Title: Gallo v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Citation: 322 P.2d 372, 83 Ariz. 392
Docket Number: 6380
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 1958

83 Ariz. 392 (1958) 322 P.2d 372 Fred A. GALLO, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, and Arizona Service Company, Respondents. No. 6380. Supreme Court of Arizona. March 5, 1958. *393 Alan Philip Bayham, Phoenix, for petitioner. Robert K. Park, Phoenix, John R. Franks, Donald J. Morgan, and James D. Lester, Phoenix, of counsel, for respondent Industrial Commission of Arizona. *394 JOHNSON, Justice. On March 17, 1949, petitioner sustained personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment which consisted of a brain injury, broken left shoulder blade and a wrenched back. On August 30, 1950, the Commission entered a finding and award that petitioner had sustained a permanent partial disability of fifteen per cent loss of earning capacity, and awarded compensation in the monthly sum of $17.16. This award became final without protest. Thereafter, petitioner sustained twelve additional accidents while employed by various employers, all of which were accepted as compensable. Four of the twelve subsequent accidents resulted in compensable loss of time; and three times the Commission affirmed the award of August 30, 1950. But on the fourth, on June 15, 1956, the Commission entered an order terminating the benefits for permanent partial disability awarded on August 30, 1950. The Commission, on November 13, 1956, after rehearing, entered its order affirming the termination order of June 15, 1956, based on the following findings: *395 This case is before us on a writ of certiorari. At the time petitioner sustained the original injury § 56-957(c) and (d), A.C.A. 1939, A.R.S. § 23-1044, was in effect and provided: In 1949 Justice Phelps, speaking for a unanimous court, in Steward v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 159, 211 P.2d 217, 231, in order to clarify existing confusion concerning the powers and duties of the Commission in compensation cases, made certain pronouncements, inter alia: *396 The Commission's finding and award of August 30, 1950, incorporated the foregoing pronouncement from the Steward decision. In 1953 the legislature amended § 56-957, A.C.A. 1939, now A.R.S. § 23-1044F, which provides: Section 56-957, supra, was in effect at the time the Commission entered the original award, and A.R.S. § 23-1044 F was in effect at the time the Commission entered the termination order on November 13, 1956. Petitioner contends the amending statute is procedural and should be construed as acting retroactively. We do not agree with this contention as the amendment affects vested rights and is substantive legislation. A.R.S. § 1-244 provides: We have held a statute will have prospective operation only, unless it plainly indicates an intent that it have retroactive effect. Employment Security Commission of Arizona v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 61 Ariz. 96, 144 P.2d 682; cf. Rodriquez v. Terry, 79 Ariz. 348, 290 P.2d 248. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Commission to alter, amend, or rescind awards for unscheduled permanent partial disabilities in cases where the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the 1953 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act, now A.R.S. § 23-1044F, is governed by the prior statute. Petitioner further contends if the prior statute controls, and we so hold, then the Commission erred in entering its termination order of November 13, 1956, based solely on a finding that petitioner's average monthly wage was increased from $208 in March of 1949 to $280.13 in March of 1956, without evidence of a subsequent change in physical condition. The Commission admits it was aware of the decision of this court in Whyte v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230, 235, when it entered its order terminating the compensation benefits of petitioner. The Commission, prior to its decision upon rehearing and order terminating benefits entered on November 13 1956, entered a memorandum dated October *397 17, 1956, which set forth, inter alia, the following: The foregoing statement is a mere recitation by the Commission that it is cognizant of the fact that it is not unusual to find injured claimants presently earning more than the average monthly wage established at time of injury, solely because of the current economic trend, and it is not a compliance with the pronouncement of this court in the Whyte case, supra, where we stated: The Commission's order terminating benefits entered on November 13, 1956, was based solely on the economic trend without any evidence being presented to support a finding of a change in earning capacity due to a change in physical capacity of the petitioner or that the increased earning capacity was due solely to the increased efficiency or ability of petitioner. In determining increased earning capacity the Commission must exclude any increase or decrease in wages due solely to business booms or depressions. Although the Commission's order of November 13, 1956, terminating benefits awarded petitioner on August 30, 1950, was designated an "order" it had the legal effect of an award as defined in O'Neill v. Martori, 69 Ariz. 270, 212 P.2d 994. For the foregoing reasons the order of November 13, 1956, terminating benefits, is set aside. UDALL, C.J., and WINDES, PHELPS and STRUCKMEYER, JJ., concur.