Title: Polanco v. Sandor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12389
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2018

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SJC-12389 
 
DOROTEO POLANCO  vs.  ANDRAS SANDOR. 
 
 
August 13, 2018. 
 
 
Medical Malpractice, Bond. 
 
 
 
The plaintiff, Doroteo Polanco, commenced this medical 
malpractice action pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 60B, against the 
defendant, Andras Sandor, and two others.1  After a medical 
malpractice tribunal concluded that there was not evidence 
"sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability 
appropriate for judicial inquiry," as required by the statute, 
Polanco filed a surety bond in the amount of $6,000 so that he 
could pursue his claim "through the usual judicial process."  
See G. L. c. 231, § 60B.  Sandor filed a motion to strike the 
surety bond and to dismiss the complaint.  A judge in the 
Superior Court allowed the motion to strike on the basis that a 
surety bond does not satisfy the statutory obligation to file 
"bond in the amount of [$6,000] in the aggregate secured by cash 
or its equivalent."  G. L. c. 231, § 60B.  The judge then 
reported his ruling on the issue to the Appeals Court pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), 
and stayed the matter in the trial court.  We transferred the 
case to this court on our own initiative. 
 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 60B, "[e]very action for 
malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health care 
shall be heard by a tribunal consisting of a single justice of 
the superior court, a physician licensed to practice medicine in 
                                                 
1 According to the trial court docket, stipulations of 
dismissal have entered as to the plaintiff's claims against the 
two other defendants, Khaled A. Yehia and Hallmark Health 
System, Inc.  They are not a part of this appeal. 
2 
 
the commonwealth . . . and an attorney authorized to practice 
law in the commonwealth."  At the hearing, the plaintiff "shall 
present an offer of proof" and the tribunal "shall determine if 
the evidence presented if properly substantiated is sufficient 
to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for 
judicial inquiry or whether the plaintiff's case is merely an 
unfortunate medical result."  Where, as here, the tribunal finds 
for the defendant, "the plaintiff may pursue the claim through 
the usual judicial process only upon filing bond in the amount 
of [$6,000] in the aggregate secured by cash or its equivalent," 
which will be "payable to the defendant . . . for costs 
assessed, including witness and experts fees and attorneys fees 
if the plaintiff does not prevail in the final judgment."  The 
presiding judge may, in his or her discretion, increase the 
amount of the bond, or, if a determination is made that the 
plaintiff is indigent, the judge may reduce, but not eliminate 
all together, the amount of the bond.2 
 
 
General Laws c. 231, § 60B, was enacted in 1975 to help 
"ensure the continued availability of medical malpractice 
insurance at a reasonable cost," and to do so by imposing a 
screening procedure and a bond requirement to "discourage 
frivolous medical malpractice claims."  Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 
373 Mass. 645, 647, 651 (1977).  See, e.g., Faircloth v. 
DiLillo, 466 Mass. 120, 124 (2013) (discussing purpose of bond 
requirement).  The Legislature's intent in enacting § 60B 
 
"was to discourage malpractice litigation that is 
inappropriate for judicial resolution either because the 
litigation is frivolous or because, even if the plaintiff 
is acting in good faith, his alleged injury is simply an 
'unfortunate medical result' for which the defendant should 
not be held accountable." 
 
McLaughlin, A Look at the Massachusetts Malpractice Tribunal 
System, 3 Am. J.L. & Med. 197, 200 (1977). 
 
 
With that in mind, we turn to the question before us:  
whether a surety bond in the amount of $6,000 (which, as best we 
can tell from the record before us, Polanco obtained for $120) 
satisfied the requirement of the statute that a plaintiff 
wishing to proceed after a tribunal has found in favor of a 
                                                 
2 In addition to moving to strike the surety bond and 
dismiss the complaint, the defendant here also moved to increase 
the amount of the bond.  The judge denied that part of the 
motion. 
3 
 
defendant must file "bond in the amount of [$6,000] in the 
aggregate secured by cash or its equivalent."  We conclude that 
it does not. 
 
 
Where an accepted purpose of the statute is to discourage a 
plaintiff from pressing forward with what a tribunal has 
determined to be unmeritorious claims, and where, to that end, 
the statute requires a bond in the amount of $6,000 in "cash or 
its equivalent," allowing a plaintiff to proceed after paying 
only a modest sum (here, $120) rather than the statutorily-
prescribed $6,000 would not accomplish the statute's objective.  
Indeed, Polanco himself has failed to set forth any meaningful 
argument to support his position that using a surety bond is 
adequate.  The argument section of his brief includes but one 
paragraph that states, in its entirety: 
 
"$6000 = $6000.  A surety bond in the amount of $6000 is 
equivalent to $6000.  The legislature chose to add the 
words 'or its equivalent' to the subject statute.  The 
basic tenant [sic] of statutory interpretation is simply to 
give the legislature[']s word[s] their ordinary meaning.  
Clearly the legislature contemplated an alternative to cash 
to satisfy the posting requirement under G. L. c. 231, 
[§] 60B.  The purpose of G. L. c. 231, [§] 60B, is not 
punitive." 
 
That the Legislature contemplated an alternative to cash does 
not necessarily mean, however, that a surety bond will suffice, 
at least in the context presented here.3 
 
 
Polanco's point -- that a surety bond in the amount of 
$6,000 "is equivalent to $6000" -- arguably might be accurate if 
one were to look at the statute solely from a defendant's 
perspective; should a plaintiff lose in the trial court (thus 
rendering the $6,000 available to the defendant for trial costs, 
including attorney's fees) it may not matter whether the 
defendant is compensated in cash or by a professional surety 
with a bond.  Compensation is not the only objective of the 
statute, however, nor is it even the dominant objective.  As our 
cases state, a principal purpose of the statute is to deter 
plaintiffs from going forward with unmeritorious claims.  From 
that perspective, a $6,000 surety bond that cost a plaintiff 
                                                 
3  We need not here decide what, specifically, constitutes 
the "equivalent" of cash -- e.g., a certified check, a money 
order, personal property.  We merely conclude that a surety bond 
does not. 
4 
 
$120 is certainly not equivalent to $6,000 because it does 
little to accomplish the Legislature's objective.  Allowing a 
plaintiff to proceed on something quite less than $6,000 
effectively ignores the deterrence intent of the statute. 
 
 
We do agree with Polanco on one point -- that the purpose 
of the bond requirement is not punitive.  The point is not to 
punish a plaintiff; the point is to discourage unmeritorious 
claims and to compensate a defendant for costs should the 
plaintiff's claims ultimately fail.  That the bond requirement 
is not punitive does not, however, somehow render a surety bond 
equivalent to cash (and, again, Polanco has given us no legal 
argument to support his position).4 
  
 
For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that a surety 
bond in the face amount of $6,000 is not the "equivalent" of 
$6,000 in cash for purposes of G. L. c. 231, § 60B.  The order 
of the Superior Court judge allowing the defendant's motion to 
strike the surety bond is therefore affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Richard Sheehan for the plaintiff. 
 
Allyson N. Hammerstedt for the defendant. 
                                                 
4 If the Legislature had intended a surety bond to suffice 
for purposes of G. L. c. 231, § 60B, it could easily have 
included language to that effect in the statute.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Ray, 435 Mass. 249, 258 (2001) (concluding, in 
criminal bail context, that under provision in G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58, stating that defendant required to post cash bail "shall 
be allowed to provide an equivalent amount in a surety company 
bond," "a surety bond set at an amount ten times the amount of 
[the] cash bail is equal in effect to that cash bail").