Title: Butler v. Audio/Video Affiliates, Inc.
Citation: 611 So. 2d 330
Docket Number: 1911382
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 1992

611 So. 2d 330 (1992)
Allan BUTLER and Joan Butler
v.
AUDIO/VIDEO AFFILIATES, INC., et al.
No. 1911382.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 4, 1992.
Steve Olen and Michael S. McGlothren of Olen &amp; McGlothren, P.C., George W. Finkbohner III of Finkbohner and Lawler and Peter F. Burns of Burns, Cunningham &amp; Mackey, Mobile, for appellants.
A. Danner Frazer, Jr., William H. Philpot, Jr. of Frazer, Greene, Philpot &amp; Upchurch, Mobile, and William J. Baxley, Birmingham, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's order denying class certification.
Allan and Joan Butler sued Audio/Video Affiliates, Inc.; Rex Television and Appliance Centers, Inc.; and Dennis Fuqua, alleging that those defendants had engaged in a systematic and pervasive "bait and switch" consumer fraud. The Butlers filed a motion for class certification, which the trial court denied after holding a two-day *331 evidentiary hearing. The trial court later amended its order denying class certification, purporting to make that order final pursuant to Rule 54(b) Ala.R.Civ.P. The Butlers appeal.
Although we recognize that this was an interlocutory order and as such does not fit within the formal rules of finality, we note that a denial of class certification effectively terminates the litigation as to all members of the class other than the original plaintiff; this is because it has a "death knell" effect of making further proceedings in the action impractical and because it finally determines a claim of right separate from and collateral to the rights asserted in the cause of action. Therefore, we hold that an order denying class certification is an appealable "final" order.[1]
In order for a class action to be certified, the proponents of the class action must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, A.R.Civ.P.all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and one of the three categories of Rule 23(b). See Marshall Durbin &amp; Co. v. Jasper Utilities Board, 437 So. 2d 1014 (Ala.1983). Certification of a class is within the trial court's discretion, and we will reverse a certification ruling only for an abuse of discretion. See, Ex parte Blue Cross &amp; Blue Shield of Alabama, 582 So. 2d 469 (Ala.1991); Marshall Durbin v. Jasper Utilities Board, supra.
According to the Butlers, under the facts of this case, "given the overwhelming evidence of defendants' pervasive scheme of `bait and switch' consumer fraud" and given the controlling case law, the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for class certification.
According to the defendants, the trial court considered all of the requirements of Rule 23 in light of the evidence in denying the Butlers' motion to certify the class. The defendants maintain that the denial is supported by the evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification.
In its order, the trial court held that the Butlers had failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, and it painstakingly set forth the findings on which it based that holding:
(R. 695-98) (Emphasis added.)
The trial court's findings are clearly supported by the evidence, and its holding that the Butlers failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 is clearly supported by the record. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Butlers' motion for class certification.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  We recognize that this holding is contrary to current practice in federal courts, but we reject the reasoning of Coopers &amp; Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978) (rejecting the "death knell doctrine").