Title: Dorman v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 46, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
OMAR D. DORMAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 46, 2000 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. 97-01-1752; 1753; 
§                  1758  
§                  97-01-0720; 0723;     §   
               0726                   
 
Submitted: January 11, 2001 
  Decided:   March 6, 2001 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 6th day of March 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Omar D. Dorman, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s finding of a violation of probation (“VOP”).  We find no 
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
(2) 
In this appeal, Dorman claims that: 1) he was not brought before 
the Superior Court without unreasonable delay1; 2) he was denied the minimum 
                                                          
 
1Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32.1(a). 
 
 
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requirements of due process at his VOP hearing;2 3)  he was subjected to double 
jeopardy; and 4) his sentence for the VOP was illegal.  
(3) 
On February 26, 1999, while serving the Level IV portion of 
sentences on convictions for burglary and felony theft, Dorman failed to return 
to the Sussex Work Release Center after being given a one-hour pass to go to the 
bank.  On November 23,1999, Dorman was apprehended and arrested on several 
charges, including escape after conviction.  Following a bail hearing in Justice of 
the Peace Court, Dorman was committed to the Sussex Correctional Institution 
(“SCI”) in default of secured bail.   
                                                          
 
2Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32.1(a) (A)-(E). 
 
 
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(4) 
On December 3, 1999, the Superior Court conducted a second bail 
hearing by video and ordered that Dorman continue to be held at SCI without 
bail pending a fast track VOP hearing on December 21, 1999.  The record 
reflects that Dorman was sent a copy of the Superior Court’s December 3, 1999 
commitment order, which noted that a VOP hearing had been scheduled for 
December 21, 1999 at 9:00 a.m.3  At the VOP hearing, Dorman was sentenced to 
90 days incarceration at Level V on his first burglary conviction,4 with his 
sentences on his two theft convictions re-imposed to run consecutive to that 
sentence as probationary sentences.5 The sentences for Dorman’s three additional 
burglary convictions were discharged as unimproved.6  The Superior Court 
subsequently modified its sentencing order on July 12, 2000, by providing that 
                                                          
 
3The VOP hearing actually took place on December 28, 1999.   
4Cr. A. No. 97-01-1752. 
5Cr. A. Nos. 97-01-0720 and 0726. 
6Cr. A. Nos. 97-01-0723, 1753 and 1758. 
 
 
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Dorman’s sentences would run consecutive to other, unrelated sentences and by 
suspending the incarcerative portion after 60 days.   
(5) 
Dorman’s claim that he was not brought before Superior Court 
without unreasonable delay is without factual support.  Dorman was arrested on 
November 23, 1999 and, following two bail hearings between November 23 and 
December 3, 1999, was brought before the Superior Court for his VOP hearing 
on December 28, 1999.  Thus, as is required, Dorman was brought before a 
magistrate for the purpose of fixing bail without unreasonable delay and, when 
not released on bail, was afforded a prompt hearing before a judge of the 
Superior Court.7  
                                                          
 
7Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32.1. 
(6) 
Dorman’s claim that he was not afforded the minimum 
requirements of due process at his VOP hearing is without merit.  The record 
indicates that Dorman was given notice of the VOP hearing at his second bail 
hearing, as reflected in the Superior Court’s December 3, 1999 commitment 
order.  Moreover, there was never any question that the basis for the alleged VOP 
was Dorman’s disappearance from the Sussex Work Release Center for 
approximately 10 months.  The transcript of the VOP hearing reflects that 
 
 
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Dorman did not contest the allegations against him, but readily admitted he had 
committed a VOP.  Thus, even if Dorman did not receive the Superior Court’s 
December 3, 1999 commitment order, there was no prejudice to him.  Dorman’s 
contention that his due process rights were violated because he was not given an 
opportunity to retain his own counsel is equally unavailing.  The transcript of the 
VOP hearing reflects that a public defender was present to represent Dorman.  
There was no prejudice to Dorman even if he did not have notice that he could 
retain his own counsel since he did not object to proceeding with the hearing 
and readily admitted to the VOP.   
(7) 
Dorman’s claim that he was subjected to double jeopardy because 
the charge of escape after conviction constituted the basis for a separate Superior 
Court conviction in addition to the finding of a VOP is without merit.  There is 
an important distinction between prosecution for a criminal offense and 
revocation of probation in a previously-imposed sentence.8  When Dorman 
violated the terms of his probation, he received deferred punishment for his 
convictions on charges of burglary and felony theft, but was not prosecuted 
                                                          
 
8United States v. Clark, 984 F. 2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 
 
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directly for the violation of probation.  Double jeopardy is not implicated in 
these circumstances.9 
                                                          
 
9Id. 
 
 
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(8) 
Dorman’s final claim that the Superior Court imposed an illegal 
sentence for the VOP is also without merit.  Dorman appears to contend that the 
Superior Court illegally sentenced him for the VOP based upon a burglary charge 
that it discharged as unimproved.   This is incorrect. Dorman’s sentence for the 
VOP was based upon the first of his four burglary convictions, for which he 
received 2 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 1 year for 
probation.  Thus, there was as much as one additional year of incarceration at 
Level V available to the Superior Court judge when he imposed sentence for 
Dorman’s VOP.10    
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
   s/Joseph T. Walsh 
     Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
10Ingram v. State, Del. Supr., 567 A.2d 868, 869-70 (1989). 
 
 
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