Title: Aurora Medical Group v. Department of Workforce Development
Citation: 2000 WI 70
Docket Number: 1998AP001546
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2000

2000 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1546 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Aurora Medical Group,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Department of Workforce Development,  
Equal Rights Division and Kristine E. Meyers,  
 
Respondents-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 399, 602 N.W.2d 111 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 27, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 3, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by Mary Pat Ninneman, Carmella A. Huser and Quarles & 
Brady, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Carmella A. Huser. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Department of 
Workforce Development, Equal Rights Division, the cause was 
argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Kristine E. 
Meyers, there was a brief by Jeffrey P. Sweetland and Shneidman, 
Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Jeffrey P. Sweetland. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott C. 
Beightol, Amy Schmidt Jones and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Marianne 
Goldstein Robbins and Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & 
Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin State 
AFL-CIO. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Henry L. 
Solano, Nathaniel I. Spiller, Jeffrey S. Goldberg and Ellen L. 
Beard, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the U.S. Department of 
Labor, and oral argument by Ellen L. Beard. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Louise G. 
Trubek, Madison, and Judith L. Lichtman, Washington, D.C., on 
behalf of the National Partnership for Women and Families; Center 
for Public Representation, Inc.; 9to5, National Association of 
Working Women; Milwaukee 9to5; and 9to5 Poverty Network 
Initiative. 
 
 
2000 WI 70 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1546 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Aurora Medical Group,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Department of Workforce Development,  
Equal Rights Division and Kristine E.  
Meyers,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Aurora Medical Group (Aurora) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 
that affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Victor Manian, Judge.  The court of appeals held that 
§ 514(a) of the federal Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)2 does not pre-empt Kristine E. Meyers' (Meyers) claim 
                     
1 Aurora Medical Group v. Department of Workforce Dev., 230 
Wis. 2d 399, 602 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1999).  
2 Section 514(a)of ERISA provides in relevant part: 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
2 
under the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (Wisconsin 
FMLA).3  We agree that Meyers' state law claim is not pre-empted 
by federal law, and therefore affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
I. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.4 Aurora has 
employed Meyers as a part-time registered nurse since July 20, 
1995.  During the relevant time period, Aurora employed 50 or 
more employees and Meyers worked more than 1000 hours.5 On 
                                                                  
(a) "[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter 
III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1999). (All future 
references are to the 1999 Code unless otherwise indicated.) 
3  The Wisconsin FMLA is at Wis. Stat. § 103.10 (1997-1998). 
(All future references are to the 1997-1998 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated.) Section 103.10 provides in relevant part: 
(3) FAMILY LEAVE. (a)1. In a 12-month period no employe may 
take more than 6 weeks of family leave under par. (b) 1. and 2. 
 . . . (b) An employe may take family leave for any of the 
following reasons: 
 . . . 2. The placement of a child with the employe for 
adoption . . . . 
 . . . (5) PAYMENT FOR AND RESTRICTIONS UPON LEAVE. (a) 
This section does not entitle an employe to receive wages or 
salary while taking family leave or medical leave. 
(b) An employe may substitute, for portions of family leave 
or medical leave, paid or unpaid leave of any other type 
provided by the employer. 
4 Meyers and Aurora stipulated to the pertinent underlying 
facts before the administrative law judge in lieu of a hearing.  
5 Wis. Stat. § 103.10(1)(c), (2)(c).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
3 
January 30, 1997, Meyers requested family leave to adopt a 
child, covering January 24 to March 10, 1997.  Meyers also 
requested to substitute paid sick time, as well as vacation and 
holiday/personal time, for the unpaid family leave.  
¶3 
On February 4, 1997, Aurora granted Meyers' leave 
request.  However, Aurora informed Meyers that she could not 
substitute her paid sick time for the unpaid family leave 
because she was not ill.  Aurora pays sick time from a separate 
fund, a Sick Pay Plan, and, according to the terms of Aurora's 
plan, sick time is not paid unless the employee is ill.  
Aurora's plan is a welfare benefit plan under ERISA.6 
¶4 
Meyers substituted paid vacation and holiday/personal 
time for her unpaid leave.  Had Aurora allowed her to substitute 
paid sick leave, Meyers would have had 29.3 hours of unused 
vacation time when she returned to work on March 10, 1997. 
¶5 
On February 20, 1997, Meyers filed a complaint with 
the Department of Workforce Development (DWD), Equal Rights 
Division (ERD).  Meyers' complaint alleged that Aurora violated 
her rights under the Wisconsin FMLA, Wis. Stat. § 103.10(5)(b). 
 To prove a violation of § 103.10(5)(b), Meyers had to establish 
that (1) at the time she requested leave, she was covered by the 
                     
6 Our review is limited to the record in this case, which 
includes the stipulation that Aurora's Sick Pay Plan is a 
welfare benefit plan within ERISA's definitions. Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57 (1997-98). We render no opinion whether Aurora's plan 
is actually an ERISA plan. Instead we address the important 
issue of whether ERISA pre-empts employee substitution rights 
under the Wisconsin FMLA.   
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
4 
Wisconsin FMLA; (2) she asked to substitute other leave for 
family 
leave; 
(3) 
Aurora 
provided 
leave 
that 
could 
be 
substituted;7 (4) she had accrued the leave to be substituted; 
and (5) Aurora denied the substitution request.   Miller Brewing 
Co. v. DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 26, 31, 563 N.W.2d 460 (1997) (citing 
Leher v. Consolidated Papers, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 
(W.D. Wis. 1992)).  
¶6 
After the ERD concluded that there was probable cause 
to believe that Aurora violated the Wisconsin FMLA, Meyers and 
Aurora stipulated, in effect, to facts establishing the above 
five elements.  In lieu of a hearing and based upon the 
stipulation of facts, the administrative law judge (ALJ) 
concluded 
that 
ERISA 
did 
not 
pre-empt 
Wisconsin 
FMLA's 
substitution right, as Aurora contended, and that Aurora had 
thus interfered with, restrained, or denied Meyers' right of 
substitution under the Wisconsin FMLA.  The ALJ relied upon the 
language of § 401(b) of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act 
(federal FMLA) that "[n]othing in this Act or any amendment made 
by this Act shall be construed to supersede any provision of any 
State or local law that provides greater family or medical leave 
rights than the rights established under this Act or any 
amendment made by this Act."  29 U.S.C. § 2651(b).   According 
                     
7 "An employer must provide leave that is definite and 
quantifiable in order for such leave to be available for 
substitution under the [Wisconsin] FMLA." Miller Brewing Co. v. 
DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 26, 31 n.6, 563 N.W.2d 460 (1997) (citing 
Richland Sch. Dist. v. DILHR, 174 Wis. 2d 878, 895-96, 498 
N.W.2d 826 (1993)).    
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
5 
to the ALJ,  § 514(d) of ERISA8 dictates that ERISA is 
subordinate to § 401(b) of the federal FMLA.  Consequently, 
because § 401(b) of the federal FMLA allows the Wisconsin FMLA's 
substitution provision to apply to sick pay plans covered by 
ERISA, ERISA did not pre-empt the Wisconsin FMLA's leave 
substitution.  The ALJ also found that the federal FMLA was 
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant reviewing the legislative 
history that supported the determination of no pre-emption.   
¶7 
The ALJ ordered Aurora to credit Meyers 29.3 hours in 
the vacation time she used instead of her paid sick time and to 
reduce Meyers' sick leave by the time she would have used to 
substitute for the unpaid family leave.  The ALJ also ordered 
Aurora to pay Meyers the amount she would have received in 
compensation had she been permitted to substitute her paid sick 
leave, plus interest, and attorney's fees and costs. 
¶8 
Aurora petitioned the circuit court for judicial 
review of the ALJ's decision pursuant Wis. Stat. § 227.53.  The 
circuit court, on de novo review, relied upon the language of 
the federal FMLA and ERISA, as well as the federal FMLA's 
legislative history to affirm the ALJ's decision.  
¶9 
Aurora then appealed to the court of appeals, which 
affirmed the decision below, holding that Aurora "failed to meet 
its 'burden of establishing pre-emption.'" Aurora Medical Group 
                     
8 Section 514(d) of ERISA provides in relevant part: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, 
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the 
United States. . . . 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
6 
v. Department of Workforce Dev., 230 Wis. 2d 399, 405, 602 
N.W.2d 111 (quoting Miller Brewing Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 35).  The 
court of appeals relied upon the federal FMLA's legislative 
history as an indication that the federal FMLA was intended to 
insulate provisions of state medical and family leave statutes. 
 Aurora, 230 Wis. 2d at 406-410. 
¶10 We granted Aurora's petition for review of the court 
of appeals decision. 
II. 
¶11 Whether § 514(a) of ERISA pre-empts the Wisconsin FMLA 
is a question of law.  Miller Brewing Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 33 
(citing International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 
IAM Local 437 v. U.S. Can, 150 Wis. 2d 479, 487, 441 N.W.2d 710 
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990)).  The Court is not 
bound by an administrative agency's interpretation of the law, 
but may defer to it if the agency has experience, technical 
expertise and specialized knowledge that would aid in the 
interpretation.  Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290-91, 485 
N.W.2d 256 (1992).  However, if there is no evidence that the 
agency brings to the interpretation any special expertise or 
experience, and the question of law is one of first impression, 
the court will review the agency's interpretation of the law de 
novo.  Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 209 Wis. 2d 655, 664, 
562 N.W.2d 917 (1997).  
¶12 This is a case of first impression, apparent from the 
fact that the ALJ did not rely on published precedent or 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
7 
promulgated rules.9  Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 
234, 245-46, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  In addition, there is no 
evidence here that the DWD brings any special expertise in 
determining the scope of federal pre-emption.  Miller Brewing 
Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 34.  Accordingly, while we benefit from the 
DWD's decision and the de novo reviews thereof by the circuit 
court and court of appeals, we, too, review the DWD's decision 
de novo.  Id. at 33-34; Aurora Medical Group, 230 Wis. 2d at 
403.   
III. 
A. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION 
¶13 According 
to 
the 
Supremacy 
Clause 
of 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution, federal law "shall be the supreme law of the 
land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law may pre-empt 
state law in one of three ways: (1) expressly, (2) by 
implication, or (3) by a direct conflict between federal and 
state law.  Miller Brewing Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 34; see also New 
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
                     
9 The ALJ indicated, however, that the reasoning in an 
unpublished decision from the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin, Bean v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 
No. 94-C-569, unpublished slip op. (E.D. Wis. July 17, 1995) was 
persuasive.  In Bean, the District Court held that the defendant 
had improperly removed plaintiff's complaint to federal court.  
Id. at 6.  That complaint alleged that the defendant had 
violated the Wisconsin FMLA by denying plaintiff's request to 
substitute paid sick leave for unpaid family leave.  Id. at 1. 
The court determined that, contrary to the defendant's argument, 
ERISA did not pre-empt the Wisconsin FMLA in light of the 
legislative history of the federal FMLA; and thus, ERISA did not 
provide a basis for removal.  Id. at 2-6. 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
8 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995).   Despite the 
Supremacy Clause and the varied types of pre-emption, the 
starting point for determining whether a state law is pre-empted 
is a presumption against pre-emption.  Miller Brewing Co., 210 
Wis. 2d at 35.  "[W]e have never assumed lightly that Congress 
has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed 
claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that 
Congress does not intend to supplant state law."  Travelers, 514 
U.S. at 654.  
¶14 Where federal law would bar a state action in an area 
which the state traditionally regulateswithin "the historic 
police powers"the presumption against pre-emption must be 
overcome by showing that it is "the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress" that federal law supersedes state law.  California 
Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 
655); Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 215-16, 
533 N.W.2d 746 (1995), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1067 (1996); 
Miller Brewing Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 35.10  The historic police 
powers of the State include labor standards, as well as matters 
of health and safety.  Miller Brewing Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 35-36; 
                     
10 In both California Div. Of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997), and 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), the Supreme Court 
used the words "assumption" and "presumption" interchangeably to 
describe the presumption against pre-emption.  See Dillingham, 
519 U.S. at 325; Miller Brewing Co. v. DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 26, 35 
n.9, 563 N.W.2d 460 (1997). 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
9 
see also De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 
U.S. 806, 814 (1997) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated 
Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)).  Such matters are 
clearly implicated by the provisions of the Wisconsin FMLA at 
issue here.  
¶15 The burden of establishing pre-emption rests with the 
party seeking the benefit of pre-emption.  Miller Brewing Co., 
210 Wis. 2d at 35; De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814.  That burden is a 
"considerable" one, which requires "overcoming 'the starting 
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state 
law.'"  De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. 
at 654).  Since pre-emption turns on congressional intent, we 
look first to the text of ERISA.  "[W]e begin as we do in any 
exercise of statutory construction with the text of the 
provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure 
and purpose of the Act in which it occurs."  Travelers, 514 U.S. 
at 655 (citations omitted); McDonough v. Department of Workforce 
Dev., 227 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999). 
 
B. 
SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES OF ERISA PRE-EMPTION 
¶16 The primary objective of ERISA is to protect employees 
from the mismanagement of funds set aside to finance employee 
benefits and pensions by establishing a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme that required employers to fulfill certain reporting, 
disclosure and fiduciary duties.  Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 
U.S. 107, 115 (1989).  ERISA is "expressly concerned [with] 
'reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility and the like.'" 
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
10
¶17 Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that it "shall 
supersede  . . .  all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to 
any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  Even though 
this language may appear at first glance to be clear and 
unambiguous, over the nearly 20 years the United States Supreme 
Court has looked at ERISA pre-emption, it concluded that the 
pre-emption provision is "not a model of legislative drafting." 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 
510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987)).  The term "relate to" is decidedly 
indeterminate; it does not limit ERISA pre-emption in any 
material 
way 
because "really, universally, 
relations 
stop 
nowhere."  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 (quoting H. James, 
Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's Classics 1980)).  
 
¶18 Early ERISA pre-emption cases interpreted the phrase 
"relate to" literally, pre-empting state laws that "had a clear 
'connection with or reference to'" employee benefit plans.  De 
Buono, 520 U.S. at 813 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).  Where state laws do not have an 
express reference to ERISA, the Court was left with attempting 
to determine the scope of the term "connection with."  
 
[T]his still leaves us to question whether the [state] 
laws have a "connection with" the ERISA plans, and 
here an uncritical literalism is no more help than in 
trying to construe "relate to." For the same reasons 
that infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-
emption, neither can infinite connections.  We simply 
must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating 
difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead 
to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
11
the scope of the state law that Congress understood 
would survive. 
 
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added). 
¶19 One objective of ERISA is evident from the same 
section that sets forth the scope of ERISA pre-emption, § 514, 
namely, that ERISA is not to be "construed to alter, amend, 
modify, invalidate, impair or supersede" any other federal law. 
 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).  Correspondingly, Congress did not intend 
that ERISA pre-empt state law that follows from federal law or 
that federal law encourages.  Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330; 
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665-67; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100-102.  Such 
pre-emption would, in effect, supersede federal law in violation 
of § 514(d) of ERISA.  Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100-102; see also 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 
n.21 (1985)(Congress did not intend ERISA to pre-empt state 
minimum mental health benefits law in part due to the federal 
McCarran-Ferguson Act that reserves insurance regulation to the 
States). 
IV. 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
12
¶20 In the present case, Aurora argues that no presumption 
against pre-emption exists here,11 and, if it did, it has 
overcome 
the 
presumption 
against 
pre-emption 
because 
the 
Wisconsin FMLA substitution provision "relates to" its sick 
leave plan.  Aurora relies upon Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 
specifically that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit 
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection 
with or reference to such a plan."  According to Aurora, the 
substitution provision requires employers to pay ERISA benefits 
they would not have otherwise paid; and thus, the provision 
makes reference to, as well as has a connection with, ERISA 
plans.  
¶21 We reject Aurora's arguments.  The presumption against 
pre-emption exists here.  There is no indication that Congress 
intended to abandon traditional pre-emption principles when it 
enacted ERISA.  "[W]e discern no solid basis for believing that 
Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to 
alter traditional pre-emption analysis."  John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. at 99.  It 
would be indeed "unsettling" if § 514(a) pre-empted state law in 
areas of traditional state regulation or laws that had only an 
                     
11 Aurora also argues that the presumption against pre-
emption was "moot" because the DWD determined in Thompson v. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc., ERD Case No. 9052160 (7/12/91), that 
an employee could not substitute accrued sick leave benefits 
provided under an ERISA plan for unpaid family leave under the 
Wisconsin FMLA.  However, this case was decided prior to the 
enactment of the federal FMLA which casts doubt on the extent of 
ERISA pre-emption in the area of family and medical leave.  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
13
indirect effect on ERISA plans.12  Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330-
31; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665.  These historic police powers 
are not to be superseded by federal law unless such is the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.  See Gorton, 194 Wis. 2d at 
216.  There is no dispute here that the Wisconsin FMLA's 
substitution provision is within the area of traditional state 
regulation.  
¶22 The Wisconsin FMLA's substitution provision has no 
reference to, nor clear connection with, ERISA plans.  It makes 
no express reference to employee benefit plans.  District of 
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 
(1992).  Employees can substitute accrued leave for unpaid 
family leave (Richland Sch. Dist. v. DILHR, 174 Wis. 2d 878, 498 
N.W.2d 826 (1993)), "whether or not its funding apparatus is of 
a kind as to bring it under ERISA."  Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 
328. 
 
The 
substitution 
provision 
"functions 
irrespective 
of . . . the 
existence 
of 
an 
ERISA 
plan." 
Id. 
(quoting 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)).  
                     
12 Aurora contends that ERISA pre-empts even those state 
laws not designed to affect ERISA plans or affects plans 
indirectly, relying upon Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 
(1987). This is incorrect, as evidenced by Dillingham and 
Travelers, both of which dealt with state laws not designed to 
affect ERISA plans but that nonetheless indirectly affected such 
plans.  Pilot Life is inapposite.  There was no dispute, as 
there is here, whether the common law contract and tort claims 
"relate to" an ERISA plan.  Id. at 48.  In addition, § 502(a) of 
ERISA provides a 
"comprehensive civil 
enforcement scheme" 
indicating that Congress intended to bar parallel state law 
claims.  Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. There is no similar 
evidence here that Congress intended to bar state family leave 
rights.  Rather, just the opposite is evident.  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
14
¶23 Nor is there any connection between the substitution 
provision and ERISA plans.  As the United States Supreme Court 
has indicated, almost anything could have a connection with 
anything else, rendering that test unhelpful.  Travelers, 514 
U.S. at 656.  We "look instead to the objectives of the ERISA 
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress 
understood would survive."  Id. 
 
¶24 Aurora argues that pre-emption is justified because 
the substitution provision hinders ERISA's objectives to (1) 
minimize 
interference with 
the administration 
of employee 
benefit plans, and (2) promote national uniformity of those 
plans.  The substitution provision does not sufficiently  
interfere with employee benefit plans to justify pre-emption.  
If the substitution provision interferes at all with Aurora's 
administration of an employee benefit plan, it is because Aurora 
set up its sick leave plan as an ERISA plan.  This is not unlike 
the situation in De Buono, 520 U.S. 806.  There, an ERISA fund 
was not protected by ERISA pre-emption from paying a state tax 
on hospitals because the fund chose to provide medical benefits 
by operating a hospital itself rather than purchasing those 
benefits from a hospital.  Id. at 816.  The United States 
Supreme Court concluded that, even though the tax imposed "some 
burdens on the administration of ERISA plans," id. at 815, this 
was not enough to warrant pre-emption.  
 
Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost 
of providing benefits to covered employees will have 
some effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
15
that simply cannot mean that every state law with such 
an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute. 
 
De Buono, 520 U.S. at 816 (footnote omitted).13 
¶25 The 
substitution 
provision's 
"indirect, 
economic 
effect[]" here is "a result no different from myriad state laws 
in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which 
Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate." 
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.  
Indeed, if ERISA were concerned with any state action 
 . . . that 
increased 
costs 
of 
providing 
certain 
benefits, and thereby potentially affected the choices 
made by ERISA plans, we could scarcely see the end of 
ERISA's pre-emptive reach, and the words "relate to" 
would limit nothing. 
 
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 329 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 660-
661).  
                     
13 Similarly, ERISA does not pre-empt state garnishment laws 
even though garnishment proceedings would impose administrative 
burdens and costs upon employee benefit plans.  Mackey v. Lanier 
Collection Agency and Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).  ERISA 
does not pre-empt state law that required hospitals to collect 
surcharges from HMO's (health maintenance organizations) and 
patients covered by commercial insurance even though the 
surcharges increased the costs of ERISA plans that used the 
commercial insurance or HMO's.  New York State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645 (1995). "If a law authorizing an indirect source of 
administrative cost is not pre-empted, it should follow that a 
law operating as an indirect source of merely economic influence 
on administrative decisions, as here, should not suffice to 
trigger pre-emption either."  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662.  Also, 
ERISA does not pre-empt a state's prevailing wage statute even 
though 
it 
imposed 
administrative 
costs 
and 
burdens 
on 
apprenticeship programs covered by ERISA.  Dillingham, 519 U.S. 
316. 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
16
¶26  Consideration of the national uniformity of employee 
benefit plans does not require pre-emption of the substitution 
provision, either.  Where a state law is within the area 
traditionally left to local regulation, and that state law 
promotes the purpose of other federal laws, there is no 
congressional intent of pre-emption.14  Travelers, 514 U.S. 645. 
 Travelers involved a state law that imposed surcharges that 
increased the cost of ERISA plans in New York.  514 U.S. at 649. 
 The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
law 
was 
pre-empted, 
concluding 
instead 
that 
there 
was 
congressional intent to encourage the kind of law that New York 
enacted.  Id. at 664-667.  The same Congress that passed ERISA 
passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Act of 1974 (NHPRDA)15 to encourage state efforts to address 
increased health care costs and the disparate health care 
coverage.  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665.  The state law in 
                     
14 Moreover, where state law promotes ERISA's primary 
purpose of protecting employees, ERISA does not pre-empt that 
law even though compliance therewith disrupts nationally uniform 
employee benefits.  See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)(statute that mandated minimum 
mental health–care benefits not pre-empted but held to fall 
under ERISA's savings clause regarding state regulation of 
insurance, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)); see also 
ERISA § 514(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (ERISA exempts from 
pre-emption Hawaiian Prepaid Health Care Act). 
15 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665 (citing Pub. L. 93-641, 88 
Stat. 2225, §§  1-3, repealed by Pub. L. 99-660, title VII, 
§ 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
17
question in Travelers also regulated health care rates.  Id. at 
649.  ERISA pre-emption "would have rendered the entire NHPRDA 
utterly nugatory, since it would have left States without the 
authority to do just what Congress was expressly trying to 
induce them to do by enacting the NHPRDA."   Id. at 667.  The 
NHPRDA provided "indirect evidence" that Congress did not intend 
to pre-empt New York's surcharge law. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 
331 n.7 (discussing Travelers).16 
¶27 As evident from Travelers, ascertaining the objectives 
of ERISA to determine "the scope of the state law that Congress 
understood would survive" (514 U.S. at 656), requires us to look 
at the interplay between ERISA and other applicable federal 
laws.  In looking for congressional intent, we start, as we 
would with our own legislature, with the language of the 
statute.  Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d at 247 
(citing Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 748, 470 
N.W.2d 625 (1991)).  We cannot look at § 514(a) in isolation, 
but must also look at § 514(d) of ERISA and §§ 401(b) and 402(b) 
of the federal FMLA, as they all deal with the pre-emption issue 
at hand.  "While it is true that statutory interpretation begins 
                     
16 In Dillingham, California's state law regarding the 
apprenticeship programs followed a federal law known as the 
Fitzgerald Act that was enacted before ERISA.  519 U.S. at 319-
320, 331 n.7.  The Court concluded "Congress' silence on the 
pre-emption of state statutes that Congress previously sought to 
foster counsels against pre-emption here."  Id. at 331 n.7. 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
18
with the language of the statute, it is also well established 
that courts must not look at a single, isolated sentence or 
portion of a sentence, but at the role of the relevant language 
in the entire statute."  Alberte v. Anew Health Care Serv., 
Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 (citing 
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 51 (United States 
Supreme Court looked at federal McCarran-Ferguson Act as well as 
ERISA to determine pre-emption)).  
¶28 That 
Congress 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
pre-empt 
the 
substitution provision of the Wisconsin FMLA is evident from the 
plain text of the federal FMLA, §§ 401(b) and 402(b).17  29 
U.S.C. §§ 2651(b), 2652(b).  Section 401(b) provides the 
authority, even encouragement, for the States to enact "greater 
family or medical leave rights than the rights established under 
this Act . . . ."  29 U.S.C. § 2651(b).  The substitution 
provision of the Wisconsin FMLA is such an enactment, providing 
a "greater family leave right" than the federal FMLA.  Wis. 
                     
17 We are thus not persuaded by Aurora's argument that had 
Congress intended for the federal FMLA to "trump" ERISA pre-
emption, the statute would have stated such; or the Department 
of Labor, the agency that promulgates regulations under both 
ERISA and the federal FMLA, would have written a specific 
regulation 
regarding 
pre-emption. 
 
The 
federal 
FMLA 
unambiguously addresses ERISA pre-emption. That the Department 
of Labor has not is of no surprise or consequence in light of 
the fact that many courts have attempted to parse ERISA pre-
emption, evident from the 2,800-plus opinions on the subject as 
of 1992.  District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of 
Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
19
Stat. § 103.10(5).  If ERISA pre-empted the Wisconsin FMLA's 
substitution provision, § 401(b) would be rendered "utterly 
nugatory" and the States could not do exactly what Congress 
attempted to prompt the States to do.18  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 
667.  
¶29 Section 402(b), as well as § 401(b), furnishes 
"indirect evidence" that Congress did not intend ERISA to 
supersede state laws like the Wisconsin FMLA.  See Dillingham, 
519 U.S. at 332 n.7.  Section 402(b) provides that the "rights 
established for employees under this Act . . . shall not be 
diminished by . . . any employment benefit program or plan" 
within the meaning of ERISA.19  By defining "employee benefit" by 
                     
18 ERISA pre-emption would also render § 401(b) superfluous 
contrary to axiomatic statutory construction that a statute 
should be interpreted so that every provision is given full 
effect.  Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency and Serv., Inc., 486 
U.S. at 837.  "[S]tatutes should be so construed that no word or 
clause shall be rendered surplusage."  Milwaukee County v. 
DILHR, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 452-53, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977) (quoting 
Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 Wis. 2d 232, 239, 240, 142 N.W.2d 
827 (1966)).  
19 The federal FMLA defined "employment benefit" by directly 
referencing ERISA's definition of the same term.  
The term "employment benefits" means all benefits 
provided 
or 
made 
available 
to 
employees 
by 
an 
employer, including . . . sick leave . . . regardless 
of whether such benefits are provided . . . through an 
"employee benefit plan," as defined in [29 U.S.C.] 
section 1002(3) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(5).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
20
referring to ERISA, Congress apparently contemplated ERISA's 
potential effect on employee protection established under the 
federal FMLA, including access to greater benefits provided by 
the States under § 401(b), and, determined that such rights are 
not to be diminished by ERISA.  
¶30 We conclude that Congress did not intend for ERISA to 
pre-empt the Wisconsin FMLA's substitution provision because 
pre-emption would "impair" the federal FMLA, as prohibited by 
ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).  It would impair the 
federal FMLA by frustrating its goals; one, that the States 
provide greater family or medical leave rights, and, two, that 
ERISA employee benefit plans not diminish employee rights 
advanced by the federal FMLA.  See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102-03 
(ERISA pre-emption of state law where it did not conflict with 
Title VII would "modify" and "impair" federal law under 
§ 514(d)); see also Humana v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 311 (1999) 
("to 'impair' a law is to hinder its operation or 'frustrate [a] 
goal' of that law"). 
¶31 Aurora contends that this is use of the "double saving 
clause" approach rejected in Shaw, i.e., "that because ERISA 
does not pre-empt Title VII, and Title VII does not pre-empt 
state fair employment laws, ERISA does not pre-empt such laws." 
463 U.S. at 101 n.22.  We disagree.  Shaw rejected an attempt to 
bootstrap a state law that prohibited what the federal law 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
21
permitted 
at 
the 
timepregnancy 
discrimination 
in 
health 
benefitsin order to avoid ERISA pre-emption.20 Id. at 97.  
However, as the United States Supreme Court recently explained, 
"[w]e held in Shaw that the New York law was pre-empted only to 
the extent it prohibited practices lawful under Title VII." 
Humana v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. at 310 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 
103) (emphasis added).  Shaw did not pre-empt any other aspects 
of the New York law that followed and implemented Title VII.  In 
fact, the Court held that pre-emption would "frustrate the goal" 
of Title VII to encourage joint state and federal enforcement of 
Title VII: "Such a disruption of the enforcement scheme 
contemplated by Title VII would, in the words of § 514(d), 
'modify' and 'impair' federal law." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102, 
(footnote omitted).  
¶32 In Shaw, the state law was pre-empted insofar as the 
law extended beyond the scope of what Congress indicated by way 
of Title VII that it intended would survive ERISA pre-emption.  
Here, the federal FMLA indicates Congress' intent that the scope 
of state law that would survive pre-emption would extend beyond 
that which it permitted, to wit, state laws that provided 
"greater 
family 
leave 
rights." 
In 
contrast 
with 
the 
                     
20 Subsequently, 
Congress 
enacted 
the 
Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, amending Title VII to cover 
pregnancy discrimination.  Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85, 88-89 (1983).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
22
circumstances in Shaw, the Wisconsin FMLA does not prohibit that 
which is lawful under the federal FMLA; rather, the Wisconsin 
FMLA substitution provision does not only that which is lawful, 
but also encouraged.  Correspondingly, pre-emption here would 
impair the federal FMLA. 
¶33 More importantly, in Shaw there was "no statutory 
language or legislative history suggesting that the federal 
interest in state fair employment laws extends any farther than 
saving laws from pre-emption by Title VII itself."  463 U.S. at 
104 n.24.  Here, we have both.  Where Title VII only "preserves 
nonconflicting state laws," id. at 101, federal FMLA's § 401(b) 
preserves state laws "that provide[] greater family or medical 
leave rights than the rights established under this Act."  29 
U.S.C. § 2651(b).  
¶34  Moreover, the federal FMLA's legislative history 
shows a federal interest in state family and medical leave acts 
beyond saving those laws from pre-emption by the federal FMLA 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
23
itself.21  The legislative history indicates (1) that Congress 
intended to encourage the states to enact family and medical 
leave acts that provided a greater scope of protection than that 
afforded by the federal FMLA, and (2) that ERISA is not to pre-
empt these state laws that give greater rights.  According to 
the Senate Report, 
Section 401(b) also clarifies that state family leave 
laws at least as generous as that provided in S. 5 
[the federal FMLA] (including leave laws that provide 
continuation of health insurance or other benefits, 
and paid leave), are not pre-empted by ERISA, or any 
other federal law.   
 
                     
21 Because we do not find the pertinent provisions of the 
federal FMLA ambiguous, and rely on the plain meaning of those 
provisions, it is unnecessary to look to the legislative history 
to determine the meaning of the statute.  "If the language of 
the statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative 
intent, it is the duty of the court to apply that intent to the 
case at hand and not look beyond the statutory language to 
ascertain its meaning."  Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 
Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  Nonetheless, the 
legislative history supports our conclusion.  State v. Oakley, 
2000 WI 37, ¶ 18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 609 N.W.2d 786. 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
24
S. REP. NO. 103-3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 38, reprinted in 1993-2 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40.22 
¶35 Assuming, arguendo, that ERISA § 514(a) pre-empted the 
Wisconsin FMLA's substitution provision in the first instance, 
the federal FMLA § 401(b) casts doubt on that pre-emption.  
Consequently, where ERISA might have been plain on its face, its 
interaction with federal FMLA raised an ambiguity.  "Although 
the statutes are plain in their face, statutes may be rendered 
ambiguous by their interaction with other statutes."  McDonough, 
227 Wis. 2d at 278 (citing State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 
295 N.W.2d 346 (1980)).  However, since both sections deal with 
pre-emption, "[i]t is our duty to construe statutes on the same 
subject matter in a manner that harmonizes them in order to give 
each full force and effect."  McDonough, 227 Wis. 2d at 279-80 
                     
22 The House Report is silent as to ERISA pre-emption.  
Since we need only find "legislative history suggesting that the 
federal interest . . . extends . . . farther than saving [state] 
laws from pre-emption by [the federal FMLA] itself" (Shaw, 463 
U.S. at 103 n.24), we need not explore the legislative history 
further, even though that history includes a colloquy among the 
federal FMLA's sponsor Senator Dodd of Connecticut and Wisconsin 
Senators Feingold and Kohl that supports the conclusion that 
Congress intended that ERISA not pre-empt the Wisconsin FMLA 
substitution provision. 139 CONG. REC. 2254 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
1993).  Nor do we need to consider the letter from Congressional 
Research Service to the House of Representatives Committee that 
advises that the federal FMLA would have no impact on the scope 
of ERISA pre-emption.  139 CONG. REC. H396-03, *H412 (daily ed. 
Feb. 3, 1993).  There is no evidence that a member of Congress 
adopted this view.  See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 n.13 
(1986) (statements at congressional hearing not made by member 
of Congress accorded no significance).  
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
25
(quoting State v. Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56, 66, 571 N.W.2d 399 
(Ct. App. 1997)).  The only interpretation that would give both 
§ 514(a) of ERISA and § 401(b) of the federal FMLA full effect 
is the one we adopt.   
¶36 Our conclusion is further supported by general pre-
emption principles.  Whenever a question arises regarding pre-
emption, the presumption against pre-emption comes back into 
play.  Miller Brewing Co., 210 Wis. 2d at 35.  It is this 
presumption that Aurora failed to rebut.  It is this presumption 
that has required us to determine whether Congress intended to 
pre-empt a state law such as the Wisconsin FMLA's substitution 
provision.  We find this intent by looking at the objectives and 
plain meaning of both ERISA § 514(a) and (d), and of both 
§ 401(b) and § 402(b) of the federal FMLA.  There is no need for 
us to find, and we do not find, that the federal FMLA either 
amended or nullified the scope of ERISA pre-emption. 
¶37 In summary, we conclude that Aurora has failed to 
establish that § 514(a) of ERISA pre-empts the Wisconsin FMLA 
substitution provision.  First, Aurora has failed to establish 
that the substitution provision "relates to" employment benefit 
plans under § 514(a) of ERISA.  Second, Aurora has failed to 
show a clear and manifest purpose by the Congress to pre-empt 
the Wisconsin FMLA substitution provision.  Instead, evident 
from the federal FMLA, Congress intended to protect from pre-
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
26
emption state laws that provide additional family leave rights. 
 Congress also intended that these rights are not to be 
diminished by any employment benefit plan.  Third, Aurora is not 
able to show how ERISA pre-emption of state-provided family 
leave rights would not result in impairment of the federal FMLA 
in contravention of § 514(d) of ERISA.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Aurora has failed to carry its burden of overcoming the 
presumption against pre-emption.  Thus, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals, which, in turn, affirmed the judgment 
of the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
98-1546 
 
 
1