Title: Paige K.B. v. Louis J. Molepske
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002620
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2620 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Paige K.B. and Kaitlin I.B., minors by their 
Guardian ad Litem, Mark A. Peterson,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Lauralie H.B.,  
 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Louis J. Molepske,  
 
Defendant, 
Dennis J. Massoglia and National Union Fire 
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  211 Wis. 2d 572, 565 N.W.2d 549 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 26, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 29, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Portage 
 
JUDGE: 
Lewis W. Charles 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Bradley, J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Mark A. Peterson, John F. Maloney, Robert K. 
Bultman and McNally, Maloney & Peterson, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Mark A. Peterson. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Charles H. Bohl, John P. Spector  and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, 
S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Charles H. Bohl. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief was filed by James A. Walrath 
and James M. Brennan, Milwaukee for the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark K. Thomsen 
and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield for the Wisconsin Academy 
of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregg Herman, 
Matthew J. Price and Loeb & Herman, S.C.; Peggy L. Podell, and 
Podell & Podell, all of Milwaukee for the Family Law Section of 
the State Bar of Wisconsin. 
 
No.  96-2620 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2620 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Paige K. B. and Kaitlin I. B.,  
minors by their Guardian ad Litem, Mark  
A. Peterson,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Lauralie H. B.,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Louis J. Molepske,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Dennis J. Massoglia and National Union  
Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The sole issue in this case 
is whether an attorney-guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed by the 
circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.045 (1993-94) to 
represent the best interests of a child in a custody dispute is 
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for the negligent 
performance of his or her duties.  Both the circuit court and 
the court of appeals recognized such absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity. 
No.  96-2620 
 
2 
¶2 
This case is before the court on petition for review 
of a published opinion of the court of appeals, Paige K. B. v. 
Molepske, 211 Wis. 2d 572, 565 N.W.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1997), 
affirming an order of the Circuit Court for Portage County, 
Lewis W. Charles, Judge.  The circuit court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant, Attorney Dennis J. Massoglia, and his 
liability insurance carrier, concluding that, as a GAL appointed 
by the court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.045,1 he enjoyed 
absolute quasi-judicial immunity from liability in a negligence 
action arising out of his professional services.  The court of 
appeals unanimously affirmed.  We granted the petition for 
review filed by the plaintiffs, Paige K. B. and Kaitlin I. B., 
and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶3 
The relevant facts of this case, as represented by the 
court of appeals, are simple and undisputed.  The plaintiffs' 
parents, Steven J. B. (Steven) and Lauralie H. B. (Lauralie), 
were married in 1987.  In 1990, Steven filed a petition for 
divorce.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.045(1)(a), the circuit 
court appointed Massoglia as GAL to represent the best interests 
of the children during the divorce and custody proceedings 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 767.045 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) APPOINTMENT. (a) The court shall appoint a 
guardian ad litem for a minor child in any action 
affecting 
the 
family 
if 
any 
of 
the 
following 
conditions exists: 
 
1. 
The court has reason for special concern as 
to the welfare of a minor child. 
 
2. 
The legal custody or physical placement of 
the child is contested.  
No.  96-2620 
 
3 
between Steven and Lauralie.  On May 10, 1990, the circuit court 
issued a temporary order awarding Steven and Lauralie joint 
custody over the children.  
¶4 
During the divorce proceedings, allegations arose that 
Steven had sexually abused the children during his marriage to 
Lauralie.  Three psychologists were appointed to examine the 
children.  Massoglia petitioned the court for psychological 
testing based upon allegations by both parents of alcoholism, 
drug abuse, and abuse of the children.  Dr. Jay Cleve conducted 
this examination.  Another psychologist employed by the Portage 
County Department of Human Services, Dr. Richard Williams, also 
evaluated the children.  Steven requested a third psychologist, 
Dr. Sue Seitz, through a motion to the circuit court seeking an 
order that the children be examined by an independent clinical 
psychologist.  All three psychologists testified during the 
custody proceedings.  Dr. Williams testified that Steven had 
probably sexually abused the children.  Dr. Seitz testified that 
she found no evidence to support the allegation of sexual abuse. 
 Dr. Cleve testified that, based on his examination, he could 
not express a definitive opinion on the allegation. 
¶5 
Massoglia, 
without 
specifically 
relying 
on 
the 
allegations of sexual abuse, recommended that the circuit court 
grant custody of the children to their mother.  Notwithstanding 
Massoglia's recommendation, 
the circuit 
court 
awarded the 
parties joint custody of the children, granting to Steven 
primary physical placement and to Lauralie temporary physical 
placement.  In making this custody award, the circuit court 
No.  96-2620 
 
4 
found the testimony of Dr. Seitz, who found no evidence of 
sexual abuse, more credible than the testimony of Dr. Williams, 
who thought there probably had been abuse.  Once the circuit 
court entered its final custody order, the court terminated 
Massoglia's appointment as GAL.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.045(5). 
¶6 
Sometime after the divorce, Lauralie obtained the 
court's permission to take the children out of state for the 
Easter holiday.  Lauralie did not return custody to Steven as 
scheduled, and a criminal complaint was filed against her for 
interfering with Steven's custodial rights.  Lauralie eventually 
returned to Wisconsin with the children and surrendered to 
authorities on May 24, 1991.  Physical placement of the children 
was then formally returned to Steven.   
¶7 
Approximately two months after their return, the 
children were placed in a foster home after a child in need of 
protection or services (CHIPS) petition was filed alleging that 
Steven had sexually abused the children.  Steven was formally 
charged with sexually assaulting the children.  After a jury 
trial, Steven was found guilty and sentenced to a prison term.  
The circuit court then transferred physical custody of the 
children from the foster home back to Lauralie. 
¶8 
The 
children 
subsequently 
brought 
suit 
against 
Massoglia, alleging that he had negligently performed his duties 
as their GAL in the custody proceedings and that this negligence 
was a cause of their injuries.  The circuit court granted 
Massoglia's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, as a 
No.  96-2620 
 
5 
GAL, Massoglia was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. 
 The children appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. 
¶9 
In affirming the circuit court's order, the court of 
appeals noted that, like judicial immunity which makes a judge 
absolutely immune from liability when performing judicial acts 
within his or her discretion, quasi-judicial immunity extends to 
non-judicial officers when they are performing acts intimately 
related to the judicial process.  See Paige K. B., 211 Wis. 2d 
at 577.  The court of appeals then concluded that a GAL 
appointed by a circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.045 to 
represent the best interests of a child in a custody proceeding 
performs functions intimately related to the judicial process 
and, therefore, is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. 
 See id. at 578.  We agree with the court of appeals and affirm 
its decision. 
¶10 As this court explained in Ford v. Kenosha County, 160 
Wis. 2d 485, 466 N.W.2d 646 (1991), "[a]n immunity is a 'freedom 
from suit or liability'" conferred upon a particular defendant 
"not because of the existence of a particular set of facts or 
the moral justification of an act[,]" but as a result of that 
defendant's status or position.  Id. at 495 (internal citation 
omitted).  As the court of appeals noted, Wisconsin courts have 
recognized an absolute quasi-judicial immunity for those persons 
who perform functions that are an "intimately related to the 
judicial process."  Paige K. B., 211 Wis. 2d at 577; see, e.g., 
Ford, 160 Wis. 2d at 497-98 (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 
F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)); Dowd v. City of New Richmond, 137 
No.  96-2620 
 
6 
Wis. 2d 539, 558, 405 N.W.2d 66 (1987)(finding witnesses in 
judicial proceedings shielded by absolute immunity); Bromund v. 
Holt, 24 Wis. 2d 336, 346, 129 N.W.2d 149 (1964)(finding 
appointed pathologist immune from negligence liability); Snow v. 
Koeppl, 
159 
Wis. 2d 
77, 
82, 
464 
N.W.2d 
215 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990)(finding court-appointed psychologist absolutely immune 
from suit).2 
¶11 Drawing from the reasoning of the United States 
Supreme Court, Wisconsin courts apply a functional analysis to 
determine 
whether 
such 
absolute 
immunity 
attaches 
to 
a 
particular defendant: "immunity is justified and defined by the 
functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it 
attaches." Ford, 160 Wis. 2d at 495 (quoting Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)).  Applying this functional analysis, 
this court in Ford held that clerical personnel in the county 
clerk of court's office and in the district attorney's office 
were 
absolutely 
immune 
from 
any 
negligence 
liability 
in 
preparing and submitting a bench warrant.  The Ford court first 
noted that a judge is absolutely immune from liability for 
performing judicial acts within the judge's discretion.  See id. 
                     
2 The 
United 
States 
Supreme Court 
similarly has not 
hesitated  to extend absolute immunity to various individuals 
whose adjudicatory functions or other involvement with the 
judicial process have been deemed to warrant protection from 
harassment, intimidation, or other interference with impartial 
decision making.  See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 
(1983)(witnesses in judicial proceedings); Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478 (1978)(federal administrative law judge); Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)(state prosecuting attorneys).  
No.  96-2620 
 
7 
(citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978)).  The 
court explained that "[t]o allow unsatisfied litigants to sue a 
judge would 'contribute not to principled and fearless decision-
making but to intimidation.'"  Id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U.S. 546, 554 (1966)).  In similarly cloaking with absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity the functions of the clerical personnel, 
the court reasoned: 
 
The same policy that supports absolute immunity for 
judges justifies absolute immunity for non-judicial 
officers when they are performing acts 'intimately 
related to the judicial process.'  '[A] nonjudicial 
officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the 
court should not be a "lightning rod for harassing 
litigation" aimed at the court.' 
Id. at 497-98 (quoting Ashbrook, 617 F.2d at 476)(internal 
citation omitted).3 
¶12 The sole issue in this case then is whether, like the 
clerical personnel in Ford, a GAL appointed by a circuit court 
                     
3 Employing the same functional analysis used by this court 
in Ford v. Kenosha County, 160 Wis. 2d 485, 466 N.W.2d 646 
(1991), a number of federal and state courts have held various 
participants in judicial proceedings, including guardians ad 
litem (GALs), absolutely immune from liability for the actions 
undertaken in performance of their roles as integral parts of 
the judicial process.  See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 
1989)(GAL in custody dispute); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 
1465-67 (8th Cir. 1987)(GAL in investigation of child sexual 
abuse); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 
1984)(GAL in proceeding to terminate parental rights); Tindell 
v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1988)(GAL in paternity and 
support action); Penn v. McMonagle, 573 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (Ohio 
App. 1990)(GAL in child custody dispute).  But see Fleming v. 
Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994)(paid GAL could be held 
liable by ward for negligent acts during custody dispute); 
Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 45-46 (N.M. 
1991)(GAL in medical malpractice suit not entitled to immunity).  
No.  96-2620 
 
8 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.045 to represent the best interests 
of a child in a proceeding involving child custody is a non-
judicial officer who performs acts intimately related to the 
judicial process and is therefore entitled to quasi-judicial 
immunity from negligence liability in performing his or her 
statutory duties.4  No Wisconsin court has directly addressed the 
propriety of an extension of the absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity to a GAL appointed by a circuit court under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.045.  We, like the court of appeals, are convinced that 
quasi-judicial immunity must now be so extended. 
¶13 We agree with the court of appeals that a GAL's role 
when appointed under Wis. Stat. § 767.045 is intimately related 
to the judicial process.  See Paige K. B., 211 Wis. 2d at 578.  
Section 767.045(4) prescribes the specific responsibilities of a 
GAL appointed by the circuit court in child custody proceedings: 
 
The guardian ad litem shall be an advocate for the 
best interests of a minor child as to paternity, legal 
custody, physical placement and support.  The guardian 
ad litem shall function independently, in the same 
manner as an attorney for a party to the action, and 
shall consider, but shall not be bound by, the wishes 
of the minor child or the positions of others as to 
the best interests of the minor child. 
                     
4 Our review and conclusions in this case are limited to 
whether a GAL appointed by the circuit court under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.045 is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 
negligence liability for performing his or her statutorily 
prescribed functions.  The Petitioners do not contend that 
Massoglia acted outside his statutory duties.  We need not, nor 
do we, decide whether absolute immunity should extend to GALs 
acting 
outside 
the 
limited 
functions 
of 
child 
custody 
proceedings. 
No.  96-2620 
 
9 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶14 This statutory section makes clear that the GAL is 
appointed in a custody dispute to independently represent the 
best interests of a child.  As the court of appeals explained in 
Marriage of Wiederholt v. Fischer, 169 Wis. 2d 524, 485 N.W.2d 
442 (Ct. App. 1992): 
 
[Section 767.045(4)] clearly states that the guardian 
ad litem shall be an advocate for the best interests 
of a minor child and that the guardian ad litem shall 
not be bound by the wishes of the minor child.  This 
means that the guardian ad litem does not represent a 
child per se.  Rather the guardian ad litem's 
statutory duty is to represent the concept of the 
child's best interest. 
Id. at 536.  This statutory function, imposed upon a GAL under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.045(4), is intimately related to that of the 
circuit court.  Like the GAL, the circuit court too must protect 
the best interests of the child in a custody dispute.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 767.24(2), (5).5  In determining the best interests of 
the child, both the GAL and the court are required to consider 
identical, statutorily prescribed factors.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 767.045(4) and 767.24(5)(a)-(k).  In a proceeding involving 
the custody of a child, therefore, both the GAL and the circuit 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 767.24(2) provides in pertinent part: "based 
on the best interest of the child and after considering the 
factors under sub. (5), the court may give joint legal custody 
or sole legal custody of a minor child." 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24(5) provides in pertinent part: "In 
determining legal custody and periods of physical placement, the 
court shall consider all facts relevant to the best interest of 
the child. . . ." 
No.  96-2620 
 
10
court are statutorily charged with determining and protecting 
the best interests of that child. 
¶15 Unlike 
the 
circuit 
court, 
however, 
a 
GAL 
is 
"[u]nhampered by the ex parte and other restrictions that 
prevent the court from conducting its own investigation of the 
facts . . . ."  State ex rel. Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 
384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);6 see Wis. Stat. § 767.045(4)(stating 
"The guardian ad litem shall function . . . in the same manner 
as an attorney for a party to the action . . . .").  The GAL 
accordingly 
serves 
an 
essential 
role 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.045(4), filling a "void inherent in the procedures 
required for the adjudication of custody disputes."  Weinstock, 
864 S.W.2d at 384; see Bahr v. Galonski, 80 Wis. 2d 72, 83, 257 
N.W.2d 869 (1977)(explaining that GAL aids court in visitation 
action because court is not free to investigate, consult with 
the children, marshal evidence, and to subpoena and cross-
examine witnesses).  As the court in Weinstock explained: 
 
Absent the assistance of a guardian ad litem, the 
trial court, charged with rendering a decision in the 
'best interests of the child,' has no practical or 
effective means to assure itself that all of the 
requisite information bearing on the question will be 
brought before it untainted by the parochial interests 
of the parents. 
                     
6 Considering the same issue and a similar fact situation as 
we face in this case, the court in State ex rel. Bird v. 
Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) concluded that a 
GAL appointed to represent the best interests of a child in a 
custody dispute was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity 
from negligence liability.   We find persuasive the Weinstock 
court's analysis and conclusions. 
No.  96-2620 
 
11
Id. at 384.  When appointed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.045, 
the GAL essentially functions as an agent or arm of the court, 
charged with the same standard that must ultimately govern the 
court's decision—the best interests of the child. 
¶16 Under our statutory scheme for custody proceedings, 
the GAL and the circuit court have the same responsibility to 
promote the children's best interests, and their functions are 
intimately related.  We therefore conclude that the circuit 
court, as affirmed by the court of appeals, properly granted 
summary judgment to the GAL and his insurance carrier.  A GAL 
appointed by the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 767.045 is 
absolutely immune from negligence liability for acts within the 
scope 
of 
that 
GAL's 
exercise 
of 
his 
or 
her 
statutory 
responsibilities.7 
¶17 Relying primarily on Tyson v. Tyson, 94 Wis. 225, 68 
N.W. 1015 (1896), and Will of Jaeger, 218 Wis. 1, 259 N.W. 842 
(1935), the Petitioners argue that a GAL appointed under Wis. 
Stat. § 767.045 is "expected to be an aggressive, effective, and 
diligent advocate" and, like any other licensed attorney, must 
be answerable in damages for negligence.  We find this argument 
unpersuasive.   
                     
7 Nothing in this opinion should be read as a determination 
that there is any substance to the plaintiffs' underlying 
allegations that Attorney Massoglia was negligent in the 
performance of his duties as GAL.  Like the court of appeals, we 
"have presumed negligence solely to permit us to address the 
arguments relative to quasi-judicial immunity presented by the 
parties."  Paige K. B. v. Molepske, 211 Wis. 2d 572, 583 n.2, 
565 N.W.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No.  96-2620 
 
12
¶18 The Petitioners' reliance on Tyson and Jaeger is 
misplaced.  As the Petitioners point out, in both Tyson and 
Jaeger, this court stated in dicta that while a GAL "is at all 
times under the control of the court, the responsibility of 
protecting the infant's interest wholly devolves upon [that 
guardian]", Tyson, 94 Wis. at 229; see Jaeger, 218 Wis. at 11, 
and that the guardian "is answerable in damages for negligence," 
if the guardian neglects or fails in his or her duty in that 
regard.  Jaeger, 218 Wis. at 11; see Tyson, 94 Wis. at 229.  
Neither Tyson nor Jaeger, however, involved an action in 
negligence against a GAL.  Neither involved the appointment of a 
GAL in a child custody proceeding.  Nor did either case address 
whether GALs are entitled to immunity, in any form, from 
liability for their negligent acts or omissions. 
¶19 In Tyson, the court addressed whether, in an action to 
establish and quiet title to property, a GAL appointed by the 
court has the authority to appeal that court's judgment, which 
is adverse to the minor's interests.  See Tyson, 94 Wis. at 229. 
 After discussing the general duties of a GAL, the court 
concluded that it is not only the GAL's right, but his duty, to 
petition for review of the court's judgment, if the guardian 
deems the interests of the minor prejudiced by that judgment.  
See id. at 231.  The Tyson court was not confronted with, nor 
did it address, the functions of a GAL appointed in a custody 
dispute, the alleged negligence of such GAL, or the extension of 
absolute immunity to a GAL performing such functions. 
No.  96-2620 
 
13
¶20 In Jaeger, the court considered whether, in a probate 
proceeding, the court properly struck a brief submitted by a 
GAL, wherein the GAL concluded that the minor contingent 
legatees had no interest in the trust property in dispute.  See 
Jaeger, 218 Wis. at 11.  After discussing the general duties of 
the GAL, the court concluded that in such a situation, the GAL 
should have reported his conclusions to the court and then 
requested the court to relieve him as GAL.  See id.  As in 
Tyson, the Jaeger court did not address the issue presented in 
the case at bar.  In the present case we address only whether a 
GAL is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 
negligence in performing functions statutorily prescribed under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.045(5).  To the extent the dicta in Tyson and 
Jaeger is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled. 
¶21 The Petitioners additionally argue that, unless GALs 
are held civilly liable, there will be no effective remedy 
available to parties injured by the negligent acts and omissions 
of GALs.  This argument too is unpersuasive.   
¶22 The denial of a particular plaintiff's civil remedy is 
an unavoidable consequence each time this court recognizes or 
extends a privilege of immunity.  In rejecting the Petitioners' 
argument, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
explained 
that, 
although 
recognition of immunity in this case will leave the Petitioners 
with one less remedy than other litigants, "'it is better to 
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to 
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of 
retaliation.'"  Paige K. B., 211 Wis. 2d at 583 (quoting 
No.  96-2620 
 
14
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949)(quoted in 
Ford, 160 Wis. 2d at 495)).  We agree that matters of public 
policy weigh in favor of recognizing absolute immunity in this 
case. 
¶23 The purpose in appointing a GAL in custody proceedings 
is not strictly to provide legal counsel to the child client.  
In determining the best interests of the child under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.045(4), the GAL must act independently.  Although the GAL, 
in performing his or her statutory function, must consider the 
child's preferences, such preferences are but one factor to be 
investigated and are not considered binding on the GAL.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 767.045(4).  Thus, the statutory obligations placed 
on a GAL under Wis. Stat. § 767.045(4) "necessarily impose a 
higher degree of objectivity on a guardian ad litem than that 
imposed on an attorney for an adult."  Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d at 
384.  In child custody proceedings: 
 
[a] guardian ad litem serves to provide the court with 
independent information regarding the placement or 
disposition which is in the best interests of the 
child.  This independent determination is crucial to 
the court's decision.  The threat of civil liability 
would seriously impair the ability of the guardian ad 
litem to independently investigate the facts and to 
report his or her findings to the court.  As a result, 
the ability of the judge to perform his or her 
judicial 
duties 
would 
be 
impaired 
and 
the 
ascertainment of truth obstructed. 
Ward v. San Diego County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 691 F. Supp. 238, 
240 (S.D. Cal. 1988); see also Short by Oosterhous v. Short, 730 
F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990).   
No.  96-2620 
 
15
¶24 To properly perform their duties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.045, GALs must be allowed to independently consider the 
facts of a case and advocate the best interests of the child, 
free from the threat of harassment for retaliatory litigation.  
Opening the door to negligence liability for GALs appointed 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.045 would likely result in a decline in 
the number of attorneys willing to serve as GALs in child 
custody proceedings.  In addition, fear of liability could warp 
the judgment of those GALs who are appointed toward the 
appeasement of disappointed parents or children and away from 
protecting the best interests of the child.  See Short, 730 F. 
Supp. at 1039; see also Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d at 386. 
¶25 As we have explained, without the assistance and 
impartial judgment of a GAL, the circuit court would have no 
practical or effective means to assure itself that all of the 
essential facts have been presented untainted by the self-
interest of the parents and children.  See Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 
at 384.  Absolute immunity is necessary in this case to avoid 
the harassment and intimidation that could be brought to bear on 
GALs by those parents and children who may take issue with any 
or all of the GAL's actions or recommendations.  See id. at 383; 
Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1988).  We 
therefore conclude that, from a public policy perspective, it is 
better to have a diligent, unbiased, and objective advocate to 
assist the court in determining and protecting the best 
interests of the child than it is to assure that the minor child 
may later recover damages in tort. 
No.  96-2620 
 
16
¶26 We also note, as did the court of appeals, that a 
number of mechanisms, aside from civil liability, exist to 
prevent and punish abuse, misconduct, and irresponsibility on 
the part of a GAL appointed under Wis. Stat. § 767.045.  First, 
the GAL must be an attorney admitted to practice in this state, 
see Wis. Stat. § 767.045(3), who is therefore bound by, and 
subject to reprimand for violating, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  See SCR 20:8.4, 21.06 (1998).  Second, the court is 
not 
bound 
by, 
and 
may 
modify 
or 
reject, 
the 
GAL's 
recommendation.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.045(4).  Finally, and most 
importantly, the appointing court oversees the conduct of the 
GAL, and may on its own, or at the request of a parent, remove 
and replace the GAL.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.045(5).  In 
overseeing the conduct of a GAL, the circuit court plays a vital 
role, for in a custody dispute, the circuit court must be the 
vanguard for the best interests of the child.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court must not idly wait for or blindly rely on a GAL's 
recommendation.  Rather, the court, at each stage of the 
proceeding, should inquire into the method of analysis utilized 
by the GAL, the time and effort expended by the GAL, and the 
reasons supporting the GAL's actions and recommendations.  In 
addition, the court may request that the GAL provide additional 
information necessary for the court to render its decision, or 
the court may instruct the GAL to take additional measures 
necessary to protect the best interests of the child.  If the 
circuit court, for any reason, finds a GAL's performance 
inadequate to protect the best interests of the child, the court 
No.  96-2620 
 
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should either remove and replace that GAL or take other 
appropriate action. 
¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a GAL 
appointed by the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 767.045 to 
represent the best interests of a child in a child custody 
proceeding is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 
negligence liability for acts within the scope of that GAL's 
exercise of his or her statutory responsibilities.  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
¶28 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
 
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