Title: Rauda v. Oregon Roses, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44257
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 1999

FILED: AUGUST 5, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

FIDEL AGUILAR RAUDA, JOSE SAUL
AVALOS AGUILAR, OSCAR AGUILAR,
MARIA TERESA ALVARADO DE MEDINA,
REFUGIO BUCIO MARTINEZ, MARTIN
LEON MARTINEZ, TAURINO LOPEZ
TENORIO, TIBURCIO RAMIREZ MENDEZ,
ARACELI REYES ROSENDO, HERMILIO
ROMERO ARZOLA, SILVESTRE RUIZ MENDEZ,

	Respondents on Review,

	v.

OREGON ROSES, INC.,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 9410-75CV; CA A90331; SC S44257)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted on March 2, 1998.

	Barbee B. Lyon, Tonkon, Torp, Galen, Marmaduke &amp; Booth, Portland, argued the cause
on behalf of petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was Jon P. Stride, Portland.

	D. Michael Dale, Oregon Legal Services Corporation, Hillsboro, argued the cause on
behalf of respondents on review.  

	Joe Hobson, Jr., Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Farm Bureau
Federation.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Van Hoomissen, Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson,
Justices.**

	DURHAM, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the appeal dismissed.

	*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court,

	 Jon Lund, Judge.

	 147 Or App 106, 935 P2d 469 (1997).

	**Graber, J., resigned March 31, 1998, and did not participate in this decision.  Gillette
and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.  

	DURHAM, J.

	In this employment dispute, the parties disagree whether plaintiffs stated a claim
for wrongful discharge.  We conclude, however, that the trial court's judgment is not appealable. 
Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss defendant's appeal.

	Plaintiffs are agricultural workers who allege that defendant, their employer,
discharged them for discussing the terms of their compensation with defendant's agent.  Plaintiffs
filed two claims regarding the discharges:  breach of contract and wrongful discharge.  Defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim.  ORCP 21 A(8).  The
trial court dismissed the claim for breach of contract.  No party challenges that decision.  The
trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the wrongful discharge claim.

	The parties then stipulated to the entry of a judgment that resolved all of plaintiffs'
claims and submitted the stipulated judgment to the court.  The stipulated judgment purported to
reserve to defendant a right to appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss the claim for wrongful
discharge.(1)  The court signed and entered the stipulated judgment.

	The stipulated judgment provides:

		"The Court has denied defendant's motion to dismiss both counts of the
[wrongful discharge claim].  Defendant has offered to stipulate that the amount of
damages otherwise recoverable on [that claim] is $30,000, reserving nevertheless
its right to appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss [that claim].  Plaintiffs have
agreed to the stipulation.  It is therefore

		"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

		"1. Plaintiffs have judgment against defendant on their First Claim [for
wrongful discharge] in the amount of $30,000;

		"2. All other claims are dismissed; and

		"3. No costs or attorney fees are awarded to either party.

	"[Financial details of Money Judgment omitted.]

		"DATED this 5th day of September, 1995.

						/s/ Jon Lund                  

						JON LUND, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

	"It Is So Stipulated:

	"[Signature of Counsel 		[Signature of Counsel 

	  for defendant]			 for plaintiffs]

	"Dated: August 29, 1995		Dated: September 1, 1995"

	Defendant appealed from that judgment.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Rauda
v. Oregon Roses, Inc., 147 Or App 106, 935 P2d 469 (1997).  Defendant petitioned for review.

	We inquire sua sponte into the question whether the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal.  See, e.g., Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Van Dyke, 285
Or 375, 377, 591 P2d 352 (1979) (even if the respondent does not raise the issue, court will
dismiss appeal on own motion if appellate jurisdiction does not exist).  Defendant argued, in
response to questions from the court during oral argument, that the stipulated judgment was
appealable.  

	Ososke v. DMV, 320 Or 657, 659-60, 891 P2d 633 (1995) states: "The right to
obtain appellate review is statutory and subject to limitations imposed by the statute conferring
the right."  An appellate court cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over an appeal unless a
statute authorizes an appeal from the judgment or order that the trial court entered.  See Zacker v.
North Tillamook County Hospital Dist., 312 Or 330, 336, 822 P2d 1143 (1991) (Court of
Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction where party attempted to appeal from order of dismissal;
statute authorized appeal only from judgment of dismissal).  

	The pertinent statute here is ORS 19.245,(2) which provides, in part:

		"Any party to a judgment or decree, other than a judgment or decree given
by confession or for want of an answer, may appeal therefrom.  The plaintiff may
appeal from a judgment or decree given by confession or for want of an answer
where such judgment or decree is not in accordance with the relief demanded in
the complaint. * * *"

In Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or 445, 927 P2d 591 (1996), this court construed that statute and
concluded that the legislature intentionally omitted any authorization to appeal from a stipulated
judgment.  In reaching that conclusion, Russell relied on the established legal meaning of the
distinctive terminology in the statute as well as a number of earlier decisions of this court that
construed ORS 19.245 or its substantively identical predecessors.  Those authorities establish
that Oregon law never has authorized an appeal from a stipulated judgment, that is, "a judgment
entered with the consent of both the party against whom the judgment is entered and the party in
whose favor the judgment is entered."  Russell, 304 Or at 450 (emphasis in original).

	As noted above, the parties stipulated to the judgment, which resolved all of
plaintiffs' claims.  They also agreed that defendant "reserv[ed] nevertheless its right to appeal the
denial of its motion to dismiss" the wrongful discharge claim.  For purposes of this opinion, we
assume that that wording sought to reserve for defendant a right to appeal from the judgment for
the purpose of assigning error to the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss the
wrongful discharge claim.  The parties did not confine their stipulation, for example, to the fact
or amount of plaintiffs' damages.  This case raises the question whether the stipulated judgment
is appealable because it purports to reserve defendant's right to appeal from it.  For the reasons
discussed below, we conclude that the stipulated judgment is not appealable.

	In two cases, this court has held that the attempt to reserve a party's right of appeal
in a stipulated judgment is without legal effect.  In Twitchell v. Risley, 56 Or 226, 107 P 459
(1910), the defendant answered the plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff demurred to new matter in
the answer, and the trial court sustained the demurrer.  The parties then stipulated:

			"'That the plaintiff paid substantially
as alleged in defendant A.J. Risley's further
and separate answer the sum of $1,020, to
which answer a demurrer was interposed and
sustained by the court, and it is hereby
agreed by and between the parties hereto that
judgment may be entered against A.J. Risley
in that sum.  It is further understood and
agreed that the defendant, A.J. Risley, is
not to be prejudiced hereto to take an appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon
from the ruling of the court sustaining the
demurrer to his further and separate answer,
it being the intention thereby to arrive at
the amount, if any, due plaintiff in this
action, if a trial was had on the issues as
they now stand.'"

Id. at 227.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.  Ibid.  This court
dismissed the appeal on its own motion, stating:

		"It has been held by this court that no appeal
lies from a judgment or decree rendered by consent of
the parties:  Rader v. Barr, 22 Or. 495 (29 Pac. 889);
Schmidt v. Oregon Gold Mining Co., 28 Or. 9 (40 Pac.
406, 1014: 52 Am. St. Rep. 759).  In the latter case it
was held that, strictly speaking, such a decree is not
given by confession or for want of an answer, yet will
be governed by Section 548, B. &amp; C. Comp.  The purpose
of an appeal is to bring up for review an erroneous
action of the trial court; but the trial court performs
no judicial act when an order, decree, or judgment is
entered by consent.  No appeal can be taken by either
party from such decision, since the error, if any, is
his own, and not the court's.  2 Pld. &amp; Prac. 99."

Id. at 227-28.		

	This court then discussed the invalidity of the defendant's attempt, in the text of
the stipulated judgment, to preserve a right to appeal:

		"By the stipulation in the record, the parties to
this cause expressly agreed that the judgment from
which the appeal is attempted to be prosecuted should
be rendered; but defendant attempted to create or save
a right to appeal therefrom by inserting in the
stipulation a reservation to the effect that he should
not be prejudiced thereby to appeal from the ruling of
the court, sustaining the demurrer to his further and
separate answer.  This right he never possessed.  All
the errors of law committed by the court during the
course of a trial are merged in the judgment, from
which the appeal, if any, is taken, and not from
interlocutory orders.  Defendant cannot appeal from the
judgment because of the statute and he cannot waive
that to which he had no right * * *."

Id. at 228 (citations omitted).  

	In a similar manner, in Basche-Sage Hdw. Co. v. DeWolfe, 113 Or 246, 251, 231
P 135 (1925), the plaintiff sought to preserve a right to appeal by incorporating in a stipulated
judgment a statement that the stipulation was "subject to" the plaintiff's right to appeal.  This
court concluded that such a statement was ineffective to preserve the right to appeal: