Title: Coleman v. Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S03-1008-CR-458
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2011

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Cara Schaefer Wieneke 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Wieneke Law Office, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ian McLean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 20S03-1008-CR-458 
 
TYRUS D. COLEMAN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court, No. 20C01-0703-MR-1 
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A03-0904-CR-185 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
May 18, 2011 
 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
May 18 2011, 9:54 am
 
2 
 
In this opinion we discuss among other things whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
United States Constitution precludes the State from retrying a defendant where in the first trial 
the jury acquitted the defendant of murder with respect to one victim but failed to return a verdict 
on a charge of attempted murder with respect to another victim.  We conclude it does not.   
 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
In a tragic incident occurring March 18, 2007, Tyrus Coleman shot his friends Anthony 
Dye and Dye‟s son Jermaine Jackson during a confrontation on Coleman‟s property, where 
Coleman operated a music recording studio.  The confrontation stemmed from an event 
occurring approximately four months earlier in which Omar Sharpe, one of Coleman‟s musician 
clients, robbed Dye at gunpoint.  Coleman retrieved part of the stolen property from Sharpe and 
returned it to Dye.  Jermaine1 was irritated when he later learned that Sharpe had robbed his 
father, but Dye asked him not to get involved.  On the afternoon of the shootings, Jermaine 
discovered that Sharpe was present at Coleman‟s studio and frantically phoned Dye to “[c]ome 
over here right now.”  Tr. 1 at 131.2  Armed with a handgun Dye headed to Coleman‟s studio.  In 
the meantime an armed and agitated Jermaine pushed open the door to the studio and attempted 
to enter.  Sharpe, who was present inside, prevented Jermaine‟s entry and closed the door.  
Exiting the studio Coleman attempted to calm Jermaine and to dissuade him from trying to enter.  
Coleman called a neighbor to come over to help calm Jermaine; he also called his business 
partner to inform him of the situation.  The neighbor testified that he tried to talk with Jermaine 
by telling him what he [Jermaine] was doing “wasn‟t worth it.  Just go ahead and leave.  There 
was kids around and people around that didn‟t have nothing to do with what they was angry 
about.”  Tr. 1 at 220-21.  According to the witness Jermaine responded by saying, “F**k that.  
He didn‟t think about that s**t when he did the s**t to my Daddy.”  Tr. 1 at 221.  Coleman 
armed himself, Tr. 1 at 286, and walked back and forth in front of the studio door holding his 
                                                 
1 For the sake of consistency with the parties‟ briefs, we refer to Jermaine Jackson by first name and the 
other actors by last name. 
2 We cite the transcript from Coleman‟s first trial as “Tr. 1” and the transcript from his second trial as “Tr. 
2.” 
 
3 
handgun at his side.  State‟s Ex. 25 at 03:32:20.3  As Coleman was making a phone call, Dye 
came into the yard through a front gate carrying a handgun which was pointed toward the 
ground.  Dye strode toward his son Jermaine, who was standing next to Coleman on the patio in 
front of the studio.  Within three seconds, the following occurred:  Dye stepped onto the patio 
where Jermaine and Coleman were standing.  As Dye stepped in front of Coleman, Coleman 
raised his gun and fired at Dye, who immediately fell to the ground.  Coleman then shot Dye a 
second time.  At that point Coleman “turned to Jermaine.”  Tr. 1 at 330.  Coleman saw that 
Jermaine‟s handgun, which before that time had been concealed under his shirt and in a holster, 
was “pointed at [Coleman],” Tr. 1 at 330; and Coleman shot Jermaine.  Jermaine fell to the 
ground, State‟s Ex. 25 at 03:35:33-03:35:36, and died at the scene as a result of his injuries.  
After the shooting, Coleman drove to Milwaukee disposing of his weapon along the way.  
Several days later he returned to Elkhart and surrendered to the police. 
 
The State charged Coleman with murder, a felony, for the death of Jermaine and 
attempted murder, a Class A felony, for shooting Dye.  During a jury trial conducted in February 
2008 Coleman testified and admitted the shootings, but contended that his actions against both 
Jermaine and Dye were justified on the basis of self-defense.  The jury returned a verdict of not 
guilty on the murder charge, but was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge.  
The trial court thus declared a mistrial on that count and scheduled another trial.  Prior to retrial 
Coleman filed a motion to dismiss contending a subsequent trial on attempted murder was barred 
by collateral estoppel and would therefore violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the 
United States and Indiana Constitutions.  See Appellant‟s App. at 147.  After a hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion.  A retrial ensued, at the conclusion of which the jury found Coleman 
guilty as charged.  Thereafter the trial court sentenced him to a term of forty-five years.  
Coleman appealed raising several issues for review.  In a divided opinion the Court of Appeals 
reversed Coleman‟s conviction on grounds of collateral estoppel.  Coleman v. State, 924 N.E.2d 
659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  Having previously granted transfer thereby vacating the opinion of the 
                                                 
3 As part of the recording studio‟s security system, video cameras were present in the vicinity of the 
studio.  Tr. 1 at 187.  The security system recorded the events of the day onto DVDs, which were 
admitted into evidence as State‟s Exhibits 25 and 34.  We reference State‟s Exhibit 25 in hours, minutes, 
and seconds as time-stamped on the video recording.   
 
4 
Court of Appeals, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we now affirm Coleman‟s conviction.  
Additional facts are set forth below where necessary.      
 
Discussion 
I. 
Collateral Estoppel 
 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”4  Collateral estoppel (also referred to as issue preclusion) has been 
characterized as an “awkward phrase” however “it stands for an extremely important principle in 
our adversary system of justice.  It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once 
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 
same parties in any future lawsuit.”  Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).  Collateral 
estoppel is not the same as double jeopardy, but rather it is embodied within the protection 
against double jeopardy.  “„[T]he traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the 
crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the 
government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.‟”  Little v. 
State, 501 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind. 1986) (quoting United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 341, 343-44 
(5th Cir. 1979)).  In essence the doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes the Government from 
relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury‟s acquittal in a prior trial.”  Yeager 
v. United States, ___U.S.___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2009).  To decipher what a jury 
necessarily decided in a prior trial, courts should “examine the record of a prior proceeding, 
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude 
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the 
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.”  Id. at 2367 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444).  
 
 
                                                 
4 A similarly worded provision of the Indiana Constitution provides, “No person shall be put in jeopardy 
twice for the same offense.”  Ind. Const. art. 1, § 14.  Although Coleman cites Article 1 section 14, he 
advances no argument concerning the Indiana Constitution.  We thus address the Double Jeopardy claim 
under the Federal Constitution only.   
 
5 
 
Coleman contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the attempted 
murder charge following the first trial.  He argues the second trial violated his protection against 
double jeopardy by allowing the State to relitigate an issue already definitively decided in the 
first trial, namely, that he acted in self-defense when shooting Dye.  According to Coleman, “the 
jury‟s acquittal of Coleman on the murder charge could only have been based on its 
determination that Coleman acted in defense of himself and/or another person.”  Br. of Appellant 
at 16.  
 
A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.  
Randolph v. State, 755 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind. 2001).  In order to prevail on a claim of self-
defense a defendant must show: (1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted 
without fault; and (3) he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.  Id. at 576; see also 
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2.  Here, Coleman seems to contend that because of the brief interval 
between the two shootings, they necessarily amounted to a single transaction.  Thus, the 
conclusion is that Coleman‟s general fear of death or great bodily harm applied equally to 
Jermaine and Dye.  This argument is unavailing.  To begin, Coleman was charged separately 
with the murder of Jermaine and the attempted murder of Dye.  See Appellant‟s App. at 17.  It is 
true that in the first trial, the trial court did not instruct the jury on the elements of self-defense 
separately with respect to each victim.  See Appellant‟s App. at 112.  However, during 
summation Coleman‟s counsel specifically addressed the separate shootings and argued each 
was justified by Coleman‟s reasonable imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury from Dye, 
and then from Jermaine.  See Tr. 1 at 378, 382-83, 388, 390-94.     
 
 
Further, for the sake of argument we accept as true that the jury‟s acquittal of Coleman 
on the murder charge in the first trial was based on its belief that Coleman acted in self-defense.  
But, the jury could have rationally concluded that the act of self-defense was in response to the 
conduct of Jermaine only.  The jury was not bound to believe that Coleman likewise acted in 
self-defense with respect to Dye.  Stated differently, the jury could very well have determined 
that Jermaine so threatened Coleman and others on the property that he was justified in using 
deadly force to protect himself and others from Jermaine.  The record shows for example that an 
armed and agitated Jermaine had attempted to gain access to the studio in pursuit of Sharpe, and 
 
6 
that although Coleman fired his weapon first at Dye, it was only Jermaine and not Dye who 
actually pointed his own weapon at Coleman.  And there was testimony that Jermaine fired his 
weapon in Coleman‟s direction.  Tr. 1 at 208, 300-02.  Coleman responded by firing at Jermaine 
resulting in fatal injury.  In essence the acquittal relating to the murder of Jermaine even if based 
on self-defense did not amount to the jury determining that Coleman acted in self-defense with 
respect to the attempted murder of Dye.  Thus, in retrying Coleman the State did not relitigate an 
issue that was necessarily decided by the jury in the first trial.  Instead, the jury was asked to 
make the determination of whether Coleman acted in self-defense when he shot Dye.  This issue 
was not decided during the first trial.  Thus, collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation.  And the 
trial court correctly denied Coleman‟s motion to dismiss.  Because the Court of Appeals reversed 
the judgment of the trial court on this issue, it did not address Coleman‟s remaining claims.  We 
do so now.  
 
II.  
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
 
Coleman contends the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by (i) presenting false 
testimony that the State knew to be false, and (ii) further using the false testimony to the State‟s 
advantage during closing argument.  The essential facts are these.  During the first trial, Dye 
testified that upon entering Coleman‟s backyard he “asked [Jermaine] where [Sharpe] was at” 
and he “might” have done so using foul and offensive language, specifically “where that n****r 
at[?]”  Tr. 1 at 135.  During the second trial, Dye responded “No” when the prosecutor asked, 
“Did you say anything to [Coleman]?”  Tr. 2 at 146.  On cross-examination Coleman‟s counsel 
asked Dye if he had said “anything to anybody” [including Jermaine] as he walked into the 
backyard, to which Dye responded “No.”  Tr. 2 at 156.  Coleman‟s counsel made no effort to 
confront Dye with his inconsistent statement from the first trial, and the prosecutor did not point 
out the inconsistency.  In his closing argument the prosecutor highlighted Coleman‟s own 
statement given to police in which he said that “[Dye] didn‟t say anything” when he entered the 
yard, as well as Dye‟s trial testimony to that effect.  Tr. 2 at 535-36.   
 
 
 
7 
Coleman does not identify any objection presented at trial to the asserted prosecutorial 
misconduct and concedes “[u]nfortunately, the claim has not been properly preserved in this case 
. . . .”  Br. of Appellant at 24.  See Johnson v. State, 725 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 2000) (declaring 
that a party‟s failure to present a contemporaneous trial objection asserting prosecutorial 
misconduct results in waiver of appellate review).  
 
If a defendant properly raises and preserves the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, then 
the reviewing court determines (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and if so, (2) 
whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of 
grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected.  Baer v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752, 
756 (Ind. 2007).  Where a claim of prosecutorial misconduct has not been properly preserved, 
our standard for review is different from that of a properly preserved claim.  More specifically, 
the defendant must establish not only the grounds for the misconduct but also the additional 
grounds for fundamental error.  Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006).  Fundamental 
error is an extremely narrow exception that allows a defendant to avoid waiver of an issue.  It is 
error that makes “a fair trial impossible or constitute[s] clearly blatant violations of basic and 
elementary principles of due process . . . present[ing] an undeniable and substantial potential for 
harm.”  Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002).   
 
 
In this case we do not reach the question of fundamental error because we conclude 
Coleman has not carried his burden of demonstrating misconduct.  It is of course true that “[t]he 
prosecution may not stand mute while testimony known to be false is received into evidence.  
False evidence, when it appears, must not go uncorrected.”  Sigler v. State, 700 N.E.2d 809, 813 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (internal citation omitted).  But the fact of contradictory or inconsistent 
testimony does not mean the testimony is false.  See Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 253 
(Ind. 1997) (“While the knowing use of perjured testimony may constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct, contradictory or inconsistent testimony by a witness does not constitute perjury.”).  
Dye‟s testimony during retrial that he said nothing when entering Coleman‟s yard is at most 
inconsistent with his testimony during the first trial.  To refer to the statement as false is mere 
hyperbole.  The contradictory statement was elicited by Coleman‟s counsel on cross-
examination.  However, for reasons not clear from the record before us Coleman‟s counsel did 
 
8 
not capitalize on this opportunity by confronting Dye with this apparent inconsistency.  When 
the State then referred to Dye‟s testimony in its closing argument, it first highlighted Coleman‟s 
own statement to police that Dye had said nothing.  This was fair comment on the evidence.  
These acts do not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.  Coleman‟s claim on this issue 
therefore fails. 
 
 
III. 
Exclusion of Evidence 
 
 
Coleman next contends the trial court erred by excluding the introduction of certain 
evidence.  According to Coleman not only was most of the evidence admitted during the first 
trial, but also the evidence was presented by the State in its case-in-chief during the first trial.  He 
argues, “[o]n retrial, however, the State chose not to present the evidence and even objected to its 
use by the defense.”  Br. of Appellant at 28.5  Specifically Coleman refers to statements made by 
Dye during the first trial and statements attributable to Jermaine that were introduced into 
evidence during the first trial.  Coleman also asserts error in the trial court‟s refusal to allow 
evidence that he was acquitted of Jermaine‟s murder.  
 
A. 
Statements made by Dye   
 
As discussed in Part II above, during the first trial Dye testified that upon entering 
Coleman‟s backyard he “asked [Jermaine] where [Sharpe] was at” and he “might” have done so 
using offensive language.  Tr. 1 at 135.  On retrial, the trial court permitted Coleman to testify to 
the exact words Dye uttered.  However, sustaining the State‟s hearsay objection, the trial court 
prohibited three defense witnesses from so testifying.  Instead, the trial court allowed the 
witnesses to testify that Dye said “something” as he entered the yard.  Coleman claims error.   
 
                                                 
5 Other than complaining that “[t]he retrial jury was presented with a very different case than the first 
jury,” Br. of Appellant at 27, Coleman makes no claim of error in this regard and we find none.  The fact 
of the matter is that the second trial was necessarily different.  In the first trial Coleman was faced with 
two separate charges against two separate alleged victims.  And the evidence concerning these charges 
was overlapping.  By contrast, in the second trial there was only one charge against one alleged victim.  
The State thus structured its presentation of the evidence to reflect this reality.  
 
9 
 
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.  Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c); Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002).  
Coleman contends the witnesses‟ statements were not hearsay because they were not offered for 
their truthfulness.  Instead, according to Coleman, the statements were offered to show that he 
was in fear of his life or the lives of others on his property and thus the statements supported his 
claim of self-defense.   
 
 
 
This Court has held “[w]hen a claim of self-defense is interposed, any fact which 
reasonably would place a person in fear or apprehension of death or great bodily injury is 
admissible.”  Hirsch v. State, 697 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ind. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus if Dye‟s words could reasonably be interpreted as placing Coleman in fear or apprehension 
of death or great bodily harm, then they were relevant and admissible without regard to their 
truthfulness.  The problem here however is nowhere does Coleman contend that the words 
uttered by Dye placed Coleman in such fear or apprehension.  Although Coleman testified to the 
precise language used, he did not elaborate on or express any particular concern about the 
utterances.  Instead the focus of Coleman‟s self-defense claim was on Dye‟s overall demeanor, 
and the fact that Dye was armed.  Coleman testified for example that he believed “[Dye] was 
going to come kill us.”  Tr. 2 at 399.  He also testified, “I thought [Dye] was shooting back at 
me,” Tr. 2 at 399, and that “I felt [Dye] was coming to shoot Omar, me too.”  Tr. 2 at 402.  There 
was testimony from other witnesses that Dye spoke “loudly” and he appeared as if he was “on a 
mission” and was “angry.”  Tr. 2 at 348, 457.  There is simply nothing in the record before us 
indicating that the proffered statements Dye made were of any particular concern to Coleman or 
others.  Thus, even if Dye‟s exact words were not offered for their truthfulness and thus were not 
hearsay, they were not relevant or admissible, at least through the testimony of third party 
witnesses.  And this is so because Coleman failed to demonstrate the words placed him or others 
in fear or apprehension of great bodily harm.  Accordingly, although the trial court erred in 
excluding the evidence on grounds of hearsay, the error was harmless because the evidence was 
excludable on grounds of relevance.  See Lashbrook v. State, 762 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Ind. 2002) 
(“[A]ppellate review of the exclusion of evidence is not limited to the grounds stated at trial, but 
rather the ruling will be upheld if supported by any valid basis.”). 
 
 
10 
B. 
Statements attributable to Jermaine  
 
Coleman complains that during trial he “attempted to present testimony from Yarrum 
Murray, Willie Williams, and Otis Jackson about statements that Jermaine made that day [the 
day of the shootings] in the backyard, but the trial court excluded the evidence.”  Br. of 
Appellant at 31.  Essentially, the purported testimony would have shown that on the day of the 
shootings Jermaine made statements demonstrating that he was angry, agitated, and upset.  The 
trial court excluded the testimony on grounds of hearsay and noted that Jermaine was no longer 
available for cross-examination to test the validity of the witnesses‟ accounts.  Similar to his 
claim concerning Dye‟s excluded statement, Coleman contends that Jermaine‟s statements were 
not hearsay because they were not offered for their truthfulness.  Instead, according to Coleman, 
the statements were offered to show that he was in fear for his life or the lives of others on his 
property and thus the statements supported his claim of self-defense.  In the alternative Coleman 
argues that even if hearsay the statements were nonetheless admissible under Indiana Evidence 
Rule 803(3) to show Jermaine‟s then existing state of mind.  We have a much different view.     
 
 
Coleman‟s fear for his life or the lives of others on the basis of Jermaine‟s statements has 
no relevance to his self-defense claim with respect to Dye.  Stated differently, even if it is true  
that Jermaine‟s statements placed Coleman in fear of death and great bodily harm, at most that 
fact may have supported Coleman‟s justification for fatally shooting Jermaine.  Coleman does 
not explain, nor can we discern, how his fear of Jermaine transferred to a fear of Dye.  Coleman 
contends for example that Yarrum Murray planned to testify that he drove Jermaine to the studio 
on the day of the shooting and that Jermaine was upset and repeatedly yelled for Sharpe to come 
out of the studio.  Br. of Appellant at 31.  According to Coleman, Willie Williams intended to 
testify that Jermaine called him on the day of the shooting and asked Williams to come to the 
studio, and that when he arrived, Williams asked Jermaine what was going on and Jermaine 
replied that Sharpe was inside the studio.  Br. of Appellant at 32.  Finally, according to Coleman, 
Otis Jackson intended to testify that he spoke to Jermaine in the backyard on the day of the 
shooting and told Jermaine “it wasn‟t worth it,” that children were in the area, and that an 
agitated Jermaine responded “f**k that.  [Sharpe] didn‟t think about that s**t when he did this 
s**t” to Dye.  Br. of  Appellant at 32 (quoting Tr. 1 at 220-21).   
 
 
11 
 
Assuming for the sake of argument the foregoing statements placed Coleman in fear of 
Jermaine, there is simply nothing contained in the statements suggesting they placed Coleman in 
fear of Dye.6  The trial court did not err by excluding the testimony. 
 
C.  
Evidence of Acquittal  
 
Coleman contends the trial court erred by not permitting him to introduce evidence that 
he was acquitted in the shooting death of Jermaine.  Coleman insists, “[t]he portion of the 
surveillance video played for the jury showed Coleman turn and shoot several times at Jermaine, 
for no apparent reason, after shooting Dye.  The trial court refused to allow Coleman to tell the 
jury about his prior acquittal.”  Reply Br. of Appellant at 7 (internal citation omitted). 
 
 
To support his claim of error Coleman cites Hare v. State, 467 N.E.2d 7 (Ind. 1984).  In 
that case the defendant Hare was accused of robbing a Shelbyville pharmacy.  Over the 
defendant‟s objection the trial court admitted the testimony of a pharmacist who said the 
defendant had robbed his Terre Haute store within a week of the Shelbyville robbery.  The two 
robberies were similar in several respects, but the defendant had been acquitted of the Terre 
Haute robbery.  Although acknowledging the rule that evidence of criminal conduct other than 
that charged generally is inadmissible, we declared “[e]vidence of a crime other than that 
charged is . . . admissible to show intent, motive, purpose, identity, or common scheme or plan” 
and that the defendant‟s acquittal of the charge was also admissible as it affected the weight of 
the evidence and not its admissibility.  Id. at 18.  
 
 
Hare provides Coleman no refuge.  The essential facts in this case are these.  The State 
intended to show the video of the entire shooting incident that included the shooting of both Dye 
and Jermaine.  Coleman had no objection but argued that he should be allowed to present 
evidence that he was previously charged and acquitted in the shooting death of Jermaine.  The 
trial court rejected his argument.  However, for reasons not entirely clear from the record before 
                                                 
6 Though it is not the case here, we note that in some circumstances third party threats directed at a 
defendant might well be admissible in order to support a claim of self-defense.  See Andre M. Solé, 
Annotation, Admissibility of Threats to Defendant Made by Third Parties to Support Claim of Self-
Defense in Criminal Prosecution for Assault or Homicide, 55 A.L.R.5th 449 (1998).      
 
12 
us, the shooting of Jermaine was not visible when the video was played to the jury.7  In fact the 
trial court asked counsel for Coleman, “Do you want to put on evidence that your client shot Mr. 
Dye and then turned towards Mr. Jermaine Jackson and started shooting him?  Is that what you 
want to do?”  Tr. 2 at 450.  To which counsel responded, “I don‟t want to put on evidence that 
my client shot Jermaine.  I want to put on evidence as to why my client turned towards him, and 
also because this is very relevant to our theory of the case that Tyrus Coleman was facing two 
armed men, both of whom were dangerous.”  Tr. 2 at 450. 
 
 
Here, despite Coleman‟s claim to the contrary the video did not reveal that Coleman shot 
Jermaine.  And counsel declined the trial court‟s invitation to introduce such evidence.  In the 
absence of any evidence revealing a crime against Jermaine, Coleman was not entitled to 
introduce evidence of his acquittal of a crime.  The trial court thus committed no error on this 
issue. 
 
 
IV. 
Review of Sentence  
 
 
For his final claim Coleman seeks revision of his sentence.  Article 7, section 4 of the 
Indiana Constitution provides “[t]he Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, 
the power to . . . review and revise the sentence imposed.”  Our rules authorize revision of a 
sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court‟s decision, the Court finds that the sentence 
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”  App. Rule 
7(B).  
 
 
Although citing Rule 7(B), Coleman tells us nothing about the nature of the offense other 
than to press his argument that he acted in self-defense.  As for his character Coleman points to 
the numerous letters sent to the trial court attesting to his good character and his willingness to 
                                                 
7 Indeed on at least two occasions during the course of trial, responding to Coleman‟s persistent argument 
that the video showed Coleman shooting Jermaine, the trial court observed: “The part that was shown to 
the jury did not show him shooting Jermaine in spite of what you say.  It did not show that.”  Tr. 2 at 382.  
“Well, now, you keep saying that, but that does not appear in the video.  The evidence speaks for itself.”  
Tr. 2 at 449.  There was speculation that the failure of the video to show Jermaine‟s shooting was the 
result of the compression ratio of the courtroom video screen.  Tr. 2 at 262-63.  
 
13 
help others.  “[A] defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met 
[the] inappropriateness standard of review.”  Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 
2006).  Coleman has failed in this effort.  
 
 
Concerning the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point the 
Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.  The advisory 
sentence for a Class A felony is thirty years.  See I.C. § 35-50-2-4.  Here the trial court imposed 
a sentence of forty-five years.  Although the nature of the offense may justify a revised sentence 
under some circumstances, we are not persuaded those circumstances are present in this case.  
The record shows that Coleman fired at Dye twice at close range with a .45 caliber handgun.  
The first shot struck Dye in the head.  After Dye was immobilized and fell to the ground, 
Coleman fired again striking Dye in the chest.  Further, although Coleman had the opportunity to 
do so, he never used his cell phone to contact the police and inform them that two armed and 
dangerous men were on his property.  In addition, there were a number of other adults in the 
immediate area as well as small children, including Coleman‟s own son, whose safety was put in 
jeopardy by Coleman firing his weapon.  Regarding the character of the offender, the record 
shows that Coleman has amassed a criminal record that includes six misdemeanor offenses and 
one felony offense.  Coleman was also on probation at the time of the instant offense.  We have 
not been persuaded that Coleman‟s character or the nature of his offense requires a revision of 
Coleman‟s sentence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and David, JJ., concur.