Title: Aguilar v. Husco Int’l, Inc.
Citation: 2015 WI 36
Docket Number: 2013AP000265
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2015

2015 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP265 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Mauricio Aguilar, Dave Hughes, Daniel Radmer, 
Byron Slagle, Duaine Wagner and Michael Vinsant, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
     v. 
Husco International, Inc., 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, District No. 10, 
          Third-Party  
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 526, 851 N.W.2d 802) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 64 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 1, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dominic S. Amato  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-third-party plaintiff-respondent-cross-
appellant-petitioner, the cause was argued by John C. Schaak, 
with whom on the briefs was Jeffrey Morris, John C. Schaak, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents and third-
party defendant-appellant-cross-respondent, the cause was argued 
by Nathan D. Eisenberg, with whom on the brief was Frederick 
Perillo, Yingtao Ho, and The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 36
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2013AP265    
(L.C. No. 
2008CV1395) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mauricio Aguilar, Dave Hughes, Daniel Radmer, 
Byron Slagle, Duaine Wagner, and Michael 
Vinsant,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents,   
 
 
v. 
 
Husco International, Inc.,   
 
 
Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-
Respondent-Cross-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v.   
 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, District No. 10, 
 
 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant-
Cross-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
APR 1, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This wage claim case began 
when a union-initiated complaint was filed with the Department 
of Workforce Development on behalf of Thomas Kieckhefer and 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
2 
 
similarly situated production and maintenance employees at Husco 
International, Inc.  The complaint alleged Husco owed the 
employees wages for 20-minute meal breaks.  Such breaks had  
been unpaid; the union had previously agreed to that in every 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated since 1983 at 
the company's Waukesha plant.  This had the effect of workers 
having a shorter work shift than they would have if the schedule 
complied with the regulation on unpaid meal breaks (a work shift 
of eight hours and 20 minutes rather than eight hours and 30 
minutes).  As it turns out, this provision was in conflict with 
a state regulation1 that requires employers to pay employees for 
meal breaks that are shorter than thirty minutes.   
¶2 
The DWD regulation specifically allows employers and 
unions with a CBA to request a waiver from the State for shorter 
unpaid meal breaks,2 but no such request was submitted in this 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 274.02 (2006) states, "The 
employer shall pay all employees for on-duty meal periods, which 
are to be counted as work time. An on-duty meal period is a meal 
period where the employer does not provide at least 30 minutes 
free from work." All references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to Wis. Admin. Code (2006). 
2 Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 states that, with exceptions 
that are not applicable here,  
[W]here a collectively bargained agreement exists, the 
department may consider the written application of 
labor and management for a waiver or modification to 
the requirements of this chapter based upon practical 
difficulties or unnecessary hardship in complying 
(continued) 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
3 
 
case.  After the conflict with the regulation was discovered, 
the practice was ended.     
¶3 
In response to the complaint on the matter, a DWD 
Equal Rights Division Labor Standards Bureau investigator 
reviewed information submitted by both sides in the matter.  He 
then rendered a written decision stating that the Department 
would not seek collection of back wages on the grounds that the 
factors 
favoring 
a 
waiver 
were 
present 
in 
this 
case 
(specifically, that the parties to the CBA had agreed to the 
provision and that there was no evidence that the shorter meal 
breaks jeopardized the life, health, safety or welfare of 
employees).  When the investigator's decision was appealed, DWD 
Equal Rights Division Labor Standards Bureau issued a letter 
representing the "final determination in this matter."  That 
determination affirmed the decision not to seek back pay.  A 
request for reconsideration was denied; the letter denying the 
reconsideration request, issued by the bureau director for the 
Labor Standards Bureau of the DWD Equal Rights Division, stated 
                                                                                                                                                             
therewith. If the department determines that in the 
circumstances existing compliance with this chapter is 
unjust or unreasonable and that granting such waiver 
or modification will not be dangerous or prejudicial 
to the life, health, safety or welfare of the 
employees, the department may grant such waiver or 
modification as may be appropriate to the case. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
4 
 
that "the union on behalf of its members can bring lawsuit 
against Husco in civil court" pursuant to Wis. Stat. §  109.11.   
¶4 
As permitted by that statute, six Husco employees 
brought suit in circuit court3 January 28, 2008, on behalf of 
themselves and others similarly situated, seeking back pay for 
unpaid breaks taken during the two-year period preceding the 
filing of their complaint.4  The complaint noted that plaintiffs 
had "exhausted all available administrative remedies under 
Chapter 109 of the Wisconsin Statutes."  When the circuit court 
denied both parties' summary judgment motions, the parties 
sought interlocutory appeal.  The court of appeals5 held that the 
matter was appropriate for summary judgment and granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs, reasoning that the CBA could not 
trump the DWD meal-break regulation.  Husco petitioned this 
court for review, which we granted.   
  
                                                 
3 Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Dominic 
Amato, presiding.  
4 The meal break provision was first included in the 1983-
1985 CBA and continued in each of the subsequent agreements, 
including the 2006-2010 CBA.  Under Wis. Stat. Chapter 111, 
Employment Relations, "Back pay liability may not accrue from a 
date more than 2 years prior to the filing of a complaint with 
the department."  Wis. Stat. §111.39.  The complaint was filed 
on January 28, 2008, claiming back pay that was accrued after 
January 28, 2006. 
5 Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 2014 WI App 64, ¶11, 354 
Wis. 2d 526, 851 N.W. 802.  
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
5 
 
¶5 
We agree with the court of appeals that summary 
judgment is appropriate.6  All parties stipulate that there are 
no disputed facts material to the issue, and there exists no 
evidence in the record to the contrary.7  The starting point of 
our analysis, because this case involves a CBA and a dispute 
between labor and management, is to resolve the question of 
whether federal preemption applies to the plaintiffs' claim.  If 
plaintiffs' claim involves the interpretation of a CBA, this 
case is controlled by §301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which governs "[s]uits for violation of 
contracts 
between 
an 
employer 
and 
a 
labor 
organization 
representing employees[.]"  Because of the interest in uniform 
law in this area, "federal law is clear that, where there is a 
sec. 301 claim, federal substantive law (irrespective of the 
forum) must control.  Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 
U.S. 95 (1962), rules out the application of incompatible state 
                                                 
6 Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 60, ¶9, 243 
Wis. 2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484 ("This case is before us on a grant 
of summary judgment. Because the parties have stipulated to the 
facts, this appeal only raises a question of law, which we 
review de novo."). 
7 Id.  
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
6 
 
law and mandates that federal law must prevail in a sec. 301 
case . . . ."8   
¶6 
The test for whether a plaintiff's state-law claim is 
a Section 301 claim is whether resolving the case "requires the 
interpretation 
of 
a 
collective-bargaining 
agreement."9    
Applying that test to these facts, we conclude that federal 
preemption does not apply to plaintiffs' claim because this 
dispute requires no interpretation of the CBA.  Case law is 
quite clear that "not every dispute concerning employment, or 
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining 
agreement, is preempted by § 301."10   
 ¶7 Having ascertained that state law governs the claim 
before us, we turn to the substantive question: Are the 
employees entitled, under Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 274.02, to back 
pay for the unpaid meal breaks in this case?  Plaintiffs pursued 
this 
claim 
in 
circuit 
court 
after 
exhausting 
their 
administrative remedies, so we have the benefit in this case of 
the agency's interpretation of DWD § 274.02, its own regulation, 
                                                 
8 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, IAM Local 
437 v. U.S. Can Co., 150 Wis. 2d 479, 487, 441 N.W.2d 710 
(1989). 
9 Miller Brewing Co. v. DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 563 N.W. 
460 (1997) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 
486 U.S. 399 (1988)). 
10 Id. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
7 
 
which is given "controlling weight" if it is "reasonable and 
consistent with the meaning and purpose of the regulation."11  We 
conclude that the Department's interpretation and decision not 
to seek recovery of back pay in this case is reasonable and 
consistent with the purpose of the regulation because the 
regulation's purpose is to protect the life, health, safety, and 
welfare 
of 
the 
employees, 
and 
to 
accommodate 
reasonable 
departures from the rule on meal break length where, under a 
CBA, labor and management have agreed on that issue. 
¶8 
We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
for entry of summary judgment in favor of Husco.   
I. 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                                 
11 The level of deference we grant in this situation has 
been compared to the "great weight" deference sometimes applied 
to an agency's statutory interpretations. 
[F]or an agency's interpretation of its own rules or 
regulations, if the interpretation is reasonable and 
consistent with the intended purpose, we generally 
apply either "controlling weight" or "great weight" 
deference. 
However, 
despite 
the 
difference 
in 
terminology, the deference we give to an agency 
interpretation of its own rules is similar to the 
great 
weight 
standard 
applied 
to 
statutory 
interpretations. 
Both 
great 
weight 
deference 
and 
controlling weight deference turn on whether the 
agency's interpretation is reasonable and consistent 
with the meaning or purpose of the regulation or 
statute. 
DaimlerChrysler v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2007 WI 15, 
¶15, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311, opinion clarified on denial 
of reconsideration, 2007 WI 40, ¶15, 300 Wis. 2d 133, 729 N.W.2d 
212 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
8 
 
¶9 
There is no dispute on the central facts: that for 
decades, the union and Husco agreed, via the CBA, to unpaid meal 
breaks shorter than 30 minutes; that DWD § 274.02 allows parties 
to a CBA to obtain a waiver for such a practice; and that no 
such waiver was obtained.  From 1983 through 2007, successive 
CBAs between Husco and District No. 10 of the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union (District 
10) provided that meal breaks would be unpaid and last 20 
minutes.  All parties agree that these were the terms of the CBA 
in effect during the relevant period.  
¶10 Following the discovery, in late 2006, that DWD 
§ 274.02 was in conflict with the CBA provision, District 10 
sent a letter to Husco asserting that Husco was required to pay 
employees for the unpaid breaks notwithstanding the CBA.  Husco 
instead proposed that Husco and District 10 jointly seek a 
waiver from DWD to resolve the matter.  District 10 declined to 
do so unless Husco gave the employees new, additional monetary 
concessions in return, such as cash payments or reinstatement of 
employee pensions.  Husco declined to do so.  When the parties 
were unable to reach a resolution, Husco unilaterally extended 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
9 
 
employee meal breaks to 30 minutes, ending the practice of the 
shorter unpaid meal breaks on October 2, 2007.12  
¶11 In the meantime, District 10 had filed its complaint 
with DWD on February 9, 2007.  In a July 16, 2007, letter, the 
DWD notified the union that the DWD would not seek back pay for 
the following reasons.  It said even though the 20-minute unpaid 
breaks were technically violations of the code, it would be 
unreasonable to grant back pay because the breaks had posed no 
health or safety concerns, the statute permits waivers in 
circumstances such as these, and the employees had enjoyed other 
benefits in exchange for the agreement to have the short unpaid 
meal periods.  The union sought review of the decision and 
received a final determination from the agency that no back pay 
would be sought.  The union requested reconsideration, and the 
Department "reaffirm[ed] the earlier final determination." 
¶12 The plaintiffs then brought suit in state court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5), which authorizes such 
claims: parties may choose to pursue administrative remedies and 
then file in civil court if necessary, or they may bring the 
                                                 
12 The company's right to act unilaterally to alter the meal 
breaks was disputed by the union and was resolved through 
arbitration pursuant to the CBA.  That dispute is not relevant 
to the issues before us. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
10 
 
claim directly to civil court.13  Husco then successfully removed 
the action to federal court on the grounds that plaintiffs' 
claim required interpretation of the CBA and was thus subject to 
Section 301 preemption.  Husco raised affirmative defenses of 
unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, waiver, and failure to 
mitigate damages.  Husco also filed a third-party claim against 
District 10 seeking indemnification for any wage liability on 
the grounds that the union had breached its contractual duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, and on grounds of unjust enrichment 
and promissory estoppel. 
¶13 The case proceeded in federal court for a time, and 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 109.03(5) states: 
 
Each employee shall have a right of action against any employer for the full amount of 
the employee's wages due on each regular pay day as provided in this section and for 
increased wages as provided in s. 109.11 (2), in any court of competent jurisdiction. An 
employee may bring an action against an employer under this subsection without first 
filing a wage claim with the department under s. 109.09 (1).   
 
(Emphasis added.) See also German v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., Div. of State Patrol, 2000 WI 62, 
¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 576, 612 N.W.2d 50.  In this case the Husco employees opted to file a wage 
claim with the Department and exhausted administrative remedies within the Equal Rights 
Division of the Department of Workforce Development.  (Claims involving unemployment 
insurance, worker's compensation, and employment discrimination may be appealed to the Labor 
and Industry Review Commission; however, LIRC's jurisdiction does not extend to wage claims.  
See Wis. Admin. Code § LIRC 1.01.) 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 227.52 also provides a mechanism for judicial review of certain administrative 
decisions; a DWD decision on wage claims such as this one does not fall into any of the 
categories excluded from judicial review in that statute.  Plaintiffs in this case did not bring their 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 227.52; they brought the claim under Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5). 
 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
11 
 
Wisconsin certified it as a class action.  But the district 
court ultimately remanded the case to state court on its own 
motion, 
holding 
that, 
contrary 
to 
Husco's 
contention, 
plaintiffs' claim was not a Section 301 claim.  Consistent with 
its ruling in a contemporaneous case with virtually identical 
facts, the district court ruled that there was no basis for 
federal jurisdiction.14   
¶14 Its analysis focused on the two objectives for federal 
law preemption of state law in labor disputes: to keep states 
from "purport[ing] to determine the meaning of collective-
bargaining agreements" and to keep plaintiffs from "bypass[ing] 
arbitration over a claim for breach of the agreement."15  It 
observed that "[t]his claim is not one in which state law 
purports to determine the meaning of terms in the CBA.  Nor does 
plaintiffs' right to relief depend on establishing a breach of 
the CBA."16  It noted that in the absence of original federal 
subject matter jurisdiction conferred by a Section 301 claim, it 
had no authority to hear the case and that it had therefore also 
been without authority to certify the case as a class action.   
                                                 
14 Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-0015-LA, 
unpublished slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wis. August 11, 2011).  
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. at 4. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
12 
 
¶15 Back in state court, in Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, the parties stipulated to having the case certified as a 
class action.  All parties stipulated that there were no 
material factual disputes and the matter was appropriate for 
summary judgment; nevertheless, the circuit court denied summary 
judgment motions from all parties on the grounds that there 
existed 
material 
factual 
disputes 
requiring 
credibility 
determinations.17   
¶16 All parties sought interlocutory review of the circuit 
court's order.  On review, the court of appeals held that the 
matter was ripe for summary judgment.18  It reversed the circuit 
court's denial of summary judgment to the employees and granted 
summary judgment to the employees on the wage claim on the 
grounds that "absent a waiver from the DWD, Husco cannot 
circumvent its statutory obligation to compensate the employees 
for breaks under 30 minutes."19  It held that Husco's third-party 
claim against District 10 had to be dismissed given that it 
                                                 
17 The circuit court reasoned that there was a material 
issue of fact as to whether each member of the class made an 
intentional, knowing, voluntary, and understanding waiver of his 
or her rights.  As noted above, we agree with the court of 
appeals that there is nothing in the record on which to base a 
finding that disputed facts existed that precluded summary 
judgment. 
18 Aguilar, 354 Wis. 2d 526, ¶11. 
19 Id., ¶14. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
13 
 
depended substantially on interpretation of the CBA and was 
therefore preempted by Section 301.  The parties petitioned and 
cross-petitioned for review, and we granted both the petition 
and the cross-petition. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 This court applies the same summary judgment standards 
as the circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) and 
Bell v. County of Milwaukee, 134 Wis. 2d 25, 30, 396 N.W.2d 328 
(1986).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no 
issues of material fact and only a question of law is presented.  
Id.  As to the first question concerning the application of 
federal labor contract law, "[t]he pre-emptive effect of § 301 
is a question of law."  Miller Brewing Co. v. Dep't of Indus., 
Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div., 210 Wis. 2d 26, 33, 
563 N.W.2d 460 (1997).  As to the second, in which we review a 
decision of the DWD concerning DWD §274.02, the standard is well 
established:   
[F]or an agency's interpretation of its own rules or 
regulations, if the interpretation is reasonable and 
consistent with the intended purpose, we generally 
apply either "controlling weight" or "great weight" 
deference. 
However, 
despite 
the 
difference 
in 
terminology, the deference we give to an agency 
interpretation of its own rules is similar to the 
great 
weight 
standard 
applied 
to 
statutory 
interpretations. 
Both 
great 
weight 
deference 
and 
controlling weight deference turn on whether the 
agency's interpretation is reasonable and consistent 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
14 
 
with the meaning or purpose of the regulation or 
statute. 
DaimlerChrysler v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2007 WI 15, 
¶15, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311, opinion clarified on denial 
of reconsideration, 2007 WI 40, ¶15, 300 Wis. 2d 133, 729 N.W.2d 
212 (internal citations omitted).  Further, an interpretation 
that is subject to such deference needs to "merely be reasonable 
for it to be sustained."  Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus. 
Review Comm'n, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 661, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).  "An 
administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules is 
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
language of the rule."  State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 
576 N.W.2d 904 (1998). 
III. SECTION 301 PREEMPTION 
¶18 As noted above, the first question our analysis must 
answer when we are presented with a labor dispute is whether, as 
to plaintiffs' claim, federal law preempts state law.  As noted 
above, this court set forth the rationale and framework for 
Section 301 preemption in Miller Brewing, 210 Wis. 2d at 35-40: 
[Section] 301 pre-emption preserves the central role 
of arbitration in labor disputes, by ensuring that 
employees exhaust the grievance procedures set forth 
in a [CBA] before bringing a claim in court.  . . .  
[Section] 301 pre-emption ensures that common terms in 
collective 
bargaining 
agreements 
are 
not 
given 
different 
interpretations 
in 
different 
jurisdictions . . . . 
 
Miller Brewing, 210 Wis. 2d. at 37 (internal citations omitted).  
To accomplish its purposes, Section 301 is given "unusual pre-
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
15 
 
emptive power." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 n.16 
(1994).  Conversely, preemption does not apply where its 
application would not accomplish those purposes: "[W]hen the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
is 
merely 
a 
tangential 
consideration in the resolution of an otherwise independent 
state law action or where resort to its provisions is merely pro 
forma, we can say with confidence that such consultation does 
not trigger § 301 preemption." Loewen Group Int'l Inc. v. 
Haberichter, 65 F.3d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1995).  The test is 
therefore 
whether 
the 
state 
law 
claim 
"requires 
the 
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement." Miller 
Brewing, 210 Wis. 2d at 39. 
¶19 That test is clear and its application here is 
straightforward. 
 
Federal 
preemption 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
plaintiffs' 
claim 
because 
this 
dispute 
requires 
no 
interpretation of the CBA.  Though Husco won removal to federal 
district court on the grounds that plaintiffs' claim was subject 
to Section 301 preemption, it no longer makes that argument.  
The parties have since shifted their focus to the applicability 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
16 
 
of preemption to Husco's equitable defenses20 and to Husco's 
third-party claim against District 10 for indemnification.  
Given our resolution of the case on other grounds, it is 
unnecessary to reach either of those issues.   
¶20  In this case, the claim is that employees are 
entitled to back pay under DWD § 274.02.  The CBA permitted 
unpaid meal breaks that were 10 minutes shorter than the 
regulation requires for unpaid meal breaks.  There is no 
assertion that the CBA's terms were violated or that the CBA 
itself requires that Husco pay employees for the meal break 
time.  There is no dispute about any of the terms of the CBA, 
nor is there any dispute about the interplay between the CBA and 
the regulation that requires us to define and put a value on any 
other benefits employees received under the CBA.  The sole 
question is whether the DWD's interpretation of its own rule was 
                                                 
20 In general, a defense that implicates federal preemption 
cannot 
serve 
as 
the 
basis 
for 
original 
federal 
court 
jurisdiction; such jurisdiction is based on whether the claim 
itself arises under federal law. However, when Congress has 
completely preempted a given area of state law, the complete 
preemption exception permits recharacterization of a plaintiff's 
state law claim as a federal claim.  Bruneau v. Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp., 981 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1992).  As to whether a 
defense requiring interpretation of a CBA is sufficient to 
compel § 301 preemption such that federal law governs the claim, 
there is a circuit split in federal courts.  See Schacht v. 
Caterpillar, 503 U.S. 926, 927 (1992) (J. Blackmun dissenting) 
(noting the split over whether a claim can be preempted by a 
defense requiring interpretation of a CBA). 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
17 
 
reasonable.  Answering that question does not require the court 
to construe any of the terms of the CBA.  It is, in the words of 
Miller 
Brewing, 
a 
"dispute 
concerning 
employment" 
that 
"tangentially involv[es] a collective bargaining agreement." 
Miller Brewing, 210 Wis. 2d at 39.  There is therefore no 
requirement that federal law govern our analysis. 
IV. 
DWD'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS OWN REGULATION 
¶21 "Under 
the 
authority 
of 
§ 103.02 
the 
DWD 
has 
promulgated an administrative rule requiring employers to pay 
employees for on-duty meal periods. Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.02(3)."  German v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., Div. of State 
Patrol, 2000 WI 62, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 576, 612 N.W.2d 50.  Given 
that this case presents an agency's interpretation of its own 
regulation, 
the 
question 
we 
next 
address, 
applying 
the 
appropriate standard of review, is whether the DWD decision in 
this case is "reasonable" and "consistent with the purpose of 
the regulation." 
¶22 The regulation that we are concerned with, DWD 
§ 274.02, states that meal breaks of under 30 minutes cannot be 
unpaid.  In interpreting its regulation, the DWD also took into 
consideration DWD § 274.05, which permits waivers for the meal-
break rule for parties to a CBA. 
¶23 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 274.02 states, "The 
employer shall pay all employees for on-duty meal periods, which 
are to be counted as work time. An on-duty meal period is a meal 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
18 
 
period where the employer does not provide at least 30 minutes 
free from work."  
¶24 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 states that, with 
exceptions that are not applicable here,  
[W]here a collectively bargained agreement exists, the 
department may consider the written application of 
labor and management for a waiver or modification to 
the requirements of this chapter based upon practical 
difficulties or unnecessary hardship in complying 
therewith. If the department determines that in the 
circumstances existing compliance with this chapter is 
unjust or unreasonable and that granting such waiver 
or modification will not be dangerous or prejudicial 
to the life, health, safety or welfare of the 
employees, the department may grant such waiver or 
modification as may be appropriate to the case. 
¶25 The DWD interpretation of DWD 274.02 in this factual 
situation focused on the availability of the waiver and the lack 
of any prejudice to the life, health, safety, or welfare of the 
employees.  The record contains three documents from DWD: the 
initial determination by an investigator, the agency's final 
determination, and a letter reaffirming the final determination.  
¶26 The initial decision of the DWD Labor Standards 
Investigator is dated July 15, 2007.21  This letter to counsel 
regarding the employee's back-pay claim against Husco states 
that the investigator has "reviewed all of the information 
provided by both sides in this matter."  It briefly recites the 
evidence the investigator has considered and cites to the 
                                                 
21 The DWD case number for this case, Thomas Kieckhefer v. 
Husco International, Inc., is Equal Rights Division Case 
200700593. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
19 
 
regulation. It states, "It is not disputed that the parties 
failed to request a waiver from the department under DWD 274.05. 
However, that is a technical violation of the code."  After 
noting that there was no reason to think that the agreement 
"jeopardized the life, health, safety or welfare" of the 
employees and that the meal-break length had been a part of "the 
give and take of collective bargaining," the decision concluded, 
"Based on my review of this matter, the factors required to 
approve a waiver or modification of DWD 272.02 are present in 
the facts of this case."  The letter advised of the availability 
of administrative review. 
¶27 The agency's final determination, dated September 17, 
2007, is a letter from Labor Standards Bureau Director Robert S. 
Anderson to plaintiff's counsel in response to the request for 
administrative 
review. 
 
The 
letter 
makes 
the 
following 
statements: 
- "This letter constitutes the department's review of the 
initial determination and final determination in this 
matter." 
- "You have appealed the initial determination with respect 
to the department's decision not to collect any back 
wages for the workers." 
- "The department believes that collecting unpaid wages for 
the meal periods in question would result in an unjust 
enrichment 
of 
the 
workers 
in 
this 
case. 
 . . . Consequently, 
the 
department 
reaffirms 
its 
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20 
 
position not to seek collection of any back wages in this 
case." 
¶28 The final determination was affirmed by a third 
letter, also signed by Director Anderson and dated October 8, 
2007, which states that it is a response to counsel's request 
for the Department to "reconsider its final determination" in 
the case.  This letter states, "On behalf of the department I am 
reaffirming 
the 
earlier 
final 
determination. . . . The 
department therefore is hereby closing its case in this matter."  
The letter also observed that Wisconsin statutes provide the 
option to bring civil suit against the employer. 
¶29 We first address the parties' disagreement about 
whether the DWD decision constitutes the kind of agency decision 
that is accorded deference.   
¶30 At the circuit court summary judgment motion hearing, 
the circuit court asked the parties for their positions on the 
significance of the DWD decision.  Plaintiffs' counsel agreed 
with the characterization that "what the DWD did here is not 
binding on the court."  Counsel for Husco acknowledged that the 
DWD decision was not "binding on the court" and stated its 
position as being that DWD's interpretation of rules was 
"controlling."  Husco did not take the position that plaintiffs 
"are precluded from bringing a claim."  No party asserts that 
the DWD decision is "binding" on this court. 
¶31 The correct question is not whether the DWD decision 
is binding; there is no authority for the proposition that an 
agency interpretation of its own rules is binding on a court.  
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
21 
 
The 
correct 
question 
is 
whether 
there 
is 
an 
agency 
interpretation of its own regulations, and if so, whether that 
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the purpose of 
the regulation, and, therefore, entitled to controlling weight 
deference. 
¶32 Plaintiffs dispute the characterization that there is 
an agency decision in this case that should be accorded 
deference.  Plaintiffs cite to Building Trades Council v. 
Waunakee Community School District, 221 Wis. 2d 575, 585 N.W.2d 
726 (Ct. App. 1998), for the proposition that "[o]pinions by a 
single agency employee are not an official interpretation by the 
agency and are not entitled to any deference from the Court."  
Resp. Br. at 26.  In that case, a party sought to obtain "great 
deference" to the propositions in two letters it had obtained 
from state employees for use as evidence to bolster its open 
records request.  Id. at 588.  The letters were not decisions 
from prior proceedings in the case, and the court noted that the 
first document was "not at all the type of contested-case agency 
decision to which . . . courts will traditionally accord some 
degree of deference[,]" and the second was "no more than a 
statement of the writer's understanding of a position taken by 
another state agency." Id. at 588-589.  In contrast, the DWD 
decision at issue in this case was quite clearly the result of a 
contested process and involved the submission of evidence and 
arguments by both parties.  The DWD issued what it deemed "the 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
22 
 
department's review of the initial determination and final 
determination in this matter."22 
¶33 The other cases Plaintiffs cite for the proposition 
that discretionary agency decisions are not "final agency 
decisions subject to judicial review" are likewise inapplicable 
and unpersuasive.  See Wis. Environmental Decade v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 93 Wis. 2d 650, 659, 287 N.W.2d 737 (1980) 
(determining 
that 
an 
order 
denying 
a 
petition 
for 
an 
investigation did not qualify as an administrative decision for 
purposes of judicial review under Wis. Stat. Chap. 227); Tyler 
v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 19 Wis. 2d 166, 119 N.W.2d 460 
(1963) (holding that there was no legal right to court review of 
parole board decision because there is no legal right to release 
on parole); and Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 205 Wis. 2d. 60, 555 N.W.2d 179 (1996) 
(reviewing a discretionary decision by the Commission "under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard").  
¶34 Unlike those examples, this case involves two parties 
represented by counsel who prepared information and submitted it 
for review to the agency investigator.  The plaintiffs appealed 
and later requested reconsideration from the agency.  The facts 
                                                 
22 Plaintiffs compare these letters to the affidavit of 
Robert Anderson, prepared for this litigation after he left the 
DWD and after litigation started, that Husco relied on as 
evidence that the waiver would have been granted if requested.  
Our 
decision 
is 
based 
on 
the 
agency's 
determination 
as 
represented in the Sept. 17, 2007, letter and not on the 
contents of the Anderson affidavit. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
23 
 
were limited and undisputed.  There is no question that the 
regulation was promulgated by DWD and no question that it is the 
agency charged with administering and resolving employment 
disputes.  We therefore treat the DWD decision as one by an 
agency interpreting its own rules.  As noted above, the standard 
we employ when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own 
rules is that it is due controlling weight.  This recognizes the 
expertise and experience of DWD in both legal questions raised 
by employment disputes and technical matters such as formulas 
for back-pay calculations.  See Kuhnert v. Advanced Laser 
Machining, Inc., 2011 WI App 23, ¶12, 331 Wis. 2d 625, 794 
N.W.2d 805 (stating that "the department's methodology for 
calculating . . . overtime pay is entitled to great weight 
deference.  . . . [N]either the statutes nor the administrative 
code define 'regular rate of pay' or the appropriate method for 
calculating it.")  
 
¶35 The facts set forth above show the text of the 
regulations and the reasoning of the Department.  The DWD 
decision rests in large part on the investigator's determination 
that the failure to obtain the waiver that would have satisfied 
the regulation was "a technical violation" that did not warrant 
awarding back pay because "the factors required to approve a 
waiver or modification of DWD 272.02 are present in the facts of 
this case."     
 
¶36 We cannot say that the decision not to pursue an award 
of back pay is unreasonable.  As noted above, the "controlling 
weight" 
given 
to 
an 
agency's 
interpretation 
of 
its 
own 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
24 
 
regulations is the equivalent of the "great weight deference" 
given in some circumstances to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute.  We have explained how great that weight is: 
[T]he important difference between great weight and 
due weight deference [is that] a more reasonable 
interpretation overcomes an agency's interpretation 
under due weight deference, while under great weight 
deference, a more reasonable interpretation will not 
overcome an agency's interpretation, as long as the 
agency's interpretation falls within a range of 
reasonableness. 
UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  
To find for Plaintiffs, we would have to take the position that 
in spite of the fact that there was no violation of the CBA (the 
terms of which they agreed to);  no allegation of risk to 
workers' life, health, safety or welfare; and no likely 
alternative to simply adding ten minutes to the lunch break (and 
as a result, imposing a longer workday)——which is exactly what 
later happened——it is outside the range of reasonableness for 
DWD to deny back pay and deem the violation to be technical.  In 
fact, simply put, DWD's determination is reasonable.   
¶37 Nor can we say that it is contrary to the purpose of 
the regulation.  Where the regulation contains an exemption that 
applies under specific circumstances and the exemption may be 
granted in the Department's discretion, the regulation's purpose 
is served where the Department has made such a determination. 
¶38 We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
for entry of summary judgment in favor of Husco. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
25 
 
¶39 Plaintiffs pursued this claim in circuit court after 
exhausting their administrative remedies, so we have the benefit 
in this case of the agency's interpretation of DWD § 274.02, its 
own regulation, which is given "controlling weight" if it is 
"reasonable and consistent with the meaning and purpose of the 
regulation."  We conclude that the Department's interpretation 
and decision to deny recovery of back pay in this case is 
reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the regulation 
because the regulation's purpose is to protect the life, health, 
safety, and welfare of the employees and to accommodate 
reasonable departures from the rule on meal break length where, 
under a CBA, labor and management have agreed on that issue. 
¶40 We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
for entry of summary judgment in favor of Husco.   
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded. 
No. 2013AP265 
   
 
 
 
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