Title: Reed v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 74, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHARLES W. REED,
 
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No. 74, 2013
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for Kent County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Cr. No. 1204016188
Plaintiff Below, 
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  August 7, 2013
Decided:  September 25, 2013
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY,  Justices.
O R D E R
This 25th day of September 2013, on consideration of the briefs of the parties,
it appears to the Court that:
1) Charles W. Reed (Charles) appeals from his convictions, after a jury trial,
of second degree assault, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of
a felony, aggravated menacing, and second degree conspiracy.  He argues that the
trial court committed plain error by precluding him from cross-examining a State
witness about the witness’s prior conviction.
2) On April 6, 2012, Donald Reed, Jr. (Donnie) called Christopher Miller
(Christopher)  and told Christopher that his uncle, Charles, paid Donnie’s father,
Donald Reed (Donald), to beat up Christopher.   Donald lived across the street from
Christopher and his housemate, Jeff Helm (Helm).  After receiving the call,
Christopher  and Helm walked over to Donald’s house.  Donald came outside and
started fighting with Christopher.  The two men exchanged punches for a few
minutes, and then Christopher went home.
3) Less than an hour later, Christopher’s wife, Karen Miller (Karen), saw
Donnie, Donald, and Charles standing by their neighbor’s garage, holding metal
pipes.  She also saw one of the Reeds hitting Helm’s dog.  Helm ran outside and saw
Charles striking the dog.  While Helm was trying to bring his dog home, Charles
struck Helm in the head with a metal object.  Donald then repeatedly hit Helm in the
head with a metal object.  Karen called the police, and Helm was flown to a hospital. 
He suffered a fractured skull.
4) Charles and Donald were tried together.  Christopher was a State’s witness. 
He is also a twice convicted felon.  During cross-examination, the court allowed
Charles to admit one of Christopher’s prior convictions for impeachment, but the
court did not allow Reed to introduce the other conviction.  On appeal, Charles
contends that the trial court applied the wrong test in deciding that Christopher’s first
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degree assault conviction could not be used for impeachment.  The trial court
conducted a balancing test under Delaware Rule of Evidence (D.R.E.) 404(b)1 rather
than the balancing test under D.R.E. 609(a)2.
5) This Court considered and rejected the same argument in Donald’s appeal3:
In Getz v. State,  this Court held that before the admission of
“other crimes” evidence under 404(b), “the Court must balance the
probative value of such evidence against its unfairly prejudicial effect,
as required by D.R.E. 403.”   D.R.E. 403 provides:  “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
The record below reflects that defense was attempting to proffer
the assault conviction as impeachment evidence pursuant to D.R.E. 609. 
As Assault is not a crime of dishonesty, it can only be admitted
pursuant to D.R.E. 609(a)(1).  D.R.E. 609 states that prior crimes “shall”
be admitted “if the probative value . . . outweighs its prejudicial effect.” 
D.R.E. 403 allows relevant evidence unless its “probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  These are
two different standards, the former arguably being a more relaxed
standard than the latter.  Nevertheless, Rule 403 also allows for the trial
1 D.R.E. 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
2 D.R.E. 609(a) provides: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) constituted a felony
under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
3 Reed v. State, 2013 WL 3963450 at *3 (Del. Supr.) (Footnotes and citations omitted.).
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court to exercise control over the trial process so that cumulative
evidence is excluded.
Assuming arguendo that the D.R.E. 609 standard should have
been applied, the error in applying D.R.E. 403 and 404 was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury was presented with evidence of
[Christopher’s] prior burglary conviction, his disdain for police, his
history of  fighting, his time in prison, and his experiences assaulting
“child molesters” while serving time.  Hearing evidence of the prior
assault conviction would have added little to the impeachment mix
against [Christopher].  Further, [Christopher] was one of two witnesses
who testified to seeing [Charles] strike Helm with a metal object. 
Karen Miller also testified to having witnessed [Charles] hit Helm . . . . 
The State submitted photographs of Helm’s injuries, and a State Trooper
who arrived on the scene took note of a laceration on the side of
Helm’s head.  When measured against the strength of the total
evidence presented by the State, the failure to utilize the proper
balancing test in precluding the assault conviction, even if error, was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior
Court are AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice
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