Title: State v. Bowen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50491
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2006

FILED: May 11, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
GREGORY ALLEN BOWEN,
Appellant.
(CC 02CR0019; SC S50491)
En Banc
On automatic and direct review of judgments of conviction and sentences of death
imposed by the Curry County Circuit Court.
Richard K. Mickelson, Judge.
Argued and submitted March 10, 2006.
Robin A. Jones, Senior Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant.  With her
on the briefs were Peter Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, Salem.
Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent.  With
her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and
Carolyn Alexander and Steven R. Powers, Assistant Attorneys General, Salem.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The judgments of conviction and sentences of death are affirmed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
This case is before the court on automatic and direct
review of defendant's judgments of conviction and sentences of
death, pursuant to ORS 138.012(1).  Defendant was convicted on
two counts of aggravated murder and 16 additional felony
convictions.  On review, defendant raises numerous assignments of
error and asks this court to reverse and remand his case for a
new trial or, alternatively, vacate his sentences of death and
remand for resentencing.  For the reasons set out below, we
affirm defendant's convictions and sentences of death, and remand
for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction consistent with
this opinion. 
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we view the
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the
state.  State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250, 971 P2d 879 (1999).  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 25, 2001, defendant, along with his friend
Mike Colby, left Crescent City in search of temporary work on the
coast.  After spending the night in Coos Bay, defendant and Colby
traveled to Charleston hoping to find work on a fishing boat;
they were also looking for drugs.  At the time, defendant
habitually used methamphetamine, as well as other illegal drugs. 
Unable to obtain either employment or drugs, defendant and Colby
continued on to Newport and Warrenton.
On December 29, 2001, defendant and Colby traveled to
Gold Beach, where they began experiencing problems with their
vehicle.  While in Gold Beach, defendant decided to visit his ex-girlfriend, Bridget Dalton.  Upon arriving at Dalton's house,
defendant told her that he wanted to pick up some extra clothes
and give her money that he owed her.  After entering the house,
however, defendant and Dalton began to argue.  During that
argument, defendant struck Dalton in the face with his fist,
knocking her to the floor.  He then grabbed Dalton by her hair,
pulling her up from the floor, and proceeded to hold a knife to
her throat.  Defendant then took Dalton into the bedroom and
exchanged his knife for a black-powder pistol, which he used to
repeatedly to beat Dalton.  During that altercation, Dalton
grabbed the barrel of the pistol and cut her hand on the
gunsights.  Shortly thereafter, someone knocked on Dalton's front
door.  Defendant told Dalton that, if she made a sound, he would
shoot the person at the front door.  After defendant left the
bedroom to check the front door, Dalton escaped the house by
jumping through a bedroom window.  As Dalton ran to her
neighbor's house, she yelled for someone to call the police.  In
response, defendant and Colby fled to a friend's house to listen
to a police scanner.  
While at the friend's house, defendant heard nothing on
the police scanner regarding the incident with Dalton.  Defendant
and Colby then visited their heroin supplier, but discovered the
supplier was not home.  Defendant and Colby then traveled to the
home of another of defendant's friends, Donald Christiansen (the
victim).  Upon arriving at the victim's house, Colby and
defendant left their vehicle running and met the victim on his
front porch.  The victim allowed them inside, and all three men
sat down at the kitchen table.  While seated, defendant removed
the black powder pistol from his pocket and placed it on the
kitchen table.  Defendant asked the victim if he had any money. 
The victim answered "no," which prompted defendant to inquire
about a bowl of money sitting on the counter.  The victim
informed defendant that the bowl contained only coins.  
The victim and defendant got up from the kitchen table
and moved to the living room to talk.  Defendant left the pistol
on the kitchen table.  Colby remained at the kitchen table until
he heard their vehicle making strange noises outside.  Defendant
asked Colby to step outside and check on it.  After checking on
the vehicle, Colby remained outside to smoke a cigarette.  
Defendant testified at trial that, after returning to
the kitchen and while Colby was outside, he informed the victim
about his earlier altercation with Dalton.  Concerned about
defendant's well-being, the victim offered to call the police and
encouraged defendant to turn himself in.  Defendant further
testified that, as the victim prepared to call the police,
defendant grabbed the gun and said, "If you call 911[,] I may as
well just shoot myself and get it over with."  According to
defendant, the victim attempted to take the gun away from
defendant and during the struggle, the gun accidentally went off. 
The bullet entered the victim's chest above his left nipple and
traveled downward, deflected off a rib and pierced the victim's
heart and liver.
After hearing the gunshot, Colby rushed back inside the
victim's house.  Colby saw the victim on the floor and heard
defendant tell the victim that "It will be over shortly.  I got
you in the heart."  Colby asked, "Fuck, Buck, what happened?"  In
response, defendant looked at Colby and asked, "Are you all right
with this?"  Colby then went outside to the vehicle and waited. 
Soon thereafter, Colby watched as defendant came out of the
victim's house carrying several guns and a box with a phone in
it. (1)  After leaving the victim's home, defendant and Colby
returned to Crescent City in search of heroin.
The following day, a neighbor discovered the victim's
body and called the police.  Shortly thereafter, a police officer
arrived and determined that the victim was "obviously deceased"
and that the scene revealed "obvious foul play."  Several other
police officers arrived.  Those police officers took photographs,
turned the body over, and cut open the victim's shirt with a pair
of scissors.  Upon further investigation, police officers
discovered blood splatter low on the wall and framing of the
doorway between the living room and kitchen, low-angle blood
splatter on and under a cart just inside the kitchen, and blood
smears on the kitchen floor and on a white telephone.  The 
officers indicated that the home appeared "appropriately
cluttered" and displayed no evidence of ransacking. 
The state subsequently charged defendant in an 18-count
indictment as a result of the crimes that occurred on the night
of December 29, 2001.  One group of crimes involved defendant's
ex-girlfriend Dalton, and the second group of crimes involved the
victim.  Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges involving
Dalton.  As relevant to this court's review of the charges
involving the victim, defendant was indicted on two counts of
aggravated murder, one based on the theory that he intentionally
and personally had caused the death of the victim during a
robbery, and the other based on the theory that he intentionally
and personally had caused the death of the victim during a
burglary.  A jury ultimately convicted defendant on both counts
of aggravated murder. 
Based on the aggravated murder verdicts, the trial
court held a penalty-phase proceeding.  On each count, the jury
answered "yes" to the statutory questions submitted to it. (2) 
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the court imposed a
sentence of death on both aggravated murder convictions.  This
automatic review followed.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR REGARDING PRETRIAL ISSUES
Defendant raises seven assignments of error that
pertain to his pretrial motions.  Three of those assignments
raise facial challenges to the constitutionality of Oregon's
death-penalty statute.  This court previously has considered and
rejected defendant's constitutional challenges to that statute. 
We discuss defendant's remaining assignments of error regarding
his pretrial motions below.
A. Evidence Regarding Crimes Against Dalton  
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in
overruling defendant's objections to photographs that the state
introduced depicting evidence of his crimes against Dalton. Before trial, the parties and the court discussed a
series of photographs that the state sought to admit relating to
defendant's assault of Dalton.  Those photographs consisted of
images of injuries to Dalton's face, head, hand, and legs, all
taken prior to Dalton receiving medical treatment.  Defendant
argued that the photographs "that depict the actual scarring, the
injuring, the bruising and so forth but don't depict the blood
and gore will certainly serve the purposes of the State in
relaying to the jury what took place on that day."  Defendant
argued further that "[a]nything else is prejudicial and is not
relevant to any value [and] it's not probative of any issue in
this case."  
In response, the state argued that the photographs were
relevant because they gave a complete picture of the events that
had led to the victim's murder and because they placed defendant
in an area that was relevant to the victim's death, both in
location and in time.  Ultimately, the court sustained
defendant's objections to four of the photographs, but allowed
the state to introduce the balance of the photographs.  The court
concluded that the photographs were relevant:
"It is relevant in my opinion because we're
talking about the same black-powder revolver.  My
understanding of the evidence is the black-powder
revolver belonged to Ms. Dalton on the same date, being
December 29, 2001[,] in the same area of Curry County
where [the victim] was killed.  Since it's the same
date and it's the weapon, the alleged murder weapon in
the particular case, I think the State is allowed to
show where that weapon came from.
"Also it shows the intent of [defendant] in his
activities regarding [the victim].  I believe testimony
would be relevant as to the demeanor [defendant] showed
at the time; the violence he showed towards Ms. Dalton
at that time would be both relevant in the manner in
which he interacted with [the victim] a short period of
time later on the same day.
"Obviously they are similarly situated since both
were in their own homes.  They let a person into their
own home who they were previously aware of -- at least
knew the individual.  In the case of Ms. Dalton, knew
very well.  And during the course of the further
contact between [defendant] in their own homes Ms.
Dalton was severely beaten and [the victim] ended up
being killed."
Defendant argues that the "unfairly prejudicial effect
of the photographs substantially outweighed their minimal
probative value, and therefore the court should have excluded
them [under OEC 403]."  "In the context of OEC 403, 'unfair
prejudice' means 'an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an
improper basis, commonly although not always an emotional one.'"
State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 407-08, 927 P2d 1073 (1996) (quoting
Legislative Commentary, cited in Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon
Evidence, 125 (2d ed 1989)).  We review trial court decisions
under OEC 403 for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 407.
In order to prevail, defendant must show that admission
of the photographs was "unfairly prejudicial."  Id. (emphasis in
original).  Defendant has not suggested that the photographs in
this case created a danger of undue prejudice other than to evoke
a person's natural revulsion regarding the beating Dalton
endured.  This court previously has stated that relevant
photographs are not unfairly prejudicial simply because they are
graphic.  See State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 88, 969 P2d 1013
(1998), cert den, 528 US 1135 (2000) ("Although the photographs
in question were graphic, they could not be said to be remarkable
in the context of a murder trial").  Consequently, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the photographs of Dalton's injuries.
B. Requirement that Defendant Wear a Stun Belt During Trial
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
requiring him to wear a "stun belt" during the trial, without
first holding a hearing and finding that such control was
necessary to prevent defendant from disrupting the proceedings. 
Defendant concedes that he did not object to wearing the stun
belt or request findings to support that form of restraint. 
Nevertheless, defendant argues that the trial court erred by
"deciding the question sua sponte."  As a result, defendant
contends that this court should review his claim as "plain
error."  
Plain error requires that (1) the error be one of law;
(2) the legal point be obvious, that is, not reasonably in
dispute; and (3) to reach the error, "[w]e need not go outside
the record or choose between competing inferences to find it[.]" 
State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355, 800 P2d 259 (1990).  If the
asserted error satisfies those criteria, this court may then
exercise its discretion to correct the error.  Ailes v. Portland
Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382, 823 P2d 956 (1991).  As this
court articulated in Ailes:
"A court's decision to recognize unpreserved or
unraised error in this manner should be made with
utmost caution.  Such an action is contrary to the
strong policies requiring preservation and raising of
error.  It also undercuts the established manner in
which an appellate court ordinarily considers an issue,
i.e., through competing arguments of adversary parties
with an opportunity to submit both written and oral
arguments to the court.  Moreover, by expressly
following the prescribed method of recognizing
unpreserved or unraised error, much greater efficiency
in the review process between appellate courts is
facilitated by giving this court the benefit of the
recognizing court's reasoning."  
Id. (emphasis in original).    
According to defendant, this court should review the
alleged error as plain error because (1) he was entitled to a
hearing on the use of the restraint, but did not receive one; (2)
the trial court never made the findings required to justify the
use of the stun belt; and (3) "this court need not go outside the
record to determine that the use of the device was prejudicial to
defendant's ability to participate in his own defense." 
Defendant also contends that the court should exercise its
discretion to correct the issue because the "gravity of the error
is extreme."  Defendant argues that the stun belt deprived him of
the ability to participate fully in his defense. 
This court long has recognized the right of a criminal
defendant to appear free of physical restraints during a jury
trial.  See State v. Smith, 11 Or 205, 8 P 343 (1883)
(recognizing principle).  In State v. Long, 195 Or 81, 244 P2d
1033 (1952), this court provided the rationale for that right,
explaining "that such restraint upon a prisoner 'inevitably tends
to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties[] and thereby
materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional
rights of defense.'"  Id. at 91 (internal citations omitted). 
Defendant argues that requiring a person to wear a stun belt is
no different than requiring a person to wear shackles.  We do not
agree.  
The rationale used in Long is not applicable in this
case.  There is no evidence in the record that the stun belt that
defendant wore at trial was visible to the jury, and, therefore,
defendant cannot claim that the jury was biased by its presence. 
Furthermore, defendant failed to provide evidence or point to
anything in the record indicating that the stun belt affected his
ability to assist in his defense.  Because defendant is unable to
satisfy the third element of the plain error criteria, this court
will not consider defendant's unpreserved claim of error.
C. Motions Regarding Count One
Defendant next takes issue with the trial court's
denial of his motion to dismiss and motion for judgment of
acquittal on Count one of his indictment.  That count alleged
aggravated murder based on murder during the course of a
burglary.  Prior to trial, defendant asserted that Count one 
failed to allege the necessary elements of burglary.  In this
court, defendant similarly argues that 
"the indictment on Count 1 in this case failed to
allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense of
Aggravated Murder, and it failed to allege facts
sufficient to inform defendant of the nature of the
underlying burglary that the state intended to prove,
so that he would be able to prepare a defense."
Defendant argues that, under ORS 163.095(2)(d), the
state was required to allege that the defendant actually
committed a crime listed in ORS 163.115(1)(b) to prove the
allegations in Count one.  Defendant further notes that in State
v. Sanders, 280 Or 685, 688-90, 572 P2d 1307 (1977), this court
held that an indictment alleging burglary must specify the crime
that the accused is alleged to have intended to commit at the
time that he or she entered or remained unlawfully.  Defendant
argues that, to properly allege aggravated felony murder based on
the underlying crime of burglary, the state must allege each of
the elements of burglary.  Without such allegations on the
state's part, defendant contends that he could not know whether
the state planned to prove that he intended to commit assault,
murder, or theft. 
This court consistently has held that "an indictment
generally is sufficient if it charges an offense in the words of
the statute."  State v. Hale, 335 Or 612, 621, 75 P3d 612 (2003). 
See also State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380, 836 P2d 1308 (1992)
(sex abuse charge was sufficiently definite and certain without
specifying the state's theory of the crime or elements of sexual
abuse); State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 597, 789 P2d 1352 (1990),
cert den, 520 US 1233 (1997) (finding that "[a]n indictment in
the language of the statute generally is sufficient").  Hale,
Rogers, and Montez demonstrate that, when alleging aggravated
felony murder, it is unnecessary to set forth the elements of the
underlying felonies.  In this case, because the state's
indictment tracks the language of ORS 163.095(2)(d) and ORS
163.115(1)(b)(C), the trial court correctly denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for judgment of
acquittal on Count one. (3)
III. GUILT-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant presents eight assignments of error that
pertain to the guilt phase of his trial.  Two of those
assignments pertain to defendant's requested jury instructions on
the elements of burglary and the elements of robbery. 
Defendant's arguments regarding those assignments are not well
taken, and an extended discussion would not benefit the public,
bench, or bar.  Therefore, we decline to address them further. 
We address defendant's remaining guilt-phase assignments of error
below.  
A. Testimony of Defendant's Forensic Expert
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in
restricting the testimony of defendant's expert witness regarding
whether the bullet that entered the victim's body would have
inflicted a fatal injury if it had not deflected off the victim's
rib.  Defendant's theory of the case was that he did not shoot
the victim intentionally and, therefore, at most had committed
the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.  Defendant testified
that he had reached over and grabbed the pistol from the table
and was bringing it up to shoot himself when the victim grabbed
it in an attempt to stop him and the pistol discharged. 
At trial, the state's medical examiner testified that
the bullet that killed the victim had entered above his left
breast, traveled downward through the tissue under his skin, and
struck his left sixth rib, which deflected it to the right and
through the victim's heart and liver.  The state's forensic
expert testified, however, that the victim had been shot at a
distance of more than five feet because the clothing that the
victim wore at the time of the shooting did not contain any
gunshot residue.  
Defendant's forensic expert, Sweeney, a criminalist who
specialized in firearms-related evidence and crime scene
reconstruction, could not form an opinion on the actual proximity
between the muzzle of the pistol and the victim's body.  When
asked whether the type of wound inflicted by the trajectory of
the bullet could have occurred with both men standing up and one
shooting straight across at the other, Sweeney responded, "No." 
According to Sweeney, it was critical for the jury to understand
that the angle from which the pistol had been fired would change
relative to the position that the victim's body had been in when
he was shot.  For example, Sweeney claimed that, if the victim
had been standing upright, then the pistol would have had to have
been fired directly overhead, pointing down; but, if the victim
had been bent over at the waist, then the pistol would have had
to have been fired at an angle out in front of the victim that
would have allowed for the established trajectory of the bullet. 
Neither party disputed that the victim's body was discovered
face-down on the floor of his kitchen and that the position of
the victim's body when shot was unknown.
In the context of that testimony, defense counsel asked
Sweeney:  "Now, if that -- the way the angle that we're looking
at, if there had been no deflection, would this particular shot
have been a fatality in your opinion?"  The state objected to
that question without stating any ground, and the trial court
sustained the objection.  Defendant rephrased the question as,
"If there is no deflection, where would that -- where would you
anticipate that bullet to go through?"  Again, the trial court
sustained the state's objection, stating that the question was
"getting into high speculation."  Defendant argued that "we're
talking about a trajectory going straight down and what I'm
trying to get at is where, if there was no deflection, where
would it have gone in the body?"  The court ruled that the
question was not relevant and added, "Okay.  But to any possible
charges with [a lesser-included offense] that question's still
not even relevant."
As indicated above, the state's contention was that
defendant killed the victim intentionally.  Defendant argues that
whether the angle at which the weapon was fired was likely to
cause death was relevant to defendant's state of mind. 
Therefore, defendant contends, the trial court erred in
sustaining the state's objection to defendant's question to
Sweeney.  Further, defendant argues that the trial court's
statement that the issue was not relevant to whether defendant
was guilty of a lesser-included offense was an impermissible
comment on the evidence under ORCP 59 E. (4)  Defendant claims
that the trial court's statement "effectively directed the jury
that it could not consider whether defendant had a reasonable
expectation that firing the weapon at such an acute angle would
cause death."  The consequence of the trial court's statement,
defendant argues, was that it deprived him of his defense,
because it precluded the jury from considering his theory of the
case.
The state contends that defendant's claim is
unpreserved because, after the trial court ruled on the
objection, defendant failed to make an offer of proof as to what
Sweeney's testimony would have been.  The state points out that,
at trial, defendant provided no argument concerning how Sweeney's
opinion would be relevant to defendant's intent.  Likewise, the
state argues that defendant never objected to the trial court's
ruling on the grounds that it violated ORCP 59 E.  Accordingly,
the state argues that we should decline to consider defendant's
arguments for the first time on review.  Defendant responds that,
because the substance of Sweeney's proffered testimony was
apparent from the context of his direct examination, an offer of
proof following the trial court's ruling was not required under
OEC 103(1)(b). (5) 
To assure that appellate courts are able to determine
whether a trial court erred in excluding evidence and whether
that error was likely to have affected the trial's result, an
offer of proof ordinarily is required to preserve error when a
trial court excludes testimony.  See State v. Affeld, 307 Or 125,
128, 764 P2d 220 (1988) (overruling line of cases holding that
offer of proof was not required on cross-examination).  In
Affeld, this court stated:
"Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the
Oregon Constitution requires this court to affirm
judgments of lower courts if, in the opinion of
this court, the judgment achieved the correct
result, even if error was committed.  That
constitutional provision makes it incumbent on
lower courts and the parties appearing in lower
courts to ensure that the record reviewed by this
court is adequate for this court to make a
reasoned decision.  A record can be adequate in
situations in which the scope of testimony is
restricted by the trial court only if an offer of
proof is made. * * *
"The only situations in which an offer of proof is
not required are those situations in which an offer of
proof is impossible because of a trial court's refusal
to allow the offer of proof to be made."
307 Or at 128-29.
Following the trial court ruling at issue here,
defendant made no attempt to inform the trial court of the
purported relevance of Sweeney's opinion.  Defendant asserts for
the first time on review that Sweeney's testimony about whether
the nondeflected trajectory of the bullet would have been fatal
is relevant to the issue of intent. (6)  Without an offer of
proof to that effect, however, defendant failed to make an
adequate record for this court to review.  See State v. Smith,
319 Or 37, 43-44, 872 P2d 966 (1994) (in death-penalty case,
absence of offer of proof precluded court from considering
whether expert witness's testimony concerning length of time
defendant likely would spend in state hospital if found guilty
except for insanity was erroneously excluded and, if so, whether
that exclusion was harmful).  Likewise, defendant never argued at
trial that the trial court's statement was an impermissible
comment on the evidence under ORCP 59 E; defendant raises that
claim for the first time on review.  Furthermore, our scrutiny of
the record does not support defendant's contention that the
relevance of the desired testimony was apparent from the context
of Sweeney's direct examination.  
Consequently, we are unable to determine whether the
trial court erred in restricting Sweeney's testimony and, if so,
whether that alleged error affected the result in this case. 
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant failed to adequately
preserve that issue for this court's review.  See State v. Wyatt,
331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (preservation of error requires
party to provide trial court with explanation specific enough to
allow court to identify alleged error and correct it if
warranted).
B. Cross-Examination Regarding Defendant's Previous Felony
Convictions
Three of defendant's assignments of error involve the
prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant regarding his prior
felony convictions.
At the conclusion of defendant's direct testimony
during the guilt-phase of the proceeding, defense counsel
questioned defendant about his prior felony convictions. 
Defendant acknowledged that he had been convicted of unauthorized
use of a vehicle in California, attempted arson in Nevada, and
accessory to murder after the fact in Nevada.  Defendant could
not recall if he also had been convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm.  At the end of that exchange, defendant
stated:  "I'm also -- I also * * *," but defense counsel stopped
him with the word, "No."  The prosecutor's first question of
defendant on cross-examination was, "[W]hat other felonies have
you been convicted of?"  Defendant replied, "I've also been
convicted of a Manslaughter charge in 1981."  Defense counsel
then asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury.  The
court replied:
"No.  You can make a motion at the appropriate
time afterwards.  Your motion will be credited.
"But the question that was asked was legitimate. 
The answer that was given I will instruct the jury to
disregard because it exceeds the fifteen year period. 
But there was nothing in the question that would have
led him to give that answer."
The court next instructed the jury:
"Members of the jury, convictions can be used solely for the purpose of testing someone's
credibility.  The law says that one may only be asked
questions on convictions that have occurred within the
last fifteen years.[ (7)]  So you are to disregard
any convictions or any answers that reflect a
conviction that occurred prior to fifteen years from
this date * * *."
Defense counsel did not except to that instruction or ask for a
supplemental instruction.  The prosecutor resumed cross-examination of defendant but was interrupted by defense counsel
who stated, "Excuse me, Your Honor.  Before we -- I've got a
procedural matter."  The trial court then held a bench conference
during which defendant apparently moved for a mistrial.  That
conference, however, was unrecorded.  The trial court allowed
cross-examination to continue and, following a brief redirect,
heard defendant's motion for mistrial outside the presence of the
jury.
During that hearing, the trial court asked the
prosecutor if he was aware of another felony conviction during
the permissible 15-year period.  The prosecutor responded that he
was trying to elicit a felony conviction in 1998 in California
for receiving stolen property based on his reading of a certified
copy of conviction.  The prosecutor's reading of the certified
copy of conviction, however, was incorrect.  The prosecutor
brought his misunderstanding to the trial court's attention after
the following exchange:
"THE COURT:  Okay.  So if there is actually
another felony within the fifteen-year period then [the
prosecutor] would not be unethical or inappropriate in
asking the question, 'Do you have any other felonies?'
"[PROSECUTOR]:  That's my understanding, Your
Honor.
"THE COURT:  So that's why the Motion for Mistrial
was denied and that's why I didn't send the jury out. 
I assumed he would not be asking that unless there was
another felony in there.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, if I may comment. 
I believe that the other felony is in connection with
this one, the Manslaughter, is it not?
"[PROSECUTOR]:  It is, Your Honor.
"THE COURT:  It could be in connection with it,
but it's not one that's listed and he would be able to
list that.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I'd want to make
a little record here if I may.
"THE COURT:  Sure.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And I have some concerns. 
And the reason I have some concerns is timing.  And
[the prosecutor] has -- knows fairly well that my
client is spontaneous in response.  And * * *
"THE COURT:  (Interposing) We've noticed that.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes.  And I am walking back
to my table when he asked that statement.  He knows
darn good and well that the Manslaughter is not
admissible.  He makes that statement while I'm doing
something else.
"And, you know, the whole thing -- it was set up. 
It -- to me, it just -- I have grave concerns about the
way the process went and I think that [the prosecutor]
knew full well that that was not admissible.  He used
it at a time when I was distracted so I could not step
in and he knew exactly what the purpose was and it was
to impeach him on a crime that was not an impeachable
crime.
"THE COURT:  Okay.  But the question he asked is a
legitimate question as long as there [were] other
felonies not elicited in direct examination.  He's not
required to ask 'in the last fifteen years.'  It might
be a better question but then there might be a
complaint that he's insinuating to the jury that there
are other felonies beyond the 15-year period.
"So the question was appropriate.  He had a basis
for the question and unfortunately [defendant] didn't
give one of the theft cases, he gave a 1980 one.  And
the jury has been so cautioned.  Obviously it is always
difficult to unring the bell but the motion has been
made.  The motion has been denied."
Following that discussion, the prosecutor stated:
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, in regard to that
motion I have to indicate to the Court that in the
certified copy of conviction that I'm looking at, I
represented to the Court a moment ago that Defendant
was convicted of Receipt of Stolen Property.
"Your Honor, at the time that I asked the question
that was my impression.  As the Court was questioning
me I looked at the front page of this conviction and I
come to find that the Defendant pled guilty and was
sentenced only on Count I of that indictment.  I was in
error, Your Honor.  I thought he was convicted of Count
II as well and in looking at the information I noticed
that the other two are misdemeanors.
"As I'm asking the question I'm looking at Count
II, I see a felony; I ask the question.  For that I
apologize and I did not mean to misrepresent to the
Court * * *
"THE COURT:  (Interposing) So to make sure the
record is absolutely clear then, is there no other
felony within the fifteen years?
"[PROSECUTOR]:  That seems to be the case, Your
Honor.  I don't have another felony within the fifteen
years.  It's the Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle;
that's my mistake.  I asked for other felonies.  It was
my impression that he'd been convicted of Receiving
Stolen Property as well and in looking at the front
page of the document it appears he pled guilty only to
Count I, Unauthorized Use.
"* * * * *
"[PROSECUTOR]:  My intention, Your Honor, was not
to elicit an answer on the Manslaughter.
"THE COURT:  I know that.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  I'm aware of that and we've
discussed that with counsel and I might represent I
don't know that the Defendant is spontaneous or not. 
I've seen him on the videotapes.  I've never seen him
testify.  I had no idea whether he was spontaneous or
not.  The fact remains, Your Honor, the question was
asked; the Defendant answered it.  That's not the
answer I expected.  And so * * *
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And based on his statements
of -- and the search of the records which I appreciate,
I would again move for mistrial.
"THE COURT:  Your motion is stronger but for the
reasons previously stated the motion is still going to
be denied.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you and I would accept
your ruling.
"THE COURT:  Okay.  I believe the instruction that
I gave the jury hopefully will resolve the problem."
In instructing the jury at the end of the case, the trial court
explained that prior convictions may be used only for purposes of
impeachment and not as evidence of propensity:
"Now, if you find that a witness has been
convicted of a crime you may consider this testimony
only for its bearing, if any, on the believability of
that witness's testimony.
"Likewise, if you find that [defendant] has been
previously convicted of a crime you may consider this
conviction only for its bearing, if any, on the
believability of [defendant's] testimony. 
Specifically, you may not use this evidence for the
purpose of drawing the inference that because
[defendant] was convicted of a previous crime,
[defendant] may be guilty of the crimes charged in this
particular case."
In three assignments of error, defendant claims that
the trial court erred by (1) denying defendant's immediate
request to be heard outside the presence of the jury on his
objection to the state's question; (2) giving a curative
instruction without first allowing defendant to object to that
instruction; and (3) denying defendant's subsequent motion for a
mistrial.  Defendant makes the following combined argument in
support of those three assignments of error. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's question
prejudiced defendant's right to an impartial jury under Article
I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution as well as the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and deprived
defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial.  Defendant
contends that the result of the prosecutor's question -- i.e.,
disclosing to the jury that defendant had committed a prior
manslaughter -- was extremely prejudicial.  Defendant also argues
that no instruction could cure the overwhelming probability that
the jury would use the knowledge of that conviction as evidence
of defendant's propensity to kill.  Moreover, defendant maintains
that the trial court's instruction to the jury that the
manslaughter conviction was not admissible because it was more
than 15 years old did not mitigate that prejudice but, rather,
added to it because "[i]t effectively told the jury that the
reason that the evidence was not allowed was one of those
proverbial 'technicalities' that is just the sort of thing that
infuriates the lay public against defense attorneys and those
whom they represent."  Consequently, defendant concludes, the
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion
for a mistrial.
The state contends that defendant's claims of error are
unpreserved and factually incorrect.  First, the state argues
that defendant did not object to the prosecutor's question but,
rather, asked to be heard outside the jury's presence, an action
that the court interpreted as a motion for a mistrial.  Because
defendant did not object to either the prosecutor's question or
the trial court's contemporaneous refusal of his request to be
heard, the state argues that defendant's claim is unpreserved. 
Morever, the state contends that any error was harmless because
the trial court ultimately credited defendant's motion for a
mistrial as timely and fully considered the grounds put forth to
support the motion.
Likewise, the state contends that defendant's claim of
error regarding the trial court's curative instruction is also
unpreserved.  Relying on ORCP 59 H, (8) the state argues that
defendant made no exception to the instruction and did not argue
in his motion for a mistrial that irreversible prejudice resulted
from the prosecutor's question or, that the instruction itself
was prejudicial.  Therefore, the state concludes, this court
should decline to consider that unpreserved claim of error. 
Finally, the state argues that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a
mistrial.  The state asserts that the trial court was in the best
position to assess any potential prejudice and to rectify it. 
Consequently, the state contends, the trial court's determination
that a curative instruction would be sufficient to mitigate any
prejudice and that declaring a mistrial was unnecessary, was
within the trial court's sound discretion.  The state also points
out that defendant has not demonstrated that the jury failed to
follow the court's instruction.
In answer to the first of defendant's assignments of
error here, our review of the record supports the state's
position that defendant did not, in fact, object to the
prosecutor's question.  Instead, defendant requested to be heard
on a motion for a mistrial outside the presence of the jury. 
Although the court denied that request when made, it credited the
request as timely and heard defendant on the merits of the motion
at the close of cross-examination and a brief redirect
examination.  Hence, the premise of defendant's assignment of
error (that the trial court did not allow him to object to the
state's question) is not supported by the record.
In his second assignment of error here, defendant
claims that the trial court did not allow him to object to the
curative instruction regarding his previous manslaughter
conviction.  Our review of the record, however, reveals that
defendant made no effort to object or take exception to that
instruction and did not request that the court give a
supplemental instruction.  Consequently, defendant's claim that
the trial court did not allow him to object is not supported by
the record.  Moreover, under ORCP 59 H, a failure to except to
the trial court's instruction on a specific theory generally bars
appellate relief on that theory, because the error is not
adequately preserved.  Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l., 297 Or 10,
18, 681 P2d 114 (1984); see also Wyatt, 331 Or at 343 (to
preserve issue for appellate consideration, party must object
with sufficient clarity to allow trial court to consider alleged
error).  Likewise, a party's failure to request a proper
instruction precludes appellate relief for the trial court's
refusal to give the instruction.  Brown, 310 Or at 355.  Because
defendant did not object or take exception to the instruction
immediately after it was given and did not request a supplemental
instruction, ORCP 59 H and this court's preservation
jurisprudence preclude review of any claim of error respecting
the trial court's curative instruction.
Defendant's final assignment of error here contends
that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a
mistrial.  Whether to grant a mistrial is a determination
committed to the "sound discretion of the trial court," Rogers,
313 Or at 381, because the trial judge is in the best position
"to assess and to rectify the potential prejudice to the
defendant," State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 164, 786 P2d 161 (1990). 
Thus, we review whether a mistrial should have been granted for
abuse of discretion.  State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24, 791 P2d 836
(1990); see also State v. Wright, 323 Or 8, 19, 913 P2d 321
(1996) ("[T]he trial court's choice not to declare a mistrial
but, instead, to give a cautionary instruction, falls within the
permissible range of choices committed to the court's
discretion.").  Even if we find a prosecutor's conduct to be
improper, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless the
effect of that conduct is to deny a defendant a fair trial. 
Wright, 323 Or at 19; State v. Hoffman, 236 Or 98, 108, 385 P2d
741 (1963).  That is so because the "presumably harmful effect"
of prosecutorial misconduct may be obviated by a proper
instruction.  State v. Wederski, 230 Or 57, 60, 368 P2d 393
(1962).  Therefore, the dispositive question on this issue is
"whether the purportedly curative instruction was sufficient to
unring the bell."  State v. White, 303 Or 333, 342, 736 P2d 552
(1987); see also State v. Jones, 279 Or 55, 62, 566 P2d 867
(1977) ("There may, however, be cases in which the testimony
which the jury is instructed to 'disregard' is so prejudicial
that, as a practical matter, 'the bell once rung, cannot be
unrung' by such an admonishment.").
In Jones, the state charged the defendant with rape. 
At trial, the prosecutor persisted in insinuating to the jury
that the defendant had committed rapes many times before,
although the prosecutor knew that there was no proof of any prior
conviction for rape.  As one improper tactic, the prosecutor
called a police officer who testified that another witness had
stated in the officer's presence that the defendant "had done it
so many times before."  Jones, 279 Or at 61-62.  After the
defendant objected, the trial court instructed the jury "'to
disregard the statement made by the last witness [the officer]. 
You are directed to erase it from your mind and pay no attention
to it.'"  Id. at 62.  Subsequently, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion for a mistrial.  On review, this court
concluded that that cautionary instruction was insufficient to
unring the bell:
"This prosecuting attorney, well knowing that he had no
proof that defendant has been previously convicted of
rape (as indicated by the record of various other
offenses offered by him in evidence), persisted in
making comments and insinuations to that effect,
including the clearly improper attempt to get before
the jury the alleged statement by [the prosecution
witness] that he had 'done it so many times before.'
"In a prosecution for rape in which, as in this
case, the jury must decide between the credibility of
the prosecuting witness and the defendant, the
prejudice resulting from the admission of such evidence
was so pervasive as to lead us to the conclusion that,
as a result, defendant was denied a fair trial."
Jones, 279 Or at 63.  Accordingly, this court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
In White, the prosecutor remarked in opening statement
that the defendant had refused to testify in his codefendant's
trial.  Immediately thereafter, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial.  The trial court concluded that the remark was
inappropriate but denied the motion on grounds that, at that
stage of the proceeding, "an indication to the jury that whether
or not [the defendant] chose to testify in a prior proceeding
[was] not relevant[.]"  White, 303 Or at 337.  The trial court
then instructed the jury that the defendant's refusal to testify
was "not relevant" and not "probative of the evidence in this
case."  Id. at 338.  On review, however, this court reached a
contrary conclusion.
In light of established state and federal 
constitutional precedents prohibiting the prosecution from
drawing the jury's attention to the defendant's exercise of the
right to remain silent, this court determined that the prosecutor
was well aware of that precedent and "deliberately chose to
offend the rules."  Id. at 340-41.  Given the prosecutor's
deliberate injection of evidence regarding the defendant's
exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent, this court
ruled that the admission of such evidence is "'usually reversible
error * * * if it is done in a context whereupon inferences
prejudicial to the defendant are likely to be drawn by the
jury.'"  Id. at 341-42 (quoting State v. Smallwood, 277 Or 503,
505-06, 561 P2d 600 (1977)).  In view of the "presumably harmful
effect" of such prosecutorial misconduct, this court concluded
that the trial judge had been required to do something more than
simply instruct the jury that defendant's refusal to testify in
his codefendant's trial was irrelevant.  Id. at 343-44.  In
White, this court noted that "the misconduct * * * was at least
as serious as that involved in [Jones], and that the purportedly
curative instruction here was not even as strong as that given in
Jones."  303 Or at 344.  As a result, this court held that the
defendant was entitled to a new trial.  Id.
Here, as stated above, immediately following the
prosecutor's objectionable question, the trial court gave a
curative instruction to the jury to disregard any convictions
that were not within the permissible 15-year period.  That
instruction was significantly stronger that the statement given
in White; by contrast, it included an explanation of the sole
purpose for admitting prior convictions and the reason why the
reference to defendant's manslaughter conviction was to be
disregarded.  Additionally, the trial court expressly instructed
the jury that defendant's prior convictions could not be used as
evidence of his propensity to commit the crimes charged in the
present case.  "[J]urors are assumed to have followed their
instructions, absent an overwhelming probability that they would
be unable to do so."  Smith, 310 Or at 26.  Moreover, on the
facts of this record, it is difficult to say that the
prosecutor's behavior, though careless, was a deliberate attempt
to admit improper evidence.  
Finally, the admissibility principle that the
prosecutor's actions offended here involved an evidentiary rule
and not a constitutional right, as in White.  Thus, the
"presumably harmful effect" of the prosecutor's conduct in this
case was not of such magnitude that we can conclude that a proper
curative instruction could not ameliorate any potential
prejudice.
In view of the foregoing, as well as this court's
deference to the trial court's assessment of the need for a
mistrial, Wright, 323 Or at 12, we conclude that the trial
court's cautionary instructions to the jury were sufficient to
protect against prejudice to defendant and, therefore, its denial
of defendant's motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of
discretion.  See State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 177, 37 P3d 157
(2001) (finding curative instruction sufficient to "neutralize
the possibility of prejudice to the defendant" where witness's
statement contained inference that defendant failed polygraph
examination); Montez, 309 Or at 596 (concluding that mistrial not
warranted on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where
prosecutor's question was not intended to elicit inadmissible
testimony about defendant's prior criminal conduct).
C. Jury Instructions Regarding Lesser-Included Offenses
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in
denying his requests that (1) the jury be instructed that
manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of aggravated murder;
and (2) the verdict form include the lesser-included offenses of
murder and manslaughter as alternatives to both counts of
aggravated murder. 
In proposing jury instructions to the trial court,
defendant requested that the jury be instructed on first-degree
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to both charges of
aggravated murder (Counts one and two) and the charge of
intentional murder (Count three).  Based on defendant's testimony
that he did not intentionally kill the victim, the trial court
agreed to give the first-degree manslaughter instruction as a
lesser-included offense of the intentional murder charge.  On
defendant's request that the instruction also be given with
respect to both counts of aggravated murder, the trial court
concluded:
"You have requested the lesser included offense of
Manslaughter in the First Degree both to the Aggravated
Murder charges and to the Murder charge[].  If the jury
was to find -- not to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that a burglary or a robbery occurred, then obviously
they have to bounce down to the Murder charge.  And
then if they don't find an intentional killing, then
they can go to the lesser included offense of
Manslaughter in the First Degree.
"If they were to find that he did not
intentionally kill [the victim] in the aggravated, then
they would really be bouncing all the way down to the
reckless conduct for Manslaughter.  However, with the
way the instructions are set up they would still be
required to go through the charges that we presently
have in the indictment and they can go in any order,
obviously, but if they find him not guilty of
intentionally causing the death in the Aggravated
Murder then obviously in the next charge, Count III,
they would find him not guilty of the Murder.
"So I don't see any reason to give a lesser
included in both of those.  I think it would be
extremely confusing to the jury.  Because they're going
to get -- if they do that scenario, they’re going to
get to the lesser included Manslaughter in the First
Degree.
"* * * * *
"Because they still have to render a verdict on
Intentional Murder."
At that point, defendant's counsel indicated that the trial
court's sequence of instructions could generate "potential
confusion," but did not articulate how that confusion would
occur.  In response, the trial court explained its approach
again:
"[W]hat I've set it up as Aggravated Murder will
be decided by the jury.
"* * * * *
"If they find him not guilty of Aggravated Murder
then they have to go to the Murder charge because it is
one of the counts in the indictment.  They can't --
unless there's a hung jury, they can't fail to vote on
the Murder charge.  So they have to vote on the Murder
charge.  So I have the Manslaughter in the First Degree
as a lesser included of the Intentional Murder, not of
the Aggravated Murder.
"Because they have to get -- if they stop
somewhere along the line, they do not get to the lesser
included.  If they don't stop at Aggravated Murder or
Murder then they have to deliberate on the Manslaughter
in the First Degree."
After a recess, defendant objected to the proposed
verdict form on the ground that it did not indicate that
intentional murder and first-degree manslaughter were lesser-included offenses of aggravated murder.  Defense counsel stated 
that defendant's position was that "the verdict form in its form
does not give the jury an impression that they have an
alternative to Aggravated Murder either under Counts I or II;
that they must either vote guilty or not guilty[.]"  Referring to
its previous decision concerning the jury instructions, described
above, the trial court reiterated that it would give first-degree
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of the murder charge. 
The court indicated that, in charging the jury, it would explain 
that the jury would deliberate on the lesser-included offense
only if the jury found defendant not guilty of the charged
offenses of aggravated murder and intentional murder.  Defendant
excepted to that ruling.  Neither defendant nor the state
requested lesser included instructions on felony murder or the
crimes of first-degree burglary or first-degree robbery.
The trial court's instructions included the following
statement:  "[R]emember the instructions should always be taken
as a whole.  Don't concentrate on any particular instruction."  
After instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated murder
and murder, the trial court, in relation to the first-degree
manslaughter instruction, informed the jury, "Now, when you
deliberate you should first consider the charged offense of
Murder.  Only if you find the Defendant not guilty of the charged
offense may you consider the lesser included offense of
Manslaughter in the First Degree."
Defendant argues that he was entitled to instructions
on intentional murder and first-degree manslaughter as lesser-included offenses to the aggravated murder charges.  Defendant
reasons that, because intentional murder is necessarily a lesser-included offense to aggravated murder, and because manslaughter
is a lesser-included offense to intentional murder, manslaughter
is also a lesser-included offense to aggravated murder. 
Defendant contends that, because the evidence justified a
manslaughter instruction, the trial court's refusal to include
lesser-included offenses to each aggravated murder count violated
his rights under ORS 136.460 (9) and ORS 136.465 and his rights
under the United States Constitution. (11) (10)  Although the
trial court instructed the jury on first-degree manslaughter as a
lesser-included offense to the murder charge, defendant submits
that that procedure "did not alleviate the harm" from the trial
court's failure to so instruct on the aggravated murder counts. 
Defendant alleges the following types of harm: (1) the jury might
have found that defendant committed a robbery and a burglary, but
did not cause the victim's death intentionally, and yet
nevertheless convict him of aggravated murder rather than leave
him unaccountable for the robbery and burglary; and (2) "the jury
was not told that it could find defendant guilty of manslaughter
under each or any of the counts[.]"  Defendant contends that the
evidence in this case could have supported a "number of different
possible combinations of guilt on the principal charges and
lesser-included offenses."  Therefore, defendant concludes,
"[b]ecause many of the various lawful ways of resolving the
conflicts in the evidence were foreclosed by the instructions as
given, the denial of the requested instructions was not
harmless."  Correspondingly, defendant asserts that the trial
court erred in refusing to include intentional murder and first-degree manslaughter on the verdict form as lesser-included
offenses of each aggravated murder count.
The state argues that defendant's arguments fail for
several reasons:  (1) the trial court did, in fact, instruct the
jury on both murder and the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter in relation to the intentional murder count;
(2) the court properly considered intentional murder as the
functional equivalent of a lesser-included offense to counts one
and two; and (3) the jury rendered three rejections of the theory
that defendant did not intentionally kill the victim by
unanimously finding defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated
murder and one count of intentional murder.
In State v. Washington, 273 Or 829, 836, 543 P2d 1058
(1975), this court provided the following framework concerning
lesser included offense instructions:
"[E]ither the defendant or the prosecution can
request an instruction as to lesser offenses which are
included either under the statutory definition or under
the indictment charging the crime.
"The single limitation on the right of either the
prosecution or the defendant to request lesser included
offense instructions under [ORS 136.460 and ORS
136.465] is that there must be evidence, or an
inference which can be drawn from the evidence, which
supports the requested instruction so that the jury
could rationally and consistently find the defendant
guilty of the lesser offense and innocent of the
greater."
Furthermore, in State v. Naylor, 291 Or 191, 195, 629 P2d 1308
(1981), this court stated:
"A defendant is entitled to an instruction on lesser
included offenses if there is a disputed issue of fact
enabling the jury to find that all the elements of the
greater offense have not been proven, but that all the
elements of one or more of the lesser offenses have
been proven."
Aggravated murder "may be defined as a murder that is committed
'intentionally,' plus something more.  In that sense, intentional
murder necessarily is a lesser-included offense of aggravated
murder."  State v. Wille, 317 Or 487, 494, 858 P2d 128 (1993);
see also State v. Isom, 313 Or 391, 407, 837 P2d 491 (1992) ("The
crime of intentional murder is 'necessarily included' in the
crime of aggravated murder.").  And, "an indictment for murder in
the first degree 'necessarily involves all other grades of
homicide which the evidence tends to establish,'" State v.
Wilson, 182 Or 681, 684, 189 P2d 403 (1948), which would include
first-degree manslaughter.  Thus, defendant was entitled to an
instruction that first-degree manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of aggravated murder, and the trial court erred in not
giving that instruction under counts one and two.
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution, however, "requires this court to affirm judgments
of lower courts if, in the opinion of this court, the judgment
achieved the correct result, even if error was committed." 
Affeld, 307 Or at 128.  Further, we note that a jury instruction
does not constitute reversible error unless it prejudiced the
defendant when the instructions are considered as a whole.  State
v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 38, 828 P2d 1006 (1992).  Thus, the issue
here becomes whether the trial court's error was harmless.
In the present case, the record reflects that the trial
court instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated murder
(including the elements of burglary and robbery), intentional
murder, and first-degree manslaughter, albeit not in the sequence
that defendant requested.  Furthermore, we must presume that the
jury followed the trial court's charge that it consider all of
the jury instructions as a whole.  Smith, 310 Or at 26.  In any
event, the case was submitted to the jury with complete and
correct statements of the law necessary for it to properly
determine whether the state had proved defendant's guilt on the
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, we find it
difficult to posit that, in view of the jury instructions as a
whole, defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree
manslaughter in relation to the intentional murder charge, rather
than in relation to the aggravated murder charges.  In our view,
the trial court's instructions to the jury, as a whole, were
sufficient to inform the jury of the possible verdicts it could
return on the various charges, based on how it resolved the
facts.  Consequently, defendant was not prejudiced by the
instructions themselves or the sequence in which they
corresponded to the verdict form.  We conclude, therefore, that
the trial court's error was harmless.
IV. PENALTY-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant presents 12 assignments of error that pertain
to the penalty phase of his trial. Five of those assignments of
error raise issues pertaining to the consecutive sentences, which
arose from the assault on Dalton.  Defendant's arguments
regarding those assignments of error are not well taken, and we
do not discuss them further.  However, defendant's remaining
assignments of error present issues that warrant further
discussion. 
A. Evidence Regarding Defendant's Role in Prior Murder  
Four of defendant's assignments of error relate to
state evidence presented during the penalty phase of defendant's
trial concerning his role in the 1985 murder of Marjorie Kincaid. 

In 1989, defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of
accessory to murder after the fact in Nevada for his role in the
death of Kincaid.  While awaiting trial on that charge, defendant
shared a prison cell with Dennis Ray Wright and spoke to him
about the Kincaid murder.  During the penalty phase, Wright
testified that defendant had admitted raping and murdering
Kincaid. (12)  Wright also testified that defendant had told
Wright how he committed the crime, as well as how he had
attempted to destroy any incriminating evidence.  Finally, Wright
testified that defendant had told him that, when the state failed
to convict him, he was going to kill another woman and "make her
squeal just like the pig did -- the other pig that he killed."
Defendant argues that the trial court should have
excluded the evidence regarding the Kincaid murder as unfairly
prejudicial under OEC 403, (13) both because defendant was not
prepared to defend against a second homicide and because that
evidence was unduly inflammatory. (14)  In response, the state
contends that the trial court properly admitted the evidence
regarding the Kincaid murder and that admission of that evidence
did not violate OEC 403.  The state asserts that evidence
indicating that defendant committed a previous murder was
directly relevant to two questions that the jury was required to
consider for sentencing purposes: (1) "[w]hether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society,"
and (2) "[w]hether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), (D).  In addition, the state
points out that the trial court took measures to mitigate the
potential for unfair prejudice.  
As an initial matter, it is apparent that evidence of
defendant's previous involvement in the Kincaid murder is 
relevant to prove defendant's propensity for future
dangerousness.  See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 210 n 3,
785 P2d 350 (1990), cert den, 510 US 969 (1993) (explaining that
evidence of defendant's prior unrelated crimes "clearly would be
admissible in the penalty phase as relevant to question two,
defendant's future dangerousness"); Montez, 309 Or at 611
("Because defendant's confessions of prior crimes were highly
relevant to the jury's consideration of [the questions in ORS
163.150], we conclude that those confessions, even if
uncorroborated, were properly admitted during the penalty phase
of defendant's trial.").  The trial court correctly concluded
that evidence of defendant's involvement in the Kincaid murder
was relevant.  
Moreover, contrary to defendant's position on review,
the trial court was not required to exclude the evidence
regarding the Kincaid murder as unfairly prejudicial.  In Moore,
324 Or at 407-08, this court determined that, "[i]n the context
of OEC 403, 'unfair prejudice' means 'an undue tendency to
suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly although not
always an emotional one.'"  That is not the nature of the
evidence here.  As the trial court correctly concluded, the
proffered evidence was prejudicial in the sense that it was
highly probative, but not unfairly so.  
Furthermore, the trial court took a number of measures
to mitigate the potential for unfair prejudice.  First, the trial
court excluded from evidence all photographs regarding the
Kincaid murder with the exception of those that depicted the
ransacking of the Kincaid home.  Therefore, although the jurors
heard testimony concerning the Kincaid murder, those jurors did
not view images likely to inflame or distract them.  Second, as
was his right, defendant had the opportunity to rebut the state's
assertions regarding his involvement in the Kincaid murder. 
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury "to weigh the
evidence calmly and dispassionately and to decide this case on
its merits," as well as not "to allow bias, sympathy or prejudice
any place in [its] deliberations."  
Defendant's claim that the Kincaid evidence was
unfairly prejudicial because he was unprepared to respond to it
is without merit.  A party's lack of preparedness to meet
evidence is not a factor under OEC 403 for determining whether
that evidence should be excluded.  Furthermore, defendant does
not contend that he did not receive discovery concerning the
evidence in question.  Finally, the record indicates that
defendant was prepared to and, in fact, did present evidence to
rebut the state's theory of defendant's level of involvement in
the Kincaid murder, as explained further below. 
Defendant attempted to rebut the state's evidence
regarding the Kincaid murder by introducing testimony from
Christopher Bubel (Bubel).  Bubel, an investigator for the Clark
County Public Defender's Office in Las Vegas, Nevada, originally
investigated the Kincaid murder.  After Bubel testified, defense
counsel asked the court to reopen examination of Bubel on "an
issue as to whether or not [defendant] was capable, physically
capable at the time of the Kincaid homicide to perform a
homicide."  The prosecutor objected on the ground that the
testimony would be "hearsay from either a document or a
doctor." (15)  The trial court agreed and found Bubel's
proposed testimony to be hearsay, "because it appears that Mr.
Bubel would be giving his opinion based upon information that he
had no personal knowledge of."  The trial court did, however,
offer defendant an opportunity to "put on an offer of proof." 
Defendant never made that offer of proof.  
Defendant asserts that the trial court was obligated to
admit defendant's evidence to rebut the assertion that defendant
had committed the Kincaid murder.  Defendant therefore claims
that the trial court's exclusion of that evidence on hearsay and
confusion grounds was error.  Defendant also asserts that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence that he was physically
unable to commit the Kincaid murder.  Defendant contends that
that evidence was relevant to rebut the state's theory of that
crime and because its admission neither would have confused the
jury nor would have unduly delayed the trial. 
In response, the state argues that, by failing to make
an offer of proof as to the excluded evidence, defendant did not
adequately preserve that claim.  
This court previously has held that, to preserve a
claim of error relating to the exclusion of evidence on relevance
grounds, a party ordinarily must make an offer of proof as to the
content of the excluded evidence.  State v. Wright, 323 Or 8 at
13; State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 459-60, 800 P2d 277 (1990);
see also State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (to
preserve an issue regarding exclusion of evidence, "a defendant
must at least * * * sufficiently outline the nature of his
testimony so that the trial court, and the reviewing court, can
[intelligently consider the ruling]").  Here, the trial court
expressly offered defendant an opportunity to put Bubel's
testimony on the record to preserve his argument that the
evidence was wrongfully excluded.  Defendant declined that
opportunity, and, therefore, the trial court was not provided an
occasion to reconsider the original ruling and correct any error. 
Furthermore, this court lacks the information necessary to
determine whether the exclusion was erroneous and, if so, whether
that error affected any of defendant's substantial rights. (16) 
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has not preserved the
issue for review.  
In his next assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erroneously denied his request for a limiting
instruction regarding evidence of his involvement with the
Kincaid murder.  According to defendant, when evidence is
admissible for only a limited purpose, a trial court must provide
an instruction ensuring the appropriate use of the evidence.  In
support, defendant relies on OEC 105, which provides: 
"When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible to another party
or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly."
Defendant contends that, because the jury was permitted to
consider the Kincaid evidence only in regard to the issue of
future dangerousness, OEC 105 applies.  Consequently, defendant
argues that, without the appropriate instruction, "there was a
high risk that the jury improperly considered the prior bad acts
evidence as propensity evidence to decide that defendant
committed the crime at issue in this case deliberately[.]"  As a
result, defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to
provide a limiting instruction to the jury constituted reversible
error. 
The state responds by arguing that defendant's proposed
jury instruction was improper.  At trial, defendant requested the
following jury instruction:
"[Defendant] has pled guilty to accessory after the
fact to the homicide involving Ms. Kincaid; [the
prosecutor] is going to be presenting you evidence
that's going to try to show that [defendant] had a more
direct involvement in that homicide; that is offered
solely for the purpose of you determining his future
dangerousness."
The state claims that defendant's proposed instruction was not
only an incorrect statement of the law, but that it also
constituted an improper comment on the evidence.  
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (17) requires a trial court to
instruct the jury to consider "any aggravating evidence," as well
as mitigating evidence, in determining "[w]hether the defendant
should receive a death sentence."  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  Here,
if the jury believed the state's evidence regarding the level of
defendant's involvement in the Kincaid murder, the jury could
consider that evidence as a form of aggravating evidence. 
Accordingly, because defendant's proposed jury instruction would
have prevented the jury from considering such evidence, that
instruction would have been erroneous.  See State v. Guzek, 336
Or 424, 437, 86 P3d 1106 (2004) ("After the 1995 and 1997
amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B), the state now has an
additional express statutory avenues to introduce evidence
against a defendant, because it now may introduce 'any
aggravating evidence' that is not relevant to the first three
statutory questions and that pertains to a statutory question
that is not subject to any burden of proof.").  (Emphasis in
original.)  As a result, we conclude that the trial court
correctly rejected defendant's proposed jury instruction.
B. Testimony of Defendant's Former Girlfriend
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in
sustaining the state's objection on relevance grounds to
testimony that defendant should not receive the death penalty and
in instructing the jury to disregard that testimony.
During the penalty phase, defense counsel asked
defendant's former girlfriend, Cheryl Keil, the following
question on cross-examination:
"Ms. Keil, given all the good times that you've
had with [defendant], all the bad times that you've had
with [defendant], do you want this jury to impose the
death penalty?"
The prosecutor objected, but Keil answered "[a]bsolutely not"
before the trial court could rule on the objection.  The trial
court determined that the question was legitimate and allowed
Keil to answer; Keil stated, "I do not believe that he should be
put to death."  During a subsequent recess, however, the trial
court discussed the issue with counsel.  The trial court
determined that Keil's testimony lacked the proper foundation and
therefore was not relevant to defendant's character or
background, or any circumstances of the offense pursuant to ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B).  The trial court based that decision on its
reading of Wright, wherein this court had been unable to identify
a rational connection between a lay witness's answer to the
question, "Do you think that defendant should be given the death
penalty?," and the criteria set out in ORS 163.150.  323 Or at
15-18.  The trial court concluded that Keil's opinion as to
whether defendant should receive the death penalty was only her
"preference." (18)  Upon making that determination, the trial
court asked if defense counsel had anything more to add on the
matter, to which defense counsel replied, "No."  The trial court
then informed the jury that its previous ruling had been
incorrect and instructed the jury to disregard Keil's answer to
the question.  Defendant made no objection to that instruction.
Relying on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, defendant argues that the trial
court's striking of Keil's testimony violated his constitutional
right "to have the jury consider all mitigating evidence relevant
to his case."  Defendant contends that Keil's testimony was
relevant to the fourth statutory question submitted to the jury
during sentencing, that is, "[w]hether the defendant should
receive a death sentence."  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  Defendant
asserts that the trial court misunderstood Wright because the
court there "did not rule that lay opinion about whether a
particular defendant's life should be spared is irrelevant" but
that such evidence should be excluded only when it is "not
logically tied to any facts at issue, such as information about
the defendant's character or background."  Here, defendant claims
that Keil's opinion as to whether defendant should die, based on
her relationship with him and her experiences with him -- both
good and bad -- "says something about his character."  Defendant
concludes that Keil's testimony "that she nevertheless felt that
his redeeming qualities militated in favor of preserving his life
was relevant to rebut the inferences that the state sought to
have the jury draw -- that his character for violence is so bad
that he should die."
In response, the state argues that defendant's claim is
unpreserved because defendant did not object to the trial court's
decision to reverse its ruling or make an offer of proof to
attempt to establish the requisite foundation under Wright. 
Consequently, the state concludes, defendant has not preserved an
error for this court's review.  Alternatively, the state contends
that, in any event, the trial court's final ruling was a correct
application of Wright because Keil's testimony was not relevant
to any aspect of defendant's character or background under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D).
We conclude that defendant did not sufficiently tie
Keil's testimony together with the criteria set out in ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) and, therefore, that defendant failed to
demonstrate the relevance of that evidence to any permissible
theory of mitigation.  Consequently, under Wright, the trial
court correctly instructed the jury to disregard Keil's
testimony.  Compare State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 583-85, 879 P2d
162 (1994) (concluding that defendant's wife's testimony about
anticipated negative effect of defendant's execution on his
daughter was relevant to fourth question under ORS 163.150
because it permitted an inference that defendant's execution
would affect his daughter negatively because of some mitigating
aspect of defendant's character or background).
C. Entry of Multiple Convictions and Sentences for Aggravated
Murder
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred by
entering multiple convictions and imposing multiple sentences of
death for Count one (aggravated murder -- death caused during
robbery) and Count two (aggravated murder -- death caused during
burglary).
The trial court entered separate judgments on Count one
and Count two, each of which sentenced defendant to death for the
murder of the victim.  Defendant did not object to the court's
failure to merge those convictions, but argues that this court
should review the error as apparent on the face of the record. 
The state concedes that the trial court erred in entering
separate judgments.  We agree that the trial court erred when it
entered two separate judgments and imposed two separate sentences
of death, and that that error is apparent on the face of the
record, as discussed below.
ORS 161.067(1) provides:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each
provision requires proof of an element that the
others do not, there are as many separately
punishable offenses as there are separate
statutory violations."
In State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 10 P3d 901 (2000), the defendant
was charged with and convicted of three counts of aggravated
murder, based on three different aggravating circumstances
involving the intentional killing of a single victim.  There,
this court concluded that, although the defendant properly was
charged with and convicted of multiple counts of aggravated
murder based on the existence of multiple aggravating
circumstances, the defendant's conduct in intentionally murdering
one victim did not violate "two or more statutory provisions." 
Id. at 31.  In Barrett, this court interpreted the aggravated
murder statute, ORS 163.095, and determined that
"the harm that the legislature intended to address
by ORS 163.095 was the intentional, aggravated
killing of another human being.  The aggravating
factors constitute no more than different theories
under which murder becomes subject to the enhanced
penalties for aggravated murder.  That defendant's
conduct in intentionally murdering the victim in
this case was 'aggravated' by 'any,' i.e., one or
more, act surrounding that conduct does not
convert that conduct into more than one separately
punishable offense."
Id. at 36.  Accordingly, this court reversed the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the defendant’s conduct consisted of
three difference crimes and remanded the case to the trial court
for resentencing.
In State v. Hale, 335 Or 612, 630-31, 75 P3d 612
(2003), the jury convicted defendant on 13 counts of aggravated
murder involving three victims, and the trial court entered
multiple judgments and sentences of death for each victim.  The
defendant in Hale did not object to the imposition of those
judgments and sentences, but later asked this court to review
those sentences as error apparent on the face of the record.  The
state conceded that the trial court had erred.  This court agreed
that the sentencing was erroneous under Barrett and remanded the
case for the trial court to enter corrected judgments reflecting
a single conviction of aggravated murder for each victim.  This
court further required that each judgment enumerate separately
the aggravating factors upon which each conviction was based and
impose a single sentence of death.  Hale, 335 Or at 631.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court should have entered one judgment of conviction for the
aggravated murder of the victim, which enumerated separately each
aggravating factor and imposed one sentence of death. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of conviction for
aggravated murder on Counts one and two, vacate the sentences of
death imposed on those convictions, and remand to the trial court
for entry of corrected judgments and resentencing.  See State v.
Gibson, 338 Or 560, 577-78, 113 P3d 423 (2005) (concluding that
trial court's error in entering two convictions and two death
sentences for the aggravated murder of one victim was apparent on
the face of the record; remanding case for entry of corrected
judgment merging both convictions, enumerating separately
aggravating factors, and imposing single sentence of death).
D. Merger of Murder Count with Aggravated Murder Counts 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred by
failing to merge his conviction of intentional murder with his
convictions of aggravated murder for the death of the same
victim.
In sentencing defendant for intentional murder, the
trial court made the following statement:
"As to Count III, that is the Intentional Murder
[Count], obviously that cannot be imposed should the
Aggravated Murder death sentence be carried out. 
However, as we're all aware, there's going to be a long
and lengthy process of appeal in this particular case
so I am going to go ahead and sentence you on Count III
which may avoid coming back here if they set aside
Count I and II's sentence for any particular reason."
The trial court entered judgment on Count three sentencing
defendant to a term of imprisonment of 300 months, followed by
post-prison supervision for the rest of defendant's life, to be
served consecutively to the sentences imposed on the other
counts.  Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to the
trial court's failure to merge the murder conviction with the
aggravated murder convictions, but argues that this court should
review the error as apparent on the face of the record. 
Defendant contends that, because intentional murder is a lesser-included offense of aggravated murder, the jury in this case was
not required to find any element to convict defendant of
intentional murder that it was not also required to find to
convict him of aggravated murder.  Therefore, defendant
concludes, the crimes are not separately punishable under ORS
161.067(1).
The state concedes that the trial court erred when it
failed to merge defendant's murder conviction with his aggravated
murder convictions and that the error is apparent on the face of
the record.  The state, however, urges this court not to consider
defendant's claim of error, because it is unpreserved and is not
"so egregious that this court should exercise its discretion to
consider it."  The state bases that position on the following
reasoning:
"[D]efendant has been sentenced to death for two counts
of aggravated murder.  If those convictions and the
sentences of death are not vacated, the 300-month
sentence imposed for count 3 will have no effect on
defendant.  Consequently, as a practical matter, the
improper sentence will be merged into the greater
sentences because, if the death penalty is carried out,
defendant will never serve the sentence that was
imposed on count 3 for intentional murder."
(Emphasis in original.)  In our view, the state's argument
contains too many contingencies.
As discussed above, this court determined in Barrett
that the defendant's conduct in intentionally murdering the
victim was "aggravated" by one or more acts surrounding that
conduct, but was not thereby converted into more than one
separately punishable offense.  331 Or at 36.  Moreover, in State
v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 331, 845 P2d 904 (1993), this court
stated:
"A defendant may be punished separately for
conduct or a criminal episode that violates two or more
statutory provisions only if the following conditions
are met:  (1) the defendant engaged in acts that were
the same conduct or criminal episode; (2) the
defendant's acts violated two or more statutory
provisions; and (3) each statutory provision requires
proof of an element that the others do not. [ORS
161.067(1)].  This court has explained that those
conditions are not met where one offense charged truly
is a lesser included offense of another offense
charged, that is, when the former has no elements not
also present in the latter, even though the latter has
additional elements not present in the former.  State
v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 279-80, 779 P2d 600 (1989)."
See also Isom, 313 Or at 407 ("The crime of intentional murder is
'necessarily included' in the crime of aggravated murder.").
We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in not
merging defendant's conviction for intentional murder with his
convictions for aggravated murder and that that error is apparent
on the face of the record.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
of conviction for intentional murder on Count three, vacate the
sentence imposed on that conviction, and remand to the trial
court for entry of a corrected judgment and resentencing.
V.  CONCLUSION
In summary, we find that only defendant's assignments
of error relating to the trial court's entry of multiple
aggravated murder convictions and sentences of death, and the
court's failure to merge defendant's conviction of intentional
murder with his convictions of aggravated murder, are well taken. 
Accordingly, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment
of conviction, reflecting defendant's guilt on the charge of
aggravated murder, based upon alternative aggravating factors,
and intentional murder, and imposing one sentence of death.  We
otherwise affirm the judgments of conviction and the sentences of
death.
The judgments of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. At trial, defendant offered testimony to the contrary. 
Defendant testified that, following the shooting, he went
outside, got sick over the balcony, and then sat down on the
porch and cried.  According to defendant, Colby told him that
they needed to go and that the guns were in the vehicle when he
got in. 
2. In a death-penalty sentencing proceeding, ORS
163.150(1)(b) requires that a jury unanimously answer the
following four questions in the affirmative before the court can
impose a death sentence:
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
cased the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; 
"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and 
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."
3. We note that nothing in the record before us suggests that the discovery the state provided
to defendant did not fully inform defendant of the state's factual and legal theories underlying the
aggravated murder charges.
4. ORCP 59 E applies in criminal cases, ORS 136.330(1),
and provides that "[t]he judge shall not instruct with respect to
matters of fact, nor comment thereon."
5. OEC 103 provides, in part:
"(1) Evidential error is not presumed to be
prejudicial.  Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and:
"* * * * *
"(b) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence,
the substance of the evidence was made known to the
court by offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked."
6. We assume that defendant anticipated that Sweeney
would testify that the resulting trajectory of the bullet
had it not deflected off the victim's rib, would have
inflicted a nonfatal injury.
7. OEC 609(3)(a) provides that evidence of a
conviction for purposes of impeachment is not admissible if
"[a] period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date
of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the
later date[.]"
8. ORCP 59 H (2003), made applicable to criminal
cases by ORS 136.330(1), provided, in part: 
"[N]o instruction given to a jury shall be subject
to review upon appeal unless its error, if any,
was pointed out to the judge who gave it and
unless a notation of an exception is made
immediately after the court instructs the jury."
9. ORS 136.460 provides, in part:
"(1) Upon a charge for a crime consisting of
different degrees, the jury may find the defendant
not guilty of the degree charged in the accusatory
instrument and guilty of any degree inferior
thereto or of an attempt to commit the crime or
any such inferior degree thereof.
"(2) The jury shall first consider the
charged offense. Only if the jury finds the
defendant not guilty of the charged offense may
the jury consider a lesser included offense.  If
there is more than one lesser included offense,
the jury shall consider the lesser included
offenses in order of seriousness.  The jury may
consider a less serious lesser included offense
only after finding the defendant not guilty of any
more serious lesser included offenses."
10. ORS 136.465 provides:
"In all cases, the defendant may be found
guilty of any crime the commission of which is
necessarily included in that with which the
defendant is charged in the accusatory instrument
or of an attempt to commit such crime."
11. Defendant cites the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the accused's right
to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.  Defendant asserts, 
"The United States Supreme Court has held that
those provisions 'require criminal convictions to
rest upon a jury determination that the defendant
is guilty of every element of the crime with which
he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United
States v. Gaudin, 515 US 506, 510, 115 S Ct 2310,
132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995) (citing Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277-78, 113 S Ct 2078, 124
L Ed 2d 182 (1993)[]; footnote omitted)."
12. There were several discrepancies between the
testimony Wright provided and the evidence that police
officers uncovered.  For example, Wright testified that
defendant had admitted pistol whipping and raping Kincaid,
but police officers had found no wounds on Kincaid
consistent with being beaten with a pistol, and there had
been no evidence of rape or sexual assault. 
13. OEC 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."  
14. Defendant also argues that, because the "future
dangerousness question" of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) itself is
unconstitutional, the state's evidence showing the he had
committed the Kincaid murder was not admissible to prove
that he probably would commit violent criminal acts in the
future.  As previously stated, defendant's constitutional
argument in that regard is without merit. 
15. Defendant's witness would have testified that,
"[a]ccording to the doctor's report[,] it would have been
impossible for [defendant] to do the things he was accused
of doing." The witness, however, could not recall the name
of the doctor, but stated that he had all that information
in a box somewhere.  
16. See OEC 103 (providing that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected").
17. The jury instructions accompanying ORS
163.150(1)(b) are set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c), which
provide, in part:
"(B) The court shall instruct the jury to
answer the question in paragraph (b)(D) of this
subsection 'no' if, after considering any
aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence
concerning any aspect of the defendant's character
or background, or any circumstances of the offense
and any victim impact evidence as described in
paragraph (a) of this subsection, one or more of
the jurors believe that the defendant should not
receive a death sentence." 
18. ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) requires the court to
instruct the jury to answer "no" to the fourth statutory
question in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) -- "[w]hether the defendant
should receive a death sentence" -- "if, after considering
any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence
concerning any aspect of the defendant's character or
background, or any circumstances of the offense * * *, one
or more of the jurors believe that the defendant should not
receive a death sentence."