Title: Burgess Construction Co. v. Lindley
Citation: 504 P.2d 1023
Docket Number: 1705
State: Alaska
Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 1972

504 P.2d 1023 (1972) BURGESS CONSTRUCTION CO. and Employers Commercial Union Companies, Appellants, v. Jeanne L. LINDLEY, as the Beneficiary of Ronald Lindley, Deceased, and the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, Appellees. No. 1705. Supreme Court of Alaska. December 22, 1972. Peter R. Ellis, Ketchikan, for appellants. John E. Havelock, Atty. Gen., Michael R. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellees. Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and CONNOR, ERWIN and BOOCHEVER, JJ. BOOCHEVER, Justice. This is an appeal by Burgess Construction Company and Employers Commercial Union Companies, the employer and insurance carrier for the deceased workman, from the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board that appellee was a surviving wife entitled to compensation benefits for the death of her husband in a job-related accident. Appellee, Jeanne L. Lindley, was legally married to deceased in 1951 and had four children. In 1967, appellee obtained a divorce from Ronald Lindley and was awarded $75 per month in alimony. Appellee never remarried between her divorce and the death of Ronald Lindley. Ronald Lindley, subsequent to his divorce from appellee, remarried twice, and was divorced from each of these subsequent wives. In 1968, Jeanne and Ronald resumed living together but never went through another formal marriage ceremony. Appellee testified at the hearing that the only reason they did not marry again was because of financial inability to go outside of Ketchikan for a ceremony and the embarrassment that a ceremony in Ketchikan would cause their children and friends who were under the impression that they had in fact remarried. *1024 The couple lived together until the death of Ronald Lindley on December 10, 1970. Appellants do not contest the fact of the accident or its job connection. They further concede the payment of benefits to the minor children. Their sole argument on appeal is that under AS 25.05.011[1] appellee was not legally married to deceased at the time of his death; and that therefore, appellee was not entitled to benefits under the workmen's compensation statutes as a "surviving wife". The workmen's compensation statute in question specifically provided:[2] No definition of the term "surviving wife" is provided by the workmen's compensation statute but the terms "married" and "widow" are defined by the Act. AS 23.30.265(15) provides It is clear under the statutory definition of "married" that the decedent, though divorced, was "married" for the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, for the divorce decree required him to contribute to appellee's support. It follows that under the Act appellee would be regarded as his "surviving wife". She qualifies as a "widow" for she was living with decedent at the time of his death and was dependent upon him for support.[3] Under the marital and domestic relations laws of the State of Alaska "[n]o person may be joined in marriage in this state until a license has been obtained for that purpose as provided in this chapter. No marriage performed in this state is valid without solemnization as provided in this chapter."[4] We have held that common law marriages are thus not valid in Alaska.[5] The subject case involves similar contentions to those ruled upon by the *1025 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circut in Albina Engine &amp; Machine Works v. O'Leary[6] wherein the court stated: The Albina case is discussed in Holland America Insurance Company v. Rogers, 313 F. Supp. 314, 320 (N.D.Cal. 1970) as follows: While, for some purposes, appellee would not have been recognized by the Alaska courts as married to the decedent, appellee qualifies for benefits as a "surviving wife" under terms of the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act discussed above. The grant of benefits by the workmen's Compensation Board under the facts of this case is within the liberal humanitarian purposes of the Act[7] while a different reading of the statute would clearly frustrate this purpose. The decision of the superior court is affirmed. ERWIN, Justice (concurring). While I readily concur in the result in this case, I cannot accept the supporting reasoning used by the majority. It is clear to me that the plain reading of the definitions found in AS 23.30.265(15) and (21) must exclude benefits for appellee, who can only be characterized as a common law wife after her divorce from the deceased and his remarriage. The workmen's compensation statute granting benefits to a "surviving wife" obviously refers to a legal wife as defined in Alaska statutes (AS 25.05.011(b)).[1] While the rather strained interpretation *1026 of the majority avoids ruling on the constitutional problem, it will create problems of statutory interpretation at a later date. Therefore, I feel it is incumbent on this court to decide the central issue in this case. I find the statutory grant of workmen's compensation benefits to a legal wife and not a common law wife is a violation of Article I, § 1 of the Alaska Constitution, which guarantees all persons equal protection under the law. Such a classification constitutes impermissible discrimination for it would deny benefits under AS 23.30.215(a)(2) solely because a "spouse" did not go through a formal marriage ceremony.[2] In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court stated, in voiding a Louisiana Workmen's Compensation statutory scheme providing for different benefits for legitimate and illegitimate children, that: The Supreme Court then reached the conclusion that the denial of Workmen's Compensation Benefits to an illegitimate child did not protect legitimate family relationships, but served to unjustly penalize those not guilty of wrongdoing. An analogous situation is presented in the case at bar. I can find no reasonable relationship between the legal formality of a marriage ceremony and the purpose of the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act which compensates a dependent "spouse" for the death of a provider.[4] Further, Alaska's prohibition against common law marriage is phrased solely in terms of marriages contracted within the state.[5] Presumably, this Court would adhere to the conflicts of law principle that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place where contracted.[6] This would mean that common law marriages contracted in Alaska would not be recognized, but such marriages contracted outside the state and maintained within Alaska would be recognized and compensation benefits granted to a common law spouse. This would, in effect, permit a certain category of common law wives to recover benefits, but deny benefits to another category, thus constituting impermissible discrimination. I would affirm the decision of the superior court on the basis that common law wives are entitled to benefits as a "surviving wife" under the Alaska Workmen's Compensation act.[7] [1] AS 25.05.011 provides: Civil Contract. (a) Marriage is a civil contract requiring both a license and solemnization which may be entered into by (1) a male who is 19 years of age or older with a female who is 18 years of age or older, who are otherwise capable, or (2) those who qualify for a license under § 171 of this chapter. (b) No person may be joined in marriage in this state until a license has been obtained for that purpose as provided in this chapter. No marriage performed in this state is valid without solemnization as provided in this chapter. [2] AS 23.30.215(a). [3] The appellee, the appellants and the State of Alaska urged us to consider the equal protection argument which would result from the denial of benefits to a common law wife in such circumstances but we decline to consider this question at this time. [4] AS 25.05.011(b). [5] Edwards v. Franke, 364 P.2d 60, 63 (Alaska 1961). [6] 328 F.2d 877, 879 (1964). [7] Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602, 605 (Alaska 1967); Holland America Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 313 F. Supp. 314, 320 (N.D.Cal. 1970). [1] AS 25.05.011(b) provides: (b) No person may be joined in marriage in this state until a license has been obtained for that purpose as provided in this chapter. No marriage performed in this state is valid without solemnization as provided in this chapter. [2] In this case approximately four years elapsed since the time the parties were divorced and resumed living together with their children. Problems of duration of common law marriage are obviously not present herein. [3] Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1972); See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, 391 U.S. 73, 88 S. Ct. 1515, 20 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). [4] Appellee concedes that appellant was dependent on the deceased for support at the time of his death. [5] AS 25.05.011(b). [6] E.g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 54 S. Ct. 684, 78 L. Ed. 1219 (1934). [7] The proposition that the wording of AS 23.30.265(15) and (21) as written denied appellee equal protection renders unconstitutional only those sections. It is settled federal law that while a statute may be unconstitutional in part, the portion which is constitutional may stand. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942). Alaska Statute 01.10.030 provides that "Any law ... which lacks a severability clause shall be construed as though it contained the clause... ."