Title: State v. Holmes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92648
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2013

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92648 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JOSEPH N. HOLMES, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Christian County, Missouri 
Honorable John S. Waters, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 11, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joseph N. Holmes appeals his conviction for misdemeanor criminal nonsupport.  
He argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal claiming 
section 568.040, RSMo. Supp. 2011, is unconstitutional because it makes lack of good 
cause an element of the crime of criminal nonsupport but then shifts the burden of 
proving good cause to the defendant, thereby violating his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to disprove an 
element of the offense.   
Mr. Holmes misconstrues section 568.040.  As in effect in 2011 when his crime 
occurred, section 568.040.1 set out the elements of the crime of criminal nonsupport by 
stating, “A parent commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly fails to 
provide, without good cause, adequate support which such parent is legally obligated to 
provide ….”  It thereby makes lack of good cause an element of the offense.1   
Elements of an offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  While, as   
Mr. Holmes notes, section 568.040.3 creates an overlapping option for the defendant to 
put on an affirmative defense of good cause for failure to provide adequate support under 
a preponderance of the evidence standard, this second provision does not negate the 
express requirement in paragraph 1 making lack of good cause an element of the offense 
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State conceded at trial that it 
had the burden of proving lack of good cause beyond a reasonable doubt under paragraph 
1 of the statute, regardless of what the statute also may say about affirmative defenses.  
While the rationale for these overlapping sections is elusive, the wisdom of a statute 
permitting a defendant to offer evidence in support of an affirmative defense that 
duplicates an element of the crime is not before the Court and does not raise a 
constitutional issue.  This Court also rejects Mr. Holmes’ argument that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence from which the judge reasonably could have concluded that            
Mr. Holmes’ failure to pay the ordered child support was “without good cause.”  
Affirmed. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
The evidence, considered in the light favorable to the judgment, shows that       
Mr. Holmes and his wife, Montez Holmes, had a son, J.K.H.  Mr. Holmes was self-
employed as a tile setter.  He also owned rental property, some of which he acquired prior 
to and some during the marriage. 
                                             
 
1   Unless otherwise noted, references to section 568.040 are to the 2011 version. 
The parties later separated.  Because Ms. Holmes resided in Rolla, where J.K.H. 
was enrolled in school, and because Mr. Holmes resided in Christian County,             Ms. 
Holmes became the custodial parent.  When Ms. Holmes relocated to Christian County, 
she and Mr. Holmes arranged for the child to live with Ms. Holmes at least four days a 
week and with Mr. Holmes for two to three days a week.  In February 2010,    Ms. 
Holmes applied for Medicaid for J.K.H., and, in that process, learned that she could file a 
claim for child support with the Missouri Department of Social Services, Family Support 
Division.  See § 454.470.4, RSMo. Supp. 2011.  Once she did so, the director of the 
family support division issued a notice and finding of financial responsibility to Mr. 
Holmes.  Because Mr. Holmes did not file a timely response setting forth objections and 
requesting a hearing, the director entered an administrative order requiring Mr. Holmes to 
pay $428 in monthly child support, which became effective in November 2010.   
 
Mr. Holmes did not comply with this child support order.  The charges that are the 
basis of this case do not flow from that failure to comply, however, but from                
Mr. Holmes’ alleged failure to comply with section 568.040, which in 2011 stated that a 
parent “commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly fails to provide, 
without good cause, adequate support which such parent is legally obligated to      
provide ….” § 568.040.1.  Ms. Holmes claimed that Mr. Holmes failed to provide any 
monetary support for their child during the months of March, April and May 2011.  
Accordingly, the State charged Mr. Holmes with the Class A misdemeanor of criminal 
nonsupport for failure to provide necessary support for his son for the months of March 
through May 2011.   
 
3
At trial, the State presented evidence that Mr. Holmes was self-employed.  
Additionally, the child’s mother testified that Mr. Holmes owned rental property and 
collected rent on that property during the months in which he did not pay any child 
support.  She also testified that he was both physically and mentally able to work, yet he 
did not provide any clothing, medical care or health insurance during the three months at 
issue.  She further testified he told her that “he did not want the State involved” and that 
he would fight any effort to enforce the child support order “as much as he possibly can.”  
Finally, she said that he told her:  
he would pay me what he could pay me when he could pay me.  And I said 
that unfortunately [the child’s needs] ... don't come up when convenient, so 
child care still is required, so I need something to help. And he said, “Well, 
I'll pay you half of what his needs are.”   
 
She did not agree to this suggested division of the costs, and he paid her nothing. 
At trial, Mr. Holmes did not raise the affirmative defense of good cause and did 
not testify.  Rather, at the conclusion of the bench trial, he filed a motion for judgment of 
acquittal, asserting that section 568.040 violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to show 
good cause for not making the required payments when lack of good cause is an element 
of the offense.   
The State conceded that it bore the burden of proof to show that Mr. Holmes acted 
without good cause in failing to provide child support during the three months in question 
and that it believed it had met this burden of proof through the testimony summarized 
above.  The trial court agreed and entered judgment against Mr. Holmes.  The court 
 
4
sentenced Mr. Holmes to 180 days incarceration, suspended execution of sentence and 
placed Mr. Holmes on two years of unsupervised probation.     
Mr. Holmes now appeals his conviction for misdemeanor criminal nonsupport, 
arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal based 
on the constitutional argument described.  Because this appeal directly challenges the 
validity of section 568.040, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, 
section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
To determine whether the evidence presented to the court was sufficient to support 
a conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not 
weigh the evidence but rather “accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt 
together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignore[s] all contrary 
evidence and inferences.”  State v. Latall, 271 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo. banc 2008); see also 
State v. Guelker, 548 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Mo. banc 1976).  This “Court asks only whether 
there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably could have found the 
defendant guilty.”  Latall, 271 S.W.3d at 566.   
III. 
SECTION 568.040 DOES NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF 
LACK OF GOOD CAUSE  
 
 
Mr. Holmes was convicted under section 568.040, which at the time of his crime 
in 2011 stated in relevant part: 
1.    … A parent commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly 
fails to provide, without good cause, adequate support which such parent is 
legally obligated to provide for his or her child or stepchild who is not 
otherwise emancipated by operation of law. 
 
5
2. 
…. 
3.   
Inability to provide support for good cause shall be an affirmative 
defense under this section.  A person who raises such affirmative defense 
has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
 
The parties agree that if proof of a particular fact is made an element of an offense, 
then due process requires the State to prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt.2  
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-78 (2000); State v. Taylor, 238 S.W.3d 
145, 148 (Mo. banc 2007).  Here, paragraph 1 states that the crime of nonsupport occurs 
if a parent “knowingly fails to provide, without good cause, adequate support ….”  But 
paragraph 3 then states, “Inability to provide support for good cause shall be an 
affirmative defense under this section.”  Mr. Holmes argues that, while the statute might 
be constitutional if it ended with paragraph 1, the language of paragraph 3, which states 
that the defendant “has the burden of proving the defense [of good cause] by a 
preponderance of the evidence,” removes the burden from the State, otherwise placed on 
it in paragraph 1, to prove lack of good cause and instead places the burden on the 
defendant to make an affirmative showing that he did have good cause to fail to provide 
adequate support.  
Certainly, it is unclear why paragraph 1 makes lack of good cause an element and 
                                             
 
2 In oral arguments, Mr. Holmes raised an additional argument that imprisoning him for 
failure to pay child support violated article 1, section 11 of the Missouri Constitution, 
which prohibits imprisoning an individual for debt.  He did not discuss prior Missouri 
authority on this issue such as State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt, 533 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. banc 
1976), which held that imprisonment for failure “to comply with orders for payment of 
maintenance and child support” does not violate “the constitutional prohibition against 
imprisonment for debt.”  In any event, Mr. Holmes failed to raise this argument below or 
in his briefs on appeal, and, therefore, the argument is not preserved.  See Artman v. State 
Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 918 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. banc 1996).  
 
6
paragraph 3 also makes good cause an affirmative defense.   But, if more than one 
statutory interpretation is possible, “this Court will interpret [the] statute in a manner that 
renders it constitutional.”  Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633, 647 
(Mo. banc. 2012).  This Court disagrees that the only way to make sense of this confusion 
is to presume that, in adopting paragraph 3, the legislature intended to leave lack of good 
cause as an element but move the burden of proving it to the defendant and lower the 
standard of proof of that element to a preponderance of the evidence.  The statute on its 
face demonstrates the contrary, because paragraph 3 refers to good cause as a defense, 
not an element, and accordingly says it must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
One alternative interpretation would be that the legislature wanted to emphasize 
the right of a defendant to show that he or she had good cause by explicitly stating that 
defendant could prove this as an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.  
While this seems at best surplusage in light of the requirement in paragraph 1 that the 
State prove lack of good cause beyond a reasonable doubt, the language of the two 
paragraphs is different:  In paragraph 1, the State must prove a negative – lack of good 
cause – while in paragraph 3, the defense has the option of offering the affirmative – the 
existence of good cause – as a defense.  While this distinction may be a minor one, and 
although this Court may not be certain why the legislature drafted the statute in this 
manner, it had the authority to do so.  
Another alternative interpretation is to presume that, while the legislature 
mentioned lack of good cause in paragraph 1, it intended the language in paragraph 3 to 
 
7
clarify that lack of good cause is not an element of the crime but rather is solely an 
affirmative defense because, on its face, paragraph 3 states it sets out a defense. This 
would not be particularly artful, however, as this purpose could be served by adoption of 
paragraph 3 alone without mentioning “without good cause” in paragraph 1.  Retention of 
the “without good cause” language in paragraph 1 just confuses the issue if this was the 
legislature’s intent.  
In other words, had the legislature wished to remove “without good cause” as an 
element but allow it as an affirmative defense, it could have removed the phrase “without 
good cause” from paragraph 1 at the same time it added the affirmative defense to 
paragraph 3.  Indeed, that is just what it did in 2012 when it amended section 568.040 to 
remove lack of good cause from paragraph 1 but left the portion of paragraph 3 making 
proof of good cause an affirmative defense.  See section 568.040, RSMo. Supp. 2012.3 
Perhaps the legislature’s 2012 amendment means that its retention of lack of good 
cause in paragraph 1 in the 2011 version of the statute was mere oversight. Whatever its 
reasons for providing these overlapping methods of addressing the issue of good cause, 
the fact remains that the legislature did leave the requirement of proof of lack of good 
cause as an element in 2011 and removed it as an element in 2012.  Mr. Holmes’ crime 
                                             
 
3 This Court is not called on to and does not address the validity of the 2012 revision to 
the statute, which removes the requirement of proof of lack of good cause as an element 
of the offense. The pertinent part of the 2012 version of the statute states: 
 
1.  … a parent commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly 
fails to provide adequate support which such parent is legally obligated to 
provide for his or her child or stepchild who is not otherwise emancipated 
by operation of law.  
 
8
occurred in 2011; therefore, it is governed by the 2011 version of the statute.  
Rather than interpret this duplication to make lack of good cause an element and 
then nonsensically impose the burden of disproving it on the defendant while 
characterizing it as a defense rather than an element, the most logical interpretation in the 
circumstances is to interpret it as requiring the State to prove lack of good cause while at 
the same time permitting the defendant to offer additional proof that he has good cause.  
Indeed, the State agreed below for the purposes of this case that this was the proper 
interpretation of the statute, and it shouldered the burden to prove that Mr. Holmes acted 
“without good cause.”  This Court concurs in this reading. 
 
Mr. Holmes argues that Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988), requires a different 
result.  Hicks held that the State could not convict a defendant of contempt of a court 
order to pay child support without proof that he acted intentionally.  It was improper, 
therefore, to place the burden of proving lack of intent on the defendant in that case.  
Here, by contrast, the issue is criminal nonsupport, not failure to comply with a court 
order for child support or the administrative order for child support involved in this case.  
In addition, for the reasons just noted, this Court interprets the statute to place the burden 
of proof on the State to prove lack of good cause.  Hicks, therefore, is not on point.  
IV. 
THE STATE OFFERED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF FAILURE TO 
PAY WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.  
 
 
Mr. Holmes also argues that even if the statute placed the burden on the State to 
prove lack of good cause as an element of the crime, the State failed to do so.  He asserts 
the only evidence of his ability to support his son is his wife’s testimony that he owns 
 
9
rental properties that produce rent each month.  He further argues that, without bank 
records, tax records, employment records and pay stubs, the State failed to introduce any 
evidence of his financial condition.  Mr. Holmes argues that because the State did not 
present evidence to establish his financial condition, the State must have relied on 
burden-shifting to convict him.  While not directly stated, Mr. Holmes seems to be 
arguing that without testimony regarding how much rent he received, it was impossible 
for the court below to find that these rents were sufficient to allow him to pay his 
administratively ordered child support of $428 per month. 
It is not incumbent on the State to show that Mr. Holmes could pay the ordered 
amount of child support.  The State’s burden is to show that Mr. Holmes, without good 
cause, violated his statutory obligation “to provide … adequate support which [he] is 
legally obligated to provide for his … child.”  § 568.040.1.  To meet its burden, the State 
had to prove only that Mr. Holmes did not have good cause for failing to provide 
adequate monetary support for his son, not that he was able to pay the full amount 
required by the administrative order.  
Mr. Holmes also understates the evidence showing lack of good cause.  This is not 
a case in which Mr. Holmes made some payments and the question is whether he could 
or should have made greater payments, or, as the State argued below, “It’s not a question 
of whether he even provided adequate support, because the evidence showed that he 
provided none.”  Here, it is uncontested that he provided absolutely no monetary support 
for his son and no in-kind support other than to feed and house the child during those 
days on which he had custody. While a child support order is not conclusive regarding 
 
10
what constitutes adequate support, a complete failure to pay child support is evidence of 
failure to pay adequate support.  See State v. Reed, 181 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Mo. banc 
2006); State v. Sellers, 77 S.W.3d 2, 4-5 (Mo. App. 2002). 
In addition, the State presented evidence at trial that Mr. Holmes was self-
employed as a tile setter, was physically and mentally able to work, and had rental 
property income of an unspecified amount during March, April and May 2011.  Further, 
his wife testified that he offered to divide the child’s expenses, from which it can be 
inferred that he had some funds available for support. Finally, there is no evidence that 
his refusal to pay any money at all was due to a lack of funds; to the contrary, his wife 
testified that he also said he would not pay because he did not like being ordered to do so 
and would fight the order as much as he could.  Mr. Holmes’ only other argument in 
support of his assertion that the record did not show he failed to adequately support his 
son was his evidence that he fed and housed his son on the two to three days a week his 
son stayed with him, and that doing so satisfied his obligations.  This argument was 
rejected in State v. Degraffenreid, 877 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App. 1994): 
The gist of Defendant’s argument is that because he fed and housed his 
daughters during the times when he was exercising his right of visitation 
pursuant to the decree of dissolution, his obligation of providing adequate 
support was somehow satisfied or negated. Such is not the support 
obligation of a parent in this state.  
 
Id. at 215.    
From this evidence, a fact-finder could infer that Mr. Holmes had the ability to pay 
some amount of support for his son through his rental property and his employment and 
failed to pay not because had had good cause no to do so but because he vowed to fight 
 
11
 
12
the child support order.  This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding 
that Mr. Holmes knowingly failed to provide adequate support for his son without good 
cause and, therefore, was guilty of criminal non-support.   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Court finds that section 568.040.1, RSMo. Supp. 2011, required the State to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to provide adequate support 
without good cause, and section 568.040.3 does not unconstitutionally place the burden 
on defendant of disproving this element.  By leaving this requirement in paragraph 1, the 
legislature clearly left it as an element to be proved by the State beyond a reasonable 
doubt, however unclear its purpose may have been in duplicatively permitting a 
defendant also to prove good cause as an affirmative defense.  The State met its burden 
by presenting sufficient evidence that Mr. Holmes knowingly failed to provide his son 
with adequate support without good cause.  The judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
All concur.