Title: River Heights v. Batten
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 030180
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 
and Carrico and Compton, S.JJ. 
 
RIVER HEIGHTS ASSOCIATES 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 
                                           OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030180   
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
ALICE BATTEN, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge 
 
Procedural Background 
 
In a bill of complaint for declaratory judgment, Alice 
Batten and other owners of lots in the Carrsbrook Subdivision 
in Albemarle County (collectively, Batten)1 sought a 
declaration favoring the enforceability of restrictive 
covenants prohibiting commercial use of four unimproved lots 
in the same subdivision, namely, Lots 1, 2C, and 2D in Section 
C and Lot 1 in Section E.  River Heights Associates Limited 
Partnership is the record owner of Lot 1, Section C, which it 
acquired in 1998, S.V. Associates is the record owner of Lots 
2C and 2D, Section C, which it acquired in 1978, and First 
Gold Leaf Land Trust is the record owner of Lot 1, Section E, 
which it acquired in 1986.  Batten named these record owners 
as the defendants in her bill of complaint. 
                     
 
1 The other lot owners are James W. Craig, Anthony A. 
Hastoglis, Elizabeth S. Hastoglis, Joseph T. Mason, Nancy P. 
Mason, Thomas A. McQueeney, Catherine C. Teague, Joseph W. 
Teague, Jr., Edith L. B. Turner, Robert E. Whitworth, John W. 
Wolcott, III, and Karen Wolcott. 
 
Although the entities just listed hold title to the four 
lots in question, the briefs describe Wendell W. Wood and his 
wife, Marlene C. Wood, as the beneficial owners of the lots.  
While the Woods were not named as defendants below and are not 
parties to this appeal, the appellants in the case are 
referred to collectively in the briefs as "Wood," and we will 
follow the same practice. 
 
Wood demurred to the bill of complaint on the grounds, 
inter alia, that Batten had failed to state a cause of action 
upon which relief could be granted and had failed to allege 
the existence of a controversy pursuant to Code § 8.01-184, a 
part of the declaratory judgment statutes, so as to confer 
jurisdiction over the claims asserted in the bill of 
complaint.  The trial court overruled the demurrer on these 
grounds but sustained it on other grounds not pertinent here 
and allowed Batten to file an amended bill of complaint. 
 
Batten filed an amended bill not differing in substance 
from her original bill.  Wood filed an answer to the amended 
bill in which he denied the essential elements of Batten's 
claim for relief.  In a section styled "Affirmative Defenses," 
Wood contended that Batten had failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted, that the 
restrictive covenant was unenforceable, and that the covenant 
 
2
did not apply to his property.  Wood also contended that he 
had no knowledge of the covenant. 
Evidentiary Background 
 
Carrsbrook Subdivision is located on the eastern side of 
U.S. Route 29 between the northern city limits of 
Charlottesville and the Rivanna River.  The four lots here in 
dispute are located at the western edge of the subdivision and 
are the only lots with frontage on U.S. Route 29. 
 
The restrictive covenants were established in a deed 
dated May 6, 1959, from Norman Kelsey and wife to Charles W. 
Hurt (the Kelsey-Hurt deed), which conveyed an unsubdivided 
40-acre portion of "the land known as 'Carrsbrook.' "  The 
conveyance was made subject to "certain restrictions . . . 
which shall be considered as covenants running with the land."  
Only one of the restrictions is pertinent here:  "The property 
is to be used for residential purposes only and no rooming 
house, boarding house, tourist home, or any other type of 
commercial enterprise, or any church, hospital, asylum, or 
charitable institution shall be operated thereon" (the 
restrictive covenant). 
 
In October 1960, Section C of Carrsbrook was subdivided 
into 19 lots, all made "subject to the restrictive covenants 
applicable to Carrsbrook Subdivision of record."  An attached 
plat shows Lot 1 as containing 3.04 acres bordering Carrsbrook 
 
3
Drive, Indian Spring Road, and Route 29.  Lot 2 is shown as 
containing 2.55 acres bordering Indian Spring Road and Route 
29.  A notation on the plat states that "[l]ots 1 & 2 
restricted to non access on Rte. 29 if lots are used for 
residential purposes"  (the plat note). 
 
In 1962, Lot 2, Section C, was resubdivided into four 
lots, namely, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D.  Lots 2C and 2D border Route 
29.  Lots 2A and 2B border only Indian Spring Road, leaving 
Lots 2C and 2D without direct access to the residential roads 
in the subdivision and Lots 2A and 2B without direct access to 
Route 29.  In addition, Lots 2C and 2D, along with Lot 1C, are 
subject to the plat note. 
 
In 1969, Albemarle County adopted its first comprehensive 
zoning ordinance.  The lots in question were zoned to a depth 
of 200 feet from Route 29 in a B-1 classification, a 
commercial district in which residential use is prohibited.2  
This zoning classification was continued in a comprehensive 
rezoning in 1980, with the result that presently the lots in 
question are zoned for commercial use but are subject to the 
restrictive covenant prohibiting such use. 
 
When Carrsbrook Subdivision was created in 1969, Route 29 
was a two-lane road with residences and small businesses 
located on each side of the road.  In the area where the lots 
                     
 
4
 
2 The southern portion of Lot 1C remains residentially 
zoned. 
in question are located, Route 29 is today an eight- to ten-
lane road that is highly developed commercially on both sides 
with shopping centers, hotels, restaurants, automobile 
dealerships, and other types of businesses.  No residential 
uses have been implemented along Route 29 since 1959.  There 
have been no changes within the Carrsbrook Subdivision other 
than the aging of homes and the maturing of trees. 
The Trial Court's Decision 
 
At the conclusion of an ore tenus hearing, the trial 
court held that the restrictive covenant against commercial 
use did apply to the four lots in question and that the 
covenant was enforceable.  The court entered a final decree 
declaring the covenant enforceable and enjoining the use or 
operation of the lots in violation of the covenant, including 
developing the lots commercially in the future.  We awarded 
Wood this appeal. 
Entitlement to Declaratory Relief 
 
Wood has assigned three errors.  One of the assignments 
alleges that the trial court "erred as a matter of law in 
overruling Wood's Demurrer, Motion to Strike, and his renewal 
of the Motion to Strike [at] the conclusion of all the 
evidence on the basis that the declaratory judgment suit was 
 
5
improper under the declaratory judgment statutes [in] the Code 
of Virginia."3
Wood's Demurrer 
 
In support of his demurrer, Wood cites City of Fairfax v. 
Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E.2d 773 (1964), a case where we 
dismissed a motion for declaratory judgment.  Quoting 
Shanklin, Wood says the test for determining the efficacy of a 
declaratory judgment proceeding is whether "[t]he controversy 
[is] one that is justiciable, that is, where specific adverse 
claims, based upon present rather than future or speculative 
facts, are ripe for judicial adjustment."  Id. at 229, 135 
S.E.2d at 775.  And, Wood adds, Shanklin teaches that courts 
are not vested with authority "to render advisory opinions, to 
decide moot questions or to answer inquiries which are merely 
speculative."  Id. at 229-30, 135 S.E.2d at 776.  Wood argues 
that the allegations of Batten's bill of complaint did not 
meet this test and that this case should never have proceeded 
past the demurrer stage. 
 
Wood correctly states the rules enunciated in Shanklin.  
But the case is inapposite; its facts differ substantially 
from those in the case at bar.  In Shanklin, a taxpayer sought 
to have declared invalid provisions of the city zoning 
ordinance that conferred on the Board of Zoning Appeals 
                     
 
6
 
3 Code §§ 8.01-184 to -191 comprise the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 
authority to issue special permits for the construction of 
apartments.  We held that no justiciable controversy existed 
because no specific case regarding apartment usage within the 
city was involved and because the Board might never again be 
called upon to act on an application for a special permit for 
apartments.  Therefore, we said, too much was left to 
speculation.  Id. at 231, 135 S.E.2d at 776.  Here, a specific 
case is involved, and it places in controversy the use of land 
for commercial purposes. 
 
Wood also argues that the bill of complaint failed to 
allege an imminent threat of development necessary to maintain 
a suit for declaratory judgment.  Wood acknowledges that 
"[t]his Court has not held that a party (such as Wood) must 
establish a vested right or obtain the benefit of some 
significant governmental act before other affected landowners 
can utilize the declaratory judgment process to determine the 
rights of the parties."  Yet, Wood submits, "something more 
than mere speculation — which is all that exists here — is 
required [to] invoke the power of the Courts."  Then, citing 
Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. Mill Two Associates P'ship, 259 Va. 
685, 529 S.E.2d 318 (2000), Wood says the "something more" 
consists of " 'substantial steps,' such as the expenditure of 
significant monies or the development of specific plans, to 
 
7
create a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act." 
 
We did point out in Hoffman that the developer there had 
"taken substantial steps, with significant financial expense, 
in developing specific plans for the development" involved in 
that case.  Id. at 693-94, 529 S.E.2d at 323.  But we did not 
establish the requirement that such "significant financial 
expense, in developing specific plans for . . . development," 
must be alleged and proven in every case where declaratory 
judgment relief is requested.  Rather, the case merely 
represents one example of where proof and allegation are 
sufficient to take a prospective development out of the realm 
of speculation.  The important precedential value of the case 
is found in its holding that a developer need not have 
governmental approval to proceed with a project before a party 
adversely affected may seek relief via declaratory judgment. 
Id. 
 
The present case is akin to Cupp v. Board of Supervisors 
of Fairfax County, 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d 407 (1984).  There, 
Cupp and his wife, owners of a nursery, applied for a special 
exception to permit modification of the layout of their 
nursery.  The Planning Commission recommended that the 
application be approved on the condition that the Cupps 
construct a right turn lane for entrance to the nursery and 
 
8
dedicate a right-of-way up to 100 feet from the centerline of 
the highway.  The Cupps objected to the requirement for 
construction and dedication.  The Board denied the 
application, and the Cupps filed a motion for declaratory 
judgment challenging the requirement.  227 Va. at 584-88, 318 
S.E.2d at 408-10. 
 
The Board contended there was no controversy between the 
parties sufficient for the Cupps to maintain a claim for 
declaratory judgment.  The trial court held the Cupps could 
maintain their suit and we affirmed, holding that although the 
Board had not yet imposed the restrictions and conditions, "it 
claimed it had the power to do so and this claim of power 
threatened the Cupps [and thus] a controversy, within the 
contemplation of the Declaratory Judgment Act, existed." Id. 
at 593, 318 S.E.2d at 414. 
 
Here, Batten's bill of complaint alleged Wendell Wood had 
met with members of the Carrsbrook Subdivision and "indicated 
that he intended to commercially develop the properties at 
issue [and] he spoke of developing a commercial three (3) 
story office building with related parking facilities."  
Further, the amended bill alleged that Richard E. Carter, an 
attorney, had written Wendell Wood a letter stating that the 
"properties [in question] were bound by restrictive covenants 
 
9
and could not be used commercially."4  In response, Wendell 
Wood told the attorney "that he did not believe the 
restrictions applied to his property and that it was his 
express intention to develop any of the properties he owned on 
Route 29 as commercial property and that he wanted to make 
sure that there was no mistake as to his intentions." 
 
The bill also alleged that Donald A. Swofford, a local 
architect, had stated in a letter to one of the complainants 
that Wendell Wood had asked Swofford "to provide him with a 
proposal to do a planned development for the sites [in 
question, using a style called 'Albemarle-Georgian'], 
including an entry to the Carrsbrook neighborhood."  Swofford 
also stated that he was providing Wendell Wood "with that 
proposal now to the end that we would have drawings and 
sketches for the neighborhood to review in approximately two 
months."5
 
In overruling Wood's demurrer, the trial court stated 
that Batten had "pled sufficient facts establishing an actual 
case or controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act."  We 
agree with the trial court.  Just as in Cupp, Wood's assertion 
                     
 
4 When Carter testified later in the ore tenus hearing, he 
said that he had been contacted by a resident of Carrsbrook 
Subdivision to render an opinion on whether "two lots in 
Carrsbrook could be used for commercial purposes." 
 
10
 
5 In his testimony at trial, Swofford waffled somewhat 
about his arrangement with Wood.  However, on demurrer, we 
take as true the facts alleged in Batten's bill of complaint 
for declaratory judgment. 
here that he had the power to develop the lots in question for 
commercial use and that he would exercise that power 
threatened Batten.  And the imminence of the threat was 
supplied by the statement in Swofford's letter about having 
"drawings and sketches for the neighborhood to review in 
approximately two months."  Thus, a controversy within the 
contemplation of the Declaratory Judgment Act was sufficiently 
alleged in Batten's bill of complaint, and the trial court did 
not err in overruling Wood's demurrer. 
Proof of Justiciable Controversy 
 
This brings us to the denial of Wood's motions to strike 
Batten's evidence at the ore tenus hearing.  Wood argues that 
the motions should have been granted because Batten did not 
prove the allegations of her bill of complaint and thus failed 
to establish a justiciable controversy under the declaratory 
judgment statutes.  Wood says it was unrebutted at trial that 
he "did not have plans prepared at his request to immediately 
develop the property"; he "never stated that he would proceed 
with development without the Complainants' consent"; he "did 
not ask a local architect to provide him with a proposal to do 
a planned development"; he "never hired a planner"; he had no 
"plans underway to prepare drawings in approximately two 
months;" and he "never incurred significant financial expense 
 
11
— or any expense whatsoever — with respect to the development 
of these properties." 
 
If this analysis of the record were accurate, we might be 
inclined to agree with Wood that Batten failed to prove a 
justiciable controversy entitling her to declaratory judgment 
relief.  But the analysis is not accurate.  It completely 
disregards the most significant evidence in the case on the 
issue of Batten's entitlement to declaratory judgment relief — 
the evidence of Wood's meeting with the property owners in 
Carrsbrook Subdivision. 
 
Wood requested this meeting.  He says he wanted the 
meeting to avoid a lawsuit and he proposed a compromise under 
which he would spend up to $50,000.00 to build an entranceway 
into Carrsbrook Subdivision provided the Carrsbrook lot owners 
consented to his plan to develop the property in question with 
an office complex.  In these circumstances, it is clear that 
an actual controversy existed over whether Wood could develop 
the property in question for commercial purposes.  Indeed, 
Wood's offer to pay $50,000.00 to make peace with the 
Carrsbrook lot owners is proof that an actual controversy 
existed.  Furthermore, Wood's offer to pay the $50,000.00, 
made in light of his statement that "he wanted to make sure 
there was no mistake as to his intentions" to develop the 
property with or without the consent of the Carrsbrook lot 
 
12
owners, bespeaks immediacy; in other words, consent now or 
suffer the consequences.  Hence, there was a justiciable 
controversy, one "ripe for judicial adjustment," Shanklin, 205 
Va. at 229, 135 S.E.2d at 775, and the trial court did not err 
in denying Wood's motions to strike Batten's evidence. 
The Restrictive Covenant Vis-a-Vis The Plat Note 
 
In another assignment of error, Wood alleges that "[t]he 
Trial Court erred in failing to resolve the conflict between 
the restrictive covenants on Lots 2C and 2D, and preventing 
the commercial use of these two lots as zoned."  It will be 
recalled that the restrictive covenant prohibits commercial 
use of the three lots and the plat note prohibits access from 
the lots to Route 29 if they are used for residential 
purposes. 
 
Wood says there is a fundamental inconsistency between 
the restrictive covenant and the plat note in this case — the 
restrictive covenant prohibits commercial use of the three 
lots and the plat note denies access to the lots fronting 
Route 29 when used for residential purposes, leaving Lots 2C 
and 2D without any useable access.  This creates a patent 
ambiguity, Wood maintains, and since restrictive covenants 
must be strictly construed, Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC 
Properties, 255 Va. 75, 80, 496 S.E.2d 64, 67-68 (1998), the 
doubt must be resolved against the covenant and in favor of 
 
13
the free use of the property.  Wood concludes that when the 
doubt here is resolved in favor of the free use of the lots in 
question, it is clear that "[b]y restricting access to Route 
29 to only non-residential uses, the [plat note] specifically 
contemplated use of the parcels for commercial uses." 
 
We disagree with Wood.  No ambiguity exists between the 
restrictive covenant and the plat note.  The restrictive 
covenant deals only with the use that may be made of the 
property, without any reference to access.  The plat note 
deals only with access to the property, without any reference 
to use, and it cannot be construed, therefore, as a basis for 
saying that the note restriction "specifically contemplated 
use of the parcels for commercial uses." 
 
A further reason exists for saying that the plat note did 
not "specifically contemplate[] use of the parcels for 
commercial uses."  The plat and the instrument to which it was 
attached created the Subdivision of Section C "Carrsbrook," 
including Lot 2, the parcel from which Lots 2C and 2D later 
evolved.  The instrument provided that the numbered lots shown 
on the plat "are subject to the restrictive covenants 
applicable to the Carrsbrook Subdivision of record in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, 
Virginia, in Deed Book 348 page 235."  The covenants recorded 
in that deed book include the very covenant that prohibits 
 
14
commercial use of lots in Carrsbrook Subdivision, without 
excepting Lots 2C and 2D.  So, when the plat note and the 
restrictive covenant are read together, as they must be read, 
it is certain that the plat note could not possibly have 
contemplated commercial use of the parcels. 
 
Wood complains that the result of the trial court's 
decision "is to allow Wood no use of these lots for anything 
other than open space," resulting in a serious dimunition in 
the value of the lots.  However, Booker v. Old Dominion Land 
Co., 188 Va. 143, 152, 49 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1948), is authority 
for the proposition that the effect on the value of property 
resulting from the enforcement or a refusal to enforce a 
restrictive covenant " 'is of slight if any consequence' " 
(quoting Allen v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 143 N.E. 
499, 502 (Mass. 1924)).  Furthermore, Wood had at least 
constructive notice from the record chain of title of both the 
restrictive covenant that prohibits commercial use of his 
property and the plat note that denies Lots 2C and 2D access 
to Route 29 if developed residentially. 
 
Wood claimed he did not know of the restrictions or 
thought they would expire in twenty years.  However, the very 
deed by which Wood acquired title to Lots 2C and 2D6 
                     
 
15
 
6 This deed, from Charles W. Hurt and Letitia H. Hurt to 
Wendell W. Wood, was dated December 7, 1968, and recorded 
specifically provided that the lots were subject, without any 
time limitation, (1) to the restrictions set forth in the 
Kelsey-Hurt deed of 1959, which included the noncommercial use 
restriction, and (2) the restrictions set forth in "an 
instrument with the plat of Subdivision of Section C, 
Carrsbrook," the plat containing, of course, the restriction 
denying Lots 2C and 2D access to Route 29 if developed 
residentially.  But, whether Wood actually knew of the 
existence of the restrictions or their length, his fate is to 
be determined by what he should have known, harsh though the 
result might be.  "Equity should not set at naught solemn 
covenants voluntarily made, when to do so would enrich the 
covenantor[7] and injure the covenantee."8  Booker, supra, 188 
Va. at 152, 49 S.E.2d at 319. 
Change of Conditions 
 
In his remaining assignment of error, Wood alleges that 
"[t]he trial court erred in failing to remove the residential 
restrictive covenant as to all four lots (Lots 1E, 1C, 2C, and 
                                                                
among the land records of Albemarle County in Deed Book 452 at 
Page 475. 
 
7 Wood concedes the obvious — "the property was more 
valuable for commercial rather than for residential uses." 
 
16
 
8 Batten presented evidence about how the residents of 
Carrsbrook Subdivision would be damaged if Wood is allowed to 
develop his property commercially.  The prospective damage 
took the form of decreased value of Carrsbrook property, 
additional noise and artificial light, and increased traffic 
congestion on Carrsbrook Drive, the primary entranceway for 
the subdivision. 
2D) in light of the overwhelming evidence that established a 
change of conditions so radical as practically to destroy the 
essential objects and purposes of the restriction." 
 
Wood stresses the changes, outlined supra, that have 
taken place in the Route 29 corridor since Carrsbrook 
Subdivision was created in 1969, viz., the previous two-lane 
road with residences and small businesses strung along each 
side has become a heavily traveled eight- to ten-lane 
thoroughfare lined on each side with shopping centers, hotels, 
restaurants, automobile dealerships, and other types of 
businesses.  Further, Wood also stresses the fact that "no 
residential houses have been built or used from the city 
limits of Charlottesville to the South Rivanna River on either 
the east or west side of Route 29 in the last thirty years."9
 
The test for determining whether changed conditions 
warrant the nullification of a restrictive covenant was 
enunciated in Deitrick v. Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, 8 S.E.2d 
276 (1940), as follows: 
"No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when 
changed conditions have defeated the purpose of 
restrictions, but it can be safely asserted the changes 
                     
 
17
 
9 Wood also stresses the zoning changes that have occurred 
along both sides of Route 29 since the restrictive covenant 
was created.  However, in Ault v. Shipley, 189 Va. 69, 75, 52 
S.E.2d 56, 58 (1949), this Court said that "a zoning law 
cannot constitutionally relieve land within the district 
covered by it from lawful restrictive covenants affecting its 
use for business purposes." 
must be so radical as practically to destroy the 
essential objects and purposes of the agreement." 
 
175 Va. at 177, 8 S.E.2d at 279 (quoting Rombauer v. Compton 
Heights Christian Church, 40 S.W.2d 545, 553 (Mo. 1931)). 
 
Wood takes the trial court to task, saying that the court 
"ignored the radical changes that have occurred in and around 
the subject properties since 1959, but rather focused 
myopically on whether or not there have been changes within 
the interior of the Subdivision."  This is an unfair 
representation of what the trial court ruled in this case. 
 
In a letter opinion, the trial court wrote: "[Wood has] 
failed to prove that radical changes both in and around the 
neighborhood have occurred such that the purpose of the 
restrictive covenant is destroyed."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, 
it is clear the court did not focus upon conditions in 
Carrsbrook Subdivision alone but on conditions "around the 
neighborhood" as a whole. 
 
This is in accord with Virginia law.  In Booker, supra, 
relief was sought from a restrictive covenant prohibiting 
commercial uses of residential lots in a subdivision.  It was 
alleged that there had been a change of conditions so radical 
as to destroy the essential objectives and purposes of the 
covenant.  These changes included the operation of a nearby 
zipper factory, the conversion of one of the lots into a hard-
surfaced road leading to the factory, the widening of the road 
 
18
on which all the lots abutted from a two-lane roadway, 
carrying a small amount of traffic, to a heavily traveled 
four-lane federal highway, the construction nearby of a large 
shopping center, and the presence of a skating rink across the 
road from one of the lots.  188 Va. at 149, 49 S.E.2d at 317. 
 
The trial court refused to remove the restrictive 
covenant.  This Court affirmed.  We said that "if a radical 
change takes place in the whole neighborhood so as to defeat 
the purpose of the restrictions and render their enforcement 
inequitable and oppressive, equity will not compel observance 
of them by injunction."  Id. at 148-49, 40 S.E.2d at 317. 
(Emphasis added.)  See also Marks v. Wingfield, 229 Va. 573, 
576, 331 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1985). 
 
Wood seemingly would have the rule the other way — ignore 
the circumstances within the property protected by a 
restrictive covenant and focus only upon the surrounding area.  
However, common sense tells us that when the issue is whether 
a restrictive covenant still serves its intended purpose and 
that purpose is to protect the lots in a particular 
subdivision from commercial uses, the conditions existing 
within the subdivision must be examined along with those 
existing in the surrounding area in order to determine the 
issue fairly.  To ignore the conditions within the subdivision 
and to hold the covenant unenforceable solely because of 
 
19
changed conditions elsewhere would deny the lot owners the 
protection to which they are entitled according to a solemn 
covenant voluntarily made, and that would be grossly unfair. 
 
What is required, therefore, is a leveling exercise in 
which fair consideration is given both to conditions in the 
subdivision and those in the surrounding area.  Here, the 
facts are that there have been no changes within Carrsbrook 
Subdivision other than the aging of homes and the maturing of 
trees but there have been substantial changes within the 
surrounding area.  After giving fair consideration to both 
situations, we are of opinion the changes are not so radical 
as to defeat the purpose of the covenant. 
 
Finally, Wood cites Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center 
Associates, L.P. v. Smith, 264 Va. 350, 568 S.E.2d 676 (2002).  
That case involved a covenant that restricted the use of one 
piece of property to protect a historic home located on other 
property across the road.  Later, the historic home was moved 
to a different location and, in the meantime, the surrounding 
area had been transformed into a thriving commercial area.  
This Court affirmed the trial court's nullification of the 
covenant, holding that such a radical change satisfied the 
standard articulated in Booker and its progeny.  Id. at 356-
57, 568 S.E.2d at 680.  However, Chesterfield Meadows is 
inapposite.  Lacking here is a radical change like moving a 
 
20
historic home from its protected location, which negates the 
very purpose of the restrictive covenant. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court 
will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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