Title: Turner v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Citation: 213 N.W.2d 414
Docket Number: 43750
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 1973

213 N.W.2d 414 (1973) Fayetta V. TURNER, Respondent, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, et al., Relators. No. 43750. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 14, 1973. *415 Mordaunt Walstad Cousineau &amp; McGuire and Robert J. McGuire, Minneapolis, for relators. Feinberg Mirviss Meyers Schumacher &amp; Malmon and James J. Schumacher, Minneapolis, for respondent. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and OTIS, TODD, and MacLAUGHLIN, JJ., and considered en banc. PER CURIAM. This matter is before the court to review an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission vacating an award made August 2, 1968, arising out of an injury sustained by respondent, Fayetta Turner, on September 25, 1964. The issue of whether the employee has made a prima facie showing that she had suffered "substantial additional disability" is close, and this court is divided on the question. However, a majority is of the opinion that respondent has sustained her burden and we therefore affirm. The injury out of which this litigation arose occurred in 1964 when respondent was pushing a rack, loaded with trays of checks, which went out of control as she rounded a corner in the bank where she was employed. In reaching out to swing the rack around, she experienced pain in her low back, her right leg, the back of her neck, and top of her head. However, she completed her day's work and, although she talked to a doctor the next day, she did not see him until 3 days thereafter. Thereupon, she was absent from work for 3 weeks, worked for 3 or 4 days, and took a 2-week vacation. Upon returning, she continued her employment until December 6, 1964, when she was hospitalized until April 10, 1965. Dr. Leonard Titrud performed a left lumbosacral hemilaminectomy to remove an intervertebral disc protrusion on December 9, 1964. The employee's medical history dates back to 1952 when a tumor on the peroneal nerve of her left leg was removed, resulting in some weakness to her foot and leg. In 1953, she was hospitalized for a nervous condition, and again in 1955 for depression and symptoms of schizophrenia. She was treated in 1959 at Minneapolis General Hospital for back trouble. In her petition for disability benefits, the employee alleged she had a "permanent total" disability for which she sought compensation. The referee on December 20, 1965, found that the employee had been temporarily totally disabled since September 28, 1964, except for a period of 3 weeks. On appeal to the commission, the matter was remanded to obtain the testimony of Dr. Titrud. Following that hearing, the referee found the employee was temporarily totally disabled up to June 6, 1967 (the date of the hearing), would require further medical care, and had sustained a 20-percent permanent partial loss of the use of her back. The matter was again appealed to the commission which, on August *416 2, 1968, unanimously held that the employee's personal injury resulted in temporary total disability only up to June 14, 1965, and that she would not require further medical care as a result of that injury. In an accompanying opinion, the commission supported its decision by reference to Dr. Titrud's report of June 14, 1965, in which he stated: The commission went on to hold: No appeal was taken by the employee from that adjudication. Thereafter, employee in December 1968 petitioned the commission to vacate its decision of August 2, 1968. Again, she alleged permanent and total disability, alleging that that claim had not been previously adjudicated. On April 23, 1969, that petition was denied by a unanimous commission, and no appeal was taken from that decision. The commission accompanied its decision with the following memorandum: On June 22, 1971, the employee again petitioned the commission to vacate its award of August 2, 1968. Again, she alleges that she is permanently and totally disabled and now suffers a 35-percent permanent partial disability to her back. The commission granted her petition on March 9, 1972, "in the interests of justice from the new documentary evidence submitted." It is that order which is here for review. Although it gave no other reasons for vacating the award, at the request of the relators it thereafter filed a new order as follows: In the supporting medical reports, a psychiatrist states that she has a "hysteroid personality" and will not submit to psychiatric treatment which she needs. The psychiatrist concluded: "I do not see her as being gainfully employable due to the physical pain and discomfort she suffers." In one of his reports, Dr. Titrud stated in summary that the employee has been unable to return to gainful employment and needs "hospitalization for the purpose of rehabilitation care and during that time, should be investigated from a psychiatric angle and proper treatment carried out as indicated." In a subsequent report, he gave an opinion that the employee now suffered "a 35% partial permanent disability in the lumbo-sacral back region because of her intervertebral disc progressive problem." He concluded that he believed she is totally disabled from engaging in work, "particularly in types of work which would require very much standing, bending, back twisting, or any lifting activity." The statute which then governed the right to set aside compensation awards, Minn.St.1971, § 176.461, provides: *418 We have construed and applied this and prior statutes in a number of cases. Elsenpeter v. Potvin, 213 Minn. 129, 5 N.W.2d 499 (1942); Bomersine v. Armour &amp; Co., 225 Minn. 157, 30 N.W.2d 526 (1947); Dudansky v. L. H. Sault Const. Co., 244 Minn. 369, 70 N.W.2d 114 (1955); Jacobson v. Uptown Transfer &amp; Storage Co., 268 Minn. 336, 129 N.W.2d 41 (1964); Jones v. Flour City Ornamental Iron Works, 271 Minn. 42, 134 N.W.2d 586 (1965); Mattson v. Abate, 279 Minn. 287, 156 N.W.2d 738 (1968); Radzak v. Mercy Hospital, 291 Minn. 189, 190 N.W.2d 86 (1971); and Walker v. Midwest Foods, 293 Minn. 460, 197 N.W.2d 430 (1972). In Elsenpeter, we held that the word "cause," as used in the statute, means good cause such as fraud or surprise and that it was not the purpose of the statute "to permit repeated litigation of such issues as are susceptible of best and final decision in the initial hearing." 213 Minn. 132, 5 N.W.2d 501. The commission should be particularly reluctant to grant a rehearing or set aside an award on the basis of newly discovered evidence which was in existence at the time the order was entered. Bomersine v. Armour &amp; Co. supra. Only where there is substantial additional disability which has occurred since the award was made is the commission justified in setting it aside. See, Dudansky v. L. H. Sault Const. Co., supra. In Jacobson, we stressed the fact the statute does not "permit repeated litigation of fact issues once determined on competent evidence." There, we went on to say (268 Minn. 343, 129 N.W.2d 45): As we have often stated, in light of the humanitarian and remedial purposes of the law, the commission has broad discretion to set aside awards where justice requires it. While compensation decisions do not enjoy the same finality as ordinary judgments, the parties are entitled to have their litigation laid to rest with some assurance of finality if there has been an opportunity to fully explore the issues and no substantial change has occurred since the time of the award. It is the opinion of a majority of the court that in the instant case the commission was justified in setting aside its prior decision rendered on August 2, 1968. Dr. Titrud on June 11, 1971, expressed the opinion that respondent "is a very likely candidate for lumbosacral laminectomy. She has had other complaints, such as neck pain and stiffness, also, but this does not seem to be so especially prominent difficulty as the persisting low back trouble." The question of permanent total disability may not have been thoroughly litigated in the first two hearings. We do not now, of course, pass on the issue of whether respondent is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability. The only question before us is whether the commission abused its discretion in granting her another hearing. We hold that it did not. Respondent is allowed $350 attorneys' fees. Affirmed. [1] This statute was amended by L.1973, c. 388, § 120, but not in any areas pertinent to the issues in this case.