Title: Rowland v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101003
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ.∗ 
 
CORDARO A. ROWLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 101003             JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
    March 4, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the conviction of Cordaro A. Rowland 
(“Rowland”) for use of a firearm in the commission of a 
burglary when the elements of the burglary were completed 
before the use or display of a firearm. 
Background 
 
Rowland was convicted in a bench trial, in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond, of two counts of robbery, two 
counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery, 
statutory burglary, and one count of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a burglary.  Code §§ 18.2-53.1, -58, -91.  In 
total, Rowland was sentenced to serve a term of 73 years in 
prison, with 60 years suspended.  On the use of a firearm in 
the commission of a burglary conviction, the circuit court 
sentenced Rowland to five years’ incarceration. 
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals denied 
Rowland’s petition for appeal of the use of a firearm in the 
commission of a burglary conviction, finding the evidence 
sufficient to support the conviction.  Rowland v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 1381-09-2, slip op. at 2 (Feb. 17, 2010).  Rowland 
appeals. 
On October 4, 2008, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Ban Sung 
Luong and Chi Shin Chan were the only employees working at a 
restaurant.  The back door of the restaurant was the only door 
unlocked at the time.  While Luong was in the kitchen area of 
the restaurant, near the back door, he sensed a person behind 
him and turned around to see a man, later identified as 
Rowland, pointing a gun at him.  Neither Luong nor Chan 
observed Rowland enter the restaurant. 
Although Rowland was using clothing to partially cover his 
face, Luong recognized Rowland as the customer he called “Big 
Guy.”  “Big Guy” was Luong and Chan’s nickname for Rowland, who 
frequently came into the restaurant to ask for free drinks.  
While keeping the gun pointed at Luong, Rowland told Chan to 
put the money from the cash register into a bag.  After Chan 
put the money in the bag, Rowland left with the bag through the 
back door of the restaurant. 
Analysis 
 
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Rowland alleges that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to find him guilty of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a burglary.  Specifically, Rowland argues that he 
cannot be convicted of using a firearm in the commission of a 
burglary because the burglary had been completed by the time he 
used or displayed the firearm. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that the evidence was sufficient 
to support Rowland’s conviction of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a burglary because the offense of burglary was 
not complete in fact until Rowland had vacated the premises.  
Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that circumstantial 
evidence supports finding that Rowland had the firearm in his 
hand when he entered the restaurant, and that is sufficient to 
prove Rowland used the firearm in the commission of the 
burglary. 
 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party in the trial court.  Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 
524, 659 S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 
Va. 422, 425-26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998).  We will not, 
however, sustain a trial court’s judgment that is plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support it.  McMorris v. Commonwealth, 
 
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276 Va. 500, 504, 666 S.E.2d 348, 350 (2008); Jay, 275 Va. at 
524, 659 S.E.2d at 319. 
Code § 18.2-53.1 makes it “unlawful for any person to use 
or attempt to use any . . . firearm or display such weapon in a 
threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit 
. . . burglary . . . .”  Rowland’s argument hinges on the word 
“while” in Code § 18.2-53.1.  Rowland asserts that “while” is 
synonymous with “during” and does not include acts subsequent 
to the commission of the relevant felony.  Thus, Rowland 
asserts that he cannot be convicted of Code § 18.2-53.1 for use 
of a firearm in the commission of a burglary because he did not 
use or display a firearm until after he had committed the 
burglary.  See Code §§ 18.2-90, -91.  We agree. 
To constitute burglary of a building permanently affixed 
to realty at nighttime, the defendant must enter, with or 
without breaking, with the intent to commit a felony within.  
Code §§ 18.2-90, -91; see also Fields v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 
120, 121, 207 S.E.2d 822, 823 (1974).  Since 1937, this Court 
has stated that a burglary is complete when the defendant has 
completed all of the elements of the crime.  See Falden v. 
Commonwealth, 167 Va. 542, 547, 189 S.E. 326, 328 (1937) 
(stating that “the crime [of burglary] is complete when a 
person armed with a deadly weapon enters a banking house, in 
the day time or in the night time, with intent to commit 
 
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larceny, etc.”).  An “entry” occurs when any part of the 
defendant’s body enters the dwelling.  Franklin v. 
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 719, 722, 508 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1998); 
John L. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 9.1 
(4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010).  In the instant case, the burglary 
was complete upon Rowland’s entry into the restaurant with the 
intent to commit robbery. 
The Commonwealth, relying on Creasy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. 
App. 470, 389 S.E.2d 316 (1990), argues that there is a 
distinction between when the crime of burglary is complete for 
purposes of prosecution and when the crime is completed in 
fact.  In Creasy, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Code § 18.2-53.1 is not limited in 
application to the period of time from the 
commencement of the underlying crime until the 
point in time when the acts of the defendant make 
successful prosecution possible.  We hold that 
the statute applies to the conduct of the accused 
until the underlying crime is completed in fact. 
 
The purpose of Code § 18.2-53.1 is to deter 
violent criminal conduct.  Violent criminal 
conduct may occur at any time between the 
commencement of certain crimes and the 
perpetrator’s safe retreat.  Even though certain 
crimes may be established by proof of acts 
accomplished at the outset of a criminal venture, 
the danger and risk of violent criminal conduct 
persists until the crime is completed in fact.  
We hold that the General Assembly, in adopting 
this provision, intended to discourage the use of 
a firearm at any time during the course of the 
specified criminal endeavors. 
 
Id. at 473, 389 S.E.2d at 318 (internal citations omitted). 
 
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Because it is well-established that “[w]hen the language 
of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that 
amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what 
it actually has stated,” Baker v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 656, 
660, 685 S.E.2d 661, 663 (2009), we disagree with the analysis 
in Creasy.  As relevant to this case, Code § 18.2-53.1 requires 
that the defendant use, attempt to use, or display in a 
threatening manner a firearm while committing burglary.  This 
Court has used “while” interchangeably with “during,” 
indicating that the terms are synonymous.  See, e.g., Jay, 275 
Va. at 524, 659 S.E.2d at 319 (2008) (reversing conviction for 
attempted use of a firearm during the commission of attempted 
robbery under Code § 18.2-53.1); Walker v. Commonwealth, 272 
Va. 511, 513, 636 S.E.2d 476, 477 (2006) (considering 
conviction of use of a firearm during the commission of an 
abduction).  Thus, the qualifier “while” limits the 
applicability of Code § 18.2-53.1 to use of a firearm “during” 
a burglary.  See Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 366, 330 
S.E.2d 89, 91 (1985) (noting that “during” does not encompass 
“before” and “after”). 
As stated above, once a perpetrator enters at nighttime, 
with or without breaking, with the requisite intent, the crime 
of burglary is complete.  Although the perpetrator remains 
 
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criminally responsible for any illegal acts performed after the 
burglary, the crime of burglary does not continue until the 
perpetrator vacates the premises.  To extend the application of 
Code § 18.2-53.1, as it relates to burglary, to all actions 
undertaken after a burglary until the perpetrator vacates the 
premises would be to expand the scope of the penal statute 
beyond that clearly stated by the General Assembly.  We decline 
to do so. 
In the alternative, the Commonwealth argues that the 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the finding 
that Rowland used the firearm in the commission of the burglary 
because he had the firearm in his hand when he entered the 
restaurant.  We disagree. 
“The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the charged 
crime.”  McMorris, 276 Va. at 504, 666 S.E.2d at 350.  
“ ‘Suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a probability of 
guilt, is insufficient to support a conviction.’ ”  Rogers v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991) 
(quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 
608 (1990)). 
Code § 18.2-53.1 prohibits using, attempting to use, or 
displaying a firearm in a threatening manner while committing 
one of the enumerated felonies.  A person “uses” a firearm if 
 
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he or she employs it.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1681 (9th ed. 
2009); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
2523 (1993) (defining “use” as “the act or practice of 
employing something”).  A person “displays” a firearm if he or 
she manifests it “to any of a victim’s senses.”  Cromite v. 
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 64, 66, 348 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1986) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Moses v. Commonwealth, 
45 Va. App. 357, 363, 611 S.E.2d 607, 610 (2005). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the evidence shows that the elements of statutory burglary were 
complete before Rowland used or displayed a firearm.  There is 
no evidence that Rowland used or displayed the firearm when 
gaining entry to the restaurant.  Neither witness observed 
Rowland’s entry.  The first time either of the witnesses 
noticed Rowland was when Luong turned around to find Rowland 
pointing a gun at him.  By that time, Rowland had already 
entered the restaurant with the intent to commit robbery 
therein.  The burglary had been completed.  The evidence is 
insufficient to support a conviction of use or display of a 
firearm during the commission of the burglary. 
Conclusion 
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that 
the evidence was sufficient to support Rowland’s conviction for 
use or display of a firearm in the commission of a burglary.  
 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, vacate Rowland’s conviction of that offense, and 
dismiss the indictment against him. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
 
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