Title: Harrington v. Harrington
Citation: 210 S.E.2d 190, 286 N.C. 260
Docket Number: 102
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 1974

210 S.E.2d 190 (1974)
286 N.C. 260
Jane Pritchett HARRINGTON
v.
George Faulkner HARRINGTON.
No. 102.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
December 11, 1974.
*191 Joe T. Millsaps, Charlotte, for defendant-appellant.
Farris, Mallard &amp; Underwood by E. Lynwood Mallard, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.
MOORE, Justice.
Defendant first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of the District Court striking his defenses of adultery and willful abandonment.
G.S. § 50-6 provides in part:
The statute contains no requirement that separation of the parties be voluntary. Relative fault of the parties, therefore, is said to be irrelevant in many jurisdictions that have statutes similar to the one quoted above. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 353 (1968); 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 4.47 (2d ed. 1945); Gardner v. Gardner, 250 Ala. 251, 34 So. 2d 157 (1948); Young v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944); Cotton v. Cotton, 306 Ky. 826, 209 S.W.2d 474 (1948). However, North Carolina does not accept this reasoning, and our cases hold that the affirmative defenses of abandonment and adultery can defeat an action for divorce based on separation. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Sears v. Sears, 253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943).
As stated in Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969):
Chief Justice Stacy aptly stated the reasoning behind the North Carolina rule in Byers v. Byers, supra:
The Court of Appeals cited Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962), as support for its holding that adultery is no longer a defense to an action for divorce based on separation. It is true that based upon the evidence in that case there is dictum to the effect that in a divorce action based on two years' separation the only defense recognized by our decisions is that the separation was caused by the act of the husband in willfully abandoning her. However, as Professor Lee says, this is "clearly a dictum statement." 1 Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 88, n. 74 (1974 Supp.). Such statement was not intended to overrule the well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that adultery, as well as abandonment, is a recriminatory defense that will defeat an action for divorce based on separation. Defendant's first assignment of error is sustained.
Defendant next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's conclusion that a custody proceeding constitutes a judicial separation such as will legalize the separation of the parties and deprive the defendant of his recriminatory defenses.
Either an action for a divorce a mensa et thoro, an action for alimony without divorce under former G.S. § 5016, or a valid separation agreement may constitute a legalized separation which thereafter will permit either of the parties to obtain an absolute divorce on the ground of one year's separation. Rouse v. Rouse, 258 N.C. 520, 128 S.E.2d 865 (1963); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943).
A divorce from bed and board is a judicial separationthat is, an authorized separation of the husband and wife. The effect of a judgment under former G.S. § 50-16 is the same. Rouse v. Rouse, supra. A valid separation agreement legalizes their *193 separation from and after the date thereof. Richardson v. Richardson, supra. In the present case, however, the previous action in the District Court was for custody of the children only. The district judge found that the wife had abandoned her husband but nevertheless gave the wife the custody and ordered support payments for the children. The Court of Appeals in that action modified the custody and support order but otherwise affirmed. Abandonment was not the issue in the custody hearing. The welfare or best interests of the children in light of all the circumstances was the paramount consideration to guide the court in awarding custody of the minor children. G.S. § 50-13.2; 3 Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 224 (3d ed. 1963); Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967).
We hold that a finding of abandonment by the wife in the custody proceedingwhere abandonment was not the real issue involveddoes not constitute a judicial separation that would deprive the innocent husband of the use of either abandonment or adultery as a defense in a divorce action instituted by the wife based on one year's separation. As stated by Chief Justice Stacy in Byers v. Byers, supra: ". . . [I]t is not to be supposed the General Assembly intended to authorize one spouse willfully or wrongfully to abandon the other for a period of two years [now one year] and then reward the faithless spouse a divorce for the wrong committed, in the face of a plea in bar based on such wrong." Defendant's second assignment of error is sustained.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with direction to remand to the District Court of Mecklenburg for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.