Title: In Re Nelson
Citation: 202 Kan. 663, 451 P.2d 173
Docket Number: 45,252
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 1969

202 Kan. 663 (1969)
451 P.2d 173
In the Matter of the Adoption of RONALD VINCENT NELSON, a Minor
(DORIS JUNE WINTERS and DAVID NOBLE WINTERS, Appellees,
v.
JAMES PAUL NELSON, Appellant).
No. 45,252

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 8, 1969.
Lawrence E. Christenson, Marion P. Mathews, and W.R. Mathews, all of Winfield, on the brief for the appellant.
Earle N. Wright and Ted M. Templar, both of Arkansas City, were on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is an adoption proceeding. The principal, if not the only, question involves the necessity of the natural father's consent to the adoption.
The child in question, Ronald Vincent Nelson, was born in wedlock at Los Angeles, California, June 19, 1964, the son of Doris Ann *664 Nelson and James Paul Nelson. At some time thereafter the mother came to Kansas with the child. On November 30, 1964, the appellees, Doris June Winters and David Noble Winters, obtained custody of the child from its mother who at the same time executed her written consent to its adoption by the Winters. The child has since remained in the custody of the Winters at Arkansas City, Kansas. In January, 1966, in California, the father secured a divorce from the mother. The divorce decree contained no order respecting the child inasmuch as it was not within the court's jurisdiction.
On May 4, 1966, appellees filed in the probate court of Cowley county, Kansas, their petition to adopt the child, attaching thereto the mother's written consent to the adoption. In their petition they made the following allegation respecting the father:
Thereafter the father filed his answer in the probate court reciting his version of the marital difficulties he had had with his wife, the mother of Ronald Vincent, and his explanation as to why he had not contributed to their support. He objected to the adoption and requested custody of the child.
September 8, 1966, the probate court heard the matter and denied the adoption, finding the father had not failed for two consecutive years to support the child and that his consent was essential to the adoption. The probate court made no order with respect to custody.
Appellees promptly appealed the denial of their adoption petition to the district court of Cowley county, Kansas. Meanwhile, they declined to turn over custody of the child to the father. The father then filed in the district court of Cowley county his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he sought the child's custody. This latter action was heard by a judge pro tem who on November 30, 1966, ruled against the father.
Eventually the appeal in the adoption proceeding was heard in the district court, and on September 22, 1967, it granted the adoption by appellees of Ronald Vincent Nelson. The father has appealed from that order to this court.
K.S.A. 59-2102, provides in pertinent part:
"(1) by the living parents of a legitimate child or
"(2) by the mother of an illegitimate child or
As the basis for its order of adoption the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
The father's parental rights have never been terminated and he has never consented to the adoption; hence the issue is whether, under the facts, his consent to the adoption became unnecessary for failure and refusal to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years under K.S.A. 59-2102 (3), this being the premise of both the petition for adoption and the trial court's order granting it.
In In re Sharp, 197 Kan. 502, 419 P.2d 812, this court construed the statute in question and fixed the focal point of the two year period of default as follows:
Thus it is requisite that, before his consent becomes unnecessary the father must have failed to assume parental duties two years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption. At the time the petition herein was filed (May 4, 1966), the child lacked about seven weeks of being two years old, having been born June 19, 1964.
Appellant asserts he could not have been delinquent toward the *666 child for two years before the filing of the petition for adoption because the child was not yet two years of age when the petition was filed.
Appellees contend the term child as contemplated in our adoption statutes in determining a father's parental duty should be construed to include an unborn child. They argue a father owes a duty of support to the child during the period of gestation, commencing at the time of conception, and that here the father abandoned the mother from November, 1963, during her pregnancy, and therefore failed to assume parental responsibility for more than two years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption.
The predicament appears to call for a resolution of the meaning of the term child as contemplated in the adoption statute in connection with paternal duty. Our research and that of resourceful counsel has revealed little, if any, precedent that is helpful.
K.S.A. 77-201 provides:
..............
In common parlance we think the term child is generally understood to mean a young person between infancy and youth. It is customarily used to refer to an individual in being as distinguished from one not yet born, as a fetus which has no existence of its own apart from the mother to which it is attached. We do not ordinarily use the term child to mean an unborn child. When we intend to indicate the latter we couple the noun with the descriptive adjective. Having due regard to the context in which the term is used in the statute, and the possible difficulty of determination, we think the legislature intended this plain, ordinary meaning  a living child who could be the subject of measurable paternal attention. If anything further was intended the lawmakers could easily have said so. In construing this portion of the statute we have heretofore held that parental duty goes further than mere support (In re Waters, 195 Kan. 614, 408 P.2d 590; In re Sharp, supra). We hold then that the period of gestation of a child may not be included in computing the two year period of failure or refusal to assume *667 parental duties, so as to make a defaulting father's consent to adoption unnecessary under K.S.A. 59-2102 (3).
Appellees argue the trial court's order granting the adoption should be upheld because in the habeas corpus action the father was found to be unfit to have the child's custody. Appealing as this contention may be, it cannot be upheld under our statutory law. Custody and adoption are separate proceedings. In the latter the statutory requirements must be clearly shown to warrant the permanent severance of parental ties. In In re Sharp, supra, we held this:
No matter what the parent may have done, or what his character is, if this is not named in the statute as grounds for dispensing with his consent, then the child cannot be adopted without the parent's consent. The court must always first determine if statutory grounds for adoption exist. In In re Marsolf, 200 Kan. 128, 434 P.2d 1010, we stated:
Here consent of both parents was required. The father did not give consent and the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant the adoption. Its judgment must be and is reversed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.