Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: Billy Don Evans, Jr. v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070703
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2008

REL: 7/11/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
____________________
1070703
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Billy Don Evans, Jr. 
v. 
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-06-62)
SMITH, Justice.
The State of Alabama petitions for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to reinstate the guilty plea of the
defendant, Billy Don Evans, Jr.  We dismiss the petition as
untimely filed.
1070703
It appears from the materials before us that the alleged
1
abuse did not occur in conjunction with Evans's teaching.
Act No. 706 provided for the creation of a "pre-trial or
2
a 
pre-prosecution 
diversionary 
or 
deferred 
prosecution
program," § 2.a., in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.  Persons
who are accepted into and satisfactorily complete the
diversion program are entitled to a "non-criminal disposition"
of the charges against them.
2
Facts and Procedural History
Evans, whom the materials before us identify as a school
teacher, was indicted on two counts of child abuse for
allegedly hitting two children with an extension cord and a
water hose.   At arraignment, Evans pleaded not guilty, and
1
his case was scheduled for a trial to be held on April 17,
2006.  
The trial court subsequently set a review date to
determine whether Evans was eligible to participate in the
"pre-trial diversionary program" (hereinafter "the diversion
program") established in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in
accordance with Act No. 706, Ala. Acts 1978.   On May 3, 2006,
2
Evans filed a motion requesting that the trial court cancel
the review hearing and reschedule his case for trial.  In his
motion, Evans sought to withdraw his application for
participation in the diversion program because a guilty plea
1070703
3
was a prerequisite to admission into the diversion program,
because the district attorney had expressed strong opposition
to Evans's admission to the diversion program, and because
Evans had determined that it was not in his best interest to
enter a guilty plea as the trial court would ultimately
sentence him as charged and a conviction would "most assuredly
cause [him] to lose his employment as a teacher along with all
opportunity to vest his retirement ...."  The trial court
granted the motion and reset Evans's case for trial.
Although Evans had requested that he not be considered
for the diversion program, he later filed a "Petition to Allow
Application for Diversion."  The trial court granted this
petition, and a plea hearing was held on June 22, 2006.  At
the hearing, Evans's counsel stated that Evans wished to plead
guilty and to apply for the diversion program.  The deputy
district attorney present, however, stated in open court that
she did not think Evans would be admitted to the program.  The
trial  court commented:  "I'm going to campaign vigorously for
his admission  into  the  program.  We need to make an
exemption on this one.  This guy needs to be in."  
The trial court then proceeded to conduct a colloquy with
1070703
According to the State's brief, it has been the policy
3
of the diversion program for over 30 years to exclude all
violent offenders from participating in the program.
It is unclear what procedures Evans undertook in the
4
"appeal" process. The exhibits submitted with the petition for
the writ of mandamus simply reflect that Evans's "appeal" and
his "appeal reconsideration" had been denied by the district
attorney and that his case was "being returned to the court
system for prosecution."
4
Evans noting that "it was going to be tough" for Evans to be
admitted into the diversion program and that his counsel would
"campaign" for him and "hopefully" he would be accepted.  The
trial court also explained that if Evans was not accepted into
the diversion program, he would be adjudicated guilty and
sentenced: "[L]et's say for some reason you don't get in or
you get in and you get kicked out ... I've got to adjudicate
you guilty and sentence you ...."  Evans subsequently pleaded
guilty to two counts of felony child abuse and applied to the
diversion program. 
Evans was ultimately denied entry into the diversion
program.   He "appealed" his denial; however, his appeal and
3
his subsequent "motion for reconsideration" were also denied.4
Upon the motion of the State, Evans's case was scheduled for
sentencing; however, on November 28, 2006, the trial court
entered an order in the case-action summary continuing Evans's
1070703
5
sentencing "indefinitely" and placing the case on the trial
court's administrative docket.  
On July 24, 2007, the trial court entered the following
order appointing new counsel for Evans and setting a hearing
for sentencing:
"Comes the Court and does hereby order that the
Honorable Richard White is appointed as counsel for
the defendant for the purposes of sentencing.
Defendant pled guilty to two counts of child abuse
on June 22, 2006 before this Court. The Court having
determined that, after several attempts, defendant
was unable to enroll in the Pre-trial Diversion
Program, does hereby set sentencing for September 6,
2007 ...."
The sentencing hearing was continued, and on October 4,
2007, the trial court held a hearing "to sentence Mr. Evans on
two counts of child abuse ...."  The following exchange
occurred:  
"MR. WHITE [defense counsel]: I've talked to
[Evans] in pretty good detail. ... I'm under the
impression if he gets a felony, if you adjudicate
him guilty, he's going to lose his job.
"....
"MR. WHITE: My understanding from talking with
him was he did not understand that .... But his
understanding [was] ... that he was going to go to
pretrial; that his case--
"THE COURT: They won't let him in. ... I think
Mr. Evans ought to be allowed to do pretrial because
1070703
6
he does teach school; he's taught school for a long
time, like twenty something years. ... Mr. Evans
here is a good person who's got a good job, who's
never been in trouble, who needs to get his
retirement, who needs--and who's a great teacher.
I've gotten great reports. And I'm just going, you
know, why can't we do pretrial diversion? Well, we
can't because the DA's office says no .... 
"....
"THE COURT: Well, and this is what I was going
to do ... Mr. Evans, when can you retire?
"....
"[EVANS]: ... 2009.
"THE COURT: ...  We'll just let him withdraw the
guilty plea, and we'll just--we'll reset the case
after his retirement.
"....
"[DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: The State would
object to him withdrawing his guilty plea. On June
22, 2006, he pled guilty with the understanding--I
made it very clear--that it was my opinion that he
would not be eligible for pretrial diversion and
that he would not get into pretrial diversion. The
adjudication was withheld pending the outcome of
pretrial diversion, so he did plead guilty on that
date. 
He 
made 
a 
knowing 
and 
voluntary 
and
intelligent plea of guilt in this case. Mr. Freeman,
his attorney at that time, was given all of the
discovery, given the pictures, and there were
extensive talks about what would happen or what
could possibly happen if this case went to trial. So
based on that, the State would object to him being
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
"THE COURT: Okay. And I'll note your objection.
1070703
7
And I am going to allow him to withdraw.
"....
"THE COURT: ... And I am going to let you
withdraw your plea because I think you only entered
it with the understanding you would get in pretrial
diversion...."
The trial court granted Evans's oral motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, and it set the case for trial on January 4, 2010,
after Evans is scheduled to begin receiving his retirement
benefits.
On October 11, 2007, the State filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, presumably
seeking the same relief sought in the instant petition.  The
Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State's mandamus petition
without an opinion on January 7, 2008.  Evans v. State (No.
CR-07-0069, January 7, 2008), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2008) (table).  The State asserts that it never received a
notice that the Court of Criminal Appeals had denied its
petition; after learning of the denial, the State filed the
instant petition in this Court on February 19, 2008.
In its petition, the State contends that Evans failed to
meet his burden of establishing that his pleas were due to be
withdrawn, that the trial court 
clearly exceeded its
1070703
8
discretion in allowing Evans to withdraw his guilty pleas
simply because he had been denied entry in the diversion
program, and that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
postponing the trial date until after Evans is eligible to
begin receiving retirement benefits.
We express no opinion on the merits of the State's
arguments or the appropriateness of the trial court's actions
in this case, because we conclude that the petition must be
dismissed as untimely filed.  Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P.,
governs the filing of mandamus petitions.  Rule 21(a) governs,
among other things, mandamus petitions "directed to a judge or
judges," while Rule 21(e) specifically governs this Court's
review of a decision of a "court of appeals" on an "original
petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or other
extraordinary writ."  These two subdivisions also have
different timing provisions.  Rule 21(a)(3) provides:
"The petition shall be filed within a reasonable
time. The presumptively reasonable time for filing
a petition seeking review of an order of a trial
court or of a lower appellate court shall be the
same as the time for taking an appeal. If a petition
is filed outside this presumptively reasonable time,
it shall include a statement of circumstances
constituting good cause for the appellate court to
consider the petition, notwithstanding that it was
filed beyond the presumptively reasonable time."
1070703
9
However, the timing for the filing of a petition pursuant
to Rule 21(e) is different.  If a rehearing was sought in the
court of appeals, then the timing of the petition filed in the
supreme court (with some exceptions if the application is
withdrawn) 
is 
governed 
by 
subdivision 
(e)(3). 
 
That
subdivision incorporates the procedures for certiorari review
found in Rule 39, Ala. R. App. P., including the various
timing provisions found in that rule.
If no application for rehearing is filed (or is properly
withdrawn as specified in subdivision (e)(3)), then the timing
of the filing is governed by subdivision (e)(2), which
provides:
"(2) Such review in the supreme court of a grant
or denial must be commenced by filing the petition
in the supreme court within fourteen (14) days of
the grant or denial of the writ by the court of
appeals. Procedures on such review shall conform to
the provisions of subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of
this rule where those subdivisions are applicable."
In the instant case, the State's "original petition for
extraordinary relief" was denied by the Court of Criminal
Appeals; therefore, the State has filed in this Court a
presumably "similar petition."  Rule 21(e)(1).  Because no
application for rehearing was filed, subdivision (e)(3),
1070703
10
requiring review by writ of certiorari, does not apply in this
case.  Instead, the timeliness of the State's petition is
governed by subsection (e)(2), which requires that the
petition be filed "within fourteen (14) days of the grant or
denial of the writ by the court of appeals."
The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State's mandamus
petition on January 7, 2008; the instant petition was not
filed with this Court until February 19, 2008, well beyond the
14 days specified in Rule 21(e)(2).  Therefore, it is untimely
filed.  
However, the State points to the second sentence in
subdivision (e)(2), which states that "[p]rocedures on such
review shall conform to the provisions of subdivisions (a),
(b), and (c) of this rule where those subdivisions are
applicable."  The State suggests that "the review" of the
petition filed in this Court "must also conform to the
provisions in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)."  The State then
notes that Rule 21(a)(3) states that if "a petition is filed
outside this presumptively reasonable time, it shall include
a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the
appellate court to consider the petition, notwithstanding that
1070703
11
it was filed beyond the presumptively reasonable time."  The
State then suggests that the timing provisions in Rule
21(a)(3) apply in this case, and further contends that
although this petition was "filed beyond the presumptively
reasonable time, it is appropriate for this Court to review
because the State of Alabama filed this action immediately
after becoming aware of the decision of the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals."
The general timing provision in subdivision (a)(3) does
not apply to the State's petition for the writ of mandamus in
this case.  As noted above, Rule 21(e) specifically governs a
petition filed in the "supreme court" to review a "decision of
a court of appeals on an original petition for writ of
mandamus ...."  Furthermore, Rule 21(e)(2) invokes only the
provisions of subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), "where those
subdivisions are applicable." (Emphasis added.)  Rule 21(e)
specifically governs the filing in the "supreme court" of a
petition to review a decision of a court of appeals, and Rule
21(e)(2) requires that such a petition be filed within 14 days
of the grant or denial of the writ by the court of appeals.
Because Rule 21(e)(2) specifically governs the timing of
1070703
The materials before us do not explain why the State did
5
not receive notice that the Court of Criminal Appeals had
denied the petition, and there is no explanation or affidavits
in the materials before us demonstrating the circumstances of
the State's alleged lack of notice.
12
filing in this Court of a petition for a writ of mandamus
reviewing a decision of a court of appeals, the general
provisions governing the time for filing mandamus petitions in
Rule 21(a)(3) are not "applicable" within the meaning of the
second sentence of Rule 21(e)(2).  Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 894 So. 2d 643, 650 (Ala. 2004) ("[A]
statutory provision relating to a specific subject is
understood to act as an exception to a provision relating to
general subjects.").  Because the petition in this case was
not filed within 14 days after the Court of Criminal Appeals'
denial of the State's petition for the writ of mandamus,  we
5
hold that the instant petition is untimely filed and,
therefore, is due to be dismissed.
PETITION DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.