Title: Joseph Conway, Jr. v. Board of the Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison
Citation: 2003 WI 53
Docket Number: 2001AP000784
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2003

2003 WI 53 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0784 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Joseph Conway, Jr., and the International  
Association of Firefighters, Local 311, AFL-CIO,  
 
Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Board of the Police and Fire Commissioners of 
the City of Madison, Wisconsin, and Fire Chief 
Debra Amesqua,  
 
Respondents-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 135 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 163, 647 N.W. 291 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 12, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Moria Krueger   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, JJ., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Aaron N. Halstead and Shneidman, Hawks & Ehlke, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Aaron N. Halstead. 
 
For 
respondent-appellant, 
Board 
of 
Police 
and 
Fire 
Commissioners of the City of Madison, there was a brief by Scott 
Herrick and Herrick & Kasdorf, LLP, Madison, and oral argument 
by Scott N. Herrick. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, Fire Chief Debra H. Amesqua, 
there was a brief by Carolyn S. Hogg, assistant city attorney, 
 
 
2
and James L. Martin, city attorney, and oral argument by Carolyn 
S. Hogg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
2003 WI 53 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0784  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 762) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joseph Conway, Jr., and the International  
Association of Firefighters, Local 311,  
AFL-CIO,  
 
          Petitioners-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of the Police and Fire  
Commissioners of the City of Madison,  
Wisconsin, and Fire Chief Debra Amesqua,  
 
          Respondents-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUNE 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Lieutenant Joseph Conway, Jr., 
and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 311, 
AFL-CIO (hereinafter collectively referred to as Conway), seek 
review of a published court of appeals' decision that reversed a 
circuit court declaratory judgment.  The Dane County Circuit 
Court held that Rule 7.20 of the Board of the Police and Fire 
Commissioners of the City of Madison (board) was void, declaring 
that the rule was in excess of the board's statutory authority. 
No. 
01-0784 
 
2 
 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that the board had express statutory authority to adopt 
Rule 7.20.  That rule falls within the express statutory 
authority to promulgate "rules for the administration" of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) (1999-2000), in accord with Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(g).  Rule 7.20 ensures that the ultimate decision-
making authority remains with the board.1   
¶3 
Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that 
"[r]ule 7.20 provides a rational and efficient means of carrying 
out the board's duties under § 62.13(5) and does not delegate to 
the hearing examiner the specific duties vested in the board 
under that section."  Conway v. Bd. of Police and Fire Comm'rs 
of the City of Madison, 2002 WI App 135, ¶22, 256 Wis. 2d 163, 
647 N.W.2d 291.   
¶4 
Our holding is consistent with this court’s prior 
decisions leaving the means of carrying out administrative 
duties in the hands of the agency involved wherever possible.  
It is also consistent with the legislature’s intent that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 62.01 to 62.26 be liberally construed in favor of 
the rights, powers, and privileges of cities, as long as 
compatible with the constitution and general law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5  On December 8, 1999, the board adopted Rule 7.20, 
which allows the board to “engage a Hearing Examiner to conduct 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
01-0784 
 
3 
 
the Initial Hearing and the continuing evidentiary hearings” 
when disciplinary action is taken against a Madison police 
officer or firefighter under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5). 
¶6 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13 (1) and (2)(a) require cities 
with populations over 4000 to establish a board of police and 
fire commissioners.  The legislature has granted Wisconsin’s 
cities various powers concerning police and fire departments in 
accord with Wis. Stat. § 62.13.  The mayor of each Wisconsin 
city with a population of 4000 or more must appoint a board of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners, 
according 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(1). 
¶7 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5) outlines the procedural 
steps for disciplinary action against a subordinate officer of a 
police or fire department.  A subordinate officer may be 
suspended, reduced in rank, suspended and reduced in rank, or 
removed for just cause.  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(e) and (em).  In 
addition to the specific duties outlined, the legislature 
granted to boards of police and fire commissioners the broad 
authority to make rules for the administration of Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g). 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(5) states: 
 
(5) Disciplinary 
actions against subordinates. 
(a) A subordinate may be suspended as hereinafter 
provided as a penalty.  The subordinate may also be 
suspended by the commission pending the disposition of 
charges filed against the subordinate. 
No. 
01-0784 
 
4 
 
(b) Charges may be filed against a subordinate by 
the chief, by a member of the board, by the board as a 
body, or by any aggrieved person.  Such charges shall 
be in writing and shall be filed with the president of 
the board. Pending disposition of such charges, the 
board or chief may suspend such subordinate. 
(c) A subordinate may be suspended for just case, 
as described in par. (em), by the chief or the board 
as a penalty.  The chief shall file a report of such 
suspension 
with 
the 
commission 
immediately 
upon 
issuing the suspension.  No hearing on such suspension 
shall be held unless requested by the suspended 
subordinate.  If the subordinate suspended by the 
chief requests a hearing before the board, the chief 
shall be required to file charges with the board upon 
which such suspension was based. 
(d) Following the filing of charges in any case, 
a copy thereof shall be served upon the person 
charged.  The board shall set [the] date for hearing 
not less than 10 days nor more than 30 days following 
service of charges.  The hearing on the charges shall 
be public, and both the accused and the complainant 
may be represented by an attorney and may compel the 
attendance of witnesses by subpoenas which shall be 
issued by the president of the board on request and be 
served as are subpoenas under ch. 885. 
(e) If the board determines that the charges are 
not sustained, the accused, if suspended, shall be 
immediately reinstated and all lost pay restored. If 
the board determines that the charges are sustained, 
the accused, by order of the board, may be suspended 
or reduced in rank, or suspended and reduced in rank, 
or removed, as the good of the service may require.  
(em) No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in 
rank, suspended and reduced in rank, or removed by the 
board under par. (e), based on charges filed by the 
board, members of the board, an aggrieved person or 
the chief under par. (b), unless the board determines 
whether there is just cause, as described in this 
paragraph, to sustain the charges. In making its 
determination, the board shall apply the following 
standards, to the extent applicable: . . .  
. . . . 
No. 
01-0784 
 
5 
 
(f) Findings and determinations hereunder and 
orders 
of 
suspension, 
reduction, 
suspension 
and 
reduction, or removal, shall be in writing and, if 
they follow a hearing, shall be filed within 3 days 
thereof with the secretary of the board.   
(g) Further rules for the administration of this 
subsection may be made by the board. 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶8 
The rule at issue in this case, Madison Police and 
Fire Commissioners Rule 7.20, provides that: "[t]he Board may 
engage a Hearing Examiner to conduct the Initial Hearing and the 
continuing evidentiary hearings."  The rule also provides that 
at the initial hearing,2 the hearing examiner is charged with the 
responsibility to rule on procedural motions, make rulings on 
discovery issues, set a date for the hearing and, where 
appropriate, dismiss the complaint filed against the subordinate 
employee. 
 
The 
hearing 
examiner 
is 
charged 
with 
the 
responsibility to hear the case and "prepare a comprehensive 
report including an evaluation of witness credibility and 
demeanor 
for 
review 
by 
the 
Board 
and 
including 
the 
recommendations of the Hearing Examiner regarding disposition of 
the charges."3  
                                                 
2 Rule 7.08 provides guidelines for the initial hearing. 
3 Rule 7.20 specifically states: 
a. The Board may engage a Hearing Examiner to conduct 
the Initial Hearing and the continuing evidentiary 
hearings. 
b. The Hearing Examiner shall conduct and preside at 
proceedings in conformity with these rules and in 
consultation with Board counsel.  References to the 
No. 
01-0784 
 
6 
 
¶9 
This matter commenced when Lieutenant Joseph Conway 
Jr., a member of the Madison Fire Department and President of 
the International Association of Firefighters Local 311, and 
Local 311, filed a motion in the circuit court for judgment on 
the pleadings. They sought a declaration that the board had 
neither express nor implied statutory authority to promulgate 
Rule 7.20.  In particular, Conway asserted that because 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 does not authorize the use of hearing 
examiners in a city with a population of more than 4000 persons, 
Rule 7.20 was in excess of the board's statutory authority.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Board in this rule shall be construed to refer to a 
Hearing Examiner as context requires. 
c. All evidentiary proceedings conducted by a Hearing 
Examiners [sic] shall be videotaped and a certified 
transcript shall be prepared. 
d. Promptly following completion of the evidentiary 
proceedings 
and 
receipt 
of 
briefs, 
the 
Hearing 
Examiner shall forward the complete record to the 
Board 
and 
shall 
prepare 
a 
comprehensive 
report 
including an evaluation of witness credibility and 
demeanor for review by the Board and including the 
recommendations of the Hearing Examiner regarding 
disposition of the charges.  The report of the Hearing 
Examiner shall be included in the record of the Board 
proceedings. 
e. Promptly 
following 
receipt 
of 
the 
Hearing 
Examiner's 
report 
the 
Board 
shall 
convene 
for 
deliberations. 
 
The 
Board 
may 
require 
further 
proceeding before the Hearing Examiner or before the 
Board.  Following the close of any such further 
proceedings and deliberations the Board shall issue 
its decision in the matter. 
No. 
01-0784 
 
7 
 
¶10 On January 18, 2001, the circuit court, Judge Moria 
Krueger presiding, found that the board lacked statutory 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to promulgate Rule 7.20, 
and 
granted 
the 
plaintiffs' 
motion 
for 
judgment 
on 
the 
pleadings.  In doing so, the circuit court declared Rule 7.20 
void.  The court held that § 62.13(5) did not authorize the 
board to delegate to a hearing examiner the responsibility for 
conducting the initial hearing and the continued evidentiary 
hearing, in a case involving the suspension, reduction in rank, 
or removal of a subordinate police officer or firefighter.   
¶11 The circuit court noted that the board did not cite to 
any agencies that utilize hearing examiners when there is no 
specific statutory authority to do so.  Furthermore, the circuit 
court noted that in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m), the legislature 
provided for the use of a hearing examiner in the case of a city 
with a population of less than 4000.  Consequently, the circuit 
court reasoned that had the legislature intended to permit the 
use of a hearing examiner for a city with a population of more 
than 4000, it could have done so specifically.  
¶12 The 
circuit court 
issued 
a 
declaratory judgment 
declaring that Rule 7.20 was adopted in excess of the board’s 
statutory powers, and that the board had no statutory authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to delegate the responsibility for 
conducting hearings to hearing examiners or other persons not 
members of the board. 
¶13 The board appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court’s declaratory judgment.  In doing so, the 
No. 
01-0784 
 
8 
 
court of appeals found that the board had express statutory 
authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g) 
to 
adopt "a 
rule 
permitting a hearing examiner to carry out the tasks delineated 
in Rule 7.20, including conducting initial and evidentiary 
hearings and making a report to the board on the examiner's 
recommendations."  Conway, 2002 WI App 135, ¶1. The court of 
appeals considered the legislature’s statement of intent in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.04 was significant. The relevant portion of that 
statute states: 
For the purpose of giving to cities the largest 
measure 
of 
self-government 
compatible 
with 
the 
constitution and general law, it is hereby declared 
that ss. 62.01 to 62.26 shall be liberally construed 
in favor of the rights, powers and privileges of 
cities to promote the general welfare, peace, good 
order 
and 
prosperity 
of 
such 
cities 
and 
the 
inhabitants thereof. 
Wis. Stat. § 62.04 (emphasis added). 
¶14 Furthermore, the court of appeals did not find 
Conway's comparison between the tasks of a hearing examiner 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m) and Rule 7.20 appropriate, because 
of the differences in the scope of the hearing examiners’ 
authority.  The court of appeals determined that the board was 
not delegating its duties under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to a 
hearing examiner by Rule 7.20, because the board, not the 
hearing 
examiner, 
makes 
the 
final 
decision 
concerning 
discipline.  
¶15 The court of appeals concluded that Rule 7.20 came 
within 
the 
board’s 
express 
authority 
under 
No. 
01-0784 
 
9 
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g) 
to 
create 
further 
rules 
for 
the 
administration of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5). 
¶16 Conway petitioned this court for review of the 
decision of the court of appeals and asked for reinstatement of 
the judgment of the circuit court, which held that the board did 
not have statutory authority to promulgate Rule 7.20.  Conway’s 
petition for review was granted on August 23, 2002. 
II. ISSUE 
¶17 This is a case of first impression addressing a 
board's power to promulgate such administrative rules.   The 
issue presented is whether the board acted within its statutory 
authority in promulgating a rule, which delegates to private 
citizens 
the 
responsibility 
for 
hearing 
contested 
cases 
involving the discipline, including discharge, of firefighters 
and police officers.  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 The 
issue 
presented 
involves 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 62.01 to 62.26 in order to determine whether Rule 
7.20 is a valid exercise of the board's authority.  We 
especially focus on Wis. Stats. §§ 62.04 and 62.13(5).  
¶19 This court has held that the standard of review 
applicable 
in 
determining 
whether 
an 
administrative 
rule 
“exceeds statutory authority” is de novo, although we benefit 
from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Seider v. O’Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶25, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659.  We have also held that “[t]o determine whether an 
agency has exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating a 
No. 
01-0784 
 
10 
 
rule, this court first examines the enabling statute.  The 
enabling statute indicates whether the legislature expressly or 
impliedly authorized the agency to create the rule.”  Id., ¶70 
(citations omitted).  An administrative rule exceeds statutory 
authority if it conflicts with the language of the statute or 
the statute’s legislative intent.  Id., ¶72. 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
¶20 Conway asks this court to reverse the court of 
appeals' decision.  He argues that the circuit court decision 
correctly held that Wis. Stat. § 62.13 does not expressly, nor 
impliedly, authorize the board to adopt a rule providing for 
hearing examiners.   
¶21 First, 
Conway 
argues 
that 
there 
is 
no 
express 
statutory authority within Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) for employing a 
hearing examiner for disciplinary proceedings in cities with 
populations of 4000 or more.  Consequently, Conway contends 
that, to uphold the court of appeals, this court must construe 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13 to contain an implied power to delegate board 
responsibilities.  In determining the existence of implied 
administrative powers, "any reasonable doubt as to the existence 
of an implied power in an agency must be resolved against the 
exercise of such authority."  Pet'r Br. at 8 (citing Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 462, 329 
N.W.2d 143 (1983)). 
¶22 Second, Conway contends that the board's lack of 
authority to employ hearing examiners becomes apparent when 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) is compared to other statutes wherein the 
No. 
01-0784 
 
11 
 
legislature 
expressly 
provides 
authority 
for 
both 
the 
promulgation of rules and the use of hearing examiners.4  Arguing 
in accord with the decision of the circuit court, Conway 
emphasizes that the board has not cited any agency rules 
adopting the use of hearing examiners, unless there is express 
statutory authority granted by the legislature for such use.    
¶23 Next, 
Conway 
argues 
that 
the 
provision 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g) 
to 
adopt 
further 
rules 
for 
the 
administration of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) does not include the 
express or implied power to delegate power to hearing examiners.  
Conway asserts that if every agency's power to "administer" the 
statute under its supervision carried the power to engage 
hearing examiners, then the legislature's separate enactments, 
specifically permitting particular agencies to hire examiners, 
would be "surplusage" and run counter to well-established rules 
of statutory construction.  Pet'r Br. at 17 (citing Aurora 
Medical Group v. Dep't of Workforce Dev., Equal Rights Div., 
2000 WI 70, ¶28 n.18, 236 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 646).  
                                                 
4 Conway lists the following examples where the legislature 
expressly allowed administrative agencies to delegate the task 
of hearing contested cases to other persons:  Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.07(5) (relating to unfair labor practices and Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission 
(WERC)); 
Wis. 
Stat. § 111.70(4)(a). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 111.84(4) 
(State 
Employment Labor Relations Act); Wis. Stat. § 111.39 (4)(a) 
(Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment 
Act); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.15(3) 
(Wisconsin 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Act); 
Wis. 
Stat. § 102.17(1)(b); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.14(2m) 
(Unemployment 
Insurance Act) and Wis. Stat. § 227.46(1).  Pet'r Br. at 10-13 
and 15-17.   
No. 
01-0784 
 
12 
 
¶24 Furthermore, 
Conway 
maintains 
that 
Rule 
7.20 
impermissibly delegates to the hearing examiner the duty to make 
the "just cause" determination or the appropriate disposition.   
¶25 Finally, Conway argues that the legislature's decision 
to permit delegation of board obligations to non-commissioners 
in cities of under 4000 persons excludes, by implication, the 
possibility that it intended to invest boards in larger cities 
with such power.    
¶26 The board disagrees and argues that Rule 7.20 is a 
valid exercise of the board's authority to create rules for the 
administration 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(5), 
relating 
to 
disciplinary actions against police officers and firefighters.  
It maintains that Rule 7.20 is within the scope of the statutory 
delegation, consistent with Wisconsin case law, and consistent 
with the purpose of the statute as a whole.  Accordingly, the 
board asks this court to affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
V. 
ANALYSIS OF WIS. STATS. §§ 62.04 AND 62.13(5) 
¶27 In this case, both Conway and the board do not dispute 
that the board is to be treated as an administrative agency.  
See State ex rel. Smits v. City of DePere, 104 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 
310 N.W.2d 607 (1981). 
¶28 An administrative agency has only those powers that 
are 
expressly 
conferred 
or 
necessarily 
implied 
from 
the 
statutory provisions under which it operates.  Grafft v. DNR, 
2000 WI App 187, ¶6, 238 Wis. 2d 750, 618 N.W.2d 897, review 
denied, 2001 WI 1, 239 Wis.2d 774, 621 N.W.2d 630 (2000). 
No. 
01-0784 
 
13 
 
¶29 In order for the board's adoption of Rule 7.20 to be a 
valid exercise of administrative power, it is necessary that 
such action: (1) be based upon a proper delegation of power by 
the legislature, and (2) not constitute an administrative action 
in excess of that statutorily conferred authority.  State Dep't 
of Admin. v. DILHR, 77 Wis. 2d 126, 133-34, 252 N.W.2d 353 
(1997).  Thus, in examining whether an agency has exceeded its 
statutory authority in promulgating a rule, we begin by 
examining the statute that authorizes the agency to promulgate 
rules.  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶70, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659.   
¶30 We should first look to the plain language of the 
statute.  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶14, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 
N.W.2d 416; VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2003 WI 2, ¶17, 258 
Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113.  If the language of the statute is 
clear and unambiguous, we apply the language to the facts at 
hand.  State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶18, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 
N.W.2d 330.  In addition, we consider the sections of the 
statute in relationship to the whole statute and to related 
sections.  State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 416, 561 N.W.2d 695 
(1997).  Generally, we construe words and phrases according to 
common and approved usage, and if necessary, may consult a 
dictionary.  State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 
187 (1998); see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  However, such 
reliance on a dictionary does not mean that the statute is 
ambiguous.  Id.  
No. 
01-0784 
 
14 
 
¶31 In deciding whether an administrative agency's rule 
was promulgated by express authorization from the legislature, 
we "identify the elements of the enabling statute and match the 
rule against those elements."  Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Natural 
Res. Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 688, 706, 457 N.W.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1990).  
If the rule matches the statutory elements, then the statute 
expressly authorizes the rule. Id.  However, the enabling 
statute need not spell out every detail of a rule in order to 
expressly authorize it; if it did, no rule would be necessary.  
Id. at 705-06.  Therefore, whether the exact words used in an 
administrative rule appear in the statute is neither dispositive 
nor controlling.  Id. at 706. 
¶32 Next, we examine Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  As noted 
previously, the overall purpose of §§ 62.01-26 is found in the 
language of § 62.04, which states: 
For the purpose of giving to cities the largest 
measure 
of 
self-government 
compatible 
with 
the 
constitution and general law, it is hereby declared 
that ss. 62.01 to 62.26 shall be liberally construed 
in favor of the rights, powers and privileges of 
cities to promote the general welfare, peace, good 
order 
and 
prosperity 
of 
such 
cities 
and 
the 
inhabitants thereof.   
Wis. Stat. § 62.04 (emphasis added).  
¶33 Keeping in mind the legislature's directive that the 
statute should be liberally construed in favor of the rights, 
powers and privileges of cities, we turn specifically to 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g), which authorizes the board to make 
rules for the administration of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).   
No. 
01-0784 
 
15 
 
¶34 As listed previously in paragraph 7 of this opinion, 
and noted by the court of appeals: 
The duties specifically vested in the board under Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5) regarding hearings are the following: 
(1) providing for a public hearing, in which both the 
accused and the complainant may be represented by an 
attorney and may compel the attendance of witnesses, 
§62.13(5)(d); (2) determining whether there is just 
cause to sustain the charges applying the standards of 
§62.13(5)(em)1-7; 
(3) determining 
the 
appropriate 
disposition, 
§ 62.13(5)(e); 
and 
(4) reducing 
to 
writing the findings and determinations and orders of 
suspension, reduction, suspension and reduction, or 
removal, § 62.13(5)(f). 
Conway v. Bd. of Police and Fire Comm'rs of the City of Madison, 
2002 WI App 135, ¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 163, 647 N.W.2d 291. 
¶35 After listing the specific duties of the board, the 
legislature added: "[f]urther rules for the administration of 
this 
subsection 
may 
be 
made 
by 
the 
board." 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g).  We must look to see whether Rule 7.20 
matches these statutory elements. 
¶36 Along with the provisions in Wis. Stat. § 62.04, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
found 
the 
broad 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g) significant in addressing the board's 
authority to promulgate Rule 7.20.  In its analysis, the court 
of 
appeals 
looked 
at 
the 
word 
"administration" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g) to determine the board's scope of 
power.  Because the word "administration" is not specifically 
defined in this statutory provision, the court of appeals 
applied the dictionary definition of the word.  See State v. 
Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998).  The 
No. 
01-0784 
 
16 
 
dictionary defines administration as follows: "[a]dministration 
is: '5 a: the principles, practices, and rationalized techniques 
employed 
in 
achieving 
the 
objectives 
or 
aims 
of 
an 
organization.'"  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 28 
(unabr. 1993). 
A. 
Express Authority 
¶37 As noted previously, Conway has argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13 does not contain statutory language allowing delegation 
of the board's statutory duties as done in Rule 7.20.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we disagree, and hold that there is 
express statutory authority supporting the board's power to 
promulgate Rule 7.20.  That rule plainly comes within the 
board's 
express 
authority 
to 
promulgate 
rules 
for 
the 
administration of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), and is consistent with 
the overall purpose of the statutes.  The board's authority to 
enact a rule allowing hearing examiners to conduct evidentiary 
hearings is grounded in the express authorization in Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(g). 
¶38 Rule 7.20 provides practices and rational techniques 
employed to aid the board in fulfilling the objective of 
providing public hearings as required by § 62.13(5).  The 
limited duties of the hearing examiner under Rule 7.20 all 
relate to 
administration 
of 
the 
disciplinary 
proceedings.  
Specifically, Rule 7.20 assists the board in carrying out its 
duties under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(d), (e), (em), and (f).   
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13, regulating boards of police 
and fire commissioners throughout Wisconsin, is a broad generic 
No. 
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17 
 
statute that is meant to be flexible, in order to meet the needs 
of different cities. 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5) provides a quasi-judicial 
proceeding with all the elements of "fair play" fundamental to 
due process in an administrative law setting.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 62.13(5) broadly outlines the features of the disciplinary 
process 
before 
the 
board, 
from 
complaint 
filing 
through 
findings, determinations, and orders.  In addition, the statute 
as a whole demonstrates a legislative intent to provide due 
process protections to police officers and firefighters subject 
to disciplinary proceedings.  Efficiency and fairness are the 
purposes for the disciplinary hearing process.  State ex rel. 
Kaczkowski v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 33 Wis. 2d 488, 148 
N.W.2d 44, rehearing denied, 33 Wis. 2d 488, 149 N.W.2d 547 
(1967). 
¶41 One of the primary purposes for the legislative act 
providing for the creation of the board was to remove the 
administration of fire and police departments from city politics 
and to place it in the hands of impartial and nonpolitical 
citizen boards.  State ex. rel. Pieritz v. Hartwig, 201 
Wis. 450, 230 N.W. 42 (1930).  None of the elements of due 
process 
in 
quasi-judicial 
administrative 
hearings 
are 
compromised by the appointment of a hearing examiner for the 
purposes indicated in Rule 7.20, because the board, not the 
hearing examiner, makes the final decision and disposition.  The 
board may require further proceedings before the hearing 
examiner or before the board itself.  Due process does not 
No. 
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18 
 
require that evidence be taken before the officer who ultimately 
decides the matter.  Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Bd., 23 Wis. 2d 118, 126, 126 N.W.2d 520 (1964).  
¶42 Such a reading of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) is consistent 
with the legislature’s statement of intent under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.04, that the authority of the board under statutes such as 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) is to be liberally construed.   
¶43 As discussed previously, Conway has contended that the 
board's lack of authority to employ hearing examiners is 
apparent when Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) is compared to other 
statutes.5 He has argued that the comparison reveals that when 
the legislature intends to approve of the use of hearing 
examiners by agencies, it expressly provides authority for both 
the promulgation of rules and the use of hearing examiners in 
the relevant legislation.  
¶44 Conway misstated the holding of the court of appeals 
when he maintained that: 
The court of appeals concluded that implicit in the 
Board's power to make rules for the purpose of 
"administering" sec. 62.13 is the power to hire 
hearing examiners, since such a rule "aid[s] the board 
in fulfilling 
the objective 
of 
providing 
public 
hearings as required by § 62.13(5)" and "assists the 
board in carrying out its duties under § 62.13(5)(d), 
(e), (em), and (f)."  
Pet'r Br. at 13 (citing 2002 WI App 135, ¶13)(emphasis added). 
                                                 
5 See supra note 3. 
No. 
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¶45 Contrary to Conway's contention, the court of appeals' 
decision clearly stated that the board had express statutory 
authority to create Rule 7.20. Conway, 2002 WI App 135, ¶15. 
¶46 We agree with the decision of the court of appeals 
that the "rule falls squarely within the board's administration 
of its duties under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) and the legislature's 
express authorization that the board may make rules for that 
purpose."  Conway, 2002 WI App 135, ¶15.  Since we hold that the 
board has the express authority to enact Rule 7.20, we need not 
engage in an analysis of implied authority. 
B. 
Delegation of Authority 
¶47 Next, Conway has argued that special qualifications 
for board appointment prohibit delegation of any of the board's 
functions to a hearing examiner.  The board is composed of an 
impartial body that operates independently of the city itself.  
Eau Claire County v. General Teamsters Union Local No. 662, 228 
Wis. 2d 640, 650, 599 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, 2000 WI 
57, 235 Wis. 2d 385, 611 N.W.2d 744.  The board is comprised of 
citizen members who have no direct interest in the outcome of 
the case, as would a party to the dispute, and appointment of 
members is designed to prevent the board from operating as an 
agent of a city official or police or fire chief.  Id. 
¶48 Under Rule 7.20, the board, not the hearing examiner, 
makes the ultimate decision.  Rule 7.20 assists the board in 
carrying out its duties under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(d), (e), 
(em), and (f).  As such, the hearing examiner is required to 
provide to the board a comprehensive report, including an 
No. 
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20 
 
evaluation 
of 
witness 
credibility 
and 
demeanor, 
and 
recommendations for disposition of the matter.  In addition, the 
hearing must be videotaped and a certified transcript prepared. 
The board may require further proceedings before either the 
hearing examiner or the board itself.   
¶49 Conway's argument that the rule permits a hearing 
examiner to consider procedural motions, the parameters of 
discovery, and to dismiss the complaint at the initial hearing 
does not change our holding.  The hearing examiner is only able 
to dismiss the complaint if the complainant fails to appear at 
the initial hearing.  Rule 7.20.   
¶50 As noted previously, in administrative proceedings, 
due process does not require that evidence be taken before the 
officer who ultimately decides the matter.  Tecumseh Prods. Co. 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 23 Wis. 2d 118, 126, 126 
N.W.2d 520 (1964).  In a similar vein, we have held that the 
ability of administrative agencies should not be unnecessarily 
restricted by the courts.  State ex rel. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. 
Bd. of Appeals, 21 Wis. 2d 516, 541, 124 N.W.2d 809 (1963).  See 
also Wright v. Indus. Comm., 10 Wis. 2d 653, 103 N.W.2d 531 
(1960).  Accordingly, our holding in this case is consistent 
with our precedent emphasizing the importance of providing an 
administrative agency with the discretion to perform its duties 
as it sees fit, provided that it is not promulgating rules in 
excess of statutorily conferred authority.  Under Rule 7.20, the 
board remains the ultimate decision-making authority, and, 
No. 
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21 
 
therefore, has not impermissibly abdicated its duties to a 
hearing examiner. 
C. 
Comparison of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to Other Statutes 
¶51 Finally, Conway has argued that the legislature did 
not intend to allow cities over 4000 to use hearing examiners.  
In support of this argument, Conway relied on the case of State 
v. Deborah J.Z., 228 Wis. 2d 468, 546 N.W.2d 490 (Ct. App. 
1999), which held "[i]f a statute contains a given provision, 
'the 
omission 
of 
such 
provision 
from 
a 
similar 
statute 
concerning a related subject is significant in showing that a 
different intention existed.'"  Pet'r Br. at 20 (citing Deborah 
J.Z., 228 Wis. 2d 468 at 475-76 (citations omitted). 
¶52 Conway has argued that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m) contains 
a clause allowing persons other than the members of a board to 
"act . . . in 
place 
of 
the 
board 
of 
police 
and 
fire 
commissioners."  Pet'r Br. at 20.  He has maintained that this 
clause follows the statutory provisions governing the board in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(1)-(6).  Conway has asserted that "[n]owhere 
in subd. (1)-(6) is there found any language respecting a 
board's employment of hearing examiners or committees of persons 
who are not Board members."  Pet'r Br. at 20.  
¶53 We agree with the court of appeals that the statute 
establishing alternative ways to conduct hearings in cities with 
a population of less than 4000 (municipalities not required to 
establish a board of police and fire commissioners) is not 
persuasive as to whether the board had authority here to enact 
Rule 7.20.  
No. 
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22 
 
¶54 Conway's argument relying on Deborah J.Z.  overlooks 
the difference between the authority of the hearing examiners 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m) and under Rule 7.20.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 62.13(6m) establishes two alternative ways to conduct 
hearings in cities that are not required to establish a board of 
police and fire commissioners——a three-member committee or a 
hearing examiner.  Either acts entirely in place of the board 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) in all respects.  Thus, for example, 
a hearing examiner under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m) has the duty 
that a board has under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) to make the 
appropriate disposition.  It may be reasonable to infer from 
subsection (6m) that the legislature did not intend that in 
cities with a board, a hearing examiner could assume all the 
board's responsibilities under subsection (5).  However, this 
subsection does not indicate that the legislature intended to 
prohibit the board from delegating to a hearing examiner the 
tasks the board has identified in Rule 7.20. 
¶55 The other statutes listed by Conway are not helpful or 
persuasive in construing Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5). Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 111.07(5) and Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(a) allow the hearing 
examiner to hear and decide the complaint.  As stated above, 
Rule 7.20 does not purport to delegate to the hearing examiner 
the authority to make the determination and disposition required 
under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  As noted previously, Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13, regulating police and fire commissions throughout 
Wisconsin, is a broad statute that is meant to provide 
flexibility to meet the needs of different cities and is to be 
No. 
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23 
 
liberally construed.  Statutes regulating agencies, like the 
Department of Workforce Development, are more specific, and are 
meant to apply the same procedures universally throughout 
Wisconsin. 
¶56 Thus, Conway’s analogy between cities with populations 
of 
less 
than 
4000, 
which 
are 
regulated 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(6m), and cities with populations of 4000 or more, which 
are regulated by Wis. Stat. § 62.13(1) through (5), is not 
appropriate.  Simply because the legislature has given smaller 
cities without boards of police and fire commissioners a choice 
of engaging a hearing examiner for disciplinary proceedings does 
not mean that the legislature intended that boards in larger 
cities may not choose to appoint hearing examiners.   
¶57 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(6m) actually shows that the 
legislature 
believed 
that 
using 
hearing 
examiners 
for 
disciplinary proceedings was a satisfactory way of complying 
with Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), and that such use satisfied the 
legislature’s due process concerns.   
¶58 Rule 7.20 is based upon a proper delegation of power 
by the legislature, and does not constitute administrative 
action in excess of that statutorily conferred authority. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶59 In summary, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  We hold that the City of Madison’s Board of Police and 
Fire Commissioners had the express statutory authority to adopt 
Rule 7.20, because Rule 7.20 falls within the authority under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(g) 
to 
promulgate 
"rules 
for 
the 
No. 
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24 
 
administration" of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  Rule 7.20 ensures 
that the ultimate decision-making authority remains with the 
board.  We are satisfied that Rule 7.20 matches the statutory 
elements of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), and therefore, that the 
statute expressly authorizes that rule.  Our decision is 
consistent with this court’s prior decisions leaving the means 
of carrying out administrative duties in the hands of the agency 
involved whenever possible, and with the legislature’s intent 
that Wis. Stat. §§ 62.01 to 62.26, be liberally construed in 
favor of the rights, powers, and privileges of cities, as long 
as compatible with the constitution and general law.  Our 
interpretation here is compatible. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
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1
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree with the circuit court that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) does 
not authorize the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the 
City of Madison to promulgate Rule 7.20, delegating to a hearing 
examiner the responsibility for conducting the initial hearing 
and the continued evidentiary hearings in a case involving the 
suspension, reduction in rank, or removal of a subordinate 
police officer or firefighter. 
¶61 First, the power to promulgate rules to administer 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) 
does 
not, 
as 
the 
majority 
asserts, 
expressly include the power to adopt Rule 7.20.6  The statute 
simply grants the board the power to make "further rules for the 
administration of this subsection"7 and nowhere does it expressly 
state that these rules may include the delegation of the board's 
responsibilities to a hearing examiner.   
¶62 In other statutes, when the legislature intends to 
permit an administrative agency to delegate its obligation to 
hear contested cases to a hearing examiner, the legislature not 
only grants the agency the power to make rules to administer the 
relevant statute but also expressly grants the agency the power 
                                                 
6 See majority op., ¶¶2, 37, 45, 46, 59. 
7 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g). 
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2
to employ hearing examiners in the relevant legislation.8  
Furthermore, the legislature's decision to permit the delegation 
of board obligations to non-commissioners in cities of under 
4000 persons by express language excludes, by implication, the 
possibility that it intended to invest boards in larger cities 
with such power.9 
¶63 Second, it is well-settled that if a rule promulgated 
by an administrative agency contradicts the language of the 
statute or the statute's legislative intent, the rule is not 
reasonable, exceeds the agency's statutory authority, and must 
be invalidated.10  The majority opinion announces this rule11 but 
then fails to apply it in the present case. 
¶64 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(c) 
gives 
police officers 
and firefighters suspended by the chief the right to request "a 
hearing before the board"——not a hearing before the hearing 
examiner.12  Section 62.13(5)(d) then provides that the board 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 111.07(5) (granting the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission power to make rules to regulate 
hearings); 111.71(1) (expressly granting WERC the power to 
employ hearing examiners); 111.375 (granting the Department of 
Workforce Development the power to make rules necessary to carry 
out the Fair Employment Act); 111.39(4) (granting the DWD power 
to 
employ 
hearing 
examiners 
to 
assist 
in 
effective 
administration).  For more examples, see majority op., ¶22 n.4.   
9 See Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m) (relating to hearings for 
officers suspended, reduced in rank, or removed in cities of 
less than 4,000 people). 
10 Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶73, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659. 
11 Majority op., ¶19 (citing Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶72).  
12 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(c) (emphasis added). 
No. 
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3
must set a date for that requested "hearing" and that the 
requested "hearing" shall be public.13  Section 62.13(5)(d) 
further provides that at the public hearing "both the accused 
and the complainant may be represented by an attorney and may 
compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoenas which shall be 
issued by the president of the board."14 
¶65 The majority reads paragraphs (c) and (d) to vest in 
the board the mere duty to "provid[e] for a public hearing, in 
which both the accused and the complainant may be represented by 
an attorney and may compel the attendance of witnesses."15  In so 
doing, the majority ignores the fact that the right granted to 
subordinates is not just the right to request a public hearing, 
but the right to request a public hearing "before the board," 
and that the attendance of witnesses at the hearing is not 
ominously compelled, but rather compelled by subpoenas issued by 
the "president of the board."  In short, the majority opinion 
ignores that Rule 7.20 contradicts the language of the statute 
establishing the presence of the board at the subordinate's 
hearing and a role for the board in the hearing's procedures.  
¶66 The 
majority opinion 
focuses exclusively on the 
decision-making 
authority 
vested 
in 
the 
board 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), paragraphs (e), (em), and (f), when it 
                                                 
13 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(d). 
14 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(d) (emphasis added). 
15 Majority op., ¶34 (citing Conway v. Bd. of Police and 
Fire Comm'rs, 2002 WI App 135, ¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 163, 647 
N.W.2d 291). 
No. 
01-0784.ssa 
 
 
 
4
concludes that Rule 7.20 does not delegate to the hearing 
examiner 
any 
duties 
vested 
in 
the 
board 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  Section 62.13(5), paragraphs (c) and 
(d), however, make clear that the board's duties are not simply 
to make ultimate decisions but to participate in the hearing as 
well. 
¶67 I also write separately to highlight that today's 
erroneous decision is the third decision released by this court 
this term eroding the rights of police officers and firefighters 
to obtain a just cause hearing before the Board of Police and 
Fire Commissioners under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).16   
¶68 In Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police & Fire Commission, 
2003 
WI 
51, 
__ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___, 
this 
court 
effectively held that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) does not protect 
municipal employees who are promoted subject to successful 
completion of a period of probation when they are denied that 
promotion during the period of probation.  In City of Madison v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 2003 WI 52, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, this court effectively held that 
the same statute bars those same municipal employees from 
collectively 
bargaining 
with 
a 
municipality 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70 to require that a chief's or PFC's decision 
to deny a promotion be reasonable. 
¶69 Now, in the present case, where a municipal employee 
is entitled to a just cause hearing, this court approves the 
                                                 
16 See also City of Madison v. WERC, 2003 WI 52, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Kraus v. City of Waukesha Police & 
Fire Comm'n, 2003 WI 51, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
01-0784.ssa 
 
 
 
5
Madison 
PFC's 
decision 
to 
delegate 
almost 
all 
of 
its 
responsibilities to a hearing examiner.  Rule 7.20 delegates to 
a hearing examiner the responsibility for (1) conducting an 
initial hearing, (2) conducting all continuing evidentiary 
hearings, (3) ruling on procedural motions, (4) making rulings 
on discovery issues, (5) setting dates for a hearing, (6) where 
appropriate, dismissing a complaint filed against a subordinate 
employee, (7) evaluating witness credibility, and (8) making a 
preliminary recommendation on disposition of the charges.17  I 
think it is fair to say that the likely effect of Rule 7.20 is 
to transform the board from a decision-making body into a 
reviewing body and eliminate the right of Madison police 
officers and firefighters to request "a hearing before the 
board."18 
¶70 As 
I 
stated 
in 
Kraus, 
Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(d) 
requires the revisor of statutes to report to the law review 
committee of the legislature those decisions of this and other 
courts "in which Wisconsin statutes or session laws are stated 
to be in conflict, ambiguous, anachronistic, unconstitutional or 
otherwise in need of revision."19  I suggest that the just cause 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.13 are in need of legislative 
oversight. 
¶71 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶8. 
18 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(c). 
19 Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(d). 
No. 
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6
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.