Title: State v. Jeffrey Drury
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-110-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 110 September Term 2005 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JEFFREY DRURY, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 29, 2006 Decided April 24, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 382 N.J. Super. 469 (2006). Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Robert E. Bonpietro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Jeffrey Drury was convicted of multiple offenses, all arising out of an incident that began when a group of teenagers approached him, seeking to buy marijuana, and that ended after defendant sexually assaulted one teenager and carjacked them and their vehicle. Our grant of certification was limited to two discrete issues, one relating to defendant s aggravated sexual assault conviction and the other concerning defendant s kidnapping sentence. More specifically, the first issue before us is whether carjacking can support an aggravated sexual assault conviction. Sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c, a second-degree offense, is elevated to aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a, a first-degree crime, when the assault is committed during the commission, or attempted commission of certain enumerated offenses, including robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(3). In this matter, we consider whether the jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2, constituted commission of a robbery sufficient to elevate the sexual assault he committed from a second-degree to a first-degree offense. We conclude that the Legislature did not intend to include triggering offenses other than those specifically enumerated in the statute defining aggravated sexual assault and that, therefore, defendant could only have been guilty of second-degree sexual assault. The second issue before us relates to the sentence imposed on defendant for the crime of kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1b, and the application, if any, of the principles established in State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005), State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497 (2005), and State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516 (2005), to this crime. We conclude that because kidnapping is an offense to which a twenty-year presumptive term, see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(1)(a), previously applied, defendant is entitled to a remand for reconsideration of the twenty-five year sentence imposed on him for kidnapping pursuant to Natale. Although these latter comments demonstrate that the Governor was aware of a relationship between the crimes of carjacking and robbery, the statement does not suggest that he, or the Legislature, considered carjacking to be simply a variety of robbery. On the contrary, the inclusion of references to the other related offenses in addition to robbery supports the conclusion that carjacking is, and was intended to be, a separate offense. Alternatively, we have considered the suggestion, implicit in the Appellate Division s decision, that the Legislature s failure to enumerate carjacking as a trigger for aggravated sexual assault is the product of a mere legislative oversight. See Drury, supra, 382 N.J. Super. at 480. This argument is based on the fact that although the aggravated sexual assault and robbery statutes were both enacted in the late 1970s as part of the new Code of Criminal Justice, see L. 1978, c. 95; L. 1979, c. 178, 28, the statute that created the crime of carjacking was not enacted until 1993, some fourteen years after the Code became effective, see L. 1993, c. 221, 1. Based on this time gap alone, it could be argued that the Legislature, when enacting the carjacking statute, simply overlooked including it as a triggering offense for purposes of first-degree sexual assault. Our review of the legislative history suggests the contrary conclusion. The aggravated sexual assault statute has been amended three times since the carjacking statute was passed, see L. 1997, c. 194, 1 (creating separate paragraph a(6)); L. 2001, c. 60, 1 (amending c(3)(b) to alter type of supervisory capacity listed); L. 2004, c. 130, 13 (replacing reference in c(3)(c) to foster parent with reference to resource family parent). None of those amendments added carjacking as an enumerated offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(3). Therefore, we find no support for the suggestion that the Legislature intended carjacking to be a new form of robbery and simply overlooked the role that robbery plays as a triggering offense for aggravated sexual assault. Moreover, since the time when the carjacking statute was enacted, the Legislature has amended several other previously-existing statutes to include references to carjacking. Significant to our analysis, the Legislature has several times amended statutes referring to robbery in order to add references to carjacking. For example, the original version of the felony murder statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, enacted in 1978, included robbery as an enumerated triggering offense that would elevate the crime of criminal homicide to murder. See L. 1978, c. 95. That statute was amended by the Legislature in 1998 to include carjacking, along with robbery, as one of the enumerated triggering offenses. See L. 1998, c. 25, 1. As another example, the statute governing the grounds for the waiver of juveniles out of family court on a prosecutor s motion, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, also enacted before the carjacking statute, originally enumerated robbery as one of the triggering offenses for purposes of waiver. See L. 1982, c. 77, 7. That statute was amended in 1999 to include carjacking as an additional triggering offense. L. 1999, c. 373, 1. Finally, the statute authorizing the imposition of a discretionary extended term to certain defendants, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3, enacted in 1978, see L. 1978, c. 95, has since been amended twice. It was amended in 1981 to designate robbery as a triggering offense, see L. 1981 c. 31, 3, and again in 1999 to add carjacking as a triggering offense. See L. 1999, c. 160, 4. Each of these examples suggests that the Legislature does not consider carjacking to be a form of robbery and that its failure to add the aggravated sexual assault statute to specifically include carjacking was not an oversight. Further support for our conclusion can be found in several other statutes enacted after the creation of carjacking as a separate offense in 1993 in which the Legislature has specifically listed both robbery and carjacking as triggering offenses. For example, in 1994, in enacting bail restrictions under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-12, the Legislature was careful to include both robbery as well as the then-newly created crime of carjacking. See L. 1994, c. 144, 1. In addition, when the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (NERA), was enacted in 1997, it stated in broad terms that it applied to violent crimes. See L. 1997, c. 117, 2. When the Legislature amended NERA in 2001 to enumerate specific offenses in place of the earlier references to violent crimes, both robbery and carjacking were included. See L. 2001, c. 129. Similarly, in identifying offenses that would support a conviction for the newly created crime of terrorism under N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2, the Legislature, in 2002, listed both robbery and carjacking. See L. 2002, c. 26, 2. In the same year, the Legislature designated both robbery and carjacking as crimes that would disqualify current or prospective airline employees under N.J.S.A. 6:1-100f(5). See L. 2002, c. 73, 2. Similarly, in listing the disqualifying convictions for airport employment in N.J.S.A. 32:2-37(f), the Legislature enumerated both robbery and carjacking. See L. 2002, c. 73, 1. We find in this wide spectrum of relevant legislative pronouncements strong evidence that the Legislature regards carjacking as a crime separate and distinct from robbery. We conclude that when the Legislature intends to include carjacking as a relevant offense, it does so explicitly either by amending statutes that were enacted before the creation of the crime of carjacking or by referring specifically to both robbery and carjacking in statutes that were passed after the carjacking statute was enacted. We are therefore guided by the principle that the Legislature ha[ving] carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 308 (1993). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-110 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JEFFREY DRURY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED April 24, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Hoens CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY