Title: Ex Parte Thompson
Citation: 210 So. 2d 808
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 1968

210 So. 2d 808 (1968)
Ex parte Jack THOMPSON.
In re Madge THOMPSON
v.
Jack THOMPSON.
3 Div. 194.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 23, 1968.
*809 Alvin T. Prestwood, Volz, Capouana, Wampold &amp; Prestwood, Montgomery, for petitioner-respondent.
Hill, Robison &amp; Belser, Montgomery, for appellee.
LAWSON, Justice.
This is an original proceeding for certiorari in this court to review the action of the Judge of the Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in Equity, holding Jack Thompson, the petitioner, to be in contempt of court.
Madge Thompson filed suit for divorce against Jack Thompson on April 2, 1964, in the Bessemer Division of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, in Equity. The ground for divorce was cruelty.
On June 3, 1964, the said divorce suit was ordered to be transferred to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in Equity, under the provisions of Act 76, approved September 15, 1961, Acts of Alabama 1961, Vol. II, p. 1953. See 1965 Cumulative Pocket Part to Vol. 3 of the 1958 Recompiled Code of Alabama, where the provisions of Act 76, supra, are designated as §§ 64(1) and 64(2) of Title 7. The transfer was completed on or about June 5, 1964.
The bill filed by Madge Thompson contained the following averments:
Aside from the prayer for general relief, the bill prayed for an absolute divorce, temporary and permanent alimony to be *810 paid monthly, and solicitor's fees. The bill also contained the following special prayer:
On July 30, 1964, there was filed in the Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in Equity, to which we will sometimes hereinafter refer as the trial court, an undated separation agreement apparently signed by Madge and Jack Thompson, wherein the former is referred to as the party of the first part and the latter as party of the second part. The separation agreement contained the following provisions:
On the day that the separation agreement was filed, July 30, 1964, Jack Thompson, the respondent in the divorce action, filed in the trial court an answer and a waiver of notice to him of the taking of testimony or other proceedings, consenting that the suit for divorce proceed to a final decree without further notice to him.
On August 6, 1964, the trial court rendered a final decree which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
On December 3, 1964, Madge Thompson filed a petition in the trial court asking that Jack Thompson be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court in that "he has failed and refused to pay any amounts whatsoever to the Exchange Security Bank of Birmingham, Alabama; Standard Oil Company; Public Finance Company; M. &amp; M. Flyers, and Ed S. Moore," although he had sufficient means to make payments. In essence, the petition sought to have Jack Thompson adjudged to be in contempt of court for failure to comply with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement.
On January 7, 1965, the trial court rendered a decree wherein Jack Thompson was adjudged to be in contempt of court and as punishment for such contempt it *811 was decreed that he be confined "in the jail of Montgomery County until further Order of this Court."
Jack Thompson was not arrested and confined as ordered in the decree of January 7, 1965, apparently because he made payments to one or more of the "creditors" named in Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement.
On April 1, 1965, Madge Thompson filed her second petition wherein she prayed in effect, that Jack Thompson be required to show cause why he should not be adjudged to be in contempt of court in that "* * * on, to-wit the 6th day of August, 1964, this Honorable Court entered a decree confirming the agreement of the Respondent and the Complainant and ordering the Respondent, Jack Thompson, to pay certain obligations and Respondent is now in arrears again on his payments under the decree heretofore rendered, and has willfully refused to make proper and sufficient payments as set out in said decree of this Honorable Court."
Following a hearing on April 16, 1965, at which Madge and Jack Thompson were the only witnesses, the trial court on May 4, 1965, rendered the following decree:
Upon request of Jack Thompson, the trial court ordered that he not be arrested prior to May 25, 1965, and before that date Jack Thompson filed in this court his petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's decree or order of May 4, 1965, adjudging him to be in contempt of court. The writ was issued. Under the circumstances just related, certiorari is the proper method of review. See Worley v. Worley, 267 Ala. 71, 100 So. 2d 18.
The threshold question presented for our consideration is whether petitioner's failure to comply with the provisions of Paragraph *812 2 of the separation agreement is punishable by imprisonment for contempt of court.
Petitioner, Jack Thompson, concedes that it is the law of this state that a decree ordering a husband to pay alimony can be enforced by contempt proceedings and imprisonment of the husband unless he purges himself of the contempt by paying the alimony or by showing that he has neither estate nor ability to pay.  Ryan v. Ryan, 267 Ala. 677, 104 So. 2d 700; Ex parte Stephenson, 252 Ala. 316, 40 So. 2d 716, and cases cited. This, for the reason that we have held that alimony is not a debt within the meaning of § 20 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which provides: "That no person shall be imprisoned for debt."  Murray v. Murray, 84 Ala. 363, 4 So. 239; Ex parte Stephenson, supra.
But petitioner contends that the decree of August 6, 1964, did not require him to pay alimony to his wife; that the payments which he agreed to make in Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement, which was incorporated into the decree of August 6, 1964, were not for alimony but for debts, some of which "are debts of the corporation, some of the petitioner, and some of Madge Thompson;" hence, the decree or order of May 4, 1965, in so far as it orders petitioner to be imprisoned because he has not made payments as provided in Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement is erroneous in that it is violative of § 20 of the 1901 Constitution of Alabama, supra. See Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218.
On the other hand, in the brief filed here on behalf of Madge Thompson in support of the decree of the trial court presently under review, it is contended that the incorporation into the divorce decree under date of August 6, 1964, of the provisions of Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement is tantamount to or constitutes an award of alimony in gross to Madge Thompson.
The statutory authority for the awarding of alimony to the wife in a divorce decree is found in §§ 31, 32 and 33 of Title 34, Code 1940. We are not here concerned with § 33, supra, because it deals with the awarding of alimony to the wife where the decree is in favor of the husband for the misconduct of the wife. The divorce in this case was awarded to the wife because of the misconduct of the husband.
Sections 31 and 32, Title 34, supra, read:
The provisions just quoted have been construed by this court as authorizing the allowance to the wife as alimony to be made in gross out of the husband's estate, payable presently or as directed; or it may be made as for continuous maintenance, payable in monthly or other periodical installments; or by a combination of both of these methods. Specific property of the husband may also be awarded as permanent alimony.  Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 112 So. 190; Roubicek v. Roubicek, 246 Ala. 442, 21 So. 2d 244; Wood v. Wood, 263 Ala. 384, 82 So. 2d 556; Frazier v. Frazier, 273 Ala. 53, 134 So. 2d 205.
In Smith v. Rogers, supra, we said:
In Montgomery v. Montgomery, 275 Ala. 364, 366, 155 So. 2d 317, 319, we observed:
See Le Maistre v. Baker, 268 Ala. 295, 105 So. 2d 867. In the case last cited we said:
As we have shown, in her bill for divorce Madge Thompson prayed for temporary and permanent alimony and also prayed that the court "order and decree that respondent [Jack Thompson] assume and pay her personal obligations incurred for said Corporation [Aero Charter, Inc.]."
In the undated separation agreement, no mention is made of the payment of alimony by Jack Thompson to Madge Thompson. In Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement, Jack Thompson merely agreed to pay and assume "as his obligation and responsibility to pay all amounts owing creditors * * *" When construed in the light of the allegations of the bill for divorce, the prayer thereof, and the testimony adduced at the contempt hearing, the creditors were those of Aero Charter, Inc., although Madge Thompson may have been personally obligated to pay some or all of the amounts owed those creditors.
We do not perceive how the payments which Jack Thompson agreed to make in Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement can be construed as being for the sustenance or support of Madge Thompson. Those payments were not to be made to her and they were not for necessaries.
It is the element of sustenance and support which excludes alimony, in gross or in installments, from the meaning of the word "debt" as used in § 20 of our Constitution, supra. The duty of a husband to support his wife is a higher duty than a mere contractual obligation, and, like the marriage contract, involves public interest and public policy.  Murray v. Murray, supra.
Thus, assuming contemptuous avoidance by Jack Thompson of an order of the trial court to pay to the creditors mentioned in Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement which, as we have heretofore shown, became a part of the divorce decree, we do not believe that Jack Thompson can be legally imprisoned for failure to comply with that order when it relates *814 solely to the payment of a debt as distinguished from payments for the sustenance or support of his former wife, Madge Thompson.
Neither the decree of August 6, 1964, nor the separation agreement incorporated therein contains language which can be said to show unequivocally that alimony in gross was awarded to Madge Thompson. In fact, the word "alimony" is not used in the instrument. And Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement does not show with certainty the total amount due each of the creditors named therein, and as to two of the named creditors there is no reference to the time when payment was to be made to them by Jack Thompson or the amount to be paid.  Montgomery v. Montgomery, supra.
Aero Charter, Inc., was a corporation owned by Jack Thompson and Madge Thompson as a business venture. The obligations which Jack Thompson agreed to pay were business debts incurred on behalf of Aero Charter, Inc. That portion of the separation agreement between Jack Thompson and Madge Thompson (Paragraph 2) as to who should pay the creditors of Aero Charter, Inc., was a business agreement or contract as opposed to domestic. As a contract to pay money it is not enforceable by imprisonment, in view of the provisions of § 20 of our Constitution, supra.
We hold that the trial court erred in holding Jack Thompson, the petitioner here, to be in contempt of court and ordering his imprisonment because of his failure to make the payments as provided in Paragraph 2 of the separation agreement.
The decree of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions that a decree be entered in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and COLEMAN and KOHN, JJ., concur.