Title: Silicon Valley Taxpayers v. Santa Clara Co. OSA
Citation: 44 Cal. 4th 431 original opinion
Docket Number: S136468
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2008

1 
Filed 7/14/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SILICON VALLEY TAXPAYERS 
) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S136468 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H026759 
SANTA CLARA COUNTY OPEN SPACE ) 
AUTHORITY, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
)         Super.Ct. Nos. 1-02-CV804474 
 
 
)                         and 1-03-CV000705 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In 1996, Proposition 2181 limited local government’s ability to impose real 
property assessments in two significant ways.  An assessment can be imposed only 
for a “special benefit” conferred on real property (art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (b)), and 
the assessment on any parcel must be in proportion to the special benefit conferred 
on the particular parcel.  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a)) 
In 2001, the Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (OSA) imposed a 
countywide assessment to fund a program to acquire, improve, and maintain 
unspecified open space lands in the county.  Plaintiffs sued, challenging that 
assessment on the grounds that it fails to satisfy the special benefit and 
                                              
1  
Article XIII D of the California Constitution (article XIII D). 
2 
proportionality requirements of Proposition 218.  To decide whether OSA’s 2001 
assessment violates article XIII D, we must first determine the appropriate 
standard of judicial review of a local governmental agency’s assessment 
determination.  We conclude that Proposition 218 requires courts to make an 
independent review of local agency decisions that are governed by express 
constitutional provisions, as in this case, and that OSA’s assessment does not 
comply with the special benefit and proportionality requirements of article XIII D. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  The Creation of OSA and the 1994 Special Assessment District  
In 1992, the Santa Clara County Open-Space Authority Act (Pub. Res. 
Code, § 35100 et seq.) created OSA, with the express purpose of acquiring and 
preserving open space within the county to counter the conversion of land to urban 
uses, to preserve quality of life, and to encourage agricultural activities.  (Pub. 
Res. Code, § 35101, subd. (a).)  The act provides no particular method to fund 
open space acquisitions, but it authorizes OSA to levy special assessments under 
the Streets and Highways Code.  (Pub. Res. Code, § 35173.)  OSA’s jurisdiction 
included all Santa Clara County lands except those already within the boundaries 
of the Midpeninsula Regional Open-Space District. 
In 1994, OSA formed an original assessment district under the authority of 
the Landscape and Lighting Act of 1972 (LLA).2  (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 22500 et 
seq.)  OSA levied an annual special assessment on the district’s property owners to 
acquire and preserve open space land under the LLA’s procedures.  Certain 
                                              
2  
An “ ‘[a]ssessment district’ means the district of land to be benefited by the 
improvement and to be specially assessed to pay the costs and expenses of the 
improvement and the damages caused by the improvement.”  (Sts. & Hy. Code, 
§ 10008.) 
3 
taxpayers challenged the 1994 assessment, but the Court of Appeal upheld it.  The 
1994 assessment raised approximately $4 million annually and allowed OSA to 
purchase thousands of acres of open space lands.3 
B.  The Creation of the 2001 Assessment District and the Passage of 
Proposition 218 
In 2000, OSA determined that it needed additional annual funding to 
purchase open space.  To raise these additional funds, OSA considered forming an 
additional assessment district.  However, in 1996, California voters had passed 
Proposition 218 to “significantly tighten the kind of benefit assessments” an 
agency can levy on real property (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) 
argument in favor of Prop. 218, p. 76) and to “protect[] taxpayers by limiting the 
methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their 
consent.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 218, § 2, p. 108, reprinted 
in Historical Notes, 2A West’s Ann. Const. (2008 supp.) foll. Cal. Const., art. XIII 
C, p. 85 (Historical Notes).) 
To achieve these goals, Proposition 218 tightened assessment requirements 
and definitions, imposed stricter procedures on agencies, and shifted traditional 
presumptions that had favored assessment validity.  (Art. XIII D, §§ 2, subd. (i), 
4.)  Under Proposition 218’s procedures, local agencies must give the record 
owners of all assessed parcels written notice of the proposed assessment, a voting 
ballot, and a statement disclosing that a majority protest will prevent the 
assessment’s passage.  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subds. (c), (d).)  The proposed assessment 
must be “supported by a detailed engineer’s report.”  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (b).)  
At a noticed public hearing, the agencies must consider all protests, and they 
                                              
3  
The 1994 special assessment is not at issue in this case. 
4 
“shall not impose an assessment if there is a majority protest.”  (Art. XIII D, § 4, 
subd. (e).)  Voting must be weighted “according to the proportional financial 
obligation of the affected property.”  (Ibid.)4 
OSA explored the possibility of creating a second assessment district that 
would comply with the new provisions of Proposition 218.  As a first step, the 
OSA Board of Directors (OSA Board) authorized a poll of Santa Clara County 
property owners to determine whether they would support an assessment to fund 
the purchase of additional open space.  The poll showed that approximately 55 
percent of property owners would likely support up to a $20 per year property tax 
increase for acquiring and maintaining open space lands. 
The OSA Board hired Shilts Consultants, Inc. (SCI) to prepare the 
engineer’s report.  That report stated that the assessment would fund the 
“[a]cquisition, installation, maintenance and servicing” of open space lands for 
recreation, conservation, watersheds, easements, and similar purposes.  Although 
the SCI report identified areas OSA was considering for potential acquisition and 
improvement and outlined general considerations OSA would use to identify and 
acquire open space lands, it identified no particular parcels to be acquired and no 
particular areas to be prioritized.   
The proposed 2001 assessment district included all Santa Clara County 
lands that were in the 1994 assessment district.  The proposed assessment district 
included approximately 314,000 parcels and over 800 square miles containing 
                                              
4  
In 1997, the Legislature codified and detailed the notice, hearing, and 
protest procedures in the Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act.  (Gov. 
Code § 53750 et seq., added by Stats. 1997, ch. 38, § 5.)  These statutory 
provisions expressly supersede any others that apply to the levy of a new 
assessment.  (Gov. Code § 53753, subd. (a).)  These procedures are incorporated 
by reference into the LLA.  (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 22588.) 
5 
over 1,000,000 people.  The SCI engineer’s report identified the special benefits 
that would accrue to the assessed parcels, estimated the proportion of all the 
benefits that could be considered special, set the assessment for a single-family 
home at $20 per year, and provided a formula for estimating the proportionate 
special benefit that other property on the tax rolls would receive.  Using the $20 
property tax increase per single-family home, the SCI engineer’s report calculated 
that the assessment would produce an approximately $8 million increase in OSA’s 
budget. 
The OSA Board accepted and filed the engineer’s preliminary report and 
authorized an assessment ballot proceeding.  On September 1, 2001, OSA mailed 
an informational pamphlet to all of the approximately 314,000 property owners 
within the proposed district.  The pamphlet described the assessment district and 
OSA’s goal of raising about $8 million annually to acquire open space lands 
within the county. 
On September 14, 2001, OSA mailed a notice of the proposed assessment 
and an official ballot to all affected property owners.  On October 25, 2001, OSA 
conducted an informational meeting, at which OSA’s general manager and special 
counsel and a representative from SCI responded to numerous questions from the 
public.  The formal public hearing was held on November 8, 2001. 
On December 13, 2001, OSA reported the results of the balloting at a 
public hearing.  Of the approximately 314,000 official ballots mailed, OSA 
received only 48,100 responses, a return of approximately 15 percent.  Of those 
responses, 32,127 (66.8 percent) voted in favor of the assessment, while the rest 
voted “no” (33.2 percent).  The returned ballots were weighted in proportion to the 
amount each parcel was to be assessed, making the final tally 50.9 percent in favor 
and 49.1 percent opposed.  Plaintiff Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association (SVTA) 
objected to the results on procedural grounds no longer relevant to the issues 
6 
raised here. The final engineer’s report, which was before OSA at the December 
meeting, contained some changes from the draft report filed in September. In 
particular, the final report emphasized that the “overriding” and “most important” 
criterion for OSA to use in acquiring open space was that the acquired lands be 
distributed throughout OSA’s jurisdiction.  At the conclusion of the December 
hearing, the OSA Board approved the results, accepted the final engineer’s report, 
and established the new assessment district. 
A year and a half later, the OSA Board renewed the assessment for 2003-
2004 and added a cost-of-living increase of $0.34 per parcel. 
C.  Procedural History 
SVTA, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, and several individual 
taxpayers (collectively plaintiffs) filed this action for a writ of mandate, 
declaratory relief, and an injunction seeking to invalidate the 2001 assessment.  
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint contains two causes of action:  the first 
alleges that OSA’s notice and balloting procedures did not comport with 
Proposition 218 and the Government Code; the second challenges the substantive 
validity of the assessment under Proposition 218 and the Landscaping and 
Lighting Act. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, 
summary adjudication.  The court issued an order granting summary adjudication 
in favor of OSA on the second cause of action. 
After the OSA Board renewed its assessment for the 2003-2004 fiscal year, 
plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit challenging that assessment.  The new complaint 
contained allegations similar to those in the original lawsuit and added claims 
contesting the increase in the new assessment.  The two cases were then 
consolidated.  The court issued an order granting summary adjudication in OSA’s 
7 
favor on the remaining causes of action.  Based on that order and the previous 
order in the first lawsuit, the court entered judgment in favor of OSA. 
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.  The majority held that Proposition 218 had altered the traditionally 
deferential standard of review by eliminating the presumption that an assessment 
was valid.  Nevertheless, the majority held that courts should still accord the final 
legislative determination substantial deference, as long as the agency had followed 
Proposition 218’s procedural requirements in levying the challenged assessment, 
and as long as substantial evidence in the administrative record supported the 
agency’s finding that the benefits were special.  Using this limited scope of 
review, the majority determined that the engineer’s report supported OSA’s 
determination of special benefits and proportionality. 
In her dissent, Justice Bamattre-Manoukian disagreed with the majority 
regarding the standard of review.  In her view, the drafters of Proposition 218 had 
specifically targeted the deferential standard of review for change.  Because the 
validity of a post-Proposition-218 assessment is now a constitutional question, she 
asserted that courts should exercise independent judgment in determining whether 
an assessment complies with article XIII D’s procedural and substantive 
requirements.  The dissent independently analyzed the engineer’s findings 
concerning special benefits and proportionality and concluded that the identified 
benefits did not comply with Proposition 218’s legal requirements. 
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs contend that because state constitutional provisions now govern 
assessments, courts should apply an independent standard of judicial review to 
determine their validity.  They claim that, in this case, the $20 flat-rate levy is an 
invalid assessment because it fails to satisfy several provisions of article XIII D, 
8 
section 4, and that the levy is in essence a “special tax.”  They argue further that, 
because OSA neither sought nor obtained the mandatory two-thirds voter approval 
for a special tax as required by Proposition 13, the $20 flat-rate levy violates both 
Propositions 13 (Cal. Const., art. XIII A) and 218.  In discussing these claims, we 
first discuss the nature of special assessments before the enactment of Proposition 
218, their relationship to Proposition 13 taxes, and how Proposition 218 changed 
the law governing assessments.  As explained below, we agree with plaintiffs’ 
contentions. 
We explained the nature of a special assessment in Knox v. City of Orland 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 132, (Knox), a pre-Proposition 218 case.  A special assessment is 
a “ ‘ “ ‘compulsory charge placed by the state upon real property within a pre-
determined district, made under express legislative authority for defraying in 
whole or in part the expense of a permanent public improvement therein . . . .’ ”  
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]  In this regard, a special assessment is ‘levied against real 
property particularly and directly benefited by a local improvement in order to pay 
the cost of that improvement.’  [Citation.]  ‘The rationale of special assessment[s] 
is that the assessed property has received a special benefit over and above that 
received by the general public.  The general public should not be required to pay 
for special benefits for the few, and the few specially benefited should not be 
subsidized by the general public.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]. . . . 
“A tax, on the other hand, is very different. Unlike a special assessment, a 
tax can be levied ‘ “without reference to peculiar benefits to particular individuals 
or property.” ’  [Citations.]  Indeed, ‘[n]othing is more familiar in taxation than the 
imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit 
from its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be 
remedied.’  [Citations.]. . . . 
9 
“Therefore, while a special assessment may, like a special tax, be viewed in 
a sense as having been levied for a specific purpose, a critical distinction between 
the two public financing mechanisms is that a special assessment must confer a 
special benefit upon the property assessed beyond that conferred generally.”  
(Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 141-142.) 
We explained the history of Proposition 218 in Apartment Assn. of Los 
Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles  (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830 (Apartment 
Assn.):  “ ‘Proposition 218 can best be understood against its historical 
background, which begins in 1978 with the adoption of Proposition 13.  “The 
purpose of Proposition 13 was to cut local property taxes.  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  
Its principal provisions limited ad valorem property taxes to 1 percent of a 
property’s assessed valuation and limited increases in the assessed valuation to 2 
percent per year unless and until the property changed hands.  (Cal. Const., art. 
XIII A, §§ 1, 2.) 
“ ‘To prevent local governments from subverting its limitations, 
Proposition 13 also prohibited counties, cities, and special districts from enacting 
any special tax without a two-thirds vote of the electorate.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII 
A, § 4; Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 6-7 [2 Cal.Rptr. 2d 490, 
820 P.2d 1000].)  It has been held, however, that a special assessment is not a 
special tax within the meaning of Proposition 13.  (Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 
4 Cal.4th 132, 141 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 159, 841 P.2d 144], and cases cited.)  
Accordingly, a special assessment could be imposed without a two-thirds vote. 
“ ‘In November 1996, in part to change this rule, the electorate adopted 
Proposition 218, which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California 
Constitution.  Proposition 218 allows only four types of local property taxes: (1) 
an ad valorem property tax; (2) a special tax; (3) an assessment; and (4) a fee or 
charge.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a)(1)-(4); see also [ id.], § 2, subd. 
10 
(a).)  It buttresses Proposition 13’s limitations on ad valorem property taxes and 
special taxes by placing analogous restrictions on assessments, fees, and charges.’  
(Howard Jarvis [Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999)] 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 
681-682.)”  (Apartment Assn., supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 836-837.) 
Proposition 218 restricts government’s ability to impose assessments in 
several important ways.  First, it tightens the definition of the two key findings 
necessary to support an assessment:  special benefit and proportionality.  An 
assessment can be imposed only for a “special benefit” conferred on a particular 
property.  (Art. XIII D, §§ 2, subd. (b), 4, subd. (a).)  A special benefit is “a 
particular and distinct benefit over and above general benefits conferred on real 
property located in the district or to the public at large.”  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. 
(i).)  The definition specifically provides that “[g]eneral enhancement of property 
value does not constitute ‘special benefit.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Further, an assessment on any 
given parcel must be in proportion to the special benefit conferred on that parcel:  
“No assessment shall be imposed on any parcel which exceeds the reasonable cost 
of the proportional special benefit conferred on that parcel.”  (Art. XIII D, § 4, 
subd. (a).)  “The proportionate special benefit derived by each identified parcel 
shall be determined in relationship to the entirety of the capital cost of a public 
improvement, the maintenance and operation expenses of a public improvement, 
or the cost of the property-related service being provided.”  (Ibid.)  Because only 
special benefits are assessable, and public improvements often provide both 
general benefits to the community and special benefits to a particular property, the 
assessing agency must first “separate the general benefits from the special benefits 
conferred on a parcel” and impose the assessment only for the special benefits. 
(Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a).) 
Second, as described above, Proposition 218 established strict procedural 
requirements for the imposition of a lawful assessment.  (Ante, at pp. 3-4.) 
11 
A.  Standard of Review 
Before Proposition 218 was passed, courts reviewed quasi-legislative acts 
of local governmental agencies, such as the formation of an assessment district, 
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.  (Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 
145-149; Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills (1976) 16 Cal.3d 676, 684-685 
(Dawson).)  Because it was recognized that “the establishment of a special 
assessment district takes place as a result of a peculiarly legislative process 
grounded in the taxing power of the sovereign,” the scope of judicial review of 
such actions was “quite narrow.”  (Dawson, supra, at pp. 683-684; id. at p. 684 
[“ ‘The board of supervisors is the ultimate authority which is empowered to 
finally determine what lands are benefited and what amount of benefits shall be 
assessed against the several parcels benefited . . . .’ ”].) 
Accordingly, the standard of review was as follows:  “A special assessment 
finally confirmed by a local legislative body in accordance with applicable law 
will not be set aside by the courts unless it clearly appears on the face of the record 
before [the legislative] body, or from facts which may be judicially noticed, that 
the assessment as finally confirmed is not proportional to the benefits to be 
bestowed on the properties to be assessed or that no benefits will accrue to such 
properties.”  (Dawson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 685; see also Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
at p. 146.)  Under the Dawson/Knox standard of review, courts presumed an 
assessment was valid, and a plaintiff challenging it had to show that the record 
before the legislative body “clearly” did not support the underlying determinations 
of benefit and proportionality.  (See also Lent v. Tillson (1887) 72 Cal. 404, 429 
[judicial interference is warranted only “when the courts can plainly see that the 
legislature has not really exercised this judgment at all, or that manifestly and 
certainly no such benefit can or could reasonably have been expected to result”].) 
12 
The drafters of Proposition 218 specifically targeted this deferential 
standard of review for change.  Article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f), provides: 
“In any legal action contesting the validity of any assessment, the burden shall be 
on the agency to demonstrate that the property or properties in question receive a 
special benefit over and above the benefits conferred on the public at large and 
that the amount of any contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater 
than, the benefits conferred on the property or properties in question.” 
In determining the effect of article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f), we 
apply the familiar principles of constitutional interpretation, the aim of which is to 
“determine and effectuate the intent of those who enacted the constitutional 
provision at issue.”  (Richmond v. Shasta Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 409, 418.)  “The principles of constitutional interpretation are similar to 
those governing statutory construction.”  (Thompson v. Department of Corrections 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 122.)  If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain 
meaning governs.  (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th. 1051, 1056.)  But if the 
language is ambiguous, we consider extrinsic evidence in determining voter intent, 
including the Legislative Analyst’s analysis and ballot arguments for and against 
the initiative.  (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1281; People v. Rizo 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.) 
Article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f), states that the agency has the 
burden of demonstrating special benefit and proportionality in any legal action 
contesting the validity of any assessment.  Although it is clear that the voters 
intended to reverse the usual deference accorded governmental action and to 
reverse the presumption of validity by placing the “burden” on the agency, the 
provision does not specify the scope of that burden.  Because the language 
imposing a “burden” on the agency is somewhat imprecise, we look to the ballot 
materials as further indicia of voter intent.   
13 
The Legislative Analyst explained to the voters that Proposition 218 was 
designed to “constrain local governments’ ability to impose . . . assessments . . . .” 
and to “place extensive requirements on local governments charging assessments.”  
(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 218 by the Legis. Analyst, p. 
73.)  Addressing the burden of demonstration language of proposed article XIII D, 
section 4, subdivision (f), the Legislative Analyst explained:  “Currently, the 
courts allow local governments significant flexibility in determining fee and 
assessment amounts.  In lawsuits challenging property fees and assessments, the 
taxpayer generally has the ‘burden of proof’ to show that they are not legal.  This 
measure shifts the burden of proof in these lawsuits to local government.  As a 
result, it would be easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits, resulting in reduced or 
repealed fees and assessments.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, at p. 74.)  Or 
stated another way, Proposition 218 was intended to make it more difficult for an 
assessment to be validated in a court proceeding. 
As the dissent below points out, a provision in Proposition 218 shifting the 
burden of demonstration was included in reaction to our opinion in Knox.  The 
drafters of Proposition 218 were clearly aware of Knox and the deferential 
standard it applied based on Dawson, supra, 16 Cal.3d 676.  The argument in 
favor of Proposition 218 referred to a “growing list of assessments imposed 
without voter approval” after Proposition 13 that are in fact special taxes.  As one 
example of several named abuses of the assessment process, it specified that “[i]n 
Northern California, taxpayers 27 miles away from a park are assessed because 
their property supposedly benefits from that park.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec., 
supra, argument in favor of Prop. 218, p. 76.)  The reference to 27 miles was 
based on the facts of Knox, which involved an assessment to raise funds to 
maintain five existing parks serving four school districts.  We upheld the 
assessment, deferring to the City of Orland’s determination that the property 
14 
owners were “uniquely benefited by the proximity of these facilities to their 
properties” (Knox, supra 4 Cal.4th at p. 149), although the assessment district 
contained 42,300 acres of land and geographically consisted of the entire city and 
portions of outlying areas in Glenn County.  (Id. at p. 137, fn. 5.) 
Also, in Knox, we declined a request to reevaluate the Dawson deferential 
standard of review for special assessments, finding “no basis” for requiring the 
assessing agency to bear the burden of proof “in the context of benefit 
assessments.”  (Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 147.)  The Knox plaintiffs argued that, 
as in Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist. (1985) 165 
Cal.App.3d 227, 235, the local agency should bear the burden of proof in 
establishing the validity of a special assessment, and we should reassess the 
traditional standard of review that we reaffirmed in Dawson.  (Knox, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at pp. 146-147.)  In rejecting the argument, we distinguished benefit 
assessments from the development fees in Beaumont, noted the different statutory 
contexts, and refused to change the deferential standard of review.  (Ibid.)  Thus, it 
appears that the inclusion of the burden of demonstration language was intended to 
supply the “basis” found lacking in Knox, and that the drafters of Proposition 218 
particularly targeted Knox. 
As further evidence that the voters sought to curtail local agency discretion 
in raising funds, Proposition 218’s preamble includes an express statement of 
purpose:  “The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that 
Proposition 13 was intended to provide effective tax relief and to require voter 
approval of tax increases.  However, local governments have subjected taxpayers 
to excessive tax, assessment, fee and charge increases that not only frustrate the 
purposes of voter approval for tax increases, but also threaten the economic 
security of all Californians and the California economy itself.  This measure 
protects taxpayers by limiting the methods by which local governments exact 
15 
revenue from taxpayers without their consent.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 
218, § 2, p. 108; Historical Notes, supra, p. 85; People v. Canty, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
at p. 1280 [“In considering the purpose of legislation, statements of the intent of 
the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not conclusive, are entitled to 
consideration”].)  In passing Proposition 218, the voters clearly sought to limit 
local government’s ability to exact revenue under the rubric of special 
assessments. 
The Court of Appeal majority below recognized that the voters intended to 
change the deferential standard of review:  “[B]y placing the burden to 
demonstrate special benefit and proportionality on the agency the new law must 
now require that which Lent held was not necessary, i.e., that the record contain 
affirmative evidence of the two substantive bases for the assessment.”  
Nevertheless, the majority maintained that courts should continue to give 
deference to the local agency’s assessment decision (an act of a legislative body) 
for two reasons.  First, “the constitutional separation of powers demands that we 
give it deference.  (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3; [citations].)”  Second, if the 
challenged assessment was levied according to Proposition 218’s procedural 
requirements, courts will continue to accord the final legislative determination 
substantial deference.  Otherwise, “invalidating an assessment that received the 
support of a majority of the property owners would frustrate the will of those 
property owners.”  The majority concluded that the scope of judicial review was 
“limited.”   
Accordingly, the majority stated the new standard of review as follows:  “A 
special assessment finally confirmed by a local legislative body in accordance 
with applicable law will not be set aside by the courts so long as the local 
legislative body demonstrates, by reference to the face of the record before that 
body, that the property or properties in question will receive a special benefit over 
16 
and above the benefits conferred on the public at large and that the amount of any 
contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater than, the benefits conferred 
on the property or properties in question.  In all other respects, such an assessment 
shall not be set aside by the courts unless it clearly appears on the face of the 
record before the legislative body, or from facts which may be judicially noticed, 
that the assessment constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion.”  
Under the majority’s standard, an assessing agency’s determinations 
regarding whether benefits are special and proportional under the state 
Constitution must be affirmed if substantial evidence supports them.  Although the 
substantial evidence standard is less deferential than the Dawson/Knox standard of 
review, it nevertheless is still highly deferential.  (Crawford v. Southern Pacific 
Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [power of appellate court begins and ends with a 
determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or 
uncontradicted, to support conclusions below]; Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 
Cal.3d 639, 660 [reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and 
resolving all conflicts in its favor].)  The majority’s choice of the deferential 
substantial evidence standard comported with its emphasis on the constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine, the legislative character of the assessment 
determinations at issue, and the consent of the weighted majority of property 
owners in the district. 
However, a valid assessment under Proposition 218 must not only be 
approved by a weighted majority of owners under the procedural requirements in 
article XIII D, section 4, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e), but must also satisfy the 
substantive requirements in section 4, subdivision (a).  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subds. 
(a), (c)-(e).)  These substantive requirements are contained in constitutional 
provisions of dignity at least equal to the constitutional separation of powers 
17 
provision.  (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)  Before Proposition 218 became law, special 
assessment laws were generally statutory, and the constitutional separation of 
powers doctrine served as a foundation for a more deferential standard of review 
by the courts.  But after Proposition 218 passed, an assessment’s validity, 
including the substantive requirements, is now a constitutional question.  “There is 
a clear limitation, however, upon the power of the Legislature to regulate the 
exercise of a constitutional right.”  (Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 471.)  
“ ‘[A]ll such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provision, and in 
furtherance of its purpose, and must not in any particular attempt to narrow or 
embarrass it.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Thus, a local agency acting in a legislative capacity has no 
authority to exercise its discretion in a way that violates constitutional provisions 
or undermines their effect. 
We “ ‘ “must . . . enforce the provisions of our Constitution and ‘may not 
lightly disregard or blink at . . . a clear constitutional mandate.’ ” ’ ”  (State 
Personnel Bd. v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 512, 523.)  In 
so doing, we are obligated to construe constitutional amendments in a manner that 
effectuates the voters’ purpose in adopting the law.  (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 
Assn. v. City of Salinas (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.) 
Proposition 218 specifically states that “[t]he provisions of this act shall be 
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue 
and enhancing taxpayer consent.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 218, § 5, p. 
109; Historical Notes, supra, p. 85.)  Also, as discussed above, the ballot materials 
explained to the voters that Proposition 218 was designed to:  constrain local 
governments’ ability to impose assessments; place extensive requirements on local 
governments charging assessments; shift the burden of demonstrating 
assessments’ legality to local government; make it easier for taxpayers to win 
lawsuits; and limit the methods by which local governments exact revenue from 
18 
taxpayers without their consent.  Because Proposition 218’s underlying purpose 
was to limit government’s power to exact revenue and to curtail the deference that 
had been traditionally accorded legislative enactments on fees, assessments, and 
charges, a more rigorous standard of review is warranted.  We construe article 
XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f) — the “burden . . . to demonstrate” provision — 
liberally in light of the proposition’s other provisions, and conclude that courts 
should exercise their independent judgment in reviewing local agency decisions 
that have determined whether benefits are special and whether assessments are 
proportional to special benefits within the meaning of Proposition 218.  
(Redevelopment Agency v. County of Los Angeles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 68, 74 
[courts exercise independent judgment in matters involving constitutional 
interpretation]; see People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894 [courts use 
independent, de novo review for mixed questions of fact and law that implicate 
constitutional rights].) 
Defendants argue that because a weighted majority of property owners 
approved the assessment, it furthers Proposition 218’s emphasis on voter consent, 
and we should accord deference to those voting owners’ wishes.  However, voter 
consent cannot convert an unconstitutional legislative assessment into a 
constitutional one.  Under Proposition 218, all valid assessments must both clear 
the substantive hurdles in article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (a) and be 
approved by a weighted majority of owners under section 4, subdivisions (c), (d), 
and (e).  Moreover, Proposition 218 was designed to prevent a local legislative 
body from imposing a special tax disguised as an assessment.  (Apartment Assn., 
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 839 [“The ballot arguments identify what was perhaps the 
drafter’s main concern:  tax increases disguised via euphemistic relabeling as 
19 
‘fees,’ ‘charges,’ or ‘assessments’ ”].)5  The judicial invalidation of an assessment 
does not thwart the objective of taxpayer consent; under Proposition 13, two-thirds 
of the voters must still approve the proposed revenue source (i.e., a special tax).  
(Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4; art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a)(2).)   Neither the separation 
of powers nor property owner consent justifies allowing a local legislative body or 
property owners (both bound by the state Constitution) to usurp the judicial 
function of interpreting and applying the constitutional provisions that now govern 
assessments. 
Courts are familiar with the process of determining the constitutionality of 
the taxes, fees, and assessments that local governments impose.  (See Richmond v. 
Shasta Community Services Dist., supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 418-428 [determination 
whether charge that water district imposed violated article XIII D restrictions 
required de novo review]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville 
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 647-650 [court found that in-lieu fee that city imposed 
was unconstitutional under article XIII D]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City 
of Riverside, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 684-690 [question whether existing 
streetlight assessment was subject to Proposition 218 limitations involved court’s 
de novo interpretation of the constitution and voters’ intent]; Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Salinas (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1354-1359 [court 
independently interprets constitutional amendments contained in article XIII D to 
                                              
5  
The argument in favor of Proposition 218 stated:  “After voters passed 
Proposition 13, politicians created a loophole in the law that allows them to raise 
taxes without voter approval by calling taxes ‘assessments’ and ‘fees’. . . .  [¶] . . . 
[¶]  Proposition 218 will significantly tighten the kind of benefit assessments that 
can be levied.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 218, 
p. 76).)  It also declared that “Proposition 218 simply give taxpayers the right to 
vote on taxes and stops politicians’ end-runs around Proposition 13.”  (Ballot 
Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 218, p. 77.) 
20 
determine whether water fee was a property-related fee requiring property owners’ 
vote]; Graber v. City of Upland (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 424, 429 [question whether 
local ordinance violated constitutional provisions relating to tax increment 
financing was subject to de novo review].) 
Accordingly, courts should exercise their independent judgment in 
reviewing whether assessments that local agencies impose violate article XIII D.6 
B.  The 2001 Special Assessment  
We apply this standard of review to the special assessment in this case to 
determine whether OSA met its burden of demonstrating that the assessed 
properties received a special benefit and that the assessment is proportional to that 
special benefit. 
1.  Special Benefits 
“Under Proposition 218, only special benefits are assessable.  (Cal. Const., 
art. XIIID, § 4, subd. (a).)  Local governments may not impose assessments to pay 
for the cost of providing a general benefit to the community. . . .”  (City of 
Saratoga v. Hinz (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1223.)  If a proposed project will 
provide both general benefits to the community and special benefits to particular 
properties, the agency can impose an assessment based only on the special 
benefits.  It must separate the general benefits from the special benefits and must 
secure other funding for the general benefits.  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a); Hinz, 
supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1223.) 
                                              
6  
In Not About Water Com. v. Board of Supervisors (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 
982), the Court of Appeal held that courts review the creation of a special 
assessment district under an abuse of discretion standard (Id. at pp. 994-995), but 
at another point it references a substantial evidence standard (Id. at p. 986).  We 
disapprove Not About Water Com. v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 
982, to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
21 
Both before and after Proposition 218 passed, special assessments were 
distinguished from special taxes through the concept of special benefits.  (Knox, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 142; Ventura Group Ventures, Inc. v. Ventura Port Dist. 
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1089, 1106 (Ventura Group Ventures).)  In Knox, we referred to 
a special benefit as a benefit “ ‘over and above that received by the general 
public.’ ”  (Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 142.)  There, we presumed (in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary) that the presence of well-maintained open park land 
contributed to the district’s attractiveness and thus was a special benefit because it 
enhanced the desirability of the residential properties in that district.  (Knox, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 149.) 
Proposition 218 made several changes to the definition of special benefits.  
First, Proposition 218 defines a special benefit as “a particular and distinct benefit 
over and above general benefits conferred on real property located in the district 
or to the public at large,” with the additional italicized requirement.  (Art. XIII D, 
§ 2, subd. (i), italics added.)  Correspondingly, it emphasizes that “[g]eneral 
enhancement of property value does not constitute ‘special benefit.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
Since the “[g]eneral enhancement of property value” is a “general benefit[] 
conferred on real property located in the district” (ibid.), Proposition 218 clearly 
mandates that a special benefit cannot be synonymous with general enhancement 
of property value.  Thus, Proposition 218 tightened the definition of special 
benefits and broadened the definition of general benefits to include benefits 
conferred generally “on real property located in the district.”  (Art. XIII D, § 2, 
subd. (i).)7 
                                              
7  
OSA suggests that it can classify general benefits to parcels within the 
district as special benefits because benefit-to-property language is omitted from 
article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f).  That subdivision requires the agency “to 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
22 
Relying on Harrison v. Bd. of Supervisors (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 852 
(Harrison), the Court of Appeal majority below commented that “[i]f there is a 
significant difference between the two definitions [of special benefits before and 
after Proposition 218], we do not detect it.”  Harrison simply held that an increase 
in property value alone did not amount to a special benefit.  (Harrison, supra, 44 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 858-859.)  This holding did not preclude a determination of 
special benefit based in part on the general enhancement of property value. 
Moreover, while pre-Proposition 218 case law makes clear that assessments 
may not be levied for purposes of conferring purely general benefits, courts did 
not invalidate assessments simply because they provided general benefits to the 
public in addition to the requisite special benefits, and did not demand a strict 
separation of special and general benefits.  (See e.g., Knox, supra, 4 Cal. at pp. 
137, 149 [upheld validity of assessment for park maintenance despite fact city did 
not separate general benefits to people outside area and to community at large 
from special benefits to residential parcels]; Allen v. City of Los Angeles (1930) 
210 Cal. 235, 238 [“It would be well within the power of the city council to make 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
demonstrate that the property or properties in question receive a special benefit 
over and above the benefits conferred on the public at large and that the amount of 
any contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater than, the [special] 
benefits conferred on the property or properties in question.”  (Art. XIII D, § 4, 
subd. (f).)  OSA disregards the fact that section 4, subdivision (f), requires OSA to 
prove a proportional “special benefit” to each property as that term is defined in 
section 2, subdivision (i), which includes the benefit-to-property component.  The 
additional reference in section 4, subdivision (f), to the “public at large” is 
surplusage, because that language is already included in section 2, subdivision 
(i)’s definition of “special benefit.”  (See Voters for Responsible Retirement v. 
Board of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 772-773.) 
23 
the cost of the entire proceeding rest upon the shoulders of the property owners of 
a given district especially benefited thereby”]; Federal Construction Co. v. Ensign 
(1922) 59 Cal.App. 200, 210 (Ensign) [“To invalidate the assessment the general 
public benefit must be the only result of the improvement”; 100 percent of cost of 
new sewage treatment plant fully assessable notwithstanding general benefits]; 51 
Cal.Jur.3d (2003) Public Improvements, § 19, p. 900 [“For an assessment to be 
invalid because it confers a general public benefit, the general benefit must be the 
only result of the assessment”].) 
Consequently, the pre-Proposition 218 cases on which the Court of Appeal 
majority below and OSA relied are not instructive in determining whether a 
benefit is special under Proposition 218.  Instead, under the plain language of 
article XIII D, a special benefit must affect the assessed property in a way that is 
particular and distinct from its effect on other parcels and that real property in 
general and the public at large do not share.8  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (i).) 
                                              
8 
OSA observes that Proposition 218’s definition of “special benefit” 
presents a paradox when considered with its definition of “district.”  Section 2, 
subdivision (i) defines a “special benefit” as “a particular and distinct benefit over 
and above general benefits conferred on real property located in the district or to 
the public at large.”  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (i), italics added.)  Section 2, 
subdivision (d) defines “district” as “an area determined by an agency to contain 
all parcels which will receive a special benefit from a proposed public 
improvement or property-related service.”  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (d), italics 
added.)  In a well-drawn district — limited to only parcels receiving special 
benefits from the improvement — every parcel within that district receives a 
shared special benefit.  Under section 2, subdivision (i), these benefits can be 
construed as being general benefits since they are not “particular and distinct” and 
are not “over and above” the benefits received by other properties “located in the 
district.”   
 
We do not believe that the voters intended to invalidate an assessment 
district that is narrowly drawn to include only properties directly benefitting from 
an improvement.  Indeed, the ballot materials reflect otherwise.  Thus, if an 
assessment district is narrowly drawn, the fact that a benefit is conferred 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
24 
Our examination of the engineer’s report supporting the assessments 
reveals that OSA has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the 
assessment is based only on the special benefits conferred on the particular parcel 
and is in proportion to those benefits.  Various studies supported the listed benefits 
in the engineer’s report.  But, as discussed below, the report’s designation of these 
listed benefits as “special” failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements for 
assessments that fund open space acquisitions. 
The engineer’s report enumerates seven “special benefits” that the 
assessment will confer on all residents and property owners in the district:  (1) 
enhanced recreational activities and expanded access to recreational areas; (2) 
protection of views, scenery, and other resources; (3) increased economic activity; 
(4) expanded employment opportunity; (5) reduced costs of law enforcement, 
health care, fire prevention, and natural disaster response; (6) enhanced quality of 
life and desirability of the area; and (7) improved water quality, pollution 
reduction, and flood prevention. 
The report states that the benefit of “[e]nhanced recreational opportunities 
and expanded access to recreational areas” will be conferred on “all property 
owners, residents, employees and customers throughout the OSA” and that “[a]ll 
properties will benefit from the assessments . . . .”  It explains that residential 
properties will benefit because “[t]hese improved open space areas will be 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
throughout the district does not make it general rather than special.  In that 
circumstance, the characterization of a benefit may depend on whether the parcel 
receives a direct advantage from the improvement (e.g., proximity to a park) or 
receives an indirect, derivative advantage resulting from the overall public benefits 
of the improvement (e.g., general enhancement of the district’s property values). 
25 
available to residents and guests of property owners within the OSA, thereby 
making these properties more valuable,” and that nonresidential properties will 
benefit because additional recreation areas available to employees will “enhance 
an employer’s ability to attract and keep quality employees.”  The “enhanced 
economic conditions benefit the [nonresidential] property by making it more 
valuable.”  The report therefore acknowledges that all people in OSA’s territory 
will benefit broadly, generally, and directly from the assessment, resulting in all 
properties receiving a derivative, indirect benefit. 
Similarly, the report describes the second listed “special benefit” as 
benefiting everyone in the district generally (“[p]rotection of views, scenery and 
other resources values and environmental benefits enjoyed by residents, 
employees, customers and guests”).  The report concludes that “[t]hese benefits 
ultimately accrue to properties because properties are more desirable in areas that 
offer environmental and economic benefits.”  The report makes no attempt to tie 
this benefit to particular properties.  Instead, it concludes that all properties 
throughout the district will receive this benefit equally. 
“Increased economic activity” and “[e]xpanded employment opportunity” 
are also listed in the report as “special benefits.”  Again, the report states that 
increased economic activity and expanded employment opportunity will result 
from the acquisition of additional open space because increased recreational 
opportunities will likely attract more people to the county.  These people, in turn, 
will patronize county services and businesses, thereby fostering economic growth 
and “additional employment opportunities for OSA residents.”  The report broadly 
concludes that the increased economic activity in the area is “a benefit ultimately 
to residential, commercial, industrial and institutional property.”  However, it 
simply assumes that the resultant increased economic activity will affect people 
26 
and property throughout the county equally, but makes no direct connection to any 
particular properties. 
The remaining listed “special benefits” do not satisfy the constitutional 
requirements either.  Relying on various studies, the report claims that because 
open space and parks promote good health and reduce crime and vandalism, the 
county can expect a reduction in health care and law enforcement costs.  It reasons 
that “[s]uch cost reduction frees public funds for other services that benefit 
properties,” and “[a]ll of these factors ultimately benefit property by making the 
community more desirable and property, in turn, more valuable.”  The report also 
asserts that, because open space helps protect water quality and reduce flooding, 
the costs of public utility services for properties in the district will decrease.   
Finally, the report emphasizes that open space areas will “enhance the 
overall quality of life and desirability of the area.”  All the listed benefits are 
general benefits in this case, shared by everyone — all 1.2 million people — living 
within the district.  The report does not even attempt to measure the benefits that 
accrue to particular parcels.  Indeed, the report describes OSA’s mission, which is 
“[t]o preserve, protect and manage, for the use and enjoyment of all people, a well-
balanced system of urban and non-urban areas of scenic recreational and 
agricultural importance.”  (Italics added.)  OSA is responsible, as the report 
explains, “for preserving and maintaining open space for approximately 1.2 
million people residing within its boundaries, representing over two-thirds of the 
population within Santa Clara County.”  Although it is reasonable to conclude that 
quality-of-life benefits to people living in, working in, and patronizing businesses 
in the district will, in turn, benefit property in the district, such derivative benefits 
are only “general benefits conferred on real property located in the district or to 
the public at large.”  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (i).)  Moreover, to the extent that the 
value of property located in a desirable community is enhanced, this is a “[g]eneral 
27 
enhancement of property value,” and is thus, by definition not a special benefit.  
(Ibid.) 
In addition, the report’s description of general benefits fails to comport with 
the Constitution.  The engineer’s report acknowledges that the acquisition, 
maintenance and preservation of open spaces “provide a degree of general benefit 
to the public at large.”  But it then asserts that the ratio of general and special 
benefit that will be derived from OSA’s open space acquisition program will be 10 
percent general benefit and 90 percent special benefit, based on its determination 
that general benefit is measured only as the benefit conferred on “individuals who 
are not residents, employees, customers or property owners” (italics added) in the 
assessment district.  This distinction finds no support in the Constitution. 
Under article XIII D, general benefits are not restricted to benefits 
conferred only on persons and property outside the assessment district, but can 
include benefits both “conferred on real property located in the district or to the 
public at large.” (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (i), italics added.)  “At large” means 
“[n]ot limited to any particular . . . person” or “[f]ully; in detail; in an extended 
form.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 136.)  By its plain language, section 
2, subdivision (i), does not permit OSA to choose one segment of the “public at 
large” to measure general benefit.  The “public at large” thus means all members 
of the public — including those who live, work, and shop within the district — 
and not simply transient visitors.  The report assumes that people and property 
within the district — an area covering over 800 square miles, with a population of 
approximately 1.2 million people — will receive no general benefit at all, only 
special benefits, from OSA’s acquisition of open space.  But under these 
circumstances, “[i]f everything is special, then nothing is special.”  (Ventura 
Group Ventures, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1107.) 
28 
Further, we note the validity of this assessment would be questionable even 
under the pre-Proposition 218 cases on which OSA relies.  (See e.g., Knox, supra, 
4 Cal.4th 132 [assessment valid for maintenance of five existing parks in four 
school districts in city]; City of San Diego v. Holodnak (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 759 
[assessment valid to fund parks and other public facilities located in new 
development]; Ensign, supra, 59 Cal.App. 200 [assessment valid to fund new 
sewer system].)  Unlike the assessment here, the assessments in the pre-
Proposition 218 cases involved specific, identified improvements that directly 
benefited each assessed property and whose costs could be determined or 
estimated and then allocated to the properties assessed.  Also, in Knox and 
Holodnak, the properties assessed received special benefits from the particular 
park because of their proximity to park facilities.  (Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 
149; Holodnak, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 763.) 
Here, with a district of 314,000 parcels, OSA shows no distinct benefits to 
particular properties above those which the general public using and enjoying the 
open space receives.  The special benefits, if any, that may arise would likely 
result from factors such as proximity, expanded or improved access to the open 
space, or views of the open space.  (See Ensign, supra, 59 Cal.App. at p. 217 
[property which is specially benefited is “ ‘real property adjoining, or near the 
locality of the improvement’ ”].)  But, because OSA has not identified any specific 
open space acquisition or planned acquisition, it cannot show any specific benefits 
to assessed parcels through their direct relationship to the “locality of the 
improvement.”  The improvement is only to OSA’s budget for open space 
acquisitions. 
Based on the undisputed facts in OSA’s record (the engineer’s report), OSA 
has failed to demonstrate that the properties in the assessment district receive a 
29 
particular and distinct special benefit not shared by the district’s property in 
general or by the public at large within the meaning of Proposition 218. 
2.  Proportionality 
For an assessment to be valid, the properties must be assessed in proportion 
to the special benefits received:  “No assessment shall be imposed on any parcel 
which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on 
that parcel.”  (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a).)  “The proportionate special benefit 
derived by each identified parcel shall be determined in relationship to the entirety 
of the capital cost of a public improvement, the maintenance and operation 
expenses of a public improvement, or the cost of the property-related service being 
provided.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Capital cost is defined as “the cost of 
acquisition, installation, construction, reconstruction, or replacement of a 
permanent public improvement by an agency.”  (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (c), italics 
added.) 
To satisfy the proportionality requirement, the engineer’s report assigned 
all single-family homes in the district one single family equivalent (SFE) unit and 
assigned other types of property greater or lesser SFE’s, depending on the 
estimated number of people using those properties.  Condominiums received a 
lesser SFE because the average number of people per unit was estimated to be 
fewer than in an average single-family residence.  Commercial properties received 
a higher SFE than single-family residences because greater numbers of people use 
them.  Each SFE corresponded to an annual assessment of $20, an amount a 
majority of property owners surveyed would be willing to pay.   
Because all single-family homes were assessed the same $20 amount, the 
engineer’s report assumed that all single-family homes throughout the 800-square-
mile district would receive an equal special benefit, regardless of their proximity 
30 
to open space areas that might be acquired at some time in the future.  The report 
contains no detailed analysis on how specific properties, blocks, school districts, 
or even cities would benefit from their proximity to open space.  OSA contends 
that its assessment is nonetheless valid because it plans to acquire space equally 
throughout the district, and all properties will be equally close to and benefit from 
open space areas.  The engineer’s report lists 30 priority acquisition areas and 
identifies a number of other “potential acquisition and improvement areas.”  This, 
OSA claims, is sufficient to satisfy Proposition 218’s proportionality requirement.  
We disagree. 
The report’s proportionality analysis fails to satisfy Proposition 218 largely 
because the special assessment is based on OSA’s projected annual budget of $8 
million for its open space program rather than on a calculation or estimation of the 
cost of the particular public improvement to be financed by the assessment.  The 
figure of $8 million was derived from the additional $20 per year in property taxes 
multiplied by the number of properties on the tax rolls in the district.  The $8 
million collected for the assessment annually — with an automatic cost-of-living 
increase — provides a continuing source of revenue for OSA’s budget.  However, 
the purpose of an assessment is to require the properties which have received a 
special benefit from a “public improvement” “to pay the cost of that 
improvement,” and not to fund an agency’s ongoing budget.  (Ventura Group 
Ventures, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1106, italics added; Knox, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 
142) 
The engineer’s report generally describes a program to acquire various 
properties throughout the county, as well as to provide maintenance and servicing 
of these public areas.  Such future acquisitions include, but are not limited to, 
“greenbelts, hillsides, viewsheds and watersheds, baylands, riparian corridors, 
urban open space, parklands, agricultural lands, development rights on agricultural 
31 
lands and other land-use types, conservation easements, other property rights, 
wetlands, utility right-of-ways, surplus school sites, [and] quarries.”  OSA argues 
its goal is to acquire open space land that is evenly distributed throughout the 
district.  Although the report lists 30 general priority acquisition areas, it further 
notes this list is not exclusive.  The report identifies no particular parcels or 
specific area within the district that OSA plans to acquire for open space or parks.  
Further, the engineer’s report notes that OSA “should” complete at least one 
acquisition of open land every five years.  Notably, OSA is not required to do so. 
Thus, the report fails to identify with sufficient specificity the “permanent 
public improvement” that the assessment will finance, fails to estimate or calculate 
the cost of any such improvement, and fails to directly connect any proportionate 
costs of and benefits received from the “permanent public improvement” to the 
specific assessed properties.  As the dissent below observed, “an assessment 
calculation that works backward by starting with an amount taxpayers are likely to 
pay, and then determines an annual spending budget based thereon, does not 
comply with the law governing assessments, either before or after Proposition 
218.” 
As with its determination of special benefits, OSA has failed to demonstrate 
proportionality.  Accordingly, we conclude that the assessment is invalid for 
failing to meet the requirements of Proposition 218.  In light of this disposition, we 
need not reach the other arguments plaintiffs raise. 
32 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Association v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 130 Cal.App.4th 1295 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S136468 
Date Filed: July 14, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: William J. Elfving 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke, Tony J. Tanke; Law Offices of Gary Simms, Gary L. Simms; Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Association and Timothy Arthur Bittle for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Aaron L. Katz as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
James Sherman Burling and Harold E. Johnson for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Pahl & Gosselin, Fenn C. Horton III and Karen Kubala McCay for California Apartment Association as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk and Thomas W. Hiltachk for Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles, 
Apartment Association of Greater Inland Empire, Burbank Chamber of Commerce and Lodi Association of 
Realtors as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Jack Cohen for Jonathan M. Coupal as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Eric Grant for Alameda County Taxpayers Association, Association of Concerned Taxpayers, League of 
Placer County Taxpayers, Pomona Coalition for Better Government, Sacramento County Taxpayers 
League, Solano County Taxpayers Association, United Organization of Taxpayers, Valley Taxpayers 
Coalition, Ventura County Taxpayers Association and Yolo County Taxpayers Association as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor, James R. Parrinello, John E. Mueller, Christopher E. 
Skinnel and Sean P. Welch for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S136468 - counsel continued 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Hopkins & Carley and Jay M. Ross for San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce and Silicon Valley 
Manufacturing Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
McMurchie Law Firm and David W. McMurchie for The Mosquito and Vector Control Association of 
California and California Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel,  Sue Andra Gallagher and Kathleen Larocque, Deputy County 
Counsel; and Elizabeth Strauss for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Timothy N. Washburn for Sacramento Area Flood Control District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Willoughby, Stuart & Bening and Bradley A. Bening for San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce 
and Silicon Valley Leadership Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinbergeer, Ellen J. Garber and Winter King for Committee for Green Foothills, 
Greenbelt Alliance, Planning and Conservation League and Sierra Club as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Ann Miller Ravel. County Counsel (Santa Clara) and Katherine Harasz, Deputy County Counsel, for 
County of Santa Clara as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, Vanessa Ottilie Wells, Ingrid S. Leverett and David A. Thomas for 
The Trust for Public Land as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Tony J. Tanke 
Law Offices of Tony J. Tanke 
2050 Lyndell Terrace, Suite 240 
Davis, CA  95616 
(530) 758-4530 
 
James R. Parrinello 
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor 
591 Redwood Highway, Bldg. 4000 
Mill Valley, CA  94941 
(415) 389-6800