Title: Deal v. Commissioner of Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12246
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12246 
 
TIMOTHY DEAL & another1  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 3, 2017. - November 9, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.2 
 
 
Commissioner of Correction.  Due Process of Law, Prison 
classification proceedings.  Imprisonment, Reclassification 
of prisoner.  Youthful Offender Act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 26, 2016. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Barbara Kaban for the petitioner. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Dulcineia Goncalves, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
also present) for the intervener. 
 
Charles W. Anderson, Jr., for the respondent. 
 
James R. Pingeon, for Prisoners' Legal Services of 
Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The Department of Correction (department) has 
1 Jeffrey Roberio, intervener. 
 
 
2 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
                     
 
2 
adopted procedures to determine, on a periodic basis, the 
security classification of every inmate, including juvenile 
homicide offenders.3  Approximately one year ago we examined the 
department's then procedure used to classify juvenile homicide 
offenders, and concluded that, as pertaining to that cohort, the 
procedure violated G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, 
c. 189, § 2, which prohibits the department from categorically 
barring juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in minimum 
security facilities.  See Deal v. Commissioner of Correction, 
475 Mass. 307, 312 (2016) (Deal I).  The department has since 
developed a modified process for classifying juvenile homicide 
offenders, which the petitioner and intervener in this case 
(collectively, petitioners) -- juvenile homicide offenders who 
also were petitioners in Deal I -- continue to challenge. 
 
Applying our holding in Deal I to these updated procedures, 
we conclude that the department still falls short of the 
requirements of § 72B.  Given that the department continues to 
block the majority of objectively qualifying juvenile homicide 
offenders from placement in a minimum security facility, its 
written explanations for doing so do not go far enough to ensure 
3 In this opinion, the term "juvenile homicide offender" 
refers to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first 
or second degree and was under the age of eighteen at the time 
that he or she committed the crime.  See Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 32 (2015) 
(Diatchenko I), citing Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62 
(2015). 
                     
 
3 
that the classification procedure is actually individualized and 
that no juvenile homicide offender is categorically barred from 
classification to a minimum security facility.  We also conclude 
that the department must make a recording of the initial 
classification hearing and make that recording (or a 
transcription of that recording) available at any subsequent 
stage of review so that the final classification decision may 
include the same level of individual evaluation.  We reject, 
however, the petitioners' claim that § 72B requires broader 
procedural protections in the form of a right to the presence of 
counsel at classification hearings and seven days' notice of 
such hearings, rather than the forty-eight hours they currently 
receive.4  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(c) (2007). 
 
Background.  In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 
(2012), the United States Supreme Court held that "mandatory 
life without parole for those under the age of [eighteen] at the 
time of their crimes violates the . . . prohibition on 'cruel 
and unusual punishments [under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution].'"  One and one-half years later, 
in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 
Mass. 655, 674 (2013) (Diatchenko I), we went a step further 
under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief of Prisoners' Legal 
Services of Massachusetts. 
                     
 
4 
held that it was unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of 
murder in the first degree to be sentenced to life without 
parole and that they must be given a "meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release [on parole] based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation." 
 
After our opinion in Diatchenko I, the Legislature in 2014 
amended G. L. c. 119, § 72B, by adding the following language: 
"The department of correction shall not limit access to 
programming and treatment including, but not limited to, 
education, substance abuse, anger management and vocational 
training for youthful offenders, as defined in [§] 52, 
solely because of their crimes or the duration of their 
incarcerations.  If the youthful offender qualifies for 
placement in a minimum security correctional facility based 
on objective measures determined by the department, the 
placement shall not be categorically barred based on a life 
sentence." 
 
St. 2014 c. 189, § 2. 
 
 
The last sentence of the amendment concerns the annual 
classification process in which the department classifies every 
inmate, including juvenile homicide offenders, as high, medium, 
or low security risks, to be placed in (or transferred to) a 
corresponding maximum, medium, or minimum security facility.  
The classification process seeks to "objectively assess the 
inmate's custody requirements and programmatic needs and match 
those to the appropriate security level in a manner that 
minimizes the potential for escape, prison violence and inmate 
misconduct," by, inter alia, "[r]ationally using a reliable, 
 
5 
validated set of variables to support classification decisions."  
103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.07(a) (2007). 
 
According to the department's Male Objective Point Base 
Classification Manual (eff. Jan. 27, 2014) (manual), the 
variables are: 
1.  severity of current offense (possible score 1-6); 
 
2.  severity of convictions within the last four years 
(possible score 0-6); 
 
3.  history of escapes or attempts to escape (possible 
score 0-7); 
 
4.  history of prior institutional violence within the last 
four years (possible score 0-5); 
 
5.  number of guilty disciplinary reports within the last 
twelve months (possible score 0-4); 
 
6.  most severe guilty disciplinary report within the last 
eighteen months (possible score 0-7); 
 
7.  age (possible scores -2, 0, 1); and 
 
8.  program participation or work assignment (possible 
scores -2, -1, 0). 
 
A correctional program officer (CPO) computes the total score 
and compares it to a set of cut-off values to determine the 
prisoner's preliminary custody level.  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 420.08(2) (2007).  Twelve or more points qualify a prisoner 
for maximum security; seven to eleven points qualify the 
prisoner for medium security; and six or fewer points qualify 
the prisoner for minimum security.  Deal I, 475 Mass. at 309-
310. 
 
6 
 
Before the amendment to § 72B, regardless of their 
objective classification score, juvenile homicide offenders were 
ineligible for placement in minimum security prison facilities 
because of certain "non–discretionary minimum custody 
restriction codes" that the department had adopted.5  Deal I, 475 
Mass. at 312.  After the amendment to § 72B, although the 
department discontinued its use of nondiscretionary overrides in 
relation to the cohort of juvenile homicide offenders, it began 
applying what it defines as "discretionary override codes."  Id. 
at 313-316.  Juvenile homicide offenders with objective 
classification scores that qualified them for transfer to 
minimum security facilities would nonetheless invariably be 
denied that transfer via the application of discretionary 
override codes unless and until they received a positive parole 
vote by the parole board.  Id. at 315-316. 
In 2015, the petitioners in this case, along with a third 
inmate, Siegfried Golston,6 each of whom had received an 
objective classification score qualifying him for placement in a 
 
5 Before the amendment to G. L. c. 119, § 72B, in 2014, the 
department employed code E, which barred all those offenders 
convicted of murder in the first degree from being considered 
for minimum security; and code F, which barred, among others, 
those offenders who were incarcerated for a crime involving a 
loss of life from a minimum security classification unless a 
positive parole decision had been granted or they were within 
two years of their release date.  See Deal v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 475 Mass. 307, 312-313 (2016). 
 
 
6 Siegfried Golston is not a party in this case. 
                     
 
7 
minimum security facility but had been denied such placement due 
to the application of discretionary codes, brought a petition in 
the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and G. L. 
c. 231A.  Deal I, 475 Mass. at 313-315.  The matter was reserved 
and reported to the full court by a single justice.  Id. at 316. 
As relevant to the present case, the petitioners in Deal I 
argued that the department's practice of using certain 
discretionary override codes to effectively preclude a juvenile 
homicide offender from being eligible for minimum security 
placement was a violation of § 72B, amounting to the same 
categorical bar to such a placement that the Legislature had 
sought to eliminate by amending that statute.  Id. at 316.  We 
agreed, holding that § 72B required the department to consider a 
juvenile homicide offender's suitability for minimum security on 
a case-by-case, rather than a categorical, basis.  Id. at 319-
320.  Accordingly, and as required by the department's manual, 
we ordered the department to "memorialize its rationale [for the 
classification decision] . . . in writing."  Id. at 320. 
 
Following our decision in Deal I, the department adopted a 
modified process for classifying juvenile homicide offenders who 
objectively qualified for, but were nonetheless denied, minimum 
security placement, including the petitioners.  The whole 
process can be summarized as follows.  A CPO calculates a point-
based score pursuant to the department's objective 
 
8 
classification instrument, reviews both nondiscretionary and 
discretionary override codes to determine if any apply, and 
holds an interview with the inmate to discuss classification 
status.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(2).  Where the objective 
classification score would permit a classification to a minimum 
security placement, the CPO's report is then provided to a 
three-person departmental review board (DRB), which consists of 
the department's deputy director of classification (serving as 
chair), a correctional officer having classification expertise, 
and a correctional officer from the inmate's correctional 
facility.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(e) (2007).  The 
juvenile homicide offender is present for, and participates in, 
the DRB hearing, which includes a discussion of his or her 
crime, his or her institutional behavior, and factors that 
contributed to each.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(d), (e) 
(2007).  After the hearing, the DRB votes on whether any 
discretionary override codes should prevent the inmate's 
transfer and provides a written decision recommending a 
classification level that includes an explanation of the 
recommended application of any override codes.  103 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 420.08(3)(f) (2007).  The DRB's recommendation is 
provided to the inmate as well as to the Commissioner of 
Correction (commissioner) or the commissioner's designee.  Id.  
The inmate may submit an appeal from an adverse DRB 
 
9 
recommendation to the commissioner or his designee -- in the 
case of both petitioners, the director of the department's 
classification division (director) -- who makes the final 
classification determination.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 
420.08(3)(h), (i) (2007). 
1.  Timothy Deal.  Deal was convicted of murder in the 
second degree for an offense committed in 2002, when he was 
seventeen.  Deal I, 475 Mass. at 313.  Currently incarcerated in 
a medium security facility, id. at 314, Deal was brought before 
the DRB in the fall of 2016 for reclassification.  The hearing, 
which was not recorded, lasted for approximately one hour, 
during which time Deal testified before the DRB, and the board 
explored with him his offense and disciplinary history. 
 
Despite an objective classification score of four, which 
qualified him for placement in a minimum security facility, the 
DRB voted unanimously to recommend that discretionary override 
codes R, T, and U should block his transfer to such a facility.  
According to the manual, discretionary code R allows an override 
where "[t]he facts or notoriety of the offense presents a 
seriousness that cannot be captured in the score."  
Discretionary code T allows an override where "[t]he [inmate's] 
institutional adjustment presents a seriousness that cannot be 
captured in the score."  Discretionary code U allows an override 
where an "inmate['s] behavior, while not always negative enough 
 
10 
to warrant disciplinary action, may serve to threaten security 
or undermine the exercise of proper control and maintenance of 
order within the institution." 
 
The DRB wrote that its recommendation was based on the 
"serious, violent, and retaliatory nature of [Deal's] offense," 
and his "receipt of significant disciplinary reports" during his 
incarceration.  Further, "[d]espite the absence of discipline 
for several years and a vast amount of program participation," 
the DRB found that Deal's presentation "minimized the 
significance of this noncompliant behavior . . . [and] 
present[ed] a series of excuses that involved others being at 
fault for his actions as well as outright denial of his 
actions." 
 
Deal appealed from the DRB's recommendation, asserting that 
the board mischaracterized the tenor of his presentation at the 
hearing and that, overall, its conclusions lacked reasonable 
support based on his institutional record.  The director, 
considering both the DRB's recommended decision and Deal's 
appeal, denied the appeal, deciding that discretionary override 
codes R and U applied in Deal's case.  In her written 
explanation, the director specifically cited the DRB's 
description of Deal's "minimizing" and failure to take 
responsibility for his crime, "coupled with [his] presentation 
to the [DRB]," and his persistent "criminal thinking." 
 
11 
 
About one month after receiving notice that the department 
was denying his transfer to minimum security prison, Deal 
appeared before the parole board for his scheduled initial 
parole hearing.  Board member Dr. Charlene Bonner questioned 
Deal about the DRB's written assessment of his hearing 
performance.7 
 
2.  Jeffrey Roberio.  Roberio was convicted of murder in 
the first degree for an offense committed in 1987, when he was 
seventeen.  Deal I, 475 Mass. at 314.  Roberio was denied parole 
in 2015 and is currently housed in a medium security 
facility.  Id. at 314-315. 
 
Roberio states in an affidavit that during his most recent 
classification hearing he was asked "why [he] did it, what led 
up to it, [and] did [he] take responsibility for it."  He was 
also asked why he "refused" to participate in a particular 
rehabilitative program.  Roberio responded that he did not 
refuse to participate; to the contrary, he said, he had asked to 
enroll but was told that he could not do so due to prison 
logistics. 
 
7 For instance, Deal was asked by parole board member Dr. 
Charlene Bonner, "Why do you think [the departmental review 
board (DRB) is] portraying you as someone . . . who minimizes?"  
Deal responded that he "really [did not] know how to answer 
that" and suggested that there must have been a 
"misunderstanding."  As of the time of briefing in this case, 
the parole board had not yet reached a decision on Deal's parole 
petition. 
                     
 
12 
 
Despite an objective classification score of three, 
qualifying him for minimum security, the DRB voted to deny 
Roberio's transfer to minimum security, citing override codes R 
and U in its recommendation.  The DRB explained that its 
decision was warranted in part by Roberio's extensive 
disciplinary history and the brutal nature of his crime, coupled 
with his lack of participation in substance abuse programming. 
 
Roberio appealed from the DRB's recommendation to the 
director, arguing, inter alia, that the board ignored the 
circumstances of his inability to participate in the particular 
program at issue, and had further ignored the volume of other 
rehabilitative programming that he completed.8  In her final 
classification decision, the director followed the DRB's 
recommendation, rejected Roberio's appeal, and invoked override 
codes R and U to prevent a transfer to a minimum security 
facility, citing, among other things, Roberio's failure to 
participate in sufficient programming to address his alcoholism.  
The director did not address Roberio's arguments that he "tried 
explaining" to the DRB that he had been told he was ineligible 
 
8 Roberio argued, "[S]ince my parole hearing . . . , I have 
completed an [eight-week] criminal addictive thinking program, 
an [eight-week] violence reduction program, a [six-week] mental 
flexibility program, and a nonviolent conflict resolution 
program; plus, I continue to be an active charter member of 
Toastmasters and a facilitator of [Alcoholics 
Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous].  The [DRB's] recommendation 
doesn't mention any of this programming even though I told them 
about it . . . ." 
                     
 
13 
for substance abuse programming, and instead approved the DRB's 
recommendation for a lateral transfer.  Roberio's next hearing 
before the parole board is scheduled for the year 2020.  Deal I, 
475 Mass. at 314. 
 
3.  Aftermath.  After being denied minimum security 
classifications for a second time, Deal and Roberio again 
petitioned for relief in the county court.9  The matter is before 
the full court on the reservation and report of the single 
justice.10 
 
Although Deal and Roberio bring this petition as 
individuals, the record before us reflects that as of the time 
of oral argument in this case in April, 2017, the department's 
new, post-Deal I classification process for juvenile homicide 
offenders has been used to classify forty-two juvenile homicide 
offenders who preliminarily qualified for transfer to minimum 
security with an objective score of six points or fewer.  Of 
those forty-two offenders, thirty-two, including Deal, were 
recommended to remain in their current, medium security 
 
9 Roberio moved to intervene in Deal's petition, and the 
single justice allowed the motion. 
 
 
10 While this case was pending before the full court, the 
petitioners and the department separately moved to expand the 
record on appeal:  the petitioners moved to permit the addition 
of a parole board decision and a parole board hearing transcript 
for Roberio and Deal, respectively; the department moved to add 
a second affidavit of Lori Cresey, the director of the 
department's classification division.  Both motions are allowed. 
                     
 
14 
facilities; five, including Roberio, were recommended for 
lateral transfers to other medium security facilities so they 
could pursue specific programming; and four were recommended for 
minimum security placement (including Golston).  In her role as 
the commissioner's designee, the director followed the DRB's 
recommendation in all but one case.11  In sum, in these post-Deal 
I classification proceedings, discretionary overrides have been 
used to block approximately ninety per cent of juvenile homicide 
offenders whose objective classification score qualified them 
for transfer to a minimum security facility from placement in 
such a facility.  The department's regulations stipulate that 
the discretionary override codes should generally be employed in 
"5-15% of all custody level decisions."  See 103 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 420.06 (2007). 
 
Discussion.  The petitioners do not dispute that, in 
response to our opinion in Deal I, the department has changed 
its classification procedures for juvenile homicide offenders 
who qualify for placement in minimum security facilities.  Nor 
do the petitioners dispute that, under these new procedures, the 
initial classification hearing before the DRB is individualized.  
Rather, the petitioners contend that the broad or "shape-
 
11 In that case, the director decided not to apply the 
override codes that the board had recommended, thereby allowing 
the inmate to transfer to a minimum security prison.  This 
inmate had already received a positive parole vote. 
                     
 
15 
shifting" nature of the discretionary override codes employed in 
the classification process, viewed in light of the exceedingly 
high rate at which the override codes have in fact been used, 
demonstrates that the department continues in effect to bar 
categorically many juveniles from a minimum security 
classification based on their life sentence, in violation of 
§ 72B.  In addition, the petitioners claim they have no 
meaningful recourse to challenge such categorical decision-
making, because no recording is made of the DRB hearing on which 
the final classification decision-making process is largely 
based. 
 
To ensure compliance with § 72B, the petitioners argue that 
the department must incorporate the following procedural 
protections in its security classification process for juvenile 
homicide offenders:  (1) the right to written findings as to the 
basis of the classification decision that are sufficiently 
detailed that they may be refuted, if necessary, as clearly 
erroneous or otherwise arbitrary and capricious; (2) the right 
to have the hearing recorded; (3) the right to receive written 
notice at least seven days in advance of the classification 
hearing; and (4) if represented, the right to have counsel 
attend the hearing. 
 
The department asserts that its newly constituted process 
for classifying juvenile homicide offenders fully comports with 
 
16 
G. L. c. 119, § 72B, and Deal I, and that if this court were to 
require the department to implement the petitioners' requested 
procedures, the court's ruling would violate art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which bars the judicial 
branch from invading the prerogatives of the executive branch. 
 
We agree with the petitioners that the department's new 
classification procedure falls short of the requirements of 
§ 72B in some respects.  As mentioned above, in Deal I, 475 
Mass. at 320, we declared that the department's use of 
discretionary override codes against objectively qualifying 
juvenile homicide offenders violated § 72B, which prohibits 
categorically barring such offenders from placement in minimum 
security "based on a life sentence."  We therefore required the 
department to "individually consider each [juvenile homicide 
offender's] suitability for classification in minimum security 
and provide a written explanation for its decision."  Id.  In 
this subsequent case, the record before us illustrates the risk 
that, despite the individualized nature of the DRB hearing, true 
individual consideration will not be achieved if the youthful 
offender's life sentence alone may effectively be deemed an 
adequate ground for a discretionary override.  See Longval 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 420 (2007) ("the 
department and the commissioner may not sidestep statutory and 
regulatory provisions stating the rights of an inmate . . . by 
 
17 
assigning as a pretext another name" to forbidden practice 
[citation omitted]). 
 
This risk is realized where code R is used as the 
discretionary override.  Where a youthful offender has been 
convicted of murder, he or she has killed a human being either 
with malice, or during the commission of a felony.  See G. L. 
c. 265, § 1; Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807-808 
(2017) (prospectively requiring actual malice for conviction of 
felony-murder).  The use of code R where "[t]he facts or 
notoriety of the offense presents a seriousness that cannot be 
captured in the [objective] score" poses the risk of potentially 
including every juvenile homicide offender.12  Therefore, to 
ensure true individualized consideration, we now declare that, 
whenever code R is used as a discretionary override, the written 
explanation for the decision must explain in detail why this 
youthful offender's conduct in committing the murder is so 
 
12 The amicus states, based on information obtained from the 
department in a public records request, that, among the juvenile 
homicide offender cases where override codes were employed, the 
department has used code R in over sixty per cent of cases. 
 
Moreover, because code R does not distinguish between adult 
and juvenile offenders, the application of code R to a juvenile 
homicide offender might not take into account that, as 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and this court, 
the adolescent brain is not fully developed, and therefore in 
all but a very few cases, the juvenile homicide offender 
represents an individual who, at the time he or she committed 
the homicide, had "diminished culpability and greater prospects 
for reform."  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 659-660, quoting Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
                     
 
18 
significantly different in its seriousness as to reasonably 
distinguish it from the conduct of others and, in particular, 
other juveniles who committed murder. 
 
The department argues that code R does not effectuate a 
blanket policy prohibiting juvenile homicide offenders' 
placement in minimum security facilities because code R is often 
coupled with code U.  But code U is also suspect as a basis for 
a discretionary override.  The objective classification score, 
which is based on validated empirical evidence of risk, does not 
consider any disciplinary report that is more than eighteen 
months old and does not even consider any institutional act of 
violence that is more than four years old.  Yet code U, which 
permits an override where an "inmate['s] behavior, while not 
always negative enough to warrant disciplinary action, may serve 
to threaten security or undermine the exercise of proper control 
and maintenance of order within the institution," has no time 
limit and appears to cover the inmate's entire term of 
incarceration.  Therefore, if an inmate's misconduct is so 
severe that it results in disciplinary action, it is not 
considered in the validated objective classification score if it 
is more than eighteen months old, but if it is not so serious as 
to warrant such action, it may override that score without time 
limitation through discretionary override code U.  The absence 
of any time limitation is especially detrimental to inmates who 
 
19 
have served longer sentences.13  Moreover, like code R, code U's 
criteria are so broad that they could conceivably apply to any 
juvenile homicide offender without the need for individualized 
justification.14  Because the use of code U is so inconsistent 
with the objective classification score's reliance on recent 
disciplinary reports and acts of violence, and because it is so 
broad in its scope and duration and conclusory in its language, 
we now declare that, whenever code U is used as a discretionary 
override, the written explanation for the decision must explain 
in detail the specific conduct that justifies its application. 
 
The risk that the department's practices may result in 
categorical denials is not mitigated by the design of its 
administrative appeal process.  Where the DRB applies an 
override code and recommends that the inmate be denied transfer 
to a minimum security facility, the inmate has an opportunity to 
appeal from that recommendation before the director makes the 
13 In the case of juvenile homicide offenders, negative 
institutional behavior during the early years of their 
incarceration might also reflect, at least in part, the 
immaturity and recklessness characteristic of their age at the 
time.  Cf. Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 660, quoting Miller, 567 
U.S. at 472. 
 
14 The record demonstrates that the department applied code 
U to Roberio despite the fact that "housing unit officers 
identif[ied] him as a quiet inmate who keeps to himself and is 
not a management concern."  And, according to the amicus, the 
department has applied code U approximately eighty per cent of 
the time in classification hearings for juvenile homicide 
offenders, compared to just one per cent of the time in 
classification hearings generally. 
                     
 
20 
final decision.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.8(3)(h), (i).  
But the failure of the department to make any recording of the 
DRB classification hearing severely limits the director's 
ability to make an individualized evaluation of the inmate's 
challenge.  At oral argument, the department conceded that the 
director typically relies on the written findings of the DRB 
when considering an inmate's appeal, and it is clear from the 
record that the director rarely departs from the DRB 
recommendation. 
 
The department's updated procedures fall short of the 
requirements of § 72B because, without a recording of the DRB 
hearing, it is impossible for an inmate who appeals from a 
recommendation applying broadly sweeping override codes to 
obtain an individualized evaluation of the merits of the DRB's 
decision.  See Deal I, 475 Mass. at 319 (noting that "department 
may consider the criteria embodied in discretionary override 
codes" but may not use such codes to effectuate categorical 
policy).  The obligation in § 72B that the department 
individually consider each juvenile homicide offender's 
suitability for classification in minimum security applies to 
the director's final classification decision as much as to the 
DRB's written recommendation to the director.  The director is 
not present at the DRB hearing; without a recording of the 
hearing (or a transcript of the hearing), the director cannot 
 
21 
meaningfully evaluate whether the DRB's written findings 
accurately reflect the information that was presented at the 
hearing.15  The fact that in a small number of instances this 
process has yielded a favorable outcome for juvenile homicide 
offenders does not alter our conclusion that, in practice, the 
process still largely deprives the inmate of individualized 
review. 
 
Therefore, we now require that the department make a 
recording of the initial classification hearing and make that 
recording (or a transcription of that recording) available at 
any subsequent stage of review.  Cf. Covell v. Department of 
Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 782 (2003) ("That a transcript 
must be submitted to support a claim that the evidence was 
insufficient is not some hypertechnical requirement, but a 
reflection of the fact that resolution of such a claim requires 
15 Further support for recording the DRB classification 
hearings comes from the department's own regulations, which 
provide inmates with the right to appeal from the classification 
recommendation, 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.8(3)(h), (i), and 
mandate "quality assurance" of the DRB classification hearings, 
103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.8(3)(g) (2007).  Without a recording 
of the initial classification hearing, it is difficult to 
envision how the department can administer a "quality assurance 
process" that examines the "completeness and accuracy" of 
classification hearings as required under its regulations.  103 
Code Mass. Regs. § 420.8(3)(g).  And without a recording, the 
right to appeal to the Commissioner of Correction or his or her 
designee is hollow, because this final decision maker will not 
have access to the information presented by the prisoner at the 
DRB hearing or the opportunity to independently evaluate that 
information. 
                     
 
22 
the reviewing court to see the entirety of the evidence that was 
presented"); New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. Assessors of 
Dartmouth, 368 Mass. 745, 751 (1975) ("summary of evidence . . . 
is no substitute for a transcript").  The obligation to record 
the DRB hearing does not pose a significant burden on the 
department, which acknowledges that it already has the equipment 
necessary to record classification hearings. 
 
Contrary to the petitioners' arguments regarding the 
written rationale for the classification recommendation and the 
recording of classification hearings, we do not interpret § 72B 
as granting a right for the prisoner's counsel to attend the 
classification hearings.  We do not understand, however, why the 
department bars the presence of counsel at classification 
proceedings for juvenile homicide offenders who qualify for 
placement in minimum security facilities.  The department's 
regulations already allow for representation at such hearings 
whenever an inmate is considered for a transfer to a higher 
security facility.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(b).  
There is certainly nothing in the department's regulations that 
prohibits the presence of counsel.  But, in the absence of 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory mandate, it is not 
appropriate for us to require an agency to provide additional 
procedural rights simply because we think it would be sensible 
to do so.  See American Family Life Assur. Co. v. Commissioner 
 
23 
of Ins., 388 Mass. 468, 477-478, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850 
(1983).  Although the Legislature, of course, may afford the 
right to counsel or the right of counsel to attend a hearing 
when it so desires, see Poe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 
Mass. 801, 811 & n.11 (2010) (discussing statutory right to 
counsel in sex offender classification hearings under G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L), nothing in the language of § 72B compels the 
conclusion that the Legislature intended to afford a right to 
have counsel present. 
 
Similarly, we are not persuaded that § 72B requires that 
the youthful offender receive at least seven days' notice in 
advance of the classification hearing, rather than the notice of 
not less than forty-eight hours currently provided by 
regulation.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(c).  We understand 
why additional notice would make it easier for the youthful 
offender to confer with counsel and prepare to submit 
information at the classification hearing, but we cannot say 
that the additional notice is so essential to an individualized 
hearing that it is part and parcel of the entitlements afforded 
by § 72B. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed herein, the case is 
remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.