Title: Bank of Am., N.A. v. Babcock
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11651
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 2014

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SJC-11651 
 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. & another,1 trustees,2  vs. 
VICTORIA BABCOCK & others.3 
 
 
October 28, 2014. 
 
 
Trust, Taxation.  Taxation, Marital deduction.  Practice, Civil, 
Declaratory proceeding. 
 
 
 
The trustees of the Indenture of Trust of Hollis W. 
Plimpton, Jr., dated June 24, 1964, as amended, also known as 
the Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr. Family Trust (trust), filed a 
complaint in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, 
seeking a declaration that the trust as drafted correctly 
expresses the intent of Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr. (settlor) that 
his estate be eligible to obtain the optimal benefit of 
allowable Federal and State estate tax marital deductions.4  
                                                          
 
1 Peggy L. Plimpton. 
 
2 Of the Indenture of Trust of Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr., 
dated June 24, 1964, as amended. 
 
3 Priscilla Morphy; Hollis W. Plimpton, III; Charles 
Babcock; John Babcock; Caroline Baptista; Sarah Babcock; Calvin 
Morphy; Katherine Morphy; Victoria Morphy; Hollis W. Plimpton, 
IV; Christopher Plimpton; Elizabeth Catherine Morphy; the 
Attorney General; the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and the 
Commissioner of the Department of Revenue.  Neither the Attorney 
General nor the commissioners have appeared in the case. 
 
4 It is undisputed that the trust, as amended, was intended 
to qualify as a qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) 
trust, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(7).  Because of the 
settlor's failing health and a concern that at some point he 
2 
 
 
 
Alternatively, the trustees seek an order rewording a portion of 
the trust to ensure that it accomplishes the settlor's intent, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 6.  A single justice of this court 
reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
 
 
Litigants have sought reformation of trusts, and judicial 
declarations of rights in will and trust cases, from this court 
in a variety of situations under the Bosch rubric.  See 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 
456 (1967).  The cases raise issues of State law, which the 
parties have asked us to resolve because of their Federal tax 
implications.  See Walker v. Walker, 433 Mass. 581, 582 (2001); 
Kirchick v. Guerry, 429 Mass. 215, 217 (1999) (court decides 
State law issues in Bosch cases, not Federal law issues).  "We 
have decided [such] cases . . . not only when the parties have 
been actively engaged in disputes with the Internal Revenue 
Service, but also, on occasion, when the parties have sought 
decisions that would enable them to plan their estates correctly 
and to prepare effectively for future tax consequences."  Walker 
v. Walker, supra at 582-583 (2001).  See Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. 
Buckley, 422 Mass. 706, 709-710 (1996); Billings v. Fowler, 361 
Mass. 230, 233-234 (1972).  In the latter category, our cases 
have involved situations where there is a clear mistake in the 
drafting or some real uncertainty about the meaning of an 
instrument that would lead inevitably to adverse tax 
consequences in the future.  See, e.g., Hillman v. Hillman, 433 
Mass. 590 (2001).  See also Linehan v. Linehan, 453 Mass. 1017, 
1018 (2009), and cases cited. 
 
 
These features are noticeably absent from the case before 
us.  There is no indication of any adverse ruling or position 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
might no longer possess the physical and mental capacity to make 
gifts as he had throughout the years, the trust was amended 
during his lifetime to authorize the bank trustee to make 
certain gifts from the trust in his behalf.  The amendment 
allowed the bank, during the settlor's lifetime, to make gift-
tax free "annual exclusion" gifts; taxable gifts to the 
settlor's descendants; and gifts to charities that he had 
supported throughout the years.  After the settlor died, the 
bank became concerned that, because the amendment authorized 
gifts to the settlor's children and to charities during his 
lifetime, and distributions to his surviving spouse after his 
death, the trust might be misconstrued to permit distributions 
to the children and charities after his death.  It is this 
possibility that the trust might be misconstrued that the 
trustees seek to eliminate by way of this action. 
3 
 
 
 
taken by the Internal Revenue Service; nor is there any claim of 
a mistake in drafting or a real uncertainty concerning how the 
instrument is to be interpreted.  To the contrary, the drafting 
attorney and the parties take the position that there was no 
mistake, in other words, that the instrument was drafted exactly 
as planned and that a careful reading of the instrument leads to 
the desired result consistent with the settlor's intent.  They 
do not claim to be in any serious doubt about how properly to 
administer the estate under the language of the instrument.  See 
Linehan v. Linehan, supra at 1018 (dismissing complaint and 
declining to grant declaratory relief; noting absence of any 
actual or likely dispute with Internal Revenue Service, and 
absence of any claim of uncertainty or that trustees would be 
unable to fulfil their duties without judicial guidance).  
Contrast Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Buckley, supra at 709-710 ("Here, 
the parties explain that the current uncertain state of Mary's 
will has an impact on their present decision-making.  The 
executors of Mary's will claim that if we do not provide them 
with a definitive construction of the troubling language in 
Mary's will, they will be unable to fulfil their present 
duties"). 
 
 
The trustees in this case claim only to be concerned that 
the trust language might be misconstrued (presumably by the 
taxing authorities) in the future and, as a preemptive measure, 
they ask this court to declare that it operates in the manner 
they understand it to operate.  Far from there being any 
controversy, mistake, or uncertainty of the type that we have 
historically considered under the Bosch rubric, there is an 
affirmative belief that there has been no mistake; there is no 
demonstrated problem with the language of the trust as drafted 
and no real uncertainty on the part of the trustees as to how to 
proceed under it; there is only a claimed possibility that the 
trust language might be misconstrued by others in the future. 
 
 
This is not an appropriate situation for a declaratory 
judgment or instructions on how to proceed, since the trustees 
are not in doubt as to their interpretation of the trust or how 
to effectuate it.  Nor is it an appropriate situation for a 
reformation, there being no proof of a mistake of any kind.  The 
apparent objective of the parties -- to insure by declaration or 
reformation that no one in the future misconstrues the document 
-- while understandable as a precautionary measure, is not 
something that justifies judicial involvement under the guise of 
Bosch. 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
A judgment shall enter in the county court declaring that 
this is not a suitable occasion for the type of relief sought, 
and dismissing the complaint without prejudice.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Barry C. Klickstein & Jillian B. Hirsch for the plaintiffs. 
                                                          
 
5 In the future, cases such as this adequately can be 
resolved in the Probate and Family Court.  See O'Connell v. 
Houser, ante     ,      (2014).