Title: Sims v. Knollwood Park Hosp.
Citation: 511 So. 2d 154
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 1987

511 So. 2d 154 (1987)
Eulyn H. SIMS
v.
KNOLLWOOD PARK HOSPITAL.
85-609.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 27, 1987.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 10, 1987.
Taylor D. Wilkins, Jr., of Wilkins, Bankester &amp; Biles, Bay Minette, for appellant.
Jerry A. McDowell and Davis Carr, Mobile, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
Appeal by plaintiff, Eulyn H. Sims, from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict for the defendant, Knollwood Park Hospital, in plaintiff's action based upon negligence and breach of an implied agreement. We reverse and remand.
While a patient at Knollwood, plaintiff had surgery for the removal of her gallbladder. She was placed in the intensive care unit of the hospital. While there, Mrs. Sims fell from a chair in which she had been placed and sustained a hip fracture.
Mrs. Sims's complaint against the hospital contained two counts. Count I alleged that the defendant negligently caused or allowed plaintiff to fall and injure herself while in the intensive care unit, with the proximate consequence being her permanent injury; pain; and mental anguish. Count II alleged an implied agreement, for a consideration, to treat, nurse, care for, and observe plaintiff while she was a patient, and a breach of that agreement to her injury.
Defendant hospital answered, denying any negligence and any implied agreement. Trial by jury ensued, with plaintiff withdrawing Count II, the allegation of an implied agreement. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant on Count I.
Plaintiff has presented a number of issues for our review. Among these is the trial court's denial of a discovery request made by plaintiff concerning an "incident report."
Plaintiff filed a motion to produce which sought "[a]ll written reports, memoranda or notes concerning the fall of Eulyn H. Sims in the Intensive Care Unit at Knollwood Park Hospital." Defendant objected to the production, with the following response:
Plaintiff then moved for an order for production contending she was entitled under Rule 26, A.R.Civ.P., to peruse the incident report prepared by hospital personnel concerning her fall. The trial court ordered production of the document, reviewed it in camera, denied plaintiff's motion, and ordered the document sealed. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied. Subsequently, the trial court granted defendant's motion in limine prohibiting reference to the incident report during trial.
In reviewing this issue, it is important to consider that the gist of plaintiff's action was that she was allowed to fall from the chair in which hospital personnel had placed her. The following facts concerning that event illuminate plaintiff's purpose in attempting to obtain the incident report.
The nurse in charge of plaintiff at the time of her fall was Mrs. Armita Underwood, who testified as follows:
Apparently Mrs. Underwood had testified by deposition to the same effect.
The deposition of Dr. Lozier, one of Mrs. Sims's attending physicians, varied somewhat from Mrs. Underwood's account:
A comparison of Mrs. Underwood's testimony with that of Dr. Lozier reveals contradictory aspects which might have been either clarified, on the one hand, or accentuated on the other, by the contents of the "incident report." The "incident report" may have contained relevant information, indeed, on the merits of the case, i.e., the negligence vel non of the hospital staff.
The response of defendant's counsel to the trial court's order to produce the "incident report" is revealing in regard to the character and nature of that report. We quote from counsel's letter, which is contained in the record:
Although the hospital concluded that this document was prepared in anticipation of litigation, that conclusion, we respectfully observe, must be tested by applying the rules of discovery to the circumstances of the incident report's creation.
Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." When it is asserted that an otherwise discoverable document was made "in anticipation of litigation," the objecting party bears the burden of proving the elements of the work-product exception of Rule 26(b)(3). Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
A case analogous to the instant situation arose in Assured Investors Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So. 2d 228 (Ala.1978). In that case, civil litigants sought to discover a transcript of a statement made by a person whose activities were being investigated by the district attorney's office. The district attorney's office opposed discovery of the document on the ground that it was the "work product" of that office. In deciding against that position, this Court stated, at 232:
*157 "The `work product' argument is inapplicable because:
The defendant's own description of the need for such "incident reports," moreover, is revealing, for it states that "[t]his document is prepared when an incident occurs at the hospital which might result in some legal action." That is to say, while "incidents" that in someone's opinion might result in legal action may not in themselves be routine, it is the routine of the hospital to make an "incident report" when such incidents do occur.
Of course, such a speculation as to possible litigation is not enough to cloak those reports with the protection given an attorney's work product. Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir.1983), contains relevant discussion and evaluation of that premise:[1]
"Similarly, we find persuasive the court's reasoning in Janicker v. George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C.1982):
"The court in Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C.Cir.1980) held that the party seeking to assert the work product privilege has the burden of proving that `at the very least some articulable claim, likely to lead to litigation, [has] arisen.'" (Emphasis added.)
That court concluded at 1120:
Nor does it aid the defendant that this incident report was turned over to a "risk manager" and ultimately made its way to "the legal department." In Rakus v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 76 F.R.D. 145 (W.D.N. Y.1977), the incident reports prepared by a railroad supervisor and a division engineer for the railroad's claims department were held not to have been made in anticipation of litigation. "If defendants' argument were upheld," the court pithily observed, "all discovery of intercompany reports would be subject to the requirements of rule 26(b)(3) in any case where the company maintained a claims department. This position is untenable."
We conclude that this "incident report" was not a "work product" falling within the trial preparation exception of Rule 26(b)(3), A.R.Civ.P. In reaching that conclusion, we observe that in essence there was no difference in the preparation of this report and the preparation of the statements referred to in Assured Investors Life Ins. Co., supra, or the letters in *159 question in Binks Manufacturing Co., supra. See also APL Corporation v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 91 F.R.D. 10 (D.Md.1980).
We are not unmindful of the broad discretionary power given to the trial court in the discovery process, as noted in Campbell v. Regal Typewriter Co., 341 So. 2d 120 (Ala.1976). The question in such cases as Regal and the instant case "becomes one of whether, under all the circumstances, the trial court has abused its discretion." Campbell, at 123. Under the circumstances of the preparation of this report, however, and the principles of law applicable thereto, we must conclude that the trial court erred in denying production of the document and subsequently granting defendant's motion in limine. That error must, and does, result in reversal of the judgment below, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
REATTY, Justice.
OPINION MODIFIED; APPLICATION OVERRULED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
[1]  "Our Rules of Civil Procedure are based upon, and are strikingly similar to, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because these two sets of Rules are virtually verbatim, a presumption arises that cases construing the Federal Rules are authority for construction of the Alabama Rules." Assured Investors Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So. 2d 228, 231 (Ala.1978).