Title: State v. Goodbird
Citation: 344 N.W.2d 483
Docket Number: 956
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 1984

344 N.W.2d 483 (1984) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Myron E. GOODBIRD, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 956. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 23, 1984. *484 Tom P. Slorby, State's Atty., Minot, for plaintiff and appellee State; no appearance on brief. Steven C. Farhart, Minot, for defendant and appellant; submitted on brief. VANDE WALLE, Justice. Myron E. Goodbird appealed from the criminal judgment and sentence entered by the Ward County court on August 10, 1983, convicting Goodbird of driving while under the influence of alcohol. We affirm the conviction and reverse the sentence and remand for further proceedings. Goodbird was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol in Ward County in 1982. Goodbird posted bond but did not appear in court. A bench warrant for his arrest was issued and in July 1983 Goodbird was arrested on the bench warrant and transferred to Ward County. At that time he faced two charges: driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to appear. The trial judge advised Goodbird of the maximum and minimum penalties for the first offense of driving while under the influence. Goodbird pleaded guilty to the driving charge and the charge for failure to appear was dismissed.[1] Prior to sentencing Goodbird's counsel objected to the trial court's sentencing Goodbird in accordance with the law then in effect rather than the law which was in effect at the time the offense was committed. The trial court overruled that objection and sentenced Goodbird to ten days in the county jail with credit given for the 20 days Goodbird had already spent *485 in jail and a fine of $250. In addition, in the judgment and sentence the trial court assigned 24 "points" to Goodbird's driving record and required him to undergo an evaluation for alcohol treatment. On appeal Goodbird raises three issues, two of which are concerned with the use by the trial court of the penalty statute in effect at the time of the sentencing rather than the statute in effect at the time of the offense. Goodbird contends that it was a retroactive application of a statute which operates as an ex post facto application of the law. He further contends that the trial court was without authority to assign "points" to Goodbird's driving record. At the time of the offense in 1982 the statute in effect, Section 39-08-01(2), N.D. C.C., provided, in part: At the time of the sentencing in August 1983 Section 39-08-01, N.D.C.C., had been amended to provide at subsection 5 thereof: The maximum penalty for conviction of a Class B misdemeanor at the time of the commission of the offense as well as at the time of sentencing was 30 days' imprisonment, a fine of $500, or both. See Section 12.1-32-01(6), N.D.C.C. The sentence by the trial court was, with regard to the fine and imprisonment, within the maximum permitted by the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed. However, the State and Goodbird have entered into a stipulation for purposes of this appeal, indicating as follows: The trial court suspended the $50 costs because of the time Goodbird spent in jail prior to his appearance in court but the trial judge indicated he could not suspend the $250 fine because it was mandatory under the statute in effect at time of sentencing.[2] A reading of the transcript clearly indicates that the trial judge sentenced Goodbird under the statute in effect at the time of conviction rather than the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed. Therefore, although the sentence was within the maximum permitted by the statute at the time the offense was committed, we will consider that the sentence was given in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of conviction. *486 In Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237, 239 (N.D.1979), this court stated: In Reiling we examined the provisions of Section 1-02-10, N.D.C.C., which provides that no part of the North Dakota Century Code is retroactive unless it is expressly declared to be so, and concluded: We can discern no express legislative intent that Section 39-08-01, as amended by the 1983 Legislative Assembly, apply to offenses committed prior to the effective date of the amendment, July 1, 1983. Furthermore, a review of the legislative history of SB 2373 of the 1983 Legislative Session, the bill which amended Section 39-08-01, indicates exactly the opposite, i.e., that the bill was not intended to apply retroactively. See Minutes of Senate and House Judiciary Committees, 48th Legislative Assembly. We therefore conclude that insofar as the trial court sentenced Goodbird under the provisions of Section 39-08-01, N.D. C.C., as it was amended in 1983, rather than under the provisions of Section 39-08-01 as it existed at the time of the commission of the offense, the sentence was improper. Because of our conclusion regarding this issue we need not consider whether or not Section 39-08-01, as amended in 1983, if applied to an offense committed prior to the effective date of the amendment, would operate as an ex post facto law in violation of Article I, Section 18, of the North Dakota Constitution and Article 1, Section 10, of the United States Constitution.[3] The final issue raised by Goodbird is whether or not the trial court was in error in assigning "points" to Goodbird's driving record. Under the statutory scheme of this State, when a person is convicted of certain driving offenses, including driving while under the influence of alcohol, a certain number of points is assigned to his driving record and, when those points reach a specific number, the person's driver's license is suspended. See Section 39-06.1-10, N.D.C.C. Section 39-06.1-10, as it was in effect at the time of the offense, provided for 15 points to be assigned for driving while under the influence in violation of Section 39-08-01. Section 39-06.1-10, as amended in 1983 and in effect at the time of sentence, provided for an assignment of 24 points for the offense of violating Section 39-08-01 if the driving record shows the licensee has not, within the five years preceding the violation, previously violated Section 39-08-01 or an equivalent ordinance. Although there is a disparity in the points assigned, under the statute as it was in effect at the time of sentence and the statute as it existed at the time the offense was committed Goodbird's challenge is not primarily on that basis. Rather, he challenges the assignment of any points by the trial court. He contends that the assignment of points is an administrative function to be performed by the Highway Commissioner upon report of the conviction by the trial court.[4] We agree. A review of the pertinent statutory provisions indicates it is the responsibility of the *487 court to report the conviction to the Highway Commissioner. It is the duty of the Highway Commissioner, upon receipt of the report of the conviction, to enter the proper number of points on the licensee's driving record. See Sections 39-06.1-02, 39-06.1-03, 39-06.1-04, 39-06.1-10, and 39-07-11, N.D.C.C. In Andre v. North Dakota State Highway Com'r, 295 N.W.2d 128, 130 (N.D.1980), we stated: We also agree with Goodbird that the number of points assigned to his driving record should be in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of commission of the offense rather than the statute in effect at the time of sentence. The sentence is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of sentencing Goodbird in accordance with the standards specified herein. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and PEDERSON, GIERKE and SAND, JJ., concur. [1] Goodbird explained that he did not appear in court as directed because he posted $300 bond and that he believed if he forfeited the bond he would not have to appear. This procedure is used in noncriminal traffic offenses. See Section 39-06.1-02, N.D.C.C. The charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol is, of course, a criminal traffic offense. [2] For a reason which was discussed at the time of sentencing but not explained, Goodbird was held in the Ward County jail for 20 days before making an appearance in court. That is not an issue before us although his counsel did argue at the trial-court level that the fine should be waived because of that fact. The trial judge indicated he did not believe he had the authority to waive the fine under the law in effect at the time of sentencing. [3] In Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237 (N.D.1979), we indicated at footnote 3 thereof that even if the Legislature expressly intends to make the statute retroactive such application must not violate the United States Constitution or the North Dakota Constitution. [4] Presumably Goodbird believes that if the assignment of points is left to the Commissioner he would assign the number of points specified by the statute at the time of the commission of the offense rather than the number of points specified by the statute at the time of sentencing.