Title: Satchell v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 396, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AN’DESHIA SATCHELL, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 396, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1711001757  
§                   1711001790 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: November 21, 2018 
Decided: 
December 20, 2018 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In January 2018, the appellant, An’Deshia Satchell, was indicted on 
charges of Robbery Second Degree, Robbery First Degree, Assault Second Degree, 
Aggravated Menacing, and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During 
Commission of a Felony. The charges arose from two separate incidents that 
occurred on November 1, 2017. On May 23, 2018, Satchell pleaded guilty to 
Robbery First Degree and Robbery Second Degree. In exchange for Satchell’s guilty 
plea, the State entered a nolle prossequi on the other charges.  
 
2 
(2) 
On July 13, 2018, following a presentence investigation, the Superior 
Court sentenced Satchell as a habitual offender for Robbery Second Degree, 
imposing a sentence of fifteen years at Level 5 incarceration, with credit for 257 
days previously served. For the charge of Robbery First Degree, the Superior Court 
sentenced Satchell to fifteen years at Level 5 incarceration, with decreasing levels 
of supervision beginning after serving five years at Level 5. This is Satchell’s direct 
appeal. 
(3) 
Satchell’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Satchell’s counsel asserts that, based upon a complete 
and careful review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Counsel 
states that he informed Satchell of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided her 
with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief. Counsel also 
informed Satchell of her right to supplement counsel’s presentation. Satchell 
responded with a written submission raising an issue concerning her sentencing as a 
habitual offender. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues that 
the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.  
(4) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 
 
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a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.1 This 
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the 
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”2 
(5) 
In her written submission, Satchell challenges her sentencing as a 
habitual offender. She claims that her plea agreement does not reflect that she would 
be sentenced as a habitual offender.  
(6) 
The record makes clear that Satchell was aware that she faced a 
potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment as a habitual offender. The plea 
agreement that Satchell signed indicates that Satchell’s potential sentence for 
Robbery Second Degree was “5 yrs to life,” as “HO § 4214(a).” Even if Satchell 
may not have known from reading the plea agreement form alone that “HO § 
4214(a)” referred to habitual offender status under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the plea 
agreement made clear that she faced a potential maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment. And Satchell acknowledges on appeal that she was aware of the issue 
“through conversations.” The truth-in-sentencing form that Satchell signed similarly 
indicates that Satchell’s maximum potential penalty was life imprisonment.  
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738, 744 (1967).  
2 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81. 
 
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(7) 
The transcript of the plea proceeding confirms that Satchell’s counsel 
stated that he had explained to Satchell that the State would be seeking sentencing 
as a habitual offender; recited her prior convictions and that he had reviewed those 
convictions with Satchell; stated that she was eligible for habitual offender 
sentencing; and stated that she would be subject to a sentence of “five to life.” The 
Superior Court asked Satchell if she understood that, “because of what is your likely 
status,” she “face[d] a sentence up to life in jail,” to which Satchell responded, 
“Yes.”  
(8) 
During Satchell’s sentencing hearing, Satchell’s counsel conceded that 
Satchell was a habitual offender and remarked that she could receive a life sentence. 
The Superior Court asked Satchell’s counsel whether he had any objections to the 
State’s habitual offender motion. Her counsel stated that he did not, noting that the 
prior convictions appeared to satisfy the statutory requirements for habitual offender 
status. 
(9) 
Finally, even if Satchell had disputed her habitual offender status when 
she entered into the plea agreement—which she did not—the Superior Court would 
not have erred by sentencing her as a habitual offender. Satchell’s prior convictions 
 
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clearly satisfy the statutory requirements for habitual offender status under § 
4214(a).3 
(10) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and concludes that 
Satchell’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue. We also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the 
record and the law and properly determined that Satchell could not raise a 
meritorious claim on appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.  
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 2015 WL 4606521 (Del. July 30, 2015) (affirming sentencing as habitual 
offender where the defendant disputed habitual offender status on plea agreement form but did not 
oppose the later-filed habitual offender motion and did not show on appeal that his prior 
convictions did not support his designation as a habitual offender); Alley v. State, 2015 WL 
4511348 (Del. July 24, 2015) (affirming sentencing as habitual offender where defense counsel 
stated at the guilty plea hearing that the defendant intended to challenge the State’s motion to seek 
habitual offender sentencing, defense counsel stated at the sentencing hearing that there was no 
good faith basis to oppose the habitual offender motion, and the defendant had the required number 
of prior felony convictions to be declared a habitual offender).