Title: Breeze v. Breeze
Citation: 421 N.E.2d 647
Docket Number: 681S163
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 1981

421 N.E.2d 647 (1981)
George Robert BREEZE, Trustee of Paul E. Breeze Living Trust, Jennifer Lynn Holder, Bruce Breeze, Carolyn Breeze, Paul Edward Breeze and John Carey Breeze, Appellants (Defendants below),
v.
Imogene BREEZE (Lofton), Appellee (Plaintiff below). Continental Casualty Company, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
Charles A. Novy, M.D., Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 681S163.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 18, 1981.
David O. Givens, Allyn &amp; Givens, Mount Vernon, William E. Borror, Hunt, Suedhoff, Borror, Eilbacher &amp; Lee, Fort Wayne, for appellants.
Ronald Warrum, Bates, Warrum &amp; Noffsinger, Evansville, S. Anthony Long, Phillips &amp; Long, Boonville, Thomas S. Locke, James A. Federoff, Raver &amp; Federoff, Fort Wayne, for appellees.
*648 Hunter, Justice.
This cause is before us upon the petition to transfer of defendants-appellants, George Robert Breeze, trustee of Paul E. Breeze living trust, et al., and plaintiff-appellee, Charles A. Novy. In each case, the Court of Appeals ruled upon a particular application of Ind.R.Tr.P. 59. The Court of Appeals, First District, ordered a dismissal in the case of defendants-appellants, Breeze, et al., but the Court of Appeals, Third District denied a petition for dismissal in the case of plaintiff-appellee, Novy. Continental Casualty Co. v. Novy, (1979) Ind. App., 397 N.E.2d 294.
We now grant transfer under Ind.R.Ap.P. 11(B)(2)(c), in that there is a conflict between the actions of the two courts. We are in accord with the Court of Appeals, Third District, in its holding that Ind.R. Tr.P. 59 and our case of P-M Gas &amp; Wash Co., Inc. v. Smith, (1978) 268 Ind. 297, 375 N.E.2d 592, do not preclude the filing of a second motion to correct error addressed to a change in the trial court's finding or judgment. Accordingly, the order of the Court of Appeals, First District, granting plaintiff-appellee's motion to dismiss in the Breeze case is hereby vacated.
We also wish to give more detailed consideration to the procedural issues raised by these two cases. Accordingly, the decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, Third District, are hereby vacated and both petitions to transfer are granted. Both cases involve the filing of second motions to correct error after the trial courts had considered the original motions and entered changed findings and judgments.
In the first case, appellee Imogene Breeze brought an action following her husband's death against the trustee of a trust and its beneficiaries. A judgment entry was made on September 7, 1978, awarding certain real estate, which was the subject of the action, to the estate of Paul E. Breeze, deceased. The estate was not one of the parties to the action. Defendants-appellants filed a motion to correct error on November 2, 1978. The relevant chronology follows:
The final amended judgment entry awarded the property to Imogene Breeze in her individual capacity. After defendants-appellants had perfected their appeal from the January 29 amended judgment entry, appellee Breeze filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the theory that defendants-appellants had not timely perfected their appeal from the January 12 ruling on their first motion to correct error. The motion to dismiss was granted by written order of the Court of Appeals, First District.
The relevant facts in the second case in the Third District were succinctly stated by Judge Garrard in Continental Casualty Co. v. Novy, supra:
The issue which is before us then involves the application of TR. 59 in those situations where the trial court has altered, amended, or supplemented its findings and/or judgment after the filing of one motion to correct error. The question is whether a party is permitted to file a second motion to correct error addressed to a change in the court's finding or judgment.
A review of our position in P-M Gas &amp; Wash Co., Inc. v. Smith, supra, leads us to the conclusion that there is a certain flexibility inherent in TR. 59 which results in a liberal but efficient system of raising errors on appeal. This flexibility does permit the filing of a second motion to correct error. First, it is absolutely clear that one motion to correct error is all that is required as a condition to appeal:
The spirit behind this requirement of a motion to correct error is the sound principle that the trial court should be accorded the first opportunity to correct a mistake. This principle underlies TR. 59 as it existed at the time of P-M Gas &amp; Wash Co., Inc. v. Smith, supra, and as it has been amended as of January 1, 1980, and exists today.
Second, we find that in a broader context, our rules and their amendments and our case law are responsive to the demand of the public and the bar for a better system of dispute resolution at all levels. See Harvey 4 Indiana Practice § 59.3 (1980 Supp.). As we said:
These considerations lead us to agree with Judge Garrard's well-reasoned conclusion that there are three reasons for finding that a second motion to correct error is permitted. As he stated in Continental Casualty Co. v. Novy, supra:
Thus, we hold that after one motion to correct error has been filed and the trial court has subsequently altered, amended, or supplemented its findings and/or judgment, the parties have the discretion to appeal immediately or to file a new motion to correct error directed to the changed findings and/or judgment.[1] This liberal interpretation provides the needed flexibility in our trial rule and gives an equitable opportunity for appeal to all parties. This holding is consistent with our present TR. 59.
Our holding here does result in one apparent inconsistency between our appellate and trial rules. When one motion to correct error has been filed and then ruled upon by the trial court and this ruling involves a change in the findings and/or judgment, two different rules may be invoked. Ind.R. Ap.P. 2 provides that a praecipe shall be filed within thirty days after the court's ruling on the motion to correct error. But at the same time, in light of our instant holding, Ind.R.Tr.P. 59 provides that a second motion to correct error is allowed to be filed within sixty days of the trial court's ruling.
Under these circumstances, we hold that TR. 59 takes precedence and that the trial court continues to have jurisdiction of the case for sixty days after a ruling on a motion to correct error when the ruling results in changed findings or judgment. If a second motion to correct error is filed within this sixty-day period, the trial court must make a ruling on this second motion to correct error. All time periods for the purpose of the appellate rules will then start from the time of the trial court's ruling on the second motion to correct error. If a praecipe was filed after the ruling on the first motion to correct error, no second praecipe is required. However, a praecipe is timely if filed within thirty days of the ruling on the second motion to correct error. A praecipe which was filed earlier will count as if filed from the date of the ruling on the second motion to correct error. The party then has ninety days from the ruling on the second motion to correct error to file the record of the proceedings. This interpretation and holding will provide courts, attorneys and the public with flexible but equitable rules of appellate procedure.
In the instant cases, the parties have timely perfected their appeals from the rulings on the second motions to correct error and neither appeal can be dismissed. The petitions to transfer are both granted. Both cases are remanded to their respective districts for decisions on the merits of their cases.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
[1]  In these cases, it is clear that counsel acted in complete good faith and in the great traditions of the Indiana bar. However, the discretion which this decision gives to attorneys is susceptible of abuse. If there is any indication in the record that a second motion to correct error was filed only for the purpose of delay or for any other reason without good cause, it should be dealt with by the trial court or the appellate courts according to Ind.R.Tr.P. 11(A).