Title: Harman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130627
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2014

PRESENT:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
McClanahan, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
MICHELLE C. HARMAN, ADMINISTRATRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH A. GRANA, III, 
DECEASED, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
v.  Record No. 130627 
 
 
 
    June 5, 2014 
 
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises out of two consolidated wrongful death 
actions against Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”).  We 
consider the admissibility of testimony regarding the contents of 
an accident investigation report, as well as the admissibility of 
lay witness opinion testimony.  We also address statements made 
by Honeywell’s counsel during closing argument.  Finally, we 
consider whether the circuit court erred in striking portions of 
a proffered jury instruction defining proximate cause. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On April 27, 2008, Joseph A. Grana, III (“Grana”) and his 
father, Joseph E. Grana, Sr., were killed when the single-engine 
airplane Grana was piloting crashed shortly after takeoff from 
Chesterfield County Airport.  The takeoff was normal.  
Approximately ninety seconds into the flight, the plane’s nose 
began moving up and down erratically.  The plane then spiraled 
nose-down to the ground. 
2 
The Administrators of the Granas’ estates (collectively, 
“the Administrators”) filed wrongful death actions in the Circuit 
Court of Chesterfield County against Honeywell, the manufacturer 
of the plane’s autopilot system.1  The actions were consolidated 
for trial. 
The sole claim pursued at trial was for breach of the 
warranty of merchantability.  The Administrators asserted that 
the defective design of the Honeywell autopilot system allowed 
microscopic debris to enter into one of the gear systems, jamming 
the gears and causing the plane to become uncontrollable.  
Specifically, the Administrators claimed that the jammed gears 
caused a situation known as “runaway trim,” which occurs when the 
autopilot’s auto-trim system repeatedly attempts to increase and 
decrease the plane’s pitch, or horizontal incline, in a futile 
effort to level the plane.2 Honeywell denied any defective design 
or malfunction of the autopilot system.  It maintained that the 
crash was simply the tragic result of an inexperienced pilot 
becoming disoriented while flying in heavy cloud-cover. 
                                                 
1 The Administrators originally filed wrongful death actions 
against various other entities and individuals involved in 
manufacturing components of the plane.  The claims against all 
defendants except Honeywell were dismissed prior to trial. 
2 The auto-trim system controls the movement of the plane’s 
tail and thus the angle of its ascent or descent.  Specifically, 
the auto-trim system causes the horizontal stabilizer in the tail 
to move up or down, which causes the pitch to change. 
3 
Grana had begun pilot training just sixteen months prior to 
the accident, and he had been licensed for approximately fourteen 
months.  On the day of the accident, he was flying in instrument 
meteorological conditions that require pilots to navigate using 
navigational instruments rather than visual cues.  He had at most 
one hour of solo flight time in such conditions in this 
particular plane that was manufactured by Mooney Airplane 
Company, Inc. (the “Mooney plane”).  His previous experience had 
been in a less-powerful, less-complex plane that was manufactured 
by Cessna Aircraft Company (the “Cessna plane”).  Honeywell’s 
theory was that upon entering the cloud-cover, Grana experienced 
“spatial disorientation,” a phenomenon that occurs when a pilot 
has no visual cues to determine a plane’s pitch and thus flies 
erratically without knowing it. 
Following a nine-day trial, the jury deliberated for one 
hour before returning a verdict in favor of Honeywell.  The 
Administrators filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a 
new trial, which the circuit court rejected.  This appeal 
followed. 
The Administrators pursue five assignments of error.  They 
assert that the circuit court erred by (1) admitting into 
evidence an accident investigation report and testimony regarding 
its contents; (2) allowing William Abel to testify that he had 
concerns about Grana’s judgment in taking off in the weather 
4 
conditions present on the day of the accident; (3) allowing 
Robert Norman to testify regarding his subjective feelings and 
experiences while flying the Mooney plane and the Cessna plane; 
(4) overruling their objection to statements made by Honeywell’s 
counsel during closing argument; and (5) striking portions of 
their proffered jury instruction on proximate cause. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Mooney Report 
The Administrators assign error to the circuit court’s 
admission of testimony regarding an accident investigation report 
prepared by Mooney Airplane Company describing its investigation 
of the crash (the “Mooney Report”).  It describes the plane’s 
movements during flight and the condition of the wreckage, and 
sets forth the author’s conclusions that there was no evidence 
“that the aircraft engine was not capable of producing power or 
that the aircraft was uncontrollable at the time of the 
accident.”  Portions of the Mooney Report related to the position 
of the “jackscrew,” a component in the autopilot’s auto-trim 
system that corresponds with the position of the horizontal 
stabilizer in the plane’s tail. 
The central question in the case was whether contaminated 
gears in the autopilot system caused the pitch to become erratic, 
rendering the plane uncontrollable.  Consequently, a critical 
issue at trial was the position of the autopilot’s trim setting 
5 
at the time of impact.  The experts for both sides agreed that 
the trim setting could be determined by examining the jackscrew.  
The experts also agreed that the jackscrew had six threads 
exposed at the time of impact.  However, they vigorously 
disagreed regarding whether this position indicated a nose-down 
or normal takeoff trim setting. 
Honeywell’s expert in aircraft accidents, Dr. George Clarke, 
III, testified that the jackscrew was in a “normal and safe 
takeoff position,” and therefore runaway trim could not have been 
the cause of the accident.  Honeywell’s counsel directed Dr. 
Clarke’s attention to the Mooney Report to support that opinion.  
The Administrators objected on hearsay grounds.3  Honeywell 
responded that the Mooney Report was admissible pursuant to the 
“learned treatise” exception to the hearsay rule set forth in 
Code § 8.01-401.1.  The circuit court agreed with Honeywell and 
overruled the Administrators’ objections, holding that the Mooney 
Report was a “pamphlet” admissible under Code § 8.01-401.1. 
 
Dr. Clarke then read and displayed to the jury statements in 
the Mooney Report supporting his opinion that the jackscrew was 
in a normal takeoff position at the moment of impact: 
Q. And what did the Mooney Aircraft Company 
investigation indicate with respect to that trim 
position? 
                                                 
3 The record does not indicate why the author of the Mooney 
Report was not called as a witness to testify regarding its 
contents. 
6 
 
A. It says in the last sentence, “This indicates an 
approximate takeoff position trim setting.” 
 
. . . . 
 
Q. And again, it is Exhibit 11.  And would you show 
that page from the [Mooney Report]?  We’re looking at 
the [Mooney Report] page 0006. 
 
A. Yes.  And this was the part that I just read.  This 
indicates an approximate takeoff position trim setting.  
And to validate what we just spoke about, it says that 
there were six threads exposed on the jackscrew.  And 
it’s the same six threads we were talking about from 
the full nose-down position. 
 
After being prompted by the court, Dr. Clarke stated that he 
relied upon the Mooney Report in reaching his conclusions, but he 
did not testify that it was a reliable source.  Additionally, 
Honeywell was permitted to introduce the entire Mooney Report 
into evidence as an exhibit. 
 
On appeal, the Administrators argue that the circuit court 
erred twice, by allowing testimony regarding the contents of the 
Mooney Report and also by admitting it into evidence.  The 
Administrators claim the report contained inadmissible hearsay 
statements and did not satisfy the requirements of the “learned 
treatise” exception under Code § 8.01-401.1. 
“[W]e review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, 
will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence 
absent a finding of abuse of that discretion.”  John Crane, Inc. 
7 
v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 590, 650 S.E.2d 851, 855 (2007).  However, 
a trial court has no discretion to admit clearly inadmissible 
evidence.  Id. 
Hearsay statements generally are inadmissible.  See Va. R. 
Evid. 2:802. One exception to the hearsay rule in civil cases, 
the “learned treatise” exception in Code § 8.01-401.1, provides: 
To the extent . . . relied upon by the expert witness 
in direct examination, statements contained in 
published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on a 
subject of history, medicine or other science or art, 
established as a reliable authority by testimony or by 
stipulation, shall not be excluded as hearsay.  If 
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but 
may not be received as exhibits. 
 
See also Va. R. Evid. 2:706(a) (same).  Because Code § 8.01-401.1 
is in derogation of the common law, we must strictly construe the 
statute and be careful not to enlarge it beyond its express 
terms.  See Bostic v. About Women OB/GYN, P.C., 275 Va. 567, 576-
77, 659 S.E.2d 290, 295 (2008). 
Code § 8.01-401.1 creates an exception to the hearsay rule 
“in certain limited instances.”4  Weinberg v. Given, 252 Va. 221, 
226, 476 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1996).  First, when learned material is 
                                                 
4 This Court has long recognized the dangers of admitting 
hearsay expert opinion testimony.  See McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 
558, 566, 379 S.E.2d 908, 912 (1989) (“The admission of hearsay 
expert opinion without the testing safeguard of cross-examination 
is fraught with overwhelming unfairness to the opposing party.”).  
In enacting the “learned treatise” exception in 1994, “the 
General Assembly was clearly aware of those dangers and sought to 
avoid them by inserting . . . preconditions to the admission of 
hearsay expert opinions as substantive evidence on direct 
examination . . . .”  Bostic, 275 Va. at 576, 659 S.E.2d at 294. 
8 
used on direct examination the testifying witness must have 
“relied upon” the hearsay statements.  Second, the statements 
must be (a) contained in a published treatise, periodical or 
pamphlet; (b) on a subject of history, medicine or other science 
or art; and (c) established as “a reliable authority” by 
testimony or by stipulation.  Dr. Clarke’s testimony regarding 
the Mooney Report failed to satisfy these requirements. 
At the outset, we note that the Mooney Report simply is not 
the type of authoritative literature contemplated by Code § 8.01-
401.1.  Learned treatises have sufficient indicia of 
trustworthiness because their authors have no bias in any 
particular case and are aware that their work will be read and 
evaluated by others in their field.  See United States v. 
Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 312 (6th Cir. 2009).  However, the Mooney 
Report lacks such assurances of trustworthiness.  The report is 
not a “published treatise[], periodical[] or pamphlet[]” on a 
“subject of . . . science.”  Code § 8.01-401.1.  Rather, it is a 
four and one-half page accident investigation report that was 
prepared by the plane’s manufacturer.  Of even greater 
importance, at the time the report was prepared, Mooney had not 
yet been dismissed as a defendant in this case.  Thus, the Mooney 
Report was prepared for litigation purposes and “was not 
subjected to peer review or public scrutiny, and it was not 
written primarily for professionals with the reputation of the 
9 
writer at stake.”  Martinez, 588 F.3d at 312 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Consequently, the report lacks the reliability 
necessary to be a “learned treatise.”  See Sommerfield v. City of 
Chicago, 254 F.R.D. 317, 323 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“[D]ocuments 
prepared specifically for use in litigation are . . . dripping 
with motivations to misrepresent” and “are therefore inadmissible 
hearsay.”) (quoting Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 
1942)). 
Moreover, the Mooney Report was not established as a 
reliable source through testimony or stipulation as required 
under Code § 8.01-401.1.  Honeywell maintains that by stating 
that he “relied upon” the report, Dr. Clarke thereby endorsed its 
authority.  We disagree.  Code § 8.01-401.1 expressly requires 
that a report used on direct examination by a party’s own expert 
be both “relied upon” and “established as a reliable authority by 
testimony or by stipulation.”  See also Va. R. Evid. 2:706(a) 
(same); Bostic, 275 Va. at 576, 659 S.E.2d at 294.  Dr. Clarke 
only satisfied the first precondition. 
Dr. Clarke did not testify that the Mooney Report was a 
reliable source typically used by experts in his field.  Indeed, 
he could not offer such testimony because, as established above, 
it was not a “treatise[], periodical[] or pamphlet[]” on a 
“subject of . . . science.”  Further, the parties did not 
stipulate to the Mooney Report’s reliability.  Thus, we conclude 
10 
that the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting Dr. 
Clarke to testify regarding the conclusions reached in the Mooney 
Report. 
Having determined that the hearsay statements in the Mooney 
Report were erroneously admitted, we turn to whether their 
admission was harmless error, as asserted by Honeywell.  
Honeywell argues that the facts asserted in the portion read into 
evidence by Dr. Clarke were independently established by other 
evidence presented at trial.  Thus, it claims that the circuit 
court’s admission of the hearsay statements was “merely 
cumulative of other competent evidence” and therefore harmless 
error.  Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 154, 487 S.E.2d 
224, 228 (1997); see also Schindel v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 814, 
817, 252 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1979) (“Even though testimony is 
objectionable as hearsay, its admission is harmless error when 
the content of the extra-judicial declaration is clearly 
established by other competent evidence.”).  We disagree. 
The circuit court’s error “‘is presumed to be prejudicial 
unless it plainly appears that it could not have affected the 
result.’”  Hinkley v. Koehler, 269 Va. 82, 92, 606 S.E.2d 803, 
808 (2005) (quoting Spence v. Miller, 197 Va. 477, 482, 90 S.E.2d 
131, 135 (1955)).  The Mooney Report contains conclusions that go 
to the very heart of the case.  For instance, it concludes that 
the position of the jackscrew indicates an “approximate takeoff 
11 
position trim setting.”  Honeywell insinuates that other experts 
provided this same testimony; however, this is not accurate.  Dr. 
Clarke was the only witness to testify that the autopilot’s trim 
setting was in the takeoff position at the time of impact.  The 
Administrators’ experts agreed with Dr. Clarke that the jackscrew 
had six threads exposed, but testified that this represented a 
nose-down trim position, not a normal takeoff trim position.  
Likewise, it was the only investigation report to categorically 
conclude that the plane was not “uncontrollable at the time of 
the accident.” 
 
Moreover, the Mooney Report repeatedly was brought to the 
jury’s attention by Honeywell.  Its counsel had Dr. Clarke read 
from and display parts of the report to the jury.  Honeywell also 
referred to it twice during closing argument.  Further, the 
entire Mooney Report was admitted into evidence as an exhibit and 
taken into the jury room during deliberations.  This exacerbates 
the prejudice in this case.5  See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. 
Puryear, 250 Va. 559, 562-63, 463 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1995) (finding 
that the error was not harmless when an erroneously admitted 
exhibit could have been reviewed during deliberations). 
                                                 
5 Honeywell argues that the Administrators did not clearly 
object to the Mooney Report itself being received as an exhibit.  
Because we find that it was error for it to be used at all, we 
need not address Honeywell’s argument.  However, we note that 
Code § 8.01-401.1 clearly forbids such action: “[i]f admitted, 
the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received 
as exhibits.”  See also Va. R. Evid. 2:706(a) (same). 
12 
Accordingly, we reject Honeywell’s argument that the error 
by the circuit court was harmless.  It does not plainly appear 
from the record that the erroneous admission of the hearsay 
statements could not have affected the jury’s verdict.  
Therefore, we will reverse the judgment appealed from and remand 
the case for a new trial.  See Bostic, 275 Va. at 578, 659 S.E.2d 
at 296.  While this error alone requires reversal of the circuit 
court’s judgment, we will address the Administrators’ remaining 
arguments because they involve issues that are likely to arise in 
the retrial of the case.  See, e.g., Velocity Express Mid-
Atlantic, Inc. v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 203, 585 S.E.2d 557, 566 
(2003) (the Court “must consider certain issues that probably 
will arise upon remand”). 
B.   Lay Witness Opinion Testimony 
The Administrators also assign error to the circuit court’s 
admission of certain opinion testimony by William Abel and Robert 
Norman.6  We address these two assignments of error concurrently. 
(1) 
William Abel’s Testimony 
William Abel was Grana’s friend and flight instructor.  He 
had extensive experience flying with Grana in the Mooney plane 
and the Cessna plane, including in poor weather conditions 
requiring the use of navigational instruments. 
                                                 
6 Abel and Norman were deposed by Honeywell prior to trial.  
The depositions were videotaped, and the portions determined to 
be admissible by the circuit court were played for the jury. 
13 
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Abel that he and 
Grana had agreed that Grana would not fly the Mooney plane in 
instrument meteorological conditions without an instructor.  Abel 
testified that he monitored the weather forecast a few days prior 
to the crash, and that he and Grana discussed the weather 
forecast via email.  Abel testified that he was not at 
Chesterfield County Airport on the day of the crash, but that he 
checked the weather report as soon as he learned of it.  Over the 
Administrators’ objection, Abel testified that he had concerns 
about Grana’s judgment in deciding to fly on that day: 
A. While [Grana] exercised safe judgment during almost 
all of our flying, the fact that he took off on this 
day makes –- makes me have some concerns about the 
judgment, taking off into conditions based on the 
weather that –- that was reported to me. 
 
. . . . 
 
Based on the –- all the flying I’ve done with [Grana] 
and the conversations that we had, I had concerns about 
why he would take off into those conditions on that 
day. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q. With respect to Mr. Grana’s lack of experience in 
this airplane in actual [instrument meteorological] 
conditions and the judgment that he used in taking off 
that day, in your opinion, was that a cause or 
contributing cause of this accident? 
 
A. I don’t know what happened in that airplane.  In my 
opinion, it wasn’t the best of judgment to take off in 
those conditions. 
 
14 
 
On appeal, the Administrators argue that Abel’s testimony 
regarding Grana’s judgment lacked sufficient foundation and was 
improper opinion testimony by a lay witness that invaded the 
province of the jury. 
(2) 
Robert Norman’s Testimony 
Robert Norman was a co-owner of the Mooney plane along with 
Grana.  He obtained his pilot’s license around the same time as 
Grana, and both men transitioned from flying the Cessna plane to 
the Mooney plane.  At the time of the crash, Norman had not been 
endorsed to fly the Mooney plane solo.  He had five to ten hours 
less flight time in it than Grana. 
Over the Administrators’ objection, the jury heard testimony 
from Norman regarding his personal experiences flying the Mooney 
and Cessna planes.  Norman compared them, opining that the Mooney 
plane was faster, more powerful, more complex, and more difficult 
to maneuver than the Cessna plane.  Norman testified that he had 
a “healthy fear” of the Mooney plane and that he did not feel 
prepared to fly it solo because of its complexity.  He also 
stated that he had never perceived problems with the flight 
controls in the Mooney plane. 
On appeal, the Administrators challenge Norman’s testimony 
regarding his subjective feelings and experiences flying the 
Mooney and Cessna planes.  The Administrators argue that such 
15 
testimony was improper opinion testimony by a lay witness, 
irrelevant, and prejudicial. 
(3) 
Analysis 
As stated previously, we review a trial court’s decision to 
admit or exclude testimony using an abuse of discretion standard.  
See John Crane, Inc., 274 Va. at 590, 650 S.E.2d at 855. 
Neither Abel nor Norman was qualified by the court as an 
expert.  Thus, we review their testimony in light of Rule 2:701, 
which states: 
Opinion testimony by a lay witness is admissible 
if it is reasonably based upon the personal experience 
or observations of the witness and will aid the trier 
of fact in understanding the witness’ perceptions.  Lay 
opinion may relate to any matter, such as –- but not 
limited to –- sanity, capacity, physical condition or 
disability, speed of a vehicle, the value of property, 
identity, causation, time, the meaning of words, 
similarity of objects, handwriting, visibility or the 
general physical situation at a particular location.  
However, lay witness testimony that amounts only to an 
opinion of law is inadmissible. 
 
To summarize, Rule 2:701 permits lay witness opinion testimony if 
(1) “it is reasonably based upon the personal experience or 
observations of the witness;” and (2) it “will aid the trier of 
fact in understanding the witness’ perceptions.” 
The first prong of Rule 2:701 requires personal knowledge.  
Clearly, both Abel’s and Norman’s testimony satisfied this 
requirement.  Abel was Grana’s flight instructor and had flown 
with Grana in various weather conditions.  He had extensive 
16 
personal knowledge of Grana’s flying abilities and was well-
positioned to testify regarding whether Grana should have been 
flying in instrument meteorological conditions.  Likewise, 
Norman’s testimony was based on his personal experiences flying 
the Mooney and Cessna planes.  He was an appropriate witness to 
explain the difference between the two planes because he had 
owned both planes and had experience flying them. 
The second prong of Rule 2:701 speaks to the necessity of 
lay opinion testimony.  Generally, lay opinion testimony is only 
admitted when “the witness’s information for some reason cannot 
be adequately conveyed to the court by a detailed recital of the 
specific facts upon which the opinion is based.”  Charles E. 
Friend & Kent Sinclair, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 13-
3[a], at 731 (7th ed. 2012).  For instance, this may be because 
the witness’s impression is one that cannot by its very nature be 
broken down into constituent parts.  See Richards v. 
Commonwealth, 107 Va. 881, 889, 59 S.E. 1104, 1107 (1908) 
(holding that a lay witness’s opinion that a substance was oil or 
grease was admissible because the subject matter could not be 
fully described to the jury as it appeared to the witness). 
However, if the witness can conveniently relate the facts in 
a manner that will provide the jury with an adequate 
understanding of the issue, the witness’s opinion based on those 
facts is unnecessary and therefore inadmissible.  See Friend & 
17 
Sinclair, supra, § 13-1[b], at 726; see also Denis v. 
Commonwealth, 144 Va. 559, 574, 131 S.E. 131, 135 (1926) (“The 
test of admissibility of a conclusion of fact of a nonexpert 
witness is this:  Is it clear that the jurors would or could have 
been fully and as exactly furnished with the data which formed 
the basis for the conclusion of the witness as the latter was?  
If so, the conclusion is inadmissible in evidence.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
We find that Abel’s testimony regarding Grana’s judgment was 
unnecessary and therefore should have been excluded pursuant to 
Rule 2:701.  Abel testified at length regarding Grana’s 
inexperience flying the Mooney plane in instrument meteorological 
conditions.  He testified that he and Grana agreed that Grana 
would not fly it in such conditions without an instructor, and 
that Grana specifically assured him that he would not fly on the 
day of the crash if such conditions were present.  That Abel 
believed Grana exercised bad judgment in deciding to fly on the 
day of the crash was implicit in the rest of his testimony.  
Expressing this opinion did nothing further to “aid the trier of 
fact in understanding [Abel]’s perceptions.”  Va. R. Evid. 2:701. 
Rather, it was superfluous.  The jury was fully capable of 
listening to the specific facts recited by Abel and reaching its 
own conclusion based on those facts. 
18 
Moreover, Abel’s testimony was an impermissible assessment 
of Grana’s culpability for the accident.  While the passage of 
Code § 8.01-401.3 in 1993 expanded the ability of expert and lay 
witnesses to express opinions on ultimate issues of fact, “mere 
assessments of liability or its constituent findings are not 
admissible.”  Friend & Sinclair, supra, § 13-5[a], at 742.  This 
Court has held that witnesses are precluded from “characterizing 
acts or conduct as careful, careless, cautious, dangerous, good 
management, in the line of duty, necessary, negligent, omitting 
anything possible, practicable, proper, prudent, reasonably safe, 
skillful, usual or unusual.”  Davis v. Souder, 134 Va. 356, 362, 
114 S.E. 605, 607 (1922) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Abel’s testimony that “it wasn’t the best of judgment [for Grana] 
to take off” characterized Grana’s actions as careless or unsafe.  
This was improper lay opinion testimony directed at Grana’s 
culpability or blameworthiness for the crash. 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
Norman’s testimony.  Norman did not address Grana’s judgment or 
flying abilities.  Rather, his testimony focused solely on his 
own experiences flying the Mooney and Cessna planes.  Further, 
Norman’s opinion testimony as to the differences between the two 
planes was not unnecessary.  It was impossible for Norman to 
adequately convey the differences between them without couching 
these differences in comparative terms.  Norman’s statements that 
19 
the Mooney plane was faster, more powerful, more complex, and 
more difficult to maneuver than the Cessna plane aided the jury 
in understanding Norman’s experiences and therefore qualified as 
proper lay opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 2:701. 
Finally, Norman’s testimony was relevant and not unfairly 
prejudicial.  It helped the jury understand Grana’s transition 
between the Mooney and Cessna planes.  This was relevant because 
it bore on Grana’s ability to handle the Mooney plane on the day 
of the crash and demonstrated some of the problems he may have 
encountered.  We cannot say that the probative value of this 
testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Va. R. Evid. 2:403(a).  Thus, Norman’s testimony was 
properly admitted.  See Gamache v. Allen, 268 Va. 222, 227-28, 
601 S.E.2d 598, 601 (2004) (“Evidence that is factually relevant 
may be excluded from the jury’s consideration if the probative 
value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.”). 
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in admitting Abel’s opinion testimony regarding 
Grana’s judgment.  However, it did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting Norman’s testimony. 
C. Statements During Closing Argument 
The Administrators next challenge certain statements made by 
Honeywell’s counsel during closing argument as violating a 
20 
pretrial order and Virginia law.  Prior to trial, the 
Administrators filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence 
or argument “as to the number of [Honeywell] autopilots sold or 
as to the so-called ‘safety history’ of [the Honeywell] 
autopilots.”  The circuit court granted the motion. 
Yet, during closing argument Honeywell’s counsel stated: 
They walk you into this courtroom and try to convince 
you of this theory.  Don’t have one test.  Didn’t 
sprinkle any debris in it to show does this happen.  
How can it run away?  Don’t you expect that out of 
them?  If they have the burden of proof here to prove 
this happened, why didn’t they show you this stuff?  
Why didn’t they prove it?  It’s never happened before.  
There is no evidence this has ever happened anywhere 
any time. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Administrators promptly objected, arguing 
that Honeywell’s counsel’s statements violated the order granting 
the motion in limine.  The court overruled the objection and 
directed Honeywell to “proceed.”  A few minutes later, 
Honeywell’s counsel again argued that the autopilot system had a 
“[s]afe design for 35 years, and no complaints,” and that there 
was “[n]o evidence of a prior problem at all ever.” 
 
Immediately following Honeywell’s closing argument, the 
Administrators requested a conference outside the jury’s 
presence.  The Administrators restated their objection and asked 
the court to issue a cautionary instruction directing the jury to 
disregard the improper statements.  The court declined, stating:  
“I had previously told the jury that what [the attorneys] tell 
21 
them is not evidence, and they should not consider it as such, 
we’ll leave it at that.  Overrule the motion.” 
 
The Administrators again contested the court’s ruling in 
their motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.  The 
court denied the motion, finding that the statements were proper 
because they “were made in reference to the testimony of the 
parties’ experts.  No expert, for either side, testified that the 
alleged cause of this crash was the cause of another crash that 
he had investigated, and [Honeywell] was entitled to make that 
argument.” 
 
On appeal, the Administrators assert that the court’s 
pretrial order properly excluded any argument regarding the 
safety history of the autopilot system. See Goins v. Wendy’s 
Int’l, Inc., 242 Va. 333, 335-36, 410 S.E.2d 635, 636 (1991) 
(holding that evidence of the absence of other incidents is 
inadmissible).  They argue that Honeywell violated this ruling by 
repeatedly telling the jury that there was an absence of other 
incidents.  Honeywell responds that its counsel’s statements 
merely summarized the testimony of the Administrators’ experts, 
who testified without objection that they had not investigated 
any other crash caused by debris in the gears of an autopilot 
system.  We disagree. 
Honeywell’s counsel’s statements went beyond summarizing the 
experts’ testimony.  He did not place his remarks in the context 
22 
of any particular expert’s testimony.  Rather, he made sweeping 
proclamations that the autopilot system had a “[s]afe design for 
35 years, and no complaints;” that the alleged debris-in-the-
gears problem had “[n]ever happened anywhere any time;” and that 
there was “[n]o evidence of a prior problem at all ever.”  These 
statements violated the court’s pretrial order excluding argument 
regarding the safety history of the autopilot system.  Because 
Honeywell did not assign cross-error to the court’s pretrial 
order, it is the law of the case.  See Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 
697, 722, 652 S.E.2d 129, 144 (2007) (holdings uncontested on 
appeal become “the law of the case”); Board of Supervisors v. 
Stickley, 263 Va. 1, 6, 556 S.E.2d 748, 751 (2002).  
Consequently, it was error for the circuit court to allow 
Honeywell’s counsel to make statements in contravention of its 
own order. 
D. Jury Instruction on Proximate Cause 
The Administrators finally contend that the circuit court 
erred in striking portions of their proposed jury instruction on 
proximate cause.  We disagree. 
At trial, the Administrators proffered the following jury 
instruction defining proximate cause: 
A proximate cause of an accident, injury, or damage is 
a cause which in natural and continuous sequence 
produces the accident, injury, or damage.  It is a 
cause without which the accident, injury, or damage 
would not have occurred.  There may be more than one 
23 
proximate cause[].  Proximate cause need not be 
established with such certainty so as to exclude every 
other possible conclusion. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Honeywell objected to the last two sentences.  
It noted that, at the time of trial, these sentences were not 
included in the Virginia model jury instruction defining 
proximate cause.  See 1 Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Civil, 
No. 5.000 (2012).  The circuit court struck the last two 
sentences of the proposed instruction over the Administrators’ 
objection. 
 
On appeal, the Administrators argue that the court erred in 
striking those sentences.  They claim that the proposed 
instruction accurately stated Virginia law, and that the last two 
sentences were necessary to dispel any erroneous impression that 
there could only be one proximate cause of the accident. 
Our sole responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is 
“to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the 
instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.”  
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 381, 673 S.E.2d 185, 187 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We review de novo 
whether an instruction correctly states the law and whether it 
finds support in credible evidence. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 
285 Va. 187, 228-29, 738 S.E.2d 847, 870 (2013).  “When reviewing 
a trial court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of 
24 
the instruction.”  Id. at 228-29, 738 S.E.2d at 871 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Administrators primarily rely on Holmes v. Levine, 273 
Va. 150, 159, 639 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2007), in which we reversed a 
jury verdict where the circuit court refused to instruct 
regarding multiple potential proximate causes.  This reliance is 
misplaced.  In Holmes, we narrowly held that the circuit court 
erred in refusing the instruction “[i]n light of the 
Administrator’s theory of the case and the evidence in support of 
that theory.”  Id. at 160, 639 S.E.2d at 240.  In that case, 
there were two possible proximate causes of the decedent’s death: 
cancer itself and the defendant physician’s negligent delay in 
diagnosing the cancer.  The Administrator in Holmes put on 
considerable evidence regarding both causes.  Id. at 159, 639 
S.E.2d at 239.  Here, however, the Administrators’ position was 
that the autopilot system was the sole cause of the accident.  
The Administrators’ experts opined that other possible causes of 
the accident had been considered and rejected.  The experts 
explicitly refuted the argument that Grana’s own error could have 
contributed to the crash. 
In light of the Administrators’ theory, the granted 
instruction fully and fairly covered the principle of proximate 
25 
causation.7  It “refers to ‘a proximate cause’ instead of ‘the 
proximate cause’” precisely because “there may be more than one 
proximate cause of an injury.”  See 1 Virginia Model Jury 
Instructions – Civil, No. 5.000 (2012) (commentary).    The jury 
repeatedly was instructed that it could find Honeywell liable if 
it concluded that Honeywell’s alleged breach of warranty was “a 
proximate cause” of the crash.8  Thus, the first additional 
sentence proposed by the Administrators added nothing that was 
not already encompassed by the given instructions.  While an 
instruction may not be withheld from the jury solely because it 
varies from the model instruction, see Code § 8.01-379.2, it is 
not error for a court to reject proposed additions to a model 
instruction that are redundant.  See Stockton v. Commonwealth, 
227 Va. 124, 145, 314 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984); Wilson v. Brown, 
                                                 
7 The definition of proximate cause provided to the jury was 
identical to the corresponding Virginia model jury instruction at 
the time of trial.  We note that the model jury instruction was 
amended post-trial to add the following sentence:  “There may be 
more than one proximate cause of an accident, injury, or damage.”  
1 Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Civil, No. 5.000 (2014).  
However, the commentary clarifies that this sentence should only 
be included in cases “[w]here the evidence . . . shows the 
possibility of more than one proximate cause of an accident.” Id.  
As discussed, that was not the case here. 
8 The given proximate cause instruction used the phrase “a 
cause” three times.  It never referred to “the cause” of the 
accident.  Likewise, the rest of the given instructions 
consistently referred to “a proximate cause” and never referenced 
“the proximate cause” of the accident.  By contrast, in Holmes we 
emphasized that the circuit court improperly used the definite 
article “the” when instructing the jury since concurrent causes 
were alleged.  273 Va. at 160, 639 S.E.2d at 240. 
26 
136 Va. 634, 637-38, 118 S.E. 88, 89 (1923) (“Where the jury has 
been sufficiently and correctly instructed on any point, it is 
not error to refuse further instructions on that point, however 
correct a tendered instruction may be.”). 
Finally, the second proposed additional sentence could have 
confused the jury regarding the burden of proof.  The jury was 
separately instructed to find for the Administrators if they 
“proved by the greater weight of the evidence” that, among other 
things, the autopilot system was a proximate cause of the 
accident.  It also was specifically instructed as to the meaning 
of the phrase “greater weight of all the evidence.”  These 
instructions were clear and consistent.  Adding words such as 
“certainty” could have heightened the potential for confusion. 
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not err in 
striking the last two sentences of the Administrators’ proposed 
instruction on proximate cause. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.