Title: Oregon v. Stark
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S060384
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2013

Filed:  August 15, 2013 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondent on Review, 
 
v. 
 
NILE TERRENCE STARK, 
Petitioner on Review. 
 
(CC 08040789; CA A144974; SC S060384) 
 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted March 12, 2013. 
 
 
Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief 
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services. 
 
 
Gregory A. Rios, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, 
Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General. 
 
 
Before Balmer, Chief Justice, and Kistler, Walters, Linder, Landau, and Baldwin, 
Justices.** 
 
 
WALTERS, J. 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are 
affirmed.  
 
 
*Appeal from Linn County Circuit Court, John A. McCormick, Judge. 248 Or 
App 573 (2012). 
 
 
**Brewer, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
WALTERS, J. 
1 
 
 
Defendant challenges his conviction for the crime of felon in possession of 
2 
a firearm, arguing that, when he possessed the firearm in question, he was not a "person 
3 
who has been convicted of a felony" within the meaning of the felon-in-possession 
4 
statute, ORS 166.270.  Paragraph (3)(a) of that statute provides that a conviction shall not 
5 
be deemed a felony conviction if, "at the time of judgment," the court declared the 
6 
conviction to be a misdemeanor.  We interpret that paragraph to refer not only to the 
7 
original judgment of conviction, but also to subsequent judgments of conviction entered 
8 
prior to an accused's firearm possession.  In this case, we conclude that the court had not 
9 
declared defendant's conviction to be a misdemeanor in the original or a subsequent 
10 
judgment of conviction by the time that defendant possessed the firearm in question.  
11 
Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of error and affirm his conviction on the felon-
12 
in-possession charge. 
13 
 
 
The following undisputed facts appear in the record.  In 2004, defendant 
14 
was convicted in Marion County Circuit Court of felony possession of a controlled 
15 
substance and was sentenced to 18 months of supervised probation.  The judgment of 
16 
conviction included a handwritten notation:  "If defendant successfully completes 
17 
probation with no violations, [he] may apply to [the] court for misdemeanor treatment."   
18 
 
 
When defendant completed his probation early in 2006, he moved the 
19 
Marion County Circuit Court for "an order reducing the charge in the present case from a 
20 
felony to a misdemeanor."  In an affidavit attached to the motion, defendant explained 
21 
that he was seeking reduction to a misdemeanor because he thought that would give him 
22 
2 
 
a better chance of obtaining employment.  The state informed the court that it did not 
1 
object, and the court, "having reviewed the files and records herein and good cause 
2 
appearing," issued an order on March 29, 2006, reducing defendant's felony conviction to 
3 
a misdemeanor.   
4 
 
 
Some years later, in 2008, police discovered a handgun in defendant's 
5 
possession.1  Defendant subsequently was charged, this time in Linn County Circuit 
6 
Court, with being a felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270.  Before the matter 
7 
came to trial, defendant moved in Marion County Circuit Court for a judgment 
8 
"memorializing" that his 2004 drug conviction had been for a misdemeanor.   That court 
9 
issued a judgment stating that "defendant [was] guilty of a misdemeanor * * * and has 
10 
been since * * * 2004."  Later, the court vacated that judgment and entered a different 
11 
judgment that was worded in terms of granting defendant's motion to reduce his felony 
12 
conviction to a misdemeanor.  The latter judgment, dated January 5, 2009, purported to 
13 
be "nunc pro tunc" to March 29, 2006, the date of the order reducing the 2004 felony 
14 
conviction to a misdemeanor.     
15 
 
 
At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the felon-in-
16 
possession charge, arguing that, in light of the January 5, 2009, judgment that purported 
17 
to retroactively reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor, the state could not establish that, 
18 
                                              
 
1  
The gun was discovered in the course of a search of defendant's car, which 
occurred when defendant was stopped by police while driving in Linn County.  The 
validity of the search is not an issue before this court.  
   
3 
 
at the time that he possessed the firearm in question, he was a "person who has been 
1 
convicted of a felony."  ORS 166.270(1).   Relying on the statutory definition of that 
2 
phrase at ORS 166.270(3), which excludes circumstances in which "the court declared 
3 
the conviction to be a misdemeanor at the time of judgment," defendant argued that he 
4 
was not a "person who has been convicted of a felony" at the time that he was alleged to 
5 
have possessed the firearm.  The trial court disagreed with defendant's interpretation of 
6 
ORS 166.270(3) and denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  The felon-in-
7 
possession charge went to the jury, which found defendant guilty.      
8 
 
 
Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court had 
9 
erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  
10 
The court concluded that, when ORS 166.270(3)(a) provides that a "conviction shall not 
11 
be deemed a conviction of a felony if * * * the court declared the conviction to be a 
12 
misdemeanor at the time of judgment," it refers only to declarations made at the time of 
13 
the original judgment of conviction.  Thus, the court reasoned, once a judgment is 
14 
entered convicting a person of a felony, a later order or judgment reducing that 
15 
conviction to a misdemeanor cannot alter the person's status as a felon for purposes of the 
16 
felon-in-possession statute.   State v. Stark, 248 Or App 573, 580, 273 P3d 941 (2012).   
17 
 
 
Before this court, defendant argues that that interpretation of ORS 
18 
166.270(3)(a) is incorrect.  He contends that the phrase "at the time of judgment" refers to 
19 
the judgment in effect at the time that the person charged with the crime possessed the 
20 
firearm.  Employing that construction, defendant contends that his 2004 conviction was 
21 
adjudged to be a misdemeanor conviction on March 29, 2006, before the felon-in-
22 
4 
 
possession issue arose.  In that regard, defendant contends that the order issued by the 
1 
Marion County Circuit Court on that date in fact was an erroneously labeled judgment, 
2 
which error the same court corrected, retroactively, in its January 5, 2009, "nunc pro 
3 
tunc" judgment.  Thus, this case presents two questions, one pertaining to the proper 
4 
construction of ORS 166.270(3)(a), and one pertaining to the timing and effect of the 
5 
March 29, 2006, order and the January 5, 2009, judgment issued by the Marion County 
6 
Circuit Court.  For obvious reasons, the latter question is relevant only if defendant's 
7 
construction of ORS 166.270(3)(a) is correct.  
8 
 
 
We approach the first (statutory construction) issue in our usual way, 
9 
attempting to discern the legislature's intent from statute's text and context and any 
10 
helpful legislative history.  State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).  
11 
Our starting point is the text of ORS 166.270, which provides, in part: 
12 
 
"(1) Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the law of 
13 
this state or any other state, or who has been convicted of a felony under the 
14 
laws of the Government of the United States, who owns or has in the 
15 
person's possession or under the person's custody or control any firearm 
16 
commits the crime of felon in possession of a firearm. 
17 
 
"* * * * * 
18 
 
"(3) For purposes of this section, a person 'has been convicted of a 
19 
felony' if, at the time of conviction for an offense, that offense was a felony 
20 
under the law of the jurisdiction in which it was committed.  Such 
21 
conviction shall not be deemed a conviction of a felony if: 
22 
 
"(a) The court declared the conviction to be a misdemeanor at the 
23 
time of judgment[.]" 
24 
(Emphasis added.)  The parties' disagreement focuses on the emphasized wording, with 
25 
the state reading the phrase "the time of judgment" to mean the time of the original 
26 
5 
 
judgment of conviction, and defendant reading it to mean the time of the judgment of 
1 
conviction in effect when the person is found in possession of a firearm, including a 
2 
judgment issued after the original judgment.     
3 
 
 
Generally speaking, a "judgment" is "the court's final determination of the 
4 
rights and obligations of the parties in the case."  Black's Law Dictionary 918 (9th ed 
5 
2009).   ORS 18.005(8) defines "judgment," as used in ORS chapter 18, as "the 
6 
concluding decision of a court on one or more requests for relief in one or more actions, 
7 
as reflected in a judgment document."2  (Emphasis added.)  Although each "judgment" 
8 
that a court issues is, by definition, the "final" or "concluding" determination of the 
9 
matter decided, the fact is that a court may issue a subsequent "judgment" that supersedes 
10 
the former -- for example, a judgment to correct a prior judgment, ORS 138.083(1), to 
11 
comply with an appellate court's remand, or to reduce a felony conviction to a 
12 
misdemeanor conviction after a convicted defendant's successful completion of 
13 
probation, ORS 161.705(d).   Thus, when ORS 166.270(3)(a) refers to "the time of 
14 
judgment," the question may arise:  "Which judgment?" 
15 
 
 
Defendant argues that, as used in ORS 166.270(3)(a), the term "judgment" 
16 
denotes the last and, thus, final, judgment that a court has entered at the time of the act 
17 
that constitutes the other necessary element of the crime of felon-in-possession -- 
18 
                                              
 
2  
Although the definition of "judgment" in ORS 18.005(8) by its terms 
applies to ORS chapter 18, a judgment document in a criminal action must comply with 
ORS 18.038 and meet other statutory requirements.  ORS 137.071(2).   
6 
 
possessing a firearm.  Defendant contends that, if the legislature had intended to refer to 
1 
something other than the judgment in effect at the time of possession, it would have 
2 
identified the intended time more specifically.  
3 
 
 
The state counters that, in this statutory context, the word "judgment" in 
4 
ORS 166.270(3)(a) necessarily refers to the original judgment entered at the time of 
5 
conviction.   The state derives that conclusion from the repeated use of the definite article 
6 
"the" in the phrase "the court declared the conviction to be a misdemeanor at the time of 
7 
judgment."  (Emphases added.)  In the state's view, that phrasing shows that the 
8 
legislature had in mind a declaration by a particular court at a particular time, and not 
9 
any judgment that a court might later enter.  The state further argues that, because the 
10 
introductory wording that precedes ORS 166.270(3)(a) refers to "the time of conviction 
11 
for an offense," it is reasonable to assume that the legislature had that same time in mind 
12 
when it referred in paragraph (3)(a) to "the time of judgment."  
13 
 
 
The state is correct that ORS 166.320(3) includes the phrase "at the time of 
14 
conviction":  It provides that a person "has been convicted of a felony if, at the time of 
15 
conviction for an offense, that offense was a felony under the law of the jurisdiction in 
16 
which it was committed."  (Emphasis added.)  Paragraph (3)(a) then provides that a 
17 
conviction shall not be deemed a felony conviction if the court declared the person's 
18 
conviction to be a misdemeanor "at the time of judgment."  As we see it, the "time of 
19 
conviction" phrase in subsection (3) only relates to the condition necessary to make a 
20 
conviction a felony conviction (the offense must be a felony under the law of the 
21 
jurisdiction in which it was committed at the time it was committed) and not to the 
22 
7 
 
exemption in paragraph (3)(a) for a felony conviction that a court has declared to be a 
1 
misdemeanor.  In fact, the legislature's use of entirely different time references in those 
2 
provisions may indicate that the legislature did not equate "the time of conviction" with 
3 
"the time of judgment." 
4 
 
 
Thus, although we agree with the state that the phrasing of ORS 
5 
166.270(3)(a) suggests an intent to refer to a particular time, we do not think that the 
6 
legislature intended to require that a court's declaration occur only "at the time of 
7 
conviction."  So understood, the legislature's phrasing is not contrary to defendant's 
8 
proposed interpretation.  Under defendant's interpretation, a court may make the 
9 
necessary declaration not only when the court first enters a judgment of conviction, but 
10 
also when the court enters a subsequent judgment categorizing the conviction as a 
11 
misdemeanor.  In either circumstance, the court declares the conviction to be a 
12 
misdemeanor at the time of judgment.  
13 
 
 
Defendant's interpretation becomes even more compelling, and the state's 
14 
less so, when considered in the context of other statutes that were in effect at the time that 
15 
ORS 166.270(3)(a) was enacted.3  Two of those statutes are particularly relevant -- ORS 
16 
161.585 (1987)4 and ORS 161.705 (1987).5  Under both of those statutes, certain crimes 
17 
                                              
 
3  
ORS 166.270(3)(a) was enacted, in its present form, in 1989.  Or Laws 
1989, ch 839, § 4.   
 
4  
ORS 161.585 (1987) provided: 
 
"(1) When a crime punishable as a felony is also punishable by 
 
8 
 
                                              
imprisonment for a maximum term of one year or by a fine, the crime shall 
be classed as a misdemeanor if the court imposes a punishment other than 
imprisonment under ORS 137.124(1). 
 
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.525, upon 
conviction of a crime punishable as described in subsection (1) of this 
section, the crime is a felony for all purposes until one of the following 
events occurs, after which occurrence the crime is a misdemeanor for all 
purposes: 
 
"(a) Without granting probation, the court imposes a sentence of 
imprisonment other than to the legal and physical custody of the 
Department of Corrections. 
 
"(b) Without granting probation, the court imposes a fine. 
 
"(c) Upon revocation of probation, the court imposes a sentence of 
imprisonment other than to the legal and physical custody of the 
Department of Corrections. 
 
"(d) Upon revocation of probation, the court imposes a fine. 
 
"(e) The Court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor, either at 
the time of granting probation, upon suspension of imposition of sentence, 
or on application of defendant or the probation officer of the defendant 
thereafter. 
 
"(f) The court grants probation to the defendant without imposition 
of sentence upon conviction and defendant is thereafter discharged without 
sentence. 
 
"(g) Without granting probation and without imposing sentence, the 
court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor and discharges the 
defendant." 
ORS 161.585 (1987) was amended by the same legislature that enacted the present 
wording of ORS 166.270(3)(a), to make it applicable "only to persons convicted of a 
felony committed prior to November 1, 1989."  Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 52.  Subsequent 
legislatures made minor changes that are not relevant to the present issue.  Or Laws 1993, 
ch 14, § 18; Or Laws 2005, ch 264, § 15.   
 
5  
ORS 161.705 (1987) provided: 
 
9 
 
that otherwise would be classified as felonies could, under described circumstances, be 
1 
classified as misdemeanors.  ORS 161.585 (1987) generally addressed the effect of 
2 
certain sentencing decisions on the conviction's classification.  Paragraphs (2)(a) to (d) 
3 
and (f) of that statute provided that a felony conviction could be reduced to a 
4 
misdemeanor conviction at the time of, and by virtue of, sentencing decisions and 
5 
subsequent events that effectively precluded imprisonment in a Department of 
6 
Corrections facility.  Those paragraphs did not require a particular decision by the court 
7 
                                              
 
"(1) Notwithstanding ORS 161.525, the court may enter judgment of 
conviction for a Class A misdemeanor and make disposition accordingly 
when: 
 
"(a) A person is convicted of any Class C felony; or 
 
"(b) A person is convicted of a Class B felony pursuant to ORS 
475.992(2)(a); or 
 
"(c) A person is convicted of the Class B felony of possession of 
marijuana pursuant to ORS 475.992(2)(4)(a); or   
 
"(d) A person convicted of any of the felonies described in 
paragraph (a) to (c) of this subsection, or of a Class A felony pursuant to 
ORS 166.720, has successfully completed a sentence of probation; and  
 
"(e) The court, considering the nature and circumstances of the 
crime and the history and character of the defendant, believes that it would 
be unduly harsh to sentence the defendant for a felony. 
 
"(f) This section does not apply, however, in cases subject to ORS 
475.995." 
ORS 161.705 has since been amended (1) to remove the exception set out in paragraph 
(f) above, Or Laws 2005, ch 708, § 48; and (2) to clarify that the additional requirement 
set out at paragraph (e), that is, the requirement that the court believe that it would be 
unduly harsh to sentence the defendant for a felony, applies to each of the four preceding 
paragraphs, Or Laws 2009, ch 610, § 2.  
10 
 
that the offense should be treated as a misdemeanor; rather, the reduction occurred by 
1 
operation of law.  In contrast, ORS 161.585(2)(e) and (g) (1987) provided that a court 
2 
could decide to reduce a felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction by imposing no 
3 
sentence or a sentence other than imprisonment and then expressly "declar[ing]" the 
4 
conviction to be a misdemeanor.  At least one of those provisions -- paragraph (2)(e) -- 
5 
contemplated that the court could make such a declaration after the original judgment of 
6 
conviction and sentence. 
7 
 
 
ORS 161.705 (1987) also gave (and continues to give) a trial court 
8 
authority to reduce a felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction, but did so by 
9 
authorizing the court to "enter a judgment" altering the classification of a defendant's 
10 
offense:  Such reduction could occur only if the trial court, considering the 
11 
circumstances, thought "that it would be unduly harsh to sentence the defendant for a 
12 
felony."  ORS 161.705(1)(e) (1987). 
13 
 
 
Those statutes demonstrate that, before 1989 when the current version of 
14 
ORS 166.270(3)(a) was enacted, a judgment convicting a defendant of a felony and 
15 
imposing a sentence of probation could be superseded, in certain circumstances, by a 
16 
later declaration or judgment entered after the sentence of probation was completed, 
17 
changing the conviction to a misdemeanor.  The 1989 legislative assembly that enacted 
18 
the present version of ORS 166.270(3) presumably was aware of those statutes and the 
19 
possibility that a subsequent judgment could reduce what originally had been adjudged a 
20 
felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction.  See State v. Reams, 292 Or 1, 8, 636 P2d 
21 
913 (1981) (court assumes that the legislature, at time of adoption of new criminal code, 
22 
11 
 
was aware of existing law in Oregon on subject); State v. Waterhouse, 209 Or 424, 436, 
1 
307 P2d 327 (1957) ("Knowledge on the part of the legislature of * * * earlier enactments 
2 
is presumed").  Cf. State v. Clevenger, 297 Or 234, 244, 683 P2d 1360 (1984) (legislature 
3 
is presumed to be aware of the Supreme Court's decisions).  Insofar as the unmodified 
4 
term "judgment" can pertain to both original and subsequent judgments, it would seem 
5 
that, if the 1989 legislative assembly had intended to make only the original felony 
6 
judgment, and not the subsequent misdemeanor judgment, relevant to a determination of 
7 
a person's status as a felon for purposes of that statute, it would have signaled that intent 
8 
instead of using the more general term "judgment."6  The legislature's omission of any 
9 
such signal, in that statutory context, suggests that the legislature did not intend that the 
10 
term "judgment" mean only the original judgment.7    
11 
                                              
 
6 
We note, in that regard, that when courts refer to judgments other than the 
most recent and, thus, most final judgment, they tend to use more specific terms, such as 
"original judgment."  See, e.g., State v. Ainsworth, 346 Or 524, 526, 213 P3d 1225 (2009) 
(referring to "original judgment"); State v. Estey, 247 Or App 25, 27, 268 P3d 772 (2011) 
(same). 
 
7 
The 1989 legislative assembly that enacted the current wording of ORS 
166.270(3)(a) also presumably would have been aware that any judgment of conviction 
of a felony could be overturned or set aside by a higher court, and that such a court might 
even enter a judgment reducing the conviction to a misdemeanor.  But if the state's 
interpretation of the wording is taken to its natural conclusion, a subsequent appellate 
judgment would not be relevant in determining whether a person "has been convicted of a 
felony" for purposes of ORS 166.270.  The state suggests that that would not be so 
because, if set aside, a felony conviction is treated as void ab initio.  But this court 
rejected a similar argument in Bailey v. Lampert, 342 Or 321, 153 P3d 95 (2007), when 
the defendant in that case sought to set aside his felon-in-possession conviction on the 
ground that, subsequent to the felon-in-possession conviction, the underlying felony 
conviction had been reversed.  The defendant argued that, because the underlying felony 
 
12 
 
 
 
The state identifies another statute, ORS 166.274, as relevant context for 
1 
interpreting the phrase "the time of judgment" in ORS 177.270(3)(a).  That statute 
2 
provides that a person who is barred from possessing a firearm under ORS 166.270 may 
3 
file a petition for relief from the bar in the circuit court for the person's county of 
4 
residence, ORS 166.274(1), (2), and may be granted such relief if he or she demonstrates, 
5 
"by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner does not pose a threat to the safety 
6 
of the public or the petitioner," ORS 166.274(7).  The state argues that that provision 
7 
demonstrates that the legislature intended that convicted felons follow that prescribed 
8 
procedure to have their gun-possession rights restored and that defendant's expansive 
9 
reading of ORS 166.270(3)(a) would frustrate that legislative intent by allowing felons to 
10 
obtain relief simply by requesting misdemeanor treatment. 
11 
 
 
The state's argument has the tail wagging the dog:  It seeks to treat a clearly 
12 
secondary statute, pertaining to relief from the prohibition on felons possessing firearms, 
13 
as dictating the meaning of the prohibition itself (and the crime that results from its 
14 
violation).  There is no reason to think that the legislature's intent that "any person who 
15 
                                              
conviction was void ab initio, he had never been a "person who ha[d] been convicted of a 
felony" within the meaning of ORS 166.270.  This court concluded that, in ORS 166.270, 
"the legislature intended to, and did, focus on a person's status at the time that he or she 
possessed a firearm," even if that status might later change because the prior felony 
conviction is reversed or set aside.  Id. at 327.  Although Bailey does not address the 
particular subsection of the statute that is at issue in the present case, it demonstrates that, 
if the state were correct that the statute refers to only the time of the original judgment, a 
person whose conviction was later overturned by a court nevertheless would be a person 
who "has been convicted of a felony:" The person could not claim that the original 
conviction was void ab initio.  
13 
 
has been convicted of a felony" be required to follow the procedure at ORS 166.274 to 
1 
have their gun-possession rights restored had any bearing on its thinking about who 
2 
would qualify as a "person who has been convicted of a felony." The legislature could 
3 
have decided that a trial court's reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor should 
4 
remove that person from the prohibition on firearm possession at ORS 166.270 
5 
altogether, and at the same time reasonably could have provided a path for persons who 
6 
remain felons for purposes of the statute to restore their prior right to possess firearms.   
7 
 
 
Although, at this point, the textual and contextual clues point to the 
8 
interpretation of ORS 166.270(3)(a) for which defendant contends, we still have not 
9 
addressed the legislative history that the state has brought to our attention.  Gaines, 346 
10 
Or 171-72.   We turn to that legislative history now. 
11 
 
 
As we briefly noted above, 354 Or at __ (slip op at 7 n 3), ORS 
12 
166.270(3)(a) was enacted in its current form in 1989.  Before then, subsections (1) and 
13 
(2) of ORS 166.270 were similar to their current versions, but subsection (3) provided: 
14 
 
"For the purposes of this section, a person 'has been convicted of a 
15 
felony' if, at the time of conviction for an offense, that offense was a felony 
16 
under the law of the jurisdiction in which it was committed.  Provided, 
17 
however, that such conviction shall not be deemed a conviction of a felony 
18 
if: 
19 
 
"(a) At the time of conviction, and pursuant to the law of the 
20 
jurisdiction in which the offense occurred, the offense was made a 
21 
misdemeanor by the type or manner of sentence actually imposed." 
22 
(Emphasis added.)  The original 1989 bill to amend ORS 166.270, HB 3470, would 
23 
simply have removed all the italicized wording, abolishing the then-existing exception for 
24 
reductions from felony to misdemeanor status made "by the type or manner of sentence 
25 
14 
 
actually imposed."  One of the proponents of that change, Sheriff Burks of Lane County, 
1 
explained to the House Judicial Committee that the change was proposed because 
2 
members of the law enforcement community were 
3 
"concerned about the definition of a felon * * * [because] there apparently 
4 
are certain circumstances when people are convicted [as] felons but 
5 
sentenced as * * * misdemeanant[s], and we wanted to eliminate that 
6 
possibility.  If they're convicted of a felony, then they are a felon, that's 
7 
what we wanted." 
8 
Tape Recording, House Judiciary Committee, Natural Resources Subcommittee, HB 
9 
3470, May 10, 1989, Tape 23, Side A (statement of Sheriff Burks).   
10 
 
 
However, as the bill went through the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was 
11 
modified to provide a new and different exception to the broader definition of a "person 
12 
[who] has been convicted of a felony" -- the one that now appears in paragraph (3)(a) and 
13 
that is the subject of this review:   
14 
 
"(3) * * * Such conviction shall not be deemed a conviction of a 
15 
felony if: 
16 
 
"(a) The court declared the conviction to be a misdemeanor at the 
17 
time of judgment[.]" 
18 
When the modified wording was introduced to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the 
19 
committee's legislative counsel, Morris, explained at length that a felony conviction could 
20 
become a misdemeanor either through the type of sentence imposed or by the trial court 
21 
declaring the misdemeanor to be a felony, and that, under the then-existing felon-in-
22 
possession statute, if a felony conviction became a misdemeanor under either method, 
23 
then the felon-in-possession statute did not apply.  Tape Recording, Senate Judiciary 
24 
Committee, HB 3470, June 30, 1989, Tape 259, Side A (statement of Counsel Morris).  
25 
15 
 
Morris went on to explain how the original bill (which entirely removed the exception he 
1 
had described) and the amended bill would operate if enacted: 
2 
 
"What the bill as it came to us did would abolish things becoming 
3 
misdemeanors by operation of law, and, arguably -- it's unclear -- abolish 
4 
the * * * effect on the firearms law when the judge declares it a 
5 
misdemeanor.   
6 
 
"What we've done with the changes from yesterday and today, we've 
7 
made it so if a [conviction] becomes a misdemeanor by operation of law, 
8 
you're still in trouble for the gun laws.  But we've made it clear, and you'll 
9 
see the new language on lines 15 and 26, that if the court feels that special 
10 
circumstances exist that justify declaring it a misdemeanor, you're in good 
11 
shape for the gun law." 
12 
Id.  Finally, in response to a question about why the amended bill drew that distinction, 
13 
Morris stated: 
14 
 
"We felt that when a felony becomes a misdemeanor by operation of 
15 
law, that it does not justify getting the person back in good shape for the 
16 
gun law.  But if a judge thinks that circumstances are such that it should be 
17 
a misdemeanor from jump street, then you should be okay for gun laws.  So 
18 
we basically took the middle ground with the changes that we've made, as 
19 
opposed to bringing everybody into the [felon] in possession statute as the 
20 
bill did." 
21 
Id. 
22 
 
 
Defendant observes that a persistent theme runs through all the discussions 
23 
of the existing statute and the proposed changes quoted above:  The idea that a felony 
24 
conviction may become a misdemeanor conviction either by operation of law or by an act 
25 
of judicial discretion.   Defendant contends that it is clear from the quoted history that, 
26 
when the legislature finally settled on the wording that became the present statute, it 
27 
intended to draw a line between the two methods, excepting from the prohibition in the 
28 
statute only those persons whose felony convictions had been reduced to misdemeanors 
29 
16 
 
through an act of judicial discretion.   
1 
 
 
The state argues, however, that one of Morris's last statements to the Senate 
2 
Judiciary Committee -- that a defendant "should be ok for gun laws" if a judge "thinks 
3 
that circumstances are such that [a felony] should be a misdemeanor from jump street"8 --  
4 
shows that the exception to the felon-in-possession law that the legislature intended to 
5 
enact was more narrow:  It intended to except only persons whose felony convictions 
6 
were specifically declared by the court to be misdemeanors at the outset.   Thus, 
7 
according to the state, the phrase "the time of judgment" in ORS 166.270(3)(a) must refer 
8 
to the time of the judgment that was issued when defendant first was convicted and 
9 
sentenced. 
10 
 
 
We agree with defendant, however, that the fleeting "jump street" reference 
11 
in Morris's statement is inadequate support for the state's interpretation of the phrase in 
12 
ORS 166.270(3)(a).  First, there is some possibility that Morris was simply attempting to 
13 
provide an example of a circumstance in which a judge's decision to reduce a defendant's 
14 
conviction to a misdemeanor could remove the defendant from the reach of ORS 
15 
166.270.  In that regard, we note that, although Morris explained that, "if a judge thinks 
16 
that circumstances are such that it should be a misdemeanor from jump street, then [a 
17 
person] should be okay for gun law," he did not state that a similar determination made in 
18 
                                              
 
8  
According to Richard A. Spears, Dictionary of American Slang and 
Colloquial Expressions (4th ed 2007), "jump street" means "the beginning; the start (of 
something) * * * :  Way back at jump street, I spotted you as a troublemaker." 
17 
 
other circumstances should not be treated similarly.  Furthermore, in the context of 
1 
Morris's overall comments, the "jump street" reference is an anomaly.  Morris had 
2 
explained the bill and its antecedents entirely in terms of the distinction between the two 
3 
ways in which a felony conviction might become a misdemeanor conviction (by 
4 
operation of law and by judicial declaration), and had never suggested that an additional 
5 
distinction -- based on the timing of a judicial declaration reducing a conviction to 
6 
misdemeanor status -- was relevant.9   It follows that Morris's comments about the effect 
7 
of the proposed amendments to ORS 166.270(3), although useful for determining what 
8 
the legislature intended with respect to Morris's primary point (the distinction between 
9 
reductions to misdemeanor status occurring by operation of law and by considered 
10 
judicial declaration), do not reflect the legislature's thinking with respect to the timing of 
11 
any judicial declaration reducing a felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction.   
12 
 
 
The state argues that Morris's comments are significant for another reason:  
13 
They show that the legislature considered the wording of the amended bill (which was 
14 
                                              
 
9  
It is true that, earlier in his comments, Morris had also stated that the 
"judicial declaration" method of reducing a felony conviction to a misdemeanor 
conviction occurred "at the time of sentencing."   However, the statutes in effect at the 
time in fact clearly contemplated that a felony conviction could be reduced to a 
misdemeanor by judicial declaration at the time of sentencing or at a later time.  See 
ORS 161.585(2)(e) (1987) (court could declare an offense to be a misdemeanor at time 
court grants probation "or thereafter"); ORS 161.705(1)(d) (1987) (court may enter 
judgment for misdemeanor when person convicted has successfully completed sentence 
of probation, if court believes felony conviction is unduly harsh).   We assume that the 
legislature had a correct understanding of the existing law, and the legislative history 
does not establish that the legislature relied on Morris's misstatement.  
18 
 
enacted) to be a "middle ground" between the then-existing exception and the proposal in 
1 
the original bill to entirely eliminate that exception.  The state contends that post-
2 
sentencing reductions from felony to misdemeanor status were not an option under the 
3 
then-existing statutory exception and that, in light of that fact, "neither Morris -- nor the 
4 
legislature -- would have understood that option to be part of the compromise." 
5 
 
 
There are at least two problems with the state's argument.  First, it assumes 
6 
a point that is far from established -- that post-conviction reductions were not an option 
7 
under the law that existed prior to the 1989 amendments.  Although the state plausibly 
8 
interprets the words of the pre-1989 version of ORS 166.270(3) as excepting only 
9 
reductions to misdemeanor status occurring at the time of an original judgment (because 
10 
the reduction had to occur "at the time of conviction" through the "sentence actually 
11 
imposed"), that is not the only reasonable interpretation of that statute, at least when the 
12 
statute is read in the context of other statutes that were in existence at the time.10 
13 
 
 
Second, although Morris spoke of the amended version of HB 3470 as a 
14 
"middle ground," he never specifically identified the pre-1989 version of ORS 166.270 as 
15 
                                              
 
10  
As we already have noted, 354 Or at __ (slip op at 7-11), two statutes then 
in existence authorized post-sentencing reduction of a felony conviction to misdemeanor 
status.  In the absence of any clear decision to the contrary, it was at least arguable that, 
in 1989, ORS 166.270(3) (1987) spoke to only reductions that occurred by operation of 
law as a result of the "sentence actually imposed" and did not pertain to or affect a trial 
court's separate authority to declare a reduction to misdemeanor status under those 
statutes.  Morris might have been speaking to that possibility when he testified that, if the 
legislature adopted the amendment as originally proposed, it would only "arguably -- it's 
unclear, abolish the * * * effect on the firearms law when the judge declares it a 
misdemeanor."    
19 
 
one of the baselines for that assessment.  It is conceivable that he was referring to a 
1 
"middle ground" between Sheriff Burks' position that, "if they are convicted of a felony, 
2 
then they are a felon" and cannot possess a firearm, and the position that, if a felony 
3 
conviction is reduced to a misdemeanor -- whether by a judge or by operation of law -- 
4 
the person is no longer deemed to be a felon and is permitted to possess a firearm.  The 
5 
position that the legislature adopted -- that only a person whose felony conviction was 
6 
reduced to a misdemeanor by a judge may possess a firearm -- clearly would fall into the 
7 
middle ground between those two positions.   
8 
 
 
In summary, Morris's "jump street" and "middle ground" comments do not 
9 
convince us that the state's interpretation of ORS 166.270(3)(a) is the correct one.  The 
10 
only conclusion that we legitimately can draw from Morris's testimony is that, in enacting 
11 
the amended version of HB 3470, the legislature recognized that a felony conviction 
12 
could be reduced to a misdemeanor by operation of law or by a considered judicial 
13 
declaration, and the legislature intended to except from the operation of the felon-in-
14 
possession statute only convictions reduced by the latter method.  Thus, the legislative 
15 
history that the parties have offered is consistent with the conclusion that we have 
16 
tentatively drawn from the text and context of ORS 166.270(3)(a).  The legislature used 
17 
the general term "judgment" and not a qualified term such as "original judgment."  
18 
Particularly because the legislature was aware that the law permitted courts to enter 
19 
subsequent judgments declaring a prior felony conviction to be a misdemeanor, we would 
20 
have expected the legislature to explicitly exclude such judgments from the exception to 
21 
the felon-in-possession statute if that is what it intended.  For all those reasons, we 
22 
20 
 
conclude that the phrase "at the time of judgment" in ORS 166.270(3)(a) refers to the 
1 
time of the judgment of conviction that was in effect at the time of the alleged firearm 
2 
possession.    
3 
 
 
Having settled that interpretive issue, we must determine whether defendant 
4 
was a person who "has been convicted of a felony" at the time that he possessed the 
5 
firearm in question.  Because ORS 166.270(3)(a) provides that a conviction shall not be 
6 
deemed a felony conviction if, "at the time of judgment," the court declared the 
7 
conviction to be a misdemeanor, it is clear that the court's declaration must be 
8 
incorporated into or concurrent with a judgment to fall within the scope of the exception.  
9 
And, because ORS 166.270 is concerned with a person's status as a felon at the time that 
10 
he or she possessed the firearm, it requires that the judgment incorporating or concurrent 
11 
with the declaration be in effect when the person possesses the firearm.  See Bailey v. 
12 
Lampert, 342 Or 321, 327, 153 P3d 95 (2007) (judgment setting aside a felony conviction 
13 
issued after time of possession of firearm did not negate defendant's status as a felon at 
14 
the time he possessed the firearm).  
15 
 
 
When police found a gun in defendant's car in 2008, the only judgment in 
16 
the record in the 2004 Marion County case was the original judgment, finding defendant 
17 
guilty of felony possession of a controlled substance and sentencing defendant to a term 
18 
of probation.  The record also contained an order, issued on March 29, 2006, that granted 
19 
defendant's motion for an order reducing his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.  
20 
21 
 
However, at the time that the order was entered, it was not incorporated in or concurrent 
1 
with a judgment.11  It was not until after the gun was discovered and defendant was 
2 
charged under ORS 166.270 that the Marion County Circuit Court issued, on defendant's 
3 
motion, a judgment reducing the felony conviction to a misdemeanor.  The judgment 
4 
specified that the reduction was nunc pro tunc to the date of the March 29, 2006, order.    
5 
 
 
Without the nunc pro tunc provision, the latter judgment clearly could not 
6 
advance defendant's effort to place himself within the exception at ORS 166.270(3)(a):   
7 
ORS 166.270 is concerned with a person's status as a felon at the time he or she possesses 
8 
a firearm, even if that status might change at some later point.  Bailey, 342 Or at 327-28.   
9 
Defendant argues, however, that the nunc pro tunc wording made all the difference:  It 
10 
meant that a judgment declaring defendant's 2004 felony conviction to be a misdemeanor 
11 
was in effect in 2008 before he possessed a firearm.  
12 
 
 
In that regard, defendant observes that, in its original judgment, the 
13 
Multnomah County Circuit Court expressly invited defendant to apply for misdemeanant 
14 
                                              
 
11  
Defendant may have thought that the order was sufficient to nullify his 
felony conviction for purposes of the felon-in-possession statute.  But the fact remains 
that the exception set out in ORS 166.270(3)(a) requires that the declaration reducing a 
felony conviction to a misdemeanor be made "at the time of judgment."  Although it may 
seem unfair, defendant's belief that he was a misdemeanant, not a felon, is irrelevant 
under ORS 166.270:  As this court recently stated in State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 506, 
268 P3d 568 (2011), that statute "exhibits a clear legislative intent to dispense with the 
culpable mental state requirement as to the element that a defendant 'has been convicted 
of a felony.'" 
 
22 
 
status upon completion of probation and followed through on its offer to reduce the 
1 
conviction to a misdemeanor in its March 29, 2006, "order."  Defendant argues that, 
2 
given that sequence of events, the court's "order" in fact was a "judgment" -- the court's 
3 
final decision on defendant's status as a felon.  Defendant also suggests that ORS 
4 
161.70512 requires trial courts to issue any decision reducing a felony conviction to a 
5 
misdemeanor conviction as a superseding judgment.   From that standpoint, defendant 
6 
argues that, regardless of the facts that he, himself, moved for "an order reducing the 
7 
charge in the present case from a felony to a misdemeanor" and that the trial court 
8 
captioned its decision on that motion as an "order," the decision in fact was a "judgment," 
9 
and the caption that appeared on the document memorializing that judgment was a 
10 
mistake.  Finally, defendant contends that the circuit court's 2009 entry of a properly 
11 
captioned judgment reducing defendant's conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor 
12 
"nunc pro tunc March 29, 2006," was a proper exercise of the court's inherent power to 
13 
"correct clerical errors at a later time so that the record reflects what actually occurred at 
14 
an earlier time."  State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Dreyer, 328 Or 332, 339, 976 P2d 1123 
15 
(1999).  In other words, defendant argues, the 2009 nunc pro tunc judgment establishes 
16 
that the March 29, 2006, "order" in fact was a judgment declaring defendant's felony 
17 
conviction to be a misdemeanor. 
18 
                                              
 
12  
Defendant adverts to the current version of ORS 161.705, which in all 
relevant respects is identical to the 1987 version of that statute, set out above, 354 Or at 
__ (slip op at 9 n 5). 
23 
 
 
 
We have stated that  
1 
"[t]he function of a nunc pro tunc entry is to make a record of what was 
2 
previously done, but not then entered; not to make an order now for then, 
3 
but to enter now for then an order previously made.  * * * Such an order is 
4 
effective only when it records a previously omitted truth -- it does not 
5 
create, but only speaks what has been done."   
6 
Gillespie v. Kononen, 310 Or 272, 276 n 7, 797 P2d 361 (1990).  Although defendant 
7 
pays lip service to that rule by describing the 2009 nunc pro tunc judgment as correcting 
8 
a mere labeling error, neither the facts, nor defendant's explanation, supports that 
9 
description.    
10 
 
 
Certainly, there is no basis for arguing that the 2006 order comported with 
11 
the formal requirements of a judgment in a criminal action.  ORS 137.071(2) requires a 
12 
judgment document in a criminal action to comply with ORS 18.038 and to provide 
13 
additional specific information about various aspects of the proceedings and the court's 
14 
decisions, including a clear specification of the court's disposition for each charge.  To 
15 
comply with ORS 18.038, the judgment document must "be plainly titled as a judgment."  
16 
ORS 18.038(1).  The 2006 order is not so titled.  It is titled an "order" and is expressed 
17 
entirely in terms of granting a motion:  "It is hereby ordered that Defendant['s] motion to 
18 
reduce [his] felony conviction to a misdemeanor is granted."  The order also contains 
19 
none of the additional information required of judgment documents by ORS 137.071(2). 
20 
 
 
Defendant suggests that such formalities are irrelevant -- that the proper 
21 
focus is on the trial court's decision and not the document that memorializes it.  He 
22 
contends that the trial court's decision on March 29, 2006, was, in every respect, a 
23 
judgment that finally disposed of his 2004 conviction, and that the 2009 "nunc pro tunc" 
24 
24 
 
judgment merely recognizes that "truth" by correcting the original, erroneous 
1 
documentation of that decision.  But defendant does not point to any evidence in the 
2 
record showing that the court's decision (as opposed to the documentation of the 
3 
decision) in fact was a judgment.13  Defendant does not assert, for instance, that he had 
4 
sought a "judgment" in 2006 or that, due to a clerical error, the word "order" was 
5 
mistakenly used even though the trial court indicated that a "judgment" should be 
6 
entered.  Instead, defendant asserts that the decision should have been issued as a 
7 
judgment, because (1) ORS 161.705 provides that, to reduce a conviction to a 
8 
misdemeanor under paragraph (1)(d) after a defendant successfully completes probation, 
9 
the court is "required" to enter a superseding judgment; and (2) the decision was the 
10 
court's final determination resolving the issue of the proper classification of defendant's 
11 
conviction.  But even if those assertions were based on correct statements of the law,14 
12 
                                              
 
13  
We understand the distinction that defendant is attempting to make, but we 
are not persuaded that it can have any real world significance in this context.  By 
definition, a court's "judgment" is reflected in a "judgment document."  See ORS 
18.005(8) ("'judgment' means the concluding decision of a court on one or more requests 
for relief in one or more actions, as reflected in a judgment document"); ORS 137.071(2) 
(requiring that judgment document in criminal action comply with ORS 18.038).  Those 
statutes would seem to make it difficult, if not impossible, to show that a decision that is 
not memorialized in a judgment in fact is a judgment.    
 
14  
As we understand them, defendant's assertions are not based on correct 
statements of the law.  Insofar as ORS 161.705 provides that a court "may enter judgment 
of conviction for a Class A misdemeanor" in the described circumstances, it clearly does 
not "require" entry of a judgment.  And, whether or not the trial court's decision had the 
effect of finally disposing of an issue in the criminal action against defendant depends, at 
least in part, on whether it in fact was a judgment. 
25 
 
they would not assist defendant.  That is so because they speak to what defendant should 
1 
have requested and what the court should have done, rather than what defendant did in 
2 
fact request and what the court did in fact do.   They do not establish that the 2009 
3 
judgment "record[ed] a previously omitted truth," as a nunc pro tunc entry must.  
4 
Gillespie, 310 Or at 276 n 7.   
5 
 
 
We conclude that the nunc pro tunc wording in the circuit court's 2009 
6 
judgment did not, and could not, transform its prior 2006 order into a judgment.  It 
7 
follows that, when police found a gun in defendant's possession in 2008, the only 
8 
judgment in effect was the original judgment convicting defendant of a felony.  The trial 
9 
court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, which was 
10 
based on the theory that defendant was not a felon within the meaning of ORS 166.270(3) 
11 
at the relevant time. 
12 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court 
13 
are affirmed.  
14