Title: Illinois v. Thompson
Citation: 2015 IL 118151
Docket Number: 118151
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2015

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DENNIS 
THOMPSON, Appellant. 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
118151 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
December 3, 2015 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District, heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 
James L. Rhodes, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg and 
Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defenders, and Tomas G. Gonzalez, Assistant 
Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of 
Chicago, for appellant. 
 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, 
State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, and 
Annette N. Collins, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the 
People. 
 
 
Justices 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier, 
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of 
Decisions 
Reason: I attest to 
the accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2016.01.08 
09:45:54 -06'00'
 
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OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied 
constitutional challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence for the first time on appeal 
from the circuit court of Cook County’s dismissal of a petition seeking relief from a final 
judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 
(West 2010)). Answering that question in the negative, the appellate court affirmed the 
circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s section 2-1401 petition. 2014 IL App (1st) 121729-U, 
¶ 23. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
The underlying details of defendant’s convictions and sentences have been previously 
recited by the appellate court. See People v. Thompson, No. 1-95-2040 (1997) (unpublished 
order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Thus, we do not repeat those details and 
summarize only the facts relevant to our disposition here. 
¶ 4 
 
On March 26, 1994, defendant Dennis Thompson fatally shot his father, Dennis 
Thompson, Sr., and a woman who was inside his father’s house, Don Renee Rouse. 
Defendant, who was 19 years old at the time, was arrested and charged with two counts of 
first-degree murder. Defendant confessed to the shootings and directed the police to the 
murder weapon. 
¶ 5 
 
At defendant’s bench trial, the evidence revealed that defendant, armed with a loaded 
firearm, drove to his father’s house on the day of the shootings to discuss an earlier 
“domestic disturbance” between defendant’s father and stepmother. After arriving at his 
father’s house, defendant discovered his father drinking alcohol with Rouse, a woman 
defendant did not know. Defendant followed his father into the kitchen and an argument 
ensued. Ultimately, defendant shot his father when his father looked inside the refrigerator. 
Defendant next encountered Rouse, and shot her repeatedly. Defendant then left his father’s 
house. Rouse, fatally wounded but still conscious, called police and identified defendant as 
the shooter. Defendant was apprehended and confessed to the shootings. 
¶ 6 
 
Defendant maintained that his actions were the result of a long history of physical and 
mental abuse committed by his father and, thus, constituted only second-degree murder. 
Defendant presented the testimony of several family members who uniformly described 
defendant’s father as a violent and abusive person, especially when his father consumed 
alcohol. Following closing arguments, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree 
murder. 
¶ 7 
 
After the circuit court found defendant guilty, defendant waived a jury for the capital 
sentencing phase. The parties stipulated that defendant’s birthday was April 1, 1974, and he 
was therefore 19 years old when he committed the murders. The court found defendant 
eligible for the death penalty but, after hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, 
declined to impose death and sentenced defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment 
under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 
 
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5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994) (natural life sentence for a defendant “found guilty of 
murdering more than one victim”)). 
¶ 8 
 
On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. 
People v. Thompson, No. 1-95-2040 (1997) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 23). This court denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. People v. Thompson, 175 
Ill. 2d 551 (1997) (table). 
¶ 9 
 
In 1998, defendant filed his first petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)), alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. The petition advanced to second-stage review but the trial court ultimately granted 
the State’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed its dismissal. People v. Thompson, 
No. 1-99-2686 (2001) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 
¶ 10 
 
In 2002, defendant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting a number of ineffective trial 
assistance claims. The district court denied defendant’s petition. Thompson v. Briley, No. 
04-3110 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2005). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Thompson 
v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2006). 
¶ 11 
 
In 2007, defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition, challenging 
various aspects of his counsel’s performance during his previous state court proceedings. The 
circuit court denied him leave to file his successive petition, and the appellate court affirmed. 
People v. Thompson, No. 1-07-0763 (2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 23). 
¶ 12 
 
In 2009, defendant filed a pleading titled “Article I Free Standing Motion to Vacate,” 
alleging that he was denied his right to capital-qualified counsel. The trial court construed 
defendant’s pleading as a successive postconviction petition and denied the petition because 
it was filed without leave of court. Defendant did not appeal that denial, but he sought leave 
to file a successive postconviction petition. The trial court denied defendant’s request. 
Although defendant filed an appeal, he subsequently withdrew that appeal. 
¶ 13 
 
On December 28, 2011, defendant filed a petition seeking relief from a final judgment 
under section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). That petition is the 
subject of the instant appeal. 
¶ 14 
 
In the section 2-1401 petition, defendant alleged that the circuit court “exceeded its 
jurisdiction” and violated his right to due process by failing to appoint capital-qualified 
attorneys, rendering his convictions void. Defendant also alleged a number of deficiencies on 
the part of his counsel during trial, direct appeal, and postconviction proceedings. 
¶ 15 
 
The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that defendant’s petition was untimely filed 
17 years after defendant’s conviction, the substantive claims were not suitable for a section 
2-1401 petition, and the claims in defendant’s petition lacked merit. Following arguments, 
the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. 
¶ 16 
 
On appeal, defendant abandoned all of his original claims in the section 2-1401 petition. 
Instead, defendant relied exclusively on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012), a decision issued by the United States Supreme Court after the circuit court’s 
dismissal of defendant’s petition. In Miller, the Court held “mandatory life without parole for 
those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 
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¶ 17 
 
Citing Miller, defendant argued for the first time on appeal that his mandatory life 
sentence was void and could be challenged at any time because it violated the eighth 
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the 
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). 
Defendant raised both a facial constitutional challenge and an as-applied constitutional 
challenge to the applicable sentencing statute. In relevant part, defendant asserted that the 
sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was 19 years old at the 
time of the shooting, had no criminal history, and impulsively committed the offense after 
years of abuse by his father. 
¶ 18 
 
The appellate court rejected defendant’s contentions, concluding that defendant’s 
as-applied constitutional challenge was not properly before the court when it was raised for 
the first time on appeal. The court determined that defendant’s as-applied challenge did not 
constitute a challenge to a void judgment. The court explained that because “a Miller claim 
only challenges a sentence as voidable, the challenge may not be raised at any time 
irrespective of waiver.” 2014 IL App (1st) 121729-U, ¶ 18. Accordingly, the court found that 
defendant’s as-applied challenge was procedurally barred, and it affirmed the circuit court’s 
dismissal of defendant’s petition. 2014 IL App (1st) 121729-U, ¶ 23. 
¶ 19 
 
We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). 
 
¶ 20 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 21 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that the appellate court erroneously concluded that “it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of [defendant’s] argument that his mandatory life 
sentence is unconstitutional and void.” Citing Miller, defendant argues that the sentencing 
statute that mandated a natural life sentence for his murder convictions is unconstitutional as 
applied to him under the eighth amendment because the sentencing statute did not allow the 
sentencing judge to consider his youth.1 Defendant acknowledges that Miller’s holding is 
directly applicable only to minors under 18 years of age, but he contends that the logical 
underpinning of Miller, focused on the unique characteristics of youthful offenders and the 
recognized distinction between juvenile and adult brains, applies with “equal force” to 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 21. 
¶ 22 
 
Defendant does not ask, however, this court to determine whether his as-applied 
constitutional challenge to his sentence is meritorious under Miller. Instead, he argues that 
“the ultimate substantive merits of [defendant’s] claim has no bearing on whether it may be 
brought and considered by the appellate court.” (Emphasis in original.) Consequently, 
defendant asks this court to remand the matter to the appellate court for its substantive review 
of his as-applied challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence under Miller. 
¶ 23 
 
The State responds that the appellate court correctly concluded that defendant’s 
as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence could not be raised for the first time on 
appeal from dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition. The State notes that defendant’s section 
                                                 
 
1Although defendant raised a facial constitutional challenge to his sentence in the appellate court, 
he does not reassert that challenge here. Indeed, in his reply brief defendant emphasizes that he “is not 
arguing that the statute under which he was sentenced is facially unconstitutional.” 
 
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2-1401 petition did not contain an as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence, was not 
timely filed, and failed to allege a meritorious defense and due diligence. 
¶ 24 
 
The State argues that the void judgment rule exception to the procedural bars of section 
2-1401 of the Code should be construed narrowly. More specifically, the State contends that 
a voidness challenge is exempt from the timing, due diligence, and meritorious defense 
requirements of section 2-1401 only when it involves a judgment issued by a court that 
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or when it involves a facially unconstitutional 
statute that is void ab initio. Because defendant’s as-applied challenge involves neither 
situation, the State argues that the appellate court properly declined to consider his as-applied 
challenge for the first time on appeal. 
¶ 25 
 
To resolve the controversy in this appeal, we must decide whether defendant’s as-applied 
constitutional challenge to his sentence is procedurally barred or forfeited because defendant 
failed to include that claim in his section 2-1401 petition. This presents a question of law that 
we review de novo. See People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2007) (reviewing de novo a 
section 2-1401 petition dismissed on legal grounds). 
¶ 26 
 
As a preliminary matter, however, we must address the appellate court’s perception of its 
“jurisdiction” in this case. See People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 36-37 (2009) (observing that a 
court of review has an independent duty to consider jurisdiction). Specifically, the appellate 
court’s unpublished order made two separate statements indicating that the court believed it 
lacked “jurisdiction.” As the State correctly concedes, the appellate court’s assessment of its 
jurisdiction was inaccurate. The appellate court obtained jurisdiction in this matter when 
defendant timely filed his notice of appeal from the circuit court’s order dismissing his 
section 2-1401 petition. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 37. 
¶ 27 
 
Despite the appellate court’s imprecise description of its jurisdiction, we agree with the 
State that it did not alter the court’s substantive analysis of the forfeiture issue. Indeed, the 
appellate court properly exercised its jurisdiction when it reviewed the procedural posture of 
defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge and concluded that defendant forfeited that 
claim by raising it for the first time on appeal. 
¶ 28 
 
We next address the parties’ respective arguments on forfeiture and defendant’s section 
2-1401 petition, the primary focus of this appeal. Section 2-1401 of the Code constitutes a 
comprehensive statutory procedure authorizing a trial court to vacate or modify a final order 
or judgment in civil and criminal proceedings. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation 
District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. Ordinarily, a petition seeking relief under section 
2-1401 must be filed more than 30 days from entry of the final order but not more than 2 
years after that entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a), (c) (West 2010). 
¶ 29 
 
When a petition is filed after the two-year limitations period and there is no basis to 
excuse the delay, the petition cannot be considered unless the limitations period is waived by 
the opposing party. People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 562 (2003). Relevant to the 
controversy in this appeal, however, this court recognizes an exception to the ordinary 
two-year deadline when the petition challenges a void judgment. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board 
of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2002). 
¶ 30 
 
Here, defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was filed approximately 17 years after his 
conviction and sentence, well outside the 2-year limitations period. Nonetheless, defendant 
argues that his as-applied constitutional challenge constitutes a challenge to a “void” 
 
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judgment for purposes of section 2-1401. Thus, defendant contends that he can raise his 
claim for the first time on appeal from dismissal of his petition because a voidness challenge 
can be raised at any time under Sarkissian. For the same reason, defendant further contends 
that his claim was excused from the general rules applicable to section 2-1401 petitions, 
including the two-year limitations period and requisite allegations of due diligence and a 
meritorious defense. We disagree. 
¶ 31 
 
As this court’s applicable decisions demonstrate, a voidness challenge to a final judgment 
under section 2-1401 that is exempt from the ordinary procedural bars is available only for 
specific types of claims. Typically, the petitioner will allege that the judgment is void 
because the court that entered the final judgment lacked personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction. See LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38 (reviewing a section 
2-1401 petition and concluding that “only the most fundamental defects, i.e., a lack of 
personal jurisdiction or lack of subject matter jurisdiction as defined in Belleville Toyota[, 
199 Ill. 2d 325, 341 (2002),] warrant declaring a judgment void”); Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 
105 (reviewing the petitioner’s allegations that a default judgment was void because the trial 
court lacked personal jurisdiction based on defective service of process). A voidness 
challenge based on a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to forfeiture 
or other procedural restraints because a judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction 
“may be challenged in perpetuity.” LVNV Funding, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38. 
¶ 32 
 
A second type of voidness challenge that is exempt from forfeiture and may be raised at 
any time involves a challenge to a final judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute 
that is void ab initio. When a statute is declared facially unconstitutional and void ab initio, it 
means that the statute was constitutionally infirm from the moment of its enactment and, 
therefore, unenforceable. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 25 (citing People v. Blair, 2013 
IL 114122, ¶ 28). Particularly relevant to this appeal, though, this court has held that the void 
ab initio doctrine does not apply to an as-applied constitutional challenge. Hill v. Cowan, 202 
Ill. 2d 151, 156 (2002); People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 300 (2002). 
¶ 33 
 
A third type of voidness challenge to a final judgment under section 2-1401 recognized 
by this court is a challenge to a sentence that does not conform to the applicable sentencing 
statute. See People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444, 447-48 (2001) (reviewing section 2-1401 
petition that alleged an extended-term sentence was void when it allegedly exceeded the 
permissible sentencing range). This type of challenge is based on the “void sentence rule” 
from People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995), holding that a sentence that does not 
conform to a statutory requirement is void. Recently, however, this court abolished the void 
sentence rule. People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19. Consequently, that type of 
challenge is no longer valid. 
¶ 34 
 
Here, defendant does not allege that his mandatory natural life sentence is void based on 
the trial court’s lack of personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Nor does 
defendant allege that his sentence is void based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is 
void ab initio. In other words, defendant’s claim is not a type recognized by any of our 
precedents as exempt from the typical procedural bars of section 2-1401. 
¶ 35 
 
Despite the lack of authority for his position, defendant argues that his as-applied 
constitutional challenge to his sentence should be exempt from the ordinary forfeiture rules 
of section 2-1401. Defendant asserts that “it makes no sense to allow a facial constitutional 
 
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challenge to a sentence at any time, but not an as-applied constitutional challenge” in a 
section 2-1401 proceeding because the “injustice” in both cases is the same—an allegedly 
unconstitutional sentence. 
¶ 36 
 
Defendant is mistaken. Although facial and as-applied constitutional challenges are both 
intended to address constitutional infirmities, they are not interchangeable. See Napleton v. 
Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 318 (2008) (recognizing the “fundamental distinction” 
between facial and as-applied challenges). An as-applied challenge requires a showing that 
the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances of the 
challenging party. People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 117 (2006). In contrast, a facial 
challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, i.e., 
the specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d at 117. 
¶ 37 
 
Because facial and as-applied constitutional challenges are distinct actions, it is not 
unreasonable to treat the two types of challenges differently for purposes of section 2-1401. 
By definition, an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular 
circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner. Therefore, it is paramount 
that the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for 
purposes of appellate review. See Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001) (noting 
that “[t]his court has long held that in order to support a claim of error on appeal the 
appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record”). 
¶ 38 
 
This point is illustrated by this case. To support his as-applied challenge, defendant relies 
exclusively on the “evolving science” on juvenile maturity and brain development that 
formed the basis of the Miller decision to ban mandatory natural life sentences for minors. 
Defendant maintains that this science applies with “equal force” to a criminal defendant who 
was between the ages of 18 and 21 when the underlying crime was committed. The record 
here, however, contains nothing about how that science applies to the circumstances of 
defendant’s case, the key showing for an as-applied constitutional challenge. Nor does the 
record contain any factual development on the issue of whether the rationale of Miller should 
be extended beyond minors under the age of 18. Undoubtedly, the trial court is the most 
appropriate tribunal for the type of factual development necessary to adequately address 
defendant’s as-applied challenge in this case. 
¶ 39 
 
In summary, defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was filed approximately 17 years after 
his conviction and sentence, well outside the 2-year limitations period. Defendant’s section 
2-1401 petition did not contain any eighth amendment challenge to his sentence, let alone an 
as-applied constitutional challenge based on Miller. Instead, defendant raised his as-applied 
challenge under Miller for the first time on appeal. As we have explained, this type of 
challenge is not one of those recognized by this court as being exempt from the typical rules 
of forfeiture and procedural bars in section 2-1401 of the Code. Supra ¶¶ 30-33. Accordingly, 
we agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that defendant forfeited his as-applied 
challenge to his sentence under Miller by raising it for the first time on appeal. 
¶ 40 
 
We are not persuaded by the authority cited by defendant in support of his argument that 
he should be permitted to raise his claim for the first time on appeal from dismissal of his 
section 2-1401 petition. Citing this court’s decisions in People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188 
(2007), People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109 (2006), and People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448 
(1989), defendant argues that this court has recognized that a sentence that violates the 
 
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constitution is void and subject to challenge at any time. Notably, though, none of those 
decisions addressed whether an as-applied constitutional challenge may be raised for the first 
time on appeal from dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition. In fact, none of those decisions 
even involved an as-applied constitutional challenge. Consequently, we do not find our 
general statements on voidness in those decisions to be controlling on the narrow issue 
presented in this appeal. 
¶ 41 
 
Defendant’s reliance on the appellate court’s decisions in People v. Luciano, 2013 IL App 
(2d) 110792, and People v. Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103568, is also misplaced. In contrast 
to this case, both of those decisions involved defendants who were sentenced to mandatory 
natural life based on the commission of murders when they were minors under the age of 18. 
See Luciano, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792, ¶ 7 (defendant convicted of two counts of murder 
committed when he was 17 years old); Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103568, ¶ 11 (defendant 
convicted under accountability theory of two counts of murder committed when he was 17 
years old). Because those defendants were sentenced to mandatory natural life imprisonment 
based on crimes committed when they were minors, the appellate court in both decisions 
concluded that Miller should be applied retroactively and remanded for a new sentencing 
hearing. Luciano, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792, ¶¶ 62-63; Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103568, 
¶ 56. 
¶ 42 
 
The holdings of Luciano and Morfin are consistent with our recent decision in People v. 
Davis, 2014 IL 115595. In Davis, this court held that Miller announced a new substantive 
rule that applies retroactively to minors sentenced to a mandatory imposition of natural life 
imprisonment. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 39-43. Notably, however, we also determined in 
Davis that the applicable sentencing statute imposing mandatory natural life was not facially 
unconstitutional because it could be validly applied to adults, and that “[a] minor may still be 
sentenced to natural life imprisonment without parole so long as the sentence is at the trial 
court’s discretion rather than mandatory.” Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 30, 43. 
¶ 43 
 
In this case, defendant was 19 years old when he committed the murders. Indisputably, he 
was not a minor for purposes of sentencing. Therefore, defendant cannot obtain the same 
collateral relief afforded the defendants in Luciano, Morfin, and Davis, who all received 
mandatory natural life sentences for crimes committed when they were under the age of 18 in 
violation of Miller. 
¶ 44 
 
Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s suggestion that it would be unfair to preclude him 
from raising his as-applied challenge under Miller in the procedural posture of his case. 
Although we have determined that defendant cannot raise his as-applied constitutional 
challenge to his sentence under Miller for the first time on appeal from dismissal of his 
section 2-1401 petition, defendant is not necessarily foreclosed from renewing his as-applied 
challenge in the circuit court. To the contrary, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)) is expressly designed to resolve constitutional issues, including 
those raised in a successive petition. See Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 13-14 (detailing the 
procedural framework of the Act). Similarly, section 2-1401 of the Code permits either a 
legal or factual challenge to a final judgment if certain procedural and statutory requirements 
are satisfied. See Warren County, 2015 IL 117783, ¶¶ 37-51 (discussing and comparing 
standards between factual and legal challenges in section 2-1401 proceedings). Of course, we 
 
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express no opinion on the merits of any future claim raised by defendant in a new 
proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
¶ 45 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 46 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment and the circuit court’s 
judgment dismissing defendant’s section 2-1401 petition. 
 
¶ 47 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 48 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed.