Title: Arbolay v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2021

Arbolay v. State Annotate this Case Download PDF IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ANGEL L. ARBOLAY, § § § § § § § § § § § Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 496, 2019 Court Below—Superior Court of the State of Delaware Cr. ID No. 1810013334A (N) Submitted: July 23, 2021 Decided: September 14, 2021 Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. ORDER After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: (1) The appellant, Angel L. Arbolay, filed this appeal from his convictions for multiple crimes including possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) and drug dealing. With one exception as discussed herein, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. (2) The evidence presented at Arbolay’s bench trial reflects the following. Around 11:30 p.m. on October 23, 2018, Delaware State Police Officer Pierre Lawler, who was assigned to the Governor’s Task Force (“GTF”) team, was patrolling the area around the Dutch Inn on Route 13 in Minquedale. While in the motel parking lot, Detective Lawler heard a man screaming and yelling “mommy” from one of the rooms. Detective Lawler traced the noise to Room 54, which had an exterior window open. After contacting additional members of the GFT team for back-up (which included Arbolay’s probation officer), Detective Lawler and the additional officers approached the room. (3) Detective Lawler spoke to Arbolay through the motel room window. When Detective Lawler asked Arbolay about the screaming, Arbolay said he was having a domestic. Detective Lawler could only see part of the room through the window, and was concerned that there could be at-risk people inside the room. He asked Arbolay if he could come inside the room to make sure nobody else was there. Arbolay initially consented, but after recognizing a different police officer, he refused to open the door, tried to close the window, and began swallowing pills. (4) One of the officers deployed a Taser on Arbolay, who fell to the floor. Detective Lawler and another officer climbed through the window. They opened the door so the other officers could enter the room. The police tried to handcuff Arbolay, but he struggled and tried to conceal his hands. After Arbolay was handcuffed, he tried to consume the pills on the floor until he was moved off of the floor. In addition to the pills, two prescription pill bottles with no labels, two blenders or coffee grinders caked with powder, and a bag of suspected cocaine on the night table were in plain view. 2 (5) Probation Officer Bryan Vettori searched the room. He found a loaded handgun, male clothing, $573.00 in cash, and a rubber stamp in a dresser. In the closet, he found many blue wax paper bags, a bag of powder suspected to be heroin, and a bag of leafy material suspected to be marijuana. No drug prescriptions were found. Detective Lawler determined that the motel room was registered to a female friend of Arbolay. (6) A forensic analytical chemist testified that the leafy material found in the closet was 373.126 grams of marijuana. The bag of powder found in the closet did not contain a controlled substance. The powder on the grinders was also not a controlled substance. The bag of suspected cocaine contained .9 grams of cocaine. The pills in the motel room were Alprazolam, also known as Xanax. (7) A forensic DNA analyst testified that an evidentiary sample taken from the grip of the gun produced a single source DNA profile that matched the profile of a DNA sample taken from Arbolay. According to the analyst, the probability of an unrelated individual with the same DNA profile was one in greater than seven trillion. The analysist admitted that it was possible for someone to have transferred Arbolay’s DNA onto the gun, but believed that a secondary transfer of DNA was unlikely given the amount of DNA on the gun grip. (8) Detective Trevor Riccobon testified as an expert. Based on his review of photographs of the items found in the motel room, the lab report, and data 3 extracted from Arbolay’s phone, he opined that Arbolay possessed drugs for distribution and operated a drug laboratory in the motel room. He also testified that substances like baby powder and baking soda are often used to cut illegal drugs. (9) At the conclusion of the State’s case, Arbolay moved for a judgment of acquittal. The Superior Court reserved decision on the laboratory charge, but denied the motion as to the other charges. (10) Two of Arbolay’s friends testified that he invited them and his sister, who died before trial, to a party in the motel room the afternoon of October 23, 2018. According to one friend, there were eight to ten people in the room when they arrived. According to the other friend, there were two people in the room when they arrived. Both witnesses testified that Arbolay was not in the room when they were there, but that they saw another man with a bag of drugs and a gun that he put in the dresser. After spending fifteen or so minutes in the room, Arbolay’s friends and sister left. (11) A former girlfriend of Arbolay testified that she visited Arbolay in the motel room that evening. When she arrived, there were two other men in the room. One of the men was the same man identified by Arbolay’s other friends. The witness testified that this man, possibly nicknamed “T”, put marijuana and a gun in the dresser. 4 (12) After the men left, Arbolay and his girlfriend had sex that resulted in Arbolay’s bodily fluids on his girlfriend’s body. While Arbolay was in the shower, the girlfriend took some of the marijuana from the dresser. She moved the gun to get to the marijuana. According to the defense theory of the case, this was how Arbolay’s DNA ended up on the gun. (13) Arbolay testified that he lived in Newport. He took prescription painkillers for an old gunshot wound and Xanax for post traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. Arbolay testified that on the morning of October 23, 2018 he took a male friend to a recording studio where his friend’s brother—identified as “T” by other witnesses—was recording. There was discussion of a music video to be filmed later that day at the motel. Throughout the day, Arbolay was taking drugs, including Xanax. (14) A female friend, whose name was on the registration for the motel room, invited Arbolay to the motel room for a party before the video shoot, which was later cancelled. Arbolay came to the room, hung out with various people for a while, and left. Arbolay returned to the motel room several times throughout the day. His male friend and “T” were also in room at various points. In the evening, Arbolay invited his girlfriend to the motel room. (15) After his girlfriend left, Arbolay hung out with his friends and his friend’s brother in the motel room. At some point that night, everyone except 5 Arbolay left. While Arbolay was in the room by himself, he saw flashing lights and someone opening the window. He recognized one of the police officers. Based on his fear of that police officer, he disregarded commands to open the door and moved away from the police officers, one of whom deployed a Taser. (16) Arbolay testified that most of the items found in the motel room, including the gun, drugs, baggies, and grinders, did not belong to him. He also testified that the text messages on his phone either related to his deceased sister’s misuse of prescription drugs or did not relate to drugs at all. He denied being a drug dealer or operating a clandestine laboratory. (17) After closing arguments and a recess, the Superior Court delivered its verdict. The Superior Court highlighted several pieces of evidence, including the presence of Arbolay’s DNA on the gun, the quantity and nature of the phone calls and text messages on Arbolay’s phone, the quantity of marijuana found, and the existence of the grinders, a cutting agent, and a large quantity of baggies often used for packaging heroin in the motel room. The Superior Court found Arbolay guilty of PFDCF, drug dealing (marijuana), aggravated possession (marijuana), operating or attempting to operate a clandestine laboratory, tampering with physical evidence, illegal possession of a controlled substance (Alprazolam), resisting arrest, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 6 (18) On November 13, 2019, the State filed a petition to declare Arbolay an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) for purposes of sentencing on the PFDCF conviction. On November 15, 2019, the Superior Court granted the State’s amended petition to declare Arbolay an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(c) for purposes of sentencing on the PFDCF conviction. The Superior Court sentenced Arbolay to forty years of Level V incarceration, suspended after twenty-five years for decreasing levels of supervision. This appeal followed. (19) On appeal, Arbolay moved to discharge his appellate counsel and proceed pro se. This Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a determination of whether Arbolay was making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel on appeal. The Superior Court determined that he was, and this Court granted Arbolay’s motion to proceed pro se. (20) Arbolay’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows: (i) his probation officer and one of the police officers involved in his October 23, 2018 arrest were biased against him and engaged in misconduct, which included an unconstitutional search of the motel room; (ii) the Superior Court erred in admitting the cocaine and a non-controlled substance into evidence; (iii) the disclosure of his previous weapons conviction under federal law required a mistrial or curative instruction; (iv) the Superior Court erred in allowing the State to use a Facebook post that was not produced in compliance with Superior Court Criminal Rule 16; (v) 7 Detective Riccobon’s expert testimony did not satisfy the requirements of Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 702 or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;1 (vi) the Superior Court erred in allowing the State to amend the habitual offender petition and in failing to hold a separate habitual offender hearing; and (vii) the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in an unfair trial. The Court does not consider the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that Arbolay raises for the first time in his reply brief.2 (21) With the exception of his argument that the search of the motel room was unconstitutional, Arbolay’s remaining allegations regarding his probation officer and a police officer involved in his arrest (who did not testify at trial) are unrelated to this case, are the subject of a civil lawsuit in federal court, and fall outside the scope of this appeal. As to the search of the motel room, Arbolay argues that it was unconstitutional because there was no warrant or compliance with Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19. Our review of this claim is limited to plain error because Arbolay did not file a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the motel room in the Superior Court.3 “[P]lain error is limited to material defects 1 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Supr. Ct. R. 14(c) (“Appellant shall not reserve material for reply brief which should have been included in a full and fair opening brief.”). See also Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994) (“This Court has consistently held it will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if that issue has not been decided on the merits in the trial court.”). 3 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Fair v. State, 2015 WL 6941336, at *2 (Del. Nov. 9, 2015). 2 8 which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”4 (22) A probation officer may conduct a warrantless search as long as he has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.5 Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19, promulgated under 11 Del. C. § 4321(d), establishes the procedural requirements for administrative searches.6 These requirements include the probation officer obtaining approval, absent emergency circumstances, from a supervisor or manager before conducting the search.7 (23) Probation Officer Vettori had reasonable articulable suspicion to search the motel room. The record reflects that Detective Lawler heard screaming from a motel room Arbolay was occupying, Arbolay admitted to having a domestic incident, and Arbolay initially consented to Detective Lawler entering the room. Arbolay then tried to prevent anyone from entering the room and began ingesting pills. Items in plain view included pills, two grinders, and a bag of suspected cocaine. The record also reflects that Arbolay was on probation and, contrary to Arbolay’s contention, Officer Vettori obtained his supervisor’s approval to search 4 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 2010). 6 Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. 2008). 7 Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 827 (Del. 2008). 5 9 the motel room. Arbolay has not demonstrated plain error in the search of the motel room. (24) Arbolay next argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting a bag of suspected cocaine8 that turned out to be a non-controlled substance. He also appears to challenge the admission of cocaine that was found in the motel room, emphasizing that he was not charged with dealing or possessing cocaine. Arbolay contends that the admission of these substances was unfairly prejudicial under D.R.E. 403. (25) Unlike the previous claim, these claims were properly preserved at trial. We therefore review the Superior Court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.9 “An abuse of discretion occurs when ‘a court has . . . exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances,’ [or] . . . so ignored recognized rules of law or practice . . . to produce injustice.”10 Under D.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”11 The risk of confusion or unfair prejudice is “less 8 Based on the trial record, this substance was suspected to be heroin. Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 78-79 (Del. 1993). 10 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del.1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988)). 571 (Del.1988)). 11 D.R.E. 403. 9 10 salient” in a bench trial where the judge “is both evidentiary gatekeeper and factfinder.”12 (26) Applying D.R.E. 403, the Superior Court concluded that the probative value of the non-controlled substance and cocaine was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. Arbolay was charged with operating or attempting to operate a clandestine laboratory under 16 Del. C. § 4760A. A clandestine laboratory is defined as “any property, real or personal, on or in which a person assembles any chemicals or equipment or combination thereof which are intended to be used to or have been used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance or other substance in violation of the provisions of this chapter.”13 Both the non-controlled substance and cocaine were relevant to proving that Arbolay was operating or attempting to operate a clandestine laboratory in the motel room. As Detective Riccobon testified, non-controlled substances like what was in the bag in the closet are often used as cutting agents for illegal drugs. He also testified that multiple types of drugs may be found in a drug laboratory. Based on this record, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the noncontrolled substance and the cocaine. 12 13 McMullen v. State, 253 A.3d 107, 117 n.41 (Del. 2021). 16 Del. C. § 4760A(c)(1). 11 (27) Arbolay next contends that discussion of his federal weapons conviction at trial required the Superior Court to declare a mistrial or give a curative instruction. Before Arbolay testified, the State sought to impeach his credibility with a Delaware conviction for carrying a concealed deadly weapon and a federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. After Arbolay objected, the Superior Court reviewed the admissibility of the convictions under D.R.E. 609. The Superior Court concluded that neither crime was a crime of dishonesty, and ruled that the State could not impeach Arbolay with those convictions. (28) Arbolay did not request a mistrial or curative instruction based on the disclosure of his federal weapons conviction so we review for plain error.14 In the context of bench trials like this one, the Court has recognized a presumption that the trial judge, sitting as a trier of fact, reached his verdict only on admissible evidence and disregarded inadmissible evidence.15 Arbolay points to nothing in the record suggesting that the trial judge considered his previous weapons convictions in determining Arbolay’s guilt. After ruling the State could not use the previous weapon convictions, the trial judge expressly stated that he would not consider the convictions in his deliberations. Arbolay has not demonstrated plain error. 14 Supr. Ct. R. 8. Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 706 (Del. 2006); Burke v. State, 1997 WL 139813, at *2 (Del. Mar. 19, 1997). 15 12 (29) Arbolay argues that the Superior Court erred in allowing the State to use a Facebook post that it had failed to produce under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Arbolay whether he had invited anyone to the planned video shoot at the motel or mentioned it on social media. After Arbolay said he could not remember everything from a year ago and confirmed his Facebook username, the prosecutor began to show him a Facebook post. Arbolay’s counsel objected that the post had not been produced in discovery. The prosecutor responded that it was in rebuttal and he was not seeking to introduce it into evidence. The judge asked if the prosecutor was using the item to refresh Arbolay’s recollection or for another purpose. The prosecutor stated that Arbolay claimed a lack of recollection and that the post went to the credibility of Arbolay’s testimony during direct examination. (30) The Superior Court overruled the objection, ruling that the prosecutor could use the post to refresh Arbolay’s recollection. The prosecutor had Arbolay read the post, which stated “[v]ideo shoot at 4 in box (sic) if you trying to get famous.”16 Arbolay argues that the State’s failure to produce this post as required by Rule 16 significantly prejudiced his defense. (31) In the event of a discovery violation, the Court considers: (i) the centrality of the error to the case; (ii) the closeness of the case; and (iii) the steps 16 Answering Brief Appendix at B109. 13 taken to mitigate the results of the error.17 The Court reverses “a conviction on the basis of a discovery violation only if the defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected.”18 Assuming without deciding that the State was required to produce the Facebook post under Rule 16, this error was not central to the case, the case was not close, and Arbolay’s substantial rights were not prejudicially affected. Arbolay’s role or lack thereof in the video shoot had little relevance to the case. There was also significant evidence of Arbolay’s guilt, including his sole presence in the motel room at the time of his arrest, his DNA on the gun in the motel room dresser, the presence of multiple types of drugs and materials used to manufacture and package drugs in the motel room, and text messages on his phone reflecting drug dealing activity. The State’s failure to produce the Facebook post under Rule 16 does not warrant reversal of Arbolay’s convictions. (32) Arbolay next contends that Detective Riccobon’s expert testimony, which was based in part on redacted text messages extracted from Arbolay’s phone, did not satisfy the requirements of D.R.E. 702 or Daubert. Arbolay did not make this objection below so we review for plain error.19 At trial, the State called Detective Riccobon to testify as an expert witness on drug dealing and operation of a drug laboratory. Detective Riccobon testified about his experience as a law 17 Valentin v. State, 74 A.3d 645, 648–49 (Del. 2013). Wharton v. State, 246 A.3d 110, 117 (Del. 2021). 19 Supr. Ct. R. 8; McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364, 368 (Del. 2008). 18 14 enforcement officer in drug investigations and how he reached his opinions. Detective Riccobon’s reliance on redacted text messages selected by the prosecutor instead of all of the unredacted messages goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of his expert testimony.20 Arbolay does not explain how Detective Riccobon’s testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of D.R.E. 702 or Daubert, and has not demonstrated plain error in the admission of this testimony. (33) Arbolay next argues that the Superior Court erred in permitting the State to amend the habitual offender petition and failing to hold a separate hearing on the petition. On November 13, 2019, the State filed a petition to declare Arbolay an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) for purposes of the PFDCF charge. Under Section 4214(b), Arbolay would be subject to a minimum sentence of twelveand-a-half years of incarceration (half of the statutory maximum penalty of twentyfive years for PFDCF) up to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. (34) Arbolay’s counsel then submitted a sentencing memorandum referring to Arbolay’s minimum sentence as twenty-five years of incarceration if he was declared as an habitual offender for the PFDCF charge. In response to the Superior Court’s inquiry concerning the difference in the possible sentences, the State indicated that it was an oversight, a corrected petition would be filed promptly, and 20 See, e.g., New Haverford P’ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 800 (Del. 2001) (concluding that experts’ failure to conduct certain tests went to the weight, not the admissibility, of their opinions). 15 that the parties had previously discussed and understood that Arbolay faced a minimum sentence of twenty-five years under Section 4214(c). Section 4214(c) provides for a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty up to life imprisonment. (35) On November 15, 2019, the State filed a petition to declare Arbolay an habitual offender under Section 4214(c) for purposes of the PFDCF charge. At the sentencing hearing that day, Arbolay’s counsel opposed the petition as untimely under Rule 45(d). Rule 45(d) provides that a written motion must be served not later than two days before a scheduled hearing. Arbolay’s counsel stated that he only opposed the petition on procedural grounds, and that he had no good faith basis to oppose the petition on the merits as Arbolay qualified for habitual offender sentencing under Section 4214(c). He admitted that he had previously discussed a minimum sentence of twenty-five years with the State and Arbolay so there was no surprise in the State’s request for habitual offender sentencing under § 4214(c). The State argued that the petition should be granted because the parties understood that State intended to seek a minimum sentence of twenty-five years for the PFDCF charge. (36) Based on the lack of opposition to the merits of the habitual offender petition and the previous understanding that Arbolay faced a twenty-five year minimum sentence for the PFDCF charge, the Superior Court concluded that the 16 State could request amendment of the original petition. The State moved to amend the petition, and Arbolay’s counsel took no position on the motion. After discussion of plea offers that would resolve the case as well as severed possession of a firearm by person prohibited charges and Arbolay’s rejection of those offers, the Superior Court granted the amended petition to declare Arbolay an habitual offender under § 4214(c). (37) “We review the Superior Court’s determination of habitual offender status to ensure it is supported ‘by substantial evidence in the record and [is] free from legal error and abuse of discretion.’”21 Even if the habitual offender petition was untimely under Rule 45(d), the Superior Court did not err in permitting the State to amend the petition and in granting the amended petition. The record reflects that the parties understood Arbolay faced a minimum twenty-five year sentence for PFDCF as an habitual offender well before the filing of the original habitual offender petition in November 2019. This minimum sentence was raised during Arbolay’s rejection of a plea offer in June 2019. It was also discussed during the parties’ posttrial negotiations. In addition, Arbolay’s counsel admitted that Arbolay had the felony convictions required by Section 4214(c), and that he had no good faith basis to oppose the merits of the petition. As to Arbolay’s claim that the Superior Court 21 McNeill v. State, 2011 WL 4478122, at *2 (Del. Sept. 27, 2011) (quoting Morales v. State, 696 A.2d 390, 394 (Del. 1997)). 17 failed to hold a separate hearing on the habitual offender petition, he did not request a separate hearing and has not shown that he suffered any prejudice. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in permitting the State to amend the habitual offender petition and in granting the amended petition. (38) Arbolay contends that the aforementioned errors cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial. When there are several errors in a trial, this Court weighs “the cumulative impact to determine whether there was plain error.”22 Having determined that each of the claims is without merit, the Court concludes that a cumulative error analysis is not warranted here. (39) Finally, we note that before opening arguments the Superior Court and State discussed how Arbolay could be found guilty of both drug dealing (marijuana) and aggravated possession (marijuana), but that the aggravated possession (marijuana) offense would merge with the drug dealing (marijuana) offense for purposes of sentencing. Notwithstanding this discussion, the Superior Court sentenced Arbolay to: (i) six years of Level V incarceration, suspended for decreasing levels of supervision for drug dealing (marijuana); and (ii) two years of Level V incarceration, suspended for decreasing levels of supervision for aggravated possession (marijuana). This matter must be remanded for the limited purpose of 22 Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 690 (Del. 1979) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 18 merging the aggravated possession (marijuana) charge with the drug dealing (marijuana) charge and resentencing.23 Arbolay is entitled to the assistance of counsel at resentencing. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, with the exception of the lack of merger of the aggravated possession (marijuana) offense with the drug dealing (marijuana) offense, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Order. Jurisdiction is not retained. BY THE COURT: /s/Karen L. Valihura Justice 23 See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 2016 WL 7011352, at *3 (Del. Nov. 30, 2016) (recognizing that aggravated possession is a lesser included offense of drug dealing and requires merger for sentencing); Ayers v. State, 97 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Del. 2014) (remanding for merger of drug dealing and aggravated possession charges and resentencing). 19