Title: CITY OF NOVI V ROBERT ADELL CHILDRENS FUNDED TRUST
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122985
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 20, 2005 
CITY OF NOVI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122985 
ROBERT ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
FRANKLIN ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
MARVIN ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
AND NOVI EXPO CENTER, INC., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, C.J.   
In this land condemnation case where the city of Novi 
is attempting to take private property to construct a road, 
the first issue is whether the requirement of a public use, 
under Const 1963, art 10, § 2, is met when the proposed 
road will be available for use by the public but will be 
primarily used by a private entity that has contributed 
funds to the project. 
We conclude that such a road does 
qualify as a public use. 
The second issue is whether, 
under MCL 213.56, a court can find the city has abused its 
 
 
 
discretion in determining there is a public necessity for 
the 
condemnation 
when 
the 
city 
has 
not 
considered 
alternatives to the taking. 
We conclude that a failure of 
the city to consider alternatives was not an abuse of its 
discretion. 
Because the Court of Appeals incorrectly 
decided that the proposed road was not a public use, we 
reverse that decision. 
We also find no fraud, error of 
law, or abuse of discretion in the city’s determination 
that there exists a public necessity to take defendants’ 
property for the proposed project. 
Accordingly, we remand 
this matter to the trial court for entry of summary 
disposition in favor of plaintiff. 
I 
For many years traffic congestion at the intersection 
of Grand River Avenue and Novi Road in the city of Novi was 
a concern to the city because it represented a growing 
traffic hazard. 
As early as 1984 a study recommended a 
“ring road” around the intersection to relieve traffic 
congestion and provide access to vacant land not fronting 
on Grand River Avenue or Novi Road. 
The study also 
recommended a road, referred to here as the “spur road,” 
from the northwest side of the ring road, that would access 
industrial establishments that were then accessed from 
Grand River Avenue. 
The study recommended the spur road 
2  
 
 
                                                 
because the employee traffic from the industries with 
access on Grand River Avenue was resulting in frequent 
accidents. 
The study noted that, but for “the need to 
resolve [this] critical traffic problem,” the northwest 
quadrant of the ring road project “may have been abandoned 
altogether.” 
Wisne Corporation was one of the industrial entities 
that would be served by the spur road.1  The new spur road 
was to traverse property owned by defendants, even though 
Wisne Corporation owned property that could possibly be 
used for a new access road. 
Wisne at one point agreed to 
pay $200,000 toward the funding of the spur road, and the 
road was to be named A.E. Wisne Drive. 
In 
August 
1998, 
the 
Novi 
City 
Council 
passed 
resolutions declaring the necessity for taking defendants’ 
property for the purpose of creating A.E. Wisne Drive. 
Plaintiff filed a condemnation complaint in September 1998 
pursuant to the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act, MCL 
213.51 et seq. 
Defendants filed a motion challenging the public 
purpose and necessity of the taking, pursuant to MCL 
1 Wisne Corporation changed ownership and its name
several times over the years. 
3  
 
 
 
213.56. 
Defendants claimed that the taking was for the 
private purpose of benefiting Wisne, pointing out Wisne’s 
financial support for the road and documents referring to 
the benefit Wisne would receive from the road. 
Defendants 
did not deny that the public would use the street. Rather, 
the thrust of defendants’ argument was that the road was 
planned to primarily serve private entities and that the 
city wanted to include it in the plans because the funding 
Wisne agreed to provide would entitle the city to obtain 
state funding for the rest of the ring road project. 
Defendants also alleged that the taking was not necessary, 
and that the city exceeded its authority because the 
enabling legislation that gave it authority to condemn did 
not permit it to take property from one private owner and 
transfer it to another private owner. 
In 1999, the trial court held a three-day evidentiary 
hearing and bench trial, during which a dozen witnesses 
testified. The parties stipulated that the existing access 
drive used by Wisne was hazardous and that it was going to 
be eliminated as a result of part of a bridge improvement 
4  
 
 
   
                                                 
project undertaken by the Oakland County Road Commission on 
Grand River Avenue.2 
The circuit court concluded that the proposed taking 
was unconstitutional. 
The court applied the heightened 
scrutiny test set forth in Poletown Neighborhood Council v 
Detroit, 410 Mich 616; 304 NW2d 455 (1981),3 concluding that 
although the project “further[ed] a benefit to the general 
public,” it benefited a specific, identifiable, private 
interest, and this private benefit predominated over the 
benefit to the general public. 
Although the trial court 
did not expressly say so, presumably it found that under 
Poletown such a predominant private benefit removed the 
project from the realm of constitutional, public uses. 
Without further explanation, the court then held that 
“Plaintiff City’s actions evidence a lack of public 
necessity 
by 
fraud, 
error 
of 
law 
and/or 
abuse 
of 
discretion,” 
and 
thus 
the 
proposed 
taking 
was 
unconstitutional. 
2 Despite eliminating Wisne’s access drive, the Oakland
County Road Commission did not develop a new access road
off Grand River Avenue, relying instead on the access that
was to be provided by the planned A.E. Wisne Drive. 
3 On July 30, 2004, Poletown was overruled by this
Court in Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445; 684 NW2d 765
(2004). 
5  
 
 
In analyzing plaintiff’s appeal, the Court of Appeals 
also relied on Poletown, recognizing that it was bound to 
do so. 
253 Mich App 330, 343; 659 NW2d 615 (2002). 
It 
noted that both the majority opinion and Justice Ryan’s 
dissent 
in 
Poletown 
regarded 
the 
concept 
of 
public 
necessity as being separate and distinct from that of 
public use or public purpose. 
Although it found that the 
trial court had erred by conflating the two concepts, the 
Court found this error harmless because it agreed with the 
trial court that the private interest predominated over the 
public 
interest, 
making 
the 
proposed 
taking 
unconstitutional. The Court found the public benefit to be 
“speculative 
and 
marginal” 
and 
the 
private 
interest 
“specific and identifiable,” primarily to the benefit of 
Wisne. 
It affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 
concluding that, under the Poletown heightened scrutiny 
test, plaintiff failed to show the project was a public 
use. 
We granted the city of Novi’s application for leave to 
appeal after issuing our decision in Wayne Co v Hathcock, 
471 Mich 445; 684 NW2d 765 (2004). 471 Mich 889 (2004). 
II 
Under the Michigan Constitution, private property 
shall 
not 
be 
taken 
for 
public 
use 
without 
just 
6  
 
 
 
compensation. 
Const 1963, art 10, § 2. 
This provision 
precludes condemnation of private property for private use, 
even though some “public interest” may be said to be served 
by such private use. 
Hathcock, supra at 472; Portage Twp 
Bd of Health v Van Hoesen, 87 Mich 533; 49 NW 894 (1891). 
We review de novo the question whether a proposed taking is 
constitutional. Hathcock, supra at 455. 
The statutes under which plaintiff was proceeding are 
the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq., and the Uniform 
Condemnation Procedures Act, MCL 213.51 et seq. The former 
authorizes plaintiff to condemn private land for boulevards 
and streets, among other uses, MCL 117.4e, and the latter 
provides 
the 
procedures 
plaintiff 
must 
follow 
for 
condemnation. Defendants’ challenge to the proposed taking 
was made pursuant to MCL 213.56, which allows the owner of 
the property to be taken “to challenge the necessity of 
acquisition of all or part of the property for the purposes 
stated in the complaint” by filing a motion asking that the 
necessity be reviewed. 
MCL 213.56(1). 
The statute also 
provides that when the proposed taking is by a public 
agency, “the determination of public necessity by that 
agency is binding on the court in the absence of a showing 
of fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion.” 
MCL 
213.56(2). 
We review the trial court’s factual findings 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
for clear error, but its legal conclusions are reviewed de 
novo. 
Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 
Mich 98, 106; 649 NW2d 383 (2002).4 
III 
There 
does 
not 
appear 
to 
be 
any 
dispute 
that 
plaintiff, in its charter, has claimed for itself the 
condemnation powers granted it by the Legislature under the 
Home Rule City Act. 
The act authorizes plaintiff to take 
private property for the purpose of a public road. 
MCL 
117.4e. Defendants also do not question that the ring road 
part of the project is a public road. 
The heart of this 
case is whether the spur road part of the project 
constitutes a private use requiring rejection of part or 
all of the road project. 
Plaintiff asserts that the 
planned spur road is a public use and that defendants have 
not successfully challenged the necessity of the project. 
We agree. 
This 
Court 
recently 
clarified 
Michigan’s 
law 
concerning public use in Hathcock, supra. 
However, we 
4 Cases stating that the trial court’s determinations
in condemnation cases are reviewed for clear error are 
correct only to the extent that this standard applies to
factual findings. 
See, e.g., City of Troy v Barnard, 183
Mich App 565, 569; 455 NW2d 378 (1990); Nelson Drainage
Dist v Filippis, 174 Mich App 400, 403; 436 NW2d 682
(1989). 
8  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
declined to provide a “single, comprehensive definition of 
‘public use . . . .’” 
Hathcock, supra at 471. 
We 
overruled Poletown’s heightened scrutiny test because it 
violates our Constitution, and instead set forth the three­
factor test proposed by Justice Ryan in his dissenting 
opinion in Poletown. 
Under Hathcock, when land condemned 
by a public agency is transferred to a private entity, we 
do not weigh the relative benefits but instead analyze the 
facts to see if any of three conditions are met.5  However, 
such a transfer of property is not proposed here; the city 
will retain ownership of the land. Thus, although Hathcock 
informs us that we are not to use Poletown’s heightened 
scrutiny test, it does not provide us with the elements to 
apply when the public agency retains ownership and control. 
Plaintiff urges us to hold that any road project is 
unquestionably a public use. 
In Poletown, supra at 672, 
Justice Ryan quoted Rindge Co v Los Angeles Co, 262 US 700, 
706; 43 S Ct 689; 67 L Ed 1186 (1923), where the United 
5 Under Hathcock, the transfer of condemned property to
a private entity may be appropriate where: (1) “‘public
necessity of the extreme sort’” requires collective action;
(2) the property remains subject to public oversight after
the transfer to the private entity; or (3) the property is
selected 
because 
of 
“‘facts 
of 
independent 
public
significance,’” rather than the interests of the private
entity receiving the property. 
Hathcock, supra at 476,
quoting Poletown, supra at 674-681 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
9  
 
 
 
States Supreme Court said, “‘That a taking of property for 
a highway is a taking for public use has been universally 
recognized, from time immemorial.’” However, we agree with 
defendants that the single fact that a project is a road 
does not per se make it a public road. 
In Rogren v Corwin, 181 Mich 53, 57-58; 147 NW 517 
(1914), we explained that the difference between public and 
private use in the context of roads 
“depends 
largely 
upon 
whether 
the 
property
condemned is under the direct control and use of 
the 
government 
or 
public 
officers 
of 
the 
government, or, what is almost the same thing, in
the direct use and occupation of the public at
large, though under the control of private
persons or of a corporation . . . .” 
[Quoting
Varner v Martin, 21 W Va 534, 552 (1883).] 
The 
Rogren 
Court 
continued 
quoting 
Varner 
for 
its 
definition of when a road is a public road and when it is a 
private road: 
“All agree that, if the road has been 
established by public authority, and the damages
for the condemnation of the land has been paid by
the general public, and the road is under the
control and management of public officers, whose
duty it is to keep it in repair, then it is a 
public 
highway, 
and 
the 
legislature 
may
constitutionally authorize the condemnation of 
land for the route of such a road, though it may
have been opened under such act by a county court
on the application of a single person to whose
house the road led from some public road, and
though it may not have been expected when the
road was established that it would be used to any
considerable extent by any person, except the
party for whose accommodation it was opened.” 
10  
 
 
 
[Rogren, supra at 58, quoting Varner, supra at 
554.] 
Thus, 
according 
to 
Rogren, 
where 
the 
public 
body 
establishes a road, pays for it out of public funds, and 
retains control, management, and responsibility for its 
repair, the Michigan Constitution allows private land to be 
condemned for the project, no matter what the proportional 
use of the road will be by the public or by private 
entities. 
Under the Rogren analysis, the spur road proposed by 
plaintiff is a public use. Plaintiff initiated the project 
in response to the growing traffic problems in the area. 
Ownership, control, and maintenance will remain with that 
public body. The public will be free to use and occupy the 
spur, and although Wisne may be the primary user of the 
spur, “[i]t is the right of travel by all the world, and 
not the exercise of the right, which constitutes a way a 
public highway.” 
Road Dist No 4 v Frailey, 313 Ill 568, 
573; 145 NE 195 (1924). Wisne is to be granted no interest 
in the property and will have no ability to control use of 
or access to the road. 
We therefore find the proposed 
project a public road, and thus a public use. 
We do not find the fact that Wisne was expected to 
contribute to the funding of the road dispositive of the 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
question of public use. 
“The fact that a private 
individual pays for the right of way does not change the 
character of the road.” 
Id. at 574. See also 2A Nichols, 
Eminent Domain (3d ed), § 7.03[5][e], p 7-51. The county’s 
role in the hazardousness of the original driveway, and in 
its removal, is also not relevant. In sum, when the public 
body that establishes a road retains ownership and control 
of it, and the public is free to use and occupy it, that 
proposed use is a public use. 
Therefore, in accord with the characteristics of 
public use identified in Rogren, the project proposed by 
plaintiff is a public use. 
The lower courts erred in 
applying the Poletown test to this case because no property 
interest is being transferred to a private entity and 
because, even if there were such a transfer, Hathcock’s 
three-factor test would apply, rather than Poletown’s 
heightened scrutiny test.6 
IV 
Defendants also have challenged the proposed taking on 
the basis of public necessity. 
It is required pursuant to 
6 We note that the Court of Appeals attempted to apply
such a test by looking to Justice Ryan’s Poletown dissent. 
However, the test applies when there is a transfer of
property to a private entity, which did not occur here. 
12  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
MCL 213.56 that there be a public necessity for the taking 
to be permitted. 
Specifically, there must be a necessity 
for the taking “of all or part of the property for the 
purposes stated in the complaint . . . .” 
MCL 213.56(1); 
State Hwy Comm v Vanderkloot, 392 Mich 159, 175; 220 NW2d 
416 
(1974). 
Yet, 
pursuant 
to 
the 
statute, 
the 
determination of necessity is left not to the courts but to 
the public agency, which in this case is the city.  The 
only 
justiciable 
challenge 
following 
the 
agency’s 
determination is one based on “fraud, error of law, or 
abuse of discretion.” 
MCL 213.56(2). 
None of these bases 
is shown to exist here.7 
Fraud does not provide defendants a basis for relief 
in this case because the requisite elements are not 
supported by the record.8
 Moreover, under the Home Rule 
7 We agree with the dissent that we first must review
the trial court’s decision on this issue for clear error. 
Post at 17. However, the trial court’s conclusion that the
project was not necessary was clearly based on an erroneous
legal theory (i.e., that there was no public use and thus
no necessity). Moreover, both parties assured the Court at
oral argument that the record was sufficient for us to make
a determination on the necessity issue without a remand. 
8 The elements of fraud are: (1) that the charged party
made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3)
that when he or she made it he or she knew it was false, or
made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and
as a positive assertion; (4) that he or she made it with
(continued…) 
13  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
City Act, plaintiff has the legal authority to condemn this 
land for a public road, so it has not made an error of law.9 
We are left to review whether plaintiff abused its 
discretion in determining that plaintiff’s property was 
necessary to complete this project. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when an unprejudiced 
person considering the facts upon which the decision was 
made would say that there was no justification or excuse 
for the decision. Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 
749, 761-762; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). 
Discretion is abused 
when the decision results in “an outcome falling outside 
this principled range of outcomes.” 
People v Babcock, 469 
Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). 
Here, defendants’ 
objections to the necessity of taking their property for 
the proposed road are based on the assertion that the city 
(…continued)
the intention that it should be acted upon by the other
party; (5) that the other party acted in reliance upon it;
and (6) that the other party thereby suffered injury.
Scott v Harper Recreation, Inc, 444 Mich 441, 446 n 3; 506
NW2d 857 (1993). 
Defendants at most have asserted that 
plaintiff made “untrue” statements and behaved in an 
“unseemly” manner. 
Nowhere does the record show any
reliance or injury resulting from these acts. 
9 
Defendants 
claim 
that 
plaintiff’s 
condemnation 
complaint 
is 
not 
supported 
by 
appropriate 
enabling
legislation. 
This claim is based on the assertion that 
plaintiff is not authorized to take private land for a
private use. Because we conclude that the road is a public
use, defendants’ argument is without merit. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
never considered any alternatives and that reasonable 
alternative locations were available. 
Even if that were 
so, such facts would not remove the proposed road from the 
“principled range of outcomes.”10
 The city’s decision­
making process is not what we review; rather, we look at 
the resulting outcome. 
The city is not obligated to show 
that its plan is the best or only alternative, only that it 
is a reasonable one.11
 The dissent’s insistence that 
plaintiff has the burden of proving necessity is clearly 
contrary to the deference the Legislature requires of us. 
The statute not only limits the grounds for reversal and by 
its language places that burden on defendants, but also 
10 Although defendants contend that plaintiff could
have built an alternative to the proposed Wisne drive on
land actually owned by Wisne, the record indicates that
such an alternative would still have exited onto Grand 
River 
Avenue. 
We 
note 
in 
passing 
that 
such 
an 
“alternative” would likely have defeated the purpose of
relocating the access road, because it would have done
nothing to eliminate the “critical traffic problem” posed
by the exit onto Grand River Ave. 
11 In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173, we identified
numerous factors that might play a role in determining the
routing 
of 
a 
road, 
including 
“comparative 
costs 
of 
construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance,
safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography,
aesthetics, 
etc.” 
That 
is 
why 
these 
legislative
determinations 
are 
entitled 
to 
a 
highly 
deferential 
standard of judicial review, and will not be disturbed
except where there is evidence of fraud, error of law, or
an abuse of discretion. 
15  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
allows only thirty days between when defendants file a 
necessity motion and when the hearing is held, implicitly 
limiting discovery on the issue. 
MCL 213.56. 
The 
Legislature 
adds 
a 
final 
hurdle 
for 
defendants 
by 
permitting appellate review of the trial court’s decision 
only by leave granted. 
MCL 213.56(6). 
Because defendants 
have not shown that the proposed route of the public road 
is outside the zone of reasonable alternatives, we find 
plaintiff did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
the taking of defendants’ property is necessary for the 
ring road project. 
V 
In his dissent, Justice Cavanagh sua sponte raises the 
question of mootness,12 concluding that the city does not 
12 Where the facts of a case make clear that a 
litigated issue has become moot, a court is, of course,
bound to take note of such fact and dismiss the suit, even
if the parties do not present the issue of mootness.
“‘“Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their 
authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion,
though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by
counsel, recognize its lack of jurisdiction and act 
accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the action,
or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the 
proceeding.”’” 
Daniels v Peterson, 462 Mich 915, 917-918;
615 NW2d 14 (2000) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Fox v 
Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146
[1965], quoting In re Fraser Estate, 288 Mich 392, 394; 285
NW 1 [1939]). Because “‘[t]he judicial power . . . is the
right to determine actual controversies arising between
(continued…) 
16  
 
 
 
                                                 
intend to pursue this project. 
To make this argument, he 
relies exclusively on the colloquy at oral argument. While 
we do not think that that argument supports his conclusion, 
which we will discuss below, a brief review of the basic 
principles of mootness law also shows that it is premature 
to declare this matter moot. 
When a complaint is filed and an actual injury is 
alleged, a rebuttable presumption is created that there is 
a genuine case or controversy. 
See Nat’l Wildlife 
Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 631; 
684 NW2d 800 (2004). The case may be dismissed as moot if 
the moving party satisfies the “heavy burden” required to 
demonstrate mootness. 
MGM Grand Detroit, LLC v Community 
Coalition for Empowerment, Inc, 465 Mich 303, 306; 633 NW2d 
357 (2001), citing Los Angeles v Davis, 440 US 625, 631; 99 
S Ct 1379; 59 L Ed 2d 642 (1979).  If such a motion is 
brought, 
“the 
plaintiff 
must 
further 
support 
the 
allegations 
of 
injury 
with 
documentation” 
and 
must 
sufficiently support its claim if it goes to trial. 
Nat’l 
Wildlife, supra at 631. 
(…continued)
adverse litigants,’” Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich
592, 616; 179 NW 350 (1920) (citation omitted), a court
hearing a case in which mootness has become apparent would
lack the power to hear the suit. This is not such a case. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
These procedural requirements are entirely lacking in 
this case at this time. 
No motion or other pleading has 
claimed mootness and there has been no “support” so as to 
meet any burden, much less the “heavy burden” required to 
demonstrate mootness. 
Notwithstanding this, the dissent evidently feels that 
the record here is sufficient so that we sua sponte can 
proceed. 
We 
think 
the 
record 
cannot 
support 
that 
conclusion. 
The dissent, relying entirely on the oral 
argument 
here, 
infers 
that 
several 
statements 
by 
plaintiff’s counsel support a finding of mootness. 
The 
essence of the first statement made in response to Justice 
Corrigan’s query about whether the ring road part of the 
project could be split off was that it could not because 
plaintiff did not want the project built piecemeal. 
This 
does not indicate abandonment; rather, it refers to a 
desire to consolidate all parts of the project before 
getting 
underway. 
Certainly 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
contradictory evidence, of which none has been presented, 
the draconian reading given by the dissent is unwarranted. 
The second claim is that the plaintiff, in rebuttal 
argument, failed to “contest or deny that there are 
currently no plans to pursue the project.” 
Post at 4. 
Yet, plaintiff had no reason to respond in such a way 
18  
 
 
 
 
because the defense counsel did not say the city had no 
intention of completing the spur road for which defendants’ 
property was being condemned; he merely said the ring road 
project, with its rescinded state funding, was “gone.” 
This appears to be nothing more than a reference to the 
lapse of funding, which happens invariably when there is 
extended litigation. 
With this understanding, a rebuttal 
would not, for a person conversant with this process, call 
for a full vindication of continued interest in the whole 
project. 
Thus, that one did not come is unexceptional and 
in no event establishes mootness. 
Finally, the dissent faults plaintiff for its response 
to the defense counsel’s observation that the reason 
plaintiff continued the litigation was because it wants a 
rule of law reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
How surprising is it that an appellant would concede that 
it wanted the Court of Appeals decision reversed? 
Not 
very, we believe. Surely it says nothing about mootness. 
We conclude therefore that plaintiff’s complaint is a 
matter of current controversy because there is no evidence 
here presented, indeed only defendants’ speculation, that 
plaintiff would not proceed with the condemnation upon 
prevailing in this Court. On remand, should the defendants 
conclude that mootness actually is an issue, they can raise 
19  
 
 
 
it in the normal course and let the trial court determine 
if they have met their burden. Such has not been shown on 
the record before us, and thus we conclude that this matter 
is not moot and is appropriate for adjudication. 
VI 
We hold that the proposed road and spur are for a 
public use, and therefore the proposed condemnation does 
not violate Const 1963, art 10, § 2. We also hold that 
plaintiff’s determination that defendants’ property is 
necessary to complete the ring road project does not 
violate the UCPA because it does not indicate fraud, error 
of law, or an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court are 
reversed, and this matter is remanded to the circuit court 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CITY OF NOVI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122985 
ROBERT ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
FRANKLIN ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
MARVIN ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
AND NOVI EXPO CENTER, INC., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
_______________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the majority opinion that the road 
proposed by the city of Novi is a public use under Const 
1963, art 10, § 2 and private property may be condemned for 
the construction of the road because the road will be 
established, paid for, and controlled and managed by a 
public body and because the public at large will be able to 
use the road. See Rogren v Corwin, 181 Mich 53, 57-58; 147 
NW 517 (1914). 
The majority correctly notes that this case does not 
involve the transfer of private property through the 
exercise of eminent domain from one private entity to 
another and thus is not controlled by this Court’s recent 
decision in Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445; 684 NW2d 765 
 
 
 
(2004). 
But then the majority suggests that the lower 
courts also erred because if there had been such a 
transfer, the lower courts should have applied Hathcock’s 
three-factor test. Ante at 12. However, because the lower 
courts’ decisions in this case preceded this Court’s 
decision in Hathcock, the lower courts could not have erred 
by not applying Hathcock. Id. 
I also concur in the majority opinion that the city of 
Novi did not commit fraud, an error of law, or abuse its 
discretion when it declared that the condemnation of the 
property in question was necessary under MCL 213.56. 
Finally, I agree with the majority that the case 
before us is not moot and that this Court cannot avoid 
addressing 
the 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
questions 
presented on the basis of the dissent’s assumption that the 
proposed road project will not proceed. 
However, I do not 
join 
the 
majority’s 
purported 
“review 
of 
the 
basic 
principles of mootness law . . . . ” Ante at 17. 
The 
majority does not in fact review Michigan’s law regarding 
moot cases. 
Instead, the majority imports a discussion of 
subject-matter jurisdiction requirements from a case that 
involved standing. 
See Nat’l Wildlife Federation 
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 631; 684 NW2d 800 
(2004). As I stated in my opinion concurring in the result 
2  
v 
 
 
 
only in Nat’l Wildlife, the cited discussion had little to 
do with the question of standing that was at issue in Nat’l 
Wildlife. 
The cited discussion similarly has little 
relevance to the question whether the issues presented in 
this case are moot. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CITY OF NOVI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122985 
ROBERT ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
FRANKLIN ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
MARVIN ADELL CHILDREN'S FUNDED TRUST,
AND NOVI EXPO CENTER, INC., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
_______________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
This matter is moot and, consequently, we are without 
authority to decide it. 
With regard to the majority’s 
substantive analysis, the majority erroneously decides a 
matter that should first be addressed by the trial court. 
Further, by improperly diminishing the degree of inquiry 
that should be made into the city’s condemnation decision, 
the majority erroneously concludes that the city’s taking 
met the standard for public necessity. 
I. MOOTNESS 
“The principal duty of this Court is to decide actual 
cases and controversies.” 
Federated Publications, Inc v 
City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 112; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), 
 
 
                                                 
citing Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich 592, 610; 179 NW 
350 (1920). 
“To that end, this Court does not reach moot 
questions or declare principles or rules of law that have 
no practical legal effect in the case before us unless the 
issue is one of public significance that is likely to 
recur, yet evade judicial review.” 
Id., citing Anway, 
supra at 610, and In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 
Mich 148, 152 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984). 
Today the majority grants the city’s request for entry 
of a judgment on its condemnation suit, despite the fact 
that the relief granted has no practical legal effect on 
the parties to this claim. 
The city sued to condemn 
defendants’ land so that it could pursue a particular 
project. 
As identified in its condemnation complaint, the 
city’s project involved constructing a ring road and a 
connecting spur, the latter of which was designed to rest 
on defendants’ property.1
 A review of both parties’ 
statements of facts in their briefs to this Court reveal 
that the funding for the ring road project was rescinded by 
the funding agency in 1999. 
In the briefing, there is 
1 The parties’ nomenclature for the whole project is
the “ring road project.” The majority’s assertion, ante at 
19, that plaintiff represented “merely” that the “ring road
project” was gone, and this meant that the spur road 
portion is still pending, is not borne out by the facts. 
2  
 
 
 
nothing declaring, and nothing from which to infer, that if 
the city prevails on its condemnation claim, it has the 
present ability and the present intent to pursue the 
originally intended project. 
At oral argument, this Court made several inquiries 
regarding the project’s status and the potential mootness 
of this appeal. 
First, Justice Corrigan asked whether 
there was any reason why this Court could not issue an 
order allowing the ring road portion of the project to 
proceed while the spur portion of the project was still 
under consideration. Counsel for the city responded: 
We are now, Your Honor, 
several years
removed from the road project. 
This was not a 
piecemeal kind of project. 
Part of the reason 
for the industrial spur, for example was that the
Ring Road where it was proposed to connect to
Grand River would have been too close to this 
driveway on Grand River that currently served the
Wisne property. 
That was one of the reasons to 
have the industrial spur. [Emphasis added.] 
Counsel elaborated, “It was difficult at the trial and 
in addition now, 6 years, 7 years removed from when the 
project was started, the project itself has kind of been 
uncertain.” (Emphasis added.) 
During 
defense 
counsel’s 
argument, 
Justice 
Kelly 
asked: 
You began to develop an idea and you didn’t
complete it because you were interrupted. 
Were 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
you telling us that when Wisne was sold the whole
project became uninteresting to the city? 
Counsel replied: 
It is gone forever and what [counsel for the
city] will tell you probably because he has to is
that maybe someday it will get built. 
The 
reality 
of 
the 
situation, 
and 
there 
were 
depositions on this point, that Ring Road is 
gone. 
And the driveway that they are proposing 
now would extend to nothing. [Emphasis added.] 
Interestingly, on rebuttal, counsel for the city did 
not contest or deny that there are currently no plans to 
pursue the project. 
Rather, he attempted to proffer 
alternative reasons why this Court should decide this case: 
Very briefly, and I’ll stay within the two
minutes, the question was raised kind of a 
mootness kind of question. 
Here is the city’s
response on that. 
It is true that we have a 
published Court of Appeals opinion that we think 
is very much wrong on the issue of public use and
what the standard of review is with regard to
public use in this kind of case. 
It’s relevant 
not just for the future and how trial courts are 
going to apply it, it’s relevant to this case
with regard to is there a responsibility for the
attorney fees that were incurred on behalf of the
property owner if that case is not dealt with and 
found to have been correct or incorrect, so there 
is a reality for this case that needs to be dealt
with.  It’s not moot. [Emphasis added.][2] 
2 It is not surprising at all that counsel for 
plaintiff wants this Court to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals. 
See ante at 19. 
What is surprising is
that counsel for plaintiff offered nothing more than this
desire in response to the questions that were raised 
regarding mootness. 
4  
 
 
 
Our 
jurisprudence 
regarding 
mootness 
has 
been 
established for well over a century. 
There is no question 
but that a court “‘will not take jurisdiction, unless it 
can afford immediate relief, and certainly will not 
undertake, where there is no matter in dispute, to declare 
future rights.’” 
Anway, supra at 609, quoting Woods v 
Fuller, 61 Md 457, 460 (1884), citing Heald v Heald, 56 Md 
300 (1881). 
“‘It will never undertake to decide upon and 
determine a contingency that may never arise, unless such 
determination is necessary for the decision of some 
immediate relief to be granted, and which the court can 
enforce by a decree.’” 
Id. at 609-610, quoting Woods, 
supra at 460 (emphasis added). 
“‘Where a complainant has 
sustained no injury and the object of the action is merely 
to obtain a declaration as to the constitutionality of a 
legislative act, the question presented to the court is 
merely an abstract one and the action will be dismissed.’” 
Id. at 610, quoting Hanrahan v Buffalo Terminal Station 
Comm, 206 NY 494, 504; 100 NE 414 (1912) (emphasis added). 
Counsel for the city expressly stated that relief is 
sought in this case not because the city intends to pursue 
the road project, but to overturn what it perceives as an 
erroneous Court of Appeals opinion and to render guidance 
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
for trial courts addressing this issue in the future.3  We 
are constitutionally proscribed from granting declarations 
of 
this 
sort, 
despite 
whether 
the 
mootness 
inquiry 
originates from a party. 
See id.; see also Sibron v New 
York, 392 US 40, 57; 88 S Ct 1889; 20 L Ed 2d 917 (1968) 
(recognizing the constitutional genesis of the mootness 
doctrine). 
In many instances, both parties may strongly 
desire a court ruling, despite the moot nature of the case. 
But where the ruling is purely advisory and has no effect 
on the parties’ rights, a court is without jurisdiction to 
entertain the claim. 
Thus, the majority’s puzzlement over 
the dissent’s effort to address mootness is puzzling in and 
of itself. 
Although it has been aptly recognized that it “is 
assuredly 
frustrating 
to 
find 
that 
a 
jurisdictional 
impediment prevents us from reaching the important merits 
[of the] issues that were the reason for our agreeing to 
hear 
[a] 
case,” 
it 
is 
simultaneously 
true 
that 
we 
nonetheless “cannot ignore such impediments for purposes of 
our appellate review without simultaneously affecting the 
principles that govern district courts in their assertion 
3 Such a reading is hardly “draconian.” 
See ante at 
18. 
6  
 
 
 
or retention of original jurisdiction.” 
Honig v Doe, 484 
US 305, 341-342; 108 S Ct 592; 98 L Ed 2d 686 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See also the collection of cases 
noted in City of Warren v Detroit, 471 Mich 941 (2004) 
(Markman, J., concurring). 
The city, having failed to confirm or present any 
supporting facts that it is currently pursuing the road 
project for which this taking was ostensibly required, 
leaves us no choice but to declare that there is simply no 
controversy remaining and no relief available to the 
parties. 
It is unfortunate that the majority does not 
recognize this. 
Instead, the majority remands this case 
for entry of a judgment that the city can condemn 
defendants’ property. 
But that judgment is meaningless. 
The basis for the city’s condemnation complaint, in which 
it declared that it required defendants’ property for its 
ring road project, simply no longer exists because the 
project is defunct. As defense counsel noted, constructing 
the spur on defendants’ property would be an exercise in 
futility because there is no ring road with which to 
connect it. 
Consequently, the trial court will enter 
judgment on the city’s condemnation complaint, but the only 
effect of that judgment will be that the city will know 
that, if, at some time in the future it decides to pursue 
7  
 
 
 
the road project, it has a Supreme Court advisory opinion 
in its favor. 
Because of the tremendous restrictions a potential 
taking puts on a property owner’s ability to use or dispose 
of his land, the city should not get the benefit, and 
defendants should not get the detriment, of today’s ruling. 
In Horton v Redevelopment Comm’n of High Point, 262 NC 306; 
137 SE2d 115 (1964), a concurring justice of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court commented on the appropriateness of 
requiring a city to show that it has present intent and 
present 
ability 
to 
begin 
and 
complete 
an 
urban 
redevelopment project when the project involves taking 
private property. The principles espoused in the justice’s 
thoughtful analysis are equally applicable in the case at 
hand, and bear repeating: 
The 
urban 
redevelopment 
law 
and 
the 
decisions of this Court have given ample notice
that the City must show present ability to 
finance the project. This may be done by the use
of funds on hand derived from sources other than 
taxation, or the City must have the present
authority to get the money by means other than by
pledging the credit of the City. 
This is so 
because the filing of the plan prevents the owner
of the property from dealing with it as his own.
He cannot improve it, or rent it, or sell it,
except at the hazard of being ejected at the will
of the Commission. 
His property is virtually
frozen by the plan. 
The filing of a lawful plan
is equivalent to a restriction of the owner’s
right to use his property as of the date of the
taking of any interest therein. 
The law wisely 
8  
 
 
 
 
provides 
that 
authorities 
may 
not 
acquire
property until the plan shows financial ability
to complete the project. 
The taking of private
property is in derogation of a common law right
of the owner, and the act which authorizes the
taking must be strictly construed. 
[Horton, 
supra at 328 (Higgins, J., concurring).] 
Likewise in this case, the majority’s ill-conceived 
advisory opinion will place defendants’ property in a 
perpetual state of uncertainty, thus effectively depriving 
them of their common-law right to use their property as 
they see fit. 
Despite that fact, the majority apparently 
does not feel bound by the well-established principles set 
out by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court 
that dictate against reaching the merits of this claim. 
The city’s request for this Court’s legal guidance to 
combat what it alleges is an incorrect Court of Appeals 
analysis is an insufficient basis on which to disregard the 
moot nature of this claim. 
And because the majority 
insists on issuing an opinion, its grant of “permission” to 
the parties to raise this matter before the trial court is 
too little, too late. Plaintiff gets what plaintiff wants: 
an advisory opinion from this Court on public use and 
necessity. 
Further, the city’s plea for us to decide the matter 
so that a determination regarding attorney fees can be made 
is easily rejected. 
I am unaware of any such exception to 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
the mootness doctrine. 
Indeed, such an exception would 
wholly obviate the doctrine because a party to a moot 
appeal would invariably advance the argument that a 
decision is required so that one party can seek attorney 
fees. 
Nor is it dispositive that neither party briefed the 
mootness issue. 
Because of the constitutional dimensions 
of jurisdiction, it is incumbent on this Court to identify 
and reject moot claims even absent a party’s request for us 
to do so. And it is ascertainable from the existing record 
that 
this 
moot 
matter, 
while 
of 
arguable 
public 
significance, is not susceptible to evading judicial 
review. 
While the state funding agency required the city 
to submit an explanation if the project had not moved 
forward within two years, and reserved its right to rescind 
the funding if progress was not being made, rescinding was 
neither a requirement nor a foregone conclusion.4  And there 
is no indication that the agency would have rescinded the 
funding, rather than granting an extension because of a 
pending lawsuit, had the city requested such an extension. 
4 This is contrary to the majority’s assertion that a
“lapse of funding . . . happens invariably when there is 
extended litigation.” Ante at 19 (emphasis added). 
10  
 
 
Thus, there is no sufficient showing that this case is the 
sort that is “likely to recur, yet evade judicial review.” 
Moreover, it is worth noting that in its grant 
application, the city misrepresented that defendants had 
agreed to donate the property on which the spur road would 
be built. 
By misrepresenting defendants’ intention, the 
city became entwined in a self-created dilemma. 
It had to 
sue for condemnation to fulfill what it alleged was already 
true, 
i.e., 
that 
property 
had 
been 
donated 
by 
the 
community, and, at the same time, avoid exhausting the 
funding agency’s patience. Rather than giving the city the 
benefit of the doubt that, by virtue of a possible time 
limitation, this case is likely to evade review, I would 
simply suggest that a taking entity has any number of 
alternative options available to it. 
For instance, it 
could first condemn property and then apply for project 
funding. 
Or it could forthrightly inform the agency that 
condemnation is being pursued so the agency would be aware 
that the lawsuit may bear on the project’s timing. But the 
city cannot, as the majority will apparently allow, place 
itself, by misrepresentation, in its present predicament 
and obtain judgment on the merits where it has made no 
showing that it would otherwise be continually precluded 
from doing so. 
11  
 
 
With 
respect 
to 
the 
majority’s 
statement 
that 
defendants have come up with no evidence that the project 
is not moving forward, I would simply point the majority to 
the documentary evidence contained in the record, which 
consists of letters discussing the funding withdrawal for 
the road project. 
I believe that evidence, coupled with 
the statements made at oral argument, should give the 
majority pause. 
Because 
I 
believe 
that 
the 
existing 
record 
demonstrates that there is no present case or controversy, 
no meaningful relief to be afforded the parties, and no 
showing that this matter is likely to evade judicial 
review, and because the inevitable result of deciding the 
claim is to shackle defendants’ ability to freely use their 
land, I would decline to exercise jurisdiction and dismiss 
the city’s claim as moot. 
II. PUBLIC NECESSITY 
Because the majority insists on addressing the merits 
of this moot claim and rendering an advisory opinion that 
will now control the state of the law, I find it incumbent 
on me to respond to its analysis. 
The majority correctly recognizes that a trial court’s 
realm of permissible inquiry in a condemnation case is 
limited to whether a taking entity’s decision regarding 
12  
 
 
public necessity was based on fraud, an error of law, or an 
abuse of discretion. 
MCL 213.56(2). 
The Court of Appeals 
reviews the trial court’s determination regarding public 
necessity for clear error. 
City of Troy v Barnard, 183 
Mich App 565, 569; 455 NW2d 378 (1990); Nelson Drainage 
Dist v Filippis, 174 Mich App 400, 403; 436 NW2d 682 
(1989). 
Likewise, this Court may only reverse a decision 
of the Court of Appeals if we find the decision clearly 
erroneous. 
MCR 7.302(B)(5). 
Thus, it is our task to 
determine whether the Court of Appeals clearly erred in 
affirming the trial court’s decision. 
Although the trial court concluded its written opinion 
by stating that defendants “met their burden of showing 
that Plaintiff City’s actions evidence a lack of public 
necessity 
by 
fraud, 
error 
of 
law 
and/or 
abuse 
of 
discretion,” the substance of its opinion demonstrates that 
it analyzed not public necessity, but public use. 
The 
paragraph preceding the trial court’s conclusion summarized 
the basis for its ruling: 
The Court does not dispute the fact that the
project proposed by the City of Novi furthers a
benefit to the general public. 
Nonetheless, the
Court is persuaded that Plaintiff City’s proposed
action will benefit a specific, identifiable 
private interest and, therefore, the Court is
compelled to inspect with heightened scrutiny as
outlined 
by 
the 
Michigan 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit, 410 Mich 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
616 [304 NW2d 455] (1981). 
The question thus
becomes whether the public interest is the 
predominant interest being advanced; the public
benefit of which can be neither speculative nor
marginal, but clear and significant. Id. at 635. 
Applying heightened scrutiny to the overwhelming
evidence before this Court, the Court finds that
the proposed industrial spur, A.E. Wisne Drive,
is primarily for the benefit of Wisne, which
benefit predominates over those to the general
public. 
Thus, the trial court, despite erroneously citing the 
standard of review for a public necessity challenge, found 
that the city had not demonstrated that its condemnation 
was for a public use. 
Having found so, it was unnecessary 
for the trial court to inquire into public necessity. 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals focused solely on public 
use. 
Consequently, this Court is without the benefit of 
any lower court findings on public necessity.5 
Therefore, were this case not moot, I would first 
agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals holding 
that the taking was for a public use was clearly erroneous 
for the reasons the majority states. 
But I would then 
remand this case to the trial court and instruct it to 
address defendants’ claim that the city’s determination of 
5 The fact that the trial court based its decision 
regarding public use on an erroneous legal theory, see ante 
at 13 n 7, does not negate the fact that the trial court
made no findings regarding public necessity. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
public necessity was made on the basis of fraud, error of 
law, or abuse of discretion. 
I would not foreclose defendants’ argument regarding 
fraud on the basis that defendants showed no “reliance or 
injury resulting from these acts.” 
Ante at 14 n 8. 
A 
trial court cannot accept the taking entity’s assertion of 
public necessity when that assertion was fraudulently made. 
The 
record 
shows 
that 
plaintiff 
submitted 
a 
grant 
application misrepresenting that defendants donated their 
property toward the project. 
On the basis of that 
misrepresentation, the state pledged the funding. When the 
state granted the funding, plaintiff then had no choice but 
to condemn defendants’ land. 
And in pursuit of the 
condemnation, 
plaintiff 
claimed 
that 
the 
taking 
was 
“necessary.” 
But plaintiffs’ assertion of necessity was 
not grounded in a decision that the land in question was 
“reasonably suitable and necessary” for the project and 
that this particular piece of property, rather than some 
other, was required. See State Hwy Comm v Vanderkloot, 392 
Mich 159, 176-177; 220 NW2d 416 (1974). 
Its assertion was 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
made 
because 
plaintiff 
had 
to 
make 
good 
on 
its 
misrepresentation.6 
Last, I wholeheartedly disagree with the amount of 
deference 
the 
majority 
affords 
the 
government 
in 
determining that the taking of a particular piece of 
property is necessary. 
As stated, the precise legal 
question 
is 
whether, 
to 
complete 
the 
project, 
the 
government needs all the property involved or needs one 
particular piece of property rather than some other 
property. 
Vanderkloot, supra at 176-177. 
That review 
encompasses variables such as “whether the land in question 
is reasonably suitable and necessary for the ‘improvement’ 
and whether there is the necessity for taking particular 
property rather than other property for the purposes of 
accomplishing 
the 
‘improvement.’” 
Id. 
at 
177-178. 
Necessarily, then, there must be some factual demonstration 
that would allow a court to determine whether an agency 
abused its discretion in condemning a particular piece of 
property. 
6 Defendants need not claim that plaintiff directly
defrauded defendants. 
Such a task would be difficult in a 
condemnation case, in which a decision regarding necessity
is presumably made before a private property owner even
knows of a looming condemnation. 
Rather, a trial court
must determine whether a plaintiff’s assertion of necessity
was, in a general sense, fraudulently made. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
With regard to public necessity, the majority’s first 
analytical error is in failing to properly apply the clear 
error standard. 
City of Troy supra at 569; Nelson 
Drainage, supra at 403. 
Where the trial court did not 
reach the issue of necessity, it is impossible to determine 
whether its nonexistent findings were clearly erroneous, 
despite whether the parties believe that the record is 
sufficient for us to do so.7 
In its next analytical error, rather than actually 
assessing whether the facts demonstrate that the city even 
undertook a necessity analysis, the majority concludes that 
even if there were other suitable locations for the spur, 
the decision to take defendants’ property was not outside 
the “‘principled range of outcomes.’” 
Ante at 14, quoting 
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). 
But defendants presented evidence that the city did not 
examine any range of outcomes, but rather fixated on this 
particular 
piece 
of 
property 
to 
the 
exclusion 
of 
considering 
other 
parcels 
or 
even 
alternatives 
to 
condemnation.8  Thus, a conclusion that the city’s outcome 
7 See also n 8 of this opinion. 
8 The majority’s suggestion that one of defendants’
proposed alternatives—building the spur road on Wisne’s own
(continued…) 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
fell within an acceptable “range” is unsupportable. 
The 
majority’s overly deferential viewpoint permits a city to 
prevail against a challenge to public necessity by simply 
claiming that its taking of a particular piece of property 
was, in fact, necessary. 
While deference to a taking 
agency’s finding is certainly warranted, it cannot be said 
that as long as an agency claims necessity, its decision 
cannot be disturbed. 
Such an approach does not venerate 
the constitutional principle on which the UCPA is based: a 
taking can only occur on proof that the taking was both for 
a public purpose and that the taking of a particular piece 
of property was truly necessary. 
This 
is 
especially 
true 
here, 
where 
defendants 
presented evidence that, during the negotiation phase, they 
proffered several alternatives to taking their property. 
The city refused those avenues because to be eligible for 
the funding it sought, some portion of the ring road 
(…continued)
land—was unworkable because the spur still would have 
exited onto Grand River is not useful to resolving the
abuse of discretion claim. 
As an initial matter, without
knowing the logistical details, I would not make a factual
determination that the alternative was unworkable. 
But 
even if the alternative would not have sufficed, defendants
offered other alternatives as well. 
Invalidating one 
alternative says nothing about whether other alternatives
were available, viable, and preferable to the drastic 
measure of condemnation. 
18  
 
 
 
project had to consist of a “community donation.” The city 
decided that to fulfill the community donation portion, it 
would simply require defendants to unwillingly sacrifice 
their land. 
Thus, the city never answered the question 
whether the particular piece of property was necessary for 
the purposes stated in its complaint, i.e., safety and 
welfare. 
Rather, it is clear only that the taking was a 
“necessary” means to an end. 
The majority further states that “[t]he city is not 
obligated to show that its plan is the best or only 
alternative, only that it is a reasonable one.” 
Ante at 
15. 
Again, a taking agency’s mere claim that the choice 
was “reasonable” is not conclusive. 
When defendants 
challenged public necessity, they put forth evidence that 
there were alternatives to taking their particular piece of 
property. Other than a road project plan that incorporated 
defendants’ property, nothing in the record demonstrates 
that the city chose defendants’ property in lieu of other 
alternatives because other alternatives were inferior, or 
because there were no available alternatives. 
Thus, the 
city’s assertion of public necessity is bare. 
If it is 
enough for the city to say that it needs a particular piece 
of property and that its choice is a reasonable one, 
judicial 
review 
of 
public 
necessity 
is 
essentially 
19  
 
 
 
 
foreclosed, and an abuse of discretion could never or only 
rarely be found. 
Under the majority’s rationale, a necessity hearing 
hardly seems meaningful. 
The majority accuses my dissent 
of reversing the burden of proof, but nothing could be 
further from the truth. 
If the city is required to do no 
more than sit back and assert public necessity, what, then, 
is the hearing’s purpose? Generally, in civil matters, one 
party begins with the burden of proof and must present 
evidence in support of its position. 
The other party must 
then somehow diminish, rebut, or contest that evidence with 
evidence of its own. 
Only then can a trial court decide 
which party should prevail under the appropriate standard. 
But the majority’s position allows the following scenario. 
A property owner disputes public necessity and requests a 
hearing. 
At that hearing, the owner puts forth evidence 
that, if believed, would support his claim that the taking 
of his particular parcel was not necessary. 
The taking 
entity rebuts the allegation not with evidence, but merely 
by affirming that the taking was necessary. 
Under the 
novel rule of law set forth by today’s majority, the taking 
entity prevails, despite the fact that it produced nothing 
more than an unsupported assertion of public necessity. 
20  
 
 
 
This unquestioning ceding of power is not what was 
contemplated 
by 
the 
constitutional 
or 
statutory 
prohibitions against the unnecessary taking of private 
property. Contrary to the majority’s position, a reviewing 
court has an obligation to determine whether, in the face 
of evidence to the contrary, the taking entity produced 
evidence—not assertions—of necessity. 
And this is true 
despite the fact that the burden of disproving necessity is 
on the property owner. 
When a trial court must determine 
whether there was an abuse of discretion, defendants raise 
a compelling argument that the taking entity’s failure to 
use any discretion at all is, in itself, an abuse of 
discretion. 
Were this case not moot, in the complete absence of 
trial court findings on necessity, I would remand for the 
trial court to determine whether the city’s decision to 
take defendants’ property was based on fraud, error of law, 
or an abuse of discretion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of mootness should preclude this Court 
from reaching the merits of this claim. 
As such, the 
city’s 
appeal 
should 
be 
dismissed. 
Moreover, 
the 
majority’s public necessity analysis dilutes the power and 
obligation of a reviewing court to protect a private 
21  
 
 
 
 
property owner from an unlawful taking by conferring 
unchecked deference on a taking entity’s declaration of 
necessity. Accordingly, I dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
22