Title: People v. Pearson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S120750
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2012

1 
 
Filed 1/9/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S120750 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
)  
KEVIN DARNELL PEARSON, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. NA039436 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Kevin Darnell Pearson was convicted and sentenced to death for 
the 1998 first degree murder of Penny Sigler, also known as Penny Keptra.  The 
jury found the murder was committed during the course of robbery, kidnapping, 
rape, and sexual penetration by foreign object, and that it involved the infliction of 
torture.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(17), (18).)1  In addition, 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to state prison for robbery, forcible rape, 
sexual penetration by foreign object, forcible rape and sexual penetration by 
foreign object while acting in concert, kidnapping for purposes of rape, and 
torture.  (§§ 206, 209, subd. (b)(1), 211, 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1, 289, subd. 
(a)(1).)  On this automatic appeal (§ 1239, subd. (b)), we affirm the convictions of 
first degree murder and the other charged felonies, but reverse the judgment as to 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
 
the penalty of death due to the trial court’s improper excusal of a prospective juror 
because of her views on capital punishment. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The evidence showed defendant and two other men, Jamelle Armstrong and 
Warren Hardy, killed the victim, a stranger to them, during a brutal robbery and 
sexual assault.  The crimes took place late on the night of December 29, 1998, by 
a freeway embankment in Long Beach. 
Guilt Phase Evidence 
Between 11:00 p.m. and midnight on December 29, 1998, the victim, 
Penny Sigler, left her Long Beach home to go to the store.  She had $6 worth of 
food stamps given to her by her roommate.  Her nude body was found the next day 
on the freeway embankment of northbound Interstate 405, near the intersection of 
Wardlow Road and Long Beach Boulevard.  The body was 10 to 15 feet from the 
bottom of the embankment, separated from the surface streets by a drainage ditch 
and, above the ditch, a nylon mesh fence supported by wooden stakes.  One of the 
stakes was broken, a tennis shoe lay on the embankment, and there was blood on 
the fence and in the drainage area.   
The victim’s injuries were extensive.  The medical examiner counted 114 
injuries, including around 25 fractures, all of which appeared to have been 
inflicted before death.  Blunt force trauma to the head and neck was a component 
of her death, but the medical examiner also found signs of asphyxiation.  Sigler 
had sustained multiple blunt force injuries to her head, face and neck, including 
abrasions and bruising on her neck, bruising around both eyes, an exposed 
fractured left cheekbone, a laceration of the forehead exposing the skull bone, a 
wounded left cheek, a partially torn-off right ear, internal bruising and bleeding in 
the muscles of the neck, and broken neck bones.  She also had blunt force injuries 
3 
 
on her back, chest, abdomen, arm and thigh.  Some of the wounds could have been 
inflicted with a piece of wooden stake. 
Sigler also suffered bruising, abrasions and lacerations in and around her 
genitalia, perineum and anus.  A small splinter of wood was found in her vagina.  
Her genital injuries could have been caused by penetration with a wooden stake 
but not by penetration with a human penis.   
On the night of December 29, defendant was at his friend Monty Gmur’s 
house in Long Beach.  He left around 10:00 p.m. with Warren Hardy and Jamelle 
Armstrong.  According to Gmur, the men were drunk and boisterous when they 
left his house, though they were walking without difficulty.   
The next day, defendant told Gmur he and the men he was with had killed 
“a white woman” after they left Gmur’s home.  After seeing a news report about 
Sigler’s murder, Gmur asked defendant for more information.  Defendant told 
Gmur the men had gone to the Wardlow Metro station, where they momentarily 
became separated.  On hearing a commotion across the way, defendant went to see 
what was happening, found Hardy “stomping” on a woman, and tried to get him to 
stop.  The victim had said she did not have any money; when they found her food 
stamps, Hardy became angry and beat her with a stick.  Defendant told Gmur he 
helped Hardy and Armstrong move the victim from the street, over a fence to the 
freeway embankment, but attributed all the violence committed to Hardy.  A few 
days later, Gmur contacted the police and told them what defendant had told him.   
Long Beach Police Detective Bryan McMahon interviewed defendant on 
January 6, 1999.  After initially denying all involvement, defendant said that he, 
Hardy and Armstrong, together with a man named Chris, had left Gmur’s house 
late on the night of December 29 after drinking together.  Chris soon left the 
group, and the remaining three took a Metro train to the Wardlow station.  As they 
walked toward Long Beach Boulevard, Hardy lagging behind, defendant heard a 
4 
 
woman screaming for help and turned to find Hardy punching her.  The woman 
momentarily escaped Hardy, running to a nearby fence.  The victim either climbed 
and fell over the fence or was lifted over it; Hardy then jumped the fence and 
dragged her into a drainage ditch area.  Defendant and Armstrong followed to find 
Hardy sitting on the woman’s chest, gesturing to his crotch and demanding she 
orally copulate him.  When defendant told Hardy that was disgusting and he could 
get AIDS from the blood on the victim’s face, Hardy got up, zipped his pants, and 
resumed beating the victim with a stick, as he had been doing (while also 
stomping on her) earlier.  Hardy and Armstrong then repeatedly jabbed the stick 
into the victim’s vagina. 
When Hardy and Armstrong stopped, defendant suggested they move the 
woman’s body.  Wrapping shirts around her, the three carried her farther up the 
freeway embankment.  They then collected her clothing in a bag and carried the 
bag and stick to a bus stop on Long Beach Boulevard, where Armstrong threw the 
stick into a field.  The three then rode the bus to Los Angeles, leaving the clothing 
in a trash can at a transfer point.  They went to Hardy’s girlfriend’s house, where 
they stayed until the next day, when defendant and Hardy returned to Long Beach 
for some clothing; there was blood on the clothes they had worn during the killing. 
On January 7, 1999, police arrested Hardy and Armstrong and searched 
their residences.  Later that day, after receiving information from Hardy and 
Armstrong, Detective McMahon reinterviewed defendant.  Without telling 
defendant what Hardy and Armstrong had said, McMahon informed defendant it 
was not entirely consistent with what defendant had told him.  “More [had] 
happened out there” than defendant had admitted, and defendant “needed to tell 
the truth and take responsibility” for his own actions.  Defendant nodded 
affirmatively and gave a significantly more incriminating version of events.  
5 
 
As the three men were walking to Long Beach Boulevard from the 
Wardlow station, defendant said, they were shouting “Happy New Year” and 
“Merry Christmas.”  They heard a woman yell back, “Yeah, Merry Christmas.  
Happy New Year.”  The men crossed the street and talked with the woman.  At 
some point Hardy asked the woman where her money was; she said she didn’t 
have any, but defendant started looking through her jacket pockets.  When she 
tried to get away, defendant and Armstrong wrestled her to the ground and started 
pulling her clothes off and going through them, looking for valuables.  Once she 
was naked, Hardy said, “We have to finish the job,” and he and Armstrong began 
stomping on the victim’s head and upper body.  Defendant and Armstrong then 
threw the victim over the fence onto the freeway embankment, the three men 
jumped the fence, and Armstrong dragged her farther off the road.   
Defendant, according to his January 7 statement, then unzipped his pants 
and raped the victim for a minute or less, while she struggled and Armstrong held 
one of her legs.  When he quit, Hardy approached and began beating the victim 
with a stick or stake on her head and neck.  Hardy and Armstrong again stomped 
on her, and defendant also did so, kicking or stomping on her upper body five or 
six times.  Finally, Hardy and Armstrong vaginally penetrated the victim with the 
stick.  The remainder of defendant’s January 7 statement accorded with his earlier 
account:  the three moved the victim’s body up the embankment, collected 
clothing from the scene, and took the bus to Los Angeles, discarding the stick and 
clothing as previously described.  The next day, Hardy spent food stamps they had 
taken from the victim at a Mexican market near his girlfriend’s apartment. 
In letters defendant wrote and sent after he was arrested, he said he did not 
kill the victim but kicked her in the head several times, and the victim was raped 
but he did not remember by whom.  
6 
 
The serial numbers of two food stamps that originated at a check cashing 
agency in Long Beach and were exchanged at Lorena’s Market in Los Angeles 
matched those on a food stamp booklet cover found at the crime scene.  DNA 
matching Hardy’s was found in saliva on the victim’s body.  DNA matching that 
of Sigler, the victim, was found on boots and pants defendant had left at Hardy’s 
girlfriend’s house, items of clothing similar to those Gmur had seen defendant 
wearing on the night of December 29.  Shoe prints at the crime scene were similar 
to the sole pattern of the boots.   
Defendant testified in his own defense.  In December 1998, he was living 
on the second floor of his mother’s house; Gmur lived next door.  On 
December 29, defendant drank a six-pack of Olde English 800 malt liquor before 
going to Gmur’s house around 4:00 p.m.  At Gmur’s house, defendant, with 
others, smoked marijuana and drank beer and a mixture of alcoholic beverages 
they called “gasoline.”  By 9:00 p.m., defendant was drunk and high.  The group, 
which included Hardy and Armstrong, drank some more, then finally left Gmur’s 
house.   
As defendant, Hardy and Armstrong walked along Wardlow Road toward 
Long Beach Boulevard, where they planned to catch a bus to Los Angeles, 
defendant heard a cry of pain from across the street.  He saw Hardy with a woman.  
Holding the woman’s jacket lapel, Hardy asked if she had any money, and when 
she said no, he accused her of lying, started looking through her pockets, and took 
the jacket off her to search it.  Armstrong held the victim to prevent her from 
leaving or resisting.  Though defendant told his friends to leave the woman alone, 
they both began to hit her face and head with their fists.  Eventually Hardy and 
Armstrong forced the victim to the ground and started kicking her.  Defendant 
continued to tell them to leave her alone. 
7 
 
Hardy and Armstrong threw the victim over a fence, then climbed over, as 
did defendant.  Bleeding and in pain, the victim asked for help in a voice “like a 
gurgle.”  Armstrong dragged her to the drainage ditch area, then kicked her in the 
head and neck while Hardy kicked her chest.  Armstrong and Hardy stripped the 
victim of her clothes, then beat and kicked her further.  When defendant again told 
them to stop and started toward the fence, Hardy gave him a threatening look, 
asked where he was going, and said, “We have to finish the job.”  Armstrong 
found a stick and started beating the victim with it while Hardy continued to kick 
her.  Eventually Armstrong used the stick to penetrate the victim vaginally; Hardy 
then grabbed the stick from Armstrong and did the same, while Armstrong kicked 
the victim. 
When Hardy and Armstrong stopped their assault, defendant could tell the 
victim was dead because she did not seem to be breathing and the “water-type 
sound coming out of her throat” had stopped.  Hardy said they had to “clean up.”  
Defendant and Armstrong wrapped shirts around the victim so as not to touch her, 
then carried her up the embankment.  They gathered her clothing and put it into a 
bag Hardy had.  The three men then went to the bus stop on Long Beach 
Boulevard, Armstrong threw the stick into a field, and they boarded a bus.  Hardy 
got into an altercation with a man on the bus, and when the driver threatened to 
call the police, defendant promised to keep Hardy calm.  They threw the bag of 
clothing into a trash can in Los Angeles. 
Defendant testified he had given Detective McMahon untrue versions of the 
events because he was scared and the detective kept calling him a liar.  He told a 
different story in the January 7 interview because he thought if he told the 
detectives what they wanted to hear he would be released sooner.  A detective told 
him Armstrong had said defendant raped the victim, so he repeated that false story 
to the detectives.  During the killing, defendant did nothing to stop Armstrong and 
8 
 
Hardy from attacking the victim because he was afraid if he did so, they would 
turn on him and attack him.   
Penalty Phase Evidence 
For the prosecution, Janisha Williams testified that defendant, along with 
Williams and about 25 of their friends, was a member of the Capone Thug 
Soldiers, a gang,2 and that initiation into this group required fighting two of the 
members for a few minutes.  Once, several members of Capone Thug Soldiers, 
including the witness and defendant, beat up a person “for the fun of it.”  On other 
occasions, Williams saw defendant hit people with sticks or knock riders off their 
bicycles, in one case injuring the rider.   
Monty Gmur testified that while defendant, Hardy and Armstrong were at 
his house on December 29, 1998, with a young man named Chris, they asked if 
they could use his back room to initiate Chris into their gang.  When Gmur 
refused, the four left, returning about 15 minutes later.  Gmur then heard Hardy on 
the telephone tell someone named Capone that “Chris is cool.  We’re going to call 
him Playboy.” 
Teddy Keptra, Penny Sigler’s son, testified to the impact of her murder on 
him.  Fifteen years old at the time of her death, he subsequently dropped out of 
high school and had difficulty holding a job.  He missed his mother and thought of 
her constantly. 
For the defense, Colette Burnett, defendant’s mother, testified defendant’s 
first stepfather, with whom he had had a good relationship, died in 1986, when 
defendant was nine years old.  Burnett had a breakdown in 1989; she was 
                                              
2  
Williams first denied Capone Thug Soldiers was a gang but, reminded of 
her contrary statement to police, then agreed it was.   
9 
 
hospitalized and unable to care for her children for several months, during which 
time defendant stayed with relatives and in foster care.  In late 1989, she began 
living with a man named Saleem, whom she married in 1991.  Saleem physically 
abused Burnett, despite defendant’s efforts to stop him.  Burnett herself sometimes 
hit defendant with a belt, broomstick or mop handle. 
Defendant’s younger brother testified Capone Thug Soldiers was a rap 
group, not a street gang, and consisted of only five or six people, including himself 
and defendant.  He also testified Saleem hit their mother on many occasions, and 
she had beaten her sons regularly. 
A former neighbor testified defendant used to babysit for her grandchildren, 
who lived with her.  On one occasion, she saw Saleem try to hit defendant and his 
brothers with a two-by-four. 
Psychiatrist Jack Rothberg interviewed defendant, administered 
psychological testing, and reviewed investigatory and trial materials relating to the 
case, including police reports and transcripts of defendant’s police interviews and 
trial testimony as well as statements to police by Hardy and Armstrong.  
Defendant had described his family history, including his abusive stepfather, and 
told Rothberg of a conflict with Armstrong and Hardy that occurred sometime 
before the killing of Sigler.  Defendant had accused Armstrong of stealing; in 
response, Armstrong, Hardy and “one of their gang friends” threatened defendant 
with a gun and told him to shut up about it.  From his examination of defendant 
and review of materials, Rothberg concluded that during the attack on Sigler 
defendant was frightened of Hardy and Armstrong, “was shocked as the events 
unfolded and was really paralyzed to do anything about it . . . as if he was on a fast 
moving train he just couldn’t stop or get off of.”  On cross-examination, Rothberg 
said he was aware that Armstrong and Hardy had told the police defendant raped 
the victim; he nonetheless believed defendant’s denial of having done so.   
10 
 
The parties stipulated defendant had no prior criminal convictions. 
DISCUSSION 
I.  Denial of Suppression Motion 
Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his confession to the police, 
arguing in part that he should have been readvised of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 at the time of his second interview with Long Beach 
Police Detective McMahon, which took place on January 7, 1999.  On appeal, 
defendant repeats his claim that Detective McMahon’s failure to repeat, on 
January 7, the Miranda advisements given defendant before his first interview on 
January 6 rendered statements made in the second interview inadmissible. 
At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective McMahon testified he 
first interviewed defendant on the afternoon of January 6, 1999, starting around 
1:00 p.m. and ending around 6:45 p.m.  McMahon advised defendant of his 
Miranda rights by reading aloud from a written form placed on the table between 
them, which defendant then signed, indicating he understood his rights and wished 
to speak with the detective.  McMahon first interviewed defendant about the Sigler 
murder without a tape recorder, then tape-recorded defendant’s statement.   
After giving his first statement, defendant remained in the interview room 
until 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. the next morning, when he was booked into the jail, except 
for a period of a couple of hours during which he accompanied officers to the 
crime scene and other locations.  While defendant was in the interview room, 
Detective McMahon and others, who were preparing to arrest Armstrong and 
Hardy and search their residences, came in occasionally to consult defendant on 
facts relevant to those preparations.  On January 7, defendant remained in the jail 
until about 3:30 p.m. when Detective McMahon, who had received additional 
11 
 
information from Armstrong and Hardy, had defendant brought back to the 
homicide interview room.   
Before the January 7 interview, Detective McMahon asked defendant if he 
remembered his rights from the day before.  Defendant said he did.  As on the 
previous day, McMahon first interviewed defendant without taping, then, 
beginning at 5:19 p.m., tape-recorded a statement.   
The trial court found defendant had understood and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights before each interview.  Following People v. Mickle (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 140, the court found the January 7 interview reasonably contemporaneous 
with the administration of Miranda advisements and defendant’s waiver of his 
rights on January 6, especially in light of the “continuous” law enforcement 
contact with defendant between the two events.   
“[R]eadvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is 
‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. 
[Citations.]  The courts examine the totality of the circumstances, including the 
amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the 
interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior 
advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, 
and any indicia that he subjectively understands and waives his rights.”  (People v. 
Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 170; accord, People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 
504.) 
Considering all the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that 
defendant’s January 7 interview was reasonably contemporaneous with his 
advisement and waiver of Miranda rights on January 6.  Approximately 27 hours 
passed between the advisements and waivers on January 6 and the interview on 
January 7, a period longer than the 18 hours of People v. Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
at pages 499-500, 504, but shorter than the 36 hours of People v. Mickle, supra, 54 
12 
 
Cal.3d at page 171, both of which found the events reasonably contemporaneous.  
As the trial court noted, defendant not only remained in custody but was, for much 
of the time, in contact with the investigating officers; even after the first interview 
ended, defendant took officers to locations he had mentioned in his first statement 
and answered their questions about Hardy’s and Armstrong’s residences.  Before 
agreeing to the second interview, moreover, defendant was asked if he 
remembered his Miranda rights, and he said he did.  The hearing record contains 
nothing suggesting to the contrary, i.e., that defendant had forgotten or no longer 
understood his rights. 
Defendant correctly observes that in People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
page 171, we noted, as a factor in the analysis, the defendant’s familiarity with the 
criminal justice system, a factor not shown to exist here.  Considering “the totality 
of the circumstances” (id. at p. 170), however, we do not agree the absence of this 
factor alone undermined the trial court’s finding that defendant had participated in 
the second interview voluntarily and with knowledge of his rights.  Considering 
defendant’s continuing contact and cooperation with police investigators through 
much of the time between advisement and the second interview, the passage of 
time was not so great as to create an inference that defendant, contrary to his own 
statement at the time, no longer understood or remembered the rights he had 
earlier waived. 
Admission of statements made in the second interview did not, therefore, 
violate defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, or his corresponding rights under 
the California Constitution. 
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II.  Failure to Record Entirety of Interview 
Defendant contends admission of statements he made to Detective 
McMahon in the interview of January 7, 1999, violated his due process rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
because McMahon did not tape-record the entire interview or the entirety of the 
January 6 interview.   
“Defendant argues due process requires application of a blanket rule 
requiring that all interrogations, including the Miranda warnings and waivers, be 
tape-recorded to facilitate later determinations of voluntariness.  He cites Stephan 
v. State (Alaska 1985) 711 P.2d 1156 in support.  While we have no wish to 
discourage law enforcement officials from recording such interrogations, we have 
already found that such a blanket rule is not required to protect the due process 
rights of those being interrogated (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 663-665 
[63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213]), and defendant fails to raise any argument 
convincing us that Holt was incorrectly decided.”  (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 557, 602-603.) 
As we explained in People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 664, federal 
due process is violated only when the government in bad faith fails to preserve 
evidently exculpatory evidence.  (See Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 
56-58; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 519.)  Defendant takes issue with 
Detective McMahon’s suppression hearing testimony that he does not tape-record 
the beginning of a suspect’s interview because “when you begin talking with 
somebody, you place a tape recorder right in front of their face, they have a 
tendency to clam up,” asserting that many police departments have hidden 
recording systems.  Defendant’s skepticism about McMahon’s motives, however, 
falls well short of a showing the detective acted in bad faith.  No violation of 
defendant’s due process rights is established. 
14 
 
III.  Sufficiency of Evidence for Personal Use Finding 
The guilt phase jury found true several allegations that defendant personally 
used a deadly weapon in the commission of the various crimes of which he was 
convicted.  These findings were, pursuant to sections 667.61, 12022 and 12022.3, 
used to determine and enhance defendant’s state prison sentence. 
The jury was instructed, with regard to the personal use allegations, that the 
only weapon to be considered was the stake or stick with which the victim had 
been beaten and sexually penetrated.  We agree with defendant that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the findings he personally used the stake or stick in the 
crimes he committed against Sigler.  In his testimony and in statements to the 
police and others, defendant admitted helping wrestle the victim to the ground and 
move her over the fence onto the freeway embankment, raping her, kicking or 
stomping on her head or upper body, and moving her body after the attack.  The 
victim’s beating and penetration with the wooden stake, however, defendant 
attributed to Hardy and Armstrong, and no other statements or testimony from 
percipient witnesses was introduced at defendant’s trial.  Sigler’s DNA was found 
on defendant’s boots and pants, and shoe prints at the scene were similar to those 
of defendant’s boots, but no physical evidence tied defendant specifically to the 
stake, which police did not recover. 
Even viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and presuming every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from that 
evidence (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 1199, 1206), we find nothing from which a rational trier of fact could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant personally wielded the stake in 
the attack on Sigler.  No witness testified defendant used the stake, no out-of-court 
statements to that effect were introduced, and no physical evidence indicated he 
had used it.  The evidence leaves it entirely possible defendant used the stake in 
15 
 
attacking Sigler, but does not support a finding of such use beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The Attorney General argues the jury could infer defendant’s personal use 
of the stake from his other violent criminal acts committed in concert with Hardy 
and Armstrong.  To do so, however, would go beyond deduction to speculation.  
That defendant kicked and raped the victim could lead a rational trier of fact to 
suppose he may also, like his companions, have beat her with the stake, but not to 
infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he did so. 
IV.  Jury Instructions on Torture and Related Offenses 
Defendant contends the jury instructions on torture and related offenses and 
allegations were prejudicially flawed in several respects.   
A.  Instruction on Torture as a Predicate Felony for First Degree 
Felony Murder 
In its instructions on felony murder as a theory of first degree murder, the 
trial court included torture (along with robbery, kidnapping, rape, and sexual 
penetration by foreign object) as a possible predicate felony upon which a guilty 
verdict could be based.  As the Attorney General concedes, this was error, as 
torture in violation of section 206 was not added to section 189’s list of predicate 
felonies for first degree murder until 1999, after Sigler’s murder.  (Stats. 1999, 
ch. 694, § 1, p. 5054.)3 
                                              
3  
Torture as a predicate for first degree felony murder is distinct from first 
degree murder as a killing “perpetrated by means of . . . torture” (§ 189), a theory 
on which the jury was also instructed.  “The elements of first degree murder by 
torture are:  ‘(1) acts causing death that involve a high degree of probability of the 
victim’s death; and (2) a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause 
extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or 
another sadistic purpose.  [Citations.]’  (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 
602 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492].)  The prosecution need not establish that 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
16 
 
We agree with the Attorney General that the error was harmless because the 
jury necessarily convicted defendant of first degree murder on other, proper 
felony-murder theories.  The jury found true special circumstance allegations that 
defendant murdered Sigler while engaged in the commission of robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, and foreign object rape.  Because a killing in commission of any 
of these offenses constitutes first degree murder under section 189, it follows the 
jury must unanimously have found defendant guilty of first degree murder on the 
valid theory the killing occurred during the commission of these felonies.  (See 
People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 315-316; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1, 38.)  The erroneous instruction thus did not affect the verdict and was, 
on any standard of prejudice, harmless. 
B.  Instructions on Intent to Inflict Pain 
Defendant contends the instructions erroneously allowed the jury to reach 
guilty verdicts on the offenses of torture and first degree murder on a theory of 
murder by torture, and a true finding on the torture-murder special circumstance, 
without finding defendant had personally intended to inflict extreme pain and 
suffering on the victim. 
The trial court instructed on the crime of torture (§ 206) through CALJIC 
No. 9.90, telling the jury that crime required proof that “[a] person inflicted great 
bodily injury” on the victim and that “[t]he person inflicting the injury did so with 
specific intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
the defendant intended to kill the victim (ibid.), but must prove a causal 
relationship between the torturous acts and the death [citation].”  (People v. 
Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 643.) 
17 
 
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.”4  Defendant is correct 
this instruction, by itself, does not require a finding that an aider and abettor to the 
torture personally harbored the specific intent that the torturer cause extreme pain 
to the victim.  The court’s instruction defining aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 
3.01), however, explained that defendant was liable on that theory only if he acted 
“[w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator” and “[w]ith the 
intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of 
the crime.”  And while the court did instruct on the natural and probable 
consequences extension of accomplice liability (see People v. McCoy (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 1111, 1117), telling the jury defendant was guilty of certain charged 
offenses if they were the natural and probable consequences of a target offense in 
which defendant might be found complicit, torture was not among the charged 
offenses listed in this instruction.5  The combination of instructions on torture and 
aiding and abetting thus ensured defendant could not be found guilty of torture as 
an aider and abettor without proof he knew and shared the actual torturer’s 
specific intent to inflict extreme pain and suffering on the victim.  (McCoy, at 
p. 1118.) 
The instruction on first degree murder perpetrated by torture (CALJIC No. 
8.24), similarly to the instruction on the offense of torture, required a finding that 
                                              
4  
The instruction closely reflects the language of section 206. 
5  
Defendant points out that in argument to the jury the prosecutor incorrectly 
included torture as one of the charged crimes to which the jury could apply the 
natural and probable consequences rule and that in her rebuttal argument the 
prosecutor suggested the intent to cause pain, required for torture, could have been 
held by “defendant or his accomplices.”  Defendant did not object to these 
statements at trial, however, and does not contend on appeal that they constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
18 
 
“[t]he perpetrator” of the murder acted with the “intent to inflict extreme and 
prolonged pain” on the victim (see fn. 3, ante).  Again, however, the aiding and 
abetting instruction (CALJIC No. 3.01) supplemented this direction by explaining 
an aider and abettor must know of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and 
must act with the intent of furthering the perpetrator’s crime.  Perhaps a juror 
could have read the inclusion of murder in the list of charged crimes subject to the 
natural and probable consequences rule as suggesting defendant could be guilty of 
murder by torture if he intentionally assisted Hardy or Armstrong in one of the 
listed target crimes, regardless of defendant’s personal intent regarding the 
victim’s torture, though such a convoluted interpretation of the instructions seems 
unlikely.  In any event, such reasoning would appear consistent with the natural 
and probable consequences rule itself, which extends accomplice liability to the 
perpetrator’s reasonably foreseeable crimes regardless of whether the defendant 
personally harbored the specific intent required for commission of the charged, 
nontarget offense.  (See People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118, fn. 1; 
People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) 
Nor did the court err in instructing on proof of defendant’s intent to inflict 
pain on the victim with respect to the torture-murder special circumstance.  The 
instruction explicitly required a finding “defendant” intended to inflict extreme 
pain and suffering on the victim, precluding the jury from resting a true finding on 
the theory that only Hardy or Armstrong actually intended to torture Sigler.6 
                                              
6  
Again, defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s statement to the 
contrary in jury argument and does not now contend it was misconduct. 
19 
 
C.  Instruction on Personal Intent to Kill Under the Torture-murder 
Special Circumstance 
The court did err, however, in its instructions on intent to kill as related to 
the torture-murder special circumstance.  That charge is not one of the 
felony-murder special circumstances set out in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).  
Rather, as set out separately in subdivision (a)(18) of the same statute, the torture-
murder special circumstance requires proof “[t]he murder was intentional and 
involved the infliction of torture.”  Under subdivision (c) of section 190.2, a 
defendant who aided and abetted the murder but was not the actual killer is 
generally eligible for capital punishment only if he or she acted with the intent to 
kill.  The exception in subdivision (d) of the same statute, allowing a true finding 
for a nonkiller defendant who acts as a “major participant” in a predicate felony 
and with “reckless indifference” to human life, applies only to the felony-murder 
special circumstances listed in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) and not to the 
torture-murder special circumstance set out in subdivision (a)(18). 
The trial court therefore erred in including torture in the list of felonies on 
which the jury could base a felony-murder special circumstance under section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(17), and as to which the jury needed to find only that 
defendant, if not the actual killer, acted as a major participant and with reckless 
indifference to human life.  This instruction (CALJIC No. 8.80.1 (1997 rev.)) was 
proper as to the charged felony-murder special circumstances based on the 
predicate felonies of robbery, kidnapping, rape, and foreign object rape (see 
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)-(C), (K)), but incorrectly described the mental state 
element of the torture-murder special circumstance (id., subd. (a)(18)), which 
requires the intent to kill, regardless of whether the defendant personally killed the 
victim or assisted an accomplice in doing so. 
20 
 
We are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Jennings, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 676-677; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689) 
that the court’s instructional error, the omission of an intent-to-kill requirement for 
an accomplice’s liability under the torture-murder special circumstance, was 
harmless.  The verdict form for the offense of murder asked the jury to make one 
of two findings, that defendant was “A.  The Actual Killer; or [¶] B. An Aider and 
Abettor and had the intent to kill; or was a Major Participant and acted with 
reckless indifference to human life.”  The jury selected finding B.  The jury 
thereby showed its reliance on an aiding and abetting theory.  At the same time, 
the jury made no finding—it was asked to make none—as to whether defendant 
aided and abetted his accomplices’ fatal acts with the intent to kill or merely with 
reckless indifference to the victim’s life.7 
No other instructions supplied the missing element.  As previously 
discussed, the standard instruction on aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01) was 
given, but it expressly related to “the commission of a crime,” not the truth of a 
special circumstance allegation; the jury was not likely to read it as displacing the 
instruction that expressly defined the required mental state for aiding and abetting 
acts constituting a special circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.80.1), which erroneously 
told them the torture-murder special circumstance, like the felony-murder special 
circumstances, could be found true even if defendant acted only with reckless 
indifference to human life.  An instruction on the torture-murder special 
                                              
7  
As to the torture-murder special circumstance itself, the jury found, in the 
ungrammatical and confusing language provided on the verdict form, “that the 
defendant, KEVIN DARNELL PEARSON, committed the murder of PENNY 
SIGLER was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.”  This falls short of 
a finding defendant personally intended to kill Sigler. 
21 
 
circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.81.18) required the jury to find “[t]he murder was 
intentional,” but not necessarily to find defendant personally harbored the intent to 
kill. 
The instructional conflation of the torture-murder special circumstance 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) with the felony-murder special circumstances (id., subd. 
(a)(17)) carried over to the jury arguments.  The prosecutor’s summation 
reinforced the instruction’s erroneous aspect.  In describing “the special 
circumstance rule,” the prosecutor told the jury they should find a special 
circumstance true if they found defendant had the intent to commit or aid and abet 
the commission of any of several felonies, including torture, and acted as an aider 
and abettor in the killing (she conceded it was unproven defendant was the actual 
killer) with either the intent to kill or reckless indifference to human life.  Defense 
counsel’s jury argument did nothing to explain the difference between torture and 
other felonies in this respect. 
Nor do we agree with the Attorney General that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of defendant’s intent to kill was 
overwhelming.  While the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding 
defendant intended to kill the victim had the jury made such a finding, the 
defendant’s intent was subject to substantial factual dispute at trial.  Given the 
evidence of defendant’s intoxication and the conflicting narratives, in testimony 
and prior statements, of what defendant personally did to the victim, it was a live 
issue for the jury whether he acted with the intent to kill her or merely with 
reckless indifference to her life, the distinction erroneously blurred in the 
instruction.  We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury, if correctly 
instructed, would have found defendant acted with the intent to kill. 
The torture-murder special circumstance must therefore be vacated.  The 
error does not, however, require reversal of the judgment of death, because 
22 
 
numerous special circumstance findings remain, unaffected by the instructional 
error.  “There is no likelihood that the jury’s consideration of the mere existence 
of the torture-murder special circumstance tipped the balance toward death.”  
(People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1139.)  In a later part of the discussion, 
however, we conclude the penalty judgment must be reversed because of error in 
death-qualifying the jury.  (See pt. IX., post.) 
V.  Instructions on Felony-murder Special Circumstances 
On the charged special circumstances of murder in the commission of 
robbery, kidnapping, rape, and foreign object rape (see § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)-
(C), (K)), the jury was correctly instructed through CALJIC No. 8.80.1 on 
defendant’s required mental state as an aider and abettor of the murder.  Defendant 
complains, however, that the proper effect of this instruction was “neutralized” by 
the giving of an additional instruction on the same charges, a version of CALJIC 
No. 8.81.17 that told the jury the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations 
required proof “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in 
or was an accomplice in the commission of” the listed predicate felonies, without 
any mention of a requirement that defendant, if an aider and abettor in the murder, 
intended to kill the victim or acted in reckless disregard of her life, as required 
under CALJIC No. 8.80.1.  Defendant contends that because of CALJIC No. 
8.80.1’s length and complexity, and the CALJIC No. 8.81.17 version’s relative 
shortness and simplicity, the jury was likely misled about the mental state required 
of a defendant who was not the actual killer. 
We disagree.  The instructions did not conflict, and CALJIC No. 8.80.1, 
while somewhat complicated, was not “impenetrable” or “unintelligible,” as 
defendant suggests.  The jury was not likely to understand the simpler CALJIC 
No. 8.81.17 as negating or displacing CALJIC No. 8.80.1, but rather as 
23 
 
supplementing it.  As the Attorney General suggests, the two instructions, read 
together, outline respectively the relationship of the murder to the predicate felony 
(CALJIC No. 8.81.17) and the mental state required for either an actual killer or 
an aider and abettor in the murder (CALJIC No. 8.80.1).  The instructions as a 
whole posed no reasonable likelihood (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525) 
of jury confusion on the point defendant identifies. 
VI.  Failure to Instruct on Voluntary Intoxication in Relation to the 
Specific Intent to Torture  
The offense of torture (§ 206) requires that the perpetrator act with “the 
intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, 
extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose . . . .”  As the Attorney General 
acknowledges, this mental state element describes a specific intent rather than 
general criminal intent.  (People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 451-452.) 
At defense request, the trial court instructed the jury, through CALJIC No. 
4.21.1, that they were to consider evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication 
in deciding whether defendant possessed a required specific intent.  The court’s 
instruction, however, expressly applied only to the charged offenses of murder, 
robbery, and kidnapping for rape.8  Defendant contends the omission of torture 
from this list of specific intent offenses on which his voluntary intoxication could 
be considered was prejudicial error. 
Although a trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a “pinpoint” 
instruction on the relevance of evidence of voluntary intoxication, “when it does 
                                              
8  
Without discussion of the point, counsel for both parties agreed with the 
trial court’s statement, during discussion of jury instructions, that only these three 
offenses involved specific intent, while the remaining counts charged general 
intent crimes.   
24 
 
choose to instruct, it must do so correctly.”  (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
1009, 1015.)  We apply the “reasonable probability” test of prejudice to the court’s 
failure to give a legally correct pinpoint instruction.  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 287, 362-363.)9 
No such reasonable probability of prejudice appears here.  While there was 
evidence defendant had consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana at Gmur’s house 
during the evening before the attack on Sigler, and some evidence defendant was 
intoxicated when he left Gmur’s house, the jury necessarily determined any such 
intoxication did not prevent defendant from forming the specific intent to 
permanently deprive Sigler of her property or the specific intent to rape her, 
mental states the jury was instructed were required for conviction of robbery and 
kidnapping for rape, respectively.  They reached these conclusions despite being 
instructed, through CALJIC No. 4.21.1, to consider voluntary intoxication on the 
question of whether defendant held these specific intents.  That a more fully 
instructed jury would nonetheless have determined defendant was too intoxicated 
to intend causing Sigler extreme pain and suffering when he participated or 
assisted in kicking and stomping on her, raping her, and sexually penetrating her 
repeatedly with a wooden stake is very unlikely.  The brutal beating and foreign 
object rape defendant and his companions inflicted on the victim would obviously 
cause her great pain, a fact of which even an intoxicated assailant could hardly be 
unaware.  Indeed, defendant testified he knew the victim was in pain during the 
                                              
9  
The failure to give a fully inclusive pinpoint instruction on voluntary 
intoxication did not, contrary to defendant’s contention, deprive him of his federal 
fair trial right or unconstitutionally lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof.  (See 
People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117-1120 [voluntary intoxication as 
negating specific intent sets out neither a defense nor a general principle of law on 
which instruction must be given sua sponte].) 
25 
 
assault as she pleaded for help in a voice “like a gurgle.”  We see no reasonable 
probability the jury, if instructed to consider evidence of intoxication on the 
question, would have found other than it did on defendant’s intent to cause the 
victim extreme pain and suffering. 
Defendant points out the torture count was also omitted from instructions 
on concurrence of act and specific intent (CALJIC No. 3.31) and on proof of 
specific intent by circumstantial evidence (CALJIC No. 2.02).  These additional 
asserted errors, defendant argues, closed “every doorway” against the jury’s 
consideration of voluntary intoxication on the question of defendant’s intent to 
cause the victim extreme pain.  Our conclusion on prejudice is unchanged, 
however.  Even had the doorway been fully opened to a determination that 
defendant’s voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent 
to cause the victim extreme pain, it is not reasonably likely the jury would have 
walked through it. 
VII.  Instructions Affecting Requirement of Proof Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt 
Defendant contends standard instructions given on consideration of 
circumstantial evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, 8.83.1) and other standard 
instructions on weighing and assessing evidence on various issues (CALJIC Nos. 
1.00, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 8.20) unconstitutionally vitiated the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (on which the jury was properly 
instructed through CALJIC No. 2.90) by suggesting factual questions were to be 
resolved on the basis of merely reasonable interpretations of the evidence or by the 
preponderance of evidence.  We have repeatedly rejected these contentions, and 
defendant adds nothing to warrant reexamining our conclusions.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 414-415; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 
26 
 
1037, 1058-1059; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 792; People v. Nakahara 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 713-714.) 
VIII.  Cumulative Prejudice 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of errors at the guilt and special 
circumstances phase of the trial was to render that trial fundamentally unfair.  We 
have concluded that the jury findings that defendant personally used a deadly 
weapon were unsupported by substantial evidence (pt. III., ante), and that the jury 
was misinstructed on torture as a predicate felony for first degree felony murder 
(pt. IV.A., ante), on the mental state requirement of the torture-murder special 
circumstance (pt. IV.C., ante), and on the relevance of voluntary intoxication to 
the offense of torture (pt. VI., ante).  While these conclusions require the personal 
use findings to be stricken and the torture-murder special circumstance reversed, 
even taken together they do not undermine the fairness of the trial as a whole or 
affect any other portion of the judgment. 
IX.  Erroneous Excusal of Prospective Jurors for Cause 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in granting five prosecution 
challenges for cause during the death-qualification portion of jury selection.  
Applying well-established constitutional standards, we agree as to one of the 
prospective jurors, identified here by her initials, C.O.  Because that error requires 
reversal of the judgment as to penalty, we do not address the propriety of excusing 
the other prospective jurors defendant identifies. 
“Past decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court establish 
that ‘[a] prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her 
views regarding capital punishment only if those views would “ ‘prevent or 
substantially impair’ ” the performance of the juror’s duties as defined by the 
court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.  (Wainwright v. Witt [(1985)] 469 U.S. 
27 
 
412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 
83, 121 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
408, 456 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)  “ ‘ “A prospective juror is properly 
excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing 
alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.”  [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]  In addition, ‘ “[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is 
fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court’s determination 
as to the prospective juror’s true state of mind when the prospective juror has 
made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.”  [Citations.]’ ”  [Citation.]’  
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 
519].)”  (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 958.)  When the juror has not 
made conflicting or equivocal statements regarding his or her ability to impose 
either a death sentence or one of life in prison without the possibility of parole, the 
court’s ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. 
Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 896-897.) 
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated the applicable 
principles as follows:  “First, a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury 
drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by 
selective prosecutorial challenges for cause.  Witherspoon [v. Illinois (1968)], 391 
U.S., at 521 . . . .  Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors who are 
able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes.  
[Wainwright v.] Witt, [supra,] 469 U.S., at 416 . . . .  Third, to balance these 
interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the 
death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the 
juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.  Id., at 424 
. . . .  Fourth, in determining whether the removal of a potential juror would 
vindicate the State’s interest without violating the defendant’s right, the trial court 
28 
 
makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed 
deference by reviewing courts.  Id., at 424-434 . . . .”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 
551 U.S. 1, 9.) 
On her questionnaire, C.O. indicated she wished to serve and thought she 
could be an impartial juror because she was unbiased and believed in “[f]airness to 
the defense and prosecution.”  Asked for her general feelings about the death 
penalty, she wrote she had none, adding that she had thought about the “negatives 
& positives but I came to no conclusions.”  She did not “yet” have a view on 
whether California should have a death penalty, but when asked if the state should 
“abolish” the penalty today, she checked “no” and explained that she thought the 
penalty might deter some people from committing crimes.  C.O. did not believe 
either death or life without parole should be mandatory in all murder cases, 
because “not all murder cases are the same.”  It would not be impossible for her to 
vote for or against death in every case, and she would not automatically vote for 
either sentence regardless of the evidence presented.   
Question No. 188 of the questionnaire was as follows:  “Some people say 
they support the death penalty; yet could not personally vote to impose it.  Do you 
feel the same way?”  C.O. checked “no” and wrote in explanation:  “I’m not sure 
where I stand but if I strongly felt strong about something, I would stand behind 
it.”   
Question No. 228 of the questionnaire was as follows:  “Please describe 
what you have seen, read, or heard about the death penalty from any source (TV, 
radio, friends, newspapers, etc.).”  C.O. wrote in response:  “I’ve heard that people 
are claiming this to be cruel & unusual punishment because that person actually 
knows when they are going to die.”  To a followup question asking for her 
reaction to what she had heard or read (question No. 228A), C.O. wrote:  “I don’t 
think that is cruel and unusual punishment.  But I’m uncertain if I approve or 
29 
 
disapprove w/ death sentence.”  A second followup (question No. 228B) asked 
whether she could set aside whatever she had heard or read and decide the 
punishment based only on the evidence at trial; C.O. checked “yes.” 
On examination by defense counsel, C.O. reiterated her questionnaire view 
that the death penalty was appropriate in some cases and, asked whether she could 
actually vote to impose it in an appropriate case, answered “yes.”  Presented with 
the premise that she and the other jurors had found defendant guilty of murder and 
had found true one or more allegations of “kidnap, torture, robbery, or sexual 
assault,” C.O. agreed that she would have an “open mind” and no “pre-set feeling” 
as to which penalty to impose. 
Asked what she meant by her answer to question No. 228A on the 
questionnaire (that she did not think the death penalty was cruel and unusual but 
was uncertain whether she approved or disapproved of it), C.O. said, “I think with 
that answer, because I’m uncertain of how I really feel about the death penalty, 
unless I had everything presented in front of me, so I don’t know what I really 
meant on that one.”  On further questioning by defense counsel, she reiterated that 
she could vote for death in an appropriate case and agreed her uncertainty related 
to the appropriateness of the penalty in a given case, which she could not decide 
without hearing all the facts. 
The prosecutor pressed C.O. to say whether she was “for or against the 
death penalty,” adding that it would be unfair to both parties to seat her as a juror 
“if you truly, at this point in time, don’t know what you will do.”  C.O. answered, 
“I think with that, I’d have to be an actual juror to see what’s presented for me.  
I’m not saying that I can’t vote for it or that I wouldn’t vote for it, but I think that I 
have to have all of the evidence before I can say anything concerning this case 
itself.” 
30 
 
The prosecutor said she understood, “[b]ut this is the time and place, we 
need to know whether or not you actually can vote for the death penalty” or 
whether C.O. was a person who, while supporting the penalty in the abstract, 
could never vote for it.  C.O. answered, “No, I could vote for it.”  To the 
prosecutor’s statement she did not have the feeling “that you are sure that you 
can,” C.O. responded, “I am positive that I could.”  When the prosecutor asked for 
her general feelings about the death penalty, C.O. said, “in some cases it should be 
given to people,” giving as a possible example the murder of a child. 
Finally, the prosecutor questioned C.O. about her answer to question 
No. 188 (quoted above), saying that “what we need to know right now is, you 
know, if you are for the death penalty and if you could vote for it or if you’re not 
and you can’t.”  C.O. answered, “All I can say to that is that I can vote for it.” 
Over defense objection, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s challenge 
for cause.  Expressly relying on the guidance of People v. Guzman (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 915, which the trial court read as indicating prospective jurors may be 
excused “due to their equivocal views on capital punishment,” the court found 
C.O. had given “equivocal” and “conflicting” responses about capital punishment, 
“and, therefore, she would not be an appropriate juror in this particular case.”  
Later, in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the court focused particularly 
on C.O.’s answer to question No. 188 of the questionnaire.  “Given that she has no 
such strong feelings about the death penalty, the response to question 188 
seemingly supports this court’s finding regarding her state of mind that she is 
equivocal on her equivocal view on capital punishment and conflicting and 
equivocal responses regarding the imposition of the penalty of death.  [¶] . . .  
[¶] Since this juror had no strong feelings on the death penalty, by her own 
statements, she could not stand behind them.  Therefore, when asked whether 
she’s one that supports the death penalty, but yet couldn’t impose it, this juror 
31 
 
responded quote, ‘I’m not sure where I stand,’ close quote.  [¶] This series of 
responses, coupled with her affirmation of the responses during voir dire, gives 
this court a view of her state of mind, shows an equivocal view on the imposition 
of the death penalty, and supports this court’s grant of a challenge for cause.”   
We conclude the record does not support the trial court’s finding that 
C.O.’s views regarding the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of her duties as a juror.  Contrary to the trial court’s impression, C.O. 
made no conflicting or equivocal statements about her ability to vote for a death 
penalty in a factually appropriate case.  In the absence of such contradictions or 
equivocation, the trial court’s ruling is reviewed for substantial evidence (People 
v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 896-897), of which we find none. 
None of C.O.’s answers on the questionnaire or in voir dire suggested 
views that would substantially impair her ability to perform her duties by voting to 
impose the death penalty in an appropriate case.  Her general views on the death 
penalty were vague and largely unformed, though she thought it sometimes served 
the purpose of deterrence and so should not be abolished.  But on whether she 
could vote to impose it, her responses were definite and consistent.  According to 
the questionnaire, she would not vote automatically for life in prison regardless of 
the evidence; she would not find it impossible to vote for death in every case; she 
could set aside whatever she had heard about the death penalty outside of court 
and decide defendant’s punishment based only on the evidence at trial; and she 
was not a person who, while supporting the death penalty, could not vote to 
impose it.  On voir dire, C.O. repeated several times that she could vote for death 
in an appropriate case.  She never wavered on this point, and when the prosecutor 
expressed skepticism, C.O. reassured her, “I am positive that I could.” 
The trial court thought C.O. disqualified because of her “equivocal views 
on capital punishment,” citing People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, as 
32 
 
authority.  But Guzman is inapposite.  There, both disputed prospective jurors had 
made statements indicating they would be unable to vote for death and would 
instead choose life imprisonment in every case.  (Id. at pp. 955-956.)  In upholding 
the challenges for cause, we rejected the defense argument that these statements, 
“because preceded by statements such as ‘I believe’ and ‘I think,’ ” were 
insufficient to support a finding of substantial impairment.  (Id. at p. 956.)  The 
prospective jurors’ statements showed their substantial impairment in spite of the 
statements’ qualified nature, not because of it.   
Guzman does not stand for the idea that a person is substantially impaired 
for jury service in a capital case because his or her ideas about the death penalty 
are indefinite, complicated or subject to qualifications, and we do not embrace 
such a rule.  As the high court recently reminded us, “a criminal defendant has the 
right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of 
capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause.”  (Uttecht v. 
Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.)  Personal opposition to the death penalty is not 
itself disqualifying, since “[a] prospective juror personally opposed to the death 
penalty may nonetheless be capable of following his oath and the law.”  (People v. 
Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699.)  It follows the mere absence of strong, 
definite views about the death penalty is not itself disqualifying, since a person 
without strong general views may also be capable of following his or her oath and 
the law.   
To the extent the trial court excused C.O. because of what the court 
characterized as “equivocal” views on the merits of the death penalty itself, the 
court rested its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.  C.O.’s possession of such 
views (more accurately described as vague, indefinite or unformed) did not itself 
disqualify her from service in this case, so long as she could follow her oath to 
33 
 
conscientiously consider the death penalty.  As explained above, her responses on 
that point were unequivocally affirmative. 
As already noted, the trial court, in denying defendant’s motion for a new 
trial, focused particularly on C.O.’s answer to question No. 188 of the 
questionnaire.10  The trial court expressed concern that because C.O. had no strong 
views on the death penalty and was not sure where she stood on it, she would not 
“stand behind it,” as she wrote she would stand behind something about which she 
felt strongly.  This concern was misplaced, however, as the role of a capital case 
juror is not to “stand behind” either penalty but to assess the evidence, weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, deliberate with the other jurors, and 
choose the appropriate penalty.  (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 41.)  
On her ability to perform this duty, C.O.’s responses were clear and unequivocal.   
To exclude from a capital jury all those who will not promise to immovably 
embrace the death penalty in the case before them unconstitutionally biases the 
selection process.  So long as a juror’s views on the death penalty do not prevent 
or substantially impair the juror from “conscientiously consider[ing] all of the 
sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate” (People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1146), the juror is not disqualified by his or her 
failure to enthusiastically support capital punishment. 
Observing that C.O. said she would like to serve as a juror, the Attorney 
General argues the trial court may have determined from her response to question 
                                              
10  
For convenience, we repeat the question and answer.  Question No. 188 
read:  “Some people say they support the death penalty; yet could not personally 
vote to impose it.  Do you feel the same way?”  C.O. checked “no” and wrote in 
explanation:  “I’m not sure where I stand but if I strongly felt strong about 
something, I would stand behind it.” 
34 
 
No. 188 and her other answers that she “was someone who was uncertain about 
whether she could personally impose the death penalty but seemingly gave correct 
answers because she wanted to sit on the jury.”  This hypothesis fails in two 
respects.  First, the trial court made no such finding about C.O.’s state of mind; 
while the court at one point mentioned C.O.’s desire to serve as a juror, the court 
did not find she was giving deceptive responses in order to do so.  Second, nothing 
in C.O.’s response to question No. 188 indicated uncertainty about her ability to 
impose the death penalty.  Asked whether she was a person who, while supporting 
the penalty, could not personally vote to impose it, C.O. answered “no,” 
suggesting, consistent with her other responses, that she could personally impose 
the penalty.  She elaborated by explaining that, unlike the type of person identified 
in the question, she stood behind her strong beliefs—she would not say one thing 
and do another.  In other responses, C.O. consistently indicated she could and 
would conscientiously consider both possible penalties and could personally vote 
to impose death if she found it appropriate to the case, going so far as to tell the 
prosecutor she was “positive” she could vote to impose the death penalty.  Her 
answer to question No. 188 did not contradict or undermine these responses. 
We conclude the trial court’s finding that C.O.’s views on imposition of the 
death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties 
as a juror is not supported by substantial evidence.  By erroneously excusing C.O. 
for cause, the trial court denied defendant the impartial jury to which he was 
entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at pp. 6, 9.)  “Furthermore, the 
governing high court decisions also establish that although such an error does not 
require reversal of the judgment of guilt or the special circumstance findings, the 
error does compel the automatic reversal of defendant’s death sentence, and in 
that respect the error is not subject to a harmless-error rule, regardless whether the 
35 
 
prosecutor may have had remaining peremptory challenges and could have 
excused Prospective Juror [C.O.].”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 966.) 
X.  Determinate Sentencing Issues 
Defendant contends the trial court erred under section 654 in imposing 
multiple enhancements for the use of a single deadly weapon, the stake with which 
Sigler was beaten and sexually assaulted, imposing sentence on both forcible rape 
in concert (count 4; § 264.1) and forcible rape (count 5; § 261), imposing sentence 
on both foreign object penetration in concert (count 6; § 264.1) and foreign object 
penetration (count 7; § 289, subd. (a)(1)), and imposing sentence for any felony 
except first degree murder. 
As we earlier concluded (pt. III., ante), the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury findings that defendant personally used the stake in any of the 
charged felonies.  Because those findings must be vacated, we need not decide 
whether sentence was properly imposed on more than one personal use 
enhancement. 
The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred in imposing sentence 
for both forcible rape in concert (count 4) and forcible rape (count 5); we agree, as 
the evidence showed only a single indivisible act of intercourse.  We also conclude 
section 654 did not prohibit sentencing defendant on both foreign object 
penetration in concert (count 6) and foreign object penetration (count 7).  
According to defendant’s testimony, Hardy and Armstrong each sexually 
assaulted Sigler with the stake, in separate penetrations; the perpetrators of these 
distinct crimes could each be punished for them.  (See People v. Harrison (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 321, 335-338 [§ 654 did not bar perpetrator’s punishment for each of 
three forcible sexual penetrations committed in sequence].)  Thus, two separate, 
individually punishable criminal acts were committed, and defendant was found 
36 
 
criminally liable for each of them under the law of complicity.  Punishing him for 
both does not violate section 654.   
Finally, defendant is clearly wrong that the trial court could sentence him 
only on murder.  The robbery and sexual assaults were pursued with different 
criminal objectives than the murder and could be separately punished.  (People v. 
Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1207-1209, 1216.) 
Because the trial court must resentence defendant in a manner consistent 
with this opinion (vacating the personal use enhancements and staying imposition 
of sentence for one count under § 654), we need not decide whether the court’s 
imposition of the upper term on counts 2, 4, 6 and 7 violated defendant’s jury trial 
rights under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, or whether any such 
error was harmless.  On remand, the trial court is to exercise its sentencing 
discretion as described in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 843-852. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is reversed as to the sentence of death, the jury’s findings 
that defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§§ 667.1, 12022, 
12022.3), the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance of murder with the 
infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), and the state prison sentence.  The 
judgment is otherwise affirmed.  The case is remanded to the trial court for a new 
penalty trial and for resentencing in a manner consistent with our opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Pearson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S120750 
Date Filed: January 9, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Tomson T. Ong 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Conrad Petermann, under appointment by the Supreme court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Yun K. 
Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Conrad Petermann 
Law Office of Conrad Petermann 
323 East Matilija Street, Suite 110 
Ojai, CA  93023 
(805) 646-9022 
 
Yun K. Lee 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2051