Title: Douglas v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 316, 2006, 333, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DARRYL E. DOUGLAS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  Nos. 316/333, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0309000027A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 9, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: March 28, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of March 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Darryl E. Douglas, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s May 18, 2006 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In November 2003, Douglas and a co-defendant were charged 
in a superceding indictment with Robbery in the First Degree, four counts of 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, two counts of 
Kidnapping in the First Degree, Aggravated Menacing, Wearing a Disguise, 
 
2
Possession of Deadly Weapon By a Person Prohibited, and Conspiracy in 
the Second Degree.  The charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a 
Person Prohibited was severed prior to trial.  During the trial, which took 
place in April 2004, the Superior Court judge sua sponte dismissed the two 
kidnapping charges and the related weapon charge.   
 
(3) 
Douglas was found guilty of the remaining charges and was 
sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this 
Court vacated the aggravated menacing conviction and the related weapon 
convictions and also reversed the Superior Court’s decision to dismiss the 
kidnapping and related weapon charge.1  On remand, the State declined to 
retry Douglas on those charges. 
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Douglas claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to a) interview or call witnesses whose 
names he provided; b) file pretrial motions; c) interview witnesses who 
would have testified that his co-defendant lied; d) demonstrate rigorous 
advocacy; e) construct a defense; and f) move to suppress the results of a 
show-up.  Douglas also claims that the Superior Court denied his 
constitutional right to proceed pro se at trial. 
                                          
 
1 Douglas v. State, 879 A.2d 594 (Del. 2005). 
 
3
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.2  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”3  The 
defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.4 
 
(6) 
Douglas makes six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
In none of those claims does he demonstrate how any alleged error on the 
part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to him.  In the absence of any 
showing of prejudice by Douglas, we conclude that the Superior Court 
properly denied the claims as meritless.  Douglas also claims that the 
Superior Court denied his constitutional right to proceed pro se at trial.  The 
record reflects that, while Douglas made a request during trial to dismiss his 
                                          
 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
4
attorney, he did not make a request to represent himself.5  In the absence of a 
factual basis for this claim, we conclude that the Superior Court properly 
denied it. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
     
                                          
 
5 The record reflects that Douglas stated in a letter that he hoped he could replace his 
counsel with another public defender.  Compare Hartman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 260, 
2006, Holland, J. (Mar. 9, 2007) (where, prior to trial, the defendant wrote a letter to the 
Superior Court specifically requesting permission to represent himself and citing Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).