Title: State v. Blair
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057796
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2010

FILED: March 25, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
MICHAEL JAMES BLAIR,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
042431; CA A130455; SC S057796)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
February 22, 2010, at Jesuit High School, Portland, Oregon.
Andrew S. Chilton,
Chilton &amp; Galli, LLC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioner on review.
Susan G. Howe, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor
General.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Lincoln
County Circuit Court, Charles P.
Littlehales, Judge. 230 Or App 36, 214
P3d 47 (2009).
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Defendant petitions for review from a
Court of Appeals opinion affirming his conviction for, among other crimes,
felony murder.(1) 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the felony murder statute, ORS
163.115(1)(b), does not require that the state allege and prove that a
defendant acted with a culpable mental state in causing the victim's death; rather,
the defendant's commission or attempted commission of the underlying felony
establishes, as a matter of law, the requisite mens rea with respect to
the victim's death.  State v. Blair, 230 Or App 36, 56, 214 P3d 47 (2009). 
We allowed defendant's petition for review.  As explained below, we agree with
the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and therefore, affirm.
The facts are undisputed.  Defendant
broke into the victim's home, stole several marijuana plants and household
items, and attempted to rape and sexually abuse the victim.  The next day, the
victim's son found her body on the floor next to her bed, with a bed sheet tied
around one of her legs and also loosely tied to a bedpost.  The cause of the
victim's death was chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) due to
emphysema.  The victim suffered from acute COPD, which was exacerbated critically
by defendant's burglary, attempted rape, and attempted sexual abuse.  
Before trial, defendant demurred to
the felony murder count in the indictment.  Defendant argued that the demurrer
should be sustained, because the felony murder count did not allege that
defendant had caused the death of the victim with a culpable mental state and
therefore did not allege facts "constitut[ing] an offense."  See ORS
135.630(4) (defendant may demur to accusatory instruction when "the facts
stated do not constitute an offense.").
Defendant argued that, because felony
murder is a form of criminal homicide, the state was required to allege in the
indictment one of the mental states described in ORS 163.005(1):  that is, it
was required to allege that defendant had killed the victim
"intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence[.]" 
The trial court overruled the demurrer.  During the trial, defendant submitted proposed
jury instructions that would have required the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had caused the victim's death "knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence" as one of the elements of felony
murder.  The trial court refused to give those requested instructions.  A jury
subsequently convicted defendant of felony murder, among other crimes.  On the felony
murder conviction, the trial court imposed a life sentence with the possibility
of parole after 25 years.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.  Blair, 230 Or App 36.   The Court of Appeals
acknowledged some ambiguity in the relevant statutes, but held that their text,
context, and legislative history supported the interpretation that felony
murder, as defined in Oregon, does not require a separate mental state.  The
Court of Appeals pointed out that the concept of felony murder was first
codified in 1864 and that long-standing case law from this court discussing
felony murder never had required that a specific mental state attend the cause
of death of the victim; instead, the mens rea element was satisfied by
the commission of certain underlying felonies.  The Court of Appeals also noted
that the statutes relied on by defendant were part of the 1971 revision of the
criminal code and that nothing in the legislative history suggested that the
legislature intended to alter the longstanding felony murder rule.  Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not erred.  Id.
at 56.
We allowed
defendant's petition for review to determine whether the definition of criminal
homicide in ORS 163.005(1) applies to felony
murder, as codified in ORS 163.115(1)(b), in such a way that felony murder in
Oregon requires the state to allege and prove that a defendant acted with a
mental state in causing the victim's death distinct from any mental state
required to prove the underlying felony.  In doing so, our task is to "ascertain
and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are
several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be
adopted as will give effect to all."  ORS 174.010.  We interpret the
statutory text in context, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 610-11, 859 P3d 1143 (1993), and then, to the extent we find it helpful,
we consider the legislative history proffered by the parties.  ORS 174.020(3); see
also State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (after
considering text and context, court considers any pertinent legislative
history, giving it appropriate weight).  In this case, the context that we
consider along with the text includes the law as it existed before the adoption
of the 1971 criminal code.  See State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532, 964 P2d
1007 (1998) (context of a statute includes this court's prior interpretations
of the same statute or earlier versions of that statute).  
ORS
163.005 provides, in part: 
"(1) A person commits criminal homicide if,
without justification or excuse, the person intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of another human
being.  
"(2) 'Criminal homicide' is murder,
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or aggravated vehicular
homicide."  
The felony murder statute, ORS 163.115, provides, in part:
"(1) Except as provided in ORS 163.118 and
163.125, criminal homicide constitutes murder:
"* * * * *
"(b) When it is committed by a person,
acting either alone or with one or more persons, who commits or attempts to
commit any of the following crimes and in the course of and in furtherance of
the crime the person is committing or attempting to commit, or during the
immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another participant if there be any,
causes the death of a person other than one of the participants:
"* * * * *
"(C) Burglary in the first degree as
defined in ORS 164.225[.]"
 As
defendant reads the above statutes, because felony murder is a type of
criminal homicide -- and, under ORS 163.005(1), a person commits criminal
homicide only if the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence causes the death of another -- felony murder requires that,
in causing the death, the defendant acted with a mens rea of at least
criminal negligence.  The state responds that ORS 163.005(1) does not provide
the exclusive definition of criminal homicide because ORS 163.005(2) provides a
further definition of criminal homicide and, under defendant's reading,
subsection (2) would be rendered superfluous.  Moreover, the state argues, under
ORS 163.005(2), "criminal homicide" includes "murder."  Accordingly,
all the subspecies of murder listed in ORS 163.115(1) constitute "criminal
homicide," regardless of whether the specific subspecies requires that a
defendant act with a culpable mental state in causing the victim's death.  The
state asserts that nothing in ORS 163.005(1) prevents the mens rea required
to prove the underlying felony from being imputed to the person who causes the death
of a victim for purposes of ORS 163.115(1)(b).  With those competing arguments
in mind, we turn to an examination of the pertinent statutes.  
The
legislature adopted ORS 163.005 and ORS 163.115 in 1971 as part of an overall
revision of the criminal code.  Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed
Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report §§ 87-88, 84-85 (July 1970). 
"Criminal homicide" was a new offense created during the 1971
revision and thus had no preexisting history in Oregon law.  See
Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code,
Final Draft and Report § 87(C), 84 (July 1970) (Commentary) (setting out
definition).  On the other hand, the felony murder rule was first
codified in Oregon in 1864 as part of both the first- and second-degree murder
statutes.  Or Laws, 1864, ch 43, §§ 502-03.(2) 
The relevant portions of the first-and second-degree
felony murder statutes remained substantially unchanged until the criminal code
revisions in 1971, and this court has consistently incorporated an
"implied malice" rule into felony murder, that is, felony murder contains
no distinct or independent mens rea requirement in relation to the cause
of death of the victim.  See State of Oregon v. Brown, 7 Or 186, 198,
204 (1879) (first-degree murder statute did not require defendant to act
purposely in killing victim if defendant killed victim in commission or
attempted commission of felonies enumerated in statute; intent to kill
"incontrovertibly implied" from defendant's participation in felony);
State v. Branch, 244 Or 97, 100, 415 P2d 766 (1966) ("[A] malignant
purpose is established by proof of the defendant's other felony * * *."); State
v. Dorland, 161 Or 403, 404, 89 P2d 595 (1939) ("[I]t is not necessary
for the indictment to allege or the state to prove that [the killing] was done
purposely or with deliberate and premeditated malice.  It is sufficient if it
be alleged and proved that the killing was done while the defendant was engaged
in the commission or attempt to commit any of [the enumerated
felonies][.]").
Thus, when
the legislature adopted ORS 163.005 and ORS 163.115 in 1971, the felony murder
rule, as construed and applied by this court, long had operated to impose responsibility
for homicides that occur during the commission or attempted commission of a
felony, without the separate and additional requirement that the defendant
acted with a mens rea in causing the death of another person.  In
addition, since 1971, this court has continued to treat felony murder as
requiring no distinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause
of the victim's death.  See State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205, 208 P3d 936
(2009) ("[A] defendant may be convicted of felony murder even though the
defendant did not participate in the murder, cause the death, or intend that
the death occur.  * * * [I]f a participant in a felony also participates in and
causes a murder, and does so intentionally, then the participant commits
intentional murder, as well as felony murder."); State v. Zweigart,
344 Or 619, 626, 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, ___ US ___, 130 S St 56
(2009) ("[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when * * * a person
participates in one of certain enumerated felonies and, in the course of that
felony, that person, or any other person, causes the death of another person,
whether intentionally or not[.]"); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 405
n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall,
339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005) (under ORS 163.115(1)(b), "the jury need only
find the intent necessary for burglary, intent to kill is not an element of
felony murder").   
Nothing
in ORS 163.115 or any related statutes indicates that the legislature intended
to change that long-standing rule.  To the contrary, other aspects of the
statutory scheme demonstrate that the legislature intended to retain the felony
murder rule in its traditional form.  For example, ORS 163.115(1)(b) provides
that criminal homicide constitutes murder by a person when it is committed by
that person "or another participant if there be any."  (Emphasis
added.)  Under that provision, a defendant may be criminally liable for felony
murder even if an accomplice causes the death of the victim.  Another
subsection in the same statute, ORS 163.115(3), provides for a limited
affirmative defense to felony murder if a defendant
"(a) Was not the only participant in the
underlying crime;
"(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in
any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid in the commission
thereof;
"(c) Was not armed with a dangerous or
deadly weapon;
"(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe
that any other participant was armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon; and
"(e) Had no reasonable ground to believe
that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in
death."
Under defendant's
interpretation of the felony murder statute, ORS 163.115(3) would be rendered
unnecessary, in contravention of the statutory construction directive set out
in ORS 174.010.   
Moreover,
ORS 163.115(1)(a) provides that criminal
homicide constitutes murder when it is "committed intentionally." 
(Emphasis added.)  Under a parallel reading of ORS 163.115(1)(a) and (b), the
fact that the legislature included a mental state in paragraph (1)(a) but not
(1)(b) supports the interpretation that the legislature intended that the
mental state required for the underlying felony in paragraph (1)(b) to be
imputed as a matter of law to the cause of the death of the victim.  
Finally,
as the Court of Appeals noted, nothing in the 1971 legislative history suggests
that the legislature intended to change the longstanding rule regarding implied
malice; in fact, much the legislative history suggests that the legislature
intended to adhere to it.  See Blair, 230 Or App at 51-55 (summarizing
that history).  Indeed, defendant does not assert that anything in the
legislative history of the two statutes supports its position; rather,
defendant asserts that his reading of the statutes is the only plausible
interpretation and therefore that any resort to legislative history is
unnecessary.  As explained above, we disagree that defendant's interpretation
is the only plausible one.  In all events, we may always consider pertinent
legislative history.  Gaines, 346 Or at 172.  
Taken
together, the context, including this court's case law and the legislative
history, compel the conclusion that the legislature intended to continue the implied
malice rule.  Accordingly, we conclude that, (1) under ORS 163.005(1),
"criminal homicide" requires that a defendant act with a culpable mens
rea with respect to causing the victim's death; (2) under ORS 163.005(2),
"criminal homicide" includes "murder," and (3) under ORS
163.115(1)(b), requisite culpable mens rea is established, as a matter
of law, by the defendant's commission or attempted commission of the predicate
felony.  Thus, the trial court properly overruled defendant's demurrer
and properly refused to give defendant's requested jury instruction.  The Court
of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's rulings.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Defendant's
other convictions are not at issue on review.  
2. Sections
502 and 503 provided:    
"If any person shall, purposely, and of
deliberate and premeditated malice, or in the commission or attempt to
commit any rape, arson, robbery or burglary, kill another, such person
shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree.  
"If any person shall purposely and
maliciously, but without deliberation and premeditation, or in the
commission or attempt to commit any felony, other than rape, arson, robbery or
burglary, kill another, such person shall be deemed guilty of murder in the
second degree."  
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch XLIII, §§ 502-03, p 527
(Deady 1845-1864) (emphasis added).