Title: People v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92783
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2003

Docket No. 92783-Agenda 19-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							RAYMOND HARRIS, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether a police officer, having obtained an
identification card from a passenger in a vehicle during a traffic stop, may
perform a check to determine whether there are outstanding warrants for
the passenger's arrest. We hold that, under the circumstances at bar, the
warrant check was outside the scope of the traffic stop and was
impermissible.
BACKGROUND
	At approximately 4:30 p.m. on September 27, 1997, Officer
Vernard Reed of the Will County sheriff's department, observed a vehicle,
driven by Keith Weathersby, make an illegal left turn from Route 53 onto
Mills Road. Officer Reed initiated a traffic stop. During the course of the
traffic stop, Officer Reed requested identification from defendant, a
passenger in the vehicle. Officer Reed performed a check on defendant's
identification card and discovered that defendant had an outstanding
warrant for failure to appear in court. Officer Reed placed defendant
under arrest. In an ensuing search, officer Reed recovered a pea-sized
rock of cocaine and a "Chore Boy"(1) from defendant's pocket.
	Defendant was charged by indictment, in the circuit court of Will
County, with the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class
4 felony. 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1996). He filed a motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that Officer Reed had neither a
warrant to search him nor probable cause to believe that he had
committed a crime.
	At a subsequent hearing on the motion, defendant testified that he
was a passenger in the car stopped by Officer Reed. The officer told the
driver that he had made an illegal left turn and requested identification from
the driver. Sometime later, the officer approached defendant and asked
him for identification. Defendant complied, giving the officer a state
identification card. The officer returned to the squad car, ran a warrant
check, and discovered that defendant had an outstanding warrant for
failure to appear in court. The officer had defendant step out of the car,
handcuffed defendant and searched him. Defendant stated that at no point
during the stop did Officer Reed inform defendant that he wanted to see
defendant's identification to determine whether defendant had a valid
driver's license.
	Officer Reed testified that when he first initiated the traffic stop, he
requested identification from the driver of the vehicle. The driver, Keith
Weathersby, stated that he did not have his driver's license on his person.
The driver gave his date of birth, and identified himself as either Darren or
Darryl Weathersby. Officer Reed transmitted the driver's information to
county dispatch and learned there was no valid driver's license for anyone
by that name. Officer Reed confronted the driver, who then gave his
correct name and admitted that his license was either suspended or
revoked. Officer Reed transmitted the new information to county dispatch
and confirmed that Weathersby's license was suspended or revoked.
	Officer Reed testified that it was his usual practice, once he
determined that a driver could not legally drive, to request identification
from the passengers in the car to determine whether another person could
drive the car. In keeping with this practice, Officer Reed asked defendant
for identification, intending to release the vehicle to defendant if defendant
had a valid driver's license. At no time during the traffic stop, however,
did Officer Reed ask defendant whether defendant was able to drive the
car. Further, defendant's behavior had not aroused suspicion and Officer
Reed did not believe that defendant had committed any wrongdoing.
Having obtained defendant's identification card, Officer Reed ran the
information through county dispatch and discovered that defendant had an
outstanding warrant. Officer Reed advised defendant of the outstanding
warrant, placed defendant under arrest, handcuffed defendant and
searched him, finding the pea-sized rock of cocaine and the "Chore Boy."
Officer Reed also searched the car incident to defendant's arrest. Officer
Reed found another pea-sized rock of cocaine on the back seat and
arrested Weathersby.
	Lastly, Officer Reed testified that an officer has the authority to arrest
any person driving with a suspended license. Pursuant to such an arrest,
the officer also has the authority to impound the vehicle and perform an
inventory search. Officer Reed stated that he had the right to search the
car once he found out that Weathersby's license was suspended.
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's
motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The court found that
Officer Reed requested identification from defendant in order to determine
whether defendant had a valid driver's license. Officer Reed intended to
release the car to defendant, if defendant could legally drive the car, in
order to avoid towing the vehicle. The cause proceeded to trial.
	At trial, Officer Reed testified that when he activated his emergency
lights, Weathersby pulled the car to the side of the road. Although Officer
Reed stated that he requested identification from defendant in order to
determine whether defendant could drive the vehicle, officer Reed
acknowledged that, in his police report, he stated that the car was legally
parked. Officer Reed also testified that once he determined there was no
valid driver's license for a Darrell Weathersby, he confronted the driver
and obtained the driver's correct name. Officer Reed then turned to
defendant and asked him for identification. Having obtained defendant's
identification card, Officer Reed ran a check on both defendant and
Weathersby. County dispatch informed him that Weathersby's license was
suspended and that defendant had an outstanding warrant. Officer Reed
arrested defendant and searched him, finding the cocaine at issue. Because
Officer Reed found a controlled substance on defendant, Officer Reed
searched the car to see if it also contained drugs. Officer Reed explained,
however, that in the absence of a passenger eligible to drive the vehicle,
he would have done an inventory search of the vehicle and recovered the
cocaine from the back seat.
	The jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. Subsequently, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 28 days
in jail with credit for 28 days previously served and to a term of probation
for 24 months. The court also ordered defendant to pay court costs and
certain fines.
	Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court should have
granted the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The appellate
court agreed. The court held that defendant did not voluntarily comply
with Officer Reed's request for identification. Officer Reed conveyed the
message that compliance with the request for identification was
mandatory. Under the circumstances, no reasonable person would have
felt free to disregard the officer and terminate the encounter without
tendering identification. 325 Ill. App. 3d 262, 266.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
	As an initial observation, we note that the case at bar involves only
the suppression of the evidence recovered from defendant during the
course of the traffic stop. We are not called upon to determine any
charges pressed upon defendant pursuant to the outstanding warrant for
his arrest. As noted above, the circuit court denied defendant's motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence. Generally, a motion to suppress
evidence presents mixed questions of law and fact: the trial court first
weighs the evidence and determines the facts surrounding the
complained-of conduct, after which it decides whether, as a matter of law,
these facts constitute an unconstitutional seizure. People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 108 (2001); People v. Shapiro, 177 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (1997).
A reviewing court accords great deference to the factual findings of the
trial court. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 108. However, the reviewing court
considers de novo the trial court's ultimate determination to grant or deny
the defendant's motion to suppress. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 466
(2002); Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 108; People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001).
B. Identification/Warrant Check
	The State argues that defendant was not seized during the course of
the traffic stop and defendant was free to decline Officer Reed's request
for identification. According to the State, defendant's compliance with the
officer's request was voluntary and evinced a desire to cooperate with the
officer's community caretaking function. Defendant counters that for the
duration of the traffic stop both he and Weathersby were detained, and
the traffic stop had not come to an end when Officer Reed requested
defendant's identification. Thus, defendant reasonably believed that
compliance with Officer Reed's request was necessary.
	In People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), we considered
whether, during the course of a routine traffic stop, a police officer's
request for identification from a passenger violated the federal and state
constitutional prohibitions against unlawful seizures (see U.S. Const.,
amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). As an initial matter, we rejected
the State's contention that the fourth amendment was not implicated
because the police officer's request for identification qualified as
"community caretaking." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 223-24. Citing People
v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1990), we noted that "community
caretaking" is a label used to describe consensual police-citizen
encounters that typically involve the safety of the public. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 224. A "community caretaking" encounter between the police
and a citizen involves no coercion or detention, and, consequently, does
not violate the fourth amendment. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 224. We also
rejected the State's contention that the passenger was not seized during
the course of the traffic stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 224-26. We noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court has characterized the temporary detention of
'individuals' during a vehicle stop by police, even if only for a brief period
and for a limited purpose, as a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning
of the fourth amendment." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 225. We concluded
that a passenger in a vehicle stopped by the police is "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 226; see also
People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7 (2003). Further, because a traffic stop
constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants, the stop is subject to the
fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 
at 226, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); see also Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d  at 13.
	Having disposed of the State's preliminary contentions, we
considered whether the officer's request for identification from the
passenger was reasonable. We noted that a traffic stop is analogous to a
Terry investigatory stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 226.
Consequently, a court of review judges the reasonableness of a traffic stop
by reference to Terry's dual inquiry. The traffic stop is deemed reasonable
if the officer's action in initiating the stop was justified and if the officer's
action during the course of the stop was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Gonzalez,
204 Ill. 2d  at 228, quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at
905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879; see also Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d  at 14. With respect
to the second inquiry, we explained:
			"[A] rule governing the application of Terry's scope
requirement to vehicle stops cannot be so permissive as to give
police complete discretion in questioning the occupants of a
stopped vehicle, nor can it be so limiting that any meaningful law
enforcement activities are quashed. We believe the better
approach, the one that strikes the proper balance, is that
expressed by Judge Murphy in his partial concurrence and partial
dissent in [United States v.] Holt:
			'Terry's scope requirement is a common sense limitation on
the power of law enforcement officers. It prevents law
enforcement officials from fundamentally altering the nature of
the stop by converting it into a general inquisition about past,
present and future wrongdoing, absent an independent basis
for reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. The
scope doctrine does not, however, prevent officers from
engaging in facially innocuous dialog which a detained
motorist would not reasonably perceive as altering the
fundamental nature of the stop.' Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1240
(Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
			Thus, in determining whether police questioning during the
course of a traffic stop satisfies Terry's scope requirement, we
must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related
to the initial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably
related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation
occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose
of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement
officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify
the question. If the question is so justified, no fourth amendment
violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to
the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we
must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and
common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the
detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop."
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 234-35.
	Applying these principles to the traffic stop at issue, we held in
Gonzalez that the stop was justified at its inception because the vehicle
did not have a front license plate. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 228-29.
Although the officer's request for identification was not reasonably related
to the initial justification for the traffic stop, we also held that the officer's
request for identification was reasonable. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 235-36. We observed that the request for identification did not impermissibly
prolong the length of the detention. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236. Further,
the request did not change the fundamental nature of the traffic stop.
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236. A simple request for identification is facially
innocuous. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236. It does not suggest official
interrogation and is not the type of question or request that would increase
the confrontational nature of the encounter. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236.(2)
	As in Gonzalez, we reject the State's contention that defendant was
not seized during the course of the traffic stop. The encounter between
Officer Reed and defendant involved a detention and is not appropriately
labeled as "community caretaking." The fourth amendment is implicated
when a police officer detains the driver and passenger of a vehicle during
the course of a traffic stop.
	Because defendant was seized when the vehicle in which he was a
passenger was stopped, we must determine whether the seizure was
reasonable. To do so, we reference Terry's dual inquiry. With respect to
the first inquiry, we note that the traffic stop was justified at its inception.
Officer Reed observed the vehicle, in which defendant was a passenger,
make a left turn from the right-hand lane of Route 53 onto Mills Road.
With respect to the second inquiry, we note that Officer Reed's request
for identification was facially innocuous. Such a request gave the officer
the opportunity to identify a potential witness to the traffic violation and to
the officer's actions during the course of the stop, providing a certain level
of protection to both the officer and the driver of the vehicle. Moreover,
the request for identification, in and of itself, did not change the
fundamental nature of the stop by converting it into a general inquisition
about past, present and future wrongdoing. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 236.
	Once Officer Reed obtained the identification card, however, he
proceeded to run a check to determine whether there were outstanding
warrants for defendant's arrest. Thus, our review of the reasonableness
of the traffic stop does not end with the request for identification, as it did
in Gonzalez. Nevertheless, Gonzalez is instructive because we there
emphasized that the scope inquiry into the reasonableness of the traffic
stop is dependent upon both the duration of the traffic stop and the
manner in which the stop is conducted. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 233; see
also Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d  at 14 ("Under the second prong we consider the
length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out"
(emphases in original)). With the warrant check at issue, as with the
request for identification at issue in Gonzalez, we must consider whether
the check was related to the initial justification for the stop. If the check
was reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment
violation occurred. If the check was not reasonably related to the purpose
of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the check. If the check
was so justified, no fourth amendment violation occurred. In the absence
of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable,
articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the
circumstances and common sense, the check impermissibly prolonged the
detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. See Gonzalez,
204 Ill. 2d  at 235; Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d  at 16.
	The warrant check performed by Officer Reed was not related to the
initial justification for the traffic stop. Officer Reed initiated the traffic stop
because the driver made an illegal left turn. Defendant, however, was
simply the front-seat passenger in the car and was not implicated in the
traffic violation.(3) Thus, the warrant check was not directly related to the
initial justification for the traffic stop. Further, the warrant check was not
supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime. Officer Reed neither saw nor
suspected that defendant had committed any wrongdoing. Indeed, Officer
Reed testified that at the time he requested defendant's identification,
defendant was not doing anything suspicious and Officer Reed did not
suspect defendant of committing a criminal offense. In the absence of a
reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable,
articulable suspicion, we consider whether the check impermissibly
prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.
From the record, we cannot ascertain whether the warrant check
prolonged the detention. Officer Reed testified at trial that he transmitted
the driver's and defendant's information to county dispatch at the same
time. Some time later, county dispatch informed Officer Reed that the
driver's license was either suspended or revoked. County dispatch also
informed Officer Reed that defendant had an outstanding warrant.
However, Officer Reed did not testify that the warrant check performed
on defendant was completed before the check on the driver. The warrant
check performed on defendant could well have lengthened the duration of
the detention if the officer had to wait for the results of the warrant check.
Under the circumstances at bar, however, regardless of the duration of the
detention, the warrant check was impermissible because it changed the
fundamental nature of the traffic stop. The warrant check converted the
stop from a routine traffic stop into an investigation of past wrongdoing by
defendant. As Justice Murphy aptly observed in Holt,
		 "Terry's scope requirement is a common sense limitation on the
power of law enforcement officers. It prevents law enforcement
officials from fundamentally altering the nature of the stop by
converting it into a general inquisition about past, present and
future wrongdoing, absent an independent basis for reasonable
articulable suspicion or probable cause." United States v. Holt,
264 F.3d 1215, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
	In Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 229, we acknowledged the divergence
of opinion among the federal and state courts regarding the propriety of
police questioning during a traffic stop. We noted that some jurisdictions
look only to the length of the detention in determining the propriety of
police questioning during the traffic stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 230-31.
We chose, however, to emphasize that the manner in which the traffic stop
is conducted is an important consideration in determining the
reasonableness of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 233. As in Gonzalez,
we acknowledge the tempestuous discourse in foreign jurisdictions as to
whether a police officer can either request identification from a passenger
or perform a check for outstanding warrants for the passenger's arrest
using information obtained from the passenger. E.g., compare People v.
Jackson, 39 P.3d 1174 (Colo. 2002) (evidence suppressed because
police officer retained passenger's identification, instructed passenger to
remain in vehicle and performed warrant check on passenger); Spikes v.
State, 323 S.C. 28, 31, 448 S.E.2d 560, 563 (1994) (evidence
suppressed where passenger was detained for 20 minutes while the
officers "went fishing" for evidence of some crime); Holt v. State, 227
Ga. App. 46, 487 S.E.2d 629 (1997); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 44
Mass. App. 531, 692 N.E.2d 106 (1998); Hornberger v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 799 A.2d 566 (2002)
(compiling cases); with State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1245 n.2 (Utah
1994) (the officer could perform a warrant check because the passenger
consented to drive the car, and the warrant check did not significantly
extend "the period of time reasonably necessary to run" a check on the
passenger's driver's license); State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah
1991) (not within the scope of the traffic stop to do a warrant check on
the passenger where the passenger had denied having a license); State v.
Mennegar, 114 Wash. 2d 304, 787 P.2d 1347 (1990) (a traffic stop
does not involve an arrest or seizure of the passenger; as part of a police
officer's community caretaking function, the officer may ask a passenger
if the passenger wishes to drive an intoxicated driver's vehicle and may
run a check on the passenger's information); State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 (1980) (a police stop based on a parking violation
committed by the driver did not reasonably provide the officer with
grounds to require identification of passengers unless other circumstances
gave the police independent cause to question them); and with State v.
Landry, 588 So. 2d 345, 348 (La. 1991) ("While the request for
information (or perhaps even the removal from the car) may not have been
reasonable if the officers had stopped a lone person on a college campus
in broad daylight, the circumstances of the traffic stop in the present case
made the request for identification from the two men reasonable"); People
v. O'Neal, 32 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2000) (an officer's request for a
passenger's name was part of a consensual interview; once the officer had
reason to believe that the passenger had given a false name, the officer
could conduct the investigatory stop which led to the discovery of the
outstanding warrants); State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App. 3d 551, 669 N.E.2d 92 (1995) (having obtained a passenger's identification
information, the police officer could perform a warrant check because any
questioning which occurred during the detention, even if unrelated to the
scope of the detention, was valid so long as the questioning did not
improperly extend the duration of the detention). We continue to adhere,
however, to our analysis in Gonzalez that the length and scope of the
detention must both be considered in determining the reasonableness of
the traffic stop. Having applied the Gonzalez framework and considered
both prongs of the Terry dual inquiry, we conclude that Officer Reed
exceeded the proper scope of the traffic stop when he retained
defendant's identification card and performed a check for outstanding
warrants for defendant's arrest.
	By our opinion today, we do not intimate that warrant checks are
always improper. As we acknowledged in Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 234-35, "a rule governing the application of Terry's scope requirement to
vehicle stops cannot be so permissive as to give police officers complete
discretion in questioning the occupants of a stopped vehicle, nor can it be
so limiting that any meaningful law enforcement activities are quashed."
Circumstances may arise during a routine traffic stop that focus suspicion
upon the passenger. The police officer may have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the passenger has committed a crime, in which case a
warrant check may be proper. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sinforoso,
434 Mass. 320, 749 N.E.2d 128 (2001). The passenger's conduct may
cause the officer to fear for his safety.(4) We also do not address the
situation where the passenger has violated a traffic law, such as riding in
a car with an open container of alcohol. See 625 ILCS 5/11-502(b)
(West 2000); United States v. Henderson, 229 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.
Mass. 2002). Lastly, we distinguish the facts of the present case from a
situation where the driver and passenger, knowing that the driver is being
arrested or is otherwise incapable of driving, agree that the passenger
should drive the vehicle. See, e.g., Higgins, 884 P.2d  at 1242.
C. Inevitable Discovery
	The State argues that the evidence recovered from defendant should
not be suppressed because the evidence would have been discovered
independently of the warrant check and the ensuing search of defendant's
person. According to the State, Officer Reed would have performed an
inventory search of the vehicle; Officer Reed would have discovered the
pea-sized rock of cocaine in the vehicle; Officer Reed would have
searched defendant, as an occupant of a vehicle containing cocaine; and
Officer Reed would have found the evidence on defendant's person which
is the subject of this motion to suppress.
	Defendant counters that the inevitable-discovery doctrine requires a
showing of much more than the possibility that an inventory search would
have been conducted. According to defendant, the State must show that
a proper inventory search would have occurred, leading to the discovery
of evidence. Defendant argues the State has not met its burden of showing
that Officer Reed would have arranged for the vehicle to be towed and
would have performed an inventory search. Defendant also maintains that
the State has failed to show that defendant would have been in or near the
vehicle at the time of an inventory search.
	Pursuant to the inevitable-discovery doctrine, "evidence obtained in
violation of an accused's constitutional rights and which otherwise would
be inadmissible at trial may be admitted if the prosecution is able to show
that the evidence 'would inevitably have been discovered without
reference to the police error or misconduct.' " People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 142 (1991), quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 390, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2511 (1984). The rationale for the
inevitable-discovery doctrine is that "while 'the prosecution is not to be
put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had
transpired,' the prosecution should not be put 'in a worse position simply
because of some earlier police error or misconduct.' " (Emphasis
omitted.) People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill. 2d 429, 437 (1997), quoting Nix,
467 U.S.  at 443, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 387, 104 S. Ct.  at 2508. Speculation
and assumption will not support application of the inevitable discovery
doctrine.
	In the present case, without addressing the propriety of the inventory
search conducted, we decline to apply the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
We agree with the appellate court that the chain of events presupposed by
the State for application of the doctrine is simply too tenuous. It strains the
imagination to assume that, once Officer Reed told defendant the car
would be towed, defendant would have stayed for the duration of the
inventory search. It is a further stretch to assume that, upon discovery of
the pea-sized rock of cocaine in the back seat of the vehicle, Officer Reed
would have searched defendant, the front seat passenger, in the belief that
defendant possessed cocaine. In that regard we note that the State
charged only the driver of the vehicle with possession of the cocaine found
in the vehicle. A court must not apply the inevitable-discovery doctrine
"upon the basis of nothing more than a hunch or speculation as to what
otherwise might have occurred." 5 W. LaFave, Search &amp; Seizure
§11.4(a), at 247 (3d ed. 1996).
CONCLUSION
	In reaching our conclusion, we note that the case at bar involved only
the suppression of the evidence recovered from defendant during the
course of the traffic stop. We were not called upon to determine the
validity of any charges pressed upon defendant pursuant to the outstanding
warrant for his arrest. We also note that the warrant check performed by
Officer Reed was not related to the initial justification for the traffic stop,
that is the illegal left turn the driver made. Further, the warrant check was
not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime. Officer Reed neither saw nor
suspected that defendant had committed any wrongdoing. Lastly, as noted
above, a warrant check may be appropriate where a passenger's conduct
causes the officer to fear for his safety. However, in the present case,
Officer Reed did not testify to any safety concerns. Nor was there any
intimation that the warrant check was "a precautionary measure to afford
a degree of protection to the officer." Mimms, 434 U.S.  at 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d  at 336, 98 S. Ct.  at 333. Instead, Officer Reed testified that he
requested identification from defendant and performed the warrant check
because he wanted to release the car to defendant. These facts indicate
that Officer Reed neither feared for his own safety nor for that of the
general public. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the warrant
check changed the fundamental nature of the traffic stop. The detention
was unreasonable and the circuit court should have suppressed the
evidence recovered from defendant's person. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court reversing the circuit court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:
	The majority holds that, under the facts of this case, Officer Reed
could not lawfully run a routine check for outstanding warrants, after he
lawfully obtained identification from the passenger of a lawfully stopped
vehicle. In reaching this conclusion, the majority purportedly relies on this
court's recent decision in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003). In
Gonzalez, we made clear that common sense was not to be abandoned
in determining what is "reasonable" in the context of a vehicle stop.
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 234-35. Today, the majority not only abandons
common sense, but distorts fundamental principles of fourth amendment
jurisprudence.
	In Gonzalez, we held that, in judging the reasonableness of police
questioning during a vehicle stop, where the questioning was neither
related to the purpose of the stop nor justified by a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal conduct, "we must consider whether, in light of all the
circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged
the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez,
204 Ill. 2d  at 235. The majority first speculates that the warrant check in
the present case "could well have lengthened the duration of the
detention." Slip op. at 11. Constrained, however, by the absence of
argument or evidence to that effect, the majority concludes that the
warrant check "changed the fundamental nature of the traffic stop" by
converting it into "an investigation of past wrongdoing by defendant." Slip
op. at 11. The majority's analysis and ultimate conclusion fails to recognize
that not all police conduct is created equal. That is, the majority opinion
overlooks the significant difference between the police conduct at issue in
Gonzalez-a face-to-face exchange between a police officer and a
detained passenger-and the police conduct at issue in the present case-an
unobtrusive check of information that is part of the public record.
Consideration of this difference leads to the inescapable conclusion that
Officer Reed did not exceed the bounds of the fourth amendment when
he checked for outstanding warrants.
	Roadside questioning by police of the passenger of a stopped vehicle
can take many forms-from the totally benign to the highly intrusive. At the
one extreme, an officer's questions may constitute nothing more than
casual banter that elicits a neutral response. At the other extreme, an
officer's questions may approach something akin to official interrogation
that invites, or even compels, an incriminating response, possibly on
matters divorced from the stop and unsupported by any newly aroused
suspicion. The degree of intrusiveness permitted by the fourth amendment
was the question we took up in Gonzalez. There, we were called upon to
determine whether an officer's request for identification from the
passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle offends fourth amendment
principles in the absence of a particularized suspicion of criminal conduct.
In short, did the officer go too far?
	In deciding this issue, we necessarily balanced the need for effective
law enforcement, on the one hand, against the need to safeguard the
privacy and security of passengers against arbitrary governmental
invasions, on the other hand. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 225, 234-36. We
ultimately concluded that the officer's mere request for identification from
the passenger was facially innocuous, did not suggest official interrogation,
and was not the type of request that would increase the confrontational
nature of the encounter, thus changing the stop in some fundamental way.
We held that the officer's conduct did not make the otherwise lawful
detention of the passenger unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 235-36.
	The police conduct at issue in the present case stands in stark
contrast to the conduct at issue in Gonzalez. A warrant check is simply
a computerized retrieval of information in the public record-information
which indicates whether a court has entered a written order commanding
the arrest of a specific person. See 725 ILCS 5/107-1 (West 2002).
Thus, a warrant check is never intrusive in the way that police questioning
of a detained passenger can be. A warrant check involves no face-to-face
exchange and does not even require the passenger's participation. It is
never inquisitorial, confrontational, or suggestive of official interrogation.
It does not invite, much less compel, an incriminating response. Further,
the passenger has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
retrieved during a warrant check, whether the police suspect the
passenger of criminal activity or not. Accordingly, unless the warrant
check impermissibly prolongs the passenger's detention-which was not
the case here-no fourth amendment concerns arise.
	I recognize that where the identity of the passenger is unknown, the
officer cannot run a check for outstanding warrants unless the passenger
assents to the officer's request for identification and permits this initial de
minimis intrusion on his or her privacy. A warrant check, however,
represents no further intrusion on the passenger's rights. Thus, if, under
Gonzalez, a police officer may lawfully request identification from the
passenger of a stopped vehicle, the additional step of a warrant check,
without more, does not somehow change the "fundamental nature of the
stop."
	Stated another way, if a police officer lawfully detains a passenger
like defendant by lawfully stopping the vehicle in which he is riding;
lawfully obtains the passenger's identification; conducts a check for
information in which the passenger can claim no privacy interest
(information which even the majority could not seriously contend should
be unavailable to police); does not require the passenger to implicate
himself in possible criminal wrongdoing (as would, for example, a series
of pointed questions irrelevant to the stop); does not intrude any further on
the passenger's privacy or security (as would, for example, a search of his
person or property); and does so without unnecessarily prolonging the
passenger's detention, in what conceivable way have the passenger's
fourth amendment rights been compromised? Where is the
governmental intrusion?
	Under the majority's reasoning, even if Officer Reed was acquainted
with the passenger and made no request for identification, he would have
been prohibited from running a warrant check. The absurdity of this
proposition is manifest. Thus, the majority opinion achieves what we
sought to avoid in Gonzalez: "stripping any notion of common sense out
of the 'reasonableness' equation." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 234. As we
stated, "Although our legal system is steeped with rules, standards, and
formulas, logic and common sense should be no less a part of it."
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 234.
	Moreover, the majority opinion makes no attempt to balance the
competing governmental and individual interests that lie at the heart of
fourth amendment analysis and drove our analysis in Gonzalez. See
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 224-25, 233-35, citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667-68, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396
(1979); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838,
848, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001). Instead, the majority establishes a new
rule of fourth amendment jurisprudence that prohibits police from engaging
in one of the most basic law enforcement techniques with no explanation
other than the simple statement that it constitutes an "investigation of past
wrongdoing." Slip op. at 11. Nowhere in Gonzalez did we intimate that
police should be barred from performing enforcement and investigatory
functions. That is, after all, precisely what police do. What we said, in
determining the acceptable parameters of police questioning during a
routine traffic stop, is that police cannot conduct a " 'general inquisition
about past, present and future wrongdoing,' " absent a reasonable,
articulable suspicion. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d  at 235, quoting United States
v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Conducting a non-intrusive computerized
check to determine if a judge has commanded the arrest of the passenger
cannot reasonably be deemed a "general inquisition." The majority's
conclusion to the contrary effectively creates a constitutional right to avoid
justice.
	The majority opinion also calls into question this court's decision in
People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462 (2002). In Cox, we stated, without
qualification, that an officer may conduct a speedy warrant check on the
driver of a stopped vehicle. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 468, citing People v.
Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220 (2000); People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App.
3d 487, 491 (1997); People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 163
(1995). The appellate court cases cited in Cox for this proposition did not
expound on this point, and no specific justification for permitting a warrant
check on the driver of a stopped vehicle was offered. The reason,
perhaps, is that there is nothing inherently objectionable about such an
investigative technique. See 4 W. LaFave, Search &amp; Seizure §9.2(f), at
51-58 (3d ed. 1996). Today, the majority holds otherwise.
	Under the court's present analysis, a warrant check will only comport
with Terry's scope requirement if it is either related to the purpose of the
stop, or supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
conduct. A warrant check, however, will rarely, if ever, relate to the
purpose of a routine traffic stop-issuing a warning or citation for an
observed traffic violation. Nor will facts necessarily develop during a
routine stop providing a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
conduct. Although the present case involves a passenger, rather than the
driver, the same Terry principles that govern the reasonableness of the
officer's encounter with the passenger, also govern the reasonableness of
the officer's encounter with the driver. Accordingly, under the majority's
opinion, a driver can now legitimately argue that a warrant check
"change[s] the fundamental nature of the traffic stop" by converting the
stop "into an investigation of past wrongdoing." Slip op. at 11. Once
again, the absurdity of the majority's position is evident.
	Finally, I am compelled to comment on the majority's conclusion that
because Officer Reed did not testify that he feared for his own safety,
considerations of officer safety should not color our analysis in this case.
Slip op. at 16. Officer safety is always at issue during a vehicle stop.
Decades ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state's
concern for officer safety during a traffic stop is "both legitimate and
weighty." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977). The Court cited the high incidence
of police shootings when an officer approaches a suspect seated in an
automobile, as well as the significant percentage of murders of police
officers during traffic stops. Mimms, 434 U.S.  at 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d  at
336-37, 98 S. Ct.  at 333; see also United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging "the tragedy of the many
officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year"); In re Arturo
D., 27 Cal. 4th 60, 85 n.23, 38 P.3d 433, 450 n.23, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 600 n.23 (2002) ("Nationwide, 13 law enforcement officers
feloniously were killed while enforcing traffic laws in the year 2000," and
that same year "6,234 officers were assaulted during traffic pursuits and
stops"), citing FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement Officers
Killed and Assaulted, at 28, 83 (2000); State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d
845, 875, 549 N.W.2d 218, 230 (1996) (Abrahamson, J., concurring)
("From 1978-94 about twice as many officers were killed in traffic
pursuits or stops as were killed in arrest situations involving drug-related
matters"), citing U.S. Dept. of Justice Hindelang Criminal Justice Research
Center, 1994 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, at 357; State v.
Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 37, 573 A.2d 1376, 1377 (1990) ("One study of
State Police officers killed nationwide in the line of duty from September
1976 to September 1982, shows that 40 percent of the troopers killed by
gunfire were fatally wounded while making traffic stops").
	More recently, the Court has recognized that the possible sources of
harm to an officer increase where a passenger is present. Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885
(1997). This court, until today, has also considered the risk of harm to a
police officer during a routine traffic stop in determining the permissible
scope of the officer's authority with respect to the passenger. See People
v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 418 (1998) (concluding that the public
interest in officer safety outweighs the potential intrusion to the passenger's
liberty interest in being ordered to remain at the scene). The majority's
present stance, that officer safety cannot be at issue unless the officer
testifies to a subjective fear, is unjustified under the case law, totally
divorced from reality, and does a grave disservice to police officers.
	In a footnote, the majority purports to recognize the legitimacy of
concerns over officer safety. Slip op. at 13 n.4. The majority nonetheless
denigrates the dissenters' concerns, characterizing them as nothing more
than an "emotional reaction" which we have allowed to "cloud" our
judgment in this case. Slip op. at 13 n.4. I freely admit that the number of
police officers killed each year during traffic stops strikes a very real
emotional chord. How could it not? The suggestion, however, that I, and
my colleagues in dissent, have elevated emotion over legal analysis is at
best unfounded, and at worst a poor attempt to direct attention away from
the other significant flaws in the majority opinion.
	As set forth above, the majority opinion misrepresents this court's
holding in Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220. Further, it distorts basic principles
of fourth amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the majority opinion is
inconsistent with statements the same majority made in Cox. In response
to these observations, the majority has made no attempt to shore up its
tortured fourth amendment analysis, nor any attempt to reconcile today's
holding with Cox. These are weighty and legitimate matters which the
majority needs to address and which are far more significant than
unwarranted suggestions that the dissenting justices are ruled by emotion.
	I dissent.



	JUSTICES THOMAS and GARMAN join in this dissent.



	JUSTICE THOMAS, also dissenting:
	In People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), I predicted that
"[t]he lower courts and the police will find the majority's rule difficult to
follow because the majority does not explain what type of questioning
would change the fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 
at 242 (Thomas, J., specially concurring). Today's decision demonstrates
that my fears were not unwarranted. Nevertheless, I agree with Justice
Fitzgerald that, to the extent that a workable rule emerged from Gonzalez,
that rule is not being applied faithfully in this case. I therefore join in Justice
Fitzgerald's dissent.
1.       A "Chore Boy" is a
scrubbing pad that can be used to heat up cocaine. The cocaine can then be
smoked.            
      

2.                 
          
             
         
          
             
We note that the request for identification, a mere question, did
not constitute a seizure or a search. The important consideration in Gonzalez
was that the passenger was seized by virtue of the traffic stop, and the
questioning could not impermissibly prolong the detention or change the
fundamental nature of the traffic stop. Gonzalez is thus entirely
consistent with Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, where this court determined that a
traffic stop was unreasonable, without consideration as to whether the dog-sniff
test at issue was a search. The principle to take from Gonzalez and Cox
is that an officer's conduct during the course of a traffic stop must be
reasonably related in length and scope to the initial justification for the
traffic stop.           
            

3.                 
               
The passenger in this case is similarly situated to
the passenger in Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7. In Bunch, an officer
observed a car come to a brief stop but did not see the car's brake lights
activate. The officer initiated a traffic stop, arrested the driver because the
driver could not produce a driver's license, and asked the passenger, Bunch,
to exit the car and stand at the rear of the vehicle. It was approximately 1:10
in the morning, and the officer twice shined a flashlight in Bunch's face as
the officer asked Bunch his name and where he was coming from. The officer
observed a small, 

clear plastic item, containing something white, in Bunch's mouth. The
officer arrested Bunch and ordered him to spit the object out of his mouth. This
court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding that the trial court
erred in denying a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In doing so, we
observed that "[p]rior to being approached by [the officer], [Bunch] was
simply a passive occupant of the car. Although the trial court indicated
that the officer had numerous' reasons to have a conversation with [Bunch],
including explaining to him the reason for the arrest and determining if [Bunch]
could be an alternative driver, the questions the officer actually posed were
not objectively related to either of these reasons." Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d  at 16-17.
We note that the actions of the passenger in the present case and the
passenger in Bunch are in sharp contrast to the actions of the passenger in People
v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402 (1998). In Gonzalez, an officer
initiated a traffic stop in a high-crime area at approximately 2:40 in the
morning. As the officer exited his squad car, the passenger "abruptly"
exited from the rear passenger seat. The officer ordered the passenger to stop
and return to the vehicle because the officer "didn't know what [the
passenger] was planning on doing." Because the passenger ignored the
officer's command and continued to walk away, the officer instructed his
police dog to exit the squad car and stand in the "heel" position, at
which point the dog began to bark. The officer repeated his instruction to the
passenger to stop and return to the vehicle. The passenger turned around, looked
at the officer, and walked back to the vehicle after hesitating a few seconds.
Having observed this "strange behavior," the officer asked the
passenger whether he was carrying any guns, needles or knives, to which the
passenger replied "yes." The officer did a "pat down," and
discovered a gun inside the front waist area of defendant's pants. This court
determined "it is reasonable for a police officer to immediately instruct a
passenger to remain at the car, when that passenger, of his own volition, exits
the lawfully stopped vehicle at the outset of the stop." Gonzalez,
184 Ill. 2d  at 418.
4.               
Like the dissenting justices, the court recognizes that concerns
about officer safety are "legitimate and weighty." Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977).
The court is mindful about the safety of officers in every situation where
danger is present, as our case law aptly demonstrates. Today's ruling does
not, in any way, alter our commitment to the safety of those entrusted to
protect the public. In this case, we must emphasize that there was no testimony
from Officer Reed regarding safety concerns. Moreover, we have made clear that a
different set of factual circumstance may well yield a different conclusion
based on safety concerns. Thus, while we share the anxiety of our dissenting
colleagues over the number of officers killed during traffic stops, we simply
cannot allow the understandable emotional reaction to such numbers to cloud our
legal analysis, or ignore, as those in dissent appear to do, the fact that
Officer Reed did not fear for his safety in this case.