Title: West v. Provo City Corporation
Citation: 27 Utah 2d 306, 495 P.2d 1251
Docket Number: 12644
State: Utah
Issuer: Utah Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 1972

495 P.2d 1251 (1972) 27 Utah 2d 306 Ruby WEST, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a municipal corporation, Defendant and Respondent. No. 12644. Supreme Court of Utah. March 29, 1972. Pete N. Vlahos and Gary L. Gale, of Vlahos &amp; Gale, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant. Glen J. Ellis, Provo, for defendant and respondent. HENRIOD, Justice. Appeal from a no cause of action summary judgment in favor of the City, on timely motion made therefor by the City. Affirmed. Plaintiff alleged that while walking on a snow-covered sidewalk she slipped and fell, asking damages for injuries sustained on account of the City's "negligence ... in allowing accumulation of ice on a sidewalk located in the business section... ." No specific act of negligence other than the alleged accumulation was evidenced by affidavit or otherwise. Plaintiff urged that statutory sanction to regulate sidewalks[1] gave the City no agency by ordinance[2] to delegate its authority to maintain sidewalks to abutting owners. This may be true, but that fact is not of controlling moment here, and we need not decide that point. The authorities generally[3] and we particularly[4] adhere to the principle that a city is not liable for injuries occurring on sidewalks caused by natural accumulation of falling snow or formation of ice, without some other and independent tortious act or omission constituting compensable negligence, and we so hold. CALLISTER, C.J., and TUCKETT and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). I could agree with the prevailing opinion if it did no more than hold that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The plaintiff then could amend her complaint to show facts which might give her a right to recover, but to sustain the ruling of the *1252 trial court granting a summary judgment precludes the plaintiff from ever showing negligence on the part of the defendant. The motion for a summary judgment and the judgment made pursuant thereto are premised upon an erroneous assumption as to what the law is. The order of the court states the error clearly, to wit: While Section 10-8-23, U.C.A. 1953, purports to give cities the right to require owners of real property to remove ice and snow from sidewalks adjoining the property, it does not relieve the cities from their primary duty to keep the sidewalks free from dangerous conditions. The law is stated in 39 Am.Jur.2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, as follows: I have no complaint to make of the case of Berger v. Salt Lake City,[1] wherein it was held that Salt Lake City was not liable to Mrs. Berger for injuries she received from a fall on an icy sidewalk. The facts *1253 of that case were set forth by this court as follows: In reversing the judgment in favor of Mrs. Berger, this court found no negligence because of the difficulty which snow removal from the sidewalks would entail upon the city. It said: It appears that there has been a change in the local climatic conditions since the Berger case was tried, for if we did not take judicial notice of the fact, our Chamber of Commerce would convince us that it is no longer in this area true that "snowfall is great and continuous for a considerable period of time." The city has a nondelegable duty to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel by pedestrians, and naturally a greater effort is required downtown in the business district where many people will be upon the sidewalk than will be required in the remote sections of the city in front of a vacant house as was the fact in the Berger case. The defendant in this case is not liable to the plaintiff for a fall due to natural accumulation of snow upon a sidewalk but may be held liable to her for negligence in failing to maintain its sidewalks in a safe condition,[2] provided that the dangerous condition can be remedied without an unreasonable effort or expense on its part. We do not know how long the snow had remained upon the sidewalk or what notice the defendant had regarding the condition. These are matters which were neither available to nor considered by the court in its ruling. I do not think the defendant is entitled to a summary judgment under the law and based upon the facts of the case, and I would reverse the trial court and remand the matter for such further proceedings as may be proper and would award no costs. [1] Title 10-8-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953. [2] Provo City Ordinances (1964), Sec. 12.52.150. [3] Rhyne, Municipal Law (1957), Sec. 30-16, p. 758; 21 Minn.Law Rev. 704; Smith v. Distr. of Col., 89 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 189 F.2d 671, 39 A.L.R.2d 773. [4] Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920). [1] Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233 (1920). [2] Sec. 63-30-8, U.C.A. 1953, Replacement Vol. 7A.