Title: Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13253
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2023

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SJC-13253 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANK DiBENEDETTO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 4, 2022. – February 28, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Due Process of Law, Plea.  Constitutional Law, Plea.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Plea, Trial of defendants together, 
Postconviction relief, District attorney.  District 
Attorney.  Words, "New and substantial question." 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 21, 1986. 
 
Following review by this court, 414 Mass. 37 (1992), 427 
Mass. 414 (1998), 458 Mass. 657 (2011), and 475 Mass. 429 
(2016), a motion for postconviction relief, filed on May 7, 
2021, was heard by James F. Lang, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gaziano, J., 
in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
Ruth Greenberg for the defendant. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Travis H. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Hampden District. 
Robert F. Hennessy for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
2 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 1994, the defendant, who had been indicted, 
along with two codefendants, on two counts of murder in the 
first degree, and was to be tried jointly with one of his 
codefendants, was offered a "package deal" plea bargain.  Under 
the terms of this offer, the defendant would have been able to 
plead guilty to manslaughter, but only if his codefendant also 
agreed to the same plea.  The defendant agreed to the terms of 
the agreement, but his codefendant, a juvenile, refused.  Both 
the defendant and his codefendant subsequently were tried and 
convicted of all charges, and sentenced to consecutive terms of 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.  In May 2021, 
the defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court, pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), to 
vacate his convictions of murder in the first degree and to 
accept his pleas to manslaughter, as the Commonwealth originally 
had offered.  The defendant's motion to enforce the terms of the 
proffered agreement was based on the argument that the condition 
attached to the offer -- that both he and his codefendant plead 
guilty -- violated his due process right to decide whether to 
accept the plea or to go to trial.  A Superior Court judge, who 
was not the trial judge, denied the motion.  The defendant filed 
a gatekeeper petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, seeking leave to appeal from the denial of the 
3 
 
motion, and a single justice allowed the appeal to proceed in 
this court. 
 
We conclude that the plea offer did not violate the 
defendant's rights to due process.  A package deal plea is 
consonant with the prosecutor's broad discretion to decide 
whether, and under what terms, to enter into a plea agreement.  
A prosecutor may insist that, in order for a defendant to 
receive a more lenient sentence than what might be received at 
trial, all codefendants must agree to waive their rights to 
trial.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Prior proceedings.  This case has a 
lengthy history in this court.  In April 1988, the defendant and 
one of his codefendants, Louis R. Costa, were found guilty of 
two counts of murder in the first degree after a joint trial.  
Another codefendant, Paul Tanso, also was convicted of two 
counts of murder in the first degree at a separate trial.  In 
1992, this court reversed the convictions of all three 
defendants because recorded testimony of a witness who was 
unavailable at the trials had been admitted improperly.  See 
Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 50 (1992); 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district 
attorney for the Hampden district and the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services. 
4 
 
Commonwealth v. Tanso, 411 Mass. 640, 656, cert. denied, 505 
U.S. 1221 (1992). 
 
The defendant and Costa were retried jointly, and on 
February 3, 1994, they each were convicted of two counts of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  The defendant also was found guilty on a theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant and Costa each 
were sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole.  This court affirmed the convictions and 
denied the defendants' requests for relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 416 
(1998).  In March 1994, Tanso was retried separately and was 
acquitted. 
 
In 2005, the defendant and Costa each filed a motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence concerning 
deoxyribonucleic acid testing of bloodstains on the defendant's 
sneakers.  In 2009, the Superior Court judge who had presided 
over the defendant's second trial denied these motions.  The 
defendant and Costa each filed gatekeeper petitions in the 
county court pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, seeking leave to 
appeal from the denial of their motions for a new trial; two 
different single justices allowed these gatekeeper petitions to 
proceed.  On a consolidated appeal from the denials, this court 
remanded the matter to the Superior Court for further findings 
5 
 
concerning the newly uncovered evidence and its exculpatory 
value.  See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 670-673 
(2011).  After a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge 
again denied the motions.  The defendant then filed a petition 
in the county court to reinstate his appeal in the full court.  
A single justice held that the defendant was "required to seek 
leave to appeal from the renewed denial of his new trial motion 
through a second gatekeeper petition under [G. L. c. 278,] 
§ 33E."  Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 475 Mass. 429, 431 (2016).  
The single justice "treated the defendant's petition to 
reinstate his appeal as a second gatekeeper petition" and 
"denied the petition."  Id.  In September 2015, "the defendant 
filed a motion in the full court to reinstate his appeal."  Id. 
at 431-432.  We held that "reinstatement of the appeal [was] 
appropriate, even though the court did not expressly retain 
jurisdiction."  Id. at 432.  We further concluded that the 
"motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion [for a new trial]."  Id. 
 
On October 9, 2015, Costa, who was sixteen at the time of 
the shooting, was resentenced to serve two concurrent life 
sentences with the possibility of parole.  The resentencing 
followed this court's decision in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013), S.C., 
471 Mass. 12 (2015), in which we concluded that the 
6 
 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not permit a sentence 
of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
individuals who commit murder in the first degree while under 
the age of eighteen.  On July 26, 2018, Costa was released on 
parole. 
 
In May 2021, the defendant, who was nineteen years old at 
the time of the shooting, filed a motion in the Superior Court, 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, to vacate his convictions of 
murder in the first degree and to enforce a plea arrangement 
under which he would plead guilty to two counts of manslaughter.  
In his motion, the defendant asserted that, during his retrial 
in 1994, the prosecutor offered him and Costa a plea agreement 
in which they each would plead guilty to manslaughter, but only 
on the condition that both of them accepted the arrangement.  
The defendant agreed to accept the proffered agreement, but 
Costa rejected it.  As grounds for his motion, the defendant 
argued that "making [his] plea offer contingent on the 
willingness of his codefendant to accept it . . . violated his 
due process right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and 
art. 12, to make his own decision whether to accept the plea or 
go to trial."  The defendant's motion was denied.  The defendant 
filed another gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, in the county court, seeking leave to appeal from the 
denial of the motion.  The single justice allowed the appeal to 
7 
 
proceed "on the ground that it presents a new and substantial 
question which ought to be determined by the full court." 
 
b.  Plea offer.  The defendant submitted six affidavits to 
support his contention that the Commonwealth offered him and 
Costa a plea arrangement during the course of the 1994 retrial.  
One affidavit was by the defendant himself; two were from the 
attorney who represented him on retrial; one was by the 
attorney's then associate, who assisted him on the case; one was 
from the defendant's sister, who was in the court room during 
the retrial; and one was by Costa. 
 
The defendant avers that the prosecutor offered him and 
Costa the opportunity to plead guilty to two counts of 
manslaughter, with the imposition of consecutive sentences, 
provided that both accepted the offer.  The defendant recollects 
that the plea arrangement would have included a combined 
sentence of from twenty-four to twenty-six years; the defendant 
asserts that, given then-available statutory good time and 
reductions for time served, had he been able to accept the plea, 
he would have been released in 2004.  The defendant maintains 
that he wanted to accept the offer, but that Costa refused to do 
so.  According to the defendant, if he were released from 
custody, he would live with his sister and would work at a 
restaurant that she and her husband own. 
8 
 
 
The other affidavits accord with the defendant's 
recollection.  Costa recalled that the plea arrangement would 
have required that the defendants "agree to a sentence that 
would have each of [them] serve another eight or so years in 
prison"2 and that "[t]he offer was a take it or leave it for both 
of [them] together."  The other affiants did not recall the 
length of the proposed sentence. 
 
According to the affidavit by the defendant's sister, 
during the 1994 retrial, she "learned that the Commonwealth had 
offered [the defendant] and his codefendant . . . a plea to 
manslaughter provided that both of them accepted it.  [The 
defendant] said he wanted to accept the plea.  In a hallway 
outside the courtroom, [she] saw [Costa's] lawyer . . . get on 
his knees and beg [Costa] to take the plea, but he refused."  
The defendant's attorney and his associate each recalled that 
Costa's attorney told them that he had "gotten on his knees and 
begged Costa to accept the plea, but he still refused." 
 
2 The shooting took place on February 19, 1986.  The 
defendant and his codefendants were arrested on February 23, 
1986.  The defendant and Costa originally were sentenced on 
April 11, 1988.  On December 28, 1992, this court reversed the 
judgments, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the cases for a 
new trial, and the defendant was released on bail.  On February 
3, 1994, the defendant and Costa were convicted after retrial.  
The defendant asserts that, at the time the plea agreement was 
proffered, he had been incarcerated for four years and four 
months. 
9 
 
 
The defendant's attorney averred that, in November 2020, he 
spoke with the assistant district attorney who prosecuted the 
case.  That assistant district attorney, who is now a Superior 
Court judge, recalled that there had been a plea offer that had 
been approved by the district attorney.  She further recalled 
that it was her practice at the time to "require package pleas 
in cases involving codefendants."  She did not remember the 
specific terms of the offer.  The defendant's attorney also 
explained in his affidavit that he had informed the 
Commonwealth, either through the assistant district attorney who 
prosecuted the case or through a first assistant district 
attorney, that the defendant wished to accept the offer and 
"urged that it be accepted despite Costa's refusal." 
 
The Commonwealth agrees that the defendant and Costa 
received a plea offer that was contingent on acceptance by both 
of them.  The Commonwealth takes no stance on the specific terms 
of the arrangement. 
 
2.  Discussion.  A "package deal" plea agreement is a plea 
arrangement under which "the government accepts a defendant's 
guilty plea on the condition that his [or her] co-defendant(s) 
also plead guilty."  United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 489 
10 
 
(3d Cir. 2005).3  The defendant argues that a prosecutor's offer 
to participate in a package agreement violates his rights to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights; the defendant maintains that such an offer violates the 
due process rights of the defendant who receives the offer, 
because the defendant's ability to plead is arbitrarily and 
unfairly made contingent upon the willingness of a codefendant 
to do so.  The defendant contends, therefore, that the plea 
offer he received in 1994 was a violation of his due process 
rights and that the appropriate remedy is to enforce the 1994 
plea offer, even though Costa refused to accept it at the time. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant has waived any 
claims he might have concerning the 1994 plea offer, because he 
failed to raise them when he moved for a new trial in 2005.  The 
Commonwealth also argues that the package plea offer did not 
infringe upon the defendant's due process rights. 
 
Ordinarily, "[w]e review the denial of a motion brought 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) . . . for abuse of discretion or 
 
3 Package plea deals also have been described as "wired" 
pleas, United States v. Knight, 981 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 
2020); "locked" pleas, United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 482 
(3d Cir. 2005); "contingent" pleas, State v. Solano, 150 Ariz. 
398, 401 (1986); "tied" pleas, State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 
530, 534 (2008); and "linked" pleas, People v. Wyatt, 2 A.D.3d 
218, 219 (N.Y. 2003). 
11 
 
error of law."  Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 Mass. 562, 567 
(2018).  Where, however, "a defendant claims that a judge has 
made an error of constitutional dimension, we accept the judge's 
subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error . . . but review 
independently the application of constitutional principles to 
the facts found" (quotations and citation).  Id. at 567-568.  
The defendant's argument here is constitutionally based, and 
thus we review the denial of his motion de novo. 
 
a.  New and substantial question.  As an initial matter, we 
consider whether the defendant's claim presents a new and 
substantial question.  Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, a defendant 
"is entitled to review of the denial of his [or her] 
motion . . . if and only if [the defendant] can show that he [or 
she] is raising an issue that is 'new and substantial.'"  
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 459 Mass. 480, 488, cert. denied, 565 
U.S. 868 (2011).  "An issue is not 'new' within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, where either it has already been addressed, 
or . . . it could have been addressed had the defendant properly 
raised it . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Ambers, 397 Mass. 705, 707 
(1986).  Accordingly, "[i]f a defendant fails to raise a claim 
that is generally known and available at the time of trial or 
direct appeal or in the first motion for postconviction relief, 
the claim is waived."  Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016, 
1017-1018 (2000).  A claim is deemed waived under G. L. c. 278, 
12 
 
§ 33E, however, only if the defendant previously had a "genuine 
opportunity" to raise it (citation omitted).  See Mains v. 
Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 33 (2000).  See also Rodwell, supra 
("the waiver principles that we apply pursuant to [G. L. 
c. 278,] § 33E," are similar to "the waiver rules expressed in" 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (2), which provides that claim is not 
waived if it "could not reasonably have been raised in the 
original or amended motion").  A genuine opportunity did not 
exist if the "theory on which the [defendant's argument relies] 
was not sufficiently developed at the time of [trial, in a 
direct appeal, or in a prior motion for postconviction relief]" 
(citation omitted).  Mains, supra at 34. 
 
Here, the single justice determined that the defendant's 
motion to enforce the 1994 plea offer "raises a new and 
substantial question regarding the scope of constitutional 
protections afforded a defendant during the plea-bargaining 
process."  The Commonwealth, however, argues that the 
defendant's claim is not new, because he had had prior 
opportunities to raise the issue, and thus the claim has been 
waived.  The defendant maintains that he has not waived the 
claim, because the theory on which it relies was not available 
prior to 2012, when the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decisions in two companion cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 
(2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 
13 
 
 
In both Frye, 566 U.S. at 143, and Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174, 
the Court held that, at least in certain instances, a fair trial 
may not suffice to cure a violation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights during pretrial plea bargaining.  In Frye, 
supra at 138-139, defense counsel failed to advise his client of 
a prosecutor's plea offers, and the offers expired; the 
defendant eventually pleaded guilty on more severe terms than he 
would have had if he had accepted the original offers.  The 
Court held that the defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution to the effective assistance of 
counsel applies to plea bargaining, and remanded the matter to 
the trial court to determine whether defense counsel's failure 
to inform the defendant resulted in Strickland prejudice.4  Id. 
at 147, 151.  The Court reasoned that "it is insufficient simply 
to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that 
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process."  Id. at 143-144.  
 
4 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court held that, to establish that 
"counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of 
a conviction," a defendant must show, first, "that counsel's 
performance was deficient," and second, that "the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense."  The Court in Missouri v. 
Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012), held that there is Strickland 
prejudice in the plea bargaining context if a defendant can show 
there is a "reasonable probability [the defendant] would have 
accepted the earlier plea offer" absent deficient performance by 
counsel and "there is a reasonable probability neither the 
prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer 
from being accepted or implemented." 
14 
 
In Lafler, supra at 160-161, the defendant rejected the 
prosecutor's plea offers due to erroneous advice by his 
attorney, and was convicted at trial.  The Court held that 
defense counsel's faulty advice violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
at 174.  Furthermore, the Court held, the fact that the 
defendant had had a fair trial did not "wipe[] clean any 
deficient performance by defense counsel during plea 
bargaining."  Id. at 169.  As a remedy, the Court ordered the 
State to reoffer the defendant the original plea agreement.  Id. 
at 174. 
 
The defendant relies upon Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174, and 
Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-144, to argue that the 1994 plea offer 
should be enforced, regardless of whether he subsequently 
received a fair trial.  At the time of Lafler, supra, and Frye, 
supra, this court had not endorsed the enforcement of an expired 
plea offer as a remedy.  See Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 
11, 27 (2004) (Sosman, J., concurring) ("There is no basis for 
ordering the prosecutor to revive the withdrawn offer as a 
remedy for defense counsel's deficient advice concerning the 
original plea offer").  See also Lafler, supra at 183 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) ("It is a remedy unheard of in American 
jurisprudence -- and, I would be willing to bet, in the 
jurisprudence of any other country").  The Court's holdings in 
15 
 
Lafler, supra, and Frye, supra, obviously were not available to 
the defendant in 2005, when he moved for a new trial, nor in 
2009, when he filed a gatekeeper petition seeking leave to 
appeal from the denial of that motion.  The defendant therefore 
lacked a genuine opportunity to raise this claim prior to the 
present motion.  See Mains, 433 Mass. at 33 (no genuine 
opportunity to raise claim until after issuance of United States 
Supreme Court decisions on which claim was based). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant had a previous 
opportunity to raise a claim that relied upon Lafler, 566 U.S. 
at 174, and Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-144, because he actively was 
pursuing litigation in this case in 2012.  In that year, 
however, the defendant was litigating the motion for a new trial 
that he had filed in 2005, following this court's remand for 
further findings in 2009.  See DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. at 672-
673.  This court retained jurisdiction over the case while it 
was remanded to the Superior Court, and then, in 2016, 
reinstated the defendant's 2009 appeal once the Superior Court 
judge's "further hearing and findings" enabled us to decide the 
issue the defendant had raised in 2005.  See DiBenedetto, 475 
Mass. at 437-438.  We concluded that the defendant was not 
required to file a new gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, in order to have his appeal reinstated, because 
"a single justice already determined in 2009 that the 
16 
 
defendant's motion for a new trial raised a new and substantial 
issue worthy of consideration by the full court."  Id. at 437.  
The defendant was not able to raise a new issue in his petition 
to reinstate his appeal, because, had he done so, he would have 
had to submit a new gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  See id. at 438 n.12.  The defendant therefore 
did not have an opportunity to raise a new claim during the 
period of litigation between 2012 and 2016.  Accordingly, he has 
not waived his claim challenging the constitutionality of the 
plea offer that he was presented in 1994. 
We also agree with the single justice that the defendant's 
claim is "substantial."  To be "substantial," a claim must 
present a "meritorious issue . . . worthy of consideration by an 
appellate court."  Gunter, 459 Mass. at 487.  As the single 
justice explained, the issue presented here -- whether package 
agreements are consistent with a defendant's rights to due 
process -- has been a subject of disagreement among judges in 
the Superior Court, and has not been addressed by this court 
since the United States Supreme Court issued its decisions in 
Lafler and Frye.  Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant 
has presented a "new and substantial question." 
 
b.  Plea bargaining.  Prosecutors have "substantial freedom 
to exercise their discretion in plea bargaining."  Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 522 (1981).  It is the prosecutor's 
17 
 
role to determine, on behalf of the Commonwealth, whether the 
public interest would benefit from a plea agreement.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500 (1991), S.C., 422 
Mass. 816 (1996).  A defendant therefore has "no right to insist 
that the prosecutor participate in plea bargaining."  Smith, 
supra.  The discretion granted to the prosecutor in plea 
bargaining "rests largely on the recognition that the decision 
to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 423 Mass. 129, 
136 (1996).  Judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion 
over plea bargaining could "threaten[] to chill law enforcement 
by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and [decision-making] to 
outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness 
by revealing the Government's enforcement policy" (citation 
omitted).  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). 
 
That is not to say that there are no constraints on the 
prosecutor's actions in plea bargaining.  See Lafler, 566 U.S. 
at 168.  To the contrary, "[t]his phase of the process of 
criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in 
accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to 
insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the 
circumstances."  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
(1971).  Hence, "[d]ue process requires that '[a] "plea is valid 
only when the defendant offers it voluntarily, with sufficient 
18 
 
awareness of the relevant circumstances . . . and with the 
advice of competent counsel"'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 362 (2015).  Moreover, a judge may 
"enforce a plea agreement over the Commonwealth's objection if 
[the judge] finds that the defendant has reasonably relied on a 
prosecutor's promise to his or her detriment."  Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 477 Mass. 582, 585 (2017). 
 
This court previously has suggested that package plea 
offers do not violate a defendant's due process rights.  In 
Smith, 384 Mass. at 520, the defendant was tried with a 
codefendant on charges of murder in the first degree.  The 
prosecutor indicated that he would accept a guilty plea to 
murder in the second degree from the defendant "only if [his 
codefendant] also pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree."  Id.  At first, the codefendant rejected the offer, and 
thus prevented the defendant from accepting it.  Id.  After jury 
deliberations began, however, the codefendant pleaded guilty to 
murder in the second degree with the approval of the prosecutor.  
Id. at 521.  Thereafter, the defendant attempted to plead to 
murder in the second degree, but "the prosecutor opposed it," 
and the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.  
Id.  The judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial 
because he concluded that the plea offer had expired once the 
jury began deliberations and therefore was no longer enforceable 
19 
 
over the Commonwealth's objection.  Id.  We affirmed.  Id. 
at 520.  While the defendant did not challenge the 
constitutionality of the package arrangement that he was 
offered, we observed in passing that "[s]uch an arrangement has 
survived challenge."  Id. at 520 n.2.  In affirming the trial 
judge's ruling, we reasoned that "[t]he defendant is in no worse 
position than he would have been if the prosecutor had made no 
plea bargain offer at all," because "the defendant is left with 
the adequate remedy of having a trial."  Id. at 522. 
 
The defendant maintains that the United States Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169-170, and Frye, 566 
U.S. at 143-144, calls into question this court's reasoning in 
Smith, 384 Mass. at 522.  In contrast to this court's holding in 
that case, the United States Supreme Court in Lafler, supra 
at 166, observed that "[e]ven if the trial itself is free from 
constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of 
taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a 
conviction on more serious counts or the imposition of a more 
severe sentence."  While defendants have "no right to be offered 
a plea," the State "nonetheless [must] act in accord with the 
dictates of the Constitution" once it decides to engage in plea 
bargaining (citations omitted).  Id. at 168.  The defendant 
contends that the offer of the package agreement violated his 
rights to due process and, therefore, in order to cure the 
20 
 
injury, the terms of the offer should be enforced.5  See Lafler, 
supra at 166. 
 
c.  Fundamental right.  The defendant argues that the 
condition attached to the plea offer -- that Costa also had to 
plead guilty in order for the defendant to plead to a lesser 
charge -- violated the defendant's fundamental right to choose 
whether to accept or reject the offer.  According to the 
defendant, the package deal unfairly impeded his ability to 
enter into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, because the 
success of the plea arrangement turned on Costa's willingness to 
plead, a factor over which the defendant had no control. 
 
 
5 Prior to 2012, at least four United States Circuit Courts 
of Appeals, and three State appellate courts, had rejected 
challenges to package plea deals where a defendant could not 
plead guilty because a codefendant had rejected the terms of the 
offer.  See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43 
(1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814, 823 
(10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1 (1997); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1134 (3d Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1107, 499 U.S. 968, and 499 U.S. 982 
(1991); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 
1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); State v. McInelly, 146 Ariz. 
161, 165 (1985); People v. Barnett, 113 Cal. App. 3d 563, 574 
(1980); Bostic v. State, 184 Ga. App. 509, 511 (1987).  Since 
the United States Supreme Court decided Frye and Lafler in 2012, 
all appellate decisions of which we are aware have rejected 
constitutional challenges to package plea deals.  See United 
States v. Knight, 981 F.3d 1095, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2020); United 
States v. Martin, 516 Fed. Appx. 433, 442-443 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 919 and 571 U.S. 936 (2013); Lampkin v. State, 
495 P.3d 529 (Nev. Ct. App. 2021); State v. Drain, 2020-Ohio-
701, at ¶¶ 12-15. 
21 
 
 
We evaluate a claim that the Commonwealth has impaired a 
fundamental right under the framework of substantive due 
process.  See Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 13 (2002).  
Substantive due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as by arts. 
1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See 
Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 55 (2022).  "Substantive 
due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct 
that shocks the conscience . . ." (quotations and citation 
omitted), Vega v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 226, 231 (2022), or 
that "unduly interfere[s] with rights that are deemed 
fundamental," Kligler, supra.  Where fundamental rights are 
involved, governmental conduct is "subject to strict scrutiny, 
an exacting form of judicial review requiring that the statute 
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling and legitimate 
government interest" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id. 
 
"Fundamental rights are those rights that are explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Kligler, 491 Mass. at 55.  We have 
recognized that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights "may 
demand broader protection for fundamental rights than the 
Federal Constitution" (citation omitted).  Id. at 60.  We adopt 
a "comprehensive approach" to identifying fundamental rights 
under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Id.  Under this 
22 
 
approach, the court must use "reasoned judgment" to identify 
"interests of the person so fundamental that the State must 
accord them its respect."  Id. at 58, quoting Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015). 
 
We conclude that the package plea offer did not violate the 
defendant's fundamental due process rights under either the 
United States Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  "It is undisputed that a criminal defendant has no 
constitutional right to a plea bargain."  Commonwealth v. 
Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 127 (2013).  See Lafler, 566 U.S. 
at 168.  Rather, "[t]he decision whether the Commonwealth enters 
into a plea agreement with the defendant is the prosecutor's 
alone."  Francis, 477 Mass. at 585.  In deciding whether to 
enter into a plea agreement, the prosecutor may consider, among 
other factors, "the strength of the case, the prosecution's 
general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement 
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's 
overall enforcement plan."  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 607 (1985).  The prosecutor therefore may choose whether to 
extend a plea offer to a defendant due to factors that are 
outside the defendant's control, so long as those factors are 
not "based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification" (citation omitted).  
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).  See 
23 
 
Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., 479 Mass. 397, 409 (2018).  Contrast 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-250 (1980) ("A 
scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, 
into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or 
impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in 
some contexts raise serious constitutional questions"); United 
States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1297-1298, 1301-1302 
(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding to District 
Court to determine whether government purposely gave more 
favorable plea bargains to women as compared to men).  For 
example, a prosecutor may prioritize the wishes of a victim, and 
may choose to enter into a plea agreement with a defendant only 
if a victim or a victim's family first approves the agreement.  
See Latimore, 423 Mass. at 137.  There is no apparent reason, 
then, why a prosecutor may not communicate to a defendant that 
the prosecutor will agree to a plea only if a codefendant also 
agrees to plead guilty. 
 
In support of his argument that a package deal plea offer 
violates a fundamental right, the defendant points to two United 
States Supreme Court decisions.  He first relies on language in 
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363, wherein the Court stated that a 
defendant's due process rights are violated if the defendant is 
not "free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."  That 
24 
 
case, however, was about the defendant's right freely to reject 
a plea offer without facing retaliation for doing "what the law 
plainly allows him [or her] to do."  Id.  There is nothing in 
the Court's holding to suggest that a defendant has a right to 
accept a plea offer under terms to which the prosecutor has not 
agreed.  See id. at 365.  The defendant also cites Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), in which the Court stated that 
a defendant "has the ultimate authority to make certain 
fundamental decisions regarding the case," including "whether to 
plead guilty."  Jones, supra, however, concerned the authority 
that a defendant has vis-à-vis the defendant's attorney to 
control certain pretrial decisions and decisions at trial.  See 
id. at 746.  The cited language simply explained that the 
defendant's attorney may not override the defendant's decision 
whether to plead guilty.  See id. at 751. 
 
d.  Rational basis review and procedural due process.  
Governmental conduct that does "not have an impact on 
fundamental rights . . . [is] subject to rational basis review, 
a less exacting standard of review whereby a challenged [action] 
will pass constitutional muster . . . if it bears a reasonable 
relation to a permissible legislative objective" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Kligler, 491 Mass. at 55.  Moreover, if a 
statute or governmental action has survived substantive due 
process scrutiny, "[p]rocedural due process requires that [it] 
25 
 
be implemented in a fair manner" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 674 (1993). 
 
The defendant contends that the package plea offer did not 
serve a legitimate public purpose, and was arbitrary and unfair.  
We conclude that package plea offers serve a legitimate public 
purpose and that such offers are not inherently unfair to a 
defendant.  Accordingly, they pass constitutional muster.  See 
Kligler, 491 Mass. at 73. 
 
When a prosecutor enters into a plea agreement with a 
defendant, the prosecutor agrees to "limit[] the defendant's 
criminal liability."  Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 410 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  In return, the Commonwealth avoids 
trial, and thereby conserves "scarce judicial and prosecutorial 
resources."  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).  
Where a prosecutor jointly tries two or more defendants, the 
only way for the Commonwealth to avoid the effort and expense of 
a trial is for each defendant to plead guilty; if only one 
defendant pleads guilty, the Commonwealth still must try those 
defendants who did not waive the right to trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 457 Mass. 24, 25 (2010) (by pleading 
guilty defendant waives right to trial by jury).  In proffering 
a package plea arrangement, a prosecutor can be assured that 
each defendant will receive lenient treatment only if, in 
return, the Commonwealth obtains the complete avoidance of 
26 
 
trial.  See In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 277, 289 n.5 (1983) 
(package plea deal "may be a valuable tool to the 
prosecutor" because "prosecutor may be properly interested in 
avoiding the time, delay and expense of trial of all the 
defendants"). 
 
In the defendant's view, package plea offers are 
unnecessary, and therefore reliance upon them is arbitrary and 
unfair, because individual plea offers are a more effective 
means of conserving the Commonwealth's resources.  The defendant 
maintains that a package deal is effective only if all 
defendants choose to plead, because otherwise all defendants 
must be tried.  Individual plea offers, by contrast, allow the 
Commonwealth to save on costs by trying fewer defendants, even 
if not all defendants agree to plead. 
 
Here, the defendant contends, an individual trial of Costa 
would have been less costly than the joint trial that did take 
place, because the former option would have saved the 
Commonwealth from having to present evidence that pertained to 
the defendant's, and not Costa's, guilt.  Furthermore, had the 
prosecutor allowed the defendant to plead, and solely tried 
Costa, the Commonwealth would have had to respond to the 
objections and arguments of only one defense attorney, rather 
than two.  The defendant notes that, while the joint trial with 
Costa lasted fifteen days, Tanso's trial took place over only 
27 
 
eight days.  The defendant asserts that, if the prosecutor's 
goal was to conserve resources, that goal would have been better 
served had she allowed the defendant to plead to manslaughter. 
 
We disagree with the defendant's reasoning.  In plea 
bargaining, a prosecutor must make difficult calculations about 
the trade-offs between seeking a harsher sentence for a 
defendant and sparing the Commonwealth the burden of a trial.  
See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.  It is for the prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor alone, to decide in any given instance whether these 
trade-offs are in the public interest.  See Francis, 477 Mass. 
at 585. 
 
Here, the prosecutor reasonably could have decided that it 
would be worthwhile to allow the defendant to plead guilty to 
manslaughter only if, thereby, trial were altogether avoided.  
Consider, for example, that the prosecutor's focus could have 
been on saving the victims' families from the ordeal of sitting 
through a retrial.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 
913 (1983) (Abrams, J., concurring) (retrial "forces the friends 
and family of the victim to relive the trauma of the crime and 
again suffer the ordeal of a trial").  An individual plea offer 
would have permitted the defendant a more lenient sentence 
without serving this legitimate interest.  Accordingly, we 
discern no reason to conclude that the package plea offer was 
arbitrary or unfair.  See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
28 
 
U.S. 833, 845 (1998) ("[t]he touchstone of due process is 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
government" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 
Mass. 267, 283 (2009) ("Procedural due process, at a bare 
minimum, requires that the proceedings against a defendant not 
be fundamentally unfair"). 
 
e.  Coercion.  Finally, the defendant contends that the 
offer of a package arrangement was designed to pressure him into 
coercing Costa into pleading guilty.  Nothing in the record, 
however, suggests that this was the prosecutor's motive.  
Moreover, neither the defendant nor Costa pleaded guilty, and 
thus there is no risk that the plea offer had a coercive effect.  
See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 
2000) (concern "that the defendant may have been coerced into 
giving up his right to go to trial obviously does not apply when 
the defendant does go to trial"); United States v. Wheat, 813 
F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) 
("defendant cannot complain that there was any coercion or 
element of involuntariness here, because neither he nor his 
codefendant accepted the [package deal plea offer]"). 
 
We agree, however, that there are legitimate concerns about 
the potential for package plea agreements to be coercive.  While 
package plea agreements "are not per se involuntary," they 
present a risk that "[o]ne defendant may be coerced into 
29 
 
pleading guilty by a co-defendant who believes he is getting a 
good deal under the package deal."  United States v. Mescual-
Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1175 
and 543 U.S. 1176 (2005).  Furthermore, when there is a family 
relationship between two defendants, "one defendant . . . 
[might] involuntarily sacrifice his [or her] own best interests 
for those of a family member . . . in a belief that the package 
deal will benefit the other."  Id.  See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 
at 364 n.8; Hodge, 412 F.3d at 489; State v. Bey, 270 Kan. 544, 
554-555 (2001); State v. Hoang Muc Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542 
(Minn. 1994).  To mitigate these concerns, courts in other 
jurisdictions have required that, for a package deal to be 
enforced, the parties "must notify the . . . court that a 
package deal exists," and the court must inquire into the 
voluntariness of the package agreement "with special care."  
Hodge, supra at 489-491.  See Mescual-Cruz, supra at 8; United 
States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 659-660 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. 
Solano, 150 Ariz. 398, 402 (1986); In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 
at 288-290; Bey, supra at 555; Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 
335-336 (Tenn. 2006). 
 
We conclude that courts in Massachusetts should adopt a 
similar approach.  Rule 12 (a) (3) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as amended, 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), states 
that a judge "may accept a plea of guilty . . . only after first 
30 
 
determining that it is made voluntarily with an understanding of 
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."  "A 
plea is voluntary if entered without coercion, duress, or 
improper inducements" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Sherman, 451 Mass. 332, 338 (2008).  Accordingly, during the 
plea colloquy, "a judge must conduct a real probe of the 
defendant's mind to determine that the plea is not being 
extracted from the defendant under undue pressure" (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Id.  This inquiry is rendered incomplete 
if the judge is not made aware that the defendant's codefendants 
had reason to pressure the defendant to plead guilty. 
 
Accordingly, from the date of the issuance of the rescript 
in this case, if a plea agreement "is conditioned on the 
cooperation of more than one defendant," the plea judge must be 
informed of the "package nature of the deal."6  Caro, 997 F.2d 
at 660.  In the absence of such information, the judge's probe 
into the voluntariness of the defendant's plea cannot account 
for the "risks inherent in package deals."  Mescual-Cruz, 387 
F.3d at 9.  Further, in determining whether a defendant whose 
plea was pursuant to a package agreement "was subject to undue 
pressure to plead guilty" (citation omitted), Sherman, 451 Mass. 
 
6 We ask this court's standing advisory committee on the 
rules of criminal procedure to propose a suitable amendment to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 to delineate these requirements. 
31 
 
at 338, the judge must consider "the traditional types of 
coercion and the unique pressure from a co-defendant or family 
member that might be present in a package deal," Mescual-Cruz, 
supra.  Consequently, a defendant must "be allowed to withdraw 
his or her guilty plea if the [Commonwealth] fails to fully 
inform the trial court of the nature of the [package] plea."  
Bey, 270 Kan. at 555. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The Superior Court judge's order denying 
the defendant's motion to enforce the plea bargain is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.