Title: People v. Bolden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87117
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2001

Docket No. 87117-Agenda 6-September 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								EDWARD BOLDEN, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 21, 2001.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Edward Bolden, was convicted of the first
degree murders of two persons and of the attempted first degree
murder and aggravated battery of a third person. The defendant
was sentenced to natural life imprisonment for the two murder
convictions and to a consecutive term of 30 years' imprisonment
for attempted murder. The appellate court affirmed the defendant's
convictions and sentences in an unpublished order. No. 1-96-4221
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed
the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)),
and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	Before this court, the defendant raises two issues concerning
a lineup he voluntarily participated in before he was charged with
any offense in this case. The defendant also challenges one of the
jury instructions used at his trial, as well as the trial judge's
exclusion of certain related evidence. Given the nature of the
issues raised by the defendant, we will provide only a brief
summary of the trial evidence and a more detailed recitation of the
testimony introduced at the suppression hearing.



BACKGROUND
	According to the evidence presented at trial, on January 29,
1994, the three victims in this case-Clifford Frazier, his brother,
Derrick Frazier, and a third man, Irving Ledell Clayton-went to
J&amp;J's Fish Store at 64th Street and Cottage Grove Avenue in
Chicago to sell three kilograms of cocaine. Upon arriving at the
fish store, they entered the building and spoke to "Ant" Williams,
with whom they had engaged in similar transactions in the past.
Clifford Frazier testified that he was asked to leave the store
because he was armed, so he went across the street to another
restaurant, ordered some food, and watched the fish store from a
window. After about five minutes, Clifford saw a man enter the
fish store and shake hands with Williams, Derrick Frazier, and
Ledell Clayton. After another 5 or 10 minutes, Derrick, Ledell, and
the man entered the restaurant where Clifford was waiting. As
Derrick and Ledell spoke with Clifford, the man got change and
left the building.
	Clifford testified that Derrick and Ledell next got into
Derrick's car with the man and drove off. Clifford Frazier then left
the restaurant and moved his car to a nearby vacant lot. According
to Clifford, two suspicious-looking men came out of a building
and walked to a car behind his. Clifford got out of his own vehicle,
opened the hood, and watched the two men. Clifford testified that
after 10 to 15 minutes, the man who had earlier driven off with
Derrick and Clayton approached on foot, shouted "Freeze," and
started firing a gun at him. Clifford ran off but was struck in the
back and the leg. Clifford ran to the fish store, but the door was
locked and no one would let him in. The man caught up with
Clifford, and the two struggled. Clifford fell, and the man ran off.
At trial, Clifford identified the defendant as the man who had shot
him.
	Derrick Frazier and Ledell Clayton were found a few blocks
away in Derrick's car; both of them had been shot a number of
times in the head at close range. Derrick was dead, and Ledell died
the next day. Investigators learned that the defendant, who fit a
description provided by the surviving victim, Clifford Frazier, had
talked with "Ant" Williams earlier, and they subsequently
attempted to contact the defendant at his mother's house.
	According to the testimony presented at the suppression
hearing, the defendant retained counsel, and his lawyer, Charles
Ingles, later contacted the police in response to the detectives'
inquiries. The defendant eventually agreed to meet with the
detectives. Following some delay, the defendant and his lawyer
went to Area 2 headquarters on February 26, 1994. At that time,
the defendant was not under arrest and had not been charged with
any offense in connection with this case. At the police station, the
defendant agreed to take part in a lineup. The lineup consisted of
five persons, including the defendant; because of disparities in
height, the participants were seated. The witness, Clifford Frazier,
viewed the lineup through a one-way mirror from an adjacent
room.
	Called as a witness by the defendant, Detective Angelo
Pesavento testified at the suppression hearing that the defendant
was given his choice of which seat to take, and he chose the fourth
seat. Pesavento also testified that he told the defendant's lawyer,
Charles Ingles, that Ingles could not be in the same room with the
witness during the lineup but that he was welcome to remain with
the defendant. According to Pesavento, Ingles chose instead to
wait in an office outside. Detective Pesavento stood with the
witness in the viewing room. Pesavento testified that the witness
readily identified the defendant as the person who had fired shots
at him. Pesavento denied that the defendant was told where to sit
and that the defendant later changed chairs with another
participant. Pesavento also denied that an officer walked into the
lineup room and addressed the defendant by name during the
procedure and that Frazier was prompted in any way in making his
identification.
	Also testifying at the suppression hearing was Charles Ingles,
the lawyer who had represented the defendant at the time of the
lineup. Ingles stated that he contacted the police after he learned
that the police were trying to reach the defendant. The defendant
agreed to meet with the police, and Ingles and the defendant went
to Area 2 headquarters on February 26, 1994. After some initial
questioning by the detectives, the defendant agreed to take part in
a lineup. Ingles testified that he told the detectives that the
defendant would participate in a lineup if counsel could be
present. According to Ingles, one of the detectives responded that
that would be all right. The defendant was later placed in a lineup
room. Ingles saw the witness, who had walked by the defendant
and counsel earlier, go into the viewing room. Ingles said that he
started to follow the witness and Detective Pesavento into the
viewing room but that Pesavento barred his way. Ingles reminded
the detective of their agreement, that the lawyer could be present
during the lineup; Pesavento replied that he was present.
	The defendant also testified at the suppression hearing. The
defendant stated that, after speaking with police detectives, he
agreed to take part in a lineup if his lawyer could be present. The
defendant said that he was then taken to the lineup room, which
contained five chairs; four of them were already occupied.
According to the defendant, he was told to sit in the empty chair,
which was the first one. The door to the room was then closed.
The defendant said that he then switched seats with the person
sitting in the fourth chair. After changing places, the defendant
saw the witness on the other side of the window come to the glass
and point to the person sitting in the first chair. The defendant
described the witness as chubby and said that he was wearing a
green sweatshirt and a gold chain with the letter "D" on it. The
defendant testified that he then saw the detective in the viewing
room put his head out the door; the detective who was outside the
lineup room next opened the door, stuck his head in, and said
" 'You, Eddie Bolden, right?' " The defendant did not reply. The
detective again said, " 'Eddie Bolden, right?' " and gave the
defendant's address. This time the defendant replied in the
affirmative. The detective then told the persons in the lineup room
to stand up, and they did. The defendant testified that he was next
able to see the witness in the other room move down to where the
defendant was standing, and he could see the detective say
something to the witness. The witness shook his head no and tried
to walk away, but the detective grabbed him, brought him back to
the glass, and said something again, and the witness then nodded
his head yes.
	Appearing on behalf of the State at the suppression hearing,
Officer Joe Barnes testified that he was one of the participants in
the defendant's lineup. Barnes stated that he, the defendant, and
three other men entered the lineup room together that afternoon.
A detective told the defendant that he could sit wherever he liked,
and the defendant chose to sit in the fourth chair. The lineup was
then conducted. Barnes stated that persons in the lineup room were
not able to see or hear persons in the viewing room. Barnes denied
that the defendant switched places with anyone and that a detective
entered the room and called out the defendant's name during the
lineup.
	Detective George Karl also testified on behalf of the State at
the suppression hearing. Karl stated that the defendant's lawyer,
Charles Ingles, asked to be with Frazier during the lineup. Karl
told Ingles that the lawyer could not be with the witness but that
he could be with the defendant. Karl said that Ingles instead stayed
in a nearby conference room or squad room during the course of
the lineup. Detective Karl further testified that the defendant was
given his choice of chairs in the lineup room and that the
defendant selected the fourth seat. Karl denied that the defendant
initially sat in the first chair and then switched places. Karl also
stated that a person in the lineup room could see into the adjacent
witness room only by putting his head right against the one-way
mirror that separated the two rooms. Detective Karl stated that
when the witness, Clifford Frazier, arrived at the police station, the
detectives did not have him walk by the defendant. Karl denied
that anyone called out the defendant's name during the procedure.
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the lineup identification. The judge
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights were not
violated by the detectives' refusal to permit defense counsel to be
with the witness during the lineup. The judge believed that the
police had been more than accommodating in this case, because
they had gone beyond what the law required in suggesting that
defense counsel could be with the defendant during the lineup. The
judge also rejected the defendant's separate contention that the
lineup was suggestive.
	The preceding witnesses testified similarly at trial when they
were questioned about the circumstances surrounding Frazier's
identification of the defendant in the lineup. The eyewitness in this
case, Clifford Frazier, had not testified at the suppression hearing,
and at trial he said he did own a necklace like the one described by
the defendant, but he could not recall whether he had worn it on
the day of the lineup.
	Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found the
defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Derrick Frazier and
Irving Ledell Clayton and of the attempted first degree murder and
aggravated battery of Clifford Frazier. A capital sentencing
hearing then commenced. The jury found the defendant eligible for
the death penalty on the ground that he had murdered two or more
persons. After the presentation of evidence in aggravation and
mitigation, the jury was not able to unanimously conclude that the
defendant should be sentenced to death. The judge subsequently
sentenced the defendant to natural life imprisonment for the two
first degree murder convictions and to a consecutive term of 30
years' imprisonment for his conviction for attempted first degree
murder. The judge concluded that the conviction for aggravated
battery merged into the conviction for attempted first degree
murder and therefore did not impose any sentence for the former
offense.
	The appellate court affirmed the defendant's convictions and
sentences in an unpublished order. No. 1-96-4221 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish the
defendant's guilt for those offenses. The court also rejected the
defendant's contention that the lineup identification should have
been suppressed because counsel was not allowed to observe it. In
addition, the court held that the jury was properly instructed in this
case, that there was no error in the exclusion of certain evidence
at trial, and that certain comments by the prosecution were either
proper or did not constitute reversible error. One member of the
appellate panel dissented, believing that the lineup was
constitutionally flawed because counsel had not been allowed to
view the lineup as it proceeded. We allowed the defendant's
petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).



ANALYSIS
I
	The defendant first argues that the lineup identification must
be suppressed because the police failed to honor his lawyer's
request that counsel be permitted to observe the lineup and the
witness' identification of the defendant. In essence, the defendant
contends that a person who is represented by counsel and who has
agreed to take part in a lineup has a right, as a matter of due
process, to have counsel present during the identification process.
The defendant recognizes that there is generally no constitutional
right to counsel when a person is placed in a lineup prior to the
initiation of adversary proceedings, but he argues that the present
case is different because he was already being represented by
counsel and because the detectives had previously agreed to permit
counsel to view the lineup.
	Prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings, a person does
not have a constitutional right to counsel when he takes part in a
lineup. The sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until
the initiation of adversary proceedings against the person, whether
by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429-30, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 426-27, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1145-46 (1986); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877,
1881-82 (1972) (plurality opinion); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1156-57, 87 S. Ct. 1926,
1931-32 (1967); People v. Garrett, 179 Ill. 2d 239, 247-48 (1997).
	At that time a person also does not possess a right to counsel
under the fifth amendment. A person's appearance in a lineup is
nontestimonial in nature and does not constitute interrogation; for
these reasons, identification evidence stemming from a lineup
does not implicate any fifth amendment concerns. Kirby, 406 U.S. 
at 687-88, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 416-17, 92 S. Ct.  at 1881; Wade, 388 U.S.  at 221-23, 18 L. Ed. 2d  at 1154-55, 87 S. Ct. at 1929-30;
People v. Nelson, 40 Ill. 2d 146, 152 (1968). As the United States
Supreme Court explained in Wade:
			"We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely
to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution
witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the
accused to give evidence having testimonial significance.
It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical
characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge
he might have." Wade, 388 U.S.  at 222, 18 L. Ed. 2d  at
1154-55, 92 S. Ct.  at 1930.
	The defendant acknowledges that he had no right to counsel
at the lineup under the preceding authorities. He believes that a
different rule must apply in his case, however, because he was
already represented by counsel and because the detectives had
agreed to permit counsel to observe the lineup. The defendant
contends that these circumstances conferred on him a right under
due process to have counsel present during the lineup. In support
of this proposition, the defendant relies primarily on a line of cases
from New York, in which courts of that state have concluded that
a person who is represented by counsel is entitled to have the
lawyer view a lineup in which the client appears, even though
adversary proceedings have not yet been initiated against the
client.
	The New York cases cited by the defendant base their result
on an interpretation of that state's own constitution and public
policy. See People v. Wilson, 89 N.Y.2d 754, 680 N.E.2d 598
(1997); People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474, 435 N.E.2d 376
(1982); People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625 (1974);
People v. Lennon, 243 A.D.2d 495, 662 N.Y.S. 821 (1997). In
contrast to the New York decisions, our own cases have previously
declined to recognize a right to counsel in circumstances similar
to the ones here. Thus, in People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414
(1994), this court declined to hold that a defendant who was
represented by counsel was entitled to have counsel present during
a lineup. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 447. Although the court in that
case concluded that a defendant for whom a lawyer has been
retained must be told, prior to any interrogation, that counsel is
available for consultation, the court declined to impose a similar
requirement with respect to lineups. See also People v. Garrett,
179 Ill. 2d 239 (1997).
	The defendant contends that McCauley is distinguishable,
however, because the defendant in that case was already under
arrest and therefore could be compelled to appear in a lineup. The
present defendant was not yet under arrest at the time of the
lineup, and he argues that a different rule should therefore apply
in these circumstances. We do not agree. We do not believe that
the defendant's status as a person not under arrest at the time of
the lineup conferred on him a constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel. In fact, the absence of an arrest would seem to argue
for the opposite conclusion. If the defendant was free to leave, he
could have simply done so, and thus one option in this case was
for the defendant to refuse to take part in the lineup if counsel was
barred from assisting him.



II
	The defendant raises an additional argument concerning the
lineup identification. He contends that the refusal of the police to
permit his lawyer to observe the witness during the lineup
converted his voluntary appearance at the police station into a
seizure by the detectives. As a preliminary matter, the State
contends that the defendant has waived consideration of this issue
by his failure to raise it in the courts below. See Parks v.
Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 180 (2000); Jones v. Chicago HMO
Ltd., 191 Ill. 2d 278, 306 (2000).
	This point was first raised by the dissenting justice in the
appellate court, who believed that the detectives' refusal to permit
counsel to observe the witness make the identification transformed
the defendant's voluntary appearance at the police station into an
involuntary seizure for fourth amendment purposes. The waiver
rule is a limitation on the parties, however, and not on the
jurisdiction of the courts. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 327
(1998). Recognizing both the importance of this issue and our
obligation to maintain a sound and consistent body of case law, we
choose to address the question in this appeal. See People v.
Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (1999); People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19, 23 (1998); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224-25 (1967).
	The defendant argues that the detectives' conduct here
violated the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
and the search and seizure and privacy clauses of article I, section
6, of the Illinois Constitution. None of these authorities are
persuasive, however, and we decline to find that the defendant was
subjected to an involuntary seizure.
	The defendant cites article I, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution as providing a basis on which to conclude that the
action by the police amounted to an involuntary seizure. Article I,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution provides, "The people shall
have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6.
The defendant contends that this provision must be interpreted
more broadly than its federal constitutional analogue.
	The defendant's argument in this regard fails to distinguish
between the search and seizure clause and the privacy clause of
that provision. Although the specific guarantees of the privacy
clause represent a departure from the scope of the United States
Constitution (see In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381 (1992)), the separate search and seizure clause does not.
Thus, in People v. Clark, 65 Ill. 2d 169 (1976), Justice Schaefer
explained:
		"It is of course true that section 6 of article I contains
references to 'invasions of privacy or interceptions of
communications' which are not found in the fourth
amendment. The portion of section 6 which deals with
unreasonable searches, however, is patterned after the
fourth amendment, and the defendant suggests no reason
for construing the section as imposing additional
conditions which must be met before a search may be
deemed a reasonable one." Clark, 65 Ill. 2d  at 175.
	Decisions of this court have long understood the search and
seizure clause of article I, section 6, to command an interpretation
like the one that is given to the corresponding provision of the
fourth amendment. See Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 (1996);
People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 (1995); People v. Lucente,
116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 (1987); People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 242
(1984). While the privacy clause of article I, section 6, possesses
a unique constitutional history, it is of no assistance here to the
defendant, for it is a separate guarantee and does not serve to
transform the nearby search and seizure clause into a source of
state constitutional rights that are more extensive than those
conferred by the fourth amendment.
	We note that our decision in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60
(1996), is not to the contrary. In Krueger the court considered the
validity of a "no-knock" statute. In deciding that the provision was
unconstitutional, the court determined that the fourth amendment
and article I, section 6, provided similar guarantees. Nonetheless,
in holding that the evidence at issue must be suppressed, the court
refused to apply the federal good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, applying instead the Illinois exclusionary rule,
which afforded greater protection. We do not construe Krueger as
suggesting that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6,
of the Illinois Constitution must be interpreted more expansively
than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment. The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, and its history in
Illinois may be traced to this court's decision in People v.
Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (1923).
	Finally, we do not believe that the defendant was subject to a
seizure by law enforcement authorities in this case under the
principles applicable to the fourth amendment or the
corresponding guarantee found in article I, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980), the Supreme Court stated:
			"We adhere to the view that a person is 'seized' only
when, by means of physical force or a show of authority,
his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such
restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for
invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between
the police and the citizenry, but 'to prevent arbitrary and
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the
privacy and personal security of individuals.' [Citation.]
As long as the person to whom questions are put remains
free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has
been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as
would under the Constitution require some particularized
and objective justification.
			***
			We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave."
Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 553-54, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877.
	Among the circumstances a court may consider in
determining whether a person has been seized for fourth
amendment purposes are the presence of multiple police officers,
the display of weapons by an officer, the touching of the person by
the officers, the officers' use of language suggesting that the
person is compelled to obey, and the occurrence of practices that
normally accompany an arrest, such as searching, handcuffing, and
fingerprinting. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509,
100 S. Ct.  at 1877; see also People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382
(1990).
	In the present case, the defendant voluntarily went to the
police station with his lawyer. There is no evidence that the
detectives there threatened the defendant in any way. Rather than
insist that the defendant take part in a lineup, the officers asked
counsel whether the defendant would agree to participate in one.
The defendant never stated that he did not feel free to leave the
premises. The defendant correctly observes that conduct by the
police may, in certain circumstances, transform a voluntary
appearance into a seizure. Unlike the cases cited by the defendant,
however, the present case does not demonstrate that the defendant
was effectively seized by the police. Cf. United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1987) (officers separated suspect
from coworker, accused suspect of lying, and insisted that he tell
the truth); People v. Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d 789 (1990) (defendant
kept overnight in interview room at police station); People v.
Gordon, 198 Ill. App. 3d 791 (1990) (defendant kept overnight at
police station). In the case at bar, the conduct of the detectives at
the police station did not represent a seizure of the defendant. Not
until after the lineup concluded was the defendant formally placed
under arrest. Prior to that time, the defendant was not subjected to
actions that restricted his freedom to leave. For these reasons, we
conclude that the detectives' failure to permit counsel to observe
the witness' identification of the defendant in the lineup did not
constitute a seizure of the defendant.



III
	Finally, the defendant challenges one of the jury instructions
used at his trial, as well as the trial judge's related exclusion of
certain evidence. At the State's request, and over defense
counsel's objection, the trial judge gave the jury a nonpattern
instruction to the effect that a person is not entitled to the
assistance of counsel at a lineup conducted prior to the initiation
of adversary proceedings. The defendant contends that this
instruction was unnecessary and confusing and that it would only
have invited the jury to disregard the defense theory regarding the
lineup.
	The instruction at issue stated:
			"A person's right to counsel attaches only after
adversary judicial criminal proceedings have been
initiated against him, whether by way of a formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. This is a right not invocable by an accused
during the fact finding process, such as a line-up, prior to
the commencement of adversarial proceedings."
	The defendant contends that the instruction given by the court
improperly anticipated that the defense would argue that his
constitutional rights were denied. In addition, the defendant
complains that the instruction had the improper effect of justifying
the detectives' refusal to permit lawyer Ingles into the viewing
room and undermined the defendant's argument that Frazier was
coached in his identification of the defendant. The defendant
further theorizes that the instruction could have led the jurors to
believe that he was not entitled to meet with the police with a
lawyer, or that he must be guilty because he chose to do so.
Finally, the defendant believes that the instruction implied that the
police could not have allowed the defendant's lawyer into the
viewing room.
	Whether to instruct the jury on a particular matter depends on
the facts in the case and the governing law, and the use of a
nonpattern instruction is reserved to the trial judge's discretion.
People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 412 (2000); People v. Emerson,
189 Ill. 2d 436, 505 (2000). The defendant concedes that the
challenged instruction was "technically accurate"; his objection is
directed instead at the possible effect of the instruction on the
minds of the jurors. We believe that the defendant misconstrues
the likely impact of the instruction on the jury. Throughout the
trial, the defendant attacked the reliability of Frazier's
identification and repeatedly pointed out that defense counsel had
not been allowed in the viewing room during the lineup. The
defense thus put at issue the detectives' refusal to permit Ingles
into the viewing room, attempting to use that as a means of
undermining the reliability of the lineup procedure in this case. We
do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in giving
the jurors the challenged instruction. The instruction simply told
the jury that the defendant was not constitutionally entitled to have
counsel present during the lineup. This was an accurate statement
of the law, as the defendant properly acknowledges, and we
believe that it would have helped the jurors in evaluating the
defendant's claims regarding the lineup. Under the particular
circumstances presented, we do not believe that the trial judge
abused his discretion in giving the jurors the nonpattern instruction
challenged here.
	In a related argument, the defendant maintains that the trial
judge's error in giving the preceding instruction was compounded
by the judge's earlier refusal to permit Ingles to testify that in other
instances he had been allowed to observe police lineups. The
defendant contends that the lawyer's testimony was relevant and
demonstrated why counsel accompanied the defendant to the
police station.
	We have already concluded that no error occurred in the
judge's use of the instruction. We also find no merit in the
defendant's further contention here that the trial judge erred in
excluding Ingles' testimony about other lineups. "Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." People v.
Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 115 (2000). We do not believe that the
lawyer's testimony was relevant in this case. What he was allowed
to do on previous occasions had no bearing on the conduct of the
detectives in this case or their reasons for not permitting counsel
to be present during the lineup. Moreover, there was no showing
that the lawyer's prior contacts were with the particular detectives
involved in this case. On this record, we cannot say that the trial
judge abused his discretion in excluding the proffered testimony.



CONCLUSION
		For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,
which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County,
is affirmed.