Title: State v. Derryle S. McDowell
Citation: 2004 WI 70
Docket Number: 2002AP001203-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2004

2004 WI 70 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1203-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Derryle S. McDowell,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 168 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 599, 669 N.W.2d 204 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 11, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Christopher J. Cherella and the Law Offices of Christopher J. 
Cherella, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Christopher J. 
Cherella. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenshlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John A. Pray, Keith A. 
Findley, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers and Frank J. Remington Center, Univ. of 
Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by Keith A. Findley. 
 
 
2004 WI 70 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   02-1203-CR 
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 822) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Derryle S. McDowell,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Derryle S. 
McDowell, seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a judgment of conviction and order denying 
postconviction relief.1  McDowell was convicted of robbery, 
kidnapping, and five counts of sexual assault while using a 
dangerous weapon, all as party to a crime.  He contends that he 
was afforded ineffective assistance of trial counsel that was 
                                                 
1 State v. McDowell, 2003 WI App 168, 266 Wis. 2d 599, 669 
N.W.2d 204 (affirming a decision of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County.  Judge Dennis P. Moroney presided over the 
jury trial and entered the judgment of conviction.  Judge Victor 
Manian presided over the postconviction motion and entered the 
order denying postconviction relief). 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
2 
 
both deficient and prejudicial.  Additionally, McDowell asserts 
that the circuit court erred in failing to permit him new 
counsel. 
¶2 
This case discusses the important issue of how 
criminal defense attorneys should deal with the prospect of 
client 
perjury. 
 
Specifically, 
it 
addresses 
under 
what 
circumstances counsel has knowledge of the perjury sufficient to 
trigger a requirement that a client testify in the unaided 
narrative rather than the usual question and answer format.2  
Prior to the decision of the court of appeals in this case, no 
Wisconsin case had defined what standard should be employed to 
determine when attorneys "know" their clients will lie. 
¶3 
We agree with the court of appeals that defense 
counsel may not substitute narrative questioning for the 
traditional question and answer format unless counsel knows that 
the client intends to testify falsely.  Absent the most 
                                                 
2 Commentators have described the narrative format as 
follows: 
The narrative approach allows the lawyer to put the 
client on the stand and allow him to tell his story in 
a free narrative manner.  While this occurs, the 
lawyer does not engage in the testimony; she asks no 
questions of the client and presents no corroborating 
evidence.  The client is allowed to present his 
testimony to the court without help from the attorney.  
In his closing argument, the attorney does not and 
cannot rely on any of the client's false testimony. 
Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, The Criminal Defense 
Attorney Facing Prospective Client Perjury, 15 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 935, 951 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
3 
 
extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge must be based on the 
client's expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully.  
We further determine that attorneys must advise the client, 
opposing counsel, and the circuit court of the change of 
questioning style prior to use of the narrative.  
¶4 
In the case before us, we conclude that defense 
counsel's performance was deficient in two respects: (1) he 
shifted to narrative questioning without advising his client 
beforehand; and (2) he used narrative questioning despite 
believing that his client intended to testify truthfully.  We 
also conclude, however, that McDowell suffered no prejudice 
under the facts of this case.  Finally, we reject McDowell's 
claim that the circuit court erred in failing to permit him new 
counsel.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I  
¶5 
On April 21, 1997, an 18-year-old woman was sexually 
assaulted near a building at 4720 West Burleigh Street, 
Milwaukee.  She had exited a bus and was followed by two men 
with guns.  The men rushed her and forced her off the street.  
With guns to her head, they robbed her, fondled her, and 
repeatedly assaulted her sexually, penetrating her orally and 
vaginally by both penis and gun barrel.  After the assaults, the 
victim spat ejaculate.   
¶6 
Although the victim could not identify her attackers, 
the State built its case based on evidence collected from her 
body, her clothing, and the scene.  Police recovered a sample of 
the victim's saliva mixed with semen containing McDowell's DNA.   
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
4 
 
They also recovered evidence containing the DNA of the second 
man, who eventually pled guilty. 
¶7 
McDowell was appointed counsel from the State Public 
Defender's Office.  On the first day of trial, counsel informed 
the court that McDowell had fired him over the weekend.  The 
exchange between the two was as follows: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Judge, just so the Court is aware, 
I was fired over the weekend and that is where we 
stand. 
THE COURT:  He has no right to fire you.  Only I can. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I understand that.  I am just 
advising the Court that Mr. McDowell has discontinued 
any efforts to assist, and that is where we are. 
THE COURT:  Mr. McDowell, you have to understand 
something.  [Defense counsel] is an officer of this 
Court.  This matter has been scheduled for trial.  
This Court is the only one that has that authority to 
fire him, not you.  If you decide you are not going to 
cooperate, well that is your own situation, but you 
don't have any rights to fire him.  Only I do.  And I 
am telling you on the weekend before trial he is not 
going to be fired by this Court. 
This 
Court 
knows 
[defense 
counsel], 
knows 
his 
abilities, and he is staying on the case.  [The] 
[c]ase is going to trial today.  Understand it.  You 
have a right to finality.  So do the people of the 
State of Wisconsin.  So do the victims in this case or 
alleged victims, and that is what is going to happen.   
¶8 
Later that day while discussing pre-trial motions, 
defense counsel informed the court that he did not know what the 
theory 
of 
defense 
would 
be 
because 
McDowell 
had 
become 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
5 
 
unassistive.  Wary of another delay, the court indicated an 
intent to move forward with the case.3  It stated:    
Well he must be unassistive long before this past 
weekend, so let's not get into that.  That is hogwash.  
Let's go.  The issue is long before this weekend with 
the amount of appearances we have had in this court on 
this case.  If we don't have a theory of defense 
formulated and then whatever little iron[-]outs you 
have to do, that is different.  That is an ongoing 
process anyway all during trial. 
¶9 
The court then told McDowell that he could decide 
whether to cooperate with counsel.  It explained, "Either you 
help or you don't help, and that is your decision.  Obviously if 
you don't help[,] it obviously hurts your situation more than it 
helps it, but that is your call, not mine.  Fair enough?"  
McDowell replied "Yes."  Defense counsel later informed the 
court that he would reserve his opening statement until the 
close of the State's case. 
¶10 On the third day of trial, after the State had rested, 
defense counsel expressed reservations to the court about his 
ability to effectively proceed as counsel.  Although not 
specific, 
he 
implied 
that 
his 
concerns 
related 
to 
the 
possibility that McDowell would testify untruthfully.  The court 
advised counsel that he had two options: (1) he could recommend 
to McDowell that he not testify if his intended account was 
                                                 
3 The record indicates that the case was initially scheduled 
for jury trial July 26, 1999.  Subsequently, it was rescheduled 
for September 20, 1999.  It was rescheduled again for November 
15, 1999, and then again January 24, 2000.  It was rescheduled 
yet another time for March 6, 2000.  Finally, it was rescheduled 
for May 15, 2000, when the trial proceeded. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
6 
 
untrue or so outrageous that a trier of fact would hold it 
against him; or (2) take the "middle ground" by calling McDowell 
to testify in narrative form.   
¶11 While the court acknowledged a third option in 
counsel's motion to withdraw, it rejected that request because 
the resulting mistrial would affect "not only the rights of 
[McDowell] but the rights of all the other people" involved in 
the nearly completed jury trial.   The court further reasoned 
that 
allowing 
counsel 
to 
withdraw 
would 
not 
necessarily 
accomplish anything since McDowell's next attorney would likely 
face the same ethical dilemma. 
¶12 After a short break in which defense counsel conferred 
with McDowell, he informed the court that his client would be 
testifying truthfully.  He declared: 
Your honor, I have spoken with Mr. McDowell.  Mr. 
McDowell advised me he does wish to testify and that 
what he would be testifying to will be the absolute 
truth 
with 
respect 
to 
anything 
regarding 
this 
testimony.  He wishes to get up there and testify as 
to the truth. . . .  
Judge I have no reason to believe in light of what Mr. 
McDowell has told me that he will not get up there and 
testify as to the truth.  Therefore when he takes the 
stand I will be asking him questions, specific 
questions with respect to his testimony before this 
jury. 
¶13 The court accepted counsel's decision.  However, it 
warned him that "should something change," he should immediately 
advise the court and then proceed in the narrative form of 
questioning. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 Defense 
counsel 
subsequently 
gave 
his 
opening 
statement.  He told the jury that McDowell would testify that he 
never assaulted the victim and that the area where the crime 
took place was behind the building where his father lived.  
Counsel further explained that McDowell had been in the area the 
night before the assault, had oral sex with his girlfriend, 
Sunshine, and had ejaculated, which would account for the semen 
being found at the scene. 
¶15 After 
completing 
his 
opening 
statement, 
defense 
counsel called McDowell to the witness stand.  Shortly after 
McDowell took the stand, counsel received a note from the public 
defender's office.  Defense counsel began his examination in the 
conventional 
question 
and 
answer 
format 
and 
asked 
three 
questions about McDowell's age and residence.  He then stated, 
"Mr. McDowell, I want you to look at this jury and tell this 
jury about the events of April 20 and April 21 of 1997.  Take 
your time and speak loudly and clearly please."  As McDowell 
began his answer, defense counsel interrupted and asked the 
court if it wanted a sidebar conference, and the court 
responded, "I certainly do."   
¶16 Following an off-the-record discussion, the court 
instructed the jury that it was not to consider the opening 
statements or closing arguments of counsel as evidence.  It then 
directed defense counsel to restate the question.  He said, 
"[a]gain, Mr. McDowell, take your time and tell this jury what 
you would like for them to know regarding the allegations 
against you beginning with where you were and what you were 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
8 
 
doing on April 20, 1997, through the early morning hours of 
April 21, 1997.  Proceed please."  The defendant responded with 
the following narrative answer: 
On April 20, 1997, I was by my father's house at 4720 
West Burleigh.  Later on in the afternoon I had 
company.  My girlfriend came over sometime in the 
afternoon.  We watched TV.  We got movies and ate, 
joked around, played around.  And as the evening went 
through we continued to watch movies, and I asked my 
father could I go to the gas station.  He told me to 
take out the garbage before I went to the gas station 
so me and my girlfriend was cuddled up and I continued 
to ask did she want to go out in the back with me.  
And she first continued to tell me no, but afterward 
she told me yes.  So I asked my father can I go to the 
gas station.  He told me to take out the garbage. 
Instead of me taking out the garbage, me and Sunshine, 
my girlfriend, had just went out the door to go to the 
gas station.  That is where we were at.  At the gas 
station we had two sodas and returned back to my 
father's apartment, 4720, but then we didn't go inside 
the apartment.  We went outside around the back.  
While we was in the back we was fooling around and had 
oral sex in the back, and then by the time we had oral 
sex, after we were through and everything like that, 
my father ended up coming out in the back bringing out 
the garbage and caught me and my girlfriend fooling 
around back there and got yelling and screaming at me 
and my girlfriend telling us to go in the house.  As 
we went to the house he told my girlfriend to call her 
mother, and he continued to yell and fuss and 
everything at us.  Her mother wasn't there, so he told 
her to get ready to take her home.  Afterwards she got 
ready to go and continued fussing, continued to argue 
at us, and we took her home.  And then we came back.  
First me and my father rode around because he 
continued to talk to me about what just happened back 
there, how dangerous it was and how we could have got 
in trouble and what we was doing was wrong.  So we 
finally arrived back to my father's house.  When we 
arrived we went in the house and went back to sleep. 
That is what happened according to them days. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 Defense counsel asked two more questions relating to 
McDowell's four juvenile adjudications.  The prosecutor then 
conducted 
a brief 
cross-examination 
during 
which McDowell 
admitted that he had attempted to avoid arrest and run from the 
police.  McDowell also revealed that he was a friend of the 
other man who had been convicted of the assaults.  There was no 
re-direct examination.4 
¶18 In his closing statement, defense counsel commented at 
length on the nature of DNA evidence.  He then asked, "Where 
would you expect to find DNA material of yours?  In your house? 
. . . Where else would you expect to find your DNA material but 
around where you in fact live or work or someplace that you 
frequent?"  Counsel observed, "There is an expectation that you 
could find evidence of Mr. McDowell being related and associated 
with 4720 West Burleigh." 
¶19 After the case was submitted to the jury, defense 
counsel provided an account of the off-the-record sidebar that 
had occurred when he shifted from question and answer to 
narrative form.  He indicated that he had planned to proceed in 
                                                 
4 Following the prosecutor's cross-examination, the circuit 
court said, "All right.  There is no re[-]direct allowed under 
the circumstances of this Court's ruling."  As the court of 
appeals noted in its decision, the preclusion of re-direct 
examination would appear to be the logical corollary of the 
restriction 
to 
narrative 
questioning 
in 
most 
instances.  
McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶14, n. 7.  However, like the court 
of appeals, we do not view that preclusion as absolute.  
Instead, we leave to the circuit court's discretion whether 
additional 
questioning 
would 
be 
appropriate 
under 
the 
circumstances of the case. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
10 
 
the question and answer format.  However, he acknowledged 
receiving a note from legal counsel at his office, which changed 
his mind.  Counsel did note, however, that he had previously 
advised McDowell as to what a narrative entailed.  He explained: 
Subsequent to the initial decision to go ahead and do 
a question and answer with regards to Mr. [McDowell's] 
testimony, I did in fact receive an opinion back from 
Attorney Bill Tyroller [sic], who is both an appellate 
attorney as well as legal counsel for the agency, 
advising me that I should go with narrative.  I did in 
fact advise Mr. Derryle McDowell that that is the way 
we would be proceeding, and we had already discussed 
what the narrative entailed prior to, as a result of 
prior discussions, so he was familiar with what it was 
that I was advising him that we were going to do in 
terms of his testimony.  So that was the result of me 
making a switch from question and answer to the 
narrative.  
¶20 During deliberations, the parties briefly reconvened 
to address a question from the jury:  "Need to know time frame 
between sexual act with girlfriend and the time [the victim] was 
assaulted."  The court stated that it intended to instruct the 
jury to use its collective memory relative to the time frame, if 
any, between the two acts.  Neither the prosecutor nor defense 
counsel objected. 
¶21 Ultimately, the jury found McDowell guilty of all 
counts.  He was sentenced to 40 years in prison, consecutive, on 
all five counts of first-degree sexual assault, followed by a 
consecutive probationary sentence on the two remaining counts.  
McDowell subsequently moved for postconviction relief, arguing, 
among other things, that his attorney had provided ineffective 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
11 
 
assistance of counsel and that the circuit court had erred in 
failing to permit him new counsel. 
¶22 At the Machner5 hearing, defense counsel testified that 
he 
initially 
believed 
that 
McDowell 
and 
his 
girlfriend, 
Sunshine, had not engaged in any sexual activity behind the 
building the night before the assaults based on his pretrial 
discussion with them.  He noted inconsistencies between their 
accounts.6  Moreover, he explained that McDowell had introduced 
the oral-sex-the-night-before theory of defense only after 
learning that any scientific challenge to the DNA evidence would 
be useless.  Counsel ultimately decided not to call Sunshine as 
a witness. 
¶23 In addition, defense counsel testified that McDowell 
had asked, "[']What if Sunshine and I get together and we 
say . . . ,[']" and had told him, "[']I'll say what I need [to] 
say to help myself out and if I have to say something untruthful 
I'll say that.  I need to help myself out.[']".  Counsel said 
that he warned McDowell that he might have to testify in the 
narrative.  In that situation, he advised McDowell to testify to 
                                                 
5 Under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a hearing may be held when a criminal 
defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly providing 
ineffective assistance.  At the hearing, trial counsel testifies 
as to his or her reasoning on challenged action or inaction.  
6 At the Machner hearing, defense counsel testified that 
Sunshine's statements regarding the location of their alleged 
oral sex conflicted with the physical evidence, specifically the 
location of the semen recovered from the crime scene. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
12 
 
everything he wanted the jury to hear because it would be his 
only opportunity.   
¶24 Finally, defense counsel elaborated on the events 
leading to McDowell's actual testimony.  He explained that he 
had intended to proceed in the question and answer format, as 
McDowell had eventually informed him that he was going to tell 
the truth.  However, counsel acknowledged that his plan later 
changed when he received a note from the public defender's 
office, urging him to shift to the narrative.  The note said, 
"Tyroler says go with a narrative.  Tell that to the client.  It 
must be narrative."  Accordingly, defense counsel converted to 
the narrative form.  He conceded, however, that he did so 
without either advising McDowell of the change beforehand or 
having concluded that McDowell intended to lie. 
¶25 McDowell, meanwhile, testified at the hearing that he 
never told defense counsel he was going to testify untruthfully.  
He maintained that he was of the impression that counsel was 
going to employ the traditional question and answer format, not 
the narrative.  Furthermore, McDowell stated that he had never 
testified before a jury before and was nervous and confused.  He 
insisted that had he been asked, he would have testified that 
the night before the assaults Sunshine performed oral sex on 
him, that he was not wearing a condom, that he ejaculated at the 
scene, and that he never committed the crimes. 
¶26 The circuit court denied McDowell's postconviction 
motion.  It noted that McDowell had placed defense counsel in an 
untenable position, and that counsel had reacted in a way that 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
13 
 
best preserved both his client's rights and his own ethical 
responsibilities.  The court further surmised that even with 
McDowell's full and complete testimony, the outcome of the trial 
would have been no different in light of the indisputable 
scientific evidence.  Finally, it upheld the decision to proceed 
with existing counsel.  The court explained, "with the jury 
literally in the wings, and the case ready to proceed, with the 
witnesses present and everybody having said they were ready to 
proceed, that that's a discretionary call by Judge Moroney, and 
he made that decision."  McDowell appealed. 
¶27 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  
State v. McDowell, 2003 WI App 168, 266 Wis. 2d 599, 669 N.W.2d 
204.  In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, it set forth the 
standard that it believed should govern a criminal defense 
attorney's legal obligations in assessing and responding to 
possible perjury.  Id., ¶3.  The court stated that "absent the 
most extraordinary circumstances, criminal defense counsel, as a 
matter of law, cannot know that a client is going to testify 
falsely absent the client's admission of the intent to do so."  
Id., ¶47. 
¶28 Applying that standard to the case at hand, the court 
of appeals determined that defense counsel was deficient in his 
performance at trial.  Id., ¶4.  It also concluded, however, 
that the deficient performance was not prejudicial under the 
circumstances of the case.  Id.  Finally, the court rejected 
McDowell's claim that the circuit court erred in denying his 
request for new counsel.  Id., ¶24.  It reasoned that because 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
14 
 
the circuit court had received no request for new counsel, it 
could not have erred in failing to make such inquiry or 
determination.  Id., ¶30.7   
II 
 
¶29 This case presents an opportunity to address how 
criminal defense attorneys should deal with the prospect of 
client perjury.  The issue is raised in the context of the first 
argument in this case:  ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
¶30 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel invokes 
the analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  To find success, a defendant must demonstrate both (1) 
that counsel's representation was deficient; and (2) that this 
deficiency was prejudicial.  Id. at 687.   
 
¶31 Appellate review of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (citing 
State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 609, 516 N.W.2d 
362 (1994); State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633-34, 369 N.W.2d 
711 (1985)).  We will not disturb the circuit court's findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id. at 768.  The 
ultimate determination of whether the attorney's performance 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals additionally rejected McDowell's 
assertions that (1) the circuit court presented erroneous jury 
instructions on the sexual assault counts, thus requiring 
dismissal of one of them and retrial of the other four; and (2) 
the circuit court sentenced him based on inaccurate information.  
McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶4, n. 2.  Because McDowell did not 
pursue these issues on review, however, we do not address them 
here.  
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
15 
 
falls below the constitutional minimum, however, is a question 
of law subject to independent appellate review.  Id. (citing 
Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 634). 
 
¶32 Additionally, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in failing to permit McDowell new counsel.  A circuit 
court exercises discretion in determining whether to appoint new 
counsel in a criminal case.  State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356, 
359, 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988).  Accordingly, we review the decision 
of the circuit court to determine if it erroneously exercised 
its discretion. 
III 
¶33 We begin our discussion with the threshold inquiry for 
evaluating 
McDowell's 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel:  Under what circumstances do criminal defense attorneys 
have knowledge of prospective perjury sufficient to trigger a 
requirement that a client testify in the unaided narrative 
rather than the usual question and answer format?  Such a 
question implicates not only the constitutional rights of the 
criminal defendant, but also the ethical responsibilities of 
counsel. 
¶34 The United States Supreme Court has not expressly set 
forth a standard of knowledge that, when met, requires a 
criminal defense attorney to reveal client confidences and 
affirmatively act to prevent client perjury.  In Nix v. 
Whiteside, 
it 
observed 
that 
"[w]hatever 
the 
scope 
of 
a 
constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a 
right does not extend to testifying falsely."  475 U.S. 157, 173 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
16 
 
(1986).  The Court further recognized that, "[a]lthough counsel 
must take all reasonable lawful means to attain the objectives 
of the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any 
way assisting the client in presenting false evidence or 
otherwise violating the law."  Id. at 166.  However, Nix 
provided 
no 
guidance 
in 
determining 
when 
attorneys 
had 
sufficient basis to conclude that their clients intend to commit 
perjury.     
¶35 Similarly, 
the 
Wisconsin 
rules 
of 
professional 
responsibility do not articulate a clear minimum standard of 
knowledge applicable to this case.  Supreme Court Rule 20:3.3 
(1999-2000)8 provides in relevant part: 
Candor toward the tribunal.   
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal 
or fraudulent act by the client; 
. . .  
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  
If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to 
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable 
remedial measures. 
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) apply even if 
compliance 
requires 
disclosure 
of 
information 
otherwise 
protected 
by 
Rule 
1.6 
[regarding 
                                                 
8 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
17 
 
confidentiality 
of 
information 
received 
from 
a 
client]. 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
(Emphasis added).  Supreme Court Rule 20:3.4 provides in 
relevant 
part 
that 
"[a] 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
 . . . falsify 
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely[.]"  
(Emphasis added). 
 
¶36  The court of appeals reviewed Nix, the Supreme Court 
Rules, together with various legal authorities9 to discern the 
appropriate balance.  McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶44.  Under its 
standard, "absent the most extraordinary circumstances, criminal 
defense counsel, as a matter of law, cannot know that a client 
is going to testify falsely absent the client's admission of the 
intent to do so."  Id., ¶47.  The court explained that with its 
qualification of "extraordinary circumstances," it did not mean 
to obscure the bright line it created or invite endless 
litigation; rather, it simply recognized that in the truly 
                                                 
9 Commentators and courts in other jurisdictions have set 
forth a myriad of standards for determining when an attorney 
"knows" his or her client intends to testify falsely.  These 
include:  "good cause to believe" a client intends to testify 
falsely; "compelling support" for concluding that the client 
will commit perjury; "knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt," "a 
firm factual basis," "a good faith determination," and "actual 
knowledge."  See generally, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 
1237, 1246-47 (Mass. 2003) (citations omitted). 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
18 
 
exceptional case counsel might be presented with the same 
dilemma even absent a direct admission.10  Id., ¶48. 
 
¶37 The court of appeals offered several justifications 
for its bright-line rule.  To begin, it observed that adopting a 
lesser standard "would be a defining step in a sad parade" of 
situations (e.g., negotiated pleas and Alford11 pleas) that, in 
its estimation, compromised a criminal defense attorney's duty 
to the client.  Id., ¶44.  Moreover, the court explained that 
without such an approach, counsel would lack guidance, as they 
cannot truly "know" whether the client intends to commit 
perjury.  Id., ¶45.  Finally, it suggested that the requirement 
of actual knowledge maximized the ability of criminal defense 
attorneys to protect their clients' Sixth Amendment rights.  See 
id., ¶46. 
 
¶38 Both McDowell and the amici12 support the court of 
appeals as to the standard it set regarding the issue of 
                                                 
10 As an example of a truly exceptional case, the court 
proffered the modern-day Bonnie and Clyde, that is, a couple 
conclusively captured on video and apprehended at the scene of 
the crime who inform counsel of their intent to testify that 
they were never even at the bank.  McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, 
¶48, n. 16.     
11 An Alford plea is a guilty plea where the defendant 
pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not 
admitting having committed the crime.  See North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).   
12 The Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and 
the Frank J. Remington Center of the University of Wisconsin Law 
School filed an amicus brief in this case and participated in 
oral arguments.  We echo the sentiments of the court of appeals 
in acknowledging that our analysis was greatly benefited by 
their contributions.    
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
19 
 
"knowledge."13 
 
McDowell 
writes 
that, 
"[t]he 
decision 
appropriately balances defense counsel's duty to provide candor 
to the Court at all times along with his or her continuing duty 
to provide effective and competent assistance of counsel to the 
client."  The amici, meanwhile, urge us to adopt the approach 
"because anything less jeopardizes the defendant's right to have 
a jury decide the facts, undermines the relationship and role of 
defense 
counsel 
as 
zealous 
and 
loyal 
advocate, 
and 
is 
practically unworkable."   
 
¶39 The State, however, contends that the standard of the 
court of appeals demands too much.  Specifically, it asserts 
that such an approach "will allow attorneys to dodge the ethical 
dilemma of prospective client perjury quite effectively by 
practicing selective ignorance of the only fact that would 
trigger their duty to prevent prospective perjury."   The State 
submits that a different standard——one that takes into account 
all relevant facts and circumstances——will both protect the 
client's constitutional rights and better ensure the integrity 
of the criminal justice system.  It therefore asks that we adopt 
the "firm factual basis" standard. 
 
¶40 The difficulty we have with the State's position is 
twofold.  First, the "firm factual basis" standard is really no 
                                                 
13 McDowell and the amici differ only in their support for 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
qualification 
of 
"extraordinary 
circumstances."  McDowell asserts that the court should not have 
added a subjective component to an otherwise objective test.  
The amici, however, are willing to accept such language, 
acknowledging the potential need for future flexibility. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
20 
 
standard at all.  As noted by the amici in their brief, 
"[l]eaving it up to individual lawyers to 'take into account all 
relevant facts and circumstances' and decide whether a 'firm 
factual basis' exists to believe the client will commit perjury 
tells 
lawyers 
virtually 
nothing 
about 
when 
they 
should 
compromise their role as advocate."  Such an approach, in our 
estimation, breeds needless uncertainty.14   
 
¶41 Second, we recognize that any standard we adopt should 
be a high one given the constitutional considerations involved.  
We are mindful that, "[e]xcept in the rarest of cases, attorneys 
who adopt 'the role of the judge or jury to determine the 
facts,' pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous 
advocacy and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment."  
Nix, 475 U.S. at 189 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  As a result, 
we are reluctant to strip a defendant of the right to counsel or 
compromise the attorney-client relationship.  
 
¶42 Thus, we are satisfied that the approach taken by the 
court of appeals was the appropriate one.15  Despite the 
                                                 
14 Indeed, it is unclear from the facts and circumstances of 
this case whether defense counsel ever formed a "firm factual 
basis" that McDowell would commit perjury.  The State contends 
that he had; however, the defendant notes that his attorney 
specifically informed the court that McDowell was going to take 
the witness stand and testify truthfully.  This disagreement 
about what defense counsel believed or should have believed 
demonstrates the unworkable nature of the State's proffered 
approach. 
15 Although its opinion is a recent one, the court of 
appeals' reasoning has already been cited with approval.  See 
Orange County Lawyer, Formal Op. 2003-01 (Client Perjury and the 
Criminal Defense Attorney) (2004). 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
21 
 
multitude of standards, courts "generally have set an extremely 
high standard for" evaluating prospective perjury.  Monroe H. 
Freedman, But Only If You "Know," in Ethical Problems Facing the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer 138 (Rodney J. Uphoff, 1995).   
¶43 Accordingly, we determine that an attorney may not 
substitute narrative questioning for the traditional question 
and answer format unless counsel knows that the client intends 
to 
testify 
falsely. 
 
Absent 
the 
most 
extraordinary 
circumstances, such knowledge must be based on the client's 
expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully.  While we 
recognize that the defendant's admission need not be phrased in 
"magic words," it must be unambiguous and directly made to the 
attorney.   
¶44 We agree with the observation of the court of appeals 
that Supreme Court Rule 20:3.3 must be harmonized with our 
determination here.  Like the court of appeals, we "interpret 
SCR 20:3.3(c)'s suggestion that counsel 'may refuse to offer 
evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false' to apply 
to circumstances beyond the borders surrounding the questions 
involving a criminal defendant's stated intention to testify 
falsely."  McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶47.  Indeed, "[a]ny other 
interpretation 
would, 
in 
our 
estimation, 
produce 
an 
irreconcilable conflict between the two rules."  Id. (citing 
State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 51, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987)). 
 
¶45 On those occasions when a defendant informs counsel of 
the intention to testify falsely, the attorney's first duty 
shall be "to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
22 
 
course of conduct."  Nix, 475 U.S. at 169.  As the court of 
appeals noted, "we do not dismiss the persuasive power of 
counsel to do so on ethical, legal, and moral grounds."  
McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶53.  Moreover, we recognize 
counsel's ability to be persuasive on pragmatic grounds.  "By 
explaining what may be the evidentiary weakness of the false 
account, counsel can describe the likely consequences that, 
obviously, the defendant does not desire."  Id.  
 
¶46 In addition, we emphasize that an attorney should 
seriously consider moving to withdraw from the case.16  As noted 
by Nix, withdrawal "deprives the defendant of neither his right 
to counsel nor the right to testify truthfully."  475 U.S. at 
173-74.  
 
¶47 If, however, the motion to withdraw is denied and the 
defendant insists in committing perjury, we conclude that 
counsel should proceed with the narrative form, advising the 
defendant beforehand of what that would entail.  While far from 
perfect, we recognize that the narrative represents the best of 
several imperfect options.17  It "best accommodates the competing 
                                                 
16 The withdrawal method, however, is not without its 
difficulties.  Commentators have noted, "it does not solve the 
problem; it just passes along the ethical dilemma to another 
attorney."  Slipakoff & Thayaparan, supra note 2 at 953. 
17 These imperfect options include conducting a separate 
hearing on the potential perjury, refusing to call the client to 
the stand, and fully cooperating with the defendant. See 
Slipakoff & Thayaparan, supra note 2 at 949-53.  See also People 
v. Johnson, 62 Cal. App. 4th 608, 621-26, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805 
(1998). 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
23 
 
interests of the defendant's constitutional right to testify and 
the attorney's ethical obligations."  People v. Johnson, 62 Cal. 
App. 4th 608, 630, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805 (1998).18   
 
¶48 Finally, we agree with the court of appeals that 
attorneys must also inform opposing counsel and the circuit 
court of the change of questioning style prior to use of the 
narrative.  Courts, in turn, shall be required to examine both 
counsel and the defendant and make a record of the following: 
"(1) the basis for counsel's conclusion that the defendant 
intends to testify falsely; (2) the defendant's understanding of 
the right to testify, notwithstanding the intent to testify 
falsely; and (3) the defendant's, and counsel's, understanding 
of the nature and limitations of the narrative questioning that 
will result."  McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶57. 
IV 
¶49 We turn next to McDowell's claim that he was afforded 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  As noted above, in 
order to establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must 
                                                 
18 Contary to the assertion of the concurrence at ¶95, the 
Supreme Court did not reject the narrative approach in Nix v. 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 163, n. 6.  Rather, it expressed 
skepticism in it.  Despite that skepticism, the narrative has 
continued to enjoy widespread use and acceptance in criminal 
trials.  See, e.g., Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373 (Del. 
1989); Com. v. Jermyn, 620 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1993); State v. 
Layton, 432 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1993); State v. Waggoner, 864 
P.2d 162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Reynolds v. State, 625 N.E.2d 
1319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); see also Norman Lefstein, Client 
Perjury in Criminal Cases:  Still in Search of an Answer, 1 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics, 521 (1988) (endorsing narrative approach after 
comparing its merits relative to option of informing court). 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
24 
 
prove 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
both 
deficient 
and 
prejudicial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  We consider each of 
these elements in turn. 
¶50 To prove deficient performance, a defendant must 
establish that his or her counsel "made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Id.   Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel's performance will be highly deferential.  Id. at 689.  
Deficient performance, nevertheless, may be demonstrated by acts 
and 
omissions 
"outside 
the 
wide 
range 
of 
professionally 
competent assistance."  Id. at 690.   
¶51 Here, McDowell contends that his trial counsel's 
actions were deficient in that he had no reason that justified a 
switch from the question and answer format to the narrative 
format.  McDowell notes that defense counsel specifically told 
the court that his client would testify truthfully.  Moreover, 
McDowell observes that counsel did not change his mind regarding 
the presentation of the testimony until he was given the 
"Tyroler note."  That note, McDowell reminds us, instructed 
counsel to "inform the client," which he did not do. 
¶52 The State concedes that defense counsel rendered 
deficient performance at trial.  Citing the reasoning of the 
court of appeals, it writes, "the State will not dispute the 
court's ultimate conclusion that [defense counsel] rendered 
deficient performance in requiring McDowell to testify in 
narrative format under the circumstances described above."  The 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
25 
 
State, however, correctly notes that under Strickland it does 
not have to defend counsel's performance to prevail on appeal.  
¶53 We agree with the parties that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient in this case.  Although we are 
sympathetic to counsel's dilemma, we determine that his actions 
ultimately fell "outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance" in two respects.  First, he shifted to 
narrative questioning without advising his client beforehand.  
Second, he used narrative questioning despite believing that his 
client intended to testify truthfully.   
¶54 Accordingly, we address next whether defense counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced McDowell.  Under Strickland, a defendant 
is not required to show that counsel's deficient conduct was 
outcome determinative.  See id. at 693-94.  Rather, "[t]he 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id. at 694.  In making this determination, reviewing 
courts are to consider the totality of the evidence before the 
trier of fact.  Id. at 695. 
¶55 McDowell asserts that prejudice should be presumed 
under the circumstances of the case.  He maintains that for all 
intents and purposes, he was without counsel at a critical stage 
of the proceeding when his attorney switched from question and 
answer to the narrative form.  McDowell further submits that 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
26 
 
prejudice should be presumed because his attorney had a conflict 
of interest at the point in time he received the "Tyroler note." 
¶56 Additionally, even if not presumed, McDowell advances 
that he suffered actual prejudice because he was not afforded 
the opportunity to fully present his defense to the jury.  He 
contends that he had a plausible explanation for why his DNA was 
found at the scene, which was reconcilable with the remainder of 
the evidence.  Because the jury never fully heard that 
explanation, McDowell reasons, his defense was prejudiced.  
¶57 The 
State, 
meanwhile, 
asks 
that 
we 
affirm 
the 
conclusion of the court of appeals that McDowell suffered no 
prejudice.  It argues that McDowell's case fits none of the 
limited circumstances in which this court presumes prejudices.  
Furthermore, it describes McDowell's theory of defense as both 
"implausible" and "improbable." 
¶58  This court has made clear that it will presume 
prejudice only in rare instances.  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 770.  
In the limited category of cases most relevant to McDowell's 
claim, we have presumed prejudice when "the actual assistance 
rendered by a particular attorney has been deemed so outside the 
bounds necessary for effective counsel that a court has presumed 
prejudice."  Id. at 771.   
¶59 For example, "courts have presumed prejudice when an 
attorney fails to present known evidence to the court calling 
into question the defendant's competency to stand trial."  Id. 
(citing State v. [Oliver Ross] Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 223-34, 
395 N.W.2d 176 (1986)).  Likewise, "where an attorney has 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
27 
 
labored on behalf of a defendant while harboring a conflict of 
interest, prejudice is automatic."  Id.  (citing Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980); State v. Kaye, 106 Wis. 
2d 1, 8-16, 315 N.W.3d 337 (1987)).  
¶60 In the present case, we cannot conclude that defense 
counsel's action of switching from question and answer to the 
narrative form was "so outside the bounds necessary for 
effective counsel" as to constitute a rare instance when this 
court must presume prejudice.  As the court of appeals correctly 
observed, "[defense counsel] was not absent and McDowell was not 
unrepresented during his testimony."  McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, 
¶71, n. 23.  Counsel further indicated that he had warned 
McDowell about the possible use of the narrative at trial and 
had advised him to testify to everything he wanted the jury to 
hear in that situation because it would be his only opportunity. 
¶61 We also reject McDowell's claim that defense counsel 
had 
a 
conflict 
of 
interest 
that 
requires 
an 
automatic 
presumption of prejudice.  Here, counsel's conflict stemmed from 
a perceived ethical dilemma between his duty of loyalty to his 
client and his ethical obligation to the court.  This is not 
remotely the kind of conflict of interest at issue in Cuyler and 
Kaye.  Cuyler involved two attorneys' multiple representation of 
three defendants charged with murder.  446 U.S. at 337.  
Similarly, Kaye involved one attorney's representation of two 
defendants in the same arson case.  106 Wis. 2d at 3.  To equate 
the divided loyalties in those cases with the potential divided 
loyalties here misses the mark.  In every case, an attorney's 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
28 
 
loyalty to the client is tempered by the rules of professional 
responsibility.  That divided loyalty, however, is not the type 
of conflict of interest that rises to the level of a presumption 
of prejudice. 
¶62 Absent a presumption of prejudice, McDowell must make 
a showing of actual prejudice.  Like the court of appeals, we 
"readily acknowledge that McDowell's testimony could have been 
enhanced 
and 
clarified 
through 
counsel's 
questioning."  
McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶66.  It is true that McDowell's 
narrative account did not specify that Sunshine had performed 
oral sex on him, that he was not wearing a condom, or that he 
had ejaculated on the ground behind the building the day before 
the assaults.  It is also true that McDowell did not actually 
deny that he had committed the assaults.   
¶63 However, upon consideration of the totality of the 
evidence before the trier of fact, we are satisfied that 
McDowell suffered no actual prejudice in this case.  When called 
upon to testify in the narrative form, McDowell produced an 
account of his actions during the period in question.  That 
testimony included the date ("April 20, 1997"), activity 
("fooling around and had oral sex in the back"), and location 
("4720 West Burleigh") that were critical to his "oral-sex-the-
night-before" theory of defense.  Such information, bracketed by 
defense 
counsel's 
opening 
statement 
and closing 
argument, 
provided a sufficient basis for the jury to reason its way to an 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
29 
 
acquittal if it so chose.19  Indeed, the question submitted by 
the jury indicates that McDowell's defense was on the mind of 
the jurors.   
¶64 Our conclusion that McDowell suffered no prejudice is 
further supported by "two even more powerful reasons: his 
defense 
was 
preposterous, 
and 
the 
State's 
evidence 
was 
overwhelming."  Id., ¶68.  The court of appeals cogently 
explains: 
McDowell's defense depended on his account of oral sex 
the night before with Sunshine at the very location 
where the assaults occurred.  Not only was that theory 
far-fetched, but it was not going to be supported by 
any testimony from Sunshine, who, [defense counsel] 
concluded, 
should 
not 
testify 
given 
the 
inconsistencies between her and McDowell's accounts of 
their claimed encounter.  But, of course, that's not 
all.  McDowell's defense depended not only on the 
jury's acceptance of his oral-sex-the-night-before 
account, but also on the extraordinary coincidence of 
the victim's semen-filled saliva landing on the exact 
location of his ejaculate.  It was not just that 
McDowell's DNA was discovered at the scene, but that 
his semen was mixed with the victim's saliva.  As 
[defense counsel] testified at the Machner hearing, 
not 
only 
was 
McDowell's 
oral-sex-the-night-before 
defense a stretch, it was not, standing alone, 
exculpatory. [Counsel] was blunt: "The bottom line 
 . . . was  . . . that mixed sample put his penis in 
her mouth." 
Id., ¶69.   
                                                 
19 As the circuit court correctly noted in its instructions 
to the jury, opening statements and closing arguments of counsel 
are not evidence.  However, we need not ignore them in 
evaluating whether, in the full context of the trial, McDowell 
was able to present his essential defense. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
30 
 
¶65 In the end, we determine that defense counsel's 
deficiency was not so prejudicial that there is "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different."  Indeed, 
the probability of selecting a person at random with the same 
DNA profile as McDowell in this case was approximately one in 
six billion.  As a result, we reject McDowell's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
V 
 
¶66 The final issue we consider is whether the circuit 
court erred in failing to permit McDowell new counsel.  In 
situations involving appointment of new counsel, a circuit 
court's exercise of discretion is triggered by a defendant's 
presentation 
of 
a 
substantial 
complaint 
that 
could 
be 
interpreted as a request for new counsel.  State v. Kazee, 146 
Wis. 2d 366, 371, 432 N.W.2d 93 (1988).  When a substantial 
complaint is made, the trial judge should inquire whether there 
are proper reasons for substitution.  Id. (citations omitted).   
 
¶67 Here, there is no dispute that on the morning of the 
first day of trial, defense counsel advised the court that 
McDowell had "fired" him over the weekend.  There is also no 
dispute, however, that neither counsel nor McDowell explained 
why.  Accordingly, the question becomes whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to inquire 
into the matter before ruling that McDowell could not have new 
counsel. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
31 
 
 
¶68 McDowell contends that defense counsel's disclosure on 
the first day of trial was tantamount to a request for new 
counsel.  Although he acknowledges that counsel's request was 
not specific, McDowell maintains that, "[i]t should have been 
obvious to all those involved that counsel was no longer wanted 
as McDowell's attorney."  McDowell further submits that the 
conflict which arose between counsel and client before trial was 
"too wide a divide to permit meaningful representation." 
 
¶69 The State responds that the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that McDowell did not make a substantial complaint 
that could reasonably be interpreted as a request for new 
counsel.  Alternatively, it argues that the circuit court did 
not err in refusing to permit counsel to withdraw based on the 
facts of the case. 
 
¶70 Upon examining the record, we note that defense 
counsel did not actually move to withdraw on the first day of 
trial, even though he acknowledged being "fired."  Moreover, we 
recognize that McDowell himself made no request for new counsel, 
even though he spoke to the circuit court, confirming his 
understanding that he would benefit by cooperating with his 
attorney.   
¶71 Still, like the court of appeals, we "do not endorse 
the trial court's quick 'hogwash' reaction.  A defendant's right 
to representation must be protected and, even absent an explicit 
request for new counsel, courts should inquire into what they 
may reasonably infer is a problem potentially undermining that 
right."  McDowell, 266 Wis. 2d 599, ¶27, n. 10. 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
32 
 
 
¶72 Thus, we employ the factors set forth in State v. 
Lomax to determine whether withdrawal of counsel and the 
appointment of new counsel was warranted under the circumstances 
of this case.  These include:  
(1) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the 
defendant's complaint; (2) the timeliness of the 
motion; and (3) whether the alleged conflict between 
the defendant and the attorney was so great that it 
likely resulted in a total lack of communication that 
prevented an adequate defense and frustrated a fair 
presentation of the case. 
Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d at 359 (citations omitted).  
 
¶73 In addressing the first Lomax factor, we acknowledge 
that the circuit court did not conduct a colloquy to more fully 
develop the substance of McDowell's complaint.  However, as the 
State notes, this must be set against "the fact that neither 
[defense 
counsel] 
nor 
McDowell 
offered 
any 
evidence 
of 
incompetency or of a conflict that made counsel's continued 
representation untenable."  In light of the record, we agree 
that the circuit court cannot reasonably be faulted for failing 
to make a full inquiry. 
 
¶74 The second Lomax factor supports upholding the circuit 
court's decision.  We have previously noted that "defendants in 
criminal cases often attempt to secure last-minute substitution 
of counsel to delay the trial, and the practice has 'plagued' 
the criminal courts in Milwaukee county."  Kazee, 146 Wis. 2d at 
373.  Given the number of adjournments in this case, along with 
the lack of clear expression on the part of both defense counsel 
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
33 
 
and McDowell, it is understandable why the circuit court 
rejected McDowell's eleventh-hour attempt to fire counsel. 
 
¶75 Finally, the third Lomax factor also favors the 
circuit court.  The record does not support that the alleged 
conflict between McDowell and defense counsel was so great that 
it resulted in a total lack of communication, or prevented an 
adequate defense.  Indeed, as the State observes, it seems 
likely that the court's remarks to McDowell regarding the 
advisability of cooperating with counsel persuaded him to 
communicate with counsel.  The fact that McDowell disagreed with 
his attorney over the presentation of his testimony does not, in 
our view, automatically create "an irreconcilable conflict which 
leads to an apparently unjust verdict."  State v. Wanta, 224 
Wis. 2d 679, 703, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999).   
 
¶76 Based on these factors, we cannot conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying 
McDowell new counsel.  Accordingly, we reject his claim.  
VI 
¶77 In sum, we agree with the court of appeals that 
defense counsel may not substitute narrative questioning for the 
traditional question and answer format unless counsel knows that 
the client intends to testify falsely.  Absent the most 
extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge must be based on the 
client's expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully.  
We further determine that attorneys must advise the client, 
opposing counsel, and the circuit court of the change of 
questioning style prior to use of the narrative.  
No. 
02-1203-CR   
 
34 
 
¶78 In the case before us, we conclude that defense 
counsel's performance was deficient in two respects: (1) he 
shifted to narrative questioning without advising his client 
beforehand; and (2) he used narrative questioning despite 
believing that his client intended to testify truthfully.  We 
also conclude, however, that McDowell suffered no prejudice 
under the facts of this case.  Finally, we reject McDowell's 
claim that the circuit court erred in failing to permit him new 
counsel.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
¶79 DIANE S. SYKES, J. did not participate. 
 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶80 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  While I 
agree with the majority opinion's conclusion to affirm the 
judgment, I write separately because I would hold that:  (1) 
counsel has knowledge that his or her client intends to testify 
falsely 
when 
his 
or 
her 
belief 
is 
based 
on 
objective 
uncontradicted facts; (2) counsel's representation of McDowell 
was not deficient under the standards set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as explained in Nix v. 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986);20 and (3) counsel with knowledge 
that his client is about to commit perjury should not passively 
facilitate it.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶81 McDowell, who was convicted of five counts of sexual 
assault while using a dangerous weapon, as party to the crime, 
complains he did not have effective assistance of counsel 
because when he began to tell his version of how his semen came 
to be mixed with the victim's saliva at the crime scene, defense 
counsel switched to a narrative form of testimony, instead of 
assisting McDowell in bringing out all the details of his story.  
The majority concludes that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, although not prejudicial, because in order to refuse 
                                                 
20 The majority opinion notes that the State has conceded 
that trial counsel rendered deficient performance at trial.  
Majority op., ¶52.  However, while the arguments of counsel are 
very helpful, they do not restrict our analysis of the legal 
issues presented on appeal.  Randy A. J. v. Norma I. J., 2004 WI 
41, ¶31 n.15, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 677 N.W.2d 630. 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
to present a defendant's trial testimony in the usual question 
and answer format, trial counsel must have knowledge that the 
defendant is going to commit perjury.  According to the majority 
opinion, that knowledge must be based on "the client's expressed 
admission of intent to testify untruthfully [and the client's 
admission] must be unambiguous and directly made to the 
attorney."21  The majority opinion concludes that the change to a 
narrative presentation of McDowell's testimony by trial counsel 
was deficient performance22 because McDowell had not personally 
told trial counsel that he was going to testify untruthfully;23 
the beginning of McDowell's testimony was not sufficient to 
provide "knowledge" that McDowell intended to lie;24 and even if 
we were to assume it was sufficient, counsel should have asked 
for an adjournment and advised McDowell a second time25 that the 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶43. 
22 In order to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), test for ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, a defendant must prove both that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result.  
Id. at 687. 
23 Majority op., ¶53. 
24 Id. 
25 At 
the 
hearing 
held 
under 
State 
v. 
Machner, 
92 
Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979), trial counsel 
explained, "There was a juncture in discussions that Mr. 
McDowell had with myself and [Assistant State Public Defender] 
Deja Vishny on [the day he was going to testify], where there 
were several statements by Mr. McDowell[, o]ne of which [was] 
that he would proffer untruthful testimony if it would help him" 
and he told trial counsel how his story would go.  At that time, 
trial counsel advised McDowell that if he chose to tell that 
untruthful story, he would have to testify in the narrative, and 
counsel explained what a narrative form of testimony was. 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
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testimony he was about to give would have to be in a narrative 
form.26 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
¶82 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Franklin, 2001 WI 104, 
¶12, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289.  We will not overturn a 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  However, whether trial counsel's representation 
was deficient or prejudicial to a defendant's case are questions 
of law that we review de novo.  Id.   
B.  Knowledge of Intent to Testify Falsely 
¶83 Whether defense counsel should assist a defendant in a 
criminal trial in presenting his testimony to the trier of fact 
when defense counsel believes that the defendant will testify 
untruthfully presents a tension between a defendant's right to 
testify and the truth-seeking function upon which a trial is 
based.  See Nix, 475 U.S. at 173.  Courts have addressed this 
tension by applying various quanta of proof to the degree of 
certainty with which trial counsel holds the belief that the 
defendant will commit perjury when he or she testifies.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 545-46 (S.Ct. 2003).  
The majority opinion concludes defense counsel would not have 
sufficient knowledge to refuse to assist a criminal defendant in 
presenting 
his 
testimony, 
unless 
the 
knowledge 
that 
the 
defendant planned to testify untruthfully was obtained by the 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶52. 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
defendant's own admission of such intent made directly to trial 
counsel.27     
¶84 McDowell agrees with the majority position, that 
sufficient knowledge of the intent to commit perjury is present 
only when the defendant tells his or her attorney that he or she 
will lie on the stand.  The State asks us to conclude that 
sufficient knowledge may be based on facts obtained from sources 
other than a defendant's admission, and to apply "firm factual 
basis" as the necessary quantum of proof for those facts.  It 
cites Mitchell, supra, as supportive of its position.   
¶85 In Mitchell, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviewed 
various standards of proof applied by courts that have wrestled 
with deciding on a workable standard for sufficient knowledge by 
criminal defense counsel that his or her client is planning to 
commit perjury.28  The court in Mitchell decided to require "a 
firm basis" in objective fact for counsel's knowledge because it 
concluded that quantum of proof provided a proper balance 
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶43. 
28 In Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 545-46 (S.Ct. 
2003), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted the 
following standards have been used for determining when defense 
counsel has sufficient knowledge for determining that a client 
is about to commit perjury:  a "firm factual basis," United 
States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 
1977); "actual knowledge," United States v. Del Carpio-Cotrina, 
733 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D. Fla. 1990); "knowledge beyond a 
reasonable doubt," Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379 (Del. 
1989); "compelling support," Sanborn v. State, 474 So.2d 309, 
313 
n.2 
(Fla. 
Dist. 
Ct. 
App. 
1985); 
a 
"good-faith 
determination," People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1991); and "good cause to believe the defendant's proposed 
testimony would be deliberately untruthful," State v. Hischke, 
639 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 2002). 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
between a lawyer's duty of candor toward the tribunal, by not 
aiding a client who intends to testify falsely, and a criminal 
defendant's right to a vigorous defense.  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 
546-47.  The court also explained that to require too great a 
quantum of proof, would compel defense counsel to remain silent 
when a sharp private warning to his or her client could prevent 
perjury by persuading the client to testify truthfully or not at 
all.  Id. at 546. 
¶86 I agree that a proper balance between maintaining the 
truth-seeking function of a trial and a defendant's right to a 
vigorous 
defense provided 
through 
effective 
assistance of 
counsel is essential.  However, to accomplish that end, I would 
require knowledge based upon objective, uncontradicted facts as 
that which is sufficient to show a defendant's intent to present 
perjured testimony.  This standard recognizes that an attorney 
may have knowledge that his client is about to lie, without the 
client directly admitting that to counsel.  It also strikes a 
proper balance between the truth-seeking function of a trial and 
a defendant's right to present a vigorous defense.  In my view, 
applying the majority's standard will result in more perjured 
testimony than would a standard based on knowledge obtained from 
objective, uncontradicted facts, and it will place ethical 
defense attorneys in the position of having to assist with 
direct examinations of clients whom counsel know are not 
testifying truthfully. 
¶87 That standard could include, of course, a statement by 
the client that he or she intended to relate facts that are not 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
true.  It could also be satisfied by objective facts such as 
McDowell's explanation of how his semen came to be mixed with 
the victim's saliva at the crime scene.  To explain:  the victim 
told police that one of her assailants had ejaculated in her 
mouth during his sexual assault and she spat the ejaculate at 
the crime scene.  The DNA analysis of the specimen from the 
crime scene contained DNA from the victim and DNA from McDowell.  
In McDowell's version of the events, his girlfriend performed 
fellatio on him in the same location as that in which the sexual 
assault occurred.  McDowell said he ejaculated at the scene, 
with his ejaculate landing on the same spot where the victim had 
spat the ejaculate from her assailant, thereby mixing her saliva 
with his ejaculate.  Aside from the implausibility of McDowell 
being able to hit the exact same spot with his ejaculate as the 
victim had spat the assailant's ejaculate at the time of the 
sexual assault, McDowell's testimony cannot be true because if 
it were, there would be DNA from three persons in the sample the 
police had examined:  DNA from the victim, DNA from her 
assailant and DNA from McDowell.  However, the specimen 
contained DNA from only two sources:  the victim and McDowell.  
In my view, that is sufficient objective, uncontradicted facts 
such that when McDowell began to relate what supposedly occurred 
with his girlfriend, defense counsel had a sufficient quantum of 
proof to have "knowledge" that McDowell was about to commit 
perjury.   
C.  Deficient Performance 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶88 Counsel has rendered deficient performance when his or 
her representation falls below an "objective standard of 
reasonableness."  Franklin, 245 Wis. 2d 582, ¶13 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  In Nix, cited earlier, the United 
States Supreme Court, in the context of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based upon an attorney's response to a 
client's proposed perjury, discussed whether that attorney's 
performance was deficient.29   
¶89 In Nix, the defendant, Whiteside, was charged with 
murder.  When Whiteside's attorney began representing him, he 
obtained a statement from Whiteside that he had stabbed the 
victim as the victim "was pulling a pistol from underneath the 
pillow on the bed."  Nix, 475 U.S. at 160.  However, upon 
further investigation by counsel, Whiteside explained that he 
had not really seen a gun; no gun was found on the premises; and 
no one who was present at the time of the stabbing had seen a 
gun.   
¶90 Shortly before trial, Whiteside, for the first time, 
told counsel that he had seen "something metallic" in the 
victim's hand.  When asked about what he meant, Whiteside 
responded, "[I]n Howard Cook's case there was a gun.  If I don't 
say I saw a gun, I'm dead."  Id. at 161.  Trial counsel 
explained to Whiteside that such testimony would be perjury and 
                                                 
29   As stated by the Supreme Court, the issue was, "whether 
the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance 
of counsel is violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate 
with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at his 
trial."  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 159 (1986). 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
that he would not assist him in providing perjured testimony.  
Trial counsel also informed Whiteside that if he insisted on 
testifying that he saw "something metallic" in the victim's 
hand, trial counsel would advise the court that in his view 
Whiteside was going to commit perjury and that counsel would 
probably be permitted to impeach that testimony before the jury.  
Id.   
¶91 Based on counsel's statements, Whiteside testified 
truthfully and did not say he saw "something metallic" in the 
victim's hand.  Whiteside said that the reason he stabbed the 
victim was because he was afraid he was going to be shot when he 
thought the victim was reaching for a gun, thereby raising the 
issue of self-defense.  Testimony also came in that the victim 
had been seen with a sawed-off shotgun on other occasions and 
that the police search of the apartment could have been careless 
and missed a weapon. 
¶92 Whiteside was convicted of second-degree murder, which 
was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court.  Whiteside then sought 
review of his conviction by habeas corpus in the federal 
district court.  The district court affirmed, but the Eighth 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed. 
 
The 
Eighth 
Circuit 
concluded: 
[C]ounsel's actions in threatening to withdraw, advise 
the state trial judge and testify against appellant if 
appellant testified falsely, impermissibly compromised 
appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel.  
Despite 
counsel's 
legitimate 
ethical 
concerns, 
counsel's 
actions 
were 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
obligations of confidentiality and zealous advocacy. 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984).  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and took the Eighth Circuit to 
task on its legal reasoning.  The Supreme Court concluded that, 
"[A]lthough counsel must take all reasonable lawful means to 
attain the objectives of the client, counsel is precluded from 
taking steps or in any way assisting the client in presenting 
false evidence or otherwise violating the law."  Nix, 475 U.S. 
at 166.  The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyers have a dual 
ethical obligation:  an obligation to the client for zealous 
advocacy within the bounds of the law and an obligation to the 
system of justice as a whole as an officer of the court. Id. at 
168-69.  It explained: 
These standards confirm that the legal profession 
has accepted that an attorney's ethical duty to 
advance the interests of his client is limited by an 
equally solemn duty to comply with the law and 
standards of professional conduct; it specifically 
ensures that the client may not use false evidence.  
This special duty of an attorney to prevent and 
disclose frauds upon the court derives from the 
recognition that perjury is as much a crime as 
tampering with witnesses or jurors by way of promises 
and threats, and undermines the administration of 
justice. 
Id. 
(footnote 
and 
citations 
omitted). 
 
Based 
on 
these 
principles, the Supreme Court concluded that counsel had not 
rendered deficient performance.  Id. at 171. 
 
¶93 In my view, under the standards set in Nix, McDowell's 
trial counsel did not render deficient performance when he 
switched 
to 
a 
narrative 
format 
for 
the 
presentation 
of 
McDowell's 
testimony. 
 
Trial 
counsel 
had 
objective, 
uncontradicted facts sufficient to have knowledge that when 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
McDowell began testifying about what he and his girlfriend did 
that he was about to commit perjury.  As I will explain below, 
trial counsel went further than should be required in the face 
of impending perjury. 
D.  Passive Toleration of Perjury 
¶94  The majority concludes that when trial counsel has 
knowledge that a client will commit perjury during his or her 
testimony because the client has told him that he or she will do 
so, he must nevertheless continue to represent the client; call 
the client to the stand to testify; and tell the client that his 
or her testimony must be presented in the narrative format and 
what a narrative format means.30  The majority cites People v. 
Johnson, 62 Cal. App. 4th 608, 621-26 (1998) as support for this 
being the best "option" under the circumstances.31  However, the 
United States Supreme Court explained in Nix that not only was a 
lawyer not to assist in the presentation of perjured testimony, 
but a lawyer was not to "passively tolerate" a client's giving 
false testimony because to do otherwise was inconsistent with 
the purpose of a trial, what "we have long called a 'search for 
the truth.'"  Nix, 475 U.S. at 171.   
¶95 In concluding that lawyers should not "passively 
tolerate" the presentation of perjured testimony, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the approach of the majority in 
the case before us, e.g., that a lawyer should explain to the 
client how to do narrative testimony; call the client to the 
                                                 
30 Majority op., ¶47. 
31 Id., ¶47 n. 17. 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
stand and passively facilitate perjured testimony.  Id. at 170 
n.6.  The Court in Nix also pointed out that this approach in 
treating a client's intent to present perjured testimony has 
been rejected by most courts and rejected by the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Id. at 170. 
¶96 While it is beyond dispute that a defendant has the 
right to testify in his own defense, State v. Fritz, 212 Wis. 2d 
284, 292, 569 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1997), that right is not 
absolute.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
Whatever the scope of a constitutional right to 
testify, it is elementary that such a right does not 
extend to testifying falsely.  . . .  Having 
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an 
obligation to speak truthfully. 
Nix, 475 U.S. at 173.  Therefore, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that for defense counsel to actively persuade a 
criminal defendant to testify truthfully or not to testify at 
all by explaining that he or she will withdraw from further 
representation if the client persists in a claimed right to tell 
a story counsel knows is false was the proper route to follow 
because it "deprives the defendant of neither his right to 
counsel nor the right to testify truthfully."  Id. at 173-74.  I 
fully agree with this rationale, which has been the rule of law 
in the United States Supreme Court in all cases this writer 
could find.  The truth is the foundation of our justice system, 
as Justice Benjamin Cardozo so aptly stated: 
There is a privilege protecting communications between 
attorney and client.  The privilege takes flight if 
the relation is abused.  A client who consults an 
attorney for advice that will serve him in the 
commission of a fraud will have no help from the law.  
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). 
¶97 Accordingly, I would conclude that counsel should 
follow the example of trial counsel in Nix who, by explaining to 
Whiteside that counsel would not tolerate perjured testimony and 
that if necessary he would disclose Whiteside's perjury to the 
court or withdraw, persuaded Whiteside to testify truthfully.  
In so doing, Whiteside maintained his right to testify and 
counsel was not put in the position of suborning perjury.   
¶98 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully concur. 
No.  02-1203-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1