Title: People v. Ladd
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85265
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1999

People v. Ladd (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 85265-Agenda 8-November 
1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The defendant, Leroy Ladd, was convicted of 
armed violence and aggravated battery after a jury trial in the circuit court of 
St. Clair County. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent 
sentences of 12 years' imprisonment on the armed violence conviction and 4 
years' imprisonment on the aggravated battery conviction. The appellate court 
reversed the defendant's convictions, concluding that the defendant had been 
denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. 294 Ill. App. 3d 928. We allowed 
the State's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now 
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
The following chronology is relevant to this 
appeal. The defendant was taken into custody on April 9, 1995, and he 
continuously remained in custody through the time of trial. Defense counsel 
moved to dismiss the charges against the defendant on June 26, 1995. The 
defendant filed a pro se motion seeking the same relief the next day. 
Both motions alleged that the defendant was in custody for more than 30 days 
before a grand jury indicted him, in violation of section 109-3.1 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/109-3.1 (West 1996)). At a status 
appearance on June 29, a hearing on the motions was scheduled for July 12, 1995. 
Nothing occurred on that date, however, and the motions were not disposed of 
until October 16, 1995, when the court denied them.
While the dismissal motions were pending, the 
defendant filed, on August 14, 1995, a pro se motion seeking his 
discharge under the speedy-trial statute, section 103-5(a) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1996)). Defense counsel 
filed a similar motion for discharge a day later, on August 15. The motions 
alleged that the defendant had by then been in custody for more than 120 days, 
in violation of the speedy-trial statute. The judge heard arguments on the 
motions on August 15, and the judge allowed the defense until August 25 to 
present additional authority in support of the defendant's position. The judge 
denied the speedy-trial motions on September 15, 1995. In a written order, the 
judge explained that the motions to dismiss filed by the defense in June tolled 
the speedy-trial clock and that the period would remain suspended until the 
motions were eventually disposed of. As we have noted, the judge denied the 
motions to dismiss the charges on October 16, 1995. The defendant's trial began 
the next day, on October 17. A jury found the defendant guilty of armed violence 
and aggravated battery but not guilty of attempted murder. The defendant 
received concurrent sentences of 12 years' and 4 years' imprisonment for the two 
convictions.
The defendant appealed, and the appellate court 
concluded that the defendant's speedy-trial rights had been violated. 294 Ill. 
App. 3d 928. The appellate court disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion 
that the speedy-trial clock remained tolled while the defendant's dismissal 
motions were pending. The appellate court believed that the speedy-trial period 
resumed running after the July 12 hearing date, even though the motions remained 
unresolved at that time. The appellate court also determined that the 
defendant's motions for discharge under the speedy-trial statute, though they 
were premature when they were filed, ripened into meritorious ones while the 
trial judge had them under advisement. The appellate court therefore held that 
the defendant was entitled to discharge on speedy-trial grounds. We allowed the 
State's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm 
the judgment of the appellate court.
The present appeal involves two questions 
regarding the defendant's pretrial custody and the calculation of time preceding 
trial. First, we must determine the amount of the delay attributable to the 
defendant for the defense motions to dismiss the charges. If we conclude that 
the defendant is not chargeable with the entire period preceding their eventual 
denial, we must then determine whether the defendant's motions for discharge 
under the speedy-trial statute, which were premature when they were filed, could 
ripen into meritorious motions while they were under advisement by the trial 
judge.
A defendant possesses both statutory (725 ILCS 
5/103-5 (West 1996)) and constitutional (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §8) rights to a speedy trial. These rights are not necessarily 
coextensive. People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318, 323 (1990); People 
v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 286 (1984). The statute receives a liberal 
construction, designed to effectuate its purpose, though each case must be 
decided on its own facts. People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423, 427 (1977); 
People v. Fosdick, 36 Ill. 2d 524, 528-29 (1967).
Section 103-5(a) provides:
The appropriate 
remedy for a violation of the speedy-trial provision of section 103-5(a) is 
dismissal of the charges. Section 103-5(d) provides:
The speedy-trial 
statute does not specify how time is to be calculated. Section 1.11 of the 
Statute on Statutes, however, provides, "The time within which any act provided 
by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including 
the last ***." 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 1996). Applying section 1.11, the appellate 
court has excluded the first day and included the last day of any relevant 
period for purposes of calculating time periods under the speedy-trial act. See 
People v. Grant, 104 Ill. App. 3d 183, 188 (1982); People v. 
Solheim, 54 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386 (1977); People v. Walton, 110 
Ill. App. 2d 115, 118 (1969). We have consistently employed the same method in 
the past (see, e.g., People v. Kliner, No. 81314 (December 3, 
1998)), and do so here.
We must first determine how much, if any, delay 
is attributable to the defendant's motions to dismiss the charges, filed June 26 
and 27, 1995. The State contends that the entire period from June 26, when the 
first one was filed, to October 16, when the motions were denied, must be 
charged to the defendant. A defendant is generally charged with delay caused by 
defense motions, and the defendant is responsible for calling up defense motions 
for hearing and disposition. People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 278-79 
(1984); People v. Terry, 61 Ill. 2d 593, 595-96 (1975). We agree with 
the appellate court, however, that the general rule attributing delay to the 
defense is not applicable here. In the present case, apparently no one appeared 
at the July 12, 1995, setting for the defendant's dismissal motions. There is no 
explanation in the record for the inaction on that date, though a later hearing 
sheds some light on the matter. The transcript of the hearing conducted on 
August 15 on the defendant's motions for discharge reveals that the assistant 
State's Attorney assigned to the case was apparently on vacation at that time in 
July.
Whether delay should be attributed to the 
defense depends on whether the defendant's actions in fact caused or contributed 
to a delay. People v. Donalson, 64 Ill. 2d 536, 541 (1976). As this 
court explained in People v. Fosdick, 36 Ill. 2d 524, 528-29 
(1967):
In the present 
case, nothing shows how the defendant's motions delayed proceedings in any way 
past the July 12 hearing date. Moreover, delay will not be attributable to the 
defendant from a silent record. People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 553 
(1989); People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982). For these 
reasons, we decline to attribute delay after the original July 12 setting to the 
defendant. We note that the June dismissal motions filed by defense counsel and 
the defendant pro se were simple and uncomplicated and did not require 
extensive preparation by the State. The twin motions were ultimately disposed of 
following a very brief argument by the prosecutor at a hearing on October 16, 
1995, on the eve of trial. At that time, the prosecutor explained that the 
defendant had received a timely preliminary hearing and, moreover, that 
dismissal of the charges was not the appropriate remedy even if a violation of 
the statute had occurred.
The question also arises whether the period of 
delay occasioned by the defendant's dismissal motions properly began on June 26, 
when the first motion was filed, or on June 29, when the July hearing was 
scheduled. We need not determine who must take responsibility for this three-day 
period, however. As we explain below, the trial judge's eventual ruling on the 
defendant's discharge motions came more than three days after the motions had 
ripened into meritorious ones, so the three-day difference can have no bearing 
on our ultimate disposition here.
We must next determine whether the defendant's 
motions for discharge under the speedy-trial statute, which were premature when 
they were made, could ripen into meritorious motions while the trial judge had 
them under advisement. The defendant filed a motion for discharge under the 
speedy-trial statute on August 14, contending that the speedy-trial period had 
already run. By that time, the defendant had been in custody for more than 120 
days, and the defendant asserted that the earlier motions to dismiss the charges 
did not result in any delay chargeable to him. The defendant therefore contended 
that he was entitled to be discharged under the speedy-trial statute. As we have 
explained, however, the earlier motions did produce at least some delay 
attributable to the defense. The defendant's motions for discharge were 
therefore premature, having been filed less than 120 days following the time the 
defendant was placed in custody, after deducting the period that begins either 
June 26 or June 29 and ends July 12.
At the August 15 hearing on the defendant's 
motions for discharge, the judge granted the defendant additional time, until 
August 25, to submit cases in support of his position. The judge issued a ruling 
on the motions on September 15, when he denied them. In a brief written order, 
the judge cited the defendant's pending motions for dismissal of the charges, 
filed in June, and the judge concluded that the speedy-trial clock did not run 
while the earlier motions were pending.
As we have noted, we disagree with the trial 
judge's conclusion that the speedy-trial clock did not resume running after the 
July 12 hearing date. By the time the trial judge ruled on the motion, the 
defendant had been in custody longer than 120 days, and we must determine what 
portions, if any, of the period after the speedy-trial motion was filed may be 
included or excluded from the speedy-trial clock.
The State argues that a premature motion may 
never ripen into a meritorious one and that we must always exclude the time in 
which the motion for discharge remains pending. Opposing that result, the 
defendant contends that the period in which a motion for discharge under the 
speedy-trial act is pending may never be chargeable to the defense. In support 
of the contention that no delay involved in the consideration or resolution of 
speedy-trial motion may be attributed to the defense, the defendant cites this 
court's decisions in People v. Tamborski, 415 Ill. 466, 473 (1953), and 
People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606, 611 (1966). In Tamborski, 
this court stated that the time in which a motion seeking discharge for a 
speedy-trial violation is pending may not be attributed to the defense. In 
Moriarity, this court in dictum repeated Tamborski's 
declaration. The State urges us to overrule or disregard those earlier 
statements, while the defendant contends that they should be 
reaffirmed.
We do not agree with the defendant that time 
involved in the resolution of a speedy-trial motion may never be attributed to 
the defense. The court in Tamborski discussed the effect in that case 
of a defendant's prior motion for discharge, and the court concluded that it had 
not actually resulted in any delay attributable to the defendant. The court 
explained:
We do not interpret 
the preceding passage from Tamborski as establishing a rigid rule that 
would preclude a court from attributing delay to the defense for a discharge 
motion under the speedy-trial statute. The present case illustrates well why 
some periods of delay in resolving motions for discharge under the speedy-trial 
statute may be chargeable to the defense. At the August 15 hearing on the 
speedy-trial motions, defense counsel requested additional time to the respond 
to the cases cited by the State. Under the defendant's theory, however, even 
this period of delay could not be attributed to the defense. We disagree. To 
accept the defendant's theory would mean that a defendant could purposely delay 
the proceedings so that the motion would become ripe while the delay was 
occurring. As the court below explained, "Defendant cannot pursue inaction on 
his discharge motion, gain the court's agreement to refrain from action, and 
subsequently raise Tamborski to assign the resulting delay to the 
State." 294 Ill. App. 3d at 938. Moreover, we note that, under the law in effect 
when Tamborski and Moriarity were decided, the consequence of 
a delay attributable to the defense was to begin a new speedy-trial period when 
the delay ended, and not simply to resume the running of the previous period. 
See People v. Donalson, 64 Ill. 2d 536, 540 (1976). Attributing delay 
to a defendant's premature motion for discharge would therefore have produced a 
particularly harsh result.
Although we have determined that at least a 
portion of the time required to dispose of a motion for discharge may be 
attributed to the defense, we are not prepared to adopt the State's view and 
conclude that all the time used to dispose of a discharge motion must be charged 
to the defendant. The appellate court below agreed that the period of delay from 
August 15 to August 25, requested by defense counsel, should be chargeable to 
the defendant. The appellate court declined to attribute any period after that 
to the defendant, however. Like the appellate court panel in this case, other 
panels of the appellate court have also concluded that neither the prosecution 
nor the defense must automatically bear all the time attributed to the 
resolution and disposition of a defendant's motion seeking discharge under the 
speedy-trial statute. See People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 
298-300 (1996) (in considering which party is responsible for time necessary for 
disposing of speedy-trial motion, court "must look to the timeliness of the 
motion, the complexity of the motion, whether the facts necessary to decide the 
motion are readily available, and the length of the continuance"); People v. 
Medina, 239 Ill. App. 3d 871, 877-78 (1993).
We agree with the appellate court in this case 
that the defendant is not responsible for the entire period of time following 
the August 15-25 continuance he requested. The trial court did not dispose of 
the defendant's discharge motions until September 15, when the written order 
denying them was filed. By that time, the defendant had been in custody 132 
days, after deducting two periods of delay chargeable to the defense: from June 
26 to July 12, and from August 14 (the date the defendant filed his pro 
se speedy-trial motion) to August 25. The appellate court below stated, 
"After August 25, 1995, defendant sought immediate discharge and awaited 
decision. His further stay in the St. Clair County jail does nothing to delay 
decision. The only conceivable act of delay was the tender of the question for 
decision. After August 25, 1995, defendant did nothing to actually delay trial." 
294 Ill. App. 3d at 938. We agree, and we believe that the defendant was 
entitled to be released at that time.
As a final matter, we note that the speedy-trial 
statute, section 103-5, has recently been amended. The legislature added a 
sentence to section 103-5(a), which now concludes, "Delay shall be considered to 
be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a 
written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record." Pub. Act 
90-705, eff. January 1, 1999. The parties do not suggest that the new statute 
applies to the present case, and we express no opinion on the operation or 
effect of the new provision.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the 
appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment 
affirmed.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
JUSTICE HARRISON, specially 
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority: 
defendant is entitled to discharge on speedy-trial grounds. I write separately 
because I do not agree with my colleagues' interpretation of People v. 
Tamborski, 415 Ill. 466 (1953), and People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606 (1966). In my view, those cases mean precisely what they say: delays 
attendant to the filing and disposition of a motion for discharge on 
speedy-trial grounds are not attributable to the defendant. See 
Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d  at 611.
Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that 
this rule should be subject to exceptions. Speedy-trial rights are not 
self-executing. In order to avail himself of the protection of our state's 
speedy-trial statute, a defendant must make application for discharge. 
People v. Shields, 58 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1974). Because the filing of a 
discharge motion is necessary to assert speedy-trial rights, it is anomalous to 
hold that the prosecution of such a motion creates delay for which the defendant 
is responsible. Defendants bring discharge motions because they want to 
terminate the proceedings, not protract them. Tamborski, 415 Ill.  at 
473.
The majority worries that a defendant might 
attempt to subvert the system by filing a discharge motion prematurely, then 
deliberately delay resolution of the matter so that the speedy-trial clock will 
run out while the discharge motion is still pending. Such a concern, however, 
seems more theoretical than real. Motions to discharge do not require elaborate 
evidentiary hearings. They can and should be resolved promptly by the court. In 
a normal case, the trial court should have no need to grant the defendant 
anything more than the briefest of continuances. That being so, it is difficult 
to see where the opportunities for abuse lie. Of course, there is always the 
possibility that the trial court may be dilatory in resolving the matter once it 
is presented. That, however, is the fault of the court, not of the 
defendant.
In any event, there is certainly no evidence 
that the defendant was attempting to manipulate the speedy-trial law in this 
case, and the majority has cited no other instances in which such abuse has 
occurred or is alleged to have occurred. If a defendant does in fact, attempt 
such abuse one day, that is when we should take the matter up. Sound 
jurisprudential considerations counsel against attempting to resolve a problem 
before we are certain that the problem really 
exists.