Title: Dunning v. Boyes
Citation: 351 So. 2d 883
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 1977

351 So. 2d 883 (1977)
W. D. DUNNING et al.
v.
Earl BOYES.
SC 2417.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 30, 1977.
Rehearing Denied November 18, 1977.
Otto E. Simon, Mobile, Mozart G. Ratner, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Bert S. Nettles, Mobile, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is an interlocutory appeal involving controlling questions of law as to which the parties substantially disagree. Those questions are:
1. Are defamatory communications made in the course of, and relevant to, a federal grievance proceeding absolutely privileged?
2. Is referring to a person as "a known Bigot" actionable?
The trial court, by refusing to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss a libel action, in effect, held that Alabama should recognize only a qualified privilege to communications made in the course of a labor grievance proceeding, and that whether the reference to the plaintiff as "a known Bigot" was libelous, was a question for a jury. We affirm.
*884 The defendants claim that the federal preemption doctrine has special application to grievance proceedings conducted pursuant to collective bargaining contracts governed by federal law, "for those proceedings serve Congress' purpose of promoting industrial peace." Pertinent statements by either party in the presentation or resolution of a grievance, they say, are privileged, and they claim that to subject the parties to the risk of state tort liability for such statements "would cabin their freedom to present their positions with reference to the grievance in a manner they consider most effective."
The libel action arose out of a letter, Appendix A, written in connection with a grievance proceeding. The letter states, among other things, that the Union, after investigation, "finds no justifiable cause" for denial of a step increase to one Kyser. It attributes denial of Kyser's step increase to "Racial Overtones," and asserts:
"He [Kyser] had no trouble until Earl Boyes, a known Bigot, arrived at the Station."
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, as follows:
We hold that defamatory communications made in the course of, and relevant to, a federal grievance proceeding are not absolutely privileged. Therefore, we refuse to follow the rule of absolute privilege suggested in General Motors Corp. v. Mendicki, 367 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1966). We follow instead what we consider is a better rule, that of a qualified privilege, as set out in Bird v. Meadow Gold Products, Inc., 60 Misc.2d 212, 302 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1969). We believe that the rule we announce follows what the Supreme Court of the United States has established as a general rule that a party to a labor dispute may recover for defamatory statements made during the course of the dispute if he can establish that the statement was made maliciously, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S. Ct. 657, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1966). There, Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, opined:
As stated by the Supreme Court in Linn, the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth.
*885 "Malicious libel enjoys no constitutional protection in any context," the Court said in Linn. "After all, the labor movement has grown up and must assume ordinary responsibility," the Court added.
The defendants say that even assuming that the communication is not privileged, it is not actionable, because the defamatory characterization "known Bigot" is not a statement of fact, but a "pejorative opinion: `rhetorical hyperbole,' like calling one's adversary a `scab,' or a `blackmailer,' or a `Fascist,' or `unfair.'" The defendants contend:
We disagree with the defendants' argument. Like the Supreme Court of the United States, we are aware that "robust language" is sometimes used in labor disputes, but it is for a jury to say whether there was an abuse of the qualified privilege under all the facts and circumstances of the case. It would be inappropriate to determine this question on a motion to dismiss unless it were shown that the plaintiff could not recover under any set of circumstances, or that no issue of a material fact remained in the case, if the motion to dismiss were treated as a motion for summary judgment. Whether the qualified privilege was abused by the defendants is a jury question.
The plaintiff may be able to prove that the characterization of him was a deliberate or reckless untruth. The jury could infer that the characterization meant that Boyes discriminated against Kyser because of Kyser's race. If the charge were true, it could have meant that Boyes was guilty of violating Federal laws and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (1974), and Postal Service, 39 C.F.R. § 447.25 (1976).
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.