Title: People v. Simms
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86200
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2000

Docket No. 86200-Agenda 6-November 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								DARRYL SIMMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	On November 14, 1995, defendant, Darryl Simms, filed a
post-conviction petition in the circuit court of Du Page County
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)). With leave of court, on May 21,
1997, defendant filed an amended petition in which he sought
relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
1994)). On August 12, 1998, the circuit court dismissed the
amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant
appeals directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). We affirm in
part, reverse in part and remand for an evidentiary hearing on
certain claims raised by defendant.
BACKGROUND
	Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of murder
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)), aggravated criminal
sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14(a)), criminal
sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-13(a)), armed
robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 18-2), home invasion (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-11(a)) and residential burglary (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19-3(a)). At a separate hearing, the
trial court sentenced defendant to death. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,
ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6). On direct appeal, this court affirmed
defendant's convictions, but reversed and remanded for a new
death sentencing hearing because of error during the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing. People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259
(1988) (Simms I).
	On remand, a jury determined that defendant was eligible for
the death penalty and there were no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of a death sentence. Accordingly, the trial
court sentenced defendant to death. Again, on appeal, this court
reversed and remanded for a new death sentencing hearing because
of error during the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing.
People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154 (1991) (Simms II).
	At the third death sentencing hearing, a jury once more found
defendant eligible for the death penalty and concluded that there
were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of
a death sentence. Consequently, the trial court sentenced defendant
to death. On appeal, this court affirmed defendant's death
sentence. People v. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d 176 (1995) (Simms III).
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Simms v. Illinois, 518 U.S. 1021, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1074, 116 S. Ct. 2556 (1996).
	In Simms I, Simms II, and Simms III, we set forth in detail the
facts supporting defendant's convictions and death sentence. To
the extent that facts contained in these opinions pertain to the
issues defendant raises in his amended petition, we will repeat
them as we consider each issue.
DISCUSSION
	A proceeding brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
is not a direct appeal but a collateral attack on the judgment of
conviction. People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41, 50 (1998). The
purpose of the proceeding is to determine whether in the
proceedings which resulted in the judgment of conviction there
was a substantial denial of the petitioner's rights under either the
state or federal constitution. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). The
petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing as a matter of right (People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998);
People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (1995)), and the petition
cannot consist of nonfactual and nonspecific assertions which
merely amount to conclusions that errors occurred at trial (People
v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (1999); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at
381; Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 389). Rather, the allegations in the
petition must be supported by the record in the original trial
proceedings or by the affidavits filed with the petition, and the
petition is subject to dismissal when the allegations are
contradicted by the record. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381-82. For the
purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all
well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying
affidavits, in light of the original trial record, are to be taken as
true. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 89; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 380-82.
	In a post-conviction proceeding, issues that could have been
presented on the direct appeal of the conviction but were not are
deemed waived. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 407-08
(2000); Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 89. Further, determinations of the
reviewing court on direct appeal are res judicata as to issues
actually decided. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999);
People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73 (1997); People v. Mahaffey,
165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1995). The petitioner may not avoid the bar
of res judicata simply by rephrasing issues previously addressed
on direct appeal. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d  at 62. On the other hand,
when a petitioner's claims are based upon matters outside the
record, this court has emphasized that it is not the intent of the Act
that such claims be adjudicated on the pleadings. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d  at 433; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382. Rather, the function of the
pleadings in a proceeding under the Act is to determine whether
the petitioner is entitled to a hearing. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382.
The circuit court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 387-89.
	 As noted above, the circuit court dismissed defendant's
amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. The amended
petition contains allegations of numerous constitutional violations
at defendant's third death sentencing hearing. For the most part,
defense counsel did not object to the alleged errors at trial nor
include them in a written post-trial motion. Furthermore, on direct
appeal, appellate counsel did not include the alleged errors
amongst the issues raised. In anticipation of a claim by the State
that the alleged errors have been waived, defendant argues that his
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the alleged
errors for review, and his appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to bring the alleged errors to this court's attention on direct
appeal or to argue that trial counsel was ineffective.
	A defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel
at trial and at a death sentencing hearing. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984). A defendant is also guaranteed the
effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal as of right (Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 830-31, 105 S. Ct. 830, 836-37 (1985)), and a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel is cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 531 (1995)). Accordingly,
this court has held that the doctrine of waiver should not bar
consideration of an issue where the alleged waiver stems from
incompetency of appellate counsel in failing to raise the issue on
appeal. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 531-32; Guest, 166 Ill. 2d  at 390;
People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 269-70 (1989).
	To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must satisfy the familiar Strickland test. See Strickland,
466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. The test is
composed of two prongs: deficiency and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	First, the defendant must prove that counsel's performance
was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. A court measures counsel's
performance by an objective standard of competence under
prevailing professional norms. To establish deficiency, the
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the
challenged action or inaction might have been the product of
sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at
73-74.
	Second, the defendant must establish prejudice. The defendant
must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The prejudice
prong of Strickland entails more than an "outcome-determinative"
test. The defendant must show that counsel's deficient
performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the
proceeding fundamentally unfair. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93; Griffin,
178 Ill. 2d  at 74.
	A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test.
Therefore, "failure to establish either proposition will be fatal to
the claim." People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 487 (1996); accord
Guest, 166 Ill. 2d  at 390.
	A court uses the Strickland analysis also to test the adequacy
of appellate counsel. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 458; Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d  at 269-70. A defendant who contends that appellate counsel
rendered ineffective assistance, e.g., by failing to argue a particular
issue, must show that appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue
was objectively unreasonable and prejudiced the defendant. People
v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999) (and cases cited therein).
Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue
on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from
raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit,
unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. People
v. Easley, No. 84418, slip op. at 13 (May 25, 2000); West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435. Thus, the inquiry as to prejudice requires that the
reviewing court examine the merits of the underlying issue (Mack,
167 Ill. 2d at 534), for a defendant does not suffer prejudice from
appellate counsel's failure to raise a nonmeritorious claim on
appeal (Easley, slip op. at 13; West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435; Guest, 166
Ill. 2d at 390).
	With these principles in mind, we turn to the specific
allegations in defendant's amended petition.
I. Peremptory Challenges
	Defendant contends that he was denied a fair sentencing
hearing because the State used its peremptory challenges to
remove six prospective jurors who expressed reservations about
the death penalty, but were not excusable for cause under
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), and its progeny. Under Witherspoon, prospective
jurors may not be excused for cause merely because they voice
general objections to the death penalty or express conscientious or
religious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty.
Witherspoon, 391 U.S.  at 522, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 784-85, 88 S. Ct.  at
1776-77. Defendant complains that, through the use of its
peremptory challenges, the State was able to do what it could not
do under Witherspoon: obtain a jury inclined to return a verdict
imposing the death sentence. Defendant concludes that the trial
court erred in allowing the State to exercise its peremptory
challenges to excuse the prospective jurors.
	Defendant concedes that trial counsel failed to preserve the
issue for review because counsel neither objected to the removal
of the prospective jurors during voir dire nor raised the issue in a
post-trial motion. See People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 510
(1996); People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 168 (1992). Defendant
also concedes that, on direct appeal, appellate counsel did not
question the State's use of the peremptory challenges or argue that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the issue for
review. All of the facts needed to raise this issue were present in
the record and available on direct appeal. As stated above, any
claim that could have been, but was not, presented to the
reviewing court on direct appeal is, thereafter, barred under the
doctrine of waiver. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 92.
	Defendant contends, however, that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to preserve this issue for review, and
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue on direct
appeal that trial counsel was ineffective. We disagree. This court
has repeatedly held that Witherspoon and its progeny do not limit
the State's use of peremptory challenges at voir dire. People v.
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 549 (1995); People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1994); People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 136-38
(1991); People v. Lear, 143 Ill. 2d 138, 150 (1991); People v.
Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 481-82 (1984). Thus, contrary to
defendant's assertion, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing
to object to the use of the peremptory challenges at voir dire or to
include the issue in a post-trial motion. Moreover, given our
repeated rejection of this claim, appellate counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal or argue
that trial counsel was ineffective.
II. Caldwell Violations
	Citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), defendant maintains that the jury was
misinformed by the trial court and the State that the jury's role was
to "recommend" whether defendant should be sentenced to death.
Defendant contends his death sentence must, therefore, be vacated.
	At the death sentencing hearing, the trial court conducted
individual, sequestered voir dire. The trial court used the word
"recommend" once in its examination of jurors Peterson, Henning,
Brunke, Stephen, and Slager, and twice in its examination of juror
Chick. Defendant notes that the trial court also told juror Slager
that she had "kind of a limited role." The State used the word
"recommend" once in its examination of juror Bozec.
	Trial counsel did not object during voir dire to the use of the
word "recommend." Nor did trial counsel include this issue in a
post-trial motion. Appellate counsel neither raised this issue on
direct appeal nor argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to preserve the issue for review. All of the facts supporting this
claim were present in the record and available on direct appeal.
The issue is thus waived. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 92; People v. Lear,
175 Ill. 2d 262, 278 (1997). However, as with his challenge to the
State's use of the peremptory challenges, defendant argues
ineffectiveness of trial counsel in failing to preserve the issue for
review and appellate counsel in failing to argue that trial counsel
was ineffective. Consequently, we consider the merits of this
issue. Lear, 175 Ill. 2d  at 278.
	In Caldwell, the Supreme Court held "that it is
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere." Caldwell, 472 U.S.  at 328-29,
86 L. Ed. 2d  at 239, 105 S. Ct.  at 2639. In evaluating an alleged
Caldwell violation, this court considers the challenged remarks in
the context of the entire sentencing proceeding. People v. Flores,
153 Ill. 2d 264, 287 (1992); People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 57
(1990). This court also considers whether the jury instructions and
the verdict forms accurately set forth the law regarding the jury's
role in imposing the death penalty (Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 287;
Fields, 135 Ill. 2d  at 57; People v. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 91 (1985))
and the balance between aggravation and mitigation at sentencing
(Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 287; Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 164). No single
factor is necessarily dispositive. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 287. The
relevant inquiry, considering all the facts and circumstances, is
whether the trial court and/or the State misled the jury regarding
its sentencing role. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 287; Perez, 108 Ill. 2d  at
90-91.
	We consider, then, whether the remarks defendant challenges
misled the jury. As noted above, use of the word "recommend" at
voir dire was limited to one comment to each of six jurors, and
two comments to the seventh juror. The trial court conducted
individual, sequestered voir dire, hence a comment made to one
juror would not have been heard by another. Moreover, the jury
was repeatedly informed of its responsibility in imposing the death
sentence by the trial court, the State, and the defense. In opening
remarks at voir dire, the trial court informed the prospective jurors
that the jury's role was to decide whether defendant was eligible
for the death penalty. During questioning of the individual venire
members, the trial court repeatedly informed the prospective jurors
they would decide whether defendant should be sentenced to
death, and the trial court would be bound by that decision. The
State and the defense also informed the prospective jurors of the
important role they played in the sentencing process. Each of the
prospective jurors in question expressed understanding of the
jury's role in imposing the death sentence. Lastly, both the jury
instructions and the verdict forms accurately set forth the law.
	The trial court's remark to juror Slager that she had "kind of
a limited role" is taken entirely out of context, as the following
questions by the trial court and answers by the juror demonstrate:
			"Q. Then if you determine that he is eligible, then we
go to the heart of the case, which would be does he
receive the death penalty or not?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Those are two separate hearings, two separate stages.
You understand that?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Even though you may find him eligible, you don't
have to impose the death penalty. On the other hand, if
you feel that that's called for under the evidence and the
law?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Should your decision be something other than
recommending the death sentence, the matter would be
turned over back to the Court and the Court would impose
a sentence other than death. You understand that?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Are you comfortable with that aspect?
			A. Yes.
			Q. It is kind of a limited role. You are not deciding guilt
or innocence, you are really deciding the penalty aspect
and only as it relates to whether he should receive the
death penalty or not.
			A. Yes."
Viewed in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding, we
conclude that the challenged remarks did not mislead the jury
regarding its sentencing role. Accordingly, trial counsel and
appellate counsel were not ineffective with respect to this claim.
	In a related argument, defendant maintains that three
statements the State made to the jury served to diminish the jury's
sense of responsibility in imposing the death penalty. During
closing argument, the following colloquies took place between
prosecutor Telander, defense counsel Brucar, and the trial court:
			"MR. TELANDER: The law in this case is what
controls your decision and what is going to happen.
			Mr. Brucar's argument wants you to feel guilty for
following the law. He wants you to think that you are
killing Darryl Simms, that you are with premeditation
murdering Darryl Simms.
			That's just not what is occurring here-
			MR. BRUCAR: Objection, I didn't use the term
murder.
			THE COURT: All right.
			MR. TELANDER: Killing Darryl Simms. That's not
what is happening here. That is not the purpose of the
hearing. It is not why every one of us is in this courtroom.
			We are in this courtroom for one reason. The law.
* * *
			MR. TELANDER: [The judge] is going to tell you if
you find that there's not a sufficient mitigating factor, the
defendant is to be sentenced to death.
			That's your job. Not to think about is the death penalty
right or wrong. Is the death penalty final. Should we
consider mercy to Darryl Simms.
			MR. BRUCAR: Objection, they can consider mercy for
Darryl Simms.
			THE COURT: That's true. But it is argument. I will
allow him to argue.
* * *
			MR. TELANDER: You have to judge your verdict on
the evidence.
			And don't let Mr. Brucar make you feel guilty for
fulfilling your oath as jurors. You are not killing anyone. 	You are following the law that you swore to do."
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant complains of the italicized statements.(1)
	Once more, we note trial counsel's failure to object to the
remarks at the sentencing hearing, and appellate counsel's failure
to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective. Waiver
applies. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 92. However, we consider the merits
of the issue because defendant maintains that trial and appellate
counsel were ineffective. Lear, 175 Ill. 2d  at 278.
	 Throughout closing argument, the State argued that the jury's
role was to determine whether defendant should be sentenced to
death. The State informed the jury that its decision to impose the
death penalty would be binding on the trial court. The State also
argued that it was not the province of the jury to determine the
validity of the death penalty. Rather, the jury should impose the
death penalty, if appropriate, without feeling guilty for following
the law. See Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 206. The State's argument
addressed defense counsel's arguments that the State was asking
the jury to kill defendant; that the death penalty is final; and the
jury's decision to impose the death penalty would stay with it
forever.
	Defense counsel made an emotional plea for defendant's life.
Repeatedly, counsel told the jury that it would decide whether
defendant should live or die, and it had the power to take
defendant's life or to spare defendant's life. Thus, counsel
nurtured and reinforced the jury's sense of responsibility. We note
again that both the jury instructions and the verdict forms
accurately set forth the law regarding the jury's role in imposing
the death penalty. Having reviewed the challenged remarks in the
context of the entire sentencing proceeding, we conclude that the
remarks did not lead the jury to feel less responsible for its
sentencing decision. See People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 318-19 (1997); Lear, 175 Ill. 2d  at 279; People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 120 (1996). Consequently, trial counsel and appellate counsel
were not ineffective with respect to this claim.
	In a final Caldwell challenge, defendant maintains that juror
Jekkals was misled regarding her role in imposing the death
penalty. During voir dire, the State asked juror Jekkals whether
she would "sign a verdict recommending the death sentence" if
she felt the sentence was appropriate. In an affidavit attached to
defendant's post-conviction petition, a defense investigator states
that juror Jekkals told the investigator she believed she was
making a recommendation to the trial judge whether or not to
impose the death penalty.
	We note that defendant's challenge to the State's remark at
voir dire has been waived. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 92. However, the
affidavit attached to the petition is evidence, unavailable to
defendant on direct appeal. Further, defendant maintains that he
received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We
therefore address the issue on the merits. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at
94.
	In People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507 (1978), this court held that
testimony or an affidavit of a juror cannot be used to impeach the
verdict reached by a jury, where the testimony or affidavit is
offered in an attempt to prove the motive, method or process by
which the jury reached its verdict. The court reasoned that " 'being
personal to each juror, the working of the mind of any of them
cannot be subjected to the test of other testimony, and therefore
*** such testimony should not be received to overthrow the
verdict to which all assented.' " Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d  at 512-13,
quoting State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 99, 118 A.2d 812, 816
(1955).
	In the present case, the jury was polled in open court. Each
juror, Jekkals included, affirmed that the verdict read in court was
his or her verdict. The statement attributed to juror Jekkals in the
affidavit is offered to show that she believed she was making a
recommendation to the trial court regarding the death penalty; the
judge would actually decide whether to impose the death penalty.
Such a statement calls into question the "motive, method or
process by which the jury reached its verdict." Consequently, the
affidavit may not be used to impeach the verdict reached by the
jury. See People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 457 (1998); People v.
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 457 (1995); People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90, 112 (1993).
	In reviewing each of the alleged Caldwell violations, we
conclude that the jury was not misled regarding its role in
imposing the death penalty. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective
in failing to preserve the issues for review, and appellate counsel
was not ineffective in failing to raise the issues on direct appeal or
argue that trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant is not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on these claims.
III. Jury's Failure to Consider All Elements in Determining
Eligibility
	Defendant notes that, in order to find him eligible for the
death penalty, the jury was first required to find he murdered
Lillian LaCrosse in the course of another felony. Defendant
maintains that certain remarks made by prosecutor Telander during
closing argument, led the jury to believe it did not have to make a
separate finding regarding eligibility but could simply rely on the
certified copies of convictions:
			"[MR. TELANDER]: And the last thing we have to
show is that the other felony was either aggravated
criminal sexual assault or home invasion or armed
robbery. *** If you find that any one of those three
felonies existed, he is eligible. But in this case I believe
and assert from the evidence that all three existed. And
again, how do you know that? Not because I told you. Not
even really because the evidence has told you, but it has.
But you have certified copies of convictions saying that
Mr. Simms was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual
assault. Mr. Simms was convicted of home invasion, and
he was convicted of armed robbery.
* * *
			I don't mean to make light of your decision, because it
is not a light decision. But the decision under the law, you
really have no choice to make. Beyond a reasonable
doubt, every single element has been proven, frankly
beyond all doubt.
* * *
			In addition to the certified copies of convictions, you
also have certain facts. A small piece of the trial is
brought in to show you what the case was about. To show
you how you know he invaded her home, how you know
in addition to the convictions that he raped her, how you
know he murdered her and how you know he robbed her."
(Emphasis added.)
	Defense counsel did not object to the italicized remarks at the
death sentencing hearing. Further, counsel did not complain of the
remarks in a post-trial motion. Appellate counsel did not raise this
issue on direct appeal although the facts needed to present the
claim were present in the record and available to defendant. Once
again, defendant maintains that waiver should not apply because
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the issue for
review, and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the
issue on direct appeal. Thus, we must examine the claim on its
merits.
	Initially, we observe that the State produced extensive
evidence at the death sentencing hearing regarding the commission
of the murder, home invasion, aggravated criminal sexual assault
and armed robbery. Fourteen witnesses testified at the hearing
regarding the circumstances of the crimes. The State also
introduced testimony of several witnesses by stipulation. Lastly,
the State introduced numerous exhibits relevant to the crimes into
evidence.
	Next, we note that the trial court instructed the jury it was the
jury's duty to determine the facts from the evidence; to apply the
law to the facts and in this way decide whether defendant was
eligible for a death sentence. The jury was told to presume that
defendant was not eligible for the death sentence, a presumption
which could not be overcome unless, from all the evidence, the
jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
eligible for a death sentence. The trial court also instructed the jury
that the State was required to prove that defendant killed Lillian
LaCrosse in the course of an armed robbery, aggravated criminal
sexual assault or home invasion. The jury was given two verdict
forms: the first declared that the jury could not unanimously find
that defendant was eligible for the death sentence because it could
not determine that the statutory aggravating factor existed; the
second declared that the jury unanimously found that the statutory
aggravating factor existed and defendant was eligible for the death
penalty. The jurors signed the second verdict form, thereby
indicating they had found unanimously that defendant killed
Lillian LaCrosse during the course of another felony. The jury
instructions and the verdict forms were proper statements of the
law. We must presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the
jury followed the trial judge's instructions in reaching a verdict.
Simms II, 143 Ill. 2d  at 174.
	Lastly, the remarks assigned as error were juxtaposed to other
statements informing the jury that in order to find defendant
eligible for the death penalty, it had to determine defendant killed
Lillian LaCrosse in the course of an armed robbery, aggravated
criminal sexual assault or home invasion. The State also detailed
to the jury the evidence supporting a determination that defendant
had committed armed robbery, aggravated criminal sexual assault
and home invasion, and asked that the jury find the statutory
aggravating factors existed.
	In turn, defense counsel informed the jury:
			"You have got a duty here to scrutinize every scintilla
[of] evidence in this case. You have to be satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt that these felonies occurred in the
course of a murder. Now, you have to ask yourself
another question. The evidence that they put in front of
you, is it enough to find that person eligible to be killed?"
Defense counsel reviewed the evidence for the jury, arguing the
evidence failed to show a forced entry into Lillian LaCrosse's
apartment or the use of a weapon or threats to take her property.
Trial counsel also highlighted the evidence supporting defendant's
claim of an affair and consensual sex with Lillian LaCrosse. In
conclusion, counsel told the jury:
			"And you have got a duty to do. You can't put it off on
some other Court, saying conviction[s] got to enter, that's
it. You can't do that. You are good people, you can't do
that. You took an oath, you can't do that. You have to ask
yourself, is there enough evidence here for someone to be
eligible to be killed?"
	In light of the above, we conclude that the jury was not misled
regarding the scope of its duties. See Fields, 135 Ill. 2d  at 57;
Perez, 108 Ill. 2d  at 91. The jury was well aware that it had to
determine the existence of a statutory aggravating factor, and the
signed verdict form evinces such a determination. For this reason,
we reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve the issue for review and that appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.
IV. Multiple Convictions
	Defendant argues that he was improperly prejudiced by the
admission, during the aggravation-mitigation phase of the death
sentencing hearing, of four certificates of conviction for residential
burglary, all related to defendant's entry into Lillian LaCrosse's
apartment on the date of the murder. Defendant notes he could
only be guilty of one count of residential burglary. He contends the
jury may have believed the three additional convictions for
residential burglary were relevant to a determination of his
sentence.
	Defendant raised this issue on direct appeal. See Simms III,
168 Ill. 2d  at 198. The court's determination in Simms III is res
judicata. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	Defendant maintains, however, that he challenged his
convictions in Simms I, but the court failed to address the issue.
Hence, defendant argues that the court should not have held in
Simms III that defendant could not challenge his convictions. We
decline defendant's invitation to revisit this issue.
V. Jury Instruction-Underlying Felonies
	Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury regarding the mental state necessary to sustain a
conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault or armed
robbery. Although the jury was instructed regarding the mental
state necessary to sustain a conviction for home invasion, the jury
returned a general verdict, finding that the aggravating factor
existed, without specifying that its verdict was based on the
underlying offense of home invasion. Defendant argues his death
sentence must be vacated because the jury may have determined
that he was eligible for the death sentence based on the underlying
offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault or the underlying
offense of armed robbery.
	Defendant acknowledges that trial counsel failed to object to
the instructions the trial court gave the jury and failed to offer
alternate instructions. Also, appellate counsel failed to raise this
issue on direct appeal. Defendant maintains, however, that trial
counsel was ineffective because trial counsel failed to object to the
instructions or offer alternate instructions, and appellate counsel
was ineffective because appellate counsel failed to argue that trial
counsel was ineffective. We disagree.
	In People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 209 (1989), this court
held that the legislature did not intend the aggravated criminal
sexual assault statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14) to
define a strict liability or public welfare offense. Since the
aggravated criminal sexual assault statute does not prescribe a
mental state applicable to the offense, a mental state of intent,
knowledge or recklessness must be implied. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d  at
209, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 4-3 through 4-6, 4-9.
This court, however, did not consider the additional issue
presented here, namely, what, if any, jury instructions are required
for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
	In People v. Burton, 201 Ill. App. 3d 116 (1990), our appellate
court considered this issue and rejected the defendant's contention
that he was entitled to instructions setting forth the required mental
states the State had to prove to convict him of aggravated criminal
sexual assault. The Burton court explained that the mental states
implied by section 4-3 of the Criminal Code are in the nature of
general criminal mental states, distinguished from specific mental
states about which the jury must be advised in instructions
defining an offense or describing the elements the State must
prove. Further, the Burton court noted that the mental states
implied by section 4-3 of the Criminal Code are mental states
which almost always accompany the acts alleged. The Burton
court concluded:
		"[S]ome mental states involved in offenses, although not
specifically mentioned in the statute defining the offense,
may be implied in the offense and be specific enough to
require instruction to the jury. Under some circumstances,
the mental state implied by section 4-3 of the Code may
possibly be so specific as to require instruction. [Citation.]
			Here, the implied mental states were not specific, and
the circuit court did not err in giving the pattern
instructions, which did not set forth those mental states."
Burton, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 122.
Accord People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d 833, 845 (1994); People
v. Franzen, 251 Ill. App. 3d 813, 830 (1993); People v. Fryer, 247
Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1060 (1993); People v. Bock, 242 Ill. App. 3d
1056, 1075-76 (1993). See also People v. Bofman, 283 Ill. App. 3d
546, 550-51 (1996); People v. Robinson, 265 Ill. App. 3d 882,
888-89 (1994); People v. Adams, 265 Ill. App. 3d 181, 187 (1994);
People v. Calva, 256 Ill. App. 3d 865, 870 (1993).
	We agree with the Burton court that jury instructions on a
specific mental state are not required for the offense of aggravated
criminal sexual assault. Consequently, we reject defendant's
argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the instructions or to offer alternate instructions. We also reject
defendant's argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective.
	Next, we consider whether the trial court should have
instructed the jury on a specific mental state for the offense of
armed robbery. Initially, we note that the statutory provision for
the offense of armed robbery, like the statutory provision for the
offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, does not prescribe
a particular mental state applicable to the elements of the offense.
However, in People v. Jones, 149 Ill. 2d 288, 297 (1992), this
court held that, pursuant to section 4-3 of the Criminal Code,
"either intent, knowledge or recklessness is an element of
robbery."
	In People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305 (1995), this court stated
that robbery is a general intent crime, and, unlike specific intent
crimes, proof that the prohibited harm was intended is not
necessary to proof of a general intent crime. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at
337. The court concluded that "proof that robbery was intended is
not required to sustain a conviction for armed robbery. The gist of
armed robbery is simply the taking of another's property by force
or threat of force." Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d  at 338.
	In the present case, evidence was presented that defendant
stabbed Lillian LaCrosse and took her purse, her jeans, and a
movie camera her parents owned. This evidence supported
defendant's conviction for armed robbery. In a statement he gave
to the police, defendant admitted killing Lillian LaCrosse but
claimed that he took her purse and the movie camera because he
feared he had left fingerprints on them the previous afternoon.
However, defendant's subjective intent in taking the property, i.e.,
to dispose of items containing incriminating evidence, was of no
import. The jury was instructed that a person commits the offense
of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person
or while otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon, takes property
from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by
threatening the imminent use of force. This instruction was
appropriate since the mental state of intent, knowledge or
recklessness could be inferred from the circumstances of the
crime. Pursuant to this court's holding in Lewis, the State was not
required to prove that defendant acted with the subjective intent to
rob Lillian LaCrosse, nor was the trial court required to instruct
that the jury must find defendant acted with the subjective intent
to rob. See also People v. Garland, 254 Ill. App. 3d 827 (1993);
People v. Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d 38, 54 (1990) (listing cases
holding mental state is not an essential element for jury
instructions on armed robbery). Thus, trial counsel was not
ineffective in failing to object to the jury instructions on armed
robbery or offer alternate instructions, and appellate counsel was
not ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal or argue
that trial counsel was ineffective.
VI. Disclosure of Aggravating Evidence
	Defendant filed a bill of particulars as well as a motion to
compel the prosecution to disclose nonstatutory aggravating
factors. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant maintains
that the death sentencing hearing is a critical stage of trial, and he
needed notice and time to prepare a response to the nonstatutory
aggravating factors the State intended to introduce. He assigns
error to the trial court's denial of his motion to compel.
	Trial counsel did not raise this issue in a post-trial motion.
Appellate counsel did not raise this issue on direct appeal or argue
that trial counsel was ineffective. In his amended petition,
defendant has not alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective in
this respect. As noted above, issues that could have been presented
on direct appeal but were not are waived in subsequent
proceedings. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 89. Thus, we conclude that this
issue is procedurally barred.
VII. Testimony of Attorney
	In his amended petition, defendant argues that the State
should not have had attorney Katherine Zellner testify at the
second stage of the death sentencing hearing regarding an incident
she observed in 1991. Defendant contends that the information
Zellner possessed regarding the incident was subject to the
attorney-client privilege and should not have been disclosed absent
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In a related argument,
defendant maintains that Zellner should not have agreed to
represent him in 1992 because she knew she might be a witness
against him regarding the 1991 incident, and because prosecutor
Telander was her partner. The basis for Zellner and Telander's
partnership was their joint representation, pursuant to court
appointment, of a criminal defendant in Du Page County over a
six-month period in 1992. Defendant asserts he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because Zellner's representation of
defendant was subject to a per se conflict of interest.
	At the death sentencing hearing, Zellner testified that in the
fall of 1991, while interviewing a client in the visiting room at
Pontiac Correctional Center, she observed defendant strike his
wife, Christine Simms, in the face. Defendant then unzipped his
pants, and his wife performed oral sex on him. Although there are
television cameras in the visiting room, they do not record
activities at some of the tables in the visiting room. Zellner did not
report the incident to the guard seated at a desk by the door. She
had reported a sex act she observed on another visit to this very
guard, and he failed to take action. Zellner also testified that when
she learned that Birkett was prosecuting defendant's case, she told
Birkett about the oral sex incident.
	At the conclusion of the death sentencing hearing, defendant
motioned that the trial court appoint new counsel to review
specific allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Defendant
alleged, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not have defendant testify to rebut Zellner's testimony. At a post-trial hearing on defendant's motion, Zellner testified as follows. In
the spring of 1992, while she and her associate, Daniel DeLay,
were interviewing Larry Eiler, a prisoner at Pontiac she had been
appointed to represent, defendant asked Eiler if defendant could
talk to Zellner for a moment. Defendant and his wife, Christine
Simms, then spoke with Zellner and DeLay. Defendant asked
Zellner what she thought of Telander; whether it was ethically
appropriate for Telander to become close to the LaCrosse family.
She answered that she and Telander were both representing a
criminal defendant in Du Page County and, in her opinion,
Telander is an ethical attorney. Defendant then asked her if she
would see Telander sometime soon. She replied she would see him
within the next two weeks. Defendant requested that she ask
Telander whether some kind of a deal could be worked out if
defendant pled guilty. She said, "I don't know anything about your
case, but I will convey the message." Subsequently, she spoke with
Telander, with Birkett present. When she told Telander that
defendant wanted to plead guilty, Telander and Birkett laughed,
explaining that guilt was not at issue; defendant's case had been
remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
	Zellner also testified that she told Telander and Birkett about
the 1991 oral sex incident. She could not recall whether she told
them about the incident at the time she relayed defendant's plea-bargaining request or during another conversation. However, she
believes they only had one conversation about defendant. Zellner
stated that she did not tell defendant and his wife that Telander
was a close friend. The first time she met Telander was when they
were appointed to jointly represent a criminal defendant in
Du Page County. Telander withdrew from the case after six
months. Zellner also stated that she has never accepted a defendant
facing the death penalty as a private client. She has only
represented such defendants when she has been appointed by the
court.
	We consider first whether Zellner should have been allowed
to testify at the death sentencing hearing regarding the 1991
incident. We note that trial counsel did not object to Zellner's
testimony at the death sentencing hearing. Furthermore, appellate
counsel did not argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to Zellner's testimony. Defendant
maintains, however, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to Zellner's testimony and appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise this issue on appeal.
	The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to secure for the
client the ability to confide freely and fully in his or her attorney,
without fear that confidential information will be disseminated to
others. People v. Knuckles, 165 Ill. 2d 125, 130 (1995). In People
v. Adam, 51 Ill. 2d 46 (1972), this court restated the essential
elements for the creation and application of the attorney-client
privilege:
		" '(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from
a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived.' " Adam, 51 Ill. 2d  at 48, quoting 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
The privilege is based upon the confidential nature of such
communications. People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 294 (1983).
	In the present case, defendant cannot argue that he made a
privileged communication to Zellner while seeking her legal
advice. See Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hospital, 298 Ill.
App. 3d 396, 408 (1998). Additionally, the 1991 incident occurred
in the presence of others, i.e., Zellner's client and the desk guard,
in a room under camera surveillance. At the very least, defendant's
behavior was subject to observation by anyone present in the
room. A defendant's voluntary disclosure of information, or other
matters subject to being testified to, in the presence of opposing
counsel or any other third person who is not the agent of the
defendant or his attorney is not privileged. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d  at
295.
	We conclude that Zellner did not disclose any communication
subject to the attorney-client privilege. Trial counsel was not
ineffective in failing to object to Zellner's testimony and appellate
counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this issue on direct
appeal or argue trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
	Next, we consider whether an attorney-client relationship
existed between defendant and Zellner in 1992. The attorney-client
relationship is a voluntary, contractual relationship that requires
the consent of both the attorney and client. In re Chicago Flood
Litigation, 289 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941 (1997). As explained in Corti
v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 521 (1981), the relationship "is
only created by a retainer or an offer to retain or a fee paid.
(De Wolf v. Strader (1861), 26 Ill. 225.) It cannot be created by the
attorney alone or by an attorney and a third party who has no
authority to act." See also In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 289 Ill.
App. 3d at 941; Holstein v. Grossman, 246 Ill. App. 3d 719, 743
(1993). Being a consensual relationship, "[t]he client must
manifest [his] authorization that the attorney act on [his] behalf,
and the attorney must indicate [her] acceptance of the power to act
on the client's behalf." Simon v. Wilson, 291 Ill. App. 3d 495, 509
(1997).
	The record from defendant's death sentencing hearing reveals
that throughout the proceedings defendant was represented by
three court-appointed attorneys, Baker, Brucar and Ost. Defendant
did not seek to have the trial court appoint Zellner as new counsel
or as additional counsel. Zellner testified that she did not discuss
possible representation with defendant or defendant's wife.
Defendant wanted a moment of her time; posed some questions
regarding Telander; and asked that she inquire of Telander
whether a deal could be worked out. These facts do not show a
consultation by a layperson with an attorney for the purpose of
securing that attorney's legal advice on a particular matter. These
facts also do not show that Zellner ever agreed to represent
defendant. Although defendant's wife stated in an affidavit that
she spoke with Zellner three times about representing defendant,
she did not state that either she or defendant paid Zellner a
retainer, or attempted to have the trial court appoint Zellner as
counsel. To the contrary, in her affidavit defendant's wife
indicates that Zellner wanted $15,000 for the sentencing hearing,
with a 30% retainer. Further, she states that when she told Zellner
she could not raise the money for the fee, Zellner replied that she
did not give free advice and there was nothing more to talk about.
Thus, the affidavit does not contradict the record, but rather
supports our conclusion that an attorney-client relationship did not
exist between defendant and Zellner. Consequently, defendant did
not have a right to conflict-free representation from Zellner. It
follows that the circuit court properly dismissed this claim.
VIII. Perjury
	In the amended petition, defendant alleges that three of the
State's witnesses, Mary Matas, Detective Mueller of the Hillside
police department, and Joseph Mogavero, committed perjury at the
death sentencing hearing with full knowledge of the State.
Defendant also alleges that the State failed to disclose certain
information to the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963),Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972), and
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 115 S. Ct. 1555
(1995).
	Matas' testimony and Detective Muller's testimony are
fundamentally related. First, we will summarize the testimony of
these witnesses, and the allegations in defendant's amended
petition pertaining to them. We will then summarize Mogavero's
testimony and the allegations pertaining to him.
Mary Matas and Detective Mueller
	At the death sentencing hearing, Matas testified that, on the
evening of March 17, 1985, defendant entered her car without her
knowledge. When she got into the car to drive home from work,
defendant grabbed her from behind, cut her with a knife, hit her on
the face and in the ribs, forced her to cut herself with a razor blade,
and raped her. Defendant left her tied to the car's steering wheel.
Three weeks later, on the evening of April 9, 1985, defendant
attacked her as she exited her car in her garage. Defendant said he
did not get enough the first time. He hit her in the face with a
wrench, threw her to the ground and kicked her. Defendant was
scared away when a family member turned the lights on in the
back yard. Matas testified that she identified defendant, without
hesitation, in a photo lineup on July 18, 1985.
	Mueller investigated the Matas incidents. He testified that, in
July of 1985, he became aware of the circumstances of the
LaCrosse murder and sexual assault. He obtained a photograph of
defendant from the Addison police department. He included the
photograph, along with photographs of defendant's brothers,
Sherrod and Troy Simms, in a photo lineup he showed Matas.
When Matas viewed the photographs, she became emotionally
upset. She told Mueller she recognized her assailant, and
positively identified defendant.
	In 1997, defendant's post-conviction counsel subpoenaed the
records of the Hillside police department and the Bellwood police
department regarding the Matas incidents. He received a 39-page
report from the Hillside police department (the 1997 report), and
a two-page report from the Bellwood police department. In 1985,
at the guilt phase of defendant's trial, defense counsel, now
Associate Judge Eugene Wojcik, had also requested the Hillside
police department reports regarding the Matas incidents. In an
affidavit attached to the amended petition, Judge Wojcik states
that he received a 13-page report from the Hillside police
department (the 1985 report). Judge Wojcik also states his belief
that "all the documents set forth in Exhibit 'S,' [the 1997 report]
and all the information contained therein were not disclosed to
[him] by either the Hillside Police Department or the State."
(Emphasis in original.) Of the two sets of reports from the Hillside
police department, only two pages are identical.
	A comparison of the 1985 and 1997 reports reveals certain
inconsistencies. The 1985 report shows that Mueller had Matas
view a photo lineup on July 18, 1985. The photo lineup contained
pictures of defendant's brothers, Troy and Sherrod. Matas readily
identified defendant as her assailant. The 1997 report seems to
indicate that Mueller conducted two photo lineups in connection
with the Matas incident prior to July 1985. At the first lineup on
May 17, 1985, Matas indicated that defendant's picture "looked
close," but she needed a better photograph. At the second lineup
on June 1, 1985, Matas stated that defendant looked like her
assailant, but she would have to hear him speak to be sure. The
two lineups did not include photographs of defendant's brothers.
	In the 1997 report, Mueller states that Matas felt she knew her
assailant from a prior contact and might recognize his voice. The
offender had called Matas by her middle name, Sue, when he
raped her. Notes from another police officer indicate that Matas
believed she had heard her assailant's voice before but was not
sure she would be able to recognize his face if she saw him again.
The 1997 report also contains extensive notes on the course of the
investigation. In particular, Mueller interviewed various members
of Matas' family and her former spouse because Matas believed
the rape was a setup.
	The 1985 report supports Matas' testimony at the death
sentencing hearing. The 1997 report bespeaks the hesitancy in her
identification of defendant as her assailant. Defendant maintains
that the State's failure to disclose the 1997 report earlier was in
violation of Brady, Giglio and Kyles. He argues that, had the State
disclosed the 1997 report, he would have been able to attack
Matas' tentative identification and the course of the investigation.
He would also have been able to circumvent the alleged perjury at
the death sentencing hearing. Lastly, defendant maintains the State
should have disclosed the Bellwood police department report
because it indicates that Matas could not positively identify her
assailant in the garage attack, although she believed her assailant
was the person who had previously raped her.
Joseph Mogavero
	Prior to the commencement of the death sentencing hearing,
defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the introduction of gang-related evidence. The trial court granted the motion as to any
evidence that defendant possessed gang paraphernalia or signs.
The trial court also forbade mention of gangs in front of the jury,
unless the State obtained a ruling that testimony from a specified
witness showed a connection between defendant's gang affiliation
and an aggravating factor.
	In compliance with this ruling, the State made an offer of
proof prior to Mogavero's testimony. Outside the presence of the
jury, Mogavero testified regarding defendant's gang affiliation,
defendant's attempts to intimidate other inmates, and defendant's
attempts to solicit sexual acts from Mogavero. Mogavero also
testified that the State had not offered to reduce his forgery
sentence; he had finished his jail sentence; he did not have any
pending cases; and he was not currently on bond. The trial court
allowed Mogavero to testify at the sentencing hearing.
	At the sentencing hearing, Mogavero testified that he served
time in the Du Page County jail in 1993 for forgery. Although he
had been released from jail, he was still on probation for the
forgery. In March 1993, he was housed in the same cell pod as
defendant. Defendant told him defendant was a high-ranking
member of a gang, and defendant used his affiliation with the gang
and other tactics to intimidate the inmates in the cell pod.
Defendant also "bragged about how he can get any kind of dope
he wanted and free coke." Mogavero testified further that
defendant made a pass at him, which he refused. Defendant also
solicited sex from another inmate. Mogavero did not know
whether defendant had sex with the other inmate.
	On cross-examination, Mogavero stated that he was a
recovering cocaine addict. Defense counsel then quizzed him on
his motives for testifying:
			"Q. With regard to your testimony today, have you been
assured any consideration from the State?
			A. No, I haven't, and I didn't ask for any.
			Q. You are testifying today out of your interest in
justice?
			A. Yes, I am."
	In his amended petition, defendant states that, in 1993,
Mogavero was in jail for burglary in addition to forgery.
Defendant also states that Mogavero was promised a favor in
return for his testimony. Defendant attached to his amended
petition an affidavit in which Lee Smith, a defense investigator,
avers that, on January 22, 1997, he asked Mogavero whether the
prosecutors offered any type of deal if Mogavero testified against
defendant. Mogavero replied: "Joseph Birkett told him that by
looking at his record he would be getting in trouble again and if he
testified against Darryl Simms [Birkett] would owe him a favor if
he got in any more trouble with the law."
	Defendant also claims the State withheld evidence that
Mogavero pled guilty to burglary on May 10, 1993, and was
sentenced to six months' imprisonment, to be served concurrently
with his forgery sentence, followed by 30 months of probation;
that Mogavero was required to participate in a drug and substance
abuse program as a condition of probation for the forgery and
burglary offenses; that Mogavero pled guilty to domestic battery
on June 1, 1993, and was placed on one year of probation; and that
Mogavero violated the terms of his probation by failing to report
to probation on three occasions and refusing to submit to a drug
test. Defendant attached affidavits from defense counsel Baker and
Ost, in which each states the first time he recalls receiving any
information concerning the Mogavero matters was in October
1996. Defendant maintains that the State had an obligation under
Brady, Giglio and Kyles to disclose the information regarding
Mogavero.
	Having reviewed the witnesses' testimony and the post-conviction claims(2) in defendant's amended petition, we turn to a
consideration of the applicable law. We find our opinion in
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, to be instructive.
	In Coleman, this court summarized federal and Illinois
jurisprudence regarding the use of perjured testimony and the
disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense, and, in particular,
detailed the evolution of the United States Supreme Court's Brady
decision. See Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 391-92. The court noted that,
in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 349,
96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976), the Supreme Court identified "three
quite different situations" to which Brady applies. In the first
situation, the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that the
prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury. The
second situation is characterized by a pretrial request for specific
evidence followed by the prosecution's noncompliance with the
request. In the third situation, the defense makes either no
discovery request or only a general request for "Brady" material
and exculpatory matter is withheld by the prosecution. This court
pointed out, however, that in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985), the Supreme Court
abandoned the distinction between the second and third situations,
i.e., the "specific request" and the "general or no request"
situations.
	The court then outlined the corresponding tests the Supreme
Court requires that we use in determining whether a defendant's
conviction must be reversed. In the first situation, the defendant's
conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood
that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury. In the second and third situations, favorable evidence is
material and constitutional error results from its suppression by the
government, if the evidence could reasonably be taken to put the
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
the verdict. Finally, the cumulative effect of the suppressed
evidence also informs the materiality determination. See Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 392-93.
	Lastly, recognizing that a particular case may involve both the
use of perjured testimony and the failure to disclose Brady
material, the court then held:
		"[W]here undisclosed Brady material undermines the
credibility of specific testimony that the State otherwise
knew to have been false, the standard of materiality
applicable to the first [Brady situation] applies. In such
circumstances, the failure to disclose is 'part and parcel of
the presentation of false evidence to the jury and therefore
"corrupt[s] *** the truth-seeking function of the trial
process," [citation] and is a far more serious act than a
failure to disclose generally exculpatory material.'
[Citation.] Therefore, the standard of materiality in this
case is whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 394.
	With Coleman firmly in mind, we turn to defendant's post-conviction claims of perjury and Brady violations. At the outset,
we note that Coleman is applicable even though the alleged
perjury in the present case took place at a death sentencing hearing
and not at trial. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ***."
Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196-97.
We also note that the State's alleged conduct with respect to Matas
and Detective Mueller falls within both the first and the
second/third Brady situations. It is within the first situation
because Detective Mueller's testimony regarding the course of his
investigation and Mary Matas' testimony that she did not have any
hesitation when she identified defendant in the lineup were known
by the State to be false. It is within the second/third situation
because the 1997 report and the Bellwood police department
report revealed inconsistencies in Mary Matas' description of her
assailant; hesitancy in her identification of defendant; and the
existence of other suspects, with varying motives, in the Matas
incidents. Likewise, the State's alleged conduct with respect to
Mogavero falls within both the first and the second/third Brady
situations. It is within the first situation because Mogavero's
testimony that the State had not made any promises to him and
that he did not have any pending cases was known by the State to
be false. It is within the second/third situation because the State
failed to disclose that Mogavero had pled guilty to burglary and
domestic battery, and Mogavero was in violation of the terms of
probation, information that could have been used for
impeachment. Thus, the standard of materiality to be used is
whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false
testimony could have affected the outcome of the death sentencing
hearing. Accordingly, we can affirm the circuit court's decision to
dismiss these claims without an evidentiary hearing only if we can
conclude, as a matter of law, that the allegedly false testimony
(which we must assume is true for purposes of the motion to
dismiss) does not fall within this strict standard of materiality. See
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 394.
	Matas was a prominent witness at the death sentencing
hearing. As set forth above, she testified that defendant raped her
and battered her a few weeks before he sexually assaulted and
murdered Lillian LaCrosse. Matas testified that she identified
defendant in a photo lineup on July 18, 1985, and she had no
doubt in her mind back in 1985 that defendant was her assailant.
We recognize that two other women, Sandra Sender and Sharon
Williams, testified that defendant had sexually assaulted them.
Their testimony, however, was not as effective because defendant
was charged with a misdemeanor in connection with the assault on
Sharon Williams, and pled guilty to aggravated battery in
connection with the assault on Sandra Sender.
	Detective Mueller's testimony supported Matas' testimony.
Detective Mueller testified that Matas positively identified
defendant in a photo lineup which allegedly contained photographs
of defendant's brothers. Her ability to discern differences between
the photographs of defendant and his brothers would surely have
weighed in the jury's mind.
	Mogavero was also a prominent witness at the death
sentencing hearing. His testimony contained the first mention of
defendant's involvement in a gang. Mogavero's testimony
reflected defendant's attempts to intimidate, and to obtain sexual
favors from, other prisoners, and defendant's disregard for prison
regulations. Had the defense known that Mogavero had pled guilty
to two other offenses and that the State had, as alleged, made a
promise to Mogavero in return for his testimony, the defense
might have effectively impeached him.
	Having reviewed the entire transcript, we are unable to
conclude there exists no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly
false testimony would not have affected the jury's determination
to impose the death penalty. Accordingly, we hold that the
allegations in defendant's amended petition were sufficient to
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation and to
require an evidentiary hearing to determine if the violation did in
fact occur. The circuit court's dismissal of these claims without an
evidentiary hearing was improper. We, of course, express no
opinion on the actual merits of defendant's claims. Rather, we
reverse and remand with instructions for the circuit court to
proceed to the evidentiary stage on these claims.
IX. Testimony Regarding Prior Death Sentence
	In proceedings leading to the death penalty hearing, the trial
court granted a motion in limine barring the State from eliciting
testimony regarding defendant's prior death sentences for the
murder of Lillian LaCrosse or the fact that defendant was on death
row. At the death penalty hearing, the State solicited testimony
from Dr. Wahlstrom, a psychiatrist and medical doctor who
testified on defendant's behalf, that defendant had told other
people he had a loving, caring family. The State then asked Dr.
Wahlstrom the following questions:
			"Q. And at the time that he made those statements to
other people, he was not facing the death penalty. Is that
right?
			A. (No response).
			Q. Correct?
			A. I am not sure of the dates."
The trial court sustained trial counsel's objection and instructed
the jury to disregard the answer.
	In the amended petition, defendant contends that the State
violated the motion in limine by questioning Dr. Wahlstrom as
noted above. Trial counsel did not include this issue in a post-trial
motion. Further, appellate counsel did not raise this issue on direct
appeal although the facts needed to raise the issue were present in
the record and available to counsel. Waiver applies. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d  at 390. Defendant maintains, however, that appellate counsel
was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on appeal. Defendant
also maintains that, in light of numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct in this case, this court need not assess the prejudicial
effect of the alleged violation of the motion, but should find that
defendant is entitled to a new death sentencing hearing. Given that
we find error only with respect to the perjury allegations, we reject
defendant's contention that we need not determine whether he was
prejudiced by appellate counsel's inaction. Instead, we find that
defendant has failed to show prejudice under the Strickland test.
	As noted above, trial counsel objected to the testimony
elicited from Dr. Wahlstrom, and the trial court instructed the jury
to disregard the testimony. We must presume, absent a showing to
the contrary, that the jury followed the trial judge's instructions in
reaching a verdict. Simms II, 143 Ill. 2d  at 174. Moreover, we do
not believe the jury would have viewed the testimony as a
reference to defendant's prior death sentences or to defendant's
presence on death row. Thus, we conclude that appellate counsel
was not ineffective for failing to raise the matter on direct appeal.
X. Admission of Defendant's Statements
	Defendant contends that he suffered prejudice from the
admission, at the death sentencing hearing, of a statement he made
to Detective Mueller regarding the aggravated criminal sexual
assault of Mary Matas. Although the statement is a denial of any
involvement with the aggravated criminal sexual assault, the State
used other remarks defendant made to Detective Mueller as
evidence of defendant's untruthfulness.
	This issue was considered by this court on direct appeal.
There, defendant argued that the admission of the statement at the
death sentencing hearing violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel. The State argued that defendant had waived this claim
since trial counsel made only a general objection to the statement.
This court agreed, finding that "[a] general objection results in a
waiver of the claim of error unless (1) the grounds for the
objection were clear from the record, (2) trial counsel's assistance
was ineffective [citation], or (3) there was plain error." Simms III,
168 Ill. 2d  at 193. The court determined that "[a]n objection based
on the sixth amendment right to counsel was not clear from the
record since, at the time of the general objection, the testimony did
not reflect that the defendant was unrepresented by counsel during
the statement." Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d  at 193. Next, the court
rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance, observing that
"[i]n light of the minor role played by the challenged statement,
there was no reasonable probability that admission of defendant's
statement changed the outcome of defendant's sentencing
hearing." Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d  at 194. Lastly, the court declined
to review the issue as plain error because the evidence was not
closely balanced, and admission of the challenged statement did
not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d 
at 194-95.
	In these proceedings, defendant maintains that the court in
Simms III should not have held the issue waived. Further,
defendant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective to the extent
that he failed to make the record clear regarding the basis for the
objection, and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue
that trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant's arguments on
waiver and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were fully
addressed in Simms III. The court's resolution of these contentions
is res judicata. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d  at 62.
	Since the challenged statements did not prejudice defendant
(Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d at 194), it follows that appellate counsel
was not ineffective for failing to argue ineffective assistance of
trial counsel (Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d at 82).
XI. State's Closing Argument
	Defendant next argues he was denied a fair hearing because
of certain inflammatory and improper remarks made by the
prosecution during closing arguments at the second stage of the
death sentencing hearing. Defendant cites 22 separate remarks that
he believes are, either individually or cumulatively, sufficiently
prejudicial to require a new death sentencing hearing. One remark
is said to be misstatement of the law on the issue of mitigation.
We reviewed this remark on direct appeal, and our determination
that the remark was proper is res judicata to defendant's renewed
challenge. Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d  at 196-97. The remaining remarks
are to the effect: that there was insufficient mitigation to preclude
the imposition of the death penalty; that the only punishment
supported by the law and the evidence was the imposition of the
death penalty; that defendant lacked remorse; that defendant could
have had witnesses testify that he was sorry for the crimes; that
defendant would be a "gang banger" until executed; that defendant
was hoping for a very short sentence; that the only thing defendant
cared about was getting off; that defendant's case was a "bunch of
garbage"; that defendant had committed aggravated battery upon
a prison guard; that the jury had an obligation to consider the
victim impact evidence presented; that defendant knew Lillian
LaCrosse's children would suffer as a result of the murder; that
defendant had decided what he would do in the event the children
woke up; that Lillian LaCrosse would trade places with defendant;
and that, in the opinion of the prosecutors, there were no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
penalty.
	Every defendant has the right to a trial free from improper
prejudicial comments or arguments by the prosecutor. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 184. Whether a prosecutor's comments or arguments
constitute prejudicial error is evaluated according to the language
used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of the argument on
the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 
at 184, citing People v. Bivens, 163 Ill. App. 3d 472, 482 (1987).
On the other hand, a prosecutor is allowed a great deal of latitude
in presenting closing argument. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144,
244 (1999); People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 554 (1992). The
prosecutor has the right to comment on the evidence and to draw
all legitimate inferences deducible therefrom, even if they are
unfavorable to the defendant. People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 80
(1997). Because the trial court is in a better position than a
reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks
made, the regulation of the substance and style of the argument is
within the trial court's discretion. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 184-85,
citing People v. Smothers, 55 Ill. 2d 172, 176 (1973). The trial
court may cure errors by giving the jury proper instructions on the
law to be applied; informing the jury that arguments are not
themselves evidence and must be disregarded if not supported by
the evidence at trial; or sustaining the defendant's objections and
instructing the jury to disregard the inappropriate remark. People
v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1 (1996); Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 185. The trial
court's determination of the propriety of the remarks will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 244;
Smith, 177 Ill. 2d  at 80.
	In evaluating a defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
remarks in closing argument were erroneous, a reviewing court
must consider the remarks in the context of the parties' closing
arguments as a whole. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 244; People v. Brown,
172 Ill. 2d 1, 53 (1996). Moreover, the reviewing court must
indulge in every reasonable presumption that the trial judge
properly exercised the discretion vested in him. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 
at 554. The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict unless it
can be said that the remarks resulted in substantial prejudice to the
accused (Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 244), such that absent those remarks
the verdict would have been different (Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 185).
	In the present case, as to each remark, either trial counsel
failed to preserve the alleged error for review or appellate counsel
failed to challenge the remark on direct appeal. Waiver applies.
However, defendant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to preserve the errors for review and appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective.
Consequently, the challenged remarks must be reviewed in the
context of a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
	Applying these legal principles, we find that defendant has
failed to establish prejudice from the remarks. Some of the
challenged remarks were based on reasonable inferences from the
evidence. See Smith, 177 Ill. 2d  at 80. Other remarks were forceful
argument that the State had proven its case, and not misstatements
of the law. See Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d  at 196-97. Yet other remarks
were brief and isolated comments, which did not affect the overall
fairness of the sentencing hearing. See People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 509-10 (2000); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 513
(1998); People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 37-38 (1988). The
remarks which might be considered improper were cured by the
trial court's sustaining defense objections, informing the jury that
arguments are not evidence and must be disregarded if not
supported by the evidence, or giving the jury proper instructions
on the law to be applied. We conclude defendant has not shown
that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the alleged
errors for review, or that appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to challenge the remarks on appeal.
XII. Abandonment of Defense
	Citing People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449 (1985), defendant
maintains that trial counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case
to meaningful adversarial testing and, consequently, ineffective
assistance of counsel can be presumed without application of the
Strickland test. At the second stage of the death sentencing
hearing, trial counsel made the following statements:
			"The horror of the acts Darryl committed is beyond
dispute. And I won't take exception to them, I won't
cheapen this process by attempting to make excuses. By
trying to say that they are anything less than they are.
			The fact that Darryl sits here before you, he takes
responsibility. He takes responsibility for every single
thing he's done in his life. Regardless of what he said,
regardless of the things he denied, regardless of how he
may have manipulated, regardless of how he's lied, and
surely-he has lied-there are no excuses today. Today he
sits here before you in judgment. He sits here in judgment
for his acts, and possibly final judgment.
* * *
			The power you have is awesome, if you think about it.
And the circumstances you are in, it is almost irresistible
for you to use it. You only have really one choice of what
you can do here today. You can put Darryl to death, or
you can do nothing. The way the law works, the way it is
presented to you, and what I am asking you to do is
nothing. And it is almost inconceivable for me to have to
ask you to do that, to sit there and do nothing. After what
we have all been through for these last three or four
weeks. How can you do nothing? As was Mr. Birkett, as
was I am sure everybody in this courtroom, or anybody
who has been touched by these proceedings, we have been
moved by what has happened to the LaCrosse family. I
am sure some of you felt rage. I myself have felt it. It is
mind boggling. The last three weeks, especially for you
because you are not a part of this process the way we are,
has to be a very, very disorienting experience. We read
about these things in the newspaper, we see them on TV.
We hear about violence, we hear about the problems we
have in this world, but we don't get a view of them like
we have in this courtroom.
* * *
			And I stand here before you now with the greatest
humility, but with utmost sincerity, and tell you not to kill
Darryl in this case. In this case it is not right. And I have
very little to put in front of you to ask that. I have very,
very little to put in front of you to make that request. All
I have is what is left of Darryl's humanity.
* * *
			My task I think is the virtual impossibility of trying to
get you to understand something about Darryl. Trying to
understand something about his life. About his crimes.
About the crimes from where he's coming from. The
drugs in his life. The hatred, the fear, the despair.
			It is easy, and almost natural, almost natural to want to
kill what we hate, and what we fear, and what we don't
understand. One of the things you promised us at the
beginning of this trial is to keep an open mind. And I ask
you to maintain that for a few more moments.
* * *
			I ask you please, keep your minds open for a few more
minutes. And please, let me try to explain to you
something about this process. Let me try to explain to you
why Darryl does have some worth as a human being. And
Darryl should not be put to death.
* * *
			You have all been qualified that you believe in the
death penalty, and under appropriate circumstances you
will give the death penalty. You have also been qualified
to say that you will not give the death penalty
automatically. That you will listen to everything that's
been said. No matter how horrible the crime, no matter
how disturbing the evidence, you will keep your minds
open and listen and determine whether or not you feel you
should kill one of your fellow human beings.
			You know, coming in here and going through this
process, the process we have gone through for the last
three or four weeks, is almost in a way like basic training.
* * *
			But unlike what we try to accomplish with basic
training, even though there are so many similarities in the
process, the whole point of why we question you, the
whole point of why we bring you here, give you
instructions of law, is that when you go into that room to
deliberate, we don't just say kill. Irresistible urge. It has to
be. But I ask you to think about that. We instruct you by
means of the law on how you are to discharge your duty.
What are some of your duties in this case? Certainly
Darryl has to be punished. Certainly the man has to be
punished. And we don't look today for anything other
than that. Certainly society needs to be protected from
Darryl. Certainly as citizens you want to serve justice.
And as the mandate you took when you were sworn as
jurors, you must follow the law. To do those duties, ladies
and gentlemen, you don't have to kill Darryl.
* * *
			I agree with Mr. Birkett, the aggravation in this case
speaks for itself. I agree with Mr. Birkett, just on the basis
of what you heard, the initial hearing, the qualification
hearing, on the basis of what happened to Lillian
LaCrosse, do we have sufficient aggravation to impose
the death penalty? No question about it.
			The question is, is there a sufficient mitigating factor.
Not an excuse, not a justification, but a sufficient
mitigating factor. A reason not to put Darryl to death. And
that's why we call you. And this mitigating factor is a
personal decision. Each and every one of you who has to
decide this case has to decide in your mind if there is a
mitigating factor that precludes Darryl being killed.
* * *
			But the thing is, if what you see is a mitigating factor,
if that's enough, regardless of how much aggravation
there is if you see a sufficient reason not to kill Darryl,
that is enough. One of you.
* * *
			The death penalty is an absolute punishment. Absolute
punishment. To give the death penalty we need to be
absolutely sure a person is absolutely guilty, and
absolutely deserves it. Of guilt there's no question. I am
not trying to turn cute phrases here. A person has to be
absolutely guilty. So we look to mitigation. Reasons why
or a reason why Darryl shouldn't be put to death. In 1985,
maybe I would have had nothing to say to you. It is eight
years later. We know more than we did then." (Emphasis
added.)
	Defendant complains of the italicized statements. He
maintains that trial counsel shouldered part of the State's case and
joined the State in its effort to have the jury impose the death
sentence. He argues that he was effectively abandoned by trial
counsel at a crucial time in the death sentencing hearing, and
concludes that he was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel.
	Defendant concedes this issue has been waived. All the facts
needed for consideration of the issue were available on direct
review, yet appellate counsel failed to argue that trial counsel was
ineffective in representing defendant. In this appeal, defendant
contends that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue
that defendant had been effectively abandoned by trial counsel at
the sentencing hearing. We consider then whether trial and
appellate counsel were ineffective.
	In Hattery, this court considered the defendant's claim that
defense counsel's actions at trial were totally inconsistent with the
defendant's plea of not guilty and thus constituted a per se denial
of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Initially, the court
observed that defense counsel's strategy at trial is entitled to
deference:
			"Although the sixth amendment guarantees criminal
defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel
[citation], courts ordinarily will not second-guess defense
counsel's judgment and trial strategy. It is recognized that
the independence of defense counsel is essential to a fair
trial. Moreover, it is also recognized that no two defense
attorneys will necessarily agree on the same strategy for
a particular case. Therefore, when evaluating
ineffectiveness claims, courts 'must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance ***.' "
Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d  at 460-61.
However, citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), the court explained that there are
some circumstances so likely to harm the defense that prejudice
need not be shown under the Strickland test of ineffective
assistance of counsel, but will be presumed:
			"In *** [Cronic], the court emphasized that the sixth
amendment requires, at a bare minimum, that defense
counsel act as a true advocate for the accused. Where
'counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a
denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.' "
Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d  at 461.
The court then found that defense counsel had failed to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, noting that
defense counsel conceded the defendant's guilt in opening
statement, advanced no theory of defense during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, presented no evidence of their own,
chose not to make a closing statement to the jury, conceded that
the defendant was truthful when he confessed to the murders, and
told the jury that the trial was a "death penalty case." Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d  at 459-60.
	In People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253 (1989), this court
explained when it is appropriate to use the per se ineffectiveness
of counsel rule set forth in Hattery and when it is appropriate to
require that a defendant show prejudice under the Strickland test:
			"Though Hattery condemned the practice [of conceding
guilt after a not-guilty plea was entered], we did not in
that case hold that it is per se ineffectiveness whenever
the defense attorney concedes his client's guilt to offenses
in which there is overwhelming evidence of that guilt but
fails to show on the record consent by defendant. This
would be especially true when counsel presents a strong
defense to the other charges. [Citation.] The examples
given in Cronic and Strickland for when ineffectiveness
was established without an inquiry into prejudice were
clearly instances where the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel was violated and such violation could not
be tolerated regardless of prejudice. Likewise, in Hattery
it was clear that the representation fell below acceptable
standards and prejudice need not have been established.
			*** [T]he rule in Hattery must be narrowly construed.
[Citation.] Thus, if a concession of guilt is made,
ineffectiveness may be established; however, the
defendant faces a high burden before he can forsake the
two-part Strickland test." Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d  at 269-70.
See also People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 246 (1989).
	Trial counsel's actions in the present case stand in sharp
contrast to the actions of defense counsel in Hattery and do not
support a finding of per se ineffectiveness of counsel. Trial
counsel presented both opening and closing arguments; cross-examined all of the State's witnesses; objected to certain
testimony; presented several defense witnesses; and argued
successfully that certain evidence should be excluded.
Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of per se ineffective
assistance of counsel.
	We must, then, consider, in light of the Strickland test,
whether defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
We conclude that he did not. In arriving at this conclusion, an
important factor is that trial counsel did not concede defendant's
guilt either during the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial or
during the eligibility stage of the death sentencing hearing. Indeed,
during the eligibility stage, trial counsel maintained that defendant
was not eligible for the death penalty; he informed the jury that the
State had the burden to prove defendant eligible for the death
penalty; and he asked the jury to hold the State strictly to its
burden of proof. Furthermore, trial counsel moved for a directed
finding regarding eligibility; submitted jury instructions and
objected to the State's instructions; presented testimony; and
argued in closing that the jury should not find defendant eligible
for the death penalty because the evidence did not support a
finding that defendant killed Lillian LaCrosse during the course of
a felony. Trial counsel even argued there was no evidence of
forced entry into the apartment and that testimony that a witness
had seen defendant and Lillian LaCrosse speak on several
occasions in the three months preceding the murder supported
defendant's assertion that he was having an affair with Lillian
LaCrosse and they had consensual sex the afternoon of the murder.
	The statements defendant complains of were made by trial
counsel in closing argument at the second stage of the death
sentencing hearing. It is appropriate that we take into consideration
the phase of the proceedings at which the challenged conduct takes
place. At the second stage of defendant's death sentencing hearing,
no question remained of defendant's guilt, his eligibility for the
death penalty, and the brutal nature of the murder. The jury had
determined that defendant was over the age of 18 when he
committed the crimes, and the State had met its burden of proof by
showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of a statutory
aggravating factor. What remained to be done was for the jury to
consider the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine
whether defendant should be sentenced to death.
	Again, trial counsel presented a strong challenge to the State's
case. Trial counsel cross-examined the State's witnesses; asked the
court to suppress identification testimony and defendant's
statements to Officer Mueller and Detective Gorniak; moved for
the exclusion of testimony regarding gang-crime evidence and
defendant's gang affiliation; and presented mitigation evidence,
including the testimony of Dr. Wahlstrom and a mitigation expert,
Dr. Sturman. Trial counsel then made an impassioned plea for
defendant's life. He argued that the jury should take into
consideration defendant's background, including his difficult
childhood; the neighborhood in which he grew up; his exposure to
gangs at an impressionable age; his alcohol and drug use; and his
mental condition at the time of the murder. He argued that
defendant had changed for the better during the years spent in
prison. He highlighted defendant's relationship with his sons and
with his new wife and her daughter, defendant's attempts to
complete his education, and defendant's participation in the
"scared-straight" program. Trial counsel argued forcefully that
defendant could be rehabilitated, that his humanity could be
salvaged, and that defendant did not deserve to die.
	The statements of which defendant complains, when taken in
isolation, as set forth in defendant's brief on appeal, may suggest
that trial counsel was ineffective in the closing argument.
However, the statements are part of an argument which,
transcribed, numbered 65 pages. We have attempted to put the
statements in a fuller context. Our conclusion, upon close
examination of the statements, the argument in its entirety, and
trial counsel's actions at the death sentencing hearing, is that trial
counsel exposed the State's case to the "crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing." Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 656-57, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
666, 104 S. Ct.  at 2045-46. He conceded no more than what was
beyond question, and attempted to humanize defendant in an effort
to have the jury spare defendant's life. We will not second-guess
trial counsel's judgment and strategy.
	In light of our conclusion, we also reject defendant's
contention that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue
on direct review that defendant was denied the effective assistance
of trial counsel at the death sentencing hearing.
XIII. Jury Instruction on Life Imprisonment
	Defendant signed a waiver of sentencing alternatives in which
he requested that the trial court sentence him to natural life in
prison in the event the jury should choose not to sentence him to
death. Defendant believed that the jury might not sentence him to
death if the jury knew that the trial court would sentence defendant
to natural life in prison, without possibility of parole. Defendant
proposed that the trial court instruct the jury regarding the waiver
of sentencing alternatives. The trial court refused the proposed
instruction.
	In Simms III, defendant claimed that the trial court abused its
discretion when it refused to instruct the jury that defendant would
be sentenced to natural life in prison if he was not sentenced to
death. Defendant argued that a waiver of lesser sentences is a form
of mitigation, and, since relevant mitigation evidence cannot be
barred, he was entitled to make such a waiver. Defendant argued
further that, since he had waived his eligibility for any sentence
less than natural life in prison, he was entitled to a Gacho
instruction. See People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 262 (1988). This
court stated that a Gacho instruction is required in a capital
sentencing hearing where a sentence of natural life in prison is the
only available alternative to the death penalty. However, a Gacho
instruction is unavailable where, as here, a defendant is statutorily
eligible for a sentence less than natural life in prison. Simms III,
168 Ill. 2d at 198-99; see People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 73-74
(1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 150-51 (1996);
Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 169-70. Thus, the court concluded the trial
court did not commit error in refusing defendant's proposed
instruction. Simms III, 168 Ill. 2d  at 198-99.
	In his amended petition, defendant highlights the State's
argument at the death sentencing hearing that defendant was
hoping for a short sentence. Defendant maintains that he was
entitled to rebut the State's argument by informing the jury that he
would receive a sentence of natural life in prison, without
possibility of parole. Defendant also argues that a waiver of lesser
sentences is mitigation because it may serve as a basis for a
sentence less than death. Defendant concludes the trial court
should have allowed the proposed instruction.
	We reject this argument, finding that it is a rephrasing of the
argument decided adversely to defendant in Simms III. A post-conviction petitioner may not avoid the bar of res judicata simply
by rephrasing issues previously addressed on direct appeal.
Williams, 186 Ill. 2d  at 62. As this court held in Simms III, a
waiver of lesser sentences is not mitigation. Further, defendant
was not entitled to a Gacho instruction. It matters not that, in
support of his contentions, defendant makes the additional
argument he was entitled to the instruction because the waiver of
lesser sentences could have been used to rebut the State's
argument regarding a short sentence. See Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 75
(rejecting defendant's argument that he was constitutionally
entitled to a Gacho instruction because the State argued that
defendant's future dangerousness was a reason to impose a
sentence of death); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 150-51 (1996)
(rejecting defendant's argument that he was entitled to a Gacho
instruction because the State raised the issue of defendant's prior
criminal record and his commission of crimes after being paroled).
	We also reject defendant's contention that appellate counsel
was ineffective because he failed to argue on direct appeal that the
waiver of lesser sentences was mitigation evidence. Since this
court held in Simms III that a waiver of lesser sentences is not
mitigation, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to
argue that a waiver of lesser sentences is mitigation.
XIV. Jury Instruction on Alternate Sentences
	In a related argument, defendant maintains he was denied a
fair, reliable and accurate death sentencing hearing because the
trial court failed to instruct the jury about the other possible
sentences defendant could have received if not sentenced to death,
thus depriving defendant of an opportunity to rebut the State's
argument that defendant was hoping for a very short sentence.
Trial counsel submitted, but later withdrew, an instruction listing
the other possible sentences, setting forth information regarding
good-conduct credit and advising the jury that parole was
unavailable. Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective
because he withdrew the proposed instruction, and appellate
counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue on direct appeal
that trial counsel was ineffective.
	All of the facts needed to raise this issue were present in the
record and available on direct appeal. The issue is thus waived.
Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 92. However, we consider the merits of the
issue because defendant maintains that trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective. Lear, 175 Ill. 2d  at 278.
	In Simms II, defendant argued the trial court should have
instructed the jury that, if not sentenced to death, defendant would
receive either a fixed term of 20 to 80 years' imprisonment or a
life sentence without the possibility of parole. The trial court had
refused defendant's proposed instruction and instead instructed the
jury that, if it determined a death sentence was inappropriate, the
court would impose a sentence other than death. Citing People v.
Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 81 (1984), this court held that, where a
defendant's eligibility for death is not predicated upon multiple
murder convictions, it is proper for the trial court to instruct the
sentencing jury that the alternative to death is a prison term,
without specifying that the term is life imprisonment. Simms II,
143 Ill. 2d  at 180. The court explained that the sentencing jury is
responsible for determining only whether the death penalty is
warranted, not the severity of the prison sentence if the death
sentence is found inappropriate. Simms II, 143 Ill. 2d  at 180.
	The court then considered defendant's argument that, without
information regarding the other possible sentences, the jurors
could have believed defendant would be released in a few years
and, thus, be more inclined to sentence him to death. The court
rejected this argument, observing:
		"[T]he trial court would have to explain our State's entire
determinate sentencing system before the jury would be
fully informed about the alternative sentences the
defendant could receive if not sentenced to death. The
jury could fairly and accurately compare the death
sentence to alternative sentences of imprisonment only if
it was instructed that the defendant could be released from
prison before he served the full sentence imposed, either
[through] executive clemency or by earning good-conduct
credits provided for by the rules of the Department of
Corrections. [Citations.] We have repeatedly held,
however, that it is improper to inform a jury about the
possibility that a defendant may be paroled before serving
his full sentence. Such information diverts the jury's
attention from the character of the offender and the
circumstances of his offense and focuses it upon a
speculative possibility that may or may not occur." Simms
II, 143 Ill. 2d  at 181-82.
	In these proceedings, defendant maintains that Simms II is not
controlling. He reasons that the court in Simms II did not consider
whether a jury instruction on other possible sentences must be
given where, as here, it is necessary to rebut the State's contention
that the defendant is trying to obtain a short sentence. We must
disagree. This court held in Simms II that a defendant is not
entitled to an instruction on the possible terms of imprisonment he
might receive if not sentenced to death. In particular, this court
rejected defendant's argument that such an instruction was needed
to dispel the jurors' belief that defendant would be released after
serving a short sentence. Defendant's current argument, that the
instruction was needed to counter the inference he sought a short
sentence, is a mere rephrasing of his argument in Simms II.
	In addition, we note that the trial court sustained trial
counsel's objection to the State's remark regarding the sentence
defendant hoped to receive. We must presume, absent a showing
to the contrary, that the jury followed the trial judge's instructions
in reaching a verdict. Simms II, 143 Ill. 2d  at 174.
	We also doubt that defendant could have used the jury
instruction to effectively refute the argument he was seeking a
short sentence. The instruction would have informed the jury that
the trial court might sentence defendant to 20 years'
imprisonment. Further, the instruction would have informed the
jury that defendant would be entitled to one day of good-conduct
credit for each day in prison, and an award of 90 days' additional
good-conduct credit for meritorious service. Assuming defendant
received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, and the maximum
credit for good conduct and meritorious service, the instruction
would have informed the jury that defendant could be released
from prison in less than 10 years. Far from refuting the argument
regarding a short sentence, such an instruction might lead the jury
to harbor serious misgivings regarding the imposition of a
sentence other than death.
	For the reasons discussed above, we reject defendant's
contention that trial counsel was ineffective because he withdrew
the proposed instruction on the available sentences. Defendant was
not entitled to such an instruction. Further, there is no reasonable
probability that, but for trial counsel's alleged error in withdrawing
the jury instruction, the result of the death sentencing hearing
would have been different. We also reject defendant's contention
that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue on
direct appeal trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Since defendant was
not prejudiced by the withdrawal of the jury instruction, he could
not have been prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise this
issue on direct review. See Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 82.
XV. Jury Instruction on Unanimity, Mitigating Factors
	In his amended petition, defendant argues that he was denied
a fair and reliable sentencing hearing because the trial court
refused to instruct the jury as defendant proposed. The proposed
instructions were as follows:
			"[No. 5] If you are not persuaded either that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a
death sentence or that there are mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, you
are required to sign the verdict form directing the court to
impose a sentence other than death."
			"[No. 7] If one or more of you believe that the death
penalty should not be imposed then sign the appropriate
verdict form."
The trial court refused to give these instructions. Instead the trial
court instructed the jury as follows:
			"Under the law, the defendant shall be sentenced to
death if you unanimously find that there is not a
mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a
death sentence.
			If you are unable to find unanimously that there is not
a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a
death sentence, the Court will impose a sentence other
than death." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal, No. 7C.05 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI
Criminal 3d).
			"If you do not unanimously find from your
consideration of all the evidence that there is not a
mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of a
death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring
the Court to impose a sentence other than death." See IPI
Criminal 3d No. 7C.06.
	At the outset, we note that appellate counsel did not raise this
issue on direct review. Waiver applies. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 92.
However, defendant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective
in failing to raise this issue on appeal. Consequently, we must
determine whether appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue
was objectively unreasonable and prejudiced defendant. West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435.
	A defendant is entitled, as is the State, to the submission of
appropriate jury instructions on the law that applies to his theory
of the case if there is evidence in the record to support that theory.
However, it is for the trial court to determine, after considering the
facts and the governing law, whether the jury should be instructed
on a particular subject. If an appropriate IPI instruction exists, it
must be used. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519.
	The decision whether to give a non-IPI instruction rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court abuses its
discretion in refusing a non-IPI instruction only where there is no
IPI instruction that applies to the particular subject. Conversely, a
trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a non-IPI instruction if there is an applicable IPI instruction or the
essence of the refused instruction is covered by other given
instructions. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519. See also Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144.
	Defendant's Instruction No. 5 and Instruction No. 7 are non-IPI instructions. The trial court properly submitted to the jury IPI
Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 and IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06, which
accurately state the law. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing defendant's Instruction No. 5 and Instruction
No. 7. It follows that appellate counsel was not ineffective in
failing to raise this issue on appeal. See Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 70-71.
	Next defendant complains that the trial court should have
given defendant's Instruction No. 8: "A juror may consider a
mitigating factor even though all or some of the other jurors do not
believe that the mitigating factor exists." Once more, appellate
counsel did not raise this issue on direct review. However,
defendant maintains appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise the issue. We disagree.
	In People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 44-46 (1995), the trial court
had refused a similar defense instruction and, instead, given the
jury IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. On appeal, this court rejected the
defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refusing his
requested instruction. The court opined that the jury instruction
given did not convey the impression that unanimity was required
before a mitigating factor could be considered. Rather, the
instruction and argument in the case adequately informed the jury
that unanimity was not required to find a mitigating factor
sufficient to preclude death. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 45; see also
People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 197-98 (1996); Brown, 172 Ill.
2d at 58-59; Fields, 135 Ill. 2d  at 70.
	In the present case, the jury was given IPI Criminal 3d No.
7C.06, the same instruction given in Hope. The instruction
adequately informed the jury that unanimity was not required to
find a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude death. In addition,
during closing argument, trial counsel repeatedly stressed that each
juror had the power to prevent the imposition of the death penalty
and spare defendant's life. Thus, we conclude that the jury was
given appropriate information regarding the consideration of
mitigating factors. The trial court did not err in refusing
defendant's Instruction No. 8, and appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
	Lastly, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in
refusing defendant's Instruction No. 6 and Instruction No. 4b.
Defendant's Instruction No. 6 stated: "You may consider as a
mitigating factor the defendant's background and the facts
surrounding the offense even though the mitigating factor is not
specifically listed in these instructions. You should not give less
weight to a mitigating factor merely because it is not specifically
listed in these instructions." Defendant's Instruction No. 4b
defined the term "aggravating factor" and contained a list of
aggravating factors. The instruction also defined the term
"mitigating factor" and contained a list of statutory mitigating
factors and nonstatutory mitigating factors. The nonstatutory
mitigating factors were that defendant was physically abused in his
life, lived in poverty, did good deeds in his life, has an improving
prison record, and has a good school record; and any other reason
supported by the evidence why defendant should not be sentenced
to death.
	As noted above, the trial court refused to give defendant's
Instruction No. 6 and Instruction No. 4b. Instead, the trial court
gave an instruction to the jury which contained the same
definitions of aggravating factors and mitigating factors, and the
same list of aggravating factors and statutory mitigating factors as
found in defendant's Instruction No. 4b. In addition, the
instruction stated that mitigating factors include: "[a]ny other
reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be
sentenced to death." Defendant maintains that the trial court
should have given to the jury his list of nonstatutory mitigating
factors noted above.
	As with the other instruction issues, appellate counsel failed
to argue on direct review that the trial court erred in refusing to
give defendant's Instruction No. 6 and Instruction No. 4b.
However, defendant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective
in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Thus, we consider
whether counsel's representation was ineffective.
	This court has previously held that nonstatutory mitigating
factors need not be specified in an instruction so long as the jury
is instructed that it may consider all potential mitigating
circumstances. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 58; Hope, 168 Ill. 2d at 43-44;
Fields, 135 Ill. 2d  at 74. Here, the trial court instructed the jury
that mitigating factors included any other reason supported by the
evidence. Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing to
include a list of nonstatutory mitigating factors in the instructions
to the jury. It follows that defendant was not prejudiced by
appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal.
XVI. Right of Allocution
	At the death sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's request to address the jury in allocution. Defendant
notes that noncapital defendants have the right to speak in
allocution. Defendant also notes that the trial judges in Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, and People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133 (1996), allowed
capital defendants to speak in allocution at their bench trials.
Defendant concludes that he has been denied the equal protection
of the laws.
	In his post-trial motion, defendant challenged the trial court's
denial of his request to speak to the jury in allocution. However,
appellate counsel did not raise this issue on direct appeal. Since all
the facts needed to raise the issue were of record, waiver applies.
Guest, 166 Ill. 2d  at 390. Defendant contends, however, that
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this claim on
appeal. Consequently, we consider the merits of the issue.
	This court has held consistently that a capital defendant does
not have either a statutory or a constitutional right to address the
judge or jury in allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. People
v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 259 (1998); People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 470 (1996); People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 94 (1994); People
v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 307-08 (1994); People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 382 (1993); People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 280-82 (1989); People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 95 (1986). In addition,
this court has held that allowing allocution in noncapital
sentencing proceedings (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
1005-4-1(a)(5)) while disallowing it in capital sentencing
proceedings does not deny capital defendants equal protection.
Brown, 185 Ill. 2d at 259-60; People v. Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d 96, 127-29 (1987); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 374-80
(1981).
	We recognize that capital defendants have sometimes been
allowed to speak in allocution at their bench trials. However, this
court has not endorsed the actions of the trial judges who have
allowed capital defendants to speak in allocution. To the contrary,
in Brown, 185 Ill. 2d  at 260, this court rejected the defendant's
argument that the trial judge should have allowed him to speak in
allocution at the conclusion of his bench trial because the trial
judge had allowed a codefendant to speak in allocution at the
conclusion of the codefendant's separate death sentencing hearing.
The court expressed its belief that the judge's apparent
inconsistency in allowing allocution in another case did not
unfairly penalize the defendant, and held that the judge acted
properly in denying the defendant's request to address the court.
	Consistent with this line of authority, we cannot find appellate
counsel ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
XVII. Death Sentence Excessive
	Next, defendant maintains that his death sentence is excessive
and should be vacated. At the outset, we note that appellate
counsel did not raise this issue on direct appeal. Thus, waiver
applies. Defendant maintains, however, that appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to raise this issue on appeal. Consequently,
we consider this issue on the merits.
	In determining whether a death sentence is proper in a
particular case, we must consider the character and record of the
individual offender. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d  at 161; People v. Towns,
182 Ill. 2d 491, 519 (1998). Each capital case is unique and must
be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are
such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate
sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty. Johnson,
128 Ill. 2d  at 280. As such, this court has determined that, when
reviewing a death sentence, it will make a separate evaluation of
the record, but it will not lightly overturn the jury's findings made
during the aggravation and mitigation phase of the death
sentencing hearing when they are amply supported by the record.
Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 201; Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d  at 122.
	The record shows that Lillian LaCrosse had complained that,
over a two-month period preceding her death, defendant had been
harassing her by asking her for dates. She was afraid of defendant.
On the evening of April 17, 1985, the outer door to Lillian
LaCrosse's apartment building was open because Commonwealth
Edison personnel were working on restoring the electricity.
Defendant entered Lillian LaCrosse's apartment without
authorization. Bloodstains on the front door of the apartment and
defense wounds on her hands evinced a struggle between Lillian
LaCrosse and defendant. Defendant, armed with two different
weapons, stabbed Lillian LaCrosse at least 25 times in the ear,
shoulder, throat, chest, arms and back. Defendant also strangled
and sexually assaulted Lillian LaCrosse. She died from a loss of
blood.
	Defendant, thereafter, stole Lillian LaCrosse's purse, a movie
camera she had borrowed from her parents and a pair of her jeans.
Lillian LaCrosse's husband discovered her body on the dining
room floor when he returned home from work. Her three children,
ranging in age from 2 to 4 years, were crying in their bedroom; the
phone had been taken off the hook.
	The State also introduced evidence of defendant's criminal
record at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing. He had
twice been adjudicated delinquent and his juvenile criminal history
included theft from school lockers after cutting the locks off;
setting his school on fire; residential burglary; auto theft; burglary
of a church; and possession of a firearm. His adult criminal
activity included burglary of a laundromat in May 1980; a second
burglary in May 1981; attempted auto theft; possession of a stolen
motor vehicle; and unlawful possession of a weapon.
	On behalf of the State, two women(3) testified regarding
previous contacts with defendant. Sharon Williams was 16 years
old in August 1980 when she agreed to go on a date with
defendant, then 19 years old. Defendant, along with two male
friends, picked her up. She got into the back seat of the car with
defendant, who subsequently forced her, at knife point, to have
sexual intercourse. Defendant was charged with contributing to the
delinquency of a minor.
	Sandra Sender stated that defendant, a friend of her ex-husband, came to her apartment on May 26, 1983, on the pretext
of talking with her about her car. After she let him inside, he
pulled a knife and strangled her. She passed out. When she
regained consciousness, defendant took her to the bedroom, threw
her onto the bed and strangled her again. She passed out once
more. When she regained consciousness, defendant was having
sexual intercourse with her. Subsequently, she distracted defendant
long enough to flee the building and obtain help. Defendant was
charged with attempted murder and unlawful restraint and pled
guilty to aggravated battery.
	The State also presented evidence regarding defendant's
behavior in prison. Several witnesses testified regarding
defendant's gang affiliation and various infractions of prison
regulations. Attorney Zellner testified that, while meeting with a
client at Pontiac in the fall of 1991, she observed defendant hit his
wife in the face and force her to perform oral sex on him in the
prison visiting room. Defendant's prison behavior also included
beating another inmate, and throwing hot liquid on the head, face
and forearm of a prison guard.
	In mitigation, defendant presented evidence of his difficult
childhood. His natural father left the house when he was a child.
His mother remarried when he was 10 years old. Defendant was
beaten by his stepfather, and not disciplined by his mother. He
grew up in a low-income, high-crime neighborhood in Chicago
and began to use drugs and alcohol at a relatively young age.
When defendant was about 16 years old, his mother moved and he
then lived with an older sister.
	Several witnesses testified regarding the laundromat burglary
on May 6, 1980. Defendant was bitten by a police dog when police
responded to the burglary. Defendant suffered a tear to the foreskin
of his penis, and a puncture wound to his thigh. Defendant married
Lydia Smith on June 14, 1980. She testified that defendant did not
have normal intercourse with her for several months after the dog-bite incident. He became very aggressive, short-tempered,
subdued, and his drug use increased. Lydia Smith stopped living
with defendant in 1983, when he was incarcerated for a burglary.
She divorced defendant in 1985. Although defendant did not pay
child support, he maintained regular contact with his two children.
Defendant and his current wife, Christine Simms, married while
he was in prison. According to her, defendant has changed for the
better in the past few years and is very loving and supportive of
her and her daughter. Christine Simms denied that defendant hit
her on any of her visits to the prison, or forced her to perform oral
sex in the visiting room.
	Defendant also presented mitigation evidence that he had
assisted in a program for juvenile delinquents. On four occasions,
he spoke to groups of youth offenders and encouraged the youths
to stay out of trouble. According to the program director and a
juvenile who heard him speak, defendant's participation has had
a positive influence on the juveniles. While in prison, defendant
got his GED and showed interest in taking college courses.
	Dr. Wahlstrom examined defendant in September 1993. He
testified that in 1985 defendant suffered from an antisocial
personality disorder, as well as from post-traumatic stress disorder,
in partial remission, stemming from the dog-bite incident.
Defendant also suffered from drug and alcohol dependence.
Finally, Dr. John Sturman testified that defendant had changed for
the better while in prison.
	In light of the mitigation presented, defendant maintains that
his sentence must be vacated, consistent with this court's holding
in Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284
(1986), and People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980). We disagree.
The decisions to vacate the defendants' death sentences in those
cases were based on mitigating factors that are not present in this
case. Thus, in Johnson, the defendant returned to his place of
employment nine days after he was fired to collect his final
paycheck. The defendant was told that there was no paycheck for
him. The defendant shot the supervisor who had fired him, shot
and stabbed one of his former coworkers, and shot and killed
another former coworker. On the day of the offenses, the
defendant had used alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana laced with the
drug "PCP." This court vacated the defendant's death sentence
because of his good character, steady employment history, and
insignificant criminal record. The court found that an isolated
stressful event led to the crimes, concluding that the crimes had
occurred only because the defendant had just been fired and
believed that he had been deprived of his final paycheck. See
Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253.
	In Buggs, the defendant and his wife argued after she received
a telephone call from one of her boyfriends. During the argument,
she told the defendant that he was not the father of two of her
sons. The defendant became outraged; poured gasoline on his
wife, the hallway and the stairway; threw a lit match on the stairs;
and fled. The defendant's wife and son died in the fire. This court
vacated the defendant's death sentence because he had served 21
years in the military and been honorably discharged; he had no
history of serious criminal activity; he had a drinking problem; and
he had been experiencing marital difficulties which, in fact,
triggered the dispute leading to the murders. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d  at
293-95.
	In Carlson, the defendant, recently divorced, had moved out
of the marital home, but continued seeing his former wife with a
view to remarriage. The defendant had not contested the divorce
upon his former wife's agreement not to entertain men at the
marital home. On the day of the murders, the defendant and his
former wife argued over her relationship with other men. The
defendant shot his former wife, poured gasoline throughout her
house, and set the house on fire. The defendant then went to a bar
and tried to contact his daughter by telephone so he could give her
money for his son's support. Since he was unable to contact her,
he gave a coworker a large sum of money in an envelope with
instructions to give the envelope to the daughter for the son's use.
When the police arrived to arrest him at the bar, the defendant
killed one of the officers. This court found that the defendant had
no significant history of prior criminal activity, and had acted
under an extreme emotional disturbance exacerbated by his very
poor physical and emotional health. This court also stated that the
defendant's concern for his son was a mitigating factor. Carlson,
79 Ill. 2d  at 587-91.
	The mitigating factors in Johnson, Buggs, Carlson are absent
in the present case. Thus, we are not inclined to vacate defendant's
death sentence. Instead, we find ample support for the jury's
verdict in the brutal nature of the murder; defendant's generous
criminal record; his negative sexual contacts with Sandra Sender
and Sharon Williams; his gang affiliation; his violent behavior in
prison; and the many infractions of prison regulations. In addition,
the record contains evidence contradicting some of the mitigation
testimony. For example, Lydia Smith testified that defendant drank
alcohol in moderation; was not addicted to any particular drug;
and chose when to use drugs. Defendant's sexual contact with
Sharon Williams occurred a scant three months after the dog-bite
incident, which, allegedly, prevented him from having normal
sexual intercourse with Lydia Smith. Various psychiatrists who
examined defendant found no evidence of psychopathy, and a
report prepared by one psychiatrist noted that defendant denied
any psychiatric problems. Lastly, Dr. Wahlstrom could not testify
to a direct correlation between the disorders he diagnosed and the
murder of Lillian LaCrosse. In light of the record, we decline to
overturn the jury's findings made during the aggravation-mitigation stage of the death sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we
find that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise
this issue on direct appeal.
	Defendant next argues that the Du Page County State's
Attorney acted arbitrarily in seeking the death penalty in the
present case but not in the case of People v. Hernandez, 204 Ill.
App. 3d 732 (1990). Defendant invites a comparison of the facts
of his case with the facts in Hernandez, and suggests that this
court vacate his death sentence in order to rectify "the
arbitrariness" evinced by the Du Page County State's Attorney in
seeking the death penalty against him.
	We note, at the outset, that defendant did not raise this
argument in the trial court or on direct appeal. Defendant
acknowledges the waiver, but posits that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise this claim in the trial court and
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue trial
counsel's ineffectiveness. Consequently, we consider the issue on
its merits.
	We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the Illinois
death penalty statute is unconstitutional because of the discretion
it gives the prosecutor in deciding whether to seek the death
penalty in a particular case. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 89
(1999); People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173-74 (1997); Kidd,
175 Ill. 2d  at 55; Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d  at 291. Furthermore, the
very fact that the prosecutor is afforded a measure of discretion
under the death penalty statute entails that the prosecutor will seek
the death penalty in one case and not in another. The prosecutor
may decide to do so based upon the strength of the evidence, the
circumstances of the crime, the accused's rehabilitative potential,
the availability and credibility of witnesses, and any number of
legitimate factors.
	In the present case, there was a statutory aggravating factor,
murder committed in the course of an armed robbery and
aggravated criminal sexual assault, to warrant a request for a death
penalty hearing. Defendant has not shown that the Du Page County
State's Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty against him
was based on circumstances other than the presence of the
statutory aggravating factor, the strength of the evidence against
him, his substantial criminal history, and his demonstrated lack of
rehabilitative potential as evidenced by numerous prison
infractions. Moreover, our review of the record has not uncovered
any evidence to support the contention that the State's Attorney
considered impermissible factors in arriving at his charging
decision.
	The only support advanced by defendant for the contention
that the State's Attorney acted improperly is the State's Attorney's
decision not to seek the death penalty against Hernandez. Such is
insufficient, however, to support an inference that the State's
Attorney was improperly motivated in seeking the death penalty
in the present case. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-07,
95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 287-88, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774-45 (1987);
People v. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d 93, 110-12 (1988); People v. Foster,
119 Ill. 2d 69, 90-93 (1987); People v. Free, 112 Ill. 2d 154, 160-63 (1986).
	Defendant has failed to supply this court with evidence that
the State's Attorney acted improperly in seeking the death penalty
against him. Absent such proof, we will not assume that the
State's Attorney's decision in seeking the death penalty against
defendant was "based on whim or caprice or otherwise invoke[d]
impermissible considerations." Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d  at 112.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's death sentence was not
imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. Furthermore, we conclude that
defendant's death sentence was not excessive. In light of these
conclusions, we find that trial and appellate counsel were not
ineffective for failing to argue that the State's Attorney acted
arbitrarily in seeking the death penalty against defendant, and
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that
defendant's death sentence was excessive.
XVIII. Multiple Death Sentences and Delay in Execution
	Defendant next raises constitutional objections to his death
sentence and its implementation. In Simms II, this court vacated
defendant's death sentence and remanded for a new death
sentencing hearing because the jury had been instructed
erroneously that residential burglary could be the predicate felony
for the imposition of the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) of
the Criminal Code of 1961. Simms II, 143 Ill. 2d 154. On May 27,
1992, defendant filed a motion asking the trial court to bar the
death sentencing hearing pursuant to the fifth, eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. V, VIII, XIV). Defendant maintained that
principles of double jeopardy applied to bar a new death
sentencing hearing. Defendant also argued that the trial court
should bar the death sentencing hearing because of the State's
misconduct in submitting erroneous instructions to the court. The
trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed to this court.
	On September 16, 1992, this court dismissed defendant's
appeal "as patently without merit," and remanded the cause to the
trial court with directions to proceed with the death sentencing
hearing. This court thus determined that a new death sentencing
hearing should not be barred on principles of double jeopardy, and
rejected defendant's argument that the State should forgo the
hearing because of prosecutorial misconduct.
	In the present appeal, defendant contends that sentencing him
to death on three occasions is a violation of the double jeopardy
clause and permits the State to continue to engage in continuing
prosecutorial misconduct to secure a sentence of death. Defendant
also argues that the delay in carrying out the death sentence
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We have heretofore
addressed defendant's double jeopardy and prosecutorial
misconduct claims and will not reconsider these claims.
	We turn, then, to the additional argument that the delay in the
execution of the death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. As noted above, in 1985, defendant was sentenced to
death for the murder of Lillian LaCrosse. This court affirmed
defendant's convictions but vacated defendant's death sentence
and remanded for a new death sentencing hearing. See Simms I,
121 Ill. 2d 259. Thereafter, defendant was twice resentenced to
death. In 1995, this court affirmed defendant's death sentence. See
Simms III , 168 Ill. 2d 176. The post-conviction proceedings have
caused an additional delay of five years in the execution of the
death sentence.
	Defendant concedes that this claim has been waived.
However, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in not
raising this claim and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing
to argue the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
	This court has not previously considered whether, in general,
executing a defendant after a delay occasioned by the appeal
process and/or post-conviction proceedings constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.(4) However, this issue has been considered,
and rejected by several other courts. We agree with the reasoning
of these courts.
	In Chambers v. Bowesox, 157 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1998), the
court discussed the origins of the delay argument and its success
since 1993 in commonwealth countries. The court then
distinguished our legal system and observed that the delays
generated by our system of appeals are a function of our courts'
desire to address any argument that might save the defendant's
life:
			"The essential point for our purposes, of course, is
whether or not the Eighth Amendment is being violated.
We believe that delay in capital cases is too long. But
delay, in large part, is a function of the desire of our
courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore
exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any argument that
might save someone's life. Chambers's strongest
argument is that the State has had to try him three times
before getting it right. That is true, but there is no
evidence, not even a claim, that the State has deliberately
sought to convict Chambers invalidly in order to prolong
the time before it could secure a valid conviction and
execute him. We believe the State has been attempting in
good faith to enforce its laws. Delay has come about
because Chambers, of course with justification, has
contested the judgments against him, and, on two
occasions, has done so successfully." Chambers, 157 F.3d 
at 570.
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is also instructive:
			"In Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40, 113 S. Ct. 528, 121 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1992), vacated, 986 F.2d 1583 (9th Cir.
1993), we rejected a very similar argument. We reasoned
that:
			A defendant must not be penalized for pursuing his
constitutional rights, but he also should not be able to
benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of
those right. It would indeed be a mockery of justice if
the delay incurred during the prosecution of claims that
fail on the merits could itself accrue into a substantive
claim to the very relief that had been sought and
properly denied in the first place. If that were the law,
death-row inmates would be able to avoid their
sentences simply by delaying proceedings beyond some
threshold amount of time, while other death-row
inmates-less successful in their attempts to
delay-would be forced to face their sentences. Such
differential treatment would be far more 'arbitrary and
unfair' and 'Cruel and unusual' than the current system
of fulfilling sentences when the last in the line of
appeals fails on the merits. We thus decline to
recognize Richmond's lengthy incarceration on death
row during the pendency of his appeals as substantively
and independently violative of the Constitution.
		Id. at 1491-92. Although the opinion was subsequently
vacated, Richmond remains persuasive authority, and we
adopt its analysis of this issue as our own." McKenzie v.
Day, 57 F.3d 1493, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
See also Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1995);
Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995); McKinney v. State,
133 Idaho 695, 701-03, 992 P.2d 144, 150-52 (1999).
	We conclude that a delay in the execution of the death
sentence occasioned by the appeal process and/or post-conviction
proceedings does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
	In this case, was trial counsel ineffective in failing to argue at
the third death sentencing hearing that the delay in the execution
of the death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment?
We think not. Defendant has not cited, nor are we aware of, any
cases in our jurisprudence supporting the argument that a delay in
execution of a death sentence occasioned by the appeal process
and/or post-conviction proceedings is cruel and unusual
punishment. "When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Given the lack of support for defendant's
position, we cannot agree that trial counsel's performance was
deficient. We also conclude that appellate counsel was not
ineffective in failing to raise this issue on appeal given the lack of
support for defendant's position and our determination that such
a delay does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
XIX. Constitutionality of Death Penalty
	Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the Illinois death
penalty. He argues that the death penalty statute (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g)) is unconstitutional because the State
does not carry a burden of persuasion at the second stage of the
death penalty hearing. He asserts that a defendant who is convicted
and then proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be eligible for the
death penalty will mandatorily receive the death penalty if he
chooses to stand idly by. He maintains that the result of this
statutory scheme is to place a burden on the defendant which has
not been authorized by the legislature, in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights.
	We have previously considered and rejected this argument.
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 62-63; Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 152; Terrell,
132 Ill. 2d  at 227; Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d  at 130; Williams, 97 Ill. 2d  at 265-66. We adhere to our prior decisions.
XX. Cumulative Effect of Errors
	As evidenced by the length of this opinion, defendant's
amended post-conviction petition contains allegations of numerous
errors at his death sentencing hearing. Defendant claims that he
was deprived of a fair trial and reliable sentencing hearing because
of the cumulative effect of these errors. We have examined each
allegation, and, with the exception of one, have found no error
where so claimed. We do not believe we should assign any weight
to these allegations of error. Consequently, there remains only the
allegation that certain witnesses committed perjury at the death
sentencing hearing. Since we are remanding this cause for a
hearing on the allegations of perjury, the trial court will determine
whether this claim is meritorious and should lead to a new death
sentencing hearing.
CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit
court of Du Page County dismissing defendant's post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The circuit court is instructed to hold an
evidentiary hearing with respect to the allegations of perjury. As
to the dismissal of the remaining allegations, the circuit court's
order is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	The murder for which defendant was convicted took place
over 15 years ago. During the decade and a half between then and
now, the State has repeatedly attempted to have defendant
sentenced to death. Its efforts have repeatedly failed. Although
death sentences have been imposed, our court has had to set them
aside based on trial error. People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259 (1988)
(Simms I); People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154 (1991) (Simms II).
Depending on what the evidentiary hearing discloses on remand,
our court may have to do so again. If the State's witnesses lied, as
defendant alleges, defendant's present death sentence is invalid
and cannot be allowed to stand.
	The process which has brought this case to where it is today
has been extraordinarily protracted. Defendant was first convicted
and sentenced to death in late 1985. He was placed on death row
and remains there today, a decade and a half later. By the standards
in effect when the United States Constitution was ratified, such a
delay would have been rare, if not unheard of. See Lackey v.
Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 131 L. Ed. 2d 304, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995)
(Stevens, J., mem. op. on denial of cert.); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 142 L. Ed. 2d 303, 119 S. Ct. 366 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Even by contemporary norms, the delay is exceptional.
According to the most recent bulletin published by the United
States Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
average elapsed time from sentence to execution for defendants of
all races between 1977 and 1998 was 113 months. U.S.
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin,
Capital Punishment 1998, at 12 (December 1999). With a death
row tenure of approximately 175 months, the defendant in this
case has been facing the executioner for nearly 50% longer.
	The courts of the British Commonwealth have ruled that
imposition of capital punishment would be cruel and unusual
punishment where the defendants have sat on death row for only
a fraction of the time that this defendant has. Similarly, the
European Court of Human Rights has held that holding an inmate
on death row for six to eight years would contravene article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Chambers v. Bowesox, 157 F.3d 560,
570 (8th Cir. 1998).
	I am unpersuaded by the suggestion that United States courts
must tolerate greater delays than the courts of Europe because the
American judicial system is more concerned with addressing
meritorious claims and achieving correct results. In Illinois at
least, the system for handling capital offenses has been become
notoriously unreliable. After matters degenerated to the point
where our court no longer felt any compunction about illegally
dismissing a death row inmate's appeal and having him summarily
put to death (People v. Kokoraleis, M.R. 15833, Official Reports
Advance Sheet No. 11, at 4-7 (June 2, 1999)), the Governor was
forced to invoke his constitutional authority to grant reprieves (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. V, §12) and declared an indefinite moratorium on
future executions. The moratorium remains in effect today.
	I am likewise unpersuaded by the argument that capital
defendants must suffer inordinate delays because it is they who
initiate the legal proceedings which postpone their executions.
Such an argument may carry some force where a defendant's
claims are frivolous and initiated solely for purposes of delay, but
few, if any, of the capital cases coming before us are subject to
that criticism. In nearly every instance where an execution remains
to be carried out after a decade or more, the additional litigation
has been necessary to address errors occasioned by the prosecution
or attributable to incompetent representation. It has not been the
fault of the defendant. 
	So long as double jeopardy principles are not violated, the
State must normally be given the opportunity to correct its
mistakes and retry a defendant whose trial was found to be flawed.
There must be a point, however, at which the court steps in and
says enough is enough. Beyond a certain number of years and a
certain number of failed attempts by the State to secure a
constitutionally valid sentence of death, the litigation becomes a
form of torture in and of itself. It is as if the State were holding a
defective pistol to the defendant's head day and night for years on
end and the weapon kept misfiring. It may eventually go off, but
then again, it may not, and the defendant has no way to be sure.
	As the United States Supreme Court recognized more than a
century ago, the suffering inherent in a prolonged and uncertain
wait for execution is undeniable. See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160,
172, 33 L. Ed. 835, 840, 10 S. Ct. 384, 388 (1890) ("when a
prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in the
penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the
most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that
time is the uncertainty during the whole of it"). It is a
dehumanizing experience known to precipitate mental illness and
even suicide. See Knight v. Florida, ___U.S. ___, ___ 145 L. Ed. 2d 370, 373, 120 S. Ct. 459, 462 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Lackey, 514 U.S.  at 1045-46, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 305, 115 S. Ct.  at
1421-22 (Stevens, J., mem. op. on denial of cert.). While some
may find this just and fitting, I consider it to be inconsistent with
"the evolving standards of decency" which inform eighth
amendment jurisprudence. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101,
2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598 (1958).
 	In my view, any delay of the magnitude present here caused
by trial error for which defendant is not responsible raises
compelling eighth amendment concerns. What makes this case
particularly abhorrent, and what sets it apart from Chambers v.
Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1998), cited by the majority, is
the possibility of deliberate wrongdoing by the government. If
defendant's charges are true, as we presume them to be for
purposes of the present proceeding, the State responded to its
previous failures to secure a valid death sentence by knowingly
employing perjured testimony. By so doing, the prosecution and
the prosecution alone condemned defendant to untold additional
time on death row. At a minimum, additional time will be needed
to conduct the hearing ordered by our court today. If defendant's
allegations prove meritorious, the entire sentencing process will
have to begin again. Defendant's case will then be no closer to
resolution that it was when he was first sentenced in 1985.
	No reasonable claim can be made that such a delay is an
inherent and inevitable byproduct of our capital justice system.
Nothing in our system of capital punishment requires the knowing
use of perjured testimony by the State. That decision was the
responsibility of the State and the State alone. Its unilateral act of
wrongdoing cannot be allowed to serve as the predicate for
exacerbating defendant's death watch.
	With each attempt by the State to secure defendant's death,
the integrity of the process degrades. The passage of time brings
an ever-greater likelihood that witnesses will disappear, memories
will fade, and evidence will be lost. Retribution and deterrence,
the two principal social purposes of capital punishment, carry less
and less force. See Lackey, 514 U.S.  at 1045-46, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at
304-05, 115 S. Ct.  at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., mem. op. on denial of
cert.). Eventually, "an execution may well cease to serve the
legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a necessary
justification for the death penalty." Elledge, 525 U.S.  at 945, 142 L. Ed. 2d  at 303, 119 S. Ct.  at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting). By the
time these proceedings are concluded, that point will have been
reached here.
	I continue to adhere to the view set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), that the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). The result in every death
case in Illinois is suspect, and no sentence of death should be
allowed to stand. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 353 (1998)
(Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even if the
law were not otherwise invalid, however, I would nevertheless
hold, for the reasons set forth above, that enforcement of the death
penalty under the facts of this case would violate the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Defendant's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the
matter should be remanded for imposition of a term of
imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j).
	Even if the death penalty were constitutional and could be
applied here without violating the eighth amendment, I still could
not concur in this court's judgment. Although my colleagues are
correct in concluding that the circuit court committed reversible
error when it dismissed defendant's post-conviction claims of
perjury without an evidentiary hearing, I believe that this case
presents an even more fundamental problem. Under the
constitution, it is "impermissible to rest a death sentence on a
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 239, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2639
(1985). This is precisely what happened here.
	A majority of the jurors in the case before us were misled
regarding their responsibility for defendant's death sentence. As
the majority points out, the trial judge told them during voir dire
that their role was to "recommend" whether defendant should be
sentenced to death. Any reasonable juror would understand this
instruction to mean that the jury's decision to impose the death
sentence would not be binding and that ultimate responsibility for
imposing capital punishment would rest with the trial judge. Such
is not the case. Under section 9-1(g) of the Criminal Code of
1961, when a capital sentencing jury returns a sentence of death,
the trial court is required to follow the decision of the jury and
impose a death sentence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g).
	Because responsibility for imposing the death penalty rests
solely with the jury, any implication that the responsibility is
shared by, or delegated to, the trial court is improper. People v.
Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 147 (1991). The majority's attempt to
mollify the effects of the trial judge's remarks is unpersuasive.
Rather than revealing statements taken out of context, the quoted
colloquy between the trial judge and juror Slager corroborates
defendant's claim. 
	Defendant's claim is further supported by the affidavit of the
defense investigator, who stated under oath that juror Jekkel had
told him that she believed that she was merely making a
recommendation to the trial judge regarding imposition of the
death penalty. Contrary to the majority's analysis, the
investigator's statements do not constitute an improper attempt to
impeach the jury's verdict. Rather, they provide direct
corroboration that the harm addressed by Caldwell v. Mississippi
was present in this case.
 	Defendant's attorneys were ineffective for failing to raise this
claim. At a minimum, the matter should therefore be remanded to
the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
1.      1Throughout this opinion, we consider defendant's challenges to
various remarks made by the prosecution or defense counsel. Since we
must consider the challenged remarks in context, we have italicized
each remark to differentiate the remark from other comments we have
provided for context. 

2.      2Defendant also sought relief for these claims under section 2-1401
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Because of our resolution of defendant's
post-conviction claims, we will not consider this alternate ground for
relief.

3.      3We have omitted all references to testimony given by Matas,
Detective Mueller and Mogavero in light of our holding on the perjury
issue.

4.      4This issue was raised in Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 515. There, we
stated that the defendant had failed to persuade us we should decide that
the passage of time between the offense and the imposition of the death
penalty in his case caused his punishment to be cruel and unusual.
Given the fact that a second defendant is raising this same issue, and
others are likely to adopt this argument, we have decided to consider at
this time whether the issue presents a valid constitutional challenge.