Title: Taylor v. Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm’n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11963
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2016

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SJC-11963 
 
HUGH C. TAYLOR, trustee,1 & others2  vs.  MARTHA'S VINEYARD 
LAND BANK COMMISSION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 8, 2016. - October 11, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.3 
 
 
Easement.  Real Property, Easement.  Martha's Vineyard Land Bank 
Commission. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on June 
9, 2010. 
 
 
A motion for summary judgment was heard by Alexander H. 
Sands, III, J., and the remaining issues were also heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Diane C. Tillotson for the defendant. 
 
Gordon M. Orloff for the plaintiffs. 
 
Jeffrey T. Angley & Nicholas P. Shapiro, for Roma III, 
Ltd., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Of Taylor Realty Trust. 
 
 
2 Jeanne S. Taylor and Brian M. Hurley, as trustees of 
Taylor Realty Trust. 
 
 
3 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Greg D. Peterson, Mark S. Furman, & Matthew S. Furman, for 
Sarah A. Kent, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant, Martha's Vineyard Land Bank 
Commission, owns and manages a nature preserve on the western 
edge of Martha's Vineyard.  The preserve is comprised of various 
parcels of land that the defendant purchased in the 1990s.  
In 2010, the defendant created a hiking trail through the 
preserve, which it planned to open to the public.  The trail 
began on a main road, crossed over the grounds of an inn owned 
by the plaintiffs via a forty-foot wide easement, proceeded from 
there across three parcels of the defendant's land for whose 
benefit the easement was created, and then entered a fourth 
parcel, also owned by the defendant, that was not intended to 
benefit from the easement.  The plaintiffs filed an action in 
the Land Court to prevent the defendant from using the easement 
as part of the hiking trail.  They argued, among other things, 
that it was improper, pursuant to Murphy v. Mart Realty of 
Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675 (1965), for the trail to cross 
over the easement and then continue onto the fourth parcel, 
given that the easement was not intended to serve that parcel.  
On this basis, a judge of the Land Court granted partial summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs.  Following a bench trial, at which 
certain remaining issues were resolved in the defendant's favor, 
the defendant appealed from the grant of partial summary 
3 
 
 
 
judgment, and we allowed its application for direct appellate 
review.4 
 
The defendant contends that the bright-line rule in Murphy, 
disallowing any use of an easement to benefit land to which the 
easement is not appurtenant,5 is overly rigid.  The defendant 
suggests that, instead, this court should adopt a fact-intensive 
inquiry requiring consideration whether the use of a particular 
easement to benefit other parcels would increase unfairly the 
burden on the easement.  We conclude that the benefits of 
preserving the long-standing, bright-line rule set forth in 
Murphy outweigh any costs associated with its rigidity, and 
therefore decline to adopt the defendant's suggestion.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Land Court. 
 
1.  Background.  Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Commission 
"was established in 1985 by a special act of the 
Legislature . . . for the purpose of acquiring land for 
environmental protection, conservation, and managed public use."  
It owns and manages, among other properties, the Aquinnah 
Headlands Preserve, a nature preserve on the western edge of 
                                                          
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Roma III, 
Ltd., on behalf of the defendant, and the amicus brief of Sarah 
A. Kent. 
 
 
5 An easement "appurtenant" is one created for the benefit 
of a particular parcel of land; the right to use it is "tied to 
ownership or occupancy of [that] particular unit or parcel of 
land."  Restatement (Third) of Property:  Servitudes § 1.5 
(2000). 
4 
 
 
 
Martha's Vineyard located atop the Gay Head Cliffs.  The 
preserve contains a series of hiking trails, which are open to 
the public annually during the tourism off-season, from 
September 15 through June 15. 
 
In the early 1990s, the defendant assembled what is now the 
preserve by purchasing a series of parcels on the Gay Head 
Cliffs.  Four of these parcels are relevant here.  From south to 
north, these adjacent parcels are referenced by the parties as  
Ginnochio Lot 1,6 Vanderhoop Parcel, Ginnochio Lot 2, and Diem 
Lot 5.7  None of the four parcels abuts the nearest public way, 
Lighthouse Road, which runs to the south of the properties.  A 
separate parcel, however, located to the southeast of the 
defendant's properties, connects Ginnochio Lot 1 to Lighthouse 
Road.  That parcel, owned by the plaintiffs, is registered land 
known as the Inn Property.  It contains a small hotel with seven 
guest rooms that is open only during the tourism season, 
approximately from mid-May through Columbus Day weekend. 
 
The defendant's parcels benefit from two easements that 
burden the Inn Property.  Those easements, which were created 
before the defendant purchased the parcels that now comprise the 
                                                          
 
 
6 The parties do not dispute that the defendant holds title 
to Ginnochio Lot 1, but the Land Court judge noted in his 
decision that it is unclear whether this is so. 
 
 
7 All of the defendant's parcels at issue, with the 
exception of the Vanderhoop Parcel, are registered land. 
5 
 
 
 
preserve, provide access to and from Lighthouse Road.  Neither 
of the easements is appurtenant to all four of the parcels.  The 
first easement, a forty-foot wide road referred to in the Land 
Court proceedings and by the parties here as the Disputed Way, 
is appurtenant to and serves the three southern parcels 
(Ginnochio Lot 1, Vanderhoop Parcel, and Ginnochio Lot 2).  The 
other easement, called Twenty-Foot Way, is appurtenant to and 
serves Diem Lot 5, the northernmost property.8 
 
In May, 2010, the defendant received approval from various 
government agencies to implement a "Management Plan"9 that called 
for creating a hiking trail on the preserve.  The proposed trail 
would incorporate Disputed Way and Twenty Foot Way in a single 
loop.  The trail would extend along the full length of Disputed 
                                                          
 
 
8 Both Disputed Way and Twenty-Foot Way "originat[e] at 
Lighthouse Road" and "cross[ north onto] the Inn Property."  
(One document in the record suggests that Disputed Way actually 
originates south of Lighthouse Road, but the Land Court judge 
credited other documents that "do not depict any portion of the 
Disputed Way south of Lighthouse Road.")  From there, Disputed 
Way branches northwest, crossing onto Ginnochio Lot 1, 
Vanderhoop Parcel, and, finally, Ginnochio Lot 2.  Twenty Foot 
Way, on the other hand, "branches off of the Disputed Way . . . 
and runs northeasterly across the Inn Property" onto another 
parcel owned by the plaintiffs.  From there, it crosses onto two 
other parcels owned by neither party and "intersects with" 
another easement, "which . . . access[es] Diem Lot 5." 
 
 
9 "Management plans" are the official name for land-
management projects proposed by the defendant.  They may be 
carried out only after a public hearing, and require approval 
from the Gay Head town advisory board and the Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, a State 
agency. 
6 
 
 
 
Way, "begin[ning] at Lighthouse Road, proceed[ing] northwesterly 
over [the Inn] Property, then over Ginnochio Lot 1, . . . and 
the Vanderhoop Parcel," and "terminating on Ginnochio Lot 2."  
From there, the trail would run north into Diem Lot 5, and 
ultimately intersect with Twenty Foot Way.  Then, via Twenty 
Foot Way, the trail would return to its point of origin near 
Lighthouse Road. 
 
In June, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Land 
Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant could 
not use Disputed Way as part of the proposed hiking loop.  Among 
other things, the plaintiffs argued that, because the Disputed 
Way easement was appurtenant only to Ginnochio Lot 1, Vanderhoop 
Parcel, and Ginnochio Lot 2, the three southern parcels, the 
defendant was not entitled to use it as part of a trail that 
reached Diem Lot 5.10  The plaintiffs also argued that opening 
Disputed Way to the public, even without a continuation onto 
Diem Lot 5, would overburden11 the easement. 
                                                          
 
 
10 They did not dispute, though, that Twenty Foot Way was 
meant to serve Diem Lot 5. 
 
 
11 We "use[] 'overburden' to describe only use of an 
easement for a purpose different from that intended in the 
creation of the easement, [and] 'overload' to describe the 
situation . . . where an appurtenant easement is used to serve 
land other than the land to which it is appurtenant."  Southwick 
v. Planning Bd. of Plymouth, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 319 n.12 
(2005). 
7 
 
 
 
 
In March, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  A Land Court judge granted the motion in part, 
concluding, among other things, that incorporating Disputed Way 
into a hiking trail that reached Diem Lot 5 would overload the 
Disputed Way easement and, accordingly, that any trail passing 
over Disputed Way must terminate before crossing onto Diem 
Lot 5.  This effectively divided the proposed hiking loop into 
two separate trails, the first from Lighthouse Road to Ginnochio 
Lot 2 via Disputed Way, and the other from Lighthouse Road to 
Diem Lot 5 via Twenty-Foot Way.  While hikers could make use of 
both trails, they would not be able to do so in a single loop. 
 
The judge also concluded, however, that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact whether, among other things, opening the 
easement to the public would unreasonably increase pedestrian 
traffic on the Inn Property and thereby overburden the easement.  
The judge conducted a trial on that issue, and concluded that 
opening Disputed Way to members of the public would not 
overburden the easement.  He noted that "such use comports to 
the [original] scope of the easement" and that the defendant 
proposed only "limited use of the Disputed Way by the public." 
 
The defendant filed a notice of appeal.  The notice 
specified that the defendant was challenging only the Land 
Court's decision on summary judgment, i.e., the ruling that 
Disputed Way could not be used to benefit Diem Lot 5.  The 
8 
 
 
 
defendant then filed an application in this court seeking direct 
appellate review; that application was allowed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We have long held that a "right of way 
appurtenant to [a particular piece of] land . . . cannot be used 
by the owner of the dominant tenement to pass to or from other 
land adjacent to or beyond that to which the easement is 
appurtenant."12  See Murphy, 348 Mass. at 678-679.  See, e.g., 
McLaughlin v. Selectmen of Amherst, 422 Mass. 359, 364 (1996) 
(easement may not be used to serve estate to which not 
appurtenant); Davenport v. Lamson, 21 Pick. 72, 74 (1838) (it is 
"well settled by the authorities, that if a [person] have a 
right of way over another's land, to a particular close, he [or 
she] cannot enlarge it and extend it to other closes");.  
"[A]bsent . . . consent [from the owner of the servient estate], 
use of an easement to benefit property located beyond the 
dominant estate constitutes an over[load]ing of the easement" 
(citation omitted).  McLaughlin, supra at 364. 
 
This limitation on the permissible use of easements is a 
bright-line "rule [meant to] avoid[] otherwise difficult 
litigation over the question whether increased use unreasonably 
increases the burden on the servient estate," and, consequently, 
                                                          
 
 
12 "A dominant estate is an estate that benefits from an 
easement . . . ."  Cater v. Bednarek, 462 Mass. 523, 524 n.5 
(2012).  "A servient estate is an estate burdened by an 
easement."  Id. 
9 
 
 
 
applies "even if no additional use of the easement or burden on 
the servient estate would ensue."  Restatement (Third) of 
Property:  Servitudes § 4.11 comment b (2000) (Restatement of 
Property).  Here, the parties do not dispute that, under this 
long-standing rule, the defendant would be prohibited from using 
Disputed Way to access a parcel the easement was not intended to 
benefit, i.e., Diem Lot 5. 
 
The defendant suggests, however, that this court adopt a 
new rule that would replace the bright-line test described in 
Murphy with a fact-based inquiry.13  The inquiry would consider 
"whether use of an easement by an adjacent parcel would place 
additional burden on the servient estate," and, if so, whether 
                                                          
 
 
13 The defendant suggests also that we might limit 
application of the traditional rule to those cases where, unlike 
here, use of an easement to benefit other parcels would result 
in a significant additional burden to the servient estate.  
Contrast Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 
678-679 (1965) (owner of dominant estate enjoined from using 
easement appurtenant to one lot for commercial access to large 
discount store and parking lot located on other parcels).  As 
the Land Court judge correctly noted, however, the relevant 
precedents are "clearly based on [an] established rule, and not 
based on unique facts." 
 
 
The defendant also requests that, even if we affirm the 
traditional bright-line rule, trial court judges should be 
encouraged not to issue injunctions enforcing it.  See, e.g., 
Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 496 (Ct. App. 2012) (if "the 
additional burden is relatively trifling, the user will not be 
enjoined" [citation omitted]).  We decline this invitation; an 
"injunction is an appropriate remedy to enjoin repeated 
trespasses, even though no substantial damage is thereby 
incurred by the landowner."  Doody v. Spurr, 315 Mass. 129, 134 
(1943). 
10 
 
 
 
such additional use "unfairly burden[s] the servient 
estate . . . in a manner beyond the scope of that intended" in 
the original grant.  This proposed test is the functional 
equivalent of that used by courts in determining whether the 
owner of a dominant estate has overburdened an easement by 
changing the "manner, frequency, [or] intensity of the use."  
See Restatement of Property, supra at § 4.10.  See, e.g., Marden 
v. Mallard Decoy Club, Inc., 361 Mass. 105, 107 (1972) 
("easement granted in general terms is . . . available for all 
reasonable uses to which the dominant estate may thereafter be 
devoted"); Labounty v. Vickers, 352 Mass. 337, 345 (1967) ("The 
question as to the extent and limits of a reasonable right of 
way . . . [is] largely one of fact . . ."); Restatement of 
Property, supra at § 4.10 comment c ("Resolution of the conflict 
[over changed use] often demands a detailed inquiry into the 
particular facts and circumstances of the case, and the issues 
as to intent, reasonable expectations, purpose, reasonableness 
of use, and extent of damage and interference are usually 
intertwined").  Under this test, the defendant contends, use of 
the Disputed Way easement to reach Diem Lot 5 would not 
constitute an overloading, as "it is unlikely that pedestrian 
traffic over the [plaintiffs'] lot will increase [merely 
because] the Disputed Way . . . is used for access to Diem 
Lot 5." 
11 
 
 
 
 
The defendant's proposed test has the advantage of being 
more flexible than the current bright-line rule.  That 
flexibility, however, would come with significant costs.  First, 
it requires altering a long-standing rule of "contract and 
property law . . . , in which reliance upon existing judicial 
precedent often influences individual action," see Papadopoulos 
v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 385 (2010), and in which 
"considerations favoring stare decisis are 'at their acme.'"  
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 
(2015), quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).  
While "this court is not barred from departing from previous 
pronouncements," we do so only where "the benefits of [the 
proposed rule] outweigh the values underlying stare decisis."  
Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 562, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 979 
(2004). 
 
Here, we are not persuaded that the defendant's proposed 
rule would provide such benefits.  The type of detailed inquiry 
the defendant proposes "frequently present[s] difficult factual 
issues as to how broadly or narrowly the purpose [of the 
easement] should be defined, whether the proposed [expanded use] 
is . . . of the sort that should have been contemplated by the 
parties, how much damage or interference is likely to ensue, and 
whether it is reasonable."  Restatement of Property, supra at 
12 
 
 
 
§ 4.10 comment c.  Our bright-line rule in Murphy was formulated 
to avoid precisely this type of "difficult" litigation.  See id. 
 
It goes without saying, as the defendant notes, that "we do 
not reject desirable developments in the law [of easements] 
solely because such developments may result in disputes spurring 
litigation."  M.P.M. Bldrs., LLC v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 93 
(2004).  We are not so much concerned, however, with the mere 
fact of litigation, as with the uncertainty that the prospect of 
such litigation would introduce in land ownership.14  See id. at 
92 (we disfavor "plac[ing] property interests in an uncertain 
status"); Nelson v. Blinn, 197 Mass. 279, 281 (1908), aff'd, 222 
U.S. 1 (1911) (policy against subjecting "regular and lawful use 
and ownership of property" to "restrictions and uncertainty"). 
 
For example, a company might acquire a single, small parcel 
of land served by an easement, and then use that easement to 
provide access to a large commercial establishment located on 
multiple adjoining parcels, none of which was intended to 
benefit from that easement.  See Murphy, 348 Mass. at 677-679 
                                                          
 
 
14 In M.P.M. Bldrs., LLC v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 92 (2004), 
where we held that the owner of servient property unilaterally 
may relocate an easement, we rejected the argument that the 
ability to do so would create "uncertainty in property 
interests."  We reasoned that the resulting uncertainty, if any, 
would affect only the rights of easement holders, who have 
"merely a right of way" and not "a possessory interest."  Id. at 
92-93.  Here, by contrast, any uncertainty would affect the 
rights of the servient landowner, who does have a "possessory 
interest."  Id. 
13 
 
 
 
(defendant used easement to serve discount store; "neither the 
store itself nor [its] parking area" were within lot benefited 
by easement).  In this scenario, a court operating under the 
current rule could permanently enjoin the company's expanded use 
of the easement without any need for further fact finding.  
Under the defendant's fact-intensive rule, however, a court 
could not issue an injunction without inquiry into whether the 
expanded use is "of the sort that should have been contemplated 
by the parties, how much damage or interference is likely to 
ensue, and whether it is reasonable."  See Restatement of 
Property, supra at § 4.10 comment c.  This inquiry would require 
a longer process of litigation than would the bright-line rule, 
would lead to a less predictable outcome, and might not be 
affordable to owners of small servient parcels who are 
litigating against defendants with the financial means to 
acquire and develop multiple parcels of land.15  See Perdido 
                                                          
 
 
15 The present litigation is an example of how a bright-line 
rule may produce quicker results and greater certainty than a 
fact-intensive inquiry.  The plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment in March, 2011, and, by the end of 2012, citing Murphy, 
a Land Court judge had issued a permanent injunction prohibiting 
use of Disputed Way to benefit Diem Lot 5.  The next stage of 
the litigation -- involving a fact-intensive inquiry whether 
opening Disputed Way to the public would unreasonably increase 
the burden on the Inn Property -- required three additional 
years of litigation, as well as a trial.  Even then, the judge's 
decision did not put an end to the dispute, as the judge stated 
that he might have to revisit his conclusion if the plaintiffs 
presented evidence that "public use" of the Disputed Way 
easement had "substantially increase[d]." 
14 
 
 
 
Place Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Bella Luna Condominium Owners 
Ass'n, 43 So. 3d 1201, 1210 (Ala. 2009) (Murdock, J., 
dissenting) (Perdido) (under fact-based inquiry, developer might 
acquire small parcel of land and use it to serve many adjoining 
ones; servient landowner at "some point," depending on 
circumstances, "may be able to argue that its property is being 
overburdened" [emphasis supplied]). 
 
The defendant points, however, to cases from two other 
jurisdictions that had adopted a bright-line rule, but 
subsequently moved away from that rule in favor of a more fact-
based analysis.  See Perdido, supra at 1206-1207 (easement 
properly used to benefit both lots on which condominium sits); 
Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, 246 Conn. 815, 829-232 
(1998) (in certain circumstances, easement may serve after-
acquired lot).  These cases do not stand for the proposition 
attributed to them. 
 
In Perdido, supra at 1204, while a deed creating the 
easement at issue stated on its face that the easement was to 
apply only to one of two lots, the judge concluded that the 
easement properly could be used to benefit both lots because the 
"parties at th[e] time [the easement was created] contemplated 
that the easement would benefit" both.  Similarly, in Abington 
Ltd. Partnership, supra at 829, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that an easement could be used for the benefit of after-
15 
 
 
 
acquired parcels, but only if the "intent of the parties when 
the easement was created" was that it would benefit such 
parcels.16  This comports with our rule that the "terms and 
conditions under which an easement may be created and the manner 
of its exercise are within the control of the creating parties" 
(citation omitted).17  See Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 665 
(2007).  See, e.g., Pion v. Dwight, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 406, 410 
(1981) (easement intended to benefit multiple parcels).  Here, 
by contrast, the judge found specifically that, at the time of 
its creation, the Disputed Way easement was not intended to 
benefit Diem Lot 5. 
 
Further, we are not persuaded, as the defendant maintains, 
that "[c]urrent Massachusetts law creates a substantial 
                                                          
 
 
16 See Reporter's Note, Restatement (Third) of Property:  
Servitudes § 4.11 (2000) ("Connecticut Supreme Court . . . 
favor[s] an inquiry into the intent of the parties" and, in 
particular, whether "the proposed use and likely development of 
the dominant estate [at the time the easement was created] 
include[d] the acquisition of additional property that would be 
served by the easement"). 
 
 
17 The Appeals Court's decision in Bateman v. Board of 
Appeals of Georgetown, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 236 (2002), that a 
particular easement taken by eminent domain could be used for 
after-acquired property, is not to the contrary.  As the court 
noted, while it was not clear whether the easement was intended 
to benefit after-acquired properties, the easement was taken by 
eminent domain, and the "principles of interpretation designed 
to give effect to the express or implied intent of parties 
contracting for or acquiring an interest in land . . . are, in 
general, inapplicable to eminent domain proceedings."  Id. at 
239.  Here, by contrast, the easement was created by private 
conveyance, and the principle that the creators' intent governs 
is applicable. 
16 
 
 
 
impracticality" in circumstances such as these, and that it is 
inconsistent with our "public policy favoring socially 
productive use of land."  See Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC, 467 
Mass. 1, 13 (2014).  As applied here, the traditional rule 
allows hikers to make use of both Disputed Way and Twenty Foot 
Way; it prevents them only from walking the two paths in a 
single loop.  While this may be an inconvenience, it does not 
amount to a "substantial impracticality."  In addition, the 
current rule will not necessarily prevent parties in the 
defendant's position from expanding their use of the easement 
insofar as they may attempt to "negotiate a result" with 
servient landowners.  See M.P.M. Bldrs., LLC, 442 Mass. at 94. 
 
In sum, the bright-line rule articulated in Murphy provides 
owners of servient property with certainty regarding their 
possessory rights.  The benefits of this certainty outweigh the 
perceived advantages of a more flexible rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.