Title: In re Wilson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S53377
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2006

FILED: December 29, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of 
LINDA J. WILSON,
Accused.
(OSB 04-155, 04-157; SC S53377)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted November 1, 2006.
John Halpern, Jr., Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for the accused.
Stacey J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State
Bar.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for six
months, commencing 60 days from the effective date of this
decision. 
*Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged Linda J. Wilson (the accused) with
violating two disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:  Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation)
and DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to 
administration of justice). (1)  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found that the accused had committed the
charged violations and recommended that the accused be suspended
from the practice of law for six months.  
The accused seeks review in this court.  ORS 9.536(1); 
Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1.  This court reviews the record
de novo.  ORS 9.536(3) and BR 10.6.  The Bar has the burden of
establishing the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing
evidence.  BR 5.2.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4) and that a
six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction.  
On December 12, 2003, the accused became the lawyer of
record for the respondent in a domestic relations matter.  Haines
represented the petitioner in that matter.  At that time, the
case was set for trial on December 17, 2003.  The day before the
trial was set to begin, the court granted Haines's motion to
postpone the trial date to January 8, 2004.  
On January 5, 2004, the accused and Haines both were in
court on separate matters.  At that time, the accused informed
Haines that she had a trial and an arbitration hearing set for
January 8, 2004, and that she, therefore, would have to postpone
the trial of the domestic relations matter.  Haines told the
accused that she would not agree to the postponement.  
Nevertheless, later that day, the accused filed a motion to
postpone the trial in the domestic relations matter.  In her
supporting affidavit, the accused stated that a postponement was
necessary because, on the scheduled trial date, she also was
required to arbitrate a matter in Douglas County and participate
in a settlement conference in Linn County.  The presiding judge 
denied the accused's motion shortly after it was filed and
directed her judicial assistant to inform the parties of that
ruling.
On January 7, 2004, the accused's husband and law
partner, Daum, informed the judge's judicial assistant that the
accused had the flu and needed to postpone the trial.  After
speaking with the judge, the assistant telephoned Haines and
discovered that Haines opposed any postponement because she
intended to present the testimony of an expert witness and a
delay in the trial would result in significant expense.  After
learning of Haines's objection, the judge directed the assistant
to telephone the accused and request a doctor's note regarding
her alleged ailment. 
Later that afternoon, Daum telephoned Haines and stated
that the accused had the flu and would not appear at the trial on
the following day.  Haines then telephoned the judge's judicial
assistant, who informed her of the judge's request that the
accused produce a doctor's note.  Shortly thereafter, the judge
was scheduled to be in court and informed the assistant that she
would rule on the motion to postpone when she returned.  While
the judge was in court, the assistant informed Haines that the
accused had yet to produce a note from a doctor and that the
judge had yet to rule on the accused's motion to postpone. 
Moments later, the accused telephoned Haines and told her that
the trial had been postponed.  Haines asked the accused whether
she had spoken to the judge's assistant and done everything that
needed to be done.  The accused assured Haines that she had. 
After speaking with Haines, the accused then telephoned
the judge's judicial assistant and told her that Haines had
withdrawn her objection to the postponement.  Because the judge
was still on the bench at that time, the assistant told the
accused that she would relay that information to the judge and
that the judge would make her ruling later that day.  At no point
during that conversation did the judge's assistant indicate to
the accused that the trial was postponed.  Shortly after
concluding that conversation, the judge's assistant received a
telephone call from Haines.  Haines told her that the accused had
stated that the case had been postponed.  The assistant corrected
Haines and informed her that the judge had yet to make her ruling
on the accused's motion to postpone.  
Shortly after 4:00 p.m., on the same day, the judge
returned to her chambers, spoke with the assistant about the
various conversations involving the accused and Haines, and
denied the accused's motion to postpone.  Telephone messages were
left for both Haines and the accused stating that the motion for
a postponement had been denied.  
On January 8, 2004, shortly before 9:00 a.m., when the
trial was scheduled to begin, Daum telephoned the court and said
that the accused was ill and would submit proof to the court
later that day.  Haines appeared at court with her expert witness
and discovered that neither the accused nor the accused's client
was present.  At that time, the judge placed Haines under oath
and had her testify about the events that had occurred during the
previous few days.  Based upon both the information that she had
received from the judicial assistant and Haines's testimony, the
judge informed Haines that she would consider a request that the
accused be required to pay attorney and expert fees incurred by
Haines in preparation for trial.  
On January 14, 2004, Haines submitted a motion for
attorney fees.  On January 20, 2004, the accused signed an
affidavit in response to Haines's motion.  In that affidavit, the
accused swore that, on January 5, 2004, she had told Haines that
she was not feeling well and would have to postpone the January
8, 2004, trial date unless she felt better.  The accused also
swore that Haines had had no objection to the postponement at the
time, but only objected to it later in the day. (2) 
Ultimately, the judge issued an order awarding Haines $1,750 in
attorney fees and $600 in costs.  That order provided that the
sanctions be entered against the accused personally and not
against her client. 
The Bar's formal complaint against the accused alleged
that the accused's conduct had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation) and DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct
prejudicial to administration of justice).  Following a hearing,
the trial panel found that the accused had violated both DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4) and recommended a six-month
suspension. (3)  As noted, the accused sought review in this
court. 
The accused raises three arguments.  First, she
contends that she was struggling with depression at the time of
the domestic relations matter.  In that regard, the accused
challenges a trial panel ruling to the effect that, if the
accused did not produce certain medical records (as the Bar had
requested below), then she would be "prohibited from offering at
trial any evidence or testimony regarding any medical or
psychological condition, either in defense of the Bar's
allegations or in mitigation of any sanction that may be imposed
upon the Accused as a result of her conduct." 
Second, the accused argues that "almost all of the
testimony in this case consisted of differing interpretations of
the meanings of words and fine shadings of the meanings of
words."  As support for that contention, the accused provides the
following example:
"[A]lthough it would be said that 'the court' informed
the Accused of some fact, it was revealed during trial
that the words 'the court' meant some official working
for the court and 'informed Ms. Wilson' meant delivered
a message to somebody in some manner to be given to Ms.
Wilson, without knowing whether or not she got the
message."
According to the accused, the trial panel gave too much
credence to the testimony of certain witnesses and not enough to
other witnesses.  For example, the accused suggests that "Haines
was shown to be a hostile, biased witness against the accused,
and her testimony should be taken in that light."  
Finally, the accused also argues that, even if her
conduct violated the disciplinary rules, the trial panel imposed
an excessive sanction.  The accused suggest than an appropriate
sanction would be a 90-day suspension.  
In response, the Bar argues that the trial panel
correctly decided the issues concerning the accused's illness and
medical records.  The Bar contends that, "[t]o the extent the
accused was putting her mental state at issue, the Bar was
entitled to explore and test the accused's assertion.  It could
do so only by reviewing the accused's mental records."  The Bar
argues that, under those circumstances, "the trial panel chair
was justified in ordering the accused to either produce those
records by a date certain or forego introducing any evidence
regarding her mental state."  The Bar also argues that the
accused failed to identify how the trial panel's discovery order
denied her a fair hearing.  Similarly, the Bar argues that, "[t]o
the extent the trial panel rejected the accused's version of
events and found her explanations not credible, the court should
give substantial weight to those findings and conclusions." 
In our view, the accused has not presented any cogent
legal argument as to why she should have been permitted to place
her mental state in issue at the trial panel proceeding but not
permit the review of her medical or mental health records.  In
the absence of such an argument, we conclude that the trial panel
ruled correctly that the accused's failure to produce her medical
or mental health records provided a sufficient basis to bar her
from introducing evidence regarding her medical condition or
mental health.  
After reviewing the record, we also conclude that the
trial panel correctly assessed the testimony before it and
correctly determined that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
and DR 1-102(A)(4).
In determining the appropriate sanction for violations
of the disciplinary rules, this court first refers to the
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  Using the ABA
Standards, we make a preliminary determination of the appropriate
sanction by considering the duty that the accused violated, the
accused's mental state, and the injury that the accused's
misconduct caused.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then consider the
existence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may
justify either an increase or a reduction in the degree of
sanction to be imposed.  ABA Standards 9.2, 9.3.  Finally, we
evaluate the appropriate sanction in light of this court's case
law.  See In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 64-65, 36 P3d 468 (2001)
(describing  methodology).
In this case, the accused violated her duty to the
public, the legal system, and the profession when she made false
statements in a court proceeding.  The conduct that constituted
those violations was done intentionally and caused actual injury
to the court in that the trial was delayed and had to be
rescheduled.  
Taking into account the duty violated, the accused's
mental state, and the actual and potential harm, we conclude that
ABA Standard 6.12, which suggests that a suspension is
appropriate, most closely fits the misconduct at issue. (4) 
There are two aggravating factors present in this case. 
First, the accused has a prior disciplinary record.  ABA Standard
9.22(a).  In 1986, a trial panel found that the accused violated
DR 2-110(A)(2) (withdrawing as counsel without taking reasonable
precautions to avoid foreseeable prejudice), DR 7-104(A)(1)
(communicating with a person the lawyer knew to be represented by
another lawyer), DR 9-102(A) (withdrawing funds from one client's
trust account to be applied to a different client's
representation), and DR 9-102(B)(4) (applying money held in trust
for the benefit of the client to attorney fees without the
authority to do so).  In re Wilson, 1 DB Rptr 225 (1986). 
Second, the accused has substantial experience in the practice of
law.  
The Bar concedes that a mitigating factor also is
present, in that the accused demonstrated a cooperative attitude
toward the proceeding.  ABA Standard 9.32(e). (5) 
We turn to a consideration of this court's case law. 
Although there is no case law that is precisely on point, there
are several cases that offer guidance.  In previous lawyer
disciplinary cases involving dishonesty and misrepresentation,
this court has ordered sanctions ranging from six-month
suspensions to disbarment. (6)  See In re Starr, 324 Or 283,
924 P2d 308 (1996) (two-year suspension for knowingly making
false statements in petition for restraining order); In re
Benson, 317 Or 164, 854 P2d 466 (1993) (six-month suspension for
assisting client in preparation of fraudulent documents); In re
Hawkins, 305 Or 319, 751 P2d 780 (1988) (disbarment for filing
false affidavit and using false evidence); In re Brown, 298 Or
285, 692 P2d 107 (1984) (two-year suspension for preparation of
false affidavit). 
In this case, the accused cooperated with the Bar in
the underlying proceedings, and her prior offenses occurred
almost two decades ago.  Furthermore, although her dishonesty
with the court -- which included making false statements to
opposing counsel and court staff, and also filing an affidavit
containing false statements -- constituted an egregious
violation, it does not rise to the level of the misconduct found
in the more severe lawyer disciplinary cases described above.  As
a result, we conclude that the trial panel's six-month suspension
was the appropriate sanction in this case. 
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
six months, commencing 60 days from the effective date of this
decision. 
1. The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became
effective January 1, 2005.  The conduct at issue in this
proceeding occurred before that date, and we therefore apply the
Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. According to the Bar, the accused was aware that those
statements were false when she provided them.
3. Specifically, the trial panel found by clear and
convincing evidence:
"(1) That on January 7, 2004, the accused
represented to counsel for the adverse party in the
[domestic relations] case that the court had granted
her oral motion to postpone, which representation was
false, and the Accused knew the representation was
false when she made the statement.
"(2) That on January 7, 2004, the accused
represented to the court that [Haines] no longer
objected to a postponement of the January 8, 2004 trial
date, knowing this representation was false when made.
"(3) When the court informed the Accused that it
had not yet ruled on her motion to postpone, the
accused failed to inform [Haines] that her prior
representation that the court had granted her motion to
postpone was incorrect.  
"(4) That in an affidavit filed with the court on
January 20, 2004, the Accused represented she told
[Haines] on January 5, 2004, that she was not feeling
well and would have to postpone the January 8, 2004,
trial date unless she felt better.  The Accused knew
that representation was false when she made the
statement in her affidavit."
4. ABA Standard 6.12 provides:
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows that false statements or documents are being
submitted to the court or that material information is
improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial
action, and causes injury or potential injury to a
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or
potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding." 
5. We note that the accused's prior offenses are remote in
time.  ABA Standard 9.32(m).  The Bar offers that the remoteness
in time of the accused's 1986 misconduct also may serve as a
mitigating factor under ABA Standard 9.32(m).  In Oregon,
however, remoteness in time does not serve as a mitigating
factor, although it can serve to lessen the significance of the
prior misconduct in aggravation.  See In re Dugger, 334 Or 602,
609-10, 54 P3d 595 (2002) (so explaining).
6. We do not separately address any cases involving
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  In our
view, the sanction associated with the accused's dishonesty and
misrepresentation in this case takes into account the accused's
conduct that harmed the administration of justice.