Title: KING v. KING
Citation: 107 P.3d 570, 2005 OK 4
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 2005

KING v. KING Annotate this Case KING v. KING 2005 OK 4 107 P.3d 570 Case Number: 99248 Decided: 02/01/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA BARBARA KING, Defendant/Appellant, v. ANTHONY KING, Plaintiff/Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I Honorable Noah Ewing, Trial Judge ¶0 Following allegations of sexual abuse by an uncle during visitation with the plaintiff/appellee, Anthony King (father), the defendant/appellant, Barbara King (mother), refused to allow the father visitation with the child. The father filed a motion to modify asserting that it would be in the best interests of his son to change the custodial arrangement. After a hearing, the trial court, Honorable Noah Ewing, granted the father custody ordering the mother to pay child support. He also ordered that the child was not to be around the uncle at any time. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed determining that: 1) the mother had good cause for the temporary failure to allow visitation; 2) there was no evidentiary support for the conclusion that the child was manipulated; 3) no clear and convincing evidence existed of a permanent, substantial and material change of circumstances; and 4) the trial court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. Because the clear, explicit, mandatory and unmistakable terms of CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION LEFT UNDISTURBED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED. Charles L. Hill, Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Spencer Ford Shroeder, Chickasha, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 We granted certiorari to consider a single first impression issue: whether a prevailing parent, demonstrating good cause for withholding court-ordered visitation, is entitled to appeal-related attorney fees pursuant to FACTS ¶2 Neither parent is accused of abusing their child. Rather, the abuse allegations are directed at the child's uncle ¶3 The parties were married in 1998, and the only child of the marriage was born the same year. The mother moved to Kansas in December of 2000. The father filed for divorce the next March and the matter was tried in May and July of 2002. It appears that the divorce was granted on July 31, 2002. However, the decree was not filed until October 8, 2002. During the proceedings and before the filing of the decree, the mother accused the uncle of child abuse. Although we do not have the record associated with the divorce action, it is apparent that the trial court gave some credence to the mother's concerns. The decree specifically provides that the child is not to be around the uncle even in a worship setting. ¶4 Because of the mother's failure to provide the child for court-ordered visitation and her unfounded abuse contentions, the father filed a motion to modify on September 9, 2002, asserting that it would be in the best interests of his son to change the custodial arrangement. Here, the specific allegations arose following a visit with the father in November of 2002. ¶5 After picking up the child, the mother stopped at her niece's home. Although the father testified that the child was never in his uncle's presence, ¶8 The Chickasha police received a documentation report from the Kansas police and a referral from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services on December 18, 2002. ¶9 The church member indicated that the child had not attended services in over a year. The uncle stated that he had not seen the child since October of 2001, but that he was not surprised by the mother's allegations. He told the officer that he believed the mother had never liked him because of his race and because of a conflict which arose when the mother broke a lease and failed to pay rent money in a complex he managed. ¶10 Initially, the officer made several attempts to contact the mother but he was unable to do so. On January 16, 2003, he was notified by a Kansas police officer that the mother had complained to the chief of police that, when he phoned her, the officer had been rude. Up to this point, the officer said he had never spoken with the mother but that he did reach her by phone following the notification from Kansas. In this conversation, he reported that the mother was belligerent and that she yelled and cussed at him until he just hung up on her. ¶11 In an interview held on February 3, 2003, when the officer asked the child if he knew the uncle, he responded, "that's the man that touches my pee pee." ¶12 There is no question that the evidence presented at the hearing on March 28, 2003, was highly contested. The father insisted that the incident in November never occurred because his son did not see the uncle. ¶14 On May 14, 2003, the mother appealed. A year later, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed stating that the mother had good cause for the temporary failure to allow paternal visitation during the course of the investigations in Kansas and Oklahoma and that there was no evidentiary support for the conclusion that she manipulated the child, social workers or the child's therapist. Furthermore, the appellate court held that there was no clear and convincing evidence of a permanent, substantial and material change of circumstances directly and adversely affecting the best interests of the child in such a way that the child would be substantially better off as to his temporal, moral or mental welfare if custody were given to the father. I. ¶15 THE CLEAR, EXPLICIT, MANDATORY AND UNMISTAKABLE TERMS OF ¶16 The mother asserts that, as the prevailing party, she is entitled to her appeal-related attorney fees under authority of 43 O.S. Supp. 2003 §112(D)(2).30 Although the father agrees that the mother could seek attorney fees under the statute,31 he argues that the mother is not entitled to recover because she did not act in the best interests of their son either in withholding court-ordered visitation or in opposing the motion to modify. We disagree. A. ¶17 THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHILD MAY HAVE BEEN SEXUALLY ABUSED, WHILE IN THE FATHER'S CUSTODY COUPLED WITH THE THREAT THAT HER PARENTAL RIGHTS MIGHT BE IN JEOPARDY IF SHE ALLOWED VISITATION DEMONSTRATE GOOD CAUSE FOR THE MOTHER'S WITHHOLDING VISITATION. ¶18 Title 43 O.S. Supp. 2003 §112(D)(1)32 first became a part of Oklahoma's statutory law in 1999.33 [Because the language referring to both the "good cause" showing and that addressing the award of attorney fees has remained unchanged since its addition in 1999, references are to the current statutory compilation.] It provides: "Except for good cause shown, a pattern of failure to allow court-ordered visitation may be determined to be contrary to the best interests of the child and as such may be grounds for modification of the child custody order." [Emphasis provided.] Research reveals no case in which we have directly addressed the ramifications of the statute. Nevertheless, the statute specifically provides authority for a change of custody based on failure to allow court-ordered visitation. However, the statute also contains an exception -- a good cause showing for interrupting visitation. "Good cause" is determined by application of equitable principles.34 ¶19 If good cause was not exhibited here, it is difficult to fathom how a parent could demonstrate a well-founded reason for interrupting court-ordered visitation. Immediately following visitation with the father, the child spontaneously told his mother and her niece that he was fondling himself because his uncle stretched his pee pee.35 The child's counselor came to the same conclusion after the child reported, in a subsequent play session, that his uncle had pulled on his pee pee.36 Although the police officer conducting the investigation in Oklahoma did not believe there had been any contact with the uncle or that any abuse occurred, the determination contradicted the child's own statements to the officer that his uncle touched his pee pee.37 The child's step-sister testified that the child told her that his uncle had put his hands down his pants and touched his pee pee.38 The Kansas department equivalent to Oklahoma's Department of Human Resources found the child's claims to be substantiated39 and the child's counselor threatened to file a deprived action against the mother if she did not protect the child from the alleged abuse which could have resulted in the child being removed from her home and her parental rights being terminated. She could have suffered the same fate under Oklahoma law. In our state, a finding that a parent has sexually abused a child supports a termination of parental rights,40 as well as the failure of a parent to protect a child from physical or sexual abuse.41 B. ¶21 TITLE ¶22 In determining whether a statute applies to a given set of facts, we focus on legislative intent42 which controls statutory interpretation. Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective43 considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.44 When a special statute clearly includes the matter in controversy, the special statute controls over a statute of general applicability.45 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.46 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end47 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them.48 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.49 ¶23 The award of court costs, attorney fees and other reasonable costs and expenses incurred in an action involving failure to allow court-ordered visitation is specifically addressed in 43 O.S. Supp. 2003 §112(D)(2). The statute provides: "For any action brought pursuant to the provision of this section which the court determines to be contrary to the best interests of the child, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover court costs, attorney fees and any other reasonable costs and expenses incurred with the action." [Emphasis supplied.] In clear, explicit, mandatory50 and unmistakable terms, the Legislature states that in any action brought pursuant to the statute which is contrary to the best interests of the child, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover court costs, attorney fees and other reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the cause. ¶24 The father presented no evidence that the mother was unfit as a custodial parent or that the interrupted visitation had damaged his relationship with his son. Although he denied that he had allowed the child to see the uncle, the father did not call the uncle to testify as to whether he had been in the child's presence in violation of the divorce decree or any other witness on this issue. The father chose to rely on the officer's determination that the child had not seen the uncle or been abused. This finding is unconvincing when the child's statements before the officer and the conclusions drawn by all of the other professionals involved are considered. Furthermore, he neither took his son to a counselor nor called an expert to testify on his behalf. ¶25 The mother presented evidence that it would be against the child's best interests to be placed in his father's custody. She called four witnesses who all testified that the child reported the abuse with two of those witnesses believing that the abuse had occurred in recent visitation settings. ¶26 The father filed the action, the mother presented evidence of good cause for denying the visitation and presented sufficient evidence to rebut any argument that a change of custody was in the child's best interest. She is a prevailing party51 entitled to recover attorney fees and costs under the clear, explicit, mandatory and unmistakable terms of 43 O.S. Supp. 2003 §112(D)(2).52 C. ¶27 TITLE 43 O.S. SUPP. 2003 §112(D)(2) AUTHORIZES THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO THE PREVAILING PARTY. WHERE THERE IS AUTHORITY FOR SUCH AN AWARD IN THE TRIAL COURT, SIMILAR FEES ARE ALLOWABLE ON APPEAL. THEREFORE, THE MOTHER IS ENTITLED TO APPEAL- RELATED ATTORNEY FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY. ¶28 The original right to appeal-related attorney fees is established in the appellate court.53 These fees are recoverable if statutory authority exists for their award in the trial court.54 Title 43 O.S. Supp. 2003 §112(D)(2)55 unambiguously provides that the prevailing party shall be allowed attorney fees. The mother successfully defended the modification. She is the prevailing party entitled to recover for legal services rendered on appeal. II. ¶29 THE BALANCING OF JUDICIAL EQUITIES SUPPORTS AN AWARD OF APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY FEES TO THE MOTHER. ¶30 In Oklahoma, neither the nonprevailing party in a matrimonial case nor the principal spousal provider is under a duty to pay counsel fees. Rather, counsel-fee allowances are granted only to the litigant who qualifies for the benefit through the process of a judicial balancing of the equities.56 This Court determines the right for appellate attorney fees in matrimonial litigation.57 ¶32 The hours billed and set forth in the application for appellate attorney fees appear reasonable. CONCLUSION ¶33 There is no question that the divorce proceeding and the modification action have been contentious and time consuming for both the parties and the trial court. Neither the mother nor the father are completely without fault in the way matters have been handled. The litigation has been troublesome and extensive. Certainly, the trial court and the attorneys feel as though they have exercised "the patience of Job". ¶34 The clear and convincing evidence of the real possibility that her son had been sexually abused, when in the father's custody, was good cause for the mother to withhold visitation coupled with the counselor's threat to report her to Kansas child welfare officials. Title CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION LEFT UNDISTURBED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED. WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER,V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COLBERT, J.J. concur. OPALA, J. dissents. FOOT