Title: Monroe v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 372, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BOBBY L. MONROE,  
§ 
No.  372, 2009     
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0706000335 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 13, 2010 
 
 
Decided:   December 8, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 8th day of December 2010, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Bobby L. Monroe (“Monroe”), the defendant below, appeals from a 
Superior Court final judgment of conviction.  A Superior Court jury found Monroe 
guilty of two counts of Burglary in the Third Degree, 1 one count of Felony 
Criminal Mischief,2 and two counts of Misdemeanor Theft.3  On appeal, Monroe 
claims that his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment 
                                                 
1 11 Del. C. § 824. 
 
2 11 Del. C. § 811. 
 
3 11 Del. C. § 841. 
 
 
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of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution 
was infringed, because of juror bias.  We find no error and affirm.  
 
2. 
Monroe was arrested for a series of burglaries occurring between April 
10, 2007 and May 22, 2007.  He was indicted on five counts of third-degree 
burglary, three counts of felony theft, two counts of misdemeanor theft, one count 
of felony criminal mischief, one count of theft of a motor vehicle, and six counts of 
second-degree conspiracy.  The Superior Court held a three-day trial from March 
31 to April 2, 2009.  At the conclusion of the State’s case, Monroe moved for 
judgment of acquittal on all charges, which the trial court denied.  The jury 
returned a guilty verdict on five of the charges, and acquitted the defendant on the 
remaining sixteen. 
3. 
Several hours after the jury returned the verdict, a juror contacted the 
Superior Court chambers, and informed the trial judge that she had seen Monroe at 
her apartment complex, located at 320 Shipley Road in Wilmington (the “Shipley 
complex”), shortly after the jury reached its verdict.  By letter that same day, the 
trial judge notified Monroe’s defense counsel of the juror’s allegations, and 
ordered Monroe to “stay away from the juror’s apartment complex.”  According to 
the trial judge, “[t]he juror reported that [Monroe], apparently, has a friend in the 
place where the juror lives and, much to the juror’s discomfort, [Monroe] came 
 
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by.”  There was no additional information regarding the juror’s knowledge of 
Monroe. 
4. 
Neither Monroe nor his trial counsel informed the trial court about 
Monroe’s discomfort with the juror, or about her potential bias against him, until 
Monroe’s sentencing hearing on May 29, 2009.  At that hearing, Monroe stated 
that he lived at the Shipley complex with his girlfriend, Avagay Green.4  Monroe 
asserted that he had not been at the Shipley complex on April 2nd, however, 
because after the jury returned its verdict, his stepsister immediately drove him to 
Newark, from where he then left for Maryland.  Monroe speculated that the juror 
knew him and Green, that she was biased against him, and that she intentionally 
failed to inform the court that she knew that he and Green lived in her apartment 
complex. 
5. 
As the trial judge noted, the preliminary evidence showed only that the 
juror saw Monroe at the Shipley complex and that the juror thought Monroe was 
visiting a friend there after the trial.  Nevertheless, the trial judge decided to leave 
the record open for thirty days to allow Monroe and his defense counsel to 
investigate the possibility of juror bias and move for a new trial.  The trial judge 
then sentenced Monroe without objection from the defense. 
                                                 
4 At trial, Green testified that Monroe had been living with her in her apartment at the Shipley 
complex since May 2007. 
 
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6. 
By letter dated June 23, 2009, Monroe’s trial counsel informed the 
court that Monroe would not be moving for a new trial.  Trial counsel reported that 
he had investigated the potential juror bias, but found no basis on which “to 
challenge the validity of the verdict as contemplated by Delaware Rule of 
Evidence 606(b).” 
7. 
On appeal, Monroe’s trial counsel filed a brief and moved to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).5  In that brief, trial counsel included a letter from Monroe 
listing several issues he (Monroe) wished to raise on appeal.  This Court granted 
trial counsel’s motion to withdraw on April 13, 2010, and new appellate counsel 
was appointed.  This appeal followed. 
8. 
Monroe seeks reversal of his convictions on the ground that he was 
denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States, and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware, Constitutions, 
because of juror bias.  He asks this Court to grant him a new trial.  Monroe 
contends that the juror knew he lived in the same apartment building, but yet still 
continued to serve as a juror.  That amounted to juror bias, Monroe argues, because 
the juror improperly influenced the other members of the jury during deliberations. 
                                                 
5 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 26(c). 
 
 
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9. 
This Court generally reviews de novo claims of alleged constitutional 
violations.6  Monroe’s claim, however, is reviewed only for plain error because 
although he raised the issue of potential juror bias at his sentencing hearing, he 
failed to move for a new trial.7  Under the “plain error” doctrine, we are “limited to 
material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, 
serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused 
of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”8 
10. Although Monroe purports to rely on both the United States and 
Delaware Constitutions, he has made no legal argument, or cited any authority, to 
support his conclusory statement that his rights under the Delaware Constitution 
were violated.  Monroe refers to Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution in the 
Summary of Argument section of his opening brief, but fails to address the merits 
of his Delaware Constitutional claim in the Argument itself.9  This Court has 
consistently declined to consider state constitutional claims that the appellant has 
                                                 
6 Grace v. State, 658 A.2d 1011, 1015 (Del. 1995). 
 
7 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8; see also Cruz v. State, 990 A.2d 409, 412 (Del. 2010). 
 
8 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
9 Under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 14, an appellant must raise and argue claims of error in 
both the Summary of Argument and the Argument portions of his opening brief.  DEL. SUP. CT. 
R. 14(b)(iv), (vi); Roca v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 842 A.2d 1238, 1242 (Del. 2004) (“It 
is well established that ‘to assure consideration of an issue by the court, the appellant must both 
raise it in [the Summary of the Argument] and pursue it in the Argument portion of the brief.’”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 
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failed to support other than with conclusory assertions.10  “The proper presentation 
of an alleged violation of the Delaware Constitution should include a discussion 
and analysis of one or more of the criteria set forth in Jones [v. State11] or other 
applicable criteria.”12  Failure to do that operates as a waiver of the claim.13  
Accordingly, to raise a cognizable claim under the Delaware Constitution (here, 
that the Delaware Constitution provides greater protection than the United States 
                                                 
10 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 290-91 (Del. 2005) (noting that a defendant’s claim under Article 
I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution is waived where the defendant makes only a conclusory 
declaration of such violation in his opening brief); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 
1993) (holding that a defendant’s claim under the Fourth Amendment was waived where the 
defendant failed to dispute the Superior Court’s factual finding that he voluntarily consented to 
the search and seizure in the text of his opening brief). 
 
11 745 A.2d 856, 864-65 (Del. 1999).  In Jones, the defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution provided separate protections against unlawful 
search and seizure.  Id. at 861.  Although the Fourth Amendment, and Article I, § 7 of the 
Delaware Constitution contain similar language, this Court concluded that the Delaware 
Constitution provided more protection than the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  In arriving at that 
conclusion, we examined the following criteria, including:  textual language, legislative history, 
preexisting state law, structural differences, matters of particular state interest or local concern, 
state traditions, and public attitudes, “for determining whether a provision in the United States 
Constitution has a meaning identical to a similar provision on the same subject in a state’s 
constitution.”  Id. at 864. 
  
12 Ortiz, 869 A.2d at 291, n.4.  See also Jenkins v. State, 970 A.2d 154, 158 (Del. 2009) 
(explaining that a defendant must “discuss and analyze” one or more of the criteria set forth in 
Jones); Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630, 637-38 (Del. 2008) (same). 
 
13 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised in the body of 
the opening brief [is] deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on appeal.”); see 
also Ortiz, 869 A.2d at 291 (noting that the “alleged violation of the Delaware Constitution will 
not be addressed because it was not fully and fairly presented to this Court as an issue on 
appeal.”); Murphy, 632 A.2d at 1152 (holding that “[t]he failure to raise a legal issue in the text 
of the opening brief generally constitutes a waiver of that claim on appeal.”). 
 
 
7
Constitution),14 Monroe must include an analysis of the Jones criteria in both the 
Summary of Argument and the Argument portions of his opening brief.  Because 
he has not done that, Monroe has not fully and fairly presented his Delaware  
constitutional claim to this Court, and we decline to address it.  We address only 
his Sixth Amendment claim. 
11. Monroe’s Sixth Amendment claim lacks merit, because Monroe has not 
established plain error.  Although juror bias will not be tolerated,15 for this Court to 
overturn a jury verdict, Monroe must show “actual prejudice” 16  or that “the 
circumstances surrounding the [juror] misconduct were so egregious and inherently 
prejudicial so as to support a presumption of prejudice.”17  Relying on our decision 
in Hughes v. State, Monroe asserts that he does not have to show actual prejudice, 
because the juror bias here constituted “egregious circumstances,” in which case 
prejudice should be presumed.18  In Hughes, we held that juror impartiality was 
impermissibly tainted when several jurors knew, before trial, about the defendant’s 
                                                 
14 For example, this Court has held that for jury trials, Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution 
can provide greater protection than the Sixth Amendment where the latter is silent on the issue of 
juror substitution.  See Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 1991). 
  
15 Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1256-57 (Del. 1988). 
 
16 Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Del. 1985). 
 
17 Massey, 541 A.2d at 1255. 
 
18 See Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1046 (“However, under egregious circumstances such as those 
presented here, the law raises a presumption of prejudice and, consequently, a violation of due 
process, in favor of the defendant.”). 
 
 
8
prior convictions for the same offense and informed the rest of the jury during their 
deliberations.19  We concluded that “[o]nce [the jurors] acquired new, extremely 
prejudicial information, their ability to remain impartial became inherently 
suspect.”20 
12. Here, unlike Hughes, the facts do not rise to the level of “egregious 
circumstances.”  Monroe speculates that the juror was inherently biased because 
she lived in the same apartment complex, but he provides no evidentiary or legal 
support for his theory.  Monroe cites no authority to support his claim that simply 
living in the same building as the defendant is inherently prejudicial.21  Further, 
nothing in the record shows that the juror knew Monroe or had encountered him 
                                                 
19 Id. at 1040-43; see also id. at 1044 (“[W]e are hard-pressed to think of anything more damning 
to an accused than information that a jury had previously convicted him for the crime charged.”) 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 
20 Id. at 1045. 
 
21 The Southern District of New York has held that even if a juror potentially recognizes a 
defendant, that is not inherently prejudicial.  Ayuso v. Artuz, 2001 WL 246437, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (concluding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for new trial where a 
juror stated that the defendant looked familiar because the two lived in the same neighborhood, 
because “there is no nexus between the possible recognition of [the defendant] from the 
neighborhood and [defendant’s] involvement in the crime.”).  See also Owen v. Hood, 41 F.3d 
1513 (Table), 1994 WL 622975, at *3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant’s right to a fair and 
impartial jury was not violated where the trial court refused to excuse a juror who lived in the 
same neighborhood as a police officer involved in the case, and had also gone to school with 
another officer also involved in the case); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F.Supp.2d 260, 316 (W.D. Pa. 
2002) (“The mere fact that [the juror] had a past [legal] relationship with the [district attorney] 
was not enough under Pennsylvania law to obtain a reversal of the trial court’s ruling.”); 
Commonwealth v. Bright, 420 A.2d 714, 716-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that there was no 
ground to exclude a juror merely because he lived in the same neighborhood as the prosecutor 
and had known the prosecutor since childhood). 
 
 
9
before the trial.  Because the juror did not see Monroe at the Shipley complex until 
after the verdict was returned, no “bias” could have occurred before or during the 
jury deliberations.  Moreover, Monroe’s trial counsel investigated the potential 
juror bias claim, and independently concluded there was insufficient evidence to 
challenge the validity of the verdict.  Because the circumstances here were not 
inherently prejudicial, and Monroe has failed to show actual prejudice, his claim 
must be rejected. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the 
Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
         Justice