Title: Megel v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002816
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2001

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
MICHAEL L. MEGEL 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002816 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
September 14, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether an accused's home may 
be subjected to a warrantless search by police while the accused 
is serving a sentence, pursuant to Code § 53.1-131.2(A), in the 
so-called Electronic Incarceration Program. 
I 
 
Michael L. Megel was indicted in the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County for the possession of firearms as a convicted 
felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.  The trial court 
denied Megel's motion to suppress evidence of firearms found in 
a warrantless search of his home.  Thereafter, a jury convicted 
Megel of the charged offense and fixed his punishment at 12 
months in jail, and the trial court sentenced him in accordance 
with the jury's verdict. 
 
Megel appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeals, and 
a panel of the Court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the 
judgment.  Megel v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 414, 524 S.E.2d 
139 (2000).  On rehearing en banc, the full Court of Appeals 
also affirmed the conviction for the reasons stated in the panel 
opinion.  Megel v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 648, 536 S.E.2d 451 
(2000).  We awarded Megel this appeal. 
II 
 
On October 22, 1996, the General District Court of Fairfax 
County convicted Megel of unlawful entry.  The court sentenced 
Megel to 12 months in jail, but suspended six months of the 
sentence upon the condition that he remain of good behavior.  
The court further ordered Megel to serve the six-month sentence 
in his own home as a participant in the Fairfax County Sheriff's 
Electronic Incarceration Program (the Program). 
 
Megel entered the Program on February 21, 1997.  At that 
time, he executed a written agreement to abide by certain rules 
as a condition of his participation in the Program.  These rules 
required Megel, among other things, to submit to random urine 
tests, continuously wear an electronic monitoring device on his 
ankle, refrain from possessing weapons or intoxicating 
substances, and subject himself to random, unannounced home 
visits by the sheriff. 
 
On July 22, 1997, a deputy sheriff and two county police 
detectives, acting upon an anonymous tip that Megel had 
narcotics in his home, went to Megel's apartment.  The officers 
did not possess a search warrant. 
 
Megel's girlfriend, who lived with Megel and their infant 
child, admitted the officers into the apartment.  The deputy 
 
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sheriff asked Megel if the officers could "look around" the 
apartment, and Megel responded, "[Y]eah[,] go ahead."  The 
officers then made a quick inspection of the apartment for their 
own safety and determined that no one was hiding in the 
apartment and no weapons appeared to be readily available.  The 
deputy then told Megel why they were present and asked him if 
they could search the apartment for drugs.  Megel said, "[G]o 
ahead.  You're not going to find anything.  You're welcome to 
look around." 
 
While conducting a search of the apartment, the officers 
found two handguns in the bottom of a dresser drawer in a 
bedroom.  The drawer also contained men's underwear and socks. 
III 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides 
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated."  Therefore, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions, Thompson v. 
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984), and the Commonwealth has 
the heavy burden of establishing an exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984). 
 
Whether a person has the right to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the person has a 
 
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legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched.  
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).  This zone of privacy is most clearly 
defined when bounded by "the unambiguous physical dimensions of 
an individual's home."  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 
(1980). 
A 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the search of Megel's home 
was reasonable because "as a prisoner he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy there."  The Court of Appeals agreed, 
concluding that "participation in the [Program] is more 
analogous to a person serving time in a jail or prison" and that 
Megel's home "is the functional equivalent of a jail or prison 
cell."  Megel, 31 Va. App. at 422, 524 S.E.2d at 143.  In so 
concluding, the Court of Appeals relied upon Hudson v. Palmer, 
468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court considered whether an inmate 
in a penal institution has a right to privacy in his prison 
cell, thus affording him Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches.  The Court stated the following: 
[W]hile persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many 
protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that 
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or 
loss of many significant rights. . . .  These 
constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete 
withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the 
considerations underlying our penal system." . . .  
 
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The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a 
practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of 
"institutional needs and objectives" of prison 
facilities, . . . chief among which is internal 
security . . . .  Of course, these restrictions or 
retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders 
that, under our system of justice, deterrence and 
retribution are factors in addition to correction. 
468 U.S. at 524 (citations omitted).  The Court then held that 
 
society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any 
subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner 
might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, 
the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable 
searches does not apply within the confines of the 
prison cell.  The recognition of privacy rights for 
prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be 
reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the 
needs and objectives of penal institutions. 
Id. at 526. 
 
We reject the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Megel's 
home is the functional equivalent of a jail or prison cell.  
Although the Program restricts Megel's freedom, he is not a 
prisoner in the traditional sense.  Code § 53.1-131.2(A), which 
authorizes the Program, provides, in pertinent part, that: 
Any court having jurisdiction for the trial of a 
person charged with a criminal offense . . . may, if 
the defendant is convicted and sentenced to 
confinement in a state or local correctional facility, 
and if it appears to the court that such an offender 
is a suitable candidate . . . , assign the offender to 
a home/electronic incarceration program as a condition 
of probation. 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, Megel was assigned to the Program "as a 
condition of probation;" he was not confined with other inmates 
 
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in a prison where the needs and objectives of the facility must 
be considered. 
B 
 
We also reject the Commonwealth's contention that, pursuant 
to the terms of the agreement Megel executed, he waived his 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Although the agreement gave the 
sheriff the right to make random visits to Megel's home, there 
is no provision in the agreement that gives the sheriff the 
right to fully search Megel's home. 
 
The present case is altogether different from Anderson v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 580, 507 S.E.2d 339 (1998), upon which the 
Commonwealth relies.  In Anderson, the defendant executed a 
written plea agreement whereby he voluntarily and knowingly, 
with the advice of counsel, agreed to waive his Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 582, 507 S.E.2d at 340.  Additionally, the 
sentencing order stated that the defendant, by waiving his 
Fourth Amendment rights, "shall submit his person, place of 
residence, and property to search or seizure at any time . . . 
with or without a warrant."  Id.  In the present case, no 
reasonable interpretation of the agreement gives rise to a 
waiver by Megel of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
In exercising the right to visit Megel's home, the officers 
reasonably could "look around" Megel's apartment to ensure their 
safety.  Such an inspection, however, did not justify a full 
 
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search of the premises, as was made clear in Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1990), where the Supreme Court stated the 
following: 
We should emphasize that . . . a protective 
sweep, aimed at protecting . . . officers, if 
justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a 
full search of the premises, but may extend only to a 
cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may 
be found.  The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary 
to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
IV 
 
A 
 
The Commonwealth further contends that, even if Megel was 
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the record 
supports the trial court's alternative holding that Megel 
voluntarily consented to the search.  The Court of Appeals, 
however, declined to address this issue in light of its holding 
that Megel had no reasonable expectation of privacy.  Megel, 31 
Va. App. at 424, 524 S.E.2d at 144.  Although we question 
whether Megel raised this issue before the Court of Appeals, we 
will leave that determination to the Court of Appeals.  
B 
 
In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling 
that, by Megel's entering into the Program, his home became "the 
functional equivalent of a jail or prison cell," resulting in 
the loss of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
 
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searches and seizures.  We further hold that Megel did not waive 
his Fourth Amendment rights by executing the agreement to enter 
the Program. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
reversed and, because the Court declined to consider the issue 
of consent and the issue is not before us as an assignment of 
error, the case will be remanded to the Court of Appeals for 
consideration thereof. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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