Title: People v. Cornelius
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97062
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2004

Docket No. 97062-Agenda 8-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN 							
W. CORNELIUS, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 2, 2004. 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Defendant, John Wayne Cornelius, was charged by indictment in
the circuit court of Champaign County with one count of unlawful
failure to register as a sex offender in the City of Champaign, within
10 days of establishing residence there, in violation of section 3(b) of
the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS
150/3(b) (West 2002)). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
charge, arguing that the Registration Act, as well as the Sex Offender
and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law)
(730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)), violated several provisions
of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
The circuit court granted defendant's dismissal motion. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and
remand this cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	The Sex Offender Registration Act and the Sex Offender and
Child Murderer Notification Law operate in tandem, providing a
comprehensive scheme for the registration of Illinois sex offenders and
the dissemination of information about these offenders to the public.
People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 416 (2000).
	The Registration Act requires that all sex offenders, as defined in
section 2 of that act (730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002)), shall register in
person with municipal or county law enforcement officials within 10
days of establishing a residence in that municipality or county. 730
ILCS 150/3(a)(1), (a)(2), (b) (West 2002). Pursuant to the
Registration Act, an offender must provide a written, signed statement
which includes the registrant's current address and current place of
employment. In addition, the offender must submit a photograph. The
Registration Act further provides that the registry information may
also include the offender's fingerprints. 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(6), 8
(West 2002). Finally, the registration information must also include
whether the person is a sex offender as defined in section 105 (730
ILCS 152/105 (West 2002)) of the Notification Law. 730 ILCS 150/8
(West 2002). The registering law enforcement agency shall enter the
information into the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System
(LEADS). 730 ILCS 50/8 (West 2002).
	The Registration Act further requires that, in making this
registration, the offender must provide "positive identification and
documentation that substantiates proof of residence at the registering
address." 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(5) (West 2002). A registrant who
changes his address must inform the law enforcement agency with
which he last registered within 10 days of the change, and he must
register anew with the appropriate local law enforcement agency
having jurisdiction over his new residence, also within a 10-day
period. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2002). Failure to comply with the
registration requirements of this act is a Class 4 felony. 730 ILCS
150/10 (West 2002).
	An offender who is subject to Registration Law is, in turn, also
subject to the provisions of the Notification Law. The Notification
Law provides that at the time a sex offender registers under section 3
of the Registration Act, or reports a change of address under section
6 of that Act, "the offender shall notify the law enforcement agency
having jurisdiction with whom the offender registers or reports a
change of address *** that the offender is a sex offender." 730 ILCS
152/110 (West 2002). The Notification Law requires the Illinois State
Police to maintain a Statewide Sex Offender Database "for the
purpose of identifying sex offenders and making that information
available" to those individuals specified in the Notification Law. 730
ILCS 152/115(a) (West 2002). The information contained in this
database-which includes the name, address, date of birth, place of
employment, school attended and offense or adjudication of all sex
offenders required to register under section 3 of the Registration
Act-must be disclosed to entities such as school boards, school
principals, and child care facilities in the county where the offender is
required to register, resides, is employed, or is attending an institution
of higher education. 730 ILCS 152/120 (West 2002). The State
Police, in its discretion, may also disclose this information to any
person "likely to encounter a sex offender." 730 ILCS 152/120(b)
(West 2002). Local law enforcement authorities must make the
registry information available and "open to inspection by the public"
in accordance with procedures set forth in the Notification Law. 730
ILCS 152/120(c) (West 2002).
	On July 1, 2000, section 115 of the Notification Law was
amended by adding a new subsection (b), which requires that the
Illinois State Police make the information contained in the Statewide
Sex Offender Database accessible to the general public by means of
the Internet. 730 ILCS 152/115(b) (West 2002). Specifically, section
115(b) provides:
			"(b) The Department of State Police must make the
information contained in the Statewide Sex Offender
Database accessible on the Internet by means of a hyperlink
labeled 'Sex Offender Information' on the Department's
World Wide Web home page. The Department of State
Police must update that information as it deems necessary."
	It is against this background that defendant was arrested on April
18, 2002. At the time of his arrest, defendant lived in an apartment
building in the City of Champaign and had resided at that location
since July 2001. The landlord of the building called police after several
female tenants complained that defendant had engaged in peculiar and
disturbing behavior, including roaming the hallways at night while
moaning, peeping at them from his windows, and making strange
noises.
	When the police responded, they ran defendant's name through
the LEADS system. LEADS indicated that defendant had been
convicted in 1992 for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Accordingly,
because a conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse classified
defendant as a "sex offender" pursuant to section 2 of the Registration
Act (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2002)), defendant was required to
comply with the Act's registration requirements. At the time of his
1992 conviction, defendant was registered at an address in Rantoul,
Illinois. However, the Champaign officers discovered that, at the time
of his arrest, defendant was not in compliance with the provisions of
the Registration Act, as he had failed to notify the authorities that he
had moved to Champaign.
	Defendant was subsequently indicted by a Champaign County
grand jury for unlawful failure to register as a sex offender, in
violation of section 3 of the Registration Act. The provision under
which defendant was charged specifically provides as follows:
			"Any sex offender, regardless of any initial, prior or other
registration, shall, within 10 days of establishing a residence,
place of employment, or temporary domicile for more than 10
days in any county, register in person as set forth in
subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a-5)." 730 ILCS 150/3(b) (West
2000).
In addition to the registration requirements set forth in section 3 of the
Registration Act, defendant was also subject to the similar registration
requirement found in section 110 of the Notification Law (730 ILCS
152/110 (West 2002)), as well as the provision requiring that his sex
offender registry information be available on the State Police Internet
site pursuant to section 115(b) of the Notification Law. 730 ILCS
152/115(b) (West 2002).
	On July 31, 2002, defendant moved to dismiss the charge.
According to defendant's motion to dismiss, "the Illinois Sex Offender
Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and its
companion Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification
Law (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)) are in violation of the
United States and Illinois Constitutions as they violate the defendant's
Due Process rights and constitute unconstitutional punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions and are in violation of the right to privacy guaranteed by
the Illinois constitution." Defendant further asserted in his dismissal
motion that both the Registration Act and the Notification Law were
unconstitutional because they violated the prohibition against double
jeopardy in the Illinois and United States constitutions; they violated
the equal protection provisions in the Illinois and United States
constitutions; and they violated the right to privacy implied in the
United States Constitution.
	In his motion to dismiss, defendant acknowledged that this court,
in our prior decision in People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413 (2000),
held that section 3 of the Registration Act and section 110 of the
Notification Law did not violate the federal and state constitutions.
Defendant asserted, however, that subsequent to our decision in
Malchow, the General Assembly added the new subsection (b) to
section 115 of the Notification Law, which requires the Illinois State
Police to publish information about a sex offender and his or her
photograph on its Internet site. According to defendant, the addition
of subsection (b) to section 115 of the Notification Law raised new ex
post facto, privacy, due process, and double jeopardy concerns not
addressed by this court in the Malchow decision. Defendant further
distinguished Malchow on the basis that Malchow did not discuss the
general due process implications of the Registration Act and
Notification Law and only "briefly discussed" whether those
provisions impermissibly infringed on the defendant's privacy rights.
In his motion, defendant stressed that he was not challenging, on
privacy grounds, the requirement that he register under the
Registration Act; defendant's challenge was limited to section 115(b)
of the Notification Law, which requires that his sex-offender data be
made available on the Internet. According to defendant, the
"wholesale dissemination by the State of his private information on its
World Wide Web site violates his right to privacy."
	In addition, defendant asserted in his motion to dismiss that two
then-recent decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals
"mandate[d]" a finding that both the Registration Act and the
Notification Law were unconstitutional. In Doe v. Department of
Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a Connecticut sex offender registration law violated
procedural due process when it failed to provide persons on the state
sex offender registry an opportunity to avoid being listed on the
registry by proving they were not currently dangerous to the public.
In Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 84, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that because the effects of the Alaska sex offender
registration and notification law were punitive, that scheme violated
the ex post facto clause.
	On August 11, 2003, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum
in support of his motion to dismiss. In this pleading, defendant noted that
the United States Supreme Court had recently decided Connecticut
Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003), wherein the Court reversed the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals' decision in Doe v. Department of Public Safety, which held
that the public disclosure of the Connecticut sex offender registry violated
the due process clause. In his supplemental memorandum, defendant
attempted to factually distinguish his case from that of Doe. Whereas in
Doe the defendant asserted that his right to procedural due process had
been violated by the statutory provisions, in the matter at bar defendant
stressed that the Registration Act and Notification Law violated his
constitutional right to substantive due process.
	On September 3, 2003, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
defendant's motion to dismiss the charge. Defendant and the State
were each represented by counsel, who briefly presented arguments
to the circuit court. The transcript of this hearing, which consists of
15 pages, reveals that defense counsel focused his brief argument
upon the substantive due process and privacy challenges to the
statutes and did not mention the numerous other constitutional
challenges to the statutes set forth in his written motion to dismiss.
	At the conclusion of argument, the trial court judge made an oral
ruling, granting defendant's motion to dismiss the charge. The entirety
of that oral ruling is as follows:
			"THE COURT: Counsel, this is an interesting issue. I
think as I have indicated on more than one occasion, the
Illinois Supreme Court [in Malchow] was rather specific and
detailed in their analysis of the old statute, and they base their
decision on the limited dissemination of that information. The
fact that the new statute mandates putting this information on
the Web, which makes it available to literally everyone in the
world, is interesting, and quite frankly, troubling. Our Illinois
constitution talks about the right to privacy. And I have to
agree with [defense counsel], if you're going to establish a
law that allows this information to be so broadly
disseminated, there has to be a purpose for it, and I believe
the old law was appropriate and correct, and [defense
counsel], I'm going to give you the opportunity, if the State
wishes to appeal this, to argue your case before the Illinois
Supreme Court. I'm going to grant the Motion to Dismiss."
The record reveals that this is the only pronouncement made by the
circuit court with respect to its grant of defendant's motion to dismiss
the charge. The record does not contain a written order entered by the
circuit court with respect to this ruling.
	The State timely made a direct appeal to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R.
603.

ANALYSIS
	Although the circuit court did not explicitly declare the
Registration Act and the Notification Law unconstitutional, a finding
of unconstitutionality can be the only basis for granting dismissal of
the charge against defendant. Accordingly, the circuit court's
judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss is before us on direct
review. Because the constitutional validity of a statute is a question of
law, we review de novo the circuit court's decision declaring the
statute unconstitutional. In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253
(2004); Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 536 (2004).
	In the matter at bar, the circuit court, in a very brief oral ruling,
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him. In turn,
defendant's dismissal motion alleged numerous grounds upon which
the Registration Act and the Notification Law violated both the
United States and the Illinois Constitutions. Unfortunately, the circuit
court failed to set forth the specific grounds upon which it granted
defendant's motion to dismiss. As we recently observed in In re
Parentage of John M., "[o]ur task of reviewing the circuit court's
judgment in the case at bar is hampered by a lack of clarity in the
court's ruling." In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d  at 266. It is
with concern that we note that the instant cause is the second occasion
in which we have recently been forced to discern the scope of a circuit
court's ruling declaring a statute to be unconstitutional. See In re
Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253 (2004).  
	As in In re Parentage of John M., we are here faced with a
circuit court ruling that is "conclusory and unsupported by any legal
analysis or explanation." In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d  at
266. When a circuit court does something as serious as holding that
a statute violates the constitution, then the circuit court must also be
mindful to clearly state what portion of the statute is unconstitutional
as well as the legal basis for that ruling.
	We remind our circuit courts that statutory enactments are
presumed constitutional, and that it is the duty of the court to construe
a statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if such a construction is
reasonably possible. Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional
Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173 (2003); Burger v. Lutheran General
Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 32 (2001). This presumption derives from the
fact that when a circuit court declares a statute unconstitutional, such
a holding destabilizes the area of law within which the statute is
invalidated until that ruling is reviewed by this court. We have
previously cautioned that circuit courts should " 'not *** compromise
that stability in the first place by declaring legislation unconstitutional
when the particular case does not require it.' " Hearne v. Illinois State
Board of Education, 185 Ill. 2d 443, 454 (1999), quoting Trent v.
Winningham, 172 Ill. 2d 420, 425 (1996). To that end, it is well
settled that only where the party challenging the validity of the
enactment has borne his or her burden to clearly establish a
constitutional violation that a statute may be declared invalid. In re
J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 62 (2003); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 290 (2003). If a statute's construction is doubtful, a court
should resolve that doubt in favor of the statute's validity. Miller v.
Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57-58 (2001).
	This is not to mean that statutes are unassailable; however,
"neither should circuit courts lightly or cavalierly declare
unconstitutional that which the representatives of the people have seen
fit to enact." People v. Conlan, 189 Ill. 2d 286, 291-92 (2000).
Accordingly, the best practice for our circuit courts when holding a
statute unconstitutional is to state with specificity the statutory
provision or provisions found to violate the constitution, the
constitutional provision or provisions violated, and the legal basis
supporting that determination.
	Turning to the matter at bar, "our task, initially, is to define the
parameters of the circuit court's holdings." In re Parentage of John
M, 212 Ill. 2d  at 267. To this end, we must, therefore, look at the
record as a whole and give the court's statements their most logical
meaning. We begin by examining the text of the circuit court's oral
ruling. The scope of the ruling is not readily apparent from the vague
and general statements made by the circuit court judge in his one-paragraph pronouncement. We note that, in granting defendant's
motion, the circuit court judge spoke of the "new statute" challenged
in this case and the "old statute" reviewed by this court in Malchow.
In addition, in the course of his ruling, the circuit court judge stated
that the "new statute mandates putting this information on the Web."
Finally, we note that the circuit court judge mentioned, in the course
of the ruling, that "[o]ur Illinois constitution talks about the right to
privacy."
	 Because the circuit court makes reference to the "old" statute
being the statute we reviewed in Malchow and the "new" statute as
containing the Internet provision, we logically conclude that the circuit
court intended by this ruling to find the recently added Internet
provision of the Notification Law, found in section 115(b) (730 ILCS
152/115(b) (West 2002)), to be unconstitutional as an invasion of
defendant's right to privacy as guaranteed by article I, section 6, of
the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). We
believe this is a reasonable interpretation of the court's order and is
the only basis, apparent from the record, upon which the trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
	After having determined that the circuit court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss on the basis that the Internet provision of the
Notification Law, found in section 115(b) (730 ILCS 152/115(b)
(West 2002)), impermissibly invades defendant's right to privacy
guaranteed by article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6), we address the propriety of this specific
ruling. Defendant, however, correctly notes in his brief to this court
that our review of the circuit court's judgment is not limited to that
court's reasoning, and we may uphold the circuit court's ruling that
the Notification Law and the Registration Act are unconstitutional on
any basis in the record. "[A]s a reviewing court, we can sustain the
decision of the circuit court on any grounds which are called for by
the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on the
grounds and regardless of whether the circuit court's reasoning was
correct." Bell v. Louisville &amp; Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148
(1985). Accordingly, we will therefore also address the remainder of
the constitutional challenges raised by defendant in his brief.

I. Privacy
	We begin our analysis by reiterating that defendant, as the party
challenging the validity of the statute, bears the burden of clearly
establishing its unconstitutionality. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 58
(2002). In his brief to this court, defendant asserts that the
Notification Law, and, by implication, the Registration Act, violates
his right to privacy guaranteed by article I, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). Defendant
emphasizes that it is not his position that the statutes violate his right
to privacy by requiring that he register with local law enforcement
authorities; rather, defendant asserts that it is the "wholesale
dissemination" by the state of his photograph and physical attributes
on its Internet page, pursuant to section 115(b) of the Notification
Law, that violates his privacy rights.
	According to defendant, prior to the addition of the Internet
provision to the Notification Law, an individual interested in obtaining
information from the sex offender registry either had to travel to the
courthouse to view specific records on a specific person or to request
by telephone or in writing information from the offender database
maintained by the Illinois State Police. Defendant asserts that a much
lower threshold of participation is involved when an individual sits at
a computer in his or her home and conducts an Internet search for sex
offender information. According to defendant, "It is a violation of
[his] right to privacy to allow access to those records by persons
whose only interest is curiosity or whose motives may be
reprehensible." Defendant contends that there is no correlation
between the stated purpose of the Registration Act and the
Notification Law in protecting the public from sex offenders and the
dissemination of defendant's registry information and his photograph
on the World Wide Web. Defendant concludes that the "dissemination
of the database information to the world at large through the Internet
and the corresponding wholesale invasion of defendant's right to
privacy is not reasonable."
	 The State contends that defendant's argument is flawed because
it is based upon a faulty premise, namely, that defendant's sex
offender data is "private information." The State notes that, even prior
to the addition of the Internet provision to the Notification Law,
defendant's sex offender registry information was open to public
inspection by any individual-whether an Illinois resident or not-who
wished to obtain information about sex offenders in this state.
Therefore, the State asserts, even under the traditional means of
notification, defendant's registration information was not "private."
According to the State, the addition of subsection (b) to section 115
of the Notification Law-which requires that defendant's registry
information also be available on the Internet-merely provides an
additional avenue for public access to already public information.
Thus, the State concludes, defendant has failed to meet his burden to
clearly establish that section 115(b) of the Notification Law violates
his right to privacy under the Illinois Constitution. We agree.
	Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides:  
			"The people shall have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or
other means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause,
supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §6.
The privacy protections guaranteed under the Illinois Constitution
"go[ ] beyond federal constitutional guarantees by expressly
recognizing a zone of personal privacy ***." Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 537 (1997). However, even under the expanded privacy
protections afforded by the Illinois Constitution, it is well settled that
the right to privacy is not absolute. Only unreasonable invasions of
privacy are constitutionally forbidden. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 51-52;
Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d  at 538; Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 450 (1997).
	Thus, our inquiry is twofold: we must first determine whether
defendant has a reasonable privacy expectation in his sex offender
registry information, and, if so, we must then decide whether the
provisions of the Notification Law mandating that this information be
available on the Internet unreasonably invades that privacy
expectation.
	The Registration Act was passed by the General Assembly "in
response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against
children." People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386 (1991). By requiring
sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies, "the
legislature sought to create an additional method of protection for
children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual
abuse." Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 387. The Registration Act was designed
to aid law enforcement agencies in allowing them to "monitor the
movements of the perpetrators by allowing ready access to crucial
information." Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 388. Similarly, the Notification
Law, by disseminating the information gathered through the
Registration Act, is intended to protect the public. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 420.
	In Malchow, we rejected various constitutional challenges to the
prior version of the Notification Law, before its amendment by the
addition of the Internet provisions contained in subsection (b) of
section 115. Similar to defendant at bar, the defendant in Malchow
asserted that the Registration Act and the Notification Law
impermissibly infringed upon his right to privacy. However, because
Malchow did not adequately develop his argument that he was denied
his right to privacy under the Illinois Constitution, we concluded that
he had not overcome the presumption of constitutionality and failed
to meet his burden to clearly show that the statutory provisions were
invalid. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 426.
	In the matter before us, defendant asserts that the prior version
of the law upheld in Malchow, which provided the public with access
to registry information only upon personal request to local law
enforcement offices, was a preferable method of disseminating this
information and did not violate privacy concerns. Defendant contends
that because the Internet provides a faster, more convenient manner
of obtaining sex offender information, this results in a far more
extensive transmission of that information. According to defendant,
because his sex offender data is now "available to anyone who has
access to the Internet, be that person in Kansas, England or Illinois,"
his right to privacy protected by the Illinois constitution is violated by
this "wholesale dissemination" of personal information.(1)
	We find it significant that defendant embraces, rather than
challenges, the traditional methods of public dissemination of sex
offender information, and argues that such dissemination is preferable
to listing this information on the State Police's Internet site. Prior to
the addition of the Internet provisions, the Notification Law
required-and continues to require-that a sex offender's name,
address, date of birth, offense, photograph and employment
information be "open to inspection by the public." 730 ILCS
152/120(c) (West 2002). Accordingly, any individual who was "likely
to encounter a sex offender" (730 ILCS 152/120(b) (West 2002))
could request registry information from the appropriate law
enforcement agency "in person, in writing, or by telephone." 730
ILCS 152/120(c) (West 2002). Thus, even before the addition of the
Internet provision in subsection (b) of section 115 of the Notification
Law, any person-whether an Illinois resident or not-averring that he
or she was "likely to encounter a sex offender"-whether this
likelihood was based upon legitimate concern, mere suspicion, or
simple interest-could have requested defendant's sex offender registry
information by telephone, by mail, or in person, paid the required
copying fees, and obtained the information.
	We agree with the State that the Internet access to sex offender
registry information authorized under section 115(b) of the
Notification Law is "simply another manner of archiving, storing and
disseminating the information-already available by numerous other
means-to interested parties." Criminal proceedings are open to the
public, and "[w]hat transpires in the court room is public property.
*** Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with
impunity." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 91 L. Ed. 1546,
1551, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1254 (1947). In addition, the court's file for
each case is deemed to be a public record, and "shall at all times be
open to inspection without fee or reward, and all persons shall have
free access for inspection and examination to such records ***." 705
ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2002). Thus, all information in defendant's
court file, including any personal information with respect to
defendant, is available for inspection by anyone in the world. This
leads us to conclude that defendant does not have a cognizable
privacy interest in his sex offender registry information. Defendant
"engaged in conduct that lowered the privacy bar *** [as] [h]is acts
spawned a criminal prosecution culminating in a public record that
contains the challenged information." People v. Grochocki, 343 Ill.
App. 3d 664, 670 (2003) (upholding the Internet provision of the
Notification Law against a privacy challenge). Accordingly,
"defendant cannot argue that the compilation and dissemination of
truthful information that is already, albeit less conveniently, a matter
of public record constitutes a legitimate privacy interest." People v.
Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d 319, 334 (1998) (sex offender registry
information is a matter of public record and is not protected by
privacy rights).
	Thus, defendant's argument that Internet access makes it too easy
or convenient for the public to procure registry information misses the
mark. The determinative fact is that the sex offender registry
information is already open to the public and is a matter of public
record. The Internet provides for a different kind of accessibility to
information that is already publically available by other means. Thus,
defendant's registry information is not "private" and, accordingly,
does not fall within the protections of the privacy clause of the Illinois
Constitution.
	It is for this reason that defendant's heavy reliance upon our prior
decision in In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381
(1992), is misplaced. In that case, two men were subpoenaed by a Will
County grand jury to appear in a lineup and submit hair samples. In
addition, one man was ordered to submit a complete set of
fingerprints and palmprints. No charges had been filed against either
man. The men filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. In finding that
the men had a viable privacy claim under the Illinois Constitution, we
explained that:
		"A person has a reasonable expectation that his private
records will not be exposed to public view. Similarly, a
person has a reasonable expectation that he will not be forced
to submit to a close scrutiny of his personal characteristics,
unless for a valid reason. We believe that the individual's
privacy interest in his physical person, as well as his privacy
interest in his documents, must be protected." In re May
1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 391-92.
	This court held that, under the specific circumstances presented
in that case, the privacy protections guaranteed under the Illinois
Constitution required that there be a showing of individualized
suspicion, as well as relevance, before physical evidence of a
noninvasive nature-such as an in-person appearance for a lineup or
fingerprinting-is demanded of a witness. In re May 1991 Will County
Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 393. Because there was no showing by the
State that relevance and individualized suspicion were established
before the subpoenas requiring the men to submit to a lineup and
fingerprinting were issued, this court held that the subpoenas should
have been quashed. In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 393-94. In addition, with respect to the demand that the men
submit hair samples, this court held that such a request is a far greater
intrusion into an individual's personal privacy than requesting
evidence of a noninvasive nature and, therefore, is reasonable only
when warranted by probable cause. In re May 1991 Will County
Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 395. Because the men were not charged
with any crime, nor was there any testimony implicating them in a
commission of a crime, the subpoenas for their hair samples were
unreasonable and should not have been granted. In re May 1991 Will
County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 400.
	We hold that our decision in In re May 1991 Will County Grand
Jury is inapposite to the facts in the matter before us. In Grand Jury,
no charges had been filed against either man, nor were they suspects
in the case. Under those specific facts, this court found that it was an
invasion of the men's privacy to compel them to appear in a lineup
and submit physical samples for purposes of inspection by the grand
jury. This court emphasized that there is a privacy interest in an
individual's private records as well as his person, and that the men had
not engaged in conduct that lowered their expectation of privacy. In
contrast, in the matter at bar, defendant's sex offender registry
information is not a private record. As stated, his conviction for
aggravated criminal sexual abuse lowered the privacy bar and
culminated in a public record that contains the challenged information.
	Defendant raises an additional argument in support of his
contention that the Internet provisions of the Notification Law violate
his right to privacy under the Illinois Constitution. Defendant argues
that, by placing the registry information on the Internet, the state is
providing that information to those who have no need for it and who
are in no danger. According to defendant, the wide availability of this
information does not narrowly serve the governmental purpose of
protecting the public from recidivist sex offenders. To the contrary,
defendant asserts, the only "accomplishment of Internet dissemination
is the individual's invasion of privacy, and, accordingly, loss of liberty
in the form of shunning and shaming which is almost certain to occur
after world wide Internet exposure." It is defendant's assertion that
shaming sex offenders is the main purpose of posting the registry
information on the State Police's Internet site. We disagree.
	In rejecting defendant's claims, we are guided by the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003). Although Smith
addressed the issue of whether Alaska's Internet sex offender registry
was an impermissible ex post facto statute, and the offenders in that
case did not raise any privacy challenges to that statute, we find the
Supreme Court's discussion of the posting of sex offender registry
information on the Internet to be instructive. In the course of rejecting
the argument that posting sex offender registry information on the
Internet constituted punishment, the Court stated:
		"[T]he stigma of [the sex offender registry law] results not
from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the
dissemination of accurate information about a criminal
record, most of which is already public. Our system does not
treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of
a legitimate governmental objective as punishment. On the
contrary, our criminal law tradition insists on public
indictment, public trial, and public imposition of sentence.
Transparency is essential to maintaining public respect for the
criminal justice system, ensuring its integrity, and protecting
the rights of the accused. The publicity may cause adverse
consequences for the convicted defendant, running from mild
personal embarrassment to social ostracism. *** [H]owever,
the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma
an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.
			The fact that Alaska posts the information on the Internet
does not alter our conclusion. It must be acknowledged that
notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to public
shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent
of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is
greater than anything that could have been designed in
colonial times. These facts do not render Internet notification
punitive. The purpose and the principal effect of notification
are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate
the offender. Widespread public access is necessary for the
efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a
collateral consequence of a valid regulation.
			The State's Web site does not provide the public with
means to shame the offender by, say, posting comments
underneath his record. An individual seeking the information
must take the initial step of going to the Department of
Public Safety's Web site, proceed to the sex offender
registry, and then look up the desired information. The
process is more analogous to a visit to an official archive of
criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to
appear in public with some visible badge of past criminality.
The Internet makes the document search more efficient, cost
effective, and convenient for Alaska's citizenry." Smith, 538 U.S.  at 98-99, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 180-81, 123 S. Ct.  at 1150-51.
	Thus, informed by the analysis of the Supreme Court in Smith,
we conclude that Illinois may permissibly use the Internet
dissemination of sex offender registry information as a "more efficient,
cost effective and convenient" means of providing its citizens with
important public information. Even if the collateral effect of the
Internet notification provision is to "shame" defendant, this effect is
the
			"result of the offender's crimes and not of the designation
and disclosure statutes. The statutes do not 'affirmatively'
impose those negative consequences. Rather those
consequences are byproducts of the nature of the offender's
crimes and of people knowing about a sex offender's status -
which can occur in many ways, and not merely by way of a
community notification statute." Meadows v. Board of
Parole &amp; Post-Prison Supervision, 181 Or. App. 565, 576,
47 P.3d 506, 512 (2002).
 As such, the collateral effects flowing from the dissemination of sex
offender information are substantially outweighed by the goal of
safeguarding the public-especially children-from convicted sex
offenders.
	Moreover, we disagree with defendant's assertion that the
protection of the general public is not increased by broad
dissemination of his sex offender registry information over the Internet
to individuals outside the immediate community in which he resides.
The flaw in defendant's argument can be more fully understood
through an example the State provides in its brief to this court.
Consider an out-of-state family with young children wishing to
purchase a home in Illinois. As part of this process, the family may use
the State Police's Internet site to research the locale to which they
desire to move, and discover where that area's registered sex
offenders reside. In this way, the family may plan its move
accordingly. This example underscores that,
		"as a practical matter, the actual audience for the [sex
offender registry] information is essentially self-defining and
self-limiting: [t]he information will be obtained by people
who choose to seek it. Bluntly, although the information
could, in the abstract, be available to millions of people, the
vast majority of those who will take the time and effort to
obtain the information will be those who fall within the
statute's remedial ambit, particularly including parents or
others responsible for young children who might come into
contact with the offender." Meadows, 181 Or. App. at 577-78, 47 P.3d  at 513.
It is our view that publishing the sex offender registry information on
the Internet makes the goals of the statute more attainable. See A.A.
ex rel. M.M. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2003).
	In conclusion, we also note that our decision today is in accord
with the majority of other jurisdictions which have held that the
posting of sex offender registration information on the Internet merely
provides for a different kind of accessibility to substantially the same
public information that has been historically available by other means.
See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S.  at 98-99, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 180-81, 123 S.
Ct. at 1150-51; Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000);
State of New Mexico v. Druktenis, 135 N.M. 223, ___, 86 P.3d 1050,
1062 (2004); Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W. Va. 88, ___, 593 S.E.2d 839,
846 (2003); Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Ky.
2002); State v. Stevens, 26 Kan. App. 2d 606, 613, 992 P.2d 1244,
1249 (1999).
	Accordingly, we hold that defendant has failed to satisfy his
burden to clearly establish that the Internet dissemination provisions
contained in 115(b) of the Notification Law violate his right to privacy
under the Illinois Constitution.

II. Substantive Due Process
	We next address defendant's substantive due process challenge
to the Internet dissemination provisions found in section 115(b) of the
Notification Law. In his brief to this court, defendant starts his
argument by asserting that the Internet provisions violate his right to
substantive due process guaranteed under the fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), and
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2). Defendant then quotes from each constitutional
provision and makes citation to cases in which both the United States
and Illinois constitutional provisions were at issue. However, toward
the end of his argument, defendant states that he "links his argument
specifically to the Illinois due process clause." We therefore conclude
that defendant has explicitly abandoned his claim to relief under the
federal due process clause.
	With respect to his Illinois due process claim, defendant frames
his substantive due process challenge as follows: "the wholesale
Internet dissemination of the sex offender's picture, address and other
identifying information violates [defendant's] fundamental
constitutional right: the right to be free from unreasonable invasions
of privacy." At another point in his argument, defendant contends that
the Internet provisions violate his "fundamental right to privacy." In
turn, defendant asserts, because the Internet provisions impermissibly
restrict a fundamental constitutional right, we must review the
challenged statute using strict scrutiny analysis. It is defendant's
position that the Internet provisions fail strict scrutiny analysis because
the worldwide dissemination of his sex offender registry information
is not narrowly tailored to achieve the government purpose of
assisting law enforcement in protecting Illinois citizens. We reject
defendant's assertions.
	When confronted with a claim that a statute violates the
constitutional guarantees of due process, a court must first determine
the nature of the right purportedly infringed upon by the statute. In re
R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 302 (2001). Where the statute does not affect
a fundamental constitutional right, the test for determining whether
the provision comports with substantive due process is the rational
basis test. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 67 (2003); People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 216 (1992). The rational basis test is satisfied where the
challenged statute bears a rational relationship to the purpose the
legislature intended to achieve in enacting the statute. Arangold Corp.
v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003); In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d  at 67.
However, where the right infringed upon is among those rights
considered "fundamental" constitutional rights, the challenged statute
is subject to strict scrutiny analysis. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d  at 537; In re
R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 303. To survive strict scrutiny, the means
employed by the legislature must be necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, and the statute must be narrowly tailored to accomplish
this goal, i.e., the legislature must employ the least restrictive means
consistent with the attainment of the intended goal. Village of Lake
Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 122 (2004); In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 
at 303.
	Thus, we must initially determine whether defendant's substantive
due process challenge involves a "fundamental" right. We agree with
the State that defendant's "fundamental right" argument here is really
an argument that Internet dissemination would damage his reputation.
Defendant asserts that the main effect of Internet dissemination is his
invasion of privacy and the resulting shame he may have to endure. It
is well settled, however, that damage to an individual's reputation
does not constitute a deprivation of the fundamental right to life,
liberty or property. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 414, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160-61 (1976); Grochocki, 343 Ill. App.
3d at 673. We agree with the State that "the 'right' to be free from the
shame, stigma and embarrassment resulting from a conviction for
sexually abusing a child is not the kind of 'fundamental right'
contemplated" by our constitution. Accordingly, because no
fundamental right is implicated by the Internet provisions of the
Notification Act, strict scrutiny analysis does not apply.
	Using the rational basis test, we conclude that the Internet
provisions of section 115(b) of the Notification Law bear a rational
relationship to the purpose the legislature intended to achieve in
enacting that statute. As we explained above, the primary purpose of
the Registration Act and Notification Law is to assist law enforcement
and to protect the public from sex offenders. We hold that the
amendment to the Notification Law allowing for Internet
dissemination of sex offender data-public information which is already
available by other means-bears a rational relationship to these goals.
As we held above, the Internet dissemination provisions contained in
section 115(b) of the Notification Law do not violate defendant's right
to privacy. Accordingly, we find nothing unreasonable in the methods
of serving the intended purposes of the statutes by providing
electronic access to the relevant information. As we explained above,
the Internet provides merely another method of allowing public and
law enforcement access to information that was already public. We
conclude that there is a rational relationship between the disclosure of
sex offender registration information via the Internet and the goals of
protecting the general public and assisting law enforcement. See
Grochocki, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 673.
	As stated, it is the burden of the party challenging the validity of
a statute to clearly rebut the presumption of constitutionality. Burger,
198 Ill. 2d  at 31. We hold that defendant has failed to clearly establish
that section 115(b) of the Notification Law violates substantive due
process under the Illinois Constitution.

III. Equal Protection
	Defendant next challenges section 115(b) of the Notification Law
on the basis that it violates equal protection. Once again defendant
states, as he did in support of his substantive due process challenge,
that "the wholesale dissemination of his photograph, physical
characteristics and current address on the Internet is a violation of his
right to privacy." Apart from also stating that strict scrutiny applies
and concluding, without discussion, that dissemination of defendant's
sex offender registry information does not satisfy this test, defendant
offers no other legal analysis in support of this constitutional claim.
	In Malchow, the defendant presented an equal protection
challenge that was similarly lacking in substance. We observed that
"[d]efendant's 'argument' amounts to little more than a suggestion"
and that "[g]laringly absent is any reasoned or developed argument."
Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 427. We held that defendant had "utterly
failed" to satisfy his burden of showing that the challenged statutes
were unconstitutional. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 427.  
	The position we took in Malchow with respect to the defendant's
equal protection argument there is equally applicable to the matter
before us. Because defendant has "utterly failed" to present any
reasoned or developed argument with respect to his equal protection
challenge, we conclude that he has also failed to satisfy his burden of
clearly showing that the Internet dissemination provisions of the
Notification Law violate equal protection.

IV. Ex Post Facto
	Defendant next contends that the Internet dissemination provision
contained in section 115(b) of the Notification Law violates the ex
post facto clauses of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art.
I, §§9, 10) and the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6).
Although defendant acknowledges that this court in Malchow held
that the Registration Act and the Notification Law did not violate the
ex post facto clauses, defendant notes that Malchow upheld the earlier
version of the Notification Law, which provided for limited
dissemination of the names of offenders listed in the State Police sex
offender database. According to defendant, the Internet dissemination
provisions contained in section 115(b) of the Notification Act allow
"worldwide dissemination" of his sex offender registry information,
and renders the statute punitive. We disagree.
	Retroactive application of a law that inflicts greater punishment
than did the law that was in effect when the crime was committed is
forbidden by the ex post facto clauses of the United States
Constitution. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-41, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63, 71-72, 117 S. Ct. 891, 895-96 (1997). The ex post facto
provisions restrain a legislative body from enacting arbitrary or
vindictive legislation, and assures that statutes provide fair warning of
their effect. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 418. A law is considered ex post
facto if it is both retroactive and disadvantageous to the defendant.
Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 230 (1997). A defendant is
disadvantaged by a law if that law criminalizes an act that was
innocent when performed, increases the punishment for a previously
committed offense, or alters the rules of evidence by making a
conviction easier. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 418. Our court "has long
interpreted our own [ex post facto] provision in step with Supreme
Court pronouncements." Barger v. Peters, 163 Ill. 2d 357, 360
(1994). Accordingly, the Illinois ex post facto clause does not provide
any greater protection than that offered by the United States
Constitution.
	Defendant's argument that the Internet dissemination provisions
of the Notification Act constitute retroactive punishment forbidden by
the ex post facto clauses is foreclosed by the recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003). In Smith, the Court held that
Alaska's sex offender registration act was nonpunitive and its
retroactive application did not violate the ex post facto clause. We
note that in the circuit court defendant relied upon the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' ruling in Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
However, this ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court in Smith. In
his brief to this court, defendant neither makes citation to, nor
discusses, the Smith decision.
	As stated, in Smith, the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether Alaska's sex offender registration act violated the ex post
facto clause. The registration and notification provisions of the Alaska
act are similar to those of Illinois' Registration Act and Notification
Law, including that the information furnished by the offender is
maintained by the Alaska Department of Public Safety in a central
registry of sex offenders, and the Department makes that information
available to the public on the Internet. Smith, 538 U.S.  at 90-91, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 175-76, 123 S. Ct.  at 1146.
	The Court began its analysis by stating that the focus of the
inquiry is upon whether the legislature, in passing the statute, meant
the statute to establish civil proceedings. If the intent was to enact a
statutory scheme that is nonpunitive and civil, the inquiry becomes
whether that scheme is so punitive either in effect or purpose so as to
negate the legislature's intent to deem it civil. Smith, 538 U.S.  at 92,
155 L. Ed. 2d  at 176, 123 S. Ct.  at 1147. Because deference is
afforded to the stated intent of the legislature, only the clearest proof
is sufficient to transform what has been characterized as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty. Smith, 538 U.S.  at 103, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 184,
123 S. Ct . at 1153.
	The Court first determined that the intent of the Alaska
legislature was to create a civil, nonpunitive scheme when it enacted
the challenged statute. The Court then assessed the effects of the
statute, employing relevant factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661, 83 S. Ct. 554,
567-68 (1963), as an analytical framework.
	The Supreme Court initially assessed whether the challenged
regulatory scheme has been regarded in our history and tradition as
punishment. The Court rejected the arguments advanced by the
defendants that the statute-most particularly the Internet notification
provisions-resembled shaming punishments of the colonial period.
The Court explained, in a passage quoted earlier in this opinion as a
basis for our rejection of defendant's privacy argument, that, in
contrast to traditional "shaming" punishments which subjected
individuals to public ridicule, an offender's stigma under the
challenged statute results from dissemination of truthful information
about his criminal record, most of which is already open to the public.
Smith, 538 U.S.  at 98, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 180-81, 123 S. Ct.  at 1150.
	Second, the Court held that the statutory scheme did not subject
the offenders to an affirmative disability or restraint, as offenders
remained free to change jobs or residences. Smith, 538 U.S.  at 100,
155 L. Ed. 2d  at 181, 123 S. Ct.  at 1151. Third, the Court determined
that the statute did not promote the traditional aims of punishment.
Smith, 538 U.S.  at 102, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 183, 123 S. Ct.  at 1152. In
addition, the Court held that the statute had a rational connection to
a legitimate nonpunitive purpose, public safety, which is advanced by
alerting the public to the presence of sex offenders in their community.
Smith, 538 U.S.  at 102-03, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 183, 123 S. Ct.  at 1152.
Finally, the Court held that the regulatory scheme was not excessive
with respect to its purpose: "[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not
preclude a state from making reasonable categorical judgments that
conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory
consequences." Smith, 538 U.S.  at 103, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 184, 123 S. Ct.  at 1153.
	Informed by the analysis of the Supreme Court in Smith, we
similarly conclude that defendant has failed to meet his burden to
clearly show that section 115(b) of the Notification Law violates the
ex post facto provisions of the United States or Illinois constitutions.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
reversed. This cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
 
1.                   
           
              
          
         
 
We note that defendant did not provide the court below with any facts or data to support his assertion that his sex 
offender registry information will be accessed by more people on the Internet, or that it would be more readily or widely accessed compared 
to the other, more traditional methods for accessing this information which is already provided for under the Notification Law.