Title: State v. Perkins
Citation: 457 P.2d 465
Docket Number: 11657
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 1969

457 P.2d 465 (1969) The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lynn PERKINS, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11657. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted June 10, 1969. Decided July 17, 1969. William Dee Morris, argued, Helena, for defendant and appellant. Robert L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., Helena, John C. Weingartner, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Helena, Oscar Hendrickson, County Atty., Chinook, for plaintiff and respondent. JAMES T. HARRISON, Chief Justice. Appeal from an order entered in the district court of Blaine County denying defendant's petition for postconviction relief. This matter was previously before this Court on a motion made by the State to dismiss an appeal, and on December 13, 1967 we issued an Order which read: As noted in the order the time for taking an appeal from the judgment of conviction expired before a Notice of Appeal was filed, but we did provide that if the defendant desired to apply for any form of post-conviction relief, if the application was promptly filed and served, we would hear the matter at our January 1968 term. Over six months later defendant requested the district court to have copies of all records, minutes and transcript of the testimony prepared for him, at his expense, and the district court on July 10, 1968, ordered this to be done upon deposit by the defendant of the necessary funds to prepay such costs. Such deposit was made and the records, minutes and transcript of the testimony were so prepared. We point this out to indicate that defendant is not indigent and he was at all times and is now represented by retained counsel of his own choice. Counsel filed a motion with this Court to reinstate the appeal, and on September 10, 1968, the following order was made: Finally, on November 15, 1968, eleven months after this Court had first offered to consider any application for post-conviction relief if it was promptly served and filed, defendant filed a motion in the district court seeking relief under the post-conviction statutes. To excuse the delay defendant alleges that his trial counsel refused to appear in any post-conviction relief proceeding and for that reason he was denied review by this Court of his conviction. The state questions the jurisdiction of this Court to consider this appeal, submitting that defendant has waived any right he would have had by his failure to promptly proceed. We agree that this should be the rule but in view of the change in counsel and the fact that a post-conviction proceeding is involved, we will in this instance consider the various contentions of the defendant. First we would observe that defendant did not submit any additional evidence in support of his motion in the district court, relying solely on the transcript of testimony, briefs and arguments, and he relies here upon these same records. In support of his motion it is the contention of the defendant that (1) the court erred in giving instruction No. 4; (2) that defendant was denied his right to effective counsel; (3) that certain evidence was obtained by an unlawful search; (4) that the court erred in admitting plaintiff's exhibit "C", and (5) that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Turning to the matter of instruction No. 4, the record discloses that the court on settlement of instructions asked counsel for the defendant if there was any objection to the instruction. None was offered and the instruction was given. Section 94-7201(4), R.C.M. 1947, provides that no cause shall be reversed by this Court for any error in instructions which was not specifically pointed out and excepted to at the time of settlement of the instructions. We have consistently followed this statute, some of the latest cases in which we have done so are State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978, 22 A.L.R.3d 824; State v. Bubnash, 142 Mont. 377, 382 P.2d 830. In any event, the instruction quoted section 94-2704.1, R.C.M. 1947, and was proper in the circumstances here. We will spend little time with the contention that defendant was denied effective counsel. He hired his own counsel for the trial and another to appear in this proceeding. While it is true his trial counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal, in this post-conviction proceeding we are giving consideration to all contentions raised by the defendant so he has not been prejudiced because of such failure. As to the complaint that there was an illegal search, the district court in this connection found as follows: In our view the district court was correct. There was no search, the calves were in a corral in open sight. A corral can be likened to an open field and the Supreme Court of the United States in Hester *468 v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898, stated: "[I]t is enough to say that, apart from the justification, the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their `persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields." Thus evidence obtained from viewing a corral may be used as direct evidence in a prosecution. See, also, State v. Johnson, 149 Mont. 173, 424 P.2d 728. As to the admission of plaintiff's exhibit "C", a bill of sale when this exhibit was offered in evidence the court asked counsel for the defendant: "Any objection?" Counsel answered: "No objection." This Court stated in State v. Doe, 146 Mont. 501, 409 P.2d 439: Since no objection was made at the trial we are not in a position to review the alleged error. See also State v. Walker, 148 Mont. 216, 419 P.2d 300; State v. Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 306 P.2d 679. While defendant's counsel in his brief asserts that the bill of sale was obtained after the arrest of the defendant and before any Miranda warnings were given, testimony at the trial is otherwise. Defendant was arrested on a warrant, taken before a justice of the peace who gave him his Miranda warnings and released him on his own recognizance. The record further discloses that defendant thereafter returned to the corral at about 6:30 p.m. and the bill of sale, exhibit "C", was not delivered until 7 to 7:30 p.m. As to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the record discloses that one Ed Williamson owned a ranch near Chinook, Montana, where he ran cattle. All of the cows were branded but his calves had not yet been marked. On Sunday, November 27, 1966, Williamson went to check his cattle to see if they had been bothered by the fresh snow that had fallen the night before. He noticed that there were a number of cows standing around bawling and looking for their calves which appeared to be missing. The cows' udders were full which indicated that they had not been nursing their calves. He observed tire tracks and footprints in the snow. It was subsequently determined that the tire tracks were similar to the tire tread of Perkins' pickup. The tracks led to a corral where the calves were unloaded. Williamson had noticed that on Saturday afternoon defendant's pickup truck was washed and cleaned. When it was inspected Sunday night, it was seen that the pickup had recently been used to carry livestock, as evidenced by a quantity of straw and defecated matter in the bed of the truck. Williamson went to Perkins' corral and found some bawling calves which indicated to him that they had lost their mothers. He came back Monday morning and observed Perkins in the corral feeding seventy or eighty calves. Williamson noticed that some calves had a right ear crop similar to the ones he placed on his calves, and some of the calves had a fresh brand which he estimated were two days old at the most. These calves bore Perkins' brand. Some of these freshly branded calves had been recently castrated. Williamson testified: "I asked if I could bring some cows down to identify these calves and he [Perkins] agreed to that. * * * he * * * asked if it would be just as well if we took the calves to the cows, that it would be easier to take them up there rather than bring the cows, down." Williamson returned to his place and loaded the bawling cows in his truck. He drove them to Perkins' corral to put them with the calves. At that time Perkins offered to give Williamson a bill of sale for the calves if he would terminate his investigation and not unload his cows. Williamson *469 unloaded the cows and they immediately paired up with the bawling calves each cow claiming her own. The cows and calves were tagged and marked and were segregated again and later released. The calves returned to their respective mothers and began nursing. This "mothering up" affirmatively showed that the eleven calves found in Perkins' corral belonged to Ed Williamson. Duane Alexander, a service station attendant, testified that he fixed a flat tire on the defendant's truck on a Friday or Saturday night during the last part of November, 1966. As he was fixing the tire, he saw nine or ten Hereford calves in the Perkins' pickup. Defendant testified that he bought the calves from one Sweeney, a state stock inspector since 1959, but Sweeney denied the charge. To briefly sum up the State's case, a review of the evidence shows that tire tracks similar to those of Perkins' pickup were found in the snow around the corral; his pickup, which was clean on Saturday, was covered with straw and manure on Sunday; Williamson's calves were found in Perkins' corral, branded and castrated; Perkins alleged he bought the calves from Sweeney, the state stock inspector, Sweeney denied this; and Perkins was seen in a service station on a Friday or Saturday night in November with a load of calves in the back of his pickup. The jury found the evidence sufficient to warrant conviction; the district court concurred when it made its order from which this appeal was taken, and we are of the same mind. The order denying post-convintion relief is affirmed. Haswell, CASTLES and JOHN CONWAY HARRISON, JJ., concur. BONNER, J., being disqualified did not participate.