Title: Randolph v. Delaware Board of Parole, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 371, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNETH RANDOLPH, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE BOARD 
OF PAROLE, DAVID 
HENDERSON, MARLENE 
LICHTENSTADTER, RICHARD 
NEGLEY, and RALPH 
LIBERATORE 
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§    No. 371, 2018 
§   
§ 
§    Court Below—Superior Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§    C.A. No. N15M-04-060 
§  
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  February 22, 2019 
    Decided:  April 16, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Kenneth Randolph, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s order, dated June 19, 2018, in which the Superior Court denied Randolph’s 
motion for leave to amend his petition for a writ of mandamus, dismissed his 
petition, and denied his motion for leave to proceed pro se as moot.  We conclude 
that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion and affirm. 
 
2 
(2) 
In 1980, Randolph pleaded guilty to one count of rape and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  He was released on parole in 1993.  In March 2014, 
he was arrested on multiple criminal charges.  After a hearing before the Board of 
Parole (the “Board”) on July 29, 2014, the Board revoked his parole.  On November 
13, 2014, his new criminal charges were dismissed.  In April 2015, Randolph filed 
a petition for a writ of mandamus.  His amended petition and his amended prayer for 
relief requested the Superior Court to direct the defendants to reinstate his parole and 
sought other relief.  Among other arguments, Randolph asserted that his hearing 
before the Board was unfair because he did not receive notice of the hearing and 
have an opportunity to prepare.  The Superior Court dismissed the petition for 
mandamus, and Randolph appealed.   
(3) 
On appeal, Randolph argued that the Board abused its discretion by 
holding his violation hearing before his underlying criminal charges were resolved.  
He also contended that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he violated 
parole and argued that the Board violated his due process rights.  Because Randolph 
could not establish a clear legal right to the relief he requested—including the 
reinstatement of his parole—this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.1  
But the Court also noted that “[i]n cases involving the Board of Parole, the Superior 
                                                 
1 See Randolph v. State, 2017 WL 512471 (Del. Feb. 6, 2017) (“A writ of mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy that the Superior Court may issue to a state agency or official to compel the 
performance of a non-discretionary duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right. 
. . .  The Board’s final decision to revoke or continue parole, however, is entirely discretionary and 
is not subject to mandamus relief.”). 
 
3 
Court has an obligation to ensure that the process afforded to the parolee comports 
with the minimum requirements of due process.”2  The Court determined that 
Randolph had raised “significant due process issues” and therefore remanded the 
case to the Superior Court for the appointment of counsel, who could help Randolph 
“ascertain the factual record and present an amended complaint in a proper 
procedural posture, if such a complaint is deemed by counsel to be appropriate,” and 
leave to file an amended complaint.3 
(4) 
Randolph was appointed counsel, who sought a new hearing with the 
Board.  The Board undertook a review of the circumstances of the July 2014 hearing.  
In an April 12, 2018 letter to Randolph, the Board summarized its findings as 
follows: 
On April 10, 2018, the Board reviewed the facts of your July 29, 2014 
violation hearing.  It was determined that you were arrested by Delaware 
State Police and charged with PWID and that you did not report your 
change of address to your supervising officer.  In addition, you did not 
participate in sex offender groups, as required by the Board’s December 
11, 2012 special conditions.  All of these incidents violated the terms of 
your paroled release. 
 
On April 8, 2014, you signed a Preliminary Hearing Activation and 
Tracking form.  By signing, you acknowledged receipt of the violation 
report. 
 
                                                 
2 Id.  In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), the United States Supreme Court set forth 
the minimum requirements of due process for parole revocation hearings, which include (i) notice 
of the claimed violations, (ii) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him, (iii) an 
opportunity to be heard in person and present evidence, (iv) the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him, (v) a neutral and detached hearing body, and (vi) a written statement of the 
reasons for revoking parole. 
3 Randolph, 2017 WL 512471. 
 
4 
At the start of the July 29, 2014 hearing, you were asked if you wished 
to proceed with the violation hearing.  You had an opportunity to ask 
that the hearing be deferred until such time as you obtained an attorney.  
You indicated that you wanted to go forward with the process. 
 
The disposition of the July 29, 2014 [hearing] remains in effect.  You 
are able to reapply for parole consideration on July 29, 2018. 
 
(5) 
 On June 6, 2018, Randolph’s counsel filed a letter informing the 
Superior Court of the Board’s findings and indicating that he intended to file a 
motion to withdraw.  Shortly thereafter, counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which 
stated that he had “made a conscientious examination of the record and the law and 
has exhausted all reasonable efforts to obtain a new hearing and [] concluded that 
the action is now without merit.” 
(6) 
On June 13, 2018, Randolph filed a motion to proceed pro se and for 
leave to file a new complaint.  The Superior Court denied Randolph’s motion and 
dismissed the action with prejudice.  The court stated that the “Board found that Mr. 
Randolph had waived the appearance of counsel at his hearing in 2014 and therefore 
denied the request” for a new hearing.  The court concluded that “Randolph may 
have a new cause of action, the Court has no opinion on the matter.  But this 
particular matter seeking a writ of mandamus against the parole authorities has been 
fully litigated and finally decided.  We are well past the point of amending pleadings 
and asserting new claims under this case caption.”  Randolph has appealed to this 
Court. 
 
5 
(7) 
“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that the Superior 
Court may issue to a state agency or official to compel the performance of a non-
discretionary duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right. . . .  The 
Board’s final decision to revoke or continue parole, however, is entirely 
discretionary and is not subject to mandamus relief.”4  This Court remanded for the 
appointment of counsel to “ascertain the factual record and present an amended 
complaint in a proper procedural posture, if such a complaint is deemed by counsel 
to be appropriate.”5  After seeking another hearing from the Board and considering 
the Board’s letter concerning the process surrounding the 2014 hearing, counsel 
determined that any further proceedings would be without merit.  The Superior Court 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied Randolph’s request to amend his petition 
and dismissed the case.6 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s judgment 
is AFFIRMED.  Randolph’s motion for this Court to appoint counsel on appeal is 
denied. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 King v. State, 2015 WL 317128 (Del. Jan. 23, 2015) (“We review the Superior Court’s denial of 
a petition for a writ of mandamus for abuse of discretion.”).