Title: Smith v. Norman
Citation: 495 So. 2d 536
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 1986

495 So. 2d 536 (1986)
Glenn D. SMITH, Peggy Smith, David T. Wright, and Karlin Wright
v.
Max NORMAN.
84-630.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 15, 1986.
James W. Cameron of Cameron &amp; Cameron, Montgomery, for appellants.
J. Bernard Brannan, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Two of the plaintiffs in this case, Glenn Smith and Peggy Smith, entered into a contract with Mike Norman, d/b/a Norman Construction Company, for the construction of their new home. The other plaintiffs, David Wright and Karlin Wright, similarly contracted with Norman Construction Company for the construction of their *537 home. Construction on both homes was begun, but neither home was completed. Each set of plaintiffs filed a contract action against Mike Norman, his father Max Norman, and his brother Keith Norman, individually and as partners doing business as Norman Construction Company. Keith Norman was dismissed from both actions on motion of the plaintiffs. Mike Norman filed for bankruptcy, so the proceedings against him were stayed.
The two actions against Max Norman were consolidated for trial. At trial, Norman's motion for directed verdict was granted. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion for new trial. We affirm.
The plaintiffs' case against Max Norman is based upon an estoppel theory. The plaintiffs contend that Norman led them to believe he was a partner with his son Mike in Norman Construction Company. They argue that during the construction work on their homes, they made payments to Mike Norman in reliance on Max Norman's representations that he was a partner in the business. Because of this alleged reliance, they assert that Max Norman, although he was in actuality not a partner of his son, should be estopped from denying liability for the losses sustained by the plaintiffs from the alleged poor workmanship and failure to complete their homes. We disagree.
Code 1975, § 10-8-55, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
In Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So. 2d 770 (Ala.1976), this Court discussed the doctrine of equitable estoppel:
"The basic elements of equitable estoppel are stated in Dobbs, Remedies § 2.3 (1973):
The undisputed facts in this case do not support a cause of action against the defendant based upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel or its statutory counterpart. The plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that they relied to their detriment on the defendant's alleged representations. Webb v. Pioneer Ins. Co., 56 Ala.App. 484, 323 So. 2d 373 (1975). They did not meet this burden.
A directed verdict in favor of a defendant is proper only when there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. Pate v. Sunset Funeral Home, 465 So. 2d 347 (Ala.1984). In this case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the plaintiffs entered into their contracts with Mike Norman based upon any conduct or declaration by his father. Plaintiff Glenn Smith testified that when he entered into the contract with Mike Norman, he did not think Max Norman was a partner in Mike Norman's business. Plaintiff David Wright testified that he likewise dealt only with Mike Norman and knew of no involvement by Max Norman in the business. Although the plaintiffs allege that there was detrimental reliance in that they made payments to Mike Norman based upon Max Norman's alleged representations, their existing contracts clearly obligated them to make those payments. Had the alleged representations by Max Norman been made prior to or at the time the plaintiffs entered into their contracts with Mike Norman, the decision in this case might be different. Because the alleged representations came after the plaintiffs had obligated themselves to make the payments, however, it cannot be said that they relied upon those alleged representations to their detriment. One jurisdiction with a partnership by estoppel statute similar to ours, New Mexico, has reached this same conclusion under similar facts. In Gilbert v. Howard, 64 N.M. 200, 326 P.2d 1085 (1958), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that where the plaintiffs entered into a rental contract with Howard only, and were later told that Moore was Howard's partner, the plaintiffs could not assert a theory of partnership by estoppel against Moore, since every word or deed connecting the defendant Moore with Howard came five months after the plaintiffs had entered into the contract with Howard; there had been no detrimental reliance. The same reasoning applies in the case before us.
There being no error in the record, the decision of the trial court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.