Title: State v. Toevs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S42836
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 1998

Filed:  September 24, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

								Respondent on Review,

	v.

LESLIE LEE TOEVS,

								Petitioner on Review.

(CC 10-94-01400; CA A85708; SC S42836)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted May 3, 1996, en banc; consolidated and
reargued with State v. Cleveland (S41302) and State v. Fleetwood
(S41311), and resubmitted March 3, 1997, before Carson, Chief
Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen, and Durham, Justices.**

	Eric R. Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review on May 3, 1996.  Peter Gartlan,
Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause on March 3, 1997, and
filed a consolidated brief.  With them on the briefs was Sally L.
Avera, Public Defender.

	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review on May 3, 1996.  With
him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General,
and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.  Timothy A. Sylwester,
Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause on March 3, 1997,
and filed a consolidated brief.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General,
Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant Solicitor General, and Robert M.
Atkinson, Rives Kistler, and Eleanor E. Wallace, Assistant
Attorneys General.

	Thomas M. Christ, Portland, filed a consolidated brief on
behalf of amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.

	David G. Terry and David E. Groom, Salem, filed a
consolidated brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association.

	CARSON, C.J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.

    *Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court,

	Lyle C. Velure, Judge.

	137 Or App 529, 904 P2d 658 (1995).

   **Unis, J., retired June 30, 1996, and did not participate in
this decision; Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J.,
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.

		CARSON, C.J.

		This criminal case involves the application of      
ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1993),(1) 
which sets forth the authority of a
police officer during the course of investigating a traffic
infraction.  After denying defendant's motion to suppress
evidence found during a traffic stop, the trial court convicted
defendant of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction.  State v. Toevs, 137 Or App 529, 904 P2d 658 (1995). 
Defendant now asks this court to reverse that conviction.  For
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the officers' conduct
in this case violated ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1993) and, consequently,
that the evidence at issue must be suppressed.  Accordingly, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the trial court.  

		On December 8, 1993, at 12:40 a.m., Officer Smith of
the Cottage Grove Police Department saw defendant operating a
vehicle that did not have its headlights turned on, a Class B
traffic infraction.  ORS 811.515(1) and 811.520(3).  Officer
Solesbee, Smith's training officer, was with Smith.  Smith
stopped defendant's vehicle to investigate the traffic
infraction, parking his patrol vehicle behind defendant's
vehicle.  Solesbee stepped out of the patrol vehicle and stood in
front of it on the driver's side.  Smith, meanwhile, approached
the driver's side of defendant's vehicle and asked to see
defendant's driver license, proof of insurance, and vehicle
registration.  Defendant produced them and explained to Smith
that he thought that his headlights were on when, in fact, he had
turned on only his parking lights. 

		Smith took defendant's documents and ran a check on
them.  Smith then learned from his dispatcher that defendant, who
had a valid driver license, was on parole.  Smith decided not to
issue a traffic citation to defendant and switched off his
overhead lights.  Smith mentioned to Solesbee, however, that he
wanted to search defendant's vehicle.  Solesbee responded that he
had had prior drug-related contact with defendant and thought
that defendant was on parole for drug use.  Solesbee further
opined that, if Smith searched defendant's vehicle, he would find
contraband of some sort.

		Smith walked back to defendant's vehicle, returned
defendant's documents, and told defendant that he was free to go. 
At that time, Smith had no reason to believe that defendant had
engaged in criminal activity.  Smith then asked defendant if he
could search defendant's vehicle.  Defendant asked Smith if Smith
was accusing him of anything.  Smith responded that he was not
accusing defendant, but wondered why defendant would not consent
to a search.  Smith then asked if he could search both defendant
and defendant's vehicle, and asked whether there were any drugs
in defendant's vehicle.  Defendant responded that he did not have
any drugs and, again, did not consent to a search.  That
conversation, beginning from the time when Smith told defendant
that he was free to go, lasted about 30 seconds.

		Solesbee, who had been watching Smith and defendant
from his position behind defendant's vehicle, then approached the
driver's side of defendant's vehicle and interrupted the
conversation between Smith and defendant.  Smith stepped back and
stopped his questioning.  Solesbee asked defendant, in a "low
key" and "friendly" manner, "if he had any dope in the vehicle." 
Defendant shielded his eyes, lowered his face, and answered
"[n]o."  At that point, Solesbee observed that defendant
"appeared very fidgety, extremely nervous acting, excited in his
body movements but not excited in his speech.  His pupils were
extremely dilated."  In Solesbee's training and experience, he
believed that defendant might have ingested methamphetamine. 

		Solesbee then stated to defendant that defendant would
feel better about the situation if he were honest and told
Solesbee that he had drugs in his vehicle, if indeed he did. 
Solesbee asked defendant again if he had any drugs in the
vehicle.  Defendant responded that "[t]here is a little in the
truck."  Solesbee then ordered defendant to get out of his
vehicle.  Smith searched the vehicle, following defendant's
directions, and found a box under the driver's seat that
contained a bindle of methamphetamine and several syringes.

		Defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance.  Before trial, he moved to suppress the
evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, contending,
among other things, that the questioning by Smith and Solesbee,
following the initial traffic stop, constituted either a
continued detention or a separate stop, neither of which were
permissible under ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1993).  After hearing
testimony from Smith, Solesbee, and defendant, the trial court
denied defendant's motion.  Based upon stipulated facts, the
court then found defendant guilty, as charged.

		Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed in a per curiam opinion, citing only State v. Bonham,
120 Or App 371, 852 P2d 905 (1993).  Toevs, 137 Or App 529.  We
allowed defendant's petition for review and 
heard oral argument.(2)

		ORS 810.410(3) (1993) provided, in part:

	"A police officer:

	"* * * * *

	"(b)  May stop and detain a person for a traffic
infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably
related to the traffic infraction, identification and
issuance of citation."(3)

		That statute "defines the authority of the police to
respond to a traffic infraction; by implication, the statute
proscribes any further action by the police * * *, unless [that
further action] has some basis other than the traffic
infraction."  State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 120, 817 P2d 1306
(1991).  That is, ORS 810.410(3)(b) prohibits an officer from
continuing to detain a person stopped for a traffic infraction
after completing the investigation reasonably related to the
infraction, unless the officer has some other reason, separate
from the traffic stop, for doing so.  State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 212, 895 P2d 306 (1995).  Further, the
statute prohibits a search or investigation that explores for
evidence of other crimes or infractions not reasonably related to
the traffic infraction.  Porter, 312 Or at 120.

		Defendant contends that Smith and Solesbee exceeded the
scope of their authority under ORS 810.410(3)(b) when they
questioned him about possessing drugs and requested consent to
search his vehicle.  Defendant first argues that the officers'
conduct constituted a continued detention that was not reasonably
related to the traffic stop and, therefore, was unlawful under
Dominguez-Martinez.  Defendant also argues that, even if the
traffic stop ended when Smith stated that he was free to go and
the subsequent questioning constituted only a mere conversation
or noncoercive encounter, such an encounter is not authorized in
the context of a traffic stop, under ORS 810.410(3)(b). 
Alternatively, defendant argues that, if the traffic stop ended
when Smith stated that he was free to go, then the subsequent
questioning constituted a second stop under Article I, section 9,
of the Oregon Constitution,(4) 
that was not supported by reasonable
suspicion that defendant had engaged in any criminal activity.

		The state responds that the traffic stop ended when
Smith returned defendant's documents and told defendant that he
was free to go.  It follows, in the state's view, that the
subsequent questioning constituted a mere conversation or
noncoercive encounter that is not prohibited by               
ORS 810.410(3)(b).  As we shall explain, we conclude that the
traffic stop did not end when Smith returned defendant's
documents and told defendant that he was free to go. 
Consequently, the subsequent questioning by Smith and Solesbee
constituted a continued detention of defendant that violated   
ORS 810.410(3)(b), because it was neither reasonably related to
the investigation of the traffic infraction, identification, or
issuance of a citation, nor based upon some other reason,
separate from the traffic stop.(5)

		As a preliminary matter, we must ascertain the proper
methodology for determining whether a traffic stop either
continued or ended under ORS 810.410(3)(b).  That is, we must
determine the legislature's intent when it provided that an
officer "[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic
infraction."  (Emphasis added.)  We first examine the text and
context of the statute.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Context includes other
provisions of the statute at issue and related statutes.  Id. at
611.  Case law interpreting the statute at issue also is
considered at our first level of analysis.  Davis v. O'Brien, 320
Or 729, 741, 891 P2d 1307 (1995).  If the meaning of the statute
is clear from its text and context, then we proceed no further. 
PGE, 317 Or at 611.

		ORS 810.410(3)(b), which is part of the Oregon Vehicle
Code, does not define the words "stop" and "detain."  Our case
law applying the statute also is not helpful, because the cases
involved facts that were sufficiently clear without requiring
that the court develop a methodology for making that
determination.  See, e.g., Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or at 213
(officer unlawfully detained defendant by standing in open
doorway of defendant's vehicle); State v. Farley, 
308 Or 91, 94-95, 775 P2d 835 (1989) (officer unlawfully detained defendant by
requesting driver license and proof of insurance after reason for
traffic stop no longer existed).

		Other related statutory provisions, however, are
instructive.(6)  First, in 
addition to authorizing a police officer
to "stop" and "detain" a person, ORS 810.410(3) also authorizes 
an officer to "make an arrest of a person as authorized by       
ORS 133.310(2) if the person is stopped and detained pursuant to
the authority of this section."  Former ORS 810.410(3)(c) (1993),
renumbered as ORS 810.410(3)(g) (1997) (emphasis added).      
ORS 133.310(2) is part of the criminal procedure code and sets
forth the authority to make warrantless arrests in certain
circumstances.  For the purpose of that statute, "arrest" is
defined as follows:

	"'Arrest' means to place a person under actual or
constructive restraint or to take a person into custody
for the purpose of charging that person with an
offense.  A 'stop' as authorized under ORS 131.605 to
131.625 is not an arrest."  

ORS 133.005(1) (emphasis added).

		ORS 131.605 to 131.625, which also are part of the
criminal procedure code, provide definitions and set forth the
authority of a peace officer to stop, detain, and frisk a person
in contexts other than a traffic stop.  According to former   
ORS 131.605(5) (1993), renumbered as ORS 131.605(6) (1997), "[a]
'stop' is a temporary restraint of a person's liberty by a peace
officer lawfully present in any place."  (Emphasis added.)    
ORS 131.615(2) further provides that "[a] detention and inquiry
[during the course of a lawful stop] shall be conducted in the
vicinity of the stop and for no longer than a reasonable time." 
(Emphasis added.)

		It is evident that, in referring to specific provisions
of the criminal procedure code in ORS 810.410(3), the legislature
intended that certain legal terms that are common to both the
vehicle code and the criminal procedure code, such as "stop" and
"detain," would carry the same meaning and be interpreted in the
same manner, unless otherwise provided.  Nothing in the text or
context of ORS 810.410(3)(b) points to a contrary conclusion, or
even to a plausible alternative interpretation.  Consequently, we
conclude that, in using the words "stop" and "detain" in      
ORS 810.410(3)(b), the legislature was referring to a temporary
restraint of a person's liberty and a continuation of such a
restraint.  We further conclude that our methodology for
determining whether a stop either ended or continued must be the
same under the vehicle code as under the criminal procedure code.

		Consistent with the foregoing, we now explain our
general methodology for determining whether an officer's contact
with a citizen rises to the level of a stop or a detention under
the criminal procedure code.  This court has stated that, in
enacting ORS 131.605 to 131.625, the legislature intended to
codify judicial decisions interpreting Article I, section 9, of
the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.(7)  State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 496-97, 624
P2d 99 (1981).  The analysis of a defendant's rights under those
statutes, therefore, "is substantially the same as [an] analysis
of [the defendant's] rights under the search and seizure
provisions of the Oregon and Federal constitutions."(8)  Id. at
497.

		In State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 407, 813 P2d 28 (1991),
this court explained that generally there are three categories of
encounters between police officers and citizens:  (1) a mere
conversation or noncoercive encounter that involves no restraint
of liberty and, therefore, is not a seizure that requires any
justification; (2) a stop, which is a type of seizure that occurs
when an officer temporarily restrains a person's liberty or
freedom of movement, that must be justified by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) an arrest, which also is
a type of seizure, that must be justified by probable cause to
believe that the person arrested has committed a crime.  As we
have explained, a "detention," in this context, is the
continuation of a "stop."

		The court in Holmes held that a "seizure," which
includes a stop, occurs under Article I, section 9, whenever a
person subjectively believes that a law enforcement officer
significantly has restricted or interfered with that person's
liberty or freedom of movement and such a belief is objectively
reasonable under the circumstances.  Id. at 409-10; see also
State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 76-77, 854 P2d 421 (1993) (applying
that test under former ORS 131.605(5) (1993), renumbered as   
ORS 131.605(6) (1997)).  The determination whether a stop
occurred thus requires a fact-specific inquiry into the totality
of the circumstances.  Holmes, 311 Or at 408; see also Ehly, 317
Or at 76-77 (demonstrating such an inquiry under former       
ORS 131.605(5) (1993), renumbered as ORS 131.605(6) (1997)).

		Because a detention is the continuation of a stop, that
same analysis applies when determining whether an unlawful
detention occurred following a lawful stop.  See State v. Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or 1, 6-7, 942 P2d 772 (1997) (discussing case law
governing stops of persons under Article I, section 9, in context
of determining whether unlawful detention of property had
followed lawful stop).  In either circumstance, the central
inquiry is whether an officer 

"engages in conduct significantly beyond that accepted
in ordinary social intercourse.  The pivotal factor is
whether the officer, even if making inquiries [that] a
private citizen would not, has otherwise conducted
himself in a manner that would be perceived as a
nonoffensive contact if it had occurred between two
ordinary citizens."  

Holmes, 311 Or at 410.

		The determination of a defendant's subjective belief
under Holmes is a question of fact to be determined by the trial
court.  See State v. Ford, 310 Or 623, 638, 801 P2d 754 (1990)
("What actually transpired is a question of fact for the finder
of fact.").  The determination whether a defendant's subjective
belief is objectively reasonable, however, requires an
independent assessment of the facts by this court.  See State v.
Gerrish, 311 Or 506, 513, 815 P2d 1244 (1991) (court
independently determined whether defendant's belief was
reasonable in the circumstances).

		We now apply those principles to the facts of this
case.  At the outset, we note that the trial court made no
written findings of fact.  However, the record demonstrates that
the court found that defendant subjectively believed that Smith
and Solesbee significantly had restricted his freedom of
movement, despite telling him that he was free to go,(9) and that
that belief objectively was reasonable.  However, believing to be
bound by a Court of Appeals decision, State v. Bonham, 120 Or App
371, the trial court nonetheless denied defendant's motion.(10)

		We now conduct an independent determination whether
defendant's belief that the stop had not ended objectively was
reasonable.  In our view, the following facts are significant. 
First, after telling defendant that he was free to go, Smith
immediately asked defendant if he could search the vehicle.  He
continued to do so, even though defendant did not give consent
after the first request.  He also asked defendant if defendant
possessed any drugs.  Second, while Smith was questioning
defendant, Solesbee, who had had prior drug-related contact with
defendant, was standing outside the patrol vehicle, behind
defendant's vehicle on the driver's side.  When it became
apparent that Smith was unable to obtain defendant's consent to a
search, Solesbee also approached defendant and interrupted Smith. 
Solesbee then asked defendant two more times if he had any drugs
in the vehicle.

		Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that a reasonable person in defendant's position could have
believed that the officers significantly had restricted his
liberty or freedom of movement.  Indeed, the officers' continuous
show of police authority constituted conduct that was
"significantly beyond that accepted in ordinary social
intercourse."  Holmes, 311 Or at 410.  Therefore, through that
conduct, they continued to detain defendant.  See State v.
Painter, 296 Or 422, 425, 676 P2d 309 (1984) ("[A] show of
authority may suffice to convert a police-citizen encounter into
a 'stop' of statutory proportion.").

		The state contends that, because Smith told defendant
that he was free to go, the traffic stop ended before Smith began
questioning defendant about possessing drugs.  It is true that,
when an officer tells a driver that he or she is free to go, that
factor certainly can weigh in favor of concluding that a traffic
stop indeed had ended.  However, our case law demonstrates that,
when viewing the totality of the circumstances, an officer's
conduct after stating that a driver is free to go may negate such
a statement.  See Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or at 208, 213 (officer
who told defendant that he was free to go while leaning on open
door of defendant's vehicle continued to detain defendant in
violation of ORS 810.410(3)(b)).(11)

		In sum, we conclude that the stop did not end when
Smith returned defendant's documents and told him that he was
free to go.  Because the ensuing questioning was neither
"reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification
[or] issuance of citation" under ORS 810.410(3)(b), nor based
upon some other reason, separate from the traffic stop, the
officers exceeded the scope of their authority under that statute
when they continued to detain defendant.

		Having concluded that the officers detained defendant
in violation of ORS 810.410(3)(b), we now must determine whether
the evidence discovered during the search of defendant's vehicle
should have been suppressed.  Under this court's case law,
suppression is appropriate here:  

"* * * '[B]ecause the object of [ORS 810.410(3)] is to
define the authority of officers to respond to a
traffic infraction,' the evidence should be suppressed
when police officers exceed that authority.  [Porter,]
312 Or at 121.  See also State v. Davis, 295 Or 227,
236, 666 P2d 802 (1983) ("[W]hen the object of the
statute is to define the authority of officers to seize
or to search a person or property * * * the court has
drawn the logical consequence and has given effect to
the statute by denying the state the use of evidence
that it would not have secured if its officer had
respected the rights that the statute was designed to
protect.'  (Emphasis added.))."

Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or at 214 (emphasis in original; second
and fourth brackets in original; second ellipses in original).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when it denied
defendant's motion to suppress.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.

1. 	ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1993) is set out in the text below.

2. 	This case originally was argued and submitted in May
1996.  In November 1996, the voters approved Ballot Measure 40
(1996), a "crime victims' rights" initiative that, among other
things, would have created new constitutional limitations upon
the suppression of evidence.  Another oral argument was held in
this case in March 1997, so that the parties could address issues
concerning the retroactivity and validity of Measure 40, and its
potential application to this case.  Subsequently, in Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49 (1998), this court concluded
that Measure 40 contained two or more amendments to the Oregon
Constitution that must be voted upon separately and,
consequently, that the measure was invalid in its entirety. 
Accordingly, Measure 40 no longer is an issue in this case.

		The 1997 Legislature enacted legislation that, similar
to Measure 40, created new limitations upon the suppression of evidence in certain
circumstances.  ORS 136.432 (1997); Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 1.  Because neither party has
raised the issue whether that new legislation applies to this case, we do not address that issue
here.

3. 	The 1997 Legislature amended ORS 810.410(3).  The amended version of the
statute provides that, when investigating traffic stops, police officers may:  (1) inquire into
certain circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) inquire
regarding the presence of weapons; and (3) request consent to search for certain items of
evidence.       ORS 810.410(3)(c) to (e) (1997).  That amended version of      ORS 810.410(3)
does not apply retroactively.  Or Laws 1997,     ch 866, §§ 5, 6.  Our decision in this case
concerns only the 1993 version of ORS 810.410(3), and all references to the statute in the text
that follows are to that earlier version.

4. 	Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides, in part:  "No law shall
violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search, or seizure[.]"

5. 	Because we conclude that the officers' actions constituted a continued detention
under ORS 810.410(3)(b), we need not, and do not, decide whether that statute prohibits a police
officer from engaging in mere conversation with a driver following the completion of a traffic
stop.

6. 	One related statute, ORS 801.510, defines the word "stop" for purposes of the
vehicle code.  However, that definition, which applies "[e]xcept where the context requires
otherwise," ORS 801.100, refers to the cessation from movement of a vehicle, rather than
defining a type of police-citizen encounter.  Therefore, that statutory definition is not helpful to
our inquiry here.

7. 	The relevant text of Article I, section 9, is set out at ___ Or at ___ n 4 (slip op at 7
n 4).  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:  "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]"

8. 	This court conducts a separate analysis, first under the state constitution and then
under the federal constitution, if required.  See, e.g., State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 77-91, 854 P2d
421 (1993) (so demonstrating).

9.      	The evidence in the record supports that conclusion. 
Defendant testified that he never felt that he was free to leave
and that, "[i]f I felt like I was free to leave, I would have
left."

10. 	In Bonham, a police officer had told the defendant that
he was free to go, following a valid traffic stop, and then had
asked the defendant for consent to search his vehicle.  The
defendant consented, and the ensuing search uncovered drugs and
other evidence of criminal activity.  120 Or App at 373.  A
majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that the traffic stop
ended when the officer told the defendant that he was free to go
and that the subsequent request to search was permissible,
because it did not rise to the level of a stop.  Id. at 376-77.

11.      	The state also contends that, because the conversation
between Solesbee and defendant was "low key" and "friendly,"
their interaction could not be viewed as a stop.  That fact does
not change our conclusion that, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person could have believed that the
stop had not ended.