Title: State v. Muldrow
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000740-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2018

2018 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP740-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF  
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 223, 900 N.W.2d 859  
PDC No:  2017 WI App 47 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc 
 
JUDGE: 
Jerome L. Fox 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by and an oral argument by Leonard Kachinsky and Kachinsky 
Law Offices, Neenah.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by 
Tiffany M. Winter. 
   
 
 
2018 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP740-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF334) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   A defendant who enters a 
guilty plea waives numerous constitutional rights.  State v. 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d 246, 
270, 
389 
N.W.2d 12 
(1986).  
Accordingly, "[u]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution,[1] a defendant's 
                                                 
1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
states 
"[n]o 
State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property[] 
without due process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 
§ 1.   
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
2 
 
guilty plea must be" entered in a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent fashion.  State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶16, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64.  This means, inter alia, the circuit 
court must notify the defendant of any direct consequence of his 
guilty plea.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).  
A direct consequence of a guilty plea is one that "has a 
definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range 
of a defendant's punishment."  State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 
232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199.  We have identified direct 
consequences of a plea as being those that impose punishment.  
Id., ¶17.   
¶2 
The 
legislature 
has 
codified 
this 
prerequisite, 
requiring circuit courts to "[a]ddress the defendant personally 
and 
determine 
that 
the 
plea 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted" before the court accepts a guilty plea.  
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) (2015-16).2  A defendant who is not 
accurately informed of the punishment that could result from his 
guilty plea may be entitled to withdraw that plea.  State v. 
Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶32, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482. 
¶3 
Petitioner DeAnthony K. Muldrow pled guilty to second-
degree sexual assault contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  This 
conviction subjects Muldrow to (as is relevant here) lifetime 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
3 
 
GPS tracking pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.48.3  Muldrow moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that his plea was not 
knowing4 because he was never informed that lifetime GPS tracking 
is a consequence of a conviction for second-degree sexual 
assault. 
¶4 
The parties agree that the circuit court failed to 
inform Muldrow that his guilty plea would subject him to 
lifetime GPS tracking.  The issue in this case is whether 
lifetime GPS tracking is a "punishment" such that due process 
requires a defendant be informed of it before entering a plea of 
guilty.  The Manitowoc County Circuit Court5 concluded that 
lifetime GPS tracking is not punishment, and so denied Muldrow's 
motion to withdraw his plea.  The court of appeals affirmed.  
State v. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, ¶1, 377 Wis. 2d 223, 900 
N.W.2d 859. 
                                                 
3 Lifetime GPS tracking applies after an offender has 
completed 
all 
sentences 
and 
any 
periods 
of 
probationary 
supervision.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 301.48(2)(a)3-3m.  It should be 
noted that an offender may be subject to GPS tracking during 
extended supervision and probation pursuant to other statutory 
provisions.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(5), (9); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2)(a)1m.  These, however, are not at issue 
in the present case, as Muldrow  challenges only lifetime GPS 
tracking pursuant to § 301.48(2)(a)3-3m. and does not challenge 
GPS tracking during extended supervision or probation.   
4 Muldrow did not specify in his motion to withdraw his plea 
in the circuit court whether his plea was not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent——or some combination thereof.  Before 
this court, Muldrow argues only that his plea was not knowing.  
5 Honorable Jerome L. Fox, presiding.  
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
This case presents us with an opportunity to set forth 
the 
proper 
test 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
sanction6 
is 
"punishment" such that due process requires a defendant be 
informed of it before entering a plea of guilty.  We must first, 
therefore, determine what that test is. 
¶6 
We hold that the intent-effects test is the proper 
test used to determine whether a sanction is punishment such 
that due process requires a defendant be informed of it before 
entering a plea of guilty. 
¶7 
After determining the proper test for whether a 
sanction is punishment such that due process requires a 
defendant be informed of it before entering a plea of guilty, we 
must apply that test to the facts of Muldrow's case. 
¶8 
Applying the intent-effects test, we hold that neither 
the intent nor effect of lifetime GPS tracking is punitive.  
Consequently, Muldrow is not entitled to withdraw his plea 
because the circuit court was not required to inform him that 
his guilty plea would subject him to lifetime GPS tracking.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Though the colloquial definitions of "sanction" and 
"punishment" may be similar, courts routinely use "sanction" as 
a general term for a negative consequence that may or may not 
rise to the level of "punishment."  See, e.g., Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963); Turner v. Glickman, 
207 F.3d 419, 430 (7th Cir. 2000); State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 
¶42, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
5 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Muldrow's Plea 
¶9 
In 2009, the State charged Muldrow with five counts of 
criminal conduct as a consequence of an incident in which he had 
forcible intercourse with a 15-year-old girl.  He reached a plea 
agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to 
the first two counts:  second-degree sexual assault of a child 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2)7 ("count one"), and third-
degree sexual assault contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3)8 
("count two").  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss, but 
read into the record for purposes of sentencing, the remaining 
three 
counts. 
 
Further, 
Muldrow 
and 
the 
State 
jointly 
recommended the following sentence:  an 18-year deferred 
judgment agreement ("DJA") on count one, and one year initial 
confinement followed by one year of extended supervision on 
count two.  If Muldrow complied with the terms of the DJA, count 
one would be dismissed.9  Because of other sentences not relevant 
                                                 
7 "Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a 
Class C felony."  Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  
8 "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person without the 
consent of that person is guilty of a Class G felony."  Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225(3).   
9 The conditions of the DJA included:  no new violations of 
the criminal law, no contact with the victim, compliance with 
the Wisconsin sex offender registry, no sexual contact or 
intercourse with anyone under the age of 18, and compliance with 
all conditions of extended supervision. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
6 
 
here, Muldrow would be under Department of Corrections ("DOC") 
supervision for the first 12.5 years of the DJA. 
¶10 The State moved to vacate the DJA in 2015 after 
Muldrow violated the terms of his extended supervision in a 
different case by, inter alia, cutting off the GPS tracker he 
was 
required 
to 
wear 
as 
a 
condition 
of 
that 
extended 
supervision, 
absconding, 
and 
using 
controlled 
substances.  
Muldrow did not contest the facts underlying the State's motion.  
The circuit court vacated the DJA and ordered that a judgment of 
guilt be entered on count one.  The court then withheld sentence 
and placed Muldrow on ten years of probationary supervision.  
Additionally, following the judgment of guilt being taken 
against him as to count one, and by dint of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.48(2)(a)3m., Muldrow became subject to lifetime GPS 
tracking.10     
¶11 Muldrow moved to withdraw his plea in October 2015——
approximately six months after the DJA was revoked and judgment 
of conviction was entered on count one.  His motion alleged that 
his guilty plea was not made in a knowing fashion because the 
circuit court did not inform him that pleading guilty to count 
one would subject him to lifetime GPS tracking pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 301.48(2)(a)3m.  Muldrow contended that his unknowing 
guilty plea was a violation of his right to due process because 
                                                 
10 During the time of his probationary supervision, GPS 
tracking 
would 
occur 
by 
operation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.48(2)(a)1m. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
7 
 
lifetime GPS tracking is a punishment for a conviction of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child of which the circuit 
court was required to notify him. 
¶12 Muldrow relied to a great extent on a federal district 
court decision that concluded lifetime GPS tracking violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution11 if 
applied to a person convicted before the statute was in effect.  
Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (E.D. Wis. 2015), rev'd, 
811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).  The threshold question for ex 
post facto violations is the same as the threshold question in 
the present case:  is the sanction "punishment?"  In concluding 
that lifetime GPS tracking is punishment, the district court in 
Belleau applied the intent-effects test, which is commonly used 
by state and federal courts in ex post facto decisions.  Id. at 
                                                 
11 The 
Ex 
Post 
Facto 
Clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part, 
"[n]o 
state 
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law."  U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 10. 
The Wisconsin Constitution also prohibits passage of ex 
post facto laws.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 12 ("No . . . ex post 
facto law . . . shall ever be passed.").  We construe the 
protections afforded by Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to be equivalent to those afforded by Article I, 
Section 10 of the United States Constitution.  See State v. 
Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994); see also 
State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶50, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 
N.W.2d 143 (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted) 
(alterations in original) ("Where . . . the language of the 
provision in the state constitution is virtually identical to 
that of the federal provision . . . , Wisconsin courts have 
normally construed the state constitution consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal 
constitution."). 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
8 
 
1095; see also, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); State v. 
Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786.  The 
district court determined that the intent of lifetime GPS 
tracking is not punitive, but the effect is.  Belleau, 132 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1104. 
¶13 Shortly before the circuit court hearing on Muldrow's 
motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that lifetime 
GPS tracking is punishment.  Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th 
Cir. 2016).  The panel unanimously concluded that lifetime GPS 
tracking is a less onerous sanction than civil commitment 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Id. at 937.  Thus, the court 
reasoned, "if civil commitment is not punishment, as the Supreme 
Court has ruled, then a fortiori, neither is having to wear an 
anklet monitor."  Id. 
¶14 The circuit court, relying on the Seventh Circuit's 
decision in Belleau, denied Muldrow's motion to withdraw his 
plea.  The circuit court concluded that lifetime GPS tracking is 
not punishment and, consequently, Muldrow did not have a right 
to be informed that his guilty plea would result in its 
imposition. 
¶15 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed. 
 
Muldrow, 
377 
Wis. 2d 223, ¶1.  The court of appeals observed a certain lack 
of clarity as to the correct test for determining whether a 
particular sanction is punishment such that due process requires 
a defendant be informed of it before entering a plea of guilty.  
Id., ¶15.  It noted, for example, that in State v. Dugan, 193 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 610, 620-21, 534 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995), the court 
of appeals applied the fundamental purpose test to determine 
that restitution is not punishment.  Moreover, it observed that 
we applied a truncated version of the intent-effects test in 
Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, to determine that Wisconsin's Sexual 
Offender Registry was not punishment.  In Bollig, we emphasized 
the lack of punitive intent, but provided only conclusory 
analysis of the punitive effects of the registry.  See id., 
¶¶23-26. 
¶16 Be that as it may, the court of appeals concluded that 
Muldrow's claim failed under either test.  Muldrow, 377 
Wis. 2d 223, ¶23.  The court of appeals combined its analysis of 
the fundamental purpose test with the intent prong of the 
intent-effects test.  Id., ¶35.  It concluded that the 
fundamental 
purpose/intent 
of 
lifetime 
GPS 
tracking 
is 
protection of the public, not punishment of the offender.  Id.  
The court then concluded that the effect of lifetime GPS 
tracking is not punitive.  Id., ¶¶36-40 (citing Belleau, 811 
F.3d at 937-38). 
¶17 Muldrow petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on October 17, 2017.  
B.  Lifetime GPS Tracking 
¶18 The DOC has not yet begun tracking Muldrow pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2)(a)3m. because he has completed neither 
his probationary supervision on count one nor his sentences 
imposed as a consequence for various other criminal conduct.  
However, the parties agree that the DOC will begin tracking 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
10 
 
Muldrow pursuant to § 301.48(2)(a)3m. upon either the conclusion 
of 
his 
probationary 
supervision 
or 
his 
release 
from 
incarceration, whichever occurs later.  However, pursuant to a 
stipulation between the parties, the circuit court took judicial 
notice of the practical effects of lifetime GPS tracking as 
described in the district court opinion in Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 
3d 1085, rev'd on other grounds, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). 
¶19 Certain serious sex offenders are subject to lifetime 
GPS tracking.  Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2).12  Though offenders are 
constantly tracked, the DOC reviews the data in only two 
                                                 
12 Offenders are subject to lifetime GPS tracking when 
released from DOC supervision after conviction (or released from 
Department of Health Services supervision after acquittal on the 
basis of mental disease or defect) for a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02 or 948.025 in one of four sets of circumstances.  Wis. 
Stat. § 301.48(2)(a)1.-5. 
1. 
(i) the offender had sexual contact or intercourse 
with (ii) a victim who is unrelated to the offender, (iii) is 
under 13 years old, and (iv) suffered great bodily harm as a 
result of the sexual contact or intercourse.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.48(1)(cm)1. 
2. 
(i) the offender had sexual intercourse with (ii) a 
victim who is not related to the offender and (iii) is under 12 
years old.  Wis. Stat. § 301.48(1)(cm)2. 
3. 
(i) the offender had sexual intercourse (ii) by use or 
threat of force or violence (iii) with a victim who is not 
related to the offender that (iv) is under 16 years old.  Wis. 
Stat. § 301.48(1)(cn)1. 
4. 
(i) the offender had sexual contact (ii) by use or 
threat of force or violence (iii) with a victim who is not 
related to the offender that (iv) is under 16 years old when (v) 
the 
offender 
was 
over 
18 
years 
old. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.48(1)(cn)2. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
11 
 
circumstances.  Each night, DOC personnel view location data 
from the previous day to confirm the offender's whereabouts.  
Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1091, rev'd on other grounds, 811 
F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).  Second, DOC personnel receive an 
alert whenever an offender leaves an inclusion zone13 or lingers 
in an exclusion zone.14  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 301.48(3)(a)3. 
¶20 Though called "lifetime" GPS tracking, some offenders 
may be released from tracking.  Wis. Stat. § 301.48(6)-(7m).  An 
offender who was not convicted of a crime during the period of 
tracking and who was not previously committed pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 may petition for termination of lifetime tracking 
after 20 years.  § 301.48(6)(b).  In addition, the DOC may 
petition to terminate lifetime tracking of an offender who is 
"permanently physically incapacitated."  § 301.48(7).  Finally, 
lifetime GPS tracking is terminated if the offender moves out of 
Wisconsin.  § 301.48(7m).   
¶21 The GPS tracker is attached to the offender's ankle by 
a black neoprene rubber strap.  Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 
1090, rev'd on other grounds, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).  The 
offender is prohibited from ever removing it.  Id.  To that end, 
the tracker is waterproof up to 15 feet to allow for bathing and 
                                                 
13 An inclusion zone is an area that the offender is 
prohibited from leaving.  Wis. Stat. § 301.48(1)(c).  
14 An exclusion zone is an area that the offender is 
prohibited from entering other than to pass through.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.48(1)(a).   
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
12 
 
swimming.  Id.  The tracker can, however, cause blistering, 
especially when wet.  Id. 
¶22 The tracker is approximately 2.5 x 3.5 x 1.5 inches.  
Id.  Though small, the tracker is noticeable; its position at 
the bottom of the offender's ankle means that it is always 
visible if the offender wears shorts or sits down while wearing 
pants.  Id. at 1091.  Even if the tracker is totally covered by 
the offender's pants, it nonetheless creates a noticeable bulge 
on the offender's pant leg.  Id.   
¶23 The tracker must be charged for one hour once per day, 
which requires the offender to stay close enough to an 
electrical outlet for the cord to reach.  Id. at 1090.  The 
tracker has a speaker that can play messages sent from DOC 
personnel, such as orders to call the DOC, orders to report to 
the DOC, reminders of upcoming appointments with DOC personnel, 
and warnings for low batteries.  Id. at 1091.  These messages 
can be heard by anyone within earshot of the offender.  Id. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 Whether a plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently is a question of constitutional fact.  Bollig, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶13.  We uphold the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  We apply 
constitutional principles to those historical facts de novo.  
Id. 
¶25 In 
determining 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.48 
is 
punishment, we must interpret the statute.  We interpret the 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
13 
 
statute de novo.  State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶15, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶26 We first consider the proper test for determining 
whether a sanction is "punishment" such that due process 
requires a defendant be informed of it before entering a plea of 
guilty.  We hold that the intent-effects test is the proper test 
used to determine whether a potential sanction is punishment 
such that due process requires a defendant be informed of it 
before entering a plea of guilty. 
¶27 Next, we apply the intent-effects test to the facts of 
Muldrow's case.  Applying the intent-effects test, we hold that 
neither the intent nor effect of lifetime GPS tracking is 
punitive and, consequently, the circuit court was not required 
to inform Muldrow of it. 
 
A.  Whether a Sanction is Punishment Such that Due Process 
Requires a Defendant be Informed of it Before Entering a Plea of 
Guilty is Determined by Application of the Intent-Effects Test. 
¶28 The State brings to our attention three proposed tests 
to determine whether a sanction is punishment.  First, the State 
asks us to adopt a bright-line rule whereby only imprisonment 
and fines are punishment.  The State grounds this test on State 
v. Finley, 2016 WI 63, 370 Wis. 2d 402, 882 N.W.2d 761.  We 
reject this proposal because to do otherwise would be to read 
too much into our holding in Finley.  We did not undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of what constitutes punishment in that 
case because it was not centered on the question of what kind of 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
14 
 
sanctions constitute punishment.  Rather, in Finley, the circuit 
court's error was misstating the defendant's potential term of 
imprisonment——a sanction that is indisputably punishment.  Id., 
¶8. 
¶29 In the alternative, the State encourages us to adopt 
the "fundamental purpose" test.  The fundamental purpose test 
looks to "the fundamental purpose of the sentencing provision at 
issue" in order to determine whether a particular sanction 
constitutes punishment.  Dugan, 193 Wis. 2d at 620.  Put another 
way, the fundamental purpose test is really the intent-effects 
test without consideration of any punitive effect of the 
sanction.  We see no reason to adopt this test as it provides a 
less comprehensive and, therefore, less useful analysis than the 
third test proposed by the State, the intent-effects test. 
¶30 The third time here indeed being the charm, we choose 
to adopt the State's final proposed standard, the intent-effects 
test.  The intent-effects test was first articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 168-70 (1963).  The issue in Mendoza-Martinez was 
whether 
a 
statute 
that 
automatically 
stripped 
American 
citizenship, without any hearing, from a person who left the 
country to avoid the draft violated the right to due process.  
Id. at 165-66.  The Court held that forfeiture of citizenship 
was a punishment that could be imposed only after conviction in 
a criminal trial with all of the protections of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Id. at 167.   
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
15 
 
¶31 In determining whether forfeiture of citizenship was a 
punishment, the Court first looked to the "statute's primary 
function," i.e., intent.  Id. at 169.  However, the Court's 
analysis did not end there.15  The Court also considered whether 
the effect of the statute was "penal or regulatory in 
character."  Id. at 168.  To aid its determination of the effect 
of the statute, the Court set out seven non-exclusive factors: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability 
or 
restraint, 
[2] 
whether 
it 
has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the 
traditional 
aims 
of 
punishment——retribution 
and 
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it 
applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable 
for 
it, 
and 
[7] 
whether 
it 
appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned . . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted).   
¶32 The intent-effects test is used in many contexts to 
determine whether a sanction is punishment.  The United States 
Supreme Court applied the intent-effects test to determine 
whether Alaska's sex offender registry was punishment for 
purposes of the ex post facto clause, Smith, 538 U.S. 84; 
whether monetary penalties and revocation of occupational 
licenses were punishment such that a subsequent criminal 
                                                 
15 This is in contrast to the fundamental purpose test.  We 
agree with the court of appeals that the fundamental purpose 
test is equivalent to the intent prong of the intent-effects 
test.  State v. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, ¶24, 377 Wis. 2d 223, 
900 N.W.2d 859. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
16 
 
prosecution based on the same conduct violated the Fifth 
Amendment's double jeopardy clause, Hudson v. United States, 522 
U.S. 93 (1997); and whether monetary penalties assessed against 
those who discharged hazardous substances into navigable waters 
were punishment such that a requirement that a person report any 
such discharge violated the Fifth Amendment's protection against 
compulsory self-incrimination, United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242 (1980). 
¶33 Wisconsin courts have similarly used the intent-
effects test to determine whether a sanction is punishment in 
multiple contexts.  For example, Wisconsin courts have applied 
it to determine whether civil commitment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 is punishment such that it violates either the ex post 
facto clause or double jeopardy clause, State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 
81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762; whether the mandatory DNA 
surcharge is punishment such that it violates the ex post facto 
clause, Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312; and whether monetary penalties 
for those who do not comply with a county ordinance regulating 
large gatherings are punishment such that they may be imposed 
only after a criminal trial with full Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
protections, 
Sauk 
Cty. 
v. 
Gumz, 
2003 
WI 
App 
165, 
266 
Wis. 2d 758, 669 N.W.2d 509. 
¶34 Other jurisdictions have applied the intent-effects 
test to the issue of whether a sanction is punishment such that 
the defendant must be informed of it in order for a guilty plea 
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  People v. Cole, 817 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
17 
 
N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2012); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 
2010).   
¶35 We conclude that the intent-effects test is the proper 
test to determine whether a sanction is punishment such that due 
process requires a defendant be informed of it before entering a 
plea of guilty.  We do so not out of habit or blind adherence to 
custom.  We do so because the intent-effects test has been 
effectively 
applied 
by 
courts 
in 
multiple 
contexts 
and, 
consequently, brings with it a broad and deep base of case law, 
which provides us with the type of helpful guidance necessary to 
our analysis of the issue we address herein.  Winnebago Cty. v. 
J.M., 2018 WI 37, ¶41, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (adopting 
the Strickland16 standard in Wis. Stat. ch. 51 commitments 
because, inter alia, "the Strickland standard carries with it a 
developed body of case law that will aid courts in the efficient 
and timely resolution of claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel"). 
 
B.  Application of the Intent-Effects Test to Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.48 Leads us to Conclude that Lifetime GPS Tracking is Not 
Punishment. 
¶36 In his application of the intent-effects test, Muldrow 
relies primarily on the district court's decision in Belleau, 
132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, rev'd, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016), as 
well as the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Cole, 817 
N.W.2d 497.  He does so in order to lay the foundation that Wis. 
                                                 
16 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
18 
 
Stat. § 301.48 is punitive.  For its part, the State relies 
primarily on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Belleau, 811 F.3d 
929.  Though, of course, we are not bound by the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Belleau, we are persuaded by it because it 
correctly applies the law, whereas the decision of the district 
court does not.  See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 
99, ¶68, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337 ("While the Seventh 
Circuit's analysis of Act 10 is not binding on this court, we 
find no reason to disagree with its clear and rational 
articulation of the law.").  Further, Cole is distinguishable 
from the present case due to differences between the Michigan 
and Wisconsin lifetime GPS tracking statutes.   
1.  The intent of lifetime GPS tracking is not punitive. 
¶37 "Determining whether the legislature intended [a] 
statute to be punitive 'is primarily a matter of statutory 
construction . . . .'"  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶17 (quoting 
Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶40).  Accordingly, we use the rules of 
statutory construction to determine "whether the legislature 
expressly or impliedly indicated" whether Wis. Stat. § 301.48 is 
"a civil remedy or a criminal penalty."  Id., ¶18. 
¶38 Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning 
of the text.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Context 
and structure are important to statutory meaning.  Id., ¶46.  
Where a statutory provision is codified is indicative of whether 
the legislature intended a provision to be punitive.  Smith, 538 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
19 
 
U.S. at 94; Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶24; see also Tyson v. 
State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 93 (Ind. 2016). 
¶39 Muldrow 
relies 
on 
the 
Michigan 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision in Cole, 817 N.W.2d 497, to argue that the intent of 
lifetime GPS tracking is punitive.  We are not persuaded.  The 
Michigan 
lifetime 
GPS 
tracking 
statute 
is 
readily 
distinguishable from Wis. Stat. § 301.48.  For instance, the 
Michigan lifetime GPS tracking statute states, in relevant part: 
A 
person 
convicted . . . [of] 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct . . . against an individual less than 13 years 
of age shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic 
tracking . . .  
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520n (emphasis added).  Additionally, a 
plain reading of the relevant Michigan statutes makes clear that 
the Michigan legislature intended its lifetime GPS tracking 
statutory scheme to be a punitive measure: 
(2) Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is a 
felony punishable as follows: 
 . . .  
(d) In addition to any other penalty imposed 
under subdivision (a) or (b), the court shall 
sentence the defendant to lifetime electronic 
tracking under section 520n. 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
(2) Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is a 
felony punishable as follows: 
 . . .  
(b) In addition to the penalty specified in 
subdivision (a), the court shall sentence the 
defendant to lifetime electronic tracking under 
section 520n . . .  
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
20 
 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2)(b) (emphasis added).   
¶40 In Cole, the Michigan Supreme Court quite reasonably 
concluded that lifetime GPS tracking is intended to be punitive 
because the relevant statutes expressly refer to it as a 
"penalty."  Cole, 817 N.W.2d at 502-03. Or, put another way, it 
is, by the plain language of the statute, a "punishment."17  See 
id.  In stark contrast, the language, structure, and context of 
Wis. Stat. § 301.48 demonstrate that our legislature did not 
intend lifetime GPS tracking to be punitive. 
¶41 Our legislature has set forth the purpose of chapters 
301-304, which include "provid[ing] a just, humane[,] and 
efficient program of rehabilitation of offenders."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.001.18  "We take the legislature at its word."  Wis. Med. 
                                                 
17 "Punishment" 
is 
defined, 
inter 
alia, 
as 
a 
"penalty . . . assessed against a person who has violated the 
law."  Black's Law Dictionary 1428 (10th ed. 2014).  
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.001 states in whole: 
The purposes of this chapter and chs. 302 to 304 are 
to prevent delinquency and crime by an attack on their 
causes; to provide a just, humane and efficient 
program 
of 
rehabilitation 
of 
offenders; 
and 
to 
coordinate and integrate corrections programs with 
other social services. In creating the department of 
corrections, chs. 301 to 304, the legislature intends 
that the state continue to avoid sole reliance on 
incarceration of offenders and continue to develop, 
support and maintain professional community programs 
and placements. 
Express statements of legislative purpose are part of a 
plain-meaning inquiry.  Wilmet v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 WI 
App 16, ¶13, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893 N.W.2d 251 (citing State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶49, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
21 
 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 94, ¶102, 328 Wis. 2d 469, 787 
N.W.2d 22.  These purposes are indisputably non-punitive in 
nature, and are reflective of an intent to rehabilitate 
offenders 
and 
protect 
the 
public 
rather 
than 
to 
punish 
offenders.   
¶42 The structure and context of Wis. Stat. § 301.48 
demonstrate that the legislature considers punitive sanctions 
intended to punish criminal conduct to be distinct from 
regulatory sanctions, which are intended to have a focus that 
encompasses a broad array of considerations as opposed to the 
singular nature of punishment of the offender.  The legislature 
set out sanctions that are indisputably punishment——imprisonment 
and fines——in chapter 939.  See Finley, 370 Wis. 2d 402, ¶4.  
The legislature set out many of the sanctions it considers 
regulatory in nature in chapter 301 and has interspersed others 
throughout the statutes.  
¶43 Conversely, lifetime GPS tracking is located in 
chapter 301, which sets forth both the organizational overview 
for the DOC and administrative matters such as:  purchasing care 
and services for prisoners, Wis. Stat. § 301.08; payment of 
benefits, Wis. Stat. § 301.085; and purchases, bills, audits, 
and payments, Wis. Stat. § 301.10.  In contrast, disciplinary 
procedures such as punishments for misbehavior by those subject 
to DOC supervision, e.g., solitary confinement, are contained in 
chapter 302. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 302.40.   
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.48 is, in fact, surrounded by 
statutes that establish various safeguards to protect the public 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
22 
 
from persons convicted of criminal conduct.  See generally Wis. 
Stat. §§ 301.45-301.49.  When courts have had the opportunity to 
review whether these safeguards constitute punishment, the 
statutes have, in every instance, been found to be non-punitive 
in nature.   
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. 
§§ 301.45 and 301.46 govern the 
Wisconsin sex offender registry. Section 301.45 requires sex 
offenders to register with the Wisconsin sex offender registry.  
Section 301.46 regulates the use of information in the registry.  
We held that mandatory compliance with the registry is not 
punishment in Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶21; see also id., ¶20 
(collecting cases from other jurisdictions holding that sex 
offender registries are not punishment); Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-
06 
(holding 
that 
Alaska's 
sex 
offender 
registry 
is 
not 
punishment).  Likewise, the fee assessed against sex offenders 
to pay for the registry has been found not to be punishment.  
Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 2014). 
¶46 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.47, the statute immediately 
preceding lifetime GPS tracking, prohibits sex offenders from 
changing their names (whether legally or through common usage).  
The only court to analyze whether § 301.47 is punitive concluded 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
23 
 
that it is not.  Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F. Supp. 2d 897, 908 (E.D. 
Wis. 2012), rev'd on other grounds, Mueller, 740 F.3d at 1133.19 
¶47 The final two sections (Wis. Stat. §§ 301.475 and 
301.49) of chapter 301 have never been challenged as punitive.  
Section 301.475 
requires 
sex 
offenders 
to 
notify 
school 
officials when the offender seeks to enter school property.  
Section 301.49 establishes an analogous GPS tracking program for 
persons who violate a domestic abuse or harassment restraining 
order or injunction. 
¶48 A review of the three provisions for terminating 
lifetime GPS tracking indicate that the intent of tracking is 
protecting the public.  The three means of terminating tracking—
—upon motion of the offender after 20 years of full compliance, 
upon motion of the DOC based on offender incapacitation, and 
upon the offender moving out of state——are tailored to ensure an 
offender is tracked only when he poses a threat to Wisconsin 
residents.  See supra, ¶19.  This tailoring strongly indicates 
that the intent of lifetime GPS tracking centers more closely 
around the protection of the public than it does punishment of 
                                                 
19 The district court concluded that enforcing Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.47 against a sex offender convicted before its passage did 
not violate the ex post facto clause because § 301.47 creates a 
new crime rather than increasing punishment for a prior crime.  
Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F. Supp. 2d 897, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2012).  The 
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision because 
the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge § 301.47.  
Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 2014).  
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit did not reach the merits of 
whether § 301.47 is punishment.  Id. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
24 
 
the offender.  Put simply, if punishment was the objective, the 
legislature would have had no reason to allow termination of 
"lifetime" GPS tracking. 
2.  The effect of lifetime GPS tracking is not punitive. 
¶49 We now consider whether lifetime GPS tracking "is so 
punitive in effect as to transform [it] into a criminal 
penalty."  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶39 (citing Rachel, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, ¶42).  We give the legislature's decision to label 
a statute as a civil remedy "great deference."  Id., ¶20 (citing 
Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶42).  "[O]nly the clearest proof will 
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has 
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."  
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Ward, 488 U.S. at 249). 
 
a.  We determine whether lifetime GPS tracking is punitive by 
applying the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors. 
 
i.  Whether lifetime GPS involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint. 
¶50 The 
"paradigmatic 
affirmative 
restraint" 
is 
imprisonment.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.  Lifetime GPS tracking 
does not resemble imprisonment because the offender is not 
confined and has substantial freedom of movement (subject only 
to inclusion zones and exclusion zones).  As the Seventh Circuit 
persuasively stated, "if civil commitment is not punishment, as 
the Supreme Court has ruled, then a fortiori, neither is having 
to wear an anklet monitor."  Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
25 
 
¶51 Muldrow is "restrained" in the sense that he must be 
close enough to an electrical outlet to charge the GPS tracker 
for one hour each day.  However, sitting near a wall for an hour 
per day is so "minor and indirect" a restraint that it does not 
have the effect of punishment.  Id. at 943 (Flaum, J., 
concurring) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 100).   
 
ii.  Whether lifetime GPS tracking has historically been 
regarded as punishment. 
¶52 Lifetime GPS tracking has not historically been 
regarded as punishment——largely because GPS is relatively new 
technology.  Id. (Flaum, J., concurring).  Muldrow contends that 
lifetime GPS tracking resembles historical forms of punishment 
such as public shaming.  The analogy fails because any "shaming" 
in the GPS tracker context is an unintended byproduct of the 
associated technology and can be minimized, if not eliminated——
albeit, at some inconvenience——by the offender.  The GPS tracker 
is as small as present technology permits20 and is placed in a 
discreet location——the bottom of the offender's ankle.  In 
contrast, public shaming was intended to bring as much attention 
as possible to the offender's status.  Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. 
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:  A Proposal for Reform 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. Law & Econ. 365, 368 
                                                 
20 It has been noted elsewhere that just as with other 
electronic devices, as technology advances, the size and, 
therefore, the apparentness of the monitor will be reduced.  
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 939 (7th Cir. 2016) (Flaum, J., 
concurring).  
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
26 
 
(1999) ("Shaming is the process by which citizens publicly and 
self-consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or 
actions of an offender . . . ."); see also Belleau, 811 F.3d at 
943 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
 
iii.  Whether lifetime GPS tracking comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter. 
¶53 Lifetime GPS tracking is contingent upon a criminal 
conviction (or acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect).  
Wis. Stat. §§ 301.48(2)(a)1-5.  However, no scienter is required 
for the imposition of lifetime GPS tracking.  If the statutory 
criteria are met, the offender is subject to lifetime GPS 
tracking.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2).  This is analogous to 
civil commitment pursuant to chapter 980, which similarly relies 
on a prior conviction, but does not contain a scienter 
requirement 
for 
the 
commitment 
itself. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(2).  We held in Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶51, that 
requiring a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to civil 
commitment did not mean that the commitment itself had a 
scienter requirement.  Rachel's reasoning applies with equal 
strength here.   
 
iv.  Whether lifetime GPS will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment——deterrence and retribution. 
¶54 We acknowledge that lifetime GPS tracking likely 
promotes deterrence because the offender knows that his location 
is constantly known to authorities——indeed, this is likely one 
of the purposes of lifetime GPS tracking.  Belleau, 811 F.3d at 
944 (Flaum, J., concurring).  However, a statute is not punitive 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
27 
 
simply because it may deter crime.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized, "[a]ny number of governmental programs 
might deter crime without imposing punishment."  Smith, 538 U.S. 
at 102.  Lifetime GPS tracking is one such program. 
¶55 A statute promotes retribution if it "affix[es] 
culpability for prior criminal conduct."  Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).  Though many offenders are subject to 
lifetime GPS tracking because they were found guilty of a 
criminal offense, some are subject to lifetime GPS tracking 
because they were found not guilty due to mental disease or 
defect.  Wis. Stat. §§ 301.48(2)(a)4-5.  In Hendricks, the Court 
relied heavily on the fact that some of the persons committed 
pursuant to Kansas's sexually violent person law were not 
criminally responsible in order to reach its conclusion that the 
statute did not promote retribution.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 
362.  It did so as a result of its reasoning that if some of the 
committed persons were not criminally responsible, then the 
statute was not seeking to affix culpability upon them for any 
prior criminal conduct.  Id.  The same reasoning applies here.  
This is so because lifetime GPS tracking applies to those who 
are criminally culpable for their conduct as well as to those 
who are not by reason of mental disease or defect.   
 
v.  Whether the behavior to which lifetime GPS tracking applies 
is already a crime. 
¶56 Where "[e]vidence of a crime . . . is essential to the 
[sanction]," then the sanction is more likely punitive.  Lipke 
v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922).  Evidence of past criminal 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
28 
 
conduct (either a conviction or acquittal on the basis of mental 
disease or defect) is necessary to trigger lifetime GPS 
tracking, but no new, uncharged criminal conduct is required.  
Wis. Stat. § 301.48(2).  This is in contrast to the tax at issue 
in Lipke, which the Court found punitive because it applied only 
to alcohol manufacture and sale that was already criminal and 
could be separately criminally charged.  259 U.S. at 561.   
 
vi.  Whether an alternative purpose to which lifetime GPS 
tracking may rationally be connected is assignable for it. 
¶57 The existence of an alternative non-punitive purpose 
for a sanction is considered "the most significant factor" in 
determining whether the effect of a sanction is punitive.  
Belleau, 811 F.3d at 943 (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting Smith, 
538 U.S. at 103).  The non-punitive purpose of lifetime GPS 
tracking is protecting the public from future sex offenses.  Id. 
at 937; id. at 943 (Flaum, J., concurring).   
¶58 Protecting the public from future sex offenses has 
been deemed a non-punitive purpose in analogous contexts:  sex 
offender registration, Smith, 538 U.S. at 103; State v. Smith, 
2010 
WI 
16, 
¶26, 
323 
Wis. 2d 377, 
780 
N.W.2d 90; 
civil 
commitment of sex offenders, Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363; and 
municipal ordinances restricting sex offender residency, City of 
S. Milwaukee v. Kester, 2013 WI App 50, ¶30, 347 Wis. 2d 334, 
830 N.W.2d 710.   
¶59 Lifetime GPS tracking has a rational relationship to 
this non-punitive purpose because it ensures law enforcement 
will have ready access to evidence of an offender's whereabouts.  
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
29 
 
Belleau, 811 F.3d at 938.  This rational relationship may also 
work to the benefit of the offender:  location evidence from 
lifetime GPS tracking can prove an accurate alibi just as easily 
as it can disprove a false alibi. 
 
vii.  Whether lifetime GPS tracking appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
¶60 Lifetime GPS tracking is commensurate with the goal of 
protecting the public.  It provides a middle ground between 
releasing dangerous sex offenders into the public wholly 
unsupervised and civil commitment pursuant to chapter 980.  In 
light of the "frightening and high" rate of recidivism for sex 
offenders, the relatively minimal intrusion of lifetime GPS 
tracking (especially when compared to chapter 980 commitment) is 
not excessive in relation to protecting the public.  Smith, 538 
U.S. at 104. 
¶61 The opportunity to terminate tracking, see supra, 
¶¶19, 45, keeps lifetime GPS tracking closely-tailored to its 
purpose.  Unlike any other sanction known to Wisconsin law, any 
offender who wishes to discontinue "lifetime" GPS tracking can 
terminate it by simply moving out of state.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.48(7m).   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶62 We hold that the intent-effects test is the proper 
test used to determine whether a sanction is punishment such 
that due process requires a defendant be informed of it before 
entering a plea of guilty. 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
30 
 
¶63 Applying the intent-effects test, we hold that neither 
the intent nor effect of lifetime GPS tracking is punitive.  
Consequently, Muldrow is not entitled to withdraw his plea 
because the circuit court was not required to inform him that 
his guilty plea would subject him to lifetime GPS tracking.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP740-CR   
 
 
 
1