Title: Com. v. Ziegler
Citation: 379 Pa. Super. 515, 550 A.2d 567
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: November 7, 1988

379 Pa. Superior Ct. 515 (1988) 550 A.2d 567 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Clair B. ZIEGLER, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted August 1, 1988. Filed November 7, 1988. David Crowley, Assistant Public Defender, Bellefonte, for appellant. Sharon L. Potter, Assistant District Attorney, Bellefonte, for Com., appellee. *516 Before OLSZEWSKI, MONTGOMERY and HOFFMAN, JJ. MONTGOMERY, Judge: At the conclusion of a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in connection with an assault committed against a twelve year old girl. Timely filed post-verdict motions were denied by the trial court and the appellant was sentenced to a term of five to fifteen years imprisonment. This timely appeal followed. We dismiss the appellant's appeal from the discretionary aspects of his sentence and, finding his other argument meritless, we affirm the judgment of sentence. The appellant argues that the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court is excessive. He therefore urges us to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. The crux of the appellant's argument is that a lesser sentence would have adequately protected the public and would have more fully met his rehabilitative needs. The appellant's challenge is to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Thus, he may not appeal of right, but must petition for allowance of his appeal. Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). The appellant has complied with the requirement of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), as interpreted in Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, supra, in that he has included in his brief a separate statement, preceding the argument portion, as to why his case involves a substantial question that the sentence imposed is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code and thus warrants the exercise of our discretion to consider his appeal. However, we are constrained to dismiss the appellant's appeal from the discretionary aspects of his sentence because we find his attempt to satisfy Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) falls short of the requirements which this Court set forth in Commonwealth v. Cummings, 368 Pa. Super. 341, 534 A.2d 114 (1987). In Cummings, a panel of this Court wrote: Id., 368 Pa.Superior Ct. at 344, 534 A.2d at 115. Instantly, we have reviewed the appellant's statement of reasons for allowance of appeal. Therein we find that the appellant supplies us with the term of his sentence: total confinement in a state correctional institution for a period of not less than five years nor more than fifteen years. However, fatal to his appeal, the appellant fails to identify the "crime . . . which gave rise to that sentence. . . ." Id. Thus, bound by the previous holding of this Court in Commonwealth v. Cummings, supra, we dismiss the appellant's appeal from the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The second argument presented by the appellant is that the trial court erred in allowing his conviction to stand despite the lack of evidence that penetration, a necessary element of the offense, occurred. We note preliminarily that the appellant's motion in arrest of judgment was presented to the trial court based upon this same assertion. Because a motion in arrest of judgment is the proper mode of attack to the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, we construe the instant argument to present a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented against the appellant. *518 See, Commonwealth v. Westcott, 362 Pa.Super. 176, 523 A.2d 1140 (1987). When confronted with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we thoroughly examine all of the evidence actually received, viewing it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner below. Our objective is to determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient in law to establish each material element of the crime and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the crime. See, Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa.Super. 477, 528 A.2d 610 (1987). See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 520 Pa. 600, 467 A.2d 1120 (1983). Specifically, the appellant argues that his conviction cannot stand absent proof of penetration. A person commits the crime of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse when he: 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123. Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as "sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings who are not husband and wife, except as provided in section 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. In Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 311 Pa.Super. 190, 457 A.2d 559 (1983), this Court addressed the issue of "penetration." There, we reasoned that: Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 311 Pa.Super. at 193, 457 A.2d at 560-561. In Commonwealth v. Bowes, supra, the appellant argued that his conviction for sodomy, stemming from subjecting his child victim to cunnilingus, could not be sustained since there was no evidence of penetration. The Bowes Court noted that every possible ingredient of the offense was clearly established, except that there was no direct evidence of penetration. Commonwealth v. Bowes, 166 Pa.Superior Ct. at 626, 74 A.2d at 795. Relying on an earlier decision, Commonwealth v. Donahue, 136 Pa.Super. 306, 7 A.2d 13 (1939), the Court rejected the argument advanced by the appellant and held "[t]he defendant had committed a well-known type of perversion and the jury was quite justified in finding that the position he was in was circumstantial proof of penetration." Commonwealth v. Bowes, 166 Pa.Superior Ct. at 627, 74 A.2d at 796. In the case at bar, the appellant argues that cases such as Commonwealth v. Donahue, supra, and Commonwealth v. Bowes, supra, holding that penetration can be proven circumstantially, are distinguishable from this case because both Donahue and Bowes involved eyewitness testimony of a nonparticipant whose view of the act in question was necessarily obstructed by the positions of the participants. The appellant maintains that the instant case does not present that problem as the witness declarant is the "supposed *520 victim" who is in the best position to notice labial insertion if it in fact occurred. It is settled law in this Commonwealth that even the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecution witness may be sufficient to convict. Commonwealth v. Westcott, supra, citing, Commonwealth v. Stoner, 284 Pa.Super. 364, 425 A.2d 1145 (1981); Commonwealth v. White, 341 Pa.Super. 261, 491 A.2d 252 (1985). Additionally, like any element of an offense, penetration can be proven with circumstantial evidence. In the instant matter, the appellant's victim testified on direct examination as follows: Trial transcript, at 47. The offensive conduct leading to the appellant's conviction in this case also served as the basis for the conviction in Commonwealth v. Westcott, supra. The appellant in Westcott also challenged, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. The victim in Westcott offered testimony similar to that presented in the instant case: Id. 362 Pa.Super. at 200, 523 A.2d at 1152. Viewing the record before us, in the appropriate light, in its entirety, we conclude that the Commonwealth produced ample evidence which established the requisite elements of the crime of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. The appellant's appeal from the discretionary aspects of his sentence is dismissed, and the judgment of sentence is affirmed. HOFFMAN, J., concurs in the result.