Title: Wilburn v. State
Citation: 487 S.W.2d 600
Docket Number: 5781
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 1972

487 S.W.2d 600 (1972) Tommy Lee WILBURN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. 5781. Supreme Court of Arkansas. December 11, 1972. Lloyd R. Haynes, Little Rock, for appellant. Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. JONES, Justice. Tommy Lee Wilburn was convicted of robbery by a jury in the Pulaski County Circuit Court and was sentenced to prison for a term of 12 years as a third offender under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2328 (Supp. 1971), and under the procedure as outlined in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2330.1 (Supp. 1971). The pertinent portions of these two sections as they relate to the case at bar, appear as follows: On his appeal to this court Wilburn has designated the point on which he relies for reversal as follows: We conclude that Wilburn is correct in his contention on this point. As above indicated, Wilburn was being tried for the crime of robbery which, upon conviction, carries a statutory penalty of imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than three nor more than 21 years. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-3602 (Repl.1964). The record in this case reveals that after the jury had found Wilburn guilty of robbery, the jury then heard evidence of the defendant's prior convictions as provided in § 43-2330.1, supra, and as charged in the information filed against him. The state offered proof of two prior felony convictions, one of which was not questioned at the trial or questioned on this appeal. As to the evidence of conviction that was questioned at the trial and is questioned on this appeal, a certified criminal court docket entry for Phillips County was offered and accepted in evidence over the objections of Wilburn. This docket entry recites as follows: It will be noted that nowhere in this docket entry of judgment is it recited that Wilburn was represented by counsel or that he had waived counsel, but on the contrary the record indicates that no defense counsel was present. The docket entry does indicate that the court officials were present; that the state appeared by its prosecuting attorney and the defendant appeared in person. Wilburn's objections to the introduction of this evidence appears as follows: The state's attorney general concedes with commendable candor that his careful research of the point indicates that Wilburn's assignment has merit under the decisions of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L. Ed. 2d 319; United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592; Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 31 L. Ed. 2d 374, 92 S. Ct. 1014; Goodwin v. Smith, 439 F.2d 1180 (5th cir., 1971); United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (7th cir., 1972); Craig v. Beto, 458 F.2d 1131 (5th cir., 1972); Tiffey v. State, 476 P.2d 84 (Okl.Cr., 1970); State v. Kennedy, 107 Ariz. 133, 483 P.2d 548 (1971); White v. State, 11 Md.App. 423, 274 A.2d 671 (1971); Donahay v. State, 47 Ala.App. 418, 255 So. 2d 598 (1971). The appellant does rely heavily on Burgett v. Texas, supra, and argues that his conviction should be reversed. We agree with the state, however, that Burgett is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the questioned evidence of the prior conviction in Burgett was admitted prior to determination of the defendant's guilt by the jury on the crime for which he was being tried. We also agree with the state that the error involved does not call for a new trial in the case at bar because this court has the power to modify the judgment of a trial court, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-2144 (Repl.1962), and to reduce the penalty in criminal cases to that penalty which is appropriate for the crime involved. Blake v. State, 186 Ark. 77, 52 S.W.2d 644, see also Clark v. State, 246 Ark. 876, 440 S.W.2d 205. The practical effect of § 43-2328, supra, is simply to add one year in prison to the minimum punishment for a second offense and to add three years in prison to the minimum punishment for a third offense. In the case at bar, Wilburn could have been sentenced to the state penitentiary for a determinate term of anywhere from three to 21 years for the crime of robbery upon a first conviction. He was, however, sentenced to a term of 12 years, which amounted to six years more than the minimum for a third conviction and eight years more than the minimum for a second conviction. As pointed out in the trial court's instructions, the minimum time for which Wilburn could have been sentenced for robbery on a third felony conviction, would have been six years; but, the evidence offered as to one of the three convictions in this case was not sufficient proof of a third conviction for the purpose of increasing the minimum punishment for the crime of robbery for which Wilburn was being tried. In Burgett, supra, the Texas State Appellate Court upheld the conviction of an accused, holding that there had been no error in reading to the jury an indictment containing a prior conviction in Tennessee since the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the prior offenses and because the petitioner had not received the enhanced punishment prescribed by the recidivist statutes. There were two versions of *603 the Tennessee conviction, one recited that the defendant appeared "without counsel," and the other simply recited that he appeared "in proper person." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and in reversing the judgment of the state court, said: From the record before us, we are unable to determine what effect, if any, the jury gave to the evidence pertaining to three convictions in this case. The 12 year sentence was less than the maximum for a first conviction but greater than the minimum for a third conviction. Only a second conviction was established by competent evidence and the minimum penalty upon a second conviction would have been imprisonment for a period of four years. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the state should have the option of retrying this case upon reversal for the error indicated, or accepting the minimum penalty of four years upon affirmance of the judgment as a second conviction. Consequently, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, unless the attorney general within 17 days elects to accept a modification of the punishment so as to sentence Wilburn to the minimum time of three years plus one additional year as penalty for the second offense, or a total of four years in the state penitentiary.