Title: State v. Northcutt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99600
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2010

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 99,600 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
GAYL NORTHCUTT 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court reviews all the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational factfinder could have 
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
2. 
 
To prove the existence of a conspiracy, there need not be direct proof of an agreement.  It 
is enough if the parties tacitly come to an understanding in regard to the unlawful purpose, and 
this may be inferred from sufficiently significant circumstances. 
 
3. 
In cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of 
some lesser included offense, the judge should instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any 
such lesser included offense. 
 
4. 
 
To justify instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter 
arising from a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, there must be severe provocation.   
 
 
 
2 
 
5. 
 
Mere evidence of an altercation between parties does not alone support a finding of 
sufficient provocation to justify instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser 
included offense.   
 
6. 
 
A provocation is adequate to justify the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction if 
the provocation is calculated to deprive a reasonable person of self-control and to cause him or 
her to act out of passion rather than reason. 
 
7. 
In determining whether a voluntary manslaughter instruction should be given, the test of 
the sufficiency of provocation is objective, not subjective.  The provocation, whether it be 
sudden quarrel or some other form of provocation, must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person 
to lose control of his or her actions and reason. 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte district court; ROBERT P. BURNS, judge.  Opinion filed February 26, 2010.  
Affirmed.   
 
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney general, was with him on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Defendant Gayl Northcutt appeals his convictions for premeditated first-
degree murder, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3302.  The defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence with 
respect to the conspiracy conviction and also alleges the trial court erred by not instructing the 
jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense.  Both issues are inherently factual, 
3 
 
and the facts of this case do not support Northcutt's arguments on either issue.  Consequently, 
Northcutt's convictions are affirmed.  
 
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE 
 
After David Mason's family reported him missing, police began an investigation that led 
them to suspect Mason had been killed by Northcutt and his brother.  Two custodial interviews 
of Northcutt confirmed he had fought with Mason and that Mason was dead.  In fact, after the 
interviews, Northcutt showed officers where he and his brother had buried Mason.   
 
At Northcutt's trial, audiotapes of the two custodial interviews were played to the jury.  In 
both interviews, Northcutt admitted to beating Mason, and in the second interview he confessed 
that he and his brother had gone to Mason's apartment with the intent to kill Mason.  
Consequently, the audiotapes are important to the analysis of Northcutt's factually-based 
appellate arguments.  Yet, when this court began its review of the case, the audiotapes of the 
interviews—trial exhibits 57 and 58—were not in the record on appeal. 
 
During oral arguments, the court questioned counsel regarding the burden of creating an 
adequate record on appeal.  At that point, both counsel were alerted to the absence of the tape 
recordings from the record.  In response, both counsel advised the court the exhibits had been 
designated for inclusion in the record on appeal through a supplemental designation, which was 
also not in this court's record.  It was later reported to the court that the original exhibits could 
not be located.  Northcutt then filed a "Motion to Order Transmission of the Record on Appeal."  
In support of the motion, Northcutt's appellate counsel stated that she had received the tapes after 
the appeal had been docketed, relied on the tapes in preparing Northcutt's appellate brief, and 
then returned the tapes to the Wyandotte County District Court Clerk's office.  Although the 
parties' statements of facts did not significantly differ, Northcutt argued his constitutional due 
process and equal protection rights would be violated if this court did not have the opportunity to 
review the tapes.   
 
4 
 
After the motion was filed, the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, with the cooperation of 
counsel, located copies of the audiotapes and a police department transcript of the recorded 
interviews.  Based on the availability of these substitutes, this court  
 
"ordered [the parties] to notify this court within (10) days if there is any objection to the court's 
addition of the audio copies and transcripts to the record on appeal, as substitutes for the 
unavailable exhibits.  If objection is made, the party should also address why this matter should 
not be remanded for a hearing regarding the unavailability of the exhibits and alternatives for 
preservation of a record on appeal.  See Rule 3.02 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 22); Rule 3.04 (2009 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 26). " 
 
 
The State responded, indicating it did not object to the addition to the record.  Northcutt 
did not file an objection.  Hence, the audiotapes and transcript were submitted to the court as part 
of the record on appeal.  As a result of this procedure and Northcutt's waiver of any objection, 
the record is complete, Northcutt's motion is moot, and this appeal is ready for decision. 
 
FACTS 
 
 
The record reveals that Mason died the night of March 15, 2006, and that Mason had 
spent much of that day with Northcutt.  Virtually all of the evidence regarding what occurred that 
day came from Northcutt's two custodial interviews and his trial testimony.  Although there are 
common themes and details in his various statements, there are also variances.   
 
 
In his first interview with police, Northcutt explained that after spending most of March 
15 with Mason, he went home mid-afternoon.  That evening he went to Mason's apartment, 
which Mason shared with Northcutt's younger brother, John.  At the apartment, Mason and 
Northcutt "got into a kind of pushing, shoving argument."  Northcutt explained he had 
confronted Mason about a dispute between Mason and his brother regarding rent money and 
because Mason owed Northcutt for some expensive camera equipment that Mason had borrowed 
and not returned, claiming the equipment had been stolen from him.  Northcutt told Mason to 
"take care of business" and then shoved Mason.  Mason fell and hit his head on a metal bed rail.  
Mason then stood up, slipped, fell down, and again hit his head on the bed rail.  Later in the 
5 
 
interview, Northcutt admitted that he shoved Mason both times Mason fell.  After Mason fell 
against the bed rail the second time, Northcutt left Mason where he had fallen and walked out of 
the room.  Northcutt returned to Mason's apartment the next day and found Mason dead.   
 
 
Police interviewed Northcutt a second time after they interviewed his brother, John.  In 
the second interview, Northcutt implicated his brother as a participant in the fight and stated that 
both he and his brother went to Mason's apartment with the intent to kill Mason.  In explaining 
the events, Northcutt told police he left his house with rope that had a "gear shifting knob" 
attached to it.  He described the knob as about the size and weight of a pool ball.  After entering 
the apartment, Northcutt pulled Mason out of a chair, pushed him against a wall, and "conked" 
him on the head.  Mason started screaming, and John increased the volume on the television to 
cover the sound.  The fight continued as Mason attempted to run away from Northcutt.  
Northcutt admitted to hitting Mason twice in the back of the head and to punching Mason in the 
chest.   
 
Another version of events was offered by Northcutt during his trial, which was separate 
from his brother's trial.  In testifying in his own defense, Northcutt told the jury that he and 
Mason spent the day of March 15 together, riding in Mason's car, going to a lake, and getting 
drunk.  Sometime during their outing, Mason fell off a boat dock and cut his arm, and Northcutt 
helped him put a bandage on it.  They returned to Mason's apartment around 3 p.m. so Mason 
could go to the bank and get $500 he owed to Northcutt.  When they arrived at the apartment, 
Mason went inside, and Northcutt walked three blocks to his mother's house.   
 
Defense counsel asked Northcutt about the problems between Mason and Northcutt and 
between Mason and John.  Northcutt testified that there were issues between John and Mason 
concerning rent and utilities.  As for Northcutt's situation, he testified that in addition to loaning 
money to Mason, he had loaned his expensive camera equipment to Mason around 1986 or 1987, 
and Mason had told him it had been stolen.  Northcutt estimated the value of the equipment as 
around $30,000.  On March 15, John called Northcutt and informed Northcutt that Mason was 
using Northcutt's supposedly-stolen camera.  Northcutt testified that he told his brother that if 
Mason has "got my camera I wanted to get it back, and if he's taking pictures of me, I said I'm 
6 
 
going to kick his butt."  The brothers also talked about the disagreement between Mason and 
John regarding rent and utility payments.  Northcutt testified: 
 
"I told John, I said well, I would confront [Mason] about it, but I said that's really none of my 
concern, that's between you and him.  John wanted to move out and I said well, you can't move 
over here. . . . I'll let you park your bags over here if you want, but as far as that, I said I'll confront 
[Mason] about certain issues, you know, and –if you want, you know, because John's kind of 
scared to talk to him." 
 
When Northcutt made this offer, John reported that Mason was not at the apartment.  
Northcutt told John to call him when Mason returned, which John did a short time later.  
Northcutt immediately went over to Mason's apartment.   
 
Northcutt rode his bicycle and brought with him a climber's "impelling rope" that he 
routinely used to suspend his bicycle in trees to prevent it from getting stolen.  This impelling 
rope, according to Northcutt, was about 18 inches long, had a clip, and had a gearshift knob on 
one end for weight.  The impelling rope was attached to a longer rope that was about 35 feet 
long.  When he arrived at Mason's residence, he discovered the branches on the trees were too 
tall to reach, so he could not hang his bicycle.  He put the bicycle under the back porch and 
carried the impelling rope inside.   
 
Northcutt testified that he came up behind Mason, who was sitting at the computer, and 
"kind of kicked him in the butt" and asked if he had his camera.  At that point, Mason jumped 
up, bringing some computer cords with him.  The two men got "tangled up" in the cords.  
Northcutt said his impelling rope got wrapped around Mason's hand, so he tried to unwrap it.  
But, according to Northcutt, Mason was "half drunk" and kept pulling at the impelling rope at the 
same time Northcutt was working on it, which caused the heavy ball to keep hitting both of 
them.  They got untangled, but Mason started "yelling and screaming" because the bandage 
ripped off his arm in the struggle and his cut was bleeding.  At that point, John came into the 
room and turned up the volume on the television.   
 
7 
 
The arguing continued, and Northcutt tried to "chase them around" the apartment in an 
attempt to bandage Mason's arm.  Eventually, Mason sat at the kitchen table but then ran to his 
bedroom.  Northcutt followed and when he opened Mason's bedroom door, Mason pulled 
Northcutt's hand.  Their hands slipped apart, and Mason fell backwards, hitting his head on the 
bed railing.  According to Northcutt, Mason's head was bleeding, so Northcutt told him to sit 
while Northcutt got a first aid kit.  Mason tried to get up but fell again, hitting his head on the 
bed's footboard.  Mason got on the bed, saying, "I just want rest."  At that point, Northcutt left 
the apartment. 
 
Northcutt testified that he returned to Mason's apartment the next day.  John, who had 
spent the night at his girlfriend's house, arrived at the same time.  The two went inside and found 
Mason dead.  He was lying face down in the living room.  Northcutt told the jury that he did not 
know what happened but thought people would think "I done something wrong" because of his 
fight with Mason the previous night.  A couple of days later, Northcutt told John "we're going to 
have to do something" about Mason.  They used some plastic and a moving dolly to transport 
Mason to the bedroom floor.  Sometime later, Northcutt decided to bury Mason behind their 
mother's house and leave town.   
 
When asked by defense counsel if he intended to kill Mason, Northcutt testified, "No, I 
did not."  He also denied conspiring with John to kill Mason and indicated that he did not know 
how Mason died.   
 
Several other witnesses testified during the trial.  Although most of this testimony relates 
to matters that are not at issue on appeal, some additional points are significant to our discussion, 
including police testimony that there was a large blood stain on the bedroom floor and a forensic 
pathologist's testimony regarding autopsy results.  The pathologist testified he could not 
determine the cause of death because of the level of decomposition resulting from the body being 
wrapped in plastic for nearly a month before police uncovered the grave.  Despite the 
decomposition, the pathologist could discern four head lacerations that were consistent with 
blows by a pool ball-sized object.  These injuries by themselves were not necessarily fatal but 
could have been part of the "mechanism of death."   
8 
 
An additional witness' testimony provides circumstantial evidence relevant to our 
consideration, as will be more fully discussed.  That witness—a neighbor who lived in the 
upstairs portion of the duplex—testified that she met John and Northcutt on the sidewalk and, 
about 10 minutes after entering her apartment, heard a loud argument coming from downstairs.  
She recognized the voices of John, Mason, and one or two others.  She heard Mason tell John 
that he was going to kick him out of the apartment because John was not helping pay the rent.  
Then, the television downstairs got very loud, and a short time later she heard the slam of a door.  
From her apartment window she saw John driving away in Mason's car, screeching the tires as he 
left the driveway.  This was unusual because Mason did not let others drive his car.  The 
neighbor testified that this was the last time she saw Mason's car at the apartment.  
 
After hearing Northcutt's various statements and the testimony of the other witnesses, a 
jury convicted Northcutt of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-
degree murder.  For the murder conviction, the journal entry of sentencing reflects a term of life 
imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 25 years and a concurrent term of 117 months' 
imprisonment for the conspiracy.  Northcutt appeals.   
 
SUFFICIENCY OF CONSPIRACY EVIDENCE  
 
First, Northcutt contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.  In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an 
appellate court reviews all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine 
whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118, 127, 209 P.3d 696 (2009); State v. Gutierrez, 285 Kan. 
332, 336, 172 P.3d 18 (2007).   
 
To meet this standard, there must be evidence supporting each element of the conspiracy 
charge, which the State alleged was based on Northcutt and John knowingly and willfully 
"enter[ing] into an agreement with each other to commit or assist in the commission of a crime, 
to-wit:  First-Degree Murder, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3401, and in furtherance of such 
9 
 
agreement . . . kill[ing] David Mason by striking him in the head with a hard object several times 
until he died."   
 
Thus, to establish that Northcutt had committed the crime of conspiracy to commit first-
degree murder, the State was required to prove (1) that Northcutt agreed with John to commit or 
assist in the commission of the crime of first-degree murder; (2) that he agreed with the intent 
that the crime be committed; (3) that Northcutt or John acted in furtherance of the agreement; 
and (4) that this act occurred on or about March 15, 2006, in Wyandotte County, Kansas.  See 
K.S.A. 21-3302; State v. Webber, 260 Kan. 263, 288, 918 P.2d 609 (1996); Pattern Instructions 
for Kansas Crim. 3d 55.03.  To prove these elements under Kansas law, the existence of an 
agreement does not need to be proved directly.  "[I]t is enough if the parties tacitly come to an 
understanding in regard to the unlawful purpose, and this may be inferred from sufficiently 
significant circumstances."  State v. Swafford, 257 Kan. 1023, 1040, 897 P.2d 1027 (1995); see 
State v. Sharp, 289 Kan. 72, 105, 210 P.3d 590 (2009).  
 
The record includes evidence to support each of these elements.  Northcutt's testimony at 
trial revealed an express agreement between the brothers.  As quoted above, Northcutt told his 
brother he would confront Mason about the rent because John was "scared" to talk to Mason 
about it.  Further, the brothers agreed that John would let Northcutt know when Mason returned 
to the apartment, indicating an express acceptance of Northcutt's offer.  In addition to this direct 
evidence of an agreement, there are several pieces of circumstantial evidence, including the fact 
that John met Northcutt outside the apartment (indicating a plan) and the neighbor overheard an 
argument about rent (indicating that plan was implemented).   
 
Moreover, there is evidence of an agreement to kill Mason.  Direct evidence of this 
agreement comes from Northcutt's second interview with police in which he repeatedly admitted 
that he went to the apartment with the intent to kill Mason.  In addition, at one point during the 
interview, Northcutt stated that both he and John went to the apartment to kill Mason.  Further, 
there is supporting circumstantial evidence.  For example, Northcutt brought a homemade 
weapon with him into the apartment, despite Northcutt's testimony that he usually left it on his 
bicycle.  Then, when Mason began to scream, John increased the volume on the television, an act 
10 
 
which suggests he knew the fight and the screaming were going to continue.  Further, although 
vague and conflicting, Northcutt made statements indicating John "may have" helped to hold 
Mason while Northcutt hit him repeatedly, including landing severe blows to Mason's head.  
Regardless of the ambiguity regarding the level of John's participation in the beating, there was 
evidence that both brothers acted in furtherance of an agreement to kill Mason. 
 
In summary, there is evidence that Northcutt and John agreed to kill Mason, they planned 
a confrontation, Northcutt armed himself with a weapon, they met outside the apartment before 
beginning the confrontation, they assisted each other in the commission of the crime, and Mason 
died as a result of their premeditated actions.  This evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support a conclusion that a reasonable factfinder 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Northcutt conspired with John to commit first-degree 
murder.   
 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
 
Next, Northcutt argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder.  The 
court did instruct on second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter as lesser offenses but 
refused Northcutt's request to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction.  
 
The legislature has established the parameters for when jury instructions on lesser 
included offenses should be given.  K.S.A. 22-3414(3) provides in relevant part: 
 
"In cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser 
included crime as provided in subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3107 and amendments thereto, the 
judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime."  
 
Thus, we must examine the record to see if there is some evidence of each of the elements of 
voluntary manslaughter and, if so, if that evidence would reasonably justify a conviction for 
voluntary manslaughter.  See State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 276, 213 P.3d 728 (2009).  
 
11 
 
In arguing that the facts of the case meet this standard, Northcutt admits that a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction "does not completely fit with either party's theory of the case."  Yet he 
argues the jury could have believed that the victim provoked a sudden quarrel when he stood up 
from the computer and entangled Northcutt in the computer cords, "causing a drunken fight to 
ensue."  See K.S.A. 21-3403(a) (voluntary manslaughter defined to include intentional killing on 
"a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion"); State v. Arteaga, 257 Kan. 874, 890, 896 P.2d 1035 
(1995).   
 
This argument ignores Kansas precedent that requires severe provocation to justify giving 
a voluntary manslaughter instruction.  E.g., State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 55-56, 194 P.3d 563 
(2008); State v. Gallegos, 286 Kan. 869, 874, 190 P.3d 226 (2008); State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 
704, 713, 101 P.3d 1218 (2004); State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 40-41, 91 P.3d 517 (2004).  Under 
our precedent, mere evidence of an altercation between parties does not alone support finding 
sufficient provocation.  State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, 353, 7 P.3d 1135 (2000); see Gallegos, 
286 Kan. at 874-75 (holding evidence of argument between victim and defendant fails to 
demonstrate legally sufficient provocation for shooting victim).   
 
In Horn, 278 Kan. 24, we reiterated these and other basic principles regarding the 
elements of voluntary manslaughter, stating in part that "'[a] provocation is adequate if it is 
calculated to deprive a reasonable man of self-control and to cause him to act out of passion 
rather than reason.'  [Citation omitted.]"  Horn, 278 Kan. at 40.  The Horn court further 
explained that "'[t]he test of the sufficiency of the provocation is objective, not subjective.  The 
provocation, whether it be "sudden quarrel" or some other form of provocation, must be 
sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason.'"  Horn, 278 
Kan. at 40 (quoting State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 796-97, 696 P.2d 381 [1985]).   
 
Considering these rules, we conclude that even if the jury accepted that Mason stood up 
and became tangled in the computer cords and Northcutt's "impelling rope," such an action is not 
severe provocation; it is not an action that would cause an ordinary person to lose control of his 
or her actions and reason.  Moreover, one consistency in all of Northcutt's various renditions of 
events was that Northcutt was the first one to push, shove, kick, lift, or hit.  Even before the jury, 
12 
 
Northcutt testified that he went into Mason's home, came up behind Mason, and "kicked him in 
the butt."  Only then did Mason rise and become tangled in the cords.  In other words, Northcutt 
provoked Mason's actions, not the other way around.   
 
Because there is no evidence of provocation by Mason, much less severe provocation, the 
trial court was not required to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.  See Vasquez, 287 
Kan. at 55-56 (stating that facts did not "'meet the provocation threshold—that which is 
calculated to deprive a reasonable [person] of self-control and to cause [the defendant] to act out 
of passion rather than reason'"); Gallegos, 286 Kan. at 874-75 (holding evidence of argument 
between victim and defendant fails to demonstrate legally sufficient provocation for shooting 
victim); Drennan, 278 Kan. at 711-13 (hitting someone's back during verbal argument not 
sufficient provocation). 
 
Affirmed.