Title: Commonwealth v. Vacher
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11220
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11220 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT B. VACHER. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     April 11, 2014.  -  August 19, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Search and seizure, Voluntariness of statement, Probable 
cause.  Search and Seizure, Standing to object, Probable 
cause.  Evidence, Identification, Opinion, Photograph, 
Immunized witness.  Identification.  Practice, Criminal, 
Admissions and confessions, Agreement between prosecutor 
and witness, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Motion to 
suppress, Standing, Voluntariness of statement.  Joint 
Enterprise.  Witness, Immunity. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 10, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Gary A. 
Nickerson, J., and the cases was tried before Robert C. Rufo, J. 
 
 
 
James L. Sultan (Kerry Haberlin with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Julia K. Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
                                                          
 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree, on theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder.2  
On appeal, the defendant asks us to recognize for the first time 
the concept of "target standing," and to declare the witness 
immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, § 20C, unconstitutional.  He 
argues that, in litigating his own motions to suppress, he 
should have been afforded target standing to challenge the 
violation of his alleged coventurers' constitutional rights.  He 
further argues that the witness immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20C, is facially unconstitutional, in that it operates to 
benefit only the Commonwealth and unfairly skews the adversary 
system, and unconstitutional as applied to him, in that the 
Commonwealth's reliance on a "spate" of immunized witnesses 
deprived him of a fair trial.     
 
The defendant also contends that the trial judge's failure 
to exclude identification testimony, and his failure to instruct 
the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 
423, 447-448 (2004), concerning the partial recording of the 
defendant's interrogation by police, were erroneous and require 
a new trial.  Concluding that there was no prejudicial error, we 
 
2 The defendant also was convicted of armed robbery, the 
predicate felony underlying the felony-murder conviction; two 
counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; 
and disinterring a body. 
                                                          
 
3 
 
affirm the defendant's convictions.  After a review of the 
entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no 
reason to exercise our power to reduce the defendant's 
conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. 
 
1.  Introduction.  On December 16, 2008, the victim's body 
was found burning in a pit on Jennifer Lane in Hyannis.  The 
victim, sixteen year old Jordan Mendes, had been stabbed in the 
neck and face twenty-seven times, and had suffered a gunshot 
wound to the chest.3  He was last seen alive shortly after 
2 P.M., the end of the school day, on December 15, 2008.4  Forty-
five witnesses testified at the defendant's trial, five of them 
pursuant to a grant of immunity.  The prosecutor elicited 
testimony that the victim, his half-brother Charlie M.5 (then 
aged thirteen), and the defendant (then aged twenty), were 
involved in the sale of drugs, particularly the prescription 
painkiller Percocet.  The Commonwealth's theory at trial was 
 
3 The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound to 
the torso with perforations of the liver and colon, and incise 
and stab wounds to the head and neck, including trachea and 
major blood vessels. 
 
 
4 There was no testimony concerning the time of death. 
 
 
5 A pseudonym.  We refer to all of the middle school, high 
school, and college witnesses and alleged participants by 
pseudonyms. 
 
 
Charlie is the defendant's first cousin; Charlie's mother 
and the defendant's mother are sisters.  The defendant is not 
related to the victim.  
                                                          
 
4 
 
that the defendant, as part of a joint venture with Charlie and 
John R., also thirteen at that time, killed the victim in a 
scheme to steal drugs and cash from him.  The defense theory was 
that Charlie, the picked-on younger brother of the victim, was 
the true culprit, who retaliated against the victim's bullying 
by killing him, without the defendant's involvement. 
 
Before the defendant was questioned in connection with the 
victim's death, police interviewed both Charlie and John on 
December 18, 2008.  Charlie and John made statements inculpating 
the defendant, and based on those statements, police issued a 
"be on the lookout" alert for the defendant.  Police stopped the 
defendant in his vehicle later that night and brought him to 
Barnstable police headquarters, where he was interrogated. 
 
Information learned in the course of John's interview also 
was set forth in the affidavit supporting the application for a 
warrant to search the defendant's vehicle, which was allowed.  
In proceedings against Charlie and John, however, a Juvenile 
Court judge suppressed the entirety of Charlie's December 18, 
2008, statement to police, and most of John's, due to the 
officers' failure to follow proper procedures for interrogating 
juveniles under the age of fourteen.  Before trial, the 
defendant unsuccessfully sought to have suppressed the evidence 
seized pursuant to the search of his vehicle.  He argued, inter 
alia, that information in the search warrant affidavit that had 
5 
 
been obtained from John in contravention of John's 
constitutional rights should have been redacted, and that what 
would have remained following such redaction was insufficient to 
establish probable cause.  A Superior Court judge disagreed, 
ruling that there was no need to suppress evidence against the 
defendant obtained as a result of a violation of a third party's 
constitutional rights, and that, in any event, even if the 
affidavit were redacted as the defendant wanted, there would 
still have been probable cause for the search. 
 
2.  Facts.  Based on the evidence at trial, the jury could 
have found the following.  The victim, a sophomore at Barnstable 
High School, lived with his grandmother in an apartment in 
Hyannis.  He had his own bedroom, which he always locked when he 
was not at home; even his grandmother could not access his 
bedroom without the key.  He also had installed locks on his 
closet doors.  On his belt loop, he carried a key chain that 
included a key to his grandmother's apartment, a key to a safe, 
and a key bearing the Boston Red Sox insignia.  The victim's 
room was very neat, and he swept the floor in a particular 
manner so that he would be able to see footprints if someone had 
been in his room. 
 
The victim spent a great deal of time with his half-brother 
Charlie and was often at Charlie's mother's house on Arrowhead 
Drive in Hyannis (Arrowhead Drive house).  The two were both 
6 
 
involved in selling drugs, particularly Percocet.  The victim 
often carried large amounts of cash, and at least once was seen 
with up to $10,000 on his person, which he organized into stacks 
of $1,000, folding each stack in half and wrapping it with a 
rubber band. 
 
a.  Monday, December 15, 2008.  After school ended at 
2 P.M. on December 15, 2008, a classmate dropped the victim off 
on Arrowhead Drive.  Charlie, John, and the defendant also had 
been dropped off at the Arrowhead Drive house around the same 
time by Diana R.,6 one of the defendant's classmates at Cape Cod 
Community College.  Charlie telephoned Louis L.,7 a student at 
Barnstable High School, expressing interest in purchasing a 
black Nissan Maxima that Louis was selling for $11,000.  Louis 
and his girl friend picked up Charlie and the defendant in the 
Nissan and drove to the high school parking lot.  At the school, 
Charlie gave Louis $11,000 in cash, which was organized into 
piles of $1,000, with each stack folded in half and wrapped in a 
rubber band; a photograph of Charlie holding the cash, taken by 
Louis, was admitted in evidence at trial.  The defendant showed 
Louis his driver's license, and Louis agreed to let the 
defendant test drive the vehicle with Charlie. 
 
6 Diana R. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. 
 
 
7 Louis L. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. 
                                                          
 
7 
 
 
At some point after 4 P.M., Charlie's grandmother, who was 
also the victim's grandmother, saw Charlie enter her locked 
apartment through the front door, using the victim's keys.8  
Charlie had never before used the victim's keys to enter the 
apartment.  She asked Charlie if he would buy her some ginger 
ale, because she was not feeling well.  After a stop at a 
convenience store, Charlie returned with the ginger ale to his 
grandmother's apartment, in a black vehicle, between 7 and 
9 P.M.9  Charlie's grandmother asked him if he had a cigarette, 
and he gave her a filtered menthol cigarette. 
 
Later that evening, Charlie dropped by the house of the 
victim's godmother in Hyannis.  The victim kept some of his 
belongings in the closet of the upstairs bathroom there, 
including a safe box containing money.  Although another 
bathroom was available, Charlie waited for someone else to 
finish showering in order to use the upstairs bathroom in 
particular.  After making use of that bathroom, he left. 
 
At approximately 8:00 P.M., the defendant, Charlie, and 
John met Louis at a pharmacy in Hyannis to return the Nissan, 
 
8 The victim's grandmother recognized the keys as belonging 
to the victim based on the Boston Red Sox logo on one of them. 
 
 
9 Still photographs taken from video surveillance footage of 
the convenience store, showing the defendant inside the store, 
carrying what appears to be a soda bottle, were introduced at 
trial.  As discussed infra, the defendant argues that a 
detective's testimony identifying him as the person in the 
photographs was improper. 
                                                          
 
8 
 
which the defendant had been driving, and Louis gave them back 
the $11,000 in cash.  As they were walking away, Louis called 
after them that they had left their keys on a key chain in the 
ignition; he testified that he recognized the keys as belonging 
to the victim. 
 
At some time during the evening, the defendant telephoned 
Diana and told her that he would give her ten Percocet pills if 
she came to the Arrowhead Drive house right away, where he, 
Charlie, and John were.  When Diana arrived at the house, she 
saw that the three of them had a "big bag" containing, in her 
estimation, approximately one thousand Percocet pills; she 
testified that she never before had seen them with such a large 
supply.  The four of them then spent time at another house on 
Elm Street before returning to the Arrowhead Drive house for the 
night.  Diana initially did not want to spend the night at the 
Arrowhead Drive house, preferring instead to spend time with the 
victim, with whom she was "hooking up," but the three males 
repeatedly assured her that the victim would be coming to the 
house.  While she waited for the victim to arrive, Diana 
consumed Percocet and Oxycontin with the others, and eventually 
agreed to spend the night.10  Diana telephoned the victim 
 
10 Diana testified that, at some point in the past, she had 
seen a gun in Charlie's bedroom in the basement of the Arrowhead 
Drive house.  She also had been with Charlie when he purchased a 
black knife that he called "the Hawk."  She had seen the knife 
                                                          
 
9 
 
throughout the night, but was unable to reach him.  The victim 
never showed up at the Arrowhead Drive house. 
 
b.  Tuesday, December 16, 2008.  In the morning, Charlie 
asked Diana to drive him to his grandmother's apartment, because 
he was worried that the victim had not come to the Arrowhead 
Drive house the night before.  Diana drove Charlie, John, and 
the defendant to the apartment.  Once there, Charlie went into 
the victim's bedroom and then left the apartment. 
 
Charlie then said that he "wanted to get a car," so Diana 
drove them to a dealership in Hyannis.11  Charlie and the 
defendant spoke with a salesman about purchasing a silver 2000 
BMW and negotiated a sale price for the vehicle, which had a 
sticker price of $10,995.12  Charlie presented $7,500 in cash and 
the defendant supplied the difference, grouped in $1,000 
increments and wrapped in rubber bands.  The vehicle was 
registered in the defendant's name. 
 
Meanwhile, the victim's grandmother was growing 
increasingly worried about her grandson, whom she had not seen 
since the previous day.  She and the victim's mother drove to 
on a washing machine in the basement sometime during the day on 
December 15, 2008. 
 
 
11 Diana testified that she did not know how old Charlie was 
at the time, and that he had told her that he was seventeen.  
 
 
12 The salesman noticed that Charlie looked "very young" but 
did not specifically inquire into his age. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 
 
the houses of different friends and family members, looking for 
the victim, to no avail.  Charlie returned to his grandmother's 
apartment with John between 5 and 6 P.M. that evening, wearing a 
new jacket.  His grandmother took the victim's keys from Charlie 
and went into the victim's bedroom.  She noticed that there was 
duct tape on a door in the room; she testified that the victim 
was "immaculate about his room" and would not have put tape on 
his door.  
 
The victim's grandmother then received a telephone call 
from her son, the father of both Charlie and the victim, who 
told her to take the victim's sister with her to check the 
places where the children used to play.  Charlie and John then 
left the apartment.  Sometime early that evening, Charlie was 
seen behind the wheel of a BMW at a local gasoline station, as 
the defendant walked towards it, carrying a red gasoline can.  
The defendant got into the BMW and John came out of it, holding 
the can as he walked toward the gasoline pumps. 
 
Approximately twenty-five minutes after leaving her 
apartment, the victim's grandmother and sister arrived at a 
place in the woods where the children often spent time.  They 
noticed a bright orange light in the distance, and realized that 
it was a fire emanating from a pit.  The victim's body was 
burning at the bottom of the pit.  Emergency personnel arrived 
at the scene, extinguished the fire, and extracted the victim's 
11 
 
body, which had been wrapped in a sheet and a comforter.13  
Evidence later recovered from the scene included a package of 
Newport menthol cigarettes,14 a red pushpin, and a pink Starburst 
candy;15 a certified accelerant detection dog also twice alerted 
to the presence of gasoline. 
 
After she received news of the victim's death, Diana 
telephoned the defendant and asked him if he knew what had 
happened and whether he knew who was responsible.  The defendant 
responded, "We think we have an idea," and told her that he and 
Charlie were going to New York.16 
 
c.  Thursday, December 18, 2008.  On December 18, 2008, the 
defendant drove in the BMW to the home of his friend Sam T.17  
The defendant was carrying bags of Oxycontin and Percocet pills, 
and showed Sam a "wad" of cash that appeared to be at least 
 
13 The victim's grandmother testified that she recognized 
the comforter as one that Charlie used when he lived with her in 
2007. 
 
 
14 As mentioned, testimony at trial indicated Charlie had 
been seen with menthol cigarettes. 
 
 
15 Colored pushpins and a package of Starburst candy were 
later found in the basement of the Arrowhead Drive house. 
 
 
16 The defendant did not go to New York after the discovery 
of the victim's body, but spent the night of December 17 at a 
motel in Attleboro. 
 
 
17 Sam T. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. 
 
                                                          
 
12 
 
$1,000.18  Along with two other friends, they went to the mall, 
where the defendant spent cash on purchases for a friend and 
himself. 
 
Later that evening, after dropping off the other friends, 
Sam and the defendant drove to Wellfleet to meet their friend 
Ella M.  During the trip, the defendant said, "I have something 
to tell you.  I killed Jordan Mendes.  I shot him, and I stabbed 
him.  I bodied him."  He said that he and Charlie had planned to 
rob the victim for his money,19 but then "shit went bad" and he 
shot the victim while they were in the basement of the Arrowhead 
Drive house after school one day, and also stabbed him in the 
neck.  The defendant told Sam that he and Charlie had rolled the 
body in a blanket, thrown it in a ditch, and burned it with 
gasoline.  The defendant went on to say that he was not worried 
about getting caught because he had "cleaned it up" with bleach. 
 
In Wellfleet, the two picked up Ella20 and drove to a 
restaurant.  Sam went inside the restaurant while the defendant 
and Ella consumed a crushed Percocet pill in the vehicle, using 
 
18 Sam testified that he never had seen the defendant, whom 
he had known since childhood, with that amount of cash before. 
 
 
19 Another witness, one of the defendant's classmates, 
testified that, one week before the victim's death, the 
defendant told her that "within a week, he was going to be 
getting a BMW for ten stacks." 
 
 
20 Ella M. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. 
 
                                                          
 
13 
 
a $100 bill that the defendant supplied to inhale it.21  The 
defendant told Ella that he "had all the money in the world" and 
wanted to spoil her and take her out to dinner whenever she 
desired.  After they were seated inside the restaurant, the 
defendant told Ella that he loved her but that he was "going 
away for a long time" and that she would not be able to see him.  
He then took a "wad of money" out of his pocket and scattered it 
on the table.  Ella counted somewhere between $500 and $1,000, 
but the defendant said that he had over $28,000. 
 
After dinner, Ella and the defendant continued to talk in 
the BMW.  When Ella asked him how he came to have so much money, 
the defendant told her, "We jumped someone," and that he had 
robbed that person of his pills and money.22  The defendant, 
"very nervous [and] shaking," said that "it was a mess" and 
"mentioned something about blood."  He said that he was going to 
 
21 Ella also testified that she had met the defendant 
earlier that day at the Registry of Motor Vehicles in Yarmouth 
to buy drugs from him.  The defendant was with Charlie and 
carried a bag of at least fifty Percocet and Oxycontin pills.  
The defendant showed Ella his new BMW, telling her that he had 
purchased it with cash. 
 
 
22 In addition to confessing to Sam and Ella, the defendant 
confessed to an inmate in the Barnstable house of correction 
shortly after he was arrested.  According to the inmate, who was 
housed in the cell adjacent to the defendant, the defendant said 
that he and "Little Jordan" had shot and stabbed the victim and 
burned the body in a ditch.  The inmate also testified that the 
defendant said that he and Charlie had taken apart and disposed 
of the gun that was used to shoot the victim. 
 
                                                          
 
14 
 
be in a lot of trouble and reiterated that he would be going 
away for a long time. 
 
Sam and the defendant dropped off Ella and returned to 
Sam's house, where the defendant left pills, approximately 
$2,000 in cash, and a knife.  On the way back from Sam's house, 
the defendant was stopped by police, who had received a "be on 
the lookout" alert regarding a BMW registered to the defendant.  
An officer of the Barnstable police department read the 
defendant the Miranda rights after the defendant got out of the 
vehicle, but did not place him under arrest.  Another officer 
asked the defendant if he would go voluntarily to the police 
station to speak with detectives about a recent homicide, and 
the defendant agreed.  The BMW was towed to the police station. 
 
A redacted23 recording of the defendant's interview with 
police was played for the jury.24  During the interview, the 
defendant did not admit to killing the victim, but made 
statements concerning his whereabouts over the prior days that 
were inconsistent with other evidence.  For example, he claimed 
 
23 The interview was redacted primarily to remove any 
reference to statements made by Charlie and John implicating the 
defendant. 
 
 
24 The audio portion of the first four minutes of the 
interview was not recorded.  One of the interviewing officers 
testified that, although the video recording was motion-
activated, turning on the audio recording required manual 
intervention.  The officers initiated the audio recording after 
a preliminary exchange concerning the logistics of the 
interview. 
                                                          
 
15 
 
that, after Diana dropped him off at the Arrowhead Drive house 
on the afternoon of December 15, 2008, he stayed there for the 
rest of the day, and maintained that he spent the entirety of 
December 16, 2008 at his own home in South Yarmouth. 
 
d.  Police investigation.  i.  Search of Arrowhead Drive 
house.  Police searched the Arrowhead Drive house pursuant to a 
warrant, finding, among other things, a number of stains in the 
basement that tested positive for the presence of blood.25  A 
forensic expert testified that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
consistent with the victim's DNA profile was found in several of 
the blood stains, including stains on the wall, on an end table, 
on a remote control, and on the floor.26  She testified that the 
probability of the DNA profile of a randomly selected Caucasian 
individual matching that found in the blood stains was at least 
1 in 19.18 quintillion.27  Additionally, a DNA mixture from at 
least two individuals was found on a sneaker, to which the 
 
25 The basement, to which Charlie had a key, was partitioned 
into makeshift rooms using sheets that had been affixed to the 
ceiling beams with multicolored pushpins.  In one of the ceiling 
beams, investigators noted holes several feet apart but no 
sheet.  A package of Starburst candies also was found in the 
basement, and a red gasoline tank was recovered from a shed in 
the backyard. 
 
 
26 The defendant presented one witness, a different 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) expert, who testified that she would 
have excluded the defendant as a potential contributor to the 
DNA found on the knife blade. 
 
 
27 The defendant is Caucasian. 
                                                          
 
16 
 
victim and the defendant were included as potential contributors 
and Charlie and John were excluded. 
 
ii.  Search of Nissan.  In Louis's Nissan, between the 
passenger seat and the center console, police found a black 
folding knife that tested positive for the presence of blood and 
contained a DNA mixture of at least two individuals.  The major 
profile of DNA extracted from the knife blade was consistent 
with that of the victim, and the defendant could not be excluded 
as a potential contributor.  The probability of DNA in the 
mixture matching the DNA profile of a randomly selected 
Caucasian individual was 1 in 28.  A tennis racquet that tested 
positive for the presence of blood and bore DNA consistent with 
the victim's was found in the Nissan's trunk. 
 
iii.  Search of BMW.  Pursuant to a search warrant, police 
found a number of new articles of clothing, with store tags 
still on them, in the trunk of the defendant's BMW, as well as 
some clothing that appeared to have been worn.  One T-shirt and 
one pair of sneakers that appeared to have been worn tested 
positive for the presence of blood; DNA found on the T-shirt 
matched the defendant's profile, and neither the victim nor John 
could be excluded as contributors to DNA found on the sneaker. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant raises constitutional issues 
concerning the availability of "target standing" under art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the 
17 
 
constitutionality of the witness immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, 
§§ 20C-20E.  The defendant also argues that there was error in 
the admission of testimony from a police officer who identified 
him as the person shown in surveillance footage, and in the 
judge's failure to instruct the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2004). 
 
a.  Target standing.  Probable cause to stop and search the 
defendant's BMW rested in part on statements made by John and 
Charlie implicating the defendant.  A Juvenile Court judge 
ordered the majority of those statements suppressed in the 
juvenile proceedings against John and Charlie, primarily due to 
the failure of police to adhere to the protocol established by 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134 (1983), for 
interrogating juveniles under the age of fourteen.  The 
defendant argues that, as the real target of the police 
investigation, he should have been granted standing to assert 
the violation of John and Charlie's constitutional rights in 
litigating his own motions to suppress, and the failure to 
afford him such standing resulted in the erroneous denial of his 
motions.  He asks this court to recognize the concept of target 
standing, which we have not done previously. 
 
Although the United States Supreme Court has rejected the 
theory under the Fourth Amendment, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 133-138 (1978), "[w]e have left open the question 
18 
 
whether target standing has vitality under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Commonwealth v. 
Scardamaglia, 410 Mass. 375, 379 (1991), citing Commonwealth v. 
Manning, 406 Mass. 425, 429 (1990).  We have expressed a 
"reluctance to grant a wide scope to target standing, and 
perhaps thereby to deny the trier of fact highly relevant 
evidence of guilt," id. at 380, but have recognized certain 
circumstances in which allowing such standing may have a 
salutary deterrent effect on police misconduct. 
 
For example, "[u]nconstitutional [police conduct directed 
at] small fish intentionally undertaken in order to catch big 
ones may have to be discouraged by allowing the big fish, when 
caught, to rely on the violation of the rights of the small 
fish, as to whose prosecution the police are relatively 
indifferent."  Commonwealth v. Manning, supra at 429, citing 4 
W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(h), at 354-355 (2d ed. 
1987).  See 6 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(h), at 301 
(5th ed. 2012) (posing hypothetical situation in which target 
standing might lie where X is arrested for armed robbery, and 
subsequently, "acting with the specific intention of finding 
additional evidence incriminating X with respect to that crime, 
the police conduct a fruitful search of X's wife").  
Nonetheless, "the need to create a deterrent effect on police 
misconduct by the recognition of target standing is not great 
19 
 
except perhaps in the case of distinctly egregious police 
conduct."  Commonwealth v. Scardamaglia, supra at 380. 
 
We need not resolve in this case the extent of the 
availability of target standing under art. 14, because the 
defendant's claim that he was, in fact, the target of the police 
investigation is belied by the record.  Rather than pointing to 
the defendant as the "big fish" that police sought, the record 
indicates that, before conducting the interviews, police had 
information suggesting that Charlie and John, in addition to the 
defendant, could have played significant roles in the victim's 
death, and actively were pursuing both juveniles as suspects.  
Police officers testified at the hearing on the defendant's 
motions to suppress that they knew prior to the interviews that 
Charlie had used the victim's keys to access the victim's 
bedroom on December 15, 2008, and that the victim never gave his 
keys to anyone; that the victim's grandmother believed that the 
victim had in his possession a large amount of cash, which 
Charlie was trying to find; that Charlie was known to own a gun; 
that John, who had been with Charlie earlier in the day on 
December 16, 2008, had been seen running from the rear of the 
Arrowhead Drive house as police approached; that the defendant 
recently had purchased a BMW; and that Charlie, John, and 
someone matching the defendant's description had been seen near 
a silver BMW with a gasoline container. 
20 
 
 
Thus, unlike a wife who is searched by police with the 
specific intent of finding evidence incriminating her husband, 
Charlie and John were not ostensibly innocent "small fish, as to 
whose prosecution the police [were] relatively indifferent."  
Commonwealth v. Manning, supra at 429.  Rather, insofar as 
information already known to police suggested the juveniles' 
material involvement in the victim's death, it appears that 
police "were genuinely interested in implicating [them], and 
thus the added threat of exclusion vis-à-vis [the defendant] 
would not seem necessary in such circumstances."  6 W.R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 11.3(h), at 305 (5th ed. 2012). 
 
Indeed, it is not the case that Charlie and John were 
without opportunity to contest the police misconduct directed at 
them, a circumstance which otherwise might counsel in favor of 
allowing a third party to assert their rights instead.  To the 
contrary, in separate criminal proceedings, Charlie and John 
both successfully challenged the violations of their respective 
constitutional rights, resulting in the suppression of all 
statements obtained as a result of those violations.  To be 
sure, because both Charlie and John were juveniles under the age 
of fourteen, only the defendant could be prosecuted as an adult, 
subject to the prospect of a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole.  See G. L. c. 119, §§ 52, 58, 72B.  See 
also G. L. c. 265, § 2.  But that alone cannot suffice to 
21 
 
establish the defendant as the actual target of the 
investigation, particularly where, as here, there was ample 
evidence of the juveniles' involvement.  Thus, even assuming the 
availability of target standing under art. 14, the defendant 
cannot establish that he was the prime target of the police 
investigation and therefore was properly denied target standing 
to challenge the violations of the juveniles' constitutional 
rights.28,29 
 
b.  Constitutionality of immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, 
§§ 20C-20E.  The defendant also challenges the constitutional 
validity of the witness immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, §§ 20C-
20E, both facially and as applied to him.  The defendant argues 
 
28 Since the defendant's argument fails because he was not 
in fact the prime target of the police investigation, we do not 
consider whether the police misconduct directed at John and 
Charlie was "distinctly egregious."  Commonwealth v. 
Scardamaglia, 410 Mass. 375, 380 (1991). 
 
 
29 We note also that the Superior Court motion judge found 
that there was probable cause to stop the defendant's BMW, seize 
it, and interrogate the defendant even without considering the 
information gleaned from illegally obtained statements, a 
finding that is supported by the record.  In particular, before 
police issued the "be on the lookout" alert for the defendant or 
stopped his vehicle, they had information that the defendant had 
been at the Arrowhead Drive house around the time that the 
victim was last seen alive; that Charlie and the defendant had 
purchased a BMW with cash on the day that the victim's body was 
discovered, which was particularly significant given that the 
killing appeared to be motivated by robbery of a large amount of 
cash; and that Charlie, John, and a person matching the 
defendant's description were seen with a gasoline container 
shortly before the victim's body was found burning in a pit 
amidst an odor of gasoline. 
                                                          
 
22 
 
that the scheme for immunizing witnesses in the Commonwealth, 
whereby an order granting immunity to a trial witness may be 
issued only "at the request of the attorney general or a 
district attorney," G. L. c. 233, § 20E (a), is unconstitutional 
insofar as it "clearly inures to the benefit of only one party 
in our adversary system of justice."  That the power to seek 
immunity for witnesses lies only with the government, the 
defendant contends, bestows on the prosecution "an undue 
tactical advantage," rendering a defendant's trial 
"fundamentally unfair and its result unreliable."  The defendant 
argues that the Commonwealth's reliance on a "spate" of 
immunized witnesses in his case deprived him of his Federal and 
State constitutional rights by undermining "the procedural 
safeguards which ostensibly protect the defendant from 
conviction based upon false evidence." 
 
Turning first to the defendant's as-applied challenge, the 
Commonwealth in this case elicited testimony from five immunized 
witnesses:  Diana, Louis, Sam, Sam's mother, and Ella.30  Based 
on their testimony, viewed in the aggregate, the jury could have 
found that the defendant had been at the Arrowhead Drive house 
around the time that the victim was last seen alive on December 
 
30 The Commonwealth also intended to offer immunity to a 
sixth witness, and obtained an order granting immunity to a 
seventh witness.  Both nonetheless refused to testify and were 
found to be in contempt. 
                                                          
 
23 
 
15, 2008; that he test-drove Louis's Nissan on December 15, 
2008, in which the victim's keys were seen at the time and a 
knife later was found; that he had at least $2,000 in cash and 
large bags of pills on his person on December 18, 2008, some of 
which he sold; and that he confessed to shooting and stabbing 
the victim and robbing him of pills and money. 
 
Defense counsel lodged his first objection to the 
Commonwealth's asserted overreliance on immunized witnesses 
before the fifth such witness took the stand, arguing that this 
excessive resort to offers of immunity constituted a "structural 
flaw."  The judge took no action, noting that the objection had 
been raised "at the eleventh hour."31 
 
Our jurisprudence has not vested criminal defendants with 
expansive rights vis-à-vis the immunization of witnesses.  To 
the contrary, "[w]e have held, without qualification, that a 
defendant 'has no standing to argue that the testimony of . . . 
purportedly immunized witnesses [is] the product of improper 
grants of immunity,'" reasoning that "[t]he privilege against 
self-incrimination is a personal right of the witness, and one 
that the witness is in a position to protect by his own means."  
Smith v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 345, 349 (1982), citing 
 
31 In a motion for a required finding of not guilty at the 
close of the Commonwealth's case, defense counsel also raised 
the issue of the Commonwealth's excessive reliance on immunized 
witnesses. 
                                                          
 
24 
 
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976).  While a 
prospective defense witness's assertion of his right under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution could affect a 
defendant's ability to present his defense most effectively, the 
compulsory process provisions of the Federal and State 
Constitutions do not mandate a judicial grant of immunity to 
such a witness as a matter of course.  See Commonwealth v. 
Curtis, 388 Mass. 637, 646 (1983), S.C., 417 Mass. 619 (1994).  
Although we have left open the possibility that "unique 
circumstances" could require a judge to grant a limited form of 
immunity to a defense witness, see id., we have not been 
presented yet with such a scenario.  See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 
453 Mass. 827, 834 n.7 (2009) (collecting cases). 
 
Other courts have recognized that such unique circumstances 
might emerge "where there exists prosecutorial misconduct 
arising from the government's deliberate intent to distort the 
fact-finding process."  United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 
1190 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Granito v. United States, 
498 U.S. 845 (1990), and cases cited.  See Commonwealth v. Cash, 
64 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 818 (2005), quoting Curtis v. Duval, 124 
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (judicial grant of immunity not 
required where there was no evidence of "attempt to harass or 
intimidate potential witnesses, or . . . that the prosecutor 
25 
 
deliberately withheld immunity for the purpose of hiding 
exculpatory evidence from the jury"). 
 
Here, however, the defendant has pointed to no such 
prosecutorial misconduct, nor has he even suggested the 
existence of a witness who was deterred from testifying in his 
favor due to his inability to secure a grant of immunity.  Under 
these circumstances, "we see no logical basis for departing from 
the principle . . . that 'it is up to the jury to evaluate the 
credibility of a[n immunized] witness' . . . based merely upon 
the number of witnesses that received inducements from the 
government in exchange for their testimony."  United States v. 
Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 878 (1998), quoting United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 
1552 (5th Cir. 1994).  See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 
74, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012) (assessing credibility 
of witnesses who have received consideration in exchange for 
testimony is within province of jury).  Standing alone, the 
Commonwealth's presentation of immunized witnesses, particularly 
where a defendant has not sought to immunize his own prospective 
witness, does not deprive a defendant of his right to a fair 
trial.32 
 
32 We decline the defendant's invitation to exercise our 
general superintendence power pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to 
announce a rule limiting the Commonwealth's authority to 
immunize witnesses.  A prerequisite to the invocation of this 
                                                          
 
26 
 
 
The Commonwealth is, in any event, constrained by G. L. 
c. 233, § 20I, which provides that a defendant cannot be 
convicted solely on the basis of immunized testimony.  That was 
not the situation here, as the immunized testimony was amply 
corroborated by nonimmunized witnesses.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 425 Mass. 357, 360 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Scanlon, 373 Mass. 11, 19 (1977) ("[T]o provide the requisite 
credibility, 'there must be some evidence in support of the 
testimony of an immunized witness on at least one element of 
proof essential to convict the defendant'").  There was evidence 
that a blood mixture containing DNA matching the victim's, to 
which the defendant could not be excluded as a potential 
contributor, was found on a knife discovered in a vehicle that 
the defendant had been driving.  There was also testimony that, 
approximately one week before the victim's death and the 
defendant's purchase of the BMW, the defendant told a classmate 
that, within a week, he would "be getting a BMW for ten stacks."  
Although two of the immunized witnesses provided powerful 
testimony concerning the defendant's confession to them that he 
had killed the victim, a third, nonimmunized witness also 
testified to a similar statement by the defendant.  Finally, the 
court's "truly extraordinary" general superintendence power is 
"a substantial claim of violation of [a litigant's] substantive 
rights," which has not been demonstrated here.  See McMenimen v. 
Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 184 (2008), S.C., 458 Mass. 1007 
(2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 
 
defendant was seen holding a tank of gasoline at a gasoline 
station shortly before the victim's body was discovered on fire, 
having been doused with an accelerant.  This evidence "not only 
corroborate[d] the essential elements needed to convict the 
defendant but also link[ed him] to the crime."  Id. 
 
Other safeguards further preserved the defendant's right to 
a fair trial.  The judge instructed the jury, before each 
immunized witness testified, that they could consider a 
witness's grant of immunity in assessing his or her credibility, 
and gave a similar instruction in his final charge.  The judge 
also instructed the jury in his final charge that they could not 
convict solely on the basis of immunized testimony.  In 
addition, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined four of the 
five immunized witnesses on the nature of the inducements they 
received from the government.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 
Mass. 100, 110-111 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) 
(rejecting due process challenge to witness payments contingent 
on outcome of case where, inter alia, judge gave "comprehensive 
instructions concerning witness credibility" and defense counsel 
cross-examined witnesses on nature of payments).  We discern no 
basis to doubt that the defendant received a fair trial. 
 
Finally, because we conclude that G. L. c. 233, § 20E, is 
constitutional as applied to the defendant, his facial challenge 
must fail.  See Commonwealth v. Abramms, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 
28 
 
587 (2006) (Brown, J., concurring), citing Blixt v. Blixt, 437 
Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) 
("Where a constitutional construction of a challenged statute is 
possible, a facial challenge must be rejected"). 
 
c.  Other errors.  i.  Identification testimony.  Eight 
still photographs extracted from video surveillance footage 
taken on December 15, 2008, at a convenience store were admitted 
in evidence at trial.  A detective testified, over objection, 
that the person seen in the photographs was the defendant.  The 
defendant argues that such identification testimony was improper 
and unduly prejudicial, because the criteria for the admission 
of lay opinion identification testimony were not met. 
 
The defendant is correct that the admission of this 
testimony was erroneous.  The general rule is that a "witness's 
opinion concerning the identity of a person depicted in a 
surveillance photograph is admissible if there is some basis for 
concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify 
the defendant from the photograph than is the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 326 (2000), 
quoting United States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th 
Cir. 1984).  "Put another way, 'such testimony is admissible 
. . . when the witness possesses sufficiently relevant 
familiarity with the defendant that the jury cannot also 
possess.'"  Id. at 326-327, quoting United States v. Jackman, 48 
29 
 
F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1995).  If the witness lacks such 
familiarity, it is the province of the jury to draw their own 
conclusions regarding the identity of the person depicted 
without the witness's assistance.  See Commonwealth v. Austin, 
421 Mass. 357, 366 (1995); Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37, 
41-42 (1966), S.C., 354 Mass. 249 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
1039 (1969), quoting Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 
137 (1875). 
 
Here, there is no indication that the detective possessed 
any special familiarity with the defendant that the jury lacked, 
or that the defendant's appearance had changed since the time 
the footage was taken, such that the jury needed assistance in 
identifying the individual depicted.  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 460 (1978) (police officer's testimony 
could aid jury in identifying person in photograph as defendant 
where officer testified that he had known defendant for long 
time and had seen him often, and defendant testified that he had 
lost twenty-five pounds since date photograph was taken). 
 
Although we are cognizant of the "increase[d] potential for 
inappropriate prejudice to the defendant" stemming from 
"identification testimony from a police officer who is so 
designated," Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 879 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Pleas, supra at 327, we cannot say that 
the improper testimony here constituted reversible error.  The 
30 
 
testimony, brief and fleeting as it was, did not overwhelm the 
other compelling, properly-admitted evidence against the 
defendant.  The defendant argues that the testimony "placed 
[him] near [the victim's] apartment around the time that the 
Commonwealth alleged he was murdered," but, where there was no 
indication that the defendant's appearance at trial was 
different than it was in the photographs, the jury were capable 
of drawing the same conclusion.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
19 Mass. App. Ct. 968, 969 (1985) (erroneous identification 
testimony harmless where "photographs upon which the non-
eyewitnesses based their opinions were introduced in evidence, 
permitting the jury to decide independently whether the 
defendant was the person on film").  Moreover, the defendant, in 
his interview with police, admitted to being in the convenience 
store on the night in question.  Thus, the improper testimony 
was not prejudicial. 
 
ii.  Failure to give DiGiambattista instruction.  As 
discussed, see note 24, supra, the audio portion of the first 
four minutes of the defendant's police interview was not 
recorded, although there was a complete video recording.  The 
defendant contends that the judge's failure to give an 
instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 
Mass. 423 (2004) (DiGiambattista), was prejudicial, where the 
prosecutor argued in her closing argument that there was no 
31 
 
coercion during the interview, and where the jury asked to 
review the digital video disc (DVD) of the interview during 
deliberations. 
 
We do not agree with the defendant that the issue properly 
was preserved for appellate review.  Generally, if defense 
counsel requests a specific instruction and the judge rejects 
it, or gives an instruction inconsistent with the requested one, 
we consider the objection to have been preserved.  See 
Commonwealth v. Biancardi, 421 Mass. 251, 253-254 (1995).  Here, 
however, although defense counsel requested a DiGiambattista 
instruction, the judge never rejected the request; rather, he 
told counsel that he would consider giving such an instruction 
in his final charge, but ultimately did not do so.  Under the 
circumstances, "it was entirely likely that the omission was 
inadvertent and that the judge would have rectified the error 
had it been brought to his attention.  [Defense counsel] should 
have brought the omission to the judge's attention by objecting 
at the end of the charge."  Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass. 
133, 139 (2008).  Because he did not, our review is for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992). 
 
We held in DiGiambattista, supra at 447-448, that 
"when the prosecution introduces evidence of a 
defendant's confession or statement that is the 
product of a custodial interrogation or an 
32 
 
interrogation conducted at a place of detention (e.g., 
a police station), and there is not at least an 
audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the 
defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury 
instruction advising that the State's highest court 
has expressed a preference that such interrogations be 
recorded whenever practicable, and cautioning the jury 
that, because of the absence of any recording of the 
interrogation in the case before them, they should 
weigh evidence of the defendant's alleged statement 
with great caution and care." 
 
Further, "[w]here voluntariness is a live issue and the humane 
practice instruction is given, [as it was here,] the jury should 
also be advised that the absence of a recording permits (but 
does not compel) them to conclude that the Commonwealth has 
failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. 
at 448. 
 
The failure to give a DiGiambattista instruction was 
erroneous.  Contrary to the Commonwealth's suggestion, the State 
police sergeant's testimony33 concerning the substance of the 
unrecorded portion of the interview does not cure "the failure 
to preserve the evidence in the first place."  Id. at 447 n.23.  
Nor is it the case, as the Commonwealth argues, that there was 
no need for a cautionary instruction because the entire 
recording was available to the defendant -- the defendant had 
 
33 The State police sergeant testified that, during the 
unrecorded portion of the interview, he thanked the defendant 
for agreeing to speak with police, explained that they were 
conducting an investigation into the circumstances surrounding 
the death of the victim, and asked whether the defendant would 
be willing to speak about that; the defendant agreed to do so. 
                                                          
 
33 
 
the full video recording, but no party had the full audio 
recording, which did not exist.  Since the audiotape recording 
of the defendant's interrogation was incomplete and defense 
counsel requested the DiGiambattista instruction, the 
requirements for giving such an instruction were met, and the 
instruction should have been given. 
 
Nonetheless, there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The defendant does not contest the 
interviewing State police sergeant's testimony as to the 
introductory nature of the first four minutes of the interview, 
and nothing in the record suggests that any substantive exchange 
took place during that time.  To the contrary, the recorded 
portion began as the sergeant introduced himself and his partner 
to the defendant and explained that the interview would be 
recorded, tending to corroborate the sergeant's trial testimony.  
See note 33, supra.  The recorded portion, spanning thirty-five 
pages of transcript, also captured the defendant's waiver of 
Miranda rights, and the form memorializing the waiver was 
admitted at trial.  Thus, it appears that most, if not all, of 
the substance of the interview was recorded and played for the 
jury, who accordingly were well situated to determine the 
voluntariness of the defendant's statements. 
 
In any event, even if the jury had disregarded the 
defendant's recorded statements in their entirety, there was 
34 
 
ample other evidence supporting a conviction of murder in the 
first degree.  The defendant's statements did not directly 
incriminate him, while other overwhelming evidence did.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 801-802 (2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011) (trial judge's error in giving 
only part of DiGiambattista instruction did not prejudice 
defendant where his unrecorded police interview was "some of the 
weakest evidence against him"). 
 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Pursuant to 
our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we consider an error neither 
objected to by the defendant at trial nor raised in his appeal 
to this court. 
 
Where, as here, the Commonwealth proceeds against a 
defendant on a joint venture theory of an offense that includes 
possession of a weapon as an element, the judge should instruct 
the jury that they must find that the defendant knew of his 
coventurers' possession of that weapon.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lee, 460 Mass. 64, 68-70 (2011), and cases cited.  After the 
defendant's 2011 trial, we clarified that, where the 
Commonwealth proceeds on alternate theories of a defendant's 
guilt (that the defendant was the main perpetrator of the 
offense or that his coventurer in fact carried out the offense), 
further explanation is required.  In such a case, the judge 
should instruct the jury that, to convict the defendant, they 
35 
 
must find either that a coventurer committed the offense and the 
defendant participated while knowing that the coventurer 
possessed a weapon, or that the defendant himself committed the 
offense with a weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 
440, 450 (2012).  "[T]he requirement of knowledge of a weapon in 
the context of murder in the first degree on a joint venture 
theory applies only where the conviction is for felony-murder 
and the underlying felony has as one of its elements the use or 
possession of a weapon."  Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 
100 (2013). 
 
On all four offenses charged, the Commonwealth here 
proceeded against the defendant on alternate theories of his 
guilt.  Three of those offenses included an element of 
possession of a weapon, namely, felony-murder with armed robbery 
as the predicate offense,34 the armed robbery itself, and assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon.  As such, the judge should 
have instructed the jury regarding the requirement of the 
defendant's knowledge of his alleged coventurers' possession of 
a dangerous weapon.  However, his failure to do so did not 
 
34 Because the defendant was convicted of murder on three 
different theories, the defendant's conviction of armed robbery 
was not duplicative of his conviction of felony-murder.  "Where, 
as here, the conviction of murder is based on a theory [or 
theories] in addition to the theory of felony-murder, the 
conviction of the underlying felony stands."  Commonwealth v. 
Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 370-371 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 200 n.1 (2004). 
                                                          
 
36 
 
result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The defendant did not argue at trial that his alleged 
coventurers carried out the offenses with weapons that he did 
not know they possessed.  Indeed, such a position would have 
been weak at best in light of evidence, such as confessions to 
two different people as well as DNA evidence, that the defendant 
himself used a weapon to kill the victim.  It is therefore 
unlikely that the omitted jury instruction would have affected 
the outcome of the case, and we discern no reason, on this or 
any other basis, to order a new trial or to reduce the 
conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.