Title: Commonwealth v. Feliz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12879
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12879 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERVIN FELIZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 11, 2020. - December 23, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Obscenity, Child pornography.  Sex Offender.  Practice, 
Criminal, Probation.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender, 
Search and seizure.  Search and Seizure, Probationer, 
Expectation of privacy.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 3, 2015. 
 
 
A motion for relief from a condition of probation, filed on 
June 18, 2018, was heard by William F. Sullivan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Sarah M. Joss, for Massachusetts Probation Service, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts 
of possession and dissemination of child pornography.  He was 
sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration, suspended 
subject to compliance with special conditions of probation, for 
five years.  One condition, challenged here, required the 
defendant to allow the probation department to conduct random, 
suspicionless searches of his electronic devices and other 
locations where child pornography might be stored.  The 
defendant maintains that this condition authorizes unreasonable 
searches in violation of art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  On its face, we agree that the condition 
subjected the defendant to the continuing possibility of 
unreasonable searches throughout the term of his probation, and 
is too broad.  Properly limited, however, in these particular 
circumstances, imposition of the condition did not violate the 
defendant's rights under art. 14. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Underlying offenses.  In 2014, 
investigators were alerted to social media posts involving 
suspected child pornography.  The investigators traced the posts 
to a single Internet protocol (IP) address that was associated 
with the defendant's apartment.  After executing a search 
warrant for the apartment, officers uncovered dozens of images 
and video recordings of child pornography from a computer and a 
3 
 
"micro SD" memory card belonging to the defendant.2  The 
defendant admitted that he had been in possession of child 
pornography.  He told police that he would meet people with 
similar interests on chat websites, and would exchange child 
pornography with them through an online chat service. 
 
In March 2015, the defendant was indicted on two counts of 
possession of child pornography, G. L. c. 272, § 29C, and five 
counts of dissemination of child pornography, G. L. c. 272, 
§ 29B (a).  He pleaded guilty on all counts.  In April 2016, a 
Superior Court judge sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 
two and one-half years' incarceration in a house of correction, 
suspended for five years, and an aggregate period of five years' 
probation. 
 
The sentencing judge also imposed twelve special conditions 
of probation.  Condition no. eight required the defendant to 
"allow the Department of Probation to inspect and to 
search, at random and without announcement, any computer, 
electronic device, digital media, videotape, photographs or 
other item capable of storing photographs, images, or 
depictions, for the purpose of monitoring compliance with 
[his] conditions of probation." 
 
                                                          
 
 
2 A "micro SD" memory card can be inserted into small 
electronic devices, such as cellular telephones, laptop 
computers, or digital cameras.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 
485 Mass. 172, 181, petition for cert. filed, U.S. Supreme Ct., 
No. 20-6343 (Nov. 16, 2020) (officer removed memory card from 
camera and inserted it into laptop computer); Commonwealth v. 
Tarjick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 378 (2015) (data may be freely 
transferred from one device to another through memory card). 
4 
 
Condition no. ten ordered the defendant to submit to global 
positioning system (GPS) monitoring, as required by G. L. 
c. 265, § 47.3  The defendant unsuccessfully objected to 
condition nos. eight and ten when they were imposed. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  On the day that he was sentenced, 
the defendant filed a motion for relief from condition no. ten; 
he argued, among other claims, that the statutorily mandated GPS 
monitoring requirement was unconstitutional under art. 14.  See 
Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 692 (2019) (Feliz I).  A 
Superior Court judge denied the motion, the defendant appealed, 
and his petition for direct appellate review thereafter was 
allowed by this court.  See id. at 693.  We held that 
statutorily imposed GPS monitoring was unconstitutional as 
applied to the defendant, that imposition of GPS monitoring on 
any defendant required an individualized hearing, and that 
statutorily mandated GPS monitoring as a condition of probation 
"will not necessarily constitute a reasonable search for all 
                                                          
 
 
3 Condition no. nine prohibited the defendant from using the 
Internet, or having any computer or device connected to the 
Internet, unless he was required to do so for an official job 
function.  Other conditions prohibited the defendant from having 
unsupervised contact with any child under the age of sixteen; 
loitering near a school, library, park, or other location where 
children regularly congregate; and violating any local, State, 
and Federal laws.  The terms of probation stated that if the 
defendant were fully compliant with all of his terms of 
probation for two years, he could seek relief from condition no. 
nine. 
5 
 
individuals convicted of a qualifying sex offense."  Id. at 690-
691. 
 
In June 2018, the defendant filed a second motion for 
relief from condition no. eight.4  He argued that condition no. 
eight allowed unconstitutional searches under art. 14 because "a 
search of a probationer must be based upon reasonable 
suspicion."  See Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 790 
(1988); Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 304 
(2016).  After a hearing in July 2018, a Superior Court judge, 
who was not the sentencing judge, denied the motion.  The judge 
stated that, "[u]nlike the probation conditions in LaFrance and 
Waller, the condition in the present case does not permit a 
search of the defendant's premises," and that "[t]he sentencing 
judge . . . specifically limited a search to devices and not a 
general search of the defendant's home."  The judge did not 
explain his reasoning in interpreting the condition so narrowly, 
given its broad wording.  Recognizing that condition no. eight 
constituted a search under art. 14, the judge concluded that the 
                                                          
 
 
4 In the same motion, the defendant also sought relief from 
condition no. nine, which prohibited his use of the Internet 
anywhere except as a job requirement while at work.  When 
condition no. nine was imposed, the sentencing judge had 
indicated that the defendant could seek relief from the 
condition after two years of compliance with all terms of 
probation, and that, after four years, if he had been fully 
compliant with all of the terms of his probation, he could seek 
early termination. 
6 
 
condition "is reasonably related to the goals of probation and 
is tailored to specific characteristics of the defendant [and] 
his offenses,"5 and therefore denied the motion. 
 
In May 2020, the defendant successfully moved for early 
termination of his probation, as permitted under the original 
order of probation. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mootness.  Because the defendant's 
only request for relief in this appeal is the vacatur of a 
condition of probation, and his probation has been terminated, 
his appeal is moot.  Nonetheless, we have discretion to review a 
case notwithstanding its mootness where the issue is of public 
importance and is capable of repetition yet evading review.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 486 (2008); Matter of 
Sturtz, 410 Mass. 58, 59-60 (1991), and cases cited. 
 
Although "we are particularly reluctant to answer 
constitutional questions which have become moot," Matter of 
Sturtz, 410 Mass. at 60, the issue here warrants resolution.  
                                                          
 
 
5 The judge observed further that there was no indication in 
the record that early relief from condition no. nine had been 
mandatory at the time of sentencing, and that the language of 
the condition simply provided that the defendant could seek such 
relief.  The judge noted as well that the request for relief 
from condition no. nine demonstrated the importance of condition 
no. eight to ensure that the defendant was complying with the 
terms of his probation. 
 
 
In 2019, the defendant renewed his motion for relief from 
condition no. nine.  At that point, the Commonwealth did not 
oppose the motion, and it was allowed by the sentencing judge. 
7 
 
There is apparent confusion among probation officers and 
district attorneys' offices regarding the validity of search-
related conditions of probation.  Indeed, following the Appeals 
Court's decision in Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, which held 
that "any standard below . . . reasonable suspicion" would not 
allow a search of a probationer and the probationer's premises, 
the probation department directed its officers not to enforce 
conditions that allowed random, suspicionless searches of 
probationers, and to seek reevaluation of those conditions in 
court (citation omitted).6  Given the broad importance of the 
issue and the apparent uncertainty among prosecutors and courts, 
we exercise our discretion to decide the case. 
 
b.  Search-related conditions of probation.  We review de 
novo the motion judge's conclusion that, as a matter of law, 
condition no. eight "is reasonably related to the goals of 
probation and is tailored to specific characteristics of the 
defendant [and] his offenses."  See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 
                                                          
 
 
6 While district attorneys in two districts apparently have 
taken the position that random search conditions in sex offender 
cases are unconstitutional, the district attorney in another has 
not.  Moreover, the Appeals Court recently determined that a 
random, suspicionless search, pursuant to a probation condition 
virtually identical to condition no. eight, and imposed on a 
probationer whose offenses were similar to the defendant's, was 
permissible.  See Commonwealth v. Shipps, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 
34, 44 (2020). 
8 
 
Mass. 526, 532 (2005).  See also Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 
Mass. 405, 412 (2015). 
 
Article 14 guarantees the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches.  See Commonwealth v. Norman, 484 Mass. 
330, 335-336 (2020); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 
775 (2015) ("ultimate touchstone" of art. 14 is reasonableness 
[citation omitted]).  Nonetheless, "[a]s a probationer, the 
defendant lawfully may be subjected to reasonable restraints on 
'freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.'"  Feliz I, 481 Mass. 
at 700, quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 
(2001).  See Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 402 (1998).  
"The defendant's status as a probationer informs our assessment 
of both 'the degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an 
individual's privacy' and 'the degree to which it is needed for 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'"  Feliz I, 
supra, quoting Knights, supra.  "A probation condition is not 
necessarily invalid simply because it affects a probationer's 
ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights" (citation 
omitted).  Pike, supra at 403.  Where a condition of probation 
"infringes on constitutional rights," however, it must "be 
'reasonably related' to the goals of sentencing and probation" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 
Mass. 90, 96 (2018); Commonwealth v. Guzman, 469 Mass. 492, 497 
9 
 
(2014); Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 417 (1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996). 
 
In examining the reasonableness of a condition of probation 
that authorizes suspicionless searches without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, courts weigh the government's need for the 
search and the degree of invasion of the reasonable expectations 
of privacy that the search entails.  See Landry v. Attorney 
Gen., 429 Mass. 336, 348 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1073 
(2000).  "There is no ready test for reasonableness except by 
balancing the need to search or seize against the invasion that 
the search or seizure entails."  Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 
Mass. 46, 56 (2004), citing Landry, supra, and Commonwealth v. 
Shields, 402 Mass. 162, 164 (1988). 
 
Some conditions, such as those that authorize blanket 
suspicionless searches of a probationer's home, are so invasive 
that they are not permissible under art. 14.  See, e.g., 
LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 794-795.  Others, such as random drug 
screens, authorize only minimally invasive searches and are 
constitutional despite permitting suspicionless searches.  See, 
e.g., Eldred, 480 Mass. at 96.  Where a condition of probation 
involves "more than [a] minimally invasive" search, a sentencing 
judge must conduct an individualized assessment and determine 
whether the Commonwealth's "particularized reason" for the 
10 
 
search outweighs its "degree of invasiveness" (citations 
omitted).  Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 699-700, 705. 
 
Here, given the defendant's use of electronic devices to 
download and share child pornography over the Internet, we 
conclude that condition no. eight is reasonably related to the 
Commonwealth's probationary goals.  See Eldred, 480 Mass. at 96. 
 
c.  Condition no. eight.  The admittedly very broad 
language of condition no. eight requires the defendant to "allow 
the Department of Probation to inspect and to search, at random 
and without announcement, any computer, electronic device, 
digital media, videotape, photographs or other item capable of 
storing photographs, images, or depictions, for the purpose of 
monitoring compliance with [his] conditions of probation."7  We 
begin by focusing only on suspicionless searches of the 
defendant's electronic devices for the presence of child 
pornography.8 
                                                          
 
 
7 With one exception, the language of condition no. eight is 
precisely as requested by the Commonwealth during the 
defendant's pretrial release.  The sentencing judge did not 
impose the final requested provision, that the defendant allow a 
police officer to assist probation in searching his computers. 
 
 
8 In describing condition no. eight, the motion judge stated 
that it "requires the defendant to allow the probation 
department to search any electronic device," and did not discuss 
any of its broader terms.  At argument before us, the 
Commonwealth maintained this narrow focus, and indicated that it 
was not arguing that condition no. eight would permit probation 
officers to search the defendant's home or person for child 
11 
 
 
i.  Degree of invasiveness.  Electronic devices are the 
repositories of a "vast store of sensitive information" that can 
provide "an intimate window into a person's life."  Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214, 2217 (2018).  For many 
people, electronic devices contain the "privacies of life" 
(citation omitted).  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 
(2014).  "Indeed, a cell phone search . . . typically [would] 
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive 
search of a house . . . ."  Id. at 396.  Even a device that 
contains a singular type of data, such as a digital camera that 
stores only photographs, can reveal "intimate details of an 
individual's life."  See Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 
588, 593 (2017).  Accordingly, an individual has a compelling 
privacy interest in the contents of his or her electronic 
devices.  See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 32-33, 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017) (text messages implicate 
strong privacy interests).  See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 
728 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (noting "significant privacy 
implications inherent in cell phone data searches"); United 
States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (electronic 
mail messages implicate strong privacy interests). 
                                                          
 
pornography.  Rather, its explicitly stated concern was with 
computers and electronic devices. 
12 
 
 
The location-specific information that a device such as a 
cellular telephone can provide also has significant privacy 
implications.  That such devices have become almost a "feature 
of human anatomy" makes their protection from government 
intrusion all the more important.  See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385.  
As the use of electronic devices becomes increasingly 
"indispensable to participation in modern society," Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 2220, an individual's "realm of guaranteed 
privacy" must be preserved (citation omitted), see Commonwealth 
v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 41 (2019). 
 
Here, the judge reasoned that "[t]he condition allowing 
searches of the defendant's electronic devices is more closely 
analogous to a condition of random drug and alcohol tests than 
it is to a search of the defendant's home."  We disagree.  A 
search of an individual's electronic device is far more akin to 
the search of a home than to a random drug test. 
 
ii.  Commonwealth's interests.  While the defendant's 
privacy interests are heavily implicated by condition no. eight, 
the Commonwealth also maintains a powerful interest in 
furthering its probationary goals by means of that condition.  
Preventing "sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance."  
Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 702, quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 757 (1982).  Child pornography is a "permanent record of 
13 
 
the depicted child's abuse, and the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by [its] circulation" (quotations omitted).  
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 440 (2014), quoting 
Ferber, supra at 759.  "The reproduction and dissemination of 
child pornography itself harms the children who are depicted and 
revictimized with each viewing."  Feliz I, supra at 703.  At the 
same time, the Commonwealth also "has a 'vital interest in 
rehabilitating convicted sex offenders,' . . . in part because 
rehabilitation protects the public, by reducing the possibility 
of future offenses" (citation omitted).  Id. at 702. 
 
The Commonwealth's interest is particularly strong where, 
as here, the offenses involve many vulnerable victims, and a 
defendant who seeks out online communities from which to obtain 
and share child pornography during chat sessions.  "Because 
child pornography is now traded with ease on the Internet, 'the 
number of still images and videos memorializing the sexual 
assault and other sexual exploitation of children, many very 
young in age, has grown exponentially.'"  Paroline, 572 U.S. 
at 440, quoting United States Sentencing Commission, Federal 
Child Pornography Offenses 3 (2012).  The ability to store these 
images on memory cards that can be inserted into multiple 
different electronic devices, many of them mobile, enhances the 
Commonwealth's concerns.  This capability affords numerous means 
and settings in which child pornography can be shared, and 
14 
 
potentially reduces the effectiveness of police tactics such as 
monitoring specific websites or IP addresses. 
 
iii.  Assessing the balance.  The Commonwealth's interest 
in prevention is especially compelling with respect to a 
defendant who, as here, explained to police that he used chat 
sites to seek out like-minded people on the Internet in order to 
obtain and share child pornography, and who had numerous such 
images, far more than those which underlay the indictments, both 
on stationary devices at his home and on a mobile card that 
could be inserted into a cellular telephone.  The Commonwealth 
accordingly had a particularly cogent need for a condition of 
probation that would permit monitoring of the defendant's 
electronic devices for the presence of child pornography.  See 
Commonwealth v. Shipps, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 44 (2020) ("it 
[is] difficult to imagine how the probation department could 
effectively monitor the defendant's adherence to the condition 
that he not possess child pornography on his cell phone, absent 
a condition permitting [an] unannounced, targeted search"). 
 
More generally, the goals of probation -- rehabilitation 
and protection of the public -- "are best served if the 
conditions of probation are tailored to address the particular 
characteristics of the defendant and the crime."  Commonwealth 
v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 390 (2013), quoting Pike, 428 Mass. 
at 403.  Where a condition of probation involves suspicionless 
15 
 
searches of the instrumentalities of a defendant's offenses, the 
Commonwealth's interest in prevention and rehabilitation may be 
particularly strong.  See Rousseau, supra (condition of 
probation prohibiting defendants' use of computers, limited to 
permit work on their legal cases, was reasonably related to 
goals of preventing "attention-seeking behavior" of using 
computers "to enhance the image of themselves or their past acts 
of arson," given evidence at trial that defendants "actively 
sought to publicize their criminal acts").  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 460-461 (2001) 
(condition of probation prohibiting defendant who had been 
convicted of sexual abuse of his daughter from living in family 
home, where crimes had occurred and where defendant had molested 
other family members, was reasonably related to reducing risk of 
recidivism and also to helping rehabilitate defendant, and 
struck "an appropriate balance between the facts of the case and 
the goals of sentencing and probation"); Commonwealth v. 
Veronneau, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 478, 481-482 (2016) (upholding 
condition of probation that defendant "surrender his firearms 
during the term of his probation," where "given the nature of 
the offense [(carrying loaded firearm while under influence of 
alcohol)], the condition was reasonable and appropriate").  
Compare Commonwealth v. Gomes, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 857, 859-860 
(2009) (striking condition of probation requiring random drug 
16 
 
and alcohol testing where record did not demonstrate connection 
between drugs or alcohol and offense or offender). 
 
Undoubtedly, even a narrow search of the photograph files 
on one of the defendant's electronic devices would be far more 
than minimally invasive, thus ordinarily requiring reasonable 
suspicion and a warrant to search.  Given the defendant's 
history, however, his limited expectation of privacy in his 
devices, while substantial, must give way to the Commonwealth's 
overriding interest in protecting virtually limitless numbers of 
vulnerable children.  In the circumstances here, where the 
condition involves the type of instruments that the defendant 
used to commit his offenses, and that played a crucial role in 
allowing revictimization of the children depicted in the images 
by countless others, the Commonwealth's need for a probation 
condition authorizing searches of the defendant's electronic 
devices for child pornography outweighs the defendant's privacy 
interests in the devices.  Accordingly, condition no. eight, 
with limitations, is constitutional as applied to the defendant. 
 
d.  Limitations on condition no. eight.  We turn to 
consider two issues with respect to the plain language of 
condition no. eight, beyond the condition's authorization of 
searches of the defendant's electronic devices for child 
pornography. 
17 
 
 
First, we note that, by its terms, condition no. eight 
encompasses not only searches of the defendant's electronic 
devices, but also searches of his "digital media, videotape, 
photographs or other item[s] capable of storing photographs, 
images, or depictions."  This language appears to permit dragnet 
searches of the defendant's home, at any time, without 
reasonable suspicion, to uncover possible physical photographs 
or videotapes, as well as to search his home for the existence 
of any electronic devices.  Such indiscriminate rummaging 
through a defendant's home is precisely the kind of "blanket 
threat of warrantless searches" that art. 14 prohibits.  See 
Commonwealth v. Obi, 475 Mass. 541, 548 (2016).  "[T]the 
drafters of the Fourth Amendment [to the United States 
Constitution] and art. 14 undoubtedly were concerned with the 
physical integrity of persons, homes, papers, and effects for 
their own sake, [but] they also sought to preserve the people's 
security to forge the private connections and freely exchange 
the ideas that form the bedrock of a civil society."  
Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360, 371 (2020).  Accordingly, 
"[w]ith few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless 
search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be 
answered no."  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).  
A probationer's existing, albeit limited, expectation of privacy 
means little if he or she loses the ability "to retreat into his 
18 
 
[or her] home and there be free from government intrusion."  
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 
Therefore, condition no. eight cannot be read to permit 
suspicionless searches of the defendant's home.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 123 (2016) (probation 
officer may search probationer's home by obtaining warrant 
supported by reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause), 
with LaFrance, 402 Mass. at 792-793 (suspicionless searches of 
probationer's person and home, permitted by terms of probation, 
were invalid under art. 14, and reasonable suspicion was 
required to justify search of probationer and her premises), and 
Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 305 (condition of probation 
authorizing suspicionless searches of probationer's home ordered 
modified to require reasonable suspicion). 
 
A second concern with condition no. eight is that, by its 
terms, it authorizes a probation officer to search the 
defendant's "digital media . . . for the purpose of monitoring 
compliance with these conditions of probation."  As the 
defendant points out, his conditions of probation also include, 
inter alia, not having contact with individuals under the age of 
sixteen; not loitering within three hundred feet of a school, 
library, or park; that he continue to pursue mental health 
counselling; and that he obey all laws.  Applied broadly, as the 
plain language appears to permit, this provision could allow 
19 
 
searches of any document, text message, electronic mail message, 
image, or file on the defendant's computers, tablets, or 
cellular telephones, in an effort to determine whether the 
defendant, for example, had attended scheduled meetings with his 
counsellor, to read his notes to his therapist and details about 
his medical condition, or to search for evidence of the 
defendant having violated any statute or ordinance. 
 
Moreover, in invalidating GPS monitoring (and location 
tracking) in Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 705-706, as applied to this 
defendant, we noted that the Commonwealth had not demonstrated 
the need to monitor his physical location, in part because his 
crimes took place over the Internet.  A suspicionless search of 
the defendant's electronic devices pursuant to condition no. 
eight, to determine the defendant's prior locations and whether 
he stayed out of excluded zones such as parks, would be equally 
impermissible.9 
                                                          
 
 
9 One of the difficult issues raised in this case is how to 
implement a rule that authorizes the search of a probationer's 
electronic devices, including his or her cellular telephones, 
without granting the government blanket permission to search the 
probationer's home or person.  The record here provides no 
answers, and any such condition necessarily would be fact-
specific to an individual probationer's circumstances.  It might 
be possible, for example, to use technology to monitor a 
probationer's use of the Internet without physical access to the 
electronic device.  It also might be possible effectively to 
monitor a probationer's cellular telephone use by other means 
short of entering the probationer's home.  A judge considering 
imposing a condition requiring some form of monitoring of a 
20 
 
 
Thus, to ensure that condition no. eight does not violate 
art. 14, it must be understood to allow only searches of the 
defendant's electronic devices for child pornography, not his 
home or person, and not for other subjects.  See, e.g., Shipps, 
97 Mass. App. Ct. at 33, 43-44 (search of probationer's 
electronic devices pursuant to probation condition was 
permissible when probation officer limited search to opening 
photograph application on probationer's cellular telephone, and 
ended search immediately after recognizing child pornography).10 
 
Finally, we note that were a probation officer to have 
conducted searches of the defendant's electronic devices in a 
frequency or manner inconsistent with the specific probationary 
goals discussed supra, the defendant could have challenged those 
specific searches as unconstitutional under art. 14.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 720, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 247 (2019); Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 699 n.16. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the motion for relief 
from a condition of probation is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
probationer's electronic devices should determine what is 
effective and possible given the constitutional limitations we 
have discussed. 
 
 
10 Because the defendant's period of probation has been 
terminated, a remand to modify the language of condition no. 
eight to reflect these necessary limitations would serve no 
purpose.