Title: State v. Jimmie Lee Thomas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-50-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2001

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for the Court. This appeal raises the question whether the No Early Release Act (NERA or the Act) applies to a defendant who pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault for touching an eleven-year-old victim in her vaginal area. The victim accused defendant, Jimmie Lee Thomas, who was thirty-nine years old at the time and babysitting the victim, of penetrating her vaginal opening with his pinky finger. Thomas was charged with first- degree aggravated sexual assault and lesser-included offenses. Thomas entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault on a female under the age of thirteen. In his factual statement supporting the plea, defendant admitted touching the victim in her vaginal area, but denied penetration. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to permit defendant to be sentenced as if his criminal act were a third-degree offense and to recommend a four- year term of imprisonment. The question of the application of NERA, which requires a defendant to serve 85 percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole, arose at the plea hearing. The State took the position that NERA applied. The plea agreement provided that if the trial court determined NERA did not apply, the State could appeal that decision. It also provided that Thomas could withdraw his plea if the trial court determined that NERA did apply. The trial court held that NERA did not apply to defendant because the Act requires the use of physical force beyond that inherent in an act of sexual contact or a threat to use force against the victim. The trial court found that there was nothing in Thomas's factual statement demonstrating an independent act of force or threat of force against the victim. Thomas was sentenced to a custodial term of four years without a term of parole ineligibility. The State appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed. 322 N.J. Super. 512 (1999). The Appellate Division rejected the State's argument that this Court's definition of physical force in State in the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 444 (1992), was the same physical force contemplated by the Legislature in the definition of a violent crime under NERA. It held that physical force as defined under NERA requires an independent act of force or threat of force against the victim that is additional to the constituent elements of the crime to which defendant pled guilty. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: Where, as here, the elements of the sexual offense charged do not contain as an element proof of any one or more of the NERA factors, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt an independent act of force or violence or a separate threat of immediate physical force before enhanced sentencing under NERA. 1. NERA applies to defendants convicted of first- or second-degree crimes if the crime is a violent crime. The Act defines violent crime to be any crime in which the actor causes death or serious bodily injury; uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon; and any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2a, d. The phrase physical force is not defined in the Act and does not invoke a single meaning that is obvious and plain. Hence, the Court must look to extrinsic factors to divine legislative intent. (Pp. 5-9) 3. NERA was enacted primarily because of New Jersey's alarmingly high rate of parolee recidivism. Although early versions of the bill applied to all first- and second-degree crimes, the State Bar Association opposed that bill because of its potentially catastrophic impact on the prison system. The bill was then amended to focus on violent offenders. The Governor's Study Commission on Parole reviewed the bill and recommended that the Legislature narrowly define violent crime. The bill was amended, apparently following the Commission's recommendation. The legislative history indicates that the primary purpose to be advanced by NERA was to enhance the punishment for the most violent criminals in society. (Pp. 11-14) 4. NERA covers three types of first- and second-degree sexual assaults: (1) those in which the actor causes serious bodily injury; (2) those in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon, and (3) those in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force. Those three categories are NERA factors. One of the three NERA factors pertinent to sexual offenses is essential to satisfy the violence requirement of the Act. By limiting NERA to these sexual crimes, the Legislature must have been aware that not all first- and second- degree sexual assaults would be covered by NERA. The across-the-board application of NERA urged by the State would compromise the legislative purpose of minimizing the Act's impact on the prison system. (Pp. 14-18) 5. The statutory offense under which defendant pled guilty does not require proof of a NERA factor. Where the elements of the sexual offense charged do not contain as an element proof of any one or more of the NERA factors, there must be proof of an independent act of force or violence or a separate threat of immediate physical force to satisfy the NERA factor in a manner that comports with this Court's holding today in State v. Johnson, __ N.J. __ (2000). This holding should not be viewed as an indication that the Court does not deem defendant's offense to be serious. Defendant's offense is one of the second-degree, which carries a sentence of up to ten years with five years of parole ineligibility, subject to other statutory provisions for an extended term. The policy choice exercised by the Legislature in this instance was to enhance the sentences of the most violent criminals while recognizing that less violent first- and second-degree offenders will still be punished severely. (Pp. 18-20) 6. The State alternatively argues that an adult who commits an unwanted touching against a child implicitly threatens the use of physical force. In support, it cites to federal cases interpreting federal statutes to include in the definition of crime of violence sexual assaults by an adult against a child. These cases hold that when an adult sexually assaults a child, there is a substantial risk that physical force will be used. The Legislature could have made NERA applicable to all tender-years sexual assaults, but it chose instead to define violent crime more narrowly. (Pp. 20-23) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, dissenting, is of the view that the Court's holding conflicts with its decision in M.T.S., which held that a sexual assault is a violation of the victim's bodily integrity and is inherently violent. JUSTICE STEIN and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ZAZZALI joins. JUSTICES LONG and VERNIERO did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 50 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIMMIE LEE THOMAS, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 11, 2000 -- Decided February 28, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 322 N.J. Super. 512 (1999). Deborah C. Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. d. For the purposes of this section, violent crime means any crime in which the actor causes death, causes serious bodily injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:11-1, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. Violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which the actor uses, or threatens the immediate use of, physical force. The State relies on a series of cases involving the application of 18 U.S.C. 16, which defines a crime of violence for purposes of determining whether a crime is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). According to 18 U.S.C. 16, a crime of violence is (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Federal cases hold that sexual abuse is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) because when an adult sexually assaults a child, there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the child's compliance. See, e.g., Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding the offense of attempted lewd assault on a minor under 16 is a felony involving a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the victim ); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child under the age of fourteen, there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the child's compliance ). The State argues that the reasoning of those cases should apply in the context of NERA. The State maintains that there is an inherent threat of physical force in a sexual assault by an adult against a child and that therefore NERA applies to all first- and second-degree sexual assaults committed by adults against children. We agree that the Legislature could have made NERA applicable to all first- and second-degree offenses or made it applicable to all tender-years sexual assaults. But, as we stated before, the Legislature chose instead to narrowly define violent crime. We have, therefore, narrowly construed NERA to effectuate the Legislature's intent. We do not believe that the Legislature intended to apply NERA when there is only a possibility that the actor would have used physical force. Instead, NERA requires the actor actually to use or threaten the immediate use of a deadly weapon or physical force unless serious bodily injury has been inflicted. If we have misinterpreted the legislative intent, we invite a correction of course by the Legislature. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIMMIE LEE THOMAS, Defendant-Respondent. PORITZ, C.J., dissenting. The Court today holds that the No Early Release Act ( NERA ) applies only to sexual assaults and aggravated sexual assaults in which physical force beyond that inherent in the act of penetration or contact is used or threatened. Because I believe that holding conflicts with and is precluded by the Court's decision in State in the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992), I respectfully dissent. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1) makes sexual penetration a crime of the second degree where the actor uses physical force and coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury. In M.T.S. the Court examined that language in the context of almost two hundred years of rape law in New Jersey. M.T.S., supra, 129 N.J. at 431. Whether there had been physical force and coercion constituting rape had traditionally been viewed in relation to the victim's resistance thereby shifting attention from the defendant's assaultive conduct to the victim's response. Id. at 432. The Court found that when the Legislature adopted the current Code of Criminal Justice in 1978, it reformulated the statutory provisions concerning rape: In redefining rape law as sexual assault, the Legislature adopted the concept of sexual assault as a crime against the bodily integrity of the victim. Although it is possible to imagine a set of rules in which persons must demonstrate affirmatively that sexual contact is unwanted or not permitted, such a regime would be inconsistent with modern principles of personal autonomy. The Legislature recast the law of rape as sexual assault to bring that area of law in line with the expectation of privacy and bodily control that long has characterized most of our private and public law. In interpreting physical force to include any touching that occurs without permission we seek to respect that goal. Most important, the Court held that any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration constitutes the offense of sexual assault. Therefore, physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not required for such penetration to be unlawful. The definition of physical force is satisfied under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1) if the defendant applies any amount of force against another person in the absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be affirmative and freely-given permission to the act of sexual penetration. I have discussed M.T.S. in some detail because I believe that we are now backing away from the principles so eloquently described by Justice Handler in that opinion. We determined there that the statutory language physical force and coercion does not require physical force beyond that involved in unwanted sexual penetration or sexual contact. Today we are reverting back to the more traditional view rejected by the 1978 revisions to the Criminal Code and by this Court in M.T.S. Implicit in the traditional view is the notion that when an actor commits sexual assault without using or threatening any extra physical force the assault does not involve violence. I believe, and M.T.S. held, that a sexual assault is a violation of the victim's bodily integrity and is inherently violent. That view lies at the very heart of the reform of our sexual assault laws. See M.T.S., supra, 129 N.J. at 445-46. It is against this backdrop that the Court interprets the same language in NERA. In defining violent crimes for sentence enhancement purposes under NERA the Legislature stated: For the purposes of this section, violent crime means any crime in which the actor causes death, causes serious bodily injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:11-1, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. Violent crime also includes any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which the actor uses, or threatens the immediate use of, physical force. [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2d (emphasis added).] As in the sexual assault statute, NERA does not define physical force, and as in M.T.S., the Court finds that the disputed language is ambiguous. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 9). The Court further finds that the Legislature is presumed to have known about our construction of the disputed language in M.T.S. but, inexplicably, decides that physical force should now be interpreted differently in NERA. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 11). I see no basis for a departure from that basic rule of statutory construction. The purpose of NERA is to to penalize more severely the criminal who is prone to use violence. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 17). That purpose is not subverted by the M.T.S. conclusion that sexual assault is inherently violent. Moreover, utilizing the M.T.S. definition of sexual assault does not render the physical force language of NERA mere surplusage. We expressly rejected that contention in M.T.S. when we found that as a description of the method of achieving 'sexual penetration,' the term 'physical force' serves to define and explain the acts that are offensive, unauthorized, and unlawful. 129 N.J. at 445. Similarly, the term physical force in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2d does not add additional force beyond that of the actual sexual assault but, rather, serves to describe the crimes defined in M.T.S. and included under NERA. Finally, like the majority, I too would invite the Legislature to clarify its intentions in respect of NERA. I recognize that the Legislature may ultimately choose to exclude certain categories of sexual assault from the NERA parole ineligibility requirements. Until then, however, I am unwilling to attribute to the Legislature an intent to require additional force beyond that of unwanted sexual penetration or contact before those crimes can be classified as violent for the purposes of NERA sentencing. JUSTICE ZAZZALI joins in this opinion. NO. A-50 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIMMIE LEE THOMAS, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED February 28, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz