Title: New Jersey v. S.N.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2018

New Jersey v. S.N. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This appeal sought the proper standard for appellate review of pretrial detention decisions under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. In a complaint-warrant, the State charged defendant S.N. with first-degree aggravated sexual assault on a person under the age of thirteen; fourth-degree lewdness; and second-degree child endangerment. Following defendant’s arrest, a pretrial services officer prepared a Public Safety Assessment (PSA) that rated defendant a 1 out of 6, the lowest possible risk score, for both failure to appear and new criminal activity. Despite the low risk scores, the PSA concluded “No Release Recommended.” The State then moved for pretrial detention. The prosecution certified that there was a “serious risk” that “defendant will not appear in court,” and “defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community.” The certification stated, “[d]efendant’s victim is his step-daughter. Defendant is a risk to harm and intimidate his victim and her mother and to obstruct justice by interfering with the investigation and witnesses. Defendant is a risk of flight because his biological mother and sister live in Canada.” The trial court found that the State had established probable cause that defendant committed the charged offenses. The court specifically found that defendant was eligible for detention under the statute. The court gave “great weight to [the No Early Release Act]NERA, the fact that this is a NERA offense and first degree, the dual citizenship, due to the extensi[ve] exposure of incarceration if convicted, the fact that release was not recommended, and the fact that this is considered a violent offense.” The Appellate Division reversed and released defendant with conditions, finding the trial court abused its discretion by not considering defendant’s age, level of prior criminal involvement and ties to the community.” The Appellate Division required as part of defendant’s release that “defendant must report to pretrial detention as frequently as necessary to determine his compliance with restraining orders prohibiting him from having any contact with the victim or her family . . . . [and] must surrender his passport.” The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court abused its discretion, finding that the trial court’s decision rested on an “impermissible basis,” “fail[ed] to take into consideration all relevant factors,” including defendant’s characteristics as he stood before the court, and “reflects a clear error in judgment.” The next appropriate procedural step was to remand the matter to the trial court to determine the suitable conditions of release: Remand is required because the trial court has the opportunity at a detention hearing to “hear and see witnesses” and gain a “'feel’ of the case which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.” Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. S.N. (A-60-16) (079320)Argued September 11, 2017 -- Decided January 30, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court determines the proper standard for appellate review of pretrial detention decisions under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. In March 2017, law enforcement obtained an arrest warrant for defendant S.N. for acts alleged to have been committed against his stepdaughter in 2012. In a complaint-warrant, the State charged defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault on a person under the age of thirteen; fourth-degree lewdness; and second-degree child endangerment. The affidavit of probable cause in support of the complaint-warrant stated that the victim told a staff member at her school that defendant came into her bedroom and sexually assaulted her approximately fifty times while she was in the sixth and seventh grades. In addition, the State prepared a preliminary law enforcement incident report (PLEIR), which stated that “defendant was known to the victim as [f]amily.” Following defendant’s arrest, a pretrial services officer prepared a Public Safety Assessment (PSA) that rated defendant a 1 out of 6—the lowest possible risk score—for both failure to appear and new criminal activity. Despite the low risk scores, the PSA concluded “No Release Recommended.” The State moved for pretrial detention. The prosecution certified that there is a “serious risk” that “defendant will not appear in court,” and “defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community.” In addition, the certification stated, “[d]efendant’s victim is his step-daughter. Defendant is a risk to harm and intimidate his victim and her mother and to obstruct justice by interfering with the investigation and witnesses. Defendant is a risk of flight because his biological mother and sister live in Canada.” Defense counsel countered that the State did not present clear and convincing evidence to support its detention motion, and that the State’s arguments were based on “mere speculation.” Defense counsel noted that defendant had no prior record, including no disorderly persons offenses, had no failures to appear, was gainfully employed, and had the support of his adoptive parents, who live in New Jersey. Regarding defendant’s biological mother in Canada, counsel stated defendant has not had “telephonic or face-to-face contact with her” and defendant “doesn’t even know where she lives.” Further, defense counsel claimed that defendant lived in the same home as the victim “until a couple of years ago” and that “no further problems apparently . . . have been even alleged.” The trial court found that the State had established probable cause that defendant committed the charged offenses. In making the pretrial detention determination, the judge reviewed the circumstances of the charged offenses, the potential sentence if convicted, defendant’s risk of flight in light of his dual U.S. and Canadian citizenship, and the potential for defendant’s obstruction of the criminal justice process. The court specifically found that defendant is eligible for detention under the statute “because this is a first degree [offense] with No Early Release attaching to it pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)(1).” The court gave “great weight to NERA, the fact that this is a NERA offense and first degree, the dual citizenship, due to the extensi[ve] exposure of incarceration if convicted, the fact that release was not recommended, and the fact that this is considered a violent offense.” The Appellate Division reversed and released defendant with conditions. The panel, citing State v. C.W.,449 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 2017), found that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by not considering defendant’s age, level of prior criminal involvement and ties to the community.” The Appellate Division required as part of defendant’s release that “defendant must report to pretrial detention as frequently as necessary to determine his compliance with restraining orders prohibiting him from having any contact with the victim or her family . . . . [and] must surrender his passport.” The Court granted leave to appeal. 230 N.J. 349, 350 (2017). 1 HELD: The proper standard of appellate review of pretrial detention decisions is whether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an impermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors, by failing to consider all relevant factors, or by making a clear error in judgment. Here, the trial court abused its discretion.1. To determine the appropriate standard of appellate review in the absence of an “explicit statutory command,” a court first must “ask whether the 'history of appellate practice’ yields an answer. Second, at least where 'neither a clear statutory prescription nor a historical tradition exists,’ [a court asks] whether, 'as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.’” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-67 (2017). Although the CJRA does not explicitly set forth the appropriate scope of appellate review of trial court detention decisions, the pointed use of the permissive “may” in those provisions establishes the trial court’s significant discretion in making pretrial detention decisions and suggests that deferential review is appropriate. (pp. 14-20)2. Turning to the first inquiry under the McLane test, there is further support for the abuse of discretion standard in the history of appellate practice. Since the 1800s, appellate courts have acknowledged that bail determinations were discretionary. Over many decades, appellate courts have reviewed many bail determinations for abuse of discretion. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to change that practice under the new system. As to the second part of the test in McLane, courts have long deferred to trial courts’ factual determinations because they hear and see the witnesses and have the “feel” of the case. With respect to detention determinations, trial courts regularly handle detention motions under the CJRA and will continue to develop expertise in the CJRA’s application. In C.W., the panel concluded that an abuse of discretion standard should apply to detention determinations under the CJRA, and correctly enunciated the standard. 449 N.J. Super. at 235, 252–55. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant’s detention, the Court reviews whether the decision “rest[s] on an impermissible basis,” “was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors,” “fail[ed] to take into consideration all relevant factors and whe[ther] [the] decision reflects a clear error in judgment.” Id. at 255. (pp. 20-25)3. The State’s burden to overcome the statutory presumption of release is substantial because “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 68 (2017). The CJRA specifically delineates the kind of evidence that the court may consider in making a detention decision. Defendant’s characteristics as he stood before the court, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20, were as follows: he was fifty years of age; he had a PSA score of 1/6—the lowest score—for both “[f]ailure to appear” and “[n]ew criminal activity”—he was gainfully employed, had no criminal history, had no violence flags, and had strong ties to the community including the support of his adoptive parents and his relationship with his biological children; he was born in Canada, but adopted shortly thereafter; defendant has dual U.S.-Canadian citizenship. (pp. 25-28)4. The nature and circumstances of the offense are pertinent to whether the statutory presumption of release has been overcome. However, the court based its detention decision almost entirely upon the offense charged, even though that charge does not carry a presumption of detention. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b). The court also relied on unsupported conclusory statements by the prosecutor to establish risk of obstruction even though there was no evidence of defendant’s obstructive conduct. As defense counsel noted, defendant lived in the same home as the victim “until a couple of years ago” and “no further problems apparently . . . have been alleged.” The court based defendant’s risk of flight upon his dual U.S.-Canadian citizenship even though the evidence presented at the detention hearing was that defendant had “lived in New Jersey [for] almost his entire life” and that defendant has no ties to Canada because he has no contact with his biological mother and does not know where she lives. In summary, the trial court, in ordering defendant detained, failed to properly consider defendant’s characteristics as he stood before the court. Furthermore, the trial court relied upon general, conclusory statements put forward by the prosecutor at the detention hearing. Because the court’s detention decision does not set forth articulable facts supporting its exercise of judicial discretion, it is not entitled to deference. The trial court’s detention decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Remand is required because trial courts are better positioned to determine conditions of release. (pp. 28-31) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for a hearing to determine the appropriate conditions of release. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 60 September Term 2016 079320STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.S.N., Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 11, 2017 – Decided January 30, 2018 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the brief; Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Hunterdon County Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). Philip De Vencentes argued the cause for respondent (Galantucci, Patuto, De Vencentes, Potter & Doyle, attorneys; Philip De Vencentes, on the briefs; Richard G. Potter, of counsel and on the briefs). Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor Director, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Richard T. Burke, President, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and on the brief; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the brief). Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, 1 Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief). Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we determine the proper standard forappellate review of pretrial detention decisions under theCriminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26.After doing so, we must apply that standard to the facts of thepresent appeal. We conclude that the proper standard of appellate review iswhether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on animpermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriatefactors, by failing to consider all relevant factors, or bymaking a clear error in judgment. Here, we affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment reversingthe trial court’s decision to detain defendant. We do sobecause the trial court relied on inappropriate factors andfailed to consider all relevant factors in finding that therewas sufficient evidence before the court to overcome thepresumption of defendant’s release. I. 2 The facts and procedural history are culled from the recordof defendant’s detention hearing. In March 2017, law enforcement obtained an arrest warrantfor defendant S.N.1 for acts alleged to have been committedagainst his stepdaughter2 in 2012. In a complaint-warrant, theState charged defendant with first-degree aggravated sexualassault on a person under the age of thirteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); fourth-degree lewdness, 2C:14-4(b)(1); and second-degree child endangerment, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).3 The affidavitof probable cause in support of the complaint-warrant statedthat the victim told a staff member at her school that defendantcame into her bedroom and sexually assaulted her approximatelyfifty times while she was in the sixth and seventh grades. Theaffidavit also disclosed that, in 2015, the victim told a friendthat defendant had “touched her in a sexual manner.” Inaddition, the State prepared a preliminary law enforcement1 As per Rule 1:38-3(c)(12), initials will be used to preserve the confidentiality of the victim in this case.2 Defendant and the victim’s mother were never married and defendant is not the victim’s biological father.3 Two months after defendant’s arrest on the complaint-warrant, he was indicted for first-degree aggravated sexual assault,N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child,N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1); and fourth-degree lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4(b)(1). 3 incident report (PLEIR), which stated that “defendant was knownto the victim as [f]amily.” Following defendant’s arrest, a pretrial services officerprepared a Public Safety Assessment (PSA)4 that rated defendant a1 out of 6 -- the lowest possible risk score -- for both failureto appear and new criminal activity. The PSA noted thatdefendant did not have any prior criminal history or failures toappear, but the current charges pending against defendantstemmed from a violent offense. Despite the low risk scores,the PSA concluded “No Release Recommended.” The State moved for pretrial detention, pursuant toN.J.S.A. 2A:162-19. In support of its pretrial detentionmotion, the prosecution certified that the charged crime couldsubject defendant to “an ordinary or extended term of lifeimprisonment,”5 there is a “serious risk” that “defendant willnot appear in court,” and “defendant will pose a danger to any4 The PSA is a tool that “assesses the level of risk for failure to appear and for new criminal activity on a scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest, and may include a flag to denote new violent criminal activity.” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 62 (2017). In addition, “[t]he PSA . . . recommends whether to release a defendant and what, if any, conditions of release to impose.” Ibid.5 The State had not, in fact, charged defendant with an offense that carried an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment. The prosecutor corrected this assertion on the record at the pretrial detention hearing. 4 other person or the community.” In addition, the certificationstated, “[d]efendant’s victim is his step-daughter. Defendantis a risk to harm and intimidate his victim and her mother andto obstruct justice by interfering with the investigation andwitnesses. Defendant is a risk of flight because his biologicalmother and sister live in Canada.” At the detention hearing, the State submitted the affidavitof probable cause in support of the complaint-warrant, thePLEIR,6 and the PSA. The prosecutor claimed that the PSA did nottake into account defendant’s dual citizenship or the risk tothe victim because “[defendant] knows where she lives. He knowswhere her mother lives. And the fear is that if he’s released,he will harm them physically.” Regarding the potential forobstruction, the prosecutor stated that [t]hese sorts of cases are sensitive in the sense that if a defendant has access to the victim or other family members, we know -- and it’s common sense -- that the defendant often tries to obstruct justice by trying to convince family members and other people in the family to say it didn’t happen, or put pressure on the victim.6 It is not clear from the transcript that the PLEIR was offered or admitted into evidence. However, probable cause is not disputed and, therefore, it does not affect the ultimate outcome of this case. 5 The State also sought a restraining order to prohibit defendantfrom having contact with the victim, her mother, and his threebiological children (the victim’s half-siblings). Defense counsel countered that the State did not presentclear and convincing evidence to support its detention motion,and that the State’s arguments were based on “mere speculation.”Defense counsel further noted that defendant had no priorrecord, including no disorderly persons offenses, had nofailures to appear, was gainfully employed, and had the supportof his adoptive parents, who live in New Jersey. Regardingdefendant’s biological mother in Canada, defense counsel stateddefendant has not had “telephonic or face-to-face contact withher” and defendant “doesn’t even know where she lives.” Counselnoted that defendant’s biological mother had visited New Jersey“more than a decade ago,” but it “ended in [defendant’s] gettinga restraining order against her, [and] her being physicallyremoved from his house by the police.” Further, defense counsel claimed that defendant lived inthe same home as the victim “until a couple of years ago” andthat “no further problems apparently . . . have been evenalleged.” Defense counsel also asserted that defendant isinvolved in the lives of his three biological children and hashad “constant contact” with them despite no longer living in thesame household. 6 The trial court issued an oral ruling at the end of thedetention hearing granting the State’s motion for pretrialdetention and the restraining order. The court found that theState had established probable cause that defendant committedthe charged offenses. In making the pretrial detentiondetermination, the judge reviewed the circumstances of thecharged offenses, the potential sentence if convicted,defendant’s risk of flight in light of his dual U.S. andCanadian citizenship, and the potential for defendant’sobstruction of the criminal justice process “[b]ased on the factthat this is essentially a he said, she said situation.” The court gave great weight to “the nature and seriousnessof the danger to any other person or community that would beposed by the defendant’s release.” Also, the court specificallyfound that defendant is eligible for detention under the statute“because this is a first degree [offense] with No Early Releaseattaching to it pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)(1).” Thecourt summarized its detention decision as follows: Based on the factors I’ve outlined, the Court does find that the nature and circumstances should be given great weight, as well as the flight risk due to dual citizenship. Also, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, as well as the fact that -- and/or the defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process. 7 In making my decision today I’ve given great weight to NERA,7 the fact that this is a NERA offense and first degree, the dual citizenship, due to the extensi[ve] exposure of incarceration if convicted, the fact that release was not recommended, and the fact that this is considered a violent offense. Therefore, based on all of the above the Court will grant the State’s motion and pretrial detention will occur. In “[t]he history and characteristics of the defendant”section of the pretrial detention order, the court wrote,“[r]isk of flight –- family in Canada, no prior record, dualcitizenship, employed. Resident of NJ.” Under “[t]he natureand seriousness of the danger to any other person or thecommunity that would be posed by the defendant’s release,” thecourt wrote that the alleged crime was a first-degree aggravatedsexual assault and further noted “NERA.” Regarding the risk ofobstruction, the court wrote “potential to intimidate.” Thecourt also listed “Further Reasons for Pretrial Detention”: - NERA offense –- [first degree] - [D]ual citizenship creates a high risk of flight due to the extensive exposure to incarceration - Release not recommended - Violent offense7 “NERA” refers to the “No Early Release Act,” N.J.S.A. 2C:43– 7.2. 8 Pursuant to Rule 2:9-13, defendant appealed from the trialcourt’s pretrial detention order, and the Appellate Divisionreversed and released defendant with conditions. The panel,citing State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 2017),found that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by notconsidering defendant’s age, level of prior criminal involvementand ties to the community.” The Appellate Division required aspart of defendant’s release that “defendant must report topretrial detention as frequently as necessary to determine hiscompliance with restraining orders prohibiting him from havingany contact with the victim or her family . . . . [and] mustsurrender his passport.” This Court granted the State’s emergent motion for leave toappeal and for a stay of the Appellate Division’s order torelease defendant on conditions. 230 N.J. 349, 350 (2017). Wegranted leave to appear as amicus curiae to the American CivilLiberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU), the Office of the PublicDefender (OPD), and the County Prosecutors Association of NewJersey (CPANJ). Following oral argument, we lifted the stay,allowed defendant’s release, and directed that “the trial courtmay enforce the Appellate Division’s order reversing the orderfor defendant’s pretrial detention, including establishing theschedule for defendant to report 'as necessary to determine hiscompliance with restraining orders.’” 230 N.J. 585 (2017). 9 II. We summarize the parties’ arguments on appeal as follows. A. The State urges this Court to adopt an abuse of discretionstandard and claims that the appellate panel essentiallyreviewed the detention decision de novo, substituting its ownjudgment for that of the trial court. The State furthercontends that the Appellate Division compounded its error byimposing conditions of release without a remand to the trialcourt. The State asserts that, in its detention order, the trialjudge highlighted facts that pertain “to every subcategory ofN.J.S.A. 2A:162-20, which is merely a permissive list of factorsa court may consider” and, therefore, the trial court did notfail to consider any relevant factors, and did not err inordering pretrial detention. The State posits that “[t]he PSAis only a starting point” and that the court “properly gavegreat weight to the nature and circumstances of the offensecharged” and properly “considered the risk that defendant wouldcontact the victim . . . and that defendant knows how to contactthe victim as she is [his] stepdaughter.” The State also notesthat the court was permitted to consider defendant’s dualcitizenship as an indication of an enhanced flight risk. 10 Lastly, the State, citing C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 231,asserts that the panel was required to identify factors that thetrial court should have considered and then remand to the trialcourt. B. Noting that a majority of circuit courts have adopted astandard of independent review, defendant urges the Court toreject a more deferential standard and to adopt a standard that“calls for independent review, while according deference to thetrial judge’s factual findings that are clearly and convincinglysupported by the evidence presented by the prosecutor.” Defendant asserts that “[t]here is a significant differencebetween the nature of the liberty interest involved for adefendant between seeking a review of an order settingunreasonable release conditions . . . and an order denyingrelease under any conditions.” The latter type of review is atissue in this case; it “necessarily requires an independentreview” of the evidence to determine whether that evidenceclearly and convincingly supports the State’s motion forpretrial detention. Regardless of which standard the Court adopts -- abuse ofdiscretion or independent review with deference -- defendantargues that the panel was correct to reverse the trial court’sorder of detention because the State failed to produce clear and 11 convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of pretrialrelease. Defendant claims the State offered “little more thanits boilerplate recitation” that defendant posed a risk offlight and of obstruction. C. The amici all urge the Court to adopt an abuse ofdiscretion standard. The ACLU and the OPD assert that the trialcourt abused its discretion in ordering detention. Conversely,the CPANJ asserts that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion. The ACLU argues that “the trial court abused its discretionby considering inappropriate factors, by failing to considernecessary factors and by engaging in a clear error of judgment.”The ACLU notes that defendant is an United States citizen, thathis dual citizenship alone is not probative of risk of flight,and that “there is no evidence, other than [d]efendant’srelationship to the complaining witness, to suggest he wouldinterfere in the investigation or prosecution of the case.” The ACLU asserts that the court incorrectly held the factthat the case “is essentially a he said, she said situation”against defendant because “a defendant should not be deemed tobe higher risk because there is less evidence.” The ACLU also claims that the trial court failed toconsider necessary factors such as defendant’s employment, ties 12 to the State of New Jersey, age, and lack of a criminal record.The ACLU therefore contends that the court abused its discretionby failing to consider factors that would make it more likelythat defendant would appear in court when required. The OPD makes similar arguments. It contends that thetrial court failed to make an individualized risk assessment byfailing to consider defendant’s age, employment, residence, andlack of criminal record. The OPD further argues defendant“received the lowest PSA scores, had no violence flag,8 wasgainfully employed, had absolutely no criminal history, and hadstrong family ties in New Jersey.” According to the OPD, thecourt also “inappropriately considered the defendant’s dualcitizenship and familiarity with the complaining witness asevidence of risk of flight and obstruction when neither factestablishes an actual risk that the defendant would engage insuch future conduct.” Additionally, the OPD argues that thecourt did not provide any statement to support its finding thatdefendant posed a danger to the community. The OPD claims that the trial court ordered defendantdetained pretrial based solely on the charged crime, even thoughfirst-degree sexual assault is not one of the enumerated8 Violence flags are generated as part of a PSA “if there is a statistical likelihood that the defendant would engage in a New Violent Criminal Activity.” State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231, 240 (App. Div. 2017). 13 offenses that the Legislature identified in the CJRA. The OPDreaches this conclusion “[b]ecause the only other reasons putforward -- that [defendant] has dual citizenship and knows thevictim -- even if properly considered, could not be sufficientto overcome a presumption of release.” The CPANJ similarly asks this Court to confirm “that theappropriate appellate standard of review in pretrial detentioncases is abuse of discretion, with de novo review onlyappropriate when the pretrial detention hearing court hasmisapplied the law.” According to the CPANJ, this standardcomports with the purpose of the CJRA and “the historicalstandards of review for pretrial and post-conviction decisions.”The CPANJ claims that, before the CJRA, appellate courtsreviewed bail determinations for abuse of discretion, and“[t]here is no legal or public policy reason to disturb a legalstandard that advances the efficient administration of pretrialjustice and appropriate risk management.” Finally, according to the CPANJ, assuming the judge abusedher discretion, the panel should have remanded the case “forconsideration in light of the appellate court’s ruling.” III. A. Our initial task is to determine the scope of appellatereview of pretrial detention decisions made by the trial court 14 under the CJRA. Although this is the first time this Court hasconfronted the issue, guidance is provided by the United StatesSupreme Court’s decision in McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. ___,137 S. Ct. 1159 (2017). In McLane, the Supreme Court employed a two-part test todetermine the appropriate standard of appellate review in theabsence of an “explicit statutory command.” 137 S. Ct. at 1166-67. In Pierce v. Underwood, a case involving the award ofcounsel fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §2412(d), the Court provided an example of what would qualify asa “relatively explicit statutory command” that would reveal “thestandard of appellate review”: “[T]he court, in its discretion,may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’sfee.” 487 U.S. 552 , 558 (1988) (alterations in original)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Absent such a command, a courtfirst must “ask whether the 'history of appellate practice’yields an answer. Second, at least where 'neither a clearstatutory prescription nor a historical tradition exists,’ weask whether, 'as a matter of the sound administration ofjustice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another todecide the issue in question.’” McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1166-67(quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558-60). 1. 15 To determine whether there is a “clear statutoryprescription” in favor of a particular review standard, we lookto the text of the CJRA. We note that the CJRA does not specifya standard of review, unlike the example furnished in Pierce.That does not mean, however, that the statute cannot provideguidance as to the appropriate level of review. Indeed,although the United States Supreme Court did not find an“explicit statutory command” in the legislation at issue inPierce, it found the use of permissive language highlysignificant: We turn first to the language and structure of the governing statute. It provides that attorney’s fees shall be awarded “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This formulation, as opposed to simply “unless the position of the United States was substantially justified,” emphasizes the fact that the determination is for the district court to make, and thus suggests some deference to the district court upon appeal. That inference is not compelled, but certainly available. [Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559.] We therefore review the applicable provisions of the CJRA.We do so in the context of the statutory requirement that theCJRA “shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose ofprimarily relying upon pretrial release by non-monetary means toreasonably assure” that a defendant will “appear[] in court when 16 required,” will not endanger “the safety of any other person orthe community,” and “will not obstruct or attempt to obstructthe criminal justice process.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. The CJRA provides that, “following the issuance of acomplaint-warrant,” as occurred in this case, a defendant “shallbe temporarily detained to allow the Pretrial Services Programto prepare a risk assessment with recommendations on conditionsof release.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25. Thereafter, the CJRA authorizes trial courts, “upon motionof a prosecutor,” to order a defendant detained pretrial “whenit finds clear and convincing evidence that no condition orcombination of conditions can reasonably assure the effectuationof [the] goals” of safeguarding against danger, flight, andobstruction. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. When considering a prosecutor’s detention motion, trialcourts must consider the risk assessment and recommendations and“shall make a pretrial release decision” within forty-eighthours of the “defendant’s commitment to jail.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(1). To make that decision, the “court shall hold ahearing to determine whether any amount of monetary bail or non-monetary conditions or combination of monetary bail andconditions . . . will reasonably assure” that the three goalsset forth above are met. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(c). If, as in thiscase, the prosecutor moves for detention where there is no 17 indictment, the prosecutor must first establish at the hearingthat probable cause exists that the defendant committed thecharged offense. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). Unless thedefendant is charged with murder or a crime for which he wouldbe subject to an ordinary or extended life term, N.J.S.A.2A:162-19(b), the CJRA imposes a presumption against pretrialdetention, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b); R. 3:4A(b)(5). The State canrebut that presumption of release only by presenting “clear andconvincing evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); see also R.3:4A(b)(5). At a pretrial detention hearing, the defendant has theright “to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examinewitnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present informationby proffer or otherwise.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1). The Stateneed not present a live witness at a detention hearing, State v.Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 213 (2017), but it has the option to doso. Additionally, “the trial court has discretion to requiredirect testimony if it is dissatisfied with the State’sproffer.” Ibid. At the hearing, the court “may take into account” variousfactors, including “[t]he nature and circumstances of the[charged] offense”; the weight of the evidence proffered againstthe defendant; characteristics of the defendant as he or shestands before the court, including his or her employment status, 18 familial ties, and length of residence in the community; “[t]henature and seriousness of the danger” that would be posed toother persons or the community if the defendant were released;the risk that the defendant will obstruct the criminal justiceprocess; and the PSA recommendation. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. If the court orders pretrial detention, it shall “includewritten findings of fact and a written statement of the reasonsfor the detention.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a)(1); see also R.3:4A(c). A defendant may appeal a pretrial detention order asof right, pursuant to court rules. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(c); seealso R. 2:9-13(a). Because the defendant remains detainedpending appeal, the court shall hear the defendant’s appeal inan expedited manner. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(c); R. 2:9-13(a). Although the CJRA does not explicitly set forth theappropriate scope of appellate review of trial court detentiondecisions, its language supports that the proper standard ofappellate review is abuse of discretion. First, the Legislatureused both “may” and “shall” in various provisions of the CJRA.See generally N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. “Where a statutoryprovision contains both the words 'may’ and 'shall,’ it ispresumed that the lawmaker intended to distinguish between them,'shall’ being construed as mandatory and 'may’ as permissive.”Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 325 (2000). 19 Under the CJRA, “the court may take into account” certaininformation. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20 (emphasis added). If the courtfinds by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions ofrelease will be sufficient, “the court may order, before trial,the detention of an eligible defendant.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1) (emphasis added). By contrast, the trial court mustprovide a written statement of reasons if it orders detention.N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a)(1). The pointed use of the permissive“may” in those provisions establishes the trial court’ssignificant discretion in making pretrial detention decisionsand suggests that deferential review is appropriate. SeePierce, 487 U.S. at 559. Nevertheless, because the statutory language is notsufficiently explicit to dispose of the question here, we applythe two-part McLane test. 2. Turning to the first inquiry under that test, we findfurther support for the abuse of discretion standard in “thehistory of appellate practice.” McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1166. Since the 1800s, appellate courts have acknowledged thatbail determinations were discretionary and not readilyreviewable by appellate courts. See Parsell v. State, 30 N.J.L. 530, 546 (1863) (finding that “the law confides 'the exclusiveorder and directions in such cases [(referring to discharging 20 bail, &c.,)] to the legal discretion and judgment of the courthaving jurisdiction over the subject matter; and courts of errorwill not deem themselves at liberty to review the same’”(alteration in original) (quoting Wright v. Green, 11 N.J.L. 334, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1830) (involving trial court’s decision toset aside amercement and discharge debtor))). As a result, over many decades, appellate courts havereviewed many bail determinations for abuse of discretion. SeeState v. Fajardo-Santos, 199 N.J. 520, 531, 533-34 (2009)(stating that a trial court “engage[s] in a fact-sensitiveanalysis in setting bail” and noting our Court “us[ed] [an]abuse of discretion standard to review [the] fact-sensitivedetermination whether to remit forfeited bail” in State v.Ventura, 196 N.J. 203, 206 (2008)); State v. Korecky, 169 N.J. 364, 373 (2001) (“The imposition of a bail condition is a matterof judicial discretion.”); State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 364(1972) (noting that “bail liberty is a matter for the discretionof the trial courts” and that “discretion must be exercisedreasonably”); State v. Steele, 430 N.J. Super. 24, 34 (App. Div.2013); State v. Petrucelli, 37 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1955)(noting that “[t]he amount of bail is left to sound judicialdiscretion” and that appellate courts are “not warranted innullifying a trial court’s exercise of judicial discretion inthe absence of showing that its action was clearly 21 unreasonable”). There is no indication that the Legislatureintended to change that practice under the new system. SeeC.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 254-56. 3. The second part of the Supreme Court’s test in McLane iswhether “as a matter of sound administration of justice, onejudicial actor is better positioned than another to decide theissue in question.” 137 S. Ct. at 1166-67 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559-60). We have long deferred to trial courts’ factualdeterminations because they “hear and see the witnesses and. . . have the 'feel’ of the case, which a reviewing courtcannot enjoy.” State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). As aconsequence, trial courts are “better positioned” than appellatecourts to make factual determinations. With respect to detention determinations, trial courtsregularly handle detention motions under the CJRA and, goingforward, will continue to develop expertise in the CJRA’sapplication. See Ingram, 230 N.J. at 212 (stating that underCJRA, “the State moved for detention in 7824 cases in the firsthalf of 2017” with “[c]ourts h[olding] hearings in 5548 of thosecases”). The Legislature’s significant use of permissive language inthe CJRA, the history of appellate deference to the factualfindings of trial courts, the history of appellate review of 22 bail decisions for abuse of discretion, and the ongoingdevelopment of trial court expertise in applying the CJRA, allsuggest that abuse of discretion is the appropriate appellatestandard of review for determinations made in pretrial detentionhearings under the CJRA. B. In C.W., cited by the Appellate Division here, the panelalso concluded that an abuse of discretion standard should applyto detention determinations under the CJRA. 449 N.J. Super. at 235, 252–54. The panel found support in the words and policyobjectives of the CJRA -- “the objectives of the [CJRA] inattaining the expeditious resolution of criminal cases could bethwarted if this court routinely second-guessed decisions onpretrial detention motions simply because we personally wouldhave reached a different result than the trial judge.” Id. at256. C.W. correctly recognized that, “[i]n many instances, thepretrial hearing may entail no witness testimony and no need forcredibility findings by the trial court, to which we ordinarilyaccord great deference.” Id. at 257. Nevertheless, regardlessof whether the evidence is live testimony, a videotapedstatement, or documentary evidence, deference is owed to thetrial court’s determinations of fact and credibility. State v.S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379 (2017) (“[A] standard of deference to a 23 trial court’s fact findings, even fact findings based solely onvideo or documentary evidence, best advances the interests ofjustice in a judicial system that assigns different roles totrial courts and appellate courts.”); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007). We conclude that the appellate panel in C.W. identified theproper standard of review of detention decisions under the CJRA-- abuse of discretion. We find that the panel correctlyenunciated the standard when it stated that, [w]hile the concept is difficult to define with precision, an appellate court “may find an abuse of discretion when a decision 'rest[s] on an impermissible basis’ or was 'based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors.’” Steele, 430 N.J. Super. at 34-35, 61 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). An appellate court can also discern an abuse of discretion when the trial court fails to take into consideration all relevant factors and when its decision reflects a clear error in judgment. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 444 (1997). Likewise, when the trial court renders a decision based upon a misconception of the law, that decision is not entitled to any particular deference and consequently will be reviewed de novo. See, e.g., State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016); State v. Williams, 441 N.J. Super. 266, 272 (App. Div. 2015). [C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255.]Under that standard, “[a] reviewing court generally will give nodeference to a trial court decision that fails to 'provide 24 factual underpinnings and legal bases supporting [its] exerciseof judicial discretion.’” C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255 (secondalteration in original) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012)). In other words, a trial court’sdetention decision not supported by articulable facts is notentitled to deference and may constitute an abuse of discretion. IV. Our final task is to determine whether the trial courtabused its discretion in ordering defendant’s detention. Thisdetermination requires a review of whether the trial court’sdecision “rest[s] on an impermissible basis,” “was based upon aconsideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors,” “fail[ed]to take into consideration all relevant factors and whe[ther][the] decision reflects a clear error in judgment.” C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255 (first alteration in original) (internalcitations omitted). Where, as here, the defendant has not been indicted, theCJRA requires trial courts to determine at a detention hearingwhether the State established probable cause and demonstrated byclear and convincing evidence that a defendant’s danger, risk offlight, and risk of obstruction overcomes the presumption ofrelease. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); -19(e)(2); -20(a), (b).Because the finding of probable cause is not at issue here, weconfine our consideration to the trial court’s conclusion that 25 defendant’s danger, risk of flight, and risk of obstructionovercame the presumption of his release. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); -19(e)(2); -20(a), (b). We repeat the following principles that guide our finaldetermination. The State’s burden to overcome the statutorypresumption of release is substantial because “[i]n our societyliberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or withouttrial is the carefully limited exception.” State v. Robinson,229 N.J. 44, 68 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting UnitedStates v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 , 755 (1987)). If the courtorders pretrial detention, it shall “include written findings offact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention.”N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a)(1); see also R. 3:4A(c). Indeed, “[a]reviewing court generally will give no deference to a trialcourt decision that fails to 'provide factual underpinnings andlegal bases supporting [its] exercise of judicial discretion.’”C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255 (second alteration in original)(quoting Clark, 429 N.J. Super. at 72). The CJRA specifically delineates the kind of evidence thatthe court may consider in making a detention decision. N.J.S.A.2A:162-20. As noted above, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20, thecourt may take into account various factors, including “[t]henature and circumstances of the [charged] offense;” “the weightof the evidence” proffered against the defendant; 26 characteristics of the defendant as he stands before the court,including his or her employment status, familial ties, andlength of residence in the community; “[t]he nature andseriousness of the danger” posed to other persons or thecommunity if the defendant were released; the risk that thedefendant will obstruct the criminal justice process; and thePSA recommendation. The court here considered the nature of the offense chargedand gave it “great weight.” The court acknowledged the weaknessof the State’s case by stating that the proofs were limited to“he said, she said.” Even though the weakness of the State’scase generally militates in favor of release, the court usedthis factor to support the prosecutor’s claim that there was arisk of obstruction. That was so, even though there was no pastconduct by defendant or empirical evidence offered by theprosecutor to support the contention that [t]hese sorts of cases are sensitive in the sense that if a defendant has access to the victim or other family members, we know -- and it’s common sense -- that the defendant often tries to obstruct justice by trying to convince family members and other people in the family to say it didn’t happen, or put pressure on the victim. Defendant’s characteristics as he stood before the court,pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20, were as follows: he was fiftyyears of age; he had a PSA score of 1/6 -- the lowest score -- 27 for both “[f]ailure to appear” and “[n]ew criminal activity”; hewas gainfully employed, had no criminal history, had no violenceflags, and had strong ties to the community including thesupport of his adoptive parents and his relationship with hisbiological children; he was born in Canada, but adopted shortlythereafter, and has lived in the United States; because he wasborn in Canada, defendant has dual U.S.-Canadian citizenship;and his birth mother visited him on one occasion more than tenyears ago, and the visit ended with defendant obtaining arestraining order against her. In addition, defense counsel proffered, without dispute bythe prosecutor, that defendant had “no telephonic or face-to-face contact with [his mother]” and “doesn’t even know where togo find her”; defendant lived in the same home as the victim“until a couple of years ago” and “no further problemsapparently . . . have been alleged”; and defendant is involvedin the lives of his three biological children and has had“constant contact” with them despite no longer living in thesame household. The nature and circumstances of the offense are pertinentto whether the statutory presumption of release has beenovercome. However, the court based its detention decisionalmost entirely upon the offense charged, even though thatcharge does not carry a presumption of detention. See N.J.S.A. 28 2A:162-18(b). The court also relied on unsupported conclusorystatements by the prosecutor to establish risk of obstructioneven though there was no evidence of defendant’s obstructiveconduct. As defense counsel noted, defendant lived in the samehome as the victim “until a couple of years ago” and “no furtherproblems apparently . . . have been alleged.” The court based defendant’s risk of flight upon his dualU.S.-Canadian citizenship even though the evidence presented atthe detention hearing was that defendant had “lived in NewJersey [for] almost his entire life” and that defendant has noties to Canada because he has no contact with his biologicalmother and does not know where she lives. In summary, the trial court, in ordering defendantdetained, failed to properly consider defendant’scharacteristics as he stood before the court. Furthermore, thetrial court relied upon general, conclusory statements putforward by the prosecutor at the detention hearing. Forexample, at the detention hearing, the prosecutor asserted in aconclusory fashion that defendant’s dual citizenship created arisk of flight and that because defendant knows where the victimand her mother live “the fear is that if he’s released, he willharm them physically.” Lastly, the prosecutor stated, withoutfactual support, that “[t]hese sorts of cases are sensitive”because “defendant has access to the victim and other family 29 members” and that “it’s common sense . . . that the defendantoften tries to obstruct justice by trying to convince familymembers and other people in the family to say it didn’t happen,or put pressure on the victim.” Because the court’s detentiondecision does not set forth articulable facts supporting itsexercise of judicial discretion, it is not entitled todeference. We are thus constrained to find that the evidence at thedetention hearing did not overcome the CJRA’s presumption ofrelease. The trial court’s detention decision constituted anabuse of discretion because it “rest[s] on an impermissiblebasis,” “was based upon a consideration of irrelevant orinappropriate factors,” “fail[ed] to take into consideration allrelevant factors,” including defendant’s characteristics as hestood before the court, and “reflects a clear error injudgment.” C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255 (first alteration inoriginal) (internal citations omitted). Having determined that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by detaining defendant, the next appropriateprocedural step is to remand the matter to the trial court todetermine the suitable conditions of release. Remand isrequired because the trial court has the opportunity at adetention hearing to “hear and see witnesses” and gain a “'feel’of the case which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.” Johnson, 4230 N.J. at 161. Trial courts are therefore better positioned todetermine conditions of release. V. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm as modified thejudgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial courtfor a hearing to determine the appropriate conditions ofrelease. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 31