Title: Tuskegee Institute v. May Refrigeration Co., Inc.
Citation: 344 So. 2d 156
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 1977

344 So. 2d 156 (1977)
In re TUSKEGEE INSTITUTE, a corporation,
v.
MAY REFRIGERATION COMPANY, INC., et al.
Ex parte MAY REFRIGERATION COMPANY, INC.
SC 1858.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 14, 1977.
Rehearing Denied February 25, 1977.
*157 Michael I. Kent, Opelika, for petitioner.
Fred D. Gray, Tuskegee, James Larry Lester, John S. Glenn, Opelika, for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
May Refrigeration Company installed an air conditioning unit at Tuskegee Institute, but was never paid for it. Nevertheless, Tuskegee kept the unit and used it. May filed suit against Tuskegee and its agents. A jury awarded May $2,975 [1] compensatory damages, and $3,500 punitive damages. Tuskegee appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that any employee of Tuskegee had actual or apparent authority to bind it. A fuller statement of the facts may be found in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals at 57 Ala.App. 344, 328 So. 2d 598 (1976). We granted certiorari, primarily to review the question of ratification, an issue not addressed in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, but an issue which was presented in the case as is apparent from a reading of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. May did not request the Court of Civil Appeals, pursuant to Rule 39(k), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, on application for rehearing, to add or correct the facts in its opinion on rehearing. May, apparently thinking it should have made the request, asked this Court to suspend the Rule 39(k) requirement and permit it to raise the question of ratification here. Because we can determine from a reading of the facts which are set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals that ratification was, in fact, an issue, the motion to suspend was not necessary.
A look at the record for a better understanding of the facts shows that the pre-trial order, which controls "the subsequent course of the action" (Rule 16, ARCP), reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
We also find that the trial court charged the jury on the issue of ratification. Consequently, Tuskegee had the burden on appeal of showing show the jury verdict was prejudicial to it.
In view of the finding of fact by the Court of Civil Appeals that the evidence was insufficient to show that persons purported to act for Tuskegee had actual or apparent authority we think Tuskegee did show prejudice and we affirm the judgment of that court insofar as it reverses the jury award of $3,500 as punitive damages. However, Tuskegee has failed to show that the jury award of compensatory damages in the amount of $2,975, plus interest, is prejudicial; therefore, we reinstate the judgment *158 of the trial court insofar as that portion of the judgment is concerned.
The Court of Civil Appeals cites City Stores Co. v. Williams, 287 Ala. 385, 252 So. 2d 45 (1971), as follows:
In City Stores, the question was whether City Stores was doing business in Pike County. This Court said:
It is apparent that this Court, in City Stores, recognized that if a principal has knowledge of acts performed on its behalf, even though unauthorized, then the principal can ratify those acts.
The Court of Civil appeals has failed to apply the principle of ratification to Count IV of the complaint.
As is set out in 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, § 175, pp. 560, 561:
The Court of Civil appeals held:
Our review of the evidence to better understand these findings in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals convinces us that different inferences can be drawn from the evidence regarding the 75-25% of the contract price. The jury could well have determined *159 that the 25% Was retained by Tuskegee to cover the air conditioning and heating portion of the contract.
Hence, we think the Court of Civil Appeals failed to accord to the jury verdict the usual presumption of correctness.
Our judgment of reversal is based on this reasoning. Even if the evidence was insufficient to show that Pinnock and Shell had actual or apparent authority to bind Tuskegee, as the Court of Civil Appeals found, Tuskegee nevertheless could ratify their acts.
It is the law that one may ratify the acts of another not done in the name of the former. Eagle Motor Lines v. Hood, 256 Ala. 395, 55 So. 2d 126 (1951); See also 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, § 171, p. 555.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals which reverses the judgment of the circuit court awarding compensatory damages of $2,975, with interest, is itself reversed; otherwise, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed.
May's motion to suspend the rules to permit it to argue the ratification issue is unnecessary and is denied; Tuskegee's motion to strike May's appendix and briefs is denied.
REVERSED, IN PART; AFFIRMED, IN PART, AND REMANDED.
HEFLIN, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
BLOODWORTH, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., dissent.
BLOODWORTH, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority opinion authored by Mr. Justice Maddox. It reverses the Court of Civil Appeals on "the question of ratification," holding that Tuskegee "could ratify" Pinnock's and Shell's acts even though the evidence was "insufficient to show" that they had "actual or apparent authority to bind Tuskegee."
The Court of Civil Appeals speaking through Presiding Judge Wright held that testimony (relating to ratification) was not relevant "to the question of fraudulent misrepresentation of Tuskegee or to the alleged conspiracy of Tuskegee." I think the Court of Civil Appeals was correct.
Plaintiff below (petitioner May here) sued defendant below (respondent Tuskegee here) on four countsthree common counts and a count based on a conspiracy to defraud. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner solely on Count IVconspiracy assessing $2,975 (compensatory damages) and $3,400 (punitive damages).
The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion discloses:
So, plaintiff charged Tuskegee did the misrepresentation through its agents or conspired with its agents to obtain the unit with intent not to pay for it.
The Court of Civil Appeals then held:
* * * * * *
The Court of Civil Appeals clearly points out that testimony as to ratification "may have been relevant to the common counts, but we see no relevance to Count IV upon which the verdict was returned."
I agree. The principle of ratification may have been an issue under the common counts but clearly did not become an issue under the fraud or conspiracy count. The very nature of the charge in the latter count belies "ratification." It expressly charges a willful misrepresentation by Tuskegee acting through its agents, etc., or a conspiracy between Tuskegee and its agents. How can the corporation ratify that? Either the corporation did misrepresent or conspire or it did not.
If petitioner May had wished he might have cross-appealed as to the jury's verdict on the common counts. Not having done so, and "ratification" being properly an issue only as to these counts, how can he be heard to complain now?
This Court ought to quash the writ as improvidently granted or, as I suggest, affirm the Court of Civil Appeals' decision.
ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
[1]  The Court of Civil Appeals erred in stating the amount of compensatory damages as $2,925.