Title: Beth Chapman, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of Alabama, et al. v. Richard Gooden and Angela Thomas, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051712
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2007

REL: 06/01/07 Beth Chapman
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051712
_________________________
Beth Chapman, in her official capacity as
 Secretary of State of Alabama, et al.
v.
Richard Gooden and Angela Thomas, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-05-5778)
WOODALL, Justice.
1051712
When this appeal was filed, Nancy Worley was the
1
Secretary of State.  Beth Chapman succeeded her in that office
in January 2007.  See Rule 43(b), Ala. R. App. P. ("When a
public officer is a party to an appeal ... in that officer's
official capacity, and during its pendency dies, resigns, or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action shall not abate
and 
the 
public 
officer's 
successor 
is 
automatically
substituted as a party.").
2
Secretary of State Beth Chapman,  Jefferson County
1
Registrar Nell Hunter, and the State of Alabama (collectively
"the defendants") appeal from a judgment in favor of Richard
Gooden and Angela Thomas, as class representatives in a
putative class action involving the voting rights of convicted
felons.  We reverse the judgment in part and dismiss the
appeal in part.
In June 1996, the citizens of Alabama ratified Amendment
No. 579 to Ala. Const. 1901, § 177.  As amended, § 177
provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Every citizen of the United States who has
attained the age of eighteen years and has resided
in this state and in a county thereof for the time
provided by law, if registered as provided by law,
shall have the right to vote in the county of his or
her 
residence. 
The 
Legislature 
may 
prescribe
reasonable and nondiscriminatory requirements as
prerequisites to registration for voting. The
Legislature shall, by statute, prescribe a procedure
by which eligible citizens can register to vote.
"(b) No person convicted of a felony involving
1051712
3
moral turpitude, or who is mentally incompetent,
shall be qualified to vote until restoration of
civil 
and 
political 
rights 
or 
removal 
of
disability."
(Emphasis added.)
On March 18, 2005, Attorney General Troy King issued an
opinion in response to questions posed to him by William C.
Segrest, then executive director of the Board of Pardons and
Paroles (Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-092).  Those questions, among
others, in the order in which we think they apply here, were:
(1) "If an individual has been convicted solely of [a felony
not involving moral turpitude], does he or she remain eligible
to vote?" (2) "Is an individual eligible under section 15-22-
36.1 of the Code of Alabama to apply to the Pardons and
Paroles Board for certification for eligibility to vote if he
or she has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude?"
and (3) "What specific felonies do not include moral
turpitude?"  
The opinion answered question one in the affirmative and
question two in the negative.  With regard to question two, it
said: "If a person has been convicted of a felony that does
not involve moral turpitude, that person remains eligible to
1051712
4
vote and is therefore ineligible to apply for a Certificate of
Eligibility to Register to vote."
With regard to question three, the opinion stated, in
pertinent part:
"Although 
this 
Office 
cannot 
provide 
an
exhaustive list of every felony involving moral
turpitude, we can provide a list of the crimes that
Alabama courts have determined to be crimes
involving moral turpitude.  It is important to note
that the following crimes will only prohibit a
person from voting if that person has been convicted
of a degree of one of these crimes that is
considered a felony.  The Alabama Supreme [C]ourt
stated that murder, rape, burglary, robbery, and
income tax evasion have all been found to be crimes
involving moral turpitude.  Ex parte McIntosh, 443
So. 2d 1283 (Ala. 1983) (citations omitted).
"In addition, forgery (Moton v. State, 13 Ala.
App. 43, 69 So. 235 (1915)), conspiracy to commit
fraud ([G.M. Mosley Contractors, Inc. v.] Phillips,
487 So. 2d [876,] 879 [(Ala. 1986)]), aggravated
assault (Johnson v. State, 629 So. 2d 708 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993)), possession of marijuana for
resale (McIntosh, 443 So. 2d at 1286), sale of
marijuana (Gholston v. State, 338 So. 2d 454 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1976)), manslaughter (Johnson v. State,
357 So. 2d 162 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)), theft
(Johnson v. State, 292 Ala. 208, 291 So. 2d 336
(Ala. 1974)), transporting stolen vehicles across
state lines (Matthews v. State, [51 Ala. App. 417,]
286 So. 2d 91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973)), unauthorized
sale of a controlled substance (Ex parte Bankhead,
585 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1991)), and bigamy (Lawson v.
State, [33 Ala. App. 343,] 33 So. 2d 388 (Ala. App.
1948)) have all been held to be crimes involving
moral turpitude.
1051712
5
"In addition, section 15-22-36.1 of the Code of
Alabama provides the following list of felonies
involving moral turpitude that will preclude an
individual from applying to have his or her civil
and political rights restored:
 
"'A person who has lost his or her
right to vote by reason of conviction in a
state or federal court for any of the
following will not be eligible to apply for
a Certificate of Eligibility to Register to
Vote under this section: Impeachment,
murder, rape in any degree, sodomy in any
degree, sexual abuse 
in 
any degree, incest,
sexual torture, enticing a child to enter
a vehicle for immoral purposes, soliciting
a child by computer, production of obscene
matter involving a minor, production of
obscene 
matter, 
parents 
or 
guardians
permitting children to engage in obscene
matter, possession of obscene matter,
possession with intent to distribute child
pornography, or treason.'  
"Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1(g) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis
added).
"Alabama courts have also discussed crimes that
do not involve moral turpitude.  In McIntosh, the
Supreme Court stated that both assault and doing
business without a license are not crimes involving
moral turpitude.  McIntosh, 443 So. 2d at 1286.  In
addition, violation of liquor laws (Parker v. State,
280 Ala. 685, 198 So. 2d 261 (1967)), aiding
prisoner to escape (now listed in the Alabama Code
as permitting or facilitating escape) (McGovern v.
State, 44 Ala. App. 197, 205 So. 2d 247 (1967)),
mere possession of marijuana (Neary v. State, 469
So. 2d 1321 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)), and driving
under the influence (Finley v. State, 661 So. 2d 762
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995)) have all been held to be
crimes that do not involve moral turpitude."
1051712
6
Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-092, pp. 3-4. On May 27, 2005, then
Secretary of State Nancy Worley notified Hunter and every
other voter registrar in the State that she was seeking advice
from the attorney general regarding which felonies were
disfranchising. 
On September 29, 2005, Gooden filed a complaint in the
Jefferson Circuit Court styled "complaint for declaratory
judgment, temporary restraining order, mandatory injunction,
and writ of mandamus."  Naming Nell Hunter and then Secretary
of State Nancy Worley as defendants, Gooden alleged that he
"was registered to vote from the mid-1960s until 2000, when he
was convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI), and [was] told by the State of Alabama that his voting
rights were revoked."  More specifically, the complaint
alleged, in pertinent part:
"11. The Board of Pardons and Paroles ['the
Board'] issued a press release ... upon information
and belief, to effectuate the intent and substance
of the attorney general's opinion. ... The press
release noted that ... the Board ... 'discovered
that many eligible voters [were] unaware' that they
did not need a 'certificate from this agency in
order to register to vote.'  'Under the current law
only felonies involving moral turpitude disqualify
a person from voting.  Convictions for other
felonies do not disqualify a person from voting.  If
individuals who are already eligible to vote do not
1051712
7
ask us for certificates, we can process the other
applications more promptly.'  While the press
release did not provide an exhaustive list of
felonies involving moral turpitude, it noted that
'felony driving under the influence' and 'felony
possession of drugs' are offenses that do not
involve moral turpitude.
"12. 
Notwithstanding 
the 
clear 
direction
provided by the attorney general's opinion, and the
press release that was issued by the [Board], local
registrars represented to agents of [Gooden's]
counsel that registrars in ... twenty counties ...
were directed by the secretary of state not to
register people with felony convictions -- whether
or not the felony involved moral turpitude --
without a certificate of eligibility.
"13. On September 21, 2005, [Gooden] attempted
to register with [Hunter], but was told that he was
'not eligible' to register to vote because of his
felony DUI conviction.
"14. [Gooden] was instructed by [Hunter] to
apply 
to 
the 
[Board] 
for 
a 
certificate 
of
eligibility.
"15. [Gooden] was told later that day (September
21, 2005) by an employee of the [Board] that since
his felony DUI conviction did not involve moral
turpitude, the attorney general had determined that
he, and similarly situated individuals, need not
apply for a certificate of eligibility since their
voting rights were never lost.
"16. Upon information and belief, an employee of
the [Board] telephoned [Hunter] on September 21,
2005, 
and 
explained 
that 
[Gooden] 
was 
not
disqualified from voting since his felony conviction
did not involve moral turpitude, and, therefore,
that a certificate of eligibility was not necessary
for him to register to vote.  Upon information and
1051712
Section 17-4-124 authorized an appeal from the denial of
2
registration. Act No. 2006-570 revised and reordered Title 17
of the Alabama Code 1975.  The appeal provisions now appear in
§ 17-3-55.
8
belief, the employee of the [Board] also offered to
fax [Hunter] a copy of the press release the Board
had issued to this effect.
"17. 
Upon 
information 
and 
belief,
notwithstanding 
[the 
Board's] 
concession 
that
[Gooden's] felony DUI conviction did not involve
moral turpitude, and that, in fact, his conviction
was expressly identified in the attorney general's
opinion as [a] non-disqualifying crime, [Hunter]
told the [Board] that the Defendant secretary of
state had directed [her] not to register individuals
with felony convictions who had not obtained a
certificate of eligibility, irrespective of whether
or not such felony convictions involved moral
turpitude."
(Emphasis added.)
Counts one and two of the complaint alleged a violation
of § 177.  In particular, count two alleged that registrars
throughout the State, acting on a misrepresentation of the
secretary of state, had refused to register individuals
legally eligible to vote.  Count three sought, pursuant to
former Ala. Code 1975, § 17-4-124,  a reversal of Hunter's
2
refusal to allow Gooden to register. 
Under the heading, "prayer for relief," the complaint
stated:  
1051712
9
"30. [Gooden] requests an order under [§ 17-4-
124] reversing the refusal of [Hunter] to register
him.
"31. [Gooden] seeks [a] declaratory judgment
that individuals convicted of felonies not involving
moral turpitude, as enumerated by the attorney
general and grounded in Alabama case law, are
eligible to register and vote under Alabama law, and
that, 
accordingly, 
individuals 
with 
felony
convictions not involving moral turpitude need not
apply 
to 
the 
[Board] 
for 
a 
certificate 
of
eligibility as a prerequisite to registering or
voting in Alabama.
"32. 
[Gooden] 
requests 
a 
... 
mandatory
injunction ... to require [Hunter] to provide [him]
and similarly situated individuals in Jefferson
County, 
by 
Friday, 
September 
30, 
2005, 
the
registration deadline for the October 11, 2005,
municipal 
elections 
in 
Birmingham, 
Alabama,
effective notice that individuals with felony
convictions not involving moral turpitude are
eligible 
to 
vote 
without 
a 
certificate 
of
eligibility from the [Board].
"33. 
[Gooden] 
requests 
a 
... 
mandatory
injunction ... to require [Hunter] to register [him]
and similarly situated individuals in Jefferson
County, 
by 
Friday, 
September 
30, 
2005, 
the
registration deadline for the October 11, 2005,
municipal elections in Birmingham, Alabama.
"34. 
[Gooden] 
requests 
a 
... 
mandatory
injunction ... to require [the] secretary of state
to provide effective notice to [Hunter] by September
30, 2005, and each of the other counties promptly,
that 
individuals 
with 
felony 
convictions 
not
involving moral turpitude, as enumerated by the
attorney general, are eligible to register and vote,
and are not required to apply for or obtain a
certificate of eligibility from the [Board].
1051712
10
"35. 
[Gooden] 
requests 
a 
... 
mandatory
injunction ... to require [the] secretary of state
to direct [Hunter] by September 30, 2005, and each
of 
the 
other 
counties 
promptly, 
to 
permit
individuals with felony convictions not involving
moral turpitude, as enumerated by the attorney
general, to register to vote and expressly state
that such individuals are not required to apply for
or obtain a certificate of eligibility from the
[Board].
"36. [Gooden] requests a temporary restraining
order and mandatory injunction to require [the]
secretary of state to give notice to the public by
(a) posting a prominent notice on the secretary of
state website ... and (b) issuing a press release to
all the usual news outlets notified by the secretary
of state that persons who have been convicted of a
felony which does not involve moral turpitude [sic]
and listing the examples of those crimes as
discussed in the [opinion] of the attorney general,
Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2005-092 (March 18, 2005)."
(Emphasis added.)  The following day, September 30, 2005, the
trial court entered an order directing Hunter, "upon a new
application by plaintiff [Gooden], [to] register him as a
voter as provided in Ala. Code [1975,] § [17-4-124]." 
In November 2005, the secretary of state conducted a
series of meetings with registrars throughout the State.
Under the topic of "ex-felon registration," she advised
registrars at those meetings to "continue longstanding
practice until [receipt of a] response by the attorney
general" to her May 2005 inquiry.
1051712
11
On November 18, 2005, the attorney general, on behalf of
the State of Alabama, moved to intervene in the case,
contending that the State was the only proper party to respond
to count three.  Filed simultaneously with that motion was the
"answer of the State of Alabama confessing judgment on count
three of plaintiff's complaint."  (Emphasis added.)  The
answer 
acknowledged 
that 
Gooden's 
felony 
conviction 
-- 
driving
under the influence -- is not a crime involving moral
turpitude, and, therefore, that he was not barred from
registering and voting by § 177(b).  The State "submit[ted]
that [Gooden's] remaining claims and requests for relief
should be dismissed as moot and for lack of standing."  Also
in November 2005, Hunter and the secretary of state each filed
a motion to dismiss the action.  Both parties asserted that
the State's confession of judgment in favor of Gooden rendered
the action moot and deprived Gooden of standing. 
On December 19, 2005, Gooden filed a "first amended
complaint," purporting to add as a plaintiff Andrew Jones,
who, like Gooden, was a resident of Jefferson County.  Jones
alleged that he had been "informed by the State of Alabama" in
the "early 1990s" that he was not eligible to vote because of
1051712
12
a conviction for "felony possession of drugs."  He alleged
that in June 2005 Hunter initially refused to allow him to
register, notwithstanding the fact that his felony conviction
was for a crime not involving moral turpitude.  However, Jones
also alleged that before he joined this action he was allowed
to register to vote.  
The amended complaint also contained class allegations.
Specifically, it sought certification of a class of plaintiffs
consisting of "[a]ll unregistered persons otherwise eligible
to register to vote in Alabama who have been convicted of one
or more felonies, but who have not been convicted of any
felonies involving moral turpitude."  It also sought
certification of a defendant class consisting of "[a]ll voter
registrars in the State of Alabama."  Other than the class
allegations and the addition of Jones, the first amended
complaint differed in no material respect from the original
complaint.
On January 10, 2006, a copy of the attorney general's
March 18, 2005, opinion was sent to every board of registrars
in the State, and the registrars were invited to seek the
advice of the attorney general, if necessary, in determining
1051712
The new forms were precleared by the United States
3
Department of Justice on July 14, 2006.
13
whether a particular felony involved moral turpitude.  By May
8, 2006, the secretary of state had promulgated revised voter-
registration forms for statewide use.  The new forms state, in
pertinent part: "To register to vote in the State of Alabama,
you must ... [n]ot have been convicted of a disqualifying
felony, or if you have been convicted, you must have had your
civil rights restored."  (Emphasis added.)  Also on the
revised forms, the registrant's signature is required, by
which he or she swears or affirms: "I am not barred from
voting by reason of a disqualifying felony conviction."
(Emphasis added.)  The word "felony" in the predecessor forms
was not modified by the word "disqualifying."3
On May 8, 2006, Gooden and Jones filed a "second amended
complaint," asserting -- for the first time -- a violation of
due process and/or equal protection under the United States
Constitution.  Specifically, count six alleged, in pertinent
part:
"88. The promulgation and use of [the new] voter
registration forms ... is misleading and serves to
discourage registration of persons who have been
convicted of felonies not involving moral turpitude.
1051712
14
"89. The secretary of state violates section 177
of the Constitution of the State of Alabama by the
promulgation and use of [the new registration
forms].
"90. The secretary of state violates the Due
Process 
and 
Equal 
Protection 
Clauses 
of 
the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and Section 1 of the Constitution of
the State of Alabama by the promulgation and use of
[the new registration forms]."
(Emphasis added.)
 The second amended complaint also sought an award of
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  In other respects, the
second amended complaint essentially restated the allegations
of the previous  complaints.    
On May 26, 2006, Gooden and Jones filed a "third amended
complaint," which was superseded on June 9, 2006, when Gooden
and Jones filed a fourth, and last, amended complaint,
purporting to add plaintiff Angela Thomas, who, like Gooden
and Jones, was a resident of Jefferson County.  According to
the last amended complaint, Hunter had removed Thomas's name
from the voter registry in 2003 following Thomas's "conviction
for possession of marijuana (first degree)," which is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.
1051712
15
The last amended complaint differed little substantively
from the second amended complaint.  Under the heading "prayer
for relief," Gooden, Jones, and Thomas sought an order
"reversing the defendants' refusal to register them."  Relief
sought under that heading also included an "injunction to
require [the] secretary of state to give notice to the voter
registrars of all felonies that have been declared to be
crimes involving moral turpitude and all felonies that have
been declared not to be crimes involving moral turpitude."  It
also contained the federal constitutional claims set forth in
count six of the second amended complaint.
On June 23, 2006, Hunter notified Thomas through counsel
that Thomas was eligible to vote, notwithstanding her
conviction, and that Thomas "should submit an application,"
which would be accepted if she was "otherwise eligible."
Thereafter, on July 7, 2006, all the defendants moved for a
summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the case
no longer involved a justiciable controversy because "what the
plaintiffs [sought] to compel through injunction ha[d] already
happened," namely, that "the plaintiffs [were] all either
registered to vote or ha[d] been informed that they [could] do
1051712
As discussed previously in this opinion, counts one and
4
two alleged violations of § 177; count three involved the
statutory appeal from the denial of registration; and count
six alleged federal constitutional violations.
As to those counts, Gooden and Thomas appealed, pursuant
5
to § 17-4-124, the "refusal to register them to vote."
Jones is not involved in this appeal.
6
16
so."  They further argued that the plaintiffs wanted (1) "the
county Boards of Registrars to be given certain advice that
they ha[d] already received"; (2) "a judgment declaring the
law to be what all parties agree that it is"; and (3) "forms
to be revised that have already been revised."  That same day,
Gooden, Jones, and Thomas moved for a summary judgment on
counts one, two, three, and six of their last amended
complaint.  
4
On August 23, 2006, the trial court entered a "class
certification order and final order on all pending issues."
In so doing, it granted the attorney general's motion to
intervene and entered a summary judgment for the defendants on
two counts of the last amended complaint.   It also entered a
5
summary judgment for the defendants on all Jones's claims, on
the ground that Jones lacked standing.   Also, it held that
6
1051712
17
Gooden's individual claims were moot and that Thomas's
individual claims were time-barred.  
Nevertheless, the trial judge certified a plaintiff class
and a defendant class, before granting the plaintiffs
declaratory and equitable relief.  The plaintiff class was
defined as "[e]very citizen of the United States, currently
residing in this State and 18 years of age or older, who has
at any time been convicted of a felony in any jurisdiction and
who is not, as of the date of this order, registered to vote
in this State."  He defined the defendant class as "[e]very
individual duly appointed and presently serving in an official
capacity as a registrar for the purpose of conducting,
supervising or otherwise regulating the registration of voters
in the county where such individual resides."
In paragraph 7 of the order, the judge stated:
"7. The court hereby declares that the policy
and practice previously promulgated or employed by
the defendants of denying voter registration to an
individual otherwise qualified to vote, but who had
been convicted of any felony, violated Amendment 579
to the Alabama Constitution.  This policy and
practice further violated the due process rights of
the plaintiff class members provided by the Alabama
Constitution.  The named defendants, all members of
the defendant class, and all those who work with or
on behalf of any of the defendants or defendant
class members, are ordered immediately to cease and
1051712
18
desist in refusing voter registration on this
basis."
(First emphasis added.)  According to Gooden and Thomas,
"paragraph 7 of the circuit court's order provided precisely
the relief requested by the Plaintiffs."  Gooden and Thomas's
brief, at 49 n.13 (emphasis added).
However, the trial judge went much further.  He concluded
that the "disfranchisement provision of [§ 177(b)] authorizes
the imposition of a  criminal penalty," and, consequently,
could, consistent with the separation-of-powers provisions of
the Alabama constitution, be imposed only by the legislature.
As a corollary, he concluded that the definition of moral
turpitude is so vague as to invalidate disfranchisement on
that basis, unless and until every felony involving that
element has been expressly cataloged by the legislature.
Specifically, he stated:
"8. Unless and until the Alabama Legislature
passes, and the Governor signs into law, legislation
specifically identifying which felonies involve
moral turpitude ..., the named defendants, all
members of the defendant class, and all those who
work with or on behalf of any of the defendants or
defendant class members, are enjoined from refusing
to register any individual, otherwise qualified to
vote, on the ground that the individual has
previously been convicted of a felony.
1051712
19
"9. Unless and until the Alabama Legislature
passes, and the Governor signs into law, legislation
specifically identifying which felonies involve
moral turpitude ..., the named defendants, all
members of the defendant class, and all those who
work with or on behalf of any of the defendants or
defendant 
class 
members 
are 
enjoined 
from
promulgating, 
distributing 
or 
employing 
voter
registration application forms that refer in any way
to a prior criminal conviction as a basis of
disqualification.  The defendant secretary of state
is 
further 
ordered 
to 
revise 
existing 
voter
registration application forms to delete any such
references. 
"10. Unless and until the Alabama Legislature
passes, and the Governor signs into law, legislation
specifically identifying which felonies involve
moral turpitude ..., the named defendants, all
members of the defendant class, and all those who
work with or on behalf of any of the defendants or
defendant class members, are enjoined from removing
from voter lists any registered voter by reason of
that voter's conviction of a felony."
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, the trial court's judgment
requires that all felons who are otherwise qualified to vote
be permitted to vote until the enactment and gubernatorial
approval of a statute naming all disqualifying felonies.  In
essence, as a basis for the relief granted in paragraphs 8-10,
the court held that § 177(b) deprives the plaintiffs of the
due process guaranteed by Ala. Const. 1901, §§ 6 and 13, in
the absence of a complete catalog of disqualifying felonies
supplied by the legislature.  
1051712
20
Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees and
expenses to the plaintiffs' attorneys in the amount of
$66,024.  From that judgment, the defendants appealed.  On
appeal, they reiterate their argument that the claims asserted
by Gooden and Thomas have become moot, and, therefore, that
this case no longer involves a justiciable controversy.  In
that connection, they argue that Gooden and Thomas never
challenged the constitutionality of § 177(b), "never claimed
that the framework of [Amendment No. 579] violates [the]
separation of powers or their rights to due process," and
"never briefed [such issues] in the trial court."  Defendants'
brief, at 49.  Thus, they insist that the relief afforded in
paragraphs 8-10 was never requested by Gooden and Thomas and
was erroneously awarded.  Finally, they challenge the award of
attorney fees.
I. Justiciable Controversy
"'A moot case or question is a case or question in or on
which there is no real controversy; a case which seeks to
determine an abstract question which does not rest on existing
facts or rights, or involve conflicting rights so far as
plaintiff is concerned.'"  Case v. Alabama State Bar, 939 So.
1051712
21
2d 881, 884 (Ala. 2006) (quoting American Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 18, 104 So.
2d 827, 830-31 (1958)).  "The test for mootness is commonly
stated as whether the court's action on the merits would
affect the rights of the parties."  Crawford v. State, 153
S.W.3d 497, 501 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing VE Corp. v. Ernst &
Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993)).  "A case becomes moot
if at any stage there ceases to be an actual controversy
between the parties."  Id. (emphasis added) (citing National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex.
1999)). 
"There must be a bona fide existing controversy of a
justiciable character to confer upon the court jurisdiction to
grant declaratory relief under the declaratory judgment
statutes, and if there was no justiciable controversy existing
when the suit was commenced the trial court had no
jurisdiction."  State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69,
73, 300 So. 2d 106, 110 (1974).  "'"Unless the trial court has
before it a justiciable controversy, it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and any judgment entered by it is void ab
initio."'"  Sustainable Forests, L.L.C. v. Alabama Power Co.,
1051712
22
805 So. 2d 681, 683 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Hunt Transitional
Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Greiner, 782 So. 2d 270, 272 (Ala.
2000), quoting in turn Ex parte State ex rel. James, 711 So.
2d 952, 960 n. 2 (Ala. 1998)).  "A moot case lacks
justiciability."  Crawford, 153 S.W.3d at 501.  Thus, "[a]n
action 
that 
originally 
was 
based 
upon 
a 
justiciable
controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions
raised in it have become moot by subsequent acts or events."
Case, 939 So. 2d at 884 (citing Employees of Montgomery County
Sheriff's Dep't v. Marshall, 893 So. 2d 326, 330 (Ala. 2004)).
"'The lack of a justiciable controversy may be raised
either by a motion to dismiss, Rule 12, [Ala. R. Civ. P.], or
a motion for summary judgment.'"  Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So.
2d 932, 937 (Ala. 1997)(quoting Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock &
Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 649, 309 So. 2d 424, 427
(1975)).  Indeed, "[i]t is well settled that lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time by the parties
or by the court ex mero motu."  Ex parte V.S., 918 So. 2d 908,
912 (Ala. 2005).  "'"[I]f there is an absence of jurisdiction
over ... the subject matter, a court has no power to act, and
jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be created by
1051712
23
waiver or consent."'"  Id. (quoting Flannigan v. Jordan, 871
So. 2d 767, 768 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Norton v.
Liddell, 280 Ala. 353, 356, 194 So. 2d 514, 517 (1967)).  A
court without subject-matter jurisdiction "'may take no action
other than to exercise its power to dismiss the action. ...
Any other action ... is null and void.'"  State v. Property at
2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999) (quoting
Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996)). An outstanding request for attorney fees "does
not resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy."  Cammermeyer
v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1996).  See also Lewis
v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990).
A. Paragraphs 8-10
We first address the defendants' contention that the
trial court erred in ordering relief in paragraphs 8-10 of its
order based on an issue never joined by the parties, namely,
the constitutionality of § 177(b).  We recognize the rule that
a "final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings."  Ala. R.
Civ. P. 54(c).  However, the rule has its limits:
1051712
24
"'A court may not, without the consent of all
persons affected, enter a judgment which goes beyond
the claim asserted in the pleadings.... Unless all
parties 
in 
interest 
are 
in 
court 
and 
have
voluntarily litigated some issue not within the
pleadings, the court can consider only the issues
made by the pleadings, and the judgment may not
extend beyond such issues nor beyond the scope of
the relief demanded.
"'....
"'The foregoing rules are all fundamental and
state nothing more than the essentials of due
process and of fair play.  They assure to every
person 
his 
day 
in 
court 
before 
judgment 
is
pronounced against him.'"
Central Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Ambrose, 435 So. 2d 1203,
1206 (Ala. 1983) (quoting Sylvan Beach, Inc. v. Koch, 140 F.2d
852, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1944)).  The question thus resolves
itself to whether the relief given by the trial court is based
upon  issues that "were in the case."  435 So. 2d at 1207
(emphasis added).
In this same connection, it hardly bears repeating that
without specific statutory authority not here applicable
Alabama courts are not empowered to decide "abstract or
hypothetical questions or render purely advisory opinions."
Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. at 651, 309 So.
2d at 429.  Thus, aside from creating the due-process problems
1051712
25
discussed in Ambrose, if a trial court undertakes to decide a
question, other than one presented by the parties, it enters
the area of the "abstract or hypothetical" and therefore acts
beyond its authority. 
The rationale for the relief granted in paragraphs 8-10
can be syllogized as follows: (1) § 177(b) purports to
disfranchise convicted felons on the basis of whether the
felony of which they are convicted involves moral turpitude;
(2) disfranchisement is part of the punishment for the crime
of which they were convicted; (3) the definition of moral
turpitude is vague as applied on a case-by-case basis; (4)
that vagueness creates confusion among voters and registrars
as to who is entitled to the franchise; (5) the confusion may
result in the disfranchisement of voters convicted of
nondisqualifying felonies; (6) the disfranchisement deprives
qualified voters of due process; therefore the deprivation can
be cured only by a complete catalog of disqualifying crimes
supplied in due course by the legislature -- the only body
empowered to define crimes and to set the punishment therefor.
The trial court effectively held that the courts of Alabama
1051712
26
have no power to decide whether a crime involves moral
turpitude.
Whatever merit this syllogism might have in the abstract,
it has no application to this case.  This is so, because this
case does not involve a dispute about how to distinguish
between felonies that involve moral turpitude and those that
do not; instead, it involves the secretary of state and
Hunter, acting upon direction from the secretary of state,
ignoring the distinction altogether and not attempting to
apply the clear language of § 177(b).  This fact is amply
illustrated by the plaintiffs' pleadings in the trial court
and Gooden and Thomas's arguments in this Court.
Although Gooden and Thomas have adapted their arguments
in  this Court to support the trial court's holding that
legislative direction is required, their pleadings extol the
direction provided by the attorney general in his opinion.  In
paragraph 12 of the original complaint, for example, Gooden
lauded the attorney general's opinion of March 18, 2005, as
providing "clear direction" and states that, "notwithstanding
[that] clear direction," the secretary of state instructed
Hunter and other registrars "not to register people with
1051712
27
felony convictions -- whether or not the felony involved moral
turpitude."  (Emphasis added.)  In paragraph 17 of the
complaint, Gooden alleged that the secretary of state had
directed Hunter "not to register individuals with felony
convictions ... irrespective of whether or not such felony
convictions involved moral turpitude," and that he was not
permitted to register "notwithstanding" the fact that "his
conviction  was expressly identified in the attorney general's
opinion as [a] non-disqualifying crime."  (Emphasis added.)
Those 
allegations 
were 
repeated 
in 
substantially
identical terms in the last amended complaint.  In addition,
the last amended complaint alleged that Thomas "would have
been registered but for the illegal policy of the defendants
to disfranchise all persons convicted of any felony."
(Emphasis added.)  The relief sought in paragraphs 100, 101,
and 102 of the last amended complaint essentially mirrors the
relief sought in the paragraphs 31, 34, and 35 of the original
complaint, namely, that the court declare "individuals
convicted of felonies not involving moral turpitude, as
enumerated by the attorney general ..., are eligible to vote"
(emphasis added), and issue an injunction requiring the
1051712
28
secretary of state to direct Hunter and other registrars
"promptly to permit individuals with felony convictions not
involving moral turpitude to register to vote."  Conspicuously
absent is any allegation that Gooden, Thomas, or any putative
class member was disfranchised as a result of any confusion
over the particular nature of their felony.  There was no
allegation, for example, that any felon was erroneously
allowed to vote notwithstanding that he or she had been
convicted of a disqualifying felony.
Similarly, in their brief to this Court, Gooden and
Thomas contend that the "[l]ongstanding practice" of the
registrars 
was 
that 
"of 
categorically 
disfranchising
individuals who had any felony conviction."  Gooden and
Thomas's  brief, at 13 (first emphasis added).  They argue
that "[b]y categorically disfranchising every person with a
felony conviction without considering whether the felony in
question involved moral turpitude, the Defendants have ...
disregarded the substantive mandate of Section 177 of the
Alabama Constitution."  Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 17
(emphasis added). 
1051712
This 
construction 
of 
paragraph 7 mirrors the 
construction
7
given it by Gooden and Thomas, who describe it  as "providing
declaratory 
and 
injunctive 
relief 
against 
Defendants' 
practice
of disfranchising voters based on their conviction of any
felony, without regard to whether the felony involved moral
turpitude."  Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 49.
29
Significantly, Gooden and Thomas concede that paragraph
7 of the trial court's order "provided precisely the relief"
they sought.  Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 49 n.13 (emphasis
added).  However, the relief afforded in that paragraph was
limited to (1) a declaration that "the policy and practice
previously ... employed by the defendants of denying voter
registration to an individual ... who had been convicted of
any felony" (emphasis in original) violated the Alabama
Constitution, and (2) an order that the defendants "cease and
desist in refusing voter registration on [that] basis"
(emphasis added).   All matters relating to confusion over the
7
meaning of the phrase "moral turpitude" were addressed in
paragraphs 8-10 of the order.  Gooden and Thomas's concession
as to the sufficiency of paragraph 7 belies any argument that
they were complaining about the inability of the registrars to
understand, that is, to correctly apply, the definition of
"moral turpitude."
1051712
It also follows that the issues forming the basis of the
8
relief in paragraphs 8-10 were not "in the case" for purposes
of the application of Rule 54(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. See Ambrose,
supra.
30
Finally, there was no evidence indicating that anyone has
been disfranchised as the result of a decision on the merits
applying the definition of moral turpitude.  On the contrary,
it is undisputed that Gooden, Jones, and Thomas had been
denied the right to register without any concern as to the
specific nature of their felonies.  Consequently, we can only
conclude that this action did not arise out of, and does not
involve, the constitutionality of § 177 as applied; any
matters relating to the trial court's syllogistic reasoning;
or the purported evils that were the focus of paragraphs 8-10.
Because this case was never about the definition of moral
turpitude, it involved no issue regarding the proper entities
to apply the definition of that term to any particular felony.
In addressing such issues, the trial court fundamentally
recast the character of this case.  In so doing, it entered
the forbidden territory of the abstract and hypothetical and
thereby exceeded its authority.  It follows that paragraphs 8-
10 of the trial court's order are therefore void.8
1051712
According to Gooden and Thomas, "Thomas registered to
9
vote just before the November 2006 election."  Gooden and
Thomas's brief, at 10. 
31
B. Paragraph 7
In their motion for a summary judgment, the defendants
contended that the case had become moot because "nothing
remain[ed] for [the] court to declare or enjoin."  Therefore,
they argued, the trial court "lack[ed] jurisdiction to do
anything other than dismiss this action."  In this Court, they
insist:
"Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are
moot because the actions Plaintiffs sought to compel
have already happened.  Gooden is already registered
to vote and Thomas has been informed by [Hunter]
that she may register.[ ] Plaintiffs wanted the
9
county boards of registrars to receive certain
advice that they have already received.  Plaintiffs
wanted a judgment declaring the law to be what all
parties agree that it is.  Plaintiffs wanted
[registration] forms to be revised that have already
been revised.  Nothing remains to be done by any of
the Defendants that the trial court is authorized by
law to direct."
Defendants' brief, at 36.  
Gooden and Thomas argue that "defendants who seek to
avoid judicial resolution of the merits (of an injunctive
suit) by voluntarily terminating the complained-of conduct,
'face a heavy burden to establish mootness.'" Gooden and
1051712
32
Thomas's brief, at 26 n.5 (quoting Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v.
Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72 (1983)).  This burden is, as often
stated, simply the need to demonstrate that the defendants
will not "be free to 'return to [their] old ways' after the
threat of a lawsuit had passed."  464 U.S. at 72 (quoting
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
The burden is satisfied, however, by a showing that "'there is
no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated.'"
464 U.S. at 72 (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633).
Moreover, the "voluntary discontinuance" doctrine would seem
to have no application where, as here, the voluntary acts are
the dispositive acts of a third-party intervenor.  See id.
(assuming, without deciding, that the doctrine applied to a
"third party non-defendant," and holding, nevertheless, that
the case was moot).  In any event, the burden is satisfied in
this case. 
The focal point of the complaints in this case was the
secretary of state.  As Gooden and Thomas correctly note, the
secretary of state is the "chief elections official in the
state," former Ala. Code 1975, § 17-1-8(a)(now § 17-1-3(a)),
and is charged with the duty to "provide uniform guidance for
1051712
33
election activities."  Id.  The secretary of state is invested
with rule-making power to aid in the discharge of those
duties.  Id.  See also former Ala. Code 1975, § 17-4-136 (now
§ 17-3-1) (the secretary of state "may promulgate rules for
the receipt of applications for registration and the expedient
administration of those applications").  It was under this
authority that the revised voter-registration forms were
promulgated during the pendency of this action.  The secretary
of state is further authorized, pursuant to former § 17-4-151
(now § 17-3-3), to "remove[] for cause" registrars appointed
under former § 17-4-150 (now § 17-3-2).  Thus, the secretary
of state was sued, according to Gooden and Thomas, to compel
her to obey the law as expressed by the attorney general in
his opinion of March 18, 2005. 
However, "'[t]he attorney general is ... the chief law
officer of the state, and on him are conferred various
authorities and duties in connection with instituting and
prosecuting, in the name of the state, suits and other
proceedings ... for the preservation and protection of the
rights and interests of the state.'"  Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.
2d 675, 679 (Ala. 1990) (quoting State ex rel. Carmichael v.
1051712
34
Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 484, 41 So. 2d 280, 284 (1949)) (emphasis
added).  See, e.g., Ala. Code 1975, § 36-15-21.  Essentially
"'all litigation concerning the interest of the state or any
department thereof [lies] under the direction and control of
the attorney general.'"  570 So. 2d at 679-80 (quoting State
ex rel. Carmichael, 252 Ala. at 484, 41 So. 2d at 284).
That the attorney general has the "power to formulate
legal policy" for the State, and, in connection therewith, the
power to bind state officers and departments in litigation is
well established.  570 So. 2d at 681 (discussing with approval
Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 368, 366 N.E.2d 1262,
1267 (1977)).  In Ex parte Weaver, supra, this Court held that
the attorney general had "the authority to move to dismiss the
State Department of Insurance's [appeal/mandamus petition] in
the Court of Civil Appeals over the objection of the
commissioner of insurance."  570 So. 2d at 684.  In so doing,
it relied on State ex rel. Carmichael v. Jones: 
"In [Jones], the attorney general brought a mandamus
action to compel the trial court to enter a consent
judgment in a case pending between the State
Department of Revenue and several defendants.  The
question presented was whether the attorney general
was authorized and empowered to settle a pending
suit by the State filed by him in his official
capacity for the collection of an unliquidated tax
1051712
35
claim, by taking a consent judgment in the cause for
less than the amount sued for and claimed to be due
by the revenue department.  This Court held 'that
the attorney general, as the chief law officer of
the state, was fully empowered to make any bona fide
disposition of the cause as in his judgment might be
deemed to be to the best interest of the state
unless inhibited by organic law.'"
Ex parte Weaver, 570 So. 2d at 679 (emphasis added).  
These principles are applicable here.  Upon learning of
this litigation, the attorney general intervened to assume
control of the case, thereby eliminating any dispute regarding
the duties of the secretary of state.  When he joined this
action on November 18, 2005, he brought with him the
construction and application of § 177 advocated by the
plaintiffs and made it binding on the defendants.  From that
time until August 23, 2006, when the trial court entered its
final judgment, it was undisputed that neither the plaintiffs
nor any individuals similarly situated would be disfranchised
solely on the basis of a felony conviction as had been the
policy of Hunter and the secretary of state.
Indeed, the parties have stipulated that registrars in
Jefferson and Houston Counties are now basing their decisions
on whether the prospective voter's felony conviction involved
moral turpitude and are no longer disfranchising anyone simply
1051712
36
on the basis of a felony conviction.  Considering the posture
of this case, the identity of the parties, and the remedial
action taken by Hunter and the secretary of state, we can
foresee "'no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be
repeated.'"  Heckler, 464 U.S. at 72 (quoting W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. at 632).
Gooden and Thomas also contend that the trial court was
empowered to provide the relief afforded in paragraph 7 under
an exception to the general mootness rule for cases involving
"'a broad public interest.'" Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 20
(quoting Slawson v. Alabama Forestry Comm'n, 631 So. 2d 953
(Ala. 1994)).  It is true that an exception exists for a "moot
case involving issues of great public importance, which may
recur in the future."  1A C.J.S. Actions § 81 (2005).  "The
criteria for applying the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine include the public nature of the question,
the desirability of an authoritative determination for the
purpose of guiding public officers, and the likelihood that
the question will generally recur."  Id. (footnote omitted).
However, this "exception is construed narrowly ... and a clear
showing of each criterion is required to bring a case within
1051712
37
its terms."  In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365,
710 N.E.2d 1226, 1227 (1999).
Although this case does involve a matter of public
importance, the second and third factors in the analysis weigh
against the application of the "public-interest" exception.
As we have already discussed, the conditions that gave rise to
this action are unlikely to recur.  Indeed, Nancy Worley, who
was secretary of state when this action was filed, no longer
serves as secretary of state.  (See note 1.) Moreover, in view
of the actions taken by the attorney general in this case,
including the distribution of his March 18, 2005, opinion to
the registrars throughout the State, as well as the action of
the secretary of state herself, in revising the voter-
registration forms, it is difficult to see how a judgment
based on paragraph 7 would further enlighten the secretary of
state or the registrars in the performance of their duties. 
These factors, although not expressly considered in
Slawson, weighed in favor of the application of the exception
in that case.  Slawson involved an action by Bart Slawson and
Naomi Furman against the Alabama Forestry Commission ("the
Commission") 
and 
others, 
challenging 
the 
Commission's
1051712
38
financial "support of a private nonprofit organization known
as 
Stewards 
of 
Family 
Farms, 
Ranches, 
and 
Forests
('Stewards')."  631 So. 2d at 955.  The action sought a
judgment declaring, among other things, that the Commission
had violated the Alabama Sunshine Law, Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-
14-2, by failing to "provide the public with notice of a
meeting it held by special session ... at which the Commission
passed a resolution approving the use of Commission resources
... in promoting Stewards ...."  631 So. 2d at 955.  They also
"sought to enjoin the [Commission] from," among other things,
"meeting in secret, [and] from meeting without prior public
notice."  Id.  The trial court entered a summary judgment for
the defendants.  On appeal, the Commission contended that the
notice issue was moot, because it had begun giving public
notice of its meetings.  631 So. 2d at 957.  This Court,
citing the public-interest exception,  id., proceeded to
address the merits and reversed the summary judgment.  631 So.
2d at 959.
Slawson involved two notable features that distinguish it
from this case.  First, and perhaps most significantly, the
Commission was still arguing on appeal that the statute did
1051712
39
not require that it provide notice.  In particular, it sought
to persuade this Court to "follow the Georgia Supreme Court,
which [had] indicated that '[Georgia's] Sunshine Law deals
with the openness of public meetings, not with the notice of
such meetings.'"  631 So. 2d at 958 (quoting Harms v. Adams,
238 Ga. 186, 187, 232 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1977)).  Thus, unlike
this case, the dispositive issue in Slawson, namely, the
correct construction and application of the Alabama Sunshine
Law, remained controverted, even at the appellate stage.
Here, by contrast, the dispositive issue, namely, the correct
construction and application of § 177, has not been disputed
by anyone since the intervention of the attorney general at
the outset of the case.  
Second, because of the continuing dispute in Slawson over
the necessity of notice, there was a reasonable probability
that the challenged conduct would recur, absent a final
judicial determination.  In fact, the Commission had reversed
its position on the notice issue more than once.  It had
provided public notice of its meetings in the past, "but [had]
discontinued that practice because the public did not attend."
631 So. 2d at 957.  By the time the case reached this Court,
1051712
40
the Commission was again providing public notice.  Id.
However, by pressing its position in this Court that notice
was not required, the Commission signaled its unwillingness to
abandon its claim of the right to discontinue giving notice at
any time.  By contrast, no one in this case is insisting,
expressly or by implication, on the right to revive the prior
policy of disfranchisement without regard to the nature of the
felony conviction.  For these reasons, Slawson is not
controlling.
Next, Gooden and Thomas contend that, because this is a
putative class action, mootness of the representative's claims
does not necessarily moot the entire action.  For that
proposition, they cite Jones v. Southern United Life Insurance
Co., 392 So. 2d 822 (Ala. 1981).  Jones was a class action
commenced by Mary Jones against Southern United Life Insurance
Company ("Southern United").  Jones, the beneficiary of a
burial-insurance policy issued by Southern United, sought the
payment of interest allegedly due between the dates of proof
of the death of the named insured and the date of the payment
of the policy proceeds.  Id. at 822-23.  Shortly after the
action began, Southern United "tendered payment of interest
1051712
41
from the date of death to the date of payment of the benefit,"
and filed motions to deny class certification and for a
summary judgment.  Id. at 823.  The trial court granted the
motions, and Jones appealed.  Id.
One question on appeal was whether "Jones, whose claim
[was] rendered moot through satisfaction, prior to certifying
the class, [could] be permitted to have the class certified,
and proceed to represent that class, even though she no longer
[had] a real interest in the right to be protected."  Id.
This Court answered that question in the affirmative and
reversed the summary judgment, stating: "Notwithstanding the
mootness of the suit as to Mary Jones, it is not moot as to
other members of the class, and she can continue to litigate
the issues as a representative of the class."  Id. (emphasis
added).  
Gooden and Thomas's reliance on Jones, however, is
misplaced.  The problem in this case is not -- as it was in
Jones -- that the claims of the class representatives have
become moot; it is that the claims of the entire putative
class have become moot.  They became moot, at the latest, by
May 8, 2006, when the second amended complaint was filed.  By
1051712
It follows that the joinder of Jones and Thomas by the
10
first and fourth amended complaints, respectively, did not
affect the mootness of the case.  Their alleged causes of
action differed in no material respect from that of Gooden,
the original plaintiff, and it is not alleged that they
suffered any deprivation after May 8, 2006.
42
that time, the attorney general had intervened and had sent a
copy of his March 18, 2005, opinion with instructions to every
board of registrars in the State;  the secretary of state had
promulgated the revised voter-registration forms; and Hunter
had 
undisputedly 
discontinued 
her 
former 
practice 
of
indiscriminately rejecting the applications of all convicted
felons.  Paragraph 7, which Gooden and Thomas concede afforded
"precisely the relief [they had] requested," did not purport
to extend relief beyond that which had been accomplished by
the actions of the defendants and the attorney general by May
8, 2006.
  This relief extended, not only to Gooden and
10
Thomas, but to all members of the putative class.  The relief
purportedly awarded in paragraph 7 affords nothing in addition
to that which has been available to the parties and members of
the putative class since May 8, 2006.  Thus, it can be said
that "the court's action on the merits would [not] affect the
1051712
This conclusion obviates the need to discuss the
11
implications, if any, of the mootness of Gooden's individual
claims or the untimeliness of Thomas's claims with regard to
their right to represent a plaintiff class.
43
rights of the parties."  Crawford, 153 S.W.3d at 501 (test for
mootness).
In short, this case was moot long before August 23, 2006,
when the trial court purported to certify classes and enter a
summary judgment for the plaintiff class.  "A moot case lacks
justiciability."  Crawford, 153 S.W.3d at 501.  "'"Unless the
trial court has before it a justiciable controversy, it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and any judgment entered by it is
void ab initio."'"  Sustainable Forests, L.L.C., 805 So. 2d at
683-84 (quoting Grenier, 782 So. 2d at 272, quoting in turn
Ex parte State ex rel. James, 711 So. 2d 952, 960 n. 2 (Ala.
1998)). Consequently, the  trial court's purported class
certification and summary judgment were void.11
II. Attorney Fees
Finally, the defendants contend that the trial court's
award of attorney fees was erroneous, because of, among other
things, the mootness of the plaintiffs' claims.  We agree.
Gooden and Thomas concede that, as a general rule,
sovereign immunity as enshrined in Ala. Const. 1901, § 14,
1051712
44
bars an award of attorney fees against the State.  Ex parte
Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006).  However,
sovereign immunity is no bar to such an award based on 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.  James v. Alabama Coalition for
Equity, Inc., 713 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1997) (plurality opinion)
(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978)).
Section 1988(b) provides, in pertinent part:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-
318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. §
2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section
13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs ...."
(Emphasis added.)
The question of whether a party is the "prevailing party"
within the meaning of § 1988(b) is often a matter of
contention.  However, the following principles are well
settled:
"'[A] plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the
merits of his claim materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits
the plaintiff.'  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-
1051712
45
12, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1992).
In the context of an injunction, 'a party "need not
obtain relief identical to the relief [that it]
specifically demanded, as long as the relief
obtained is of the same general type."'  Ensley
Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1583
(11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ashley v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Nor does the plaintiff need to obtain relief to the
extent demanded; getting something suffices to
authorize an award of fees.  See Farrar, 506 U.S. at
111, 113 S. Ct. at 573."
Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1353-54 (11th
Cir.  2000).  
Moreover, "attorney's fees are available in cases 'in
which plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory, non-civil-
rights claim pendent to a substantial constitutional claim.'"
Davis v. Everett, 443 So. 2d 1232, 1235-36 (Ala. 1983)
(quoting Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980)) (emphasis
added).  They are available "'where [the] Court enters
judgment in favor of a plaintiff on [the pendent] state law
claim,'" rather than on the federal civil-rights claim, "'as
long as both claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative
fact.'"  Davis, 443 So. 2d at 1235 (quoting trial court's
order).  See also Lowery v. Thomas, 575 So. 2d 1030, 1032
(Ala. 1990) ("If the [federal civil-rights] claim and the
state law claim arise out of a 'common nucleus of operative
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fact,' then in determining the plaintiff's status as a
'prevailing party' under § 1988 it is immaterial upon which
claim or claims the judgment is based, unless the [federal]
claim is specifically denied.").
However, the term "prevailing party" does not include "a
party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a
court-ordered consent decree," even if the party has "achieved
the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a
voluntary change in the defendant's conduct."  Buckhannon Bd.
& Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (emphasis added).  "[F]or a
party to be considered 'prevailing,' there must  be a
'material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties,' ... and there must be 'judicial imprimatur on the
change.'"  Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools, 401 F.3d 16, 22
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604
(emphasis in Buckhannon)).  Thus, it does not include a party
whose claims have become moot before the entry of such a
judgment or decree, resulting in a dismissal of the claims.
See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09; Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 483 (1990) (a party is not a "'prevailing
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party' as it must be to recover fees under § 1988," even
though the court of appeals holds in that party's favor, where
the Supreme Court vacates the judgment of the court of appeals
"on the basis of an event that mooted the controversy before
the court of appeals' judgment issued"); Cramer v. Virginia
Commonwealth Univ., 486 F. Supp. 187, 192 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1980)
("a plaintiff cannot be a prevailing party where his claim is
dismissed as moot").
Gooden and Thomas contend that they are entitled to
attorney fees under count six of their second, third, and
fourth amended complaints.  Specifically, they state:
"'[T]he plaintiffs' equal protection/due process
claims under count six were not reached, with the
court's ruling instead premised on its analysis of
state constitutional rights.  The claims of count
six, and the due process analysis used in resolving
the other claims in the plaintiffs' favor, however,
certainly suggest that at least to some extent,
relief to the plaintiffs could have been based on
federal constitutional claims.'"
Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 70 (quoting the trial court's
order). According to Gooden and Thomas, paragraph 7 was
"justified by the federal due process clause."  Gooden and
Thomas's brief, at 54.  
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Gooden and Thomas's reliance on the federal claims in
count six is unavailing.  Those claims were asserted for the
first time in the second amended complaint, which was filed on
May 8, 2006.  By that time, the case had become moot, as
discussed previously in this opinion.  In other words, it was
moot, not only when the judgment was entered, but when the
federal civil-rights claims were first asserted.  Thus, in
whatever respect the "legal relationship of the parties," and,
in particular, the relationship between the defendants and
Gooden before May 8, 2006, may have been altered with
"judicial imprimatur," they were clearly altered in the
absence of any pendent federal claim upon which Gooden and
Thomas rely.  For these reasons, the trial court erred in
awarding fees to the plaintiffs' attorneys. 
III. Summary
In summary, the trial court erred in awarding attorney
fees, based on federal claims that were not asserted before
the case was mooted by the voluntary acts of the attorney
general, 
as 
intervenor, 
and 
the 
original 
defendants.
Therefore, to the extent the trial court awarded attorney
fees, its judgment is reversed.  In all other respects, as
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49
explained in Part I of this opinion, the judgment of August
23, 2006, is void.  A void judgment will not support an
appeal.  Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone,
935 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (Ala. 2006).  Consequently, with the
exception of the reversal of the award of attorney fees, this
appeal must be dismissed.
REVERSED IN PART AND APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.