Title: Berken v. Beneficial Standard Life Insurance Co.
Citation: 221 N.W.2d 122
Docket Number: 44523
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 1974

221 N.W.2d 122 (1974) Margaret S. BERKEN, Formerly Known as Margaret S. Wilcox, Appellant, v. BENEFICIAL STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. No. 44523. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 21, 1974. Rehearing Denied September 6, 1974. *123 Wright, Wanglie &amp; Leighton and F. Gordon Wright, Minneapolis, for appellant. Richards, Montgomery, Cobb &amp; Bassford and Jon D. Jensvold and Jerome C. Briggs, Minneapolis, for respondent. Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and OTIS, SCOTT, and KNUTSON, JJ., and considered and decided by the court. SCOTT, Justice. This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, Beneficial Standard Life Insurance Company. We affirm. The agreed statement of the case under Rule 110.04, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part as follows: In 43 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 259, the text contains these pertinent statements: See, also, Bettenburg v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 350 F. Supp. 873 (D.Minn.1972); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Implement Dealers Ins. Co., 294 Minn. 236, 199 N.W.2d 806 (1972). It is clear that the clause before us meets this standard in that it is unambiguous and unequivocally states the circumstances under which coverage will be denied. It is therefore unnecessary to resort to a determination of the subjective intent of the parties. In considering an exclusionary clause of nearly identical import in Slomovic v. Tennessee Hospital Service Assn., 46 Tenn.App. 705, 709, 333 S.W.2d 564, 566 (1959), the Court of Appeals of Tennessee wrote: We must give this insurance policy the plain meaning that was intended. This is not a situation, as contended by plaintiff, where one policy provides primary coverage and another is relegated to a secondary position. A necessary conclusion to this contention would be that the two policies, namely the workmen's compensation policy and this health and accident insurance policy, both cover the same accident or loss. In no way do they purport to do this. We are clearly not dealing with conflicting, overlapping insurance escape or excess clauses. Sathre v. Brewer, 289 Minn. 424, 184 N.W.2d 668 (1971). It is true that when ambiguities are present an insurance policy is to be liberally construed in favor of the named insured. However, this construction is not necessitated when the clause is unambiguous and its meaning is readily apparent to the insured. By the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy of insurance, coverage for injury or death where benefits are payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act is expressly excluded and, therefore, the lower court's summary judgment should be affirmed. Affirmed.