Title: Ex Parte Daniel
Citation: 459 So. 2d 948
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 1984

459 So. 2d 948 (1984)
Ex parte George DANIEL.
(Re George Daniel v. State).
83-721.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 31, 1984.
Rehearing Denied November 9, 1984.
James R. McKoon, Jr. of Ferrell &amp; McKoon, Phenix City, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari in this case under Rule 39(c), A.R.A.P., to determine whether or not the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct in its conclusion that petitioner was not denied competent counsel in his trial on a charge of capital homicide, § 13A-5-31(5), Code 1975, which trial occurred in November 1981. We affirm.
As the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals discloses, this Court had in an earlier decision granted certiorari, remanding this case to the Court of Criminal Appeals with directions to remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the defendant's challenge to the competency of his trial counsel and to direct the trial court to make findings of fact relating to that issue. The Court of Criminal Appeals was also directed to conduct an independent review of the trial *949 court's findings and to make a final determination of the competency-of-counsel issue. Ex parte Daniel, 459 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 1982). Pursuant to that mandate, the Court of Criminal Appeals, 459 So. 2d 943, remanded the cause to the trial court, and the trial court conducted the prescribed evidentiary hearing and made findings in accord therewith, holding that counsel for the defendant were competent. Those proceedings were reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, which then issued an opinion upholding the trial court's judgment. Daniel v. State, 459 So. 2d 944 (Ala. Crim.App.1984). Following that decision, this Court again granted certiorari.
The sole issue presented by counsel to this Court on this petition is:
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals sets out the findings of the trial court. These were made after a hearing conducted by that court attended by Thomas Estes, chief deputy district attorney; Larry Roney, attorney for the defendant; Ruben K. King and Curtis Bernard, counsel for the defendant at his November 1981 trial; and witnesses Lillie Daniel and Hazel Bampoe. In addition to those findings, the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals contains a review of the evidence adduced in the trial court, together with its conclusion based thereon,
In making this determination, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the "farce, sham or mockery" test and also the "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" test of Harris v. Oliver, 645 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1981).
Subsequent to the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on January 10, 1984, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), established guidelines for the review of claims of deficient or ineffective counsel:
Ibid. at 104 S. Ct. 2064. That Court added, at 2065-66:
As made clear by the United States Supreme Court, an ineffective assistance claim requires not only an unreasonable error but also prejudice to the defense:
Id. at 2067. The defendant's burden was explained at 2068:
This burden was amplified at 2069:
Involving as it does the fundamental right of counsel at trial, this case properly should be reviewed under the standards adopted in Strickland, supra, even though the conduct complained of occurred prior to the date of that opinion. Accordingly, this Court has reviewed the record and briefs under those standards.
The first question to be addressed is whether or not the petitioner's counsel, in light of all the circumstances of this case, committed an act or omission "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" by failing to "move for [or procure] an independent psychiatric examination."[1]
This specific allegation of ineffectiveness must be viewed with the actual efforts of counsel to procure a mental examination before trial. The record affirmatively discloses that on April 30, 1981, Mr. Bernard, co-counsel for the defendant, filed a "Petition for Psychiatric Examination," which in part stated the following:
In response to this encompassing petition, the trial court ordered that the defendant be examined by the East Alabama Mental Health Center. A Dr. Rose, Ph.D., opined that there were "substantial questions regarding his capacity to stand trial." His full report, filed shortly thereafter, recommended admission to a state mental hospital for further evaluation, whereupon the trial court ordered the petitioner committed to the Alabama Mental Hospital in Tuscaloosa.
On September 8, 1981, a report of a psychiatric study of the petitioner was sent to the trial court. We quote pertinent portions of that report from the record:
Notwithstanding this report, the record on remandment reveals that the petitioner's attorneys had their own doubts concerning the petitioner's mental capacity to stand trial. Mr. Bernard himself testified that it was still his opinion that Mr. Daniel was not competent to stand trial. Nevertheless, that record also discloses both an investigation of the facts of the *953 homicide and a consideration of possible defenses. Indeed, the record shows that defense counsel affirmatively considered the possible practical effect before a jury of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and weighed the success of such a plea against the evidence contained in the psychiatric report. Under the circumstances, their decision not to move for another psychiatric evaluation was the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, and not an error which could be viewed as a deficiency in professional performance. Certainly, such conduct cannot be judged as an error "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, supra, at 2064.
Having found no such error, we find it unnecessary to inquire into the prejudice component of the Strickland standards. Strickland, supra, at 2069.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals must be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Justices concur.
[1]  Though not important to this question, it cannot go unnoticed that on the first appeal of this case, the petitioner asserted that a conflict of some sort existed between counsel which prevented him from receiving a fair trial. That assertion has been abandoned; the failure to move for the independent sanity hearing is now the basis for the allegation of incompetent counsel.