Title: Commonwealth v. Desiderio
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13338
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13338 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NICHOLAS DESIDERIO. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 8, 2023. – May 4, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Armed Home Invasion.  Robbery.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, 
Joint venturer.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 3, 2015. 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
MarySita Miles for the defendant. 
Nathaniel R. Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A jury in the Superior Court convicted the 
defendant, Nicholas Desiderio, of one count of armed home 
invasion and three counts of armed robbery while masked.  The 
indictments were based on a theory of joint venture.  The jury, 
2 
 
however, were not instructed that, to convict the defendant of 
those charges on a joint venture theory, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove that the defendant knew that at least one 
coventurer was armed (for the count of armed home invasion), and 
that at least one coventurer was both armed and masked (for the 
counts of armed robbery while masked).  Those instructions were 
required.  See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 450 
(2012). 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether the failure to instruct 
the jury of these requirements created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  To decide whether an error creates a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage justice, we must determine "if 
we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might 
have been different had the error not been made."  Commonwealth 
v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005), 
quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999).  In 
making this determination, we consider four factors, where 
applicable:  "[(1)] the strength of the Commonwealth's case, 
[(2)] the nature of the error, [(3)] the significance of the 
error in the context of the trial, and [(4)] the possibility 
that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable 
tactical decision."  Azar, supra. 
 
Although we recently have analyzed the question of 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where an element of 
3 
 
a crime has been omitted from the jury instructions by 
determining whether "the evidence was 'so overwhelming' that 
'there is no likelihood that the omitted instruction materially 
influenced the jury's verdict[],'" Commonwealth v. Silvelo, 486 
Mass. 13, 17-18 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 
Mass. 575, 581 (2018), we now recognize that this formulation 
confuses rather than accurately reflects the necessary 
considerations of the substantial risk analysis in this context. 
 
As in all contexts, where an element of the crime charged 
has been omitted from the jury instructions, the factors for 
determining whether there was a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice remain the focus of the analysis.  The 
factors applicable to circumstances where an element has been 
omitted in particular, however, and the manner in which they 
should be considered, are captured in the standard we 
articulated in Azar:  whether the presence of the omitted 
element was an ineluctable inference from the evidence at trial.  
See Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.  This standard, although undoubtedly 
high, is best understood as an explanation of the applicable 
substantial risk factors, and not a deviation from their 
application.  Where an element of a crime is omitted from the 
instructions, the jury are erroneously excused from applying the 
facts, as they find them, to that element.  This creates a risk 
of conviction in circumstances where the Commonwealth failed to 
4 
 
meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
missing element.  Our substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice analysis in these circumstances thus must be 
correspondingly exacting. 
 
Because, in this case, the defendant's knowledge that the 
coventurers were armed or masked cannot be ineluctably inferred 
from the evidence at trial, the instructional error leaves us 
with a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have 
been different had the jury been correctly instructed.  We 
therefore conclude that the error created a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  As a result, we reduce the 
defendant's convictions of armed robbery while masked to unarmed 
robbery, and we vacate the judgment on the conviction of armed 
home invasion and set aside the verdict. 
 
Background.  We recite the relevant facts adduced at trial 
to establish the defendant's guilt as a coventurer. 
 
1.  The home invasion.  On the evening of January 5, 2014, 
the homeowner, his daughter, and her boyfriend, who was visiting 
for the evening, were all in the home.  The homeowner (victim)1 
went to bed at approximately 9 P.M., as he did most nights, 
after all the doors to his home were locked.  Not long after 
 
 
1 We recognize that the daughter and her boyfriend were also 
victims, but we refer to them by their relational titles to 
avoid confusion. 
5 
 
9 P.M., two masked men entered the home:  a shorter, heavy-set 
man with "Hispanic, African-American kind of complexion" and a 
tall, Caucasian man.2  The taller man carried a gun, and the 
shorter, heavier-set man carried a ten to twelve inch crowbar.  
It is undisputed that neither man was the defendant. 
The two men first entered the daughter's bedroom, where the 
daughter and her boyfriend were watching television.  The men 
carried two zip ties.  They tied the boyfriend's hands behind 
his back with one of the zip ties, and then whispered to each 
other.  The daughter heard one say, "Just go duct tape her," and 
the men proceeded to tie the daughter's hands behind her back 
with duct tape.  The men also placed duct tape over the mouths 
of the daughter and her boyfriend.  The men forced both to lie 
on the floor and placed a blanket over their heads.  They asked 
the daughter where her father was, but they did not ask about 
her mother, who was deceased. 
 
The men next went to the victim's bedroom.  The heavier-set 
man jostled the victim awake and flipped him over in bed.  He 
tied the victim's hands behind his back with the second zip tie.  
The men pulled the victim out of bed and pushed him down the 
hallway toward the living room where there was a stone chimney.  
 
 
2 The man with the darker complexion did not have his face 
fully covered by the mask, and while the lighter-complexioned 
man had a "full-fledged mask" on, the skin under his eyes was 
visible. 
6 
 
A picture that ordinarily hung on the chimney to hide a safe 
that was installed there had already been removed.  The safe was 
exposed.  At the taller gunman's insistence, the victim provided 
the men with the combination to unlock the safe.  Unable to open 
the safe, the men freed the victim's hands so that he could 
input the combination.  Once the safe was unlocked, the heavier-
set man with the crowbar again bound the victim's hands, this 
time using duct tape.  Meanwhile, the taller man filled a 
pillowcase with the safe's contents, which included $50,000 in 
cash in one hundred dollar bills, and numerous pieces of jewelry 
belonging to the victim, his daughters, and his deceased wife.  
The men also took "a couple hundred" dollars from the victim's 
wallet, as well as the victim's father's Purple Heart and other 
military medals from a chest inside the victim's bedroom. 
 
After emptying the safe, the men led the victim to his 
daughter's bedroom, where the daughter and her boyfriend 
remained hand-bound on the floor.  The men forced the victim to 
get on the floor, and they put the blanket over his head as 
well.  The men asked if there was any more money or drugs in the 
house, and "ransack[ed]" the room, checking drawers and the 
mattress.  They then left with the cell phones of all three.  
After hearing the men leave, the boyfriend slipped his right 
hand loose from the zip tie and freed the victim.  The boyfriend 
next went to the window and saw the two men get into the front 
7 
 
and rear passenger seats of a waiting vehicle.  The vehicle was 
driven away, and the boyfriend found a telephone and dialed 911.  
Police were dispatched to the house at 9:52 P.M.  When police 
arrived, no signs of forced entry were detected. 
 
2.  Evidence connecting the defendant.  The defendant and 
the victim met around 2009, while the defendant was dating the 
daughter of the victim's cousin.  The defendant began to work 
for the victim's home construction business, and he did so for 
approximately three years until the victim scaled back his 
business in 2012 due to health issues.  During that time, the 
defendant was "like a family member" to the victim and often 
frequented the victim's home.  Indeed, the defendant became 
"very familiar" with the victim's home.  The defendant knew that 
the victim had a safe inside the stone chimney hidden behind a 
framed picture and that the victim kept large amounts of cash in 
this safe.  Further, the defendant knew that the victim's wife 
was deceased and that he lived with one of his daughters. 
 
After the defendant had left the victim's employ, the 
victim's health improved, and he purchased a two-family house to 
remodel and sell.  The victim learned that the defendant was 
displeased with his living situation, and he offered to allow 
the defendant to live in the second-story apartment of the two-
family house in exchange for the defendant's assistance with 
remodeling and maintenance.  The defendant agreed.  The 
8 
 
relationship, however, broke down in the summer of 2013 when the 
victim sold the house and informed the defendant that he needed 
to find another place to live.  The defendant refused to leave 
and "threatened" the victim by stating, "If you weren't such an 
old, you know, SOB, I'd kick the shit out of you."  The victim 
retained counsel and paid the defendant a sum of money, after 
which the defendant agreed to vacate the premises.  The victim 
and the defendant had minimal contact following that dispute. 
 
Around the time of the home invasion on January 5, 2014, 
the defendant and Timothy Lavin shared three telephone calls and 
one text message.  At the time, the defendant and Lavin had 
known each other for twelve to thirteen years.  There was 
considerable testimony at trial that Lavin matched the 
description of the tall, Caucasian gunman involved in the 
invasion.  The first call was placed from Lavin's cell phone at 
9:08 P.M.  It connected to the defendant's cell phone at 
9:09 P.M., and it lasted fifteen seconds on the defendant's cell 
phone.3  The second call was placed at 9:15 P.M., and it lasted 
twenty-two seconds on the defendant's cell phone.  At 9:33 P.M., 
Lavin sent a text message to the defendant that went unanswered.  
The third call was placed at 9:48 P.M., and it lasted seven 
 
 
3 There was some discrepancy between the length of the 
telephone calls registered to Lavin's and the defendant's cell 
phones due to the time it took to connect to the defendant's 
cell phone and for the defendant to answer. 
9 
 
seconds on the defendant's cell phone.  Each of the three calls 
connected to a cell tower that was less than one mile from the 
victim's home. 
 
On January 22, just over two weeks after the home invasion, 
Lavin, who had a suspended license, was observed by police 
driving a BMW motor vehicle.4  Lavin was known to have an 
inconsistent work history and money issues, and investigation by 
police revealed that he had purchased the BMW six days earlier, 
on January 16, for $3,700 in cash.  The BMW was registered to 
Lavin's longtime friend, Gerald Bates.  Lavin was arrested that 
day for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and 
his bail was set for an amount between $1,500 and $2,000.  Lavin 
paid most of his bail with a "bundle of hundred dollar bills" 
that he had on his person.  The defendant and his girlfriend 
drove to the police station, and his girlfriend went inside and 
paid the remaining amount while the defendant waited in the car. 
 
Eight days later, police executed a search warrant at 
Lavin's residence.  Inside the residence, police discovered a 
mask, a firearm, and two locked safes.  One of the safes 
contained $2,700 in cash, and inside the other, multiple pieces 
of jewelry were found.  Among the jewelry recovered, the victim 
and his daughter identified the victim's high school class ring, 
 
 
4 Lavin stipulated at trial that his license was suspended 
on that date and that he had notice of the suspension. 
10 
 
the victim's wedding ring, the victim's deceased wife's watch 
and rings, and a necklace given to the daughter by her 
grandparents for graduating high school. 
 
3.  Procedural history.  A grand jury indicted the 
defendant on one count of armed home invasion and three counts 
of armed robbery while masked.5  The defendant's cases were 
joined with Lavin's for trial.6  At trial, the Commonwealth 
proceeded against the defendant under a theory of joint venture, 
contending that the defendant provided the coventurers with the 
necessary information to execute the home invasion and robbery 
and that he acted as the getaway driver. 
 
During the main jury charge, in accordance with 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009), the judge 
instructed the jury that, to find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged under a theory of joint 
venture, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the 
offenses and shared or had the requisite intent for the 
offenses.  However, the judge did not instruct the jury that, to 
prove that the defendant shared the intent required for those 
 
 
5 The defendant also was indicted on one count of 
conspiracy, which was dismissed at the Commonwealth's request. 
 
 
6 The shorter, heavy-set man involved in the home invasion 
was never identified or charged. 
11 
 
crimes, the Commonwealth needed to prove that the defendant knew 
that at least one coventurer was armed, for the charge of armed 
home invasion, and that at least one coventurer was armed and 
masked, for the charges of armed robbery while masked.  See 
Commonwealth v. Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 116, cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 607 (2018) (under joint venture theory, "[w]here . . . an 
element of the offense is that the perpetrator is armed, the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew that at least 
one coventurer was armed"); Commonwealth v. Quinones, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. 215, 219 (2010) ("To support a conviction on the charge 
of armed robbery while masked, the Commonwealth, proceeding on a 
joint venture theory of the defendant's guilt, had the burden of 
proving that the defendant knew that the principal perpetrators 
of the robbery . . . would be both armed and masked").  The 
defendant did not object to the jury instructions.  The jury 
convicted him of all four counts. 
 
The defendant appealed.  The Appeals Court, in a divided 
opinion, concluded that the failure to instruct the jury that 
the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knew 
that his coventurers were armed and masked created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice because, pursuant to the 
standard we articulated in Silvelo, 486 Mass. at 18, "the 
evidence . . . was not 'so overwhelming' that 'there is no 
likelihood that the omitted instruction materially influenced 
12 
 
the jury's verdict[].'"7  Commonwealth v. Lavin, 101 Mass. App. 
Ct. 278, 279 (2022).  We allowed the Commonwealth's application 
for further appellate review, limited to the issue whether the 
failure to instruct the jury on the Commonwealth's burden to 
prove that the defendant knew that one of the coventurers was 
armed and masked created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Because the defendant 
did not object to the erroneous jury instructions, we review the 
case to determine whether the instructional error created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Bolling, 462 
Mass. at 452.  "The substantial risk standard requires us to 
determine 'if we have a serious doubt whether the result of the 
trial might have been different had the error not been made.'"  
Azar, 435 Mass. at 687, quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. at 174.  In 
conducting this analysis, we are guided by four factors:  "[w]e 
consider [(1)] the strength of the Commonwealth's case, [(2)] 
the nature of the error, [(3)] the significance of the error in 
the context of the trial, and [(4)] the possibility that the 
 
 
7 The Appeals Court, at the Commonwealth's request, reduced 
the defendant's convictions of armed robbery while masked to 
unarmed robbery and remanded for resentencing of those charges, 
but vacated the defendant's conviction of armed home invasion, 
leaving to the Commonwealth the decision whether to retry the 
defendant on that charge.  See Commonwealth v. Lavin, 101 Mass. 
App. Ct. 278, 301 (2022). 
13 
 
absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable tactical 
decision."  Azar, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 
8, 13 (1999) (setting forth factors applicable to standard of 
review for unpreserved errors in noncapital cases).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 298 (2002) 
(articulating formulation as series of questions). 
 
We previously have addressed the particular suitability of 
the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard to 
situations where the elements of a crime are stated erroneously 
or are omitted from the jury instructions.  See Silvelo, 486 
Mass. at 17 n.7, quoting Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.  In Azar, where 
the judge provided an erroneous definition of the "so-called 
third prong of malice" in a murder trial, which lowered the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof, we surveyed cases where the same 
error had or had not required reversal.  See Azar, supra at 682, 
687-688, and cases cited.  We deduced from those cases that a 
new trial is not required where the evidence at trial did not 
permit a finding of lesser proof than what is required under the 
third prong of malice -- the erroneously stated element.  Id. at 
687-688.  We therefore stated that the proper question in such 
circumstances is "whether the evidence required the jurors to 
find [the omitted or erroneously stated element, had it been 
correctly stated]."  Id. at 688.  In other words, where the 
presence of the omitted or erroneously stated element, "as it is 
14 
 
correctly understood, can be 'ineluctably inferred' from the 
evidence," a new trial is not necessary.  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 397 (1998), S.C., 
431 Mass. 360 (2000). 
 
More recently, in Silvelo, 486 Mass. at 17, where the judge 
omitted from the jury instructions an essential element of the 
crime of possession of a loaded firearm, and the defendant 
failed to object, we similarly applied the substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice standard.  There, we stated that our 
consideration in this context was "to determine whether the 
evidence was 'so overwhelming' that 'there is no likelihood that 
the omitted instruction materially influenced the jury's 
verdict[].'"  Id. at 17-18, quoting Lutskov, 480 Mass. at 581.  
In so stating, we specifically acknowledged that "this 
formulation diverge[d] from Azar, 435 Mass. at 688, under which 
we analyzed whether the 'evidence required the jury to [have 
found]' or to have 'ineluctably inferred' that the Commonwealth 
carried its burden of proving the omitted element beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Silvelo, supra at 18 n.9.  We nevertheless 
emphasized that, in using this particular formulation, we did 
not "intend this semantic difference in language to change the 
stringency of the standard announced in Azar."  Id.  We meant 
it. 
15 
 
 
The reason the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
standard is stringent in this context is not because we apply a 
different test to this type of error from the one we apply to 
others.  In all noncapital cases,8 where a defendant has waived a 
claim of error, our review is limited to the substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice standard, which "calls for us to decide 
if we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might 
have been different had the error not been made."9  LeFave, 430 
Mass. at 174-175 & n.6.  However, in making this determination, 
we must consider the relevant factors applicable to the 
substantial risk analysis, including the nature of the error and 
its significance in the context of the evidence presented at 
trial.  See Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13.  Omitting an element from 
the jury instructions is an error of constitutional dimension, 
see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1999), that poses 
a significant risk that the jury will convict the defendant on 
 
 
8 In capital cases, we review claims of unpreserved error 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 659 (2022). 
 
 
9 We also have said that "[a]n error creates a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice unless we are persuaded that it 
did not 'materially influence[]' the guilty verdict."  Alphas, 
430 Mass. at 13, quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 
564 (1967).  The two explanations produce the same result:  "An 
error may be said to have materially influenced the verdict only 
if we are left with 'a serious doubt [as to] whether the result 
of the trial might have been different had the error not been 
made'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Horne, 476 Mass. 
222, 228 (2017). 
16 
 
proof less than what is required for the crime charged.  See 
Azar, 435 Mass. at 688-689.  And on appeal, "our role is not to 
sit as a second jury."  Id. at 689.  Thus, in order for us not 
to have serious doubt that the defendant's guilt has been fairly 
adjudicated, such that the error did not create a substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice, we must analyze the evidence 
pertaining to that element with an exacting lens.  See id. at 
687-688. 
 
This substantial risk analysis contemplates whether the 
evidence addressing the omitted or erroneously stated element 
was overwhelming or uncontested at trial.  Compare Lutskov, 480 
Mass. at 581 (omitted instruction on Commonwealth's burden to 
prove defendant's age created no substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice where evidence of age was "so overwhelming that [it] 
was not a contested issue at trial"), with Bolling, 462 Mass. at 
450-452 (omitted instruction on Commonwealth's burden to prove 
defendant knew coventurer was armed created substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice where evidence of defendant's knowledge 
that one coventurer was armed "was not overwhelming" and was 
contested at trial).  Cf. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 470 (1997) (unpreserved error of omitted instruction on 
materiality in perjury prosecution created no "miscarriage of 
justice" where "evidence supporting materiality was 
17 
 
'overwhelming,'" and "[m]ateriality was essentially 
uncontroverted at trial" [citation omitted]). 
 
Thus, in providing another articulation of how we analyze 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in the omitted 
element context in Silvelo, 486 Mass. at 17-18, we asked 
"whether the evidence was 'so overwhelming' that 'there is no 
likelihood that the omitted instruction materially influenced 
the jury's verdict[]'" (citation omitted).  We now acknowledge 
that this articulation of the standard is flawed.  It is so, in 
part, because it mirrors our prior explanation of the standard 
for analyzing harmless error -- the standard applicable to 
preserved constitutional error.  See Commonwealth v. Castano, 
478 Mass. 75, 82 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 
Mass. 546, 555 (2006) ("an error may be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt where the Commonwealth's evidence is so 
'overwhelming' that it 'nullif[ies] any effect the erroneously 
admitted [evidence] might have had on the jury or the 
verdict'").  But more so, this formulation poses a question 
that, in most cases, is extremely difficult to answer:  whether, 
because the evidence was "so overwhelming," there is no 
likelihood, theoretical or otherwise, that the error materially 
influenced the verdict.  Silvelo, supra. 
 
Our review of unpreserved errors is not whether there is 
any risk of a miscarriage of justice, but rather, it is whether 
18 
 
that risk is a substantial one.  See Azar, 435 Mass. at 676, 
quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. at 175 ("society's justified interest 
in finality . . . has long been implicit, and sometimes 
explicit, in our announcements that any late-arriving issue will 
prevail only if the issue presents a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice").  See also Commonwealth v. Russell, 439 
Mass. 340, 351 (2003) ("As the terminology implies, a 
'substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice' refers to a risk 
that has some genuine substance to it.  That standard does not 
encompass an abstract, theoretical possibility of a miscarriage 
of justice, utterly divorced from the case as it was 
tried. . . .  [If] the only risk identified is one that is 
totally removed from or at odds with that 'context,' we may rest 
assured that the error did not give rise to a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice"). 
 
To be sure, whether the Commonwealth's evidence is 
"overwhelming," let alone "so overwhelming," is certainly a 
consideration in the substantial risk calculus as a general 
matter.  It is, however, one part of that analysis.  See Alphas, 
430 Mass. at 13.  The analysis of substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice must consider the four factors as they 
apply to the individual circumstances of each case.  But not all 
of the factors will be applicable in every case, and the way 
that they apply may vary depending on the particular 
19 
 
circumstances.  Where the nature of the error is omitting an 
element from the jury instructions, specifically, our assessment 
of the strength of the Commonwealth's evidence must focus on the 
evidence addressing the element that was stated erroneously or 
omitted from the jury instructions. 
 
In this case, notably, the Commonwealth does not argue that 
the fourth factor -- whether it can be inferred that the 
defendant's failure to object to the erroneous jury instructions 
was a reasonable tactical decision -- is applicable.  See 
Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13.  Nor can we now contemplate a case 
where the failure to object to jury instructions relieving the 
Commonwealth of its burden to prove a necessary element beyond a 
reasonable doubt would be the result of a reasonable tactical 
decision.10  See Bolling, 462 Mass. at 452 ("it seems unlikely 
that the failure to request the instruction was a reasonable 
 
 
10 We note that the circumstances here are distinguishable 
from those where a defendant strategically declines to request 
an instruction on the elements of a lesser included offense.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 844 (2011) 
(reasonable strategic decision not to request instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter so as to proceed solely on theory of 
self-defense).  But see id. at 843 n.8 ("However, where defense 
counsel's strategic decision not to request an instruction on a 
lesser included offense . . . is manifestly unreasonable, a 
judge may need to exercise the inherent authority to give the 
instruction sua sponte to protect the case from the risk of 
reversal on appeal").  We also note that a judge may always 
provide an instruction on a lesser included offense that is 
warranted from the evidence, regardless of whether the defendant 
or the Commonwealth objects.  See Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 
Mass. 464, 480 (2015). 
20 
 
tactical decision because requiring the jury to make an 
additional finding about the defendant's state of mind before 
convicting him could not have prejudiced his case"); Azar, 435 
Mass. at 689 ("there is no reasonable tactical basis for a 
failure to object to a mistaken and unfavorable [to the 
defendant] definition of an element of the crime"). 
 
Accordingly, where an element that the Commonwealth is 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is omitted from the 
jury instructions, our analysis of substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice is limited to considering the three 
remaining factors, which focus on the strength of the 
Commonwealth's evidence in light of the nature of the error and 
its significance in the context of the trial.  These factors are 
all captured by the standard articulated in Azar, 435 Mass. at 
688.  We therefore clarify today that, to determine whether a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is created by the 
omission of a required element from the jury instructions, the 
question is, as we said in Azar, supra, whether the presence of 
the omitted element was an ineluctable, or inescapable, 
inference from the evidence presented at trial.  In light of the 
nature and significance of this type of error, only when the 
answer to that question is "yes," in this context, will the 
error not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
In other contexts, of course, the substantial risk determination 
21 
 
will depend on the circumstances of each case, considering the 
applicable factors.  See Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13. 
 
2.  Application.  To prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was guilty of armed home invasion and armed 
robbery while masked under a theory of joint venture, the 
Commonwealth was respectively required to prove that the 
defendant knew that one coventurer was armed, and that one 
coventurer was both armed and masked.  We therefore must 
determine whether the presence of these elements was an 
ineluctable inference from the evidence at trial.11  Because, as 
to either element, we conclude it was not, we are left with a 
serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been 
different had the instructional error not been made. 
 
There was no direct evidence that the defendant knew that 
the coventurers were armed or masked.  This is "not 
determinative," however, because a defendant's knowledge that a 
coventurer is armed or masked may be proved by circumstantial 
 
 
11 The Commonwealth's argument that this standard should not 
apply in this case because the requirements of joint venture are 
not elements of the underlying crimes is unavailing.  While 
"joint venture is neither a crime nor an element of a crime," 
Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 522 (2010), the 
perpetrator being armed is an element of both underlying crimes 
in this case.  See G. L. c. 265, §§ 17, 18C.  Thus, to convict 
the defendant of those crimes under a joint venture theory, the 
Commonwealth needed to prove that the defendant knew that one 
coventurer was armed.  See Buth, 480 Mass. at 116.  The same is 
true of the preparator being masked for the charge of armed 
robbery while masked.  See Quinones, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 219. 
22 
 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 432 Mass. 746, 762 (2000).  
The Commonwealth directs our attention to nine pieces of 
circumstantial evidence that it asserts should leave us with no 
serious doubt that the defendant's guilt as a coventurer was 
fairly adjudicated. 
 
This circumstantial evidence includes (1) evidence 
suggesting that the defendant told the coventurers intimate 
details about the victim's home, such as the location of the 
safe, indicated by the removal of the picture from the chimney; 
(2) evidence suggesting that the defendant knew and told the 
coventurers that the victim kept large amounts of cash in the 
safe; (3) evidence suggesting that the defendant told the 
coventurers that only two people would be in the home, such as 
them having brought only two zip ties; (4) evidence suggesting 
that the defendant told the coventurers that the victim's wife 
was deceased, such as the coventurers not asking the daughter 
where her mother was; (5) evidence that the defendant had a 
motive to seek revenge and steal money from the victim due to 
their animosity arising out of the defendant's living 
arrangement in the summer of 2013; (6) evidence that the 
defendant and Lavin communicated via cell phone on the night of 
the home invasion; (7) historical cell site location information 
(CSLI) evidence placing the defendant in the vicinity of the 
home invasion at the time it occurred; (8) evidence that the 
23 
 
defendant and his girlfriend drove to the police station to pay 
Lavin's bail, but the defendant stayed in the car, inferably to 
avoid police connecting him with Lavin; and (9) evidence that 
the defendant and Lavin had a close relationship. 
 
There is no question that the coalescence of this 
circumstantial evidence told a powerful and persuasive story 
that the defendant was substantially involved in the home 
invasion and subsequent robbery.  It did not, however, require 
the jury to find that the defendant knew that his coventurers 
were armed and masked during the commission of those crimes.  
See Azar, 435 Mass. at 688.  While the evidence suggesting that 
the defendant assisted with orchestrating the crimes and acted 
as the getaway driver may have been sufficient for the jury to 
infer that the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge, see 
Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 703 (2003), such 
inferences were hardly ineluctable.12 
 
At trial, there was no evidence -- direct or circumstantial 
-- that one of the coventurers conspicuously possessed a weapon 
or a mask around the defendant.  The most forceful evidence that 
the defendant knew that the coventurers were armed and masked 
was the evidence that placed him in the vicinity of the home on 
 
 
12 For sufficiency purposes, "[i]nferences must be 
reasonable, but they do not have to be inescapable."  Netto, 438 
Mass. at 703.  The same is not true of our calculus here. 
24 
 
the night in question and suggested that he drove the getaway 
vehicle.  However, as the Commonwealth has acknowledged, to 
adjudicate the defendant guilty as a coventurer, the jury were 
not required to find that the defendant participated in the 
crimes by driving the getaway vehicle.  Given the other evidence 
of his participation, and the defendant's vehement challenges to 
the accuracy of the CSLI evidence placing him near the victim's 
home that night,13 it is not readily apparent that the jury did 
so find.  Even if the jury did find that the defendant was the 
getaway driver, although it would have been permissible for them 
to infer the defendant's knowledge from this fact, see 
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 470-471 (2007), the 
absence of evidence that the coventurers exhibited weapons or 
masks when leaving or entering the vehicle could also have led 
the jury to reach the opposite inference. 
 
In short, while the evidence that the defendant knew that 
the coventurers were armed and masked during the home invasion 
 
 
13 Specifically, on cross-examination of the State police 
trooper who testified for the Commonwealth about the defendant's 
CSLI, the defendant elicited testimony that historical CSLI such 
as that used in this case is the least accurate method to 
identify the location of a cell phone.  The trooper further 
testified on cross-examination that a cell site tower may have a 
range of five or more miles, and that cell phones do not always 
connect to the cell tower to which they are physically closest.  
In closing, the defendant relied heavily on this testimony to 
undermine the Commonwealth's position that the defendant's CSLI 
placed him in the vicinity of the victim's home at the time of 
the crimes. 
25 
 
and robbery was certainly sufficient, and from that evidence the 
jury were more than entitled to draw those inferences, we cannot 
say that the inferences were ineluctable.  Without proper 
instruction informing the jury that the Commonwealth was 
required to prove the defendant's knowledge of those two 
particulars beyond a reasonable doubt, we are left with a 
serious doubt whether the outcome of the trial would have been 
different had the instructional error not been made.  The error 
therefore created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
Conclusion.  Consistent with the Commonwealth's request in 
the Appeals Court, the defendant's convictions of armed robbery 
while masked are reduced to unarmed robbery, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing of those 
offenses.  The judgment on the defendant's conviction of armed 
home invasion is vacated and the verdict is set aside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.