Title: State v. Favela
Citation: 576 P.2d 282
Docket Number: 11822
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1978

576 P.2d 282 (1978) STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernestine FAVELA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 11822. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 17, 1978. Rehearing Denied March 28, 1978. William D. Teel, Acting Chief Public Defender, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, Manuel L. Lopez, Asst. Public Defender, Clovis, for defendant-appellant. Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Sammy J. Quintana, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee. PER CURIAM. The defendant, a female adult, was indicted by the Grand Jury and charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, contrary to § 40A-6-3, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. 1972) by reason of sexual intercourse with a juvenile, a fifteen year old boy, who had allegedly consented to the act. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and defendant took an interlocutory appeal to the Court of *283 Appeals. The Court of Appeals in a 2 to 1 decision reversed the trial court. This Court, on its own motion issued a writ of certiorari under authority of N.M. Const. art. 6, § 3. See State v. Gunzelman, 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973). We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and charge. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals erroneously held that § 13-14-3, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Children's Code Definitions) and § 40A-6-3, supra, which relates to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, must be construed together, and when so construed, a person cannot be found guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor by causing the minor to do an act for which the minor could not be found legally delinquent. Section 13-14-3 is part of the Children's Code. It provides that a "child" is an individual who is less than 18 years of age. Subsection (N) of § 13-14-3, supra, reads: The Legislature of New Mexico made it abundantly clear that the Children's Code applied to juveniles and not to adults. The title of the Children's Code reads: "An act relating to children." The legislative purpose of the Children's Code is set forth in § 13-14-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 and the pertinent parts read: The Code is thus intended to protect children from the consequences of their own acts so long as it is "consistent with the protection of the public interest." It establishes a system of treatment, care and rehabilitation for children who have committed either "delinquent acts" or who are neglected or in need of supervision. On the other hand, § 40A-6-3, supra, applies to adults and is designed to protect children from harmful adult conduct. It reads: The Court of Appeals ruled that the minor did not commit a "delinquent act" under the Code, since fornication is not an offense which if committed by an adult would be a crime. Section 13-14-3(N). Because the minor did not commit a delinquent act the Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant could not be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of the minor. We do not agree. We hold that the two statutes are separate in purpose and application. If the contributing to delinquency statute were applicable only to situations where the *284 child committed a "delinquent act" there would be no reason for its existence. In any situation where an adult contributed to the commission of an act which constitutes a crime, the adult could be tried either as a principal, or as an accessory under § 40A-1-14, N.M.S.A. 1953. In State v. McKinley, 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964 (1949), on facts quite similar to the facts presented in this case, the criminal statute relative to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, then in effect, was held by this Court to be constitutional. Except for the penalty provision, that Act was almost identical with § 40A-6-3. In reaching this result, the Supreme Court of New Mexico in McKinley said: Id. at 110-11, 202 P.2d at 966-67. McKinley was reaffirmed in State v. Roessler, 58 N.M. 102, 266 P.2d 351 (1954). Although the enactment of the Children's Code in 1972 narrowed the definition of a "delinquent act" committed by a child, that definition did not extend, amend, change or become incorporated into § 40A-6-3, supra. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED.