Title: Eslinger v. MILLER BROTHERS COMPANY
Citation: 315 S.W.2d 261
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1958

315 S.W.2d 261 (1958) Oliver ESLINGER v. MILLER BROTHERS COMPANY, INC. Supreme Court of Tennessee. June 6, 1958. Rehearing Denied July 11, 1958. Ogle &amp; Ogle, Sevierville, for appellant. Frantz, McConnell &amp; Seymour, Knoxville, Wynn &amp; Wynn, Sevierville, for appellee. NEIL, Chief Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case which originated in the Chancery Court by an original bill filed by Miller Brothers against Eslinger seeking a declaratory judgment as to its liability for compensation. The contention of Miller Brothers, who was the defendant's employer, was that the injury complained of did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. The defendant filed an answer and cross bill charging that he had been a regular employee of Miller Brothers, Inc., since 1950 and was so employed on July 27, 1956, at which time he had a heat stroke. The circumstances of its occurrence and extent of it is thus alleged: "Cross complainant alleges that while thus working for the cross defendant company in the regular course of his employment he suddenly, accidentally and while in the course of his employment, and due to the intensive heat on that day, suffered a severe heat stroke which caused him to fall or sit down and caused him to be lifeless, his head swimming and unable to do anything. He was immediately sent to Dr. Roberts in Sevierville, Tennessee, where he was treated and was later sent to Dr. Powers at the Acuff Clinic in Knoxville, Tennessee, where he was treated for some time. "As a result of said accident and injury he became totally and permanently disabled and is now totally and permanently disabled from following any gainful occupation. *262 "The cross defendant company began paying him $29.64 per week. It recognized his disability and its liability under the Workman's Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-901 et seq. Said company continued to pay him until May 25, 1957, when it refused to pay him any further. Your cross complainant has never recovered from the said heat stroke and is now totally and permanently disabled from following any gainful occupation. He believes that he will continue to be totally and permanently disabled throughout his natural life." We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the cross action, not as "cross complainant" and "cross defendant", but to Eslinger as the petitioner and Miller Brothers, Inc., as the defendant. The facts show without dispute that Mr. Eslinger had been employed by Miller Brothers since 1950 as a common laborer. He was 66 years of age at the time of the alleged accident and suffered a heat stroke while he was at work. His work required loading cars, handling lumber, flooring, and the like and while so engaged he became overheated. He stated to his foreman, a Mr. Whitson, on Monday, "I got too hot Friday. I had a heat stroke here and I want you to send me to the Company Doctor." He was told to see his family doctor in Sevierville, a Dr. Roberts. There can be no doubt but that he had a severe heat stroke or "heat exhaustion" on July 27, 1956, to the extent that he required medical aid. He went to see Dr. Roberts for examination and treatment on July 30th. As to his condition at that time we quote the testimony of Dr. Roberts as follows: He further testified that Mr. Eslinger "is a diabetic", but to what extent the record is silent. It is conceded that a heat stroke would not cause diabetes. Continuing Dr. Roberts' testimony: There is no dispute as to the petitioner having had a heat stroke while at work. The foregoing testimony of Dr. Roberts (who is a capable medical man) discloses the effect of a heat stroke. The evidence also shows that Mr. Eslinger had suffered from hardening of the arteries for several years prior to the day he had this heat stroke. The medical term used by medical experts for hardening of the arteries is "arteriosclerosis". Dr. Roberts gave it as his opinion that a heat stroke would have no causative effect on arteriosclerosis. Now there is abundant evidence to sustain the petitioner's contention that he is totally and permanently disabled from following any gainful occupation. This fact is not seriously controverted. But the defendant insists that this condition was not an accidental injury "which arose out of or in the course of his employment"; that the heat stroke was not a contributing cause. The learned chancellor took this view of the case and dismissed the petition. In his opinion he said among other things: "The Court feels the responsibility in this matter, but I cannot see that this would not have happened whether he was with Miller Brothers or whether he had been walking down Main Street." The petitioner's assignments of error question the judgment of the Chancellor, contending that he erred in sustaining the defendant's theory of non-liability. In support of the assignment of error that the Chancellor erred in his opinion, the petitioner's counsel invokes the ruling of this Court in King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3, 4, 53 A.L.R. 1086, wherein it was held, "While this court is bound by the findings of the trial judge on questions of fact whenever there is any evidence to sustain the finding, it is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the trial judge from undisputed facts", and more especially does he rely on Swift &amp; Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S.W.2d 388, 391. In this latter case it was held: The foregoing citation of authority brings us to a consideration of the defendant's evidence, and especially to that of Dr. W.W. Powers, who is conceded to be a capable medical expert. Dr. Powers explained that there was a technical difference between "a heat exhaustion" and "a true heat stroke", the latter "is almost 100% fatal". It was his opinion that Mr. Eslinger had not had a true heat stroke and that the heat exhaustion suffered by the petitioner did not cause or aggravate the "arteriosclerosis and Parkinson". Dr. Powers' testimony is cited by defendant's counsel as some material evidence to support the Chancellor's decree, and that under the holdings of this Court it is conclusive of the issue on appeal. But his testimony must be considered as a whole in the light of facts which are not disputed. Moreover his opinion is based upon an assumption which may or may not be true, such as that Mr. Eslinger did not suffer a "true heat stroke" because he could not have survived, and for this reason he was forced to the conclusion that it was a case of "heat exhaustion"; that "it was temporary in effect". Now in all deference to the learned doctor, we think the admission by him that the heat stroke aggravated a pre-existing disease, even temporarily, made a compensable injury. The question naturally arises, if it was "temporary, not permanent", then to what extent was he injured, i.e. for what period of time was he disabled? The essential facts necessary to support the petitioner's claim, and which are undisputed, are the following: (1) Mr. Eslinger's injury, a "heat stroke" or "heat exhaustion" occurred while at work. (2) He became totally and permanently disabled as a result thereof, according to all the evidence including the testimony of Dr. Powers. (3) It aggravated a pre-existing disability, to wit, "arteriosclerosis", to some extent at least, as appears from Dr. Powers' testimony to which special reference is made in this opinion. We cannot consider the aggravating effect of the heat stroke upon the pre-existing cause as temporary only when it came very near to being fatal. Moreover it is shown without dispute that three days following its occurrence Mr. Eslinger was totally disabled, and at the time of the trial, according to Dr. Powers he was totally and permanently disabled. If the heat stroke aggravated the pre-existing "arteriosclerosis" in any degree then under the great weight of authority, and especially in Milstead's case, infra, and cases therein cited, this Court cannot write it off as temporary, when all medical experts agree that the petitioner is totally and permanently disabled. We are constantly admonished by the statute (section 50-918, T.C.A.) that an equitable construction must be given "to the end that the objects and purposes of this law may be realized and attained." We think the holding of this Court in King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.; Swift &amp; Co. v. Howard, supra, and McCann Steel Co. v. Carney, 192 Tenn. 94, 237 S.W.2d 942, and relied on by the petitioner, are applicable to the case at bar. As further supporting authority see Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, wherein this Court held: "Death caused by heat prostration, sunstroke or heat exhaustion is compensable." The Court also held: In Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10, 13, the Court used this language: We deem it unnecessary to cite additional authority to support the petitioner's insistence that his injury was an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The assignments of error are sustained. The cause is reversed and remanded for a final decree for total permanent disability as provided in Section 50-1007, subsection (d), T.C.A., and will be retained upon the trial docket for such further orders and decrees as may become necessary for its enforcement. SWEPSTON, Justice. A petition to rehear has been filed in behalf of Miller Brothers Company, Inc. Opposing counsel reply that the petition should be dismissed because of failure to comply with Rule 32 of this Court, requiring the petition to be filed within 10 days of the filing of the opinion of the Court. The opinion was filed on June 6, 1958, and the petition was filed on June 16, 1958. This is within the 10 days. T.C.A. § 1-302 provides that in computing time the first day is omitted and the last day is included. The petition to rehear is a re-argument of the matters presented to and considered by the Court heretofore with emphasis by counsel upon the case of Drinnon v. Pope, 202 Tenn. 684, 308 S.W.2d 424. Therefore, the petition must be overruled. As a last resort, petitioner for the first time asserts that the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed because the bill of exceptions fails to include the words "this is all the evidence", or other words of like import. We think first, that this insistence comes too late. Both counsel have proceeded in this Court on the assumption that the record is complete, the Court has worked the record, written and released its opinion. See Tennessee Oil Co. v. McCanless, 178 Tenn. 683, 704, 157 S.W.2d 267, 162 S.W.2d 1081. Secondly, we think the record includes a much broader statement on page 61, wherein it is said: That statement appears above the signature of the trial judge approving the bill of exceptions. It is a broader term than the statement that this is all the evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of the word "procedure", which is defined as follows: We think the above language brings this situation within the spirit of Yates v. State, *266 18 Tenn. 549; and Woods v. State, 47 Tenn. 335. The petition to rehear is accordingly overruled. NEIL, C. J., not participating.