Title: Commonwealth v. Craan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 11436
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11436 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY CRAAN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.      March 3, 2014. - July 9, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Narcotic Drugs.  Constitutional Law, 
Narcotic drugs, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, 
Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, 
Threshold police inquiry, Probable cause, Search incident 
to lawful arrest.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Probable 
Cause.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on August 6, 2010. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Rosalind Henson Miller, J., and a motion for reconsideration was 
also heard by her. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial 
Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by 
her to the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own 
initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Brian J. Anderson for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
2 
 
 
William W. Adams for Ardil Innis. 
 
Donald Bronstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Joshua Levy, Matthew Mazzotta, & Matthew R. Segal, for American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & another. 
 
Michael D. Cutler & Steven S. Epstein for National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In this case, we are asked again to determine the 
effect of the 2008 ballot initiative decriminalizing possession 
of one ounce or less of marijuana (2008 initiative) on police 
authority to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles, this time 
in the context of a search effected on the basis of the odor of 
unburnt marijuana.1 
 
The defendant's vehicle was searched at a sobriety 
checkpoint on June 11, 2010, after a State police trooper 
smelled the odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from it.  The 
search revealed both loose marijuana and plastic baggies 
containing marijuana residue, in addition to three "Ecstasy" 
pills (methylenedioxy methamphetamine) and several rounds of 
ammunition.  The search was based on the odor of marijuana 
alone; the defendant exhibited no signs of impairment and, 
although issued a summons for criminal offenses, was permitted 
to drive away without being asked to submit to any field 
sobriety tests.  Approximately two months later, however, a 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted on behalf of 
the defendant by the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts and the Committee for Public Counsel Services; the 
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law; and Ardil 
Innis. 
                                                          
 
3 
 
criminal complaint issued charging the defendant with various 
drug- and firearms-related offenses. 
 
A judge of the Boston Municipal Court initially denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search, namely, 
the marijuana, Ecstasy pills, and ammunition.  Several months 
later, in light of Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459 (2011), 
the judge reconsidered her ruling and allowed the motion to 
suppress.  A single justice of this court subsequently allowed 
the Commonwealth's application for leave to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court, and we transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that the search was justified on 
three different grounds.  First, it was lawful because the 
search was conducted incident to the defendant's arrest.  
Second, the search was permissible because it was to prevent the 
defendant from smoking marijuana while driving.  And, third, the 
search was lawful because it fell under the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement, insofar as there was probable cause 
to believe that the defendant's vehicle contained evidence of a 
Federal crime.  Considering this case in conjunction with our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Overmyer, ante     ,     (2014), we 
reject these contentions and affirm the judge's order allowing 
the motion to suppress. 
4 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts found by the judge 
after an evidentiary hearing, supplemented by uncontested facts 
in the record.  See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 
337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  The only witness at 
that hearing was the State police trooper who conducted the 
search at the sobriety checkpoint.  "In reviewing a ruling on a 
motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of 
fact absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of 
[her] ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002). 
 
In the early morning hours of June 11, 2010, State police 
were conducting a sobriety checkpoint2 on Gallivan Boulevard in 
the Dorchester section of Boston.  The testifying trooper was 
responsible for stopping every passing vehicle to determine 
 
2 In order to pass constitutional muster, "the selection of 
motor vehicles to be stopped [at a sobriety checkpoint] must not 
be arbitrary, safety must be assured, motorists' inconvenience 
must be minimized and assurance must be given that the procedure 
is being conducted pursuant to a plan devised by law enforcement 
supervisory personnel."  Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 
137, 143 (1983).  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 
(1979).  No evidence was adduced at the hearing concerning the 
existence of a protocol governing the sobriety checkpoint in 
question, or whether any such protocol addressed the use of 
marijuana as well as alcohol.  In any event, however, the 
defendant did not challenge the legality of the sobriety 
checkpoint below or on appeal.  We assume for the sake of 
discussion that the checkpoint met constitutional requirements, 
and deem any arguments to the contrary waived.  See, e.g., Carey 
v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006) (issues not 
raised or argued below waived on appeal). 
                                                          
 
5 
 
whether the driver was operating it while under the influence of 
alcohol.  One of the vehicles stopped was driven by the 
defendant.  After the trooper identified himself, the defendant 
rolled down the driver's side window to speak with him, at which 
point the trooper smelled a strong odor of unburnt marijuana 
emanating from the vehicle. 
 
The trooper asked the defendant to pull into the screening 
area, and, once there, asked the defendant whether there was any 
marijuana in the vehicle.  The defendant responded that he and 
the vehicle's passenger "had just smoked some weed."  However, 
after the trooper explained that he smelled unburnt, rather than 
burnt, marijuana, the defendant opened the glove compartment to 
reveal a "small plastic bag" containing a substance that the 
trooper believed to be marijuana.3  At that point, the trooper 
ordered both the defendant and the passenger out of the vehicle 
and proceeded to pat frisk them.4 
 
The trooper then performed a search of the vehicle, which 
uncovered, in the door on the driver's side, a device commonly 
used for grinding marijuana; three blue pills, later identified 
as Ecstasy; "some marijuana" in the center console; and, in the 
 
3 The trooper did not testify whether he believed that the 
bag contained more or less than one ounce of marijuana, and no 
other evidence as to the weight of the marijuana was before the 
judge. 
 
 
4 No evidence was seized as a result of this pat frisk. 
                                                          
 
6 
 
passenger compartment, plastic baggies which appeared to contain 
burnt marijuana residue.  The trooper also searched the trunk, 
where he found rounds of .38 caliber ammunition. 
 
At the conclusion of the search, the trooper did not arrest 
the vehicle's occupants, but rather issued summonses for 
criminal offenses and released them.  A complaint subsequently 
issued against the defendant, charging him with illegal 
possession of ammunition, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1); possession of a class D substance with the intent 
to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a); and 
possession of a class B substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 34. 
 
The judge determined that, based on his experience, the 
trooper was qualified to recognize the odor of marijuana.5  See 
Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 48-49 (2008).  The judge 
went on to rule that, because the passage of the 2008 initiative 
did "not change the probable cause analysis," the scent of 
marijuana still provided "probable cause to believe that 
marijuana is nearby."  Although the judge found that there was 
no basis to believe that more than one ounce of marijuana was 
 
5 The trooper testified that, over his five years of service 
for the State police, he encountered marijuana "on a very 
regular basis," and had made approximately twenty or twenty-five 
arrests related to marijuana.  He also testified that, since 
2008, he had issued between twenty and thirty civil citations 
for possession of marijuana. 
                                                          
 
7 
 
present in the vehicle, she nevertheless concluded that the 
warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement.  The odor of unburnt marijuana 
provided the basis for the search; although the odor did not 
suggest the presence of a particular quantity of marijuana, it 
did indicate the presence of some marijuana, which, the judge 
stated, was still unlawful contraband after the 2008 initiative.  
Therefore, the judge initially denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
 
The judge's initial ruling, however, predated our decision 
in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 472, 475-476 (2011), in 
which we held that, in view of the decriminalization of 
marijuana occasioned by the 2008 initiative, "the odor of burnt 
marijuana alone cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal 
activity," nor can it give rise to probable cause to search a 
vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement.  After the release of this court's decision in that 
case, the defendant moved for reconsideration of the judge's 
ruling on his motion to suppress.  The judge allowed the motion 
for reconsideration and thereafter reversed her initial ruling. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable, under both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights."  Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 792 (2012).  
8 
 
"When a search is conducted without a warrant, the burden is on 
the Commonwealth to show that the search 'falls within a narrow 
class of permissible exceptions' to the warrant requirement."  
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 603 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974). 
 
Since the enactment of the 2008 initiative decriminalizing 
the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, we have held 
that the odor of burnt marijuana alone cannot support probable 
cause to search a vehicle without a warrant.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, supra at 475-476.  As we hold in a companion to this 
case, neither can such probable cause rest solely on the odor of 
unburnt marijuana.  See Commonwealth v. Overmyer, supra 
at      .  The Commonwealth, however, offers several different 
justifications for the presumptively unreasonable search of the 
defendant's vehicle, separate and apart from the odor of 
marijuana alone.  We address each in turn.6 
 
6 We focus primarily on the lawfulness of the search of the 
defendant's vehicle, rather than the exit order, because it was 
the search that yielded the evidence sought to be suppressed.  
However, because, as the judge found, the basis for the search 
was the odor of unburnt marijuana, and there was no other reason 
to believe that a criminal amount of marijuana was present in 
the vehicle, there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity warranting an exit order.  See Commonwealth v. 
Overmyer, ante     ,     (2014); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 
459, 472 (2011).  The other permissible grounds for an exit 
order similarly were absent:  there was no indication that the 
trooper's safety was threatened, nor, as shall be discussed 
infra, was the exit order justified "to facilitate an 
independently permissible warrantless search of the car under 
                                                          
 
9 
 
 
a.  Search incident to arrest.  The first rationale 
proffered by the Commonwealth is that the trooper had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for operating his vehicle while 
under the influence of marijuana, and therefore the search was 
permissible as a search incident to arrest.  This argument, 
however, overlooks a crucial fact:  neither the defendant nor 
his passenger was arrested.7 
 
A search incident to arrest, as the name suggests, may be 
effected without a warrant when an arrest has taken place, in 
order to "remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to 
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape" or "to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in 
order to prevent its concealment or destruction."  Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969).  See Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 410 Mass. 737, 743 (1991).  Although a search may 
precede a formal arrest, see id. at 742, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Brillante, 399 Mass. 152, 154 n.5 (1987), the search and the 
arrest "must be roughly contemporaneous."  Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 481 (2007). 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement."  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, supra at 467. 
 
 
7 Nor, for that matter, was the defendant subsequently cited 
for or charged with operating his vehicle while under the 
influence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 
 
 
Where no arrest is underway, the rationales underlying the 
exception do not apply with equal force.  Indeed, "[t]o permit a 
search incident to arrest where the suspect is not arrested 
until much later, or is never arrested, would sever this 
exception completely from its justifications" and effectively 
"create a wholly new exception for a 'search incident to 
probable cause to arrest.'"  Commonwealth v. Washington, supra 
at 482, citing Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 554 
(1995).  See Commonwealth v. Skea, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 690 
(1984), and cases cited ("Detentions for frisking, questioning, 
routine traffic stops, and the like, where the detainee is 
released after the police business is transacted, are treated as 
'"seizures" of the person,' subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny 
. . . , but are differentiated from 'formal,' or 'custodial,' 
arrests, the custodial aspect of which serves as the theoretical 
justification for the incident search" [citations omitted]).  
Given that it lacked the critical element of an arrest, the 
search of the defendant's vehicle cannot be sustained as a 
search incident to arrest. 
 
In any event, the testimony at the motion hearing would not 
have supported a finding of probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
11 
 
influence of marijuana.8  There was no evidence that the 
defendant bore any of the classic indicia of impairment, nor did 
the trooper administer a field sobriety test in order to gauge 
the defendant's level of impairment, notwithstanding the fact 
that the vehicle had been stopped at a sobriety checkpoint.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 756-757 (2013) ("[T]he 
Commonwealth elicited no testimony that [the defendant] showed 
any signs of impairment during [her] encounter [with police].  
The officer did not testify that [the defendant's] eyes were red 
or glassy, that her speech or movements were unusual, or that 
her responses to questioning were inappropriate or 
uncooperative.  He did not perform any tests to assess [the 
defendant's] physical and mental acuity"[footnote omitted]). 
 
There was likewise no evidence that the defendant had been 
driving erratically; indeed, the defendant's vehicle was stopped 
pursuant to a systematic effort to stop every passing 
automobile, and no other individualized reason for the stop was 
given.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 465 Mass. 112, 117-
118 (2013) (police officer was justified in stopping defendant's 
vehicle to determine whether he was operating it while under 
influence of drugs or alcohol, where vehicle was observed 
 
8 The 2008 initiative explicitly did not alter statutes 
relating to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of marijuana.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32L; Commonwealth v. Daniel, 
464 Mass. 746, 754 (2013). 
                                                          
 
12 
 
swerving erratically).  Although the defendant admitted to 
having smoked marijuana earlier, the exact time at which he had 
done so was not clear, and, prior to searching his vehicle, the 
trooper observed no drug paraphernalia used to consume 
marijuana.  Far short of arresting the defendant for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, the 
trooper in fact released the defendant, allowing him to continue 
driving.9 
 
Therefore, because the defendant was not arrested, and 
because the trooper lacked probable cause to arrest him for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
marijuana, the search of the defendant's vehicle was not 
justified as a search incident to arrest. 
 
b.  Search in order to prevent defendant from smoking 
marijuana while driving.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
trooper was "duty-bound" to search the defendant's vehicle to 
ensure that he would not "smoke additional marijuana while 
 
9 The Commonwealth conceded at oral argument that evidence 
that the defendant was operating while under the influence of 
marijuana was "scant."  The Commonwealth instead pursued the 
novel claim that the State trooper was justified in searching 
the vehicle where the defendant handed over a small amount of 
marijuana in what the Commonwealth argued was an attempt to 
"divert" the trooper's attention from the presence of other 
criminal contraband in the vehicle.  That the defendant intended 
to distract the trooper by using the small amount of marijuana 
in the glove compartment as a decoy is not supported by the 
findings of the judge, and we decline to address such a 
"diversion" theory on appeal. 
                                                          
 
13 
 
driving."  In this argument, the Commonwealth does not attempt 
to fit the search within the parameters of the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement, nor could it; the 
Commonwealth argues only that the odor of unburnt marijuana and 
the presence of a small amount of marijuana in the glove 
compartment suggested that "there could have been more."  The 
mere possibility that more marijuana was present in the vehicle 
does not amount to probable cause to believe that the defendant 
had committed, or was committing, a crime, namely possession of 
more than one ounce of marijuana.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
461 Mass. 44, 49 & n.6 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. 
Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 53 (1974) (automobile exception to 
warrant requirement permits search of vehicle where probable 
cause supports search).  See also Commonwealth v. Daniel, supra 
at 751-752 (defendant's surrender of two small bags of marijuana 
did not give rise to probable cause to search vehicle). 
 
Instead, the Commonwealth maintains only that effectuating 
a warrantless search of the vehicle was the appropriate 
resolution of the choice facing the trooper, between searching 
the defendant's vehicle or releasing him, with the possibility 
that he could smoke additional marijuana while driving.  But, 
notwithstanding this novel argument, there is no "Hobson's 
choice" exception to the warrant requirement; that operating 
while under the influence may be an "epidemic," as the 
14 
 
Commonwealth argues, does not legitimate otherwise 
unconstitutional searches. 
 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendant would 
have smoked marijuana while driving had the trooper refrained 
from searching his vehicle.  The trooper was adamant that it was 
unburnt, rather than burnt, marijuana that he smelled, 
suggesting that, prior to the stop, the defendant had not been 
smoking while driving.  Similarly, as discussed supra, there is 
no evidence that the defendant was impaired; the trooper 
performed no tests to assess his physical and mental acuity and 
permitted him to drive away. 
 
We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth's suggestion that 
the search was permissible owing to the trooper's duty to ensure 
the safety of the roadways and to prevent the mere potential 
that the defendant could smoke marijuana while driving.  Were we 
to conclude otherwise, it would follow necessarily that police 
could search any vehicle containing sealed bottles of alcohol, 
based on a potential risk that the driver could open a bottle 
and begin drinking while driving. 
 
c.  Search pursuant to automobile exception, based on 
probable cause to believe that defendant had violated Federal 
law.  As a third possible justification for the search, the 
Commonwealth suggests the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, which provides that police may search an automobile 
15 
 
where they have probable cause to believe that evidence of a 
crime will be found therein.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra 
at 49 & n.6, citing Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, supra at 53.  
According to this theory, the search conformed to the 
requirements of the automobile exception because the trooper had 
probable cause to believe that evidence of a Federal crime, 
namely, possession of marijuana, would be found inside the 
defendant's vehicle, despite the absence of any Federal 
involvement in the stop at issue.  This argument effectively 
asks us to circumvent the "clear intent" of the voters who 
enacted the 2008 initiative, which we identified in Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 464-465, 472 (2011), and to overrule the 
holding of that case.  We decline to do so. 
 
We observe at the outset that State and local law 
enforcement authorities are the creatures of statute, which may 
be modified by the Legislature.  See Commonwealth v. Dugan, 12 
Met. 233, 234 (1847) ("The office of a police officer is not one 
known to the common law; it is created by statute, and must be 
regulated and administered according to the statute").  It 
follows that duly enacted laws may circumscribe police authority 
to act.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Landry, 438 Mass. 206, 211 
(2002) (in light of statute providing that it "shall not be a 
crime" to participate in hypodermic needle exchange program, 
police officer may not lawfully arrest individual bearing 
16 
 
program membership card for violating provision regarding 
unlawful possession of needles).  Thus, the 2008 initiative, 
constituting as it does a valid exercise of legislative 
authority, limited the scope of permissible police conduct with 
regard to marijuana offenses by reclassifying possession of one 
ounce or less as a civil violation.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
supra at 471-472 ("the entire statutory scheme [enacted by the 
2008 initiative] also implicates police conduct in the field"). 
 
Similarly, although the "general rule is that local police 
are not precluded from enforcing federal statutes," Gonzales v. 
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other 
grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 
1999), their authority to do so derives from State law.  See 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958) (where State 
police officers make arrest for violation of Federal law, 
"lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is to be determined by 
reference to state law"); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
15 n.5 (1948) (same); Goulis v. State Judge of the Third Dist. 
Court of E. Middlesex, 246 Mass. 1, 5-6 (1923), quoting 
Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169, 174 (1905) ("It has long 
been held that power may be conferred upon a state officer, as 
such, to execute a duty imposed under an act of Congress, and 
the officer may execute the same, unless its execution is 
prohibited by the constitution or legislation of the state").  
17 
 
While State law may authorize local and State police to enforce 
Federal criminal statutes,10 it need not do so. 
 
Where the 2008 initiative decriminalized possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana under State law, and accordingly 
removed police authority to arrest individuals for civil 
violations, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32N, it also must be read as 
curtailing police authority to enforce the Federal prohibition 
of possession of small amounts of marijuana.  Any contrary 
interpretation would clearly contravene the people's intent, to 
which we must give effect.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, supra at 
470-471.  Construing the statutory scheme to continue to permit 
State and local police to enforce the Federal prohibition would 
be entirely inconsistent with the objective that we discerned in 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, supra at 477, to "free up the police for 
more serious criminal pursuits."  We will not adopt an 
interpretation that is so plainly at odds with the purpose of 
the initiative.  See Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. Assessors 
of Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 160 (2012) (court will not 
embrace "absurd or unreasonable" interpretation of statute). 
 
The Commonwealth appears to acknowledge that, after the 
2008 initiative, State and local police lack authority to make 
arrests under Federal law for possessing small amounts of 
 
10 Of course, State law may authorize local enforcement of 
Federal statutes only if not preempted by Federal law.  See 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505-2507 (2012). 
                                                          
 
18 
 
marijuana, but claims nonetheless that police may simply 
investigate possible violations of Federal statutes and turn 
over any evidence obtained to Federal authorities.  Even 
assuming that the power to investigate crimes and make arrests 
may be decoupled in such a way, the Federal government's current 
stance on prosecuting marijuana-related offenses significantly 
undercuts the strength of this argument.  In 2009, and again in 
2013, the United States Department of Justice issued a 
memorandum to all United States Attorneys outlining its 
enforcement priorities with respect to marijuana-related 
offenses.  See J.M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General of the United 
States, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) 
(Cole); D.W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General of the United 
States, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing 
the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009).  Such priorities 
include, inter alia, "[p]reventing revenue from the sale of 
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and 
cartels" and "[p]reventing violence and the use of firearms in 
the cultivation and distribution of marijuana."  Cole, supra at 
1-2. 
 
The Department of Justice has recognized that, "[o]utside 
of these enforcement priorities, the federal government has 
traditionally relied on states and local enforcement agencies to 
address marijuana activity through enforcement of their own 
19 
 
narcotics laws," and will continue to do so where Federal 
priorities are not implicated.  Id. at 2-3.  Therefore, given 
the clear preference expressed in the 2008 initiative that 
police focus their attention elsewhere, Federal law does not 
supply an alternative basis for investigating possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana, especially where the Federal 
government has signaled a lessened interest in prosecuting such 
conduct. 
 
To be sure, examples of cooperation between Federal and 
State law enforcement authorities are legion in our case law.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 426 Mass. 313, 314 (1997); 
Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 893 (1990).  See also 
United States v. Franklin, 630 F.3d 53, 54 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2466 (2011).  By concluding as we do, we do 
not intend to call into question the legitimacy of such joint 
efforts.  We hold only that where, as here, State law expressly 
has decriminalized certain conduct, there is no extant joint 
investigation, and the Federal government has indicated that it 
will not prosecute certain conduct, the fact that such conduct 
is technically subject to a Federal prohibition does not provide 
an independent justification for a warrantless search. 
 
Therefore, "[a]bsent articulable facts supporting a belief 
that either occupant of the vehicle possessed a criminal amount 
of marijuana [under State law], the search was not justified by 
20 
 
the need to search for contraband [under Federal law]."  
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 752 (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.