Title: Beacon Residential Management, LP v. R.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12265
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2017

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SJC-12265 
 
BEACON RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, LP  vs.  R.P.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2017. - September 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.2 
 
 
Summary Process.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, 
Intervention. 
 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Boston Division of 
the Housing Court Department on July 27, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to intervene was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed in the Appeals Court by Gregory I. Massing, 
J.  After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
David Emer (Alison T. Holdway also present) for the mother. 
 
Therese Quijano for the plaintiff. 
 
Julia Devanthéry, for Casa Myrna & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Dorothy Bourassa & Eileen M. Fava, for Women's Bar 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In this case we consider whether a mother3 has the 
right to intervene in an eviction action brought by a landlord 
against the mother's husband and their young children as the 
named defendants where, although she is not a named tenant on 
the lease, she has lived with her family in the apartment 
throughout the tenancy and alleges domestic violence in the 
home.  We conclude that she may intervene both on her own behalf 
and on behalf of her children.4 
 
1.  Background.  This case is before us on the mother's 
appeal from the denial, by a judge of the Housing Court, of the 
her motion to intervene in a summary process action brought by 
Beacon Residential Management LP (Beacon), the agent of the 
apartment owner, Georgetowne Homes Two, L.L.C. (Georgetowne 
Homes) (collectively, landlord).  We recite relevant allegations 
from the mother's motion to intervene and proposed answer, as 
supplemented by the testimony at the hearing before the motion 
judge.5 
                     
 
3 The prospective intervener. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the Women's Bar 
Association, and Casa Myrna and Jane Doe, Inc. 
 
 
5 In this case the landlord premised its notice to quit on 
the ground that there was an "unauthorized individual" -- the 
mother -- living in the apartment who had been involved in a 
"disturbance" on the property.  In the proposed answer appended 
 
3 
 
 
 
In October, 2009, the mother, together with her husband, 
R.P., and their son, moved into a federally regulated and 
subsidized apartment in the Hyde Park section of Boston; the 
apartment was owned by Georgetowne Homes.6  Initially both the 
mother and R.P. signed the lease.  Soon thereafter the landlord 
informed them that the Federal government would not subsidize 
the rent due to the mother's immigration status; thereafter, the 
couple removed the mother from the lease.7  At that time, 
February, 2010, R.P. remained in the apartment and signed a new 
                                                                  
to the mother's motion to intervene, she claimed that she would 
raise affirmative defenses to both of the grounds listed in the 
notice to quit.  Accordingly, a trial on the merits of the 
summary process action or on the merits of the defenses raised 
in the mother's proposed answer would involve the same factual 
circumstances as the question whether the mother claims an 
interest in the subject of the proceeding.  In these 
circumstances, for the reasons we discuss infra, the motion to 
intervene is to be determined on the allegations in the motion, 
attached pleadings, and supporting testimony and documents.  See 
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 585 
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Inv. Corp. v. 
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985) 
(discussing analogous Federal rule). 
 
 
6 The project-based housing was available through the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development Housing 
Choice Voucher Program, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012) and 
implementing regulations.  See Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 
Mass. 354, 355 & n.2 (2014).  In eligible housing, commonly 
referred to as "Section 8" housing, the Federal government, 
through the local public housing agency, "pays rental subsidies 
so eligible families can afford decent, safe and sanitary 
housing."  Id. at 355 n.2, quoting 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1) 
(1999). 
 
 
7 At the time, as a noncitizen, the mother needed 
documentation that she was legally in the United States. 
4 
 
 
lease for subsidized rent for himself and the son, and the 
mother and son moved to R.P.'s parents' home.  The two returned 
to the apartment in June, 2010, but neither the mother nor R.P. 
took steps to amend the lease to include the mother as a 
household member. 
 
In June, 2012, the mother was approved as a permanent 
resident.  She returned to the landlord's office with her 
immigration paperwork, including her green card, and asked the 
landlord to add her name to the lease.  The landlord's policy 
was to give an "add-on" application to anyone who requested one, 
and the landlord's agent testified that had the mother completed 
an add-on application, she would have been added to the lease as 
a matter of course, as long as R.P. agreed.  However, although 
the mother asked to be added to the lease, she was not given an 
add-on application.  The mother testified that the landlord's 
agent told her that only R.P. could add her name to the lease.  
She further testified that R.P. refused to do so as a way of 
controlling her. 
 
On May 1, 2015, the mother obtained an abuse prevention 
order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A order) against R.P..8  The 
                     
 
8 She had previously obtained an abuse prevention order 
pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A order) against R.P. in 2012.  In 
2013, R.P. tried -- unsuccessfully -- to obtain an order against 
the mother.  Although the Housing Court judge permitted the 
parties to introduce the relevant orders in evidence at the 
 
5 
 
 
order required him to stay away from the apartment and from the 
mother's workplace; it also ordered him not to contact the 
mother or their two children9 and granted full custody of the 
children to the mother.  The order was subsequently extended for 
a full year. 
 
On May 26, 2015, the landlord served a notice to quit on 
R.P. and the two children.  The notice stated that the mother 
was an "unauthorized individual" living in the apartment, and 
that she was "involved in a disturbance on the property."10  In 
July, 2015, the landlord filed a summary process action in the 
Boston Division of the Housing Court Department based on the 
notice to quit.  The mother filed a motion to intervene and a 
proposed answer,11 arguing that the housing provisions of the 
                                                                  
intervention hearing, he did not permit them to introduce 
evidence related to the underlying facts for any of these 
actions, ruling that such evidence was "not relevant to [the] 
proceedings" on the motion to intervene. 
 
 
9 The mother gave birth to a second child after the family 
moved into the apartment but before the summons and complaint 
for summary process were filed. 
 
 
10 The mother claims that the disturbance was related to the 
209A order and thus was an impermissible ground for eviction 
under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).  The factual and 
legal bases for this claim would be properly litigated in a 
trial on the merits. 
 
11 In the Housing Court, the mother had also moved for 
permissive intervention pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (b), 365 
Mass. 769 (1974).  Because we conclude that she is entitled to 
intervene as of right, we need not consider the judge's denial 
of permissive intervention, which is subject to considerable 
 
6 
 
 
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-11 (2012 & Supp. 
II) (VAWA), and G. L. c. 239, § 2A, prohibited the eviction 
because it was predicated on domestic violence.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14043e-11 (housing protections for victims of domestic 
violence). 
The landlord opposed the mother's motion to intervene, and 
the judge permitted both parties to introduce documents and 
testimony in an evidentiary hearing, at which the mother and the 
landlord's leasing agent testified.  The judge issued oral 
findings in which he did not credit most of the mother's 
testimony and found that she and R.P. made a joint decision not 
to add her to the lease, to enjoy the benefit of lower rent.  In 
addition, he found that the landlord's failure to give the 
mother an add-on application was due to negligence and not 
related to domestic violence, so the mother had not been 
discriminated against as an applicant under VAWA.  As a result, 
the judge determined that the mother did not have an interest 
that allowed her to intervene as of right, but he allowed the 
mother to amend the motion to seek intervention on behalf of her 
children.  He later denied the motion as amended, stating that 
the mother could not represent the children because she had 
                                                                  
discretion.  See Cruz Mgt. Co. v. Thomas, 417 Mass. 782, 785 
(1994) ("A judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
permit intervention"). 
7 
 
 
acted fraudulently by living in the apartment without being 
named as a tenant on the lease.  Finally, because R.P. did not 
appear, the judge entered a judgment of default.12  The mother 
timely appealed to the Appeals Court the denial of her motion to 
intervene and the judgment of default.  In an unpublished 
memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, the 
Appeals Court affirmed the denial.  We allowed the mother's 
application for further appellate review and vacate both the 
denial of the motion to intervene and the judgment of default. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Legal standard.  We begin with the 
language of the relevant rule governing intervention as of 
right.  "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition 
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties" 
(emphasis added).  Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2), 365 Mass. 769 
(1974).  Whether the prospective intervener has met "the 
requirements for intervention is a question of law," and 
                     
 
12 For reasons that are not apparent, the judgment of 
default was entered not only against R.P., but also against the 
children (who had been dismissed from the case) and the mother 
(who had not been permitted to intervene). 
8 
 
 
therefore we review the ruling de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 217 (2011).  In interpreting 
this rule, we look for guidance to decisions of Federal courts 
concerning Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a), as the Massachusetts rule on 
intervention is nearly identical to this analogous rule.  See 
Fremont Inv. & Loan, supra at 218. 
 
Rule 24 (a) (2) "does not articulate explicit criteria for 
determining the sufficiency of the asserted interest."  
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 
465, 484 (2015), quoting Bolden v. O'Connor Café of Worcester, 
Inc., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 62 (2000).  Cf. Commonwealth v. One 
Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand One Hundred Ninety-One Dollars, 76 
Mass. App. Ct. 279, 281-282 (2010) (in civil drug forfeiture 
cases, inquiry is similar to injury prong of standing analysis).  
Thus, the type and degree of interest that suffice for 
intervention depend on "the nature of the action in which 
intervention is claimed."  Care & Protection of Zelda, 26 Mass. 
App. Ct. 869, 871 (1989).  In the context of this proceeding, 
the question is whether the prospective intervener claims an 
interest relating to the unit subject to eviction proceedings 
notwithstanding the fact that she is not listed on the lease as 
a tenant. 
 
What a prospective intervener must show to intervene is 
central to this case.  We note, first, that "Rule 24 (a) (2) 
9 
 
 
requires only that the applicant claim an interest relating to 
the property in suit," even if the claim may ultimately fail on 
the merits.  See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 
F.2d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago 
Inv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 471 
U.S. 1100 (1985).  Because the question of intervention is a 
threshold inquiry, see United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 
1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980), resolution of the merits of the 
prospective intervener's proposed pleading (an answer, in this 
case) or of the existing case would be inappropriate, so the 
motion to intervene "cannot be resolved by reference to the 
ultimate merits of the claim the intervener seeks to assert 
unless the allegations are frivolous on their face."  Turn Key 
Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 164 F.3d 1080, 1081 (8th 
Cir. 1999), citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 
261, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).  See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. 
Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 993 (1980).  Instead, in these cases, "[t]he situation 
is somewhat akin to that presented on a motion for summary 
judgment or on a motion to dismiss," Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 
309 F.2d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 
(1963), and the judge should "take all well-pleaded, 
nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the 
proposed complaint or answer in intervention, and declarations 
10 
 
 
supporting the motion as true absent sham, frivolity or other 
objections."  Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 
268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001) ("the propriety of 
intervention must be determined before discovery").  See Reich 
v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1995).  Cf. 
Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental 
Health, 469 Mass. 323, 329 (2014), S.C., 476 Mass. 51 (2016), 
and cases cited (on motion to dismiss for lack of standing, 
court "take[s] as true all facts alleged in the . . . 
complaint").  See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 
636 (2008). Although a motion judge may hear arguments on the 
motion, or hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve ambiguities 
where the motion to intervene is not clearly understood, see 
Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra, it is legally 
inappropriate at such an early stage to make findings regarding 
a prospective intervener's claimed interest, at least where, as 
here, such a determination would go to the merits of the 
proposed pleading or of the underlying case.13 
                     
 
13 Citing Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 
501, 509, 510 (1997), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 
423 Mass. 1402 (1996), the landlord argues that upon the review 
of a denial of a motion to intervene, the motion judge's 
findings must stand absent clear error.  Indeed, this court 
stated as much as dictum in Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 
459 Mass. 209, 217 (2011).  However, we note that the case cited 
in Fremont to support the proposition that we allow factual 
findings to stand absent clear error relied on a case that had 
 
11 
 
 
 
Thus, the prospective intervener should not be required to 
demonstrate the merits of his or her claim at an evidentiary 
hearing.  Instead, the claim of intervention should be evaluated 
based on the allegations of the claim itself, and related 
documents; its merits are to be decided with all other claims.  
To hold otherwise would require a judge to rule on the merits of 
a prospective intervener's claimed interest -- including where 
that interest concerns the merits of a case that would go to a 
jury -- rather than determining only whether the prospective 
intervener has claimed an interest.  See American Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co. of Chicago, 750 F.2d at 585. 
 
b.  Application.  The mother argues that both she and her 
children have an interest in the subject of the eviction 
proceedings that is not adequately represented by the existing 
parties.14  The judge ruled that the mother did not have a 
sufficient interest in the proceedings because she is neither a 
                                                                  
nothing to do with intervention or any analogous pretrial 
situation.  More importantly, adopting such a rule would 
overlook the procedural context of a motion to intervene.  
Indeed, the sources cited by the landlord concern appellate 
review following a full trial on the merits, whereas a motion to 
intervene is generally filed prior to discovery. 
 
14 As the judge noted, R.P. was no longer permitted to live 
with the family due to the abuse prevention order, so he had 
very little incentive to act in the mother's or children's 
interest.  See Frostar Corp. v. Malloy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 
712 (2010), quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 
F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978) ("burden of showing that 
representation may be inadequate . . . 'should be treated as 
minimal'"). 
12 
 
 
tenant nor an "otherwise qualified applicant" within the meaning 
of VAWA, and that, as described below, she could not represent 
the children's interest because she committed fraud.  We 
disagree and conclude that she is entitled to intervene on 
behalf of herself pursuant to VAWA and on behalf of her children 
pursuant to both VAWA and G. L. c. 239, § 2A. 
 
i.  Mother's interest in the proceedings.  Among other 
protections, VAWA provides that tenants and otherwise qualified 
applicants of public housing programs may not be denied or be 
evicted from housing on the basis that the tenant or applicant 
is a victim of domestic violence.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-
11(b)(1).  The mother asserts that she is an otherwise qualified 
applicant because she sought to be added to the lease and was a 
victim of domestic abuse by R.P..  The motion judge concluded, 
however, that the mother was not "otherwise qualified" under 
VAWA, finding that she committed fraud by living in the 
apartment without being added to the lease to avoid an increase 
in rent.  This was error. 
 
As discussed above, because the issue to be determined in 
deciding a motion to intervene is simply whether the prospective 
intervener has alleged plausible facts that claim an interest, 
not whether she would ultimately prevail in the underlying 
action, we take the mother's allegations in her motion, 
testimony, and supporting documents as true, and draw reasonable 
13 
 
 
inferences in her favor.  In other words, we consider only 
whether the mother has claimed an interest here as an otherwise 
qualified applicant.  As the landlord's contrary allegations -- 
that she was an unauthorized occupant and committed fraud -- go 
to the merits of the eviction case, they should not have been 
considered at the motion to intervene hearing. 
 
VAWA does not expressly define what it means to be 
otherwise qualified, including whether this definition refers 
only to factors such as income and family size.  However, this 
motion arose in a preliminary stage of the case.  Because the 
mother claims that she tried to apply and that R.P. was abusive 
and prevented her from being added to the lease as a way of 
controlling her, she has alleged sufficient facts to permit an 
inference that she was an otherwise qualified applicant, and is 
entitled to intervene in the eviction proceeding.  American 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 750 F.2d at 585 (opposing 
party's defenses to intervener's counterclaim did not defeat 
motion to intervene).  Any further determination of the 
credibility of her factual allegations as to whether she is 
otherwise qualified would be properly adjudicated at a later 
stage.  Id. 
14 
 
 
 
ii.  Children's interest in the proceedings.15  The mother 
also seeks to intervene in the eviction action on behalf of her 
children.  We note that as to any interest claimed by the 
children, it is appropriate for the mother to intervene, as she 
is the parent with sole custody and they are minors.16  We 
conclude that the mother has sufficiently alleged that the 
                     
 
15 The unqualified judgment of default against R.P. means 
that if the lower court decision stands, the children will be 
forced to move.  Normally, where minor children are living in an 
apartment with one parent, the question whether they have an 
interest sufficient to intervene is irrelevant because the 
parent is presumably an adequate representative of their 
interests.  Here, however, R.P. was barred from contact with the 
children as a result of the 209A order, and he failed to appear 
in court.  That does not automatically mean that the children 
have no recourse to prevent eviction.  Cf. Arsenault v. Chicopee 
Hous. Auth., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 939, 941 (1983) (where custodial 
parent abandoned child and apartment, child who was lawful 
occupant could assert right to grievance procedures before 
eviction, even if success on merits was not guaranteed). 
 
 
16 As the 209A order against R.P. awarded sole custody of 
the children to the mother, it is appropriate for her to be the 
one to intervene on their behalf.  Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 17 (b), 
as appearing in 454 Mass. 1402, 1402-1403 (2009); Arsenault, 15 
Mass. App. Ct. at 939-940 (natural father brought action on 
child's behalf as next friend).  In this case we find that any 
potential deficiencies in the mother's claims asserted in 
support of her motion to intervene as a party in her own right 
do not prevent her from meeting her threshold burden to 
intervene in her representative capacity on behalf of the two 
children.  Moreover, as discussed supra, these are issues that 
should be properly resolved on the merits in the summary process 
proceeding itself. 
15 
 
 
children have interests entitling them to intervene, pursuant to 
both Federal and State law.17 
 
VAWA provides that tenants may not be denied occupancy 
rights "solely on the basis of criminal activity directly 
relating to domestic violence . . . that is engaged in by a 
member of the household of the tenant or any guest . . . if the 
tenant or an affiliated individual of the tenant is the victim 
or threatened victim of such domestic violence."  42 U.S.C. 
§ 14043e-11(b)(3)(A).  Here, the landlord seeks to evict the 
family, including the children, alleging that the parents 
committed fraud.18  The children qualify as tenants for purposes 
                     
 
17 Because the mother has alleged that the lease violations 
claimed by the landlord were the result of domestic abuse by 
R.P., she has also alleged sufficient facts for the children to 
have an interest under other provisions of VAWA, including 42 
U.S.C. § 14043e-11(b)(2) (2012 & Supp. II), which provides: 
 
 
"An incident of actual or threatened domestic violence 
. . . shall not be construed as --  
 
 
"(A) a serious or repeated violation of a lease for 
housing assisted under a covered housing program by the 
victim or threatened victim of such incident; or 
 
 
"(B) good cause for terminating the assistance, 
tenancy, or occupancy rights to housing assisted under a 
covered housing program of the victim or threatened victim 
of such incident." 
 
 
18 Fraud may fall under the category of "criminal activity" 
for purposes of VAWA.  See United States Department of Housing & 
Urban Development, The HUD Handbook 4350.3: Occupancy 
Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs, at 8-26 
 
16 
 
 
of VAWA because they are lawful occupants and members of the 
"assisted family," see 81 Fed. Reg. 80,724, 80,730 (Nov. 16, 
2016), and their mother is an "affiliated individual" of them.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-11(a)(1)(A) (including "parent" and 
"child" in definition of "affiliated individual").  Here, 
accepting as true the mother's claim that she was prevented from 
adding her name to the lease as a part of R.P.'s abuse, it 
follows that we also accept as true the proposition that the 
criminal activity, i.e., fraud, alleged by the landlord was a 
result of domestic violence.  As a result, the landlord's 
attempt to evict the children violates 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-
11(b)(3)(A).  Therefore, under VAWA, the children are tenants 
with an interest in the unit and the right to defend against 
wrongful eviction; thus, they have an interest sufficient to 
intervene in the action. 
 
The children also have a viable defense to eviction based 
on Massachusetts law.  Under G. L. c. 239, § 2A, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that an eviction action commenced within 
six months of a household member seeking a 209A protective order 
is retaliatory.  Here, the 209A order was entered on May 1, 
2015, and the notice to quit was dated May 26, 2015.  Thus, 
there are sufficient facts to permit a presumption of 
                                                                  
to 8-27 (Nov. 2013) (concerning Section 8 housing, "Fraud can be 
handled as a civil and/or criminal violation"). 
17 
 
 
retaliation.  Accordingly, the mother may intervene on behalf of 
the children on this basis as well. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  It perhaps goes without saying that 
success on a motion to intervene in an action does not guarantee 
success on the merits of that action.  In this case, it means 
simply that the mother is permitted to assert affirmative 
defenses to the eviction action on behalf of herself and her 
children.  Because we conclude that the motion judge prematurely 
reached the merits of the case, we vacate the judgment of 
default, reverse the denial of the motion to intervene, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.