Title: Williams v. State
Citation: 325 N.E.2d 827
Docket Number: 874S154
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1975

325 N.E.2d 827 (1975)
Steven Wayne WILLIAMS and Albert L. Williams, Appellants (Defendants below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 874S154.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 16, 1975.
*828 Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Bruce H. Klang, Deputy Public Defender, for appellants.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Walter F. Lockhart, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
Petitioners appeal from the denial of their petition for post-conviction relief, seeking withdrawal of their pleas of guilty to first degree murder.
On January 19, 1973, petitioners were preliminarily charged with first degree murder and had counsel appointed at that time. Thereafter, petitioners, with counsel, were present when the Grand Jury of Elkhart County returned formal indictments. On January 26, 1973, petitioners waived arraignment on the formal charge and entered pleas of guilty to first degree murder. During this proceeding, the court addressed petitioners only once, asking them their ages. The court made the following entry:
The statements referred to by the trial court in its entry were forms prepared by the prosecutor. These forms were read to and completed for petitioners by defense counsel. Each form bore the following general information: defendant's name, the place and date of his birth, years of formal education and a statement that defendant could read, write, and understand the English language. The form advised each petitioner that he was charged with first degree murder and that the penalty upon conviction was life imprisonment. The form further stated:
Each form continued with the following statement written by defense counsel:
Immediately following this statement on each form, there appears the signature of the petitioner named therein.
Prior to accepting petitioners' guilty pleas, the court heard the following evidence:
On February 8, the trial court heard testimony establishing the corpus delicti, received petitioners' extra-judicial confessions, *831 entered judgment and sentenced petitioners to life imprisonment.
The single issue presented by this appeal is whether petitioners' guilty pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily when the record of the guilty pleas proceeding demonstrates that petitioners were advised of their rights under Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, by defense counsel but not by the trial court.
The entry of a plea of guilty in state court proceedings entails a waiver of three important federal constitutional rights. As stated in Boykin, the first of these rights:
The waiver of these federal rights may not be presumed "from a silent record." 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279-80 (emphasis added).
The definition of a silent record is the threshold question critical to the determination of petitioners' appeal. Any conclusion as to the meaning of that term must be predicated upon the ultimate holding in Boykin, i.e.:
This holding does not state that a guilty plea is constitutionally defective when the record fails to disclose that the judge advised defendant of his constitutional rights even though evidence in the record demonstrates that defendant was advised of each of the rights enumerated in Boykin. If Boykin had expressly so held, there would be no doubt that the record in this case would be silent, for the judge did not affirmatively advise petitioners of their rights.
We recognize that some portions of Boykin may implicitly suggest the rule which the express holding does not mandate: i.e., the trial court must advise a defendant of the federal rights enumerated in Boykin, regardless of any other evidence in the record. Consider, for example, the following excerpts:
However, if our task is to probe about the opinion for language which more fully describes the holding in terms of what the record must contain, then the following passages are relevant:
These excerpts, in light of the express holding set forth above, lead to but one conclusion about the import of Boykin. The essence of Boykin is that the record must affirmatively show that a defendant entering a guilty plea does so voluntarily and intelligently. Moreover, a plea could not be presumed to be made intelligently and understandingly where the record did not show that defendant knew the federal rights which would be lost by his plea. We conclude that Boykin was concerned primarily with what the record must show and not who must make the record. Of course, there can be no doubt that the trial judge should as a matter of practice inform the defendant of the rights enumerated in Boykin, regardless of other evidence showing that defendant was advised of his rights. But such a rule, however desirable, is not constitutionally mandated, and we decline to create such a requirement as a matter of state law.
This view accords with prior decisions of this Court. In Lockhart v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 349, 274 N.E.2d 523, we affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief where the record revealed that defendant was represented by counsel, had consulted with counsel prior to entering the plea, and appellant acknowledged that counsel had advised him of his constitutional rights. Lockhart unsuccessfully contended that his plea was invalid on the basis of Boykin. In Brimhall v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 153, 165, 279 N.E.2d 557, 564, we ordered that defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea where the record contained no indication "that the appellant was advised of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions, and nothing to indicate that he intentionally and freely waived these rights." While Brimhall had consulted with counsel, there was no testimony that he had been advised of his constitutional rights under Boykin. Nor did the record reflect such advice by the court. In Brown v. State (1973), Ind., 300 N.E.2d 83, we allowed appellant to withdraw his guilty plea where the record showed only *833 that defendant was represented by counsel and did not show that he had been advised of his rights.
In Brown we stated:
Our holding in Brown was clearly premised upon the same interpretation of Boykin which we find controlling today.
That interpretation requires that the trial court provide a record of the guilty plea proceeding which demonstrates that the defendant was advised of his Boykin rights by the trial court itself or that the defendant was otherwise aware of such guaranties. Campbell v. State (1975), Ind., 321 N.E.2d 560, 563-64. We have repeatedly stressed the desirability of the trial court advising a defendant of his federal constitutional rights as enumerated in Boykin. We affirm that position today. We believe the essence of that decision requires only that the record affirmatively show that defendant was advised of the Boykin rights prior to the entry of his plea. A defendant's guilty plea is not tainted merely because the trial court fails to repeat defendant's rights for him, so long as the record of the guilty plea proceeding contains evidence from which the trial court may validly conclude that defendant was meaningfully informed of the specific rights enumerated in Boykin. Nothing we have said, however, may be interpreted as relieving the trial court of its absolute duty to decide, on the basis of evidence in the record before it, whether a defendant's plea is made voluntarily and understandingly.
In view of our holding, we believe it prudent to discuss several decisions of the Court of Appeals, which would reach a different result on the facts of this case. In Thomas v. State (1974), Ind. App., 306 N.E.2d 136, 138, we find the following statement:
Thomas has been followed in Toon v. State (1974), Ind. App., 317 N.E.2d 875 and Kite v. State (1974), Ind. App., 318 N.E.2d 390. Kite's rephrasing of Thomas states the rule most forcefully.
We do not find such rule to be compelled by the authorities cited in Thomas v. State, supra. In Bonner v. State, the court faced the following issue.
and resolved it thusly:
This conclusion was undeniably required on the basis of the record for the post-Boykin plea before the court in Bonner. But see Conley v. State (1972), Ind., 284 N.E.2d 803. Compare Chandler v. State (1973), Ind., 300 N.E.2d 877, 881; Campbell v. State (1975), Ind., 321 N.E.2d 560, 563. The discussion found in Bonner v. State, supra, following the above stated conclusion, however, strongly suggests that a trial court must always advise a defendant of his federal rights, regardless of whether the defendant is represented by counsel. Read broadly, such a statement goes too far. The relevant inquiry is not whether a defendant is represented by counsel, but whether defendant has been duly apprised of his rights and the record of the guilty plea proceeding so indicates. When the record of the guilty plea proceeding shows only that defendant was represented by counsel and the court failed to advise defendant of his rights prior to the entry of his plea, the requirements of Boykin have not been met, and the trial court upon proper motion must allow the plea to be withdrawn. If, however, the record of the guilty plea proceeding indicates that defendant was not only represented by counsel, but that counsel duly advised him of his specific federal rights, even though the trial court did not do so, the requirements of Boykin have been met. Nor do we find the broadest reading of Bonner adopted in Thomas to be required by Brady v. United States. Bonner, supra, 297 N.E.2d  at 877 states:
A careful reading of Brady will show that it imposed no new requirement vis-a-vis who must inform a defendant of his federal rights. Brady did unequivocally affirm the proposition  not a new one, either  that the duty of the trial court is to determine whether the guilty plea is both voluntary and intelligent. Brady states:
A defendant's knowledge of the rights enumerated in Boykin bears upon his ability to enter his plea intelligently and understandingly. The trial court's duty to determine that the plea is intelligently made vis-a-vis Boykin is fulfilled when the record affirmatively indicates that defendant has been advised of those rights by counsel. Of course, the trial court must still consider other factors which bear upon the defendant's ability to make an intelligent and understanding plea, such as his general education and mental capacity.
Even the court in Bonner recognized that its discussion of who must inform the defendant of his federal rights was merely dicta, however, persuasive. Thus the court concluded:
Thomas and the cases following it declared the dicta of Bonner to be the law of this state, but for the reasons stated above, we decline to follow that approach in the case at bar.[1]
Petitioner Albert L. Williams gave conflicting testimony at the hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. When petitioner was appointed counsel, he had already given a signed confession admitting his part in the murder. Petitioner did not controvert the validity of that confession. The thrust of his argument at the post-conviction hearing was that he signed the statement advising him of his rights because he wanted to plead guilty and get it over with, particularly after counsel explained that he could not receive a lesser penalty upon conviction after trial by jury. Such claim does not carry petitioner's burden of showing that his plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently. Moreover, in reviewing petitioner's testimony, we find that he admits, on direct *836 examination, an inquiry by the trial court at the guilty plea proceeding which the record thereof does not show:
The trial court's denial of Albert Williams' petition for post-conviction relief was proper and is hereby affirmed.
Petitioner Steven Wayne Williams testified at the post-conviction relief hearing that he did not recall being advised of his rights, either by counsel or by the court. When asked to explain his brother's conflicting testimony, he ventured that his brother was mixed up and didn't know what he was saying. On cross-examination, Steven gave the following testimony:
Steven Williams then answered affirmatively when the court asked him whether the statement which he had signed had been read to him in open court at the time the statement was received.
The trial court's denial of Steven Wayne Williams' petition for post-conviction relief was proper and is hereby affirmed.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court denying these petitions for post-conviction relief are hereby affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and ARTERBURN, J., concur.
PRENTICE, J., concurs in result.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion.
DeBRULER, Justice (dissenting).
The Elkhart Circuit Court has to date been reversed twice upon the same issue presented by appellants here. In Brimhall v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 153, 279 N.E.2d 557, we reversed the court's judgment denying a post-conviction petition to withdraw a guilty plea, for failure of the record of the guilty plea proceeding to demonstrate an advice of rights and a knowing and intelligent waiver of them. Referring to applicable United States Supreme Court decisions and their underlying rationale, we stated:
*838 In Darmody v. State (1973), Ind. App., 294 N.E.2d 835, the Court of Appeals for the Third District reversed the Elkhart Circuit Court's denial of a post-conviction petition to withdraw a guilty plea, for failing to make a record of the guilty plea proceeding reflect the waiver of the right to counsel. There, the court explained:
As might be expected from a court which refuses to be instructed, the record in this case of both the guilty plea proceeding and the post-conviction proceeding does not show a waiver of federal constitutional rights. At no time does anyone inform the accused that the effect of their pleas of guilty is to waive their rights to have the State prove them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and to be free from compulsory self-incrimination, and to confront their accusers. A waiver of these rights is governed by federal constitutional standards. Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274. A waiver of them may not be inferred from this record no matter how it is viewed, since there is no record affirmation by the accused that they desire to forego these fundamental rights. Carnley v. Cochran (1961), 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70. We are presented here by an advice of rights by defense counsel and simple pleas of guilty. The failure of the trial judge personally to question the accused concerning their understanding of the dimension of their rights prior to extracting the guilty plea is contrary to our holding in Brimhall v. State, supra. Brimhall requires the trial judge to perform this function. An advice of rights by the prosecutor or defense counsel does not satisfy the constitutional mandate that the trial judge, prior to accepting the plea of guilty, determine for himself upon addressing the accused, that the accused understands his rights and understands that they will be given up by a plea of guilty. These rights are personal to the accused. They do not belong to counsel. It is counsel's job to raise the awareness of the accused of his rights and the practical effect of a waiver. Then the court must test the effectiveness of counsel's educative efforts. This is what must be done under the law as it exists today. I would settle for no less.
Here the record discloses that the court, reflected by the record, does not understand the twofold nature of the guilty plea. A guilty plea is not only a judicial admission of guilt. It is also a waiver of federal constitutional rights. It is not a waiver of arraignment. Prior waivers under the Miranda rule cannot take the place of it. It cannot be inferred from any advisement of what the abstract rights are and a subsequent plea of guilty.
And finally, this issue of waiver is before the Court in this appeal. In the motion to correct errors the accused posited:
And in their brief, the accused argue:
The requirement that the trial judge at the guilty plea proceeding personally address the accused and delve into his appreciation of his rights and the fact that a plea of guilty is a waiver of them is now statutory. I.C. 1971, 35-4.1-1-2 and 35-4.1-1-4, being Burns §§ 9-1203 and 9-1205. Indiana Code 1971, 35-4.1-1-5, being Burns § 9-1206, requires a full and complete transcript of the judge's colloquy with the accused. Perhaps together the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana General Assembly can convince the Elkhart Circuit Court that his personal attention to the advisement of rights and extraction of a waiver is mandatory.
I vote to reverse the judgment of the trial court with instructions to grant these petitioners' leave to withdraw their pleas of guilty.
[1]  We note that petitioners' guilty pleas were entered on January 26, 1973, six months prior to the effective date (July 26, 1973), of P.L. 325, Acts 1973, being IC 1971, 35-4.1-1-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1204. That act provides:

"Defendant advised by court.  The court shall not accept a plea of guilty from the defendant without first addressing the defendant and
"(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him;
"(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment or information to an offense included thereunder and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and sentence;
"(c) informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, to face the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself;
"(d) informing him of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
"(e) informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby."
If this statutory standard had been applicable at the time of petitioners' pleas, and if the record was identical to the one before us, petitioners would undoubtedly have presented a solid case for post-conviction relief.