Title: Joe Elton Nixon v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-006
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
Nos. SC92006, SC93192 & SC01-2486 
___________ 
 
JOE ELTON NIXON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
                                 
JOE ELTON NIXON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc., 
Respondent. 
                                   
 
JOE ELTON NIXON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 20, 2006] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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PER CURIAM. 
Joe Elton Nixon, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals an order of 
the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Additionally, he files a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus with this Court.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1),(9), Fla. Const.  
We issued an opinion in this case which addressed Nixon’s claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective for conceding his guilt to first-degree murder without his consent.  
We reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.  See Nixon v. State, 857 
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2003).  The United States Supreme Court accepted the case for 
certiorari review and reversed this Court’s decision.  See Florida v. Nixon, 543 
U.S. 175 (2004).  We now readdress the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
the issue of concession of guilt, and we address the other issues raised in Nixon’s 
appeal from the denial of 3.851 relief, as well as the issues raised in the habeas 
petition.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief, and we deny habeas relief . 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Joe Elton Nixon was charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1984 
murder of a Tallahassee woman.  This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence 
on direct appeal.  See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).1  The United 
States Supreme Court denied Nixon's petition for a writ of certiorari.  See Nixon v. 
                                          
 
1.  Hereafter referred to as Nixon I.  
 
 
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Florida, 502 U.S. 854 (1991).  Subsequently, in 1993, Nixon filed a rule 3.850 
motion, which the trial court denied without an evidentiary hearing.  Nixon 
appealed the trial court's summary denial of his 3.850 motion to this Court.  
Additionally, Nixon filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court.  
Nixon raised seven issues relating to the denial of his rule 3.850 motion2 and three 
issues in his habeas petition.3  See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 
2000).4 
In Nixon II, this Court found the primary issue to be Nixon's claim that he 
was denied effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer conceded guilt without 
                                          
 
2.  The issues raised in Nixon's appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion 
were:  (1) whether the trial court denied Nixon a full and fair hearing on his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (2) whether Nixon was denied his right not 
to be tried while mentally incompetent; (3) whether Nixon’s death sentence had to 
be set aside because his counsel failed to make an effective argument for sparing 
his life and presented evidence that was harmful to his case during the sentencing 
phase of the trial; (4) whether Nixon was denied a competent mental health 
evaluation in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (5) whether 
Nixon was entitled to prove his claims under Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 
(1988), that the two prior convictions used as aggravating circumstances lacked 
validity; (6) whether Nixon should have the opportunity to prove that race 
discrimination tainted his conviction and death sentence; and (7) whether the jury 
weighed invalid and unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstances in 
violation of James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993), and Jackson v. State, 648 
So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994). 
3.  In his habeas petition Nixon argued that: (1) appellate counsel failed to 
raise on direct appeal any issue regarding Nixon's competency to stand trial; (2) 
appellate counsel failed to properly preserve Nixon's claims under Ake v. 
Oklahoma; and (3) appellate counsel failed to properly preserve Nixon's claims 
under James v. State and Jackson v. State. 
 
4.  Hereafter referred to as Nixon II.  
 
 
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his consent.  Nixon's counsel made the following statement during opening 
argument of the guilt phase: 
In this case, there will be no question that Jeannie [sic] Bickner died a 
horrible, horrible death.  Surely she did and that will be shown to you. 
In fact, that horrible tragedy will be proved to your satisfaction 
beyond any reasonable doubt. 
In this case, there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my 
client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death.  
Likewise, that fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any 
reasonable doubt.  This case is about the death of Joe Elton Nixon and 
whether it should occur within the next few years by electrocution or 
maybe its natural expiration after a lifetime of confinement. 
Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 620. 
During closing argument, Nixon's counsel made the following statement: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I wish I could stand before you and 
argue that what happened wasn't caused by Mr. Nixon, but we all 
know better.  For several very obvious and apparent reasons, you have 
been and will continue to be involved in a very uniquely tragic case. 
In just a little while Judge Hall will give you some verdict forms that 
have been prepared.  He'll give you some instructions on how to 
deliberate this case.  After you've gotten those forms and you've 
elected your foreperson and you've done what you must do, you will 
sign those forms.  I know you are not going to take this duty lightly, 
and I know what you will decide will be unanimous.  I think that what 
you will decide is that the State of Florida, Mr. Hankinson and Mr. 
Guarisco, through them, has proved its case against Joe Elton Nixon.  
I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every element of the crimes charged, first-degree 
premeditated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson. 
Id. 
On appeal, the parties were in disagreement regarding the appropriate 
standard of review to be applied in the case.  The State argued that the standard 
 
 
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explained in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), should be applied, 
whereas Nixon argued that because counsel's concessions amounted to per se 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), 
standard was the proper test.  Ultimately, this Court held that if Nixon could 
establish that he did not consent to counsel's strategy, then the Court would find 
counsel to be per se ineffective under the Cronic standard.  This Court reasoned 
that the Cronic standard should apply because: 
Although statements made by attorneys in closing arguments 
are not evidence, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, counsel's 
admission of guilt on behalf of his client denied to petitioner his 
constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence decided by the jury.  
Petitioner, in pleading not guilty, was entitled to have the issue of his 
guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue.  
Counsel's complete concession of petitioner's guilt nullified the 
adversarial quality of this fundamental issue. 
Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 623 (quoting Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 
1981)).  Since counsel's comments operated as the "functional equivalent of a 
guilty plea," this Court concluded that "Nixon's claim must prevail at the 
evidentiary hearing below if the testimony establishes that there was not an 
affirmative, explicit acceptance by Nixon of counsel's strategy.  Silent 
acquiescence is not enough."  Id. at 624.  To avoid similar problems in the future, 
this Court said: 
[W]e hold that if a trial judge ever suspects that a similar strategy is 
being attempted by counsel for the defense, the judge should stop the 
proceedings and question the defendant on the record as to whether or 
not he or she consents to counsel's strategy.  This will ensure that the 
 
 
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defendant has in fact intelligently and voluntarily consented to 
counsel's strategy of conceding guilt. 
Id. at 625 (citations omitted).  Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court 
to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Nixon consented to trial 
counsel's strategy.5 
On remand, an evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Janet Ferris on 
May 11, 2001.  Although Nixon was present at the evidentiary hearing, he did not 
testify; the only witness presented was Michael Corin, Nixon's trial counsel.  After 
the hearing, the trial court denied relief and found that Nixon consented to 
counsel's strategy.  On appeal to this Court, we applied the per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard from United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), 
found counsel ineffective, and remanded for a new trial.  See Nixon v. State, 857 
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2003).   
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review and held that 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s concession of guilt 
to the crime charged, even without the defendant’s consent, are to be analyzed 
under the principles enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).  We now determine all of Nixon’s 
                                          
 
5.  This Court declined to address the remaining issues in Nixon's 3.850 
appeal.  Additionally, this Court opted not to address Nixon's habeas claims given 
its disposition of his 3.850 appeal.  Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 625.  
 
 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims under that standard and address the other 
issues raised in this 3.850 appeal and the habeas petition.6   
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Motion for Postconviction Relief 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Concession of Guilt 
We initially held that Nixon was entitled to a new trial because the defense 
attorney conceded his guilt to first-degree murder without obtaining his consent to 
this trial strategy.  See Nixon v. State, 857 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2003).  Our grant of a 
new trial was based on this Court’s earlier opinion in this case which held that the 
per se standard of ineffective assistance of counsel was applicable to a situation 
where the defendant had not agreed to trial counsel’s strategy of conceding guilt to 
the crime charged.  See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000).  However, 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review and said: 
We granted certiorari, 540 U.S. 1217 (2004), to resolve an important 
question of constitutional law, i.e., whether counsel’s failure to obtain 
the defendant’s express consent to a strategy of conceding guilt in a 
capital trial automatically renders counsel’s performance deficient, and 
whether counsel’s effectiveness should be evaluated under Cronic or 
Strickland.  
 
                                          
 
6.    We do not address in detail Nixon’s claims that the jury was allowed to 
consider the aggravating circumstances of heinous, atrocious or cruel and cold, 
calculated and premeditated because these issues are procedurally barred.  See 
James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 1993).  Moreover, counsel cannot be 
found ineffective for failing to object to instructions which had not been 
invalidated at the time of trial.  See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1196 
(Fla. 2001).  
 
 
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Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 186-87 (2004).  After a discussion of the issue, the 
supreme court answered this question and held: 
 
 
 
To summarize, in a capital case, counsel must consider in 
conjunction both the guilt and penalty phases in determining how best 
to proceed.  When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy 
counsel believes to be in the defendant’s best interest and the 
defendant is unresponsive, counsel’s strategic choice is not impeded 
by any blanket rule demanding the defendant’s explicit consent.  
Instead, if counsel’s strategy, given the evidence bearing on the 
defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, that is the end of 
the matter; no tenable claim of ineffective assistance would remain. 
 
Id. at 192. 
 
Therefore, in order to obtain relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel 
for conceding guilt without the defendant’s consent, the defendant must 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the deficient performance as required under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  As to the performance prong of Strickland, the 
defendant must establish that “counsel made error so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland 466 
U.S. at 687.  On the prejudice prong, the reviewing court must determine whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  See id. at 695.  A reasonable probability is 
defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the 
proceeding.  Id. at 694.  “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be 
 
 
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said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the 
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”  Id. at 687. 
This issue was first brought to this Court’s attention during the direct appeal 
proceedings.  Nixon argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for conceding his 
guilt during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.  We did not address the issue at 
that time,7 but invited the defendant to raise the issue in postconviction 
proceedings.  The issue was in fact raised in Nixon’s 1993 motion for 
postconviction relief.  The trial judge summarily denied relief, and specifically 
denied Nixon’s claim that under United States v. Cronic counsel was per se 
ineffective for conceding the defendant’s guilt.  On appeal, this Court reversed the 
summary denial and held the ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be 
analyzed under the framework of Cronic and remanded to the trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing on this issue.  See Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 625. 
At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the only witness was Nixon’s trial 
counsel, Mr. Corin; Nixon did not testify at the hearing.  Counsel testified that his 
strategy was to attempt to save Nixon’s life.  He indicated that he wanted to show 
that while the State could prove Nixon committed certain acts, there were still 
good reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced to death.  Corin further 
testified that he explained this strategy to Nixon on several occasions, and Nixon 
                                          
 
7.  The issue had been remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, 
but Nixon would not waive his attorney-client privilege, and trial counsel could not 
testify concerning the matter.  See Nixon I, 572 So. 2d at 1340. 
 
 
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did not say or do anything after the discussions.  Corin’s testimony was consistent 
with the testimony he gave at an evidentiary hearing in 1988.  The trial judge 
found that Nixon’s normal pattern of communicating with trial counsel was by 
passively receiving information. 
 
The Supreme Court, viewing the same facts and testimony, found trial 
counsel was not required to get the express consent of Nixon to the trial strategy.  
Specifically the Court said: 
 
 
 
Corin was obliged to, and in fact several times did, explain his 
proposed trial strategy to Nixon.  See supra, at 181, 186.  Given 
Nixon’s constant resistance to answering inquiries put to him by 
counsel and court, see Nixon III, 857 So. 2d, at 187-188 (Wells, J., 
dissenting), Corin was not additionally required to gain express 
consent before conceding Nixon’s guilt.  The two evidentiary hearings 
conducted by the Florida trial court demonstrate beyond doubt that 
Corin fulfilled his duty of consultation by informing Nixon of 
counsel’s proposed strategy and its potential benefits.  Nixon’s 
characteristic silence each time information was conveyed to him, in 
sum, did not suffice to render unreasonable Corin’s decision to cede 
guilt and to home in, instead, on the life or death penalty issue.     
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 189. 
Trial counsel pursued a strategy of trying to avoid a sentence of death, 
because the totality of the evidence in this case demonstrated Nixon committed the 
various acts constituting murder.  As the Supreme Court indicated, “Counsel 
therefore may reasonably decide to focus on the trial’s penalty phase . . . .”  Nixon, 
543 U.S. at 191.   Counsel’s performance was not deficient under the facts and 
circumstances of this case.  
 
 
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Because trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, we need not address 
the prejudice prong of Strickland.  See Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 518 n.19 
(Fla. 1999) (indicating there is no need to address the prejudice prong if the 
defendant has failed to establish deficient performance).  Trial counsel was not 
ineffective for conceding guilt to first-degree murder. 
Evidentiary Hearing on the Brady/Giglio Claims 
 
Nixon next claims the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing on his claims that the prosecutor withheld certain exculpatory evidence in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1967).  He also alleges he was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the State knowingly used false 
or misleading evidence in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972).  Generally, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the 
postconviction motion or any particular claim in the motion is legally insufficient 
or the allegations in the motion are conclusively refuted by the record.  See 
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000).  In order to support summary 
denial, the trial court must either state its rationale in the order denying relief or 
attach portions of the record that would refute the claims.  See Anderson v. State, 
627 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1993).  Additionally, where no evidentiary hearing has 
been held, an appellate court must accept the defendant’s factual allegations as true 
to the extent that such allegations are not refuted by the record.  See Peede v. State, 
 
 
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748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).  The burden is on the defendant to establish a 
legally sufficient claim.  See Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1061.  Based on these 
principles, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of these claims because the 
evidence was not material and the State did not use false or misleading evidence.8 
 
In order to demonstrate a Brady violation, the defendant must establish that 
the State suppressed material evidence that was favorable to the accused (i.e., the 
evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching) and that he was prejudiced by the 
State’s suppression.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).  If it is 
demonstrated that material evidence was suppressed, the next inquiry must be 
whether the favorable evidence would put the whole case in such a different light 
as to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
435 (1995); Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 2000).  In this case, 
even assuming that the State withheld evidence, this Court’s first inquiry must be 
whether that evidence was material.  As the Supreme Court said in United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), “evidence is material only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  “The mere 
                                          
 
8.  While rule 3.851(f), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,  provides for 
an evidentiary hearing on claims listed in the initial postconviction motion as 
requiring a factual determination, this portion of the rule was added in 2001, 
subsequent to the filing of the motion in this case. 
 
 
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possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, 
or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in 
the constitutional sense.”   United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).  
 
Nixon argues the State withheld information that Lamar Nixon, the 
defendant’s uncle, said he saw the defendant in another town around the time of 
the murder.  He also claims the State withheld information that John Nixon and 
Wanda Robinson, two witnesses who testified for the State, received money from 
the sheriff’s office for their testimony, that John Nixon received favorable 
treatment on his case,9 that John Nixon was threatened with an outstanding arrest 
warrant, and that John Nixon was an informant for the State.10  We accept these 
allegations as true but find that this evidence does not meet the test of materiality 
set forth in Bagley and its progeny.  We further find that there is no reasonable 
probability that the result of the trial would have been different; in other words, our 
confidence in the outcome of the trial has not been undermined.   
Although Lamar Nixon stated the defendant was in another town near the 
time of the murder, this statement is contradicted by the other evidence in this case, 
including the defendant’s confession to three persons and the physical evidence–– 
the defendant’s hand print was found on the victim’s car.  The defendant was also 
                                          
 
9.  John Nixon was charged in 1986 with kidnapping, assault, and sexual 
battery.  The charges were brought after Joe Elton Nixon’s trial, which took place 
in July 1985.   
10.  These allegations are also relied on to support Nixon’s Giglio claim. 
 
 
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seen driving the victim’s car on the day of the murder.  In addition, another witness 
at the trial, Wanda Robinson, testified that Lamar Nixon was with her at the time 
he claims to have seen the defendant in Woodville.  Several other witnesses placed 
the defendant with the victim near a mall in Tallahassee at the same time.   
Despite the fact that John Nixon indicated in an affidavit executed in 1993, 
some eight years after Joe Nixon’s trial, that he and Wanda Robinson received 
money from the sheriff’s office for their testimony, in 1984 both he and Robinson 
stated they had not received anything in exchange for their testimony.  They 
further indicated there had been no threats or coercion on the part of the State to 
elicit their testimony.  Moreover, given the evidence that was introduced 
connecting the defendant to this murder, there is no reasonable probability that this 
impeachment evidence would have resulted in a different verdict. 
The trial court did not err in summarily denying Nixon’s claims based on 
Brady and Giglio. 
Mental Competence 
 
Nixon’s next allegation involves his claim that he was incompetent to 
stand trial.  He also alleges that he is mentally retarded and suffers from organic 
personality disorder.11  He bases these allegations primarily on the fact that during 
the trial he acted “bizarre,” in that he disrobed down to his underwear (not in the 
                                          
 
11.  Nixon does not make a separate argument on this issue beyond his 
argument that he was tried while incompetent.  
 
 
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presence of the jury), demanded a black judge and a black attorney, and refused to 
return to the courtroom.  After conducting a hearing in the holding cell on Nixon’s 
continued refusal to return to the courtroom, the trial court informed Nixon that his 
failure to return to court that afternoon would result in a finding that he had 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to be present during the 
trial.  When Nixon refused to come to the courtroom during the afternoon, the trial 
court made the finding of voluntary waiver of attendance, and the trial continued in 
his absence. 
On direct appeal, this Court addressed the issue of voluntariness and said 
that a defendant can waive his right to be present at any stage of a capital trial if he 
personally and voluntarily absents himself.  After reciting the factual 
circumstances of Nixon’s absence, we found no error in the trial court’s decision to 
conduct the trial in Nixon’s absence.  See Nixon I, 572 So. 2d at 1341-42.  Based 
on the same facts, Nixon now raises essentially the same issue under the guise that 
the trial court erred by not sua sponte ordering a competency determination and 
trial counsel was ineffective in not requesting a competency determination.  
Nixon has failed to demonstrate error by the trial court or trial counsel.  
First, it must be noted that the trial judge was familiar with this defendant because 
he had presided over a competency hearing concerning the defendant in another 
case, and the defendant was determined to be competent in that proceeding.  The 
competency hearing in the prior case took place a short time before the trial court 
 
 
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proceedings in this case.  The trial judge knew that in the earlier case, Nixon had 
threatened to disrupt the courtroom.  Nixon was again threatening to disrupt the 
proceedings.  These actions did not require the trial court to have Nixon examined 
for competency. 
Second, trial counsel had no reason to request a competency determination.  
Nixon had been examined by a mental health expert who did not give trial counsel 
any reason to delve further into competency.  In fact, trial counsel indicated that 
had he been aware of any basis, he would have filed a motion for a competency 
evaluation.  In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985), the United States 
Supreme Court said, “A defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in 
every criminal proceeding . . . .”  When there is no reason to suspect that a 
defendant is incompetent, it cannot be deficient performance if counsel does not 
request a competency examination.  See, e.g., Mills v. State, 603 So. 2d 482, 485 
(Fla. 1992) (finding no deficient performance where counsel had no reason to 
believe that mental mitigation could be developed).     
Thus, the record does not support Nixon’s claim that trial counsel erred in 
failing to request a competency determination. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Penalty Phase 
Nixon claims that counsel was ineffective in the penalty phase because he 
failed to investigate and introduce available mitigating evidence, argued evidence 
that was devastating to Nixon’s case for mercy, and permitted the State to argue 
 
 
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improper aggravating circumstances.  We must determine, based on the alleged 
facts, whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, whether Nixon 
was prejudiced by any deficiency.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  We find that the trial court did not err in summarily denying this claim 
because the allegations of deficient performance are refuted by the record. 
The record demonstrates that trial counsel investigated the defendant’s 
background, including his criminal history background.  Trial counsel met with the 
defendant and his mother, who did not tell counsel of the abuse that Nixon now 
presents.  Moreover, the jury was presented evidence of Nixon’s troubled 
childhood and his mental and emotional problems.  Counsel introduced fifty 
exhibits and called nine witnesses to support his arguments concerning mitigation 
in the form of Nixon’s background and mental and emotional problems.  Counsel 
retained the services of two mental health experts, and both of these experts 
testified that the two statutory mental mitigators applied in this case.  In addition 
counsel introduced a number of documents that the mental health experts relied 
upon in reaching their conclusions.  Clearly, counsel based his strategy for the 
penalty phase on the evidence he uncovered after a thorough investigation.  See 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland and stating that 
strategic decisions made after a thorough investigation of the facts and the law are 
virtually unchallengeable); see also Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 693 (Fla. 
2003).   
 
 
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Nixon argues that trial counsel should not have introduced these documents 
because they contain information about his criminal history.  However, trial 
counsel’s strategy at the penalty phase was to focus on Nixon’s mental health 
problems.  Counsel made a strategic decision to introduce this evidence although 
there was other information in the records.  Moreover, much of Nixon’s prior 
criminal history was before the jury because the State argued and the trial court 
found prior violent felonies and contemporaneous felonies as aggravating 
circumstances.  While present counsel would have proceeded differently in 
hindsight, that is not the standard applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995) (finding trial 
counsel not ineffective based on strategic decisions and holding that the standard is 
not how present counsel would proceed in hindsight).  Counsel in this case cannot 
be found ineffective based on his strategic decision.  See Zakrzewski, 866 So. 2d at 
693.  
The trial strategy from the beginning of this case was to concede that Nixon 
was the perpetrator of events that led to this murder.  Thus, in the opening 
statement, counsel for Nixon agreed that the victim’s death was horrible; the victim 
was tied to a tree and terrorized, and her body was set on fire while she was still 
alive.  However, the defense focused on arguing that despite the facts of the crime, 
Nixon was a life worth saving because of his troubled childhood, his mental and 
emotional problems, and the fact that he was convicted of three other felonies 
 
 
- 19 - 
which carried lengthy sentences.  The mere fact that counsel did not attempt to 
downplay a terrible death does not demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.   
Furthermore, this statement by defense counsel standing alone did not assist 
the State in proving the aggravating circumstances of heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC), and cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of legal or 
moral justification (CCP).  These two aggravating factors are supported by the 
evidence presented at trial, including the following information obtained from the 
defendant’s taped confession as outlined in the direct appeal: 
After his arrest, in a taped confession which was played to the 
jury, Nixon admitted murdering Ms. Bickner.  He described how he 
met Ms. Bickner at the mall and asked her to take him to his uncle’s 
house because he was having car trouble.  Once on the road, Nixon 
hit Bickner in the face.  When she stopped the car, Nixon put her in 
the trunk and then drove to a secluded wooded area where he took 
her from the trunk and tied her to a tree with jumper cables.  
According to Nixon, the two talked about their lives.  Ms. Bickner 
offered to give Nixon money, to sign her car over to him, begging 
him not to kill her.  Nixon recounted how he burned Ms. Bickner’s 
personal belongings and then threw the top of the convertible into the 
fire.  At some point after placing a paper bag over her head, Nixon 
threw the smoldering convertible top on Ms. Bickner, setting her on 
fire.  He then left the scene in the M.G.  According to the medical 
examiner, Ms. Bickner was alive at the time she was set on fire and 
the fire was the cause of death. 
 
See Nixon I, 572 So. 2d at 1338.  Thus, the aggravating circumstances of HAC and 
CCP were based on the evidence and not a statement by defense counsel that 
 
 
- 20 - 
acknowledged the awful facts of this murder.  The record in this case refutes the 
claim that counsel was ineffective in the penalty phase. 
Adequacy of Mental Health Evaluation 
Nixon next claims he was denied a competent mental health evaluation in 
violation of the principles enunciated in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  
Pursuant to Ake, a defendant is entitled to have access to a competent mental 
health expert who will conduct an examination of the defendant and assist in  
evaluating, preparing, and presenting a mental health defense.  The defendant in 
this case had the assistance of two mental health experts.  Both Dr. Merton L. 
Ekwall and Dr. Allen L. Doerman performed extensive evaluations of Nixon that 
included neuropsychological testing, interviews, and reviews of pertinent 
documents and records.  These documents and records included records of 
childhood discipline, records from correctional institutions, psychiatric reports, 
psychological reports, and records from group treatment homes.  The fact that 
Nixon has now found mental health experts who have different opinions and who 
say he is mentally retarded does not demonstrate that the initial experts’ 
evaluations were insufficient.  See Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 295 (Fla. 1993).   
We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on Nixon’s claim that he had an 
incompetent mental health evaluation. 
Racial Discrimination 
 
 
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Nixon argues he should be allowed to prove that racial discrimination tainted 
his conviction and death sentence.  He argues that State witnesses improperly gave 
racial descriptions of him as a black male and of the victim as a white female.  We 
affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this matter.  While Nixon offers statistics 
concerning the number of homicides in Leon County involving white victims and 
black victims and the percentage of death penalties received in these categories, he 
does not make an allegation that the State acted with purposeful discrimination in 
seeking the death penalty in his case.  This is the standard a defendant must meet in 
making a racial discrimination claim.  See Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259, 
1263-64 (Fla. 2004); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 463 (Fla. 1992).  Nixon’s 
additional argument ignores the fact that the racial descriptions used by the 
witnesses were presented in instances where the witness could not identify the 
defendant or the victim by name.   
We find no error in the trial court’s summary denial of these claims. 
Prior Violent Felony Aggravator 
As his last 3.850 claim, Nixon argues that the two prior felonies used to 
support the prior violent felony aggravator were not valid.  He argues that under 
Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), an invalid prior felony cannot be 
used to support this aggravating circumstance.  The trial court properly denied this 
claim because the prior violent felonies used in Nixon’s case have not been vacated 
 
 
- 22 - 
and are still valid convictions.  See Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 952 (Fla. 
1998). 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
 
Nixon argues three instance in which he claims appellate counsel was 
ineffective:  failure to raise the competency issue on appeal; failure to properly 
preserve his claim under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); and failure to 
preserve his claim under James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993), and Jackson v. 
State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994).  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel are properly raised in a habeas petition before the court that heard the 
defendant’s direct appeal.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 
2000).  The standard to be applied to these claims parallels the standard applied to 
claims involving the effectiveness of trial counsel as set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Thus, a defendant must demonstrate that 
appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the deficient performance.  Prejudice is demonstrated by showing 
that the appellate process was compromised to the degree that confidence in the 
correctness of the appellate result is undermined.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 
643.  Moreover, the appellate court must presume that counsel’s performance falls 
within that wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
 
 
- 23 - 
 
Nixon’s first ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, that appellate 
counsel should have recognized from simply reading the record that Nixon was 
incompetent to proceed at trial, is basically the same claim he raised in his 3.850 
motion concerning trial counsel.  As noted above, trial counsel did not request a 
competency determination, and the record does not support a finding that Nixon 
was incompetent.  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an 
issue that has not been preserved for appeal, that is not fundamental error, and that 
would not be supported by the record.  See Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 318 
(Fla. 1991).  Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel has not been demonstrated 
on this issue. 
 
Likewise, we find that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
properly preserve the Ake claim.  Nixon argues that appellate counsel, based solely 
on a reading of the record, should have realized that he had an incompetent mental 
health evaluation.  The record demonstrates that trial counsel requested and 
received the assistance of two mental health professionals.  These professionals 
examined the defendant, reviewed documentation concerning the defendant, 
prepared reports after their examinations, and testified at the penalty phase.  Nixon 
has neither alleged nor demonstrated any specific omissions by these professionals 
that could have been successfully argued on appeal.  Ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel has not been demonstrated.  
 
 
- 24 - 
 
Nixon also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
that the jury instructions on the aggravating factors of HAC and CCP were vague 
and cites to this Court’s decisions in James and Jackson.  Again, this is an issue 
which was not preserved for appellate review by objection in the trial court.  Trial 
counsel did not object to the HAC instruction, only argued CCP as improper 
doubling, and did not propose alternative instructions for either HAC or CCP.  
Moreover, at the time of the direct appeal, neither instruction had been invalidated.  
Thus, habeas relief is not warranted on this issue. 
Apprendi/Ring Issue 
 
Nixon also argues that his death sentence is unconstitutional because it is 
based on facts not included in the jury’s verdict of guilty to the first-degree murder 
charge.  He relies on the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
This Court has held that Ring is not retroactive in Florida under the test espoused 
in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).  See Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400 
(Fla. 2005).12  Thus, Ring is not applicable in this instance because Nixon’s case 
became final more than a decade before Ring was decided. 
Mental Retardation 
                                          
 
12.  In addition, two of the aggravating factors found in this case are prior 
violent felony and murder during the commission of a kidnapping.  As we have 
previously said, these aggravators take this case out of the purview of Ring.  See 
Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 193 (Fla. 2003); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788, 
793 (Fla. 2003). 
 
 
- 25 - 
 
As his last habeas claim, Nixon argues he is mentally retarded and therefore 
cannot be constitutionally executed.  The record before this Court does not 
demonstrate that the defendant is mentally retarded.  To the extent that Nixon is 
eligible to pursue a claim of mental retardation under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.203, he should do so within sixty days of the release of this opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s denial 
of postconviction relief, and we deny habeas relief.  
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
BELL, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Three Cases Consolidated: 
 
Two Appeals from the Circuit Court in and for Leon County,  
L. Ralph Smith, Jr., Judge - Case No. 84-2324 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Eric M. Freedman, New York, New York, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Curtis M. French, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent