Title: Hedrick v. Warden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992913
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BRANDON WAYNE HEDRICK 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 992913 
November 1, 2002 
 
WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I 
STATE PRISON 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
I. 
 
Petitioner, Brandon Wayne Hedrick, was convicted of the 
capital murder of Lisa Yvonne Alexander Crider in the 
commission of robbery, forcible sodomy, and rape in violation 
of Code § 18.2-31(4) and (5); robbery in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-58; rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61; forcible 
sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1; abduction in 
violation of Code § 18.2-47; and use of a firearm in the 
commission of murder in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  The 
jury fixed his punishment for the non-capital offenses within 
the relevant statutory ranges.  The jury fixed petitioner's 
punishment at death for the capital murder convictions.  The 
circuit court sentenced petitioner in accord with the jury 
verdicts.  We affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in 
Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999). 
 
As permitted by Code § 8.01-654(C)(1), petitioner filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the 
Sussex I State Prison alleging, among other things, that his 
trial counsel were ineffective.  The warden filed a motion to 
dismiss, and this Court entered an order directing that the 
Circuit Court of Appomattox County conduct an evidentiary 
hearing limited to the issue whether petitioner was denied 
effective assistance of counsel during his capital murder 
trial.  The circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing 
required by Code § 8.01-654(C), and submitted a very thorough 
and exhaustive written report that contained its findings of 
fact and recommended conclusions of law.  The circuit court 
concluded that petitioner's allegations lacked merit, and the 
court submitted its report to this Court.1
 
While petitioner's habeas corpus petition was pending 
before this Court, petitioner forwarded a notarized letter to 
this Court and requested permission to withdraw his petition 
for habeas corpus.  The following day, petitioner wrote 
another letter to this Court, which also contained his 
notarized signature.  Petitioner stated in that letter: 
"Dear Supreme Court of Virginia 
 
"My attorneys will not do what I say when I tell 
them I wish to withdraw my appeals.  My attorneys 
are against the death penalty and I am for the death 
penalty, so there is a conflict of intrest [sic] 
there.  I beleive [sic] in the Bible, and if someone 
takes a life then that person should have his life 
                     
1 The Honorable Richard S. Blanton submitted the report to 
this Court. 
 
2
taken as well.  I am guilty of the charges in which 
Im [sic] being obtaind [sic] for.  What I did was 
cruel and selfes [sic], I had no disregard [sic] for 
human life, there for [sic] I should be punished, 
for my sake and the sake of my victim.  There for 
[sic] since my attorneys will not abide by my 
demand, I personaly [sic] write my owne [sic] motion 
to withdraw my habius corbus pititeon [sic] and to 
have a [sic] execution date set as soon as possibal 
[sic].  Thank you for your time in this matter. 
 
"Sincerly [sic] yours, 
 
"B.W.H. 
"Brandon Wayne Hedrick" 
 
 
Subsequently, petitioner forwarded another letter to this 
Court that had apparently been prepared by his habeas 
attorneys.  In that letter, petitioner stated that he desired 
to proceed with his habeas corpus petition.  This Court 
entered an order that directed the circuit court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and determine whether petitioner desired 
to proceed with his habeas corpus petition.  The circuit court 
conducted the hearing and concluded that petitioner "desire[d] 
to continue with the litigation of his petition.  When 
questioned by the circuit court, petitioner . . . indicated 
that this was his final decision on this matter." 
II. 
 
On May 10, 1997, Trevor Jones, William K. Dodson, and 
petitioner were together in Jones' apartment in Lynchburg. 
Petitioner and Jones left the apartment and traveled in Jones' 
truck to an area in Lynchburg near Fifth and Madison Streets 
 
3
to find some prostitutes.  Petitioner and Jones met two 
prostitutes and gave them money to purchase crack cocaine.  
Petitioner, Jones, and the prostitutes went back to the 
apartment where they smoked the crack cocaine and engaged in 
sexual relations.  Petitioner, Jones, and the prostitutes 
returned to the area near Fifth and Madison Streets.  
Petitioner and Jones gave the prostitutes money and asked them 
to purchase more crack cocaine.  The prostitutes took the 
money and did not return. 
 
Petitioner and Jones met two different prostitutes and 
took them to Jones' apartment where petitioner and Jones drank 
bourbon, smoked marijuana, and engaged in sexual relations 
with the prostitutes.  Around 11:00 p.m., petitioner, Jones, 
and the prostitutes left the apartment and returned to the 
area near Fifth and Madison Streets.  The prostitutes got out 
of Jones' truck, and Jones saw Lisa Crider, the victim in this 
case. 
 
Jones knew that Crider's boyfriend sold crack cocaine, 
and petitioner and Jones decided to "pick up" Crider, have 
sexual relations with her, and rob her of any crack cocaine in 
her possession.  Jones approached Crider and asked her if she 
wanted to have sex.  Crider got into the truck and went to the 
apartment with Jones and petitioner.  Jones paid her $50 and 
 
4
had sexual intercourse with her.  Petitioner did not have 
sexual relations with her at the apartment. 
 
Jones left his bedroom after he had sexual intercourse 
with Crider, and while she was "getting dressed" Jones went to 
another room and spoke with petitioner.  Jones and petitioner 
devised a plan in which petitioner would pretend to rob Jones 
and Crider.  Jones did not want Crider to know that he was 
involved in the robbery because she knew where Jones lived, 
and Jones was afraid that Crider's boyfriend would retaliate 
against him.  Jones directed petitioner to leave the apartment 
and retrieve Jones' shotgun from the truck.  When petitioner 
entered the apartment with the shotgun, he "racked" the pump 
on the shotgun and "motioned for" Crider and Jones and told 
them to go into a bedroom.  Petitioner told Jones to empty 
Crider's pockets, and Jones took the $50 bill that he had paid 
her, cigarettes, and a cigarette lighter.  Jones placed 
handcuffs on Crider, covered her eyes and mouth with duct 
tape, and placed a shirt over her face.  Petitioner took 
Crider out of the apartment and placed her in the truck. 
 
Petitioner, Jones, and Crider left the apartment at about 
1:00 a.m.  Petitioner and Crider were seated in the back of 
the truck, and Jones drove the truck.  Petitioner removed the 
shirt and duct tape from Crider.  Jones stopped the truck and 
got out while petitioner raped Crider. 
 
5
 
Petitioner and Jones decided that they would kill Crider 
because they feared that her boyfriend might retaliate against 
them.  Jones drove the truck while he and petitioner tried to 
find a suitable location to kill Crider, who cried and pled 
for her life.  As she pled for her life, Crider asked, "[i]s 
there anything I can do to make y'all not do this?" and 
petitioner replied that if Crider performed oral sex on him, 
he would "think about it."  Crider performed oral sex on 
petitioner. 
 
Around "daybreak," Jones drove the truck to a location 
near the James River, where he, petitioner, and Crider got out 
of the truck.  Jones removed the handcuffs from Crider, bound 
her hands together with duct tape, and placed duct tape around 
her mouth and eyes.  Petitioner and Jones took Crider to the 
river bank.  Jones "turned [Crider and] faced her back to the 
river."  As Jones began to walk to the truck, petitioner 
killed Crider by shooting her in the face with the shotgun. 
III. 
A. 
 
This is the first opportunity that we have had to discuss 
the standard of review that we apply when we consider a 
circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law made 
in its report pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C).  We conclude 
that the circuit court's recommended conclusions of law, as 
 
6
required by Code § 8.01-654(C), involve mixed questions of law 
and fact subject to our de novo review.  The circuit court's 
factual findings, however, are entitled to deference and are 
binding upon this Court unless those findings are plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support them. 
B. 
 
In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner claims that 
his trial counsel were ineffective.  In Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established 
the legal principles that we must apply.  The circuit court 
properly applied these principles in its report filed in this 
Court.  The Supreme Court has stated that "actual 
ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney 
performance are subject to a general requirement that the 
defendant affirmatively prove prejudice."  Id. at 693; accord 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394-95 (2000); Basden v. 
Lee, 290 F.3d 602, 616-17 (4th Cir. 2002); Sheikh v. 
Buckingham Correctional Center, 264 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (2002) (this day decided).  The Supreme Court held in 
Strickland that "[e]ven if a defendant shows that particular 
errors of counsel were unreasonable . . . the defendant must 
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense."  
466 U.S. at 693; accord Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 479, 487, 527 
 
7
S.E.2d 419, 423 (2000); Murray v. Griffith, 243 Va. 384, 388, 
416 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1992). 
 
The Supreme Court has articulated the following test that 
we must apply to ascertain prejudice: 
"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome. 
 
 
"In making the determination whether the 
specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, 
a court should presume, absent challenge to the 
judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, 
that the judge or jury acted according to law. . . .  
The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the 
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, 
conscientiously, and impartially applying the 
standards that govern the decision. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"The governing legal standard plays a critical 
role in defining the question to be asked in 
assessing the prejudice from counsel's errors.  When 
a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"In making this determination, a court hearing 
an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality 
of the evidence before the judge or jury.  Some of 
the factual findings will have been unaffected by 
the errors, and factual findings that were affected 
will have been affected in different ways." 
 
 
8
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95; accord Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 481-82, 484-86 (2000); Bell v. Cone, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002). 
 
Additionally, as the Supreme Court stated in Roe, 
" 'no particular set of detailed rules for counsel's 
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.'  
Rather, courts must 'judge the reasonableness of 
counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular 
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct,' 
and 'judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must 
be highly deferential.' " 
 
Roe, 528 U.S. at 477 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90) 
(citations omitted).  We also observe that the Supreme Court 
has held that "Strickland's standard, although by no means 
insurmountable, is highly demanding."  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). 
IV. 
A. 
 
Petitioner argues that "[t]he pervading problem in this 
case was trial counsel's failure to communicate" which 
rendered them ineffective.  Petitioner asserts that trial 
counsel did not discuss trial strategy until one business day 
before the trial.  Petitioner claims that trial counsel did 
not "seriously" discuss:  the witnesses; whether petitioner 
would plead guilty and avoid a trial on the guilt phase of the 
capital murder trial; a theory of defense for the guilt phase; 
 
9
what records trial counsel had obtained relevant to the case; 
and the witnesses' prospective testimony.  Continuing, 
petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to communicate 
regarding:  voir dire of the jury; the names of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses; assignment of the opening statement 
and closing argument; witness subpoenas; and other 
information. 
 
The circuit court concluded in its report, and we agree, 
that petitioner's claims are without merit.  Lee R. Harrison 
and James P. Baber were petitioner's trial counsel.  Harrison 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that any communication 
problem between trial counsel was limited to a complaint that 
Baber had not promptly disseminated information to Harrison.  
Harrison "testified that only on one occasion did Baber not 
forward material to him in a timely manner and that [Harrison] 
solved the problem by going to Baber's office to copy the 
material."  Additionally, even though trial counsel did not 
meet in either counsel's office, trial counsel discussed the 
trial of this case on numerous occasions. 
 
Trial counsel discussed the division of trial 
responsibility, pretrial investigation, witnesses, and trial 
strategies.  Harrison agreed to prepare the expert witnesses, 
and Baber agreed to locate lay witnesses.  Baber collected 
information about petitioner's background and contacted 
 
10
petitioner's parents and grandparents.  Trial counsel provided 
petitioner's mental health expert witness with information 
Baber had collected from his own investigation and materials 
provided by the Commonwealth.  Therefore, we hold that 
petitioner's claim that trial counsel's purported failure to 
communicate rendered them ineffective fails to satisfy either 
the performance or prejudice standards established in 
Strickland v. Washington. 
B. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to 
investigate and prepare adequately for trial.  Petitioner 
claims that the circuit court "provided [him] two attorneys, 
one of whom had never even selected a jury in a capital case, 
and neither of whom had completed even a single capital 
trial."  Petitioner contends that trial counsel did not speak 
to his friends or relatives about petitioner's background and 
had not spoken with witnesses prior to their testimony during 
the sentencing hearing.  Petitioner also claims that Dr. Gary 
Hawk, who was appointed to serve as petitioner's mental health 
expert witness during the capital murder trial, urged trial 
counsel to contact and interview petitioner's family members, 
friends, or other individuals who might have had information 
about petitioner's background or behavior relevant at the 
 
11
sentencing phase of the trial, and that trial counsel failed 
to do so. 
 
Continuing, petitioner claims that trial counsel failed 
to obtain his public school records, which indicated that 
petitioner had "borderline" intellectual abilities, and 
records concerning his family's history of alcohol and drug 
addiction.  Petitioner argues that trial counsel made no 
effort to obtain an expert witness to assist or advise him in 
scientific areas.  Petitioner states that even though trial 
counsel visited him separately on several occasions, there 
were only five meetings when both counsel met together with 
petitioner. 
 
The circuit court, in its report, rejected petitioner's 
allegations.  The circuit court found that after petitioner 
was indicted, trial counsel researched legal issues and 
prepared and filed numerous motions.  Trial counsel reviewed 
extensive discovery provided to them by the Commonwealth that 
included police investigation reports, witness statements, and 
certificates of analysis related to forensic testing.  Trial 
counsel collected information about petitioner's background, 
contacted petitioner's parents, grandparents, former employers 
and school personnel, and tried to obtain his school records.  
Trial counsel met with expert witnesses designated by the 
Commonwealth, including the medical examiner, a firearms 
 
12
expert, and an expert on DNA.  Trial counsel met with Dr. Gary 
Hawk, the mental health expert witness who was appointed by 
the court at their request. 
 
The circuit court found that trial counsel met with 
petitioner on numerous occasions before trial.  In preparation 
for sentencing, trial counsel met with petitioner's family 
members and discussed the need to provide character testimony.  
Trial counsel solicited petitioner's family members' help in 
locating friends and family character witnesses. 
 
The circuit court also found that Baber, one of 
petitioner's trial counsel, had practiced law for 39 years and 
had maintained a practice in Cumberland County, which is in 
the same judicial circuit as Appomattox.  Baber, who had 
served as the Commonwealth's Attorney for Cumberland County 
for 16 years, also had extensive criminal law experience and 
had tried innumerable felony jury trials throughout the 
Commonwealth.  Harrison, petitioner's other trial counsel, had 
been involved in 12 previous capital murder cases, and he had 
tried jury trials involving serious felony charges such as 
murder, rape, and robbery.  Both trial counsel had also 
attended seminars on capital murder trials. 
 
In view of the circuit court's findings that are 
supported by the record, we hold that petitioner's contentions 
that trial counsel were ineffective because they allegedly 
 
13
failed to investigate and prepare for trial are without merit.  
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that trial counsel were 
ineffective, and he fails to satisfy the performance or 
prejudice standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
C. 
 
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to develop guilt phase theories.  
Specifically, petitioner contends that "Baber did not think 
that 'accidental shooting' was 'a credible theory of the 
case,'" but Harrison acknowledged that it was "an important 
point for [the defense] to make before the jury . . . [and 
that he] wanted to try to find someone to confirm what Brandon 
had to say about this accidental shooting."  Petitioner claims 
that trial counsel failed to reconcile their difference in 
approaches to this potential defense.  Continuing, petitioner 
asserts that trial counsel could have consulted other expert 
witnesses to pursue an "accidental shooting" defense.  
Petitioner argues that the Commonwealth's medical examiner 
provided information to trial counsel that supported a defense 
theory that the victim's death was accidental. 
 
We reject petitioner's contentions that trial counsel 
were ineffective because they purportedly failed to develop a 
defense of accidental shooting.  As the circuit court noted in 
its report, the jury did hear testimony that petitioner had 
 
14
indicated that he was trying to shoot over the victim's head 
to scare her.  The Commonwealth's evidence, however, showed 
that petitioner killed the victim by shooting her in the face 
with a 12-gauge shotgun from a distance of three to seven 
feet.  The victim was not shot in the top of her head, but the 
"full load" hit her in the mouth. 
 
Additionally, the evidence at trial clearly established 
that the suggestion that the victim was killed accidentally 
was initially made by Special Agent Holt, not petitioner.  
Special Agent Holt testified that when he interviewed 
petitioner, Holt attempted to minimize petitioner's 
involvement in the crime by suggesting to petitioner that when 
he shot the victim, he did so accidentally.  Petitioner did 
not testify that the shotgun discharged accidentally.  
Additionally, petitioner admitted in his judicial admission 
filed with this Court that he was guilty of the crimes 
charged, which included the intentional killing of the victim.  
We hold that petitioner's argument that trial counsel were 
ineffective because they failed to develop guilt phase 
theories does not satisfy the performance or prejudice 
standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
D. 
 
Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to obtain an expert witness to help them 
 
15
develop and present evidence to the jury that petitioner 
accidentally killed Crider.  Petitioner claims that the 
medical examiner's finding that the shotgun blast entered the 
victim's brain at a slightly "upwards angle" supported the 
theory that the shotgun accidentally discharged with the gun 
at petitioner's hip. 
 
Petitioner introduced the de bene esse deposition of 
Brian Berger in evidence at the habeas evidentiary hearing.  
Berger, who works in a laboratory at the Department of 
Anesthesiology at the Medical College of Virginia, described 
himself as a part-time gunsmith and self-taught "wound 
ballistics expert."  Berger testified that it was impossible 
for petitioner to have held the shotgun against his shoulder 
when the shotgun discharged because the entry of the wound on 
the victim's face was consistent with petitioner having held 
the gun on his hip and "shooting slightly upward."  Petitioner 
claims that Berger's testimony demonstrates that expert 
assistance was available to trial counsel to support the 
theory of accidental discharge. 
 
We hold that petitioner's contentions are without merit.  
The circuit court implicitly rejected Berger's testimony, and 
we find no reason to disagree with the circuit court.  Also, 
the circuit court concluded that Berger "conceded that a 
slightly upward tilt of the victim's head at the time of the 
 
16
shotgun blast would have produced the identical wound path 
from a shotgun held at [petitioner's] shoulder."  As we have 
already stated in Part IV.C. of this opinion, the facts do not 
support a theory that petitioner accidentally killed Crider. 
 
Additionally, petitioner testified at the capital murder 
trial that he tried to shoot the shotgun over the victim's 
head; he did not testify that the shotgun accidentally 
discharged.  Furthermore, petitioner made a judicial admission 
in this Court that he was guilty of the crimes charged, which 
included the capital murder charge.  Therefore, we hold that 
petitioner's claims that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they did not obtain any expert witness to support this 
theory fail to satisfy the performance or prejudice standards 
established in Strickland v. Washington. 
E. 
 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel "failed to develop 
evidence of involuntary intoxication as a defense."2  
Petitioner says that because he testified at the capital 
murder trial that he "was stoned and didn't realize what [he] 
was doing and didn't have a clear mind," trial counsel were 
                     
2 In the context of petitioner's argument, this appears to 
be a typographical error.  Petitioner presents no evidence to 
suggest involuntary intoxication. 
 
 
17
deficient for "failing to investigate and properly present at 
trial evidence of [his] voluntary intoxication." 
 
As the circuit court found in its report, trial counsel 
did present evidence of petitioner's drug and alcohol abuse, 
and trial counsel argued to the jury that petitioner had 
consumed alcohol and drugs the night preceding the murder.  
And, the circuit court's conclusions are supported by the 
record.  However, there was no evidence of the quantities of 
alcohol and drugs that petitioner ingested the night before 
the murder other than his own vague assertions made before 
trial and in his testimony at trial.  The circuit court found 
that "a minimum of five hours had transpired from the time 
[petitioner] last ingested any substance" and the time the 
murder occurred.  As many as seven hours may have passed 
between the time petitioner last ingested alcohol or drugs and 
the time of the murder.  The evidence at trial did not depict 
petitioner as someone who was intoxicated or impaired by 
drugs.  The conduct of Jones and petitioner during the early 
morning hours preceding Crider's murder was planned and 
purposeful.  Jones stopped the truck and he and petitioner 
discussed the necessity of killing Crider.  They spent several 
hours looking for a suitable secluded location.  They removed 
the handcuffs to avoid leaving evidence, and petitioner wore 
gloves to avoid leaving any fingerprints.  They placed duct 
 
18
tape around the victim's hands, mouth, and eyes before they 
took her to the river bank.  Before fleeing to Nebraska, they 
disposed of much of the incriminating evidence.  Additionally, 
the fact that petitioner may have been impaired by alcohol and 
drugs was presented to the jury by Dr. Hawk at the sentencing 
phase as evidence in mitigation. 
 
In light of defense counsel's presentation of evidence 
regarding alcohol and drug use, as well as the facts 
effectively negating an assertion of impairment, we hold that 
petitioner's contentions are without merit because he fails to 
satisfy the performance or prejudice standards established in 
Strickland v. Washington.  
F. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to submit a jury instruction on voluntary 
intoxication.  We disagree with petitioner.   
 
Trial counsel's performance was not deficient because, as 
the circuit court stated, "the evidence at the trial did not 
depict [petitioner] as someone who was significantly 
intoxicated and impaired."  We have already summarized the 
extensive reasons why the evidence did not support a voluntary 
intoxication jury instruction in Part IV.E. of this opinion, 
and we will not repeat those reasons here.  We hold that 
 
19
petitioner fails to satisfy the performance or prejudice 
standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
G. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel made errors 
affecting the penalty phase of the capital murder trial.  
Petitioner states that one counsel in this case spent a total 
of 53 hours working on the case during the year he had to 
prepare for trial.  Continuing, petitioner claims that defense 
counsel failed to investigate petitioner's background, 
character, and mental condition.  Petitioner says that despite  
"any imprudent reliance that counsel had on their 
mistaken belief that [petitioner] would plead guilty 
or the case would 'plead out' without any indication 
that the prosecution would allow [petitioner] to 
plead to charges that did not involve the death 
penalty, [petitioner's] trial counsel conducted no 
meaningful penalty phase investigation.  They made 
only the most superficial effort to collect records 
concerning [petitioner's] background.  They made no 
effort to identify and interview individuals 
concerning [petitioner's] background, and, in fact, 
resisted the repeated urging to do so by the mental 
health expert appointed to assist them, Dr. Hawk."   
 
Petitioner alleges that trial counsel did not subpoena any 
witnesses for the sentencing or guilt phases of the trial and 
did not talk to witnesses about their testimony before trial. 
 
Petitioner asserts that trial counsel's performance was 
ineffective because counsel did not adequately utilize its 
mental health expert, Dr. Hawk.  Petitioner claims that 
defense counsel did not communicate with each other regarding 
 
20
Dr. Hawk's testimony and that defense counsel failed to 
respond to Dr. Hawk's suggestion that counsel interview 
witnesses regarding petitioner's background.  Petitioner 
contends that trial counsel did not meet with Dr. Hawk until 
the night before his testimony and made no efforts to 
ascertain the information that Dr. Hawk would need to conduct 
a thorough evaluation of petitioner. 
 
Petitioner claims that the Commonwealth's Attorney was 
able to argue in his closing argument during the penalty phase 
of the capital murder trial that petitioner "has a decent 
family" because trial counsel failed to introduce accurate 
evidence about petitioner's family and home life.  Petitioner 
states that his family members "could have described for the 
jury a vivid and compelling picture of the extremely chaotic 
and often violent environment in which [petitioner] grew up." 
 
Petitioner also asserts that certain "[r]ecords of the 
Commonwealth's investigations of [his] family" could have been 
easily obtained and would have provided trial counsel with an 
accurate understanding of his family.  Petitioner points out 
that trial counsel were provided a report from Dr. Hawk that 
referenced petitioner's father's history of drug abuse. 
 
During the evidentiary hearing in the circuit court, Dr. 
Kent McDaniel testified about certain factors leading to 
"family chaos -- [petitioner's] parents' substance abuse, his 
 
21
father's physical absence from the home for extended periods 
of time, his mother's psychological limitations, his father's 
psychiatric symptoms and his own psychological limitations, 
[petitioner's brother's] extensive behavioral problems, and 
the overall recurrent violence that was in the home" and the 
effect these factors had on petitioner's emotional 
development.  Petitioner argues that this information would 
have created a considerably different picture of his family 
environment than that which was presented during his capital 
murder trial. 
 
We hold petitioner's claims are without merit.  As the 
circuit court noted in its report, trial counsel requested the 
appointment of Dr. Hawk to assist trial counsel to identify 
and present mitigating evidence at trial.  Trial counsel 
provided Dr. Hawk with information they had obtained.  Dr. 
Hawk had previously worked with Harrison, and Harrison was 
aware that Dr. Hawk would contact trial counsel if he needed 
additional information.  According to Harrison's testimony at 
the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Hawk only made one request for 
additional information. 
 
Dr. Hawk interviewed and tested petitioner, and he 
conducted his own interviews with petitioner's mother and 
brother.  Dr. Hawk informed trial counsel of a number of 
mitigating factors that could be offered at trial.  Dr. Hawk 
 
22
identified, among other things, such mitigating factors as 
petitioner's intellectual limitations, depression, immaturity, 
drug use, and alcohol abuse.  Dr. Hawk also testified about 
these mitigating factors at the capital murder trial. 
 
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, trial counsel met 
with Dr. Hawk in preparation for the capital murder trial.  
Trial counsel met with Dr. Hawk in Charlottesville and 
Appomattox.  During the week of the trial, they communicated 
with Dr. Hawk and spoke about the progression of the trial. 
 
Petitioner's assertion that trial counsel failed to 
develop evidence concerning his intellectual limitations is 
without merit.  Dr. Hawk testified at the capital murder trial 
that petitioner's I.Q. was 76 and that 95% of similarly-aged 
individuals were intellectually superior to petitioner.  Dr. 
Hawk also testified that petitioner had performed poorly in 
school and that petitioner had failed the third grade.  Dr. 
Hawk opined that petitioner's pattern of failure "normally 
would indicate the presence of possibly a learning disorder or 
some other problem at school, but none was apparently 
diagnosed." 
 
Even though petitioner contends that trial counsel failed 
to present evidence at the capital murder trial of his 
disruptive family environment, the circuit court found that 
petitioner "personally had directed his attorneys not to 
 
23
attempt to present evidence of a 'bad childhood.'"  Petitioner 
cannot, in a subsequent habeas corpus petition, assert that he 
was prejudiced by trial counsel's performance simply because 
they followed his directive. 
 
Additionally, during petitioner's sentencing hearing at 
the capital murder trial, his family members and friends 
testified that he was raised in a "normal" family, he had not 
been abused, and he had been taught right from wrong.  His 
family members described him as quiet, helpful, and 
respectful, and testified that recently he had become involved 
"with people who led him into criminal activities."   
 
Trial counsel also presented evidence of petitioner's 
drug and alcohol dependence at the sentencing phase.  Dr. Hawk 
described petitioner's history of drug and alcohol abuse, and 
he testified that petitioner's drug use at the time of the 
crimes would have "affected his thinking in a negative way."  
We agree with the circuit court's report that trial counsel 
"presented this mitigation evidence to the jury in the manner 
it had been formulated by Dr. Hawk." 
 
Even though petitioner contends that trial counsel failed 
to develop and effectively present evidence to the jury of 
petitioner's intoxication at the time of the offense, 
petitioner ignores the record of the capital murder trial.  
Trial counsel presented evidence that petitioner had ingested 
 
24
alcohol and drugs the night prior to the murder.  Trial 
counsel also argued these facts to the jury.  However, no one, 
including petitioner, knew the exact quantity of substances 
that he had consumed.  Petitioner's own expert witness, Dr. 
Kent McDaniel, testified at the habeas evidentiary hearing 
that he could not opine with any degree of certainty that 
petitioner was intoxicated at the time he killed the victim.  
Dr. McDaniel also stated that he could not opine that 
petitioner was intoxicated to the point where petitioner could 
not form an intent to commit a specific act.  Clearly, trial 
counsel's performance cannot be deemed deficient when 
petitioner could not tell counsel the quantity of drugs and 
alcohol that he had ingested.  And, petitioner could not have 
been prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged deficient 
performance because the evidence of record clearly showed that 
petitioner acted with deliberation in the development and 
implementation of his plan to rob and kill the victim.   
 
We note that petitioner's contention in his brief that 
"[b]oth Dr. Hawk and Dr. McDaniel were of the opinion that 
given information that [petitioner] was significantly 
intoxicated at the time of the offense, this condition would 
have significantly impaired his capacity to conform his 
conduct [to the] requirements of the law" is inconsistent with 
the record before this Court.  Based on that record, neither 
 
25
Dr. Hawk nor Dr. McDaniel knew, or could have known, the 
quantity of alcohol and drugs that petitioner ingested the 
night before the murder.  We hold that petitioner's argument 
that trial counsel made errors affecting the penalty phase of 
the capital murder trial fails to satisfy the performance or 
prejudice standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
H. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel did not thoroughly 
present evidence of his remorse and cooperation.  Petitioner 
states that three weeks before the capital murder trial, 
Special Agent Holt testified at petitioner's sentencing 
hearing in another court regarding an unrelated robbery 
conviction that petitioner "fully cooperated with [police 
officers] in making [his] statement" about Crider's death, and 
that petitioner expressed remorse for his acts.  Additionally, 
petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to question 
Jones before or during the trial regarding petitioner's 
reaction to the crimes.   
 
Petitioner also claims that trial counsel were 
ineffective because even though Susan Poindexter, a youth 
minister who had provided spiritual counseling to petitioner, 
testified at the capital murder trial, trial counsel did not 
speak with her prior to her testimony and did not question her 
about the substance of her contact with petitioner.  
 
26
Petitioner also argues that trial counsel could have used jail 
records containing a notation that petitioner was "currently 
expressing extreme shame, remorse, [and] pessimism" to 
demonstrate that he was remorseful. 
 
Petitioner's assertions are without merit.  Trial counsel 
presented evidence of petitioner's cooperation with police 
officers.  Additionally, trial counsel presented 14 lay 
witnesses at the sentencing hearing, and many of these 
witnesses testified that petitioner was remorseful.  As the 
circuit court pointed out in its report, these witnesses 
described petitioner as "very regretful," "extremely 
remorseful," "quite remorseful," and "very sorry."  The 
circuit court also noted in its report that every member of 
petitioner's family expressed remorse for the victim except 
petitioner himself.  The circuit court stated in its report 
that petitioner 
"undermined his cooperation with police by asserting 
at trial that he had not made the statements 
attributed to him by police officers.  Further, 
[petitioner's] statements to police and to a 
cellmate disparaging his victim clearly undermined 
any arguments that counsel could have made in 
regards to his remorse.  His comments disparaging 
his victim as 'just another nigger dead' belied his 
professions of remorse.  Trial counsel presented at 
sentencing [a black] cellmate who testified that he 
had not detected any racial animosity from 
[petitioner].  Defense counsel did present to the 
jury evidence of [petitioner's] cooperation and 
remorse to the extent that it existed." 
 
 
27
 
Based on these findings of fact by the circuit court 
which are supported by the record, we hold that petitioner's 
contentions are without merit and that petitioner fails to 
satisfy the performance or prejudice standards established in 
Strickland v. Washington. 
I. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel's performance in the 
guilt phase, along with their performance at the penalty 
phase, affected the outcome of the penalty phase of the trial.  
Petitioner claims that trial counsel's "failure to adequately 
cross-examine Trevor Jones [about] his bias and his prior 
inconsistent statements left the jury with the impression that 
[petitioner] was probably not impaired due to drugs and 
alcohol at the time of the offense, significantly diminishing 
the impact of this mitigating factor."  Petitioner also 
asserts that trial counsel's failure to advise him whether he 
should testify and their failure to competently prepare him to 
testify resulted in a very unsympathetic presentation of 
petitioner to the jury.   
 
Petitioner's claims are without merit.  As will be 
discussed in Part IV.K. of this opinion, trial counsel were 
not ineffective in their cross-examination of Jones.  And, as 
we have already stated, there is no evidence in this record 
that petitioner was impaired because of alcohol or drugs at 
 
28
the time of the offense.  Even though petitioner observes that 
one of his trial counsel only spent 53 hours out of court 
prior to trial, petitioner neglects to mention that his other 
trial counsel spent approximately 119 hours in preparation for 
the trial.   
 
Additionally, as we will discuss in Part IV.L. of this 
opinion, trial counsel adequately advised petitioner whether 
he should testify at trial, and trial counsel adequately 
prepared petitioner to testify at trial.  And, as the circuit 
court found, petitioner wanted to testify at trial and tell 
his version of the events related to the crimes.  Thus, we 
hold that petitioner's contentions fail to satisfy either the 
performance or prejudice standards established in Strickland 
v. Washington.   
J. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to present his family's history of drug 
abuse as mitigation evidence in the penalty phase of his 
capital murder trial.  As we have already stated, petitioner 
specifically directed trial counsel to refrain from presenting 
evidence of his "bad childhood."  For example, Baber gave the 
following testimony during the habeas evidentiary hearing:   
 
"Q:  From Brandon Hedrick or from his parents, 
did anyone ever give you a reason to suspect that he 
 
29
had a bad childhood -- that he had been neglected or 
bad childhood? [sic] 
 
 
"A:  Well, he -- no; he told me that he didn't 
want any evidence like that.  I had talked to him 
about -- I mean, we talked about getting a 
mitigation expert.  And I -- you know, we had a 
conversation that indicated that that probably was 
one of the factors that might be developed or words 
to that effect.  And he told me that he didn't want 
to put on any evidence that he came from a bad house 
or, you know, a bad home . . . that he didn't feel 
like he did. . . ." 
 
 
Petitioner also claims that had the jury been presented 
with evidence of his "borderline intelligence" and his 
vulnerability to the influence of others, such evidence would 
have significantly influenced the jury's appraisal of his 
moral culpability.  However, petitioner ignores the evidence 
presented during the trial of the capital murder proceeding.  
Trial counsel presented evidence of petitioner's "borderline 
intelligence" and Jones' strong influence upon petitioner.    
 
Therefore, we hold that petitioner's claims regarding a 
lack of mitigation evidence in the penalty phase fail to 
satisfy the performance or prejudice standards of the test 
established in Strickland v. Washington. 
K. 
 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel's failure to cross-
examine Jones effectively constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Petitioner argues that even though trial counsel 
knew that Jones was biased against petitioner, trial counsel 
 
30
failed to elicit such bias at trial.  Apparently, trial 
counsel's notes indicated that allegedly Jones had assaulted 
petitioner when they were in jail because petitioner had made 
statements to the police officers that implicated Jones in the 
crimes.   
 
Additionally, petitioner asserts that Baber's cross-
examination of Jones was ineffective because when the 
Commonwealth's Attorney concluded his direct examination of 
Jones, Baber, who was supposed to conduct the cross-
examination, purportedly "turned to Harrison and stated, 
'[y]ou do the cross.'"  Harrison refused this request.  
Petitioner claims that Baber, who conducted the cross-
examination, failed to impeach Jones about inconsistent 
statements that Jones had made to the police officers and 
failed to question Jones thoroughly about his felony 
convictions.  Petitioner also contends that trial counsel 
failed to question Jones about offers of leniency that the 
Commonwealth's Attorney had made to Jones in exchange for his 
testimony.   
 
The circuit court concluded in its recommendations to 
this Court, and we agree, that these contentions are without 
merit.  The circuit court accepted trial counsel's testimony 
at the habeas evidentiary hearing that they made a tactical 
decision to emphasize in their cross-examination of Jones his 
 
31
leadership role in the crimes.  "Prior to trial, Baber and 
Harrison discussed the goal of stressing Jones' leadership 
role consistent with Dr. Hawk's recommendation."  Baber 
elicited testimony during his cross-examination of Jones that 
demonstrated that Jones was "the 'brains' and that he directed 
[petitioner] throughout the criminal activity."  Jones 
acknowledged his dominant role in these crimes during the 
cross-examination.  On direct examination, Jones admitted his 
prior felony convictions, and he admitted that he had 
previously lied to police officers.  As the circuit court 
found, Jones "acknowledged the inconsistent statements that he 
had previously given to law enforcement officials."   
 
Even though Harrison was surprised when Baber asked 
Harrison if he would conduct the cross-examination of Jones, 
Baber effectively elicited the information from Jones that 
Harrison and Baber had agreed prior to trial should be 
elicited.  For example, during the cross-examination, Jones 
admitted that his truck was used during the crimes, that he 
knew the victim, and that he suggested the idea of robbing the 
victim.  And, just as important, petitioner failed to 
demonstrate how he was prejudiced as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies of trial counsel during the cross-examination of 
Jones.  Indeed, petitioner, who admitted his guilt on at least 
three occasions including the judicial admission in this 
 
32
Court, cannot satisfy the performance or prejudice 
requirements established in Strickland v. Washington.   
 
We also agree with the circuit court's recommendation 
that trial counsel were not ineffective in failing to question 
Jones about his expectations of receiving a reduced sentence 
for his testimony at petitioner's capital murder trial.  The 
Commonwealth's Attorney at the capital murder trial, Thomas W. 
Lawson, testified during the habeas evidentiary hearing that 
no promise had been made to Jones in return for his testimony.  
The circuit court noted in its report to this Court that "at 
the time Jones entered his pleas of guilty he represented to 
the court that no promises had been made to him" and, in fact, 
the Commonwealth did not recommend a reduced sentence.   
 
We also hold that even though trial counsel did not 
cross-examine Jones about his purported bias against 
petitioner, petitioner failed to demonstrate how he was 
prejudiced, and he failed to establish that there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the capital murder 
trial would have been different had such testimony been 
elicited.  Furthermore, in view of petitioner's judicial 
admission in this Court that he is guilty of the crimes 
charged, he could not have been prejudiced.  Therefore, we 
hold that petitioner fails to satisfy the performance or 
prejudice standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
 
33
L. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have advised 
petitioner that he should not have testified at the capital 
murder trial because of his intellectual limitations and 
emotional immaturity.  Petitioner also alleges that trial 
counsel failed adequately to prepare him for his testimony and 
failed to rehabilitate him after he had performed poorly 
during cross-examination. 
 
Petitioner's contentions are without merit.  The circuit 
court found in its report that even though trial counsel were 
aware of petitioner's intellectual limitations, they knew that 
he was capable of telling his version of the events 
surrounding the crimes.  Trial counsel knew that petitioner 
had given his version of the events to law enforcement 
officers on two occasions, and petitioner repeatedly informed 
trial counsel of his version of the crimes.  And, the circuit 
court found that "trial counsel also knew that [petitioner] 
wanted to testify and tell his version of events."  Harrison 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that petitioner "wanted 
to testify and that he had a story he wanted to tell."  Baber 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that petitioner "wanted 
to testify and that he wanted to tell his story." 
 
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the circuit court 
found that even though trial counsel did not formally rehearse 
 
34
petitioner's testimony with him, trial counsel adequately 
prepared him for trial.  Trial counsel "repeatedly" reviewed 
petitioner's version of events with him, and they questioned 
him about petitioner's inconsistencies in his statements to 
the police officers and to trial counsel.  Trial counsel "made 
sure that [petitioner] was familiar with his statements and 
stressed to [petitioner] how he should present himself."  The 
circuit court stated in its report that "[w]hen cross-
examined, [petitioner] was combative with the prosecutor and 
after being confronted with his inconsistent statements, 
announced that he was not going to answer any further 
questions.  It is certainly doubtful that [petitioner] could 
have been rehabilitated on re-direct examination.  Counsel 
elected to get him off of the stand and use the beneficial 
parts of his testimony in closing arguments." 
 
Based on these findings which are supported by the 
record, we hold that petitioner fails to satisfy the 
performance or prejudice standards established in Strickland 
v. Washington.  Indeed, in view of petitioner's judicial 
admission that he is guilty of the crimes for which he was 
charged, he could not have suffered prejudice as a result of 
trial counsel's purported deficiencies. 
M. 
 
35
 
Petitioner alleges that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to cross-examine law enforcement officers.  
Petitioner asserts that the Commonwealth's Attorney "pressed 
the argument that [petitioner] got the idea that the shooting 
was accidental from Special Agent Holt, who purportedly 
suggested it during interrogation as a ruse to get 
[petitioner] to own up to shooting Lisa Crider.  Trial counsel 
never challenged the prosecutor's rendition of events."  
Continuing, petitioner asserts that Deputy Sheriff Williamson, 
who made contemporaneous handwritten notes during his 
interrogation of petitioner in Nebraska, stated at the 
evidentiary hearing that he did not suggest to petitioner that 
the shooting may have been accidental.  Petitioner also 
asserts that "Williamson also testified that, although Agent 
Holt 'may have said that,' Williamson did not make any 
notation in his contemporaneous notes that the suggestion was 
made."   
 
Petitioner claims that Agent Holt's notes do not suggest 
that petitioner's account of the accidental shooting was a 
suggestion that originated with Holt.  Petitioner contends 
that the detailed contemporaneous written notes of Deputy 
Sheriff Williamson and Agent Holt conflicted with Holt's 
testimony at trial and, therefore, adequate cross-examination 
would have demonstrated this conflict to the jury.  
 
36
Additionally, petitioner asserts that testimony could have 
been elicited from these officers that petitioner had been 
cooperative in their investigation. 
 
The circuit court concluded in its report, and we agree, 
that even though trial counsel could have cross-examined 
Deputy Sheriff Williamson and that trial counsel could have 
cross-examined Special Agent Holt further, the cross-
examination of these police officers would not have led to a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different.  The circuit court noted that at the 
capital murder trial, Williamson demonstrated to the jury the 
manner in which petitioner had shown Williamson how petitioner 
used the shotgun to kill Crider.  Williamson demonstrated the 
shooting by placing the stock of the weapon on his shoulder 
and pointing the barrel directly at the victim.  And, contrary 
to petitioner's contentions, during trial counsel's cross-
examination of him, Special Agent Holt disclosed evidence that 
petitioner had been cooperative with the police.  We also 
observe that trial counsel presented other evidence during the 
capital murder trial that petitioner was cooperative.   
 
We hold that petitioner fails to satisfy the performance 
or prejudice standard established by the test in Strickland v. 
Washington.  And, we note that petitioner fails to demonstrate 
prejudice because, among other things, he admitted his guilt 
 
37
in his statements to the police officers and in his judicial 
admission in this Court.   
N. 
 
Petitioner contends that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to object to the testimony of Edna 
Alexander, the victim's grandmother.  During the guilt phase 
of the capital murder trial, Alexander identified a photograph 
of the victim's son and she described the events that occurred 
the day before the victim was killed.  We disagree with 
petitioner.   
 
As the circuit court found in its report, trial counsel 
made a tactical decision that they would not object to this 
testimony because they believed that the information was 
unlikely to cause any prejudice to petitioner, and the 
Commonwealth's evidence "opened the door," permitting trial 
counsel to cross-examine Alexander about the victim's past 
criminal history.  During trial counsel's cross-examination of 
Alexander, they were able to elicit information that the 
victim lived with Alexander because the victim had been 
incarcerated for drug-related convictions.  Trial counsel also 
cross-examined Alexander about her knowledge that the victim 
"was a prostitute who sold drugs."   
 
We hold that petitioner's claim regarding the testimony 
of the victim's grandmother fails to satisfy the performance 
 
38
or prejudice standards established in Strickland v. 
Washington. 
O. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to object to the Commonwealth's Attorney's 
closing argument.  During closing argument, trial counsel 
argued that petitioner was guilty only of manslaughter and 
suggested that the victim was killed accidentally.  The 
Commonwealth's Attorney stated in rebuttal: 
 
"This case is not about negligent manslaughter, 
as [petitioner's attorney] says, and the defendant 
is [not] not guilty.  Not guilty means he gets to 
walk right out that door.  That means he gets to 
take Trevor's shotgun with him.  That's not what 
this case is about.  It's about capital murder." 
 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that trial counsel should 
have objected to this argument, petitioner failed to 
demonstrate prejudice.  There is simply no reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.  As the circuit court aptly concluded, "[t]he jury 
already knew that [petitioner] had been convicted in other 
jurisdictions and had received a lengthy prison sentence.  
[The jury] could not have been misled by this statement."  In 
short, the jury knew that in view of petitioner's other 
convictions, he would not have been released from 
incarceration in the event the jury failed to convict him of 
 
39
capital murder.  Therefore, we hold that petitioner fails to 
satisfy the prejudice standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington.   
P. 
 
Petitioner, in a very conclusional argument, asserts that 
trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to object 
to venue.  Petitioner says that "[t]he record in this case 
clearly demonstrated that venue was not proved on the 
substantive charges of forcible sodomy and rape, and that 
trial counsel neglectfully failed to object to the venue of 
those charges."  
 
Petitioner's contention is without merit.  As the circuit 
court stated in its report, "[i]t is not disputed that the 
murder of Lisa Crider occurred in Appomattox County at the 
conclusion of the criminal enterprise.  Capital murder is a 
distinct species of homicide and venue was proper for all of 
the capital murder indictments in Appomattox County, 
regardless of where the underlying offenses occurred."  See 
Code §§ 19.2-244 and -247.  Additionally, robbery is a 
continuing offense and the crime was not completed until the 
victim was murdered and venue for that offense was proper in 
Appomattox.  See Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 855-56, 
284 S.E.2d 844, 851 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982); 
accord Linwood Earl Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532, 543-
 
40
44, 273 S.E.2d 48, 55-56 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 
(1981).  We hold that petitioner's contention regarding a 
purported failure to object to venue does not satisfy the 
performance or prejudice standards established in Strickland 
v. Washington. 
Q. 
 
Petitioner alleges that trial counsel were ineffective 
because defense counsel failed to make a motion for a change 
of venue when members of the venire had been exposed to 
coverage about the case in the media.  Petitioner states that 
he "was charged in a rural county with the brutal rape, 
sodomy, abduction, robbery, and murder of a young mother on 
Mother's Day" and that articles with detailed descriptions of 
the facts and circumstances of the case appeared in local 
newspapers.  The petitioner claims that these articles 
identified him as a suspect, described the details of the 
crimes, and included a statement that he had confessed to the 
murder. 
 
Petitioner's contentions are without merit.  As the 
circuit court concluded in its report, "[p]etitioner has 
collected newspaper articles from at least three different 
newspapers.  Over half of the articles describe the trial and 
subsequent events.  These articles could not have influenced 
the jury.  The majority of the remaining articles appear to be 
 
41
routine and accurate coverage of events.  The jurors who were 
seated in the [capital murder trial] all assured the trial 
court that they could set aside any information that they had 
acquired about the case and base their decisions solely on the 
basis of the evidence presented.  Three jurors who indicated a 
fixed opinion as to [petitioner's] guilt were excused." 
 
Based upon the record before this Court, trial counsel 
had no legitimate basis to file a motion for a change of venue 
based on the venire members' exposure to the media coverage.  
Additionally, petitioner failed to demonstrate how he could 
have been prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged deficient 
performance.  Therefore, we hold that petitioner fails to 
satisfy the performance or prejudice standards established in 
Strickland v. Washington. 
R. 
 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to conduct an adequate voir dire of the 
jury.  Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to ask the 
members of the venire what they had read or heard about 
petitioner's crimes and what effect this information may have 
had on their abilities to serve as jurors.  Petitioner argues 
that even though juror Shirley Baker testified that "if 
someone killed someone else they should accept the same," 
 
42
trial counsel failed to ask questions that may have shown that 
she was unable to consider any penalty other than death. 
 
Petitioner also claims that juror Melanie Burrell 
indicated that she believed he was guilty before she heard any 
evidence, but that she later changed her mind to state that 
she agreed that what she had heard about the case would not 
affect her judgment.  Petitioner contends that trial counsel 
were ineffective because they failed to ask her about the 
information to which she had been exposed and how that 
information might affect her at the penalty phase of the 
trial.  Petitioner claims that jurors Bonnie Burks and Thomas 
Franklin stated that they had fixed opinions of petitioner's 
guilt.  Petitioner claims that jurors Raymond Coggins and 
Alice Dill had demonstrated strong biases in favor of the 
death penalty, and that trial counsel failed to scrutinize 
those biases.  Petitioner claims that juror Dennis C. Haley 
stated that he "would not impose the death penalty right off," 
and trial counsel failed to challenge his statement.  
Petitioner contends that trial counsel were ineffective in 
their failure to scrutinize these jurors in greater detail or 
seek their removal from the venire for cause. 
 
We disagree with petitioner's contentions.  The record of 
the capital murder trial discloses that trial counsel 
conducted voir dire of prospective jurors, and that trial 
 
43
counsel were successful in removing certain jurors for cause.  
Even though juror Baker stated that "if someone killed someone 
else they should accept the same," a review of the trial 
transcript indicates that she also stated, "I would be willing 
to listen to all the evidence before deciding."  She said, in 
response to a question by trial counsel, that she would 
consider both aggravating factors and mitigating factors and 
"the whole circumstance" in deciding whether to impose a 
penalty of life imprisonment or the death penalty.  Baker also 
stated, in response to a question from trial counsel, that she 
had not formed any opinions or conclusions that might affect 
her judgment based upon the information she had acquired from 
the media.  She said that she would listen to both sides of 
the case and decide the case based upon the evidence presented 
in the courtroom. 
 
Juror Burrell initially indicated that she had formed an 
opinion based upon what she had read in the newspaper, but she 
unequivocally stated that she could set that opinion aside and 
that she did not have a fixed opinion.  When trial counsel 
specifically asked her if she felt that what she had heard 
about the case would affect her judgment, Burrell responded 
"no."  When trial counsel asked her if she had any 
predisposition towards the imposition of the death penalty, 
 
44
Burrell stated that she did not and that she could consider an 
alternative punishment of life in prison. 
 
Even though petitioner claims that trial counsel failed 
to make any inquiry of juror Burks, the circuit court 
concluded, and we agree, that the record of the capital murder 
trial indicates otherwise.  Trial counsel specifically asked 
juror Burks whether "what you already heard about this case is 
going to affect your judgment about what you are going to hear 
here?  Are you going to have some notion of what you think of 
it already?"  She responded no to these questions. 
 
Juror Franklin stated that even though he had formed some 
opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of petitioner, he 
could set whatever impression or opinion he had formed aside 
and render a verdict based solely on the evidence that he 
would hear at trial.  He stated that he had no bias or 
prejudice against either the Commonwealth or petitioner. 
 
Juror Coggins initially indicated his belief that the 
Bible supports the death penalty and that if he found 
petitioner guilty he would impose a sentence of death.  After 
further questioning, Coggins unequivocally stated that he 
could consider a lesser penalty.  Juror Dill unequivocally 
stated that she would listen to all the evidence before she 
reached a decision about petitioner's guilt and that she did 
not remember the details about the articles she had read in 
 
45
the newspapers.  She stated that she had not formed any pre-
conceived ideas about the capital murder trial or about 
petitioner's guilt or innocence. 
 
Contrary to petitioner's contention, trial counsel did 
conduct voir dire questions of juror Haley after he stated 
that he "would not impose the death penalty right off."  
According to the record of the capital murder trial, counsel 
asked Haley whether he was willing to listen to the evidence 
and at the conclusion of the trial, if petitioner were found 
guilty, whether Haley would consider life imprisonment as well 
as the death penalty, and Haley responded, "yes."  Trial 
counsel further asked Haley if he was predisposed to one 
punishment over another, and Haley responded, "no." 
 
We hold that petitioner's arguments regarding voir dire 
fail to satisfy the performance or prejudice standards 
established in Strickland v. Washington.   
S. 
 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to coherently 
advise him regarding a statement that he made to police 
officers.  In May 1997, after petitioner's arrest, he was 
interviewed in Nebraska by Deputy Sheriff Williamson and 
Special Agent Holt.  Trial counsel were appointed after that 
statement was made.  Subsequently, Jones and his attorney met 
with Deputy Sheriff Williamson and Agent Holt and gave a 
 
46
voluntary statement concerning Crider's murder.  Petitioner, 
who was concerned about what information Jones may have given 
the police officers about the crimes, desired to give a second 
statement to the police officers.  Petitioner contacted his 
attorneys and told them that he intended to make another 
statement to the police officers.  According to petitioner, 
one of his trial counsel, Baber, informed petitioner that if 
petitioner made a second statement to the police officers, the 
statement could not hurt him and might help him.  Harrison, 
petitioner's other trial counsel, stated that he told 
petitioner that he should not make a second statement. 
 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to obtain 
information that would have permitted them to render competent 
advice to him.  Petitioner says that he made the second 
statement to the police officers before trial counsel had the 
benefit of a preliminary hearing, that trial counsel did not 
go to the Commonwealth's Attorney's office to examine its 
files, that trial counsel had not determined or assessed the 
mental health and intellectual and emotional capacities of 
petitioner, and that trial counsel did not formulate "ground 
rules" for the statement with the police officers. 
 
The circuit court in its report concluded that 
petitioner's claims are without merit, and we agree.  
Harrison, one of petitioner's trial counsel, testified at the 
 
47
evidentiary hearing that when he told petitioner that it was 
"a bad idea to give the statement," petitioner responded that 
"he was making the statement" with or without counsel. 
Harrison also testified that petitioner "wasn't going to allow 
[trial counsel] to stop the statement."  The circuit court 
concluded in its report that "[t]rial counsel cannot be 
faulted for being present for [petitioner's] statement after 
he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right and 
submitted to questions by the police." 
 
Petitioner, who made a conscious decision to speak with 
police officers, cannot complain in a habeas corpus petition 
that his trial counsel did not prevent him from making the 
statement, even though one of his counsel tried to do so.  We 
hold that petitioner's claim that trial counsel inadequately 
advised him regarding his statement to police officers fails 
to satisfy the performance or the prejudice standards 
established in Strickland v. Washington. 
T. 
 
Petitioner alleges that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to request a jury instruction that would 
have informed the jury that it must accept the testimony of an 
accomplice with great caution.  We disagree. 
 
Trial counsel were not required to request a cautionary 
accomplice instruction.  "Cautionary accomplice instructions 
 
48
. . . deal with a lack of evidence, evidence of a 
corroborative nature.  The test, therefore, in determining 
whether a cautionary instruction should be granted becomes 
this:  is corroborative evidence lacking?  If it is, the 
instruction should be granted; if it is not lacking, the 
instruction should be refused. . . ."  Smith v. Commonwealth, 
218 Va. 455, 456, 237 S.E.2d 776, 777 (1977) (quoting Dillard 
v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 820, 822, 224 S.E.2d 137, 139 
(1976)). 
 
As the circuit court pointed out in its report, 
corroborative evidence was not lacking at petitioner's capital 
murder trial.  Petitioner incorrectly asserts that Jones was 
the Commonwealth's only source of evidence that petitioner had 
raped Crider.  Petitioner stated to the police officers that 
he had consensual sexual intercourse with Crider at the 
apartment in Lynchburg, and he used a condom.  However, 
seminal fluid that was consistent with petitioner's DNA type 
and inconsistent with the DNA type of Jones was detected in 
the victim's vaginal and anal areas.  Petitioner admitted to 
the police officers that it was possible that he had committed 
acts of sodomy upon the victim.  Additionally, petitioner 
failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
alleged deficient performance, particularly in light of the 
judicial admission he made to this Court that he is guilty of 
 
49
the charged crimes, which includes the crimes of rape and 
sodomy.  Furthermore, petitioner does not assert that 
corroboration was necessary to support his conviction of 
capital murder during the commission of robbery.  We hold that 
petitioner fails to satisfy the performance or prejudice 
standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
U. 
 
Petitioner contends that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to request a jury instruction directing 
the jury that it must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable 
doubt that petitioner forced Crider to commit either oral 
sodomy, anal sodomy, or both before finding him guilty of 
forcible sodomy or capital murder in the commission of a 
forcible sodomy.  Continuing, petitioner states that "[a] 
conviction for forcible sodomy requires proof that the accused 
engaged in 'cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or anal 
intercourse with a complaining witness,' by force."  
Petitioner states that the jury instructions in this case 
instructed the jury that it could convict petitioner if the 
jury found that "the penis of the defendant penetrated into 
the mouth or the anus of Lisa Yvonne Crider who was not then 
the defendant's spouse" and that the crime was against her 
will and by force, threat, or intimidation.  Finally, 
petitioner claims that this instruction was constitutionally 
 
50
defective because it permitted the jury to make two alternate 
findings to prove the element of sodomy – anal penetration or 
oral penetration – and did not require the jury to find 
unanimously that either act had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
We need not, and do not, decide whether trial counsel 
were required to request such jury instruction because even if 
counsel were required to do so, this petitioner cannot 
demonstrate any prejudice.  Petitioner was convicted of 
capital murder in the commission of robbery, capital murder in 
the commission of forcible sodomy, and capital murder in the 
commission of a rape.  Even if petitioner prevailed on his 
claim regarding the lack of unanimity for the forcible sodomy 
instruction, petitioner's convictions for capital murder in 
the commission of robbery and capital murder in the commission 
of a rape would not be affected.  These convictions, which 
support the imposition of the death penalty, remain valid and 
enforceable.  Therefore, we hold that petitioner's arguments 
fail to satisfy the prejudice requirement established in 
Strickland v. Washington. 
V. 
 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to request a jury instruction that 
required that the jury unanimously agree upon "the vileness 
 
51
aggravating circumstance."  Petitioner claims that the jury 
was required to agree unanimously whether petitioner possessed 
depravity of mind, whether petitioner committed an aggravated 
battery upon the victim, or whether petitioner committed acts 
of torture upon the victim.  Petitioner claims that trial 
counsel were ineffective because the vileness instruction that 
was submitted to the jury created a risk that petitioner was 
sentenced to death based upon the vileness predicate even 
though some members of the jury may have concluded that his 
conduct demonstrated a depravity of mind, other jurors may 
have concluded that he committed an aggravated battery, and 
yet other jurors may have believed that he committed acts of 
torture upon the victim.  Petitioner says that his trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to request a jury 
instruction which remedied this so-called constitutional 
defect. 
 
We hold that petitioner fails to satisfy the prejudice 
standard of the two-part test in Strickland v. Washington.  At 
the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the jury found 
that petitioner represented a continuing serious threat to 
society and that his offense was outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, 
depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim.  
Petitioner does not challenge the jury's finding that he 
 
52
presents a continuing threat to society, and this finding 
alone is sufficient to support the judgment imposing the 
sentence of death. 
W. 
 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to preserve 
and argue meritorious issues on appeal.  Petitioner failed to 
present any evidence during the evidentiary hearing on this 
issue.  We hold that in view of petitioner's failure to 
present any evidence to support this claim, he fails to 
satisfy the performance or prejudice standard established in 
Strickland v. Washington. 
V. 
A. 
 
Petitioner claims that the circuit court erred because it 
refused to permit his habeas corpus counsel to inspect the 
Commonwealth's Attorney's files.  We disagree.  This Court, 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C)(2), entered an order directing 
the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing limited to 
the issues raised in Claim I of the habeas corpus petition 
alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness.  Petitioner's 
allegations regarding Claim I do not raise any issue 
concerning the Commonwealth's Attorney's files or trial 
counsel's access to information in those files.  Petitioner is 
not allowed to expand the scope of this Court's order.  
 
53
Additionally, a habeas corpus petitioner is not allowed to 
embark upon a "fishing expedition" of the Commonwealth's 
Attorney's files.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court 
properly denied habeas counsel's request to examine the 
Commonwealth's Attorney's files. 
B. 
 
Contrary to petitioner's contentions, we hold that the 
circuit court did make proper findings of fact, and the 
circuit court resolved those factual disputes as required by 
Code § 8.01-654(C)(3) and this Court's order. 
C. 
 
Petitioner, in his amended petition for habeas corpus, 
raised two claims that he failed to assert in petitioner's 
opening brief.  Specifically, petitioner alleged in his 
amended petition for habeas corpus that the Commonwealth 
failed to disclose favorable information to him in violation 
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, and 
petitioner argued that "[j]urors failed to consider evidence 
presented at sentencing prior to determining to impose the 
death penalty and relied on prayer and religious teachings 
during deliberations to reach their verdict rather than the 
instructions of the court."  We hold that these claims are 
procedurally defaulted because the petitioner failed to 
discuss these claims in his opening brief. 
 
54
VI. 
 
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that all 
petitioner's claims are without merit, and we will dismiss the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Petition dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring. 
 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion because I 
conclude that the petitioner, Brandon Wayne Hedrick, failed to 
establish the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for 
judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
collateral attack on a judgment of conviction.  To satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong, the petitioner had to “show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 694.  The petitioner did not do so with 
regard to any of his claims.  When, as in this case, “it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be 
followed.”  Id. at 697; accord Strickler v. Murray, 249 Va. 
120, 128, 452 S.E.2d 648, 652 (1995).  Thus, I respectfully 
concur. 
 
55
 
 
56