Title: P. v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S014021
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2005

1
Filed 8/15/05 (this opn. should precede companion case, S023000, also filed 8/15) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S014021 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
DEAN PHILLIP CARTER, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. A-089330 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Following the guilt phase of the trial, a Los Angeles County jury found 
defendant Dean Phillip Carter guilty of the forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261)1 and 
first degree murder of Jillette Mills (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189), and found true the 
special circumstances that the murder was committed in the course of a forcible 
rape and in the course of a first or second degree burglary (§ 460).  (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17), subparts (C), (G).) 
 
The jury also found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Susan 
Knoll (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and of residential burglary (§ 459), and found true 
the special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of 
a burglary.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), subpart (G).) 
 
The jury further found defendant guilty of the forcible rape (§ 261) and first 
degree murder of Bonnie Guthrie (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and of residential 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
2
burglary (§ 459), and found true the special circumstances that the murder was 
committed in the course of a forcible rape and in the course of a burglary.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), subparts (C), (G).) 
 
In addition, the jury found true the special circumstance that defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding of more than one offense of murder.  (§ 190.2,  
subd. (a)(3).)   
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  
This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).) 
 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
FACTS 
I. 
Guilt Phase Evidence 
A. 
The Prosecution’s Case 
1. 
The Death of Tok Kim 
 
The prosecution commenced its case by introducing, over defendant’s 
objection, evidence that pertained to the death of Tok Kim, who was 42 years of 
age, in Alameda County in early April 1984.  The evidence, summarized below, 
was introduced under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), for the 
purpose of demonstrating defendant’s identity and criminal intent in the charged 
offenses relating to the murders of Jillette Mills, Susan Knoll, and Bonnie Guthrie 
on April 10 and 11, 1984.    
 
In the early evening of Sunday, April 1, 1984, defendant entered the 
Rocking Horse Bar and Grill, located in Lafayette, California.  The bartender, 
Nicole Didion, testified that business was slow that evening when defendant sat 
down at the bar, ordered a drink, and introduced himself to her as “Phil.”  He wore 
casual pants, which she believed were jeans, and a sweatshirt inscribed with the 
words “Tenakee Tavern ─ Southeast Alaska’s Classiest Joint.”  He told Didion 
 
 
3
that he worked as a cameraman.  Cocktail waitress Margo Fulton observed 
defendant sitting at the bar, and joined his conversation with Didion. 
 
Approximately one-half hour later, Tok Kim entered the bar, sat down a 
few bar stools apart from defendant, and ordered a glass of white wine.  She 
departed from the bar soon thereafter, only to return a few minutes later, declaring 
that she had been unable to start her Honda automobile.  Defendant offered to 
assist her and left with her.   
 
After a few minutes, defendant returned to the bar and asked whether 
anyone had “jumper cables.”  A restaurant employee obtained cables; the car 
thereafter was started, and defendant returned to the bar to gather his belongings.  
Defendant remarked to a cocktail waitress that he was getting a ride to the local 
BART station. 
 
Approximately 9:00 p.m. the same evening, defendant and Kim walked into 
Jim Sutton’s Lafayette Shell gasoline station and reported car trouble.  David 
Hogan, an employee at the station, assisted the couple in bringing the disabled 
vehicle to the station.  Because the alternator apparently was malfunctioning, the 
vehicle was left at the station overnight for repairs. 
 
The next day, April 2, Kim and defendant returned to the Shell station.  
Hogan noticed that defendant wore a black “Members Only” jacket that “was in 
style back then,” as well as mirrored sunglasses on top of his head.  Hogan, 
observing that defendant’s neck bore a “big ⎯ like a hickey on his neck,” told 
defendant, “Well[, i]t looked like you had fun last night.”  Defendant replied:  “I 
don’t even know what I’m doing here, I don’t even know her.”   
 
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 10 or Wednesday, April 11, 
Kim’s neighbor, Connie Santos, heard Kim arguing with someone.  Santos knew 
the voice of Kim’s boyfriend, Ray Blevins, and testified that the person with 
whom Kim was arguing “was not [Blevins] definitely, but instead belonged to 
 
 
4
someone “ ‘younger.’ ”  Santos could not discern the precise words spoken, but 
recalled that the persons arguing sounded “really angry.”  Santos thought that 
perhaps she should call the police, but instead she went to bed, pulling the bed 
covers over her head in an effort to block the noise.  
 
On Thursday, April 12, Kim failed to arrive at her job at the Concord 
Macy’s department store.  Her manager at Macy’s, Ingrid Maleska-King, 
telephoned Kim’s apartment manager, William Elson, to request that he ascertain 
whether she was at her apartment.  Elson, who had observed defendant standing 
near Kim’s apartment mailbox earlier that same week, did not find Kim at her 
apartment.  Elson also observed that Kim’s vehicle was not in its designated 
parking space or anywhere in the vicinity.  When Kim did not appear for work on 
Friday, April 13, Maleska-King again contacted Elson and asked him to recheck 
whether Kim was at her apartment.  As Elson approached the apartment on this 
second occasion, he “felt extinctively [sic] that she was in there because of the 
odor that I smelled.”  Elson found Kim’s lifeless body sprawled upon the floor of 
her bedroom. 
 
Oakland Police Detective Raymond Conner investigated Kim’s death, 
arriving at her apartment on the morning of April 13.  Beneath Kim’s neck, he 
discovered a curtain tie approximately 18 to 24 inches in length. 
 
Kim’s body had decomposed to an extent that it precluded a determination 
of a cause of death.  The pathologist who performed the autopsy, Thomas Rogers, 
testified over defendant’s objection that the tie found beneath Kim’s neck could 
have been used to fatally strangle her.  On cross-examination, Rogers 
acknowledged that in view of the body’s advanced state of decomposition, he 
could not eliminate the possibility that Kim might have died from natural causes.   
 
 
5
2. 
The Deaths of Susan Knoll and Jillette Mills 
 
Susan Knoll and her sister, Sandra Pender, grew up in Wisconsin.  Knoll’s 
best friend was Bonnie Guthrie.  In 1972, Pender relocated to San Diego, and in 
1979 Knoll journeyed west to live with her.  Guthrie also relocated to the Los 
Angeles area at some point and resumed her close friendship with Knoll.  In 
March 1984, Knoll moved into a Culver City apartment with Jillette Mills.  Knoll 
and Mills each were 25 years of age. 
 
On April 10, 1984, Knoll appeared at work at Mitsubishi Bank,  
according to Annette Cheng, Knoll’s colleague.  On April 11, Knoll was absent 
from work, and Cheng received a telephone call from a male who declined to 
identify himself.  The caller informed Cheng that Knoll was “just involved in a 
traffic accident and she have some minor injury [sic] and would like to go to 
hospital for the checkup, but she asked me to call the bank to let the bank know 
that she won’t be in today.”  Cheng asked the caller if he was a friend of Knoll’s, 
and the caller replied:  “No, I just happened to be in the accident scene and she 
asked me to call for her.”  When Cheng asked for the caller’s name, he hung up 
the telephone.  Cheng never saw Knoll alive again.  On cross-examination, Cheng 
acknowledged that when she spoke to the caller, she believed he was a Black man 
with a southern accent. 
 
For a few days prior to April 10, 1984, Jillette Mills’s brother, Jeff, tried 
without success to contact Jillette.  On April 11, 1984, Jeff and his friend, 
Christopher Thurman, began searching for her.  Jeff and Christopher traveled to 
Jillette’s Culver City apartment, to her place of employment (Laird Studios), and 
to a local community college where she had attended classes, but were unable to 
locate Jillette or her automobile, a distinctive white Datsun 280 ZX that bore the 
 
 
6
license plate “PHANTM Z.”2  Jeff and Christopher thereafter returned to the 
apartment building, scaled a security fence, and approached the apartment.  
Jillette’s apartment door was unlocked. 
 
Upon searching much of the apartment without success, Jeff and 
Christopher encountered a framed piece of artwork leaning against the doors of a 
bedroom closet.  Opening the closet doors, Christopher noticed “feet on the floor” 
and advised Jeff that “we have a problem.”  The fully-clothed bodies of Susan and 
Jillette were lying on the floor of the closet, one stacked upon the other.  Jeff 
called the police, and Christopher went outside to await their arrival.  
 
While Christopher waited by the curb, he leaned on the left front fender of a 
blue Honda that investigators subsequently determined belonged to Tok Kim.  
Inside the vehicle, investigators recovered a pair of sunglasses identified at trial by 
David Hogan, the Lafayette gasoline station attendant, as matching the pair he 
observed resting atop defendant’s head. 
 
Police investigators examined Jillette’s apartment for fingerprints and other 
physical evidence.  Two wine glasses found in the kitchen appeared to have been 
wiped clean to eliminate any traces of fingerprints.  A latent palm print was 
retrieved from the bathroom sink.  Martin Collins, a latent print investigator 
employed by the California Department of Justice, testified that the latent print 
matched defendant’s right palm print with “100 percent” certainty. 
                                              
2  
In addition to its personalized license plate, Jillette Mills’s white Datsun 
was easily identifiable by a black, front-fender car cover (or “bra”) emblazoned 
with the vehicle model ⎯ “280 ZX,” black engine cover vents, dual-colored 
pinstripes, a tinted-glass “T-top” roof, black “sports slats” that covered much of 
the rear window, a black rear stabilizer, and dual-colored wheel rims shod with 
Goodyear Eagle GT tires. 
 
 
7
 
Dr. Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran, the Chief of Forensic Medicine at the 
Los Angeles County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that Jillette Mills died of 
asphyxia due to ligature strangulation.  He added that “considerable force” had to 
have been “continuously applied” for approximately two minutes or more in order 
to cause death.  Jillette also suffered “blunt force type trauma” to her head, and 
injury to her genital area consistent with “traumatic sexual assault” including 
“penile penetration . . . and ejaculation.”  Sam Le, a Los Angles County 
criminalist, testified that a white nightgown found in the apartment contained 
seminal fluid consistent with defendant’s PGM type and that of 15.8 percent of the 
population.  Seminal fluid recovered from Mills’s vaginal area “was [of an] 
insufficient quantity for typing.”  
 
Dr. Sathyavagiswaran further testified that Susan Knoll died of asphyxia 
due to manual strangulation, the result of “considerable compression force.”  
Susan also suffered blunt force injuries and hemorrhages consistent with having 
struggled against her assailant.  Dr. Sathyavagiswaran stated:  “[W]hen Miss Knoll 
was strangulated and was asphyxiated, this was probably a terminal event [─] that 
she vomited and aspirated.  [¶]  The very fact that the vomitus did not go to the 
distal parts of the lung, that is, [the] distal bronchi, she did not live very long after 
this vomitus ─ after this vomiting episode.”  Seminal fluid recovered from Knoll’s 
vaginal area was of an insufficient quantity for typing. 
 
Each victim had been dead for a minimum of 15 hours prior to the time the 
autopsies were performed upon their bodies. 
3. 
The Death of Bonnie Guthrie 
 
In the early afternoon of April 11, 1984, Bonnie Guthrie, then 34 years of 
age, and a friend, Geula Vehab, purchased fruit together in Santa Monica.  The 
two parted company at approximately 1:20 p.m.  Between 3:00 p.m. and 
 
 
8
4:00 p.m., Matty Spiro, the manager of the apartment building in which Guthrie 
resided, entered her West Los Angeles apartment, accompanied by Manny 
Gleberman, to repair a leaky bathroom faucet.  As Gleberman worked on the 
faucet, Spiro observed Guthrie lying on her stomach on the bedroom floor:  “So I 
says to Manny, the plumber ─ I said, ‘Look at that, Manny.  She’s sleeping on the 
floor.’  I said, ‘I better close the door and let her sleep.’ ” 
 
The next morning, April 12, Spiro noticed that Guthrie’s automobile was 
still in the garage.  Wondering why Guthrie apparently had not gone to work, he 
returned to Guthrie’s apartment and knocked on the door.  Upon entering the 
apartment, Spiro noticed Guthrie lying in the same position as he previously had 
observed.  He then notified the police. 
 
Dr. Sathyavagiswaran testified that Guthrie died of ligature strangulation.  
He added that Guthrie’s body bore the signs of having suffered blunt force injury 
as well as genital abrasions consistent with traumatic sexual assault.  Vaginal area 
samples revealed the presence of spermatozoa.  
 
Two days later, on April 14, Adolph Romero, a commercial fisherman, 
noticed a white Datsun 280 ZX parked in front of a San Diego shipyard.  
Approximately 50 feet from the vehicle, Romero retrieved Guthrie’s wallet from 
beneath some bushes.  When Guthrie could not be reached, the wallet ultimately 
was turned in to the local police. 
4. 
The Death of Janette Cullins 
 
The prosecution, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), 
presented evidence over defendant’s objection that on or about April 12, 1984, 
Janette Cullins, who was 24 years of age, died by strangulation.  Janette originally 
had encountered defendant in a San Diego bar in February 1984, and saw him 
socially the following month.  Lee Ann Johnson, who resided across the street 
 
 
9
from Janette’s apartment, reported that during April 1984 she observed a 
distinctive looking vehicle arrive and depart from the area on several occasions.  
At trial, Johnson testified that the vehicle, a white Datsun 280 ZX, resembled the 
one owned by Jillette Mills.  One night that April, Johnson observed the vehicle 
parked across the street, its engine running for 10 or 15 minutes, “[a]nd then all of 
a sudden I heard the car start ─ take off, and it sort of screeched and made a u-turn 
and came up past my house to the corner and didn’t stop for the stop sign and went 
through the stop sign.”  Johnson never saw the vehicle again.  
 
Approximately midday on April 13, Cullins’s previous roommate, Nancy 
McEachern, drove to Cullins’s apartment because they had planned to conduct a 
yard sale on the following day, a Saturday, and McEachern wanted to drop off 
some items to sell.  As she was parking her vehicle in front of the apartment, 
defendant drove up in a white Datsun 280 ZX.  He asked McEachern whether 
Cullins was home.  McEachern replied, “Her car is not here.  She hasn’t answered 
a phone call” placed by McEachern earlier that morning.  Defendant left, and 
McEachern entered the apartment.  Inside, the drapes were drawn and the 
Venetian blinds were closed, causing the apartment to appear dark, which 
McEachern testified was “unusual” for that time of day because “We had the habit 
of opening everything up and making it real bright first thing in the morning.”  
McEachern left a note for Cullins on the dining table and departed from the 
apartment.  McEachern returned the next day to discover Janette’s body lying in 
the bedroom closet.  The cause of her death was asphyxiation due to strangulation. 
 
Records of Great American Bank revealed that on April 13, 1984, a 
withdrawal from Janette Cullins’s account in the amount of $60.00 (leaving an 
account balance of $4.06) was made from an automatic teller machine located at 
the bank’s Point Loma Branch.  A four-minute videotape of the transaction, 
 
 
10
introduced into evidence and shown to the jury, depicted a man wearing a black 
jacket.3  
5. 
Defendant’s Arrest 
 
Approximately 10:50 p.m. on April 17, 1984, Arizona Highway Patrolman 
Robert Dapser was completing a traffic stop on Interstate 40 in northern Arizona, 
when he received a call from a truck driver on the citizen’s band radio located in 
his patrol vehicle.  The caller advised that “an erratic vehicle had been driving in 
his location, passed by him twice and nearly cut him off both times,” and 
identified the California license plate on the car as “PHANTOM 2.”  The subject 
vehicle, a Datsun 280 ZX, drove by as Officer Dapser was receiving this 
information. 
 
Officer Dapser pursued the vehicle, which he observed “swerving across 
the center line of the highway.”  He activated the emergency lights on his patrol 
vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.  After illuminating the Datsun with a spotlight, 
Dapser approached the car and requested that the driver produce identification.  
Defendant, the lone occupant of the vehicle, produced an expired driver’s license 
issued by the State of Alaska.  Dapser asked for the vehicle registration 
documents. Defendant searched the center console and glove box and then stated, 
“I can’t find it, she must not have it in here.”  Dapser thought he observed a burnt 
marijuana cigarette in the center console of the Datsun and, having witnessed the 
                                              
3  
In a separate proceeding conducted in San Diego County, defendant was 
charged with and found guilty of the first degree murder of Janette Cullins; the 
jury in that case also found true several special circumstances and returned a 
verdict imposing a sentence of death, and the San Diego court thereafter imposed a 
judgment of death.  The facts of that case, and defendant’s appeal from the 
judgment rendered in that case, form the basis of the companion case, People v. 
Carter (Aug. 15, 2005, S023000) ____ Cal.4th ____ decided simultaneously with 
this case.   
 
 
11
vehicle’s erratic movement, decided to take defendant into custody.  He advised 
defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) 
and placed him in the patrol vehicle. 
 
Officer Dapser returned to the Datsun to search for the burnt marijuana 
cigarette.  He noticed beer bottles, one of which was empty, located on the 
passenger side floorboard.  While searching for the marijuana cigarette, Dapser 
observed a bank identification card located in the crevice between the driver’s seat 
and the center console.  The name on the card was that of Janette Cullins.  
Believing that the truck driver who originally noticed the Datsun had misidentified 
the license plate, Dapser transmitted a message over his police radio, advising that 
the license plate was not “PHANTOM 2,” but “PHANTM Z.”  Within several 
minutes, a dispatcher instructed Dapser to detain the vehicle and all occupants at 
the request of California law enforcement officials.  Dapser discontinued his 
search of the Datsun and arranged for it to be towed to a locked police storage 
area.4   
 
Officer Dapser administered a Breathalyzer test to defendant, which 
revealed that his blood-alcohol content was .078 percent approximately 80 to 90 
minutes after the traffic stop.  Defendant was transported to the Yavapai County 
jail in Prescott, Arizona. 
6. 
The Contents of the Datsun 280 ZX 
 
On April 18, 1984, Officer Dapser released the contents of Jillette Mills’s 
Datsun 280 ZX, as well as certain personal property confiscated from defendant’s 
person, to West Los Angeles and Culver City police detectives.  The detectives 
                                              
4  
Defendant asked Officer Dapser what he had been searching for, to which 
the officer replied, “I was looking for the marijuana roach that was on the 
console.”  In response, defendant said, “Don’t waste your time looking for it.” 
 
 
12
inventoried the personal property and other objects recovered from the vehicle, 
which included the following items introduced into evidence at defendant’s trial:  
an American Tourister suitcase containing a plastic jar filled with pennies and 
labeled “black bean soy sauce,” a Korean-made, wood-handled kitchen knife, 
yellow rubber gloves, and a gold chain ⎯ all identified as having belonged to 
Kim; a sweatshirt depicting a location in Alaska; an Alpha Beta supermarket 
CASHEX card identified as having belonged to Susan Knoll; towels, athletic 
wear, and photographic equipment identified as having belonged to Jillette Mills; 
three hand-woven sweaters identified as having belonged to Bonnie Guthrie; a 
“Member’s Only” jacket, which contained a butcher knife, a knee-high nylon 
sock, a business card from Jim’s Lafayette Shell gasoline station; a key ring 
identified as having belonged to Janette Cullins; and a piece of paper with the 
words “SHY LAS” ⎯ the access code to Cullins’s Great American Bank 
(originally San Diego Federal Savings and Loan) account; and a number of items 
emblazoned with the names of Las Vegas casinos.  A pair of jeans recovered from 
the Datsun contained a yellow half sock and a blue bandana.  
B. 
The Defense Case 
 
The defense did not present any evidence. 
II. Penalty Phase Evidence 
A. 
The Prosecution’s Case  
 
The prosecution presented evidence in aggravation establishing that in the 
early morning hours of March 29, 1984, defendant, uninvited, entered the Ventura 
County residence of Jennifer S., 22 years of age, with whom he had been 
acquainted for approximately two weeks.  During a period of four and one-half 
hours, defendant twice strangled Jennifer until she lost consciousness.  After she 
regained consciousness, defendant tied her hands behind her back.  Sometimes 
 
 
13
wielding a bone-handled knife, defendant forced her to orally copulate him on 
multiple occasions.  Unable to attain an erection, defendant complained that 
Jennifer “could do it better.”  Shaking violently and uncontrollably, Jennifer asked 
for a drink of water.  Instead, defendant located a bottle of wine and two wine 
glasses and “took the wine and . . . forced it against” her, causing it to spill onto 
Jennifer’s face.  Thereafter, defendant demanded and obtained cash kept at the 
residence.  Subsequently, he pulled off Jennifer’s clothes and raped her.  At some 
point, defendant informed Jennifer he “liked cocaine,” and Jennifer told him he 
could find a small amount in a cupboard.  Defendant retrieved the drug, which she 
assumed he snorted, and he subsequently “calmed down quite a lot.”  Shortly after 
reassuring defendant that she wouldn’t call the police and feigning concern for 
defendant’s well-being, Jennifer “ran out the front door and ran as fast as [she] 
could” to a neighbor’s apartment, where she “pounded” and “kicked” the door.  
The neighbor answered and shortly thereafter notified the police. 
 
The police took Jennifer to the Ventura County Medical Center, where she 
was treated for facial cuts, hip abrasions, and several broken fingernails, bits of 
which were recovered by police investigators from the floor of her residence.  
Jennifer testified that she was “fairly certain” that the facial cut she suffered was 
from the knife defendant had wielded.5 
                                              
5  
Based upon the offenses defendant committed against Jennifer S., Ventura 
County law enforcement officials filed a criminal complaint against defendant and 
caused an arrest warrant to issue.  Prior to trial in the present case, a Ventura 
County jury convicted defendant of robbery, rape, four counts of oral copulation, 
and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and found that defendant 
personally used a knife in the commission of the offenses.  Two prior serious 
felony convictions also were found to be true.  Defendant was sentenced to serve a 
term of 56 years in prison.  Only the facts underlying the offenses perpetrated 
against Jennifer S. were introduced at the penalty phase of the present 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
14
 
The prosecution also introduced into evidence abstracts of judgments 
reflecting defendant’s prior felony convictions, a 1974 burglary conviction in 
Oregon and a 1977 burglary conviction in Alaska. 
B. 
The Defense Case 
 
The defense evidence in mitigation was extensive, involving the testimony 
of 21 witnesses, as well as multi-faceted, presenting various aspects of defendant’s 
background and character, as summarized below. 
 
First, defendant’s older brother, Jerry Lee Carter, and their younger sister, 
Polly Anne Reasner, testified regarding the difficulties of growing up as the 
children of an alcoholic mother and alcoholic stepfather in the small, remote 
Alaskan town of Nome.  Esther Carter, defendant’s mother, was half-Eskimo; Jim 
Carter, defendant’s stepfather, served for several years as Nome’s Chief of 
Police.6  Defendant’s parents argued and fought frequently, hurling profanities as 
well as furniture at each other.  As a result, the children “wanted to get as far away 
from them as you could.”  As a young child, defendant (who was born in 1955), 
repeatedly ran away from home for days at a time, once reaching Anchorage 
several hundred miles away, and another time hiding in the wheel well of an 
aircraft.  When defendant was eight or nine years of age, defendant’s stepfather 
affixed a chain to defendant’s ankle, attaching the other end of the chain to a bed, 
to prevent further similar incidents.  A family friend, Bertha Adsuna, recalled that 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
proceedings ⎯ the jury was not informed of defendant’s arrest, conviction, or 
sentence for having committed those offenses.   
6  
The record is silent as to the identity or whereabouts of defendant’s natural 
father.  We refer to defendant’s mother and stepfather as his parents.  At the time 
of defendant’s trial in 1989, defendant’s stepfather was deceased, and his mother, 
who refused to discuss her son with a defense investigator, did not testify at trial. 
 
 
15
defendant was treated differently from his older brother, and that defendant ⎯ 
unlike Jerry ⎯ was dressed by their mother “like an orphan.”  When defendant 
was nine years of age, his parents sent him several hundred miles away to a 
boarding school for “problem children.” 
 
Second, several witnesses testified that in the late 1970’s, defendant 
became an accomplished television cameraman, thereafter marrying and becoming 
the proud father of twin boys.  He also engaged in activities not considered 
unusual for residents of Nome, such as climbing upon icebergs during the 
springtime ice break.  In the early 1980’s, however, defendant’s enthusiasm for his 
career began to wane as marital problems and his addiction to cocaine increasingly 
dominated his life.  By 1983, defendant and his wife were divorced, and defendant 
was not permitted to visit his children.  According to his brother, defendant 
became “disgruntled,” “heartbroken,” and “angry.”  Defendant missed his sons, 
and according to a former colleague, Mary Alexander, following defendant’s 
separation from his family “it was as if the light had gone out.”  Defendant told 
Beth Farley, whose friendship with defendant dated to their childhood, that 
because he could not see his children, he planned to move away from Alaska and 
begin a new life. 
 
Third, a number of defendant’s friends and former colleagues testified 
regarding defendant’s dependability and trustworthiness, but also to his 
accelerating addiction to cocaine, a substance that defendant termed “marching 
powder.”  According to one witness, during several months prior to March 1984 
defendant was using cocaine regularly, drinking heavily, and was “clearly out of 
control.” 
 
Fourth, two witnesses employed by Ventura County provided further 
details regarding the rape of Jennifer S.  Detective William Ragsdale recalled that 
Jennifer had remembered that defendant’s eyes were “glazed over” during the 
 
 
16
incidents on the morning of March 29, and that, at various intervals, defendant 
acted remorsefully and acknowledged he “needed psychiatric help.”  Lynda Zych, 
a toxicologist, testified that Jennifer tested “positive for cocaine,” but that a 
confirming test never was administered. 
 
Finally, two witnesses testified regarding events following the attack upon 
Jennifer S.  Andrew Holtz, a former colleague of defendant’s, testified that on 
March 29, 1984, defendant telephoned him, sounding “very depressed,” and 
expressed a desire to visit the Alaska Psychiatric Institute, located in Anchorage.  
Holtz encouraged defendant “to get in touch with the authorities in Ventura to 
straighten things out.”  Daniel Shields, an employee at the Los Angeles County 
jail, testified that during defendant’s period of incarceration prior to trial, 
defendant had not presented any discipline problems. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing  
 
Defendant contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his 
preliminary hearing because his attorney, Ezekiel Perlo, (1) performed only a 
perfunctory cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses who testified 
pertaining to the death of Tok Kim and the murder of Jillette Mills, and (2) failed 
to cross-examine any of the prosecution’s witnesses called to testify regarding the 
murders of Bonnie Guthrie and Janette Cullins.  Defendant asserts:  “The record 
demonstrates that defense counsel was not responsible for any meaningful 
challenge to evidence presented over a five-day preliminary hearing that produced 
thirty-seven witnesses and twenty-seven exhibits.”  As a result of these alleged 
deficiencies at the preliminary hearing, defendant alleges that he suffered 
prejudice at trial.  The contention lacks merit. 
 
 
17
 
“In general, irregularities in pretrial commitment proceedings require 
reversal on appeal only where the defendant shows he was ‘deprived of a fair trial 
or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result.’  (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 
Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].)  Where the case involves an 
ineffective assistance claim of the sort at issue here [that is, the alleged failure to 
adequately cross-examine witnesses], no prejudice typically appears unless 
counsel’s pretrial performance resulted in the loss of material evidence and caused 
tangible harm to the defense at trial.  (See People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 
749, 771-773 [251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260] [preliminary hearing counsel’s 
failure to contest prosecution’s scientific evidence and conduct independent 
forensic investigation did not impair defense of rape-murder charge at trial, 
including introduction of expert medical testimony]; People v. Aston (1985) 39 
Cal.3d 481, 494-495 [216 Cal.Rptr. 771, 703 P.2d 111] [unavailability of witness 
at preliminary hearing was ‘cured’ when witness later testified for defendant at 
suppression hearing and was available at trial].)”  (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 96, 121-122.)   
 
In the present case, defendant has failed to make the requisite showing.  
Perlo’s performance at the preliminary hearing was not deficient.  Defendant’s 
assertions to the contrary ignore Perlo’s appropriate questioning of various  
witnesses and instead merely speculate that more vigorous cross-examination of 
certain witnesses, such as Ray Blevins, Tok Kim’s former boyfriend (who died 
prior to trial), might have led the trial court to preclude the prosecution from 
introducing evidence relating to the death of Kim and the murder of Janette 
Cullins.  Defendant’s assertions in this regard do not establish that counsel 
performed deficiently. 
 
Moreover, at trial the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence linking 
defendant to the charged offenses.  Thus, even if we were to assume for the sake 
 
 
18
of argument that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce 
evidence pertaining to Kim and Cullins, defendant does not demonstrate that in the 
absence of such evidence, the result at trial would have been different.  (See 
People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 773 [in postconviction proceedings, the 
burden is on the defendant to establish prejudice as a result of counsel’s pretrial 
performance].)  Although at trial the defense presented no case-in-chief, defense 
counsel vigorously cross-examined numerous witnesses for the prosecution.  We 
further observe that the prosecution’s evidence at trial relating to Kim was 
inconclusive as to cause of death, and that although the Cullins evidence linked 
defendant to that homicide, defendant had not yet been tried or convicted in that 
case ⎯ circumstances that considerably lessened the impact of such evidence. 
 
On this record, which is similar to that in People v. Millwee, supra, 18 
Cal.4th 96, 122, “[d]efendant identifies no exculpatory or mitigating evidence 
overlooked at any phase of the proceedings, nor does he demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance at the preliminary hearing ‘affected the ability of trial 
counsel to advocate defendant’s case at trial.’  [Citation.]”  We therefore reject 
defendant’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance based upon 
counsel’s performance at the preliminary hearing.7   
                                              
7  
“With regard both to this claim and to every other claim raised in his brief, 
defendant asserts that each alleged error violates not only state law but multiple 
provisions of the federal and California Constitutions.  In addressing each claim 
discussed in this opinion, we have considered defendant’s contention that the 
alleged error violates the federal and California Constitutions, and our rejection of 
each claim of reversible error includes a determination that the alleged error does 
not warrant reversal under the state or federal Constitution.”  (People v. Slaughter 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199, fn. 2.)   
 
 
19
B. 
Motion to Suppress Evidence 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his section 1538.5 
motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and from Jillette Mills’s 
vehicle following his arrest.  Defendant asserts that his detention and arrest were 
unlawful because they were not supported by probable cause and that the search of 
his person and the vehicle violated state and federal constitutional guarantees 
against unreasonable search and seizure.  We reject defendant’s position as to each 
of these points. 
 
At the pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion, Robert Dapser, the Arizona 
law enforcement officer who stopped and detained defendant on April 17, 1984, 
testified that he initiated the traffic stop only after receiving a call that a “white 
Datsun 280 Z with California personalized [license] plates” had been seen driving 
in a dangerous manner and after the officer personally observed a vehicle that 
matched that description driving erratically.  Upon directing the driver to pull over 
and stop, Officer Dapser approached the vehicle, observed beer bottles and a burnt 
portion of a marijuana cigarette inside, and detected the scent of alcohol as well as 
the faint smell of burnt marijuana.  Defendant’s eyes appeared to Dapser to have 
been “rather glossed over,” indicating to Dapser that defendant “was under the 
influence of something.”  Dapser took defendant into custody for possession of the 
marijuana cigarette and advised him of his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 
436, “for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.”  Less than 10 
minutes later, Dapser was notified to detain the vehicle and all occupants at the 
request of law enforcement officials located in Culver City, California. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial 
court denied the motion, finding:  “I think the officer did have sufficient cause to 
stop, detain, and then arrest Mr. Carter under the facts and observations.” 
 
 
20
 
On appeal, defendant’s arguments are substantially similar to his assertions 
in the trial court.  For the following reasons, we find them unpersuasive.  
 
“ ‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress is governed by well-settled principles.  [Citations.]  In ruling on such a 
motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule 
of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law 
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.  [Citations.]  “The [trial] 
court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate 
review.”  [Citations.]  [¶]  The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which 
involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence 
standard.  [Citations.]  Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, 
is scrutinized under the standard of independent review.  [Citations.]  Finally, its 
ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however 
predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review.’  (People v. 
Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].)”  
(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 (Alvarez); see also People v. 
Superior Court (Keithley) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 406, 410 [the trial court’s findings 
must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence].)   
 
“The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 
643-660 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1081-1093, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933]; Wolf v. 
Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 [93 L.Ed. 1782, 1785-1786, 69 S.Ct. 1359], 
overruled on another point, Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. at pp. 654-655 [6 
L.Ed.2d at pp. 1089-1090]), guarantees ‘the people’ ‘[t]he right . . . to be secure 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .’  ‘[A] Fourth Amendment 
“seizure” occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint’ by a law enforcement 
officer.  (Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444, 450 [110 
 
 
21
L.Ed.2d 412, 420, 110 S.Ct. 2481].)  ‘The question thus becomes whether such [a] 
seizure [] [is] “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.’  (Ibid.)”  (Alvarez, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 182-183; see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19 [for 
any type of detention, the overall standard to which the government must adhere is 
that of reasonableness]; People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584 [“the 
officer may temporarily detain the offender at the scene for the period of time 
necessary to discharge the duties that he incurs by virtue of the traffic stop”].) 
 
Further, any challenge to the admissibility of a search or seizure must be 
evaluated solely under the Fourth Amendment.  (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 1148, 1171; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879; see also California 
v. Greenwood (1987) 486 U.S. 35, 38.)  “ ‘An illegal search or seizure violates the 
federal constitutional rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded space or the seized thing.  (United States v. Salvucci (1980) 
448 U.S. 83, 91-92 [65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628, 100 S.Ct. 2547].)  The legitimate 
expectation of privacy must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in 
order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.’  (People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 
Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189 [245 Cal.Rptr. 513], italics in original.)”  (People v. 
McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171.)  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish that a legitimate expectation of privacy (Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 
448 U.S. 98, 104) was violated by government conduct.   
 
Our independent review has not disclosed any error in the superior court’s 
application of these principles.  In the present case, defendant, as the driver of a 
stolen vehicle, lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy to contest the search of 
that vehicle.  (See Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 141, fn. 9 [“ ‘No interest 
of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law 
will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a 
search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its 
 
 
22
fruits are proposed to be used against him.  This would of course not avail those 
who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the 
premises searched.’ ”]; accord People v. Melnyk (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1532, 
1533.)  To accept defendant’s assertion that he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy while driving a stolen vehicle would be to overlook the word 
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”   
 
As noted, Officer Dapser received information that a specific vehicle was 
being driven recklessly ⎯ information that soon was corroborated when he saw it 
drive by.  Therefore, he had a reasonable basis to stop the vehicle and detain the 
driver.  Upon encountering defendant, Dapser had further indicia of unlawful 
conduct:  defendant’s eyes appeared glazed, the odor of alcohol and marijuana 
wafted from the car’s interior, the passenger-side floorboard was littered with beer 
bottles, and a burnt marijuana cigarette was visible.  Because possession of 
marijuana was a felony in Arizona at that time, the officer’s observations provided 
him with a reasonable basis to arrest defendant and take him into custody. 
 
Thus, even if we were to assume defendant’s expectation of privacy was 
reasonable, his challenge to the seizure of incriminating evidence fails because his 
detention and arrest were lawful, thereby eliminating any reasonable expectation 
of privacy that would have existed had the vehicle not been stolen.  (New York v. 
Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454.)  Nor are we persuaded that the length of the 
detention prior to arrest ⎯ less than 10 minutes ⎯ was, as defendant asserts, “for 
an excessive time waiting for the dispatcher’s report,” or that Officer Dapser’s 
ultimately unsuccessful search for the marijuana cigarette during that period 
required “an inordinate amount of time.”  
 
In sum, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the 
evidence recovered from Jillette Mills’s vehicle.   
 
 
23
C. 
Motion to Strike Prior Burglary Convictions 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in (1) refusing to strike his prior 
burglary convictions from Oregon and Alaska, alleged as prior serious felonies 
within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and section 1192.7, 
subdivision (c)(18); (2) declining to dismiss these alleged prior convictions 
pursuant to section 1385; and (3) admitting evidence of the prior convictions at the 
penalty phase pursuant to section 190.3, subdivision (c).  Defendant argues each of 
these alleged errors denied his constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair 
trial, and a reliable sentence.  We are unpersuaded.   
 
Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant moved to strike the prior 
conviction allegations on the grounds that the Oregon and Alaska priors did not 
constitute “serious felony convictions” within the meaning of section 667, 
subdivision (a).8  In defendant’s view, certain distinctions between the language of 
the Oregon and Alaska burglary statutes on the one hand, and the California 
statute on the other, precluded the introduction of the out-of-state priors.9  
                                              
8  
At the time defendant brought his motion to strike, section 667, subdivision 
(a) provided in pertinent part: 
 
“Any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been 
convicted of a serious felony in this state or any offense committed in another 
jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, 
in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year 
enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried 
separately.”  
9  
The Oregon burglary statute in effect at the time of defendant’s December 
1974 offense provided in relevant part:   
 
“(1)  A person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if he 
violates ORS 164.215 and the building is a dwelling, or if in effecting entry or 
while in a building or in immediate flight therefrom he:   
“(a) Is armed with a burglar’s tool as defined in ORS 164.235 or a deadly weapon, 
or;  
“(b) Causes or attempts to cause physical injury to any person, or;  
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
24
Specifically, defendant alleged that neither the Oregon nor the Alaska burglary 
statute included all of the elements of the California crime of residential burglary.  
 
At a pretrial hearing conducted on March 20, 1987, the superior court  
rejected defendant’s motion to strike his prior burglary convictions.  The court 
observed:  “It seems like the purpose of this rule is to look to see if and to avoid 
the holding of an individual responsible for a serious felony prior for conduct that 
in this state would not substitute for a serious felony.  And based on my review of 
the documents and the points and authorities in this case, that isn’t what we’re 
facing here.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  What we have here is that it appears that what the 
defendant was charged with and convicted of is conduct, precisely that which is 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
“(c) Uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.”  (ORS 164.225.) 
 
ORS 164.215, referred to in the foregoing statute, provided:   
 
“A person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.”  
 
The Alaska burglary statute in effect at the time of defendant’s December 
1977 offense provided in relevant part:   
 
“A person who breaks and enters a dwelling house with intent to commit a 
crime in it, or having entered with that intent, breaks a dwelling house or is armed 
with a dangerous weapon in it, or assaults a person lawfully in it is guilty of 
burglary, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for no less than one year nor more than 10 years. . . .”  (Alaska Statute 11.20.080.)   
 
Alaska Statute Section 11.20.090 defined breaking of a dwelling house as 
follows: 
 
“An unlawful entry of a dwelling house with intent to commit a crime in it 
is a breaking and entering of the dwelling house for the purpose of section 80 of 
this chapter.”   
 
When defendant brought his motion to strike, section 459 provided in 
pertinent part:   
 
“Every person who enters any house, room, apartment . . . with intent to 
commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.” (Italics added.)   
 
 
25
required to come within [section] 459 as a first degree burglary.”  The court 
concluded, “The motion to strike is denied at this time.”  
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have stricken the prior 
serious felony enhancements that were based on his residential burglary 
convictions in Oregon and Alaska, because the foreign convictions did not include 
all the elements of the “serious felony” of “residential burglary” (Pen. Code, 
§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), (4), 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)) as defined in California (id., 
§ 459).  Defendant further urges that the court violated then-applicable law when it 
went behind the facial elements of the foreign convictions, and considered the 
entire records of the foreign convictions to determine whether the minimum 
elements of a California residential burglary were actually present. 
As set forth in the margin (fn. 9, ante), the Oregon and Alaska statutes 
required only entry with intent to commit a “crime.”  (ORS §§ 164.215, 
164.225(1); Alaska Statutes 11.20.080, 11.20.090.)  By contrast, Penal Code 
section 459, then and now, requires entry with intent to commit “grand or petit 
larceny or any felony.”  (Italics added.)  Thus, defendant’s Oregon and Alaska 
convictions conceivably could have been for conduct which, if committed in 
California, would not support a conviction under section 459.  
As defendant observes, the law as it existed in 1984 allowed courts to look 
only at the face of a foreign conviction to determine whether its minimum 
elements established a “serious felony” under California law.  (People v. Crowson 
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 623.)  But, as defendant acknowledges, we overruled Crowson in 
People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193.  Myers held that, in determining whether a 
foreign conviction satisfies the minimum elements of a “serious felony” in 
California, the court may examine “the entire record of the prior conviction.”  (Id., 
at p. 1201; see also People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355-356 [in 
determining the truth of a prior-conviction allegation, the trier of fact may look to 
 
 
26
the entire record of the conviction, overruling People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
627].) 
Defendant fails to explain his view that Myers is not fully retroactive, and 
no reason appears to depart from the general rule that judicial decisions, even 
those overruling prior authority, have full retroactive effect.  (See, e.g., Burris v. 
Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1023; Woosley v. State of California 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 793-794.)  Retroactive application is particularly appropriate 
here, because Myers would apply to the consideration of the prior conviction at 
any new trial.   
Although defendant additionally questions the “competence” of the foreign 
records on which the trial court relied, he fails to persuade us that the records are 
invalid or otherwise deficient.  Our own review of those records reveals that as to 
the Alaska conviction, defendant pleaded guilty to “unlawfully break[ing] and 
enter[ing] a . . . residence, . . . the breaking and entering being with the intent to 
commit the crime of larceny therein,” and that as to the Oregon conviction, 
defendant was found guilty of “knowingly and unlawfully enter[ing] a dwelling [a 
residence] . . . with the intent to commit the crime of theft therein.”  (Cf. former 
§ 459:  “Every person who enters any house, . . . apartment, . . . with intent to 
commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary”; see also former 
§ 460, subd. (1):  “Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house . . . is burglary 
of the first degree”; § 490a:  “Whenever any law or statute of this state refers to or 
mentions larceny, . . . said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as 
if the word ‘theft’ were substituted therefor”; § 1192.7, subd. (c)(18) [any burglary 
of the first degree is a “serious felony”].)  Because each one of defendant’s prior 
 
 
27
convictions thus would satisfy the necessary elements to convict defendant of first 
degree burglary in California, we reject defendant’s challenge.10 
 
After the jury reached its guilt phase verdicts, defendant outside the jury’s 
presence renewed his request that evidence of his prior burglary convictions be 
excluded from the jury’s consideration, this time requesting that the trial court 
exercise its discretion under section 1385 to strike the allegations.  The trial court 
appears to have denied the request, although the reporter’s transcript does not 
explicitly so indicate.11 
 
On appeal, defendant contends “it was in the interests of justice to dismiss 
the [prior conviction allegations] under section 1385, because the crimes charged 
were committed before the 1986 amendment to that section.”  We disagree.  The 
circumstance that defendant’s prior convictions were committed before the 1986 
amendment that added subdivision (b) to section 1385 (“This section does not 
authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious felony . . .”) did not 
preclude the trial court in 1989 from denying defendant’s motion to strike the prior 
conviction allegations.  No error or abuse of discretion appears.12 
                                              
10  
Even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court should have 
struck defendant’s prior convictions from Oregon and Alaska on the ground that 
they were not serious felonies, the prosecution still was entitled to introduce 
evidence of those convictions at the penalty phase under section 190.3, 
subdivision (c), which permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of “the 
presence . . . of any prior felony conviction” regardless of whether it is a “serious 
felony.”   
11  
The clerk’s transcript, however, reads:  “Motion to strike priors pursuant to 
[section] 1385 [of the] Penal Code in the interest of justice is denied.” 
12  
In rejecting defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss 
the prior conviction allegations pursuant to section 1385, we need not and do not 
address the broader question whether, in a case tried after the 1986 amendment to 
that statute but involving a prior conviction of a serious felony that was committed 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
28
 
Defendant next contends the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of 
defendant’s prior burglary convictions under section 190.3, subdivision (c) at the 
penalty phase.  He is incorrect.  (See People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 
201 [“The plain meaning of subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 190.3 is that the 
jury must consider any violent criminal activity by the defendant, whether or not it 
led to prosecution and conviction, and any ‘prior felony conviction’ (italics added), 
whether the underlying offense was violent or nonviolent.”].)  Defendant’s prior 
burglary convictions in Oregon and Alaska clearly qualify as prior felony 
convictions.  Defendant offers no persuasive argument to the contrary.  
 
Finally, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that defendant 
is correct in asserting that the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s prior 
burglary convictions at the penalty phase, we perceive no prejudice.  The jury did 
not learn of defendant’s prior convictions until after it already had considered the 
evidence that defendant had committed the charged murders and had found him 
guilty of those crimes as well as other offenses.  Under these circumstances, there 
existed no reasonable possibility of a different outcome at the penalty phase, had 
the prior burglary convictions not been admitted. 
D. 
Denial of Pretrial Motion to Exclude Other-Crimes Evidence 
Pertaining to the Deaths of Tok Kim and Janette Cullins  
 
Defendant contends the superior court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to exclude evidence pertaining to the death of Tok Kim in Alameda 
County and the murder of Janette Cullins in San Diego County.  He argues that the 
judgment must be reversed in its entirety due to the lower court’s admission of this 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
before the enactment of that amendment, a trial court retained the authority to 
dismiss a prior conviction allegation under the statute.   
 
 
29
“other-crimes evidence” in purported violation of defendant’s constitutional rights.  
We conclude defendant’s position is without merit. 
 
In March 1987, approximately two years prior to the commencement of 
defendant’s trial, the prosecution informed the defense of its intention to 
introduce, at the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, evidence of the then-pending, 
unadjudicated crimes charged against defendant in Alameda and San Diego 
Counties.  In July 1987, defendant responded to the prosecution’s notice by filing 
a “motion to exclude evidence of pending prosecutions in Alameda and San Diego 
Counties.”  In July 1988, the superior court considered and summarily denied 
defendant’s motion.  Approximately one year later (on the eve of trial), defendant 
renewed the motion to exclude this evidence, limiting the motion to the Kim 
matter only and asserting that the prosecution had failed to disclose laboratory and 
related police reports revealing that defendant had not been the donor of semen 
detected on a bedspread in Kim’s apartment.  The court summarily denied this 
motion as well.13   
 
As we have summarized in the foregoing statement of facts, at the guilt 
phase of trial the prosecution, over defense objection, introduced evidence 
pertaining to the death of Tok Kim and the murder of Janette Cullins.  Defendant 
had yet to be tried in those cases and, in the wake of the death judgments rendered 
in the present case and in the subsequently tried case involving Janette Cullins, 
Alameda County dismissed the charges against him based on the death of 
Tok Kim.  As noted, defendant contends the trial court below erred in permitting 
the prosecution to introduce evidence of these crimes. 
                                              
13  
The latter motion was captioned:  “Motion for mistrial, or in the alternative 
renewed motion in limine re ‘Oakland’ evidence of other misconduct.” 
 
 
30
 
Character evidence is not admissible to show conduct on a specific 
occasion.  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)  This type of evidence sometimes is 
referred to as evidence of criminal disposition or propensity.  (E.g., People v. Sam 
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 203 [77 Cal.Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700].)  The rule excluding 
such evidence, however, is qualified by Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b), which provides:  “Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence 
that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove 
some fact (such as . . . opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” 
“Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than those currently 
charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character 
or has a criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to 
prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, 
the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator 
acted in the commission of the charged crimes.  (Evid. Code, § 1101.)  Evidence 
of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or 
intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support 
a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent.  (People v. 
Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402–403.)  On appeal, the trial court’s determination 
of this issue, being essentially a determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.  (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 14; People v. Alvarez (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 155, 201; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1239; see also 
People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 617; U. S. v. Khan (9th Cir. 1993) 993 
F.2d 1368, 1376.) 
“To be relevant on the issue of identity, the uncharged crimes must be 
highly similar to the charged offenses.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 
403.)  Evidence of an uncharged crime is relevant to prove identity only if the 
 
 
31
charged and uncharged offenses display a ‘ “pattern and characteristics . . . so 
unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” ’  (Ibid., quoting 1 McCormick 
on Evidence (4th ed. 1992) § 190, pp. 801-803.)  ‘The strength of the inference in 
any case depends upon two factors:  (1) the degree of distinctiveness of individual 
shared marks, and (2) the number of minimally distinctive shared marks.’  (People 
v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 756, italics in original, disapproved on other 
grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12.)”  (People v. Kipp 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369-370.) 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, 
certain of the charged and uncharged offenses displayed common features that 
revealed a highly distinctive pattern.  As noted in our summary of the evidence, 
Jillette Mills and Susan Knoll each was fatally strangled and their bodies found in 
a closed bedroom closet; in the uncharged offense involving Janette Cullins, the 
victim’s body also was found strangled in her closed bedroom closet.  Although 
defendant notes certain differences in the circumstances surrounding the victims’ 
deaths, the combination of fatal strangulation and placement of a young woman’s 
body in a closed bedroom closet is both highly distinctive and suggestive that the 
same person perpetrated the crimes involving Knoll, Mills, and Cullins. 
To be highly distinctive, the charged and uncharged crimes need not be 
mirror images of each other.  Thus, although there were certain differences in the 
crimes committed against Knoll and Mills, and those against Cullins, such 
distinctions went to the weight of the evidence and did not preclude the 
prosecution from introducing the evidence regarding Cullins’s murder. 
Although the evidence of Kim’s death did not share the distinctive features 
of the murders charged in the present case, it clearly was relevant on the issues of 
 
 
32
intent and a common plan.14  The vehicle owned by Tok Kim was missing at the 
time her body was found but later was discovered near the residence of Knoll and 
Mills.  Subsequently, a white Datsun 280 ZX matching the description of Mills’s 
vehicle, missing since the time Mills’s body was found, was observed in the 
vicinity of Cullins’s apartment near the time of Cullins’s murder.  When arrested, 
defendant had on his person or in the Datsun an eclectic array of objects identified 
as having belonged to:  (1) each of the three victims in the murders charged in the 
present case, (2) Janette Cullins, and (3) Tok Kim. 
The shared characteristics of the killings, as well as the presence of 
evidence associated with a particular victim or victims at events related to the next 
murder, indicate that when defendant committed the crimes charged in the present 
case as well as the uncharged crimes, he acted pursuant to a common plan to kill 
and steal from his victims. 
“A lesser degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue 
of common design or plan.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.)  For 
this purpose, ‘the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather 
than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be 
distinctive or unusual.’  (Id., at p. 403.)   
“The least degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the 
issue of intent.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.)  For this purpose, 
the uncharged crimes need only be ‘sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses] 
to support the inference that the defendant “ ‘probably harbor[ed] the same intent 
in each instance.’  [Citations.]” ’  (Ibid.)”  (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 
                                              
14  
Although no cause of death was established as to Kim, as noted a curtain tie 
was found beneath her neck.  In his briefing, defendant characterizes Kim’s death 
as an “uncharged homicide.”  
 
 
33
371.)  Considering the shared characteristics noted above, we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly determining that the charged 
and uncharged offenses were sufficiently similar to support an inference that 
defendant harbored the same intent — to kill and to steal — in each instance.  (See 
People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.) 
As we stated in Kipp, “There is an additional requirement for the 
admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes:  The probative value of the 
uncharged offense evidence must be substantial and must not be largely 
outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of 
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.  (People v. 
Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 404–405.)  On appeal, a trial court’s resolution of 
these issues is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id. at p. 405.)  A court abuses its 
discretion when its ruling ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’  (People v. De 
Santis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226.)”  (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 
371.)   
We find no abuse of discretion.  Evidence of the circumstances surrounding 
the death of Tok Kim was highly probative, as it helped to establish a link between 
her recent acquaintance with defendant and her sudden death, and the murders of 
Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, Bonnie Guthrie, and Janette Cullins that shortly 
followed.  Because the five women each died within a period of approximately 
four days, the proximity of these incidents to each other “further enhanced” the 
probative value of the other crimes evidence.  (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 
Cal.4th 349, 371.)  Kim’s Honda was discovered shortly after her death, hundreds 
of miles from her residence, parked in front of the apartment in which the bodies 
of Knoll and Mills were discovered, and at approximately the same time that 
Mills’s car disappeared.  Evidence of the circumstances of Cullins’s death was 
probative for the same reason.  Mills’s missing white Datsun 280 ZX matched the 
 
 
34
description of the vehicle that a neighbor observed rapidly driving away from the 
apartment building in which Cullins (who also had been acquainted with 
defendant) had resided.  The cause of Cullins’s death, and the location of her body 
in a bedroom closet, closely resembled both the manner of killing and the  
concealment utilized by the perpetrator at the Knoll/Mills crime scene.  As noted, 
at the time of defendant’s arrest items linking him to all five deceased women 
were discovered on his person or in Mills’s vehicle. 
These evidentiary links were highly probative as to the identity of the 
perpetrator of the crimes, as well that person’s murderous and larcenous common 
plan and intent. The prosecution was required to prove in its case-in-chief that 
defendant intended to kill Knoll, Mills, and Guthrie, each of whom was fatally 
strangled.  When the trial court ruled admissible the evidence in question, 
defendant had not conceded either the issues of identity or intent, nor did the 
prosecution possess other evidence proving these material disputed facts so 
conclusively that evidence of the Kim and Cullins deaths should have been 
excluded as merely cumulative.  (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 372.)  
“Against this substantial probative value on material and contested issues, 
we must weigh the danger of undue prejudice to defendant, of confusing the 
issues, or of misleading the jury.”  (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 372.)  
Evidence of the Kim and Cullins crimes “posed a substantial danger of prejudice 
to defendant because a jury would be inclined to view [such] evidence  . . . as 
evidence of his criminal propensities, and because a jury might well view 
defendant as deserving of punishment” for the Kim and Cullins crimes regardless 
of his guilt of the Knoll, Mills, and Guthrie murders.  (Ibid.)  “But prejudice of this 
sort is inherent whenever other crimes evidence is admitted (People v. Ewoldt, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 404), and the risk of such prejudice was not unusually grave 
here.”  (People v. Kipp, supra, 7 Cal.4th 349, 372.)  The Kim death and the 
 
 
35
Cullins murder were not significantly more inflammatory than the charged 
offenses; the prosecution was unable definitively to establish that Kim had died at 
the hands of another, and there was no evidence that Cullins suffered sexual 
assault as had Mills and Guthrie.   
Moreover, the jury was instructed correctly pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.09 
and 2.50 as to the limited purposes for which it might consider the evidence of the 
Kim and Cullins matters.  The instructions conveyed that evidence relating to 
those events could not be considered to prove defendant’s bad character or 
criminal disposition.15 
                                              
15  
The jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.09, as follows:   
 
“Evidence concerning Tok Chum Kim in Oakland and Janette Cullins in 
San Diego was admitted for the limited purpose of determining if it shows the 
identity of the person who committed the crime of which the defendant is accused.   
 
“Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose 
for which it was admitted.”  
 
The jury also was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, as follows:   
 
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed [crimes] other than that for which [he] is on trial.   
 
“Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by 
you to prove that defendant is a person of bad character or that [he] has a 
disposition to commit crimes.   
 
“Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the 
limited purpose of determining if it tends to show:   
 
“[The existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime 
charged;]   
 
“The identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the 
defendant is accused;]   
 
“[A motive for the commission of the crime charged;]   
 
“[The defendant had knowledge of the nature of things found in [his] 
possession;]   
 
“[The defendant had knowledge or possessed the means that might have 
been useful or necessary for the commission of the crime charged;]   
 
“[The defendant did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the 
person with whom [he] engaged or attempted to engage in a sexual act consented 
to such conduct;]   
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
36
Defendant also contends that in view of the summary nature of the trial 
court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion, the court “failed to engage in the 
balancing process required under Evidence Code section[s] 352 or section 954,” 
and on that basis reversal is required.  We disagree.  The parties agreed to present 
the issue to the court based on the strength of their written submissions (that is, 
without oral argument), prompting the court to observe that the parties’ arguments 
“certainly were completely handled in the papers.”  Although “the better practice” 
would have been for the trial court, prior to issuing its ruling, to have set forth on 
the record its balancing of the probative value of the evidence against its 
prejudicial effect (Brown v. Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767, 793), its ruling did 
not have to be that explicit.  (See People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177-
179 [trial court’s failure to state on the record that it had weighed prejudice against 
probative value held not erroneous when parties had argued at length as to the 
admissibility of certain testimony that allegedly was unduly prejudicial to the 
defendant]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 894-895 [trial court’s explicit 
rejection of the Evidence Code section 352 claim deemed to be sufficient, the 
court “having heard lengthy argument”]; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 
655-656 [in upholding admissibility of the defendant’s letters that assertedly were 
privileged under Evidence Code section 980, observing that although the trial 
court could have been more explicit in explaining its reasoning, “we review the 
ruling, not the reasoning.”]; see also People v. Triplett (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 624, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“[The crime charged is a part of a larger continuing plan, or scheme].   
 
“For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you 
must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case.   
 
“You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.” 
 
 
37
626-629 [reviewing the evolution of the case law in this area].)  In the present 
case, the parties submitted the issue to the court on the strength of their thoroughly 
prepared written arguments.  In view of the court’s indication it had reviewed such 
submissions, the weighing process contemplated by Evidence Code section 352 
may be inferred. 
In view of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not exceed the 
bounds of reason in determining that the probative value of the evidence of the 
Kim and Cullins matters “was not substantially outweighed by the probability that 
its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the 
issues, or of misleading the jury.”  (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 
372.) 
 
Finally, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in denying 
defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence relating to the deaths of Kim and 
Cullins, reversal would not be required unless it is reasonably probable the 
outcome would have been more favorable to defendant had such evidence been 
excluded.  (People v. Kipp,  supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 374.)  In view of the strong 
evidence implicating defendant in the charged murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette 
Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, it is not reasonably probable that an outcome more 
favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the evidence 
related to Kim and Cullins. 
E. 
Denial of Motion for Severance of the Culver City Crimes 
(Knoll and  Mills) from the West Los Angeles Crimes 
(Guthrie) 
 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever 
defendant’s trial on the “Culver City crimes” involving the murders of Susan 
Knoll and Jillette Mills, the rape of Mills, and the burglary of the apartment shared 
by Knoll and Mills (offenses that were alleged to have occurred on April 10, 1984) 
 
 
38
from the “West Los Angeles crimes” involving the murder and rape of Bonnie 
Guthrie and the burglary committed at her apartment (offenses that were alleged to 
have occurred on April 11, 1984).  Defendant argues that in denying the motion to 
sever and thereby compelling him to face “a joint trial of offenses arising from 
separate incidents on different dates,” the trial court denied defendant a panoply of 
state and federal constitutional rights, requiring reversal of the entire judgment.  In 
particular, defendant maintains that “while the offenses are of the same class, the 
crimes were not inextricably connected in their commission, and the so-called 
common markers between the Mills/Knoll and Guthrie homicides can only be 
termed ‘minimally distinctive’ under close scrutiny.”  Defendant further contends 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever in the same summary 
fashion as the court had denied defendant’s motion to exclude the other crimes 
evidence, and in failing explicitly to weigh the relevant factors on the record and 
exercise its discretion.  None of these claims has merit. 
 
“Section 954 provides that ‘[a]n accusatory pleading may charge . . . two or 
more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate 
counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of 
justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different 
offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or 
divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.’  
Because both offenses involved murder and thus belonged to the same class of 
crimes, the statutory requirements for joinder were satisfied.  Therefore, defendant 
can predicate error in denying the motion to sever only upon a clear showing of 
potential prejudice. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 
26, 919 P.2d 640]; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 172-173 [14 
 
 
39
Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862], affd. sub nom. Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 
U.S. 1 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) 16 
 
“In reviewing this claim, we apply the familiar standard of review 
providing that the trial court’s ruling may be reversed only if the court has abused 
its discretion. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 720 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 
928 P.2d 485]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 508 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 
896 P.2d 119]; see People v. Osband [1996] 13 Cal.4th 622, 666; People v. 
Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1284 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].) An 
abuse of discretion may be found when the trial court’s ruling ‘ “falls outside the 
bounds of reason.” ’  (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 666.) 
 
“ ‘ “The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that 
there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately 
tried.”  [Citation.]  [¶]  “The determination of prejudice is necessarily dependent 
on the particular circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have 
emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial.”  
[Citation.] Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where:  (1) evidence on 
the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; 
(2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the 
defendant; (3) a “weak” case has been joined with a “strong” case, or with another 
“weak” case, so that the “spillover” effect of aggregate evidence on several 
                                              
16  
“Proposition 115, adopted in June 1990, contained several new 
constitutional and statutory provisions on the subjects of joinder and severance.  
(See Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (a); § 954.1)  Defendant was tried prior to the 
effective date of Proposition 115, and accordingly we apply the law predating 
Proposition 115 in our review of defendant’s claims regarding severance.  (People 
v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126, fn. 7 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980].)”  
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1314.)   
 
 
40
charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one 
of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a 
capital case.  [Citations.]’  (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th 155, 172-173; 
People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 721; People v. Memro (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 786, 849-850 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305]; People v. Davis, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 507-508; People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 933-934 
[277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950]; Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 
441, 452-454 [204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699].) 
 
“Furthermore, we have observed that the criteria enumerated in Sandoval 
are not equally significant.  ‘[T]he first step in assessing whether a combined trial 
[would have been] prejudicial is to determine whether evidence on each of the 
joined charges would have been admissible, under Evidence Code section 1101, in 
separate trials on the others.  If so, any inference of prejudice is dispelled.’  
(People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 171-172 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 
480]; see People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 721.) Cross-admissibility 
suffices to negate prejudice, but it is not essential for that purpose.  Although 
‘ “we have held that cross- admissibility ordinarily dispels any inference of 
prejudice, we have never held that the absence of cross-admissibility, by itself, 
sufficed to demonstrate prejudice.” ’  (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th 155, 
173.)” (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1314-1316.) 
 
In the present case, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to sever 
clearly was based on certain obvious similarities among the crimes.  “Pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence that a defendant has 
committed an offense, although inadmissible to demonstrate a defendant’s 
disposition to commit crimes, may be received to establish, among other things, 
identity, intent, motive, or plan. To be admissible to demonstrate a distinctive 
modus operandi, the evidence must disclose common marks or identifiers, that, 
 
 
41
considered singly or in combination, support a strong inference that the defendant 
committed both crimes. (People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 988-989 [269 
Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289]; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 937 [251 
Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996]; see People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th 786, 851; 
People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].)”  
(People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1316.) 
 
The Susan Knoll/Jillette Mills and Bonnie Guthrie offenses, having been 
committed approximately one day apart, each involved the murder by 
strangulation of young women whose belongings were found approximately one 
week later in defendant’s possession.  On this basis alone, the evidence connecting 
defendant to the Knoll/Mills and Guthrie crimes would be cross-admissible if the 
court had ordered separate trials, thereby dispelling any inference of prejudice.  
(People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 1315-1316.)  Moreover, because both 
crime scenes involved murder and sexual assault, the evidence from each 
disclosed a commonality with regard to intent and plan (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. 
(b)), while presenting little if any possibility that one of the charges or set of 
charges would have unduly inflamed the jury against defendant.  Although all 
three women were not strangled in an identical manner — Mills and Guthrie were 
strangled by ligature, whereas  Knoll was strangled manually — both crime scenes 
had in common a ligature strangulation, as well as the traumatic sexual assault of 
Mills and Guthrie.  Nor did the prosecution join a “weak case” with a “strong” 
one ⎯ the evidence linking defendant to each crime was especially compelling.  
Further, Knoll and Guthrie were best friends, a circumstance that suggested one 
person committed the crimes against both victims in the two-day period, and that 
therefore supported the cross-admissibility of the evidence.  The murders of each 
of the three women presented one or more special circumstances; because each 
one of the murders by itself formed the basis for capital charges to be brought 
 
 
42
against the perpetrator, joinder did not lead to one set of crimes being “elevated” 
to capital status. 
 
Although the better practice would have been for the trial court to make 
clear on the record the basis for its denial of defendant’s motion to sever, the 
court’s failure to articulate its reasoning does not invalidate its ruling or undermine 
the correctness of that denial. 
 
Further, we observe that even had defendant demonstrated that the evidence 
would not have been cross-admissible, he has failed to establish prejudice.  He has 
not demonstrated that one offense or set of offenses was “significantly more likely 
to inflame the jury against defendant, since the murders were similar in nature and 
equally gruesome.  Defendant has not shown that evidence of guilt was 
significantly stronger in one case, creating the danger that that case would be used 
to bolster the weaker case, because the prosecutor’s evidence was nearly equal in 
strength” in establishing defendant’s involvement in the Knoll/Mills and Guthrie 
murders.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 1317-1318.) 
 
Under these circumstances, no abuse of discretion appears.  We therefore 
reject defendant’s claims of error. 
F. 
Pretrial and Midtrial Motions Contesting the Sufficiency of 
the Evidence of Felony Murder in the Deaths of Susan Knoll, 
Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, and of the Special 
Circumstances of Burglary and Rape 
 
Prior to trial, defendant moved pursuant to section 995 to strike and set 
aside the substantive charges and special circumstances pertaining to the murders 
and to other offenses involving victims Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie 
Guthrie.  The motion was denied.  Defendant thereafter petitioned the Court of 
Appeal for writ relief, which also was denied.  At the close of the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to 
section 1118.1.  This motion, too, was denied.  
 
 
43
 
Defendant generally contends there was insufficient evidence (1) to support 
his conviction, based on the theory of felony murder, for the murders of Susan 
Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, and (2) to find true the special 
circumstance allegations of burglary and rape.  Defendant specifically asserts the 
evidence was inadequate to establish that he harbored a felonious intent upon 
entering the victims’ residences; he notes the premises bore no sign of forced 
entry.  Defendant’s position is without merit.   
 
The law applicable to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is well-
settled:  “ ‘In reviewing [a claim regarding] the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
must determine “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  [Citation.]  “[T]he court must 
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to 
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  [Citation.]  We “ ‘presume 
in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably 
deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’  [Citation.]  If we determine that a rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the due process clause of the United States Constitution is 
satisfied [citation], as is the due process clause of article I, section 15, of the 
California Constitution [citation].”  (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 
690; see also People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413-414; People v. Morris 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 19.) 
 
Section 187, subdivision (a), defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a 
human being, or a fetus with malice aforethought.”  At the time the crimes were 
committed, first degree murder could be accomplished by a “murder . . . 
 
 
44
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, 
burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under section 288 . . . .”  (Former § 189, 
added by Stats. 1982, ch. 950, § 1, p. 3440.)  Rape was defined in pertinent part as 
“an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the 
perpetrator [that was] accomplished against a person’s will by means of force or 
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.”  (Former 
§ 261, subd. (2) added by Stats. 1984, ch. 1635, § 79.5, p. 5865.)  Burglary was 
defined, in pertinent part, as an entry into any “room, apartment . . . or other 
building . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony . . . .”  
(Former § 459, added by Stats. 1984, ch. 854, § 2, p. 2896.)   
 
With regard to the murder charges, we observe that Susan Knoll, Jillette 
Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie each was fatally strangled; Knoll manually, Mills and 
Guthrie by ligature.  There is no question that each of these killings was unlawful 
and was committed with malice aforethought.  Defendant’s palm print was 
discovered in the apartment shared by Susan Knoll and Jillette Mills where their 
bodies were found. 
 
Similarly, the evidence was sufficient to establish rape; Mills’s and 
Guthrie’s bodies bore signs of having suffered traumatic sexual assault, and 
seminal fluid discovered on a white nightgown in the apartment was consistent 
with defendant’s PGM type and that of 15.8% of the population. 
 
With regard to the offense of burglary, evidence of a forced entry is not 
required to establish felonious intent; defendant’s intent instead may be inferred 
from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.  (People v. 
Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41.)  Defendant’s commission of crimes in close, 
temporal proximity, combined with a very similar modus operandi in each 
incident, strongly indicates that he entered the residences with the requisite 
felonious intent.  (Ibid.) 
 
 
45
 
Defendant was arrested driving Mills’s stolen Datsun 280 ZX, containing 
an Alpha Beta supermarket CASHEX card identified as having belonged to Knoll; 
towels, athletic wear, and photographic equipment identified as having belonged 
to Mills; and three hand-woven sweaters identified as having belonged to Bonnie 
Guthrie. 
 
In view of the evidence summarized above, the jury reasonably could have 
inferred that the murders of Knoll, Mills, and Guthrie occurred in the course of 
defendant having committed the felonies of burglary and rape.  The evidence 
adduced at trial clearly was sufficient, for purposes of the felony murder rule and 
the special circumstances alleged, to establish that defendant committed rape and 
burglary.   
G. Motion to Reconsolidate the Los Angeles, Alameda, and San 
Diego County Cases 
 
As originally filed, the complaint against defendant charged all of the 
crimes allegedly committed in Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego Counties in 
a single pleading.  Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the charges arising 
from the Alameda and San Diego crimes committed against Tok Kim and Janette 
Cullins, respectively.  The prosecution did not oppose the motion, instead 
informing defendant that if the motion were granted, the crimes committed in 
Alameda and San Diego Counties would form the basis for a refiling of the 
charges against defendant in those counties.17 
                                              
17  
At the hearing on defendant’s motion to sever, the prosecutor observed:   
 
“The law is very clear that venue objections must be made in a timely 
fashion or they are forever waived.  This is the correct time for making such a 
motion, and I think there is no legally tenable ground the People would urge for 
the court to deny the motion.  In other words, I think the motion is well-taken.   
 
“I filed the case in its present form for two primary or three primary 
reasons.  First, because it seemed to me quite clear that this is a series of crimes in 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
46
 
On January 28, 1986, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
charges involving the crimes committed in Alameda and San Diego Counties.  
Defendant thereafter separately was charged in San Diego County for the murder 
of Janette Cullins, and was transferred to that county for arraignment, preliminary 
hearing, and other pretrial motions.  Defendant also was charged in Alameda 
County with murder and related offenses involving Tok Kim.18   
 
On August 8, 1988, more than two and one-half years after the court 
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the Alameda and San Diego County 
charges, defendant — now represented by new counsel — moved to reconsolidate 
the Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego cases.  At the hearing conducted 10 
days later, defense counsel informed the court that the motion was made over 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
the general sense connected in their commission.  It made sense to me that there be 
one prosecution rather than three separate prosecutions, and in order to foreclose a 
later objection in Oakland and San Diego, it seemed to me important that the 
defense be given first an opportunity to have this case tried as one and secondly be 
put on notice that if only the Los Angeles crimes were charged here that it would 
be clear that both Oakland and San Diego were going to go forward with their 
cases as capital cases and that the defense would have to be prepared to defend the 
crimes committed in Oakland and in San Diego and could not then be heard in 
those two counties to urge that this should have been prosecuted all in Los 
Angeles County.   
 
“[¶] . . . [¶]   
 
“So, with that in mind, the defendant is put on notice now that there will be 
prosecutions in Oakland and San Diego.   
 
“[¶] . . . [¶]   
 
“Thus, what the defense has chosen to do is to accept the inevitability of 
three separate death penalty trials with the attendant risk of three death penalty 
verdicts by juries, three separate appeals, any [one] of which not being successful 
would result in the ultimate punishment.”   
18  
As previously noted (ante, p. 29), the Alameda County prosecution 
ultimately was dismissed after the Los Angeles and San Diego County death 
judgments were rendered against defendant. 
 
 
47
defendant’s objection.19  After hearing the parties argue the issue and observing 
that the disagreement between defendant and his attorneys as to whether to seek 
reconsolidation “[d]oes raise an interesting issue,” the court granted defense 
counsel’s request for one additional day in which to review the matter with 
defendant.  At the hearing the next day, defense counsel informed the court that 
notwithstanding counsel’s efforts to persuade defendant to seek reconsolidation, 
defendant remained in “clear opposition” to the motion.  The court determined that 
defendant’s position on the issue was “paramount,” and denied the motion to 
reconsolidate.20 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
reconsolidate the Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego cases.  Specifically, 
defendant contends that his trial attorneys’ decision to seek reconsolidation over 
defendant’s objection fell within counsel’s “tactical prerogative” to “waive” 
                                              
19  
At the hearing on the motion to reconsolidate, defense counsel represented 
to the court:  “I . . . am prepared to indicate with the utmost clarity, that Mr. Carter 
opposes the motion to reconsolidate.  [¶] . . .  [¶] Mr. Carter’s position on the 
motion to reconsolidate, his personal position is that he is opposed to the motion.” 
20  
The court found:  “The bottom line is that Mr. Carter is facing three 
chances to get the death penalty as the cases stand now.  If they were consolidated, 
there would be but one.   
 
“And just from a logical standpoint it would seem like his odds are better 
with consolidation than the cases being tried in three separate jurisdictions as 
they’re set up now.   
 
“On the other hand, it’s the court’s view that this is a monumental issue and 
that it is one of fundamental importance and at this point in time I cannot see 
overriding Mr. Carter’s desires in telling the District Attorney to set in motion 
procedures to bring all these cases together.   
 
“[¶] . . . [¶]   
 
“. . . I think this is the type of decision that Mr. Carter is entitled to make, 
and no matter what the court’s personal view is to the benefit of his making that 
decision, I don’t think it’s the kind that can be overridden, I think Mr. Carter’s 
decision will have to remain the paramount one in this issue and the motion to 
reconsolidate is denied.”  
 
 
48
defendant’s right to a jury drawn from the vicinage where the crimes were 
committed, and that the trial court’s denial of the motion violated defendant’s 
rights to “due process of law, fair trial, burden of proof, effective assistance of 
counsel, death eligibility and reliable determinations of guilt and penalty.” 
 
Although it is questionable whether the trial court was correct in 
determining that defendant, rather than defense counsel, possessed the 
“paramount” authority to decide whether a motion to reconsolidate the charges 
should have been proffered (see, e.g., People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 
935-939), even if the trial court erred in this determination we conclude that 
reversal of the judgment is not warranted because the error was not prejudicial.  
Had the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion to reconsolidate the Alameda 
and San Diego charges with the Los Angeles charges, there is no reasonable 
probability (or, for that matter, possibility) that defendant would have fared better 
in a consolidated trial involving these additional charges than he did in a trial of 
the Los Angeles charges alone.  Defendant presents no persuasive basis for 
concluding that a jury that imposed the death sentence for three murders would 
have imposed a lesser sentence if defendant had been charged in this proceeding 
with additional crimes, including murder. 
 
Defendant contends that a trial court’s error in failing to consolidate 
charges should be characterized as “structural error” that requires reversal without 
any showing of prejudice.  (See, e.g., People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 501-
502.)  Defendant presents no authority, however, to support the claim that a failure 
to consolidate charges arising from crimes committed in different counties 
constitutes structural error, and we conclude that the contention lacks merit.  
Although the severance of the Los Angeles charges from the San Diego and 
Alameda charges — on defendant’s own motion — resulted in defendant having 
to face two separate capital trials, in the absence of any showing how defendant 
was prejudiced in either trial it is clear that the failure to consolidate the cases did 
 
 
49
not undermine the basic fairness of either trial or warrant reversal of the 
judgment.21   
H. 
Pretrial Ruling Denying Exclusion of the Evidence Related to 
Kim or of the Testimony of Ray Blevins, Based on the 
Prosecution’s Failure to Timely Disclose Exculpatory Semen 
Evidence at the Kim Crime Scene 
 
On June 15, 1989, five days before the prosecution commenced the 
presentation of its case-in-chief, defendant moved for a mistrial or, alternatively, 
for exclusion of the evidence pertaining to the death of Tok Kim or of the 
testimony of her former boyfriend Ray Blevins, on the ground the prosecution had 
failed to timely provide the defense with a 1986 laboratory report generated by the 
Oakland Police Department.  The report indicated defendant was not the donor of 
semen found on a bedspread in Kim’s apartment.  Defendant argued that the 
prosecution’s failure to respond in a timely fashion to a February 19, 1988 
discovery order to produce any forensic evidence or related reports pertaining to 
the bedspread, coupled with Blevins’s death in 1987, precluded the defense from 
ascertaining whether Blevins was the donor of the semen.  In response, the 
prosecution argued that the report had not been timely disclosed because Oakland 
Police Department officials had failed to transfer it to the prosecutor and, in any 
event, the report was immaterial because the prosecution alleged that defendant 
had murdered Kim, not that he had raped her.  The trial court denied defendant’s 
motion in its entirety. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion, 
asserting that the laboratory report was “highly material.”  We review the matter 
                                              
21  
In view of our determination that the trial court’s denial of the motion to 
reconsolidate may not be set aside on appeal, we need not and do not address the 
broader question under what circumstances an intercounty reconsolidation order 
might be proper or improper. 
 
 
50
for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 957.)  No abuse 
of discretion appears.  When the report was provided to the defense, the 
prosecution had yet to present its case-in-chief, and the defense still had time to 
formulate a response to the evidence.  Moreover, as indicated above, a proffer of 
rape never had been part of the proffer of the other crimes evidence.  Rather, the 
relevance of the evidence pertaining to Kim’s death was twofold:  (1) to 
demonstrate a similarity in the circumstances of her death to the murders of Susan 
Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, pursuant to Evidence code section 1101, 
subdivision (b), and (2) to establish a link between defendant and the Los Angeles 
County murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie based upon the 
circumstances that Kim’s vehicle was parked outside the apartment occupied by 
Knoll and Mills, and that Mills’s vehicle, containing possessions belonging to 
each of the victims, was being driven by defendant at the time of his arrest.  The 
discovery of semen on Kim’s bedspread, and the report establishing that defendant 
had not been the donor of that fluid, was, at best, of marginal significance in the 
prosecution’s case against defendant with regard to the Los Angeles County 
murders.  Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecution’s belated 
disclosure of the laboratory report prior to the swearing-in of the jury and the 
introduction of evidence. 
 
Defendant makes the related assertion that the prosecutor misled the jury by 
arguing that the circumstances surrounding the deaths of each of the victims, 
including Tok Kim, had sexual assault as a common marker.  The record belies 
this claim.  In his closing summation to the jury, which was relatively brief in 
view of the number of crimes charged against defendant, the prosecutor did not 
assert that Kim had been raped or otherwise sexually assaulted, and instead made 
clear that only “two [victims] were raped” and that “[t]he evidence relating to 
Miss Kim [was] offered to you for your determination in how the defendant was 
 
 
51
involved in this and, if he was, how he relates to all of this.”  Later in his 
summation, the prosecutor asked, rhetorically if also ambiguously, “When did 
[defendant] form the intent to steal or to rape?  Was this, in the case of Miss Kim, 
which is not before you as a finding that you have to make, an afterthought?  
Certainly it’s possible.”  The fleeting reference to Kim in this context hardly 
suggested to the jury that defendant had sexually assaulted her; to the contrary, the 
prosecutor explicitly reminded the jury that it need not make any findings as to 
Kim.  Again, no prejudice appears. 
I. 
Pretrial Ruling Admitting the Alameda County Eyewitness 
Identifications 
 
As part of the police investigation following the discovery of Tok Kim’s 
body on April 13, 1984, Oakland Police Sergeant Raymond Conner prepared a 
photographic lineup containing defendant’s photograph as well as the photographs 
of five other individuals (members of the Oakland Police Department, shown 
wearing street clothes, without indicia of their occupation).  The lineup was shown 
to nine witnesses, eight of whom identified defendant as the man they saw with 
Kim, and one of whom alternated between selecting defendant’s image and that of 
one other individual depicted in the lineup.  The order in which the photographs 
were arranged was changed between presentations to the witnesses, who were 
separately shown the lineup.  At a pretrial proceeding, defendant moved to 
suppress the photographic identifications as having been the product of an unduly 
suggestive lineup.  Following an evidentiary hearing, in which Sergeant Conner 
testified, the court denied the motion, observing:  “[C]ertainly there are some 
differences, as there always are in photographs, but I don’t find that the 
photographic lineup was unduly suggestive.” 
On appeal, defendant renews his contention that the lineup was 
impermissibly suggestive, “resulting in a tainted in-court identification critical to 
 
 
52
the People’s case.”  He asserts the testimony given by several of these witnesses at 
trial deprived him of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process of 
law, a fair trial, confrontation, an impartial jury, and reliable determinations of 
guilt, death eligibility, and penalty.  Specifically, defendant contends:  (1) he was 
the only person whose photograph depicted an individual wearing an orange shirt 
that resembled a “jail jumpsuit”; (2) the photograph of defendant was of “booking-
photograph quality,” as distinguished from the Polaroid photographs of the other 
individuals depicted in the lineup; (3) upon identifying defendant’s photograph, 
the witnesses were asked to sign their names on the reverse side of the image, a 
technique that “subtl[y] . . . reinforce[d]” and tainted the witnesses’ identification 
of defendant. 
“ ‘In deciding whether an extrajudicial identification is so unreliable as to 
violate a defendant’s right to due process, the court must ascertain (1) “whether 
the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary,” and, if so, 
(2) whether the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances.  (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242.)’  (People v. 
Wash [1993] 6 Cal.4th [215,] at p. 244.)”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
312, 366-367.)  Whether we review deferentially or independently the trial court’s 
finding regarding suggestiveness (see id., at p. 367; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 1183, 1216-1217), defendant’s position lacks merit.   
 
Our review of the photographs contained in the lineup indicates that 
defendant overstates the significance of the distinguishing characteristics seen in 
the photographs, and overlooks their more compelling general similarities.  Each 
one of the six color photographs is approximately the same size, and depicts a 
middle-aged or somewhat younger adult male with a mustache and dark hair.  Two 
of the individuals are shown wearing white t-shirts, two are seen wearing light-
colored “dress” or “polo” shirts, one wears a plaid shirt, and one individual ― 
 
 
53
defendant ― is wearing an orange shirt.  Nothing about defendant’s shirt identifies 
it as a “jail jumpsuit” or any other type of jail-issued clothing, and even if it had, a 
conclusion that the lineup was unduly suggestive would not necessarily follow.  
(People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1217 [“The fact that defendant was the 
only person depicted in jail clothing  . . . was not unduly suggestive under the 
circumstances present here.”].)  The expressions exhibited by the individuals are 
roughly comparable: each has his eyes open and his mouth closed, except for one 
individual whose mouth is slightly parted.  Such distinctions are immaterial.  (Id., 
at p. 1217 [minor differences in facial hair among the participants in a photo 
lineup held not to be suggestive].)  Although the size of the white border around 
defendant’s photograph is slightly larger than the border seen on the Polaroid 
images, and the Polaroid images are glossy while the image of defendant is semi-
gloss, such trivial distinctions also are immaterial.  (Id., at p. 1217 [differences in 
background color and image size among the photographs held not to render the 
lineup impermissibly suggestive].)  The witnesses clearly were instructed to  
consider the persons depicted, not whether a particular image was potentially 
distinguishable from the others based upon variations in photographic composition 
or processing.22 
 
Nor do we attach significance to Sergeant Conner’s request that the 
witnesses write their names on the backs of the particular photographs they 
                                              
22  
Prior to viewing the photographs, the witnesses were admonished by 
Sergeant Conner:  “You’ll be asked to look at a group of photographs.  The fact 
that the photographs are shown to you should not influence your judgment.  You 
should not conclude or guess that the photographs contain the picture of the person 
that committed the crime.  You’re not obliged to identify anyone.  [¶]  It’s just as 
important to free innocent persons from suspicion as to identify guilty parties.  [¶]  
Please do not discuss the case with other witnesses or indicate in any way that you 
have or have not identified someone, other than to myself.”  
 
 
54
identified.  Although it would have been preferable to employ a more neutral 
recordation procedure ⎯ for example, one in which a witness did not discover 
upon selecting an individual from the lineup that other witnesses previously had 
identified the same person ⎯ we disagree with defendant that the procedure 
utilized by Conner was unduly suggestive or represented a “subtle method of 
reinforcement.”  Because the witnesses’ signatures were added only after each 
witness had made his or her selection, we find no basis for concluding that the 
witnesses were induced to identify defendant’s image.  (Compare People v. 
Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 411-413 [photographic identification of the 
defendant upheld notwithstanding the circumstance that his photograph was the 
only one taken in profile:  “ ‘A procedure is unfair which suggests in advance of 
identification by the witness the identity of the person suspected by the police.’ ”]  
(Italics added.) 
In sum, regardless of the applicable standard of review, we conclude that 
defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the photo identification 
procedure used here was unduly suggestive. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 
Cal.4th 312, 367.)  We therefore need not reach the question “whether the 
identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of circumstances.”  
(People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 366-367; see also People v. Ochoa, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 413; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1218.)23 
                                              
23  
Assuming for the sake of argument that the witnesses’ in-court 
identifications of defendant as the man whom they saw in Alameda County with 
Tok Kim were tainted by unduly suggestive identification procedures at the 
pretrial stage, any error clearly was harmless in view of other evidence that 
directly linked defendant to Kim and to the murder victims in Los Angeles and 
San Diego Counties.   
 
 
55
J. 
Pretrial Ruling Admitting Photographs and Testimony of 
Victims’ Relatives Identifying Victims’ Property 
At a pretrial hearing, defense counsel made several motions in limine  
pertaining to evidence involving the three Los Angeles County murder victims, 
Jillette Mills, Susan Knoll, and Bonnie Guthrie, as well as the San Diego County 
murder victim, Janette Cullins, and the Alameda County deceased woman Tok 
Kim.  Specifically, counsel offered a broad range of stipulations in an effort to 
prevent the prosecution from introducing exhibits depicting post-mortem 
photographs of the five individuals (including close-up images of various wounds) 
and testimony of family members as to the victims’ ownership of various items of 
personal property discovered in Mills’s Datsun 280 ZX.24 
Immediately prior to the parties’ opening statements, outside the jury’s 
presence, the defense renewed its offers to stipulate that on a certain date, Knoll 
and Mills died by strangulation.  Counsel argued that the stipulation “must be 
accepted,” emphasizing in particular the potentially prejudicial impact of one 
close-up photograph depicting a dark wound on the neck of Knoll’s body, an 
image that counsel described as “terribly disturbing and in my opinion 
prejudicial.”  Counsel further offered stipulations as to the testimony to be given 
by family members.  The prosecution rejected the proffered stipulations.  
At trial, defense counsel renewed the offer to stipulate that Knoll and Mills 
“died of strangulation” and, in view of the prosecution’s rejection of the proffered 
stipulations, counsel objected under Evidence Code section 352 to the introduction 
of two coroner’s photographs, one depicting the wound to Knoll’s neck, the other 
depicting bruises to Guthrie’s vaginal area.  The trial court overruled defendant’s 
                                              
24  
Defense counsel also requested, and the prosecutor agreed to, withdrawal of 
a photograph that depicted Kim when she was alive.  The prosecutor also 
withdrew photographs depicting Guthrie and Cullins when they were alive.  
 
 
56
objections to the introduction of the photographs, observing:  “I don’t feel that 
they’re disturbing to the point of being excludable.”25 
The trial court thereafter admitted the challenged photographic evidence 
and the testimony of various relatives identifying the items of personal property 
found in the Datsun 280 ZX.  
On appeal, defendant renews his challenge to the above-described evidence. 
He contends that because, in view of “the lack of substantive defense presented at 
[the] guilt phase, trial counsel were willing to stipulate to many facts they 
considered not in dispute,” including the strangulation of victims Knoll, Mills, and 
Guthrie and the victims’ ownership of the items found in the Datsun 280 ZX, the 
prosecution was required to accept the stipulations offered by the defense.  
Defendant further contends that the photographic evidence was unduly gruesome 
as well as cumulative, and that evidence pertaining to the personal property found 
in the car ⎯ that is, the “highly emotional” testimony given by Sandra Pender 
                                              
25  
The prosecution also introduced into evidence the following photographic 
evidence:  (1) two photographs depicting Kim’s clothed body lying face-down on 
the floor, each showing post-mortem discoloration on her arms; (2) three 
photographs showing the clothed bodies of Knoll and Mills stacked in their 
apartment bedroom closet; (3) two photographs showing Guthrie’s clothed body 
lying face-down on the floor of her apartment and one photograph showing her 
clothed body after investigators placed her on her back, revealing discoloration to 
her arms and face and a stain on the midsection area of her pants; (4) two 
coroner’s closeup photographs, each showing a portion of Guthrie’s body ⎯ one 
showing her discolored facial and neck area and wounds to her nose and lower lip, 
and one showing her bruised neck; (5) three photographs depicting Cullins’s 
partially clothed and discolored  body lying in her apartment bedroom closet, one 
of which showed a closeup of her stained left hand; (6) two  photographs, 
including one depicting Cullins’s partially clothed and discolored  body lying in 
the apartment bedroom closet, and one showing an apparent bloodstain on the 
bedding, and (7) one coroner’s closeup photograph depicting Cullins’s neck area, 
showing an abrasion, discoloration, and an apparent bloodstain on her jaw.   
 
 
57
(Susan Knoll’s sister), Jennifer Bollman (Jillette Mills’s sister), and George 
Cullins (Janette Cullins’s father) ⎯ “was clearly the subject of stipulation or other 
available procedures, such as identification by police personnel.”  Defendant 
assigns further error to the trial court’s failure to engage in a weighing process as 
to the admissibility of the photographs in response to defendant’s objection on 
Evidence Code section 352 grounds.  Finally, defendant asserts that he was denied 
various of his state and federal constitutional rights because of “the trial court’s 
erroneous rulings admitting inflammatory and prejudicial autopsy and family 
evidence [regarding the items found in the car].” 
As we shall explain, none of defendant’s contentions have merit. 
We recently set forth the applicable analysis in People v. Heard (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 946:  “In reviewing the ruling of the trial court, we reiterate the well-
established principle that ‘the admissibility of this evidence has two components:  
(1) whether the challenged evidence satisfied the “relevancy” requirement set forth 
in Evidence Code section 210, and (2) if the evidence was relevant, whether the 
trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in finding that 
the probative value of the [evidence] was not substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue 
prejudice.’  (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13.)”  (People v. Heard, supra, 
31 Cal.3d at p. 972.) We address these issues in turn. 
1. 
Relevance of the Photographs and Testimony of 
Relatives 
“ ‘The rules pertaining to the admissibility of photographic evidence are 
well-settled.  Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 350; People v. 
Crittenden[, supra,] 9 Cal.4th 83, 132; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 
176-177; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681), and all relevant evidence 
is admissible unless excluded under the federal or California Constitution or by 
 
 
58
statute.  (Evid. Code, § 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).)  Relevant 
evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence “having any 
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action.”  The test of relevance is whether the evidence 
tends “ ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material 
facts such as identity, intent, or motive.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Garceau, supra, 
6 Cal.4th at p. 177.)  The trial court has broad discretion in determining the 
relevance of evidence (ibid.; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 132; 
People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 681) but lacks discretion to admit 
irrelevant evidence.  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 132; People v. 
Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 527.)’  (People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 
13-14.)”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 972-973.) 
In his opening brief, defendant does not challenge the relevance of the 
photographs depicting the deceased women, although in his reply brief he adopts a 
more critical stance.  Defendant’s ambivalent position is inconsequential.  The 
images plainly were relevant to the proceedings at the guilt phase of trial (People 
v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 973-975 [and cases cited therein]), as well as at 
the penalty phase, to demonstrate circumstances in aggravation.  (People v. 
Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 182.) Nor does defendant clearly assert a 
relevancy challenge to the testimony regarding the property found within the 
Datsun 280 ZX, although his characterization of that testimony as being of 
“minimal probative value,” which in his reply brief is amplified to “irrelevant, 
cumulative, and prejudicial,” could be construed as a challenge to its relevancy.  
To the extent defendant’s characterization constitutes a relevance-based challenge, 
we reject it ⎯ the testimony linking the property to the women clearly fell within 
Evidence Code section 210’s definition, and was not cumulative.  (See People v. 
Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 973-975 [and cases cited therein].)  
 
 
59
2. 
The Photographs and Testimony Were Not Unduly 
Prejudicial   
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude 
this evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.  Defendant maintains the 
photographs were gruesome and cumulative.  He further contends the testimony 
given by relatives of Knoll, Mills, and Cullins was “highly emotional [and] 
outweighed the minimal probative value of such testimony.”  The People disagree 
with defendant’s characterizations and contend the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the probative value of the photographs and the testimony 
outweighed any potential prejudice.  As we shall explain, we find no abuse of 
discretion.  
“The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion 
of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or 
inflammatory.  [Citations.]  The court’s exercise of that discretion will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is 
outweighed by their prejudicial effect.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Crittenden (1994)  
9 Cal.4th 83, 133-134.)   
The photographs at issue “served to illustrate and corroborate the testimony 
given by various prosecution witnesses regarding the circumstances of the 
crime[s].”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 976.)  “ ‘[I]nsofar as 
defendant is contending that the trial court was required to exclude the 
photograph[s] under Evidence Code section 352 because th[e] physical evidence 
was cumulative of the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court correctly 
rejected defendant’s argument.  (See People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938 
[“ ‘[W]e have often rejected the argument that photographs of a murder victim 
should be excluded as cumulative if the facts for which the photographs are 
offered have been established by testimony.’ ”]; accord, People v. Kaurish (1990) 
 
 
60
52 Cal.3d 648, 684; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 115.)’  (People v. 
Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 19.)”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 976.)   
As to whether the photographs or the testimony in question had an unduly 
prejudicial effect, we observe that “ ‘[w]e have described the “prejudice” referred 
to in Evidence Code section 352 as characterizing evidence that uniquely tends to 
evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual, while having only slight 
probative value with regard to the issues.  (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
140, 178.)  As we previously have observed, victim photographs and other graphic 
items of evidence in murder cases always are disturbing.  (People v. Hendricks 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 594.)’  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 134; 
accord, People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 223.)”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 
Cal. 4th at p. 976.)  Here, the challenged photographs depict the wounds suffered 
by Knoll and Guthrie; “that they are graphic and unpleasant to consider does not 
render the introduction of those images unduly prejudicial.  (See People v. 
Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 496 [rejecting the defendant’s contention that the 
‘sexually suggestive nature’ of  photographs taken of the victim rendered them 
unduly prejudicial, and holding that ‘[w]hen the victim of a murder has been 
stabbed directly between the breasts and left with her pants and underwear around 
her ankles, the defendant cannot complain that the jury is exposed to images of her 
nudity.’]; see also People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1194 [‘The fact that the 
exhibits involved blood was due to the crime, not the court’s rulings.’].)”  (People 
v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 976.)  
 
Our independent review of the photographs introduced at the trial 
convinces us that, although they are unpleasant, they are not unduly gory or 
inflammatory.  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977; People v. 
McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 998; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 
531-532; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 590-592; People v. Pride, 
 
 
61
supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243, People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 223; People v. 
Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 963; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 707; 
People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 776.)  “The photographs . . . do not 
appear to be of the sort that might inflame a jury.  (See, e.g., People v. Turner 
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 320, 321, and fn. 9, overruled on another ground in People 
v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1149-1150 [upholding trial court’s finding 
that four crime scene photographs, which included a photograph of one victim’s 
head in a large pool of blood and of another victim lying face up with bleeding 
wounds, were ‘not gruesome’]; see also People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 
1258 [victims’ bodies were not depicted ‘in a badly decomposed condition . . . or 
after they had been grossly disfigured during autopsy’].)”  (People v. Heard, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 977.) 
Further, “as we observed in People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 20, ‘the 
trial court clearly and properly could find that the photograph[s were] not so 
gruesome as to have impermissibly swayed the jury “in light of the testimony 
detailing each and every fact relating to the crime scene and victims.” ’  Certain 
“witnesses for the prosecution testified in detail as to what they observed when 
they first encountered [the bodies].  (See People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 
1258 [observing that the inflammatory nature of nine photographs ‘was relatively 
slight in comparison with the heinous nature of the crime presented to the jury 
through the testimony of witnesses’].)” (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 
977.)  The jurors having heard that testimony, the photographic images taken of 
the victims once their bodies had been taken to the coroner’s facility were unlikely 
to have elicited an improper response from the jurors.   
Nor were the photographs unduly prejudicial on the ground they were 
cumulative by reason of their corroboration of facts independently established by 
testimony.  (See, e.g., People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 977-978, and 
 
 
62
cases cited therein.)  Similarly, although the testimony of the victims’ friends and 
family members identifying objects found in the Datsun 280 ZX may have been 
punctuated with emotion that is not unexpected in a capital trial (for example, 
Mills’s sister, Jennifer Bollman, cried during her testimony), such testimony was 
not unduly prejudicial in view of the expression of that emotion or because 
ownership of the identified items might have been established by stipulation or 
other means.  The circumstance that the defense might have preferred that the 
prosecution establish a particular fact by stipulation, rather than by live testimony, 
does not alter the probative value of such testimony or render it unduly prejudicial.  
The prosecution was not required to accept such a stipulation or other “sanitized” 
method of presenting its case.  (People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 182; see 
also People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 
Cal.4th 83, 133.)  
Moreover, as was the situation in People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 
978, “even if the photographs engendered a disturbing response among the jurors, 
we believe the risk defendant would be prejudiced by that response was minimal, 
because the jury knew defendant had committed the acts described by the 
witnesses who had appeared before them.”  We believe that risk, as well as the 
risk that jurors somehow might have been improperly moved by the testimony of 
friends and family members toward a guilty verdict, was further minimized here 
by the circumstance that the defense at the guilt phase rested without calling a 
single witness.   
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court reasonably determined that the 
probative value of the photographic and testimonial evidence outweighed its 
potentially prejudicial effect.  Although, in the interest of creating a clearer record, 
the court could have been more explicit in setting forth its reasoning in denying 
defendant’s motions and overruling defense objections relating to the challenged 
 
 
63
evidence (see People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 25 [“the record must 
affirmatively show that the trial judge did affirmatively weigh prejudice against 
probative value”], we are persuaded that the court engaged in a deliberative 
weighing process and acted within its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 
in admitting the photographic and testimonial evidence.  (People v. Heard, supra, 
31 Cal.4th at p. 978; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 134; People v. 
Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 656; 
People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 666; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 
786.)   
3. 
Even if the Trial Court Had Erred, No Prejudice Would 
Have Occurred 
“Even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court erred in 
admitting the photographic [or testimonial] evidence in question, we nonetheless 
would conclude that any error in admitting such evidence was harmless under the 
Watson standard.”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 978; People v. Allen, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1258, applying the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.)   
“Under the Watson standard, the erroneous admission of a photograph 
warrants reversal of a conviction only if the appellate court concludes that it is 
reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different result had the 
photograph been excluded.  (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)”  
(People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  The photographic evidence at issue 
did not disclose to the jury any information that was not presented through the 
testimony of witnesses; the testimonial evidence merely established that items of 
property found in the Datsun 280 ZX belonged to certain victims, thereby helping 
to establish a link between defendant and those victims.  Although the 
photographic and testimonial evidence may have been unpleasant for the jury to 
 
 
64
confront, it was not unusually disturbing or unduly gruesome, and was no more 
inflammatory than the testimony provided by other witnesses for the prosecution 
(such as the medical examiners, who offered their expert opinions as to the 
victims’ suffering during the fatal strangulations).  “Under these circumstances, 
we conclude it is not reasonably probable that the admission of the photograph[ic 
and testimonial evidence] affected the jury’s verdict.”  (People v. Heard, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 978, citing People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 625; People v. 
Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1258.) 
K. Pretrial Ruling Admitting Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
Given by Witness Ray Blevins 
Tok Kim’s former boyfriend, Ray Blevins, testified at defendant’s 
preliminary hearing that he saw Kim and defendant together at midday on or 
“around” April 1, 1984.  Blevins also identified certain objects as being similar to 
those he had seen in Kim’s apartment.  Some of these objects were seized in the 
search of the Datsun 280 ZX that defendant was driving at the time of his arrest.  
Defendant’s attorney at the preliminary hearing briefly cross-examined Blevins.  
Several months later, but prior to the commencement of defendant’s trial, Blevins 
died. 
In pretrial proceedings, defendant moved to exclude from his trial the 
testimony given by Blevins at the preliminary hearing “on the ground that the lack 
of any meaningful cross-examination denied [defendant] his Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation, and prevent[ed] him from presenting any effective defense 
to the events in Alameda County.”  The motion was denied.  On the eve of trial, 
defendant renewed the motion to exclude this testimony, and that motion again 
was denied.  At trial, the prosecution read into the record Blevins’s testimony 
given at the preliminary hearing. 
 
 
65
On appeal, defendant contends the admission of Blevins’s testimony 
violated Evidence Code section 1291, as well as defendant’s right of confrontation 
under the state and federal Constitutions.  Specifically, defendant asserts the court 
should have excluded the testimony because at the preliminary hearing defense 
counsel made “no effort . . . to focus on Blevins as a third-party suspect in Kim’s 
murder,” despite counsel’s knowledge that Blevins and Kim had argued bitterly 
just prior to her death.  According to defendant, Blevins’s prior testimony should 
have been found inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291 “because 
there had been no meaningful cross-examination by [defense counsel] at [the] 
preliminary hearing, and therefore no adequate showing the preliminary hearing 
testimony was reliable.”  Defendant, however, misconstrues the applicable law. 
A criminal defendant has a constitutionally guaranteed right to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him or her.  (U.S. Const., Amends VI, XIV; 
Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403-405.)  The right of confrontation is not 
absolute, however, and may “in appropriate cases” bow to other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process.  (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 
284, 295; accord Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722.)  An exception to the 
confrontation requirement exists where the witness is unavailable, has given 
testimony at a previous judicial proceeding against the same defendant, and was 
subject to cross-examination by that defendant.  (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
541 U.S. 36, 59; Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 722; accord People v. 
Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 339-348; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
505, 515; see also California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 167-168 [where a 
defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at the time of his or 
her prior testimony, that testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the 
confrontation requirement].)  Further, the federal Constitution guarantees an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not a cross-examination that is as 
 
 
66
effective as a defendant might prefer.  (United States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 
554, 559.) 
California permits the use of the prior testimony of a witness against a 
criminal defendant only when the unavailability of the witness and the reliability 
of the testimony are established.  (§ 686; Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).)  A 
witness is deemed unavailable if he or she is deceased.  (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. 
(a)(3).)  The testimony is deemed reliable if “[t]he party against whom the former 
testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony 
was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with 
an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1291, subd. (a)(2).) 
“In People v. Zapien [1993] 4 Cal.4th 929, 975, this court recognized that 
the ‘[a]dmission of the former testimony of an unavailable witness is permitted 
under Evidence Code section 1291 and does not offend the confrontation clauses 
of the federal or state Constitutions — not because the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at the preliminary hearing is considered an exact substitute 
for the right of confrontation at trial [citation], but because the interests of justice 
are deemed served by a balancing of the defendant’s right to effective cross-
examination against the public’s interest in effective prosecution.’  The court 
further determined that a defendant’s motive in cross-examining a witness at a 
preliminary hearing may differ somewhat from the motive at trial, but nevertheless 
the earlier testimony may be admissible at the trial under section 1291 because the 
‘motives need not be identical, only “similar.” ’  (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at p. 975, citing People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 784 [15 
Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192].)  Following similar reasoning and principles, in 
People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290] the 
court held the defendant’s interest and motive in cross-examining the alleged rape 
 
 
67
victim at the preliminary hearing in a prior unrelated criminal prosecution was 
sufficiently similar to the defendant’s interest and motive at the penalty phase of a 
subsequent capital trial to warrant the admission of the preliminary hearing 
testimony under Evidence Code section 1291.  (53 Cal.3d at p. 589.)”  (People v. 
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 850.) 
 
In the present case, defendant’s motive and interest in cross-examining 
Blevins at the preliminary hearing were closely similar, if not identical to, 
defendant’s objectives at the guilt phase of the trial — namely, to attempt to 
discredit the prosecution’s theory as to the date on which defendant initially 
encountered Tok Kim (in turn, suggesting that someone other than defendant 
encountered Kim at the Lafayette bar on the evening of April 1, 1984).  The record 
indicates that at the preliminary hearing, defense counsel sought to establish that 
Blevins saw defendant and Kim together around midday April 1, 1984, several 
hours prior to the time the prosecution’s other witnesses placed the pair together 
initially.   
 
In view of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly, if implicitly, 
concluded that defendant’s “motive and interest” in cross-examining Blevins at the 
preliminary hearing and at the trial were sufficiently similar to satisfy the 
requirements of Evidence Code section 1291. 
 
Defendant further contends the admission of Blevins’s preliminary hearing 
testimony violated defendant’s federal constitutional right of confrontation, 
because defense counsel’s brief cross-examination constituted incompetent 
representation.  We disagree.  As we previously have explained:  “as long as a 
defendant was provided the opportunity for cross-examination, the admission of 
preliminary hearing testimony under Evidence Code section 1291 does not offend 
the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution simply because the defendant 
did not conduct a particular form of cross-examination that in hindsight might 
 
 
68
have been more effective.”  (People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th 795, 851; see 
also People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th  929, 975; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 742, 784 [the requirement that the party have a similar interest and motive 
is satisfied notwithstanding the decision of defense counsel to alter the nature or 
scope of cross-examination].)   
It is undisputed that at the time of trial, Blevins was dead and thus  
unavailable as a witness.  Blevins’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, where 
defendant had an interest and motive to cross-examine him similar to what 
defendant had at the trial, therefore was admissible.  The trial court did not err in 
permitting the prosecution to introduce that testimony against defendant at trial. 
II. JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A. Defendant’s Challenge to the Jury Selection Procedures 
Defendant contends the jury selection procedures employed at his trial were 
improper, mandating a reversal of the judgment.  Specifically, he contends:  
(1) the trial court failed to administer the oath of truthfulness on penalty of perjury 
to 28 prospective jurors, (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by interposing 
improper objections to defense counsel’s voir dire examination, resulting in the 
improper restriction of voir dire, and (3) the trial court erred in denying a number 
of challenges for cause and also abused its discretion by denying defendant 
peremptory challenges in addition to the 20 specified in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 231, subdivision (a). 
Although defendant’s initial contention is correct insofar as he asserts the 
trial court erred in failing to administer the oath to prospective jurors, for the 
reasons set forth below we conclude that defendant has failed to establish 
prejudice and that none of defendant’s other contentions has merit. 
 
 
69
1. The Oath of Truthfulness on Penalty of Perjury 
Administered to Prospective Jurors 
On March 20-21, 1989, the trial court commenced jury selection by 
screening one panel of prospective jurors.  On March 27, 1989, the court screened 
a second panel.  On May 1-2, 1989, the court screened a third panel.  With regard 
to the latter two panels of prospective jurors, the trial court apparently failed to 
administer the oath to prospective jurors mandated by former Code of Civil 
Procedure section 232, subdivision (a).26  Defendant moved for a mistrial or, 
alternatively, to excuse the 28 prospective jurors who had not been given the oath 
at the commencement of the voir dire examination.  The court denied these 
motions.  
After conducting further voir dire examination, the prosecution and the 
defense both informed the court that the jury as constituted was acceptable.  At 
that point, the court administered the oath to jurors mandated by Code of Civil 
Procedure section 232, subdivision (b).27  According to defendant, 14 of the 
                                              
26  
Former Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a) provided:  
“Prior to the examination of prospective trial jurors in the panel assigned for voir 
dire, the following acknowledgement shall be administered to the panel, which 
shall be acknowledged by the prospective jurors with the statement ‘I do’:   
 
“ ‘You do, and each of you, understand and agree that you will accurately  
and truthfully answer, under penalty of perjury, all questions propounded to you 
concerning your qualifications and competency to serve as a trial juror in the 
matter pending before this court; and that failure to do so may subject you to 
criminal prosecution.’ ”   
27  
Former Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (b) provided:  “As 
soon as the selection of the trial jury is completed, the following 
acknowledgement and agreement shall be obtained from the trial jurors, which 
shall be acknowledged by the statement ‘I do’: 
 
“ ‘You do, and each of you understand and agree that you will well and 
truly try the cause now pending before this court, and a true verdict render 
according only to the evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the 
court.’ ” 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
70
prospective jurors who were not administered the oath prescribed by Code of Civil 
Procedure section 232, subdivision (a) for prospective jurors at the outset of the 
voir dire examination became actual jurors or alternates. 
Defendant contends the trial court’s error at the commencement of the voir 
dire process in failing to administer the oath of truthfulness to the prospective 
jurors who comprised the second and third panels was a “structural defect” and  
therefore was reversible per se, citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 
307-309, and People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 502; see also People v. Pelton 
(1934) 116 Cal.App.Supp. 789, 791 [holding that a conviction by an unsworn jury 
renders the verdict “a nullity justifying a reversal”].) 
We disagree with defendant’s position.  First, neither Arizona v. 
Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. 279 (holding that the harmless-error rule applies to 
erroneously admitted coerced confessions), nor People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 
478 (holding that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession does not require 
automatic reversal under California law), addressed the juror-oath question 
presented here and therefore are unhelpful to defendant’s case.  The fundamental 
or “structural” defects discussed in those decisions consisted of significant 
irregularities, unlike the present situation, where the trial court partially but not 
fully complied with the oath-giving provisions set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 232.  (See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 309-310; People 
v. Cahill, supra, 4 Cal.4th 501-502.)  Similarly, the decision in People v. Pelton, 
supra, 116 Cal.App.Supp. 789, unlike the present case, involved the trial court’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
The Legislature slightly amended subsections (a), and (b) of the statute 
shortly after defendant’s trial, but these modifications have no bearing upon the 
issues that confront us in the present case.  (Amend. by Stats. 1989, c. 1416, § 10.)   
 
 
71
failure to administer the oath to jurors mandated by Code of Civil Procedure 
section 232, subdivision (b).  These decisions do not support defendant’s assertion 
that the trial court’s failure to administer the oath of truthfulness to prospective 
jurors, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a), 
constitutes a structural defect.  Indeed, although empanelling one or more jurors 
who are actually biased against the defense would constitute structural error (In re 
Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 654, citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 
U.S. 279, 309), here the trial court’s error in failing to swear some of the 
prospective jurors has not been shown to have resulted in the inclusion of any 
biased jurors on the panel, and defendant’s claim of structural error fails for that 
reason.  
Second, although there is a dearth of California case law examining the 
factual situation presented here, our decision in an analogous case, People v. Lewis 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 629-631, is instructive.  In Lewis, we addressed the 
question whether the trial court erred in failing to administer the oath to 
prospective jurors prior to their answering written questionnaires regarding their 
views on the death penalty and other matters.  (Id., at p. 629.)  Observing that the 
prospective jurors had signed their questionnaires under penalty of perjury and 
were sworn under Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a), prior to 
being personally questioned in open court, we held that although the defendant 
was “correct that prospective jurors should have been sworn under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 232[, subdivision (a),] before filling out the questionnaires, he 
fails to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to administer the 
oath at that juncture.  [Citations.]”  (Id., at pp. 630-631; see also People v. Cruz 
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 69, 72-74 [no prejudicial error where the oath taken 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (b), did not ask the 
jurors to agree to follow the instructions of the court].)   
 
 
72
For similar reasons as those found in Lewis, we reject defendant’s assertion 
of prejudicial error here.  Although the trial court omitted giving the first oath, the 
jury ultimately was instructed as to its duty to follow the trial court’s instructions 
and was presumed to have performed its official duty, and defendant has failed to 
establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to administer the 
required oath at the outset of questioning some of the prospective jurors.  We 
further observe that, as in People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th 610, 629-631, the 
prospective jurors each filled out a juror questionnaire that was signed under 
penalty of perjury, a circumstance that undoubtedly impressed upon the 
prospective jurors the gravity of the matter before them and the importance of 
being truthful and thereby ameliorated at least in part the trial court’s failure to 
timely administer the oath set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 232, 
subdivision (a).  In view of the virtual certainty that these prospective jurors 
understood that they were required to answer truthfully the questionnaires, we 
reasonably may infer that the same prospective jurors similarly understood that 
they were required to respond truthfully to the questions posed during the voir dire 
examination ― much of which was essentially a follow-up to the prospective 
jurors’ answers given in response to the questions set forth in the questionnaires.   
Accordingly, on these facts we believe the jury understood that it was 
required to answer truthfully the questions posed during the voir dire examination.  
We therefore conclude the court’s error in not administering the oath to some of 
the prospective jurors was not prejudicial to defendant. 
2. 
Prosecutor’s Objections to Defense Counsel’s Questions 
During Voir Dire 
In the course of defense counsel’s examination of eight prospective jurors, 
the prosecutor interposed objections on the ground that counsel’s questions asked 
the prospective jurors to “prejudge” the case.  None of these eight individuals 
 
 
73
became a member of defendant’s jury (although one individual was selected as an 
alternate juror).  Prior to the parties’ presentation of their respective cases, 
defendant moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, for excusal of the prospective 
jurors, asserting that the prosecutor’s objections impeded and disrupted counsel’s 
voir dire examination.  The trial court denied the motion.   
On appeal, defendant reiterates his contention that the prosecutor 
impermissibly interfered with defense counsel’s voir dire examination of the 
prospective jurors and on that basis contends the trial court erred in denying his 
motion.  He is mistaken; our review of the voir dire examination of the prospective 
jurors in question reveals that the prosecution’s objections to defense counsel’s 
questions were proper.  The two passages of the hearing transcript cited by 
defendant as examples of the prosecutor’s objections reveal no impropriety on the 
part of the prosecutor: 
“[Defense counsel]:  ‘Then, is it fair to say that if indeed the opposite were 
true, that is, it was not only not exemplary but there were other ⎯ there was 
evidence of other activity ⎯  criminal activity, that in that situation it would be 
difficult to see anything other than a death verdict?’ 
“[Prosecutor]:  ‘Excuse me.  I object.  It asks the juror to prejudge the 
evidence.’ 
“The court:  ‘Objection sustained.’ 
[¶] . . . [¶] 
“[Defense counsel]:  ‘. . . .  It would be some amount of extraordinary 
background evidence of an exemplary nature before you could even consider it?’ 
“[Prosecutor]:  ‘Just a moment please.  Now, I have an objection and it asks 
the juror to prejudge.’ 
“[Defense counsel]:  ‘I would ask the [prospective] juror to go outside.’ ” 
 
 
74
To the contrary, insofar as defense counsel’s questions sought to ascertain 
the prospective jurors’ views as to hypothetical cases not before the court, they 
were improper and the court acted within its discretion in prohibiting such 
questioning.  (People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 646.)  Insofar as counsel’s 
questions sought to commit a prospective juror to vote in a certain way given a 
particular set of facts, the questions similarly were improper.  (See People v. 
Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408 [“We reaffirm that it is not ‘a function of the 
examination of prospective jurors to educate the jury panel to the particular facts 
of the case, to compel the jurors to commit themselves to vote a particular way, to 
prejudice the jury for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate 
the jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law.’ ”].) 
Moreover, even were we to conclude that the prosecution’s objections were 
improper, any error clearly would be harmless in view of the circumstance that 
none of the eight prospective jurors became a member of defendant’s jury. 
3. 
Peremptory Challenges 
During jury selection, defendant challenged for cause prospective jurors 
Hickert, Kotz, Hughes, MacDonald, Craddock, Richards, Swope, and Humphrey.  
The trial court denied each of these challenges.  Although prospective juror 
Craddock was selected as an alternate juror, none of these individuals was 
impaneled as a member of defendant’s jury.  After exercising 18 out of the 20 
peremptory challenges available to it, the defense informed the court that the jury 
as constituted was acceptable.  The prosecution similarly indicated its acceptance 
of the jury. 
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error under the 
federal and state Constitutions in denying the challenges to excuse the above-
named prospective jurors based upon their views regarding the death penalty.  
 
 
75
(See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 423-424; U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th 
& 14th Amends., Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 7, subd. (a) (15, 16).  As noted, however, 
when the defense accepted the jury, it had not exhausted all of its peremptory 
challenges. 
“In order successfully to claim error in the denial of a challenge for cause 
of a prospective juror, a defendant on appeal must demonstrate that the ruling 
affected his or her right to a fair and impartial jury.”  (People v. Horton (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 1068, 1093; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 121; People v. 
Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 174.)  Because defendant exercised peremptory 
challenges to remove the prospective jurors whom he unsuccessfully had 
challenged for cause, these individuals could not have compromised the 
impartiality of the jury.  As a result, “under Witt, [defendant] cannot claim 
constitutional error based upon the trial court’s denial of those challenges for 
cause.”  (People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal 4th at p. 1093; see also People v. 
Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1211.)  Indeed, “[i]t is well-settled that even if the 
trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to remove a juror for cause, that 
error will be considered harmless if ‘[n]one of the prospective jurors whom 
defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.’ ”  (People v. Hawkins 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939.)  “Moreover, defendant did not communicate to the 
trial court any dissatisfaction with the jury selected.”  (Ibid.) 
In sum, defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated, and any 
error by the trial court in denying defendant’s motions to exclude the above-
mentioned members of the jury venire for cause would not have been prejudicial.  
 
 
76
(See People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1093; People v. Hawkins, supra, 
10 Cal.4th 920, 939.)28   
III. JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES  
A. 
Instructions Regarding the Las Vegas Evidence and Evidence 
of “Flight” 
At the outset of trial, and outside the jury’s presence, the defense moved to 
exclude certain items that were recovered from the Datsun 280 ZX subsequent to 
defendant’s arrest.  These items included: a glass cup bearing the words “Silver 
City Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada,” a booklet of casino coupons (characterized by 
the prosecutor as “drink tickets”) with one ticket bearing the word “void” and 
“4/17/84” (the date of defendant’s arrest), and a key with an attached green token 
identifying the Westward Ho Casino (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred 
to as “the Las Vegas evidence”).  Defendant contended that the Las Vegas 
evidence was irrelevant and, even if relevant, unduly prejudicial as being 
improperly suggestive of a lack of remorse by defendant.  In response, the 
prosecutor asserted that the listed items were relevant because they were recovered 
from the vehicle defendant was driving when arrested and established the route 
defendant had taken following his commission of the charged offenses.  The 
defense offered to stipulate as to the route taken by defendant in the days leading 
up to his arrest in Arizona, but the prosecution declined to accept the stipulation.  
The trial court overruled defendant’s objections to the introduction of the Las 
                                              
28  
On June 19, 1989, the day set for trial to commence, the defense requested 
that the trial court grant three peremptory challenges in addition to the twenty 
prescribed by statute.  (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a).)  As indicated 
above, however, defendant had not exhausted all 20 of the challenges available to 
him.  The trial court denied the request.  On appeal, defendant assigns error, but 
we previously have rejected virtually identical claims (see, e.g., People v. Pride 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230-231) and do so again here.   
 
 
77
Vegas evidence, which briefly was identified at trial through the testimony of 
Sergeant Gary McEwen. 
Immediately prior to the parties’ closing arguments, defendant renewed his 
objection to the introduction of the Las Vegas evidence on the grounds of lack of 
relevancy and undue prejudice.  (See Evid. Code, §§  210, 352.)  The trial court 
granted defendant’s motion, finding that as to the Las Vegas evidence, “I didn’t 
feel that they were probative of any disputed fact.  [¶]  The fact remains that the 
defendant was in Arizona heading eastbound and was not in California, and the 
fact that he may or may not have gone through Las Vegas I did not feel had any 
relevance and was not probative.”29 
Defendant moved for a mistrial based upon the trial court’s finding that the 
Las Vegas evidence erroneously had been introduced into evidence.  Alternatively, 
the defense requested that the court admonish the jury with a curative instruction.  
The court denied the motion for a mistrial, but admonished the jury as follows: 
“We’ve had a lot of exhibits marked.  Not all of them were received [into 
evidence].  [¶]  You’re instructed to disregard exhibits 21 through 23 [the Las 
Vegas evidence].  It’s a drinking glass, coupons, key chain and a key.  Also 
Exhibit 4-E, which was a kitchen knife and the tape cassettes that were inside 
Exhibit 14, which was a gray Lancome Bag.  [¶]  You must also disregard any 
testimony about those things, and they should play no part in your thoughts or 
deliberations.” 
                                              
29  
The trial court also granted defendant’s motion to exclude certain other 
items introduced into evidence, including a knife found inside the pocket of the 
black jacket retrieved from the Datsun 280 ZX, and a tote bag identified as having 
belonged to Janette Cullins, containing audio cassette tapes.  
 
 
78
Although agreeing with defendant as to the asserted irrelevancy of the Las 
Vegas evidence, the trial court stopped short of prohibiting the prosecution from 
arguing to the jury that in its deliberations the jury could consider defendant’s 
“flight” from California.  Indeed, the trial court made clear that exclusion of the 
Las Vegas evidence “does not take away flight as an issue. . . .”  Ultimately, the 
prosecutor did argue defendant’s flight as demonstrating consciousness of guilt.  
When the trial court read its instructions to the jury, however, the court did not 
read CALJIC No. 2.52, the standard instruction pertaining to flight.  Outside the 
presence of the jury, the prosecutor commented:  “I noticed in your honor’s 
reading of the instructions that there was no [CALJIC] No. 2.52 instruction which 
I had requested and which I thought I saw in the instructions when we went 
through them the other day.”  The prosecutor added that he was not asking that the 
jury be brought back to hear the court read CALJIC No. 2.52, but requested that 
the instruction be included with the written packet of instructions given to the jury.  
The defense objected to the giving of the instruction on the grounds that the 
defense did not contest the circumstance that defendant was arrested in Arizona, 
and that the omitted instruction focused the jury’s attention on the Las Vegas 
evidence that the court ultimately had deemed irrelevant.  The trial court overruled 
the objection, finding that the prosecution was “entitled to the instruction,” which 
was inserted into the packet with the other instructions. 
On appeal, defendant contends reversal is warranted on the grounds that 
introduction of the Las Vegas evidence was unduly prejudicial, the trial court’s 
curative instruction was inadequate, and the court’s instruction as to flight was 
violative of defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we reject each of these contentions. 
Defendant asserts that to the extent the irrelevant Las Vegas evidence was 
indicative of a lack of remorse on defendant’s part, it was violative of his state and 
 
 
79
federal constitutional rights to “due process of law, fair trial, burden of proof, 
death eligibility, and reliable guilt and penalty phase determinations,” and that the 
introduction of such evidence was prejudicial because “it create[d] the likelihood a 
non-statutory factor in aggravation will be considered by the jury in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment’s” proscription against vague and unreliable penalty 
determinations.  We disagree.  In view of the trivial nature of the Las Vegas 
evidence relative to the other evidence presented by the prosecution at the guilt 
and penalty phases, the trial court’s clear and comprehensive admonition to the 
jury to disregard that evidence, and the substantial evidence supporting the jury’s 
guilt and penalty phase determinations, we conclude that the trial court’s curative 
instruction was adequate and that any error in admitting the Las Vegas evidence 
could not have been unduly prejudicial.  
Defendant further asserts “[t]here was no evidence of consciousness of guilt 
to warrant a flight instruction.”  In support of this contention, defendant argues 
that there was no evidence he fled immediately after the commission of the 
charged offenses, that during his travels in the several days leading up to his arrest 
in Arizona he had not been confronted with (and therefore could not have fled 
from) the charges filed against him, and that at every point during his detention 
and arrest in Arizona he was cooperative.  Defendant maintains that in view of 
these circumstances, the trial court erred in furnishing the jury with a written copy 
of CALJIC No. 2.52. 
We reject defendant’s contention.  Section 1127c requires a trial court in 
any criminal proceeding to instruct as to flight where evidence of flight is relied 
upon as tending to show guilt.30  CALJIC No. 2.52, which is derived from section 
                                              
30  
Section 1127c provides:  “In any criminal trial or proceeding where 
evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to show guilt, the court 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
80
1127c, advises the jury “that evidence of flight alone is insufficient to establish 
guilt, but may be considered with other proven facts in deciding the question of 
guilt or innocence.”  (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60.)  Contrary to 
defendant’s position, the instruction neither requires knowledge on a defendant’s 
part that criminal charges have been filed, nor a defined temporal period within 
which the flight must be commenced, nor resistance upon arrest.  (Ibid.)  In view 
of the evidence introduced by the prosecution establishing that defendant left 
California in the days immediately following the charged offenses and was in 
possession of the vehicle belonging to murder victim Jillette Mills when he was 
arrested in Arizona, the flight instruction plainly was warranted here.  (Ibid. [a jury 
could infer that the defendant’s flight reflected consciousness of guilt].)  As noted, 
the instruction merely permitted the jury to consider evidence of flight in deciding 
defendant’s guilt or innocence; it did not suggest that the jury should consider 
such evidence as dispositive.  
Moreover, even if we were to conclude the instruction should not have been 
given, any error would have been harmless.  The instruction did not assume that 
flight was established, but instead permitted the jury to make that factual 
determination and to decide what weight to accord it.  (Id., 2 Cal.4th at p. 61.) 31 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
shall instruct the jury substantially as follows:   
 
“ ‘The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or 
after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding 
his guilt or innocence.  The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a 
matter for the jury to determine.’ ”   
31  
Having determined that the trial court’s curative instruction was adequate, 
and its instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52 was proper, we reject defendant’s 
contention that the erroneous admission of the Las Vegas evidence, in 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
81
B. 
Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses 
 
At the close of the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, and outside the presence 
of the jury, defendant requested that the court instruct the jury on second degree 
murder and second degree felony murder.32  Defense counsel argued that the jury 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
combination with the instruction on flight, violated defendant’s state and federal 
constitutional rights.  
32  
Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury as follows:   
 
“Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with 
malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a 
human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and 
premeditation.  (CALJIC No. 8.30.) 
 
“Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being 
when:   
 
“1.  The killing resulted from an intentional act, 
 
“2.  The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and 
 
“3.  The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, 
and with conscious disregard for, human life. 
 
“When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to 
establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a 
human being. (CALJIC No. 8.31.)  
 
“The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional 
or accidental, which occurs [during] [as the direct casual [sic] result of] the 
commission or attempted commission of the crime of [grand theft] is murder of 
the second degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such 
crime.   
 
“The specific intent to commit [grand theft] and the commission or 
attempted commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(CALJIC No. 8.32.)  
 
“Murder is classified into two degrees, and if you should find the defendant 
guilty of murder, you must determine and state in your verdict whether you find 
the murder to be of the first or second degree.  (CALJIC No. 8.70.)  
 
“If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder 
has been committed by a defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such 
murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give defendant the 
benefit of the doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree. 
(CALJIC No. 8.71.)  
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
82
“really ought to have instructions on  those . . . lesser included . . . areas that would 
be reasonably within their frame of a verdict . . . .”  The prosecutor objected:  
“There is not one wit of evidence [sic], nor a scintilla either, for that matter, 
having to do with second degree murder or any other lesser crime, given the 
medical testimony and the unique facts of the case.  [¶]  I don’t think any theory 
[of admissibility] has been advanced until now, and either by cross-examination or 
any other ⎯ anywhere else in this case, and I don’t see it under the facts.”  
Acknowledging that “when you have crimes of degrees they have to be told about 
it, and sometimes it’s an issue,” the trial court rejected defendant’s request, 
finding:  “Here it’s either first [degree murder] or nothing [i.e. acquittal]  [¶]  . . .  
[¶]  The court’s . . . ruling is to reject the murder of the second degree instructions.  
I don’t see that as a theory in this case.” 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court deprived him of various 
constitutional rights and thus committed reversible error in declining to give the 
requested instructions pertaining to second degree murder and second degree 
felony murder, and further, that the court had a sua sponte duty to give such 
instructions even if defendant had not requested them.  In support of this 
argument, defendant emphasizes that he “is entitled under [the] state and federal 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously 
not only as to whether the defendant is guilty or not, but also, if you should find 
him guilty of an unlawful killing, you must agree unanimously as to whether he is 
guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree.”  (CALJIC 
No. 8.74.)  
 
Defendant additionally requested that the trial court instruct the jury 
regarding homicide generally, as follows:   
 
“Homicide is the killing of one human being by another, either lawfully or 
unlawfully.  Homicide includes murder and manslaughter, which are unlawful, 
and the acts of excusable and justifiable homicides, which are lawful.”  (CALJIC 
No. 8.00.)  
 
 
83
Constitutions to have the jury instructed on lesser-included offenses arising from 
the evidence.”  (Italics added.)  He contends that in addition to the possible 
verdicts of a first degree murder conviction and an acquittal, the jury ought to have 
been afforded the “third option” of convicting defendant of second degree murder.  
(See Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637.)   
We discern no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the instructions 
requested by defendant.  “California decisions have held for decades that even 
absent a request, and even over the parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct 
on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is 
substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser.  [Citations.]” 
(People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118, italics added.)  In the present case, we 
agree with the trial court that there was not substantial evidence to warrant the 
second degree murder instructions requested by defendant. 
 
As described above, the prosecution’s evidence demonstrated that Susan 
Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie were murdered at their residences in 
similar fashion within days of each other.  All three had been fatally strangled — 
Mills and Guthrie by ligature, and Knoll by what the medical examiner described 
as the use of “considerable compression force” (and had suffered blunt force 
injuries consistent with having struggled against her assailant).  Not only does the 
manner in which each of these three killings was perpetrated strongly indicate in 
itself that each of the killings was willful, premeditated, and deliberate, but the 
entire course of conduct clearly revealed by the evidence, taken as a whole, is 
inconsistent with any suggestion that the killings were not willful, premeditated, 
and deliberate.  Furthermore, the evidence additionally demonstrated that each of 
the murders occurred during the commission of either rape or burglary, a 
circumstance that in itself establishes the offenses as first degree murders under 
the felony-murder doctrine.  (§ 189.)  Defendant fails to point to any substantial 
evidence that would support a jury’s determination that the killing of any of the 
victims constituted second degree, rather than first degree, murder.   
 
 
84
 
Defendant cites a number of decisions in support of his contrary contention, 
but these cases either have been overruled or involve inapposite factual situations.  
(See People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510 [defendant has a right to instructions 
on lesser related offenses that merely bear some relationship to the charged 
offense, overruled on that point in People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1, 136], 
People v. Dillon (1983) 24 Cal.3d 441 [modifying the defendant’s conviction of 
first degree felony murder to second degree murder where the defendant was an 
immature 17-year-old youth involved in a conspiracy with other youths to “rip-
off” a marijuana farm and discharged his firearm when confronted by the victim, 
who displayed a shotgun]; Vickers v. Rickettes (9th Cir. 1986) 798 F.2d 369 
[prisoner was stabbed and fatally strangled by his cellmate, who had a brain 
disorder related to an epileptic condition].) 
The trial court therefore properly refused to instruct the jury regarding 
second degree murder and second degree felony murder.  Because no evidence 
was presented indicating a basis for finding any of the killings to have been an 
excusable or justifiable homicide, the court also properly refused to give the 
homicide instruction.  (CALJIC No. 8.00.) 
C. 
Instructions Regarding Felony Murder and Special 
Circumstances 
The trial court instructed the jury as to first degree felony murder and as to 
special circumstances.  (CALJIC Nos. 8.21, and 8.80, respectively.)33 
                                              
33  
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:   
 
“The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional 
or accidental, which occurs during the commission of the crime of burglary or the 
commission of the crime of rape is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator 
had the specific intent to commit such crime.   
 
“The specific intent to commit a burglary, the specific intent to commit a 
rape and the commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
85
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the 
jury that it could not find the special circumstance allegations of burglary murder, 
rape murder, and multiple murder true unless it found that defendant possessed the 
intent to kill Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie.  Defendant argues 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
doubt.”  (CALJIC No. 8.21.)  
 
The court further instructed:   
 
“If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, 
you must then determine if one or more of the following special circumstances are 
true or not true:   
 
“(1)  That the murder of Jillette Mills was committed by the defendant 
while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of rape;   
 
“(2)  That the murder of Jillette Mills was committed by the defendant 
while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary;   
 
“(3)  That the murder of Susan Knoll was committed by the defendant 
while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary; 
 
“(4) That the murder of Bonnie Guthrie was committed by the defendant 
while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of rape; 
 
“(5)  That the murder of Bonnie Guthrie was committed by the defendant 
while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary; 
 
“(6)  That the defendant has in this case been convicted of more than one 
offense of murder in the first degree.   
 
“The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance.  
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you 
must find it to be not true. 
 
“If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual 
killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being in order 
to find the special circumstance to be true. 
 
“You must decide separately each special circumstance alleged in this case.  
If you cannot agree as to all of the special circumstances, but can agree as to one 
or more, make your finding as to the one or more upon which you do agree. 
 
“In order to find a special circumstance alleged in this case to be true or 
untrue, you must agree unanimously.   
 
“You will state your special finding as to whether the special circumstance 
is or is not true on the form that will be supplied.”  (CALJIC No. 8.80, italics 
added.)  
 
 
86
that the trial court’s error in failing so to instruct constitutes a “structural defect” in 
the proceedings that is reversible per se (see Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 
U.S. 279, 307-309), or that alternatively constitutes an error that cannot be 
characterized as being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18) and therefore requires setting aside the findings of 
special circumstances and reversing the judgment of death.  (See People v. 
Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 41-44.)  We reject defendant’s position, for the 
reasons that follow. 
“In 1983, this court held that intent to kill was an element of felony-murder 
special circumstances whether or not the defendant was the actual killer.  (Carlos 
v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 
862].)  Although we overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], holding that the intent-to-kill 
requirement applied only to an accomplice and not to the actual killer, Carlos 
remained applicable to (and the trial court was required to instruct the jury on) 
intent to kill in all cases involving a defendant charged with a felony-murder 
special circumstance if the offense was committed during the ‘window’ period 
between our decisions in Carlos and Anderson.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Marshall, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 41-42.) 
In the present case, the jury found a total of six special circumstance 
allegations to be true ⎯ one allegation of multiple murder, two allegations of rape 
murder (as to Mills and Guthrie), and three allegations of burglary murder (as to 
Mills, Knoll, and Guthrie).  (§§ 190.2, subs. (a)(3), (a)(17), subparts (C), (G).)  
The murders occurred in April 1984, during the Carlos/Anderson “window” 
period.  Accordingly, the jury in this case could find the special circumstance 
allegations to be true “only if it found that defendant acted with intent to kill.”  
(Id., at p. 42.)  Nonetheless, as defendant asserts and the People concede, the trial 
 
 
87
court’s instruction on special circumstances, CALJIC No. 8.80, in relevant part 
informed the jury that defendant’s intent was inconsequential:  “If you find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that 
the defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the special 
circumstance to be true.”  (See fn. 33, ante.) 
“We have consistently held that when a trial court fails to instruct the jury 
on an element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the 
error must be measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California [, supra,] 
386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].  
[Citations.]  Under that test, an error is harmless only when, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it did not contribute to the verdict.  (Chapman, supra, at p. 24 [87 S.Ct. at 
p. 828].)”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689.)  We have held that 
“ ‘error in failing to instruct that a special circumstance contains a requirement of 
the intent to kill is harmless [beyond a reasonable doubt] when “the evidence of 
defendant’s intent to kill . . . was overwhelming, and the jury could have had no 
reasonable doubt on that matter.” ’ ”  (People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 
42.) 
In the present case, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant 
possessed the intent to kill when he murdered Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and 
Bonnie Guthrie.  As noted, within a very brief period all three victims were killed 
by strangulation ⎯ Knoll by manual strangulation, Mills and Guthrie by ligature 
strangulation.  The latter two victims also suffered traumatic sexual assaults.  That 
evidence, considered with the evidence that the bodies of Knoll and Mills were 
concealed within a closet, and that in each instance defendant departed from the 
crime scene with selected possessions of each victim, is consistent only with 
intentional killings.  No evidence was presented that would have supported a 
finding of unintentional murder.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that no 
 
 
88
reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have failed to find that defendant acted 
with the requisite intent to kill.  We are satisfied that the trial court’s instruction 
removing that issue from the jury’s consideration was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (See People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 46-47 [intent to 
kill properly found where one victim was strangled and set on fire, and the other 
victim was beaten to death]; see also People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 683 
[concealing of victim’s body beneath dresser drawers “further supports the view 
that (defendant) intended to kill”].) 
D. 
Guilt Phase Instructions in General 
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to several pattern jury 
instructions at the conclusion of the guilt phase, including CALJIC Nos. 2.01 
(sufficiency of circumstantial evidence ⎯ generally), 2.02 sufficiency of 
circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent), 2.50 (evidence of other crimes), 
2.50.1 (evidence of other crimes by the defendant proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence), 2.50.2 (definition of preponderance of the evidence), 8.83 
(sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove special circumstance), and 8.83.1 
(sufficiency of evidence to prove mental state).  Defendant contends that decisions 
rendered by this court rejecting constitutional challenges to these instructions (see, 
e.g., People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 942-943; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 
Cal.3d 612, 669-671) are “inconsistent with principles set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court” and should be reconsidered. 
Defendant has provided no basis for reconsidering our prior decisions 
upholding the validity of these pattern jury instructions.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 942-943; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 
669-671.)  We therefore reject defendant’s challenge. 
 
 
89
IV. ALLEGED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the 
guilt phase by conceding defendant’s guilt, as demonstrated by counsel’s failure to 
(1) make an opening statement, (2) present any evidence on defendant’s behalf, 
and (3) make any substantive argument in his summation (which comprised four 
and one-half pages of the Reporter’s Transcript) as to whether the prosecution had 
sustained its burden of proof as to defendant’s guilt of the crimes charged or the 
truth of the special circumstances alleged.  Relying upon Griffin v. California 
(1965) 380 U.S. 609, defendant further contends that during the guilt phase 
summation, his counsel improperly drew adverse attention to defendant’s assertion 
of the privilege against self-incrimination.  Defendant also contends counsel 
inappropriately conceded guilt in his penalty phase summation.34 
As we explain, defendant fails to demonstrate that counsel rendered 
constitutionally deficient performance, or that such performance was prejudicial to 
the defense. 
“In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider 
whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant 
suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 
668, 694 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 
Cal.3d 171, 217 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].)  A reviewing court will 
indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of 
                                              
34  
Defendant’s argument encompasses issues relating to both the guilt and the 
penalty phases.  In the interest of clarity and brevity, we address these issues 
together.   
 
 
90
professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained 
as a matter of sound trial strategy.  Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing 
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.  (Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at p. 687 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2064]; In re Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 
1253 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 473, 52 P.3d 656].)  If the record on appeal sheds no light 
on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for 
an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory 
explanation.  (People v. Mendozo Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266 [62 
Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].)  Otherwise, the claim is more appropriately 
raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  (Id. at pp. 266-267.)”  (People v. 
Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211; see also People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 926, 1003 [same]; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1059 [“The 
decisions whether to waive opening statement and whether to put on witnesses are 
matters of trial tactics and strategy which a reviewing court generally may not 
second-guess.”].)  
Each one of counsel’s decisions, to forego making an opening statement, 
present a defense, or offer more than a brief summation, was tactical.  In view of 
the strong evidence directly linking defendant to the charged murders, as well as 
the looming prospect of other capital trials in Alameda and San Diego Counties 
arising out of the deaths of Tok Kim and Janette Cullins, reasonably competent 
counsel could have determined to hear the prosecution’s case prior to deciding 
whether to present a defense, and further could have determined that counsel’s 
summation ought to be limited to inviting the jury to consider whether the 
prosecution actually had met its burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (See generally People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1059.)  Indeed, 
in his summation, counsel alluded to the other criminal cases pending against 
 
 
91
defendant to suggest a reason why defendant did not take the stand, and 
emphasized the significance of the reasonable doubt instruction.35 
Reasonably competent counsel could have determined that an extended 
summation would present the danger of focusing the jury’s attention upon the 
heinous details of the crimes committed.  Likewise, reasonably competent counsel 
also could have determined that in view of the strong evidence linking defendant 
to the murders, a guilty verdict was virtually a foregone conclusion, and that 
defendant’s prospects of avoiding the death penalty would be improved if the 
defense refrained from placing its “credibility” at risk by suggesting an 
implausible defense and instead focused upon challenging the testimony of certain 
witnesses who testified for the prosecution.36  
Thus, reasonable defense counsel could have had a number of legitimate 
tactical reasons for refraining from making an opening statement, presenting 
witnesses in defense, or summarizing the case more extensively.  The record 
before us does not fully reveal why counsel elected to proceed in the manner in 
which defendant now complains, and defendant’s claim must fail for that reason.  
(People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1059.)  To the extent the record on 
                                              
35  
Defense counsel argued:  “While all the instructions that the judge will give 
you are important, critical to deciding the guilt of any person, is the instruction 
about reasonable doubt.  In short, you will hear words to this effect, that you may 
not find Mr. Carter guilty unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt the truth 
of the charge or charges to a moral certainty.  [¶]  I would expect [the prosecutor], 
when he replies, as is his right to reply to this argument since he has the burden, to 
tell you that this does not mean beyond all possible doubt.  That’s true.  But you 
will hear the words ‘to a moral certainty.’  [¶] . . . [¶]  You’ve heard reference to 
other pending cases in San Diego and Oakland, and so there are some times that 
defendants do not testify for many, many reasons.” 
36  
Defendant acknowledges that “[o]f the more than 50 witnesses presented by 
the People, the defense cross-examined roughly half. . . .”  
 
 
92
appeal does provide insight into the basis for counsel’s decision not to present a 
defense at the guilt phase, counsel’s strategy was a tactical one influenced by the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of a decision to present a defense, as well as by 
the pendency of the murder charges against defendant in other counties.  (See post, 
at p. 95.)37 
As noted, defendant also complains that his counsel “drew adverse 
attention to [defendant’s] assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.”  At 
issue is counsel’s argument to the jury, in which he hypothesized a number of 
reasons why a defendant might elect not testify, including the observation, “some 
people tell the truth in this kind of setting, some people lie poorly.”  Defendant 
asserts that counsel’s remark was an improper comment upon defendant’s 
invocation of his constitutional right not to testify, in contravention of Griffin v. 
California, supra, 380 U.S. 609.  In response, the People respond that counsel’s 
comment did not draw adverse attention to defendant’s silence.  
In his guilt phase summation, defense counsel argued to the jury: 
“In this decision your process is analytical; that is, have the crimes been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty, and has it been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty that [defendant] is the person who 
committed one or more of the acts charged? 
“[Defendant] did not testify.  The court will instruct you that you may not 
consider this in any way, shape, or form.  You may not hold it against him.  
However, experience tells us that people often have trouble with that concept.  
                                              
37  
Defendant acknowledged at the hearing on his motion for new trial that he 
had understood the risks and perils of a defense strategy that involved his taking 
the witness stand.  (See post, pp. 100-101.) 
 
 
93
‘Well, if I were the defendant, I would testify.  I would be up there screaming 
about it.’ 
“Let me say a word about this:  There are many reasons that a defendant 
may or might not testify in a case, speaking hypothetically.  There is, for example, 
the possibility that his lawyer might instruct you not to testify, even though he 
wanted to.  There is on the contrary the possibility that his lawyer wants him to 
and he does not want to for various reasons. 
“He may be articulate, he may be too articulate.  He may be scared.  I’ll tell 
you, it is not easy to be a witness.  If any of you have ever been a witness, where 
from time to time one comes up in one’s career at the bar, I’m always amazed that 
you were just plain nervous up there even after all your experience in law school 
[sic]. 
“Some people tell the truth in this kind of setting, some people lie poorly. 
“You’ve heard reference to other pending cases in San Diego and Oakland, 
and so there are some times that defendants do not testify for many, many reasons.  
There are many, many reasons why the defendant may not testify, and I give you 
hypothetically various reasons that occur from time to time so that you do not 
consider any of it and hold it against him.”  (Italics added.) 
As an initial matter, we observe that the decisions finding Griffin error have 
not extended to the situation of a defendant who asserts that his or her own 
attorney invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s failure 
to testify.  (Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 615 [“We . . . hold that the 
Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s 
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”]  (Italics 
added.))  Defendant does not cite any authority in support of the broad reading of 
Griffin that he advances here ⎯ to the contrary, the decisions upon which 
defendant relies are distinguishable, involving either a prosecutor’s comment upon 
 
 
94
a defendant’s silence (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 35-36; People v. 
Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 711), or the trial of a case against multiple 
defendants in which the comment was made by counsel for a codefendant (People 
v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 157-161; People v. Haldeen (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 
478, 481) or a codefendant sought to make such a comment (People v. Jones 
(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 237, 243-244).  The absence of authority on the point is not 
surprising, because if ⎯ by merely reminding the jury at summation that the 
defendant did not testify ⎯ defense counsel thereby would inject Griffin error into 
the proceedings, counsel would be placed in the awkward and untenable position 
of deciding whether to infringe upon his or her client’s constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination in order to increase the likelihood that any conviction 
would be vulnerable to a grant of a new trial or reversal on appeal.  Griffin does 
not stand for such a proposition.  
Moreover, even if we were to overlook the foregoing fundamental defect in 
defendant’s position, no Griffin error appears.  Viewing defense counsel’s remarks 
in their proper context, it is clear that counsel was not suggesting that the jury 
draw any sort of adverse inference from defendant’s silence.  Nor did counsel’s 
comments represent a “concession of [defendant’s] guilt” as defendant asserts.  
“Rather, the passage quoted above reveals that counsel merely sought to explain to 
the jury that there are “many reasons” why a defendant may not testify, including 
the “hypothetical[]” possibility that “[s]ome people tell the truth in this kind of 
setting, some people lie poorly,” and that the jury should not hold such silence 
against him.  (Italics added.)  Counsel’s references to defendant’s failure to testify 
were made “so that you do not consider any of it and hold it against him,” and 
 
 
95
manifestly did not constitute the type of comments that Griffin declared invalid.  
(See Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 613-615.)38 
Defendant’s reliance upon United States v. Swanson (9th Cir. 1991) 943 
F.2d 1070 similarly is misplaced.  Swanson held that defense counsel effectively 
abandoned and betrayed his client and aided the prosecution by arguing to the jury 
that there was no reasonable doubt his client was the person who committed the 
bank robbery charged in the indictment.  By contrast, defense counsel’s 
performance in the present case did not constitute abandonment.  In view of the 
strong prosecution evidence linking defendant to the charged offenses, as well as 
to the murder cases then pending against defendant in Alameda and San Diego 
Counties, defense counsel reasonably could believe that their client’s interests 
would best be served by treating the case “as a penalty case,” rather than by 
presenting a defense or relying upon defendant’s testimony.  Consistently with that 
strategy, at the close of the guilt phase counsel argued to the jury that a defendant 
might choose not to testify for any one or more of several reasons.  Defense 
counsel’s argument clearly was proper.39  
                                              
38  
At defendant’s request, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to 
CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61, as follows:   
 
“A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be 
compelled to testify.  You must not draw any inference from the fact that a 
defendant does not testify.  Further, you must neither discuss this matter nor 
permit it to enter into your deliberations in any way.  (CALJIC No. 2.60.)   
 
“In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on 
the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the charge against him.  No 
lack of testimony on defendant’s part will supply a failure of proof by the People 
so as to support a finding against him on any such essential element.” (CALJIC 
No. 2.61.)  
39  
Defendant also cites, “by way of comparison,” this court’s decisions in 
People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th 795, In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, and 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
96
Next, defendant offers myriad contentions ⎯ most briefly stated and quite 
conclusory in nature ⎯ in an effort to demonstrate he was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel.  These contentions encompass a wide array of both 
general and specific claims, including defense counsel’s failure to present a 
coherent defense and more vigorously challenge the following:  the prosecution’s 
witnesses by cross-examination, the identification evidence discovered during the 
Kim investigation, the evidence linking defendant to Mills’s murder (by 
highlighting evidence that Mills habitually kept personal items in her vehicle), the 
special circumstances allegations, the purportedly confusing jury instructions 
submitted to the trial court by the prosecution, and the absence of pinpoint jury 
instructions.  All of these contentions, however, amount to or relate to trial tactics 
and, as noted previously, must be rejected because the record before us does not 
reveal why defense counsel elected to proceed in the manner of which defendant 
now complains.  (People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Ca1.4th 1027, 1059.) 
For the same reasons, we reject defendant’s similar attack on the manner in 
which counsel represented defendant at the penalty phase of the trial.  
In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate on this record that defense counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance at trial.  To the contrary, the record indicates that 
counsel was placed in the extremely challenging position of representing a 
defendant clearly linked to the deaths of five women, four of whom died by 
strangulation within days of each other, as well as to the near fatality by 
strangulation of a sixth woman.  The record before us does not suggest that 
counsel’s performance in defending against the charges in the manner summarized 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1.  None of these cases is helpful to defendant’s 
argument.   
 
 
97
above, in the face of the prosecution’s strong case against their client, “fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” nor 
that “defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217.)  
Defendant’s related claims, that counsel committed Griffin error and 
inappropriately conceded defendant’s guilt at the penalty phase, lack merit for the 
reasons previously discussed. 
V. 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUES 
A. 
The Conflict Between Defendant and his Trial Counsel, 
Defendant’s Desire to Testify, and the Motion for New  
Trial  
In a multi-pronged argument, defendant contends the trial court failed to 
inquire adequately into defendant’s conflict with his attorneys regarding the 
presentation of a defense during the guilt phase of the proceedings (including 
defendant’s desire to testify), failed to appoint new counsel once the conflict was 
disclosed, and improperly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.  As we shall 
explain, none of defendant’s contentions has merit.  (See fn. 34, ante.) 
1. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
On July 5, 1989, at the conclusion of the People’s case-in-chief at the guilt 
phase, defendant’s trial counsel requested an in-camera hearing pursuant to People 
v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 803.  At the hearing, conducted outside the presence 
of the jury and the prosecution, defense counsel informed the court that 
notwithstanding the circumstance that several defense witnesses were available to 
be called, counsel was prepared as part of the defense strategy to rest without 
putting on a defense, and that defendant “emphatically disagrees with that 
 
 
98
strategy.”  The trial court agreed with defense counsel’s reasoning that “in these 
matters the decisions should be with the counsel.” 
On July 10, 1989, prior to the presentation of the parties’ closing 
arguments, defense counsel requested a second in-camera hearing under the 
authority of Marsden.  During a brief hearing, counsel informed the court that 
during the July 5 Marsden hearing, he had neglected to mention that “by not 
putting on the witnesses, it also precluded the potential of [defendant] testifying 
. . . .” 
Later that same day, after the parties had argued their respective cases to 
the jury, defense counsel informed the court during an in-camera hearing that 
defendant “asked me to spread upon the record that he does not agree with the 
closing argument that counsel made, that he had asked me what it was, and that he 
was not informed of the type of argument.  [¶]  And he certainly does not feel that 
it was adequate, and this just compounds the problem of lack of defense by the 
argument that counsel made, and he asked me to spread that upon the record.” 
On July 17, 1989, the jury returned its guilt phase verdict.  Later that same 
day, defense counsel requested a third Marsden hearing, informing the court that 
“[defendant] continues to express disappointment [in] the manner in which to this 
point the case has been handled by counsel.”  Defense counsel continued:  
“[Defendant requests the court] to appoint Mr. Rowan Klein . . . to . . . prepare and 
file a new trial motion or some motion pre-penalty phase. . . .  [¶]  I will say that 
counsel opposes that motion.  We have opposed other things before, and we would 
oppose that.”  The trial court denied defendant’s motion, stating:  “[I]t is just not 
timely. The motion to appoint Mr. Klein, even the motion for new trial, isn’t ⎯ 
now is not the time to raise such a motion.  Certainly, if at some time it looks like 
Mr. Klein’s expertise would be of some assistance, I’d entertain the motion; but 
now I don’t think is the appropriate time to even consider it.  That request is 
denied . . . .” 
 
 
99
On August 7, 1989, the jury returned its penalty phase verdict.  
Approximately four weeks later, on September 5, 1989, the court conducted a 
fourth Marsden hearing, wherein defense counsel informed the court of their 
client’s request that they be relieved and replaced by attorney Rowan Klein.  The 
court granted the request. 
On January 9, 1990, defendant, assisted by his newly appointed attorney, 
filed a motion for new trial that asserted:  (1) defendant erroneously was denied 
his constitutional rights to testify and to present a defense at the guilt phase of 
trial; (2) the trial court erroneously failed to afford defendant a hearing regarding 
his allegations that a conflict of interest existed between him and his attorneys; 
(3) defendant did not validly waive his constitutional right to testify; (4) the trial 
court erroneously admitted evidence of other alleged homicides, and (5) the trial 
court erroneously determined that defendant lacked standing to object to evidence 
that was seized from the vehicle in which he was arrested. 
At the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial, one of defendant’s trial 
counsel, Howard Gillingham, testified that defendant “wanted to put on at all 
times a full-blown defense . . . .  [¶]  There was no question that [defendant], from 
early on, wanted to . . . contest the guilt at the special circumstance level.  No 
question about that.”  Gillingham added:  “Near the end of the case-in-chief, . . . 
we definitely knew that [defendant] did not agree with our approach.”  Gillingham 
explained the term, “our approach” to mean:  “Our approach was this case was a 
potential death case, and at some point I, along with [co-counsel] Miss Morrissey, 
made the decision that that’s how it had to be litigated. . . .  [¶]  As an example, the 
review of the voir dire of the jurors was almost entirely death-focused, so right 
from the beginning . . . the tentative decision was it was going to be tried as a 
penalty case.” 
Gillingham affirmed that the position of both attorneys representing 
defendant was not to present a defense and that defendant would not testify at the 
guilt phase.  When Gillingham conveyed this position to defendant near the 
 
 
100
conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, defendant’s response, according to 
Gillingham, was “[a]gitated.  Total disagreement, which I must say, has been 
vindicated.  We sort of had that feeling.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  [W]e knew that [defendant] 
wanted to contest the guilt phase. . . .”  Gillingham stated that defendant wanted to 
put on a defense and wanted to testify.  On cross-examination, Gillingham 
acknowledged that he and defendant’s co-counsel considered the decision not to 
present a defense at the guilt phase to have been tactical in nature, and that factors 
influencing counsel’s decision included the strength and weaknesses of presenting 
a defense as well as the pending murder cases against defendant in Alameda and 
San Diego Counties. 
Defendant testified that shortly after Gillingham was appointed to represent 
him, “I told him that I wanted to present a defense and that during the guilt phase I 
was more concerned about the guilt phase and I felt it was necessary for me to 
testify.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I questioned the way he was conducting voir dire.  I wasn’t 
happy with what he was doing, with what he was focusing on.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  He 
wasn’t really paying any attention to the guilt aspect.  He was more concerned 
with the penalty phase.  That is what I felt, anyway.”  According to defendant, on 
“the day before the prosecution rested,” Gillingham “told me that he didn’t plan to 
call any witnesses and that he wasn’t going to put on a defense.  [¶] . . . [¶]  He 
also stated, well, if he didn’t put on a defense and I am going to testify, I asked 
him about that, and he said if we are not going to put on a defense I was not going 
to be testifying.”  Defendant’s reaction to counsel’s strategy was, “I was upset.  I 
indicated pretty strongly that I wasn’t happy with him.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I told him I 
wanted to call witnesses, put on a defense and testify.”   
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that his trial attorneys had 
opined it was in defendant’s best interest that defendant not testify:  “they said it 
was a tactical decision.”  Defendant also acknowledged understanding that if he 
had testified at trial, he would have been subject to cross-examination by the 
prosecutor, including questions regarding the items taken from Tok Kim and 
 
 
101
Janette Cullins found in the car defendant was driving when apprehended, and that 
defendant would be asked to explain how those items came into his possession and 
that such answers “more than likely” would have been communicated to the 
prosecutor’s counterparts in Alameda and San Diego Counties and ultimately used 
against defendant in proceedings conducted in those counties.   
Defendant further testified on cross-examination that during the Marsden 
hearings, defense counsel accurately summarized the disagreements that existed 
between defendant and counsel. 
During an in-camera portion of the hearing, defendant’s new counsel 
recited the names of several persons whom he identified as having been potential 
defense witnesses but who were not called to testify at the guilt phase of the trial 
in light of prior trial counsel’s decision not to put on a case-in-chief.  Counsel 
thereafter argued extensively in favor of the motion for new trial, which was 
denied. 
2. 
The Issues 
a. Defendant’s conflict with his attorneys at trial 
Defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to present a 
defense, including his right to testify, and that the trial court failed adequately to 
inquire as to the nature of the conflict.  As we shall explain, we reject these 
arguments. 
Although “a defendant in a capital trial [has] the right to have his only 
viable defense to the guilt or special circumstance charges presented at the initial 
stage of trial” (People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 815 [plurality opn.]), and 
counsel lacks the authority to override the defendant’s decision to present such a 
defense at the guilt phase of the trial (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 
856), in the present case the record does not establish that defendant had a viable 
defense. (See id., at p. 857 [“[d]efendant’s reliance on Frierson . . . is misplaced, 
since the record does not show that any defense he wished to present had credible 
evidentiary support]; see also People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 671 [“When 
 
 
102
the record reflects a tactical choice to curtail presentation of defense evidence or 
closing argument with the defendant’s purported knowledge and acquiescence, it 
would amount to an untoward interference with the attorney-client relationship to 
suggest the trial court has an obligation to question the defendant as to his 
concurrence in counsel’s strategy and to secure a waiver of any rights incidentally 
relinquished.”].)  Here, the record supports the People’s position that defendant, “a 
person with a sophisticated view of the criminal justice system from the inside,” 
complained sufficiently during proceedings conducted in the trial court so as to 
create a colorable appellate issue, but not sufficiently to obligate the trial court to 
relieve his counsel.40 
Accordingly, defendant’s claim that he was denied the opportunity to 
present a defense, and to “conflict-free, effective representation,” should be 
denied. 
With respect to defendant’s asserted desire to testify at trial, we are guided 
by well-settled rules:  “ ‘Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his 
own defense, or to refuse to do so.’  (Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225 
[91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1].)  The defendant’s ‘absolute right not to be 
called as a witness and not to testify’ arises from the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.  
                                              
40  
We believe that the prosecutor’s argument in summation at the hearing on 
defendant’s motion for new trial aptly summarizes the state of the record:  
“[L]ooking at the transcript, the court could . . . and should draw the conclusion 
that what happened was Mr. Carter was a defendant who wanted things his way.  
[Defense counsel] Mr. Gillingham did not do them his way for valid legally 
sufficient reasons, and Mr. Gillingham indicated this . . . displeasure of Mr. Carter, 
but in the end, Mr. Carter acceded to Mr. Gillingham’s trial strategy.  He was 
present during all of these proceedings, and he is not a novice in this business.  He 
is not a person who is not unfamiliar [sic] with the courts and the court system.  
He has not hesitated in the past to comment.  I suggest this motion should be 
denied in its entirety.  There is no error at all.” 
 
 
103
(Cramer v. Tyers (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137 [151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793.)  
Although tactical decisions at trial are generally counsel’s responsibility, the 
decision whether to testify, a question of fundamental importance, is made by the 
defendant after consultation with counsel.  (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
616, 631, fn. 9 [194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769]; U.S. v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1989) 
883 F.2d 750, 755, vacated other grounds (1991) 928 F.2d 1470; see also People 
v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 [85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710].)”  (People v. 
Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1032.) 
Moreover, we previously have rejected the position that a trial court must 
obtain an affirmative waiver on the record whenever a defendant fails to testify at 
trial.  (People v. Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 806 [“When the record fails to 
disclose a timely and adequate demand to testify, ‘a defendant may not await the 
outcome of the trial and then seek reversal based on his claim that despite 
expressing to counsel his desire to testify, he was deprived of that opportunity.’ 
(Citations.).]”; see also Florida v. Nixon (2004) ___ U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. 551, 561] 
[although defense counsel “was obliged to, and in fact several times did, explain 
his proposed trial strategy” to the defendant, counsel “was not additionally 
required to gain express consent before conceding the (defendant’s guilt”)]; 
People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 671 [“ ‘[A] trial judge may safely assume 
that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify[,] is merely 
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding 
by his counsel’s trial strategy; otherwise, the judge would have to conduct a law 
seminar prior to every criminal trial.’  [Citation.]”].)   
Here, as noted above, defendant had ample opportunity during the course of 
three Marsden hearings to inform the court that he wished to testify, against the 
advice and over the objection of defense counsel, even if defense counsel were 
permitted to decline to present any other defense witnesses who would support 
defendant’s own testimony.  In view of defense counsel’s repeated efforts during 
the Marsden hearings to inform the trial court of the conflicts that had arisen with 
 
 
104
his client, the trial court reasonably could have determined that had defendant told 
his counsel that defendant insisted upon testifying despite the absence of any other  
defense witnesses, his counsel would have conveyed that demand to the trial court.  
In view of the circumstance that counsel never told the trial court that defendant 
had made such a demand, on this record we may not assume that defendant in fact 
had insisted upon testifying even where no other defense witnesses would be 
presented to support his testimony.  (Compare People v. Robles, supra, 2 Cal.3d 
205, 214-215 [a defendant has the right to testify in his or her own defense, over 
counsel’s objection, when the defendant insists upon being permitted to testify].) 
Similarly, defendant’s further contention that the trial court failed 
adequately to inquire into his conflict with trial counsel similarly is belied by the 
record before us.  As noted above, the court conducted three Marsden hearings 
during the course of the trial for the purpose of permitting the airing of the conflict 
between defendant and his attorneys.  During these hearings, defense counsel 
brought to the court’s attention defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel’s trial 
strategy and tactics.  Although, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, 
defendant testified that counsel had not informed the court at the July 5th and July 
10th Marsden hearings of all the witnesses whom defendant wanted to call, we are 
satisfied from the record before us that in the course of conducting three Marsden 
hearings, the trial court adequately inquired as to the issues raised by the defense, 
and that counsel fairly characterized the nature of the conflict for the trial court. 
b. Failure to appoint new counsel 
Defendant contends that in view of the conflict between him and his trial 
counsel, the trial court was obligated to appoint new counsel, and the court’s 
failure to do so constitutes reversible error.  As we have indicated in the 
immediately preceding section, however, the record does not indicate that any 
defense that defendant sought to present had “credible evidentiary support” 
(People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 843, 857; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
1115, 1139; see also People v. Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d 803, 815 [“a defendant 
 
 
105
in a capital trial . . . retain[s] the right to have his only viable defense to the guilt or 
special circumstance charges presented at the initial stage of the trial” (italics 
added)].)  In view of that circumstance, the trial court was under no obligation to 
interrupt the trial proceedings to order the appointment of new counsel.  We 
therefore reject defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in not appointing 
new counsel upon learning of the conflict between defendant and his counsel 
regarding trial tactics and strategy. 
c. Motion for new trial 
In view of defendant’s foregoing contentions, but without additional 
argument beyond what he has cited in support thereof, defendant asserts the trial 
court committed reversible error in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.  As 
we previously have explained, however, defendant fails to persuade us that his 
conflict with defense counsel over trial tactics and strategy (including the decision 
whether defendant should testify), the trial court’s inquiries into that conflict, or 
the court’s refusal to appoint new counsel prior to the conclusion of the penalty 
phase, either singularly or in the aggregate, deprived defendant of his state or 
federal constitutional rights.  Having discerned no error in this regard, we 
conclude the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.   
VI. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. 
The Admissibility of Evidence of Defendant’s Attack on 
Jennifer S.  
 
Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant moved to exclude from the 
penalty phase the evidence of (1) defendant’s prior conviction for the Ventura 
County sexual assault committed upon Jennifer S., and (2) the facts underlying 
that conviction.  Defendant asserted he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the Ventura County proceedings, that but for counsel’s deficient 
performance he would have been acquitted in that case, and that therefore the 
 
 
106
Ventura County conviction and the facts underlying that conviction should be 
excluded from the penalty phase. 
 
At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the prosecution conceded that 
because the conviction had not occurred before the charged murders, it was not a 
“prior” conviction within the meaning of section 190.3, subdivision (c), and thus 
evidence of the conviction itself was not admissible under that provision.  (See 
People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 203.)  Accordingly, the court granted 
defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of the conviction. 
 
With regard to the direct evidence of defendant’s attack upon Jennifer S. 
underlying the conviction, however, the trial court denied defendant’s motion.  
Accordingly, as described earlier (ante, pp. 12-13), at the penalty phase the 
prosecution introduced the testimony of Jennifer S. and other evidence relating to 
defendant’s brutal attack upon her. 
 
On appeal, defendant renews his challenge to the trial court’s ruling 
denying his motion to exclude the evidence underlying the Ventura County 
conviction.  He argues that had he not been represented ineffectively in Ventura 
County, “he would have been acquitted of the charges there and the evidence 
would not have been admissible against him here,” relying on the portion of 
section 190.3 providing that “in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity 
be admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted.”  
(See People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 948-952.)  Defendant points in 
particular to the Ventura County prosecutor’s assertedly improper reference to 
defendant’s failure to testify in that case (see Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 
609), implicitly asserting that had defense counsel in those proceedings more 
vigorously and effectively challenged the prosecutor’s comments, the conviction 
would not have been sustained. 
 
 
107
 
We conclude that defendant’s contention lacks merit.  To begin with, in the 
prior proceeding both the trial court and the Court of Appeal explicitly rejected the 
claim that the prosecutor’s comments undermined the validity of the conviction.42 
Furthermore, even if defendant nonetheless properly could challenge the prior 
conviction on this ground at this point (an issue we need not and do not decide), 
and even if the error upon which defendant relies had been prejudicial, the very 
most that defendant would have been entitled to would have been an order striking 
the prior conviction for purposes of this proceeding, not the entry of an acquittal.  
(See People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-1141.)  Because, in any 
event, as already noted, evidence of the conviction itself was not admitted in the 
present case, defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s conduct in the Ventura 
proceeding or to defense counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance in that 
proceeding has no bearing upon the validity of the trial court’s admission of 
evidence of the conduct underlying the prior conviction. 
 
With regard to that evidence, past cases make clear that the introduction of 
evidence of the Ventura assault was proper under section 190.3, subdivision (b), 
which authorizes the trier of fact at the penalty phase to consider “[t]he presence 
or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or 
violence,” whether such violent criminal conduct occurred prior to or after the 
charged capital offense.  (See, e.g., People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 426-
428 [unlike prior felony convictions, evidence of violent conduct is admissible 
even if it occurred after the capital crime]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 
676-677 [possession of knife during burglary is sufficient to establish implied 
                                              
42  
Defense counsel in the Ventura proceedings moved for a mistrial based on 
the prosecutor’s improper comments, but the trial court denied the motion.  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal, in an unpublished decision, affirmed defendant’s 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
108
threat of force or violence]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 97 [upholding 
constitutionality of section 190.3, subd. (b)]; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 
144, 204-205 [evidence of other criminality, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
“is simply one factor the penalty phase jury is to consider in deciding the 
appropriate punishment for the capital offense”].)  No error appears. 
B. 
Adequacy of the Jury Instructions Given 
Defendant raises a number of contentions related to the standard jury 
instructions given by the trial court.  As we shall see, none of these contentions 
has merit. 
First, defendant contends the standard California instructions “do not 
adequately channel sentencing discretion by clear and objective standards that 
provide specific and detailed guidance for the sentencing authority, resulting in 
arbitrary and capricious sentencing decisions in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  We repeatedly have rejected similar claims.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th 153, 267-268; People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
622, 702-703; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 563-564.)  We are not 
persuaded to reconsider those decisions.   
Second, defendant contends that on the second day of the jury’s penalty 
deliberations, the trial court failed to respond adequately to two questions 
submitted by the jury that sought guidance as to the meaning of the terms, 
“extenuating,” “mitigating,” and “aggravating” circumstances, and that the failure 
of the trial court to make an adequate record of its response deprived defendant of 
his right to due process of law by denying him meaningful appellate review of the 
proceedings.  The jury’s questions, submitted in a pair of notes signed by the jury 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
conviction, concluding “[t]his was not a close case,” and that the Griffin error 
“was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
 
109
foreman, inquired:  [1] “We would like the legal definition of:  extenuating[,] 
mitigating[, and] aggrevating [sic].  [2] If a member of the jury finds that the 
aggravating circumstances [are] greater than the mitigating circumstances, may the 
juror vote for life?  If a member of the jury finds that the mitigating circumstances 
[are] greater than the aggravating circumstances, may the juror vote for death?” 
With regard to the jury’s request for definitions, the record is silent as to 
how, if at all, the trial court responded.41  We find entirely speculative, however, 
defendant’s assertion that the jury’s request that the trial court elaborate on certain 
legal definitions “raises serious doubts about the reliability of the sentencing 
process conducted here.”  Even if we infer from the record that the trial court, 
either intentionally or inadvertently, ignored the jury’s request for definitions of 
the terms, “extenuating,” “mitigating,” and “aggravating” circumstances, and did 
not discuss the matter with counsel, any error (see § 1138) was harmless, because 
those terms did not require further definition. 
As to the second note from the jury, the trial court answered “yes” and 
“no,” respectively.42  The jury thereafter continued its deliberations and, without 
submitting any further inquiries to the court, reached its verdict five days later.  
Although the better practice would have been for the court (or the parties) to 
ensure that the proceedings responsive to the jury’s questions were reported, on 
                                              
41  
The matter was discussed several years later when the parties attempted to 
settle the record, prior to filing their briefs in this court.  Defense counsel observed 
at the record settlement hearing that although the Clerk’s Transcript contains the 
questions submitted by the jury, there is no corresponding Reporter’s Transcript 
indicating whether the trial court discussed the questions with counsel.  The 
Reporter’s Transcript for the date in question, August 2, 1989, indicates only that 
“the jury retired for further deliberations.”  
42  
At the record settlement hearing, the trial court recalled:  “I am confident 
that the jury was never brought out, that ⎯ I have some vague recollection, but I 
could be in error ⎯ that we had contact with either [defense counsel] and we all 
agreed that those were the correct answers.”  
 
 
110
the record before us we are unable to discern any error in the trial court’s handling 
of the jury’s inquiries.43   
Finally, defendant contends that because he was personally absent from 
court when the jury submitted the foregoing inquiries (although his counsel was 
present), reversal of the death judgment is  mandated.  Although defendant did not 
waive his presence at any stage of the trial, his failure to demonstrate prejudice 
from his absence at this stage of the proceedings forecloses his claim.  (See People 
v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1358.)   
C. 
Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Defendant contends certain comments made by the prosecutor on eight 
distinct occasions during closing argument constituted prejudicial misconduct in 
violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. 
 
“Improper remarks by a prosecutor can ‘ “so infect[] the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’  (Darden 
v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181 [106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144]; 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 642 [94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 40 
L.Ed.2d 431]; cf. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 
952 P.2d 673].)  Under state law, a prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade either the court or the jury has committed misconduct, even if 
such action does not render the trial fundamentally unfair.  (People v. Hill, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 819; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal. 
                                              
43  
Defendant contends that the inadequate record violates a panoply of 
defendant’s rights under the state and federal Constitutions.  In the absence of any 
showing by defendant that any matter not reported was of consequence and 
prejudicial, defendant’s claim lacks merit.  (See People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 
Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8 [“The record on appeal is inadequate, however, only if the 
complained-of deficiency is prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to prosecute his 
appeal.  [Citation.]  It is the defendant’s burden to show prejudice of this sort.”].)   
 
 
111
Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40] (Berryman); People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447 
[3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610] (Price).) 
 
“Nevertheless, as a general rule, to preserve a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the defense must make a timely objection and request an admonition 
to cure any harm.  The rule applies to capital cases.  (Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
at p. 1072 [rejecting defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct both for failure 
to object or request admonition at trial[,] and on the merits]; Price, supra, 1 
Cal.4th at pp. 447, 460-462 [declining to address whether prosecutors committed 
misconduct[,] because defense did not object at trial]; People v. Monteil (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 877, 914 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277 (Monteil) [although trial 
counsel objected to prosecutor’s remarks at trial, the failure to request admonition 
failed to preserve claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal].)”  (People v. Frye 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 969-970; see also People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 
427.)   
 
With regard to seven of the eight instances of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct, defense counsel did not object when the comments were made.  
Further, the record before us fails to disclose a basis for applying any exception to 
the general rule requiring both an objection and a request for a curative instruction.  
(See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970.)  Accordingly, insofar as 
defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct relates to comments that were not 
objected to, the claim is barred.  (Ibid.)  
 
The instance in which an objection to the purported misconduct was 
interposed consisted of the prosecutor arguing to the jury:  “What kind of a man 
does things like this?  Well, the defense has tried to tell you what kind of a man, 
and they have not told you very much.  They have had, as any criminal defendant 
facing the nature of these charges, a great deal of time to find people, to call them.  
Virtually unlimited money ⎯”  At that point, defense counsel objected.  The trial 
court ruled:  “The objection is sustained as [to] monetary [sic].” 
 
 
112
 
On appeal, defendant contends that although the trial court sustained his 
objection, defendant did not seek an admonition because to do so “would have 
been futile and not cured the prejudice.”  We disagree.  Defendant’s objection 
having been sustained, defendant bore the burden of seeking a curative admonition 
from the court.  He refrained from doing so.  Although defendant asserts here that 
such corrective action would have been pointless, his argument is unpersuasive.  
The prosecutor’s reference to money was fragmentary and ambiguous.  It appears 
likely that the reference had minimal potential effect upon the jurors.  Whatever 
potential for harm arose from the prosecutor’s remark was assuaged by the court’s 
ruling and certainly was capable of elimination by means of an admonition, had 
one been requested. 
 
Moreover, the prosecutor’s brief remark was fleeting and of marginal 
significance.  The trial court’s ruling alerted the jury to the inappropriate nature of 
the comment.  In addition, the prosecutor’s other comments ⎯ about which 
defendant has waived his right to complain based upon his failure to object 
below ⎯ came within the bounds of fair comment or at most constituted trivial 
improprieties.  Under these circumstances, and in view of the nature of 
defendant’s crimes, we conclude that any possible error was harmless, because 
defendant has failed to establish “a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or 
applied the complained-of statements in an improper or erroneous manner.”  
(People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 970.)44   
                                              
44  
Defendant includes in his claim of prosecutorial misconduct at the penalty 
phase a similar claim of prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase.  With respect 
to defendant’s asserted claims of error directed at the prosecution’s closing 
argument at the guilt phase, defendant did not interpose a single objection.  As we 
have explained ante, because defendant failed to object the trial court did not act 
to cure any purported harm through admonition.  Defendant’s failure to assert a 
timely objection and request such an admonition constitutes a failure to preserve 
the claim on appeal.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 427; People v. 
Frye, supra, 18 Cal. 4th 894, 969-970.)   
 
 
113
D. 
Motion for New Trial Based on Alleged Juror Misconduct  
Prior to sentencing, defendant moved for a new trial on various grounds 
that already have been discussed.  (See ante, pp. 99-105.)  At the hearing on the 
motion, defendant orally conveyed an additional ground upon which he urged the 
trial court to grant his motion, juror misconduct.  Defense counsel contended:  
“The basis of the allegation is that there may have been perjury committed by 
[Juror K.] in the questionnaire she completed for the court and counsel.  
Specifically Question 61 which says:  ‘Have you ever been in a situation where 
you feared being hurt or being killed as a result of violence of any sort?’  Answer 
was:  ‘No.’ ”  The defense argued that Juror K., who was 31 years of age when she 
completed the juror questionnaire, feared being raped, slept with a knife under her 
bed, and therefore committed perjury when she responded in the negative to 
Question 61.  The defense added that Juror K. communicated her concealed fear to 
Juror C-M. 
The prosecutor argued that the issue raised by Question 61 “is directed 
toward a specific instance” and did not apply to the “general fear” on the part of 
Juror K. noted by defense counsel, adding that there was no evidence before the 
court of any misconduct.  The trial court voiced some misgivings over the 
defense’s claim, observing:  “I think we all fear violence [⎯] [I]f we don’t, then 
there is something wrong with us, I imagine,” but permitted defense counsel to 
question Juror K., as set forth below.45   
                                              
45  
“Counsel: 
Ma’am, you were a juror in this case? 
 
“Juror K.: 
Yes. 
 
“Counsel: 
On March 20th, 1989, do you remember filling out a 
questionnaire, it is about 18 pages, signed under penalty of perjury? 
 
“Juror K.: 
Yes. 
 
“Counsel: 
Prior to that time, did you ever sleep with a knife under your 
bed? 
 
“Juror K.: 
Prior to what time? 
 
“Counsel: 
Prior to March 20th, 1989, did you ever sleep with a knife 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
114
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
under your bed? 
 
“Juror K.: 
At one time. 
 
“Counsel: 
Why did you do that? 
 
Juror K.: 
I got an apartment for the first time when I was ⎯ I can’t 
even remember ⎯ 18 or 19, and I lived by myself, and prior to that time, I had 
never been alone and, after I first moved in, every little creak in my house, and 
tree branch, or whatever, I was paranoid for a short period of somebody breaking 
in, or whatever, because there is no one else around as my parents, or roommates 
at school, or whatever, and I think the incident you are referring to, one night I 
woke up, could not go to sleep, and I said, well, if anything does happen, I am 
going to defend myself, so I went into my kitchen.  I got a knife, and I put it 
between my mattresses, and I then ⎯ that didn’t help, so I spent the entire night 
up still, and I don’t know exactly when, but I can tell you I probably got up the 
next morning and thought how silly and put it back.  It was very brief and that was 
it. 
 
“Counsel: 
Did you fear any particular kind of crime being committed? 
 
“Juror K.: 
Well, somebody breaking in and, you know, raping and 
murdering, you know 18 years old ⎯ 
 
“Counsel: 
Had there been anything in the community that you had read 
about ⎯ 
 
“Juror K:  
No. 
 
“Counsel: 
⎯ that contributed to that fear? 
 
“Juror K.: 
No. 
 
Counsel: 
Was this when you were living in Pasadena? 
 
Juror K.: 
Yes, that is where I had my first apartment. 
 
“Counsel: 
And did you ever tell anybody that you feared the fact that 
there had been rapes in the Pasadena community? 
 
Juror K.: 
No, I don’t know that I was aware of a lot of that happening. 
 
“Counsel: 
Had you ever been burglarized prior to that time? 
 
Juror K.: 
No. 
 
“Counsel: 
Did you fear any ⎯ well, have you ever been in a situation 
where you feared any kind of violence? 
 
“Juror K.: 
Are you referring to that particular time or moment? 
 
“Counsel: 
Any time.  Any time prior to March 20th? 
 
“Juror K.: 
No, no, not really. 
 
“Counsel: 
So the time that you put the knife under your bed, you didn’t 
fear any particular violence ⎯ 
 
“[Objection sustained.] 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
115
After hearing further argument from the parties, the trial court without 
comment denied the motion for new trial. 
On appeal, defendant contends that Juror K. “intentionally concealed her 
direct experience in voir dire and her questionnaire responses,” in contravention of 
defendant’s rights under the United States and California Constitutions “to [an] 
impartial and unbiased jury, due process, fair trial, present a defense, 
determination based on material facts and evidence at trial, and to death eligibility 
and reliable determinations of guilt and penalty.”  Defendant asserts that in view 
of the charges filed against defendant (including burglary, rape, and murder), Juror 
K.’s testimony ⎯ “revealing fears of being victim to the very crimes at issue in 
[defendant’s] case” ⎯ must be presumed to establish prejudicial concealment in 
the absence of affirmative and competent rebuttal, citing In re Stankewitz (1985) 
40 Cal.3d 391, 402, People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d (1979) 199, 207, and Dyer 
v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1988) 151 F.3d 970, 973, fn. 2). 
In response, the People contend that the court’s ruling “necessarily rested 
on implied findings that Juror K. did not conceal the information, and/or that it 
was not material, and/or that any concealment was not deliberate, and/or that 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“Counsel: 
Did you consider the time that you put the knife under your 
bed as being a situation where you feared violence[?] 
 
“Juror K.: 
I had trouble sleeping because of noises going on, or 
whatever, and it was all in my imagination.  Like I said, I probably got up in the 
morning and thought how silly and, quite frankly, I hadn’t and haven’t thought 
about that incident at all for the last 12 years. 
 
“Counsel: 
In you[r] mind, isn’t that a situation where you feared 
violence against you ⎯  
 
“[Objection overruled.] 
 
“Juror K.: 
That night? 
 
“Counsel: 
Yes. 
 
“Juror K.: 
Yes. 
 
“Counsel: 
Thank you.” 
 
 
116
Juror K. had no actual bias against appellant.”  The People further contend that the 
present case is unlike those relied upon by defendant.  
Both parties refer to other answers provided by Juror K. on the 
questionnaire:  Question 57 asked, “Have you or anyone close to you been the 
victim of a crime, reported or unreported?” to which Juror K. answered 
affirmatively, indicating that she been the victim of burglaries in San Jose, 
Pasadena, and West Lost Angeles.  Question No. 71 asked, “Any other 
comments?” to which Juror K. responded, “[E]veryone has feares [sic] + you don’t 
know what will happen in the next minute.” 
In previous decisions, we have reviewed at some length the principles that 
guide our examination of a claim of juror misconduct during voir dire.  (See, e.g., 
In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646-660; In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
97, 110-123.)  We need not reiterate here those extensive discussions; suffice it to 
say for present purposes that “juror misconduct involving the concealment of 
material information on voir dire raises the presumption of prejudice,” and that 
“[t]his presumption of prejudice ‘ “may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary 
showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court’s examination of the 
entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm 
to the complaining party [resulting from the misconduct]. . . .” ’  Citations.]”  (In 
re Hitchings, supra, at p. 119; see also Dyer v. Calderon, supra, 151 F.3d 970, 
973, fn. 2 [“The presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a 
new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.”].)   
Applying the foregoing standards, it is clear that Juror K.’s failure to 
answer Question 61 more completely did not constitute misconduct and, even if 
we were to assume that misconduct did occur, the presumption of prejudice was 
rebutted by the substance of her testimony at the hearing on defendant’s motion 
for new trial.  Assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant is correct in 
asserting that Juror K.’s answer to Question No. 61 was inaccurate, her statement 
 
 
117
at the hearing that “I hadn’t and haven’t thought about that incident at all for the 
last 12 years” diminished if not dispelled its potential significance.46 
Further, even if Juror K. in fact had concealed the information, the 
circumstances that the incident was “very brief” and occurred more than a decade 
earlier, and that Juror K. realized because she had been burglarized that “everyone 
has feares” [sic], established that the omitted information was immaterial to her 
overall qualifications or suitability to serve as a juror.  Those qualifications clearly 
were established in the course of counsel’s voir dire.47 
Moreover, even if we were to assume Juror K.’s answer to Question No. 61 
was inaccurate, evasive, and material, the circumstance that as a teenager living 
alone for the first time, Juror K. was “paranoid for a short period of someone 
                                              
46  
Because the issue is not germane to the resolution of the issues presented 
here, we need not and do not have occasion to address the question whether a 
juror’s concealment of information must be intentional.  (See In re Hitchings, 
supra, 6 Cal.4th 97, 114-116 [declining to answer the question]; Weathers v. 
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 110, fn. 5 [same]; compare 
People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 932 [concealment need not be 
intentional], People v. Blackwell (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 925, 929 [same] with 
People v. Kelly (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 118-125-128 [disagreeing with Diaz], and 
People v. Jackson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 704-706 [same]; see also 
McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 555-556 [an 
honest yet mistaken answer to a question on voir dire rarely amounts to a 
constitutional violation, and even an intentionally dishonest answer is not fatal 
provided that the falsehood does not reflect a lack of impartiality].)   
47  
During voir dire examination, Juror K. also made a few passing references 
to convicted murderer Charles Manson, indicating that she believed he would have 
been an individual eligible to receive the death penalty.  On appeal, defendant 
contends that Juror K.’s “voir dire answers take on even greater significance when 
read with her concealed fears” and with “[w]hatever else may be said about Juror 
[K.]’s fears of Charles Manson.”  Our review of the record indicates there is no 
basis for concluding that Juror K.’s brief references to Manson are supportive of 
defendant’s position.  Moreover, both the prosecutor and defense counsel took the 
opportunity to ask follow-up questions on voir dire regarding Juror K.’s 
knowledge of the Manson case.   
 
 
118
breaking in,” leading her to keep a kitchen knife in close proximity overnight, 
does not provide any basis for concluding that she harbored undisclosed juror bias.  
Accordingly, the presumption of prejudice was rebutted.48 
We further note defendant’s misplaced reliance upon our decisions in In re 
Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d 391, and People v. Pierce, supra, 24 Cal.3d 199, and 
the United States Court of Appeals’ decision in Dyer v. Calderon, supra, 151 F.3d 
970.  In Stankewitz, the petitioner successfully sought a writ of habeas corpus 
following his conviction of first degree murder, alleging he was denied a fair trial 
because one of the jurors, a police officer, had violated the court’s instructions and 
“ ‘consulted’ his own outside experience as a police officer on a question of law” 
as to when a robbery takes place.  (40 Cal.3d at p. 399.)  We characterized the 
juror’s determination as being “totally wrong,” and concluded that because the 
juror “stated it again and again to his fellow jurors [he] thus committed overt 
misconduct.”  (40 Cal.3d at pp. 399-400, fn. omitted.)  In Pierce, the defendant 
obtained a reversal of his conviction for second degree murder upon the ground of 
juror misconduct, because one of the jurors had ignored the court’s repeated 
admonitions not to discuss the case with third persons by discussing the 
proceedings during the course of the trial with a police officer acquaintance who 
had testified as a prosecution witness in the case.  (24 Cal.3d at p. 209.)  In Dyer, 
in which the court reversed a first degree murder conviction, a juror answered 
“no” to questions asking whether a relative or close friend ever had been a victim 
of any type of crime or had been accused of any offense other than a traffic 
                                              
48  
With regard to defendant’s related claim of misconduct arising from 
Juror K.’s reportedly having told Juror C-M. of her concealed fears, we observe 
that the record on appeal does not indicate what Juror K said to the other juror and 
when she said it.  Defense counsel had the opportunity to call Juror C-M. at the 
hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial, but did not do so.  The record before 
us thus provides no basis for concluding that prejudicial misconduct occurred, and 
the claim therefore fails.   
 
 
119
offense, notwithstanding the circumstance that the juror’s brother had been 
murdered and her estranged husband had been arrested for rape.  None of these 
decisions, involving egregious transgressions in derogation of the jurors’ oaths, is 
remotely apposite to the misconduct alleged to have occurred here. 
“ ‘The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within 
the court’s discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and 
unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.’ ”  (People v. Williams (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 1268, 1318 [rejecting a claim of juror misconduct based upon allegations 
that during a capital trial a juror consumed tranquilizers and engaged in a 
discussion regarding “the religious aspects of the penalty phase”].)  Our review of 
the relevant portions of the record described above leads us to conclude that the 
trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial based upon alleged 
juror misconduct.  We agree with that court’s implied finding that Juror K.’s fear 
of an intruder more than a decade earlier was highly unlikely to have influenced 
her role as a juror.  Defendant’s assertions to the contrary lack support and thus are 
unpersuasive.  No abuse of discretion by the trial court occurred.   
E. 
Section 190.4, subd. (e) Motion 
Approximately five months after the jury returned its penalty phase 
verdicts, the court considered defendant’s automatic motion for modification of 
the death sentence.  At a hearing, the court stated that it had reviewed the evidence 
introduced at trial, found the jury’s verdicts as to guilt and its findings as to special 
circumstances to be supported by the weight of the evidence, considered the 
factors in aggravation and mitigation as set forth in section 190.3, and concluded 
that “the aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh[ed] the mitigating 
circumstances.”  The court on that basis denied defendant’s application for 
modification of the death sentence. 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court improperly denied the motion, 
because (1) prior to ruling on the motion, the court considered other-crimes 
 
 
120
evidence introduced at the guilt phase of trial (notably the deaths of Tok Kim and 
Janette Cullins), and (2) following the hearing on the motion to modify but prior to 
imposing the death judgment, the court considered victim-impact statements.  
Defendant’s position is without merit. 
“ ‘In ruling on a verdict-modification application, the trial judge is required 
by section 190.4(e) to “make an independent determination whether imposition of 
the death penalty upon the defendant is proper in light of the relevant evidence and 
the applicable law.”  [Citations.]  That is to say, he must determine whether the 
jury’s decision that death is appropriate under all the circumstances is adequately 
supported.  [Citation.]  And he must make that determination independently, i.e., 
in accordance with the weight he himself believes the evidence deserves.’  
(People v. Marshall [1990]  50 Cal.3d [907,] 942.) 
“On appeal, we subject a ruling on such an application to independent 
review:  the decision resolves a mixed question of law and fact; a determination of 
this kind is generally examined de novo [Citation].  Of course, when we conduct 
such scrutiny, we simply review the trial court’s determination after independently 
considering the record; we do not make a de novo determination of penalty.”  
(People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d 612, 703-704; see also People v. Jones (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 119, 191 [same].) 
Defendant contends initially that the trial court improperly considered the 
“other-crimes” evidence involving the deaths of Tok Kim and Janette Cullins in a 
light different from that considered by the jury ⎯ that is, the jury may have 
considered the evidence in the context of establishing intent, identity, or common 
plan, whereas the trial court at the section 190.4, subdivision (e) hearing 
considered the Kim and Cullins evidence in aggravation.  As the People point out, 
however, the trial court was entitled to consider the Kim and Cullins evidence as a 
factor in aggravation under the category of criminal activity involving the use of 
force or violence.  (§ 190.3, subd. (b).)  In any event, any error in this regard 
clearly would have been nonprejudicial, because the court’s comments in 
 
 
121
extensively reviewing the list of aggravating and mitigating evidence and finding 
that the circumstances in aggravation “substantially outweigh[ed]” the 
circumstances in mitigation make clear that there is no reasonable possibility that 
such an error would have affected the trial court’s denial of the application for 
modification of the death sentence.  
With regard to defendant’s claim pertaining to improper reliance by the trial 
court upon victim-impact evidence, we perceive no error.  The court heard and 
denied defendant’s application for modification of the death sentence on 
January 11, 1990.  No victim-impact statements were made in connection with that 
motion.  Although the record contains 12 letters (either undated or bearing 1989 
dates) written by family and friends of the victims Knoll, Mills, and Guthrie 
generally expressing extreme anger, loss, and sadness, the record does not indicate 
that the court considered any of these statements prior to denying the application 
for modification of defendant’s death sentence.49  On January 30, 1990, 
immediately prior to the court’s imposition of the judgment of death, it heard 
similar statements made by Jillette Mills’s mother, Sue Ann Mills, Bonnie 
Guthrie’s sister, Jennifer Bollman, and Susan Knoll’s sister, Sandra Pender. 
Defendant assigns error to the court’s consideration of the statements 
submitted by the victims’ family members and friends.  His contention fails for 
two reasons.  First, he failed to object to the statements in question and therefore 
forfeited appellate review of this claim.  (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 
1183; People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013.) 
                                              
49  
The People assert that the letters were received by the court on January 30, 
1990, the date the court entered the judgment of death, but do not include a 
reference to the record, which does not indicate whether the letters in fact were 
received on that date.  In his Reply Brief, however, defendant does not challenge 
the People’s reference to January 30, 1990, as the date on which the court received 
the letters.   
 
 
122
Second, defendant’s claim fails on the merits.  We previously have rejected 
similar contentions that Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, prohibiting 
victim impact statements, extends to proceedings under section 190.4, subdivision 
(e).  (People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1184; People v. Benson, supra, 52 
Cal.3d 754, 812; cf. Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 830 and fn. 2, 
overruling Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496.)  Nevertheless, we also have 
observed that “the scope of a modification motion does not encompass statements 
of the victim’s relatives or any other evidence not presented to the jury during the 
penalty phase trial.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1184.)  
Here, however, the record is clear that in denying defendant’s application to 
modify the death sentence, the trial court relied solely upon the evidence presented 
to the jury and was guided by the factors enumerated in section 190.3; as indicated 
above, the three oral statements now challenged by defendant were made 
approximately three weeks after the court denied the application, and nothing in 
the record indicates that the trial court considered the letters at any time.  Thus, the 
record before us provides no basis for concluding that the trial court in ruling on 
the application improperly considered any matter that was not placed before the 
jury.50 
F. 
Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors 
committed at his trial led to a miscarriage of justice, requiring reversal of the guilt 
and penalty phase judgments.  Having determined that defendant’s trial was nearly 
devoid of any error, and that to the extent any error was committed it was clearly 
                                              
50  
Nor do we find any merit in defendant’s claim that the trial court 
improperly admitted “prejudicial victim-impact evidence” in the form of the 
victims’ family members’ identification of items of personal property recovered 
from the vehicle driven by defendant at the time of his arrest.  This testimony 
properly was admitted.  (See ante, pp. 55-64.)   
 
 
123
harmless, we conclude that defendant’s contention as to cumulative error lacks 
merit. 
G. The Delay Between Imposition of Sentence and Execution  
Defendant was sentenced to death on January 30, 1990, and counsel was 
appointed to pursue his automatic appeal more than four years later, on March 18, 
1994.  Defendant contends that the passage of this period of time, in addition to 
the approximately eleven years that have elapsed since then (during which time 
defendant has pursued his automatic appeal and claims on habeas corpus in state 
and federal court), are “largely the result of inadequate resources provided by the 
state to review death verdicts, and the complexity of review mandated by past 
abuses.”  Defendant contends that in view of these asserted circumstances, the 
judicial process compels him “to endure the uncertainty and ever-present tension 
on death row for such an extended period of time constitut[ing] cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment . . . .”  (Ibid.)  (See Lackey v. 
Texas 1995) 514 U.S. 1045 [memo. opn. on den. of cert. by Stevens, J., observing 
that neither retribution nor deterrence is served when prisoners serve 17 years 
under a sentence of death].) 
Defendant’s contention resembles a claim that we declined to address in 
People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1182-1183.  As we explained in 
Barnett, “[b]ecause defendant’s claim is dependent upon evidence and matters not 
reflected in the record on appeal, we decline to consider it at this juncture.”  (Id., at 
p. 1183.)  For similar reasons, we decline to address defendant’s claim. 
H. Use of Lethal Injection 
 
Defendant contends the use of lethal injection as a method of execution 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and on that basis is unconstitutional.  We 
previously have rejected the identical claim (see, e.g., People v. Samayoa, supra, 
 
 
124
15 Cal.4th 795, 864; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 702), and defendant 
fails to present any reason for us to reconsider our prior decisions.  We therefore 
reject defendant’s contention. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Carter 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S014021 
Date Filed: August 15, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert W. Thomas 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Phillip H. Cherney, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Carl H. Horst and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Phillip H. Cherney 
214 South Johnson Street 
Visalia, CA  93291 
(559) 732-6852 
 
Jeffrey J. Koch 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street. Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2213