Title: Jaime R. Peterson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.
Citation: 2005 WI 61
Docket Number: 2003AP000955
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2005

2005 WI 61 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP955 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jaime R. Peterson,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc.,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 76 
Reported at:  272 Wis. 2d 676, 679 N.W.2d 840 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 27, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 6, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Lee S. Dreyfus   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Bruce D. Huibregtse, Laura Skilton Verhoff, Drew J. Cochrane 
and Stafford Rosenbaum, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Drew 
J. Cochrane. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Gregory H. 
Moss and Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Chicago, IL, and oral argument by 
Scott Cohen. 
 
 
2005 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP955  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 2254) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jaime R. Peterson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Volkswagen of America, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision, Peterson v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 2004 WI App 76, 272 Wis. 2d 676, 679 N.W.2d 840, reversing 
an order of the Waukesha County Circuit Court, Lee S. Dreyfus, 
Judge.  The circuit court granted Volkswagen's motion to dismiss 
Jamie R. Peterson's (Peterson) three-count complaint, which 
sought various forms of relief under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§  2301-2312 (2000)[hereinafter "the MMWA" or 
"the Act"].1    
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the United States Code are to 
the 2000 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
2 
 
I. 
ISSUE 
¶2 
The question presented is whether Peterson, as a 
lessee, meets the definition of "consumer" under the MMWA, such 
that she can maintain a cause of action under the Act for breach 
of written warranty against the manufacturer and warrantor of an 
allegedly defective vehicle.  We hold that Peterson has alleged 
sufficient facts to qualify as a category two consumer under the 
Act because the facts alleged in her complaint indicate that 
Volkswagen's warranty satisfies the definition of "written 
warranty" and because Peterson has alleged that the vehicle in 
question 
was 
transferred 
to 
her 
during 
the 
duration 
of 
Volkswagen's warranty.  Volkswagen's warranty constitutes a 
"written warranty" under the MMWA because Peterson has alleged 
that it was issued by Volkswagen in connection with the sale of 
the vehicle by an authorized dealer to a lending institution in 
order to facilitate the lease, the warranty was part of the 
basis of the bargain between the dealership and the lending 
institution, and the lending institution purchased the vehicle 
for purposes other than resale.   
¶3 
Furthermore, we 
conclude 
that Peterson 
has 
pled 
sufficient facts to qualify as a category three consumer because 
the facts alleged in her complaint indicate that Volkswagen's 
warranty satisfies the definition of "written warranty" and 
because Peterson has alleged that she was entitled by the terms 
of Volkswagen's warranty to enforce said warranty against 
Volkswagen.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
3 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On September 18, 2002, Peterson filed a three-count 
complaint 
against 
Volkswagen, 
alleging 
breach 
of 
written 
warranty, 
breach 
of 
implied 
warranty, 
and 
revocation 
of 
acceptance under the MMWA.  The pertinent facts as alleged in 
her complaint are as follows.   
¶5 
On March 27, 1999, Peterson leased a new 1999 
Volkswagen Beetle, manufactured by the defendant, from North 
Shore Bank (the Bank).  "Prior to or contemporaneous to 
Plaintiff's lease of the Beetle," Ernie Von Schledorn Pontiac 
Buick Volkswagen (EVS), an authorized Volkswagen dealer, sold 
the Beetle to the Bank.  The Bank "purchased the Beetle for 
purposes other than resale."  The Bank "purchased the Beetle to 
lease to the Plaintiffs [sic]."  As part of the consideration 
for the sale of the Beetle, Volkswagen issued the Bank a written 
warranty "which included a two (2) year or twenty-four thousand 
(24,000) mile bumper to bumper coverage" in addition to other 
warranties.  At the time of the sale, the Beetle had been driven 
100 miles and was covered by Volkswagen's written warranty.   
¶6 
On March 27, 1999,2 the Bank assigned it rights in the 
defendant's written warranty to Peterson and "[t]he transfer of 
[the] written warranty occurred during the duration of said 
warranty."  The Bank would not have purchased the vehicle 
                                                 
2 The complaint incorrectly stated that Peterson took 
possession of the vehicle on March 27, 2002.  We also note that 
the first sentence of the complaint incorrectly identified the 
defendant as General Motors Corporation.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
4 
 
without the issuance of the warranty and Peterson would not have 
leased the vehicle without the transfer of the warranty.   
¶7 
Shortly after taking 
possession of 
the vehicle, 
Peterson began experiencing several problems with the vehicle 
that "substantially impair[ed] the use, value and/or safety of 
the Beetle."  Such defects violated the defendant's written 
warranty and implied warranty of merchantability.  Peterson 
furnished the vehicle to authorized Volkswagen dealers for 
repairs on several occasions.  The defendant "allowed [Peterson] 
to enforce its written warranty" and said repairs "were covered 
by [Volkswagen's] written warranty."     
¶8 
The 
defects in 
the 
vehicle 
remained 
uncorrected 
despite 
the 
numerous 
attempts 
at 
repair. 
 
The 
defects 
substantially impaired the value of the vehicle, and Peterson 
justifiably lost confidence in the vehicle after allowing 
Volkswagen a reasonable number of attempts to cure the defects.  
Peterson thereafter attempted to revoke her acceptance of the 
vehicle in writing, and Volkswagen refused her demand for 
revocation.   
¶9 
Peterson attached an unsigned copy of the lease as an 
exhibit to her complaint, which stated at the top of the 
document:  "WITH ASSIGNMENT TO NORTH SHORE BANK, FSB."  Peterson 
did not attach a copy of the warranty to her complaint, and the 
warranty is not part of the record.   
¶10 Volkswagen filed its answer on December 9, 2002, which 
denied 
many 
of 
the 
allegations 
in 
the 
complaint 
and 
affirmatively alleged that Peterson leased the vehicle in 
No. 2003AP955  
 
5 
 
question from EVS, not the Bank.  Volkswagen also asserted 
various affirmative defenses.  It maintained that Peterson 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and 
that the MMWA did not apply to Peterson because she is a lessee.  
On the same date, Volkswagen filed a notice of motion and motion 
to dismiss under Wis. Stat. § 802.06 (2001-02),3 asserting that 
Peterson failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted because she is a lessee and the MMWA does not apply to 
lessees.4   
¶11 In her brief in opposition to dismissal, Peterson 
attached as an exhibit an affidavit from one Richard Wibe, a 
lease manager at EVS who had "overseen over a thousand lease 
transaction[s] for the lease of cars at my dealer."5  The 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
4 Subsequently, 
Peterson 
served 
upon 
Volkswagen 
interrogatories, a request for production of documents, and a 
request for admissions.  In response, on January 2, 2003, 
Volkswagen 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
a 
protective 
order 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 804.01(3)(a)2., seeking a stay of discovery pending 
the circuit court's resolution of the motion to dismiss.  The 
record does not indicate whether this motion was granted.  
However, the record does not contain any responses to the above 
discovery requests.   
5 Volkswagen filed a motion to strike the brief filed by 
Peterson in response to its motion to dismiss as untimely.  The 
record does not indicate whether this motion was granted.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
6 
 
affidavit describes in detail Peterson's dealing with EVS and 
the relationship between EVS and the Bank.6     
¶12  A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss on 
February 10, 2003.  The circuit court ruled: 
I'm satisfied that regardless of how you define it 
that the plaintiff in this case does not constitute a 
consumer under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  Now, I 
would note and I'm satisfied that that's a legislative 
issue to ultimately be addressed.   
 . . . .   
However, I'm also satisfied that at least based 
upon [Volkswagen's] analysis, and I'm satisfied it's a 
correct one, it still has to apply to a buyer that on 
the basis that the –- a warranty, whether written or 
implied, must be in connection with the sale of a 
vehicle.   
Now, in this case the person who's attempting to 
enforce it was not the purchaser.  That's an issue 
that we cannot get around.  Clearly, they are the 
lessee.  The purchaser is North Shore Savings.   
On February 26, 2003, the circuit court entered an order for 
final judgment and judgment dismissing Peterson's complaint. 
¶13 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed, 
concluding 
that 
Peterson was entitled to enforce Volkswagen's written warranty7 
                                                 
6 Wibe stated that "[a]s a matter of practice, after Ms. 
Peterson expressed an interest in leasing a vehicle from [EVS], 
my dealer contacted [the Bank] to see if they would agree to 
lease the vehicle to Ms. Peterson and in turn purchase the car 
from my dealer."  Further, he stated that EVS sold the vehicle 
in question to the Bank after the Bank agreed to lease the 
vehicle to Peterson "so that [the Bank] may lease it to Ms. 
Peterson."  He also stated that the Bank "did not purchase the 
vehicle for inventory purposes but rather to immediately lease 
the vehicle to Ms. Peterson."  Finally, he stated that Peterson 
was entitled to enforce the warranty the same as a new car 
purchaser. 
No. 2003AP955  
 
7 
 
as a category two consumer under the MMWA.  Peterson, 272 
Wis. 2d 676, ¶17.   
We agree with the courts that have held that 
where the sale of a vehicle is merely to facilitate a 
lease, the issuance of the warranty accompanies this 
sale, and the lessor explicitly transfers its rights 
in the warranty to the lessee——the lessee is protected 
by 
the 
Magnuson-Moss 
Act. . . . The 
statutorily 
defined term "written warranty" does not dictate that 
the sale be made to an ultimate consumer with a 
passage of title to the party.  The language of the 
Act demands only that we find a warranty exchange 
between a buyer and a supplier in connection with a 
sale made for purposes other than resale. . . . To the 
extent that a lessee fits the definition of "consumer" 
by receiving an automobile in transfer, it would be 
unreasonable, if not illogical, to conclude that a 
lessee does not enjoy the same right to enforce a 
warranty as a purchaser enjoys.   
Id., ¶15.  The court of appeals also stated that it was 
significant that Peterson alleged that Volkswagen's warranty was 
in effect at the time of the transfer and that the terms of the 
warranty were part of the bargain between EVS and the Bank.  
Id., ¶17.  The court did not address whether Peterson also 
qualified as a category three consumer.  Id. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6. allows a party to 
move to dismiss a complaint on the ground that the complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Such a 
motion "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint."  Watts v. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987).  "Whether a 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The court of appeals did not consider whether Peterson had 
standing to pursue her claim of breach of implied warranty under 
the MMWA.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
8 
 
complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted is a 
question of law and this court need not defer to the circuit 
court's determination."  Id.   
¶15 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we assume the 
facts set forth in the complaint are true and consider only the 
facts set forth therein.  Larson v. City of Tomah, 193 
Wis. 2d 225, 227, 532 N.W.2d 726 (1995).  However, "[w]hen a 
document is attached to the complaint and made part thereof, it 
must be considered a part of the pleading, and may be resorted 
to in determining the sufficiency of the pleadings."  Friends of 
Kenwood v. Green, 2000 WI App 217, ¶11, 239 Wis. 2d 78, 619 
N.W.2d 271.8  Any document so attached prevails over inconsistent 
averments in the complaint.  Id.   
                                                 
8 Therefore, we will consider the lease Peterson attached to 
her complaint.  However, we will not consider the affidavit 
Peterson attached to her brief in opposition to Volkswagen's 
motion to dismiss.   
We 
note 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(b) 
provides, 
in 
pertinent part: 
If on a motion asserting the defense described in par. 
(a)6. to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or on a 
motion asserting the defenses described in par. (a) 8. 
or 9., matters outside the pleadings are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in s. 802.08, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by s. 802.08. 
(Emphasis added.)  See also Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3).   
 
Here, Peterson attached an affidavit to her brief in 
opposition to Volkswagen's motion to dismiss.  Volkswagen 
moved to strike the entire brief as untimely.  Further, at 
No. 2003AP955  
 
9 
 
¶16 We will not grant a motion to dismiss "unless it 
appears certain that no relief can be granted under any set of 
facts that a plaintiff can prove in support of his or her 
allegations."  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 512.  As such, courts are 
to liberally construe a complaint and should deny a motion to 
dismiss when the facts alleged, if proven true, would constitute 
a cause of action.  Keller v. Welles Dept. Store of Racine, 88 
Wis. 2d 24, 28-29, 276 N.W.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1979). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶17 The federal MMWA "allows a consumer to bring suit 
against a warrantor in any state for failure to comply with its 
obligations under a written warranty or implied warranty."  
Mayberry v. Volkswagen, 2005 WI 13, ¶16, 278 Wis. 2d 39, 692 
N.W.2d 226 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)).  An individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 
hearing 
on 
the 
motion 
to 
dismiss, 
counsel 
for 
Volkswagen emphasized that the affidavit should not be 
considered.  When the circuit court made its oral ruling, 
it made no mention of the affidavit and treated the motion 
as a motion to dismiss, not one for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court stated:  "However, I'm going to grant the 
Motion to Dismiss and for the following reasons." 
 
Therefore, there is a reasonable inference from the 
record that the circuit court excluded the affidavit for 
purposes of Volkswagen's motion.  As such, we will continue 
to treat the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings 
and not one for summary judgment.  Our decision to affirm 
the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's order 
granting the motion to dismiss will allow the parties the 
opportunity to conduct discovery on remand and present 
disputed issues of fact, if they exist. 
No. 2003AP955  
 
10 
 
seeking to bring suit under the MMWA against a warrantor9 must 
fall within one of the three categories set forth under the 
definition of "consumer" in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).  Dekelaita v. 
Nissan Motor Corp., 799 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).10    
¶18 In order to determine whether Peterson, as a lessee, 
may pursue a cause of action under the Act for breach of express 
warranty, we must determine whether she is a "consumer" under 
the Act, which in turn requires us to determine whether there is 
a "written warranty" as defined under the Act.11  Statutory 
interpretation is an issue of law, reviewed de novo by this 
                                                 
9 A "warrantor" is defined as "any supplier or other person 
who gives or offers to give a written warranty or who is or may 
be obligated under an implied warranty."  15 U.S.C. § 2301(5).  
In turn, a "supplier" is defined as "any person engaged in the 
business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly 
available to consumers."  15 U.S.C. § 2301(4).  There is no 
dispute that Volkswagen qualifies as a "warrantor" under the 
Act.   
10 While the MMWA does not utilize the terms "category one," 
"category two," and "category three" consumer, we find this 
terminology to be useful in analyzing who qualifies as a 
consumer under the Act.   
11 We are cognizant that Peterson's complaint also stated a 
cause of action for breach of implied warranty.  An "implied 
warranty" under the Act is "an implied warranty arising under 
State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this 
title) in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer 
product."  15 U.S.C. § 2301(7).  Although the court of appeals 
did not explicitly consider whether Peterson could pursue this 
claim, 
the 
issue 
was 
briefly 
addressed 
in 
the 
parties' 
submissions to this court.  However, it is unnecessary to 
address whether Peterson qualifies as a "consumer" in relation 
to her claim for breach of implied warranty because, as 
Volkswagen correctly indicates, the Act's definition of "implied 
warranty" is not satisfied in this case.    
No. 2003AP955  
 
11 
 
court.  State v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, 
¶14, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 N.W.2d 514.   
¶19 The rules governing statutory interpretation are well 
settled:  
When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect 
to the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶43, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We begin by looking to 
the language of the statute because we "assume that 
the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language."  Id., ¶44.  Technical terms or legal terms 
of art appearing in the statute are given their 
accepted 
technical 
or 
legal 
definitions 
while 
nontechnical words and phrases are given their common, 
everyday meaning.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  Terms that 
are specifically defined in a statute are accorded the 
definition 
the 
legislature 
provided. 
 
Wisconsin 
Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 2004 
WI 40, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  In 
addition, we read the language of a specific statutory 
section in the context of the entire statute.  Id.  
Thus, we interpret a statute in light of its textually 
manifest scope, context, and purpose.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶48 & n.8.   
Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157.  
As such, extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, are not 
consulted 
unless 
the 
statute 
is 
ambiguous. 
 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible 
to more than one reasonable understanding.  Id., ¶47.   
¶20 Volkswagen argues that lessees are not "consumers" 
under the Act because the pertinent definitions of "consumer" 
require the warranty in question qualify as a "written warranty" 
under the Act.  According to Volkswagen, the definition of 
"written warranty" requires a sale to the person seeking to 
enforce the warranty.  Volkswagen argues that its written 
No. 2003AP955  
 
12 
 
warranty does not qualify as a "written warranty" under the MMWA 
because there was no "sale" to Peterson and consequently 
Peterson does not qualify under any of the definitions of 
"consumer."   
¶21 Peterson, while conceding that she does not fall 
within the first definition of "consumer" under the Act, 
nonetheless maintains that she qualifies as a category two or 
category three consumer.  Peterson argues that she qualifies as 
a category two consumer because the vehicle was transferred to 
her during the duration of Volkswagen's written warranty.  
Peterson asserts that she also qualifies as a category three 
consumer 
because 
she 
was 
entitled 
under 
the 
terms 
of 
Volkswagen's written warranty to enforce the warranty, as 
Volkswagen made numerous repairs to the vehicle under the 
warranty free of charge.  Finally, Peterson contends that 
Volkswagen's written warranty does, in fact, constitute a 
"written warranty" under the Act because the MMWA does not 
require that a sale be made directly to the ultimate consumer of 
the product.  She states that EVS sold the vehicle to the Bank 
for purposes other than resale and that this transaction renders 
Volkswagen's warranty a "written warranty."   
¶22 At the outset, we recognize that there exists a split 
of authority as to whether an automobile lessee may qualify as a 
"consumer" under the MMWA.  The leading case concluding that the 
MMWA does not apply to leases, and the case upon which 
Volkswagen principally relies, is DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2002).  Peterson, in contrast, 
No. 2003AP955  
 
13 
 
relies primarily on a line of cases from Illinois, beginning 
with Cohen v. AM General Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (E.D. 
Ill. 2003), which holds that a lessee may qualify as a category 
two or category three consumer.  This question is an issue of 
first impression in Wisconsin.  Ultimately, we conclude that the 
reasoning of the authorities relied upon by Peterson is more 
congruent with the plain meaning of the pertinent provisions of 
the MMWA than the analysis employed by DiCintio.  Thus, we begin 
by examining the text of the MMWA.  
¶23 As noted, in order to have standing to bring suit 
under the MMWA, an individual must meet the definition of 
"consumer" under the Act.  A category one consumer is "a buyer 
(other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product."12  
15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).  The parties agree that Peterson does not 
qualify as a category one consumer.  A category two consumer is 
"any person to whom such product is transferred during the 
duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) 
applicable to the product."  Id.  Finally, a category three 
consumer is "any other person who is entitled by the terms of 
such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State 
law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the 
obligations of the warranty (or service contract)."  Id.13 
                                                 
12 "Consumer product" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1).  
The parties do not dispute that the automobile in this case 
falls within this definition.     
13 This case does not involve a service contract.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
14 
 
¶24 Volkswagen argues that Peterson is not a category two 
consumer because Volkswagen's warranty does not meet the 
definition of "written warranty" under the Act, as there was no 
sale of the vehicle to Peterson.  The MMWA contains two 
definitions of "written warranty."  Peterson concedes that only 
the second definition is applicable here.  Thus, we turn to the 
definition of "written warranty" in § 2301(6)(B).  Section 
2301(6)(B) defines a "written warranty" as:   
any undertaking in writing in connection with the 
sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, 
repair, replace, or take other remedial action with 
respect to such product in the event that such product 
fails to meet the specifications set forth in the 
undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or 
undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain 
between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than 
resale of such product. 
(Emphasis added.)  The Act does not define the term "sale" or 
the phrase "in connection with the sale."  Volkswagen argues 
that the "sale" referred to in the Act must be to the ultimate 
consumer in order for a written warranty to meet the definition 
of "written warranty."  Further, it argues that even if the sale 
of the vehicle from EVS to the Bank qualifies as a sale under 
the Act, it nonetheless was not a sale "for purposes other than 
resale."  For the reasons discussed below, we reject these 
arguments.   
¶25 First, the plain language of § 2301(6)(B) does not 
limit to whom a sale can be made or require a sale to the 
ultimate consumer.  Rather, the MMWA requires only that the 
No. 2003AP955  
 
15 
 
warranty be issued "in connection with the sale by a supplier of 
a consumer product."  15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B). 
The legislature's definition[] of "written warranty" 
 . . . state[s] quite simply that the warranty be 
issued "in connection with the sale" of a consumer 
product:  Congress does not demand its readers to 
conclude that the sale must be between the consumer 
and the supplier.   
Where, as here, there was a sale——between the 
dealer and the lessor——it suffices to say that there 
was a written warranty issued in connection with the 
sale.  In no event does the Act limit a "sale" to 
transactions between the warrantor and the ultimate 
consumer.   
Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at 373.14  "'Sale,' . . . is not limited to 
transactions between the warrantor and the ultimate consumer."  
Cohen, 264 F.Supp. 2d at 619.   
¶26 We also note that the definition of "written warranty" 
utilizes the term "supplier," which is defined as "any person 
engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or 
                                                 
14 See also Mangold v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 809 N.E.2d 251, 
254-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004):  
The plain language of the statute simply requires 
that warranties under the Act be issued "in connection 
with the sale" of a consumer product.  It does not 
require a sale to be made to the ultimate consumer 
with a passage of title to that party and does not 
forbid the subsequent assignment of the warranty.   
Given 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
statute, 
"in 
connection with [a] sale" means the sale between the 
dealership and [the leasing company].   
Since the vehicle was sold to the lessor with a 
manufacturer's written warranty, the warranty was made 
"in connection with" the sale . . . . 
(Citations omitted.)   
No. 2003AP955  
 
16 
 
indirectly 
available 
to 
consumers." 
 
15 
U.S.C. 
§ 2301(4)(emphasis added).  If Congress had intended to require 
a direct sale between a manufacturer and the ultimate consumer 
in order for the definition of "written warranty" to be 
satisfied, it would not have included the term "supplier" in the 
definition of "written warranty" or defined the term "supplier" 
so broadly.   
At least with written warranties, the Act does not 
require that a supplier be in contractual privity with 
the consumer so as to restrict the meaning of "sale" 
to be a transaction only between a direct supplier and 
a 
consumer. 
 
Rather, 
the 
Act 
implicates 
those 
suppliers 
who 
make 
their 
products 
"indirectly 
available to consumers."  Here, [the dealership] made 
the car directly available to the lessor and lessee[].  
Applying the plain language of the statute, it follows 
that defendant manufacturer . . . made the automobile 
indirectly available to consumers.  In short, there 
was a "written warranty" issued in connection with the 
sale from a "supplier" to a "consumer"——albeit, but 
permissibly, indirectly.   
Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at 373-74 (citations omitted).  Here, 
Volkswagen clearly made "a consumer product . . . indirectly 
available" to Peterson.    
¶27 However, the court in DiCintio reached a contrary 
conclusion, ruling that a lessee did not meet the definition of 
"written warranty" because such definition required the transfer 
of title to a consumer.  DiCintio, 768 N.E.2d at 1124.  In 
DiCintio, the court relied on the definition of "sale" under the 
Uniform Commercial Code and stated that under that statute, a 
transfer of title was required for a sale to occur.  Id.  The 
court then concluded that no sale had occurred under the MMWA 
No. 2003AP955  
 
17 
 
because title did not pass to the plaintiff under his lease.  
Id.  The court also relied heavily on the legislative history of 
a precursor to the MMWA to support its conclusion that lessees 
were not covered under the definition of "consumer" in the Act.  
Id. at 1125-26.  
¶28 We 
respectfully 
disagree 
with 
the 
rationale 
of 
DiCintio.  First, even assuming it is appropriate to turn to the 
Uniform Commercial Code for the definition of "sale," nothing in 
the text of the MMWA limits to whom the sale must be made.  That 
is, even conceding that the MMWA requires a transfer of title 
for a sale to occur, it does not require that title be 
transferred to the ultimate consumer.  Also, we note that 
requiring that title be transferred to the ultimate user of the 
product 
would 
render 
superfluous 
the 
second 
category 
of 
"consumer," as anyone to whom title was transferred through a 
sale would necessarily constitute a category one consumer——"a 
buyer . . . of any consumer product."  15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 
¶29 Here, Peterson alleged that EVS sold the Beetle to the 
Bank "[p]rior to or contemporaneous to the Plaintiff's lease of 
the Beetle."15  Further, Peterson alleged:  "In consideration for 
the sale of the Beetle, Manufacturer issued and supplied to 
Lessor its written warranty . . . ."  Thus, assuming these 
allegations in the complaint are true, Volkswagen issued a 
                                                 
15 At oral argument, Volkswagen conceded that a sales 
transaction between EVS and the Bank occurred at some point in 
time.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
18 
 
written warranty "in connection with the sale by a supplier of a 
consumer product."  15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B).   
¶30 In addition, we disagree with the DiCintio court's 
reliance on legislative history.  As noted, Wisconsin courts 
generally do not examine legislative history unless the text of 
the statute is ambiguous.  Simply put, nothing in the text of 
the MMWA's definition of "written warranty" requires or even 
suggests a requirement that there be a sale to the ultimate 
consumer.  Congress chose to specifically define "written 
warranty" in terms of a "writing in connection with the sale by 
a supplier[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B).  We will not delve into 
legislative history and judicially graft a requirement onto the 
statute that does not appear in the text of the statute.16  
Moreover, the legislative history relied upon by the DiCintio 
court was not even that of the MMWA itself but rather "[t]he 
history of a precursor bill[.]"  DiCintio, 768 N.E.2d at 1125.  
¶31 Therefore, we conclude that the "sale" referred to in 
the definition of "written warranty" need not be between the 
manufacturer and ultimate consumer.  Here, Volkswagen's warranty 
was allegedly issued in connection with the sale of the Beetle 
to the Bank.  This allegation is sufficient to satisfy the 
                                                 
16 See Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 
2004 WI 40, ¶21, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 ("Wisconsin 
courts have long followed the rule that '[w]here a word or 
phrase is specifically defined in a statute, its meaning is as 
defined in the statute, and no other rule of statutory 
construction need be applied.'")(quoting Beard v. Lee Enters., 
Inc., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 591 N.W.2d 156 (1999)).  
No. 2003AP955  
 
19 
 
statutory requirement of a "writing in connection with the sale 
by a supplier" in the definition of "written warranty."  15 
U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B).   
¶32 In 
addition, 
Peterson 
specifically 
alleged 
that 
Volkswagen's issuance of a warranty to the Bank was part of the 
consideration for the purchase of the vehicle and that the Bank 
would not have purchased the vehicle but for the issuance of the 
warranty.  Thus, Peterson has alleged sufficient facts to 
satisfy the part of the definition of "written warranty" that 
requires that the "written affirmation, promise, or undertaking 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and 
a buyer[.]"  15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B).   
¶33 However, Volkswagen contends that even if all of these 
prerequisites have been met, the sale of the Beetle from EVS to 
the Bank and the issuance of the warranty were not "for purposes 
other than resale of such product."  Id.  Volkswagen, again 
relying on DiCintio, contends that the sale of the vehicle was 
not for purposes other than resale because Peterson retains an 
option to purchase the vehicle at the end of the lease.17   
¶34 The DiCintio court concluded that when an automobile 
dealership sells a vehicle to a leasing company, "ultimate 
                                                 
17 Volkswagen also argues that the sale was not for purposes 
other than resale because EVS, not the Bank, is the lessor of 
the Beetle.  However, Peterson alleged in her complaint that she 
leased the vehicle from the Bank.  This allegation is supported 
by the lease itself, which was attached as an exhibit to the 
complaint and clearly contains a clause at the top of the form 
assigning the lease to the Bank.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
20 
 
resale 
is 
presumably 
an 
intrinsic 
part 
of 
[the 
leasing 
company's] plan when it takes title to the vehicle. . . . Even 
though its lease to [the plaintiff] is not a sale, [the leasing 
company] obviously intends to sell the vehicle to him or some 
other consumer."  DiCintio, 768 N.E.2d at 1127.  See also 
Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 523 (7th 
Cir. 2003)(accord).  Again, we disagree with the reasoning of 
DiCintio.   
¶35 "While it is true that [the leasing company] [i]s 
likely to sell the vehicle after the expiration of the lease 
(potentially 
even 
to 
plaintiff[]), 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
transaction between [the leasing company] and defendant was not 
for resale, but for the lease of the vehicle to plaintiff[]."  
Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 619.  Further,  
the 
court's 
reading 
of 
the 
statute 
in 
DiCintio . . . would 
render 
many 
purchasers 
of 
automobiles unable to sue for breach of warranty.  
Certainly, many customers plan on selling or trading 
in a vehicle after years of use.  The Act requires us 
to look for the reason that the vehicle was purchased, 
and 
the 
reason 
was 
the 
subsequent 
lease 
to 
plaintiff[], not resale.   
Id. at 620.  Furthermore, "most automobile purchasers buy a car 
with the ultimate goal of resale, although maybe not until much 
later.  Under the DiCintio court's reasoning, few buyers could 
ever enforce the Act."  Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at 375.   
¶36 Peterson alleged in her complaint that the Bank 
"purchased the Beetle for purposes other than resale."  The Bank 
"purchased the Beetle to lease to the Plaintiffs [sic]."  
No. 2003AP955  
 
21 
 
Therefore, assuming the allegations in the complaint are true, 
we conclude that EVS's sale of the Beetle to the Bank was "for 
purposes other than resale of [the vehicle]."  15 U.S.C. 
§ 2301(6)(B).   
¶37 As such, 
Peterson's 
complaint has 
alleged 
facts 
sufficient to meet the definition of "written warranty" under 
the Act.  Therefore, having concluded that Volkswagen's warranty 
constitutes a "written warranty" under the Act, we now examine 
whether Peterson meets the remaining criterion to qualify as a 
category two consumer.  Specifically, we must determine whether 
Peterson is a person "to whom such product is transferred during 
the 
duration 
of 
a[] . . . written 
warranty." 
 
15 
U.S.C. 
§ 2301(3)(emphasis added).   
¶38 In DiCintio, the court concluded that the plaintiff 
did not qualify as a category two consumer because the sale of 
the vehicle to the leasing company occurred after the lease was 
executed and thus, even if the sale was sufficient to create a 
"written warranty" under the Act, "DiCintio is not a 'person to 
whom such product is transferred during the duration of an 
implied or written warranty.'"  DiCintio, 768 N.E.2d at 1127 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3)).  Likewise in Voelker, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff did not qualify as a category two 
consumer because in order to qualify as a category two consumer, 
the product in question must have been "'transferred during the 
duration of'" a written warranty.  Voelker, 353 F.3d at 524 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3))(emphasis supplied by Voelker).  
The court noted that the warranty in question "did not begin 
No. 2003AP955  
 
22 
 
until after possession of the car transferred to Voelker, and 
not 'during [the warranty's] duration.'"  Id.   
¶39 While both DiCintio and Voelker are correct that a 
vehicle 
leased 
before 
the 
warranty 
takes 
effect 
is 
not 
"transferred during the duration of" a written warranty, 15 
U.S.C. § 2301(3), here, Peterson alleged in her complaint that 
the warranty was in effect at the time of the lease.  She 
alleged that the vehicle was sold to the Bank prior to her lease 
and that Volkswagen issued the Bank a written warranty as part 
of the consideration for the sale of the Beetle.  Further, she 
averred that at the time of the sale, the Beetle was "covered by 
[Volkswagen's] written warranty."  She asserted that on March 
27, 1999, the date she leased the vehicle, the Bank assigned its 
rights in the Volkswagen's written warranty to Peterson and 
"[t]he transfer of [the] written warranty occurred during the 
duration of said warranty."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶40 As there is not a copy of the warranty in the record 
stating otherwise, we assume for purposes of the motion to 
dismiss that Peterson's allegation that she leased and took 
possession of the vehicle during the duration of the warranty is 
true.  Assuming the allegations in her complaint are true, 
Peterson is a "person to whom such product is transferred during 
the 
duration 
of 
a[] . . . written 
warranty." 
 
15 
U.S.C. 
§ 2301(3).  Therefore, we hold that Peterson has alleged 
sufficient facts to proceed under the MMWA as a category two 
consumer because her factual allegations satisfy the second 
No. 2003AP955  
 
23 
 
definition of "consumer" and the definition "written warranty" 
under the Act.  
¶41 However, even if the Beetle was not transferred to 
Peterson during the duration of the warranty, we conclude that 
she nonetheless would be able to proceed under the Act as a 
category 
three 
consumer 
because 
her 
factual 
allegations 
establish that she is a "person who is entitled by the terms of 
such warranty . . . to enforce against the warrantor . . . the 
obligations of the warranty[.]"  15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).  Peterson 
alleged that the Bank assigned her its rights in Volkswagen's 
warranty.  She also alleged that she furnished the vehicle to 
authorized Volkswagen dealers for repairs on numerous occasions 
for several different problems and that Volkswagen "allowed 
[her] to enforce its written warranty" and said repairs were 
"covered by [the] written warranty."  Thus, even though we do 
not have the warranty before us, Volkswagen cannot seriously 
argue (at this stage in the proceedings) that Peterson was not 
entitled to enforce its warranty.  We agree with the reasoning 
of the court in Mangold v. Nissan North America, Inc., 809 
N.E.2d 251, 253-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) on this issue.   
To 
facilitate 
the 
lease, 
[the 
leasing 
company] 
assigned its warranty rights to plaintiff[]. . . .  
Moreover, in this case, the dealership actually 
serviced plaintiff['s] vehicle numerous times, and 
each time the repairs were covered by the warranty.  
We find no merit in allowing plaintiff[] to enforce 
the warranty for repairs, but denying warranty rights 
when a violation under the Act is asserted.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
24 
 
¶42 Rather than arguing that Peterson was not entitled to 
enforce the warranty, Volkswagen contends that Peterson fails to 
satisfy the criteria for a category three consumer because its 
warranty is not a "written warranty" under the Act.  However, as 
we have already concluded that Volkswagen's warranty qualifies 
as a "written warranty," we hold that Peterson has alleged 
sufficient facts to proceed as a category three consumer.   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶43 In 
summary, 
we 
hold 
that 
Peterson 
has 
alleged 
sufficient facts to qualify as a category two consumer because 
the facts alleged in her complaint indicate that Volkswagen's 
warranty satisfies the definition of "written warranty" and 
because Peterson has alleged that the vehicle in question was 
transferred to her during the duration of Volkswagen's warranty.  
Volkswagen's warranty constitutes a "written warranty" under the 
MMWA because Peterson has alleged that it was issued in 
connection with the sale of the vehicle by EVS to the Bank in 
order to facilitate the lease, the warranty was part of the 
basis of the bargain between EVS and the Bank, and the Bank 
purchased the vehicle for purposes other than resale.   
¶44 Furthermore, we 
conclude 
that 
Peterson 
has 
pled 
sufficient facts to qualify as a category three consumer because 
the facts alleged in her complaint indicate that Volkswagen's 
warranty satisfies the definition of "written warranty" and 
because Peterson has alleged that she was entitled by the terms 
of Volkswagen's warranty to enforce said warranty against 
No. 2003AP955  
 
25 
 
Volkswagen.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.18   
¶45 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
                                                 
18 We emphasize that we do not hold that all lessees may 
proceed under the MMWA or that Peterson is a category two or 
category three consumer.  We merely hold that Peterson alleged 
sufficient facts in her complaint to survive Volkswagen's motion 
to dismiss.  Peterson has alleged sufficient facts to meet the 
statutory definition of a category two and category three 
consumer.  On remand, the parties should be accorded the full 
opportunity to conduct discovery and present motions for summary 
judgment if the evidence produced during discovery demonstrates 
there are no disputed issues of fact.   
No. 2003AP955  
 
 
 
1