Title: Perry v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092418
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2010

Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
JAMES PERRY 
v.  Record No. 092418  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 4, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it affirmed the trial court’s denial of James Edward 
Perry’s (“Perry”) motion to suppress and his conviction for 
possession of phencyclidine (“PCP”). 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of October 15, 
2006, Trooper Clinton A. Weidhaas (“Trooper Weidhaas”) was 
traveling on Interstate 66 in Arlington County when he noticed 
a vehicle with its emergency flashers activated parked on a 
“pretty well lit” area of the right shoulder.  With the 
intention of assisting the occupants, Trooper Weidhaas pulled 
off the interstate with his emergency equipment activated, and 
he exited and approached the vehicle.   
 
Upon reaching the vehicle, Trooper Weidhaas observed that 
all four windows and the sunroof were open, and he “detected a 
strong odor of marijuana coming from that vehicle.”  The 
vehicle had three occupants:  Valdemere Perry (“Valdemere”) was 
the driver of the vehicle, Maurice Sprurgeon (“Sprurgeon”) was 
the front-seat passenger, and Perry was in the back seat.   
 
Upon checking Valdemere’s driving record, Trooper Weidhaas 
discovered that Valdemere’s license was suspended.  Trooper 
Weidhaas called for a back-up unit; this second trooper watched 
Valdemere from behind the vehicle.  Sometime thereafter, 
Trooper Weidhaas approached Sprurgeon, whose demeanor Trooper 
Weidhaas described as “visibly impaired.”  “He wasn’t very 
responsive” to questions, he was “somewhat slow [and] slow to 
react,” “unsteady, [and he] had a hard time keeping his 
balance.”  Trooper Weidhaas initially suspected that Sprurgeon 
was “under the influence of something, either marijuana or 
something stronger, [such as] PCP, because he was definitely 
not coherent.”   
 
Trooper Weidhaas asked Sprurgeon to exit the vehicle.  As 
he did, Trooper Weidhaas saw “a small vial with an orange-
reddish cap come out of [Sprurgeon’s] right hand in a throwing 
motion, onto the ground.”  Upon hitting the ground the cap came 
off, and Trooper Weidhaas observed “a dark plant-like material” 
that appeared as if it “had been soaked in something.”  Trooper 
Weidhaas expressed his concern that there were only two 
troopers present at the scene, while “[t]here [were] three of 
them.”  He expressed particular concern that “[t]hey could 
overpower the officer and all the weapons that we have to 
defend ourselves may not work on some [people under the 
influence] of these certain types of drugs [such] as PCP.”  He 
 
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further indicated a concern that these suspects, if under the 
influence of such substances, would “have no pain whatsoever” 
and “can go from being at a low to a high, high strung, in a 
matter of minutes.”  While unable to recall the exact time of 
arrival, Trooper Weidhaas testified that a third trooper 
arrived sometime during or after his interaction with 
Sprurgeon.   
 
Trooper Weidhaas placed Sprurgeon under arrest “for 
possession of a controlled substance.”  When asked whether he 
had “smoked anything tonight,” Sprurgeon admitted that he had 
“smoked some PCP earlier.”  A field test of the substance in 
the vial recovered from Sprurgeon returned positive results for 
both PCP and marijuana.   
 
Finally, Trooper Weidhaas approached Perry, whose demeanor 
he described as “exactly like Sprurgeon’s.”  Perry was “[s]low 
to respond,” “[n]ot very coherent,” and “[u]nsteady when I got 
him out of the car.”  Once Perry was out of the vehicle, 
Trooper Weidhaas “got him up to the front of the car and did a 
patdown for weapons.”  When performing a pat-down on suspects, 
Trooper Weidhaas stated that he “squeeze[s] their pockets as 
well.”   
 
In Perry’s front pocket, Trooper Weidhaas detected “a 
bundle,” which he described as a “bulge” that had the “same 
size, same round feeling, [and] same length as the vial that 
 
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was previously thrown on the ground [by Sprurgeon].”  On cross 
examination, Trooper Weidhaas testified that he detected the 
bulge in Perry’s pocket “between [his] thumb and . . . index 
finger,” and he felt it “[s]omewhere between two and three” 
times.   
 
Trooper Weidhaas then asked Perry, “[w]ould you mind 
showing what’s in your pockets,” and Perry “took his right 
hand, reached down in his pocket” and produced “the same type 
[of] vial.”  When asked about the vial’s contents, Perry 
responded that it contained marijuana.  Perry also admitted to 
smoking PCP earlier that night.  Trooper Weidhaas then placed 
Perry under arrest.   
 
Prior to his trial for possession of PCP in violation of 
Code § 18.2-250, Perry filed a motion to suppress.  Perry 
claimed his rights under the United States and Virginia 
Constitutions were violated because (i) “[t]here existed no 
reasonable articulable suspicion or otherwise lawful cause to 
frisk,” and (ii) “[t]here existed no probable cause or 
otherwise lawful cause justifying the search and seizure of the 
property.”  Perry argued that as a result, “[a]ll evidence 
obtained by law enforcement subsequent to, or as a result of, 
such improper action [were] inadmissible ‘fruit of the 
poisonous tree’ and must be suppressed.”   
 
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In support of his motion to suppress, Perry argued that 
Trooper Weidhaas “did not have a reasonable basis to believe 
that [Perry] was armed and dangerous.  And therefore, the Terry 
frisk of James Perry was unlawful.”  Perry also argued that, 
assuming the pat-down search was lawful, “Trooper Weidhaas 
exceeded . . . the permissible scope” of the pat-down by 
manipulating the contents of Perry’s pocket with his thumb and 
fingers.  
 
The Commonwealth responded that “suspicion of narcotics 
possession gives rise . . . to an inference of dangerousness, 
. . . which makes a Terry search under those circumstances 
appropriate.”  The Commonwealth then argued that Trooper 
Weidhaas “had probable cause to believe that the items that he 
felt and that he brushed up against did contain contraband.”  
As a result, the Commonwealth argued that Trooper Weidhaas “had 
probable cause to go into [Perry’s] pocket.”   
 
The trial court observed that this was “a very close 
case,” but denied Perry’s motion to suppress.  At his trial, a 
jury found Perry guilty of possession of PCP and fixed his 
penalty at $2,500.   
The Court of Appeals affirmed Perry’s conviction.  Perry 
v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 122, 133, 684 S.E.2d, 227, 232 
(2009).  Applying the right result for the wrong reason 
doctrine, the Court of Appeals “assume[d] without deciding that 
 
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the trial court erred when it found [that] Trooper Weidhaas had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to believe [Perry] was armed 
and dangerous.”  Id.  Instead, the Court of Appeals held that 
Trooper Weidhaas “certainly had probable cause to believe that 
[Perry] possessed illegal drugs--either by having joint or 
constructive possession of the drugs originally in Sprurgeon’s 
hand or by having actual possession of other drugs that the 
officer had not yet seen.” Id. at 132, 684 S.E.2d at 231.  
Despite the acknowledgment of the Commonwealth that it never 
argued to the trial court that Trooper Weidhaas had probable 
cause to arrest Perry, id. at 128, 684 S.E.2d at 229, the Court 
of Appeals held that “the parties here were aware at all stages 
of this case that the courts would look to the Fourth Amendment 
to determine if Trooper Weidhaas’s actions were appropriate--
regardless of whether the question involved probable cause or 
reasonable articulable suspicion.”  Id. at 130, 684 S.E.2d at 
230.   
Citing this Court’s holding in Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 105, 677 S.E.2d 265 (2009), the Court of Appeals 
determined that “[a]ll the facts required to consider [the 
Commonwealth’s probable cause to arrest] legal argument were 
presented to the trial court and considered by it when it 
addressed the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion argument of 
the trial prosecutor.”  Perry, 55 Va. App. at 130, 684 S.E.2d 
 
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at 230.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that this 
case presented an appropriate situation for the application of 
the right result for the wrong reason doctrine.  Id.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
denial of Perry’s motion to suppress and his subsequent 
conviction.  Id. at 133, 684 S.E.2d at 232. 
 
Perry timely filed his notice of appeal and we granted an 
appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The Circuit Court erred in denying Appellant’s 
motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation 
of his constitutional rights. 
 
2. 
The Court of Appeals erred by considering a new 
justification for the illegal search, which was 
never presented to the trial court. 
 
3.  The Court of Appeals erred in finding that 
Trooper Weidhaas had probable cause to arrest 
Appellant at the time of the illegal search. 
 
II. Analysis 
A. 
Standard of Review 
On appeal, this Court reviews “questions of law de novo, 
including those situations where there is a mixed question of 
law and fact.”  Westgate at Williamsburg Condo. Ass’n v. Philip 
Richardson Co., 270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2005).  
See Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 521, 527, 690 S.E.2d 95, 99 
(2010).  Additional well-established principles of appellate 
review guide this Court’s analysis. 
 
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We consider the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
prevailing party at trial.  Reid v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 564, 506 S.E.2d 787, 
789 (1998).  We apply the same standard when, as 
here, we review the trial court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.  
Ewell [v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 
S.E.2d 721, 723 (1997).] 
 
Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 
(2000). 
B.  The Right Result for the Wrong Reason Doctrine 
Perry argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying 
the right result for the wrong reason doctrine to hold that 
Trooper Weidhaas had probable cause to arrest Perry.  The 
Commonwealth argues that our decision in Whitehead requires 
that we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  We agree 
with the Commonwealth. 
Under the right result for the wrong reason doctrine, “it 
is the settled rule that how[ever] erroneous . . . may be the 
reasons of the court for its judgment upon the face of the 
judgment itself, if the judgment be right, it will not be 
disturbed on account of the reasons.”  Schultz v. Shultz, 51 
Va. (10 Gratt.) 358, 384 (1853).   
 
In Whitehead, we properly embraced the correct focus of 
the right result for the wrong reason doctrine when we stated 
that cases are only proper for application of the right result 
 
8
for the wrong reason doctrine when the evidence in the record 
supports the new argument on appeal, and the development of 
additional facts is not necessary.  278 Va. at 115, 677 S.E.2d 
at 270.  If the record does not support the arguments made for 
the first time on appeal, then application of the right result 
for the wrong reason doctrine is inappropriate and those new 
arguments will not be considered. 
We declined to apply the right result for the wrong reason 
doctrine in Whitehead because the legal methods of proof, 
offered for the first time before the Court of Appeals, 
required different presentation of facts in order to support 
the elements of the offense charged.  Id. at 115, 677 S.E.2d at 
270.  Whitehead was charged with receiving stolen property--an 
offense for which there were several methods of proof.  Id.  In 
refusing to apply the right result for the wrong reason 
doctrine, we cited the Court of Appeals and explained: 
An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a 
trial court when it has reached the right result 
for the wrong reason.  However, [t]he rule does 
not always apply. . . . [T]he proper application 
of this rule does not include those cases where, 
because the trial court has rejected the right 
reason or confined its decision to a specific 
ground, further factual resolution is needed 
before the right reason may be assigned to 
support the trial court’s decision. 
Whitehead, 278 Va. at 115, 677 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 670, 675-76, 576 S.E.2d 228, 231 
 
9
(2003)); Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 633, 642, 613 
S.E.2d 460, 465 (2005) (“an appellee may argue for the first 
time on appeal any legal ground in support of a judgment so 
long as it does not require new factual determinations.”)  We 
further explained that because a conviction based upon the 
Commonwealth’s alternative theories of guilt “is predicated 
upon presentation of different facts that support the elements 
of the offense,” we found that “Whitehead was not on notice to 
present evidence to rebut any other method of proof possible.”  
278 Va. at 115-16, 677 S.E.2d at 270.   
Indeed, other cases we have decided express this limited 
principle as well. When the trial court has reached the correct 
result for the wrong reason, but the record supports the right 
reason, “we will assign the correct reason and affirm that 
result.”  Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 
253 (2000); Chesterfield County v. Stigall, 262 Va. 697, 704, 
554 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2001).  Furthermore, an appellate court’s 
“examination is not limited to the evidence mentioned by a 
party in trial argument or by the trial court in its ruling.”  
Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 147, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 
(2008).  Rather, “an appellate court must consider all the 
evidence admitted at trial that is contained in the record.”  
Id. 
 
10
 In another aspect of the Whitehead opinion, we accurately 
summarized our holding in Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 
S.E.2d 280, 283 (1963), when we stated:   
However, cases in which the party seeking 
affirmance failed to present the argument in the 
trial court, such that the trial court did not 
have an opportunity to rule on the argument, are 
not “proper cases” for the application of the 
doctrine. 
 
Whitehead, 278 Va. at 114, 677 S.E.2d at 270. However, upon 
reconsideration of the case law on this matter, we are of the 
view that this principle, adopted from Eason, is too broad and 
is inconsistent with case law that followed it. Failure to make 
the argument before the trial court is not the proper focus of 
the right result for the wrong reason doctrine.  Consideration 
of the facts in the record and whether additional factual 
presentation is necessary to resolve the newly-advanced reason 
is the proper focus of the application of the doctrine. 
In this case, the facts necessary to resolve the issues of 
reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, reasonable 
articulable suspicion for a pat-down, and probable cause to 
arrest for possession were established in the record before the 
trial court.  The Court of Appeals correctly held that “[a]ll 
the facts required to consider [the Commonwealth’s] legal 
argument [concerning probable cause to arrest] were presented 
 
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to the trial court.”  Perry, 55 Va. App. at 130, 684 S.E.2d at 
230.   
Additionally, both parties were aware that Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure issues were before the court.  The 
Court of Appeals held that “the parties here were aware at all 
stages of this case that the courts would look to the Fourth 
Amendment to determine if Trooper Weidhaas’s actions were 
appropriate – regardless of whether the question involved 
probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion.”  Id. at 
130, 684 S.E.2d at 230.   
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the 
distinction between “reasonable articulable suspicion” and 
“probable cause,” explaining that reasonable suspicion is 
“considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance 
of the evidence,” and “obviously less demanding than that for 
probable cause.”  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989).  However, the underlying facts required to prove that 
Trooper Weidhaas had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk 
Perry are the same as those required to consider whether he had 
probable cause to arrest Perry for possession.  The factual 
record is complete; the conclusion to be drawn from these 
facts, namely, whether these facts support reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause, may be decided on this record. 
 
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The United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals both support the rule that the record must 
support the “right reason.”  The Supreme Court has held that 
“the appellee [is] free to defend its judgment on any ground 
properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied 
upon, rejected, or even considered by the [trial court] or the 
Court of Appeals.”  Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes 
of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 476 n.20 (1979). The 
Court has explained,  
it is likewise settled that the appellee may, 
without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of 
a decree any matter appearing in the record, 
although his argument may involve an attack upon 
the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence 
upon matter overlooked or ignored by it. 
United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 
(1924) (emphasis added).  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals has stated that “[a] prevailing party may urge an 
appellate court to affirm a judgment on any ground appearing in 
the record.”  Rosenruist-Gestao E Servicos LDA v. Virgin 
Enters. Limited, 511 F.3d 437, 447 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  An appellate court 
is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in 
support of its decision, and it is “entitled to affirm the 
court’s judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds are 
 
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apparent from the record.”  MM v. School District of Greenville 
County, 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, in the case before us today, we apply the right 
result for the wrong reason doctrine because the facts in the 
record establish that Trooper Weidhaas had probable cause to 
arrest Perry for possession of PCP before the pat-down search.  
Addressing the specific assignment of error, we cannot say that 
the Court of Appeals erred in applying the right result for the 
wrong reason doctrine to hold that the trooper had probable 
cause to arrest Perry before the pat-down search.  Trooper 
Weidhaas noted the smell of drugs in the vehicle, verified the 
existence of PCP in the vial thrown on the ground, and 
identified Perry’s behavior as being consistent with that of an 
individual under the influence of PCP.  At that point, based on 
his training and experience as a police officer, Trooper 
Weidhaas had probable cause to believe that Perry possessed 
PCP.  As a result, the subsequent search of Perry was a lawful 
search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment.  See 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); see also Wright 
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 193, 278 S.E.2d 849, 852-53 
(1981) (“Where, as here, the product of the search was not 
essential to probable cause to arrest and the formal arrest 
followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of [the 
defendant’s] person, we do not believe it particularly 
 
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important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice 
versa.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial of 
Perry’s motion to suppress and affirming Perry’s conviction on 
the basis of probable cause to arrest.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
 
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