Title: State ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Honorable Mullen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99942
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2023

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE EX REL. MONSANTO COMPANY, ) 
Opinion issued August 15, 2023 
 
) 
 
Relator, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No.  SC99942 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MULLEN, 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent. 
) 
  
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
 
The plaintiffs in the separate underlying cases filed claims in the city of St. Louis 
circuit court against the Monsanto Company seeking monetary damages due to injuries 
Monsanto allegedly caused.  In response, Monsanto sought to transfer venue over 
plaintiffs’ claims to St. Louis County.  Following the circuit court’s refusal to transfer 
venue to St. Louis County, Monsanto petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition or 
mandamus, and this Court issued a preliminary writ.  Because Missouri law requires the 
circuit court to transfer venue of five of the six plaintiffs’ claims, the preliminary writ is 
made permanent as to the claims made by those plaintiffs. 
 
 
2 
 
Background 
 
The six individual plaintiffs in the instant matter allege they were injured as a result 
of exposure to Roundup, a herbicide manufactured by Monsanto.  Their claims were 
originally filed as part of five separate cases dating from 2017 to 2021.  Although none of 
the six plaintiffs allege they were first injured in Missouri, the petitions filed in the five 
cases were each filed in the city of St. Louis circuit court.  Plaintiff Martin Griswold filed 
his claims as part of an 82-plaintiff petition in Denise Albanese, et al. v. Monsanto Co., 
No. 1922-CC11226.  Plaintiff Angela Sadowski filed her claims as part of a 79-plaintiff 
petition in Sharon Baldwin, et al. v. Monsanto Co., No. 1922-CC11237.  Plaintiffs Stephen 
Powers and Derrick Sisk filed their claims as part of an 89-plaintiff petition in James 
Martin III, et al. v. Monsanto Co., No. 1722-CC10879.  Plaintiff Linda Eugster filed her 
claims in a single-plaintiff petition in Linda Eugster v. Monsanto Co., No. 2122-CC09039.  
Finally, plaintiff Corey Swanson filed his claims in a single-plaintiff petition in Corey 
Swanson v. Monsanto Co., No. 2122-CC09140. 
 
It is uncontested Monsanto filed a motion to transfer venue as to five of the plaintiffs 
in the instant case – plaintiffs Griswold, Sadowski, Powers, Sisk, and Eugster.   In each 
motion, Monsanto sought to transfer venue to St. Louis County, the location of its 
registered agent as of the date each respective suit was filed, pursuant to section 508.010.5.1  
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise indicated.  Although sections 
507.040 and 508.010 were amended in 2019, the amendments do not affect the issues 
presented in this case except as discussed below. 
3 
 
Monsanto, however, did not file a motion to transfer venue in plaintiff Swanson’s 
individual case despite being served with the petition on November 17, 2021.   
All six plaintiffs moved to consolidate their individual claims and schedule their 
separate claims for one trial.  The circuit court entered an order on December 17, 2021, 
sustaining plaintiffs’ motion and consolidating the six plaintiffs’ claims.  After 
consolidation, the pretrial motions addressing the six plaintiffs’ claims were primarily filed 
and litigated in the Albanese case.  On May 5, 2022, Monsanto filed a motion to reconsider 
the circuit court’s order consolidating the six individual claims.  In its motion, Monsanto 
reiterated its argument that venue is appropriate only in St. Louis County.  The six plaintiffs 
responded that, pursuant to section 508.010.9, venue should remain in the city of St. Louis, 
as that was where Monsanto’s registered agent was located when each plaintiff was first 
injured by a Roundup product. 
On June 8, 2022, the circuit court entered an order overruling Monsanto’s motion 
to reconsider and eventually set the case for trial to begin January 23, 2023.  Monsanto 
then filed a petition in this Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the 
circuit court’s order.2  This Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Prior to petitioning this Court for relief, Monsanto sought a writ of prohibition or 
mandamus in the court of appeals to compel transfer of venue.  The court of appeals 
summarily denied Monsanto’s petition.  Monsanto, it should be noted, did not seek a writ 
from the court of appeals until January 13, 2023, and did not seek a writ from this Court 
until January 18, 2023, seven months after the circuit court overruled its motion to 
reconsider and only days before trial was set to begin.  Such late filing of a writ petition on 
the eve of trial may be grounds for this Court in future cases to exercise its discretionary 
authority not to issue the writ, as suggested by the separate opinion of J. Draper. 
4 
 
Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs pursuant to article V, 
section 4.1 of the Missouri Constitution.  “The writ of prohibition, an extraordinary 
remedy, is to be used with great caution and forbearance and only in cases of extreme 
necessity.”  State ex rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal 
quotation omitted).   
A writ of prohibition is appropriate: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial 
power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an 
excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court 
lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable 
harm if relief is not granted. 
 
Id. (internal quotation omitted).  This Court has recognized an extraordinary writ is 
appropriate to correct a circuit court’s erroneous venue ruling.  State ex rel. Heartland Title 
Servs., Inc. v. Harrell, 500 S.W.3d 239, 241 (Mo banc 2016). 
Analysis 
Venue Pursuant to Section 508.010.5 
The issue before the Court is the proper venue for the plaintiffs’ claims—whether 
venue is determined based on a defendant corporation’s registered agent’s location at the 
time suit is filed or based on the agent’s location on the date of a plaintiff’s first alleged 
injury.  “Venue in Missouri is determined solely by statute.”  State ex rel. Linthicum v. 
Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857 (Mo. banc 2001) (internal quotation omitted).  “In determining 
a statute’s meaning, this Court’s primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the 
legislature’s intent, as evidenced by the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.”  
5 
 
Charter Commc’ns Ent. I, LLC v. Dir. of Revenue, 667 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Mo. banc 2023) 
(citing Beyond Housing, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 653 S.W.3d 400, 406 (Mo. banc 2022)).   
All parties agree section 508.010 is the applicable statute governing venue for the 
plaintiffs’ claims.  Section 508.010.5 establishes venue determinations in all actions 
alleging a tort in which the plaintiff was first injured outside the state of Missouri: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions in which there is 
any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was first injured outside 
the state of Missouri, venue shall be determined as follows: 
(1) If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in any county 
where a defendant corporation’s registered agent is located or, if the 
plaintiff’s principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the 
date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the county of the 
plaintiff’s principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first 
injured[.] 
 
Section 508.010.5 (emphasis added). 
 
When applicable, section 508.010.5(1) establishes venue “in any county where a 
defendant corporation’s registered agent is located[.]”  The statute uses the present tense 
to describe the relevant location of the defendant corporation’s registered agent, placing 
venue where the registered agent “is located,” not where the registered agent was located 
on “the date the plaintiff was first injured.”  See section 508.010.5(1) (emphasis added).  
“[T]he date the plaintiff was first injured” is relevant by the terms of section 508.010.5(1) 
to venue determinations only when the plaintiff’s first injury occurs outside the state of 
Missouri and the plaintiff’s principal place of residence was in Missouri on that date.  The 
past location of a registered agent, moreover, is irrelevant to the agent’s primary purpose 
to “accept, on behalf of its client, service of process and other notices” at the time a case is 
initiated.  Sieg v. Int’l Env’t Mgmt., Inc., 375 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Mo. App. 2012) (citing 
6 
 
State ex rel. McDonald’s Corp. v. Midkiff, 226 S.W.3d 119, 125 (Mo. banc 2007)); see also 
section 351.380.1 (“The registered agent so appointed by a corporation shall be an agent 
of such corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by 
law to be served upon a corporation may be served.”).  By establishing venue in “any 
county where a defendant corporation’s registered agent is located[,]” section 508.010.5(1) 
clearly provides venue based on the location of the defendant corporation’s registered agent 
at the time the case is filed.3 
This common-sense interpretation of section 508.010.5(1) is further confirmed by 
the statute’s use of past tense, rather than the present tense, in other provisions in the same 
subdivision assessing venue based on the plaintiff’s principal place of residence.  Section 
508.010.5(1) utilizes past tense in providing “if the plaintiff’s principal place of residence 
was in the state of Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be 
in the county of the plaintiff’s principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first 
injured[.]” (Emphasis added).  By contrast, section 508.010.5(1) also provides, “If the 
                                                 
3 Present tense language within venue statutes is commonly understood in Missouri and 
other jurisdictions as referring to the date of filing.  See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 
538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003) (“[T]he plain text of [the relevant] provision, because it is 
expressed in the present tense, requires that instrumentality status be determined at the time 
suit is filed.”); Quinney v. Pittman, 895 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Ark. 1995) (holding a statute 
using present tense verb permitted the plaintiff to file suit in the county of his residence “at 
the time of the filing of the complaint”); Personal Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 
3d 922, 924 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (holding, because the applicable venue statute used present 
tense language, “venue facts are to be examined as of the date the suit is filed”); DesJardin 
v. Lynn, 149 N.W.2d 228, 230-31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (holding, because the venue 
statute used present tense verbs, venue was determined by the defendant’s establishment 
at the time of the suit). 
 
7 
 
defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in any county where a defendant’s registered 
agent is located[.]”  (Emphasis added).  The legislature’s use of contrasting verb tenses, 
particularly within the same subdivision of a statute, is a significant indicator in statutory 
construction and confirms the plain language of section 508.010.5(1), providing for venue 
in any county where the defendant corporation’s registered agent is located, was not 
accidental.  C.f., e.g., Quinney, 895 S.W.2d at 541 (holding the Arkansas legislature’s use 
of both present and past tenses in different subsections of a venue statute was “obviously 
intentional” and the subsection using present tense verbs permitted “plaintiff to file suit for 
fraud in the county of his residence at the time of the filing of the complaint”); United 
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“By using these verbs in the past and present 
perfect tenses, Congress has indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the 
defendant begins his sentence.”). 
The plaintiffs contend section 508.010.5 should be read in conjunction with section 
508.010.9.  Section 508.010.9 provides, “In all actions, venue shall be determined as of the 
date the plaintiff was first injured.”  Throughout section 508.010, language similar to 
subsection 9 is repeated in various provisions assessing venue based on the plaintiff’s 
principal place of residence.  See section 508.010.5(1)‐(3).  Section 508.010.9 evidences 
the legislature’s intent to clarify that, when venue is based on the plaintiff’s principal place 
of residence, it “shall be determined as of the date the plaintiff was first injured.”  As noted, 
however, the legislature left out this language in the phrasing related to the defendant 
corporation’s registered agent in section 508.010.5(1).  This signifies the legislature’s 
intent to not apply “the date the plaintiff was first injured” to the phrase “in any county 
8 
 
where a defendant corporation’s registered agent is located.”  C.f. State v. Moore, 303 
S.W.3d 515, 520-21 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Armco Steel v. City of Kan. City, Mo., 883 
S.W.2d 3, 7 (Mo.  banc 1994) (“The legislature’s use of different terms in different 
subsections of the same statute is presumed to be intentional and for a particular 
purpose.”)).  More importantly, section 508.010.5(1) applies “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law[.]”  Section 508.010.5.  Because section 508.010.5 is plain, clear and 
applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” section 508.010.9 does not apply 
as plaintiffs contend.  See Kidde Am., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 242 S.W.3d 709, 711-12 
(Mo. banc 2008) (holding the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the law to 
the contrary … overrides all provisions that would otherwise be applicable”) (alteration in 
original).   
As each plaintiff in this tort action alleges residence and first injury outside the state 
of Missouri and because Monsanto is a defendant corporation, venue lies only “in any 
county 
where 
a 
defendant 
corporation’s 
registered 
agent 
is 
located[.]”   
Section 508.010.5(1) (emphasis added).  There is no dispute as to the location of 
Monsanto’s registered agent as of the date each plaintiff’s petitions was filed – St. Louis 
County.  Because the plain language of section 508.010.5(1) mandates venue shall be 
where Monsanto’s registered agent is located as of filing ‒ St. Louis County ‒ the circuit 
court exceeded its authority by refusing to transfer venue to St. Louis County as Monsanto 
requested as to plaintiffs Griswold, Sadowski, Powers, Sisk, and Eugster.  Writ relief is 
warranted.  Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d at 355 (“A writ of prohibition is appropriate … to remedy 
an excess of authority[.]”).   
9 
 
Venue as to Plaintiff Swanson 
Because Monsanto did not file a timely motion to transfer venue as to plaintiff 
Swanson, however, Swanson’s claims shall remain in the city of St. Louis.  Rule 51.045(a) 
provides that a party seeking transfer of venue shall file a motion alleging improper venue 
within 60 days of service.  In this case, Swanson served Monsanto on November 17, 2021, 
with his individual petition for damages.  Monsanto’s motion to challenge venue in 
Swanson’s case was due January 16, 2022.  As Monsanto admits, it did not file a motion 
to transfer venue as to Swanson by January 16, 2022, as required by Rule 51.045(a). 
Monsanto, nonetheless, argues it did not waive its improper venue objection.  
Monsanto contends its prior motion to transfer venue filed in Albanese became operative 
as a timely motion to transfer venue as to Swanson upon the circuit court consolidating 
Swanson’s case with the Albanese case.   
Monsanto’s arguments are unavailing.  Monsanto filed a motion to sever and 
transfer venue in Albanese on December 26, 2019.  Two years later, on December 17, 2021, 
the circuit court consolidated Swanson’s claims with the other five plaintiffs’ claims into 
the Albanese case.  The motion to sever and change of venue filed in Albanese before the 
consolidation of Swanson’s claims with the other plaintiffs’ claims cannot serve as a 
motion to transfer venue as to Swanson.  There is simply no legal basis, caselaw or 
otherwise, to support Monsanto’s position that a prior motion to transfer venue that does 
not mention or relate to Swanson somehow constitutes a motion to transfer venue as to 
Swanson.  Monsanto must raise claims of improper venue as to Swanson’s claims to be 
10 
 
entitled to a change of venue for those claims, but Monsanto failed to timely request 
transfer of Swanson’s claims to the proper venue.  Rule 51.045(a). 
The motion for reconsideration Monsanto filed May 5, 2022, raising its objection to 
venue after the six plaintiffs’ claims were consolidated also cannot constitute a timely 
motion to transfer venue as to Swanson because the motion for reconsideration was filed 
more than 60 days after Swanson served Monsanto with his petition on November 17, 
2021.  The motion for reconsideration was untimely under Rule 51.045(a) as to Swanson.  
Monsanto, therefore, waived its claim of improper venue as to Swanson’s claims. 
Conclusion 
 
Because the circuit court exceeded its authority by refusing to transfer venue to  
St. Louis County as requested by Monsanto as to plaintiffs Griswold, Sadowski, Powers, 
Sisk, and Eugster, writ relief is warranted. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d at 355 (“A writ of 
prohibition is appropriate … to remedy an excess of authority[.]”).  The preliminary writ 
is made permanent as to the claims made by these plaintiffs, and the circuit court is 
prohibited from taking any further action regarding these plaintiffs other than transferring 
their claims to St. Louis County.4   
 
 
                                                 
4 Monsanto also argues it is entitled to writ relief because section 507.040 as amended in 
2019 prohibits joinder of plaintiffs’ claims and, with respect to the claims of Powers and 
Sisk, the circuit court did not rule on Monsanto’s motion to transfer venue within 90 days.  
Because the plain language of section 508.010.5 resolves this matter, it is not necessary for 
this Court to consider these separate arguments.   
11 
 
The circuit court, however, may proceed to preside over Swanson’s claims in the city of 
St. Louis as Monsanto waived its claim of improper venue as to plaintiff Swanson. 
 
 
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge, Fischer, Ransom  
and Wilson, JJ., concur; Draper, J., dissents in part  
and concurs in part in separate opinion filed. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE EX REL. MONSANTO COMPANY, 
) 
 
) 
 
Relator, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No.  SC99942 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MULLEN, 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent. 
) 
 
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
 
 
I believe venue should remain in the City of St. Louis for all of the underlying 
cases.  Further, I would not exercise this Court’s discretionary writ authority due to 
Monsanto Company’s untimely motion made on the cusp of trial.  Accordingly, I dissent 
from the principal opinion making the preliminary writ permanent as to plaintiffs Martin 
Griswold, Angela Sadowski, Steven Powers, Derrick Sisk, and Linda Eugster.  I concur 
in the principal opinion’s result with respect to Corey Swanson’s claims.  
 
____________________________ 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge