Title: State v. Smith
Citation: 223 Kan. 192, 573 P.2d 985
Docket Number: 48,641
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 1977

223 Kan. 192 (1977)
573 P.2d 985
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM F. SMITH, Appellant.
No. 48,641

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 10, 1977.
Joseph D. Johnson, assistant public defender, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Donald P. Morrison, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, and Gene M. Olander, district attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWSLEY, J.:
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction for theft (K.S.A. 21-3701).
The state's evidence revealed that defendant went to Noller Leasing Company in Topeka on September 17, 1975, and told the manager that he needed to rent a car because his car had been totaled out in an accident. Defendant told her the car would be *193 paid for by his insurance company and gave her an address and place of employment, facts later shown to be false. The rental was arranged for one day, but was subsequently extended to September 25. Defendant failed to return the car and on October 10 the rental manager sent defendant a registered letter stating the car would be reported stolen if not returned within seven days. On November 6, defendant called Noller and advised the manager the car was parked in the Country Club Plaza area of Kansas City, Missouri. The car had been driven more than 4,000 miles at the time it was recovered.
Defendant's only complaint on appeal is in regard to the trial court's instruction to the jury on intent to deprive. The instruction, based on K.S.A. 21-3702, stated:
Defendant argues the instruction creates an impermissible presumption which denies the jury the right to determine intent and shifts the burden of proof upon defendant. A statutory presumption that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of another is rebuttable and governs only the burden of going forward with the evidence, not the ultimate burden of proof. Likewise, the use of a presumption to establish prima facie evidence does not destroy a defendant's presumption of innocence. (State v. Powell, 220 Kan. 168, 551 P.2d 902.) In order to clarify these rules an instruction should be given on the meaning of "prima facie" as the trial court did in the instant case.
*194 The rule governing the constitutionality of statutory presumptions was set forth in State v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 515 P.2d 1217, where this court stated:
Haremza involved an attack on the presumption of intent to defraud the recipient of a worthless check when it was established (1) that the defendant made or drew a check, (2) that payment for such check was refused by the bank because of insufficient funds, and (3) that the defendant failed to pay the amount due on the check within seven days after a registered letter informed defendant the check had not been paid by the bank. The seven-day notice provision (K.S.A. 21-3707[2]) was held to be constitutional.
Defendant argues Haremza is clearly distinguishable from this case. He claims 21-3702 unconstitutionally invades the province of the jury as fact finders, an issue not considered in Haremza. We disagree. In Haremza this court held that the presumption did not *195 infringe on the right of the jury to decide the case according to the facts proven.
In support of his position defendant cites the cases of Dedrick v. State, 210 Ind. 259, 2 N.E.2d 409 (1936), and Jacobs v. State, 210 Ind. 107, 1 N.E.2d 452 (1936). We find both cases distinguishable as they involved irrebuttable presumptions which required a jury to return a guilty verdict once a set of facts had been established. The statute under consideration here has no such effect.
K.S.A. 21-3702(2) provides that failure to return property within seven days of receiving a registered letter giving notice that said property has not been returned within ten days of the time required by the lease or rental agreement shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the possession, use or benefit of said property. The statute creates a presumption similar in nature to that created by K.S.A. 21-3707(2), which was upheld in Haremza. We find that in both cases there is a natural and rational evidentiary relationship between the fact proved and the fact presumed.
Similarly, K.S.A. 21-3702(1) creates a prima facie case of an intent to permanently deprive when a false name, address or place of employment is used in order to obtain control over property. In assessing the validity of the presumption, it must be determined whether the presumption is based on factual logic.
In People v. Herrick, 13 Wend. 87, 92 (N.Y. 1834), the court stated:
32 Am.Jur.2d, False Pretenses, § 70, p. 218, states:
*196 (See also, Rosengarten v. State, 171 So. 2d 591 [Fla. App. 1965]; Benefield v. State, 151 So. 2d 650 [Fla. App. 1963].)
This court, in State v. Giddings, 216 Kan. 14, 531 P.2d 445, cited K.S.A. 21-3702(1), and stated:
(See also, State v. Taylor, 212 Kan. 780, 789, 512 P.2d 449; State v. Shannon, 194 Kan. 258, 398 P.2d 344, cert. denied 382 U.S. 881, 15 L. Ed. 2d 122, 86 S. Ct. 172, reh. denied 382 U.S. 922, 15 L. Ed. 2d 238, 86 S. Ct. 298.)
Nearly identical to the case at bar is State v. Mace, 429 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. 1968). In examining the sufficiency of the evidence the Missouri court stated:
Based upon the foregoing discussion we find there is a natural and rational evidentiary relationship between the use of a false name, address or place of employment and the prima facie presumption that a defendant intends to deprive the owner of the possession, use or benefit of the property thereby obtained. It does not shift the burden of proof unjustly upon the defendant as he may come forth and rebut the inference created if he has evidence of an innocent intent.
For the reasons set forth above we hold that K.S.A. 21-3702 is constitutional and valid. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.