Title: SILVER BOW COUNTY v HAFER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12823
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1975

No. 12823 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 SILVER BOW COUNTY, a Body P o l i t i c and Corporate and P o l i t i c a l Subdivision of t h e S t a t e of Montana, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, C A R L HAFER, J R . a /k/a C A R L HAFER, and PATRICIA ANN HAFER, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : Holland and Haxby, Butte, Montana Robert J. Holland argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent : Gary Winston, County Attorney, argued, Butte, Montana Maurice Hennessey, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Butte, Montana Submitted : January 21, 1975 Decided : MAR - 4 1975 Filed : MAR - 4 1975 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of t h e Court . This i s an appeal from a preliminary order of condemnation entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Silver Bow County, wherein the County exercised i t s power of eminent domain t o condemn 3.64 acres of defendants ' land. The f a c t s of the case a r e : O n October 15, 1970, s i l v e r B o w County i n i t i a t e d an action t o condemn 3.64 acres of defendants ' land f o r the purpose of improving the Bert Mooney Silver B o w County Airport. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' land was needed t o e s t a b l i s h a "clear zone" a t the end of the runway t o comply with the present regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Defendant landowners, Carl and P a t r i c i a Hafer, f i l e d a respon- sive pleading admitting the County had the power t o condemn land f o r a i r p o r t purposes but denying t h a t the County had demonstrated a necessity f o r the taking, and further denying t h a t the County could e s t a b l i s h a necessity f o r taking t h e i r property i n f e e simple absolute. O n May 9, 1974, almost four years subseqmnt t o the f i l i n g of the condemnation complaint, a necessity hearing was held and the d i s t r i c t court heard the testimony of two witnesses i n behalf of the County--Ed DeGeorge and Charles Engdahl. Ed DeGeorge, a county commissioner from Silver B o w County, t e s t i f i e d the County had the power of eminent domain t o condemn defendants' land f o r a i r p o r t purposes. Charles Engdahl, a c i v i l engineer employed by the Federal Avia- t i o n Administration, t e s t i f i e d the defendants' land was located I l within the c l e a r zone" approach t o the a.irport a s defined i n t h e regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Further, t h a t it was necessary t o acquire t h i s property pursuant t o a grant agree- ment entered i n t o between the Federal Aviation Administration and the Silver B o w County Airport. The alleged grant agreement was not introduced i n t o evidence. O n cross-examination, however, t h i s trans- pired : "Q. J c * * What we a r e trying t o determine here i s , i s it an absolute necessity t h a t you take t h i s man's land a.way from him? A . I don k know a s I 1 can give you a yes' o r 'no' answer on it. "Q. Possibly, you knew t h a t i t would be 'no'? A . I f there was no other ramifications involved on the c l e a r zone, I would say t h a t you could say t h a t it wouldn't be. 11 After hearing the evidence, the d i s t r i c t court took j u d i c i a l notice of the regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration and signed the order of necessity allowing the County t o take t i t l e t o the land i n f e e simple absolute. Defendants appeal from t h a t order and r a i s e t h i s issue: Has the county demonstrated the necessity t o condemn defendants' land i n f e e simple absolute? The authority t o exercise the power of eminent domain f o r county a i r p o r t purposes has been delegated by the Montana l e g i s l a t u r e t o the counties by section 1-801, R.C.M. 1947. However, before exercising t h i s power, the County must f i r s t show t h a t the taking i s necessary t o a public use. Section 93-9905(2), R.C.M. 1947. State Highway ~omrn'n v. Yost Farm Co., 142 Mont. 239, 384 P.2d 277. It i s well established t h a t a condemning authority can not acquire a greater i n t e r e s t o r e s t a t e i n the condemned property than the public use requires. This r u l e i n 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain 5 9.2[2], s t a t e s : "It necessarily follows from the principle t h a t property cannot corrstitutiona1.ly be taken by eminent domain except f o r the public use, t h a t no more property can be taken by eminent domain than the public use requires, since a l l t h a t might be appropriated i n excess of the public needs would not be taken f o r the public use. While considerable l a t i t u d e i s allowed i n providing f o r the anticipated expansion of the re- quirements of the public, the r u l e i t s e l f i s well es- tablished, and applies both t o t h e amount of property t o be acquired f o r public use and t o the e s t a t e o r i n t e r e s t -acquired i n such property. I f an easement w i l l s a t i s f y the public needs, t o take the f e e would be unjust t o the owner, who i s e n t i t l e d t o r e t a i n whatever the public needs do not require, and t o t h e public, which should not be obliged t o pay f o r more than it needs. f: * *" (Emphasis supplied). See also: Berry v. Southern Pine E l e c t r i c Power Ass'n, 222 Miss. 260, 76 So.2d 212; S e a t t l e v. Faussett, 123 Wash. 613, 212 P. 1085; Warm Springs Irr. D i s t . v. Pacific Live Stock Co., (1921, C A 9 Ore.) 270 F. 560. In S t a t e v. Whitcomb, 94 Mont. 415, 429, 22 P.2d 823, t h i s Court examined the requirement of necessity and stated: "* * * The solution of the question of necessity i n a given case involves a consideration of f a c t s which r e l a t e t o the public, and also t o private c i t i z e n s whose property i s taken. The g r e a t e s t good on the one hand, and the l e a s t injury on the other, a r e the questiom of f a c t t o be determined i n passing upon t h e question of necessity. I I Apply the balancing t e s t of Whitcomb t o the i n s t a n t case, the l e a s t private injury t o defendants' property occurs when the County i s granted an easement t o r i d the "clear zonel',of a l l ob- structions, prevent t h e creation of future obstructions and t o allow it the r i g h t of e n t m c e and e x i t t o insure that the s a f e and unrestricted passage of a i r c r a f t i n and over t h e area i s uninhibited. Such an easement i s e n t i r e l y consistent with the regulations established by the Federal Aviation Administration enunciated i n 14 C F R § 151.9: "(a) Whenever funds a r e allocated f o r developing new runways o r landing s t r i p s , o r t o improve o r r e p a i r e x i s t i n g runways, the sponsor must own, acquire, o r agree t o acquire, runway c l e a r zones. Exceptions a r e considered (on the basis of a f u l l statement of f a c t s by the sponsor) upon a showing of uneconomical acqui- s i t i o n c o s t s , o r lack of necessity f o r the acquisition. "(c) For the purposes of t h i s section, an a i r p o r t operator o r owner i s considered t o have an adequate property i n t e r e s t i f it has an easement (or a covenant running with the land) giving i t enough control t o r i d the c l e a r zone of a l l obstructions * * * and t o prevent the creation of future obstructions; together with the r i g h t of entrance and e x i t f o r those purposes, t o ensure the safe and unrestricted passage of a i r c r a f t i n and over the area. " (Emphasis supplied. ) The County has not demonstrated the necessity f o r taking a fee simple t i t l e t o defendants' property. From what has been said heretofore, it appears the preliminary order of comdenmation should not have been issued; it i s ordered dismissed. ,.Me Concur: Chief Justice Justices.