Title: Bruce A. Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc.
Citation: 2009 WI 83
Docket Number: 2008AP001913-CQ
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2009

2009 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1913-CQ 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Bruce A. Tammi, 
          Plaintiff-Appellee, 
     v. 
Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 7TH CIRCUIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Jeffrey S. 
Fertl and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Jeffrey S. Fertl. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellee there was a brief by Bruce A. 
Tammi, and oral argument by Bruce A. Tammi. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Frank J. Daily, 
Mitchell S. Moser, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf 
of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1913-CQ   
(L.C. No. 
2008AP1913-CQ) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
Bruce A. Tammi, 
 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
     v. 
 
Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of questions of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified questions 
answered, in part, and cause remanded.    
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (2007-08)1 and 
Circuit Rule 52 (Circuit Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit).  The four certified questions relate to 
damages permitted in a suit under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
2 
 
Wisconsin's Lemon Law,2 in a specific factual situation.  The 
questions restated by the Seventh Circuit are as follows: 
1. 
When a consumer defined in Wisconsin Statute 
Section 218.0171(1)(b)4[.] brings an action pursuant 
to subsection (7), if that consumer, after making his 
Lemon Law demand, then exercises an option to purchase 
and buys the vehicle as provided in the lease, is the 
consumer then entitled to recover the amount of the 
purchase price? 
2. 
If the consumer defined in Wisconsin Statute 
Section 218.0171(1)(b)4[.] is entitled to recover the 
vehicle purchase price when he exercises the purchase 
option provided in the lease, does the purchase amount 
qualify as pecuniary loss subject to the doubling 
provision in subsection (7)? 
3. 
If the answers to questions 1 and 2 are in the 
affirmative, is the consumer permitted to keep the 
purchased vehicle in addition to the receipt of the 
damage award or must the vehicle be returned to the 
manufacturer? 
4. 
Is a damage award under subsection (7) subject to 
a reduction for reasonable use of the vehicle? 
Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 536 F.3d 702, 713-14 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
¶2 
We answer the first certified question as follows: No.  
When a consumer who is leasing a motor vehicle brings an action 
against the manufacturer of the vehicle pursuant to subsection 
(7) of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, and then exercises his option to 
purchase the vehicle under the terms of the lease, the consumer 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin's Lemon Law is "a remedial statute enacted to 
protect buyers [and lessees] of new [motor] vehicles if they 
experience certain types of problems with their purchases."  
Garcia v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶1, 273 
Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365.  Vehicles with problems covered 
under the statute are known as "lemons."  See id., ¶9. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
3 
 
is not entitled to damages for the price of his voluntary 
purchase because his purchase was not "caused" by any violation 
of 
the 
statute 
by 
the 
manufacturer. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7). 
¶3 
Because our answer to the first certified question is 
"no," it is unnecessary for us to reach the second and third 
certified questions, as they depend upon a "yes" answer to the 
first question.  A discussion of certified questions two and 
three would devolve into an impermissible discussion of a 
hypothetical situation, because this case does not implicate a 
consumer who is entitled to recover his vehicle purchase price.  
As the resolution of those issues "depends on hypothetical or 
future facts, [they are] not ripe for adjudication and will not 
be 
addressed 
by 
this 
court." 
 
State 
v. 
Armstead, 
220 
Wis. 2d 626, 631, 583 N.W.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1998); see also City 
of Janesville v. County of Rock, 107 Wis. 2d 187, 199, 319 
N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1982) ("Courts will not render merely 
advisory opinions."). 
¶4 
We answer the fourth certified question as follows: 
The plain language of the statute makes clear that a consumer's 
refund under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. or 3.a. is subject 
to a reasonable allowance for use.  Because we read subsection 
(7) in conjunction with the rest of the statute, we conclude 
that 
the 
amount 
of 
"pecuniary 
loss" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7) must incorporate a reasonable allowance for use 
before the pecuniary loss is doubled.   
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
4 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3 
¶5 
On May 30, 2003, Bruce A. Tammi (Tammi) entered into a 
36-month lease with Zimbrick Inc. Hyundai & European of Madison 
(Zimbrick) for a 2003 Porsche 911 Turbo Coupe.4  Tammi was an 
avid car enthusiast and member of the Porsche Club of America.  
He "leased the vehicle for use in competitive car club events as 
well as for his work commute" to his law firm in Milwaukee.  
Tammi, 536 F.3d at 704.   
¶6 
Tammi's payment obligations under the 36-month lease 
amounted to $69,327.10.  This total included an initial payment 
of $1,999.85, 35 monthly payments of $1,912.35 ($66,932.25), and 
a termination fee of $395.00. 
¶7 
Tammi had significant experience purchasing expensive 
cars, and he frequently purchased vehicles via lease contracts 
containing options to purchase.  In this case, he negotiated a 
sophisticated lease under which he could purchase the Porsche at 
the end of the lease or at any time during the lease.  The 
negotiated 
purchase 
price at the end of the lease was 
$64,344.10, plus taxes and fees.  If Tammi decided to exercise 
his option to purchase prior to the expiration of 36 months, the 
                                                 
3 The facts and procedural history are based upon the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Tammi v. Porsche Cars North 
America, Inc., 536 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); the relevant order 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Judge, Tammi v. Porsche Cars 
North America, Inc., No. 04-C-1059, 2007 WL 777522 (E.D. Wis. 
Mar. 13, 2007); and the briefs and appendices of the parties. 
4 Zimbrick promptly assigned its interest in Tammi's lease 
to U.S. Bank (hereinafter "the lessor"). 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
5 
 
$64,344.10 purchase price would be increased pro rata based upon 
the previously negotiated residual value of the vehicle, namely 
$63,994.10.  
¶8 
Approximately eight months after Tammi took possession 
of the Porsche, he began to encounter mechanical problems with 
the vehicle.  See id.  Tammi's Porsche was equipped with a rear 
spoiler that was "designed to deploy automatically when the 
vehicle exceeded 75 m.p.h."  Id.  When the vehicle traveled 
below 40 m.p.h., the spoiler was designed to retract.  See id.  
Tammi's problem was that, when the spoiler deployed, it often 
failed to retract.  Id. at 704-05.  This occurred about one-
third of the time that Tammi drove the vehicle.  See id. at 704, 
707.  Moreover, when the spoiler failed to retract, "it prompted 
an audible chime to ring intermittently, a red warning light to 
illuminate, and a red warning message image to display in the 
center instrument cluster."  Id. at 704.  These warning signals 
were annoying, distracting, and frequently forced Tammi to pull 
over or leave the highway to turn off his vehicle in an effort 
to reset the spoiler and defective alarms.  See id. at 704-05.  
In addition, the vehicle's radio would sometimes blare loudly 
upon start-up before eventually returning to normal volume after 
a few minutes.  See id.   
¶9 
Between March and August 2004, Tammi took his vehicle 
to a certified Porsche service provider for repairs at least 
eight times.5  See id. at 705.  He always brought the vehicle to 
                                                 
5 Tammi first took his Porsche for repairs on March 2, 2004, 
by which time he had put about 6,500 miles on the car. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
6 
 
certified Porsche service providers so that he would not violate 
any provisions of his lease.  Id.; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(a).  These many attempts to correct the problems 
were not successful.  Tammi, 536 F.3d at 705. 
¶10 On September 7, 2004, Tammi submitted the requisite 
notice under Wisconsin's Lemon Law to Porsche.  Tammi submitted 
his notice using a Lemon Law notice form provided by the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation.  In his notice, Tammi 
informed Porsche that the "vehicle had been made available for 
repair at least [four] times for the same defect during its 
first year of warranty, and [he] demanded a refund calculated in 
accordance with the Lemon Law, plus collateral costs."  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  Tammi also offered to return the 
vehicle.  In a letter dated October 6, 2004, Porsche rejected 
Tammi's Lemon Law claim, stating "its understanding that [the] 
vehicle had been repaired."  Id.   
¶11 On October 14, 2004, following Porsche's denial of his 
claim, Tammi filed a Lemon Law complaint in Waukesha County 
Circuit Court, seeking double damages for his lease payments in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  See id.  Citing 
diversity jurisdiction, Porsche removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.  
See id.  A month or so later, on December 6, 2004, Tammi filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  The district court denied Tammi's 
motion, finding that there were issues of material fact that 
remained unresolved: specifically, whether the vehicle had a 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
7 
 
substantial impairment that would constitute a nonconformity 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(f). 
¶12 Tammi filed Federal Rule 266 disclosures on January 14, 
2005, alleging damages for the amount of his lease, his tire 
rack and floor mat purchases, and his insurance expenditures.  
His initial damages disclosure did not include the purchase 
price of the vehicle.  Following Tammi's disclosures, the 
district court ordered that discovery be completed by September 
1, 2005. 
¶13 In December 2005, while the case was pending, Tammi 
exercised his option to purchase the Porsche vehicle for 
$75,621.88.  Tammi, 536 F.3d at 705.  Because Tammi's purchase 
occurred after his initial lease payment of $1,999.85, plus 29 
subsequent monthly lease payments of $1,912.35, his payments 
under the lease totaled $57,458.00.7  Despite his ongoing claim 
that the vehicle was a lemon, Tammi testified that he had fixed 
the spoiler malfunction on his own, see id. at 705 n.1, and 
decided to purchase the vehicle because he felt it was worth 
more than the lease buyout amount. 
                                                 
6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires each party to 
file certain pretrial disclosures, including "a computation of 
each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party."  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
7 The parties differ slightly as to the total lease payments 
made between May 30, 2003, and November 30, 2005.  This is, of 
course, a question of fact. The district court calculated 
Tammi's lease payments to be $57,458.00.  Tammi, 2007 WL 777522, 
*3.  We accept this finding of fact.  Any discrepancy as to the 
actual amount of payments made does not affect this court's 
discussion of the certified questions. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
8 
 
¶14 On 
April 
12, 
2006, 
the 
district 
court 
held 
a 
scheduling conference during which it referred the case to 
mediation and set a final pretrial conference for August 3, 
2006.  Tammi subsequently revised his Rule 26 disclosures to 
include a claim of damages for the purchase price of the 
vehicle.  In response, Porsche filed several motions in limine 
asking the court to limit Tammi's damages to his lease payments.  
The district court denied these motions. 
¶15 Ultimately, Tammi sought the following in damages:  
[R]ecovery of his lease payments ($57,458.00), the 
amount he paid for the purchase of the car under the 
[buyout] option of the lease ($75,621.88), insurance 
($2,457.85), winter tires ($2,044.11) and floor mats 
and 
an 
auto 
manual 
($788.71), 
for 
a 
total 
of 
$138,370.55.  [He also wanted] to retain ownership of 
the car. 
Id. at 705-06.  Porsche countered that Tammi's lease payments 
were "proper subjects of damage, but that the other items were 
not related to the vehicle repairs."  Id. at 706.  The district 
court allowed Tammi to seek all his enumerated damages, 
reserving the right to reconsider the damage award after the 
jury's verdict.  Id.   
¶16 On August 24, 2006, the jury determined that Tammi had 
suffered a "nonconformity covered by the manufacturer's express 
warranty which substantially impaired the use, value or safety 
of his vehicle."  Id. (internal quotes omitted).  It determined 
that Tammi had complied with the requirements of the Lemon Law 
and awarded him "$26,600 for pecuniary loss resulting from the 
nonconformity."  Id.   
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
9 
 
¶17 Following the verdict, Tammi renewed his pre-trial 
position that the court should have given a specific Lemon Law 
damages instruction, not a general damages instruction, and he 
asked that the damage award be changed as a matter of law.  
After hearing argument and taking the issue of damages under 
advisement, 
the 
district 
court 
revised 
the 
jury 
award, 
concluding as a matter of law that Tammi was entitled to 
reimbursement for his lease payments ($57,458.00) and the 
purchase price he paid for the vehicle ($75,621.88).  See id.  
Pursuant to the Wisconsin Lemon Law, the court doubled the 
"pecuniary loss" for a total award of $266,159.76, plus costs.8  
See id.  The district court also allowed Tammi to keep the 
Porsche.  Id. 
¶18 In holding that Tammi was entitled to the return of 
his lease payments, the district court stated that, because 
Tammi was obligated to make those payments under the lease, 
those payments should be refunded.  See Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. 
Am., No. 04-C-1059, 2007 WL 777522, *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 
2007).  The court recognized that, "at the very least, the 
consumer suffers pecuniary loss in the amount of the refund he 
                                                 
8 In addition to pursuing any other remedy, a consumer 
may bring an action to recover for any damages caused 
by a violation of this section.  The court shall award 
a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the 
amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, 
disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate. 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7). 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
10 
 
or 
she 
should 
have 
received 
[under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3.a.]."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
Because Tammi's total lease obligations——the payments he had 
already made as well as those that he would have made had he not 
exercised his purchase option——totaled $69,327.10, the district 
court 
determined 
that 
reimbursement 
of 
this 
amount 
was 
consistent with the purposes of the Lemon Law.  See id.  The 
court declared that awarding Tammi anything less than his total 
lease obligation "flies in the face of two purposes of the 
[L]emon [L]aw:  putting the consumer back in the position he was 
in when the car was leased and doing so in a timely manner."  
Id.   
¶19 As to the return of Tammi's purchase price, the 
district court relied on this court's opinion in Hughes v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996).  
The court focused on Hughes's holding that a purchaser is 
entitled to the return of his entire purchase price, not just 
reimbursement for actual expenditures made.  See Tammi, 2007 WL 
777522, *5 (citing Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 977, 979, 983).9  
Additionally, the district court reasoned that return of Tammi's 
purchase price comports with the legislature's decision to 
include leased vehicles within the coverage of Wisconsin's Lemon 
Law.  See id. at **6, 10.  Finally, the court stated that a 
failure to reimburse Tammi's purchase price would not put Tammi 
                                                 
9 See also Tammi, 2007 WL 777522, *9. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
11 
 
in the position he was in when he purchased the vehicle.  See 
id. at **7-8.   
¶20 The district court declined to include Tammi's costs 
for winter tires, a tire rack, or insurance in the revised 
damages award because these items were not "purchased at or near 
the time of delivery of the car."  Id. at *9.  Instead, it ruled 
that reimbursable pecuniary losses for accessories may include 
only "'the amount paid by the consumer at the point of 
sale . . . [such as] anything paid for by the consumer that day, 
including non[-]manufacturer options paid for at the time of the 
sale whether installed prior to sale or after.'"  Id. at *9 
(quoting Kiss v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WI App 122, ¶16 n.5, 
246 Wis. 2d 364, 630 N.W.2d 742). 
¶21 Finally, the district court ruled that Tammi could 
keep the Porsche and refused to reduce the damage award based on 
Tammi's reasonable use of the vehicle prior to his Lemon Law 
complaint.  The court stated that Tammi would not receive "twice 
the amount of any pecuniary loss," as required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7), "[i]f the court requires that [he] return the 
car."  Id. at *10.  In short, the district court reasoned that 
the return of the car or a reduction of the damage award for 
reasonable use would cause Tammi to receive less than double 
damages, a remedy mandated by Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  See id.  
The court determined that, because Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) did 
not contain a provision for reducing the damages award based on 
the consumer's reasonable use of the vehicle, Tammi's recovery 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
12 
 
should not be reduced based on phantom provisions.  See id. at 
*11.   
¶22 Following the district court's modification of the 
damages award, Porsche appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.10  Tammi, 536 F.3d at 706-07.  
Porsche presented three arguments:  (1) "there was insufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude that the vehicle had a 
nonconformity" that violated the Lemon Law; (2) the jury's 
verdict was against the "overwhelming weight of the evidence" 
regarding any substantial impairment of the vehicle's use, 
value, or 
safety; 
and (3) the district court erred in 
calculating Tammi's damage award.  See id.   
¶23 On August 4, 2008, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
"there was sufficient evidence presented that the vehicle Tammi 
leased suffered a nonconformity that substantially impaired its 
use," thereby rejecting Porsche's argument that the jury's 
verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence.  Id. at 
707.  In assessing the district court's measure of damages, the 
Seventh Circuit decided to certify four questions to this court 
because the answers to those questions are matters of first 
impression in Wisconsin that could have significant impact on 
Wisconsin consumers.  See id. at 713-14. 
¶24 This court accepted certification on September 11, 
2008. 
                                                 
10 The appeal was heard by Judge Joel M. Flaum, Judge 
Kenneth F. Ripple, and Judge Daniel A. Manion, who authored the 
court's opinion.  Tammi, 536 F.3d at 704.   
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
13 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 The issues in this case require us to determine 
damages under Wisconsin's Lemon Law.  To do this, we must 
interpret the language contained in Wis. Stat. § 218.0171.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we 
review de novo.  See Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978-79 (interpreting 
and applying Wisconsin's Lemon Law de novo).   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶26 To answer the questions certified by the Seventh 
Circuit, we must interpret Wisconsin's Lemon Law statute.  The 
object of statutory interpretation is to determine statutory 
meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  This requires 
us to focus primarily on the language of the statute: 
We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed 
in the statutory language.  Extrinsic evidence of 
legislative intent may become relevant to statutory 
interpretation in some circumstances, but is not the 
primary focus of inquiry.  It is the enacted law, not 
the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public.  
Therefore, the purpose of statutory interpretation is 
to determine what the statute means so that it may be 
given its full, proper, and intended effect. 
Id. 
¶27 Therefore, we start with the language of the statute.  
Id., ¶¶44-45; see also DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶37, 
299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311.  When examining the statutory 
language, "if the plain meaning is clear, a court need not look 
to the rules of statutory construction or to extrinsic sources 
of interpretation."  DaimlerChrysler, 299 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37; see 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
14 
 
also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  Moreover, "[a] statute is not 
ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to its 
meaning."  DaimlerChrysler, 299 Wis. 2d 1, ¶38. 
A. 
Overview of Wisconsin's Lemon Law 
¶28 The 
Wisconsin 
Lemon 
Law 
is 
one 
of 
Wisconsin's 
preeminent consumer protection statutes.  It was first adopted 
in 1983, 1983 Wis. Act 48, § 1, and has been revised and 
extended several times in the intervening years.11  The statute 
is designed to assist consumers who have purchased or leased a 
new motor vehicle that does not function properly.  State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 345-46, 
592 N.W.2d 201 (1999).  In a dispute, the statute reduces the 
disparity between a motor vehicle manufacturer and a consumer by 
equalizing the bargaining power of the consumer.  It creates 
standards of conduct for manufacturers of new motor vehicles and 
their agents as well as potent consequences for violations of 
those standards.   
¶29 Subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 embodies a 
list of definitions for the section, including "consumer," 
§ 218.0171(1)(b); 
"motor 
vehicle," 
§ 218.0171(1)(d); 
"nonconformity," § 218.0171(1)(f); and "reasonable attempt to 
repair," § 218.0171(1)(h).  The term "consumer" includes the 
"purchaser of a new motor vehicle, if the motor vehicle was 
purchased from a motor vehicle dealer for purposes other than 
                                                 
11 See 1985 Wis. Act 205; 1987 Wis. Acts 105, 169, 323, 403; 
1989 Wis. Act 31; 1999 Wis. Act 31; 2001 Wis. Act 45. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
15 
 
resale," § 218.0171(1)(b)1., and also "[a] person who leases a 
motor vehicle from a motor vehicle lessor under a written 
lease," § 218.0171(1)(b)4.12 
¶30 Subsection (2) imposes obligations upon motor vehicle 
manufacturers and their agents.  The first obligation is the 
obligation of repair located in paragraph (a): 
 
(a) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to 
an applicable express warranty and the consumer [1] 
reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, the 
motor vehicle lessor or any of the manufacturer's 
authorized motor vehicle dealers and [2] makes the 
motor vehicle available for repair [3] before the 
expiration of the warranty or one year after first 
delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever 
is sooner, the nonconformity shall be repaired. 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
 
¶31 Under subsection (2)(a), the manufacturer or the 
manufacturer's 
agent 
has 
an 
obligation 
to 
repair 
a 
"nonconformity," which is defined as a "condition or defect 
which substantially impairs the use, value or safety of a motor 
vehicle."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(f). 
                                                 
12 The following persons are also identified as consumers 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(b): 
2.  A person to whom the motor vehicle is 
transferred for purposes other than resale, if the 
transfer occurs before the expiration of an express 
warranty applicable to the motor vehicle. 
3.  A person who may enforce the warranty. 
The Lemon Law groups these consumers with consumers who purchase 
new motor vehicles under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(b)1.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2., (c), and (f).  
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
16 
 
 
¶32 "Recovery under the statute is provided in both 
subsection (2)(a) and (2)(b)."  Kletzien v. Ford Motor Co., 668 
F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. Wis. 1987).  Subsection (2)(a) was 
discussed by the court of appeals in Vultaggio v. General Motors 
Corp., 145 Wis. 2d 874, 890-91, 429 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1988).13  
The court concluded that subsection (2)(a) creates an obligation 
of repair and that a consumer may bring suit for violation of 
that obligation under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  Id.  The court 
stated its decision as follows: 
 
Subsection (2)(a) protects the consumer from 
those instances in which the consumer is unable to 
establish the "reasonable attempt to repair" necessary 
under sec. [218.0171(2)(b)], but can show that the 
dealer 
has 
not, 
cannot, 
or 
will 
not 
repair 
a 
nonconformity brought to its attention during the 
warranty period.  In accord with the remedial purpose 
of sec. [218.0171], that consumer should still be 
afforded relief. 
Id. at 891 (emphasis added).  Thus, a "manufacturer who fails to 
repair 
a 
nonconformity 
reported 
to 
it 
pursuant 
to 
[218.0171(2)(a)] has violated its [obligation]," id. at 890, and 
the consumer may bring suit under § 218.0171(7) for the 
violation of that obligation, even though the consumer is not 
able 
to 
take 
advantage 
of 
"the 
remedies 
of 
refund 
or 
replacement" under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b).  Id. at 891. 
 
¶33 If the remedies of refund or replacement are not 
available for a violation of subsection (2)(a) alone, the 
consumer may recover "any damages caused by a violation" of 
                                                 
13 See also Dussault v. Chrysler Corp., 229 Wis. 2d 296, 
306-08, 600 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
17 
 
subsection 
(2)(a) 
and 
collect 
twice 
the 
amount 
of 
that 
"pecuniary 
loss, 
together 
with 
costs, 
disbursements 
and 
reasonable attorney fees, and any equitable relief the court 
determines appropriate."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).14 
¶34 The point of this discussion is that the Wisconsin 
Lemon Law has been interpreted for more than 20 years as 
providing recovery for a violation of subsection (2)(a).  If 
this interpretation is correct, it suggests that when damages 
"caused by a violation of this section" are determined under 
subsection (7), they should be linked to a specific violation of 
the statute and vary based on the facts of each case. 
 
¶35 Subsections 
(2)(b) 
and 
(c) 
impose 
additional 
obligations on manufacturers and their agents: 
 
(b) 1.  If after a reasonable attempt to repair 
the nonconformity is not repaired, the manufacturer 
shall carry out the requirement under subd. 2. or 3., 
whichever is appropriate. 
                                                 
14 In its amicus curiae brief in Vultaggio v. General Motors 
Corp., 145 Wis. 2d 874, 429 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1988), the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice cited a Minnesota Law Review 
Note on a Minnesota statutory provision similar to Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(a).  See Julie A. Vergeront, Note, A Sour Note: A 
Look at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 846 (1984).  
The writer of the Note suggested that a violation of the 
obligation to repair would result in a recovery "very similar to 
recovery of damages for breach of express warranty under the 
UCC."  Id. at 862.  The Department observed that such a recovery 
would be doubled in Wisconsin and reasonable attorney fees would 
be provided under § 218.0171(7).  Nonetheless, the Department 
predicted that § 218.0171(2)(a) was not likely to be utilized 
very often because it is so much less attractive than the 
remedies under (2)(b).  Normally, a consumer will try to qualify 
under subsection (2)(b). 
 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
18 
 
 
2.  At the direction of a consumer described 
under sub. (1)(b)1., 2. or 3., do one of the 
following: 
 
a. 
Accept return of the motor vehicle and 
replace the motor vehicle with a comparable new motor 
vehicle and refund any collateral costs. 
 
b. 
Accept return of the motor vehicle and 
refund to the consumer and to any holder of a 
perfected security interest in the consumer's motor 
vehicle, as their interest may appear, the full 
purchase price plus any sales tax, finance charge, 
amount paid by the consumer at the point of sale and 
collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use.   
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b) (emphasis added).  Subdivision b. 
then continues on, creating a ceiling on the amount that may be 
deducted as "a reasonable allowance for use" from a refund of 
the full purchase price.15  Reasonable allowance for use is not a 
factor under subdivision a.  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2.a. 
 
¶36 Plainly, subsection (2)(b)2. applies to purchasers and 
others who acquire title to a new motor vehicle.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(1)(b)1.-3.  Payment obligations are created when 
title to a motor vehicle is transferred to a purchaser.  A 
consumer who is a purchaser (or other person who acquires title 
in 
conformity 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(1)(b)) 
and 
who 
                                                 
15 Under this subdivision, a reasonable allowance for 
use may not exceed the amount obtained by multiplying 
the full purchase price of the motor vehicle by a 
fraction, the denominator of which is 100,000 or, for 
a motorcycle, 20,000, and the numerator of which is 
the number of miles the motor vehicle was driven 
before the consumer first reported the nonconformity 
to the motor vehicle dealer. 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
19 
 
satisfies other statutory requirements, such as allowing the 
manufacturer a "reasonable attempt to repair" the vehicle, must 
offer to transfer title of the vehicle back to the manufacturer.  
See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c).  Once these requirements have 
been met, the consumer may direct the manufacturer either to 
"replace the motor vehicle with a comparable new motor vehicle" 
or refund the full purchase price, as provided.16  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)2.  The manufacturer or the manufacturer's agent 
has 30 days to "provide the consumer with the comparable new 
motor vehicle or refund."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c); see also 
Estate of Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 234, ¶¶8-9, 248 
Wis. 2d 193, 635 N.W.2d 635. 
¶37 A 
manufacturer's 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
obligations set out in subsection (2)(b)2. permits the consumer 
to file suit under subsection (7).  See Gosse v. Navistar Int'l 
Transp. Corp., 2000 WI App 8, ¶12, 232 Wis. 2d 163, 605 
N.W.2d 896 (recognizing that Wis. Stat. § 218.015(7) (1997-98), 
now Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7), "allows the consumer to enforce 
the statute by bringing legal action").  The consumer's 
"pecuniary loss" in subsection (7) is the loss "caused by a 
violation of this section."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  If the 
                                                 
16 The manufacturer is expected to "refund to the consumer 
and to any holder of a perfected security interest in the 
consumer's motor vehicle, as their interest may appear, the full 
purchase price plus any sales tax, finance charge, amount paid 
by the consumer at the point of sale and collateral costs, less 
a 
reasonable 
allowance 
for 
use." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
20 
 
consumer "prevails in such an action," the court "shall 
award . . . twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together 
with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate."  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
¶38 A consumer acting under subsection (2)(b)2. may 
receive a comparable new motor vehicle or a refund of the full 
purchase price, as provided, but the consumer does not get 
double his purchase price, or attorney fees, or other add-ons 
not contemplated by (2)(b)2., as long as the manufacturer 
complies timely with the demand.  A manufacturer that fails to 
comply timely with a consumer's demand under (2)(b)2. assumes 
the risk of paying twice the vehicle's full purchase price and 
other items mentioned in (2)(b)2.b.——namely, "any sales tax, 
finance charge[s], amount paid by the consumer at the point of 
sale and collateral costs"——plus the consumer's reasonable 
attorney fees, plus other "costs" and "disbursements" and even 
possible "equitable relief," plus its own attorney fees, if any.  
See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7); Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 976-77.  
Considering these potent consequences for violating the statute, 
the manufacturer must weigh very carefully when "to hold 'em and 
when to fold 'em."17 
¶39 Subsection (2)(b)3. applies to lessees.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0171(1)(b)4.  "If after a reasonable attempt to 
                                                 
17 Kenny Rogers, The Gambler, on The Gambler (United Artists 
1978). 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
21 
 
repair the nonconformity is not repaired, the manufacturer 
shall" do the following: 
 
3. 
a. 
With respect to a consumer described in 
sub. (1)(b)4., [namely, a lessee,] accept return of 
the motor vehicle, refund to the motor vehicle lessor 
and to any holder of a perfected security interest in 
the motor vehicle, as their interest may appear, the 
current value of the written lease and refund to the 
consumer the amount the consumer paid under the 
written lease plus any sales tax and collateral costs, 
less a reasonable allowance for use. 
 
b. 
Under this subdivision, the current value of 
the written lease equals the total amount for which 
that lease obligates the consumer during the period of 
the lease remaining after its early termination, plus 
the motor vehicle dealer's early termination costs and 
the value of the motor vehicle at the lease expiration 
date if the lease sets forth that value, less the 
motor vehicle lessor's early termination savings. 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶40 These provisions, providing explicit protections for 
lessees, were approved in 1987.  1987 Wis. Act 105.  They are 
obviously separate from the provisions protecting purchasers. 
B. 
Certified Question One 
¶41 In its first certified question, the Seventh Circuit 
asked the following:  
When a consumer defined in Wisconsin Statute Section 
218.0171(1)(b)4[.] 
brings 
an 
action 
pursuant 
to 
subsection (7), if that consumer, after making his 
Lemon Law demand, then exercises an option to purchase 
and buys the vehicle as provided in the lease, is the 
consumer then entitled to recover the amount of the 
purchase price? 
Tammi, 536 F.3d at 713.  For the reasons stated, we believe the 
answer is no.   
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
22 
 
¶42 A purchaser obtains title to a motor vehicle.  A 
purchaser is obligated to pay for the entire motor vehicle.  A 
purchaser will typically be required to pay the institution that 
provided financing for the vehicle so that the purchaser could 
purchase the vehicle from the manufacturer.  In this scenario, 
the manufacturer has been fully paid and the consumer is fully 
obligated unless and until the contract is rescinded.  Hence, a 
remedy that returns the vehicle to the manufacturer and requires 
the manufacturer to make a full refund of the consumer's 
purchase price, including taxes and finance charges, attempts to 
restore the parties to the situation they were in before the 
purchase.  Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 976-77.  A reasonable 
allowance for use provides a reasonable adjustment to the status 
quo. 
¶43 In a typical lease situation, a financial institution—
—the lessor——has paid the manufacturer, and the lessor holds 
title to the motor vehicle during the term of the lease.18  The 
lessee has financial obligations to the lessor for a specific 
term.  Depending upon the terms of the lease, the lessee may 
purchase the vehicle from the lessor at or before the end of the 
lease, or may walk away at the end of the lease.  In short, the 
financial obligation of the lessee is not as great as the 
financial obligation of a purchaser.  This is why Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
18 Leases are structured so that lessees take possession of 
the property, but legal title remains with the lessor.  See 
Watertown Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 94 
Wis. 2d 622, 632, 289 N.W.2d 288 (1980). 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
23 
 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3.a. provides that the manufacturer must refund 
"to the motor vehicle lessor"——not the consumer lessee——"the 
current value of the written lease" and why the consumer lessee 
receives a refund of only "the amount the consumer paid under 
the written lease plus any sales tax and collateral costs [as 
defined], less a reasonable allowance for use." 
¶44 Both the consumer and the lessor have obligations to 
the manufacturer that must be satisfied to receive a refund.  
The consumer lessee must offer to return the motor vehicle to 
the manufacturer.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(cm)1.  The lessor 
must offer to transfer title to the manufacturer.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)2.  This latter obligation may have been 
formalized 
in 
the 
contract 
between 
the 
lessor 
and 
the 
manufacturer.  Once the consumer returns the vehicle and 
receives 
his 
refund 
under 
(2)(b)3., 
the 
lease 
becomes 
unenforceable 
against 
the 
consumer. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)3. 
¶45 Logically, if the manufacturer violates the statute by 
failing to provide a refund, then the consumer's damages caused 
by the violation are equal to the consumer's total financial 
obligation under the lease, not the lease payments to date, 
"plus any sales tax and collateral costs, less a reasonable 
allowance for use."  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)3.a.; see 
also Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 981-84.  The consumer's damages 
include his total financial obligation under the lease because 
this obligation continues when the manufacturer refuses to 
provide the consumer a refund.  If suit is brought under 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
24 
 
subsection (7) and the consumer prevails, the consumer is 
entitled to "twice the amount of any pecuniary loss"——namely, 
the total financial obligation under the lease, plus any sales 
tax and collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use——
"together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney 
fees, 
and 
any 
equitable 
relief 
the 
court 
determines 
appropriate."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7). 
¶46 Put differently, when a lessee receives a refund under 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3., the lease becomes unenforceable against the 
consumer because the consumer has returned the vehicle.  Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.  However, when a lessee receives 
damages under § 218.0171(7), the lessee is not discharged from 
any obligation to the lessor under the lease.  If the lease has 
not expired, the lessee must return the vehicle to the 
manufacturer, who has paid damages, and must settle his 
obligation with the lessor because the lessor will no longer be 
able to rely on the vehicle as security.  The benefit to the 
lessee is that his total financial obligation under the lease 
has been compensated and his pecuniary loss has been doubled.19  
                                                 
19 Doubling the lessee's total financial obligation under 
the lease eliminates the disparities that would occur if the 
"pecuniary loss" were measured by the amount of lease payments 
actually made, on a case-by-case basis, depending upon when suit 
was filed and concluded during the course of a lease.  The 
manufacturer is ultimately responsible for the current value of 
the written lease.  The consumer should be credited with the 
full lease obligation because he assumes the burden of resolving 
the matter in court. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
25 
 
¶47 The facts in this case present an additional wrinkle.  
In the midst of the dispute over the manufacturer's obligations 
to the lessee, the lessee opted to become a purchaser——opted to 
change his status.  Tammi asserts that he was entitled to 
purchase the vehicle under the terms of the lease, and he 
contends that he is not only entitled to a refund of his reduced 
lease obligation but also a refund of his entire purchase price.  
Both, he contends, are measures of his "pecuniary loss," which 
should be doubled by the court as a matter of law. 
¶48 This is not how we read the statute.  A consumer may 
be entitled to purchase the vehicle under his lease, but he is 
not required to purchase the vehicle.  An option is not the same 
as an obligation.  See, e.g., Clear View Estates, Inc. v. 
Veitch, 
67 
Wis. 2d 372, 
377, 
227 
N.W.2d 84 
(1975) 
("The 
distinguishing feature of an option is that it does not bind the 
purchaser to purchase or exercise the option.") (emphasis 
added); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1121 (7th ed. 1999) 
(defining "option" as "[a] contract made to keep an offer open 
for a specified period, so that the offeror cannot revoke the 
offer during that period").  If a consumer has paid or would pay 
extra under the lease to secure the right to purchase, that 
extra cost is built into the refund covering the consumer's 
total lease obligation.  Thus, paying the consumer his entire 
lease obligation, plus any sales tax and collateral costs, less 
a reasonable allowance for use, should relieve the consumer of 
any financial obligation and restore the consumer to his prior 
position.  See Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 981-84.  Doubling that 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
26 
 
amount compensates the consumer for his trouble.  See id. at 
984-86.  Paying his reasonable attorney fees makes it all 
possible.  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).   
¶49 The consumer also may keep the vehicle when the 
consumer has opted to purchase the vehicle. 
¶50 Although we believe this policy is clear, we base our 
conclusion on the statutory language.  Subsection (7) provides 
that "a consumer may bring an action to recover for any damages 
caused 
by 
a 
violation 
of 
this 
section." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7) (emphasis added).  The manufacturer's violation of 
the statute forced Tammi to continue paying his entire lease 
obligation ($69,327.10).  However, it did not cause him to buy 
the car.  That was a voluntary decision, not a cost attributable 
to the manufacturer's violation of the statute. 
¶51 Subsection (7) provides that "[t]he court shall award 
a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of 
any pecuniary loss."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  We fail to see 
how a consumer's voluntary expenditure of money——beyond any 
obligation in his lease and sales tax and collateral costs——can 
fairly be described as part of a "pecuniary loss" caused by the 
manufacturer that the statute requires a court to double.20   
                                                 
20 If the lessee has voluntarily spent money to accessorize 
the leased vehicle and then must give the accessorized vehicle 
back to the manufacturer upon refund of the lease obligation, 
the lessee may be able to seek reimbursement of these costs.  
Whether such costs would be included in the lessee's "pecuniary 
loss" under the statute would depend on the facts. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
27 
 
¶52 In this case, the district court submitted the 
question of damages to the jury.  The jury awarded damages of 
$26,600.00.  The court modified these damages.  The court was 
required to have some basis in law for modifying the verdict.  
The basis in law is found in the statute.  Subsection (7) cannot 
be viewed as wholly separate from the rest of the statute.21  The 
subsections of the statute must be reconciled.   
C. 
Certified Question Four 
¶53 The fourth certified question reads as follows: "Is a 
damage award under subsection (7) subject to a reduction for 
reasonable use of the vehicle?"  Tammi, 536 F.3d at 714. 
¶54 As noted, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) cannot be viewed as 
wholly separate from the rest of the statute.  It is very clear 
from the statute that a purchaser-consumer who demands a refund 
of the full purchase price is subject to "a reasonable allowance 
for use."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2.b.  It is equally clear 
that a lessee-consumer who demands a refund of "the amount the 
consumer paid under the written lease" is also subject to "a 
reasonable allowance for use."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)3.a. 
                                                 
21 Contrary language is found in Estate of Riley v. Ford 
Motor 
Co., 2001 WI App 234, ¶10, 248 Wis. 2d 193, 635 
N.W.2d 635: "Wisconsin Stat. § [218.0171(2)(b)3.a. and b.] do 
not apply when a Lemon Law action is filed in the trial court."  
The court of appeals reached the correct determination when it 
rejected the proposition that the lessee's loss was "the current 
value of the written lease."  Id.  However, we believe the 
correct damage amount was essentially the lessee's total 
financial obligation under the lease. 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
28 
 
¶55 Under subsection (7), a lessee-consumer is entitled to 
a refund of his entire lease obligation.  In a normal situation, 
we see no reason in equity or in the statute to disregard "a 
reasonable allowance for use" to reduce the amounts used in 
determining 
"pecuniary 
loss." 
 
We 
note 
that 
"reasonable 
allowance for use" is not a precise term.  The ceilings provided 
in 
the 
statute 
are 
not 
inflexible. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. and (2)(b)3.c. 
¶56 The statute provides ample penalties for violation——
namely, a doubling of the consumer's "pecuniary loss, together 
with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7).  Reasonable attorney fees may exceed pecuniary 
loss.  Disregard of "a reasonable allowance for use" is not a 
penalty contemplated by the statute and is not appropriate in 
the normal situation. 
¶57 Here the consumer is an attorney who represented 
himself and did not ask for attorney fees.  We were not asked to 
address this subject. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶58 The purpose of the Lemon Law is to ensure that 
manufacturers, who almost always have superior bargaining power 
in consumer transactions, comply speedily with its requirements 
to make the consumer whole.  See Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 982-86; 
Church v. Chrysler Corp., 221 Wis. 2d 460, 468, 585 N.W.2d 685 
(Ct. App. 1998).  Because the Wisconsin Lemon Law is a remedial 
statute, its provisions "should be liberally construed to 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
29 
 
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy that the statute 
intended to afford."  Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978. 
¶59 There are, however, limitations to the penalties that 
may be imposed for a manufacturer's violations.  Recognizing 
those limitations will not undermine the effectiveness of an 
important consumer protection statute. 
¶60 When a consumer who is leasing a motor vehicle brings 
an action against the manufacturer of the vehicle pursuant to 
subsection (7) of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, and then exercises his 
option to purchase the vehicle under the terms of the lease, the 
consumer is not entitled to damages for the price of his 
voluntary purchase because his purchase was not "caused" by any 
violation of the statute by the manufacturer.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7). 
¶61 Furthermore, the plain language of the statute makes 
clear 
that 
a 
consumer's 
refund 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. 
or 
3.a. 
is 
subject 
to 
a 
reasonable 
allowance 
for 
use. 
 Because we read subsection (7) in 
conjunction with the rest of the statute, we conclude that the 
amount of "pecuniary loss" under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) must 
incorporate a reasonable allowance for use before the pecuniary 
loss is doubled. 
¶62 By the Court.—Certified questions of law answered, in 
part, and the cause is remanded to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further proceedings. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP1913-CQ 
 
 
 
1