Title: Glen James Ocha v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-2507
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-2507
____________
GLEN JAMES OCHA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[June 27, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Facts
On October 5, 1999, the appellant, Glen James Ocha, who also calls himself
“Raven Raven,” met the victim, Carol Skjerva, at Rosie’s Pub in Kissimmee,
Florida.  They left the bar together and the victim drove the appellant to his home,
where the two had consensual sexual intercourse.  Afterwards, the victim made
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disparaging comments about Ocha and threatened to tell her boyfriend about the
incident.  Ocha became angry and forcefully told the victim to sit in a chair, as he
paced back and forth deciding how he would address the situation.  Ocha then
entered the garage where he found a length of rope which he proceeded to use in
strangling the victim.  As he applied pressure, he lifted her off of the floor several
times to ensure that she was dead.  Finally, because he ascertained that the victim’s
heart was still beating, Ocha again tightened the rope around Skjerva’s neck, hung
the cord over an interior door to the garage, and closed the door on the rope,
catching it between the door and its frame.  Ocha then left the victim hanging from
this door location.
Ocha then consumed a beer, cleaned the area, removing bottles and ash from
the kitchen table, and changed his clothing.  After several minutes he returned to
lower the victim’s body from the door and force it into the cabinet portion of an
entertainment center located in the garage.  Thereafter, Ocha left the premises and
drove the victim’s car to Daytona Beach, where he was arrested on October 6, 1999
for disorderly intoxication.  While in jail, Ocha confessed to detectives of the
Daytona Beach Police Department that he had murdered Skjerva.  The detectives
promptly notified the Osceola County Sherriff’s Office of the appellant’s statements. 
Thereafter, Ocha was transferred to incarceration in Osceola County, where he gave
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a detailed description of the murder to detectives.  
On November 1, 1999, Ocha was indicted for first-degree murder.  Based
upon the testimony of three mental health professionals, the trial judge concluded
that Ocha was competent to enter a guilty plea.  Ocha acknowledged to the trial
court that he had, in fact, signed the plea form, waiver of jury trial, waiver of
presentation of mitigation of evidence, and the acknowledgment that the State was
seeking the death penalty, voluntarily and without coercion after reading and
understanding the documents.  Ocha further stated that he was not currently
suffering from, nor had he been treated in the past for, mental or emotional disorders
and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  The State then related the facts
of Ocha’s crime, and the trial court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) to be
conducted prior to the  sentencing hearing.
On July 6, 2000, the trial court reconvened for a hearing on sentencing.  The
State presented evidence of three aggravating factors: Ocha’s prior commission of a
violent felony, that the instant murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
(HAC), and that it was cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP).  As to the first
aggravator, the trial court admitted certified copies of Ocha’s conviction in
Kentucky for attempted premeditated murder and robbery in the first degree, and his
incarceration in various Kentucky prisons.  With regard to the second and third
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possible aggravators, the court received testimony from Dr. Sashi B. Gore, the chief
medical examiner, who examined the victim’s body at the scene and later conducted
an autopsy, and Ed Boykin, a Deputy Sheriff of Osceola County.  
Dr. Gore testified that the victim’s death resulted from ligature strangulation. 
Moreover, he stated hypothetically, that strangulation of a conscious person to the
point that one becomes unconscious requires “from thirty, sixty seconds to up to
three to four minutes.”  The doctor testified that, initially, a victim may be so
frightened as to experience cardiac arrhythmia when she sees the perpetrator
approaching with the intent and capacity to strangle.  The victim then experiences
pain during the actual strangulation.  He further stated that he could not conclusively
testify as to any defensive wounds on the victim due to decomposition of the body
prior to the autopsy.  He could, however, specifically identify the ligature that was
used in the strangulation of the victim because its texture matched the patterns left
on the victim’s neck.  Consistent with Ocha’s wishes and instructions, defense
counsel did not cross-examine Dr. Gore.
Ed Boykin testified that he arrived at Ocha’s home on October 7, 1999, after
a “well-being check” by the Osceola Sheriff’s Office--which was prompted by the
report from the Volusia County Sheriff’s Department--revealed the victim’s body in
the garage.  Detective Boykin identified several photographs of the crime scene and
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an audio tape and transcript of Ocha’s October 11, 1999, statement to the Osceola
Sheriff’s Office.  Additionally, Detective Boykin recounted Ocha’s version of the
events in relation to the photographs.  Again, defense counsel reiterated that Ocha
did not want him to cross-examine the witnesses.
Despite Ocha’s waiver of the right to present mitigation, defense counsel
proffered the competency hearing testimony of Drs. Tressler, Berns, and Berland,
which, absent Ocha’s clear instructions to the contrary, he would have otherwise
fully presented for the trial court’s consideration.  Additionally, Dr. Berland’s
testimony would address the existence of fifteen possible mitigating factors. 
Defense counsel proffered several letters written by Ocha to the victim’s fiancé, to
the prosecuting assistant state attorney, and to defense counsel, which showed
remorse; he also submitted for consideration Ocha’s cooperation with the
investigating police departments.
Ultimately, the trial court found the prior violent felony and HAC aggravators
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, the court did not find the
CCP aggravator present because Ocha did not act with a heightened and
premeditated plan or design to kill.  The court gave little weight to the mitigator that
Ocha was a good prisoner in Kentucky; some weight to his history of suicidal
thinking; some weight to Ocha’s artistic ability; little weight to his report of two
1.  The appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to order further testing to develop the trial record as to possible mental mitigators;
that the trial court erred in finding that the instant murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; and that this Court should recede from its holding in Hamblen v.
State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988), allowing a capital defendant to waive the
presentation of mitigating evidence.
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severe head injuries; some weight to his extensive history of alcohol and drug abuse;
little weight to Ocha’s learning disability; little weight to Ocha’s ability to form a
warm and caring relationship; little weight to his urging his ex-wife to seek a more
professional career; no weight to Ocha’s military service; little weight to his post-
traumatic stress disorder; little weight to his chaotic and violent childhood; little
weight to Ocha’s remorse for the murder; some weight to the fact that he was
intoxicated with alcohol and Ecstasy (MDMA) on the night of the offense; little
weight to his psychiatric disturbance; and little weight to his having been a hard
worker in the Kentucky prison system.  The trial court determined that the
aggravators “far outweigh[ed]” the mitigators and sentenced Ocha to death.  On
appeal, Ocha asserts three claims.1
Analysis
When testifying with regard to Ocha’s competency, two of the psychological
experts stated that they would prefer to perform further testing of the appellant.  Dr.
Berland would have tested the appellant further to fully evaluate certain of his
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psychotic symptoms.  Likewise, Dr. Berns recommended that Ocha undergo a full
neuropsychiatric evaluation to rule out the possibility of a brain tumor.  In his first
assertion of error, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
not ordering the tests mentioned by the experts before sentencing the appellant to
death.
It is well established that a competent defendant may waive his right to
present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of his first-degree murder trial.  See
Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1992); Pettit v. State, 591 So. 2d 618,
620 (Fla. 1992); Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1988).  In Hamblen,
this Court held that where a competent pro se defendant pled guilty, waived his right
to a jury’s sentencing recommendation, and did not wish to present mitigating
evidence, a trial court was not required to appoint counsel to present mitigating
evidence on the defendant’s behalf.  Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 804.  Under such
circumstances, it was sufficient that the trial court engaged in a “thoughtful analysis
of the facts,” which adequately protected society’s interests in ensuring that the
death penalty was not being abused.  Id.; see also Pettit, 591 So. 2d at 620 (holding
that one convicted of first-degree murder could waive his right to present mitigating
evidence, but stressing that “the trial judge must carefully analyze the possible
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors against the aggravators to assure that
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death is appropriate”).
Although a trial court may have discretion to comply with a competent
defendant’s decision to waive presentation of mitigating evidence, it is obligated to
ensure that the defendant’s waiver is knowing, uncoerced, and not due to defense
counsel’s failure to fully investigate penalty phase matters.  See Koon v. Dugger,
619 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 1993).  The defendant in Koon instructed his attorney to
present no mitigating evidence for consideration in the penalty phase after his
conviction for first-degree murder.  See id. at 249.  On appeal, however, Koon
argued that his attorney’s willingness to forego presentation of mitigating evidence
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id.  While upholding Koon’s
death sentence, this Court created a prospective rule for trial courts to follow when
a defendant waives his right to present mitigators, as occurred here:
When a defendant, against his counsel’s advice, refuses to permit the
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must
inform the court on the record of the defendant’s decision.  Counsel
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably
believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and
what that evidence would be.  The court should then require the
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these
matters with him, and despite counsel’s recommendation, he wishes to
waive presentation of penalty phase evidence.
Id. at 250.  Application of this rule creates a trial record that adequately reflects the
defendant’s knowing waiver of his right to present evidence in mitigation.  See id.
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Ocha now relies on Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001), for the
proposition that it was within the trial court’s discretion to order further evaluation
and testing by the doctors.  In Muhammad, we vacated the defendant’s death
sentence and remanded for resentencing, in part because Muhammad waived the
right to present mitigating evidence and the trial court provided no alternative means
for mitigating evidence to be presented to the jury.  See id. at 349, 361-62.  In
anticipation of Muhammad’s continued refusal to offer mitigating factors at
resentencing, this Court prospectively required a presentence investigation report
(PSI) for all cases in which the defendant does not challenge his death sentence and
refuses to present evidence in support of mitigating factors.  See id. at 363. 
To be meaningful, the PSI should be comprehensive and should include
information such as previous mental health problems (including
hospitalizations), school records, and relevant family background.  In
addition, the trial court could require the State to place in the record all
evidence in its possession of a mitigating nature such as school records,
military records, and medical records.  Further, if the PSI and the
accompanying records alert the trial court to the probability of
significant mitigation, the trial court has the discretion to call persons
with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses.
Id. at 363-64 (footnote omitted).
Although there was no jury recommendation below, the trial court here
recognized its duty to independently examine the record for any evidence of
mitigation, whether presented by the defendant or not.  See Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d
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1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993); Santos v. State, 591 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 1991). 
According to Ocha, however, the trial court abused its discretion by not heeding the
doctors’ recommendations for further testing.
Initially, it is clear that Muhammad is not applicable to the instant case
because it was decided on January 18, 2001--two months after Ocha’s sentencing
on November 1, 2000.  Our Muhammad opinion specified that the PSI requirement
was prospective only: “An adoption of a prospective procedure in this case would
not call into question those cases that are already final on appeal or those cases that
already have been tried but not yet decided on appeal at the time this opinion is
rendered.”  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 365.  Nevertheless, the trial court here did
order a PSI, and evaluated testimony presented by Drs. Tressler and Berns, as well
as the potential mitigators prepared by Dr. Berland, including Ocha’s history of
suicidal thinking, two severe head injuries as a child, extensive history of drug and
alcohol abuse, a learning disability, possible post-traumatic stress disorder, a chaotic
and violent childhood, and a psychiatric disturbance or mental illness.  After such
consideration, the trial court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed and
were more compelling than the mitigators.
Even under Muhammad’s PSI requirement, nothing compels the trial court to
order psychological testing.  First, there is no guarantee that Ocha will even submit
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to further testing, as he has refused to cooperate in the past.  Second, the mitigating
evidence already contained in the record provides an ample basis upon which the
trial judge could determine the extent to which Ocha’s mental condition impacted
his life.  In its sentencing order, the trial court stated: 
[M]ental illness does not always equate with insanity under the law. 
Ocha has demonstrated that, while he may have mental problems, he
does know that his killing of Skjerva was wrong and he has shown
remorse for his actions.  At the competency and plea hearing . . . the
Court found Ocha competent to stand trial or to enter a plea.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order further
testing to determine Ocha’s mental condition.  “Discretion is abused only ‘when the
judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying
that discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court.’”  Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000)
(quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990)).  There is ample
evidence contained in the record directed to mental mitigating factors and a proper
consideration thereof to support the trial court’s balancing and weighing to render
the sentencing order.  Therefore, we deny the appellant’s requested relief.
In his second claim, the appellant asserts that the trial court improperly
applied the HAC aggravating circumstance.  When evaluating claims alleging error
in the application of aggravators, this Court does not reweigh evidence to determine
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whether the State proved each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.  See
Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).  Rather, our function is “to
determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating
circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its
finding.”  Id. (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)).  It is clear
that the trial court correctly applied this Court’s oft-repeated rule that “it is
permissible to infer that strangulation, when perpetrated upon a conscious victim,
involves foreknowledge of death, extreme anxiety and fear, and that this method of
killing is one to which the factor of heinousness is applicable.”  Tompkins v. State,
502 So. 2d 415, 421 (Fla. 1986); see also, e.g., Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399,
409 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, in Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1996), we
explicitly stated:  
Our case law establishes . . . that strangulation creates a prima facie
case for this aggravating factor [HAC]; and the defendant’s mental
state then figures into the equation solely as a mitigating factor that
may or may not outweigh the total case for aggravation.  
Id. at 263.
Ocha attempts to rebut the presumption of heinousness by showing his lack of
intent to prolong Skjerva’s suffering.  For this he relies on this Court’s statement in
Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993):  
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The fact that the victim begged for his life or that there were multiple
gunshots is an inadequate basis to find this aggravating factor [HAC]
absent evidence that Bonifay intended to cause the victim unnecessary
and prolonged suffering.
Id. at 1313.  Although Bonifay shot the victim and the victim begged for his life
before being executed by a shot to the head, the record indicated Bonifay’s intent
that the death be quick.  See id.   
It is clear that the defendant’s intent does not weigh as heavily in the
determination of the applicability of the HAC aggravator as does the victim’s actual
suffering.  See Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595, 603 (Fla. 1991) (finding HAC
proper where “[t]he evidence supports the conclusion of horror and contemplation
of serious injury or death by the victim,” but not CCP because “[t]he evidence . . .
failed to demonstrate [the] requisite heightened level of premeditation [on the part of
the defendant]”).  Indeed, in Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1998), the
Court held:
The intention of the killer to inflict pain on the victim is not a necessary
element of the [HAC] aggravator.  As previously noted, the HAC
aggravator may be applied to torturous murders where the killer was
utterly indifferent to the suffering of another.
Id. at 1160; see also Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (Fla. 2001) (stating
that “there is no necessary intent element to HAC aggravating circumstance”);
Hitchcock v. State, 755 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 2000) (same).  Additionally, Bonifay
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is distinguishable because the defendant was seventeen years old and the murder
was committed by gunshot to the head.  See 626 So. 2d at 1311.  
In contrast, Ocha engaged in an extreme struggle with his victim here, and
was eventually able to produce death by strangulation.  By Ocha’s own account,
Skjerva was extremely frightened when she realized he was approaching her with
the rope.  During the struggle and strangulation, she urinated on herself and
thereafter became limp.  Ocha loosened the rope and the victim attempted to breathe
again, but Ocha tightened the rope, hung it over a door, and closed the door on the
rope so that the victim’s body remained suspended.  Clearly, the record rebuts
Ocha’s assertion that there is no evidence that Skjerva suffered, and supports the
inference that Skjerva was conscious at the time strangulation began, knew Ocha
was attempting to kill her, and was struggling to escape death.  Therefore, this claim
has no merit.
In his third and final claim, Ocha contends that this Court’s holding in Klokoc
v. State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991), is in conflict with our decision in Hamblen v.
State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988).  Therefore, according to the appellant, this Court
should recede from Hamblen.  This Court has long adhered to the idea that “[i]n the
field of criminal law, there is no doubt that ‘death is different,’ but, in the final
analysis, all competent defendants have a right to control their own destinies. . . . A
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defendant cannot be executed unless his guilt and the propriety of his sentence have
been established according to law.”  Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 804; see also, e.g.,
Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla. 1995); Clark v. State, 613 So. 2d 412,
413-14 (Fla. 1992); Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla. 1992); Pettit, 591 So.
2d at 620.  With regard to this issue, this Court’s decision in Klokoc is entirely
consistent with its holding in Hamblen. 
Klokoc was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his daughter. 
See 589 So. 2d at 219.  At Klokoc’s request, the public defender moved to dismiss
his mandatory direct appeal.  See id. at 221.  This Court denied the motion stating:
“[C]ounsel for the appellant is hereby advised that in order for the appellant to
receive a meaningful appeal, the Court must have the benefit of an adversary
proceeding with diligent appellate advocacy addressed to both the judgment and the
sentence.”  Id. at 221-22.  Thus, Klokoc reiterates this Court’s interest in ensuring
that every death sentence is tested and has a proper basis in Florida law. 
This proposition is not, as Ocha maintains, inconsistent with our Hamblen
opinion.  Hamblen and its progeny operate under the premise that a competent
defendant may direct his own defense at trial.  See Farr v. State, 656 So. 2d 448,
449 (Fla. 1995).  However, on appeal, this Court must examine Ocha’s death
sentence to ensure the uniform application of law, evidentiary support, and
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proportionality.  See Alston, 723 So. 2d at 160.  To facilitate the Court’s duty,
Klokoc requires that the defendant have appellate counsel.  Therefore, it is not
inconsistent for Ocha to waive his right to present mitigating evidence at the trial
level, yet have appellate counsel appointed against his wishes.  Because Ocha
presents no cognizable reason for this Court to recede from our holding in Hamblen,
we deny his requested relief.
While not presented by the appellant, this Court must also review the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction, as well as the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances of this case for constitutional proportionality.  When a
defendant pleads guilty to first-degree murder and is subsequently sentenced to
death, the focus of our customary review of the conviction shifts.  In this situation,
we must examine “the propriety of [the] plea, since it is the plea which formed the
basis for [the] conviction.”  Koenig v. State, 597 So. 2d 256, 257 n.2 (Fla. 1992). 
Proper review requires this Court to scrutinize the plea to ensure that the defendant
was made aware of the consequences of his plea, was apprised of the constitutional
rights he was waiving, and pled guilty voluntarily.  See LeDuc v. State, 365 So. 2d
149, 150 (Fla. 1978); see also Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 1979).
In the instant case, the record contains substantial evidence revealing that the
trial court, with the assistance of the appellant’s trial counsel, explored the
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voluntariness of Ocha’s plea and his informed basis to an exhaustive degree.  Ocha
pled guilty and waived his rights to a jury and the presentation of mitigation
evidence in writing, and submitted the documents to the trial court.  In addition to
these documents, the record reveals that the trial court engaged in an extended
colloquy with Ocha.  The following portion exemplifies the exchange:
The Court: Mr. Ocha, did you sign the plea form and the waiver of jury
trial, the waiver of presentation of mitigation evidence, and the
acknowledgment that the State is seeking the death penalty?
The Defendant: Yes, Sir.
The Court: Did you read them over before you signed them?
The Defendant: Yes, I did, Sir.
The Court: Did you understand everything that you read in there?
The Defendant: Yes, Sir.
The Court: Did you go over them with your lawyer before you signed
them?
The Defendant: Yes, I did.
The Court: Did you understand everything that your lawyer told you?
The Defendant: Yes, Sir.
The Court: Did anybody use any force or threats or pressure or
intimidation or blackmail to make you sign them?
The Defendant: No, Sir.
The Court: Did you sign them freely and voluntarily?
The Defendant: I did, Sir.
. . .
The Court: And do you understand that the plea agreement reads no
agreement, [the] State will be seeking the death penalty, on the plea
form?
The Defendant: Yes, Sir.
Clearly, the appellant understood the gravity and effect of his actions and waivers,
and his voluntary plea of guilty was properly accepted by the trial court.
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It is well settled that because “death is a unique punishment,” this Court must
conduct a proportionality review in every death case.  Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d
649, 673 (Fla. 2000).  This review is a “unique and highly serious function of this
Court, the purpose of which is to foster uniformity in death-penalty law.”  Tillman v.
State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1992).  “It is not a comparison between the number
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; rather, it is a thoughtful, deliberate
proportionality review to consider the totality of the circumstances in a case, and to
compare it with other capital cases.”  Beasley, 774 So. 2d at 673 (quoting Porter v.
State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Additionally, proportionality review requires a “discrete analysis of the facts,
entailing a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each
aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.”  Urbin v. State, 714
So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1996)). 
Finally, any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant.  See Tillman, 591
So. 2d at 169.
While it is clear that the instant case may not be the most vicious or
outrageous of murders reported in Florida, it is certainly one of the most aggravated
and least mitigated of first-degree murders.  Particularly weighty here is the
existence and nature of the appellant’s prior violent felony.  In 1984, Ocha was
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convicted of both first-degree robbery and attempted murder.  The appellant’s
Kentucky criminal record reveals that Ocha used a handgun to shoot a man, and
robbed him after he was incapacitated.  The combination of this weighty aggravating
circumstance with the gruesome strangulation underlying the HAC aggravator in the
instant case results in the unavoidable conclusion that these aggravators far
outweigh the possible mitigators, and the death penalty is proportionate here. 
Clearly, this case presents a murder which is among the most aggravated and least
mitigated reviewed by this Court.  See, e.g., Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399,
412-13 (Fla. 2000) (concluding that the death sentence was proportionate where the
HAC aggravator outweighed one statutory mitigator and multiple nonstatutory
mitigators); Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390, 391-92 (Fla. 1996) (death sentence
proper where the defendant had prior violent felony aggravator and several
nonstatutory mitigators).
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence contained in the
record is sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction for first-degree murder. 
Additionally, his death sentence is proportional.  Because Ocha has identified no
reversible error by the trial court below, we affirm the appellant’s conviction and
sentence of death.
2.  For the reasons expressed in Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 142-44 (Fla.
2001) (Pariente, J., concurring in result only), I concur in result only as to the
majority's discussion of the HAC aggravator and the element of intent.  However,
we have repeatedly upheld HAC in strangulation cases. 
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It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs as to conviction and concurs in result only as to sentence
with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring as to conviction, concurring in result only as to sentence.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction, and concur in result only as to
the sentence.  Based on the record before us, I conclude that the death sentence is
proportional, and that there are no errors in the procedures that the trial court
followed in this case under the current state of our death penalty jurisprudence.2 
The facts of this case, however, only reinforce my opinion that in order to ensure the
reliability of our death penalty proportionality review, we should adopt a procedure
by which we provide for the "appointment of special counsel to present available
mitigation for the benefit of the jury, the trial court and this Court in order to assist
the judiciary in performing our statutory and constitutional obligations." 
Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 370 (Fla. 2001) (Pariente, J., specially
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concurring); see also LaMarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209, 1217-18 (Fla. 2001)
(Pariente, J., concurring as to conviction, concurring in result only as to sentence)
(stating that there should be "appointment of special counsel to present mitigating
evidence in order to further increase the reliability, fairness and uniformity of the
penalty phase and to better assist the trial court and this Court in fulfilling our
constitutional and statutory obligations").  
Ocha's attorney asserts that Ocha is a "death volunteer."  Indeed, Ocha
confessed voluntarily to the murder when arrested for an unrelated incident of
disorderly conduct, has been remorseful for his actions, and wants to be executed. 
However, Ocha's attorney alleges that Ocha has a history of attempted suicide, two
prior severe head injuries, and a history of alcohol and drug abuse.  Apparently,
when Ocha was arrested for his prior crime, he unsuccessfully tried to have police
officers shoot him.  Further, when arrested in Volusia County in 1999, Ocha was
placed on suicide watch.  Thus, there is a definite indication that Ocha is mentally
ill.  There is also an indication, based on the testimony from the mental health
experts who examined Ocha for purposes of determining his competency, that Ocha
may have a bipolar disorder.  Further, Ocha reported that shortly before the murder,
he used drugs (Ecstasy) and alcohol, and thus, there is some basis for establishing
that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the murder.  In
3.  Although a presentence investigation report ("PSI") was done in this case,
the PSI contains virtually no information regarding Ocha's mental problems, no
information from Ocha's prior imprisonment in Kentucky, and no information from
Ocha's prior schooling.  The information in the PSI appears to be largely based upon
conversations with Ocha.  Although I recognize that the procedure for requiring a
PSI in Muhammad is prospective, I would note that 
 
[t]o be meaningful, the PSI should be comprehensive and should
include information such as previous mental health problems (including
hospitalizations), school records, and relevant family background.  In
addition, the trial court could require the State to place in the record all
evidence in its possession of a mitigating nature such as school records,
military records, and medical records.   Further, if the PSI and the
accompanying records alert the trial court to the probability of
significant mitigation, the trial court has the discretion to call persons
with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses.   
Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363 (footnote omitted).
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addition, although Ocha stated to the trial court, when requesting that he waive
presentation of mitigation, that he had not been treated in the past for mental or
emotional disorders, in fact, there is evidence that he might have been treated for
mental illness.  Nevertheless, all of this evidence, which would weigh heavily as
mitigation, is essentially undeveloped in this record, hindering our ability to make a
determination as to whether imposition of the death penalty is proportional. 3    
As I stated in my special concurrence in Muhammad:
Moreover, it is not necessarily those most deserving of the death
penalty (e.g., the most aggravated and least mitigated) who seek its
imposition and refuse to present mitigation.  Rather, in some cases,
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those seeking the death penalty, while competent, may suffer from
serious underlying mental illnesses.  The case of Klokoc[ v. State, 589
So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991)] is a salient example of this fact.  As we
noted in Klokoc:
While this record reflects that this murder occurred when
Klokoc was not in a heightened rage, it is unrefuted in this
record that he was under extreme emotional distress.  The
record also establishes that he suffers from bipolar
affective disorder, manic type with paranoid features, and
that his family has a history of suicide, emotional
disturbance, and alcoholism.  Further, he had no record of
prior criminal activity.  
Klokoc, 589 So. 2d at 222 (emphasis supplied).  In Klokoc, although
the defendant refused to put on mitigation, the Court unanimously
reduced the death sentence to life based on specially appointed
counsel's presentation of mitigating evidence, including evidence of
mental illness. 
Klokoc is also an example of the importance of a uniform
procedure for evaluating mitigating evidence before imposition of the
death penalty in these rare cases and the benefits of appointing special
counsel. . . .  As a result of the procedure of appointing special counsel
in Klokoc to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, we
unanimously reversed Klokoc's death sentence on the grounds that the
mitigating evidence in the record rendered the death sentence
disproportionate.  Essentially, this reversal was over the defendant's
own objection. 
Muhammed, 782 So. 2d at 369 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).
Yet, based on the record in this case, I concur in affirming the death penalty,
even considering the possibility of these various mitigating factors.  In my view,
what separates this case from both Klokoc, 589 So. 2d at 222, and Robertson v.
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State, 699 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Fla. 1997), is the aggravating factor of Ocha's prior
conviction of another violent felony involving attempted murder and robbery for
which he served his full sentence in Kentucky before being released in 1998,
approximately one year before this murder.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,
Frank N. Kaney, Judge - Case No. CR99-2297
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee