Title: Shankle v. Woodruff
Citation: 324 P.2d 1017, 64 N.M. 88
Docket Number: 6301
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 1958

324 P.2d 1017 (1958) 64 N.M. 88 Leslie E. SHANKLE, Petitioner, v. T.M. WOODRUFF, Warden of the State Penitentiary of the State of New Mexico, Respondent. No. 6301. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 30, 1958. Kellahin &amp; Fox, by Jason W. Kellahin, Santa Fe, for petitioner. Fred M. Standley, Atty. Gen., Hilton A. Dickson, Jr., and Robert F. Pyatt, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent. SADLER, Justice. The petitioner herein seeks release by habeas corpus from the state penitentiary where he is serving a life sentence. He was committed to the state penitentiary on May 2, 1952, for the full term of the rest of his natural life beginning with the date mentioned for the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses. The life sentence was imposed by reason of a showing that he was subject to an increased penalty under the habitual criminal act. 1953 Comp. §§ 41-16-3 and 41-16-4. At the trial it appeared the petitioner on December 9, 1935, was convicted of the crime of swindling in the state of Texas. On July 8, 1938, he was convicted of two charges of swindling in the state of Texas; and on February 3, 1941, petitioner was *1018 convicted of making and issuing worthless checks. As a result of the last conviction at Portales in Roosevelt County, New Mexico, petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment in the New Mexico state penitentiary under the provisions of 1953 Comp. §§ 41-16-3 and 41-16-4. On December 20, 1949, petitioner received a full and complete pardon from the Governor of New Mexico following a previous release on parole. Thereafter, on November 13, 1951, in Chaves County, New Mexico, the petitioner was proceeded against by the office of district attorney, the charge being the obtaining of money under false pretenses and with being an habitual criminal under the provisions of the habitual criminal act. He was tried before the Honorable George T. Harris, a judge of the district court for the Fifth Judicial District and upon being found guilty was sentenced to the state penitentiary for the rest of his natural life. The information upon which petitioner was tried and convicted in the Fifth Judicial District within and for the County of Chaves, State of New Mexico, which resulted in the sentence which petitioner is now serving, is a part of the record in this case. For convenience, so much of the information as is pertinent to the present proceeding, reads as follows: The conviction, as noted, was in Chaves County and commitment thereon was issued in the name of the Honorable George T. Harris, a judge of the Fifth Judicial District, the commitment reading in part, as follows: The petitioner seeks his release from the present life sentence being served in this proceeding on habeas corpus. His amended petition for the writ raises the following points: The respondent, Superintendent of the state penitentiary, designated Warden herein, answers petitioner's first point under a heading stating the converse thereof, to-wit: His first authority cited is from 15 Am. Jur. 153, § 502, and we quote as follows: The controlling authority, however, is Ex parte DeVore, 18 N.M. 246, 136 P. 47, 51, reading: Looking at the record, we find the information filed charges petitioner with obtaining money under false pretenses, contrary to section 40-21-3 "* * * and of being an habitual criminal, contrary to section 41-16-3 * * *." He was tried under this information, and the jury duly returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Thereupon, the district court announced its judgment and sentence, and imposed the life sentence mandatorily required by 1953 Comp. §§ 41-16-3 and 41-16-4. This valid judgment is not to be nullified by the flaws complained of in the commitment. The petitioner next challenges jurisdiction of the district court to impose the judgment and sentence it did, passing up any argument on the point by saying validity of the proceedings leading up to the judgment and sentence will be discussed under other points urged. It is pertinent to remark, however, that in view of 1953 Comp. § 40-21-3, penalizing as a felony the obtaining of money under false pretenses, of which petitioner stands convicted, and of 1953 Comp. §§ 41-16-3 and 41-16-4, enhancing the penalty on one thrice convicted of a felony, there would seem to be no doubt of jurisdiction of the district court to impose the sentence it did, even in the face of the objections urged. The petitioner's counsel next advances what constitutes the most serious challenge to the validity of his sentence. It is that having received a full and complete pardon of his sentence to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal, by reason of his previous convictions, such convictions became so to speak "functus officio" and, neither they nor any of them could be again employed to support a sentence to life imprisonment under the habitual criminal act. Counsel for petitioner admits there is a distinct split of authority on the proposition and it becomes our province to say which line of authorities is based upon the better reason and logic constituting, as it does, the weight of authority. While recognizing the division of authority on the question, the decided weight of *1020 authority rests with the respondent in his claim that an executive pardon of the offense which provokes the court into imposing a life sentence under the habitual criminal act is unavailing to deny the court authority to employ the same felony convictions again for purpose of imposing a sentence under the habitual criminal act, if subsequent to his pardon, the prisoner commits another felony. Taking note of this division of authority the author of the text on the subject in 25 Am.Jur. 269, § 21, under topic "Habitual Criminals" has this to say: There are so many cases supporting the proposition that a pardon by the Chief Executive is unavailing to deny use of the habitual act upon commission of a subsequent felony, that it will suffice to cite only a few of them. See, People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 214, 116 A.L.R. 205; People v. Dutton, 9 Cal. 2d 505, 71 P.2d 218, appeal dismissed Dutton v. People of State of California, 302 U.S. 656, 58 S. Ct. 365, 82 L.Ed 508; Jones v. State, 141 Tex. Crim.R. 70, 147 S.W.2d 508, overruling Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex.Crim.R. 194, 20 S.W.2d 416, holding contra; Newton v. State, 56 Okl.Crim. 391, 40 P.2d 688, indicating disapproval of Tucker v. State, 14 Okl.Crim. 54, 167 P. 637, holding contra; State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221, 262 P. 622; Dean v. Skeen, 137 W. Va. 105, 70 S.E.2d 256, 31 A.L.R.2d 1180; People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468, 139 A.L.R. 667, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 625, 63 S. Ct. 62, 87 L. Ed. 506; Carlesi v. People of State of New York, 233 U.S. 51, 34 S. Ct. 576, 58 L. Ed. 843. See, also, exhaustive annotations of the subject in 58 A.L.R. 49; 82 A.L.R. 362; 116 A.L.R. 683; and 31 A.L.R.2d 1186, where the authorities pro and con are listed and discussed. We call special attention to the excellent analysis of the authorities and the rationale of the decisions supporting the conclusion we have reached touching it, as found in the cases of People v. Biggs from California and People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy from New York, both cited, supra [9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 215]. In the Biggs case, the court observed: After a somewhat critical discussion about pardons making new men of convicts, the court went on to say: and concluded at pages 217-218 of 71 P.2d, by holding: The annotation on the subject on the effect of a pardon to be found in 139 A.L.R. 683 is introduced by this language, to-wit: Again, in 31 A.L.R.2d 1186, the author of the annotation, as in every earlier one, makes the same appraisal of the authorities. He states: We reach the same conclusion as do the courts in cases cited, supra. We must rule against petitioner on this point. Finally, the petitioner complains that the information fails to charge prior felonies. Actually, the information filed, after charging petitioner with the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, contrary to 1941 Comp. § 41-2103 (1953 Comp. § 40-21-3), as a basis for imposition of the sentence called for by the habitual criminal act, specifically 1953 Comp. § 41-16-3, did charge petitioner with having been convicted, not three times as required by the statute, but with the commission of four separate felonies, including that for which he had been pardoned, the conviction in Roosevelt County, New Mexico. As the attorney general so aptly states the controlling statute makes no requirement that prior convictions be pleaded in the information itself, as was done in this case. The court instructed the jury that the petitioner herein as a defendant in the *1022 case in which he now stands convicted before this Court, touching prior convictions, as follows: We have heretofore spoken on the question of imposition of the penalties called for by the habitual criminal act, where allegations of prior convictions in the felony charge were sought to be made the basis of a claim of fundamental error on an appeal. See, State v. Johnson, 57 N.M. 716, 263 P.2d 282, 284. Speaking through Mr. Justice Compton, we said: It would seem somewhat incongruous to release one on habeas corpus by reason of pleading in the information prior convictions sufficient to invoke the habitual criminal act, and declining to sustain it on a claim of fundamental error on a direct appeal by one under sentence of death as in State v. Johnson, supra. We agree with the attorney general that the grounds of petitioner's objection to the information, if valid and the error reserved below, might have been made the basis of a timely appeal but not grounds for release on habeas corpus. Incidentally, speaking of appeals, the record discloses *1023 that such an appeal was taken, but subsequently was dismissed by the district attorney at the written request of petitioner herein. We find no basis for ordering the discharge of the petitioner. Accordingly, his petition will be dismissed and he is remanded to the custody of the respondent. It will be so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and McGHEE and COMPTON, JJ., concur. SHILLINGLAW, J., did not participate.