Title: People v. Edwards
Citation: 2012 IL 111711
Docket Number: 111711
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2012

2012 IL 111711
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111711)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
WALTER EDWARDS, Appellant. 
Opinion filed April 19, 2012.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
Petitioner, Walter Edwards, appeals from orders of the circuit
court of Cook County denying him leave to file his third and fourth
successive petitions for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)). The pro se petitions
alleged actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. The
two cases were consolidated on appeal, and a divided panel of our
appellate court affirmed. Nos. 1-07-0714, 1-08-1089 cons.
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
¶ 2
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3
In January 1999 the State charged petitioner and six other
individuals  with the first degree murder of Jacqueline Bernaugh.
1
Lawrence Coleman, Eddie Coleman, Kentrell Culbreath, Sam Taylor,
1
Willie Richards and Octavius Sims were charged in the same indictment.
Petitioner was tried separately by jury and was found guilty under a
theory of accountability. He was sentenced to 28 years’
imprisonment.
¶ 4
Petitioner admitted his involvement in the murder in a transcribed
statement to police. He was 15 years old at the time. Prior to trial,
petitioner moved unsuccessfully to suppress the statement, alleging
it was not voluntary.
¶ 5
In the statement, which was published at trial, petitioner
acknowledged he was a member of a street gang, the Renegade Vice
Lords (Renegades), which was at war with a rival gang, the Mafia
Insane Vice Lords (Mafias). Petitioner stated two of the Mafias killed
his friend and fellow gang member, Elijah McLachlan. According to
petitioner’s statement, on November 29, 1998, following
McLachlan’s funeral, petitioner and other gang members went to the
home of fellow gang member Lawrence Coleman and discussed a
plan to avenge McLachlan by killing some of the Mafias. Petitioner
stated he and a group of fellow Renegades went to a building on
South Exchange Avenue in Chicago where one of the Mafias lived.
Petitioner and other Renegades, including Eddie Coleman, who was
armed with a shotgun, positioned themselves around the building and
waited for one of the Mafias to emerge. As petitioner waited across
the street, his companions, who were closer to the building, began
shooting at a woman who was standing at a window inside the
building. Petitioner stated he fired his gun in the air so his
companions would know he fired his weapon.
¶ 6
An autopsy indicated Bernaugh died of a shotgun wound to the
face.
¶ 7
Petitioner’s statement was the only evidence at trial placing him
at the scene of the crime. None of the State’s eyewitnesses identified
him as being there, and the State introduced no physical evidence
linking him to the crime. Petitioner did not testify, and the defense
rested without presenting evidence.
¶ 8
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal. People v. Edwards, No. 1-00-2332 (2001) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court denied leave to appeal.
People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 569 (2001) (table).
¶ 9
In July 2002 petitioner filed an initial pro se postconviction
petition alleging his constitutional rights were violated when he was
questioned outside the presence of his legal guardian or a youth
officer. Petitioner also alleged the circuit court violated his right to
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due process when it denied his motion to suppress his statement. The
circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and without merit,
and the appellate court affirmed (People v. Edwards, No. 1-02-2563
(2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). This court
denied leave to appeal. People v. Edwards, 209 Ill. 2d 588 (2004)
(table). In January 2006 petitioner sought leave to file a successive
pro se postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, actual innocence.
Petitioner claimed he had newly discovered evidence, including an
affidavit from codefendant Sam Taylor, showing petitioner was
actually innocent of the murder. In that affidavit, Taylor named
people who were present with him at Lawrence Coleman’s home on
November 29, 1998, after McLachlan’s funeral. Petitioner’s name
was not mentioned. The circuit court denied leave to file the
successive petition, finding petitioner failed to meet the cause-and-
prejudice test set forth in section 122-1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1(f) (West 2006)). The court also found the issues raised in the
petition were frivolous and patently without merit. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed (People v. Edwards, No. 1-06-1986 (2008)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). This court denied
leave to appeal. People v. Edwards, 229 Ill. 2d 638 (2008) (table).
¶ 10
In September 2006 petitioner sought leave to file his third
postconviction petition. In this petition, as in the second, petitioner
alleged actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.
Attached to the petition was an affidavit from fellow Renegade Eddie
Coleman, who stated that he, Willie Richards and “Little Mikey”
were the shooters, and that petitioner, Lawrence Coleman, Kentrell
Culbreath and Octavius Sims “had nothing to do with this shooting.”
Eddie explained he did not come forward earlier because “all I cared
about was my freedom.”  Also attached to the petition was an
2
affidavit from Lawrence Coleman, who stated he received Eddie
Coleman’s affidavit on January 3, 2006, and gave a copy to petitioner
on May 15, 2006, “because this new evidence I recieved [sic]
pertained to [petitioner] also.”
¶ 11
In a written order dated November 6, 2006, the circuit court
denied leave to file the third petition, finding petitioner failed to
satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test, and the issue raised in the
As noted, Eddie Coleman was originally charged as a codefendant in
2
this case. According to the State, the case against him was dismissed on
June 7, 2000.
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petition was frivolous and patently without merit.  Petitioner filed a
3
motion to reconsider, which the court also denied. Petitioner
appealed, and the appeal was docketed under case No. 1-07-0714.
¶ 12
In January 2008 petitioner sought leave to file his fourth
postconviction petition. Here again, as in petitioner’s second and third
petitions, he alleged actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence. Attached to the new petition were alibi affidavits from
Dominique and Kathleen Coleman which, according to petitioner,
established that he was with them in their residence “before, during,
and after the shooting took place.” In their affidavits, Dominique and
Kathleen stated that petitioner went to their residence on November
29, 1998, after McLachlan’s funeral, and he remained there until the
next morning, November 30, when they all left and attended
McLachlan’s burial. In explaining why she did not come forward
earlier, Dominique stated in her affidavit that she was a minor at the
time of the incident, and her mother, Kathleen, forbade her from
speaking out. Kathleen stated in her affidavit that she herself was
afraid to get involved in the case, “being as serious as it was.”
Kathleen added that several of her family members were “already
supposedly involved with this crime.” She stated that although
defense counsel contacted her numerous times to try to convince her
to testify on petitioner’s behalf, she refused to do so and refused to
allow her daughter to do so. Kathleen also was uncooperative with
investigators sent by petitioner since his incarceration.
¶ 13
Petitioner also argued in his petition that he was denied due
process of law because his “illegally obtained” statement was
admitted into evidence.
¶ 14
In a written order dated March 19, 2008, the circuit court denied
leave to file the fourth postconviction petition, finding petitioner
failed to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. Petitioner filed a notice
of appeal, and the appeal was docketed under case No. 1-08-1089.
¶ 15
On appeal, case Nos. 1-07-0714 (the third postconviction petition)
and 1-08-1089 (the fourth petition) were consolidated. The appellate
court majority affirmed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file the
petitions, holding that petitioner failed to state a valid claim of actual
The court also observed that the date on Eddie Coleman’s affidavit had
3
2005 “crossed out” and 2006 “written in over it,” and noted that petitioner
filed his second postconviction petition on January 10, 2006. 
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innocence. Nos. 1-07-0714, 1-08-1089 cons. (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 16
The majority noted People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319 (2009), which
was decided while the instant case was pending before the appellate
court. Ortiz held that “where a defendant sets forth a claim of actual
innocence in a successive postconviction petition, the defendant is
excused from showing cause and prejudice.” Id. at 330. The appellate
court majority concluded supplemental briefing on this issue was
unnecessary. The majority’s holding here was based, not on the
cause-and-prejudice test, but rather on petitioner’s failure “to state a
claim of actual innocence.” Nos. 1-07-0714, 1-08-1089 cons.
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In the majority’s
view, “[t]he facts in this case would not warrant relief under Ortiz.”
Id.
¶ 17
The dissenting justice concluded the appellate court majority
applied the wrong standard. The dissent would have applied the test
for determining whether an initial postconviction petition may be
summarily dismissed at the first stage of postconviction proceedings.
Under that test, a petition may be dismissed as frivolous or patently
without merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law
or in fact. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2009). In the
dissent’s view, the petitions at issue here met this “low threshold.”
No. 1-07-0714 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)
(Gordon, J., dissenting).
¶ 18
Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we allowed
pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010) and 612
(eff. Sept. 1, 2006). In addition, we allowed the Center on Wrongful
Convictions to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 19
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20
The parties dispute the standard a petitioner claiming actual
innocence must meet in seeking leave of court to initiate a successive
postconviction proceeding under the Act.
¶ 21
We begin by noting that the Act provides a statutory remedy to
criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their
constitutional rights occurred at trial. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d
501, 510 (1991). The Act is not a substitute for an appeal, but rather,
is a collateral attack on a final judgment. People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d
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1, 9 (1989). Thus, where a petitioner has previously taken an appeal
from a judgment of conviction, the ensuing judgment of the
reviewing court will bar, under the doctrine of res judicata,
postconviction review of all issues actually decided by the reviewing
court, and any other claims that could have been presented to the
reviewing court will be deemed waived. People v. Neal, 142 Ill. 2d
140, 146 (1990); 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2006) (specifically stating
that “[a]ny claim *** not raised in the original or an amended petition
is waived”).
¶ 22
In light of the above, both the language of the Act and our own
case law make clear that only one postconviction proceeding is
contemplated under the Act. Nevertheless, this court has, in its case
law, provided two bases upon which the bar against successive
proceedings will be relaxed. See People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d
444, 459 (2002) (citing People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 278-79
(1992)); see also People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19, 42-44 (1998)
(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, J.) (tracing
history of relaxation of bar against successive postconviction
proceedings). The first basis for relaxing the bar is when a petitioner
can establish “cause and prejudice” for the failure to raise the claim
earlier. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459. The General Assembly
codified the cause-and-prejudice exception in section 122-1(f) of the
Act, several years after our decision in Pitsonbarger.
¶ 23
The second basis by which the bar to successive postconviction
proceedings may be relaxed is what is known as the “fundamental
miscarriage of justice” exception. See Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at
459. This exception is not unique to Illinois. The United States
Supreme Court has stated that the exception serves “as an additional
safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an
unconstitutional loss of liberty [citation], guaranteeing that the ends
of justice will be served in full.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d at 43 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined
by Heiple, J.) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991)).
In order to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice to excuse the
application of the procedural bar, a petitioner must show actual
innocence. See Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459; Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U.S. 333 (1992). Although this exception was not codified by the
legislature, this court has reaffirmed its use in relaxing the bar against
successive postconviction proceedings. See People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill.
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2d 319 (2009) (acknowledging that leave of court to file a successive
postconviction petition may be based on actual innocence alone).
¶ 24
As this court noted in People v. Tidwell, a petitioner seeking to
institute a successive postconviction proceeding must first obtain
“leave of court.” People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 157 (2010). We
also made clear in Tidwell that it is the petitioner’s burden to obtain
“leave” before further proceedings on his claims can follow. Id. To do
so, we specifically acknowledged that “it is incumbent upon [a
petitioner], by whatever means, to prompt the circuit court to consider
whether ‘leave’ should be granted, and obtain a ruling on that
question.” Id. Defendant not only has the burden to obtain leave of
court, but also “must submit enough in the way of documentation to
allow a circuit court to make that determination.” Id. at 161. This is
so under either exception, cause and prejudice or actual innocence.
With respect to those seeking to relax the bar against successive
postconviction petitions on the basis of actual innocence, we hold
today that leave of court should be denied only where it is clear, from
a review of the successive petition and the documentation provided
by the petitioner that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot set
forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. See People v. Smith, 341
Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (2003) (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339 (actual
innocence defined in context of federal habeas petitions as colorable
claim of factual innocence)); Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th
Cir. 2003) (habeas petitioner must initially come forward with new
reliable evidence to support “colorable claim of actual innocence”
under fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception). Stated
differently, leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s
supporting documentation raises the probability that “it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the
light of the new evidence” (Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)
(characterizing threshold standard as one of probability)).
¶ 25
Notwithstanding the above, petitioner argues we should evaluate
his successive petitions under the same first-stage standard as an
initial postconviction petition. He agrees with the dissenting justice
below that when reviewing a successive petition, as when reviewing
an initial petition, our task is simply to determine whether the petition
is frivolous or patently without merit. See Nos. 1-07-0714, 1-08-1089
cons. (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Gordon, J.,
dissenting) (citing People v. Williams, 392 Ill. App. 3d 359, 365
(2009)). We disagree.
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¶ 26
First, applying the frivolous or patently without merit standard
here would render the “leave of court” language in section 122-1(f)
superfluous. We have repeatedly held that statutes should be read as
a whole and construed so that no part is rendered meaningless or
superfluous. E.g., People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005).
¶ 27
Second, there is simply no basis in the statute for applying a first-
stage analysis to a successive petition. Section 122-1(f), which
governs successive petitions, describes the “leave of court”
requirement but makes no mention of the frivolous or patently
without merit standard, which is set forth in a separate provision,
section 122-2.1(a)(2). The legislature was clearly aware of the
frivolous or patently without merit language in 2004, when section
122-1(f) was added, and could have incorporated it into that section
if it chose to do so. Where language is included in one section of a
statute but omitted in another section of the same statute, we presume
the legislature acted intentionally and purposely in the inclusion or
exclusion. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 24. See also 2A
Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction § 46:5, at 228-29 (7th ed. 2007) (“where the legislature
has employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should
not be implied where excluded”).
¶ 28
Also relevant to this issue is the legislative history of section 122-
1(f). In discussing the first sentence of subsection (f), which provides
that “[o]nly one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this
Article without leave of the court,” Senator Dillard stated: “This
would make Illinois law consistent with federal law by letting a
prisoner have one post-conviction petition without court permission
while requiring that he or she formally seek leave of the court to file
additional petitions.” (Emphasis added.) 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, April 4, 2003, at 138 (statements of Senator Dillard).
These statements clearly support our conclusion that the “colorable
claim of actual innocence” standard should apply, as opposed to the
first-stage standard urged by petitioner. As noted, federal courts
employ this same “colorable claim” formulation in the context of the
fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception. See Gomez, 350 F.3d
at 679.
¶ 29
Another reason for rejecting the first-stage standard is that treating
successive petitions the same as initial petitions, as urged by
petitioner and the dissent below, ignores the well-settled rule that
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successive postconviction actions are disfavored by Illinois courts.
See People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1999) (Freeman, C.J.,
specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).
¶ 30
Having established what a petitioner must set forth when seeking
leave of court to file a successive petition on the basis of actual
innocence, we turn to the standard of review, which was briefed only
minimally here. Generally, decisions granting or denying “leave of
court” are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., People ex
rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 547 (2003).
However, as we have just noted, a trial court should deny leave only
in cases where, as a matter of law, no colorable claim of actual
innocence has been asserted. This suggests a de novo review. We
need not decide this question in this case, however. Petitioner’s claim
of actual innocence here fails under either standard of review. His
supporting documentation is too insufficient to justify further
proceedings. We therefore leave this issue for another day and a more
appropriate case.
¶ 31
In this case, petitioner claimed actual innocence when seeking
leave of court to file his third and fourth successive postconviction
petitions. As noted, the circuit court incorrectly relied on the cause-
and-prejudice test in denying leave to file the successive petitions.
See Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 330. Thus, the question is whether petitioner
set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.  In other words, did
petitioner’s request for leave of court and his supporting
documentation raise the probability that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence?  Because we conclude that petitioner did not set forth such
a claim, we do not believe a remand is necessary. Like the appellate
court below, we believe petitioner’s request for leave to file a
successive petition based on actual innocence can be resolved as a
matter of law and that further proceedings are unnecessary.
¶ 32
The elements of a claim of actual innocence are that the evidence
in support of the claim must be “newly discovered”; material and not
merely cumulative; and of such conclusive character that it would
probably change the result on retrial. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333; People
v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004); People v. Washington, 171
Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996). We deem it appropriate to note here that the
United States Supreme Court has emphasized that such claims must
be supported “with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory
scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical
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physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S.
at 324. The Court added: “Because such evidence is obviously
unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence
are rarely successful.” Id.
¶ 33
As stated earlier, a petitioner’s request for leave of court and his
supporting documentation must set forth a colorable claim of actual
innocence, i.e., they must raise the probability that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the
light of the new evidence. 
¶ 34
As the appellate court below concluded, the alibi affidavits of
Dominique and Kathleen Coleman do not qualify as newly discovered
evidence. Citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (2002), which
defined newly discovered evidence as “evidence that was unavailable
at trial and could not have been discovered sooner through due
diligence,” the appellate court asserted that Dominique’s and
Kathleen’s testimony could have been discovered sooner through the
exercise of due diligence. The court reasoned: “It is illogical for
defendant to claim that this evidence of his alibi is new, where he
obviously knew of his alibi at the time of trial, on appeal and during
initial postconviction proceedings.” Nos. 1-07-0714, 1-08-1089 cons.
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court
continued: “The fact that defendant was allegedly with the Coleman
family in their house on the night of the offense could have been
discovered sooner with the exercise of due diligence where defendant
was the source of this information and was armed with this
knowledge at the time of trial.” Id.
¶ 35
Petitioner does not dispute that he knew of the alibi at the time of
trial. Petitioner’s argument is that this evidence was unavailable to
him. In support, he points to Kathleen’s and Dominique’s assertions
in their affidavits that attempts by petitioner’s attorney to persuade
them to testify were rejected.
¶ 36
After carefully reviewing the record, we find no indication that
petitioner’s attorney attempted to subpoena these witnesses to testify.
Nor do we find any explanation as to why subpoenas were not issued.
The logical assumption is that the witnesses’ testimony would not
have been helpful.
¶ 37
We do not conclude that such evidence could never be considered
unavailable where, as here, the witnesses rejected the petitioner’s
attempts to persuade them to testify. In this instance, however, where
there was no attempt to subpoena Dominique and Kathleen, and no
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explanation as to why subpoenas were not issued, the efforts
expended were insufficient to satisfy the due diligence requirement.
The alibi evidence could have been discovered sooner through the
exercise of due diligence, and the evidence therefore was not newly
discovered. See Bentley v. United States, 701 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that alibi evidence could not
have been produced at trial, even with due diligence; “[t]he facts
concerning an alibi are peculiarly within the knowledge of a
defendant himself”).
¶ 38
This leaves only the affidavit of Eddie Coleman to support
petitioner’s claim. While petitioner obviously knew of Eddie at the
time of trial, the evidence in Eddie’s affidavit apparently was
nevertheless “unavailable at trial” (Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 301), and the
evidence thus qualified as newly discovered. Eddie was a
codefendant, with a fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination.
No amount of diligence could have forced him to violate that right if
he did not choose to do so. See People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128,
135 (1984).
¶ 39
However, even though Eddie’s affidavit contains newly
discovered evidence, the result is the same. In the affidavit’s specific
references to petitioner, Eddie averred petitioner “had nothing to do
with this shooting,” he (Eddie) “never saw or spoke with [petitioner]
after the funeral,” petitioner was neither “a part [of nor] took part in
this crime,” and he (Eddie) did not “share this information [about the
shooting] with [petitioner] after the crime.” Though Eddie averred
petitioner “had nothing to do with this shooting” and was neither “a
part [of nor] took part in this crime,” Eddie critically does not assert
that petitioner was not present when the shooting took place. As the
appellate court correctly noted, Eddie’s averment in his affidavit that
he was the principal offender “does little to exonerate defendant who
*** was convicted of the murder under the theory of accountability.”
¶ 40
Thus, even though Eddie Coleman’s affidavit could be considered
new evidence, it does not raise the probability that, in the light of the
new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted petitioner. This evidence is not “of such
conclusive character that it would probably change the result on
retrial” (Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d at 154). See Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at
489 (describing “conclusive character” requirement as the “most
important[ ]” element of an actual-innocence claim). See also
Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2010) (habeas
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petitioner asserting innocence as gateway to defaulted claim must
show that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt);
Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that
this “no reasonable juror” standard “requires a stronger showing than
that required to establish Strickland prejudice”).
¶ 41
The appellate court below held that further postconviction
proceedings were unnecessary because petitioner failed to assert a
colorable claim of actual innocence as a matter of law. We agree. 
Petitioner failed, as a matter of law, to raise the probability that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in the light of the new evidence. The appellate court correctly
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file petitioner’s third
and fourth successive petitions.
¶ 42
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the orders of the circuit court denying
petitioner leave to file his third and fourth successive postconviction
petitions.
¶ 44
Affirmed.
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