Title: Massachusetts Coalition for Homeless v. City of Fall River
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12914
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2020

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SJC-12914 
 
MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS & others1  vs.  
CITY OF FALL RIVER & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 2, 2020. - December 15, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.3 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press.  Statute, 
Severability.  Practice, Civil, Declaratory proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on June 21, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin for the plaintiffs. 
 
Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, for district 
attorney for the Bristol district. 
 
Gary P. Howayeck, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city 
of Fall River & another, submitted a brief. 
 
Rajan Bal, of the District of Columbia, Eric S. Tars, of 
Pennsylvania, Andrew Nathanson, Susan M. Finegan, Emily 
                     
 
1 John Correira and Joseph Treeful. 
 
 
2 District attorney for the Bristol district and chief of 
police of Fall River. 
 
 
3 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
 
2 
Kanstroom Musgrave, Courtney Herndon, & Nana Liu, for National 
Homelessness Law Center, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
LENK, J.  Under G. L. c. 85, § 17A, sometimes referred to 
as the "panhandling" statute, a person who signals to a motor 
vehicle on a public way, causes the vehicle to stop, or accosts 
an occupant of the vehicle "for the purpose of soliciting any 
alms, contribution or subscription or of selling any 
merchandise" is generally subject to criminal prosecution and a 
fine.  The statute permits the same conduct when undertaken for 
other purposes, however, such as selling newspapers, and it 
specifically exempts activity that would otherwise fall within 
the statute's sweep if conducted by a nonprofit organization 
with a permit from the local chief of police.  We conclude that 
G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is unconstitutional on its face under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 16 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, because the 
statute is a content-based regulation of protected speech in a 
public forum that cannot withstand strict scrutiny.4 
1.  Background.  Plaintiffs John Correira and Joseph 
Treeful are low income residents of the city of Fall River who 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the National 
Homelessness Law Center. 
 
 
3 
are currently homeless; they are both members of the 
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, an organization that 
provides social services and advocates on behalf of homeless 
individuals and families (collectively, the plaintiffs).5  In 
order to provide for their basic needs, Correira and Treeful 
sometimes stand by the side of public streets in Fall River with 
signs indicating that they are homeless, and they accept 
donations from passing motorists.  They have done so in the past 
and intend to do so in the future. 
During 2018 and 2019, Fall River police initiated a 
combined total of over forty criminal complaints against the two 
men, charging them with violation of G. L. c. 85, § 17A.6  Both 
                     
 
5 We take our facts primarily from the statement of agreed-
upon material facts filed by the plaintiffs and two of the 
defendants, the city of Fall River and its chief of police, in 
support of their motion to transfer the case to the county 
court.  The district attorney did not join in the motion or in 
the statement of agreed-upon material facts, but conceded that 
the statute is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits the 
"soliciting [of] any alms" from occupants of motor vehicles on 
public ways and that declaratory judgment should enter in favor 
of the plaintiffs.  As discussed infra, the district attorney 
has expressed disagreement with the plaintiffs only as to the 
scope of the proposed declaration. 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 85, § 17A, provides: 
 
"Whoever, for the purpose of soliciting any alms, 
contribution or subscription or of selling any merchandise, 
except newspapers, or ticket of admission to any game, 
show, exhibition, fair, ball, entertainment or public 
gathering, signals a moving vehicle on any public way or 
causes the stopping of a vehicle thereon, or accosts any 
 
4 
men have been incarcerated as the result of such charges:  
Correira, for failing to respond to a summons on one of the 
complaints, and Treeful, for violating his probation on other 
charges by, allegedly, violating § 17A. 
The plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior Court 
against Fall River, its chief of police, several individual 
police officers, and the district attorney for the Bristol 
district, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the 
ground that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, violates their right to free 
speech under the State and Federal Constitutions.  The 
plaintiffs also asserted violations of the Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act (MCRA), G. L. c. 12, § 11I, by the individual 
defendants. 
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of G. L. c. 85, 
                     
occupant of a vehicle stopped thereon at the direction of a 
police officer or signal man, or of a signal or device for 
regulating traffic, shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than fifty dollars.  Whoever sells or offers for sale any 
item except newspapers within the limits of a state highway 
boundary without a permit issued by the department shall 
for the first offense be punished by a fine of fifty 
dollars and for each subsequent offense shall be punished 
by a fine of one hundred dollars.  Notwithstanding the 
provisions of the first sentence of this section, on any 
city or town way which is not under jurisdiction of the 
department, the chief of police of a city or town may issue 
a permit to nonprofit organizations to solicit on said ways 
in conformity with the rules and regulations established by 
the police department of said city or town." 
 
5 
§ 17A.  The district attorney voluntarily agreed not to enforce 
the statute during the pendency of the litigation, and after a 
hearing, the Superior Court judge issued a preliminary 
injunction as to the remaining defendants, enjoining enforcement 
of the statute. 
The district attorney subsequently conceded that G. L. 
c. 85, § 17A, is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes 
imposition of a fine for signaling, stopping, or accosting a 
motor vehicle or its occupants on a public way if undertaken for 
the purpose of panhandling, while exempting the same conduct if 
undertaken for the purpose of selling newspapers or raising 
money for a nonprofit organization.  He filed a notice of 
consent to the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs on the first count of the complaint. 
In response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their 
claims against the individual defendants for damages under the 
MCRA and joined with Fall River and the chief of police in 
filing a petition in the county court to have the declaratory 
judgment claim transferred there and then reserved and reported 
to the full court.  The district attorney opposed the transfer, 
in part based on doubts that the case presented the requisite 
adversity for adjudication of a constitutional question. 
After a hearing, a single justice of this court granted the 
petition for transfer and reserved and reported the case to the 
 
6 
full court.  The case before us consists of a single claim for a 
declaration that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is unconstitutional on its 
face under the First Amendment and art. 16.  As noted above, the 
district attorney concedes that the statute is unconstitutional, 
but disagrees with the plaintiffs as to the appropriate scope of 
the declaration.  Fall River and the chief of police defend the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
2.  Discussion.  "The First Amendment, applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment 
of laws 'abridging the freedom of speech.'"  Reed v. Gilbert, 
576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).  Article 16 of our Declaration of 
Rights provides analogous protections and, in some instances, 
provides more protection for expressive activity than the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 
444 Mass. 188, 201 (2005) (holding that art. 16 provides more 
protection for nude dancing than does First Amendment).  Here, 
G. L. c. 85, § 17A, violates both the First Amendment and 
art. 16. 
Some aspects of the First Amendment analysis require little 
discussion.  First, "[i]t is beyond question that soliciting 
contributions is expressive activity that is protected by the 
First Amendment."  Benefit v. Cambridge, 424 Mass. 918, 922 
(1997).  See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990), 
citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 
 
7 
629 (1980) ("Solicitation is a recognized form of speech 
protected by the First Amendment"); Riley v. National Fed'n of 
the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788-789 (1988).  In 
Benefit, this court specifically held "that there is no 
distinction of constitutional dimension between soliciting funds 
for oneself and for charities," and therefore, "peaceful begging 
constitutes communicative activity protected by the First 
Amendment."  Benefit, supra at 923.7 
Second, it is well settled that the State's "public way[s]" 
are "traditional public fora" for purposes of the First 
Amendment (citations omitted).  McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 
464, 476 (2014).  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 
                     
 
7 See, e.g., McCraw v. Oklahoma City, 973 F.3d 1057, 1066 
(10th Cir. 2020) (gathering cases and concluding that "begging" 
is form of protected speech); Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 
456 (8th Cir. 2019) ("[A]sking for charity or gifts, whether on 
the street or door to door, is protected First Amendment speech" 
[quotation and citation omitted]); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 
F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2015) ("There is no question that 
panhandling and solicitation of charitable contributions are 
protected speech"); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 878 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (holding that "begging, or the soliciting of alms, is 
a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects"); 
Smith v. Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 966 (1999) ("Like other charitable 
solicitation, begging is speech entitled to First Amendment 
protection"); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 
704 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Begging frequently is accompanied by speech 
indicating the need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care or 
transportation.  Even without particularized speech, however, 
the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person holding out his 
or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys a 
message of need for support and assistance"). 
 
8 
(1988) ("No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a 
specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the 
public trust and are properly considered traditional public 
fora"). 
As this court observed in Benefit, "[t]he streets and 
public areas are quintessential public forums, not because they 
are a particularly convenient platform for expression, but 
because they are the necessary, essential public spaces that 
connect our individual private spaces, from which we may exclude 
others and likewise be excluded, but from which we almost all 
must inevitably emerge from time to time."  Benefit, 424 Mass. 
at 926-927.  And although assertions that peaceful begging or 
other forms of solicitation on public ways create a safety 
hazard may be relevant to the question whether a government 
regulation of such activity ultimately passes constitutional 
muster, such assertions "do not deprive public streets of their 
status as public fora."  McCraw v. Oklahoma City, 973 F.3d 1057, 
1068 (10th Cir. 2020). 
Third, it is indisputable that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, in its 
current form is a content-based regulation subject to strict 
scrutiny.  The United States Supreme Court has held that 
"[g]overnment regulation of speech is content based if a law 
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or 
the idea or message expressed."  Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.  "Some 
 
9 
facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining 
regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are 
more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or 
purpose.  Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a 
speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict 
scrutiny."  Id. at 163-164. 
Here, G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is content based on its face 
because its restrictions "depend entirely on the communicative 
content" of the activity it regulates.  Reed, 576 U.S. at 164-
165.  More specifically, the conduct described in the statute 
(signaling to a vehicle, causing it to stop, or accosting one of 
its occupants) is only proscribed if it is done "for the purpose 
of soliciting any alms, contribution or subscription or of 
selling any merchandise" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 85, § 17A.  
The statute purports to carve out specific exemptions for the 
same conduct, however, when it is performed for other enumerated 
purposes, including selling newspapers and soliciting 
contributions on behalf of permitted nonprofit organizations.8  
                     
 
8 The plaintiffs assert that G. L. c 85, § 17A, 
discriminates not only on the basis of content, but also on the 
basis of viewpoint.  We need not reach this issue because, under 
Reed, a regulation is content based, and thus subject to strict 
scrutiny, if it "singles out specific subject matter for 
differential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints 
within that subject matter," Reed v. Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 169 
(2015), and as discussed infra, § 17A cannot withstand the 
strict scrutiny applicable to such content-based regulations. 
 
10 
We need go no further to conclude that the statute is content 
based for purposes of a First Amendment analysis.  See Benefit, 
424 Mass. at 924 (holding that statute was content based on its 
face where it prohibited "communicative activity that asks for 
direct, charitable aid," while permitting similar activity by 
those who sought money "for other purposes").  See also Thayer 
v. Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233-234 (D. Mass. 2015) 
(gathering cases and concluding that ordinance banning 
"aggressive" panhandling was content based); McLaughlin v. 
Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D. Mass. 2015) (observing that 
"Reed makes earlier cases, which had split over what forms of 
regulation of panhandling were content-based, of limited 
continuing relevance"). 
Because we conclude that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is a content-
based regulation of protected speech, strict scrutiny applies.  
See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163-164.9  Strict scrutiny "requires the 
                     
 
9 At oral argument, and in a subsequently proffered surreply 
brief, the district attorney argued that if the provision 
concerning the "soliciting [of] any alms" were removed from the 
statute, it would be a regulation of purely commercial speech 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.  See Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-
566 (1980).  In our discussion of remedy, infra, we reject the 
contention that G. L. c 85, § 17A, can be saved by severing, or 
selectively invalidating, the quoted language.  Thus, we do not 
reach the issue whether regulations directed at purely 
commercial speech, which are content based by definition, are 
subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny after Reed.  See 
International Outdoor, Inc. v. Troy, 974 F.3d 690, 704-705 (6th 
 
11 
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 171.  Here, the parties do not 
dispute that the State's interest in protecting public safety on 
its public ways is a compelling one.  We therefore turn to 
whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve the asserted 
interest. 
In the context of strict scrutiny, a regulation is not 
narrowly tailored unless "it chooses the least restrictive means 
to further the articulated interest."  Sable Communications of 
Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989) (Sable).  See Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 647, 661 n.10 (2011), 
cert. denied, 566 U.S. 987 (2012), citing Sable, supra ("[T]he 
content of noncommercial speech is fully protected under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and may be 
regulated by the government only where such regulation is the 
                     
Cir. 2020) (discussing, and distinguishing, cases from United 
States Courts of Appeals for Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits applying intermediate scrutiny to regulations of purely 
commercial speech post-Reed).  The "diversity of approaches" 
taken by the justices in the United States Supreme Court's 
recent, fractured opinion in Barr v. American Ass'n of Political 
Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020), concerning the 
constitutionality of the Federal ban on "robocalls," illustrates 
that the law in this area is "far from settled."  Id. at 2361 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to 
severability and dissenting in part). 
 
12 
least restrictive means to further a compelling State 
interest"). 
Here, the plaintiffs and the district attorney both agree 
that the statute is not narrowly tailored.  The plaintiffs 
contend that the statute is simultaneously overinclusive 
(because it reaches expressive conduct that does not pose a 
threat to public safety) and underinclusive (because it uses 
content-based distinctions to exempt conduct that just as easily 
could pose a threat to public safety).  The district attorney 
agrees that the statute is underinclusive, but, at least in his 
principal brief, he did not address the issue of 
overinclusiveness.10  Fall River and the chief of police, on the 
other hand, urge us to uphold the statute as narrowly tailored, 
based largely on their assertions that the statute is enforced 
only against individuals who "actively signal or otherwise 
[a]ccost a stopped or moving vehicle, thereby impeding and 
obstructing the flow of traffic."  We agree with the plaintiffs 
                     
 
10 After oral argument, the district attorney moved for 
leave to file a surreply brief.  In it, he argues, among other 
things, that the plaintiffs waived any arguments regarding 
facial "overbreadth" by failing to raise them until their reply 
brief.  We reject the contention that the plaintiffs waived 
their overbreadth arguments, as their principal brief makes 
clear that they are bringing a facial challenge based on 
theories of both over- and underinclusiveness.  The relevance of 
overbreadth principles to these claims is addressed in our 
discussion of remedy, infra. 
 
 
13 
and the district attorney that the statute's content-based 
distinctions and exemptions render it unconstitutional.11 
"While surprising at first glance, the notion that a 
regulation of speech may be impermissibly underinclusive is 
firmly grounded in basic First Amendment principles."  Ladue v. 
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994).  This is so because "an 
exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may 
represent a governmental attempt to give one side of a debatable 
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the 
people" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  
"Underinclusiveness can also reveal that a law does not actually 
advance a compelling interest."  Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 
575 U.S. 433, 449 (2015). 
Here, there can be little doubt that signaling to, 
stopping, or accosting motor vehicles for the purpose of 
soliciting donations on one's own behalf poses no greater threat 
to traffic safety than engaging in the same conduct for other 
nonprohibited or exempted purposes, such as gathering signatures 
                     
 
11 As a preliminary matter, we reject any assertion that we 
should consider the exercise of discretion by law enforcement 
when assessing the facial validity of a statute.  See United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010) (where facial 
challenge under First Amendment is concerned, "[t]he 
Government's assurance that it will apply [the statute] far more 
restrictively than its language provides is pertinent only as an 
implicit acknowledgment of the potential constitutional problems 
with a more natural reading"). 
 
14 
for a petition, flagging down a taxicab, selling newspapers, or 
soliciting donations for a nonprofit organization.  Because 
G. L. c. 85, § 17A, fails to prohibit "vast swaths of conduct 
that similarly diminish[] its asserted interest[]" in traffic 
safety, we conclude that the statute is not narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.  See Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 448, 
citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 543-547 (1993).  See also Reed, 576 U.S. at 171-172 
(ordinance limiting placement of "temporary directional signs" 
was "hopelessly underinclusive" where town had not shown that 
limiting such signs was necessary to further interest in traffic 
safety, while limiting other types of signs was not); McCraw, 
973 F.3d at 1063, 1077 (ordinance banning sitting, standing, or 
remaining on certain medians, but exempting government employees 
and individuals using medians while crossing street, performing 
"legally authorized work," or responding to emergencies, was not 
narrowly tailored under more relaxed standard for content-
neutral time, place, and manner restrictions); Rodgers v. 
Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2019) (anti-loitering law 
that applied only to charitable solicitation, and not political, 
commercial, or other types of solicitation, was underinclusive 
and consequently not narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny). 
As a means of ensuring traffic safety, the statute is also 
"significantly overinclusive."  See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
 
15 
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121 
(1991).  First, the statute applies to all public ways, 
regardless of whether the characteristics of a particular street 
are such that the plaintiff's expressive activity would pose a 
safety risk.  Second, the statute broadly prohibits signaling 
to, stopping, or accosting a motor vehicle for the enumerated 
purposes without regard to whether those activities are 
performed in a manner that in fact poses a risk to public 
safety.  See McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 190 n.9 (noting that 
ordinance prohibiting "a panhandler who never raised her voice 
or lifted a hand" from soliciting donations "is not narrowly 
tailored to the goal of public safety, much less the least 
restrictive means available to achieve that goal").  As the 
plaintiffs point out, actual interference with traffic is not 
even an element of a violation of G. L. c. 85, § 17A.  Rather, 
merely sitting by the side of the road holding a sign that 
states "I am homeless, please help" could trigger criminal 
prosecution under the statute.  The fact that Fall River 
professes to enforce the statute much more narrowly than a "more 
natural reading" of its language would permit merely highlights 
the fact that, on its face, the statute reaches far more broadly 
than necessary to achieve the government's stated purpose.  See 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010).  In sum, 
because G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is both over- and underinclusive 
 
16 
with respect to the purpose it is intended to serve, it is not 
narrowly tailored, and it cannot withstand strict scrutiny. 
The question of remedy remains.  The plaintiffs seek a 
declaration that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is facially invalid in its 
entirety.  The district attorney, on the other hand, suggests 
that the statute may be saved by invalidating it only insofar as 
it prohibits the "soliciting [of] any alms" from occupants of 
motor vehicles on public ways.  In addition to these two 
possibilities, we also have considered whether excising some 
combination, or even all, of the statute's content-based 
distinctions and exemptions would provide an appropriate remedy.  
See G. L. c. 4, § 6, Eleventh ("The provisions of any statute 
shall be deemed severable, and if any part of any statute shall 
be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall not 
affect other valid parts thereof"); Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 
Mass. 229, 238 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Petranich, 183 
Mass. 217, 220 (1903) ("where a statutory provision is 
unconstitutional, if it is in its nature separable from other 
parts of the statute, so that they may well stand independently 
of it, and if there is no such connection between the valid and 
the invalid parts that the Legislature would not be expected to 
enact the valid part without the other, the statute will be held 
good, except in that part which is in conflict with the 
Constitution").  Ultimately, we agree with the plaintiffs that 
 
17 
the statute's constitutional infirmities are too pervasive to be 
remedied through partial invalidation or severance. 
We turn first to the district attorney's suggestion that we 
simply invalidate that portion of the statute that prohibits the 
"soliciting [of] any alms."  First, such a solution falls short 
of removing even these plaintiffs' protected conduct from the 
statute's reach, where the statute would still prohibit the 
"soliciting [of] . . . contribution[s]," which arguably would 
include holding up a sign that encouraged donations from passing 
motorists.  Second, even if we were to adopt a modified version 
of the district attorney's approach, invalidating the statute 
insofar as it reached any solicitation of "alms" or 
"contribution[s]" not involving a commercial exchange, this 
would not cure the statute's constitutional deficiencies because 
the statute likely would still have a substantial chilling 
effect on protected noncommercial speech. 
The plaintiffs' allegations of overinclusiveness, and the 
doctrine of "overbreadth," are relevant here.  In contrast to 
the general rule that a facial challenge can succeed only if a 
statute is unconstitutional in all of its applications, "[i]n 
the First Amendment context, . . . [the United States Supreme 
Court] recognizes a second type of facial challenge, whereby a 
law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of 
its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the 
 
18 
statute's plainly legitimate sweep" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473.  Overbreadth sometimes has 
been described as "an exception to the general principle that 
litigants only have standing to assert their own rights and not 
the rights of others; in the free speech context, such 
challenges have been permitted in order 'to prevent [a] statute 
from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not 
before the court.'"  Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership, 460 
Mass. at 676, quoting Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984). 
These principles also are relevant to determining the 
appropriate remedy in this case because, although the proposed 
narrowing of the statute would remove the plaintiffs' conduct 
from its reach, the plaintiffs argue (and they have standing to 
argue) that the remaining provisions would continue to have an 
unconstitutional chilling effect on protected speech.  See 
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 484-485 (Alito, J., dissenting), quoting 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (overbreadth 
doctrine "seeks to balance the 'harmful effects' of 
'invalidating a law that in some of its applications is 
perfectly constitutional' against the possibility that 'the 
 
19 
threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [will] dete[r] people 
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech'").12 
We see an unacceptable risk of a chilling effect here.  The 
line between a noncommercial solicitation of a donation and the 
"selling [of] any merchandise" (which, under this hypothetical 
remedy, would continue to be prohibited by the statute) can be a 
slippery one.  Imagine that a police officer sees an individual 
step out into the roadway, accept money from a motorist, and 
then hand the motorist a rose.  Will enforcement turn on whether 
the officer perceives the exchange as a sale of the rose or the 
giving of a small token in thanks for the donation of money?  We 
see little in that distinction to guide law enforcement or to 
                     
 
12 In his proffered surreply brief, the district attorney 
argues that "the overbreadth doctrine does not apply when the 
portion of the statute asserted to be overbroad regulates 
commercial speech."  The district attorney cites our opinion in 
Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 647, 677 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 
987 (2012), in support of the proposition that "a statute whose 
overbreadth consists of unlawful restriction of commercial 
speech will not be facially invalidated on that ground -- our 
reasoning being that commercial speech is more hardy, less 
likely to be 'chilled,' and not in need of surrogate 
litigators."  Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989).  But this ignores that we also are 
concerned here with the chilling effect of the statute on fully 
protected, noncommercial speech, not just commercial speech.  
See Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership, supra ("this limitation 
[on the overbreadth doctrine] is only relevant in cases where 
the speech restricted by the overbroad application is itself 
commercial speech; an overbreadth challenge may be raised by a 
commercial speaker claiming, as here, that a regulation 
unconstitutionally restricts noncommercial speech"). 
 
20 
give comfort to those engaged in the protected activity of 
seeking donations for personal support that their activity would 
not result in criminal prosecution.  In short, we are of the 
view that the district attorney's proposed remedy would produce 
a statute that is still likely to deter a substantial amount of 
protected, noncommercial speech. 
The statute's underinclusiveness presents a different 
problem.  In the abstract, a natural cure for underinclusiveness 
would be to sever the statute's content-based distinctions and 
exemptions.  The United States Supreme Court took this approach 
in the recent case of Barr v. American Ass'n of Political 
Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).  There, six Justices 
concluded that a 2015 amendment to the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, which exempted so-called "robocalls" 
made to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the Federal 
government from the statute's general ban on such calls, 
"impermissibly favored debt collection speech over political and 
other speech, in violation of the First Amendment."  Id. at 
2343.  Seven Justices concluded that the proper remedy was to 
invalidate and sever the exception contained in the 2015 
amendment, rather than to invalidate the entire statute.  Id.  
Significantly, a plurality observed that the exception at issue 
was "only a slice of the overall robocall landscape," and that 
it was "not a case where a restriction on speech is littered 
 
21 
with exceptions that substantially negate the restriction."  Id. 
at 2348 (distinguishing Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 52). 
By contrast, in Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 46, the Court was faced 
with an ordinance that prohibited homeowners from displaying any 
signs on their properties, except those that fell within one of 
ten exemptions, including content-based exemptions for 
"residential identification signs," "for sale" signs, signs "for 
churches, religious institutions, and schools," and 
"[c]ommercial signs in commercially zoned or industrial zoned 
districts."  The Court dismissed the possibility that Fall River 
could "remove the defects in its ordinance by simply repealing 
all of the exemptions," and noted that where "the ordinance is 
also vulnerable because it prohibits too much speech, that 
solution would not save it."  Id. at 53. 
Here, G. L. c. 85, § 17A, more closely resembles the 
exemption-ridden sign ordinance struck down in Gilleo, 512 U.S. 
at 52, than the statute only partially invalidated in American 
Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 2348.  
Purged of all of its content-based restrictions and exemptions, 
what remains of § 17A "almost completely [would] foreclose[] a 
venerable means of communication" of protected speech, Gilleo, 
supra at 54, not only the peaceful begging in which the 
plaintiffs engage, but any form of speech that accompanied the 
prohibited conduct of signaling to, stopping, or accosting a 
 
22 
motor vehicle, including the political and social discourse that 
lies at the core of the First Amendment.  We discern no 
indication that such an extreme result would be consistent with 
legislative intent.  To the contrary, since the statute was 
originally enacted in 1930, see St. 1930, c. 139, the 
Legislature has amended it over the years to permit increasingly 
more speech.13  Unfortunately, the Legislature has done so in a 
way that employs content-based distinctions that are not 
narrowly tailored to achieving its stated interest in traffic 
safety. 
We therefore conclude that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, as currently 
written, must be invalidated in its entirety as violative of the 
First Amendment and art. 16.  This conclusion in no way 
precludes the Legislature from amending the statute or from 
enacting another statute aimed at protecting public safety on or 
near public roadways, but it must do so in a way that does not 
impermissibly burden protected speech. 
3.  Conclusion.  We conclude that G. L. c. 85, § 17A, is 
unconstitutional on its face under the First Amendment to the 
                     
 
13 See St. 1990, c. 117 (amending G. L. c. 85, § 17A, "to 
immediately authorize charitable organizations to solicit 
donations on public ways"); St. 1978, c. 21 (amending statute to 
allow sellers of merchandise other than newspapers to obtain 
permits to avoid prosecution under § 17A); St. 1931, c. 273 
(amending statute to create exception for sale of newspapers, 
although also broadening its reach to include all public ways). 
 
23 
United States Constitution and art. 16 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, and we remand the case to the county 
court for the entry of a declaratory judgment to that effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.