Title: Wortis v. Trustees of Tufts College
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13472
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13472 
 
HENRY H. WORTIS & others1  vs.  TRUSTEES OF TUFTS COLLEGE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 3, 2023. - March 14, 2024. 
 
Present (Sitting at Lowell):  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, 
Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Employment, Performance and breach, Construction of 
contract, Private college, School handbook, Custom, Implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Employment, 
Personnel manual.  Evidence, Custom and usage.  Practice, 
Civil, Summary judgment.  Estoppel.  Declaratory Relief.  
Words, "Economic security," "Academic freedom."  
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 5, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Maureen B. Hogan, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kevin T. Peters (Jennifer A. Henricks also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Daryl J. Lapp for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
1 Amy S. Yee, Theoharis C. Theoharides, Ana M. Soto, 
Emmanuel N. Pothos, Michael H. Malamy, David J. Greenblatt, and 
Brent H. Cochran. 
2 
 
 
Matthew W. Finkin, of New York, for Mark Barenberg 
& others. 
 
Risa Lieberwitz, of Georgia, Aaron Nisenson, of the 
District of Columbia, Edward D. Swidriski, III, of Texas, 
& James A.W. Shaw for American Association of University 
Professors. 
 
Katherine B. Wellington for Association of American 
Universities. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  At issue in the instant case is whether the 
salary and full-time status of tenured medical school professors 
at Tufts University (Tufts)2 may be substantially reduced, and 
the laboratory (lab) space they previously occupied shrunk or 
eliminated, consistent with the promises of economic security 
and academic freedom provided in their tenure commitments.     
In particular, the plaintiffs, tenured faculty at Tufts 
University School of Medicine (TUSM), challenge compensation and 
lab space policies issued in 2016, 2017, and 2019 that require 
them to cover fifty percent of their salary with external 
research funding.  Under the plans, if the plaintiffs did not 
maintain the fifty percent funding requirement, their salaries 
would be cut and their employment status would be reduced from 
full time to part time.  To maintain their existing lab space, 
the plaintiffs were also required to ensure that their external 
research funding maintained a cost recovery rate equivalent to a 
 
2 Tufts University is incorporated in Massachusetts as 
"Trustees of Tufts College."  For the sake of simplicity, we 
refer to the defendant as "Tufts" throughout the opinion. 
3 
 
Federal grant from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  
When the plaintiffs failed to meet the external funding 
requirements set out in the policies, they had their salaries 
cut, their full-time status reduced, in some cases to part time, 
and their lab space reduced or closed entirely, although they 
had access to other lab space and any grant applications they 
submitted would include a commitment by TUSM to provide the 
appropriate resources to conduct the work.     
The plaintiffs then sued Tufts in the Superior Court, 
arguing that the compensation and lab space policies violated 
their rights to academic freedom and economic security 
guaranteed by their tenure contracts.  The court granted summary 
judgment in Tufts's favor on all counts, ruling that the 
compensation and lab space policies did not violate the 
plaintiffs' tenure rights, and the plaintiffs appealed.   
We conclude that academic freedom and economic security are 
not hortatory concepts but important norms in the academic 
community.  Importantly, they are substantive terms expressly 
incorporated in Tufts's tenure documents.  The meaning of at 
least economic security is not, however, self-explanatory and 
may vary depending upon the particular university and even the 
particular school within the university.  We further conclude 
that the meaning of economic security for tenured medical school 
professors at Tufts is ambiguous in the tenure documents, and 
4 
 
more evidence is required regarding the customs and practices 
and reasonable expectations related to salary and full-time 
status for tenured professors at TUSM, and even other 
universities and medical schools, to resolve the question 
whether the significant reductions in salary and full-time 
status imposed here violated the economic security provided in 
the tenure documents.  Summary judgment was therefore not 
appropriate on this issue.  In contrast, nothing in the tenure 
documents, including the protection provided by the terms 
"academic freedom" and "economic security," guarantee the lab 
space commitments claimed here.  Summary judgment on these 
claims was therefore proper.  We therefore affirm in part and 
reverse in part.3  
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts are drawn 
from the order on the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment, supplemented by other uncontroverted facts in the 
summary judgment record, and are either not in dispute or viewed 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, against whom 
summary judgment entered.  Williams v. Board of Appeals of 
Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 685 (2022). 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Association of American Universities, the American Association 
of University Professors, and a group of law professors. 
 
5 
 
TUSM, one of Tufts's schools, divides its faculty into 
basic science faculty and clinical faculty.  Basic science 
faculty at TUSM are, according to the faculty handbook, "to 
participate in the teaching of programs of the professional 
schools, to direct graduate-training programs, to serve as a 
source of expertise within the Tufts community, and to conduct 
original research."  Clinical faculty members are generally not 
involved in classroom teaching but rather are primarily 
responsible for providing services to patients at affiliated 
hospitals or other clinical settings and for providing practical 
training of medical students.  The plaintiffs are all tenured 
basic science faculty at TUSM and were all granted tenure at 
different times, dating as far back as 1970 and as recently as 
2009. 
i.  The plaintiffs' tenure contracts.  A.  Appointment and 
promotion letters. To understand the scope of the plaintiffs' 
tenure protections, we look first to the letters each plaintiff 
received granting them tenure.  Each plaintiff was granted 
tenure at some point between 1970 to 2009, before the lab space 
and salary policies went into effect in 2016 and 2017.  The 
letters themselves say little to nothing about the terms or 
scope of the plaintiffs' tenure and say nothing about salary and 
lab space reductions or reductions in full-time equivalent (FTE) 
status.  A few of the plaintiffs received specific salary and 
6 
 
lab space commitments in their initial offer letters, but their 
subsequent tenure letters do not discuss the effect of tenure on 
those prior commitments.  
Plaintiff Dr. Michael H. Malamy received tenure when he was 
appointed an associate professor of molecular biology and 
microbiology at TUSM, "without limit of time," in 1970.  The 
letter granting him tenure indicates that Tufts appointed him 
"subject to the provisions of the applicable bylaws and 
University policies" but otherwise says nothing about the terms 
of his tenure.  Plaintiff Dr. Henry H. Wortis was granted tenure 
in 1976 in a letter that also stated his appointment was 
"without limit of time" and "subject to the provisions of the 
applicable bylaws and University policy." 
In 1991, plaintiff Dr. Theoharis C. Theoharides was granted 
tenure.  The 1991 letter is not in the record.  Plaintiff Dr. 
David J. Greenblatt was granted tenure in 1992.  As with the 
other plaintiffs, Greenblatt's letter is silent on the terms of 
tenure or the questions of salary reductions and lab space.  The 
letter provided in the record discusses the recommendation of 
the Basic Sciences Appointments, Promotions and Tenure Committee 
(tenure committee) to grant Greenblatt's tenure and notes 
favorably his reputation "as an expert in the area of 
pharmokinetics" and his citation as one of "the world's twenty 
most prolific researchers."  A year later, in 1993, plaintiff 
7 
 
Dr. Brent H. Cochran was granted tenure based on the 
recommendation of the tenure committee.  Again, the letter does 
not offer details about the tenure arrangement but does note 
that the tenure recommendation was based on Cochran's "past 
research accomplishments, [his] demonstrated commitment to 
teaching and to the training of students and postdoctoral 
fellows," as well as his "consistent record of grant support 
from NIH."  Cochran's initial offer letter notes that his 
starting salary would be "$70,000 with half being provided by 
Tufts, including fringe benefits."  The offer letter also notes 
Tufts's agreement to provide lab and office space, plus lab 
start-up funds and, if needed, up to $100,000 for one year or 
until Cochran received grant support to replace the funding he 
had been receiving from his previous employer.    
In 1994, plaintiff Dr. Ana M. Soto was granted tenure.  As 
with the other letters, Soto's letter does not discuss the terms 
of her tenure but notes that tenure was "awarded based on [her] 
scientific accomplishments," "contributions to teaching," 
"service to the university," and "national and international 
reputation as a reproductive toxicologist." 
In 1998, plaintiff Dr. Amy S. Yee was granted tenure by 
Tufts's board of trustees.  Her letter also does not discuss 
what protections or benefits tenure provides.  The letter notes 
that tenure was granted based on her "ability to publish 
8 
 
innovative studies and to obtain research funding in a highly 
competitive area," her "high recognition as a contributor to the 
field of developmental transcription factors, as evidenced by 
invitations to present [her] work at highly selective scientific 
meetings and at major institutions," her commitment to teaching, 
and her service on key university committees.  Her 1989 letter 
offering her a "tenure-track" appointment to assistant professor 
included an initial twelve months' salary offer and a specified 
amount of lab space and start-up funds for her lab.     
Finally, and most recently, Dr. Emmanuel N. Pothos was 
granted tenure in 2009.  Like the previous letters, his letter 
does not lay out the terms of tenure but notes that the 
recommendation was made by the tenure committee based on his 
"demonstrated excellence in research, teaching and service to 
the university."  Pothos's appointment letter for his initial 
tenure-track assistant professor position at Tufts provides more 
detail than most of the other appointment letters.  First, it 
notes that his salary would initially be wholly paid by TUSM in 
the first year of his appointment, and then reduced to sixty 
percent in the second year, and by the third year, he would be 
expected to cover at least fifty percent of his salary with 
outside grant funding.  Second, it specifically offered him 
"appropriate laboratory and office space" as well as funds to 
defray the cost of lab equipment, supplies, and personnel. 
9 
 
B.  Faculty handbook.  In addition to the tenure letters, 
we also consider other documents to define the scope of tenure.  
The parties agree that the TUSM faculty handbook (faculty 
handbook) is a part of the tenure contract.  The parties further 
agree that certain policies, including the basic science faculty 
appointment, promotion, and separation policy (basic science 
policy) and the policy on academic freedom, tenure, and 
retirement (AFTR policy) (both described in detail infra), set 
forth in the faculty handbook, are part of the plaintiffs' 
tenure agreements with Tufts.4  Nonetheless, nothing from the 
faculty handbook in the record, including the basic science 
policy and the AFTR policy, specifically addresses reductions in 
salary, FTE status, or lab space. 
C.  Basic science policy.  The basic science policy 
included in the record lays out the requirements for appointment 
 
4 We note that the record does not include a full copy of 
the current faculty handbook.  The record also indicates that 
there have been amendments and revisions to the faculty 
handbook, but it is unclear how or when such amendments or 
revisions happened or the substance of any such amendments or 
revisions.  The record also does not include the faculty 
handbooks or the basic science and AFTR policies in place at the 
time each faculty member was awarded tenure.  Nonetheless, as 
both parties agree that the commitments to academic freedom and 
economic security reflected in the current AFTR policy and 
faculty handbook apply to all of the plaintiffs in this case, 
and disagree only as to their legal significance, we therefore 
assume, for the purposes of summary judgment, that the relevant 
language, or at least the concepts of academic freedom and 
economic security so described, is applicable and that we must 
determine their legal significance. 
10 
 
and promotion to tenured positions within TUSM in detail.  
However, apart from noting that "[t]enure reflects a long-term 
commitment by the University to the academic freedom and 
security of faculty members," the basic science policy does not 
explain what protections tenure provides.  Nor does the basic 
science policy discuss salary or FTE reductions.  It does state, 
however, that "[d]etails on the tenure policy can be found in 
the document Policy on Academic Freedom, Tenure, and Retirement 
of the Board of Trustees of Tufts University."  
The section on separation from TUSM provides the procedures 
for termination for cause of faculty with permanent or 
continuous tenure, but it does not address salary beyond noting 
that a tenured faculty member terminated for reasons other than 
moral turpitude will receive his or her salary for one year.  
The basic science policy is similarly silent on whether faculty 
members are guaranteed lab space or whether lab space may be 
reduced.  Most of the basic science policy focuses on the 
substantive prerequisites for receiving tenure.  The 
introduction to the basic science policy included in the record 
does, however, state that "[t]he personnel policies and 
practices for all faculty appointments derive from a variety of 
sources, including the Bylaws of the Faculty, policies adopted 
by the Trustees of the University, and policies adopted by the 
University and/or the School of Medicine."  
11 
 
D.  AFTR policy.  The AFTR policy consists of six sections: 
(I) introduction to academic freedom and tenure; (II) academic 
freedom; (III) academic tenure; (IV) nonreappointments not 
involving tenure; (V) academic year; and (VI) emeritus status.  
Section I incorporates verbatim the language of the American 
Association of University Professors's (AAUP's) 1940 Statement 
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940 statement).  
It begins by emphasizing that "[a]cademic freedom is essential 
to the free search for truth and its free exposition and applies 
to both teaching and research."  The next paragraph states in 
whole: 
"Tenure is a means to a certain ends, especially:  (1) 
Freedom of teaching and research and of extramural 
activities, and (2) A sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and women 
of ability." 
 
Economic security is not further defined in the AFTR policy, but 
academic freedom is defined in § II to include:  "full freedom 
in research and in the publication of the results, subject to 
adequate performance of [the teacher's] other academic duties;" 
(b) freedom in the classroom in discussing the teacher's 
subject, so long as the teacher refrains from introducing 
controversial matter not related to the subject being taught; 
and (c) freedom from "institutional censorship or discipline" 
when the teacher "speaks or writes as a citizen."  This 
12 
 
definition of academic freedom is essentially the same as the 
definition in the 1940 statement, discussed in detail infra.    
Section III of the AFTR policy describes the procedural 
requirements for obtaining tenure and the procedural protections 
to which a faculty member is entitled in the case of termination 
for cause.  To obtain tenure, a faculty member must have 
completed a probationary period of seven years of full-time 
service.  At the end of the probationary period, a full-time 
faculty member who meets certain eligibility requirements will 
"be granted an appointment with permanent or continuous tenure, 
unless he/she is notified in writing to the contrary prior to 
the beginning of the last year of the probationary period."  
After tenure is granted, Tufts faculty "will be terminated only 
for adequate cause, or under extraordinary circumstances because 
of bona fide financial exigencies or program discontinuance or 
resignation or retirement."  Like the 1940 statement, the AFTR 
policy entitles tenured faculty to a hearing upon request in the 
case of dismissal for cause.  The AFTR policy is also silent on 
salary and FTE reductions or reductions in lab space.5 
 
5 While both parties rely heavily on both the AFTR and basic 
science policies to make their case, based on the record before 
us we do not know whether either policy was in place at the time 
the plaintiffs were granted tenure.  The AFTR policy indicates 
that it was revised in 2014, but we do not know when it was 
first adopted.  Similarly, the basic science policy states that 
it was approved and adopted in April 1999, but portions of the 
 
13 
 
E.  The 1940 statement.  The central language at issue in 
the AFTR policy is taken verbatim from the AAUP's 1940 
statement.  The 1940 statement was the product of compromise 
between professors and university administrators.  M.W. Finkin  
& R.C. Post, For the Common Good:  Principles of American 
Academic Freedom 47-48 (2009).  The AAUP sought out a partner in 
drafting the 1940 statement and ultimately found such a partner 
in the Association of American Colleges, an organization 
representing the administrators of undergraduate colleges and 
universities.  Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 3, 12, 23-
24 (1990).     
The 1940 statement seeks, in its own words, to "promote 
public understanding and support of academic freedom and tenure 
and agreement upon procedures to ensure them in colleges and 
universities."  Universities exist to serve "the common good and 
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or 
the institution as a whole.  The common good depends upon the 
free search for truth and its free exposition."  Thus, academic 
freedom is essential to the common good because "[f]reedom in 
research is fundamental to the advancement of truth" and freedom 
 
document indicate that certain provisions were adopted and 
revised well before 1999.  For example, the documentation of 
criteria guidelines, referenced in the policy, were adopted in 
1983.   
14 
 
in teaching protects both the professors' right to teach and the 
students' freedom to learn.  Academic freedom "carries with it 
duties correlative with rights."  This is the context in which 
the AAUP introduces the concept of tenure.  The third paragraph 
following these introductory statements declares that  
"[t]enure is a means to certain ends; specifically (1) 
freedom of teaching and research and of extramural 
activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and women 
of ability.  Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, 
are indispensable to the success of an institution in 
fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society." 
   
The 1940 statement then lays out the three components of 
academic freedom:  (1) full freedom in research and in the 
publication of results, subject to adequate performance of other 
academic duties; (2) freedom in the classroom; and (3) the 
ability to speak or write as citizens, free from institutional 
censorship or discipline. 
Finally, the 1940 statement concludes with a section that 
states:  "the precise terms and conditions of every appointment 
should be stated in writing and be in the possession of both 
institution and teacher before the appointment is consummated."  
It also describes tenure as "permanent and continuous" and that 
once tenure has been granted, faculty "should be terminated only 
for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or 
under extraordinary circumstances because of financial 
exigencies."  Moreover, termination for cause "should, if 
15 
 
possible, be considered by both a faculty committee" and the 
university's governing board, with the opportunity for a hearing 
in cases where facts are in dispute.  Tufts's AFTR policy 
provides substantively the same termination policies. 
ii.  Research, funding, and lab space.  As reflected in the 
parties' statement of undisputed facts, "[s]cientific research 
at TUSM, like other medical schools, is expensive and funded in 
significant part by grants from external sources, which include 
federal agencies including the [NIH]; state agencies; 
pharmaceutical and other biomedical companies; and private 
donors including family foundations and individuals."  The 
process to secure Federal funding for biomedical research is 
also highly competitive.  At TUSM, like other medical schools, 
external funds are used to underwrite both the "direct" and 
"indirect" costs of the research effort, including some of the 
salary for the faculty members serving as principal 
investigators and others who work on the projects, as well as 
the lab space, equipment, and materials used in the research.  
This is, at least in part, because Tufts owns all of the lab 
space and all of the research equipment and materials obtained 
through grants, and bears the significant administrative and 
facilities costs associated with basic science research.  
It is also undisputed that the award of tenure does not 
imply a guarantee of specific lab space to a specific 
16 
 
individual.  That being said, if a faculty member's lab space is 
reduced, or closed entirely, the faculty member still may submit 
grants, and TUSM will provide access to alternative space and 
equipment as needed to support the faculty member's actual 
research needs.  All grant submissions by TUSM faculty include a 
commitment by TUSM that it will provide the appropriate 
resources to conduct the work.  Researchers who lack 
individually assigned space may also share space with 
colleagues, as some of the plaintiffs have done.  Finally, the 
vast majority of medical schools in the United States condition 
salary for basic science faculty, at least in part, on 
performance metrics, which include success in generating 
external research funding.                     
iii.  2009 salary plan.  In July 2009, Tufts adopted the 
Faculty Salary Modification Plan (2009 salary plan), which 
required full-time tenured basic sciences faculty to generate 
enough external funding to cover a significant portion of their 
base salary.  Specifically, Tufts measured the "[three]-year 
rolling average" of the fraction of their salary covered by 
external grants.  If that three-year average fell to fifteen 
percent or less, faculty members were subject to a review 
process in which they were evaluated on factors such as the 
number and quality of publications, the dollar amounts of 
extramural support, sources of extramural support, and ongoing 
17 
 
efforts to obtain additional extramural funds.  Depending on the 
outcome of the review, faculty could have their salary reduced 
to either seventy-five percent of their current salary or the 
base salary for their relevant rank (i.e., associate or full 
professor).  
Prior to 2009, tenured medical school professors who did 
not generate external funding to cover a significant percentage 
of their base salary were not required by any formal policy to 
have their salaries reduced.  Three of the plaintiffs, Pothos, 
Yee, and Malamy, were notified of or experienced salary 
reductions under the 2009 salary plan but did not challenge 
those salary reductions in court as a violation of their tenure 
rights.6    
iv.  Lab space guidelines.  In 2016, TUSM adopted the Tufts 
University School of Medicine Research Space Guidelines (lab 
space guidelines), which linked continued faculty access to lab 
space to maintaining a certain level of external research 
funding.  Specifically, faculty were expected to maintain an 
indirect cost recovery7 rate equivalent to the rate provided by 
 
6 Yee and Malamy sought review of their salary cuts from a 
committee established under the 2009 salary plan, however 
neither challenged the legal authority of Tufts to impose the 
cuts.  
 
7 "Indirect cost recovery" refers to reimbursement for costs 
that Tufts has already paid as part of conducting research, such 
 
18 
 
an NIH grant.  If faculty fell below this rate, they were at 
risk of lab space reductions or even closure of their lab space. 
v.  2017 and 2019 compensation plans.  In 2017, Tufts 
implemented the TUSM Compensation Plan for Tenured Basic Science 
Faculty (2017 compensation plan), which required that tenured 
faculty "obtain support for at least [fifty percent] of their 
salary through extramural funding, direct cost support, facility 
and administrative cost support and/or other sources to support 
an active laboratory."  Faculty who failed to cover the required 
fifty percent of their salary with external research funds could 
face reductions in their institutional base salary8 of up to ten 
percent per year and reductions in their FTE status by up to 
0.25 FTE annually, although such reductions could never go below 
a floor of 0.50 FTE.  
Several of the plaintiffs and other faculty (grievants) 
initiated a grievance challenging the 2017 compensation plan and 
the lab space guidelines.  The TUSM Faculty Grievance Committee 
Hearing Board (faculty hearing board) held a hearing over five 
 
as investment in laboratories, information technology, hazardous 
waste disposal, and compliance with various State and local 
regulations.  Direct costs are expenses such as salaries, 
equipment, and allocated lab space. 
 
8 Institutional base salary refers to the salary Tufts pays 
faculty before bonuses and other additional income is added.  It 
is set in reference to differing percentiles of the average 
salary paid to medical school faculty in the northeastern United 
States.   
19 
 
days in May and June 2018 and issued its findings and 
recommendations to Tufts's president, Anthony Monaco, in August 
2018. 
The faculty hearing board issued a detailed sixteen-page 
decision.  The decision began with fact finding related to the 
$6 million operating deficit of TUSM and concerns expressed by 
the school's accrediting body regarding that deficit.  The 
faculty hearing board also found that "[a]n important component 
of TUSM's deficit is the significant subsidy needed to support 
basic science research largely resulting from a decrease in 
sponsored research funding.  In [fiscal year 2017], TUSM 
Administration note[d] that $20 million was needed to support 
its basic science research infrastructure."  The faculty hearing 
board further found that "TUSM's ability to manage and 
efficiently utilize research space is crucial to its fiscal 
recovery."  The faculty hearing board then concluded regarding 
lab space:  "The Research Space Guidelines do not violate 
Grievants' rights as tenured faculty members, including their 
rights under the AFTR Policy and the Handbook Policy" as neither 
academic freedom nor economic security "guarantee Grievants a 
right to a certain amount of TUSM-funded research space -- or to 
any research space at all."  
The faculty hearing board concluded otherwise regarding 
compensation reductions:  
20 
 
"While TUSM may institute a compensation plan that 
conditions maintenance of certain salary levels and full-
time employment upon faculty satisfaction of extramural 
funding requirements and other factors without violating 
Grievants' rights as tenured faculty members, the 
Compensation Plan as currently written and operationalized 
is vague, confusing and can result in the setting of a 
compensation level which violates Grievants' rights under 
the AFTR Policy." 
 
The faculty hearing board further concluded:  
"The evidence at the formal hearing established that a 
majority of Grievants were performing well with respect to 
their teaching and service commitments to TUSM and a number 
in that group also have been working hard to increase their 
extramural funding even though their efforts have not been 
rewarded with grant success.  Where tenured faculty 
demonstrate proficiency in teaching and service and where 
their efforts to obtain extramural funding are satisfactory 
even though their results are not, the [faculty hearing 
board] finds that it would be a violation of their tenure 
rights for TUSM to reduce their institutional base salary 
level below the [American Association of Medical Colleges 
(AAMC)] [twenty-fifth] percentile[9] for a 1.0 FTE."  
 
It did, however, "accept the notion that there could be a basis 
for an FTE reduction to a tenured faculty member, so long as it 
does not go lower than 0.75." 
The faculty hearing board's decision was appealed to 
Monaco.  He likewise concluded that the lab space guidelines did 
not violate the grievants' tenure rights.  According to Monaco, 
the lab space reductions  
"do not violate the AFTR or the Basic Science policies in 
that they:  (1) are within TUSM's authority to implement; 
 
9 The AAMC twenty-fifth percentile refers to the twenty-
fifth percentile of salaries recorded in an AAMC survey of 
faculty salaries at private medical schools in the northeastern 
United States.  
21 
 
(2) do not compromise academic freedom; (3) provide lab 
space commensurate with need as extramural research funding 
ebbs and flows; and (4) do not violate the principles of 
economic security in the AFTR Policy because the Grievants 
are not entitled to a particular amount of space, or any 
space at all."  
   
Monaco also found that  
"just as the AFTR Policy does not provide any entitlement 
to laboratory space, it also does not provide any 
entitlement to a specific salary.  While tenure should 
afford a sufficient degree of economic security to men and 
women of ability, it does not guarantee Grievants a salary 
at the AAMC [twenty-fifth] percentile.  If TUSM were to 
adopt the [faculty hearing board's] view, all full 
professors would be entitled -- regardless of performance 
factors and contributions to the tripartite mission of the 
School -- to an annual salary in [fiscal year 2019] of 
$164,250."  
 
Monaco directed TUSM to revise the 2017 compensation plan 
to, among other things, (1) clarify that an FTE reduction would 
come with a corresponding reduction of work commitment and that 
"[a] faculty member's tenure would not automatically be at risk 
in these situations," (2) clarify the weight placed on peer 
reviewed extramural funding in evaluating performance, and (3) 
make clear that mere efforts to obtain grants were not 
sufficient under the 2017 compensation plan and that faculty 
were "expected to actually compete for and obtain peer reviewed 
extramural research support." 
TUSM revised the 2017 compensation plan in response to 
Monaco's directive and implemented a revised version in July 
2019 (2019 compensation plan).  The 2019 compensation plan 
22 
 
largely preserved the terms of the 2017 compensation plan, 
including the potential reduction in FTE status to fifty 
percent, but it clarified that all sources of peer-reviewed, 
extramural funding would be considered in evaluating faculty 
performance and that any FTE reduction would come with a 
corresponding reduction in work effort required of the faculty 
member.  Further, if a faculty member's FTE remained below 0.75 
for four consecutive years and the faculty member failed to meet 
other expectations of their employment with Tufts, the faculty 
member could be subject to review under Tufts's tenure 
revocation procedures. 
All of the plaintiffs' base salaries were reduced under the 
2017 and 2019 compensation plans as a result of their inability 
to obtain sufficient external research funding.  Wortis's salary 
was reduced from $190,176 in 2017 to $97,047 and his appointment 
reduced to 0.50 FTE.  Yee's salary was reduced from $139,387 to 
$77,220 and her appointment reduced to 0.60 FTE.  Theoharides's 
salary was reduced from $210,728 to $115,216 and his appointment 
reduced to 0.75 FTE.  Soto's salary was reduced from $214,569 to 
$149,943 and her appointment reduced to 0.85 FTE.  Pothos's 
salary was reduced from $114,000 to $71,165 and his appointment 
cut to 0.65 FTE.  Malamy's salary was reduced from $152,324 to 
$147,800, although his appointment was not reduced.  
Greenblatt's salary was reduced from $201,499 to $159,200, but 
23 
 
his appointment was not reduced.  Cochran's base salary was not 
reduced during the period at issue, but his appointment was 
reduced to 0.90 FTE.  Pursuant to the lab space guidelines, four 
of the plaintiffs have experienced or were informed that they 
will experience a reduction or closure of their assigned lab 
space.  Tufts has, however, made lab space available for all 
faculty who are submitting grants, including the plaintiffs.  
b.  Procedural history.  The plaintiffs commenced suit 
against Tufts in the Superior Court in December 2019, claiming 
breach of contract (count I), breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing (count II), declaratory judgment 
(count III), equitable estoppel (count IV), and violations of 
the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148 (count V).  The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment, and in February 2023, the 
court granted summary judgment to Tufts on all counts and issued 
a declaratory judgment that the compensation plans and lab space 
guidelines did not violate academic freedom or economic 
security.  The plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their request 
for direct appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  We review the grant of summary judgment in 
Tufts's favor de novo to "determine whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Galenski v. Erving, 
24 
 
471 Mass. 305, 307 (2015).  When both parties have moved for 
summary judgment, as they did here, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was 
entered.  Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 (2014). 
Tenure, and the benefits it confers, is defined by the 
contract between a university and a tenured professor.  See 
Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 680 (4th Cir. 1978).10   
As we do in all contracts, we strive "whenever reasonably 
practical" to give every word meaning when interpreting a 
contract (citation omitted).  DeWolfe v. Hingham Ctr., Ltd., 464 
Mass. 795, 806 (2013).  "In interpreting a university contract, 
we are also guided by two fundamental principles . . . .  First, 
we employ 'the standard of reasonable expectation -- what 
meaning the party making the manifestation, the university, 
should reasonably expect the other party to give it.[11]  Second, 
 
10 That contract may vary from university to university and 
between different schools within a university.  See Krotkoff, 
585 F.2d at 680 ("Parties to a contract may, of course define 
tenure differently in their agreement"); White, Academic Tenure:  
Its Historical and Legal Meanings in the United States and its 
Relationship to the Compensation of Medical School Faculty 
Members, 44 St. Louis U. L.J 51, 66 (2000) ("Individual 
institutions are free to depart from traditional notions of 
academic tenure . . ."). 
 
11 We note that "the rules governing tenure -- and of 
academic freedom intimately connected to it -- are not bargained 
with the applicant or incumbent at all.  These are policies 
adopted by the institution, customarily in consultation with a 
faculty governing body, not discrete bargained-for individual 
 
25 
 
we 'adhere to the principle that courts are chary about 
interfering with academic decisions made by private colleges and 
universities.'" (Quotations, citations and alterations omitted.)  
Berkowitz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 58 Mass. 
App. Ct. 262, 269 (2003), quoting Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 
Mass. 474, 478, 482 (2000).  In evaluating the standard of 
reasonable expectation, we also recognize that "[c]ontracts are 
written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of 
conduct and expectations founded upon them.  This is especially 
true of contracts in and among a community of scholars, which is 
what a university is."  Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 
F.2d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoting Greene v. Howard Univ., 
412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  
As in any contract, "[w]hen the words of a contract are 
clear, they must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense.  
Contract language is ambiguous only if it is susceptible of more 
than one meaning and reasonably intelligent persons would differ 
as to which meaning is the proper one."  (Quotation and 
citations omitted.)  Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund 
Ltd. v. PIMCO Income Strategy Fund, 466 Mass. 368, 374 
(2013).  Where a contract's terms are ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted.  Id.  This may include evidence of 
 
exchanges."  Finkin, Tenure in New York, 70 Buff. L. Rev. 1891, 
1900 (2022). 
26 
 
past practices, custom, and trade usage.  See Affiliated FM Ins. 
Co. v. Constitutional Reinsurance Corp., 416 Mass. 839, 845-846 
(1994).  See also Somerset Sav. Bank v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
420 Mass. 422, 428 (1995) ("pertinent custom and usage are, by 
implication, incorporated into a [contract] and are permissible 
to aid in [contract] interpretation, not as tending to 
contradict or vary a contract, but on the theory that usage 
forms part of the contract").  With these contract principles in 
mind, we turn to the tenure contracts at issue. 
a.  The employment contracts.  The first question we 
confront is what documents make up each plaintiff's contract 
with Tufts.  As other courts have concluded, tenure contracts 
are rarely distilled in a single document, and this case is no 
exception.  See McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 2018 WI 88, ¶ 4 
(finding that tenure contract was comprised of appointment 
letter and faculty statutes, faculty handbook, and other 
documents expressly incorporated by appointment letter).  Often, 
the contract comprises a collection of documents, such as an 
offer letter, a faculty handbook, and other rules or policies of 
the college.  See id.  See also Greene, 412 F.2d at 1135 ("The 
employment contracts of appellants here comprehend as essential 
parts of themselves the hiring policies and practices of the 
University as embodied in its employment regulations and 
customs").  In this case, the tenure letters, faculty handbook, 
27 
 
basic science policy and AFTR policy form the basis of the 
tenure contract.  
The next question is what those contract documents say, 
directly or indirectly, about the reduction in salary, FTE 
status, and lab space of tenured professors.  As explained 
above, the tenure appointment letters say little about the terms 
of the plaintiffs' tenure, apart from stating that they have 
been offered tenure-track positions or granted tenure, and say 
nothing about salary or FTE status reduction and lab space 
reassignment or reduction.  The issues are also not specifically 
or directly addressed in the faculty handbook, or at least the 
excerpts of the faculty handbook included in the record.  
The two most pertinent documents are the basic science 
policy and the AFTR policy.  Although they do not directly 
address the issues, they do contain relevant language that 
requires consideration.  Before this court, Tufts stresses the 
importance of the introductory language in the basic science 
policy that "[t]he personnel policies and practices for all 
faculty appointments derive from a variety of sources, including 
the Bylaws of the Faculty, policies adopted by the Trustees of 
the University, and policies adopted by the University and/or 
28 
 
the School of Medicine."12  Tufts then contends that this 
language therefore provides for the application and 
incorporation of the lab space guidelines and compensation plans 
into the tenure contracts.  Whether this language incorporates 
future policies, or at least future policies undermining express 
contractual rights and expectations, such as economic security, 
is far from clear.  Cf. O'Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 
422 Mass. 686, 694 (1996) (declining to "define the extent to 
which management may effectively reserve its right to change or 
withdraw a [personnel] manual," where manual contained no 
reservation of rights or disclaimer of obligations); Saxe v. 
Board of Trustees of Metro. State College of Denver, 179 P.3d 
67, 75 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) ("We need not resolve whether an 
employer may reserve the right to change any provision within an 
employment handbook without notice or consideration because even 
courts endorsing unilateral modification of an employment 
handbook have held that an employer may not abrogate an 
employee's vested benefits"); Drans v. Providence College, 119 
R.I. 845, 857 (1978) (rejecting interpretation that all of 
university's rules, regulations, and so forth may be impliedly 
 
12 Two of the plaintiffs' (Malamy's and Wortis's) tenure 
letters contained a similar statement that their appointments 
were "subject to the provisions of the applicable bylaws and 
University policies." 
29 
 
incorporated into faculty employment contracts).   At best this 
language is ambiguous. 
Tufts also relies on the criteria for granting tenure, 
which requires significant scholarship, including that a 
"successful candidate should show a sustained level of 
substantial contributions, and have the potential for long-
range, continuous productivity in an area of biological 
importance."  Nothing in the policy, however, states that once 
tenure is granted, the same standards apply to retaining tenured 
status and the rights and benefits it entails. 
In sum, although there is some relevant language in the 
basic science policy, it is at best ambiguous in regard to the 
questions we must decide regarding the reduction in salaries, 
FTE status, and lab space. 
We turn next to the AFTR policy.  The plaintiffs, in 
contrast to Tufts, rely heavily on the AFTR policy.  That 
policy, however, does not specifically address reductions in 
salary, FTE status, or lab space.  While the AFTR policy 
provides strict procedures governing when and how a faculty 
member with tenure may be terminated, it does not clarify 
whether these same or different protections extend to salary or 
lab space reductions.  The plaintiffs rely for the most part on 
the economic security, academic freedom, and "permanent or 
30 
 
continuous" tenure protections provided for tenured faculty, 
which we analyze in detail infra. 
b.  Economic security as applied to salary reductions and 
FTE status.  i.  Whether economic security is a prefatory term.  
As a threshold matter, we conclude that economic security is an 
important substantive provision of the tenure contract and not a 
prefatory or hortatory term. 
First and foremost, the term "economic security" is 
expressly included in the tenure documents.  Thus, reading it as 
prefatory or hortatory ignores the cardinal rule of contract 
interpretation that whenever "reasonably practicable," we strive 
to give effect to every word in a contract.  Hagerty v. Myers, 
333 Mass. 387, 388-389 (1955) (rejecting interpretation of 
contract that required giving "no weight whatsoever" to several 
phrases and "treating their use as utterly pointless").  Indeed, 
economic security is central to the tenure contract's definition 
of tenure as set forth in the AFTR policy.  Tenure is described 
as a means to an ends, with the ends being specifically defined 
as economic security and academic freedom.  
Other provisions in the AFTR policy further support the 
substantive purpose and meaning of economic security.  The AFTR 
policy also states that tenure is "permanent or continuous" once 
granted.  Permanent or continuous tenure would seem to be a 
hollow promise if it came without any salary commitment or 
31 
 
strong protections against outright termination.  A tenured 
professor, according to the tenure documents, cannot be 
terminated without cause or financial exigency.  If their 
salaries could be reduced at will, this contractual protection 
would be of very limited value.  Cf. American Ass'n of Univ. 
Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 266 (Ch. 
Div. 1974), aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 442 (App. Div. 1975) ("The 
interests involved, after all, are fundamentally incompatible.  
Each encroaches upon the other.  The expansion of one implies a 
constriction of the other"). 
Reading economic security as hortatory also ignores the 
admonishment to read any ambiguities in the terms of tenure 
contracts "by reference to the norms of conduct and expectations 
founded upon them," which in this case are the norms and 
expectations of the academic community.  Browzin, 527 F.2d at 
848.  The language at issue comes verbatim from the 1940 
statement, which courts have looked to, alongside other evidence 
of custom and norms in the academic community, as an appropriate 
guide for interpreting tenure contracts.  See id. at 847 n.8 
(finding AAUP's statements on tenure and academic freedom 
appropriate guides in interpreting tenure contracts because they 
"represent widely shared norms within the academic community").  
See also Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 368 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(citing 1940 statement and other AAUP statements to fill in 
32 
 
implied terms in professor's employment contract); Krotkoff, 585 
F.2d at 678 (looking to 1940 statement, case law, and general 
purpose of tenure to find implied financial exigency exception 
in tenure contract). 
To read economic security as merely hortatory would be to 
undermine an essential attribute of tenure, and why it is 
treasured in the academic world.  There is a reason champagne 
corks pop when tenure is awarded, and economic security is one 
of those obvious reasons.  Cf. Saxe, 179 P.3d at 76 (after 
reviewing evidence of "practices, customs, usages, and norms of 
tenure," court concluded that "[i]f tenured faculty would lose 
their priority or right to relocation in the event of layoff 
decisions, they would effectively be relegated to the status of 
nontenured faculty. . . .  These rights lie at the heart of the 
concept of tenure because tenure provides job security and 
thereby encourages academic freedom").  
In concluding that the term is merely hortatory, the 
Superior Court relied on a New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, decision, Monaco v. New York Univ., 204 A.D.3d 51 
(N.Y. 2022), which we do not find persuasive.  See generally 
Finkin, Tenure in New York, 70 Buff. L. Rev. 1891 (2022) 
(providing detailed critique of Monaco).  Monaco is also 
distinguishable as the court relied on the fact that the 
reference to economic security appeared in a separate section of 
33 
 
the New York University faculty handbook, titled "Case for 
Academic Tenure," which did not discuss how to obtain tenure and 
did not meaningfully discuss compensation.  Monaco, supra at 60.  
The tenure process was set out in a separate section.  Id.  
Here, the term economic security is introduced in § I of the 
AFTR policy, which does not merely discuss why tenure is 
important but defines its meaning.  
ii.  Ambiguity of the term "economic security" and past 
practices at Tufts.  While the term "economic security" is not 
prefatory or hortatory, we do conclude that it is ambiguous, as 
it is "susceptible of more than one meaning and reasonably 
intelligent persons would differ as to which meaning is the 
proper one" (citation omitted).  Brigade Leveraged Capital 
Structures Fund Ltd., 466 Mass. at 374.  Most importantly, the 
AFTR policy does not define economic security beyond the 
requirement that it be sufficient to attract "men and women of 
ability."  These words alone, we conclude, are not clear enough 
to provide guidance on what types of salary reductions, if any, 
are permissible for tenured professors. 
The other undisputed facts in the record also do not 
resolve this ambiguity or answer this question.  Until 2009, no 
policies were in place allowing for the reduction of salaries of 
tenured professors due to their failure to meet expectations 
regarding outside funding, thereby suggesting, in the light most 
34 
 
favorable to the plaintiffs, that tenured professors would not 
reasonably understand that their salaries could be reduced for 
this reason.  We also have no evidence in the record 
establishing whether the salaries of tenured professors had been 
reduced for this reason prior to 2009.  
Conversely, in 2009, when some of the plaintiffs' salaries 
were reduced, the plaintiffs did not challenge this reduction in 
court as a violation of their tenure rights, thereby suggesting 
the opposite, at least in regard to a reduction of up to twenty-
five percent.  When the policy changed in 2017, allowing greater 
reductions, the plaintiffs did challenge the 2017 compensation 
policy and the faculty hearing committee agreed that the 2017 
compensation policy violated the economic security provisions, 
although it also found that a reduction in FTE status to 
seventy-five percent was permissible.  All of this suggests that 
economic security is a substantive requirement but that further 
evidence regarding the correct application of the economic 
security provision, including the practices and customs at TUSM 
and other similarly situated institutions regarding reductions 
in salary and FTE status of tenured professors, is required to 
define what types of reductions are consistent with, and not in 
violation of, the economic security protected by the tenure 
contract at issue. 
35 
 
In sum, based on the record before us, there is a genuine 
issue of material fact whether the significant reductions in 
salary and full-time status at issue here violate the reasonable 
expectations of tenured medical school professors associated 
with economic security and other provisions in their tenure 
contracts.  
We also cannot answer the question regarding reductions in 
salary and FTE status and economic security based on the case 
law.  There is very limited case law and commentary on the 
meaning of economic security in this context.  See White, 
Academic Tenure:  Its Historical and Legal Meaning in the United 
States and its Relationship to the Compensation of Medical 
School Faculty Members, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 51, 73 & n.90 
(2000).  In Kirschenbaum v. Northwestern Univ., 312 Ill. App. 3d 
1017, 1019 (2000), a case relied on by Tufts, the professor's 
appointment letter made clear that his faculty position was a 
tenure track position with "zero-base salary," which meant he 
would not receive any salary from the university but might 
receive other sources of reimbursement.  There is no such 
language in the tenure documents of any of the plaintiffs in the 
instant case.  In Berry v. Battey, 666 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 
1981), also cited by Tufts, the court interpreted the 1940 
statement, as adopted by the university employing the plaintiff, 
to not protect the plaintiff from the denial of pay raises.  
36 
 
Again, the issue here is significant salary and FTE cuts, not 
pay raises.  Moreover, the case concerned alleged violations of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, not 
breach of contract.  Id. at 1184. 
Thus, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude 
whether the economic security protection provided by the tenure 
contract was violated by the reductions in salary and FTE status 
here.  We therefore reverse the summary judgment decision in 
favor of Tufts on this count. 
c.  Economic security and academic freedom as applied to 
lab space guidelines.  We turn next to the question whether the 
tenure commitments made by Tufts precluded it from reductions, 
reassignment, and closure of lab space previously assigned to 
the plaintiffs.   
There is nothing in the tenure commitment letters 
guaranteeing the plaintiffs particular lab space.  The same is 
true for the faculty handbook, the basic science policy, and the 
AFTR policy.  Indeed, it is undisputed that the award of tenure 
does not imply a guarantee of specific lab space to a specific 
individual.  The plaintiffs appear, nonetheless, to suggest that 
a combination of economic security and academic freedom provide 
protection for their existing research preferences and, 
therefore, the lab space they have previously been provided to 
perform such research.  We discern no basis for concluding that 
37 
 
the plaintiffs' economic security is violated by Tufts's 
reallocation of lab space.  In terms of economic security, a 
reduction in salary or FTE status is different, in kind and not 
degree, from a reallocation of lab space.  While we conclude 
that academic freedom protects their right to pursue the 
research they choose to do, it does not provide them with a 
contractual commitment to particular university-owned lab space 
or even its equivalent.  
As the undisputed facts establish, university-owned lab 
space is limited and expensive.  Grants are necessary to support 
the expense, and securing such grants is a highly competitive 
process.  Medical schools, including TUSM, are also under 
significant financial pressures.  See generally White, 44 St. 
Louis U. L.J. at 51 ("For the last ten years, America's medical 
schools have endured an economic earthquake of almost 
unimaginable proportions").  As noted by the faculty hearing 
committee, given that TUSM bears the economic costs of providing 
and maintaining lab space, it follows that TUSM should be able 
to set threshold economic requirements for those seeking to use 
lab space for which it has already paid.  Providing such lab 
space to those who have grants to support the use of the space, 
rather than those who require Tufts to incur such costs, appears 
to be well within the authority of Tufts to control its affairs.  
As this court has explained, we must be "chary about interfering 
38 
 
with academic decisions made by private colleges and 
universities" (citation and alteration omitted).  Berkowitz, 58 
Mass. App. Ct. at 269.  
In their briefs, the plaintiffs largely conflate the lab 
space guidelines with the compensation policies.  Unlike a 
salary reduction or a reduction in FTE status, however, a 
reassignment or reduction in lab space does not directly 
threaten the economic security of a tenured professor.  Thus, 
even if economic security places limits on the ability of Tufts 
to reduce the plaintiffs' salary or FTE status, it does not 
preclude Tufts from allocating limited and expensive lab space 
based on a faculty member's ability to recover the costs 
incurred in building and operating lab infrastructure.   
Based on the undisputed facts in the record, Tufts has also 
not deprived the plaintiffs of access to lab space.  It 
continues to make other lab space available, and all grant 
submissions by the plaintiffs and other TUSM faculty include a 
commitment by TUSM that it will provide the appropriate 
resources to conduct the research.  Thus, faculty members are 
not deprived of the ability to secure grants, and the additional 
economic security they may provide.  Given these undisputed 
facts, we cannot conclude that the lab space reallocations and 
reductions at issue here violated the commitment to the 
plaintiffs of economic security. 
39 
 
Similarly, academic freedom, as defined by the tenure 
documents, does not prevent Tufts from reducing or transferring 
the lab space of faculty who fail to obtain grants.  According 
to the tenure contract, the three components of academic freedom 
are (1) full freedom in research and in the publication of 
results, subject to adequate performance of other academic 
duties; (2) full freedom in the classroom; and (3) the ability 
to speak or write as citizens, free from institutional 
censorship or discipline.  The latter two are clearly not 
implicated.  See, e.g., McAdams, 2018 WI 88, ¶¶ 62-64 
(discussing third component).  The first, "full freedom in 
research and in the publication of results," does not, without 
more specific commitments in the tenure documents, guarantee 
that Tufts will provide, without reimbursement, particular lab 
space or its equivalent to tenured professors in the absence of 
grants to support payment for such space.  
The case law uniformly supports such a conclusion, as 
courts have rejected the notion that reducing or relocating a 
faculty member's lab space violated academic freedom.  See, 
e.g., Tavoloni v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 26 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 198 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1999); Gertler v. 
Goodgold, 107 A.D.2d 481, 484-485 (N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 
946 (1985).  These cases affirm the principle that "[w]hile 
tenure is a concept of some elasticity and, no doubt, the source 
40 
 
of many rights, it cannot be the wellspring of every conceivable 
academic amenity and privilege."  See Gertler, supra.  See also 
Metzger, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 41-43 (discussing 
limitations of policy protections in regard to "financial 
exigencies").  
Further, the AFTR policy guarantees that nontenured faculty 
during their probationary period will enjoy the same academic 
freedom that all other faculty enjoy.  Taking the plaintiffs' 
arguments to their logical conclusion would seem to require that 
TUSM also guarantee scarce lab space for nontenured faculty. 
d.  Breach of the covenant of good faith.  "Every contract 
implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it.  
However, the covenant does not create new rights and duties not 
already provided for in the contract."  (Quotation and citation 
omitted.)  Columbia Plaza Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 493 
Mass. 570, 586 (2024).  "The scope of the covenant is only as 
broad as the contract that governs the particular relationship."  
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 385, cert. 
denied sub nom. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 546 U.S. 927 
(2005). 
Because the Superior Court erred in granting summary 
judgment to Tufts on the breach of contract claim regarding the 
compensation policies, we also reverse the judgment in favor of 
Tufts on the breach of the implied covenant claim as it relates 
41 
 
to the plaintiffs' compensation policies claims, as further fact 
finding in this regard is required.  Because we discern no basis 
whatsoever for the lab space guidelines claims, we do, however, 
affirm summary judgment on the implied covenant claim as it 
relates to the plaintiffs' lab space guidelines claims as well. 
e.  Equitable estoppel.  The plaintiffs argue that they 
reasonably relied to their detriment on Tufts's representations 
that they would receive guarantees of tenure, including academic 
freedom and economic security.  We conclude that the Superior 
Court correctly granted Tufts summary judgment on the equitable 
estoppel claim.   
In their appellate briefs, the plaintiffs cite no case law 
in support of their equitable estoppel arguments.  They merely 
assert that the Superior Court erroneously dismissed their 
equitable estoppel claim.  This does not rise to the level of 
appellate argument.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as 
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).  See also Halstrom v. Dube, 
481 Mass. 480, 483 n.8 (2019) (declining to consider argument 
made "in a cursory fashion without citation to supporting legal 
authority").  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's grant 
of summary judgment to Tufts on the equitable estoppel claim.13 
 
13 We also note that neither party disputes the validity of 
the tenure contracts at issue and the plaintiffs do not identify 
any promises made outside of the contracts that would support a 
 
42 
 
f.  Declaratory judgment.  Declaratory relief is "properly 
brought" where the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) an actual 
controversy exists, (2) the plaintiff has legal standing to sue, 
and (3) all necessary parties have been joined.  Buffalo-Water 
1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 18 (2018).  A 
declaratory judgment is premature where a material dispute of 
fact remains as to the rights of the parties.  Cf. Regis College 
v. Weston, 462 Mass. 280, 294 (2012) (vacating declaratory 
judgment in favor of defendants after finding dispute of 
material fact remained).  
Because a dispute of material fact exists as to whether the 
compensation policies violate the plaintiffs' contractual rights 
of academic freedom and economic security, we reverse the 
Superior Court's judgment declaring that there was no such 
violation.  Such a judgment was premature because the tenure 
rights of the plaintiffs remain uncertain.  However, because we 
affirm the grant of summary judgment to Tufts on the lab space 
claims, we affirm the portion of the judgment declaring that the 
 
promissory estoppel claim.  See Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. 
Hauserman Co., 376 Mass. 757, 763 (1978) ("Once consideration 
and bargain are found, there is no need to apply [the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel]"); Malden Police Patrolman's Ass'n v. 
Malden, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 61 (2017) ("Where an enforceable 
contract exists, . . . a claim for promissory estoppel will not 
lie").    
43 
 
lab space guidelines do not violate the plaintiffs' tenure 
rights.14 
g.  Wage Act claims.  Given that the plaintiffs' 
entitlement to lost compensation has not been resolved, we do 
not address the plaintiffs' claims under the Wage Act, G. L. 
c. 149, § 148.  If a fact finder concludes that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to such compensation, there will be no lost 
wages and therefore no Wage Act claim.  As resolution of this 
issue may be unnecessary, we do not decide it here. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the judgment 
of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded, as 
to the plaintiffs' claims regarding the compensation policies in 
counts I, II, III, and IV, and the Wage Act claim in count V.  
We affirm the Superior Court's judgment as to the plaintiffs' 
lab space guidelines claims in counts I, II, and III.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.  
 
14 Tufts argues that not all necessary parties have been 
joined where the plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment 
does not include nonparty TUSM faculty members.  Based on our 
decision today, we need not resolve this issue.  We note, 
however, that G. L. c. 231A, § 8, "does not require the joinder 
of persons who would be affected by a decision only as a 
precedent on an issue of law."  Attorney Gen. v. Kenco Optics, 
Inc., 369 Mass. 412, 415 (1976).