Title: State v. Cartwright
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48816
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2004

FILED:  February 26, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DAVID BRIAN CARTWRIGHT,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 97CR1088; CA A101495; SC S48816)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 10, 2003.
Rebecca Duncan, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her on
the brief was David Groom, Public Defender.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Solicitor General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
*Appeal from Curry County Circuit Court, Hugh C. Downer, Judge. 173 Or App 59, 20 P3d 223 (2001).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal proceeding, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by quashing subpoenas and denying various
motions that were aimed at obtaining certain prior statements of
persons whose testimony the state planned to introduce against
defendant at trial.  The trial court quashed the subpoenas and
denied the motions on the grounds that the statements, which were
recorded on audiotapes, were in the possession and control of a
third party and were protected from disclosure under the so-called "work-product doctrine."  On defendant's appeal, the Court
of Appeals upheld the trial judge's rulings.  State v.
Cartwright, 173 Or App 59, 20 P3d 223 (2001).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review and now hold that, regardless of
who owned or controlled the audiotapes, defendant at least had a
right to obtain them for use in cross-examining the individuals
whose statements were on the tapes, after those individuals
testified.  We further hold that defendant's right to the
audiotaped statements, at that point, was superior to any "work-
product" protection that the third party who possessed the
audiotapes asserted.   
In 1997, while defendant was employed as the general
manager of the Southern Curry Ambulance Association, Inc. (SCAA),
a female employee complained to the SCAA board that defendant had
sexually harassed her.  The board investigated the matter and, in
the course of that investigation, found that other female
employees had similar complaints.  The board decided to obtain
and record statements from each of the complaining employees
about the alleged incidents of harassment.  After recording the
statements of some of the complaining employees, the board
contacted an attorney, who advised the board to continue with the
recordings.  Thereafter, the board completed the recording
project.  Defendant subsequently was fired.  
The state later charged defendant with criminal
harassment, ORS 166.065, and other crimes, based on complaints by
the same SCAA employees.  Before trial, defendant served SCAA's
new general manager, Taurone, with a subpoena duces tecum.  That
subpoena (hereafter the "second subpoena") required Taurone to
bring the audiotaped interviews to court on a designated date
before trial. (1)  Defendant also filed a motion to compel
production of the same material, citing ORS 136.580, set out
below, as statutory authority for that motion.  Defendant also
relied on Article I, Section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
authorities supporting his right to the subpoenaed materials.    
SCAA moved to quash the second subpoena and opposed the
motion, arguing that the tapes were protected "work product" and
that "no legal authority exists for a defendant to obtain
discovery from a non-party in a criminal case."  In an attached
affidavit, Taurone averred that SCAA had made the tapes in
anticipation of litigation and had not provided them to the
prosecution in defendant's case.  The trial court granted SCAA's
motion to quash, concluding that the court had no authority to
allow pretrial discovery of material that was not in the state's
control.
Defendant then served Taurone with a third subpoena
duces tecum, directing him to appear at trial with the
audiotapes.  SCAA again moved to quash the subpoena.  Defendant
(apparently) also filed another motion to compel.  In oral
argument on the matter, defendant cited State v. Foster, 242 Or
101, 407 P2d 901 (1965), as authority for the rule that, in a
criminal proceeding, prior statements by a state's witness that
relate to the subject matter of the witness's direct testimony
must be made available to the defendant at trial to inspect and
use in cross-examining the witness.  The day before trial, the
trial court quashed the third subpoena and denied defendant's
motion to compel.  In a written order, the court indicated that
it found nothing in Foster, or elsewhere in its examination of
the relevant law, that would authorize a criminal defendant to
compel production of material in the possession of a third party. 


Defendant raised the issue yet again in his cross-examination of the complaining witnesses.  Defense counsel asked
each of the witnesses whether they previously had made any
statement to the SCAA board about the matters to which they had
testified and whether such a statement had been taped.  After
each witness replied in the affirmative, counsel asked the court
to direct SCAA to produce the tapes so that defendant could use
them in his cross-examination.  The trial court denied each of
the requests, stating that it would not change its previous
decision. Defendant was convicted on all charges.  
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred
in quashing his second and third subpoenas duces tecum and
otherwise in refusing to order Taurone or SCAA to produce the
audiotapes, either before or during his trial.  The Court of
Appeals rejected that claim, holding that defendant had
established neither a statutory right to pretrial access to the
tapes under ORS 136.580 nor a constitutional right to such access
under the state or federal compulsory process clauses. 
Cartwright, 173 Or App at 66-77.
Before this court, defendant continues to assert his
right to compelled production of the audiotapes.  Defendant
contends that that right derives from three sources:  (1) the
subpoena statutes found at ORS 136.567 and ORS 136.580; (2) the
compulsory process provisions of the Oregon and United States
constitutions; and (3) the Confrontation Clauses of Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.  We are persuaded that the answer
to the present controversy lies, primarily, in the subpoena
statutes and in cases that pertain to a party's right to cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses.  We therefore confine our
discussion to those topics.
We begin our analysis by addressing defendant' second
subpoena duces tecum.  In doing so, we acknowledge that our
discussion in this respect is not a holding because (as we shall
explain post) the decisive rulings in this case turn out to be
those that the trial court made respecting the third subpoena. 
However, the second subpoena played a prominent role in the
analysis of the Court of Appeals, and we believe that a
discussion of our present understanding of the statutory scheme
relating to such subpoenas will be of value to bench and bar in
dealing with similar issues in the future. 
Defendant's second subpoena duces tecum, commanded
Taurone to bring the audiotapes to court some two weeks before
the trial was set to begin, on a date (February 17, 1998) when,
as far as we are able to tell, no trial-related court proceedings
were scheduled.  Defendant cited, and continues to cite, ORS
136.580 as authority for that demand.  As we shall explain,
however, it does not appear that ORS 136.580 authorizes a
subpoena duces tecum commanding pretrial production of
evidentiary material such as the audiotapes at issue here.
ORS 136.580 is one of several general subpoena
provisions found in the Oregon criminal procedure statutes.  One
of those provisions, ORS 136.567, authorizes criminal defendants
to issue subpoenas that command the attendance of witnesses
before a court. (2)  Another provision, ORS 136.575, sets out
the various permissible forms of subpoenas.  ORS 136.575(4) and
(5) entitle a defendant to issuance of subpoenas that command the
recipients to appear in a designated court at a designated time
"as a witness in a criminal action." (3)  (Emphasis added.)
Although those subsections of ORS 136.575 speak
primarily to the proper form for subpoenas, they provide a
certain amount of information about the objects and permissible
uses of the subpoena device.  As noted, a defendant's subpoenas
must state that the recipient is to appear as a "witness."  A
"witness" is a person "who is called to testify before a court,"
"who testifies to what he has seen, heard, or otherwise
observed," or "whose declaration under oath * * * is received as
evidence for any purpose, whether such declaration be made on
oral examination or by deposition or affidavit.  Black's Law
Dictionary 1602 (6th ed 1990) (emphasis added).  By specifying
that a subpoena should require the recipient to appear in court
"as a witness in a criminal action," the statute proclaims the
proper use of a subpoena, i.e., to secure the availability of
testimony or other evidence at a court proceeding at which such
evidence will be heard or otherwise considered.  
With the foregoing background in mind, we turn to the
statute on which defendant principally relies -– ORS 136.580. 
ORS 136.580 provides:
"(1) If books, papers or documents[ (4)] are
required,  direction to the following effect shall be
added to the [subpoena] form * * *: 'And you are
required, also, to bring with you the following:
(describing intelligibly the books, papers or documents
required).'
"(2) Upon the motion of the state or the
defendant, the court may direct that the books, papers
or documents described in [a] subpoena be produced
before the court prior to the trial or prior to the
time when the books, papers or documents are to be
offered in evidence and may, upon production, permit
the books, papers or documents to be inspected and
copied by the state or the defendant and the state's or
the defendant's attorneys."
ORS 136.580(1) thus provides for a subpoena duces tecum by
permitting parties to a criminal proceeding to add an additional
term to the general subpoena forms set out at ORS 136.575, viz.,
a requirement that the recipient bring specified documentary
materials with him or her at the appointed time.  As noted, those
forms require the recipient to appear in court "as a witness in a
criminal action," that is, to appear at some court proceeding
held in connection with the criminal action at which the
subpoenaed party may be expected to provide testimony or other
evidence.  ORS 136.580(1) thus appears to grant to criminal
defendants only a right to issue subpoenas duces tecum that
command recipients to bring material with them to the defendant's
trial or to a trial-related court proceeding at which the
material may be called for as evidence.
The second section of ORS 136.580 then provides a
specific mechanism for obtaining access to the subpoenaed
material before the court proceeding at which the material will
or may be admitted as evidence.  Notably, the statute does not
authorize a criminal defendant to employ the subpoena powers
described elsewhere in the statutes to command early production
of documentary material directly.  Instead, it indicates that the
appropriate mechanism for obtaining early access to subpoenaed
materials is a motion asking the court to direct the production
of books, papers, or documents "prior to the trial or prior to
the time that the books, papers or documents described in the
subpoena are to be offered in evidence." (5)  
There are two important points to be drawn from the
words of ORS 136.580(2).  First, subsection (2) presupposes the
existence of a subpoena duces tecum issued in accordance with ORS
136.567 and ORS 136.580(1), i.e., one that properly summons
documentary materials to trial or to some other court proceeding
where they "are to be offered in evidence."  The provision thus
allows parties to ask for early production of material that, in
the ordinary course and as a matter of right, will be available
for evidentiary use at the proceeding to which they already have
been subpoenaed.  Second, the trial court's decision to deny or
accede to a request for such early production under ORS
136.580(2) is within the court's discretion:  The statute states
that "the court may direct that the books, papers or documents
described in the subpoena" be produced early.  (Emphasis added.)
With the foregoing points in mind, we return to
defendant's second subpoena.  Clearly, defendant did not summon
the audiotapes to a court proceeding so that they would be
available as evidence.  Indeed, the subpoena commanded production
of the audiotaped statements on a date when no evidence would be
taken, because no proceeding relating to the criminal action was
scheduled.  Instead, defendant was attempting to use the subpoena
as a discovery device to command the early production of the
audiotapes, either to the court or to himself.  However, as we
have explained, the statute on which he relies does not appear to
grant him such authority and, absent such authority, the trial
court acted properly in quashing the subpoena.
Based on our present reading of the statute,
defendant's second "Motion to Compel" (6) suffers from a
related infirmity.  The motion cites ORS 136.580, generally, as
authority, but it is clear that, in filing the motion, defendant
was focusing on the early production procedure provided in the
second subsection of that statute.  However, as we have noted
above, ORS 136.580(2) presupposes the existence of a proper
subpoena duces tecum summoning documentary materials to a
proceeding at which the materials will or may be called into
evidence.  Such a subpoena did not exist.  The subpoena duces
tecum that defendant had issued at that point was a nullity:  It
summoned the audiotapes to court, but not to a proceeding at
which they would or might be used as evidence.  Ultimately,
defendant failed to meet the preconditions for a motion under ORS
136.580(2).  The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying
the motion.
We turn, then, to defendant's third subpoena duces
tecum and the accompanying (third) motion to compel.  SCAA again
moved to quash that subpoena and opposed defendant's motion,
arguing, as it had a few weeks before, that the material was
subject to protection as work-product and that defendant was not
entitled to discovery from a third party.  The trial court heard
and decided the two motions on March 3, 1998, the day before
trial.
Unlike defendant's second subpoena duces tecum, which
purported to demand early production of the audiotapes, the third
subpoena duces tecum demanded that the audiotapes be brought to
defendant's trial.  It was, in other words, an ordinary subpoena
duces tecum, issued in accordance with ORS 136.567 and ORS 
136.580(1).  As such, the standards that apply to motions for
early production under ORS 136.580(2) were not relevant to the
issue whether the court should quash the third subpoena. 
Instead, the relevant standards were those that would apply to a
motion to quash any ordinary subpoena duces tecum commanding that
documentary materials be brought to trial.  
There is no statutory provision that expressly provides
for a motion to quash a subpoena.  However, courts regularly
receive and rule on motions to quash, and, whatever the scope of
a court's authority in such circumstances, such authority cannot
permit trial courts to violate a criminal defendant's broad 
right under the subpoena statutes to compel witnesses to attend
his or her trial (and to bring along any "books, papers or
documents" that the defendant has identified in the subpoena).
SCAA sought to quash defendant's third subpoena duces
tecum on two grounds:  (1) defendant was attempting to obtain
discovery from SCAA, despite the absence of any legal authority
for discovering material in the hands of a nonparty; and (2) the
audiotaped statements were protected work-product material. 
SCAA's first objection was not a proper ground for quashing the
subpoena at that time.  A subpoena commanding a witness to appear
as a witness in a court proceeding and to bring with the witness
specified materials is not and cannot amount to an attempt to
obtain discovery.  Such a subpoena does not require production of
the material to the party issuing the subpoena; it merely
commands that the witness bring the material to the courtroom so
that it is available if and when a party needs it. (7)
Neither was SCAA's claim of privilege a proper basis
for quashing the subpoena in this case.  In that regard, we note
that, from the beginning, defendant had asserted a right to use
the audiotapes in cross-examining any individual who had given an
audiotaped statement and who would appear in the criminal action
as a witness against him.  In support of his third subpoena and
motion to compel, defendant relied, inter alia, on Foster, 242 Or
101, as authority for that right.  Defendant also argued that his
right to examine and use any such prior statement in cross-examining a witness overshadowed any claim that the prior
statement was protected under the work-product doctrine. 
Defendant is correct.  In Foster, this court considered
whether a trial court erred in denying a criminal defendant
access to the pretrial statement of a state's witness for use in
cross-examining that witness.  The court noted that there was a
distinction between a motion seeking pretrial examination of
prior statements of a witness and a motion seeking examination of
such statements at trial for purposes of cross-examination.  242
Or at 105.  The Foster court held that it was error to deny the
latter type of motion, but not the former.  Id.  
The relevance of Foster to the present controversy is,
in our view, obvious.  While the case was decided before the
advent of reciprocal discovery rules (the document at issue
actually was in the possession of the prosecution), the logical
force of its ruling applies equally to documents properly
subpoenaed that are in the possession of third parties.  At the
very least, defendant in the present case had the right to
examine and use in cross-examination the audiotapes of any
individual who, in fact, appeared at trial as a witness against
him. (8) 
It may be argued that the foregoing analysis is
speculative because none of the taped individuals had testified
at the time that the court heard the motion to quash.  However,
that fact does not undermine the relevance of the aforementioned
right to subpoena the materials so that they could be available
at trial.  A court considering a motion to quash on the grounds
asserted here must look at the potential uses of the subpoenaed
material at trial, and, unless it is clear that the material or
testimony has no potential use at trial, the court must deny the
motion to quash.
In the present case, SCAA did not dispute defendant's
contention that the audiotapes contained the prior statements of
probable witnesses about the very incidents that they would be
addressing in their testimony.  As defendant repeatedly told the
trial court, such statements likely would contain material that
would be relevant and admissible to impeach those witnesses
(should they appear) upon cross-examination.  The witnesses were
likely to testify, and, once they did, the work-product doctrine 
would not protect their statements.  Defendant thus demonstrated
that there was a likely evidentiary use for the subpoenaed
audiotapes at trial.  Under those circumstances, it is clear that
the trial court violated defendant's statutory right under ORS
136.567 and ORS 136.580(1) when it quashed the third subpoena. 
In short, the decision to quash was error.
Had the trial court denied the motion to quash, as it
should have, defendant's difficulties may have been at an end. 
Certainly, it seems likely that, in the interests of efficiency,
the trial court would have granted defendant's request to examine
the audiotapes before the complaining witnesses had testified and
defendant's right to such an examination became absolute.  But, 
even if the trial court had some choice as to whether to make the
audiotapes available to defendant on the morning of trial, as the
third motion to compel apparently requested, (9) it had no
choice in the matter after those witnesses testified.  As we
already have discussed,     Or at ___ (slip op at 13-15), Foster
makes it clear that, when a litigant requests that a witness's
prior statement be made available for use in his or her cross-examination, the court must honor that request.  It follows that,
at the very least, the trial court erred in denying defendant's
various requests, made after each of the complaining witnesses
testified, to examine the audiotapes for use in cross-examining
those witnesses. 
The state argues that, even if the trial court did err,
there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict,
given that the state presented independent eyewitness testimony
that pertained to at least some of defendant's conduct.  We
disagree.  The testimony of the witnesses whose prior statements
defendant sought was vital to the state's case:  The only
testimony that spoke to at least some of the charges came from
those witnesses.  Depending on the content of the prior
statements, cross-examining those witnesses on their prior
statements could have been a very effective method of undermining
the state's case.  Under those circumstances, we cannot conclude
that the trial court's decision had little likelihood of
affecting the verdict.  See State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d
1111 (2003) (stating that standard).  
The state also argues that, even if we conclude that
the trial court's erroneous decisions might have affected the
verdict, the appropriate remedy may not be the one that defendant
seeks, viz., a new trial.  It argues that there remains a
possibility that the audiotapes contain no usable impeachment
material and, thus, also a possibility that the trial court's
error was harmless.  The state suggests that, instead of ordering
a new trial, we remand the case to the trial court with
instructions to review the audiotapes and to determine whether
the recorded statements of the witnesses would have provided
impeachment material that likely would have affected the result
of the trial.  If, after that exercise, the trial court concludes
that its error was harmless, it can make findings to that effect
and reinstate or reaffirm the original judgment of conviction.
We agree with the state that a new trial may not be
necessary, but we do not agree with the particulars of the
state's proposed remedy.  It is not the trial court's place to
speculate about the possible arguments that defendant might find
in the witnesses' prior statements.  Defendant has established
his right to examine the audiotapes, and he must be given them. 
On remand, the trial court shall order SCAA to make the
audiotapes available to defendant and his attorney.  After
reviewing the audiotapes, if defendant finds that there is
material in the tapes that would serve as a basis for impeaching
or otherwise discrediting the witnesses that appeared against him
at trial, he may make that argument to the trial court.  If,
after hearing that argument, the trial court concludes that
defendant's inability to use the materials could not have
affected the verdict, then the court may make findings to support
its conclusion and reinstate the original judgment of conviction. 
Unless the trial court can so conclude, however, it must order a
new trial.   
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
1. We say "second," because defendant previously had
served SCAA with a similar subpoena duces tecum, which the trial
court quashed for reasons that are unrelated to the present
controversy.  Defendant does not assign error to the trial
court's decision with respect to that first subpoena duces tecum.
2. ORS 136.567 provides, in part:
"(1) A defendant in a criminal action is entitled,
at the expense of the state or city, to have subpoenas
issued for not to exceed 10 witnesses within the state. 
A defendant is entitled, at the expense of the
defendant, to have subpoenas issued for any number of
additional witnesses without an order of the court. * * *
"(2) Any subpoena that a defendant in a criminal
action is entitled to have issued shall be issued:
"(a) Upon application of the defendant, by the
clerk of the court in which the criminal action is
pending for trial, and in blank, under the seal of the
court and subscribed by the clerk; or
"(b) By an attorney of record of the defendant,
and subscribed by the attorney." 
3. ORS 136.567(2) entitles defendants to
issuance of subpoenas either by the clerk of the court
or by the defendant's attorney of record.  The subpoena
forms applicable to clerks of the court, ORS 136.575(4)
and (5), and to a defendant's attorney of record, at
ORS 136.575(6), command the recipient's attendance in
court "as a witness in a criminal action."  In
contrast, district attorneys may issue subpoenas
commanding the recipient's attendance "before the grand
jury or in a criminal action," ORS 136.575(2), and
magistrates may issue subpoenas commanding the
recipient's attendance "on the examination of a
criminal charge," ORS 136.575(1).
4. Although audiotapes are not precisely "books,
papers or documents," no party questions the
proposition that audiotapes are or may be so analogous
to those subjects that it would be illogical to refuse
to apply the statute's terms to audiotapes.  We agree
with that common premise.  The audiotapes at issue here
are the functional equivalent of written statements. 
It would be a towering triumph of form over substance
to hold that SCAA's choice of an electronic, rather
than a documentary, mode of preserving the witness'
statements puts the statements beyond the reach of a
subpoena duces tecum.
5. We understand the alternative phrasing to
allow for the possibility that materials may be
relevant to issues raised in, e.g., an omnibus hearing
before trial.
6. The defendant's decision to label his motion
in support of the subpoena as a "Motion to Compel
Production of Taped Statements of Complaining
Witnesses" created some uncertainty, given the high
likelihood of confusing the motion with a motion to
compel discovery under ORS 135.805 to 135.873.  The
latter kind of motion seeks pretrial access to certain
material in the possession of the opposing party and
does not appear to be relevant to defendant's efforts
in the present case to gain early access to materials
subpoenaed from a third party.  We would denominate a
motion under ORS 136.580(2), which defendant clearly
intended, as a "Motion for Early Production."  
7. Neither does the fact that defendant
simultaneously moved to compel production alter the
fundamental nature of the subpoena, which is to secure
the availability of evidence.        
8. SCAA's claim of "work product" does not alter
our conclusion.  Assuming, without deciding, that the
audiotapes were "work product" –- a proposition that
the parties do not explore, but with respect to which
we have substantial questions –- any privilege
disappeared when the witnesses took the stand.  See
Pacific N.W. Bell v. Century Home, 261 Or 333, 340-41,
491 P2d 1023, withdrawn in part on other grounds, 261
Or 351, 494 P2d 884 (1972) (so holding under analogous
circumstances).
9. There is no copy of the third motion to
compel in the record, and its contents are not entirely
clear.  Defendant suggests that the motion sought an
order requiring SCAA to produce the audiotapes for
defense counsel's inspection on the morning of the
trial.  Although we see no reason to deny such a
motion, once defendant had established that the taped
individuals likely would testify and that their
testimony would pertain to the same incidents, we are
not prepared to say that refusing that motion was
error.  As discussed earlier, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
9-10), ORS 136.580(2) clearly makes the decision to
order early production of subpoenaed material (that is,
production "prior to the time when the books, papers or
documents are to be offered into evidence") a matter
for the trial court's discretion.  On the record that
is before us, and without any argument from defendant
as to the limits of that discretion, we cannot find
that denying the motion was an abuse of discretion.