Title: Zuckerman v. Bevin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018-SC-000097-TG, 2018-SC-000098-TG
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2018

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 15, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED 2018-SC-000097-TG AND 2018-SC-000098-TG (2018-CA-000289-MR) FRED ZUCKERMAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 89, ET AL. APPELLANTS V. ON APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 17-CI-000574 MATTHEW G. BEVIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ET AL. APPELLEES OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER AFFIRMING Und e r Se c t io n 14(b) o f t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t , 29 U.S.C.1 § 164(b), Co ng r e ss aut ho r ize d st at e s t o e nac t r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw s, i.e., l aw s t hat pr o hibit unio n sho p ag r e e me nt s and ag e nc y sho p ag r e e me nt s. In 2017, Ke nt uc ky’s 1 Unit e d St at e s Co d e . l e g isl at ur e passe d , and t he Go ve r no r sig ne d , 2017 HB2 1, c o mmo nl y r e f e r r e d t o as t he Ke nt uc ky Rig ht t o Wo r k Ac t , 2017 Ky. Ac t s c h. 1, § 15 (t he “Ac t ”). Sig nif ic ant l y, t his Ac t ame nd e d KRS3 336.130(3) t o pr o vid e t hat no e mpl o ye e is r e quir e d t o be c o me , o r r e main, a me mbe r o f a l abo r o r g anizat io n, o r t o pay d ue s, f e e s, o r asse ssme nt s t o a l abo r o r g anizat io n. The Ac t ’s st at e d g o al w as “t o at t r ac t ne w busine ss and inve st me nt int o t he Co mmo nw e al t h as so o n as po ssibl e .” 2017 Ky. Ac t s c h. 1, § 14. The issue w e must d e c id e in t his c ase is w he t he r t he Fr ankl in Cir c uit Co ur t e r r e d in d ismissing c o nst it ut io nal c hal l e ng e s t o t he val id it y o f t he Ac t , spe c if ic al l y t hat it vio l at e d t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n’s pr o visio ns r e quir ing e qual pr o t e c t io n o f t he l aw s, pr o hibit ing spe c ial l e g isl at io n, pr o hibit ing t aking s w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n, and t hat it w as impr o pe r l y d e sig nat e d as e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n. We ho l d t hat t he t r ial c o ur t d id no t e r r and t he r e f o r e af f ir m t he Fr ankl in Cir c uit Co ur t ’s Or d e r d ismissing t he c hal l e ng e s t o t he Ac t . I. Factual Background. Bil l s vir t ual l y id e nt ic al t o 2017 HB I w e r e int r o d uc e d in al mo st e ve r y se ssio n o f t he l e g isl at ur e be g inning in 20004 but ne ve r passe d . Go ve r no r Be vin, as a c and id at e in 2015, ac t ive l y c ampaig ne d o n a pl at f o r m o f “r ig ht t o w o r k.” Mat t Be vin f o r Go ve r no r , ht t ps://w w w .mat t be vin.c o m/is sue s (l ast 2 Ho use Bil l . 3 Ke nt uc ky Re vise d St at ut e s. 4 2000 HB 12; 2003 Se nat e Bil l (“SB”) 77; 2004 HB 173; 2005 SB 205; 2006 HB 38; 2007 HB 328; 2009 SB 165; 2011 HB 345; 2013 HB 308; 2014 HB 496; 2015 SB 1; 2016 SB 3. Le g isl at ive Re se ar c h Co mmissio n, ht t p://w w w .l r c .ky.g o v/ (l ast visit e d Aug . 30, 2018). Our r e se ar c h unc o ve r e d no ve r sio n o f t he bil l in t he bie nnial se ssio ns 1986 t hr o ug h 1998. visit e d Aug . 30, 2018). Fo l l o w ing his e l e c t io n, he e nc o ur ag e d t he e l e c t o r at e in 2016 t o suppo r t l e g isl at ive c and id at e s w ho simil ar l y f avo r e d “r ig ht t o w o r k.” Whe n t he me mbe r ship and l e ad e r ship o f t he Ho use c hang e d w it h t he 2016 e l e c t io n, t he ne w majo r it y’s t o p pr io r it ie s w e r e t he passag e o f a numbe r o f bil l s, inc l ud ing 2017 HB 1. The Ho use Ec o no mic De ve l o pme nt and Wo r kf o r c e Inve st me nt Co mmit t e e c o nve ne d a he ar ing o n HB 1 o n Januar y 4, 2017. At t he he ar ing , pr o po ne nt s o f t he Bil l t e st if ie d in suppo r t o f t he Bil l .5 The ir t e st imo ny inc l ud e d st at ist ic s t hat r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s e xpe r ie nc e supe r io r e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt and supe r io r e mpl o yme nt g r o w t h in bo t h unio n and no n-unio n jo bs, spe c if ic al l y r e f e r r ing t o Mic hig an, Ind iana, and Te nne sse e . The y c it e d Ke nt uc ky’s d isad vant ag e in at t r ac t ing c e r t ain ne w e mpl o ye r s t o l o c at e in t he st at e d ue t o t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s st at us as a no n-r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e . In ad d it io n, Spe ake r Je f f Ho o ve r r e f e r r e d t o a st ud y by Dr . Je f f r e y Eise nac h t hat c o nc l ud e d r ig ht -t o - w o r k g r e at l y be ne f it e d jo b c r e at io n, spe c if ic al l y “(p]r ivat e se c t o r e mpl o yme nt g r e w by 17.4 pe r c e nt in r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s be t w e e n 2001 and 2013.”6 Mr . 5 The Ho use Co mmit t e e he ar ing w as ac c e ssibl e o n KET (Par t 1: ht t ps:: /w w w .ke t .o r g /l e g isl at ur e /?ar c hive &pr o g r am=WGAOS&no l a=WGAOS+018003&par t =1& e po c h=2017; Par t 2: ht t ps://w w w .ke t .o r g /l e g isl at ur e /?ar c hive &pr o g r am =WGAOS&no l a=WGAOS+0180036spar t =2&e po c h=2017) (l ast visit e d Aug . 30, 2018). Wit ne sse s in f avo r o f t he Bil l w e r e Go ve r no r Be vin, Spe ake r o f t he Ho use Je f f Ho o ve r , Majo r it y Whip Jo nat han She l l , David Ad kisso n, Pr e sid e nt & CEO o f t he Ke nt uc ky Chambe r o f Co mme r c e , Ke vin Gr o ve , an e xe c ut ive w it h CBRE, a c o mme r c ial r e al e st at e f ir m in Lo uisvil l e , and Jul ia Cr ig l e r , st at e d ir e c t o r f o r Ame r ic ans Fo r Pr o spe r it y, Ke nt uc ky c hapt e r . Wit ne sse s o ppo sing t he Bil l w e r e Anna Baumann, po l ic y anal yst f o r t he Ke nt uc ky Ce nt e r o f Ec o no mic Po l ic y, w ho se af f id avit w as at t ac he d t o Appe l l ant s ’ br ie f in t his Co ur t , and Bil l Lo nd r ig an, o ne o f t he pl aint if f s/appe Uant s he r e in. 6 This quo t at io n r e c it e d in t he he ar ing appe ar s t o c o me f r o m Je f f r e y A. Eise nac h, Right-to-Work Laws: The Economic Evidence, NERA Ec o no mic Co nsul t ing , ht t p://w w w .ne r a.c o m/c o nt e nt / d am/ne r a/publ ic at io ns/2015/PUB_Rig ht _t o _Wo r k _Law s_0615.pd f (l ast visit e d Se p. 21, 2018). David Ad kisso n r e f e r r e d t o an LSU7 st ud y w hic h r e po r t e d t hat o ne -t hir d o f busine sse s l o o king t o e xpand o r r e l o c at e ind ic at e d t hat r ig ht -t o -w o r k w as impo r t ant . Mr . Ke vin Gr o ve spo ke t o his e xpe r ie nc e in at t r ac t ing ind ust r ial d e ve l o pme nt t o t he Lo uisvil l e me t r o po l it an ar e a, and t he ad vant ag e ac c r uing t o ac r o ss-t he -r ive r Ind iana d ue t o t hat st at e ’s e nac t me nt o f r ig ht -t o -w o r k l e g isl at io n in 2012. The w it ne sse s o ppo sing t he Bil l , Ms. Anna Baumann and Mr . Bil l Lo nd r ig an, pr o vid e d t e st imo ny t o r e f ut e t he st at ist ic s and c l aims o f t he pr o po ne nt s. Muc h o f t his t e st imo ny is c o nt aine d in Appe l l ant s ’ br ie f in t his Co ur t and ac c o mpanying at t ac hme nt s. 2017 HB 1 w as quic kl y passe d , l ar g e l y o n a par t isan basis, and sig ne d int o l aw o n an e me r g e nc y basis.8 In May 2017, Fr e d Zuc ke r man, e f al.,9 f il e d an ac t io n in Fr ankl in Cir c uit Co ur t ag ainst t he Co mmo nw e al t h 10 c hal l e ng ing t he Ac t o n se ve r al Ke nt uc ky c o nst it ut io nal g r o und s. The r e af t e r , Bar r y Br ig ht , Jac o b Pur vis and Wil l iam Pur vis f il e d a mo t io n, w hic h t he t r ial c o ur t g r ant e d , t o int e r ve ne as d e f e nd ant s o n t he sid e o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h. The quo t e d pr ivat e se c t o r e mpl o yme nt g r o w t h r at e , 17.4%, in r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s c o mpar e d w it h t he c o mpar abl e r at e , 8.2%, in no n-r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s. 7 Lo uisiana St at e Unive r sit y. 8 Exc e pt f o r t he Ac t ’s d e sig nat io n as e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n, pur po r t e d l y in vio l at io n o f Ky. Const. § 55, no c l aim is mad e t hat t he Ac t ’s passag e and e nac t me nt d id no t c o mpo r t w it h t he r e quir e me nt s o f t he Co nst it ut io n f o r a val id l aw . 9 The pl aint if f s/appe l l ant s ar e Fr e d Zuc ke r man and Wil l iam Lo nd r ig an, as r e pr e se nt at ive s r e spe c t ive l y o f t he Ge ne r al Dr ive r s, War e ho use me n and He l pe r s Lo c al Unio n No . 89 and t he Ke nt uc ky St at e AFL-CIO, Af f il iat e d Unio ns and t he ir Me mbe r s (c o l l e c t ive l y “t he Unio ns ”). 10 The d e f e nd ant s/appe l l e e s ar e Of f ic e o f t he Go ve r no r , ex. rel. Mat t he w G. Be vin, in his o f f ic ial c apac it y as Go ve r no r , and t he Co mmo nw e al t h o f Ke nt uc ky, Ke nt uc ky Labo r Cabine t , ex rel. De r r ic k K. Ramse y, in his o f f ic ial c apac it y as Se c r e t ar y o f t he Ke nt uc ky Labo r Cabine t (c o l l e c t ive l y “t he Co mmo nw e al t h ”). In June 2017, t he Co mmo nw e al t h f il e d a mo t io n t o d ismiss. The Unio ns subse que nt l y f il e d a mo t io n f o r par t ial summar y jud g me nt . Af t e r a Se pt e mbe r 2017 he ar ing , t he t r ial c o ur t issue d it s Or d e r d e nying t he Unio ns ’ mo t io n and g r ant ing t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s mo t io n. The Unio ns appe al e d . Be c ause t his c ase invo l ve s sig nif ic ant and impo r t ant c o nst it ut io nal issue s o f g r e at and imme d iat e publ ic impo r t anc e , w e g r ant e d t r ansf e r o f t he c ase f r o m t he Co ur t o f Appe al s. CR11 74.02. 11. Standard of Review. This c ase invo l ve s a f ac ial c hal l e ng e t o t he c o nst it ut io nal it y o f t he Ac t und e r t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. We r e c o g nize , o f c o ur se , t hat al l l aw s “c o nt r ar y t o t his Co nst it ut io n, shal l be vo id .” Ky. CONST. § 26. “Our f unc t io ns ar e t o d e t e r mine t he c o nst it ut io nal val id it y and t o d e c l ar e t he me aning o f w hat t he l e g isl at ive d e par t me nt has d o ne . We have no o t he r c o nc e r n.” Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 833, 165 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1942). Fur t he r mo r e , “an [a]c t sho ul d be he l d val id unl e ss it c l e ar l y o f f e nd s t he l imit at io ns and pr o hibit io ns o f t he c o nst it ut io n. . . . [A]l w ays t he bur d e n is upo n o ne w ho que st io ns t he val id it y o f an Ac t t o sust ain his c o nt e nt io ns.” Id. at 833-34, 165 S.W.2d at 823. “In c o nsid e r ing an at t ac k o n t he c o nst it ut io nal it y o f l e g isl at io n, t his Co ur t has c o nt inual l y r e so l ve d any d o ubt in f avo r o f c o nst it ut io nal it y r at he r t han unc o nst it ut io nal it y.” Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler, 373 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1963) (c it ing Reynolds Metal Co. v. 11 Ke nt uc ky Rul e s o f Civil Pr o c e d ur e . Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 381-82, 107 S.W.2d 251, 253 (1937)). We have al so he l d t hat “t he pr o pr ie t y, w isd o m and e xpe d ie nc y o f st at ut o r y e nac t me nt s ar e e xc l usive l y l e g isl at ive mat t e r s.” Hallahan, 373 S.W.2d at 727 (c it ing Craig v. O'Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 557, 251 S.W. 828, 830 (1923)). Fur t he r , c o ur t s ar e no t at l ibe r t y t o d e c l ar e a st at ut e inval id be c ause , in t he ir jud g me nt , it may be unne c e ssar y, o r o ppo se d t o t he be st int e r e st s o f t he st at e . . . . [A]n ac t w il l no t be d e c l ar e d vo id o n t he g r o und t hat it is o ppo se d t o t he spir it suppo se d t o pe r vad e t he Co nst it ut io n, o r is ag ainst t he nat ur e and spir it o f t he g o ve r nme nt , o r is c o nt r ar y t o t he g e ne r al pr inc ipl e s o f l ibe r t y, o r t he g e nius o f a f r e e pe o pl e . Craig, 199 Ky. at 557-58, 251 S.W. at 830 (c it at io ns o mit t e d ). Sinc e t he issue s invo l ve que st io ns o f l aw , o ur r e vie w is de novo, and w e d o no t d e f e r t o c o nc l usio ns o f t he t r ial c o ur t . Adams v. Sietsema, 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017). III. Labor-Management Background. A d e t ail e d hist o r y o f Labo r -Manag e me nt r e l at io ns w o ul d und ul y pr o l o ng t his o pinio n, but an o ve r vie w is he l pf ul t o t he anal ysis o f t he issue s be f o r e us, par t ic ul ar l y be c ause 1) t he Unio ns base t he ir c hal l e ng e s und e r t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n, in par t , o n “t he l e t t e r and t he spir it o f t he d o c ume nt ,”12 and 2) 12 E.g., Appe l l ant s ’ Br ie f at 11, Unio n Amicae’s Br ie f at 1-5, 7. We r e c o g nize t he impo r t anc e o f l abo r unio ns in Unit e d St at e s ’ hist o r y and t hat o f Ke nt uc ky. We ac kno w l e d g e t hat unio ns have pl aye d a sig nif ic ant r o l e in pr o vid ing a pat h f o r many w o r king f amil ie s t o t he mid d l e c l ass, f o r impr o ving w o r king c o nd it io ns and pay, f o r g e ne r al ac c e pt anc e o f t he f o r t y-ho ur w o r k w e e k, and f o r o t he r be ne f it s. In 1933, o ur pr e d e c e sso r c o ur t had r e c o g nize d t he impo r t ant f unc t io n o f l abo r unio ns: t he r ig ht s o f e c o no mic se l f -pr e se r vat io n; o f impr o ving e c o no mic and so c ial c o nd it io ns; o f ag r e e me nt amo ng me n; o f f r e e spe e c h and ac t io n; o f pur suing o ne 's saf e t y and happine ss; o f st r iving t o ac hie ve l e g it imat e e nd s and be ne f it s by c o nc e r t o f ac t io n o r c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ; and t he pr ivil e g e o f asse mbl ing t o g e t he r in a pe ac e abl e manne r f o r t he c o mmo n g o o d . Upo n t his sid e may be pl ac e d al so t he unc o nsc io nabl e sw e at sho ps and l ame nt abl e c o nd it io ns und e r r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw s ar e e xpl ic it l y aut ho r ize d und e r f e d e r al l aw . 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). A. Kentucky Labor Law History to 1890. Tr ad e o r l abo r unio ns in Ke nt uc ky w e r e init ial l y f o r me d in t he mo r e ur banize d ar e as o f Lo uisvil l e , No r t he r n Ke nt uc ky, i.e., Co ving t o n and Ne w po r t , and in t he c o al f ie l d s o f East e r n Ke nt uc ky. See generally Jo hn He nnan, Toil, Trouble, Transformation: Workers and Unions in Modem Kentucky, 113 REG. OF THE Ky. Hist. SOCY 233, 236-37 (2015) (at t r ibut ing t his f o r mat io n t o t he po st - Civil War pe r io d , al t ho ug h so me sc ho l ar s be l ie ve unio n ac t ivit y e xist e d in ant e be l l um Ke nt uc ky), The f ir st r e po r t e d Ke nt uc ky c ase w e have f o und invo l ving a t r ad e o r g anizat io n w as Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Ass’n, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 143, 145-46 (1863), in w hic h t he c o ur t g e ne r al l y r e c o g nize d t he r ig ht o f w o r king me n t o c o mbine f o r t he ir o w n pr o t e c t io n and t o o bt ain suc h w ag e s as t he y c ho o se t o d e mand , but al so no t e d c o mbinat io ns t hat pr e jud ic e t he publ ic by und ul y e l e vat ing o r d e pr e ssing w ag e s, t o l l s, o r pr ic e s o f any me r c hant abl e c o mmo d it y ar e ind ic t abl e as c o nspir ac ie s. Fo ur ye ar s l at e r , t he c o ur t d e c id e d Lee v. Louisville Pilot Benevolent & Relief Ass’n, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 254(1867). In Le e , t he c o ur t af f ir me d t he r ig ht o f t he o r g anizat io n t o c har g e w hic h e mpl o ye e s ar e al l but c o mpe l l e d t o w o r k—t ho se t hing s w hic h c hal l e ng e an e nl ig ht e ne d , humane so c ie t y t o o ppo sit io n. Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local No. 165, 249 Ky. 639, 642, 61 S.W.2d 283, 284-85 (1933). The issue s in t his c ase , ho w e ve r , ar e no t w he t he r unio ns ar e be ne f ic ial o r g anizat io ns, but w he t he r t he l e g isl at ur e ’s passing o f t he Ac t vio l at e d any pr o visio n o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n as ar g ue d by t he Unio ns and t he Unio n Amicae. and c o l l e c t d ue s, sinc e “[t ]he pr e sume d o bje c t o f t he t ar if f w as unif o r mit y o f c har g e s, har mo ny, e f f ic ie nc y, and f id e l it y, and no t unjust mo no po l y, o r t he e xt o r t io n o f e xo r bit ant f e e s.” Id. at 255. Sur pr ising l y, in t he pe r io d pr e -d at ing t he 1890-91 Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io nal Co nve nt io n, t hat is it . In t hat e r a, and al t ho ug h c o ur t s r e c o g nize d w o r king me n’s r ig ht t o o r g anize , t he y al so r e c o g nize d e mpl o ye r s ’ r ig ht s t o c o nd uc t busine ss as t he y saw f it and , abse nt a c o nt r ac t , t o hir e and f ir e e mpl o ye e s g e ne r al l y at w il l . Fur t he r mo r e , st at ut o r y l aw s r e g ul at ing l abo r c o nt r ac t s, maximum ho ur s, minimum pay, and t he l ike , w e r e g e ne r al l y he l d unc o nst it ut io nal as an inf r ing e me nt o f t he e mpl o ye r ’s and ind ivid ual e mpl o ye e ’s r ig ht o f c o nt r ac t . See generally F. J. St imso n, Handbook TO THE Labor Law of the United States (Ne w Yo r k: Char l e s Sc r ibne r ’s So ns, 1896), 1-19. Pe r haps t he mo st f amo us, o r inf amo us, c ase o f t his e r a is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct . 539, 49 L. Ed . 937 (1905), abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct . 578, 81 L. Ed . 703 (1937), w hic h he l d t hat Ne w Yo r k’s l aw pr o hibit ing bake r y e mpl o ye e s f r o m w o r king mo r e t han sixt y ho ur s in a w e e k w as unc o nst it ut io nal . Tw o c ase s w hic h po st -d at e t he 1890 Co nst it ut io nal Co nve nt io n, but w hic h ind ic at e t he st at e o f Ke nt uc ky l abo r l aw in t his e r a ar e Hetterman v. Powers, 102 Ky. 133, 143, 43 S.W. 180, 182 (1897) (ho l d ing t hat a Unio n w as e nt it l e d t o e quit abl e pr o t e c t io n in t he use o f l abe l o r mar k d e sig nat ing pr o d uc t o f l abo r o f t he me mbe r s), and Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640, 643-45, 78 8 S.W. 482, 482-83 (1904) (upho l d ing use o f st r ike injunc t io n t o pr o t e c t o w ne r ’s busine ss and t o pr e ve nt vio l e nc e t o w ar d and int imid at io n o f his e mpl o ye e s). B. 1890 Constitutional Convention. Fo l l o w ing t he Civil War , spe c ial l e g isl at io n w as use d as a me ans t o e nc o ur ag e Ke nt uc ky’s e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt . To say t hat t he se e nac t me nt s g o t o ut -o f -hand w o ul d be an und e r st at e me nt . Mo st sc ho l ar s ac c e pt t hat Ke nt uc ky’s 1890 Co nst it ut io nal Co nve nt io n w as ne c e ssit at e d by e xc e ssive pr o l if e r at io n o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n f o r t he be ne f it o f ind ivid ual pe r so ns and c o r po r at io ns, an une qual t ax bur d e n and mo unt ing l o c al publ ic d e bt s, a d e sir e t o e xe r c ise c o nt r o l o ve r r ail r o ad s and r ail r o ad r at e s, and t he 1850 ant e be l l um c o nst it ut io n’s ind e f e nsibl e pr o t e c t io ns f o r sl ave r y. See generally Tho mas D. Cl ar k, A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY (Ashl and , Ky.: The Je sse St uar t Fo und ., 1988), 419-28. This Co ur t has o n many o c c asio ns r e c o g nize d t he ne e d t o c ur t ail spe c ial l e g isl at io n as t he pr imar y r e aso n f o r t he 1891 Co nst it ut io n. See, e.g., Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Ky. 1998) (c it ing She r yl G. Snyd e r & Ro be r t M. Ir e l and , The Separation of Governmental Powers Under the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C. V. Brown, 73 Ky. L. J. 165 (1984-85)); Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ky. 1985) (st at ing “[c ]o nc e r n f o r l imit ing t he po w e r s o f t he l e g isl at ur e in g e ne r al , and w it h c ut t ing o f f spe c ial and l o c al l e g isl at io n in par t ic ul ar , w as t he pr imar y mo t ivat ing f o r c e be hind e nac t me nt o f t he ne w Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n o f 1891[]’’). To il l ust r at e t he pr o bl e m o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n, in it s 1888 se ssio n, t he l e g isl at ur e passe d 1,403 l o c al and pr ivat e ac t s, w hic h t o o k up 3,146 pag e s in a t hr e e -vo l ume se t . 1888 ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE Commonwealth of Kentucky (Fr ankf o r t , KY: Jo hn D. Wo o d s, 1888).13 By c o nt r ast , it passe d 128 publ ic ac t s, c o mpr ising 217 pag e s. Id. In 1890, t he l e g isl at ive r e c o r d w as simil ar l y ske w e d in f avo r o f spe c ial o r l o c al l e g isl at io n: 1,726 l o c al o r pr ivat e ac t s, in 4,703 pag e s, as o ppo se d t o 174 publ ic ac t s, c o mpr ising 174 pag e s. 1890 ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE Commonwealth of Kentucky (Fr ankf o r t , KY: E. Po l k Jo hnso n, 1890). In e ac h o f t he se se ssio ns, l o c al o r spe c ial ac t s ac c o unt e d f o r o ve r 90% o f t he t o t al l e g isl at io n passe d . So me o f t he spe c ial l e g isl at io n e xe mpt e d r ail r o ad s and o t he r c o r po r at io ns f r o m t axat io n and c r e at e d mo no po l ie s, w hic h w e r e d e c r ie d by a numbe r o f t he d e l e g at e s. E.g., I 1890 Ky. Const. DEBATES (Fr ankf o r t , Ky.: E. Po l k Jo hnso n, 1890), 466 (De l . Kno t t c o mme nt s). Ano t he r po int o f vie w w as t hat t his l e g isl at io n had e nc o ur ag e d e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt , e xpansio n o f r ail r o ad s, and d e ve l o pme nt o f t he st at e ’s nat ur al r e so ur c e s. See Cl ar k, A HISTORY OF Kentucky, 419-20 (d e sc r ibing e d it o r He nr y Wat t e r so n and his e f f o r t s t o 13 The se numbe r s c o me f r o m t he t abl e o f c o nt e nt s o f t he Ke nt uc ky Ac t s ’ vo l ume s. Int e r e st ing l y, a numbe r o f t he Publ ic Ac t s had a d e c id e d l y l o c al o r r e st r ic t e d impac t . See, e.g., 1888 Ky. Ac t s c h. 632 (ame nd ing Ky. Ge n. St at . c h. 70, § 6 t o inc r e ase f r o m sixt y d ays t o six mo nt hs t he t ime pe r io d in w hic h t o f il e a me c hanic s ’ l ie n, but suc h ame nd me nt appl ie d o nl y t o Mad iso n Co unt y); 1888 Ky. Ac t s c h. 650 (e xe mpt ing t he Nic ho l asvil l e , Danvil l e and Lanc ast e r Tur npike Co mpany f r o m t he pr o visio ns o f 1886 Ky. Ac t s c h. 1127 (r e quir ing St at e ’s Sinking Fund Co mmissio ne r s t o appr o ve t he d ir e c t o r s o f a t ur npike c o mpany in w hic h t he St at e o f Ke nt uc ky o w ne d st o c k)); 1888 Ky. Ac t s c h. 1347 (ame nd ing Ky. Ge n. St at . c h. 106, ar t . 2, § 3 (r e l at ing t o t ave r ns, t ippl ing -ho use s, e t c .), but suc h ame nd me nt appl ie d o nl y t o Mad iso n Co unt y). 10 pr o mo t e ind ust r ial d e ve l o pme nt ).14 This pr o -d e ve l o pme nt po int o f vie w w as al so r e f l e c t e d in t he 1890 d e bat e s. See IV 1890 Ky. Const. Debates, 5014 (De l . Dur ham c o mme nt s).15 We inc l ud e t he se c o mme nt s no t t o r e -d e bat e t he issue s o f t he l at e nine t e e nt h c e nt ur y, but me r e l y t o po int o ut t hat t he f r ame r s o f t he 1891 Co nst it ut io n w e r e a var ie d asso r t me nt o f me n, r e pr e se nt ing d if f e r e nt par t s o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h and e c o no mic int e r e st s. See Cl ar k, 431 (st at ing “[t ]his f o ur t h c o nve nt io n w as c o mpo se d o f as mo t l e y a d e l e g at io n o f c o nst it ut io nal ist s as had e ve r be e n se e n in a c o nve nt io n hal l . . . . Far me r me mbe r s o ppo se d t he sinist e r inf l ue nc e o f c o r po r at io ns; and c o r po r at io n l aw ye r s, l o bbyist s and se l f - st yl e d c o nst it ut io nal ist s o ppo se d [Fanne r s ’] Al l ianc e l e ad e r ship)]”). Thus, 14 To quo t e Dr . Cl ar k: He nr y Wat t e r so n and his "ne w d e par t ur e " De mo c r at s w e r e d il ig e nt o n t he be hal f o f ne w ind ust r y. In Lo uisvil l e , Wat t e r so n t o o k t he l e ad in po int ing o ut ne w and pr o f it abl e ind ust r ial o ppo r t unit ie s. Bo ar d s o f c o mme r c e d ist r ibut e d t ho usand s o f c ir c ul ar s at ho me and abr o ad d e sc r ibing Ke nt uc ky’s r e so ur c e s and pr o c l aiming Ke nt uc ky a l and o f unl imit e d busine ss pr o mise . Using t he st at e 's c r e d it t o e nc o ur ag e c o r po r at io ns w as t o o unusual , ho w e ve r , f o r c o nse r vat ive ag r ar ian l e g isl at o r s, and e nt husiast ic “ne w d e par t ur e ” par t isans had t o c o nt e nt t he mse l ve s w it h g r ant ing g e ne r o us t ax e xe mpt io n and spe c ial pr ivil e g e s. This e nc o ur ag e me nt t o c apit al w as so o n no t ic e abl e , f o r r ail w ay mil e ag e inc r e ase d f r o m 567 mil e s buil t and pr o je c t e d in 1860, t o mo r e t han 1,500 mil e s in o pe r at io n, in 1880. The se r o ad s r e pr e se nt e d a st at e d c apit al inve st me nt o f $100,000,000. Al o ng w it h t he e xpansio n o f t he Ke nt uc ky r ail w ay syst e m, e ast e r n c apit al po ur e d int o t he st at e t o d e ve l o p t imbe r and c o al r e so ur c e s, and t o buil d d ist il l e r ie s and t o bac c o w ar e ho use s. Cl ar k, A History of Kentucky, at 420. 15 Bur nam st at e d : I w o ul d ho l d t he se c o r po r at io ns t o t he ir just r e spo nsibil it y f o r e ve r y inf r ac t io n o f pr ivat e r ig ht o r publ ic l aw , but I shal l ne ve r c o nse nt by my vo t e , in o be d ie nc e t o po pul ar c l amo r , t o st r ike d o w n t ho se g r e at be ne f ac t o r s o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h . . . w hic h ar e d ail y and ho ur l y g iving e mpl o yme nt and t o t ho usand s o f l abo r e r s, w ho have l inke d w it h band s o f ir o n t he d if f e r e nt po r t io ns o f t he c o unt r y, and st r e ng t he ne d and c o nso l id at e d t he po w e r , t he c ivil izat io ns and t r ue g r e at ne ss o f t he human r ac e . 11 se l e c t ive quo t at io ns f r o m a f o ur -vo l ume se t o f o ve r 6,000 pag e s is no t a use f ul e xe r c ise in “d ivining t he int e nt o f t he f r ame r s.” Our t ask, in t he int e r pr e t at io n o f Ke nt uc ky’s Co nst it ut io n, r e st s o n t he e xpr e ss l ang uag e o f t he pr o visio n, and w o r d s must be g ive n t he ir pl ain and usual me aning . City of Louisville Mun. Hous. Comm'n v. Pub. Hous. Admin., 261 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky. 1953). This Co ur t is “no t at l ibe r t y t o c o nst r ue . . . pl ain and d e f init e l ang uag e o f t he Co nst it ut io n in suc h a manne r as t o t hw ar t t he d e l ibe r at e pur po se and int e nt o f t he f r ame r s o f t hat inst r ume nt .” Harrod v. Hatcher, 281 Ky. 712, 137 S.W.2d 405, 408 (1940). In f ac t , o ur pr e d e c e sso r Co ur t r e c o g nize d as a “c ar d inal r ul e ” o f c o nst it ut io nal int e r pr e t at io n t he pr inc ipl e t hat r ul e s o f c o nst r uc t io n may no t be e mpl o ye d w he r e t he l ang uag e o f t he pr o visio n is c l e ar and unambig uo us. Grantz v. Grauman, 302 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1957). “It is t o be pr e sume d t hat in f r aming t he c o nst it ut io n g r e at c ar e w as e xe r c ise d in t he l ang uag e use d t o c o nve y it s me aning and as l it t l e as po ssibl e l e f t t o impl ic at io n[.]” City of Louisville v. German, 286 Ky. 477, 150 S.W.2d 931, 935 (1940). Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 358 (Ky. 2006). To d e mo nst r at e t he po int t hat t he 1891 Co nst it ut io n d o e s no t r e f l e c t a “pr o -l abo r , po pul ist , pr o g r e ssive ” po int o f vie w , as ar g ue d by t he Unio ns and t he Unio n Amicae, t he Co nve nt io n ad o pt e d o nl y t hr e e e xpl ic it l y pr o -l abo r pr o visio ns. The se se c t io ns w e r e Se c t io n 243 r e l at ing t o t he minimum ag e o f c hil d l abo r . Se c t io n 244 r e quir ing al l w ag e e ar ne r s t o be paid in l aw f ul mo ne y, and Se c t io n 253 r e st r ic t ing t he l abo r o f pe nit e nt iar y l abo r t o publ ic w o r ks .16 Ot he r e xpl ic it l y pr o -l abo r pr o po sal s, suc h as t ho se ad vo c at e d by t he Lo uisvil l e Tr ad e s and Labo r Asse mbl y, Unio ns and Lo d g e s, w e r e no t ad o pt e d — r e je c t e d 16 Pr io r t o 1891, ne it he r t he c o nst it ut io n no r st at ut e s l imit e d w he r e c o nvic t l abo r c o ul d be e mpl o ye d . Empl o ye r s t he r e f o r e c o ul d l e ase c o nvic t l abo r t o l o w e r w ag e s o r t o t ake t he pl ac e o f f r e e , st r iking w o r ke r s. See He nr y C. Maye r , Glimpses of Union Activity among Coal Miners in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Kentucky, 86 Reg. OF THE KY. HIST. SOC' Y 216, 220 (1988), 12 e it he r in c o mmit t e e o r by t he Co nve nt io n: d e sig nat io n o f t he numbe r o f ho ur s t hat c o nst it ut e a d ay’s w o r k o n publ ic pr o je c t s; e st abl ishme nt o f a Bo ar d o f Ar bit r at io n “w it h f ul l po w e r t o se t t l e al l ind ust r ial d if f ic ul t ie s be t w e e n e mpl o ye r and e mpl o ye e f ;]” and d e sig nat io n o f g o o d s and w ar e s manuf ac t ur e d by c o nvic t l abo r . I 1890 KY. CONST. DEBATES, 240 (Tr ad e s and Labo r Asse mbl y, Unio ns and Lo d g e s, in t he Cit y o f Lo uisvil l e Pe t it io n). In ad d it io n, t he Co nve nt io n r e je c t e d an ame nd me nt t o Se c t io n 243 w hic h w o ul d have aut ho r ize d t he l e g isl at ur e t o “pr o vid e by l aw f o r t he pr o pe r ve nt il at io n o f mine s, t he c o nst r uc t io n o f e sc ape me nt s, shaf t s and suc h o t he r appl ianc e s as may be ne c e ssar y t o pr o t e c t t he he al t h and se c ur e t he saf e t y o f t he w o r kme n t he r e in.” I 1890 Ky. Const. Debates, 265 (De l . Ramse y Re so l ut io n). Equal r ig ht s f o r w o me n, ano t he r pr o g r e ssive r e f o r m w hic h had be e n ad vo c at e d by t he Knig ht s o f Labo r , t he n a nat io nal l abo r o r g anizat io n w it h a numbe r o f Ke nt uc ky l o c al s, w e r e simil ar l y no t e spo use d by t he Co nve nt io n. See II 1890 Ky. CONST. Debates, 2371-72 (vo t e t abl ing pr o visio n t o g r ant mar r ie d w o me n e qual pr o pe r t y r ig ht s). A pr o visio n t o aut ho r ize w o me n’s suf f r ag e , l ike w ise , w as no t ad o pt e d in t he f inal d o c ume nt .17 17 Laur a Cl ay, l e ad e r o f t he w o me n’s suf f r ag e in Ke nt uc ky and d aug ht e r o f Cassius Mar c e l l us Cl ay, t he “Lio n o f Whit e Hal l ,” w as pe r mit t e d t o ad d r e ss t he Co nve nt io n. He r pl e a w as no t f o r r e c o g nit io n o f w o me n’s suf f r ag e as a c o nst it ut io nal r ig ht , but me r e l y f o r a pr o visio n aut ho r izing t he l e g isl at ur e t o e nac t w o me n’s suf f r ag e “w he n t he t ime shal l c o me .” II 1890 KY. CONST. Debates 2090-93. This l imit e d pr o visio n w as no t inc l ud e d in t he d r af t e d Co nst it ut io n; Se c t io n 145 l imit e d suf f r ag e t o “(e ]ve r y mal e c it ize n ... o f t he ag e o f t w e nt y-o ne .” In 1912, t he l e g isl at ur e aut ho r ize d w o me n t o vo t e in e l e c t io ns f o r c o unt y sc ho o l supe r int e nd e nt s, as aut ho r ize d by Ky. Const. § 155. Crook v. Bartlett, 155 Ky. 305, 159 S.W. 826 (1913). 13 The Co nve nt io n ad o pt e d spe c if ic se c t io ns d ir e c t e d at c o r po r at io ns and r ail r o ad s. Ky. Const. §§ 190-218. The se pr o visio ns, ho w e ve r , r an t o t he be ne f it o f t he publ ic at l ar g e , and w e r e d e sig ne d t o c o r r e c t t he abuse s w hic h had o c c ur r e d as a r e sul t o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n. See, e.g., § 194 (r e quir ing al l c o r po r at io ns o r g anize d o r c ar r ying o n busine ss in t he st at e t o have a pl ac e o f busine ss and a r e g ist e r e d ag e nt ); § 197 (pr o hibit ing c o mmo n c ar r ie r s f r o m issuing f r e e passe s t o publ ic o f f ic ial s); § 212 (subje c t ing r ail r o ad r o l l ing st o c k and pe r so nal pr o pe r t y t o e xe c ut io n and at t ac hme nt ); §§213-15, 217-18 (r e quir ing r ail r o ad s no t t o d isc r iminat e o r t o g ive pr e f e r e nt ial t r e at me nt o r r at e s). Simil ar l y, and as t o t axat io n, se ve r al pr o visio ns ad d r e sse d spe c ial l e g isl at io n abuse s. E.g., § 174 (subje c t ing c o r po r at e and ind ivid ual l y o w ne d pr o pe r t y t o unif o r m t ax r at e s); §§ 177, 179 (pr o hibit ing Co mmo nw e al t h, c o unt ie s o r munic ipal it ie s f r o m be c o ming shar e ho l d e r s in c o r po r at io ns). Af t e r t he publ ic at io n o f t he pr o po se d Co nst it ut io n in Apr il 1891, t he r e ac t io n o f l abo r g r o ups w as mixe d . He r be r t Finc h, Or g anize d Labo r in Lo uisvil l e , Ke nt uc ky, 1880-1914 (1965) (unpubl ishe d Ph.D. d isse r t at io n, Univ. o f Ke nt uc ky) (o n f il e w it h t he Wil l iam T. Yo ung Libr ar y, Univ. o f Ke nt uc ky), 206-07. The Tr ad e s and Labo r Asse mbl y in Lo uisvil l e “d e c id e d al mo st unanimo usl y t o vo t e ag ainst ” t he ne w Co nst it ut io n. Against the New, The Courier-Journal (Lo uisvil l e ), Mo n., Jun. 15, 1891, p. 5, c o l . 4, ht t ps://w w w .ne w spape r s.c o m/imag e /32457788/ (visit e d Se p. 5, 2018). Co nve r se l y, t he Knig ht s o f Labo r d id e nd o r se it at it s annual st at e c o nve nt io n in Jul y 1891, “by a c l o se vo t e .” Knights’ Labor, The Courier-Journal 14 (Lo uisvil l e ), We d ., Jul . 29, 1891, p. 8, c o l . 2, ht t ps://w w w .ne w spape r s.c o m/ imag e /32461411/ (visit e d Se p. 5, 2018). In t he f inal anal ysis. Dr . Cl ar k has be e n quo t e d , [T]he 1890 convention created a static document to protect [Kentucky’s] agrarian society from an emerging industrial order: “One g e t s t he impr e ssio n . . . t hat many o f t he d e l e g at e s w e r e , in f ac t , l it t l e Re d Rid ing Ho o d s t r ud g ing al o ne and f r ig ht e ne d t hr o ug h t he pe r pl e xing f o r e st o f c o nst it ut io nal l aw , ho ping t hat t he big bad w o l ve s o f ind ust r ial and pr o g r e ssive c hang e s w e r e me r e f ig me nt s o f t he ir bad l y ag it at e d imag inat io n, and t hat a r ig id c o nst it ut io n w it h st at ic pr o visio ns w o ul d se r ve t o d ispe l t he se t hr e at e ning w r ait hs.” Wil l iam Gr e e n, Constitutions, The KENTUCKY ENCYCLOPEDIA (Le xing t o n: The Univ. Pr e ss o f Ke nt uc ky, 1992), 225 (e mphasis ad d e d ). No d o ubt e xist s but t hat t he 1890 Co nve nt io n so ug ht t o r e in in t he r e ig n o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n, Le, e l iminat io n o f spe c ial t ax br e aks f o r r ail r o ad s, e qual izat io n o f t ax bur d e n, e l iminat io n o f impl ie d po w e r s. The r e sul t ing d o c ume nt w as “[n]o t so muc h a f und ame nt al r ul e o f g o ve r nme nt as a pie c e o f o mnibus l e g isl at io n.” Cl ar k, 432. C. Federal Labor Law. Wit h t he e nac t me nt o f majo r l abo r l aw s be t w e e n 1932 and 1935, Co ng r e ssio nal po l ic y t o w ar d s l abo r unio ns t r ansf o r me d f r o m o ne o f ind if f e r e nc e (at be st ) t o o ne o f e nc o ur ag e me nt . The se l aw s w e r e t he No r r is-LaGuar d ia Ac t , c . 90, § 4, 47 St at . 70 (1932), no w c o d if ie d at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (pr o hibit ing injunc t io ns w it h r e spe c t t o any l abo r d isput e ) and t he Wag ne r Ac t , Ac t o f Jul y 5, 1935, 49 St at . 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (al so kno w n as t he Nat io nal 1® Se c t io n 2 o f t he No r r is-LaGuar d ia Ac t c o nt ains a br o ad d e c l ar at io n o f publ ic po l ic y and o f t he ne e d t o pr o t e c t w o r ke r s in jo ining unio ns, pur suing c o l l e c t ive bar g aining and r e so r t ing t o c o nc e r t e d ac t ivit ie s. 29 U.S.C. § 102. 15 Labo r Re l at io ns Ac t (“NLRA”)).19 Fo l l o w ing Wo r l d War II, Co ng r e ss mo d if ie d t he Wag ne r Ac t by t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t (al so kno w n as t he Labo r Manag e me nt Ac t , 1947), c . 120, § 1, 61 St at . 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 e f . seq. By e nac t ing t he se l aw s, “Co ng r e ss l ar g e l y d ispl ac e d st at e r e g ul at io n o f ind ust r ial r e l at io ns,” and t hus, st at e s “may no t r e g ul at e ac t ivit y t hat t he NLRA pr o t e c t s, pr o hibit s, o r ar g uabl y pr o t e c t s o r pr o hibit s.” Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286, 106 S. Ct . 1057, 1061, 89 L. Ed . 2d 223 (1986) (c it ing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct . 773, 3 L. Ed . 2d 775 (1959)). Se c t io n 14(b) o f t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t , ho w e ve r , pr o vid e s a l imit e d e xc e pt io n; No t hing in t his subc hapt e r shal l be c o nst r ue d as aut ho r izing t he e xe c ut io n o r appl ic at io n o f ag r e e me nt s r e quir ing me mbe r ship in a l abo r o r g anizat io n as a c o nd it io n o f e mpl o yme nt in any St at e o r Te r r it o r y in w hic h suc h e xe c ut io n o r appl ic at io n is pr o hibit e d by St at e o r Te r r it o r ial l aw . 29 U.S.C. § 154(b). The hist o r ic al c o nt e xt o f t he r e l e vant aspe c t s o f t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t is inst r uc t ive . See Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 747, 108 S. Ct . 2641, 2650, 101 L. Ed . 2d 634 (1988) (“[T]he st r uc t ur e and pur po se o f § 8(a)(3) ar e be st und e r st o o d in l ig ht o f t he st at ut e ’s hist o r ic al o r ig ins.”). Pr io r t o t he 19 An e ar l ie r l aw , t he Nat io nal Ind ust r ial Re c o ve r y Ac t (“NIRA”), c . 90, 48 St at . 195, 196 (1933); 15 U.S.C. § 703, al so c o nt aine d pr o visio ns e nc o ur ag ing unio nizat io n. The basic st at ut e , ho w e ve r , w as d e c l ar e d unc o nst it ut io nal . A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct . 837, 79 L. Ed . 1570 (1935). Unl ike t he NIRA, t he Wag ne r Ac t ’s c o nst it ut io nal it y w as uphe l d . NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct . 615, 81 L. Ed . 893 (1937). 16 Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t , se c t io n 8(a)(3) o f t he NLRA pe r mit t e d c l o se d sho p, unio n sho p, and ag e nc y sho p ag r e e me nt s. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 414, 96 S. Ct . 2140, 2144, 48 L. Ed . 2d 736 (1976). As t ypic al l y und e r st o o d , a c l o se d sho p is a t ype o f unio n-se c ur it y ag r e e me nt t hat r e quir e s pr o spe c t ive e mpl o ye e s t o be c o me unio n me mbe r s be f o r e c o mme nc ing e mpl o yme nt . Id. at 409 n.l , 96 S. Ct . at 2141 n.l . By c o nt r ast , a unio n sho p, w hic h r e quir e s e mpl o ye e s t o jo in t he unio n af t e r be ing hir e d , and an ag e nc y sho p, w hic h r e quir e s e mpl o ye e s t o make payme nt s t o t he unio n af t e r be ing hir e d but no t t o jo in t he unio n, ar e l e ss st r ing e nt t ype s o f unio n-se c ur it y ag r e e me nt s. See id. “By 1947, [c l o se d sho ps] had c o me und e r inc r e asing at t ac k,” and Co ng r e ss d e t e r mine d t hat t he y sho ul d be banne d . Beck, 487 U.S. at 748, 108 S. Ct . at 2650. Co ng r e ss al so r e c o g nize d t hat pr o hibit ing c l o se d sho ps c o ul d c r e at e a f r e e r id e r pr o bl e m, Le., e mpl o ye e s c ho o sing no t t o c o nt r ibut e f inanc ial l y t o t he unio n but st il l be ne f it ing f r o m t he unio n’s ac t io ns. See id. Ag ainst t his hist o r ic al bac kd r o p, se c t io n 8(a)(3) o f t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t at t e mpt e d t o ac c o mpl ish t he “t w in pur po se s ” o f e l iminat ing “t he mo st se r io us abuse s o f c o mpul so r y unio nism ... by abo l ishing t he c l o se d sho p” but st il l al l o w ing c e r t ain unio n-se c ur it y ag r e e me nt s t o c o unt e r t he f r e e r id e r pr o bl e m. NLRB V. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41, 83 S. Ct . 1453, 1458, 10 L. Ed . 2d 670 (1963). Spe c if ic al l y, se c t io n 8(a)(3) “make s it an unf air l abo r pr ac t ic e f o r an e mpl o ye r "by d isc r iminat io n in r e g ar d t o hir e o r t e nur e o f e mpl o yme nt ... t o e nc o ur ag e o r d isc o ur ag e me mbe r ship in any l abo r 17 o r g anizat io n.’” Beck, 487 U.S. at 744, 108 S. Ct . at 2648 (quo t ing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)). “Take n as a w ho l e , § 8(a)(3) pe r mit s an e mpl o ye r and unio n t o e nt e r int o an ag r e e me nt r e quir ing al l e mpl o ye e s t o be c o me unio n me mbe r s as a c o nd it io n o f c o nt inue d e mpl o yme nt , but t he ‘me mbe r ship’ t hat may be so r e quir e d has be e n ‘w hit t l e d d o w n t o it s f inanc ial c o r e .”’ Beck, 487 U.S. at 745, 108 S. Ct . at 2648 (f o o t no t e o mit t e d ) (quo t ing Gen. Motors, 373 U.S. at 742, 83 S. Ct . at 1459). “Whil e § 8(a)(3) ar t ic ul at e s a nat io nal po l ic y t hat c e r t ain unio n-se c ur it y ag r e e me nt s ar e val id as a mat t e r o f f e d e r al l aw , § 14(b) reflects Congress' decision that any State or Territory that wishes to may exempt itself from that policy.” Mobil Oil, 426 U.S. at 416-17, 96 S. Ct . at 2145 (e mphasis ad d e d ). Spe c if ic al l y, § 14(b) “al l o w s a St at e o r Te r r it o r y t o ban ag r e e me nt s r e quir ing me mbe r ship in a l abo r o r g anizat io n as a c o nd it io n o f e mpl o yme nt . Id. at 417, 96 S. Ct . at 2145 (quo t at io n and f o o t no t e o mit t e d ). As e xpl aine d by t he Co ur t , § 14(b) “w as d e sig ne d t o pr e ve nt o t he r se c t io ns o f t he Ac t f r o m c o mpl e t e l y e xt ing uishing st at e po w e r o ve r c e r t ain unio n-se c ur it y ar r ang e me nt s. And it w as t he pr o viso t o § 8(a)(3), e xpr e ssl y pe r mit t ing ag r e e me nt s c o nd it io ning e mpl o yme nt upo n me mbe r ship in a l abo r unio n, w hic h Co ng r e ss f e ar e d mig ht have t his r e sul t .” Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 V. Schermerhom, 373 U.S. 746, 751, 83 S. Ct . 1461, 1464, 10 L. Ed . 2d 678 (1963) (f o o t no t e o mit t e d ); se e also Laborers’ Int’I Union, Local No. 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 472 F.2d 456, 458 (8t h Cir . 1973) (Se c t io n 14(b) “c an be st be 18 d e sc r ibe d as an e xc e pt io n t o t he g e ne r al r ul e t hat t he f e d e r al g o ve r nme nt has pr e e mpt e d t he f ie l d o f l abo r r e l at io ns r e g ul at io n.”). Wit h t hat bac kg r o und , w e t ur n t o t he c l aims in t his c ase . IV. Analysis. As pr e vio usl y no t e d , t he Unio ns r aise f o ur c o nst it ut io nal c hal l e ng e s t o t he Ac t : (a) vio l at io n o f Ke nt uc ky’s e qual pr o t e c t io n o f t he l aw s pr o visio ns; (b) vio l at io n o f Ke nt uc ky’s pr o hibit io n o n spe c ial l e g isl at io n; (c ) vio l at io n o f Ke nt uc ky’s pr o hibit io n o f t aking s w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n; and (d ) impr o pe r d e sig nat io n as e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n. We ad d r e ss e ac h c l aim in t ur n. A. Equal Protection. Cit ize ns o f Ke nt uc ky e njo y e qual pr o t e c t io n o f t he l aw und e r t he 14t h Ame nd me nt o f t he Unit e d St at e s Co nst it ut io n and Se c t io ns 1, 2, and 3 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. D.F. v. Codell, 127 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Ky. 2003) (c it at io n o mit t e d ) .20 Se c t io ns 1,2, and 3 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n pr o vid e t hat t he l e g isl at ur e d o e s no t have ar bit r ar y po w e r and shal l t r e at al l pe r so ns e qual l y. “[U]nl e ss a st at ut o r y c l assif ic at io n is ar bit r ar y, o r no t f o und e d o n any subst ant ial d ist inc t io n sug g e st ing t he ne c e ssit y o r pr o pr ie t y o f suc h l e g isl at io n, t he c o ur t s have no r ig ht t o int e r f e r e w it h t he e xe r c ise o f l e g isl at ive d isc r e t io n. Ky. Ass’n of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 549 S.W.2d 817, 20 The Unio ns make no c l aim und e r t he 14t h Ame nd me nt . That pr o visio n r e quir e s pe r so ns w ho ar e simil ar l y sit uat e d t o be t r e at e d al ike . Fe d e r al c o ur t s have he l d t hat r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw s d o no t vio l at e any pr o visio n o f t he Unit e d St at e s Co nst it ut io n. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L. V. N.w. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S. Ct . 251, 93 L. Ed . 212 (1949); Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S. Ct . 258, 93 L. Ed . 222 (1949); see, e.g., Sweeney v. Daniels, No . 2:12CV81-PPS/PRC, 2013 WL 2090473 at *8 (N.D. Ind . 2013), aff'd sub nom. Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7t h Cir . 2014). 19 822 (Ky. 1977). As no t e d e ar l ie r , o ur anal ysis be g ins w it h t he pr e sumpt io n t hat l e g isl at ive ac t s ar e c o nst it ut io nal . United Dry Forces v. Lewis, 619 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Ky. 1981); Sims v. Bd. of Educ., 290 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1956); Brooks V. Island Creek Coal Co., 678 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ky. App.1984). The g o al o f e qual pr o t e c t io n pr o visio ns is t o “ke e p[] g o ve r nme nt al d e c isio nmake r s f r o m t r e at ing d if f e r e nt l y pe r so ns w ho ar e in al l r e l e vant r e spe c t s al ike .” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct . 2326, 2331, 120 L. Ed . 2d 1 (1992). Ho w e ve r , be c ause ne ar l y al l l e g isl at io n d if f e r e nt iat e s in so me manne r be t w e e n d if f e r e nt c l asse s o f pe r so ns, ne it he r t he f e d e r al no r st at e c o nst it ut io ns f o r bid suc h c l assif ic at io n pe r se . Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S. Ct . 1620, 1627, 134 L. Ed . 2d 855 (1996). Ac c o r d ing l y, t he l e ve l o f jud ic ial sc r ut iny appl ie d t o an e qual pr o t e c t io n c hal l e ng e d e pe nd s o n t he c l assif ic at io n mad e in t he st at ut e and t he int e r e st af f e c t e d by it . See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 253, 94 S. Ct . 1076, 1080, 39 L. Ed . 2d 306 (1974). Cur r e nt l y, t hr e e l e ve l s o f r e vie w may appl y t o an e qual pr o t e c t io n c hal l e ng e . See, e.g., Steven Lee Enters, v. Varney, 36 S.W.3d 391, 394-95 (Ky. 2000). St r ic t sc r ut iny appl ie s w he ne ve r a st at ut e make s a c l assif ic at io n base d o n a “suspe c t ” c l ass. See Codell, 127 S.W.3d at 575-76 (d isc ussing st r ic t sc r ut iny). In Varney, f o r e xampl e , w e no t e d r ac e , al ie nag e , and anc e st r y as suspe c t c l asse s. 36 S.W.3d at 394. In suc h c ase s, o r w he n a st at ut e af f e c t s a f und ame nt al r ig ht , a st at ut e is “sust ainabl e o nl y if [it ] is suit abl y t ail o r e d t o se r ve a ‘c o mpe l l ing st at e int e r e st .’” Id. (c it at io n o mit t e d ). The ne xt l e ve l o f anal ysis, he ig ht e ne d r at io nal basis sc r ut iny, appl ie s t o quasi-suspe c t c l asse s , 20 suc h as g e nd e r o r il l e g it imac y. Id. Und e r t his st and ar d , “d isc r iminat o r y l aw s sur vive e qual pr o t e c t io n anal ysis o nl y ‘t o t he e xt e nt t he y ar e subst ant ial l y r e l at e d t o a l e g it imat e st at e int e r e st .” Id. (quo t ing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441, 105 S. Ct . 3249, 3255, 87 L. e d . 2d 313 (1985)). On t he o t he r hand , a st at ut e t hat “me r e l y af f e c t s so c ial o r e c o no mic po l ic y ... is subje c t ” t o a l e ss se ar c hing f o r m o f jud ic ial sc r ut iny, Le. t he “r at io nal basis” t e st . Codell, 127 S.W.3d at 575 (c it at io n o mit t e d ). Rat io nal basis r e vie w is appr o pr iat e f o r e val uat ing t he Ac t sinc e t he Ac t is e xpr e ssl y pe r mit t e d by t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t § 14(b). The Supr e me Co ur t l o ng ag o he l d t hat , und e r f e d e r al l aw , unio n me mbe r ship is no t a suspe c t c l assif ic at io n t r ig g e r ing st r ic t sc r ut iny. City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 286, 96 S. Ct . 2036, 2038, 48 L. Ed . 2d 636 (1976). The r e sul t is t he same und e r Ke nt uc ky c ase l aw , w hic h r e c o g nize s t hat st at ut e s r e l at ing t o l abo r and l abo r o r g anizat io ns ar e pr o pe r o bje c t ive s f o r e xe r c ise o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s po l ic e po w e r . Hamilton v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 262 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Ky. 1953); see also Ky. Harlan Coal Co. V. Holmes, 872 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Ky. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455 (Ky. 2011) (st at ing “t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s po w e r t o l e g isl at e publ ic po l ic y in t he ar e a o f e mpl o ye r /e mpl o ye e r e l at io ns d e r ive s f r o m it s po l ic e po w e r []”); Commonwealth v. Reinecke Coal Min. Co., 117 Ky. 885, 894, 79 S.W. 287, 289-90 (1904) (st at ut e r e l at ing t o t ime l y payme nt o f c o al mine r s and f o r bid d ing bl ac kl ist ing o f e mpl o ye e s w as val id e xe r c ise o f po l ic e po w e r ). Fur t he r mo r e , “[t ]he e sse nt ial 21 pr e d ic at e o f t he po l ic e po w e r is t he he al t h, mo r al s, saf e t y, and g e ne r al w e l f ar e o f t he pe o pl e .” Jones v. Russell, 224 Ky. 390, 392, 6 S.W.2d 460, 461 (1928). The l e g isl at ur e “in making po l ic e r e g ul at io ns has t he r ig ht t o make c l assif ic at io ns base d upo n nat ur al and r e aso nabl e d ist inc t io ns, but is w it ho ut r ig ht t o e xe r c ise t he po w e r t o c l assif y ar bit r ar il y and w it ho ut any r e aso nabl e basis inhe r e nt in t he o bje c t s o f t he c l assif ic at io n.” Id. at 393, 6 S.W.2d at 461. A st at ut e c o mpl ie s w it h Ke nt uc ky e qual pr o t e c t io n r e quir e me nt s if a “r at io nal basis ” suppo r t s t he c l assif ic at io ns t hat it c r e at e s. Elk Hom Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 418-19 (Ky. 2005) (c it at io n o mit t e d ); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 846 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Ky. 1992) (c it at io n o mit t e d ). In Varney, w e quo t e d at l e ng t h f r o m Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21, 113 S. Ct . 2637, 2642-43, 125 L. Ed . 2d 257 (1993), as “[t ]he be st summar y o f w hat r at io nal basis anal ysis e nt ail s and w hat it d o e s no t e nt ail f :]” We many t ime s have said , and but w e e ks ag o r e pe at e d , t hat r at io nal -basis r e vie w in e qual pr o t e c t io n anal ysis is no t a l ic e nse f o r c o ur t s t o jud g e t he w isd o m, f air ne ss, o r l o g ic o f l e g isl at ive c ho ic e s. No r d o e s it aut ho r ize t he jud ic iar y t o sit as a supe r l e g isl at ur e t o jud g e t he w isd o m o r d e sir abil it y o f l e g isl at ive po l ic y d e t e r minat io ns mad e in ar e as t hat ne it he r af f e c t f und ame nt al r ig ht s no r pr o c e e d al o ng suspe c t l ine s. Fo r t he se r e aso ns, a c l assif ic at io n ne it he r invo l ving f und ame nt al r ig ht s no r pr o c e e d ing al o ng suspe c t l ine s is ac c o r d e d a st r o ng pr e sumpt io n o f val id it y. Suc h a c l assif ic at io n c anno t r un af o ul o f t he Equal Pr o t e c t io n Cl ause if t he r e is a r at io nal r e l at io nship be t w e e n t he d ispar it y o f t r e at me nt and so me l e g it imat e g o ve r nme nt al pur po se . Fur t he r , a l e g isl at ur e t hat c r e at e s t he se c at e g o r ie s ne e d no t ac t ual l y ar t ic ul at e at any t ime t he pur po se o r r at io nal e suppo r t ing it s c l assif ic at io n. Inst e ad , a c l assif ic at io n must be uphe l d ag ainst e qual pr o t e c t io n c hal l e ng e if t he r e is any r e aso nabl y c o nc e ivabl e st at e o f f ac t s t hat c o ul d pr o vid e a r at io nal basis f o r t he c l assif ic at io n. 22 A St at e , mo r e o ve r , has no o bl ig at io n t o pr o d uc e e vid e nc e t o sust ain t he r at io nal it y o f a st at ut o r y c l assif ic at io n. A l e g isl at ive c ho ic e is no t subje c t t o c o ur t r o o m f ac t f ind ing and may be base d o n r at io nal spe c ul at io n unsuppo r t e d by e vid e nc e o r e mpir ic al d at a. A st at ut e is pr e sume d c o nst it ut io nal , and t he bur d e n is o n t he o ne at t ac king t he l e g isl at ive ar r ang e me nt t o ne g at ive e ve r y c o nc e ivabl e basis w hic h mig ht suppo r t it , w he t he r o r no t t he basis has a f o und at io n in t he r e c o r d . Final l y, c o ur t s ar e c o mpe l l e d und e r r at io nal -basis r e vie w t o ac c e pt a l e g isl at ur e 's g e ne r al izat io ns e ve n w he n t he r e is an impe r f e c t f it be t w e e n me ans and e nd s. A c l assif ic at io n d o e s no t f ail r at io nal -basis r e vie w be c ause it is no t mad e w it h mat he mat ic al nic e t y o r be c ause in pr ac t ic e it r e sul t s in so me ine qual it y. The pr o bl e ms o f g o ve r nme nt ar e pr ac t ic al o ne s and may just if y, if t he y d o no t r e quir e , r o ug h ac c o mmo d at io ns — il l o g ic al , it may be , and unsc ie nt if ic . Varney, 36 S.W.3d at 395 (int e r nal quo t at io ns and e l l ipse s o mit t e d ). In Elk Hom Coal, w e e xpl aine d t hat t he st at ut e und e r c o nsid e r at io n, KRS 26A.300, d id no t t r e at al l unsuc c e ssf ul appe l l ant s t he same , and t hus w as “d isc r iminat o r y. But t he st at e may d isc r iminat e in c e r t ain mat t e r s if t he r e is a r at io nal basis f o r suc h d isc r iminat io n.” 163 S.W.3d at 413. As pr e vio usl y no t e d , “[i]n ar e as o f so c ial and e c o no mic po l ic y, a st at ut o r y c l assif ic at io n t hat ne it he r pr o c e e d s al o ng suspe c t l ine s no r inf r ing e s f und ame nt al c o nst it ut io nal r ig ht s must be uphe l d ag ainst an e qual pr o t e c t io n c hal l e ng e if . . . any r e aso nabl y c o nc e ivabl e st at e o f f ac t s . . . c o ul d pr o vid e a r at io nal basis f o r t he c l assif ic at io n.” Id. (quo t at io n and f o o t no t e o mit t e d )21 see also Popplewell's 21 In Elk Hom Coal, w e ac kno w l e d g e d t hat , o n o c c asio n base d o n par t ic ul ar f ac t s, w e had e l e c t e d t o appl y a hig he r l e ve l o f sc r ut iny t o e qual pr o t e c t io n anal ysis in c ase s invo l ving so c ial and e c o no mic l e g isl at io n. 163 S.W.3d at 418 nn. 43-44 (c it ing Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 186-87 as r e quir ing subst ant ial and just if iabl e r e aso n f o r d isc r iminat o r y l e g isl at io n). A c ur so r y r e ad ing o f Tabler, ho w e ve r , d isc l o se s t hat t he d e c isio n ad d r e sse d t he pr o hibit io n o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n in se c t io ns 59 and 60 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n, spe c if ic al l y se c t io n 59(5) r e g ul at ing l imit at io n o f c ivil c ause s. In Elk Hom Coal, w e d e c l ine d t o ad d r e ss t his “he ig ht e ne d ” st and ar d be c ause o f o ur vie w t hat t he l e g isl at io n in que st io n f ail e d e ve n t he r at io nal basis t e st as “ar bit r ar y and ir r at io nal .” 163 S.W.3d at 421. 23 Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W,3d 456, 466-67 (Ky. 2004) (upho l d ing sal e s and use t ax e xe mpt io n f o r g aso l ine sal e s f o r ind ust r ial - t ype c o mme r c ial ve sse l s); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Ky. 1998) (upho l d ing juve nil e DUI st at ut e w hic h impo se s l o w e r bl o o d al c o ho l l e ve l f o r d r ive r s und e r 21 ye ar s o f ag e ). In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet, in upho l d ing a sal e s and use t ax c l assif ic at io n, w e he l d : The st and ar d s f o r c l assif ic at io ns und e r t he Ke nt uc ky c o nst it ut io n ar e t he same as t ho se und e r t he Fo ur t e e nt h Ame nd me nt t o t he Fe d e r al c o nst it ut io n. A sing l e st and ar d c an be appl ie d t o bo t h t he St at e and Fe d e r al c o nst it ut io ns in r e g ar d t o c l assif ic at io n f o r sal e s t ax e xe mpt io ns. This Co ur t has d e t e r mine d t hat e c o no mic f ac t o r s ar e val id c o nsid e r at io ns w hic h t he l e g isl at ur e may t ake int o ac c o unt in d e ve l o ping a l e g it imat e t ax c l assif ic at io n. The l e g isl at ur e has a g r e at f r e e d o m o f c l assif ic at io n and t he pr e sumpt io n o f val id it y c an be o ve r c o me o nl y by t he mo st e xpl ic it d e mo nst r at io n t hat it is ho st il e and o ppr e ssive ag ainst par t ic ul ar pe r so ns and c l asse s, 689 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Ky. 1985) (c it at io ns o mit t e d ). “A c l assif ic at io n by t he l e g isl at ur e sho ul d be af f ir me d unl e ss it is po sit ive l y sho w n t hat t he c l assif ic at io n is so ar bit r ar y and c apr ic io us as t o be ho st il e , o ppr e ssive and ut t e r l y d e vo id o f r at io nal basis.” Id . at 19. The Unio ns and t he Unio n Amicae st r e nuo usl y ar g ue t hat t he Ac t c r e at e s a c l assif ic at io n w hic h has no subst ant ial o r just if iabl e basis. The y c l aim r ig ht - t o -w o r k po l ic ie s r e d uc e w ag e s f o r unio n and no n-unio ns e mpl o ye e s, have mixe d impac t o n e mpl o yme nt o ut c o me s, and have no st at ist ic al l y sig nif ic ant impac t o n o ve r al l st at e e mpl o yme nt . The y ar g ue t he t r ue mo t ivat io n is “t o st ar ve l abo r o r g anizat io ns and t he ir me mbe r s base d o n pe r c e ive d po l it ic al 24 be nt .” The Co mmo nw e al t h, c o nve r se l y, ar g ue s t hat t he l e g isl at ur e r e aso nabl y c o ul d c o nc l ud e t hat t he Ac t w o ul d , as t e st if ie d by t he pr o po ne nt s o f 2017 HB 1, be ne f it Ke nt uc ky and it s c it ize ns by jo ining o t he r r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s w it h supe r io r e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt , e mpl o yme nt g r o w t h in bo t h unio n and no n­ unio n jo bs, and e l iminat e Ke nt uc ky’s d isad vant ag e w it h r e spe c t t o it s ne ig hbo r ing r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s in c o mpe t ing t o at t r ac t ne w busine sse s. The Co mmo nw e al t h f ur t he r ar g ue s t hat t he l e g isl at ur e mig ht have so ug ht t o pr o vid e e c o no mic f r e e d o m f o r w o r ke r s w ho d e sir e d no t t o suppo r t any unio n ac t ivit ie s. The l e g isl at ur e is pe r mit t e d t o se t t he e c o no mic po l ic y f o r t he Co mmo nw e al t h. Eve n assuming t hat t he Ac t c r e at e s a c l assif ic at io n t hat d isc r iminat e s be t w e e n l abo r unio ns and al l o t he r o r g anizat io ns o pe r at ing in t he st at e ,22 o r any so r t o f c l assif ic at io n amo ng unio n and no n-unio n w o r ke r s, w e 22 We r e je c t t he Unio ns ’ anal o g y t hat l abo r unio ns ar e akin t o t he Ke nt uc ky Bar Asso c iat io n (“KBA”) f o r pur po se s o f t he Ac t . Hist o r ic al l y, l abo r unio ns, as o ppo se d t o t r ad e o r c r af t unio ns, ar o se as asso c iat io ns o f w o r ke r s/e mpl o ye e s t o impr o ve pay and w o r king c o nd it io ns and t o pr o vid e a unif ie d g r o up t o asse r t r ig ht s ag ainst t he ir e mpl o ye r . See Music Hall Theatre, 249 Ky. at 642, 61 S.W.2d at 284-85. The se same f unc t io ns ar e l ar g e l y se r ve d t o d ay t hr o ug h an o ve r l ay o f f e d e r al l aw and c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt s. Unio ns ar e vo l unt ar y o r g anizat io ns, e ve n in no n-r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s. The KBA, by c o nt r ast , e xist s by vir t ue o f t he st at e c o nst it ut io n. See Ky. Const. § 116 (r e quir ing t he Ke nt uc ky Supr e me Co ur t t o “by r ul e , g o ve r n ad missio n t o t he bar and t he d isc ipl ine o f me mbe r s o f t he bar []”). The KBA’s pur po se is t o maint ain a pr o pe r d isc ipl ine o f t he me mbe r s o f t he bar in ac c o r d anc e w it h t he se r ul e s and w it h t he pr inc ipl e s o f t he l e g al pr o f e ssio n as a publ ic c al l ing , t o init iat e and supe r vise , w it h t he appr o val o f t he c o ur t , appr o pr iat e me ans t o insur e a c o nt inuing hig h st and ar d o f pr o f e ssio nal c o mpe t e nc e o n t he par t o f t he me mbe r s o f t he bar , and t o be ar a subst ant ial and c o nt inuing r e spo nsibil it y f o r pr o mo t ing t he e f f ic ie nc y and impr o ve me nt o f t he jud ic ial syst e m. Ke nt uc ky Rul e s o f t he Supr e me Co ur t (“SCR”) 3.025. The KBA is no t a vo l unt ar y asso c iat io n, SCR 3.030(1), e xc e pt in t he se nse t hat no o ne is r e quir e d t o pr ac t ic e l aw in Ke nt uc ky. The e sse nt ial t e no r o f SCR 3.025 is t hat t he KBA e xist s f o r t he pr o t e c t io n o f t he publ ic : “pr o pe r d isc ipl ine ... o f t he bar ,” “hig h st and ar d o f pr o f e ssio nal c o mpe t e nc e ” and “e f f ic ie nc y and impr o ve me nt o f t he jud ic ial syst e m[.]” 25 ar e unabl e t o say t hat t he l e g isl at ur e d id no t have a r e aso nabl e basis f o r so d o ing . As st at e d in Varney, “[a] l e g isl at ive c ho ic e is no t subje c t t o c o ur t r o o m f ac t f ind ing and may be base d o n r at io nal spe c ul at io n unsuppo r t e d by e vid e nc e o r e mpir ic al d at a.” 36 S.W.3d at 395. The l e g isl at ur e c l e ar l y e st abl ishe d a r at io nal basis f o r t he Ac t : t o pr o mo t e e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt , t o pr o mo t e jo b g r o w t h, and t o r e mo ve Ke nt uc ky’s e c o no mic d isad vant ag e s in c o mpe t ing w it h ne ig hbo r ing st at e s. Ad d it io nal l y, and e ve n t ho ug h no t r e quir e d , t he pr o po ne nt s o f t he Ac t t e nd e r e d e mpir ic al e vid e nc e t o suppo r t t he c l aime d be ne f it s. One d o e s no t ne e d an ad vanc e d d e g r e e in l abo r e c o no mic s t o r e c o g nize t hat e mpl o ye r s mig ht be at t r ac t e d t o l o c at e in a st at e w he r e w ag e s ar e l o w e r as o ppo se d t o a st at e w he r e w ag e s ar e hig he r . To t he e xt e nt t his c o nc l usio n mig ht be c har ac t e r ize d as spe c ul at ive , it is und o ubt e d l y r at io nal . The l e g isl at ur e c an c l e ar l y make a po l ic y d e c isio n t hat t he Ac t mig ht r e sul t in mo r e jo bs, al be it at l o w e r w ag e s, and t hat t his r e sul t , in t ur n, mig ht be ne f it t he o ve r al l e c o no mic c l imat e o f Ke nt uc ky. In f ac t , t his r e sul t is suppo r t e d by so me o f t he e c o no mic st ud ie s no t e d by t he Unio ns. See Ro be r t Br uno , Af f id avit at 5 (st at ing t hat so me st ud ie s sug g e st r ig ht t o w o r k l aw s inc r e ase manuf ac t ur ing e mpl o yme nt , w hil e o t he r st ud ie s f ind no e f f e c t ). Al l t he w hil e , o f c o ur se , f o r any g ive n w o r kpl ac e , t he majo r it y o f w o r ke r s r e t ain t he f e d e r al l y-pr o t e c t e d r ig ht t o o r g anize . The Ac t d o e s no t vio l at e t he e qual pr o t e c t io n pr o visio ns o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. We ar e unabl e t o say t he l e g isl at ur e ’s “c l assif ic at io n is so 26 ar bit r ar y and c apr ic io us as t o be ho st il e , o ppr e ssive and ut t e r l y d e vo id o f r at io nal basis.” Delta Airlines, 689 S.W.2d at 19. To t he e xt e nt t he Unio ns c l aim t he y w il l be pr o hibit e d f r o m c o l l e c t ing a f e e f o r l e g al l y-pr o t e c t e d , l e g al l y aut ho r ize d se r vic e s, t hat c l aim is ad d r e sse d , infra, in o ur d isc ussio n o n Taking for Public Purpose without Just Compensation. As t o t he Unio ns ’ c l aim t hat t he Ac t impair s t he ir f r e e d o m t o c o nt r ac t , Ke nt uc ky l aw has l o ng r e c o g nize d t hat t he po l ic e po w e r , base d o n “t he g e ne r al w e l f ar e o f t he c o mmunit y,” may val id l y inf r ing e o n t he r ig ht t o c o nt r ac t . City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 301 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Ky. 1957). “The e xe r c ise o f suc h a po w e r must be r e aso nabl e and in c o nf o r mit y w it h t he ne c e ssit y o f t he c ase and have a subst ant ial basis f o r t he ac t io n.” Id. at 889. Base d o n o ur pr e vio us d isc ussio n c o nc e r ning t he l e g isl at ur e ’s st at e d r e aso ns f o r e nac t ing t he Ac t , w e ho l d t hat it s e nac t me nt sat isf ie s t his t e st . B. Special Legislation. The Unio ns c l aim t he Ac t c o nst it ut e s spe c ial l e g isl at io n in vio l at io n o f Se c t io ns 59 and 60 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. Spe c if ic al l y, Se c t io n 59 st at e s: “[t ]he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y shal l no t pass l o c al o r spe c ial ac t s c o nc e r ning any o f t he f o l l o w ing subje c t s, o r f o r any o f t he f o l l o w ing pur po se s, name l y: . . . Tw e nt y-f o ur t h: To r e g ul at e l abo r , t r ad e , mining o r manuf ac t ur ing .” The pur po se o f t his se c t io n is no t t o pr e ve nt t he l e g isl at ur e f r o m e nac t ing any l aw s c o nc e r ning l abo r , t r ad e , mining o r manuf ac t ur ing . That w o ul d be absur d .23 23 If t he me aning w e r e t o pr o hibit al l l aw s ad d r e ssing t he se subje c t s, t he n e nt ir e Tit l e s o f t he Ke nt uc ky Re vise d St at ut e s w o ul d be vo id . E.g., KRS Tit l e XXVII: Labo r and Human Rig ht s; KRS Tit l e XXVII; Mine s and Mine r al s; KRS Tit l e XXIX; Co mme r c e and Tr ad e . Exampl e s o f 27 Rat he r , t he int e nt is f o r any ac t s t o uc hing t he se subje c t s be g e ne r al ac t s. See, e.g., Waggoner, 846 S.W.2d at 706-07 (st at ing “[t ]he f ac t t hat t he [l e g isl at ur e ] d e al s w it h a spe c ial subje c t d o e s no t per se make it spe c ial l e g isl at io n[]”); D.E. Hewitt Lumber Co. v. Brumfield, 196 Ky. 723, 727, 245 S.W. 858, 860 (1922) (ho l d ing t hat § 59 “inhibit io ns appl y o nl y t o l o c al and spe c ial l e g isl at io n, and t he r e f o r e d o no t appl y he r e unl e ss t he [Wo r ke r s ’] Co mpe nsat io n Ac t is e it he r a l o c al o r a spe c ial ac t []”). Fur t he r mo r e , w e no t e t he pur po se o f t he se se c t io ns is t o “pr e ve nt spe c ial pr ivil e g e s, f avo r it ism, and d isc r iminat io n, and t o e nsur e e qual it y und e r t he l aw ... [and t o ] pr e ve nt t he e nac t me nt o f l aw s t hat d o no t o pe r at e al ike o n al l ind ivid ual s and c o r po r at io ns.” Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. O’Shea-Baxter, LLC, 438 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Ky. 2014) (quo t at io ns and c it at io ns o mit t e d ). Spe c ial l e g isl at io n is d e f ine d as ar bit r aiy and ir r at io nal l e g isl at io n t hat f avo r s t he e c o no mic se l f -int e r e st o f t he o ne o r t he f e w o ve r t hat o f t he many. Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 468. “Lo c al ” o r “spe c ial ” l e g isl at io n appl ie s e xc l usive l y t o spe c ial o r par t ic ul ar pl ac e s, o r spe c ial and par t ic ul ar pe r so ns, and is d ist ing uishe d f r o m a st at ut e int e nd e d t o be g e ne r al in it s o pe r at io n, and t hat r e l at e s t o c l asse s o f pe r so ns o r subje c t s. Mo r e spe c if ic al l y, “[a] l o c al l aw ’ is o ne w ho se o pe r at io n is c o nf ine d w it hin t e r r it o r ial l imit s o t he r t han t ho se o f t he w ho l e st at e , o r any pr o pe r l y c o nst it ut e d c l ass o r l o c al it y t he r e in.” Ravitz v. Chapt e r s w it hin t he se t it l e s ar e KRS Chapt e r 341, Une mpl o yme nt Co mpe nsat io n; KRS Chapt e r 350, Sur f ac e Co al Mining ; and KRS Chapt e r 355, Unif o r m Co mme r c ial Co d e . 28 Steurele, 257 Ky. 108, 115, 77 S.W.2d 360, 364 (1934). He r e , t he Ac t is c l e ar l y no t a l o c al ac t be c ause it s appl ic at io n is st at e w id e . In Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, o ur pr e d e c e sso r c o ur t no t e d a c l e ar d ist inc t io n be t w e e n a g e ne r al and a spe c ial l aw , st at ing “‘[a] st at ut e w hic h r e l at e s t o pe r so ns o r t hing s as a class is a g e ne r al l aw , w hil e a st at ut e w hic h r e l at e s t o par t ic ul ar pe r so ns o r t hing s of a class is spe c ial .’” 291 Ky. at 837, 165 S.W.2d at 825 (quo t ing State ex rel. v. Toile, 71 Mo . 645, 650 (1880)); see also Ravitz, 257 Ky. 108, 77 S.W.2d 360; Stevenson v. Hardin, 238 Ky. 600, 603, 38 S.W.2d 462, 463-64 (1931) (l aw e xc e pt ing par t y no minat io ns f r o m mand at o r y pr imar y he l d t o be g e ne r al l aw as appl ying t o al l st at e w id e o f f ic e r s — “g e ne r al in it s appl ic at io n and appl ie s in an e qual manne r t o al l pe r so ns simil ar l y sit uat e d ”). In Johnson, t he issue c o nc e r ne d t he aut ho r izat io n o f al l e xe c ut ive d e par t me nt s o f t he st at e t o e mpl o y a c e r t ain c l ass o f pr o f e ssio nal assist ant s. The c o ur t o pine d t hat it “c an c o nc e ive no t hing mo r e f o r e ig n t o spe c ial l e g isl at io n” t han t his st at ut e . 291 Ky. at 837, 165 S.W.2d at 825. Our c ase l aw has l o ng r e c o g nize d a simpl e , t w o -par t t e st f o r d e t e r mining w he t he r a l aw c o nst it ut e s g e ne r al l e g isl at io n in it s c o nst it ut io nal se nse : (1) e qual appl ic at io n t o al l in a c l ass, and (2) d ist inc t ive and nat ur al r e aso ns ind uc ing and suppo r t ing t he c l assif ic at io n. Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 466; Waggoner, 846 S.W.2d at 707; Schoo v. Rose, 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954); Droege v. McInerney, 120 Ky. 796, 87 S.W. 1085 (1905); Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. V. Ecklar, 106 Ky. 115, 50 S.W. 50 (1899); see also Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 29 284 Ky. 753, 761-62, 145 S.W.2d 1067, 1072 (1940) (ho l d ing unc o nst it ut io nal ho ur and w ag e s l aw w hic h appl ie d t o r e st aur ant s e mpl o ying w ait e r s, but no t t o ho t e l d ining r o o m w ait e r s). Fr ankl y, t he Ac t appl ie s t o al l c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt s e nt e r e d int o o n o r af t e r Januar y 9, 2017, w it h t he e xc e pt io n o f c e r t ain e mpl o ye e s c o ve r e d o r e xe mpt e d by f e d e r al l aw . KRS 336.132. Wit h t he e xc e pt io ns r e quir e d by f e d e r al l aw , it appl ie s t o al l e mpl o ye r s and al l e mpl o ye e s, bo t h publ ic and pr ivat e . It d o e s no t sing l e o ut any par t ic ul ar unio n, ind ust r y o r e mpl o ye r . It appl ie s st at e w id e . We have pr e vio usl y r e je c t e d c o nst it ut io nal c hal l e ng e s t o l e g isl at io n t hat pur po r t e d l y pr o mo t e d o r har me d o r g anize d l abo r as c l aime d spe c ial l e g isl at io n, so l o ng as a r at io nal basis e xist e d f o r t he st at ut e . See Hamilton, 262 S.W.2d at 700. And in Waggoner, w e st at e d “[t ]he r e spo nsibil it y o f t his Co ur t is t o d r aw al l r e aso nabl e inf e r e nc e s and impl ic at io ns f r o m t he ac t as a w ho l e and t he r e by sust ain it s val id it y.” 846 S.W.2d at 707 (c it ing Graham v. Mills, 694 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1985)). In Tabler, w e r e quir e d t hat “a subst ant ial and just if iabl e r e aso n [must appe ar ] f r o m l e g isl at ive hist o r y, f r o m t he st at ut e 's t it l e , pr e ambl e o r subje c t mat t e r , o r f r o m so me o t he r aut ho r it at ive so ur c e .” 704 S.W.2d at 186. The l e g isl at ur e c l e ar l y e st abl ishe d a r at io nal basis f o r t he Ac t : t o pr o mo t e e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt , t o pr o mo t e jo b g r o w t h, and t o r e mo ve Ke nt uc ky’s e c o no mic d isad vant ag e s in c o mpe t ing w it h ne ig hbo r ing st at e s. As no t e d abo ve , t e st imo ny suppo r t ing t he l e g isl at io n w as pr e se nt e d at Ho use c o mmit t e e he ar ing s in Januar y 2017, The 30 Unio ns and Unio n Amicae, as no t e d , d isag r e e , but w e ar e unabl e t o say t hat t he l e g isl at ur e ’s r at io nal e is unr e aso nabl e .24 C. Taking for Public Purpose without Just Compensation. Ne xt , t he Unio ns ar g ue t hat t he Ac t c o nst it ut e s a publ ic t aking o f l abo r unio n pr o pe r t y w it ho ut just c o mpe nsat io n, in vio l at io n o f Se c t io ns 13 and 242 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. Se c t io n 13 pr o vid e s, in pe r t ine nt par t , t hat no “man’s pr o pe r t y [shal l ] be t ake n o r appl ie d t o publ ic use w it ho ut t he c o nse nt o f his r e pr e se nt at ive s, and w it ho ut just c o mpe nsat io n be ing pr e vio usl y mad e t o him.” Se c t io n 242 pr o vid e s: Munic ipal and o t he r c o r po r at io ns, and ind ivid ual s inve st e d w it h t he pr ivil e g e o f t aking pr ivat e pr o pe r t y f o r publ ic use , shal l make just c o mpe nsat io n f o r pr o pe r t y t ake n, injur e d o r d e st r o ye d by t he m; w hic h c o mpe nsat io n shal l be paid be f o r e suc h t aking , o r paid o r se c ur e d , at t he e l e c t io n o f suc h c o r po r at io n o r ind ivid ual , be f o r e suc h injur y o r d e st r uc t io n. The Unio ns ’ ar g ume nt is t w o -f o l d . Fir st , t he y asse r t t hat t he Ac t t ake s unio n pr o pe r t y be c ause unio ns ar e r e quir e d t o pr o vid e val uabl e se r vic e s t o al l e mpl o ye e s in a bar g aining unit ir r e spe c t ive o f unio n me mbe r ship w it ho ut be ing c o mpe nsat e d in r e t ur n.25 Se c o nd , t he y maint ain t he Ac t t ake s f r o m unio ns 24 The c o nc ur r ing in par t /d isse nt ing in par t o pinio n se e ms t o sug g e st t hat any t ime t he l e g isl at ur e se e ks t o al t e r any po l ic y ye t g r and f at he r pr e -e xist ing r ig ht s, d ut ie s o r o bl ig at io ns, t he n t he r e sul t ing l e g isl at io n is c o nst it ut io nal l y inf ir m und e r Se c t io ns 59 and 60. Suc h anal ysis ig no r e s t he l o ng st and ing c ase l aw c it e d in t his o pinio n t hat e st abl ishe s t he t w o -par t t e st f o r anal yzing l e g isl at io n und e r a spe c ial l e g isl at io n c hal l e ng e , and w o ul d se ve r e l y hind e r any l e g isl at ive e f f o r t t o e f f e c t c hang e in so c io -e c o no mic po l ic y. 25 A unio n’s d ut y o f f air r e pr e se nt at io n ar ise s f r o m it s st at ut o r y d e sig nat io n as t he e xc l usive r e pr e se nt at ive o f t he bar g aining unit and has be e n e st abl ishe d by c ase l aw . See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99, 65 S. Ct . 226, 230, 89 L. Ed . 173 (1944). Ho w e ve r , und e r t he d ut y o f f air r e pr e se nt at io n, a unio n r e t ains br o ad d isc r e t io n. In Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67, 111 S. Ct . 1127, 1130, 113 L. Ed . 2d 51 (1991), t he Co ur t he l d t hat 31 w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n t he ir val uabl e c o nt r ac t r ig ht t hat al l e mpl o ye e s shar e in t he c o st o f r e pr e se nt at io n in f ut ur e r e ne w al s o f c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt s. We ad d r e ss t he se ar g ume nt s in t ur n. 1. Pr o vid ing r e quir e d se r vic e w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n . The Unio ns r e l y o n t his c o ur t ’s d e c isio n in Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972) (a c ase ar ising o ut o f an at t o r ne y be ing r e quir e d t o r e pr e se nt an ind ig e nt c r iminal d e f e nd ant ) in suppo r t o f t he ir ar g ume nt t hat a r e quir e me nt t o pr o vid e a val uabl e se r vic e w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n c o nst it ut e s an unc o nst it ut io nal t aking . The Unio ns anal o g ize t hat t he Bradshaw pr inc ipl e - no o ne c an be r e quir e d und e r t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n t o pr o vid e val uabl e se r vic e s w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n—appl ie s t o unio n se r vic e s r e pr e se nt ing no nme mbe r s, f o r suc h it e ms as ne g o t iat ing and ad minist e r ing c o nt r ac t s, hand l ing e mpl o ye e g r ie vanc e s, inc l ud ing ar bit r at io n, ar bit r at io n f e e s, at t o r ne y f e e s, unio n r e pr e se nt at ive s ’ sal ar ie s, he ar ing r o o m c o st s, c o ur t r e po r t e r s, and o t he r asso c iat e d e xpe nse s. Assuming , ar g ue nd o , t hat Bradshaw st and s f o r t hat pr o po sit io n, and no o t he r ,26 t he Supr e me Co ur t ’s anal ysis o f t he “f r e e -r id e r t he r ul e anno unc e d in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S. Ct . 903, 916, 17 L. Ed . 2d 842 (1967)—t hat a unio n br e ac he s it s d ut y o f f air r e pr e se nt at io n if it s ac t io ns ar e e it he r “ar bit r ar y, d isc r iminat o r y, o r in bad f ait h ”—appl ie s t o al l unio n ac t ivit y, inc l ud ing c o nt r ac t ne g o t iat io n. We f ur t he r ho l d t hat a unio n's ac t io ns ar e ar bit r ar y o nl y if , in l ig ht o f t he f ac t ual and l e g al l and sc ape at t he t ime o f t he unio n's ac t io ns, t he unio n's be havio r is so f ar o ut sid e a “w id e r ang e o f r e aso nabl e ne ss,” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S. Ct . 681, 686, 97 L. El d . 1048 (1953), as t o be ir r at io nal . 26 A c ar e f ul r e ad ing o f Bradshaw d e mo nst r at e s t hat it s ho l d ing must be c o nsid e r e d in t he hist o r ic al and f ac t ual c o nt e xt in w hic h it w as d e c id e d . AU Ke nt uc ky c ase s r e g ar d ing at t o r ne ys ’ r e pr e se nt at io n o f ind ig e nt d e f e nd ant s pr io r t o Bradshaw he l d t hat , as o f f ic e r s o f t he c o ur t , at t o r ne ys w e r e e xpe c t e d t o pe r f o r m t he se se r vic e s as a c o l l at e r al f unc t io n o f t he pr o f e ssio n. E.g., Slavens v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1972); Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970); Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966). Ho w e ve r , as 32 pr o bl e m” in it s r e c e nt d e c isio n in Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Ctny., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,___U.S.___ , 138 S. Ct . 2448 (2018)27 c o nc l usive l y r e f ut e s, f o r se ve r al r e aso ns, t he Unio ns ’ c l aim t hat t he y w il l be c o mpe l l e d t o pr o vid e se r vic e s w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n. The Co ur t ad d r e sse d t he ar g ume nt s ad vanc e d t o just if y no n-me mbe r s ’ payme nt o f ag e nc y f e e s, spe c if ic al l y t hat be c ause unio ns ar e r e quir e d by l aw t o r e pr e se nt t he int e r e st s o f al l e mpl o ye e s in t he bar g aining unit , w he t he r unio n me mbe r s o r no t , it is unf air t hat no n-me mbe r s, i.e ., f r e e -r id e r s, ar e no t r e quir e d t o pay f e e s. The Co ur t no t e d t hat unio ns in many st at e s r e pr e se nt e mpl o ye e s w ho d o no t pay ag e nc y f e e s. Id. at 2467. No unio n is c o mpe l l e d t o se e k d e sig nat io n as e xc l usive r e pr e se nt at ive , but suc h d e sig nat io n is avid l y f e d e r al c r iminal pr o c e d ur al r ig ht s w e r e be ing e xpand e d by c ase s suc h as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct . 792, 9 L. Ed . 2d 733 (1963), t his c o ur t be c ame inc r e asing l y c o nc e r ne d t hat t he t ime and kno w l e d g e r e quir e d t o r e pr e se nt ind ig e nt c r iminal d e f e nd ant s e f f e c t ive l y w as r e ac hing a c r isis po int , st at ing “[b]e c ause o f t he inc r e ase d c r ime r at e and t he e xpansio n by U.S. Supr e me Co ur t d e c isio ns o f ne w f e d e r al c o nst it ut io nal st and ar d s t o t he ad minist r at io n o f c r iminal just ic e in t he st at e c o ur t s, an int o l e r abl e bur d e n has be e n t hr ust par t ic ul ar l y upo n t he yo ung e r me mbe r s o f t he l e g al pr o f e ssio n.” Bradshaw, 487 S.W.2d at 297. Spe c if ic al l y, w e no t e d t hat “at t o r ne ys c anno t c o nst it ut io nal l y be c o mpe l l e d t o se r ve as c o unse l w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n, in c ir c umst anc e s w he r e t he bur d e n o f suc h se r vic e w il l amo unt t o a subst a nt ial d e pr ivat io n o f pr o pe r t y.” Id. at 298. Ho w e ve r , an ad d it io nal ve r y sig nif ic ant c o nst it ut io nal r ig ht t hat pe r me at e s t he o pinio n is t he r ig ht o f an ac c use d t o e f f e c t ive assist anc e o f c o unse l . Tw o po int s ar e c l e ar in Bradshaw. One , t he c o ur t e xpr e sse d c o nc e r n o ve r t he c o nt inuing bur d e n o n yo ung at t o r ne ys t o sho ul d e r t he inc r e asing f inanc ial bur d e n o f r e pr e se nt ing ind ig e nt c r iminal d e f e nd ant s. And t w o , t he c o ur t que st io ne d w he t he r t he e xist ing syst e m pr o vid e d t he c o nst it ut io nal l y mand at e d r ig ht t o c o unse l f o r an ac c use d . Bo t h r ig ht s ar e me nt io ne d t hr o ug ho ut t he o pinio n. 27 At o r al ar g ume nt , t he Unio ns so ug ht t o d ist ing uish Janus by vir t ue o f t he Co ur t ’s ad d r e ssing t he Fir st Ame nd me nt r ig ht asse r t e d by a publ ic e mpl o ye e . Whil e w e ac kno w l e d g e t hat d if f e r e nc e , w e no t e t he Il l ino is Publ ic Labo r Re l at io ns Ac t ’s l e g al r e quir e me nt s f o r publ ic unio ns shar e many f e at ur e s o f t he NLRA. See 5 111. Co mp. St at . Ann. 315/6 (We st 2016) (r e quir ing vo t e in a bar g aining unio n f o r unio n r e pr e se nt at io n; e xc l usive r e pr e se nt at io n o f al l e mpl o ye e s by t he unio n; e xc l usive unio n ne g o t iat io n w it h t he e mpl o ye r o n mat t e r s r e l at ing t o “pay, w ag e s, ho ur s and o t he r c o nd it io ns o f e mpl o yme nt ,” inc l ud ing po l ic y mat t e r s; unio n d ut y t o r e pr e se nt t he int e r e st s o f al l e mpl o ye e s). 33 so ug ht . 28 Id. Fir st , suc h d e sig nat io n pr o vid e s a unio n w it h a pr ivil e g e d pl ac e o ve r w ag e s, be ne f it s, and w o r king c o nd it io ns. In t he c o l l e c t ive bar g aining pr o c e ss, t he unio n has t he e xc l usive r ig ht t o spe ak f o r al l e mpl o ye e s and an e mpl o ye r is r e quir e d t o l ist e n t o t he unio n and ne g o t iat e in g o o d f ait h. The d e sig nat io n r e sul t s in a t r e me nd o us inc r e ase in po w e r o f t he unio n. Id. (c it ing Am. Commc’n Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401, 70 S. Ct . 674, 686, 94 L. Ed . 925 (1950)). Se c o nd , t he unio n is g r ant e d spe c ial pr ivil e g e s in o bt aining inf o r mat io n abo ut e mpl o ye e s and having f e e s and d ue s d e d uc t e d d ir e c t l y f r o m w ag e s. Id. As no t e d by t he Co ur t , t he se be ne f it s g r e at l y o ut w e ig h any e xt r a bur d e n impo se d by t he d ut y o f f air r e pr e se nt at io n f o r no nme mbe r s, and t he d ut y o f f air r e pr e se nt at io n d o e s no t sig nif ic ant l y inc r e ase e xpe nse s t hat t he unio ns w o ul d o t he r w ise be ar in ne g o t iat ing c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt s. Id. at 2467-68. Pe r t ine nt l y, and as t o r e pr e se nt at io n o f no nme mbe r s in g r ie vanc e pr o c e e d ing s, t he Co ur t st at e d “[u]nio ns d o no t und e r t ake t his ac t ivit y so l e l y f o r t he be ne f it o f no nme mbe r s[,]” Id. at 2468. A unio n se nd s a r e pr e se nt at ive t o t he pr o c e e d ing s t o f ur t he r it s int e r e st in ke e ping c o nt r o l o f t he ad minist r at io n o f t he c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt , sinc e t he r e so l ut io n o f o ne e mpl o ye e ’s g r ie vanc e c an af f e c t o t he r s. And w he n a unio n c o nt r o l s t he g r ie vanc e pr o c e ss, it may, as a pr ac t ic al mat t e r , e f f e c t ive l y 28 Re c e nt e xampl e s o f unio n o r g anizing e f f o r t s in r ig ht -t o -w o r k st at e s have o c c ur r e d in So ut h Car o l ina and Te nne sse e . See Do ug Came r o n, Boeing May Face Union Vote at 787 Plant, Wall St. J. (Jan. 20, 2017), ht t ps://w w w .w sj.c o m/ar t ic l e s/bo e ing -may -f ac e -unio n-vo t e -at -787- pl ant -148492373l ?mo d =se ar c hr e sul t s&pag e =l &po s=4 (visit e d Aug . 29, 2018) (ar t ic l e no t ing “l o ng -r unning e f f o r t s t o o r g anize " by Int e r nat io nal Asso c iat io n o f Mac hinist s and Ae r o spac e Wo r ke r s); Chr ist ina Ro g e r s, UAW Plans Another Push at Volkswagen, Wall ST. J. (Se pt . 17, 2014), ht t ps://w w w .w sj.c o m/ar t ic l e s/uaw -se t s-up-l o c al -at -vo l ksw ag e n-in-t e nne sse e - 1410975613?mo d =se ar c hr e sul t s&pag e =l &po s=2 (visit e d Aug . 29, 2018) (ar t ic l e no t ing “(a) f o o t ho l d in Te nne sse e w o ul d r e pr e se nt a majo r ad vanc e af t e r a l o ng se r ie s o f f ail e d at t e mpt s t o o r g anize So ut he r n f ac t o r ie s o pe r at e d by f o r e ig n aut o make r s[]”). 34 subo r d inat e t he int e r e st o f [an] ind ivid ual e mpl o ye e t o t he c o l l e c t ive int e r e st s o f al l e mpl o ye e s in t he bar g aining unit . Id. (quo t at io ns and c it at io ns o mit t e d ); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-94, 87 S. Ct . 903, 916-19, 17 L. Ed . 2d 841 (1967) (ho l d ing t hat ind ivid ual e mpl o ye e has no abso l ut e r ig ht t o have g r ie vanc e t ake n t o ar bit r at io n; br e ac h o f d ut y o f f air r e pr e se nt at io n is sust aine d o nl y by pr o o f o f “ar bit r ar y o r bad - f ait h c o nd uc t o n t he par t o f t he Unio n in pr o c e ssing [a] g r ie vanc e []”). Ot he r c o ur t s have simil ar l y he l d t hat unio ns ar e f ul l y and ad e quat e l y c o mpe nsat e d f o r any l o ss o f f e e s f r o m no nme mbe r s t hr o ug h t he e xc l usive r e pr e se nt at io n d e sig nat io n. Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 666 (7t h Cir . 2014) (upho l d ing Ind iana’s r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw ag ainst f e d e r al Fif t h Ame nd me nt t aking s c l aim); Inti Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 370 v. Wasden, 217 F.Supp.3d 1209, 1223-24 (D. Id aho 2016) (upho l d ing Id aho ’s r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw ag ainst f e d e r al Fif t h Ame nd me nt t aking s c l aim); Inti Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 139 V. Schimel, 210 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1096-97 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (upho l d ing Wisc o nsin’s r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw ag ainst f e d e r al Fif t h Ame nd me nt t aking s c l aim), affd 863 F.3d 674 (7t h Cir . 2017); see also Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind . 2014) (upho l d ing Ind iana’s r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw ag ainst st at e c o nst it ut io nal t aking s c hal l e ng e o n t he basis t hat “[t ]he Unio n’s f e d e r al o bl ig at io n t o r e pr e se nt al l e mpl o ye e s in a bar g aining unit is o pt io nal ; it o c c ur s o nl y w he n t he unio n e l e c t s t o be t he e xc l usive bar g aining ag e nt , f o r w hic h it is just l y c o mpe nsat e d by t he r ig ht t o bar g ain e xc l usive l y w it h t he e mpl o ye r []”). The f o r e g o ing anal ysis appl ie s e qual l y t o pr ivat e se c t o r e mpl o ye e s and e f f e c t ive l y d ist ing uishe s t he pr e se nt c ase f r o m Bradshaw. A unio n’s 35 r e pr e se nt at io n o f a no nme mbe r e mpl o ye e t hr o ug h c o l l e c t ive bar g aining o r g r ie vanc e pr o c e ssing se r ve s t he unio n’s int e r e st , ir r e spe c t ive o f w he t he r it r e c e ive s an ag e nc y f e e . A unio n is no t “c o mpe l l e d ” by t he Ac t t o r e pr e se nt no nme mbe r s w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n. By c o nt r ast , t he unc o mpe nsat e d at t o r ne y r e c e ive s no t hing f o r his o r he r t ime and e f f o r t . Be c ause e xc l usive d e sig nat io n f ul l y and ad e quat e l y c o mpe nsat e s unio ns f o r f r e e -r id e r s, t he Ac t d o e s no t c o nst it ut e a t aking o f pr ivat e pr o pe r t y w it ho ut c o mpe nsat io n, and t he r e f o r e d o e s no t vio l at e Se c t io ns 13 and 242 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. 2. Taking o f a Co nt r ac t Rig ht in Fut ur e Re ne w al s . The Unio ns d o no t spe nd t o o muc h t ime o n t his ar g ume nt , pr e sumabl y be c ause t he Ac t e f f e c t ive l y c ar ve s o ut c ur r e nt c o nt r ac t s and w il l appl y o nl y t o r e ne w al s o f c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt s. The Unio ns, ho w e ve r , ar g ue t hat unio ns have ne g o t iat e d f o r d e c ad e s o ve r unio n se c ur it y c l ause s, have an e xpe c t at io n t hat t he se pr o visio ns w il l c o nt inue and t hat c o l l e c t ive bar g aining ag r e e me nt s ar e d if f e r e nt f r o m r e g ul ar c o mme r c ial c o nt r ac t s. We d isag r e e . Se c t io n 14(b) o f t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t has be e n par t o f t he NLRA sinc e 1947. Co ng r e ss has f o r 70 ye ar s e xpr e ssl y pe r mit t e d st at e s t o e nac t r ig ht -t o - w o r k l aw s. Rig ht -t o -w o r k l e g isl at io n has be e n pr o po se d in Ke nt uc ky f o r al mo st 20 ye ar s. We f ail t o pe r c e ive t hat any e xpe c t at io n in t he c o nt inuat io n o f a unio n se c ur it y c l ause c o ul d be a r e aso nabl e e xpe c t at io n. See Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO, 804 S.E.2d 883, 892 (W. Va. 2017) (ho l d ing t hat no pr o t e c t e d pr o pe r t y int e r e st e xist s in f ut ur e ag r e e me nt s t hat have no t be e n ne g o t iat e d o r 36 ac c e pt e d ; “unio ns have o nl y a unil at e r al e xpe c t at io n t hat t he y w il l r e c e ive f e e s f r o m no nunio n e mpl o ye e s ” in t he f ut ur e ). The Co mmo nw e al t h c o r r e c t l y ar g ue s t hat Ke nt uc ky l aw has l o ng r e c o g nize d t hat t he po l ic e po w e r , base d o n “t he g e ne r al w e l f ar e o f t he c o mmunit y,” may val id l y inf r ing e o n t he r ig ht t o c o nt r ac t . City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 301 S.W.2d at 888. As w e no t e d abo ve , “[t ]he e xe r c ise o f suc h a po w e r must be r e aso nabl e and in c o nf o r mit y w it h t he ne c e ssit y o f t he c ase and have a subst ant ial basis f o r t he ac t io n.” Id. at 889. Base d o n o ur pr e vio us d isc ussio n r e g ar d ing t he l e g isl at ur e ’s st at e d r e aso ns f o r e nac t ing t he Ac t , w e ho l d t he Ac t sat isf ie s t his t e st . D. Emergency Legislation. Final l y, t he Unio ns ar g ue t hat t he l e g isl at ur e impe r missibl y d e sig nat e d t he Ac t as e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n in vio l at io n o f Se c t io n 55 o f t he Ke nt uc ky c o nst it ut io n, and t hat t he t r ial c o ur t e r r e d by f ail ing t o c o nsid e r t his ar g ume nt . The t r ial c o ur t r e aso ne d t hat t he c o ur t is no t t he pr o pe r bo d y t o d e t e r mine w he t he r t he st at e d e me r g e nc y e xist e d , and t hat t he l e g isl at ur e is me r e l y r e quir e d t o st at e an e me r g e nc y pur po se . This c o nst it ut io nal se c t io n st at e s: No ac t , e xc e pt g e ne r al appr o pr iat io n bil l s, shal l be c o me a l aw unt il nine t y d ays af t e r t he ad jo ur nme nt o f t he se ssio n at w hic h it w as passe d , e xc e pt in c ase s o f e me r g e nc y, w he n, by t he c o nc ur r e nc e o f a majo r it y o f t he me mbe r s e l e c t e d t o e ac h Ho use o f t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y, by a ye a and nay vo t e , e nt e r e d upo n t he ir jo ur nal s, an ac t may be c o me a l aw w he n appr o ve d by t he Go ve r no r ; but t he r e aso ns f o r t he e me r g e nc y t hat just if ie s t his ac t io n must be se t o ut at l e ng t h in t he jo ur nal o f e ac h Ho use . Ky. Const. § 55. The r e aso n se t f o r t h in t he Ac t w as t hat “it is c r it ic al t o t he e c o no my and c it ize ns o f Ke nt uc ky t o at t r ac t ne w busine ss and inve st me nt int o 37 t he Co mmo nw e al t h as so o n as po ssibl e , an e me r g e nc y is d e c l ar e d t o e xist , and t his Ac t t ake s e f f e c t upo n it s passag e and appr o val by t he Go ve r no r o r upo n it s o t he r w ise be c o ming a l aw .” 2017 Ky. Ac t s c h. 1, § 14. In Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1982), w e he l d t hat w hil e a l e g isl at ive d e t e r minat io n o f e me r g e nc y is subje c t t o jud ic ial r e vie w , “l e g isl at ive jud g me nt in t hat r e spe c t must be ac c o r d e d t he same pr e sumpt io n o f val id it y t hat it e njo ys in o t he r inst anc e s o f c o nst it ut io nal inquir y.” Thus, if “any r at io nal basis f o r c o nc l ud ing t hat t he c ir c umst anc e s c it e d as c o nst it ut ing an e me r g e nc y just if ie d mo r e e xpe d it io us ac t io n t han w o ul d o r d inar il y be t r ue , t he c o ur t s sho ul d no t int e r f e r e w it h t he l e g isl at ive d isc r e t io n.” Id. And , “w he n t he r e aso n f o r d e c l ar ing an e me r g e nc y is suf f ic ie nt l y e xpr e sse d in t he l e g isl at io n it se l f , t he r e quir e me nt t hat it be r e c it e d in t he jo ur nal is sat isf ie d .” Id. In t his c ase , and al t ho ug h t he Unio ns d isag r e e , w e ar e unabl e t o c o nc l ud e t hat t he l e g isl at ur e ’s pr o f f e r e d r e aso n f o r an e me r g e nc y has no r at io nal basis. We t he r e f o r e w il l no t d ist ur b t hat d e t e r minat io n.29 V. Conclusion. Base d o n t he f o r e g o ing r e aso ns, w e ho l d t hat t he Unio ns ’ c o nst it ut io nal c hal l e ng e s t o t he Ac t ar e w it ho ut me r it . In t his ar e a o f e c o no mic l e g isl at io n. 29 Eve n if w e w e r e t o ag r e e w it h t he Unio ns, t he Ac t w o ul d no t be r e nd e r e d vo id . Fir st , w e no t e t hat t he Ac t has a se ve r abil it y c l ause , suc h t hat t he inval id it y o f any se c t io n d o e s no t af f e c t t he o t he r pr o visio ns. 2017 Ky. Ac t s c h. 1, § 13. Se c o nd , e ve n abse nt a se ve r abil it y c l ause and an inval id e me r g e nc y pr o visio n, t he Ac t be c ame e f f e c t ive nine t y d ays f o l l o w ing t he ad jo ur nme nt o f t he l e g isl at ur e . Ky. Const. § 55; see McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 16, 20, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (1927) (ho l d ing t hat w he n e me r g e nc y c l ause in bil l w as ine f f e c t ive , “t he bil l t o o k e f f e c t 90 d ays af t e r t he ad jo ur nme nt o f t he [[l ]e g isl at ur e []”). 38 t he l e g isl at ur e and t he e xe c ut ive br anc h make t he po l ic y, no t t he c o ur t s. Lo ng ag o , in an o pinio n upho l d ing a pr o visio n o f t he Rail w ay Labo r Ac t t hat aut ho r ize d a unio n sho p ag r e e me nt no t w it hst and ing a st at e ’s r ig ht -t o -w o r k l aw , Just ic e Wil l iam O. Do ug l as apt l y w r o t e , “[m]uc h mig ht be said pr o and c o n if t he po l ic y issue w e r e be f o r e us.” Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233, 76 S. Ct . 714, 719, 100 L. Ed . 1112 (1956). But , he c o nt inue d , t he que st io n is o ne o f po l ic y w it h w hic h t he jud ic iar y has no c o nc e r n. . . . [The l e g isl at ur e ], ac t ing w it hin it s c o nst it ut io nal po w e r s, has t he f inal say o n po l ic y issue s. If it ac t s unw ise l y, t he e l e c t o r at e c an make a c hang e . The t ask o f t he jud ic iar y e nd s o nc e it appe ar s t hat t he l e g isl at ive me asur e ad o pt e d is r e l e vant o r appr o pr iat e t o t he c o nst it ut io nal po w e r w hic h [t he l e g isl at ur e ] e xe r c ise s. Id. at 234, 76 S. Ct . at 719 (e mphasis ad d e d ).30 We t he r e f o r e AFFIRM t he Fr ankl in Cir c uit Co ur t ’s Or d e r d ismissing t he c o mpl aint . 30 Just ic e Fe l ix Fr ankf ur t e r , c o nc ur r ing in Railway Employees’, c o nc l ud e d his o pinio n w it h t he f o l l o w ing quo t at io n: “Whe r e t he r e is, o r g e ne r al l y is be l ie ve d t o be , an impo r t ant g r o und o f publ ic po l ic y f o r r e st r aint , t he Co nst it ut io n d o e s no t f o r bid it , w he t he r t his c o ur t ag r e e s o r d isag r e e s w it h t he po l ic y pur sue d . It c anno t be d o ubt e d t hat t o pr e ve nt st r ike s, and , so f ar as po ssibl e , t o f o st e r it s sc he me o f ar bit r at io n, mig ht be d e e me d by Co ng r e ss an impo r t ant po int o f po l ic y, and I t hink it impo ssibl e t o say t hat Co ng r e ss mig ht no t r e aso nabl y t hink t hat t he pr o visio n in que st io n w o ul d he l p a g r e at d e al t o c any it s po l ic y al o ng . But suppo se t he o nl y e f f e c t r e al l y w e r e t o t e nd t o br ing abo ut t he c o mpl e t e unio nizing o f suc h r ail r o ad l abo r e r s as Co ng r e ss c an d e al w it h, I t hink t hat o bje c t al o ne w o ul d just if y t he ac t . I quit e ag r e e t hat t he que st io n w hat and ho w muc h g o o d l abo r unio ns d o , is o ne o n w hic h int e l l ig e nt pe o pl e may d if f e r ; I t hink t hat l abo r ing me n so me t ime s at t r ibut e t o t he m ad vant ag e s, as many at t r ibut e t o c o mbinat io ns o f c apit al d isad vant ag e s, t hat r e al l y ar e d ue t o e c o no mic c o nd it io ns o f a f ar w id e r and d e e pe r kind ; but I c o ul d no t pr o no unc e it unw ar r ant e d if Co ng r e ss sho ul d d e c id e t hat t o f o st e r a st r o ng unio n w as f o r t he be st int e r e st , no t o nl y o f t he me n, but o f t he r ail r o ad s and t he c o unt r y at l ar g e .” Ry. Emps., 351 U.S. at 241-42, 76 S. Ct . at 723 (Fr ankf ur t e r , J., c o nc ur r ing ) (quo t ing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 191-92, 28 S. Ct . 277, 287, 52 L. Ed . 436 (1908) (Ho l me s, J., d isse nt ing )). The se quo t at io ns appl y e qual l y t o bo t h t he Ke nt uc ky l e g isl at ur e and t he Unit e d St at e s Co ng r e ss. In 2018, se ve r al me mbe r s o f t he Ke nt uc ky Ho use mino r it y par t y f il e d a bil l t o 39 Al l sit t ing . Mint o n, C.J., Hug he s and Ve nt e r s, JJ., c o nc ur . Mint o n, C.J., c o nc ur s by se par at e o pinio n in w hic h Hug he s and Ve nt e r s, JJ., jo in. Ke l l e r , J., d isse nt s by se par at e o pinio n in w hic h Cunning ham and Wr ig ht , JJ., jo in. Wr ig ht , J., d isse nt s by se par at e o pinio n in w hic h Cunning ham and Ke l l e r , JJ., jo in. MINTON, CJ., CONCURRING: I c o mpl e t e l y c o nc ur w it h t he majo r it y’s w e l l anal yze d o pinio n. 1 w r it e se par at e l y t o ad d r e ss t he w e apo nizat io n o f Se c t io ns 59 and 60 in ac c o mpanying o pinio ns in bo t h t his c ase and Commonwealth v. Ezra Claycomb.31 1 f e e l c o mpe l l e d t o spe ak up be c ause 1 f e ar t his Co ur t r isks o ve r st at ing it s r o l e in Ke nt uc ky ’s t r ipar t it e g o ve mme nt .32 “Se c t io n[s] 59 [and 60] . . . pr o hibit [] ‘l o c al o r spe c ial ac t s.’”33 “The pr imaiy pur po se o f . . . [Se c t io ns] 59 [and 60] is t o pr e ve nt spe c ial pr ivil e g e s, f avo r it ism and d isc r iminat io n, and assur e e qual it y und e r t he l aw .”34 “A spe c ial l aw is l e g isl at io n w hic h ar bit r ar il y o r be yo nd r e aso nabl e just if ic at io n d isc r iminat e s ag ainst so me pe r so ns o r o bje c t s and f avo r s o t he r s.”35 “Simpl y r e ve r se t he Ac t . 2018 HB 237. Gr ant e d , t his bil l d id no t r e c e ive a he ar ing , but t hat f at e w as simil ar t o t hat o f any numbe r o f mino r it y par l y bil l s se e king passag e o f r ig ht -t o -w o r k l e g isl at io n pr io r t o 2017. On t he f e d e r al l e ve l , sinc e § 14(b) o f t he Taf t -Har t l e y Ac t r e pr e se nt s an e xc e pt io n t o f e d e r al pr e e mpt io n in l abo r -manag e me nt r e l at io ns. Co ng r e ss c an c hang e t hat as w e l l . 31 2017-SC-000614-TG (Ky. No v. 15, 2018). 32 See Hayes v. State Property and Bldgs. Com’n, 731 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Ky. 1987) (“Our r o l e is no t t hat o f a supe r l e g isl at ur e .”). 33 Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Ky. 1998). 34 Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Ky. 1994) (o ve r r ul e d o n o t he r g r o und s). 35 Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. v. Bd. ofEduc. of Louisville, 472 S.W,2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1971). 40 be c ause l e g isl at io n d e al s w it h a spe c ial subje c t mat t e r d o e s no t me an it is spe c ial l e g isl at io n.”36 As it c ur r e nt l y st and s, “[t ]he t e st as t o w he t he r l e g isl at io n is spe c ial w as f o r mul at e d by t his Co ur t in Sc ho o v. Rose.37 In o r d e r f o r l e g isl at io n t o be pe r missibl e und e r [Se c t io ns] 59 [and 60] . . . ‘(1) [i]t must appl y e qual l y t o al l in a c l ass, and (2) t he r e must be d ist inc t ive and nat ur al r e aso ns ind uc ing and suppo r t ing t he c l assif ic at io n,’”38 Co nsid e r ing t he ac c o mpanying o pinio ns o f my c o l l e ag ue s in t his c ase and o t he r s, I am c o nvinc e d t hat c o nt inue d ad he r e nc e t o t he Sc ho o t e st is unt e nabl e . It w o ul d appe ar f r o m o ur pr e c e d e nt t hat t he d e t e r minat io n o f w he t he r c e r t ain l e g isl at io n c o nst it ut e s unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n r e st s in t he hand s o f a majo r it y o f t he se ve n Ke nt uc ky Supr e me Co ur t just ic e s w ho c an c ho o se t o d e f ine t he “c l ass” at issue in w hat e ve r w ay t he y w o ul d l ike , be c ause und e r t he f ir st pr o ng o f t he Sc ho o t e st , ho w o ne d e f ine s t he “c l ass ” d e t e r mine s w he t he r l e g isl at io n is c o nst it ut io nal o r no t . Fo r e xampl e , Just ic e Ke l l e r , inst e ad o f ar t ic ul at ing ho w t he “c l ass ” at issue sho ul d be d e t e r mine d und e r o ur “l o ng st and ing pr e c e d e nt ,” ac c e pt s t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s ar t ic ul at io n o f t he “c l ass ” c r e at e d by t he Rig ht t o Wo r k Ac t (“RTWA”) as “al l e mpl o ye r s ” and “al l e mpl o ye e s.” This ar t ic ul at io n o f t he “c l ass ” 36 St. Luke Hasp., Inc. v. Health Policy Bd., 913 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. App. 1996) (c it ing Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1984)). 37 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954). 38 Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 466 (quo t ing Schoo, 270 S.W.2d at 941) (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ). 41 at issue l e ad s t he d isse nt t o t he n c o nc l ud e t hat be c ause t he RTWA t r e at s c e r t ain e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s —e mpl o ye e s und e r an e xist ing c o nt r ac t mand at ing l abo r -o r g anizat io n par t ic ipat io n e nt e r e d int o be f o r e Januar y 9, 2017, st il l must c o nt r ibut e t o t he l abo r o r g anizat io n, unl ike al l o t he r e mpl o ye e s—t he RTWA is unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n. Just ic e Wr ig ht , o n t he o t he r hand , has d e f ine d t he c l ass as “c o nt r ac t s.” And be c ause he ar g ue s t hat t he RTWA t r e at s so me t ype s o f c o nt r ac t s d if f e r e nt l y t han o t he r s, he c o nc l ud e s in d isse nt t hat t he RTWA c o nst it ut e s unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n. But inst e ad o f d e f ining t he “c l ass” at issue in t he pr e se nt c ase as “al l e mpl o ye r s ” and “al l e mpl o ye e s,” o r “c o nt r ac t s,” w hat if w e c ho se t o d e f ine t he “c l ass ” as “al l l abo r o r g anizat io ns ” be c ause t he RTWA is r e al l y t ar g e t ing l abo r o r g anizat io ns? The RTWA d o e s no t d if f e r e nt iat e t r e at me nt be t w e e n, f o r e xampl e , l abo r o r g anizat io ns in w e st e r n Ke nt uc ky ve r sus t ho se in e ast e r n Ke nt uc ky—al l l abo r o r g anizat io ns must r e f r ain f r o m f o r c ing e mpl o ye e par t ic ipat io n—so t he r e f o r e t he RTWA appl ie s e qual l y t o al l w it hin t he “c l ass.” And t his simpl e “r e c l assif ic at io n,” t ur ns w hat w as o nc e unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n int o c o nst it ut io nal l e g isl at io n. Simpl y c ho o sing t o d e f ine t he “c l ass ” at issue d if f e r e nt l y t han my c o l l e ag ue s in t he d isse nt c hang e s t he o ut c o me . As e vid e nc e d abo ve , ho w t his Co ur t d e f ine s t he “c l ass ” at issue c o ul d me an t he d if f e r e nc e be t w e e n r e nd e r ing l e g isl at io n c o nst it ut io nal ve r sus unc o nst it ut io nal . Suc h a f l uid d e t e r minat io n in d e f ining t he “c l ass” at issue —in 42 c o njunc t io n w it h t he Schoo t e st ’s r ig id r ul e t hat t he l aw “must appl y e qual l y t o al l in a c l ass ” o r e l se t he l aw is unc o nst it ut io nal —g ive s t he jud ic iar y t o o muc h l e e w ay. 39 Just ic e Ke l l e r be l ie ve s t hat I have c o nc e d e d t hat t he RTWA is unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n und e r t he Schoo t e st . I d o no t c o nc e d e t hat po int at al l . Just ic e Ke l l e r ’s c o nc l usio n he r e misse s my po int : t he d isse nt ar g ue s t he unc o nst it ut io nal it y o f t he RTWA und e r “l o ng st and ing Ke nt uc ky pr e c e d e nt ” t hat f ail s t o ar t ic ul at e any r ul e f o r d e f ining t he “c l ass” at issue t o w hic h t he Sc ho o t e st t he n appl ie s. Und e r t he “l o ng st and ing Ke nt uc ky pr e c e d e nt ” t hat t he d isse nt c l aims f ait hf ul l y t o appl y, a majo r it y o f t his Co ur t c an st r ike d o w n l e g isl at io n base d o n a c o mpl e t e l y subje c t ive d e t e r minat io n o f t he “c l ass ” at issue . To pr o vid e g uid anc e t o t he jud ic iar y o n t he impo r t ant issue o f jud g ing w he t he r a pie c e o f l e g isl at io n c o nst it ut e s unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n, I f ind g r e at w isd o m in t he w o r d s o f f o r me r Unit e d St at e s Supr e me Co ur t Just ic e Be njamin Car d o zo . In his anal ysis o f w he t he r a Mar yl and st at ut e c o nst it ut e d unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n und e r Mar yl and ’s Co nst it ut io n, Just ic e Car d o zo st at e d : Time w it h it s t id e s br ing s ne w c o nd it io ns w hic h must be c ar e d f o r by ne w l aw s. So me t ime s t he ne w c o nd it io ns af f e c t t he me mbe r s o f a c l ass. If so t he c o r r e c t ing st at ut e must appl y t o al l al ike . So me t ime s t he ne w c o nd it io n af f e c t s o nl y a f e w . If so , t he c o r r e c t ing st at ut e may be as nar r o w as t he misc hie f . The [Mar yl and ] Co nst it ut io n d o e s no t pr o hibit spe c ial l aw s inf l e xibl y 39 See Hayes v. State Property and Bldgs. Com’n, 731 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Ky. 1987) (“Our r o l e is no t t hat o f a supe r l e g isl at ur e .”). 43 and al w ays. It pe r mit s t he m w he n t he r e ar e spe c ial e vil s w it h w hic h t he g e ne r al l aw s ar e inc o mpe t e nt t o c o pe . The spe c ial publ ic pur po se w il l sust ain t he spe c ial f o r m .... The pr o bl e m ... is o ne o f l e g isl at ive po l ic y, w it h a w id e mar g in o f d isc r e t io n c o nc e d e d t o t he l aw make r s. Onl y in t he c ase o f pl ain abuse w il l t he r e be r e visio n by t he c o ur t s .... If t he e vil t o be c o r r e c t e d c an be se e n t o be me r e l y f anc if ul , t he injust ic e o r t he w r o ng il l uso r y, t he c o ur t s may int e r ve ne and st r ike t he spe c ial st at ut e d o w n .... If spe c ial c ir c umst anc e s have d e ve l o pe d o f suc h a nat ur e as t o c al l f o r a ne w r ul e , t he spe c ial ac t w il l st and .40 In Ke nt uc ky, t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y is c o nst it ut io nal l y e nt r ust e d w it h id e nt if ying in c hang ing t ime s w hat it be l ie ve s t o be misc hie f and t he abil it y t o t iy t o r e me d y t hat misc hie f . In t his c ase , t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y be l ie ve s t hat f o r c e d l abo r -o r g anizat io n me mbe r ship, o r at l e ast f o r c e d c o nt r ibut io n t o a l abo r o r g anizat io n, is a pr o bl e m. So it e nac t e d t he RTWA, w hic h pr e ve nt s e mpl o ye e s in Ke nt uc ky f r o m be ing f o r c e d t o suppo r t o r g anize d l abo r . In o t he r w o r d s, t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y id e nt if ie d a “c o nd it io n [t hat ] must be c ar e d f o r by . . . l aw [,]” i.e ., f o r c e d l abo r o r g anizat io n par t ic ipat io n. This “c o nd it io n[] af f e c t s t he me mbe r s o f a c l ass,” i.e ., e mpl o ye e s w ho ar e f o r c e d int o suppo r t o f a l abo r o r g anizat io n. The “c l ass ” is t o be d e t e r mine d as suc h: w ho o r w hat is be ing ad ve r se l y af f e c t e d by t he c o nd it io n t hat t he l e g isl at io n se e ks t o r e me d y.41 As st at e d , t he “c l ass ” in t his c ase is “e mpl o ye e s w ho ar e f o r c e d int o l abo r o r g anizat io n me mbe r ship [o r suppo r t ]” be c ause t he y ar e t he ind ivid ual s w ho ar e be ing “ad ve r se l y af f e c t e d ” by t he c o nd it io n t hat t he l e g isl at io n se e ks t o 40 Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933); see also Jabe z G. Sut he r l and , Statutes and Statutory Construction, 2 Sut he r l and St at ut o r y Co nst r uc t io n § 40:6 (7t h e d . No v. 2018 upd at e ). 41 Ne c e ssar il y, t he “c o nd it io n t hat t he l e g isl at io n se e ks t o r e me d y” must be l e g it imat e . 44 r e me d y, i.e ., f o r c e d l abo r -o r g anizat io n par t ic ipat io n. Just ic e Ke l l e r be l ie ve s t hat I have d e f ine d t he “c l ass” at issue as “l abo r o r g anizat io ns,” but f ail s t o r e c o g nize t hat “e mpl o ye e s w ho ar e f o r c e d int o l abo r o r g anizat io n me mbe r ship” is t he c l ass I e spo use , having use d “l abo r o r g anizat io ns ” e ar l ie r simpl y t o il l ust r at e my po int abo ut t he unt e nabl e nat ur e o f t he Schoo t e st . The “c o r r e c t ing st at ut e ” in t he pr e se nt c ase , t he RTWA, se e ming l y d o e s no t “appl y t o al l al ike ,” be c ause o f t he g r and f at he r ing -in o f pr e -Januar y 9, 2017, ag r e e me nt s pr o vid ing f o r f o r c e d l abo r -o r g anizat io n par t ic ipat io n o f e mpl o ye e s. In o t he r w o r d s, c e r t ain e mpl o ye e s w it hin t he c l ass ar e be ing t r e at e d d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r e mpl o ye e s w it hin t he c l ass be c ause e mpl o ye e s bo und by pr e -Januar y 9, 2017, ag r e e me nt s c o nt inue t o be f o r c e d int o l abo r -o r g anizat io n suppo r t . But r e nd e r ing t he RTWA unc o nst it ut io nal simpl y o n t his f ac t f ail s t o c o nsid e r Just ic e Car d o zo ’s w isd o m, w hic h se e ming l y appl ie s an e xc e pt io n t o t he g e ne r al r ul e t hat t hat “st at ut e must appl y t o al l al ike ”; “[Ke nt uc ky’s] c o nst it ut io n d o e s no t pr o hibit spe c ial l aw s inf l e xibl y and al w ays. It pe r mit s t he m w he n t he r e ar e spe c ial e vil s w it h w hic h t he g e ne r al l aw s ar e inc o mpe t e nt t o c o pe .”42 The o nl y r e aso n t hat t he RTWA d o e s no t t r e at al l e mpl o ye e s t he same in t his inst anc e is t hat d o ing so w o ul d po t e nt ial l y vio l at e o t he r c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio ns, name l y, t he Co nt r ac t s o r Taking s Cl ause s o r bo t h. In t his w ay, a g e ne r al l aw w o ul d be “inc o mpe t e nt t o c o pe ” w it h a c o nd it io n o ur l e g isl at ur e c o nsid e r s t o be a “spe c ial e vil .” 42 Id. 45 Und e r t he Schoo t e st , ho w e ve r , t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y w o ul d appar e nt l y be pr o hibit e d f r o m at t e mpt ing t o r e me d y w hat it be l ie ve s t o be a pr o bl e m be c ause e it he r (1) t he RTWA, if appl ie d t o al l e mpl o ye e s, w il l vio l at e t he Co nt r ac t s o r Taking s Cl ause s, o r bo t h, o r (2) t he RTWA, as it c ur r e nt l y st and s, is unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n. This l ine o f t hinking , t ake n t o it s nat ur al c o nc l usio n, w o ul d me an t hat any t ime par t ie s have e nt e r e d int o a c o nt r ac t , and t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y d e c id e s t hat t ho se kind s o f c o nt r ac t s ar e bad publ ic po l ic y and c r e at e s a l aw pr e ve nt ing suc h c o nt r ac t s, t he l aw is e it he r (1) unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n if it e xe mpt s f r o m it s appl ic at io n c o nt r ac t s al r e ad y e nt e r e d int o by par t ie s o r (2) unc o nst it ut io nal und e r t he Co nt r ac t s o r Taking s Cl ause if no e xe mpt io n is af f o r d e d . Suc h an int e r pr e t at io n bl o c ks t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y f r o m e ve r ac t ing t o r e me d y a pur po r t e d pr o bl e m, w hic h is simpl y an unt e nabl e c o nc l usio n. This is Just ic e Car d o zo ’s po int : De t e r mining w he t he r l e g isl at io n c o nst it ut e s unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n r e quir e s a f l e xibl e anal ysis, asc e r t aining t he r e aso ns be hind e ve r yt hing t he l e g isl at ur e is d o ing . What is t he “c o nd it io n” t he l e g isl at ur e is at t e mpt ing t o r e me d y? Why is t he l e g isl at ur e t r e at ing o ne c l ass d if f e r e nt l y f r o m ano t he r ? Why is t he l e g isl at ur e t r e at ing so me me mbe r s o f t he c l ass d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s? Do e s t he l e g isl at ur e have g o o d r e aso ns f o r d o ing al l o f t his? Rat he r t han simpl y st r iking d o w n l e g isl at io n be c ause so me pe o pl e o r e nt it ie s ar e be ing t r e at e d d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s, bo t h o ut sid e and w it hin t he “c l ass ” at issue , w e must ask why t his is t he c ase . Suc h an anal ysis is in e xac t 46 c o nf o r manc e w it h an Equal Pr o t e c t io n Cl ause anal ysis. The Equal Pr o t e c t io n Cl ause d o e s no t r e nd e r l e g isl at io n unc o nst it ut io nal simpl y be c ause c e r t ain pe o pl e ar e t r e at e d d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s. A l aw t hat t r e at s pe o pl e be l o ng ing t o suspe c t c l asse s d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s is no t unc o nst it ut io nal simpl y o n t hat f ac t al o ne . Rat he r , a l aw t hat t r e at s pe o pl e be l o ng ing t o suspe c t c l asse s d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s is unc o nst it ut io nal if t hat l aw f ail s t o sat isf y st r ic t sc r ut iny r e vie w , i.e ., if no c o mpe l l ing g o ve r nme nt int e r e st f o r d o ing e xist s o r if t he l aw is no t nar r o w l y t ail o r e d t o ac c o mpl ish it s e nd . 43 Und e r t he Schoo t e st , d if f e r e nt t r e at me nt o f c e r t ain me mbe r s o f a c l ass r e nd e r s a l aw unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n. Re spe c t f ul l y, 1 t hink t hat t his is an unt e nabl e r e st r ic t io n o n t he l e g isl at ur e ’s abil it y t o ac t t o so l ve pr o bl e ms and o f f e nd s t he d o c t r ine o f se par at io n o f po w e r s. In my vie w , w e sho ul d anal yze w he t he r a l aw c o nst it ut e s spe c ial l e g isl at io n, appl ying t he g o o d jud g me nt o f Just ic e Car d o zo : “Onl y in t he c ase o f pl ain abuse w il l t he r e be r e visio n by t he c o ur t s . . . . If t he e vil t o be c o r r e c t e d c an be se e n t o be me r e l y f anc if ul , t he injust ic e o r t he w r o ng il l uso r y, t he c o ur t s may int e r ve ne and st r ike t he spe c ial st at ut e d o w n . . . .”44 The Schoo t e st pr o ve s t o be unw o r kabl e be c ause o f t he myst e r y as t o ho w t he “c l ass ” at issue is t o be d e f ine d . Ye t t he Schoo t e st , and r e al l y al l o ur spe c ial l e g isl at io n pr e c e d e nt , pr o ve s t o be unt e nabl e in ano t he r w ay—by sug g e st ing 43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 44 Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933); see also Jabe z G. Sut he r l and , Statutes and Statutory Construction, 2 Sut he r l and St at ut o r y Co nst r uc t io n § 40:6 (7t h e d . No v. 2018 upd at e ). 47 d if f e r e nt w ays o f anal yzing t he se c o nd pr o ng . Co nsid e r t he f o l l o w ing st at e me nt s t his Co ur t has mad e o ve r t he ye ar s abo ut t he spe c ial l e g isl at io n anal ysis: “A spe c ial l aw is l e g isl at io n w hic h arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification d isc r iminat e s ag ainst so me pe r so ns o r o bje c t s and f avo r o t he r s.”45 “Whe n asse r t ing t he val id it y o f a c l assif ic at io n, the burden is on the party claiming the validity of the classification t o sho w t hat t he r e is a val id ne xus be t w e e n t he c l assif ic at io n and t he pur po se f o r w hic h t he st at ut e in que st io n w as d r af t e d . The r e must be substantially more than merely a theoretical basis for a distinction. Rat he r , t he r e must be a firm basis in reality."46 “[T]he c l assif ic at io n [must ] be ar [] a ‘reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act."47 “[T]he r e must be a substantial and justifiable reason appar e nt f r o m l e g isl at ive hist o r y, f r o m t he st at ut e ’s t id e , pr e ambl e o r subje c t mat t e r , o r f r o m so me o t he r aut ho r it at ive so ur c e .”48 No w o nd e r t he t r ial c o ur t in t his c ase and in Claycomb had t r o ubl e ar t ic ul at ing ho w t o anal yze t he se c o nd pr o ng o f t he Schoo t e st . And t he d isse nt o f f e r s no g uid anc e as t o ho w c o ur t s ar e t o d o so w hil e c o nt inuing t o pr o f e ss f ait h in t he Schoo t e st as bind ing pr e c e d e nt . Fo r e xampl e , t he d isse nt pl ac e s t he bur d e n o n t he Co mmo nw e al t h t o ar t ic ul at e t he r e aso ns f o r upho l d ing c e r t ain l e g isl at io n. This may c o nf o r m t o ho w Yeoman has ar t ic ul at e d t he r ul e , but it is no t in c o nf o r manc e w it h Com., Revenue Cabinet v. Smith, ano t he r c ase invo l ving a 45 Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. v. Bd. of Educ. of Louisville, 472 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky 1971). 46 Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 468 (Ky. 1998). 47 Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t v. O’Shea’s-Baxter, LLC, 438 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Ky. 2014) (quo t ing Mannini v. McFarland, 172 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Ky. 1943)). 48 Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Ky. 1985). 48 spe c ial l e g isl at io n c hal l e ng e : “No t abl y, t he bur d e n o n the ones attacking the [legislation] is the negation of every conceivable basis which might support it.49 No w o nd e r no o ne c an ar t ic ul at e ho w w e e val uat e spe c ial l e g isl at io n c hal l e ng e s. Just ic e Ke l l e r ’s f inal po int is a sug g e st io n t hat 1 have appl ie d d if f e r e nt “r e ad ing s ” o f o ur c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio ns in Clay comb ve r sus t his c ase . This sug g e st io n f ail s t o appr e c iat e t he f und ame nt al d if f e r e nc e be t w e e n t he t w o pr o visio ns. Se c t io n 14, at issue in Claycomb, invo l ve s pur e c o nst it ut io nal l ang uag e t hat pl ainl y pr o sc r ibe s “d e l ay” in t he abil it y t o se e k a r e me d y t hr o ug h t he c o ur t s. Se c t io ns 59 and 60, o n t he o t he r hand , pr o sc r ibe “spe c ial ” l e g isl at io n—special is a vag ue t e r m t hat has be e n d e f ine d and r e d e f ine d by pr e c e d e nt f r o m t his Co ur t . And , r e l ying o n o ur pr e c e d e nt , w hat e xac t l y is me ant by “spe c ial ” l e g isl at io n? The d isse nt insist s o n ad he r e nc e t o “l o ng st and ing Ke nt uc ky pr e c e d e nt ” in w hic h o ur Co ur t has at t e mpt e d unsuc c e ssf ul l y t o d e f ine w hat make s l e g isl at io n special. But t r ul y t hat pr e c e d e nt is unw o r kabl e t o d ay. And w hil e st ar e d e c isis is an impo r t ant g uid ing pr inc ipl e , it is no t abso l ut e : Stare decisis is t he pr e f e r r e d c o ur se be c ause it pr o mo t e s t he e ve nhand e d , pr e d ic t abl e , and c o nsist e nt d e ve l o pme nt o f l e g al pr inc ipl e s, f o st e r s r e l ianc e o n jud ic ial d e c isio ns, and c o nt r ibut e s t o t he ac t ual and pe r c e ive d int e g r it y o f t he jud ic ial pr o c e ss. Ad he r ing t o pr e c e d e nt “is usually t he w ise po l ic y, be c ause in mo st mat t e r s it is mo r e impo r t ant t han t he appl ic abl e r ul e o f l aw be se t t l e d t han it be se t t l e d r ig ht .” Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, "this Court has never felt 49 Com., Revenue Cabinet v. Smith, 875 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Ky. 1994) (appl ying r at io nal basis r e vie w t o a spe c ial l e g isl at io n c hal l e ng e ). 49 constrained to follow precedent” St ar e d e c isis is not an inexorable command; rather, it “is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision” This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases “correction through legislative action is practically impossible” Co nsid e r at io ns in f avo r o f stare decisis ar e at t he ir ac me in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved; t he o ppo sit e is t r ue in c ase s . . . invo l ving pr o c e d ur al and e vid e nt iar y r ul e s. 50 In t he w o r d s o f t his Co ur t : “[This Co ur t is] ‘no t assig ne d t he d ut y o f maint aining t he w at c h as t he l aw o ssif ie s.’ At t ime s, t hr o ug h pr o pe r anal ysis, so und jur ispr ud e nc e mand at e s w e r e f use t o ‘unque st io ning l y f o l l o w pr io r d e c isio ns.’”51 Final l y, 1 ag r e e w it h t he majo r it y’s c o nc l usio n t hat t he Ac t d o e s no t vio l at e Se c t io n 55 o f Ke nt uc ky’s Co nst it ut io n and f ind t he d isse nt ’s o ppo sing c o nc l usio n unavail ing . I o nl y w ish t o make c l e ar , as t he majo r it y se e ming l y has, t hat Se c t io n 55 c anno t , in and o f it se l f , make an o t he r w ise c o nst it ut io nal l y so und pie c e o f l e g isl at io n unc o nst it ut io nal . “As t he Ke nt uc ky Supr e me Co ur t has e xpl aine d , if t he e me r g e nc y c l ause o f an o t he r w ise val id st at ut e is inval id , t he n t he st at ut e t ake s e f f e c t at t he t ime it w o ul d have be c o me l aw w it ho ut an e me r g e nc y c l ause .”52 Esse nt ial l y, e ve n if a vio l at io n o f Se c t io n 55 e xist e d , t his po int w o ul d be mo o t t o d ay be c ause t he RTWA w o ul d t ake e f f e c t 90 d ays af t e r ad jo ur nme nt o f t he se ssio n in w hic h it w as passe d , inst e ad o f imme d iat e l y 50 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ) (e mphasis ad d e d ). 51 Commonwealth v. Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Ky. 2015) (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ) 52 Packet V. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 607 n.4 (6t h Cir . 2016) (c it ing Lyttle v. Keith, 95 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1936)). 50 t aking e f f e c t . As it st and s no w , mo r e t han 90 d ays have e l apse d sinc e t he f inal ad jo ur nme nt o f t he 2017 r e g ul ar se ssio n in w hic h t he RTWA passe d . Hug he s and Ve nt e r s, JJ., jo in. KELLER, J., DISSENTING: I c o nc ur w it h t he majo r it y o pinio n’s ho l d ing t hat t he RTWA sur vive s an e qual pr o t e c t io n c hal l e ng e if t he r at io nal basis t e st is t he appr o pr iat e l e ve l o f sc r ut iny t o appl y; I al so ag r e e t hat t he RTWA is no t a vio l at io n o f t he Taking s Cl ause . Ho w e ve r , I r e spe c t f ul l y d isse nt f r o m t he majo r it y o pinio n’s ho l d ing t hat t he RTWA w as no t passe d in c o nt r ave nt io n o f Ke nt uc ky’s Co nst it ut io n r e l at ing t o spe c ial and e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n.53 Section 59 and Special Legislation. A. The delegates at the 1891 Constitutional Convention made the barring of special legislation a priority. Law make r s at t he 1891 Co nst it ut io nal Co nve nt io n in Ke nt uc ky w e r e c o nc e r ne d no t just w it h spe c ial l aw s be ing e nac t e d f o r r ail r o ad c o mpanie s, but f o r al l c o r po r at io ns and l o c al it ie s t hat had e nac t e d l aw s spe c if ic t o t he m. “The unive r sal d isappr o val o f e ve r y pe r so n in Ke nt uc ky sug g e st e d shar p and e f f e c t ive r e me d ie s f o r t he e vil s o f suc h a syst e m o f l aw -making . Out sid e o f al l que st io ns o f e c o no my t he d e mo r al izat io n o f t he Le g isl at ur e , t he ine qual it y o f l aw s so passe d had pr o d uc e d t he g r o sse st o f w r o ng s, and t he d e mand f o r a 53 I al so d o no t shar e t he majo r it y ’s o pinio n as t o t he appl ic abil it y o f t he Unit e d St at e s Supr e me Co ur t ’s r e c e nt d e c isio n in Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, _ U.S.__ , 138 S.Ct . 2448 (2018). Janus w as spe c if ic t o publ ic se c t o r e mpl o ye e s and d o e s no t pr o vid e r e l e vanc e t o t he r e so l ut io n o f t he c ase be f o r e t his Co ur t . 51 c hang e o n t his subje c t w as abso l ut e and unive r sal .” 1890 Ky. Const. Debates, at 5566-67. “[T]he pr imar y pur po se o f se c t io n 59 w as t o pr e ve nt spe c ial pr ivil e g e s f o r t ho se w it h w e al t h and po w e r suf f ic ie nt t o sw ay t he Asse mbl y and t o e nsur e e qual it y und e r t he l aw .” White v. Manchester Enterprise, Inc., 910 F.Supp. 311, 314 (E.D. Ky. 1996). “Unbr id l e d l e g isl at ive po w e r had be c o me t he c apt ive o f spe c ial int e r e st g r o ups. Co nc e r n f o r l imit ing t he po w e r s o f t he l e g isl at ur e in g e ne r al , and w it h c ut t ing o f f spe c ial and l o c al l e g isl at io n in par t ic ul ar , w as t he pr imar y mo t ivat ing f o r c e be hind e nac t me nt o f t he ne w Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n o f 1891.” Tabler V. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Ky. 1985). In d isc ussing Se c t io n 60 o f t he Co nst it ut io n, w hic h al so d e al s w it h spe c ial l e g isl at io n, t he f o l l o w ing st at e me nt s w e r e r e c o r d e d : “The r e f o r e , t hat , w hil st t he l aw w as unif o r m and g e ne r al in it s pr o visio ns, it w as no t unif o r m and g e ne r al in it s o pe r at io n, but w as spe c ial and l o c al in it s o pe r at io n, d e pe nd e nt e nt ir e l y upo n t he w il l o f a par t ic ul ar l o c al it y.” 1890 Ky. Const. Debates, at 5762. “The ve r y d e f init io n o f a g e ne r al l aw is t hat it must be unif o r m.” Id. Le g isl at o r s w e r e c o nc e r ne d w it h al l spe c ial l e g isl at io n, no t o nl y in it s w r it t e n f o r m, but al so in it s appl ic at io n. B. Section 59 requires that a law apply equally to all in a class. Se c t io n 59 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n pr o hibit s spe c ial l e g isl at io n and st at e s, in r e l e vant par t : The Ge ne r al Asse mbl y shal l no t pass l o c al o r spe c ial ac t s c o nc e r ning any o f t he f o l l o w ing subje c t s, o r f o r any o f t he f o l l o w ing pur po se s, name l y: 52 Tw e nt y-f o ur t h: To r e g ul at e l abo r , t r ad e , mining o r manuf ac t ur ing .... Tw e nt y-nint h: In al l o t he r c ase s w he r e a g e ne r al l aw c an be mad e appl ic abl e , no spe c ial l aw shal l be e nac t e d . Fo r a l aw t o be g e ne r al in it s c o nst it ut io nal se nse it must me e t t he f o l l o w ing r e quir e me nt s: (1) it must appl y e qual l y t o al l in a c l ass, and (2) t he r e must be d ist inc t ive and nat ur al r e aso ns ind uc ing and suppo r t ing t he c l assif ic at io n. Yeoman v. Com, Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Ky. 1998). It is c l e ar t hat t he w ay t he Co ur t d r aw s t he “c l ass” has a g r e at impac t o n t he spe c ial l e g isl at io n anal ysis. “[T]he f ac t t hat t he l e g isl at ur e d e al s w it h a spe c ial subje c t (suc h as c har it abl e g aming ) d o e s no t ne c e ssar il y make it spe c ial l e g isl at io n.” Commonwealth v. Louisville Atlantis Community/Adapt, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 810, 819 (Ky. App. 1997). “A general law applies to persons or things as a class, while a special law relates to particular persons or things of a class).]” Id. (quo t ing Commonwealth v. Smith, 975 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Ky. 1994) (e mphasis ad d e d ). Spe c ial l e g isl at io n “d o e s no t have a unif o r m o pe r at io n.” Reid v. Robertson, 200 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Ky. 1947). “[A] st at ut e d o e s no t have a unif o r m o pe r at io n if it d o e s no t r e l at e t o pe r so ns, e nt it ie s, o r t hing s as a c l ass, but t o par t ic ul ar pe r so ns, e nt it ie s o r t hing s o f a c l ass, e it he r par t ic ul ar ize d by t he e xpr e ss t e r ms o f t he ac t o r se par at e d by any me t ho d o f se l e c t io n f r o m t he w ho l e c l ass t o w hic h t he l aw mig ht , but f o r suc h l imit at io ns, be appl ic abl e .” Id. This inc l ud e s st at ut e s t hat “ar e no t g e ne r al in t he ir appl ic at io n t o t he c l ass t o 53 w hic h t he y appl y, d o no t br ing w it hin t he ir l imit s al l t ho se w ho ar e in subst ant ial l y t he same sit uat io n o r c ir c umst anc e s, o r w ho st and upo n t he same f o o t ing r e g ar d ing t he subje c t o f t he l e g isl at io n, but w hic h, t o t he c o nt r aiy, d isc r iminat e be t w e e n pe r so ns o f t he same c l ass d o ing t he same ac t .” Id. Whil e c o mmo n se nse d ic t at e s t hat t he l e g isl at ur e is no t f o r bid d e n t o pass l aw s d e al ing w it h l abo r , t his c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio n impo se s f ur t he r anal ysis f o r c o nst it ut io nal sc r ut iny w he n pr ivil e g e f o r o r d isc r iminat io n ag ainst a spe c ial c l ass is al l e g e d . Suc h c o nst it ut io nal sc r ut iny r e quir e s l o o king at t he pl ain l ang uag e o f t he appl ic abl e pr o visio ns and t he n appl ying t he l aw t o t he f ac t s o f t his c ase . The majo r it y c it e s t o nume r o us c ase s f o r t he pr o po sit io n o f sho w ing w hat a spe c ial o r g e ne r al l aw is, o r is no t , and t o sho w w he r e c o ur t s o f t his Co mmo nw e al t h have he l d l aw s no t vio l at ive o f Se c t io n 59. The majo r it y c o nc l ud e s, w it ho ut anal ysis, t hat t he l e g isl at ur e ’s r at io nal basis f o r passing t he RTWA is e no ug h t o sur vive c o nst it ut io nal at t ac k. Suc h c o nc l usio ns r un af o ul o f t he pr inc ipl e s o f c o nst it ut io nal int e r pr e t at io n and t he pl ain l ang uag e o f Se c t io n 59. The l aw must appl y e qual l y t o al l in a c l ass and t he r e must al so be d ist inc t ive and nat ur al r e aso ns suppo r t ing t he c l assif ic at io n. Ot he r w ise , t he l e g isl at io n is c o nst it ut io nal l y inval id and must be st r uc k as impe r missibl e spe c ial l e g isl at io n. Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 466. “The r e must be subst ant ial l y mo r e t han me r e l y a t he o r e t ic al basis f o r a d ist inc t io n. Rat he r , t he r e must be a f ir m basis in r e al it y.” Id. 54 The RTWA pr o vid e s t hat no e mpl o ye e is r e quir e d t o be c o me , o r r e main, a me mbe r o f a l abo r o r g anizat io n, o r t o pay d ue s, f e e s, o r asse ssme nt s t o a l abo r o r g anizat io n. The RTWA o nl y appl ie s t o e mpl o yme nt and unio n c o nt r ac t s af t e r Januar y 9, 2017, t he e f f e c t ive d at e o f t he RTWA. The Co mmo nw e al t h ar g ue s t hat t he c l ass und e r t he RTWA is “al l e mpl o ye r s ” and “al l e mpl o ye e s ” in t he st at e . Ac c e pt ing t his c l assif ic at io n as t r ue , t he RTWA t r e at s e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s w it hin t he c l ass d if f e r e nt l y. The me t ho d s and pr ac t ic e s o f t ho se e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s asso c iat e d w it h l abo r o r g anizat io ns ar e no t o nl y al t e r e d , but ar e e xt ing uishe d g o ing f o r w ar d . The e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s no t asso c iat e d w it h l abo r o r g anizat io ns ar e l e f t in t he same po sit io n as t he y w e r e pr io r t o t he RTWA. No t o nl y d o e s t he RTWA t r e at unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s d ispar at e l y t o no n-unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s, t he RTWA appl ie s d if f e r e nt l y t o unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s base d o n t he ir d at e o f e mpl o yme nt , name l y, unio n me mbe r s pr io r t o Januar y 9, 2017 ar e e xe mpt e d . The r e aso ning f o r t his, o f c o ur se , is t hat if t he RTWA appl ie d t o unio n c o nt r ac t s pr io r t o t his d at e , it w o ul d vio l at e t he c o nt r ac t s and t aking c l ause s o f t he Ke nt uc ky and f e d e r al Co nst it ut io ns.54 54 This w r it e r d o e s no t be l ie ve t hat e ve r y pie c e o f l e g isl at io n t hat has “g r and f at he r ” pr o visio ns w il l be d e e me d impe r missibl e l e g isl at io n. Co nst it ut io nal it y is d e c id e d o n a c ase by c ase basis, and , d e spit e t he majo r it y o pinio n’s c o nt e nt io n t hat t his d isse nt ing o pinio n w o ul d ho l d al l g r and f at he r pr o visio ns unc o nst it ut io nal , suc h at t ac ks w o ul d have t o und e r g o t he r ig o r o us c o nst it ut io nal anal ysis e ng ag e d he r e in. 55 Ne ve r t he l e ss, t he RTWA, o n it s f ac e , t r e at s t he unio n me mbe r s pr io r t o Januar y 9, 2017 d if f e r e nt l y t han o t he r e mpl o ye e s in t he st at e and d if f e r e nt l y t han e mpl o ye e s o f l abo r o r g anizat io ns af t e r Januar y 9, 2017. KRS 336.130(3) spe c if ie s t hat "... no e mpl o ye e shal l be r e quir e d , as a c o nd it io n o f e mpl o yme nt o r c o nt inuat io n o f e mpl o yme nt , t o . . . [p]ay . . . any d ue s, f e e s, asse ssme nt s, o r simil ar c har g e s o f any kind o r amo unt t o a l abo r o r g anizat io n . . . .” The r e st r ic t io n o n payme nt s is e xpl ic it l y l imit e d t o l abo r o r g anizat io ns as a c o nd it io n o f e mpl o yme nt o r c o nt inuat io n o f e mpl o yme nt . Thus, t he st at ut e c l e ar l y f ail s t o “o pe r at e al ike o n al l ind ivid ual s and c o r po r at io ns.” Jefferson Cnty. Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (c it ing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 104 Ky. 584, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). Eve n if w e ad o pt t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s pr o po sit io n t hat t he RTWA is g e ne r al in it s w r it t e n f o r m, t he l e g isl at io n is spe c ial in it s o pe r at io n be c ause it o nl y al t e r s me mbe r ship and d ue s f o r unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s. This is a vio l at io n o f t he l e g isl at ive int e nt o f t he 1891 c o nst it ut io nal c o nve nt io n and t he Yeoman t e st : “it must apply equally t o al l in a c l ass.” Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 466 (e mphasis ad d e d ). The Co mmo nw e al t h ar g ue s t hat no o t he r st at e has he l d r ig ht t o w o r k ac t s unc o nst it ut io nal . Af t e r a t ho r o ug h se ar c h o f t he c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio ns in o t he r jur isd ic t io ns, o nl y o ne c ase w as r e ve al e d t hat al l e g e d r ig ht t o w o r k l aw s w e r e a vio l at io n o f t hat st at e ’s spe c ial l e g isl at io n pr o visio n. That c ase w as Eastern Oklahoma Bldg. & Const. Trades’ Council v. Pitts, 82 P.3d . 1008 (Okl a. 2003), w hic h he l d t he r ig ht t o w o r k l aw w as c o nst it ut io nal and no t a vio l at io n 56 o f t he c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio n. The r e aso ning w as t hat t he r ig ht t o w o r k l aw had be e n passe d via c o nst it ut io nal ame nd me nt , and t hus w as no t passe d by t he l e g isl at ur e in vio l at io n o f t he c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio n. Pitts, 82 P3d . at 1013-14. Be c ause t he RTWA in t he inst ant c ase w as passe d by t he l e g isl at ur e , w it ho ut any at t e nd ant c o nst it ut io nal ame nd me nt , I w o ul d ho l d t hat it is a vio l at io n o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio n pr o hibit ing spe c ial l e g isl at io n.55 Be c ause o f t his unique c o nst it ut io nal d ir e c t ive , w e c anno t bl ind l y f o l l o w t he r ul ing s o f o ur sist e r c o ur t s f r o m ar o und t he nat io n o n t his mat t e r . 55 Al t ho ug h w e f ind t he RTWA unc o nst it ut io nal und e r Se c t io ns 59 and 60 o f t he Co nst it ut io n, w e br ie f l y me nt io n t he he ig ht e ne d r at io nal basis st and ar d t hat has be e n appl ie d t o c o nst it ut io nal c hal l e ng e s e nhanc e d by t he spe c ial l e g isl at io n pr o visio ns. Co nsid e r t his sc e nar io : an ind e pe nd e nt c o nt r ac t o r w ant s t o ne g o t iat e w it h an e mpl o ye r t hat is a me mbe r o f a l abo r o r g anizat io n. The ind e pe nd e nt c o nt r ac t o r has t he abil it y t o ne g o t iat e t he t e r ms f o r t he w o r k pr o vid e d , inc l ud ing payme nt and any be ne f it s o r c o nd it io ns. The ind e pe nd e nt c o nt r ac t o r c o ul d e ng ag e in t his ne g o t iat io n pr o c e ss be f o r e t he passag e o f t he RTWA and maint aine d suc h r ig ht af t e r Januar y 9, 2017. The passag e o f t he RTWA d id no t e l iminat e unio n w o r ke r s ’ abil it ie s t o c o nt r ac t w it h t he ir e mpl o ye r s. But w hat it d id d o w as t r e at unio n w o r ke r s ’ c o nt r ac t s pr io r t o Januar y 9, 2017 d if f e r e nt l y t han t ho se af t e r t he e f f e c t ive d at e . Co l l e c t ive bar g aining unit s, and t ho se w ho m t he unit s r e pr e se nt , w e r e d e pr ive d o f t he ar m’s l e ng t h ne g o t iat io n and c o nt r ac t r e l at io nships l e f t und ist ur be d f o r no n-unio n ind ivid ual s and e nt it ie s. [T]he e qual pr o t e c t io n pr o visio ns o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n ar e e nhanc e d by Se c t io n 59 and 60. ... So f ar as w e c an d e t e r mine , no ne has anyt hing l ike t he c o mbinat io n o f br o ad c o nst it ut io nal pr o t e c t io n o f ind ivid ual r ig ht s ag ainst l e g isl at ive int e r f e r e nc e vo uc hsaf e d by o ur 1891 Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. Be c ause o f t his ad d it io nal pr o t e c t io n, w e have e l e c t e d at t ime s t o appl y a g uar ant e e o f ind ivid ual r ig ht s in e qual pr o t e c t io n c ase s t hat is hig he r t han t he minimum g uar ant e e d by t he Fe d e r al Co nst it ut io n. Inst e ad o f r e quir ing a “r at io nal basis,” w e have c o nst r ue d o ur Co nst it ut io n as r e quir ing a “r e aso nabl e basis ” o r a “subst ant ial and just if iabl e r e aso n” f o r d isc r iminat o r y l e g isl at io n in ar e as o f so c ial and e c o no mic po l ic y. 57 The c o nc ur r ing o pinio n appe ar s t o c o nc e d e t hat t he RTWA is unc o nst it ut io nal if w e appl y o ur spe c ial l e g isl at io n pr e c e d e nt t hat has be e n appl ic abl e sinc e t he ad o pt io n o f o ur c ur r e nt Co nst it ut io n. The c o nc ur r e nc e t ake s issue w it h t he t w o -par t t e st in Schoo v. Rose, 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954) and Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1998), and t he id e nt if ic at io n o f t he “c l ass” at issue . “Whe n asse r t ing t he val id it y o f a c l assif ic at io n, t he bur d e n is o n t he par t y c l aiming t he val id it y o f t he c l assif ic at io n t o sho w t hat t he r e is a val id ne xus be t w e e n t he c l assif ic at io n and t he pur po se f o r w hic h t he st at ut e in que st io n w as d r af t e d .” Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 468. What ne it he r t he c o nc ur r ing o pinio n no r t he majo r it y st at e , ho w e ve r , is t hat t his d isse nt ing o pinio n anal yze s t he “c l ass” as t hat w hic h w as pr o po und e d by t he Co mmo nw e al t h it se l f f o r just if ic at io n o f t he RTWA. The Co mmo nw e al t h ad amant l y ar g ue d t hat t he RTWA d id no t t ar g e t l abo r o r g anizat io ns. To quo t e t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s br ie f t o t his Co ur t ; “It [t he RTWA] d o e s no t appl y o nl y t o l abo r o r g anizat io ns, as t he Appe l l ant s sug g e st . It appl ie s t o all o r g anizat io ns d e al ing w it h e mpl o ye r s. It appl ie s t o all e mpl o ye r s Elk Hom Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Resources, Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 418-19 (Ky. 2005) (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ). This he ig ht e ne d r at io nal basis st and ar d w as no t appl ie d by t he c ir c uit c o ur t , and pr o pe r anal ysis o n t his issue w o ul d r e quir e r e mand . This d isse nt ho l d s t hat t he RTWA is unc o nst it ut io nal o n o t he r g r o und s, but no t e s t hat t he l e ve l o f sc r ut iny t o be appl ie d t o t his c ase is an impo r t ant issue no t t o be o ve r l o o ke d . He r e , t he RTWA t r e at s busine ss c o nt r ac t s ne g o t iat e d by a unio n t o pe r f o r m w o r k d if f e r e nt l y t han it t r e at s c o nt r ac t s ne g o t iat e d by c o mpanie s t o pe r f o r m w o r k. The r e f o r e , t he st at ut e c o nst it ut e s spe c ial l e g isl at io n in vio l at io n o f Se c t io n 59 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. 58 and al l pe r so ns in t he Co mmo nw e al t h.” (e mphasis in br ie f ). The Co mmo nw e al t h st at e d : “[S]e c t io n 1 o f t he KRTW Ac t appl ie s t o all Ke nt uc ky e mpl o ye e s.” (e mphasis in br ie f ). Ac c e pt ing t hat c l assif ic at io n as t r ue , as t he Co mmo nw e al t h has t he bur d e n o f pr o ving t he val id it y o f t he l e g isl at io n, t he RTWA is unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n as st at e d in t his o pinio n and t he c o nc ur r e nc e . “This Co ur t w il l no t pe r mit a st at ut e t o sur vive by simpl y d e f ining a c l ass in a nar r o w f ashio n w hic h w il l yie l d , ipso f ac t o , a se l f -sust aining c l assif ic at io n.” Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 468 (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ). Had t his w r it e r d r aw n t he c l ass as t he c o nc ur r ing o pinio n sug g e st s - t he c l ass be ing al l l abo r o r g anizat io ns - w o ul d w e t he n be c r it ic ize d f o r d r aw ing t he c l ass t o o nar r o w l y so as t o c r e at e a se l f -sust aining c l assif ic at io n? See, id. The RTWA w o ul d st il l be unc o nst it ut io nal w it h t he appl ic at io n o f o ur c o nt r o l l ing l e g al pr e c e d e nt be c ause unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s be f o r e Januar y 9, 2017 ar e t r e at e d d if f e r e nt l y t han t ho se af t e r t hat d at e . Of c o ur se , t he c o nc ur r ing o pinio n w o ul d r at he r aband o n o ur l o ng -st and ing pr e c e d e nt t han ac c e pt t his r e sul t , but t he c o nse nsus sho w s t hat t he RTWA f ail s r e g ar d l e ss o f ho w t he c l ass is d r aw n. The Co mmo nw e al t h has maint aine d t hat , “e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt w as t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y’s e xpr e ss pur po se f o r e nac t ing t he KRTW Ac t ,”56 and l abo r o r g anizat io ns ar e no t be ing sing l e d o ut f o r d ispar at e t r e at me nt be c ause “Other private organizations have never been allowed to compel the payment of 56 Co mmo nw e al t h o f Ke nt uc ky, Of f ic e o f t he Go ve r no r e x r e l . Mat t he w G. Be vin, e t c .. Br ie f t o Ke nt uc ky Supr e me Co ur t , p. 16. 59 money from non-members to begin with.”57 A l o g ic al anal ysis o f t his e vid e nc e w o ul d l o o k so me t hing l ike t his: Ac c o r d ing t o t he Co mmo nw e al t h, t he pur po se o f t he RTWA is t o inc r e ase e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt and t he Ac t appl ie s t o al l e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s in t he st at e . Assuming t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y int e nd s e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt in t he g e ne r al se nse , and no t just no n-unio n e c o no mic d e ve l o pme nt , w hy w o ul d it c ho o se t o e nac t a l aw t hat , by t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s o w n ad missio n, w il l no t af f e c t no n-unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s be c ause t ho se pr ivat e o r g anizat io ns have ne ve r r e c e ive d o r c o mpe l l e d payme nt o f mo ne y f r o m me mbe r s o r no nme mbe r s? The Co mmo nw e al t h ’s o w n ar g ume nt s f o r c l assif ic at io ns and f o r just if ic at io ns o f t he RTWA f ail t o pass c o nst it ut io nal must e r . In University of Cumberland v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. 2010), t he l e g isl at ur e e nac t e d a st at ut e t hat pr o vid e d sc ho l ar ships f o r st ud e nt s w ho w e r e e nr o l l e d o r ac c e pt e d f o r e nr o l l me nt in a Ke nt uc ky phar mac y sc ho o l and w ho w o ul d se r ve in Ke nt uc ky. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d at 685. Be c ause t he sc ho l ar ship w as l imit e d t o t ho se st ud e nt s at t e nd ing a phar mac y sc ho o l w it h a main c ampus l o c at e d in an Appal ac hian Re g io nal Co mmissio n c o unt y in t he Co mmo nw e al t h, and o nl y o ne suc h phar mac y sc ho o l e xist e d , t his Co ur t he l d t he l e g isl at io n t o be vio l at ive o f Se c t io n 59. Id. at 684-85. Be c ause t he sc ho l ar ships w e r e r e st r ic t e d t o t ho se at t e nd ing a spe c if ic sc ho o l , t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y f ail e d t o t r e at e qual l y al l me mbe r s o f t he c l ass, d e spit e t he r e quisit e 57 Id. at p. 32. 60 “d ist inc t ive and nat ur al ” r e aso ns f o r d o ing so . Id. at 685. The same is t r ue he r e be c ause , ag ain, by t he Co mmo nw e al t h ’s o w n ad missio n, t he r e st r ic t io ns and pr o hibit io ns in t he RTWA o nl y af f e c t unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s be c ause no n-unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s d o no t t ypic al l y e ng ag e in t his t ype o f ne g o t iat e d bar g aining . Wit h al l d ue r e spe c t t o t he w isd o m and w r it ing o f f o r me r Just ic e Be njamin Car d o zo , t his Co ur t is no t bo und by t he 1933 int e r pr e t at io n o f a pr o visio n in t he Mar yl and st at e c o nst it ut io n. Cit ing se ve r al c ase s, “[t ]he hig he st c o ur t o f Mar yl and has c o nsid e r e d t his pr o visio n, and d e f ine d it s me aning and e f f e c t . . . . Our e nd e avo r in w hat f o l l o w s is t o e xt r ac t t he e sse nc e o f t he d e c isio ns and t o g ive e f f e c t t o it as l aw .” Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 45-46 (1933) (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ). The Unit e d St at e s Supr e me Co ur t anal yze d t he spe c ial l e g isl at io n c hal l e ng e in Williams by l o o king at ho w Mar yl and ’s c o ur t s had int e r pr e t e d Mar yl and l aw . Suc h anal ysis pr o vid e s no r e l e vanc e t o us he r e t o d ay. “Unl ike so me jur isd ic t io ns, st ar e d e c isis has r e al me aning t o t his Co ur t .” Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 469. “Re g ar d l e ss o f w hat t he vie w s o f t he Co ur t as no w c o nst it ut e d may be as t o t he so und ne ss o f t he c o nst r uc t io n o r ig inal l y g ive n t he Co nst it ut io n ... w e ar e o f t he o pinio n t hat t he c o nst r uc t io n sho ul d be ad he r e d t o und e r t he d o c t r ine o f st ar e d e c isis. . . . And sinc e it is o f t he ut mo st impo r t anc e t hat t he o r g anic l aw be o f c e r t ain me aning and f ixe d int e r pr e t at io n, d e c isio ns c o nst r uing a c o nst it ut io n sho ul d be f o l l o w e d in t he abse nc e o f st r o ng r e aso ns f o r c hang ing t he m.” Daniel’s Adm’r v. Hoofnel, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471- 61 72 (Ky. 1941) (int e r nal c it at io ns o mit t e d ). Abse nt a c o nst it ut io nal ame nd me nt , “t o c hang e t he int e r pr e t at io n o f t he pr e se nt c o nst it ut io n w hic h has be e n c o nsist e nt l y ad he r e d t o . . w o ul d be t o upse t g o ve r nme nt al po l ic y f o l l o w e d sinc e t he f o und at io n o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h 150 ye ar s ag o .” Id. at 472. But suppo se w e ad o pt e d t he c o nc ur r ing o pinio n’s pr o po sit io n and anal yze d spe c ial l e g isl at io n und e r t he f r ame w o r k o f Just ic e Car d o zo . “Rat he r t han simpl y st r iking d o w n l e g isl at io n be c ause so me pe o pl e o r e nt it ie s ar e be ing t r e at e d d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s, bo t h o ut sid e and w it hin t he “c l ass ” at issue , w e must ask why t his is t he c ase .”58 d o ing t his, w e w o ul d at t e mpt t o answ e r t he que st io ns: “Why is t he l e g isl at ur e t r e at ing o ne c l ass d if f e r e nt l y f r o m ano t he r ? Why is t he l e g isl at ur e t r e at ing so me me mbe r s o f t he c l ass d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s? Do e s t he l e g isl at ur e have g o o d r e aso ns f o r d o ing al l o f t his?”59 Why w o ul d t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y e nac t a l aw t hat o nl y af f e c t s l abo r o r g anizat io ns? What is t he c o nd it io n t hat t he l e g isl at ur e is at t e mpt ing t o r e me d y? The Co mmo nw e al t h c o ul d answ e r t hat it s int e nt io n is t o inc r e ase e c o no mic inve st me nt in t he st at e . Ano t he r answ e r mig ht be t hat t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y simpl y d isf avo r s unio ns. Why is t he l e g isl at ur e t r e at ing so me me mbe r s o f t he c l ass d if f e r e nt l y f r o m o t he r s? Do e s t he l e g isl at ur e have g o o d r e aso ns f o r d o ing al l o f t his? If t he g o al is t o inc r e ase e c o no mic inve st me nt , t he l aw is g r e at l y at t e nuat e d f r o m t he pur po se be c ause it pr o vid e s no c o nse que nc e , g o o d o r bad , t o t he majo r it y o f t he e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s in t he st at e - 58 Co nc ur r ing Opinio n. 59 Id. 62 t ho se be ing no n-unio n e mpl o ye r s and e mpl o ye e s. Eve n und e r t his appr o ac h, t he RTWA is spe c ial l e g isl at io n. It t r e at s me mbe r s o f a c l ass d if f e r e nt l y, r e g ar d l e ss o f ho w suc h c l ass is d e t e r mine d , and t he r e is no l e g it imat e r e aso n f o r t his d ispar at e t r e at me nt , w he t he r w e ar e r e l ying o n t he “e xpr e ss pur po se ” g ive n by t he Co mmo nw e al t h o r w he t he r w e c o nc l ud e t hat t his is ant i-unio n l e g isl at io n. This d isc ussio n br ing s me t o my f inal po int o n t he issue o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n. To d ay t his Co ur t al so r e nd e r s it s d e c isio n in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 2017-SC-000614-TG (Ky. No v. 15, 2018). In t hat c ase , t he majo r it y o pinio n e nd o r se s a st r ic t r e ad ing o f Se c t io n 14 o f o ur st at e ’s c o nst it ut io n and int e r pr e t s suc h pr o visio n base d o n t he pl ain me aning o f t he w o r d s use d . Ye t , in t he c o nc ur r ing o pinio n he r e , it is ar g ue d t hat d e t e r mining w he t he r l e g isl at io n c o nst it ut e s unc o nst it ut io nal spe c ial l e g isl at io n r e quir e s a flexible anal ysis. So , it appe ar s t hat t o so me Just ic e s, t he me t ho d o f c o nst it ut io nal int e r pr e t at io n use d var ie s w it h t he c ase and t he c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio n at issue . Thus, as st at e d be f o r e , “t he d o c t r ine o f st ar e d e c isis r e mains an e ve r ­ pr e se nt g uid e po st in o ur und e r t aking .” Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Ky. 2009). This g uid e po st is st r e ng t he ne d by t he o at h I have t ake n t o upho l d t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. Section 55 and Emergency Legislation. The unio ns ar g ue t hat t he RTWA w as passe d in vio l at io n o f Se c t io n 55 o f t he Co nst it ut io n d e al ing w it h e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n. Se c t io n 55 st at e s: 63 No ac t , e xc e pt g e ne r al appr o pr iat io n bil l s, shal l be c o me a l aw unt il nine t y d ays af t e r t he ad jo ur nme nt o f t he se ssio n at w hic h it w as passe d , e xc e pt in c ase s o f e me r g e nc y, w he n, by t he c o nc ur r e nc e o f a majo r it y o f t he me mbe r s e l e c t e d t o e ac h Ho use o f t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y, by a ye a and nay vo t e , e nt e r e d upo n t he ir jo ur nal s, an ac t may be c o me a l aw w he n appr o ve d by t he Go ve r no r ; but t he r e aso ns f o r t he e me r g e nc y t hat just if ie s t his ac t io n must be se t o ut at length in t he jo ur nal o f e ac h ho use . Ky. Co nst . § 55 {e mphasis ad d e d ). The “e me r g e nc y” f o r t he RTWA is t hat “it is c r it ic al t o t he e c o no my and c it ize ns o f Ke nt uc ky t o at t r ac t ne w busine ss and inve st me nt int o t he Co mmo nw e al t h as so o n as po ssibl e , an e me r g e nc y is d e c l ar e d t o e xist , and t his Ac t t ake s e f f e c t upo n it s passag e and appr o val by t he Go ve r no r o r upo n it s o t he r w ise be c o ming a l aw .” The RTWA be c ame e f f e c t ive o n Januar y 9, 2017, w he n sig ne d by t he Go ve r no r , inst e ad o f nine t y d ays af t e r t he l e g isl at ive se ssio n pur suant t o Ky. Co nst . § 55.60 The majo r it y o pinio n c it e s t o Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1982), as ho l d ing t hat w hil e a l e g isl at ive d e t e r minat io n o f e me r g e nc y is subje c t t o jud ic ial r e vie w , “l e g isl at ive jud g me nt in t hat r e spe c t must be 60 The majo r it y o pinio n c it e s t o McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (Ky. 1927), f o r t he pr o po sit io n t hat e ve n if t he e me r g e nc y c l ause w as ine f f e c t ive , t he bil l w o ul d t ake e f f e c t 90 d ays af t e r t he ad jo ur nme nt o f t he l e g isl at ur e . McIntyre, as d isc usse d be l o w pr o vid e s a d e t ail e d anal ysis o f e me r g e n cy l e g isl at io n, but is d ist ing uishabl e o n t his po int . McIntyre d e al t w it h an e me r g e nc y ac t t hat c r e at e d a t e r m f o r t he c o ur t s o f Pe r r y and Le sl ie Co unt ie s, d ue t o c o ng e st e d d o c ke t s. Mc Int yr e w as ind ic t e d and c o nvic t e d o f mur d e r d ur ing a t ime no t pr o vid e d f o r by t he e me r g e nc y ac t . Thus, t he que st io n o n appe al w as w he t he r his c o nvic t io n c o ul d be uphe l d d e spit e t he jud g me nt be ing r e nd e r e d w he n c o ur t c o ul d no t be he l d pur suant t o t he ac t . McIntyre d id no t d e al w it h a c o nst it ut io nal c hal l e ng e t o t he ac t it se l f , but r at he r a c hal l e ng e t o t he jud g me nt o f c o nvic t io n at t e nd ant t o t he ac t . Suc h a d ist ing uishing po int sho ul d be no t e d , as a suc c e ssf ul c o nst it ut io nal at t ac k t o t he RTWA d o e s no t me an t hat t he RTWA simpl y is d e e me d t o have be e n e f f e c t ive 90 d ays af t e r t he e nd o f t he l e g isl at ive se ssio n. 64 ac c o r d e d t he same pr e sumpt io n o f val id it y t hat it e njo ys in o t he r inst anc e s o f c o nst it ut io nal inquir y.” If “any r at io nal basis f o r c o nc l ud ing t hat t he c ir c umst anc e s c it e d as c o nst it ut ing an e me r g e nc y just if ie d mo r e e xpe d it io us ac t io n t han w o ul d o r d inar il y be t r ue , t he c o ur t s sho ul d no t int e r f e r e w it h t he l e g isl at ive d isc r e t io n.” Geary, 635 S.W.2d at 307. The majo r it y c o nc l ud e s t hat t he l e g isl at ur e ’s pr o f f e r e d r e aso n f o r an e me r g e nc y has a r at io nal basis and w il l no t be d ist ur be d . In Geary, HB 525 d e al t w it h a sur c har g e upo n insur anc e pr e miums c o l l e c t e d in t he st at e w hic h f und e d a t r ust f o r t he payme nt o f inc e nt ive s t o f ir e me n and po l ic e me n. Id. at 306. The e me r g e nc y in t he ac t st at e d : Whe r e as, t he g e ne r al f und appr o pr iat io ns f o r f isc al ye ar 1981-82 f o r t he pr o f e ssio nal f ir e f ig ht e r s f o und at io n pr o g r am f und as pr o vid e d by KRS 95A.200 t hr o ug h 95A.990, and t he l aw e nf o r c e me nt f o und at io n pr o g r am f und as pr o vid e d by KRS 15.410 t hr o ug h 15.510 w il l l apse o n June 30, 1982, an e me r g e nc y is d e c l ar e d t o e xist , and Se c t io ns 6 and 9 o f t his Ac t , shal l be c o me e f f e c t ive o n Jul y 1, 1982, and al l o t he r se c t io ns o f t his Ac t shal l be c o me e f f e c t ive upo n it s passag e and appr o val by t he Go ve r no r . In Geary, t he Fr ankl in Cir c uit Co ur t had f o und t hat , w hil e t he r e aso n c o nt aine d in t he ac t just if ying an e me r g e nc y w as “w o e f ul l y w e ak,” it w as no t inc l ine d t o d e c l ar e it unc o nst it ut io nal . Id. An ac c ur at e r e c it at io n o f t he ho l d ing in Geary is as f o l l o w s: Al t ho ug h w e ar e o f t he o pinio n t hat the court must have the ultimate authority of determining whether an emergency actually existed, t he l e g isl at ive jud g me nt in t hat r e spe c t must be ac c o r d e d t he same pr e sumpt io n o f val id it y t hat it e njo ys in o t he r inst anc e s o f c o nst it ut io nal inquir y. That is, if t he r e is any r at io nal basis f o r c o nc l ud ing t hat t he circ umstances cited as constituting an emergency Justified more expeditious action 65 than would ordinarily be true, t he c o ur t s sho ul d no t int e r f e r e w it h t he l e g isl at ive d isc r e t io n. Id. at 307 (e mphasis ad d e d ). In McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931 (Ky. 1927), t his Co ur t ’s pr e d e c e sso r d isc usse d e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n at l e ng t h. The Co ur t t he r e anal yze d e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n und e r o ur st at e c o nst it ut io n and c o mpar e d e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n t o t hat in o t he r st at e s: The que st io n al so c ame be f o r e t he Supr e me Co ur t o f Il l ino is in Graham v. Dye, 308 111. 283, 139 N. E. 390. Al t ho ug h t he Co nst it ut io n o f Il l ino is is no t so e xpl ic it as t he Co nst it ut io n o f Ke nt uc ky, t he c o ur t , ho l d ing t he ac t vo id w he r e no ac t ual e me r g e nc y appe ar e d , al t ho ug h o ne w as at t e mpt e d t o be d e c l ar e d , said : “The Co nst it ut io n d o e s no t aut ho r ize t he passag e o f an e me r g e nc y st at ut e , e xc e pt in c ase an e me r g e nc y e xist s making it impo r t ant , if no t abso l ut e l y ne c e ssar y t o ac c o mpl ish t he f ul l pur po se o f it s e nac t me nt , t hat it t ake e f f e c t imme d iat e l y upo n it s appr o val , and by pl ain l ang uag e r e quir e s t he e xpr e ssio n o f w hat t he e me r g e nc y is in t he pr e ambl e o r bo d y o f t he ac t . To say t he me r e d e c l ar at io n t hat an e me r g e nc y e xist s f ul f il l s t he r e quir e me nt o f t he Co nst it ut io n w o ul d be a pl ain d isr e g ar d o f t he l ang uag e t hat t he e me r g e nc y shal l be e xpr e sse d in t he pr e ambl e o r bo d y o f t he ac t . The st at e me nt t hat an e me r g e nc y e xist s is no t an e xpr e ssio n o f t he e me r g e nc y.” McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (Ky. 1927). Base d o n Geary and t he Co ur t ’s ac c e pt anc e o f t he Il l ino is c o ur t ’s r at io nal e in McIntyre, 1 am e ve n mo r e c o nvinc e d t he RTWA vio l at e s t he e me r g e nc y l e g isl at io n pr o visio n o f Se c t io n 55. The st at e d e me r g e nc y in Geary w as “w o e f ul l y w e ak,” ye t it st at e d mo r e o f a basis t han t he RTWA. The l e g isl at io n in Geary, w it h spe c if ic it y, no t e d t hat w it ho ut e xpe d it io us ac t io n by t he l e g isl at ur e , t he inc e nt ive s pr o vid e d t o f ir e f ig ht e r s and l aw e nf o r c e me nt via spe c if ic , e nume r at e d st at ut e s w o ul d l apse . No suc h spe c if ic it y e xist s w it hin 66 t he RTWA. Whil e t he st at ut e in t he Il l ino is c ase , d isc usse d in McIntyre, o nl y st at e d t hat an e me r g e nc y e xist e d , but me nt io ne d no t hing abo ut w hat t he e me r g e nc y w as, t he RTWA is simil ar . “To at t r ac t ne w busine ss and inve st me nt int o t he Co mmo nw e al t h as so o n as po ssibl e ” is no t suf f ic ie nt t o sat isf y t he c o nst it ut io nal pr o visio n. If suc h w e r e suf f ic ie nt , t he st at e ne e d ing mo r e jo bs, mo ne y and inve st me nt w o ul d be a pr e t e xt t o t he e me r g e nc y passag e o f a myr iad o f l aw s. Wo ul d t he r e e ve r be a t ime w he n at t r ac t ing busine ss and inve st me nt w o ul d no t be a g o al o f t he Co mmo nw e al t h? This w r it e r , as I w o ul d ho pe d o mo st Ke nt uc kians, po sse sse s a d e sir e f o r inc r e ase d pr o spe r it y f o r o ur Co mmo nw e al t h. Ho w e ve r , t his d e sir e c anno t manif e st it se l f as a c o nst it ut io nal bl anke t w hic h w o ul d c o ve r o t he r w ise inf ir m l e g isl at io n. Geary g o e s f ur t he r and ho l d s t hat t he e me r g e nc y must r e quir e mo r e e xpe d it io us ac t io n t han w o ul d o r d inar il y be t r ue . Geary, 635 S.W.2d at 307. Geary invo l ve d a t r ust f o r st at e f ir e f ig ht e r s and po l ic e o f f ic e r s t hat w as r e ad y t o l apse . The r e w as so und r e aso ning and ur g e nt ne e d f o r mo r e e xpe d it io us ac t io n in t hat c ase t hat is no t pr e se nt he r e . The r e f o r e t his Co ur t sho ul d ho l d , und e r o ur c l e ar pr e c e d e nt , t hat no e me r g e nc y ac t ual l y e xist e d . Id. The majo r it y no t e s, and I w o ul d ag r e e , t hat po l ic y suc h as t he e c o no mic po l ic y w hic h is at t he c o r e o f t he RTWA is w it hin t he pur vie w o f t he Ge ne r al Asse mbl y. The c it ize ns, as vo t e r s, sit in jud g me nt o f t he so und ne ss o f l e g isl at ive po l ic y. Ho w e ve r , Se c t io ns 59 and 60 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n ar e unique t o t he Co mmo nw e al t h and t o o ur jur ispr ud e nc e . As a just ic e o n t his Co ur t , I t o o k an o at h t o upho l d bo t h t he Unit e d St at e s and Ke nt uc ky 67 Co nst it ut io ns. This I must d o , d e spit e t he d ir e c t io n o f any pr e vail ing po l it ic al w ind s. Thus, I w o ul d ho l d t hat t he RTWA vio l at e s Se c t io ns 59 and 60, as w e l l as Se c t io n 55 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n, and is t he r e f o r e unc o nst it ut io nal o n it s f ac e and in it s appl ic at io n. Wit ho ut c o mme nt ar y o n t he pr o pr ie t y o f t he RTWA as it r e l at e s t o publ ic po l ic y, o ur Ge ne r al Asse mbl y must f o l l o w t he l e ad o f Okl aho ma. The po l ic y e spo use d in t he RTWA c an pr o pe r l y be impl e me nt e d in t he Co mmo nw e al t h o f Ke nt uc l y via appr o pr iat e c o nst it ut io nal ame nd me nt . Cunning ham and Wr ig ht , JJ., jo in. WRIGHT, J., DISSENTING: Whil e I f ul l y ag r e e w it h Just ic e Ke l l e r ’s ast ut e se par at e o pinio n, 1 w r it e se par at e l y t o f ur t he r l ay o ut my o pinio n o n t he mat t e r . It is t he d ist ing uishe d r o l e o f t his Co ur t t hr o ug ho ut t he ag e s t o be a st abil izing f o r c e , st and ing apar t f r o m t he po l it ic al he ad w ind s w hic h sw e e p t hr o ug h t he l e g isl at ive pr o c e ss. Le g isl at io n f r o m o ur Ge ne r al Asse mbl y is po l it ic al in t he making . Our d e c isio ns ar e no n-po l it ic al and ar e base d o n t he g uid ing hand o f o ur st at e c o nst it ut io n. If t his Co ur t is no t vig il ant in pr o t e c t ing e qual l y t he w e ak and t he st r o ng , t he po o r and t he r ic h, t he ac c use d and t he vic t ims, t he n so me ind ivid ual s and so me r ig ht s may be t r ampl e d und e r f o o t . So c ial and e c o no mic issue s ar e mat t e r s o f l e g isl at ive c o nc e r n r at he r t han t his Co ur t ’s—so l o ng as basic c o nst it ut io nal mand at e s ar e sat isf ie d . Ye t , suc h mand at e s w e r e no t sat isf ie d he r e . It is t he po sit io n o f t his d isse nt t hat t he l e g isl at io n in que st io n f ail s be c ause it d o e s no t me e t t he r e quir e me nt s and pr o sc r ipt io ns o f o ur st at e 68 c o nst it ut io n. Mo r e par t ic ul ar l y, t he l e g isl at io n vio l at e s Se c t io n 59 o f o ur st at e c o nst it ut io n. Se c t io n 59 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n pr o vid e s g r e at e r pr o t e c t io ns t han t ho se o f o ur sist e r st at e s, as Just ic e Ke l l e r l ays o ut . Se c t io n 59 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n r e ad s: “The Ge ne r al Asse mbl y shal l no t pass l o c al o r spe c ial ac t s c o nc e r ning any o f t he f o l l o w ing subje c t s, o r f o r any o f t he f o l l o w ing pur po se s, name l y: . . . [t ]o r e g ul at e l abo r , t r ad e , mining o r manuf ac t ur ing .” Be c ause o f t his unique c o nst it ut io nal d ir e c t ive , w e c anno t bl ind l y f o l l o w t he r ul ing s o f o ur sist e r c o ur t s f r o m ar o und t he nat io n o n t his mat t e r —unl e ss w e f o l l o w t he l e ad o f Okl aho ma and d o so t hr o ug h a c o nst it ut io nal ame nd me nt . As Just ic e Ke l l e r no t e s, w he n Okl aho ma (t he o nl y o t he r st at e w it h simil ar pr o t e c t io ns) e nac t e d it s so -c al l e d “Rig ht t o Wo r k” l aw , it d id so t hr o ug h an ame nd me nt t o it s st at e c o nst it ut io n. We have he l d t he pur po se o f Se c t io n 59 is t o “pr e ve nt spe c ial pr ivil e g e s, f avo r it ism, and d isc r iminat io n, and t o [e ]nsur e e qual it y und e r t he l aw .” Ky. Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Ky. 1994). Se c t io n 59 pr e ve nt s t he e nac t me nt o f l aw s t hat d o no t “o pe r at e al ike o n al l ind ivid ual s and c o r po r at io ns.” Jefferson Cnty. Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky.l 982) (c it ing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 104 Ky. 584, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). I po int o ut t hat , “in o r d e r f o r a l aw t o be g e ne r al in it s c o nst it ut io nal se nse it must me e t t he f o l l o w ing r e quir e me nt s: (1) it must appl y e qual l y t o al l in a c l ass, and (2) t he r e must be d ist inc t ive and nat ur al r e aso ns ind uc ing and suppo r t ing t he c l assif ic at io n.” Kentucky Harlan Coal Co., 872 S.W.2d at 452. 69 Thus, t o d e t e r mine w he t he r t he st at ut e is spe c ial l e g isl at io n w e must f ir st d e t e r mine w hat t he c l ass c o nsist s o f and w he t he r t he st at ut e t r e at s al l c l ass me mbe r s e qual l y. KRS 336.132 spe c if ic al l y st at e s t hat “[a]ny ag r e e me nt , und e r st and ing , o r pr ac t ic e , w r it t e n o r o r al , impl ie d o r e xpr e ss, be t w e e n any l abo r o r g anizat io n and e mpl o ye r w hic h vio l at e s an e mpl o ye e ’s r ig ht s as se t f o r t h in subse c t io n (3) o f Se c t io n 1 o f t his Ac t shal l be unl aw f ul and vo id , . . . .” An ag r e e me nt o r und e r st and ing is a c o nt r ac t and t he st at ut e r e st r ic t s w hat an ag r e e me nt o r und e r st and ing c an r e quir e . The r e f o r e , it is c l e ar t hat t he st at ut e pl ac e s r e st r ic t io ns o n t he f r e e d o m o f c o nt r ac t . As t his Co ur t has ac kno w l e d g e d , t he Co mmo nw e al t h has “ve r y subst ant ial po l ic ie s in f avo r o f t he f r e e d o m o f c o nt r ac t .” State Farm Mat. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Ky. 2013). This r ig ht t o f r e e d o m o f c o nt r ac t is e qual l y impo r t ant t o t ho se o f al l po l it ic al and so c io e c o no mic bac kg r o und s—f r o m busine ss o w ne r s t o unio ns and f r o m w hit e c o l l ar w o r ke r s t o bl ue . Af t e r l o o king at t he c l ass, t he ne xt que st io n w e must e xamine is w he t he r t he l e g isl at io n pl ac e s t he r e st r ic t io n e qual l y o n al l c o nt r ac t s. KRS 336.130(3) spe c if ie s t hat “no e mpl o ye e shal l be r e quir e d , as a c o nd it io n o f e mpl o yme nt o r c o nt inuat io n o f e mpl o yme nt , t o . . . [p]ay any d ue s, f e e s, asse ssme nt s, o r simil ar c har g e s o f any kind o r amo unt t o a l abo r o r g anizat io n . . . .” The r e st r ic t io n o n payme nt s is e xpl ic it l y l imit e d t o l abo r o r g anizat io ns as a c o nd it io n o f e mpl o yme nt o r c o nt inuat io n o f e mpl o yme nt . Thus, t he st at ut e c l e ar l y f ail s t o “o pe r at e al ike o n al l ind ivid ual s and c o r po r at io ns.” Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d at 416. 70 We bst e r ’s Dic t io nar y d e f ine s e mpl o y as “1. To put t o se r vic e o r use . 2. To appl y o r d e vo t e (e .g ., t ime ) t o an ac t ivit y. 3. a. To put t o w o r k. b. To pr o vid e w it h g ainf ul w o r k.” Webster’s H New Riverside University Dictionary 429 (1994). This d e f init io n w o ul d c o ve r pe o pl e w o r king und e r a c o nt r ac t ne g o t iat e d by a unio n and t ho se w ho ar e no t . The pr o bl e m w it h t he st at ut e ar ise s be c ause it d o e s no t c o ve r al l me mbe r s o f t he c l ass. It w o ul d c o ve r unio n c o nt r ac t s —but no t o t he r c o nt r ac t s be t w e e n e mpl o ye e s and e mpl o ye r s. Unio ns ne g o t iat e busine ss ag r e e me nt s —o f t e n inc ur r ing l ar g e c o st s in t he pr o c e ss. Unio ns must inve st in a st r ike f und in c ase c o nt r ac t ne g o t iat io ns ne c e ssit at e a st r ike , spe nd c o unt l e ss man ho ur s, and e xpe nd var io us o t he r r e so ur c e s in ne g o t iat ing t he c o nt r ac t . Al l e mpl o ye e s g e t t he be ne f it s o f t he c o nt r ac t in t e r ms o f w ag e s and be ne f it s w he t he r t he y ar e unio n me mbe r s o r no nunio n w o r ke r s. Und e r pr io r l aw , no nunio n w o r ke r s und e r t he c o nt r ac t w o ul d have t o c o ve r t he ir pr o po r t io nal shar e o f t he unio n’s c o st o f ne g o t iat ing and e nf o r c ing t he c o nt r ac t . Eve n und e r t his pr io r l aw , t he no nunio n w o r ke r s w e r e e xe mpt f r o m paying any par t o f unio n c o st s f o r any ac t ivit y be yo nd t he c o st o f t he c o nt r ac t und e r w hic h t he y ar e w o r king . Fo r e xampl e , t he y w e r e no t r e quir e d t o c o nt r ibut e t o any po l it ic al ac t ivit y o f t he unio n. The l e g isl at io n t hat has be e n d e sig nat e d as “Rig ht t o Wo r k” g ive s t he se e mpl o ye e s t he be ne f it o f w o r king und e r a c o nt r ac t t hat w as ne g o t iat e d at c o nsid e r abl e c o st , ye t pr o hibit s t he c o nt r ac t f r o m r e quir ing t hat t he no nunio n w o r ke r pay any shar e o f t he c o st o f t he c o nt r ac t . No o t he r c o nt r ac t s ar e t r e at e d in t his manne r und e r o ur l aw s. 71 I w il l o f f e r a c o upl e e xampl e s t o be t t e r il l ust r at e my po int . Assume a c o mpany c al l e d Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., ne g o t iat e d a c o nt r ac t t o suppl y ve hic l e par t s t o To yo t a. Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., inc ur r e d t he e xpe nse o f ne g o t iat ing t he t e r ms and c o nd it io ns o f t he w o r k t he y w o ul d pe r f o r m o n be hal f o f To yo t a as w e l l as t he e xpe nse s inc id e nt t o d e ve l o ping t he spe c if ic at io ns f o r t he par t . The c o nt r ac t ne g o t iat e d by Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., w o ul d be an e mpl o yme nt c o nt r ac t sinc e it amo unt s t o an ag r e e me nt t o d o g ainf ul w o r k f o r so me o ne e l se . The que st io n t he n ar ise s: w o ul d t he st at ut e pr o hibit Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., f r o m ne g o t iat ing a c o nt r ac t t hat w o ul d make it t he so l e pr o vid e r f o r t he par t ? It w o ul d no t . Wo ul d t he st at ut e r e quir e Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., t o shar e t he ne g o t iat e d t e r ms o f t he c o nt r ac t and f o r c e it t o shar e t he pr o pr ie t ar y inf o r mat io n o n t he pr o d uc t io ns spe c if ic at io ns w it h any c o mpe t it o r w ho w ishe d t o suppl y t he same par t t o To yo t a? No . Wo ul d t he st at ut e pr o hibit Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc f r o m ne g o t iat ing c o mpe nsat io n f o r it s w o r k in d e ve l o ping t he c o nt r ac t o r r e quir ing any c o mpe t it o r t o pay a pr o po r t io nal shar e o f t he c o st o f d e ve l o ping t he spe c if ic at io n o f t he c o mpo ne nt par t if a c o mpe t it o r w e r e t o make and suppl y so me par t s und e r said c o nt r ac t ? No . Whil e t his st at ut e w o ul d no t pr o hibit Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc . f r o m ne g o t iat ing suc h a c o nt r ac t , t he st at ut e pr o hibit s just suc h c o nd uc t by l abo r unio ns. The r e f o r e , Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., w o ul d be t r e at e d d if f e r e nt l y und e r t he st at ut e t han a unio n—e ve n t ho ug h bo t h t he unio n and Wo r k De ve l o pme nt , Inc ., ne g o t iat e d c o nt r ac t s t o d o w o r k f o r so me o ne e l se . The r e f o r e , t his st at ut e 72 f it s t he ve r y d e f init io n o f spe c ial l e g isl at io n—as it t r e at s o ne me mbe r o f t he c l ass (a c o mpany ne g o t iat ing a c o nt r ac t f o r e mpl o yme nt ) d if f e r e nt l y t han ano t he r (a unio n ne g o t iat ing t he same t ype o f c o nt r ac t ). Le t us l o o k t o a d if f e r e nt e xampl e . Suppo se a l and o w ne r w ishe s t o have a bo und ar y o f c o al mine d . Wit h t hat g o al in mind , t he pr o pe r t y o w ne r ne g o t iat e s a c o nt r ac t w it h a c o mpany c al l e d Co al Wo r ks, Inc ., t o mine t he c o al . Co al Wo r ks w o ul d have t o d o t he w o r k o f d e ve l o ping and appl ying f o r a mining pe r mit . Upo n r e c e iving t he pe r mit . Co al Wo r ks w o ul d be t aske d w it h buil d ing r o ad s ac r o ss t he pr o pe r t y t o t he l o c at io n o f t he c o al bo und ar y. Do e s t he st at ut e pr o hibit Co al Wo r ks f r o m ne g o t iat ing c o nt r ac t s st at ing t he y have t he e xc l usive r ig ht t o mine t he c o al ? No . If ano t he r c o mpany mine s par t o f t he c o al , w o ul d t he st at ut e pr o hibit t he c o nt r ac t f r o m pr o vid ing t hat a pr o po r t io nal shar e o f t he c o st o f d e ve l o ping t he pe r mit and buil d ing t he r o ad s be ing paid t o Co al Wo r ks? Ce r t ainl y no t . Ho w e ve r , t he st at ut e pr o hibit s a unio n f r o m be ing c o mpe nsat e d f o r t he w o r k it d o e s in ne g o t iat ing a c o nt r ac t . This st at ut e w o ul d no t have t he same e f f e c t o n Co al Wo r ks ’ c o nt r ac t t o d o t he w o r k o f mining t he c o al f o r so me o ne e l se as it w o ul d o n a unio n’s c o nt r ac t t o pe r f o r m w o r k. He r e , t he st at ut e t r e at s busine ss c o nt r ac t s ne g o t iat e d by a unio n t o pe r f o r m w o r k f o r so me o ne d if f e r e nt l y t han it t r e at s c o nt r ac t s ne g o t iat e d by c o mpanie s t o pe r f o r m w o r k f o r so me o ne . The r e f o r e , t he st at ut e c o nst it ut e s spe c ial l e g isl at io n in vio l at io n o f Se c t io n 59 o f t he Ke nt uc ky Co nst it ut io n. Cunning ham and Ke l l e r , JJ., jo in. 73 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: FRED ZUCKERMAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 89 AND WILLIAM LONDRIGAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KENTUCKY STATE AFL-CIO, ITS AFFILIATED UNIONS AND MEMBERS Wil l iam E. Jo hnso n Jo hnso n Be ar se , LLP Ro be r t Mat t he w Co l o ne Te amst e r s Lo c al 89 Ir w in H. Cut l e r , Jr , Be njamin S. Basil Mat t he w P. Lync h Pr id d y Cut l e r Naake & Me ad e PLLC David O’Br ie n Sue t ho l z De vo n No r a Ro s Ose r Br anst e t t e r St r anc h & Je nning s PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW G. BEVIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY Mar k St e phe n Pit t St e phe n Chad Me r e d it h Mat t he w Kuhn Of f ic e o f t he Go ve r no r COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: DERRICK K. RAMSEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE KENTUCKY LABOR CABINET Mic hae l Gar y Sw ansbur g , Jr . COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES BARRY BRIGHT, JACOB PURVIS, AND WILLIAM PURVIS Wil l iam L. Me sse ng e r Nat io nal Rig ht t o Wo r k Fo und at io n Ric har d Lynn Mast e r s Mast e r s, Mul l ins, & Ar r ing t o n COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE: KENTUCKY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY Pame l a Jo y Pe nd o r f Tho mas 74 COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE: INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA; UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION; AND KENTUCKY PIPE TRADES ASSOCIATION: Ke vin Cr o sby Bur ke Jamie Kr ist in Ne al Bur ke Ne al PLLC To ny Oppe g ar d 75