Title: Commonwealth v. Sherman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12530
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 13, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12530 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD SHERMAN, JR. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 6, 2018. - February 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Consent.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Question by jury.  Evidence, Inflammatory evidence, Expert 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 11, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Joshua I. Wall, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of penile-vaginal and digital-vaginal rape, implicitly rejecting 
the defendant's testimony that all sexual intercourse between 
him and the victim had been consensual.  On appeal, the 
2 
 
defendant claims that the trial judge committed two reversible 
errors.  First, the defendant contends that, where the 
deliberating jury asked the judge whether initially consensual 
sexual intercourse could become rape if the victim withdrew her 
consent after penetration, the judge erred by failing to 
instruct the jury that a defendant may not be found guilty of 
rape under such circumstances unless the penetration continued 
after the victim communicated the withdrawal of consent to the 
defendant.  Second, the defendant argues that, where there was 
no expert testimony regarding the effect of cocaine on 
perception and memory, the judge erred in admitting evidence of 
cocaine use for the purpose of allowing the jury to assess the 
defendant's ability to perceive and recall events.  We conclude 
that the judge erred in failing to provide the jury with an 
instruction regarding the withdrawal of consent and in admitting 
cocaine evidence for the purpose of assessing the defendant's 
memory, but that, in the circumstances of this case, neither 
error requires reversal of the defendant's convictions. 
 
Background.  The primary contested issue at trial was 
whether the victim had consented to sexual intercourse with the 
defendant.  The victim and the defendant offered sharply 
differing accounts of what happened in the early morning of 
October 14, 2014.  We summarize the evidence at trial. 
3 
 
 
The victim testified that on the night of October 13, 2014, 
she drank one beer with a female friend at a pub, and then went 
with her friend to a second pub.  The two arrived at the second 
pub at some time between midnight and 12:15 A.M.  Upon arriving, 
the victim recognized one of her coworkers and the bartender, 
and began speaking with them.  The defendant, whom the victim 
did not know, joined the conversation.  The victim and the 
defendant remained at the pub until approximately 1 A.M., when 
the pub closed.  The victim drank one beer and one shot at the 
second pub. 
 
The defendant, the victim, and others continued to talk 
outside the pub after closing.  The defendant asked the victim 
if she wanted to "hang out."  The victim agreed, but explained 
to the defendant that it was "just going to be us hanging out" 
because she was gay.  The defendant said that was fine, and the 
two exchanged telephone numbers before parting. 
 
The victim and her friend then went to a restaurant, where 
the victim received a text message from the defendant:  "I wanna 
c u 2nite make it happen."  The victim texted back, "Thats fine, 
but you just need to know that i like girls."  The defendant 
asked by text whether the victim wanted him to get condoms.  The 
victim replied by text, "im down to chill but i like girls."  
After the defendant texted, "K thats cool . . . ," the victim 
added, "Plus, not to sound gross but im on my period.  Lol."  
4 
 
The defendant replied by text, "Its all good."  The victim then 
drove her friend home and continued alone to the defendant's 
apartment, arriving shortly before 2 A.M. 
 
The defendant came downstairs to meet the victim, and the 
two went up to his apartment.  Both the victim and the defendant 
drank beer in the kitchen while discussing their shared interest 
in music.  The defendant then told the victim that he wanted to 
show her a record in his bedroom.  The victim entered the 
defendant's bedroom, sat at the foot of the bed, and began 
looking at the record.  The defendant sat down behind the victim 
and attempted to kiss her on the cheek.  The victim responded by 
putting her hand out and telling the defendant that she was gay 
and that "it is not going past just hanging out."  The defendant 
apologized multiple times, and then attempted to kiss the victim 
again.  Before she could tell him to stop, the defendant got on 
top of the victim, put his knees on her thighs, and put his 
hands on her shoulders.  The victim testified that she felt 
"terrified," that she "froze," and that she was unable to fight 
back against the defendant. 
 
The defendant then pulled down the victim's pants and 
pulled her shirt up to her neck.  The victim told the defendant 
to "stop" and to "get the fuck off me," and the defendant asked 
why.  When the victim responded that she was gay, the defendant 
said "good" and vaginally raped her with his penis.  Intercourse 
5 
 
was painful for the victim, who was wearing a tampon, but the 
defendant "kept going harder and faster."  The defendant then 
put his penis in the victim's mouth.  When the victim turned her 
head away, he inserted his fingers into her vagina.  The 
defendant then vaginally raped the victim with his penis for a 
second time.  The victim screamed "stop" repeatedly and 
attempted to push the defendant off her by moving her arms from 
side to side.  The defendant then got off the victim. 
 
The victim dressed rapidly, went into the bathroom, and 
then collected her things to leave.  The defendant told the 
victim not to "worry about the blood," which the victim observed 
on the defendant's bed, in the kitchen (located between the 
bedroom and the bathroom), and on the defendant.  The defendant 
then offered to walk the victim to her vehicle.  The victim 
declined.  Nevertheless, the defendant followed the victim 
downstairs, held her vehicle's door open while she tried to 
close it, and attempted to kiss her.  The victim pushed the 
defendant and drove away. 
 
Soon after leaving the defendant's apartment, the victim 
called a friend from her vehicle.  After five or six telephone 
calls, her friend answered and the victim told her, "I've been 
fucked.  It just happened.  I just got raped."  The friend 
testified that the victim was so "distraught" and "hysterical" 
6 
 
on the telephone that it was initially difficult to understand 
her. 
 
The victim then drove to her parents' home, and they took 
her to a hospital where a nurse conducted an evidence collection 
examination.  The nurse testified at trial that the victim -- 
who, the nurse reported, said that she had been assaulted1 -- was 
"horrified, angry, upset, [and] tearful."  The nurse further 
testified that the victim denied being in pain at that time, and 
that the nurse observed no trauma to the victim's body. 
 
At around 4:45 A.M., the victim met with Salem police 
Detective Eric Connolly at the hospital.  Connolly testified 
that the victim was "visibly upset" and crying.  After speaking 
with the victim, Connolly and two uniformed officers went to the 
defendant's address.  They arrived at approximately 6 A.M., and 
the defendant let them into his apartment.  The officers asked 
the defendant whether he had met anybody that night, and the 
defendant responded that he had had sexual intercourse with a 
woman, but could not remember her name.  Then, while the 
officers were speaking with him, the defendant lowered his 
shorts to reveal a "reddish brown stain" resembling blood on his 
underwear.  The defendant also led the officers into his bedroom 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant did not object to the admission of the 
testimony regarding the victim's statement that she had been 
assaulted. 
7 
 
to show them a bloodstain on his bed sheets.  The officers 
placed the defendant under arrest and transported him to the 
Salem police department for booking.  During booking, Connolly 
observed that the defendant had "red brownish stains" resembling 
blood on his left hand. 
 
That same day, officers obtained a warrant to search the 
defendant's apartment.  During their execution of the warrant, 
officers discovered a paper plate with a spoon on it on the 
defendant's kitchen counter.  The spoon, which appeared burnt, 
held a white powdery substance believed by Connolly to be 
cocaine.  Connolly observed more white powder next to the plate.  
Officers also obtained a search warrant for the defendant's cell 
phone, which led to extraction of the text messages between the 
defendant and the victim. 
 
On October 20, the victim went to the Salem police 
department to have photographs taken of bruises that had 
appeared on her inner arm and inner thigh after the assault. 
 
The defendant testified that he had been at the pub for 
several hours when the victim, whom he had not met before, 
arrived.  The defendant told the victim that he was recently 
divorced but "still involved" with his ex-wife.  The victim 
responded that it was not a good idea for the defendant to 
remain involved with his ex-wife, that he would "probably end up 
getting hurt," and that he "should move on."  The defendant 
8 
 
replied, "Move on with you?"  The victim told the defendant that 
she "like[d] girls."  When he asked, "[Y]ou don't like men?" she 
replied, "I didn't say that." 
 
After last call, the defendant asked the victim for her 
telephone number.  The victim provided it, and the defendant 
texted her soon after to ask whether she wanted to meet later 
that night.  The victim agreed, but repeatedly told the 
defendant that she liked girls.  The defendant understood this 
to mean that in light of the victim's interest in women, he 
should not "expect a commitment" from the victim. 
 
When the victim texted the defendant to let him know that 
she had arrived at his apartment, the defendant went downstairs 
to greet her, kissed her on the cheek, and brought her upstairs 
to his home.  The two were speaking about music in the kitchen 
when the defendant kissed the victim on the lips.  The victim 
reciprocated, and the two kissed for several minutes.  The 
victim then walked into the defendant's bedroom, and the 
defendant followed. 
 
When the defendant entered his bedroom, the victim was 
sitting on the edge of his bed.  The defendant joined her, and 
the two resumed kissing.  They also began touching each other's 
genitals, although the defendant testified that he never 
inserted his finger into the victim's vagina.  The defendant 
then lowered his shorts, and the victim got off the bed to 
9 
 
perform oral sex on the defendant from the edge of the bed.  The 
defendant did not force the victim to engage in oral sex.  After 
a couple of minutes, the victim removed her jeans and sweatshirt 
and lay down in the middle of the bed.  The defendant lay down 
next to her, and the two resumed kissing and touching one 
another.  After several minutes, the victim told the defendant 
to "just put it in her."  The defendant asked the victim about 
her period, and she responded, "I don't care if you don't care."  
The two then had consensual vaginal intercourse.  The defendant 
testified that the victim did not ask the defendant to stop, 
push him away, or twist her body. 
 
Afterward, the victim went into the defendant's bathroom 
for approximately five to ten minutes.  When she came back into 
the bedroom, the defendant and the victim spoke for 
approximately five to ten minutes about how strange it was that 
they had never met despite sharing a number of mutual friends.  
The victim did not seem upset.  After this conversation, the 
defendant walked the victim to her vehicle and kissed her 
goodbye.  The defendant then returned to his apartment.  At 3:28 
A.M., he texted the victim to say he hoped she got home safely 
and to ask whether she wanted to get together the next day to 
"cuddle."  The victim did not respond to this message. 
 
Later, police officers arrived at the defendant's door and 
asked whether he knew the victim.  The defendant testified that, 
10 
 
at that time, he thought the police might have come to his 
apartment because the victim had been involved in an accident.  
The defendant invited the officers into his home and, when 
asked, told them that he had had sexual intercourse with the 
victim.  The officers also asked the defendant whether he had 
raped the victim, and the defendant responded that he had not. 
 
The defendant testified that on the night in question, he 
had a total of three or four beers at the pub and approximately 
one-half of one beer at his apartment.  The defendant also 
testified that he had not ingested cocaine or any other drug 
that evening.  When asked about the cocaine found on his kitchen 
counter, the defendant said that he did not recognize the 
cocaine and had not used it on the night in question.  The 
defendant also confirmed that he lived alone in his apartment. 
 
At the close of the evidence, the judge instructed the jury 
regarding the law governing the three indictments of rape:  
digital-vaginal rape, penile-vaginal rape, and penile-oral rape.  
The judge instructed the jury that "[i]n order to prove the 
defendant guilty of this offense, the Commonwealth must convince 
[the jury] beyond a reasonable doubt of two things:  First, that 
the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse . . . with the 
alleged victim . . . and, second, that the sexual intercourse 
was accomplished by compelling [the victim] to submit by force 
or threat of bodily injury and against her will."  With regard 
11 
 
to the second element, the judge went on to instruct the jury 
that the Commonwealth "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
at the time of penetration, [the victim] did not consent."  The 
judge also instructed the jury that the force requirement would 
be satisfied if the defendant compelled sexual intercourse by 
physical force, violence, threat of bodily injury, or 
constructive force, which "may be by threatening words or 
gestures" and requires "proof that the victim was afraid or that 
the victim submitted to the defendant because his conduct 
intimidated her." 
 
During their deliberations, the jury sent the following 
written question to the judge:   
"Need clarification.  Is 'time of penetration' the start or 
duration?  Definition of the rape -- does it include if she 
says No in the middle of the Act?  In other words, is it 
rape if it started consensual and she changed her mind?" 
 
 
After conferring with counsel, the judge brought the jurors 
back into the court room and explained:   
"I understand your question to be can lawful sexual 
intercourse become unlawful at some point during the act.  
The answer to that is yes, if the Commonwealth proves the 
second element beyond a reasonable doubt; and the second 
element includes lack of consent and use of force or 
constructive force.  So, legally, the answer is yes.  
Lawful sexual intercourse can become unlawful sexual 
intercourse, but remember that the Commonwealth has to 
prove . . . both portions of the second element:  Lack of 
consent and use of force or constructive force." 
 
12 
 
Neither party objected to this instruction.2 
 
Later that day, the jury found the defendant guilty on the 
indictments charging digital-vaginal rape and penile-vaginal 
rape, and not guilty on the indictment charging penile-oral 
rape.3  The defendant appealed, and we granted his application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Withdrawal of consent.  The defendant 
claims that it was reversible error for the judge not to 
instruct the jury explicitly that, in order for initially 
consensual intercourse to turn into rape, a victim must 
communicate his or her withdrawal of consent to a defendant and 
the defendant must persist with intercourse despite the 
communication.  Because the defendant did not object to the 
judge's instructions concerning the withdrawal of consent, we 
evaluate whether the instructions created a substantial risk of 
                                                          
 
 
2 When the judge first spoke with the attorneys about the 
jury's question, defense counsel requested that the jury be 
"instructed that if it starts out consensual, it is consensual 
up until the point where there is a clear . . . statement to the 
contrary."  Defense counsel, however, did not press this 
argument, and did not object to the judge's answer to the jury 
question. 
 
 
3 The judge sentenced the defendant to from six to eight 
years in State prison on the penile-vaginal rape conviction, and 
to three years of probation on the digital-vaginal rape 
conviction, to be served from and after his release from 
custody. 
13 
 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Pires, 453 Mass. 
66, 73 (2009). 
 
To find a defendant guilty of rape under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22 (b), the Commonwealth must prove two elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  first, that there was sexual intercourse 
between the defendant and the victim; and second, that the 
defendant compelled the victim to submit to the intercourse "by 
force or threat of force and against the will of the victim."  
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722, 726 (2001).  See G. L. 
c. 265, § 22 (b) ("compels such person to submit by force and 
against his [or her] will, or . . . by threat of bodily 
injury").  The first element is undisputed here.  The second has 
been interpreted "as truly encompassing two separate elements":  
force or threats, and lack of consent.  Lopez, supra at 727.  To 
satisfy the force or threats element, the Commonwealth must 
prove "that the defendant committed sexual intercourse . . . by 
means of physical force; nonphysical, constructive force; or 
threats of bodily harm, either explicit or implicit" (citations 
omitted).  Id.  To satisfy the lack of consent element in a 
typical case, the Commonwealth must prove that "at the time of 
penetration, there was no consent" (emphasis added).  Id. 
 
We recently described our case law regarding the issue of 
consent in cases where the defendant alleges that he or she 
14 
 
honestly and reasonably believed that the victim had agreed to 
sexual intercourse: 
"In Lopez, 433 Mass. at 727-728, we held that a defendant 
charged with rape is not entitled to raise a defense of an 
honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's consent, 
noting that our rape statute, G. L. c. 265, § 22, does 'not 
require proof of a defendant's knowledge of the victim's 
lack of consent or intent to engage in nonconsensual 
intercourse.'  A defendant need only intend to perform the 
act by force or threat of force.  Id. at 728-729.  Because 
the Commonwealth is not required to prove that a defendant 
intended the intercourse be without consent, 'a mistake of 
fact as to that consent cannot . . . negate a mental state 
required for the commission of the prohibited conduct.'  
Id. at 728. 
 
"We further determined that requiring the Commonwealth to 
prove that a defendant 'compelled the victim's submission 
by use of force; nonphysical, constructive force; or threat 
of force' negates 'any possible mistake as to consent.'  
Id. at 729.  In so holding, we observed that a mistake of 
fact defense has the potential to 'eviscerate the long-
standing rule in this Commonwealth that victims need not 
use any force to resist an attack.'  Id.  A rape victim 
need not fend off attackers with physical force 'in order 
to communicate an unqualified lack of consent to defeat any 
honest and reasonable belief as to consent.'  Id. 
 
"Nonetheless, we concluded our analysis by acknowledging 
that a mistake of fact defense as to consent might, in some 
circumstances, be appropriate.  Accordingly, we left open 
the possibility of its use in 'a future case where a 
defendant's claim of reasonable mistake of fact is at least 
arguably supported by the evidence.'  Id. at 732. 
 
"Seven years later, in Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 
583, 594 (2008), we considered whether a defendant charged 
with raping someone incapable of consenting to intercourse 
(due to intoxication) was entitled to an instruction on 
mistake of fact.  Because the Commonwealth is not required 
to prove the use of force beyond that necessary for 
penetration [in cases involving a victim who was incapable 
of consenting], 'the possibility of a defendant's 
reasonable mistake about the complainant's consent could 
increase, creating the potential for injustice.'  Id.  We 
15 
 
held that 'in such a case the Commonwealth must prove that 
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the 
complainant's condition rendered her incapable of 
consenting to the sexual act.'  Id." 
 
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 809-810 (2018). 
 
 
The jury question in this case requires us for the first 
time to consider whether an additional element of proof -- 
communication of the withdrawal of consent -- is required to 
avoid the risk of a reasonable mistake of fact in a case where 
the jury may find that the initial sexual penetration was 
consensual but that the victim withdrew consent during the 
course of continued sexual intercourse. 
 
We have no doubt that consensual sexual intercourse between 
adults is not only lawful, but a private act of intimacy so 
important that it is constitutionally protected as a liberty 
interest.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 572 (2003); 
Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 328-329 
(2003) ("how to express sexual intimacy" is "among the most 
basic of every individual's liberty and due process rights" 
under Massachusetts Constitution).  We also have no doubt that 
consensual sexual intercourse can become unlawful where the 
victim withdraws consent after the initial act of penetration 
has occurred.  See M.G. v. G.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 142 
(2018) ("a person's consent may be withdrawn prior to or during 
the act"); Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 661 
16 
 
(2012) (where victim consented at time of initial penetration 
but withdrew consent during intercourse, and where defendant 
forcibly continued intercourse after victim's withdrawal of 
consent, jury could have found defendant guilty of rape).  
Consequently, we must draw a clear line that is crossed when 
sexual intercourse that begins as a consensual act of intimacy 
is transformed into rape, one of the most serious crimes 
punishable by law.  See G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b) (rape conviction 
punishable by imprisonment for up to twenty years; second or 
subsequent rape conviction punishable by imprisonment for life 
or for any term of years); Newsom v. State, 533 P.2d 904, 911 
(Alaska 1975) ("forcible rape ranks among the most serious 
crimes . . . because it amounts to a desecration of the victim's 
person which is a vital part of [his or] her sanctity and 
dignity as a human being"). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that no additional element of proof 
is necessary because, where the victim withdraws consent, 
continued sexual intercourse becomes rape only where the 
defendant compels the victim to continue to have sexual 
intercourse by force or threat of force.  The Commonwealth 
contends that such a finding is, "effectively and essentially, 
the equivalent of a finding by the jury that the victim conveyed 
or communicated to the defendant that she no longer consented."  
In other words, the Commonwealth agrees with the defendant that 
17 
 
a victim must communicate his or her withdrawal of consent, but 
argues that an instruction on the matter is unnecessary because 
a jury would always understand that continued penetration that 
is compelled by force or threat of force could only be so 
compelled after the communicated withdrawal of consent. 
 
The problem with this argument is that it is far easier to 
evaluate whether force or the threat of force compelled a victim 
to submit to a defendant's initial penetration of a victim's 
vagina, anus, or mouth than it is to evaluate whether force or 
the threat of force compelled a victim to submit to a 
defendant's continued penetration.  Therefore, where the initial 
penetration was consensual, the fairest and clearest way to draw 
the line separating consensual sexual intercourse from 
postpenetration rape is to require, as an element of the 
offense, that the victim reasonably communicate to the defendant 
his or her withdrawal of consent.  This approach is in keeping 
with the decisions of a number of State courts.  See, e.g., In 
re John Z., 29 Cal. 4th 756, 760 (2003) ("the offense of 
forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual 
intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to 
stop the act and the defendant forcibly continues despite the 
objection"); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1068-1069 (Me. 
1985) (affirming conviction where judge instructed jury that 
where intercourse is initially consensual "and one or the other 
18 
 
changes his or her mind, and communicates the revocation or 
change of mind of the consent, and the other partner continues 
the sexual intercourse by compulsion of the party who changes 
his or her mind, then it would be rape"). 
 
The communication of withdrawn consent certainly need not 
be made through the use of physical force.  Cf. Lopez, 433 Mass. 
at 729 (noting "long-standing rule in this Commonwealth that 
victims need not use any force to resist an attack").  It also 
need not be made through the use of particular words, or through 
words at all.  Physical gestures, such as trying to push the 
defendant away or attempting to move in a way that would require 
the defendant to end the penetration, may suffice, provided that 
these gestures reasonably communicate the withdrawal of consent 
to a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances.  We 
emphasize, however, that the Commonwealth need not prove that 
the defendant actually knew that the victim withdrew consent.  
It suffices that the victim reasonably communicated the 
withdrawal of consent in such a manner that a reasonable person 
would have known that consent had been withdrawn.  See id. at 
727 ("Although the Commonwealth must prove lack of consent, the 
elements necessary for rape do not require that the defendant 
intend the intercourse be without consent" [quotation and 
citation omitted]). 
19 
 
 
The requirement of a reasonable communication protects a 
defendant who lawfully initiates sexual intercourse with a 
partner's consent from being convicted of rape where the partner 
withdraws consent during sexual intercourse without 
communicating the withdrawal to the defendant.  However, we 
emphasize that we require no such communication of nonconsent in 
a case where the victim alleges that the initial penetration was 
without consent.  In such cases, the requirement that the sexual 
intercourse be compelled by force or the threat of force will 
typically suffice to protect a defendant from being found guilty 
of rape based on a reasonable mistake of fact.  See Lopez, 433 
Mass. at 728-729. 
 
We also clarify that in withdrawn consent cases, the force 
or threat of force required for a rape conviction is only that 
necessary to compel continued intercourse after the withdrawal 
of consent.  Cf. Lopez, 433 Mass. at 726 ("The essence of the 
crime of rape . . . is sexual intercourse with another compelled 
by force and against the victim's will or compelled by threat of 
bodily injury" [citation omitted]).  No additional use or threat 
of force is required under G. L. c. 265, § 22. 
 
We expect that these withdrawn consent rape instructions -- 
explaining that initially consensual sexual intercourse can 
become rape, adding the element of a reasonable communication of 
the withdrawal of consent, and defining the element of force or 
20 
 
threat of force as only that necessary to compel continued 
intercourse after the withdrawal of consent -- will apply only 
in two rare circumstances:  first, where there is evidence 
presented at trial that the victim consented to the initial 
penetration of sexual intercourse and later withdrew consent; or 
second, where the jury asks a question concerning withdrawal of 
consent, as they did here.  In the absence of such a jury 
question, the defendant's testimony that the victim consented to 
sexual intercourse will not suffice alone to warrant an 
instruction on the withdrawal of consent after penetration.  Nor 
will the victim's prior consent to an earlier completed act of 
sexual intercourse suffice alone to warrant such an instruction.  
Rather, in the absence of a jury question, the instruction will 
be warranted only when there is evidence that the victim 
initially consented to the sexual intercourse at issue, and then 
withdrew his or her consent during the course of it.  Only then 
will instructions on withdrawn consent be needed to prevent the 
routine instruction -- that the Commonwealth "must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that at the time of penetration, [the victim] 
did not consent" -- from causing confusion. 
 
Having concluded that the jury question here warranted such 
instructions, we now consider whether their absence created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  We must order a 
new trial under the substantial risk standard "if we have a 
21 
 
serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been 
different had the error not been made."  Commonwealth v. Azar, 
435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 
Mass. 169, 174 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 
600, 610 (2018).  "We consider the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, the nature of the error, the significance 
of the error in the context of the trial, and the possibility 
that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable 
tactical decision."  Azar, supra.  We recognize that we must 
closely scrutinize this risk where, as here, "the elements of a 
crime are erroneously stated in the jury charge."  See id. 
 
Having evaluated this case with that close scrutiny, we are 
confident that the jury's verdicts would have been the same had 
the judge correctly instructed the jury on how to proceed if 
they found that the victim initially consented to sexual 
penetration and then withdrew her consent during intercourse.  
The jury heard no evidence that the victim initially engaged in 
consensual penile or digital sexual intercourse with the 
defendant and then later withdrew her consent.  The defendant 
testified that sexual intercourse was consensual at all times; 
the victim testified that it was never consensual.  Although the 
jury's decision to acquit the defendant of oral rape could 
potentially mean that they credited the defendant's testimony 
22 
 
that this form of intercourse was consensual,4 the defendant 
testified that the oral intercourse came first.  A victim's 
consent to oral intercourse does not necessarily imply his or 
her consent to penile or digital intercourse.  In the absence of 
any evidence that the victim withdrew initially granted consent 
to penile or digital intercourse, we are persuaded that the lack 
of an instruction on the matter "did not materially influence[] 
the guilty verdict" (quotation and citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 354-355 (2018). 
 
2.  Admission of cocaine evidence.  Before trial, the 
defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the admission of 
evidence concerning the cocaine found on his kitchen counter.  
The defendant argued that, because there was no evidence that he 
was under the influence of cocaine on the morning of October 14, 
the cocaine evidence would be more prejudicial than probative.  
The judge deferred ruling on the motion until he learned that 
the defendant would testify in his own defense, and then ruled 
that the evidence was admissible because there was "solid 
indicia . . . of [cocaine] use that night" and because evidence 
                                                          
 
 
4 The jury may also have had a reasonable doubt whether the 
oral intercourse occurred at all.  In contrast with the penile 
and digital penetration, that charge was not supported by 
physical evidence in the form of stains left by the victim's 
blood on the defendant's hand, bed sheets, and underwear.  
Furthermore, defense counsel suggested during trial that the 
victim had not informed police officers or medical personnel 
that she had been orally raped. 
23 
 
of drug use was relevant to the defendant's "ability to perceive 
. . . and recall events." 
 
After the defendant testified, the judge informed counsel 
that, although he had initially admitted the cocaine evidence 
"solely for the purpose of evaluating the defendant's ability to 
. . . perceive and recall events," he was now also admitting it 
for the purpose of evaluating the credibility of the defendant, 
who during direct examination had denied using drugs that 
evening and during cross-examination had denied recognizing the 
white substance found on his kitchen counter.  The judge 
instructed the jury that they could use this evidence "only for 
purposes related to the defendant's credibility" and "the 
defendant's ability to perceive and recall events as they took 
place."  He forbade the jury from using the evidence to conclude 
that "the defendant is of a bad character or is more likely to 
commit crimes."  After the close of evidence, when the judge 
charged the jury, he again instructed them that evidence 
concerning cocaine could be used only for two purposes:  to 
determine whether drug use affected a witness's ability to 
perceive and recall events, and to assess the believability of 
testifying witnesses.  Neither party objected to the judge's 
limiting instruction. 
 
The defendant argues, and the Commonwealth concedes, that 
it was error for the judge to allow evidence of drug use to be 
24 
 
admitted for the purpose of assessing the defendant's memory 
where there was no expert testimony regarding cocaine's effects 
on one's ability to perceive and recall events.  We agree.  A 
party that seeks to admit evidence of drug use for the purpose 
of challenging a witness's ability "to perceive and to remember 
correctly" is required to "show a connection between the drug 
use and the witness's ability to perceive, remember, or testify 
to the event" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 
471 Mass. 550, 565 (2015).  Where there is a lack of reliable 
general knowledge regarding the relevant effects of a drug, 
expert testimony is required to show that connection.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 785-787 (2017) (expert 
testimony required to establish effects of marijuana); 
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 933 (1998) (expert 
testimony required to show Prozac's effect on ability to 
perceive or remember events). 
 
Because the defendant did not object to the judge's 
limiting instruction and objected to the admission of the 
cocaine evidence only on the ground that it was more prejudicial 
than probative because there was insufficient evidence of drug 
use, we consider whether the error created a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 
Mass. 501, 506 (2007) ("Where the defendant advanced precise 
grounds at trial in support of his objection, he may not rely on 
25 
 
a different ground in his appeal"); Commonwealth v. Perez, 405 
Mass. 339, 342 n.3 (1989), citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 
Mass. 556, 563-564 (1967) (where objection below was on grounds 
different from those raised on appeal, court considers whether 
error created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice).  We 
conclude that it did not.  There was no evidence that drugs 
played any role in the events of October 14, and neither 
attorney mentioned the cocaine in closing argument.  See 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673 (2015) (although 
cross-examination on particular issue was improper, "prosecutor 
did not mention the matter in his closing argument, thus keeping 
any prejudice at a minimum").  Furthermore, where the jury 
acquitted the defendant of one of the three rape charges, we 
conclude that it is unlikely that the drug evidence was given 
significant weight in the jury's evaluation of the defendant's 
testimony or culpability.  See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 
838, 844 (2010) ("acquittals on two indictments indicate an 
unbiased jury"); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 595 
(1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998) (where jury acquitted 
defendant of certain charges, it was "clear that the jury 
carefully considered the evidence with regard to each crime 
charged").5 
                                                          
 
 
5 The Commonwealth argues that the cocaine evidence was 
properly admitted to impeach the defendant's credibility, and 
26 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
points out that there was no objection to the admission of the 
evidence for this purpose.  Defense counsel, however, questioned 
the witness about cocaine -- subjecting the witness to later 
impeachment -- only after the judge ruled that cocaine evidence 
was admissible for the purpose of determining the defendant's 
ability to recall and perceive events.  Because we conclude that 
the judge's error did not create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, regardless of whether the cocaine 
evidence otherwise would have been admitted, we need not decide 
whether that evidence was properly admitted for impeachment 
purposes.