Title: New Jersey v. Sutherland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2018

New Jersey v. Sutherland Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In this matter, a police officer pulled over a car under the belief that the vehicle was in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehicle’s taillights was not working. The trial court determined that the officer was mistaken about the law and granted defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the motor vehicle stop. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the relevant motor vehicle statutes were ambiguous and that, applying the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___ (2014), the officer’s stop of defendant’s car constituted at most an objectively reasonable mistake of law that should be treated in the same manner as a mistake of fact. Accordingly, the panel held that the officer’s mistake of law did not require suppression of the motor vehicle stop. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed: the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the holding in "Heien" was applicable here. Because the motor vehicle statutes pertinent here were not ambiguous, the Court did not consider the issue in light of Heien. "The officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore unconstitutional." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Ryan Sutherland (A-14-16) (077807)Argued October 10, 2017 -- Decided January 11, 2018LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers the constitutionality of an officer’s stop of a motor vehicle under the belief that the vehicle was in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehicle’s taillights was not operational. A Toyota Camry that appeared to have a malfunctioning taillight passed Officer Carletta. Although the vehicle had four taillights in total, two on each side, and although only one light on the rear passenger side was not illuminated, Officer Carletta believed that the vehicle was in violation of the motor vehicle code. He executed a motor vehicle stop. Officer Carletta asked the driver, defendant Ryan Sutherland, for his driver’s license, motor vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Officer Carletta returned to his vehicle to check defendant’s information. Upon confirming that defendant’s license was suspended, Officer Carletta issued two summonses: driving with a suspended license, and failure to maintain the vehicle’s “lamps” in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. A Morris County Grand Jury later indicted defendant and charged him with fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-intoxicated conviction. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop and to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the traffic stop constituted an unreasonable seizure because his vehicle had three operable taillights, in compliance with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66. The State countered that the stop was lawful because the malfunctioning taillight provided Officer Carletta with reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and because the stop was lawful under the “community caretaking” function by which police officers engage in protecting public safety. Officer Carletta testified at the hearing that he had stopped the vehicle both because he believed that any malfunctioning taillight constituted a violation of the statute and because he was engaging in community caretaking by letting defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working order. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence resulting from the motor vehicle stop, but the court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. On the motor vehicle stop, the trial court agreed with defendant that Officer Carletta’s understanding of the maintenance-of-lamps statute had been “incorrect” and that defendant had not violated the statute because he had at least one functioning taillight on each side of the vehicle. The court concluded that Officer Carletta’s erroneous interpretation of the law could not pass constitutional scrutiny. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed the trial court. 445 N.J. Super. 358 (2016). Relying extensively on Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), the panel determined that “even if the officer was mistaken that the inoperable tail light constituted a Title 39 violation, he had an objectively reasonable basis for stopping defendant’s vehicle.” Id. at 360. In reaching that conclusion, the panel questioned the continuing vitality of State v. Puzio, which had held “that where an officer mistakenly believes that driving conduct constitutes a violation of the law, but in actuality it does not, no objectively reasonable basis exists upon which to justify a vehicle stop.” 379 N.J. Super. 378, 383 (App. Div. 2005). The panel went on to conclude that the statute at issue here was ambiguous and that even if Officer Carletta’s interpretation of the statute was an objectively reasonable mistake of law, the stop was permissible pursuant to Heien. 445 N.J. Super. at 368–70. The panel’s reasoning made it unnecessary to reach the State’s argument about the applicability of the community caretaking doctrine. Id. at 371. The Court granted defendant leave to appeal. 228 N.J. 246 (2016).HELD: The Appellate Division erred in concluding that the holding in Heien is applicable here. The motor vehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous. The officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore unconstitutional. 1 1. Under previous case law in this state, a police officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of fact does not render a search or arrest unconstitutional. Consistent with federal jurisprudence, the Court has held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides room for some mistakes by police. However, that principle applies only when the police behave reasonably. (pp. 10-11)2. Until the Appellate Division decision in this case, the jurisprudence of New Jersey appellate courts had not held that reasonable mistakes of law would pass constitutional muster. In fact, courts had reached the opposite conclusion. See Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. at 382-83. The Puzio decision noted “a clear distinction between the present situation and those presented in cases where the officer correctly understands the statute but arguably misinterprets the facts concerning whether a vehicle, or operator, has violated the statute.” Id. at 382. In explaining its reasoning, the panel stated that “[i]f officers were permitted to stop vehicles where it is objectively determined that there is no legal basis for their action, 'the potential for abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.’” Id. at 384. The panel also viewed the creation of an exception for a mistake of law as inconsistent with the exclusionary rule because “it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.” Ibid. (pp. 11-14)3. In Heien, the United States Supreme Court considered a police officer’s reasonable but erroneous interpretation of a motor vehicle statute. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion noted that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.’” 135 S. Ct. at 536. After explaining that “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect,” and that the Fourth Amendment allows for reasonable mistakes of fact, the Chief Justice went on to explain that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry applies to mistakes of law just as it applies to mistakes of fact. Ibid. Based on the language of the North Carolina statute involved in Heien, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the officer’s error of law was reasonable and thus provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Id. at 540. Importantly, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurrence that has garnered support with states that have chosen to follow the Heien approach in their own search and seizure analyses. Critical to her agreement with the majority was her belief that erroneous interpretations of the law will pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny only when the law at issue is “'so doubtful in construction’ that a reasonable judge could agree with the officer’s view.” Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring). Such cases must necessarily involve a “really difficult” or “very hard question of statutory interpretation” and will thus be “exceedingly rare.” Ibid. (pp. 14-16)4. A number of states have subsequently adopted Heien’s holding. Importantly, however, a number of states have either followed or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretation of an objectively reasonable mistake of law. In State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20 (2016), the Court did not reach the question of whether to adopt Heien. The officer’s mistake of law in that case was not objectively reasonable and thus did not qualify as the type of “rare” case that involves an objectively reasonable mistake of law. (pp. 17-19)5. Defendant’s traffic stop was premised on perceived violations of two statutes. The statutes read together require that a motor vehicle only have two working rear lamps, with at least one working lamp on each side. See N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a); N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 mandates that the lamps “required by this article” must be kept in good working order. The statutes require one working taillight on each side of a vehicle. Thus, if a vehicle has two taillights on each side of the vehicle—more than the law requires—and one of those multiple taillights on one side is not working, a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66, as was assumed and charged here, has not occurred. The officer’s erroneous application of the functioning taillight requirement was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law. This case does not present a basis for considering the application of Heien. Simply put, this was not a good stop. The judgment of the Appellate Division, premised on an application of Heien to the stop in this matter, is reversed. (pp. 19-23)6. The State also asserted community caretaking as an alternative basis to support the stop. The Appellate Division did not reach the argument in light of the manner in which it resolved the case. Accordingly, a remand is appropriate to allow the Appellate Division to address the unresolved argument advanced by the State. (p. 23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 14 September Term 2016 077807STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.RYAN SUTHERLAND, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 10, 2017 – Decided January 11, 2018 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 445 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2016). Joseph P. Rem, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Rem Law Group, attorneys; Joseph P. Rem, Jr., of counsel, and Tamra Katcher, of counsel and on the brief). Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, of counsel and on the brief, and Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, on the brief). Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L. Barocas and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief). Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, submitted a letter brief on behalf of respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney). 1 JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This Court has acknowledged that a reasonable mistake offact on the part of a police officer will not render a search orarrest predicated on that mistake unconstitutional. See Statev. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 53-54 (2011). In this matter, a policeofficer pulled over a car under the belief that the vehicle wasin violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of thevehicle’s taillights was not operational. The trial courtdetermined that the officer was mistaken about the law andgranted defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the motorvehicle stop. The Appellate Division reversed. The paneldetermined that the relevant motor vehicle statutes wereambiguous and that, applying the reasoning of the United StatesSupreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), the officer’s stop of defendant’s carconstituted at most an objectively reasonable mistake of lawthat should be treated in the same manner as a mistake of fact.Accordingly, the panel held that the officer’s mistake of lawdid not require suppression of the motor vehicle stop. We now reverse. The Appellate Division erred in concludingthat the holding in Heien is applicable here. Because the motorvehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous, we need notconsider importing Heien into the determination of this matter. 2 Thus, we do not address the arguments raised herein that Heien’smistake-of-law analysis is not reconcilable with our stateconstitutional jurisprudence. The officer’s stop of defendant’smotor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of lawthat gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stopwas therefore unconstitutional. We remand to the AppellateDivision for its consideration of the State’s alternativeargument, which the panel did not reach, that the stop should besustained based on the community caretaking doctrine. I. A. At the suppression hearing in this matter, the followingfacts were adduced. Officer Michael Carletta of the Mount OlivePolice Department was the sole witness. At about 9:00 p.m. on the evening of February 3, 2014,Officer Carletta was on motor vehicle patrol travelingsouthbound on Route 206. A Toyota Camry passed him travelingnorthbound. Looking in his rearview mirror, the officerobserved that the northbound vehicle appeared to have amalfunctioning taillight. Although the vehicle had fourtaillights in total, two on each side, and although only onelight on the rear passenger side was not illuminated, OfficerCarletta believed that the vehicle was in violation of the motorvehicle code. He made a U-turn and began to follow the vehicle. 3 After confirming that one of the vehicle’s taillights was notilluminated, he executed a motor vehicle stop. Officer Carlettatestified that, in such situations, it is typical policepractice to give the driver a warning rather than a summons. After stopping and approaching the vehicle, OfficerCarletta asked the driver, defendant Ryan Sutherland, for hisdriver’s license, motor vehicle registration, and proof ofinsurance. Defendant initially stated that he did not have hisdriver’s license with him but then quickly admitted that he didnot have a valid driver’s license. After obtaining defendant’sname and date of birth, Officer Carletta returned to his vehicleto check defendant’s information with police dispatch. Upon confirming that defendant’s license was in factsuspended, Officer Carletta issued defendant two summonses:driving with a suspended license in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and failure to maintain the vehicle’s “lamps” in violationof N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. Officer Carletta explained to defendantthat he had been stopped because one of his taillights was notworking and that he could no longer drive the vehicle because hehad a suspended driver’s license. The officer allowed defendantto leave the scene on the condition that his passenger drive thecar to its intended destination. B. 4 On June 2, 2014, defendant was charged in municipal courtwith fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period oflicense suspension in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. A MorrisCounty Grand Jury later indicted defendant and charged him withfourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period oflicense suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-intoxicated conviction in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop andto dismiss the indictment,1 arguing that the traffic stopconstituted an unreasonable seizure because his vehicle hadthree operable taillights, in compliance with the requirementsof N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66. The State countered that thestop was lawful because the malfunctioning taillight providedOfficer Carletta with reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicleand because the stop was lawful under the “community caretaking”function by which police officers engage in protecting publicsafety. Officer Carletta testified at the hearing that he hadstopped the vehicle both because he believed that anymalfunctioning taillight constituted a violation of the statute1 The Appellate Division opinion treats defendant as having filed two separate motions: a motion to suppress the stop and a motion to dismiss the indictment. However, it appears from the record that defendant filed one motion to dismiss the indictment for two discrete reasons: (1) because the charge resulted from an unconstitutional stop; and (2) because the prosecutor gave improper instructions to the grand jury. 5 and because he was engaging in community caretaking by lettingdefendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working order. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppressevidence resulting from the motor vehicle stop, but the courtdenied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds offaulty instructions provided to the grand jury. On the motorvehicle stop, the trial court agreed with defendant that OfficerCarletta’s understanding of the maintenance-of-lamps statute hadbeen “incorrect” and that defendant had not violated the statutebecause he had at least one functioning taillight on each sideof the vehicle. Relying heavily on State v. Puzio, 379 N.J.Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), as well as an unpublished 2009Appellate Division decision, the trial court concluded thatOfficer Carletta’s erroneous interpretation of the law -- eventhough it was a “common sense” and “practical” approach tointerpreting the statute -- could not pass constitutionalscrutiny. The State sought leave to appeal on the grounds that(1) Officer Carletta had reasonable suspicion to conduct atraffic stop; (2) Puzio’s continuing vitality was put intoquestion by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heien,in which the Supreme Court held that objectively reasonablemistakes of law can provide the reasonable suspicion necessaryfor a constitutional stop; and (3) the stop was lawful under the 6 community caretaking doctrine. The Appellate Division grantedleave to appeal and reversed the trial court in a publishedopinion. State v. Sutherland, 445 N.J. Super. 358 (2016). Relying extensively on Heien, the panel determined that“even if the officer was mistaken that the inoperable tail lightconstituted a Title 39 violation, he had an objectivelyreasonable basis for stopping defendant’s vehicle.” Id. at 360.In reaching that conclusion, the panel questioned the continuingvitality of Puzio, which had held “that where an officermistakenly believes that driving conduct constitutes a violationof the law, but in actuality it does not, no objectivelyreasonable basis exists upon which to justify a vehicle stop.”Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. at 383 (collecting cases).2 The panelreasoned that Puzio had been decided before Heien and thatHeien’s “well-reasoned” holding had cast doubt on Puzio’scontinuing validity. Sutherland, 445 N.J. Super. at 366-67.The panel went on to conclude that the statute at issue here wasambiguous and that even if Officer Carletta’s interpretation ofthe statute was an objectively reasonable mistake of law, thestop was permissible pursuant to Heien “[b]ecause the FourthAmendment tolerates objectively reasonable mistakes of law.”2 The panel below also disagreed with the holding in the unpublished decision referenced by the trial court, which, the panel noted, is unpublished and thus does not constitute precedential authority. Sutherland, 445 N.J. Super. at 365.7 Id. at 368–70. The panel’s reasoning made it unnecessary toreach the State’s argument about the applicability of thecommunity caretaking doctrine. Id. at 371. Defendant sought leave to appeal from this Court, which wegranted. 228 N.J. 246 (2016). We also granted the motion ofthe American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) toappear as amicus curiae. II. The parties’ arguments are largely those advanced in theproceedings before the trial and appellate courts. Defendant argues that the Appellate Division’s adoption ofHeien is at odds with prior New Jersey precedent, which hastraditionally provided greater protections under our stateanalogue to the Fourth Amendment than those provided by theFederal Constitution. Specifically, he argues that Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. at 383, correctly held that a traffic stop based onan incorrect interpretation of law can never be objectivelyreasonable. That holding, defendant argues, is a naturalextension of this Court’s decision in State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987), which held that our State Constitution does notcontemplate good faith mistakes by law enforcement as anexception to the exclusionary rule. Defendant also contendsthat the statutory provisions at issue here were plain andunambiguous and did not apply to his vehicle, undermining any 8 basis for reasonable suspicion. In essence, defendant’sargument challenges Officer Carletta’s interpretation of thoseprovisions as not reasonable. The State argues that the Appellate Division correctly heldthat Officer Carletta’s belief that defendant was in violationof the motor vehicle code was objectively reasonable andprovided him with reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’svehicle. Relying on Heien, the State posits that just as wehave held that reasonable mistakes of fact can passconstitutional scrutiny, so too should we hold that reasonablemistakes of law do not run afoul of our constitution. Such aresult is not inconsistent with Puzio, the State argues, becausePuzio involved an objectively unreasonable mistake of law,whereas here, Officer Carletta was forced to interpret aconfusing and outdated set of statutes ambiguous enough to beopen to differing and equally reasonable interpretations.Additionally, the State maintains that it preserved its argumentthat Officer Carletta had lawful authority to stop defendant’svehicle based on the community caretaking doctrine, whichprovides police with the power to ensure the safety and welfareof the public independent of their law enforcement objectives. Amicus curiae ACLU-NJ argues that the statutes at issuehere are not ambiguous and that the rule of lenity requiresstrict construction of those statutes in defendant’s favor. 9 ACLU-NJ further argues that a stop based on a police officer’smisunderstanding or ignorance of the law can and should bedifferentiated from mistakes of fact, and that such ignorance ormisunderstanding of the law must always be unreasonable and thusunconstitutional under our Article I, Paragraph 7 jurisprudence.Like defendant, ACLU-NJ maintains that that conclusion flowsnaturally from state constitutional case law, most specificallyfrom Novembrino. Heien, the ACLU-NJ argues, is inconsistentwith that jurisprudence and thus should not be adopted by thisCourt. III. A. Under previous case law in this state, a police officer’sobjectively reasonable mistake of fact does not render a searchor arrest unconstitutional. Consistent with federaljurisprudence, we have held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of theNew Jersey Constitution provides “room . . . for some mistakes[by police].” Handy, 206 N.J. at 54 (second alteration inoriginal) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 , 186(1980)). However, that principle applies only when “the police. . . behave[] reasonably.” Ibid.; see also State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 346, 352-53 (App. Div. 1999) (holding reasonable butmistaken belief leading to arrest did not warrant suppression). 10 In Handy, a police dispatcher, erroneously relying on arecord of a warrant containing a name and date of birth that didnot match the defendant’s reported information, advised a policeofficer to execute that warrant without taking necessary stepsto clarify discrepancies. 206 N.J. at 41-42. Our Courtconcluded that the dispatcher’s conduct was not objectivelyreasonable. Id. at 54. Therefore, we determined that thearrest violated the defendant’s federal and state constitutionalrights, and we suppressed the evidence found during the searchincident to the arrest. Id. at 42. The facts in Handy led us to a different conclusion thanthe mistake of fact in State v. Green, in which the error wasdetermined to be objectively reasonable. In Green, which wecited approvingly in Handy, the Appellate Division upheld anarrest and search of defendant Green, where Green closelymatched the description of another man named Lovett -- for whomthe warrant was issued -- and where the police encountered Greenoutside Lovett’s residence. Green, 318 N.J. Super. at 352-53.In those circumstances the Appellate Division rightly concludedthat the arrest was premised on an objectively reasonablemistake of fact and was thus lawful. Ibid. Until the Appellate Division decision in this case, thejurisprudence of our state appellate courts had not held thatreasonable mistakes of law would pass constitutional muster. In 11 fact, courts had reached the opposite conclusion. See Puzio,379 N.J. Super. at 382-83. In Puzio, an officer stopped a moving vehicle withcommercial license plates, believing the driver was operating itin violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-46(a) because the vehicle had noplacard on the right side of the vehicle displaying the name andaddress of its business. Id. at 380. The Appellate Divisiondetermined as a matter of law that the stop was in error becausethe statute relied on by the officer plainly excluded “passengervehicles,” like the one driven by the defendant, from the“placard” requirement. Id. at 382-84. Importantly, the Puzio decision noted “a clear distinctionbetween the present situation and those presented in cases wherethe officer correctly understands the statute but arguablymisinterprets the facts concerning whether a vehicle, oroperator, has violated the statute.” Id. at 382. In explainingits reasoning, the panel stated that “[i]f officers werepermitted to stop vehicles where it is objectively determinedthat there is no legal basis for their action, 'the potentialfor abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stopsseems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.’”Id. at 384 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282,289 (5th Cir. 1999)). The panel also viewed the creation of anexception for a mistake of law as inconsistent with the 12 exclusionary rule because “it would remove the incentive forpolice to make certain that they properly understand the lawthat they are entrusted to enforce and obey.” Ibid. (quotingUnited States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2000)). Another mistake-of-fact case -- the State’s assertions tothe contrary notwithstanding -- is State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302 (1994). Williamson dealt with a police officer’s reasonablesuspicion that a motorist had “affected traffic” so as to be inviolation of the motor vehicle code by failing to use a turnsignal. Id. at 303–04. The officer was required to make ajudgment that involved interpreting facts, namely whether themotorist had actually affected traffic; there was no mistakeabout what the law meant. See id. at 304. We held that “theState need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car,not that it could convict the driver of the motor-vehicleoffense.” Ibid. At its core, Williamson involved a factualdispute: whether the officer could have an objectivelyreasonable belief, even if mistaken, that the defendant’sdriving behavior “affected traffic,” to justify the stop. Seealso State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999) (noting thatState is not required to prove that motor vehicle violationoccurred in order to meet standard of reasonable suspicion). 13 Thus, at the time of the Appellate Division’s decisionhere, neither this Court nor the Appellate Division hadauthorized reliance on a reasonable but mistaken understandingof the law to support a search or arrest. In the appellatejudgment under review, the panel relied on, as persuasive, theintervening decision of the United States Supreme Court in Heiento support its holding. We turn therefore to that decision insetting forth the background to this appeal. B. In Heien, the United States Supreme Court considered apolice officer’s reasonable but erroneous interpretation of amotor vehicle statute. In that case, a North Carolina Sheriff’sOfficer observed a vehicle traveling along the highway with amalfunctioning brake light. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.Believing the faulty brake light to be in violation of thestate’s motor vehicle code, the officer executed a traffic stop.Ibid. During the stop, the officer received permission tosearch the vehicle and discovered illegal drugs in a duffel bag.Ibid. The defendant sought to suppress the evidence uncoveredduring the search, contending that the stop had violated hisrights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 535. The trial courtdenied the suppression motion, but the North Carolina Court ofAppeals reversed, holding that the initial stop was invalid 14 “because driving with only one working brake light was notactually a violation of North Carolina law.” Ibid. The Stateappealed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holdingthat the officer’s interpretation of the motor vehicle code --even if incorrect -- was not unreasonable and thus not aviolation of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Chief JusticeRoberts’s majority opinion noted that “the ultimate touchstoneof the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.’” Id. at 536(quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473,2482 (2014)). After explaining that “[t]o be reasonable is notto be perfect,” and that the Fourth Amendment allows forreasonable mistakes of fact, the Chief Justice went on toexplain that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry appliesto mistakes of law just as it applies to mistakes of fact: [R]easonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion [than mistakes of fact]. Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but 15 not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law. [Ibid.] Based on the language of the North Carolina statuteinvolved in Heien, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that theofficer’s error of law was reasonable and thus provided theofficer with reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.Id. at 540. Importantly, Justice Kagan, joined by JusticeGinsburg, wrote a concurrence that has garnered support withstates that have chosen to follow the Heien approach in theirown search and seizure analyses. Justice Kagan’s concurrence contained several importantcaveats. Critical to her agreement with the majority was herbelief that erroneous interpretations of the law will passFourth Amendment scrutiny only when the law at issue is “'sodoubtful in construction’ that a reasonable judge could agreewith the officer’s view.” Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring)(quoting The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 825, 826 (No. 5,125) (C.C.D.Mass. 1812)). Thus, “[i]f the statute is genuinely ambiguous,such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires hardinterpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonablemistake. But if not, not.” Ibid. Such cases must necessarilyinvolve a “really difficult” or “very hard question of statutoryinterpretation” and will thus be “exceedingly rare.” Ibid. 16 A number of states have subsequently adopted Heien’sholding. See, e.g., Sevilla-Carcamo v. State, 783 S.E.2d 150,153 n.12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (dicta); Williams v. State, 28 N.E.3d 293, 294-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 886-88 (N.Y. 2015); State v. Hirschkorn, 881 N.W.2d 244, 248-49 (N.D. 2016); State v. Lerma, 884 N.W.2d 749, 750-53(S.D. 2016). However, some of those states had alreadydeveloped a jurisprudence prior to Heien allowing for reasonablemistakes of law on the part of police officers. See, e.g.,Sevilla-Carcamo, 758 S.E 2d at 153 n.12 (noting that Heien is inaccord with established Georgia case law); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 796-99 (S.D. 2010) (suggesting that objectivelyreasonable mistake of law can provide basis for constitutionaltraffic stop).3 Importantly, however, a number of states have eitherfollowed or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretationof an objectively reasonable mistake of law when decidingsimilar issues under the rubric of Heien’s analysis. See State3 Some states have changed their views entirely in light of Heien. Compare Williams, 28 N.E 3d at 293-95 (Indiana Court of Appeals reversing on rehearing and following Heien’s holding that reasonable mistakes of law can provide reasonable suspicion for traffic stop), with Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting party’s acknowledgement of “Indiana decisions determining that an officer’s mistake of law can never be reasonable”); see also Guthrie, 30 N.E 3d at 885 (noting prior appellate precedent in New York that “mistake of law cannot justify a traffic stop”). 17 v. Stoll, 370 P.3d 1130, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (citingJustice Kagan’s concurrence for proposition that statute must be“genuinely ambiguous” and require “hard interpretive work” tofind that officer has made reasonable mistake); People v.Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 652 (Ill. 2015) (same); State v.Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d 740, 743-44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (same);State v. Hurley, 117 A.3d 433, 441 (Vt. 2015) (noting JusticeKagan’s indication that “the bar is high in cases in which astop is predicated on a mistake of law”); State v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 158-60 (Wis. 2015) (noting Justice Kagan’s view thatobjectively reasonable mistakes of law will be “exceedinglyrare”); see also State v. Dopslaf, 356 P.3d 559, 563-64 (N.M.Ct. App. 2015) (citing Justice Kagan’s concurrence as supportfor proposition that police officer’s potential mistake of lawwas reasonable). In this state, we have had only one prior occasion toconsider Heien; that opportunity presented itself in State v.Scriven, 226 N.J. 20 (2016). However, we ultimately did notreach the question of whether to adopt Heien and find that anobjectively reasonable mistake of law could support reasonablesuspicion for a constitutional police stop. Id. at 36.Instead, we held that the officer’s mistake of law in that casewas not objectively reasonable, see ibid., and thus did not 18 qualify as the type of “rare” case that involves an objectivelyreasonable mistake of law. With that background in mind, we turn to the motor vehiclestatutes that, the State contends, give rise to an objectivelyreasonable mistake of law in this matter. IV. Defendant’s traffic stop was premised on perceivedviolations of two statutes.N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a), relating to the types of “lamps andreflectors” required on certain motor vehicles, provides inrelevant part: Every motor vehicle other than a motor cycle and other than a motor-drawn vehicle shall be equipped on the front with at least two headlamps, an equal number at each side, and with two turn signals, one on each side; and on the rear with two tail lamps, two or more stop lamps, as prescribed by section 2 of L. 2013, c. 230 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:3-66.3), two turn signals, and two reflectors, one of each at each side; except that a passenger vehicle manufactured before July 2, 1954, and registered in this State may be equipped with one stop lamp, one reflector, and one tail lamp and is not required to be equipped with turn signals. [(emphasis added).]N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, which specifies the proper maintenance of suchlamps and reflectors, provides: All lamps, reflectors and other illuminating devices required by this article shall be kept clean and in good working order and, as far as 19 practicable, shall be mounted in such a manner as to reduce the likelihood of their being obscured by mud or dust thrown up by the wheels. [(emphasis added).] When interpreting a statute we look first, and foremost, toits actual language and ascribe to its words their ordinarymeaning. Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68 (2008)(citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). “If inascribing to those words their 'ordinary meaning andsignificance,’ the Legislators’ intent is self-evident, we neednot search further for guidance.” Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 332 (2007) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492). The statutes read together require that a motor vehicleonly have two working rear lamps, with at least one working lampon each side. See N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a); N.J.S.A. 39:3-66.Additionally, N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 mandates that the lamps “requiredby this article” must be kept in good working order. Thus, ifthere is only the minimum one taillight on each side of avehicle and either of those taillights is not working, anofficer can lawfully stop the vehicle and issue a citation forfailure to maintain lamps. When a vehicle has more than theminimum of two rear taillights, for example the vehicle has twotaillights on each side, an officer can lawfully stop thevehicle when one side’s taillights are both out, even though the 20 vehicle has two or more taillights illuminated on the otherside. In other words, the statutes require one workingtaillight on each side of a vehicle. Thus, if a vehicle has twotaillights on each side of the vehicle -- more than the lawrequires -- and one of those multiple taillights on one side isnot working, a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66, as wasassumed and charged here, has not occurred. We find the language unambiguous and therefore need notresort to legislative history. Were that history to be examinedon the relevant question, we would note, as the State pointsout, that the Legislature did at one point begin considerationof an amendment; that amendment would have worked a differentinterpretation of existing law as we read it, and as it wasapplied in a prior unpublished decision that receivedlegislative attention. As originally introduced at the outsetof the 2012 Legislative Session, Assembly Bill 354 would haveamended N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 and N.J.S.A. 39:3-61 to establish that“an equipment violation [will be found] if any lighting deviceinstalled on a vehicle is not in working order.” Those proposedamendments were never adopted by the Legislature, as theAppellate Division noted in its opinion. Sutherland, 445 N.J.Super. at 367 n.3. We do not ascribe much weight to legislativeinaction but note merely that there has been no legislation to 21 alter prior application of the pertinent statutes. Cf. State v.Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 335 (2009). Finally, we reject the argument that N.J.S.A. 39:3-48,which addresses visibility specifications for vehicle lights,can inject ambiguity into the clear wording of the statutes atissue here. Nor does the permissive repair provision inN.J.S.A. 39:3-61(l) -- which does not have applicability in thepresent situation or in most modern malfunctioning-taillightcircumstances -- convert the interpretative question before usinto one that rises to the level of difficulty envisioned as the“rare” case of an objectively reasonable misunderstanding of thelaw. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (noting that such cases mustnecessarily involve “very hard question[s] of statutoryinterpretation”). Putting the statutes in question to rigorous analysis, wefail to find them unclear, as the State suggests. We find thatthe officer’s erroneous application of the functioning taillightrequirement was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law.This case does not present a basis for considering theapplication of Heien and the Appellate Division erred inreaching that determination based on the error here. Simplyput, this was not a good stop. Even Heien could not save it,were we ever to consider adopting such an approach for the trulyrare case that rose to the level of an objectively reasonable 22 mistake of law. But this was not that case. The judgment ofthe Appellate Division, premised on an application of Heien tothe stop in this matter, is reversed. That, however, does not end the matter. V. The State also asserted community caretaking as analternative basis to support the stop. It is a rule that allowspolice officers to conduct warrantless searches where necessaryto “preserve life or property.” State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117,141–42 (2012) (summarizing community caretaking rule). Therationale for the community caretaking rule is that searchesmade pursuant to the rule are “divorced from the detection,investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to theviolation of a criminal statute.” Id. at 142 (quoting Cady v.Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 441 (1973)). That doctrine was raised at the suppression hearing andthere was testimony from the officer on the point. Althoughraised on appeal, the Appellate Division did not reach theargument in light of the manner in which it resolved the case.Accordingly, a remand is appropriate to allow the AppellateDivision to address the unresolved argument advanced by theState. VI. 23 The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. Weremand the matter for further proceedings in the AppellateDivision. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 24