Title: Commonwealth v. Grundman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12264
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2018

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SJC-12264 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL C. GRUNDMAN. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     November 9, 2017. - March 22, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Global Positioning System Device.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Probation. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 19, 2012. 
 
 
A motion to correct a clerical error in sentence, filed on 
September 24, 2014, was heard by Gary A. Nickerson, J., and 
motions for reconsideration were considered by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth M. Carey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant pleaded guilty to two indictments 
charging five counts of rape of a child and was sentenced to a 
term of incarceration and a term of probation.  Despite the 
provisions of G. L. c. 265, § 47, mandating that defendants 
2 
 
 
convicted of certain sex offenses, including rape of a child, be 
subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a 
condition of any term of probation, that condition was not 
announced in open court when the defendant's sentence was 
imposed.1  At issue here is whether the judge erred in 
resentencing the defendant to include the GPS monitoring 
condition approximately ten months after the defendant was 
originally sentenced.  We conclude that because the defendant 
here did not receive actual notice from the sentencing judge, at 
the time of sentencing, that GPS monitoring was included as a 
special condition of his probation, and because the resentencing 
occurred after the sixty-day period in which an illegal sentence 
may be corrected under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1), as 
appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016), the belated imposition of 
GPS monitoring must be vacated.  See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 
469 Mass. 502, 513-514 (2014). 
 
Background.  Following a plea colloquy, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to five counts of rape of a child, involving two 
victims.  The defendant's sentencing hearing occurred 
approximately two months later, when a Superior Court judge 
                                                 
1 General Laws c. 265, § 47, states that any person who is 
"placed on probation for any offense listed within the 
definition of 'sex offense,' a 'sex offense involving a child' 
or a 'sexually violent offense,' as defined in [G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178C], shall, as a requirement of any term of probation, wear 
a global positioning system device." 
3 
 
 
sentenced him to a term of two years in a house of correction 
and a ten-year term of probation (with special conditions) to be 
served concurrently with his term of incarceration.  In open 
court, the clerk announced that the defendant's sentence would 
be " subject to the terms and conditions of the probation 
department," with certain special conditions.  The clerk then 
announced approximately fifteen special conditions of the 
defendant's probation including that he register as a sex 
offender, complete sexual abuse perpetrator counselling, and 
have no contact with the victims or their families.  However, 
the clerk did not articulate that GPS monitoring was a special 
condition of the defendant's probation.  Similarly, neither the 
judge nor the parties had mentioned a GPS monitoring condition 
during the sentencing hearing or the plea colloquy, and it was 
not included in the Commonwealth's recommended sentence. 
 
Shortly after sentencing, the defendant signed a probation 
contract stating that he was required to "wear a GPS or 
comparable device in accordance with G. L. c. 265, § 47."  The 
probation contract was signed by a Superior Court judge 
different from the judge who sentenced the defendant.  That 
judge's signature was dated two days after the defendant's 
sentencing hearing.  The GPS monitoring condition was also 
memorialized on the docket. 
4 
 
 
 
Approximately ten months after the defendant's sentence was 
imposed, he filed a motion to remove the GPS monitoring 
condition from the docket, claiming it had been erroneously 
entered.  Although the condition had not been announced at 
sentencing, the judge determined that he could correct this 
mistake because the defendant's guilty plea to the rape of a 
child was subject to mandatory GPS monitoring as a condition of 
probation under § 47.  The judge then resentenced the defendant 
to include GPS monitoring as a special condition of probation. 
The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
judge denied, concluding that the defendant had actual notice of 
the condition because he signed the probation contract 
contemporaneously with the sentencing hearing, in addition to 
the fact that GPS monitoring is statutorily mandated for the 
crime of rape of a child. 
 
The defendant again moved for reconsideration, this time 
supported by an affidavit from his plea counsel stating that 
counsel was unaware that § 47 mandated GPS monitoring in the 
defendant's circumstances, and that he had not discussed GPS 
monitoring as a probationary condition with the defendant.  
Additionally, counsel was not present with the defendant when he 
signed the probation contract, which likely occurred after the 
sentencing hearing, while the defendant was in custody.  The 
judge denied this motion.  The defendant appealed, and the 
5 
 
 
Appeals Court affirmed the decision of the sentencing judge.  
See Commonwealth v. Grundman, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 404 (2016).  
We granted the defendant's application for further appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant acknowledges in his brief that 
because he pleaded guilty to the rape of a child, § 47 required 
that his probation include GPS monitoring.  Nevertheless, the 
defendant contends that because the judge failed to announce the 
GPS monitoring condition, and the defendant did not have actual 
notice of that condition at sentencing, the judge erred in 
resentencing him to include the GPS monitoring condition after 
his sentence became final. 2  We agree. 
 
"A criminal defendant has the right to be present at his 
own sentencing."  Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676,  
685 (2012), quoting United States v. Vega-Ortiz, 425 F.3d 20, 22 
(1st Cir. 2005).  In accordance with this right, "the oral 
pronouncement of a sentence [at the sentencing hearing] 
generally controls over the written expression where there 
exists a material conflict between the two" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Williamson, supra.  "However, no material 
conflict exists where the defendant is on notice that he is 
                                                 
2 Given that clerks are authorized to announce a defendant's 
sentence in court, in the presence of the sentencing judge, the 
clerk's announcement of the defendant's sentence would 
constitute actual notice of the terms that were announced. 
6 
 
 
subject to the terms included in the written judgment" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Because "the imposition of GPS monitoring is singularly 
punitive in effect. . . . a defendant must receive actual notice 
from the sentencing judge that his probation will be conditioned 
on such a harsh requirement."  Selavka, 469 Mass. at 505 n.5, 
citing Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 568-569 (2009).  See 
Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 477 Mass. 206, 215 (2017) (sentence 
invalid unless defendant receives notice of its terms when 
sentence imposed).  Actual notice of GPS monitoring at 
sentencing is particularly important for a defendant who has 
tendered a guilty plea because, at the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant is still entitled to withdraw the guilty plea if the 
judge decides to impose a sentence that exceeds the recommended 
or agreed-on sentence.  See Selavka, supra at 514-515 (defendant 
may plead guilty to achieve measure of certainty in sentence); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (6) (B), as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 
(2015).  Notice that the defendant's probation includes GPS 
monitoring, at some point after the defendant's sentence has 
been imposed and after he has lost the opportunity to withdraw 
the plea, is insufficient.  See Selavka, supra at 515. 
 
Even though § 47 mandates GPS monitoring, the judge's duty 
to announce that condition at sentencing is not obviated.  
Selavka, 469 Mass. at 505 n.5 (unlike ordinary probationary 
7 
 
 
conditions, judge must articulate GPS monitoring).  Where the 
judge fails to announce this condition despite the statutory 
mandate, the defendant's sentence is illegal "insofar as it did 
not include GPS monitoring as a condition of the defendant's 
probation."  Id. at 503.3 
 
This type of illegal sentence may be corrected under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (1) by resentencing the defendant to include 
the GPS monitoring condition within sixty days from when the 
sentence was imposed.  See Selavka, 469 Mass. at 513-514.  Where 
the modification is "so punitive as to increase significantly the 
severity of the original probation. . . . our common-law 
principles of double jeopardy bar the imposition of what is 
essentially a new, harsher sentence once the rule 29 period has 
expired" (quotations and citation omitted).  Id. at 511.  For 
that reason, "[e]ven an illegal sentence will become final for 
the purposes of double jeopardy after the expiration of that 
time period, and no longer will be subject to revision or 
revocation within the terms of rule 29 (a)."  Id. at 514. 
 
Here, the record is devoid of evidence indicating that the 
defendant had actual notice of the GPS monitoring condition of 
                                                 
3 The fact that the defendant's sentence was illegal because 
it did not include global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as 
a special condition of probation (as required by the statute) 
does not affect the legitimacy of the special conditions of the 
defendant's probation that were announced at sentencing or his 
term of incarceration. 
8 
 
 
probation when he was sentenced.  Contrast Williamson, 462 Mass. 
at 685-686 (ample notice at sentencing hearing that probation 
included community parole supervision for life).  GPS monitoring 
was never discussed as a condition of probation during the plea 
colloquy or announced in open court at the sentencing hearing.  
When the defendant's sentence was announced, the statement that 
his sentence was "subject to the terms and conditions of the 
probation department, with the following special conditions," 
gave notice of the special conditions that were specifically 
articulated in addition to the general conditions applicable to 
all terms of probation.  See Selavka, 469 Mass. at 505 n.5, 
citing Rule 56 of the Rules of the Superior Court (2012).  
Accordingly, the general statement that his sentence was 
"subject to the terms and conditions of the probation 
department" did not satisfy the requirement that GPS monitoring 
be specifically articulated at sentencing.  See id.  The 
Commonwealth's recommended sentence, which the judge accepted, 
also did not include the GPS monitoring condition.  Moreover, 
the affidavit from the defendant's plea counsel stated that 
counsel was unaware that GPS monitoring was a mandated condition 
of probation under § 47 in these circumstances, and that he had 
never discussed it with the defendant. 
 
In addition, the sentencing judge's determination that the 
defendant had actual notice of the GPS monitoring condition 
9 
 
 
based on his contemporaneous signing of the probation contract, 
which was recorded on the docket, is misplaced.  To the extent 
that the probation contract gave the defendant notice of the GPS 
monitoring condition, that notice was given by the probation 
department, not the trial judge, after the defendant's sentence 
was imposed.  Notice occurring shortly after the sentencing 
hearing, standing alone, is inadequate to satisfy the 
requirement that the defendant receive actual notice of the GPS 
monitoring condition from the sentencing judge at the time his 
sentence is imposed, where oral pronouncement of the sentence in 
open court is required.  See Selavka, 469 Mass. at 505 n.5; 
Williamson, 462 Mass. at 685.  Accordingly, the judge exceeded 
his authority in imposing the GPS monitoring condition on the 
defendant after the passage of the sixty-day deadline to correct 
the sentence under rule 29 (a)(1).  See Selavka, supra at 513-
514. 
 
Conclusion.  The denial of the defendant's motion is 
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court to 
vacate the GPS monitoring condition of the defendant's probation 
from the docket. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.