Title: R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96683
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2019

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
R.M.A. (A MINOR CHILD), by his
    ) 
next friend:
    ) 
RACHELLE APPLEBERRY,
    ) 
    ) 
              Appellant, 
    ) 
    ) 
v. 
    ) 
No. SC96683 
    ) 
BLUE SPRINGS R-IV SCHOOL  
    ) 
DISTRICT and BLUE SPRINGS 
) 
SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF 
    ) 
EDUCATION, 
    ) 
    ) 
              Respondents. 
    ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Marco Roldan, Judge 
R.M.A., by his next friend, appeals the circuit court’s judgment dismissing with
prejudice his petition alleging Defendants, the Blue Springs R-IV School District 
(“School District”) and the Blue Springs School District Board of Education (“School 
Board”), unlawfully discriminated against him on the grounds of his sex in violation of 
section 213.0651 of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).  Because R.M.A.’s 
petition alleges facts that (if taken as true, as required by the standard of review) establish 
1   All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated. 
Opinion issued February 26, 2019
2 
 
the elements of a claim under section 213.065, the judgment of the circuit court is 
vacated, and the case is remanded.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, 
section 10, of the Missouri Constitution.   
Background 
In October 2014, R.M.A. filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri 
Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) alleging he was discriminated against in 
a public accommodation on the grounds of his sex.  In July 2015, the Commission issued 
a notice of right to sue, which terminated its administrative proceedings.  Then, following 
an unsuccessful attempt to obtain relief via a writ of mandamus,2 R.M.A. filed suit in 
October 2015 against the School District and the School Board (collectively, 
“Defendants”).  R.M.A.’s petition alleges his “legal sex is male” and that, by denying 
him “access to the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms,” Defendants have discriminated 
against him in the use of a public accommodation “on the grounds of his sex” in violation 
of section 213.065.2.   
In November 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  The motion asserts two grounds for dismissal: 
(1) the MHRA does not cover claims based on gender identity and (2) Defendants are not 
“persons” as defined by section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065.2.  From 
September 2015 through May 2016, both R.M.A. and Defendants made numerous filings 
with the circuit court regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Then, in June 2016, the 
                                                          
 
2   See R.M.A. v. Blue Springs Sch. R-IV Dist., 477 S.W.3d 185 (Mo. App. 2015).  
3 
 
circuit court sustained Defendants’ motion to dismiss without explanation and entered 
judgment dismissing R.M.A.’s petition with prejudice.  This timely appeal follows.   
Analysis 
 Appellate courts review “a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss … de 
novo.”  Ward v. W. Cty. Motor Co., Inc., 403 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 2013).  “A motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is an attack on the 
plaintiff’s pleadings.”  In re T.Q.L., 386 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Mo. banc 2012).  “Such a 
motion is only a test of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s petition.”  Id.  “When considering 
whether a petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court must 
accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest intendment, 
and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader.”  Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 
393, 398 (Mo. banc 2012).  “The Court does not weigh the factual allegations to 
determine whether they are credible or persuasive.”  Id.  “Instead, this Court reviews the 
petition to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of 
action ….”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
Here, R.M.A. asserts he has stated a claim under section 213.065.2, which, in 
relevant part, provides: “It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly 
or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person … advantages, facilities, 
services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation … or to 
segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the grounds of … 
sex ….”  Therefore, the elements of a public accommodation sex discrimination claim 
under section 213.065 are: 
4 
 
(1) plaintiff is a member of a class protected by section 213.065;  
(2) plaintiff was discriminated against in the use of a public 
accommodation (as defined by section 213.010); and  
(3) plaintiff’s status as a member of a protected class was a contributing 
factor3 in that discrimination.   
Cf. Midstate Oil Co., Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Mo. 
banc 1984) (holding elements of an employment sex discrimination claim under section 
213.055 are: “that complainant [(1)] was a member of a class protected by § 296.020.1; 
[(2)] that she was discharged; and [(3)] that a gender-related trait – pregnancy – was a 
factor in respondent’s decision to discharge her”). 
As is often said, Missouri is a fact-pleading state.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. 
Mid-Am. Marine Supply Co., 854 S.W.2d 371, 379-80 (Mo. banc 1993).  But the facts 
                                                          
 
3   In Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. banc 2007), this Court 
held a party seeking to make a claim of discrimination need only plead and prove that 
consideration of the party’s age, disability, or other protected characteristics “contributed to” the 
unfair treatment.  The “contributing factor” test set forth in Daugherty was abrogated by 
S.B. No. 43 (2017), which requires the protected classification be the “motivating factor” in the 
decision to discriminate.  § 213.010(2), (19), RSMo Supp. 2017.  But this change did not come 
about until nearly two years after R.M.A. filed his claim before the Commission and his petition 
in the circuit court.  Generally, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the 
legislature specifically provides for retroactive application of the statute or the statute is 
procedural.  Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. banc 1993).  The 
applicable statute is typically the one in effect when the petition was filed.  Mehra v. Mehra, 819 
S.W.2d 351, 353 (Mo. banc 1991).  Accordingly, the Court assumes for purposes of this case that 
the August 2017 amendments to sections 213.010 and 213.065 do not apply here because 
R.M.A. filed his petition in October 2015.   Moreover, even if the “motivating factor” test 
applied, a question this Court does not now decide, it would have no bearing on the sufficiency 
of R.M.A’s petition.  As discussed below, R.M.A. claims he was discriminated against “on the 
grounds of,” “based on,” and “because of” his sex.  These allegations are more akin to “but for” 
causation and, when assumed to be true, Bromwell, 361 S.W.3d at 398, plainly satisfy both the 
“contributing factor” test in Daugherty and the “motivating factor” test in section 213.010(2) and 
(19), RSMo Supp. 2017. 
5 
 
that must be pleaded are the ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 
S.W.2d 285, 290 (Mo. banc 1976).  Ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a 
verdict for the plaintiff.  Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 523 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Mo. 
banc 2017) (concluding “a not-in-MAI instruction must follow substantive law by 
submitting the ultimate facts necessary to sustain a verdict”) (quotation marks and 
alteration omitted).   
There is no Missouri Approved Instruction (MAI) for submitting a plaintiff’s 
public accommodation claim under section 213.065 to a jury.  But MAI 38.01(A), which 
applies to employment discrimination claims under section 213.055, can be made 
applicable with only minor modifications.  Using MAI 38.01(A) as the starting point, 
therefore, a verdict director in this case would state (in substance if not in form): 
Your verdict must be for plaintiff [R.M.A.] if you believe: 
First, defendants [School District and School Board] denied plaintiff full and equal 
use and enjoyment of the males’ restroom and locker room facilities at defendants’ 
school, and 
Second, plaintiff’s male sex was a contributing factor in such denial, and 
Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage. 
With these elements identified, the analysis required to resolve R.M.A.’s appeal is 
simple and straightforward.4  This analysis, of course, requires a faithful application of 
                                                          
 
4   Contrary to the arguments made by the parties, this analysis does not require consulting Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  The parties devote much time and attention to 
whether R.M.A. has stated a claim for “sex stereotyping” under Price Waterhouse as though 
“sex stereotyping” is a distinct “type” of sex discrimination claim.  But the MHRA does not 
provide for “types” of sex discrimination claims; a claim is either a claim of sex discrimination 
6 
 
the standard of review.  See, e.g., In re T.Q.L., 386 S.W.3d at 139 (“[T]his Court assumes 
that the allegations set forth are true and liberally grants the plaintiff reasonable 
inferences based on those allegations.”).5  
The first element is the defendants denying the plaintiff “full and equal use and 
enjoyment” of a public accommodation.  § 213.065.1.  R.M.A. alleges Defendants have 
denied him (and, in 2015 when the petition was filed, were continuing to deny him) 
“access to the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms.”  Petition at ¶ 31, R.M.A. v. Blue 
Springs School R-IV Dist. (No. 1516-CV20874) (Cir. Court Jackson County, Sept. 25, 
2015).  See also id. at ¶ 27 (alleging “Defendants refused to give R.M.A. access to the 
boys’ locker room and restrooms when he requested such access while attending Delta 
Woods Middle School”); id. at ¶ 40 (alleging Defendants “refused to give him access to 
                                                          
 
or it is not.  Rather than a “type” of sex discrimination claim, “sex stereotyping” merely is one 
way to prove a claim of sex discrimination, i.e., “sex stereotyping” can be evidence of sex 
discrimination.  Price Waterhouse, itself, makes this clear: 
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that 
gender played a part in a particular employment decision.  The plaintiff must show 
that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.  In making 
this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a 
part. 
Id. at 251 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, because the issue is whether R.M.A.’s petition states 
a claim for sex discrimination, this Court must leave for another day consideration of the proof 
of that claim, including any proof of “sex stereotyping.”  
5   The dissent suggests this opinion wrongly presumes R.M.A. will be able to present evidence 
regarding his sex and whether his sex was a contributing factor to the discrimination he claims to 
have suffered, see Slip Op. at 6, n. 5, but this ignores the standard of review.  See Nazeri v. Mo. 
Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. banc 1993) (stating that, in evaluating a motion to 
dismiss, it does not matter whether Plaintiff’s “averments may well be difficult to … prove at 
trial”).  By considering what R.M.A. may (or may not) be able to prove at summary judgment or 
trial, the dissent weighs the evidence at a time when this Court is to “accept all properly pleaded 
facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest intendment, and construe all allegations 
favorably to the pleader.”  Bromwell, 361 S.W.3d at 398.   
7 
 
the boys’ locker rooms”); id. at ¶ 42 (R.M.A. “has been required to use separate 
bathrooms from other boys on a daily basis and has been denied access to the boys’ 
locker room if he wishes to participate in boys’ P.E. or athletic activities.”).  A school’s 
restrooms and locker rooms constitute public accommodations as defined in section 
213.010(15)(e).6  Thus, R.M.A.’s petition alleges facts sufficient to satisfy this first 
element. 
The second element is the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.  Section 
213.065 protects the following classes: “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
ancestry, or disability,” and the petition specifically alleges that “R.M.A.’s legal sex is 
male.”  Petition at ¶ 25.  Accordingly, R.M.A.’s petition pleads facts sufficient to satisfy 
the second element.7   
                                                          
 
6   Section 213.010(15) provides,  
“Places of public accommodation”, all places or businesses offering or holding 
out to the general public, goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages or 
accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare and safety of the general 
public or such public places providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement, 
including, but not limited to:  
…  
(e) Any public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state 
or any agency or subdivision thereof, or any public corporation; and any such 
facility supported in whole or in part by public funds …. 
7   To state a claim under the MHRA, R.M.A. must allege he is a member of a protected class.    
§ 231.065.2.  Here, R.M.A. claims discrimination based on his sex and, therefore, he must allege 
he is either male or female.  R.M.A. alleges he is a member of the male protected class and, 
under the applicable standard of review for a motion to dismiss, that is sufficient.  Bromwell, 361 
S.W.3d at 398.  The dissenting opinion apparently does not believe R.M.A.’s allegation, citing 
R.M.A.’s allegations that he “is a female to male transgender teenager who was born as a female 
child and transitioned to living as male” and that he “is transgender and is alleged to have female 
genitalia.” See Slip Op. at 2-3.  In essence, the dissent suggests R.M.A.’s sex was determined by 
the genitalia he displayed at birth and can never be changed.  But no lesser authority than the 
General Assembly has acknowledged that one’s sex may not remain throughout a person’s life 
what it was identified to be when that person was born.  See § 193.215.9 (“Upon receipt of a 
8 
 
The third element is that plaintiff’s sex8 was a contributing (or motivating) factor 
in the denial of his use of a public accommodation.  § 213.065.2.  R.M.A. alleges he was 
“discriminated against in his use of a public accommodation on the grounds of his sex.”  
Petition at ¶ 50.  See also id. at ¶ 35 (“Defendants have discriminated and continue to 
discriminate against Plaintiff R.M.A. based on his sex.”); id. at ¶ 43 (“Plaintiff received 
different and inferior access to public facilities because of his sex.”).  As a result, 
R.M.A.’s petition pleads sufficient facts to satisfy the third element.9   
                                                          
 
certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating the sex of an individual 
born in this state has been changed by surgical procedure and that such individual’s name has 
been changed, the certificate of birth of such individual shall be amended.”).  In any event, the 
debate in which the dissenting opinion seeks to engage is premature.  For now, the “academic 
manner” with which this Court must view R.M.A.’s petition and this Court’s obligation to 
construe all of R.M.A.’s allegations favorably and give them their “broadest intendment” require 
this Court to conclude R.M.A.’s allegation he is male satisfies the second element of a sex 
discrimination suit under the MHRA.  Smith v. Humane Soc’y of U.S., 519 S.W.3d 789, 798 
(Mo. banc 2017) (on a motion to dismiss, the petition must be “reviewed in an almost academic 
manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action”); 
Bromwell, 361 S.W.3d at 398 (“this Court must accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving 
the pleadings their broadest intendment, and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader”).  
8   The dissenting opinion devotes unnecessary time and energy to construing the definition of 
the term “sex,” and more broadly the phrase “discrimination … on the grounds of … sex.”  See 
Slip Op. at 3-5.  But there is nothing ambiguous about this term or the context in which it is used.  
After thousands of discrimination claims under the MHRA, it seems incredulous that this phrase 
suddenly – and without explanation – needs construction or that such construction should result 
in hitherto undiscovered elements.  For instance, the dissenting opinion claims, with great 
confidence, “[t]he MHRA prohibits discrimination on grounds of biological sex,” not legal sex.  
Slip Op. at 3.  Significantly, however, the MHRA makes no mention of “biological” or “legal” 
sex.  Rather, the MHRA simply uses the word “sex,” wholly unqualified.  See § 231.065.  It is 
telling that − in an opinion emphasizing the significance of adhering to the plain language of the 
statute − the dissent must add the word “biological” to the statute to reach its result.  As this 
stage, R.M.A. is only required to allege he was discriminated against on the grounds of his sex − 
which he did.  See Petition at ¶ 50.  
9   As further support for its position that discrimination on the grounds of sex exclusively refers 
to biological sex, the dissenting opinion relies on Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 
S.W.3d 479 (Mo. App. 2015), and numerous federal circuit court cases.  Slip Op. at 5 n.4.  
Notably, however, none of these cases define the term “sex” exclusively to mean biological sex 
as the dissent does.  Rather, the cases cited therein hold a plaintiff cannot claim the  protection of 
9 
 
The fourth, and last, element is damages.  R.M.A. alleges that, as “a direct result 
of the unlawful conduct of Defendants …, Plaintiff R.M.A. has suffered damages.”  Id. at 
¶ 51.  This is sufficient to meet the fourth element. 
This same simple and straightforward analysis has also been utilized in federal 
court.  For instance, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996), 
the plaintiff, a heterosexual male, alleged “his homosexual male supervisor and other 
homosexual male employees at Pizza Hut subjected him to a ‘hostile work environment’ 
in violation of Title VII.”  Id. at 139.  The district court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff appealed.  Id. at 139.  The Fourth Circuit 
reversed, and in doing so held:    
 [W]hile it is true Title VII does not afford a cause of action for 
discrimination based upon sexual orientation, Wrightson does not allege 
that he was discriminated against because he is heterosexual.  He 
specifically alleges in his complaint that he was discriminated against 
“because of his sex, male.”  The unequivocal allegation that he was 
discriminated against “because of his sex,” which, for purposes of Rule 
                                                          
 
Title VII based on either his or her (1) sexual orientation status − i.e., Williamson A.G. Edwards 
and Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989), Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996),  
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999), Vickers v. Fairfield 
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006), and Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th 
Cir. 2017) – or (2) transgender status – i.e., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th 
Cir. 1982) and Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).  But in a case such 
as this where the plaintiff claims his discrimination was based on sex, neither set of cases is 
relevant.  All of the above mentioned cases are distinguishable because, unlike the plaintiffs in 
those cases, R.M.A. does not claim protection under the MHRA based on his transgender status 
but, rather, based on his sex.  See Petition at ¶ 35.  Furthermore, in the same footnote, the 
dissenting opinion discusses the legislature’s failure to adopt various proposed amendments to 
the MHRA.  But “[c]ongressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally 
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing 
legislation already incorporated the offered change” and, therefore, this is also an unpersuasive 
basis upon which to interpret the statute.  United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287, (2002) 
(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).  See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 
(1969) (“Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.”).  
10 
 
12(b)(6) must be accepted as true, is alone sufficient to withstand Pizza 
Hut’s motion to dismiss[.]  Of course, even had Wrightson alleged that he 
was discriminated against both because he was heterosexual and because he 
was male, he would still state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  [A] cause of 
action lies even though the discrimination against the employee is not 
“solely” because of the employee’s sex, as long as the employee’s sex was 
a cause of the discrimination. 
Id. at 143-44 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
The same is true here.  R.M.A.’s petition alleges he is a member of a protected 
class, he was discriminated against in the use of a public accommodation, his status as a 
member of a protected class was the basis for the discrimination he suffered, and he 
sustained damages, as required by section 213.065.  At this stage of the proceedings, that 
is all that is required of R.M.A; therefore, the circuit court should have overruled 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
Defendants also argue that, even if the Court finds they engaged in impermissible 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, they cannot be held liable under section 213.065 
because neither Defendant is a “person” under the MHRA.  This Court disagrees.   
Section 213.065.2 provides:  “It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any 
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person … any of 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any 
place of public accommodation … on the grounds of … sex.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
definition of the term “person,” as used in chapter 213, is set forth in section 213.010(14), 
which provides a person “includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, 
associations, organizations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, 
11 
 
joint stock companies, trusts, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, fiduciaries, or 
other organized groups of persons.”   
Defendants assert that, because section 213.010(14) does not specifically list 
“school district,” “school board,” or, more generally, a “subdivision” of the state, neither 
of them is a “person” as defined in section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065.10  
This argument fails because the definition of “person” in section 213.010(14) expressly 
states that it “includes” the individuals and entities listed therein, not that it is limited to 
them.  The state and its political subdivisions need not be explicitly listed to be 
encompassed in a statute if “an intention to include them is clearly manifest, as where 
they are expressly named therein, or included by necessary implication.”  Carpenter v. 
King, 679 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Mo. banc 1984).  That is the case here.  (Cf. § 1020(12), 
RSMo 2016.) 
“The provisions of a legislative act are not read in isolation but construed together, 
and if reasonably possible, the provisions will be harmonized with each other.”  Bachtel 
v. Miller Cty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Mo. banc 2003).  “In 
determining the intent and meaning of statutory language, the words must be considered 
in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia, as well as cognate sections, must 
be considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words.”  State ex rel. 
                                                          
 
10   Defendants also rely on section 213.010(7), which, in relevant part, provides, “‘Employer’… 
includes the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, or any person employing six or 
more persons within the state ….”  Defendants reason that, because the legislature did not 
explicitly include “the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof” in the definition of 
“person,” as it did in the definition of “employer” (which is found in a different subsection of the 
same statute), the legislature intended to exclude those entities from the definition of “person” 
under section 213.010(14). 
12 
 
Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., 254 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Mo. banc 2008) (quotation marks 
omitted).  The MHRA’s protections against discrimination in access to public 
accommodations plainly extend to accommodations owned by the state or its 
subdivisions.  See, e.g., § 213.010(15)(e) (providing a “public accommodation” includes 
“Any public facility owned … by or on behalf of this state or any agency or subdivision 
thereof ….”).11  And the MHRA plainly prohibits discrimination by the state or its 
subdivisions on the basis of sex.12  See § 213.070 (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory 
practice … (3) For the state or any political subdivision of this state to discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, [or] sex ….”).  Accordingly, the state and its 
subdivisions – including the School District and the School Board − are “persons” as 
defined by section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065.   
 
 
 
                                                          
 
11   If, as Defendants contend, the state and its subdivisions do not constitute a “person,” then, 
even though a state subdivision is the owner or operator of a public accommodation (which, 
under section 213.010(15)(e), is one of the defining characteristics of a public accommodation), 
it could not be sued for engaging in discriminatory conduct within that public accommodation.  
Of course, it would be illogical for the legislature to, on the one hand, ban discrimination in 
public accommodations and, on the other hand, exempt the owner of the public accommodation 
from liability for that discrimination.  Instead, by construing the entire act together, Bachtel, 110 
S.W.3d at 801, and considering cognate statutes in pari materia, Evans, 254 S.W.3d at 35 − as 
this Court is required to do − the legislature’s intent becomes clear: the state and its subdivisions 
may be held liable for any discriminatory acts they commit within the public accommodations 
they own and operate.  As a result, the state and its subdivisions must be “persons” as defined by 
section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065.  
12   Furthermore, if the legislature intended to exclude schools (including school districts and 
school boards) from liability under the MHRA, it is unlikely it would have hidden its intent to do 
so in the definitions of “employer” and “person.”  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 
U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (The legislature “does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).   
13 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and 
the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
 
 
Draper, Russell, Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., concur;  
Fischer, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Powell, J., concurs in opinion of Fischer, C.J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
R.M.A (A MINOR CHILD), by his  
    ) 
next friend:  
 
                
    ) 
RACHELLE APPLEBERRY, 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
Appellant, 
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
 
No. SC96683 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
BLUE SPRINGS R-IV SCHOOL  
    ) 
DISTRICT and BLUE SPRINGS                ) 
SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF 
    ) 
EDUCATION, 
 
 
 
    ) 
                                 
 
 
    ) 
Respondents.  
 
    ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The principal opinion holds the analysis is simple and 
straightforward: the circuit court erred by dismissing R.M.A.'s petition because he alleges his 
legal sex is male and that Defendants discriminated based on his sex.  This analysis is simple 
and straightforward, but it is also incorrect.  R.M.A. alleged he is a biological female whose 
legal sex is male.  R.M.A. alleged Defendants discriminated unlawfully by barring him from the 
boys' restrooms and locker room because he "is transgender and is alleged to have female 
genitalia."  The MHRA prohibits sex discrimination and does not bar discrimination based on 
2 
 
transgender status.  The petition, therefore, fails to state a claim of unlawful sex discrimination 
under the MHRA.  The judgment should be affirmed.1  
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a judgment dismissing a petition for failure to state a claim, all 
allegations in the petition are assumed to be true and are construed in favor of the plaintiff.  
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 915 
(Mo. banc 2016).  "If the petition sets forth any set of facts that, if proven, would entitle the 
plaintiffs to relief, then the petition states a claim."  Id.  (internal quotation omitted).   
R.M.A.'s Petition 
R.M.A. alleged he "is a female to male transgender teenager who was born as a female 
child and transitioned to living as male" while in the fourth grade.  R.M.A. alleged Defendants 
unlawfully discriminated "based on his sex."  Specifically, R.M.A. alleged Defendants prevented 
him from using the boys' restrooms and locker room because he "is transgender and is alleged 
to have female genitalia."   
When assessing whether a petition states a cause of action, all allegations are taken as 
true.  The principal opinion takes some allegations as true, while ignoring those contradicting its 
preferred conclusion.  The principal opinion takes as true R.M.A.'s allegation that his "legal sex 
is male" while ignoring R.M.A.'s allegation he is a biological female who has "transitioned to 
living as a male."  Similarly, the principal opinion notes R.M.A. alleged discrimination "based 
on his sex" while ignoring his allegation Defendants discriminated against him because he "is 
                                                          
 
1 Because R.M.A.'s petition fails to state a claim of sex discrimination under the MHRA, I express no 
opinion about the principal opinion's unnecessary analysis of whether the Defendants are a "person" 
subject to suit under the MHRA.  
3 
 
transgender and is alleged to have female genitalia."  Taking all of R.M.A.'s allegations as true, 
the petition alleges Defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination by barring R.M.A., a 
biological female who transitioned to living as a male and self-identifies as male, from using the 
boys' restrooms and locker room because he is transgender.  By focusing on R.M.A.'s allegation 
that his "legal sex" is male while ignoring the allegation he is biologically female who 
transitioned to living as a male and self-identifies as male, the principal opinion implicitly, and 
without analysis, incorrectly extends the MHRA beyond biological sex to include claims of 
discrimination based on transgender status. 2 
The MHRA prohibits discrimination on grounds of biological sex 
"This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent 
as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue."  Laut v. City of Arnold, 491 S.W.3d 
191, 205 (Mo. banc 2016) (internal quotations omitted).  When the plain language and legislative 
intent are clear, this Court is bound by the statutory language.  Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 
S.W.3d 450, 455 (Mo. banc 2011).  "This Court must enforce statutes as written, not as they 
might have been written."  City of Wellston v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 203 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Mo. 
banc 2006).    
Section 213.065.2 of the MHRA prohibits discrimination in any place of public 
accommodation "on the grounds of … sex."  The MHRA does not define the word "sex."  When 
                                                          
 
2 R.M.A. does not construe his own petition as liberally as does the principal opinion.  Unlike the 
principal opinion, R.M.A. does not argue his petition alleges a straightforward and simple claim of sex 
discrimination based on the fact his legal sex is male.  Instead, R.M.A.'s first point on appeal asserts his 
"petition stated a claim for which relief can be granted, in that the Missouri Human Rights Act prohibits 
sex discrimination in public accommodation, including discrimination on the basis of gender-related 
traits."  Consistent with his petition, R.M.A. argues the "gender-related traits" forming the basis of his 
claim of sex discrimination are that he is "transgender and is alleged to have female genitalia."  App. Br. 
at 22.   
 
4 
 
there is no statutory definition, the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory term can be derived 
from the dictionary.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 438 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Mo. banc 
2014). "  
The word "sex" means "one of the two divisions of [organisms] esp. human beings 
respectively designated male or female."  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY  
2081 (1993).  It also means the "sum of morphological, physiological, and behavioral 
peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction with its concomitant genetic 
segregation and recombination…that is typically manifested as maleness or femaleness."  Id.  
Additionally, the word "sex" refers to "the sphere of interpersonal behavior esp. between male 
and female," the "phenomena of sexual instincts and their manifestations," and "determin[ing] 
the sex of an organic being."  Id.  Each of these definitions is premised either directly or indirectly 
on "sex" as a biological classification of individuals as male or female.  None of these definitions 
state or imply the word "sex" is defined by the fact a person self-identifies as one sex or the other 
or has transitioned to living as a member of the opposite sex.  The plain, ordinary meaning of 
the word "sex" refers to the biological classification of individuals as male or female.3  The 
MHRA, therefore, prohibits discrimination based on the biological classifications of male or 
female and does not extend to the separate concept of transgender status.  Cf. Pittman v. Cook 
Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo. App. 2015) (holding the "clear meaning" of 
the phrase "discrimination because of . . . sex" refers only to discrimination based on the fact the 
                                                          
 
3 The definition of "sex" as referring to the biological distinction between male and female has remained 
consistent both before and after the 1986 enactment of the MHRA.  See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (1961) (same); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
2081 (2002) (same); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1187 (1976) ("The property or quality by which 
organisms are classified according to their reproductive functions"). 
5 
 
plaintiff is male or female and does not extend to claims of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation).4   
                                                          
 
4 The principal opinion asserts it is "incredulous" that the scope of unlawful sex discrimination is 
"suddenly" in need of interpretation.  Respectfully, there is nothing incredible about the need to resolve 
the question of statutory interpretation raised squarely by R.M.A.'s petition: namely, does the MHRA 
extend beyond biological sex to include claims of discrimination based on transgender status?  As 
established in Pittman, the plain language of the MHRA does not include claims of discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, nor would it be extended to transgender status.  The principal opinion leaves 
Pittman intact as an accurate statement of Missouri law.  Similarly, the overwhelming weight of federal 
circuit court precedent holds federal sex discrimination statutes bar discrimination on the basis of the 
biological sex classifications of male and female.  See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 
F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (Title VII does not extend to discrimination based on sexual orientation); 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title VII does not afford a cause of action for 
discrimination based upon sexual orientation" because the statutory "prohibition of 'sex' discrimination 
applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to include 
sexual preference such as homosexuality") (internal quotation omitted); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 
453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (sexual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts 
under Title VII); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (transgender status 
not a protected class); Williamson A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(homosexuality not a protected class); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 
2007) ("In light of the traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not claim protection under 
Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual"); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l 
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017) (sexual orientation discrimination is not actionable under 
Title VII").    
Further, the General Assembly has expressly distinguished "sex" from the concept of "sexual 
orientation" while repeatedly declining to adopt bills seeking to amend the MHRA to prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender status.  For instance, § 556.061(46) defines 
"Sexual orientation" as "male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination, 
practice, identity or expression, or having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's 
gender."  Section 557.035 provides enhanced penalties for certain crimes that "the state believes to be 
knowingly motivated because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation or disability 
of the victim or victims."  Section 590.653 authorizes civilian review boards to investigate alleged police 
misconduct "relating to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation and disability."  While 
recognizing a distinction between "sex" and "sexual orientation," the General Assembly has declined 
repeatedly to adopt bills seeking to amend the MHRA to prohibit discrimination based on a person's 
sexual orientation or gender identity.  See SB 962 (2014), SB 757 (2014), SB 96 (2013), SB 798 (2012), 
SB 239 (2011), SB 626 (2010), SB 109 (2009), SB 824 (2008), and SB 266 (2007).  The principal 
opinion asserts the General Assembly's repeated rejection of bills seeking to expand the MHRA to 
include claims based on sexual orientation or gender identity amounts to indeterminate legislative 
inaction and silence.  To the contrary, the fact the General Assembly expressly distinguished "sex" from 
"sexual orientation" while repeatedly declining proposed amendments to extend the MHRA to include 
claims based on sexual orientation or gender identity confirms that unlawful discrimination on grounds 
of "sex" refers only to discrimination based on biological sex.  The Court likewise has noted the 
distinction between sex and sexual orientation by its amendments to Rules 2-2.3 and 4-8.4(g). 
6 
 
The Petition Fails to State a Claim 
To determine whether R.M.A.'s petition states a claim of unlawful sex discrimination 
under the MHRA, this Court must determine whether the petition invokes "principles of 
substantive law [that] may entitle the plaintiff to relief."  Lynch v. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d 834, 836 
(Mo. banc 2008) (internal quotation omitted).  The substantive principles of law within the 
MHRA define the word "sex" as biological sex.  Consequently, the petition survives a motion to 
dismiss only if it alleges that, as a biological female, R.M.A. was deprived of a public 
accommodation available to biological males.   
R.M.A. makes no such allegation.  Instead, R.M.A. alleges he is a female who has 
transitioned to living as a male, and that the Defendants discriminated against him based on his 
sex by preventing him from using the boys' restrooms and locker room.  R.M.A. does not allege 
that, as a biological female, he was barred from any public accommodation afforded to biological 
males.  Instead, R.M.A.'s allegation of discrimination distills to an acknowledgement that the 
Defendants excluded him from the boys' restrooms and locker room because he is biologically 
female.  If, as the principal opinion reasons, the relevant allegation is that R.M.A.'s "legal sex" 
is male,5 then the majority will have ignored the crux of the petition while discarding the 
substance of the MHRA.  The logical upshot is that the majority is presumably willing to hold 
the MHRA prohibits schools from maintaining separate restrooms and locker rooms for male 
and female students.  The alternative, of course, is to accept all of R.M.A.'s allegations as true, 
                                                          
 
5 The suggested jury instruction proposed by the principal opinion presumes R.M.A. could present 
evidence he was biologically male at the time of the alleged discrimination and that fact was a 
contributing factor in him being denied access to the boys' restrooms and boys' locker rooms.   
7 
 
apply the plain language of the MHRA, and hold R.M.A.'s petition fails to state a claim of sex 
discrimination. 
It is not this Court's role to "question the wisdom, social desirability, or economic policy 
underlying a statute as these are matters for the legislature's determination."  Turner v. Sch. Dist. 
of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotations omitted).  Rather, this 
Court's role is to declare the meaning of the language used in the MHRA consistent with 
legislative intent.6  The General Assembly has spoken, and R.M.A.'s petition fails to state a claim 
of unlawful sex discrimination under the MHRA.  The principal opinion errs in concluding 
otherwise.  The judgment should be affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice 
 
                                                          
 
6 As explained more fully in footnote 4 above, the fact the General Assembly has expressly distinguished 
"sex" from "sexual orientation" and repeatedly declined proposed amendments to extend the MHRA to 
include claims based on sexual orientation or gender identity demonstrates that unlawful discrimination 
based on "sex" refers only to discrimination based on a trait unique to one sex and does not extend to 
claims based on gender identity or transgender status.  Even R.M.A.'s own counsel has previously 
acknowledged the MHRA does not extend to claims of discrimination based on gender identity or sexual 
orientation.  See Alex Edelman, Show-Me No Discrimination: The Missouri Non-Discrimination Act 
Expanding Civil Rights Protections to Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity; 79 UMKC L. REV. 741, 
743-44 (Spring 2011) (advocating passage of the "Missouri Non-Discrimination Act" to expand the 
MHRA "in two ways: by adding sexual orientation and gender identity as newly protected traits and by 
adding protection against discrimination based on a person's presumed or assumed race, color, religion, 
national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, age . . . disability, or familial status . . . whether or not 
the presumption or assumption . . . is correct." (internal quotation omitted).