Title: STATE v EMERSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13104
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 24, 1976

No. 13104 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 7 6 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - CRAIG EMERSON, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable W. F J . Lessley , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : McKinley Anderson argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles E. Erdmam Deputy Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, appeared, Bozeman, Montana Submitted : February 2, 1976 Decided : FEB 2 4 1976 < " I 9 ; " ~ ~ 1 ' Filed : + a;: 5 ". " . ., : O I . M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant appeals from a G a l l a t i n County judgment of conviction f o r robbery entered on t h e v e r d i c t of a jury, t h e Hon. W. W. Lessley, presiding. I n t h e e a r l y morning of January 11, 1975, Three Forks and G a l l a t i n County law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s were n o t i f i e d by one Wilbur "Swede" Capps of Three Forks t h a t he had been attacked near h i s home and h i s w a l l e t containing $200 t o $300 was taken. The f a c t s surrounding defendant's a r r e s t a r e not sub- s t a n t i a l l y i n dispute. After receiving t h e r e p o r t , i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r s backtracked f r e s h f o o t p r i n t s i n t h e snow from t h e scene of t h e incident t o defendant's vehicle. The o f f i c e r s knew defend- a n t was staying i n a t r a i l e r owned by James Aughney and proceeded t h e r e i n furtherance of t h e i r investigation. A t t h e t r a i l e r , t h e owner allowed t h e o f f i c e r s t o e n t e r and d i r e c t e d them t o t h e room where defendant w a s sleeping. The door t o t h i s room was a j a r . The o f f i c e r s entered and found defendant intoxicated and uncon- scious on t h e bed. H e was awakened by t h e o f f i c e r s and u t t e r e d "I d i d n ' t mean t o h u r t him" before losing consciousness. Further shaking by t h e o f f i c e r s again brought t h e defendant around. H e r a i s e d up and s t a t e d , "The money is i n t h e c l o s e t i n t h e blue pants. " V i s i b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r s through an open c l o s e t door w a s a wad of currency s t i c k i n g o u t of a p a i r of blue pants. Earlier, the o f f i c e r s noticed i n p l a i n view a p a i r of snow covered t e n n i s shoes, a s they entered defendant's room. The o f f i c e r s took t h e shoes and t h e money and checked t h e t r a c k s i n t h e snow before a r r e s t i n g defendant. A s he was being taken t o j a i l , defendant t o l d t h e o f f i c e r s he had thrown Capps' w a l l e t on top of t h e drug s t o r e . Upon investigation, t h e w a l l e t w a s discovered on t h e roof of t h e drug s t o r e . A motion t o suppress evidence and statements of defend- a n t based on t h e circumstances surrounding t h e a r r e s t w a s heard by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and denied. On appeal defendant a l l e g e s an i l l e g a l and unconstitu- t i o n a l search by t h e law enforcement o f f i c e r s and urges v i o l a t i o n of defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s f o r f a i l u r e t o give Miranda warnings t o defendant before and s h o r t l y a f t e r h i s a r r e s t . I n addition, defendant contends omissions i n t h e a f f i d a v i t accompany- ing t h e o r i g i n a l application f o r leave of t h e c o u r t t o f i l e an Information deprived t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of j u r i s d i c t i o n requir- ing dismissal of t h i s action. Further, defendant argues t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t acted beyond its power by allowing an amended appli- c a t i o n and a f f i d a v i t t o be f i l e d t o remedy t h e omissions i n t h e o r i g i n a l a f f i d a v i t . I n i t i a l l y , w e consider whether defendant was t h e victim of an unreasonable search. I n so doing, we must determine whether a search i n f a c t took place. The d e f i n i t i o n of a search w a s s t a t e d by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Williams, 153 Mont. 262, 269, "Plunging d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e f e d e r a l constitu- t i o n a l t h i c k e t we f i n d t h a t a 'search' has been held t o imply an examination of one's premises o r person with a view t o t h e discovery of con- traband o r evidence of g u i l t t o be used i n prose- cution of a criminal action; it implies an exploratory i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r quest. * * *" A Montana f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t case a l s o provides a discussion of what c o n s t i t u t e s a search. I n United S t a t e s v. Lodahl, 264 F.Supp. 927, 928, t h e Court s t a t e d : "The c o u r t s have not solved search and s e i z u r e problems by technical a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e r u l e s of agency. It is not l i k e l y t h a t any person i n possession of a house containing contraband a r t i c l e s had ever given a t h i r d person--child; wife; friend--actual a u t h o r i t y t o i n v i t e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n ; and y e t , where t h e person opening t h e door i n v i t e s an o f f i c e r t o e n t e r , an obser- vation by t h a t o f f i c e r of what i s i n p l a i n s i g h t a f t e r t h e e n t r y is not held t o be a n unreasonable search. If because of some l a c k of a u t h o r i t y on Moisan's p a r t t h e r e was a t r e s p a s s , t h a t would not convert t h e observation of what was i n p l a i n s i g h t i n t o a search. This is s o because t h e word ' s e a r c h ' denotes an i n t e n t i o n t o f i n d and absent such an i n t e n t i o n t h e r e simply i s no search. The Constitution f o r b i d s searches, n o t t r e s p a s s e s . The defendant may have been t h e victim of a very innocent trespass--he was t h e victim of i n c r e d i b l y bad luck--but he was n o t t h e v i c t i m of an unreasonable search and s e i z u r e . " (Emphasis added.) Applying t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s , w e cannot say t h a t a search was conducted by t h e law enforcement o f f i c e r s while they w e r e i n defendant's room. Here, t h e o f f i c e r s intended only t o speak t o defendant when they entered h i s room through an open door. What they d i d n o t i c e was i n p l a i n view o r d i r e c t e d t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n by defendant. Given no i n t e n t i o n t o f i n d , t h e r e can be no search. S t a t e v. Braden, 154 Mont. 9 0 , 97, 460 P.2d 85. Thus defendant's contention f a i l s . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , defendant claims t h e r e was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r by t h e law o f f i c e r s i n f a i l i n g t o g i v e defendant Miranda warnings as he l a y i n h i s room o r when he w a s driven t o j a i l a f t e r he was a r r e s t e d . Such e r r o r defendant contends should cause t h i s Court t o r e v e r s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e motion t o suppress. The s t a t e submits t h a t t h e Miranda warnings were n o t required s i n c e defendant w a s n o t s u b j e c t t o interroga- t i o n . The s t a t e f u r t h e r argues t h a t giving defendant Miranda warnings would have been a u s e l e s s a c t i n view of h i s s t a t e of i n t o x i c a t i o n . W e agree. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n s afforded by Miranda warn- ings a r e required i n i n s t a n c e s where one i s subjected t o c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 4 4 4 , 8 6 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L ed 2d 694. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e defendant's u t t e r a n c e s were n o t i n response t o questioning. Due t o t h e obvious i n t o x i - c a t i o n of defendant, t h e l a w enforcement o f f i c e r s involved r e f r a i n e d from giving him a Miranda warning and from questioning him, Thus there was no infringement of defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel guaran- teed him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doubt with regard to the voluntariness of defendant's statements going to their admissibility as evidence is also raised. Defendant urges that his physical and mental condition as a result of intoxication made it impossible for him to give a free, voluntary and uncoerced statement to the police, or to fully appreciate the consequences of his statements. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, S841 (Chadbourn rev. 1970),discusses the admissibility of confessions where the intoxication of declarant is self-induced. That discussion cites a New York Court of Appeals decision which we find helpful. In People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300, 226 N.E.2d 305, 309, the court stated: "Both the cases and Wigrnore's analysis, therefore, support a distinction between confessions made under self-induced intoxication and those, however truthful, coerced or the product of police-induced intoxication. In the case of self-induced intox- ication, the kind involved on this appeal, the criterion should be trustworthiness rather than any automatic application of a degree of intoxi- cation, in determining the admissibility of confessions. If trustworthiness is the criterion, then it is logical that the trustworthiness be testable by the content of the confession or evi- dence of subsequent events which confirm the reliability of the confession". Here, the subsequent events confirmed the reliability of defendant's statements. Therefore, we cannot say the court erred in admitting the statements in evidence. State v. Chappel, 149 Mont. 114, 423 P.2d 47; State v. Rossell, 113 Mont. 457, 127 P.2d 379; State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 P. 138. Considering the affidavit accompanying the initial appli- cation for leave to file an Information and the amendment allowed by the district court, we find no error. Admittedly section 95- 1301, R.C.M. 1947, requiring that the affidavit establish probable cause t o believe t h a t t h e offense has been committed was v i o l a t e d by t h e o r i g i n a l a f f i d a v i t . This, however, i s p a t e n t l y a procedural matter, n o t a s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e involving t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t . S t a t e v. Logan, 156 Mont. 48, 55, 473 P.2d 833. Given such a procedural d e f e c t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t does have t h e power t o allow t h e a f f i d a v i t t o be amended. This power i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e e f f i c i e n t administration of j u s t i c e and t h e b a s i c r i g h t of defendant t o prepare h i s own defense. S t a t e ex rel. B e l l v. D i s t r i c t Court, 157 Mont. 35, 37, 482 P.2d 557. Defendant's t e c h n i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 95-1503 and s e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, cannot overcome t h e s e weighty concerns. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. J u s t i c e s