Juan, Puerto Rico.  Plaintiffs alleged that,
in the process of selling limited partnership interests in PCS to
plaintiffs, defendants violated the securities laws of the United
States and other jurisdictions, including Oregon; committed
common-law fraud; and violated the Oregon Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act (ORICO), ORS 166.715 to 166.735.
The Court of Appeals summarized the pertinent factual
allegations as follows:
"Plaintiffs invested in PCS by purchasing limited
partnership interests.  As part of the purchase, they
became parties to the PCS Agreement of Limited
Partnership (the Agreement).  All of their claims in
this case are based on events that occurred before they
purchased those interests and became parties to the
Agreement.  Among other things, plaintiffs allege that
defendants represented that PCS could buy licenses from
the [Federal Communications Commission] at a certain
price when defendants in fact did not know what the
price would be; did not disclose the cost of
engineering, acquiring, and installing the necessary
equipment; did not disclose the risk of losing the
licenses if PCS failed to raise sufficient capital or
to build the infrastructure within the required times;
did not disclose that two principal promoters had been
involved in previous unsuccessful transactions in the
telecommunications industry and had defaulted on
guarantees to equipment suppliers, creating a risk that
it would be more difficult for PCS to raise capital;
and did not disclose the increased costs and
disadvantages of the technology that PCS would use in
comparison to conventional cellular telephones.
"The trial court dismissed the case based on the
choice of law, forum selection, and arbitration clause
of the Agreement.  That clause provides:
"'This Agreement shall be construed and
enforced in accordance with and governed by
the law of the State of Delaware, excluding
that body of law relating to conflicts of
law.  Any dispute under this Agreement shall
be submitted to binding arbitration in San
Juan, Puerto Rico under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association concerning
commercial disputes, and the parties agree to
be bound by any decision reached under such
rules.  Any arbitrator shall be specifically
bound by the provisions respecting limitation
of liability set forth in this Agreement. 
Venue for any legal action arising from this
Agreement, including enforcement of any
arbitration award, shall be in San Juan,
Puerto Rico.'
"Although this clause appears to provide for
arbitration as the primary method of resolving disputes
under the Agreement, defendants did not ask the court
to order plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims.  Rather,
they relied on the final sentence, which establishes
venue 'for any legal action arising from this
Agreement' in Puerto Rico.  They argued that that
sentence required plaintiffs to bring this action in
Puerto Rico, not in Oregon.  The trial court agreed and
dismissed the case."
Black v. Arizala, 182 Or App 16, 22-23, 48 P3d 843 (2002).
The parties agree (as do we) that the venue agreement
in the last sentence of the contractual provision quoted above is
the focal point of their dispute.  Defendants sought to enforce
that contractual provision by filing a motion to dismiss the
complaint, relying on ORCP 21 A as their authority for the
motion.  ORCP 21 A provides:
"Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for
relief in any pleading, whether a complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion to dismiss: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, (4) that plaintiff has not the legal capacity to
sue, (5) insufficiency of summons or process or
insufficiency of service of summons or process, (6)
that the party asserting the claim is not the real
party in interest, (7) failure to join a party under
Rule 29, (8) failure to state ultimate facts sufficient
to constitute a claim, and (9) that the pleading shows
that the action has not been commenced within the time
limited by statute.  A motion to dismiss making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted.  The grounds upon which
any of the enumerated defenses are based shall be
stated specifically and with particularity in the
responsive pleading or motion.  No defense or objection
is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or
motion.  If, on a motion to dismiss asserting defenses
(1) through (7), the facts constituting such defenses
do not appear on the face of the pleading and matters
outside the pleading, including affidavits,
declarations and other evidence, are presented to the
court, all parties shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present affidavits, declarations and
other evidence, and the court may determine the
existence or nonexistence of the facts supporting such
defense or may defer such determination until further
discovery or until trial on the merits.  If the court
grants a motion to dismiss, the court may enter
judgment in favor of the moving party or grant leave to
file an amended complaint.  If the court grants the
motion to dismiss on the basis of defense (3), the
court may enter judgment in favor of the moving party,
stay the proceeding, or defer entry of judgment
pursuant to subsection B(3) of Rule 54." (1)

In moving to dismiss on the basis of the venue
agreement, defendants did not cite the subsection of ORCP 21 A on
which they relied.  Neither did the trial court base its order of
dismissal on a particular subsection of ORCP 21 A.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
considering defendants' motion under ORCP 21 A because defendants
had relied on facts outside those stated in plaintiffs'
complaint.  The Court of Appeals concluded, in accordance with
plaintiffs' argument, that "[d]efendants' motion was the
functional equivalent of a summary judgment motion under ORCP 47
C." Black, 182 Or App at 27.  The Court of Appeals held
that dismissal was improper under ORCP 47 because the venue
agreement was ambiguous and arguably did not apply to disputes,
like the present one, over defendants' actions that predated
execution of the contract. Id. at 29-30.
Judge Armstrong concurred in the result that the Court
of Appeals majority reached.  He concluded that the Oregon Rules
of Civil Procedure did not provide a procedural mechanism for
enforcing a venue agreement between the parties.  He also
concluded that ORS 1.160 authorized the court to fashion a
suitable procedure for accomplishing that objective, including
consideration of a motion to dismiss the complaint. (2)
  Judge
Armstrong agreed with the Court of Appeals majority that
plaintiffs' claims focused exclusively on events that preceded
formation of the parties' contract and did not seek to enforce
any duty provided in the contract.  However, he concluded that
the venue agreement was unambiguous and did not apply to
plaintiffs' claims.  Consequently, he agreed that the trial court
had erred in dismissing the complaint. Id. at 41
(Armstrong, J., concurring).  
On review, defendants adopt Judge Armstrong's view
regarding the trial court's authority under ORS 1.160 to consider
their motion to dismiss.  Plaintiffs challenge the applicability
of the venue agreement to this dispute and assert that the court
has no authority to address that issue through a motion to
dismiss under ORCP 21 A.  They point out that the grounds for a
motion to dismiss set out in ORCP 21 A do not include a
plaintiff's asserted failure to commence the action in a venue
that a contract between the parties requires.  They also contend
that, because defendants based their motion on facts not alleged
in the complaint, the motion was, in reality, a motion for
summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss, and that the presence
of a genuine issue about the material facts precluded summary
judgment. See ORCP 47 C (summary judgment proper if record
demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law").  Plaintiffs also argue that defendants failed to
preserve their argument based on ORS 1.160.
We first address the question whether Oregon law
authorized the trial court to consider a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that an agreement required the parties to
litigate the claims in a different venue.  In analyzing that
question, the Court of Appeals determined that ORCP 21 A(1),
which authorizes a motion to dismiss for "lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter," did not apply, stating:
"In our view, the issue concerning the enforceability
of a forum selection clause in a contract is a matter
of contract law and not a matter that would implicate
subject matter jurisdiction under ORCP 21 A(1).  * * * 
The concept of subject matter jurisdiction is well
defined as pertaining to the authority of the court to
deal with the general subject involved in the action. 
'It exists when the constitution, the legislature or
the law has told a specific court to do something about
the specific kind of dispute in issue.'  Under the
Oregon Constitution, subject matter jurisdiction exists
in the circuit courts unless a statute or rule of law
divests them of jurisdiction.  
"Merely because the parties have agreed upon a
forum selection clause that limits where the parties
may litigate their disputes under their agreement does
not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.  Parties by
agreement have neither the power to confer or the power
to divest an Oregon court of subject matter
jurisdiction.  The issue of the enforceability of a
forum selection clause is qualitatively different from
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  * * *  In
sum, ORCP 21 A(1) does not authorize a motion for
dismissal on the basis of a forum selection clause."
182 Or App at 25-26 (citations and footnote omitted).  The Court
of Appeals then concluded that, because defendants' motion to
dismiss relied on matter outside the facts stated in the
complaint, it was, in reality, a motion for summary judgment.
Whether ORCP 21 A(1) or some other provision of Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to consider a
motion to dismiss a complaint due to a venue agreement of the
kind involved here is an issue that turns on the intent of the
legislature.  This court construes the provisions of the Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure according to the same methodology that
applies to the interpretation of statutes. Mulier v.
Johnson, 332 Or 344, 349, 29 P3d 1104 (2001).  Consequently,
we examine the text and context of the pertinent rules.  Context
includes, among other things, statutory predecessors of the
current rules and any interpretations of those earlier statutes
by this court. See SAIF v. Walker, 330 Or 102, 108-12, 996 P2d 979 (2000) (illustrating principle).
Neither ORCP 21 A(1) nor any other section of the
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides for the
dismissal of a complaint due to an agreement to litigate claims
in a different venue.  However, the context of ORCP 21 A(1) sheds
light on the legislature's intent in that regard.  
The Oregon Legislature enacted the Oregon Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1979 and made them operative on January 1,
1980.  Or Laws 1979, ch 284, §§ 3, 201.  Before the adoption of
the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, an Oregon statute,
former ORS 16.260 (1977), repealed by Or Laws 1979,
ch 284, § 199, authorized the use of a different procedural
device –- a demurrer –- to obtain dismissal of a complaint when
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  That statute
provided, in part:  
"The defendant may demur to the complaint within
the time required by law to appear and answer, when it
appears upon the face thereof:
"(1) That the court has no jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant, or the subject of the
action[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
Former ORS 16.260(1) was in effect for decades
before the enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure in
1979 brought about its repeal.  Oregon courts routinely
considered the dismissal of civil complaints for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under former ORS 16.260(1). See,
e.g., Local 9206 CWA v. Maloney, 259 Or 470, 486 P2d
1275 (1971) (trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over
complaint seeking enforcement of local union's fine on member;
court reversed trial court's judgment dismissing complaint after
grant of demurrer); Corvallis S. &amp; G. Co. v. H. &amp; P. Eng.,
247 Or 158, 419 P2d 38, cert den, 387 US 904 (1967)
(federal law preempted authority of circuit court to grant
recision of collective bargaining agreement; court affirmed trial
court's dismissal of complaints after sustaining defendants'
demurrers that asserted lack of jurisdiction of subject
matter).
ORCP 21 A(1) changed slightly the wording that
describes a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.  Whereas a
demurrer under former ORS 16.260(1) could raise the absence
of "jurisdiction of * * * the subject of the action[,]" a motion
to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1) authorizes the assertion of a "lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter."  We perceive no
distinction in the substantive effect of those two quoted
phrases.  Further, we have found no evidence that the
legislature's adoption of that slight difference in wording in
ORCP 21 A(1) made any change in the substantive authority of
Oregon courts to consider the dismissal of a complaint due to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  As a result, Oregon cases
that determined the court's authority to dismiss a complaint
under former ORS 16.260(1) are context for our inquiry into
the intent of the legislature in adopting ORCP 21 A(1).
One case is instructive.  In Reeves v. Chem
Industrial Co., 262 Or 95, 495 P2d 729 (1972), the plaintiff,
a resident of Oregon, entered into a contract with the defendant
to distribute its goods.  A dispute arose, and the plaintiff
brought a breach of contract action in Oregon.  The defendant
"moved to quash and dismiss" the complaint, id. at 96,
arguing that the parties had contracted that they would litigate
any claims arising out of the contract in the courts of Ohio.
This court began by acknowledging that it had held in a
1928 case "that an agreement to confer exclusive jurisdiction
upon the courts of a particular jurisdiction is void." Id.
at 97, (citing State ex rel Kahn v. Tazwell, 125 Or
528, 543, 266 P 238 (1928)).  The court, however, acknowledged
and followed what it determined was the trend of the law to the
contrary.  Citing a variety of authorities, the court concluded
that it would enforce a contractual provision regarding an
exclusive forum by dismissing an action filed in a forum not
agreed to by the parties unless the court determined that the
contractual provision was unfair or unreasonable. Reeves,
262 Or at 101.  The court explained that Oregon courts had
authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to dismiss an
action to enforce a valid agreement between the parties:
"It should be understood that we are not holding
that such clause 'ousted' the Oregon court from
jurisdiction.  We are not deciding whether Oregon had
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.  We are
holding that if Oregon has jurisdiction the Oregon
court nevertheless will dismiss the action because the
contract clause agreeing upon the courts of Cleveland,
Ohio, as the place for litigation over the contract is
valid and should be enforced.  This conclusion is
reached because there is no evidence that the clause is
unfair or enforcement would be unreasonable."
Id.  This court affirmed the trial court's order granting
dismissal of the complaint.
There is no question that, as a general proposition,
the Oregon court in Reeves had subject matter jurisdiction
over actions for breach of contract. See School Dist.
No. 1, Mult. Co. v. Nilsen, 262 Or 559, 566, 499 P2d 1309
(1972) ("'[J]urisdiction over the subject matter exists when the
constitution or the legislature or the unwritten law has told
this court to do something about this kind of
dispute.' (Emphasis in original.)"); Garner v.
Alexander, 167 Or 670, 675, 120 P2d 238 (1941), cert
den, 316 US 690 (1942) ("'Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power to deal with the general subject involved. 
In other words, the court must have cognizance of the class of
cases to which the one to be adjudicated belongs.'"). 
However, the court determined that it would not exercise its
jurisdiction and instead would dismiss the action to give effect
to the parties' enforceable agreement to litigate breach of
contract claims in the courts of Ohio. 
For present purposes, it is helpful to analyze the
Reeves decision in terms of the then-current statute --
former ORS 16.260(1) -- that governed the court's authority
to dismiss an action due to the absence of "jurisdiction of * * *
the subject of the action."  The court regarded its conclusion,
that the parties' forum agreement was enforceable, as a legal
determination that required the trial court to relinquish its
jurisdiction over the subject of the action.  That is, the
specific, private law established by the parties' valid agreement
superseded the general jurisdiction of the Oregon courts over
claims for breach of contract. 
The analysis that the court followed in Reeves
provides helpful context for our interpretation of ORCP 21 A(1). 
It is clear that, as in Reeves, a conclusion of an Oregon
court that the parties' venue agreement is valid and enforceable
is a legal determination that requires the court to dismiss
the action in response to a timely motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.  From the foregoing
discussion, we may conclude tentatively that the legislature
intended ORCP 21 A(1) to authorize the courts to dismiss an
action if the parties had entered into a valid agreement to
litigate contract claims in another venue.
In support of its contrary reading of ORCP 21 A(1), the
Court of Appeals relied on two other contextual sources.  We turn
to them now. 
The Court of Appeals determined that defendants' motion
sought dismissal under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state ultimate
facts sufficient to constitute a claim.  According to that court,
ORCP 21 A(8) does not permit the trial court to rely on facts
beyond those pleaded in the complaint in deciding the legal
sufficiency of the complaint.  That conclusion led the Court of
Appeals, as already noted, to decide that defendants' motion was
the functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment under
ORCP 47 C and that dismissal was not permissible under that rule
because the parties' agreement regarding venue was ambiguous.  
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals reflects a valid
concern that, in addressing defendants' motion, the court must
confine its analysis to the correct components of the record and
must not permit a party to evade the standards in ORCP 47 by
characterizing a motion under that rule inaccurately as a motion
to dismiss.  Those analytical principles are unquestionably
correct in their proper context, but, as we explain below, they
have no application here.
Defendants' motion sought dismissal to enforce an
alleged venue agreement, not because the complaint failed to
allege facts sufficient to constitute a claim.  That distinction
is important, because, in theory, a venue agreement may require
dismissal notwithstanding the presence in the complaint of a
sufficient statement of facts constituting a claim. (3)
  The
Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the basis for
defendants' motion to dismiss.  Because ORCP 21 A(8) was not
applicable here, neither was the requirement that pertains to that rule that the
court must confine its analysis to the facts alleged in the
complaint.
We also conclude that, on the facts of this case,
defendants' reliance on facts outside the scope of the complaint
did not transform the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment under ORCP 47.  The trial court has authority under ORCP
21 A(1) through (7) to consider whether to dismiss a complaint on
the basis of facts drawn both from the complaint and "matters
outside the pleading, including affidavits, declarations and
other evidence."  Under that rule, the court must use care to
insure that its determination of the facts on a motion to dismiss
does not interfere with a party's right to a trial on disputed
questions of material fact. See Timberline Equip. v. St.
Paul Fire and Mar. Ins., 281 Or 639, 643, 576 P2d 1244 (1978)
(distinguishing legal questions from factual ones in construction
of contracts).  But, that concern aside, a trial court may
consider, in the context of a timely motion to dismiss under ORCP
21 A(1), evidence that the parties submit regarding a venue
agreement and whether it is ambiguous.
We have discovered no other contextual sources that
point to any other plausible reading of ORCP 21 A(1).  The
legislature's intent is clear from an examination of the text and
context of ORCP 21 A(1).  We conclude that ORCP 21 A(1)
authorizes Oregon courts to dismiss an action for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter when the motion is timely
filed and the record demonstrates that the parties have an
enforceable agreement to litigate the action in a different
venue.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Oregon's
procedural rules point out the course that the court must follow
in deciding whether a venue agreement requires dismissal. 
Consequently, this court has no occasion in this case to adopt a
mode of proceeding under ORS 1.160.  The remaining question is
whether the trial court correctly determined that the parties'
venue agreement required dismissal.
The parties' venue agreement provides that "[v]enue
for any legal action arising from this Agreement, including
enforcement of any arbitration award, shall be in San Juan,
Puerto Rico."  (Emphasis added.)  When addressing the parties'
competing arguments about the meaning of that provision, we bear
in mind another provision of the parties' agreement that states:
"This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in
accordance with and governed by the law of the State of
Delaware, excluding that body of law relating to
conflicts of law."
The parties agree that Delaware law governs the
construction of their contract, including the venue agreement. 
However, no party cites any Delaware statute, and plaintiffs cite
only one Delaware Supreme Court decision, discussed below, that
bears in any way on the proper construction of the venue
agreement under Delaware law.
Our objective in construing the venue agreement is to
discern the intent of the parties in entering into that
agreement.  The principal interpretive question before the court
is whether plaintiffs' action is one "arising from" the parties'
agreement.  The dictionary defines the verb "arise" to include
"to originate from a specific source[,]" "to come into being[,]"
and "to become operative[.]" Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 117 (unabridged ed 1993).  The dictionary also
explains that "from" is "used as a function word to indicate the
source or original or moving force of something:  as * * * (4)
the place of origin, source, or derivation of a material or
immaterial thing[.]" Id. at 913.  Applying those
definitions, we conclude that the parties' agreement must be the
specific place of origin or the source of the legal action to
trigger application of the venue agreement.
The parties recognize that plaintiffs' claims stem from
defendants' alleged misrepresentations made substantially before
they entered into a contract.  According to defendants, however,
plaintiffs' claims nevertheless arise from the agreement,
because, if plaintiffs had not entered into the agreement, then
they would have suffered no damages from any alleged
misrepresentation and would have no claims.  Defendants also
contend that the venue agreement applies to any legal action
arising from the agreement, not to misrepresentations arising
from the agreement, and that plaintiffs' legal claims arose only
because they chose to invest in PCS by entering into the
agreement.
Plaintiffs respond by arguing that their claims assert
violations of duties imposed on defendants by securities statutes
and the law of torts, and that none of their claims relies on any
promise or duty that has its source in the parties' agreement. 
They emphasize that they were not parties to the agreement when
defendants allegedly made the representations that provide the
basis of plaintiffs' claims.  They also point out that the
agreement itself contains no representations that might induce a
person to invest in PCS.  Plaintiffs indicate that their action
will not require the court to interpret any term or clause in the
agreement and that their evidence, instead, will focus on facts
that predate contract formation, especially their reliance on
written and oral solicitations that ultimately led them to invest
in PCS.  Finally, plaintiffs contend that they can establish the
falsity of defendants' offering materials and oral
representations, and their right to rescind the agreement,
without referring to any provision of the agreement.
This court has not addressed those interpretive issues,
but the Delaware Supreme Court recently answered similar
questions in a case that sheds light on the problem now before
this court.  In Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet,
Inc., 817 A2d 149 (Del 2002), cert den 538 US 1032
(2003), several corporate investors (Xcelera), entered into an
underwriting agreement with the defendant Mirror Image Internet,
Inc. (Mirror Image), in which Xcelera agreed to provide needed
funds in exchange for a controlling stock interest in Mirror
Image.  In the underwriting agreement, "the parties agreed that
any dispute, controversy, or claim 'arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement, or the breach, termination or
invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration' in Sweden." 
Id. at 151-52.  When the parties' relationship
deteriorated, minority shareholders (Parfi) in Mirror Image
submitted several breach of contract claims to arbitration in
Sweden, as the underwriting agreement required.  Parfi also
brought an action in the Delaware court against Mirror Image and
Xcelera for a breach of fiduciary duties that they owed to Mirror
Image stockholders, as well as claims of fraud, conspiracy,
implied contract, and misappropriation of a corporate
opportunity.  The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the
action in part on the ground that Parfi failed to submit the
latter claims to mandatory arbitration under the underwriting
agreement. Id. at 154.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed,
stating:
"When parties to an agreement decide that they
will submit their claims to arbitration, Delaware
courts strive to honor the reasonable expectations of
the parties and ordinarily resolve any doubt as to
arbitrability in favor of arbitration.  Nevertheless,
arbitration is a mechanism of dispute resolution
created by contract.  An arbitration clause, no matter
how broadly construed, can extend only so far as the
series of obligations set forward in the underlying
agreement.  Thus, arbitration clauses should be applied
only to claims that bear on the duties and obligations
under the Agreement.  The policy that favors alternate
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration,
does not trump basic principles of contract
interpretation.
"When [the parties] agreed to the arbitration
provision in the Underwriting Agreement they did not
commit to bring into arbitration every possible breach
of duty that could occur between the parties.  The
arbitration clause signals only an intent to arbitrate
matters that touch on the rights and performance
related to the contract.  The term 'arising out of or
in connection with' must be considered in that light. 
The Court of Chancery should have concentrated on the
similarity of the separate rights pursued by
plaintiffs under both the contract and the independent
fiduciary duties rather than the similarity of the
conduct that led to potential claims for both the
contract and fiduciary breaches of duty.
"Parfi can maintain an action based on the alleged
breaches of the independent set of fiduciary duties
that Xcelera owes Mirror Image stockholders even though
the claims arise from some or all of the same facts
that relate to the transactions that provided the basis
for its contract claims.  Xcelera's fiduciary duties to
Mirror Image consist of a set of rights and obligations
that are independent of any contract and need be
submitted to arbitration only if the claims based on
fiduciary duties touch on the obligations created in
the Underwriting Agreement.  If the Underwriting
Agreement does not implicate Xcelera's fiduciary
duties, the arbitration clause cannot bar Parfi from
seeking the relief every other stockholder is entitled
to under Delaware law."
Id. at 155-57 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
There are obvious differences between a contractual
duty to arbitrate claims arising under a contract, as in
Parfi, and a contractual duty to litigate claims arising
under a contract in a specified venue, as in this case, but those
differences play no role here.  To paraphrase the Parfi
court, we must focus on whether plaintiffs' action sought to
enforce the rights and duties that the parties' contract created
or, instead, the rights and duties created by sources of law
external to the parties' contract.  To address that question, we
turn to the claims stated in plaintiffs' complaint.
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is the operative
pleading.  In that complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants
had sold, participated in, or materially aided in the sale of PCS
securities to plaintiffs by means of untrue statements and
omissions of fact, including nondisclosure of various risks
associated with the investment, such as the allegedly poor track
record of those offering the security.  Plaintiffs alleged that
the sellers of the securities had defrauded them.  They also
alleged that the sellers had sold the securities in violation of
several Oregon securities statutes, including ORS 59.115(1)(b),
several federal securities statutes, including 15 USC § 77e, and
ORICO, ORS 166.715 to 166.735.  Plaintiffs demanded relief
under those claims of treble damages, plus attorney fees and
costs.
As already noted, defendants argue that the venue
agreement nevertheless applies to those claims because the
contract was the means by which plaintiffs purchased the
securities in question and, thus, the contract is the origin or
source of their legal action.  That reasoning is flawed, because
it disregards the noncontractual nature of the allegedly improper
acts that are the sources of the rights and duties that
plaintiffs' action sought to enforce.  As the Parfi
decision recognized, plaintiffs may maintain an action based on
noncontractual sources of their rights even though the claims
arise from some of or all the same facts that relate to the
parties' contractual transactions. Id. at 156-57.
Parfi also noted that, if an agreement is merely a source
of information that the court may find useful in its analysis of
the plaintiffs' claims, then the agreement does not require
arbitration of the claims. Id. at 157 n 25.  We think that
a Delaware court would conclude that the same analysis applies
here.  The fact that the parties' contract may help to explain
their securities transaction and, potentially, the extent of
plaintiffs' alleged economic injuries does not transform
plaintiffs' action into a claim that arises from the contract.
We conclude that the parties' agreement is not the
source of the legal action that plaintiffs filed.  Consequently,
the venue provision of that agreement does not apply to
plaintiffs' claims.  The parties' venue agreement is not
ambiguous in that respect.  The trial court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint on the basis of the venue agreement.
Defendants contend that the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' ORICO claim was correct for a separate reason. 
According to defendants, the legislature in 1995 added a
requirement that a plaintiff prove that a conviction of the
defendant in the ORICO action "has been obtained" and that any
rights of appeal have expired.  ORS 166.725(6), (7); Or Laws
1995, ch 619, § 1.  At present, a claim under ORICO accrues only
when the government obtains the conviction of the defendant.  ORS
166.725(11)(b).  Defendants argue that the verb tense of the
phrase "has been obtained" demonstrates that the legislature made
the amendment retroactive to existing ORICO claims.
We begin by noting that plaintiffs had an accrued ORICO
claim before the legislature enacted the 1995 amendment. 
Defendants do not contend that that claim was insufficient except
for the 1995 amendment discussed above.
As a general matter, we assume that the legislature
intends its amendments to existing legislation to apply
prospectively unless the legislature signals an intention to
apply an amendment retrospectively. Hall v. Northwest Outward
Bound School, 280 Or 655, 660, 572 P2d 1007 (1977).  Our
difficulty with defendants' argument is that the phrase in which
they rely, "has been obtained," provides no signal that the
legislature intended that its amendment shall apply to
transactions that precede the legislative amendment.  Rather, it
states a condition that must exist when a plaintiff files an
ORICO claim.
This court ordinarily declines to construe a
legislative amendment to have a retrospective effect if to do so
would "impair existing rights, create new obligations or impose
additional duties with respect to past transactions." Derenco
v. Benj. Franklin Fed. Sav. and Loan, 281 Or 533, 539 n 7, 577
P2d 477, cert den, 439 US 1051 (1978).  In this case,
retrospective application of the legislature's 1995 amendment
would impair plaintiffs' existing right under the former ORICO
statute.  In the absence of some indication that the legislature
intended to apply its amendment retrospectively, we adhere to our
usual assumption that the legislature intended a prospective
application of its amendment.  For that reason, the trial court's
additional reason for dismissing plaintiffs' ORICO claim was
incorrect.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. In this case, the 1997 version of ORCP 21 A is the
applicable version because it was the one in effect when
defendants' filed their motion.  Since 1997, ORCP 21 A has been
amended twice.  However, because those amendments do not bear on
our analysis in this case, we have quoted the current version of
ORCP 21 A.
2. ORS 1.160 provides:
"When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or by
statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
the means to carry it into effect are also given; and
in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of
proceeding is not specifically pointed out by the
procedural statutes, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of the procedural statutes."
3. In the Court of Appeals, defendants argued that the trial
court had authority to determine the pertinent facts from sources
outside the complaint because, in reality, their motion asserted
a lack of personal jurisdiction under ORCP 21 A(2).  But
defendants' motion did not assert a lack of personal
jurisdiction.  The issue that defendants' motion raised had no
necessary relationship to the question whether the court had
personal jurisdiction over the parties to the action.