Title: Commonwealth v. Colondres
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11725
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 2015

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SJC-11725 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHNNY COLONDRES. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 2, 2014. - April 13, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, 
Probable cause, Search incident to lawful arrest. 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. 
Probable Cause.  Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit, 
Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 7, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and the cases were heard by Tina S. 
Page, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Before trial, the defendant, Johnny Colondres, 
moved to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by 
Springfield police during the execution of an "anticipatory 
search warrant."  The defendant claimed that police had executed 
the search before the "triggering events" stated in the 
affidavit had occurred, and that therefore the search should be 
treated as warrantless and the evidence suppressed.  The motion 
judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress and, after a 
jury-waived trial before a different judge, the defendant was 
convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine, and of unlawful 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.1  The 
defendant appealed, and we granted his application for direct 
appellate review.  We conclude that where, as here, the 
Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the 
judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on 
the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is 
authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance 
with that condition precedent.  Because we conclude that, in 
this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the 
warrant's condition precedent and probable cause to search the 
                                                 
 
1 The defendant was sentenced to from eleven to thirteen 
years in State prison on the trafficking convictions, and one 
year in the house of correction on the possession with intent to 
distribute conviction, all to be served concurrently.  He was 
found not guilty on an indictment charging possession of 
"Ecstasy" pills with intent to distribute. 
 
3 
 
defendant's residence once equivalent compliance was achieved, 
we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting 
convictions. 
 
Background.  The facts are not in dispute.  The search of 
the defendant's apartment at 250 Oakgrove Avenue in Springfield 
arose out of an investigation by the Springfield police 
department of the defendant's nephew, Carlos Colondres.2  As 
detailed in the affidavit by Officer John Wadlegger in support 
of the application for the warrant to search the defendant's 
apartment, the police were investigating the sale of cocaine and 
heroin by a man known as "Loso."  The investigation was assisted 
by an anonymous "cooperating source" (CS), who informed Officer 
Wadlegger that the CS had purchased cocaine from Loso "numerous 
times over the past month."  The CS provided Officer Wadlegger 
with Loso's cellular telephone number and the license plate 
numbers of the two vehicles Loso operated, one of which the CS 
identified as belonging to Loso's girl friend.  The CS informed 
Officer Wadlegger that Loso lived with his girl friend "on a 
side street off of St. James Ave. in Springfield."  The CS also 
informed Officer Wadlegger that the CS had seen Loso in 
possession of heroin for sale, and that Loso had offered to sell 
heroin to the CS. 
                                                 
2 Because Carlos Colondres has the same last name as the 
defendant, we refer to him as Carlos to avoid confusion. 
4 
 
 
After conducting a registry of motor vehicles inquiry, 
Officer Wadlegger determined that one of the vehicles identified 
by the CS was registered to Carlos, and the second vehicle was 
registered to a woman named Mychael Barnett who lived at 14 
Berkeley Street in Springfield.3  When Officer Wadlegger showed 
the CS the registry of motor vehicles photograph of Carlos, the 
CS positively identified Carlos as Loso.  Officer Wadlegger 
conducted a surveillance of 14 Berkeley Street and observed both 
vehicles parked in front of the address.  He also observed 
Carlos leave that address, travel to 250 Oakgrove Avenue, and 
enter the building at that address.  Carlos reemerged a short 
time later and returned to 14 Berkeley Street. 
 
Officer Wadlegger arranged for the CS to conduct two 
"controlled buys" of narcotics from Carlos.  The first was 
initiated "[d]uring the week of December 25, 2011," when the CS 
telephoned Carlos and asked to purchase heroin from him; the 
second was initiated "[d]uring the week of January 8, 2012," 
when the CS telephoned Carlos and asked to purchase cocaine.  
During both initiating telephone calls, Carlos told the CS to 
meet him at a prearranged location; during the conversation 
initiating the second controlled purchase, Carlos explained that 
                                                 
 
3 The Commonwealth claimed in its opposition to the 
defendant's motion to suppress that 14 Berkeley Street is only 
0.2 miles from St. James Avenue in Springfield, but this 
information was not included in Officer John Wadlegger's 
affidavit in support of his application for a search warrant. 
5 
 
he "had to go and pick up the cocaine for the sale."  Following 
the telephone conversations, police conducted a surveillance of 
Carlos's movements, observing the same sequence of events on 
both occasions.  Carlos traveled to 250 Oakgrove Avenue in 
Springfield, where he parked his vehicle and entered the 
building.  Carlos took the elevator to the third floor and 
entered apartment 304 with a set of keys.4  A short time later, 
Carlos left the building and traveled to the arranged meeting 
location, where he met with the CS.  After the meetings, Carlos 
returned to 14 Berkeley Street, and the CS met with Officer 
Wadlegger to turn over the drugs that the CS had purchased from 
Carlos using "buy money" the CS had been provided by the police.5 
 
On January 19, 2012, Officer Wadlegger applied for a search 
warrant for the defendant's apartment.  In his affidavit, 
Officer Wadlegger said that, based on his training and 
experience and on the information obtained through his 
investigation, the defendant's apartment was being used as a 
                                                 
 
4 After the first controlled purchase, Officer Wadlegger 
entered the entryway of the building at 250 Oakgrove Avenue and 
saw the defendant's name on the mailbox for apartment 304. 
 
 
5 Before both controlled purchases, police searched the 
confidential source (CS) for "currency and/or contraband" and 
found none.  The drugs that the CS turned over were "field 
tested" by police, with the drugs from the first controlled 
purchase testing positive for heroin, and the drugs from the 
second controlled purchase testing positive for cocaine. 
 
6 
 
"stash house" to store narcotics and cash.6  He stated in the 
affidavit that he was "requesting an anticipatory search warrant 
for 250 Oakgrove Ave., Apt. #304."  He also attested that, 
between 6 P.M. and 8 P.M. that day, he received information from 
the CS that Carlos "would be making a delivery of cocaine to the 
South End section of the city," and "would be leaving 14 
Berkeley St. and then going to 250 Oakgrove Ave., Apt 304 to 
retrieve the cocaine," which Carlos would then deliver to the 
customer.  Officer Wadlegger declared in his affidavit, "If this 
occurs, this will trigger probable cause to believe that cocaine 
is being kept inside 250 Oakgrove Ave., Apt #304." 
 
Based on the affidavit, a warrant was issued by an 
assistant clerk-magistrate of the Springfield Division of the 
District Court Department to search the defendant's apartment 
for cocaine, as well as for drug paraphernalia, monies, and 
personal papers.  Later that day, the police observed Carlos 
travel from 14 Berkeley Street to the defendant's apartment, 
leave a short time later, and reenter his vehicle.  At that 
time, not waiting for Carlos to make the anticipated delivery of 
cocaine, the police approached Carlos, removed him from the 
                                                 
 
6 Officer Wadlegger explained in his affidavit that it is 
"quite common for upper level narcotics dealers" to have a 
"stash house" to protect their cash and narcotics from "'Rip 
Off' crews" and other rival drug dealers, and to reduce the 
likelihood that a cooperating source could inform police where 
the dealers store their cash and narcotics. 
7 
 
vehicle, and placed him under arrest.  During the search 
incident to arrest, two bags of cocaine, one weighing 
approximately 57 grams and the other 4.5 grams, were seized from 
Carlos's person.  The police then executed the search warrant 
for the defendant's apartment, seizing approximately 1,700 grams 
of cocaine, 878 tablets of "Ecstasy," 101 grams of heroin, one 
pound of marijuana, and drug packaging paraphernalia.7 
 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from 
the search, claiming that the search was not authorized by the 
warrant because it was conducted without the occurrence of the 
warrant's triggering event, i.e., the delivery of cocaine by 
Carlos to someone in the South End of Springfield.  In denying 
the defendant's motion to suppress, the motion judge concluded 
that the warrant to search the defendant's apartment was not an 
anticipatory search warrant.  He recognized that "the affiant 
. . . viewed probable cause as anticipatory," but found "no such 
limitation in the warrant itself," which commanded a search of 
the apartment within a reasonable time within seven days and 
"was not predicated on the occurrence of any triggering event."  
The judge also found that the search warrant affidavit 
                                                 
 
7 The defendant was at home when the police knocked and 
announced themselves but he did not answer the door.  When the 
police forced open the door and entered the apartment, they saw 
the defendant running from a couch in the living room before he 
was secured.  
 
8 
 
"established probable cause that evidence of criminal activity 
would be found" at the apartment, "whether or not the triggering 
events occurred."  Having found that the search warrant was not 
anticipatory and that there was probable cause to support the 
warrant regardless of whether the triggering events occurred, 
the judge denied the motion to suppress.  
 
Discussion.  We address first the judge's conclusion that 
the search warrant was not anticipatory because the warrant 
itself did not declare that a triggering event was a condition 
precedent to the execution of the search.  An anticipatory 
search warrant is "not require[d] . . . to contain on its face 
explicit directions about the triggering event, as long as the 
conditions precedent to the warrant's execution are contained in 
the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant."  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 Mass. 71, 73 (2000).  See United 
States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97-99 (2006); Commonwealth v. 
Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37, 41-45 (1997).  Because the affidavit 
here set forth the triggering events that were the conditions 
precedent to execution of the warrant, the failure of the 
warrant to recite those events on its face did not prevent the 
warrant from being an anticipatory search warrant. 
 
"An anticipatory search warrant is a warrant that takes 
effect at a specified future time and not on its issuance."  
Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass. 521, 525 (2004).  See 
9 
 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 844 n.3 (2000), quoting 
United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943 (1989) ("An 
anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been 
issued before the necessary events have occurred which will 
allow a constitutional search of the premises; if those events 
do not transpire, the warrant is void").  See also Grubbs, 547 
U.S. at 94, quoting 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), 
at 398 (4th ed. 2004) ("An anticipatory warrant is 'a warrant 
based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some 
future time [but not presently] certain evidence of crime will 
be located at a specific place'").  Implicit in this definition 
is that the occurrence of the "so-called 'triggering condition'" 
specified in the affidavit is necessary to establish probable 
cause and therefore is a condition precedent to the execution of 
the warrant.  See Grubbs, supra ("by definition, the triggering 
condition which establishes probable cause has not yet been 
satisfied when the warrant is issued").  Cf. Cruz, supra at 843-
844 ("Because probable cause existed at the time the warrant was 
issued, it was not an anticipatory warrant").  The judge or 
clerk-magistrate who authorizes an anticipatory warrant must 
find probable cause to believe that the evidence particularized 
in the warrant "will be found when the search is conducted" 
(emphasis in original), Grubbs, supra at 95, not when the search 
10 
 
is authorized.  See Staines, supra.  The authorization of the 
search, therefore, is conditioned on the occurrence of the 
triggering condition, because only then will the judge's or 
clerk-magistrate's "probable cause determination at the time of 
issuance [have] reached fruition."  United States v. Rowland, 
145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
Because judicial authorization for the search depends on 
the occurrence of the condition precedent, the triggering 
condition must be "clearly and narrowly defined," Gauthier, 425 
Mass. at 43, both "to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by 
government agents," id. at 44, quoting United States v. 
Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993), and to permit a 
court to determine whether the triggering condition has 
occurred.  See Gauthier, supra.  Here, the triggering conditions 
were clearly defined:  Carlos would leave his residence at 14 
Berkeley Street, travel to the defendant's apartment at 250 
Oakgrove Avenue, and then make a delivery to the customer.  The 
first two conditions occurred; the third did not because Carlos 
was arrested after he left the defendant's apartment.  
 
If strict compliance with the triggering conditions is 
required, the conditions were not met and the search of the 
defendant's apartment was not authorized by the warrant.  
However, if equivalent compliance is required, the triggering 
conditions were met because Carlos's delivery of the cocaine was 
11 
 
instrumental in establishing probable cause only because it 
would have demonstrated that Carlos had obtained cocaine from 
the apartment, and that was demonstrated without a delivery once 
two bags of cocaine were found on his person during the search 
incident to arrest.  In effect, the police substituted the 
discovery of the bags of cocaine on Carlos's person for the 
delivery of at least some of that cocaine to a third person. 
 
We conclude that the execution of a search is authorized by 
an anticipatory search warrant once there is equivalent 
compliance, albeit not strict compliance, with the triggering 
conditions in the affidavit.  An anticipatory search warrant, by 
definition, "takes effect at a specified future time," Staines, 
441 Mass. at 525, which means that the affidavit supporting it 
must make a prediction about the future events that will trigger 
the warrant.  Because the future rarely goes exactly according 
to plan, the benefits of an anticipatory warrant would too often 
be lost if we required that the triggering conditions be 
satisfied to the letter before the warrant takes effect.8 
                                                 
8 "[O]ne of the major practical difficulties that confronts 
law enforcement officials is the time required to obtain a 
warrant.  In many instances, the speed with which government 
agents are required to act . . . demands that they proceed 
without a warrant or risk losing both criminal and 
contraband. . . .  The question . . . is whether the objective 
of the [F]ourth [A]mendment [to the United States Constitution] 
is better served by allowing an agent to obtain a warrant in 
advance of the delivery, or whether it is better served by 
forcing him to go to the scene without a warrant, and, if 
12 
 
 
In determining whether there has been equivalent 
compliance, we look to the inference that would have been drawn 
had the triggering conditions stated in the affidavit occurred -
- here, that the cocaine in Carlos's possession was obtained 
from a stash in the defendant's apartment -- and determine 
whether the weight of that inference is as strong or stronger 
under the actual conditions.  The Commonwealth bears the burden 
of proving that the conditions that actually gave rise to the 
search were as or more likely to establish probable cause as the 
triggering conditions stated in the affidavit.  Cf. United 
States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 394-397 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Moore v. United States, 537 U.S. 1097 (2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1130, and cert. denied sub. nom. 
McDaniels v. United States, 538 U.S. 971 (2003) (reading 
affidavit in "commonsense fashion" and concluding that 
triggering condition, which required delivery and acceptance of 
parcel containing cocaine by someone inside residence, was met 
where someone who had been previously inside residence greeted 
delivery person outside, accepted parcel, and immediately left 
with it in vehicle, because these events "sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                                             
necessary, proceed under the constraints of the 'exigent 
circumstances' exception, subject always to the risk of 'being 
second-guessed' by judicial authorities at a later date as to 
whether the known facts legally justified the search."  United 
States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. 
nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943 (1989), quoting 1 W.R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), at 700-701 (1978). 
13 
 
establishe[d] a connection between the parcel and someone who 
ha[d] access to the residence to which the parcel [was] 
addressed"); People v. Martini, 265 Ill. App. 3d 698, 708-710 
(1994) ("the standard to be adhered to in the context of police 
execution of 'anticipatory' search warrants is the substantial 
compliance standard," and was satisfied where "strict 
compliance" was "not necessary").  Although here, by arresting 
Carlos, the police actively interrupted the sequence of events 
that the affidavit had said would trigger the warrant, that 
should not prevent the warrant from taking effect where the 
police otherwise established facts that provided equal support 
for the same inference on which the probable cause determination 
approved by the clerk-magistrate had been based.9 
 
The requirement of equivalent compliance comports with our 
opinion in Commonwealth v. Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37 (1997).  Under 
the anticipatory warrant authorized in that case, there were 
three triggering conditions for the execution of the search 
warrant of the defendant's residence:  (1) the confidential 
informant was to place an order to purchase marijuana from the 
                                                 
9 The record before the motion judge is silent as to why 
police chose to arrest Carlos and search him for cocaine rather 
than wait and see if he made the anticipated delivery.  But we 
recognize that there will sometimes be good reason for police to 
make such a choice in response to a developing situation, for 
instance, out of concern that crucial evidence will be lost or 
destroyed or that the identity of a confidential informant will 
be revealed. 
 
14 
 
dealer identified in the affidavit, (2) the dealer was to enter 
the defendant's residence (where marijuana was allegedly 
stored), and (3) marijuana was to be found on the dealer after 
he was searched upon leaving the residence.  Id. at 39.  The 
first two conditions were met, but we concluded that the third 
was not, because the police officer did not search the dealer as 
he was leaving the residence but instead waited until the 
officer saw him enter the vehicle that he had driven to the 
defendant's residence and place something on the floor behind 
the driver's seat.10  Id. at 40-41.  We declared, "The triggering 
event language in warrants such as this one should be read 
sensibly and in context, and, when that is done, we must 
conclude that the triggering event failed to materialize here."  
Id. at 41.  We reached that conclusion not simply because the 
delay in searching the dealer departed from the letter of the 
third condition, but because the actual evidence of probable 
cause was significantly weaker where the marijuana was found in 
the dealer's vehicle rather than on his person as he was leaving 
the defendant's residence.  We noted that the police officer did 
not testify that he saw the dealer carry the package as he left 
                                                 
 
10 The dealer drove off before the police could reach him to 
conduct a search.  He was finally stopped by the police one and 
one-half miles from the defendant's residence, "following an 
attempted escape."  The police searched the vehicle and found a 
bag containing marijuana behind the driver's seat.  Commonwealth 
v. Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37, 39-40 (1997). 
15 
 
the defendant's residence, and we further noted that where the 
driver of the vehicle "was himself an active dealer in 
narcotics," it was "possible that he had that particular bag of 
narcotics in the car all along."  Id. at 40-41. 
 
Our conclusion that equivalent compliance with the 
triggering conditions is sufficient to authorize the execution 
of the search warrant does not give "unfettered discretion" to 
the police.  See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d. at 12 ("magistrates who 
are asked to issue such warrants must be particularly vigilant 
in ensuring that the opportunities for exercising unfettered 
discretion are eliminated").  Although the police are not bound 
to the strict letter of the triggering conditions, they are very 
much fettered:  where probable cause depends on compliance with 
the triggering conditions and the police do not strictly comply 
with those conditions, the Commonwealth must demonstrate at the 
motion to suppress hearing that the inference supporting 
probable cause was at least as strong from the conditions that 
actually gave rise to the search as it would have been from the 
triggering conditions stated in the affidavit.  Failing that, 
the motion judge will rule that the execution of the search was 
not authorized by the warrant, and any fruits will be suppressed 
16 
 
unless the Commonwealth proves that the search was lawful as a 
warrantless search.11 
                                                 
 
11 Because we conclude that there was equivalent compliance 
with the triggering conditions in this case, we need not 
consider whether a search is authorized by an anticipatory 
warrant where there is not equivalent compliance with the 
triggering conditions but where the information in the affidavit 
provided probable cause at the time the search warrant was 
approved regardless of whether there was compliance with the 
triggering conditions.  See Gauthier, 425 Mass. at 38 n.1.  See 
also United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 80 (1st Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172 (2000) ("whether the condition was 
satisfied . . . is beside the point" where "leaving the package 
at the door did nothing to establish probable cause to search 
the premises" and "probable cause existed to search the premises 
without delivery of the package [emphasis in original]"). 
 
 
Where an affiant believes that there might be probable 
cause to conduct a search without any triggering conditions but 
that probable cause would be stronger with triggering conditions 
(e.g., where an affiant believes that the evidence described in 
the affidavit might be regarded as stale), the affiant may 
request in the affidavit both an anticipatory and a traditional 
warrant to search the premises.  A judge or clerk-magistrate 
will determine whether to issue an anticipatory search warrant 
based on whether there will be probable cause for the search 
once the triggering condition is satisfied, and whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will 
occur.  See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2006), 
quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("[F]or a 
conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of 
probability must be satisfied.  It must be true not only that if 
the triggering condition occurs 'there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place,' . . . but also that there is probable cause 
to believe the triggering condition will occur" [emphasis in 
original]).  The judge or clerk-magistrate will determine 
whether to issue a traditional search warrant based on whether 
there is probable cause for the search at the time of the 
warrant request.  If the warrant is allowed as both an 
anticipatory and a traditional warrant (and the judge or clerk-
magistrate should so specify), a judge deciding a motion to 
suppress the search should treat the warrant as an anticipatory 
17 
 
 
Having found equivalent compliance with the triggering 
conditions, we conclude that compliance with those conditions 
provided probable cause to believe that evidence of Carlos's 
drug trafficking would be located at the defendant's residence, 
which Carlos appeared to use as a "stash house."12  Where, as 
here, "the place to be searched is a residence," a showing of 
probable cause requires that the affidavit establish "a 
sufficient nexus" connecting the residence with evidence of 
criminal activity, by "provid[ing] a substantial basis for 
concluding that [such] evidence" will be found at the residence.  
Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 725-726 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441 (2009), and 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  This nexus 
"need not be based on direct observation," Donahue, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983), but "may be found in ' . . . normal 
inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide' the 
drugs he sells."  Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 302 
(2003), quoting Cinelli, supra.  Although "[n]o bright-line rule 
can establish whether there is a nexus between suspected drug 
                                                                                                                                                             
warrant if there is equivalent compliance with the triggering 
condition and as a traditional warrant if there is not.  
 
12 The defendant does not contend that there was not 
probable cause to believe that Carlos was engaged in drug 
trafficking at the time of his arrest. 
18 
 
dealing and a defendant's home . . . [,] [o]bservations by 
police of a suspect on multiple occasions leaving his residence 
and proceeding directly to a prearranged location to sell drugs 
can support a reasonable inference that the suspect is a drug 
dealer who stores drugs or packages drugs for resale in his 
residence."  Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 643 (2012) 
(citing cases). 
 
Officer Wadlegger's affidavit specified that during two 
controlled purchases, one during "the week of December 25, 
2011," and the second during "the week of January 8, 2012," the 
police observed that, shortly after the CS had telephoned Carlos 
to initiate the purchase of heroin or cocaine, Carlos left his 
residence and stopped briefly at the defendant's apartment 
before delivering the heroin or cocaine to the CS.13  If there 
was any risk that the information regarding the earlier 
controlled purchases was stale or that it was insufficient to 
establish a pattern connecting the defendant's residence with 
Carlos's drug trafficking, that risk was eliminated when, in 
equivalent compliance with the triggering conditions for 
execution of the search, the same pattern was repeated by Carlos 
before he was found with two bags of cocaine on his person 
outside the defendant's apartment.  Considered together with 
                                                 
 
13 Carlos told the CS prior to one of these controlled 
purchases that Carlos "had to go and pick up the cocaine." 
19 
 
Officer Wadlegger's statement that, based on his experience, 
narcotics dealers commonly store drugs at "stash houses" located 
somewhere other than their primary residences, this evidence 
provided probable cause to believe that Carlos used the 
defendant's residence as a "stash house" from which he retrieved 
drugs when he needed them for a sale.14 
Conclusion.  We therefore conclude, for reasons other than 
those found by the motion judge, that the defendant's motion to 
suppress was properly denied.  The defendant's convictions are 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                 
 
14  For an anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, there must not only be probable cause for the search 
once the triggering condition is satisfied; there must also be 
probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will 
occur.  See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 95-97.   The defendant does not 
specifically challenge on appeal whether there was probable 
cause to believe that the triggering conditions set forth in the 
affidavit would occur.  Even if he had, such a challenge would 
fail, because the belief that the triggering conditions would 
occur was based on information from the CS, and in denying the 
motion to suppress, the motion judge implicitly found that the 
CS's basis of knowledge and veracity had been established in the 
affidavit (as required to show probable cause) from the 
corroboration obtained through independent police investigation 
of the information provided by the CS and through the two 
controlled purchases.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 
Mass. 721, 728-730 (2012).