Title: Commonwealth v. Taylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980378
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1998

Present: All the Justices  
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 980378   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                            November 6, 1998 
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in reversing the defendant’s conviction of grand larceny 
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove his 
criminal intent. 
Michael W. Taylor was indicted for grand larceny in 
violation of Code § 18.2-95.  He was accused of stealing eleven 
dies used in the manufacture of trunk locks from Long 
Manufacturing Company ("Long"), a business located in the City 
of Petersburg.  Taylor was convicted in a bench trial in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Petersburg and was sentenced to 
three years’ imprisonment, with execution of all three years 
suspended. 
Taylor appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, 
which reversed the trial court’s judgment in an unpublished 
opinion.  Taylor v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2474-96-2 (December 
16, 1997).  The Commonwealth appeals the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals under Code § 19.2-317(C). 
We will state the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.  Horton v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1998); 
Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 425-26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 
(1998).  In March 1995, Long held an auction of its property in 
compliance with the terms of a bank foreclosure action.  Since 
the electric power had been turned off in all the buildings, the 
items for auction were illuminated by lighting powered by an 
electric generator or by the auctioneer’s flashlight.  The 
purchasers at the auction were allowed thirty days to remove 
their items from Long’s premises. 
Taylor, a self-employed scrap metal dealer, attended the 
auction and purchased approximately $900 worth of items, 
including several presses and dies.  The dies he purchased were 
located in the "main building" on metal racks containing three 
or four shelves.  Taylor returned on the first or second day 
after the auction and removed most of his property, but waited 
until the thirtieth day to retrieve his remaining items. 
Before the auction, Long had sold to Sudhaus of America, a 
New Jersey business, eleven dies used to manufacture trunk locks 
("the Sudhaus dies").  The purchase price was $9,000 plus an 
additional $29,000 for the patent rights to the dies.  These 
dies were stored on wooden pallets on the floor of Long’s 
shipping and receiving building.  Deborah Loftis, Long’s 
president, placed yellow tags bearing the name and address of 
Sudhaus on at least half of the eleven dies prior to the 
 
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auction.  The tags measured about two by four inches, and the 
dies were two to three feet long. 
The Sudhaus dies were the only items remaining in the 
shipping and receiving building on the thirtieth day following 
the auction.  The building doors were open that day on both 
sides, providing sufficient natural light to illuminate the 
interior space.  Loftis saw the yellow tags on the dies that 
morning. 
Loftis was present when Taylor arrived that day, but soon 
left the premises for several hours.  When Loftis returned later 
in the day, she noticed that the Sudhaus dies were missing.  
Loftis located some of the Sudhaus dies at Peck Recycling, a 
business in the City of Richmond.  The dies were untagged, but 
Loftis was able to identify them by pulling apart and examining 
each die. 
The day after the Sudhaus dies were taken, Loftis spoke to 
Taylor by telephone and made notes of their conversation.  When 
Loftis asked about the missing dies, Taylor responded: "Well, 
what am I going to do about my press that wasn’t there [sic] I 
came to pick up?"  Loftis then asked Taylor, "Did you take [the 
Sudhaus dies]?"  Taylor responded, "Well, yeah, but what am I 
going to do about my stuff that wasn’t there?" 
After his arrest a few days later, Taylor admitted to 
Detective Raymond Richardson of the City of Petersburg Police 
 
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Department that he took the Sudhaus dies and sold them for scrap 
metal to Peck Recycling.  Taylor stated, however, that he 
mistakenly thought that the dies belonged to him.  Taylor also 
told Detective Richardson that the Sudhaus dies were located in 
the same building where most of his other purchases were 
located. 
Taylor testified at trial that, on the day of the auction, 
the dies he purchased were illuminated only by a flashlight and 
were later removed from their marked metal racks and placed on 
the floor with no identifying lot marks.  He stated that he saw 
no tags on any of the Sudhaus dies when he returned to remove 
the last of his purchases and mistakenly thought that those dies 
were the same dies he had purchased because he saw no other dies 
on the premises.  Taylor admitted that he previously had been 
convicted of two misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. 
Taylor argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 
his conviction.  He contends that the evidence supported his 
claim of mistake, and that the Court of Appeals properly held 
that the trier of fact would have had to speculate from the 
evidence in order to conclude that Taylor took the tagged 
Sudhaus dies.  We disagree with Taylor’s argument. 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal, the reviewing court must accord the judgment of the 
trial court sitting without a jury the same weight as a jury 
 
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verdict.  Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 113, 406 S.E.2d 
39, 42, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991); Evans v. 
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 609, 613, 212 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1975).  It 
is the appellate court’s duty to examine the evidence that tends 
to support the conviction and to uphold the conviction unless it 
is plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.  Code § 8.01-
680; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 
265 (1998); Walton, 255 Va. at 427, 497 S.E.2d at 871; Tyler v. 
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 165-66, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1997).  
In making this determination, the appellate court must examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
Jenkins, 255 Va. at 521, 499 S.E.2d at 265; Walton, 255 Va. at 
425-26, 497 S.E.2d at 871. 
If there is evidence to support the conviction, the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment, 
even if its view of the evidence might differ from the 
conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.  
Jenkins, 255 Va. at 520, 499 S.E.2d at 265; Tyler, 254 Va. at 
165-66, 487 S.E.2d at 223; Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 
239, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992).  The fact finder, who has the 
opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, has the sole 
responsibility to determine their credibility, the weight to be 
given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from 
 
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proven facts.  Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 S.E.2d at 871; 
Saunders, 242 Va. at 113, 406 S.E.2d at 42. 
Larceny, a common law crime, is the wrongful or fraudulent 
taking of another’s property without his permission and with the 
intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof.  Bryant v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 183, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1994); 
Winston v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 756, 497 S.E.2d 141, 
147 (1998).  Under Code § 18.2-95, grand larceny includes the 
taking, not from the person of another, of goods having a value 
of $200 or more. 
Here, Taylor admitted to Loftis and Detective Richardson 
that he took the Sudhaus dies from Long's premises.  There is no 
dispute that the dies were worth more than $200.  Thus, we must 
determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s 
finding that Taylor wrongfully took the dies with the necessary 
criminal intent. 
There can be no larceny if the accused, in good faith, 
believes that the property taken belongs to him, since the 
essential element of criminal intent is lacking in that 
circumstance.  Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 533, 138 
S.E.2d 28, 31-32 (1964); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 
811-12, 133 S.E. 764, 767-68 (1926).  Intent is the purpose 
formed in a person’s mind at the time an act is committed.  See 
Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 140, 495 S.E.2d 489, 492 
 
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(1998); Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 
313, 314 (1979).  Intent may, and often must, be inferred from 
the facts and circumstances of the case, including the actions 
and statements of the accused.  Id.; Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 
214 Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974). 
We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court’s conclusion that Taylor wrongfully removed the 
Sudhaus dies from Long’s premises with the intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of that property.  When Loftis asked Taylor to 
explain his actions, he did not say that he took the Sudhaus 
dies by mistake.  Instead, he flatly stated that he took the 
dies and twice asked Loftis about his items that he alleged were 
missing. 
Taylor told Detective Richardson that he found the Sudhaus 
dies in the same building as his other purchases, which 
contradicted Loftis’ testimony that none of Taylor’s items were 
located in the shipping and receiving building where the Sudhaus 
dies were stored.  Loftis’ testimony further contradicted 
Taylor’s version of the events when she stated that Taylor’s 
dies were stored on metal racks, while the Sudhaus dies were 
located on pallets on the floor and were marked with yellow 
tags.  The trier of fact was entitled to accept the entire 
testimony of Richardson and Loftis, find Taylor’s contradictory 
testimony unworthy of belief, and conclude that the Sudhaus dies 
 
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were located in a different building than Taylor’s items and 
were clearly marked when Taylor took them.  Thus, there is 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that 
Taylor was untruthful in his testimony, and that he knew when he 
took the Sudhaus dies that they were not the dies he had 
purchased. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment and reinstate Taylor’s conviction in accordance with 
the trial court’s judgment order. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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