Title: Ex parte Wesley E. Dekle and Sharon R. Dekle. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Wesley E. Dekle and Sharon R. Dekle v. M. Lee Seagraves and Susan Seagraves)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051659
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2008

Rel: 04/11/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649)), of any typographical or other errors, in 
order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1051659
____________________
Ex parte Wesley E. Dekle and Sharon R. Dekle
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Wesley E. Dekle and Sharon R. Dekle
v.
M. Lee Seagraves and Susan Seagraves)
(Tallapoosa Circuit Court, CV-03-44;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2040872)
PARKER, Justice.
I. Facts and Procedural History
This dispute concerns a prescriptive easement over
waterfront property on Lake Martin owned by Wesley E. Dekle
1051659
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and Sharon R. Dekle, making the Dekles' lot servient to that
of their next-door neighbors, M. Lee Seagraves and Susan
Seagraves, for access to a boat ramp.  Although the details of
the original property transfers are scant, the two parcels
were once owned by Alabama Power Company and were eventually
divided and sold as part of a subdivision in the 1990s. 
The original owner of the Seagraveses' lot, the allegedly
dominant lot, after Alabama Power, was John R. Jones, who had
leased the lot from Alabama Power from the late 1970s. In the
1980s Jones built a concrete boat ramp on the allegedly
servient lot, i.e., the Dekles' lot. The Dekles bought the
allegedly servient lot from John P. Wachtel and Shirley A.
Wachtel in March 1996, and the Dekles claim to have agreed
with Jones that Jones would have the use of the boat ramp in
exchange for their use of his well for their domestic water.
City water service became available to the Dekles in early
1998, and when Jones died about that time, the Dekles
disconnected the waterlines from his well and considered the
alleged agreement to be terminated. 
Jones's daughter, Cheryl C. Corlee, sold the property to
the Seagraveses on May 12, 1999, and the Seagraveses began
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3
using the boat ramp on the Dekles' property. The Dekles did
not object, but they claim to have shown the Seagraveses the
property lines before they purchased the Jones property and to
have told them that the boat ramp, although close to the
property line, was on the Dekles' property. The Seagraveses
state that they did not meet the Dekles until a year after
they purchased the property. The Dekles' deed shows the lot to
be subject to "existing utility and ingress-egress easements
and the facilities thereon, whether or not of record, and
which would be disclosed by [an] inspection of the property;
also easements shown on recorded plat." Dekles' brief at 2. No
easement involving the boat ramp is recorded or included on
the plat. 
When the Seagraveses poured a concrete drive from the
parking pad on their property to the boat ramp on the Dekles'
property, the Dekles notified Alabama Power that the
Seagraveses had infringed on Alabama Power's waterfront
easement. Eventually the Seagraveses removed the concrete, and
the Dekles erected a chain-link fence on the property line,
denying the Seagraveses access to the boat ramp. The
Seagraveses then sued the Dekles, alleging claims of
1051659
4
ejectment, trespass to easement, and negligence and seeking a
judgment declaring their right to the claimed easement.
Seagraveses' brief at 2. The Dekles answered with a general
denial and demanded a jury trial on all triable issues. The
Seagraveses dismissed the negligence and trespass counts
before the trial, leaving the statutory-ejectment claim and
the declaratory-judgment claim.
The statutory-ejectment claim and the declaratory-
judgment claim went to trial before a jury on March 9, 2005.
At trial, the Seagraveses claimed that they "and their
predecessors had been using the easement openly, notoriously,
adversely and continually for 'a period of in excess of twenty
years.'" Dekles' petition, exhibit C, at 3. At the close of
the Seagraveses' case-in-chief, the Dekles moved for a
judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), claiming that the
Seagraveses "had failed to prove their cause of action ...."
The trial court denied the motion for a JML, and the court
also denied the same motion when it was renewed at the close
of all evidence. The trial court then instructed the jury only
on the requirements for a prescriptive easement, because the
jury was required to find that an easement existed if
1051659
5
enforcement by declaratory judgment and ejectment was to be
ordered. The Dekles did not object to the jury charge,
allegedly because they believed that the jury could not find
that the Seagraveses had met all the elements required for a
prescriptive easement. The  Dekles later claimed that their
renewed motion for a JML was based in part on the allegation
that no evidence of the alleged agreement with Jones, who was
deceased, was allowed into evidence. The alleged agreement was
discussed before the jury, however, and the trial court
allowed the evidence of the existence of the agreement,
instructing the jury that the testimony as to the Dekles'
alleged agreement with Jones was being allowed over the
Seagraveses' objection. The jury found that the Seagraveses
had obtained a prescriptive easement over the Dekles' property
to the boat ramp, apparently tacking the Seagraveses'  use
onto Jones's use and finding the existence of the other
elements of prescription. The trial court entered a judgment
for the Seagraveses.
The Dekles appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which
affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion,
citing  as authority in its no-opinion affirmance State Farm
1051659
6
Mutual Automobile Insurance  Co. v. Motley, 909 So. 2d 806,
822 (Ala.  2005); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v.
Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949 (Ala. 2004); Crutcher v. Wendy's of
North Alabama, Inc., 857 So. 2d 82, 97 (Ala. 2003); Johnny
Spradlin Auto Parts, Inc. v. Cochran, 568 So. 2d 738, 741
(Ala. 1990); and Hampton v. Magnolia Trucking Co., 338 F.2d
303, 306 (5th Cir. 1964). Dekle v. Seagraves (No. 2040872,
Feb. 17, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)(table).
The Dekles then petitioned this Court for certiorari review,
stating three grounds. We granted review only on the ground
alleging 
that 
the 
Court 
of 
Civil 
Appeals' 
no-opinion
affirmance conflicts with decisions of this Court. 
The 
Dekles 
present 
four 
issues 
for 
this 
Court's
consideration:
1. Did the Court of Civil Appeals err in apparently
determining that the Dekles failed to cite appropriate
authority in support of their position in their brief to
that court?
2.
Did the Court of Civil Appeals err in apparently
determining that the Dekles failed to properly preserve
certain issues for appellate review?
3.
Did the Court of Civil Appeals err in apparently
determining that the Dekles had improperly raised issues
for the first time on appeal? 
4.
Did the Court of Civil Appeals err in deciding the case
1051659
7
based on an allegedly improper standard of review?
II. Standard of Review
The Dekles in their petition ask this Court to review
four legal issues raised by the no-opinion affirmance of the
Court of Civil Appeals by virtue of the cases cited in that
no-opinion affirmance. We interpret the no-opinion affirmance
differently than do the Dekles, however, as we will explain
below. The determinative  issue, as we see it, is the
reasoning behind the trial court's denial of the Dekles'
motions for a judgment as a matter of law. 
"In reviewing a decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals on a petition for a writ of certiorari, this
Court 'accords no presumption of correctness to the
legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate court.
Therefore, we must apply de novo the standard of
review that was applicable in the Court of Civil
Appeals.' Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132,
135 (Ala. 1996)." 
Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 308 (Ala. 2005).
A de novo review is "a review without any assumption of
correctness." King Mines Resort, Inc. v. Malachi Mining &
Minerals, Inc., 518 So. 2d 714, 716 (Ala. 1987).
III. Analysis
We granted certiorari review in this case to consider an
apparent conflict in the caselaw concerning the required
1051659
8
precision with which grounds must be stated in a renewed
motion for a JML or, alternatively, for a new trial, based on
insufficiency of the evidence.
The Dekles asserted in their motions for a JML that the
Seagraveses had failed to prove their cause of action. This
Court has held that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to
prove a cause of action by undisputed evidence to preclude a
JML; the plaintiff need merely to provide substantial evidence
that produces a conflict for resolution by the finder of fact.
"[The defendant] asserts that the trial court erred in
not granting it either a directed verdict at the close
of 
the 
plaintiff's 
evidence 
or 
a 
[judgment
notwithstanding the verdict] [both now renamed as
judgments as a matter of law], on grounds that [the
plaintiff] failed to prove ... an essential element of
a cause of action for breach of contract. We find,
upon examining the facts set out above, that there was
sufficient evidence before the trial court to produce
a conflict as to whether the eventual default ...
damaged [the plaintiff], and we hold, therefore, that
the 
trial 
court 
did 
not 
err 
in 
denying 
[the
defendant's] 
motions 
for 
directed 
verdict 
and
[judgment notwithstanding the verdict]."
Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 863-64 (Ala. 1988).
Here, the trial court charged the jury on the elements of
a prescriptive easement as opposed to an easement by statutory
adverse possession, asking the jury to "look back over the
years and determine whether or not the facts and evidence show
1051659
9
that an easement was established under the law." The trial
court instructed the jury that "[t]o recover the ... property
right alleged to be lost ... the [Seagraveses] must prove to
the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, from the evidence
that the [Seagraveses] had the right to immediate use of the
easement alleged." It further instructed the jury that 
"[p]rescription means that if a party is in possession
of a right to use property, and that the possession of
that right is hostile under claim of right, actual,
open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, visible and
uninterrupted for the prescriptive period of 20 years,
then the possession of that right ripens into a
legally recognized interest in the property." 
The elemental terms were defined in detail to convey  the
legal meaning of each term to the jury. The trial court then
defined the prescriptive period of 20 years as meaning "20
years of the current person claiming the right and his
predecessors who have claimed the same right."
In the Court of Civil Appeals, the Dekles argued that
there were two reasons the requirement for a 20-year
prescriptive period was not met: first, the period would have
begun to run "before the lots were platted and sold by Alabama
Power, [because] before that time the boat ramp was not
adverse to anything, because the two lots were part of the
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10
same original parcel"; and second, because Jones's use of the
boat ramp after the Dekles acquired the lot on which the boat
ramp was located was "under an agreement" and thus was not
hostile. Dekles' brief at 20-22. We see no evidence that the
Dekles' first argument was presented to the trial court, and
"[t]his Court cannot consider arguments raised for the first
time on appeal; rather, our review is restricted to the
evidence and arguments considered by the trial court."
Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992);
see also Rodriguez-Ramos v. J. Thomas Williams, Jr., M.D.,
P.C., 580 So. 2d 1326, 1328 (Ala. 1991). As to the second
argument, the Dekles' statement in their motion for a JML  or
a new trial that the jury was not permitted to hear the
discussion 
of 
their 
alleged 
agreement 
with 
Jones 
is
contradicted by the record.  Over the Seagraveses' objection,
the jury heard testimony regarding the alleged agreement
between the Dekles and Jones when the trial court admitted the
testimony with the understanding that the other party to the
alleged agreement –- Jones -- was deceased and that there was
no offer of any documentation of the purported agreement. The
record indicates that sufficient evidence was presented to the
1051659
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jury to support its verdict and that the Dekles failed to
preserve for appellate review the issue whether the 20-year
prescriptive period can include a leasehold.
We now address certain of the Dekles' arguments directed
to the Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion affirmance. The
pinpoint citation in that document to Johnny Spradlin, 568 So.
2d at 741, refers to a two-part test that requires that
"[a]n appellant who seeks reversal of an adverse
judgment on the ground that there is insufficient
evidence must meet a two-pronged test: he must have
asked for a [JML] at the close of all evidence,
specifying 'insufficiency of the evidence' as a
ground, and he must have renewed this motion by way of
a timely filed motion for [a JML], that again
specified 
the 
same 
insufficiency-of-the-evidence
ground. Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P.; King Mines Resort v.
Malachi Mining & Minerals, Inc., 518 So. 2d 714 (Ala.
1987)."
Johnny Spradlin, 568 So. 2d at 741. Although  the Dekles argue
that they met the requirements of the two-prong test, Dekles'
brief at 26-27, the  Court of Civil Appeals could reasonably
have concluded that the Dekles failed to provide the
specificity required by each prong of the test. At the close
of 
the 
Seagraveses' 
case-in-chief, 
the 
Dekles 
stated:
"Basically our argument would be, Judge, that the plaintiffs
failed to prove their cause of action for statutory ejectment
1051659
12
and also they have claimed declaratory judgment ...." Then, at
the close of all evidence, they stated that "[w]e just renew
our motion previously made." The Dekles did not specify
"insufficiency of the evidence" in their motions, and we
therefore find no error or conflict with caselaw in the Court
of Civil Appeals' use of Johnny Spradlin in this case. 
In their brief to the Court of Civil Appeals, the Dekles
argued that "[Jones's] use of the land cannot satisfy the
initial 20-year prerequisite. Mr. Jones did not own, but
merely leased the property in 1980, when the alleged
prescriptive use is argued to have commenced." Dekles' brief
at 20. The basis for the argument that the time land is under
lease cannot contribute to a prescriptive period was "[not]
supported by citations to the record," and the argument is
"unsupported by proper citation to legal authority, violates
Rule 28(a), Ala. R. App. P., [and was] not argued in the trial
court." Crutcher, 857 So. 2d at 97. Furthermore, the citation
to Crutcher in the Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion
affirmance 
could 
alternatively 
refer 
to 
the 
following
statement in Crutcher: "'"Where an appellant fails to cite any
authority, we may affirm, for it is neither our duty nor [our]
1051659
13
function to perform all of the legal research for the
appellant."'" 857 So. 2d at 97 (quoting McLemore v. Fleming,
604 So. 2d 353, 353 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), quoting in turn
Gibson v. Nix, 460 So. 2d 1346, 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)).
We find no error or conflict in the caselaw with this
application of Crutcher by the Court of Civil Appeals.
The Court of Civil Appeals also cited State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Motley, apparently in response to
the Dekles' argument that a prescriptive period may not
include periods of leasehold. It states, in particular, that
"[the appellant] having cited no authority whatsoever in
support of its novel theory, and the theory not otherwise
being 'self-evident,' we decline to adopt it." 909 So. 2d at
822.
Our review has indicated that the Dekles failed to argue
in the trial court the issue whether a prescriptive period may
include the period during which the land was leased. Their
argument that they had an agreement with Jones and that his
use of the boat ramp on their lot was therefore not adverse
was before the jury and was apparently considered in the
jury's deliberations. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of
1051659
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Civil Appeals did not err in affirming the judgment of the
trial court, which had sufficient evidence before it to
present the question to a jury for determination. 
The citations to cases in the Court of Civil Appeals' no-
opinion affirmance  provide guidance as to the basis of that
Court's ruling; we find no conflict with that caselaw in its
application here. Accordingly, we pretermit discussion of the
cases in the Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion affirmance
that are not specifically addressed herein.
IV. Conclusion
We granted the Dekles' petition to review the decision of
the Court of Civil Appeals based on the ground asserted in the
petition, i.e., that the decision conflicts with controlling
precedent. Although a no-opinion affirmance is sometimes
subject 
to 
differing 
interpretations, 
this 
no-opinion
affirmance is self-explanatory because of the use of pinpoint
citations. It is not this Court's function in the  appellate
process to reweigh the evidence presented to a jury; rather,
we are to review the legal issues raised in the petitioner's
or appellant's brief. We find no conflict between the decision
of the Court of Civil Appeals and controlling precedent, and
1051659
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the writ, therefore, is due to be quashed.
WRIT QUASHED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ.,
concur. 
Murdock, J., recuses himself.