Title: Gilliard v. State
Citation: 446 So. 2d 590
Docket Number: 53959
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 1984

446 So. 2d 590 (1984) In re Robert C. GILLIARD, Jr. v. STATE. No. 53959. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 22, 1984. *591 J. Ronald Parrish, Laurel, Lionel R. Barrett, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Petitioner, Robert C. Gilliard, Jr., was indicted in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District, Jones County, Mississippi, during the September 1981 Term, for the capital murder of Grady Chance during the commission of an armed robbery at the Best Chance Package Store in Laurel, Mississippi. Gilliard entered a plea of guilty to the charge and the trial proceeded on the sentencing phase. After hearing the evidence, receiving the instructions from the court, and argument of counsel, the jury found Gilliard guilty and sentenced him to death. The judgment of the lower court was appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court and was affirmed. Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576 (Miss. 1983). Gilliard did not file a petition for rehearing. A petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi was filed in the United States Supreme Court and denied on October 3, 1983. Application for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis was filed in this Court November 7, 1983, setting out twenty-nine (29) grounds for relief, and was responded to by the State on November 28, 1983. We address each of the grounds for relief hereinafter. On direct appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the petitioner assigned as error that the lower court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue. The lower court received evidence on the question, and it was thoroughly presnted there. On appeal to this Court, it was completely considered and addressed. Gilliard v. State, supra, at 578-79. However, the petitioner now contends that the motion should have been granted and that denial of the motion was of constitutional magnitude and that petitioner was denied a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, citing Anderson v. State, 92 Miss. 656, 46 So. 65 (1908); Eddins v. State, 110 Miss. 780, 70 So. 898 (1916); and Bond v. State, 128 Miss. 792, 91 So. 461 (1922). The question now before this Court is whether or not, under state procedure and law, petitioner may raise the question and attack the judgment on federal constitutional grounds. In Minor v. Lucas, 697 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.1983), Minor neglected to frame in state court the constitutional claims found in his federal habeas petition. The Fifth Circuit commented as follows: In Callahan v. State, 426 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1983), quoting from In re Broom's Petition, 251 Miss. 25, 168 So. 2d 44 (1964), we said: We resolve the question referred to in Minor, supra, and hold that a defendant in a criminal trial, who has litigated matters of fact and law at the trial, and whose conviction has been affirmed, may not, through a writ of error coram nobis, present and litigate the question again, even though then framed and placed in a setting of federal constitutional questions. The Court Erred in Failing to Quash the Jury Panel Which Actually Rendered the Death Sentence in this Case Because of the State's Use of Its Peremptory Challenges to Excuse All Persons of the Negro Race from the Panel Solely on the Basis of Their Race. The questions A-II, A-III, and A-IV were raised and denied on the direct appeal. They were adjudicated and constitute res adjudicate and are procedurally barred. Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1983); Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1983); Callahan v. State, 426 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1982); Auman v. *593 State, 285 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1973); and In Re Broom's Petition, 251 Miss. 25, 168 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 1964). Petitioner's question A-V was not raised on direct appeal and it is procedurally barred. Smith v. State, supra; Edwards v. Thigpen, supra; Wheat v. Thigpen, 431 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1983); Callahan v. State, supra; and Holloway v. State, 261 So. 2d 799 (Miss. 1979). In its response to this question, the State conceded the need for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of resolving the voluntariness of the guilty plea, although it did not concede that petitioner has met the pleading requirements established by this Court in Tiller v. State, 440 So. 2d 1001 (Miss. 1983), and did not concede the merits of petitioner's contention that the plea was unconstitutional. When we now consider this question, along with Section D, addressed hereinafter, we hold that petitioner be given an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Question C-I, C-II, C-III and C-XIV were not alleged as error and raised on direct appeal. The questions may not now be raised for the first time on this Application for Leave to File the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and are procedurally barred. Smith v. State, supra; Edwards v. Thigpen, supra; Wheat v. Thigpen, supra; Callahan v. State, supra; Holloway v. State, supra. Petitioner's questions C-IV, -V, -VI, -VII, -VIII, -IX, -X, -XI, -XII, and -XIII, were alleged as error and adjudicated on direct appeal. They are now res adjudicata, may not be relitigated on this petition and are procedurally barred. Smith v. State, supra; Edwards v. Thigpen, supra; Callahan v. State, supra; Auman v. State, 285 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1973); In Re Broom's Petition, supra. Further, the questions C-IV, -VI, -VIII, -IX, -X, -XII, and -XII, either added a federal constitutional argument to that made on direct appeal, or reframe the direct appeal argument in federal constitutional terms. As we have stated and addressed on the question A-I, motion for change of venue, the principle there applies to these questions. They may not be relitigated on this petition for writ of error coram nobis and are procedurally barred. Under the general question posed in Section D, petitioner has raised questions D-I *594 through D-IX. The sub-question D-VI relates to the entry of the guilty plea at the first phase, or guilt phase, of the trial. The question is interwoven with the question of effective assistance of counsel. The State concedes that there should be an evidentiary hearing on question B and on question D, although the State does not concede the merits of petitioner's allegations. We are of the opinion that there should be an evidentiary hearing on question B and question D, guilty plea and effectiveness of counsel. Therefore, the Motion and Application for Leave to File the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis is granted as to the questions presented in Sections B and D. APPLICATION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, J., specially concurs. SULLIVAN, J., not participating. ROBERTSON, Justice, specially concurring: I concur unreservedly in the result reached in the majority opinion authored by Presiding Justice Roy Noble Lee. At several points, however, I differ as to the grounds that ought to be relied upon. With respect to Section A [I-IV] and Section C[IV-XIII] of the majority opinion, I agree that claims which have been fully litigated at trial and adjudicated on their merits on direct appeal generally ought not be available for relitigation via post-conviction proceedings, even though framed with different terminology. Any such attempt at relitigation ought, in my view, be barred by familiar notions of collateral estoppel. See my special concurring opinion in Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So. 2d 906, 909-910 (Miss. 1983); and my dissenting opinion in Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520, 534 (Miss. 1983). I have carefully reviewed the claims presented under Section A[V] and Section C [I-III and XIV] and find them to be wholly without merit. I would deny those on their merits. It continues to escape me why claims such as these, wholly lacking in substantive merit, should be dealt with on procedural grounds. See my special concurring opinion in Pruett v. Thigpen, 444 So. 2d 819 (Miss. 1984). I concur in what has been said in Section B of the majority opinion. I concur further in what has been said in Section D to the effect that an evidentiary hearing should be held on the question of whether Gilliard has been denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 836-842 (Miss. 1983).