Title: In re K.J.E.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 500A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-109 
No. 500A20 
Filed 24 September 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: K.J.E. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 25 
September 2020 by Judge Frederick B. Wilkins Jr. in District Court, Alamance 
County. This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 
August 2021 but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant 
to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
No brief for petitioner-appellee. 
 
No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Sean P. Vitrano for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent appeals from an order terminating his parental rights in K.J.E. 
(Keith).1  We vacate the termination order and remand the matter to the trial court. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
Keith’s mother (petitioner) initiated this action to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights in District Court, Alamance County on March 8, 2019.  The petition 
asserted that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on the 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.  
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failure of respondent to provide substantial financial support or consistent care for 
Keith pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) and willful abandonment pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).  Respondent filed an answer opposing the termination of 
his parental rights on April 18, 2019. 
¶ 3 
 
Evidence presented in the petition tended to show that respondent was under 
a monthly child support obligation of $475 and was $9,599.88 in arrears at the time 
the petition was filed.  In addition, respondent failed to make any effort to have 
contact with Keith since Keith’s birth.  The only contact between respondent and 
Keith occurred as a result of petitioner’s efforts.  Respondent’s last contact with Keith 
occurred in June 2017.  Petitioner further alleged that respondent never 
communicated with Keith, nor had respondent acknowledged the child’s birthday by 
calling or sending a card or gift.  Further, respondent never sent a gift to Keith or 
otherwise communicated with the child at Christmas. 
¶ 4 
 
A termination hearing was held on September 16, 2020.  Prior to the hearing, 
the trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) as a 
ground for termination because respondent submitted to genetic testing which 
determined that he was Keith’s father, and the child’s birth certificate had been 
amended to recognize respondent as the father.  The hearing proceeded solely on 
petitioner’s willful abandonment claim.  On September 25, 2020, the trial court 
entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights based on willful 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
abandonment.  Respondent appeals. 
II. 
Analysis 
¶ 5 
 
“Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for termination of parental 
rights proceedings consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In re 
Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94, 839 S.E.2d 792, 796–97 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, 
1110 (2019)).  “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving 
by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for 
termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 
3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019)).  “We review 
a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 to determine whether the 
findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings 
support the conclusions of law.  The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de 
novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019) (cleaned 
up). 
¶ 6 
 
Here, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights for willful abandonment based on the following findings of fact: 
5. Petitioner and respondent began a relationship 
sometime in 2015 and resided together at petitioner’s 
residence . . . until sometime in June, 2016 when 
petitioner was approximately six (6) weeks pregnant 
and the parties separated.  
6. The petitioner and respondent reconciled and began 
living together for approximately two (2) months after 
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the birth of the minor child and resided together at 
petitioner’s residence until sometime in May or June, 
2016 when the parties separated.  
7. The Court finds that from the separation in May or 
June, 2016 through November, 2017, that it was the 
petitioner who was encouraging respondent to develop 
a 
relationship 
with 
the 
minor 
child, 
despite 
respondent’s testimony to the contrary. 
8. The Court finds that respondent has no bond with the 
minor child nor has he made significant effort to 
establish a relationship or bond by his actions including 
initiating a visitation proceeding.  
9. That respondent has provided some financial support 
during the relevant six (6) month period through 
involuntary wage withholding from November 26, 2018 
through the filing of the petition. This was not the court-
ordered amount of $465.00/month. 
10. 
The Court finds by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence, that grounds exist for termination of parental 
rights pursuant to G.S. 7B-1111(a)(7) in that the 
Respondent has willfully abandoned the minor child for 
at least six (6) consecutive months immediately 
preceding the filing of this Petition.  
¶ 7 
 
Respondent argues the trial court’s factual findings are insufficient to establish 
willful abandonment.  More specifically, respondent contends the trial court made 
inadequate findings regarding his conduct during the determinative period under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).  
¶ 8 
 
A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights when “[t]he parent has 
willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2019).  “Abandonment 
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implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to 
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Young, 
346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 
N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986)).  “[I]f a parent withholds his presence, 
his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to 
lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and 
abandons the child.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962).  
“Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of 
fact to be determined from the evidence.” In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32, 35, 839 S.E.2d 
748, 752 (2020) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. at 276, 346 S.E.2d at 
514).  “[A]lthough the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-
month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions, the ‘determinative’ 
period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding 
the filing of the petition.”  In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77, 833 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2019) 
(quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 619, 810 S.E.2d 375, 378 (2018)).  Here, the 
determinative six-month period was from September 8, 2018 to March 8, 2019.  
¶ 9 
 
Upon review, the trial court’s sparse findings in the adjudicatory stage are 
insufficient as they do not address respondent’s behavior within the relevant six-
month period.  Apart from the trial court’s ultimate determination in finding of fact 
ten that “the Respondent has willfully abandoned the minor child for at least six (6) 
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consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of this Petition[,]” only finding 
of fact nine references the relevant period.  Finding of fact nine notes that respondent 
provided financial support solely through involuntary wage withholding during the 
“relevant six (6) month period”  but nevertheless fails to address the amount withheld 
or any other attendant circumstances.  
¶ 10 
 
Although the trial court’s generalized finding of fact eight arguably addresses 
the relevant period, the finding does not address any specific conduct by respondent 
during the relevant period.  Instead, the trial court generally states respondent has 
not “made significant effort to establish a relationship or bond” with Keith.  The trial 
court’s order fails to provide sufficient evidentiary findings concerning respondent’s 
acts or omissions for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 
for this Court to conclude that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights due to willful abandonment.  In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 601, 850 S.E.2d 330, 
337 (2020) (“[T]he trial court must make adequate evidentiary findings to support its 
ultimate finding as to whether willful intent exists.”).   
¶ 11 
 
We note that evidence was presented during the adjudicatory stage of the 
termination hearing from which the trial court could have made additional findings 
of fact that might support a conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights based on willful abandonment.  However, the trial court distinguished 
its findings of fact in the adjudicatory portion of its order from its findings of fact in 
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the dispositional portion.  Indeed, the trial court made such additional findings in the 
dispositional portion of the termination order.  Because the trial court only moves to 
the dispositional stage if it adjudicates one or more grounds for termination during 
the adjudicatory stage, see In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 94, 839 S.E.2d at 797, and 
because there are different evidentiary standards and burdens in the two stages, see 
N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109(f), -1110(a), we do not consider the trial court’s findings of fact 
that are clearly labeled as dispositional findings to support the adjudication of 
grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights.  
¶ 12 
 
Thus, because the trial court failed to make proper findings on adjudication, 
we vacate the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights based on 
willful abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and remand the matter for 
further factual findings on this ground.  See In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 284, 837 S.E.2d 
861, 869 (2020) (finding that although the record contained additional evidence to 
support termination, the trial court’s adjudicatory findings were insufficient, and 
remand was necessary).  
VACATED AND REMANDED.