Title: Askari Abdullah Muhammad f/k/a Thomas Knight v. State of Florida (Corrected Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-2015
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 3, 2014

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-2105 
____________ 
 
ASKARI ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD f/k/a THOMAS KNIGHT,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[December 19, 2013] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Askari Abdullah Muhammad f/k/a Thomas Knight,1 a prisoner under 
sentence of death, appeals from the denial of his successive motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Muhammad filed the 
instant successive postconviction proceeding after Governor Rick Scott signed a 
death warrant on October 21, 2013.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 
                                          
 
 
1.  Muhammad‟s original name was Thomas Knight.  While imprisoned, 
Knight adopted the new name of Askari Abdullah Muhammad for primarily 
religious reasons.  See Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 970 n.1 (Fla. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).  We refer to him herein as Muhammad.  
 
- 2 - 
circuit court‟s order denying postconviction relief on the claims raised in his 
successive postconviction motion, but we reverse the court‟s order denying 
Muhammad‟s public records request to the Florida Department of Corrections 
(DOC) for copies of his own inmate and medical records, and we order immediate 
transmission of copies of those records to Muhammad‟s counsel.   
BACKGROUND 
 
Muhammad was convicted of the October 12, 1980, first-degree murder of 
correctional officer James Burke.  Burke was fatally stabbed by Muhammad while 
he was incarcerated on death row for the murder of a Miami couple.2  Burke was 
routinely taking death row inmates to be showered and, when he unlocked 
Muhammad‟s cell, Muhammad attacked him with a knife made from a sharpened 
spoon.  Burke died after suffering more than a dozen wounds.  It was reported that 
Muhammad became upset when he was not allowed to see a visitor because he had 
refused to shave without a special exemption.  Muhammad was heard to say he 
would have to start “sticking people.”  See Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 
970 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987). 
                                          
 
 
2.  When the murder of Burke occurred, Muhammad was on death row 
pursuant to two death sentences for the murders of Lillian Gans and Sydney Gans.  
See Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 1998) (affirming death sentences 
imposed upon resentencing ordered by a federal appeals court); see also Knight v. 
State, 338 So. 2d 201, 205 (Fla. 1976) (affirming convictions and sentences).  
 
- 3 - 
In 1981, prior to trial, Muhammad‟s counsel obtained appointment of two 
mental health experts to examine him as to competence, but he consistently refused 
to cooperate with them.  The court later added a third competency expert, 
psychiatrist Jamil Amin, M.D., who was originally appointed as a defense advisor 
but was later appointed to act as a competency expert.  Muhammad did meet with 
Dr. Amin and, based on an opinion from him that Muhammad was suffering from 
a schizophreniform illness but was competent to stand trial, the trial court adjudged 
Muhammad competent to proceed.   
Muhammad sought to represent himself at trial but his request to proceed 
pro se was denied by the first judge assigned to the case.  After a second judge was 
assigned to the case, Muhammad again asked to represent himself, but was denied.  
The case proceeded to trial but ended in a mistrial.  That trial judge subsequently 
recused himself and Muhammad then proceeded to a second trial.  He again sought 
to represent himself and the successor judge allowed him to appear pro se with 
standby counsel.  Muhammad was convicted and waived a jury recommendation in 
the penalty phase.  The trial court found nothing in mitigation, and found three 
aggravating factors: (1) the defendant was under a sentence of imprisonment, 
§ 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); (2) the defendant had been convicted of a prior 
capital felony, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat.; and (3) the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat.  Muhammad was sentenced 
 
- 4 - 
to death and this Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence in 
Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d at 976.3  
Muhammad filed an initial postconviction motion under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising eighteen claims.  Relief was denied and 
Muhammad appealed the denial of fifteen claims.4  On appeal, this Court affirmed 
                                          
 
 
3.  The claims on direct appeal were: (1) the trial court erred in finding 
Muhammad competent without sufficient facts; (2) the trial court erred in allowing 
him to represent himself without first determining competency to waive counsel 
and to represent himself; (3) the trial court erred in preventing him from presenting 
evidence of insanity because he refused to be examined, in violation of his 
constitutional rights; (4) the trial court erred in finding as aggravating factors that 
Muhammad was under a sentence of imprisonment when he committed the murder 
and that he had a conviction for a prior felony; and (5) the trial court erred in 
failing to consider Muhammad‟s mental status in mitigation. 
 
4.  The claims appealed after denial of the initial postconviction motion 
were: (1) summary denial was erroneous; (2) a reliable transcript and critical 
records were not included in the record on appeal; (3) Muhammad was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 
(1975); (4) Muhammad‟s constitutional rights were violated when the appointed 
mental health expert failed to conduct a competent evaluation, causing counsel to 
render ineffective assistance; (5) Muhammad was denied effective assistance of 
counsel when defense counsel was ordered not to present an insanity defense; 
(6) Muhammad was tried while not legally competent; (7) the death sentence was 
unreliable because Muhammad was not competent to waive his sentencing jury, 
and no advisory jury was employed; (8) Muhammad was denied his rights as a pro 
se defendant at both phases of the trial; (9) State misconduct violated 
Muhammad‟s right to a fundamentally fair and reliable trial and sentencing; 
(10) the trial court‟s denial of Muhammad‟s motions for change of venue and for 
individual voir dire deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial jury; 
(11) Muhammad was indicted by a biased grand jury; (12) the trial court erred in 
failing to consider Muhammad‟s mental deficiencies as mitigating circumstances 
and in considering nonstatutory aggravating factors; (13) the trial court 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof with regard to the appropriateness of 
 
- 5 - 
summary denial of most of the claims as procedurally barred.  Muhammad v. State, 
603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992).  However, we reversed summary denial of the 
claim that the State failed to disclose exculpatory statements concerning 
Muhammad‟s mental state at the time of the crime in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  
Muhammad, 603 So. 2d at 489-90.  
On remand to the circuit court, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court vacated Muhammad‟s death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing.  
The State appealed the grant of a new sentencing hearing and Muhammad cross- 
appealed the claim that the trial court failed to consider the impact of the evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing on the guilt phase of his trial.  See State v. 
Knight, 866 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2003).  We affirmed the portion of the trial court‟s 
order denying the motion to vacate Muhammad‟s conviction, but reversed that 
portion of the order vacating his death sentence.  Id. at 1210.  In reversing the order 
granting a new penalty phase, we concluded that even if Muhammad had clearly 
proven that certain employee and inmate statements from the DOC investigatory 
                                                                                                                                        
a life sentence; (14) the jury and judge improperly considered certain “victim 
impact” information; and (15) the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating 
circumstance was applied in violation of Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 
(1988).  Muhammad combined and rearranged some of his claims on appeal, and 
did not appeal his claims that the trial court failed to apply the law of the case and 
collateral estoppel.  See Muhammad, 603 So. 2d at 488-89 & n.1. 
 
- 6 - 
file were willfully or inadvertently withheld, Muhammad failed to prove that he 
was prejudiced by the alleged suppression.  The seven unattributed, unsigned, and 
undated statements contained limited and conflicting information concerning 
Muhammad‟s state of mind around the time of the murder, and they were 
cumulative to information in employee depositions that were turned over to 
Muhammad, but which he did not attempt to use to present any mitigation.5  Id. at 
1200-02.  We also denied Muhammad‟s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging 
five claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.6  Id. at 1203 & n.9.  The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari review in Muhammad v. Florida, 541 U.S. 1066 
(2004). 
                                          
 
 
5.  While the case was on remand, Muhammad moved for a determination of 
competency and the court appointed two experts on February 10, 1999.  He was 
found to be competent by one of the experts, but the record does not contain the 
report of the second expert or an order of the court on the issue.  See Muhammad 
v. McDonough, No. 3:05-CV-62-J-32, 2008 WL 818812, *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 
2008), certificate of appealability denied, 554 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2009), cert. 
denied, 559 U.S. 906 (2010). 
 
6.  The claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were: (1) failure 
to appeal the claim that the trial court instructed standby counsel not to assist 
Muhammad; (2) failure to appeal the claim that Muhammad was not present at 
critical stages of the proceedings, and the trial court engaged in ex parte 
communications with the State; (3) failure to appeal denial of meaningful access to 
the law library to prepare defenses; (4) failure to appeal the trial court‟s denial of 
change of venue and sequestered, individual voir dire, thus denying a fair and 
impartial jury; and (5) failure to appeal the claim that Muhammad was 
unconstitutionally indicted by a biased grand jury.  See Knight, 866 So. 2d at 1203 
n.9. 
 
- 7 - 
In 2005, Muhammad filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal 
district court alleging ten claims.7  Muhammad v. McDonough, No. 3:05-CV-62-J-
32, 2008 WL 818812, *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2008).  The federal court denied an 
evidentiary hearing on the claims, id. at *8, *22, and denied habeas corpus relief.  
Id. at *48.  Muhammad sought a certificate of appealability from the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals on five of the grounds previously pursued in the state 
                                          
 
 
7.  The claims filed in federal district court were: (1) Muhammad‟s  
constitutional rights were violated because he was forced to undergo criminal 
justice proceedings although he was not legally competent; (2) he was denied the 
assistance of counsel (with four subclaims); (3) his constitutional rights were 
violated and he was denied effective assistance of counsel when the court ordered 
his defense counsel not to present an insanity defense; (4) he was denied his rights 
as a pro se defendant in violation of the Constitution (with eight subclaims); (5) the 
State‟s misconduct throughout the proceedings denied him his rights to a 
fundamentally fair and reliable capital trial and sentencing guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution (with three subclaims); (6) his death sentence is not 
reliable because he was not competent to waive his sentencing jury, the trial court 
failed to conduct the penalty phase before a sentencing jury, and the resulting 
sentence violates the Constitution; (7) the trial court erred by failing to consider his 
mental deficiencies as nonstatutory mitigation and erred in considering 
nonstatutory aggravating factors in violation of the Constitution; (8) he was 
deprived of his constitutional rights because the mental health expert retained to 
evaluate him before trial failed to conduct a professionally competent and 
appropriate evaluation, and the State‟s failure to disclose crucial information 
caused defense counsel to render ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of a 
fair, individualized, and reliable sentencing proceeding (with three subclaims); 
(9) the trial court‟s failure to grant his motions for change of venue and for 
individualized sequestered jury voir dire deprived him of his constitutional right to 
a fair and impartial jury; and (10) his constitutional rights were violated because no 
reliable transcript of his capital trial exists and critical records were not included in 
the record on appeal. 
 
- 8 - 
courts and federal district court.8  The Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of 
appealability in Muhammad v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al., 554 
F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 906 (2010), holding that 
Muhammad failed to show the denial of a constitutional right in connection with 
any of the claims for which he sought the certificate of appealability. 
On July 28, 2008, Muhammad filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief in the state circuit court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 
raising only one claim, a challenge to the constitutionality of Florida‟s lethal 
injection procedures which were in effect on that date.  Muhammad contended that 
the lethal injection procedures created a risk of unnecessary pain and did not call 
for a medical determination of unconsciousness, which violated the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17, of the 
Florida Constitution.  Muhammad sought an evidentiary hearing to present 
testimony of certain DOC personnel and an anesthesiologist who served on the 
Governor‟s Commission on Administration of Lethal Injection, which was created 
                                          
 
 
8.  The five grounds for which he sought a certificate of appealability were: 
(1) he was not competent to stand trial; (2) his rights under Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 
were violated; (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that he could 
not present evidence of insanity; (4) the State interfered with his right to consult 
with counsel; and (5) he was denied his right to evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963).  See Muhammad v. Sec‟y, Dep‟t. of Corr., 554 F.3d 949, 953 
(11th Cir. 2009). 
 
- 9 - 
after the execution of Angel Diaz in 2006.  The circuit court summarily denied the 
claim without an evidentiary hearing.   
On appeal, we affirmed, noting that Muhammad was raising the same claims 
and proposing essentially the same evidence that was presented in earlier 
proceedings in which we held the same lethal injection procedures to be 
constitutional.  See Muhammad v. State, 22 So. 3d 538, 2009 WL 3807205 at *1 
(Fla. 2009) (table) (citing Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1080 (Fla. 2008), 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1161 (2009); Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1130 (Fla.), 
cert. denied, 557 U.S. 960 (2009)).  We further stated, “The Court has also 
repeatedly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to Florida‟s August 2007 
revised lethal injection protocol.”  Muhammad, 22 So. 3d 538, 2009 WL 3807205 
at *2 (citing Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 198 (Fla.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2839 (2009); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
28 (2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 334, 353 (Fla. 2007), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2485 (2008)).   
With this background in mind, we turn to Muhammad‟s successive motion 
for postconviction relief filed in the circuit court after Governor Scott signed the 
death warrant in this case on October 21, 2013.  Pursuant to the circuit court‟s 
scheduling order, on October 29, 2013, Muhammad filed a successive motion to 
vacate his judgments of conviction and sentence of death in which he raised seven 
 
- 10 - 
claims.9  Muhammad also filed motions for disclosure of public records, discovery, 
and for a stay.  The State filed responses to the motions and to the postconviction 
claims and, on October 31, 2013, the circuit court held a combined motion hearing 
and case management conference.  The court denied the motions and issued a 
written order summarily denying the postconviction claims on November 4, 2013.  
Notice of appeal was timely filed. 
                                          
 
 
9.  The postconviction claims raised in the circuit court in this proceeding  
were: (1) Muhammad is being denied his rights to due process and equal protection 
as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution because 
access to the files and records pertaining to his case in the possession of certain 
state agencies have been withheld in violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes, and 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852; (2) the current, revised procedure that the State of Florida 
utilizes for lethal injection using midazolam hydrochloride as the first drug 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of  article I, section 17, of the 
Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
(3) use of the current three-drug lethal injection procedure, rather than a one-drug 
lethal injection procedure, creates a substantial risk of serious harm and thus 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution; (4) the clemency process in Muhammad‟s case was 
applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner and deprived him of due process in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution; (5) because 
of the inordinate length of time that Muhammad has spent on death row, adding his 
execution to that punishment would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and binding norms of international law; (6) portions of the “Timely 
Justice Act of 2013,” chapter 2013-216, Laws of Florida, are unconstitutional 
because they violate separation of powers in violation of article II, section 3, of the 
Florida Constitution; and (7) Muhammad is exempt from execution under the 
Eighth Amendment because he suffers from such severe mental illness that death 
can never be an appropriate punishment.  
 
 
- 11 - 
A majority of the Court determined that Muhammad‟s claim as to the 
substitution of a new drug, midazolam hydrochloride, as the first drug in the three-
drug lethal injection protocol warranted an evidentiary hearing.  We therefore 
granted a stay of execution until December 27, 2013, and temporarily relinquished 
jurisdiction for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue of 
the safety and efficacy of the new drug in the lethal injection procedure.10  We also 
directed the DOC to produce correspondence and documents that it had received 
from the manufacturer of midazolam hydrochloride, including those materials 
addressing any safety and efficacy issues. 
Pursuant to this Court‟s order, an evidentiary hearing was held on November 
21-22, 2013, during which Muhammad presented the testimony of Dr. Mark Heath.  
The State presented the testimony of Dr. Roswell Lee Evans and Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Inspector Jonathan Feltgen.  Following 
the hearing, the circuit court entered an order on November 25, 2013, finding that 
midazolam hydrochloride is an FDA-approved drug routinely used as a pre-
anesthetic sedative and as an anesthetic in minor surgical procedures.  The circuit 
court concluded that the evidence was undisputed that the dosage called for in the 
revised lethal injection protocol, 500 milligrams, would induce not only 
                                          
 
 
10.  Justice Canady dissented to the relinquishment, joined by Chief Justice 
Polston.   
 
- 12 - 
unconsciousness when properly administered, but would also result in respiratory 
arrest and ultimately death.  The circuit court found that “a properly administered 
dosage of 500 milligrams would render a person insensate, and thus, not in any 
pain, during the period when the part of the brain that drives breathing stops 
working.”  The court further found that no evidence was presented that the 
movement of William Happ‟s head, noted by some observers during his October 
2013 execution under the revised 2013 lethal injection protocol, demonstrated that 
he was experiencing any pain or suffering, and Muhammad‟s expert witness 
“acknowledged the movement during Happ‟s execution did not mean that he was 
actually harmed.”  Thus, the circuit court rejected the claim that use of midazolam 
hydrochloride as the first drug in the three-drug lethal injection protocol would 
result in a substantial risk of serious harm and accordingly held that the protocol 
was not unconstitutional. 
Jurisdiction has returned to this Court and the parties have submitted 
supplemental briefs on this issue.  We now consider all pending issues on appeal.  
We turn first to Muhammad‟s claim that use of midazolam hydrochloride as the 
first drug in Florida‟s 2013 three-drug lethal injection protocol violates the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the United States Constitution 
or the Florida Constitution.11 
                                          
 
 
11.  See amend. VIII, U.S. Const.; article I, § 17, Fla. Const.  
 
- 13 - 
ANALYSIS 
I.  Constitutionality of Florida’s Lethal Injection Procedures 
Muhammad contends that prior to the evidentiary hearing on the issue of the 
safety and efficacy of midazolam hydrochloride, the circuit court erred in several 
respects in its evidentiary rulings.  Muhammad contends that the hearing granted to 
him was not full and fair because most of his proposed witnesses were stricken, the 
subpoenas issued to two news reporters who observed the Happ execution in 
October 2013 were quashed, and he was denied a continuance to further prepare 
his expert witness, Dr. Mark Heath.  However, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in any of these rulings.   
A.  Ruling Quashing Journalists‟ Subpoenas and Excluding News Articles 
The circuit court quashed subpoenas issued by Muhammad‟s counsel to 
Associated Press reporter Brendan Farrington and to Gainesville Sun newspaper 
reporter Morgan Watkins based on the qualified journalist‟s privilege set forth in 
section 90.5015, Florida Statutes (2013).  The court also excluded evidence of 
news articles concerning information gathered by the two reporters while they 
were observing the October 2013 Happ execution, in which the revised protocol 
was followed for the first time.  In the articles, the reporters noted that Happ 
blinked and moved his head several times in the minutes following introduction of 
midazolam hydrochloride.   
 
- 14 - 
The reporters filed motions to quash the subpoenas based on section 
90.5015, which creates a qualified journalist‟s privilege against compelled 
testimony under certain circumstances.  That section provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
90.5015. Journalist’s privilege.— 
(1) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section, the term: 
(a) “Professional journalist” means a person regularly engaged 
in collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or 
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information 
sought while working as a salaried employee of, or independent 
contractor for, a newspaper, news journal, news agency, press 
association, wire service, radio or television station, network, or news 
magazine.  Book authors and others who are not professional 
journalists, as defined in this paragraph, are not included in the 
provisions of this section. 
(b) “News” means information of public concern relating to 
local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events. 
(2) PRIVILEGE.—A professional journalist has a qualified 
privilege not to be a witness concerning, and not to disclose the 
information, including the identity of any source, that the professional 
journalist has obtained while actively gathering news.  This privilege 
applies only to information or eyewitness observations obtained 
within the normal scope of employment and does not apply to 
physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio 
recording of crimes.  A party seeking to overcome this privilege must 
make a clear and specific showing that: 
(a) The information is relevant and material to unresolved 
issues that have been raised in the proceeding for which the 
information is sought; 
(b) The information cannot be obtained from alternative 
sources; and 
(c) A compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the 
information. 
(3) DISCLOSURE.—A court shall order disclosure pursuant to 
subsection (2) only of that portion of the information for which the 
 
- 15 - 
showing under subsection (2) has been made and shall support such 
order with clear and specific findings made after a hearing. 
(4) WAIVER.—A professional journalist does not waive the 
privilege by publishing or broadcasting information. 
(5) CONSTRUCTION.—This section must not be construed to 
limit any privilege or right provided to a professional journalist under 
law. 
 
§ 90.5015 (1)-(5), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). 
The reporter‟s qualified privilege applies to both confidential and non-
confidential sources, see State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 1998), and in 
both criminal and civil cases, see Morris Communications Corp. v. Frangie, 720 
So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1998).  In order to overcome the privilege, the party must 
demonstrate that the journalist‟s information is relevant, that the information 
cannot be reasonably obtained from alternative sources, and that a compelling 
interest exists requiring disclosure.  See § 90.5015(2)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2013); 
McCarty v. Bankers Ins. Co., Inc., 195 F.R.D. 39, 47 (N.D. Fla. 1998).  The 
requirement of a compelling interest has been characterized in different ways, but 
in 1958 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals described a compelling interest 
sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the test for overcoming the reporter‟s 
privilege as information that goes to the “heart of the plaintiff‟s claim.”  Garland v. 
Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958).  The Eleventh Circuit described a 
“compelling interest” as one in which the information is “highly relevant, 
necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable from other 
 
- 16 - 
sources.”  U.S. v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Miller v. 
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a compelling 
interest where the only way that the claimant could prove his case was with the 
protected information)). 
In this case, the circuit court found that Muhammad failed to satisfy the 
three-prong test for overcoming the qualified privilege.  The court concluded that 
the information was not relevant to the narrow issue before the court, that 
Muhammad failed to exhaust other alternative sources who could provide the same 
information, and that he failed to demonstrate a compelling interest.  Muhammad 
contends that the information was relevant to his claim that midazolam 
hydrochloride is not efficacious in anesthetizing the inmate, which is the issue for 
which the case was relinquished.  He also contends that he could not reasonably 
obtain the information from other witnesses because their names were not released, 
and that he had a compelling interest in the information because of the 
constitutional nature of his claim.   
We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in quashing 
these two subpoenas based on the qualified privilege in section 90.5015.  There 
were twenty-eight witnesses to the Happ execution.  Muhammad failed to explain 
why he could not discover the identity of even one of those witnesses other than 
through public records requests that were denied him.  Further, his own expert 
 
- 17 - 
witness read the news articles in question and was aware of the reports of Happ‟s 
movements after introduction of midazolam hydrochloride in the lethal injection 
procedure.  Dr. Heath did not testify that the movement reported in the articles 
indicated Happ was conscious or that the midazolam hydrochloride did not work as 
anticipated.  He testified instead that movement does not necessarily equate with 
consciousness.  Further, Dr. Evans gave similar testimony.  Thus, Muhammad 
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in disclosure of the information 
gathered by the news reporters in the scope of their employment, and failed to 
demonstrate that the information, even if relevant to the efficacy of midazolam 
hydrochloride, could not have been obtained from alternate sources.   
For similar reasons, the circuit court did not reversibly err in denying 
admission of the news articles themselves.  The articles constituted hearsay.  See 
Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 547 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the circuit court did not 
err in excluding as inadmissible hearsay the affidavits of two reporters, and 
newspaper articles written by them, detailing their accounts of an execution).  
Because Muhammad failed to overcome the qualified journalist‟s privilege under 
section 90.5015, and because the news articles were inadmissible hearsay, the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoenas and in 
excluding the articles. 
 
- 18 - 
B.  Ruling Striking Witnesses and Denying a Continuance 
 
Muhammad also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
striking all of his witnesses except Dr. Heath.  Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court struck most of Muhammad‟s proposed witnesses, including DOC 
attorney David Arthmann; Secretary of DOC Michael Crews; DOC Deputy 
Communications Director Misty Cash; Florida State Prison Warden John Palmer; 
attorneys D. Todd Doss, Neal Dupree, Roseanne Eckert, Suzanne Keffer, Todd 
Sher; Executive Office of the Governor attorney Thomas Winokur; and execution 
team members and observers from the Happ execution on October 15, 2013, and 
the execution of Darius Kimbrough on November 12, 2013.   
On November 19, 2013, the circuit court heard the State‟s motion to compel 
the names of proposed defense witnesses who would offer relevant testimony on 
the limited issue for which the case was relinquished.  Muhammad‟s counsel 
indicated that most of the witnesses had been listed in his postconviction motion, 
including Arthmann, Cash, and Crews, and that a few more would be added later 
that day in a revised list.  Because of the compressed time frame for holding the 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court took up the State‟s objections to the testimony 
of these three witnesses and granted the motion to strike over Muhammad‟s 
objection that he was not prepared to state what relevant testimony they might 
offer.  The court allowed counsel to file written objections and a statement of the 
 
- 19 - 
relevance of their proposed testimony.  In response, Muhammad filed a motion for 
rehearing and an objection that he was not required to set forth the relevance of a 
witness‟s testimony before calling the witness to testify.  In that filing, Muhammad 
also explained that he sought to call Secretary Crews to testify about what matters 
DOC reviewed before issuing the revised protocol that included midazolam 
hydrochloride, and why he represented in a letter to the Governor that the drug will 
be safe and efficacious for use in lethal injection.  Muhammad said he sought to 
call Misty Cash to testify about “research” that she referred to in her statement to 
the press on October 14, 2013, in explaining the revised lethal injection protocol 
and the DOC‟s opinion that midazolam hydrochloride would not present a 
substantial risk of serious harm.  Muhammad said he sought to present Arthmann 
to testify about his knowledge of any DOC records that would discuss the research 
DOC undertook or relied on in revising its lethal injection protocol.  
  Muhammad filed his final witness list, which included the three DOC 
employees, five defense attorneys, a representative of the manufacturer of 
midazolam hydrochloride, two journalists, an attorney from the Executive Office 
of the Governor, as well as all execution team members, medical personnel, and 
FDLE employees who observed or participated in the Happ and Kimbrough 
executions.  
 
- 20 - 
In a hearing on November 20, 2013, the circuit court heard argument about 
whether a majority of the witnesses should be stricken.  After hearing the argument 
concerning possible relevance of the witnesses‟ testimony, the circuit court granted 
the State‟s motion to strike all the witnesses except Dr. Heath, Juliana Reed or 
another representative of Hospira, which manufactures midazolam hydrochloride, 
and the two news reporters, Farrington and Watkins.  The reporters‟ motions to 
quash their subpoenas based on journalist privilege were later granted and 
Muhammad was unable to secure the attendance of Reed, so Muhammad‟s only 
witness was Dr. Heath. 
“It is well settled that „[t]he admissibility of evidence is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and the trial court‟s determination will not be disturbed 
on appellate review absent a clear abuse of that discretion.‟ ”  Rimmer v. State, 59 
So. 3d 763, 774 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 
2005)).  We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in striking 
the witnesses.  In our order in this case, we relinquished jurisdiction “for the 
narrow purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing solely on Muhammad‟s claim 
regarding the efficacy of midazolam hydrochloride as an anesthetic in the amounts 
prescribed by Florida‟s protocol.”  Just as in Valle, in which we relinquished for 
the same reason concerning a change in the first drug in the three-drug protocol, 
our concern is focused on evidence relating to whether the drug will sufficiently 
 
- 21 - 
render an inmate unconscious before the administration of the last two drugs.  See 
Valle, 70 So. 3d at 547.  In Valle, we affirmed the court‟s striking of a number of 
defense witnesses, including DOC employees, the Secretary of the DOC, and 
execution personnel, because their testimony was not relevant to the narrow issue 
on relinquishment.  This same reason supports the circuit court‟s ruling in this 
case.  We did not relinquish jurisdiction to determine why DOC chose midazolam 
hydrochloride as the first drug in the protocol, we relinquished to determine if the 
drug would be safe and efficacious if administered according to the protocols.  Nor 
did we relinquish to hear what transpired in executions under prior protocols.  
Muhammad was given an opportunity to present his medical expert to testify 
concerning the safety and efficacy of midazolam hydrochloride and he did so.  
Dr. Heath was well aware of news reports and the testimony of FDLE Inspector 
Feltgen that in the Happ execution, movement was detected some minutes after the 
administration of the drug.  Dr. Heath testified fully about the way in which the 
drug is used in normal surgical settings and opined that in the dosage required by 
the protocols, the drug would render the inmate unconscious in a matter of minutes 
and would ultimately lead to the inmate‟s death.   
Muhammad also contends that he was not provided all the documents 
ordered to be produced by this Court in its relinquishment order.  The order 
required the DOC to produce correspondence and documents it received from 
 
- 22 - 
Hospira concerning the drug‟s use in executions or otherwise, including those 
addressing any safety and efficacy issues.  The DOC produced two letters from 
Hospira objecting to the use of the drug in executions and asking that any 
remaining drugs be returned.  The DOC did not produce any drug package inserts 
or invoices for the purchase of the drug.  We find that the DOC‟s interpretation of 
the phrase “documents and correspondence” not to include package inserts is a 
strained interpretation but any error is harmless.   
Muhammad‟s own expert, Dr. Heath, was a direct resource for Muhammad 
concerning approved uses of the drug and any safety and efficacy warnings 
associated with it.  Muhammad contends that the invoices that were not produced 
would be relevant in determining whether the drug had expired or was subject to 
recall.  Again, Muhammad could ascertain through his own witness if midazolam 
hydrochloride had ever been recalled.  And, even if the invoices could have 
indicated when the drug would expire, we find any error in failure to disclose the 
invoices to be harmless.  The lethal injection protocol expressly requires that a 
designated execution team member will purchase the lethal chemicals to be used in 
the execution and will “ensure that the lethal chemicals have not reached or 
surpassed their expiration dates.”  In addition, the protocol calls for the FDLE 
monitor to confirm that all lethal chemicals “are correct and current.”  We will not 
presume that the DOC will violate its own protocol in regard to assuring that the 
 
- 23 - 
lethal drugs have not surpassed their expiration dates.  Thus, the failure of the 
DOC to produce the invoices did not deny Muhammad a full and fair hearing. 
Muhammad also contends he was not given a full and fair hearing because 
his motion to continue the hearing to allow more time to consult with Dr. Heath 
and to prepare his testimony was denied.  We disagree.  The circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a continuance of the evidentiary hearing.  
Muhammad had sufficient time to prepare the witness, who had been identified as 
Muhammad‟s expert witness as early as the filing of the postconviction motion in 
October 2013.  Nor did the fact that Dr. Heath was required to testify by telephone 
impair the fairness of the proceedings.  The State presented its own medical expert 
witness by telephone as well, and the record discloses no difficulty or 
complications caused by telephonic testimony of either witness.  For all these 
reasons, relief is denied on the claim that Muhammad was not provided a full and 
fair hearing.  The testimony given at the evidentiary hearing is discussed next.  
C.  Evidentiary Hearing Testimony 
 
At the evidentiary hearing held November 21-22, 2013, Muhammad 
presented the testimony of Dr. Heath, a board certified anesthesiologist at the New 
York Presbyterian Hospital at Columbia University.  In preparation for his 
testimony, he reviewed the revised DOC lethal injection protocol, correspondence 
from Hospira, news articles by reporters Farrington and Watkins, and the 
 
- 24 - 
testimony of FDLE Inspector Feltgen concerning his observations of the Happ 
execution.  Dr. Heath testified that midazolam hydrochloride is an FDA-approved 
drug in the class of drugs called “benzodiazepine.”  He testified that it is used in 
the operating room as both a pre-anesthetic and an anesthetic to cause sedation and 
reduce anxiety, and “in very high doses will completely ablate consciousness.”  In 
his practice, he uses the drug to make the patient less anxious.  A small amount is 
administered for this purpose, such as one milligram.  To produce a deeper level of 
anesthesia, Dr. Heath testified that he would give a dose of 10 or 15 milligrams, 
which “in [his] experience, will reliably produce a much deeper level of 
unconsciousness.”   
Dr. Heath testified that midazolam hydrochloride is generally slower to act 
than a barbiturate, but when successfully delivered to the brain will have full 
efficacy as an anesthetic.  As to the duration of unconsciousness, he explained that 
“[i]f you give any of these drugs in a very large dose, such as the doses that are 
used in lethal injections, then they will all last for a very long time.  They would 
last for many hours.”  He opined that the dosage of midazolam hydrochloride 
called for in the protocol, 500 milligrams, is a much larger dose than that needed to 
produce unconsciousness and in that amount would, with certainty, produce death.  
When asked about the significance of Happ‟s movement that was observed during 
his execution in October 2013, Dr. Heath agreed that movement is not the same as 
 
- 25 - 
consciousness and that an unconscious person may still move, although such an 
individual might in fact be conscious.   
The State presented the testimony of Dr. Roswell Lee Evans, Jr., a 
pharmacist, professor of pharmacy, and Dean at Auburn University.  He testified 
that midazolam hydrochloride is an FDA-approved drug used for induction of 
general anesthesia, with a dose of 35 to 40 milligrams for minor surgeries.  
Dr. Evans testified that midazolam hydrochloride is quickly absorbed into the 
bloodstream when introduced intravenously.  If a person were given 250 
milligrams, he or she would be rendered unconscious in no more than two minutes; 
and that the higher the dose, the longer the person will remain unconscious.  He 
testified that the dosage called for in the lethal injection protocol, 500 milligrams 
given in two separate doses, would cause respiratory arrest and possibly cardiac 
arrest, and would render the person insensate or comatose.  He also agreed that 
movement by a person who was given midazolam hydrochloride would not 
indicate consciousness, although he would be surprised if an individual moved 
more than five minutes or so after its administration; but he explained that reports 
of Happ‟s movement, if observed nine minutes after administration of the drug, 
could have been a response to depressed respiration. 
Both Dr. Heath and Dr. Evans agreed that the consciousness check called for 
in the protocol is critically important.  Dr. Evans noted that a consciousness check 
 
- 26 - 
using an eyelid tap, such as is done in Florida executions, is also used in surgical 
settings and is necessary to measure the depth of unconsciousness.  Dr. Heath 
opined that because midazolam hydrochloride takes longer to effect 
unconsciousness, the Florida protocol should specify an extended period of time 
after administration before the consciousness check is performed.   
The State also presented the testimony of FDLE Inspector Feltgen, who was 
an official monitor for the Happ execution.  He testified that during the execution, 
he was located in the chemical room, standing next to the person who injected the 
drugs, and that he could observe the whole execution chamber through a two-way 
mirror.  After the first syringe of midazolam hydrochloride was injected, Feltgen 
saw Happ breathe heavily four or five times, with his chest rising off of the table.  
This action may have gone on through the second syringe of midazolam 
hydrochloride.  Feltgen observed the warden perform a consciousness check and 
saw no movement by Happ.  Feltgen testified that Happ‟s execution looked very 
similar to the two other executions Feltgen had observed, except for Happ‟s heavy 
breathing at the beginning.   
D.  Order on Relinquishment Regarding Efficacy of Midazolam Hydrochloride 
The circuit court ruled after the evidentiary hearing that, based on the 
testimony of both Dr. Heath and Dr. Evans, it has been established that midazolam 
hydrochloride is an FDA-approved drug routinely used as a pre-anesthetic and as 
 
- 27 - 
an anesthetic in minor surgical procedures.  The court found that the testimony also 
established that the dosage called for in Florida‟s three-drug lethal injection 
protocol, 500 milligrams, would induce not only unconsciousness, rendering the 
individual insensate and not in any pain, but when properly administered would 
ultimately cause death.  The circuit court further concluded that the evidence 
established that even if Happ moved after administration of midazolam 
hydrochloride during his execution in October 2013, such movement does not 
equate to pain.  We agree that these findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Further, competent, substantial evidence established that 
Happ‟s movement, reported by several news reporters whose articles were 
reviewed by Dr. Heath prior to his testimony, does not necessarily equate with 
consciousness.   
 
In denying Muhammad‟s claim that the use of midazolam hydrochloride as 
the first drug violates the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, the circuit court held that Muhammad failed to present any 
credible evidence that, when administered in the amount called for in Florida‟s 
lethal injection protocol, the drug is “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and 
needless suffering” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers” under the 
standard set forth in the plurality decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008).  The Baze decision also pointed out that the 
 
- 28 - 
Constitution does not require the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out 
executions, id. at 47, only that it not present “the sort of „objectively intolerable 
risk of harm‟ ” that qualifies as cruel and unusual.  Id. at 50.     
E.  Application of the Law to the Facts 
The Supreme Court‟s plurality decision in Baze held that the petitioners in 
that case “have not carried their burden of showing that the risk of pain from 
maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol” constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at 41.  Muhammad makes a similar claim in this 
case that, if not properly administered and if the individual‟s level of consciousness 
is not properly determined, the use of midazolam hydrochloride will result in 
severe and needless suffering when the two subsequent drugs are administered.  
However, Dr. Heath agreed that the dosage of midazolam hydrochloride called for 
in the protocol, if properly administered together with adherence to the procedures 
for determining consciousness, will result in an individual who is deeply 
unconscious and who would feel no pain when the remaining drugs are 
administered.   
We reject Muhammad‟s invitation to presume that the DOC will not act in 
accordance with its lethal injection procedures adopted by the DOC.12  The 
                                          
 
 
12.  We reject Muhammad‟s characterization of the testimony of FDLE 
agent Feltgen, which Muhammad contends shows that the paralytic drug was 
injected only thirty seconds after the first injection of midazolam hydrochloride in 
 
- 29 - 
sufficiency of those procedures, other than the recent substitution of the midazolam 
hydrochloride as the first drug, were previously approved by this Court after a 
comprehensive evidentiary hearing in Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 
(Fla. 2007).  When we relinquished for an evidentiary hearing in Valle to examine 
the safety and efficacy of pentobarbital, which had been substituted as the first 
drug in the three-drug lethal injection protocol, we reiterated that the portion of 
Florida‟s lethal injection protocol ensuring that an inmate will be unconscious prior 
to administration of the second and third drugs has not been altered since the 
protocol was approved in Lightbourne.  Valle, 70 So. 3d at 541 n.12.  Under that 
protocol, “he will not be injected with the final two drugs, and the execution will 
be suspended until Valle is unconscious.”13  Id.  In the instant case, as we said in 
Valle, the remainder of the protocol has not been revised.  We presume that the 
DOC will follow its own procedures and Muhammad will not be injected with the 
final two drugs until he is unconscious. 
                                                                                                                                        
the Happ execution, in violation of the protocol.  A full reading of Feltgen‟s 
testimony, and his recounting of the steps that were followed in the Happ 
execution, demonstrate that the DOC followed its protocol in injecting two 
syringes of midazolam hydrochloride and a third syringe of saline, and that only 
after the consciousness check was performed and unconsciousness determined was 
Happ injected with vecuronium bromide. 
 
13.  For this same reason, we find no error in the circuit court‟s limitation on 
examination of witnesses on matters outside the narrow issue of the safety and 
efficacy of midazolam hydrochloride.   
 
- 30 - 
 
We acknowledge that, as we explained in Lightbourne, if the inmate is not 
fully unconscious when the second and third drugs, vecuronium bromide and 
potassium chloride, are administered, the inmate will suffer pain.  See Lightbourne, 
969 So. 2d at 351.  However, we agree with the circuit court that Muhammad has 
not demonstrated that the conditions presenting this risk are “sure or very likely” to 
cause serious illness or needless suffering and give rise to “sufficiently imminent 
dangers” under the standard set forth in Baze.  Thus, we reject his constitutional 
challenge to the use of midazolam hydrochloride in the lethal injection procedure.  
See also Valle, 70 So. 3d at 540-41 (rejecting challenge to newly-revised protocol 
substituting pentobarbital for the first drug in the three-drug protocol because Valle 
failed to show that the conditions presenting the risk must be sure or very likely to 
cause serious illness and needless suffering and give rise to sufficiently imminent 
dangers).  
F.  Manufacturer‟s Letters 
We also reject Muhammad‟s contention that the protocol is unconstitutional 
because the manufacturer, Hospira, wrote letters to the DOC expressing its 
disagreement with the use of midazolam hydrochloride in executions and 
demanding that any of the drug still in the DOC‟s possession be returned.  As we 
held in Valle, a manufacturer‟s warning against the use of its drug in lethal 
injections does not establish a substantial risk of harm, 70 So. 3d at 542, and does 
 
- 31 - 
not render the use of the drug unconstitutional.  See also Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 1270, 1281 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (noting that manufacturer‟s opposition 
to drug‟s use in lethal injection is not relevant to the issues or the inmate‟s burden), 
aff‟d, 641 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Williams v. Thomas, 131 S. Ct. 2487 
(2011). 
G.  One-Drug Protocol 
Muhammad also contends that Florida should be required to convert its 
lethal injection protocol to a one-drug protocol because a number of other states 
have changed to a one-drug protocol, which does not involve a paralytic drug and 
does not involve potassium chloride.  Muhammad contends that because a one-
drug protocol has been successfully used in other states, is available, and avoids 
the risks of pain presented by the second and third drugs, this change to a one-drug 
protocol is required, and that Florida‟s failure to use it constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in light of evolving standards of decency.  The State counters 
that Florida‟s current protocol does not violate the constitution simply because 
other states have altered their method of lethal injection.  We agree. 
The plurality decision of the Supreme Court in Baze stated that “a 
condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a State‟s method of execution 
merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative.”  533 U.S. at 51.  The 
plurality decision in Baze also stated: 
 
- 32 - 
Permitting an Eighth Amendment violation to be established on 
such a showing would threaten to transform courts into boards of 
inquiry charged with determining “best practices” for executions, with 
each ruling supplanted by another round of litigation touting a new 
and improved methodology.  Such an approach finds no support in our 
cases, would embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies 
beyond their expertise, and would substantially intrude on the role of 
state legislatures in implementing their execution procedures—a role 
that by all accounts the States have fulfilled with an earnest desire to 
provide for a progressively more humane manner of death. 
  
Id.  Baze further cautioned that “the proffered alternative must effectively address 
„a substantial risk of serious harm.‟ ”  Id. at 52.  Thus, before it could be said that 
Florida must adopt a one-drug protocol, the current three-drug lethal injection 
protocol must be determined to present “a substantial risk of serious harm” under 
Baze.  That has not been established in this case. 
Substantially after the Baze decision in 2008, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a 
similar challenge in Pardo v. Palmer, 500 F. App‟x 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2012), 
stating: 
Pardo‟s allegedly distinguishable contention that “the one-drug 
protocol is now constitutionally required” is insufficient to 
differentiate this case from Ferguson.  We likewise addressed 
Ferguson‟s “evolving standards of decency” claim—which Pardo 
reiterates here—and found it lacking: “[a]lthough the one-drug 
protocol is a feasible alternative that could be readily implemented, „a 
condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a State‟s method of 
execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer 
alternative.‟ ”  See Ferguson, No. 12-15191, 2012 WL 4946112, at *3 
(quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008)).  Even if nine of our 
sister states have adopted a one-drug protocol, it is not our role to 
transform ourselves into a “board[ ] of inquiry charged with 
determining the „best practices' for executions.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 51. 
 
- 33 - 
 
Pardo, 500 F. App‟x at 904, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 815 (2012).  Thus, Florida is 
not obligated to adopt an alternative method of execution without a determination 
that Florida‟s current three-drug protocol is unconstitutional.   
Because we have concluded that Muhammad failed to establish that the 
current three-drug lethal injection protocol using midazolam hydrochloride as the 
first drug in the procedure presents a serious risk of needless suffering or sufficient 
imminent danger in violation of the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment, and because Muhammad has failed to establish that 
Florida must adopt a one-drug lethal injection protocol, we deny relief on this 
claim.   
II.  Clemency Claims 
Muhammad next contends that he was denied due process in his clemency 
proceedings.  He alleges that in the fall of 2011, attorney Linda McDermott was 
appointed to represent him in clemency proceedings after being requested to act as 
Muhammad‟s clemency counsel at the request of the Florida Parole Commission, 
and that she undertook that representation.  His postconviction motion alleged that 
in January 2012, the Florida Parole Commission filed a motion asking the circuit 
court to appoint new clemency counsel for Muhammad.  He contended as he does 
here that the effort to remove McDermott as his clemency counsel “appeared to be 
a calculated effort on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General to interfere with 
 
- 34 - 
Muhammad‟s clemency proceeding,” thus making the clemency proceeding a 
sham and violating his right to due process.14  He also contended that while in 
prison, he had surgery that resulted in complications requiring follow-up treatment 
with a specialist, and that this situation raised “a looming question of DOC liability 
for the permanent damage done to his vocal cords.”  Muhammad was offered a 
September 2012 clemency interview and did not attend, based on his interpretation 
of his doctor‟s orders concerning the use of his voice.  However, his counsel did 
submit additional clemency materials to the Office of Executive Clemency for 
consideration.  By letter dated October 21, 2013, the Office of Executive Clemency 
notified Muhammad that clemency had been denied; and the death warrant in this 
case indicates that clemency was considered and rejected as not appropriate in this 
case.  The circuit court summarily denied the claim based on this Court‟s precedent 
that the clemency process is solely the prerogative of the Governor.   
We explained in Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2762 (2013), as follows: 
                                          
 
 
14.  We note that valid statutory grounds existed upon which removal of 
McDermott as clemency counsel could have been sought.  Chapter 940, Florida 
Statutes (2011), pertains to executive clemency.  Section 27.711(11), Florida 
Statutes (2011), sets forth a prohibition for postconviction counsel appointed under 
chapter 27, such as McDermott, to represent defendants in chapter 940 proceedings 
and certain other proceedings—prohibitions that this Court has upheld.  See, e.g., 
Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444, 455 (Fla. 2010) (upholding prohibitions in statute).   
 
- 35 - 
The clemency process in Florida derives solely from the Florida 
Constitution and we have recognized that the people of the State of 
Florida have vested “sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion 
exclusively in the executive in exercising this act of grace.”  Sullivan 
v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977). 
 
. . . . 
 
We have previously rejected similar challenges to the clemency 
process.  In Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 568 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 815 (2012), we rejected the clemency claim in large part 
because it is not this Court‟s prerogative to second-guess the 
executive branch on matters of clemency in capital cases.  In 
Johnston, we rejected an identical clemency claim and stated: 
We also noted in Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985 
(Fla. 2009), after Marek raised a second challenge to the 
clemency process, that “five justices of the United States 
Supreme Court concluded [in Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998)] that some 
minimal procedural due process requirements should 
apply to clemency . . . [b]ut none of the opinions in that 
case required any specific procedures or criteria to guide 
the executive‟s signing of warrants for death-sentenced 
inmates.”  Marek, 14 So. 3d at 998.  We again conclude 
that no specific procedures are mandated in the clemency 
process and that Johnston has been provided with the 
clemency proceedings to which he is entitled. 
Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 25-26 (emphasis added).  See also Valle, 70 So. 
3d at 551 (rejecting claim that clemency proceeding did not serve the 
“fail safe” purpose for which clemency is intended); Rutherford v. 
State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1122-23 (Fla. 2006) (denying a clemency 
claim because the defendant had a hearing and because clemency is an 
executive function); Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 
1986) (stating that it is not this Court‟s “prerogative to second-guess 
the application of this exclusive executive function”). 
 
Id. at 888-89 (additional emphasis added).  
 
- 36 - 
Muhammad rejected the opportunity for a clemency interview in September 
2012 based on what the record reflects to be his own misunderstanding of medical 
advice about the use of his voice.  In signing the death warrant in this case, the 
Governor indicated that clemency has been considered and rejected.  Clemency is 
solely the prerogative of the Governor.  No specific procedures are required in 
clemency proceedings, and Muhammad‟s allegations do not support a claim that 
the circumstances surrounding his clemency denied him minimal procedural due 
process.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in summarily denying 
Muhammad‟s claim that the clemency proceedings in this case were flawed. 
III.  The “Timely Justice Act of 2013” 
 
 
In his postconviction motion, Muhammad challenged portions of the 
“Timely Justice Act of 2013” (the Act),15 in which the Legislature amended a 
number of statutes relating to certain aspects of capital postconviction 
representation and the issuance of death warrants in capital cases.  Muhammad 
challenges the constitutionality of amendments to section 922.052, Florida 
Statutes, that direct the Clerk of this Court to certify in writing to the Governor that 
a person sentenced to death has completed direct appeal and initial postconviction 
proceedings in state court and habeas corpus proceedings and appeal therefrom in 
federal court, or has allowed that time to expire.  See § 922.052(2)(a)1. & (a)2., 
                                          
 
 
15.  Ch. 2013-216, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2013. 
 
- 37 - 
Fla. Stat. (2013).  He also challenges as unconstitutional the amendments to 
section 922.052 directing the Governor to sign a death warrant within thirty days 
after receiving the certification from the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court “if 
the executive clemency process has concluded, [and] directing the warden to 
execute the sentence within 180 days, at a time designated in the warrant.”  
§ 922.052(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013).  The amendments further provide that if the 
Governor determines that the Clerk has not complied with subsection (2)(a), the 
Governor may sign a warrant of execution for any person “where the executive 
clemency process has concluded.”  § 922.052(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013).  The 
remainder of section 922.052 remains unchanged.  Muhammad contends that the 
amendments are unconstitutional encroachments on this Court‟s authority, on the 
rights of postconviction defendants, and on the sole authority of the Governor in 
matters of clemency and issuance of death warrants; thus, he contends, his death 
warrant cannot stand.  The circuit court denied the claim and concluded the 
amendments were not unconstitutional.  
We do not reach Muhammad‟s constitutional challenge to the amendments 
to section 922.052 pursuant to the Act.  The Office of Executive Clemency 
initiated Muhammad‟s clemency proceeding in September 2012, long before 
passage of the Act, and that office accepted follow-up documents as to clemency 
for several months thereafter.  It cannot be said that Muhammad‟s death warrant 
 
- 38 - 
would not have been signed but for the Act.  Moreover, because it is not this 
Court‟s prerogative to inquire into the basis on which the Governor signed any 
individual death warrant, we cannot presume that signing Muhammad‟s death 
warrant was prompted by the Act or by the letter sent by the Supreme Court Clerk 
to the Governor, which contained a list of many names other than Muhammad‟s.  
For these reasons, we conclude that it is inappropriate and unnecessary for this 
Court, or the trial court, to reach the issue of the constitutionality of any portion of 
the Act in this successive postconviction proceeding or to strike the death warrant 
in this case based on Muhammad‟s claim.  Because we do not reach the issue, our 
affirmance of the circuit court‟s denial of postconviction relief in this appeal is not 
a ruling on the merits concerning the constitutionality of any portion of the Act.  
We turn next to the public records claim that Muhammad raised in this proceeding. 
IV.  Public Records 
Muhammad contends that he was wrongfully denied access to public records 
under two different subsections of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 and 
under chapter 119, Florida Statutes.  He contends that certain requested records 
were required to be produced under rule 3.852(h)(3), which allows a request within 
ten days after a death warrant is signed of records from those persons and agencies 
from whom records were previously requested.  He also contends that additional 
records requested under 3.852(i), which allows requests from new agencies or 
 
- 39 - 
persons, should have been provided because they were necessary and relevant to 
both framing his postconviction claims and prosecuting his claims.   
This Court has held that denial of public records requests are reviewed under 
the abuse of discretion standard.  See Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 698 (Fla. 
2012); Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1149 (Fla. 2006).  “Discretion is abused 
only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is 
another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable person 
would take the view adopted by the trial court.”  State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 
137 (Fla. 2003) (quoting White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806 (2002)).  The Court 
has long acknowledged that the public records procedure under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.852 “is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing 
expedition for records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.”  
Valle, 70 So. 3d at 549 (quoting Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002) 
(quoting Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 2001))).   
Rule 3.852(h)(3) provides that within ten (10) days after the signing of a 
death warrant, a records request may be made to a person or agency from whom 
collateral counsel has previously requested records.  The rule provides that upon 
such request, a person or agency shall copy, index, and deliver to the records 
repository “any public record” (A) that was not previously the subject of an 
objection; (B) that was received or produced since the previous request; or (C) that 
 
- 40 - 
was, for any reason, not produced previously.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(h)(3)(A)-
(C).  If none of the grounds are present for production, the rule requires that the 
person or agency shall file an affidavit stating that no other records exist and that 
all public records have been produced previously.  We have previously held that 
this discovery tool is not intended to authorize a “fishing expedition” unrelated to a 
colorable claim for postconviction relief.  See Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 
(Fla. 2000).  We have noted that requests for records under rule 3.852(h)(3) may be 
denied as far exceeding the scope of subsection (h)(3) if they are overbroad, of 
questionable relevance, and unlikely to lead to discoverable evidence.  See Mills v. 
State, 786 So. 2d 547, 552 (Fla. 2001); see also Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 
1100, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (affirming denial of records under rule 3.852(h)(3) because 
no prior requests were made and because the records are not related to a colorable 
claim for postconviction relief).   
Muhammad requested public records under rule 3.852(h)(3) from the DOC; 
Medical Examiner William Hamilton, M.D.; the FDLE; the State Attorney for the 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Miami); and the State Attorney for the Eighth Judicial 
Circuit (Bradford County).16  In each of these requests, Muhammad asked for “any 
                                          
 
16.  The representative for the offices of the State Attorneys from whom 
records were requested advised the court that they had no documents relevant to 
the request.  Records were also requested under rule 3.852(h)(3) from the Miami-
Dade Police Department, but that office filed an affidavit stating that a records 
review had been undertaken and all records had been previously provided. 
 
- 41 - 
files, records, reports, letters, memoranda, notes, drafts and/or electronic mail in 
the possession or control of your agency pertaining to Mr. Muhammad that were 
received or produced by your agency since Mr. Muhammad‟s previous request; 
and/or any documents that were, for any reason, not produced previously.”  The 
circuit court denied Muhammad‟s motion to compel these entities to produce the 
requested records.  We conclude that with one exception, the court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the motion.  The requests are overly broad and 
Muhammad did not clearly demonstrate how the records were relevant to a 
colorable claim.  However, we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion 
in denying Muhammad his own inmate and medical records.  The record reflects 
that Muhammad‟s counsel had made previous requests for these records from the 
DOC, and in this proceeding he sought an update of his inmate and medical files.  
He also supported the request with the explanation that such records would be 
relevant to a potential, colorable claim concerning Muhammad‟s mental health.   
Because Florida law provides that only after a death warrant is signed, an 
inmate may petition the Governor to determine if he or she is insane and therefore 
not competent to be executed, we find that Muhammad‟s inmate and medical 
records are relevant to such a potential claim and should have been produced.17  
                                          
 
 
17.  See § 922.07, Fla. Stat. (2013); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811 and 3.812.  “In 
order for insanity to bar execution, the defendant must lack the capacity to 
understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed.”  Ferguson v. 
 
- 42 - 
Accordingly, we direct the DOC to immediately provide Muhammad‟s counsel 
with those portions of his inmate and medical files that have been received or 
produced since Muhammad‟s previous requests, or for whatever reason were not 
previously produced. 
 
Muhammad also sought records under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.852(i), which allows a capital defendant to request additional public records, that 
are not required to be from agencies or persons from whom records were 
previously requested.  Under subdivision (i), the defendant must demonstrate: 
(A) that counsel has made a timely and diligent search of the repository; 
(B) counsel‟s affidavit identifies with specificity those additional public records 
that are not at the repository; (C) that the additional public records are either 
relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding under rule 3.851 or appear 
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence; and (D) the 
additional records request is not overly broad or unduly burdensome.  We have 
held that “a defendant must show how the requested records relate to a colorable 
claim for postconviction relief and good cause as to why the public records request 
was not made until after the death warrant was signed.”  Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 
1158, 1163 (Fla. 2013).   
                                                                                                                                        
State, 112 So. 3d 1154, 1156 (Fla.) (quoting Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d at 26 n.8, 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 498 (2012)). 
 
- 43 - 
Under subsection (i) of rule 3.852, Muhammad sought additional records 
from the DOC;18 the FDLE; William Hamilton, M.D., medical examiner;19 Office 
of Attorney General Pamela Bondi; the Office of the Governor; and the Office of 
                                          
 
 
18.  From the DOC and the FDLE, Muhammad sought voluminous records 
which he alleged were relevant to his claim challenging the revised method of 
lethal injection and to the process by which the September 9, 2013, revised lethal 
injection protocol was promulgated, including, but not limited to, the new lethal 
injection procedures, literature and research reviewed, communication with the 
Office of the Attorney General, Governor, any outside experts, other states, and the 
federal government; records relating to training exercises, including logs, 
checklists, and sign-in sheets from January 1, 2010, to the present; records relating 
to any correspondence with any Florida agency from January 1, 2010, to the 
present relating to the acquisition of pentobarbital, vecuronium bromide, potassium 
chloride, and midazolam hydrochloride; records relating to communication with 
any other department of corrections in any other state regarding lethal injection 
protocols from January 1, 2010, to the present; records regarding the purchase, 
storage, maintenance, use, distribution, and disposal of pentobarbital and/or 
midazolam hydrochloride that show compliance with the Federal Controlled 
Substance Act and Florida Statutes, chapters 828, 893, and 464; records showing 
the manufacturer and distributor of lethal injection drugs including package inserts, 
instructions, date of manufacture, shelf life of midazolam hydrochloride, 
pentobarbital, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride currently possessed by 
the DOC; records of executions by lethal injection of Schwab, Henyard, Tompkins, 
Marek, Grossman, Valle, Chandler, Waterhouse, D. Gore, Pardo, Mann, Carroll, 
Van Poyck, M. Gore, and Happ; and records indicating personnel changes or 
formal or informal changes to the unwritten procedures or customary practices 
testified to by DOC personnel in the litigation in Lightbourne in 2007. 
 
19. From William Hamilton, M.D., medical examiner, Muhammad 
requested additional records under 3.852(i) including but not limited to post-
execution photographs and examinations performed on executed inmate Happ, 
autopsy narrative reports, notes, diagrams, photos, and toxicology studies.   
 
- 44 - 
Executive Clemency, Florida Parole Commission.20  The circuit court denied all of 
Muhammad‟s records requests under rule 3.852(i).  We conclude that the denial of 
these records was not an abuse of discretion.   
The DOC contended that the records request they received from Muhammad 
was overbroad and burdensome, and did not appear to relate to, and would not lead 
to, a colorable claim.  The State also contended that information concerning the 
source of the drugs has been held not to present a cognizable lethal injection claim.  
See Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 565-66 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 815 
(2012); Valle, 70 So. 3d at 549.  We agree that the voluminous request was 
overbroad and burdensome, and the possible relevance to a colorable claim was not 
established.  Further, requests related to actions of lethal injection personnel in past 
executions do not relate to a colorable claim concerning future executions because 
there is a presumption that members of the executive branch will perform their 
duties properly.  See Valle, 70 So. 3d at 549.  Moreover, as to the request for 
                                          
 
 
20.  Muhammad requested additional records relating to clemency materials 
in his own case which were in the Attorney General‟s custody or possession since 
January 1, 2010, including correspondence, e-mails, reports, summaries, 
newspaper articles, transcripts of hearings, research, notes or any other document, 
photograph, or recording that was received or sent from any representative of the 
Office of the Attorney General relating to clemency for Muhammad.  Muhammad 
requested the same additional records from the Office of the Governor under rule 
3.852(i).  And, the same additional records were requested from the Office of 
Executive Clemency, Florida Parole Commission.   
 
 
- 45 - 
records of all the executions since that of inmate Schwab, no error has been shown.  
We held in Valle that the circuit court did not err in denying records of the DOC‟s 
executions of the last five inmates.  Id.  For all these reasons, the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the voluminous public records request to the 
DOC.    
Muhammad requested a long list of additional records from the FDLE under 
3.852(i) similar to his request to the DOC.  The circuit court ruled that the records 
request to FDLE was overbroad and burdensome, and generally as to all records 
requested pertaining to lethal injection, that the requested records would not lead to 
a colorable claim.  For the same reasons set forth above concerning records 
requested from the DOC under rule 3.852(i), we find no abuse of discretion.   
The lower court denied the records request to the medical examiner and 
concluded that the autopsy records sought from Dr. Hamilton were not related to a 
colorable claim that use of midazolam hydrochloride rendered the lethal injection 
protocol unconstitutional.  Muhammad has not explained how autopsy photographs 
and reports concerning Happ could disclose at what point Happ was rendered 
unconscious or whether he experienced pain by virtue of the alleged inefficacy of 
midazolam hydrochloride.  Denial of these records was not error. 
The circuit court also denied disclosure of all the clemency-related records 
requested by Muhammad on the grounds that the requests were overbroad and not 
 
- 46 - 
related to a colorable claim.  We conclude that denial of access, or failure to 
compel access, to the clemency records was not an abuse of discretion.  First, 
clemency files and records are not subject to chapter 119 disclosure and are exempt 
from production in a records request filed in a postconviction proceeding.  See 
King v. State, 840 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 2003); Roberts v. Butterworth, 668 So. 
2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1996).  In addition, the records would not relate to a colorable 
claim because we have held many times that claims challenging clemency 
proceedings are meritless.  “The clemency process in Florida derives solely from 
the Florida Constitution and we have recognized that the people of the State of 
Florida have vested „sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion exclusively in the 
executive in exercising this act of grace.‟ ”  Sullivan, 348 So. 2d at 315; see also 
Carroll, 114 So. 3d at 888-89 (holding clemency claim without merit because the 
Court will not second-guess the executive on matters of clemency); Pardo, 108 So. 
3d at 568 (rejecting clemency claim in large part because it is not this Court‟s 
prerogative to second-guess the executive branch on matters of clemency in capital 
cases).  Thus, because the clemency files are confidential and the claim 
challenging the clemency process is without merit, the denial of records from the 
Office of the Governor, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Parole 
Commission was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
- 47 - 
V.  Discovery Motions 
Muhammad contends that the circuit court erred in denying his discovery 
motions relating to his claim that the revised lethal injection protocol presents a 
risk of serious harm.  The motions also sought an order requiring the DOC to 
identify all members of the execution team when Happ was executed; that the 
DOC identify all persons with any responsibility in drafting the revised lethal 
injection protocol issued September 9, 2013; to allow a deposition of medical 
examiner William Hamilton, M.D.; to identify the manufacturer of midazolam 
hydrochloride, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride used in Florida lethal 
injections, and the lot numbers and expiration dates of these drugs that are 
available for use in lethal injection. 
Muhammad requested discovery concerning Happ‟s and Kimbrough‟s 
executions.  Muhammad sought access to the November 12, 2013, execution and 
autopsy of Darius Kimbrough by motion in which he requested an order allowing 
him to send a photographer to videotape the execution, to send a witness to view 
the execution, to allow a qualified expert to have access to Kimbrough during the 
execution to monitor his physiological responses throughout the execution, and to 
permit an expert to have access to Kimbrough‟s body after the execution to 
perform a complete autopsy or, in the alternative, an order allowing a person to 
attend and photograph the autopsy of Kimbrough.  The circuit court denied the 
 
- 48 - 
discovery request without explanation on November 4, 2013, after hearing 
argument at the October 31, 2013, case management conference.  The circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying these discovery requests. 
As to the availability and scope of discovery in postconviction proceedings, 
this Court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2005):  
In State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1994), this Court 
held that it is within the trial judge‟s inherent authority to allow 
limited prehearing discovery during postconviction proceedings.  We 
set forth the following parameters for such discovery: the motion 
seeking discovery must set forth good reason; the court may grant 
limited discovery into matters which are relevant and material; the 
court may set limits on the sources and scope of such discovery; and 
on review of orders limiting or denying discovery, the moving party 
has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 1250 (quoting 
Davis v. State, 624 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), and adopting 
procedures established therein).  In deciding whether to allow this 
limited form of discovery, the trial judge must consider “the issues 
presented, the elapsed time between the conviction and the 
postconviction hearing, any burdens placed on the opposing party and 
witnesses, alternative means of securing the evidence, and any other 
relevant facts.”  Id.  Our opinion did not expand the discovery 
procedures established in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, 
which governs discovery, nor was the opinion to be interpreted as 
automatically allowing discovery in postconviction proceedings.  We 
further cautioned that a trial judge‟s inherent authority to permit 
postconviction discovery “should be used only upon a showing of 
good cause.”  Id.  
 
Id. at 1279.  Thus, when discovery is allowed, it is limited discovery which is 
relevant and for which the movant demonstrates good cause.   
As to the request that Muhammad be allowed to send persons to witness and 
photograph the Kimbrough execution, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
 
- 49 - 
in denying that request.  As the State points out, the execution chamber is small 
and any additional personnel could interfere with the orderly and proper 
administration of the lethal injection.  Moreover, Florida law sets forth who may be 
allowed to view an execution.  Section 922.11(2), Florida Statutes (2013), provides 
that twelve citizens selected by the warden may view the execution, along with 
counsel for the inmate, and ministers requested by the inmate.  News media may 
be present under rules approved by the Secretary of the DOC, and “[a]ll other 
persons, except prison officers and correctional officers, shall be excluded during 
the execution.”  Thus, denial was not an abuse of discretion.  
It was also within the court‟s sound discretion to deny Muhammad the right 
to have his own expert autopsy Kimbrough and to deny videotaping of the 
Kimbrough autopsy as well.  Section 922.11(3), Florida Statutes (2013), provides 
that the body of an executed person shall be delivered to the medical examiner for 
an autopsy.  Muhammad did not demonstrate good cause for the right to perform a 
substitute or a second autopsy on Kimbrough.  In addition, having additional 
persons in the room videotaping could interfere with the orderly administration of 
the autopsy.  
As to denial of Muhammad‟s discovery request for an order identifying and 
allowing depositions of all members of the execution team and any other persons 
present when Happ was executed, the court did not abuse its discretion.  First, this 
 
- 50 - 
request was overbroad, and Muhammad did not demonstrate how knowing the 
identities of these persons, or even being able to call them as witnesses, would be 
necessary and relevant to a colorable lethal injection claim concerning the safety 
and efficacy of midazolam hydrochloride.  Second, section 945.10 (g), Florida 
Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, 
dispensing, or administering lethal injection confidential.  The provisions of 
section 945.10 which protect the confidentiality of the identity of members of the 
execution team have been upheld as constitutional and the Court has subsequently 
declined to recede from that ruling.  See Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 
(Fla. 2008) (citing Bryan v. State, 753 So. 2d 1244, 1250 (Fla. 2000)).  Muhammad 
has not demonstrated good cause for this veil of confidentiality to be lifted, nor has 
he demonstrated that relevant information could be obtained from any other 
persons involved in the process who are not covered by statutory confidentiality.  
Under the limited rights to discovery outlined in Lewis and Rodriguez above, and 
in light of the legislatively accorded confidentiality rights of members of the 
execution team, Muhammad‟s fishing expedition for information from the 
execution team and any other persons present was properly denied.   
Muhammad also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying discovery of persons with any responsibility in drafting the revised lethal 
injection protocol issued September 9, 2013.  The record is clear that Muhammad 
 
- 51 - 
had a copy of the September 9, 2013, revised lethal injection procedures.  Based on 
comparison of the current revised protocol with the protocol immediately 
preceding it, Muhammad is able to determine the revisions made in the protocol.  
The proper issues before the lower court did not include the reasons why the DOC 
chose midazolam hydrochloride as the new first drug in the protocol—the proper 
issue was the safety and efficacy of the drug as an anesthetic.  Discovery sought 
from persons with responsibility in drafting the revised lethal injection protocol 
was not relevant to the claims before the court.  The circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in the denying this discovery request. 
Muhammad was also denied the right to depose William Hamilton, M.D., 
chief medical examiner for the Eighth District.  In his brief, Muhammad simply 
argues this deposition, along with all the other information sought in his discovery 
request, was proper because he had pending a lethal injection claim.  This 
unspecific justification does not meet the requirements of Lewis to support a 
circuit court‟s limited ability to order discovery in postconviction proceedings.  No 
error has been shown in denial of this deposition. 
Finally, Muhammad contends the circuit court abused its discretion in 
refusing to order the DOC to disclose the manufacturers of the lethal injection 
drugs used in Florida executions, together with the lot numbers and expiration 
dates.  No abuse of discretion has been shown.  We have held that the source of the 
 
- 52 - 
drugs used in lethal injection is of questionable relevance to a colorable Eighth 
Amendment claim.  See Valle, 70 So. 3d at 549.  The same principle would apply 
to the drugs‟ lot numbers and expiration dates.  Moreover, this Court will presume 
that the DOC will act in accordance with its protocol and carry out its duties 
properly.  See, e.g., id.  This same presumption would extend to presume that the 
DOC will obtain viable versions of the drugs it intends to use and confirm before 
use that the drugs are still viable, as the protocol requires.  Muhammad has failed 
to demonstrate any necessity and relevance sufficient to require the circuit court, in 
its ability to order limited discovery in postconviction proceedings, to allow 
discovery of this information. 
For the foregoing reasons, Muhammad has failed to demonstrate abuse of 
discretion in denial of his discovery requests or in denial of any of his public 
records requests, other than for his own inmate and medical records from the DOC, 
which we have ordered to be immediately produced.     
VI.  Length of Time on Death Row 
Muhammad next contends that adding execution to the lengthy period of 
time he has served on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and 
violates the binding norms of international law.  He has been on death row for over 
three decades for this particular murder.  We have repeatedly rejected this same 
claim.  This Court has recognized that “[n]o federal or state court has accepted the 
 
- 53 - 
argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.”  
Pardo, 108 So. 3d at 569 (quoting Valle, 70 So. 3d at 552 (quoting Tompkins, 994 
So. 2d at 1085)).  The claim that execution after a lengthy time on death row 
violates binding norms of international law has also been repeatedly rejected.  See, 
e.g., Carroll, 114 So. 3d at 889 (“[T]his Court has repeatedly rejected similar 
claims that imposition of the death sentence after an extended period of time on 
death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or that it violates binding 
norms of international law.”); Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla.) (rejecting 
claim that adding execution to the twenty-three years Gore spent on death row 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates “binding norms of 
international law.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1904 (2012). 
 
Muhammad attempts to distinguish his circumstances from the normal case 
where an inmate is kept for a lengthy period of time on death row.  However, the 
fact that he was placed in special solitary confinement after murdering a 
correctional officer while on death row does not provide a sufficient distinguishing 
basis for this Court to depart from its established precedent on this issue.  Relief 
was properly denied on this claim. 
 
- 54 - 
VII.  Whether Mental Illness Should Bar Execution 
In his last issue on appeal, Muhammad contends that his mental illness 
places him within the class of persons, similar to those under the age of eighteen at 
the time of the crime and those with mental retardation, who are categorically 
excluded from being eligible for the death penalty.21  His argument is based on the 
principles set forth in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005), which held 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional for defendants who were under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the crime, and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), 
which held that the death penalty is unconstitutional for mentally retarded 
defendants.  He contends that the principles set forth in these cases should be 
extended to the class of persons such as Muhammad who suffer from mental 
illness, on the ground that such persons are less morally culpable and, that under 
the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), their mental illness should bar execution.   
This Court has rejected similar claims on the merits in the past.  See, e.g., 
Carroll, 114 So. 3d at 886-87 (holding that similar claims that mental illness bars 
the death penalty have been rejected on the merits); Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 
475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (holding claim that persons with mental illness must be 
                                          
 
 
21.  It has been reported that Muhammad suffered from schizophrenia and 
paranoia.   
 
- 55 - 
treated similarly to those with mental retardation due to reduced culpability to be 
without merit); Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 2011) (noting that “the 
Court has expressly rejected the argument that Roper extends beyond the Supreme 
Court‟s pronouncement that the execution of an individual who was younger than 
eighteen at the time of the murder violates the eighth amendment”); Johnston, 27 
So. 3d at 26 (finding no merit in the claim that mentally ill persons are similar to 
and should be treated the same as juvenile murderers who are exempt from 
execution); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting 
assertion that the Equal Protection Clause requires extension of Atkins to the 
mentally ill due to their reduced culpability).  For these reasons, summary denial of 
relief on this claim was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the circuit court denying 
Muhammad‟s successive postconviction claims,22 but we reverse the order of the 
circuit court denying Muhammad disclosure of his own inmate and medical 
records.  Therefore, the Florida Department of Corrections is hereby ordered to 
immediately provide Muhammad‟s counsel with copies of Muhammad‟s inmate 
                                          
 
 
22.  As noted earlier, the constitutionality of the amendments to section 
922.052, Florida Statutes (2013), is not determined in this proceeding and our 
affirmance of the circuit court‟s denial of postconviction relief is not a ruling on 
the merits concerning the constitutionality of any portion of the “Timely Justice 
Act of 2013.” 
 
- 56 - 
and medical records that have been compiled since that agency previously 
provided records to Muhammad.  No rehearing will be entertained by this Court 
and the mandate shall issue immediately.  We hereby lift the temporary stay 
imposed by this Court on November 18, 2013.    
 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion in which 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I would affirm the circuit court‟s order in its entirety.  I therefore dissent 
from the majority‟s reversal on the claim regarding Muhammad‟s inmate and 
medical records.  With respect to that claim, I would conclude that the records are 
not relevant to any colorable claim cognizable in this proceeding. 
 
I concur in the lifting of the temporary stay. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,  
Phyllis M. Rosier - Case No. 80-341-CFA 
 
Linda McDermott and Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P. A., Estero, 
Florida,    
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
- 57 - 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney 
General, Miami, Florida,   
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Gregg D. Thomas and Rachel E. Fugate of Thomas & LoCicero PL, Tampa, 
Florida,  
 
for Media Appellees, Brendan Farrington of the Associated Press and 
Morgan Watkins of The Gainesville Sun