Title: Ex Parte Lee
Citation: 506 So. 2d 301
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 1987

506 So. 2d 301 (1987)
Ex parte John Michael LEE.
(Re: John Michael Lee v. State).
85-543.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 30, 1987.
M. Ashley McKathan of Powell, Powell &amp; McKathan, Andalusia, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
The petitioner, John Michael Lee, was indicted in October 1984 by the Grand Jury of Covington County on the charge of robbery in the first degree. See § 13A-8-41, Code of 1975. After a jury trial, Lee was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Subsequently, a hearing was held to determine whether Lee should be involuntarily committed to the Alabama Department of Mental Health. After this hearing, the trial court issued an order which, in pertinent part, read as follows:
After his post-trial motions were denied, Lee appealed from that judgment to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. That court affirmed the trial court's judgment without issuing an opinion, 486 So. 2d 523 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). Counsel for Lee applied for rehearing and duly included as part of the application a request for a statement of additional facts pursuant to Rule 39(k), A.R.A.P. Rehearing and the Rule 39(k) request were denied. We granted certiorari to review the correctness of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We reverse and remand.
The underlying facts of this case are rather curious. The victim, Boggie Pickron, testified as follows: Lee and two other individuals, Jimmy Drinkwater (Lee's half-brother) and Fred Suttles, drove up to Pickron's trailer home in Florala, Alabama, on the night of March 10, 1984. Pickron, who had been drinking wine, invited the three into his home even though he did not know them. Once inside, the three began to smoke marijuana while Pickron continued to drink wine. Then, one of the trio, a "tall red-headed boy" (Suttles), asked Pickron if he wanted to gamble. After first refusing, Pickron decided to "cut high card" with Suttles for two dollars. Having decided to gamble, Pickron took a sum of money out of his pocket. Before they could cut the cards, however, Suttles pulled out a pistol and pointed it at Pickron. Suttles then took the money and, along with Lee and Drinkwater, left the trailer and drove away. The amount of money taken totaled $160.
Jimmy Drinkwater testified similarly. He admitted that he, Lee, and Suttles had been to Pickron's trailer on March 10, 1984. He also admitted that he had participated in the robbery of Pickron. However, he stated his belief that Lee had not participated in the crime. He said that he did not remember seeing Lee take any money from Pickron, and that although he did not see who it was that actually took the money, and even though the pistol Suttles used belonged to Lee, he believed that only he and Suttles had actually participated in the robbery.
Curiously, Lee's recollection of the extent to which he participated in the robbery differed from the account set out above. In a statement which was read into evidence, and which had been written by Lee's own hand, Lee related the following:
During cross-examination of the police officer who had read Lee's statement into evidence, Lee's counsel attempted to elicit the officer's opinion as to Lee's mental state at the time he gave the statement. The trial court sustained an objection by the State and refused to allow the testimony. Lee's counsel argues that this ruling unnecessarily limited his right to cross-examination and constitutes reversible error. We agree.
In Alabama, a lay witness may give his opinion on the question of a defendant's sanity or insanity as long as the proper predicate has been laid. Williams v. State, 291 Ala. 213, 279 So. 2d 478 (1973); Lokos v. State, 434 So. 2d 818 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), affirmed, 434 So. 2d 831 (Ala.1983); Carroll v. State, 370 So. 2d 749 (Ala.Crim. App.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1979). To lay a proper predicate for the admission of such an opinion, a witness must first have testified: (1) to facts showing that he had an adequate opportunity to observe such defendant's conduct in general, and (2) to his personal observation of specific irrational conduct of the defendant. See Williams v. State, supra; Lokos v. State, supra; Carroll v. State, supra. See also C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 128.02 (3d ed. 1977). Of course, in making the determination as to whether the witness has had an adequate opportunity to observe such defendant's conduct so as to render his opinion admissible, much is left to the sound legal discretion of the trial court. Williams v. State, supra.
In the present case, the following transpired during the cross-examination in issue:
Later, during redirect examination of this witness, the trial judge explained:
The testimony set out above clearly shows that Lee's counsel had laid a proper predicate for the admission of the officer's opinion as to whether Lee was insane. Failure to allow this opinion to be given constituted an abuse of discretion and reversible error. Hunter v. State, 335 So. 2d 194 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 335 So. 2d 203 (Ala.1976). See Williams, supra; Lokos, supra; Carroll, supra. The prejudice to the defendant in this case is obvious even though the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Lee's state of mind at the time he gave the confession would have a direct bearing upon the jury's consideration of the trustworthiness of the statement. If the jury had believed that Lee was insane at the time he gave the statement, it could have rejected his statement as untrustworthy and accepted that version of the facts regarding Lee's participation in the crime which was offered by everyone except Lee, i.e., that he did not participate in the crime. Once the jury had found that Lee had not participated in the crime, it could not have returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. A person must necessarily have committed a criminal act in order to be found not guilty by reason of insanity. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983).
The failure of the trial court to allow the officer to give his opinion as to Lee's insanity at the time Lee made his statement constitutes reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court with directions to order a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All the Justices concur.