Title: Dusenberry v. Dusenberry
Citation: 335 S.E.2d 892
Docket Number: 160PA85
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1985

335 S.E.2d 892 (1985)
G. Reid DUSENBERRY, III
v.
Sue Brown DUSENBERRY (now Fowler).
No. 160PA85.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 5, 1985.
Holt, Spencer &amp; Longest by James G. Spencer, Jr., Burlington, and Hunter, Wharton &amp; Howell by John V. Hunter III, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellant.
Boyce, Mitchell, Burns &amp; Smith by Carole S. Gailor, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee.
BRANCH, Chief Justice.
In this equitable distribution action Judge Allen, found inter alia, that defendant-wife "began having an adulterous affair... and began neglecting the plaintiff and their three minor children" which conduct was a "major reason for the break-up of this marriage ... and ... was the only serious and significant mistreatment of either party by the other party during the course of this marriage." There were other extensive findings concerning the fault of the defendant-wife in this connection. Based upon his findings, Judge Allen concluded that the "relative fault of the parties leading to the disintegration of their marriage" was a proper factor for consideration in determining the distribution of the marital assets. Subsequent to the entry *893 of this order by Judge Allen, the Court of Appeals held that fault was not a relevant factor in determining the equitable distribution of marital property. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C.App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 71 N.C. App. 242, 322 S.E.2d 393 (1984); and Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C.App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984). The Court of Appeals vacated Judge Allen's order and remanded the cause for a new order "based solely upon relevant and appropriate findings." The Court of Appeals' decision in this case was filed 19 February 1985. In the meantime, we allowed plaintiff's petition in Smith v. Smith, one of the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in its decision in the case now before us.
In Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 87, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985), filed subsequent to the Court of Appeals' decision in the instant case, we held that "marital fault or misconduct of the parties which is not related to the economic condition of the marriage is not germane to a division of marital property under 50-20(c) and should not be considered."
This cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for remand to the District Court of Alamance County for further proceedings in accord with the principles set forth in our opinion in Smith.
MEYER, Justice, dissenting.
Of the 58 separately numbered findings of fact made by Judge Allen in this case, approximately 10 relate to the defendant's moral or marital misconduct. Those are as follows:
Based upon his 58 findings of fact, including 10 of the 11 set out above relating to the marital fault of the wife, Judge Allen set out 12 conclusions of law relating to every conceivable aspect of the marital distribution. A part of conclusion number (5) relates to the marital fault of the wife:
I am convinced that the legislature fully intended that the trial judge, in his "equitable" distribution of the marital property, could and would consider "moral" or "marital" fault (as opposed to what has been termed "property" fault) which causes the marriage to break up, without regard to its impact on the extent or value of the marital property to be distributed. Such marital fault or misconduct might include adultery, spouse abuse, incest, alcoholism, drug abuse, etc.
We have noted that the intent of the legislature to vest in our trial judges broad discretion in distributing marital property under N.C.G.S. § 50-20 is made manifest by the inclusion of the catchall factor, codified as subsection (c)(12), "any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper." (Emphasis added.) White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985).
Without the benefit of an official legislative history, it is difficult to demonstrate legislative intent with record evidence. It is irrefutable, however, that when the legislature enacted the Marital Property Act, it did not exclude fault from the broad sweep of the language of factor (12), "any other factor." Also, from unofficial comments of legislators involved in its enactment, it seems clear that the act was represented to the legislative body as allowing consideration of moral fault in the distribution of marital property. For example, in 2 R. Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 169.5 (Supp.1985), there appears the following commentary reflecting comments by one of the legislators as to certain statements of the floor manager of the act made on the floor of the Senate during debate on the bill:
It is also clear that close observers of the development and passage of the new act felt that, in accord with the holdings of the majority of courts of the nation, our courts would consider moral or marital fault as a factor.
Professor Sally B. Sharp of the University of North Carolina School of Law, a teacher and writer in the field of domestic *896 relations law, had this to say about the North Carolina equitable distribution statute:
Sharp, Family Law, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981, 60 N.C.L.Rev. 1379, 1406 (1982).
The notion that serious moral or marital fault and its consequences are relevant to the equitable distribution of marital property upon divorce has been accepted by the courts of many jurisdictions. For example:
Alabama. In Wicks v. Wicks, 379 So. 2d 612, 613 (Ala.Civ.App.1980), the court stated:
See also Ross v. Ross, 447 So. 2d 812 (Ala. Civ.App.1984).
Georgia. In Peters v. Peters, 248 Ga. 490, 491-92, 283 S.E.2d 454, 455 (1981), the court, stating that adultery does not absolutely bar an equitable distribution to the guilty party, also said:
Iowa. In Cooper v. Cooper, 259 Iowa 277, 282, 144 N.W.2d 146, 148 (1966), the court stated that misconduct "is material in considering what is equitable in the way of division of property."
Michigan. In Arnholt v. Arnholt, 129 Mich.App. 810, 343 N.W.2d 214 (1983), the court stated that fault, although not a factor to be considered in divorce, might be considered in property and alimony awards. Accord Davey v. Davey, 106 Mich.App. 579, 308 N.W.2d 468 (1981).
Missouri. The court considered fault in the case of In re Marriage of Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Mo.Ct.App.1977), stating:
See also Gray v. Gray, 654 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Mo.Ct.App.1983).
New Hampshire. In Ebbert v. Ebbert, 123 N.H. 252, 459 A.2d 282 (1983), the court noted that where a fault ground has been alleged and properly pled, evidence of fault may be considered in any award of alimony or division of property.
North Dakota. In Grant v. Grant, 226 N.W.2d 358 (N.D.1975), interpreting a statute not mentioning fault as a factor, the court held that conduct of the parties could be considered. See also Larson v. Larson, 234 N.W.2d 861 (N.D.1975).
South Carolina. In South Carolina, equitable distribution exists as a common law doctrine created by the courts, in the absence of statute. In Lyvers v. Lyvers, 280 S.C. 361, 312 S.E.2d 590 (S.C.Ct.App.1984), the court pointed out that the relative fault of the parties is a factor which the trial court must consider in determining the proper portion of marital property that is owned by each spouse.
Texas. In Thomas v. Thomas, 603 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex.Civ.App.1980), the court said that a division could be based upon, among other factors, "the facts which led to the divorce." See also Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Civ.App.1976).
Particularly where the moral or marital fault diminishes the contribution of a spouse to the marriage and/or results in additional expenses and efforts on the part *897 of the innocent spouse, it should be considered in determining the "equitable" distribution of marital property. Here, Mrs. Dusenberry's lengthy absences from the home during which she made no contribution to the marriage or to the care of the children, with the concomitant additional effort and expenses required of her husband for the care and upkeep of the children, together with the estimated cost of $10,000 for the continued treatment of the psychological problems of the children, suffered by them as a result of her behavior, fully justify consideration of her marital fault.
The reason misconduct directly impacting the contribution of one spouse to the marriage should be considered was stated with clarity in Burtscher v. Burtscher, 563 S.W.2d 526, 527-28 (Mo.Ct.App.1978), as follows:
I am fully convinced that, under the particular facts of this case, the marital fault of the wife was properly considered by the trial judge, even under the rigid holding of the majority in Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 331 S.E.2d 682 (1985). Even if one completely disregards the "moral" impact of the wife's conduct here, I believe the trial court properly considered as some of the factors in the distribution the repeated adultery of the wife, her consequent neglect of her husband and children, her lengthy absences from her family during her affair, the resultant lack of contribution by her to the marriage, the exclusive burden of child care and household management which she imposed on her working husband, and the severe emotional impact of her behavior on her husband and children. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling to the contrary, and the majority of this Court has erred in affirming that ruling.
Further, where matters are left to the discretion of the trial judge, he may be reversed for abuse of his discretion only upon a showing that his actions are manifestly unsupported by reason or that his decision is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829. Most assuredly, it cannot be said of Judge Allen's order in this case that it is either manifestly unsupported by reason or that it is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.
I would vote to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and to reinstate Judge Allen's carefully considered and fully supported order of distribution dated and filed 19 April 1984.
BILLINGS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.