Title: Ahari v. Morrison
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 070146
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2008

Present:  All the Justices 
MARISSA AHARI, AS ADMINISTRATOR 
AND REPRESENTATIVE OF 
ALEXANDRA AHARI, DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 070146  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 11, 2008 
DENNIS C. MORRISON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the operative 
filing date of an amended complaint is the date on which a 
motion for leave to amend is filed or the date on which a 
trial court enters an order granting leave to amend.  
Because Rule 1:8 requires leave of court to amend any 
pleading after it is filed, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err by holding that an amended complaint is 
not deemed filed, and is thus without legal efficacy, until 
a trial court grants leave to amend. 
 
Marissa Ahari, as administrator and representative of 
the estate of Alexandra Ahari (the decedent), filed a 
complaint on March 1, 2006, naming Fairfax County, Virginia 
and the Commonwealth of Virginia as defendants.  In the 
complaint, Ahari alleged that the defendants had a duty to 
maintain and repair roadway and street surfaces so as to 
keep them in a reasonably safe condition for travel by the 
public and that they failed to do so, thereby causing the 
 
2
decedent to lose control of her vehicle on May 18, 2004 
while traveling on Baron Cameron Avenue in Fairfax County.  
Ahari further alleged that the decedent died as a result of 
injuries sustained in the accident. 
On May 15, 2006, three days before the expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations, see Code § 8.01-243, 
Ahari moved for leave to file an amended complaint.  Along 
with the motion, Ahari tendered the proposed amended 
complaint that, among other things, added as party 
defendants Dennis C. Morrison, Robert Driscoll, and John 
Doe I, II, and III, all of whom were allegedly employees of 
the Virginia Department of Transportation.1  On July 28, 
2006, the circuit court granted Ahari’s motion for leave to 
file an amended complaint but reserved for further argument 
the question as to the operative filing date of the amended 
complaint. 
The defendants named in the amended complaint then 
filed a plea of the statute of limitations.  Citing Rule 
1:8 and this Court’s decision in Mechtensimer v. Wilson, 
                     
1 Subsequent to Ahari’s motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint, the circuit court, at Ahari’s request, 
dismissed Fairfax County as a party in this case with 
prejudice.  The circuit court also dismissed the 
Commonwealth as a party based on its plea in bar asserting 
sovereign immunity, likewise with prejudice.  Future 
references in this opinion to “the defendants” will not 
include Fairfax County or the Commonwealth. 
 
3
246 Va. 121, 431 S.E.2d 301 (1993), they argued that the 
amended complaint was without legal efficacy until July 28, 
2006, the date the circuit court granted Ahari’s motion for 
leave to amend.  According to the defendants, the 
applicable statute of limitations expired before that date 
and thus barred the claims asserted against them in the 
amended complaint. 
Ahari countered by pointing out that Rule 3:2 states 
that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint in 
the clerk’s office and that Rule 3:3 directs a clerk to 
“receive and file all pleadings when tendered, without 
order of the court.”  Thus, according to Ahari, the amended 
complaint was filed when she tendered it to the clerk along 
with the motion for leave to amend on May 15, 2006, and the 
action with respect to the new party defendants was 
commenced on that date, which was before the expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations.  Relying on numerous 
decisions from courts in other jurisdictions, Ahari argued 
that an amended complaint is deemed filed for purposes of 
tolling a statute of limitations on the date a motion for 
leave to amend, along with the amended complaint, are 
filed.  Ahari claimed that to hold otherwise would ignore 
the fact that a plaintiff has no control over when a trial 
court may enter an order granting a motion for leave to 
 
4
amend.  Ahari also noted that instead of filing the motion 
for leave to amend she could have filed a new complaint, 
paid the required filing fee, and the result would be the 
same with respect to tolling the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
After hearing argument, the circuit court granted the 
defendants’ plea of the statute of limitations and 
dismissed the action with prejudice.  The court explained 
that “pursuant to Rule 1:8 . . . and legal precedent, there 
is no ability of [a] plaintiff to file an amended pleading 
save by leave of [c]ourt, and leave of court was not 
obtained in this case until July 28, 2006, which is the 
amended complaint’s operative date.” 
Now on appeal to this Court, Ahari asserts that the 
circuit court erred by granting the defendants’ plea of the 
statute of limitations despite the fact that she filed the 
motion for leave to amend and tendered the amended 
complaint before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations.  Ahari, as well as the defendants, present the 
same arguments here as they did before the circuit court.  
To resolve the issue before us, we must determine the 
operative filing date of an amended complaint.  Is that 
date when a motion for leave to amend is filed with the 
clerk and the amended complaint is tendered, as Ahari 
 
5
contends, or is the operative date of filing when a trial 
court enters an order granting leave to amend?  This 
question presents an issue of law, which we review de novo.  
See Westgate at Williamsburg Condominium Ass’n v. Philip 
Richardson Co., 270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 
(2005). 
In relevant part, Rule 1:8 states: “No amendments 
shall be made to any pleading after it is filed save by 
leave of court.”  The effect of this Rule was at issue in 
Mechtensimer where the plaintiff filed an amended motion 
for judgment without first obtaining leave of court to do 
so.2  246 Va. at 122, 431 S.E.2d at 301.  The defendant 
moved to quash service and dismiss the amended motion for 
judgment because the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 
1:8.  Id., 431 S.E.2d at 302.  Even though he had filed 
responsive pleadings to the amended motion, the defendant 
argued that the amended motion, nevertheless, had no legal 
efficacy.  Id.  The trial court agreed and granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Id.  We affirmed that 
judgment.  Id. at 123, 431 S.E.2d at 302.  Based on the 
                     
2 We utilized the term “motion for judgment” in 
Mechtensimer since the case was decided before we amended 
our Rules, effective January 1, 2006, to provide that a 
civil action, which includes legal and equitable causes of 
action, is commenced by filing a “complaint” in the clerk’s 
office.  Rules 3:1 and 3:2. 
 
6
plain language of Rule 1:8, we held “that [the plaintiff’s] 
amended motion was without legal efficacy because [the 
plaintiff] failed to obtain leave of court to amend his 
original motion for judgment.  Thus, the [trial] court did 
not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate any causes of action 
alleged in the amended motion.”  Id. at 122-23, 431 S.E.2d 
at 302.  The fact that the defendant had filed responsive 
pleadings did not confer jurisdiction upon the trial court.  
Id. at 123, 431 S.E.2d at 302. 
 
Even though Mechtensimer, unlike the case before us, 
did not involve an issue of the statute of limitations, its 
rationale is controlling and answers the question as to the 
operative filing date of Ahari’s amended complaint.  Until 
July 28, 2006, when the circuit court granted Ahari’s 
motion for leave to amend, the amended complaint had no 
legal efficacy.  See Mechtensimer, 246 Va. at 122-23, 431 
S.E.2d at 302; Harrell v. Harrell, 272 Va. 652, 657, 636 
S.E.2d 391, 394-95 (2006) (holding that plaintiff’s amended 
complaint “was properly dismissed for failing to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 1:8 to obtain leave of court 
before filing” and that any request for relief contained in 
the amended complaint was rendered a nullity by the 
dismissal); Bowie v. Murphy, 271 Va. 126, 132 n.4, 137, 624 
S.E.2d 74, 78 n.4, 80 (2006) (holding that claims asserted 
 
7
in an amended motion for judgment that exceeded the scope 
of the trial court’s leave to amend were not properly 
asserted and were therefore barred).  Only at that time was 
the amended complaint deemed filed, thereby adding the new 
party defendants and commencing the action as to them.3  See 
Mendenhall v. Cooper, 239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 
(1990) (“[I]t is well-established that when ‘a new party is 
brought into a suit by an amended pleading, the suit must 
be deemed to have been commenced as to him at the time that 
he was so brought in.’”) (quoting Webb v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 165 Va. 388, 393, 182 S.E. 557, 559 
(1935)).  Thus, until the circuit court granted leave for 
Ahari to amend her complaint, the statute of limitations 
continued to run with regard to the cause of action 
asserted against the new defendants.  See Neff v. Garrard, 
216 Va. 496, 498, 219 S.E.2d 878, 879 (1975) (holding that 
when an amended pleading asserts a new cause of action or 
makes a new demand, the statute of limitations continues to 
run until the date of the amendment).  And, on the 
operative filing date of the amended complaint, July 28, 
2006, the statute of limitations had expired by more than 
two months.  The circuit court therefore did not err by 
                     
3 No question is raised in this appeal regarding the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-6 that address “[a]n amendment 
 
8
granting the defendants’ plea of the statute of 
limitations.4 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
                                                             
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted[.]” 
4 We are not persuaded otherwise by the numerous cases 
from other jurisdictions cited by Ahari.