Title: Board of Zoning Appeals v. 852 L.L.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 981246
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS 
FOR THE COUNTY OF YORK 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 981246 
April 16, 1999 
 
852 L.L.C. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this land use controversy, we consider whether the trial 
court erred in reversing a board of zoning appeals' decision 
that had affirmed a zoning administrator's interpretation of a 
local ordinance prescribing computation of developable land 
area.  At issue is whether a landowner should be allowed a 100% 
density credit that is set forth in the ordinance. 
 
The ordinance in question is titled "Computation of 
buildable or developable area."  York County, Va., Code § 24.1-
203 (1996).  As pertinent, the section provides:  "In accordance 
with the comprehensive plan, certain land areas shall not be 
developed at all and others may only be credited partially 
toward buildable or developable area.  These shall be determined 
on a case-by-case basis utilizing the percentages shown in the 
table below where . . . [t]he 'Density' column contains the 
percentage of the specified land type which may be included in 
calculations of net developable density." 
 
The table in § 24.1-203 provides for specified density 
credits for various land types.  In subparagraph (g), "0%" 
density credit is allowed for:  "Areas of existing ponds, lakes, 
or other impounded water bodies . . . ."  In subparagraph (h), 
"100%" density credit is allowed for:  "Stormwater management 
ponds or basins."  In subparagraph (i), "50%" density credit is 
allowed for certain "non-tidal wetlands." 
 
Appellee 852 L.L.C. owns a parcel of undeveloped land at 
the intersection of Hampton Highway (Route 134) and Big Bethel 
Road in York County.  The parcel contains approximately 30 acres 
with a body of water of about 11 acres situated in the center.  
The parcel is zoned "RMF (residential multi-family)."  The 
landowner plans to construct a multi-family apartment project on 
the developable area. 
 
In 1997, the landowner sought a ruling from the County's 
zoning administrator "about density credit for the existing 
lake."  The landowner contended it was entitled to 100% density 
credit under subparagraph (h) of the ordinance.  Responding in a 
letter dated August 1, 1997, the administrator decided to "allow 
a density credit for 5.6 acres of lake area."  According to the 
administrator, "This allowance represents an area of 18.6% of 
the 30-acre site." 
 
The landowner appealed the administrator's decision to 
appellant Board of Zoning Appeals for the County of York.  
 
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Following an October 1997 public hearing, the Board adopted a 
resolution upholding the administrator's decision. 
 
The landowner presented to the circuit court, pursuant to 
former Code § 15.1-497 (now § 15.2-2314), a petition for 
certiorari for review of the Board's decision.  The court 
allowed the writ and the Board timely filed a return, later 
amended, which included a verbatim copy of the minutes of the 
public hearing. 
 
The trial court considered the matter upon the record 
without taking testimony and upon argument of counsel in a March 
1998 hearing.  At the close of the hearing, the trial court 
stated that the language of the ordinance is "clear and simple," 
that it was "conceded" the body of water was a "storm water 
management" facility, and that the ordinance required the 
landowner "be given 100 percent density allocations."  The court 
said that the Board "applied erroneous principles of law" and 
that its decision "was plainly wrong and in violation of the 
intended purpose of the zoning ordinance." 
 
In an April 1998 final decree, the trial court reversed the 
Board's decision and ruled that the landowner be "granted a 
density credit equal to 100% of the total acreage of the lake 
located on its property."  The Board appeals. 
 
On appeal, the Board argues that the ordinance "is 
ambiguous when applied to the subject property."  
 
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"Unfortunately," according to the Board, "the ordinance does not 
clearly provide for density credit calculations for a pond which 
is all at once an existing impoundment of water and a stormwater 
management facility and a nontidal wetland."  The Board 
contends, "Some degree of interpretation is needed to have the 
ordinance make sense in the present situation." 
 
The "present situation" to which the Board refers is that 
the existence of the body of water in question is a sequel to 
mining of the land in the early 1970s to sell dirt to the 
"Highway Department."  The borrow pit thus created eventually 
filled with water that drained from adjacent properties, as 
reflected in two recorded drainage easements, as well as water 
that drained from the subject property.  In 1996, when the 
landowner was considering purchase of the subject property, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a notice that the body of 
water is a nontidal wetland within its jurisdiction. 
 
During the public hearing, the zoning administrator 
articulated the rationale for his decision.  He stated that he 
"initially took the position that we were dealing with an 
existing body of water and our Ordinance is very clear.  It says 
for an existing body of water you get 0% credit for density."  
When the landowner complained this was an unfair interpretation 
of the ordinance, the administrator stated that "in deference" 
to the landowner's arguments he was "willing to look at it as a 
 
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stormwater management facility; but not in its entirety, only 
for that portion that would be required to meet the stormwater 
management requirements of this drainage area."  Thus, he 
arrived at the 18.6% allowance for the 30-acre site. 
 
The Board argues that the body of water "will be" used as a 
stormwater management pond when the area is developed.  "Just as 
surely," the Board contends, "it is an existing lake much larger 
than needed to contain storm flows" from the landowner's parcel 
and from approximately 15 acres of adjacent land.  "No less," 
the County continues, "it is a nontidal wetlands within the 
jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers." 
 
"And so," the Board argues, "the resolution of this 
conundrum cannot arise only from the text of County Code section 
24.1-203 because the pond cannot be afforded density credits 
simultaneously of 100 percent, zero percent, and 50 percent.  
The Zoning Administrator's proposal, on the other hand, offers a 
fair interpretation of the ordinance which recognizes legitimate 
development expectations, while protecting the County from 
overdevelopment."  We disagree with the Board's argument. 
 
Certainly, from the County's perspective the zoning 
administrator equitably solved the problem presented in this 
case.  Nonetheless, his decision extended beyond permissible 
ordinance interpretation and became prohibited legislative 
action taken by an administrator. 
 
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The principles applicable here are settled.  When an 
ordinance is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for 
interpretation or construction; the plain meaning and intent of 
the ordinance must be given it.  Donovan v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 251 Va. 271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996);  McClung 
v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 
(1959). 
 
But, a "decision of a board of zoning appeals is presumed 
to be correct on appeal to a circuit court; the appealing party 
bears the burden of showing that the board applied erroneous 
principles of law or that its decision was plainly wrong and in 
violation of the purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance."  
Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 
727, 732-33 (1987). 
 
And, a consistent construction of an ordinance by officials 
charged with its enforcement is given great weight.  
"Nevertheless, if the administrative interpretation of a portion 
of an ordinance is so at odds with the plain language used in 
the ordinance as a whole, such interpretation is plainly wrong, 
and must be reversed."  Cook v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 244 Va. 
107, 111, 418 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992).  This is such a case. 
 
We agree with the trial court, and with the zoning 
administrator's observation at the public hearing, that the 
language of the ordinance is clear.  The ordinance provides that 
 
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computation of buildable or developable area "shall" be 
determined utilizing the percentages set forth in the ordinance.  
Under subparagraph (h), "Stormwater management ponds or basins" 
are entitled to a density credit of 100 percent. 
 
As the trial court found, it was conceded at the public 
hearing that the body of water in question presently is an 
existing stormwater management facility, receiving runoff from 
the subject parcel as well as adjacent properties, and that it 
is not a mere pond, lake, or wetland.  For example, as the 
public hearing began, the Board's secretary, in summarizing "the 
background and factual information" relating to the landowner's 
application stated, "In the current request, the applicant and 
the staff agree that the lake serves stormwater management 
needs."  Also, during the hearing, the zoning administrator said 
"we're willing to look at it as a stormwater management 
facility." 
 
In addition, the evidence supported the concession.  The 
1996 notice from the Corps of Engineers stated that the "pond is 
used for stormwater management." 
 
Therefore, the zoning administrator should have interpreted 
the ordinance as written.  Nowhere does the ordinance permit the 
administrator to allocate a reduced density credit based on what 
the administrator and his staff determine is the appropriate 
percentage "necessary for a development site such as the subject 
 
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property," as the administrator said in his August 1997 ruling.  
Had the County Board of Supervisors intended the administrator 
to have such latitude, it would have so provided in the 
ordinance; such latitude may not properly be created by 
administrative interpretation. 
 
Consequently, we hold the trial court did not err in 
reversing the Board's decision that adopted the zoning 
administrator's interpretation.  The interpretation was plainly 
wrong and the Board applied erroneous principles of law in 
adopting it.  Thus, the judgment below will be 
Affirmed. 
 
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