Title: McCarthy Holdings L.L.C. v. Burgher
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101031
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2011

Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ. 
 
MCCARTHY HOLDINGS LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 101031             JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 September 16, 2011 
VINCENT W. BURGHER, III 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Nolan B. Dawkins, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether an easement agreement 
granting “exclusive use,” without stating the purpose or 
purposes for which the easement may be used, permits the owner 
of the dominant estate to bar the owner of the servient estate 
from reasonable use of the easement area as a matter of law. 
Background 
 
McCarthy Holdings LLC (McCarthy) filed a complaint against 
Vincent W. Burgher, III (Burgher) in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Alexandria, seeking a declaratory judgment concerning 
an easement agreement (the Easement Agreement).  McCarthy, the 
owner of the dominant estate, sought a declaration that it had 
the right, as a matter of law, to bar Burgher, the owner of the 
servient estate, from any use of the easement area.  Burgher 
filed an amended counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the easement is null and void or, alternatively, directing 
McCarthy to pay its portion of the 2009 real estate taxes on 
the easement area as required by the Easement Agreement. 
 
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The circuit court found that the Easement Agreement did 
not, as a matter of law, bar Burgher from reasonable use of the 
easement area.  Also, the circuit court dismissed, without 
prejudice, Burgher’s counterclaim requesting payment for 2009 
real estate taxes because the claim was not properly pled and 
because Burgher failed to meet his burden of proof.  McCarthy 
subsequently paid the 2009 taxes.  McCarthy appeals.  
Facts 
 
Burgher owns property located at 1000 Cameron Street, in  
the City of Alexandria.  Burgher entered into an Easement 
Agreement with Potomac Space Associates (PSA), the previous 
owner of an adjoining property, 1006 Cameron Street.  On July 
24, 2008, McCarthy purchased 1006 Cameron Street and the rights 
under the Easement Agreement from PSA.  The Easement Agreement 
grants the owner of 1006 Cameron Street an easement to use 
approximately 488 square feet of abutting land on the 1000 
Cameron Street property.  
 
The Easement Agreement states in relevant part: 
 
1. 
The Grantor [owner of 1000 Cameron 
Street] does hereby grant and convey to the Grantee 
[owner of 1006 Cameron Street], its successors and 
assigns, an easement (the “Easement”) in the area 
set forth on the plat attached hereto . . . . 
 
2. 
The Grantee shall have exclusive use of 
the land set forth in the Easement Area. 
 
3. 
Grantee agrees to hold the Grantor 
harmless from any liability, responsibility or 
 
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damages caused by reason of the granting or use of 
the Easement by the Grantee, its successors or 
assigns.  
 
4. 
Grantee shall pay to Grantor, 24.36% of 
the real estate taxes assessed on the land at 1000 
Cameron Street. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
McCarthy initiated this action to seek a declaration that 
the Easement Agreement granted it the right to bar Burgher from 
any use of the easement area.  The circuit court found that the 
Easement Agreement was unambiguous and that it did not bar 
Burgher’s concurrent use of the easement area.  The circuit 
court noted that its finding regarding the unambiguity of the 
Easement Agreement was based solely upon the language used in 
the Easement Agreement.  The circuit court also stated, 
however, that its holding was consistent with the intent 
manifested by the parties.   
Analysis 
 
McCarthy argues that the circuit court erred in construing 
the Easement Agreement.  Specifically, McCarthy contends that 
by granting “exclusive use,” the express terms of the Easement 
Agreement conveyed a fee interest, as a matter of law, and 
permit McCarthy, as owner of the dominant estate, to bar 
Burgher, the owner of the servient estate, from using the 
easement area.   
 
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McCarthy relies on this Court’s statements in Walton v. 
Capital Land, Inc., 252 Va. 324, 477 S.E.2d 499 (1996), to 
support its argument that the Easement Agreement effectively 
transferred a fee interest.  In Walton, this Court stated: 
 
If a conveyance grants the right to exclusive use of 
all or part of the servient estate for all purposes, 
the owner of the servient estate is stripped of his 
right to use the land.  Conveyances of this sort are 
generally considered to effectively transfer an 
interest in fee, not an easement, and are not favored.  
If, however, the conveyance limits exclusive use of 
all or part of the servient estate to a particular 
purpose, the conveyance is an easement and the 
servient landowner retains the right to use the land 
in ways not inconsistent with the uses granted in the 
easement. 
 
Id. at 326-27, 477 S.E.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).  
McCarthy asserts that because the Easement Agreement granted it 
exclusive use and did not limit use of the easement to a 
particular purpose, the Easement Agreement transferred a fee 
simple interest as a matter of law, and the servient estate has 
no right to any use of the easement area.  We disagree. 
 
The circuit court’s ruling that the Easement Agreement is 
unambiguous has not been appealed and is not in dispute.  This 
Court applies a de novo standard of review when interpreting an 
unambiguous contract.  PMA Capital Ins. Co. v. US Airways, 
Inc., 271 Va. 352, 357-58, 626 S.E.2d 369, 372 (2006).  “The 
contract is construed as written, without adding terms that 
were not included by the parties.”  Id. at 358, 626 S.E.2d at 
 
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372.  “No word or clause in the contract will be treated as 
meaningless if a reasonable meaning can be given to it, and 
there is a presumption that the parties have not used words 
needlessly.”  Id. at 358, 626 S.E.2d at 372-73 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
The relevant document is entitled “Easement Agreement” and 
uses the term easement ten times in describing the conveyance 
which is the subject of the document.  An easement “is a 
privilege to use the land of another in a particular manner and 
for a particular purpose.”  Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 216, 
355 S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (1987); see also Russakoff v. Scruggs, 
241 Va. 135, 138, 400 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1991) (noting that 
“[e]asements are not ownership interests in the servient 
tract”); Restatement of Property § 471, cmt. b (1944) (“An 
easement does not entitle the owner, either presently or 
prospectively, to the exclusive occupation of any portion of 
the earth’s surface.”).  An easement “creates a burden on the 
servient tract and requires that the owner of that land refrain 
from interfering with the privilege conferred for the benefit 
of the dominant tract.”  Brown, 233 Va. at 216, 355 S.E.2d at 
568. 
 
In this instance, the Easement Agreement grants the 
dominant estate “exclusive use” of the easement area.  The 
general principles regarding easements must be reconciled with 
 
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the plain meaning of the words used in the Easement Agreement.  
“Ordinarily, when a tract of land is subjected to an easement, 
the servient owner may make any use of the land that does not 
unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of the 
easement.”  Preshlock v. Brenner, 234 Va. 407, 410, 362 S.E.2d 
696, 698 (1987).  Thus, the servient owner retains the right to 
grant easements in the same land to other persons.  Id.  “If 
the first easement is not exclusive, subsequent concurrent 
easements that are not unreasonably burdensome or inconsistent 
with the original easement are valid.”  Id.  The Easement 
Agreement provided “exclusive use” to the dominant estate.  The 
term “exclusive” prohibits Burgher from granting an easement 
over the relevant piece of property to any party other than the 
owner of 1006 Cameron Street.  However, the term “exclusive” in 
an easement agreement does not deny the servient estate its 
right to use the easement area, unless such use unreasonably 
interferes with the use and enjoyment of the easement.  See 
Walton, 252 Va. at 326, 477 S.E.2d at 501. 
The language in Walton cited by McCarthy does not support 
the proposition that the conveyance of an exclusive easement 
without specifically limiting the use of the easement results 
in the transfer of a fee interest.  Transfer of a fee interest 
by the conveyance of an easement is limited to the instance in 
which the easement is stated to be for any purpose, because 
 
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when an easement is granted to be used for any purpose, any use 
of the property by the owner of the servient estate would 
interfere with the use granted and is thus prohibited.  Such is 
not necessarily the case when the purpose of the easement is 
not specifically stated in or limited by the conveyance.  
Failure of a conveyance to state the purpose of an easement is 
not the equivalent of granting an easement that may be used for 
any purpose. 
 
This Court has stated: 
Generally, when an easement is created by grant or 
reservation and the instrument creating the easement 
does not limit its use, the easement may be used for 
any purpose to which the dominant estate may then, or 
in the future, reasonably be devoted.  However, this 
general rule is subject to the qualification that no 
use may be made of the easement, different from that 
established when the easement was created, which 
imposes an additional burden on the servient estate. 
 
Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat, 265 Va. 256, 266, 576 S.E.2d 
497, 502-03 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also Walton, 252 Va. at 326, 477 S.E.2d at 501 
(stating “we have repeatedly held that the owner of the 
servient estate retains the right to use his land in any manner 
which does not unreasonably interfere with the use granted in 
the easement.”).  Contrary to McCarthy’s assertion, an easement 
can be conveyed without limitations on use by the dominant 
estate and remain an easement limited to the use established 
when the easement was created. 
 
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Conveyances of an easement that effectively transfer a 
fee, not an easement, are not favored.  Walton, 252 Va. at 326, 
477 S.E.2d at 501.  Such conveyances are limited to the 
instance in which the conveyance grants the right to exclusive 
use of all or part of the servient estate for all purposes.  
The Easement Agreement does not state that the easement may be 
used for all purposes.  In fact, neither the purpose of the 
easement, nor the extent of the privilege conferred for the 
benefit of the dominant tract, is stated in the Easement 
Agreement.  Thus, it cannot be stated, as a matter of law, that 
the Easement Agreement allows McCarthy to bar Burgher from any 
use of the easement area.  The circuit court did not err in 
denying McCarthy’s request to bar Burgher, as a matter of law, 
from any use of the easement area, based upon the Easement 
Agreement. 
 
McCarthy’s remaining arguments also lack merit.  First, 
McCarthy contends that the circuit court erred by finding that 
McCarthy did not intend to exclude Burgher from the easement 
area.  The circuit court found that the Easement Agreement was 
unambiguous; neither party challenged that finding.  “When the 
meaning of language in a contract is clear and unambiguous, as 
it is here, the contract needs no interpretation, and the 
‘intention of the parties must be determined from what they 
actually say and not from what it may be supposed they intended 
 
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to say.’ ”  Sully Station II Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dye, 259 Va. 
282, 284, 525 S.E.2d 555, 556 (2000) (quoting Carter v. Carter, 
202 Va. 892, 896, 121 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1961)).  In the instant 
case, the circuit court expressly noted that its interpretation 
of the Easement Agreement was based upon the language used 
therein.  The circuit court’s brief reference to the parties’ 
intention does not suggest that the circuit court improperly 
considered parol evidence in interpreting the Easement 
Agreement. 
 
Second, McCarthy argues that the circuit court erred by 
not dismissing Burgher’s request for payment of 2009 real 
estate taxes, with prejudice, after the circuit court concluded 
that Burgher failed to meet his burden of proof.  This issue 
has been rendered moot because McCarthy paid the 2009 real 
estate taxes in question, after the circuit court’s entry of 
the final order.  “[M]ootness has two aspects:  when the issues 
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome.”  United States Parole 
Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Whenever it appears or is made to 
appear that there is no actual controversy between the 
litigants, or that, if it once existed it has ceased to do so, 
it is the duty of every judicial tribunal not to proceed to the 
formal determination of the apparent controversy, but to 
 
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dismiss the case.”  Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 
642, 643, 29 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1944) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because McCarthy paid the 2009 property taxes, there 
is no live controversy between the parties as to that issue.  
Therefore, the Court declines to consider the merits of the 
alleged error concerning the matter. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgment. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting. 
 
I dissent.  In Walton v. Capital Land, Inc., we held that 
where a landowner reserved an “exclusive easement” that was 
limited to the narrow purpose of a “right of way for . . . 
ingress and egress,” he did not reserve the right to exclude 
the grantee.  252 Va. 324, 325, 327, 477 S.E.2d 499, 500, 501 
(1996).  However, in dicta we explained that where a conveyance 
“grants the right to exclusive use of all or part of the 
servient estate for all purposes, the owner of the servient 
estate is stripped of his right to use the land.” Id. at 326, 
477 S.E.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).  That dicta did not 
assign a talismanic meaning to the phrase “for all purposes.” 
The instrument in this case, unlike in Walton, broadly 
conveyed “exclusive use” without limiting such use to any 
 
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particular purposes.  The majority finds that the omission of 
“for all purposes” after “exclusive” equates to a grant for a 
particular purpose as in Walton.  I cannot agree.  The term 
“exclusive use” is clear, unambiguous, and absolute.  
Adjectives such as “exclusive” and “unique” are not subject to 
modification by adverbs to become more so.  A condition that is 
exclusive cannot be modified to be more exclusive.  The 
definition of exclusive in this context is “limiting or limited 
to possession, control, or use (as by a single individual or 
organization or by a special group or class).”  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 793 (1993).  Limiting the 
possession, control, and use in this case logically excludes 
Burgher.