Title: Lieber v. President & Fellows of Harvard College
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13141
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2022

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SJC-13141 
 
CHARLES M. LIEBER  vs.  PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
& another.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 3, 2021. – January 10, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, 
JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Preliminary injunction.  Corporation, Non-
profit corporation, Indemnification of officers and 
directors.  Education, Private colleges and universities.  
Contract, Private college, Performance and breach, Implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Public Policy. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 9, 2020. 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Maureen 
B. Hogan, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
David R. Suny (Andrea L. Davulis also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
Joan A. Lukey (Justin J. Wolosz also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
 
 
1 Katherine N. Lapp. 
2 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The plaintiff, Charles M. Lieber, appeals from 
the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction, whereby 
Lieber sought to require his employer, President and Fellows of 
Harvard College,2 to provide advancement under a written 
indemnification policy of counsel fees and expenses that he is 
incurring in defending against certain criminal charges.  We 
conclude that the judge did not commit an abuse of discretion 
and affirm the denial of the motion. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts, which have 
reasonable support in the record.  See Doe v. Worcester Pub. 
Sch., 484 Mass. 598, 601 (2020).  Since 1991, Lieber has been a 
professor at Harvard, where, among other things, he has served 
as the principal investigator of a research group funded 
primarily through grants from two Federal agencies, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH).  When applying for and receiving those grants, 
Harvard and Lieber are required to make certain disclosures 
regarding foreign collaborations and significant financial 
conflicts of interest, including funds received from a foreign 
country. 
 
2 President and Fellows of Harvard College is a nonprofit 
Massachusetts corporation and the legal name of Harvard 
University.  For simplicity, we refer to it as "Harvard." 
3 
 
According to correspondence later found on Lieber's Harvard 
e-mail account, between 2011 and 2013, he entered into three 
contracts with Wuhan University of Technology (WUT), located in 
the People's Republic of China (China),3 pursuant to which he was 
to assemble a research team, engage in research and development, 
mentor students, and publish articles over periods of three to 
five years, in return for the payment of certain expenses and 
compensation, including, under two of the contracts, monthly 
salaries upwards of $50,000.  One of the contracts related to 
Lieber's participation in a program designed by the Chinese 
government to attract foreign scientific talent, called the 
"Thousand Talents Plan."4  From 2012 to as late as 2017, Lieber 
provided services and received payments under the WUT contracts, 
which, at his direction, were distributed to him by depositing 
one-half of the funds in a Chinese bank account set up in his 
name and providing the other half to him in cash when he visited 
China. 
 
3 Lieber, without authority, executed one of the contracts 
with Wuhan University of Technology (WUT) in Harvard's name.  He 
also knew WUT was identifying the laboratory (lab) he helped to 
develop in China as a joint undertaking with Harvard.  Yet, when 
Harvard became aware of this in 2015 and confronted him, he 
suggested WUT was doing so without his knowledge or assent. 
 
4 The contract was titled "Employment Contract of 'One 
Thousand Talent' High Level Foreign Expert." 
4 
 
Since at least 2012, Harvard, in part to bolster compliance 
with the disclosure requirements related to Federal grants, has 
had a policy requiring faculty members like Lieber to submit 
annual outside financial activity reports (FARs) and periodic 
financial conflict of interest disclosure forms (FCOIs) 
identifying affiliations with, and payments from, foreign 
sources.  Between 2012 and 2019, Lieber submitted a total of 
seventeen FARs and FCOIs, none of which identified any contracts 
or affiliations with, or payments from, WUT. 
In 2018, NIH and DOD, having both become aware of Lieber's 
apparent involvement with WUT and the Thousand Talents Plan, 
began inquiring whether he and Harvard had made proper 
disclosures in grant applications and related submissions.  
During an ensuing interview with DOD investigators, Lieber 
denied ever having been asked to participate in the Thousand 
Talents Plan.5  Then, in a written response to an inquiry from 
NIH, Harvard, in reliance on assurances from Lieber6 and 
 
5 Two days after the DOD interview, Lieber sent an e-mail 
message to a research associate seeking the link to a webpage 
where he was listed as the director of the Wuhan lab and wrote, 
"I lost a lot of sleep worrying about all of these things last 
night and want to start taking steps to correct sooner than 
later.  I will be careful about what I discuss with Harvard 
University, and none of this will be shared with government 
investigators at this time." 
 
6 Harvard interviewed Lieber before preparing the letter, 
had him review a "near-final" draft, and copied him on the final 
version sent to NIH. 
5 
 
apparently unaware of his e-mail communications, denied he had 
any appointments or affiliations with WUT, other than a brief 
"visiting scientist appointment" in 2012,7 and stated that WUT 
had falsely exaggerated his involvement with it in subsequent 
years.  Harvard further noted in the letter to NIH that "Lieber 
has represented that he is not and has never been a participant 
in" the Thousand Talents Plan. 
In 2020, Lieber was indicted in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts on two counts of making 
false statements to a government agency.  According to the 
indictment, Lieber, as evidenced by his e-mail communications, 
made false statements when he separately informed, or caused 
Harvard to inform, DOD and NIH that he had never participated, 
or been solicited to participate, in the Thousand Talents Plan.8  
Subsequently, he was indicted on two counts of filing a false 
tax return and two counts of failing to report foreign bank and 
 
7 In an FCOI submitted on July 31, 2012, Lieber disclosed 
that he had a "visiting scientist appointment" worth more than 
$10,000 with an entity he identified as the "Wuhan Institute of 
Technology" (WIT).  After receipt of the inquiry from NIH in 
2018, Lieber informed Harvard that this had been a mistake and 
he had meant to identify WUT, not WIT, in the FCOI.  He 
maintained, however, that he had no further appointments or 
affiliations with WUT after 2012. 
 
8 An affidavit filed in support of the criminal charges 
alleges that Lieber falsely represented in the letter submitted 
to NIH that he had no appointments or affiliations with WUT 
after 2012; however, he was not charged for that alleged false 
statement. 
6 
 
financial accounts, which related to his failure to identify the 
payments received and a bank account he established in China in 
connection with the WUT contracts.  Lieber pleaded not guilty to 
all charges. 
Following his indictment, Lieber made a written request for 
indemnification and advance payment of his legal fees and 
expenses pursuant to Harvard's "Indemnification Policy."  
Subject to certain enumerated exclusions, the policy provides 
for the indemnification of "Qualified Persons"9 against 
liabilities and expenses incurred in connection with, among 
other things, the defense of criminal proceedings the person may 
be involved in or threatened with by reason of serving in a 
"Covered Role."  A "Covered Role" is "any administrative, 
executive, managerial, professional or fiduciary role [at 
Harvard], or, at the request of and for the benefit of 
[Harvard], in any other corporation, trust or organization."  
Due "to the substantial autonomy and freedom afforded to a 
faculty member's teaching, research and writing," however, 
indemnification is not extended to those activities as a "per se 
rule."  Instead, the determination is left to Harvard's 
discretion, and indemnification can only be extended to such 
 
9 "Qualified Persons" under the policy are the "Officers of 
the University," which include the "teaching, professional and 
administrative staff." 
7 
 
activities when they are within the scope of the faculty 
member's employment.  The policy also provides that Harvard 
shall pay the legal fees and expenses "in advance of the final 
disposition thereof," upon request unless "it is determined that 
it is reasonably likely that the person seeking indemnification 
will not be entitled to indemnification under th[e] policy."  
All "determinations" under the policy are required to be made, 
in "good faith discretion," by Harvard's executive vice-
president. 
To that end, Katherine N. Lapp, Harvard's executive vice-
president, responded to Lieber's requests.  With regard to the 
false statement charges, Lapp questioned whether Lieber was 
acting in a covered role at the time of the activities alleged 
in the indictment.  Nonetheless, given that the criminal 
proceedings were in the earliest stages, she decided to defer 
the indemnification determination as to those charges.  As for 
the second set of charges, Lapp determined that Lieber was not 
eligible for indemnification because, in Harvard's view, the 
allegations of filing false tax returns and failing to report a 
foreign bank account "fall outside " both the definition of a 
covered role and the scope of Lieber's employment. 
Lapp further informed Lieber that Harvard would not provide 
any indemnification payments in advance because, in Harvard's 
view, it was "reasonably likely" that he would not be entitled 
8 
 
to indemnification in the final analysis.  Specifically, Lapp 
determined that indemnification was likely to be precluded under 
any of a number of exceptions set forth in the policy, including 
where a qualified person is adjudicated or determined not to 
have acted in good faith or in the reasonable belief that his or 
her actions were in the best interests of Harvard; is 
adjudicated or determined to have engaged in criminal 
misconduct, intentional wrongdoing, recklessness, or gross 
negligence; or is found to have committed an act or omission 
that he or she knew or should have known was a violation of 
Harvard policies.  As to the last of these exceptions, Lapp 
concluded that based on Lieber's contemporaneous e-mail 
correspondence, including his execution of the WUT contracts, it 
was reasonably likely he had lied or consciously withheld or 
misrepresented facts to Harvard and the government and failed to 
make required disclosures in FARs and FCOIs over multiple years, 
in violation of Harvard policies.10 
 
Thereafter, Lieber commenced the present action, asserting 
claims against Harvard and Lapp for breach of contract, breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
 
10 Lieber's representatives made a presentation to Lapp to 
try to persuade her to alter her determinations, and Lieber, as 
was his right under the policy, then pursued an appeal from her 
determinations to the "Corporation," but neither step proved 
successful. 
9 
 
declaratory judgments with respect to both the failure to 
provide indemnification and refusal to provide advancement.11  He 
also filed the motion at issue, seeking a preliminary injunction 
requiring Harvard to provide advancement of his legal fees and 
expenses.  Following a nonevidentiary hearing, a judge in the 
Superior Court issued a written decision denying the injunction.  
Lieber appealed from the judge's ruling12 and applied for direct 
appellate review, which we granted.13 
2.  Standard of review.  "We review the grant or denial of 
a preliminary injunction to determine whether the judge abused 
[her] discretion, that is, whether the judge applied proper 
legal standards and whether there was reasonable support for 
 
11 Two of the eight counts in the complaint were against 
Lapp, alleging breach of contract and seeking specific 
performance with respect to both indemnification and 
advancement. 
 
 
12 In addition to his appeal to the Appeals Court pursuant 
to G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par., Lieber also filed a 
petition seeking review in the county court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  The petition was dismissed by a single justice of 
this court, and that dismissal was affirmed.  See Lieber v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 488 Mass. 1015 (2021). 
 
13 The only claims at issue on appeal concern the 
advancement of indemnifiable fees and expenses.  A different 
judge in the Superior Court has stayed Lieber's claims seeking 
indemnification in relation to the false statement-related 
charges pending resolution of those criminal charges and entered 
judgment on the pleadings in Harvard's favor on all claims 
regarding indemnification in relation to the charges alleging 
the filing of false tax returns and failure to report a foreign 
bank account.  Those rulings are not before us. 
10 
 
[her] evaluation of factual questions."  Commonwealth v. Fremont 
Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 741 (2008), citing Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615 (1980) (Cheney).  In 
making our determination, we examine the same factors as the 
motion judge:  whether the moving party has shown "that success 
is likely on the merits; irreparable harm will result from 
denial of the injunction; and the risk of irreparable harm to 
the moving party outweighs any similar risk of harm to the 
opposing party."  Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Weston, 461 
Mass. 159, 164 (2011), citing Cheney, supra at 616-617.  Where, 
as here, no evidentiary hearing was held and the record consists 
of affidavits and other documents, although "weight will be 
accorded to the exercise of discretion by the judge below, . . . 
we may draw our own conclusions from the record."  Cheney, supra 
at 616.  As always, we review questions of law de novo.  See 
Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017) 
(interpretation of contract, including determination regarding 
ambiguity, presents question of law for court, subject on appeal 
to de novo review). 
 
3.  Analysis.  A preliminary injunction will not be granted 
if the moving party cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success 
on the merits.  See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 
Mass. 698, 712 (2020) ("[T]he movant's likelihood of success is 
the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry. . . .  
11 
 
[Without it], the remaining factors become matters of idle 
curiosity"). 
Here, Lieber's success depends upon the meaning of the 
advancement provision in Harvard's policy, which states: 
"[Harvard] shall pay or reimburse counsel fees and other 
expenses reasonably incurred by a Qualified Person in 
defending any claim, demand, action, suit or other 
proceeding that may be indemnifiable under this policy in 
advance of the final disposition thereof, upon receipt of a 
written undertaking by the Qualified Person to repay all 
such amounts if it is ultimately determined that he or she 
is not entitled to indemnification hereunder.  This 
paragraph shall not apply if it is determined that it is 
reasonably likely that the person seeking indemnification 
will not be entitled to indemnification under this policy." 
 
Lieber contends that the second sentence of this provision, 
pursuant to which Lapp made her determination not to provide 
advancement of funds, is ambiguous and therefore should be 
struck.  Alternatively, he argues that we should "strike" the 
second sentence and require Harvard to advance payments to him 
to cover his legal fees and expenses on "public policy" grounds.  
We disagree. 
 
a.  Interpretation of the policy.  By statute, 
Massachusetts nonprofit corporations are authorized, but not 
required, to provide indemnification of its directors, officers, 
employees, and other agents "to whatever extent shall be 
specified in or authorized by" its articles of organization, 
bylaws, or a vote by a majority of the members entitled to elect 
its directors.  See G. L. c. 180, § 6.  It is under those 
12 
 
statutory auspices that, in 2019, Harvard adopted the 
indemnification policy at issue.14 
 
Although regulated by statute, corporate indemnification 
and advancement policies are considered contractual in nature 
and are interpreted "according to traditional principles of 
contract law."  Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd. 
v. PIMCO Income Strategy Fund, 466 Mass. 368, 373-374 (2013) 
(Brigade). 
Lieber argues that the second sentence of the advancement 
provision is "confusing" and "ambiguous."  The sentence to which 
he refers, however, is entirely straightforward.  It provides 
for the advancement of indemnifiable fees and expenses unless 
"it is reasonably likely that the person seeking indemnification 
will not be entitled to [it]."  When the words of a contract are 
clear, they control, and we must construe them according to 
their plain meaning, in the context of the contract as a whole.  
See, e.g., Balles, 476 Mass. at 571; Brigade, 466 Mass. at 374.  
 
14 Harvard, through the Sixteenth Statute of the Harvard 
Statutes, which it suggests are "akin to corporate by-laws," has 
authorized indemnification of its officers, employees, or other 
agents "whenever and to the extent authorized by a disinterested 
majority of the members of the Corporation or by a majority of 
the disinterested members of the Board of Overseers."  The 
Sixteenth Statute further provides that such indemnification may 
include the advancement of expenses, upon receipt of an 
undertaking by the person indemnified to repay such amounts if 
it is ultimately determined that he or she is not entitled to 
indemnification.  It was based on this authority that Harvard 
adopted the policy at issue. 
13 
 
Here, Lieber's request for advancement of indemnifiable fees and 
expenses has been denied, as Harvard has determined that it is 
reasonably likely that, when all is said and done, he will be 
found to be ineligible for indemnification.15  Contrary to 
Lieber's suggestion, that determination was made consistent with 
the plain meaning of the policy. 
b.  "Public policy" arguments.  Alternatively, Lieber 
argues that the second sentence of the advancement provision 
must be struck because it violates "strong public policies" 
favoring advancement and the protection of his rights under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  This 
argument, too, misses the mark. 
If a court determines that a contract violates public 
policy, "it has discretion to determine the rights and 
liabilities of the parties as a matter of law."  Massachusetts 
 
15 We note that Lieber argues not that the sentence is 
susceptible of more than one interpretation, which is the 
classic definition of contract ambiguity, see Brigade Leveraged 
Capital Structures Fund Ltd. v. PIMCO Income Strategy Fund, 466 
Mass. 368, 373-374 (2013), but instead that the sentence is 
confusing and therefore should be struck.  Even if the sentence 
was unclear, which, as noted supra, it is not, it is a 
fundamental principle of interpretation "that every word and 
phrase of an instrument is if possible to be given meaning, and 
none is to be rejected as surplusage if any other course is 
rationally possible."  Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 
565, 575 n.17 (2017), quoting Tupper v. Hancock, 319 Mass. 105, 
109 (1946). 
14 
 
Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Danvers, 411 Mass. 39, 55 (1991), 
citing Town Planning & Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Amesbury Specialty 
Co., 369 Mass. 737, 745–747 (1976).  "Under freedom of contract 
principles, [however], parties are held to the express terms of 
their contract, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking 
to invalidate an express term."  TAL Fin. Corp. v. CSC 
Consulting, Inc., 446 Mass. 422, 430 (2006).  Here, Lieber has 
not satisfied that burden. 
Lieber first argues that allowing Harvard to refuse to 
provide advancement based on a preliminary assessment of his 
entitlement to indemnification is inconsistent with the primary 
purpose of advancement, which he suggests is to convey "to an 
institution's most valuable and talented people" that the school 
will stand behind them when their honesty or integrity is 
challenged.  As a general proposition, that may be true, see 
Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) 
("Advancement is an especially important corollary to 
indemnification as an inducement for attracting capable 
individuals into corporate service"), and it would seem to be in 
a corporation's self-interest to consider that as it endeavors 
to compete for talented employees.  As noted above, however, in 
Massachusetts an entity like Harvard has broad statutory 
authority when it comes to providing indemnification.  See G. L. 
c. 180, § 6.  Harvard has taken that authority and adopted an 
15 
 
indemnification policy that affords it a fair amount of 
discretion when it comes to making certain determinations, 
including when it comes to the advancement of fees and expenses.  
That may or may not be in Harvard's best interest, but Lieber 
has failed altogether to establish that it violates public 
policy, such that we could impose mandatory advancement on the 
school against its clearly stated will. 
The same is true with respect to Lieber's argument that the 
advancement provision is inconsistent with his constitutional 
rights not to incriminate himself and to retain counsel to 
defend himself against the criminal charges.  Take the former, 
for example.  Lieber argues that he has been unable to dispute 
the facts upon which Lapp relied in making her advancement 
determination and upon which the motion judge relied in 
concluding that he was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his 
claims16 out of fear of waiving his right against self-
incrimination, and that this is something he should not be 
penalized for doing.  There is no doubt that parallel civil and 
 
16 Lieber suggests, in conclusory fashion, that the 
affidavits considered by the motion judge were "rife" with 
inadmissible evidence and should not have been considered.  
However, the affidavits were not intended to be definitive proof 
that Lieber is guilty of the criminal charges or that he 
violated school policies.  Instead, they were submitted to 
establish that Lapp did not abuse her discretion when she made 
her determination regarding the advancement of fees to Lieber.  
The evidence Lapp chose to consider was not subject to the rules 
of evidence. 
16 
 
criminal proceedings can "place significant burdens upon the 
. . . privilege against self-incrimination."  Louis Vuitton 
Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2012).  
"[N]ot every undesirable consequence which may follow from the 
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination[, however,] 
can be characterized as a penalty."  Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 
100, 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).  This 
is particularly true in a civil context like the present one, 
where, pursuant to the clear language Harvard chose to include 
in the indemnification policy, both parties have rights.  See 
Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996) ("in 
the civil context, where, systemically, the parties are on a 
somewhat equal footing, one party's assertion of his 
constitutional right should not obliterate another party's 
right[s]").  "To hold otherwise would, in terms of the customary 
metaphor, enable [Lieber] to use his Fifth Amendment shield as a 
sword.  This he cannot do."  Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1979).  At the very least, 
he has failed to establish that he is entitled to do so as a 
matter of public policy.17 
 
17 Lieber also argues that he had a reasonable expectation 
that his plea of not guilty would not be ignored and that the 
criminal allegations would not be used against him by Harvard in 
making the advancement determination, and that by violating 
those expectations the school committed a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The implied covenant, 
17 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  Considering the unambiguous language of 
the advancement provision in Harvard's indemnification policy 
and the reasonably supported facts in the record, particularly 
those supported by Lieber's own e-mail communications, we 
conclude that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion when 
she concluded that Lieber has not established a likelihood of 
success on the merits of his claims seeking advancement of fees 
and expenses.18  The motion for a preliminary injunction, 
therefore, was properly denied. 
Order denying motion for a 
  preliminary injunction 
  affirmed. 
 
however, "is only as broad as the contract that governs the 
particular relationship.  It cannot create rights and duties not 
otherwise provided for in the existing contractual relationship, 
as the purpose of the covenant is to guarantee that the parties 
remain faithful to the intended and agreed expectations of the 
parties in their performance" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 456 Mass. 
562, 570 (2010).  Given the plain language of Harvard's policy, 
therefore, Lieber's claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is, to borrow the words of the 
motion judge, "equally unsupported." 
 
18 As Lieber has not established a likelihood of success on 
the merits of his action, we need not reach the issue of 
irreparable harm.  See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 
Mass. 698, 712 (2020).