Title: Masri v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n
Citation: 2014 WI 81
Docket Number: 2012AP001047
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2014

2014 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1047   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Asma Masri, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc., 
          Interested Person-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 1, 832 N.W.2d 139 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 62  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 22, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Lawrence G. Albrecht, Aaron P. McCann, Katie S. Lonze and 
First, Albrecht & Blondis, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Lawrence G. Albrecht. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2 
 
For the interested person-respondent, there was a brief by 
Amy Schmidt Jones, Kirk A. Pelikan, and Michael Best & Friedrich 
LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Amy Schmidt Jones. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy W. Feeley, Sara 
J. MacCarthy, and Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman, P.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Hospital Association. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1047   
(L.C. No. 
2011CV15410) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Asma Masri, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc., 
 
          Interested Person-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 22, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a circuit 
court order that affirmed a Labor and Industry Review Commission 
(LIRC) determination. 
                                                 
1 Masri v. LIRC, 2013 WI App 62, 348 Wis. 2d 1, 832 
N.W.2d 139. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The 
case 
requires 
statutory 
interpretation 
to 
determine whether uncompensated interns are entitled to the 
anti-retaliation protections of Wis. Stat. § 146.997 (2007-08)2——
Wisconsin's health care worker protection statute.  Because this 
case involves an administrative agency's interpretation of 
§ 146.997, we must also determine the level of deference, if 
any, to grant LIRC, which, in conjunction with the Department of 
Workforce Development (DWD), is charged with administering the 
statute. 
¶3 
Asma Masri (Masri) was a doctoral student at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) when she began work as a 
"Psychologist Intern" in the Division of Transplant Surgery at 
the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW).  MCW assigned Masri to 
the transplant surgery unit at Froedtert Hospital.  MCW ended 
Masri's internship after she met with an MCW administrator to 
report "clinical/ethical" concerns.  Masri contends that the 
termination of the internship violated Wis. Stat. § 146.997, 
which provides that certain health care employers and their 
employees may not take "disciplinary action against . . . any 
person" who in good faith reports violations of state or federal 
laws, regulations, or standards.  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(3)(a).  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 146.997(1)(b) 
adopts 
the 
definition 
of 
"disciplinary action" given in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(2), namely, 
"any action taken with respect to an employee."  Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
3 
 
§ 230.80(2) (emphasis added).  Thus, the pivotal question in 
this case is whether Masri, as an unpaid intern, is an employee 
and therefore protected by Wis. Stat. § 146.997(3)(a). 
¶4 
LIRC determined that § 146.997 applies only to an 
employee, and that as an unpaid intern, Masri was not an 
employee.  Granting due weight deference to LIRC's decision, the 
circuit court and the court of appeals both affirmed.   
¶5 
We conclude the following. 
¶6 
First, we accord LIRC's decision due weight deference 
because 
LIRC 
has 
experience 
interpreting 
the 
meaning 
of 
"employee" 
under 
various 
statutes 
and 
is 
charged 
with 
administering Wis. Stat. § 146.997.  The fact that LIRC had not 
previously considered the specific question whether an unpaid 
intern is an employee is not enough to abate the due weight 
deference owed to the agency.  See Jamerson v. Dep't of Children 
& Families, 2013 WI 7, ¶47, 345 Wis. 2d 205, 824 N.W.2d 822. 
¶7 
Second, we agree with LIRC that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 
applies only to employees, a category that does not include 
interns who do not receive compensation or tangible benefits.  
See Masri v. Med. Coll. of Wis., ERD No. CR200902766 (LIRC, Aug. 
31, 2011).  As Wis. Stat. § 146.997 does not define "employee," 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
4 
 
we must give the term its ordinary meaning.3  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  After consulting the language, 
context, and structure of the statute, we conclude that LIRC's 
interpretation is reasonable, and there is no more reasonable 
interpretation.  Because Masri received no compensation or 
tangible benefits, she was not an employee of MCW and was 
therefore not entitled to anti-retaliation protection under 
§ 146.997(3)(a). 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
Masri was a doctoral candidate at UWM when she began 
working as an unpaid "Psychologist Intern" in MCW's Division of 
Transplant Surgery on August 27, 2008.  Masri worked 40 hours a 
week and was introduced as a "Psychologist Intern."  She 
received an "all-access" badge for MCW and Froedtert Memorial 
Lutheran Hospital (Froedtert)4 and had complete access to patient 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 230.80, which lends its definition of 
"disciplinary action" to Wis. Stat. § 146.997, does define the 
term "employee."  Wis. Stat. § 230.80(3).  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(3), "'Employee' means any person employed by any 
governmental unit . . . " with some exceptions.  The definition 
in § 230.80(3) is not helpful in the present case because it 
fails to define "employed," which it uses in the definition of 
"employee."  Thus, even if we were to apply the § 230.80(3) 
definition of "employee" to Masri, we would still have to define 
"employed" according to its ordinary meaning. 
4 According to Froedtert's letter to the Equal Rights 
Supervisor, "Froedtert Hospital is a teaching and research 
hospital providing tertiary-level health care services on both 
an inpatient and outpatient basis.  The physicians who provide 
patient care at Froedtert Hospital are employees of the Medical 
College of Wisconsin." 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
5 
 
records.  On November 19, 2008, Masri met with MCW Department of 
Surgery 
Administrator 
Jon 
Mayer 
(Mayer) 
to 
report 
"clinical/ethical concerns."  Masri alleges that after she 
reported a few complaints, Mayer ended the meeting so that he 
could discuss the report with Masri's supervisor, Dr. Rebecca 
Anderson 
(Dr. 
Anderson), 
MCW's 
Director 
of 
Transplant 
Psychological Services.5 
¶9 
Effective November 24, 2008, Dr. Anderson ended 
Masri's internship.  On August 6, 2009, Masri filed a standard-
form retaliation complaint against MCW and Froedtert with the 
Equal Rights Division (ERD) of DWD.  ERD matched the complaint 
with Wis. Stat. § 146.997 as the anti-retaliation law under 
which Masri might be protected. 
¶10 On August 19, 2009, MCW responded to the complaint and 
argued that Masri was not covered by Wis. Stat. § 146.997 
because she was not an employee.  MCW noted that Masri was a 
student at UWM and was allowed to gain clinical experience at 
MCW only as part of UWM's educational program.  Moreover, MCW 
                                                 
5  When she talked with Mayer, Masri alleged that Dr. 
Anderson's assistant told Masri to work as a social worker 
(rather than a "Psychologist Intern") while the social worker in 
the transplant unit was on vacation. 
She alleged Dr. Anderson's assistant told her to prepare 
two separate patient evaluations, which Masri refused to do. 
Finally, Masri alleged that Dr. Anderson told her to create 
a "borderline personality" diagnosis for a patient who had 
received a possibly negligent breast cancer operation in order 
to discredit the patient if she filed a malpractice suit.  Masri 
refused.  Masri claims that Mayer cut her off but that she would 
have continued with more complaints. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
6 
 
claimed that it terminated Masri's internship due to concerns 
with her performance and that these alleged concerns began 
before Masri made her complaints to Mayer.6  MCW attached its 
policy on whistleblowing to its letter responding to the 
complaint.  The MCW policy stated, "Wisconsin law (Wisconsin 
Statue [sic] 146.977) prohibits retaliatory action by a health 
provider 
against 
an 
employee 
who 
in 
good 
faith 
reports 
[violations of state or federal law or standards or violations 
of ethical standards]."  (Emphasis added.)  MCW also attached to 
its response letter a series of Dr. Anderson's notes about 
Masri's 
allegedly 
unsatisfactory 
performance 
beginning 
on 
October 28, 2008. 
¶11 On September 11, 2009, in a letter to Equal Rights 
Supervisor James Drinan, Masri laid out the facts underlying her 
complaint.  Masri claimed that Dr. Anderson applied for grants 
to obtain funding for Masri's position and that Dr. Anderson 
promised her health insurance and parking.  Masri eventually 
received 
free 
parking 
at 
MCW 
but 
did 
not 
receive 
any 
compensation or health insurance.  Masri also contended that Dr. 
                                                 
6 MCW attached a document drafted by Dr. Anderson to a 
letter it sent to Equal Rights Supervisor James Drinan.  Dr. 
Anderson's document is not dated, but it lists a series of 
alleged issues with Masri's performance beginning on October 28, 
2008.  In her response to MCW's letter to the Equal Rights 
Supervisor, Masri asked, "When, exactly, was this document 
created, and where is the full chain of email and correspondence 
relevant to this document's creation?"  The record does not 
indicate when Dr. Anderson drafted the list of alleged issues 
with Masri's performance.  In any event, because we conclude 
that Masri is not protected under Wis. Stat. § 146.997, the 
alleged issues with her performance are not at issue.  
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
7 
 
Anderson was supposed to prepare an "Affiliation Agreement" 
contract that would be executed between MCW and UWM,7 but Dr. 
Anderson did not prepare that contract. 
¶12 On September 15, 2009, an Equal Rights Officer issued 
a 
Preliminary 
Determination 
and 
Order 
(Preliminary 
Determination) 
that 
dismissed 
Masri's 
complaint. 
 
The 
Preliminary Determination concluded that ERD did not have 
jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 146.997 because Masri was an 
unpaid intern, and therefore she was not an employee of either 
MCW or Froedtert. 
¶13 Masri appealed the Preliminary Determination as it 
related to MCW on September 23, 2009.8  On appeal, Masri argued 
                                                 
7 UWM has a document called, "Internship in Counseling 
Psychology[,] Department of Educational Psychology at The 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee: A Handbook for Faculty, 
Supervisors, and Students" (Internship Handbook).  Under a 
section titled "Personnel Arrangements," the Internship Handbook 
states:  
The intern should be employed under a contract 
comparable 
to 
the 
psychological 
services 
staff 
contracts within the internship setting.  Salary, 
fringe benefits, and travel allowances (if applicable) 
should be specified in the contract.  Office space, 
equipment, and secretarial services should be provided 
by the internship setting as well as some released 
time for professional development. 
There is also a section in the Internship Handbook titled 
"Credits/Intern Status" that provides, "The student should have 
a 
title 
such 
as 
'intern,' 
'resident,' 
or 
other 
similar 
designation of trainee status.  Full-time Ph.D. interns do not 
need to register for intern credits, though they need to 
maintain dissertator status." 
8 Masri did not appeal the Preliminary Determination as it 
related to Froedtert. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
8 
 
that the investigator failed to properly investigate the 
complaint and that the investigator's summary dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds was improper.  She sent a letter dated 
December 4, 2009, to the ERD Hearing & Mediation Section Chief 
in which she argued that even if an "employee" must be someone 
who receives compensation, that compensation may come in the 
form of "tangible benefits."  She argued that her all-access 
badge, office space, support staff, and networking opportunities 
constituted tangible benefits that made her an employee.  She 
also asserted that "Dr. Anderson had promised her health 
insurance, employee parking, and financial grants-in-aid." 
¶14 On January 14, 2010, an administrative law judge (ALJ) 
for ERD affirmed the Preliminary Determination.  The ALJ 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 is limited to employees and 
that Masri was not an employee because she received no financial 
compensation. 
¶15 Masri filed a petition for review with LIRC on 
February 4, 2010.  On August 31, 2011, LIRC issued a decision 
affirming the ALJ's decision and adopting his findings and 
conclusion as its own.  Masri v. Med. Coll. of Wis., ERD No. 
CR200902766 (LIRC, Aug. 31, 2011).  In its decision, LIRC cited 
Ratsch v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., ERD No. CR200504192 (LIRC, Mar. 10, 
2006), for the proposition that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 applies 
exclusively to employees.  Masri v. Med. Coll. of Wis., ERD No. 
CR200902766 (LIRC, Aug. 31, 2011).  LIRC said that it had 
previously looked at compensation to determine employment status 
and noted that it is possible that a worker could be an employee 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
9 
 
based on tangible benefits other than salary.  Id.  However, 
LIRC rejected Masri's argument that she received tangible 
benefits that would make her an employee.  Id.  LIRC determined 
that Masri's alleged tangible benefits——the security badge, 
office space, parking, and support staff——all related to her 
duties and had no independent value.  Id.  In addition, 
networking opportunities were not tangible and could not be 
assigned value.  Id. 
¶16 LIRC also determined that the fact that Masri's 
supervisor told her she would have health insurance and had 
applied for grants was not enough to confer employee status on 
Masri since she never received those benefits.  Id.  Masri 
suggested that the university's internship handbook evidenced an 
employment relationship when it said that interns are supposed 
to be paid and should receive a contract similar to the staff 
with whom the intern worked.  Id.  LIRC rejected this argument 
because Masri never entered into such a contract.  Id.  Finally, 
LIRC rejected Masri's public policy argument that she should be 
protected from retaliation because she was in an ideal position 
to report illegal or unethical conduct.  Id.  LIRC declined to 
extend coverage under Wis. Stat. § 146.997 where the legislature 
did not, and it stated that "there is no authority to consider 
an unpaid activity employment simply because of the importance 
of the activity."  Id. (citing Langer v. City of Mequon, ERD No. 
199904168 (ERD, Oct. 30, 2000), aff'd Langer v. City of Mequon, 
ERD No. 199904168 (LIRC, Mar. 19, 2001)). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
10 
 
¶17 Masri filed a petition for review with the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court on September 27, 2011.9  Circuit Judge 
William S. Pocan afforded due weight deference to LIRC's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 146.997 and determined that 
LIRC's interpretation was reasonable and that there was not a 
more reasonable interpretation.  The circuit court concluded 
that § 146.997 applies only to employees, and Masri was not an 
employee.  Consequently, the circuit court affirmed the LIRC 
decision on April 2, 2012.  Masri appealed. 
¶18 In a published decision, a divided court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court.  Masri v. LIRC, 2013 WI App 62, 348 
Wis. 2d 1, 832 N.W.2d 139.  Also affording due weight deference 
to LIRC's decision, the court of appeals agreed with LIRC that 
§ 146.997 applies only to employees and that Masri was not an 
employee.  Id., ¶8.  In a passionate, policy-oriented dissent, 
Judge Ralph Adam Fine argued that the purpose of § 146.997 is to 
protect patients and that even uncompensated interns should be 
protected from retaliation when they report illegal or unethical 
                                                 
9 MCW joined the action in the circuit court as an 
interested person pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.53(2), which 
reads in part: 
Every person served with the petition for review 
as provided in this section and who desires to 
participate in the proceedings for review thereby 
instituted shall serve upon the petitioner, within 20 
days after service of the petition upon such person, a 
notice of appearance clearly stating the person's 
position with reference to each material allegation in 
the petition and to the affirmance, vacation or 
modification of the order or decision under review. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
11 
 
conduct contemplated by § 146.997.  See id., ¶44 (Fine, J., 
dissenting). 
¶19 Masri petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 13, 2013.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 When there is an appeal from a LIRC determination, we 
review LIRC's decision rather than the decision of the circuit 
court.  See Beecher v. LIRC, 2004 WI 88, ¶22, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 
682 N.W.2d 29.  Although statutory interpretation is a question 
of law that this court generally reviews de novo, we may give 
some deference to LIRC's decision.  See UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 
Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  We generally assign one 
of three levels of deference to agency interpretations: great 
weight deference, due weight deference, or de novo review.  Keup 
v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶12, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755.  The 
parties in this case dispute the appropriate level of deference.  
As will be discussed below, we accord due weight deference to 
LIRC's decision.10   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶21 DWD is the agency charged with administering Wis. 
Stat. § 146.997.  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(1)(a).  LIRC is an 
                                                 
10 "[D]ue weight shall be accorded the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as 
well as discretionary authority conferred upon it."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(10). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
12 
 
independent agency attached to DWD for administrative purposes,11 
and if deference is appropriate, it goes to the decision of 
LIRC.  Wis. Stat. § 15.225(1); 
see DILHR v. LIRC, 193 
Wis. 2d 391, 397, 535 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Where deference 
to an agency decision is appropriate, we are to accord that 
deference to LIRC, not to the department.") (citing DILHR v. 
LIRC, 161 Wis. 2d 231, 245, 467 N.W.2d 545 (1991)).  Thus, in 
this case, we review LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997.  We grant one of three levels of deference to 
administrative agency decisions: great weight, due weight, or de 
novo review.  Keup, 269 Wis. 2d 59, ¶12. 
¶22 An agency's decision receives great weight deference 
when all the following criteria are met:  
(1) the agency [is] charged by the legislature with 
the duty of administering the statute; (2) . . . the 
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; 
(3) . . . the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation 
[at issue]; and (4) . . . the agency's interpretation 
will 
provide 
uniformity 
and 
consistency 
in 
the 
application of the statute. 
UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 284 (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. 
LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)).  Under great 
weight deference, the reviewing court will not overturn an 
agency's reasonable interpretation that does not conflict with 
the statute's clear meaning even if the court believes there is 
a more reasonable interpretation.  Id. at 287. 
                                                 
11 A 
Brief 
History 
of 
LIRC, 
Wisconsin.gov, 
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/lirc/lrc_about.htm (last visited July 
2, 2014). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
13 
 
¶23 Reviewing courts apply due weight deference to agency 
interpretations "when the agency has some experience in an area, 
but has not developed the expertise which necessarily places it 
in 
a 
better 
position 
to 
make 
judgments 
regarding 
the 
interpretation of the statute than a court."  Id. at 286.  The 
decision to apply due weight deference is based more on the fact 
that the legislature charged the agency with administering the 
statute than on the agency's specialized knowledge or expertise.  
Id.  Under due weight deference, a reviewing court will not 
interfere with the agency's reasonable interpretation if it fits 
within the purpose of the statute unless there is a more 
reasonable interpretation available.  Id. at 286-87. 
¶24 Finally, reviewing courts use a de novo standard of 
review "when the issue before the agency is clearly one of first 
impression, or when an agency's position on an issue has been so 
inconsistent so as to provide no real guidance."  Id. at 285 
(internal citations omitted).  However, a reviewing court may 
grant due weight deference to an agency's decision on an issue 
of first impression if the agency is charged with administering 
the statute and has experience with issues that the statute 
addresses, even if the agency has not interpreted the particular 
statutory provision at issue.  See Jamerson, 345 Wis. 2d 205, 
¶¶46-47.  When a court uses a de novo standard of review, it 
gives no deference to the agency's decision.  Keup, 269 
Wis. 2d 59, ¶16. 
¶25 No party suggests that great weight deference is 
appropriate in this case.  Instead, the dispute is whether this 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
14 
 
court should give LIRC's interpretation due weight deference or 
no deference.   
¶26 Masri argues that this court should interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 146.997 de novo in part because the meaning of 
"employee" in § 146.997 is a matter of first impression.  
Although Masri is correct that LIRC has not yet determined 
whether an unpaid intern is an "employee" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997, DWD and LIRC have experience interpreting statutes 
relating to employment relationships.  See, e.g., Langer v. City 
of Mequon, ERD No. 199904168 (ERD, Oct. 30, 2000), aff'd Langer 
v. City of Mequon, ERD No. 199904168 (LIRC, Mar. 19, 2001) 
(stating that unpaid board of zoning appeals appointee was not 
an employee under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act); Ficken v. 
Harmon Solutions Grp., ERD No. CR200003282 (LIRC, Feb. 7, 2003) 
(stating that uncompensated volunteers are not "employees" and 
therefore are not covered under the Wisconsin Fair Employment 
Act).   
¶27 Moreover, LIRC has considered the scope of "employee" 
under § 146.997 and determined that the statutory reference to 
any "person" did not extend protections to a former employee.  
See Ratsch v. Mem'l Med. Cntr., ERD No. CR200504192 (LIRC, Mar. 
10, 2006) ("The commission concludes that § 146.997 pertains 
only 
to 
employees 
in 
spite 
of 
the 
reference 
in 
§ 146.997(3) . . . to the prohibition against a health care 
facility or health care provider taking 'disciplinary action' 
against 'any person' . . . .").  Thus, even though LIRC has not 
determined whether an unpaid intern is an "employee," it has 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
15 
 
experience interpreting the scope of "employee" in several 
contexts.  The fact that an agency is deciding an issue of first 
impression does not necessarily preclude the agency's decision 
from receiving due weight deference if the agency is charged 
with administering the statute at issue and has relevant 
experience.  See Jamerson, 345 Wis. 2d 205, ¶47. 
¶28 Masri contends that LIRC's interpretation should not 
receive due weight deference because it contravenes what she 
argues 
are 
§ 146.997's 
two 
related 
purposes: 
expanding 
retaliation protection for health care workers and protecting 
patients and public health by encouraging people to report 
misconduct.  However, the decision to accord due weight 
deference to an agency's interpretation depends on whether the 
agency is charged with administering the statute and whether it 
has some expertise in the area involved, UFE Inc., 201 
Wis. 2d at 286, not on purposes allegedly contained in the 
statute.  After the reviewing court determines that due weight 
deference 
is 
appropriate, 
the 
court 
upholds 
an 
agency's 
reasonable interpretation if it comports with the statute's 
purpose and if no more reasonable interpretation is available.  
Id. at 286-87.  Thus, consideration of whether LIRC's decision 
comports with the statute's purpose comes after we determine the 
appropriate level of deference. 
¶29 In sum, because the legislature charged LIRC with 
administering § 146.997 and LIRC has experience analyzing 
employment relationships, we give due weight deference to LIRC's 
decision.  We turn now to the language of the statute to 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
16 
 
determine whether LIRC's interpretation is reasonable and 
whether there is a more reasonable interpretation. 
A. Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 146.997 
¶30 We begin our analysis with the language of the 
statute, and we assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed therein.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶44-45.  "Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id., 
¶45 (citations omitted).  In addition to the language, the 
context and structure of the statute are important, and we 
interpret the statute in light of "surrounding or closely-
related statutes."  Id., ¶46.  If the statute's meaning is 
plain, the analysis ordinarily ends.  Id., ¶45. 
¶31 Because the subsections of Wis. Stat. § 146.997 are 
closely related, we consider each subsection in turn.  As will 
be 
discussed, 
the 
statute 
demonstrates 
that 
it 
applies 
exclusively to employees, and the ordinary meaning of "employee" 
is someone who works for compensation or tangible benefits. 
1. Language, Structure, and Context 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.997 lays out the health care 
worker protection law.  Subsection (1) of the statute begins 
with 
several 
definitions 
but, 
important 
for 
this 
case, 
§ 146.997(1) does not define "employee."  Thus, as we interpret 
the statute, we must attempt to give the word "employee" its 
"common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning." 
 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citations omitted). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
17 
 
¶33 Subsection (2) describes who may report violations of 
state and federal laws and regulations: 
Any employee of a health care facility or of a 
health care provider who is aware of any information, 
the disclosure of which is not expressly prohibited by 
any state law or rule or any federal law or 
regulation, that would lead a reasonable person to 
believe 
any 
of 
the 
following 
may 
report 
that 
information 
[to 
any 
of 
the 
enumerated 
authorities] . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 146.997(2)(a) (emphasis added).  The statute goes 
on to list the kinds of violations that employees may report.  
Subsection (2) also states that "[a]ny employee of a health care 
facility or health care provider may initiate, participate in or 
testify in any action or proceeding in which a violation 
specified in par. (a)1. or 2. is alleged."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997(2)(c) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Finally, 
subsec. 
(2) 
provides, "Any employee of a health care facility or health care 
provider may provide any information relating to an alleged 
violation specified in par. (a)1. or 2. to any legislator or 
legislative committee."  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(2)(d) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the statute addresses only one category of people 
bringing complaints: employees. 
¶34 Subsection (3) contains the anti-retaliation provision 
at issue in this case: 
No health care facility or health care provider 
and no employee of a health care facility or health 
care provider may take disciplinary action against, or 
threaten to take disciplinary action against, any 
person because the person reported in good faith any 
information 
under 
sub. 
(2)(a), 
in 
good 
faith 
initiated, participated in or testified in any action 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
18 
 
or proceeding under sub. (2)(c) or provided in good 
faith any information under sub. (2)(d) or because the 
health care facility, health care provider or employee 
believes that the person reported in good faith any 
information 
under 
sub. 
(2)(a), 
in 
good 
faith 
initiated, participated in or testified in any action 
or proceeding under sub. (2)(c) or provided in good 
faith any information under sub. (2)(d). 
Wis. Stat. § 146.997(3)(a) (emphasis added).  As used in the 
above-quoted 
provision, 
"'[d]isciplinary 
action' 
means 
any 
action taken with respect to an employee which has the effect, 
in whole or in part, of a penalty . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(2) (emphasis added); see Wis. Stat. § 146.997(1)(b).12  
The language of § 146.997(3)(a) makes it clear that the statute 
applies only to employees because by definition, only employees 
are 
subject 
to 
"disciplinary 
action." 
 
In 
addition 
to 
"disciplinary action," the term "good faith" is described in 
terms of employees.  Wisconsin Stat. § 146.997(3)(c) states that 
"an employee is not acting in good faith if the employee reports 
any information under sub. (2)(a) that the employee knows or 
should know is false or misleading . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997(3)(c) (emphasis added). 
¶35 Subsection (4) discusses the enforcement of the 
statute and states in part, "Any employee of a health care 
facility 
or 
health 
care 
provider 
who 
is 
subjected 
to 
disciplinary action, or who is threatened with disciplinary 
action, in violation of sub. (3) may file a complaint with the 
                                                 
12 The definition of "disciplinary action" comes from Wis. 
Stat. § 230.80, which is part of the statutory chapter relating 
to state employment relations.  See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 
230. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
19 
 
department under s. 106.54(6)."  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(4)(a) 
(emphasis added).  Wisconsin Stat. § 106.54(6), the statute 
under 
which 
§ 146.997 
complaints 
are 
filed, 
refers 
to 
Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act when it states, "The division 
shall receive complaints under s. 146.997(4)(a) of disciplinary 
action taken in violation of s. 146.997(3) and shall process the 
complaints in the same manner that employment discrimination 
complaints 
are 
processed 
under 
s. 
111.39." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 106.54(6) (emphasis added).  Thus, only employees may seek a 
remedy under § 146.997(4), and the available remedies are found 
in Wis. Stat. § 111.39. 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat.§ 111.39 is part of the Fair Employment 
Act and provides that the hearing examiner may grant remedies to 
"effectuate the purpose of this subchapter."13  Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.39(4)(c). 
 
The 
remedies 
mentioned 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.39(4)(c) include back pay and compensation, neither of 
                                                 
13 The purposes of the Fair Employment subchapter include 
"protect[ing] by law the rights of all individuals to obtain 
gainful employment and to enjoy privileges free from employment 
discrimination" and "encourag[ing] and foster[ing] to the 
fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly 
qualified individuals."  Wis. Stat. § 111.31(2)-(3). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
20 
 
which would be appropriate for an unpaid intern.14  Aggrieved 
employees may also receive attorney fees under the Fair 
Employment Act.  See Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 765, 345 
N.W.2d 482 (1984).  However, in light of the lack of other 
remedies, it is unlikely that an intern would bring a claim 
solely to recover the fees of her attorney.  Finally, under Wis. 
Stat. § 146.997(5), civil penalties are available for violations 
of § 146.997(3), but like attorney fees, a civil penalty would 
not make an intern whole.  The lack of remedies for unpaid 
interns demonstrates that it is highly unlikely that unpaid 
interns 
fall 
under 
the 
anti-retaliation 
protections 
of 
§ 146.997(3). 
¶37 Masri argues that although Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997 
utilizes Wis. Stat. § 111.39, there is no express provision that 
"employee" must mean the same thing under both statutes.  Masri 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.39 also provides for reinstatement 
as a potential remedy and states that "the examiner shall award 
compensation in lieu of reinstatement if requested by all 
parties and may award compensation in lieu of reinstatement if 
requested by any party."  Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4)(c).  The 
reinstatement provisions in § 111.39(4)(c) allow the parties to 
agree to compensation, which would seemingly prevent discord in 
the workplace in the event the parties could not work together 
harmoniously.  Similarly, the examiner has some discretion to 
order compensation instead of reinstatement if one party 
requests it.  Id.  However, in the context of an intern, 
compensation is not an option because of the formula in the 
statute.  Id. (providing that "[c]ompensation in lieu of 
reinstatement for a violation of s. 111.322(2m) may not be less 
than 500 times nor more than 1,000 times the hourly wage of the 
person discriminated against when the violation occurred.").  
Thus, 
having 
reinstatement 
as 
the 
sole 
remedy 
would 
be 
problematic in the event that the retaliatory termination 
created ill will and a hostile work environment. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
21 
 
may be correct that the definition of "employee" under the two 
statutes is not required to be identical, but her argument is 
unpersuasive because there also is no provision expressly 
requiring 
different 
treatment 
for 
interns. 
 
Rather, 
the 
references to the Fair Employment Act and the pervasive use of 
the term "employee" more strongly suggest that only employees 
who receive compensation or tangible benefits fall under the 
statutory protection against retaliation.15 
¶38 Subsection (5) of Wis. Stat. § 146.997 provides for 
civil penalties for "[a]ny health care facility or health care 
provider and any employee of a health care facility or health 
care provider who takes disciplinary action against, or who 
threatens to take disciplinary action against, any person in 
violation of sub. (3)."  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(5) (emphasis 
added).  Again, the statute references "disciplinary action," 
which can be taken only against an employee. 
                                                 
15 Masri highlights the fact that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 does 
not 
incorporate 
the 
Fair 
Employment 
Act's 
definition 
of 
"employee."  The Fair Employment Act's definition of "employee" 
provides, "'Employee' does not include any individual employed 
by his or her parents, spouse or child."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.32(5).  Thus, the definition in the Fair Employment Act is 
unhelpful because it describes only situations in which there is 
no employment relationship.  It does not define the parameters 
of "employee."  Instead, LIRC has considered the scope of 
"employee" under the Fair Employment Act and has determined that 
only workers who receive compensation or tangible benefits are 
employees.  See Langer v. City of Mequon, ERD No. 199904168 
(LIRC, Mar. 19, 2001).  Therefore, the fact that the legislature 
did not reference the Fair Employment Act's definition of 
"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 146.997 does not support Masri's 
argument. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
22 
 
¶39 Subsection (6), the final subsection of § 146.997, 
states in relevant part: "Each health care facility and health 
care provider shall post, in one or more conspicuous places 
where notices to employees are customarily posted, a notice in a 
form approved by the department setting forth employees' rights 
under this section."  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(6) (emphasis added).  
Consistent with an interpretation that § 146.997(3) protects 
only employees, employers need put only their employees on 
notice of their rights. 
¶40 Turning from Wis. Stat. § 146.997, Masri points to 
Wis. Stat. § 146.89——the volunteer health care program statute——
to argue that the legislature knew that some health care workers 
are not paid and that excluding the health care workers in 
§ 146.89 from retaliation protection contravenes the purposes of 
both § 146.89 and § 146.997.  Section 146.89 provides that 
volunteers under that section are considered "state agents of 
the department of health service" for the purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.25(6) (representation by the attorney general), Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(3) (notice of claim requirements), and Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.46 
(indemnification 
from 
the 
state). 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.89(4). 
 
Masri 
suggests 
that 
volunteer 
health 
care 
providers might decide not to volunteer or report illegal or 
unethical conduct if they are not considered "employees" under 
§ 146.997.  The statutory text does not support Masri's 
argument, 
and 
§ 146.89 
does 
not 
classify 
volunteers 
as 
employees.  Rather than supporting Masri's position, § 146.89 
undermines her argument because it demonstrates that the 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
23 
 
legislature has made special provisions for volunteers in other 
portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 146 but has not done so in § 146.997.  
Thus, § 146.89 suggests that the legislature distinguishes 
between employees and volunteers. 
¶41 Considering Wis. Stat. § 146.997 as a whole, every 
subsection of the statute either expressly uses the term 
"employee" or refers to "disciplinary action," which can apply 
only to employees.  Moreover, the enforcement subsection 
requires the complaints to be processed in the same manner as 
employment discrimination complaints.  Taken together, the many 
references to "employee" and the references to the Fair 
Employment Act and its remedies strongly suggest that § 146.997 
applies only to employees who receive compensation or tangible 
benefits. 
 
This 
interpretation 
is 
further 
supported 
by 
dictionary definitions of "employee." 
2. The Definition of Employee 
¶42 In the absence of a statutory definition, we may look 
to a dictionary, keeping in mind that our goal is to give 
statutory language its common and ordinary meaning.  See Cnty. 
of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶23, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571.  Indeed, in its decision in Langer, ERD noted that 
unless it is specially defined, "employee" should be given its 
ordinary definition.  Langer v. City of Mequon, ERD No. 
199904168 (ERD, Oct. 30, 2000) (using Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language——Unabridged (2d ed. 1987) to define 
"employee" as "a person working for another person or a business 
firm for pay").   
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
24 
 
¶43 Masri cites to an online dictionary that defines 
employee as "one employed by another usually for wages or salary 
and in a position below the executive level."  Merriam-Webster, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/employee (last visited 
July 2, 2014) (emphasis added).  She argues that because the 
definition says an employee usually works for wages or salary, 
unpaid interns fall within the definition.  However, Masri's 
definition could also mean that employees usually work for wages 
or 
salary 
but 
sometimes 
work 
for 
some 
other 
type 
of 
compensation. 
 
Thus, 
her 
definition 
is 
not 
necessarily 
inconsistent with LIRC's decision, which acknowledged that a 
worker could be an employee based on compensation or tangible 
benefits other than wages or salary.  Masri v. Med. Coll. of 
Wis., ERD No. CR200902766 (LIRC, Aug. 31, 2011).   
¶44 MCW 
answered 
Masri's 
definition 
with 
several 
definitions of its own, one of which defines an employee as "[a] 
person who works for another in return for financial or other 
compensation."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, 
http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=employee 
(last visited July 2, 2014).  LIRC also offers several 
definitions, including one for "employ," which means "to provide 
with a job that pays wages or a salary or with a means of 
earning a living."  Webster's New World Dictionary 743 (3d ed. 
1986).  All the definitions mentioned would support LIRC's 
reading of "employee," which would require a worker to receive 
at least some kind of tangible benefit if she is to be deemed an 
employee. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
25 
 
¶45 In addition to offering a dictionary definition, Masri 
argued in her brief that "[t]he statute's interchangeable use of 
the terms 'person' and 'employee' creates contextual openness 
regarding the full class of persons whom the legislature 
authorized to file retaliation complaints as employees and 
requires a more expansive understanding than LIRC's reflexive 
and regressive financial compensation test."  Masri appears to 
concede that a literal interpretation of "any person" does not 
fit within the statute's context and suggests instead that "any 
person" refers to an employee, although she contends the 
definition of "employee" includes unpaid interns.  While context 
is important for our statutory analysis, Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46, we disagree that the use of "any person" creates a 
contextual openness regarding the class of people that the 
statute covers. 
¶46 Given that only employees are subject to "disciplinary 
action," it seems more likely that the legislature used the term 
"person" to avoid confusion.  If Wis. Stat. § 146.997(3)(a) used 
only the term "employee," the statute would read, "[N]o employee 
of a health care facility or health care provider may take 
disciplinary action against . . . any [employee] because the 
[employee] 
reported 
in 
good 
faith . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.997(3)(a) (emphasis added).  Substituting "employee" for 
"person" causes confusion because the first reference is to an 
employee who retaliates whereas the second and third references 
are to an employee who is subject to retaliation.  The 
legislature wisely chose to refer to retaliating employees and 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
26 
 
employees subject to retaliation differently in order to allay 
confusion.  Thus, the use of "person" does not affect the 
definition of "employee." 
¶47 Moreover, if the statute's reference to "any person" 
meant that literally "any person" could avail himself, herself, 
or itself16 of the protections in Wis. Stat. § 146.997, there 
would be no justifiable stopping point.  For example, patients, 
who have no medical training to recognize ethical violations, 
would arguably be protected by § 146.997 if indeed that statute 
protected "any person" from retaliation.  Interpreting the 
statute to protect "any person" also is problematic insofar as 
only employees may seek remedies under § 146.997(4)(a), and only 
employees may bring a complaint under § 146.997(2)(a).  Thus, 
even if § 146.997(3) protected "any person" from retaliation, 
only "employees" could avail themselves of the statute's 
remedies.  We refuse to interpret a statute to provide illusory 
protections.  Instead, we consider the "any person" language in 
the 
context 
of 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
and 
conclude 
that 
§ 146.997(3) protects only employees. 
¶48 If, for the sake of argument, we were to disregard 
tenets of statutory interpretation and interpret "employee" to 
include "any person" for the purposes of who may file complaints 
under 
§ 146.997(2)(a) 
and 
who 
may 
seek 
remedies 
under 
§ 146.997(4)(a), DWD and LIRC might experience a drastic 
                                                 
16 "'Person' includes all partnerships, associations and 
bodies politic or corporate."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
27 
 
increase in filings that would be handled more efficiently by 
other entities.  For example, patients (and others) may file 
complaints 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Safety 
and 
Professional Services,17 an agency designed in part to ensure 
that licensed professionals provide safe and competent care.  In 
addition, any person may file a complaint with the Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services,18 if the person believes a health 
care provider violated state or federal law.  Thus, to allow 
absolutely anybody to file complaints under Wis. Stat. § 146.997 
would not only contradict the statutory language but also 
jeopardize the structure and efficiency of administrative 
agencies and regulatory boards in this State.  
¶49 In addition to her statutory arguments, Masri attempts 
to analogize to the "borrowed employee" test in workers' 
compensation cases to support her argument that she was an 
employee.  See Seaman Body Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis., 204 
                                                 
17 See Forms for Complaints against Professionals, Wis. 
Dep't 
of 
Safety 
and 
Prof'l 
Servs., 
http://dsps.wi.gov/Complaints-and-Inspections/Professions-
Complaints/Forms-for-Complaints-Against-Professionals/ 
(last 
visited 
July 
2, 
2014). 
 
The 
Department 
of 
Safety 
and 
Professional Services accepts complaints against psychologists, 
physicians, nurses, and many other professionals. 
18 See 
Wis. 
Dep't 
of 
Health 
Servs., 
http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/bqaconsumer/healthcarecomplaints.ht
m (last visited July 2, 2014).  The Wisconsin Department of 
Health 
Services 
Division 
of 
Quality 
Assurance 
(DQA) 
"is 
responsible for assuring the health, safety, and welfare of the 
citizens of Wisconsin.  If any individual believes that a 
caregiver, agency, or DQA regulated facility has violated State 
or 
Federal 
laws 
pertaining 
to 
regulated 
entities, 
that 
individual has the right to file a complaint with DQA."  Id. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
28 
 
Wis. 157, 235 N.W. 433 (1931).  The borrowed employee test aids 
courts 
in 
determining 
whether 
there 
is 
an 
employment 
relationship between a borrowed employee and an employer so that 
the correct entity is responsible for paying for the worker's 
injury.  See id. at 158.  The borrowed employee test asks the 
following questions:  
(1) Did 
the 
employee 
actually 
or 
impliedly 
consent to work for a special employer?  (2) Whose was 
the work he was performing at the time of injury?  (3) 
Whose was the right to control the details of the work 
being performed?  (4) For whose benefit primarily was 
the work being done? 
Id. at 163.  Masri contends that this is the proper test to 
assess whether she was an employee and points out that it makes 
no reference to compensation.  However, the borrowed employee 
test is inapplicable because it does not ask whether a worker is 
an "employee"; it asks which employer must pay for the 
employee's injuries.  Thus, there is no need for the test to 
address compensation, nor is there a need for the test to 
consider whether the worker in question falls under the 
"employee" category generally.  We decline to extend the 
borrowed employee test to the facts of this case, as the test 
was designed for a different purpose and is not relevant for 
determining whether an intern is an employee under § 146.997. 
¶50 The statute and the dictionary definitions demonstrate 
that an "employee" under Wis. Stat. § 146.997 is someone who 
works for some type of compensation or tangible benefits.  Thus, 
uncompensated interns who receive no tangible benefits do not 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
29 
 
fall under the definition of "employee" and are not protected by 
§ 146.997.19 
B. Public Policy 
¶51 In addition to her statutory interpretation arguments, 
Masri makes a variety of policy arguments.  She suggests that 
the statute's remedial purpose warrants an expansive definition 
of "employee."  She argues that interns must have retaliation 
protection to avoid destroying the statute's purpose to protect 
patients.20  Masri advances legitimate policy interests, but the 
                                                 
19 We need not consider what quantity of tangible benefits 
or compensation would cause an intern to be considered an 
"employee."  It is sufficient to note that in this case, Masri's 
alleged tangible benefits did not make her an "employee." 
20 Masri argues that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 has two related 
purposes: expanding retaliation protection for health care 
workers and protecting patients and public health by encouraging 
people to report misconduct.  She points to two pieces of 
legislative history as evidence of the statute's purposes.  The 
first piece of legislative history is a fact sheet from the 
Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals that is 
written in terms of employees.  Drafting File, 1999 Wis. Act 
176, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  The second 
piece of legislative history is a drafter's note that mentions 
that state and private health care workers receive the same 
protection under the act.  Id.  Neither piece of legislative 
history demonstrates that the legislature intended to protect 
unpaid interns. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
30 
 
effect of her argument is to engraft purposes onto the statute 
that are not embedded in its text.  Public policy is not a 
panacea 
for 
perceived 
shortcomings 
in 
legislative 
determinations.  Nothing in the statute evinces a purpose to 
protect unpaid interns.  Implicitly, the statute protects 
patients by protecting employees who report violations of health 
related state and federal statutes, regulations, and standards.  
LIRC's interpretation advances the statute's purpose to protect 
patients; it simply is not as broad as Masri would like.   
¶52 Masri attempts to support her argument by noting that 
this court has recognized public policy interests to protect 
patients in the context of nursing home residents.  See Hausman 
v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 665, 571 N.W.2d 393 
                                                                                                                                                             
Masri's reliance on legislative history is inapposite 
because analysis of a statute's purpose must begin with the 
language and context of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-49, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The language of the statute 
suggests that the legislative purpose is to protect employees 
from retaliation, which implicitly encourages the reporting of 
improper conduct, safeguards the livelihood of paid employees, 
and protects patients.  Thus, LIRC's interpretation that the 
statute applies only to employees advances the statute's 
purpose, and excluding interns from the protected group does not 
contravene the statutory purpose.  Moreover, even if Masri's 
interpretation is reasonable, it is not more reasonable than the 
interpretation of LIRC. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
31 
 
(1997).21  In Hausman, a licensed nurse and a licensed social 
worker, both employed by St. Croix Care Center, alleged that 
they were terminated for reporting abuse at the nursing home.  
Id. at 659-63.  The plaintiffs alleged that the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine allowed them to 
bring a private right of action.  Id. at 661-63.  This court 
declined to adopt a broad whistleblower exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine despite the fact that it might 
advance the public interest.  Id. at 666.  Instead, we tied the 
exception to the fact that plaintiffs had an affirmative 
obligation to prevent any suspected abuse of nursing home 
residents.  Id. at 667-69 (citing Wis. Stat. § 940.295(3) (1993-
94) as one law that creates an obligation to report concerns).  
We went on to conclude: 
The public policy of protecting nursing home residents 
from abuse is fundamental and well-defined.  Where the 
law imposes an affirmative obligation upon an employee 
to prevent abuse or neglect of nursing home residents 
and the employee fulfills that obligation by reporting 
the abuse, an employer's termination of employment for 
fulfillment of the legal obligation exposes the 
employer to a wrongful termination action.  In such 
instances, 
the 
employee 
may 
pursue 
a 
wrongful 
termination suit under the public policy exception 
regardless of whether the employer has made an initial 
                                                 
21 Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center, 214 Wis. 2d 655, 571 
N.W.2d 393 (1997), was decided before the legislature created 
Wis. Stat. § 146.997.  It appears that § 146.997 was created in 
response to the Hausman decision to protect health care 
employees who might not otherwise be protected by the public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  See Daryll 
J. 
Neuser, 
Wisconsin 
Health 
Care 
Workers: 
Whistleblower 
Protection, 77 Wis. Law. 16, 18 (Mar. 2004). 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
32 
 
request, command, or instruction that the reporting 
obligation be violated. 
Id. at 669 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).   
¶53 Influencing the Hausman decision was the fact that the 
plaintiffs could have been criminally prosecuted if they did not 
report the abuse.22  Id. at 665.  It is noteworthy that both 
plaintiffs in Hausman were employed, and the exception related 
to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Id. at 666.  Nothing in 
that decision suggests that the public policy to promote patient 
safety 
warrants 
a 
broad 
protection 
for 
unpaid 
interns, 
especially when that broad protection finds little support in 
the text.  Indeed, Hausman's aversion to creating an expansive 
public policy exception suggests that we should avoid broadening 
the definition of "employee." 
¶54 Declining to broaden the definition of "employee" to 
include interns does not contradict the statutory purposes, and 
in fact, it might actually protect internships.  Amicus Curiae, 
the Wisconsin Hospital Association (WHA), points out that health 
                                                 
22 Cf. Bammert v. Don's SuperValu, Inc., 2002 WI 85, ¶39, 
254 Wis. 2d 347, 646 N.W.2d 365 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).  
Justice Bablitch discussed the apparent rationale for the 
Hausman decision: 
In Hausman, we gave employees that fulfilled their 
legal duty protection from retaliatory firing.  The 
idea behind the exception is simply that we want 
people to fulfill their legal duties. . . .  We do not 
want people to be afraid to report nursing home abuse 
because they are afraid to be fired; therefore, we 
protect them. 
Id. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
33 
 
care employees have had training to recognize reportable 
conduct, whereas interns may not know what incidents are 
reportable.  WHA expresses concern that health care providers 
might reduce internship opportunities if interns, who might not 
have as much training as employees to recognize and report 
unethical or illegal conduct, are protected under Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997. 
¶55 MCW asserts that if interns fall under the definition 
of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 146.997, there would be no logical 
stopping point for people who fall under the protected class.  
Ultimately, the law is clear that this court should avoid using 
public policy to contradict a statute's plain text, and "[i]f 
the result in this case seems harsh, redress should come from 
the legislature, not from this court.  'If a statute fails to 
cover a particular situation, and the omission should be cured, 
the remedy lies with the legislature, not the courts.'"  Meriter 
Hosp., Inc. v. Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 145, ¶35, 277 Wis. 2d 1, 689 
N.W.2d 627 (quoting La Crosse Lutheran Hosp. v. La Crosse Cnty., 
133 Wis. 2d 335, 338, 395 N.W.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1986)).  LIRC's 
interpretation that 
§ 146.997 applies only to compensated 
employees is reasonable, and we conclude that there is no 
interpretation that is more reasonable. 
C. Application to Masri 
¶56 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 applies 
only to compensated employees, we must consider whether LIRC 
properly determined that Masri was not an employee.  Masri 
suggests that her all-access security badge, office space, 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
34 
 
parking, and support staff were tangible benefits that made her 
an employee.  Yet, as LIRC properly determined, these alleged 
tangible benefits all related to Masri's work as a "Psychologist 
Intern" and had no independent value.  If these benefits were 
enough to confer employee status on Masri, it seems that almost 
any unpaid worker would be considered an employee.  Similarly, 
Masri's networking opportunities were not tangible benefits 
because such opportunities are not tangible, nor do they have 
any 
ascertainable 
value. 
 
Finally, 
absent 
a 
contractual 
guarantee, promises of health insurance or grant money do not 
constitute tangible benefits if those promises never come to 
fruition.  Thus, we agree with LIRC's determination that Masri 
was not an employee because she received no compensation and no 
tangible benefits. 
¶57 We are not oblivious to the importance of internships 
and the often mutually beneficial relationship between interns 
and their supervising entity.  The purpose of this opinion is 
not 
to 
impair 
that 
relationship 
but 
to 
implement 
the 
legislature's statutory scheme.  Interns often provide valuable 
services to their supervising entities and receive vital 
training in return.  An internship might provide students with 
their first opportunity to apply their hard-earned knowledge in 
a real and practical setting.  Although we recognize the 
importance of internships, this court will not interlope to 
advance a policy not advanced by the legislature.  Should the 
legislature disagree with our decision and the five decisions 
below in the administrative and judicial proceedings, it may 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
35 
 
clarify the breadth of "employee" as it is used in § 146.997.  
Absent a legislative clarification, we are bound by the 
statute's text. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶58 We conclude the following. 
¶59 First, we accord LIRC's decision due weight deference 
because 
LIRC 
has 
experience 
interpreting 
the 
meaning 
of 
"employee" 
under 
various 
statutes 
and 
is 
charged 
with 
administering Wis. Stat. § 146.997.  The fact that LIRC had not 
previously considered the specific question whether an unpaid 
intern is an employee is not enough to abate the due weight 
deference owed to the agency.  See Jamerson, 345 Wis. 2d 205, 
¶47. 
¶60 Second, we agree with LIRC that Wis. Stat. § 146.997 
applies only to employees, a category that does not include 
interns who do not receive compensation or tangible benefits.  
See Masri v. Med. Coll. of Wis., ERD No. CR200902766 (LIRC, Aug. 
31, 2011).  As Wis. Stat. § 146.997 does not define "employee," 
we must give the term its ordinary meaning.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  After consulting the language, context, and 
structure of the statute, we conclude that LIRC's interpretation 
is reasonable, and there is no more reasonable interpretation.  
Because Masri received no compensation or tangible benefits, she 
was not an employee of MCW and was therefore not entitled to 
anti-retaliation protection under § 146.997(3)(a). 
¶By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
  2012AP1047 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   The 
Health 
Care Worker Protection Act protects whistleblowers who are 
health care workers and who report unethical or illegal behavior 
that threatens the health and safety of patients.  Masri, a 
full-time health care worker at the Medical College of Wisconsin 
(MCW), did everything she was supposed to do under the Act.  She 
reported what she observed as unethical and potentially illegal 
behavior.  There is nothing to suggest that her reporting was 
anything other than good faith reporting.  
¶62 She asserts that as a result of her good faith 
reporting, her internship was terminated, her educational career 
has been disrupted, and she has been stigmatized with a black 
mark on her professional career.  She asks for vindication that 
what she did was right, and payment of her attorney fees in 
seeking that vindication. 
¶63 Even though she did what was asked under the Act, the 
majority denies her any vindication.  It leaves Masri and other 
health care workers like her without protection and without a 
remedy.  The result is that these health care workers who are in 
a position to witness and report problems with patient care may 
now be silent, resulting in lower quality patient care. 
¶64 This case is about statutory construction.  I part 
ways with the majority because in reaching its conclusion it 
discards our time-tested canons of statutory construction.  In 
doing so, the majority rewrites the statute, limits application 
of the Health Care Worker Protection Act beyond what is required 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
2 
 
by its terms, and undermines the Act's purpose of protecting 
patients.   
¶65 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the Health 
Care Worker Protection Act means what it expressly provides: its 
coverage extends to "any person."  Further, even if the Act's 
coverage were limited to employees only, the canons of statutory 
construction mandate that "employee" be interpreted broadly in 
order to fulfill the remedial purpose of the Act.  Under either 
approach, Masri should be afforded coverage.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶66 The majority downplays certain facts relevant to this 
case.  Because there is more to the story, I begin with an 
overview of the events preceding this action. 
¶67  Masri was a doctoral candidate in the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee School of Education (UWM), Department of 
Education Psychology.  UWM placed Masri as a full-time intern at 
MCW as part of her educational program.  Prior to the start of 
her internship, Masri's future supervisor, Dr. Anderson, e-
mailed her stating: "I have found some funding for you for a 
research project.  And actually have a commitment.  Still 
working on the amount but think at least 500 per month." 
¶68 In 
August 
2008 
Masri 
started 
working 
as 
a 
"Psychologist Intern" in MCW's transplant surgery unit at 
Froedtert Hospital.  She worked 40 regularly scheduled hours per 
week.  Her duties included interviewing patients and staff, 
reviewing and assessing medical records, signing psychological 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
3 
 
reports, preparing patient progress notes, and attending staff 
meetings.  As part of her internship, Masri received full access 
to 
patient 
records 
otherwise 
protected 
by 
HIPAA1          
and the hospital's facilities. 
¶69 Some ethical concerns arose during Masri's internship 
and she was directed by MCW staff to report them to John Mayer, 
the official designated to receive employee complaints.  Masri 
met with Mayer on November 19, 2008, and reported that Dr. 
Anderson 
ordered 
her 
to 
create 
a 
borderline 
personality 
diagnosis to discredit a patient who may have been contemplating 
a medical malpractice suit.  She also reported that she was 
directed to perform professional duties outside the authorized 
parameters of her intern position.  Specifically, she was 
ordered to work as a professional social worker——not as a 
Psychologist Intern——while the transplant unit social worker was 
away on vacation.  She was also directed to complete evaluations 
in the role of an authorized social worker for patients.  
Although Masri had more incidents to report,2 Mayer cut her off, 
                                                 
1 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 U.S. Stat. 1936 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of Titles 18, 26, 29 and 42 of the 
U.S. Code). 
2 Masri asserts that had Mayer not cut her off, she would 
have reported the following additional incidents: 
 
1) Dr. Anderson ordering her not to speak to anyone about an 
"off-list” organ transplant recipient who paid $25,000.00 
for a kidney harvested from Pakistan; 
 
2) A social worker on the transplant unit making an 
unethical 
recommendation 
to 
eliminate 
a 
transplant 
candidate based on a subjective moral judgment of the 
candidate's personal life and educational background; and 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
4 
 
stating that he needed to discuss her allegations with Dr. 
Anderson.  Two days later, Dr. Anderson called UWM from 
Washington, D.C. to terminate Masri's internship. 
¶70 Masri filed a complaint with the Equal Rights Division 
of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) about the 
termination of her internship.  In response to inquiries from 
the Equal Rights Division, MCW stated that Masri was not an 
employee and that her internship was discontinued due to her 
unsatisfactory performance.  In support, MCW attached a letter 
from Dr. Anderson explaining her decision to terminate Masri's 
internship.  Dr. Anderson's undated letter, which was drafted 
after Masri's internship was terminated, made reference to 
incidents in October 2008 and referred to them as being the 
grounds for the termination.   Other than this undated, post-
termination letter, there are no other notes in the record about 
the incidents or any other documentation that would substantiate 
a concern that Masri's performance was unsatisfactory. 
II 
¶71 The majority determines that the Act's protections 
apply only to individuals who work in exchange for compensation 
or tangible benefits. In reaching this determination, the 
majority fails to follow time-tested canons of statutory 
construction.  Those canons provide that when interpreting a 
statute, we look first to the language of the statute.  State ex 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3) Dr. Anderson's order that Masri interview and assess a 
mentally incompetent and semi-conscious ICU patient to 
disqualify that patient from the priority transplant 
list. 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
5 
 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶72 Unlike 
what 
the 
majority 
suggests, 
the 
statute 
expressly states who is covered——"any person." Specifically, it 
provides: 
No health care facility or health care provider and no 
employee of a health care facility or health care 
provider may take disciplinary action against, or 
threaten to take disciplinary action against, any 
person because the person reported in good faith any 
information 
under 
sub. 
(2)(a), 
in 
good 
faith 
initiated, participated in or testified in any action 
or proceeding under sub. (2)(c) or provided in good 
faith any information under sub. (2)(d) or because the 
health care facility, health care provider or employee 
believes that the person reported in good faith any 
information 
under 
sub. 
(2)(a), 
in 
good 
faith 
initiated, participated in or testified in any action 
or proceeding under sub. (2)(c) or provided in good 
faith any information under sub. (2)(d). 
Wis. Stat. § 146.997(3)(a) (emphasis supplied).   
 
¶73 The majority, however, inserts its own word "employee" 
for the legislature's chosen words "any person."  In doing so, 
it violates a cardinal canon of statutory construction.  Rather 
than adhering to the express language chosen by the legislature, 
it discards it.   
¶74 The majority attempts to justify its rewriting of the 
express language of the Health Care Worker Protection Act by 
implying that it was inartfully drafted.  It offers the excuse 
that 
the 
legislature 
used 
the 
words 
"any 
person" 
to 
differentiate between the employee retaliating and the employee 
being retaliated against in order to allay confusion.  Majority 
op., ¶45.   
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
6 
 
¶75 This excuse is without merit.  If the legislature had 
intended for the statute to apply only to employees, it could 
have easily cured the suggested confusion.  It takes this writer 
mere seconds to provide an example: "No health care facility or 
health care provider and no employee of a health care facility 
or health care provider may take disciplinary action against, or 
threaten to take disciplinary action against, an employee who 
reported in good faith. . . ." 
 
 ¶76  "We have stated time and again that courts must 
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶39 (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253-54 (1992)).  As this court has previously explained, "[i]t 
is not reasonable to presume that the legislature preferred 
elegance over precision in its wording of the statute. The more 
reasonable presumption is that the legislature chose its terms 
carefully and precisely to express its meaning."  Ball v. Dist. 
No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 
2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). 
¶77 Further, it is a well-established canon of statutory 
construction that each word in a statute should have independent 
meaning so that no word is redundant or superfluous.  Pawlowski 
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 
777 N.W.2d 67.  Thus, "[w]hen the legislature chooses to use two 
different words, we generally consider each separately and 
presume that different words have different meanings."  Id.   
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
7 
 
¶78 The legislature used both "employee" and "person" 
throughout the Health Care Worker Protection Act.3  When it came 
to defining the coverage of the Act, the legislature chose to 
use the words "any person."  Wis. Stat. § 146.997(3)(a).  Under 
the canons of statutory construction, which the majority 
ignores, the express language of the statute referring to "any 
person" should not be interpreted as "employee." 
¶79 In 
reading 
the 
words 
"any 
person" 
as 
meaning 
"employees," 
the 
majority 
limits 
the 
Health 
Care 
Worker 
                                                 
3 For example, Wis. Stat. § 146.997 states: 
(2) Reporting protected.  
(a) Any employee . . . who is aware of any information, . . 
. that would lead a reasonable person to believe any of the 
following may report that information to . . . any employee 
of the health care facility  . . .. 
(b) An agency [shall], . . . notify the health care 
facility or health provider . . .. The notification 
and summary may not disclose the identity of the 
person who made the report.  
 
(c) Any employee of a health care facility or health 
care provider may initiate, . . . any action or 
proceeding . . ..  
 
(d) Any employee . . . may provide any information 
relating to an alleged violation . . ..  
(3) Disciplinary action prohibited.  
  
. . ..  
 
(b) . . . no 
employee . . . may 
take 
disciplinary 
action 
against . . . any 
person 
on 
whose 
behalf 
another person reported in good faith any information 
. . . or 
because 
the . . . employee 
believes 
that 
another person reported in good faith any information 
. . . on that person's behalf. . . .  
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
8 
 
Protection Act beyond its terms.  In its analysis, the majority 
cites to other provisions in the Act and reasons that the words 
"any person" must mean employees working for compensation or 
tangible benefit.  It asserts that the disciplinary actions the 
Act prohibits and the remedies the Act provides could not apply 
to unpaid workers.  Majority op., ¶¶36, 38, 45.  Not only is 
this suggestion not supported by the language of the Act, but it 
also reads its terms more narrowly than they are written.   
¶80 The Health Care Worker Protection Act adopts the 
definition of "discipline" provided by Wis. Stat. § 230.80(2), 
which includes such actions of the employer that result in a 
dismissal, transfer, removal of assigned duty, reprimand, verbal 
or physical harassment, denial of education or training, and 
reassignment.  It is unclear why these employer actions would 
not be applicable to unpaid workers. 
 
¶81 Similarly, it is unclear why the whistleblower's 
remedies permitted by the statute could not apply to unpaid 
workers.4 
 
As 
explained 
by 
the 
majority, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.997(4)(a) details how employees may report violations to 
the DWD.5  If the DWD determines that there have been violations, 
it may award remedies as described in Wis. Stat. § 111.39.  
                                                 
4 The majority's analysis in this respect appears circular——
unpaid workers are not covered by the Act because they cannot 
seek its remedies, yet they cannot seek the Act's remedies 
because they are unpaid workers. 
5 Although 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.997(4)(a) 
uses 
the 
term 
"employee" in describing how to report violations, as more fully 
discussed below, nothing in the Heath Care Worker Protection Act 
limits the term "employee" to an individual working in exchange 
for compensation. 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
9 
 
Majority op., ¶¶35-36.  Among the remedies suggested by Wis. 
Stat. § 111.39(4)(c) is reinstatement.  The court has also 
determined that aggrieved workers are entitled to attorney fees.  
Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n., 117 Wis. 2d 753, 765, 
345 N.W.2d 482 (1984).  An unpaid intern whose internship had 
been terminated for reporting a violation of the law may find 
reinstatement to be a desired remedy.  The intern is also likely 
to want attorney fees in seeking that reinstatement.  Nothing in 
the Act limits these remedies to only paid employees.  Nothing 
in the express language of the Health Care Worker Protection Act 
limits 
its 
protections 
only 
to 
individuals 
working 
for 
compensation as the majority suggests. 
¶82 In paragraphs 47-48, the majority sets up its own 
straw man only to quickly knock it down.  In essence, it warns 
that the sky is falling if there is a literal translation of the 
statutory words "any person."  For example, the majority 
suggests that a literal translation would mean that anybody in 
the 
world 
could 
file 
a 
complaint, 
"absolutely 
anybody."  
Majority op., ¶48.  And, if that does not frighten the reader 
enough, in a footnote, the majority expounds further to observe 
that "person includes all partnerships, associations and bodies 
politic or corporate."  Id., ¶47 n.17.  Having set up the straw 
man that "any person" could include a body politic in Timbuktu 
filing a complaint, the majority warns "there would be no 
stopping point" and that a literal translation would "jeopardize 
the structure and efficiency of administrative agencies and 
regulatory bodies in the State."  Id. 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
10 
 
¶83 The problem with the majority's straw man argument, 
like all straw men arguments, is that it sets up an argument 
that no one is advancing.  Instead, I determine that "any 
person" includes any person who faces disciplinary action from a 
health care facility for reporting possible violations that pose 
a risk to public health or safety. 
 
¶84 I acknowledge that ambiguity arises because the Health 
Care Worker Protection Act incorporates the definition of 
"disciplinary action" found in Wis. Stat. § 230.80. Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997(1)(b).  Wisconsin Stat. § 230.80 defines "disciplinary 
action" as "any action taken with respect to an employee which 
has the effect, in whole or in part, of a penalty, including but 
not limited to any of the following. . . ." (emphasis supplied).  
Where this definition conflicts with the language in the Health 
Care Worker Protection Act, it creates ambiguity. 
 
¶85 However, 
"[w]hen 
a 
statute 
is 
ambiguous, the 
legislature is presumed to have intended an interpretation that 
advances the purposes of the statute."  Belleville State Bank v. 
Steele, 117 Wis. 2d 563, 570, 345 N.W.2d 405 (1984).  The 
purpose of the Health Care Worker Protection Act is evident from 
its language.  It protects workers who report that "the quality 
of any health care service provided by the health care facility 
or health care provider . . . violates any standard . . . and 
poses a potential risk to public health or safety."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997(2)(a).  If the law protects workers who report patient 
quality of care problems, necessarily it is meant to encourage 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
11 
 
those workers to do so.  Thus, on its face, the statute is aimed 
at protecting patients.  
 
¶86 The 
majority's 
approach 
undermines 
this 
purpose.  
Although the majority acknowledges that the purpose of the 
statute is to protect patients, it simultaneously chastises 
Masri for "engraft[ing] purposes onto the statute that are not 
embedded in its text."  Majority op., ¶51.  Then, without 
explanation, the majority states that "[d]eclining to broaden 
the definition of 'employee' to include unpaid interns does not 
contradict the statutory purposes."  Majority op., ¶54. It is 
hard to conceive how a limited reading of the Health Care Worker 
Protection Act would not run counter to its goal of patient 
protection.  If fewer health care workers report problems with 
patient care, there will be fewer opportunities for those 
problems to be fixed and patients will be left at risk.   
 
¶87 Due to the remedial purpose of the Health Care Worker 
Protection Act, our canons of statutory construction dictate 
that its provisions be liberally construed.  Watkins, 117 
Wis. 2d at 762 (statutes containing broad remedial language 
shall be liberally construed).  Courts generally construe 
whistleblower 
protection 
laws 
broadly 
to 
achieve 
their 
protective goals. See, e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. 
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1993) (terms 
used in whistleblower protection law, which was aimed at 
encouraging workers to aid in enforcement of Clean Water Act and 
nuclear safety statutes, broadly construed to achieve that 
goal); Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
12 
 
(determining that a more inclusive interpretation of "employee" 
is warranted for the whistleblower provisions in the Federal 
Railway Safety Act, aimed at promoting rail safety); Phillips v. 
Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (narrow construction of the whistleblower provision 
in Mining Safety Act would be contrary to its purpose of 
increasing safety in mines).  A similar liberal construction of 
the Act's scope would support the Health Care Worker Protection 
Act's purpose of protecting patients. 
 
¶88 When liberally construed, the conflict between the 
Act's scope as dictated by the "any person" language and the 
definition of "disciplinary action" should be cured by deferring 
to the language defining the scope of the Act.  The Health Care 
Worker 
Protection 
Act 
incorporates 
the 
definition 
of 
"disciplinary 
action" 
from 
a 
statute 
on 
state 
employee 
protection.  Wis. Stat. §§ 146.997(1)(b), 230.80(2).  In the 
context of defining state employee protection, the language in 
the definition referring to employees is appropriate.  Wis. 
Stat. § 230.80(2) ("Disciplinary action" means any action taken 
with respect to an employee . . .").  However, the use of the 
term "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(2) was not intended to 
delineate the scope of the Health Care Worker Protection Act.  
That function is served by the specific language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.997(3)(a).   
 
¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.997(3)(a) more specifically 
addresses the scope of the Health Care Worker Protection Act, 
therefore its provisions should govern.  This is consistent with 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
13 
 
the canon of statutory construction that "[w]here a general 
statute and a specific statute relate to the same subject matter 
the specific statute controls."  Wauwatosa v. Grunewald, 18 
Wis. 2d 83, 87, 118 N.W.2d 128 (1962). 
 
¶90 The language of the Health Care Worker Protection Act 
indicates its remedial purpose of protecting patients.  This is 
best achieved by interpreting the words "any person" to mean 
what they say.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶39.  Accordingly, I 
conclude 
that 
the 
Act 
protects 
any 
person 
from 
facing 
disciplinary action for reporting quality of care issues.  This 
includes Masri.  
III 
¶91 Even if the majority were correct that "any person," 
as used in the Health Care Worker Protection Act, refers only to 
"employees," that does not mean that "employee" should be 
accorded a narrow definition centered on compensation.  It is 
worth noting again that statutes should be construed liberally 
to effectuate their purpose.  State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 
47, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987).  Accordingly, "employee" should be 
read broadly to meet the purpose of protecting patients. 
¶92 The majority suggests that the Labor and Industry 
Review Commission (LIRC) has always construed "employee" as an 
individual working for an employer in exchange for wage or 
compensation.  Majority op., ¶¶26, 37 n.14.  That is incorrect. 
¶93 LIRC decides appeals in three administrative areas: 
workers compensation law, unemployment compensation law, and 
equal rights law (which includes the Health Care Worker 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
14 
 
Protection Act).  In the context of both worker compensation and 
unemployment compensation, LIRC has concluded that an individual 
can be considered a statutory employee to effectuate the 
purposes of the statute even when the individual has not 
received a dime from the employer and has never set foot on the 
employer's premise. 
¶94 The appeals that LIRC review arise from the decisions 
of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD).  Here, the DWD 
dismissed 
Masri's 
complaint 
without 
further 
investigation, 
concluding that because she was not compensated by MCW for her 
work, Masri was not a covered employee under the Act.   
¶95 Yet, the DWD has previously explained that the 
definitions of "employee" in the different statutes that LIRC 
administers will vary depending on the purpose of the statute.  
It notes that the definitions "are likely to be similar, but 
rarely will they be identical.  The Legislature has determined 
that there are different policy considerations for each program, 
that 
in 
turn 
require 
slightly 
different 
definitions 
[of 
'employee']."  Department of Workforce Development, "Independent 
Contractors and Worker's Compensation in Wisconsin" at 6 (June 
2003), available at http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/publications/ 
wc/WKC_13324_P.pdf (emphasis supplied). 
¶96 For example, in Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Dep't of 
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 36, 240 N.W.2d 
422 (1976), the court determined that for purposes of the 
Worker's Compensation Act an employee of a subcontractor 
qualifies as a statutory employee of the general contractor when 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
15 
 
the subcontractor regularly furnishes to a principal employer 
materials or services which are integrally related to the 
finished product or service.  It explained that "the workmens' 
compensation law of this state must be liberally construed to 
reach the objectives of that law," and that "the purpose of this 
legislation was to protect employees of irresponsible and 
uninsured subcontractors."  Id. at 37. 
¶97 Similarly, as noted in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dep't 
of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 90 Wis. 2d 736, 280 N.W.2d 
240 (1979), the definition of "employee" for purposes of the 
unemployment compensation law "mean[t] any individual who is or 
has been performing services for an employing unit, in an 
employment, whether or not he is paid directly by such employing 
unit."  Id. at 742 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 108.02(3)(a) (1971)).  
The court explained that although an individual may be an 
independent contractor, "this does not necessarily bar him from 
being an employee under the act.  His status under the act must 
be determined from the act itself in view of the purpose of the 
act as declared therein."  Id. at 743 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 241 Wis. 200, 203, 5 N.W.2d 743 (1942)). 
¶98  In this case we are presented with an issue of first 
impression.  The Health Care Worker Protection Act does not 
define "employee."  We are asked to determine if it is more 
reasonable to liberally construe the term "employee" in the 
Health Care Worker Protection Act to effectuate the Act's 
purpose, as the court has done with the Workers' Compensation 
Law and Unemployment Compensation Law, or to use a limiting 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
16 
 
test, narrowly focusing only on compensation between the 
employer and employee.  Both LIRC and the majority have opted 
for a narrow interpretation.   
¶99 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that it is more 
reasonable to construe "employee" liberally to effectuate the 
remedial purpose of the Act.  In doing so, I would apply the 
test for a master-servant relationship as found in our common 
law.  The broad definition of employee from the master-servant 
test is more consistent with the remedial purpose of the Health 
Care Worker Protection Act because it enables more workers to 
report quality of care issues and meets the statute's purpose of 
protecting patients.   
¶100 Use of the master-servant test is also consistent with 
our caselaw.  Where a term in a statute is undefined or not 
helpfully defined, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has referred to 
the common law definition of the term to aid in interpretation.  
For 
example, 
it 
utilized 
this 
approach 
in 
interpreting 
"employee" as used in the Unemployment Compensation Act.  
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 233 Wis. 467, 478, 
290 N.W. 199 (1940).  At the time, the statutory definition of 
"employee" was "any individual employed by an 'employer' and in 
an 'employment.'"  Id. at 477.  The court stated that this 
implies that the term "employee" and "employer" are to be given 
their common-law meaning.  Id.  The court explained that "there 
is nothing in the definition there given to indicate anything 
different from the common-law concept," and that if the 
legislature "had intended to change the ordinary and commonly 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
17 
 
understood meaning of the words 'employer' and 'employee' they 
would have used language expressly so declaring."  Id. at 478. 
¶101 Likewise, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
explained 
that 
"[w]here 
Congress 
uses 
terms 
that 
have 
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court 
must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress 
means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms."  
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 
(1989) (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 
(1981)).   
¶102 Accordingly, when interpreting federal statutes that 
use the term "employee" without helpfully defining it, the 
Supreme Court construes that term as descriptive of "the 
conventional 
master-servant 
relationship 
as 
understood 
by 
common-law agency doctrine."  Id. at 740.  It has consistently 
used this approach to interpret a number of federal statutes.  
See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 
440, 448 (2003) (using the common-law definition of master-
servant relationship when interpreting the meaning of employee 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (construing "employee" 
under Employee Retirement Income Security Act based on common 
law principles of agency); Reid, 490 U.S. at 739 (construing 
"employee" as used in the Copyright Act); Kelley v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1974) (using common-law 
principle of master-servant relationship to determine employment 
statutes under the Federal Employers' Liability Act); NLRB v. 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
18 
 
United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (construing "employee" 
under the National Labor Relations Act based on common-law 
agency principles).   
¶103 In a similar vein, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has 
determined that "the factors relevant to a master/servant 
relationship are relevant to deciding whether [the defendant] 
was a state employee" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82.  
Lamoreux v. Oreck, 2004 WI App 160, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 801, 686 
N.W.2d 722.  
¶104 The 
common 
law 
definition 
of 
a 
master-servant 
relationship is much broader than the definition that the 
majority applies here, which is limited to whether or not a 
worker receives compensation or tangible benefits.  At federal 
common 
law, 
a 
determination 
of 
whether 
a 
master-servant 
relationship exists takes into account a number of factors, 
including: 
 
the hiring party's right to control the manner and 
means by which the product is accomplished. . . . the 
skill required; the source of the instrumentalities 
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of 
the relationship between the parties; whether the 
hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the 
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring 
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party; whether the 
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52). 
"[A]ll of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive."  NLRB v. United Ins. 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
19 
 
Co. of America, 390 U.S. at 258.  Consistent therewith the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 7.07(2)(b) states: "the fact 
that work is performed gratuitously does not relieve a principal 
of liability."  
¶105 Wisconsin courts use almost identical factors in 
determining whether a master-servant relationship exists in the 
context of tort liability.  As explained in Pamperin v. Trinity 
Mem'l Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 199, 423 N.W.2d 848 (1988), the 
dominant test in determining whether an individual is a servant 
is "[t]he right to control."   
¶106 Other factors to consider include: "the place of work, 
the time of the employment, the method of payment, the nature of 
the 
business 
or 
occupation, 
which 
party 
furnishes 
the 
instrumentalities or tools, the intent of the parties to the 
contract, and the right of summary discharge of employees."  Id. 
at 199.  As with the federal cases, no one factor is 
determinative and "[a] servant need not be under formal contract 
to perform work for a master, nor is it necessary for a person 
to be paid in order to occupy the position of servant."  Kerl v. 
Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶22, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 N.W.2d 
328; Petzel v. Valley Orthopedics Ltd., 2009 WI App 106, ¶16, 
320 Wis. 2d 621, 770 N.W.2d 787 (same). 
¶107 Contrary to the majority, I determine that it is more 
reasonable to interpret the Health Care Worker Protection Act 
with the broad master-servant test from our common law than a 
dictionary definition of the term "employee."  This broad test 
is consistent with the statute's purpose.  Further, Wisconsin 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
20 
 
and United States Supreme Court caselaw establishes that it is 
the appropriate test to apply when a statute uses the term 
"employee" without providing a helpful definition. 
¶108 Applying the master-servant factors to the case at 
hand reveals that Masri qualifies as an employee.  Throughout 
Masri's internship, MCW had the right to control her actions. 
Masri was placed in MCW's transplant surgery unit at Froedtert 
Hospital.  She worked 40 regularly scheduled hours per week as a 
psychology intern.  Dr. Anderson had obtained a grant to fund 
Masri's work.  Masri's duties included interviewing patients and 
staff, 
reviewing 
and 
assessing 
medical 
records, 
signing 
psychological reports, preparing patient progress notes, and 
attending staff meetings.  In that role, MCW granted Masri full 
access to HIPAA protected patient records and MCW's facilities.  
This 
suggests 
the 
intent 
to 
have 
an 
employee-employer 
relationship.  Further, MCW had the right to summarily discharge 
Masri at any time.  These factors outweigh the fact that Masri 
was not paid for her services and suggest that she should be 
considered an employee for purposes of the Health Care Worker 
Protection Act.  Accordingly, I would reverse the court of 
appeals 
and 
remand 
the 
case 
for 
an 
investigation 
and 
determination of whether MCW unlawfully terminated Masri's 
internship in retaliation for the complaints she made about 
clinical and ethical concerns. 
IV 
¶109  The parties dispute whether due weight or no weight 
should be accorded to LIRC's interpretation of the Health Care 
No.  2012AP1047.awb 
 
21 
 
Worker Protection Act limiting coverage to paid employees.  
These levels of deference are analytically equivalent as both 
require the court to independently interpret a statute. Racine 
Harley-Davidson v. State Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, 
¶20, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  Even under due weight 
deference, the agency's interpretation will not be adopted if 
the court determines an alternate interpretation is more 
reasonable.  Id.   
¶110 As discussed above, I conclude that there is a more 
reasonable interpretation of the Health Care Worker Protection 
Act than the limited one accorded by LIRC.  The Health Care 
Worker Protection Act should be interpreted as meaning what it 
expressly provides: its coverage extends to "any person."  
Further, even if the Act's coverage was limited to employees 
only, 
the 
canons 
of 
statutory 
construction 
mandate 
that 
"employee" be liberally construed in order to fulfill the 
remedial purpose of the Act.  Under either approach, Masri 
should be afforded coverage.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.    
¶111 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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