Title: New Jersey v. Fuqua
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2018

New Jersey v. Fuqua Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In September 2011, the Middlesex County New Jersey Prosecutor’s Office opened a narcotics investigation into Tyrell Johnson that later swept in defendant Danyell Fuqua. In the early morning hours, and after obtaining a search warrant, officers entered a motel room. There, the officers found defendant, Johnson, and six children between the ages of one and thirteen - three were defendant’s children, one was Johnson’s child, and two were defendant’s relatives. The small room had a kitchenette, two beds, and a bathroom. On the kitchen table, officers found marijuana; between the beds officers discovered pill bottles containing multicolored pills, bags of heroin, and a large bag of cocaine. Johnson pled guilty to drug distribution charges, and a jury convicted defendant of endangering the welfare of children. Defendant challenged the endangerment conviction, arguing the State had to prove actual harm to children to convict under the applicable statute. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court and Appellate Division correctly determined a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) could be sustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Danyell Fuqua (A-4-17) (079034)Argued April 10, 2018 -- Decided August 9, 2018TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. In this case, the Court considers whether the State must prove actual harm to a child to convict a defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), endangering the welfare of children. In September 2011, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office opened a narcotics investigation into Tyrell Johnson that later swept in defendant Danyell Fuqua. In the early morning hours of December 10, 2011, after obtaining a search warrant, officers entered a motel room. There, the officers found defendant, Johnson, and six children between the ages of one and thirteen -- three were defendant’s children, one was Johnson’s child, and two were defendant’s relatives. The small room had a kitchenette, two beds, and a bathroom. On the kitchen table, officers found marijuana, a grinder containing marijuana residue, an open box of clear plastic bags, and a white, unlabeled pill bottle holding various, multicolored pills. Between the two beds, officers discovered three loose packets of heroin, a separate plastic orange bag holding 653 packets of heroin, and one large bag of cocaine. Below the rear wall window, officers found an exposed black plastic bag holding 201 packets of heroin and fourteen plastic bags containing cocaine next to children’s shoes and a toy. Officers also discovered a digital scale covered in white cocaine residue on a nearby windowsill. Johnson subsequently pled guilty to drug distribution charges, and a jury convicted defendant of endangering the welfare of children, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, finding that the State need not prove actual harm to children to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted certification. 230 N.J. 560 (2017).HELD: The trial court and Appellate Division correctly determined that a conviction underN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be sustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm.1. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: “[a]ny person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who causes the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child as defined in [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-1, [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-3 and . . . [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21] is guilty of a crime of the second degree.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-3 delineates, in relevant part, that “[a]ny parent, guardian or person having the care, custody or control of any child, who shall abuse, abandon, be cruel to or neglectful of such child, or any person who shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any child shall be deemed to be guilty of a 1 crime of the fourth degree.” (emphasis added). N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, in pertinent part, defines “[a]bused or neglected child” as including: “a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof . . . or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court.” (emphases added). (pp. 8-9)2. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) is clearly and readily capable of comprehension. The Court sees no ambiguity in the Legislature incorporating a “substantial risk” of harm from N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 into N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), so the appellate panel here properly concluded that “[a]pplying this rule of construction would seemingly result in an uncomplicated interpretation of the statutory offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) defines “harm” by expressly incorporating N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, which proscribes exposing a child to a substantial risk of harm. No extrinsic evidence is necessary, nor is resort to the doctrine of lenity which is only pertinent if an analysis of statutory language fails to resolve a statutory ambiguity. (pp. 10-11)3. New Jersey appellate courts for decades have unanimously held that the State is not required to prove actual harm to a child to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Instead, they have concluded that proof of a child’s exposure to a substantial risk of harm is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., State v. N.A., 355 N.J. Super. 143, 150–51 (App. Div. 2002); State v. M.L., 253 N.J. Super. 13, 31 (App. Div. 1991) (collecting cases). Not one published appellate opinion holds otherwise. The Court finds no reason to disturb that decades-old sound precedent predicated on the plain language of the statute and notes that the legislative branch is presumed to be aware of judicial constructions of statutory provisions. Had the Legislature chosen to insist on proof of actual harm to a child to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), it was free to amend the statute, as it did in other aspects of the statute, in the nearly three decades since M.L. The statute expressly subsumes the Title 9 provisions signaling a legislative intent to broaden the statutory definition of “harm.” It would show little respect for the legislature were courts to suppose that the lawmakers meant to enact an irrational scheme. (pp. 11-14)4. In this case the State successfully proved that defendant exposed the children in her care to imminent danger and a substantial risk of harm pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Six underage children, ranging in age from one to thirteen, were housed in a confined space. Drugs hauntingly surrounded children’s toys and clothing. The ease of access to cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, and the attraction of brightly colored pills, all created a potentially lethal trap for the children that could have been easily sprung at any moment. (pp. 14-15)5. The Court considers the concerns of giving prosecutors too much discretion in choosing to charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), a second-degree crime, over Title 9, a fourth-degree offense. Criminal statutes can overlap in prohibiting the same basic act, and in those situations the proper prosecuting authority in the sound exercise of the discretion committed to him or her may proceed under either act. Prosecutorial discretion, however, is not unlimited, and judicial oversight is mandated to protect against arbitrary and capricious prosecutorial decisions. A defendant who proves that a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion was arbitrary and capricious 2 would be entitled to relief. Here, there is no evidence that the prosecutor abused her discretion in choosing to charge defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) instead of Title 9. Defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor acted arbitrarily and capriciously but provided no reasonable justification as to why the prosecutor should have charged her under Title 9 instead of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Rather, defendant claims generally that prosecutors retain too much discretion in choosing whether to charge defendants under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) or Title 9. That contention, however, is directly contrary to precedent that provides prosecutors such discretion. Defendant has similarly not provided any evidence that the prosecutor’s decision to charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) was discriminatory or predicated on prejudice. Indeed, the record here provided the prosecutor ample justification for her decision to charge defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). (pp. 15-18) AFFIRMED. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that a sensible textual construction of the endangering statute -- consistent with its language and legislative intent -- would be to require harm as a precondition to the examples given in the abuse-and-neglect statutes. Justice Albin adds that the majority’s position is at odds with the legislative history of the endangering statute; that even if N.A. and M.L. were “sound” precedent, they are factually distinguishable; that legislative acquiescence is a slender reed on which to justify a mistaken Appellate Division interpretation of a statute; and that when two reasonable interpretations can be given to a statute riddled with ambiguity, the doctrine of lenity instructs that the interpretation favoring the defendant must prevail. According to Justice Albin, by removing the harm requirement from the endangering statute, the majority has criminalized the civil abuse-and-neglect statute. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting, is of the view that the meaning of the endangering law is ambiguous and should therefore be read narrowly. Chief Justice Rabner notes the State’s strong argument that the phrase “causes the child harm” cannot be read separately from the words that follow, and that defendant sensibly emphasizes that “harm” means “harm” -- not “risk” of harm. Observing that the legislative history does not resolve the debate and that, in this case, the trial court noted “the absence of any direct evidence of actual harm to the children,” Chief Justice Rabner reasons that, because defendant’s conviction is based on the more expansive reading of the statute, it should not stand.JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 4 September Term 2017 079034STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.DANYELL FUQUA, Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 10, 2018 – Decided August 9, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Matthew Astore, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Matthew Astore, of counsel and on the briefs, and John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the briefs). Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah D. Brigham, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the Court considers whether the State mustprove actual harm to a child to convict a defendant under1 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), endangering the welfare of children.Because the trial court and Appellate Division correctlydetermined that a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can besustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm, weaffirm their denial of defendant Danyell Fuqua’s motion for ajudgment of acquittal. I. We marshal these facts from the record. In September 2011, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Officeopened a narcotics investigation into Tyrell Johnson that laterswept in defendant Fuqua. Defendant checked into a Studio Motel6 in late September 2011. That December, in conjunction withthe ongoing investigation, a task force began surveillance ofthe Studio Motel 6. In the early morning hours of December 10,2011, after obtaining a search warrant, officers entered room205. There, the officers found defendant, Johnson, and sixchildren between the ages of one and thirteen -- three weredefendant’s children, one was Johnson’s child, and two weredefendant’s relatives. The small room had a kitchenette, twobeds, and a bathroom. Upon their entry, officers smelled thelingering odor of raw and burnt marijuana. On the kitchen table, officers found marijuana, a grindercontaining marijuana residue, an open box of clear plastic bags,and a white, unlabeled pill bottle holding various, multicolored 2 pills. Between the two beds, officers discovered a lockbox withkey inserted containing several items of jewelry, three loosepackets of heroin, a separate plastic orange bag holding 653packets of heroin, and one large bag of cocaine. Below the rearwall window, officers found an exposed black plastic bag holding201 packets of heroin and fourteen plastic bags containingcocaine. To the immediate left and right of the drug-ladenblack plastic bag were children’s shoes and a “little puppy dog”toy. Officers also discovered a digital scale covered in whitecocaine residue on a nearby windowsill. In addition to thenarcotics and related paraphernalia, officers came upon fivecell phones, more than $2000 in cash located in a purse on thekitchen table, and around $1700 belonging to Johnson. Johnson subsequently pled guilty to drug distributioncharges, and a jury convicted defendant of endangering thewelfare of children, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a judgment ofacquittal, finding that the State need not prove actual harm tochildren to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Rather, relyingon ample appellate precedent, the court held that the Stateneeded only prove, and did prove, that a child faced a “risk” ofharm sufficient to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the phrase“causes harm” in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) refers not only to one who 3 causes actual harm, but also to one who “unreasonably allows asubstantial risk of harm.” The panel concluded that thechildren here were in “imminent danger” and exposed to a“substantial risk of harm” given the small motel room, thenumber of children present, and the large quantity of accessibledrugs to which they were exposed and which they could easilyhave ingested. We granted certification. 230 N.J. 560 (2017). We alsogranted amicus curiae status to the Attorney General of NewJersey. II. A. Defendant urges us to reverse the Appellate Division’sconclusion that exposing a child to a substantial risk of harmis sufficient to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Defendant maintains that under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)’s plainlanguage a conviction may be based only on evidence establishingactual harm, and that the statute also includes the requisiteelements for a finding of abuse or neglect under Title 9.Defendant proposes that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)’s reference to Title9 is convoluted, resulting in the Appellate Division’s erroneousconclusion that “risk of harm” equals “harm.” Defendant also raises fears that if the AppellateDivision’s holding is left undisturbed, prosecutors will retain 4 unbridled discretion in choosing between a second-degreeprosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) and a fourth-degreeprosecution under Title 9. B. The State stresses that we should affirm the AppellateDivision’s conclusion that a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be sustained by proving a risk of harm to a childwithout proof of actual harm. The State notes that its proposition is bolstered bynumerous appellate opinions, all holding that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), in all its incarnations, subsumed exposing a child to asubstantial risk of harm into the statute through Title 9. TheState maintains that “risk of harm” is apparent from the plainlanguage of the statute. The State reasons that if conduct violates more than onestatute, prosecutors retain discretion in deciding which chargeto pursue provided that they do not discriminate against anyclass of defendants and that their choice is not arbitrary,capricious, or a patent or gross abuse of discretion. C. The Attorney General also argues that both the plainlanguage and legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) indicatethe Legislature’s intent to include “risk of harm.” TheAttorney General notes that the title of the statute -- 5 Endangering Welfare of Children -- connotes legislative intentto include the risk of harm. The Attorney General counters withspecific references defendant’s notion of linguistic gymnasticsby the Appellate Division, with respect to its finding that“causes harm” equals “risk of harm.” The Attorney General notesthat “endanger” is defined as “put[ting] (someone or something)at risk or in danger.” (quoting New Oxford American Dictionary561 (1st ed. 2001)). The Attorney General cites numerousappellate cases that interpret N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) toencompass a substantial risk of harm. Taking the precedent andcommon definitional usage together, the Attorney Generalmaintains that defendant knowingly subjected the six children inher care to a substantial risk of harm because the children hadeasy access to a large quantity and variety of drugsintermingled among their toys and clothing. The AttorneyGeneral underscores the likely physical danger to the childrenof unwittingly ingesting the openly displayed drugs and thepotential emotional damage stemming from a child’s exposure todrugs and drug trafficking. Lastly, the Attorney General maintains that prosecutorshistorically retain broad prosecutorial discretion when adefendant’s action violates more than one statute. With thedefendant having proffered no proofs that the prosecutor abusedher discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the 6 Attorney General argues that the Appellate Division decisionshould be affirmed. III. A. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for a judgmentof acquittal, we apply the same standard as the trial court.State v. Sugar, 240 N.J. Super. 148, 153 (App. Div. 1990)(citing State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258, 263 (1964)). That standardis the same whether the motion is made at the close of theState’s case, at the end of the entire case, or after a juryreturns a guilty verdict under Rule 3:18-2. State v. Kluber,130 N.J. Super. 336, 341 (App. Div. 1974). We will deny amotion for a judgment of acquittal if the evidence, viewed in its entirety, be it direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State’s charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 341–42 (citing State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 436–37 (1968); State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458–59 (1967)).] Questions pertaining to statutory interpretation are legalin nature, State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (citing Statev. Revie, 220 N.J. 126, 132 (2014)), so “[w]e review suchdecisions de novo, 'unconstrained by deference to the decisions 7 of the trial court or the appellate panel,’” ibid. (quotingState v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015)). In interpreting a statute, we “give words 'their ordinarymeaning and significance,’” acknowledging that the “statutorylanguage is 'the best indicator of [the Legislature’s] intent.’”Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (alteration inoriginal) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492(2005)). At the same time, “[w]e will not presume that theLegislature intended a result different from what is indicatedby the plain language or add a qualification to a statute thatthe Legislature chose to omit.” Id. at 467-68. We only resortto extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history and committeereports, in the event that the statutory language at issue isambiguous. Id. at 468. B.N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: [a]ny person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who causes the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child as defined in [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6- 1, [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-3 and . . . [ N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.21] is guilty of a crime of the second degree. The three subsections of Title 9 incorporated by theLegislature into N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) are linchpins to thestatute’s applicability to the facts before us. 8N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 includes eight actions that constitute childabuse, none of which are germane here.N.J.S.A. 9:6-3 delineates, in relevant part, that [a]ny parent, guardian or person having the care, custody or control of any child, who shall abuse, abandon, be cruel to or neglectful of such child, or any person who shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any child shall be deemed to be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. [(emphasis added).]See also the second dissent,1 post at ___ (slip op. at 4) (Rabner,C.J., dissenting) (“[N.J.S.A. 9:6-3] also covers behavior thatplaces a child at substantial risk of harm.”).N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, in pertinent part, defines “[a]bused orneglected child” as including: a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof . . . or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court. [(emphases added).]1 For convenience, we refer to Justice Albin’s dissenting opinion as “the first dissent” and Chief Justice Rabner’s dissenting opinion as “the second dissent.” 9 As a consequence, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) “is clearly andreadily capable of comprehension.” State v. M.L., 253 N.J.Super. 13, 30 (App. Div. 1991). We see no ambiguity in theLegislature incorporating a “substantial risk” of harm fromN.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 into N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), so the appellatepanel here properly concluded that “[a]pplying this rule ofconstruction would seemingly result in an uncomplicatedinterpretation of the statutory offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), plainly, does not delineate two distinct elements –-proof of actual harm and harm qualifying as abuse or neglectunder Title 9. Rather, the statute defines “harm” by expresslyincorporating N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, which proscribes exposing achild to a substantial risk of harm. We agree with the first dissent that “[w]ords make adifference,” post at ___ (slip op. at 5) (Albin, J.,dissenting), and as such, we are bound to uphold theLegislature’s express incorporation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 intoN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, prohibiting the exposure of children to asubstantial risk of harm. Those principal purposes then becomethe statute’s principal commands. No extrinsic evidence isnecessary, rendering the first dissent’s analysis of legislativehistory unnecessary. Since the plain language of the statute isclear in its incorporation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, we similarlyneed not resort to the “doctrine of lenity” which is only 10 pertinent “if an analysis of statutory language . . . fails toresolve a statutory ambiguity.” State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4,18 (2012) (citing State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482 (2008)). C. In light of the statute’s plain language, our appellatecourts for decades have unanimously held that the State is notrequired to prove actual harm to a child to convict underN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Instead, they have concluded that proofof a child’s exposure to a substantial risk of harm issufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., State v. N.A.,355 N.J. Super. 143, 150–51 (App. Div. 2002); M.L., 253 N.J.Super. at 31 (collecting cases). In M.L., after police arrested the defendant forshoplifting, she conveyed that her fifteen-month-old child,C.L., was with a babysitter. 253 N.J. Super. at 17. Policelater entered the defendant’s apartment and discovered C.L.asleep, unattended in a playpen. Id. at 18. C.L. was sweatingin the ninety-degree heat, and the apartment was littered withdirty diapers and laundry, plates of spoiled food, and dogfeces. Ibid. A jury later found the defendant guilty ofendangering the welfare of children under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Ibid. On appeal, the defendant argued that “the trialcourt misinterpreted the statute as not requiring the State toshow that the child suffered physical harm.” Id. at 29. The 11 Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed, concluding that “[w]edo not read [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)] as calling for a demonstrationof actual physical harm.” Id. at 31. Over ten years later, in N.A., a jury convicted thedefendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) for having severely beatenher two-year-old son (actual harm). 355 N.J. Super. at 145,146. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holdingthat N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) and the Title 9 offense of crueltyand neglect of children each “criminalizes the same harm or riskof harm to the child.” Id. at 153. Specifically, the AppellateDivision concluded that the incorporation by reference ofN.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), “does not requirethat any act or omission of the parent result in specific harmto the child. The focus is on the conduct of the parent whichexposes the child to a 'substantial risk’ of death or physicalharm.” Id. at 150–51. As is apparent, our appellate courts have been unanimousover several decades in interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2),through all its iterations, as not requiring proof of actualharm to the child. N.A., 355 N.J. Super. at 150–51; M.L., 253 N.J. Super. at 31. Not one published appellate opinion holdsotherwise. We find no reason to disturb that decades-old soundprecedent predicated on the plain language of the statute. 12 In conjunction we note, “the legislative branch is presumedto be aware of judicial constructions of statutory provisions.”State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 180 (2012) (citing White v.Township of North Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 556 (1978)). It iseminently fair to observe that “where a statute has beenjudicially construed, the failure of the Legislature tosubsequently act thereon evidences legislative acquiescence inthe construction given the statute.” White, 77 N.J. at 556. Had the Legislature chosen to insist on proof of actualharm to a child to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), it wasfree to amend the statute, as it did in other aspects of thestatute, in the nearly three decades since M.L. In 1992, theLegislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) to elevate the offenseof child endangerment from a third- and fourth-degree crime to asecond- and third-degree crime, but it conspicuously did notamend the statute to require proof of actual harm. L. 1992, c.6, § 1; State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 657–58 (1993) (noting1992 amendment elevating offense levels). After that amendment,an Appellate Division panel once again upheld the precedent ofinterpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) as including the exposure of achild to a substantial risk of harm. N.A., 355 N.J. Super. at 150-51. In 2013, the Legislature broadened the scope ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) by raising the age of statutorily protectedchildren from sixteen to eighteen. L. 2013, c. 51, § 13. And 13 again, the Legislature chose not to add language that couldundercut precedent by requiring the State to prove actual harmin order to convict under the statute. The first dissent insists that “[a] sensible textualconstruction of the endangering statute” would “require harm asa precondition to the examples given in the abuse-and-neglectstatutes.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 5) (Albin, J., dissenting).The statute, however, delineates nothing about the use ofpreconditions, but instead expressly subsumes the Title 9provisions signaling a legislative intent to broaden thestatutory definition of “harm.” “It would show little respectfor the legislature were courts to suppose that the lawmakersmeant to enact an irrational scheme.” State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 228 (2002) (Long, J., dissenting) (quoting ThingsRemembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 , 135 (1995)(Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Based on the statutory construction, the Legislature’sincorporation of Title 9 provisions into N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a),and thirty years of ample judicial precedent, we agree with theAppellate Division’s decision in this case that the Statesuccessfully proved that defendant exposed the children in hercare to imminent danger and a substantial risk of harm pursuantto N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). 14 Children are naturally curious and inquisitive. Here, wehad six underage children, ranging in age from one to thirteen,housed in a confined space. Drugs hauntingly surroundedchildren’s toys and clothing. The ease of access to cocaine,heroin, and marijuana, and the attraction of brightly coloredpills, all created a potentially lethal trap for the childrenthat could have been easily sprung at any moment. With this evidence developed by the State at trial, theAppellate Division properly concluded that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a),incorporating Title 9, includes exposing a child to asubstantial risk of harm. D. We briefly consider the concerns of giving prosecutors toomuch discretion in choosing to charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), a second-degree crime, over Title 9, a fourth-degreeoffense. We have previously held that criminal statutes can “overlapin prohibiting the same basic act,” and in those situations “theproper prosecuting authority in the sound exercise of thediscretion committed to him [or her] may proceed under eitheract.” State v. States, 44 N.J. 285, 292 (1965). The UnitedStates Supreme Court has similarly held that “when an actviolates more than one criminal statute, the Government mayprosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate 15 against any class of defendants.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 , 123–24 (1979). “Whether to prosecute and whatcharge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions thatgenerally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.” Id. at 124.Prosecutorial discretion, however, is not unlimited, and“[j]udicial oversight is mandated to protect against arbitraryand capricious prosecutorial decisions.” State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 196 (1992). A defendant who proves that aprosecutor’s “exercise of discretion was arbitrary andcapricious would be entitled to relief.” Ibid. In Batchelder, the defendant was sentenced to five years’imprisonment in violation of a federal statute prohibitingpreviously-convicted felons from receiving firearms viainterstate commerce. 442 U.S. at 116. The Seventh Circuitremanded for resentencing given that a separate federal statuteproscribed identical conduct and allowed no more than a two-yearsentence. Id. at 116-17. The Supreme Court reversed, findingthat prosecutors retain discretion to “prosecute under either[act],” barring discrimination, when criminal conduct triggersmore than one statute. Id. at 123-24. In an analogous proceeding concerning the availability ofdisparate penalties under separate statutory schemes, in Statev. Reed, the defendant was sentenced to two to three years’imprisonment under the Drug Act for unauthorized possession of 16 narcotics. 34 N.J. 554, 556 (1961). The Appellate Divisionremanded, citing to another act which made unauthorized use ofnarcotics a disorderly persons offense, taking it out of theDrug Act’s purview. Ibid. Responding to the defendant’sarguments of unconstitutionally broad prosecutorial discretion,we held that when criminal conduct violates both statutes, “thedecision to proceed under either or both of the statutes istraditionally the State’s.” Id. at 573. Here, there is no evidence that the prosecutor abused herdiscretion in choosing to charge defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) instead of Title 9. Defendant bears the burden ofproving that the prosecutor acted arbitrarily and capriciously,Vasquez, 129 N.J. at 196, but provided no reasonablejustification as to why the prosecutor should have charged herunder Title 9 instead of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Rather,defendant claims generally that prosecutors retain too muchdiscretion in choosing whether to charge defendants underN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) or Title 9. That contention, however, isdirectly contrary to our precedent that provides prosecutorssuch discretion. See States, 44 N.J. at 292. Defendant has similarly not provided any evidence that theprosecutor’s decision to charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) wasdiscriminatory or predicated on prejudice. Indeed, the recordhere provided the prosecutor ample justification for her 17 decision to charge defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). Aswe have recently underscored in the Title 9 context, “a courtneed not sit idly by until a child is actually impaired byparental inattention or neglect.” DCPP v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354,370 (2017) (citing DYFS v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 23 (2013)). Inshort, danger awaited the six children at every turn in themotel room given their easy access to heroin, cocaine,marijuana, and pills, and for that reason, we find that theprosecutor did not abuse her discretion in choosing to chargedefendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) instead of Title 9. IV. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division upholdingthe trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a judgment ofacquittal. JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent. 18 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 4 September Term 2017 079034STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.DANYELL FUQUA, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The majority’s opinion violates cardinal principles ofstatutory interpretation in the service of upholding defendant’sconviction for a crime greater than the one she committed.Criminal statutes should not be pliable things, howeverdisturbing the facts of a case. Defendant surely is noinnocent. Based on the State’s proofs, had defendant beencharged with abuse and neglect, she could have been convicted ofthat fourth-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3. But based on theproofs, she did not commit the second-degree offense ofendangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, for whichshe received a six-year prison term. The majority construes the second-degree endangeringstatute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, to criminalize the civil definition 1 of abuse and neglect in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21.1 It arrives at thatconclusion by failing to apply the endangering statute’srequirement that a child suffer harm for a defendant to beguilty of that second-degree offense. Thus, according to themajority, a defendant is guilty of endangering if the child isexposed to a substantial risk of harm. In the end, the majoritymakes no distinction between harm and substantial risk of harm. To reach this result -- a result the Legislature could nothave intended -- the majority ignores the common usage of words,fails to acknowledge the textual differences between the twostatutes, disregards the endangering statute’s legislativehistory, pays no heed to the doctrine that criminal statutes areto be narrowly construed, accepts as “sound precedent” wronglyreasoned Appellate Division decisions, and forgets that thisCourt’s role is to correct and not to perpetuate lower courterrors. I therefore respectfully dissent. I. A. Under the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), aparent or guardian “who causes the child harm that would make1 Under the civil abuse-and-neglect statute, a parent or guardian who violates the statute is placed on the abuse-and- neglect registry. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11. 2 the child an abused or neglected child as defined in [ N.J.S.A.]9:6-1, [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-3 and . . . [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-8.21 is guiltyof a crime of the second degree.” (emphasis added). Theendangering statute incorporates the criminal definition ofabuse and neglect, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, and the civil definition ofabuse and neglect, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. But harm is an essentialelement of the endangering statute. If not, the endangeringstatute merely criminalizes the civil definition of abuse andneglect. The civil abuse-and-neglect statute does not necessarilyrequire the element of harm. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. A parentor guardian engages in civil abuse and neglect when a child “isin imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of thefailure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimumdegree of care” and when the child is placed in “substantialrisk” of harm. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. Other examples of abuse andneglect in the civil statute do punish harm, such as when aparent or guardian “commits or allows to be committed an act ofsexual abuse against the child,” and “the infliction ofexcessive corporal punishment.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c). Most categories of abuse and neglect in the fourth-degreecriminal statute, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3, encompass harm, but not all,see N.J.S.A. 9:6-1. Into the harm category, for example, fallssuch conduct as “habitually tormenting, vexing or afflicting a 3 child;” a “willful act of omission or commission wherebyunnecessary pain and suffering, whether mental or physical, iscaused or permitted to be inflicted on a child;” “usingexcessive physical restraint on the child under circumstanceswhich do not indicate that the child’s behavior is harmful tohimself, others or property;” and “inflicting unnecessarilysevere corporal punishment upon a child.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-1. Aparent or guardian also commits the crime of neglect, whether ornot the child suffers harm, by “willfully failing to provideproper and sufficient food, clothing, maintenance, regularschool education as required by law, medical attendance orsurgical treatment, and a clean and proper home”; “the habitualuse . . . in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent orobscene language;” “the performing of any indecent [or] immoral. . . deed, in the presence of a child, that may tend to debauchor endanger or degrade the morals of the child;” and exposing achild to “moral risk without proper and sufficient protection.”Ibid. If the endangering statute’s harm requirement does notmodify the civil and criminal definitions of abuse and neglect,then exposing a child to a substantial risk of harm (the civildefinition) or risk of harm under the fourth-degree definitionis a second-degree crime. The majority’s approach equates harmwith substantial risk of harm. As a result, the majority gives 4 the word “harm” a wholly different meaning than its customary,well-understood, and common-sense definition. Ante at ___ (slipop. at 8-10); see also Webster’s Third New InternationalDictionary 1034 (1981) (defining harm as “physical or mentaldamage” and “a material and tangible detriment or loss to aperson”). The majority reads the word “harm” caused to a child,a necessary predicate to an endangering conviction, to mean asubstantial risk of harm to a child. There is a difference,however, between a child who is permitted to run through traffic(substantial risk of harm) and a child who is struck while doingso (harm). Words make a difference. A sensible textual construction of the endangering statute-- consistent with its language and legislative intent -- wouldbe to require harm as a precondition to the examples given inthe abuse-and-neglect statutes. Thus, the statute would punish“harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child”for purposes of endangering a child under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2)(emphasis added). Exposing a child to a substantial risk ofharm, however, does not satisfy the definition of harm and isnot sufficient to constitute a violation of the second-degreeendangering statute. In this way, the endangering statute canbe reconciled with the Legislature’s grading of the fourth-degree offense of abuse and neglect and the civil statutoryviolation of abuse and neglect. 5 B. The majority’s position is also at odds with thelegislative history of the endangering statute. The originaldraft language of the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4,read: Any person who shall abuse, be cruel to or neglectful of any child shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. Any parent, guardian or person having the care, custody or control of any child, who shall abandon such child shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. [1 The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report § 2C:24-4, at 91 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971).]Noticeably absent from this draft is any mention of the word“harm.” In its Commentary, the New Jersey Criminal Law RevisionCommission expressed its criticism of this version andreluctantly endorsed it. The Commission stated: We are not happy with the breadth of, nor the precision of the definitions of, abuse, abandonment, cruelty[,] and neglect in N.J.S.[A.] 9:6-1. The conduct which is appropriately prevented by non-criminal sanctions need not always also be made criminal. Further, provisions of Chapter 6 of Title 9 show the basic thrust of it not to be to provide a criminal sanction but rather a strong remedy to compel support and/or proper conduct toward the child. Pending a re- examination of those definitions for civil purposes, we do not believe we should tamper with them for criminal purposes which might destroy the most effective sanction to stop the misconduct. We do believe that reconsideration of this entire field of law 6 would be appropriate. With hesitancy, then, we simply recommend continuation of existing law. [2 The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report § 2C:24-4, at 260 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971) (citations omitted).] The Legislature evidently was not satisfied with thebreadth of the proposed endangering statute and adopted a muchnarrower version of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 by explicitly including a“harm” requirement. Thus, the final version, as codified,reads: Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for such care, who causes such child such harm as would make such child an abused or neglected child as defined in [L.] 1974, c. 119, § 1 ([ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-8.21) shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree. [L. 1978, c. 95 (emphasis added); N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (1979).] The Appellate Division cases relied on by the majority as“decades-old sound precedent,” ante at ___ (slip op. at 11),have labored under a misunderstanding of the statute’slegislative history. A number of panels -- including the one inthis case below -- attributed the Law Revision Commission’s 1971note to the current endangering statute when, in fact, theCommission was referring to the draft proposal. See, e.g.,State v. N.A., 355 N.J. Super. 143, 153-54 (App. Div. 2002).The Commission observed that the 7 [proposed § 2C:24-4] incorporates into the Code the existing law as to abuse, abandonment, cruelty and neglect of children by making such conduct criminal under the definitions of those terms in Title 9. The intent is to incorporate the crime now defined in N.J.S.[A.] 9:6-3 without substantial change except for the penalty provisions. [2 The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report § 2C:24-4, at 259 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971) (citations omitted), cited in N.A., 355 N.J. Super. at 153.]As discussed, the current endangering statute enacted in 1979differs from the Commission’s draft proposal. Most critically,the 1971 proposal did not incorporate a harm requirement intothe statute, but spoke only generally in terms of abuse,cruelty, and neglect. See 1 The New Jersey Penal Code: FinalReport § 2C:24-4, at 91 (Criminal Law Revision Comm’n 1971).Thus, the Appellate Division has repeatedly erred by imputingthe Commission’s commentary to the current statute. In short,the Criminal Law Revision Commission’s commentary refutes anddoes not support the Appellate Division’s interpretation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 on which the majority is so dependent. We are not required to perpetuate mistakes made by theAppellate Division, even when they have been on the books formany years. In particular, the majority cites to N.A., 355 N.J.Super. at 150–51, and State v. M.L., 253 N.J. Super. 13, 31(App. Div. 1991), as support for the notion that proof of “harm” 8 and “risk of harm” have the same meaning. Ante at ___ (slip op.at 10-13) Even if N.A. and M.L. were “sound” precedent, they arefactually distinguishable. In both cases, the distinctionbetween “harm” and “risk of harm” was not necessary to theiroutcomes, because the State had provided sufficient evidence toprove actual harm. See N.A., 355 N.J. Super. at 145-47; M.L.,253 N.J. Super. at 31. In N.A., as the majority concedes, “ajury convicted the defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) forhaving severely beaten her two-year-old son (actual harm).”Ante at ___ (slip op. at 11) (emphasis added) (citing 355 N.J.Super. at 145-46). In M.L., the defendant’s infant child wasleft unattended in an apartment “littered with dirty diapers andlaundry, plates of spoiled food and dog feces.” 253 N.J. Super.at 18. The infant was found sleeping in a playpen sweating in90-degree heat and “in desperate need of a diaper change.”Ibid. The majority also suggests that the Legislature acquiescedto the interpretation given to the endangering statute by theAppellate Division by not amending the statute after the N.A.and M.L. decisions. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 12-13).Legislative acquiescence is a slender reed on which to justify amistaken Appellate Division interpretation of a statute. TheLegislature understands that, within our judicial system, the 9 New Jersey Supreme Court has the last word on the interpretationof a statute and has the obligation to correct mistakes made bylower courts. C. At the very least, there are two reasonable interpretationsof the endangering statute, and therefore the one more favorableto defendant should prevail. The majority ignores ourjurisprudence’s command that criminal statutes are to beconstrued narrowly. State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 328 (2011)(“[W]e must strictly construe the language of [a penal statute]where there is some uncertainty as to its application.”). Ourcitizens should not have to guess about the meaning or thebreadth of a criminal statute. Cf. State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 314 (2016). When two reasonable interpretations can begiven to a statute riddled with ambiguity, the doctrine oflenity instructs that the interpretation favoring the defendantmust prevail. State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 608 (2004)(“[W]hen a criminal statute is at issue, 'we are guided by therule of lenity’ and 'interpret ambiguous language in favor of acriminal defendant.’” (quoting State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218 (2002))); see also State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482(2008). Here, the majority disregards those principles bybroadly construing N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) and giving the State thebenefit of any ambiguities. 10 If uncertainty abounds concerning whether the Legislatureintended the expanded definition of harm in the endangeringstatute, the doctrine of lenity should prevail. D. Finally, by declaring that the second-degree endangeringstatute applies to conduct that creates a substantial risk ofharm to a child, the majority has erased all distinctionsbetween the criminal and civil statutes. Thus, now a parent orguardian who commits civil abuse and neglect is also guilty ofthe Title 2C, second-degree crime of endangering, which carriesa maximum prison exposure of ten years. In short, by removingthe harm requirement from the endangering statute, the majorityhas criminalized the civil abuse-and-neglect statute. The Legislature surely did not intend that absurd result. II. For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent. 11 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 4 September Term 2017 079034STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.DANYELL FUQUA, Defendant-Appellant. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting. A straightforward question lies at the center of thisappeal: to prove the crime of endangering the welfare of achild, set forth at N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, must the State presentevidence of actual harm to a child, or is it enough to show asubstantial risk of harm? To answer the question, the starting point is the languageof the statute. State v. Twiggs, ___ N.J. ___ (2018) (slip op.at 20); DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 493 (2005). Theendangering law reads as follows: Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who causes the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child as defined in [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6- 1, [ N.J.S.A.] 9:6-3 and . . . [ N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.21] is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child is guilty of a crime of the third degree. 1 [ N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) (emphasis added).] The State presents a strong argument that the phrase“causes the child harm” cannot be read separately from the wordsthat follow: “that would make the child an abused or neglectedchild as defined in” three specific laws. Read that way, “harm”incorporates various kinds of behavior listed in the cross-referenced statutes. Because those statutes encompass bothactual harm and substantial risk of harm, see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), the word “harm” in the endangering law does as well. Defendant sensibly emphasizes that “harm” means “harm” --not “risk” of harm. And the words of the endangering statutemake it a crime for a person to “cause[] [a] child harm.”N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). The legislative history cited by my colleagues does notappear to resolve the debate. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 6-8)(Albin, J., dissenting). And this Court has not addressed theissue before today. But see State v. N.A., 355 N.J. Super. 143,150-51 (App. Div. 2002) (observing in dicta that statuteencompasses substantial risk of harm); State v. M.L., 253 N.J.Super. 13, 31 (App. Div. 1991) (same). Faced with alternative reasonable interpretations of acriminal statute, the rule of lenity applies. That doctrinecalls on courts “to construe penal statutes strictly and 2 interpret ambiguous language in favor of a criminal defendant.”State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218 (2002); see also State v.Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. 93, 110-11 (2015); State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007). Here, because it is not clear whether theLegislature intended a narrow definition of actual harm or abroader meaning that includes substantial risk of harm, lenityrequires a narrow reading of the law as drafted. SeeLivingston, 172 N.J. at 218. Going forward, the Legislature, ofcourse, could amend and clarify the statute if it wished to. In this case, the trial court noted “the absence of anydirect evidence of actual harm to the children.” Becausedefendant’s conviction for second-degree endangering rests onrisk of harm to children and is based on the more expansivereading of the statute, the conviction should not stand. I respectfully dissent because I believe the meaning of theendangering law is ambiguous and should therefore be readnarrowly. 3