Title: State v. Carmen L. Doss
Citation: 2008 WI 93
Docket Number: 2006AP002254-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2008

2008 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2254-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Carmen L. Doss, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 208 
Reported at: 305 Wis. 2d 414, 740 N.W.2d 410 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Elsa C. Lamelas   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross petitioner there were 
briefs by Robert R. Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2254-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF6408) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Carmen L. Doss, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals opinion1 reversing a judgment of 
conviction and order by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Elsa C. Lamelas presiding, denying a defendant's 
postconviction motion for a new trial.  Carmen Doss (Doss) 
appealed from a judgment of conviction finding her guilty of 
unlawfully 
retaining 
funds 
from 
her 
father's 
estate, 
in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) and (3)(c) (2003-04).2 
                                                 
1 State v. Doss, 2007 WI App 208, 305 Wis. 2d 414, 740 
N.W.2d 410. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In 2003, Doss's father passed away.  At the time of 
his death he lived in Wisconsin, while Doss resided in Georgia.  
Doss retained a Milwaukee attorney to assist in the probate of 
the estate, which had assets of approximately $72,000. 
¶3 
While working on the probate case, the attorney 
learned that Doss's father's State income taxes had not been 
paid for over eight years.  The attorney filed a tax return with 
the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR) and sent the DOR 
checks totaling $39,865.  Shortly thereafter, Doss contacted the 
DOR agent responsible for the audit of her father's taxes and 
persuaded the agent to hold the checks.  The next day, Doss 
withdrew all of the money in the estate's account.  When the DOR 
subsequently submitted the checks, they were returned unpaid 
because the account had been closed. 
¶4 
Doss was charged with theft as a trustee/bailee in a 
business setting, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) and 
(3)(c).  A jury found her guilty, and Doss was sentenced to six 
years' 
imprisonment, 
consisting 
of 
one 
year 
of 
initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision.  Doss was 
also ordered to pay restitution. 
¶5 
Doss filed an appeal, arguing that certain bank 
records should not have been allowed into evidence and that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove a crime was committed.  The 
court of appeals found that admission of the bank records via 
affidavits of bank officials violated both statutory procedure 
and Doss's constitutional right of confrontation.  The court 
also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
3 
 
verdict.  State v. Doss, 2007 WI App 208, ¶28, 305 Wis. 2d 414, 
740 N.W.2d 410.  The court of appeals reversed the judgment of 
conviction and the order denying Doss's postconviction motion.3 
¶6 
On review, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
commit either statutory or constitutional error in admitting the 
bank records at issue, and that there was sufficient evidence in 
this case to sustain a conviction.  We further conclude that the 
prosecutor did not violate a court order excluding evidence of 
the DOR complaint; that evidence of the DOR lawsuit against Doss 
was not irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial; that Doss waived 
her challenge that the prosecutor did not improperly comment 
upon Doss's lack of testimony; that reversal in the interest of 
justice is not appropriate; and that the circuit court did not 
erroneously deny Doss's postconviction ineffective assistance of 
counsel motion.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals.  
I 
¶7 
Carmen Doss's father died on August 14, 2003.  At the 
time of his death, Doss's father resided in Wisconsin, and Doss 
resided in Georgia.  Diane Loftus, a Milwaukee attorney, was 
retained to assist Doss in probating the estate, and she and 
Doss were named as co-personal representatives.  The assets of 
the estate, totaling approximately $72,000, were deposited into 
                                                 
3 As a result, the court of appeals declined to reach five 
additional issues raised by Doss.  Doss, 305 Wis. 2d 414, ¶22 
n.3. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
4 
 
an account at M&I Bank under the joint control of Loftus and 
Doss.   
¶8 
In the process of trying to finalize estate matters, 
Loftus was informed by the DOR that Doss's father had failed to 
pay Wisconsin income taxes for the final eight years of his 
life.  The DOR letter, which was copied to Doss, stated that 
"[o]nce the above issue is satisfied (returns filed with full 
payment 
of 
tax 
liabilities), 
only 
then 
can 
a 
Closing 
Certificate . . . be issued."  Doss responded by claiming that 
her father was not a resident of Wisconsin and therefore did not 
owe the Wisconsin taxes.   
¶9 
On February 6, 2004, after advising Doss of the 
estate's tax liability and the need to file the income taxes, 
Loftus filed tax returns for 1995 to 2002 and included with the 
returns checks totaling $39,865.87 for taxes, interest, and late 
fees.  However, Doss directly contacted the DOR two weeks later 
asking that the checks be held because, she stated, Loftus had 
acted without Doss's knowledge or approval.  
¶10 On February 20, 2004, Doss then withdrew every penny 
of the $70,555.47 in the estate's M&I account and closed the 
account, telling the DOR that she had closed the account but had 
"every intention of satisfying [her] father's obligations to The 
State of Wisconsin."  On March 1, 2004, Doss opened a new 
account with SunTrust Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, and deposited 
the money into that account.  On March 15, 2004, after receiving 
a final determination from the DOR that the estate owed income 
taxes, Doss closed the SunTrust estate account and deposited the 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
5 
 
account's balance into her personal account.  Four days later 
she again moved the funds, this time to a new money market 
account.  The last communication Doss had with the DOR prior to 
this action was a March 26, 2004, letter in which Doss blamed 
the DOR for not contacting her father about the delinquent taxes 
and wrote that collecting the taxes at that point "just doesn't 
seem right." 
¶11 While Doss was in the process of moving the funds from 
account to account, her attorney distanced herself from her 
client's actions, filing a motion to withdraw as attorney of 
record and to resign as co-personal representative.  In the 
alternative, the motion requested an order directing Doss to 
return the estate funds.  A hearing was held on Attorney 
Loftus's motion to withdraw on March 25, 2004.  In an order 
dated April 1, 2004, the probate court allowed Loftus to 
withdraw as co-personal representative, but did not address the 
request for return of the funds.  
¶12 When the DOR submitted the eight checks for payment, 
they were returned because the account had been closed.  The DOR 
subsequently filed a lawsuit, along with a motion for summary 
judgment on August 23, 2004, seeking repayment of the money Doss 
had taken.  As an alternative, the motion requested an order 
requiring that a $52,000 bond previously issued by the Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company covering the performance of Doss and 
Loftus as probate personal representatives be paid to the DOR.  
The motion also requested that a constructive trust be imposed 
on Doss's assets; that Loftus be reappointed as co-personal 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
6 
 
representative; and that Doss, Loftus, and Ohio Casualty be held 
jointly and severally liable for payment of the taxes.  The same 
day, the DOR also filed a separate action against Ohio Casualty, 
Doss, Loftus and the estate seeking payment of $48,339.81 for 
the income taxes owed, plus interest, fees, and check return 
fees.  
¶13 After receiving notice from Ohio Casualty that she 
could be held liable for any loss, cost or expense to Ohio 
Casualty associated with this matter and after DOR arranged for 
personal service of the lawsuit on Doss, Doss closed the 
SunTrust money market account and withdrew the balance in cash.  
Ohio Casualty filed a motion in the estate action requesting an 
order directing Doss to surrender the estate funds.  At an 
October 7, 2004, hearing, Doss told the probate court that the 
money was simply gone.  The probate court then granted Ohio 
Casualty's motion and ordered Doss to pay $70,555.47 to the 
Milwaukee County Clerk of Courts.  Doss did not do so.  
¶14 On November 23, 2004, the State filed a complaint 
charging Doss with one count of theft as a trustee/bailee in a 
business setting, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) and 
(3)(c).  On October 13, 2005, a jury found her guilty.  Doss was 
sentenced to serve a six-year prison term, consisting of one 
year initial confinement, followed by five years of extended 
supervision, and was ordered to pay restitution and costs.   
¶15 On 
June 
7, 
2006, 
Doss 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief, arguing that the court erred in admitting 
certified bank records and in denying a request for a mistrial, 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
7 
 
that evidence of the DOR's lawsuit was unfairly prejudicial, 
that 
the 
prosecutor's closing argument contained improper 
commentary 
on 
Doss's 
lack 
of 
testimony, 
that 
there 
was 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, that the interest 
of justice required a new trial, and that she was prejudiced by 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  On August 22, 2006, the 
circuit court denied her motion.  Doss then filed an appeal 
making the same arguments that she made in her postconviction 
motion and that she continues to make to this court.   
¶16 In an opinion issued on August 7, 2007, the court of 
appeals focused on her arguments that the circuit court erred 
when, on short notice to Doss, it allowed certified bank records 
to be entered into evidence without supporting witnesses and 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.  
Doss, 305 Wis. 2d 414, ¶¶9, 23.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court erred "because admission of the bank 
records via affidavit violated both statutory procedure and 
Doss's constitutional right of confrontation, and because 
admission of this evidence was not harmless."  Id., ¶28.  Based 
on 
that 
conclusion, 
the 
court 
reversed 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
and 
the 
order 
denying 
Doss's 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  Id.  The court also concluded that "the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict[,] [s]o a re-
trial would not violate Doss's double jeopardy rights."  Id.  
¶17 The State filed a petition for this court to review 
the issue of the bank records, and Doss filed a cross-petition 
for review of the court of appeals' conclusion that the evidence 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
8 
 
was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  She also repeated 
and preserved her previous arguments raised to the court of 
appeals.  This court granted review. 
II 
¶18 On review, we first address the issues the court of 
appeals found dispositive, pertaining to whether admission of 
the bank records via affidavits from records custodians failed 
to meet the statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 891.24 or 
violated Doss's constitutional right of confrontation due to 
being "testimonial hearsay," and whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  Because we disagree 
with the analysis and conclusions of the court of appeals on the 
bank records issues, we must then also address the other 
arguments made by Doss in this case challenging her conviction, 
namely:  whether denial of a mistrial based on a prosecutor's 
alleged violation of the court's order excluding evidence of 
service of the DOR complaint was erroneous; whether evidence of 
a 
DOR 
lawsuit 
against 
Doss 
was 
irrelevant 
and 
unfairly 
prejudicial; whether the prosecutor's reliance upon Doss's 
failure to testify violated Wis. Stat. § 905.13(1) and deprived 
her of her constitutional rights to remain silent and to a fair 
trial; whether reversal is appropriate in the interest of 
justice; and whether the post-conviction court erred in denying 
Doss a hearing on her ineffectiveness of counsel motion. 
¶19 The various issues raised in this case require us to 
apply several different standards of review.  We will generally 
reverse a lower court's ruling related to the admission of 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
9 
 
evidence only upon a clear showing of erroneous use of 
discretion.  See State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 
271, 677 N.W.2d 276.  When reviewing an evidentiary decision, 
the question on appeal is not whether this court would have 
permitted the evidence to come in, but whether the circuit court 
exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal 
standards and in accordance with the facts of record.  State v. 
Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶24, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.  A 
proper exercise of discretion requires that the circuit court 
rely on facts of record, the applicable law, and, using a 
demonstrable rational process, reach a reasonable decision.  Id.  
We review de novo whether the admission of hearsay evidence 
violates a defendant's constitutional confrontation rights.  
Id., ¶25.   
¶20 Whether the admission of bank records meets the 
statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 891.24 involves questions 
of statutory interpretation, which are reviewed de novo under 
the standards set forth by State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  
¶21 As to sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, a 
conviction should not be reversed unless the evidence, viewed 
most favorably to the State and to the conviction, is so 
insufficient as a matter of law that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).   
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
10 
 
¶22 This court has explained the standard for reviewing a 
request for a new trial in the interest of justice as follows: 
A new trial may be granted in the interest of justice 
when the jury findings are contrary to the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, even 
though 
the 
findings 
are 
supported 
by 
credible 
evidence.  The order granting a new trial in the 
interest of justice must contain the reasons and bases 
for the general statement contained therein that the 
verdict 
is 
against 
the 
great 
weight 
and 
clear 
preponderance of the evidence.   
Krolikowski v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 
278 N.W.2d 865 (1979)(citations omitted).  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06 
(describing 
this 
court's 
discretionary 
reversal 
authority as "necessary to accomplish the ends of justice").   
¶23 Finally, 
Doss's 
claims 
regarding 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel raise mixed questions of fact and law.  We 
will not set aside the lower court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶26.  
However, whether an attorney's performance is constitutionally 
deficient is a question of law we review de novo.  Id.   
III 
¶24 We first address the main issues on review upon which 
the court of appeals decision was based.  For the reasons given 
below, we conclude that admission of the bank records via 
affidavits from records custodians violated neither statutory 
procedure nor Doss's constitutional right of confrontation, and 
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
11 
 
 
A 
¶25 The first primary basis of Doss's objection to the 
admission of the bank records in this case relates to the 
objection of her trial counsel that he had been advised only 
three days prior to trial that the records would not be 
introduced through the testimony of records custodian witnesses 
physically 
appearing 
to 
testify 
at 
trial, 
but 
would 
be 
introduced by affidavit.  Such short notice, Doss's counsel 
objected, does not meet the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 891.24 
that originals of the records must be open to inspection of all 
parties.  Doss's counsel argued that "I don't have any ability 
to go and inspect original bank records in Georgia," although 
conceding that the bank records at issue were merely those of 
his client Doss's bank accounts, which were presumably available 
to her at all relevant times.   
¶26 On 
appeal, 
Doss 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
improperly relied upon Wis. Stat. § 891.24 as a basis for 
satisfying authentication and foundational requirements of bank 
record admissions via sworn affidavits attesting to their 
accuracy, repeating her trial counsel's objection that the 
records were not "open to the inspection of all parties," as 
required by the statute.  
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 891.24 provides: 
Whenever any bank, credit union, savings bank or 
savings and loan association or any of its officers 
are subpoenaed to produce its books containing a 
specified account or other specified entries, the 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
12 
 
bank, credit union, savings bank or savings and loan 
association may, if it so elects, produce a copy of 
the specified account or other entries, verified under 
oath by one of its officers, stating that the books 
called for are the ordinary books of the bank, credit 
union, savings bank or savings and loan association 
used in the transaction of its business, that the 
entries copied were made therein at the dates thereof 
and in the usual course of business, that there are no 
interlineations or erasures in or among the items 
copied, that the books are in the custody or control 
of the bank, credit union, savings bank or savings and 
loan association, and that the officer has carefully 
compared the copy with the books and found it to be a 
correct copy of the specified account or entries.  
Such verified copy shall be prima facie evidence of 
such entries, and, when presented, no officer of the 
financial institution may be compelled to produce the 
books demanded or attend the trial or hearing, unless 
specially ordered so to do by the court or officer 
before whom it is pending; provided, that such books 
shall be open to the inspection of all parties to the 
action or proceeding. 
¶28 The court of appeals concluded that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 891.24, copies rather than a bank's original record books may 
be produced for trial, without the need for a witness to be 
present, if two conditions are met:  (1) a sworn verification is 
provided attesting to the factual truth of the copied account 
entries presented, and (2) the original records are open for the 
inspection of all parties to the action.  Doss, 305 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶15.  The court of appeals concluded that as a matter of 
"reasonableness" and "common sense," even though the statute 
does not contain a special requirement that a party give notice 
of intent prior to trial that it will be relying on the statute, 
"it can only be reasonably implied" that such notice is required 
in order to give the open inspection language of the statute 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
13 
 
meaning.  Id., ¶17.  In this case, the court of appeals 
concluded, the State therefore did not meet the open inspection 
requirement because it did not give notice that it would be 
relying on the statute until the Friday prior to the Monday 
trial.  Id.  
¶29 The State asks us to reverse this decision by the 
court of appeals on the grounds that the decision, if affirmed 
by this court, would create a new statutory requirement that 
does not exist under Wis. Stat. § 891.24.  The State also argues 
that Doss had continuous access to the records of her bank 
accounts before and during the proceedings, that records from 
the SunTrust bank were provided to the defense seven months 
before trial, and that the M&I records were provided to the 
defense eleven days before trial.  The State adds that Doss did 
not seek a continuance to inspect the records, and that she has 
never raised any challenge to the authenticity or accuracy of 
the disputed bank records.  The State asks us to conclude that 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it 
admitted copies of Doss's bank records pursuant to § 891.24.  
¶30 It is well-established that statutory interpretation 
begins with the plain text of a statute so long as the statute 
is not ambiguous: 
"We begin with the statute's language because we 
assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in 
the words it used."  [quoting State v. Reed, 2005 WI 
53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315].  We refrain 
from interpreting statutory language in isolation and 
interpret the language in the context in which it is 
used to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  State 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
14 
 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 
WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the 
meaning is plain from the language of the statute, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Reed, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 
¶13 (citation omitted). 
Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 2006 WI 68, ¶13, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 718 
N.W.2d 38.   
¶31 The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 891.24 is a matter 
of first impression for Wisconsin courts.  Although two older 
cases dating back to 1898 and 1929 address predecessor statutes, 
neither addresses the issue of adequate notice raised in this 
case.  See Peart v. Schwenker, 200 Wis. 200, 203-04, 227 N.W. 
945 (1929); Kuenster v. Woodhouse, 101 Wis. 216, 220, 77 N.W. 
165 (1898). 
¶32 We agree with the State's analysis for several 
reasons.  First, the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 891.24, quite 
simply, does not contain the notice requirement that Doss asks 
us to recognize.  The statute's language requiring bank books to 
be made open to the inspection of parties does not on its face 
require prior notice of their use at trial to be given.  It 
requires that the books be open to the inspection of all parties 
to the action or proceeding.   
¶33 Second, we interpret statutory language "in relation 
to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . to avoid absurd or unreasonable results," Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  In this case, a comparable closely 
related statute which was not in force at the time this action 
commenced but which is relevant for sake of comparison is Wis. 
Stat. § 909.02(12)(2005-06).  Section 909.02(12) requires that 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
15 
 
self-authenticating business records be accompanied by a written 
certification of the offering party that provides "written 
notice 
of 
that 
intention 
to 
all 
adverse 
parties 
and . . . make[s] the record and certification available for 
inspection sufficiently in advance of the offer of the record 
and certification into evidence to provide an adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to challenge the record and certification."  
The plain text of § 909.02(12), unlike Wis. Stat. § 891.24, does 
contain a notice requirement, helping to illustrate that if the 
legislature meant to impose a similar notice requirement in 
§ 891.24, it could have done so.   
¶34 Third, we do not see a bright-line rule requiring 
advance 
notice 
as 
being 
implicit 
within 
the 
statute's 
requirement that bank records be open to the inspection of the 
parties.  We conclude that the three days' notice Doss received 
was reasonable given that the Georgia records had been provided 
to her seven months before trial, and given that the Wisconsin 
records had been provided to her eleven days before trial.  
Furthermore, because the bank records in this case were those of 
Doss's accounts, Doss presumably already had access to inspect 
them both prior to and during this action.  As such, we conclude 
that the records were open to inspection by Doss prior to the 
trial, as § 891.24 requires.  
¶35 Consequently, we reject Doss's argument and the court 
of appeals' conclusion that the admission of the bank records in 
this case as authenticated through custodians' certifications 
did not satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 891.24.   
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
16 
 
B 
¶36 The second primary basis of the objection made by 
Doss's trial counsel to the admission of the bank records in 
this case was that "I can't cross-examine a verification 
statement."  Elaborating upon the objection, Doss's attorney 
argued that the bank records should be excluded due to the lack 
of authenticating testimony beyond mere affidavits, which Doss 
considers 
to 
be 
testimonial 
hearsay 
implicating 
her 
Confrontation Clause rights.   
¶37 The circuit court denied the objection and allowed the 
bank records to be admitted, after concluding that the leading 
federal and state case law on the issue——Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554——did not 
preclude admission of the records.  The circuit court quoted at 
length from Crawford's discussion of the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause as being to ensure that civil hearsay rules 
do not undermine constitutional protections of those criminally 
accused to cross-examine testimony against them, and addressed a 
passage from Crawford in which the Court explained that the 
Constitution's drafters intended to limit Confrontation Clause 
exceptions to those that existed at the time of founding.  See 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-54.  The circuit court in this case 
emphasized the language in Crawford that "there is scant 
evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial 
statements against the accused in a criminal case."  Id. at 56 
(emphasis in original).  Most pertinently, as emphasized by the 
circuit court, the Crawford court added, "[m]ost of the hearsay 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
17 
 
exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not 
testimonial——for example, business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶38 The circuit court then turned to this court's Manuel 
opinion, 
which 
indicated 
that 
business 
records 
are 
nontestimonial.  See Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶38 n.9.  The 
circuit court concluded: 
 
It appears then that the records that the state 
seeks to introduce are under Crawford, itself, and 
under the approach taken by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in State [v.] Manuel nontestimonial statements.  
There is no confrontation clause problem. 
 
These 
are 
records 
that 
have 
extraordinary, 
extraordinary guarantees of trustworthiness; and I 
think they should be admitted. 
¶39 On appeal, Doss clarifies that her objection is 
primarily to the affidavits underlying the bank records, arguing 
that the affidavits necessary for the admission of the bank 
records were "'testimonial' and thus violated Crawford."  The 
court of appeals agreed that the circuit court's admission of 
the bank records as authenticated by affidavits Doss could not 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
18 
 
cross-examine violated her constitutional Confrontation Clause 
rights.4  Doss, 305 Wis. 2d 414, ¶20.   
¶40 Specifically, Doss argues that under Crawford, her 
constitutional rights were violated as a result of the circuit 
court allowing the State to rely on affidavits to authenticate 
the bank records.  She argues that the affidavits meet 
Crawford's description of "testimonial hearsay" as including 
pre-trial 
statements 
memorialized 
in 
an 
affidavit 
that 
declarants may expect to be used at trial in a prosecutorial 
manner.  Doss concludes that, given the testimonial nature of 
the disputed records, the State did not produce required 
evidence of unavailability of the declarants who signed the 
affidavit, nor did it provide a prior opportunity for Doss to 
cross-examine them, thereby rendering the affidavits' admission 
erroneous.   
                                                 
4 Doss's constitutional arguments implicate the parallel 
provision 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
which 
provides 
that 
"[i]n 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him," and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face."  We have 
previously explained that "[g]enerally, we apply United States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedents 
when 
interpreting 
the 
right 
of 
confrontation contained in our constitution."  State v. Manuel, 
2005 WI 75, ¶36 n.8, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.  See also 
State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶43, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637.  
Consequently, 
our 
references 
to 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
incorporate 
both 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional 
provisions. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
19 
 
¶41 The State responds that such requirements do not apply 
to nontestimonial evidence, and that Crawford's recognition of 
business 
records 
as 
nontestimonial 
logically 
extends 
to 
affidavits authenticating nontestimonial bank records, which are 
therefore not testimonial or in violation of the Confrontation 
Clause.  The State describes the court of appeals' approach as 
overly 
mechanistic 
in 
its 
determination 
of 
whether 
the 
affidavits 
constituted 
testimonial 
hearsay 
under 
Crawford 
because 
a 
Confrontation 
Clause 
analysis 
should 
entail 
a 
consideration of the nature of the affidavits in relation to the 
Confrontation Clause's purpose.  Other courts, the State argues, 
have remained faithful to the meaning and purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause in their holdings that authenticating 
affidavits are not the accusatory hearsay statements targeted in 
Crawford, and the State suggests that this court should conclude 
the same.  
¶42 We agree that the affidavits in this case do not 
constitute "testimonial hearsay" under the Confrontation Clause.  
As the circuit court correctly observed, both federal and state 
supreme 
court 
decisions 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
affidavits in this case are nontestimonial for Confrontation 
Clause purposes.   
¶43 Crawford establishes constitutional requirements for 
the admissibility of testimonial hearsay, and echoes the Supreme 
Court's recognition in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), that 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
was 
intended 
to 
incorporate 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
20 
 
longstanding 
business 
records 
admissibility 
exceptions.5  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-56.  The decision also generally 
explains that the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted 
with an eye toward its historic context focused on testimonial 
statements by witnesses giving testimonial evidence against the 
accused.  Id. at 62-67.  The Crawford Court declined to provide 
a more specific or comprehensive definition of "testimonial."  
The Court instead noted that testimony is typically "[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact," Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation 
omitted), and listed three general formulations of testimonial 
statement classes:  
[1] "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent——that is, material such as affidavits, 
                                                 
5 Prior to Crawford, the test applied by the Supreme Court 
to determine admissibility in Confrontation Clause cases was 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated on other grounds 
by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  The Roberts two-
prong test was unavailability coupled with an "indicia of 
reliability," defined as evidence that "falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception," or has a "particularized guarantee of 
trustworthiness."  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.  Consequently, 
business records were identified by Roberts as a type of hearsay 
exception 
evidence 
that 
may 
be 
admissible 
without 
a 
Confrontation Clause violation.  See id. at 66 n.8 (quoting 
Comment, 
Hearsay, 
The Confrontation Guarantee and Related 
Problems, 30 La. L. Rev. 651, 668 (1970)("Properly administered 
the business and public records exceptions would seem to be 
among the safest of the hearsay exceptions. . . .")).  Although 
the Supreme Court in Crawford abrogated Roberts on other grounds 
by replacing the "indicia of reliability" factor (for surviving 
a Confrontation Clause challenge once evidence is concluded to 
be testimonial) with the prior opportunity for cross-examination 
factor, it left intact Roberts' conclusion that business records 
specifically are nontestimonial.  
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
21 
 
custodial 
examinations, 
prior 
testimony 
that 
the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect 
to 
be 
used 
prosecutorially," . . . [2] 
"extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained 
in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions," [and] 
[3] "statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial."  
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).  The Court explained that 
these three formulations possess the "closest kinship to the 
abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."  Id. at 
68.  "Whatever else the term [testimonial] covers," the Court 
added, "it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; 
and to police interrogations."  Id.  The Court explained that 
the common theme of the three formulations, and the core of the 
Confrontation Clause, are aimed specifically at the use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the criminally accused.  
Id. at 50-51.   
¶44 In contrast, the Court listed examples of things that 
are not testimonial.  Id. at 51-56.  As the circuit court in the 
present case correctly observed, the list of nontestimonial 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
22 
 
evidence specifically includes business records,6 and this court 
explicitly 
adopted 
the 
rule 
that 
business 
records 
are 
nontestimonial in Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶38 n.9.  In Manuel, 
while saving for another day a more complete articulation of our 
own approach to defining "testimonial" evidence, we also 
concluded that "at a minimum, we adopt all three of Crawford's 
formulations."  Id., ¶39.  
¶45 The parties do not dispute that the circuit court 
correctly described Crawford and Manuel as identifying business 
records as nontestimonial, and correctly concluded that the 
specific bank records in this case are nontestimonial business 
records and not a threat to Doss's Confrontation Clause rights.  
The issue in this case is whether the affidavits authenticating 
the bank records are similarly benign nontestimonial evidence.  
 
¶46 We conclude that affidavits verifying nontestimonial 
bank records in compliance with Wis. Stat. § 891.24 are also 
nontestimonial.  Such affidavits are generally of a different 
nature than inculpatory testimony against an accused criminal 
defendant.   
                                                 
6 The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence do not include a specific 
hearsay exception for "business records," but rather a more 
general exception for "records of regularly conducted activity."  
See Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6).  See also 7 Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Evidence § 803.6, at 621 (2d ed. 2001) ("It is 
somewhat misleading to characterize [Wis. Stat.] § 908.03(6) as 
a 'business records exception'; the rule extends without 
limitation to the records of any 'regularly conducted activity.' 
. . . The broad approach exhibited by the Wisconsin rule should 
be contrasted with the reach of [Rule] 803 [of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence], which applies to 'regularly conducted business 
activity.'")(footnote omitted).   
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
23 
 
¶47 The 
critical defining element of the affidavits 
accompanying the bank records in this case is that they fulfill 
a statutory procedure for verifying nontestimonial bank records 
and do not supply substantive evidence of guilt.  The affidavits 
in this case are not the type of affidavits described in 
Crawford, i.e., the functional equivalent of ex parte in-court 
testimony that declarants "would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  In certifying the 
authenticity of bank records in the manner set forth by Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 891.24, the affidavits themselves neither provide 
inculpatory 
evidence 
incriminating 
Doss 
nor 
threaten 
her 
Confrontation Clause rights, in contrast with the type of 
evidence described in Crawford.  As long as Wis. Stat. § 891.24 
is complied with, the affidavits are not testimonial and their 
admission did not violate Doss's Confrontation Clause rights.7  
¶48 Doss maintains that this court has never interpreted 
Crawford to categorize affidavits created for court use as 
nontestimonial.  However, the opposite is true as well; this 
court has never interpreted Crawford to categorize affidavits 
such as those in this case as testimonial hearsay either.  None 
of the Wisconsin cases cited by Doss——State v. Nelis, 2007 WI 
                                                 
7 We do not address the Sixth Amendment implications of any 
affidavit not produced in compliance with Wis. Stat. § 891.24.   
We also do not rule on the admissibility of an affidavit on 
evidentiary 
grounds 
where 
there 
is 
a 
dispute 
about 
the 
authenticity 
of 
the 
record 
itself 
that 
implicates 
the 
foundational aspect of the evidence, or the accuracy or 
reliability of the substantive information in the records. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
24 
 
58, 300 Wis. 2d. 415, 733 N.W.2d 619; State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 
26, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518; Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554; 
State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259; 
State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637——hold 
that affidavits authenticating bank records are testimonial 
hearsay. 
¶49 Doss cites cases from other jurisdictions interpreting 
Crawford as rendering various types of evidence as testimonial 
hearsay, including affidavits or certifications of business 
records under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(11), of chain of 
custody of a blood draw, of state police lab reports, of 
breathalyzers, and of revocation of driving privileges and 
notice of revocation.  See Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. 
App. 2005); United States v. Wittig, 2005 WL 122790 (D. Kan. 
2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 207-08 (Nev. 
2005); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. 2007); People v. 
Pacer, 847 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2006).   
¶50 However, Wittig is the only case cited by Doss 
involving certificates authenticating business records, and it 
is an unpublished federal district court opinion.  In contrast, 
there are a number of federal appellate decisions that have 
addressed this issue, and concluded that similar affidavits and 
certifications are nontestimonial.   
¶51 For example, in  United States v. Adefehinti, 510 F.3d 
319 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the D.C. Circuit was faced with parallel 
facts to those in this case, and determined that written 
certificates 
authenticating 
nontestimonial 
bank 
records 
in 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
25 
 
compliance with Fed. R. Evid. Rule 902(11) were not testimonial 
for purposes of a Confrontation Clause analysis.  The written 
certificates 
presented 
to 
authenticate 
bank 
records 
in 
Adefehinti were used for the sole purpose of facilitating the 
admission of nontestimonial bank records, the court explained in 
rejecting the defendant's argument that the certificates were 
"solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact" and therefore affidavits 
fitting within Crawford's description of testimonial hearsay.  
Id. at 327 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).   
¶52 In United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 
2006), a case followed and quoted by Adefehinti, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled that a certification of medical records pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11) was nontestimonial hearsay 
under Crawford due to Crawford's identification of business 
records as nontestimonial evidence, even though the records had 
been prepared for use in litigation.  The court explained, 
"[g]iven 
the 
records 
themselves 
do 
not 
fall 
within 
the 
constitutional guarantee provided by the Confrontation Clause, 
it would be odd to hold that the foundational evidence 
authenticating the records do[es]."  Ellis, 460 F.3d at 927.  
The court concluded that because the certification records did 
not 
contain 
information 
about 
the 
defendant, 
but 
merely 
established foundation for the original records, they were 
nontestimonial.  Id.   
¶53 The Ninth Circuit has similarly concluded that "a 
routine certification by the custodian of a domestic public 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
26 
 
record" is not testimonial in nature.  United States v. Weiland, 
420 F.3d 1062, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005).  Weiland involved 
certification of federal conviction records made by state 
officials and described by the court as "routine cataloguing of 
an unambiguous factual matter."  Id. (citations omitted).  The 
court noted that requiring these officials to make themselves 
available for cross-examination would be a "logistical challenge 
'without any apparent gain in the truth-seeking process,'" and 
declined to interpret Crawford to the contrary.  Id.  See also 
United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 832-34 (9th 
Cir. 2005)(another Ninth Circuit decision addressing the same 
issue in a different context, in which the court held that a 
certificate that a record the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service would normally keep in the regular course of their 
business did not exist in that case was also nontestimonial 
under Crawford). 
¶54 Similarly, 
a 
Fifth 
Circuit 
case 
involving 
the 
authentication of bank records, United States v. Morgan, 505 
F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2007), cites both Ellis and Weiland in 
similarly concluding "that Crawford does not apply to the 
foundational 
evidence 
authenticating 
business 
records 
in 
preliminary determinations of the admissibility of evidence."  
Morgan, 505 F.3d at 338-39.   
¶55 We agree with the approach taken by the federal 
appeals courts.  We similarly conclude that as long as Wis. 
Stat. § 891.24 is complied with, a bank record custodian's 
affidavit 
prepared 
for 
litigation 
is 
a 
certification 
of 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
27 
 
authenticity 
for 
foundational 
purposes 
only, 
falls 
under 
Crawford's business record exception and is not "testimonial" 
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.   
¶56 For all the above reasons, we hold, consistently with 
the federal appellate courts that have addressed this issue, 
that the routine certifications in the form of affidavits from 
record custodians authenticating the nontestimonial bank records 
in compliance with Wis. Stat. § 891.24 in this case are not 
testimonial.  Therefore, the admission of such affidavits along 
with the underlying bank records in this case did not violate 
Doss's constitutional confrontation rights.   
C 
¶57 Next, we address Doss's argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to support her conviction under Wisconsin 
Statute § 943.20(1)(b).  Doss correctly recites the elements the 
State was required to establish to obtain a conviction:  that 
(1) she had possession of money as a result of her position as a 
personal 
representative 
of 
her 
father's 
estate; 
(2) 
she 
initially retained possession of the money contrary to her 
authority and without the owner's consent; (3) she knew that 
retention of the money was contrary to her authority and without 
the owner's consent; and (4) she intended to convert the money 
to her own.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1444 & Comment n.1; State v. 
Blaisdell, 85 Wis. 2d 172, 176, 270 N.W.2d 69 (1978).  
¶58 Without contesting that the State established these 
main elements, Doss claims that the State failed to establish a 
more specific aspect of its case:  that the date Doss retained 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
28 
 
the funds was on or about October 31, 2004.  Doss concedes that 
the evidence may indicate that she possessed the funds when she 
withdrew them from the Georgia account on September 15, 2004, 
but argues that the State failed to produce evidence that she 
still had the funds more than a month later.  
¶59 Doss also argues that there was insufficient evidence 
of her intent to convert the estate funds to her own.  She notes 
that at trial, the State argued that the evidence established 
that if there was conversion, it had taken place either on 
February 20, 2004, when the funds were mailed to Doss in 
Georgia, or on March 1, 2004, when she withdrew the bulk of the 
funds from the Georgia estate account.  Therefore, Doss 
concludes, because any conversion would have been completed nine 
months before the alleged retention, the jury could not 
reasonably find that Doss's possession of the funds on or about 
October 31, 2004, was in her role as personal representative or 
with the intent to convert.  Finally, Doss asserts that any 
failure to comply with the order to return funds "long-since 
stolen" does not equate to committing the crime of "retention of 
funds lawfully in one's possession with intent to convert."   
¶60 The State responds by approvingly citing the court of 
appeals' conclusion that "the jury could reasonably infer that 
Doss retained possession of the funds" when Doss withdrew estate 
funds on September 15, 2004, and then appeared via telephone in 
October of 2004, at which time the probate court ordered her to 
pay back $70,555.47, and she failed to do so.  The State argues 
that a jury could reasonably infer that in October, Doss still 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
29 
 
had at least $10,000 of the $52,000 September 15 withdrawal, and 
that the jury was not required to believe Doss's October 7 
statement to the probate court that she no longer had the funds.  
Moreover, the State asserts that it was not required to prove 
that the offense was committed on a specific date.   
¶61 As to Doss's claim that there was insufficient 
evidence of her motive and intent to hide the funds, the State 
points to the notice sent by Ohio Casualty to Doss two days 
after the DOR suit was filed in which Ohio Casualty informed 
Doss that they had received notice that she was responsible for 
the taxes due by the estate, and asked her to correct the 
deficiency.  The State argues that the jury was entitled to 
infer from that evidence that Doss knew there were other claims 
on the funds she withdrew, and that she therefore intended to 
conceal the funds from the other claimants.  The State argues 
that Doss's intent to convert the funds was demonstrated by her 
writing a check to herself for "inheritance" from the estate 
account in an amount that far exceeded the amount to which she 
was entitled, even if no taxes had been due, and her failure to 
comply with the probate court's order to return the funds.   
¶62 A criminal conviction can be based in whole or in part 
on circumstantial evidence.  State v. Koller, 87 Wis. 2d 253, 
266, 274 N.W.2d 651 (1979).  In particular, the intent to 
defraud that must be established for a conviction under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) may be proven circumstantially and inferred 
from a defendant's conduct.  Tri-Tech Corp. of Am. v. Americomp 
Servs., Inc., 2002 WI 88, ¶28, 254 Wis. 2d 418, 646 N.W.2d 822.  
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
30 
 
This case fits squarely within such a scenario described by Tri-
Tech Corp. of America, in which this court explained that 
"[i]ndeed, the statute itself sets forth one acceptable method 
of proof:  a defendant's refusal to pay a claim upon demand to 
one entitled to be paid out of trust funds is prima facie 
evidence of the defendant's intent to convert the trust funds to 
his own use."  Id. 
¶63 In this case, the evidence creates abundant reasonable 
inferences supplementing the direct evidence of the required 
elements in this case.  See State v. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, ¶19, 281 
Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594 ("In evaluating the evidence, we 
give all reasonable inferences to it that will support the 
verdict.").   
¶64 We are in accord with the conclusion of the court of 
appeals that: 
[t]here was evidence in the record from which a jury 
could reasonably infer all the elements of the crime 
charged.  Doss withdrew all of the money from the M&I 
estate account and opened a SunTrust account with the 
estate money.  The record reflects that Doss withdrew 
the funds from the SunTrust account on September 15, 
2004.  In October, 2004, the Wisconsin probate court 
held a hearing at which Doss appeared by telephone.  
The court ordered Doss to pay $70,555.47 (the estate 
funds) to the clerk of courts.  Doss did not comply 
with the order.  Thus, the jury could reasonably infer 
that 
Doss 
retained 
possession 
of 
the 
funds.  
Accordingly, we conclude the evidence was sufficient 
to support the verdict. 
Doss, 305 Wis. 2d 414, ¶27.  We also note that the money 
obtained by Doss from the estate account was never returned to 
the estate account.  We conclude that Doss has failed to 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
31 
 
establish that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the State, 
was so insufficient as a matter of law that no reasonable trier 
of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Tri-Tech Corp. of Am., 254 Wis. 2d 418, ¶28; Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d at 501.   
IV 
¶65 We next address the remaining issues raised by Doss.  
For the reasons given below, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not commit reversible error in denying Doss's mistrial 
request related to evidence of service of the DOR complaint; 
that the evidence of the DOR lawsuit was not irrelevant and 
unfairly prejudicial; and that the prosecutor did not improperly 
rely upon Doss's failure to testify in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.13(1) and her constitutional rights to silence and to a 
fair trial.  In addition, we are not persuaded by Doss's 
arguments that we should reverse this case in the interest of 
justice, that the controversy was not fully tried, and that the 
post-conviction court erred in denying Doss a hearing on her 
ineffectiveness of counsel motion.  
A 
¶66 Doss 
contends that the circuit court improperly 
admitted DOR Attorney John Evans' testimony that he contracted 
with a process serving agency to serve the DOR's complaint on 
Doss, and that he sent the complaint out for service on August 
24, 2004.  Doss argues that this evidence should have been 
excluded because it proved only that the papers were sent out, 
not that she actually received service of process.  She 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
32 
 
maintains that proof of service was necessary to establish that 
she knew of the lawsuit and therefore had a motive to abscond 
with the estate funds.  Absent this proof, she argues, evidence 
of the lawsuit is not only irrelevant, but also prejudicial.  
¶67 However, Doss would not have us allow admission of 
such actual service evidence either.  She argues that not only 
was Evans' testimony regarding service of the DOR lawsuit 
irrelevant and prejudicial, but it also violated the trial 
judge's 
order 
prohibiting 
the 
State 
from 
introducing 
an 
affidavit from the process server attesting to the fact that 
Doss had been served.  On the first day of the trial, the 
circuit court ruled that the State could not introduce this 
affidavit, concluding that it was testimonial under Manuel.  
Although the State did not introduce the actual affidavit, Doss 
argues that the State's elicitation of testimony from Evans 
about his contract with the process serving agency essentially 
served the same purpose as the affidavit, and therefore violated 
the circuit court's order. 
¶68 The State points out that not only did the State never 
introduce the affidavit, but the circuit court sustained Doss's 
objection and ordered the answer stricken when the prosecutor 
asked Evans whether he received confirmation of service.  
Because the State did not attempt to introduce the affidavit of 
service and because the court sustained Doss's objection to 
Evans' testimony that he had been notified that Doss had been 
served, the State contends that the court acted within its 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
33 
 
discretionary 
authority 
by 
denying 
Doss's 
request 
for 
a 
mistrial.  
¶69 Whether to grant a mistrial is a decision that lies 
within the sound discretion of the circuit court.  State v. 
Ross, 2003 WI App 27, ¶47, 260 Wis. 2d 291, 659 N.W.2d 122 
(citing Haskins v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 408, 419, 294 N.W.2d 25 
(1980)).  The circuit court "must determine, in light of the 
whole proceeding, whether the claimed error was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a new trial.  The denial of a motion for 
mistrial will be reversed only on a clear showing of an 
erroneous use of discretion" by the circuit court.  Ross, 260 
Wis. 2d 291, ¶47 (citations omitted).  
¶70 In this case, the record does not support a clear 
showing of an erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit 
court.  While Doss asserts that the circuit court's order 
"exclud[ed] evidence that the DOR lawsuit ever was served on 
Doss, or at least that the lawsuit was served on her at any time 
relevant 
to 
this 
prosecution," 
this 
is 
not 
an 
accurate 
description of the order.  Rather, the circuit court expressly 
described its order as pertaining to the affidavit of service:  
It would seem to me that that the Affidavit of Service 
is testimonial under Manuel for two reasons:  One, 
it's an affidavit; and, number 2, it's certainly 
conceivable that at the time that it was executed a 
reasonably objective person or witness might believe 
that the statement would be used at a trial, not 
necessarily this trial, but certainly at a trial.  
That's the reason that the Affidavit is executed.  
 . . . . 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
34 
 
I think for now it's got to stay out.  I think it's 
got to stay out.  I think if she testifies, I think 
then you can properly confront her with this.  I think 
you've got a good-faith basis upon which to do it.   
(Emphasis added.)  This language from the court clearly 
demonstrates that Doss is incorrect in asserting that the 
circuit court ordered that all evidence regarding the DOR's 
service of process upon Doss be excluded.  The court merely 
ordered that the affidavit of service not be introduced, and it 
was not.   
¶71 Likewise, Doss's protestations that the circuit court 
denied her request for a mistrial based on an error of law are 
similarly misplaced.  Doss suggests that the court denied her 
motion because it "reconsider[ed]. . . its pretrial order," 
pointing to the court's explanation that it sustained Doss's 
objection to the prosecution's question about whether Evans 
received confirmation of service, because in the court's view, 
the question "fell within the spirit of the ruling."  It does 
not follow, as Doss seems to suggest, that because the judge 
sustained her objection to this question, the whole line of 
questioning violated the court's order.  Consequently, we 
conclude that the circuit court acted within its discretion when 
it 
denied 
Doss's 
request 
for 
a 
mistrial 
based 
on 
the 
prosecutor's use of evidence regarding the service of process of 
the DOR complaint upon Doss.   
B 
¶72 Doss argues that it was also improper for the circuit 
court to admit Exhibits 13 and 14——the complaint and the 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
35 
 
application for assessment and payment of income tax and for 
constructive trust——because absent proof that these documents 
were ever served on Doss, it would be inappropriate to conclude 
that Doss knew of their existence.  Doss maintains that the lack 
of evidence that she was actually served rendered evidence of 
the DOR lawsuit both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because 
it permitted speculation that she must have known of the lawsuit 
and 
therefore 
withdrew 
the 
funds 
with 
the 
intention 
of 
converting them.  The withdrawal itself, Doss insists, did not 
prove either that she knew of the DOR lawsuit or that she had a 
bad motive; the purpose and effect of introducing evidence of 
this suit, however, unfairly created that impression. 
¶73 The circuit court permitted the State to introduce 
these exhibits, observing that the State did not need to prove 
that Doss actually received the papers, but only that it sent 
them out for service and that Doss later took some action that 
was consistent with having received them.  
I don't think it's required there be absolute proof of 
receipt on the part of the defendant.  This is very 
much like someone who says they mailed a letter, and 
then there is some action that follows at some point 
after that.  It's a natural inference to be drawn that 
the letter was received, and so I don't find the 
objections to 13 and 14 valid, and they are received.  
Doss disagrees that the court's analogy of mailing a letter 
applies to the present situation, arguing that the presumption 
that a mailed letter was received should not apply to the 
delivery of documents through private couriers or agencies.  She 
further asserts that service of the DOR's complaint cannot be 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
36 
 
inferred from her appearance at the October 7, 2004, hearing 
because that hearing was called in connection with the probate 
matter, not with the DOR lawsuit.  Moreover, the fact that Ohio 
Casualty filed the motion requesting the hearing twelve days 
after Doss withdrew the funds, she argues, proves that it was 
logically impossible that her knowledge of this hearing provided 
a motive for her to close the SunTrust account.   
¶74 The State responds that evidence of the DOR lawsuit 
was relevant because Doss's refusal to obey Judge Martin Joseph 
Donald's order to return the estate funds was evidence that she 
knowingly retained funds to which she was not entitled.  It 
contends 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
determining 
that 
Exhibits 
13 
and 
14, 
in 
conjunction with Doss's appearance at the October 7 hearing, 
constituted admissible circumstantial evidence from which the 
jury could infer that Doss knew about the lawsuit.  The State 
rebuts Doss's argument that her knowledge of the October 7 
hearing does not bear on her knowledge of the DOR lawsuit, 
pointing out that the two cases were consolidated on October 4, 
2004.   
¶75 We agree with the State.  In Wisconsin, "[a]ll relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
constitutions of the United States and the state of Wisconsin, 
by statute, by these rules or by other rules adopted by the 
supreme court."  Wis. Stat. § 904.02.  However, whether such 
evidence should be admitted lies within the discretion of the 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
37 
 
circuit court.  State v. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d 431, 435, 328 N.W.2d 
898 (Ct. App. 1982).   
¶76 In this case, evidence of the DOR lawsuit is relevant 
because the reason the court gave Doss for its order that Doss 
return to the court the money she took was "so that we can 
address all the other issues as to whether or not the tax claim 
is one that is viable or that needs to be recognized."  
Furthermore, the impetus for Ohio Casualty's motion to surrender 
estate funds to the court which was the subject of the October 
7, 2004, hearing was Doss's refusal to pay the taxes owed by her 
father's estate to the DOR.  The DOR complaint named Ohio 
Casualty as codefendant in its suit against Doss, and the 
probate case and the DOR lawsuit had been consolidated and 
transferred to Judge Donald on October 4, 2004.  Accordingly, 
Doss's appearance at the October 7, 2004, hearing was directly 
related to the DOR lawsuit and is therefore relevant to the 
question of whether Doss knowingly retained funds to which she 
was not entitled.  
¶77 Doss's 
argument 
that 
the 
court 
inappropriately 
analogized sending documents to a private process server with 
mailing a letter is not persuasive.  This court need not address 
her argument——that Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 
(1884), Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 612, 516 N.W.2d 362 
(1994), and Danielson v. Brody Seating Co., 71 Wis. 2d 424, 428, 
238 N.W.2d 531 (1976), collectively stand for the idea that the 
presumption that a mailed letter was received only when it is 
mailed through 
a 
government entity——because this argument 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
38 
 
ignores the thrust of the circuit court's ruling.  What the 
circuit judge said was "this is very much like someone who says 
they mailed a letter, and then there is some action that follows 
at some point after that.  It's a natural inference to be drawn 
that the letter was received."  (Emphasis added.)  The court 
addressed Evans' testimony that he sent the letters out for 
service in conjunction with the fact that Doss later appeared at 
a hearing related to the estate's nonpayment of taxes as 
collectively creating an inference that Doss knew about the 
lawsuit. 
¶78 Doss's contention that evidence of the DOR lawsuit was 
unfairly prejudicial is similarly unfounded.  Although Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, the only support Doss provides for her 
argument 
that 
evidence 
of 
the 
DOR 
lawsuit 
was 
unfairly 
prejudicial is that it permitted the inference that Doss's 
motive was to convert the funds when she withdrew them from 
SunTrust.  This, however, does not rise to the level of unfair 
prejudice under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  As the court of appeals 
has noted: 
"'Unfair prejudice' does not mean damage to a party's 
cause since such damage will always result from the 
introduction of evidence contrary to the party's 
contentions."  Rather, unfair prejudice results where 
the proffered evidence, if introduced, would have a 
tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or 
if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its 
sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or 
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
39 
 
something other than the established propositions in 
the case.   
State v. Mordica, 168 Wis. 2d 593, 605, 484 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 
1992) (citations omitted).   
¶79 Thus, the fact that evidence of the DOR lawsuit may 
have led the jury to infer that Doss knew she had retained funds 
to which she was not entitled does not render the evidence 
unfairly prejudicial.  Doss has not shown how evidence that 
there was a DOR tax claim outstanding against the estate would 
inflame a jury's sense of sympathy or horror, provoke its 
instinct to punish, "or otherwise cause[] a jury to base its 
decision on something other than the established propositions in 
the case."  Mordica, 168 Wis. 2d at 605.  Consequently, we 
conclude that the Doss has failed to make a clear showing of an 
erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court in its 
decision to permit evidence of the DOR's lawsuit.   
C 
¶80 We next address whether the prosecutor improperly 
referenced a failure by Doss to testify, thereby violating Wis. 
Stat. § 905.13(1) and Doss's constitutional rights to silence 
and a fair trial as Doss contends.  Doss argues that the 
prosecutor's comments referring to the lack of explanation or 
accounting for the missing funds during the State's closing 
argument was of such character that the jury would necessarily 
take it to be a comment on the fact that Doss herself had failed 
to testify and explain herself.  Specifically, the prosecutor 
argued during closing, in relevant part, as follows: 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
40 
 
I also focus on the fact that there has been no 
accounting 
that 
has 
been 
uncovered 
in 
our 
investigation, no explanation as to where the money 
had gone. . . .  
. . . There is no evidence on this record that this 
money, the way in which this money was spent, and our 
investigation reveals only the extraordinary end point 
when Ms. Doss walked into a bank and walked out with 
$52,788.34 in cash. 
Who among us has ever done that?  What is the 
explanation for that?  That speaks volumes to me. 
. . . . 
. . . I myself have never heard an explanation for why 
we moved from the first estate account to one personal 
account, to a third account and second personal 
account in the space of just days.  To me that says 
that there's some intent to conceal here. 
. . . . 
And a person who truly didn't have the money, but was 
interested in making sure that they abided by the 
requirements of the law would have . . . provided some 
sort of formal accounting to the court, which was 
never provided, not, and from any witness that we have 
heard from the witness stand. . . .   
¶81 The State responds that Doss's claim fails for two 
reasons.  First, it argues that to preserve an objection, Doss 
was obligated to "make a contemporaneous objection and move for 
a mistrial," State v. Guzman, 2001 WI App 54, ¶25, 241 Wis. 2d 
310, 624 N.W.2d 717, but Doss failed to object.  Second, the 
State contends that the comments did not meet the criteria set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34 (1988), and recognized by the 
Wisconsin courts as well:   
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
41 
 
[F]or a prosecutor's comment to constitute an improper 
reference to a defendant's failure to testify, three 
factors must be present:  (1) the comment must 
constitute a reference to the defendant's failure to 
testify; (2) the comment must propose that the failure 
to testify demonstrates guilt; and (3) the comment 
must not be a fair response to a defense argument. 
 
State v. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, ¶21, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715 
N.W.2d 669 (citing Robinson, 485 U.S. at 34).   
¶82 The State asserts that the prosecutor's comments 
failed to meet these requirements.  The State first explains 
that the prosecutor's comment that "there has no explanation as 
to where the money has gone," was not a reference to Doss's 
decision not to testify, but rather to the results of the 
State's investigation.  The State further asserts that the 
statement by Doss's attorney in her closing argument that Doss's 
behavior in depositing the estate funds showed nothing but good 
motives opened the door for the prosecutor to comment on the 
lack of explanation for Doss's movement of the funds.  The State 
argues that the prosecutor's statement that he did not "believe 
that somebody who walks into a bank and takes out $52,000 
doesn't have that money some 16 business days later" does not 
violate the Robinson standards because the comment was a 
reference to the lack of evidence in general, not a reference to 
Doss's failure to testify.  The State additionally points out 
that defense counsel did not object to this statement.   
¶83 In this case, there was no objection made by Doss's 
counsel.  Therefore, we agree with the State that Doss waived 
this issue.  Not only did her attorney fail to object to the 
prosecutor's closing statement, but in addition, no cautionary 
or curative instruction was sought.  This prevented the circuit 
court from having the opportunity to correct any alleged error.  
See Guzman, 241 Wis. 2d 310, ¶25.  As such, Doss in essence 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
42 
 
conceded at trial that the commentary did not cross the line to 
such a degree that her constitutional rights were substantially 
infringed, requiring a curative instruction, let alone reversal. 
D 
¶84 We further reject Doss's more general argument that 
this court should reverse her conviction in the interest of 
justice, and her related ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  Doss claims that reversal is justified under Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06 because the jury was confronted with "evidence not 
properly admitted which so clouded a crucial issue that it may 
be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried," 
citing State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 
(1996).  
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 provides: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
¶86 While this court possesses the discretionary authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 to reverse a conviction in the 
interest of justice if the real controversy was not fully tried, 
we do so "only in exceptional cases."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 
161.  Such exceptional cases are generally limited to cases in 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
43 
 
which the jury was erroneously denied the opportunity to hear 
important testimony bearing on an important issue of the case, 
when the jury had before it evidence not properly admitted that 
"so clouded a crucial issue that it may be fairly said that the 
real controversy was not fully tried," id. at 160, or when an 
erroneous instruction prevented the real controversy in a case 
from being tried.  State v. Bannister, 2007 WI 86, ¶41, 302 Wis. 
2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892.  This is not such a case.   
¶87 Doss does not contend that the jury was denied the 
opportunity to hear important testimony, and we have already 
rejected Doss's claims of erroneously admitted evidence and 
improper closing argument.  Combining these arguments does not 
transform them into meritorious arguments.  Mentek v. State, 71 
Wis. 2d 799, 809, 238 N.W.2d 752 (1976).   
¶88 Doss offers an alternative basis for concluding that 
the real controversy was not fully tried; she argues that the 
court improperly failed to instruct the jury to determine who 
the owner of the funds was at the time of the alleged theft, 
suggesting that Doss herself was the owner of the funds she 
stole.  She makes the argument that "fundamental principles of 
probate law" establish that she was the owner of the funds, 
rather than the estate, citing Wis. Stat. § 857.018 and a series 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 857.01 provides: 
Upon his or her letters being issued by the court, the 
personal representative succeeds to the interest of 
the decedent in all property of the decedent. . . .  
With regard to property subject to the election of the 
surviving 
spouse 
under 
s. 
861.02, 
the 
personal 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
44 
 
of cases including Peters v. Kell, 12 Wis. 2d 32, 41, 106 N.W.2d 
407 (1960); Krause v. Krause, 240 Wis. 72, 75-76, 2 N.W.2d 733 
(1942); Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 164 Wis. 131, 134, 159 
N.W.2d 737 (1916).  
¶89 Wisconsin's theft statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b), 
does not require that the owner be named in the jury 
instruction.  As long as the jury concludes that the money Doss 
moved and refused to turn over upon being ordered to do so did 
not belong to her, its conclusion encompasses the necessary 
finding that Doss was not the owner of the money; the jury is 
not required to additionally identify beyond that who the owner 
is.  When this issue arose at the circuit court level, the court 
concluded that Doss "seeks to exploit the nuances of ownership 
in a probate estate in order to nullify the consequences of her 
theft of property that was not hers."  We agree with the State 
that even if Doss held title to the estate assets as a personal 
representative, nothing justified her refusal to return those 
funds to the clerk when ordered to do so by the probate court.  
We therefore conclude that the jury was properly instructed on 
this point.   
¶90 As to Doss's claim that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to object to 
the prosecutor's alleged prohibited comments on her failure to 
                                                                                                                                                             
representative may manage and control the property 
while the property is subject to administration.  The 
personal representative shall determine when, during 
administration, 
property 
shall 
be 
distributed 
to 
satisfy an election under s. 861.02. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
45 
 
testify, and failed to object to the other claimed errors she 
describes in her other claims regarding the bank records and DOR 
lawsuit evidence, each of these ineffective assistance arguments 
similarly 
incorporates previous arguments we have already 
rejected.  To make a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel 
claim, 
the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
counsel's 
representation 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness and that the counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced his or her defense.  State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 
207, 217, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 678-88 (1984).   
¶91 In reference to the majority of Doss's claims, for all 
the reasons we have already discussed, Doss fails to establish 
how her counsel's performance failed to adhere to an objective 
standard of reasonableness.  As to the one issue that we 
resolved on waiver grounds rather than on its merits, whether 
the prosecutor's closing argument contained improper commentary 
on Doss's lack of testimony, Doss fails to make the case that 
the closing argument rose to the level of the type of 
impermissible commentary upon Doss's silence as to warrant an 
objection from counsel.   
¶92 We have previously declined to establish a bright-line 
test as to "whether a prosecutorial comment crosses over 'into 
the forbidden area of comment on an accused's failure to 
testify' and 'violates constitutional rights,'" State v. Moeck, 
2005 WI 57, ¶74, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783(citing State v. 
Edwardsen, 146 Wis. 2d 198, 215, 430 N.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
46 
 
1988)).  Instead, such determinations must be made on a case-by-
case basis.  Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, ¶74.   
¶93 The court of appeals has adopted the approach taken by 
the Third Circuit that "[t]he test for determining whether 
remarks are directed to a defendant's failure to testify is 
'whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of 
such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily 
take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to 
testify.'  Questions about the absence of facts in the record 
need not be taken as a comment on a defendant's failure to 
testify."  State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 246, 358 N.W.2d 
824 (Ct. App. 1984)(citations omitted).  Applying this test, the 
court of appeals has ruled that by presenting a limited reply to 
a defendant's claim during a pro se trial that the state was 
unable to prove its case, the prosecutor did not improperly 
comment on the defendant's failure to testify.  Id.; See also 
State v. Werlein, 136 Wis. 2d 445, 457, 401 N.W.2d 848 (Ct. App. 
1987)([T]he prosecutor's comments were made in rebuttal to 
defense 
counsel's 
suggestion 
that 
these 
were 
legitimate 
explanations for the events leading to the shooting."). 
¶94 Thus, 
where 
Doss's 
attorney 
argued 
that 
Doss's 
behavior in depositing the estate funds showed nothing but good 
motives, it is not clear that the prosecutor's statements about 
the absence of facts in the record should be taken as a comment 
on Doss's failure to testify, particularly where there was no 
direct reference to Doss's failure to testify.  This is the type 
of case that straddles a fine line between permissible and 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
47 
 
impermissible commentary by the State.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that a prosecutor's statement that falls short of 
a direct statement on a defendant's failure to testify, but 
instead "'refers to testimony as uncontradicted where the 
defendant has elected not to testify and when he is the only 
person able to dispute the testimony,'" is at most an attenuated 
violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), and 
Robinson, 485 U.S. at 34, and may not actually constitute a 
violation at all.  United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 503, 
506 & n.4 (1983).  Therefore, Doss has not established that her 
counsel's failure to object was deficient performance.  See 
Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 217; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.   
V 
¶95 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
commit either statutory or constitutional error in admitting the 
bank records at issue, and that there was sufficient evidence in 
this case to sustain a conviction.  We further conclude that the 
prosecutor did not violate a court order excluding evidence of 
the DOR complaint; that evidence of the DOR lawsuit against Doss 
was not irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial; that Doss waived 
her challenge that the prosecutor did not improperly comment 
upon Doss's lack of testimony; that reversal in the interest of 
justice is not appropriate; and that the circuit court did not 
erroneously deny Doss's postconviction ineffective assistance of 
counsel motion.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
48 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No. 
2006AP2254-CR   
 
 
 
1