Title: Anthony K. Russell v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-335
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-335 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY K. RUSSELL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 1, 2008] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
Petitioner Anthony Russell seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Russell v. State, 920 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), on the 
ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Santiago v. State, 889 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), and the 
Second District Court of Appeal in Colwell v. State, 838 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2003), and Colina v. State, 629 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), on a question of 
law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that 
follow, we approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Russell, 
disapprove the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Santiago, and 
 
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disapprove the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Colwell and 
Colina to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.  We hold that the 
decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), is not applicable to 
probation revocation proceedings and that the trial court properly revoked 
Russell‟s probation. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Anthony Kalick Russell pled guilty in 2002 to one count of carrying a 
concealed firearm.  In January 2003, the trial court withheld adjudication and 
placed him on two years‟ probation.  In November 2003, Russell pled guilty to a 
charge of sexual battery upon a child under the age of sixteen.  The court sentenced 
him as a youthful offender to 365 days in the county jail followed by five years of 
sex offender probation, with the composite sentence to run concurrently with his 
existing probation.  On October 1, 2004, a notice of violation of probation was 
filed alleging that Russell failed to report and submit written monthly reports, 
failed to perform his fifty hours of public service, and failed to make payments 
towards his court costs and fines.   
 
On October 14, 2004, Marion County Sheriff‟s Deputy Raymond Torrellas 
was dispatched to a gas station in response to a battery call, where he met Russell‟s 
girlfriend, Nicole D‟Alessandro.  She told the deputy what had just transpired and 
wrote out a statement.  Russell was arrested later that evening and charged with 
 
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aggravated battery on a pregnant person.  On October 20, 2004, an addendum to 
the October 1 notice of violation was filed to include the alleged battery as a 
violation of probation.  Russell denied the battery allegation and demanded a 
hearing.   
Russell’s Probation Revocation Hearing 
 
At the July 15, 2005, probation violation hearing, the victim did not testify 
and Deputy Torrellas related the above version of the incident.  The detective 
testified that the victim seemed nervous and scared when he arrived some ten 
minutes after the call.  He observed a red mark on the back of the victim‟s neck 
that was consistent with her story.  Although Polaroid pictures of the bruise had 
been taken, they were not presented at the hearing.  Over objections on the ground 
of hearsay within hearsay, the State introduced a copy of the victim‟s handwritten 
statement, which stated the following: 
Anthony Russell (my boyfriend) and me Nicole D‟Alessandro were going to 
vacuum my car before I take him to his sex offenders class.  We were 
fighting [at the BP] about me not dropping him off.  He wanted to go by 
himself and I said no because I had things to do.  So we kept fighting and as 
I told him no as I turned around and he hit me in the back of the neck and I 
went to grab my key out of the car & he pulled me back & pulled my hair.  
So I got away & ran to the BP & he pulled off w/ my car. 
 
Trial counsel further objected that use of the statement would violate Russell‟s 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  The trial judge responded that it could be 
 
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“quadruple hearsay” and still be admissible in a probation violation hearing, but it 
could not be the sole basis to find a violation. 
 
The detective further testified that he arrested Russell that evening and read 
him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  He stated that 
Russell did not initially want to make any statement but, nonetheless, began a 
conversation en route to the jail.  The detective testified that Russell admitted 
knowing that the victim was pregnant, but said that he did not believe that he was 
the baby‟s father.  Russell also told the detective that he does not hit the victim, 
“he just roughs her up.”  On cross-examination, the detective admitted that his 
police report did not mention the reading of Miranda rights or Russell‟s knowledge 
of the victim‟s pregnancy.  The detective said that he remembered this particular 
arrest because Russell cried on the way to the station. 
 
Russell testified at the hearing regarding the missing probation reports and 
his failure to make scheduled payments toward his court costs, but he invoked his 
Fifth Amendment right regarding the battery allegation.  In closing, trial counsel 
argued that the reporting and financial violations were neither willful nor 
substantial.  As to the battery violation, trial counsel raised Crawford v. 
Washington as an objection to the admission of the victim‟s written statement.  
Counsel also argued that the State failed to present a prima facie case of battery on 
a pregnant woman, contending that the victim was admittedly not visibly pregnant 
 
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and that Russell‟s acknowledgement of the pregnancy should be suppressed 
because it was questionable whether he had even been read his Miranda rights. 
 
The court found Russell guilty of the battery violation by the greater weight 
of the evidence and found him not guilty of all other allegations of violation.  The 
court emphasized that “absolutely no weight” was given to the victim‟s written 
statement.  The court stated that it relied upon both hearsay and non-hearsay and 
found the officer‟s testimony to be credible.  The court adjudicated Russell guilty 
of the 2003 sexual battery charge and sentenced him to fifteen years on that charge 
and five years on the 2001 weapons charge.  On July 20, 2005, Russell was 
acquitted of the battery charge in a jury trial.  The court rendered its final order of 
violation of probation on July 26, 2005.  Soon thereafter, the court denied Russell‟s 
motion to mitigate the sentence based on the acquittal.   
Russell appealed to the Fifth District, which affirmed the revocation.  
Russell v. State, 920 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).  The Fifth District 
acknowledged contrary authority in Santiago, Colwell, and Blair v. State, 805 So. 
2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), but it held that its decision was controlled by its prior 
ruling in Arndt v. State, 815 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), where it found the 
hearsay statement of the victim coupled with the officer‟s observation of injury 
sufficient to prove a probation violation.  This Court granted review based on the 
express and direct conflict. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The case presents the Court with two issues: (1) whether admission of 
hearsay from the alleged victim denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sustaining the revocation of 
probation based only upon the hearsay statements of the victim and observation of 
an injury to the victim. 
Crawford Issue 
 
The first issue in the case is whether the admission of hearsay testimony 
from the victim denied Russell his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  
Russell contends that the victim‟s statements are testimonial hearsay under 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and further contends that Crawford 
applies to probation revocation proceedings because such proceedings are criminal 
prosecutions.  Russell argues that, as a result, he was denied his constitutional right 
to confront and cross-examine the only witness to the alleged battery, the victim, 
because she did not appear at the revocation hearing.   
 
Although jurisdiction in this case is based upon express and direct conflict 
regarding the legal sufficiency of the non-hearsay evidence needed to revoke 
probation, having granted jurisdiction, this Court may examine all issues raised and 
argued before the lower court.  See Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 
1982).   
 
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In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held an out-of-court 
testimonial statement of an unavailable declarant is not admissible at a criminal 
trial unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  If 
these requirements are not satisfied, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of 
the evidence.  The Crawford decision applies specifically to the use of testimonial 
statements during a criminal prosecution.   However, we recently addressed the 
issue of whether Crawford applies to probation revocation proceedings in Peters v. 
State, No. SC06-341 (Fla. May 1, 2008), as a certified question of great public 
importance.1  In Peters, we held that revocation of probation or community control 
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and therefore Crawford does not apply 
to revocation proceedings.  Accordingly, because Crawford addresses the use of 
testimonial hearsay only in the context of criminal prosecutions, the decision does 
not apply to Florida revocation proceedings. 
Violation of Probation Proceeding 
 
The second issue is whether a trial court may find that a violation of 
probation for an alleged battery has been proven by a preponderance of the 
                                          
 
1.  In Peters v. State, Peters argued that he had a Sixth Amendment right in 
his probation revocation hearing to cross-examine the laboratory technician who 
performed the positive urinalysis report.  The certified question asked whether “the 
„testimonial hearsay‟ rule set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 
[applied] in community control and/or probation revocation proceedings?”  Peters 
v. State, 919 So. 2d 624, 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 
 
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evidence through a hearsay statement of the victim, which would be inadmissible 
at trial, and non-hearsay testimony of direct observation of victim injury and 
attendant circumstances.  It is undisputed that hearsay evidence is admissible in a 
probation revocation hearing to prove a violation of probation.  However, the 
hearsay evidence may not form the sole basis for revocation.  See Cuciak v. State, 
410 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1982).  The hearsay evidence must be supported by non-
hearsay evidence.  See Garcia v. State, 701 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).  
Furthermore, the State need only establish by greater weight of the evidence that 
the violation of probation occurred.  State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 
2002).   
 
In determining whether probation should be revoked, the trial court enjoys 
broad discretion.  See Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974).  As the Court 
emphasized in Carter, the determination of whether probation should be revoked is 
fact specific in that “[t]rial courts must consider each violation on a case-by-case 
basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a 
particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight 
of the evidence.”  Carter, 835 So. 2d at 261.  Accordingly, the statements of the 
victim and the probationer, the type of injury, the demeanors of the victim and the 
probationer, and the credibility of the witnesses all factor into the trial court‟s 
weighing of the evidence.  The appellate court then reviews the trial court‟s 
 
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revocation under an abuse of discretion standard.  Bernhardt, 288 So. 2d at 501.  
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a violation of 
probation. 
 
In the instant case, the Fifth District held that testimony at a probation 
revocation hearing describing an observation of injury was sufficient to 
corroborate a battery victim‟s testimonial hearsay statement and that probation was 
properly revoked.  In doing so, the Fifth District followed its decisions in Arndt v. 
State, 815 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), Young v. State, 742 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1999), and Morris v. State, 727 So. 2d  975 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  The 
Fifth District in all three cases held that the investigating officer‟s hearsay 
testimony coupled with his testimony concerning his direct observation of the 
victim‟s injury was sufficient evidence to support revocation.  The Fifth District 
also acknowledged contrary authority in Santiago, Colwell, and Blair, each of 
which generally held that an observation of injury is legally insufficient to permit 
revocation based upon hearsay testimony of battery.   
 
Santiago, Colwell, and Colina, which are the cases cited for conflict by 
Russell, involved factual and evidentiary patterns that are virtually 
indistinguishable from the cases the Fifth District relied upon in its holding in the 
instant case.  In Colina, the victim‟s written statement was admitted into evidence 
 
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and other witnesses testified as to their observations of injury.  However, no one 
could testify as to the origin of the injuries on the victim.  Colina, 629 So. 2d at 
275.  The Second District reversed the probation revocation on the basis that “the 
evidence relied upon to prove appellant committed a battery while on probation 
was hearsay,” thus disregarding the non-hearsay testimony of victim injury.  Id.  In 
Colwell, the officer recounted the victim‟s allegations and testified as to his own 
observation that the victim was injured, intoxicated, and hysterical.  Even though 
the trial court found that the officer‟s observations were consistent with the hearsay 
statement, the Second District held that “[a]s a matter of law, this additional 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the revocation.”  Colwell, 838 So. 2d at 671.  
In Santiago, an officer recounted the hearsay allegations of the victim and that of a 
corroborating witness and also testified as to his observations of the victim‟s injury 
and emotional state.  In addition, the State introduced both a taped statement from 
the victim and photographs of the injuries.  The Fourth District held that “although 
the victim‟s injuries suggested to the deputy that a battery may have occurred, the 
deputy‟s observations could not connect Santiago to the alleged battery.”  
Santiago, 889 So. 2d at 203.   
 
Thus, the Second District and Fourth District in these cases reversed the trial 
court‟s revocation based on the failure to establish a direct nexus between the 
probationer and the alleged battery.  Santiago, 889 So. 2d at 203 (“[T]he deputy‟s 
 
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observations could not connect Santiago to the alleged battery.”); Colwell, 838 So. 
2d at 672 (“[T]he deputy‟s observations alone did not provide a sufficient 
evidentiary link to the perpetrator of the alleged domestic battery.”); Colina, 629 
So. 2d at 275 (“[N]o one could testify as to the origin of the injuries.”).  These 
decisions thus demonstrate that the Second and Fourth Districts require that the 
non-hearsay evidence independently establish that the probationer committed the 
battery.  We disagree with such a requirement.  Corroboration of every aspect 
should not be required in order to establish that the probationer committed a 
battery for the purpose of revoking probation.  On the other hand, the trial court 
must examine the facts and circumstances of each individual case to determine 
whether a particular violation is willful and is supported by greater weight of the 
evidence.  Thus, whether non-hearsay evidence, including direct testimony of an 
observation of victim injury, is sufficient to support a hearsay allegation of battery 
is dependent upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case.  Consequently, 
the trial court must assess the credibility of the particular witnesses, the reliability 
of the available evidence, and the totality of the evidence under the circumstances 
in each individual case.   
 
Based on the following facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court 
properly concluded that Russell committed a battery and thus committed a willful 
violation of his probation terms.  The deputy testified regarding the substance of 
 
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the victim‟s oral statement and stated that he also recognized the written statement 
of the victim, which was admitted at the hearing.  The substance of the hearsay 
statements alleged that Russell struck the victim on the neck and grabbed her by 
the hair before leaving with her vehicle.  Russell first objected to the written 
statement as hearsay within hearsay, then objected based on a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accuser.  The trial court reiterated that hearsay is 
admissible in a revocation proceeding but could not be the sole evidence used to 
find a violation.  Additional testimony from the deputy established that he 
observed a red mark on the victim‟s neck that appeared to have been made by a 
fist.  He also testified that the victim seemed nervous and scared.  Even though 
Russell initially did not want to make any statements, after being read his Miranda 
rights he began a conversation.  The deputy testified that on the way to jail, Russell 
advised him that he knew the victim was pregnant, but he was not sure if it was his 
baby or not because the victim was messing around on him.  The deputy further 
testified that Russell stated that he does not hit the victim but just “roughs her up.”  
Cross-examination revealed that the deputy‟s report did not affirmatively state that 
Russell had been read his Miranda rights and did not refer to his knowledge of the 
victim‟s pregnancy.  However, the deputy stated that he remembered this particular 
case because Russell began to cry in the squad car.  Although Russell did not 
testify regarding the battery charge, the trial court had an opportunity to weigh his 
 
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credibility when he testified regarding the willfulness element of the remaining 
probation violation allegations, which ultimately were not found by the trial court.   
Thus, the trial court considered more than just the victim‟s hearsay statement 
and direct testimony of observation of victim injury.  The trial court heard 
testimony regarding the demeanor of both the victim and Russell.  The court was 
able to compare both the oral and written hearsay accounts to the type of injury 
described by the deputy, and the court was able to directly assess the credibility on 
the stand of both Russell and the deputy.  Accordingly, we find that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the greater weight of the evidence 
demonstrated that Russell committed a battery and thus committed a willful and 
substantial violation of the terms of his probation.  As a result, we disapprove the 
decisions of the Second District and Fourth District in Santiago, Colwell, and 
Colina, to the extent that they conflict with this decision.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we approve the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal and disapprove the decisions of the Second District and Fourth 
District in Santiago, Colwell, and Colina to the extent that they conflict with this 
decision.  We hold that the trial court properly concluded that the greater weight of 
the evidence demonstrated that Russell committed a battery and, thus, a willful and 
substantial violation of the terms of his probation.  We also hold that because 
 
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Crawford does not apply to revocation proceedings, the admission of hearsay 
testimony from the victim was proper. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only. 
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting. 
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Peters v. State, No. 
SC06-341 (Fla. May 1, 2008), I cannot agree with the majority‟s conclusion that 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), does not apply to probation 
revocation proceedings.  The trial court revoked Anthony Russell‟s probation and 
sentenced him in the same proceeding.  Moreover, this Court has held that 
probation revocation proceedings, like those in this case, are deferred sentencing 
proceedings.  We have also held that Crawford applies to sentencing proceedings.  
Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority‟s holding that Crawford is not 
applicable to probation revocation proceedings.   
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D05-2630 
 
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(Marion County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and David S. Morgan, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Pamela J. Koller and 
Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent