Title: Ex Parte Hutchinson
Citation: 87 So. 2d 847
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 1956

87 So. 2d 847 (1956)
Ex parte Elkin Gillis HUTCHINSON.
4 Div. 854.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 12, 1956.
Rehearing Denied June 14, 1956.
*848 Jos. B. Wiley and Walter B. Byars, Troy, for petitioner.
John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Owen Bridges, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lewey Stephens, Jr., Circuit Sol., Elba, for respondent.
GOODWYN, Justice.
This is an original petition for mandamus to review the action of the Judge of the Circuit Court of Pike County in amending nunc pro tunc a judgment against petitioner in a criminal proceeding, revoking probation and ordering petitioner's arrest and detention. We ordered issuance of a rule nisi and the respondent-judge has made answer thereto.
The case made by the pleadings is as follows:
On October 4, 1950, petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury of Pike County for the offense of burglary in the second degree. On October 2, 1953, petitioner, in open court, entered a plea of guilty to the offense as charged, at which time the trial judge made the following entry on the bench notes, viz.:
Judgment was then entered by the clerk on the minutes of the court as follows:
On August 15 and 16, 1955, the respondent issued warrants of arrest against petitioner ordering him to show cause, at a hearing set for August 19, 1955, why his probation should not be revoked. Petitioner moved to quash said warrants contending that the judgment of October 2, 1953, in providing for probation without prescribing a definite period therefor, was, in that respect, invalid, and that the sentence was fully executed on the expiration of 13 months after October 2, 1953, which was prior to the issuance of the warrants of arrest. This motion was granted. Thereupon the solicitor filed a motion to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc. After due notice to petitioner, hearing was had on said motion on September 2, 1955. On that date respondent granted the motion and amended the judgment nunc pro tunc so as to provide for probation as follows:
Immediately following the amendment respondent issued new warrants of arrest against petitioner ordering him to show cause, at a hearing set for September 9, 1955, why his probation should not be revoked.
The foregoing facts are taken from the petition filed here, which seeks to have expunged the amended judgment and the warrants issued on September 2, 1955.
Respondent, in his answer, admits these facts as true but takes issue with petitioner's right to the relief sought. It is also averred in the answer that "the true and complete order of probation actually rendered by the court was as set forth and recorded on the date of the order, viz., October 2, 1953, upon the Probation Docket of the court", in which it is provided that the sentence of 13 months "is hereby suspended and that the said defendant is probationed on this date for a period of 2 years."
The answer also contains the following averments:
It is further shown by the answer that the proceedings to revoke petitioner's probation *850 resulted from a report made to respondent by the State Probation Officer on August 13, 1955, that petitioner "had on said date been arrested in Pike County and lodged in the Pike County jail on one warrant charging violation of the prohibition law and one warrant charging reckless driving."
The determinative question presented is whether the nunc pro tunc amendment on September 2, 1955, had the effect of making petitioner subject to a two-year period of probation running from October 2, 1953.
Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 567, provides that "circuit courts * * * may, at any time within three years after the rendition of final judgment, upon the application of either party, amend any clerical error, mistake in the calculation of interest, or other mistake of the clerk or register, * * * when there is sufficient matter apparent on the record or entries of the court to amend by. * * *" There seems to be no question about this section applying to the amendment of a judgment in a criminal case. Ex parte Brandon, 243 Ala. 610, 612, 11 So. 2d 561. And petitioner recognizes the rule that when a judgment is amended nunc pro tunc, the amendment relates back to the time of the entry of the original judgment. Phillips v. State, 162 Ala. 14, 19, 50 So. 194; Yorty v. State, 11 Ala.App. 160, 163, 65 So. 914; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1604, p. 135.
It is further recognized by petitioner that "once a valid probation commences, the probationer's sentence continues in fieri, and that a defendant is not entitled to any credit on his sentence for time served on valid probation." Persall v. State, 31 Ala.App. 309, 16 So. 2d 332.
The position taken by petitioner is that no definite probationary period was prescribed in the original judgment of October 2, 1953; that the judgment simply provided that the defendant was granted probation with suspension of sentence; that the attempted probation was invalid; that, in this circumstance, the sentence commenced to run as of October 2, 1953, and was completely satisfied 13 months thereafter, viz., on November 1, 1954; and that the amendment of the judgment on September 2, 1955, could not have any effect on petitioner since he had, prior to that time, fully satisfied his sentence.
Another argument made by petitioner is that the original judgment "in so far as it attempts to grant probation and suspend sentence is likewise invalid on the additional ground that the trial court conditioned the benefits it sought to provide on the payment of court costs", citing in support the case of State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 552, 45 So. 2d 865.
We are constrained to hold that the amendment of the judgment related back to the time of the original judgment; that petitioner was on valid probation on September 2, 1955, when the proceedings were taken to revoke his probation; and that respondent did not commit error in the action taken by him.
In support of his contention, petitioner relies on the following cases: Corporate Authorities of Scottsboro v. Johnston, 121 Ala. 397, 25 So. 809; Eddins v. Popwell, 33 Ala. App. 239, 35 So. 2d 47, affirmed 250 Ala. 453, 35 So. 2d 50; Alexander v. Posey, 32 Ala.App. 494, 27 So. 2d 237; Blakely v. State, 28 Ala.App. 574, 190 So. 102; Gardner v. State, 21 Ala.App. 388, 108 So. 635; Blackwell v. State, 19 Ala.App. 553, 99 So. 49; State ex rel. Curtis v. Heflin, 19 Ala. App. 222, 96 So. 459.
We have carefully examined these cases and do not consider them apt in the instant proceeding. In the Johnston, Popwell and Posey cases one of the principal elements involved was the lack of authority of the recorder's court to suspend sentence. There was no question involved with respect to amending a judgment nunc pro tunc so as to make it speak the truth. In those three cases there could have been no amendment with respect to the suspension of sentence because the recorder's court was without authority in the first instance to suspend sentence. In the case now before us we have an entirely different situation. The circuit court is given express authority, Code 1940, Tit. 42, §§ 19-26, as amended; *851 Amendment 38, Constitution, to grant probation and we are here dealing simply with a nunc pro tunc amendment of a judgment which could and should have been properly entered by the clerk on the minutes of the court. The bench notes clearly furnished adequate basis for the amendment; and the amendment was made within the statutory period, Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 567, supra.
We see nothing in the other cases bearing directly on the case before us.
We come now to the question concerning the effect of the provision in the judgment conditioning probation on the payment of costs.
The position taken by petitioner is that such condition rendered the probation invalid; that it was the same as if no probation had been granted at all; that being released without probation, the serving of his sentence commenced on the day of sentence and was completed at the end of thirteen months thereafter. As supporting this insistence, petitioner cites the case of State v. Esdale, 253 Ala. 550, 552-553, 45 So. 2d 865, 867, supra, where it is said:
We see no occasion to discuss this insistence other than to say that if it should be held that the condition as to the payment of costs was beyond the power of the court (which we do not decide; nor do we wish to be understood as reaffirming what was said in the Esdale case, supra), it would not necessarily follow that the part of the judgment granting probation was wholly vitiated by including such condition in the judgment. Assuming the condition to be invalid, there seems no good reason why the remaining part of the judgment granting probation should not be valid and operative. "It is generally held that the fact that a judgment is void in part will not invalidate a separable remainder of the judgment." 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 450, p. 881; Avery Freight Lines v. Persons, 250 Ala. 40, 46, 32 So. 2d 886.
Respondent insists that petitioner is not in a position to now complain since the granting of probation was at petitioner's request, and for the further reason that petitioner has paid the costs. We pretermit discussion of these points as being unnecessary to a decision.
Writ denied.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.