Title: Green v. DFS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 590, 2003, 594, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 2004

The names of the parties are pseudonyms assigned pursuant to Supr.Ct. R. 7(d).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
OLIN GREEN, ALFRED GELMAN, 
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and SHARON TAYLOR,
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No. 590/594, 2003
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(Consolidated)
Respondents Below,
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Appellants,
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v.
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Court Below: Family Court
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of the State of Delaware
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES,
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in and for Kent County
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File No.: 02-09-1TK
Petitioner Below,
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Appellee,
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and
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COURT-APPOINTED SPECIAL
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ADVOCATE,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: October 6, 2004
Decided: December 14, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  AFFIRMED.
Glynis Gibson, Esquire (argued), of Gibson & Nowak, LLP, Dover, Delaware for
Appellants Olin Green and Alfred Gelman.
Gregory Morris, Esquire (argued), of Liguori, Morris & Yiengst, Dover, Delaware,
for Appellant Sharon Taylor.
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James S. Reichert, Esquire (argued), of the Department of Justice, Georgetown,
Delaware, for Appellee Division of Family Services.
Mitchell W. May, Esquire, of Street & Ellis, P.A., of Street & Ellis, P.A., Dover,
Delaware, for Court-Appointed Special Advocate.
BERGER, Justice:
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In this appeal, we consider whether the Family Court erred in terminating the
parental rights of a mother and two fathers based on their failure to plan for their four
children.   Because the record amply supports the Family Court’s findings, we affirm.
We take this occasion, however, to address the question of whether the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) applies to a non-resident parent
seeking custody, since both fathers are Virginia residents whose ICPC home study
evaluations were denied.  We hold that the ICPC does apply to non-custodial natural
parents in some circumstances, and that the placement requirements of the ICPC do
not violate the parents’ due process rights.  
Factual and Procedural Background
Sharon Taylor had four children:  Javone, Jamare, Hykeem, and Breshawn. 
Olin Green was the father of Jamare and Javone.  Alfred Gelman was the father of
Hykeem.  All of the parents are from Virginia, which is where they were living in
1998, when the Northampton County Department of Social Services received its first
complaint about one of Taylor’s children.  Javonne, who was then five years old,
reportedly smelled bad and was filthy.  The Department developed a service plan for
Taylor that involved maintaining proper hygiene.  Over the next three years, the
Department provided services to Taylor in an effort to address the continuing hygiene
problems as well as other problems, like Javonne’s sporadic attendance at school, and
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the family’s lack of adequate housing.  In 2001, when the Department was about to
seek custody of her children, Taylor moved to Delaware.
In February 2001, Delaware’s Division of Family Services (DFS) began
working with Taylor to provide the children with adequate housing, health care, food
and other basics.  Over the next few months, DFS entered into several case plans with
Taylor, and provided, among other things,  financial assistance and a Parent Aide.
But Jamar and Javonne missed many days of school, and their living conditions did
not improve.  On June 28, 2001, when a caseworker came to visit,  she found no food
for the children.  She told Taylor, who claimed to be employed and to have a
paycheck waiting for her, to buy food for the children by the following day.  When
the caseworker returned the following day, there still was  no food for the children.
DFS immediately sought, and was granted, emergency custody.
In July 2001, DFS entered into another case plan with Taylor, under which
Taylor was to improve her parenting skills, find steady work, and find appropriate
housing.  Despite assistance from DFS, Taylor failed to make progress.  DFS entered
into new case plans in September and again in December 2001, but Taylor showed
no improvement.  In May 2002, Taylor returned to Virginia and asked to have her
children placed with her there.  The Northampton Department did not approve the
placement, however.  In September 2002, Taylor moved back to Delaware, but by that
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time DFS had changed its goal from reunification to termination.  The Family Court
heard the petition for termination, as to Taylor and the fathers,  in October 2003.
Green and Gelman traveled from Virginia to attend the Probable Cause Hearing
in July 2001.  Both expressed interest in obtaining custody of their children.  Green
returned twice in August 2001, and once in January 2002, to visit his children and
discuss their placement.  DFS requested that Virginia conduct a home study, but
neither Green nor his family cooperated with the Virginia officials and the home
study was never completed.  After January 2002, Green did not visit his children
again because his car was not running well and he had trouble arranging
transportation.
Gelman extended himself more than Green.  Virginia’s social services
caseworkers completed a home study for Gelman, but did not approve placement
because of his criminal record.  After learning of the denial, Gelman moved to
Delaware in an effort to obtain custody of his son.  In February 2002, Gelman entered
into a case plan under which he was to participate in counseling with Hykeem,
complete a parenting course, visit regularly, maintain regular employment, and find
appropriate housing.  During the next four months Gelman met all of the requirements
of the case plan except one.  According to Gelman, he was unable to find housing
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because the landlords would not rent to him until he had been in Delaware and
working for six months.
Gelman had been living with his sister in Delaware.  In June 2002, however,
his sister accused Gelman of stealing some jewelry that she thought was missing.
Gelman was so upset that he moved out immediately.  In July 2002, he advised DFS
that he had moved back to Virginia, and for almost eight months thereafter Gelman
had no contact with DFS or his son.  It appears Gelman’s sudden departure devastated
Hykeem, who became physically aggressive with children and adults.  Hykeem has
been through six foster homes and is being treated for several mental health problems
including adjustment disorder and oppositional-defiant disorder. Gelman and his
sister resolved their differences soon after he returned to Virginia, but Gelman
decided not to come back to Delaware because he wanted to stay in his own home and
he did not want to have to start over in terms of establishing his employment record.
After a three-day hearing, the Family Court terminated all the parties’ parental
rights for failure to plan.  The trial court noted that the older children suffer from
behavioral and medical problems that require consistent treatment,  counseling, and,
for one child, regular medication.  The youngest child has been living with a foster
family for most of his life and is thriving in that environment.  Based on its evaluation
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of the childrens’ needs and placement, the trial court concluded that termination
would be in their best interests.
Discussion
Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied that there is clear and
convincing evidence supporting the Family Court’s decision to terminate Taylor’s
parental rights.  As the Family Court noted:
DFS has worked extensively with Mother providing her with necessities
as well as resources to turn her life around.  While the Court is
sympathetic to the uphill battle Mother has in overcoming poverty, the
Court does not believe that poverty is the factor keeping Mother from
being reunified with her children.... At this point Mother has not yet
demonstrated even basic parenting skills.  Mother has failed to complete
the goals of the case plans.... Mother has four children who all have
severe emotional and medical needs.  Mother continually has failed to
take these conditions seriously by not making doctors appointments,
missing appointments that are scheduled, failing to get proper
vaccinations, and failing to get the proper medications.... There is a
history of lack of care and failure to terminate the relationship of parent
and child will result in continued emotional instability and physical risk
to the children.
The Family Court also carefully considered the best interests of the children and its
conclusion is amply supported by the record.  
 We are not unmindful of Taylor’s contention that her past parenting problems
were caused by poverty, and that she is now financially secure.  The record does not
support her claim.  First, financial assistance was available to Taylor from the time
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DFS became involved, but she failed to use the assistance she was given to provide
for her children’s welfare.  Second, Taylor’s contention that she is now financially
secure is based on her engagement to a man who allegedly has his own home and the
resources to care for her children.  Taylor’s fiancé did not appear at the hearing,
however, and there was no independent verification of his financial situation or his
willingness to take responsibility for four children with medical and emotional
problems.  Accordingly, we find no error in the Family Court’s decision terminating
Taylor’s parental rights in all of her children.
The record also establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Green and
Gelman failed to plan for their children and that it is in the children’s best interests
to terminate their parental rights.  Green made almost no effort to establish or
maintain a relationship with Jamare and Javone.  He visited them only three times
between  July 2001 and January 2002.  Since then, he has had no contact with the
boys.  He did not cooperate with the Virginia caseworkers, and, as a result, they were
unable to conduct a home study.  In sum, Green has not been a father to his children.
He has not given them any financial or emotional support; he has not attended to their
needs; and he has not presented evidence of his willingness or ability to do so in the
future.
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Gelman made what appears to be a sincere effort to demonstrate his ability to
care for Hykeem, for about four months.  He moved to Delaware, cooperated with
DFS, and, most importantly, developed a bond with his child.  Unfortunately,
Gelman was unable or unwilling to maintain that commitment.  He returned to
Virginia precipitously, and left Hykeem in emotional turmoil. Gelman admitted that,
shortly after the argument that precipitated his departure, he could have returned to
his sister’s home in Delaware and resumed his involvement in Hykeem’s life.  But
Gelman preferred to stay in Virginia, and he has had little or no contact with Hykeem
since June 2002.  Thus, the record establishes Gelman’s failure to plan for Hykeem.
In addition, given Hykeem’s emotional and mental problems, the Family Court
properly determined that it would be in the child’s best interests to terminate
Gelman’s parental rights.
Green and Gelman do not seriously dispute the Family Court’s findings or
conclusions as to their failure to plan for their children.  They both argue, instead, that
they were irreparably prejudiced by the fact that they reside in Virginia.  Since both
Delaware and Virginia have adopted the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children (ICPC), DFS requested the appropriate Virginia authorities to conduct a
home study for each father and to notify DFS whether placement with the fathers
would be approved.  Green’s home study was denied because he and his sister (who
31 Del. C. §381.
2
Green, apparently, did not do anything to obtain custody of his sons – either by moving to
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Delaware or by requesting, and this time attending,  a third home study visit in Virginia.
934 F.2d 474 (3  Cir. 1991).
4
rd
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lived in the same house) failed to meet with the caseworkers as scheduled.  Gelman’s
home study was denied because Gelman lied to the caseworker about his criminal
record and because the caseworker was concerned that Gelman would continue his
criminal behavior.
Pursuant to Article III(d) of the ICPC,  a child may not be sent into another
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state for “placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption” unless
the “receiving state shall notify the sending agency in writing to the effect that the
proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child.” Thus,
when the ICPC home studies were denied, DFS advised Gelman to move to Delaware
and demonstrate that he could provide for his son.   Gelman did so for a few months,
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but abruptly left Delaware and never returned.
Gelman and Green  contend that the ICPC should not apply to them because
they are not seeking placement as foster parents or adoptive parents.  They argue that,
as the  children’s natural parents, they do not have to be “approved” before being
granted custody.  McComb v. Wambaugh,  the leading authority supporting their
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view, holds that the ICPC does not apply to natural parents.  Other, more recent
See, e.g.: Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513 (Ariz. Ct.
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App. 2001); Dept. of Children and Families v. Benway, 745 So.2d 437 (Fla.App. 1999); Adoption
of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
31 Del. C. §381, Article I.
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decisions, however, hold that the ICPC does apply to non-custodial parents.5
Applying a liberal construction to the terms of the ICPC, we are satisfied that it
governs the children’s placement with Gelman and Green.
The ICPC, which has been enacted by all states, is designed to facilitate
cooperation in the interstate placement of children so that:
(a)  Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum
opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or
institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a
necessary and desirable degree and type of care.
(b)  The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be
placed may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the
proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable
requirements for the protection of the child.
(c) The proper authorities of the state from which the placement
is made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which
to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.
(d) Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of the
children will be promoted.6
In McComb v. Wambaugh, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether the ICPC applies to natural parents.  The guardian for a child, who was
abused after being returned to his mother’s care, argued that the ICPC applies to
parents by virtue of a regulation that defines “placement” to include a situation where
 AAICPC Reg. No. 3,¶ 1.
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31 Del. C. §381, Article III.
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McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 481 (Citation omitted.).
9
 31 Del. C. §381, Article X.
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a court arranges for a child to be sent to a parent in another state .  The McComb
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court, applying Pennsylvania state law, held that the regulation was invalid, as the
ICPC expressly governs only “placement in foster care or as a preliminary to possible
adoption.”   The court construed the ICPC narrowly, noting that: (i) Article VIII
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excludes from coverage children sent to another state by a parent or other close
relative to be cared for by such a relative; and (ii) close relatives were exempted “in
order to protect the social and legal rights of the family and because ... regulation is
desirable only in the absence of adequate family control or in order to forestall
conditions which might produce an absence of such control.”9
We decline to follow McComb because the ICPC directs that the Compact be
liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.    Since its purpose is to protect children
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who are subject to placement in another state, the ICPC should be read to encompass
placement of a dependent child with a non-custodial parent.  As one court succinctly
stated:
Once a court has legal custody of a child, it would be negligent to
relinquish that child to an out-of-state parent without some indication
Dept. of Children and Families v. Benway, 745 So.2d at 439.
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that the parent is able to care for the child appropriately.  The ICPC
provides an effective mechanism for gleaning that evidence and for
maintaining a watchful eye over the placement.11
Moreover, the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (AAICPC), pursuant to authority granted in Article VII of the
ICPC, adopted regulations that clearly include non-custodial parents.  The  regulations
recognize both the need to protect dependent children and the natural parents’ unique
interest.  Thus, for example, Regulation 3,¶ 1 defines “placement” to include “the
arrangement for the care of a child in the home of his parent ... in a receiving state
when the sending agency is an entity other than a parent, relative, guardian ....”
Similarly, Regulation 3, ¶ 5 defines “foster care” to include “24-hour a day care ...
provided by the child’s parent(s) by reason of a court-ordered placement (and not by
virtue of the parent-child relationship)....” But,  under Regulation 3, ¶ 6, the ICPC’s
application to a natural parent remains limited:
6. (a) Pursuant to Article VIII(a), this Compact does not apply to
the sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by the child’s
parent, ... and leaving the child with any such relative ... in the receiving
state, provided that such person who brings, sends, or causes a child to
be sent or brought to a receiving state is a person whose full legal right
to plan for the child: (1) has been established by law at a time prior to
initiation of the placement arrangement, and (2) has not been voluntarily
terminated, or diminished or severed by the action or order of any court.
 If a non-custodial parent questions the applicability of the ICPC, the Family Court should
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decide that issue at the outset in order to avoid the delay of obtaining a home study from the
receiving state.  Where such a home study is necessary, we note that Regulation 7 provides for court-
ordered priority placement if the receiving state has not acted within 30 business days.  Both of these
provisions provide important protections for the rights of natural parents and should be carefully
considered by the Family Court in each context.
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   (b) The Compact does not apply whenever a court transfers the
child to a non-custodial parent with respect to whom the court does not
have evidence before it that such parent is unfit, does not seek such
evidence, and does not retain jurisdiction over the child after the court
transfers the child.
These regulations recognize that a non-custodial parent, like Green or Gelman,
may have had no involvement in the child’s care prior to the time that the child is
removed from the care of the other parent.  In those circumstances, there may be a
question as to the non-custodial parent’s fitness to take over full responsibility for the
child.  In addition, public agencies in the receiving state may need to provide
continuing assistance to, and supervision of, the child after placement.  Thus, many
of the same concerns that must be addressed before out-of-state placement with a
“substitute” or foster parent, are also present with a non-custodial natural parent. By
contrast, where the fitness of a non-custodial parent is not in doubt, and no continuing
supervision will be necessary, the regulations authorize a  court to hold the ICPC
inapplicable to that parent.  
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Based on the foregoing, we are satisfied that the regulations further the
purposes of the ICPC, and that it does apply to Green and Gelman.  The remaining
See: Va. Code. Ann. 16.1-227.
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issue is whether the ICPC deprives them of their due process rights.  They contend,
without any supporting authority, that they had no ability to appeal the denial of their
ICPC home studies.  In fact, they could have appealed those decisions in their home
state of Virginia.   Thus, we find no merit to their due process claims.
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Conclusion
The judgments of the Family Court are hereby affirmed.