Title: Washburn County v. Eric D. Smith
Citation: 2008 WI 23
Docket Number: 2006AP003163
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2008

2008 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP3163 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the matter of the refusal of Eric D. Smith: 
 
Washburn County, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Eric D. Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 303 Wis. 2d 748, 735 N.W.2d 195 
(Ct. App.:2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 28, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 29, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn   
 
JUDGE: 
Eugene D. Harrington   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Kevin J. Mulrooney, Kirk B. Obear, and Melowski, Obear & Cohen, 
S.C., Elkhart Lake, and oral argument by Kirk B. Obear. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Daniel J. Tolan, assistant district attorney.  
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP3163  
(L.C. No. 
2006TR1848) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the refusal of Eric D. Smith: 
 
 
 
Washburn County, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric D. Smith, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 28, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Eric D. 
Smith, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming an order of the Circuit Court for Washburn 
County, Eugene D. Harrington, Judge.1  At a statutory refusal 
hearing, the circuit court revoked the defendant's operating 
                                                 
1 Washburn County v. Smith, No. 2006AP3163, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 8, 2007).   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
2 
 
privileges for refusing to submit to a test to determine the 
presence or quantity of alcohol.  The circuit court determined 
that the defendant improperly refused to submit to chemical 
testing under Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305 (2003-04).2  The circuit court ordered the defendant's 
operating privileges revoked for twelve months.  The charge of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant remains pending.   
¶2 
The issues at a statutory refusal hearing are limited 
to, inter alia, whether the officer had probable cause to 
believe that the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence and whether the officer complied with 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) governing the information the officer 
shall read to the person from whom the test specimen is 
requested.3   
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.  See also State v. Nordness, 
128 Wis. 2d 15, 28, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986) (holding that the 
issues at a statutory refusal hearing are limited to whether the 
officer had probable cause to believe that the person was 
driving under the influence of alcohol; whether the officer 
complied with the informational provisions of the Implied 
Consent Law; whether the person refused to permit the test; and 
whether the refusal to submit to the test was due to a physical 
inability). 
If any issue is determined favorably to the person, the 
circuit court shall order that no action be taken on the 
operating privilege on account of the person's refusal to take 
the test in question.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d). 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Two issues are presented on review of the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order 
revoking the defendant's operating privileges during the refusal 
hearing:  
I. 
Did the circuit court err in determining in the refusal 
hearing that the law enforcement officer had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant?   
II. 
Did the circuit court err in determining in the refusal 
hearing that the defendant improperly refused to submit 
to chemical testing?    
¶4 
This court is reviewing the rulings of the circuit 
court at the refusal hearing.     
¶5 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
affirming the circuit court's order revoking the defendant's 
operating privileges.  The circuit court did not err in 
concluding that the state presented sufficient evidence at the 
refusal hearing to establish the officer's probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of an intoxicant.  The circuit court did not 
err in holding that the defendant improperly refused to submit 
to chemical testing.  
¶6 
We shall state the facts relevant to each issue in 
discussing that issue.     
I 
¶7 
The defendant urges that the evidence presented at the 
refusal hearing established that the law enforcement officer had 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
4 
 
only a reasonable suspicion that the defendant operated a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.  In deciding 
whether the circuit court erred in determining in the refusal 
hearing that Deputy Sutherland had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant, we first state the facts surrounding 
the arrest and then answer the question of probable cause.   
A 
¶8 
Here are the facts.  At approximately 2:40 a.m. on 
July 23, 2006, Deputy Shawn Sutherland of the Washburn County 
Sheriff's Department observed the defendant's vehicle traveling 
on a two-lane highway at a rate of speed that appeared to be 
well above the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour.  The 
Deputy's stationary radar indicated that the defendant's vehicle 
was traveling at 76 miles per hour, 21 miles per hour in excess 
of the posted speed limit.   
¶9 
The Deputy activated his emergency lights and followed 
the defendant.  While in pursuit, the Deputy observed that the 
defendant seemed to have "a delayed response" in pulling over.  
Deputy Sutherland estimated that the defendant continued to 
travel down a curved portion of the highway for approximately 
three-tenths of a mile after the officer activated his emergency 
lights.  The Deputy also observed the defendant's vehicle cross 
the 
highway's 
double-yellow 
centerline 
twice 
before 
the 
defendant pulled over. 
¶10 Once the defendant pulled over, the Deputy approached 
the driver's side of the vehicle and initiated conversation with 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
5 
 
the defendant.  The Deputy detected the odor of alcohol on the 
defendant's breath and asked the defendant how much he had been 
drinking that night.  The defendant responded that he had 
consumed "a couple of beers" at Grandma Link's Restaurant and 
Bar. 
¶11 Later in the conversation, the defendant also told the 
Deputy that he would be lying if he said he had just a couple 
beers.  Deputy Sutherland asked the defendant how long he had 
been drinking that night.  The defendant replied that he had 
consumed more than two beers between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 
just prior to being stopped at 2:40 a.m.   
¶12 The Deputy testified that he formed the opinion that 
the defendant was too intoxicated to operate a motor vehicle 
safely.  The Deputy also testified that he formed this opinion 
on the basis of the excessive speed at which the defendant was 
driving; the fact that the defendant crossed the highway's 
centerline while being pursued; the odor of intoxicants on the 
defendant's breath; and the amount of alcohol that the defendant 
admitted to having consumed.  Deputy Sutherland placed the 
defendant under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant and transported the defendant to 
the Washburn County jail.4 
                                                 
4 Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant is prohibited under Wis. Stat. § 346.63.  Section 
346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive 
or operate a motor vehicle while: . . . (b) The person has a 
prohibited alcohol concentration."   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
6 
 
¶13 The defendant urges that this court reverse the 
circuit court's holding of probable cause on the ground that the 
evidence presented at the refusal hearing established that the 
law enforcement officer had only a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant operated while intoxicated, which is not sufficient to 
justify an arrest. 
B 
¶14 The issue presented is whether the circuit court erred 
in ruling in the refusal hearing that the law enforcement 
officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.  The 
circuit court could not revoke the defendant's operating 
privileges based on the defendant's refusal to submit to 
chemical testing unless the defendant's arrest was based on 
probable cause.5   
¶15 In the context of a refusal hearing following an 
arrest 
for 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated, 
"probable cause" refers generally to that quantum of evidence 
that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe 
that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the 
                                                 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a 
refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the 
defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 
346.63(1) . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d) (providing that if 
one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is 
determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order 
that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of 
the person's refusal" to submit to chemical testing).   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
7 
 
influence of an intoxicant.6  The burden was on the state in the 
instant case to present evidence sufficient to establish the 
officer's probable cause to believe that the defendant was 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.7    
¶16 Whether probable cause to arrest exists in a given 
case 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
determines 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.8  
¶17 In arguing that the Deputy did not have probable cause 
to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant, the defendant contends that no 
evidence 
existed 
of 
slurred 
speech, 
difficulty 
standing, 
bloodshot eyes, or other indicia of intoxication.  The defendant 
relies principally upon two decisions of this court to support 
his position that the Deputy did not have probable cause to 
arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of  an intoxicant: State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 
471 N.W.2d 226 (1991), and State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 
475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).  Neither case supports the defendant. 
                                                 
6 Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d at 35.   
7 Id.  
8 State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 710, 345 N.W.2d 457 
(1984) ("If the historical facts are undisputed, probable cause 
for an arrest is a question of law that is subject to 
independent review on appeal, without deference to the trial 
court's conclusion.").  
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
8 
 
¶18 In Seibel, a law enforcement officer arrested Seibel 
for homicide by negligent use of a motor vehicle after Seibel's 
motorcycle crossed a highway centerline, sideswiped an oncoming 
vehicle and caused the death of the vehicle's two occupants.9  
Seibel subsequently agreed to provide the officer with a blood 
sample for purposes of a blood alcohol test.10  The State charged 
Seibel with two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle, along with other crimes involving operation of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.11   
¶19 Seibel moved to suppress the results of his blood 
alcohol test on the ground that probable cause did not exist to 
arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant and that the State's act of drawing a 
blood sample from Seibel constituted an unlawful search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.12   
¶20 The Seibel court did not address the question whether 
the State had probable cause to arrest Seibel for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.13  
Rather, in Seibel the court concluded that when the officer had 
probable cause to arrest Seibel for homicide caused by negligent 
                                                 
9 State v. Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d 164, 167-69, 471 N.W.2d 226 
(1991) 
10 Id. at 169.   
11 Id.   
12 Id. at 170.   
13 The State did not argue that such probable cause existed.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
9 
 
operation of a motor vehicle,14 the State need prove only 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
driver's 
blood 
contained evidence to take a blood sample incident to the 
arrest.   
¶21 The Seibel court determined that the law enforcement 
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Seibel's blood 
contained evidence of the crime of homicide by negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle, namely evidence that Seibel had 
imbibed an amount of alcohol sufficient to lessen or impair his 
ability to exercise ordinary care behind the wheel.15  The court 
identified 
four 
indicia 
of 
drinking 
that 
collectively 
established reasonable suspicion: Seibel's unexplained erratic 
driving leading to a serious accident; a strong odor of 
intoxicants emanating from Seibel's traveling companions (who 
had been driving their motorcycles with Seibel as Seibel drove 
his); one officer's belief that he also smelled an intoxicant on 
Seibel; and Seibel's belligerence and lack of contact with the 
reality that he was at fault for the accident resulting in the 
victims' deaths.16 
¶22 Seibel is not, however, dispositive of the present 
case.  The Seibel court never considered whether the State could 
meet the probable cause standard for an arrest for driving while 
                                                 
14 Seibel did not dispute the existence of probable cause 
for his arrest on this charge.   
15 Seibel, 163 Wis. 2d at 180.   
16 Id. at 181-83.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
10 
 
under the influence.  Rather, the Seibel court addressed only 
the questions whether law enforcement officers had probable 
cause to arrest Seibel for operating a motor vehicle negligently 
and causing a homicide, and whether they had reasonable 
suspicion supporting a belief that Seibel's blood contained 
evidence of the crime of homicide by negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle.   
¶23 Moreover, in the present case the Deputy had knowledge 
of significant indicia of intoxication that were not present in 
Seibel.  The defendant admitted to the Deputy that the defendant 
had consumed alcohol prior to driving and supplied inconsistent 
and equivocal information regarding the amount of alcohol that 
he had consumed, first stating that he had consumed a couple of 
beers and later stating that he would be lying if he said he had 
consumed just a couple of beers.  The defendant also admitted 
that he had been at a bar for more than ten hours immediately 
preceding his encounter with the Deputy. 
¶24 The defendant also relies on Swanson, arguing that 
Swanson requires that a field sobriety test had to have been 
performed if the State is to establish probable cause to arrest 
the defendant for driving while operating under the influence.17   
¶25 In Swanson, law enforcement officers observed Swanson 
drive his automobile onto the sidewalk in front of a tavern at 
                                                 
17 The circuit court granted the defendant's unopposed 
motion to exclude testimony about the field sobriety test that 
was administered in the present case; the Deputy had failed to 
comply with a subpoena duces tecum directing him to bring his 
training manuals to the hearing.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
11 
 
approximately 2:00 a.m. and nearly hit at least one pedestrian.18  
The officers approached Swanson to speak to him about the 
incident and detected an odor of intoxicants on Swanson's 
breath, but Swanson had no slurred speech or difficulty 
standing.   
¶26 The officers who confronted Swanson apparently decided 
to administer a field sobriety test to Swanson inside their 
squad car and proceeded to perform a pat-down search of Swanson 
prior to placing him in the vehicle.  This search revealed a bag 
of marijuana in Swanson's pocket.19  
¶27 Upon receiving a request for backup assistance at a 
domestic disturbance, the officers aborted their plans to 
administer a field sobriety test.  The officers placed Swanson 
under arrest for possession of marijuana and put Swanson in the 
back of the squad car.20  Swanson accompanied the officers to the 
domestic disturbance call and then escaped when left alone.21  
Swanson was later apprehended and charged with felony escape and 
possession of a controlled substance.22  The circuit court 
dismissed the criminal complaint, concluding that the pat-down 
                                                 
18 State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 442, 475 N.W.2d 148 
(1991).   
19 Id. at 442.   
20 Id. at 442-43.   
21 Id. at 443.   
22 Id.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
12 
 
search and arrest of Swanson for possession of marijuana were 
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.23   
¶28 This court held that the officers' pat-down search of 
Swanson could not be justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), as a pat-down search for weapons.24  The Swanson court 
also held that the pat-down search could not be justified as a 
search incident to lawful arrest, because Swanson was not in 
fact under arrest at the time of the search.25 
¶29 The State argued in Swanson that the officers "could 
have" placed Swanson under arrest for a number of offenses, 
including operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an 
intoxicant 
and 
reckless 
endangering 
safety, 
and 
that 
therefore the search was a valid search incident to an arrest.26  
The Swanson court refused "to carve out an exception to 
warrantless searches based solely on probable cause with no 
resulting arrest."27  Because the State failed to show that an 
arrest for anything other than possession of a controlled 
substance was ever implied, attempted, or accomplished, the 
court refused to address whether probable cause existed to 
arrest Swanson for any of the other offenses.28   
                                                 
23 Id.   
24 Id. at 445, 454.   
25 Id. at 452. 
26 Id. at 453. 
27 Id. at 453. 
28 Id.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
13 
 
¶30 Nevertheless, 
the 
Swanson 
court 
addressed 
in 
a 
footnote the question of whether probable cause to arrest for 
any offense existed, stating that the officers "arguably" lacked 
probable cause to arrest Swanson for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or for the other 
offenses suggested by the State.29  The defendant embraces this 
footnote in Swanson, arguing that in the absence of a field 
sobriety test, the indicia of intoxication in Swanson and in the 
present case support only a reasonable suspicion that the person 
was driving while intoxicated. 
¶31 The Swanson court noted that officers had knowledge of 
three indicia of criminal conduct——namely Swanson's unexplained 
erratic driving, the odor of intoxicants on Swanson's breath, 
and the approximate time of the incident (about the time that 
bars close in Wisconsin)——and concluded that such indicia "form 
the basis for a reasonable suspicion but should not, in the 
absence of a field sobriety test, constitute probable cause to 
arrest someone for driving while under the influence of 
intoxicants."30  The court explained that without a field 
sobriety test, "the police officers could not evaluate whether 
the suspect's physical capacities were sufficiently impaired by 
the consumption of intoxicants to warrant an arrest."31 
                                                 
29 Id. at 453 n.6. 
30 Id. at 454 n.6. 
31 Id. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
14 
 
¶32 The relevant comments in the Swanson footnote are 
follows: 
Clearly, the officers here did possess a reasonable 
suspicion that Swanson had committed a criminal act, 
either operating under the influence or reckless 
endangerment, but arguably lacked probable cause to 
arrest Swanson at the time of the search.  The first 
indicia 
of 
criminal 
conduct 
included 
Swanson's 
unexplained erratic driving.  The second indicia 
included 
the 
odor of intoxicants emanating from 
Swanson as he spoke.  The third indicia included the 
approximate time of the incident, which occurred at 
about the time that bars close in the state of 
Wisconsin.  Taken together, these indicia form a basis 
for reasonable suspicion that Swanson was driving 
while 
intoxicated. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Seibel, 
163 
Wis. 2d 164, 183, 471 N.W.2d 226 (1991), where we held 
that similar factors add up to a reasonable suspicion 
but not probable cause.  
 . . . Unexplained 
erratic 
driving, 
the 
odor 
of 
alcohol, and the coincidental time of the incident 
form the basis for a reasonable suspicion but should 
not, in the absence of a field sobriety test, 
constitute 
probable cause to arrest someone for 
driving while under the influence of intoxicants.  A 
field sobriety test could be as simple as a finger-to-
nose or walk-a-straight-line test.  Without such a 
test, the police officers could not evaluate whether 
the suspect's physical capacities were sufficiently 
impaired by the consumption of intoxicants to warrant 
an arrest.32 
¶33 Swanson did not announce a general rule requiring 
field sobriety tests in all cases as a prerequisite for 
establishing probable cause to arrest a driver for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. 
                                                 
32 Id. at 453-54 n.6. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
15 
 
¶34 Furthermore, the Swanson court's statement pertained 
to the circumstances of that case.33   The question of probable 
cause must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Swanson, like 
Seibel, is distinguishable from the present case because the 
Deputy in the instant case had knowledge of significant indicia 
of intoxication that were not present in Swanson.  The defendant 
in the present case, in contrast to Swanson, admitted that he 
had consumed an indeterminate number of drinks (but more than 
two) during a 10-hour stay at a bar prior to being pulled over.     
¶35 The circumstances of the present case are similar to 
those in State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 684, 518 N.W.2d 325 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994), 
in that all circumstances have to be 
considered.  In Wille, the court of appeals determined that in 
the context of a statutory refusal hearing, a law enforcement 
officer had probable cause to arrest Wille when the officer 
smelled intoxicants coming from Wille; knew that two other 
persons had smelled intoxicants coming from Wille; knew that 
Wille had driven his automobile into the rear end of a car 
parked on the shoulder of a highway causing a serious accident; 
and heard Wille declare that had "to quit doing this."34  The 
Wille court of appeals explained that Wille's declaration 
                                                 
33 See State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 684, 518 N.W.2d 325 
(Ct. App. 1994) ("The Swanson footnote does not mean that under 
all circumstances the officer must first perform a field 
sobriety test, before deciding whether to arrest for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant."). 
34 Wille, 185 Wis. 2d at 683.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
16 
 
evinced a consciousness of guilt and determined that the 
declaration helped to distinguish that case from Swanson.35 
¶36 We conclude that under the circumstances of the 
present case, the Deputy's knowledge at the time of the arrest 
would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that 
the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant.  At the time of the arrest, the 
Deputy knew that the defendant had been driving well in excess 
of the speed limit late at night on a two-lane highway; that the 
defendant delayed pulling over after the deputy activated his 
emergency lights; that the defendant had twice driven across the 
centerline before pulling over; that the defendant had an odor 
of alcohol on his breath; that the defendant had admitted to 
consuming alcohol over a period of more than ten hours ending 
just prior to his encounter with the deputy; and that the 
defendant had supplied inconsistent and equivocal information 
regarding the amount of alcohol that he had consumed during that 
period of time.  The state has met its burden of presenting 
evidence sufficient to establish that the Deputy had probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and had 
probable cause to arrest him for this offense. 
¶37 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in concluding that the state presented 
sufficient evidence at the refusal hearing to establish the 
                                                 
35 Id. at 684. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
17 
 
officer's probable cause to believe that the defendant was 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.   
II 
¶38 The defendant urges that he did not improperly refuse 
to submit to chemical testing.  He contends that his refusal was 
not improper because the Deputy made two misstatements to the 
defendant regarding the penalties the defendant would incur for 
refusing to submit to a chemical test.  In considering whether 
the circuit court erred in concluding that the defendant 
improperly refused to submit to chemical testing, we first state 
the facts surrounding the refusal and then consider the statutes 
and case law.    
A 
¶39 Here are the facts.  When Deputy Sutherland and the 
defendant arrived at the Washburn County jail, the Deputy read, 
verbatim, a form to the defendant entitled "Informing the 
Accused."  The form, promulgated by the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, 
incorporates 
the 
language 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) that the legislature requires a law enforcement 
officer to read when the officer requests that a person submit 
to chemical testing.   
¶40 After reading the form, the Deputy asked the defendant 
whether he would submit to an evidentiary test of his breath.36  
                                                 
36 Deputy 
Sutherland's 
post-arrest 
request 
that 
the 
defendant submit to chemical testing was authorized under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(a).  Section 343.305(3)(a) provides in 
relevant part as follows:      
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
18 
 
The defendant was unsure whether he wanted to submit to the test 
and expressed concern regarding the penalties that he might be 
facing.   
¶41 According 
to 
the 
Deputy's 
testimony, 
prior 
to 
expounding upon the penalties that the defendant might face, the 
Deputy informed the defendant that he could not give the 
defendant legal advice.  The Deputy then told the defendant that 
if the breath test registered a blood alcohol concentration over 
the legal limit of .08%, the defendant's operating privileges 
would be suspended for a period of six months.  The Deputy 
further told the defendant that if the defendant refused to 
submit to the test, the defendant would face a one-year 
revocation of his operating privileges.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Upon arrest of a person for violation of s. 346.63(1), 
(2m) or (5) or a local ordinance in conformity 
therewith, or for a violation of s. 346.63(2) or (6) 
or 940.25, . . . a law enforcement officer may request 
the person to provide one or more samples of his or 
her breath, blood or urine for the purpose specified 
under sub. (2). . . . 
Under the Implied Consent Law, the defendant was deemed to 
have consented to the test requested by Deputy Sutherland when 
the defendant decided to drive upon a Wisconsin highway.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
Any person who . . . operates a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways of this state . . . is deemed to have 
given consent to one or more tests of his or her 
breath, 
blood 
or 
urine, 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
determining the presence or quantity in his or her 
blood or breath, of alcohol . . . when requested to do 
so 
by 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
under 
sub. 
(3)(a) . . . ."  
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
19 
 
¶42 The Deputy offered conflicting testimony regarding 
statements he made to the defendant about the defendant's right 
to contest a revocation of operating privileges based on the 
defendant's refusal to submit to chemical testing.  On direct 
examination, Deputy Sutherland testified that he told the 
defendant that the defendant would have a "ten-day period to 
request administrative review" if he refused to submit to 
chemical testing.  On cross-examination, defense counsel asked 
Deputy Sutherland whether the Deputy remembered telling the 
defendant that "if he refused it's a 12-month revocation but you 
get a hearing within ten days."  Deputy Sutherland replied, 
"Correct." 
¶43 The inconsistency between Deputy Sutherland's two 
statements was never resolved.37  Neither counsel for the state 
nor counsel for the defendant pointed out the inconsistency to 
the Deputy.  The circuit court did not make a factual finding 
regarding whether the Deputy advised the defendant correctly 
that he could "request" an administrative hearing within ten 
days, or told the defendant incorrectly that he could "get" a 
hearing in ten days.   
¶44 The defendant agreed to submit to a breath test.  The 
Deputy set up the Intoximeter and instructed the defendant how 
to use it.  The Deputy instructed the defendant to take a deep 
breath, to get a good seal around the Intoximeter's mouthpiece, 
                                                 
37 The questioning revealed that the conversation between 
the Deputy and the defendant had been recorded in some fashion, 
but no recording of the conversation is in the record. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
20 
 
and to provide a long, steady blow into the machine until the 
deputy told him to stop. 
¶45 The defendant made one attempt to submit a breath 
sample using the Intoximeter, but this attempt was unsuccessful.  
The Deputy explained at the hearing that the defendant did not 
have a good seal around the mouthpiece and did not blow very 
hard into the Intoximeter and that it seemed like the defendant 
was attempting to blow around, not into, the Intoximeter's tube.   
¶46 The Deputy testified that he confronted the defendant 
about the defendant's apparent attempt to blow around the 
Intoximeter's tube and that he tried to get the defendant to 
correct the problem.  The defendant responded that he did not 
think he should take the breath test.  The Deputy then asked the 
defendant if that was his final decision.  The defendant replied 
that it was.  The Deputy informed the defendant that he would 
consider the defendant's answer as a refusal to submit to the 
test.   
¶47 The Deputy provided the defendant with a notice of 
intent to revoke the defendant's operating privilege.38  The 
                                                 
38 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(a) provides in relevant part 
that "[i]f a person refuses to take a test under sub. (3)(a), 
the law enforcement officer shall immediately take possession of 
the person's license and prepare a notice of intent to revoke, 
by 
court 
order 
under 
sub. 
(10), 
the 
person's 
operating 
privilege. . . ." 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
21 
 
defendant requested a hearing (the refusal hearing) to contest 
revocation of his operating privileges.39   
¶48 At the time of his arrest, the defendant had a 
Louisiana operator's license.  Defense counsel asked Deputy 
Sutherland on cross-examination whether the Deputy was aware 
that the defendant had a Louisiana driver's license at the time 
of the arrest.  Deputy Sutherland testified that he was aware 
that the defendant had a Louisiana operator's license. 
¶49 Defense counsel also asked the Deputy whether he was 
aware that his statement of penalties applicable to the 
defendant did not accurately represent what happens to a 
Louisiana driver.  The Deputy replied that he had no idea what 
happens in Louisiana.  The Deputy testified that his statements 
to the defendant pertained to Wisconsin law.  
¶50 The circuit court ordered the defendant's operating 
privileges revoked for 12 months based on the defendant's 
refusal to submit to chemical testing. 
B 
¶51 A 
refusal 
to 
submit 
to 
a 
chemical 
test 
for 
intoxication cannot result in revocation of operating privileges 
unless the person has first been adequately informed of his 
rights under the law.40  The defendant contends that the Deputy 
                                                 
39 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. entitles the defendant 
to "request a hearing on the revocation within 10 days by 
mailing or delivering a written request to the court whose 
address is specified in the notice." 
40 State v. Schirmang, 210 Wis. 2d 324, 330, 565 N.W.2d 225 
(Ct. App. 1997).   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
22 
 
made two mistakes in informing the defendant of his rights.  
First, the defendant asserts that the Deputy mistakenly advised 
the defendant, who held a Louisiana operator's license, of the 
penalties under Wisconsin law but failed to advise the defendant 
that he might incur different penalties under Louisiana law.  
Second, according to the defendant, the Deputy mistakenly told 
the defendant that if he refused to take the chemical test he 
would get a hearing within ten days.   
¶52 The information that the Deputy had to convey to the 
defendant is governed by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), which sets 
forth the information that a law enforcement officer shall read 
to the person from whom the test sample is requested, as 
follows: 
INFORMATION.  At the time that a chemical test 
specimen is requested under sub. (3) (a) or (am), the 
law enforcement officer shall read the following to 
the person from whom the test specimen is requested: 
"You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or 
you are suspected of driving or being on duty time 
with respect to a commercial motor vehicle after 
consuming an intoxicating beverage. 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system.  If any test shows more alcohol in your 
system than the law permits while driving, your 
operating privilege will be suspended.  If you refuse 
to take any test that this agency requests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked and you will be 
subject to other penalties.  The test results or the 
fact that you refused testing can be used against you 
in court. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
23 
 
If you take all the requested tests, you may choose to 
take further tests.  You may take the alternative test 
that this law enforcement agency provides free of 
charge.  You also may have a test conducted by a 
qualified person of your choice at your expense.  You, 
however, will have to make your own arrangements for 
that test. 
If you have a commercial driver license or were 
operating 
a 
commercial 
motor 
vehicle, 
other 
consequences may result from positive test results or 
from refusing testing, such as being placed out of 
service or disqualified." 
¶53 The parties and the circuit court agree, as do we, 
that the Deputy complied fully with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  
The Deputy read the required statutory information verbatim to 
the defendant. 
¶54 The problem arises in the instant case with respect to 
the Deputy's imparting information to the defendant in addition 
to the information provided the defendant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) and the defendant's assertion that the additional 
information was in error.   
¶55 The interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305 to undisputed facts is a question of law that this 
court determines independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals but benefiting from their analyses.41  We examine the  
case law interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 343.305 to fact 
situations in which a law enforcement officer has given 
additional and incorrect information to the person from whom a 
test is requested.   
                                                 
41 State v. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 571 N.W.2d 417 
(Ct. App. 1997).   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
24 
 
¶56 The principal case is County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 
Wis. 2d 269, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), in which the court 
of appeals set forth a three-pronged inquiry for assessing the 
information process mandated by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).42 The 
Quelle court held that a circuit court must answer the following 
three questions in the affirmative before determining that the 
information 
imparted 
by 
the 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
is 
inadequate: 
(1) Has the law enforcement officer not met, or 
exceeded his or her duty under §§ 343.305(4) . . . to 
provide information to the accused driver; 
(2) 
Is 
the 
lack 
or 
oversupply 
of 
information 
misleading;43 and 
                                                 
42 County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 280, 542 
N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The Quelle court of appeals relied in part on State v. 
Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d 709, 503 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1993).  Like 
Quelle, the Sutton case involved a law enforcement officer who 
imparted information in addition to that required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) to a person.  The officer in Sutton mistakenly 
informed Sutton that one possible penalty for refusing to submit 
to chemical testing was a jail sentence.  Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d at 
713-14.  Sutton stands for the proposition that an overstatement 
of 
penalties 
supplied 
in 
excess 
of 
the 
requirements 
of 
§ 343.305(4) 
is 
still 
substantial 
compliance 
unless 
the 
overstatement has a prejudicial effect on the driver.  See 
Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d at 715.  See also Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 279 
(stating that in Sutton, "[a]lthough the police had misinformed 
the driver, [the court of appeals] nonetheless held that the 
revocation order was valid because there was no prejudicial 
effect on the driver"). 
43 "The term 'misleading' in the second Quelle prong was 
meant by [the court of appeals] to be synonymous with the term 
'erroneous.'".  State v. Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d 871, 875, 569 
N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 
198 Wis. 2d 269, 282, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
25 
 
(3) Has the failure to properly inform the driver 
affected his or her ability to make the choice about 
chemical testing?44  
¶57 Applying this three-prong inquiry to the facts before 
it, the Quelle court of appeals held that the officer had met 
his duty under Wis. Stat. § 342.305(4) but had exceeded his duty 
by going beyond the statutory duty of reading the information on 
the face of the form.  The officer had advised Quelle that she 
could refuse to submit to the test.45  The answer to the first-
prong of the Quelle inquiry was in the affirmative.  With regard 
to the second prong, the officer's advice was an accurate 
statement of the law.  Thus the answer to the second-prong was 
in the negative, and Quelle failed to satisfy the second prong.46  
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the information 
supplied to Quelle was adequate.   
¶58 Each party relies upon a different court of appeals' 
decision applying the Quelle three-prong inquiry for assessing 
the information process mandated by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  
The defendant relies on State v. Schirmang, 210 Wis. 2d 324, 565 
N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1997).  The State relies on State v. 
Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d 871, 875, 569 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 
¶59 In Schirmang, upon which the defendant relies, a law 
enforcement officer read Schirmang an Informing the Accused 
form, stating in relevant part, "If you . . . refuse to submit 
                                                 
44 Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 280.   
45 Id. at 282.   
46 Id. at 285-86.  
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
26 
 
to chemical testing and you have two or more prior suspensions, 
revocations or convictions within a five year period . . . a 
motor vehicle owned by you may be equipped with an ignition 
interlock device, immobilized or seized and forfeited."47  The 
form read by the officer was out of date.  As a result, the 
officer failed to comply with the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  At the time the officer read the form, the 
applicable penalties applied if the driver "had two or more 
prior . . . convictions [for operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of an intoxicant] within the last ten years."48  At the 
refusal hearing, it was stipulated that Schirmang had one 
conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
an intoxicant within the last five years and a second conviction 
within the last ten years.49 
 
¶60 Applying the Quelle test, the court of appeals 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
revoking 
Schirmang's  
operating privileges.   
¶61 According to the court of appeals, Schirmang satisfied 
the three prongs of the Quelle test——the information did not 
satisfy Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), the information was misleading, 
and Schirmang was prejudiced.  The arresting officer read the 
incorrect Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) information; the officer's 
                                                 
47 State v. Schirmang, 210 Wis. 2d 324, 327, 565 N.W.2d 225 
(Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added in Schirmang).   
48 Id. at 328 (citing 1993 Wis. Acts 315 & 317).   
49 Id.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
27 
 
statement was misleading because it understated the penalties 
applicable to Schirmang (falsely suggesting that the earlier of 
Schirmang's two convictions would not count against Schirmang); 
and the misinformation affected Schirmang's ability to make a 
rational choice because Schirmang could not weigh his factual 
circumstances 
against 
the 
actual 
statutory 
criteria 
that 
affected him.50 
 
¶62 The circuit court had ruled against Schirmang on the 
ground that Schirmang "was not prejudiced by the misinformation 
because he presented no testimony that he would have submitted 
to testing had he been properly informed."51  Citing State v. 
Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d 243, 448 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1989), the court 
of appeals rejected the circuit court's analysis of prejudice, 
stating that "there cannot be . . . substantial compliance with 
§ 343.305(4), Stats., which our decisions require, when, as 
here, the penalties which would actually affect the driver, 
given his driving record, were misstated."52   
                                                 
50 Id. at 330. 
51 Id. at 331.   
52 Id. (citing Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d at 251). 
The cases require "substantial" compliance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  See, e.g., State v. Muente, 159 Wis. 2d 279, 281, 
464 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1990) (complete compliance with 
§ 343.305(4) not required; substantial compliance will suffice); 
State v. Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d 243, 250, 448 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 
1989) (applying the requirement of "substantial" compliance). 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
28 
 
 
¶63 The Schirmang court of appeals interpreted Wilke as 
holding that an officer necessarily fails to substantially 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) whenever the officer 
misstates penalties that would actually affect the driver given 
the driver's record.  Schirmang's characterization of Wilke is 
not an accurate statement of the Wilke holding.  The Wilke case 
involved a law enforcement officer's failure to give the 
defendant one component of the statutorily required information 
(relating to penalties), and the Wilke court of appeals rested 
its decision on this fact.53  According to Wilke, if the circuit 
court determines that the officer failed to inform the accused 
in compliance with the statute, the circuit court "'shall order 
that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of 
the person's refusal to take the test in question.' Sec. 
343.305(9)(d)."54 
The 
Wilke 
opinion 
says 
nothing 
about 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Wilke the court of appeals stated that "substantial 
compliance does require 'actual compliance in respect to the 
substance essential to every reasonable objective of the 
statute.'"  Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d at 250 (citation omitted).  In 
Sutton the court of appeals explained that "[t]he reasonable 
objective of sec. 343.305(4), Stats., is to require the officer 
to inform the arrestee of the possible sanctions resulting from 
his taking or refusing to take the test."  Sutton, 177 
Wis. 2d at 714.   
53 Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d at 248. 
54 Id. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
29 
 
misstatements of penalties that would actually affect the 
driver.55   
 
¶64 The Schirmang court of appeals was correct, however, 
to rely upon Wilke in reaching its decision.  Schirmang, like 
Wilke, involved a law enforcement officer's failure to give the 
defendant the statutorily required information.56  Thus, the 
Wilke and Schirmang cases present the same fact situation.  If 
the Schirmang court of appeals was to adhere to Wilke, the 
Schirmang court of appeals was required to reverse the circuit 
court's 
order 
revoking 
Schirmang's 
operating 
privileges. 
Language in Quelle (and any subsequent cases applying Quelle) 
stating 
that 
the 
Quelle 
three-prong 
inquiry, 
including 
prejudice, applies when a law enforcement officer fails to 
provide the statutorily required information is withdrawn.  The 
                                                 
55 Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d at 712, also mischaracterized the 
holding in Wilke.  The Sutton court of appeals interpreted Wilke 
as holding that "to obtain substantial compliance, the officer 
must not understate the penalties for either refusal to take the 
test or taking the test and obtaining an inappropriate test 
result."  Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d at 713-14.  The Wilke opinion 
included no language referring to understatements of penalties.   
Sutton's incorrect statement of the Wilke decision is not 
the same incorrect statement that is found in Schirmang.  The 
Schirmang court of appeals did not suggest that it was relying 
upon Sutton in interpreting Wilke.    
56 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4)(b) (1993-94) required law 
enforcement officers to provide the following information when 
requesting a chemical test specimen: "If testing is refused, a 
motor vehicle owned by the person may be immobilized, seized and 
forfeited or equipped with an ignition interlock device if the 
person 
has 
2 
or 
more 
prior 
suspensions, 
revocations 
or 
convictions within a 10-year period that would be counted under 
s. 343.307 (1) . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
30 
 
Wilke analysis applies when a law enforcement officer fails to 
provide the statutorily required information.57  According to 
Wilke, the circuit court determines whether the officer failed 
to furnish the statutorily required information, and if it so 
determines, the circuit court orders that no action be taken on 
the operating privilege. 
 
¶65 The instant case is unlike Wilke and Schirmang;  Wilke 
and Schirmang therefore do not govern the instant case.  In the 
instant case the Deputy correctly advised the defendant of the 
information set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).   
 
¶66 We turn to Ludwigson, upon which the state relies. 
¶67 In Ludwigson, which was published shortly after 
Schirmang (and which does not mention Schirmang), the court of 
appeals determined that a law enforcement officer had given the 
information required under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) and also had 
provided Ludwigson with additional information.  The officer 
attempted to explain the form in layman's terms, telling 
Ludwigson that the normal penalty for refusing to submit to a 
                                                 
57 In Quelle, the officer satisfied Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) 
but supplied additional information.   
If the Quelle court of appeals' three-prong inquiry were 
applied when the law enforcement officer had not met his or her 
statutory duty under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), Quelle would be 
inconsistent with State v. Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d 243, 246-47, 448 
N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1989).  In Wilke, a law enforcement officer 
failed to provide Wilke all the information required by 
§ 343.305(4).  The Wilke court of appeals concluded that failure 
to advise a person of a component of the penalties was not 
substantial compliance and reversed the circuit court's order 
revoking 
Wilke's 
operating 
privileges 
without 
discussing 
prejudice. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
31 
 
chemical test is a one-year revocation of driving privileges.58  
Because Ludwigson had a prior conviction for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, her penalty 
for refusing to submit to a chemical test could be a revocation 
period of two years.59  The officer's additional information to 
Ludwigson understating the penalty to which Ludwigson was 
subject for refusing to submit to the test given Ludwigson's 
driving 
record 
amounted 
to 
giving 
Ludwigson 
incorrect 
information.60 
¶68 The 
Ludwigson 
court 
of 
appeals 
ruled 
against 
Ludwigson, concluding that Ludwigson had failed to present any 
evidence to show that the erroneous information caused her to 
refuse to submit to chemical testing.61  The Ludwigson court of 
appeals interpreted the third prong of the Quelle test to impose 
upon the person refusing to submit to the chemical test a burden 
of producing evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing 
                                                 
58 Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 874 & n.1. 
59 Id. at 874 n.1. 
The court of appeals also held that a second statement made 
by the officer was misleading.  The officer told Ludwigson that 
if she was not satisfied with her initial test, she could 
request an alternative test at her own expense.  The court of 
appeals explained that this statement was misleading because 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2) and (5), law enforcement agencies 
are required to administer an alternative chemical test at their 
own expense.  Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 874 n.1.    
60 Under the second Quelle prong, "misleading" is synonymous 
with "erroneous."  Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 875. 
61 Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 877.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
32 
 
of a causal connection between the misleading statements and the 
refusal to submit to chemical testing.62  Once the prima facie 
evidence has been submitted, the burden shifts to the State to 
prove otherwise.63  Ludwigson had the ultimate burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the erroneous additional 
information caused her to refuse to take the test.   
¶69 The court of appeals determined that Ludwigson failed 
to carry even the burden of producing evidence sufficient to 
make a prima facie showing of a causal connection between the 
officer's misleading statements and Ludwigson's refusal to 
submit to chemical testing.  Ludwigson never presented any 
evidence to show that the erroneous information caused her to 
refuse to submit to the test.  She never took the stand on her 
own behalf.  She was not able to point to anything supporting a 
finding of causation in her favor.  The court of appeals 
rejected Ludwigson's argument that the erroneous information 
misled her as a matter of law.64   
¶70 According to the Ludwigson court of appeals, when an 
officer gives information in addition to the information set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) and when the additional 
                                                 
62 Id. at 876.   
See also id. at 877 (citation omitted) ("When a party fails 
to produce any credible evidence as to an element [of the Quelle 
test], the party fails to meet his or her burden of proof as a 
matter of law.").  
63 Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 876. 
64 Id. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
33 
 
information is erroneous, it is the defendant's burden to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the erroneous additional 
information in fact caused the defendant to refuse to submit to 
chemical testing.65  
¶71 Ludwigson is distinguishable from both Wilke and 
Schirmang on its facts and is distinguishable when these three 
decisions are read properly.  Unlike Wilke and Schirmang, the 
Ludwigson case did not involve an officer's failure to provide 
the 
statutorily 
required 
information 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  Ludwigson, like Quelle and the instant case, 
involved an officer who met his duty under § 343.305(4) and then 
gave additional information alleged to be erroneous.  The rule 
articulated in Wilke is not applicable to the facts in Ludwigson 
or in the instant case.   
¶72 In sum, Wilke and Schirmang are cases in which the law 
enforcement officer failed to provide statutorily required 
information to the defendant.  In such cases, Wilke governs and 
the defendant's operating privileges may not be revoked based on 
an improper refusal to submit to chemical testing.  Quelle and 
Ludwigson are cases in which the law enforcement officer 
provided all the statutorily required information but then 
                                                 
65 Id. at 873.  
See also id. at 876 ("The third prong of the Quelle test 
requires 
a 
fact-finding 
process 
by 
the 
trier 
of 
fact. . . . [T]he trial judge, acting as the trier of fact, 
assesses the credibility of the two sides and determines as a 
matter of fact whether the erroneous extra information caused 
the defendant to refuse to take the test.").   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
34 
 
provided 
more 
information 
in 
excess 
of 
his 
duty 
under 
§ 343.305(4).  In such cases, the three-prong Quelle inquiry as 
interpreted in Ludwigson governs. 
¶73 The instant case falls within the Ludwigson fact 
situation and rule rather than the Schirmang and Wilke fact 
situations and rule.   
¶74 The defendant contends that Schirmang and Ludwigson 
contradict each other.  The defendant points out that the 
Schirmang court of appeals ruled in favor of the driver, 
stating, in reliance on Wilke, that there cannot be substantial 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) when the law enforcement 
officer misstates the penalties that would actually affect the 
driver given the driver's record.  The Ludwigson court of 
appeals, however, ruled against the driver, even though the 
officer had understated the penalty that would actually apply to 
the driver if she refused to submit to the test. 
¶75 We agree with the defendant that language in the two 
cases is inconsistent.  As we have previously explained, the 
Schirmang opinion is in error in stating that there cannot be 
substantial compliance with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) when the law 
enforcement officer misstates the penalties that would actually 
affect the particular driver in question given the driver's 
record.  This language in Schirmang mischaracterizes the court 
of appeals' earlier decision in Wilke.  Properly read, Wilke 
stands for the proposition that there cannot be substantial 
compliance with § 343.305(4) when the law enforcement officer 
fails to give the defendant the statutorily required information 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
35 
 
about penalties.  Upon acknowledging the erroneous statement in 
Schirmang, we conclude that Schirmang and Ludwigson can be 
reconciled. 
¶76 We now apply Quelle and Ludwigson to the present case.   
¶77 With regard to the first prong of the Quelle inquiry, 
we agree with the circuit court, the state, and the defendant 
that the Deputy gave the defendant the information required by 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  Deputy Sutherland read the Department 
of Transportation's Informing the Accused form verbatim to the 
defendant.  This form accurately states the information that 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) required Deputy Sutherland to read to 
the 
defendant. 
The 
present 
case 
therefore 
is 
not 
a 
Wilke/Schirmang case.   
¶78 We also agree with the circuit court, the state, and 
the 
defendant 
that 
the 
Deputy 
gave 
the 
defendant 
more 
information than required by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  After 
discharging 
his 
duty 
under 
§ 343.305(4) 
by 
reading 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation's Informing the Accused form 
verbatim to the defendant, Deputy Sutherland went on to provide 
additional information to the defendant.  The present case is 
therefore governed by Ludwigson.  The first prong of the three-
prong Quelle inquiry is answered in the affirmative.   
¶79 With regard to the second prong of the Quelle inquiry, 
the defendant contends that the additional information that the 
Deputy 
furnished 
the 
defendant 
was 
misleading, 
that 
is, 
erroneous, in two respects. 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
36 
 
¶80 The defendant first argues that Deputy Sutherland gave 
the defendant erroneous information when the Deputy stated that 
the defendant's operating privileges would be suspended for six 
months if the defendant failed a breath test and that the 
defendant's operating privileges would be revoked for one year 
if the defendant refused to submit to the test.  The defendant 
asserts that such information "was clearly a misstatement of the 
penalties that would actually befall" the defendant, because 
Louisiana law applicable to a Louisiana resident like the 
defendant "provides for either an administrative suspension of 
90 days if a chemical test result shows a prohibited alcohol 
concentration, or a revocation of 180 days upon a refusal."66  
The defendant argues that the information regarding suspension 
or revocation of Wisconsin operating privileges was "wholly 
inapplicable to [the defendant]," inasmuch as the defendant had 
a Louisiana driver's license.67   
¶81 We disagree with the defendant that the Deputy's 
statement of the applicable penalties was erroneous.  The Deputy 
accurately stated the Wisconsin law.  Regardless of whether the 
Deputy accurately stated the law of Louisiana, neither the 
deputy nor the defendant believed that the Deputy was stating 
the law of Louisiana. 
¶82 Officers impart information about Wisconsin law and 
cannot be required to decide whether another state's law might 
                                                 
66 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant at 17.   
67 Id. at 18.  
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
37 
 
govern or to explain that other state's law.  Imparting 
information about Wisconsin law is all that can be expected or 
required of Wisconsin law enforcement officers.  The defendant's 
argument about Louisiana law is unconvincing.   
¶83 The defendant also contends that the Deputy provided 
the defendant with erroneous information when the Deputy 
allegedly stated that if the defendant refused to submit to 
chemical testing, the defendant would be entitled to a hearing 
within ten days.  As the defendant points out, the defendant was 
entitled to request a refusal hearing within ten days; he was 
not entitled to have such a hearing within ten days.68   
¶84 The record does not conclusively show what the Deputy 
told the defendant about the hearing.  For purposes of the 
present appeal, we assume (as the defendant contends) that the 
Deputy incorrectly told the defendant that he would be entitled 
to a refusal hearing within ten days.  
¶85 The sole question remaining is whether the alleged 
erroneous information supplied by Deputy Sutherland in fact 
contributed to the defendant's decision to refuse chemical 
testing.  The circuit court in the present case did not 
determine whether the alleged erroneous information provided by 
Deputy Sutherland contributed to the defendant's decision to 
refuse to take the test. 
¶86 The absence of a finding about what the Deputy told 
the defendant and whether any misstatement contributed to the 
                                                 
68 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(am)4.     
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
38 
 
defendant's refusal to take the test does not impair our ability 
to resolve the present case.  The defendant failed to make a 
prima facie showing, as required by the Ludwigson case, that the 
Deputy's erroneous statement about a hearing contributed to the 
defendant's refusal to submit to chemical testing.  Nor does the 
Deputy's testimony suggest that the defendant cared about the 
timing of the refusal hearing.  The Deputy's testimony instead 
shows that the defendant initially decided to submit to chemical 
testing after his discussion with the Deputy and then changed 
his mind, apparently because he was unwilling to follow the 
proper procedure for submitting a breath sample.  Even assuming 
that the defendant has satisfied the first two prongs of the 
Quelle inquiry, he has not satisfied the third prong.    
¶87 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant improperly refused to submit to chemical testing under 
the Implied Consent Law. 
* * * * 
¶88 The circuit court did not err in concluding that the 
state presented sufficient evidence at the refusal hearing to 
establish the officer's probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant.  The circuit court did not err in 
holding that the defendant improperly refused to submit to 
chemical testing under the Implied Consent Law.   
¶89 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order revoking the 
defendant's operating privileges.   
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
39 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2006AP3163   
 
 
 
1