Title: State v. Baker
Citation: 100 Ariz. 339, 414 P.2d 153
Docket Number: 1616
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 1966

100 Ariz. 339 (1966) 414 P.2d 153 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William BAKER, Appellant. No. 1616. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. May 11, 1966. *340 Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., and Gary K. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert K. Corbin, Maricopa County Atty., for appellee. Wade Church, Phoenix, for appellant. BERNSTEIN, Vice Chief Justice. Appellant, hereinafter called defendant, appeals from a conviction of robbery entered by the Superior Court of Maricopa County sitting with a jury. We must view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a manner which most favorably supports the verdict. State v. Galbreath, 97 Ariz. 361, 400 P.2d 842. Accordingly, the facts are as follows. During the early morning hours of October 10, 1964, defendant and two others decided to go to a restaurant in Scottsdale. They saw the complaining witness Ritchie walking along Indian School Road. They stopped the automobile and defendant asked Ritchie if he had any money. Ritchie said no and defendant asked him if he could have all the money he found on him. Ritchie again replied in the negative whereupon defendant unsuccessfully tried to force Ritchie into the automobile. Defendant and his friends drove away, then returned and persuaded Ritchie to voluntarily get into the car on the pretext of taking him where he wanted to go. After they began moving, defendant ordered Ritchie to empty his pockets and slapped him several times when he refused to comply. Ritchie then turned over his wallet, cigarette lighter, change, keys and jacket to defendant and eventually escaped. A complaint was filed, preliminary examination held and defendant was convicted of robbery. This appeal followed. Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to allow cross examination of the prosecuting witness Ritchie as to "whether anyone tried to *341 induce him to bring these charges, or to testify." The ruling was as follows: Defense counsel did not make an offer of proof nor did he ask for the particular grounds supporting the objection. Defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling because the question was later answered by Ritchie in response to defense counsel's examination: Further, we note there was testimony before the jury impeaching Ritchie. Co-defendant Boyd testified that he, defendant and Ritchie had coffee together a short time after the preliminary examination. Boyd testified that part of the conversation went as follows: It is clear that defendant was not denied his right to cross examine the complaining witness, Ritchie, on the issue of whether he was pressured into filing the complaint. *342 Defendant next urges that the court erred in rereading a portion of the instructions to the jury on "aiding and abetting" and then proceeding to comment thereon by quoting from a decision of this court. The pertinent part of the transcript reads: Defendant admits that neither the rereading of an instruction nor quoting from a case necessarily results in error. Cf. State v. George, 95 Ariz. 366, 390 P.2d 899; Hightower v. State of Arizona, 62 Ariz. 351, 158 P.2d 156; Rules 281, 282, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. The case was tried on the theory that defendant committed the robbery and that codefendant Boyd was an aider and abettor. *343 From the transcript quoted above, it is obvious that the jury had already decided the question of defendant's guilt. Hence, defendant could not have been prejudiced when the trial court reread the instruction and quoted from a decision of this court probably State v. Roberts, 85 Ariz. 252, 336 P.2d 151 which was elaborated upon in State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 405 P.2d 885. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Counsel submitted an affidavit of defendant's father which stated that the father had not been asked to be a witness at his son's trial. The affidavit then states that the father met the complaining witness, Ritchie, a few days after the complaint was filed at which time Ritchie said his parents and the police made him bring the charge, that he wanted to drop it and that he "had used the robbery storey (sic) as an excuse for coming home late on the night of (sic) the alleged robbery occurred." We are not told why the father was not called as a witness at the trial. Generally, a new trial will not be granted to permit the introduction of testimony of a witness whose identity was known by the moving party at the time of the original trial. State v. Schroeder, 100 Ariz. 21, 409 P.2d 725; Rule 310.3 Rules of Criminal Procedure 17 A.R.S. The testimony of the father could be used to impeach Ritchie at a new trial only if he repeated the testimony he gave at the first trial. The impeaching nature of the father's testimony would be to establish a prior but unsworn inconsistent statement of Ritchie and show that his version of the facts could not be believed. Such evidence would be cumulative and will not ordinarily justify a new trial. State v. Villavicencio, 95 Ariz. 199, 388 P.2d 245. There are two decisions factually similar to the case before us. In Indian Fred v. State, 36 Ariz. 48, 282 P. 930 and State of Arizona v. Peters, 60 Ariz. 102, 131 P.2d 814 new trial motions on the ground of newly discovered evidence were denied where the evidence was in the form of affidavits stating that state witnesses had given statements prior to trial which were inconsistent with their testimony at trial. In the case before us, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. Finally, defendant contends the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. We have carefully examined the record and find that the contention is without merit. Affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and UDALL, LOCKWOOD and McFARLAND, JJ., concurring.