Title: STATE v KNOX
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83-001
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1984

NO. 83-01 I N TIIE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1953 STATE O F MONTANA, and CITY O F BOZEMAN, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- K E N N E T H CHARLES KNOX , Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of G a l l a t i n , The IIonorable W. W. Lessley, Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: J. Cort Harrington, Jr. argue2, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana James M. Scheier argued, A s s t . A t t y . General, Helena Mary Crumbaker-Smith, Bozeman, Montana - Submitted: October 28, 1983 Decided: January 23, 1984 F i l e d : $ / ' g ( ) ' r' -- Clerk Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District of the State of Montana in and for the County of Gallatin, following the conviction of appellant, for driving under the influence of alcohol. Appellant was first convicted in the city of Bozeman, by a city court jury. He appealed to the District Court for a trial de novo, made motions to exclude evidence which were denied, later moved for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial which was denied, and was convicted. He appeals that conviction. Appellant was arrested March 6, 1981, and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. He testified he had one beer and four scotch drinks over a period of a couple of hours, prior to his arrest. He was stopped a few blocks from his home by the city police and was taken to the police department, where he was given a breath-alcohol test approximately one half-hour after his arrest. The appellant was given several breath-alcohol tests after being taken to the police department, many of which were thrown away because the officer testified that he wanted to give the appellant a "fair chance." The second test he was given had a reading of .I108 and in addition he was tested to a .135%. After being tested, the appellant was driven home by the police department. He then called a friend who took him to the police station for a retest. He was refused a retest, but was told he could go to the hospital for a blood test. At 11:35 p.m., some three hours after he was first arrested, the blood test showed an alcohol blood content of Five issues were presented in this appeal. However, in view of the fact that the one controlling issue that necessitates a reversal and dismissal is the fact that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, the other issues raised on this appeal will not be discussed. The appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and by Article 11, Section 24 of the Constitution of Montana; furthermore that right is implemented by Section 46-13-201(2), MCA. While Article 11, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution does not specify the exact period of time that must elapse before the right to a speedy trial has been violated, the legislature did provide and did implement Article 11, Section 24, by specifying that unless good cause is shown, a misdemeanor must be dismissed if not brought to trial within six months, see Section 46-13-201(2), MCA, which provides: "The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution be dismissed if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon his application is not brought to trial within 6 months after entry of plea upon a complaint, information, or indictment charging a misdemeanor." These statutes were all enacted for the purpose of enforcing a constitutional right and they constitute a legislative construction or definition of the constitutional provisions, and must be construed fairly to accomplish that GOUS* result. See State v. P l c w (1942), 113 Mont. 591, 131 P.2d 262. In the case of Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 112-113, the court declined to specify a period of time after which the right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, would be violated. It did recognize the right of the legislature to set such a specified period of time, as has been done in Montana. In this case the appellant appealed his city court conviction on July 10, 1981. A trial date was not set in the District Court until August 19, 1982, and trial was not held until November 15, 1982. Plaintiff argues that conceding for purposes of argument that part of this time may be attributable to the appellant and not to the State, the six-month period prescribed by Section 46-13-201(2), MCA, elapsed some time between January 6, 1982, the date the District Court denied the motion to suppress, and July 20, 1982, the date the appellant made a motion to dismiss the charge for failure to bring the case to trial within six months. The State admits that a period of 195 days are so-called "dead time" or arose as a result of unintentional "institutional delays" and are therefore inexplainable. The appellant argues that the opinion of this Court in State v. Schnell (1939), 107 Mont. 579, 88 P.2d 19, is internally inconsistent, and was overruled by legislative action in its enactment of Section 46-13-201(2), MCA. Not so! The Schnell decision reveals that it is still valid, and the reasoning is directly applicable to the facts in the instant case. In Schnell, the defendant was convicted in justice court, of driving while under the influence of alcohol. He appealed his conviction to the district court, and was again found guilty in a trial de novo. He appealed t o t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t , and on t h e speedy t r i a l issue t h e Court h e l d a s f o l l o w s : "The c r i m e was a l l e g e d t o h a v e b e e n c o m m i t t e d o n December 23, 1 9 3 5 . On December 30, 1935, d e f e n d a n t was t r i e d i n j u s t i c e c o u r t and found g u i l t y . The a p p e a l was t a k e n on December 31. On J a n u a r y 1 3 , 1937, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d h i s motion t o d i s m i s s under s e c t i o n 12223, Revised Codes. The r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h a t s e c t i o n and o f s e c t i o n 16 of A r t i c l e I11 o f o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n , g i v i n g t o t h e accused t h e r i g h t of a speedy t r i a l , were m e t by t h e t r i a l i n t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t . On a p p e a l t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h e d e f e n d a n t does n o t have t h e b e n e f i t o f s e c t i o n 12223. On a p p e a l t h e t r i a l is d e novo . . . . I t is t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes a second o r new t r i a l . 'Where t h e accused h a s been t r i e d promptly and c o n v i c t e d , and on h i s own motion t h e c o n v i c t i o n is set a s i d e and a new t r i a l o r d e r e d , he w i l l n o t be e n t i t l e d t o a d i s c h a r g e under t h e s t a t u t e because o f t h e d e l a y o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t r y i n g him t h e second t i m e * * * it being h e l d t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y requirements a r e s a t i s f i e d by a speedy t r i a l . "' S c h n e l l , 107 Mont. a t 582, 88 P.2d a t 20. I t a p p e a r s t h a t S e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 3 - 2 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA, i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o a t r i a l d e novo i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t . A t r i a l d e novo is a "new t r i a l , " one which d o e s n o t s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , a r i s e o u t of e n t r y of p l e a upon a c o m p l a i n t , b u t a r i s e s o u t of an a p p e a l . The s t a t u t o r y speedy t r i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of S e c t i o n 46-13-201(2), MCA, were complied w i t h i n t h i s c a s e . The d e f e n d a n t was brought t o t r i a l i n c i t y c o u r t w i t h i n t h e six-month p e r i o d p e r m i t t e d by t h e s t a t u t e . The q u e s t i o n t h e n a r i s e s a s t o whether a t r i a l d e novo, o r "new t r i a l , " is s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of a speedy t r i a l . I n S t a t e v. S a n d e r s , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 372, t h i s C o u r t adopted S t a n d a r d 12-2.2(c) of t h e American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n S t a n d a r d s f o r C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e . That s t a n d a r d b a s i c a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t , i n c a s e s of a p p e a l , o r an o r d e r f o r a new . t r i a l , t h e time f o r t r i a l should begin running from t h e d a t e of t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e new t r i a l . I n S a n d e r s , t h i s Court a p p l i e d t h a t s t a n d a r d i n t h e c o n t e x t of a remand f o r a new t r i a l f o l l o w i n g an a p p e a l t o t h e Montana Supreme Court. S a n d e r s , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. a t 214, 516 P.2d a t 375. The r a t i o n a l e h a s - n o t y e t been extended t o cover a t r i a l d e novo i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o l l o w i n g an a p p e a l from a lower c o u r t c o n v i c t i o n , and t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n S c h n e l l h a s n o t been o v e r r u l e d . W e hold t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l g u a r a n t e e d by A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 24 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n was v i o l a t e d and it n e c e s s i t a t e s a r e v e r s a l of t h e c o n v i c t i o n and t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e c h a r g e , being t h e o n l y meaningful remedy f o r a v i o l a t i o n of t h e i m p o r t a n t r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Barker v. Wingo, supra. The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e is d i s m i s s e d . 1 W e concur: %4&"&q Chief J u s t i c e Mr. J u s t i c e L.C. Gulbrandson d i s s e n t i n g . I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n S t a t e v. S c h n e l l ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 107 Mont. 579, 88 P.2d 1 9 , h a s n o t been o v e r r u l e d , b u t I do n o t a g r e e t h a t , under Barker v. Wingo, t h e c h a r g e should be d i s m i s s e d . The d e l a y h e r e a p p e a r s t o be s u f f i c i e n t t o s h i f t t o t h e S t a t e t h e burden of e x p l a i n i n g t h e d e l a y and showing absence o f p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . Approximately 221 d a y s of t h e d e l a y a r e d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e f i l i n g and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m u l t i p l e d e f e n s e motions t o s u p p r e s s and a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l . The remaining p e r i o d of time c h a r g a b l e t o t h e S t a t e a p p e a r s t o be t h e r e s u l t o f " i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l a y , " w h i c h h a s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d t o w e i g h l e s s h e a v i l y t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l d e l a y s by t h e S t a t e . Although p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s been i d e n t i f i e d a s one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r B a r k e r v . Wingo, I f i n d l i t t l e p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t h e r e . The d e f e n d a n t was n o t i n c a r c e r a t e d f o r t h e o f f e n s e , h e o b t a i n e d a s t a y o f e x e c u t i o n of s e n t e n c e and r e t u r n of h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e , and none of h i s r i g h t s were c u r t a i l e d . The d e f e n d a n t d o e s c l a i m t h a t a d e f e n s e w i t n e s s d i e d d u r i n g t h e i n t e r i m , b u t it is obvious t h a t t h e w i t n e s s was known t o t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e of t h e f i r s t t r i a l , b u t was n o t c a l l e d a s a w i t n e s s f o r good r e a s o n s . T h a t w i t n e s s d i e d 6 4 d a y s a f t e r t h e d e f e n d a n t appealed h i s c i t y c o u r t c o n v i c t i o n , b u t t e n months b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . I would a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t d e p r i v e d o f h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . / '