Title: State Ex Rel. v. Morgan Superior Court, Littell, Judge
Citation: 231 N.E.2d 516, 249 Ind. 220
Docket Number: 1167S120
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 1967

249 Ind. 220 (1967)
231 N.E.2d 516
STATE EX REL.
v.
MORGAN SUPERIOR COURT, LITTELL, JUDGE.
No. 1167S120.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 7, 1967.
*221 John J. Dillon, Attorney General, for relators.
Noble K. Littell, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
This matter arose by way of a petition for a writ of prohibition on the part of the relators filed with this court on the 6th of November, 1967. On November 4, 1967, Ralph M. Lett as plaintiff filed in the respondent court his complaint for an injunction which was duly granted without notice by the respondent on the said 4th of November, 1967, enjoining the relators from calling up or mustering the Indiana National Guard. The petition further alleged that the Governor of the State of Indiana was in possession of information from which he had determined there was imminent danger of one or more riots in the city of Gary during the city election to be held the 7th of November, 1967. For this reason one of the relators, John S. Anderson, Adjutant General of the State of Indiana, was ordered to assemble units of the Indiana National Guard at convenient points in proximity to said city to be held in readiness for use in event a riot or riots occur which cannot be suppressed by the available civil authorities in the area. On November 6, 1967, a temporary writ of prohibition was issued by this court after oral argument in which attorney John J. Dillon appeared for the relators and Noble K. Littell appeared on his own behalf. Since then the election has been held and the matter made moot.
It is the law of this state that when a cause becomes moot the court will not retain jurisdiction to decide incidental questions. "West's Ind. Law Encyclopedia, Appeals Chap. 11, § 419, p. 293."
*222 However, in the case of Gardner, as Auditor, etc. v. Grills, (1961) 242 Ind. 29, 175 N.E.2d 696, this court held that an appeal will be dismissed when it presents only a moot question unless it involves a matter of great public interest or one effecting the public generally.
Conversely, this action although moot, does involve matters of great public interest and one which could well effect the public generally.
The constitution of the State of Indiana specifically cites the division of the powers of the government, the executive power of the state and the judicial power of the state. The pertinent sections are the following:
Moreover Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 45-2104 reads as follows:
The last quoted section defining the Governor's duty to call out the National Guard is followed by a section (Burns' § 45-2106) which authorizes commanding officers of the Guard to call out his troops when it is impossible to communicate with the Governor or Adjutant General. Then follow several sections dealing with how the guard operates in quelling riots and other functions and finally comes Burns' § 45-2116, the re-enactment of the 1895 prohibition against muster, etc. on election days, which ends with the clause, "if any officer shall order any such muster or assembly, he shall forfeit such amount as a court-martial may adjudge."
It becomes quite clear from the context in which the legislative prohibition against election day assemblies (Burns' § 45-2116) appears that it is intended to apply only to officers [who are defined by Ind. Acts 1953, ch. 187, § 102, as amended by Ind. Acts 1963, ch. 226, § 1, Burns' § 45-1802, as "commissioned officer[s], including warrant officer[s], in the armed forces of the state of Indiana"] and not to the Governor.
*224 Any interpretation of Burns' § 45-2116 which made it apply to the Governor would make the statute an attempt by the Legislature to limit the power given to the Governor by Article 5, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution, quoted supra, which confers on the Governor the power and discretion to "call out such forces [military and naval forces], to execute the laws, or to suppress insurrection, or to repel invasion."
Such an attempted infringement by the legislative branch of the government on the constitutional power of the executive would be repugnant to the doctrine of separation of powers as stated in Article 3, § 1, of the Indiana Constitution, quoted supra. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270, (1941).
The same may also be said of any attempt by the courts to infringe on the Governor's executive power. The power, the duty, and the discretion to manage the military forces of the state are given to the Governor by the Constitution and not to the courts. What was said in Tucker v. State, supra, on page 681 of 218 Ind. concerning management of state property has equal force and logic with respect to management or command of the national guard.
Since the courts have seldom attempted to interfere with the Governor's exercise of his executive duty, little has been said about such usurpation. Since the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana in Hovey, Governor v. The State, ex rel. Schuck, 127 Ind. 588, 27 N.E. 175, 22 Am. St. Rep. 663, 11 L.R.A. 763 (1891), seldom has need been found to say again, about injunctions against the Governor, what the Court there said about mandates to the Governor. The following from that opinion, beginning on page 598 of 127 Ind. is still (and always has been) the law in Indiana:
...
In the case of Ellingham, Secretary of State, et al v. Dye, (1912), 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 the court upheld an injunction against the State Election Board which included the governor. In this case the court indicated there is no distinction in "jurisdiction to mandate" and "jurisdiction to enjoin" quoting 5 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. § 328.
While there is no reported decision of any Indiana court having passed upon the power of a court of equity to enjoin the Governor from calling out the Guard, a three-judge United States District Court sitting in the Southern District of Indiana has. In Cox v. McNutt, 12 Fed. Supp. 355, at 358, that court said:
The alternative writ heretofore issued by the court on the 6th day of November 1967 is now made permanent.
Judge Arterburn, concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 231 N.E.2d 516.