Title: Porter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001599
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2018

2018 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1599 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
E. Glen Porter, III and Highland Memorial Park, 
Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin, Laura Gutierrez and 
Wisconsin Funeral Directors Examining Board, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 117, 902 N.W.2d 566  
PDC No:  2017 WI App 65 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick C. Haughney 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., and KELLY, J., dissent 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Thomas C. Kamenick, Richard M. Esenberg, Michael 
Fischer, Clyde Taylor, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & 
Liberty, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Richard M. 
Esenberg. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, with whom on the 
brief were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Sopen B. Shah, 
deputy solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Ryan J. 
Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Institute for 
Justice by Lee U. McGrath, Anthony B. Sanders, and Institute for 
Justice, Minneapolis, Minnesota, with whom on the brief were 
Erica Smith and Institute for Justice, Arlington, Virginia.
 
 
2018 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1599 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV1763) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
E. Glenn Porter, III and Highland Memorial 
Park, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, Laura Gutierrez and 
Wisconsin Funeral Directors Examining Board, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment 
of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Patrick C. Haughney, 
Judge.1 
                                                 
1 Porter v. State, 2017 WI App 65, 378 Wis. 2d 117, 902 
N.W.2d 566. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
E. 
Glenn 
Porter, III, and Highland Memorial Park, Inc.,2 challenge the 
constitutionality of two statutes: Wis. Stat. §§ 157.067(2)3 and 
445.12(6)4 (2015-16).5  The parties refer to these two statutes 
                                                 
2 E. Glenn Porter, III, is the president and one of the 
principal owners of Highland Memorial Park, a cemetery located 
in New Berlin, Wisconsin.  Mr. Porter and Highland Memorial Park 
shall be referred to collectively as "Porter."   
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 157.067(2) provides: 
No 
cemetery 
authority 
may 
permit 
a 
funeral 
establishment to be located in the cemetery.  No 
cemetery authority may have or permit an employee or 
agent of the cemetery to have any ownership, operation 
or 
other 
financial 
interest 
in 
a 
funeral 
establishment.  Except as provided in sub. (2m), no 
cemetery authority or employee or agent of a cemetery 
may, directly or indirectly, receive or accept any 
commission, fee, remuneration or benefit of any kind 
from a funeral establishment or from an owner, 
employee or agent of a funeral establishment. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 445.12(6) provides: 
No licensed funeral director or operator of a funeral 
establishment may operate a mortuary or funeral 
establishment that is located in a cemetery or that is 
financially, 
through 
an 
ownership 
or 
operation 
interest or otherwise, connected with a cemetery.  No 
licensed funeral director or his or her employee may, 
directly 
or 
indirectly, 
receive 
or 
accept 
any 
commission, fee, remuneration or benefit of any kind 
from any cemetery, mausoleum or crematory or from any 
owner, employee or agent thereof in connection with 
the sale or transfer of any cemetery lot, outer burial 
container, burial privilege or cremation, nor act, 
directly or indirectly, as a broker or jobber of any 
cemetery property or interest therein. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
3 
 
as the "anti-combination laws."  Generally, these laws prohibit 
the joint ownership or operation of a cemetery and a funeral 
home.  Porter argues that the anti-combination laws violate his 
rights to equal protection and substantive due process under the 
Wisconsin and United States constitutions.6 
¶3 
In the circuit court, the State moved for summary 
judgment.  It argued that rational basis scrutiny applied to 
Porter's claims because he had not alleged the creation of a 
suspect class or the violation of a fundamental right.  See 
Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 
¶56, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  The State asserted that 
the anti-combination laws survived rational basis review because 
they were rationally related to three legitimate government 
interests: (1) preserving competition in the death care services 
industry; (2) protecting consumers from higher prices and poor 
services; and (3) reducing the potential for abuses from 
commingling of cemetery and funeral revenues. 
¶4 
The circuit court granted the State's motion for 
summary judgment.  It concluded that the anti-combination laws 
are constitutional because they are rationally related to a 
number of legitimate government interests, namely "preserving 
competition, avoiding commingling of funds, preserving consumer 
choices, avoiding higher prices, fostering personal service, 
[and] avoiding undue pressure on consumers . . . ."  The circuit 
                                                 
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wis. Const. art. I, § 1. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
4 
 
court explained that it was "satisfied . . . that if there are 
arguments over whether some of this works or some of that 
doesn't work, it stands as proof then that there is a basis for 
the law . . . ." 
¶5 
Porter appealed.  The parties disagreed on the proper 
scope of rational basis review and whether the anti-combination 
laws have a rational basis.   
¶6 
The court of appeals held that regardless of the scope 
of rational basis review employed, the anti-combination laws 
were 
not 
unconstitutional 
on 
either 
equal 
protection 
or 
substantive due process grounds.7  The court of appeals explained 
that the anti-combination laws were rationally related to the 
legitimate government interests of protecting consumers and 
limiting the possibility for abuse of trusting requirements.   
¶7 
Applying the standard set forth in Mayo v. Wisconsin 
Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
anti-
combination statutes do not violate the equal protection or due 
process 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
constitutions.  The anti-combination statutes are rationally 
related to the legitimate government interests of protecting the 
welfare of particularly vulnerable consumers and limiting or 
minimizing the manipulation of funds required to be held in 
trust by funeral directors and cemetery operators. 
                                                 
7 Porter v. State, 2017 WI App 65, ¶2, 378 Wis. 2d 117, 902 
N.W.2d 566. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶9 
E. Glenn Porter is the president and one of the 
principal owners of Highland Memorial Park, a cemetery located 
in New Berlin, Wisconsin.  Porter would like to expand his 
business by operating a funeral establishment in conjunction 
with his existing cemetery operations.  However, the anti-
combination laws prevent him from doing so. 
¶10 As a result, Porter filed the instant lawsuit, 
asserting 
the 
anti-combination 
laws 
are 
facially 
unconstitutional on both equal protection and substantive due 
process grounds.   
¶11 In support of his equal protection challenge, Porter 
alleged that the anti-combination laws create anticompetitive, 
irrational, and arbitrary distinctions between classes of 
Wisconsin 
citizens 
in 
that 
only 
cemetery 
operators 
are 
prohibited from operating or obtaining ownership interests in 
funeral 
establishments, 
and 
only 
funeral 
directors 
are 
prohibited from obtaining ownership interests in cemeteries.   
¶12 In support of his substantive due process challenge, 
Porter alleged that the anti-combination laws arbitrarily and 
irrationally prevent cemetery operators from owning an interest 
in a funeral establishment and owners and operators of funeral 
establishments from having an ownership interest in a cemetery. 
¶13 As relief, Porter sought (1) a declaratory judgment 
that the anti-combination laws violate the equal protection and 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
6 
 
due 
process 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
constitutions; (2) an order permanently enjoining the State from 
enforcing the anti-combination laws; and (3) reasonable costs 
and attorney fees. 
¶14 The State moved for summary judgment.  It argued that 
rational basis scrutiny applied to both of Porter's claims 
because he had not alleged the creation of a suspect class or 
the violation of a fundamental right.  The State asserted that 
the anti-combination laws were rationally related to three 
legitimate government interests: (1) preserving competition in 
the death care services industry; (2) protecting consumers from 
higher prices and poor service; and (3) reducing the potential 
for abuses from commingling of cemetery and funeral revenues.8 
¶15 Porter argued that even if he has not definitively 
established that the anti-combination laws are unconstitutional, 
he has raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to 
                                                 
8 On appeal, the State asserts that the anti-combination 
laws are rationally related to two legitimate government 
interests:  (1) protecting consumers from increased prices; and 
(2) limiting or minimizing the manipulation of funds required to 
be held in trust by funeral directors and cemetery operators. 
As we explain below, we agree with the State that the anti-
combination laws are rationally related to the two legitimate 
government interests articulated by the State on appeal.   
Accordingly, we do not address whether the anti-combination 
laws are rationally related to any other legitimate government 
interests.  A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 
Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
7 
 
whether the anti-combination laws actually advance the State's 
asserted interests. 
¶16 In support of its motion, the State submitted a report 
authored by economics professor Jeffrey Sundberg, who rendered 
an opinion to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that 
the anti-combination laws serve the State's claimed interests.   
¶17 Sundberg 
opined 
that 
the 
anti-combination 
laws 
"protect the interest of consumers" by "encourag[ing], or 
prevent[ing] the discouragement of, competition."  Sundberg 
explained that combination firms, if permitted, would "have an 
opportunity to significantly reduce the amount of competition 
they face" through a process called "foreclosure."  According to 
Sundberg: 
[A] cemetery with a financial interest in a funeral 
home could easily create an advantage by charging a 
normal or perhaps lower price for burials from its 
partner home, and a higher price for burials from 
other funeral homes.  This would allow the combination 
to achieve a higher market share and create a 
disadvantage for rival firms, as long as the number of 
cemeteries was limited.  This at least appears to be a 
consumer-friendly 
result, 
as 
long 
as 
it 
lasts.  
However, as the combination captures more market 
share, the amount of competition will decline and the 
firm can then charge full prices that include the 
artificially higher cost of the burial plot previously 
charged to other firms.  Prices faced by consumers 
will rise. 
¶18 Although Sundberg conceded that foreclosure is "not a 
common result," he asserted that it is "most likely to work in a 
case where one part of the integrated firm is a special 
resource, one that cannot easily be replicated by others."  
Sundberg explained that "[t]his is likely to be the case with 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
8 
 
cemeteries" because there are far fewer cemeteries in the United 
States than funeral homes.  Sundberg continued: 
Given the land, capital, and regulatory requirements, 
it is reasonable to believe that entering the cemetery 
industry is much more difficult than starting a new 
funeral home. 
As a result, a funeral home that is owned by, or owns, 
a cemetery has access to a scarce resource, one that 
gives it an advantage over other funeral homes.  As 
other firms exit the market it becomes advantageous 
for the combination to use its market power to extract 
more money from consumers, perhaps by charging higher 
prices or perhaps by simply encouraging distraught 
consumers with few alternatives to add more features 
to their loved one's service. 
The small number of cemeteries and the barriers to 
creating new ones, especially in urban areas, give a 
special advantage to well-capitalized large firms that 
can afford to purchase multiple funeral homes.  With 
enough funeral homes, it may be profitable for a 
cemetery to completely exclude burials from funeral 
homes owned by others. 
¶19 As to whether the anti-combination laws limit or 
minimize the manipulation of funds required to be held in trust 
by funeral directors and cemetery operators, Sundberg opined 
that the anti-combination laws "reduce[] the potential for 
abuses from commingling of cemetery and funeral revenues."  He 
explained: 
[T]here is some potential for abuse when combinations 
exist.  The amount of money set aside is supposed to 
be 15% of the value of [a cemetery] plot.  By 
providing funeral services as well as cemetery plots, 
a 
firm 
could 
potentially 
exploit 
[the 
trusting 
requirement for cemetery plots] by increasing the 
price of something like burial vaults and reducing the 
price of the plot itself, collecting the same amount 
of revenue while being required to set aside less 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
9 
 
money for perpetual care, without actually reducing 
the actual expenses of perpetual care. 
Sundberg 
opined 
that 
having 
a 
single 
firm 
selling 
more 
categories of merchandise "makes the commingling potentially 
easier to disguise, if a firm were interested in doing so."  At 
a minimum, Sundberg asserted, "detecting such activity would be 
more difficult" without the anti-combination laws.  Sundberg 
also 
explained, 
without 
contradiction, 
that 
having 
more 
categories of merchandise makes the commingling of funds with 
different trusting requirements easier to disguise and more 
difficult to detect. 
¶20 In response, Porter submitted a report and affidavit 
authored by economics professor David Harrington, who opined to 
a reasonable degree of professional certainty that the anti-
combination laws do not actually advance the State's claimed 
interests.     
¶21 Harrington 
opined 
that 
the 
anti-combination 
laws 
actually increase the cost of death care services to Wisconsin 
consumers.  Harrington explained that it is less costly to 
produce funeral services at combination firms because those 
firms are able to benefit from economies of scale and scope.  
Harrington also disputed Sundberg's assertion that permitting 
combination firms would lead to foreclosure: 
Perhaps the best evidence for this point is [the] fact 
that combination firms already exist and do business 
in almost all of the states.  Although I have not 
deliberately investigated the possibility, I can say 
that over the many years I have studied the industry I 
have not seen any evidence that combination firms 
actually engage in the kind of exclusionary behavior 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
10 
 
that [Sundberg] says that he fears.  If they did so, 
their conduct would likely have been the subject of a 
challenge under the antitrust laws.  I am not aware 
that any such case has ever been brought in the states 
where combination firms are permitted to do business. 
¶22 Harrington further opined: 
Wisconsin has a state statute (Wis. Stat. § 157.11[9]) 
designed to ensure that cemeteries are cared for in 
                                                 
9 Presumably, 
Harrington 
is 
referring 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 157.11(9g), which reads as follows: 
(9g) Care fund for cemetery lots. 
(a) 
1. Except as provided in ss. 66.0603(1m)(c) and 
157.19(5)(b), funds that are received by a cemetery 
authority for the care of a cemetery lot shall be 
invested in one or more of the following manners: 
a. Deposited and invested as provided in s. 157.19. 
c. If not invested as provided in subd. 1.a., 
otherwise deposited by the cemetery authority in an 
investment approved by the cemetery board if the care 
funds are segregated and invested separately from all 
other moneys held by the cemetery authority. 
2. The manner in which the care funds are invested may 
not permit the cemetery authority to withdraw the care 
fund's 
principal 
amount. 
 
The 
income 
from 
the 
investment of a care fund for the care of cemetery 
lots may be used only to maintain the cemetery lots 
and grounds, except that if the amount of income 
exceeds the amount necessary to maintain the cemetery 
lots or grounds properly, the excess amount may be 
used to maintain any other portion of the cemetery, 
including mausoleums. 
(b) Anyone having in custody or control any cemetery 
care trust fund received other than by testament 
shall, upon demand, deliver it to the cemetery 
authority 
to 
be 
handled 
as 
provided 
in 
this 
subsection. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
11 
 
perpetuity.  This statute applies to cemeteries 
operated by combination firms to the same extent that 
it applies to any cemetery.  Abuse or misuse of funds 
is no more or less likely simply because a cemetery 
firms [sic] operates a funeral establishment.  By 
defendant's logic, a cemetery should be precluded from 
operating a flower shop because of the possibility 
that funds could be comingled [sic].  Wisconsin law 
does not prohibit cemeteries from engaging in the 
flower 
business 
or 
from 
selling 
any 
other 
complementary goods other than funeral services. 
¶23 The circuit court granted the State's motion for 
summary judgment.  It concluded that the anti-combination laws 
are constitutional because they are rationally related to the 
legitimate government interests of "preserving competition, 
avoiding commingling of funds, preserving consumer choices, 
avoiding higher prices, fostering personal service, [and] 
avoiding undue pressure on consumers."  The court explained that 
it was "satisfied . . . that if there are arguments over whether 
some of this works or some of that doesn't work, it stands as 
proof then that there is a basis for the law . . . ."  The 
circuit court concluded that it did not "need to go beyond 
summary 
judgment 
and 
to 
have 
a 
trial 
on 
the 
matter, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Except as provided in sub. (11), any cemetery 
authority that sells a cemetery lot on or after 
November 1, 1991, shall deposit 15 percent of each 
payment of principal into a care fund under par. (a) 
within 30 business days after the last day of the 
month in which the payment is received, except as 
provided in sub. (7)(d) and s. 157.115(2)(f). The 
total amount deposited must equal 15 percent of the 
total amount of all payments of principal that have 
been received, but not less than $25. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
12 
 
because . . . there's enough information before the court that 
the court finds the law is constitutional." 
¶24 Porter appealed.  He argued that the anti-combination 
laws must be examined under the "rational basis with teeth" 
standard that this court applied in Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. 
Wisconsin 
Patients 
Compensation 
Fund, 
2005 
WI 
125, 
284 
Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.  Under this standard, Porter 
argued, the State must demonstrate that the anti-combination 
laws bear a "real and substantial connection" to a legitimate 
government purpose.   
¶25 The court of appeals held that regardless of the 
standard of review employed (i.e., traditional rational basis or 
"rational basis with teeth"), the anti-combination laws were not 
unconstitutional on either equal protection or substantive due 
process grounds.  The court of appeals explained that the anti-
combination laws were rationally related to the legitimate 
government interests of protecting consumers and limiting the 
possibility for abuse of trusting requirements.   
¶26 The court of appeals also held that a remand for 
further proceedings would be inappropriate.  It explained that 
although evidence, including expert opinions, had been presented 
in the instant case, "the court must determine the relative 
merit of that evidence during a constitutional challenge."10   
II 
                                                 
10 Porter, 378 Wis. 2d 117, ¶48. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
13 
 
¶27 We begin by setting forth the general standards of 
review 
and 
principles 
of 
law 
applicable 
to 
Porter's 
constitutional challenges.   
¶28 Porter 
raises 
facial 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of the anti-combination laws.  "A facial 
constitutional challenge to a statute is an uphill endeavor."  
State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶5, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 
N.W.2d 851.  To succeed, Porter must demonstrate that the anti-
combination laws cannot be constitutionally enforced under any 
set of circumstances; that is, "a facial challenge is '[a] claim 
that a statute . . . always operates unconstitutionally[.]'"  
Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶60, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (quoting Olson v. Town of Cottage 
Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶44 n.9, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211).  
The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law 
that we review independently.  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶18. 
¶29 In assessing Porter's constitutional challenges, we 
presume the anti-combination laws are constitutional.  Aicher, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶18; Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 
119, 
595 
N.W.2d 392 
(1999). 
 
"The 
court 
indulges 
every 
presumption to sustain the law if at all possible, and if any 
doubt exists about a statute's constitutionality, we must 
resolve that doubt in favor of constitutionality."  Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶18; State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La 
Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46-47, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973).  This 
strong presumption of statutory constitutionality "is the 
product of our recognition that the judiciary is not positioned 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
14 
 
to make the economic, social, and political decisions that fall 
within 
the 
province 
of 
the 
legislature." 
 
Aicher, 
237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶20; State ex rel. Carnation Milk Prods. Co. v. 
Emery, 178 Wis. 147, 160, 189 N.W. 564 (1922). 
III 
¶30 We now turn to the merits of Porter's constitutional 
challenges.  We first establish the scope of rational basis 
review applicable to Porter's claims.  We then apply that 
standard to the anti-combination laws. 
A 
¶31 Porter challenges the constitutionality of Wis. Stat 
§§ 157.067(2) and 445.12(6).  Generally speaking, these statutes 
prohibit the joint ownership or operation of a cemetery and a 
funeral home. 
¶32 The parties dispute how rational basis scrutiny is to 
be applied under the specific circumstances of the instant case. 
¶33 Porter argues that the anti-combination laws must be 
examined under the "rational basis with teeth" standard that 
this court applied in Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 
N.W.2d 440.  Porter argues that under this standard, the State 
must demonstrate that the anti-combination laws bear a "real and 
substantial connection" to a legitimate government purpose.  The 
State argues that Porter's constitutional challenges should be 
analyzed under the traditional rational basis test, but that the 
anti-combination laws pass constitutional muster under either 
traditional rational basis or "rational basis with teeth." 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
15 
 
¶34 On the same day that we heard arguments in the instant 
case, we heard arguments in Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & 
Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.11  Noting that "[t]he analysis under both the due 
process and equal protection clauses is largely the same[,]"12 
the Mayo court disposed of an equal protection and due process 
challenge 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55 
under 
the 
following 
articulation of the rational basis standard: 
A classification created by legislative enactment will 
survive rational basis scrutiny upon meeting five 
criteria: 
(1) All classification[s] must be based upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class 
really different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane 
to the purpose of the law. 
(3) The classification must not be based upon 
existing circumstances only.  [It must not be so 
constituted as to preclude addition to the 
numbers included within a class.] 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must 
apply equally to each member thereof. 
(5) That 
the 
characteristics 
of 
each 
class 
should be so far different from those of other 
classes as to reasonably suggest at least the 
                                                 
11 We scheduled the release of the instant opinion to be 
contemporaneous with the release of our opinion in Mayo v. 
Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 
78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  We apply Mayo in the 
instant case. 
12 Mayo, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶39 (quoting State v. Quintana, 
2008 WI 33, ¶78, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447). 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
16 
 
propriety, having regard to the public good, of 
substantially different legislation. 
Mayo, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶42; see also Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶58.   
¶35 This five-step analysis is the proper standard to 
apply in the instant case to Porter's constitutional claims.  
See Mayo, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶39, 42. 
B 
¶36 Applying the five-step analysis relied upon in Mayo, 
we conclude that the anti-combination laws do not violate equal 
protection or substantive due process. 
¶37 First, 
we 
determine 
whether 
the 
classifications 
created 
by 
the 
anti-combination 
statutes 
are 
based 
upon 
"substantial distinctions" which makes the classes different 
from one another.  This step is satisfied.   
¶38 Cemetery operators and funeral establishment directors 
both serve a particularly vulnerable class of consumers: those 
who have suffered the loss of a loved one.  Moreover, certain 
goods and services in the death care industry are subject to 
statutory trusting requirements so that persons can pay for them 
"pre-need" with assurance that the necessary funds will exist 
when the need arises.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 157.11(9g)(c) 
(requiring sellers of cemetery plots to entrust 15% of the 
principal 
paid 
to 
cover 
perpetual 
care 
expenses); 
445.125(1)(a)1. (requiring sellers of caskets to hold in trust 
100% of funds paid before death until the "death of the 
potential decedent").  Thus, the classifications created by the 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
17 
 
anti-combination laws are based upon "substantial distinctions" 
that make the classes different from one another. 
¶39 Second, 
we 
determine 
whether 
the 
classifications 
adopted are germane to the purpose of the laws.  This step is 
satisfied.  
¶40 The State argues that the anti-combination laws are 
rationally related to two legitimate government interests: (1) 
protecting consumers from increased prices; and (2) limiting or 
minimizing the manipulation of funds required to be held in 
trust by funeral directors and cemetery operators.13 
¶41 As the court of appeals correctly explained, "[b]oth 
interests conceivably serve to protect consumers in markets 
encountered by virtually everyone, and at a time in their lives 
when they may be particularly vulnerable to questionable 
marketing influences due to the loss of loved ones."  Porter, 
378 Wis. 2d 117, ¶34. 
¶42 Moreover, 
the 
State's 
expert, 
Jeffrey 
Sundberg, 
explained at length how the anti-combination laws advanced these 
legitimate government interests.  See supra ¶¶16-19.   
¶43 As to the State's first articulated interest (i.e., 
protecting consumers), Sundberg opined that without the anti-
                                                 
13 Because we agree with the State that the anti-combination 
laws are rationally related to the two legitimate government 
interests posited by the State, we do not address whether the 
anti-combination laws are rationally related to any other 
legitimate government interests.  A.O. Smith Corp., 222 Wis. 2d 
at 491. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
18 
 
combination laws, combination firms would, in the short run, 
offer lower prices than stand-alone funeral homes and limit 
stand-alone firms' access to cemeteries.  This would drive 
stand-alone funeral homes from the market at which point 
combination firms would increase their prices. 
¶44 As to the State's second articulated interest (i.e., 
limiting or minimizing the manipulation of funds required to be 
held in trust), Sundberg also opined that the potential for 
abuse arises when a combination firm sells both cemetery plots 
and other merchandise subject to higher trusting requirements 
because such a firm could charge more for merchandise that is 
subject to a lower trusting requirement and lower its prices for 
merchandise that is subject to a higher trusting requirement.  
Doing this would give the combination firm immediate access to 
more funds at the risk that funds are not available when the 
pre-need purchaser dies and needs the paid-for merchandise.14 
¶45 Accordingly, the classifications created by the anti-
combination laws support the purposes of those laws. 
¶46 Third, 
we 
determine 
whether 
the 
statutory 
classifications are based solely upon existing circumstances.  
The anti-combination laws do nothing to "preclude addition to 
                                                 
14 We do not recite Porter's contrary evidence because doing 
so would be unnecessary.  Sundberg's report provides an 
independent and sufficient basis for concluding that the anti-
combination laws advance legitimate government interests, and 
Harrington's report and affidavit to the contrary does not 
compel a different conclusion. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
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the numbers included within a class" and "allow expansion of the 
class[es]" to include additional members in the future.  Aicher, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶69.  Therefore, the third step is satisfied. 
¶47 Fourth, we determine whether all members of each class 
are treated equally.  There is nothing in the anti-combination 
laws that would treat some cemetery operators differently than 
other 
cemetery 
operators. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 157.067(2).  
Further, there is nothing in the anti-combination laws that 
would treat some funeral directors differently than other 
funeral directors.  See Wis. Stat. § 445.12(6).  Therefore, the 
fourth step is satisfied. 
¶48 Fifth, 
and 
finally, 
we 
determine 
whether 
the 
characteristics of each class are so different from those of the 
other class to "reasonably suggest" that the legislation is for 
the public good.  This step is satisfied.   
¶49 Both funeral establishment directors and cemetery 
operators serve a particularly vulnerable class of consumers: 
those who have suffered the loss of a loved one.  Both funeral 
establishment directors and cemetery operators are subject to 
trusting requirements for the products and services they sell.  
The unique characteristics of funeral establishment directors 
and cemetery operators "reasonably suggest" that the anti-
combination laws serve the public good by protecting vulnerable 
consumers and making it more difficult for funeral directors and 
cemetery operators to disguise the commingling of funds with 
different trusting requirements. 
No. 
2016AP1599   
 
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¶50 According, we conclude that the anti-combination laws 
are constitutional.15 
 
IV 
¶51 We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted 
in favor of the State.  The anti-combination statutes do not 
violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the 
Wisconsin and United States constitutions.  The anti-combination 
statutes are rationally related to the legitimate government 
interests of protecting the welfare of particularly vulnerable 
consumers and limiting or minimizing the manipulation of funds 
required to be held in trust by funeral directors and cemetery 
operators. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
15 Because we conclude that the anti-combination laws are 
constitutional as a matter of law, we need not decide whether 
Porter has raised an issue warranting a trial.  We do, however, 
highlight a passage from the court of appeals opinion:   
We decline Porter's invitation to remand this case for 
further proceedings, as none are necessary. . . . In 
addition to being unprecedented, allowing for a fact-
finding hearing would improperly elevate a so-called 
factual determination——presumably one made under a 
mere 
preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard——as 
dispositive of the question of the anti-combination 
laws' constitutionality——which determination we know 
involves a more stringent standard that is a question 
of law. 
Porter, 378 Wis. 2d 117, ¶48. 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
1 
 
¶52 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. and DANIEL KELLY, J., 
(dissenting). 
 
The 
people 
of 
Wisconsin 
vest 
distinct 
constitutional 
powers 
of 
governance 
in 
each 
branch 
of 
government, but consistent with founding principles of limited 
government and individual freedom, the people also impose 
constraints on the exercise of those powers.  The Wisconsin 
Constitution begins with a Declaration of Rights, echoing 
language 
from 
our 
nation's 
Declaration 
of 
Independence, 
recognizing that the proper role of government——the very reason 
governments are instituted——is to secure our inherent rights, 
including liberty: 
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).  "Too much dignity 
cannot well be given to that declaration."  State v. Redmon, 134 
Wis. 89, 101, 114 N.W. 137 (1907).  An inherent right to liberty 
means all people are born with it; the government does not 
bestow it upon us and it may not infringe it.  Our nation's 
founders dissolved "all Allegiance to the British Crown" in 
order to restore liberty to the people.1  "Give me liberty or 
give me death," Patrick Henry's impassioned plea during those 
revolutionary times, embodies the fundamental importance of 
                                                 
1 The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776).   
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
2 
 
liberty, our "[f]reedom from arbitrary, despotic, or autocratic 
control."2   
¶53 While the people empower the legislature to enact laws 
and make policy, the constitution compels the judiciary to 
protect the liberty of the individual from intrusion by the 
majority.  "[C]ourts of justice are to be considered as bulwarks 
of 
a 
limited 
Constitution 
against 
legislative 
encroachments . . . ."  The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Consistent with that 
duty, courts must earnestly scrutinize laws that are challenged 
for infringing constitutional rights.    
¶54 Because government exists to protect and safeguard 
liberty, the legislature may restrict it only for a legitimate 
government purpose.  Applying even the most deferential review 
of the laws challenged in this case, we discern no legitimate 
government interest underlying the anti-combination statutes.  
We would reverse the court of appeals and declare the anti-
combination laws unconstitutional.  We respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶55 Mr. Porter argues that Wis. Stat. §§ 157.067(2)3 and 
445.12(6),4 commonly referred to as the anti-combination laws, 
                                                 
2 Liberty, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2010). 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 157.067(2) provides:   
No 
cemetery 
authority 
may 
permit 
a 
funeral 
establishment to be located in the cemetery.  No 
cemetery authority may have or permit an employee or 
agent of the cemetery to have any ownership, operation 
or 
other 
financial 
interest 
in 
a 
funeral 
establishment.  Except as provided in sub. (2m), no 
(continued) 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
3 
 
are unconstitutional under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution because those laws deny him his fundamental right 
to economic liberty——here, the right to earn a living in the 
lawful occupation of his choice.  The challenged laws prohibit 
contemporaneous ownership or operation of both a funeral home 
and a cemetery.  Mr. Porter owns and operates Highland Memorial 
Park Cemetery and would like to operate a funeral home in 
addition, but the anti-combination statutes prohibit him from 
doing so.  He asserts that these laws were passed at the behest 
of the funeral directors seeking to limit competition from 
cemetery owners.  Indeed, funeral directors drafted the original 
statutory language and submitted it to the legislature on 
Wisconsin 
Funeral 
Directors 
and 
Embalmers 
Association 
                                                                                                                                                             
cemetery authority or employee or agent of a cemetery 
may, directly or indirectly, receive or accept any 
commission, fee, remuneration or benefit of any kind 
from a funeral establishment or from an owner, 
employee or agent of a funeral establishment. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 445.12(6) provides:   
No licensed funeral director or operator of a funeral 
establishment may operate a mortuary or funeral 
establishment that is located in a cemetery or that is 
financially, 
through 
an 
ownership 
or 
operation 
interest or otherwise, connected with a cemetery.  No 
licensed funeral director or his or her employee may, 
directly 
or 
indirectly, 
receive 
or 
accept 
any 
commission, fee, remuneration or benefit of any kind 
from any cemetery, mausoleum or crematory or from any 
owner, employee or agent thereof in connection with 
the sale or transfer of any cemetery lot, outer burial 
container, burial privilege or cremation, nor act, 
directly or indirectly, as a broker or jobber of any 
cemetery property or interest therein. 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
4 
 
letterhead.  The law went into effect in 1939, and was amended 
in 1943, as a "measure requested and sponsored by the Wisconsin 
Funeral Directors and Embalmers Association."  See Drafting 
File, 1939 WI Act 240, p.2, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.5  Mr. Porter believes there is no legitimate 
governmental interest supporting the anti-combination laws, and 
he submitted evidence demonstrating that the 39 states without 
these laws experience no monopolistic or price-fixing behavior 
in the industry.  Mr. Porter contends favoritism toward funeral 
directors at the expense of cemetery owners motivated the 
legislature to enact these protectionist laws.  
¶56 The State argues the statutes protect against funeral 
industry monopolies, which would stifle competition, violate 
anti-trust laws, and ultimately result in higher prices for 
grieving customers.  The State points to eight other states that 
enacted prophylactic statutes discouraging or forbidding joint 
operation of funeral homes and cemeteries as evidence of the 
need for Wisconsin's anti-combination statutes.  It notes the 
heavy consumer protection regulations in the death industry due 
to the vulnerability of individuals who must make important 
financial decisions within hours of the loss of a loved one.  
The State's position is that these laws are rationally related 
to 
the 
following 
legitimate 
government 
interests: 
 
(1) 
protecting consumers from higher prices and (2) reducing the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin's anti-combination laws have been revised and 
rewritten over the years and now appear in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 157.067(2) and 445.12(6).  
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
5 
 
potential for evasion of Wisconsin's death care trusting 
requirements.  
¶57 Mr. Porter's constitutional challenge is a facial one; 
he 
asserts 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
in 
every 
circumstance.  See State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶10 n.9, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (discussing difference between facial 
and as-applied constitutional challenges).  The burden to prove 
a statute unconstitutional rests with the party challenging it.  
This court describes that burden as a "heavy" one because the 
court presumes the legislation is constitutional, engages in 
every attempt to uphold the statute, and requires a party 
challenging a law to prove it "is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id., ¶8; see also, Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 
Wis. 327, 
348, 
133 
N.W. 209 
(1911) 
("In 
approaching 
the 
consideration of the present law, we must bear in mind the well-
established principle that it must be sustained, unless it be 
clear 
beyond 
reasonable 
question 
that 
it 
violates 
some 
constitutional limitation or prohibition.").  This is the law 
and we are bound to apply it.  But see Mayo v. Wis. Injured 
Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, 
¶___, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ____ (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) 
(questioning whether beyond a reasonable doubt is an appropriate 
burden to impose on a person challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute). 
II 
¶58 Before assessing whether the anti-combination statutes 
violate the Wisconsin Constitution, it is necessary to decide 
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6 
 
what level of judicial review applies:  (1) rational basis; (2) 
rational basis "with teeth"; or (3) strict scrutiny.  The State 
advocates for the basic rational basis test while Mr. Porter 
requests rational basis "with teeth" review, couching it as the 
"real and substantial" standard historically applied to strike 
down protectionist laws in Wisconsin lacking a real and 
substantial link to some legitimate governmental purpose.  This 
court, however, overruled the supreme court case that created 
the rational basis with teeth standard, thereby eliminating this 
level of review.  See id., ¶38 (majority opinion) (overruling 
Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 
125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440).  Only two options for 
judicial review of challenged legislation remain:  (1) the 
traditional rational basis test or (2) the strict scrutiny 
standard.  
A 
¶59 The level of judicial scrutiny depends upon the nature 
of the challenged legislation.  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶39, 
360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  When the statute implicates a 
fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class, this 
court applies strict scrutiny and the law will be upheld "only 
if narrowly tailored 'to serve a compelling state interest.'"  
Id. (quoting Milwaukee Cty. v. Mary F.-R., 2013 WI 92, ¶35, 351 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
7 
 
Wis. 2d 273, 839 N.W.2d 581).6  In all other challenges, we 
review the law under the rational basis test and uphold it 
"unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest."  Id. (quoting 
Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶12).   
¶60 No one argues the challenged statutes discriminate 
against a suspect class, but Mr. Porter does assert the statute 
implicates a fundamental right——liberty.  Wisconsin case law 
defines 
"fundamental 
rights" 
as 
"those 
which 
are 
either 
explicitly or implicitly based in the Constitution."  State v. 
Martin, 191 Wis. 2d 646, 651-52, 530 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1995).  
This court reaffirmed that definition in Vincent v. Voight, 2000 
WI 93, ¶80, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 ("Fundamental rights 
are based on the Constitution either explicitly or implicitly." 
(citing Martin, 191 Wis. 2d at 652)).   
B 
¶61 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
explicitly 
identifies 
liberty as an inherent right and establishes state government 
for the express purpose of securing liberty, among other rights.  
The question then becomes whether economic liberty falls within 
liberty's protection.  The Wisconsin Constitution does not 
define liberty, but the framers of our state constitution 
                                                 
6 Whether strict scrutiny or rational basis applies to a 
statute involving a fundamental right may also depend on the 
extent the law burdens the right.  See State v. Alger, 2015 WI 
3, ¶39 n.16, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  A severe 
restriction compels strict scrutiny review but a reasonable 
restriction, which does not cause significant restriction, may 
trigger rational basis review.  Id. 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
8 
 
expressly 
incorporated 
language 
from 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Independence, including liberty among those inherent rights 
governments are instituted to protect.  Therefore, we may 
ascertain the original public meaning of liberty by considering 
the 
documented 
perspective 
of 
our 
nation's 
founders, 
in 
particular 
the 
principal 
author 
of 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Independence, Thomas Jefferson. 
¶62 Thomas Jefferson's understanding of "liberty" was 
influenced by the writings of Enlightenment thinkers and Whig 
intellectuals.7  At the time of Independence, the concept of 
"liberty" was "quite broad, encompassing economic liberty as 
well as other forms of liberty less tangible than mere freedom 
from physical restraint."8  Cato's Letters, from which Jefferson 
and 
other 
Framers 
conceptualized 
economic 
and 
political 
doctrine, defined "liberty" as follows:  
 
[T]he Right of every Man to pursue the natural, 
reasonable, and religious Dictates of his own Mind; to 
think what he will, and act as he thinks, provided not 
to the Prejudice of another; to spend his own Money 
himself, and lay out the Produce of his Labour his own 
Way; and to labour for his own Pleasure and Profit, 
and not for others who are idle, and would live and 
riot by pillaging and oppressing him, and those that 
are like him.[9]  
                                                 
7 David N. Meyer, Liberty of Contract:  Rediscovering a Lost 
Constitutional Right 14 (2011). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 15 (quoting "Cato," An Enquiry into the Nature and 
Extent of Liberty (Letter No. 62) (Jan. 20, 1721), in John 
Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, 2 Cato's Letters: Or, Essays on 
Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects 244-
45, 248  (1733). 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
9 
 
Cato's Letters, a major influence upon Jefferson, envisioned 
"liberty" to encompass economic freedom and the right of 
individuals to choose the means and manner of their labor, free 
from restraint.   
¶63 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, a Swiss jurist, heavily 
influenced 
the 
Framers' 
language 
in 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Independence.10  Burlamaqui regarded liberty as a natural right 
of individuals "[to] dispos[e] of their persons and property, 
after the manner they judge most convenient to their happiness."  
With Jefferson grounding his philosophy in Burlamaqui and Cato's 
Letters, the concept of "liberty" that formed the basis for 
Independence naturally encompasses economic freedom.11   
¶64  James Madison regarded a government that would 
infringe individual economic liberty as unjust:  "That is not a 
just government, nor is property secure under it, where 
arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part 
of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free 
choice of their occupations . . . ."12  Just as our nation's 
founders recognized the importance of economic freedom, over a 
century ago this court adopted an expansive interpretation of 
                                                 
10 Id. at 14. 
11 See id. at 14-17 (arguing that Jefferson, as well as most 
other 
Framers, 
understood 
"liberty" 
and 
the 
"Pursuit 
of 
Happiness" as broad concepts based on Cato's Letters and 
Burlamaqui). 
12 James Madison, Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792, 
reprinted in The Founder's Constitution 598 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
10 
 
liberty.  The term "liberty" in our constitution "does not mean 
merely immunity from imprisonment,"   
[but] include[s] the opportunity to do those things 
which are ordinarily done by free men, and the right 
of each individual to regulate his own affairs, so far 
as consistent with rights of others. 
State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 533-34, 90 
N.W. 1098 (1902).  Early in Wisconsin history, this court 
repeatedly and consistently recognized economic liberty——the 
right to earn a living in any lawful occupation without 
unnecessary 
government 
interference——as 
a 
fundamental, 
constitutional right.13   
¶65 In Maxwell v. Reed, 7 Wis. 493 (*582), 499 (*594) 
(1859), this court recognized the right to earn a living as "one 
of 
the 
great 
bulwarks 
of 
individual 
freedom" 
"guarded 
by . . . fundamental law."  The Maxwell court emphasized the 
need to protect and preserve the right every citizen has to 
attain "the means of living."  Id. at 498 (*594).  In Taylor v. 
State, 35 Wis. 298, 301 (1874), this court declared location 
restriction laws imposed on businesses posing no danger to the 
public to be invalid and "an unjustifiable restriction upon, and 
interference with, the fundamental rights of the citizen."  In 
                                                 
13 Economic liberty is also rooted in our nation's history.  
See Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 
69, 93 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J., concurring) ("The U.S. Supreme 
Court has repeatedly declared that the right to pursue a lawful 
calling 'free from unreasonable governmental interference' is 
guaranteed under the federal Constitution, and is 'objectively, 
deeply 
rooted 
in 
this 
Nation's 
history 
and 
tradition.'" 
(footnotes omitted)).    
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
11 
 
State ex rel. Winkler v. Benzenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 176, 76 
N.W. 345 (1898), this court noted that unreasonable laws 
"interfer[ing] with the right of the citizen to pursue his 
calling," which "invade the right of the citizen to pursue a 
lawful business" cannot be upheld.  This court has long 
acknowledged that laws unreasonably interfering with "the right 
of the citizen to pursue his calling" run afoul of the 
constitution. 
 
Id. 
at 
176-78 
(voiding 
a 
law 
as 
unconstitutionally 
discriminating 
against 
solo 
plumbers 
by 
granting "special privileges" to plumbers in partnership).  
¶66 This court's protection of economic liberty continued 
into the 20th century, when the court held that "[t]he general 
right of every person to pursue any calling, and to do so in his 
own way, provided that he does not encroach upon the rights of 
others, cannot be taken away from him by legislative enactment."  
Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. at 534 (emphasis added) (quoted source 
omitted). 
 
The 
court 
later 
identified 
an 
employer's 
constitutional right to employ whom he will, see, e.g., A.J. 
Monday Co. v. Auto., Aircraft & Vehicle Workers of America, 
Local No. 25, 171 Wis. 532, 539-541, 177 N.W. 867 (1920) ("The 
right of an employer to exercise his constitutional privilege as 
to whom he will employ has been fully established in this 
state." (citing Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. at 534)); and upheld a 
citizen's constitutional right to carry on a lawful business, 
see, e.g., McGraw-Edison Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee, 11 
Wis. 2d 46, 53, 104 N.W.2d 161 (1960) ("Prohibition of the use 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
12 
 
of a suitable and legitimate product certainly interferes with 
plaintiffs' right to carry on a lawful business.").  
 
¶67 In several cases, this court specifically recognized 
the limits on legislative power to confer economic prerogatives 
on certain groups to the exclusion of others.  For example, the 
court declared unconstitutional a law banning the sale of 
oleomargarine, which was passed to protect the dairy industry 
from competition posed by makers of butter substitutes.  John F. 
Jelke Co. v. Emery, 193 Wis. 311, 321-22, 214 N.W. 369 (1927).  
Criticizing the legislature for violating its constitutional 
duty to protect personal liberty, the John F. Jelke court noted:  
"The constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its 
servants and representatives, and no one of them has a right to 
ignore or disregard its plain commands."  Id. at 321.  The John 
F. Jelke court also emphasized limits on legislative power when 
its exercise touches constitutional rights, as well as the 
judicial duty to employ a more exacting scrutiny of legislation 
that oppresses the people: 
[F]rom the standpoint of constitutional right the 
Legislature 
has 
no 
more 
power 
to 
prohibit 
the 
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine in aid of the 
dairy industry than it would have to prohibit the 
raising of sheep in aid of the beef cattle industry, 
or to prohibit the manufacture and sale of cement for 
the benefit of the lumber industry.  In some cases a 
proper exercise of the police power results in 
advantage to a particular class of citizens and to the 
disadvantage of others.  When that is the principal 
purpose of the measure, courts will look behind even 
the declared intent of Legislatures, and relieve 
citizens against oppressive acts, where the primary 
purpose is not to the protection of the public health, 
safety, or morals. 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
13 
 
Id. at 323 (emphasis added).  
¶68 In Dairy Queen of Wis., Inc. v. McDowell, 260 
Wis. 471, 478c, 51 N.W.2d 34 (1952), reh'g denied, 260 Wis. 471, 
52 N.W.2d 791, Dairy Queen challenged a ban on its lower fat 
ice-cream-like product in Wisconsin.  Organizations associated 
with the dairy industry filed amicus briefs, which the court 
construed 
as 
"promot[ing] 
a 
restricted 
market" 
for 
that 
industry.  Id.  The Dairy Queen court rejected the notion "that 
the legislature or the court should be party to an act which 
appears to have no purpose except to protect the interests of 
the . . . manufacturers 
of 
ice 
cream . . . against 
the 
competition of Dairy Queen."  Id. at 478b-78c.  Instead, the 
court applied John F. Jelke in holding the statute invalid.   
¶69 In State ex rel. Grand Bazaar Liquors, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 2d 203, 313 N.W.2d 805 (1982), this court 
declared unconstitutional a Milwaukee ordinance that granted 
liquor licenses only if the licensee's business received at 
least 50 percent of its income from the sale of intoxicants.  
Id. at 204-06.  The ordinance had an anti-competitive purpose 
"to keep large retail stores out of the retail liquor business."  
Id. at 209-10.  The court, applying the rational basis test, 
cautioned that "we should not blindly rubber stamp legislation 
enacted under the guise of the city's police power when careful 
review has revealed no logical link between the legislation and 
the objective it was enacted to effect."  Id. at 218.  
Accordingly, the court determined that the ordinance did "not 
accomplish the articulated goals" and was "an arbitrary and 
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14 
 
irrational exercise of the city's police power and a denial of 
equal protection."  Id. at 212. 
¶70 Permeating these decisions is the notion of individual 
freedom, which may not be subjugated by majoritarian impulses or 
the success of certain interest groups in prevailing upon 
legislators for special privileges at the expense of individual 
rights:  "Free will in making private contracts, and even in 
greater degree in refusing to make them, is one of the most 
important and sacred of the individual rights intended to be 
protected."  Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. at 540. 
¶71 Courts and legal commentators increasingly recognize 
the importance of an engaged judiciary in protecting economic 
liberty, and modern courts are abandoning the reflexive rubber-
stamping of legislative acts that infringe it.  See, e.g., Patel 
v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 
2015) (Willett, J. concurring) (discussing economic liberty as 
fundamental right under state constitution); Randy E. Barnett, 
Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 5 (2012) (concluding the Constitution protects 
economic liberty as a fundamental right that may be reasonably 
regulated but not infringed); see also Saint Joseph Abbey v. 
Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013) (striking down 
anticompetitive law restricting the sale of funeral merchandise 
to state-licensed funeral directors in challenge by Benedictine 
monks wanting to sell handcrafted pine coffins); Merrifield v. 
Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991-92 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles 
v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (invalidating 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
15 
 
state law banning sale of caskets by anyone other than funeral 
directors as infringement of economic liberty and concluding 
that "protecting a discrete interest group from economic 
competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose"); Casket 
Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434, 436-37 (S.D. 
Miss. 2000); Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 607-08 
(S.D. Tex. 1994) ("[A] statute based on pure favoritism which 
creates 
a 
closed 
class 
will 
likely 
be 
declared 
unconstitutional."); Shoul v. Commonwealth, 173 A.3d 669, 677 
(Pa. 2017) (quoting Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 636-
37 (Pa. 1954) for the proposition, "Under the guise of 
protecting the public interests, the legislature may not 
arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual or 
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations."); David E. 
Bernstein, The Due Process Right To Pursue a Lawful Occupation:  
A Brighter Future Ahead?, 126 Yale L.J.F. 287 (Dec. 5, 2016).  
Regardless of the standard of review employed, the court in this 
case 
overlooked 
an 
opportunity 
to 
thoroughly 
scrutinize 
legislation that advances the economic interests of one group 
over the liberty interests of another at the level of inquiry it 
deserves. 
III 
A  
¶72 Economic 
liberty——the 
right 
to 
pursue 
a 
lawful 
occupation or business endeavor——predates the establishment of 
Wisconsin statehood, as well as our nation's founding.  "[A]t 
the Common Law no man might be forbidden to work in any lawful 
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16 
 
Trade . . . ."  The Case of the Tailors of Habits &c. of Ipswich 
(1614) 12 James I (KB), reprinted in 1 The Selected Writings of 
Sir Edward Coke 392 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).  As Blackstone 
noted, "[a]t common law every man might use what trade he 
pleased."14 
¶73 Historically, Wisconsin courts rejected laws grounded 
solely in economic protectionism.  In doing so, as Wisconsin 
case law illustrates, this court demonstrated its longstanding 
commitment to protecting the people's constitutional liberty 
interest, enshrined in Article I, Section 1, of the Wisconsin 
Constitution as an inherent and fundamental right. 
¶74 Because 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution includes 
economic liberty within its general 
guarantee of liberty as an inherent and fundamental right, we 
question whether rational basis review is the appropriate 
standard to apply in assessing the constitutionality of the 
anti-combination statutes in this case.  When fundamental 
constitutional rights are implicated, we generally apply strict 
scrutiny review.  The anti-combination statutes completely 
prohibit funeral homes and cemeteries from combining operations, 
thereby flatly forbidding Mr. Porter to "do those things which 
are ordinarily done by free men" and infringing "the right of 
each individual to regulate his own affairs."  See Kreutzberg, 
114 Wis. at 534.  Specifically, the statutes deny Mr. Porter his 
inherent right to earn a living in the lawful occupation of his 
                                                 
14 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *427. 
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choice by precluding him from providing funeral home services 
solely because he already operates a cemetery.  Because the 
statutes infringe a fundamental right and the burden imposed 
upon the right is a severe restriction, strict scrutiny review 
would seem to be appropriate.  See Alger, 360 Wis. 2d 193, ¶39 
n.16. 
¶75 The parties here, however, did not brief or argue 
application of strict scrutiny to the asserted infringement of 
economic liberty under the declaration of inherent rights in 
Article I, Section 1; therefore, we leave that analysis for 
another case.  Instead, we address the issues presented by the 
parties: whether the anti-combination statutes violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection, and under the 
rational basis test, do the anti-combination statutes bear a 
relationship with any legitimate government interest?   
B  
¶76 As applicable to Mr. Porter, the effect of the anti-
combination laws is to create a class of people who may not have 
a financial interest in funeral establishments.  That class 
consists exclusively of cemetery associations' employees and 
agents.  Wis. Stat. § 157.067(2).  As for Highland Memorial, the 
laws create a class of organizations that may not host funeral 
establishments 
on 
their 
property. 
 
That 
class 
consists 
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18 
 
exclusively of cemetery associations.15  Mr. Porter and Highland 
Memorial 
say 
these 
classifications, 
and 
the 
attendant 
differential treatment, violate their equal protection rights.  
We agree. 
¶77 The United States Constitution promises Mr. Porter and 
Highland Memorial the equal protection of the laws.  See U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . . . deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.").  So does Wisconsin's Constitution.  See Wis. 
Const. art. 1, § 1 ("All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.").  When a law divides people 
into 
classes, 
it 
creates 
the 
potential 
for 
differential 
treatment under the law.  That is why, when we encounter such 
classes, our first question is whether the law treats them 
differently.  Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶56, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("Parties 
                                                 
15 Because the anti-combination laws are interlocking as 
between cemetery associations and funeral establishments, the 
law also creates a class of people who may not have a financial 
interest in cemetery associations, or locate their businesses on 
cemetery grounds.  That class comprises funeral directors and 
operators.  Wis. Stat. § 445.12(6).  We could conduct the equal 
protection analysis from the perspective of either (a) funeral 
directors and operators, or (b) cemetery association employees 
and agents.  Because the petitioners fall into the latter 
category, we will address their perspective. 
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seeking to challenge the constitutional[ity] of a statute on 
equal protection grounds must demonstrate that the statute 
treats members of a similarly situated class differently.").  If 
so, we then evaluate the legitimacy of the law's purpose, and 
whether there is an acceptable fit between the purpose and the 
means by which the law attempts to achieve it.  See, e.g., State 
v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶90, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 ("The 
right to equal protection does not require that such similarly 
situated classes be treated identically, but rather requires 
that the distinction made in treatment have some relevance to 
the purpose for which classification of the classes is made.").  
When the classification does not affect a fundamental right, we 
review the "fitness" aspect under the rational basis standard of 
scrutiny.  Castellani v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 264, 578 
N.W.2d 166 (1998) ("Where . . . a suspect classification is not 
alleged, and fundamental constitutional rights are not at stake, 
the statute must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary 
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government 
interest." (internal quotations and citation omitted)).  For 
purposes of this section of our opinion, we assume the anti-
combination 
laws 
do 
not 
touch 
on 
a 
fundamental 
right.  
Therefore, we will conclude the "legislative classification 
satisfies the rational basis test if it meets five criteria": 
(1) 
All 
classification[s] 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law. 
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(3) The classification must not be based upon existing 
circumstances only. [It must not be so constituted as 
to preclude addition to the numbers included within a 
class]. 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof. 
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be 
so far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation. 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶58 (brackets in original).  
¶78 The second and fifth elements of this test, which lie 
at the heart of this contest, are best evaluated together.  
Combined, they instruct us to consider whether the law's 
classification is germane to its purpose, and reasonably 
suggests the propriety of imposing on the different classes 
substantially different rights or disabilities.  The State 
proffers two explanations in satisfaction of these requirements.  
First, it says, the anti-combination laws "reasonably restrict 
anti-competitive 
commercial 
activity 
through 
prophylactic 
antitrust-like rules forbidding the formation of potentially 
monopolistic firms."  And second, it says "the anti-combination 
laws are also rationally related to the State's interest in 
limiting the manipulation of funds required to be held in 
trust." 
1. Anti-Competitiveness 
¶79 The 
State's 
first 
justification 
for 
the 
anti-
combination laws rests on what might be the firmest possible 
grounds.  Protecting consumers from monopolistic practices is an 
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exercise of the state's police powers.16  And when the State 
exercises its police powers, it is operating in an arena where 
it has maximum flexibility to craft and implement its policies.17  
But the arena, like all arenas, has boundaries.  It is our 
responsibility to point them out and adjudge whether the State's 
chosen policy has fallen out of bounds.  And even though we 
presume the policies fall on the lee side of the line, our 
rational basis scrutiny is neither feckless nor lackadaisical.  
We insist that there really be a rational, non-fanciful 
connection between the law's purpose and the means by which the 
law pursues that purpose.  The guiding principle of this type of 
scrutiny is bound up in its name——"rational basis."  Something 
is rational only if there are reasons that support it.  Reasons 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert 
Yards, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995) 
("Antitrust laws are intended to prevent restraints on free 
competition, restraints which can harm purchasers, consumers of 
goods and the public. The importance of the antitrust laws in 
preventing 
monopolies 
and 
encouraging 
competition, 
'the 
fundamental 
economic 
policy 
of 
this 
state,' 
is 
directly 
reflected in the statement of legislative intent in sec. 133.01, 
Stats. 1991–92, and in the case law."). 
17 See 
Kahn 
v. 
McCormack, 
99 
Wis. 2d 382, 
384, 
299 
N.W.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1980) ("The state's police power has been 
defined as 'the inherent power of government to promote the 
general welfare.'  This power is broad, and includes the right 
to regulate the use of property and the conduct of business." 
(quoted source and internal citation omitted)); see also 
Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 54, 165 N.W.2d 377 (1969) 
("[O]nce within the area of proper exercise of police power, it 
is for the legislature to determine what regulations, restraints 
or prohibitions are reasonably required to protect the public 
safety and only the abrogation of a basic and substantial 
individual liberty would justify judicial intervention to set 
aside the legislative enactments."). 
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require logic, and logic is communicable from one person to 
another.  So the anti-combination laws survive rational basis 
scrutiny only if the State can provide to us a logical 
explanation for how they accomplish their legitimate purpose.   
¶80 The State's argument requires us to unpack some 
economic theory before we can determine whether there is a 
logical connection between the anti-combination laws and the 
monopoly-averting objective they are to achieve.  The State's 
concern lies with what it believes might occur if cemeteries and 
funeral establishments were allowed to combine into one company.  
It fears that such an integrated company would consolidate so 
much market share that the resulting control of the field would 
allow it to charge higher prices for its goods and services than 
would be possible absent the integration.  The general concept 
is sound, and courts have regularly affirmed that legislatures 
may adopt laws protecting against that danger.  See, e.g., 
Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 
Wis. 2d 650, 662, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995) .  And the State need 
not wait until the injury comes to pass before acting; 
legislatures properly deploy anti-combination laws prospectively 
to prevent the monopolistic seeds from taking root.  See, e.g., 
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890, 900 (D. 
N.D. 1938) (per curiam) (acknowledging that a state legislature, 
in exercising its police power, may enact laws "'to prevent a 
practice conceived to be promotive of monopoly with its 
attendant evils'" and stating the court's opinion "that the 
existence 
of 
unusual 
power 
to 
deal 
with 
competitors 
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unfairly . . . is probably a sufficient basis for legislative 
action to prevent the possibility of its exercise." (citation 
omitted)); see also May's Drug Stores v. State Tax Comm'n, 45 
N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1950) (stating that in considering the 
validity of various legislation addressing fair trade, unfair 
discrimination, and unfair competition, "the courts always 
recognized that the promotion of free competition was a proper 
legislative endeavor under the police power."). 
¶81 Because all of that spadework has already been 
accomplished, we can narrow our work to a fine point.  We need 
only explore whether there is something about cemeteries and 
funeral establishments that gives rise to a monopolistic dynamic 
if they are allowed to integrate.  If there is, then we must 
conclude there is a rational basis for the anti-combination 
laws.  If there is not, then we will have to move on to the 
State's second justification for these laws. 
¶82 Anti-competitive behavior can present in any number of 
different forms.  The one immediately of concern here is the 
"foreclosure" 
effect 
that 
can 
follow 
from 
the 
"vertical 
integration" of two or more companies.  Although the jargon is 
technical, what it describes is not especially complicated.  
"Vertical integration," the State explained, "occurs when a 
company merges with another company that provides a necessary 
input in the product supply chain."  It says higher prices may 
result from such a combination, "specifically when a company 
combines with a firm that provides a scarce resource and when 
other would-be sellers of that scarce resource face high 
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barriers to entry."  The foreclosure effect occurs when the 
integrated firm uses its control of the scarce resource to give 
itself a price advantage in the marketplace that it can pass 
along to its customers.  It accomplishes this by making the 
scarce resource more expensive to its competitors, either by 
controlling so much of the market that competition for the 
remaining resources causes a supply-demand upward spiral, or by 
selling the scarce resource to competitors at an inflated price, 
or by denying its competitors access to the resource altogether.  
As the State explained, "a combined firm——one with access to the 
resource through ownership——can charge its consumers a lower 
price for the resource and charge rival firms a higher price, 
thus gaining market share." 
¶83 There is nothing inherently wrong, of course, with one 
company obtaining more market share than its competitors.  The 
problem, if there is to be a problem, comes later.  An 
integrated firm with control of a scarce resource can use that 
control to underwrite lower prices for its own customers while 
inflating the cost of its competitors' products.  Eventually, 
with that price advantage, the integrated firm could not only 
obtain greater market share, but also drive its competitors from 
the market.  Finding itself alone, or virtually alone, in its 
product category, the State says, the integrated firm will do an 
about-face and "charge all consumers higher prices."  There is a 
real danger that the remaining player on the field can 
thereafter maintain its dominant (or even exclusive) position 
because its control of the scarce resource makes it either too 
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expensive for potential competitors to re-enter the field, or 
entirely impossible.  The validity of this theoretical construct 
is accepted broadly enough that it has generated no dispute 
between the parties here.    
¶84 As we now consider how this theory applies to 
cemeteries and funeral establishments, remember that vertical 
integration is about obtaining a company that has a resource 
necessary to production of the integrated firm's goods or 
services; the key to understanding the theory (and the analysis 
below) is keeping a watchful eye on where that resource appears 
in the supply chain.  If the scarce resource is to empower the 
company to produce a maleficent effect, its place in the supply 
chain must precede the ultimate product.  The importance of that 
resource's place in the supply chain is the power it gives the 
company to make its final product more competitive through the 
foreclosure effect.  But if the ultimate product is itself the 
scarce resource, then vertical integration has added nothing to 
the 
company's 
power 
to 
exert 
economic 
pressure 
on 
its 
competitors. 
¶85 The State says the scarce resource in this calculation 
is burial plots:  "[C]emeteries provide a relatively scarce good 
(burial plots), and it is difficult for would-be cemetery 
operators to break into this market."  Its expert also agreed 
that the burial plots are the scarce resource, particularly when 
compared 
to 
funeral 
homes: 
 
"As 
economist 
Dr. 
Sundberg 
explained, 
'[g]iven 
the 
land, 
capital, 
and 
regulatory 
requirements, it is reasonable to believe that entering the 
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cemetery industry is much more difficult than starting a new 
funeral home.'"  (Alteration in original.)  Therefore, the State 
says, integrated cemetery/funeral homes are problematic because, 
"having access to the scarce resource of burial plots, [the 
integrated firm] would be well positioned to use its market 
share to set inflated burial-plot prices for consumers coming 
through competitors' standalone funeral homes while charging its 
own consumers reduced prices."  (Alteration in original.)  The 
State goes on to say that "[t]he small number of cemeteries and 
the barriers to creating new ones, especially in urban areas, 
give a special advantage to well-capitalized large firms that 
can afford to purchase multiple funeral homes.  With enough 
funeral homes, it may be profitable for a cemetery to completely 
exclude burials from funeral homes owned by others." 
¶86 Notice the direction of economic movement through the 
supply chain.  The customer goes through the funeral home to the 
cemetery.  The scarce resource (the burial plot) already belongs 
to the cemetery before it vertically integrates.  Vertical 
integration theory, however, teaches us to look for the scarce 
resource in the part of the supply chain the cemetery does not 
already own.  So when the State looks in the proper spot, all it 
sees is funeral homes, which it admits (as does its expert) is 
not the scarce resource.  Therefore, vertically integrating with 
a funeral home will not empower the cemetery to foreclose its 
competitors, or make itself into a price-gouging monopoly.  The 
thing the State fears cannot be accomplished through the 
mechanism of vertical integration.  Here's why. 
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¶87 Imagine 
that 
Highland 
Memorial 
and 
Mr. 
Porter 
vertically-integrated with a funeral home; if this gives it the 
power to turn itself into a monopoly, we should be able to watch 
it happen in our mind's eye as the theory described by the State 
comes to life and governs Highland Memorial's economic progress 
in the market.  But as we will see, if Highland Memorial 
attempted the foreclosure gambit, it would undoubtedly be 
disappointed by the results.  Lowering the cost of burial plots 
for those who use its funeral home services and raising it for 
others is not likely to bring it additional market share.  This 
price reduction must be accounted for somewhere.  There are 
three possibilities:  (1) Highland Memorial absorbs the loss as 
a short-term hit in an attempt to gain market share, after which 
it raises prices back to an economically-viable level (or higher 
if it captures enough market share); (2) Highland Memorial 
raises the cost of its funeral home services to make up the 
difference; or (3) the profits from its funeral home operations 
subsidize its cemetery operations to such an extent that 
Highland Memorial can operate profitably even with the reduced 
rates on burial plots.  If the first option describes Highland 
Memorial's operations, it will be able to put economic pressure 
on competing cemeteries——but its ability to do so has nothing to 
do with the funeral home; it could have done the same thing 
without integrating.  If the second option is the operative 
scenario, then Highland Memorial can put no economic pressure on 
competing cemeteries at all because the combined cost for 
cemetery plots and funeral home services does not change.  
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Option three presents the most likely scenario in which Highland 
Memorial may make a sustainable bid for market share because the 
combined operations allow it to offer a cumulative price to its 
customers that stand-alone cemeteries and funeral homes cannot 
match. 
¶88 But not even option three gives Highland Memorial the 
power to foreclose its competitors.  The key, as mentioned 
above, is the position of the scarce resource in the supply 
chain.  A cemetery competing with Highland Memorial has no need 
to acquire such a resource to remain competitive.  It is the 
scarce resource.  The only thing it needs to remain on par with 
Highland Memorial is the addition of funeral home services.  And 
as the State and its expert admitted, those are not scarce.  
Once the competing cemetery obtains its own funeral home, it's 
back to parity with Highland Memorial, and neither has any 
inborn advantage as they compete for market share. 
¶89 But let's assume Highland Memorial is a very well-
capitalized 
cemetery 
(a 
scenario 
the 
State 
posits 
as 
particularly dangerous), and it uses its reserves to snap up one 
funeral home after another until it believes it can direct all 
funeral traffic to itself.  Here, the State's concession that 
funeral homes are not scarce is especially important, and 
explains why Highland Memorial can gain no advantage.  Highland 
Memorial could burn through the most generous stack of cash and 
never acquire a controlling interest in the funeral home market.  
That supply is theoretically unlimited, and if Highland Memorial 
made an attempt to corner the market, it would find itself 
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paying parlors full of funeral directors with not enough work to 
keep them busy.  Meanwhile, the competing cemetery would simply 
send an employee through the funeral-director licensing process, 
after which its overhead would be substantially lower than the 
funeral-director heavy Highland Memorial.  The free market's 
creative destruction would have its way with Highland Memorial, 
after which the competitor, not Highland Memorial, would be left 
standing. 
¶90 The only way vertical integration could create the 
type of danger the State fears is an exact reversal of the 
State's 
well-capitalized 
cemetery 
scenario. 
 
In 
this 
hypothetical, the cemeteries and funeral homes switch places, 
and it is the well-capitalized funeral home that goes on a 
spending spree.  Here, the funeral home would use its resources 
to acquire a large number of cemeteries, such that anyone 
wishing to be buried must use its services.  That would at least 
position the scarce resource (the burial plots) in the supply 
chain where it could give the well-capitalized funeral home the 
power to foreclose its competitors.  The State likely did not 
advance this alternative scenario because there is nothing for 
the anti-combination laws to do under such circumstances.  
Vertical integration cannot create a funeral-home monopoly 
without preliminarily creating another monopoly——a monopoly in 
cemeteries.  So the aspiring proprietor of a funeral-home 
monopoly will find himself stymied by the statutes that have as 
their purpose the prevention of that harmful preliminary 
monopoly.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 133 (Trusts and Monopolies).  
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Without the ability to form the cemetery monopoly, vertical 
integration will do nothing to advance his plans for a funeral 
home monopoly.  Consequently, the anti-combination laws have 
nothing to do with the prevention of anti-competitive behavior 
under these circumstances.  
¶91 It is not a trifling thing when our laws prevent some 
of Wisconsin's citizens, but not others, from engaging in lawful 
economic activity.  There must be an acceptable reason for doing 
so, and it must be expressible in logical terms.  The court, in 
deciding there is such a reason, provided no analysis.  It 
instead chose to simply paraphrase the State's expert:   
As to the State's first articulated interest 
(i.e., protecting consumers), [the State's expert] 
opined 
that 
without 
the 
anti-combination 
laws, 
combination firms would, in the short run, offer lower 
prices than stand-alone funeral homes and limit stand-
alone firms' access to cemeteries.  This would drive 
stand-alone funeral homes from the market at which 
point combination firms would increase their prices. 
Majority op., ¶43.  As we demonstrated, supra, the expert 
provided no logical connection between the anti-combination laws 
and the asserted interest in protecting against anti-competitive 
behavior.  Because the court provided no independent analysis, 
we have no way of knowing what it believes the connection to be.  
The bench and bar would benefit from the court's own analysis 
rather than a paraphrase of the State's argument. 
¶92 Our conclusion with respect to this part of the 
State's argument should not be understood as questioning the 
legislature's wisdom in enacting the anti-combination laws.  We 
question only whether they have any rational relationship to 
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preventing anti-competitive behavior.  Because they do not, we 
must consider the second asserted justification for their 
existence. 
2.  Trust Requirements 
¶93 Wisconsin's statutes protect consumers who purchase 
death-care 
products 
and 
services, 
in 
part, 
by 
requiring 
purveyors to hold a certain amount of sale proceeds in trust.  
For example, a pre-death purchase of a casket requires a funeral 
home to hold 100 percent of the proceeds in trust until the 
person is deceased.  Wis. Stat. § 445.125(1)(a)1.  Cemeteries 
are required to hold 15 percent of the proceeds from the sale of 
burial plots in trust for perpetual care purposes.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 157.11(9g)(c).  Cemetery pre-need sellers licensed under Wis. 
Stat. § 440.92 must hold in trust 40 percent of the proceeds of 
cemetery merchandise (such as monuments, markers, nameplates, 
vases, and urns).  Wis. Stat. §§ 440.92(3)(a), 157.061(3). 
¶94 The State says it can justify the anti-combination 
laws 
as 
a 
means 
of 
preventing 
cemeteries 
and 
funeral 
establishments from circumventing these trust requirements.  Its 
cursory argument notes that if a cemetery and funeral home 
combine, it might charge artificially higher prices for burial 
plots and artificially lower prices for caskets.  This would 
allow the combination firm to keep a smaller amount of funds in 
trust even as the company's revenue remains the same.  The anti-
combination 
laws 
prevent 
companies 
with 
dissimilar 
trust 
requirements from combining, the State says, as a safeguard 
against such accounting abuses.  Therefore, it concludes, there 
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is a rational connection between the anti-combination laws' 
purpose and the means by which the laws accomplish that purpose. 
¶95 We allow a certain amount of creative license when the 
State performs its post hoc rationalizations, but we need not 
entertain sophistry.  Not a word of the anti-combination laws 
suggests, even obliquely, any connection at all to the trust 
requirements 
of 
cemeteries 
and 
funeral 
homes. 
 
And 
the 
legislature has affirmatively demonstrated it does not share the 
State's 
concern 
regarding 
the 
differential 
in 
trust 
requirements.  Cemetery associations may obtain a license under 
Wis. Stat. § 440.92 to serve as cemetery pre-need sellers.  Upon 
acquiring such a license, the cemetery must not only comply with 
the 15 percent trust requirement related to burial plots, it 
must also satisfy the 40 percent trust requirement related to 
cemetery merchandise.  The statutory text and framework indicate 
that any effect the anti-combination laws might have on 
compliance 
with 
the 
various 
trust 
requirements 
would 
be 
accidental and fortuitous.  Fortuity cannot stand in for a 
rational connection between a law's purpose and means.  In fact, 
it is fair to say that fortuity is the negation of a rational 
connection, inasmuch as logic cannot explain a chance event.  
Fortifying the trust requirements imposed on cemeteries and 
funeral 
establishments 
is 
no 
explanation 
for 
the 
anti-
combination laws. 
* 
¶96 The State has identified no rational 
connection 
between the anti-combination laws and the objectives it says 
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they are meant to achieve.  But that does not mean the laws lack 
any rational basis.  We should not suppose that our legislature 
acts randomly, and without purpose.  The State was unable to 
make the required logical connection because it was trying to 
link the anti-combination laws to a purpose they do not have.  
The solution to such an analytical impasse is not to develop 
increasingly fantastic means of relating the laws to the 
asserted purposes.  If we want to discover the true rational 
basis for the anti-combination laws, we should be looking for a 
purpose that fits the laws like a jigsaw puzzle.  Here, if we 
look 
for 
a 
fitting 
purpose, 
rather 
than 
a 
convoluted 
relationship, we instantly discover what these laws are about: 
trade protectionism, plain and simple.  As a functional matter, 
there is a perfect fit between that purpose and the terms of the 
anti-combination laws.  They protect funeral directors from 
facing the possibility that market forces might teach us that 
integrated firms are more efficient than stand-alone operations.  
That creates a boon to funeral directors, but a financial burden 
on consumers who would otherwise have access to lower-cost 
funeral arrangements.  This basis is not enough to uphold the 
anti-combination laws, however, because the purpose of the law 
itself must be legitimate.  Trade protectionism is not a 
legitimate purpose.  See, e.g., Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224 
("Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete 
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate 
governmental 
purpose."). 
 
Therefore, 
because 
the 
anti-
combination laws are rationally related only to an illegitimate 
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purpose, they violate the petitioners' right to the equal 
treatment of the laws. 
IV  
¶97 Because there is no rational basis connecting the 
anti-combination statutes to any legitimate government interest, 
we conclude the statutes are unconstitutional.  The rational 
basis test applied by the court "means property is at the mercy 
of the pillagers."18  Wisconsin's "constitutional guarantee of 
liberty deserves more respect——a lot more."19  While generally 
majoritarianism rules, it may not subordinate constitutional 
rights to its preferences.  And while the judiciary rightly 
defers to legislative policy choices, the judiciary should never 
defer to legislative trampling of individual liberty.  
¶98 We respectfully dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
18 See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 483 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring). 
19 See id. 
No.  2016AP1599.rgb&dk 
 
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