Title: Boelter v. Board of Selectmen of Wayland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12353
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12353 
 
MARY ALICE BOELTER & others1  vs.  BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF WAYLAND. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 5, 2017. - April 5, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Open Meeting Law.  Municipal Corporations, Open meetings, 
Selectmen.  Moot Question.  Attorney General. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 11, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Mark J. Lanza, Special Town Counsel, for the defendant. 
 
David S. Mackey, Special Assistant Attorney General 
(Christine M. Zaleski also present) for Massachusetts Gaming 
Commission. 
 
George H. Harris for the plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                     
 
1 Dorothy J. Dunlay; Kent E. George; Stanley U. Robinson, 
III; and Lois Voltmer. 
2 
 
 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Jonathan Sclarsic & Kevin 
W. Manganaro, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney 
General. 
 
Robert J. Ambrogi & Peter J. Caruso for Massachusetts 
Newspaper Publishers Association. 
 
Kenneth S. Leonetti, Christopher E. Hart, Michael Hoven, & 
Kelly Caiazzo for Hal Abrams & others. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The plaintiffs, all registered voters in the town 
of Wayland (town), brought this action in the Superior Court to 
challenge the procedure by which the board of selectmen of 
Wayland (board) conducted the 2012 performance review of the 
town administrator.  The chair of the board had circulated to 
all board members, in advance of the public meeting where the 
town administrator's evaluation was to take place, board 
members' individual written evaluations, as well as a composite 
written evaluation, of the town administrator's performance.  
The board made public all written evaluations after the open 
meeting.  The issue before us is whether the board violated the 
Massachusetts open meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18 and 20 (a), 
which generally requires public bodies to make their meetings, 
including "deliberations," open to the public. 
 
A judge of the Superior Court allowed the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment, issued a permanent injunction, and 
declared "stricken" a contrary determination by the Attorney 
General that had issued the prior year, on essentially the same 
facts, in which the Attorney General had found that the board's 
3 
 
 
conduct had not violated the open meeting law.  The board 
appealed from the allowance of summary judgment, arguing that 
the matter is moot, its conduct did not violate the open meeting 
law, and the judge erred in "striking" the Attorney General's 
separate administrative decision. 
 
We conclude that the judge did not err in declining to 
dismiss the case on mootness grounds, because the matter is 
capable of repetition and yet evading review, and is of 
substantial public importance.  See, e.g., Seney v. Morhy, 467 
Mass. 58, 61 (2014).  We conclude further that the procedure the 
board followed in conducting the town administrator's evaluation 
did violate the open meeting law.  In making this determination, 
we consider, for the first time, the meaning of the open meeting 
law's exemption to the definition of "[d]eliberation," which 
became effective in July, 2010, that permits members of public 
bodies to distribute to each other "reports or documents that 
may be discussed at a meeting, provided that no opinion of a 
member is expressed."  See St. 2009, c. 28, § 18; G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 18. 
We conclude that this exemption was enacted to foster 
administrative efficiency, but only where such efficiency does 
not come at the expense of the open meeting law's overarching 
purpose, transparency in governmental decision-making.  As the 
individual and composite evaluations of the town administrator 
4 
 
 
by the board members contained opinions, the circulation of such 
documents among a quorum prior to the open meeting does not fall 
within the exemption, and thus constituted a deliberation to 
which the public did not have access, in violation of the open 
meeting law.  We therefore affirm the judge's decision allowing 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on this ground.  We agree 
with the board, however, that the judge erred in "striking" the 
Attorney General's determination, and vacate that portion of the 
judge's decision.2 
 
1.  Background.  The material facts are not in dispute.  On 
January 3, 2012, the five-member board held an open meeting 
during which it reviewed the procedures it intended to follow in 
conducting the annual performance evaluation of the town 
administrator.  The board agreed that, by the end of the month, 
its members would submit individual evaluations to the chair, 
who would compile the evaluations and draft a composite 
evaluation.  The composite evaluation was to be distributed to 
all board members in advance of the scheduled March 28, 2012, 
open meeting at which the board planned to discuss the town 
administrator's performance and issue a final written 
evaluation.  The procedure the board chose to follow was largely 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General; the Massachusetts Gaming Commission; the Massachusetts 
Newspaper Publishers Association; and Hal Abrams, Kim Abrams, 
and Karen Silva. 
5 
 
 
consistent with the Attorney General's guidance to public bodies 
regarding performance evaluations, which was available on the 
Attorney General's Web site: 
 
"May the individual evaluations of an employee be 
aggregated into a comprehensive evaluation? 
 
 
"Yes.  Members of a public body may individually 
create evaluations, and then submit them to an 
individual to aggregate into a master evaluation 
document to be discussed at an open meeting.  Ideally, 
members of the public body should submit their 
evaluations for compilation to someone who is not a 
member of the public body, for example, an 
administrative assistant.  If this is not a practical 
option, then the chair or other designated public body 
member may compile the evaluations.  However, once the 
individual evaluations are submitted for aggregation 
there should be no deliberation among members of the 
public body regarding the content of the evaluations 
outside of an open meeting, whether in person or over 
email." 
 
 
In accordance with the plan developed at the open meeting, 
three of the board members submitted written evaluations to the 
chair.  Two sent the evaluations by electronic mail (e-mail) 
message, and one hand-delivered her evaluation.  The chair 
created a composite performance evaluation which included the 
opinions of those three board members, as well as his own.  The 
reviews were predominantly positive.  The chair then sent the 
composite document, along with the three individual performance 
evaluations, to each board member, by e-mail, as part of an 
agenda packet for the then-upcoming open meeting. 
6 
 
 
 
At the meeting, the board reviewed and discussed the 
composite evaluation and approved it as final.  The minutes of 
the meeting simply state that the board "praised [the town 
administrator] for his availability and responsiveness to the 
public, his work ethic, his relationship with town staff, and 
his accessibility to board and committee members."  The 
composite and individual evaluations subsequently were released 
to the public. 
 
Approximately two months after the March 28, 2012, open 
meeting, George Harris, a registered voter in Wayland, filed a 
complaint with the office of the Attorney General, claiming that 
the board's procedure for conducting the town administrator's 
performance evaluation violated the open meeting law.  See G. L. 
c. 30A, §§ 18, 20 (a).  The open meeting law requires public 
bodies to make their meetings open to the public, and provide 
advance notice of such meetings, unless the meeting is an 
executive session, which can be conducted only for limited 
reasons.  See G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18, 20. 
 
In January, 2013, the Attorney General responded with a 
determination letter finding that the board's conduct had not 
violated the open meeting law; Harris's subsequent request for 
reconsideration was denied.  As judicial review of an Attorney 
General's determination in such matters is available only to an 
7 
 
 
aggrieved public body or member thereof, see G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 23 (d), Harris did not appeal from the decision. 
 
In February, 2014, the five plaintiffs in this action, who 
are also registered voters in Wayland (and who are represented 
by Harris) filed a complaint against the board in the Superior 
Court, concerning the same facts.  The complaint sought a 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting the board 
from commencing a "private exchange of opinions in deliberating 
the professional competence of an individual prior to an open 
meeting."  The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.3 
 
The plaintiffs' motion was allowed after a hearing.  The 
judge concluded that the board had violated the open meeting law 
and permanently enjoined it from "deliberating the town 
administrator's professional competence by private written 
messages before the commencement of a meeting open to the 
public."  In his decision, although not in the judgment or 
amended judgment,4 the judge also declared that "[t]he opinion 
from the Attorney General [d]ivision of [o]pen [g]overnment is 
                     
 
3 In civil actions to enforce the open meeting law, "the 
burden shall be on the respondent to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the action complained of in such complaint was 
in accordance with and authorized by the open meeting law."  
G. L. c. 30A, § 23 (f). 
 
 
4 The initial judgment was amended to correct an erroneous 
statutory reference. 
8 
 
 
stricken."  The board appealed to the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo, and thus 
"accord no deference to the decision of the motion judge" 
(citation omitted).  Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 
Mass. 775, 777 (2013).  "Summary judgment is appropriate where 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Boazova v. 
Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012), citing Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). 
 
b.  Mootness.  At first blush, the plaintiffs' claims 
appear moot, because the evaluation of the town administrator 
has been completed, and the plaintiffs are no longer able to 
affect the procedure the board implemented in 2012 in order to 
ensure compliance with the open meeting law.  In addition, the 
typical remedy for such a violation is public release of the 
documents at issue, which the board effectuated after the 
asserted violation.5  See District Attorney for the N. Dist. v. 
                     
5 The board's mootness argument focuses on the fact that the 
town administrator, whose performance evaluation was the subject 
of this action, was terminated in August, 2013.  The record is 
silent as to the reasons for the termination or the outcome of 
the administrator's other performance evaluations, if any.  The 
plaintiffs, however, are not challenging the outcome of this 
particular town administrator's performance evaluation, which 
 
9 
 
 
School Comm. of Wayland, 455 Mass. 561, 572 (2009) (School Comm. 
of Wayland). 
Nonetheless, dismissal for mootness may be inappropriate if 
the situation presented is "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" (citation omitted).  Seney, 467 Mass. at 61.  See Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner of Educ., 439 Mass. 124, 127 
(2003).  "In such circumstances, we do not hesitate to reach the 
merits of cases that no longer involve a live dispute so as to 
further the public interest" (citation omitted).  Seney, supra.  
Here, the board's practice is likely to recur; regardless of who 
is serving as the town administrator, an evaluation must take 
place every year.  Moreover, the practice that the board 
followed is endorsed by the posted information on the Attorney 
General's Web site, meaning that other public bodies might 
follow suit.6  At the same time, the issue likely would evade 
judicial review, because of the relatively short window involved 
in the annual review.  See Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 
367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975) (matter capable of repetition and yet 
evading review "because the claim of any named plaintiff is 
                                                                  
was in fact positive.  The town administrator's subsequent 
termination thus is irrelevant to the mootness determination. 
 
 
6 The Attorney General is authorized to interpret and 
enforce the open meeting law.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 23 (a).  She 
also may "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out 
enforcement of the open meeting law," and "issue written letter 
rulings or advisory opinions."  G. L. c. 30A, § 25. 
10 
 
 
likely to be mooted by the mere passage of time during the 
appeal process"). 
 
This matter is also of substantial public importance.  By 
challenging the board's procedure, the plaintiffs seek to ensure 
that all of the town's constituents have access to the decision-
making process of their local government whenever a town 
administrator is evaluated.  See School Comm. of Wayland, 455 
Mass. at 570 ("It is essential to a democratic form of 
government that the public have broad access to the decisions 
made by its elected officials and to the way in which the 
decisions are reached" [emphasis in original; citation 
omitted]).  We conclude that the motion judge did not err in 
declining to dismiss the case for mootness. 
 
c.  Open meeting law.  General Laws c. 30A, § 20 (a), 
provides that, with the exception of executive sessions,7 "all 
meetings of a public body shall be open to the public."8  The 
                     
 
7 General Laws c. 30A, § 21 (a), permits a public body to 
meet in an executive session in ten limited circumstances, none 
of which is applicable here.  Notably, these circumstances 
include discussion of "the reputation, character, physical 
condition or mental health, rather than professional competence, 
of an individual" (emphasis added).  See G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 21 (a) (1). 
 
 
8 "Except in an emergency, in addition to any notice 
otherwise required by law, a public body shall post notice of 
every meeting at least [forty-eight] hours prior to the meeting, 
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.  In an 
 
11 
 
 
statute defines a "meeting" as "a deliberation by a public body 
with respect to any matter within the body's jurisdiction," 
subject to certain exclusions not relevant here.  G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 18.  A "deliberation," in turn, is defined as "an oral or 
written communication through any medium, including [e-mail], 
between or among a quorum of a public body on any public 
business within its jurisdiction."  Id. 
The statute, however, provides an exemption:  
"'deliberation' shall not include the distribution of a meeting 
agenda, scheduling information or distribution of other 
procedural meeting or the distribution of reports or documents 
that may be discussed at a meeting, provided that no opinion of 
a member is expressed" (emphasis added).  Id.  The parties 
dispute whether, in circulating the individual and composite 
evaluations in advance of the public meeting, the board members' 
opinions were "expressed" within the meaning of this exemption. 
To resolve this dispute, we must "effectuate the intent of 
the Legislature" (citation omitted).  Koshy v. Sachdev, 477 
Mass. 759, 765 (2017).  "We begin with the canon of statutory 
construction that the primary source of insight into the intent 
of the Legislature is the language of the statute."  Id. at 766, 
                                                                  
emergency, a public body shall post notice as soon as reasonably 
possible prior to the meeting."  G. L. c. 30A, § 20 (b). 
12 
 
 
quoting International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 
853 (1983). 
As an initial matter, the open meeting law does not provide 
a meaning for the word "opinion."  In ordinary usage, an 
"opinion" is "a view, judgment, or appraisal formed in the mind 
about a particular matter."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1582 (1993).  See Boylston v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 434 Mass. 398, 405 (2001) ("We usually determine the 
plain and ordinary meaning of a term by its dictionary 
definition" [quotation omitted]).  The individual and composite 
evaluations prepared by the board members and shared with the 
quorum doubtless constituted "appraisals" of the town 
administrator's performance, and therefore contained board 
members' opinions.  The question, then, is whether the 
circulation of the individual and composite evaluations 
containing board members' opinions was permissible since the 
opinions were not expressed in the body of the chair's e-mail 
message circulating the evaluations but, rather, in the 
attachments themselves. 
 
The phrase, "provided that no opinion of a member is 
expressed," specifically pertains to "reports or documents that 
may be discussed at a meeting."  G. L. c. 30A, § 18.  See 
Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 
118, 123 (1986) (general rule of grammatical construction is 
13 
 
 
that "a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent" 
[citation omitted]).  The natural reading of the statute is that 
two categories are carved out of the definition of 
"deliberation."  It is not "deliberation" when the materials 
distributed to the quorum fall into one of two categories:  
first, purely procedural or administrative materials (such as 
agendas) and, second, reports or documents to be discussed at a 
later meeting, so long as such materials do not express the 
opinion of a board member. 
 
The board argues that the phrase, "provided that no opinion 
of a member is expressed," only pertains to the distribution of 
reports or documents, and not to the reports or documents 
themselves.  In other words, the board believes that the statute 
permits board members to share their opinions with a quorum 
provided that the opinions are not expressed in, for example, 
the body of an e-mail message or in a cover letter, but only in 
attachments to e-mail messages or documents referred to in a 
cover letter.  This reading would create a loophole that would 
render the open meeting law toothless.  See ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC 
v. Department of Pub. Utils., 475 Mass. 191, 199 (2016) ("The 
court does not determine the plain meaning of a statute in 
isolation but, rather, . . . [considers] the surrounding text, 
structure, and purpose of the Massachusetts act . . ." [citation 
and quotations omitted]); Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 
14 
 
 
249, 251 (1996) (reading of statute that causes it to have "no 
practical effect" is absurd result, and we "assume the 
Legislature intended to act reasonably").  If we were to adopt 
the board's view, the board members permissibly could have 
conducted an extended communication on any topic without public 
participation, so long as they styled their opinions as separate 
reports or documents and delivered them without substantive 
comment by hand, United States mail, or e-mail messages.  This 
plainly cannot be what the Legislature intended in adopting the 
exemption.  See Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 
134, 145 (2013), quoting North Shore Realty Trust v. 
Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 109, 112 (2001) (statute "should not be 
so interpreted as to cause absurd or unreasonable results when 
the language is susceptible of a sensible meaning"). 
Our reading is consistent with the statute's history.  
Previously, the open meeting law defined "deliberation" as "a 
verbal exchange between a quorum of members of a governmental 
body attempting to arrive at a decision on any public business 
within its jurisdiction."  See G. L. c. 39, § 23A, as appearing 
in St. 1975, c. 303, § 3.  In School Comm. of Wayland, 455 Mass. 
at 570-571, this court clarified that a "private e-mail exchange 
in order to deliberate the superintendent's professional 
competence" among Wayland school committee members "violated the 
letter and spirit of the open meeting law," because 
15 
 
 
"[g]overnmental bodies may not circumvent the requirements of 
the open meeting law by conducting deliberations via private 
messages, whether electronically, in person, over the telephone, 
or in any other form."  We reasoned that the e-mail 
communications at issue were not protected, "as we must presume 
the substance of the written comments would have been stated 
orally at an open meeting in which the superintendent's 
professional competence was discussed."  Id. at 571-572. 
In the same year that School Comm. of Wayland, supra, was 
decided, the Legislature broadened the open meeting law's 
definition of "deliberation," and affirmed that a "deliberation" 
could encompass "any medium," not just verbal communication.  
See St. 2009, c. 28, §§ 18, 20, 106 (effective July 1, 2010).  
At the same time, however, the Legislature amended the open 
meeting law expressly to allow public bodies to distribute some 
materials internally in advance of open meetings without 
triggering the definition of "deliberation"; this change seems 
to have been a response to the practical realities of local 
governmental service.  By permitting officials to review certain 
administrative materials and reports in advance of an open 
meeting, the Legislature took steps to ensure that the work of 
those officials at the meetings could be focused and efficient.  
At the same time, in recognition that the overarching purpose of 
the open meeting law is to ensure transparency in governmental 
16 
 
 
decision-making, the Legislature specified that no opinion of a 
board member could be expressed in any documents circulated to a 
quorum prior to an open meeting.  See Revere v. Massachusetts 
Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 610 (2017) ("the new version of 
the open meeting law does not alter our belief that '[i]t is 
essential to a democratic form of government that the public 
have broad access to the decisions made by its elected officials 
and to the way in which the decisions are reached'" [citation 
omitted]).  However inefficient this may prove for local bodies 
in certain circumstances, this is the balance that the 
Legislature has struck. 
The board argues that the Attorney General's interpretation 
of the open meeting law is entitled to deference and should 
prevail.  In the determination letter dismissing Harris's 
complaint, the Attorney General found that the board did not 
violate the open meeting law because "the [c]hair performed an 
administrative task exempt from the law's definition of 
deliberation."  She explained that the chair's "email did no 
more than distribute a document to be discussed at the [b]oard's 
meeting that night.  The email did not contain any advocacy by 
[the chair], and it did not invite comment from other [b]oard 
members, nor was any comment provided."  She went on to explain 
that "[a]lthough the document itself may have contained the 
opinions of [b]oard members, we find compiling evaluations to be 
17 
 
 
a permissible and necessary function for public bodies to 
conduct ahead of meetings, so long as discussion of the 
evaluations occurs during an open meeting."  The Attorney 
General conceded, however, that because e-mail communication 
among a quorum of public body members, "however innocent[,] 
creates at least the appearance of a potential open meeting law 
violation . . . our best advice continues to be that public 
bodies not communicate over email at all except for distributing 
meeting agendas, scheduling meetings and distributing documents 
created by non-members to be discussed at meetings, which are 
administrative tasks specifically sanctioned under the open 
meeting law." 
Where, as here, the Attorney General is authorized to 
interpret a statute, her interpretation is entitled to 
substantial deference, unless it is inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute.  Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 447 Mass. 
363, 367-368 (2006).  In this case, the Attorney General's 
characterization is not supported by the plain meaning of the 
statute, and therefore is not accorded such deference.  While 
the Attorney General correctly notes that the e-mail message to 
the board to which the evaluations were attached did not itself 
contain advocacy or invite comment, this does not alter the fact 
that the evaluations themselves contained board members' 
opinions.  The Attorney General dismisses the fact that the 
18 
 
 
composite evaluation contained board members' opinions by 
stating that "compiling evaluations" is a "permissible and 
necessary function for public bodies," but the chair did not 
simply compile the evaluations in this case -- he circulated the 
compiled evaluations to a quorum.  We note also that the 
Attorney General's determination letter fails to recognize that 
the chair sent not only the composite evaluation, but also the 
three individual evaluations, to all board members. 
We conclude that the board's conduct violated the open 
meeting law.  The circulated individual and composite 
evaluations expressed the opinions of the board members to a 
quorum in advance of the public meeting.  As the plaintiffs 
note, the effect of the circulation of the individual and 
composite evaluations was that all five board members were aware 
of the opinions of four of the members in advance of the open 
meeting; thus, the circulation, in effect, constituted a 
deliberation, or a meeting, to which the public did not have 
access.  Indeed, the motion judge noted that, after the 
circulation, and before the open meeting, "it was rather obvious 
that the die had been cast as to whether the town administrator 
should be continued in his position."  The open meeting law was 
intended to ensure that the public is able to see for themselves 
how such decisions are made.  See Revere, 476 Mass. at 610.  The 
distribution of the individual and composite opinions to the 
19 
 
 
quorum, prior to the meeting, was thus a violation of the open 
meeting law.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 18.  Compare School Comm. of 
Wayland, 455 Mass. at 570 ("Open meetings provide an opportunity 
for each member of the governmental body to debate the issues 
and disclose their personal viewpoints before the governmental 
body reaches its decision on a matter of public policy" 
[emphasis added]); McCrea v. Flaherty, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 
641 (2008) (open meeting law "provides for public access to the 
decision-making process when it is in a formative stage, several 
steps removed from the eventual result"). 
The result here would have been different if the board had 
made the individual and composite evaluations publicly available 
before the open meeting.  For example, the board could have 
posted the evaluations on its Web site and made paper copies 
available for inspection at or about the time that the 
evaluations were circulated among a quorum of board members.  
Ordinarily, the board is required only to make the minutes of 
open meetings, along with "the notes, recordings or other 
materials used in the preparation of such minutes and all 
documents and exhibits used at the session," available to the 
public, upon request, within ten days after an open meeting has 
taken place.  G. L. c. 30A, § 22 (c), (e).  Nothing in the open 
meeting law or the public records statute, however, precludes 
the board from prior disclosure, at least in these 
20 
 
 
circumstances.9  See G. L. c. 4, § 7; G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18-25; 
G. L. c. 66, §§ 1 et seq.  If board members wish to circulate 
documents containing board member opinions among a quorum in 
advance of an open meeting, as here, prior and relatively 
contemporaneous public disclosure of those documents, where 
permissible, is necessary in order to comply with the open 
meeting law and to advance the statute's over-all goal of 
promoting transparency in governmental decision-making. 
 
d.  Striking the Attorney General's decision.  The board 
argues that, in his decision granting the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, the judge erred in ruling that "[t]he opinion 
from the Attorney General [d]ivision of [o]pen [g]overnment is 
stricken."10  We agree.  The open meeting law establishes two 
separate means by which a party may complain of a violation:  an 
aggrieved party may seek administrative remedies, for which 
                     
 
9 Under the open meeting law, only the following materials 
used in open meetings are "exempt from disclosure to the public 
as personnel information:  (1) materials used in a performance 
evaluation of an individual bearing on his professional 
competence, provided they were not created by the members of the 
body for the purposes of the evaluation; and (2) materials used 
in deliberations about employment or appointment of individuals, 
including applications and supporting materials; provided, 
however, that any resume submitted by an applicant shall not be 
exempt" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 30A, § 22 (e). 
 
 
10 While the judge's decision does not specify which opinion 
it purports to strike, in context, it can refer only to the 2013 
determination letter dismissing Harris's complaint.  The 
plaintiffs do not dispute that the decision to strike was 
improper. 
21 
 
 
judicial review is available only to a government entity that is 
party to the ruling, or file a registered-voter complaint in the 
Superior Court, as here.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 23 (b), (d), (f).  
To the extent that the judge was attempting to reverse the 
Attorney General's decision on Harris's administrative 
complaint, he had no authority to do so.11  While Harris's 
administrative complaint and this action concern the same facts, 
Harris's complaint was not before the judge.  Nor could it have 
been, as Harris was not a member of a public body at the time 
that the complaint was filed.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 23 (d) ("A 
public body or any member of a body aggrieved by any order 
issued pursuant to this section [by the Attorney General] may, 
notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, 
obtain judicial review of the order only through an action in 
[S]uperior [C]ourt seeking relief in the nature of certiorari"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment is affirmed.  The purported 
"striking" of the Attorney General's determination at the 
administrative proceeding is vacated.  The matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for such further proceedings as are required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
11 The purported striking was not necessary to ensure 
uniform resolution of future open meeting law challenges.  The 
Attorney General has represented that if we affirm the judge's 
decision, she will amend her guidance and adjust her 
interpretation of the open meeting law when resolving 
complaints.