Title: State v. Vice
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002220-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2021

2021 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2220-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Adam W. Vice, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 754,946 N.W.2d 206 
PDC No:2020 WI App 34 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn   
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Anderson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and 
DALLET, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., joined except 
for ¶25 and footnote 14. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general; with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Kara L. Janson. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Frederick A. Bechtold; Taylors Falls, Minnesota. There was an oral 
argument by Frederick A. Bechtold. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Innocence 
Project, Inc., The Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, and 
the Wisconsin Innocence Project by Carrie Sperling, Keith Findley, 
and University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison; with whom on the 
brief was Lauren Gottesman; New York, New York.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 63 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2220-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF162) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Adam W. Vice, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, 
JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., joined except for ¶25 and 
footnote 14. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This case is about a post-
polygraph interview.  We are tasked with deciding whether the 
circuit court1 erred when it granted Adam Vice's motion to 
                     
1 The Honorable John P. Anderson of the Washburn County 
Circuit Court presiding.  
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
2 
 
suppress, concluding that the statements he made during a post-
polygraph interview were involuntary.  The court of appeals2 
affirmed the decision of the circuit court, and now the State seeks 
review.   
¶2 
We conclude that the statements Vice made during his 
post-polygraph interview 
are admissible because:  (1) the 
interview was discrete from the polygraph examination; and (2) the 
statements were not the product of police coercion, and therefore 
were voluntary.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
On December 4, 2014, Investigator William Fisher of the 
Washburn County Sheriff's Department——who was investigating child 
sexual assault allegations in which a four-year-old girl reported 
to her caregiver that Vice had sexually assaulted her——met with 
Vice at Vice's workplace.  During their meeting, Vice denied any 
wrongdoing and discussed with Fisher whether "there was anything 
[Vice] could do to clear [his] name."  Fisher suggested that Vice 
take a polygraph examination; Vice agreed to do so.  Four days 
later, Vice called Fisher to arrange the polygraph examination.  
It was scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on December 11 at the Eau Claire 
Police Department.  Because Vice did not have his own 
transportation, he accepted Fisher's offer of a ride to the 
examination.   
                     
2 State v. Vice, 2020 WI App 34, 392 Wis. 2d 754, 946 
N.W.2d 206. 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
3 
 
A. The Polygraph Examination 
¶4 
On December 11, Fisher arrived at Vice's residence in an 
unmarked police car to find Vice waiting for him outside.  At 
Fisher's invitation, Vice sat in the front seat of the car.  Fisher 
reminded Vice that he did not have to take the polygraph 
examination, and that his participation was voluntary.  Vice was 
not handcuffed.  Vice and Fisher did not discuss the sexual assault 
allegations or the upcoming polygraph examination during the 
drive, which lasted slightly less than two hours. 
¶5 
Upon arriving at the police station, Eau Claire Police 
Detective Ryan Lambeseder escorted Vice to the polygraph 
examination room, while Fisher went to an observation room.  Prior 
to the start of the polygraph examination, Vice signed a "Waiver 
of Rights" form that recited his Miranda rights.3  He also signed 
a "Polygraph Examination Consent" form, which Lambeseder read 
aloud to him, indicating that he "voluntarily:  without threats, 
duress, coercion, force, promises of reward or immunity, agree[d] 
and stipulate[d] to submit to take a polygraph (truth verification) 
examination."4   
                     
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
4 The form stated: 
I fully realize that: I am not required to take this 
examination, I may remain silent the entire time I am 
here, anything I say can be used against me in a court 
of law, I may first consult with an attorney or anyone 
I wish to before either signing this form or taking the 
examination, I may have an attorney present, if I cannot 
afford an attorney and desire one, an attorney will be 
appointed for me prior to any questioning, and I have 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Lambeseder also reviewed with Vice the Eau Claire Police 
Department Polygraph Examination Data Sheet and wrote down Vice's 
answers.  Vice described his physical condition at the time as 
"average" and stated that he:  
 
was experiencing no discomfort;  
 
had eaten in the last 24 hours;  
 
had slept fairly for eight or more hours the night 
before;  
 
had no problems with high blood pressure or seizures;  
 
had not consumed alcohol or drugs in the previous 24 
hours;  
 
had a high school education;  
 
had been arrested once before; and  
 
had never seen a psychologist or psychiatrist.   
¶7 
The polygraph examination lasted one hour and 45 
minutes.  During that time, Lambeseder never raised his voice, 
threatened Vice, or made any promises to him, and Vice made no 
admissions of wrongdoing.  After the polygraph examination 
concluded, Vice again signed the Polygraph Examination Consent 
Form.5  
                     
the opportunity to exercise all these rights at any time 
I wish to during the entire time I am here.  Further, 
that I can pick and choose the questions I wish to answer 
and can stop the interview at any time I wish. 
5 The form stated: 
This examination was concluded at 11:40 a[.]m[.] on 
[December 11, 2014].  I completely reaffirm, in its 
entirety, my above agreement.  In addition, I knowingly 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
5 
 
B. The Post-Polygraph Interview 
¶8 
Once Vice signed the second form, Lambeseder escorted 
him to a separate interview room.  Vice sat at a small table, 
facing the door with a wall behind him.  Fisher and Lambeseder 
joined him ten to 15 minutes later to commence the interview.   
¶9 
Over 
the 
course 
of 
the 
approximately 
45-minute 
interview, Fisher and Lambeseder made at least 11 references to 
Vice's polygraph results.6  The first four references took place 
immediately, when Lambeseder told Vice, "You didn't pass the exam."  
Lambeseder continued:  "[T]he questions regarding [the victim], 
it's very clear, Adam, that you weren't telling the truth . . . . 
And I can tell on that exam, okay?"  The fifth reference occurred 
soon after, when Vice asked if it was possible that he "blacked 
out" and Lambeseder responded, "You do remember doing it, otherwise 
you wouldn't react the way you did on the exam, okay?"  The next 
three references occurred intermittently over the next few 
minutes, and referred to Vice's "reactions" without specifically 
referencing the polygraph examination.  For example, "It's not 
blocked out . . . because you've reacted".   
                     
and intelligently continue to waive my rights . . . and 
I willingly made all statements that I did make.  I also 
understand that any questions I may be asked after this 
point in time, and any answers that I may give to those 
questions, are not part of the polygraph examination.   
6 The circuit court found that between the two of them, Fisher 
and Lambeseder made a total of 11 references to Vice's polygraph 
examination and to polygraph examinations generally.  Vice, 392 
Wis. 2d 754, ¶36.  We accept this factual finding by the circuit 
court.  
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
6 
 
¶10 About a minute later (eight minutes into the interview), 
Vice offered his first inculpatory statement in response to 
Fisher's assurances that the criminal justice system would address 
his case more leniently if the assault was "an isolated mistake" 
and Vice "underst[ood] that he messed up."  Vice's initial 
statement admitting to the assault was responsive to Lambeseder 
telling Vice to "[b]e truthful."  Vice said, "It's going to sound 
really shitty for me to say this right now, but I sexually 
assaulted [the victim]."  Two minutes later (ten minutes into the 
interview) Vice stated, "I'll admit that I must have did it because 
obviously the test says that I did it, but I don't physically 
remember," in response to which Lambeseder made the ninth 
reference:  "Try, okay . . . . If we believe that you didn't 
remember, we wouldn't be talking to you about this, you know?"   
¶11 Vice then began making statements regarding his access 
to the victim.  About six minutes later (16 to 17 minutes into the 
interview), Lambeseder made the tenth reference, stating, "it 
shows on the test that you remember, okay?"  Lambeseder then 
informed Vice that the victim disclosed details about Vice's 
conduct by both describing and physically demonstrating how he 
assaulted her.  Lambeseder urged Vice to tell the truth and to 
take responsibility so that Vice and the victim could both get 
help.  The officers offered to ask Vice direct questions with "yes" 
or "no" answers so that the interview would be easier for Vice, 
and he accepted that offer.  Vice then began providing details 
about the sexual assault itself, over a period of about eight 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
7 
 
minutes, in response to the officers' specific questions and 
without any reference to the polygraph examination.   
¶12 Around 30 minutes into the interview, after Vice 
provided numerous details about the assault, Fisher made the 11th 
and final reference to the polygraph examination.  He mentioned 
Lambeseder's experience "working with the polygraph things" to 
show Lambeseder's familiarity with "the techniques people use" to 
avoid admitting responsibility for sexual assaults, but Fisher did 
not mention Vice's polygraph results.  While Vice repeatedly 
claimed not to remember whether he had sexually assaulted the 
victim, at no point during the interview did Vice deny outright 
having done so.   
¶13 For the last 12 minutes of the interview, neither officer 
referenced the polygraph results as Vice continued to answer direct 
questions about the assault.  Vice responded with admissions and 
details such as what the victim was wearing, that he had been 
drinking and playing video games the night of the incident, and 
how he committed the assault.   
¶14 At no time during the post-polygraph interview did 
either officer: 
 
raise his voice or use a hostile tone when speaking to 
Vice;   
 
make any threats or promise any inducements in order to 
elicit Vice's statements; or  
 
inform Vice that polygraph results are inadmissible in 
court.   
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
8 
 
At the conclusion of the interview, Vice was not arrested; instead 
Fisher drove him home and he once again sat in the front seat. 
C. Procedural History 
¶15 The day after the interview, the State filed a criminal 
complaint charging Vice with one count of sexual contact with a 
person under the age of 13, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) 
(2019-20).7  Vice filed a motion to suppress as involuntary all of 
the statements he made during his post-polygraph interview, 
arguing that the tactics used in that interview were coercive "for 
one simple legal and factual reason[:]  the detectives repeatedly 
told [him] he failed the polygraph examination before getting the 
statement they wanted."  Vice never argued during the suppression 
proceedings that the polygraph examination and the post-polygraph 
interview were not discrete events.8   
¶16 The circuit court suppressed Vice's statements, finding 
that "the State made a number of references to a failed polygraph 
at both times, and under certain circumstances, they created a 
coercive environment . . . that becomes the fatal flaw in the 
                     
7 While Vice was convicted based on conduct that occurred in 
2014, the statutory provisions under which he was convicted have 
not substantively changed.  Therefore, we cite to the current 
version of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Unless otherwise noted, 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-
20 version. 
8 In his August 2015 motion to suppress, Vice argued only that 
his statements were involuntary.  At the September 2015 suppression 
hearing, Vice's counsel conceded discreteness, stating that "the 
police got it half right.  You're supposed to take the polygraph 
[examination] and [interview] separate.  They did that right." 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
9 
 
totality of the circumstances of this confession."  The State 
appealed.   
¶17 For the first time on appeal, and contrary to his 
argument to the circuit court at the suppression hearing, Vice 
argued that his post-polygraph interview should be suppressed 
because his polygraph examination and post-polygraph interview 
were not discrete events.  The court of appeals ruled that Vice 
was judicially estopped from arguing that the interview and the 
preceding polygraph examination were not discrete events.  
Additionally, it determined that the circuit court erroneously 
concluded that the references to Vice's failed polygraph 
examination alone rendered his statements involuntary.  The court 
of appeals instructed the circuit court to make sufficient factual 
findings on the record to support a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis regarding the voluntariness of Vice's statements.  State 
v. Vice, No. 2015AP2558-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 21, 26-27 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016). 
¶18 On remand, the circuit court balanced factors weighing 
for and against the voluntariness of Vice's statements and 
determined that Vice was "overwhelmed by the somewhat coercive 
pressuring nature of the overt references to the failed test and 
[Lambeseder's] participation in that."  The circuit court 
concluded that Vice's statements were involuntary because of the 
officers' multiple references to his polygraph results.   
¶19 The State again appealed.  The court of appeals exercised 
its discretion to consider the merits of Vice's discreteness 
argument despite its conclusion that judicial estoppel applied, 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
10 
 
and determined that the polygraph examination and subsequent 
interview were discrete events.  State v. Vice, 2020 WI App 34, 
¶¶45-46, 48, 392 Wis. 2d 754, 946 N.W.2d 206.  The court of appeals 
also affirmed the circuit court's decision to suppress Vice's post-
polygraph statements as involuntary, concluding that although 
neither Vice's personal characteristics nor the circumstances 
surrounding the interview rendered Vice's statements involuntary, 
the officers':  (1) multiple references to the polygraph results; 
(2) assertions that those results indicated that Vice remembered 
committing the offense; (3) failure to contradict Vice's statement 
that he must have committed the assault because the polygraph 
results indicated that he had; and (4) failure to inform Vice that 
the polygraph results would be inadmissible in court were coercive 
methods used to overcome Vice's ability to resist.  Id., ¶¶60, 
80.9    
¶20 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 We review the court of appeals' decision affirming the 
circuit court's decision to suppress Vice's statements.  In 
reviewing a motion to suppress, we ordinarily apply a mixed 
standard of review, upholding any findings of fact unless clearly 
erroneous, but independently considering whether those facts show 
                     
9 The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that 
the totality of the circumstances established that Vice's 
statements were involuntary, concluding that the officers did not 
use coercive or improper police tactics.  Vice, 392 Wis. 2d 754, 
¶96 (Hruz, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
11 
 
a constitutional violation.  State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶17, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  Because this case does not challenge 
any factual findings, but presents only whether Vice's statements 
were voluntary, our review is de novo.  Id.  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶22 We begin our analysis by discussing the law as it relates 
to statements made during post-polygraph interviews and the use of 
polygraph results during those interviews.  Next, we address 
whether Vice's post-polygraph interview was discrete from his 
polygraph examination.  We then review the general standards for 
establishing whether statements are voluntary, focusing on the 
issue of coercion or improper police conduct——a prerequisite for 
involuntariness.  We then apply that voluntariness analysis to the 
specific facts in this case and examine the four police tactics 
Vice contends, and the court of appeals concluded, rendered his 
statements involuntary.  We finish by assessing the circumstances 
surrounding the post-polygraph interview to determine if the 
officers engaged in any other coercive practices that would render 
Vice's statements involuntary.   
A. Use of Polygraph Results in Post-Polygraph Interviews 
¶23 Polygraph results themselves, as well as statements made 
by 
suspects 
during 
polygraph 
examinations, 
are 
generally 
inadmissible in court.  Wis. Stat. § 905.065(2).  Despite this 
general rule of inadmissibility, both suspects and law enforcement 
officers place reliance on polygraph examinations.  Suspects 
voluntarily submit to polygraph examinations in an effort to lift 
the cloud of suspicion.  State v. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, ¶9, 265 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 463, 666 N.W.2d 518.  Law enforcement uses polygraph 
examination as an investigative tool in criminal cases.  See, e.g., 
Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 43-46 (1982); Maryland v. Shatzer, 
559 U.S. 98, 101-102 (2010).10   
¶24 Statements made during a post-polygraph interview are 
admissible into evidence when they satisfy the two-part test we 
established in State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 
751 N.W.2d 332.11  The first part of the test is determining whether 
the post-polygraph interview was a discrete event from the 
polygraph examination.  Id., ¶21.  That is, whether the post-
polygraph interview is "so closely associated with the [polygraph 
examination] that the [examination] and statement[s] are one event 
                     
10 Law enforcement——particularly in the context of child 
sexual 
exploitation 
investigations——identifies 
polygraph 
examinations as an important tool in helping to uncover crimes of 
sexual abuse.  Jason Scheff, Disproving the "Just Pictures" 
Defense: Interrogative Use of the Polygraph to Investigate Contact 
Sexual Offenses Committed by Child Pornography Suspects, N.Y.U. 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 603, 605 (2013).  The polygraph examination is 
a particularly important tool with regard to sex offenders because 
of the secrecy and denial that often accompany those offenders' 
behavior.  Id. at 631.  It is often the case that disclosures of 
these types of offenses only occur after a failed polygraph 
examination.  Id. at 626.  And convicted sex offenders in Wisconsin 
may be required to submit to polygraph testing as part of their 
correctional programming or care and treatment.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.132(2). 
11 In Davis, we addressed a situation in which a suspect 
consented to a voice stress analysis rather than a polygraph 
examination prior to making an inculpatory statement, but we 
determined that the same legal principles apply equally to both 
types of examinations.  State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, ¶20, 310 Wis. 
2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332. 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
13 
 
rather than two events."  Id., ¶2.  The second part of the Davis 
test is whether the post-polygraph statements are voluntary under 
ordinary constitutional due process considerations.  Id., ¶35.12  
We will address each of these two parts in turn, first determining 
whether Vice's post-polygraph interview was discrete from his 
polygraph examination, and then whether the statements Vice made 
during that interview were the result of impermissible police 
coercion, and therefore involuntary.   
B. Discreteness 
¶25 We 
first 
determine 
whether 
Vice's 
post-polygraph 
interview was a discrete event from his polygraph examination——
the discreteness prong of the two-part Davis test.13  When a post-
polygraph interview is so closely associated with the polygraph 
examination that the examination and interview are "one event 
rather than two events," the statements made during that interview 
                     
12 We will refer to these issues as "discreteness" and 
"voluntariness" for the remainder of this opinion.  
13 The parties dispute whether the issue of discreteness is 
before this court.  We note that Vice conceded the issue to the 
circuit court in both his brief in support of his motion to 
suppress and during the oral ruling on that motion.  In his brief, 
Vice acknowledged that "[T]he detectives got the first part of the 
process right, they separated the polygraph test from the 
interrogation."  Additionally, during the oral ruling on the 
suppression motion, Vice's attorney stated that "[T]he police got 
it half right. You're supposed to take the polygraph exam and 
interrogation separate. They did that right."  Because Vice 
conceded the issue twice to the circuit court, we conclude that he 
waived the discreteness issue.  However, waiver is a rule of 
judicial administration and appellate courts may reach the merits 
of an issue that has been waived.  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 
758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  The court of appeals' decision 
addressed discreteness; we elect to do so here as well.   
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
14 
 
must be suppressed.  Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶2.  Our determination 
of discreteness "is largely dependent upon whether the [polygraph 
examination] is over at the time the statement is given and the 
[suspect] knows the [polygraph examination] is over."  Id., ¶23.  
We consider:  (1) whether the suspect was told the test was over; 
(2) whether any time passed between the polygraph examination and 
the interview; (3) whether the officer who conducted the polygraph 
examination differed from the officer who conducted the interview; 
(4) whether the examination and interview were held in the same 
location; and (5) whether the examination was referred to during 
the interview.  Id.  "An important inquiry [is] whether the test 
result was referred to in order to elicit an incriminating 
statement."  Id., ¶42.  However, we look to the totality of the 
circumstances in determining discreteness.  Id., ¶32. 
¶26 In applying the Davis factors, we conclude that:  (1) 
Lambeseder told Vice the examination was over and Vice signed a 
form acknowledging that it had ended; (2) a period of ten to 15 
minutes elapsed between the end of the examination and the 
commencement of the interview; (3) while Lambeseder both 
administered Vice's polygraph examination and conducted the 
interview, Fisher participated only in the interview; (4) the 
polygraph examination and post-polygraph interview took place in 
different rooms; and (5) although the officers referred to the 
polygraph results during Vice's interview, this factor alone does 
not make the interview and the examination "one event" where, as 
here, there is both a temporal and spatial differentiation between 
the two events.  Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶16.  Based upon the 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
15 
 
totality of the circumstances pursuant to these points, we conclude 
that Vice's polygraph examination and post-polygraph interview 
were discrete events.   
C. 
Voluntariness and Coercion 
¶27 Having established that Vice's post-polygraph interview 
was a discrete event under the first part of the Davis test, we 
turn to the second part——voluntariness.  We begin by outlining the 
law regarding voluntariness and coercion.   
¶28 The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and Article 
I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution require a statement to 
be voluntary in order to be admitted into evidence.  State v. 
Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407; see also 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).  The 
admission of an involuntary statement into evidence is a violation 
of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process.  
Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶36.   
¶29 It is the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a suspect's statements are voluntary.  Id., ¶40.  
"A defendant's statements are voluntary if they are the product of 
a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of 
choice, as opposed to the result of a conspicuously unequal 
confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the 
defendant by . . . the State exceeded the defendant's ability to 
resist."  Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶36 (quoted source omitted).   
¶30 Over time, our due process inquiry has been refined into 
one that "examines whether a defendant's will was overborne by the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession . . . [and] 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
16 
 
takes into consideration the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances."  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (quoted sources 
omitted).  That analysis involves balancing the suspect's personal 
characteristics, such as age, intelligence, physical and emotional 
condition, and prior experience with law enforcement, against any 
pressures imposed upon him by police.  State v. Clappes, 136 
Wis. 2d 222, 236, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987).   
¶31 Before we balance personal characteristics against 
police pressures, we must first examine the threshold matter of 
coercion.  "The presence or absence of actual coercion or improper 
police practices is the focus of the inquiry because it is 
determinative" on the issue of voluntariness.  Id.; see also 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ("[C]oercive police 
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession 
is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.").  If our analysis of the facts does 
not reveal coercion or improper police pressures, there is no need 
for us to engage in the balancing test between the suspect's 
personal characteristics and those nonexistent pressures.  State 
v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, ¶30, 320 Wis. 2d 209, 769 N.W.2d 110.   
¶32 While coercive or improper police conduct "may arguably 
take subtle forms," Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 238, the protections 
of the Due Process Clause are intended to safeguard against conduct 
or circumstances that "destroyed [the suspect's] volition and 
compelled him to confess."  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 162.  As a 
result, establishing coercion is a high bar for a defendant to 
surmount.  Megan Annitto, Confessions and the Right to a Fair 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
17 
 
Trial: A Comparative Case Study, 35 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 181, 201 
(2017). 
¶33 To aid us in identifying coercive police conduct, we 
review cases in which courts have analyzed various police tactics 
to determine whether or not they were coercive.  Such a review 
reveals that this court has determined that police tactics were 
not 
coercive 
where 
officers 
interrogated 
an 
injured 
and 
intoxicated suspect in a hospital emergency room or exaggerated 
evidence.  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 238 (suspect "appeared to be 
coherent, though . . . in great pain"); State v. Lemoine, 2013 WI 
5, ¶32, 345 Wis. 2d 171, 827 N.W.2d 589 (police informed suspect 
that "extensive tests had been done and that it probably would not 
look good for [him] when the results came in").  We have also 
determined that even when police engage in outright deceit, they 
may be "within the bounds of acceptable police practice."  State 
v. Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d 287, 300, 516 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶34 Our review also reveals cases in which courts have found 
police tactics to be coercive, such as when officers engage in 
physical violence to obtain a statement——that is per se coercive 
and a violation of due process.  Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 
182, (1953) (physical violence is per se coercion), overruled on 
other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 381, (1964).  In 
addition to physical violence, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated other factors indicative of coercion are an incapacitated 
and sedated suspect, sleep and food deprivation, and threats.  
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387 (2010).  The United States 
Supreme Court has also determined that holding a suspect for more 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
18 
 
than 16 days, interrogating that suspect "extensively," feeding 
him an "extremely limited" diet, and not permitting him to 
communicate with the outside world were improper coercive tactics.  
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 745-48 (1966). 
¶35 It is important to note that even when a defendant 
establishes coercive police tactics, the resulting statement is 
not automatically rendered involuntary.  A defendant must also 
show that, as a result of those pressures, the statement was no 
longer "the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting 
deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a 
conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought 
to bear on the [suspect] by . . . the State exceeded the 
[suspect's] ability to resist."  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶36.  In 
short, without coercion, there is no involuntariness.  
¶36 In this case, we must determine whether officers' 
references to polygraph results in a post-polygraph interview were 
not only coercive, but sufficiently coercive as to render a 
suspect's statements involuntary.  We begin by noting that the use 
of polygraph results in an interview is not "inherently coercive."  
Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 48-49.  That is, simply because officers make 
such references does not in itself mean the references were 
coercive, absent a finding that they were used to elicit 
involuntary statements.  Police are free to let a suspect know 
that he did not pass the polygraph examination or to let a suspect 
draw that inference.  Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶16.  We held in 
Davis that making such references is not per se coercive.  Davis, 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
19 
 
310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶42.14  To hold otherwise "would be an 
unjustifiable restriction on reasonable police questioning."  
Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 48-49.   
¶37 Having established that statements made during a 
discrete post-polygraph interview are admissible if they are 
voluntary; 
that 
coercion 
is 
a 
necessary 
predicate 
to 
involuntariness; and that referring to polygraph results during a 
post-polygraph interview is not per se coercive, we must now apply 
that law to the tactics the officers used during Vice's interview.   
C. The Absence of Coercive Practices in Vice's Interview 
¶38 To apply the voluntariness analysis explained above to 
Vice's interview, we must begin with a review of the practices the 
court of appeals determined and Vice argues were coercive, since 
"[c]oercive or improper police conduct is a necessary prerequisite 
for a finding of involuntariness."  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶37.  
Where there is no evidence of any coercive police practices, we 
                     
14 The court of appeals in this case relied on but 
misunderstood our statement in Davis that "[a]n important inquiry 
continues to be whether the [polygraph examination] was referred 
to in order to elicit an incriminating statement."  Vice, 392 Wis. 
2d 754, ¶42 (emphasis added).  To clarify, our statement in Davis 
regarding polygraph references as an important inquiry referred to 
the discreteness analysis in that case, not the voluntariness 
analysis.  Id.  The court of appeals' interpretation overlooks our 
citation to State v. Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d 382, 389, 535 N.W.2d 441 
(Ct. App. 1995), which ties that statement specifically to the 
discreteness determination.  The use of polygraph references in 
post-polygraph interviews is an important inquiry in determining 
discreteness, but it is only one of many relevant factors to 
consider in determining voluntariness.  Therefore, we do not afford 
the polygraph references here any more weight than any other 
relevant aspect of an interview.   
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
20 
 
need 
not 
balance 
police 
pressures 
against 
the 
personal 
characteristics of the suspect.  Berggren, 320 Wis. 2d 209, ¶30.  
We focus our analysis here, as the court of appeals did, on the 
tactics the officers used during Vice's interview. 
¶39 The court of appeals concluded that four tactics Fisher 
and Lambeseder employed during Vice's post-polygraph interview 
were sufficiently coercive as to render Vice's statements 
involuntary:  (1) their repeated references to Vice's polygraph 
results during the interview; (2) their assertions that Vice 
remembered the assault despite his claims not to remember; 
(3) their failure to contradict Vice's statement that he must have 
assaulted the victim because the polygraph results said that he 
did; and (4) their failure to inform Vice that the polygraph 
results were inadmissible in court.  Vice, 392 Wis. 2d 754, ¶72.  
We will address each in turn.   
¶40 The first tactic that the court of appeals determined 
was coercive was the officers' use of references to Vice's 
polygraph examination.  Vice, 392 Wis. 2d 754, ¶66.  Fisher and 
Lambeseder made at least 11 references to Vice's polygraph 
examination over the course of his 45-minute interview.  Id., ¶61.  
While we have previously held that a single reference to polygraph 
results does not constitute coercion, Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶41, 
this case requires us to determine whether multiple references 
constitute coercion.   
¶41 Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, we draw a 
substantive parallel between the suspect's offer to take the 
polygraph examination in Davis, and Vice's offer to Fisher to 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
21 
 
"clear [his] name" coupled with his subsequent agreement to take 
a polygraph examination when Fisher suggested it.  Vice agreed to 
take the polygraph examination while at his own place of 
employment, not at the police station.  Vice himself initiated the 
telephone call to Fisher to schedule the examination.  A polygraph 
"can hardly be considered a strategy of the police officers [when] 
it was administered to the defendant upon his request, and the 
statement was given after the test was over and the defendant knew 
the test was over."  Id., ¶25 (quoted source omitted).   
¶42 While the number of references to the polygraph 
examination and results during Vice's interview was greater than 
the single reference we held uncoercive in Davis, the context and 
nature of those references matter, notwithstanding their total 
number.  In this case, four of the polygraph references occurred 
in close proximity to each other at the commencement of the 
interview, and three of those references took place near the end 
of the interview after Vice had already confessed.  Vice's initial 
incriminating statement, made eight minutes into the interview, 
came in direct response to the officers telling Vice that if he 
confessed to the single offense, he would be less likely to be 
considered a "dangerous" habitual offender who could not be "in 
the community."  Vice provided statements regarding specific 
details of the sexual assault throughout the interview without 
referencing the polygraph results.  
¶43 During the course of the 45-minute interview, the 
polygraph references constituted only one component of the 
dialogue between the officers and Vice.  The officers used other 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
22 
 
tactics far more frequently and effectively during the interview, 
and it was those tactics that led most directly to Vice making 
statements against self-interest.  The officers repeatedly urged 
Vice to be truthful.  They offered to ask Vice specific questions 
to which he could answer "yes" or "no" rather than having him 
describe the details of the sexual assault himself.  They made 
empathetic statements, and they offered to get Vice the help he 
needed.  Under these circumstances, we agree with the State that 
the officers' references to the polygraph results did not 
constitute coercive or improper conduct.  In addition, it would be 
"unreasonable" for a suspect in a post-polygraph interview to 
"assume that [he] would not be informed of the polygraph readings 
and asked to explain any unfavorable result."  Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 
47.  Said differently, ignoring Vice's polygraph examination in 
his post-polygraph interview would be like ignoring an elephant in 
the room.   
¶44 The second tactic the court of appeals considered 
coercive was the officers' use of statements that the polygraph 
examination showed that Vice remembered the assault.  Vice, 392 
Wis. 2d 754, ¶63.  These statements did not constitute coercion.  
There is no dispute that Vice failed the polygraph examination; 
the officers viewed that result as an indication that Vice did, in 
fact, remember committing the assault.  The officers' insistence 
that Vice's reactions during the polygraph examination indicated 
that he did remember were simply another way of characterizing 
those results.  And even if we assume without deciding that those 
statements were outright falsehoods, they would not rise to the 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
23 
 
level of coercion absent being coupled with some other, more 
coercive practice used on a particularly vulnerable suspect.  See, 
e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (statement was 
involuntary where a false promise of leniency was combined with 
threats to remove suspect's children and welfare benefits along 
with other factors).   
¶45 Further, it is settled law that police may engage in 
active deception, including lying to a suspect, without rendering 
that suspect's statements involuntary.  Lemoine, 345 Wis. 2d 171, 
¶20 ("[U]sing deception in interrogation is common and generally 
acceptable.").  Misrepresentations by police are a relevant factor 
in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's statements, but do 
not necessarily make those statements involuntary when considered 
in light of the totality of the circumstances of the interview.  
State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶27, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  
The officers' statements that Vice's polygraph examination failure 
indicated that he remembered committing the assault were consonant 
with this type of interview technique.  We disagree with the court 
of appeals and conclude that that this tactic was not coercive. 
¶46 Third, the court of appeals reasoned that the officers' 
failure to correct Vice's "stated misunderstanding" that "I'll 
admit that I must have did it because obviously the test says that 
I did it, but I don't physically remember" was a factor 
contributing to the creation of a "coercive environment."  Vice, 
392 Wis. 2d 754, ¶63 & n.7.  But, as the court of appeals noted, 
interrogators have no absolute duty to inform a suspect during a 
post-polygraph interview that polygraph examinations are fallible.  
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
24 
 
Id.  Additionally, the officers were not required to believe Vice's 
claims that he did not remember, and it was not coercive for them 
to question those claims during the interview.  We cannot agree 
that the officers used coercive tactics to "exploit [Vice's] lack 
of memory," id., ¶67, when there is simply no evidence in the 
record to indicate whether or not Vice was being truthful.  This 
lack of response is not the kind of affirmative coercive conduct 
that would render Vice's statements involuntary. 
¶47 Finally, the court of appeals determined that the 
officers' failure to inform Vice that his polygraph results would 
be inadmissible in any criminal proceedings against him was a 
coercive act.  Id., ¶64.  We do not deem an omission such as this 
to be coercive when compared with the outright deception that the 
Due Process Clause permits.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 
739 (1969) ("The fact that the police misrepresented the statements 
that [the suspect's accomplice] had made is, while relevant, 
insufficient in our view to make [an] otherwise voluntary 
confession inadmissible.").  We therefore conclude that none of 
the four tactics singled out as problematic by the court of appeals 
were coercive.   
¶48 We further determine that, even if none of the individual 
tactics discussed above were coercive in and of themselves, they 
likewise did not add up to coercion resulting in involuntariness 
when considered together.  Police may, and often do, engage in 
multiple tactics and strategies in the same interview without 
rendering coercive what would be permissible in isolation.  We 
conclude that the tactics employed by the officers during Vice's 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
25 
 
post-polygraph interview, both in isolation and in the aggregate, 
were not coercive.  Because a suspect's statements cannot be 
involuntary absent police coercion, it is not necessary to balance 
these tactics against Vice's personal characteristics; there is 
simply nothing against which to balance them.  Berggren, 320 
Wis. 2d 209, ¶30.   
¶49 Having determined that none of the polygraph-related 
tactics used by the officers in Vice's interview, individually or 
considered in the aggregate, were coercive, we turn to the rest of 
the circumstances surrounding the interview to ensure that there 
was no other coercive or improper activity at play.  In our 
examination of the police pressures or tactics employed during an 
interview, we consider a number of factors, including: 
 
the length of the interview; 
 
the general circumstances under which the statements 
took place; 
 
whether any excessive physical or psychological pressure 
was used; 
 
whether any inducements, threats, methods, or strategies 
were used to compel a response; and 
 
whether the suspect was informed of the right to counsel 
and against self-incrimination. 
Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶39.   
¶50 As the court of appeals correctly concluded, none of 
"the circumstances surrounding the interview convince us that 
Vice's confession was involuntary."  Vice, 392 Wis. 2d 754, ¶60.  
The length of Vice's interview was short——only 45 minutes.  See, 
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
26 
 
e.g., Lemoine, 345 Wis. 2d 171, ¶3 (75-to-80-minute interview not 
coercive); Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶¶11, 39 (duration of 45-minute 
interview "was not lengthy").  The circumstances of the interview 
were similarly benign.  Vice went to the police station 
voluntarily.  At no point was Vice restrained or physically abused, 
and the room in which the interview took place was not 
uncomfortable.  The officers spoke to Vice in a calm tone of voice 
throughout, made no threats, and offered no inducements to Vice.  
Vice was informed of his right to counsel and his right against 
self-incrimination15 before both his polygraph examination and his 
post-polygraph interview.16   
¶51 We also give weight to the fact that the polygraph 
examination and post-polygraph interview took place on Vice's own 
initiative.  The United States Supreme Court has singled out this 
factor in its holding that "the totality of the circumstances, 
including the fact that the suspect initiated the questioning, is 
                     
15 The circuit court noted erroneously that the Miranda 
warnings were "discussed before the polygraph but not before the 
post-polygraph interview."  In fact, Vice signed a form at the 
conclusion of the polygraph examination stating that he "knowingly 
and intelligently continued[d] to waive [his] rights, including 
those [Miranda rights] listed . . . above."   
16 The court of appeals stated that the provision of those 
warnings "contributes to our concern regarding the voluntariness 
of his confession."  Vice, 392 Wis. 2d 754, ¶65.  However, our 
case law indicates that it is the absence of Miranda warnings that 
weighs against voluntariness.  State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶¶29, 
56, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407 (in a noncustodial interview, 
absence of Miranda warnings were one of "certain behaviors of 
police [which] constituted coercive pressures brought to bear on 
[the suspect]").   
No. 
2018AP2220-CR   
 
27 
 
controlling."  Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 48.  In the absence of improper 
or coercive tactics, there is "simply no foundation for reaching 
a finding of involuntariness."  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 240.  As 
stated above, without any police coercion, and having considered 
all conditions of the interview, we are unconvinced that Vice's 
statements were not the product of a free and unconstrained will, 
reflecting deliberateness of choice.  Therefore, those statements 
were voluntary and the circuit court erred in granting Vice's 
motion to suppress.  
III. CONCLUSION 
¶52 We conclude that the statements Vice made during his 
post-polygraph interview are admissible because:  (1) the 
interview was discrete from the polygraph examination; and (2) the 
statements were not the product of police coercion, and therefore 
were voluntary.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals.   
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.   
 
No.  2018AP2220-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
 
¶54 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority that the polygraph and post-polygraph interview were 
discrete events and that Vice's statements were voluntary.  I 
disagree with the court's attempt to explain and then reinforce an 
isolated and perhaps inartful sentence in Davis:  "An important 
inquiry continues to be whether the [polygraph] result was referred 
to in order to elicit an incriminating statement."  State v. Davis, 
2008 WI 71, ¶42, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332.  The majority 
contends that the court of appeals misunderstood this sentence, 
noting that it is followed by a citation to State v. Johnson, 193 
Wis. 2d 382, 389, 535 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1995), where the issue 
was discreteness, not voluntariness.  Majority op., ¶36 n.14.  The 
majority then holds that whether the polygraph was referred to is 
in fact "important" to the discreteness analysis, but "is only one 
of 
many 
relevant 
factors 
to 
consider 
in 
determining 
voluntariness."  Id. 
¶55 In fairness to the court of appeals, the statement in 
Davis 
occurs 
in 
a 
section 
analyzing 
voluntariness, 
not 
discreteness.  The discreteness discussion in Davis occurs and 
concludes in ¶¶23-34, while the "important inquiry" statement 
appears in ¶42, the final paragraph in the court's voluntariness 
discussion.1  310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶¶23-34, 42.  It is not obvious to 
me that the court of appeals misread our opinion.  If there was an 
error, it was in our opinion's imprecision. 
                     
1 The paragraph concludes, "Accordingly, Davis's statement 
was voluntary."  State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, ¶42, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 
751 N.W.2d 332. 
No.  2018AP2220-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
¶56 My larger disagreement, however, is with the majority's 
resolution of this solitary sentence from Davis.   
¶57 I agree with the majority's conclusion that, with 
respect to voluntariness, reference to polygraph results is merely 
one factor in a totality of the circumstances analysis.  And I 
tend to think it is, at most, a relatively small factor.  The 
question for voluntariness is coercion, and I do not see anything 
uniquely coercive with law enforcement references to inadmissible 
evidence during questioning.  As the majority points out, if law 
enforcement can refer to non-existent evidence, I'm not sure why 
reference to inadmissible evidence is unusually problematic.  See 
majority op., ¶45.  
¶58 I part ways, however, with the majority's conclusion 
that reference to a polygraph is an "important" component of the 
discreteness analysis.  Davis did not say this in its 12 paragraph 
discreteness discussion; Johnson never declares this either.  
Rather, Johnson describes the proper test as a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, and discusses this as just one factor among 
others.  193 Wis. 2d at 388-89.  In practice, the majority opinion 
does exactly the same thing even though it embraces the "important 
inquiry" language.  The majority concludes that temporal and 
spatial differences show the post-polygraph interview was a 
discrete event, and multiple references to the polygraph results 
in the interview do not change that.  Majority op., ¶26.  I agree 
wholeheartedly.  The majority does not treat these polygraph 
references as an important inquiry for discreteness because here—
—and I suspect in most instances——it's not.  In effect, the 
No.  2018AP2220-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
majority attempts to make sense of an isolated sentence in Davis, 
and in doing so, subtly changes the law.   
¶59 Rather than double down on one unclear phrase, we would 
do better to simply clarify and reinforce what I think the law has 
been up until this point:  reference to the results of a polygraph, 
for both discreteness and voluntariness, is only one potentially 
relevant fact in a totality of the circumstances analysis.  In 
this case, this fact has very little impact on either the 
discreteness or voluntariness analyses.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully concur.2 
                     
2 Other than ¶25 and footnote 14, I join the majority opinion. 
No.  2018AP2220-CR.bh 
 
 
 
1