Title: Arrington v. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 941247
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANGELA DENISE ARRINGTON, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC. 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
                                   June 9, 1995 
v.  Record No. 941247 
 
PEOPLES SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in sustaining pleas of the statute of limitations. 
 
In two actions filed on February 15, 1994, Angela Denise 
Arrington (Angela), administrator of the Estate of Charles E. 
Arrington, deceased (Charles), sued Peoples Security Life 
Insurance Company (Peoples Security), alleging breach of contract 
and seeking recovery of the proceeds under two insurance policies 
issued on Charles' life.  Peoples Security filed pleas of the 
statute of limitations, and, after conducting an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court sustained the pleas and entered 
judgments in favor of Peoples Security.  Angela appeals. 
 
The facts relating to the pleas are undisputed.  On March 
13, 1988, Charles was shot and stabbed to death.  At the time of 
his death, he was insured by a policy of life insurance in the 
amount of $50,000 (Policy No. U00095393) and by another policy in 
the amount of $25,000 (Policy No. 0302649180).  Both polices had 
been issued by Peoples Security.  The named beneficiary under 
both policies was Delores R. Arrington (Delores), Charles' wife. 
 Each policy provided that payment of the policy proceeds to the 
named beneficiary would be made upon Peoples Security's receipt 
 
 
 
 
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of proof of the insured's death. 
 
On March 21, 1988, Delores completed a "Claimant's Statement 
For Death Claims" and forwarded it and a copy of Charles' death 
certificate to Peoples Security.  By letter dated March 30, 1988, 
Peoples Security wrote to Delores and acknowledged that it had 
received the claims.  However, Peoples Security subsequently 
refused to pay the insurance proceeds to Delores because she was 
a suspect in Charles' murder.   
 
On December 28, 1989, Delores filed an action in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond to recover the proceeds under the 
$50,000 policy, and, on November 1, 1990, she filed another 
action in said circuit court to recover the proceeds under the 
$25,000 policy.  Delores was awarded a judgment in the amount of 
$50,000 in the first action; however, we reversed that judgment 
and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Peoples Security 
Life Ins. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 412 S.E.2d 705 (1992).
1  
Thereafter, Delores requested and, by orders entered February 4, 
1992, was granted a nonsuit in each action. 
 
On November 19, 1993, Angela qualified as administrator 
d.b.n. of Charles' estate.
2  By letter dated January 12, 1994, 
                     
     
1In that action, the trial court had ruled that Delores was 
not precluded from recovering the insurance proceeds because she 
was not covered by the definition of "slayer" contained in Code § 
 55-401(1).  In reversing the judgment, we ruled that Code § 55-
401(1) did not preclude Peoples Security from attempting to prove 
that Delores "procured, participated in or otherwise directed" 
Charles' death, in violation of the common law.  Arrington, 243 
Va. at 92, 412 S.E.2d at 707. 
     
2The record shows that Delores previously had qualified as 
 
 
 
 
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Angela demanded that the insurance proceeds be paid to the 
estate.  Peoples Security refused payment, and Angela filed the 
present actions. 
 
In sustaining the pleas of the statute of limitations, the 
trial court adopted Peoples Security's contention and ruled that 
the limitation period was five years from the time the causes of 
action accrued, Code § 8.01-246(2), that the causes of action for 
breach of contract accrued on the date of the breach, and that 
the accrual date was March 13, 1988, the date of Charles' death. 
 At trial, Angela agreed that the applicable limitation period 
was five years and that the causes of action accrued when the 
breach of contract occurred.  Angela, however, did not agree that 
the causes of action accrued on the date of Charles' death.  She 
advanced several arguments below, as she does on appeal, 
regarding when the causes of action accrued. 
 
Angela contends that, with respect to Charles' estate, the 
contract was not breached until Peoples Security refused the 
estate's demand for payment, made by the estate's letter dated 
January 12, 1994.  Alternatively, Angela contends that it was not 
reasonable for the estate to demand payment until "it became 
clear that there was no other beneficiary under the policy, i.e., 
on March 13, 1993, after Peoples Security had refused payment to 
Delores . . . and the statute of limitations precluded her from 
(..continued) 
administrator of Charles' estate.  However, she resigned as 
administrator, and Angela succeeded to the office. 
 
 
 
 
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pursuing her claim any further."  In other words, according to 
Angela, the statute of limitations did not begin to run against 
the estate until the limitation period had expired as to Delores. 
 Finally, Angela contends that the statute of limitations was 
tolled from the time of the entry of the trial court's judgment 
in favor of Delores until this Court's reversal of that judgment, 
a period of 14 months.
3
 
Statutes of limitations are strictly enforced and exceptions 
thereto are narrowly construed.  Consequently, a statute should 
be applied unless the General Assembly clearly creates an 
exception, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the 
enforcement of the statute.  Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps 
Unlimited, 237 Va. 543, 547, 379 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1989); Burns v. 
Stafford County, 227 Va. 354, 359, 315 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1984). 
 
Code § 8.01-246(2) provides that an action for breach of a 
written contract must be filed within five years after the cause 
of action accrues.  Code § 8.01-230 provides that a cause of 
action for breach of contract accrues and the limitation period 
commences to run from the date of the alleged breach.  With 
respect to life insurance policies, we have said that, when a 
policy requires a demand for payment and proof of death, the 
statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the demand 
                     
     
3In oral argument before this Court, Angela contended that 
Peoples Security never has refused to make payment, and, 
therefore, the statute of limitations has not begun to run.  This 
argument was not advanced at trial.  Consequently, we will not 
consider it on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
 
 
 
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and proof.  Page v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 185 Va. 919, 925-
27, 40 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (1947). 
 
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the present 
case, we must reject Angela's contentions.  We do not agree that 
the causes of action accrued at one time for Delores and at a 
different time for the estate; nor do we agree that the running 
of the statute may be tolled, or an exception applied, in the 
absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect. 
 
In the present case, the life insurance policies provide 
when a cause of action accrues.  The express language of the 
policies requires Peoples Security to pay the proceeds when 
Peoples Security "receive[s] proof of [the] Insured's death."  
The record establishes that Peoples Security acknowledged, in its 
letter to Delores dated March 30, 1988, that it had received 
proof of Charles' death.  Therefore, at that time, at the very 
latest, the five-year statute of limitations began to run.  
Consequently, Angela's actions filed on February 15, 1994, are 
time barred. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 
 
Affirmed.