Title: State Ex Rel. Sorensen v. Baird
Citation: 201 Or. 240, 269 P.2d 535
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 1954

Reversed April 21, 1954.
*241 Hugh B. Collins, of Medford, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Paul W. Haviland, of Medford.
Warren A. Woodruff, Deputy District Attorney, of Roseburg, argued the cause for respondent. With him *242 on the brief was Robert M. Stults, District Attorney, of Roseburg.
Before LATOURETTE, Chief Justice, and WARNER, LUSK and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Douglas county, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. The proceeding was instituted by Shirley L. Sorensen, on behalf of her husband Charles L. Sorensen, as plaintiff, against C.H. Baird, as sheriff of Douglas county, Oregon, as defendant.
The petition for the writ alleged facts sufficient to authorize the issuance of the writ, and, by order of the court, the writ was issued on May 14, 1953, and served upon the defendant sheriff.
On May 15, 1953, the defendant filed his return to the writ, in which it is alleged (omitting formal parts):
Attached to the return were exhibits "A" and "B", being copies of what purported to be commitment orders as alleged in the return.
Plaintiff demurred to the return on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute cause or justification for the prisoner's detention. The demurrer was overruled by the court, whereupon plaintiff filed a replication in which she denied each and every allegation of the return, excepting only paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof.
Upon the issues thus formed by the return of defendant and replication (answer) of plaintiff, a hearing was held by the court. In support of the return's allegations, defendant offered, and there were received in evidence, a copy of the journal of the district court, the original "ORDER REVOKING PROBATION", and a copy of each commitment order above referred to. No other evidence was offered or *246 received, except a transcript of the testimony given before the district court in connection with the purported revocation of probation. This testimony has no bearing whatever upon the issue now before the court.
The exemplification of the journal of said district court above referred to is in words and figures as follows:
It will be observed that upon the hearing, neither the original complaint upon which Charles L. Sorensen was prosecuted, nor secondary evidence thereof, was produced.
We will first dispose of one of defendant's contentions. He claims that the petition for the writ of habeas corpus fails to state facts sufficient to authorize the issuance of the writ.
1-4. The function of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to secure the issuance of the writ, and when that is issued, the petition has accomplished its purpose. Generally, the petition is not considered as part of the pleadings. Of course, there are cases where, upon stipulation of the parties, the petition is treated as the answer or traverse to the return to the writ, and, in such instances, it does form a part of the pleadings. However, ordinarily, upon the issuance of the writ, the petition becomes functus officio. The return to the writ is the principal pleading and corresponds to the complaint in civil actions. Strict rules of pleading are not usually applied to petitions for writs of habeas corpus, and often the writ is issued upon more *248 or less informal applications. In proper cases, it should never be denied upon mere technicalities of pleading. The petition in the instant case was amply sufficient to demand the issuance of the writ. Quinn v. Hanks, 192 Or 254, 268, 233 P2d 767; In re Davenport, 114 Or 650, 655, 236 P 758; 39 CJS 625, Habeas Corpus; § 80, p 651; § 88.
The authorities cited by defendant in support of his contention are not in point: Kelley v. Meyers, 124 Or 322, 263 P 903; Long v. Minto, 81 Or 281, 158 P 805; Garrison v. Malheur County Court, 54 Or 269, 101 P 900 (Writ of Review).
The rules respecting petitions for writs of review are different from those applying to petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Andrews v. City of Corvallis, 200 Or 632, 268 P2d 361.
5. Plaintiff urges that the trial court erred in overruling her demurrer to the return.
Section 1-904, OCLA (ORS 16.490) provides:
We are of the opinion that the return to the writ was sufficient under this statute and, hence, not vulnerable to demurrer. The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer.
However, the decisive question in this case is whether the evidence offered upon the hearing was sufficient to show legal cause or justification for the detention of the prisoner by the defendant.
*249 6-8. The district court for Douglas county is a court of inferior and limited jurisdiction. It does not have exclusive jurisdiction in prosecutions for misdemeanors. Its jurisdiction in such criminal proceedings is concurrent with that of the circuit court. From its judgments in criminal actions, appeals may be taken to the circuit court. Nothing is presumed in favor of the judgment of a court of inferior or limited jurisdiction, as against a collateral attack, and jurisdictional facts must affirmatively appear either on the face of the record, or, according to some authorities, by evidence aliunde, except as to facts required to be spread on the record. Jurisdiction, as that term is used, means jurisdiction over the subject matter. Ashford v. Ashford, 201 Or 206, 249 P2d 968, 268 P2d 382; 49 CJS 841, Judgments, § 425 (3).
In Ferguson v. Byers, 40 Or 468, 472, 67 P 1115, 69 P 32, we said:
The complaint against the prisoner claimed to have been filed in the district court is not in evidence. We cannot determine, therefore, from the record before us whether such complaint, if one was filed, stated a crime or showed proper venue, so as to be able to say whether the district court actually had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
9. The allegations of defendant's return to the writ were directly controverted and challenged by plaintiff's replication. Under the express provisions of § 1-904, OCLA (ORS 16.490), supra, and in the light of such denials in the replication, defendant was "bound to *250 establish on the trial the facts conferring jurisdiction". He, therefore, was bound to prove the filing of a sufficient complaint against the prisoner, showing that the district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the criminal action.
The question now under consideration is fully answered and determined by our holding in Evans v. Marvin, 76 Or 540, 545, 148 P 1119, 148 P 1121. There Mr. Justice BURNETT, speaking for the court, said:
10. The order of the district court purporting to revoke probation can have no more effect than the original judgment itself. "The stream cannot rise above the spring."
11. The evidence is wholly insufficient to justify the detention of the prisoner, Charles L. Sorensen, either upon the charge of "furnishing a minor with alcoholic *251 liquor", or for "operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway in Douglas county, Oregon, when such motor vehicle was not equipped with a muffler in good working order."
The judgment is reversed, and this cause remanded with directions to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and discharge the prisoner, Charles L. Sorensen, from custody.