Title: Cochran v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 982476
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1999

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
JERRY LOUIS COCHRAN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 982476 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
 
 
 
November 5, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
We granted this appeal to consider whether the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia erred in affirming a trial court's judgment 
finding Jerry Louis Cochran guilty of possession of 
phencyclidine (PCP) with intent to distribute.  The principal 
issue raised by five of six assignments of error is whether, as 
Cochran contends, the trial court erred in overruling his motion 
"to suppress the evidence of PCP because it was obtained as a 
result of an unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of 
his Fourth Amendment rights1 under the United States 
Constitution." 
 
Confirming the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced 
Cochran to a term of seven years in the penitentiary and a fine 
of $10,000.00.  The Court of Appeals granted Cochran's appeal 
                     
1 The Amendment provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
limited to the principal issue.  On January 26, 1993, two of the 
three members of a panel of that Court reversed the conviction 
on the ground that "appellant discarded the PCP while subject to 
an illegal seizure".  Cochran v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 619, 
624, 426 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1993).  The panel denied the 
Commonwealth's request for a rehearing, but by order entered 
February 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals granted a petition for 
rehearing en banc and stayed the mandate.  By order entered July 
13, 1993, an equally divided court sitting en banc affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court, withdrew the opinion of the three-
judge panel, and vacated the mandate dated January 26, 1993. By 
order entered October 2, 1998 in response to Cochran's habeas 
corpus petition, this Court awarded Cochran leave to petition 
for appeal.  We granted his petition by order entered April 22, 
1999.  Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals 
sitting en banc, we will affirm its judgment. 
 
First, we consider Cochran's sixth assignment of error 
concerning appellate procedure.  Cochran argues on brief that 
the Court of Appeals "erred in reversing the judgment of a panel 
. . . because a majority of the judges sitting en banc did not 
vote to reverse the judgment of the panel".  Cochran relies upon 
                                                                  
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
 
2
Code § 17-116.02 (now recodified as § 17.1-402) which provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
(D). … The Court sitting en banc shall consider and decide 
the case and may overrule any previous decision by any 
panel or of the full Court. 
 
(E). … In all cases decided by the Court en banc, the 
concurrence of at least a majority of the judges sitting 
shall be required to reverse a judgment, in whole or in 
part. 
 
 
The language chosen by the General Assembly is plain.  The 
"judgment" subject to reversal "in whole or in part" by a 
majority of the Court sitting en banc includes the judgment 
entered by the trial court.2  Hence, absent a majority vote of 
the Court of Appeals sitting en banc reversing the judgment of 
the trial court, that judgment is affirmed. 
 
This Court has reviewed both civil and criminal cases in 
which the Court of Appeals has applied that interpretation of 
the statute.  See, e.g., White v. White, 257 Va. 139, 143-144, 
509 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1999); Granados v. Windson Development 
Corp., 257 Va. 103, 106, 509 S.E.2d 290, 291 (1999); Husske v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 206, 476 S.E.2d 920, 921-22 (1996), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154 (1997); Lockhart v. Commonwealth, 
251 Va. 184, 184, 466 S.E.2d 740, 740 (1996). 
                     
2 The panel decision was not a judgment because "the clerk 
of the Court of Appeals [had not forwarded] its mandate . . . to 
the clerk of the trial court" as required by Rule 5A:31. 
 
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The decisions of an equally divided Court of Appeals 
sitting en banc and applying that interpretation include 
Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 562, 507 S.E.2d 625 
(1998)(en banc); Hebden v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 727, 496 
S.E.2d 169 (1998)(en banc); Brown v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 
1, 480 S.E.2d 112 (1997)(en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
118 S.Ct. 1073 (1998); Carter v. Extra's, Inc., 15 Va. App. 648, 
427 S.E.2d 197 (1993)(en banc); McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. 
App. 314, 399 S.E.2d 27 (1990)(en banc); Diehl v. Commonwealth, 
10 Va. App. 139, 390 S.E.2d 550 (1990)(en banc). 
 
In the face of these decisions, the General Assembly has 
not rejected or modified judicial interpretation of the statute 
in issue.  "Under these circumstances, the construction given to 
the statute is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature and 
therefore becomes obligatory upon the courts."  Vansant and 
Gusler, Inc. v. Washington, 245 Va. 356, 361, 429 S.E.2d 31, 33-
34 (1993). 
 
Overruling the assignment of procedural error, we turn to 
the principal question in issue.  There is no consequential 
dispute in the facts relevant to that issue. 
 
Deputy Sheriff Earl D. Chewning, Jr., on patrol in a marked 
car, was dispatched to a parking lot to meet an unknown person 
who had called concerning recovery of stolen property.  When 
Chewning arrived at the lot that night, he noticed a car parked 
 
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near a public telephone booth.  The parking lot was well 
lighted, and Chewning could see the driver standing outside the 
car and two persons seated inside. 
 
Chewning asked the driver if anyone had called the 
sheriff's department.  Before he received a response, Cochran, 
the front seat passenger, started to get out of the car.  
Chewning asked Cochran to remain in the car while he "talked to 
the driver."  The deputy sheriff testified that he did so "[f]or 
my safety, because I didn't know exactly what was going on at 
that time."  Cochran complied, and Chewning escorted the driver 
to the rear of the vehicle where he had a better view of the two 
passengers.  As Chewning was talking with the driver, Cochran 
again opened the door of the car.  Chewning instructed him to 
remain in the car, he complied, and Chewning resumed his 
conversation with the driver.  Almost immediately, Cochran began 
to get out of the car again. 
 
Chewning testified that "[a]s he got out of the vehicle, he 
shoved a bluish colored bag up underneath the car and started 
back towards me."  Chewning twice asked for Cochran's name, but 
Cochran's only response was "urrrrr, like that."  Cochran was 
"very wobbly on his feet, his eyes were very watery and red, and 
his speech was very slurred."  Chewning asked Cochran "to turn 
around and place his hands on top of the roof of the car."  
Chewning conducted a "pat down" search for weapons.  Finding 
 
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none, he retrieved the blue bag.  Inside, he found three small 
plastic bags and a film canister.  Each contained a strong 
smelling substance which Chewning recognized as likely to be 
illegal drugs.  He placed Cochran under arrest. 
 
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in California v. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) and its progeny, including this 
Court's decision in Woodson v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 401, 429 
S.E.2d 27 (1993), the Commonwealth contends that the trial court 
correctly found that Cochran "abandoned the bag containing the 
illegal drugs prior to any seizure of his person."  We agree. 
 
As this Court made clear in Woodson, it must first be 
determined "when [the defendant] was 'seized' within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 404, 429 S.E.2d at 29.  "[A] 
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he 
was not free to leave."  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980).  This test is not applicable until the person 
submits to the officer's show of authority.  Woodson, 245 Va. at 
404-05, 429 S.E.2d at 29. 
 
In our view, as evidenced by Cochran's repeated attempts to 
get out of the car, he did not submit to Deputy Chewning's 
authority until after he had attempted to hide the bag under the 
 
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car, Chewning had identified its contents, and Cochran had been 
searched for weapons and placed under arrest. 
 
Finding no merit in the assignments of error, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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