Title: Braddock v. Board of Supervisors
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 032105
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
BRADDOCK, L.C. 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 032105 
         September 17, 2004 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUDOUN COUNTY, et al. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Thomas D. Horne, Judge 
 
 
The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the 
complainant in a suit attacking a rezoning decision had 
standing to bring the suit. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Braddock, L.C. (Braddock), in early 2000, entered into 
contracts to purchase two tracts of land in Loudoun County: 
23.01 acres owned by Joseph O. Hutchison, Jr. (the Hutchison 
parcel) and 20.49 acres owned by Anthony L. Scogno (the Scogno 
parcel).  Braddock’s purpose was to develop both parcels as a 
43.5 acre residential subdivision to be developed in a “single 
phase.” 
 
On October 24, 2000, Braddock filed an application with 
the Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County (the Board) for a 
rezoning of both parcels from “A-3” to “R-4 Cluster.”  While 
the application was pending, the Board revised its 
comprehensive plan.  Pursuant to recommendations by the 
Board’s staff, Braddock filed a revised application on March 
29, 2002, seeking a rezoning of both parcels to “PD-H3” to 
 
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permit development of a “Countryside Village” containing 43.5 
acres.  On July 15, 2002, the Board denied Braddock’s 
application for rezoning. 
 
On August 14, 2002, Braddock, as sole complainant, filed 
in the trial court a bill of complaint for injunction and 
declaratory relief against the Board and the County of 
Loudoun, challenging the Board’s denial of the application. 
 
On March 19, 2002, Braddock had assigned its contractual 
right to purchase the Scogno parcel to another corporation, 
Braddock II, L.C. (Braddock II). On August 30, 2002, Braddock 
took title to the Hutchison parcel and on the same day 
conveyed that parcel to another corporation, Two 
Greens/Braddock LLC (Two Greens).  Thus, Braddock was the 
contract purchaser of both parcels when the original 
application for rezoning was filed, but had no interest in the 
Scogno parcel when filing its revised application or when 
filing the suit.  Braddock remained the contract purchaser of 
the Hutchinson parcel on the date suit was filed, but conveyed 
that interest away sixteen days later, before the trial court 
had made any rulings. 
 
The Board filed a plea in bar raising the issue of 
Braddock’s lack of standing to maintain the suit.  On May 2, 
2003, Braddock moved the court for leave to add Scogno, 
Braddock II and Two Greens as “necessary parties-complainant,” 
 
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pointing out that Scogno and Two Greens were the “current 
record owners of the property at issue in this litigation” and 
that Braddock II was the “contract purchaser of the Scogno 
Parcel.”  The court sustained the Board’s plea in bar, denied 
Braddock’s motion to add necessary parties and entered a final 
order dismissing the suit.  We awarded Braddock an appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Scogno, Braddock II, and Two Greens were clearly the only 
parties having any interests in the subject matter of the suit 
when the motion was made to add them.  Code § 15.2-2285(F), 
however, provides that actions challenging zoning decisions by 
local governing bodies “shall be filed within thirty days of 
the decision.”  Because Braddock’s motion to add “necessary 
parties” was made over eight months after the Board’s zoning 
decision, the introduction of those new parties into the suit 
would be unavailing if Braddock had no standing initially to 
bring the suit.  Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Virginia 
National Bank, 231 Va. 440, 442, 344 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1986).  
The cause would have been time-barred before being initiated 
by any party having standing to do so.  Our inquiry must 
therefore focus on Braddock’s status on August 14, 2002, the 
date this suit was filed. 
 
Braddock argues on appeal that it was, as contract 
purchaser of both parcels, authorized by Code § 15.2-
 
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2286(A)(7) and by § 6-1202 of the Loudoun County 1993 Revised 
Zoning Ordinance, as amended, to apply to the Board for a 
rezoning.  Braddock then cites Friends of Clark Mtn. v. Board 
of Supervisors, 242 Va. 16, 19, 406 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1991) where 
we said:  “For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, but 
not decide, that the applicants for the rezoning action in 
this case are necessary parties to the litigation.” 
 
Friends of Clark Mtn., however, involved a procedural 
posture that was the reverse of that now before us.  There, 
the record owners of property applied for and were granted a 
rezoning.  Neighbors filed suit against the local governing 
body, within thirty days of its decision, without joining the 
owners or the contract purchaser of the land.  242 Va. at 18-
19, 406 S.E.2d at 20.  Assuming, without deciding, that the 
owners and contract purchaser were necessary parties, we held 
that Code § 15.1-493(G), the predecessor of present Code 
§ 15.2-2285(F), required only that suit be brought within 30 
days by an “aggrieved person.”  Id. at 20-21, 406 S.E.2d at 22 
(quoting Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 225 Va. 235, 238, 302 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1983)).  
If the suit was thus timely filed, necessary parties could be 
added after the 30-day period had expired, although the trial 
court should not adjudicate the controversy until all 
necessary parties were before the court.  Friends of Clark 
 
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Mtn., 242 Va. at 21, 406 S.E.2d at 21-22.  The question 
whether the neighbors who brought suit in Friends of Clark 
Mtn. were in fact “aggrieved persons” was not disputed in that 
case and we were not called upon to decide it.1  Braddock’s 
status, therefore, presents a question of first impression in 
Virginia.2 
 
Braddock contends that it was “aggrieved” by the Board’s 
denial of its rezoning application of, at least, the Hutchison 
parcel, that it filed suit within the statutory period, and 
that, under the rule of Friends of Clark Mtn., the court erred 
in denying its motion to add the parties necessary to an 
adjudication of the case. 
                     
1 Neighbors who own property or reside adjacent to rezoned 
land ordinarily have interests sufficiently affected to confer 
upon them standing to challenge the approval of the rezoning 
in court, see, e.g., Riverview Farm Assocs. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 259 Va. 419, 427, 528 S.E.2d 99, 103 (2000), 
although the extent to which they are “aggrieved” may present 
an issue of fact.  There is no authority in Virginia, however, 
for a neighbor to challenge a denial of the rezoning of 
adjacent property, because this would put the neighbor in the 
position of advocating the rezoning of another party’s land. 
 
2 Braddock cites cases from sister states in which parties 
having only a partial interest in property were held to have 
standing to challenge a denial of rezoning in court, but most 
are inapposite because they involved owners of partial 
interests in the entire property subject to the rezoning, 
rather than an interest in only a part of the property.  See, 
e.g., Town of Stevenson v. Selby, 839 So.2d 647, 648 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2002) (owner of one-half undivided interest); Hayden 
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plainville, 214 A.2d 837,838 
(Conn. C.P. 1965) (co-tenant of entire property). 
 
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Braddock’s contention, if adopted, would lead to the 
anomalous result that the relief Braddock sought would 
encompass property it did not own, thereby profoundly 
affecting the interests of a neighboring landowner who might 
be opposed to Braddock’s proposed rezoning.  Having divested 
itself of any interest in the Scogno parcel before filing 
suit, Braddock had no right to file suit on behalf of its new 
owner, to force its new owner into litigation, or to embrace 
the new owner’s property within Braddock’s proposed 
development. 
 
Braddock urges us to disregard this problem by 
characterizing itself as the “agent” of the true parties at 
interest.  Although it is undisputed that Braddock, as 
contract purchaser of both parcels, had authority by both 
statute and local ordinance to apply for and pursue a rezoning 
before the Board, that authority did not extend to filing suit 
on behalf of the new owners.  An agent may not sue in his 
principal’s behalf without express authority from the 
principal, Fishburne v. Engledove, 91 Va. 548, 560-61, 22 S.E. 
354, 356 (1895), or unless authorized by statute to do so.  
W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Chesterfield County, 252 Va. 377, 383, 
478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996).  Because the record before us 
shows no such grant of authority, Braddock was not authorized 
to file suit on behalf of Two Greens, the owner of the 
 
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Hutchison parcel, even though Braddock remained its contract 
purchaser on the date suit was filed.3  As to the Scogno 
parcel, Braddock had divested itself of any interest before 
filing suit and had no agency relationship with its new owner, 
Braddock II. 
 
We discussed the question of standing in Harbor Cruises, 
Inc. v. State Corporation Commission, 219 Va. 675, 676, 250 
S.E.2d 347, 348 (1979) where we said that a party, to have 
standing, must “show that he has been aggrieved by the 
judgment or decree appealed from,” that “he does not have 
standing to assert purely abstract questions” and that he “has 
standing only to seek the correction of errors injuriously 
affecting him.”  (Emphasis added).  Here, Braddock was not 
injuriously affected by the Board’s refusal to rezone the 
Scogno parcel and had no standing to litigate that issue.  For 
the reasons given above, neither Braddock’s interest in the 
Hutchison parcel nor its agency relationship with the true 
owners conferred such standing upon it. 
Virginia procedure does not generally allow one person to 
sue for another. . . . Owing to the long-standing 
                     
3 Cf. Henrico County v. F.& W., Inc., 222 Va. 218, 223-24, 
278 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981), where we held that an optionee had 
standing to bring a declaratory judgment suit attacking a 
downzoning of the property subject to the option.  The 
optionee had a contract right to purchase the entire tract 
involved in the suit.  In contrast to the present case, there 
was no risk that the rights of other landowners would be 
affected by the litigation. 
 
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Virginia doctrine that suits brought without proper 
standing are “nullities,” the risks of improvident 
captioning and pleading of representative claims are 
immense.  Among other risks, such actions may be deemed 
insufficient to stop the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
 
Kent Sinclair & Leigh B. Middleditch, Jr., Virginia Civil 
Procedure § 5.1, at 322 (4th ed. 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
 
In contrast to Friends of Clark Mtn., where suit was 
filed by neighbors having undisputed standing, the present 
case was brought by a party lacking standing.  The suit was 
therefore a “nullity” that could not be resurrected by the 
addition of parties after expiration of the 30-day statutory 
limitation period set by Code § 15.2-2285(F).  Because the 
trial court correctly so ruled, we will affirm the final 
decree. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE AGEE joins, concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority opinion but write separately to 
explain why I conclude that Braddock, L.C. (Braddock) did not 
have standing to challenge the denial of its rezoning 
application by the Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County (the 
Board). 
 
Braddock’s rezoning application pertained to two tracts 
of real estate: the property referred to as “the Hutchison 
 
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parcel,” and the property referred to as “the Scogno parcel.”  
Those two parcels were to be developed as a single project in 
“a single phase.”  When Braddock filed its bill of complaint 
for injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the denial 
of its rezoning application, it no longer had any interest in 
the Scogno parcel.  However, Braddock remained the contract 
purchaser of the Hutchison parcel and therefore would have had 
standing to challenge the Board’s decision regarding that 
parcel if the rezoning application had applied only to the 
Hutchison property.  See Henrico County v. Fralin & Waldron, 
Inc., 222 Va. 218, 224, 278 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981) (holding 
that an entity with a contractual right to purchase real 
estate had standing to file a declaratory judgment proceeding 
to attack a rezoning of the property subject to the contract).  
Since the rezoning application encompassed both parcels, 
Braddock did not have the requisite interest in the entire 
property necessary to give it standing to challenge the 
Board’s denial of the rezoning application.  See Virginia 
Beach Beautification Comm’n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 
Va. 415, 419-20, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902-03 (1986). 
 
For that reason, I respectfully concur and conclude that 
the circuit court correctly held that Braddock “lack[ed] 
standing to challenge the denial of the rezoning application 
 
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for the subject property as [it was] not the contract 
purchaser for the entire subject property.”