Title: AMMC, P.C., d/b/a Alabama Men's Clinic, and John Justin Caulfield, M.D. v. Robert Snell and Tabitha Snell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180308
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2020

rel:  April 10, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
_________________________
1180308
_________________________
AMMC, P.C., d/b/a Alabama Men's Clinic, and John Justin
Caulfield, M.D.
v.
Robert Snell and Tabitha Snell
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-16-901166)
WISE, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Bolin and Sellers, JJ., dissent.
1180308
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
Robert Snell and Tabitha Snell sued AMMC, P.C., d/b/a
Alabama Men's Clinic ("AMMC"), and Dr. John Justin Caulfield,
alleging medical malpractice.  After a trial in 2018, a jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the Snells
filed a motion for a new trial.  The trial court granted that
motion, and the defendants appealed.  I respectfully dissent
from the Court's decision to affirm the trial court's
judgment.
In their motion for a new trial, the Snells asserted
that, after the trial, they discovered evidence of juror
misconduct.  Specifically, they alleged that several jurors
had failed to give complete and truthful answers to questions
asked during voir dire.
The trial court held two hearings on the motion for a new
trial, during which it heard testimony from the jurors.  After
the hearings, the trial court entered an order granting the
motion for a new trial based on the failure of three
particular jurors to reveal during voir dire that they or
their family members had been defendants in lawsuits.  Dr.
Caulfield and AMMC appealed.
2
1180308
The applicable standard of review calls for this Court to
determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in
granting the Snells' motion for a new trial.  Hood v. McElroy,
127 So. 3d 325, 328 (Ala. 2011).  "[T]he proper inquiry for
the trial court on [a] motion for new trial, grounded on
allegedly improper responses or lack of responses by
prospective jurors on voir dire, is whether this has resulted
in probable prejudice to the movant."  Freeman v. Hall, 286
Ala. 161, 166, 238 So. 2d 330, 335 (1970).  "[N]ot every
failure of a venireman to respond correctly to a voir dire
question will entitle the losing party to a new trial." 
Wallace v. Campbell, 475 So. 2d 521, 522 (Ala. 1985).
The following occurred during voir dire:
"[SNELLS' COUNSEL:] ... [W]hen I ask a question
about you, what I'm talking about is you and members
of your immediate family.  Members of your immediate
family would be your husband, wife, father, mother,
brother, sister, children.  So if you know if I ask
a question and you know that somebody in your
immediate family might be affected by it or might
have an answer to that question, if you will hold up
your hand, we will see where we go with that.
"....
"[SNELLS' COUNSEL:]  Have any of you ever been
defendants in a lawsuit? That is someone sued you or
a member of your immediate family? And what I'm
talking about, I'm not talking about divorce or
3
1180308
anything like that, I'm talking about somebody sues
you for personal injuries or damages or anything
like that.
"....
"[SNELLS' COUNSEL]:  Now, anyone else been a
defendant?  Not divorces or anything like that, just
personal injuries for money, something that involves
damages.
"....
"[SNELLS' COUNSEL]: Now, let me take that back
a step.  Have any of you been in a situation where
it didn't go to a lawsuit but somebody made a claim
against you for damages?  Car wreck, a bill,
anything like that that was upsetting to you?"
In its order granting the Snells' motion for a new trial, the
trial court stated that the Snells were probably prejudiced by
the failure of jurors C.D.C., M.H., and R.G.H. to properly
respond to voir dire questioning.
Juror C.D.C. had three small-claims default judgments
entered against her in collections actions from January 2015
to May 2016.  She testified during one of the hearings on the
motion for a new trial that she did not remember being asked
during voir dire if she or her family members had been a
defendant in a lawsuit.  She also testified that she was not
even aware of the default judgments and that she was not
trying to deceive anyone by not disclosing their existence. 
4
1180308
The Snells, however, introduced evidence indicating that D.C.
had been personally served with garnishment papers with
respect to one of the small-claims judgments.
Juror M.H. and her mother were sued in an eviction action
in October 2015 and had a judgment entered against them in
that action.  M.H. testified during one of the hearings on the
motion for a new trial that she did not remember the question
being asked during voir dire regarding whether she or her
family members had been a defendant in a lawsuit.  When asked
if she had, in fact, been a defendant in a lawsuit, she
responded that she and her mother had lived at an apartment
and that both their names were on the lease.  She testified
that she did not mean to deceive anyone and that the existence
of the eviction judgment did not influence her deliberations.
Juror R.G.H. and his wife had multiple small-claims
judgments entered against them in collections actions.  
During
one of the hearings on the motion for a new trial, R.G.H.
claimed that he was unaware of some of the judgments.  As for
the ones he did remember, he testified that he never attended
court proceedings and that he did not consider the voir dire
questions in the present case to be  aimed at collections
5
1180308
actions.  He testified that he did not intend to deceive
anyone and that the fact that he had been a defendant in the
collections actions did not influence his deliberations.
After R.G.H. testified, an investigator employed by the
Snells' attorney testified that, when he served R.G.H. with a
subpoena to appear at the new-trial hearing, R.G.H. told the
investigator that lawyers are "greedy," that R.G.H. had
discussed his opinion on that matter with the other jurors at
some unknown point during or after the trial, and that R.G.H.
had decided early in the proceedings that he was not going to
award the Snells anything.  R.G.H. denied those allegations. 
Defense counsel moved to strike the investigator's testimony
as hearsay and as an improper attempt to impeach the jury's
verdict under Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid.  The trial court did
not rule on the motion to strike, but its order granting the
Snells a new trial expressly referenced the investigator's
testimony.  Even assuming the investigator's testimony was
admissible for one reason or another, I am still of the
opinion that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
granting the motion for a new trial.
6
1180308
Although voir dire questions may be very simple to
practicing lawyers, they can be confusing for average jurors. 
Many members of the general public are unfamiliar with even 
the legal meanings of the terms "plaintiff," "defendant," and
"judgment."  Asking someone whether he or she has ever been a
plaintiff or a defendant can, at times, require an
explanation.  Many people do not appreciate what a judgment
is, why it is entered against them, or that it was the result
of a court action involving litigation.  Our legal system and
process can be confusing to jurors who have had limited
interaction with it. 
But jurors take their duty very seriously and give their
best efforts to understand their role.  They appreciate that,
from all the questions asked during voir dire, it comes down
to whether they can be fair-minded.  Can they set aside
prejudices and preconceived notions, listen to the evidence,
and make a fair decision?  While the makeup of a jury results
from seasoned trial counsel's careful study of background,
body language, and answers to probing questions resulting in
strikes, the jury is basically an amalgam of solid ordinary
7
1180308
citizens trying to fulfill their civic duty to the best of
their ability.  
Although I believe the vast majority of jurors take their
responsibilities seriously and put forth their best effort, I
doubt that many people actually enjoy jury duty.  For 10
dollars per day and 15 cents per mile they are absent from
work and juggle child-care and other family responsibilities. 
But they serve because they are summoned and they believe this
infrequent tax on their time is a responsibility akin to
voting.  We should be thankful for their service.  The last
time I myself served as a juror, the presiding judge told
everyone 
how 
invaluable 
their 
service 
was 
to 
the
administration of justice.  I think that is right; jurors'
services are invaluable and critical.
That is why it troubles me when, after a jury has reached
a verdict and has been dismissed, the jurors are subjected to
investigation to determine if they were truthful during voir
dire.  The idea that an investigator would use public records
after an unfavorable verdict to attempt to nullify that
verdict strikes me as a challenge to the entire system.  How
humiliating must it be for a juror to be hauled back into
8
1180308
court, cross-examined, treated like a criminal, and made to
feel that his or her service was illegitimate. 
The allegations of misconduct in the present case revolve
around whether the jurors understood questions during voir
dire, the truthfulness of their answers, and what information
regarding their prejudices they failed to disclose.  Some of
the information used to "impeach" each juror was not newly
discovered information, but consisted of information anyone
could have obtained before trial by a simple search of
courthouse records.  Why was this information not obtained
earlier in the proceedings and used to consider whether to
strike the jurors before wasting time trying the case?  To
cross-examine jurors after a verdict is rendered using
information that was in the public domain and readily
available before voir dire is unfair to all parties. Trial
counsel bears a burden to be properly prepared for voir dire
and should be prohibited from using public information
obtainable before trial to engage in post-trial juror
examination to support a motion for a new trial.
After the trial in Ankor Energy, LLC v. Kelly, 271 So. 3d
798 (Ala. 2018), counsel for the losing party made numerous
9
1180308
telephone calls to a juror in an effort to obtain an affidavit
to assert juror misconduct as a reason for a new trial. The
juror, failing to understand what an affidavit was, signed
three different statements.  On appeal, we held that the
"trial court exceeded its discretion in granting the 
new-trial
motion alleging juror misconduct absent ... admissible
[evidence] indicating that 
[the] 
 
misconduct 
was 
prejudicial." 
271 So. 3d at 809.  Thus, juror misconduct alone is not
enough; the misconduct must have caused prejudice.  
In the seminal case of Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 
238 So. 2d 330 (1970), the Court noted that the movant for a
new trial based on incorrect or nonexistent responses to voir
dire questions must demonstrate that the responses or lack
thereof resulted in probable prejudice to the movant.  The
Court identified five relevant factors in determining whether
prejudice has been established: 1) the temporal remoteness of
the matter inquired about; 2) the ambiguity of the question
propounded; 3) the prospective juror's inadvertence or
willfulness in falsifying or failing to answer; 4)the failure
of the prospective juror to recollect; and 5) the materiality
of the matter inquired about.
10
1180308
In my view, the jurors in the present case simply did not
understand vague voir dire questioning and legal jargon,
forgot about judgments that had been entered against them, or
neglected to disclose minor personal information.  I see no
attempt by a juror to be misleading or evasive during voir
dire.  It is one thing to knowingly tell a falsehood or fail
to disclose a critical disqualifying factor when prompted. 
But it is quite another to forget a small-claims judgment
resulting from a debt or to fail to remember a less than
material issue about a relative, coworker, or neighbor.  I
would conclude that the failure of the prospective jurors to
fully and correctly respond to voir dire questions did not
influence the jury's deliberations and had no 
material adverse
effect on the jury's verdict.  There may have been juror
misconduct in the strict sense of the word, but the misconduct
was not remotely prejudicial enough to taint the jury's
verdict.  Accordingly, I dissent.
11