Title: Garcia v. New Mexico State Highway Department
Citation: 296 P.2d 759, 61 N.M. 156
Docket Number: 6057
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1956

296 P.2d 759 (1956) 61 N.M. 156 Robert GARCIA, Claimant, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., Insurer, Defendants-Appellees. No. 6057. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 1, 1956. Joseph L. Smith, Henry A. Kiker, Jr., Oscar H. Beasley, Albuquerque, for appellant. A. T. Hannett, G. W. Hannett, T. G. Cornish, Albuquerque, for appellees. McGHEE, Justice. Plaintiff brought action under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his employer, New Mexico State Highway Department, and its insurer, Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., for compensation for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident which occurred February 10, 1953. Claim was filed on April 26, 1954. By answer the defendants set forth that the defendant employer, as an agency of the state, was immune from suit without its consent and further that plaintiff's claim was barred because not filed within one year after the defendant insurer's failure or refusal to pay compensation; dismissal was asked as to both defendants. A hearing was had before the court and, in accordance with findings of fact and conclusions of law made by it, judgment of dismissal was entered as to both defendants. The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of the claim as to the defendant insurer, arguing his claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, § 59-10-13, N.M.S.A. 1953, in that payment of certain of his medical expense by the insurer in November, *760 1953, constituted payment of compensation within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act and effectively removed the bar of the statute of limitations, or that his delay in filing his claim was caused in whole or in part by conduct of the defendants in paying his medical expense and making offer of settlement, which led claimant to believe compensation would be paid, relying upon § 59-10-14, N.M.S.A.1953. At the hearing before the court plaintiff's deposition, taken by stipulation of the parties, was presented and considered by the court. Both sides filed requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact made by the court may be summarized as follows: On February 10, 1953, the plaintiff, while working as a field man for the New Mexico State Highway Department, suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment at or near Bernalillo, New Mexico. The defendant insurer paid installments of compensation to him beginning February 11, 1953, and continuing through March 10, 1953. At all times since March 10, 1953, plaintiff has known of his disability and has claimed a permanent disability as a result of his accident but claim was not filed until April 26, 1954. Under § 59-10-18, N.M.S.A. 1953, compensation, once started, is to be paid at regular intervals of not more than sixteen days apart and the next compensation from the insurer became due not later than March 26, 1953. The defendant insurer failed to make compensation payment on that date and has failed to pay regular installments of compensation since March 10, 1953. The only conduct claimed by plaintiff to have led him to believe compensation would be paid is set forth in his deposition and briefly summarized is that in other compensation cases involving the highway department settlements had been made by the compensation carrier, of which plaintiff had knowledge, and that defendant insurer had paid certain of plaintiff's doctor bills subsequent to the last payment of compensation and consented to his being further treated. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to file his claim within one year from the failure of the defendant insurer to pay the installment of compensation to which the plaintiff was entitled on or about March 26, 1953, and that the claim was barred under § 59-10-13, supra; that no conduct of the employer or insurer led plaintiff to believe his installments of compensation would be paid and that plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. We will first consider the question whether payment of medical expenses by an employer or insurer constitutes a payment of compensation under our Workmen's Compensation Act tolling the period of limitation. Section 59-10-13, supra, provides, so far as material here: The plaintiff argues that because payments for surgical, medical and hospital services and medicines are included in the description of "compensation" under § 59-10-19, N.M.S.A.1953, they should also be considered to be a payment of an instalment of compensation tolling the period of limitation. The defendant insurer contends, on the other hand, that the last mentioned section, and § 59-10-18, N.M.S.A.1953, when read in conjunction with § 59-10-13, supra, make it clear that reference to installments of compensation means payment of semi-monthly benefits and cannot mean payments in discharge of medical expense. Section 59-10-18, supra, provides, in part: Section 59-10-19, supra, provides, inter alia: Plaintiff in support of his contention the period of limitation was tolled by payment of medical expense relies upon numerous *762 cases from other jurisdictions passing upon the question under their compensation statutes, the question never having been ruled upon by this Court. A considerable number of these cases are digested in the annotation entitled: "Payments, or furnishing medical or hospital services, or burial, by employer or his insurer, to employee after injury, as affecting time for filing claim under Workmen's Compensation Act," 144 A.L.R. 606, 617, under the general statement: Of course, the wording of the limitation provisions varies from state to state, but our examination of the authorities relied upon shows the following cases to be typical of this line of authority: Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Globe Indemnity Co., 1923, 74 Colo. 52, 218 P. 910; Richardson v. National Refining Co., 1933, 136 Kan. 724, 18 P.2d 131; McEneny v. S. S. Kresge Co., Mo.App.1932, 53 S.W.2d 1075, and Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 1929, 118 Neb. 445, 225 N.W. 117. The Colorado statute has since been amended to provide that furnishing of medical, surgical or hospital treatment by the employer shall not be considered payment of compensation within the meaning of its limitation provision, but the decision in Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Globe Indemnity Co., supra [74 Colo. 52, 218 P. 911], was based upon a statute providing: It was there held: The statute before the Kansas court, § 44-520a, Rev.St.Supp., 1931, in the case of Richardson v. National Refining Co., supra [136 Kan. 724, 18 P.2d 132], provided: Of a contention like that made here, the Kansas court declared: In McEneny v. S.S. Kresge Co., supra [53 S.W.2d 1077], the statute considered was described as providing: The court continued: In Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., supra [118 Neb. 445, 225 N.W. 118], the statute declared: The Nebraska court ruled: The review of these cases and statutes is somewhat lengthy, but this exposition is deemed necessary to demonstrate what we deem to be a major and crucial difference between other statutes and ours a difference to which we cannot close our eyes even under the canon of liberal construction of the compensation act to effect its remedial purposes. The difference is that under our law the act which sets the period of limitation running is the failure or refusal of the employer to *764 pay any workman entitled thereto any installment of the compensation to which such workman may be entitled. The qualifying word "installment" does not appear in the statute of limitations of any other state among the many we have examined and which have been called to our attention. We are of opinion that the use of this word in the limitation provision, considered in conjunction with other provisions of the act set out above, compels the conclusion that the period of limitation commences to run upon the failure or refusal of employer or insurer to pay the regular semi-monthly benefits established under the act. By the inclusion of this word the legislature has rendered our statute even more restrictive in this regard than those statutes from jurisdictions where it has been held the giving of medical benefits and the making of payments therefor do not constitute payment of compensation which will toll the period of limitation. See, for example: Marshall v. Pletz, 1943, 317 U.S. 383, 63 S. Ct. 284, 87 L. Ed. 348; Royer v. United States Sugar Corporation, 1941, 148 Fla. 537, 4 So. 2d 692; Pipes Chevrolet Co. v. Bryant, Ky.1954, 274 S.W.2d 663, and Paolis v. Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co., 1919, 265 Pa. 291, 108 A. 638. It must therefore be held that the trial court correctly ruled plaintiff's claim was not seasonably filed, unless plaintiff is correct in his contention that the delay in the filing of claim was caused in whole or in part by conduct of the defendants in the matters of paying for his medical care and making offer of settlement (which offer he refused) which reasonably led him to believe compensation would be paid. In his deposition plaintiff testified: The claimant made several requested findings of fact based upon this deposition, as did the defendant insurer and the trial court made the following finding noted above but here set out in full: Then the court concluded that no conduct of the employer or insurer led claimant to believe his installments of compensation would be paid. The utmost that can be said of plaintiff's deposition, viewing it most favorably as to him, is that it raised a question of fact as to whether or not the insurance carrier's or employer's conduct reasonably led him to believe compensation would be paid, and the trial court resolved the question against him. It certainly cannot be said that the conduct asserted had the effect claimed by plaintiff as a matter of law and there is nothing in our decisions in Lucero v. White Auto Stores, Inc., 1956, 60 N.M. 266, 291 P.2d 308, or Gilbert v. E. B. Law &amp; Son, Inc., 1955, 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d 992, to bring comfort to plaintiff under such contention. It is argued in the reply brief of plaintiff that it was improper for the trial court to consider the deposition in making its ruling, but that it was bound to accept as true the statement of plaintiff in his claim that he had been led to believe by the conduct of the defendants that compensation would be paid in full. This argument is untenable because the plaintiff not only acquiesced in the submission of the deposition to the court, but requested extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law which could only have been based thereon. The order dismissing plaintiff's claim must be affirmed and it is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN and SADLER, JJ., concur. KIKER, J., not participating.