Title: LAURENS CTY. SCH. DISTS. 55 & 56 v. Cox
Citation: 308 S.C. 171, 417 S.E.2d 560
Docket Number: 23630
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 1992

308 S.C. 171 (1992) 417 S.E.2d 560 LAURENS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS 55 AND 56, Appellants v. Betty S. COX, in her official capacity as Auditor of Laurens County, Respondent. 23630 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard December 3, 1991. Decided April 13, 1992. Kenneth L. Childs and David T. Duff, of Childs &amp; Duff, Columbia, for appellants. *172 Thomas A. Babb and Thomas F. Babb, both of Babb &amp; Babb, Laurens, for respondent. George C. Leventis, with the State Superintendent of Educ. and State Dept. of Educ., Columbia, amicus curiae. Heard Dec. 3, 1991. Decided April 13, 1992. Per Curiam: Appellants (School Districts) commenced this declaratory judgment action to resolve a dispute with Respondent (County Auditor) regarding the formula for determining the minimum local financial effort required under § 12-35-1557.[1] We reverse. Section 12-35-1557 provides: Under this statute, which is part of the Education Improvement Act of 1984 [EIA],[2] County Auditor is required annually to establish a millage rate to maintain a minimum local financial effort per pupil in order for the school district to qualify to receive EIA funds. The statute further provides for waiver of this requirement depending upon certain conditions. School Districts contend that the minimum local effort required by § 12-35-1557 must be calculated by taking the amount of local tax revenues for the prior year and adjusting this amount by the appropriate inflation factor. County Auditor's proposed calculation is essentially the same except she would use the amount of local funds actually expended for noncapital education programs in the prior year, rather than the revenues collected, and adjust this amount by the statutory inflation factor. In other words, the parties' only dispute has been which figure from the prior year, revenues collected or funds actually expended, should serve as the base amount to be adjusted for inflation. The trial judge rejected both proposed constructions and held the statute requires that local effort be calculated by using the 1983-84 fiscal year as the base year and adjusting it each year beginning with 1985-86 by the appropriate inflation factor. We disagree with the trial judge's statutory interpretation. We hold that, based upon the language and purpose of the statute, School Districts' interpretation of § 12-35-1557 is correct. Section 12-35-1557 was enacted to ensure that local school districts would not decrease their own funding of education in reliance upon EIA funds with no resulting net increase in total funding. The plain language of the statute indicates local districts must maintain "at least the level of per pupil financial *174 effort" of the prior year. However, the trial judge's interpretation here does the exact opposite. It mandates no increases, except for inflation. The result is that local districts are inhibited from going beyond the level of the financial effort set for the 1983-84 year. This is in contravention of the clear meaning and purpose of the statute to provide a minimum, not maximum, financial effort by school districts. In cases involving statutory construction, this Court has repeatedly held that a statute shall not be construed by concentration on an isolated phase. City of Columbia v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 388, 391, 154 S.E. (2d) 674, 676 (1957). Here the trial court construed Section 12-35-1557 by isolating the first three sentences and ignoring the use of the term revenue in the waiver provisions. Clearly local effort and revenue are synonyms as used in the statute. If not, the waiver provisions would be meaningless. Additionally, as we have analyzed above, the trial court's narrow interpretation is completely at odds with the purpose of this statute.[3] Accordingly, we reverse. [1] Now S.C. Code Ann. Section 59-21-1030 (Supp. 1990). [2] S.C. Code Ann. Section 12-35-1557 (Supp. 1989). [3] We note that since the passage of the EIA in 1984, the State Department of Education has interpreted § 12-35-1557 to use the prior year's local revenue as the base amount to be adjusted for inflation. This interpretation is consistent with this Court's construction of this statute. It is well settled that the construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overturned absent compelling reason. Jasper County Tax Assessor v. Westvaco Corp., ___ S.C. ___, 409 S.E. (2d) 333 (1991); Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Examiners of Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 353 S.E. (2d) 132 (1987).