Title: Wright v. Eckhardt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 030181
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
CECILIA ANN WRIGHT 
 
v.  Record No. 030181     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
TROY D. ECKHARDT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Joseph Canada, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the doctrine of res 
judicata bars giving full faith and credit to a judgment of 
the Texas Court of Appeals. 
 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Cecilia Ann Wright 
and Troy D. Eckhardt were divorced in 1993.  Pursuant to the 
divorce decree entered by the District Court of Nueces County, 
Texas, Wright was awarded a portion of Eckhardt's military 
retirement benefits when he retired.  In 1998, after Eckhardt 
retired from active military service, Wright obtained a 
clarifying order from the Texas court establishing the formula 
for computing her share of Eckhardt's pension.  Later that 
same year, Wright came to Virginia, where Eckhardt resided, 
and filed suit in the City of Virginia Beach General District 
Court seeking a judgment against Eckhardt for unpaid amounts 
due under the Texas decree.  The general district court 
entered judgment in favor of Wright for $3,331.44. 
Eckhardt appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of 
the City of Virginia Beach.  Prior to a hearing on his appeal, 
Eckhardt obtained a second clarifying order from the Texas 
court.  In that order, issued June 3, 1999, the Texas court 
concluded that Wright was not entitled to payments based on 
Eckhardt's military retirement because Eckhardt was still a 
member of the Fleet Reserve and therefore not retired.  At the 
August 24, 1999 hearing of Eckhardt's de novo appeal from the 
general district court, the Circuit Court of the City of 
Virginia Beach entered judgment in favor of Eckhardt based on 
the second clarifying order of the Texas court. 
 
Wright did not appeal the August 24, 1999 order of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach but did appeal the 
June 3, 1999 second clarifying order of the Texas court to the 
Texas Court of Appeals.*  The Texas Court of Appeals entered 
judgment on November 9, 2000 reversing the second clarifying 
order and holding that Wright was entitled to payments based 
on Eckhardt's military retirement. 
 
In November 2001, Wright filed the instant action in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach seeking $9,325.28 
plus interest and attorney's fees based on the November 2000 
judgment of the Texas Court of Appeals.  The trial court 
dismissed Wright's action, holding that the doctrine of res 
                     
* Apparently, at the August 24, 1999 hearing the trial 
court did not inquire whether the June 1993 order was a final 
order, and neither Eckhardt nor Wright, who appeared pro se 
 
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judicata as applied in Kessler v. Fauquier National Bank, 195 
Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440 (1954), precluded Wright's action 
based on the Texas Court of Appeals' November 2000 order.  We 
awarded Wright an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Eckhardt asserts here as he did in the trial court that 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude 
Wright from pursuing an action based on the November 2000 
order of the Texas Court of Appeals.  We disagree. 
The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from 
relitigating a cause of action when a valid final judgment has 
been entered on the matter; a factual issue actually litigated 
and essential to a final judgment may not be relitigated in a 
subsequent proceeding under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.  Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 382, 541 S.E.2d 899, 
901 (2001).  The party seeking to apply either doctrine has 
the burden of establishing that the claim or issue is 
precluded by the prior judgment.  Id.
 
Eckhardt asserts that the issue resolved in the August 
24, 1999 order of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia 
Beach is the same issue that Wright is asserting in the 
instant case.  According to Eckhardt, the issue in both cases 
                                                                
via telephone, volunteered any information about an appeal of 
the Texas order. 
 
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was whether the retirement payments should be paid to Wright.  
However, the Virginia courts were never asked to determine 
whether Wright was entitled to retirement payments; the issue 
in each Virginia case was whether a judgment of a foreign 
jurisdiction should be given full faith and credit by a 
Virginia court. 
When considering questions of full faith and credit, the 
Virginia court is not concerned with whether the foreign 
judgment is legally correct.  The Virginia court's inquiry 
focuses on whether the foreign court had jurisdiction to enter 
the judgment.  Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va. 18, 21-22, 267 
S.E.2d 96, 98 (1980).  The jurisdiction of the Texas courts to 
enter the various orders was not challenged in either Virginia 
proceeding.  The issue resolved by the August 1999 order of 
the Virginia court was whether full faith and credit should be 
given to the second clarifying order of the Texas trial court.  
The issue in the instant case is whether full faith and credit 
should be given to the November 2000 judgment of the Texas 
Court of Appeals.  In the absence of an identity of claims or 
issues, the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
fail. 
Finally, Kessler does not require a different result.  
That case involved a claim by Oliver Kessler that he was the 
surviving spouse of Rose Kessler and entitled to participate 
 
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in the distribution of her estate, even though Rose Kessler 
had obtained a divorce from him in Florida.  In his first 
suit, Kessler maintained that the Florida court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree.  After considering 
evidence on the issue of jurisdiction, the Virginia trial 
court held that the Florida court did have jurisdiction to 
enter the divorce decree, and therefore Kessler was not Rose 
Kessler's surviving spouse and not entitled to take from the 
proceeds of her estate.  Kessler, 195 Va. at 1098-99, 81 
S.E.2d at 442. 
Following that decision, Kessler instituted a suit in 
Florida in which the Florida court declared the divorce decree 
void for lack of jurisdiction.  Kessler then filed a second 
suit in Virginia, asking that the Virginia court give full 
faith and credit to the Florida decree holding that the 
divorce decree was void and allow him to participate in the 
distribution of his wife's estate.  The Virginia court 
declined to do so.  Id. at 1100-01, 81 S.E.2d at 442-43. 
In affirming the trial court, we pointed out that, in the 
first proceeding, the Virginia court was entitled to and did 
address whether the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter 
the divorce decree.  Thus, the substantive issue of 
jurisdiction was litigated and resolved by the Virginia court.  
In his second Virginia proceeding, Kessler sought full faith 
 
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and credit for a Florida decree that addressed the same 
substantive issue already decided by the Virginia court:  
whether the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter the 
divorce decree.  Concluding that consideration of full faith 
and credit included applying the doctrine of res judicata to 
matters of jurisdiction, we held that Kessler's second action 
was barred because the Virginia court had decided the issue of 
jurisdiction in the prior proceeding.  Id. at 1101-02, 81 
S.E.2d at 443. 
Unlike Kessler, in the present litigation the issue of 
jurisdiction has not been raised or addressed in either the 
Virginia or Texas proceedings, and the order of the Virginia 
court in the first proceeding did not resolve any issue 
subsequently addressed by the Texas Court of Appeals.  The 
factual differences between Kessler and the instant case make 
the decision in that case inapplicable here. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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