Title: State v. Qualls
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 104504
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,504 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JAMES ARTHUR QUALLS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of 
review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. 
 
2. 
Premeditation does not necessarily mean that an act is planned, contrived, or 
schemed beforehand; rather, premeditation indicates a time of reflection or deliberation. 
Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the established circumstances of a 
case if the inference is reasonable. 
 
3. 
Factors to consider in determining whether the evidence gives rise to an inference 
of premeditation include:  (a) the nature of the weapon used; (b) the lack of provocation; 
(c) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (d) the defendant's threats and 
 
2 
 
 
 
declarations before and during the occurrence; and (e) the dealing of lethal blows after 
the deceased was felled and rendered helpless. But the determination is not driven simply 
by the number of factors present in a particular case because in some cases one factor 
alone may be compelling evidence of premeditation. Use of a deadly weapon, however, is 
insufficient by itself to establish premeditation. 
 
4. 
For jury instruction issues, the analytical progression and corresponding standards 
of review on appeal are:  (a) First, the appellate court considers the reviewability of the 
issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited 
standard of review; (b) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine if the 
instruction was legally appropriate; (c) then, the court should determine if there was 
sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting 
party, that would have supported the instruction; and (d) finally, if the district court erred, 
the appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and 
degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. 
denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
5. 
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder under 
K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(a). 
 
6. 
Under K.S.A. 21-3403(b), voluntary manslaughter requires an intentional killing 
that is committed with an unreasonable but honest belief that the circumstances justify 
deadly force to defend against an aggressor's imminent use of unlawful force under 
K.S.A. 21-3211.   
 
 
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7.  
The defendant's subjective beliefs are considered when determining whether a 
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter as defined in K.S.A. 21-3403(b) is 
appropriate.  
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; JAN W. LEUENBERGER, judge. Opinion filed April 12, 
2013. Reversed and remanded. 
 
Charles S. Scott, Jr., of Shawnee, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Jason E. Geier, senior assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jodi Litfin, assistant 
district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  A jury convicted James Arthur Qualls of the premeditated first-degree 
murder of Joseph Beier in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401(a). Qualls admits shooting Beier 
during a bar fight but appeals his conviction, arguing:  (1) there was insufficient evidence 
of premeditation for first-degree premeditated murder; (2) the district court erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (3) he was entitled to an 
instruction on self-defense. 
 
We reject his argument that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient to 
support the first-degree murder conviction. But we reverse the conviction and remand for 
a new trial because Qualls' testimony and his theory of defense supported the requested 
voluntary manslaughter instruction. The district court erred in not giving that instruction. 
We hold further that the failure to issue the voluntary manslaughter instruction was not 
harmless in this circumstance.  
 
4 
 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the early morning hours of July 16, 2008, Qualls was in a Topeka bar playing 
pool with the victim's fiancée, Amber Martindale. A disagreement ensued about whether 
Martindale was playing the game by the rules. Beier overheard the conversation and 
shouted at Qualls that he would bet $100 Martindale "kicks your ass" in a pool game. 
 
At trial, there were minor discrepancies about how this escalated, but both Qualls 
and Martindale testified that Qualls approached Beier and tried to end the dispute. 
Martindale testified, "[I]t was not a heated situation at that moment," although she could 
not recall exactly what was said between the two. Both parties also agree the situation 
worsened after Qualls' wife approached and said something like, "If y'all believe 
[Martindale] can make that shot, I bet I can beat her ass," wagering either $100 or $1,000. 
 
Qualls testified that his wife and Beier "started arguing back and forth, cussing 
and so forth." He said his wife was "basically in [Beier's] face." Qualls also testified that 
he tried to end the dispute by trying "to get my wife out of his face and I told family 
members to restrain her." 
 
Beier eventually punched Qualls in the face, which started both men fighting. 
Qualls testified that he attempted to grab Beier and push him away so Beier could not hit 
him again. The bartender, Cliff Cormier, testified that he saw Beier punch Qualls in the 
chin and then stated, "[Beier was] swinging; [Qualls was] swinging down. And they're 
trying to get a hold of each other evidently." Once they "finally quit swinging," Cormier 
testified that he grabbed Qualls in a chokehold because Qualls was on top of Beier. 
Cormier then pulled Qualls away from the fight. Another bar patron, Mitchell McDonald, 
testified that he grabbed Beier and walked him over against a wall. 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Cormier testified that Qualls asked to be let go and indicated he was going to leave 
the bar. Cormier described Qualls as "very calm. His voice wasn't quaking, very calm." 
Cormier released Qualls after checking that McDonald had Beier in a "bear hug" against 
the wall. Cormier testified:  
 
"I turned and picked up a pool stick and [Qualls] is walking towards the door. His wife 
comes up yelling at me, wanting to know why they were being thrown out, and I told her 
that it was closing time, everybody was . . . leaving. Okay. At that point [Qualls' wife] 
walked up and said something to [Qualls] and I assumed she was giving him car keys or 
something so they could leave. And I said, 'Come on, Man, let's go.' And I went to grab 
him by the elbow and he walked, actually kind of quickly, stepped away from me and 
raised the gun and started firing."  
 
Cormier testified that he could not see Beier when the shooting started because 
McDonald was between Cormier and Beier, blocking his view. He stated, "[McDonald] 
was holding [Beier] in front of me. All you could see was [McDonald's] back." Cormier 
described McDonald as 6' 8'' tall and probably 400 pounds.  
 
Consistent with the State's theory that Beier was restrained when the shooting 
started, McDonald testified that he was walking Beier further away from where Qualls 
was going to go, but he released Beier and pushed him when he heard a bang. McDonald 
testified that he thought the gun shots were coming from behind him "right across my 
shoulder." 
 
 
Qualls testified that he did not see McDonald grab Beier to end the fight because 
"it was a blank spot from when I went down and being choked out to when I was 
standing up and asking to be released." This testimony referred to Cormier's statement 
 
6 
 
 
 
that he pulled Qualls out of the fight by using a chokehold. Qualls also testified that after 
Cormier released him, Qualls remembered 
 
"trying to get to the door and I pretty much hearing my wife say something and I turned 
and looked at my party to make sure, you know, everyone was . . . pretty much with us; 
not nobody, you know . . . left behind . . . And I seen [Beier] come around the island and 
was in a position that looked like he was reaching for a gun." (Emphasis added.)   
 
Qualls later described his wife as speaking in an "alerting tone" like screaming his name 
as if she was fearful.   
 
Qualls further testified that he had a clear view of Beier after the fight broke up 
and that Beier was unrestrained and coming towards him at an angle. Qualls said he saw 
Beier's hand go to his waist and then "saw an object. I saw something, but I couldn't make 
it out." (Emphasis added.) Qualls testified that he believed what he saw was a gun, so he 
took a gun he was carrying and shot Beier. Qualls also testified that he did not think 
about shooting Beier before it happened. He said he did not recall whether he had to cock 
the gun before shooting it and did not recall how many times he shot Beier. It was not 
until he was outside the bar before he realized what had taken place. 
 
Another bar patron, Mark Patrick, testified he saw McDonald help break up the 
fight and hold Beier against the wall. Like Qualls, Patrick testified McDonald was no 
longer holding Beier during the shooting. Patrick did not testify about what Beier was 
doing when the shooting started. 
 
Several security cameras in the bar recorded portions of the events described in the 
testimony. Some video was played for the jury. What was shown depended on the 
camera's distance from the events. For example, the cameras clearly capture Qualls 
 
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shooting the gun, but the video does not show Beier in the critical moments before the 
shooting, nor is there any reference in the record suggesting that Beier could be seen on 
camera at the moment just prior to the gun fire. 
 
Eleven shell casings were found inside the bar. The coroner testified that Beier 
suffered 12 gunshot wounds from at least 9 bullets, but he could not tell in what order the 
wounds were inflicted. Describing the path of the shots, the coroner testified one entered 
Beier's mid-back, traveled upward, and exited beneath his collar bone. Three superficial 
gunshot wounds started on the "left side of the back, travel[ed] beneath the skin's surface 
without entering the chest cavity . . . and then exit[ed] on the right side of the back." 
Beier also had a superficial gunshot wound starting on the lateral side of his chest moving 
right; one that entered the lower abdomen and exited outside the left side of Beier's lower 
chest; one wound to the right forearm; one wound to the penis; three wounds on the left 
lower leg; one to the right lower leg; and some abrasions on his forehead. 
 
After the shooting, Qualls walked out of the bar with his wife and dropped the gun 
somewhere in Topeka. Beier was not found with a gun or knife on his person. 
 
The jury was instructed on premeditated first-degree murder and second-degree 
intentional murder. Qualls requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction, which the trial 
court denied. There was some discussion during the jury instruction conference of a self-
defense instruction, but the jury was not instructed on self-defense. 
 
The jury convicted Qualls of premeditated first-degree murder. He was sentenced 
to life in prison, with a mandatory minimum of 25 years. Our jurisdiction arises under 
K.S.A. 22-3601 (life sentence). 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION 
 
Qualls argues there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to convict him of 
first-degree murder. We disagree. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of 
review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. State v. 
McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 710, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). 
 
Analysis 
 
The jury was instructed on the following definition of premeditation from PIK 
Crim. 3d 56.04(b), which states: 
 
 
"Premeditation means to have thought the matter over beforehand, in other 
words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no 
specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires 
more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life."  
 
Premeditation does not necessarily mean that an act is planned, contrived, or 
schemed beforehand; rather, premeditation indicates a time of reflection or deliberation. 
State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 632, 102 P.3d 406 (2004). Premeditation and deliberation 
 
9 
 
 
 
may be inferred from the established circumstances of a case, provided the inference is 
reasonable. State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 617, 186 P.3d 755 (2008). 
 
Our caselaw identifies factors to consider in determining whether the evidence 
gives rise to an inference of premeditation that include:  (1) the nature of the weapon 
used; (2) lack of provocation; (3) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (4) 
threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence; and (5) the 
dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless. 286 Kan. at 
617-18. But this analysis is not driven by the number of factors present in a particular 
case because in some cases one factor alone may be compelling evidence of 
premeditation. State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 1098, 1102, 191 P.3d 294 (2008). Use of a deadly 
weapon by itself, however, is insufficient to establish premeditation. State v. Cosby, 293 
Kan. 121, 134, 262 P.3d 285 (2011).   
 
Qualls argues three pieces of evidence showed the shooting occurred 
instantaneously without opportunity for any forethought or deliberation. In his brief, he 
first summarizes Cormier's testimony as "just as Cormier grabbed Qualls' elbow, Qualls 
turns around and instantly started firing his gun." But this recounting omits an important 
part of Cormier's testimony. Cormier actually testified that he released Qualls and 
observed Qualls' wife walk up and say something to him. Cormier then said he told 
Qualls to leave, stating, "And I went to grab him by the elbow and he walked, actually 
kind of quickly, stepped away from me and raised the gun and started firing." 
 
Qualls also claims Martindale testified that instantly upon hearing Qualls' wife 
scream, Qualls began shooting. He apparently bases that claim upon the following 
exchange:  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
"Q [Defense counsel:] You just heard a scream? 
"A [Martindale:] Yes. 
"Q And at that point [Beier] is somewhere over by these tables, right? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Okay. And the shooting begins? 
"A Yes." 
 
But this testimony only establishes a sequence of events—not the instantaneous 
time frame he alleges. Finally, Qualls relies on McDonald's testimony that the entire 
shooting incident lasted no longer than 1 1/2 to 2 minutes. 
 
 
The State argues there was sufficient evidence to infer premeditation, citing the 
factors established by this court's caselaw. First, the State notes a gun is a deadly weapon. 
Second, it argues Qualls lacked provocation at the time of the shooting because the fight 
had ended. Third, citing Cormier's testimony, it contends Qualls was calmly walking 
towards the front door before he fired. Fourth, it argues premeditation can be inferred 
from the fact Qualls shot Beier 11 times, although the State admits the shots occurred in 
rapid succession. We agree there was sufficient evidence of premeditation. In the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found the shooting was 
premeditated. 
 
Contrary to Qualls' claim that Cormier's testimony supports a finding that the 
shooting was instantaneous, the jury could have concluded Qualls decided to kill Beier 
while Qualls' wife spoke to him or while Qualls quickly stepped away from Cormier and 
raised his gun. In addition, the evidence whether Beier provoked the second attack was 
contested. The jury could have believed McDonald, who testified he was restraining 
Beier at the time the shooting started. If so, his testimony negated Qualls' claims that he 
was provoked and reacted instantly to Beier's attack. We hold there was sufficient 
evidence of premeditation to support the jury's verdict.   
 
11 
 
 
 
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION 
 
Qualls next argues the district court should have issued the requested instruction 
on voluntary manslaughter based on his honest but unreasonable belief that deadly force 
was necessary to protect himself or his family from Beier's imminent use of unlawful 
force. Qualls principally relies on his trial testimony that he believed Beier was reaching 
for a gun, but he also argues the coroner's report supports his claim. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This court recently clarified the analytical progression and standard of review for 
each step when considering on appeal whether a jury instruction should have been given: 
 
"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both 
jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) 
next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was 
legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that 
would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the 
appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and 
degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. 
denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012)." State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 
(2012). 
 
Analysis 
 
Qualls properly preserved the issue as to whether a lesser included offense should 
have been given. As to our second analytical point, this court has long held that voluntary 
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder under 
 
12 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(a). State v. Gallegos, 286 Kan. 869, 874, 190 P.3d 226 (2008). 
Therefore, the voluntary manslaughter instruction was legally appropriate. 
 
The real question in this case focuses on whether the trial record factually 
supported giving the instruction when viewed in the light most favorable to Qualls, the 
requesting party. Qualls' threshold argument is that the district court improperly resolved 
a factual dispute when it denied giving the instruction after concluding there was no 
evidence of the imminent use of unlawful force. Qualls contends the district court 
necessarily based that determination on its factual conclusion that McDonald testified 
truthfully that he was holding Beier when Qualls began shooting. But this argument lacks 
merit because the district court actually accepted Qualls' testimony that Beier had his 
hand at his waist. The district court stated:  
 
"Now in this case applying an objective standard here there was an altercation but the 
evidence doesn't reflect that the deceased had a weapon [or] that it was seen. All that 
could be said is that he had his hand at his waist, whatever that means, and it certainly 
isn't an indicator of imminent death or great bodily harm to the defendant."  
 
But the error in the district court's reasoning is not that it refused to believe Beier 
had his hand at his waist; it is in its application of an objective standard when deciding 
whether to give the instruction. And the district court stated twice that it was applying an 
objective standard to resolve that question. 
 
Under K.S.A. 21-3403(b), voluntary manslaughter requires an intentional killing 
that is committed with an unreasonable but honest belief that the circumstances justify 
deadly force to defend against an aggressor's imminent use of unlawful force under 
K.S.A. 21-3211. And under the voluntary manslaughter theory known as imperfect self-
defense recited in K.S.A. 21-3403(b), there is no objective requirement. State v. Ordway, 
 
13 
 
 
 
261 Kan. 776, 787-88, 934 P.2d 94 (1997) ("Both elements in the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter as defined in 21-3403[b] are subjective."). Therefore, what the district court 
needed to resolve was whether there was evidence of Qualls' subjective belief that 
unlawful force was imminent when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
Qualls. And as to that, there is no doubt based upon Qualls' testimony that he had a clear 
view of Beier, saw Beier's hand go to his waist, and "saw an object. I saw something, but 
I couldn't make it out." Qualls unequivocally testified he believed Beier had a gun, so he 
shot him.   
 
The State admits a defendant's statements may be sufficient by themselves to 
require issuing a lesser included offense instruction. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 292 Kan. 
493, 515, 254 P.3d 1276 (2011); see also State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 273, 262 P.3d 
1045 (2011) (defendant's confession could reasonably support lesser included offense 
instructions). But the State argues the video shows Beier was not an imminent threat to 
Qualls when Qualls shot him, so the jury could not reasonably have convicted Qualls in 
accordance with the defense's theory. The State supports this argument by relying in its 
brief only on video footage of the fistfight, which does not depict Beier immediately 
before he was shot. At oral argument, counsel for both parties acknowledged the video 
evidence does not refute Qualls' testimony that he saw Beier reach for an object at his 
waist or believed he had a gun in the critical moments just before the shooting. Our 
review of the video supplied with the record on appeal confirms counsels' observations.  
 
The absence of video evidence showing Beier just before the shooting occurs 
leaves us with the trial testimony and that is where the outcome tips in favor of Qualls' 
argument. McDonald testified he was restraining Beier when the shooting started. Qualls 
and Patrick testified that McDonald actually had released Beier. But Patrick did not 
testify about what Beier was doing once he was released. And on that point, the dissent is 
correct that there is no evidence corroborating Qualls' claim that Beier was approaching 
 
14 
 
 
 
him and reaching for something at his waist. But the dissent necessarily makes a 
credibility determination when it concludes that Qualls' testimony is "unsupported, 
imagined, and mistaken." 
 
Qualls was entitled to instructions on the law applicable to his defense theory if 
there was evidence to support that theory, as long as the evidence when viewed in the 
light most favorable to him was sufficient to justify a rational factfinder finding in 
accordance with that theory. State v. Anderson, 287 Kan. 325, 334, 197 P.3d 409 (2009). 
And this is true even if Qualls' defense theory was only supported by his own testimony. 
See 287 Kan. at 336. Patrick's testimony supports Qualls' claim that McDonald was not 
restraining Beier when the shooting started. And there is no other evidence contradicting 
Qualls' claim that Beier was coming towards him. The dissent simply does not find 
Qualls' testimony credible, but there is nothing in the record allowing us to conclude that 
a rational factfinder could not find in accordance with Qualls' theory.   
 
We hold that the record in the case when viewed in the light most favorable to 
Qualls was sufficient to submit the instruction to the jury and allow it to decide if Qualls 
had an unreasonable but honest belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to 
protect against Beier's alleged imminent use of unlawful force. This holding takes us to 
the fourth and more challenging inquiry whether the failure to issue the requested 
instruction was harmless. In State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 565, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. 
denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012), this court established the following test for harmlessness: 
 
"[B]efore a Kansas court can declare an error harmless it must determine the error did not 
affect a party's substantial rights, meaning it will not or did not affect the trial's outcome. 
The degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not affect 
the outcome of the trial will vary depending on whether the error implicates a right 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does, a Kansas court must be 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no impact on the trial's outcome, i.e., 
 
15 
 
 
 
there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. If a right 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution is not implicated, a Kansas court must be 
persuaded that there is no reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the 
outcome of the trial."  
 
Notably, prior to oral argument, neither party identified the harmless error 
standard that would apply if the court reached this point in the analysis. Qualls generally 
asserted that a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to present his or her theory of 
defense, which may have implied that we should invoke the more stringent constitutional 
error approach. But an alternative argument could be made that the error impacted a 
statutory right only because K.S.A. 22-3414(3) directs that jury instructions must be 
given when there is some evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some 
lesser included crime. At oral argument, the parties gave the court little guidance as to 
this question. 
 
This court encountered the same problem in State v. Backus, 295 Kan. 1003, 287 
P.3d 894 (2012), in which we held the parties' failure to argue the applicable standard 
would not deter our resolution of the issue. In that case, we determined under the higher 
standard that the court was firmly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no 
impact on the trial's outcome, so the defendant would not be prejudiced by the court's 
holding. 295 Kan. at 1008-09. In Qualls' case, there is an opposite outcome because we 
are convinced a new trial is required under either harmless error analysis. This result is 
driven by the evidence of premeditation, which was sufficient to support the jury's verdict 
of first-degree premeditated murder but was not so "abundant" as to convince us that the 
requested voluntary manslaughter should have been rejected. See State v. Haberlein, 296 
Kan. 195, 205, 290 P.3d 640 (2012) (noting the premeditation was "peculiarly abundant" 
given the defendant's statements before the robbery, inconsistencies in his statements, and 
overall defense strategy).  
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Qualls' defense theory was that he shot Beier because he believed Beier was 
reaching for a gun. Qualls never departed from that theory. Thus, the voluntary 
manslaughter instruction under an imperfect self-defense theory was directly applicable 
to Qualls' defense strategy. Moreover, Qualls did not make any statement before the 
shooting from which premeditation could be inferred. In other words, we hold the 
evidence of first-degree murder was not so strong that it rendered the instructional error 
harmless under either standard. Therefore, we reverse Qualls' conviction and remand for 
a new trial. 
 
This outcome makes it unnecessary to decide Qualls' final argument that he was 
entitled to an instruction on self-defense, and we decline to do so because the evidence on 
retrial might change the analysis as to whether a self-defense instruction is appropriate. 
 
BEIER, J., not participating.   
 
* * * 
 
ROSEN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I agree with the majority's 
well-reasoned conclusion finding sufficient evidence of premeditation. However, I 
respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which finds reversible error by 
concluding that the record demonstrates a duty to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter. I will not belabor the point; I would simply find on this record and, 
consistent with my dissenting opinions in State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 213, 290 
P.3d 640 (2012), State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 280, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011), and State v. 
Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 627, 186 P.3d 755 (2008), the trial judge did not err when it denied 
Qualls' request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.   
 
 
17 
 
 
 
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Qualls, I simply cannot 
agree that we are required to adopt Qualls' unsupported, imagined, and mistaken 
subjective belief that his use of deadly force was necessary to protect against Beier's 
alleged imminent use of unlawful force. The evidence in this case shows that while Beier 
was being restrained by a man described as being "6 feet 8 inches and probably 400 
pounds" and moving away from Qualls, or within seconds thereafter, Qualls opened fire 
while moving towards the unarmed Beier and shooting him 11 times, the final shots fired 
at close range with Qualls leaning over a small table where Beier lay defenseless on the 
floor. Qualls' testimony that he shot Beier multiple times because he saw Beier's hand at 
his waist and feared he had a gun approaches new levels of implausibility. Here, he fired 
11 bullets into his restrained, unarmed victim—surely giving ironic new meaning to the 
term "overkill." K.S.A. 22-3414(3) provides that "where there is some evidence which 
would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime . . . , the judge shall 
instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime." As the trial 
judge determined, the evidence produced at trial does not warrant the giving of a 
voluntary manslaughter jury instruction and is insufficient to permit a rational factfinder 
to find Qualls guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of that crime.  
 
Furthermore, even if I were to agree that the failure to include a voluntary 
manslaughter jury instruction was error, the majority's finding that the error is not 
harmless is even more perplexing. If rushing towards and shooting a defenseless person 
11 times, with the final shots fired while the shooter is leaning over a table while the 
victim lies helplessly wounded on the floor, coupled with the perpetrator then "calmly" 
leaving the scene and dropping his weapon "somewhere in Topeka" where it is never 
found—evidence indicating that his actual fear was accountability for his unconscionably 
violent actions—is not strong enough or "abundant" enough to render the instructional 
error harmless, I do not understand what evidence would suffice to make it so.  
 
 
18 
 
 
 
It bears repeating that the test set forth in K.S.A. 22-3414(3) is not a theoretical 
one. Instead, it requires the trial judge, who has heard, seen, and evaluated all of the 
evidence in the case, to determine whether there is "some evidence which would 
reasonably justify a conviction" of the lesser included crime. (Emphasis added.) We have 
now completely abrogated the trial judge's role in making that determination. The 
standard now appears to require the trial judge or reviewing court to unconditionally 
accept ephemeral evidence—or nonevidence—and to apply it to any speculative scenario 
that the facts of the case may provide (Haberlein and Scaife); or to whatever is 
proclaimed by the defendant in the investigatory phase of a crime, whether corroborated 
or not or even later recanted at trial (Tahah); or now, to whatever imagined subjective 
belief that is put forth by the defendant that is not supported by the evidence in 
determining whether a lesser included offense jury instruction is required in premeditated 
first-degree murder trials. By employing such a standard in these cases, the trial judge in 
reality has no option but to instruct on all lesser included offense jury instructions, 
regardless of whether they are requested and in spite of the actual evidence. As I have 
opined in my previous dissents on this issue, that has never been the law and should not 
become the law of this state.  
 
MORITZ, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.