Title: In re Adoption of L.T.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95746, 97947
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2005

Docket Nos. 95746, 97947 cons.-Agenda 20-September 2004.
In re ADOPTION OF L.T.M. (Jo Ellen J. et al., Appellees, v. John
M., Appellant-Ellen Jenkins Curry, Appellee, v. The County ofFranklin, Appellant).
Opinion filed January 21, 2005. 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In the underlying case, No. 95746, John M. appeals the circuit
court's finding that he is an unfit parent, as defined by section 1(D)(b)
of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2000)), as to his
son, L.T.M. Based on that finding, on September 27, 2002, the circuit
court entered a judgment of adoption that terminated John's parental
rights. John appealed first to the appellate court, where he moved,
inter alia, for appointment of counsel and for a certified copy of the
entire record. The appellate court denied both motions. Subsequently,
on January 29, 2003, the appellate court dismissed John's appeal for
want of prosecution, based on his failure to file the record on appeal.
John then filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we allowed. On
August 26, 2003, we allowed John's motion for stay of adoption
pending appeal.
	The consolidated case, No. 97947, arises from this court's order,
entered July 8, 2003, which directed the circuit court of Franklin
County to appoint counsel for John. The circuit court appointed
attorney Ellen Jenkins Curry. Curry prepared and filed John's brief in
No. 95746, and then petitioned the circuit court for approval of
attorney fees. Franklin County, by State's Attorney William K.
Richardson, entered a limited appearance and objected to the fee
petition. After a hearing, the circuit entered an order on November 7,
2003, requiring Franklin County to pay Curry fees and costs to date
in the amount of $6,153.94. The County filed a notice of appeal and,
subsequently, filed a motion for leave to appeal directly to this court,
which we allowed and consolidated with No. 95746.

BACKGROUND
	The following description of the facts in the underlying adoption
case is based primarily on the testimony at the hearing preceding the
judgment of adoption from which John appeals. Some facts are drawn
from transcripts and orders in other proceedings involving John, which
have been made part of the record in this case.
	L.T.M. was born on December 28, 1989. He was the second
child born to John and Jo Ellen E., now known as Jo Ellen J. The first
child, D.M., a daughter, is not involved in this appeal. John and Jo
Ellen were never married. They did not live together at any time after
L.T.M. was born. L.T.M. has always lived with Jo Ellen and has never
lived with John. The record further indicates that at some time John
was married to one Kelly M., that the marriage has been dissolved,
and that Kelly has adopted D.M. The record does not provide dates
for these events.
	Jo Ellen went to work when L.T.M. was about 3½ months old.
On weekdays, Jo Ellen would leave L.T.M. at John's house while she
worked or attended school. Jo Ellen testified that a "child care
provider," not John, cared for L.T.M. while he stayed at John's house.
The parties agree that John saw L.T.M. for the last time when the boy
was approximately 19 months old. The parties also agree that John
has never paid child support for L.T.M.
	On February 27, 1995, the circuit court of Williamson County
entered an order granting sole custody of L.T.M. to Jo Ellen, and
awarding restricted visitation to John under the supervision of the
Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS). The custody
proceeding had been initiated by John. No visitation ever occurred.
	On April 3, 1996, John was convicted in the circuit court of
Jackson County of armed violence, unlawful use of weapons, and
aggravated unlawful restraint. He was sentenced on those convictions
to concurrent terms of 25, 2, and 10 years, respectively. John had
entered the grade school where D.M. was in a classroom, menaced
her teacher with a handgun, removed D.M. from the school, and fled
with her to Washington state. John testified he was taken into custody
in Washington on September 9, 1995. He has been incarcerated ever
since. He testified that he is due to be released from the penitentiary
in 2010.
	John testified at length about his efforts, both before and after his
incarceration, to visit or support L.T.M. (We discuss that testimony
below, when we analyze the merits of his appeal.) John also testified
at length about his reasons for abducting D.M. Briefly, he believed
that Kelly was abusing D.M. physically and sexually, and he was
frustrated by the failure of his attempts to obtain custody of D.M.
through the courts. The record amply demonstrates that John has been
an energetic litigant, both before and after his incarceration, with
counsel and without, in this proceeding and in others. John argued to
the court at the fitness hearing that, because his attempts to care for
and protect his children by other means have been thwarted, litigation
has been his only avenue.
	By 2000, Jo Ellen had married Randall J. On June 22, 2000, the
couple filed a petition for Randall to adopt L.T.M. Initially, John was
represented by attorney Timothy Capps. However, on May 14, 2002,
Capps moved for leave to withdraw, stating that he and John
disagreed on matters of case strategy and that John wished to
represent himself. On June 14, 2002, John appeared in open court and
confirmed that he and Capps disagreed and that he wished to
represent himself. The court then granted Capps' motion to withdraw.
At no time did John ask the court to appoint counsel for him.
	Jo Ellen and Randall's petition alleged John was an unfit parent
on four grounds. However, at the hearing on their petition on
September 16, 2002, they elected to proceed on two grounds only:
depravity (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2000)) and failure to maintain
a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility (750 ILCS
50/1D(b) (West 2000)). After the fitness portion of the hearing, the
court found John was not depraved, but found him unfit for failure to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility. The
court then proceeded to the best-interests hearing and found that it
was in L.T.M.'s best interests that the petition for adoption be granted
and that John's parental rights be terminated. These appeals ensued,
as previously described. John stated in open court that, although he
disputed the finding of unfitness, he "would waive any argument, the
best interest [sic]. If I am unfit as a parent, [Randall] seems okay."
Thus our review of the judgment of adoption is limited to the finding
of unfitness.

ANALYSIS
I. No. 95746-The Adoption Action
A. Right to a Free Record in an Appeal as of Right
	The order immediately before us is that of the appellate court,
entered January 29, 2003, dismissing John's appeal for want of
prosecution based on his failure to file the record on appeal. That
order implicates the appellate court's prior order denying John's
motion for a copy of the record. We review de novo the appellate
court's conclusion that John had no right to a record.
	The federal constitution requires that, when a state affords an
appeal as of right from an order terminating parental rights in a private
adoption, it may not deny indigent parents a record of sufficient
completeness to permit proper appellate review. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473, 495, 117 S. Ct. 555, 570 (1996).
Therefore, upon motion and showing of indigency, the State was
obliged to provide a sufficient record to John. It is clear from the
undisputed claims in his financial affidavit that John was indigent when
he petitioned the appellate court for a free copy of the record.
Accordingly, the appellate court erred in denying John's request for
a free copy of the record. The appellate court erred again when it
dismissed his appeal for failure to file the record on appeal, because
John's failure to file the record was obviously caused by the fact he
had none to file. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's
dismissal of John's appeal.

B. The Circuit Court's Finding of Unfitness
	We choose not to remand John's appeal to the appellate court. In
the interest of judicial economy and, more importantly, because of
L.T.M.'s interest in the speedy resolution of his status, we choose
instead to review the circuit court's finding that John is an unfit
parent.
	Generally, the adoption of a minor child requires the consent of
both parents. See 750 ILCS 50/8(b) (West 2000). However, if the trial
court finds a parent to be an unfit person, as defined in the Adoption
Act, by clear and convincing evidence, that parent's consent is not
required. 750 ILCS 50/8(a)(1) (West 2000) (referring to grounds for
unfitness enumerated at 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2000)). The burden
of presenting clear and convincing evidence of unfitness is on those
petitioning for adoption. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274
(1990). We will reverse a trial court's finding of unfitness only if it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 274.
	In this case, the trial court found John unfit on the ground that he
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
responsibility as to L.T.M.'s welfare. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West
2000). When a parent is alleged unfit on that ground, the trial court "is
to examine the parent's efforts to communicate with and show interest
in the child, not the success of those efforts." Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 279.
Furthermore, "the issue is whether a parent maintained concern,
interest and responsibility as to his or her child's welfare that, under
the circumstances, was of a reasonable degree." (Emphasis in
original.) Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 280. As explained below, however, in
this case the utter failure of John's purported efforts would amply
demonstrate that John's efforts were not reasonable under the
circumstances.
	The evidence relevant to the finding of unfitness included the
following. (1) John has not seen or supported L.T.M. at least since he
was 19 months old, that is, since approximately July of 1991. (2) John
brought a Christmas present for L.T.M to Jo Ellen's workplace in
1991, and he brought approximately $40 for L.T.M. to her workplace
in 1992, but Jo Ellen refused to accept these offers. (3) Jo Ellen
always refused to give John her address. (4) John obtained an order
from the Williamson County circuit court, entered February 27, 1995,
requiring supervised visitation with L.T.M., with arrangements to be
made by DCFS. Nelson Adams, site administrator of the DCFS offices
in Marion and Murphysboro, testified he had done a search of the
DCFS records for Williamson County. There was no record relating
to L.T.M. There was a record relating to D.M., which had been
transferred to Springfield in December of 1995. Adams was not aware
of any pleading filed by John seeking to have DCFS cited for
contempt for failure to obey the visitation order. (5) John has been
incarcerated since September 9, 1995.
	John testified at length that he made strenuous and persistent
efforts to locate, visit and support L.T.M. ever since the time he last
saw L.T.M. According to John, he was continuously thwarted by Jo
Ellen and the courts and, later, by DCFS. He further testified at length
that he has made every effort to maintain his interest in L.T.M. within
the limits of his incarceration. However, the circuit court found John's
testimony "that he has been thwarted ***, because of the actions of
various individuals, whether it is the courts of this state, conspiring
with the mother, whether it is the Department of Children and Family
Services *** to not be credible." We take this to mean the court did
not believe any of John's attempts to explain his failure to visit or
financially support L.T.M. between the summer of 1991 and the date
John was incarcerated in September of 1995.
	Disregarding John's testimony, as was its right, the court was left
with very little explanation of John's utter failure to visit or support
L.T.M. during the four years prior to John's incarceration. Jo Ellen's
testimony makes clear she did not want John to visit or support
L.T.M. However, the evidence of her efforts to stop him during that
four-year period is limited to refusal of two gifts and refusal to
provide her address. Thus, the court was left with the fact of no
visitation or support and the fact that John was at least able to contact
Jo Ellen at work in 1991 and 1992. There is no evidence in the record,
other than John's discredited testimony, of the sorts of efforts that a
parent might reasonably use to locate or support a child. Yet,
according to John, he had run his own business-a bookstore-and later
became a registered nurse who earned "good money." Where there is
no credible and adequate explanation of the undisputed failure of a
parent to visit or support his child for over four years, we cannot say
the court's finding that there is clear and convincing evidence of a
failure to maintain reasonable interest, concern or responsibility is
manifestly wrong. The circuit court could infer that a person of John's
professed abilities and means who applied reasonable efforts would
achieve far better results than actually occurred.
	None of the foregoing should be construed to mean that the
burden was on John to prove himself fit. As explained above, Jo Ellen
and Randall had to prove John unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
However, the sheer fact of no contact or support for the four years
prior to his incarceration could be taken by the circuit court as clear
and convincing evidence meeting both the burden of production and,
if not adequately explained, the burden of persuasion as well.
	John's failure to visit or support L.T.M. after his incarceration
cannot count against him in the same way, since that failure is not
unexplained. On the other hand, we do not believe the circuit court
was required to weigh John's actions while incarcerated in his favor.
John is responsible for his incarceration.
	In Syck, we reversed a trial court's finding that a mother was
unfit for failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
responsibility for her son, where the father refused her efforts to
contact the child. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 281-82. However, in Syck the
trial court believed the mother's claim that her repeated efforts to
contact her son had been thwarted by the father and his parents. Syck,
138 Ill. 2d  at 270. That alone distinguishes Syck from this case.
Moreover, the mother in Syck was uneducated and impoverished.
	In sum, we cannot say the circuit court's finding that John is an
unfit parent as to L.T.M. is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We therefore affirm the finding of unfitness and the
judgment of adoption.

II. No. 97947-The Appointment of Counsel on Appeal
A. Separation of Powers/Appointment of Counsel in Discretionary
Appeal
	Many of the principles necessary to our resolution of this appeal
have been set forth in In re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d 448
(2002). K.L.P. also involved a termination of parental rights under the
Adoption Act. The appellate court appointed counsel for the
respondent mother, and subsequently ordered Kendall County to pay
counsel's fees. We upheld that order. K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d  at 471-72.
However, we decided the crucial question whether the adoption in
K.L.P. implicated "state action" on the unique facts of that case, and
expressly left open the question whether appellate counsel for indigent
parents is required in every case brought under the Adoption Act.
K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d  at 465.
	The Illinois Constitution mandates that "[n]o branch [of
government] shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. II, §1. In this case, as in K.L.P, a court order
"requires a county treasurer to disburse county funds where the
expenditure was neither anticipated or budgeted by the executive
branch nor authorized by the legislative branch of county
government." K.L.P, 198 Ill. 2d  at 457. Thus, the question arises
whether the court's order violates the constitutional requirement of
separation of powers. However, "the judicial branch may, indeed
must, intervene in matters generally reserved to the other branches of
state government when an action of the executive or legislative
branches offends the Illinois or United States Constitutions." K.L.P.,
198 Ill. 2d  at 458. If the appointment of counsel in this case was
constitutionally mandated, then the circuit court's order directing the
County to pay attorney fees is valid and the County must obey.
	We note that, regardless of whether counsel was constitutionally
mandated, our order directing the circuit court to appoint counsel was
within our supervisory authority over the courts of this state. Our
supervisory authority over the lower courts is unlimited in extent.
McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 302 (1993). Thus, the circuit
court was obliged to appoint counsel for John. The circuit court's
further order directing the County to pay attorney fees was certainly
justifiable. Duly-appointed counsel had documented the work she
performed, to which the court applied an hourly rate it found
reasonable. Nevertheless, the County's obligation to obey that order
depends on whether the appointment of counsel was constitutionally
mandated, which our supervisory order requiring appointment of
counsel did not decide.
	As a threshold matter, we consider that counsel in this case was
appointed to represent John in this court, and John's appeal to this
court was a matter of discretion, not of right. As the County points
out, the federal constitution provides no right to appointed counsel to
obtain discretionary appellate review. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
619, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 355-56, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2448 (1974).
Moreover, this court has denied payment of fees to counsel appointed
by the appellate court to file a petition for leave to appeal on behalf of
an indigent criminal defendant. People v. Davis, 79 Ill. 2d 472, 473
(1980).
	In this case, John requested appointed counsel for his appeal as
of right. That request was denied. He requested a copy of the record
be supplied to him free of charge. That was also denied. After his
appeal was dismissed for failure to file the record on appeal, John
sought, pro se, leave to appeal to this court. We allowed his petition
to decide whether he had a constitutional right to a free record on
appeal. Only then did we order the circuit court to appoint counsel for
John. This case differs from Moffitt and Davis in that John requested
counsel only after obtaining discretionary review. Moreover, unlike
the criminal defendants in Moffitt and Davis, John was denied
appointed counsel during his appeal as of right. If John had had
counsel in the appellate court, his ability to press his clear
constitutional right to a free copy of the record would probably have
been much enhanced. In view of these unusual circumstances, we hold
that if John had a constitutional right to appointed counsel in the
appellate court then after he obtained discretionary review in this
court due process required that the right denied in the appellate court
be honored in this court. If a parent has the right to appointed counsel
at all, he has it in his appeal as of right. K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d  at 471.
Thus, we must decide whether John had any constitutional right to
appointed counsel.
B. Equal Protection
	John claims he was entitled to appointed counsel under both the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, we find
John's equal protection claim to be dispositive.
	The fourteenth amendment is directed at the states and thus "can
be violated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as 'state
action.' " Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923-24, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 486-87, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2746-47 (1982). The Supreme
Court has found state action where "the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the State."
Lugar, 457 U.S.  at 937, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 495, 102 S. Ct.  at 2753. State
action is a precondition of invoking the equal protection clause as well
as the due process clause. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660, 672, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991).
	"The guarantee of equal protection requires that the government
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 309 (2001). While the Juvenile Court Act provides
appointed counsel to all indigent parents threatened with the loss of
parental rights (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2000)), the Adoption Act
provides that benefit only to parents who are alleged to be unfit
because of mental disability under section 1(D)(p) of the Act (750
ILCS 50/13(B)(c) (West 2000)). John claims he is situated similarly
to a parent who would be entitled to appointed counsel under the
Juvenile Court Act. The gravamen of John's claim is thus that the
statutory scheme provides a benefit to others, but not to him, on the
basis of a constitutionally illegitimate classification.
	John needed counsel because Jo Ellen and Randall sought to
terminate his parental rights. However, the reason he needed counsel
is not part of his claim. John's equal protection claim challenges the
way the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act distribute the
benefit of appointed counsel. John alleges the statutes denied him
equal protection of the laws, not that Jo Ellen and Randall did so. The
question whether Jo Ellen and Randall are state actors therefore does
not arise. Cases such as Lugar and Leesville Concrete, which concern
whether the actions of private litigants may be attributed to the state,
are inapposite. For example, in Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S.  at 619-28, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 672-79, 111 S. Ct.  at 2082-87, the equal
protection claim was that a private litigant used its peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race. By contrast, John
does not claim Jo Ellen and Randall used the Adoption Act in a
discriminatory way.
	Enactment of a statute is obviously state action, regardless of
whether the state is responsible for a particular private litigant who
relies on a statute. See Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486-87, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565, 576, 108 S. Ct. 1340,
1345-46 (1988). Thus, there is sufficient state action for purposes of
John's equal protection claim.
	Statutory classifications that affect a fundamental right violate the
equal protection clause unless they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 309. In this case, the
classification is the distinction between parents who must answer a
petition to terminate their parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act
and those, like John, who must answer under the Adoption Act. The
right to parent one's child is a fundamental right. K.L.P, 198 Ill. 2d  at
467. Clearly, John's parental rights were burdened by this
classification because the circuit court terminated his parental rights
under the Adoption Act, and he was denied appointed counsel in his
appeal as of right from that order, when he certainly would have had
it under the Juvenile Court Act. Nevertheless, the equal protection
guarantee does not apply unless John is situated similarly to a parent
facing termination of his rights in proceedings under the Juvenile
Court Act. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 311.
	Generally, a person who stands to lose a right under one statute
is not similarly situated to persons who face the same loss under an
entirely different statute with a different legislative purpose. See, e.g.,
In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 563-64 (2000)
(discussing equal protection challenges to the Sexually Violent
Persons Act and the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act based on a
comparison with persons facing commitment under the Mental Health
Code). In R.C., we rejected the claim that a mother who had
surrendered custody of her child and now faced termination of her
rights under the Adoption Act was similarly situated to parents who
had lost custody under section 2-10 the Juvenile Court Act and were
entitled to services from DCFS. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 311. Clearly, the
purposes of the Adoption Act are not identical to the purposes of the
Juvenile Court Act. Nevertheless, a parent who stands to lose his
rights under the Adoption Act if he is found unfit is in a very similar
situation to a parent who stands to lose the very same constitutional
right, based on the very same finding, in proceedings under the
Juvenile Court Act. Indeed, the Juvenile Court Act's termination
provision incorporates the Adoption Act's definition of unfitness. 705
ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2000). In this case, therefore, we find that
John is similarly situated to parents facing termination of parental
rights under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act.
	Having found that John is similarly situated to parents who would
be entitled to counsel under the Juvenile Court Act, we consider
whether the Adoption Act's failure to provide counsel serves a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to do so. We
find there is no compelling state interest served by that failure. The
only state interest served by denying appointed counsel under the
Adoption Act is the interest in limiting the payment of attorney fees.
There is certainly a legitimate interest in controlling expenditures on
appointed counsel. K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d  at 469, quoting In re Adoption
of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110, 122 (2000), quoting Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 , 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640,
650, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2160 (1981) . However, that legitimate interest
is not compelling. K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d  at 469, quoting K.L.P., 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 122, quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 650,
101 S. Ct. 2160. The State may maintain reasonable control of
expenditures without flatly denying counsel to an entire class of
persons whose parental rights are at stake. For example, the State
certainly may insist on paying only those fees that are reasonable and
necessary. Because it serves no compelling state interest, the
Adoption Act's failure to provide John appointed counsel, which he
would have had under the Juvenile Court Act, violates respondent's
constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws.
	We must now decide whether the remedy for this constitutional
violation is to require the state to extend the benefit to those who have
been excluded or to withdraw the benefit from those who have been
favored. See R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 309-10, citing Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. 728, 79 L. Ed. 2d 646, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). We note the
highest courts of other states that have faced the same remedial
question have opted to extend the benefit of appointed counsel for
indigent parents facing termination of parental rights in private
adoptions. In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Iowa 2004). In re
K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 566-67 (N.D. 1993). In re Fanning, 310 Or.
514, 523-24, 800 P.2d 773, 779 (1990). Moreover, we note our
legislature could have, consistent with the Constitution, refused to
provide a blanket right to counsel under the Juvenile Court Act and
could have instead left the provision of counsel to the trial court on a
case-by-case basis. See Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 31-32, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at
652, 101 S. Ct.  at 2162. However, the legislature decided the wiser
course is to provide counsel in all cases. We do not favor a remedy
that nullifies the considered judgment of the legislature. Therefore, we
will not eliminate the statutory right to counsel under the Juvenile
Court Act. Accordingly, we hold the state is required by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to provide appointed
counsel to indigent parents who face the loss of parental rights in
proceedings under the Adoption Act.

CONCLUSION
	The Constitution requires that John, who is indigent, is entitled
to a copy of the record sufficient for a proper appeal. Therefore the
appellate court erred when it denied his motion for a copy of the
record and then dismissed his appeal for failure to file the record on
appeal. John's appeal is reinstated. However, the circuit court's
finding that John is an unfit parent as to L.T.M. by clear and
convincing evidence is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The judgment of adoption in No. 95746 is affirmed.
	The enactment of a statutory scheme that provides appointed
counsel for indigent parents facing termination of parental rights under
the Juvenile Court Act, but not under the Adoption Act, violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. The remedy is to provide appointed counsel under
the Adoption Act as well. Appointment of counsel for John was
constitutionally mandated. Therefore, the order of the circuit court
requiring Franklin County to pay attorney Curry's reasonable fees and
costs in the amount of $6,153.94, which was entered pursuant to this
court's order, does not violate the separation of powers principles of
the Illinois Constitution. That order is affirmed.
No. 95746-Appellate court order reversed;
circuit court order affirmed.
No. 97947-Circuit court order affirmed.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.