Title: Com. v. Pitts
Citation: 404 A.2d 1305, 486 Pa. 212
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 1979

486 Pa. 212 (1979) 404 A.2d 1305 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Arthur PITTS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 24, 1979. Decided August 27, 1979. *213 *214 David Zwanetz, Philadelphia, for appellant. Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., James Garrett, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO, LARSEN and FLAHERTY, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Arthur Pitts, was tried by a judge sitting with a jury for the homicide of Edward Carter on December 23, 1975. The jury found appellant guilty of murder of the third degree and possessing instruments of crime. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to ten to twenty years in prison for the conviction of murder of the third degree and two and one-half to five years on the instruments of crime conviction, both sentences to be concurrent. This appeal followed.[1] Appellant first argues the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for murder of the third degree. This argument centers on appellant's belief the jury should have accepted defense testimony of voluntary intoxication, rather than the Commonwealth's evidence. The facts surrounding this issue are as follows. On December 23, 1975, appellant and decedent, Edward Carter, were drinking alcoholic beverages during the day. The testimony indicates a quantity of wine and large quantities of whiskey were consumed by appellant, decedent and a mutual friend, "Mr. Lumpkin." At approximately 6:00 p. m., Roberta Johnson, decedent's paramour, helped decedent upstairs to the bedroom. Johnson's assistance was necessary as Carter was intoxicated. Both Carter and Johnson lie on the bed, Johnson watching television and Carter sleeping. Appellant entered the room, attempted to wake up Carter, *215 and complained that Carter was involved with "his woman." During this argument, Johnson left the bedroom, but asked Lumpkin to go up to the bedroom to watch decedent and appellant. Upon her return to the bedroom, Johnson was asked by Lumpkin to call the police. She entered the room and saw Carter on the couch. He had sustained stab wounds of the stomach and leg, which caused his death.[2] As Johnson went to the house next door to call police, she noticed appellant leaving the house where the stabbing had occurred. She saw him drop a kitchen knife and then retrieve it. Subsequently, when the police arrived at the scene of the Carter slaying appellant returned to the house and attempted to conceal the knife in a flower pot. The knife was found by the police and it was later determined the knife had human blood on it. Appellant was then arrested. The arresting and interrogating officers both testified that although appellant's breath did smell of alcohol, his reflexes and ability to understand and discuss events surrounding the stabbing appeared unimpaired. In Commonwealth v. Firth, 479 Pa. 333, 388 A.2d 683 (1978), this court reiterated the standard of appellate review in judging the sufficiency of the evidence: *216 A review of the Commonwealth's evidence reveals that evidence to be sufficient, if it is believed. The factfinder can believe all, part or none of the testimony. Appellant next argues that the court below erred in failing to instruct the jury on the relationship of voluntary intoxication to the intent element of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court charged: The relevant statute, in effect at the time of this crime, stated: Section 308 makes clear that evidence of intoxication is relevant and admissible to negate an element of a crime. This court, in Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 122-23, 334 A.2d 661 (1975), stated:[4] In Commonwealth v. Mason, 474 Pa. 308, 378 A.2d 807 (1977), this court stated: In light of Commonwealth v. Mason, and the then applicable § 308 of the Crimes Code, the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the relationship of voluntary *219 intoxication and the specific intent requirement of voluntary manslaughter. However, the Commonwealth argues the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. The jury in the instant case found appellant guilty of murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a killing done with legal malice but without specific intent to kill. Murder of the third degree can, however, in some cases involve the specific intent to harm a victim as long as said intent falls short of the specific intent to kill. Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, involves the specific intent to kill but, by reason of passion and provocation, contains no legal malice. In the instant case, appellant was found guilty of murder of the third degree. The jury thus found appellant had no specific intent to kill the victim. By such a finding, the jury found voluntary manslaughter was not applicable to this case. The error in the instant case could not harm appellant, unless he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, for only then would the issue of intoxication become relevant. We thus agree with the Commonwealth that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's third argument is that the district attorney misstated the law, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. The district attorney, in his closing, stated: Counsel did not contest the correctness of the statement at trial. Counsel only objected to the statement of law by the district attorney. On appeal, appellant now attempts to argue that the statements were erroneous. Judgments of sentence affirmed. EAGEN, C.J., and NIX, J., concur in the result. ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which MANDERINO, J., joins. ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. The trial court's instruction on voluntary manslaughter erroneously precluded the jury from even considering evidence of appellant's intoxication. The majority holds that this instruction misstated the law but nevertheless denies relief on the spurious theory that because appellant was convicted of murder of the third degree the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I dissent. The trial court instructed the jury that as to the charge of involuntary manslaughter evidence of appellant's intoxication "would be no party [sic] whatever of your reasoning, and you must as to that determination dismiss all evidence of his intoxication from your consideration." This erroneous instruction incorrectly and improperly circumscribed the *221 jury's consideration. That the jury returned a verdict of murder of the third degree in no way lessens the possibility that the court's error diverted the jury from a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. But for the trial court's error, the jury might have found that the intoxication evidence justified a compromise verdict of voluntary manslaughter even if the jury believed that evidence insufficient to justify acquittal. Appellant clearly was entitled to a charge on voluntary manslaughter which correctly and completely expressed the law. E.g., Commonwealth v. Musselman, 483 Pa. 245, 396 A.2d 625 (1979). Having found the trial court's instructions on voluntary manslaughter to be defective, this Court may not overlook a recognized possibility of harm which could arise from that error. The trial court's acknowledged error in this case was far from harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion. [1] Appellant properly appealed the murder conviction to this court and the possession of instruments of crime conviction to the Superior Court, which certified the appeal to this court for disposition. [2] The medical examiner testified that Carter had received nine stab wounds. [3] Section 308 was subsequently amended to read: "Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder." As amended April 7, 1976, P.L. 72, No. 32, § 1, imd. effective. [4] In Graves, § 308 was not applicable.