Title: Gagnon v. Dist. Court in & for Cty. of Fremont
Citation: 632 P.2d 567
Docket Number: 81SA71
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 1981

632 P.2d 567 (1981) William GAGNON and The Star-Journal Publishing Corporation, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the COUNTY OF FREMONT, State of Colorado and The Honorable John Anderson, One of the Judges Thereof, Respondents. No. 81SA71. Supreme Court of Colorado. July 6, 1981. Rehearing Denied August 24, 1981. *568 Petersen &amp; Fonda, P. C., William F. Mattoon, David W. Crockenberg, Pueblo, for petitioners. John Anderson, pro se. Fishman &amp; Geman, P. C., Donald T. Trinen, Stephanie M. Smith, Denver, for respondents. Cooper &amp; Kelley, P. C., Thomas B. Kelley, Denver, for amicus curiae, The Colorado Press Ass'n. HODGES, Chief Justice. In this original proceeding we issued a rule to show cause why an order of the respondent district court compelling the disclosure of a newspaper reporter's confidential source and the production of documents from that source should not be reversed. From our review of the record we conclude that the order was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore discharge the rule. On August 5, 1980, a news article appeared in the Pueblo Chieftain newspaper concerning the operation of the First National Bank of Florence. Included in the article were the following paragraphs: * * * * * * On August 8, 1980, Crussell, who is the plaintiff in the action pending below, brought suit against the Star-Journal Publishing Corporation (Star-Journal), publisher of the Pueblo Chieftain, alleging that the above quoted paragraphs were false, defamatory, and highly damaging to plaintiff's personal and professional reputation. In the normal course of discovery conducted in connection with his defamation action, plaintiff deposed William Gagnon, the reporter whose byline appeared on the article, concerning his sources of information for the article. In response to a request for "all the documents...relating to the matter raised in and by the [plaintiff's] complaint," Gagnon refused to disclose the name of one source or to produce any documents given to him by that source. The plaintiff then filed a motion to compel disclosure, and Star-Journal thereupon filed a counter-motion for protective orders. At a hearing on these motions, Star-Journal submitted to the trial judge for his review a sealed envelope containing the documents given to Gagnon by the confidential source. As the close of this hearing on February 5, 1981, the trial judge granted the plaintiff's motion to compel. In making his ruling, the trial judge stated that: It is not clear from the record whether the trial judge had reviewed the documents in the sealed envelope at the time he made this ruling. However, the trial judge issued a written order on February 20, 1981 nunc pro tunc February 5, 1981 which embodied and further explained his oral ruling. This written order states that from a review of the documentary evidence the trial judge found the material to be clearly relevant. From this it is quite obvious that the trial judge reviewed the documents in the sealed envelope before he issued the written order.[1] The nunc pro tunc order of the trial judge contained the following findings: A motion to compel discovery is committed to the discretion of the trial court and will be upheld on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C.Cir. 1981); Baker v. F &amp; F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966, 93 S. Ct. 2147, 36 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1973); Mayer v. District Court, 198 Colo. 199, 597 P.2d 577 (1979). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to recognize a reporter's privilege[2] and ordering disclosure of the identity of the confidential source and production of documents provided by that source. C.R.C.P. 26(b)(1), dealing with discovery in civil actions, provides: Here, where the trial court found in effect that the identity of the confidential source and production of materials provided by that source are relevant to the subject matter, the plaintiff's motion was properly granted. Accordingly, we discharge the rule. ROVIRA and LOHR, JJ., specially concur. DUBOFSKY, J., does not participate. ROVIRA, Justice, specially concurring. I concur with the result reached by the majority for the reason that the trial judge recognized the First Amendment issues inherent in the proceeding and was sensitive to the need for a balancing of the rights of the plaintiff and of the Star-Journal. In addition to the findings set out in the majority opinion, the trial judge also stated: In my view, the majority opinion, which only applies the test of relevancy to discovery in a media libel case, does not sufficiently take into consideration and protect First Amendment values. See Pankratz v. District Court, Colo., 609 P.2d 1101 (1980) (Rovira, J., concurring). I am authorized to say that LOHR, J, joins in this special concurrence. [1] We issued a rule to show cause in this case based upon the petitioners' assertion in the petition that the respondent judge "did not avail himself of the opportunity to examine" the contents of the documents in the sealed envelope prior to his ruling. As stated above, however, it is clear from the record that the trial judge did review that material before entering the nunc pro tunc order. [2] Although the United States Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972) held that news gathering must be afforded some protection under the First Amendment, it refused to create a reporter's privilege stating: "We are admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter's privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But this is not the lesson history teaches us. ... [T]he common law recognized no such privilege, and the constitutional argument was not even asserted until 1958. From the beginning of our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of confidential news sources by the press."