Title: Dunn v. Fletcher
Citation: 96 So. 2d 257
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 1957

96 So. 2d 257 (1957)
Charles L. DUNN
v.
Richard M. FLETCHER et al.
6 Div. 835.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 20, 1957.
Ingram Beasley, Birmingham, for appellant.
Robt. S. Glasgow, Jr., Adamsville, for appellees.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Appellant and appellees are next door neighbors in Pratt City, Alabama, where they have lived side by side since 1935.
On December 22, 1953, appellant filed his bill of complaint alleging that he resides *258 at 309, and that appellees reside at 311, both on Third Street. The lot of each party fronts on Avenue U (Third Street?) about 37 feet and runs back from the street eastwardly about 181 feet to an alley. The lot of appellant lies on the north of appellees' lot on the south. The south line of appellant's lot, which is the north line of appellees' lot, is the line in dispute.
The bill of complaint further alleges that appellees, in 1950, erected, on the east or rear portion of appellees' lot, a one-story concrete block dwelling, and that part of said building extends over approximately two feet onto appellant's lot, and that appellees have refused to remove the building. The bill prays for a mandatory injunction requiring appellees to remove the building off appellant's property and that the court will establish the boundary line, and for general relief.
Appellees' answer denies the encroachment and alleges adverse possession, and also that appellant recognized the boundary as now existing and pointed out the same to appellees before the erection of the concrete block building by appellees.
The evidence was taken ore tenus before the trial judge. The record shows that the trial judge stated the contention of the parties before testimony was taken as follows:
"Mr. Glasgow: Yes, sir.
"Mr. Glasgow: Yes, sir.
"The Court: Yes, sir."
The evidence is in direct and irreconcilable conflict.
Appellees' evidence tended to show that in 1935 the disputed boundary line was marked by hedges and fences. Appellant's evidence contradicts this. Conflicts also appear in the evidence as to the existence and location of a driveway between the houses of the parties.
Appellee, Richard M. Fletcher, and one other witness testified that prior to commencing the erection of appellees' concrete block building which was completed in July 1949, appellee, Richard M. Fletcher, and the witness, Baker, who built the concrete block building, had a conference with the appellant on the ground where the building was to be erected; that on this occasion the appellant pointed out stakes at each end of the disputed line. We quote from the testimony of the carpenter, Baker:
We quote also from the testimony of Richard M. Fletcher:
Appellee, Richard M. Fletcher, further testified that appellant assisted on this occasion in the measuring as follows:
Appellant flatly denied that he had ever shown Fletcher or Baker any stakes, or that he had assisted in measuring the disputed line.
Appellant, when asked whether he had done anything to stop the erection of the concrete block house, testified as follows:
Appellant testified that about 1939 he set out a hedge in the center of the old driveway, and about that time built a low concrete wall on the front or west line of his lot. The wall appears to be about seven inches high. The south end of this wall appears to be located approximately two feet north of the line claimed by appellant.
Some time later, appellees built a low brick wall about ten inches high on the front or west line of their lot. The north end of appellees' brick wall lies about three inches south of appellant's low concrete wall above mentioned.
The decree of the trial court established the boundary line to "Begin at a point equal distant between the abutting ends of the walls in front of the respective properties."
In 1948, appellant built a concrete block wall about 15 to 20 inches high, running east and west, and on top of this concrete block wall erected a wire fence. This wall appears to lie about two feet north of the line claimed by appellant, and extends a distance of perhaps 40 feet along or near *260 the middle of the disputed boundary line. Appellant testified that this wall was built to enclose a rose garden and not to establish a boundary line. The trial court established the boundary line along the south side of this wall.
Appellant also built a retaining wall on the east side of his lot. The south end of this retaining wall also stopped some two feet north of appellant's south boundary line as contended for by the appellant.
The dimensions of these several walls are not stated precisely in the testimony, but pictures thereof appear as exhibits in the record, and the dimensions stated in this opinion are those that appear to the writer to be approximately correct according to the record filed here.
The decree appealed from recited that the boundary line between the property of the parties "had been agreed to by and between the parties" and described the boundary line, appointed a surveyor to establish said line in accordance with the decree, and taxed the costs one-half against each party.
A map or plat made by the appointed surveyor as ordered by the final decree was filed in the court below and appears in the record.
The record shows that appellees' concrete block house occupies a portion of appellant's lot as the south line of that lot is determined by the description in the deeds of the parties. Appellant argues the proposition that in order for appellees to acquire title to that portion of appellant's lot on which appellees' building stands, appellees must prove possession for the full ten-year period. Appellant further says that appellees have failed to carry the burden of proving adverse possession for ten years, and, therefore, appellees cannot succeed in this suit and the decree establishing the disputed line is erroneous.
While the proposition asserted by appellant is correct, we do not think it applies in this case. The trial court did not rest its decree on adverse possession, but instead found that the line had been agreed on by the parties and established the line on the basis of that agreement.
This decision does not rest on adverse possession. We think the doctrine of estoppel in pais applies.
That doctrine has been stated by this court as follows:
See, also:
The following statements of this court on estoppel were collected and set out in Burleson v. Mays, infra:
"`It is a sound and honest rule of equity, supported by principles of justice as well as of public policy, that if one knowingly though passively, suffers another to purchase and spend money on land, under circumstances which induce an erroneous opinion or mistaken belief of title, without making known his claim, he shall not afterwards, in a court of conscience at least, be permitted to successfully assert any right or title against the purchaser. Hatch v. Kimball, 16 Me. 146; Marshall v. Pierce, 12 N.H. [127] 136; Wendell's Ex'rs v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns.Ch. [N.Y.] [344] 354; Blake's Lessee v. Davis, 20 Ohio. 231.' Alabama Gt. Southern R. Co. v. South &amp; North Ala. R. Co., 84 Ala. 570, 580, 3 So. 286, 290 [5 Am.St.Rep. 401].
That doctrine has been applied by this court in Hendrix v. Southern Railway Co., *262 130 Ala. 205, 30 So. 596. Headnote 1 in that case recites as follows:
Also, in Thompson v. Page, 255 Ala. 29, 34, 49 So. 2d 910, 914, in 1951, this court said:
While possession for less than ten years may not confer title at law, where an owner of land has affirmatively represented the location of his boundary line to his neighbor and failed to object when the neighbor erected a building in reliance on such representation, the owner of the land encroached on will not, in equity, afterward be heard to say that his representation as to the location of the line is untrue.
In the instant case, appellant by his own admission saw appellees erecting the building, but did nothing. If the testimony of Richard M. Fletcher and Baker is believed, the appellant in this case did not merely stand by in silence, but actively participated in the location of the boundary line on which the appellees rely; wherefore, the appellant will not be permitted in this suit to oust the appellees on the strength of appellant's legal title.
We have carefully considered the entire record and exhibits, and also, the authorities relied on by appellant. The disputed issues were questions of fact. There was ample evidence to support the finding of the trial judge who heard the evidence ore tenus. We cannot say that the decree is unsupported by the evidence or so palpably wrong or manifestly unjust that we can reverse it. Christian v. Reed, 265 Ala. 533, 92 So. 2d 881; Holoway v. Carter, 261 Ala. 51, 72 So. 2d 728; 2 Ala. Dig., Appeal and Error.
Appellant further assigns as error that the decree is vague and indefinite in that the boundary line as described therein is incapable of being located.
We are of opinion that the decree is sufficiently definite to enable a surveyor and the sheriff to locate the line on the ground in accordance with the decree.
The decree appealed from is due to be and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur except STAKELY, J., not sitting.