Title: People v. Cunningham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S051342
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2015

Filed 7/2/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S051342 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
JOHN LEE CUNNINGHAM, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RCR 22225 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
In a bench trial before the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, defendant 
John Lee Cunningham was convicted of the first degree murders of Wayne Sonke, David 
Smith, and Jose Silva.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.1)  The trial court found true 
the special circumstance allegations that defendant committed multiple murders and that 
the murders of Sonke and Smith took place during the commission of a burglary and a 
robbery.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17)(A) and 17(G).)  The court also found defendant 
guilty of one count of second degree burglary (§ 459), three counts of second degree 
robbery (§ 211), one count of arson (§ 451, subd. (d)), and one count of possession of a 
firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)).  The court further found true various 
sentencing enhancement allegations—that defendant personally used a firearm in the 
commission of the murders, robberies, and burglary (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)), had 
previously been convicted of various felonies (§ 667), and had served prior prison terms 
for felony convictions (§ 667.5).   
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. 
2 
 
A jury was sworn for the penalty phase and returned a verdict of death.  After 
conducting an automatic review and declining defendant‘s request to modify the jury‘s 
verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court sentenced him to death for the three first degree 
murders with special circumstances, as well as to a determinate term of 16 years for the 
remaining counts and allegations.  
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its 
entirety.   
I. FACTS 
A. The Guilt Phase 
Defendant went to Surplus Office Sales (SOS) in Ontario, California, around 
closing time on the afternoon of Saturday, June 27, 1992, and robbed the three remaining 
employees at gunpoint.  He then bound the victims, herded them into a bathroom, and 
shot them each at least once in the head.  Afterward, he set fire to the building before 
fleeing the scene.  He was arrested a month later while on the run from police.  Defendant 
subsequently confessed to the murders, burglary, and robberies, and participated in a 
videotaped reenactment of the crimes.   
Waiving his right to a jury, defendant‘s bench trial extended over 10 non-
contiguous court days.  In addition to the prosecution‘s guilt phase evidence, the trial 
court considered the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and at pretrial 
proceedings concerning defendant‘s motion to suppress his multiple confessions.  
1. The prosecution’s case 
a) The crimes 
Around 4:00 p.m. on June 27, 1992, members of the Ontario Fire Department 
responding to a call at SOS found an inactive fire in the office portion of the building and 
three homicide victims in a hallway bathroom.  An autopsy revealed that SOS employee 
Jose Silva died from two gunshot wounds to the head, assistant manager David Smith 
3 
 
died from multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck, and store manager Wayne 
Sonke died from a single gunshot wound to the head.  More than $1,000 in cash had been 
taken from the store‘s cash register and petty cash box.   
Michael Ray, the owner of SOS, had employed defendant in the early and mid-
1980s at two other businesses.  About a month before the murders, Ray returned a phone 
call from defendant asking about work.  Ray had not heard from him for three or four 
years.  Defendant also made unannounced visits to SOS on June 20 and 24, a week and a 
few days before the murders respectively.   
About 8:30 p.m. on the evening of the murders, defendant called SOS employee 
Evelyn Eriksen at home to ask how she was.  Defendant told her he had been playing 
poker with some friends since about noon that day.  Later, defendant took Alana Costello, 
his girlfriend at the time, to the movies and a motel room.  Costello was surprised 
because defendant was not steadily employed and had been under ―stress‖ trying to find 
enough money for them to move into a bigger apartment.  That evening, defendant was 
―much more close-mouthed‖ than usual and acting ―very stressed, very tense, very 
wrapped up in himself.‖  According to Costello, defendant generally was distant and 
removed, had difficulty sleeping, and would wake up in the middle of the night from bad 
dreams.  He had borrowed her Ruger .22-caliber semi-automatic rifle and modified it by 
sawing off part of the stock and barrel.  A few days after the murders, Costello noticed 
the rifle was missing.   
b) Defendant’s subsequent flight and capture 
On June 30, defendant called Diana Jamison, a former girlfriend.  Jamison told 
defendant that his parole officer had come to her house looking for him.  In a later 
telephone conversation, defendant told Jamison he was on the run because someone, 
perhaps the Mexican Mafia, was after him.  Around the same time, defendant called 
Jamison upset and crying, saying ―something very terrible had happened‖ and he wanted 
4 
 
to come back and ―do the right thing.‖  Jamison told defendant to turn himself in.  
According to Jamison, defendant had trouble sleeping; he would often wake up in the 
middle of the night in a cold sweat, and mentioned dreams of being tortured by women 
and children from his time in Vietnam.  Defendant had tried to seek counseling at a 
veteran‘s center.   
On July 1, Costello received a telephone call from defendant asking her to join 
him in Nevada.  Meeting up at the Las Vegas airport, the two traveled by car to Atlantic 
City, New Jersey, then drove southwest through Arkansas before heading north.  Along 
the way, defendant placed an Ohio license plate on the car and registered under false 
names at motels.  He never discussed why he had left California and when Costello 
asked, he did not want to talk about it.  After seeing how anxious defendant became when 
police cars passed them, she concluded that he was running from the law.   
On July 23, law enforcement officers stopped defendant‘s car in Deadwood, South 
Dakota after being advised he was in the region and wanted as a murder suspect.  
Defendant and Costello were both taken into custody and defendant was arrested for 
violating his parole.  Police seized a Ruger .22-caliber semi-automatic rifle, a box 
containing 31 cartridges for a .22-caliber long rifle, and a magazine loaded with 10 
rounds of .22-caliber ammunition.   
c) Defendant’s statements to law enforcement officers and videotaped 
reenactment of the crimes 
Over the following two days, Ontario Police Department Detectives Gregory 
Nottingham and Pat Ortiz interrogated defendant four times.  Each interrogation was 
audiotaped or videotaped.  On each occasion, the recording equipment was in plain view.   
At their first meeting the morning of July 24, after approximately six minutes of 
preliminary introductions and questions, Detective Nottingham read defendant his rights 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).  After defendant 
confirmed that he understood these rights, Nottingham proceeded to ask defendant about 
5 
 
his relationships with Costello and Jamison, as well as about his military and employment 
background and his prior robbery arrest.  In discussing these subjects, defendant 
recounted working for Michael Ray at a facility in Long Beach in 1979 and going to SOS 
in Ontario in early June 1992 to visit Eriksen and to look for a job.   
Defendant then volunteered, ―I know what you guys are getting at. . . .  I also want 
you to know that the reason why I‘m so calm is because I‘m where I belong. . . .  I know 
why you‘re here in my dreams and that‘s all.‖  When asked to clarify, defendant replied, 
―You know as well as I do that I committed an armed robbery in Ontario‖ at ―Mike‘s 
company.‖  When asked for further clarification, defendant reiterated, ―I committed an 
armed robbery,‖ and asked, ―Should I have somebody here talking for me, is this the way 
it‘s supposed to be done?‖  Detective Nottingham reread defendant his Miranda rights 
and asked if he understood them.  Defendant stated, ―I do understand.‖   
In response to the detectives‘ subsequent questions, defendant gave an 
occasionally rambling account of his activities on June 27, describing how he chose to 
rob SOS, how the robbery, murders, and arson occurred, and his subsequent actions.  He 
admitted entering SOS with the intention to steal money, binding the hands of the three 
victims with duct tape, returning to the bathroom to shoot them, and then using gasoline 
to set the building on fire.  These confessions were interspersed with references to 
defendant‘s dreams, things he claimed to have done during his military service in 
Vietnam, and expressions of relief at being caught.  
The detectives interrogated defendant two more times the afternoon of July 24, 
and again the following morning.  No additional Miranda advisements were given.  
Defendant told the detectives he had altered two military personnel forms found in his car 
because he was looking for work and wanted to ―look[] better‖ and ―cover‖ for time 
when he had been incarcerated.  He also indicated he had ―ripped off a shipment‖ as a 
narcotics courier and asked at one point to be placed in protective custody.  One of the 
6 
 
detectives also made references to the victims‘ families, stating that once lawyers got 
involved in a case, it would get ―a lot more complicated.‖   
Between July 27 and July 31, the detectives spoke with prosecutors working on 
the case and played the interview tapes for them.  Because the quality of the tapes was 
poor, the prosecutors suggested a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene and told the 
detectives that the reenactment should be done before an arrest warrant was filed.  On 
July 31, Wesley Lewis, a correctional sergeant at Folsom Prison where defendant was 
being held on his parole violation, interviewed defendant to determine whether he would 
be willing to participate in the reenactment.  Defendant indicated that he would be 
―happy‖ to cooperate ―if it would get me out of here any sooner or quicker.‖   
On August 2, defendant conducted a reenactment of the crimes, which two 
detectives observed and videotaped.  Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights before 
starting the reenactment, and affirmed that he understood these rights and wished to talk 
to law enforcement officers.   
In the video, defendant described how on the day of the murders he first went to 
SOS shortly after noon and stayed for about a half-hour talking with the three victims.  
He then left and returned after 3:00 p.m. ―to take all the money . . . so I could leave the 
state.‖  He reentered SOS with the shortened .22-caliber rifle concealed in a paper bag.  
At gunpoint, defendant ordered the three victims to follow him through the hallway to the 
front lobby, where he forced Sonke to give him the money from the cash register.   
When defendant asked Sonke where the rest of the money was, Sonke indicated it 
was in an office down the hall.  Defendant made all the victims go with him to that 
location and Sonke opened a filing cabinet with some keys, but did not remove anything.  
Defendant took the keys and made the victims enter the women‘s bathroom, where he 
told them to lie down on the floor and be quiet.  He left all three victims with their hands 
bound behind them with heavy duty tape he had purchased weeks before, but also 
claimed he had only planned the robbery earlier that day when he decided to return to 
7 
 
SOS.  Defendant then took the money from the cash drawer in the filing cabinet, returned 
to the bathroom, and shot the three men.   
Retrieving a can of gasoline from his car, defendant went back inside to set fire to 
the building.  When he reentered the bathroom, Silva and Sonke were not moving but 
Smith was attempting to break loose of his bonds.  Defendant shot Smith again, poured 
gasoline along the hallway, and ignited it with a match.  He then removed a key from 
inside the front door and exited, locking the door from the outside.  He drove to a 
freeway overpass to watch the building for a minute or so until a fire truck arrived.   
2. The defense case 
In his opening argument during the guilt phase, defense counsel described 
defendant‘s experiences in Vietnam, stating that because of posttraumatic stress disorder, 
there were periods in his life when defendant ―lost time.‖  With respect to the murders, 
counsel claimed these were not crimes defendant wanted to commit, and that the only 
way law enforcement officers were able to connect defendant to them was by virtue of 
defendant‘s cooperation.  Counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but presented 
no guilt phase witnesses or other evidence on defendant‘s behalf.   
During closing argument, counsel contended defendant committed the charged 
offenses because he was experiencing a buildup of pressure caused by a mix of 
helplessness and fear.  In conclusion, counsel argued, ―from everything we know John 
Cunningham wished to take responsibility for this particular crime, and he did.‖  
B. The Penalty Phase 
Defendant‘s requests to absent himself from the penalty phase were denied.  A 
jury was selected and heard evidence for 34 court days over the course of five months.  
The prosecution presented testimony relating to the circumstances surrounding the 
crimes, the effect of the murders on those connected to the victims, and defendant‘s prior 
felony convictions.  Defendant presented extensive testimony to document his abusive 
8 
 
childhood, his traumatic combat experiences in Vietnam, and the effects of posttraumatic 
stress disorder on Vietnam-era veterans.  He also presented testimony that attempted to 
discredit some of the prior crimes evidence.  
1. The prosecution’s case in aggravation 
a) The circumstances surrounding the murders 
The prosecution presented the testimony of many of the same witnesses who 
testified during the preliminary hearing and the bench trial to demonstrate the 
circumstances surrounding the burglary, robberies, murders, and arson.  Also presented 
were the videotapes and transcripts of defendant‘s July 1992 interviews and August 1992 
reenactment and stipulations regarding the collection of crime scene evidence. 
b) Prior crimes  
On April 24, 1976, Herta Gill was a cashier at the Vineland Drive-In in the City of 
Industry, California, when at about 9:00 p.m., defendant robbed her at gunpoint of all the 
money in her register.  He was apprehended a short time later while in possession of a 
firearm and the stolen cash.  After pleading guilty to felony robbery and admitting to 
personally using a handgun, defendant was sentenced to one year in county jail and then 
placed on probation.   
On April 5, 1982, Michelle I. was 14 years old and alone at her home in La 
Mirada, California, when defendant sexually assaulted her.  Defendant, then a family 
friend, entered the home on the pretense his car had broken down, but after appearing to 
use the phone asked Michelle to give him a ―blow job.‖  When she refused, defendant 
forced her onto her knees.  When she began screaming, defendant struck her in the face 
with a closed fist, threatened further physical violence if she continued to scream, and 
dragged her by the hair to the sofa, where he forced her to perform oral sex on him for 
approximately 10 minutes.  Before leaving, defendant said he had killed his ex-wife and 
her lover and warned he would ―come back‖ to do the same to Michelle if she told 
9 
 
anyone what had happened.  Michelle nonetheless reported the incident to her family and 
the police and testified at the subsequent trial.  Defendant was convicted of felony 
forcible oral copulation with a minor and sentenced to state prison.   
In April 1987, Samira S. was 15 years old and living with her mother and younger 
sister in Paramount, California, when defendant, a family friend, moved in.  Within two 
or three weeks, he began fondling and kissing Samira when they were alone.  She would 
tell him to stop, but defendant would continue touching different parts of her body.  
Subsequently, defendant forced Samira to perform oral sex on him, slapping her when 
she did not perform to his satisfaction.  Samira thereafter engaged in oral sex with 
defendant once or twice a week between April and September of 1987.  If she resisted, 
defendant would get angry and slap her.  Defendant repeatedly tried to convince Samira 
to have sexual intercourse with him but she refused.  Nevertheless, he would put Vaseline 
or baby oil on his penis and partially penetrate her vagina.  Defendant also asked to take 
naked photographs of Samira, but she refused.  Sometimes defendant would give Samira 
money and buy her gifts.  He also caused her to be truant from her summer school 
courses.  In September or October of 1987, Samira told a friend from church and a school 
counselor about defendant‘s sexual assaults.  He was convicted of two counts of oral 
copulation with a minor and sentenced to state prison.  
c) Victim impact evidence  
The prosecution introduced the testimony of family members of the victims who 
testified about qualities of their loved one and how each learned about the murders.  Jose 
Silva was the youngest of 10 children and was raised by his older sister Josefina after 
their mother died.  He regularly attended family functions and had a one-year-old son at 
the time of his death.  David Smith had been married to his wife Mimi for 10 years when 
he died and had a daughter named Tiffany.  His half brother described Smith as someone 
who loved the outdoors and as ―a very gentle soul.‖  Wayne Sonke had five adult 
10 
 
children and five grandchildren at the time of his death.  His daughter Lois Backe 
described being at her mother‘s house waiting for Sonke to return home from work when 
the fire department called asking for Sonke and saying that the alarms had gone off at 
SOS.  After her father still had not returned or called home, Backe drove to SOS.  A 
police officer on the scene told her there had been a triple homicide and asked Backe to 
describe her father.  She later had to give the news of his murder to her youngest brother 
and mother.   
2. The defense’s case in mitigation 
a) Family and social history 
Ronald Forbush, a defense investigator, researched defendant‘s personal and 
social history and interviewed various relatives.  Defendant‘s parents Vivian and Maurice 
Cunningham divorced when defendant was approximately two years old.  Vivian had a 
prior marriage at age 14, two subsequent marriages, and apparently worked at some point 
as a prostitute.  Maurice subsequently remarried as well.  As a result, defendant had two 
older brothers, Sam and W.C., and several half siblings and stepbrothers and stepsisters.  
At the time of the trial, defendant‘s parents were deceased, and his brother Sam was in 
Huntsville State Prison in Texas.   
Vivian‘s younger half sister Carolyn M. testified that Vivian was dishonest; at 
various times she had lied about a brother having died, about being in a car accident, and 
about her middle son (W.C.) having died.  Carolyn also recounted one evening when she 
was in seventh grade and Vivian and Maurice were living in the same house as the rest of 
the family when Carolyn awoke to find Maurice sexually molesting her.   
Defendant‘s brother W.C. testified their mother and father both had problems with 
alcohol.  One time, when W.C. was under 10 years old, Vivian, intoxicated, called him 
into her bedroom and sexually fondled him.  After he left, she called the other two 
brothers into the room one by one.  Vivian‘s sexual abuse may have been recurring.  
11 
 
Maurice and Gene Collins, a stepfather, physically abused the boys.  One time, after a 
violent confrontation with Collins in which Vivian stabbed him with a fork, she 
abandoned her three sons (then ages five, seven, and nine) for several weeks and they 
were forced to steal food to survive.  Eventually, the boys were placed in an orphanage 
for approximately a year.  Later they were flown to California to live with Maurice, his 
second wife Betty, and her children from a previous marriage.  W.C. believed that his 
father sexually abused his stepsister, although Maurice never molested W.C. or, to the 
best of W.C.‘s knowledge, defendant or their brother Sam.   
One of defendant‘s stepbrothers testified that Maurice was a heavy drinker who 
often became violent with Betty and the children.  Maurice also sexually molested the 
stepbrother so often he ―couldn‘t count the times.‖  Once when he was in seventh grade, 
the stepbrother told his mother Betty about the molestation.  She cried but never did 
anything to stop it.   
Diana Jamison, one of defendant‘s former girlfriends, testified she got the 
impression from defendant that his mother, Vivian, was very promiscuous when he was a 
young boy and had many different men coming in and out of her life.  Defendant also 
alluded to having been sexually molested by his father, but would not discuss any details 
with Jamison.  
Some of the sexual abuse detailed by the above witnesses was confirmed or 
alluded to by defendant in his interviews with Thomas Williams, one of the defense‘s 
penalty phase psychologists.   
b) Military background 
After defendant graduated from high school, he enlisted in the United States 
Army.  According to relevant military files and records, defendant was court-martialed 
various times for being absent without leave (AWOL) between May 1969 and March 
1970.  In May 1970, defendant was sent to Vietnam for approximately 11 months where 
12 
 
he was promoted three times, ultimately to sergeant.  As a result of his service in the 
Vietnam War, defendant received several commendations.   
While in Vietnam, defendant engaged in reconnaissance missions with units that 
would travel through the jungles for periods of five to 14 days scouting and securing 
areas believed to be infiltrated by the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army.  The units 
set up claymore mines for mechanical ambushes and engaged in several firefights in 
which enemy troops or sympathizers were killed or captured.  Defendant at one time 
operated in a ―free fire zone,‖ meaning that the soldiers had permission to kill any enemy 
combatants in that area.  Sometimes a unit would happen upon empty enemy bunkers or 
mass enemy graves; other times it found ―blood trails‖ left by the enemy dragging their 
wounded or dead soldiers away from combat scenes.  If a unit encountered an enemy 
village in an uncontrolled area not authorized for settlement, standard operating 
procedure was to evacuate the people and set the buildings on fire.  Once, defendant 
required medical attention due to heat exhaustion.  Another time, he was hospitalized for 
a malaria infection.   
Nineteen veterans who served in defendant‘s reconnaissance platoons testified 
about their daily activities and various missions in Vietnam.  Some of the veterans who 
testified characterized defendant as a ―good soldier‖ but also as a ―loner‖ who generally 
kept to himself.  Others did not specifically remember defendant.  Three veterans, 
including one who allegedly knew defendant the best, for various reasons were unable to 
attend the trial and testify.   
Many of the veterans who testified suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), flashbacks, depression, or other problems as a result of their service in Vietnam.  
These veterans explained they often had problems adjusting to life after Vietnam, and 
many of those adjustment problems remained with them throughout their lives.  They had 
trouble sleeping, were regularly afflicted by nightmares, and experienced problems with 
anxiety, hypervigilance, and being easily startled by innocuous sounds (such as a car 
13 
 
backfire or a motorcycle) or simple sights (like a tree stump).  One witness compared the 
experience of suffering from PTSD to ―carrying a demon around at times.‖  However, 
none had committed any felonies or crimes of violence after they returned home.   
Cross-examination further revealed that other than the death of a medic from a 
mortar accident on base, there were no casualties or fatalities in any of defendant‘s 
platoons.  Defendant was never captured or tortured by the enemy, and none of his units 
ever destroyed a village in a manner that killed women and children.  Defendant did not 
participate in long-range reconnaissance patrols or Special Forces.  Although the 
reconnaissance platoons rarely took prisoners, on one occasion, defendant‘s unit took 30 
to 50 prisoners, including women and children who were sympathetic to the enemy, but 
none of the prisoners were bound or mistreated in any way.   
After Vietnam, defendant was stationed for the remainder of his three-year tour at 
Fort Hood, Texas, where he was court-martialed four different times for being AWOL.  
Ultimately, he was demoted from his sergeant rank and honorably discharged as a 
private.   
c) Psychological evidence concerning posttraumatic stress disorder 
G. Robert Baker and Thomas Williams testified for the defense as experts on 
PTSD, among other topics.  Baker was a psychologist with the Department of Veterans 
Affairs and clinical coordinator for the National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.  Williams was a psychologist who specialized in working with trauma victims 
and training individuals involved in treating veterans.  Both served in Vietnam in the 
Marines Corps.   
Baker and Williams described PTSD as a reaction to unusual and frightful events 
outside the normal range of human experiences, such as those experienced in war zones.  
The symptoms of PTSD include nightmares, intrusive and unwanted thoughts and 
images, flashbacks, avoidance and dissociative behaviors, depression, psychiatric 
14 
 
numbing, social isolation, disassociation from and distrust of others, anxiety, sleep 
disorders, anger management problems, hypervigilance, adrenalin- or sensation-seeking 
behaviors, memory impairment, and concentration difficulties.  Although there is no cure 
for PTSD, the symptoms can be treated and individuals can be taught how to manage 
them.   
Williams explained symptoms such as flashbacks or nightmares could happen at 
any time depending on the particular individual and his experiences.  However, certain 
stimuli would be expected to trigger them.  Military training in particular sensitized 
soldiers to various stimuli and caused them to react quickly to perceived danger.  PTSD 
may also be retriggered by secondary traumatic experiences, or compounded by 
preceding ones.  According to Baker, although soldiers suffering from PTSD might be 
expected to avoid events such as fireworks displays, which can trigger combat memories, 
they might still carry guns, which would likewise trigger combat memories, because guns 
were a source of protection.  Recurrence of malaria symptoms also can act as a PTSD 
trigger, although malaria infections themselves, which were common in Vietnam, did not 
cause PTSD.  Baker also explained the concept of ―survivor guilt‖ and how soldiers who 
suffered from PTSD often exaggerated their combat roles.  
Both experts explained how the Vietnam conflict presented unique difficulties for 
many reasons—most of the soldiers were very young, the war had no front lines, there 
were no clearly defined objectives other than killing people, it was often unclear who was 
the enemy, there were no safe areas in light of the guerrilla nature of the war, there was 
no winning strategy, the primary goal was survival, there was little unit cohesion because 
soldiers were constantly being replaced, the jungle environment made living conditions 
difficult, and neither the Vietnamese civilian population nor the American public 
appreciated the soldiers.  These factors made it more difficult to treat Vietnam War 
veterans suffering from PTSD.  In particular, the social isolation Vietnam veterans felt 
upon returning home prevented them from seeking treatment.  In defendant‘s case, the 
15 
 
isolation was exacerbated because he did not have a loving and supportive family or 
religion to turn to upon his return.  Present-day treatments for PTSD, moreover, were not 
available to veterans in the early 1970s, as the disorder was not well understood at that 
time.   
Based on his review of defendant‘s records, Baker opined defendant was involved 
in the type of combat that could produce PTSD.  However, he never met or evaluated 
defendant for PTSD.  Baker explained how individuals are screened for PTSD and the 
importance of confirming the truthfulness of reported personal histories in rendering a 
diagnosis, as malingering—feigning the symptoms of a disorder—can apply to someone 
claiming to suffer from PTSD.   
Williams positively diagnosed defendant as having PTSD.  This diagnosis was 
based on his interviews of defendant for three days in May and June of 1995, and his 
review of the videotapes of defendant‘s interviews with the detectives and the 
reenactment, charts of the daily activities of defendant‘s Vietnam units, statements of 
family members and the veterans who served with defendant, and the penalty phase 
testimony of various witnesses.  Williams did not, however, meet with any of the 
witnesses from the case.   
In his interviews with Williams, defendant said when his mother abandoned him 
and his brothers, their electricity and water were turned off and they had to steal food to 
eat and use neighbors‘ swimming pools to bathe.  Defendant further claimed he broke 
into other people‘s homes to observe what normal childhood and family life was like.  He 
told Williams that he was isolated in the orphanage.  He alluded to being sexually 
molested by his mother once, and told Williams that he was once sexually fondled by his 
father, had personally observed his father having sex with his half sister at least once, and 
―quite frequently‖ heard his stepbrother screaming as Maurice sodomized him.  Although 
defendant refused to give details of the alleged molestation by his mother, saying ―he was 
going to take that to his grave,‖ Williams felt the brother‘s reported sexual abuse by 
16 
 
Vivian and the literature on sexual abuse—which stated generally all the children are 
sexually abused within a family that has sexual abuse—corroborated defendant‘s claim of 
abuse by his mother.  Williams further noted that observing sexual abuse could cause 
PTSD.   
Williams opined defendant‘s PTSD was caused by childhood neglect and sexual 
abuse, as well as combat experiences in Vietnam.  Defendant most likely developed 
PTSD when he was about nine years old, and then was retraumatized in Vietnam, which 
contributed to his then-current PTSD.  Although he believed defendant had PTSD when 
he robbed Gill and committed the sexual offenses against Michelle I. and Samira S., 
Williams could not say whether defendant was going through a dissociative episode when 
he committed those offenses.  Williams conceded child molestation, robbery, and murder 
were not part of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD.  Although Williams found defendant to 
have an ―[i]nability to delay sexual gratification and generally poor sexual adjustment,‖ 
he did not consider defendant a pedophile or sex addict.   
Defendant told Williams he had always had an active ―fantasy life,‖ had difficulty 
at times distinguishing fantasy from reality, and relied on dreams for memory.  When 
relating stories about Vietnam, defendant was not sure whether they really happened or 
not.  Williams believed this was dissociative behavior indicative of PTSD.  It was clear to 
Williams defendant‘s Vietnam service was very important to him, ―a cornerstone in his 
life.‖  Williams acknowledged defendant made inaccurate or untrue claims about his 
military background and Vietnam experiences during the police interviews.  He also was 
aware defendant had altered a form regarding his military experience, listing training and 
awards he did not receive and operations in which he did not participate, and deleting 
references to his AWOLs.  Williams agreed falsification of military records might 
indicate a ―factitious‖ PTSD disorder or malingering, and it was also possible defendant‘s 
false Vietnam stories were unrelated to PTSD and only ―embellishments of war stories.‖   
17 
 
Based on his review of autopsy photographs and defendant‘s statements to law 
enforcement officers, Williams opined defendant ―dissociated‖ at some point during the 
SOS killings.  As a result of this altered state of mind, although defendant knew robbery 
was wrong at the time, he did not ―really internally believe[]‖ he had committed the 
murders until he participated in the reenactment.  In support of this conclusion, Williams 
cited defendant‘s claim he felt like he was standing behind himself watching the crimes 
happen, his shooting the victims even though they were bound with tape and he already 
had the money, his viewing Smith as a threat when Smith broke his bonds, defendant‘s 
reference to ―the LT‖ or lieutenant instructing soldiers ―to always burn the village, never 
leave anyone behind, kill everyone,‖ and the physical distress defendant manifested in the 
video reenactment of the crime.  Although defendant did not refer to his dreams during 
the reenactment as he had done in the first interview, Williams still felt defendant was 
―drifting‖ during the reenactment.  Williams also related some of defendant‘s behaviors 
to experiences defendant had had in Vietnam, such as arming himself with a gun, using 
duct tape, and shooting the victims in the head even if they might already have been dead.  
He conceded, however, a person who intentionally makes a decision to injure another or 
rob someone in order to take money would ―probably‖ not be acting due to PTSD.   
Defendant also took a self-administered and unsupervised test called the 
Dissociation Experiences Scale (DES).  Based on the DES, Williams concluded 
defendant had a high level of dissociative experiences.  Another self-administered and 
unsupervised test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 (MMPI-2), 
indicated defendant was distrustful and moody, had poor social skills, and was not 
malingering.  Two subscales within the MMPI-2 scored defendant positive for PTSD.  
However, defendant declined to answer five questions out of 568, which prompted the 
testing service to state ―the pattern of his item omission should be carefully noted.‖  
18 
 
d) Prior crimes 
Daniel and Olivia Negron knew Samira S. and her mother through church.  While 
defendant was residing in Samira‘s home, the Negrons attended social functions during 
which Samira sat on defendant‘s lap and appeared to be ―very flirtatious with‖ and 
―coming on‖ to him in an inappropriate manner.   
Damarie H., Samira‘s aunt, stayed at Samira‘s home for approximately six 
months, during which time defendant was sleeping on the sofa.  Damarie noticed Samira 
did not shy away from the attention she received from defendant.  Concerned about their 
relationship, she asked Samira if ―anything was going on‖ with defendant.  Samira 
became defensive, saying her mother was ―starting to get on her case about the same 
thing.‖  Samira told her aunt defendant was ―very nice‖ and she cared for him, and tried 
to imply there was something going on between defendant and her mother.  According to 
Damarie, Samira was not always truthful.  Although Samira bruised easily as a result of 
having lupus, Damarie did not recall seeing any bruises on her during the time defendant 
was staying with them.   
Deputy Sheriff Pierre Nadeau interviewed Samira in October 1987.  When asked 
about bruising around her eyes and swelling on the back of her head, Samira told Nadeau 
she had been injured fighting with her mother.  When Deputy Sheriff Goran interviewed 
Samira, she never mentioned defendant had slapped her, but said she was afraid to say no 
to defendant because other men had previously slapped or beat her for refusing sex.  
When Dr. Kerry English examined Samira, she also did not tell him that defendant had 
slapped her.  Although she indicated defendant had twice attempted to have sexual 
intercourse with her, she stated defendant stopped because it was painful for her.   
3. The prosecution’s rebuttal in aggravation  
Detective Nottingham testified defendant told him during the Deadwood, South 
Dakota, interview that he had spent two years in Vietnam and served in the Special 
19 
 
Forces.  Nottingham further explained how he found the original and altered forms 
relating to defendant‘s military record.   
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Pretrial shackling   
Defendant claims he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process and a fair trial when he was ―repeatedly and unnecessarily‖ restrained during 
pretrial proceedings without an adequate showing of manifest need and without 
employing less restrictive alternatives.  He argues the shackling rendered his trial 
structurally unsound and resulted in prejudice.  This claim is meritless.   
a) Background 
During the initial hearing on defendant‘s motion to suppress his statements to law 
enforcement officers, defense counsel objected to defendant‘s being shackled in the 
courtroom.  The trial court ordered defendant‘s waist chains removed and his hands 
placed in regular handcuffs in front of his body.  After counsel continued to object to the 
handcuffs, the prosecutor placed on the record various reasons justifying the shackling, 
including that defendant was being tried for three capital murders and had specialized 
military training.  The court ultimately ruled the ―limited restraints‖ would remain for 
purposes of the current proceedings.  
At the next hearing, defense counsel objected to any shackling of defendant, 
indicating defendant would ―waive all appearances if he has to go through this shackling 
business.‖  The court stated it was willing to order defendant not be restrained in the 
courtroom and to be restrained only during transit in the public halls of the courthouse, a 
routine security measure in the San Bernardino courthouse not limited to defendant.  The 
prosecutor concurred and the court ordered defendant ―not be shackled in the courtroom.‖   
20 
 
Defendant subsequently filed a motion objecting to the use of restraints in the 
holding areas of the courthouse, where he might be kept for several hours before a court 
appearance, and further requesting the case be transferred back to the Rancho 
Cucamonga courthouse, where the preliminary hearing had been held and where in-
transit shackling apparently was not required.  The trial court ultimately ordered that 
defendant not be restrained in the holding facilities or the courtroom.  However, it found 
the standard procedure of shackling prisoners during public transit between the holding 
cell and the courtroom to be a reasonable security precaution and denied without 
prejudice the request to transfer the case to Rancho Cucamonga.   
Later, defendant appeared in court to personally waive his presence at that and all 
future pretrial hearings.  Although his legs were shackled at the time, the court assured 
defendant the shackles would be removed in the courtroom if he chose to participate in 
the proceedings.  After defendant waived his presence, counsel asked he not be 
transported to court again until the penalty phase jury trial or transfer of the case to 
Rancho Cucamonga.   
The balance of pretrial proceedings as well as the guilt phase bench trial took 
place in San Bernardino.  Thereafter, defendant filed a written request to have the penalty 
phase tried in Rancho Cucamonga with jurors from its West End Judicial District.  The 
trial court denied the request in part, ordering that jury selection occur in San Bernardino 
but that the panel be drawn exclusively from the West End.  Defendant was ordered to 
personally appear to address jury selection issues but his counsel objected, claiming that 
the court‘s promises concerning shackling had not been kept and again objecting to the 
in-transit shackling.  The court overruled the objection, finding it had accommodated 
defendant throughout the proceedings.  Subsequent pre-penalty-phase proceedings and 
the initial portion of jury selection (primarily hardship excusals and challenges for cause 
based on the juror questionnaires) took place in San Bernardino, but the remainder of jury 
21 
 
selection and the penalty phase trial took place in Rancho Cucamonga, after which there 
were no further shackling objections.   
b) Analysis 
No defendant ―may be subjected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is 
necessary for his [or her] detention to answer the charge.‖  (§ 688.)  However, an 
appellate court will not overturn a trial court‘s decision to restrain a defendant ―absent ‗a 
showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.‘ ‖  (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 
1050 (Wallace).)   
The jurisprudence on shackling primarily concerns situations that might prejudice 
a jury.  Such cases hold that under state law, in light of the potential harm to the 
constitutional presumption of innocence and right to be present and participate in one‘s 
defense, ― ‗[a] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the 
courtroom while in the jury‘s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for 
such restraints.‘ ‖  (Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1050, quoting People v. Duran 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–291; see People v. Harrington (1871) 42 Cal. 165, 168–169; 
see also Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 624.)   
Defendant incorrectly assumes the propriety of shackling a defendant while in 
transit through the public hallways of a courthouse to attend a pretrial hearing, the factual 
scenario presented here, should be assessed under the same standards used to determine 
whether a defendant can be shackled while in the courtroom.  Not so.  The considerations 
of public safety and the need for restraints are different during prisoner transport than 
when a defendant is seated in a secured courtroom.  We have long observed that a 
defendant may be restrained while in transit between a jail and the courtroom without 
reference to any particularized showing of need.  (See, e.g., People v. Ross (1967) 67 
Cal.2d 64, 72 [―It was a reasonable practice for the sheriff to keep prisoners handcuffed 
while in transit, and the fact that the handcuffs were removed inside the courtroom rather 
22 
 
than outside added to the security.‖]; People v. Metzger (1904) 143 Cal. 447, 449 [―In 
many cases it is proper, and it is often necessary as a precaution, to manacle a prisoner to 
secure his safe conduct and guard against an escape while on the way from the jail to the 
courtroom.‖]); see also People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 180; accord, People v. 
Jacobs (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1140–1141; People v. Du Bose (1970) 10 
Cal.App.3d 544, 549–550; U. S. v. Leach (8th Cir. 1970) 429 F.2d 956, 962.].)   
Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the use of physical restraints during 
defendant‘s transit through the public hallways of the San Bernardino courthouse without 
any particularized showing of need.  The shackling was a reasonable and limited 
precaution taken to retain custody of an accused and was no more restraint than was 
necessary for his detention.  The in-transit physical restraints in no way affected the 
conduct or outcome of the trial, whether before judge or jury, nor did they impinge upon 
the presumption of innocence or defendant‘s right to present a defense.   
In his reply, defendant argues that given the necessity of shackling him for 
transport through the halls to his courtroom in San Bernardino, ―the unreasonable burden 
placed on this defendant should have been ameliorated by moving the proceeding to a 
different courtroom or to Rancho Cucamonga.‖  He cites no authority to support this 
proposition, nor are we aware of any.  As noted, defendant‘s shackling for security during 
transport was a limited and reasonable imposition.  The trial court was not required to 
move the proceedings to a different courtroom or to the Rancho Cucamonga courthouse 
simply to obviate this precaution.   
2. Waiver of the right to be present at pretrial and guilt phase 
proceedings  
Defendant claims the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights 
to due process and a fair trial when it excused him from numerous pretrial proceedings 
and the guilt phase of his trial based on a waiver of his personal presence that allegedly 
was coerced by ―painful, excessive, and unnecessary shackling.‖  He additionally 
23 
 
contends the trial court violated sections 977 and 1043 by accepting involuntary waivers 
of his right to be personally present at the guilt phase of his capital murder trial without 
adequate justification.  
a) Constitutional right to be present 
―Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally present at 
any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent ‗interference with [his] 
opportunity for effective cross-examination.‘  [Citations.]  Due process guarantees the 
right to be present at any ‗stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome‘ and where the 
defendant‘s ‗presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.‘ ‖  (People v. 
Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861.)  The state constitutional right to be present at trial, 
which is guaranteed by article I of the California Constitution, ― ‗is generally coextensive 
with the federal due process right.‘ ‖  (Butler, at p. 861.)  As a matter of both federal and 
state constitutional law, however, a defendant may validly waive his or her right to be 
present during a critical stage of the trial, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 20–21 (Moon); People v. Jackson 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1210 (Jackson).)  
Defendant premises his challenge to the voluntariness of his right to be present 
waivers entirely on the argument that the waivers were induced and coerced by improper 
shackling.  He contends he was forced to waive his presence ―simply because he could 
not endure the effects of the wrist, waist and leg chains every day for more than eight 
hours a day.‖  (Italics added.)  The record demonstrates, however, that the trial court 
relieved defendant of all physical restraints in the courtroom and holding cell prior to any 
evidentiary hearings or critical phases of the postarraignment proceedings.  Thereafter, 
defendant remained subjected to physical restraints only for the time it took to transport 
him to and from the holding cell and the courtroom.  Having concluded that this limited 
in-transit shackling was not an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion, we further conclude 
24 
 
the use of restraints in transit did not improperly coerce defendant to waive his presence 
at the pretrial and guilt phase proceedings, particularly as the court permitted him to 
remain completely unrestrained in the courtroom.   
An analogous situation was presented in People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324 
(Price).  After a hearing outside the presence of the jury during which the evidence 
established the defendant had committed multiple acts and threats of violence against 
officers at the jail or while being transported to court, the court ordered he be secured to 
his chair in the courtroom by a single belly chain not visible to the jury.  The defendant 
then stated ―he would rather be absent from the trial than appear before the jury in chains.  
The trial court allowed defendant to leave the courtroom and return to the jail, after 
informing defendant that his leaving would be construed as a voluntary waiver of 
presence.  After giving the matter further thought, the court directed jail officers to bring 
defendant back to the courtroom, but defendant refused to dress in civilian clothing for 
the court appearance.  The court then concluded that defendant had effectively waived his 
presence.  The remainder of the guilt phase proceeded in his absence.‖  (Id. at pp. 404–
405.) 
On appeal, we found ―no constitutional infirmity in the trial court‘s decisions . . . 
to accept defendant‘s actions as a voluntary waiver and to proceed with the guilt phase in 
defendant‘s absence.‖  (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 405.)  Similarly here, we find no 
constitutional infirmity in defendant‘s waivers of his right to be present at pretrial 
proceedings and the guilt phase, even assuming such waivers were motivated in part by 
concerns about the in-transit shackling that would have accompanied his appearing in 
court.   
b) Statutory right to be present 
The issue of statutory error is another matter.  As we have previously 
acknowledged, ―defendant‘s statutory ability to waive his presence in a capital case is 
25 
 
more circumscribed than the associated ability to waive his constitutional right.‖  (People 
v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 135 (Rundle); see also Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 
1211.)  Specifically, section 977 requires any defendant charged with a felony to ―be 
personally present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, 
during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the 
time of the imposition of sentence.  The accused shall be personally present at all other 
proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written 
waiver of his or her right to be personally present, as provided by paragraph (2).‖  (§ 977, 
subd. (b)(1), italics added.)  Section 1043 provides that a felony defendant ―shall be 
personally present at the trial‖ (id., subd. (a)), but that the trial may continue in a 
defendant‘s absence if the defendant (1) persists in disruptive behavior after being 
warned (id., subd. (b)(1)); (2) is voluntarily absent in ―[a]ny prosecution for an offense 
which is not punishable by death‖ (id., subd. (b)(2), italics added); or (3) has waived his 
rights ―in accordance with Section 977‖ (id., subd. (d)).  Read together, the statutes 
provide that a capital defendant cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present during 
the proceedings listed in section 977, including those portions of the trial in which 
evidence is taken, and he may not be removed from the courtroom pursuant to section 
1043 unless he has been disruptive or threatens to be disruptive. 
Defendant correctly contends his absence during the guilt phase violated sections 
977 and 1043.  However, assuming defendant has not forfeited his claim of statutory 
error by failing to raise it below (see Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 135), the error does 
not warrant reversal of the judgment because it is not reasonably probable the result of 
the trial would have been more favorable to defendant absent the error.  (See People v. 
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 968.)  Defendant fails to explain how he could have 
effectively assisted counsel in subjecting the prosecution‘s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing.  We therefore conclude the violations of sections 977 and 1043 were harmless.  
(See, e.g., Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 21.) 
26 
 
Relying upon Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, defendant also 
contends the statutory violation deprived him of his federal constitutional procedural due 
process rights because the ―arbitrary‖ violation of section 977 and section 1043 allegedly 
deprived him of a state-created ―liberty interest‖ in the proper application of state law.  
We have previously rejected this exact argument.  (See Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 
136.)  
3. Waiver of the right to a guilt phase jury  
Defendant claims the ―wanton infliction of pain‖ caused by the daily courthouse 
shackling not only coerced a waiver of his right to be present at the guilt phase, but also 
resulted in the involuntary waiver of his right to a jury trial at the guilt phase in order to 
avoid the alleged ―embarrassment and prejudice‖ attendant to being tried by a jury while 
he was not present.  He argues the failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
his right to a jury trial violated his state and federal constitutional right to due process and 
requires the reversal of his conviction.  As with his claim concerning the waiver of his 
right to be present, this claim is without merit.   
At a pretrial status conference, the prosecutor informed the court he had discussed 
with defense counsel the possibility of having a bench trial for the guilt phase.  Defense 
counsel confirmed, stating ―I am inclined to agree to recommend to my client that if he‘s 
agreeable, then we‘re agreeable to a court trial on the guilt phase[, although w]e would 
still want a jury trial in the penalty phase.‖  At the next status conference, defense counsel 
confirmed defendant had filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial of the guilt 
phase, stating, ―[W]e don‘t wish to have a jury decide [the issue of defendant‘s guilt or 
innocence,] just the court.‖  The court indicated a personal appearance by defendant was 
required for the waiver to be effective.   
Defendant subsequently appeared in person via closed-circuit television to waive 
his right to a guilt phase jury trial.  In response to questioning by the court, defendant 
27 
 
indicated he understood (1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and 
penalty phases of his trial, (2) in a jury trial, if one of the 12 jurors was not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty, the jury could not return a guilty 
verdict, (3) if he waived his right to a jury trial, instead of 12 people deciding the issue of 
his guilt or innocence, the judge alone would make that decision, and (4) it could be 
easier for the prosecution to convince only one person, as opposed to 12, that defendant 
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant nevertheless stated he wished to waive 
his right to a jury trial for the guilt phase, confirming he had discussed the issue with his 
counsel, who concurred in the waiver.  
As relevant here, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .‖  (See also Cal. Const., art. I, § 16 (―Trial by jury is an inviolate right and 
shall be secured to all . . . .‖].)  Although trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional 
right, a criminal defendant may waive the right.  (See Adams v. United States (1942) 317 
U.S. 269, 275; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)  However, ―[a]s with the waiver . . . of 
several other constitutional rights . . . long . . . recognized as fundamental, [in order to be 
valid] a defendant‘s waiver of the right to jury trial must be knowing and intelligent, that 
is, ‗ ― ‗made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it,‘ ‖ ‘ as well as voluntary, ‗ ― ‗in the sense that 
it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305.)   
The conclusion defendant‘s waiver of a guilt phase jury was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary is supported by his clear express waiver, made in open court, with 
counsel‘s consent and agreement, and after a full explanation from the court of the right 
and the consequences of the waiver.  Conversely, the record does not support defendant‘s 
contention that his waiver was induced by the ―inhumane courtroom restraints in the San 
28 
 
Bernardino County Courthouse.‖  Having been relieved of all physical restraints in the 
courtroom and holding cell well before the guilt phase commenced, defendant would 
have been restrained during the trial only for the time it took to transport him to and from 
the holding cell and the courtroom.  Having concluded this limited in-transit shackling 
was not an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion and did not improperly coerce defendant to 
waive his right to be present, we further conclude it did not improperly coerce 
defendant‘s waiver of his right to a jury trial for the guilt phase, particularly as he was 
permitted to remain completely unrestrained while in the courtroom.   
4. The guilt phase bench trial as tantamount to a “slow plea of guilty”  
Defendant claims defense counsel failed to mount a defense at the guilt phase—
presenting no affirmative witnesses, evidence, or defenses and conceding defendant‘s 
guilt on all the charges—and contends this failure was the ―functional equivalent of a 
slow plea of guilty‖ that denied defendant his state and federal constitutional rights to 
enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea following a full advisement of rights and 
express waiver of those rights.  Respondent argues that defendant forfeited this claim by 
repeatedly rejecting the trial court‘s offers to set aside the guilt phase verdict and grant 
him a new guilt phase trial with or without a jury, or, in the alternative, that defendant is 
barred from raising it under the doctrine of invited error.  We need not decide the 
forfeiture and invited error issues, however, because even assuming the claim has not 
been forfeited and is not barred, it lacks merit.   
In In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, we stated that if a defendant‘s stipulation to 
submit a case for decision on the basis of the transcripts of the preliminary hearing is, in 
the circumstances of the particular case, ―tantamount to a plea of guilty,‖ it must be 
accompanied by Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers, that is, the advisement and express 
personal waiver of three specific constitutional rights—the rights to a jury trial, to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination.  (Mosley, at p. 924; 
29 
 
id. at p. 925 & p. 926, fn. 10; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl 
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.)  The phrase ― ‗tantamount to a plea of guilty‘ ‖ was used ―to 
explain [the] extension of the Boykin-Tahl requirements to submissions in which the guilt 
of the defendant was apparent on the basis of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing and in which conviction was a foregone conclusion if no defense was offered.‖  
(Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602 (Bunnell).)2  We have further 
suggested that ―a ‗slow plea‘ of guilty‖ may occur where a defendant submits the issue of 
his or her guilt of the charged offense on the basis of the police report (In re Jennings 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 265, fn. 5) or ―other documentation‖ (People v. Watson (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 822, 826, fn. 3), or where a defendant in a capital case submits the issue of 
penalty on the transcript of prior proceedings (People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 
39 (Robertson)). 
In Robertson, we explained that ―submission‖ within the meaning of the slow plea 
doctrine ―is defined by the rights a defendant surrenders.‖  (Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 
at p. 40.)  ―Although the parties may reserve the right to present additional evidence, the 
essential components of a submission are waiver of a jury trial and, with respect to the 
witnesses who testified in the prior proceedings, waiver of the right to confrontation in 
the present proceeding.  [Citations.]  When the submission is a ‗slow plea‘ or ‗tantamount 
to a plea of guilty,‘ the defendant also gives up his privilege against self-incrimination.‖  
(Ibid.; see Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 495 [―If the submission does not amount to a 
slow plea of guilty, there is no involuntary confession of guilt.‖].)  
Defendant‘s stipulation to a bench trial for the guilt phase in this case was not 
tantamount to a plea of guilty.  (See Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 40; People v. 
                                              
2  
In Bunnell, as a matter of judicial policy we mandated Boykin-Tahl advisements 
and waivers in all cases submitted for decision on the basis of the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing.  (Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 605.)  But unless the submission 
was tantamount to a plea of guilty, a Bunnell error requires reversal only if the error was 
prejudicial to the defendant.  (People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 494–495 (Wright).)   
30 
 
Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 592–594; Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 497.)  Although 
in agreeing to the stipulation defendant gave up his right to a jury trial, he was advised of 
and personally waived this right.  In so stipulating he did not give up the right to 
confrontation and cross-examination or to remain silent.  To the contrary, defendant 
enjoyed a full court trial during which he confronted, cross-examined, and attempted to 
impeach the prosecution witnesses, and exercised his right against self-incrimination by 
not taking the witness stand.  Having fully exercised these rights, there was no need for 
defendant to waive them.  Additionally, defense counsel conceded neither guilt nor the 
necessary elements of the various offenses, but rather required the prosecution to prove 
every element of every crime through the testimony of 16 witnesses and attempted to 
raise reasonable doubt in various areas.  As counsel stated in closing argument, although 
defendant may have wished to take responsibility for the crimes, ―failing a settlement that 
I can live with, as a lawyer I must contest the charges.‖   
5. The admission of defendant’s statements to law enforcement officers 
and his videotaped reenactment  
Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting in both the guilt and penalty 
phases of the trial the contents of his custodial interrogations and his videotaped 
reenactment at the SOS store, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to 
due process, to be free from self-incrimination, and to be subjected to custodial 
interrogation only with the assistance of counsel.  According to defendant, law 
enforcement officers deliberately violated Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, ignored an 
unambiguous request for counsel, and used a variety of coercive tactics that, when 
considered in their totality, demonstrate his statements were involuntary.  He argues that 
as a result, the incriminating statements were the product of repeated and intentional 
violations of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, and that the 
allegedly erroneous admission of the confessions was prejudicial.   
31 
 
As discussed below, we conclude defendant understood the Miranda warnings he 
was given, validly waived his Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and to an attorney, 
and made uncoerced statements to law enforcement officers.  We therefore reject 
defendant‘s arguments regarding his taped statements and the video reenactment. 
a) Background 
The prosecution first sought to introduce defendant‘s various interviews and the 
video reenactment during the preliminary hearing.  Defense counsel objected.  At a 
hearing on the issue, a magistrate judge found the detectives did not violate Miranda, 
supra, 384 U.S. 436, did not make any false statements inducing the confessions, and did 
not improperly fail to clarify a request for counsel.  The judge further concluded 
defendant was properly advised of and knew his rights, and the statements and the video 
reenactment were made freely and voluntarily.  
Before the guilt phase, defense counsel moved to suppress the custodial 
statements, any resulting admissions, and the video reenactment.  The trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing at which evidence was presented concerning defendant‘s previous 
interrogations by law enforcement officers in April 1982 and January 1988 in connection 
with charges of oral copulation with Michelle I. and child molestation of Samira S., 
respectively.  In each instance, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and asked if 
he understood them, whether he wanted to talk about the case, and whether he wanted a 
lawyer; in each instance defendant agreed to talk to the officers without a lawyer and 
either wrote down his responses to the waiver questions or signed a waiver statement.   
Ontario Police Department detectives testified about an exchange that occurred 
during the preliminary six minutes of their initial meeting with defendant in Deadwood, 
South Dakota before they gave him the first Miranda warning.  After introductions and 
general questions about defendant‘s welfare, defendant asked detectives whether his 
girlfriend, Costello, was in jail.  Detective Ortiz responded, ―She‘s in our custody.  She‘s 
32 
 
safeguarded.‖3  When defendant claimed that Costello was ―not involved in any of this‖ 
and ―shouldn‘t be in custody,‖ the detectives responded, ―[T]hat‘s what we need to find 
out from you. . . .  And this is your opportunity, okay . . . .  We both have [the] suspicion 
. . . that . . . she didn‘t have nothing [sic] to do with anything that happened before . . . 
you started running.  But basically we wanted to find out from you.‖  They also related 
arriving at Folsom Prison to transport defendant to the video reenactment.  The trial court 
additionally considered the preliminary hearing testimony of three law enforcement 
officers who were involved in the traffic stop and arrest of defendant.  
Finally, several police officers testified concerning the department‘s practice at the 
time of defendant‘s interrogations of deliberately omitting the ―express waiver‖ question 
from Ontario Police Department form 4.17, from which Miranda advisements were read.  
That question asked whether, having the Miranda rights in mind, the suspect wished to 
talk to about the case.  The practice of omitting this question was based on police 
training, information gleaned from prosecutors, and confirmation from the courts 
indicating such waiver was unnecessary.  In October 1992, after defendant was 
interrogated, the San Bernardino County District Attorney‘s Office issued a 
memorandum advising the department to ask the express waiver question in their 
interrogations.   
With respect to the motion to suppress, the trial court found the detectives‘ 
comments during the first six minutes of the initial Deadwood interview, prior to giving a 
Miranda admonition about Costello being ―in custody‖ and ―safeguarded,‖ to which 
defendant responded by protesting Costello‘s innocence, constituted psychological 
inducement or ―softening up‖ likely to evoke incriminating statements.  Therefore, 
defendant‘s responses during that time had been obtained in violation of Miranda.  As to 
his later statements after the first Miranda admonition, the court found by a 
                                              
3  
It appears that Costello in fact was staying at a hotel with a law enforcement 
matron.   
33 
 
preponderance of the evidence under the totality of the circumstances that defendant 
understood his constitutional rights, and his implied waiver of those rights ―was 
voluntary and was a result of his own desire to make statements‖ and not the product of 
the prior improper influences.  The trial court also found that:  (1) defendant‘s 
incriminating statements were not induced by improper police conduct; (2) there was no 
bad faith intent to violate his Miranda rights, as the detectives had a good faith belief that 
the practice of not obtaining an express waiver was lawful; (3) defendant‘s ambiguous 
comment about having ―someone here to talk for me‖ did not constitute an invocation of 
the right to counsel; and (4) no further Miranda advisements were required for the 
second, third and fourth Deadwood interviews because their purpose was merely to 
briefly clarify matters covered in the first interrogation.   
With respect to the video reenactment, the court found (1) Sergeant Lewis‘s 
inquiry at Folsom Prison concerning whether defendant was willing to cooperate with 
authorities in an ―ongoing investigation of a murder in a warehouse‖ was not a custodial 
interrogation requiring a Miranda warning, and nothing Lewis said or did improperly 
induced defendant‘s agreement to cooperate; (2) later, more specific questioning by the 
detectives who went to the prison to retrieve defendant for the reenactment was improper 
because an affirmative answer to the question whether defendant remained willing ―to 
reenact the crimes,‖ in and of itself, would be incriminating, but this one question did not 
influence defendant‘s previous agreement to cooperate; and (3) the reenactment was 
validly conducted after a full Miranda advisement with an express waiver.   
Consequently, the court ruled defendant‘s multiple statements and confessions 
were admissible in the prosecution‘s case-in-chief during both the guilt and penalty 
phases of the trial, with the exception of the first six minutes of the initial interview and 
the in-prison questioning of defendant specifically about reenacting the crimes.  
34 
 
b) Analysis 
Defendant advances various arguments in support of the proposition the trial court 
erred in failing to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers and the video 
reenactment as obtained in contravention of his constitutional right against compelled 
self-incrimination.  None of these arguments are persuasive.   
(1) Alleged deliberate violation of Miranda 
Defendant argues his custodial statements should have been suppressed because 
they were obtained after a deliberate violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.  This 
deliberate violation allegedly occurred when, during the first interview, Detectives 
Nottingham and Ortiz intentionally declined to seek an express waiver of defendant‘s 
right to silence after giving the Miranda advisement.  
In general, if a custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full explanation 
of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, 
he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them.  (Colorado 
v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 574.)  Law enforcement officers are not required to obtain 
an express waiver of a suspect‘s Miranda rights prior to a custodial interview.  (See 
North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373 (Butler) [―An express written or oral 
statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong 
proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to 
establish waiver.‖].)  Rather, a valid waiver of Miranda rights may, as here, be inferred 
from the defendant‘s words and actions.  (Butler, at p. 373.)  As the detectives who 
interrogated defendant were not required to obtain an express waiver of the right to 
silence from him, the intentional failure to do so was not a deliberate Miranda violation 
requiring the suppression of his subsequent statements.   
(2) Alleged coercion of defendant’s custodial statements 
Alternatively, defendant contends his incriminating custodial statements were 
involuntary in light of a combination of other factors, including his compromised mental 
35 
 
state, the detectives‘ use of deception, and their implied promise to help his companion, 
Costello.   
The test for the voluntariness of a custodial statement is whether the statement is 
― ‗the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice‘ ‖ or whether the 
defendant‘s ― ‗will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically 
impaired‘ ‖ by coercion.  (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 225.)  No 
single factor is dispositive; ―rather courts consider the totality of [the] circumstances.‖  
(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 661 (Williams); see People v. Neal (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 63, 79 (Neal).)  Relevant considerations include ― ‗the crucial element of police 
coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its 
continuity‘ as well as ‗the defendant‘s maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical 
condition [citation]; and mental health.‘ ‖  (Williams, at p. 660; see Neal, at p. 84 
[appellate review entails ― ‗inquiry into all the circumstances,‘ including ‗evaluation of 
[defendant‘s] age, experience, education, background, and intelligence‘ ‖].)   
―In assessing allegedly coercive police tactics, ‗[t]he courts have prohibited only 
those psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they 
tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable.‘ ‖  (People v. Smith 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501; see, e.g., People v. Kendrick (1961) 56 Cal.2d 71, 84 
(Kendrick) [―a confession has been held involuntary and inadmissible where it was 
obtained as a result of . . . such inducements as a promise to do for an accused all that 
could be done [citation] or to protect the accused‘s family from retaliation [citation] or a 
statement that if the accused confessed the punishment would be lighter [citation] or that 
it would be better for him to confess [citation] or by threats to hold the accused‘s 
mother‖].)   
Additionally, although coercive police conduct is a necessary predicate, such 
conduct does not compel a finding that the resulting statement is involuntary.  (People v. 
Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 814 (Jablonski).)  A confession is involuntary only if 
36 
 
the coercive police conduct at issue and the defendant‘s statement are causally related.  
(Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 164, fn. 2, & 167; Jablonski, at p. 814 [The 
police misconduct ― ‗must be . . . the ―proximate cause‖ of the statement in question, and 
not merely a cause in fact.‘ ‖]; see, e.g., People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1095–
1096 [the defendant‘s statements were not coerced by false threats of arrest; the sole 
cause appearing in the record for his cooperation during the interview was the desire to 
exculpate himself]; Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 661 [promises of leniency were ―not 
the motivating cause of [the] defendant‘s admissions‖].) 
Here, even assuming, as the trial court found, the detectives engaged in improper 
―softening up‖ at the outset of the first interview by claiming defendant‘s companion, 
Costello, was in custody and implying defendant could exonerate her by speaking to 
them, the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation support the conclusion 
defendant‘s statements given after he was later advised of his Miranda rights were 
voluntary and not the product of psychological inducement.  The detectives‘ comments 
concerning Costello were relatively brief, lasting only three-to-four minutes of the 
preliminary six minutes of the interview and fell ―far short of a threat to arrest‖ Costello 
unless defendant confessed.  (Kendrick, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 86.)  Importantly, the 
comments were immediately followed by the first of two Miranda advisements given to 
defendant, following both of which defendant stated unequivocally he understood the 
rights read to him and continued to talk to the detectives and to answer their questions.  
(Cf. People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 158, 160 [a half-hour of ―clever 
softening-up, . . . disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation‖ induced the 
defendant to agree to talk about the homicide well before being advised of his Miranda 
rights].)   
During the interview, defendant indicated several times that, for various personal 
reasons, he had decided beforehand to talk to the detectives about the case.  Defendant‘s 
pre-interview decision is the sole reason appearing in the record for his cooperation.  It 
37 
 
thus does not appear the detectives‘ alleged attempts at softening up defendant overcame 
his will to resist or his ability to freely determine whether he wanted to talk to the 
detectives, such that it could be said the short discussion regarding Costello was the 
proximate cause of defendant‘s later incriminating statements.  
We further note neither the length nor physical circumstances of the interrogation 
appear to have been coercive; the initial interview was spread over a four-hour period 
with the detectives offering defendant both food and drink.  Nor was the tone of the 
questioning as evidenced in the transcript particularly harsh or accusatory.   
Additionally, at the time of the interview, defendant was ―a man of mature years 
with an extensive criminal history.‖  (Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 815.)  In his 42 
years, he had had extensive prior contacts with law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system, including having served two prior prison terms and one prior county jail term.  In 
connection with his felony convictions, defendant twice had been interviewed by law 
enforcement officers, during which he was advised of and executed express written 
waivers of his Miranda rights. 
Finally, with respect to defendant‘s mental state, it does not appear the detectives 
exploited any psychiatric problems in order to produce the incriminating statements.  
Before interviewing him, the detectives inquired about defendant‘s general welfare and 
mental state, and in response he expressed no concerns regarding his well-being or 
treatment, stating he had slept 24 hours straight.  
Defendant nevertheless argues his soft-spoken nature, various references to 
dreams and experiences in the Vietnam War, and ―consistently vague‖ responses 
demonstrate his fragile mental state during the interview.  We disagree.  A fair 
assessment of the interview in its entirety shows defendant responded to the detectives‘ 
inquiries while exhibiting normal emotions to be expected of a murder suspect facing his 
accusers and reliving the details of a horrible crime.  That a murder suspect is soft-spoken 
is less an indication of mental illness than an understandable and expected reaction of a 
38 
 
person confronted with committing such horrendous crimes.  Nor does the circumstance 
defendant may have dreamed about the homicides and their likely ramifications 
necessarily show the existence of mental defect.  Although he became emotional at times, 
defendant also took considerable time to weigh his responses before answering the 
detectives‘ questions.  Some answers may have required clarification, but they were 
generally responsive.  We note the detectives believed the references to Vietnam were 
defendant‘s attempt to build a defense.   
Lastly, defendant‘s incriminating statements were not rendered involuntary by any 
mental disease or defect.  Even if some of defendant‘s behavior was irrational or bizarre, 
there is no evidence his ―abilities to reason or comprehend or resist were in fact so 
disabled that he was incapable of free or rational choice.‖  (In re Cameron (1968) 68 
Cal.2d 487, 498; see, e.g., People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 988 (Frye) [defendant‘s 
consumption of alcohol did not so impair his reasoning that ―he was incapable of freely 
and rationally choosing to waive his rights and speak with the officers‖]; People v. 
Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 204 [defendant, who throughout the lengthy interview 
sounded lucid, spoke clearly if somewhat slowly, and at times ―engaged in animated, 
jocular, prideful, indignant or defiant conversation‖ with the detectives, was not mentally 
impaired when he made his audiotaped statement].)  
(3) Failure to terminate the interrogation after defendant allegedly 
invoked his right to counsel 
Defendant contends his incriminating statements should have been suppressed 
because detectives ignored an unambiguous request for an attorney.  He claims he 
invoked his right to counsel during the first interview when he stated, ―I committed an 
armed robbery yes.  Should I have somebody here talking for me, is this the way it‘s 
supposed to be?‖  We conclude defendant‘s vague question did not qualify as an 
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel requiring the cessation of questioning.   
39 
 
Once a defendant has waived his or her right to counsel, as defendant impliedly 
did at the outset of the interview, if that defendant has a change of heart and subsequently 
invokes the right to counsel during questioning, officers must cease interrogation unless 
the defendant‘s counsel is present or the defendant initiates further exchanges, 
communications, or conversations.  (See Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484–
485.)  For a statement to qualify as an invocation of the right to an attorney, however, the 
defendant ―must unambiguously request counsel. . . .  [H]e must articulate his desire to 
have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.‖  (Davis v. 
United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 (Davis).)  ―[A] reviewing court—like the trial 
court in the first instance—must ask whether, in light of the circumstances, a reasonable 
officer would have understood a defendant‘s reference to an attorney to be an 
unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel, without regard to the defendant‘s 
subjective ability or capacity to articulate his or her desire for counsel, and with no 
further requirement imposed upon the officers to ask clarifying questions of the 
defendant.‖  (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 (Gonzalez); see People v. 
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 428 [―[T]he question of ambiguity in an asserted 
invocation must include a consideration of the communicative aspect of the invocation—
what would a listener understand to be the defendant‘s meaning.‖].)  
Here, before the disputed exchange, defendant volunteered, ―I know what you 
guys are getting at. . . .  I also want you to know that the reason why I‘m so calm is 
because I‘m where I belong.‖  When asked to clarify what he meant, defendant replied, 
―You know as well as I do that I committed an armed robbery in Ontario‖ at ―Mike‘s 
company.‖  When Detective Ortiz indicated he wanted additional clarification, defendant 
reiterated, ―I committed an armed robbery yes,‖ and then asked, ―Should I have 
somebody here talking for me, is this the way it‘s supposed to be?‖  Far from 
unambiguously requesting counsel, defendant appeared to be expressing frustration at the 
40 
 
detectives‘ attempts to clarify his initial statements regarding the armed robbery.  At 
most, a reasonable officer could have understood defendant‘s inquiry as an indication he 
might want an attorney, in which case the detectives still would not have been required to 
terminate the interrogation.  (See Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [―[I]f a suspect makes 
a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in 
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking 
the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.‖].)   
Defendant complains the detectives should have asked questions to clarify whether 
he was invoking his right to counsel.  There is no requirement law enforcement officers 
interrupt an interrogation to ask clarifying questions following a suspect‘s ambiguous or 
equivocal responses that might or might not be construed as an invocation of the right to 
an attorney.  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 461–462; see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 107, 181.)  We again note defendant had extensive prior contacts with the police, 
including two interviews in which he expressly waived his right to counsel.  The 
detectives in this case ―could reasonably have assumed that defendant was capable of 
making an unequivocal request for counsel if he so desired.‖  (Gonzalez, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 1127.)  Moreover, after defendant‘s question and before the resumption of 
questioning, defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, expressly stated he 
understood them, and continued to talk to the detectives rather than invoke his right to 
counsel or to silence.  Later in the interview, defendant specifically confirmed the intent 
to waive his right to counsel when he stated he did not want to fight the case, did not need 
a lawyer, did not ―believe in the routine of lawyers, or courts and all that,‖ and did not 
feel a lawyer could do anything for him.   
Considering the totality of the circumstances, ―[s]hould I have somebody here 
talking for me‖ was not an unambiguous request for counsel requiring detectives to cease 
interrogating defendant.  (See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1126 [defendant‘s 
conditional statement that he wanted a lawyer ―if he was going to be charged‖ was not an 
41 
 
invocation of right to counsel]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 124, 128–131 
(Crittenden) [defendant‘s query—― ‗Did you say I could have a lawyer?‘ ‖—was a 
clarification of rights rather than an unambiguous invocation]; People v. Johnson (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 1, 27 [defendant‘s statements that ― ‗Maybe I ought to talk to my lawyer, you 
might be bluffing, you might not have enough to charge murder‘ ‖ and that his mother 
would secure ― ‗a high price[d]‘ lawyer‖ was not an invocation].) 
(4) Failure to suppress the videotaped reenactment 
Finally, defendant raises various additional challenges to the admission of the 
videotaped reenactment of the crimes.  First, relying on People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 757, and People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, defendant claims the 
reenactment should have been suppressed because the detectives took advantage of a 
postarrest delay in his arraignment, suggesting had his arraignment not been delayed, 
counsel would have been appointed and likely would have advised defendant not to 
participate in the reenactment.  Bonillas and Thompson, however, involved defendants 
who had been arrested for the crimes that later formed the basis for their arraignments.  
(See Bonillas, at p. 787; Thompson, at p. 328.)  In this case, defendant was arrested in 
South Dakota and returned to Folsom Prison for a parole violation unrelated to the SOS 
crimes.  No arrest warrant for the SOS homicides had issued before the reenactment.  
Accordingly, Bonillas and Thompson are inapposite. 
In the alternative, defendant argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached 
when he became the focus of the SOS investigation and the delay violated his right to 
counsel regardless of the fact he was arrested and confined for a parole violation.  
However, ―[a] criminal defendant‘s right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment does not exist until the state initiates adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings, such as by formal charge or indictment.‖  (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 1, 33 (DePriest); see Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 987; see also People v. 
42 
 
Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 244–245.)  Moreover, the ―right to counsel is ‗offense 
specific‘ ‖ and ―may be asserted only as to those offenses for which criminal proceedings 
have formally begun.‖  (DePriest, supra, at p. 33; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 
527.)  Before the reenactment, there were no adversarial judicial proceedings, formal 
charges, or indictment pending in connection with the SOS crimes.  Thus, defendant‘s 
right to the assistance of counsel for those offenses had not attached at the time of the 
reenactment.   
Defendant relies on Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 490–491 to argue 
the right to counsel attached when he became the focus of the detectives‘ investigation.  
Defendant‘s reliance on Escobedo is misplaced.  As we have previously explained, the 
high court has made clear the right to counsel at issue there was related to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and prophylactic measures available to 
suspects undergoing custodial interrogation, and not the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 34, fn. 9.)  Moreover, the ―focus‖ rule 
defendant urges that might once have applied in the context of the right against self-
incrimination, has since been repudiated.  (See, e.g., Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 
U.S. 318, 326.)   
Finally, defendant claims the reenactment should have been suppressed because 
his cooperation was improperly induced by Sergeant Lewis‘s ―promise‖ that he would be 
transferred out of Folsom Prison.  The record belies this claim.  As the trial court found, 
Lewis simply asked defendant whether he was willing to cooperate with an ongoing 
investigation and if so, detectives would be picking him up that weekend.  Despite 
defendant‘s concerns about being placed in administrative segregation and a high security 
unit, Lewis specifically testified that no promises concerning defendant‘s housing 
situation at the prison were made to induce his cooperation.  Additionally, any prior 
softening up regarding Costello that might have occurred during the initial interview was 
43 
 
not a factor at the time of the reenactment, as Costello had long been cleared of any 
suspected wrongdoing.  The reenactment thus was properly admitted. 
6. Cumulative prejudice  
Defendant contends that even if the alleged errors at the guilt phase of the trial 
were individually harmless, they were cumulatively prejudicial.  We have found a single 
error, a violation of defendant‘s statutory right to be present, and, assuming the issue was 
not forfeited, concluded that error was harmless.  There are no additional errors to 
cumulate and therefore no cumulative prejudice.  
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Jury selection issues 
a) Exclusion of Hispanic jurors from the penalty phase jury.   
Defendant alleges that the jury selection procedures utilized in the Rancho 
Cucamonga District of the San Bernardino County Superior Court systematically 
excluded Hispanics and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the jury 
venire.  As a result, he contends, his penalty phase jury was not composed of a 
representative cross-section of the community, depriving him of his right to due process 
and a fair trial before an impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution.  The error, he argues, is structural, requiring automatic reversal.   
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant‘s motion to quash, as 
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of the systematic exclusion of Hispanic 
jurors.  This claim therefore is without merit. 
(1) Background 
During penalty phase jury selection, defendant filed a motion to quash the jury 
panel on the ground Hispanics were systematically excluded from those summoned for 
44 
 
service in the Rancho Cucamonga District.  The trial court conducted a hearing on the 
motion, in which the following evidence was presented.   
Shirley Stoudt, the Deputy Jury Commissioner of San Bernardino County Superior 
Court, testified concerning how potential jurors were summoned from a master list 
compiled from Department of Motor Vehicles and Registrar of Voters records, and then 
processed according to statutory exemptions as well as the California Rules of Court.  
The jury commissioner‘s office was not aware of the race, religion, or ethnic background 
of the jurors when excusing or exempting them for service and, according to Stoudt, did 
nothing to keep any minority group off the jury panels.  A voluntary countywide survey 
of potential jurors showed 4.3 percent were excused for language difficulties and 1.78 
percent were excused for lack of citizenship.  Although these figures included all 
languages and noncitizens and the individuals were not asked to state their ethnic or 
racial background, she estimated that Hispanics and Spanish-speaking individuals would 
have constituted a larger percentage of these groups than other ethnicities.   
Julia Arias, a politically active elementary school teacher and community leader 
who grew up in Fontana and Rancho Cucamonga, testified concerning her childhood, 
education, and religious upbringing and the racial discrimination her family faced.4  Arias 
felt Hispanics were underrepresented on juries because they were forced to refuse jury 
service in order to preserve their ―meager pay‖ and because they were unaware of the 
importance of exercising their right to vote.  She then read various statistics from the 
Weeks study (discussed below) and suggested the court read the survey ―more carefully‖ 
to find out what was happening to her community.  John Weeks, Ph.D.,5 was retained by 
                                              
4  
The trial court permitted Arias to give a narrative statement rather than respond to 
questions from defense counsel. 
 
5  
A professor of geography and director of the International Population Center at 
San Diego State University, Weeks had previously qualified as an expert witness in 
demography and statistics in more than 50 cases.   
45 
 
the defense to conduct a demographic survey of jurors reporting for jury duty in San 
Bernardino County.  Of 574 potential jurors for the Rancho Cucamonga District surveyed 
over the course of five weeks, 16.9 percent indicated they were Hispanic.  Weeks 
compared this to the 23.1 percent he estimated to be Hispanics in the ―juror eligible‖ 
population in the Rancho Cucamonga District in 1995.  Weeks geometrically 
extrapolated the 23.1 percent figure from 1980 and 1990 census data and from 
projections of the ethnic makeup of every county in the state for 2000 and 2010 by the 
California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit.  Based on these figures, 
Weeks found there was an ―absolute disparity‖6 of 6.2 percent between the number of 
Hispanics reporting for jury duty and the number of eligible Hispanics residing in the 
judicial district.  Dividing the absolute disparity of 6.2 percent by the community percent 
of 23.1, he concluded there was a ―relative disparity‖7 of 27 percent.  Thus, according to 
Weeks, there were 27 percent fewer Hispanics in the Rancho Cucamonga jury pool than 
would be expected from the demographics of the community.  Dividing the results by 
gender, he further found an absolute disparity of 7.2 percent and relative disparity of 30 
percent for male Hispanics.8   
                                              
6  
― ‗Absolute disparity‘ is the difference between the underrepresented group‘s 
percentage in the jury-eligible population and the group‘s percentage in the actual jury 
venire.‖  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 564, fn. 6 (Anderson).)  
 
7  
Relative or ― ‗comparative disparity‘ measures the percentage by which the 
number of group members in the actual venire falls short of the number of group 
members one would expect from the overall ‗eligible population‘ ‖ of the group who are 
eligible for jury service.  (Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 564, fn. 6; People v. Ramirez 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 441 (Ramirez); People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 492, fn. 5 
(Sanders).)  In this case, 6.2 percent divided by 23.1 percent is 26.8 percent.   
 
8  
However, Weeks admitted on cross-examination that based solely on 1990 census 
data, Hispanics comprised 18.7 percent of the jury-eligible population, which translated 
to an absolute disparity of Hispanic jurors of only 1.8 percent and a relative disparity of 
10 percent.   
46 
 
Relying on the above disparities, Weeks concluded there was ―a substantive and a 
statistically significant underrepresentation of Hispanics showing up for jury duty in the 
Rancho Cucamonga District courthouse.‖  The biggest alleged cause of the disparity was 
lack of follow-up by the jury commissioner‘s office for unserved jury summonses.  
Weeks also criticized the summons form for stating ―do not forward,‖ for prominently 
inviting excusal requests, and for not explicitly asking for address corrections.  He 
believed this disadvantaged Hispanics who were more ―residentially mobile‖ than non-
Hispanics.  Based on Weeks‘s opinions, defendant argued the court could end the 
systematic discrimination and disenfranchisement of Hispanics in San Bernardino County 
by prohibiting the removal of jurors except for the reasons authorized under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 203,9 by preventing jury clerks from removing jurors without 
judicial authorization, and by taking measures to ensure adequate follow-up of jurors who 
initially fail to appear for jury service.  Weeks claimed that San Diego County had made 
―some remedies‖ in this regard, which increased the number of Hispanics on its master 
list. 
The trial court denied defendant‘s motion to quash the jury venire, ruling there 
was no underrepresentation of Hispanics by significant numbers due to systematic 
exclusion in the jury selection process.   
                                              
9  
Code of Civil Procedure section 203, subdivision (a), provides in part:  ―All 
persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except the following: 
 
―(1) Persons who are not citizens of the United States. 
 
―(2) Persons who are less than 18 years of age. 
 
―(3) Persons who are not domiciliaries of the State of California . . . . 
 
―(4) Persons who are not residents of the jurisdiction wherein they are summoned 
to serve. 
 
―(5) Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and 
whose civil rights have not been restored. 
 
―(6) Persons who are not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English 
language . . . .  
 
―(7) Persons who are serving as grand or trial jurors in any court of this state. 
 
―(8) Persons who are the subject of conservatorship.‖  
47 
 
(2) Analysis 
―In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, 
the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‗distinctive‘ group 
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries 
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the 
group in the jury-selection process.‖  (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364.)  
Defendant ―satisfied the first prong of this test, because Hispanics are a ‗distinctive‘ or 
cognizable group.‖  (Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 445; see Castaneda v. Partida 
(1977) 430 U.S. 482, 495.)  With respect to the second prong, however, he failed to show 
the representation of Hispanic jurors was unfair and unreasonable compared to their 
numbers in the community.   
Respondent contends the most reliable figures provided by defense expert Weeks, 
based solely on 1990 census data, demonstrated an absolute disparity of Hispanic jurors 
of only 1.8 percent and a relative disparity of only 10 percent.  But even assuming the 
statistical disparities Weeks calculated based on extrapolations for 1995 were credible—
an absolute disparity of 6.2 percent and a relative disparity of 27 percent for all 
Hispanics, and an absolute disparity of 7.2 percent and relative disparity of 30 percent for 
male Hispanics—defendant still failed to satisfy the second prong because such 
disparities are not constitutionally significant.  (See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 
Cal.4th 833, 856 (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity 
of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second 
prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [concluding an 
absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 
and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 
502, 528, fn.15 [finding it was ―far from clear‖ that a 5 percent absolute disparity was 
sufficient]; see also Swain v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 202, 208–209 [10 percent 
48 
 
absolute disparity inadequate]; U. S. v. Cannady (9th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 544, 548 
[―absolute disparities below 7.7% are insubstantial and constitutionally permissible‖].) 
Even had defendant demonstrated a constitutionally significant disparity, he still 
would have failed to satisfy the third prong of the test.  ―A defendant does not discharge 
the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion 
merely by offering statistical evidence of a disparity.  A defendant must show, in 
addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection 
process.‖  (Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 857.)   
The Rancho Cucamonga District master list used in this case was derived from 
Department of Motor Vehicle‘s and voter registration lists.  We have held that such a list 
― ‗ ―shall be considered inclusive of a representative cross-section of the population‖ ‘ 
where it is properly nonduplicative.‖  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 427 
(Ochoa); see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. § 197, subd. (b) [a master jury list assembled from 
lists of registered voters and driver‘s license holders, ―when substantially purged of 
duplicate names, shall be considered inclusive of a representative cross section of the 
population‖].)  There is no suggestion that the master list was duplicative in any way.   
As shown by the jury commissioner‘s testimony, moreover, juror excusals were 
based on race-neutral reasons provided by statute and the California Rules of Court.  
Indeed, the excusal forms did not even indicate the prospective juror‘s race.  The excusal 
categories of non-citizenship and lack of understanding of English encompassed all 
ethnicities and national origins, not simply Hispanics or Spanish-speaking individuals.  
―Where, as here, a county‘s jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to the 
distinctive group, the defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those 
criteria are applied that is not only the probable cause of the disparity but also 
constitutionally impermissible.‖  (Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 858; see Sanders, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 492–493 [―Evidence that ‗race/class neutral jury selection 
processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher percentage 
49 
 
of a particular class of jurors than would result from a random draw‘ is insufficient to 
make out a prima facie case.‖].)  Defendant failed to do so in this case.   
Julia Arias, the community activist who testified for the defense, suggested 
Hispanics were underrepresented because they were unaware of the importance of voting.  
However, ―the failure of a particular group to register to vote in proportion to its share of 
the population cannot constitute improper exclusion attributable to the state.‖  (Ochoa, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 427.)  Arias also speculated Hispanics were forced to refuse jury 
service in order to avoid losing the ―meager pay‖ they received in their employment.  
And defense expert John Weeks suggested, without citation to evidence, that Hispanics in 
Rancho Cucamonga were ―residentially mobile‖ because they had low incomes, were 
unlikely to own homes and were transient as renters, and consequently more difficult to 
summon for jury duty.  However, ―[s]peculation as to the source of the disparity is 
insufficient to show systematic exclusion [citation], as is evidence the disparity is 
unlikely to be a product of chance [citation] or has endured for some time [citation].‖  
(Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 858.)  
Finally, Weeks opined San Bernardino County could have remedied the alleged 
disparity in Hispanic jurors by following up on unserved summonses, soliciting address 
corrections, and making the excusal form less prominent.  Even assuming he was correct, 
merely pointing to a remedy is not enough.  (Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 428.)  The 
United States Constitution, while forbidding the exclusion of members of a cognizable 
class of jurors, ― ‗ ―does not require that venires created by a neutral selection procedure 
be supplemented to achieve the goal of selection from a representative cross-section of 
the population.‖ ‘  [Citation.]  So long as the state uses criteria that are neutral with 
respect to the underrepresented group, the state‘s failure to adopt other measures to 
increase the group‘s representation cannot satisfy Duren‘s third prong.‖  (Burgener, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 857–858.) 
50 
 
As defendant did not satisfy his burden under the second and third prongs of 
Duren, a prima facie case of underrepresentation and systematic exclusion of Hispanic 
jurors was not made.  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant‘s motion to 
quash the venire. 
b) Exclusion of life-inclined juror for cause  
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously excluded Prospective Juror G.P. for 
cause based solely on his written answers to a jury questionnaire and without any 
opportunity for voir dire.  He contends that if G.P. had been given the opportunity to 
respond to questions in person, the court could have clarified whether he was qualified to 
serve on a capital jury.  As a result of the allegedly improper removal of this prospective 
juror, defendant argues he was subjected to ―a tribunal organized to return a verdict of 
death‖ in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I, sections 15 and 16 of the California Constitution.   
To the extent defendant asserts error in the court‘s ruling on challenges for cause 
based solely on the jurors‘ responses to the questionnaires without voir dire, the claim is 
forfeited because he stipulated to this procedure.  On the merits, we conclude the court 
did not err in excusing Prospective Juror G.P. for cause based on his juror questionnaire, 
in which he stated an inability to impose the death penalty in a contested penalty phase.  
(1) Background 
Before jury selection for the penalty phase, defendant moved for sequestered voir 
dire of prospective jurors.10  The trial court denied the request for individual voir dire of 
all jurors but acknowledged that oral or questionnaire responses might warrant 
sequestered voir dire of particular jurors on particular issues.   
                                              
10  
Code of Civil Procedure section 223 provides that ―[v]oir dire of any prospective 
jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal 
cases, including death penalty cases.‖   
51 
 
Thereafter, the trial court proposed ruling on stipulated dismissals, followed by 
challenges for cause based solely on questionnaire responses, noting that denial of any 
challenge would be without prejudice, allowing counsel the opportunity to individually 
question the juror.  ―Regular‖ voir dire would then be conducted on the rest of the panel.  
Defense counsel endorsed this procedure as ―the next best thing‖ to sequestered voir dire 
of the entire jury panel and commented on ―[t]he beauty of the Court‘s procedure‖ in 
protecting against potential jurors who may ―pollute the panel.‖  As the time for jury 
selection neared, defendant personally appeared in court and expressly agreed to this 
procedure, which the court, pursuant to the parties‘ stipulation, then utilized.   
Both the prosecution and defense moved to exclude for cause various prospective 
jurors solely on the basis of their questionnaire responses.  Prospective Juror G.P. was 
among those whom the prosecutor challenged.  In his questionnaire, when asked whether 
he had ―any philosophical, religious, or moral feelings that would make it difficult or 
impossible for you to sit in judgment of another person,‖ G.P. wrote ―being educated and 
raised in the strict Catholic teachings and standards, I find it hard to be a judge of another 
person.  I was taught that God is the only rightful judge.‖  Although he also wrote, ―I 
have no problem in judging as to whether or not a person is guilty or has done wrong,‖ he 
indicated that he did ―have a problem as to whether or not punishment or appropriate 
punishment is right or wrong.‖  Despite his generally enjoying jury service ―because the 
law has always been fascinating‖ to him, G.P. reiterated, ―[i]t just so happens that 
sentencing someone is against my beliefs.‖  
Prospective Juror G.P. further wrote he would be greatly influenced by the 
Catholic Church‘s opposition to the death penalty, writing ―I have always been taught to 
try to understand why people become the way they are and that one might always forgive 
and that one might never lose hope.  Somehow these teachings have become my own and 
have influenced my decision in life.‖  G.P. reaffirmed he ―strongly‖ opposed the death 
penalty, opining it served only an economic purpose and was part of a system that ―has 
52 
 
lost all hope.  That should not be the case in any system.‖  When asked ―what types of 
crime, if any, deserve the death penalty,‖ he answered, ―I couldn‘t think of one.‖  G.P. 
also wrote life in prison without parole served no purpose other than draining the 
economy and he would ―only agree to it if it is the only solution for a person not to 
commit harm to society again.‖   
Prospective Juror G.P. indicated he would ―have to hear the case first‖ to know 
whether he could impose life without the possibility of parole or the death penalty.  He 
also stated it was ―very possible‖ to see himself rejecting the death penalty and choosing 
life without possibility of parole ―because of my beliefs,‖ but rejecting life without the 
possibility of parole and choosing the death penalty was ―a possibility‖ only if the 
defendant ―himself requests it and if he is sound in mind and body.‖ 
The defense argued that although Prospective Juror G.P. expressed a preference 
for life without the possibility of parole, his responses also indicated he would be willing 
to listen to the case before selecting a punishment.  The prosecution responded that G.P.‘s 
answers demonstrated his religious beliefs, which taught him the death penalty was 
improper, would override this willingness.  Defense counsel did not ask to question G.P. 
in order to clarify his qualification to serve on a capital jury.  Without conducting voir 
dire of G.P., the court granted the challenge for cause, finding his strong religious beliefs 
combined with his strong opposition to the death penalty indicated he would be 
―substantially impaired in seriously considering the death penalty as an option.‖ 
(2) Analysis 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to conduct voir dire to clarify 
Prospective Juror G.P.‘s views on capital punishment and in granting the prosecutor‘s 
challenge based on his juror questionnaire responses alone.  However, defendant forfeited 
this claim when he expressly agreed to that procedure.  Defendant, moreover, did not 
request individual voir dire of Prospective Juror G.P. before the court ruled on the 
53 
 
prosecutor‘s challenge for cause, instead opposing the challenge by arguing that G.P.‘s 
questionnaire responses indicated he could be a fair juror.  (People v. Cook (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1334, 1342 (Cook) [defendant who agreed to ― ‗submit on the questionnaire‘ ‖ 
challenges for cause to certain prospective jurors and waived any further questioning, 
forfeited right to complain on appeal of the court‘s failure to interrogate that prospective 
juror]; cf. People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 452 (Stewart) [finding error where 
trial court acted without the parties‘ prior agreement in granting several prosecution 
challenges for cause solely on the basis of the questionnaire responses, despite earlier 
assurances that it would conduct further oral voir dire to address any ambiguous 
responses and despite the defendant‘s repeated objections to the procedure].)  
Alternatively, defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding Prospective 
Juror G.P. for cause simply because he expressed strong opposition to the death penalty 
in his questionnaire.  A prospective juror‘s personal views concerning the death penalty 
do not necessarily afford a basis for excusing the juror for bias in a capital case.  (See 
Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 6 [― ‗[A] man who opposes the death penalty, no less 
than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the 
State.‘ ‖].)  Rather, ―[t]o achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law 
permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of 
or against capital punishment ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
his [or her] duties as a juror‖ ‘ in accordance with the court‘s instructions and the juror‘s 
oath.‖  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 
469 U.S. 412, 424; see Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510.)  Under this 
standard, a prospective juror is properly excluded in a capital case if he or she is unable to 
follow the trial court‘s instruction and ―conscientiously consider all of the sentencing 
alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.‖  (People v. McWhorter 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 340; see People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987 (Jenkins).)  
54 
 
A trial court‘s ruling on a challenge for cause based solely on a juror‘s responses 
on a written questionnaire is subject to de novo review by this court.  (People v. Avila 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 (Avila).)  We review the record to determine whether the trial 
court had sufficient information regarding Prospective Juror G.P.‘s state of mind to 
permit it to reliably determine whether his views on the death penalty would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties in this case.  (Stewart, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 445; see also Avila, at p. 531 [―a prospective juror in a capital case may be 
discharged for cause based solely on his or her answers to the written questionnaire if it is 
clear from the answers that he or she is unwilling to temporarily set aside his or her own 
beliefs and follow the law‖].)   
In Cook, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pages 1343–1344, and Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 
page 532, we upheld the trial court‘s orders excusing prospective jurors whose 
questionnaire answers showed they could not impose the death penalty even though they 
also responded they could set aside their personal feelings and follow the law.  The 
situation before us presents a similar dichotomy. 
In his questionnaire, Prospective Juror G.P. stated he had strong religious beliefs 
that made it difficult for him to judge someone else because he was taught God is the 
only rightful judge, and although he had no problem judging another person on the issue 
of guilt, he had a problem with deciding the appropriate punishment.  Significantly, G.P. 
stated unequivocally he was strongly opposed to the death penalty, which he saw as 
economically motivated and as part of a system that had ―lost all hope,‖ and he could not 
think of a single crime deserving the death penalty.  Although G.P. stated it was a 
―possibility‖ he could choose the death penalty in an appropriate case, the example he 
gave was a case in which the defendant was competent and requested it.  However, in 
another response, G.P. implied he would not make up his mind on punishment until he 
heard the case. 
55 
 
We conclude Prospective Juror G.P.‘s strong religious beliefs and opposition to 
capital punishment amply support the conclusion he would have been prevented or 
substantially impaired from performing his duties in this particular case.  His express 
reluctance to sit in judgment of someone on the issue of punishment made him 
particularly unqualified to serve on defendant‘s jury, as G.P. was being considered for 
service on a penalty phase jury that would only be deciding the appropriate punishment 
for defendant.  Although stating somewhat ambiguously he would have to hear the case 
first to know whether he could realistically impose either death or life without the 
possibility of parole, G.P. repeatedly expressed his opposition to the death penalty for all 
crimes, with a possible exception for a case in which a competent defendant exercised his 
right to a jury trial in order to request to be executed.  The trial court therefore did not err 
by excusing Prospective Juror G.P. for cause based on his responses to the jury 
questionnaire. 
c) Prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike African-American 
jurors  
Defendant claims the prosecutor improperly exercised four of his six peremptory 
challenges against African-Americans—Prospective Jurors D.W., A.L., S.A.-M., and 
A.C.—during penalty phase jury selection.  (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d. 258 (Wheeler).)  He argues the trial court erred in 
failing to find a prima facie case of discrimination based on the four challenges and 
abdicated its duty to conduct a sincere evaluation of the prosecutor‘s reasons for excusing 
those potential jurors.  Their improper removal, he contends, requires automatic reversal 
of the judgment. 
This claim fails for several reasons.  First, defendant failed to make a sufficient 
record demonstrating Prospective Juror A.L. was a member of a cognizable class.  
Second, defendant forfeited any Batson/Wheeler claim regarding Prospective Jurors S.A.-
M. and A.C. by failing to object to their excusal prior to the swearing of the jury and 
56 
 
alternates.  Finally, as to Prospective Juror D.W., the trial court correctly ruled defendant 
failed to make a prima facie showing the prosecutor excused the juror for reasons of race.   
(1) Background 
After the prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge against a non-
African-American juror, defense counsel made a premature Batson/Wheeler motion.  He 
argued prospectively that if the prosecutor were to exercise a peremptory challenge 
against any African-American jurors, a prima facie case of discrimination would be 
established because (1) of the prosecutor‘s six for-cause challenges denied by the court, 
―approximately [50] percent of those persons were [B]lack,‖ and (2) the prosecutor had 
devoted an inordinate amount of time—approximately 75 to 80 percent of the voir dire 
transcript pages—questioning African-American jurors.11  The prosecutor objected to 
what he considered defense counsel‘s attempts to intimidate him in his exercise of 
peremptory challenges.  After additional discussion, the court found, considering the 
explanations offered for the prosecutor‘s challenges for cause to minority and non-
minority jurors, there had been no attempt to systematically exclude minority jurors.   
After voir dire continued, the prosecutor exercised his second peremptory 
challenge against Prospective Juror D.W.  Defense counsel objected:  ―Batson challenge.  
She‘s a correctional officer.  She was one he picked on for no good reason just to ask a 
lot of questions.‖  The trial court denied the challenge, concluding defendant had not 
made a prima facie showing of a systematic pattern of exclusion of minority jurors.  It 
invited the prosecutor to place his reasons for exercising the challenge on the record, 
noting, however, he was under no obligation to do so.  The prosecutor declined the 
invitation, stating he would provide an explanation for each minority juror for whom he 
                                              
11  
Defense counsel did not restrict his Batson/Wheeler objections to African-
Americans or other racial groups.  He also filed a written Batson/Wheeler motion arguing 
that Vietnam veterans were a cognizable class.  
57 
 
exercised a peremptory challenge at the end of jury selection.  The court thereafter 
excused D.W.   
The prosecutor exercised his third peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror 
A.L.  Defense counsel objected:  ―Batson again.‖  The court excused A.L. without 
explicitly ruling on defendant‘s challenge.  
The prosecutor exercised his fourth peremptory challenge against Prospective 
Juror S.A.-M.  Defense counsel stated:  ―I‘ll wait till he does one more, then I‘ll do that.  
I‘m going to make a motion.  So we don‘t have to argue it each time.‖  The trial court 
responded:  ―All right.  For the record, the court notes that there was a challenge for 
cause as to [S.A.-M.] and she did indicate an attitude that was definitely leaning against 
the death penalty, although probably not sufficient, the court found, to grant a challenge 
for cause.  But certainly it‘s a basis for an exercise of the peremptory challenge.‖   
The prosecutor exercised his fifth challenge against Prospective Juror A.C.  
Defense counsel made no objection, and the trial court excused A.C.  Subsequently, the 
parties accepted 12 jurors after the prosecutor exercised his sixth and final peremptory 
challenge without any further Batson/Wheeler objections.  During the selection of the 
alternate jurors, the defendant made no Batson/Wheeler objections.  Thereafter, six 
alternate jurors were chosen.  
After the jurors and alternate jurors were sworn, the prosecutor asked whether 
there was a Batson/Wheeler motion still pending.  The trial court and defense counsel 
indicated it had been denied, referring to the colloquy that occurred in connection with 
Prospective Juror D.W.  The prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court all noted the 
prosecution thereafter had exercised peremptory challenges against two other African-
American prospective jurors, S.A.-M. and A.C.  Defense counsel then stated, ―I don‘t 
believe I said anything when he did that.  The court confirmed, ―Correct.  You didn‘t 
renew or make another motion.‖  Defense counsel affirmed, ―I had made the motion.  
58 
 
You had denied it.  And I guess the reasons for my not doing it again will have to go with 
me to the federal habeas or whatever.‖   
The prosecutor then asked for the opportunity to ―go on the record‖ regarding the 
three challenges.  The trial court granted this request, but first stated:  ―[E]ven after the 
two additional challenges[,] the Court is still satisfied that there is not a . . . prima facie 
demonstration to the Court of any systematic or attempted systematic exclusion of 
[B]lack jurors by the prosecution, particularly with regard to the last two peremptories of 
[B]lack jurors.  [¶]  The responses in the questionnaire, and the responses of the jurors 
orally, in the Court‘s view, provided adequate non-racial basis for the peremptory 
challenges.  And if the motion had been renewed, it would have been denied again at that 
point, again on the basis that there was not a prima facie showing.  [¶]  [The c]ourt will 
also note that the jury that the prosecution passed on that was actually sworn does include 
two [B]lack jurors.  Which is, again, additional evidence to the Court that there was not 
an attempt to systematically exclude [B]lacks.‖12   
Thereafter, the prosecutor explained he excused Prospective Juror D.W. because 
she was argumentative during voir dire and had used defensive body language.  D.W. 
also linked her job as a prison guard with the possibility of becoming a psychologist who 
counseled inmates, which was problematic from the prosecutor‘s perspective because 
defendant‘s penalty phase specifically involved psychological and psychiatric testimony.  
D.W. further described herself as being ―on the opposite end of the spectrum‖ of 
Prospective Juror D.P.,13 which indicated to the prosecutor D.W. would tend to always 
                                              
12  
In allowing the prosecutor to make a record of his race-neutral reasons for 
excusing the jurors in question, even though finding no prima facie case of 
discrimination, the trial court followed the ―better practice.‖  (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 313, 343, fn.13 (Bonilla) [noting that such information assists the reviewing court 
in assessing the ruling on appeal].) 
 
13  
During voir dire, Prospective Juror D.P. had expressed negative views about 
―counselors, therapists, whatever you want to call them, psychologists, psychiatrists,‖ as 
59 
 
believe such testimony.  And when the prosecutor asked D.W. about rolling her eyes 
while D.P. was speaking during voir dire, D.W. at first admitted to doing so, but then 
later approached the prosecutor during a break, in violation of a court order not to discuss 
the case, and told him she was just batting her eyes rather than rolling them.  This 
behavior, coupled with animosity in D.W.‘s voice, concerned the prosecutor.  
With respect to Prospective Juror A.C., the prosecutor first noted she failed to 
write responses to many of the questions regarding her views on the death penalty.  She 
further expressed ―severe‖ reservations about the death penalty during voir dire and was 
―dishonest‖ in recounting she had heard on the news about a recent execution in 
California, which never occurred.  
Finally, concerning Prospective Juror S.A.-M., the prosecutor explained he 
excused her due to her ―serious reservations about the use of the death penalty.‖  
Responses in the juror questionnaire indicated her religious beliefs taught her not to judge 
others and she would not consider imposing the death penalty on a combat veteran.  She 
also had a relative who was killed by a deputy sheriff in Los Angeles and her family 
wanted criminal charges brought against the sheriff‘s department.  This potential bias 
against law enforcement concerned the prosecutor as well.  And despite S.A.-M.‘s 
recognition there were ―probably circumstances where the death penalty could be 
imposed,‖ she wrote she hoped never to be part of such a decision.  Such reservations 
about the death penalty, which were further developed during voir dire, led the prosecutor 
to believe S.A.-M. would not be an appropriate juror for defendant‘s case.  
Defense counsel did not respond to or comment on the explanations volunteered 
by the prosecutor.  Having denied defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler motion regarding 
                                                                                                                                                  
well as skepticism about two psychological experts evaluating someone over a short time 
and suddenly claiming to know ―what was wrong with this person.‖  D.P. also stated an 
expert‘s credentials ―doesn‘t mean squat‖ if they have only spent a few hours, days, or 
weeks talking with the person they are evaluating.  D.P. further admitted she was 
―opinionated.‖ 
60 
 
Prospective Juror D.W. for failure to make a prima facie showing of discrimination, the 
trial court did not evaluate or otherwise render any further ruling on the prosecutor‘s 
explanations, merely stating ―all right‖ and then calling a recess.  
(2) Analysis  
(a) Prospective Juror A.L. 
Respondent argues defendant forfeited any claim of error with respect to 
Prospective Juror A.L. by failing to articulate a clear Batson/Wheeler objection.  (See 
People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 481.)  In objecting to the prosecutor‘s peremptory 
challenge of A.L., defense counsel simply stated ―Batson again.‖  Although defendant 
assumes on appeal that A.L. was one of four African-American prospective jurors against 
whom the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges, the record fails to disclose what 
cognizable class defendant was asserting as the basis for his Batson/Wheeler objection to 
the peremptory challenge of A.L.   
It is true, as defendant notes in his reply, his first Batson/Wheeler objection 
concerned an African-American prospective juror, D.W.  But defendant did not provide 
any factual basis for the objection regarding A.L. or make any record as to what 
cognizable class A.L. allegedly belonged to.  A.L. was never identified as African-
American during voir dire, and in fact self-identified as ―Caucasian,‖ ―Danish,‖ and 
―Dane‖ in his jury questionnaire.  Nor was A.L. identified as African-American in any of 
the Batson/Wheeler discussions contained in the record.  To the contrary, in their 
discussion following the swearing of the jury, the court, defense counsel, and the 
prosecutor all stated that there had been three African-American prospective jurors 
excused by the prosecution and identified those three jurors as D.W., S.A-M., and A.C.  
Defense counsel, moreover, did not restrict his Batson/Wheeler motions to racial groups; 
he also attempted to argue that Vietnam veterans were a cognizable class.  The failure to 
61 
 
clearly articulate the Batson/Wheeler objection to the peremptory challenge against A.L. 
forfeited the issue for appeal.   
(b) Prospective Jurors S.A.-M. and A.C. 
Respondent contends defendant also forfeited a claim of Batson/Wheeler error 
with respect to Prospective Jurors S.A.-M. and A.C. by failing to make a Batson/Wheeler 
objection.  In order to preserve a Batson/Wheeler claim based on the prosecutor‘s 
peremptory challenges, the defendant must make a timely objection.  (People v. 
McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 969.)  To be timely, a Batson/Wheeler objection must 
be made before the jury is sworn.  (See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154; 
People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 179.) 
When the prosecutor exercised his fourth peremptory challenge against S.A.-M., 
an African-American prospective juror, defense counsel indicated he was ―going to make 
a motion,‖ but would wait until the prosecutor ―does one more.‖  However, he did not 
object when the prosecutor exercised his next peremptory challenge against A.C., another 
African-American prospective juror, nor did he make a motion before the jurors and 
alternates were sworn in and the venire excused.  After the jurors and alternate jurors 
were sworn and the prosecutor asked whether there was a Batson/Wheeler motion still 
pending, defense counsel agreed with the trial court he had not renewed or made new 
Batson/Wheeler motions with respect to S.A.-M. and A.C., stating:  ―I guess the reasons 
for my not doing it again will have to go with me to the federal habeas or whatever.‖  
(Italics added.)  Defense counsel also did not discuss or contest the prosecutor‘s 
volunteered explanations for the two challenges.  In light of the lack of a timely, or even 
untimely, objection, any claim of Batson/Wheeler error regarding Prospective Jurors 
S.A.-M. and A.C. was forfeited.   
62 
 
(c) Prospective Juror D.W. 
Defendant did make a timely, clearly articulated Batson/Wheeler objection with 
respect to the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror D.W.  The 
applicable law is well settled.  While a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise 
peremptory challenges for almost any reason at all, ―[b]oth the state and federal 
Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors 
based on race . . . .‖  (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 341.) 
A three-stage procedure applies to the evaluation of Batson/Wheeler motions.  
―First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‗by showing that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‘  [Citations.]  Second, 
once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‗burden shifts to the State to 
explain adequately the racial exclusion‘ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications 
for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‗[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial 
court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful 
racial discrimination.‘ ‖ (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted.) 
This subclaim involves only the first of these three stages—whether defendant 
made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  Although the prosecutor 
subsequently volunteered his reasons for challenging D.W., ―the trial court did not 
evaluate the prosecutor‘s stated reasons, either explicitly or implicitly.‖  (People v. 
Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 469.)  Rather, the court expressly ruled defendant had 
not made a prima facie case before the prosecution‘s recitation of reasons and denied the 
Batson/Wheeler motion on this basis.  The trial court merely allowed the prosecution ―to 
preserve for the record its reason for those excusals.‖   
Nevertheless, in finding defendant failed to make a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination, the trial court appears to have used an incorrect standard, finding ―no 
systematic pattern of exclusion,‖ rather than no inference of discriminatory purpose.  
(See, e.g., Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 554–555 [trial court was under the mistaken 
63 
 
impression that only pattern of discrimination through multiple excusals could make 
prima facie showing].)  We therefore independently review the record to ― ‗resolve the 
legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a 
juror on the basis of race.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 554.)  
Certain types of evidence are relevant in determining whether a defendant has 
carried his burden of showing an inference of discriminatory excusal, such as whether the 
prosecutor ―struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire or 
used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group,‖ whether the 
excused jurors had little in common other than their membership in the group, and 
whether the prosecutor engaged in ―desultory voir dire‖ or no questioning at all.  
(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281.)  Although a ―defendant need not be a 
member of the excluded group,‖ it is significant if he is and if, in addition, his victims are 
members of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong.  (Id. at p. 
281; see People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779–780.)  
Defendant argues the prosecutor used a disproportionate number—four of six—of 
his peremptory challenges to excuse African-Americans from the jury pool.  The record 
does not support defendant‘s claim.  In selecting a jury for the penalty phase, the 
prosecutor exercised a total of eight peremptory challenges to potential jurors—six 
during the selection of the 12 jurors and two during the selection of the six alternate 
jurors—only three of which were used to remove African-Americans D.W., S.A.-M., and 
A.C.  As noted, the record does not support defendant‘s contention that Prospective Juror 
A.L. was African-American.   
The prosecutor, moreover, passed two African-American prospective jurors who 
ultimately were seated on the jury.  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 906 
[―Although the circumstance that the jury included a member of the identified group is 
not dispositive [citation], ‗it is an indication of good faith in exercising peremptories . . .‘ 
and an appropriate factor to consider in assessing a [Batson/Wheeler] motion.‖].)  The 
64 
 
prosecutor‘s use of three of eight (or 38 percent) of his peremptory challenges to excuse 
African-American prospective jurors, particularly where the other two African-American 
prospective jurors were passed and seated on the jury, ―does not support an inference of 
bias.‖  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 70.)  
Moreover, the prosecutor engaged in more than a desultory voir dire of 
Prospective Juror D.W.  Indeed, defendant complains that no juror was publicly 
questioned by the prosecution ―more relentlessly‖ than D.W.  However, the thoroughness 
of the prosecutor‘s probing of D.W. was not outside the norm and does not support an 
inference of racial bias. 
We discern at least one race-neutral reason for excusing Prospective Juror D.W. 
that is ―apparent from and ‗clearly established‘ in the record.‖  (People v. Scott (June 8, 
2015, S064858) __ Cal.4th __ [at p. 20].)  The defense case for the penalty phase would 
rely heavily on psychological testimony concerning PTSD resulting from defendant‘s 
abusive childhood and experiences in Vietnam.  Not only did D.W. express a strong 
receptivity toward such testimony, stating such experts ―would be necessary,‖ she also 
indicated she wanted to ―lateral over into prison counseling.‖  This was a legitimate race-
neutral reason for excusing D.W.  (See, e.g., Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 556 [a juror 
who indicated she worked closely with psychologists and psychiatrists as a nurse in a 
psychiatric ward and valued their opinions provided a reason other than racial bias for the 
prosecutor‘s challenge]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1124 [prosecutor‘s 
belief that the prospective juror would place too much weight on the opinion testimony of 
mental health experts could justify the peremptory challenge].) 
Based on our independent review of the record of voir dire, we conclude the 
totality of the relevant facts does not support inferring the prosecutor challenged 
Prospective Juror D.W. because of her race.  The trial court therefore did not err in 
denying defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler motion for failure to establish a prima facie case. 
65 
 
d) Denial of a continuance prior to jury selection  
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a 
continuance of the penalty phase based on publicity surrounding the April 1995 bombing 
of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.  He contends the denial of this request 
caused voir dire to be conducted shortly after the bombing in ―an unduly prejudicial 
atmosphere‖ and thus violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.   
Before the beginning of jury selection in the penalty phase, defendant moved for a 
continuance from May until September 1995, arguing there was good cause in light of 
―the difficulty of selecting a fair and impartial jury in this case, due to the interconnection 
of some of the major issues in [defendant‘s] life, and of those persons accused of the 
bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.‖  He pointed to the circumstance that 
Timothy McVeigh, one of the Oklahoma City bombing suspects, was an army veteran 
who might also raise a PTSD defense.  Defendant also argued future delays might occur 
because one of the defense experts was working with trauma victims in Oklahoma City.  
The trial court, noting among other circumstances that McVeigh had fought in the Gulf 
War while defendant was a Vietnam War veteran, found no similarities between 
defendant‘s case and the Oklahoma City bombing.  Concluding the events in Oklahoma 
would have no significant impact on jury selection in this case, the trial court denied 
defendant‘s request for a continuance.  
A continuance may be granted only on the moving party‘s showing of good cause.  
(§ 1050, subd. (e).)  ―The granting or denial of a motion for continuance rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.‖  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 660.)  In 
light of the lack of any relationship or similarity between the Oklahoma City bombing 
and defendant‘s case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no 
showing of good cause for a continuance. 
The publicity from the Oklahoma City bombing, which differed drastically from 
the SOS murders in both kind and degree, had no bearing on defendant‘s case.  Timothy 
66 
 
McVeigh detonated a 3,000- to 6,000-pound bomb, killing 168 people, including 19 
children and eight law enforcement officials.  (U. S. v. McVeigh (10th Cir. 1998) 153 
F.3d 1166, 1177.)  By comparison, defendant shot and killed three adult victims with 
whom he was acquainted during the commission of a burglary and robbery of a company 
for which he once worked.  The Oklahoma City bombing was politically motivated with 
the goal of inciting a general uprising against the government (ibid.), whereas defendant‘s 
murders were financially motivated.  The only concrete common feature argued by 
defense counsel, that defendant and McVeigh were both Army veterans, does not 
withstand scrutiny.  McVeigh was not a veteran of the Vietnam War, and defendant‘s 
jury would hear defense testimony that the Vietnam conflict had many significant 
characteristics not present in other conflicts and that generated unique problems for 
Vietnam War veterans.  
Not only were the supposed connections between the cases tenuous at best, the 
possibility of an unavailable witness and the notion that a separate tragedy would have a 
prejudicial effect on a jury trying this case were pure speculation.  Moreover, voir dire 
exists exactly to explore issues of prejudice such as these.  In sum, the court‘s ruling 
clearly was not manifestly erroneous or arbitrary. 
2. Failure to sua sponte appoint a second attorney  
Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution by failing to appoint, sua sponte, a second qualified attorney to assist 
defense counsel in his case.  As defendant acknowledges, ― ‗[t]he appointment of a 
second counsel in a capital case is not an absolute right protected by either the state or the 
federal Constitution.‘ ‖  (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 300.)  It is true that 
by statute, California trial courts have the authority to appoint a second attorney to 
represent a capital defendant.  (§ 987, subd. (d).)  However, no sua sponte duty to appoint 
67 
 
additional counsel can be derived from a statutory provision granting only discretionary 
authority to the trial court to do so upon a written request and supporting affidavit by 
primary counsel.  ―Indeed, under the statute, the trial court lacks any specific authority to 
appoint a second attorney in the absence of a request from the first attorney and the 
making of a factual record sufficient to support such an appointment.  To the extent that 
defendant‘s argument is that the trial courts have inherent power to appoint a second 
attorney, no authority supporting that proposition is cited.‖  (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 891, 928.)  Accordingly, defendant‘s claim that the court erred in not appointing a 
second attorney in the absence of such a request fails. 
3. Admission of photographic and videotape crime scene evidence  
Defendant claims five photographs of the victims previously admitted in the guilt 
phase, as well as a silent videotape of the crime scene, should have been excluded in the 
penalty phase as irrelevant (see Evid. Code, § 350) and more prejudicial than probative 
(see id., § 352).  The photographs depicted the victims‘ bodies as they were found on the 
floor in the restroom, with close-ups of their bound hands.  The video depicted the 
freeway next to SOS and the SOS parking lot, and a forensic expert walking around the 
building, hallways, and warehouse filming the register on the office desk, the lobby, and 
a ceiling-to-floor view of the interior of the women‘s bathroom, including the victims‘ 
bodies and at least one bullet casing.  Defendant argues the failure to exclude these 
exhibits denied him due process of law under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7, 15, 17 and 24 of 
the California Constitution.   
As a preliminary matter, defendant has forfeited any claim that three of the five 
crime scene photographs were erroneously admitted.  Although defendant moved to 
exclude five photographs and argued his objection at the hearing, at the time the trial 
court formally admitted the challenged evidence defense counsel withdrew his objection 
68 
 
to one of the photographs and affirmatively stipulated to the admission of two others.  
(See, e.g., People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 609.) 
With respect to the remaining two photographs and the 30-second portion of the 
crime scene videotape depicting the victims in the bathroom, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by admitting this evidence.  ― ‗A trial court‘s decision to admit photographs 
under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of 
such photographs clearly outweighs their probative value.‘  [Citations.]  Notably, 
however, the discretion to exclude photographs under Evidence Code section 352 is 
much narrower at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase.  This is so because the 
prosecution has the right to establish the circumstances of the crime, including its 
gruesome consequences [citation], and because the risk of an improper guilt finding 
based on visceral reactions is no longer present.‖  (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 353–
354.) 
The two crime scene photographs and videotape were relevant to the penalty phase 
of the trial.  They show the circumstances of the crime, which included premeditation and 
deliberation on defendant‘s part as evidenced by his binding the victims‘ hands behind 
their backs with duct tape he had bought a week or two before committing the crimes.  
They further corroborated defendant‘s custodial statements to law enforcement officers, 
including that he had shot Smith several more times upon discovering he had broken free 
from his bindings (one of the photographs and the videotape depicts broken strands of 
duct tape on Smith‘s wrists).  Finally, as in the guilt phase, the forensic pathologist used 
the photographs to assist the trier of fact in understanding her testimony.  The admitted 
photographs and videotape also were not cumulative; only five photographs and 30 
seconds of videotape were admitted. 
Nor were the photographs or videotape substantially more prejudicial than 
probative.  ―As we have previously noted, ‗ ―murder is seldom pretty, and pictures, 
testimony and physical evidence in such a case are always unpleasant.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. 
69 
 
Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 713.)  Likewise in this case.  But as unpleasant as these 
photographs and videotape may be, they demonstrate the real-life consequences of 
defendant‘s actions.  The prosecution was entitled to have the penalty phase jury consider 
those consequences.  The trial court‘s exercise of discretion to admit them was neither 
statutory nor constitutional error. 
4. Denial of automatic application for modification of death verdict  
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his automatic application for 
modification of the death verdict pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e).  This claim, 
amounting to no more than a disagreement with the trial court‘s assessment of the 
evidence, lacks merit. 
Section 190.4, subdivision (e), provides for an automatic application for 
modification of a finding or verdict imposing death in every case in which the jury has 
returned such a finding or verdict.  ―Pursuant to section 190.4, in ruling upon an 
application for modification of a verdict imposing the death penalty, the trial court must 
reweigh independently the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 
then determine whether, in its independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports 
the jury‘s verdict.‖  (Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 150.)  The statute thus requires the 
court to make an independent determination concerning the propriety of the death 
penalty.  The court must state the reasons for its ruling on the record, but need not 
describe every detail supporting its ruling so long as the statement of reasons is sufficient 
to allow meaningful appellate review.  (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
970, 1064.)   
―On appeal, we independently review the trial court‘s ruling after reviewing the 
record, but we do not determine the penalty de novo.‖  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 1230, 1267 (Steele).)  Where the record shows the trial court properly performed 
its duty under section 190.4, subdivision (e), to conduct an independent reweighing of the 
70 
 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, the court‘s ruling will be upheld.  (People v. Abilez 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 530 (Abilez).)   
Here, the trial court expressly recognized its duty to independently review and 
reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether 
the sentence imposed was proportionate to defendant‘s culpability.  It reviewed in detail 
the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in section 190.3.  For example, it considered 
in aggravation the circumstances of the crime, including the ―high-degree of cold-
blooded callousness‖ exhibited by the killings, defendant‘s prior felony convictions, 
including the extent to which they involved attempted use of force or violence and 
implied threats thereof, and defendant‘s maturity and life experiences at the time of the 
crimes, including his prior prison and parole terms.  In mitigation, it considered the lack 
of more numerous acts of violence by defendant in light of his mature age, defendant‘s 
traumatic childhood, including the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse and 
abandonment he experienced, his decorated service to the country and traumatic war 
experiences in Vietnam, and the testimony of defendant‘s experts concerning PTSD both 
generally and as related to defendant.  It ultimately found the weight of the mitigating 
circumstances had been ―greatly attenuated‖ by the intervening 20 years between 
defendant‘s service in Vietnam and the SOS crimes, as well as defendant‘s criminal 
convictions and acts of violence that culminated in the present offenses.  The court then 
stated its independent judgment that the circumstances in aggravation outweighed the 
circumstances in mitigation and the substantial weight of the evidence supported the 
jury‘s verdict of death. 
Defendant essentially argues the trial court erred because it failed to find his 
childhood problems, Vietnam experiences, and mental health issues to be as significant or 
weighty as it should have.  As is apparent, however, ―the trial court applied the correct 
standard and properly conducted an independent reweighing of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence.  That it did not find defendant‘s proffered mitigating evidence as 
71 
 
persuasive as he would have liked does not undermine this conclusion.‖  (Abilez, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 530; see Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1267–1268.)  The court‘s refusal 
to modify the verdict is consistent with both the law and the evidence.  We therefore 
conclude the trial court properly performed its duty under section 190.4, subdivision (e).  
5. Penalty of death as disproportionate to defendant’s individual 
culpability  
Defendant claims his death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the state and federal Constitutions because the penalty is grossly 
disproportionate to his individual culpability in committing the crimes.  ― ‗To determine 
whether a sentence is cruel or unusual as applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing 
court must examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of 
the defendant‘s involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, 
and the consequences of the defendant‘s acts.  The court must also consider the personal 
characteristics of the defendant, including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities.  
[Citation.]  If the court concludes that the penalty imposed is ―grossly disproportionate to 
the defendant‘s individual culpability‖ [citation], or, stated another way, that the 
punishment ― ‗ ―shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 
dignity‖ ‘ ‖ [citation], the court must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional.‘ ‖  
(Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1269.) 
Defendant received a death sentence for three burglary and robbery murders 
committed by him alone, purely for financial gain.  Although the three victims 
cooperated fully with defendant‘s demands and offered no resistance, he nevertheless 
shot and killed them one by one.  He also had an extensive prior criminal record 
including prior prison and jail terms.  Defendant attempts to mitigate his personal 
culpability by citing his traumatic childhood and Vietnam War experiences and resulting 
PTSD.  We agree with the trial court that these circumstances ultimately did not affect 
defendant‘s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
72 
 
conduct to the requirements of the law.  Defendant‘s actions at the time of the murders 
showed a rational, logical, intelligent, and calculated thought process, and his efforts to 
destroy evidence and to avoid capture by fleeing across the country amply demonstrate 
his awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions.  
In light of the evidence and relevant considerations, we conclude defendant‘s 
sentence is not disproportionate to his personal culpability, nor does it shock the 
conscience.   
C. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Scheme  
Defendant raises a number of challenges to the constitutionality of California‘s 
death penalty scheme, based upon the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution.  As he acknowledges, we have previously considered 
and consistently rejected these contentions in prior cases.  Presented with no reasons that 
compel reconsideration, we adhere to those decisions as follows. 
Section 190.2 is not impermissibly overbroad.  Specifically, the various special 
circumstances are not so numerous as to fail to perform the constitutionally required 
narrowing function, and the special circumstances are not unduly broad or expansive, 
either on their face or as interpreted by this court.  (E.g., Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 
1050; see also Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212, 221 [recognizing that the special 
circumstances listed in section 190.2 are designed to satisfy the narrowing requirement].)   
Section 190.3, factor (a), does not, on its face or as interpreted and applied, permit 
the ― ‗arbitrary and capricious‘ ‖ or ― ‗wanton and freakish‘ ‖ imposition of a sentence of 
death.  (E.g., People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1066; see Tuilaepa v. California 
(1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976 [―The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for 
consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the circumstances is neither 
vague nor otherwise improper under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.‖].)   
73 
 
Neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires the penalty phase jury to 
make unanimous findings concerning the particular aggravating circumstances, find the 
truth of every fact supporting all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or find 
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and 
death is the appropriate sentence.  (E.g., People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1031; 
People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255.)  The United States Supreme Court‘s 
decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee (see Cunningham v. 
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) do not alter these conclusions.  (E.g., People v. Bramit 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1250 & fn. 22.) 
Written or other specific findings by the jury regarding the aggravating factors are 
not constitutionally required.  (E.g., People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 90.) 
Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required.  (Moon, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 48; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50–51.) 
The use of adjectives such as ―extreme‖ in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), or 
―substantial‖ in section 190.3, factor (g), do not serve as improper barriers to the 
consideration of mitigating evidence.  (E.g., People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681.)  
The trial court was ―not required to instruct the jury as to which of the listed 
sentencing factors are aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either‖ 
mitigating or aggravating, depending upon the jury‘s appraisal of the evidence.  (People 
v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590, italics added; see People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 469, 509 [―The aggravating or mitigating nature of the factors is self-evident 
within the context of each case.‖].) 
Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, 
California‘s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by not 
74 
 
providing certain procedural protections afforded to noncapital defendants.  (E.g., People 
v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681.) 
We reject the argument that the use of capital punishment ―as regular punishment‖ 
violates international norms of humanity and decency and hence violates the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  ―California does not employ capital 
punishment in such a manner.  The death penalty is available only for the crime of first 
degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, 
administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions 
different from those applying to ‗regular punishment‘ for felonies.‖  (People v. 
Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43–44.) 
Lastly, we find no state or federal constitutional violation when the asserted 
defects in California‘s death penalty scheme are considered collectively.  (People v. 
Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 741.) 
75 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cunningham 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S051342 
Date Filed: July 2, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Michael A. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Brian A. Pori and Mordecai Garelick, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala G. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Annie Featherman Fraser and Ronald A. 
Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mordecai Garelick 
101 Second Street, Suite 600 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 495-0500 
 
Ronald A. Jakob 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2332