Title: Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
Citation: 257 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: 40880
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 1971

257 So. 2d 36 (1971)
Melba I. CORY, As Surviving Widow of Fay C. Cory, Deceased and As Executrix of the Estate of Fay C. Cory, Deceased, Petitioner,
v.
GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a California Corporation, Respondent.
No. 40880.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 8, 1971.
Rehearing Denied February 15, 1972.
*37 Alan R. Schwartz, of Horton &amp; Schwartz, Miami, and James H. Nance, Melbourne, for petitioner.
J. Compton French and Thorwald J. Husfeld, of Landis, Graham, French, Husfeld, Sherman &amp; Ford, DeLand, for respondent.
ADKINS, Justice.
By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 243 So.2d 478), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District (Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Turpak, 225 So.2d 340), on the same point of law. Fla. Const., art. V, § 4, F.S.A.
In the early morning hours of July 12, 1966, a greyhound bus, heading north through the fog, struck an East Volusia Mosquito Control District fogging machine, creeping slowly in the same direction. In the resulting crash and gasoline explosion, Fay C. Cory, the operator of the fogging machine was burned to death. His widow, Melba I. Cory, brought two separate actions against Greyhound Lines, Inc., to recover damages arising out of Mr. Cory's injuries and death. One action was brought individually under the wrongful death statute. The other action was brought by Mrs. Cory as Executrix of her deceased husband's estate under the survivor statute.
The cases were consolidated for jury trial and the following verdicts were returned:
The exact amount requested in the survival case ($11,192.00) was assessed in the wrongful death action. The jury assessed $147,000.00 (slightly more than had been requested in the wrongful death case) in the survival action.
Thereupon, the following occurred:
The jury returned to the courtroom and rendered the following verdicts:
The jury was then polled and a discussion took place out of the presence of the jury. Mr. James H. Nance, the attorney for plaintiff, suggested that the jury had put the Executrix award on the wrongful death verdict and the wrongful death award on the Executrix verdict when they originally returned. Thereupon, the following occurred:
The defendant filed motion for a new trial on the issues of both liability and damages. The plaintiff filed a motion for entry of final judgments in which she sought the entry of final judgments in accordance with the alleged intention of the jury as incorrectly expressed, in the first verdicts, by the entry of a judgment of $147,000.00 for the plaintiff in the wrongful death case, and $11,192.00 for the plaintiff's estate in the survivor case. The trial judge denied plaintiff's motion for entry of final judgments and granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages alone. The order stated:
Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing which was accompanied by the affidavits of five jurors and counsel's affidavit as to what he had been told by the sixth juror concerning the jurors' intentions in returning the verdict. The motion for rehearing was denied. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in a "per curiam" order affirmed the order granting defendant a new trial on damages only.
For conflict petitioner refers us to Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Turpak, supra. In that case the jury returned a verdict for the widow as Executrix, and a separate verdict for the widow in her individual capacity. These verdicts were accepted and the jury was discharged. The Court allowed the foreman to be interviewed and plaintiff's attorney gave an affidavit purporting to relate the result of the interview with the foreman. On the basis of this, the trial court undertook to reconstruct the verdict by lumping the total of both verdicts into one for the widow and awarding zero dollars' verdict for the Executrix. The defendant appealed and Mrs. Turpak, the widow, contended the jury made an "inadvertent clerical error" and that "there was no dispute concerning the jury's true intent." In reversing, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, said:
If, in the case sub judice, it appears that the jury, in its first verdicts, incorrectly apportioned damages, erroneously transposed the amounts in consolidated action, or made other clerical errors in rendering the verdicts, the Court should have corrected the verdicts and there is conflict with Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Turpak, supra. On the other hand, if the verdicts were the result of misconceptions of the jury as to the facts and law involved, or confusion, and do not reflect the true intent of the jury, there is no conflict.
The general rule is that a verdict is the determination of a jury upon the testimony submitted to them, and should be construed with reference to the issue made by the pleading. Wismer v. Alyea, 103 Fla. 1102, 138 So. 763 (1932). When the intent of the jury is apparent, their verdict will be sufficient to sustain a judgment entered in conformity with the intent of the verdict. Buffett v. Geldhauser, 155 So. 2d 844 (Fla.App.3d, 1963). Accord: 25 F.L.P., Verdict, § 5; 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 1094; 89 C.J.S., Trial, § 515. See also Channell v. State, 107 So. 2d 284 (Fla.App.2d, 1958), a criminal case, where the Court said that any words which impart beyond a reasonable doubt the meaning and intention of the jury are sufficient, and all fair intendments will be effectuated to sustain the verdict.
The intentions of the jury in the case sub judice were obvious and apparent upon the face of the verdicts it actually returned. In the initial verdicts the precise amount requested in the survival case was awarded in the wrongful death case. The insertion of the $147,000.00 in the survival verdict demonstrated beyond question that the jury simply transposed or reversed the amounts to be returned in the two consolidated actions. The verdicts total $158,192.00.
When the second verdicts were rendered some of the figures were transposed by the jury, but the same total of $158,192.00 was assessed. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that the jury's intention was to award $147,000.00 for the elements properly recoverable in the wrongful death case and $11,192.00 for the elements properly recoverable in the survival case.
In Smith v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 173 F.2d 721 (C.C.A.3d, 1949), wrongful death and survival actions were brought by the parents and the estate of a deceased child. The jury placed the respective damage figures in the wrong spaces, but the trial judge corrected the forms to reflect the jury's intent. In affirming, the Court said:
Even after the reception of a verdict, a party may move the Court to mould or amend it so as to make it conform with the jury's apparent, but unexpressed, intention. This, of course, is within the sound discretion of the Court. See Maize v. Atlantic Refining Company, 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945). As stated by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Minot v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 10, 86 N.E. 783, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 311:
Smith v. Tang, 100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697, involved a situation in which the jury reversed damages awarded to the plaintiff in two separate causes of action against the defendant. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial judge's action realigning the verdicts, saying:
Cases from numerous jurisdictions are cited in support of the following statement found in Annotations, 49 A.L.R.2d 1328, on page 1336:
In the case sub judice, the jury in its first verdict erroneously transposed the amounts in the consolidated actions. The jury's determination to award a total sum of $158,129.00 was further expressed by the second verdict. The intentions of the jury could have been effectuated by merely transposing the amounts in the two actions as expressed in the first verdicts or reapportioning the damages.
Plaintiff further contends that the affidavits attached to the motion for rehearing conclusively resolve any doubt about the intention of the jury in returning the verdicts. Respondent questions the procedure which was followed in securing the affidavits. We find it unnecessary to pass upon *42 the propriety or sufficiency of the affidavits.
The decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause is remanded with directions to further remand same to the trial court with directions to grant plaintiff's motion for final judgments and enter judgments in the amount of $147,000.00 for Mrs. Cory, individually, and for $11,192.00 for Mrs. Cory, as Executrix of her husband's estate.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C.J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.