Title: Bank of Killdeer v. Fettig
Citation: 129 N.W.2d 365
Docket Number: 8127
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1964

129 N.W.2d 365 (1964) BANK OF KILLDEER, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Angeline FETTIG, a/k/a Mrs. Phil Fettig, individually and as administratrix of the Estate of Phil Fettig, deceased, Defendant and Respondent, and Jack Fettig, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8127. Supreme Court of North Dakota. July 1, 1964. *366 Floyd B. Sperry, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. Greenwood &amp; Swanson, Dickinson, for plaintiff and respondent. Mackoff, Kellogg, Muggli &amp; Kirby, Dickinson, and Marshall T. Bergerud, Killdeer, for defendant and respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. This is an appeal by the defendant Jack Fettig from a judgment entered on the order of the District Court of Dunn County in favor of the plaintiff. A trial de novo is demanded. The plaintiff, Bank of Killdeer, initiated this action to foreclose a chattel mortgage executed by Phil Fettig, now deceased, and the defendant Angeline Fettig to secure a promissory note dated May 21, 1959, in the sum of $13,000.00, bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum, due and payable December 1, 1959, but extended by renewal to November 1, 1960. On the date of the complaint, May 14, 1962, there remained unpaid on the note the sum of $3,713.80 plus $95.31 in interest. A separate answer was filed by Angeline Fettig, as an individual and as administratrix of the estate of Phil Fettig, deceased. She has appealed neither as an individual nor as administratrix. The defendant Jack Fettig filed a separate answer admitting the execution of the note, the default, and the balance due thereon but alleging that no action could be brought to foreclose the chattel mortgage which had been given to secure the payment of the note, for the reason that the decedent, Phil Fettig, and Angeline Fettig had executed and delivered to the plaintiff at the time of the execution of the chattel mortgage a real estate mortgage securing said note, and that therefore the plaintiff was "estopped" under Section 32-1907 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, as contained in the 1957 Supplement to the Code, from foreclosing the chattel mortgage. A stipulation in writing by the parties acknowledged in effect the material allegations of the complaint. It provided that the chattel mortgage sought to be foreclosed and a real estate mortgage not the subject of this foreclosure action were both given on the same date to secure the payment of the same note and that the sole issue was whether Section 32-1907 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 "estopped" the plaintiff from foreclosing the chattel mortgage. On submission of this matter the trial court found that the plaintiff was not prevented from foreclosing the chattel mortgage and ordered judgment accordingly. The appeal is taken from the judgment entered on this order. On the basis of the stipulation the only issue in this court is whether Section 32-1907 of the North Dakota Revised Code of *367 1943, as amended in 1951 and contained in the 1957 Supplement to the Code, prohibited the plaintiff from foreclosing a chattel mortgage where a real estate mortgage was also given to secure the payment of the same note and no action or proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage had been commenced. Said section of the Code is now contained in Section 32-19-07 of the North Dakota Century Code and reads as follows: As a study of the legislative journals yields little in our efforts to determine the intent of the Legislature, we must rely wholly on the words of the statute for its meaning. The original source of the statute was Senate Bill 72 of the Twenty-fifth Session of the Legislative Assembly of North Dakota. The intent of the bill was expressed in Section 3 thereof, as follows: This statute was amended in 1951 by House Bill 541 of the Thirty-second Session of the Legislative Assembly of North Dakota to permit a deficiency judgment upon a note, mortgage, or contract given after July 1, 1951, to secure the payment of money loaned upon real estate or to secure the purchase price of real estate as provided in the bill. Neither as originally enacted nor as amended does the statute relate in any manner to the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, nor does it prohibit a person from using either his personal property or his real property or both as security for a loan. This being so, the holder of the note in the instant case, which is secured by both a chattel mortgage and a real estate mortgage, is entitled to foreclose the chattel mortgage without first foreclosing the real estate mortgage and without reference to it. As the stipulation entered into by all parties hereto restricts the issue before the district court solely to the question of whether Section 32-1907 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, as amended, and which is now contained in Section 32-19-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, prohibits the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage in this case, we need not consider the other arguments of the appellant as contained in his specifications of error and asserted for the first time in this court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. MORRIS, C. J., and TEIGEN and BURKE, JJ., concur. STRUTZ, J., did not participate.