Title: Riley v. State
Citation: 549 So. 2d 673
Docket Number: 67906
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 5, 1989

549 So. 2d 673 (1989)
Michael A. RILEY, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 67906.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 5, 1989.
Marc H. Salton, New Port Richey, Milton Hirsch, Miami, and Craig C. Villanti, New Port Richey, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Cloyce L. Mangas, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Parker D. Thomson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, and Candance M. Sunderland and Peggy A. Quince, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.
BARKETT, Justice.
Michael A. Riley was charged with two controlled substance violations as a result of the seizure of marijuana plants which police detected during the course of an aerial surveillance of his backyard. Riley filed a motion to suppress evidence and the trial court, following a hearing, granted that motion. The state appealed and the district court reversed the trial court in State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.2d DCA 1985).
In Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987), this Court decided that police needed a warrant to view the interior of a greenhouse in Riley's residential backyard from a helicopter located 400 feet above. On the facts of this case, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court reversed this Court. Florida v. Riley, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989).
All nine justices of the United States Supreme Court agreed that the record *674 lacked evidentiary development of Riley's claimed expectation of privacy. As to whether Riley or the state had the burden of proving the reasonableness of that expectation, however, there was disagreement.
Justice White, writing for four members of the Court, implied that Riley had the obligation of supporting his claim:
Id. 109 S. Ct.  at 696-97 (footnote omitted). Justice O'Connor expressed the following opinion:
Id. at 699 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
The remaining justices argued that the state ought to bear the burden of proof. Justice Brennan wrote:
Id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting, with whom Marshall and Stevens, JJ., join) (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun shared that position:
Id. at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
A majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed that the record below lacked evidentiary development concerning the reasonableness of Riley's expectation of privacy. Accordingly, we vacate our previous decision and remand to the district court with directions to return the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in this cause.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs with an opinion.
GRIMES, J., did not participate in this case.
McDONALD, J., concurring.
I concur that under the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Riley, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989), we must vacate our previous decision and remand to the district court with directions to return the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in this case. Should there be any doubt as to the scope of those proceedings, the holding of the Supreme Court's decision is summarized by Justice Blackmun in his dissent when he, complaining *675 that there had been no evidentiary hearing on the burden of proof issue which he felt was indicated, stated:
Id. 109 S. Ct.  at 705-06.