Title: Stroede v. Society Insurance
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002371, 2018AP001880
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2021

2021 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1880 & 18AP2371 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
David Stroede, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Society Insurance and Railroad Station, LLC, 
          Defendants, 
Jacob D. Tetting and West Bend Mutual Insurance 
Company, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 390 Wis. 2d 817,939 N.W.2d 614 
PDC No:2020 WI App 8 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen R. Brostrom   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
withdrew from participation.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Keith E. Trower, Krista G. LaFave Rosolino, and 
Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff & Bloch, S.C., Milwaukee. There was 
an oral argument by Keith E. Trower. 
 
For the defendant-appellant Jacob D. Tetting, there was a 
brief filed by Eric S. Darling, John Wilson, and Schmidt, 
 
 
2 
Darling & Erwin, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Eric 
S. Darling. 
 
For the defendant-appellant West Bend Mutual Insurance 
Company, there was a brief filed by Monte E. Weiss and Weiss Law 
Office, S.C., Mequon. There was an oral argument by Monte Weiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 43 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV11072) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David Stroede, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Society Insurance and Railroad Station, LLC, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Jacob D. Tetting and West Bend Mutual Insurance 
Company, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.   
 
ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
withdrew from participation. 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   The focus of this case is Wis. 
Stat. § 895.529 (2017-18),1 which immunizes and protects a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
2 
 
"possessor of real property" from claims of trespassers for 
certain conduct.  Under § 895.529(1)(a), a "[p]ossessor of real 
property" is defined as an "owner, lessee, tenant, or other 
lawful occupant of real property."  We must determine whether 
Jacob Tetting's presence in a bar meets that definition.  
¶2 
The circuit court denied summary judgment to Tetting 
and to his insurer, West Bend Mutual, concluding that Tetting 
did not fit within the definition of a "[p]ossessor of real 
property" in Wis. Stat. § 895.529(1)(a).  Specifically, the 
circuit court concluded that Tetting was not an "other lawful 
occupant of real property."2  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's decision, relying on dictionary definitions of 
"occupant" to determine that Tetting was an "other lawful 
occupant" and consequently entitled to immunity.3 
¶3 
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
because Tetting was not an "other lawful occupant of real 
property" under Wis. Stat. § 895.529.  Accordingly, we uphold 
the circuit court's denial of both Tetting and West Bend 
Mutual's motions for summary judgment and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
3 Stroede 
v. 
Soc'y 
Ins., 
2020 
WI 
App 
8, 
¶23, 
390 Wis. 2d 817, 939 N.W.2d 614. 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
3 
 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On September 20, 2014, David Stroede was drinking at 
the 
Railroad 
Station 
bar 
in 
Saukville, 
became 
extremely 
intoxicated, and punched another patron.  A bartender ordered 
Stroede to leave, and Stroede was escorted out of the bar.  
Tetting, an employee of the Railroad Station who was patronizing 
the bar with his family, saw Stroede being escorted out of the 
bar.  Several minutes later, after Tetting observed Stroede re-
enter the bar, he approached Stroede, grabbed him by the 
shoulders, and walked him backwards towards the stairway at the 
entrance of the bar.4  Upon reaching the stairway, Tetting 
released Stroede, who fell down the concrete stairs and suffered 
serious injuries. 
¶5 
Stroede filed this lawsuit against 
Tetting, 
the 
Railroad Station, and the Railroad Station's insurer, Society 
Insurance.  Stroede alleged that Tetting used excessive force 
and was negligent in the way he walked Stroede out of the bar.  
Stroede later amended the complaint to add West Bend Mutual, 
Tetting's homeowner's insurance provider. 
¶6 
The defendants filed two sets of summary judgment 
motions against Stroede.  The first set of motions, not before 
us on appeal, was filed by Railroad Station and Society 
Insurance.  The circuit court concluded that Stroede was a 
trespasser at the time of the incident and that there was no 
                                                 
4 The bar's entrance had an exterior door at ground level 
and several steps that ascended to a doorway that led into the 
bar area. 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
4 
 
basis for Stroede's negligence claim against the two parties.  
Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed all claims against both 
parties.  The other set of motions, which are the basis for this 
appeal, was comprised of motions for summary judgment filed by 
Tetting and West Bend Mutual, in which those parties asserted 
Tetting was entitled to immunity and did not owe a duty of care 
to Stroede, a trespasser.  After oral argument on these motions, 
the circuit court accepted further briefing from Tetting and 
West Bend Mutual regarding whether Tetting was a "possessor of 
real property" under Wis. Stat. § 895.529.5   
¶7 
The circuit court conducted a second hearing in which 
it denied Tetting and West Bend Mutual's motions.  The circuit 
court decided that Tetting was not a "possessor of real 
property" because he was not an "owner, lessee, tenant, or other 
lawful occupant of real property."  Specifically, the circuit 
court concluded that Tetting was not an "other lawful occupant" 
of Railroad Station because lawful occupants must exert some 
degree of control over the property and must possess a right to 
exclude others. 
¶8 
Tetting 
and 
West 
Bend 
Mutual 
each 
filed 
an 
interlocutory 
appeal, 
asserting 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
misinterpreted Wis. Stat. § 895.529.  The court of appeals 
granted leave to appeal and reversed the denial of summary 
judgment, concluding that Tetting was an "other lawful occupant" 
                                                 
5 West Bend Mutual joined in the arguments presented in 
"Tetting's Ongoing Motion for Summary Judgment." 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
5 
 
and thus entitled to immunity.6  Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2020 WI 
App 8, ¶23, 390 Wis. 2d 817, 939 N.W.2d 614.  Stroede petitioned 
this court for review, which we granted. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
"We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court."  Pinter v. 
Village of Stetsonville, 2019 WI 74, ¶26, 387 Wis. 2d 475, 
929 N.W.2d 547.  Summary judgment shall be granted where the 
record demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  This 
case requires us to interpret several provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.529, which presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 
315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶10 There are no genuine issues of material fact as it 
relates to this appeal,7 and the parties agree that Stroede was a 
trespasser at the time of the incident.  The narrow statutory 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals also affirmed the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment to Railroad Station and Society 
Insurance.  Stroede, 390 Wis. 2d 817, ¶15.  Stroede does not ask 
this court to review that determination. 
7 Whether Tetting was acting in the scope of employment, 
despite being a patron at the Railroad Station at the time 
Stroede was injured, is an open question.  At the summary 
judgment hearing, the circuit court ruled that "there are enough 
competing facts on the issue of scope of employment that I just 
don't think as a matter of law I can find it either way."  We 
take no position on the matter, as it is a live issue on remand. 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
6 
 
interpretation question presented to this court is whether 
Tetting was an "other lawful occupant of real property" within 
the definition of "[p]ossessor of real property" found at Wis. 
Stat. § 895.529(1)(a).  
¶11 Analysis of a statute begins with the language of the 
adopted text.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except technical or specially-defined words or phrases 
are given their technical or special definitional meaning."  
Id., ¶45.  This language is "interpreted in the context in which 
it is used, not in isolation but as part of a whole, in relation 
to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
Where statutory language is unambiguous, we do not consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation, 
such 
as 
legislative 
history.  Id. 
¶12 The statute at issue, Wis. Stat. § 895.529, defines a 
"[p]ossessor of real property" as "an owner, lessee, tenant, or 
other lawful occupant of real property."  It is undisputed that 
Tetting is not an owner, lessee, or tenant of Railroad Station.  
Therefore, we are focused on the phrase "other lawful occupant 
of real property," of which there is no statutory definition and 
this court has never provided an interpretation.  Without such a 
definition, we look to the common meaning of the phrase.  To 
that end, we often consult a dictionary in order to guide our 
interpretation of the common, ordinary meanings of words.  
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
7 
 
Noffke, 315 Wis. 2d 350, ¶10.  The court of appeals, relying on 
several dictionary definitions of the word "occupant," reversed 
the circuit court and concluded that the phrase "other lawful 
occupant" means "anyone who is lawfully present on the premises 
at the time of the incident."  Stroede, 390 Wis. 2d 817, ¶23.  
The dictionaries cited by the court of appeals do not 
unequivocally support its conclusion, because while the first 
definition in many of these online dictionaries aligns with the 
court of appeals' summation, other definitions, specifically 
those denoted as the meaning in "Law," support a narrower 
understanding.8  Further, legal dictionaries such as Black's Law 
Dictionary define "occupant" in a way that supports only the 
circuit court's conclusion:  "Someone who has possessory rights 
in, or control over, certain property or premises."  Occupant, 
Black's Law Dictionary 1298 (11th ed. 2019).   
¶13 Simply looking to dictionary definitions of the word 
"occupant," however, will not conclusively resolve the question 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., https://www.dictionary.com/browse/occupant?s=t 
(stating the "Law" definition of "occupant" as "an owner though 
occupancy" 
or 
"one 
who 
is 
in 
actual 
possession"); 
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/occupant (observing the "Law" 
definition as "a person who has possession of something, esp an 
estate, house, etc; tenant" or "a person who acquires by 
occupancy the title to something previously without an owner"); 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/occupant (stating the "Law" 
definition 
of 
"occupant" 
as 
"a 
person 
holding 
property, 
especially land, in actual possession").   
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
8 
 
of statutory interpretation posed in this case.9  Instead, we 
must look at the phrase "other lawful occupant of real property" 
in the context in which it is used, including the definitional 
list provided in Wis. Stat. § 895.529(1)(a) and in relation to 
surrounding subsections.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . .").10  Considering the phrase "other lawful 
occupant of real property" in this context answers the question 
of statutory interpretation definitively and unambiguously. 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.529(1)(a) defines a "[p]ossessor 
of real property" as an "owner, lessee, tenant, or other lawful 
occupant 
of 
real 
property." 
 
Two 
canons 
of 
statutory 
construction 
are 
particularly 
useful 
in 
interpreting 
the 
definition provided for "possessor of real property" and 
                                                 
9 As then-Chief Justice Abrahamson noted in her Noffke 
concurrence, "resort to a dictionary can be, as Justice Scalia 
has written of the use of legislative history, 'the equivalent 
of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads 
of the guests for one's friends.'"  Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. 
Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶60, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring)(quoted source omitted). 
10 The dissent's reliance on standard dictionary definitions 
of "lawful" and "occupant" fares no better.  The dissent also 
points to Wis. Stat. ch. 30 and 350 for uses of the term 
"occupant," as well as administrative code provisions and 
municipal ordinances regarding fire code mandates.  Dissent, 
¶¶30-31.  It is unclear how any of this information is related 
to, or helpful in interpreting, the relevant text in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.529. 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
9 
 
specifically 
the 
phrase 
"other 
lawful 
occupant 
of 
real 
property."  The first canon, ejusdem generis, instructs us that 
"when general words follow specific words in the statutory text, 
the general words should be construed in light of the specific 
words listed.  Thus, the general word or phrase will encompass 
only things of the same type as those specific words listed."11  
State 
v. 
Quintana, 
2008 
WI 33, 
¶27, 
308 
Wis. 2d 615, 
748 N.W.2d 447.  The second canon, noscitur a sociis, similarly 
instructs us that "words are known from their associates."12  
Id., ¶35.   
¶15 Both of these canons instruct us that the phrase 
"other lawful occupant of real property" should be limited by 
the terms that precede it:  owner, lessee, and tenant.  Those 
terms describe very specific groups of people and signify some 
degree of control and responsibility for the real property.  See 
Owner, Black's Law Dictionary 1331, ("Someone who has the right 
to possess, use, and convey something; a person in whom one or 
more interests are vested."); id. at 1769 (defining "lessee" as 
"Someone who has a possessory interest in real or personal 
property under a lease."); id. at 1086 (defining "tenant" as 
"Someone who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind 
of right or title.").  Those terms suggest that an "other lawful 
occupant of real property" is a person who, like an owner, 
                                                 
11 Ejusdem generis is Latin for "of the same kind or class."  
Ejusdem generis, Black's Law Dictionary 654 (11th ed. 2019).  
12 Noscitur a sociis is Latin for "it is known by its 
associates."  Noscitur a sociis, Black's Law Dictionary 1274. 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
10 
 
lessee, or tenant, has possession or control of the real 
property.  Further, the word "other" connects "lawful occupant" 
to the previous three terms.  Reading the phrase within the 
context of the other terms provided in the definition of 
"possessor of real property," an "other lawful occupant of real 
property" must be someone who has possession of or control over 
a premises. 
¶16 Reviewing the subsection as a whole further supports 
this conclusion.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.529(1)(b) defines 
"trespasser" as "a natural person who enters or remains upon 
property in possession of another without express or implied 
consent."  (Emphasis added.)  This definition suggests that a 
possessor of real property, including an "other lawful occupant 
of real property," is someone who has the ability to give and 
withdraw consent.   
¶17 This conclusion is further bolstered when we consider 
that we seek to interpret the term "possessor of real property."  
Black's Law Dictionary defines "possession" as "[t]he fact of 
having or holding property in one's power; the exercise of 
dominion over property" and the "right under which one may 
exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others."  
Possession, Black's Law Dictionary 1408.  This definition 
supports the conclusion that an "other lawful occupant of real 
property" must have some control or dominion over the real 
property; mere presence is not enough. 
¶18 Reading the statute so broadly as to categorize anyone 
and everyone who is present on a property to be an "other lawful 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
11 
 
occupant of real property" would negate the other specific terms 
provided (owner, lessee, and tenant) because it would swallow 
those terms whole.  Such a broad definition of "other lawful 
occupant of real property" would also render the legislature's 
selected terms and the word "possessor" meaningless because no 
actual possession would be required.13  Reading the statutory 
language this way would lead to absurd results.  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used . . . and reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results."  (Emphasis added.))  As the 
circuit 
court 
commented 
in 
recognizing 
this 
absurdity, 
"effectively what Tetting is asking me to do is to divide the 
world 
into 
two 
camps; 
trespassers 
and 
non-trespassers, 
right? . . . Tetting is asking me to explode this statute wide 
open to cover anyone lawfully on the property which basically 
means anyone that is not a trespasser." 
¶19 To 
summarize, 
reading 
the 
phrase 
"other 
lawful 
occupant of real property" in context demonstrates that such a 
person must have some degree of possession or control over the 
property and the ability to give and withdraw consent to enter 
                                                 
13 The dissent's analysis fails, in part, because it 
disregards most of the terms in Wis. Stat. § 895.529, focusing 
exclusively on the term "lawful occupant."  The dissent neglects 
to address the placement of the term "other" before "lawful 
occupant," and the fact that it precedes the three specific 
terms "owner, lessee, tenant."  Our role is to interpret and 
apply the plain language of the statute as a whole, not only 
particular words and read them without context.  Further, the 
dissent's analysis is void of any discussion about the term we 
are seeking to interpret:  "possessor of real property." 
Nos. 2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371   
 
12 
 
or remain on the property.14  In this case, nothing in the record 
indicates that Tetting, as a bar patron at the time Stroede was 
injured, had any possession or control over Railroad Station or 
that he had the ability to give or withdraw consent.  For this 
reason, the circuit court was correct in concluding that Tetting 
was not an "other lawful occupant of real property." 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶20 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
because Tetting was not an "other lawful occupant of real 
property" under Wis. Stat. § 895.529 and was therefore not 
entitled to immunity.  Accordingly, we uphold the circuit 
court's denial of both Tetting and West Bend Mutual's motions 
for 
summary 
judgment 
and 
remand 
the 
case 
for 
further 
proceedings. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
¶21 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.   
¶22 ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
 
                                                 
14 The parties provided the most apt example of a "lawful 
occupant" as a family member, like a grandparent, who moves in 
with her family.  She is not a tenant, lessee, or owner, but she 
is residing at the residence and has the authority to invite 
guests to visit.  That is, she has some degree of possession or 
control of the property. 
No.  2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶23 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  "Courts 
have sometimes ignored plain meaning in astonishing ways."  
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 72 (2012).  The majority opinion 
in this case presents yet another example.  The majority 
misreads Wis. Stat. § 895.529 and impermissibly narrows the 
meaning of the phrase "lawful occupant."  According to the 
majority, 
the 
phrase 
"lawful 
occupant" 
refers 
to 
"a 
person . . . [who] [has] some degree of possession or control 
over the property and the ability to give and withdraw consent 
to enter or remain on the property."  Majority op., ¶19.  None 
of the majority's limiting language appears in the text of the 
statute and this strained interpretation of the phrase is belied 
by its plain meaning.  "Lawful occupant of real property" means 
precisely what it says:  an individual who lawfully occupies the 
property——that is, an individual who is lawfully present on the 
premises.  The majority's contrary interpretation privileges 
trespassers while erasing the statutory rights of individuals 
who are lawfully present on real property.  The defendant, Jacob 
Tetting, was entitled to immunity under § 895.529 as a lawful 
occupant of the premises where David Stroede, a trespasser, was 
injured.  I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶24 On September 20, 2014, Stroede visited Railroad 
Station Bar in Saukville, Wisconsin.  Stroede became highly 
intoxicated, punched another patron in the face, and urinated on 
himself.  An employee at the bar instructed Stroede to leave and 
No.  2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371.rgb 
 
2 
 
escorted 
him 
outside. 
 
Shortly 
thereafter, 
without 
the 
permission of staff, Stroede reentered the bar, knocking over a 
table and shattering glasses.  Tetting, an employee of Railroad 
Station visiting the bar with his family that night, witnessed 
Stroede return.  Tetting approached Stroede and grabbed him by 
the shoulders, telling him that he was not allowed to be in the 
bar anymore.  Tetting walked Stroede backwards towards the exit 
door, which was preceded by a short descending stairwell.  
Tetting released his grip on Stroede before reaching the stairs.  
Stroede took a step backward and fell down the stairs, suffering 
serious head injuries. 
¶25 Stroede sued Tetting and his insurer, West Bend Mutual 
Insurance 
Company, 
arguing 
that 
Tetting 
negligently 
used 
excessive force in removing him from the bar.1  Stroede did not 
assert that Tetting acted willfully, wantonly, or recklessly.2  
Tetting and West Bend Mutual filed motions for summary judgment, 
arguing that Tetting was entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.529 because, as a patron of Railroad Station, he did not 
                                                 
1 Stroede also sued Railroad Station Bar and its insurer, 
Society Insurance, arguing that Railroad Station negligently 
allowed Tetting to use excessive force on its premises.  
Railroad Station and Society Insurance filed motions for summary 
judgment.  The Milwaukee County Circuit Court granted both 
motions, finding that Stroede was a trespasser and that Railroad 
Station did not owe Stroede a heightened duty of care. 
2 Stroede moved the circuit court to amend his complaint to 
add a claim for willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.  The 
circuit court denied Stroede's motion.  Stroede appealed this 
issue to the court of appeals, which affirmed the denial of 
Stroede's motion to amend his complaint.  Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 
2020 WI App 8, ¶11, 390 Wis. 2d 817, 939 N.W.2d 614.  Stroede 
did not appeal this issue to this court. 
No.  2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371.rgb 
 
3 
 
owe a duty of care to a trespasser.3  Under § 895.529(1) and (2), 
a "lawful occupant of real property" "owes no duty of care to a 
trespasser," but may be liable to a trespasser if his conduct 
willfully, wantonly, or recklessly causes injury or death. 
¶26 The circuit court denied Tetting's and West Bend 
Mutual's motions for summary judgment, holding that Tetting owed 
Stroede a duty of care, despite the fact that Stroede was a 
trespasser at the time of his injury.  According to the circuit 
court, Tetting was not a "lawful occupant of real property," 
limiting the meaning of this phrase to people who have the right 
to exclude others from the premises, thereby denying immunity to 
mere patrons.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision, holding that the phrase "lawful occupant" means 
"lawfully present," and concluding that Wis. Stat. § 895.529 
provides immunity to patrons for alleged negligent conduct 
toward trespassers.  Stroede petitioned this court for review of 
the court of appeals' decision. 
II 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.529 governs the duty of care 
owed to trespassers.  In relevant part, the statute reads: 
(1) 
In this section: 
(a) 
"Possessor of real property" means an owner, 
lessee, tenant, or other lawful occupant of 
real property. 
(b) 
"Trespasser" means a natural person who 
enters 
or 
remains 
upon 
property 
in 
                                                 
3 On appeal, the parties do not raise the issue of whether 
Tetting acted as an employee at Railroad Station on the night in 
question.  This writing assumes that Tetting was a patron. 
No.  2018AP1880 & 2018AP2371.rgb 
 
4 
 
possession of another without express or 
implied consent. 
(2) 
Except as provided in sub. (3), a possessor of 
real 
property 
owes 
no 
duty 
of 
care 
to 
a 
trespasser. 
(Emphasis added.)  Subsection (3) provides, in relevant part, 
that possessors of real property may be liable for willful, 
wanton, or reckless conduct toward trespassers.  Reading these 
provisions together, a "possessor of real property" is immune 
from the negligence claims of trespassers.  In this case, the 
circuit court found that Stroede was a "trespasser," and this 
finding 
is 
undisputed 
on 
appeal. 
 
Stroede 
asserts 
only 
negligence against Tetting.  The only question before this 
court, then, is whether Tetting was a "possessor of real 
property."  If so, he is statutorily immune from Stroede's 
negligence claim. 
¶28 Under the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 895.529(1)(a), 
Tetting qualifies as a "possessor of real property."  There is 
no dispute that Tetting is not an "owner, lessee, [or] tenant" 
of Railroad Station; however, at the time of Stroede's injury, 
Tetting was a "lawful occupant."  "[S]tatutory interpretation 
'begins with the language of the statute,'" which is "given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).  "If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Id.  The 
phrase "lawful occupant" plainly means just what it says:  an 
individual who is lawfully occupying property——that is, an 
individual who is present on the premises in a lawful manner. 
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¶29 Dictionary definitions of the phrase "lawful" and 
"occupant" support this conclusion.  Id., ¶¶53-54 (instructing 
courts to turn to dictionary definitions to help ascertain the 
plain meaning of statutory language); see also Noffke ex rel. 
Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156 ("A dictionary may be utilized to guide the common, 
ordinary meaning of words.").  "Lawful" means what the average 
person would reasonably understand it to mean:  something that 
is "within the law" or "allowed by law."  Lawful, American 
Heritage Dictionary 996 (5th ed. 2011).  "Occupant" likewise 
bears a common, ordinary meaning:  "one that resides in or uses 
a physical space," such as someone who is an "occupant of a 
car."  Occupant, American Heritage Dictionary 1218 (5th ed. 
2011); see also Occupant, Oxford English Dictionary 1978 (6th 
ed. 2007) ("[a] person who occupies, resides in, or is in a 
place"); Occupant, Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1339 (2d 
ed. 1996) ("a person, family, group, or organization, that lives 
in, occupies, or has quarters, or space in or on something, 
[such as] occupant of a taxicab."). 
¶30 Accordingly, the plain meaning of "lawful occupant" is 
someone who has permission or a right to be physically present 
on the premises.  This meaning fully comports with our everyday 
understanding of these terms.  Just as an individual is an 
"occupant" in a car, so too is an individual an "occupant" of a 
business while patronizing it.  Similarly, when setting maximum 
occupancy limits in fire and building codes, states and 
municipalities use the term "occupants" to refer to individuals 
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occupying space.  See, e.g., Wis. Admin. § SPS 314.01(g)1.b 
(applying statewide fire code mandates to facilities containing 
inflammable 
conditions 
endangering 
the 
"occupants" 
of 
buildings); City of Greenfield, Wis., Ordinance § 18.02 (for 
purposes of the city's fire code, defining "occupant" as "[t]he 
person or persons, who physically reside, work or are present in 
a facility").  It is the job of courts to interpret statutes "in 
accordance with their plain and obvious meaning," and the phrase 
"lawful occupant" means exactly what it says.  State v. Smith, 
184 Wis. 664, 668, 200 N.W. 638 (1924); see also Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 69 ("Words are to be understood in their 
ordinary, everyday meanings[.]"). 
¶31 Other statutes also use the phrase "occupant" to refer 
to individuals physically present in a place.  For example, Wis. 
Stat. § 30.67 mandates any "occupant" of a boat to file a 
written 
accident 
report 
when 
the 
operator 
is 
physically 
incapable of doing so.  The same is true for Wis. Stat. 
§ 350.15, which requires any "occupant" of a snowmobile to file 
a written report in the event of an accident when the operator 
is incapable of doing so.  Neither of those provisions limit the 
word "occupant" to only those with an ownership or possessory 
interest in the property; to the contrary, each encompasses any 
individual who is physically present and using the property, 
along with the operator.  See §§ 30.67 and 350.15.  "When the 
legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed to act with full 
knowledge of the existing laws, including statutes."  Mack v. 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 3, 92 Wis. 2d 476, 489, 285 N.W.2d 604 
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(1979).  The legislature uses "occupant" in its ordinary sense 
throughout the Wisconsin Statutes so that the citizens bound by 
the law may understand what it means. 
¶32 As a lawful patron of Railroad Station on the night 
Stroede was injured, Tetting was a "lawful occupant" for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 895.529(1)(a).  Accordingly, Tetting 
qualified as a "possessor of real property" under subsection (2) 
and was therefore entitled to a lower standard of care with 
respect to trespassers on the premises.  § 895.529(2).  Because 
the circuit court concluded (and no party disputes) that Stroede 
was a trespasser at the time he was injured, Tetting is 
statutorily immune from liability for negligence. 
¶33 Contrary to the majority's opinion, see majority op., 
¶18, interpreting the phrase "lawful occupant" to encompass 
patrons visiting a bar affords full meaning to the other terms 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.529(1)(a), thereby "giv[ing] reasonable 
effect to every word . . . in order to avoid surplusage."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Under the statute, "a possessor of 
real property" means "owner, lessee, tenant, or other lawful 
occupant of real property."  § 895.529(1)(a).  Giving "lawful 
occupant" its plain meaning does not deprive the words "owner," 
"lessee," or "tenant" of their meaning even though "lawful 
occupant" applies to any person lawfully occupying space on real 
property.  Even though an "owner" may also qualify as an "other 
lawful occupant" when physically present on his own property, an 
"owner"——unlike 
a 
"lawful 
occupant" 
without 
an 
ownership 
interest——will remain immune from trespasser negligence suits 
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8 
 
even when the owner is not present on the property.  The same is 
true for both lessees and tenants.  In this way, § 895.529 
affords greater protection to "owners," lessees," and "tenants" 
than mere "lawful occupants."  The statute immunizes the former 
categories of persons whether they are present or absent from 
the premises at the time the trespasser is injured, whereas 
"lawful occupants," logically, must occupy the premises in order 
for immunity to apply. 
¶34 Despite the plain meaning of "lawful occupant," the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
"lawful 
occupant" 
refers 
to 
"a 
person . . . [who] [has] some degree of possession or control 
over the property and the ability to give and withdraw consent."  
Majority op., ¶19.  None of this language appears in the text of 
the statute nor does any of it reflect the common, ordinary 
understanding 
of 
"lawful" 
or 
"occupant." 
 
The 
majority 
improperly rewrites the statute, arbitrarily limiting its scope 
in order to reach the absurd conclusion that a person lawfully 
occupying a place is not a "lawful occupant."  This is akin to 
holding that roosters are not "animals" in order to protect 
purveyors of cockfighting from prosecution for cruelty to 
animals.  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 72 (citing State ex rel. 
Miller v. Claiborne, 505 P.2d 732, 733 (Kan. 1973)). 
¶35 In adopting its constrictive definition of "lawful 
occupant," the majority applies the ejusdem generis canon "with 
a rigidity that hamper[s] rather than help[s] the search for 
genuine textual meaning."  Id. at 212.  Courts must be mindful 
that "the doctrine often gives rise to the question how broadly 
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or narrowly to define the class delineated by the specific items 
listed," which underlies the question the parties ask us to 
resolve.  Id. at 207.  The canon "does not specify that the 
court must identify the genus that is at the lowest possible 
level of generality" as the majority in this case elects to do.  
Id.  Instead, "[t]he court has broad latitude in determining how 
much or how little is embraced by the general term."  Id.  In 
making that determination, courts should consider each of the 
items in the list "and ask what category would come into the 
reasonable person's mind."  Id. at 208.  Only a lawyer would 
exclude roosters from the general term "animals" and only a 
lawyer would exclude permitted patrons from "lawful occupants" 
of property.  If "lawful occupant" means "a person . . . [who] 
[has] some degree of possession or control over the property and 
the ability to give and withdraw consent to enter or remain on 
the property" as the majority says, majority op., ¶19, "words in 
themselves plain have been construed as bearing a meaning which 
they have not, and which ought not to have been ascribed to 
them."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 212 (quoting Anderson v. 
Anderson, [1895] 1 Q.B. 749, 755 (per Rigby, L.J.)). 
¶36 The majority briefly mentions the associated-words 
canon, noscitur a sociis, accompanied by no analysis of it.  
Majority op., ¶14.  Under this canon, "[t]he common quality 
suggested by a listing should be its most general quality——the 
least common denominator, so to speak——relevant to the context."  
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 196.  The majority's construction 
does exactly the opposite, applying the most restrictive reading 
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of "other lawful occupant" to mean someone with "possession or 
control over the property and the ability to give and withdraw 
consent to enter or remain on the property" rather than its most 
general quality——someone with a lawful right to be there.  
Rather than mechanically reciting Kalal, the majority should 
have applied the ordinary-meaning canon it espouses, "the most 
fundamental 
semantic 
rule 
of 
interpretation" 
under 
which 
"[w]ords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday 
meanings——unless 
the 
context 
indicates 
that 
they 
bear 
a 
technical sense."  Id. at 69. 
¶37 Rejecting the ordinary, everyday meaning of "lawful 
occupant," the majority imposes on anyone with a lawful right to 
be present in a place (but who does not own or control it) a 
duty of care toward a trespasser whose presence is unlawful.  
Invitees——individuals who "by virtue of an invitation . . . go[] 
upon the premises of another for the purpose of aiding, 
transacting, assisting, or furthering the business of such 
other"——are categorically excluded from Wis. Stat. § 895.529.  
Voeltzke v. Kenosha Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 45 Wis. 2d 271, 282, 172 
N.W.2d 673 (1969).  So, too, are house guests and frequenters——
individuals who have "a right to be in or about the place in 
question under circumstances which do not render [them] a 
trespasser." 
 
Wilson 
v. 
Evangelical 
Lutheran 
Church 
of 
Reformation of Milwaukee, 202 Wis. 111, 115, 230 N.W. 708 
(1930); see also Wis. Stat. § 101.01(6).  As a result of this 
misinterpretation of the law, a person present on property owned 
and controlled by others must now conform his conduct in 
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anticipation of a trespasser's intrusion.  For example, the 
delivery man who leaves packages outside the door of a closed 
store must devise a different drop off location in order to 
protect the trespasser from tripping over the packages as he 
exits the store into which he intruded. 
¶38 The 
absurdity 
of 
the 
majority's 
statutory 
interpretation becomes even more apparent upon extension to 
other circumstances.  Under the majority's construction of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.529, the owner of a home would not owe a duty of 
care 
to 
a 
trespasser, 
but 
a 
grandmother 
visiting 
her 
grandchildren at the same house would.  If a trespasser enters 
the property and trips on a child's toy left in the yard, the 
trespasser could recover damages against the grandmother, but 
not against the homeowner.  Why would the visiting grandmother 
owe any duty to a trespasser, who had no lawful right to be 
there in the first place and whose intrusion could not be 
anticipated?  Why would § 895.529 expose the grandmother to 
liability but immunize the homeowner?  The majority doesn't 
explain. 
¶39 The majority inexplicably draws the same distinction 
between patrons of businesses and their owners.  By definition, 
an invitee is someone who enters a premises "for a purpose of 
mutual advantage or benefit both to the owner of the premises 
and to the person entering."  Voeltzke, 45 Wis. 2d at 282.  
According to the majority, only the latter is categorically 
liable to trespassers despite both individuals having the lawful 
and mutually beneficial right to be on the premises.  For 
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example, if a patron negligently spills a drink on the floor and 
a trespasser on the property slips and sustain injuries as a 
result, the majority would allow the trespasser to collect 
damages against the patron but not the owner, despite no 
appreciable difference between the negligent acts of the 
business owner and the patron.  But for the trespasser's 
unlawful entry, the trespasser's injury would not have occurred; 
nevertheless, the majority overlooks the trespasser's misconduct 
in order to allow him recovery.  Had the legislature drawn this 
distinction, the majority's conclusion in this case would 
comport with the law, assuming no constitutional infirmity in 
the statute.  But in this case, the majority steps beyond proper 
judicial boundaries to recast the law in accordance with its own 
apparent policy preferences, rather than applying the law the 
legislature actually enacted. 
¶40 "Society has an interest in punishing and deterring 
intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests 
of the individual landowner."  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 
209 Wis. 2d 605, 620, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (emphasis added).  
Doing so helps to "preserv[e] the integrity of the legal 
system."  Id.  In this case, the majority abandons this well-
established principle, elevating the interests of trespassers 
over individuals lawfully on the premises.  "[B]oth the 
individual and society have significant interests in deterring 
intentional trespass to land[.]"  Id. at 617.  As such, "our 
laws seek to encourage the [lawful use of land] and discourage 
the [trespass to land]."  Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2000 
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WI App 48, ¶92, 234 Wis. 2d 1, 608 N.W.2d 331.  The plain 
language of "lawful occupant" in Wis. Stat. § 895.529 does just 
that:  it protects individuals lawfully on premises, regardless 
of whether they own or control the land, and discourages the 
unlawful conduct of trespassers. 
¶41 Under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.529, 
Tetting was a "lawful occupant" of Railroad Station on the night 
Stroede was injured and should be afforded statutory immunity 
from Stroede's negligence claim.  Tetting was physically present 
on the property as a patron and had a lawful right to be there.  
According to Stroede's complaint, Tetting did not act willfully, 
wantonly, or recklessly; the force he used in removing Stroede 
from the bar was merely negligent.  As the circuit court found, 
Stroede was a trespasser at Railroad Station; therefore, no 
lawful occupant of the premises owed him any duty of care, 
except to refrain from conduct that willfully, wantonly, or 
recklessly causes injury or death.  The majority's misreading of 
§ 895.529 impermissibly gives Stroede an avenue for recovery 
against individuals lawfully on the premises despite Stroede's 
unlawful intrusion.  I respectfully dissent.  
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