Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Chris K. Konnor
Citation: 2005 WI 37
Docket Number: 2003AP001181-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2005

2005 WI 37 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1181-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Chris K. Konnor, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Chris K. Konnor,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KONNOR 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2005 WI 37 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1181-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Chris K. Konnor, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Chris K. Konnor,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's report and 
recommendation that Attorney Chris K. Konnor be publicly 
reprimanded for having committed eight counts of professional 
misconduct as alleged in the complaint filed by the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) in this court on May 1, 2003.  In 
general, the referee determined that Konnor had seriously 
neglected a probate matter, had failed to keep the beneficiaries 
advised of the status of the matter, had not appropriately 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
2 
 
handled the estate assets because he had not deposited them in 
accounts bearing interest, had not made timely deposits, and had 
not attempted to collect rents on the estate property. 
¶2 
Rejecting the OLR's position that Konnor's license 
should be suspended for 90 days as a sanction for these eight 
separate counts of misconduct, the referee recommended a public 
reprimand and that Konnor be ordered to pay the costs of this 
proceeding totaling $11,365.06. 
¶3 
Neither party has appealed from the referee's report 
and recommendation for public reprimand.  Konnor has, however, 
filed an objection in this court to the costs as requested by 
OLR.  Konnor seeks a reduction or amelioration of the total 
costs because he claims that several times prior to the hearing 
before the referee, he and/or his attorney expressed willingness 
to resolve the matter by a stipulated private or public 
reprimand; the OLR, however, declined to accept those offers and 
instead chose to pursue a 90-day license suspension as a 
sanction.  Konnor maintains that as a matter of equity and 
reasonableness, this court should view his offers to accept a 
public reprimand for his misconduct as a reason to now mitigate 
the costs as requested by OLR——especially those costs which were 
incurred because of the hearing before the referee.  Konnor is 
willing to pay $6774.91 in costs incurred prior to the referee's 
hearing, but now asks to be absolved from paying the additional 
$4590.15 in costs that were incurred as a result of the 
referee's hearing.  According to Konnor, had OLR accepted his 
offer for a public reprimand instead of demanding a 90-day 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
3 
 
suspension, this matter would have been resolved without a full 
evidentiary hearing before the referee.   
¶4 
We 
determine 
that 
Attorney 
Chris 
K. 
Konnor's 
professional 
misconduct 
as 
established 
by 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing evidence presented to the referee warrants a public 
reprimand.  We also determine, for reasons explained below, that 
Konnor 
should 
pay 
all 
the 
costs 
of 
these 
disciplinary 
proceedings in the amount specified, $11,365.06.  
¶5 
Respondent, Chris K. Konnor, was admitted to the 
practice of law in this state in April 1988 and practices in 
Milwaukee.  He has never before been the subject of professional 
discipline but he has twice been administratively suspended for 
nonpayment of dues.   
¶6 
The OLR filed a complaint in this court alleging eight 
violations by Konnor of the rules of professional conduct.  
Those violations arose from Konnor's handling of the estate of 
B.B. who died intestate on February 20, 1997, survived by five 
brothers and the children of two brothers who had predeceased 
her.   
¶7 
Attorney Stanley Hack was appointed to act as referee 
in this matter, and after a hearing, he filed his report 
concluding that OLR had established by clear and convincing 
evidence 
that 
Konnor 
had 
committed 
the 
eight 
counts 
of 
misconduct as alleged.   
¶8 
As noted, neither side has appealed from the referee's 
report; consequently the facts are not now in dispute.  Briefly 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
4 
 
summarized, the pertinent facts with respect to each of the 
eight counts are these: 
COUNT ONE 
¶9 
Attorney Chris K. Konnor was retained to handle the 
B.B. estate in March of 1997.  After preliminary proceedings to 
determine heirs, Konnor was appointed as personal representative 
by the Milwaukee Deputy Register in Probate on October 6, 1997.  
The next day, Konnor opened a noninterest-bearing estate 
checking account for which, as the personal representative, 
Konnor had check writing authority.  Konnor, however, did not 
arrange with the bank to have the cancelled checks returned to 
him, nor did he regularly receive from the bank the cancelled 
checks for the estate until January 2002, after one of the 
beneficiaries had complained to OLR about Konnor's handling of 
the estate.  That course of conduct, from 1997 to 2002, where 
Konnor failed to maintain complete records of the account he 
held in trust, led to Count One of the OLR complaint which 
alleged that Konnor had violated SCR 20:1.15(a) and (e).1 
                                                 
1 Until January 1, 1999, SCR 20:1.15(a) provided that a 
lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own 
property, property of clients or third persons "that is in the 
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation."   
Effective January 1, 1999, SCR 20:1.15(a) was amended to 
provide that a lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third 
persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with 
the representation "or when acting in a fiduciary capacity."   
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
5 
 
COUNT TWO 
¶10 At the time of her death, B.B. owned a rooming house 
with multiple rental units.  After her death, one or more of her 
brothers moved into the rooming house and began collecting rent 
from the other tenants; however, these rental payments were not 
forwarded to Konnor for deposit in the estate's account.  Konnor 
sent letters to the 12 tenants in the rooming house requesting 
that their rent be forwarded directly to him as the estate's 
personal representative.  Initially, he received payment from 
several of the tenants, but after October 6, 1997, Konnor 
received rent payments from only one of the tenants; the rental 
payments from the other tenants continued to be received by two 
of B.B.'s brothers.  
¶11 In a letter sent to a tax accountant in February 2000, 
Konnor stated that he believed the decedent's two brothers had 
"stole all the rents after the decedent died."  Despite this, 
Konnor did not inform the probate court about any difficulty in 
collecting the rents, nor did he notify the police or take any 
steps to try to evict the tenants from whom he was not receiving 
rent.  
¶12 This course of misconduct led to Count Two of the OLR 
complaint which alleged that instead of collecting rent from all 
of the tenants, including B.B.'s brothers, Konnor had allowed 
the brothers to misappropriate the rent from the estate without 
taking any action to protect the estate assets.  By doing 
nothing to prevent these types of estate misappropriations, it 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
6 
 
was alleged that Konnor had failed to act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.2 
COUNTS THREE, FOUR, AND FIVE 
¶13 In July 1998 Konnor deposited several money orders he 
had received from the one tenant who had been making the rental 
payments directly to him.  The dated money orders contained 
notations that they represented that tenant's rent for December 
1997 and for January, February, March, April, June, and July of 
1998.  In January 1999 Konnor deposited another money order from 
that tenant dated August 3, 1998; again in February 2000, Konnor 
deposited another money order from that same tenant dated May 1, 
1998.  In his testimony before the referee, Konnor offered no 
explanation for these delayed deposits other than stating that 
he did not routinely travel to the area where the bank was 
located.  
¶14 The testimony before the referee also established that 
in October 1997 Konnor sent a letter to the heirs of the estate 
advising them that he was in the process of preparing the 
inventory; however, in April 1998 the inventory had yet to be 
filed and the probate court ordered Konnor to file it by June 
11, 1998.  Konnor failed to appear at that scheduled meeting and 
did not then file the inventory.  The matter was rescheduled to 
July 9, 1998, and Konnor was warned that he could be removed as 
personal representative if he failed to appear at that hearing.  
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "Diligence. A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
7 
 
Konnor finally filed the estate inventory on July 8, 1998, 
listing gross estate assets at $62,948.98.  Konnor, however, had 
failed to provide all interested parties with a copy of that 
inventory.  By letter dated November 13, 1998, the probate court 
advised Konnor that the estate had then been open for 14 months 
and that it would have to be closed within the next 4 months but 
a petition for an extension of time could be filed.  At that 
time, a number of documents still remained to be filed in the 
estate including the final account and final judgment.  
¶15 In January 1999 the decedent's rooming house was sold. 
Konnor, as personal representative, received two checks dated 
January 15, 1999, representing the proceeds of the sale.  Those 
checks, however, were not deposited into the estate's checking 
account until May 1999.   
¶16 On March 12, 1999, the probate court issued another 
order requiring Konnor to appear on May 27, 1999, to show cause 
why the final judgment had not yet been entered.  
¶17 Between July 1999 and November 1999, Konnor's brother 
Stewart——who was homeless and who had a history of substance 
abuse as well as an extensive criminal history including 
convictions for theft——had been allowed by Konnor's father to 
live in the building where Konnor's law office was located.  
Stewart Konnor had access to his brother's law office and stole 
the checkbook for the B.B. estate and then cashed six checks 
payable to himself (Stewart) totaling $3500.  Chris Konnor had 
left that checkbook in an estate file on the floor next to his 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
8 
 
desk; neither the file nor the checkbook had been kept in a 
secure place.  
¶18 After discovering the theft, Konnor deposited $3544 he 
had obtained from his father into the estate's checking account 
in February 2000.  The checks Konnor had received from his 
father to pay back the money his brother had stolen from the 
estate, contained misleading notations about the purpose for 
which the checks from his father were intended.  Konnor did not 
advise the police about the thefts from the estate's account nor 
did 
he 
inform 
the 
heirs 
or 
the 
court 
about 
the 
misappropriations.  Only after OLR began its investigation into 
the grievances the heirs had filed, did Konnor disclose that the 
thefts had occurred; that disclosure was in Konnor's final 
account filed on May 15, 2004.   
¶19 Based on this course of conduct, Count Three of OLR's 
complaint alleged that by not depositing the estate's funds into 
the trust account in a timely manner, Konnor had failed to keep 
those funds in trust, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).3   
                                                 
3 SCR 
20:1.15(a) 
(now 
renumbered 
as 
SCR 
20:1.15(b)) 
provides:  Safekeeping property. 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity. Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c). The trust 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
9 
 
¶20 Similarly, Count Four alleged that by not taking any 
steps to lock his office or keep the estate checkbook in a 
secure location, Konnor had failed to safeguard the estate's 
funds and hold them in trust, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).   
¶21 Count Five alleged that because Konnor had not 
reported the thefts to the police or the heirs, and had provided 
misleading notations with respect to where the reimbursement 
checks had come from and for what purposes they had been 
received, Konnor had engaged in conduct that was deceitful and 
                                                                                                                                                             
account shall be maintained in a bank, savings bank, 
trust 
company, 
credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account. Unless the client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import. Other property of 
a client or third person shall be identified as such 
and 
appropriately 
safeguarded. If 
a lawyer 
also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
10 
 
conduct that amounted to misrepresentation by omission, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).4   
COUNTS SIX, SEVEN, AND EIGHT 
¶22 In February 2000 Konnor retained a tax accountant to 
prepare the estate's tax returns and the decedent's personal 
income tax returns.  In January of 2001 the accountant sent 
Konnor completed tax forms for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.  
Although penalties and interest had resulted from the late 
filing of the returns, Konnor failed to advise the heirs about 
the penalties or interest.   
¶23 On May 25, 2001, Konnor liquidated the estate's mutual 
funds and deposited the proceeds in a noninterest-bearing 
account having a balance of over $61,000.  In May 2001 Konnor 
wrote to the heirs for the first time since October 1997, 
informing them that all of the tax returns had been filed except 
for the 2001 returns which Konnor wrote would be filed in the 
near future.   
¶24 Konnor later advised the heirs that he would be making 
distributions and closing the estate.  On January 15, 2002, 
Konnor filed a Department of Revenue form required for a 
fiduciary closing of an estate; he also asked the accountant to 
complete the final tax return for the estate.  The information 
                                                 
4 Specifically, regarding the latter count, it was alleged 
that Konnor had made misrepresentations by omissions because he 
failed to advise the heirs that his brother had stolen from the 
estate, and then had further attempted to cover up the thefts by 
depositing into the estate account four separate checks from 
Konnor's father with misleading notations.   
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
11 
 
he provided revealed that for an extended period of time, more 
than $58,000 of the estate's funds had remained in a non-
interest bearing account.  
¶25 Subsequently the probate court ordered Konnor to file 
the final account by April 8, 2003; he did not do so.  At an 
April 15, 2003, hearing, Konnor told the court that he had 
problems balancing the final account.   
¶26 Konnor finally filed the final account on May 15, 
2003, and distributions were made to the various heirs in July 
2003.   
¶27 This course of conduct led to Count Six of the OLR 
complaint which alleged that by failing to provide the heirs 
with a copy of the inventory, by failing to notify the heirs of 
the misappropriation of the estate funds, and by failing to 
notify the heirs of the penalties the estate had incurred with 
respect to the late tax filings, Konnor had failed to explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the heirs to 
make 
informed 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
representation, 
in 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(b).5   
¶28 Similarly, in Count Seven, OLR alleged that by 
depositing large sums of the estate's assets into a noninterest-
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation." 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
12 
 
bearing checking account for extended periods of time, Konnor 
had violated SCR 20:1.15(c)(1)a.6   
¶29 Finally, in Count Eight, OLR alleged that by failing 
to close the estate for more than five years, Konnor had failed 
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.7 
¶30 After determining that OLR had proven by clear and 
convincing evidence all eight counts of misconduct as alleged in 
its complaint, the referee then turned to an appropriate 
sanction to be recommended for Konnor's misconduct.  In his 
report, the referee identified several aggravating factors 
including the number of rules violations Konnor had committed, 
his serious neglect of the probate matter, Konnor's lack of 
concern in keeping the heirs advised of the status of the matter 
over a number of years, and his lack of proper handling of 
estate assets.  Balanced against those aggravating factors, the 
referee noted several mitigating factors including Konnor's 
cooperativeness with OLR, his lack of a history of prior 
professional 
discipline, 
the 
fact 
that 
Konnor 
had 
not 
misappropriated any of the estate's assets for his own use, his 
good faith effort to restore the assets stolen by his brother, 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:1.15(c)(1)a. provides: "IOLTA accounts. A lawyer 
who receives client funds shall maintain a pooled interest-
bearing, demand account for deposit of client or 3rd-party funds 
that are: a. nominal in amount or expected to be held for a 
short period of time." 
7 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "Diligence. A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
13 
 
and finally, his remorse.  The referee recommended, in light of 
prior cases with similar facts, that a public reprimand was an 
appropriate sanction for Konnor's professional misconduct.  The 
referee also recommended that Konnor be required to pay all the 
costs of the disciplinary proceeding now totaling $11,365.06.  
¶31 As noted, the only matter in dispute before this court 
is Konnor's request that he be absolved from paying all of the 
costs; he maintains that he should only pay those costs incurred 
before the referee's hearing because Konnor had previously 
offered to accept a public reprimand which was the same sanction 
ultimately recommended by the referee.  According to Konnor, had 
the OLR agreed to a public reprimand at the time, there would 
have been no need for the public hearing before the referee. 
¶32 Although under SCR 22.24(1) this court has discretion 
to assess all or a portion of the costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding in which misconduct has been found against the 
respondent, this court very infrequently reduces the reasonable 
costs as requested by the OLR.  There is no claim in the instant 
case 
that 
the costs requested by 
OLR are 
excessive or 
unreasonable.  Under these circumstances we decline Konnor's 
request to reduce the costs.  
¶33 We 
note, 
however, 
that 
questions 
concerning 
appropriate costs in OLR matters have frequently been before 
this 
court.  
Consequently, 
we have 
asked 
the 
Board of 
Administrative Oversight in conjunction with the State Bar, to 
develop a comprehensive approach regarding the assessment of 
No. 
03-1181-D   
 
14 
 
costs in OLR matters and to present the proposals to this court 
for our consideration.   
¶34 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as set forth in the referee's report because they are supported 
by clear and convincing evidence.  We determine that the 
seriousness of Attorney Konnor's misconduct as established in 
this proceeding warrants a public reprimand.  And, we direct 
that Attorney Konnor pay the costs of these disciplinary 
proceedings now totaling $11,365.06.  
¶35 IT IS ORDERED that Chris K. Konnor is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct.  
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Chris K. Konnor pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation all the costs of this proceeding provided that if 
such costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within 
that time, the license of Chris K. Konnor to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of this court.  
 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
to provide some context and perspective regarding costs in 
disciplinary proceedings.  First, some background about the 
lawyer regulation system.  Second, facts about costs for the 
fiscal years July 1999 through June 2004.  Third, the dissenting 
opinions (in seven cases) during these years objecting to the 
levying of full costs on the lawyer involved.  Fourth, 
alternatives the court might consider in levying costs on the 
lawyer involved.  Fifth, given this discussion, where do we go 
from here. 
I 
¶38 To put costs in context and perspective, it is helpful 
to have some background about the lawyer regulatory system and 
the rules regarding costs. 
¶39 The 
Code 
of Professional 
Responsibility and the 
provisions for the lawyer regulatory system have always been 
designed to protect the public from lawyers' unethical conduct 
and to protect lawyers from unfounded and unproven charges.  In 
2000 the court revamped the lawyer regulation system to provide 
more protections for lawyers, complainants, and the public.  In 
adopting the change, the court heard from representatives of the 
State Bar of Wisconsin and the American Bar Association, 
individual lawyers, and the public.  The court also consulted 
with a mediator, Kenneth Feinberg, about the operation of the 
then-existing lawyer regulatory system.    
¶40 The Office of Lawyer Regulation, as created effective 
October 1, 2000, was designed to provide a series of checks and 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
balances to better protect the public and lawyers.  The entire 
OLR system is overseen by a Board of Administrative Oversight 
composed of lawyers and public members.  Before a complaint is 
filed against a lawyer, an independent panel composed of lawyers 
and public members must find probable cause to proceed against 
the lawyer.  If a complaint is dismissed, the complainant can 
get a review of the dismissal.  If a complaint is filed, a 
referee determines the facts and whether violations have 
occurred, 
and 
recommends 
discipline. 
 
The 
Supreme 
Court 
ultimately establishes the facts, the violation, and the 
discipline.   
¶41 The lawyer regulatory system is presently totally 
funded by annual assessments on the lawyers licensed to practice 
in the state, not by the state.8  For fiscal year July 2004-June 
2005, each member of the bar was assessed $132.00.  An 
individual lawyer who is subject to a disciplinary proceeding, a 
medical incapacity proceeding, or a reinstatement proceeding may 
be ordered to pay all or part of the costs of his or her 
proceeding, thus reducing the total operating expenses of the 
lawyer regulatory system and the assessment on each member of 
the state bar.       
¶42 Since 1970, two types of expenditures have been 
present 
in 
the 
lawyer 
regulatory 
system: 
(1) 
general 
administrative expenses, and (2) costs of proceedings against a 
particular lawyer.  The state and the members of the state bar 
                                                 
8 SCR 21.21 (Wis. Stat. Ann. 2001-02). 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
have, over the years, provided financial support for the general 
administrative expenses of the lawyer regulatory system since 
1970.  Costs of a proceeding against an individual lawyer during 
this period could be levied against that lawyer.   
¶43 In 1970 the state paid all the expenses incurred by 
the Board of Bar Commissioners, the administrative entity 
governing 
the 
lawyer 
regulatory 
system. 
 
The 
state's 
expenditures for the system were reduced to the extent that the 
costs of formal proceedings against an individual attorney were 
recovered from the attorney involved in the proceedings.9 
¶44 In 1976, when the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility (BAPR) replaced the Board of Bar Commissioners, 
only the expenses of formal proceedings were paid by the state.10  
The general expenses of administering the lawyer regulatory 
system were imposed on the members of the state bar.  Costs were 
apparently still levied against individual lawyers. 
¶45 In 1981-82 the members of the state bar became 
responsible for funding in full the lawyer regulatory system.  
The Joint Finance Committee of the State Legislature eliminated 
state funding for the lawyer regulatory system and imposed the 
expenses of the system on members of the state bar.11  Continuing 
past practice, the Supreme Court permitted BAPR to collect from 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 256.283(8)(d)(9) (1971). 
10 In re Regulation of the Bar of Wisconsin, 74 Wis. 2d ix 
(1976).  
11 1981-82 BAPR Annual Report. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
an individual attorney the costs incurred in his or her 
disciplinary proceeding, reinstatement proceeding, or moral 
character investigation.12  
¶46 Thus, since at least 1970, Wisconsin has authorized 
levying on an individual attorney all or a portion of the costs 
incurred in that attorney's disciplinary proceedings.   
¶47 Similarly, the present supreme court rules provide for 
the levying of all or a portion of the costs on the individual 
lawyer in any proceeding in which misconduct is found, in which 
                                                 
12 1981-82 BAPR Annual Report.  
In 1979 a rule amendment provided that BAPR or the referee 
(and in 1980 the court) could assess the individual lawyer for 
direct and indirect costs of a litigated proceeding.  In the 
Matter of Promulgation of Supreme Court Rules, filed Dec. 11, 
1979 (on file with the Clerk of Supreme Court, Madison, WI).  
The rules did not define direct and indirect costs. 
In December 1980 the court amended the rule to define 
costs.  Costs were defined in essentially the same way as in the 
current rule, but the costs did not explicitly include BAPR's 
attorney fees in formal proceedings.  In the Matter of the 
Amendment of Supreme Court Rules Governing Enforcement of 
Attorney Professional Responsibility (SCR Chapters 11, 21 and 
22), filed Dec. 29, 1980 (on file with the Clerk of Supreme 
Court, Madison, WI) (creating SCR 22.01(6m) and amending 22.10).  
Apparently the practice was to assess the individual attorney 
for 
costs 
incurred 
in 
formal 
proceedings 
involving 
that 
attorney.  
In 1985 the rule on costs was amended so that the Supreme 
Court may assess all or part of the costs of the proceedings in 
which it acted and BAPR may assess all or part of the costs of a 
proceeding in which the board imposes discipline.  In the Matter 
of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rules Governing Enforcement of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility: SCR 22.20, filed May 28, 
1985 (on file with the Clerk of Supreme Court, Madison, WI).  
See SCR 22.20, 22 (Wis. Stat. Ann. 1997-98).   
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
medical incapacity is found, and in which reinstatement is 
granted or denied after license suspension.13        
 
¶48 Costs in individual discipline, medical incapacity, 
and reinstatement proceedings are defined in the rules as 
follows:  
• Compensation and necessary expenses of referees;  
• Fees and expenses of counsel for the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation;  
• Reasonable disbursements for service of papers;  
• Amounts actually expended for certified copies of 
public 
records, 
postage, 
telephone, 
adverse 
examinations 
and 
depositions, 
witness 
fees 
and 
expenses, compensation and reasonable expenses of 
experts and investigators employed on a contractual 
basis; and  
• Costs and fees authorized by chapter 814 of the 
statutes.14   
II 
¶49 I move now to analyze the costs levied on individual 
attorneys from the beginning of fiscal year 1999 (July 1, 1999) 
through calendar year 2004.  Some of these cases were initiated 
by BAPR and completed by OLR; others were initiated and 
completed by OLR. 
                                                 
13 SCR 22.24 (Wis. Stat. Ann. 2001-02). 
14 SCR 22.001(3) (Wis. Stat. Ann. 2001-03).  See also 
SCR 22.01(6m) (Wis. Stat. Ann. 1995-96). 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶50 Costs are not levied when no violation is proved or 
when a stipulation is reached before a referee is appointed.  
Otherwise the general practice of the court has been to levy the 
full 
costs 
of 
the 
discipline, 
medical 
incapacity, 
or 
reinstatement proceeding on the lawyer involved.  If a lawyer 
cannot pay the full costs immediately, an agreement may be 
reached to enable the lawyer to pay the costs over time.  If a 
lawyer is indigent, all or part of the costs are waived.     
¶51 During this five-year period the court decided 123 
disciplinary cases, 83 of which were contested and 40 of which 
were stipulated.  The court also decided 15 reinstatement cases 
(all of which involved formal proceedings and involved costs) 
and three medical incapacity cases (all resolved by stipulation 
with no costs).  In only seven cases did one or more justices 
dissent from levying full costs, and advocate instead levying 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
partial costs; five were contested disciplinary cases and two 
were reinstatement proceedings.15   
                                                 
15 Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent 
(agreeing 
with 
discipline but dissenting from levy of full costs; urging remand 
to referee for apportionment of costs without providing guidance 
for apportionment); OLR v. Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶34, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(Prosser, 
J., 
agreeing 
with 
discipline imposed but dissenting on costs; dissenting from levy 
of full costs; urging remand to referee for apportionment of 
costs without providing guidance for apportionment; not fully 
subscribing to Justice Butler's methodology of apportioning 
costs; 
Butler, 
J., 
agreeing 
with 
discipline 
imposed 
but 
dissenting from levy of full costs; urging remand to the referee 
to apply a rule either that "costs associated exclusively with 
the unsuccessful prosecution of a [lawyer] on specific counts 
may not be assessed against that [lawyer]," ¶39 (emphasis in 
original) or that costs incurred in dismissed counts that are 
not substantially related to successfully charged counts may not 
be assessed against the lawyer, ¶42); OLR v. Trewin, 2004 WI 
116, ¶¶53-62, 275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121 (Prosser, J., 
agreeing with discipline but dissenting from imposition of full 
costs exceeding $25,000 because some of the counts were 
dismissed; no statement of what would be reasonable costs or 
explanation of how to calculate reasonable costs, except for a 
reference at ¶56 to a reader having a hard time  "keeping score" 
of counts proved and not proved); OLR v. Marks, 2003 WI 114, 
¶90, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836 (Prosser, J., agreeing with 
discipline 
but 
dissenting 
from 
costs 
of 
$22,178.69 
as 
disproportionate to seriousness of offense and as reflecting a 
desire by OLR to appeal the referee's finding; no statement of 
what would be reasonable costs or explanation of how to 
calculate reasonable costs); OLR v. O'Neil, 2003 WI 48, ¶23, 261 
Wis. 2d 404, 661 N.W.2d 813 (Bablitch, Prosser, and Sykes, JJ., 
agreeing with discipline but dissenting from levy of full costs 
as excessive without explanation or discussion of what would be 
reasonable costs); OLR v. Webster, 2002 WI 100, ¶59, 255 
Wis. 2d 323, 647 N.W.2d 831 
(Prosser, 
J., 
dissenting 
from 
decision not to reinstate and objecting without any explanation 
or discussion to "whopping sum" of $9,121.75 costs); OLR v. 
Penn, 2002 WI 5, ¶¶15-28, 249 Wis. 2d 667, 638 N.W.2d 287 
(Bablitch and Prosser, JJ., agreeing with reinstatement but 
dissenting from levy of full costs of  $6,803.24 as seven times 
that levied in another matter decided the same day but under 
older rules; no statement of what would be reasonable costs or 
explanation of how to calculate reasonable costs).  For further 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶52 To evaluate the functioning of OLR and costs, here are 
some facts for these five fiscal years:  
• Misconduct was found on all counts in 66 of the 83 
contested disciplinary cases, or in 80% of contested 
cases. 
• Misconduct was found on some (but not all) counts in 
11 of the 83 contested disciplinary cases, or in 13% 
of contested disciplinary cases.   
• All counts were dismissed in 6 of the 83 contested 
disciplinary cases, or in 7% of contested disciplinary 
cases and no costs were levied. 
• In the 15 reinstatement cases, 10 reinstatements were 
granted and 5 were denied. 
• The costs in the 92 disciplinary and reinstatement 
proceedings during this period in which costs were 
levied ranged from a few hundred dollars to the five 
highest costs of almost $52,000, $27,500, $22,500, 
$21,800, and $20,500.   The average total cost levied 
on an individual lawyer for the 92 cases in this 
period in which costs were levied was $6170.      
• Costs 
in 
the 
92 
disciplinary 
and 
reinstatement 
proceedings 
in 
which 
costs 
were 
levied 
on 
an 
individual lawyer were less than $4000 in 54 cases 
(58% of the cases), between $4000 and $10,000 in 20 
cases (22% of the cases), and between $10,000 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
discussion of these cases, see Part III. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
9 
 
$20,000 in 13 cases (15% of the cases), and over 
$20,000 in 5 cases (5% of the cases).  Of those 18 
cases in which costs exceeded $10,000, one was a 
reinstatement case, in which reinstatement was denied. 
• Attorney fees in the 92 disciplinary and reinstatement 
cases in which costs were levied on an individual 
lawyer ranged from $289 to a high of $32,400.  
Attorney fees comprised about 63% of the total costs 
levied. 
• Costs levied for the five fiscal years totaled 
$569,071.  OLR collected $431,958 in costs during the 
same period.  
III 
¶53 I know of only one case during this period in which 
the court levied less than full costs.  Dissenting opinions in 
seven cases have objected to the levy of full costs on an 
individual lawyer from July 1, 1999 through this case.  The 
dissents have varied in length, vigor, and vitriol, as is each 
justice's prerogative.   
¶54 Although much heat has been generated about costs in 
some of the seven cases, including this one, unfortunately 
little light has been shed on the subject.  
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶55 Except for the dissent in Polich (mandated today), 
proposing that costs be levied on the basis of counts proved,16 
the other dissenting opinions offer no principles, criteria, or 
guidelines 
to 
assist 
the 
court 
in 
fairly 
and 
equitably 
exercising its discretion to levy less than full costs. 
¶56 In determining reasonable attorney fees, the court has 
adopted in non-disciplinary cases the lodestar approach for 
calculating attorney fees:  The reasonable number of hours is 
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  Supreme Court Rule 
20:1.5(a) lists factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee.  The lodestar approach is the approach 
actually used for attorney fees charged in disciplinary cases.  
In an OLR matter, OLR must submit evidence supporting the hours 
worked.  The hourly rate is fixed at $60 by supreme court rule.17       
                                                 
16 OLR 
v. 
Polich, 2005 
WI 36, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Butler, J., concurring on discipline and dissenting 
on levy of full costs; urging remand to the referee to apply a 
rule 
either 
that 
"costs 
associated 
exclusively 
with 
the 
unsuccessful prosecution of a [lawyer] on specific counts may 
not be assessed against that [lawyer]," at ¶39 (emphasis in 
original) or that costs incurred in dismissed counts that are 
not substantially related to successfully charged counts may not 
be assessed against the lawyer, at ¶42)).  
Justice Prosser does not fully subscribe to Justice 
Butler's methodology but joins in seeking a remand to the 
referee for an apportionment of costs.  OLR v. Polich, 2005 WI 
36, 
¶34, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(Prosser, 
J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
17 See Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 
275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶57 In three of the seven cases in which there has been a 
dissent on full costs levied on the lawyer involved, the dissent 
merely objected to levying full costs without explaining what a 
reasonable levy might be.18 
¶58 In OLR v. O'Neil, 2003 WI 48, 261 Wis. 2d 404, 661 
N.W.2d 813, the attorney disclosed extensive information to 
police about meeting with his client, Erik Garcia, regarding a 
divorce.  Garcia's wife was found dead the same day Attorney 
O'Neil filed the divorce petition; Garcia called to request a 
refund of the fee because he no longer needed a divorce.  In 
several subsequent interactions with the police, Attorney O'Neil 
disclosed the details of conversations with his client and 
turned over his divorce file, without consulting with Garcia or 
invoking the attorney-client privilege.  Garcia was later 
convicted of first-degree intentional homicide in the death of 
his wife.   
¶59 The referee recommended that a public reprimand be 
imposed for several reasons:  None of the disclosed files or 
information 
from 
Attorney 
O'Neil 
was 
used 
in 
Garcia's 
                                                 
18 See O'Neil, 261 Wis. 2d 404, ¶23 (Bablitch, Prosser, and 
Sykes, JJ., agreeing with decision not to reinstate and 
objecting without any explanation or discussion about costs); 
Webster, 255 Wis. 2d 323, ¶59 (Prosser, J., dissenting from 
decision not to reinstate and objecting without any explanation 
or discussion to "whopping sum" of $9121.75 costs);  Penn, 249 
Wis. 2d 667, ¶¶15-28 (Bablitch and Prosser, JJ., agreeing with 
reinstatement but dissenting from levy of full costs of $6893.24 
as seven times that levied in another matter decided the same 
day but under prior rules; no statement of what would be 
reasonable costs or explanation of how to calculate reasonable 
costs). 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
12 
 
prosecution; Garcia did not make an issue of the disclosure at 
his trial; O'Neil claimed he was trying to help Garcia; and 
O'Neil cooperated with OLR.  The referee recommended that 
Attorney 
O'Neil 
pay 
the 
full 
costs 
of 
the 
proceedings 
($11,438.82).  This court agreed with the reduced penalty and 
the levy of full costs.   
¶60 Justices Bablitch, Prosser, and Sykes agreed with the  
discipline imposed but dissented in a one-sentence dissent from 
the levy of full costs as excessive, without explanation or 
discussion of what would be reasonable costs.  In his concurring 
and dissenting opinion in the present case, Justice Prosser 
classifies this case as one that was over-litigated.19 
¶61 In OLR v. Webster, 2002 WI 100, 255 Wis. 2d 323, 647 
N.W.2d 831, the referee recommended the denial of Attorney 
Webster's 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin.  Attorney Webster's license to practice law was 
suspended "for two years following his felony conviction in 
federal court on the charge of aiding and abetting the 
fraudulent concealment of a debtor's property from a bankruptcy 
trustee."20  Following his release from federal prison, the 
referee found that Attorney Webster, in a series of minor 
infractions, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  
The referee noted that individually these offenses did not 
necessarily require that Attorney Webster's petition be denied, 
                                                 
19 Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶105. 
20 Webster, 255 Wis. 2d 323, ¶1. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
13 
 
but that cumulatively they rendered Attorney Webster unable to 
overcome the requisite burden imposed by law for reinstatement.  
This court agreed and ordered costs to be paid in the amount of 
$9121.75 ($7224.10 for the proceedings before the referee; 
$1897.65 for the costs incurred during the appeal).   
¶62 The 
dissenting 
justice 
argued 
for 
reinstatement, 
characterizing the infractions as "molehills of unauthorized 
practice" being elevated to great heights and the costs as a 
"whopping sum."21 
 ¶63 In OLR v. Penn, 2002 WI 5, 249 Wis. 2d 667, 638 
N.W.2d 287, Attorney Penn 
petitioned for reinstatement to 
practice law in Wisconsin after a suspension following six 
misdemeanor drug convictions.  This court agreed with the 
referee that reinstatement was warranted.  The court imposed the 
reinstatement proceedings costs totaling $6803.64 on Attorney 
Penn, but allowed Attorney Penn one year to pay rather than the 
six months recommended by the referee. Two justices concurred in 
the reinstatement but dissented from the court's levying full 
costs on the lawyer.  Attorney Penn objected to proceeding under 
the new OLR rules for reinstatement but did not object to the 
costs.  The dissenting justices objected to the costs compared 
to those 
that would have 
been imposed under 
the 
prior 
procedure.22   
                                                 
21 Id., ¶¶58-59 (Prosser, J., dissenting). 
22 Penn, 249 Wis. 2d 667, ¶¶15-28 (Prosser and Bablitch, 
JJ., dissenting from levying of full costs). 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶64 In a fourth case, OLR v. Trewin, 2004 WI 116, 275 
Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121, the referee found that Attorney 
Trewin violated several rules involving more than one client.  
The referee recommended a five-month suspension and payment of 
full costs.  This court agreed.   
¶65 Attorney Trewin objected to costs exceeding $25,000 on 
the ground that many of the facts were undisputed and that much 
of the OLR costs related to dismissed claims that were not 
challenged on appeal or were unreasonably incurred in excessive 
and redundant discovery.  The court noted that the determination 
of whether those undisputed aspects of his case amounted to 
disciplinary violations was "hotly contested."23 
¶66 The Trewin dissent (on costs, but not discipline) 
asserted that "in retrospect" certain counts "were overpled."24  
Retrospect is far from perfect.  OLR's losing on a charge is not 
necessarily the equivalent of overpleading. 
¶67 The Trewin dissent asks whether the "cost assessment 
in some disciplinary proceedings is consistent with the lodestar 
methodology or whether it is driven by nothing more than OLR's 
legitimate need for funding and [the court's] cold-blooded 
political determination that additional costs not be assessed to 
the members of the state bar."  "Both of these factors are 
                                                 
23 Trewin, 275 Wis. 2d 116, ¶49. 
24 Id., ¶62 (Prosser, J., concurring in the discipline but 
dissenting from the levying of full costs).  In the present 
case; the dissent characterizes the Trewin case as over-
litigated.  Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶107. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
15 
 
reasonable," concludes the dissent, "but not if they completely 
override the element of fair play to a respondent attorney."25  
In my opinion, neither of these factors is reasonable under any 
conditions.  Furthermore, neither factor has been asserted as 
justifying the levy of costs in any proceeding.             
¶68 In a fifth case, OLR v. Marks, 2003 WI 114, 265 
Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836, the referee recommended that Attorney 
Marks be suspended for 60 days based on a finding that Attorney 
Marks engaged in intentional misrepresentation in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) when he wrongfully "notif[ied] two insurance 
companies that he maintained a lien on the proceeds for 25 
percent of his former client's recovery in a personal injury 
wrongful death claim," contrary to the plain language of the fee 
agreement.26  The referee dismissed two claims that were filed 
against Attorney Marks under the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  The court disagreed with the dismissal but did not 
remand the matter in the interest of judicial economy.  Attorney 
Marks argued that a 60-day suspension was too long.  We agreed 
with 
the 
referee, 
noting 
that 
Attorney 
Marks 
had 
been 
reprimanded on three separate occasions. 
¶69 The 
dissent 
asserted 
that 
the 
costs 
were 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense and "in part 
                                                 
25 Trewin, 275 Wis. 2d 116, ¶62 (Prosser, J., concurring in 
the discipline but dissenting from the levying of full costs).  
The dissent states at ¶62 that it would adjust some of the costs 
to reflect Trewin's success in defending himself against some of 
OLR's charges but fails to state how it would do so. 
26 Marks, 265 Wis. 2d 1, ¶44. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
16 
 
reflect OLR's obsession to appeal an issue that it lost before 
the referee."27   
¶70 In a sixth case mandated this same day, OLR v. Polich, 
2005 WI 36, ____ Wis. 2d ____, ____ N.W.2d ____, one dissent 
proposes levying costs on the basis of counts proved.28  We 
rejected this methodology in several cases, most recently in In 
re Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998), without 
explanation.  The other dissent does not fully subscribe to this 
methodology but joins in seeking a remand to the referee for an 
apportionment of costs.29   
¶71 The fairness of this approach is open to question.  
For 
example, 
Attorney 
Polich 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
CLE 
requirements.  His office received notification of his problem 
                                                 
27 Id., ¶90 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  In the present case, 
the concurrence/dissent characterizes the Marks case as over-
litigated.  Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶106. 
28 Polich, 2005 WI 36, (Butler, J., concurring in discipline 
but dissenting from levy of full costs; urging remand to the 
referee 
to 
apply 
a 
rule 
either 
that 
"costs 
associated 
exclusively with the unsuccessful prosecution of a [lawyer] on 
specific counts may not be assessed against that [lawyer]," at 
¶39 (emphasis in original) or that costs incurred in dismissed 
counts that are not substantially related to successfully 
charged counts may not be assessed against the lawyer, at ¶42).  
Justice Prosser does not subscribe fully to Justice 
Butler's methodology but joins in seeking a remand to the 
referee for an apportionment of costs.  Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶34 
(Prosser, J., concurring in discipline but dissenting from 
levying of full costs).  Justice Prosser characterizes the 
Polich 
case 
as 
over-litigated. 
 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶108. 
29 Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶34 (Prosser, J., concurring in 
discipline but dissenting from levying of full costs). 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
17 
 
and suspension of his license by certified mail.  OLR was 
justified in prosecuting Polich for practicing without a 
license, even though these counts were dismissed.  Attorney 
Polich's defense was that his staff failed to notify him that he 
was 
suspended. 
 
As 
the 
referee 
stated, 
the 
attorney's 
explanation is susceptible to skepticism.   The referee judged 
the credibility of the witnesses, and this court must abide by 
the referee's determination of credibility, even though we too 
are skeptical of Attorney Polich's explanation for the counts 
that were dismissed.   
¶72 Nothing in the record indicates that the counts on 
which Attorney Polich prevailed were without prosecutorial merit 
or that the OLR costs were unreasonable or unnecessary.  
Attorney Polich's conduct caused this prosecution to proceed on 
all the counts.  Why should the costs Attorney Polich caused OLR 
to incur be shifted to all the other attorneys of the state who 
are innocent of any wrongdoing?  Between the members of the 
state bar and Attorney Polich, why should the members pay for 
any part of the prosecution Polich (who was disciplined) caused?        
¶73 In the present case, the seventh case, the dissent 
charges the Office of Lawyer Regulation with over-litigating 
four cases.30  The only evidence given for the charge of over-
litigating is that OLR did not prevail on all counts.  No 
hearing was held by the referee or this court on the issue of 
                                                 
30 Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶105-108.  The 
four cases are O'Neil, Marks, Trewin, and Polich. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
18 
 
the reasonableness of the costs incurred in any of the cases; 
neither the OLR nor the lawyer involved had an opportunity to 
explain the costs or rebut the charge of over-litigating in any 
of the cases.  I do not think that the court or any justice 
should make unsubstantiated charges that either OLR staff or 
retained counsel over-litigated a case.    
¶74 No one has accused the lawyers representing OLR in any 
of these cases of padding their hours, that is, misstating the 
number of hours worked.  Everyone agrees they spent the hours 
reported.  Rather, a dissenting justice has sometimes opined 
that the OLR lawyer should have spent less time on the case.  
¶75 OLR staff lawyers get paid regardless of the hours 
they spend on particular cases.  They have more than enough work 
to keep busy working efficiently on the cases they have.  They 
need not spend excess time on a case.   
¶76 Retained counsel take OLR cases as a public service 
and are paid $60 an hour, a rate far below the market rate for 
legal work.  A lawyer retained in an OLR case is lucky to cover 
his or her office overhead, much less turn a profit.  There is 
simply no incentive for retained counsel to over-litigate under 
these circumstances, that is, to spend too many hours on an OLR 
case!  Time spent at $60 per hour cannot be spent on cases that 
pay more.  As one lawyer retained by OLR joked at a recent 
seminar, "I get paid $60.00 per hour for OLR work.  I don't ask 
an extra question." 
¶77 In the present case, the dissent charges that OLR 
utilized different procedures in two cases that straddled the 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
19 
 
change from BAPR to OLR so as to increase the costs in the case 
using the new OLR procedure.31  Implicit is an allegation that 
OLR improperly manipulated the procedure to increase attorney 
fees or obtain a favorable recommendation.  Nothing in the 
record supports any such inference.     
¶78 Finally, the dissent in the present case asserts that 
several policy questions should be addressed (and they are good 
ones) but fails to advance the discussion of these policy 
issues.  The dissent poses as one policy question, "What factors 
should this court consider when a disciplined attorney moves to 
reduce full costs?"32  The dissent does not answer its own 
question (and has not answered this question in its prior 
dissents), other than recommending in the present case that the 
case be remanded to the referee to levy costs (without giving 
any guidance to the referee).  Nevertheless the question 
deserves a response.33     
IV 
¶79 Shifting costs to a losing party is a troublesome 
issue in the American system, and states vary considerably in 
their approaches to costs incurred in individual cases in the 
lawyer regulatory system.  Some states impose no costs on the 
                                                 
31 Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶103-104. 
32 Id., ¶111. 
33 On what basis then does the dissent charge that under the 
present cost structure the OLR is not accountable "in terms of 
overcharging, over-litigating, or failing to prove its case"?  
Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶100. 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
20 
 
disciplined attorney; others impose a standard fee that varies 
with the level of discipline or stage of the proceeding.  Still 
other states, like Wisconsin, levy all costs on the individual 
lawyer, absent a showing of an inability to pay.  Each 
alternative for dealing with costs has its own set of advantages 
and pitfalls.      
 
¶80 In the hope that I might advance the discussion about 
costs, let me present a list of several alternatives for dealing 
with costs.  The list is not exhaustive.  Until an attempt is 
made to articulate and discuss alternatives, the debate about 
costs will continue in a relatively unproductive manner.  As I 
see it, here are some alternatives:   
¶81 (1) The court can retain the present system, namely 
that the court levy all or part of the costs against the lawyer 
involved.  These costs include such things as the cost for the 
referee and court reporter, as well as reasonable disbursements 
and attorney fees.  The advantage of this alternative is it 
gives the court discretion to allocate fairly the costs in each 
case.  The disadvantages are that no principles, criteria, or 
guidelines have been developed for levying partial costs, and 
that a justice may dispute the costs on a hunch, without taking 
any testimony or considering any evidence, that the costs are 
too high. 
¶82 Alaska has set forth factors for the court or the 
board to consider in imposing costs and fees on a lawyer when a 
finding of misconduct is made, including the following:  the 
complexity of the disciplinary matter; the duration of the case; 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
21 
 
the reasonableness of the number of hours expended by counsel 
and the reasonableness of the costs incurred; the reasonableness 
of the number of counsel used; and counsel's efforts to minimize 
fees.   
¶83 If Wisconsin retains the present system of allowing 
the levy of partial costs, this court should adopt criteria for 
the imposition of costs and require the referee to levy costs.  
A referee is in a better position than the justices of this 
court to levy costs:  The referee is often a practicing lawyer 
with experience in keeping time sheets, has prepared cases, and 
is familiar with billing norms.  Even if the referee is not a 
practicing lawyer, the referee has witnessed first-hand the 
quality of services rendered and can take testimony on the 
reasonableness of the costs.   
¶84 (2) The court can adopt a bright-line rule that the 
court shall levy all costs against the lawyer.  The advantage of 
such a rule is certainty and uniformity.  But not all cases are 
the same.  The disadvantage is that without court discretion, 
unfairness may result. 
¶85 (3) The court can adopt a bright-line rule that no 
costs be levied against the lawyer involved.  The advantage of 
such a rule is certainty and uniformity; it is simple to 
administer.  All members of the state bar would bear the 
expenses of prosecuting individual cases rather than the 
individual lawyer involved.  If the court were to adopt this 
alternative, the assessment of each member of the state bar 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
22 
 
would probably increase by about $5.00 per year, a relatively 
small amount.  
¶86 (4) The court can adopt a rule that the court (or 
referee) 
shall 
levy 
costs 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the 
counts 
successfully proved against the lawyer, if the lawyer is found 
guilty of some of the charges.  One of the Polich's dissents 
proposes this solution and suggests two ways of allocating costs 
on the basis of counts proved and dismissed.  Both solutions are 
not as easy or as fair in application as they might initially 
sound.  Costs do not necessarily increase proportionally with 
the number of counts, some of which are proved and some not, and 
the members of the bar upon whom costs are imposed are innocent, 
while the disciplined lawyer is not.  
¶87 (5) The court can adopt a rule that all costs shall be 
levied against the lawyer except the attorney fees.  Attorney 
fees seem to have generated the most discussion in the court and 
eliminating the levy of attorney fess would substantially reduce 
costs levied against the lawyer involved.  Under this proposal 
attorney fees would be treated as administrative costs to be 
funded by an increased assessment imposed on all members of the 
state bar.  This alternative is proposed by a petition by Keith 
L. Sellen, Director of the Office of Lawyer Regulation recently 
filed in this court.  It will be heard sometime in the fall of 
2005.          
¶88 (6) The court can adopt a rule levying a fixed or 
graduated 
administrative 
fee 
rather 
than an 
expense-based 
amount. Several states employ this technique.  Under this 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
23 
 
system, probably a much smaller amount would be collected from 
the lawyer involved.  
¶89 No 
method 
has 
clearly 
distinct 
advantages 
over 
imposing full costs on a disciplined lawyer or is free from 
significant pitfalls. 
V 
¶90 The fundamental issue presented is who should fund the 
costs incurred to prosecute individual cases against disciplined 
lawyers: The disciplined lawyer against whom proceedings were 
brought after probable cause was found, or the members of the 
bar?  And in what proportion should these costs be borne?  The 
court has asked the Office of Lawyer Regulation, the Board of 
Administrative Oversight, and the state bar to consider this 
issue and report to the court.  A petition has been filed 
recently.      
¶91 In the absence of a proposal that has been clearly 
articulated, debated, and adopted, I conclude that levying 
partial costs without any principles, criteria, or guidelines 
degenerates into unbridled discretion.  We demand that circuit 
courts exercise discretion according to principles.  And rightly 
so.  We demand that circuit courts explain their exercise of 
discretion.  And rightly so.  We should hold ourselves to this 
same high standard.  Therefore I conclude that full costs should 
be levied on the lawyer disciplined until the court can levy 
partial costs according to established principles.   
¶92 For the reasons set forth, I write separately, in the 
hope that with costs put in perspective and context, we can 
No. 03-1181-D.ssa 
 
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develop a sound proposal for determining whether and when 
partial costs should be levied. 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
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¶93 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  I agree with the public reprimand of Attorney Chris 
K. Konnor but dissent from the court's decision to levy the full 
cost of the disciplinary proceeding against him. 
¶94 In this case, Attorney Konnor offered to stipulate to 
a public reprimand on the counts filed.  The Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) rejected his offer, asking a referee to 
recommend the more stringent sanction of a 90-day license 
suspension.  After a hearing, the referee recommended a public 
reprimand, and that is the sanction approved by this court.  
Nevertheless, the court imposes the full cost of prosecuting the 
case, meaning that Attorney Konnor is required to pay the cost 
of OLR's unsuccessful effort to secure a higher sanction. 
¶95 The majority attempts to cushion this determination 
with an explanation that our court has asked the Board of 
Administrative Oversight to review the assessment of costs in 
attorney discipline cases and to present proposals for reform in 
the future.  Until then, the court appears committed to 
eschewing its discretion under SCR 22.24(1) (2002) and assessing 
full costs to disciplined attorneys, irrespective of the merit 
in their arguments.  This necessitates comment. 
I 
¶96 The lawyer regulation system exists "to carry out the 
supreme court's constitutional responsibility to supervise the 
practice of law and protect the public from misconduct [and 
incompetence] by persons practicing law in Wisconsin."  SCR 21 
Preamble.  The Office of Lawyer Regulation has been given the 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
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lead role in investigating and prosecuting attorney discipline 
cases.  OLR does vital work for our court and the public, and it 
enjoys the confidence and support of the full court. 
¶97 This cannot mean, however, that OLR is unaccountable.  
The 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
should 
not 
be 
expected 
to 
rubberstamp every determination made by other players in the 
lawyer regulation system.  This court has the final word on 
attorney discipline and discretion whether to impose "all or a 
portion of the costs of a disciplinary proceeding," SCR 
22.24(1), or a reinstatement proceeding.  SCR 22.29(5).  At 
present, the court has been unwilling or unable to formulate a 
set of principles to assist in exercising this discretion. 
II 
¶98 "Under the American Rule, the parties to a lawsuit 
bear the cost of their own attorney fees absent legislative 
authorization to shift costs."  Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac 
Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶17, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58 
(citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of 
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001); Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. 
Employers Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 744, 351 N.W.2d 156 
(1984)). The Wisconsin legislature has authorized courts to 
shift costs and award attorney fees to successful litigants in a 
number of specific situations. 
¶99 In addition, the legislature has authorized parties to 
a lawsuit to make settlement offers as a means to promote 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
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settlements and control costs.  Wis. Stat. § 807.01 (2003-04).34  
For instance, a defendant may serve upon a plaintiff an offer of 
judgment to be taken against the defendant, and "If the offer of 
judgment is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to recover a 
more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall not recover costs 
but defendant shall recover costs to be computed on the demand 
of the complaint."  Wis. Stat. § 807.01(1). 
¶100 The lawyer regulation system does not follow the 
American Rule.  In attorney discipline cases, this court is 
imposing full costs on a respondent attorney even when the 
attorney has been partially or substantially successful or OLR 
has failed to recover "a more favorable" determination than the 
attorney offered.  With very rare exceptions, the only time an 
attorney escapes the imposition of full OLR costs is when the 
attorney secures dismissal of all OLR counts.  Even in these 
cases the attorney must shoulder his or her own expenses.  The 
effect 
of 
this 
practice 
is 
to 
eliminate 
virtually 
all 
accountability 
for 
OLR 
in 
terms 
of 
overcharging, 
over-
litigating, or failing to prove its case.  
¶101 SCR 22.24(1) provides that the supreme court may 
assess all or a portion of the total costs of a disciplinary 
proceeding to a respondent attorney.  Thus, the assessment is 
not mandatory.  When a respondent attorney prevails on many or 
most issues in a case but is assessed the total costs of the 
                                                 
34 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
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proceeding, the attorney does not receive the benefit of the 
discretion that is built into the rule.   
III 
¶102 In recent years, I have repeatedly expressed concern 
about the costs imposed in attorney discipline cases.  See OLR 
v. David V. Penn, 2002 WI 5, 249 Wis. 2d 667, 638 N.W.2d 287; 
OLR v. Leslie J. Webster, 2002 WI 100, 255 Wis. 2d 323, 647 
N.W.2d 831; OLR v. 
James 
Paul O'Neil, 2003 
WI 48, 261 
Wis. 2d 404, 661 N.W.2d 813; OLR v. Marvin E. Marks, 2003 WI 
114, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836; and OLR v. Michael G. 
Trewin, 2004 WI 116, 275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121.  The 
circumstances in these cases varied substantially, but the 
result was always the same: full costs to the attorney. 
¶103 At least twice, in Penn and Webster, OLR utilized 
procedures that increased costs.  In Penn, the attorney sought 
reinstatement before the restructuring of the lawyer discipline 
system, but regulators held up his case until he became 
ineligible for review by a district professional responsibility 
committee. 
 
Although 
no 
one 
opposed 
the 
attorney's 
reinstatement, his case was assigned to a referee, and OLR 
retained counsel.  The attorney was forced to pay the increased 
costs, plus the cost of litigating issues under OLR's new rules.  
The total assessment was more than $6800. 
¶104 In Webster, the court imposed more than $9100 in costs 
on an attorney who sought but failed to gain reinstatement.  OLR 
first rejected the favorable recommendation of a district 
professional 
responsibility 
committee, 
then 
insisted 
on 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
5 
 
repeating the reinstatement review process under the referee 
system to obtain a different recommendation.  The attorney was 
finally reinstated in 2004, after incurring additional costs of 
$5300. 
¶105 Several cases appear to have been over-litigated.  For 
example, in O'Neil, the attorney was given a public reprimand.  
Although the referee concluded that the attorney "cooperated 
fully with the OLR" and showed a cooperative attitude toward the 
proceedings, he was assessed costs of more than $11,400. 
¶106 In Marks, OLR waited almost three years after a 
grievance was made before it filed a complaint.  Then it pursued 
the case adamantly.  To illustrate, the referee dismissed two 
counts involving alleged violations of another state's rules.  
OLR appealed and prevailed before this court, but its victory 
added nothing to the attorney's discipline, only his costs.  The 
assessed costs for a 60-day suspension exceeded $22,000. 
¶107 In Trewin, OLR filed 12 counts of misconduct against 
the attorney.  Some of these counts alleged multiple violations 
against multiple clients.  The attorney did not dispute some 
counts, challenged portions of other counts, and resisted more 
than he might have if the desired discipline had not been so 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
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severe.35  He succeeded in defeating parts of several counts, 
securing total dismissal of one count, and winning a significant 
reduction in the recommended discipline, but was required to pay 
the entire cost of the proceeding which amounted to more than 
$25,000. 
¶108 In another case decided today, OLR v. Steve J. Polich, 
2005 WI 36, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the attorney is 
given a public reprimand after beating back five of seven counts 
filed by OLR, as well as OLR's recommendation of a nine month 
suspension.  He is nonetheless required to pay the full cost of 
$17,500.  Again, the court declines to apportion costs by 
exercising its discretion. 
IV 
 
¶109 In my view, these cases demand a serious review of 
procedures in the lawyer regulation system.  The overriding 
question for me is whether practices and procedures in the 
system can be revised to achieve the system's goals at less cost 
and greater fairness to all parties. 
                                                 
35 In my opinion in the Trewin case, I stated that "the 
complaint against Trewin at the outset was so open-ended that he 
had no idea what discipline OLR was seeking, or what the 
potential consequences would be if he simply conceded every 
count."  OLR v. Michael G. Trewin, 2004 WI 116, ¶57, 275 
Wis. 2d 116, 
684 
N.W.2d 121 
(Prosser, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting).  In retrospect, I must acknowledge that 
that statement is not correct.  The complaint, dated December 
12, 2002, asked that "the Court impose discipline commensurate 
with the severity of Trewin's misconduct," but OLR apparently 
advised Trewin in another document that it was seeking a one-
year suspension.  This discipline turned out to be more than 
twice the discipline recommended by the referee. 
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶110 It 
should 
be 
noted 
that 
some 
attorneys 
have 
tenaciously fought OLR discipline, at enormous expense, without 
justification.  I have no difficulty assessing these attorneys 
with full costs (although I am somewhat skeptical whether the 
costs assessed are always paid).  If assessed costs in these 
cases are not paid, OLR is put under tremendous pressure to seek 
full costs in situations where full costs may not be justified.  
There should thus be broad interest in revising procedures in 
the system in ways that will benefit OLR as well as the affected 
attorneys. 
¶111 Several policy questions should be addressed.  First, 
what standards should OLR employ when it notifies an attorney 
what discipline it intends to seek and when, if ever, should the 
desired sanction be revised?36  Second, can the lawyer regulation 
system make increased use of stipulations, partial summary 
judgments, and other means to narrow disputes and hold down 
costs?  Third, is there a place for plea agreements in the 
lawyer regulation system?  Fourth, should this court authorize 
both parties to make offers of settlement similar to the offers 
under Wis. Stat. § 807.01?  Fifth, if plea agreements or offers 
of settlement are not permitted, should the court establish 
standards that will discourage overcharging and over-litigating 
                                                 
36 Under present practice, the OLR staff, especially the 
director, determines the level of discipline to be sought.  As I 
understand it, the OLR's retained counsel are not permitted to 
negotiate any change in OLR's recommended discipline with the 
respondent attorney or the attorney's counsel without approval 
from the director.   
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
8 
 
discipline cases?  Sixth, what factors should this court 
consider when a disciplined attorney moves to reduce full costs?  
Seventh, should the court consider financial penalties like 
forfeitures, apart from costs, as one option in attorney 
discipline cases? 
V 
 
¶112 In his concurrence in the Polich case, Justice Butler 
suggested that the case be remanded to the referee for a 
reasonable apportionment of costs.  I believe similar action is 
warranted here.  Referees are usually better positioned than 
this court to make an initial determination of appropriate 
costs. 
VI 
 
¶113 The concurrence of the Chief Justice responds to the 
first five sections of this concurrence/dissent.  It criticizes 
my alleged failure in previous writings to propose a formula for 
apportioning 
costs37 
and 
concludes 
that 
until 
appropriate 
standards and criteria are adopted, this court will continue to 
impose 
all 
reasonable 
costs 
incurred 
in 
a 
disciplinary 
proceeding against a disciplined attorney and will not reduce 
                                                 
37 I acknowledge that I have never proposed a specific 
formula for apportioning costs.  Instead, I urged colleagues to 
address the issue collectively.  These requests eventually led 
to 
the 
court's 
request 
for 
input 
from 
the 
Board 
of 
Administrative Oversight.  In OLR v. Steve J. Polich, 2005 WI 
36, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, I joined Justice Butler in 
suggesting that the referee be delegated authority to apportion 
costs.  
No. 03-1181-D.dtp 
 
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costs on an ad hoc basis.  See Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
concurrence, ¶56.   
 
¶114 The question of how to assign costs in attorney 
discipline cases is not an easy one.  In all likelihood, there 
is no single all-purpose answer.  My failure to propose a 
solution does not absolve the court of its duty to seek a 
solution.  It would be a mistake to assume that no one outside 
of our chambers cares about the attorney cost issue. 
 
 
 
 
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