Title: In re Barnett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S096831
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2003

1 
Filed 8/7/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
) 
S096831 
In re 
 
) 
 
 
) 
LEE MAX BARNETT 
) 
 
) 
Butte County 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 91850 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Petitioner Lee Max Barnett is being held in custody pursuant to a judgment 
of death rendered on November 30, 1988.  Petitioner is represented by appointed 
counsel in this state habeas corpus proceeding challenging the legality of that 
judgment.  Despite such representation, petitioner has submitted a number of pro 
se habeas corpus claims, motions, and other documents to this court for filing and 
consideration.  Because this court has begun to receive a number of pro se 
submissions in capital habeas corpus matters, and because our actions thereon 
have at times varied, we find it appropriate to announce a standard procedure for 
such submissions. 
Consistent with the general rule that represented parties have no right to 
present their cases personally alongside counsel—a principle we have recognized 
in the context of both capital trials and appeals, and noncapital habeas corpus 
proceedings as well—this court will not file or consider a represented capital 
inmate’s pro se submissions that challenge the legality of the inmate’s death 
judgment or otherwise fall within the scope of counsel’s representation.  
 
2 
Conversely, we shall file and consider a represented capital inmate’s pro se 
submissions that pertain to matters falling outside the scope of counsel’s 
representation.  We shall also file and consider pro se motions limited to matters 
concerning the inmate’s representation.  (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 
118 (Marsden) [motion to substitute counsel].) 
I. 
The facts underlying petitioner’s convictions are not pertinent to the 
procedural matter presented here.  It suffices to note that a jury convicted 
petitioner in 1988 of one count of assault with a firearm, several counts of 
kidnapping and robbery, and one count of first degree murder.  Petitioner 
committed his crimes upon encountering the victims unexpectedly in 1986 at a 
remote campsite in a Butte County gold mining area.  The evidence at trial 
included testimony from persons present at the encounter, including petitioner, and 
from others who had contact with petitioner the summer before the crimes 
occurred or immediately afterward. 
The relevant procedural facts are as follows.  Appointed counsel Michael 
Willemsen and Ronald A. Parravano represented petitioner in his automatic appeal 
and concurrent state habeas corpus proceeding (judgment of death affirmed May 
4, 1998, in People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044; concurrent habeas corpus 
petition denied Nov. 17, 1999).  On July 12, 2000, we granted the request of 
Willemsen and Parravano to withdraw from all further representation.  We also 
appointed Robert D. Bacon, who currently represents petitioner in federal 
postaffirmance capital-related habeas corpus proceedings, to represent petitioner 
through the remaining state habeas corpus and executive clemency proceedings in 
this matter until the judgment is reversed or until petitioner’s death. 
 
3 
On April 5, 2001, Bacon filed in this court a 560-page second petition for 
writ of habeas corpus that challenges the legality of petitioner’s death judgment.  
That petition, which attaches 20 volumes of appendices, is pending. 
Beginning in November 2001, petitioner has submitted the following pro se 
documents to this court for our consideration:  (1) a “Declaration and Motion to 
Supplement Habeas Corpus” in In re Barnett (S096831, Apr. 5, 2001) (received 
Nov. 2, 2001); (2) a document containing pro se habeas corpus claims No. 275 and 
276 (received Nov. 19, 2001); (3) a “Declaration of Lee Max Barnett” and a 
“Declaration and Motion and Objections to Respondent’s Request for Extension of 
Time, Motion for Summary Judgement” (received Nov. 21, 2001); (4) a letter 
referring to an alleged misleading statement of fact in Appellant’s Opening Brief 
and the court’s opinion in People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044 (received 
Nov. 27, 2001); (5) a document containing pro se “Supplemental Habeas Claim 
#278” (received Dec. 7, 2001); (6) a document entitled “Impediments to Filing 
preAEDPA & Entitlement to preAEDPA Standards on Review” (received Jan. 9, 
2002); (7) a petition for writ of habeas corpus that complains both of “prison 
conditions impeding & obstructing habeas” and of denial of petitioner’s rights to a 
speedy trial and a speedy appeal (received Mar. 6, 2002); and (8) a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus that complains the superior court erred in denying a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus filed on August 28, 2001 in Marin County Superior 
Court, No. SC 120773 (received Apr. 2, 2002). 
The foregoing documents do not criticize Bacon’s effectiveness and do not 
seek his removal.  While the last two documents complain primarily of prison 
conditions, the others largely purport to present, as habeas corpus claims, various 
assignments of trial court and appellate error, prosecutorial misconduct, and 
ineffectiveness of all prior appointed counsel.  To this day, however, Bacon 
continues to represent petitioner in these state court proceedings, and petitioner 
 
4 
has never disavowed the state habeas corpus petition Bacon prepared on his 
behalf. 
In view of the pro se documents petitioner submitted, we issued an order on 
April 10, 2002 that directed the Director of Corrections to show cause why this 
court should not file the foregoing documents and consider their merits, 
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner is currently represented by counsel.1  (See 
generally People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 797-798 (Mattson); People v. 
Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173 (Clark); In re Cathey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 679, 684 
(Cathey).)  We requested briefing on the following issues:  (1) whether and to 
what extent this court should accept for filing and consideration, from a capital 
inmate who is represented by counsel, a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus 
that challenges the legality of the inmate’s death judgment; (2) whether and to 
what extent this court should accept for filing and consideration, from a 
represented capital inmate, a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus that 
complains of prison conditions; and (3) whether and to what extent this court 
should accept for filing and consideration, from a represented capital inmate, pro 
se motions, pro se declarations, and other pro se submissions such as those 
petitioner submitted here. 
Respondent filed a return to the order to show cause.  Counsel for petitioner 
then filed a traverse to respondent’s return, and petitioner submitted his own pro se 
“reply” to the return as well. 
                                             
 
1  
Our order specified that briefing of the merits of any matter set forth in 
petitioner’s pro se submissions is deferred pending further order of this court. 
 
5 
II. 
As a general rule, parties who are represented in court by counsel of record 
are required to proceed in court through their counsel.  As a prelude to 
determining the proper disposition of petitioner’s pro se submissions, we find it 
useful to review the rules regarding legal representation and pro se submissions 
applicable to capital trial and appellate proceedings. 
A criminal defendant facing state capital charges has two mutually 
exclusive rights with respect to legal representation at trial.  “He may choose to be 
represented by professional counsel, or he may knowingly and intelligently elect 
to assume his own representation.”  (People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 
1162 (Hamilton); see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1368; 
People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1003.)  These are federal 
constitutional rights that derive from the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 
806, 818.) 
Significantly, however, a capital defendant who chooses professional 
representation, rather than self-representation, is not entitled to present his or her 
case personally or to act as cocounsel at trial.2  (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 730, 741; Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1162, and cases cited therein; 
see also Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 789.)  There are sound reasons for this 
rule.  “Undesirable tactical conflicts, trial delays, and confusion often arise when a 
                                             
 
2  
There is one exception to this rule:  Defendants may make pro se motions 
regarding representation, including requests for self-representation (Faretta v. 
California, supra, 422 U.S. 806) and for substitution of counsel (Marsden, supra, 
2 Cal.3d 118). 
 
6 
defendant who has chosen professional representation shares legal functions with 
his attorney.”  (Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1162.) 
Accordingly, when a defendant exercises his or her constitutional right to 
representation by professional counsel, it is counsel who “is in charge of the case” 
and the defendant “surrenders all but a handful of ‘fundamental’ personal rights to 
counsel’s complete control of defense strategies and tactics.”  (Hamilton, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at p. 1163.)  Although a trial court retains discretion to allow a 
represented defendant’s personal participation, such an arrangement ought be 
avoided unless the court is convinced, upon a substantial showing, that it will 
promote justice and judicial efficiency in the particular case.  (People v. Frierson, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 741; Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 797.)  Indeed, it is the 
trial court’s duty “to safeguard and promote the orderly and expeditious conduct of 
its business and to guard against inept procedures and unnecessary indulgences 
which would tend to hinder, hamper or delay the conduct and dispatch of its 
proceedings.”  (Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 792.) 
A criminal defendant’s rights regarding legal representation are more 
limited on appeal than at trial.  The Sixth Amendment does not include any right 
to appeal, so it implicates no basis for a right to representation by professional 
counsel on appeal.  (See People v. Scott (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 550, 558, cited in 
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 
155 (Martinez).)  The Fourteenth Amendment and its due process and equal 
protection guarantees, however, prohibit discrimination against convicted indigent 
inmates; consequently, an indigent inmate has a constitutional right to counsel 
appointed at the state’s expense where, as here, the state confers a criminal appeal 
as of right.  (Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 356-357.)  The right to 
appointed counsel promotes an appellate system “ ‘free of unreasoned 
distinctions’ ” by assuring that indigent inmates, like inmates in better economic 
 
7 
circumstances, have an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within 
the adversary system.  (Ross v. Moffitt (1974) 417 U.S. 600, 612.)  Consistent with 
these constitutional principles, California provides a statutory right to appointed 
counsel for both capital and noncapital criminal appeals.  (Pen. Code, §§ 1239, 
1240, 1240.1.) 
Notably, however, there is no right—constitutional, statutory, or 
otherwise—to self-representation in a criminal appeal in California.  (See People 
v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 834-835 [no right to dismiss counsel in capital 
appeals]; People v. Scott, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 569-573 [noncapital 
appeals].)  In particular, neither the Sixth Amendment nor the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution furnishes a basis for 
finding such a right.  (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 160-163.)  As the United 
States Supreme Court recently explained, the sole constitutional right to self-
representation derives from the Sixth Amendment, which pertains strictly to the 
basic rights that an accused enjoys in defending against a criminal prosecution and 
does not extend beyond the point of conviction.  (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 
154, 160-161.)  Emphasizing that the change in one’s position from “defendant” to 
“appellant” is a significant one, the high court found that the balance between a 
criminal defendant’s interest in acting as his or her own lawyer and a state’s 
interest in ensuring the fair and efficient administration of justice “surely tips in 
favor of the [s]tate” once the defendant is no longer presumed innocent but found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Id. at p. 162.)  Consequently, the court 
concluded, states may exercise broad discretion when considering what 
representation to allow and may require an indigent inmate “to accept against his 
will a state-appointed attorney” for representation on a direct appeal without 
violating the federal Constitution.  (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 164.) 
 
8 
As relevant here, represented capital inmates are not permitted to present 
their automatic appeals personally to this court.  That is, such inmates have no 
right personally to supplement or supersede counsel’s briefs and arguments on the 
merits of their appeals.  (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 173; Mattson, supra, 
51 Cal.2d at p. 798.)  As we explained in Mattson, pro se submissions pertaining 
to an appeal will not be filed or considered “[b]ecause of the undesirability of 
fruitlessly adding to the burdens of this court the time-consuming task of reading 
pro se documents which are not properly before us, and, if they be read, of 
consequently enlarging [the] opinion by a recountal and discussion of the 
contentions made in propria persona. . . .”  (Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 798.) 
Thus, all appellate motions and briefs must be prepared and filed by 
counsel and may not be submitted pro se.  (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 173.)  
Although we will accept and consider pro se motions regarding representation 
(i.e., Marsden motions to substitute counsel), such motions “must be clearly 
labeled as such” and “must be limited to matters concerning representation.”  
(Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 173.)  Any other pro se document offered in an 
appeal “will be returned unfiled” (ibid.), or, if mistakenly filed, will be stricken 
from the docket (Mattson, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 798).3 
                                             
 
3  
Petitioner contends that respondent should be “estopped” from arguing here 
that represented capital inmates may not file papers pro se in appellate and habeas 
corpus proceedings because respondent supposedly advanced a contrary position 
in Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. 152.  That is, respondent assured the United States 
Supreme Court, both in briefing and during oral argument, that appellate courts in 
California routinely permit represented criminal appellants to make pro se filings.  
The contention lacks merit.  Whether or not respondent should be estopped from 
arguing a point, this court is not estopped from applying correct constitutional and 
policy principles. 
 
In any event, we note the only apparent statement in Martinez that bears on 
the matter is the high court’s observation that “the rules governing appeals in 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
9 
With this overview in mind, we now assess whether and to what extent 
similar restrictions should apply to pro se submissions by represented inmates in 
capital habeas corpus proceedings before this court. 
The federal Constitution guarantees that habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, except as necessary for public safety during a rebellion or invasion.  
(U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.)  Notwithstanding the fact that the concept of habeas 
corpus relief is the subject of a constitutional provision, while appellate relief is 
not, an inmate’s rights regarding legal representation in a state habeas corpus 
proceeding are even more limited than on an appeal. 
“Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than 
is discretionary direct review.[4]  It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and 
it is in fact considered to be civil in nature.  [Citation.]  . . . .  States have no 
obligation to provide this avenue of relief, [citation], and when they do, the 
fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that 
the state supply a lawyer as well.”  (Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 
556-557; see In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 815 [state capital habeas corpus 
proceeding in which a referee was appointed to take evidence and make findings 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
California, and presumably those in other States as well, seem to protect the ability 
of indigent litigants to make pro se filings.  See, e.g., People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 
436, 440, 600 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1979); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967).”  (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 164.)  The citations to People v. Wende 
and Anders v. California make it apparent that the court’s focus was on the sort of 
situation, not presented here, where counsel submits an appellate brief that raises 
no specific issues on the client’s behalf or that describes the appeal as frivolous. 
4  
As used by the Supreme Court here, the term “postconviction relief” refers 
to collateral relief, that is, relief from a conviction other than by direct appeal or 
discretionary direct review.  (Cf. post, fn. 6.) 
 
10 
on an inmate’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was civil in nature].)  
Consequently, there is no federal constitutional right to counsel for state habeas 
corpus proceedings, not even in a capital case.  (Murray v. Giarratano (1989) 492 
U.S. 1, 10 (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, C. J.); see Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 
U.S. 722, 752.) 
California likewise confers no constitutional right to counsel for seeking 
collateral relief from a judgment of conviction via state habeas corpus 
proceedings.  Nonetheless, the long-standing practice of this court is to appoint 
qualified counsel to work on behalf of an indigent inmate in the investigation and 
preparation of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that challenges the legality of 
a death judgment.5  (In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 717; In re Anderson 
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 633; Cal. Supreme Ct., Internal Operating Practices & 
Proc., XV, Appointment of Attorneys in Criminal Cases; Cal. Supreme Ct., 
Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death, policy 3.)  This 
practice, now codified in principle at Government Code section 68662, promotes 
the state’s interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice and, at the 
same time, protects the interests of all capital inmates by assuring that they are 
provided a reasonably adequate opportunity to present us their habeas corpus 
claims. 
                                             
 
5  
An attorney willing to be appointed to represent an inmate in such a 
proceeding must meet certain minimum qualifications and must demonstrate the 
commitment, knowledge, and skills necessary to represent the inmate competently.  
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 76.6(a), (b), (e), (f).)  Appointed counsel are charged 
with “the duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for the filing of a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus,” as delineated in our court’s policies regarding cases 
arising from death judgments.  (Cal. Supreme Ct., Internal Operating Practices & 
Proc., XV E.) 
 
11 
We turn now to the question whether inmates have a right to self-
representation when seeking habeas corpus relief in our courts.  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this matter specifically, it is logical 
to conclude that if there is no federal constitutional right to self-representation in a 
state appeal as of right (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 163), then there is no such 
constitutional right in state collateral proceedings.  Not only does the Sixth 
Amendment right to self-representation at trial clearly not apply, but the autonomy 
interests that survive a judgment of conviction surely are no greater once the 
judgment is affirmed on appeal and the inmate is relegated to the civil remedy of 
seeking collateral relief. 
Inmates, moreover, have no state constitutional right to self-representation 
in habeas corpus proceedings.  Like its federal counterpart, the California 
Constitution guarantees that habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except as 
necessary for public safety during a rebellion or invasion.  (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 11.)  That provision makes no mention of representational rights, and furnishes 
no more a basis for such rights than the federal provision. 
Recent legislation, however, alludes to the matter of self-representation.  
Government Code section 68662 provides that our court “shall offer to appoint 
counsel to represent all state prisoners subject to a capital sentence for purposes of 
state postconviction proceedings,[6] and shall enter an order containing one of the 
following:  [¶] (a) The appointment of counsel to represent the prisoner in 
postconviction state proceedings upon a finding that the person is indigent and has 
                                             
 
6  
As used in Government Code section 68662, the term “state postconviction 
proceedings” refers to state proceedings in which the prisoner seeks collateral 
relief from a capital sentence, i.e., relief other than by automatic appeal.  (Cf. ante, 
fn. 4.) 
 
12 
accepted the offer to appoint counsel or is unable to competently decide whether 
to accept or reject that offer.  [¶] (b) A finding, after a hearing if necessary, that 
the prisoner rejected the offer to appoint counsel and made that decision with full 
understanding of the legal consequences of the decision.  [¶] (c) The denial to 
appoint counsel upon a finding that the person is not indigent.”  (Italics added; see 
Gov. Code, former § 68652, added by Stats. 1997, ch. 869, § 3.)  Although these 
provisions contemplate that a capital inmate may decline our offer of counsel at 
the outset, so long as he or she fully understands the legal consequences of such a 
decision, they specify no right to withdraw an election of professional legal 
representation once made. 
Additionally, the Penal Code specifies that “[e]very person unlawfully 
imprisoned or restrained” may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus (Pen. Code, 
§ 1473, subd. (a)) by means of a petition “signed either by the party for whose 
relief it is intended, or by some person in his behalf” (id., § 1474, italics added).  
But neither of these provisions is contravened by a rule that a “person” represented 
by counsel for the specific purpose of pursuing habeas corpus remedies must 
generally exercise the right to prosecute the writ through that counsel, who, in 
such cases, acts “in his behalf.” 
Certainly, capital inmates who are represented by habeas corpus counsel 
have no more right to present their cases personally alongside their attorneys than 
do represented capital defendants at trial or on appeal. 
As is the situation in a capital trial or appeal, there is no constitutional or 
statutory provision that grants a represented inmate the right to file pro se 
petitions, motions, objections, or other briefing in furtherance of his or her capital 
habeas corpus case.  Nor do our published practices, procedures or policy 
standards governing capital habeas corpus proceedings afford such a right.  
Moreover, we indicated quite some time ago that the general rule prohibiting a 
 
13 
represented party’s pro se documents applies in the habeas corpus context.  (See 
Cathey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 684 [represented petitioner seeking release from the 
custody of the California Medical Facility at Vacaville]; accord, In re Mozer 
(Mont. 1973) 511 P.2d 1320, 1321 [per curiam order dismissing noncapital 
defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging unconstitutionality of his 
confinement]; In re Stirewalt (C.G.C.C.A. 2001) 56 M.J. 506, 507 [refusing to 
entertain a pro se habeas corpus petition where the petitioner had been previously 
represented by counsel, had a right to continuing representation by government-
provided counsel, and had given no indication that he had been inappropriately 
deprived of representation]; In the Matter of Stroik (Del., Sept. 22, 1998, No. 389, 
1998) 1998 WL 736284 [unpublished disposition holding that a noncapital 
defendant could not file a pro se habeas corpus petition because it was directly 
related to postconviction matters in which he was represented by counsel]; Gilbert 
v. Singletary (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1994) 632 So.2d 1104, 1105; Ex parte Taylor 
(Tex.App. 1985) 690 S.W.2d 33, 34; Pitts v. Hopper (N.D.Ga. 1974) 402 F.Supp. 
119, 120.) 
In consideration of all of the foregoing, the rule we adopt is this:  This court 
will not file or consider a represented capital inmate’s pro se submission to the 
extent it challenges, or otherwise pertains to (see post, fn. 11), the legality of the 
death judgment.7  Challenges that go to the legality of the death judgment fall 
                                             
 
7  
Consistent with our rule on appeal, however, we will file and consider a pro 
se motion regarding an inmate’s representation (i.e., a Marsden motion) to the 
extent it is clearly labeled and limited to such matters.  (See Clark, supra, 3 
Cal.4th at p. 173; Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118.) 
 
Additionally, we clarify that this opinion does not speak to pro se 
submissions in which the represented inmate expresses a desire to immediately 
end state habeas corpus proceedings, to forgo executive clemency proceedings, 
and to urge the state’s implementation of the death penalty in his or her case. 
 
14 
squarely within the scope of habeas corpus counsel’s representation, and there 
appears no legitimate reason why capital inmates who have habeas corpus counsel 
should not be required to submit such matters to their attorneys for investigation 
and proper presentation to this court in a petition prepared and filed by their 
attorneys.8  Indeed, with their formal legal training, professional experience, and 
unrestricted access to legal and other resources, counsel possess distinct 
advantages over their inmate clients in investigating the factual and legal grounds 
for potentially meritorious habeas corpus claims and in recognizing and preparing 
legally sufficient challenges to the validity of the inmates’ death judgments.  (See 
generally Jones v. Barnes, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 751 [noting the superior ability of 
counsel to present the client’s case on appeal].) 
A rule declining the filing and consideration of a represented capital 
inmate’s pro se submissions as such is consistent with the general rule that 
represented parties have no right to present their cases personally alongside 
counsel—a principle we have recognized in the context of both capital trials and 
appeals, and in noncapital habeas corpus proceedings as well.9  Restricting pro se 
                                             
 
8  
Of course, counsel need not press habeas corpus claims requested by their 
inmate clients, even those that might be considered nonfrivolous, if counsel, as a 
matter of professional judgment, decide not to present those claims.  (See 
generally Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751.)  We hereby disapprove of 
Cathey, supra, 55 Cal.2d 679, to the extent it suggests we will file or consider pro 
se applications or briefs if counsel merely offers the pro se documents for filing on 
the inmate’s behalf. 
9  
We recognize that inmates convicted solely of noncapital crimes typically 
are represented only by appellate counsel who have no obligation to investigate or 
present grounds for habeas corpus relief.  (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 
783-784, fn. 20.)  Nothing in this opinion should be construed to bar a court’s 
filing and consideration of pro se habeas corpus petitions and claims from a 
noncapital inmate unless counsel has also been specifically retained or appointed 
to prosecute habeas corpus remedies on the inmate’s behalf. 
 
15 
submissions by represented inmates also is consistent with the established rule in 
California that represented parties in civil matters must act through their counsel.10  
(Boca etc. R.R. Co. v. Superior Court (1907) 150 Cal. 153, 155 [civil trials]; 
Electric Utilities Co. v. Smallpage (1934) 137 Cal.App. 640, 641-642 [civil 
appeals].)  Such a restriction is reasonable and serves to promote the fair and 
efficient administration of justice while avoiding inept procedures, repetitious and 
piecemeal claims, tactical conflicts, and confusion.  (See generally Martinez, 
supra, 528 U.S. at p. 163.) 
III. 
As our order to show cause reflects, petitioner submitted eight pro se 
documents to this court for filing and consideration.  We shall return to petitioner 
as unfiled the following six documents:  (1) the “Declaration and Motion to 
Supplement Habeas Corpus” in In re Barnett (S096831, Apr. 5, 2001) (received 
Nov. 2, 2001); (2) the document containing pro se habeas corpus claims No. 275 
and 276 (received Nov. 19, 2001); (3) the “Declaration of Lee Max Barnett” and 
the “Declaration and Motion and Objections to Respondent’s Request for 
Extension of Time, Motion for Summary Judgement” (received Nov. 21, 2001); 
(4) the letter referring to an alleged misleading statement of fact in Appellant’s 
Opening Brief and the court’s opinion in People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044 
(received Nov. 27, 2001); (5) the document containing pro se “Supplemental 
Habeas Claim #278” (received Dec. 7, 2001); (6) the document entitled 
                                             
 
10  
As indicated, habeas corpus proceedings like the one before us are properly 
viewed as civil actions designed to overturn presumptively valid criminal 
judgments and not as part of the criminal process itself.  (Pennsylvania v. Finley, 
supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 556-557; Murray v. Giarratano, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 13 
(conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.); In re Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 815.) 
 
16 
“Impediments to Filing preAEDPA & Entitlement to preAEDPA Standards on 
Review” (received Jan. 9, 2002).  These documents consist largely of issues and 
claims that pertain to the legality of the death judgment and therefore are within 
the scope of counsel’s representation.11 
Conversely, we shall file the following two pro se documents under 
separate file numbers:  (1) the petition for writ of habeas corpus that complains 
both of “prison conditions impeding & obstructing habeas” and of denial of 
petitioner’s rights to a speedy trial and a speedy appeal (received Mar. 6, 2002); 
and (2) the petition for writ of habeas corpus that complains the superior court 
erred in denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on August 28, 2001 in 
Marin County Superior Court, No. SC 120773 (received Apr. 2, 2002).  Because 
these documents complain primarily of prison conditions, reflecting matters falling 
outside the scope of appointed counsel’s representation, we shall consider, at a 
future time and independently of the habeas corpus proceeding herein 
denominated as case No. S096831, those submissions on their merits.  (See ante, 
fn. 1.)  To the extent, however, that these documents also include contentions that 
challenge or otherwise pertain to the legality of the death judgment, such 
contentions are not properly presented and we shall decline their consideration. 
                                             
 
11  
The third listed document includes objections to respondent’s request for an 
extension of time to file an informal response to the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus that counsel filed on petitioner’s behalf.  The handling of such objections 
falls directly within the scope of counsel’s representation. 
 
17 
The order to show cause is discharged. 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
POLLAK, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 
Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.
 
18 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Barnett on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S096831 
Date Filed: August 7, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Lee Max Barnett. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, 
Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Ward A. Campbell, Jean M. Marinovich, Ruth M. 
Saavedra and Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert D. Bacon 
484 Lake Park Avenue 
Oakland, CA  94610 
(510) 834-6219 
 
Eric L. Christoffersen 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5248