Title: Johnson v. Commissioner Taylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 568, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DERRICK L. JOHNSON, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER STAN TAYLOR 
et al.,  
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 568, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 05M-09-111 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 31, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 13, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of June 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, Derrick L. Johnson, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s October 18, 2005 order summarily dismissing his 
petition for a writ of mandamus.  We find no merit to the appeal.  
Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In 1984, Johnson pleaded guilty to Murder in the Second 
Degree.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment.  In 2005, Johnson filed a 
petition for a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court challenging the 
 
2
Department of Correction’s calculation of his good time credits.  He also 
moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  The Superior Court 
granted Johnson leave to proceed IFP, but summarily dismissed his petition 
for a writ of mandamus as legally frivolous.1  
 
(3) 
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued by this 
Court to compel a trial court to perform a duty.2  As a condition precedent to 
the issuance of the writ, the defendant must demonstrate that: he has a clear 
right to the performance of the duty; no other adequate remedy is available; 
and the trial court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.3 
 
(4) 
Johnson argues that, because Delaware law requires that good 
time credit be applied to reduce his life sentence,4 the Superior Court had a 
duty to order prison officials to recalculate his release date.  Johnson’s 
argument is incorrect.  Under the applicable Delaware law,5 good time credit 
may only be applied to Johnson’s sentence to accelerate his parole eligibility 
date, not the length of his sentence.  Johnson is not eligible for conditional 
release and must remain incarcerated until his death, unless he is granted 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 8801(5); 8803(b). 
2 In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988). 
3 Id. 
4 Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003). 
5 Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 558 (Del. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Multi-Purpose 
Criminal Justice Facility, 700 A.2d 1203 (Del. 1997)). 
 
3
parole.6  Johnson has, thus, failed to demonstrate that the Superior Court had 
a duty that it failed or refused to perform. 
 
(5) 
While the Superior Court did not provide any reasons for its 
summary dismissal of Johnson’s petition,7 we do not believe that any 
purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the Superior Court.  It 
is within our discretion to affirm a decision of the trial judge, “if, upon a 
reading of the record in relation to the order, the reasons [for the decision] 
appear obvious.”8  In this case, it is clear that the Superior Court’s summary 
dismissal of Johnson’s petition was proper. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
  
 
 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Ball v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, 780 A.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Del. 2001) 
(“The failure of a trial judge to give reasons for the court’s disposition constitutes a per se 
abuse of discretion.”) 
8 Id. at 1105.