Title: P. v. Farnam
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S010808
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2002

1
Filed 6/10/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S010808
v.
)
)
JACK GUS FARNAM,
)
Los Angeles County
)
Super. Ct. No. A780838
Defendant and Appellant.
)
__________________________________ )
Defendant Jack Gus Farnam was convicted by a jury of one count of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 one count of rape (§ 261), and one
count of sodomy (§ 286).  The jury found true the special circumstances that
defendant committed the murder while engaged in burglary, robbery, rape, and
sodomy (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and that defendant previously had been convicted
of first degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)).  After a penalty trial, the jury
returned a verdict of death and the trial court imposed that sentence.  Appeal to
this court is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)
We find no prejudicial error at the guilt or penalty phase of defendant’s
trial, and affirm the judgment in its entirety.
                                                
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
I.  FACTS
A.  The Guilt Phase
On November 19, 1982, Lillian Mar, a 55-year-old Asian widow, was
brutally murdered in her home.  The prosecution theorized that defendant, then 18
years old, used a knife to cut an opening in a locked screen door and thereby
gained access to the downstairs living room through an open, adjacent, sliding
glass door.  He attacked Mrs. Mar in her upstairs bedroom, bludgeoning her head
before raping and sodomizing her.  Mrs. Mar then moved or was moved to the
hallway, where defendant struck her and then strangled her with a scarf he had
brought.  Defendant ransacked the bedrooms, taking various items, and escaped
through a side door in the living room.
The prosecution sought to establish the special circumstances that
defendant murdered Mrs. Mar while engaged in burglary, robbery, rape, and
sodomy, and that defendant was previously convicted of murder.  Pursuant to a
stipulation between the parties, the court informed the jury of defendant’s
admission that he previously had been convicted of the first degree murder of
Barbara Griswold on or about September 10, 1985.
1.  The Prosecution Case
At the time of the crimes, Mrs. Mar owned a seven-unit apartment building
in Los Angeles, where she lived with an adult son, Harry Mar.  The ethnic
composition of the neighborhood was predominantly Asian, mainly Chinese, with
a few Latinos.  Mrs. Mar socialized with very few people — her close-knit family
and a small group of older Chinese women from the neighborhood.  No
Caucasians visited her.
On November 19, 1982, sometime between 7:00 and 7:15 p.m., Harry and
his fiancée, Patricia, left the apartment together for an evening outing.  Mrs. Mar
3
remained at home alone.  Around midnight, Harry found his mother’s bloodied
body in the upstairs hallway.
Police investigators made the following observations at the apartment.  The
downstairs of the Mar apartment was relatively undisturbed, with the exception of
an L-shaped slit in a locked screen door outside a sliding glass door and a severed
cord to the telephone on the floor next to the couch in the living room.  There were
no pry marks on the front door or the sliding glass door.  None of the
entertainment equipment in the living room had been tampered with, and
envelopes containing large sums of money were in plain view in the adjoining den.
The deadbolt on a side exit door in the living room, which was always kept
locked, was unlocked.
At the top of the stairs, Mrs. Mar was lying facedown in a pool of blood in
the hallway.  She was naked from the waist down, and several buttons were
missing from her blouse.  A bloody scarf was knotted around her neck, and it
appeared she had been bludgeoned, strangled, and possibly raped.  A loose, light
brown-blondish hair was found on the right side of Mrs. Mar’s neck.
A woman’s panty and pants, with what appeared to be bloodstains, were
rolled together in a ball on the floor at the foot of the bed in Mrs. Mar’s bedroom.
Nearby were buttons similar to those missing from Mrs. Mar’s blouse, broken hair
curlers, blood drops, and milky or clear fluid stains resembling semen on the
carpet.  Blood drops were on the bedspread, and impressions apparently left by
buttocks, the lower portion of a body, and elbows were at the foot of the bed.
Blood drops trailed from Mrs. Mar’s bedroom to where her body was found in the
hallway.
The other bedrooms bore evidence of ransacking.  In Harry’s bedroom, the
drawers of his nightstand and desk had been pulled out and personal belongings
were strewn about.  The bedroom formerly belonging to his brother, Jerry, also
4
had been disturbed.  And like the downstairs telephone cord, the cord to the
telephone outside Harry’s bedroom had been cut.  Harry later discovered that
various items were missing from the residence, including a gold necklace,
envelopes of money from the dresser in his mother’s bedroom, some money from
his coin bank, a handgun, a tie clip, a Timex watch, and two silver coins (balboas).
Dr. Joan Shipley conducted the autopsy and determined the cause of Mrs.
Mar’s death was asphyxia due to ligature strangulation.  The victim exhibited
blunt force injuries on the back of the head and a fairly large and severe wound on
the right shoulder.  The victim had additional wounds on the eyelids, the inside
and outside of the lips, underneath the jaw, and the back of the ears.  All of the
wounds, including the head wounds, occurred prior to death.
Dr. Shipley observed no abnormalities during an external visual inspection
of the victim’s vagina.  Although Dr. Shipley did not detect any visible signs of
rape, she opined her examination was not inconsistent with a rape having taken
place.
A sexual assault kit was used to gather evidence from Mrs. Mar’s body.
Swabs were taken from areas including the external genital area, the vagina, and
three inches inside the anal cavity; slides and smears were then made from those
swabs.  The contents of this kit were examined twice — first in February of 1983
and then again in 1988.  In her 1983 examination, police criminalist Alison Ochiae
observed blood on the external genital swabs and the vaginal swabs, intact sperm
on the vaginal slides, fragments of sperm (i.e., the heads) on the anal slides, and a
small amount of sperm on the external genital slides.  In his 1988 examination of
these same items, Keith Inman, a private criminalist, observed an unusual
abundance of columnar cells on the anal slides, which was indicative of trauma
consistent with either sodomy or postmortem decompositional changes.
5
Evidence taken from Mrs. Mar’s bedroom was also examined twice.  In
1983, criminalist Ochiae detected intact sperm on carpet fibers at the foot of the
victim’s bed, but found no semen on the bedspread and no semen on the victim’s
panty or pants.  Subsequently, in 1988, criminalist Inman discovered semen on the
bedspread by utilizing a procedure not used by the Los Angeles Police Department
in 1983.
The police lifted latent prints from ransacked objects in Harry’s bedroom,
but could not match them with any suspect for a couple of years.  Ultimately it
was discovered that defendant’s right middle and right ring fingerprints matched
the latent prints from Harry’s coin bank with as many as 20 points of comparison.
A print of defendant’s right thumb matched the latent print taken from Harry’s
stethoscope box, with over 10 points of comparison.
Serological analysis disclosed that Mrs. Mar’s blood was type AB and her
PGM subtype was 2 minus 1 plus.  Defendant’s blood type was type A and his
PGM subtype was 1 plus.  Defendant was a secretor, which means his ABO blood
type is found in body fluids other than blood, such as semen.  Upon examining the
carpet fibers from the foot of Mrs. Mar’s bed and the items in the sexual assault
kit, criminalist Warren Loomis reached the following conclusions:  (1) since only
a 1 plus PGM subtype was found on the carpet sample, it had to have come from a
source other than the victim and from a group comprising 40-43 percent of the
population, of which defendant was a member; and (2) since the vaginal, anal, and
external genital swabs all exhibited AB and H activity, and since the victim’s
blood type AB would mask defendant’s blood type A in the swabs, defendant
could not be excluded as a possible donor of the semen on those items.
Hair analysis indicated that the loose, light brown-blondish hair found on
Mrs. Mar’s neck was a forcibly removed head hair with Caucasian characteristics
that could not have originated from the victim, Harry, or Margaret Lee (the
6
victim’s adult daughter, who had curled the victim’s hair the evening of the
crimes).  Comparing the appearance and microscopic characteristics of the loose
hair with a sample of defendant’s hair, prosecution experts concluded that the two
could have a common origin given their similar pigmentation, similar pattern, the
abundance and size of their pigment granules, and other characteristics including
the cuticle and medulla, the straightness of the hair, and color.2  One expert opined
that violent bumping of the head against something or somebody could be
sufficient to dislodge hair from the head.
A tool mark expert compared the cut ends of the two telephone cords at the
crime scene with a wood-handled knife that had been found in defendant’s
possession in January of 1983, some two months after Mrs. Mar’s murder.3  The
expert testified that although the severed cords had no individual striations or
marks associated with defendant’s knife, the cords could have been cut by
defendant’s knife.  Defendant’s knife also could have been used to cut the screen
door since the knife’s widest part was consistent in width with an offset slit that
marked the initial thrust into the screen.
Defendant also demonstrated consciousness of guilt.  On February 28,
1986, Detective Kirk Mellecker went to Folsom State Prison to meet with
defendant.4  Upon seeing and recognizing Mellecker in the prison medical office,
                                                
2 
The police had also found five loose hairs on Mrs. Mar’s bedspread, which
were determined to be an Asian person’s head hairs that had not been forcibly
removed.  Although the hairs could not have come from Mrs. Mar, Harry, or
Margaret given their microscopic characteristics, a prosecution expert testified that
hairs could cling to a bedspread through laundering or storage, and studies
indicated that hairs can remain on garments for several years.
3 
Defendant’s possible involvement in the Mar crimes was not discovered
until November of 1985.
4 
Defendant was then incarcerated in Folsom for a different crime.
7
defendant became stiff and apprehensive.5  Mellecker indicated he was there to
execute a court order for hair and blood samples from defendant.  Defendant
refused to cooperate, even after Mellecker explained that he had a valid search
warrant and that defendant had no choice in the matter.  Defendant responded that
he did not care, that it was a violation of his rights, and that he was not going to do
it.  When a correctional sergeant in charge of hospital security entered the medical
office, defendant exhibited a fighting stance.  Defendant ultimately agreed to
provide the samples “under duress.”
2.  The Defense Case
The defense challenged the testing used to establish that defendant was the
donor of the semen found at the crime scene.  Defense experts opined that, had
other available tests been conducted, the population of possible semen donors
would have been narrowed considerably and could have excluded defendant as a
donor.  The defense also attempted to demonstrate that the autopsy and other
forensic evidence did not establish rape and sodomy.
B.  The Penalty Phase
1.  The Prosecution Case
The prosecution relied on the circumstances of the crimes committed
against Mrs. Mar.  It also presented aggravating evidence of defendant’s prior
violent criminal activity on four other occasions:  (1) in 1981, defendant
sodomized and savagely beat Barbara Griswold in her hotel room before finally
                                                
5 
Mellecker had spoken to defendant the previous month about an
investigation where defendant’s fingerprints were discovered inside a location.
Although Mellecker did not tell defendant that the investigation pertained to the
Mar murder, Mellecker had given defendant a business card indicating he was in
the Robbery/Homicide Special Division of the Los Angeles Police Department.
8
killing her; (2) in 1983, he robbed and assaulted Mr. and Mrs. N. in their hotel
room; (3) in 1983, he attempted to burglarize Beverly McCarthy’s hotel room
while she and her son were there; and (4) in 1983, he committed an assault with a
deadly weapon on Pasadena Police Officer Thomas Bradley.  The Griswold, N.,
and McCarthy incidents all occurred at nighttime at the Holiday Inn in Pasadena,
where the victims were registered as guests.  The assault on Officer Bradley
occurred within a mile of the same hotel just minutes after the McCarthy incident.
2.  The Defense Case
A number of family members and friends testified on defendant’s behalf.
Their testimony included the following mitigating evidence.
Defendant’s mother spent several years in mental institutions and was
incapable of caring for children.  Defendant’s father, who also was mentally
disabled, had not worked since 1965 and was frequently drunk.  Defendant and his
older brother, David, were always hungry.
The family led a nomadic existence.  Defendant and his brother were
unsupervised, and they wandered the streets at a very young age.  Defendant’s
parents never showed any concern over their sons’ absences from school.
Defendant’s brother bullied and beat him.  The two began to burglarize
houses, where defendant ate food from the kitchens.  As a result of his burglaries,
defendant was sent to juvenile camps and homes, but his parents did not visit him
there.  Defendant’s parents never disciplined him or his brother.
When defendant was about 13 years old, he met Arlene Reynolds, her son
Jace Tompkins, and her daughter, Dorian Jackson.  Defendant lived with this
family off and on for five years and was always respectful.  Defendant once saved
Reynolds’s life on a rafting trip.  Tompkins recalled that defendant once tried to
commit suicide by hanging himself.
9
Defendant became romantically involved with Reynolds’s granddaughter,
Shawn.  Their son was born on March 4, 1983.
Dr. Alvin Davis, a psychiatrist, evaluated defendant three times in 1986 and
once in 1988.  From his 1986 interviews, Dr. Davis observed that defendant
appeared depressed and had an IQ in the very low normal range of 75 to 80.
Defendant met diagnostic criteria for conduct disorder, socialized aggressive type,
manifested by a history of violence toward persons and property.  He did not,
however, have an antisocial personality disorder because he was capable of
forming relatively permanent attachments to others and of feeling remorse and
concern.  Nor did he have a borderline personality disorder.  Although defendant
had expressed a desire for treatment and therapy, he never received any.
In 1988, Dr. Davis noticed that defendant exhibited a marked improvement.
Defendant had been reading and taking education courses, and his IQ had
increased to the low normal range, somewhere between 92 and 100.  He expressed
more clearly and verbally his remorse for his offenses.  Although Dr. Davis noted
that defendant continued to be depressed and possibly suicidal, defendant was no
longer a danger to others or to property.
Defendant took the stand and testified on his own behalf.  He testified at
length about his undisciplined upbringing, the family’s frequent moves and their
stays in shelters and missions, and the crimes he and his brother used to commit.
Defendant admitted that he robbed, raped, and killed Mrs. Mar.  He denied,
however, that he sodomized her or that he killed her intentionally or with
premeditation.  He testified he was really sorry that Mrs. Mar was dead.
Defendant refused to discuss any matter relating to the Griswold murder
because he was appealing his conviction for that crime.
10
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Jury Selection and Juror Bias Issues
1.  The Defense’s Challenges for Cause
Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his challenges for
cause to Jurors Lucas D., Thomas V., Joseph O., and John S., who he claims were
prejudicially disposed in favor of the death penalty.  He asserts that his federal
constitutional right and his state constitutional and statutory rights to an impartial
jury were violated by the court’s failure to adhere to Wainwright v. Witt (1985)
469 U.S. 412.
“A prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her
views regarding capital punishment only if those views would ‘ “prevent or
substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror’s duties as defined by the
court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25
Cal.4th 926, 975, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; People v.
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910.)  “Assessing the qualifications of jurors
challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial
court.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 910.)  On appeal,
we will uphold the trial court’s decision if it is fairly supported by the record, and
accept as binding the trial court’s determination as to the prospective juror’s true
state of mind when the prospective juror has given conflicting or ambiguous
statements.6  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 910; People v.
Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 975.)
                                                
6 
Defendant cites Green v. Georgia (1996) 519 U.S. 145 for the proposition
that a state appellate court need not give deference to a trial court’s findings
relating to juror bias.  The law in California, however, is settled on the point.
11
“To preserve a claim of trial court error in failing to remove a juror for bias
in favor of the death penalty, a defendant must either exhaust all peremptory
challenges and express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected or justify
the failure to do so.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 667; see People
v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 976.)  Here, the defense did not exercise a
peremptory challenge to Juror Lucas D., who served as an alternate juror
throughout the guilt phase and as an actual juror in the penalty phase, even though
defendant had several peremptory challenges remaining when the alternate jurors
were sworn in.  Moreover, it is arguable whether the defense even challenged
Juror Thomas V. for cause.7  Nonetheless, even assuming defendant preserved the
issue for appellate review, the trial court’s retention of the four jurors in question
is amply supported by the record.
Although some of Lucas D.’s remarks during the voir dire process could be
construed as suggesting he would automatically vote for death at the penalty
phase, many other of his comments indicated an ability and a willingness to be fair
and open-minded.8
                                                
7 
After the prosecution passed for cause on Thomas V., the defense stated,
“Not under the responses that the court has heard.”  The court then responded
“Anything further?” before excusing everyone for the day.  The court did not
appear to rule on any defense challenge for cause, nor did the defense request any
such ruling.
8 
Lucas D. thrice said he would not always vote for the death penalty over
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, “no matter what evidence was
presented during trial.”  And though he said he might be more inclined to vote for
the death penalty in light of a prior murder special circumstance, he stated he
would “do [his] best” to keep an open mind in determining the appropriate
penalty.  Lucas D. also thought defendant “would have a fair chance of showing
[that] he ought not to get the death penalty” and affirmed he would not
automatically impose the death penalty if he were to find the defendant guilty and
the special circumstance to be true.
12
On his jury questionnaire, Joseph O. wrote that “if proven guilty, yes, the
death penalty should be invoked.”  In addition, he wrote that he thought “it would
cut down on crime if more people were executed.”  Although these written
statements, in isolation, seemingly indicated a pro-death-penalty bias, Joseph O.’s
responses during voir dire questioning negated that inference.  In any event,
Joseph O. was excused long before deliberations ever began in the guilt phase,
thereby defeating defendant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s
refusal to excuse the juror.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487-488.)
Although Thomas V. wrote on his jury questionnaire that his general
feeling of the death penalty was that “if a defendant is guilty, so be it,” he
explained that his statement was made without an understanding that there might
be options as to penalty.  During further questioning, Thomas V. conveyed a
willingness to be fair and impartial at the penalty phase.9
John S. initially indicated his general philosophy was that all first degree
murderers should get the death penalty and nothing else.  In responding to
questions, however, he stated he could set aside that philosophy and be open to
both possible penalties.  He further indicated he would be guided by the evidence
and would vote for life without the possibility of parole if the evidence persuaded
him it was proper.
Given the conflicting statements made by the four jurors, we cannot say
that the trial court exceeded its discretion in finding that none of them held an
unalterable preference in favor of the death penalty.  The trial court’s ruling is
                                                
9 
Thomas V. repeatedly responded he would not automatically vote for the
death penalty.  He further stated that he had “no prejudgment on anybody,” that he
was open-minded and fair, and that he would listen to both sides before deciding
the appropriate sentence.
13
fairly supported by the record, and we will not second-guess the court’s credibility
determinations on the matter.  No error appears.
2.  The Prosecution’s Peremptory Challenges
After the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against five
prospective jurors, the defense made a motion pursuant to People v. Wheeler
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  Defense counsel noted that four of those
potential jurors had been Black (Sheila C., Norman T., John G., and Helena B.)
and stated, “I think that speaks for itself.”  The court denied the motion, evidently
agreeing with the prosecutor that a prima facie showing of discrimination had not
been demonstrated.  Nonetheless, it allowed both sides to make a record for
appellate purposes.  Thereafter, the court reiterated its rejection of the motion,
stating that the excusals “appear to be well justified based upon the subjective
observations of the prosecution and having nothing to do with racial bias.”  The
jury that ultimately was sworn in consisted of four Blacks and eight Whites, and
the alternate panel consisted of two Blacks and four Whites.
Defendant contends the denial of his Wheeler motion violated the federal
equal protection clause and his federal and state constitutional rights to a trial by a
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.  (Powers v. Ohio
(1991) 499 U.S. 400, 404, 411; People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 713-714.)
He seeks reversal of the judgment and a remand for a new trial.  (Ford v. Georgia
(1991) 498 U.S. 411, 425; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 100; Wheeler,
supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283.)
Although a presumption exists that peremptory challenges are exercised in
a constitutional manner, those used to remove prospective jurors solely on the
basis of membership in a cognizable racial group violate both the federal and state
Constitutions.  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 114-115, relying on
14
Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258; People v.
Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 134.)
The rules governing a Wheeler challenge are settled.  If a defendant
believes the prosecution is improperly using peremptory challenges for a
discriminatory purpose, he or she must raise a timely objection and make a prima
facie showing that jurors are being excluded on the basis of racial or group
identity.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 993; People v. Arias, supra, 13
Cal.4th at pp. 134-135.)  To establish a prima facie case, the defendant should first
make as complete a record as possible.  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153,
1187; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  Second, the defendant
must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group.
(Ibid.)  Third, the defendant must show a strong likelihood or reasonable inference
that such persons are being challenged because of their group association.  (People
v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1188 & fn. 7; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 115.)
When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie
case of group bias, the appellate court reviews the record of voir dire for evidence
to support the trial court’s ruling.  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 993;
People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 116-117.)  We will affirm the ruling
where the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably
have challenged the jurors in question.  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 117.)  Moreover, if we find that the trial court properly determined that no
prima facie case was made, we need not review the adequacy of the prosecution’s
justifications, if any, for the peremptory challenges.  (People v. Turner (1994) 8
Cal.4th 137, 167.)
Defendant first contends that the trial court’s denial of his Wheeler motion
was based in part on an erroneous belief that defendant had no standing to make
15
the motion because he was White.  (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281
[defendant need not be a member of the excluded group to complain of a violation
of the representative cross-section rule].)  In support of this claim, defendant
observes that the court interrupted the prosecution’s initial response to the Wheeler
motion by remarking:  “Well, let me indicate for the record, No. 1, the defendant
is [W]hite, and, No. 2, a quick check of the jury as presently composed would
indicate that six of the remaining 11 are also [B]lack.  [¶] I don’t know that there is
anything else you want to put on the record, Miss Clark [the prosecutor].”
We are not persuaded.  As the People point out, the court never stated it
was denying the Wheeler motion because defendant was not the same race as the
challenged jurors; at most, it merely observed “for the record” that defendant was
White and that six of the jurors remaining in the box were Black.  Even though a
defendant’s race clearly is not dispositive of a Wheeler motion, it is equally clear
that the matter remains a subject of proper consideration by the court.  (See People
v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 115 [defendant may support a prima facie
showing of group bias by showing that he himself is a member of the excluded
group]; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)  Accordingly, it is neither troubling
nor problematic that the court noted defendant’s race for the record.  In the
absence of a more persuasive showing, defendant’s contention must be rejected.
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s “invitation” to the prosecution
to provide justifications for its peremptory challenges “could be deemed” an
implicit finding of a prima facie case of racial bias.  (See People v. Sims (1993) 5
Cal.4th 405, 428 [“in general, when the trial court inquires as to the prosecutor’s
justifications, the court has made ‘ “at least an implied finding” ’ of a prima facie
showing”].)  We disagree.
The record makes reasonably clear that the trial court did not invite the
prosecution to justify its challenges or otherwise inquire as to justifications, but
16
simply acquiesced in the parties’ wishes to make a record.  Significantly, after the
prosecution asked permission to make a record for appellate purposes, the court
stated:  “All right.  In any event, I’m going to deny the motion.  You can make
your record also, if you wish.  I don’t know, at least at this point in time, that it’s
required.  [¶] But I think out of an abundance of caution you may, at the
conclusion of the proceedings today, or the beginning of the proceedings on
Monday, you might at least put on the record whatever it is that you wish to put on
the record as to those individuals that have been excluded that were [B]lack.”
Thereafter, when defense counsel requested that the record be made at the end of
the day when memories were still fresh, the court reiterated its earlier ruling,
stating, “I have no objection, if it’s something that you [defense counsel] and
apparently [the prosecutor] wish to put on the record.  At least at this point in time
I think it’s at least apparent to me that it’s not an issue.”  On this record, there is
no basis for concluding that a prima facie case of racial bias had been found,
implicitly or otherwise.
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that
no prima facie showing of racial bias had been shown.  Notably, defendant’s only
stated bases for establishing a prima facie case were that (1) four of the first five
peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution were for Black prospective
jurors, and (2) a very small minority of jurors on the panel were Black.  Not only
does the record appear to disprove the second factual assertion,10 but even
assuming both assertions were factually accurate, they fall short of a prima facie
showing.  (People v. Rousseau (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 526, 536 [concluding a
                                                
10 
As explained, the court noted for the record that six of the remaining 11
jurors were Black at the time defendant made his Wheeler motion.
17
prima facie case was not established by defense counsel’s statement that “ ‘there
were only two [B]lacks on the whole panel, and they were both challenged by the
district attorney’ ”], cited with approval by People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
pp. 167-168; see also People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 136, fn. 15; People v.
Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154-1155.)
Defendant could not and did not point to anything otherwise supporting a
Wheeler motion.  For example, defendant was unable to show that the prosecutor
had struck most or all of the Black members from the venire.  (See People v.
Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  Defendant did not demonstrate that the
challenged jurors “ ‘share only this one characteristic — their membership in the
group — and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community
as a whole.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Nor did he establish that the prosecutor failed “ ‘to engage
these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any
questions at all.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Finally, defendant was not a member of the excluded
group, and the victim was not a member of the group to which the majority of the
remaining jurors belonged.  (Ibid.)
As set forth below, the record discloses ample grounds upon which the
prosecution might reasonably have challenged Sheila C., Norman T., John G., and
Helena B. — the four jurors in question.  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 117.)
During the voir dire process, Sheila C. indicated her belief that the death
penalty is used too often and that life imprisonment is sufficient punishment.  She
also indicated that she did not like the death penalty and that, if given the
opportunity, she would vote in an election to make the death penalty unavailable
in California.  Although Sheila C. had not been removed for cause, presumably in
light of her claimed willingness to be fair and to impose the death penalty if
appropriate, the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged her based upon her
18
negative views toward the death penalty.  (See People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 171.)
Norman T. indicated in response to prosecution questioning that he was
“generally against” the death penalty, but that “it’s not etched in stone.”
Thereafter, when questioned whether he would “lean heavily in favor of” a life
sentence without possibility of parole rather than a death sentence if given a
choice in the instant case, Norman T. accused the prosecutor of “trying to put
words in my mouth.”  Where, as here, a prospective juror evinces reservations
against the death penalty (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 171) and
demonstrates a degree of hostility toward the prosecutor (see People v. Cummings
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1282), the prosecutor might reasonably challenge the juror.
Norman T. additionally indicated a belief that “lack of justice goes with lack of
money” and mentioned his work at a juvenile hall.  Since defendant was a young
offender from a poor background who was being represented at trial by appointed
counsel, the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged Norman T. in the belief
that he might feel a special sympathy for defendant.
During the voir dire process, Helena B. disclosed that she previously served
as a juror in a case that resulted in a hung jury.  Since one who has had such an
experience “constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution, which seeks a
jury that can reach a unanimous verdict” (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.
170), the prosecutor might reasonably have chosen to challenge Helena B.
John G. disclosed that “on a couple of occasions” in the previous year he
visited a nephew incarcerated in Chino.  Although John G. claimed that the
experience would have no impact on him as a juror, a prosecutor may reasonably
surmise that a close relative’s adversary contact with the criminal justice system
might make a prospective juror unsympathetic to the prosecution.  (People v.
19
Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 138; see People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp.
664-665, 666; People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1282.)
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that no
prima facie showing of racial bias had been made.  No Wheeler error appears.
In light of our conclusion that the trial court properly found no prima facie
case of racial bias, we need not review the prosecutor’s justifications for her
peremptory challenges or the trial court’s weighing of those justifications.
Nonetheless, we have reviewed all of defendant’s claims on these matters, and,
even were we to assume that a prima facie case had been or should have been
found, we would find such claims lacking in merit based on the record before us.
Suffice it to say, the prosecutor articulated her belief that each of the four
challenged jurors harbored a pro-defense bias, based upon many of the specific
matters identified above and upon other matters covered during the voir dire; such
concerns furnished ample bases for the trial court’s subsequent conclusion that the
peremptory challenges appeared “well justified based upon the subjective
observations of the prosecution and having nothing to do with racial bias.”
Moreover, defendant does not establish that the trial judge failed to fulfill his legal
obligations faithfully.  Although the judge had commented that he did not “really
think too much of Wheeler motions,” he subsequently clarified that he simply
thought the motion frequently was misused.  Given the judge’s explanation of his
comments and his actions in allowing both sides to make their cases, we cannot
conclude that he harbored a preexisting bias that prevented him from fully and
fairly considering defendant’s particular Wheeler motion.11
                                                
11 
As indicated, defendant further claims that the prosecution’s peremptory
challenges violated his rights under the federal Constitution, including the federal
equal protection clause.  In turn, the People argue that defendant’s failure to raise
(footnote continued on next page)
20
3.  The Defense’s Motion to Discharge Four Jurors for Good Cause
During the guilt phase of trial, Jurors Violet J., Virginia W., Lillian C., and
Mary H. were returning to the court from lunch when four men stopped Virginia
W. to ask for the time.  One of the men then jumped toward Violet J. and knocked
her to the ground.  He took her purse and ran up the hill before police officers
apprehended him.  Although Violet J. saw no weapon, she was told by police that
the man had a knife.
The trial court questioned these four women outside the presence of the
other jurors.  Although Violet J. said she felt “shook up” and “not coherent enough
to drive home,” she believed she could listen to the testimony and pay attention to
the case.  The other three jurors also indicated they would have no problem
staying and listening to the testimony.  The trial court admonished all four jurors
to not discuss the incident with the other jurors, and emphasized that the incident
had no relationship to defendant’s case and that nothing that happened should
“spill over as it relates to” defendant.  The trial resumed, and counsel took turns
questioning one witness for approximately five minutes before the evening recess
was called.
The next day, the defense moved for a mistrial on the grounds that (1)
Violet J., Virginia W., Lillian C., and Mary H. were all of similar age to the victim
in defendant’s case, and (2) the incident involved a situation similar in nature to
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
these particular objections in trial court forfeits such claims on appeal.  (See
People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1174.)  No matter.  Because essentially
the same standard applies under either Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, or Batson v.
Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79 (see People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 192-
193), and because defendant fails to show that his rights under California law were
violated, the point is moot.  (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 117, fn. 4.)
21
the charges against defendant.  The defense also moved to discharge the four
jurors and to replace them with alternates.12
At the defense’s request, the trial court allowed counsel to question Juror
Violet J. with no other jurors present.  Violet J. admitted that the experience was
very terrifying, but indicated she did not think it would affect her ability to be
impartial in a case involving an allegation of robbery.  She also stated she would
have no difficulty separating the purse-snatching incident from her duties as a
juror and said she could be fair to defendant and evaluate his case and the
evidence fairly.
The trial court next questioned the other three jurors who witnessed the
robbery.  Virginia W. admitted she was considerably upset over the incident, but
denied her thought process would be affected in making findings in defendant’s
case.  When the trial court emphasized that the incident and defendant’s case had
“no relation whatsoever” to each other, Virginia W. agreed.  Jurors Lillian C. and
Mary H. also affirmed that witnessing the incident would not create a problem for
them in deciding defendant’s case.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court declined to discharge the
four jurors and denied the mistrial motion.  The court found that the jurors
appeared to be “calm, cool and collected” and able to separate the purse-snatching
incident from defendant’s case.  Violet J. served throughout the guilt and penalty
phases of trial.  Virginia W. was excused just prior to guilt phase deliberations.
                                                
12 
The People urge us to find that defendant forfeited any appellate right to
complain that he was denied the opportunity to be tried by an unbiased jury
pursuant to the federal and state Constitutions because he failed to specifically
identify such provisions at trial.  We decline to do so, finding on this record that
defendant adequately preserved such objections.
22
Mary H., an alternate at the time of the robbery, later deliberated on both guilt and
penalty.  Lillian C. remained an alternate throughout the trial.  At the close of the
trial, defense counsel again argued that all four jurors should have been excused
for bias.
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court’s failure to discharge the
four jurors resulted in a trial before a biased jury in violation of his rights under
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
his rights under corresponding state constitutional provisions.  In particular, he
complains that the trial court did not conduct an adequate and individual inquiry of
the four jurors to discover bias, and that it erred in determining that the four jurors
could be objective.
Penal Code section 1089 authorizes a trial court to discharge a juror if,
among other reasons, “good cause” is shown that the juror is “unable to perform
[her] duty.”13  When a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a
juror may exist, “it is the court’s duty to make whatever inquiry is reasonably
necessary to determine if the juror should be discharged and failure to make this
inquiry must be regarded as error.”  (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505,
520, overruled on another point in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743; see
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 231.)
                                                
13 
We reject any suggestion that a case of juror misconduct might be
established on the basis of the appellate record here.  (See In re Hamilton (1999)
20 Cal.4th 273, 294 [juror misconduct occurs when there is a direct violation of
the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on jurors, such as when a juror
conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information about the case
on which she sits, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper
information with other jurors].)
23
“Before an appellate court will find error in failing to excuse a seated juror,
the juror’s inability to perform a juror’s functions must be shown by the record to
be a ‘demonstrable reality.’  The court will not presume bias, and will uphold the
trial court’s exercise of discretion on whether a seated juror should be discharged
for good cause under section 1089 if supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.]”  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 659; see also People v.
Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the trial court’s inquiry was more than
adequate.  The court held two separate hearings on the matter, and ascertained the
details of the purse-snatching incident.  In both hearings, the trial court queried
whether the four jurors understood the absence of any relation between the
incident and the crimes allegedly involving defendant.  The court was obviously
aware that the purse snatching might interfere with the jurors’ ability to sit in
judgment of defendant, and the questions put to the jurors reflected that awareness.
And although the court was not obligated to do so, it allowed each side to question
Violet J. directly.  Upon hearing the four jurors’ responses regarding their state of
mind and observing their demeanor, the court had ample basis for determining
whether they could fulfill their obligations as jurors.  No more was required.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s assertion that Jurors
Virginia W., Lillian C., and Mary H. should not have been questioned together.
Defendant cites no legal authority compelling individual, sequestered questioning,
and the trial court’s decision not to do so was well within its discretion under the
circumstances.  Moreover, while defendant complains on appeal that the court
asked leading questions concerning the three jurors’ states of mind, the court had
previously covered the topic with open-ended questions.  The jurors were
consistent in their responses.  In addition, the trial court made whatever inquiries
were requested by the defense, and terminated questioning only after the
24
prosecution and the defense each affirmatively indicated that no further inquiry
was desired.
Defendant next argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to
excuse the four jurors in question.  We disagree.  The record contains substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that good cause did not exist to
excuse the jurors.  As indicated, each of the four jurors expressed an
understanding that the purse snatching had no relation to the crimes allegedly
involving defendant, and each indicated that she could be fair.
Although the record amply supports the trial court’s ruling, defendant
points to Violet J.’s frank statement that “still things come into your mind of what
happened to you and you can only try to visualize what happened to the other
person.”  Violet J.’s comment, however, appeared to reveal her honesty in
conveying what someone in her position might feel, rather than a bias against
defendant or an inability to fulfill her duties as a juror.  Given the balance of
Violet J.’s responses, the trial court’s observation of her demeanor, and the
minimal similarity between the purse-snatching incident and the crimes involving
Mrs. Mar, the trial court was not bound to find that Violet J. had formed emotional
and psychological bonds with the victim such that she would be unable to remain
objective during defendant’s trial.  (Cf. People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d
926, 939 [addressing likelihood of subconscious bias where juror previously
experienced the same type of violent physical assault that the defendant was
accused of committing].)  On this record, we see no basis for upsetting the
judgment.
25
B.  Guilt Phase Issues
1.  Sufficiency of Sodomy Evidence
Although defendant does not argue the evidence is insufficient to support
the rape conviction and the rape-murder special-circumstance finding, he
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the sodomy conviction and
the sodomy-murder special-circumstance finding.
“In considering a claim of insufficiency of evidence, a reviewing court
must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Earp (1999) 20
Cal.4th 826, 887.)  “The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
[Citations.]”  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)  “Although it is the
jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible
of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other
innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at pp. 1053-1054.)  Simply put,
if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not
be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding.  (Id. at p. 1054; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp.
887-888.)
Section 286, subdivision (a) defines sodomy as the “contact between the
penis of one person and the anus of another.  Any sexual penetration, however
26
slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy.” 14  “[T]he offense of sodomy
requires that the victim be alive at the time of penetration.”  (People v. Ramirez
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1176, fn. omitted.)
Here, the prosecution presented the following evidence.  The body of the
victim had been found naked from the waist down.  When Detective Randy Adair
arrived at the Mar residence on the night of the murder, he observed indentations
on the victim’s bed that were consistent with sexual activity having occurred at the
foot of the bed.  Semen found on the bedspread and on carpet fibers at the foot of
the bed provided further evidence that sexual activity had occurred.  Criminalists
found fragments of sperm on slides smeared with a swab taken from three inches
inside the victim’s anal cavity.  Criminalists also observed an abundance of
columnar cells on one of the anal slides, which was unusual and indicative of
trauma consistent with either sodomy or postmortem decomposition.  Viewed
favorably to the prosecution, such evidence was sufficient to establish that a
sodomy had been committed.
Defendant argues no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that a
sodomy occurred because:  (1) there was no evidence of trauma to the rectal
opening; (2) there was evidence that the victim’s body was moved around and
turned over before the anal swabs were taken; and (3) there was “universal
medical doctor agreement” that “semen possibly migrated from the vaginal area to
the anus.”  Additionally, defendant points to the possibility that the anal swabs
may have come into contact with the sperm cells on the outside of the victim’s
body, not from inside the anus.
                                                
14 
At the time of the Mar crimes, the second sentence of the present version of
section 286, subdivision (a), was contained in former section 287.  (See Stats.
1975, ch. 71, § 9, p. 134, repealed by Stats. 1991, ch. 144, p. 1351.)
27
We are not convinced.  The existence of alternative theories, other than
sodomy, that might possibly have explained the presence of the sperm in the
victim’s anal cavity, in no way renders the evidence insufficient to support the
sodomy conviction.  “The finding of sperm in the victim’s anus is in itself
sufficient evidence of sodomy.” 15  (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134,
171.)  Lack of trauma to a victim’s rectum does not preclude a finding that the
victim was sodomized.  (E.g., People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-
1060.)  Because the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, we may
not reverse the judgment simply because the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with defendant’s alternative theories.  (See id. at p. 1054; People v.
Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 887-888.)
Defendant next argues that, even assuming the evidence sufficiently
establishes an anal penetration, there was no substantial evidence that the victim
was alive at the time of the act.  (See People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p.
1176.)  Specifically, he contends that the lack of trauma or blood in the anal area
indicated that no penetration occurred while the victim was alive.
This contention is without merit.  As discussed, sodomy upon a live victim
may occur without trauma to the victim’s rectum.  Moreover, the contention
disregards the evidence showing that the victim was killed in the upstairs hallway,
where her body was found, after she had been sexually attacked in her bedroom.
                                                
15 
We note that in People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1017, a case where
the defendant had not been charged with sodomy, we stated that sperm found
inside the victim’s anus, coupled with evidence showing that victim had been on
her stomach at some point during the defendant’s alleged assault, did not provide
“overwhelming support” for a sodomy theory.  Nonetheless, we concluded, such
evidence furnished a sufficient basis to justify the prosecutor’s references to
sodomy during questioning and closing argument.  (Ibid.)
28
Blood drops were found all over the carpet at the foot of the bed, and semen stains
were found on the bedspread and on the carpet.  Blood on the victim’s rolled-up
panty and pants, found on the floor near the bed, as well as the pattern of
bloodstains on the bedspread, indicated that the victim had been bludgeoned in the
head in her bedroom after her clothes had been forcibly removed.  More blood
drops led into the hallway, indicating the victim moved or was moved there after
the sexual attack.  Evidence that the victim died in the hallway included
postmortem lividity, the position of the victim’s left hand, and the blood
discharged from her head.  On this record, there was ample evidence that the
victim was sodomized while alive.16
2.  Prior Murder Conviction
Section 190.1 provides that, when a death penalty case involves a prior
murder conviction special-circumstance allegation, the truth of that allegation shall
be determined in a separate proceeding following a finding of first degree murder
by the trier of fact.  (Id., subd. (b).) 17  In this case, one of the allegations charged
                                                
16 
Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant intended to have sexual
contact with a corpse.  (See People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1176.)
17 
Section 190.1 provides in pertinent part:  “A case in which the death
penalty may be imposed pursuant to this chapter shall be tried in separate phases
as follows:  [¶] (a) The question of the defendant’s guilt shall be first determined.
If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the
same time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged as enumerated
in Section 190.2 except for a special circumstance charged pursuant to paragraph
(2) of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 where it is alleged that the defendant had
been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder in the first or second
degree.  [¶] (b) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and one of
the special circumstances is charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a)
of Section 190.2 which charges that the defendant had been convicted in a prior
proceeding of the offense of murder of the first or second degree, there shall
thereupon be further proceedings on the question of the truth of such special
circumstance.”
29
that defendant previously had been convicted of the murder of Barbara Griswold.
Prior to jury selection, defendant filed a written motion to waive a separate
proceeding for determination of that allegation.  Defendant and one of his
attorneys, Albert Garber, submitted declarations in support of the motion, and
counsel argued that a waiver was in defendant’s best interests.  With the
prosecutor’s agreement, the trial court accepted the waiver and presented
defendant’s stipulation to the truth of the prior murder conviction special-
circumstance allegation to the jury before its guilt deliberations.18  The jurors
ultimately returned a guilty verdict and a true finding on all of the special-
circumstance allegations.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court violated his federal
constitutional right to a fair trial by erroneously allowing evidence of the prior
murder conviction to be presented to the jury in advance of guilt deliberations.
The trial court, he argues, should not have accepted his waiver of a separate or
bifurcated special-circumstance proceeding on his prior murder conviction.
Subdivision (b) of section 190.1 (section 190.1(b)) makes clear that a trial
court may not force a capital defendant to undergo a unitary trial of the separate
issues of the defendant’s guilt of first degree murder and the truth of a prior
murder conviction special-circumstance allegation.  It does not, however,
explicitly forbid a defendant from validly waiving a bifurcated trial of such issues
                                                
18 
As read in full to the jury, the stipulation provided:  “The defendant, Jack
Gus Farnam, has admitted that before this trial, he was previously convicted of the
first degree murder of Barbara Griswold on or about the 10th day of September,
1985, in case number A 564216, in the Pasadena branch of the Superior Court of
the State of California, in and for the County of Los Angeles, in violation of
Section 187 of the Penal Code, and within the meaning of Penal Code section
190.2, Subdivision [(a)(2)], as charged in one of the special circumstances in this
case.  [¶] No further evidence is required for the proof of this charge.”
30
in an affirmative, knowing, and voluntary manner.  This case presents a question
of first impression, that is, does a trial court have the discretion to accept a
defendant’s express waiver of his statutory right to a separate proceeding?
It is undisputed that section 190.1(b)’s provision for a separate proceeding
is intended for the benefit of capital defendants charged with a prior murder
conviction special-circumstance allegation.  In essence, the statute recognizes that
evidence of such a conviction may potentially have an inflammatory effect on
jurors who are asked to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence on a current
charge of murder.
It is settled, however, that defendants accused of capital crimes may waive
important rights conferred to them by constitutional and statutory law.  (E.g.,
People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 738 [defendant may waive federal and
state constitutional right of presence at critical stages of a capital trial]; Cowan v.
Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 370 [statute of limitations for a lesser
offense than that charged]; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617 [right to
counsel in both guilt and penalty phases]; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658,
704 [statutory right to jury in special-circumstance phase of trial]; see also People
v. Trejo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032 [state constitutional right to a jury of
12 persons].)
The reason for this is clear.  Generally, permitting waiver “ ‘is consistent
with the solicitude shown by modern jurisprudence to the defendant’s prerogative
to waive the most crucial of rights.’  [Citation.]”  (Cowan v. Superior Court,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 371.)  A defendant may waive a right that exists for his or
her own benefit, where such waiver is not against public policy.  (Ibid.)
Defendant offers no convincing reason why section 190.1(b) should be
construed to preclude him and other capital defendants from waiving its benefits if
they believe it is in their best interests to do so.  This is not a situation where the
31
statute itself prohibits or limits waivers.  (Cf. People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1164, 1209-1211 [defendant charged with a felony may not voluntarily waive
statutory right under sections 977 and 1043 to be present at trial during the taking
of evidence].)  Nor is public policy violated by an affirmative, knowing, and
voluntary waiver of the statutory right where, as here, a capital defendant and his
counsel determine that the circumstances before them make such a waiver
desirable.
Defendant next argues his waiver and stipulation were invalid because he
was not fully advised of the penal consequences.  Specifically, he complains he
was not admonished “that should he be found guilty of first degree murder in the
Mar incident, a prior murder special circumstance, without more, would be
sufficient to make him eligible for the death penalty.”  He contends such lack of
information was all the more egregious in light of his “very low normal” or “low
normal” intelligence and his very low literacy skills.  We disagree.
Defendant represented to the court, both in a signed declaration and at
hearings on the matter, that his attorneys fully explained the protections of section
190.1(b) to him, and that he was “knowingly” giving up his right to a separate
proceeding “with full awareness of the implications.”  The attorneys themselves
likewise assured the court that they explained in considerable detail to defendant
“the entire sequence of events that [defendant] would otherwise be entitled to but
for this proceeding, including the proceeding by virtue — should this waiver be
accepted, and what the procedure would be thereafter.”
Moreover, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to question defendant
thoroughly in order to ascertain defendant’s understanding of his rights and the
consequences of stipulating to the prior murder conviction.  In response to the
prosecutor’s questions, defendant affirmed his understanding that, by so
stipulating, he would give up his right to have the special-circumstance allegation
32
tried by a jury, his right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses regarding the
prior conviction, his right against self-incrimination, and his right to call and
subpoena witnesses on his behalf in that matter.  With the court’s permission, the
prosecutor then explained to defendant:  “The effect of this admission, Mr.
Farnam, if the jury finds you guilty of murder in the first degree, this admission
alone would cause you to proceed to the penalty phase.  Understand, that is even if
all the other special circumstances were found not to be true, your admission of
this special circumstance of having been convicted previously of murder in the
first degree would make you eligible for the penalty phase of this trial.”  After
defendant stated that he understood, the prosecutor emphasized, “That means at
the very least, once you’re found guilty of murder in the first degree, with this
admission, the very least penalty you would get would be life without the
possibility of parole.”  Defendant again stated that he understood.
We find defendant was adequately advised of the consequences of his
waiver and stipulation.  Even though defendant was not advised in open court in
the precise words identified on appeal, the on-the-record admonishments conveyed
substantially the same information to him.  Both defendant and his attorneys
attested to the fact that counsel thoroughly explained the consequences of the
proposed waiver and stipulation to defendant.  Nothing in the record raises any
doubts about defendant’s knowledge or understanding of these matters.19  Under
these circumstances, we are satisfied that defendant acted knowingly, intelligently,
                                                
19 
That defendant may have answered some questions in monosyllabic terms
— i.e., “yes,” — does not support the contention that he failed to grasp the import
of those questions.  Defendant simply was responding to questions calling for a
yes or no answer.
33
and voluntarily in waiving the protections of section 190.1(b) and in stipulating to
the prior murder conviction.
Defendant next argues there was no valid tactical justification for the
waiver and that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing the
prior murder conviction to be introduced at the guilt phase.
Defendant first claims that defense counsel mistakenly believed that section
190.1(b) “only applied if the prior murder conviction was the sole special
circumstance.”  (Italics added.)  The claim is without merit.  By expressing their
awareness that section 190.1(b) was enacted primarily for that type of situation,
and by offering defendant’s waiver to the court knowing that other special-
circumstance allegations were at issue, counsel demonstrated their clear
understanding to the contrary.
To otherwise demonstrate ineffectiveness of counsel, defendant must show
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687-688), and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.  (People v. Weaver,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 925; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 484.)  The
standard of review for ineffective assistance claims is well settled.  In examining
such claims, we accord great deference to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions.
(People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 925; see People v. Freeman, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 484.)  “ ‘Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and
counsel’s decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts.’
[Citation.]”  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 926.)
Here, trial counsel explained their strategy for the waiver and stipulation in
an in camera hearing.  Counsel set forth their concern that, if the jurors were to
find defendant guilty of first degree murder and to find true the other alleged
34
special circumstances, the jurors might react negatively toward defendant if they
were to then learn for the first time about the prior murder conviction special
circumstance.  Counsel understood that the factual circumstances of the prior
murder — as opposed to the fact of defendant’s conviction for the murder —
could be devastating and could obfuscate the jurors’ ability to judge the case
before them, so counsel expressly sought to keep the details of the murder itself
out of the guilt phase.  However, counsel decided it was in defendant’s best
interest to make the jurors aware that the topic of a prior murder conviction would
be coming up in the future if they were to find defendant guilty.  In explaining
their tactics, counsel informed the trial court that they consulted other criminal
defense attorneys, and that those attorneys agreed that a waiver was in defendant’s
best interests.
The record in this case amply supports counsel’s decision.  Defendant was
charged with three crimes (first degree murder, rape, sodomy) and five special
circumstances (the prior murder conviction special circumstance, plus the four
felony-murder special circumstances of burglary murder, robbery murder, rape
murder, sodomy murder), and all but the prior murder conviction had to be
addressed at the guilt phase.  Evidence of the charged crimes and the four felony-
murder special circumstances was overwhelming.  The severed telephone cords
both upstairs and downstairs indicated that the intruder, whoever it was, knew
there was someone in the residence and acted to prevent that person from calling
for help.  That evidence, as well as evidence that envelopes of cash and
entertainment equipment were left untouched on the first floor where the intruder
slit the screen door to gain entry, tended to negate the inference that the intruder
intended merely to burglarize the home.  The victim’s clothes had been forcibly
removed, and sperm was found on vaginal and anal samples taken from her body,
as well as on the carpet of her bedroom.  Blood evidence and the position of the
35
victim’s body indicated she was killed immediately after the sexual attack.  The
method of killing — strangulation with a scarf brought into the home — reflected
premeditation and deliberation.  Finally, the bedrooms upstairs had been
ransacked, and a number of items were missing after the night of the crimes,
including money, jewelry, a gun, and a watch.
Disregarding the prior murder conviction, the evidence of defendant’s
identity in the Mar crimes was strong — prints of defendant’s right middle finger,
right ring finger, and right thumb matched latent prints taken from two items in
Harry Mar’s ransacked bedroom.  Additionally, serological analysis, hair analysis,
and comparisons of defendant’s knife with items found cut at the scene of the
crimes all tended to connect defendant with the crimes and failed to exclude him
as the perpetrator.
Given the strength of the evidence, counsel could reasonably have believed
that a separate proceeding on the prior murder conviction and an eventual penalty
phase were likely.  Counsel had to weigh the possible prejudice of presenting the
prior murder conviction at the guilt phase against the possible prejudice of the
jury’s hearing of it for the first time thereafter.  In deciding that presentation
during the guilt phase would avoid antagonizing the jury without prejudicing
determinations on the Mar murder and the four felony-murder special
circumstances, counsel knew that none of the circumstances of the prior murder —
which, like the Mar crimes, involved sodomy, blows to the victim’s head, and a
ligature around the neck — would be introduced during the guilt phase.
Moreover, counsel conferred with other criminal defense attorneys and found that
none of them disagreed with their tactical decision.
Under the circumstances, we cannot fault counsel’s decision to recommend
the stipulation and waiver to defendant.  Our conclusion here is consistent with
prior decisions recognizing the validity and reasonableness of analogous tactical
36
decisions.  People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, for example, rejected a claim
of ineffective assistance where defense counsel had decided to refer to the
defendant’s prior armed robbery convictions during jury voir dire in order to blunt
their effect on the jury at the penalty phase.  “ ‘[C]ounsel may reasonably treat the
entire trial as a whole, and consider what effect a tactical decision at one phase
will have on a later phase.’ ”  (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 484,
quoting People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 522; id. at pp. 520-521 [counsel
could reasonably believe that guilt phase admission of a confession might aid the
defense at the penalty phase].)20
Finally, defendant contends the trial court’s failure to give, sua sponte, a
proper limiting instruction concerning the prior murder conviction violated his
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
Constitution.  He additionally argues that counsel was prejudicially ineffective in
not requesting a limiting instruction.  These contentions are without merit.
The trial court gave two jury instructions relevant to defendant’s
contentions.  First, the court instructed the jurors that if they were to find the
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, only then would they need to
determine the truth of the five special-circumstance allegations, including the prior
murder conviction allegation.21  The court followed up with a modified version of
                                                
20 
We reject defendant’s related assertion that counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not protesting the inclusion of certain details in the prior murder
conviction stipulation, e.g., the date and county location of the conviction, and the
female victim’s name.  Those critical details ensured that the prosecution and the
defense had reached a meeting of the minds regarding the subject matter of the
stipulation.  Defendant does not persuade us that omission of such details would
have been appropriate.
21 
The court instructed:  “If you find the defendant in this case guilty of
murder in the first degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following
(footnote continued on next page)
37
CALJIC No. 8.82, as follows:  “In this case, it is alleged that the defendant has
been previously convicted of murder in the first degree.  The defendant in this case
has admitted the truth of this special circumstance in the stipulation which I
previously read to you earlier in this trial.  In that stipulation, the defendant
admitted that he was convicted of murder in the first degree of Barbara Griswold
in the Pasadena branch of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of Los Angeles on or about September 10th, 1985.  [¶] Therefore, if
and only if you have found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you
may consider that stipulation as conclusive proof of the allegation that defendant
was previously convicted of murder in the first degree as charged in the
Information.”  (Italics added.)
Defendant does not argue that the foregoing instructions were erroneous.
He asserts, however, that the trial court was further obligated to instruct the jurors
that they could not consider the stipulation for any purpose until they first found
defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Mrs. Mar and that they could not
rely on the prior murder conviction as evidence of guilt.  We are not persuaded.
Taken together, the instructions correctly and adequately informed the jurors that
they could not consider the stipulation or the prior murder conviction unless and
until they first found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Mrs. Mar.  The
instructions were reasonably clear, and no more was required.22
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
special circumstances are true or not true:  [¶] Murder in the course of the
commission of burglary, robbery, rape, and sodomy, and murder with the prior
murder conviction.”
22 
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, this case bears no resemblance to
People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 186, in which the trial court erred by
(footnote continued on next page)
38
Even assuming that the court’s instructions presented a potential ambiguity,
their correct import was reinforced to the jury by the prosecutor’s exhortation
during closing argument that the prior murder conviction “[s]hould have no part in
your considerations with respect to his guilt of anything else until it’s all resolved,
and unless and until you find him guilty of murder in the first degree.  [¶] And you
will, I trust, when you look at the evidence clearly and rationally.  Then and only
then do you get to the point where you discuss the prior murder conviction special
circumstance.”  Hence, the absence of a further limiting instruction could not have
undermined defendant’s trial, and any perceived incompetence by counsel on the
point was harmless.
In sum, defendant does not demonstrate that the trial court committed
prejudicial error, that the waiver and the stipulation rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair, that the jury instructions violated his federal constitutional
rights, or that his trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective on these points.
3.  Evidentiary Matters
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecution to
present much irrelevant evidence during the guilt phase.  He argues that the jury’s
exposure to such inadmissible and unreliable negative evidence was prejudicial,
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair (Cooper v. Sowders (6th Cir. 1988) 837
F.2d 284, 288), and denied him his federal constitutional right to heightened due
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
advising the jurors that they could consider other-crimes evidence “ ‘for any
purpose, including but not limited to’ ” the defendant’s “ ‘character or any trait of
his character.’ ”  (Italics omitted; id. at pp. 185-187 [nonetheless concluding such
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].)
39
process in a capital case (Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637-638).  We
address each claim of error below.
a.  Consciousness of Guilt
Correctional Sergeant Hess testified for the prosecution that defendant,
while in prison in February of 1986, threatened to forcibly resist a court order for
production of hair and blood samples.  When Hess told defendant he could “make
it easy on yourself” or could “make it rough,” defendant said he would comply
with the order under duress.  The samples were taken from defendant without
further incident.  After Hess and another witness completed their testimony, the
prosecutor called Detective Mellecker to the stand.  Mellecker testified he had
gone to the prison to execute a search warrant for defendant’s hair and blood
samples, and had been waiting in the prison medical office when defendant
entered the office.  When the prosecutor asked Mellecker what happened next,
defense counsel objected on relevancy grounds.  The court overruled the
objection, and Mellecker’s testimony on the subject was consistent with Hess’s.
During a break in the defense’s cross-examination of Mellecker, counsel moved to
strike Hess’s testimony on the matter.  That motion was overruled.
On appeal, defendant contends that admission of the challenged testimony
was error under state law because:  (1) it was irrelevant for the stated purpose; (2)
it included unreliable opinion testimony of a lay witness; (3) it consisted of
uncharged “bad act” testimony with no basis for admission under Penal Code
section 1101, subdivision (b); and (4) its admission violated Evidence Code
section 352.
The People argue that defendant’s failure to raise timely and specific
objections to the admission of Hess’s testimony in the trial court bars appellate
review of his four claims.  We agree.  Defense counsel’s relevancy objection
40
during Mellecker’s testimony was inadequate to preserve for appellate review the
admissibility issues concerning Hess’s preceding testimony on the same subject.
(See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1122 [a subsequent objection to
admission of photographs is inadequate to preserve for review the issues of
admissibility concerning a witness’s preceding testimony and explanation of the
photographs]; id. at p. 1130 [objection on relevancy grounds does not preserve a
challenge under Evid. Code, § 352]; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 530
[objection that questions were leading does not preserve a challenge on hearsay
grounds]; People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 979-980.)  In any event, even if
all claims had been preserved, we would conclude there was no error.
“[T]he refusal of a defendant to provide an exemplar in violation of a court
order is admissible evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.”  (People v.
Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1003 [handwriting exemplar]; see also People v.
Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 149 [same]; People v. Johnson (1992) 3
Cal.4th 1183, 1223, fn. 9 [refusal to stand in a lineup].)  Here, defendant concedes
that evidence of his initial refusal to provide blood and hair samples despite a
court order “could conceivably have been material” to show consciousness of
guilt, but that would only be so, he argues, if the defense had put the matter at
issue.  That reasoning fails to persuade, for defendant did not concede guilt at the
first phase of trial.  The relevancy objection lacked merit, and the evidence was
properly admitted.
Second, Correctional Sergeant Hess’s testimony that defendant stood “in a
posture like he was going to start fighting” did not constitute inadmissible opinion
testimony of a lay witness.  A lay witness may testify to an opinion if it is
rationally based on the witness’s perception and if it is helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony.  (Evid. Code, § 800.)  Here, Hess’s opinion was
based on his personal observations that defendant was being “very defiant” about
41
the court order and physically stood with his hands at his side and left foot
forward.  On this record, we cannot say that Hess’s testimony lacked a rational
basis, or that it failed to clarify his testimony.  Moreover, perceptions such as
those formed by Hess are sufficiently within common experience, and certainly
within the experience of a correctional sergeant like Hess who had 15 years of
security experience at a prison hospital.  The trial court acted well within its
discretion in permitting the lay opinion testimony.  (See People v. Medina (1990)
51 Cal.3d 870, 887.)
Third, the prosecution did not offer the evidence regarding defendant’s
defiant conduct to establish his criminal propensity in violation of Evidence Code
section 1101.  Rather, the evidence was offered to show defendant’s consciousness
of guilt, and was properly admitted for that purpose.  (See People v. Clark, supra,
5 Cal.4th at p. 1003.)  To the extent defendant argues that impermissible
inferences could also have been drawn from such evidence, he could have
requested a proper limiting instruction to eliminate any perceived problem.
(People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 746, fn. 3 [absent a request, the trial
court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction].)  Again, no error
appears.
Finally, we see no error with respect to Evidence Code section 352.  As
discussed, the evidence was relevant to establish defendant’s consciousness of
guilt.  In the absence of a request, the trial court was not required to weigh the
prejudicial value against the probative value of the evidence.  In any event, the
testimony describing defendant’s initial defiance with respect to the court-ordered
blood and hair samples did not suggest his actions were criminal or violent;
indeed, Hess testified that defendant was never cited for any security or
disciplinary violation as a result of the incident.  Because the testimony was
42
neither inflammatory nor misleading, its admission was proper under Evidence
Code section 352.  (See People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1130-1131.)23
b.  Testimony Regarding A Series of Murders
Detective Mellecker testified that, at the time of Mrs. Mar’s murder in
1982, he was working on a series of murders involving lone, elderly females in the
area.  Mellecker initially went to the crime scene to investigate the possibility of a
connection between the Mar murder and the other murders he was investigating.
Because “there was no similarity” to the other murders, Mellecker did not become
involved in the Mar case at that time.  Subsequently, for reasons unrelated to the
other series of murders, Mellecker’s division was formally assigned to the Mar
case in 1983, and Mellecker himself started actively investigating Mrs. Mar’s
murder in 1985.
On appeal, defendant complains the detective’s testimony was irrelevant
and left the jury with the erroneous and inflammatory impression that defendant
may have been involved in serial murders of older women.  He contends the trial
court prejudicially erred by refusing to strike the testimony, refusing to instruct the
jury to disregard the testimony, and refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial.
                                                
23 
To the extent defendant argues the trial court violated his due process by
allowing the prosecutor to urge the jury to hold his assertion of a constitutional
right against him, he is wrong.  As relevant here, defendant’s primary authority,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 363, simply recognizes that “[t]o
punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a
due process violation of the most basic sort.”  That principle fails to aid defendant
here because, among other things, he fails to establish the lawfulness of his refusal
to provide the court-ordered samples.
Finally, for all the reasons supporting our conclusion that none of
defendant’s claims on this guilt phase evidence is meritorious, we reject his related
contention that such evidence tainted the penalty phase.
43
We first address whether defendant is procedurally barred from asserting
these claims on appeal.  As the People point out, Detective Mellecker initially
referred to a series of murders involving lone, elderly females during his direct
examination.  The first two times he mentioned the subject, defendant did not
object.  The third time, when the prosecution asked Mellecker whether he decided
to take the Mar case as part of his investigation of the other series of murders,
defendant made only a relevancy objection.  Thereafter, it was defense counsel
who raised the topic during Mellecker’s cross-examination.  It was not until the
prosecutor’s redirect examination of Mellecker that defendant objected to the
subject matter as being highly prejudicial and moved for a mistrial.  The tardiness
of defendant’s objections, coupled with the defense’s questioning on the same
topic, arguably resulted in a forfeiture of the right to raise the admissibility
contentions on appeal.  (See People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1122,
1130; see also People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097, fn. 9 [forfeiture is
the failure to make the timely assertion of a right].)  In any event, none of the
contentions is meritorious.
Although the circumstances of Mellecker’s early involvement in the Mar
case were not relevant to the issue of guilt, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting Mellecker to clarify his official role for the jury’s
benefit.24  Moreover, any prejudicial effect from the detective’s reference to a
series of other murders was minuscule.  Not only did Mellecker clearly and
repeatedly state that Mrs. Mar’s murder was “entirely different than” and “not
anywhere similar to” the other murders, but he explained he did not take
                                                
24 
For example, Randy Adair testified he was the lead detective at the crime
scene, yet Mellecker indicated he had assumed the primary role in obtaining and
executing the court order for the blood and hair samples.
44
responsibility of the Mar crime scene and investigation because “there was
nothing at [the] scene to indicate that it was part of our other series.”  In denying
defendant’s mistrial motion, the trial court limited further testimony on the subject
to evidence that was “unique” about the Mar murder, thus ensuring that no details
of the unrelated murders would be solicited.  On this record, admonishment of the
jury was unnecessary and a mistrial unwarranted.  Defendant’s claims of error are
rejected.25
c.  Knife Evidence
In January of 1983, about two months after Mrs. Mar’s homicide, police
arrested defendant for reasons unrelated to the Mar case and found a knife in his
possession.  The prosecution sought permission to introduce that knife as evidence
and to show it could have been the tool used to cut the telephone cords and the
screen door at the Mar residence in November of 1982.  Objecting on relevance,
due process, and Evidence Code section 352 grounds, the defense argued that no
connection between the knife and the crimes could be established and that its
introduction would be highly prejudicial.  The trial court overruled the objection.
Criminalist William Lewellen then testified that, although his analyses of the items
did not conclusively identify the knife with the cuts, they did indicate that the
blade’s length and shape were similar to the slit in the screen door and that the
knife could have been used to cut the telephone cords.
                                                
25 
Defendant additionally contends that Mellecker’s references to the murders
of elderly women led to further prejudice by giving the four jurors who were
involved in the purse-snatching incident more possible victims to identify with and
a further emotional bias against defendant.  Since the trial court had independently
ascertained that the purse-snatching incident would not affect the jurors’ ability to
judge defendant’s case fairly, and since Mellecker made clear that the Mar murder
was not connected to the series of murders he was investigating, this contention is
devoid of merit.
45
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due
process by admitting the knife and associated testimony into evidence.  He claims
the knife evidence was irrelevant to any disputed material issue because there was
no showing as to when he acquired the knife.  Improper introduction of the
weapon, he argues, led jurors to infer that he murdered Mrs. Mar simply because
he had a similar knife two months after the killing.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is
admissible.”  (Evid. Code, § 351.)  Relevant evidence is evidence “having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action.”  (Id., § 210.)
Evidence that defendant possessed a knife two months after the Mar crimes,
coupled with the evidence that the perpetrator of the Mar crimes used a sharp
instrument, consistent with defendant’s knife, to slit a screen door and sever two
telephone cords at the Mar residence, tended to establish that defendant was the
perpetrator.  “Standing alone the inference may have been weak, but that does not
make the evidence irrelevant.”  (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 491
[rejecting argument that evidence of a garbage bag found in the defendant’s car
shortly after the subject robbery was irrelevant because no one identified it as the
bag used to hold the robbery victims’ property, and an “ ‘infinite’ ” number of
people “ ‘must possess such common, unremarkable articles as plastic bags’ ” in
their cars].)  The fact that many persons may similarly have possessed such a knife
“may diminish the strength of the evidence, but it does not make it irrelevant.”
(Ibid.)
It does not matter that the prosecution could not conclusively connect
defendant’s knife to the Mar crime scene.  In People v. De La Plane (1979) 88
Cal.App.3d 223, for instance, the trial court admitted evidence of a sawed-off axe
handle found in the house in which the defendant was arrested.  There, the only
46
evidence that connected the axe handle to the murder victim was expert testimony
concluding that the handle “could have caused” the victim’s wounds.  (Id. at p.
239.)  As the appellate court aptly reasoned in that case, “If a victim’s wound
could have been caused by a specific type of weapon or instrument, such a weapon
or instrument found in defendant’s possession is admissible in evidence.  Such a
weapon or instrument is considered relevant on the theory that a trier of fact may
reasonably draw an inference from defendant’s possession of the weapon or
instrument to the fact that he used the weapon or instrument to commit the offense
— a disputed fact of consequence in the action.”  (Ibid.; see also People v. Alcala
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 796-797 [evidence of Kane Kut knives seized from
defendant’s residence properly admitted to show that defendant had access to, or
familiarity with, the same brand of carving knife found near the murder victim’s
remains]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 129 [evidence of two knives
belonging to the defendant properly admitted at trial, even though neither knife
was directly or conclusively connected to the offenses].)
Not only was the knife evidence relevant, but its admission was not error
under Evidence Code section 352.  In light of Lewellen’s anticipated testimony,
which proved consistent with his actual testimony, the court could reasonably
conclude that the jury would not be confused or misled on the subject matter of the
knife.26  Thus, although the probative value of the knife was not that strong, the
danger of confusion, speculation, or prejudice was minimal.  We find no abuse of
discretion and no deprivation of defendant’s due process rights.
                                                
26 
On the stand, criminalist Lewellen additionally clarified that, in his opinion,
any other sharp, single-bladed object, such as a scalpel, a kitchen knife, or part of
a scissors blade, could also have cut the items.
47
d.  Margaret Lee’s Statements About The Red Scarf
Mrs. Mar’s daughter, Margaret Lee, testified for the prosecution that she
had not ever seen her mother wearing scarves around the house, that she did not
see her mother wearing a scarf on the night of the murder, and that the red scarf
found around her mother’s neck did not belong to her mother.  On cross-
examination, the defense sought to impeach Margaret’s testimony by asking her if
she had told Detective Adair, the day after the 1982 murder, that the red scarf
belonged to and was worn by the victim the last time Margaret saw her.
Thereafter, Detective Mellecker testified, over a defense hearsay objection, that
Margaret told him in 1986 that her mother was not wearing a scarf when Margaret
last saw her.  The prosecution had offered Mellecker’s testimony under the prior
consistent statement rule.
Defendant contends Mellecker’s testimony was not properly admitted as a
prior consistent statement of Margaret Lee.  The erroneous admission of such
hearsay evidence, he argues, was prejudicial and rendered his trial fundamentally
unfair and unreliable.
Evidence Code section 1236 authorizes the admission of hearsay if the
statement is consistent with a witness’s trial testimony and is offered in
compliance with Evidence Code section 791.  Evidence Code section 791,
subdivision (b) allows a prior consistent statement if offered after “[a]n express or
implied charge has been made that [the witness’s] testimony at the hearing is
recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the
statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper
motive is alleged to have arisen.”
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Mellecker’s testimony did
not fall within this hearsay exception, any error in admitting the testimony was
harmless under any standard.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24;
48
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  Margaret’s out-of-court statement
to Mellecker — i.e., that Mrs. Mar was not wearing a scarf when Margaret last
saw her — merely corroborated other testimony at trial to the effect that none of
Mrs. Mar’s children ever told Detective Adair that their mother was wearing a red
scarf on the night she was murdered.  As the record discloses, Margaret testified
she did not tell Adair that her mother was wearing a scarf on the night of
November 19, 1982, and she emphasized that Adair would have been mistaken if
he had gotten that impression from her.  Consistent with Margaret’s testimony,
Adair testified that his police report notation concerning the scarf was a mistake,
that he could not find any documentation in the family statements or in the police
officers’ statements to support that notation, and that he had simply assumed the
scarf belonged to Mrs. Mar.  Furthermore, both Harry Mar and his wife, Patricia,
testified at trial that they did not see Mrs. Mar wearing a scarf on the night of the
murder.  In light of all the properly admitted evidence on the point, the admission
of Mellecker’s hearsay testimony could not possibly have prejudiced defendant.
e.  The Computerized Fingerprint Matching Program
After an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the trial court allowed the
prosecution to present testimony from Samuel Erwin, Jr., concerning the Los
Angeles Police Department’s use of a computerized database for fingerprint
matching (the CAL-ID system) that produced a list of candidates, which included
defendant, whose fingerprints were similar to those found at the Mar crime scene.
After the CAL-ID system initially identified defendant as a possible candidate for
a match, a latent print analyst visually compared defendant’s fingerprint card to
the latent prints taken from the Mar crime scene and found that defendant’s
fingerprints appeared to match the latent prints.  Erwin then confirmed that the
prints matched.  Defendant contends the introduction of the CAL-ID system
49
evidence was erroneous because:  (1) it was irrelevant, confusing, and cumulative
(Evid. Code, § 352); and (2) it lacked the requisite scientific foundation (People v.
Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 (Kelly)).  Additionally, he complains that an
advertising brochure explaining the CAL-ID system should not have been shown
to jurors because the brochure was unauthenticated.
Defendant’s failure to object at trial on grounds of Evidence Code section
352 and lack of authentication procedurally bars him from asserting those
contentions on appeal.  (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at
p. 1130.)  In any event, even if all points were properly preserved, they lack merit.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Erwin’s testimony concerning the
computerized fingerprint matching program had little or no relevance, the
testimony presented little, if any, potential for prejudice.  Contrary to defendant’s
assertions, it was not “the type of evidence that might evoke prejudice” by
“making it appear as though [defendant] was the subject of some impeachable
computerized decision.”  Rather, Erwin’s testimony clarified that the CAL-ID
system did not actually make identifications and that it merely pointed police to
candidates in the fingerprint database who come closest to matching a particular
latent print.  Once a candidate list was produced, he explained, it would remain
necessary for a qualified expert to make a visual comparison to determine the
existence of a match.  Given the clear import of such testimony, there was no
potential for juror confusion, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.  Likewise, there could have been no harm arising from the
admission of the CAL-ID advertising brochure.
Defendant’s contention based on Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24 fares no better.
Under Kelly, “the proponent of evidence based on a ‘new’ scientific technique”
must “establish its general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.”
(People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 238; see People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th
50
243, 281.)  “This approach is intended to prevent lay jurors from being unduly
influenced by procedures which seem scientific and infallible, but which actually
are not.”  (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 524.)  On the other hand, where
“a procedure isolates physical evidence whose existence, appearance, nature, and
meaning are obvious to the senses of a layperson, the reliability of the process in
producing that result is equally apparent and need not be debated under the
standards of Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24.”  (Ibid.)
We conclude that the admission of Erwin’s testimony concerning the CAL-
ID system did not implicate the concerns addressed in Kelly.  The reliability of the
computerized system in comparing latent prints to fingerprints in its database was
apparent at trial.  The jury could make its own comparisons between the latent
prints found at the Mar crime scene and defendant’s fingerprints, and there was no
dispute that the system made its comparisons “without tampering or alteration of
any kind.”  (People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 524.)  Moreover, Erwin did not
suggest that the CAL-ID system positively identified the latent prints as
defendant’s fingerprints, or that any opinion regarding a fingerprint identification
was based on the computer.  Although the police used the CAL-ID system to
narrow the range of potential candidates whose fingerprints might match the latent
prints, the prosecution relied on a long-established technique — fingerprint
comparison performed by fingerprint experts — to show the jury that defendant’s
fingerprints matched those found at the Mar residence.  Accordingly, the trial
court did not err under Kelly when it admitted Erwin’s testimony.27
                                                
27 
In light of our conclusion that Kelly was inapplicable to evidence regarding
the CAL-ID system, we reject defendant’s related contentions that Erwin was
unqualified to testify about the system, that his testimony did not satisfy the Kelly
requirements, and that his active involvement in procuring the system for the
(footnote continued on next page)
51
Finally, defendant asserts he was prejudiced by Erwin’s explanation of the
categories of persons included in the CAL-ID system database.  In defendant’s
view, Erwin’s testimony that felons convicted of homicide, rape, robbery, and
burglary were among those included in the database in effect disclosed his prior
felon status to the jury and implied he had been previously convicted of those
particular crimes.
Defendant failed to raise any objection to this testimony at trial.  (Evid.
Code, § 353; People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 979-980.)  Even if
preserved, however, the contention is without merit.  Not only did Erwin make
clear that the database also included nonfelons such as job applicants who required
background clearance, but he did not purport to explain defendant’s inclusion in
the database, and he made no mention of past crimes defendant committed or was
alleged to have committed.  In any event, since defendant stipulated to informing
the jury, during the guilt phase, of his prior murder conviction, no prejudice could
possibly have resulted from a suggestion that his fingerprints may have been
included in a database comprised of felony offenders.
f.  Testimony of Criminalist Keith Inman
Based on his review of photographs showing blood drips, drops, and
spatters on the victim and at the crime scene, and other evidence as well,
criminalist Keith Inman offered the following conclusions regarding the sequence
of events leading to Mrs. Mar’s death.  The blood drops on Mrs. Mar’s pants and
panty indicated that Mrs. Mar suffered trauma to her head, resulting in bleeding,
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
police department rendered him unable to provide fair and impartial scientific
testimony on the subject.
52
after those clothes were pulled off her body.  The trauma was inflicted in the
bedroom near her bed, but the absence of contact stains on the bedspread indicated
that while her head was bleeding it did not come into contact with the bed.  The
presence of semen on the bedspread and the bedroom carpet indicated that the
sexual assault occurred most likely on the edge of the bed, but it was impossible to
tell whether ejaculation occurred before or after penetration.  That is, there could
have been intercourse with ejaculation and then leakage of semen out of the
vagina or the rectum onto the bedspread and the carpet, or alternatively, there
could have been an ejaculation via masturbation with intercourse after that.
Bloodstains on both sides and at the very bottom of the bedspread indicated there
was movement all along the foot of the bed, and then Mrs. Mar moved or was
moved out into the hallway.  Blood spatters on the hallway wall indicated that
force was applied to Mrs. Mar one or more times in the hallway, at a time when
she was not on the floor.  It appeared likely that she was strangled in the hallway
where her body was found.  It also appeared that the attack on Mrs. Mar was
continuous and that all the events occurred within a short period of time, perhaps
10 to 20 minutes.
On appeal, defendant contends that Inman was not qualified to render an
expert opinion on blood spatters (Evid. Code, § 720) and that therefore his
conclusions as to the sequence of events were conjectural and speculative.  At
trial, defense counsel objected to Inman’s blood spatter testimony as assuming
facts not in evidence, speculative, and conclusory.  But counsel affirmatively
stated they had no objection if Inman were to “reconstruct the way the crime may
have occurred” and did not challenge Inman’s qualifications to provide expert
opinion on blood spatters.  At most, counsel objected to Inman’s qualifications
with respect to estimating the amount of time elapsing from the start to the finish
of the attack on the victim.  Consequently, defendant’s challenges to Inman’s
53
testimony regarding blood spatters and crime scene reconstruction have been
forfeited.  (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 321.)
In any case, defendant’s contentions lack merit.  Error regarding a witness’s
qualifications as an expert will be found only if the evidence shows that the
witness “ ‘ “clearly lacks qualification as an expert.” ’ ”  (People v. Chavez (1985)
39 Cal.3d 823, 828.)  Here, the record does not reflect that Inman, a criminalist
with 10 years of experience, clearly lacked qualifications to offer opinions on
blood spatters.  Inman’s work as a criminalist involved the examination of
serological evidence, as well as crime scene reconstruction “by examining the
totality of the physical evidence.”  He had earned a bachelor of science degree and
a masters degree in criminalistics from the University of California at Berkeley,
and had worked for three different law enforcement crime laboratories.  He had
examined evidence in 250 to 300 homicide cases and had worked on over 300
sexual assault cases.  As a member of the California Association of Criminalists
and the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, Inman had presented a number
of technical papers to his peers.  This record, made with no challenge to Inman’s
qualifications, does not demonstrate error.  Moreover, the case here is amply
distinguishable from People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, which found that a
trial court had erroneously permitted a criminalist to offer blood spatter testimony
where the criminalist had merely observed many bloodstains without any inquiry,
analysis, or experiment.  (See id. at pp. 852-853.)
Moreover, it was not improper for Inman to testify about the sequence of
events, even if he stated at one point that “common sense” supported the
conclusion that Mrs. Mar was strangled where her body was found.  Expert
opinion on crime scene reconstruction generally is admissible (see, e.g., People v.
Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 321-322; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795,
839-841; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1151), and “ ‘[t]he jury need
54
not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion in order to justify its
admission’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299).  Here, we cannot
say that Inman’s testimony would not have assisted the jury (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a)) or that “ ‘it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of
information’ ” (People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300).
4.  Instructional Error
We have already considered and rejected defendant’s claim that the trial
court erroneously failed to give, sua sponte, a proper limiting instruction
concerning his prior murder conviction stipulation.  (Ante, pt. II.B.2, p. 28.)  We
now consider his other claims of instructional error at the guilt phase.
a.  Failure to Limit Bad Character Evidence
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to properly limit the jury’s
consideration of bad character evidence showing:  (1) defendant’s defiant refusal
to provide court-ordered blood and hair samples; (2) his possession of a knife two
months after Mrs. Mar’s murder; (3) his inclusion in a fingerprint database
consisting in part of felons who had committed homicide, rape, burglary, or
robbery; and (4) his alleged connection with a “series of murders.”  Defendant
contends he was denied a fair trial because the guilt verdict was impermissibly
based on the foregoing evidence.
While evidence of a person’s character generally “is inadmissible when
offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion” (Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (a)), none of the aforementioned evidence reflected a character trait, and
none was offered to prove defendant’s conduct on a specified occasion.  As
already discussed, the knife evidence was properly admitted to show that
defendant possessed a knife that could have been used to cut Mrs. Mar’s screen
door and telephone cords, while the evidence of his defiance was relevant to show
55
consciousness of guilt.  (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  As also discussed,
the testimony explaining the felony-offender fingerprint database and the
reference to an unrelated series of murders were not erroneously admitted and
could not possibly have prejudiced defendant.
In any event, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give a limiting
instruction for such evidence.  (See People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 950;
People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 214.)  This was not an “extraordinary
case” in which the unprotested evidence was “both highly prejudicial and
minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose,” and was “a dominant part of the
evidence against the accused.”  (People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 64, italics
added [articulating a hypothetical exception to the rule generally rejecting a sua
sponte duty].)  Even assuming that some of the evidence at issue was only
minimally relevant or not relevant at all, none of the evidence constituted a
“dominant” part of the case, given the strength of the fingerprint, serological, and
hair evidence against defendant.  Nor was such evidence inflammatory or
otherwise highly prejudicial.  The claim is rejected.
b.  Consciousness of Guilt
Pointing to the evidence of defendant’s initial threat to forcibly resist the
court order for hair and blood samples, the prosecution requested a jury instruction
regarding consciousness of guilt based on a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.06.
The defense objected on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant the instruction and that it permitted the jury to draw an adverse inference
56
from an innocent act, i.e., defendant’s assertion of a perceived constitutional right.
The trial court overruled the objection and gave the requested instruction.28
Defendant contends the modified instruction impermissibly incorporated a
permissive presumption not supported by the evidence.  That is, he appears to
argue there was insufficient evidence indicating that his reasons for initially
refusing to provide Detective Mellecker with blood and hair samples had anything
to do with the Mar case.  We disagree.  Sufficient evidence supported the
instruction in light of Mellecker’s previous meeting with defendant in prison a
month prior to defendant’s act of refusal.  At that previous meeting, Mellecker
questioned defendant about the discovery of his fingerprints at an unidentified
crime scene, and he gave defendant a card indicating he was a homicide/robbery
detective.  When Mellecker returned to the prison with the court order, defendant
became nervous and apprehensive and initially refused to provide the samples
until a prison security officer intervened.  The jury could reasonably infer from the
foregoing evidence that defendant attempted to suppress evidence that might
incriminate him in Mrs. Mar’s murder.  To the extent other evidence in the record
might have supported innocent explanations for defendant’s conduct (e.g., he was
concerned about the pending appeal of his prior murder conviction), that was a
matter properly left for argument and for determination by the jury.
                                                
28 
The trial court instructed as follows:  “If you find that a defendant
attempted to suppress evidence against himself in any manner such as by
concealing evidence in his attempt to refuse to comply with the court order
requiring his blood and hair samples, such attempts may be considered by you as a
circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  However, such evidence is
not sufficient in itself to prove guilt and it’s [sic] weight and significance, if any,
are matters for your consideration.”
57
Defendant next claims the instruction improperly invited the jury to
penalize him for mistakenly asserting his rights “as he believed them to be.”  This
claim is premised on evidence that defendant refused to provide the blood and hair
samples on the stated basis that it was “a violation of [his] rights.”  Because
defendant fails to establish that his refusal was protected by law, we cannot
conclude that the challenged instruction was in error or that it violated
constitutional prohibitions.  (See People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 311.)
Defendant additionally argues that the instruction constituted a prejudicially
erroneous pinpoint instruction because it specifically referred to the evidence that
he attempted to refuse to comply with the court order requiring his blood and hair
samples.  Since defendant failed to raise this particular claim in the trial court, he
has forfeited appellate review of the issue.  (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at
p. 326 [failure to object to proposed wording of instruction bars claim on appeal].)
In any event, we have rejected similar claims in the past, finding that CALJIC No.
2.06 benefits the defense by “ma[king] clear to the jury that certain types of
deceptive or evasive behavior on a defendant’s part could indicate consciousness
of guilt, while also clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove
a defendant’s guilt, and allowing the jury to determine the weight and significance
assigned to such behavior.”  (People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1224; see
also People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1235.)  Moreover, the modified
instruction given here is virtually indistinguishable from the one found proper in
People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183.  In that case, the consciousness of guilt
instruction specifically referred to the defendant’s refusal to participate in a lineup.
(See id. at pp. 1235-1236.)
Finally, defendant contends the instruction violated his Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial and an Eighth Amendment right to jury instructions that do not
impermissibly restrict a jury’s consideration of relevant evidence.  These
58
contentions have not been preserved for review, because they were not raised
below.  In any event, defendant fails to establish that the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments to the federal Constitution would justify a different result with
respect to the challenged instruction.
c.  Preservation of Evidence
Defendant contends the state’s failure to preserve biological evidence
collected from the victim’s body and home denied him due process, a fair trial,
and the right to reliable guilt and penalty determinations.  Specifically, defendant
claims that the state’s failure to properly refrigerate or freeze carpet samples,
sexual assault kit evidence, blood and semen samples, and the victim’s bedspread
resulted in the degradation of material exculpatory evidence.  Moreover, he
claims, the trial court erroneously denied a defense request for a jury instruction
on the matter29 and a motion for a new trial on the same ground.
“ ‘Law enforcement agencies have a duty, under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to preserve evidence “that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect’s defense.”  (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467
U.S. 479, 488; accord, People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 976.)  To fall within
the scope of this duty, the evidence “must both possess an exculpatory value that
was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means.”  [Citations.]  The state’s responsibility is further limited when
                                                
29 
The proposed instruction read:  “While in the possession of law
enforcement, the following items of evidence were either not suitably refrigerated
or frozen:  carpet samples, sexual assault kit evidence, and semen and/or blood
samples.  [¶] You must take the failure to preserve this evidence as indicating that
among the inferences which may reasonably have been drawn from this evidence,
those inferences most favorable to the defendant are the more probable.”
59
the defendant’s challenge is to “the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary
material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”  (Arizona v.
Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57.)  In such case, “unless a criminal defendant
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”  (Id. at p. 58; accord,
People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 976.)’ [Citation.]”  (People v. Catlin,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 159-160.)
Defendant’s claims are devoid of merit.  Here, the crux of his complaint is
that the state failed to properly “preserve evidentiary material of which no more
can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant.”  (Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S.
at p. 57.)  Accordingly, to prevail on his claims defendant must show bad faith on
the part of the state.  (Id. at p. 58.)  He does not do so.  At the time the samples
were taken in 1982, the police had no suspects in the Mar crimes, and the police
crime laboratory did not routinely refrigerate samples other than those in sexual
assault kits.  Freezers were not even available in the police department’s property
division until the end of 1983.  Defendant does not contend that the prosecution
withheld any evidence or reports pertaining to the sexual assault kit or any other
evidence gathered from the crime scene.  Because the record fails to reflect any
bad faith on the part of the state, the inaction complained of did not result in any
due process violation.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in
refusing defendant’s instructional sanction or in determining that a new trial was
not necessary.
Finally, consistent with our conclusion that the state breached no duty to
defendant in failing to freeze or refrigerate evidence, we reject defendant’s related
contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request and secure
60
suppression of any testimony by the prosecution experts who examined the
evidence.
5.  Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed multiple acts of
prejudicial misconduct during the guilt phase by engaging in inflammatory
argument, misstating the evidence, misleading the jury, and expressing her
personal opinions regarding witness testimony and defendant’s guilt.
“ ‘Improper remarks by a prosecutor can “ ‘so infect[] the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ”  (Darden
v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416
U.S. 637, 642; cf. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)’  [Citation.]  ‘But
conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair
is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves “ ‘the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the
jury.’ ” ’  (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820; People v. Price (1991) 1
Cal.4th 324, 447.)  ‘To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct,
the defense must make a timely objection at trial and request an admonition;
otherwise, the point is reviewable only if an admonition would not have otherwise
cured the harm caused by the misconduct.’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Earp, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 858.)
Here, any conceivable harm resulting from the instances of alleged
misconduct could have been cured by an admonition.  Therefore, defendant’s
failure to make timely objections and requests for admonishment bars him from
now challenging many of the prosecutor’s comments he identifies on appeal.  In
any case, upon consideration of all the comments at issue, whether objected to or
not, we find no prejudicial misconduct for the reasons below.
61
Defendant asserts the prosecutor used her opening statement to appeal
improperly to the jurors’ emotions by repeatedly referring to the victim as a
widow and mother, by remarking that the victim was murdered on the birthday of
her daughter, Margaret, and by noting that the victim’s son, Harry, was involved
with a children’s group at his church.  Also, the prosecutor referred to defendant as
“monstrous,” “cold-blooded,” vicious, and a “predator,” and called the evidence
“horrifying” and “more horrifying than your worst nightmare.”
“The purpose of the opening statement is to inform the jury of the evidence
the prosecution intends to present. . . .”  (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96,
137.)  “Nothing prevents the statement from being presented in a story-like
manner that holds the attention of lay jurors and ties the facts and governing law
together in an understandable way.  Although it is generally improper to ask jurors
to step into the victim’s shoes and imagine his or her suffering [citation], the
prosecutor is not prohibited from identifying traits that made the victim
particularly vulnerable to attack where such facts bear on the charged crimes and
are not otherwise inadmissible on their face.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)
The prosecutor here did not violate due process principles or state law.  The
fact that the victim was a widow was relevant to inform the jury of the victim’s
identity and to limit the number of persons who could be the source of the loose
hair and the semen recovered from the victim’s body and her bedroom.  That the
murder occurred on Margaret’s birthday and that Harry was involved with a
children’s group were relevant to explain where those witnesses were after leaving
their mother’s apartment on the evening of the murder.30  These references
                                                
30 
Margaret left the apartment after curling her mother’s hair to celebrate her
birthday with her husband.  Harry left to help with a children’s function at his
church.
62
accurately forecast the evidence admitted in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  No
misconduct appears.
Additionally, there was nothing inappropriate about the prosecutor’s use of
epithets in describing defendant’s actions, or her characterization of the evidence
as “horrifying” and “more horrifying than your worst nightmare.”  Prosecutors
“are allowed a wide range of descriptive comment and the use of epithets which
are reasonably warranted by the evidence” (People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538,
561), as long as the comments are not inflammatory and principally aimed at
arousing the passion or prejudice of the jury (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th
475, 527).  Here, the prosecutor’s statements were no more than fair comment on
what she anticipated the evidence would show.  In light of the record, the
comments were neither deceptive nor reprehensible.  (People v. Earp, supra, 20
Cal.4th at p. 858.)  Nor were they so unfair as to deny defendant due process.
(Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 181.)
Defendant contends that prejudicial misconduct occurred when the
prosecutor asked Detective Mellecker on direct examination whether Mrs. Mar’s
murder was being investigated as part of a “series of murders” of elderly women.
We disagree.  As discussed (ante, pt. II.B.3.b, p. 42), testimony on this point was
both relevant and admissible to provide background regarding Mellecker’s
involvement in the case.  Moreover, any possible prejudicial impact of the
testimony was dispelled by Mellecker’s repeated testimony that the Mar murder
appeared unrelated and completely dissimilar to the other murders under his
investigation.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct during her closing argument by:  (1) improperly commenting on his
prior murder conviction; (2) misstating evidentiary facts and misleading the jury
as to proper inferences; (3) vouching for witnesses and expressing personal
63
opinions on ultimate questions; and (4) insinuating that the defense had been
fabricated.  As set forth below, we find no merit to any of these claims.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor violated an understanding between the
court and the parties that facts underlying the prior murder conviction would not
be presented to the jury at the guilt phase.  No violation appears.  As the record
discloses, the defense stipulated to the truth of the prior murder conviction
allegation with the expectation that the facts of the prior murder would be kept out
of the guilt phase.  That expectation was fulfilled.  Those few times that the
prosecutor referred to the prior conviction, she noted primarily those facts that had
been read to the jury as part of the stipulation.  (See ante, fn. 18.)  Although the
prosecutor did mention other facts not reflected in the stipulation (i.e., Griswold
was murdered on March 5, 1981; defendant was convicted by a jury; and
defendant went to Folsom State Prison after the conviction), she refrained from
addressing the evidence about the prior murder itself.  Contrary to defendant’s
assertions, the prosecutor was not guilty of misconduct.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor misstated evidentiary facts and
misled the jury on whether the Mar killing was premeditated and deliberate.  The
law on this issue is settled.  “Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw
inferences from the evidence at trial.”  (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p.
522.)  “Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury
to decide.”  (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence showed, among other things, that before the attack, Mrs.
Mar had telephoned a friend and was on the telephone for nearly an hour.  The
victim’s children testified that their mother would use the telephone in the living
room downstairs for lengthy calls, and that the victim often left the living room
screen door open and habitually left the curtains to that door partially open.  The
interior of the living room was visible from street level.  The rooms downstairs,
64
which contained entertainment equipment and envelopes of cash, were relatively
undisturbed despite the intruder’s entry through the living room screen door.  Both
telephone cords had been cut, and the victim had been attacked on the upstairs
level of the residence.  On this record, we cannot say that the prosecutor acted
improperly in presenting her theory of premeditation and deliberation by arguing
that defendant, from the street, watched the victim through open curtains in her
living room and waited for an opportune time to enter the residence to commit a
planned sexual attack and murder.  (See People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865,
948 [referring to matters outside the record clearly is prosecutorial misconduct].)
The argument was neither deceptive nor reprehensible.  (People v. Earp, supra, 20
Cal.4th at p. 858.)
Defendant next claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for
criminalist Keith Inman’s opinion regarding the sequence of events during the
assault and murder when she argued to the jurors, “I think the reasonable
inferences are from all of the evidence that after [the victim] was murdered,
[defendant] stepped over the body and went and committed the ransacking that
you can see in People’s [exhibit] 13.”  He also claims the prosecutor improperly
vouched for Detective Randy Adair’s observation of body indentations on the
victim’s bed, even though indentations could not be seen in photographs of the
bed, by arguing that Adair “told you he put it in his 60-day report way back in
1983.  I saw this and this looked real significant to me.  And of course he was
right.”  Defendant additionally complains about the prosecutor’s comments that
the prosecution witnesses are “the ones that know what’s going on.  [¶] . . .  And
you know it’s true, too.”  In these latter comments, the prosecutor was addressing
a discrepancy between Margaret Lee’s testimony regarding the scarf found around
the victim’s neck and a police report that referenced witness statements on the
topic.
65
This claim is utterly without merit.  The prosecutor’s statements constituted
proper comments on the evidence, not attempts to vouch personally for the
credibility of these witnesses.  (Cf. People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1187.)
Read in context, the challenged comments urged the jury to credit the witnesses’
testimony based on matters within the record, not matters within the prosecutor’s
own personal knowledge.  (See People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 443.)
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly disparaged Dr. Ryan, a
defense pathologist, by insinuating he had lied for a price.  He also claims that the
prosecutor improperly argued:  “I couldn’t believe this Dr. Ryan tried to tell us
that our eyes couldn’t see what they plainly saw” and “[i]t’s unimaginable to me.”
Again, no misconduct appears.
“It is within the bounds of proper argument to attack the credibility of
defense expert witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony, based on the
witnesses’ compensation and the fact of their employment.”  (People v. Babbitt
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 702.)  Here, the insinuation complained of was based
largely on words spoken by Dr. Ryan himself.31  Moreover, the cited comments,
when read in context, make clear that the prosecutor was arguing points and
drawing evidentiary inferences at odds with Ryan’s views of the evidence.  The
record does not show that she misstated the facts or went beyond the evidence in
doing so.
Defendant claims the prosecutor improperly implied during rebuttal
argument that his trial counsel knew he was guilty and were fabricating a defense
                                                
31 
Quoting from a portion of the trial transcript, the prosecutor argued:  “But I
think we can sum up [Dr. Ryan] in the following exchange on cross-examination
in questioning the doctor towards the end.  I said:  ‘Sir, I’m not going to take much
more of your time.’  His answer:  ‘I get paid for it, that’s all right, talk slow.’ ”
66
which they themselves disbelieved.  The prosecutor, he asserts, insinuated that
counsel had attempted to mislead the jury by making up stories about suppressed
evidence and representing DNA evidence in a way they knew was unsupported.
These contentions lack merit.  As the record discloses, the prosecutor pointedly
remarked that defense counsel had “a difficult case to argue,” given the
prosecution’s strong evidence against defendant.  Although she contended that
counsel’s DNA and suppressed evidence arguments were not supported by the
record, she did so without impugning defense counsel’s honesty and integrity.
Such arguments clearly were appropriate.  (See People v. Bemore (2000) 22
Cal.4th 809, 846 [“prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in
opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account”]; cf. People v. Bain (1971) 5
Cal.3d 839, 847 [an unsupported implication that defense counsel fabricated a
defense constitutes misconduct].)
Finally, defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by
engaging in ex parte communications with the jurors just after the purse-snatching
incident involving Violet J. and three other jurors.  We disagree.
During the guilt phase, defense counsel had moved for a mistrial based on
their perception that the prosecutor had approached the jurors after the purse
snatching in order to commiserate with them.  The trial court questioned the four
jurors and heard from the prosecutor about the incident, and ultimately determined
that no deliberate ex parte contact or misconduct occurred.  We find that sufficient
evidence supports that determination, and see no basis for overturning it.  Contrary
to defendant’s assertion, the situation here is nothing like that presented in In re
Possino (1984) 37 Cal.3d 163, a case in which an attorney was disciplined for,
among other things, approaching a juror in his own pending criminal trial on drug
charges, conversing with that juror about the prosecutor in his case and his own
religious beliefs, and buying drinks for the juror and her companions.  (Id. at pp.
67
167, 170 [record amply supported the trial court’s conclusion that the attorney
attempted to influence the juror and arouse sympathy on his behalf].)
In sum, we conclude that none of the challenged statements or conduct
amounted to prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, and none deprived defendant of
due process or rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.
6.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends he was denied effective assistance at the guilt phase by
a number of counsel’s actions or omissions.  In addition to the ineffective
assistance claims addressed earlier in this opinion, defendant argues that counsel
were ineffective because:  (1) they should have moved for a separate penalty jury;
(2) they untimely objected to the state’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory
serological evidence; (3) they should have objected to Correctional Sergeant
Hess’s testimony disclosing that defendant was in state prison when contacted for
blood and hair samples and to Samuel Erwin’s testimony indicating that
defendant’s fingerprints were included in a database of felons with offenses
similar to those charged against him; (4) they failed to request a standard limiting
instruction (CALJIC No. 2.50), or any other judicial admonition, to counter the
evidence of defendant’s defiant refusal to provide samples, the “series of murders”
comment, and the evidence that defendant possessed a knife at the time of his
arrest in 1983; and (5) they should have objected to all alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant first argues that “counsel’s concern about the jurors somehow
wondering why they were not told of the conviction in the guilt phase would have
been removed through use of a different penalty panel.”  Defendant, however, fails
to show that the circumstances facing the defense constituted the requisite “good
cause” for a separate penalty jury.  (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (c); see People v.
68
Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 252 [danger that the jury might blame the defense for
failing to disclose prior violent crimes and prior felony conviction at the guilt
phase does not require separate juries].)  Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to
make a doomed motion.
The balance of defendant’s claims fares no better.  As discussed, defendant
fails to establish any breach of a duty to preserve potentially exculpatory
serological evidence.  (Ante, pt. II.B.4.c, p. 58.)  Accordingly, defendant cannot
establish that the alleged omissions of counsel on this point amounted to
incompetent assistance, prejudicial or otherwise.
Additionally, defendant fails to establish any prejudice resulting from
counsel’s alleged omissions with respect to Hess and Erwin.  Significantly, an
integral part of the defense strategy was to have defendant’s prior murder
conviction stipulation read to the jury during the guilt phase.  Given the
information contained in that stipulation (see ante, fn. 18), the jury would not have
been surprised to learn that defendant was in prison in 1985, or that his
fingerprints may have been included in the felony-offender database.  Since the
trial court adequately instructed the jury with respect to its consideration of
defendant’s stipulation (ante, pt. II.B.2, p. 28), and the testimony in question was
not inflammatory (ante, pts. II.B.3.a, p. 39, II.B.3.e, p. 48), there is no reasonable
probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different had
counsel lodged timely objections.
Defendant’s claim that counsel negligently failed to request an instruction
to limit the jury’s consideration of “other crimes evidence” also fails.  To begin
with, the three evidentiary matters at issue did not involve crimes previously
committed by defendant, so CALJIC No. 2.50 was inapplicable.  In any event, the
three matters were properly admitted and involved little, if any, potential for
improper use by the jury.  (Ante, pts. II.B.3.a, p. 39 [refusal to provide blood and
69
hair samples], II.B.3.b, p. 42 [“series of murders” comment], II.B.3.c, p. 44 [knife
evidence].)  Accordingly, the possibility that such an instruction, or a similar
instruction, had it been requested and given, “would have led to a result more
favorable to defendant is not reasonably probable, ‘since the likelihood of the
jury’s using the evidence for an improper purpose was so minimal under the facts
of this case that any conceivable error was harmless.’ ”  (People v. Padilla, supra,
11 Cal.4th at p. 951, quoting People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1226.)
Finally, we have already determined that the prosecutor committed no
misconduct.  (Ante, pt. II.B.5, p. 60.)  Consequently, there can be no ineffective
assistance due to defense counsel’s failures to object.  (People v. Cunningham,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1038.)
7.  Effect of Alleged Guilt Phase Errors
Defendant claims there were numerous serious and prejudicial errors that,
even if deemed harmless separately, in combination resulted in an unfair trial and
a denial of due process in violation of the state and federal Constitutions.  Not so.
Whether considered separately or in combination, the few errors that may have
occurred during defendant’s trial, as discussed earlier, were harmless.
C.  Penalty Phase Issues
1.  Evidence Relating to the McCarthy and Griswold Incidents
The trial court permitted the prosecutor to present evidence of four
incidents, including the Griswold murder and the attempted burglary involving
Beverly McCarthy, to show that defendant previously engaged in criminal activity
70
involving the use or attempted use of force or violence, or the express or implied
threat to use force or violence.32  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)
Defendant challenges the admission and use of facts surrounding the
Griswold murder and the McCarthy burglary attempt on three grounds.  First, the
prosecutor violated section 190.3 and his due process rights by giving inadequate
notice of the incidents.  Second, because the McCarthy incident did not involve a
violent offense, it was in any event inadmissible.  Third, relitigation of the
Griswold and McCarthy incidents in this case violated the constitutional bars
against double jeopardy.  We address these arguments in sequence.
a.  Notice
As relevant here, section 190.3, fourth paragraph, provides that “no
evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the
evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable
period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.”  The purpose of this
provision is to advise an accused of the evidence against him so that he may have
a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty trial.
Although the prosecutor gave notice to defendant well before the start of
trial that the Griswold and McCarthy incidents would be presented as
circumstances in aggravation, defendant claims the notice did not adequately
inform him that sodomy (in the Griswold matter) and an attempted sexual assault
(in the McCarthy incident) would be at issue.  Defendant, however, did not raise
the issue of inadequate notice at trial.  Nor did he object when the prosecutor
                                                
32 
Because defendant was not convicted of the Griswold murder and the
McCarthy burglary attempt until after he murdered Mrs. Mar, they were not
admissible as prior convictions (§ 190.3, factor (c)), but only as criminal activity
involving the use of force or violence (id., factor (b)).
71
referred to such matters at trial.  His failure to do so forfeits appellate review of
this issue.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1153; People v.
Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 956.)
Even assuming the claim was preserved, it is without merit.  “ ‘Notice that
evidence will be presented regarding a specific prior crime or crimes should alert
counsel that evidence of all crimes committed as part of the same course of
conduct may be offered, and, therefore, substantially complies with the notice
requirement of section 190.3.’ ”  (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 639.)
Here, the prosecutor filed two pretrial notices that “[a]ll evidence pertaining to the
homicide of Barbara Griswold for which defendant suffered a conviction for
murder in the first degree on September 10, 1985, in the Pasadena Superior Court
in Case Number A564216” and that “[t]he burglary, rape and murder of Barbara
Griswold” would be at issue.  These notices were sufficient to alert counsel that
any rape or otherwise unlawful sex act performed on Griswold at the time of the
identified burglary and murder would be introduced at trial.  (Ibid.; People v.
Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 259.)  In view of this conclusion, we find no merit to
defendant’s related contentions that the prosecutor committed misconduct in
serving the notice and in focusing on evidence of sodomy during her closing
argument.33
As for the other incident, the prosecutor never sought to introduce any
direct evidence in aggravation that defendant intended to attack McCarthy in a
sexual manner.  Accordingly, the prosecutor’s written pretrial notice referring to
“the attempted burglary of Beverly McCarthy and [her son] Eric Wilson
                                                
33 
The evidence at trial included the testimony of Dr. Cogan, a deputy medical
examiner, that the victim’s anus was “dilated or widened” and that a small area of
hemorrhage in the mucosa around the opening indicated “some type of sodomy.”
72
committed by the defendant on January 22, 1983” clearly satisfied the statutory
notice requirement for what she did introduce.  Although defendant evidently
complains that the prosecutor impermissibly suggested to the jury that a sexual
attack might have happened had defendant actually gotten into the hotel room
alone with McCarthy, that argument, to which defendant did not object, was brief
and constituted a reasonably fair comment in light of the evidence pertaining to
the Mar and Griswold crimes.
In any event, any perceived inadequacy in the prosecution’s notice must be
deemed harmless.  The record discloses no indication that the defense needed
more time to prepare a response or that the notice otherwise affected the manner in
which defense counsel handled the proceedings.  (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8
Cal.4th at pp. 1153-1154.)  Under these circumstances, no reasonable possibility
of prejudice appears.34  (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 958.)
b.  Nonstatutory Aggravation
Defendant argues that the McCarthy burglary attempt was inadmissible
under section 190.3, factor (b) because it did not involve the use or attempted use
of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.
Defendant’s assertions are without merit.  The prosecution’s evidence
tended to show that defendant, armed with a pipe, attempted to break into Beverly
McCarthy’s hotel room late at night knowing the room was occupied.  The first
                                                
34 
Defendant claims that a continuance would not have been an appropriate
remedy here.  This claim is rejected, for as presented it is conjectural and lacks
any support in the record.
Alternatively, defendant asserts that counsel rendered ineffective assistance
in failing to request a continuance.  This claim also is rejected, for the appellate
record indicates no reason for counsel’s inaction, and we have no basis for
assessing whether or not such inaction was reasonable.
73
time he attempted to break in through the room’s sliding glass door, he left after
McCarthy opened the drapes to the door and screamed.  When defendant returned
and tried to break in a second time, McCarthy’s son opened the drapes and saw
defendant carrying a pipe.  Defendant raised the pipe over his head, and as
McCarthy described it, the pipe looked “like it was going to come through the
window on my son.”  Defendant did not leave until the son began pounding on the
door.  This evidence, taken together with other evidence showing that defendant
previously used similar pipes to assault other victims when breaking into their
homes (Mar) or hotel rooms (Griswold and Mr. and Mrs. N.), gave rise to the
reasonable inference that the McCarthy incident involved the attempted use of
force or violence, or at least a threat to use force or violence.
c.  Double Jeopardy
Arguing that he was tried once on the McCarthy incident and found guilty
of attempted burglary based on larceny, not sex, as a motive for entry, and that he
was tried twice for Griswold’s murder without any sexual offense charged or
proved, defendant claims the litigation of those matters in this trial violated
constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  The contention is without
merit.
Because the prosecutor did not present any direct evidence of sexual motive
in the McCarthy incident, the claim partially lacks factual foundation.  In any
event, we have repeatedly held that “[t]he use under factor (b) of a crime for which
a defendant was previously convicted does not violate the constitutional and
statutory bars against double jeopardy.  The defendant is not being tried again, or
made subject to punishment or conviction, for the same offense; instead, the
evidence is admitted to assist the jury in its determination of the appropriate
sentence on the current charge.”  (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 71, and
74
cases cited therein; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 820.)  We
have also rejected the contention that Taylor v. United States (1990) 495 U.S. 575
requires a contrary conclusion.  (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 820.)
We decline defendant’s request to reexamine these precedents.
2.  Defendant’s Confession
As part of its case-in-chief, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence
that in 1983 defendant confessed to the McCarthy and Griswold crimes, as well as
the robbery and assault of Mr. and Mrs. N.  In response to a defense motion, the
trial court excluded any reference to a rape of Mrs. N. on corpus delicti grounds.
The court subsequently held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 on
another defense motion seeking suppression of the confession on the ground that
defendant’s arrest on the night of the McCarthy incident was illegal, and that
therefore the two subsequent interviews at the Pasadena jail, in which defendant
confessed, were also improper.  The court denied the motion, finding that ample
cause supported defendant’s detention and subsequent arrest.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in ruling the confession
admissible.  His principal argument asserts that he had invoked his right to remain
silent during a custodial interrogation conducted by Officer Bradley on the night
of the McCarthy incident, which rendered his subsequent confession to Lieutenant
Huff inadmissible.  Defendant also contends the following circumstances
established the involuntariness of his confession:  he was young; he had a low
intelligence; he was left overnight in a cell; he was distraught; he had been
smoking marijuana; and the police psychologically coerced his confession by
falsely telling him his fingerprints were found on Mr. N.’s wallet.  Because the
confession was a cornerstone of the prosecution’s evidence at the penalty phase,
75
he argues, reversal of the penalty determination is required under Chapman v.
California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.
In response, the People assert the following two bars to consideration of
these claims.  First, defendant is collaterally estopped from litigating these
admissibility issues because they were actually litigated and resolved against him
in his trial for the Griswold murder.  (See Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841,
848-849.)  Second, defendant’s failure to raise these issues at trial bars their
assertion on appeal.  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 [where defendant
sought suppression of confession at trial based solely on Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), claim pertaining to involuntariness of confession
was barred on appeal because the parties had no incentive to litigate fully the
theory below, and the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual
disputes and make necessary factual findings].)
At trial, defendant never asked the court to determine whether Officer
Bradley’s questioning occurred in the context of a custodial interrogation, or
whether defendant had invoked his right to remain silent at that time — even
though such determinations are necessary to evaluate his principal appellate
contention.  Generally, when reviewing a trial court’s decision that a statement
was obtained in violation of Miranda, we “defer to the trial court’s resolution of
disputed facts, including the credibility of witnesses, if that resolution is supported
by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]  Considering those facts, as found, together
with the undisputed facts, we independently determine whether the challenged
statement was obtained in violation of Miranda’s rules.”  (People v. Weaver,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 918.)  Here, however, the relevant circumstances are not in
dispute.
Additionally, the prosecutor noted at the suppression hearing that the
confession’s admissibility had been fully litigated in the Griswold case.  But after
76
stating her uncertainty whether res judicata principles applied in this particular
case, she expressed a preference “to go ahead and allow [admissibility of the
confession] to be litigated again.”  On balance, we believe it prudent to reach the
merits of defendant’s appellate contentions, and do so below.
The facts underlying defendant’s contentions are as follows.  Late on the
night of January 22, 1983, Police Officer Bradley was on patrol when he received
a radio broadcast regarding an attempted burglary at a nearby Holiday Inn.
Bradley spotted defendant approximately eight blocks from the hotel.  Because
defendant resembled the described suspect and was acting suspiciously, Bradley
detained him and conducted a patdown search for weapons.  Defendant was
carrying a folding knife in a sheath.  Sergeant Schultze arrived to assist Bradley,
and made a radio broadcast to have the witnesses to the attempted burglary
brought to the scene.  Although defendant initially answered Bradley’s questions
about his recent whereabouts, defendant became uncooperative after Schultze’s
broadcast.
Officer Bradley testified that, after the broadcast, “I began to ask some
more detailed questions to identify Mr. Farnam.  [¶] I initially asked him his
name.”  Defendant replied, “Fuck you.  I’m not going to answer any of your
fucking questions.”  When Bradley continued to ask basic interview questions,
“what’s your name, what’s your birthday, where do you live, have you ever been
arrested before,” defendant “either did not answer or gave abusive responses.”
Defendant then “turned around and began to walk northbound on the sidewalk
after making the statement, words to the effect ‘Fuck this, I’m not staying here
anymore.’ ”  When defendant started to walk away, Bradley placed his hands on
defendant’s arm “to prevent him from leaving,” and a scuffle ensued.  Defendant
grabbed hold of Bradley’s baton and was about to strike Bradley’s head, but was
blocked.  Defendant was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon on a police
77
officer and was taken to the station for booking.  At no time during these events
did the police advise defendant of his Miranda rights.  Nor did defendant reveal
his name or other identifying information.
The next morning, Lieutenant Huff, who was investigating the Griswold
case, went to speak to defendant in his jail cell.  After defendant disclosed his
name, Huff walked defendant to a small interview room.  Once there, Huff read
defendant his Miranda rights off a written card and ascertained that defendant
wished to waive such rights.  After securing an oral waiver, Huff and Sergeant Orr
questioned defendant from approximately 9:30 a.m. to noon.  Defendant admitted
his involvement in the McCarthy, N., and Griswold crimes.  In a second tape-
recorded interview later that day, defendant signed a written waiver of his
Miranda rights and reiterated the same information.
Under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at page 444, “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. . . .  Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.  The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”  However, if the suspect “indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease.  At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise.  Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a
78
statement after the privilege has been once invoked.”  (Id. at pp. 473-474, fn.
omitted.)
Defendant makes no express claim here that Miranda warnings were
required during the initial police contact on the night of the McCarthy incident.
He argues, however, that the exercise of the right to remain silent, prior to the
receipt of Miranda warnings, by an accused facing a custodial interrogation
renders invalid a subsequent Miranda waiver during interrogation.  (See People v.
Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 381, 384.)  Specifically, defendant contends that he
invoked his right to silence by refusing to answer questions during Officer
Bradley’s custodial interrogation, and that his invocation of rights as such was
sufficient to invalidate his subsequent Miranda waivers during Lieutenant Huff’s
interrogations the following day, thus rendering his confession to Huff
inadmissible.
As an initial matter, we reject defendant’s factual assertion that Officer
Bradley was conducting a custodial interrogation at the time defendant refused to
answer further questions regarding his identity and whereabouts and attempted to
walk away.  While the term “interrogation” refers to any words or actions on the
part of police that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, it does
not extend to inquiries — like those made here by Officer Bradley — that are
“essentially ‘limited to the purpose of identifying a person found under suspicious
circumstances or near the scene of a recent crime[.]’ ”  (People v. Clair (1992) 2
Cal.4th 629, 679-680 [investigatory inquiries made during a temporary detention
not a custodial interrogation].)  Likewise, the term “custody” generally does not
include “a temporary detention for investigation” where an officer detains a person
to ask a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to
obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  (Id. at p. 679
[custody not found where an officer, with his gun drawn, approached the
79
defendant at an apartment crime scene to ask who he was, whether he had
identification and lived in the apartment, what he was doing in the apartment, and
whether he knew the residents].)  Notably, the fact that defendant started to leave
the scene after refusing to respond to further questioning by the police indicates
that, up to that moment, defendant did not reasonably believe that his freedom of
action was being curtailed in any significant way.  (See Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.
at p. 444; People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [question is “whether a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would have felt he or she was in
custody,” disregarding any “uncommunicated subjective impressions of the police
regarding defendant’s custodial status”].)
In any event, the law is settled that when a suspect under interrogation
makes an ambiguous statement that could be construed as an invocation of his or
her Miranda rights, “the interrogators may clarify the suspect’s comprehension of,
and desire to invoke or waive, the Miranda rights.”  (People v. Clark, supra, 5
Cal.4th at p. 991; see also People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 25-26.)  Here,
defendant’s prearrest refusal to answer Officer Bradley’s investigatory inquiries,
which was not made in response to an advisement of Miranda rights, fell short of a
clear invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  That is,
defendant’s comments (“I’m not going to answer any of your fucking questions”;
“Fuck this, I’m not staying here anymore”) and his attempt to walk away from the
officers, viewed together, may simply have reflected that defendant did not want
to stay at the scene and answer the particular questions posed by Officer Bradley.
Under these circumstances, defendant’s comprehension and desire to invoke or
waive his right to remain silent and right to counsel warranted clarification.
Lieutenant Huff’s subsequent advisement of Miranda rights achieved just that;
Huff did not ask defendant any substantive questions until defendant’s position
was clarified and valid Miranda waivers were obtained.  We therefore reject the
80
claim that defendant’s confession to the Griswold, N., and McCarthy crimes was
obtained in violation of Miranda.
We now turn to defendant’s second contention, i.e., that other
circumstances surrounding the postarrest interviews rendered his confession
involuntary despite the fact that Miranda warnings were given.  In determining
whether or not a defendant’s confession is voluntary, the totality of circumstances
must be considered.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 920.)  On appeal,
“we independently examine the record, but, to the extent the facts conflict, we
accept the version favorable to the People if supported by substantial evidence.”
(Id. at p. 921.)
As relevant here, the following facts were undisputed.  The morning after
defendant’s late night arrest, Lieutenant Huff met with defendant in his jail cell
and learned his name.  At that point, Huff knew that defendant had not yet been
advised of his Miranda rights.  Huff indicated he wanted to speak to defendant
about an incident that occurred the night before and asked if defendant was willing
to talk to him.  The two then moved to a small interview room, where Huff read
defendant his Miranda rights.  Defendant indicated he understood such rights and
wished to waive them.  Huff then interrogated defendant in a quiet and
nonjudgmental manner for approximately two and one-half hours.  Later that
afternoon, defendant signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights and
participated in a tape-recorded interview.  Although defendant was emotional
when interviewed (sometimes crying or being very quiet), he never indicated any
desire to have an attorney, to be left alone, or to discontinue questioning.  At no
time did the police make any promises to defendant regarding prosecution.
Defendant was only 18 years old at the time of the custodial interrogations.
However, he had been arrested a number of times as a juvenile, and there is no
indication he felt intimidated during Huff’s interviews.  Finally, although
81
defendant suggests on appeal that his low intellect and marijuana smoking might
have affected his judgment, nothing in the record supports such a conclusion.  The
totality of circumstances, we find, raises no doubt as to the volitional character of
defendant’s confession.
That Huff and his partner falsely informed defendant his fingerprints had
been found on Mr. N.’s wallet did not render defendant’s subsequent confession to
the N. and Griswold crimes involuntary.  “Lies told by the police to a suspect
under questioning can affect the voluntariness of an ensuing confession, but they
are not per se sufficient to make it involuntary.”  (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17
Cal.4th 1216, 1240; People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 167.)  Where the
deception is not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement, a
finding of involuntariness is unwarranted.  (In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764,
777 [confession found voluntary where wounded defendant was told, perhaps
deceptively, that he might die before reaching the hospital and that he should talk
to close the record].)
Here, the deception concerning defendant’s fingerprints was unlikely to
produce a false confession.  (See People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 166-
167 [defendant’s statements properly admitted even though police falsely stated
that incriminating evidence had been found]; People v. Watkins (1970) 6
Cal.App.3d 119, 124-125 [confession found admissible where defendant was
falsely told that his fingerprints had been found on the getaway car].)  The record
is otherwise devoid of any evidence showing a coercive climate, use of pressure
tactics, or promises of help or leniency.  On this point, we observe the situation
here is distinguishable from that in People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d 815, where
the defendant, confronted with false statements purporting to show his guilt of
murder, came to doubt his own sanity and confessed in response to a police offer
to get him help for his alleged mental condition.  (Id. at pp. 840-841.)
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Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied that defendant’s
confession was the product of a rational intellect and a free will.  (In re Walker,
supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 776.)
3.  Denial of Lineup
At trial, defendant moved on due process grounds to have Mr. and Mrs. N.
attend a lineup in order to test their ability to make an identification.  The defense
noted that six years had passed since Mr. and Mrs. N. had been robbed and that
one crime report contained the notation “suspect, M/B” (supposedly indicating the
victims’ description of the suspect as “Male/Black”), whereas defendant was
Caucasian.35  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, defendant claims the
court’s ruling violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the federal Constitution.
In Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625 (Evans), we
concluded that “due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon
timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the
alleged criminal conduct can participate.  The right to a lineup arises, however,
only when eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there
exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would
tend to resolve.”  (Fn. omitted.)  Although Evans was decided in the context of a
guilt phase witness identification, we have applied its principles in addressing
lineup claims involving penalty phase witnesses whose testimony pertained to
alleged aggravating evidence.  (See People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp.
235-236; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1155.)
                                                
35 
Two other crime reports, however, indicated that the victims described the
suspect as being White.
83
Here, the People argue that the concerns addressed in Evans, supra, 11
Cal.3d 617, apply only in the guilt phase and that due process does not require a
right to a lineup so as to test the reliability of “other crimes” evidence during the
penalty phase of a capital trial.  The People reason as follows.  Differing treatment
is warranted because “[u]nlike a guilt determination where identity is a necessary
element that the prosecution must prove, proof of an aggravating factor in the
penalty phase of a capital case and the facts supporting the aggravating factor such
as identity are not ‘elements’ of the capital offense.”  The entire jury need not have
found the prosecutor met her burden of proof on the other crimes evidence before
a single juror could consider such evidence.  (See People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th
at p. 462.)  Accordingly, “the concern for reliability of each aggravating
circumstance in a penalty determination is not the same magnitude of concern for
reliability as that which exists during the guilt determination.”  Due process,
therefore, does not demand that, in the penalty phase of a capital case, a lineup be
required to test the reliability of eyewitness identifications for other crimes
evidence presented in aggravation.  In pressing this argument, the People argue
that People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th 153, and People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8
Cal.4th 1060, should not be controlling because neither case specifically
considered this issue.
We need not address the validity of the People’s claimed distinction in
order to resolve defendant’s due process claim.  Defendant in any event was not
entitled to a lineup under Evans in the absence of a timely request and a showing
that eyewitness identification was “a material issue” and that “a reasonable
likelihood of a mistaken identification” existed “which a lineup would tend to
resolve.”  (Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625, fn. omitted.)  Even assuming
defendant’s motion was not untimely, the trial court properly ruled that eyewitness
identification by Mr. and Mrs. N. was not a material issue and that no reasonable
84
likelihood of misidentification existed.  Significantly, defendant had given a
detailed confession to the police in which he admitted he was the perpetrator of the
crimes against these victims.  Since that confession was properly admitted (ante,
pt. II.C.2, p. 74), we reject defendant’s due process contention.
Defendant’s other assignments of constitutional error also fail.  Having
failed to raise them at trial, he is barred from raising them on appeal.  (See People
v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1174.)  In any event, the trial court’s action did
not implicate any of the cited constitutional protections.
4.  Admission of Griswold Photographs
As indicated, the prosecution presented evidence of Griswold’s murder at
the penalty phase.  During a hearing, the prosecutor initially offered approximately
46 autopsy photographs showing injuries suffered by Griswold.  After defendant
objected to some, but not all, of the photographs, the prosecutor voluntarily
withdrew some and the trial court acted to exclude others.  Ultimately, the
following 32 photographs were ruled admissible:  (1) five pre-autopsy
photographs showing ligatures on various parts of Griswold’s body; (2) four
photographs showing head and face wounds; (3) five photographs showing
injuries on the hands and arms; (4) five photographs showing wounds on the
abdomen; (5) three photographs showing feet and calf injuries; (6) seven
photographs showing injuries on the back, side, and posterior; and (7) three
photographs showing wounds to the neck.  Dr. Cogan, a deputy medical examiner,
utilized the photographs to explain to the jury the nature of the 71 wounds he
observed on Griswold’s body and to illustrate his opinion regarding the torturous
manner of her death.
Defendant contends that the trial court admitted these photographs in
violation of Evidence Code sections 350 and 352, that the prosecutor used the
85
photographs in argument to inflame the jury, and that the combination of these two
factors violated his federal constitutional rights and resulted in an unreliable death
penalty verdict.
At the outset, we observe that defendant has forfeited appellate review of
his admissibility contention as to all but seven of the photographs because he
failed to interpose timely objections at trial.  (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People
v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 644.)  Moreover, defendant’s appeal fails to specify
which particular photographs he contends were improperly admitted.  But even
were we to overlook these procedural deficiencies, we would find that all of the
photographs were properly admitted for the reasons below.
“ ‘The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion
of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or
inflammatory.’  [Citation.]  On appeal, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion
standard when reviewing the trial court’s ruling.”  (People v. Kipp (2001) 26
Cal.4th 1100, 1136.)  Applying that standard here, we find no abuse of discretion.
“Generally, photographs that show the manner in which a victim was
wounded are relevant to the determination of malice, aggravation and penalty.”
(People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 655; see also People v. Lucas (1995) 12
Cal.4th 415, 450.)  Here, the autopsy photographs not only showed criminal
activity that involved the use of force or violence, but they aided Dr. Cogan in his
explanation to the jury regarding the massive number and nature of the wounds
inflicted upon the victim prior to death.  They clearly were relevant to the
prosecution’s penalty phase case under factor (b) of section 190.3, and indeed,
highly probative of the prosecution’s theory that Griswold was the victim of a
torture murder.
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion otherwise, the photographs, which we
have reviewed, were not impermissibly cumulative or inflammatory.  Photographs
86
are not cumulative simply because they illustrate facts otherwise presented
through testimony.  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 592; People v.
Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1199.)  Moreover, while the number of photographs
admitted here was relatively large and several were superficially similar, they
provided different views of Griswold’s wounds that corroborated Dr. Cogan’s
testimony and were helpful to a full understanding of the prosecution’s torture-
murder theory.  None of the photographs, we observe, is unduly gruesome or
likely to inflame the passions of a jury.  In sum, the trial court could properly
conclude, in its discretion, to admit the photographs as having probative value that
outweighed their potentially prejudicial effect.
Defendant raises a related misconduct claim premised on the italicized
portion of the following comments made by the prosecutor during her closing
argument:  “Now for the worst crime of them all, the murder of Barbara Griswold.
I told you in my opening statement that words really could not convey the horror
that was inflicted on her.  I’m sure you could not imagine anything as gruesome as
this.  [¶] These photographs are truly frightening, aren’t they?  What makes them
so bad is not that they’re gory, because you’ve seen pictures worse than this on TV
every day.  What we see here and what makes it so awful is the knowledge that
[Griswold] was alive to suffer every single one of these blows.”  (Italics added.)
Any harm that could conceivably have resulted from the foregoing
comments could have been cured by an admonition.  Therefore, defendant’s
failure to make a timely objection and request for admonishment bars his
contention on appeal.  (People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 858.)
In any case, the prosecutor’s argument, viewed in context, represented a
fair comment on the nature of the criminal acts committed against Griswold and
was based on inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the photographs and
Dr. Cogan’s testimony.  (See People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 579.)  That
87
the prosecutor employed the terms “gruesome” and “truly frightening” to describe
the criminal acts and the victim’s consequent suffering is insufficient by itself to
establish that deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion were used.  (See
ibid. [prosecutor’s argument that the defendant’s crime was “the worst possible”
or the most “incredibly horrible” constituted a reasonably fair comment on the
evidence].)  The claim is rejected.36
5.  Cross-examination Regarding Escape and Escape Attempt
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to
cross-examine him concerning his nonviolent escape from a youth facility known
as Camp Barley Flats and a later plan to stab a prison guard during a plot to escape
from a California Youth Authority (CYA) facility.  Defendant first argues the
incidents did not constitute evidence of criminal activity involving the use of force
or violence as contemplated in Penal Code section 190.3.  He also complains that
the prosecutor’s inappropriate reliance on hearsay deprived him of his state and
federal constitutional rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair and reliable
penalty determination.  Reversal, he argues, is compelled under the harmless error
standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.
a.  Defendant’s Escape from Camp Barley Flats
On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from
defendant.  Defendant had been at Camp Barley Flats for “two or three days”
                                                
36 
We additionally reject defendant’s related constitutional contentions.
Defendant’s failure to raise such contentions in the trial court bars them on appeal.
(E.g., People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 592, fn. 17.)  For the reasons
stated above, we find them unpersuasive in any event.
In light of our conclusions above, we reject defendant’s further claims that
trial counsel were ineffective in failing to make all the noted objections.  Counsel
had no obligation to interpose meritless objections.
88
before he made an escape while being transported by van to juvenile hall for an
evaluation.  When the van stopped at a traffic light, defendant, who was
handcuffed, opened the door and ran away.  Defendant outran his counselor and
subsequently avoided capture by a motorcycle officer.  Thereafter he fled to
Washington.
Defendant argues that the foregoing cross-examination exceeded the scope
of direct examination and that the escape incident itself was inadmissible under
section 190.3 because no force or violence was involved.  We disagree.
Although defendant appears to have preserved his section 190.3 contention
by having lodged an appropriate objection prior to the start of the penalty phase,
he has forfeited review of the permissible scope of cross-examination because he
failed to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutor’s questions.  In any case, as
set forth below, both contentions are lacking in merit.
It is settled that the trial court is given wide discretion in controlling the
scope of relevant cross-examination.  (See People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p.
477.)  Here, defendant testified on direct examination that he spent “four to seven”
days at Camp Barley Flats in 1981 as a result of a burglary and that he “[g]ot
along . . . good” with the staff and inmates there.  As part of the same line of
questioning on direct, defendant testified that he spent time at the county jail, at
other juvenile camps and facilities, and at the CYA, and indicated that nothing
improper or unusual occurred during many of those stays except that he hurt
himself once and attempted suicide twice because of depression.  In light of this
direct testimony and the impression it likely left on the jury, the prosecutor was
entitled to cross-examine defendant about his escape from Camp Barley Flats two
or three days after his arrival there.  Although the prosecutor’s questions pertained
to a matter that had not been discussed on direct, we are persuaded that the trial
court acted well within its broad discretion in permitting the prosecutor to elicit
89
such testimony on cross-examination.  (See, e.g., People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th
at pp. 476-477 [prosecutor properly cross-examined the defendant about a prior
robbery after he testified on direct that he was incapable of murdering the victim].)
Moreover, reference to the escape was not barred per se by section 190.3.
Generally, section 190.3 allows the prosecution, at the penalty phase, to introduce
evidence in aggravation consisting of prior criminal activity by the defendant, so
long as the criminal activity involved the use or attempted use of force or violence
or the express or implied threat to use force or violence and proper notice to the
defense is given.  (Id., 2d & 4th pars.; see also id., 1st par.)  Here, however, the
prosecutor never relied on or sought to use evidence of the Camp Barley Flats
escape as a circumstance in aggravation.  Rather, as discussed above, she elicited
the escape testimony for a proper, independent purpose, i.e., to rebut impressions
left by defendant’s own testimony on direct.  No error appears.
b.  The CYA Escape Plan
Prior to the start of the penalty phase, the trial court ruled that the
prosecution could present as a circumstance in aggravation defendant’s alleged
plan in 1982 to stab a prison guard during an escape from a CYA facility.
Although the prosecutor did not introduce the incident during her case-in-chief,
she raised the topic with defendant during his cross-examination.  Specifically, she
asked defendant if he had planned an escape while at CYA in 1982 and whether
the plan involved killing a female staff member.  Defendant admitted that he had
planned an escape involving two other juveniles and that the plan called for one
cohort to start a fight in order to distract the guards.  Although defendant conceded
that one of his cohorts mentioned he could “take out” a staff member with a
pencil, defendant claimed he kept telling the cohort that such action was
90
unnecessary.  Defendant denied that the plan called for the killing of a staff
member.
Defendant argues the trial court should have disallowed the foregoing
cross-examination.  He claims the escape plan was inadmissible under section
190.3 because it did not involve any “concrete” plan or agreement to use violence
by anyone, including himself.  He also argues that the plan was outside the proper
scope of rebuttal and that the questioning was impermissibly based on hearsay.
Defendant preserved his section 190.3 contention by having made a proper
objection prior to the start of the penalty phase, but he failed to interject timely
objections based on scope-of-rebuttal and hearsay grounds during the prosecutor’s
questioning.  In any event, as set forth below, his contentions warrant no relief.
Although the prosecutor had obtained a ruling allowing presentation of the
CYA escape plan pursuant to section 190.3, she ultimately forwent such
presentation and instead cross-examined defendant on the topic in rebuttal.  Unlike
defendant’s escape from Camp Barley Flats, however, an escape from CYA never
actually occurred, and there was no indication that defendant or his cohorts
attempted to act on the escape plan before it evidently was discovered.  Nor,
apparently, was there any proof that defendant was ever cited or disciplined for the
plan.  Consequently, testimony regarding the CYA escape plan would not have
appeared to rebut defendant’s direct testimony suggesting that nothing unusual had
occurred during his stays at the county jail and various juvenile and CYA facilities
except for his self-injury and attempted suicides.  Nor would it have rebutted the
testimony that he got along well with staff members and inmates at some of those
places.  On this record, it appears that defendant’s direct testimony did not invite
cross-examination about the escape plan.  Nonetheless, we determine whether it is
reasonably possible that any trial court error in permitting the cross-examination
91
affected the verdict (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-449) and whether
federal constitutional standards were violated.
In reviewing the record of the penalty phase, we observe the jurors had
been presented with overwhelming aggravating evidence showing that defendant
was a repeat sexual predator and murderer, including evidence that defendant
found Lillian Mar and Barbara Griswold alone in their respective quarters, and
that he bludgeoned and sexually attacked them before murdering them.  The jurors
also were presented with evidence showing that defendant relentlessly tortured
Griswold by striking her repeatedly with a threaded metal pipe and a belt.
According to expert testimony, Griswold had been alive throughout the ordeal and
had received most of the wounds while bound and defenseless.  Finally, the jurors
heard testimony that even the presence of another person did not deter defendant
from using or threatening to use force or violence in the crimes involving Mr. and
Mrs. N., Beverly McCarthy, and Officer Bradley.
In light of all this evidence demonstrating that defendant was extremely
violent and capable of extreme acts of cruelty and aggression, it was not
reasonably possible that the jurors could have drawn any more damaging
inferences from the relatively brief testimony pertaining to defendant’s planned
escape from CYA.  (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 428-429; People v.
Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 449.)  The evidence showing the brutality of the Mar
and Griswold murders and the brazen nature of the N., McCarthy, and Bradley
crimes so completely overshadowed defendant’s testimony about the CYA escape
plan that the latter could not possibly have enhanced the jurors’ perception of him
as a violent man.37
                                                
37 
Defendant additionally complains of improper cross-examination
concerning alleged statements he made in 1989 to jail staff or other inmates
(footnote continued on next page)
92
Defendant additionally contends that, in light of cross-examination, the
jurors impermissibly might have considered him an escape risk if given a life
sentence without the possibility of parole.  The prosecutor, however, never argued
to the jury that the possibility of escape constituted an additional reason for
imposing the death penalty.  Indeed, she neglected to even mention the CYA
escape plan in her closing argument.  Moreover, the jurors were specifically
instructed not to consider any aggravating circumstances other than those listed by
the court as a basis for imposing the death penalty; that list did not include any
reference to an escape or an escape plan.  Under these circumstances, no relief is
warranted.  (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 711 [any improper
suggestion concerning the possibility of escape may be neutralized depending
upon defense evidence and prosecutorial comment about the topic, and the giving
of a proper jury instruction].)
6.  Instructional Error
a.  Meaning of Life Without Possibility of Parole
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred and violated his state
and federal constitutional rights to due process and a reliable penalty
determination by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that he would be executed
if sentenced to death, and that he would never be released from prison if sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Such an instruction,
however, would have been inaccurate in light of the Governor’s power to
ameliorate any sentence through use of the commutation or pardon power.
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
regarding “escapes as a juvenile.”  We reject this claim as not properly raised.
(See People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)
93
(People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 172; see also People v. Carpenter (1999)
21 Cal.4th 1016, 1063.)  No error or constitutional violation appears.
Defendant is correct that some of the jurors expressed misconceptions
during voir dire regarding the effect of a life without possibility of parole sentence.
But the trial court addressed that particular concern by giving an instruction
specifically requested by defense counsel.38  Defendant does not suggest the
instruction was in error.
Finally, defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s argument to the jury about
future dangerousness implied he would be released if sentenced to life without
possibility of parole.  If trial counsel believed the prosecutor made some improper
suggestion, they could have objected and requested an admonishment to cure any
potential harm.  They did not.  In any case, the court’s instruction adequately
addressed such concern.  (See ante, fn. 38.)
b.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
The penalty phase jury was instructed to reach its sentencing determination
by weighing the factors in aggravation against the factors in mitigation.  (CALJIC
No. 8.88.)  The applicable factors were set forth in the language of CALJIC No.
8.85, which derives from section 190.3, factors (a) through (k).  On appeal,
                                                
38 
The instruction read:  “Statements by some jurors during jury selection
showed an awareness of news reports concerning other cases or sentences of death
were not carried out for legal reasons or where persons sentenced to life
imprisonment may have been considered for parole.  [¶] Under the 1978 death
penalty law, which governs this case, the only possible penalties are death or life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  [¶] In the past, other cases were
decided under other laws which are no longer in effect.  [¶] You must not consider
other cases or news reports or speculate about actions by other authorities in
arriving at a penalty verdict in this case.  Those are matters that must not affect
your verdict.”
94
defendant contends these instructions were unconstitutionally vague under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  He also contends the
court’s instruction with a unitary list of aggravating and mitigating factors,
including some which were inapplicable to his case, violated the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
bestowed unchanneled discretion upon the jury.
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the trial court had no obligation to
advise the jury which statutory factors are relevant solely as mitigating
circumstances and which are relevant solely as aggravating circumstances.
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1026; People v. Bradford (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1229, 1383.)  Moreover, it was proper for the court to instruct the jury in
the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 without deleting certain factors that were
inapplicable to defendant’s case.  (People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 899, fn.
13; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1027.)
In short, CALJIC No. 8.85 is not unconstitutionally vague and does not
allow the penalty process to proceed arbitrarily or capriciously.  (People v. Lucero
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 728; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 898-899.)
c.  CALJIC No. 8.88
Defendant argues that the trial court’s utilization of CALJIC No. 8.88, the
principal sentencing instruction, violated his federal and state constitutional rights.
In essence, defendant asserts that the instruction, as it reflects California’s 1978
death penalty law, is constitutionally defective.  We have consistently rejected
identical claims, as follows.
The capital sentencing scheme is not unconstitutional insofar as it does not
require the jury to render a statement of reasons or to make unanimous written
findings on the aggravating factors supporting its verdict.  (People v. Welch (1999)
95
20 Cal.4th 701, 772; People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 559.)  There is no
constitutional requirement that the jury, in order to return a verdict of death, must
unanimously find that aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt or that death is the appropriate remedy beyond a reasonable
doubt.  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 191; People v. Barnett, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 1178; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1059.)
Defendant’s arguments fail to convince us to revisit any of these holdings.
7.  Death Penalty Statute
Defendant contends that California’s death penalty statute violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution because it is vague
and overbroad.  Our decisions hold otherwise, as follows.
The 1978 capital sentencing scheme does not contain so many special
circumstances that it fails to perform the constitutionally mandated narrowing
function.  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 191; People v. Barnett,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1179; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 60-61.)  Nor
is the system constitutionally defective in allowing the same facts to be used as a
special circumstance supporting death eligibility and as an aggravating factor
supporting the death penalty, for “the facts underlying a special circumstance
finding serve distinct purposes at different phases of trial.”  (People v. Millwee,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 164-165, fn. 35, and cases cited therein.)  Defendant’s
contentions fail to persuade us that reconsideration of our decisions is warranted.
Defendant additionally argues that the lack of any statutory requirement of
intercase proportionality review, as well as the absence of any such review by the
trial court below, violates his federal constitutional rights to equal protection and
meaningful appellate review.  As defendant concedes, we have repeatedly rejected
96
this argument.  (E.g., People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1139; People v.
Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)  We see no reason to rule differently here.
8.  Automatic Motion for Modification of Death Verdict
After the jury returned its verdict of death, the trial judge made a few
concluding remarks to the jury, including the following.  “[L]et me indicate to you
that in my humble opinion, your decision was correct.  And that’s based on about
42 years of experience in the justice system, over half of which has been on the
bench, for whatever value that may be to you.”  A month later, the defense filed a
motion for modification of the death judgment in which it requested the judge
either to reduce the judgment to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
or to recuse himself and allow another judge to determine the modification
motion.  The judge denied modification.
On appeal, defendant first contends the trial judge should have recused
himself because his concluding remarks to the jury reflected bias and an inability
to review his modification motion fairly.39  We disagree.
Although trial courts may understandably wish to express gratitude to
jurors in lengthy capital trials such as this, they must refrain from making any
comment indicating that they cannot, or will not, perform their obligations fairly
and impartially under the law.  (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 816.)
                                                
39 
The People argue that this claim is not cognizable on appeal because, even
in a capital case, “all litigants who seek to challenge denial of a statutory judicial
disqualification motion are relegated to writ review” as described in section 170.3,
subdivision (d).  (People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 335.)  “[A] litigant may,
and should, seek to resolve such issues by statutory means, and . . . his negligent
failure to do so may constitute a forfeiture of his constitutional claim.”  (Id. at p.
336.)  Even assuming defense counsel’s failure to seek writ review here resulted in
a forfeiture, we proceed to the merits in response to defendant’s assertion that the
failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
97
Here, the trial judge’s comment to the jury that its “decision was correct” was
inappropriate to the extent it suggested he had already decided to deny
modification without a proper hearing on the matter and without complying with
his independent review obligations under section 190.4, subdivision (e).40  (People
v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 816.)  To resolve defendant’s recusal claim,
however, we must determine whether the judge’s remarks establish an inference
that he in fact had prejudged the merits of modification, and therefore could not
fairly and impartially perform his statutory obligations in ruling on defendant’s
subsequent modification request.  (Ibid.)
In People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 815, the trial judge in a
capital case wrote a letter to the jurors, prior to a hearing on modification, telling
them:  “ ‘Your decision is acceptable and shall be followed.’ ”  After duly noting
the presumption that “official duty has been regularly performed” (Evid. Code,
§ 664), we found that the trial judge’s explanation for the remark (it “ ‘was made
for therapeutic purpose more than a legal purpose’ ”) and his detailed findings
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors refuted any conclusion that the
judge had failed to make the “ ‘independent determination’ ” respecting the
appropriateness of the penalty verdict as required by section 190.4, subdivision
(e).  (People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 816.)  Here, defendant argues
that the trial judge’s failure to distance himself from his statements to the jurors
                                                
40 
Section 190.4, subdivision (e) states in relevant part that in ruling on an
automatic application for modification of a verdict of death, “the judge shall
review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a
determination as to whether the jury’s findings and verdicts that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the
evidence presented.  The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his
findings.”
98
and his failure to offer any specific findings compel a different result.  We
disagree.
Although the trial judge here initially indicated to the jurors that he thought
their penalty verdict was correct, he did not suggest that he was committed to that
view, and his remarks did not imply that further examination of the verdict was
unnecessary.  Moreover, while the judge here did not explain his statements, we
may reasonably infer, from his utilization of the phrase “for whatever value that
may be to you” in concluding his remarks, that the judge intended his comments to
have therapeutic value for the jurors rather than a legal purpose, just as in People
v. Belmontes.
More significantly, the judge explained to the parties at the subsequent
modification hearing that he had “considered the matter in careful detail” since the
conclusion of the trial, and that, after having reviewed the People’s motion in
support of the death judgment and the defense’s motion to reduce, the opinion he
initially formed “has not changed or been altered.”  In response to the prosecutor’s
inquiries, the judge further clarified that he “independently reviewed and
evaluated each of the factors under [section] 190.3 [factors] (a) through (k),” that
he “independently” found upon reweighing the factors that the factors in
aggravation “overwhelmingly” outweighed the factors in mitigation “to the degree
that the only appropriate sentence is death.”  On this record, we are satisfied that
the trial judge did not in fact prejudge the modification issue.  His remarks at the
modification hearing reflect that he was willing and capable of fairly and
impartially performing his statutory duty to review the jury’s death verdict
independently, and that he did so.  No recusal was necessary.
Defendant complains that the trial judge made no mention of any particular
aggravating or mitigating circumstance at the hearing and offered no explanation
as to what weight he may have given to any of those circumstances, but this
99
ignores the context of the judge’s remarks at the modification hearing.  As noted,
the judge expressly confirmed he had “independently reviewed and evaluated each
of the factors under [section] 190.3 [factors] (a) through (k).”  He also stated that,
after having “considered the matter in careful detail,” he independently concluded
that the factors in aggravation “overwhelmingly” outweighed the factors in
mitigation.  Although the judge did not single out specific factors in aggravation or
mitigation, his statements were sufficiently specific to demonstrate his
performance of the statutory requirement to review all the evidence independently.
(§ 190.4, subd. (e).)
Undoubtedly, a more detailed statement of reasons would have been helpful
to understand more fully the trial court’s independent determination that death was
warranted.  But the record here not only establishes that the court acted on a
proper understanding of its statutory duties, it amply justifies the court’s
conclusion as well.  Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation rejecting
defendant’s claims.  (See People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1251; People v.
Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 371-373; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d
147, 199-202 [holding that defendant was not prejudiced by trial court’s failure to
state reasons for denial of modification]; cf. People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d
730, 792-794 [remand for new hearing ordered where record reflected trial court’s
erroneously narrow view of the scope of its statutory powers]; People v. Bonillas
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 801 [same where the trial court’s statement of reasons
indicated it did not exercise independent judgment in reweighing the evidence].)
Defendant next claims the trial court erroneously read and considered the
probation report prior to ruling on the modification motion.
In ruling on a modification motion, a trial court must not consider
extraneous material or facts not presented to the jury, such as a probation report.
(People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644; People v. Wader, supra, 5
100
Cal.4th at p. 665.)  “However, absent a contrary indication in the record, we
assume that the court was not influenced by the report in ruling on the motion.”
(People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 787; see People v. Dennis, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 551.)  Here, the record contains no indication that the trial court relied
on defendant’s probation report in deciding the modification issue.  The court did
not mention the report; nor was the report discussed in the parties’ briefing on the
issue.  The claim is rejected.
In sum, the trial court’s actions did not deprive defendant of his statutory
rights or his constitutional rights to due process and a reliable penalty verdict.
9.  Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed numerous acts of prejudicial
misconduct during the penalty phase.  Considered individually and cumulatively,
he argues, such acts violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, notice,
an unbiased jury, cross-examination and confrontation, due process, and to an
individualized and reliable penalty determination.
Initially, we observe defendant did not timely object and request
admonishment at trial for most of the instances of alleged misconduct.  There is no
indication that meritorious objections would have been futile, and admonitions
could have cured any potential harm resulting from the perceived misconduct.
Accordingly, defendant has failed to preserve most of his contentions for appellate
review.  (People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 858.)  In any event, as we discuss
below, no instance of prejudicial misconduct appears.
Defendant first complains the prosecutor cross-examined him repeatedly
about sodomizing Mrs. Mar without any factual support.  At trial, however,
substantial evidence of sodomy had been presented, including expert testimony
that semen had been found in the victim’s anus.  Since defendant, on direct
101
examination, omitted any mention of sodomy in recounting his crimes against the
victim, the prosecutor properly raised the topic during cross-examination.
Defendant also claims the prosecutor posed the following argumentative
and compound question to him:  “So somehow after you pulled the scarf tight
enough to knock her out, she was unconscious, you put a knot in it, you hit her
over the head and raped her and she was able to get up and run behind you.  [¶] Is
that your testimony?”  While that question might have been subject to a proper
objection, it merely distilled what the prosecutor believed defendant’s testimony to
be and did not reflect misconduct.  Had defendant objected to or disagreed with
any part of the prosecutor’s description of his testimony, he could easily have said
so instead of responding “[y]es” to the question.
Defendant next argues the prosecutor improperly asked whether he
“enjoy[ed]” raping Mrs. Mar and felt “strong” and “powerful” while raping and
strangling her.  Again, no misconduct appears.  The prosecutor was entitled to
inquire into the circumstances of the underlying crimes.  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)
Moreover, the questioning was proper in light of testimony by Dr. Alvin Davis,
the defense psychiatrist, that defendant had “repeatedly expressed bewilderment or
lack of understanding as to why he had killed anyone.”
Defendant additionally contends the prosecutor suggested through improper
questioning that Dr. Davis had been sanctioned by the court.  Not so.  As the
record discloses, the prosecutor sought to ask Dr. Davis why he no longer served
on a panel of psychiatrists appointed to assist the court in mental competency
determinations, and she based this inquiry on information that the doctor had been
removed for lack of competence.  Accordingly, the topic fell within the proper
scope of inquiry regarding Dr. Davis’s qualifications as an expert witness.
Nor did the prosecutor improperly question Dr. Davis about:  (1) police
reports concerning “20 residential burglaries” committed by defendant; (2) “phone
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sex” and bondage fantasies; and (3) “fake remorse.”  First, the prosecutor properly
relied on the police reports, which appeared to indicate that food was not the
object of the reported burglaries, to test Dr. Davis’s opinion that defendant was
truthful in claiming he burglarized to get food.41  Second, after ascertaining that
Dr. Davis did in fact review statements made by the longtime wife or girlfriend of
defendant’s brother, to the effect that defendant told her “while she was living
with his brother and he fantasized about rape and bondage and kind of engaged in
phone sex with her,” the prosecutor could properly ask Dr. Davis whether his
review of such statements affected his opinion that defendant was able to maintain
stable relationships with family members and others.  Third, as defendant
acknowledges, the prosecutor could properly cross-examine Dr. Davis on the
subject of “fake remorse” given his direct examination testimony.
Defendant also argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
during her closing argument by:  (1) commenting on defendant’s exercise of rights
and lack of remorse; (2) arguing nonstatutory aggravation; (3) inviting the jury to
discount the evidence in mitigation; and (4) advancing her own personal opinion
of witnesses’ credibility.  We disagree.
Defendant first claims the prosecutor improperly commented on
defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to discuss the Griswold
offense during the penalty phase.42  He is mistaken.  Although the prosecutor
remarked that defendant “wouldn’t allow himself to be drawn into saying anything
                                                
41 
We note, moreover, that defense counsel initially raised the subject of
defendant’s past burglaries in their direct examination of defendant’s mother
earlier in the penalty phase.
42 
Defendant also claims the prosecutor improperly commented on his refusal
to provide the blood and hair samples.  However, none of the transcript pages cited
by defendant appears supportive of the claim.
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that could be used or later connected to prove against him for the Barbara
Griswold murder,” she did so clearly as part of her rebuttal to the defense’s case
that defendant’s low intelligence constituted a mitigating factor.  Moreover, the
prosecutor’s comments did not go beyond defendant’s own testimony about the
reason for his silence.43  And contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecutor did
not suggest that his “claim of rights” should be considered a factor in aggravation.
Additionally, the prosecutor’s argument regarding defendant’s lack of
remorse was appropriate to show the potential mitigating factor was
inapplicable.44  Where, as here, “ ‘a prosecutor does not suggest that a defendant’s
lack of remorse should be considered a factor in aggravation, he or she properly
may comment on the lack of remorse.’ ”  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th
622, 724.)  Likewise, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by arguing that
defendant did not deserve sympathy and compassion because he had shown none
for his victims.  (See People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1076-1077.)
                                                
43 
When defendant took the stand during the penalty phase, he specifically
explained to the jury that he was refusing to discuss the Griswold matter because
“since I’ve been coming to this court, I’ve learned that if I testify in regards to the
Griswold case, then if by the appellate courts I was able to have my confession
thrown out and granted a new trial or something, then whatever I might say in this
court, they would be able to use that against me as a whole new confession.”
44 
To counter the defense’s case-in-mitigation, the prosecutor argued:  “But,
ladies and gentlemen, his act is transparent to the neutral and critical observer such
as you are, and you all know that no matter what words may be used to try and
convince us this defendant feels remorse and cares for others, et cetera, et cetera,
those are words.  And words are easily spoken, but actions speak louder than any
words.  [¶] And the sadism, premeditation, and ritualistic repetition shown in these
crimes are the classic trademark of the psychopath who feels no remorse and has
no concern for anyone outside of himself.  He’s the beast who walks upright.  You
meet him on the street.  He will seem normal, but he roams those streets, parasitic
and cold-eyed, stalking his prey behind a veneer of civility.”
104
Defendant’s contention regarding nonstatutory aggravation also fails.
Contrary to his suggestion, the prosecutor never urged the jury to sentence
defendant to death because of his consensual sexual relationship with Shawn, a
young teenager who later became his wife and mother of his child.  Nor did she
accuse defendant of having raped Shawn, who testified on defendant’s behalf.
Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s argument told the jury that Shawn’s mitigating
testimony lacked credibility and that defendant’s claim of “loving feelings” for
Shawn was questionable.  Her argument suggested nothing more.
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in raising the issue of
defendant’s future dangerousness.  The defense had presented mitigating evidence
regarding defendant’s good conduct in prison and had urged the jury to consider
the point as a mitigating factor.  In arguing the issue, the prosecutor properly
supported her comments by referring to defendant’s past violent conduct.  (People
v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 353.)
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor argued against a life sentence
based on improper speculation that he would fantasize about his crimes in prison.
The assertion, however, is based on a mischaracterization of the record.  The
prosecutor simply argued that the confessions offered by defendant should not be
viewed as mitigating because they were made for self-serving purposes.  Directing
the jury’s attention to the fact that defendant “repeatedly says he doesn’t recall or
he doesn’t remember” certain details of his confessed crimes, the prosecutor
properly argued:  “And as you saw when he testified, this defendant has an
exceptionally detailed and comprehensive memory that is very vividly visual. . . .
[¶] Well, if he vividly remembers [small events occurring in his childhood], you
better get [sic] he’s got all these crimes on a mental film he can run back anytime
he wants to.”  No misconduct occurred.
105
At times during her closing argument, the prosecutor referred to defendant
as a “monster,” an “extremely violent creature,” and the “beast who walks
upright.”  She also referred to aspects of defendant’s testimony and his case in
mitigation as “garbage,” “a scam,” “obvious ploys,” “lies,” “baloney,” and “a fairy
tale.”  Because defendant did not object or request admonishment with respect to
any of this perceived misconduct, he has forfeited the contention on appeal.  In
any event, the prosecutor’s use of such terms, for the most part, constituted fair
comment on the evidence presented.  (People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1249
[use of epithets “can constitute permissible comment regarding egregious
comment on defendant’s part”]; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 180
[referring to testimony as “lies” is acceptable “so long as the prosecutor argues
inferences based on the evidence” and not on personal belief].)  Even if we were to
assume that the references to defendant as a “monster” and a “beast” exceeded the
bounds of “vigorous yet fair argument” (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p.
180), no prejudice is shown in light of the record as a whole.
Defendant further asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by
repeatedly offering her personal opinion on the credibility of mitigation witnesses
such as Jace Tompkins and Dr. Davis.  (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th
694, 776 [“prosecutors should not purport to rely in jury argument on their outside
experience or personal beliefs based on facts not in evidence”].)  The prosecutor,
however, did not rely on her personal experience or on facts outside the record in
making her arguments.  Instead, she drew reasonable inferences from the
testimony and demeanor of these witnesses, and pointed to inconsistencies evident
from the trial record.  The claim is rejected.
Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by
inviting the jurors to base their sentencing decision on the imagined fear and pain
of the victims.  The only prosecutorial argument he specifically cites is the
106
following:  “[I]t’s very difficult to confront the agony and the terror [Barbara
Griswold] must have been going through.  Every time I think about it my mind
recoils.”  The prosecutor, however, explicitly based her argument on testimonial
and photographic evidence regarding the torturous nature of the wounds inflicted
upon the victim.  This was not a case of unfounded prosecutorial speculation.
In sum, we conclude there was no prejudicial misconduct during the
penalty phase.  Even assuming some misconduct may have occurred, as discussed,
there is no reasonable possibility that a jury would have reached a different result
without such misconduct.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1019
[to be prejudicial, “prosecutorial misconduct must bear a reasonable possibility of
influencing the penalty verdict”].)  Moreover, defendant has not established that
improper remarks by the prosecutor “ ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ”  (Darden v. Wainwright,
supra, 477 U.S. at p. 181.)  Nor does he demonstrate a violation of his right to an
individualized and reliable penalty determination.
10.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
several respects during the penalty phase.  To prevail on such contentions,
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
would have been different.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 925; People
v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 484.)  Because we are limited to the record on
appeal, if the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the
manner challenged, then unless counsel were asked for an explanation and failed
to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, we
107
must reject the contention that counsel provided ineffective assistance.  (People v.
Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1058.)
Defendant first contends that competent trial counsel would have objected
to the pervasive prosecutorial misconduct occurring during the penalty phase.  To
the extent this contention is based upon the perceived instances of prejudicial
misconduct addressed and rejected in part II.C.9, page 100, ante, we conclude
there was no prejudicial ineffective assistance due to counsel’s failures to object.
(People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1038.)
Defendant next asserts that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to invoke statutory safeguards in connection with the automatic motion to
modify the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e).  In particular, he argues
that counsel:  (1) failed to object to the court’s consideration of extraneous or
erroneous matter and improper argument; and (2) did not insist that the court more
specifically detail its reasons for denying the motion.  The claim is without merit.
As discussed (ante, pt. II.C.8, p. 96), the record here demonstrates that the trial
court acted on a proper understanding of its statutory duties in deciding the
modification motion.  Likewise, there is no indication that the trial court relied on
inappropriate matters or argument in denying modification.45
Defendant additionally argues that his counsel should have objected to the
prosecutor’s cross-examination regarding the Griswold murder and the McCarthy
attempted burglary incident because her questioning exceeded the scope of his
direct examination testimony.  Specifically, he contends he did not offer testimony
on those two matters during his direct examination and complains that the
                                                
45 
To the extent defendant claims that age was not a proper factor for the court
to consider, he is wrong.  (People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 338-339.)
108
prosecutor improperly questioned him even though he had expressed a desire to
refrain from discussing those matters in light of his pending appeal.  Even
assuming that at least some scope-based objections might have been sustained if
made, counsel’s reasons for not objecting do not appear in the record, and we are
not convinced that there could be no valid tactical reason for choosing not to
object.  “[C]ompetent counsel may often choose to forgo even a valid objection.
‘[I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is best able to determine proper tactics in
the light of the jury’s apparent reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to
object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’
[Citation.]”  (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197; see also People v.
Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 502.)  These principles compel rejection of
defendant’s appellate contention.
Defendant further contends that counsel should have objected to the
following “argumentative” and factually unsupported question posed to Dr. Davis,
the defense psychiatrist:  “Were you at that time aware that [defendant] had been
planning to fake some form of insanity so that he could do some short time in
Atascadero?”  The contention is without merit.  While on the stand, Dr. Davis
confirmed he had reviewed a transcript of a taped interview with defendant’s
sister-in-law, Vicki Horner, in which she indicated that defendant wanted to go to
Atascadero and fake insanity.  Because this provided adequate foundation for the
challenged question, and the question was not argumentative, counsel’s omission
was reasonable.
Defendant also argues that counsel were ineffective during the penalty
phase in allowing him to offer “a formless and incriminating narrative of the Mar
homicide without any direction by way of questioning.”  We disagree.
As the People point out, defendant’s narrative of the Mar murder appears to
have been carefully prepared and perhaps even rehearsed.  At the outset of the
109
narrative, defendant explained he wanted to “point out facts” to the jurors to show
them that the murder was not premeditated.  He then related his account of what
happened in a step-by-step manner.  After finishing his account, defendant
countered some of the prosecutor’s theories of premeditation and apologized for
what happened.  Contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, his penalty phase
narrative appeared straightforward, concise, and focused upon the claim that he
acted without premeditation.
Moreover, the record contains no indication that the narrative was a result
of counsel’s decision rather than defendant’s decision.  (See In re Horton (1991)
54 Cal.3d 82, 95 [by choosing professional representation, defendant does not
surrender the decision as to whether to testify].)  To the extent counsel had no
choice in the matter, they cannot be blamed.  Alternatively, even if the narrative
was counsel’s idea, defendant fails to establish that there could be no valid tactical
reason for presenting the jury with a succinct version of the underlying events that
emphasized the absence of premeditation.  True, defendant admitted to burglary,
rape, and killing in the narrative.  But the jury had already determined such facts
to be true at the guilt phase, and the admissions were helpful, if not necessary, to
lend credibility to the position that the circumstances of the crime were less
aggravating than the People claimed.
Finally, defendant contends trial counsel were ineffective in failing to
register a doubt as to his competence to stand trial at the penalty phase.  To
support this claim, defendant notes that:  (1) counsel, the prosecutor, and the court
at one point commented upon his agitation and apparent willingness to speak out
in front of the jury; and (2) defendant claimed a “conflict” with counsel.  No
ineffectiveness of counsel is shown.  Not only do the cited instances fall far short
of indicating a deteriorating mental state, but it remains entirely possible that
counsel’s observations of defendant’s behavior outside the courtroom contradicted
110
the position advocated here.  In any event, even if counsel had explicitly
questioned defendant’s competence, it is not reasonably probable that the result
would have been different.  “[A] trial court is not required to order a competency
hearing based on counsel’s perception that his client may be incompetent.”
(People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 953.)  Here, nothing in the record raised a
substantial doubt as to defendant’s competency; if anything, his lengthy testimony
at the penalty phase reflected an individual fully capable of assisting in his own
defense.
11.  Cumulative Effect of Errors
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of errors in the guilt and penalty
phases of his trial resulted in such a miscarriage of justice as to require reversal.
We disagree.  Whether evaluated individually or together, the few errors that may
have occurred during the trial were harmless.
III.  DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, we find no reversible error in the record.  The
judgment of death is affirmed.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Farnam
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S010808
Date Filed: June 10, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Clarence A. Stromwall
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Samuel D. McVey, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey, Robert Henry and David A.
Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
112
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Samuel D. McVey
Kirton & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT  84111-1004
(801) 328-3600
David A. Wildman
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA  90013
(213) 897-2359