Title: Southwest Motel Brokers, Inc. v. Alamo Hotels, Inc.
Citation: 382 P.2d 707, 72 N.M. 227
Docket Number: 7183
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1963

382 P.2d 707 (1963) 72 N.M. 227 SOUTHWEST MOTEL BROKERS, INC. and C.B. Snyder National Realty Co., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALAMO HOTELS, INC., Defendant-Appellant. No. 7183. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 6, 1963. Rehearing Denied June 27, 1963. *709 W.A. Keleher, T.B. Keleher, John B. Tittmann, William B. Keleher, Albuquerque, for appellant. J.C. Ryan, Hannett, Hannett &amp; Cornish, Albuquerque, for appellees. CHAVEZ, Justice. Plaintiffs-appellees filed suit against defendant-appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc. and E.B. McKinley, alleging that after some negotiations between appellee, Southwest Motel Brokers, Inc., by its president, W.E. Hoyt, and appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc., through its president, E.B. McKinley, that appellee, Southwest Motel Brokers, Inc., in conjunction with appellee, C.B. Snyder National Realty Company, at the request of appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc., produced through their efforts a buyer, ready, willing and able to purchase all of the stock of appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc., for the sum of $1,000,000 net. It is further alleged that appellees and appellant, on June 21, 1960, entered into an agreement to purchase and upon this agreement appellees base their claim. Appellees asked judgment in the sum of $50,000. Appellant and E.B. McKinley moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds: (1) That the nature of the action is a suit for payment of brokerage commission; (2) that appellees are not licensed real estate brokers within the state of New Mexico; and (3) that under § 67-24-19, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., the action is illegal and unlawful. The motion was denied. Appellant and E.B. McKinley then filed their answer, denying the allegations of the complaint and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that their attorneys disapproved the contract. The cause was tried by the trial court and a jury and, at the conclusion of the case, the trial court directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of appellees in the sum of $50,000. Both parties submitted requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judgment was entered for appellees and against appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc., in the sum of $50,000, together with interest and costs. The judgment decreed that appellees recover nothing from E.B. McKinley. From the judgment, appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc., duly perfected this appeal. Appellant, Alamo Hotels, Inc., is a New Mexico corporation which owns and operates the Desert Aire Motor Hotel in Alamogordo, New Mexico. It stock is owned by E.B. McKinley of Alamogordo, Don Lee and Charlie Lee who live on their ranch approximately 70 miles southeast of Alamogordo, Henry Thygeson of Albuquerque, and P.M. Crawford of El Paso, Texas. The record is not clear as to the exact time, but early in 1960, W.E. Hoyt, president of Southwest Motel Brokers, Inc., contacted E.B. McKinley, president of Alamo Hotels, Inc., with reference to the possible sale of their motel. McKinley advised Hoyt that if he came up with anything that might be acceptable, that he would see whether a deal could be made, and that if Hoyt could obtain a deal of $1,000,000 net that he, McKinley, would present it to the board of directors. Hoyt did present several offers which were not interesting to McKinley and at one time, in the Spring of 1960, Hoyt went to El Paso or Alamogordo, expecting to meet a prospective purchaser who, it appears, did not show up. On March 17, 1960, McKinley wrote to Hoyt, submitting certain information requested by Hoyt in a telephone conversation, and further stated in said letter: In due time McKinley was advised of a proposal to purchase by Julius Epstein and Associates. This proposal was from C.B. Snyder National Realty Company and contained in their letter signed by Max Seigel, addressed to W.E. Hoyt, president of Southwest Motel Brokers, Inc., dated May 5, 1960, as follows: On June 20-21, 1960, Hoyt, Seigel and Epstein's representative Manuel Weinberger, met McKinley at the Desert Aire Motor Hotel in Alamogordo. There were discussions regarding Epstein's offer between the parties for two days and, at the conclusion thereof, the following handwritten agreement was executed: McKinley testified that Seigel and Hoyt signed the agreement, probably on June 21, 1960, but that he did not sign it at the same time because he was not authorized to do so by the board of directors. At that time there was a discussion as to how to contact the board of directors. Later, McKinley and Weinberger flew to the Lee ranch and consulted with Don and Charlie Lee as to the transaction and as to the contents of the agreement. McKinley also consulted Crawford and thereafter McKinley signed the agreement. On July 7, 1960, Max Seigel, vice president of C.B. Snyder National Realty Company, wrote to E.B. McKinley, president of Alamo Hotels, Inc., as follows: On or about July 20, 1960, McKinley, accompanied by Don Lee and Henry Thygeson, went to Albuquerque and consulted with their attorney, W.A. Keleher, with reference to the agreement. McKinley testified that after this conference Keleher advised McKinley "to write a letter to Mr. Seigel explaining that there was no deal; that our attorneys had not approved the contract." On July 20, 1960, Keleher telephoned Seigel and, on the same day, wrote the following letter to him: On July 25, 1960, McKinley also wrote to Seigel, saying: McKinley testified that he believed that in a telephone conversation with Hoyt he told him that, on advice of attorneys, they were not going to sell. No reason was given as to why the transaction could not go forward and no contracts were prepared as called for in the agreement. On redirect examination by Mr. T.B. Keleher, McKinley testified as follows: Seigel also testified that his principal in the transaction was Julius Epstein; that he was being paid by appellant who retained them, through McKinley as president. Don Lee testified that on or about June 21, 1960, McKinley and Weinberger came to his ranch and that he and his son, Charlie Lee, discussed with them the contents of the agreement. Don Lee also testified: Charlie Lee also testified that about June 21, 1960, McKinley and Weinberger visited him and his father at their ranch and that they discussed the contents of the agreement. Charlie Lee was asked: Mr. Weinberger testified that he is a licensed attorney but not engaged in the practice of law; that he is the assistant of Julius Epstein who is engaged in investing *714 in real estate businesses and general investments; that he looks after the operation of certain of Epstein's properties and properties of other people associated with Epstein; that he looks into new offerings submitted, and does generally what is required of him in the furtherance of Epstein's investment business. Weinberger also testified: Appellant's first point asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the transaction involved the sale of real estate and that a suit for commission by a non-licensed broker is barred by law. Appellant cites §§ 67-24-19 and 67-24-33, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., which provide: Appellant contends that the agreement involved a going-business operation, including the Desert Aire Motel and its fee, all of its equipment, furniture and other assets, free and clear of all liabilities, liens and encumbrances, with the exception of the new first mortgage for $800,000 at 6% interest. Appellant argues that the provision in the agreement to purchase 100% of the stock of appellant corporation is mere form and that, in substance, the agreement involved the sale of the Desert Aire Motel, including the land and buildings, and was a real estate transaction within the meaning of § 67-24-33, supra. The difficulty with appellant's argument is that, regardless of the fact that the land upon which the motel is located is involved in the agreement, there is no evidence in the record that appellees were not licensed real estate brokers. Appellant contends, however, that the case was tried upon the assumption that appellees were not licensed real estate brokers in New Mexico and directs our attention to the letter written by appellees' *715 attorneys to the trial judge on January 6, 1961, in which the statement is made: This letter was written while the trial court was considering appellant's and McKinley's motion to dismiss and, thereafter, on March 15, 1961, the motion was denied. Counsel for appellant says that the fact that appellees were not licensed in New Mexico had been duly stipulated and that appellees' letter of January 6, 1961, should be made a part of the record. We do not so understand the stipulation. It provides that prior to deciding the motion to dismiss filed on November 16, 1960, the attorneys for appellees advised the trial judge in writing, by letter of January 6, 1961, that appellees were not licensed as real estate brokers in New Mexico. The record is devoid of testimony of any nature that appellees were not licensed real estate brokers in New Mexico. Based upon the evidence, the trial court refused appellant's and McKinley's requested findings of fact that appellees were not licensed real estate brokers in New Mexico and that appellees may not maintain an action in New Mexico for the payment of commission for the sale of real estate. The trial court concluded that appellees were not estopped to assert their cause of action and that appellees' commission is not within the provisions of § 67-24-19, supra. The burden was upon appellant and McKinley to establish by evidence in the record that appellees were not licensed real estate brokers in New Mexico. Since no evidence was introduced establishing this fact, there is no evidence in the record from which the trial court could have concluded as a matter of law that appellees could not maintain their action. Neither the stipulation nor the letter was in evidence at the trial and hence we are clear that we cannot consider the stipulation or the letter of January 6, 1961. See Hamilton v. Doty, 71 N.M. 422, 379 P.2d 69. Appellant's next contention is that a jury question was presented as to the existence of any contract and that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for appellees. Under this point appellant contends that the sentence in the contract "This offer is subject to the attorneys for both parties approving the Contracts." is ambiguous and that the agreement was not effective or binding until approved by appellant's attorneys. Appellant argues that it should have been permitted to introduce evidence that it was the intention of the parties that the agreement was not binding until it had been approved by the attorneys for both parties, and that a material issue of fact existed which should have been submitted to the jury for determination. Appellant and McKinley offered to prove: The trial court held that the contract was clear and unambiguous and that no testimony would be received to contradict or vary its terms. The trial court concluded that the contract is to be construed by the court as a matter of law. The trial court found that on June 21, 1960, appellant entered into an agreement to sell all of its stock of the corporation to Julius Epstein and Associates for the sum of $1,050,000 and to pay the sum of $50,000 commission for the sale of the stock; that appellees produced a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to purchase and who was accepted by appellant as ready, willing and able to purchase; that on or about July 20, 1960, appellant advised appellees that the transaction could not go forward; that no reason was given by appellant to appellees for the refusal of appellant to consummate the transaction; that appellant never prepared *716 or presented contracts to the purchaser or appellees; that the agreement was breached by appellant on or about July 20, 1960. The trial court concluded that appellant accepted the purchaser as ready, willing and able to purchase the stock of appellant corporation; that the refusal of appellant to go forward with the transaction was arbitrary and unreasonable; that appellant, as principal, owed a duty to its agents, appellees, to assert reasonable efforts to consummate the transaction; and that appellant did not act in good faith toward appellees. Since no attack is made by appellant upon the findings of the trial court, the facts found are the facts upon which our decision is based. Hinkle v. Schmider, 70 N.M. 349, 373 P.2d 918. Even though the trial court held that it would not permit parol evidence to vary the terms of the agreement, and also refused the tender of proof made by appellant and McKinley, the trial court permitted testimony by McKinley, Don and Charlie Lee, and Weinberger, as to the intention of the parties and held: Based upon the evidence and construing the contract as a whole, we hold that the trial court was correct in holding that the contract was unambiguous and binding between the parties, and that the interpretation of the contract was a question of law for the court and not a question for submission to the jury to determine. Stewart v. Brock, 60 N.M. 216, 290 P.2d 682; 156 A.L.R. 602. As hereinbefore stated, the trial court found that no reasons were given by appellant for their refusal to consummate the transaction; concluded that the refusal by appellant to go forward with the transaction was arbitrary and unreasonable, and that appellant did not act in good faith toward appellees. The standard of conduct between a broker and his principal is set out in 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 95(2), p. 222, as follows: See also, 8 Am.Jur., Brokers, §§ 141, 181, pp. 1066-1067, 1096-1097. Appellant's point III claims error in that the agreement called for the purchase of 100% of the stock of appellant corporation, which was to include the Desert Aire Motel in its entirety, and was not approved by the corporation's stockholders as required by § 51-2-31, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. This section provides that in the sale of assets of a corporation in this state, not less than two-thirds of the stockholders shall consent at a special meeting of the stockholders. Although during the trial, in argument between counsel on a motion to strike certain testimony, appellant's attorney stated that if the entire assets of a corporation are to be sold the consent of the stockholders must be obtained, this issue was likewise never raised and no ruling by the trial court on this issue was invoked. No evidence was presented or requested on this issue and, therefore, the question was *717 not preserved for review. Supreme Court Rule 20(2), (§ 21-2-1(20) (2), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.). We might also add that appellant's claim under this point is that of illegality, which is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. Section 21-1-1(8) (c), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. Appellant's point IV is that the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that appellee's right to a commission was not contingent upon the consummation of the sale. This issue also was not raised at the trial and no ruling was invoked in order to preserve the question for review. The trial court concluded that appellees were acting as agents for and as brokers for appellant and, that upon acceptance of the agreement, appellant became obligated to appellees for their commission. The agreement and the evidence all support the trial court's conclusion. The agreement provides that in the event the deal is accepted, appellees are to be the recognized brokers in the transaction. Appellant accepted the agreement. Appellees produced a buyer, ready, willing and able to purchase and, as the trial court concluded, that upon acceptance of the agreement by appellant, by and through its president, McKinley, appellant became obligated to pay appellees their commission, and that appellees' right to a commission was not contingent upon consummation of the sale. Appellant's point V claims error in the trial court's conclusion of law that McKinley was authorized to sign the agreement on behalf of appellant. Again, under this point, no ruling was invoked of the trial court by appellant as to McKinley's lack of authority to execute the agreement. The issue was neither pleaded, as is required under an affirmative defense, nor raised during the trial. No objection was made to the trial court's conclusion on this point. Hence, this question cannot be considered by us on appeal. Appellant's point VI claims that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the proposed agreement was indefinite and incapable of performance. The trial court found that appellees produced a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to purchase. This finding was not attacked and hence it is a finding upon which this decision is based. No evidence was presented by appellant that any of the stockholders did not consent to the transaction. In fact, one of the stockholders testified "that it was a good deal for us." It should be noted that where both parties to an action request the trial court to direct a verdict in their behalf, findings of fact and conclusions of law must be made unless waived. Goldenberg v. Village of Capitan, 53 N.M. 137, 203 P.2d 370. Thus, it follows in this case that we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, unless they are attacked. Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, J, concur.