Title: Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co.
Citation: 2012 WI 30
Docket Number: 2009AP002099
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2012

2012 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2099 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Admiral Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Paper Converting Machine Company (PCMC), 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Chubb Custom Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 331 Wis. 2d 486, 795 N.W. 2d 62 
(Ct. App. 2010 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 27, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Mitchell J. Metropulos 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Ward I. Richter, Sheila M. Sullivan and Bell, Moore & 
Richter, S.C., Madison and oral argument by Sheila M. Sullivan. 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Robert S. Soderstrom, Todd S. Schenk, Nicolas C. Mesco 
and Tressler LLP, Chicago, and oral argument by Todd S. Schenk. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief filed by 
Dudley W. Von Holt, Matthew S. Darrough and Thompson Coburn LLP, 
St. Louis, Gregory B. Conway, April Baker and Liebmann, Conway, 
Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C. Green Bay and oral argument by Dudley 
W. Von Holt. 
 
 
2012 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2099 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV1392) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Admiral Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paper Converting Machine Company (PCMC), 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Chubb Custom Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 27, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of orders of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.  The 
petitioners, 
Admiral 
Insurance 
Company 
and 
Chubb 
Custom 
Insurance 
Company 
(hereinafter Admiral), seek review of unpublished orders of the 
court of appeals, which dismissed as untimely Admiral's appeal 
of a grant of summary judgment in favor of Paper Converting 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
2 
 
Machine Company (PCMC).1  In the event that we conclude that the 
appeal was timely and reverse the court of appeals, Admiral also 
asks us to review the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of PCMC.  
¶2 
The court of appeals dismissed Admiral's appeal as 
untimely because it concluded that the circuit court's March 26, 
2009 decision and order was the final order for purposes of 
appeal.  Admiral argues that the March 26 decision and order was 
not a final order because it did not dispose of the entire 
matter in litigation, and it notes that the order did not 
contain a statement of finality.  Admiral contends that the 
judgment entered on July 8, 2009, was final for purposes of 
appeal, and that it timely appealed from that judgment.   
¶3 
If we conclude that there is any ambiguity in an order 
or judgment about whether it disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties, we will construe 
the ambiguity so as to preserve the right to appeal.  Under 
these circumstances, although the March 26 order arguably 
disposed of the entire matter in litigation between the parties, 
we cannot say on this record that it unambiguously did so.  
Accordingly, we construe it as nonfinal, pursuant to our policy 
                                                 
1 Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co., Case No. 
2009AP2099, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Dec. 21, 2010), 
dismissing Admiral's appeal of an order of the circuit court for 
Outagamie County, Mitchell J. Metropulos, J., as untimely; 
Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co., Case No. 
2009AP2099, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App., Jan. 14, 2011) 
(denying Admiral's motion for reconsideration). 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
3 
 
of construing any ambiguity to preserve the right of appeal.  We 
conclude that Admiral's appeal of the July 8 judgment is timely.       
¶4 
Regarding the merits, Admiral acknowledges that it 
entered into an agreement with its insured, PCMC, to contribute 
$2 million towards the settlement of a lawsuit, but it contends 
that the oral funding agreement is unenforceable because it does 
not meet the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 807.05.2  Even if the 
contract is enforceable, Admiral asserts that it is entitled to 
restitution, either because PCMC was unjustly enriched by its 
contribution of $2 million towards the settlement or because of 
Admiral's mistake of fact.   
¶5 
We conclude that the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.05 are inapplicable, and the funding agreement is an 
enforceable contract.  We further conclude that under these 
circumstances, an insurer cannot recover payments based on an 
unjust enrichment theory, and Admiral's asserted mistake of fact 
does not provide grounds for voiding the contract.    
¶6 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.   
I 
¶7 
The following facts are undisputed.  PCMC manufactures 
paper machines.  Elizabeth Young was severely injured on 
February 22, 2005, while working on a machine that was 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 807.05 governs the enforceability of agreements, stipulations, 
and consent between parties and their attorneys. 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
4 
 
manufactured by PCMC, and PCMC learned about the accident 
shortly thereafter.  At the time, PCMC was self-insured.    
¶8 
Several months later, PCMC was acquired by another 
company, and it purchased additional insurance coverage.  PCMC 
maintained a self-insured retention of $250,000 (which included 
defense costs), and additionally, it purchased two relevant 
policies: (1) a claims-made policy issued by Admiral Insurance 
Company 
that 
provided 
$2 
million 
in 
products/completed 
operations liability coverage;3 and (2) an excess policy issued 
by Chubb Custom Insurance.     
¶9 
As part of its application for insurance, PCMC 
disclosed all pending legal cases as well as known accidents 
that could reasonably result in litigation.  PCMC's disclosure 
was made to Admiral's underwriting department, and it included 
the accident in which Young was injured.     
¶10 Approximately one year after the policies were issued, 
Young filed suit against PCMC, and PCMC notified Admiral's 
claims department of the litigation.  Although Admiral was not 
named as a party, it opened a file on the case and hired an 
attorney to represent its interest in the lawsuit.  By letter, 
Admiral 
informed 
PCMC 
that 
it 
had 
been 
"monitoring 
the . . . claim and determined that there is exposure to the 
Admiral policy."     
                                                 
3 The Admiral policy promised to cover certain claims that 
were first made against the insured within the policy period, 
but it did not cover any property damage or bodily injury which 
occurred before September 7, 1995. 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
5 
 
¶11 Admiral 
participated 
in 
mediation, 
and 
during 
settlement negotiations, it entered into a funding agreement 
with PCMC to contribute its policy limits, $2 million, toward 
settlement of the lawsuit.  Admiral admits that the attorney it 
sent to the settlement negotiations acted as its representative 
or agent, and that Admiral provided the attorney with authority 
to contribute the policy limits to achieve settlement without 
any intent to seek reimbursement from PCMC.     
¶12 Ultimately, Young agreed to accept $3.5 million to 
settle the suit.  A written settlement agreement was signed by 
PCMC's attorney, Young, and Young's attorney, but not by 
Admiral.     
¶13 After the settlement agreement was negotiated but 
prior to sending its payment under the funding agreement, 
Admiral changed its position on coverage.  It contended, for the 
first time, that there was no coverage for the Young accident 
under the known claims exclusion of its policy.4     
                                                 
4 The known claims endorsement states that it modifies 
insurance provided under commercial general liability coverage, 
commercial 
property 
coverage, 
and 
professional 
liability 
coverage.  It makes no mention of products/completed operations 
liability coverage, the type of coverage purchased by PCMC.  The 
text of the exclusion is as follows: "It is agreed this 
insurance does not apply to liability arising out of any claim 
or 'occurrence', or circumstance or condition that may result in 
a claim or 'occurrence', known or which reasonably should have 
been known by an insured prior to 09/07/2005."   
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
6 
 
¶14 Admiral implied that it would withhold payment unless 
PCMC agreed that it had reserved the right to seek reimbursement 
from PCMC in a subsequent lawsuit.5  PCMC replied that Admiral 
was bound by the funding agreement and had no right to seek 
reimbursement.  Admiral paid the policy's maximum, $2 million, 
as it had agreed to do.6       
¶15 Admiral then filed an action against PCMC, seeking a 
declaration that its policies provided no coverage for Young's 
                                                                                                                                                             
On July 12, 2007, Admiral sent a letter to PCMC which 
relied on this exclusion in disclaiming coverage: "We have now 
been advised that Paper Converting Machine Company knew of the 
claim of Elizabeth Young at least as early as July 22, 2005 
(when the claim was disclosed by Paper Converting Machine 
Company on a 'claims audit' form).  The fact that the claim of 
Elizabeth Young was known to Paper Converting Machine Company 
prior to September 7, 2005, brings this claim clearly and 
unambiguously within the 'known claims' exclusion of the 
policy."  
5 On July 16, it sent the following letter: "Admiral 
Insurance Company has denied, and continues to deny, coverage 
for the claims arising out of the Elizabeth Young incident.  
However, as long as all interested parties agree that by 
participating in the settlement with the Elizabeth Young 
plaintiffs reflected in the 'Post Mediation Agreement' in the 
Outagamie County Circuit Court lawsuit, Admiral does not waive, 
and continues to expressly reserve, its coverage defenses in 
this matter, then Admiral will agree to advance money toward 
that settlement as if it did afford coverage, leaving the 
resolution of the coverage issue to be later determined." 
6 The excess insurer, Chubb, paid $1.3 million, and likewise 
attempted to reserve the right to seek reimbursement.   
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
7 
 
claim and reimbursement of the $2 million.7  PCMC answered and 
filed a separate counterclaim for attorney fees.8  All parties 
moved for summary judgment.    
¶16 The circuit court entered a decision and order on 
March 26, 2009.  It concluded that PCMC was entitled to summary 
judgment because the oral settlement agreement between Admiral 
and PCMC was enforceable and there was no mutual mistake of 
fact.  The circuit court's order provided as follows: "Based on 
the foregoing, the Court denies the summary judgment motions 
filed on behalf of Admiral and Chubb.  The Court grants the 
summary judgment motion in favor of PCMC.  The Court hereby 
orders this case dismissed."    
¶17 The parties assert that after the entry of this order, 
they agreed to delay entry of a final judgment because PCMC 
intended to pursue its counterclaim for attorney fees, which had 
not been addressed in the court's decision and order.  They 
                                                 
7 Chubb also filed a declaratory action.  It asserted that 
if there was no coverage under the Admiral policy, then there 
was likewise no coverage under its excess policy.  In its brief 
to this court, Chubb incorporated all arguments advanced by 
Admiral, and it presented no substantive arguments of its own.  
Therefore, from this point forward, we make no separate mention 
of Chubb in this opinion.    
8 The counterclaim provided: "PCMC hereby requests its 
attorney's fees as prevailing party in this litigation under 
Wisconsin Statute Section 806.04(8) [the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act]."  
We note that in PCMC's answer, its request for attorney 
fees 
was 
not 
specifically 
designated 
as 
a 
counterclaim.  
However, Admiral refers to it as a counterclaim throughout its 
brief, and PCMC takes no issue with that designation.   
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
8 
 
assert 
that 
PCMC 
ultimately 
decided 
not 
to 
pursue 
this 
counterclaim.9   
¶18 The circuit court entered judgment on July 8, 2009.  
The judgment provided, "This is a final judgment for purposes of 
appeal."    
¶19 Admiral 
appealed 
on 
August 
12, 
2009. 
 
In 
an 
unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court.  Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co., 
unpublished slip op., No. 2009AP2099 (Wis. Ct. App., Dec. 7, 
2010).  It reasoned that Admiral entered into a valid and 
enforceable oral agreement with PCMC to pay money toward the 
settlement of the Young claim.  It rejected Admiral's argument 
that it should be relieved of this agreement based on a mistake 
of fact or some equitable theory.  Id., ¶¶11-13.     
¶20 In a footnote, the court of appeals questioned the 
timeliness of the appeal, given that the March 26 decision and 
order appeared to be final and Admiral's notice of appeal was 
not filed within 90 days of that order.  Id., ¶1 n.1.  However, 
it concluded that PCMC had waived any objection to the court's 
jurisdiction by declining to object to the timing of the appeal.  
Id.   
                                                 
9 Admiral moved the court of appeals to supplement the 
record with the parties' correspondence.  The court of appeals 
denied Admiral's motion.  Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting 
Machine Co., No. 2009AP2099, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App., 
Jan. 14, 2011).  Although Admiral included some correspondence 
in its appendix here, it acknowledges that this information is 
not included in the record, and it has not made a motion before 
this court to supplement the record.       
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
9 
 
¶21 The following day, the court of appeals withdrew its 
opinion on its own motion.  Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting 
Machine Co., unpublished order, No. 2009AP2099 (Wis. Ct. App., 
Dec. 8, 2010).  As it later explained, "A court must raise 
questions of subject matter jurisdiction even if the parties do 
not, and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be obtained by a 
party's waiver or consent."  Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper 
Converting Machine Co., No. 2009AP2099, unpublished slip op., ¶3 
(Wis. Ct. App., Dec. 21, 2010).  The court of appeals dismissed 
Admiral's appeal as untimely.  Id.  It likewise denied Admiral's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration. 
 
Admiral 
Ins. 
Co. 
v. 
Paper 
Converting Machine Co., No. 2009AP2099, unpublished order, (Wis. 
Ct. App., Jan. 14, 2011). 
II 
¶22 In this case, we are required to review the court of 
appeals' 
determination 
that 
it 
lacked 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction because Admiral's appeal was untimely.  Admiral's 
appeal was untimely if the March 26 order was a final order for 
purposes of appeal.  This presents a question of law that we 
review independently of the court of appeals' determination.  
Kenosha Prof'l Firefighters v. City of Kenosha, 2009 WI 52, ¶20, 
317 Wis. 2d 628, 766 N.W.2d 577. 
¶23 If we conclude that the appeal is timely, we will also 
review the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment in 
favor of PCMC.  A circuit court's grant or denial of summary 
judgment is a question of law which we review independently of 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
10 
 
the circuit court.10  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 
Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  
¶24 We address these issues in turn.   
III 
¶25 In Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), the legislature set forth 
the standard for determining whether a judgment or order is 
final for purposes of appeal: "A final judgment or final order 
is a judgment, order or disposition that disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties . . . ."  
To determine whether the March 26 decision was final for 
purposes of appeal, the question is whether it "dispose[d] of 
                                                 
10 Initially, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment, but it later vacated that 
decision and dismissed the appeal on the basis of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Even if we reverse the court's dismissal of the 
appeal, there is no need to reinstate the court of appeals' 
opinion on the merits of the case, given that our review of the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment is independent.    
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
11 
 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the 
parties."11   
¶26 We recently addressed what it means for a judgment or 
order to be final in Wambolt v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 
2007 WI 35, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670.  In that case, we 
discussed the difference between deciding an issue in a written 
memorandum decision and disposing of a matter in litigation.   
¶27 We explained that a memorandum decision that decided 
all the substantive legal issues, but did not explicitly dispose 
of the entire matter in litigation, was not final for purposes 
of appeal.  To constitute a final order or judgment, the 
document must explicitly dismiss or adjudge the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more parties.  Id., ¶35.  If the 
language of the document only arguably disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation, that is, if there is some ambiguity as to 
whether the language of the order or judgment disposes of the 
                                                 
11 Here, there is little doubt that the parties did not 
understand or intend the March 26 decision and order to be final 
for purposes of appeal.  However, our case law makes clear that 
the intentions of the circuit court and the parties do not 
render nonfinal an order that actually "disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties."  Wambolt 
v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, ¶¶30 n.9, 31, 299 
Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670; Kenosha Prof'l Firefighters v. City 
of Kenosha, 2009 WI 52, ¶30 n.38, 317 Wis. 2d 628, 766 
N.W.2d 577; see also Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thoma, 45 
Wis. 2d 580, 587, 173 N.W.2d 717 (1970).  As the court of 
appeals explained in this case, it is the language of the order 
or judgment, and not anyone's intentions, upon which the inquiry 
is based.  Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co., No. 
2009AP2099, unpublished order, at 2 (Wis. Ct. App., Jan. 14, 
2011).  
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
12 
 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties, 
then we will construe the ambiguity to preserve the right of 
appeal.  Id., ¶46.   
¶28 In Wambolt, we acknowledged that the question of what 
constitutes a final order or final judgment "continue[d] to 
arise despite our past efforts to provide certainty," and that 
uncertainty 
was 
"unacceptable 
in 
our 
system 
where 
the 
determination of finality is the lynchpin for jurisdiction on 
appeal."  Id., ¶41.  Therefore, going forward, we required that 
final orders and final judgments state that they are final for 
purposes of appeal.  Id., ¶44.  We instructed appellate courts 
to construe any ambiguities in the order or judgment to preserve 
the right of appeal.  Id., ¶46.   
¶29 The focus of the ambiguity inquiry is on the language 
of the order or judgment, not on the finality statement.  The 
absence of a finality statement cannot be used to create 
ambiguity when it is unambiguous that the order or judgment 
disposed of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of 
the parties.  The Wambolt court's purpose in requiring a 
statement of finality was to increase clarity and the efficient 
administration of justice.  However, if the lack of a finality 
statement created an ambiguity, the time for appeal of judgments 
and orders that explicitly dispose of the entire matter in 
litigation would be indefinitely extended, and the efficient 
administration of justice would be frustrated.       
¶30 Here, the March 26 decision and order stated: "The 
court hereby orders this case dismissed."  On its face, that 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
13 
 
language explicitly disposes of the entire matter in litigation 
between the parties and the order would appear to be final for 
purposes of appeal.  See Tyler v. The RiverBank, 2007 WI 33, 
¶22, 
299 
Wis. 2d 751, 
728 
N.W.2d 686 
(concluding 
that 
a 
statement that "the claims of Plaintiff are dismissed with 
prejudice" was an explicit statement disposing of the entire 
matter in litigation); Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 2008 WI 63, 
¶30, 
310 
Wis. 2d 175, 
750 
N.W.2d 806 
(concluding 
that 
a 
statement that all claims were "dismissed on the merits" was an 
explicit 
statement 
disposing 
of 
the 
entire 
matter 
in 
litigation).     
¶31 Nevertheless, Admiral contends that the March 26 order 
did not actually dispose of the entire matter in litigation 
between the parties because a "substantive issue" remained.  In 
Wambolt, we acknowledged that an order which purports to dispose 
of the entire matter in litigation might not actually do so.  
299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶¶33 n.10, 46.  We explained: "It is certainly 
the case where substantive issues remain, a document dismissing 
or adjudging only part of the action cannot constitute a final 
order 
or 
final 
judgment 
for 
purpose 
of 
appeal 
under 
§ 808.03(1)."  Id., ¶33 n.10.12   
                                                 
12  However, we have warned that a test which focuses on 
"whether all substantive issues have been decided might result 
in an up-tick in late-filed appeals and collateral litigation 
over 
whether 
the 
time to appeal began."  Wambolt, 299 
Wis. 2d 723, ¶38 (quoting the amicus brief of the Appellate 
Practice Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin).  We reiterated 
that the touchstone is the statutory standard——whether the 
judgment or order disposes of the entire matter in litigation as 
to one or more parties.  Id., ¶33 n.10. 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
14 
 
¶32 In this case, PCMC filed a counterclaim for attorney 
fees, and that counterclaim was not addressed in the parties' 
motions for summary judgment or in the court's March 26 decision 
and order.  We turn then to examine Admiral's argument that the 
pendency of PCMC's counterclaim for attorney fees prevented the 
order from actually disposing of the entire matter in litigation 
between the parties.      
¶33 Longstanding Wisconsin law provides that the pendency 
of a claim for attorney fees under a fee-shifting statute does 
not affect the finality of a judgment that disposes of the 
matter in litigation.  In Leske v. Leske, 185 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 
517 
N.W.2d 538 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994), 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
acknowledged that a judgment or order dismissing a complaint is 
not final if a counterclaim between the parties remains 
unresolved, but it determined that "the pendency of a claim for 
attorney's fees under a specific fee-shifting statute does not 
render a judgment or order nonfinal, provided that the judgment 
or order disposes of all of the substantive causes of action 
between the parties."13  Had PCMC's pending counterclaim been 
                                                 
13 See also Kenosha Prof'l Firefighters, 317 Wis. 2d 628, 
¶15 n.10 (quoting Leske); Campbell v. Campbell, 2003 WI App 8, 
259 Wis. 2d 676, 659 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 2002) (a family law 
order was final despite a pending request for attorney fees 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.262 (1999-2000)); Hartman v. Winnebago 
Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 419, 574 N.W.2d 222 (1998) (pending claim for 
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not affect finality of 
judgment); Laube v. City of Owen, 209 Wis. 2d 12, 13, 561 
N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that an order in a 
condemnation action under Wis. Stat. ch. 32 was final, even 
though a request for an award of litigation expenses under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.28 remained pending). 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
15 
 
made under a fee-shifting statute, it is clear that it would not 
affect the finality of the March 26 order.14   
¶34 However, Admiral asserts that PCMC's counterclaim was 
not "the routine variety of taxation of costs" or a claim for 
attorney fees under a fee-shifting statute.  Rather, it asserts, 
it was "a substantive issue that required briefing by both of 
the parties."     
¶35 In the record before this court, the nature of PCMC's 
counterclaim is unclear.  The counterclaim makes reference to 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8), 
which is not a fee-shifting statute.  Rather, it permits parties 
to pursue "[f]urther relief . . . whenever necessary or proper."  
The pleading does not specify the theory of law upon which 
PCMC's counterclaim was based.  Further, the court of appeals 
denied 
Admiral's 
motion 
to 
supplement 
the 
record 
with 
information pertinent to PCMC's counterclaim.  On this record, 
we cannot determine whether PCMC's counterclaim was based on, 
for example, an asserted contractual right or other theory of 
law which might take it outside the rule set forth in Leske.        
                                                 
14 As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
explained, 
the 
Kenosha 
Professional Firefighters case stands for the proposition that 
"a final judgment or final order pertaining to fees or costs may 
be appealed separately from any appeal of the merits of the 
underlying 
dispute." 
 
Kenosha 
Prof'l 
Firefighters, 
317 
Wis. 2d 628, ¶15.  Like the court of appeals, we conclude that 
"Kenosha 
Professional 
Firefighters 
does 
not 
overrule 
the 
longstanding holding that the pendency of a claim for costs and 
fees does not affect the appealability of a judgment that 
otherwise disposes of the matters in litigation."  Admiral Ins. 
Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co., No. 2009AP2099, unpublished 
order, at 2 (Wis. Ct. App., Jan. 14, 2011). 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
16 
 
¶36 Under these circumstances, although the March 26 order 
arguably disposed of the entire matter in litigation between the 
parties, we cannot say on this record that it unambiguously did 
so.  Accordingly, we construe it as nonfinal, pursuant to our 
policy of construing any ambiguity to preserve the right of 
appeal.  We conclude that Admiral's appeal of the July 8 
judgment is timely.   
IV 
¶37 Having construed the ambiguity to preserve Admiral's 
right to appeal, we turn to the merits of the appeal.  We must 
decide whether the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of PCMC. 
¶38 Admiral asserts that there was no coverage for the 
Young accident under its policy because PCMC knew about the 
accident as evinced by the disclosure PCMC submitted to 
Admiral's underwriting department.  Admiral bases its coverage 
argument on the known loss doctrine, see State v. Hydrite 
Chemical Co., 2005 WI App 60, 280 Wis. 2d 647, 695 N.W.2d 816 
and American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bateman, 2006 WI App 
251, 297 Wis. 2d 828, 726 N.W.2d 678, and the policy's exclusion 
for known claims.15   
                                                 
15 
PCMC 
counters 
that 
the 
known 
loss 
doctrine 
is 
inapplicable and that there is at least arguable coverage under 
the policy.  In particular, the exclusion upon which Admiral 
relies expressly modifies commercial general liability coverage, 
commercial 
property 
coverage, 
and 
professional 
liability 
coverage, 
but 
the 
exclusion 
makes 
no 
mention 
of 
products/completed operations liability coverage, the coverage 
actually purchased by PCMC. 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
17 
 
¶39 Coverage is a question of law, Doyle v. Engelke, 219 
Wis. 2d 277, 284, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998), and under proper 
circumstances, it might well be decided on summary judgment.  
Here, the circuit court made no determination about whether 
there is coverage.  Rather, it appeared to assume that there was 
no coverage, and it granted summary judgment to PCMC because it 
determined that the settlement negotiations produced a second 
enforceable contract.      
¶40 We observe that Admiral's argument about coverage 
leaves unanswered questions.  Nevertheless, like the circuit 
court, we decline to decide the coverage question, and we 
assume, without deciding, that there was no coverage under the 
policy.   
¶41 The insurance policy is a contract between Admiral and 
PCMC.  During the settlement negotiations, PCMC and Admiral 
entered into a second agreement, this one oral, under which 
Admiral agreed to contribute $2 million to the settlement in 
exchange for a written release.  At the time, it thought that 
there was exposure under the policy.  Admiral admits that the 
attorney who was sent to the settlement negotiations acted as 
its representative or agent, that Admiral provided the attorney 
with authority to contribute the policy limits to achieve 
settlement without any intent to seek reimbursement, and that 
Admiral agreed to pay $2 million as its contribution to 
settlement.   
¶42 Nevertheless, 
Admiral 
asserts 
that 
the 
funding 
agreement is unenforceable because it was not made in court and 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
18 
 
not memorialized in writing at the time it was made.  It relies 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05, 
which 
governs 
agreements 
and 
stipulations between parties to litigation. 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 807.05 provides as follows: 
No agreement, stipulation, or consent between the 
parties 
or 
their 
attorneys, 
in 
respect 
to 
the 
proceedings in an action or special proceeding shall 
be binding unless made in court or during a proceeding 
conducted under s. 807.13 or 967.08 and entered in the 
minutes or recorded by the reporter, or made in 
writing and subscribed by the party to be bound 
thereby or the party's attorney.  
¶44 Admiral's 
reliance on this statute is unfounded 
because it does not apply to the funding agreement.  The statute 
addresses agreements "between parties or their attorneys," and 
Admiral was not a party to the lawsuit between Young and PCMC.   
¶45 In Adelmeyer v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 135 
Wis. 2d 367, 400 N.W.2d 473 (Ct. App. 1986), the court concluded 
that an oral settlement agreement between the parties to the 
suit was void at its inception because it did not conform to the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 807.05.  The court noted that "the 
statute is an exception to the usual rule that oral contracts 
are binding."  Id. at 369.  In this case, given that the statute 
is inapplicable, the funding agreement falls under the "usual 
rule" that oral agreements are enforceable.    
¶46 Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
have determined that the funding agreement between Admiral and 
PCMC constitutes an enforceable contract.  Nevertheless, under 
certain 
circumstances, 
a 
party 
can 
be 
relieved 
of 
its 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
19 
 
contractual obligations.  Admiral asserts that it is entitled to 
restitution 
because 
PCMC 
was 
unjustly 
enriched 
by 
its 
contribution of $2 million toward the settlement agreement.16  It 
also argues that it should be relieved of its obligation under 
the funding agreement because of its mistake of fact.  We 
address each argument in turn.   
¶47 Under these circumstances, Wisconsin law, General 
Accident 
Fire 
& 
Life 
Assurance 
Corp. 
v. 
Bergquist, 
15 
Wis. 2d 166, 111 N.W.2d 900 (1961), provides that an insurer 
cannot recover payments it made pursuant to a settlement 
agreement based on an unjust enrichment theory.  Bergquist 
instructs that, "if [the] insurer's cause of action for the 
amount paid in settlement has any merit, it must arise from 
contract."  Id. at 172.   
¶48 In Bergquist, the insurer contested that there was 
coverage 
for 
its 
insured's 
liability, 
but 
the 
insurer 
nevertheless agreed to defend pursuant to a reservation of 
rights.  When presented with a settlement agreement that was 
advantageous 
to 
the 
insured, 
the 
insurer 
agreed 
to 
the 
settlement under the condition that the settlement "shall not 
have any effect whatsoever so far as the relative rights or 
liabilities of [Bergquist] and the General Accident Fire & Life 
                                                 
16 The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) a benefit 
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) knowledge or 
appreciation of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) acceptance 
or retention by the defendant of such benefit under such 
circumstances that it would be inequitable for him or her to 
retain it without paying the value thereof.  Wis JI——Civil 3028. 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
20 
 
Assurance Corporation, Ltd., . . . relative . . . to the 
coverage or validity of any insurance [policy]."  Id. at 168.  
That condition was incorporated into the settlement agreement. 
¶49 The insurer then sought reimbursement from the insured 
based on two theories: contract and unjust enrichment.  The 
court 
concluded 
that 
there 
were 
no 
grounds 
for 
unjust 
enrichment: "if [the] insurer's cause of action for the amount 
paid in settlement has any merit, it must arise from contract."  
Id. at 172.  The Bergquist court explained, "Were we to decide 
otherwise, every insurer could hold open a policy defense, 
however dubious, when making a settlement."  Id.      
¶50 Because Admiral cannot make a claim for unjust 
enrichment, 
its 
citation 
to 
the 
Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) is unavailing.17  We 
turn next to the argument about mistake of fact.   
¶51 Admiral contends that when it agreed to contribute $2 
million to the settlement, it made a mistake of fact in that it 
did not know that PCMC had knowledge of the Young accident prior 
to purchasing the policy.  Admiral explains that its claims 
department 
and 
its 
underwriting 
department 
are 
separate 
entities, and that the claims department agreed to contribute to 
the settlement because it was unaware that PCMC had disclosed 
the Young accident to Admiral's underwriting department.  It 
                                                 
17 Likewise, Admiral's citation to Buckett v. Jante, 2009 WI 
App 55, 316 Wis. 2d 804, 767 N.W.2d 376, provides no support 
because 
Buckett 
is 
an 
unjust 
enrichment 
case 
and 
under 
Bergquist, no claim for unjust enrichment is available. 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
21 
 
argues: "Although information on that subject would have been 
available in Admiral's files had [the claims department] known 
to look for it, the claims personnel had no reason to 
investigate that aspect of the claim."   
¶52 The attorney Admiral hired to monitor and settle the 
litigation stated in an affidavit: "When I attended the June 28, 
2007 mediation on behalf of Admiral, I had no idea that PCMC was 
aware of Elizabeth Young's accident prior to the inception of 
the policy.  I am confident that none of my contacts at Admiral 
had any idea either.  I did not review the contents of Admiral's 
underwriting file prior to the mediation."    
¶53 Initially, we observe that Admiral cannot claim it 
made a mistake of fact because the underwriting department knew 
that PCMC had disclosed the Young accident, and its knowledge is 
imputed to Admiral's claims department.  The general rule of 
imputation is well established in Wisconsin.  A corporation is 
charged with constructive knowledge of all material facts of 
which its agent receives notice while acting within the scope of 
employment, even if the agent did not actually communicate the 
knowledge to the corporation.  Suburban Motors of Grafton, Inc. 
v. Forester, 134 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 396 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 
1986) (quoting 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 790 (rev. perm. ed. 1975)); see also Tele-Port, 
Inc. v. Am. Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 2001 WI App 261, ¶17, 248 
Wis. 2d 846, 637 N.W.2d 782; Congar v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 
24 Wis. 157 (1869). 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
22 
 
¶54 Nevertheless, Admiral cites Ryan v. Rockford Insurance 
Co., 85 Wis. 573, 55 N.W. 1025 (1893), Ryder v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 51 Wis. 2d 318, 187 N.W.2d 176 
(1971), and Nugent v. Slaght, 2001 WI App 282, 249 Wis. 2d 220, 
638 N.W.2d 594, for the proposition that its underwriting 
department's knowledge should not be imputed to its claims 
department and the attorney it hired to settle the case.  All 
three cases are inapposite. 
¶55 The argument in Ryan was that an agent who requested a 
premium from the insured somehow waived the insurer's coverage 
defenses on an outstanding claim.  The court concluded that the 
agent did not have any authority to bind the company.  85 
Wis. 2d at 
578. 
 
Here, 
it 
is 
undisputed 
that 
Admiral's 
underwriting department had authority to bind the insurer by 
issuing a policy, and further, that Admiral's attorney was sent 
to the settlement negotiations with the express purpose of 
binding Admiral to the funding agreement.  Further, neither 
Ryder nor Nugent addressed a situation in which an insurer, 
after 
entering 
into 
an 
enforceable 
contract 
to 
fund 
a 
settlement, attempted to set aside the contract based on a 
mistake of fact.18 
¶56 Here, the underwriting department knew that PCMC had 
disclosed the Young accident.  Because its knowledge is imputed 
                                                 
18 PCMC argues that the underwriting department's knowledge 
of the disclosure is likewise imputed to Admiral under Wis. 
Stat. § 631.09(1).  Because we reject Admiral's argument that it 
made a mistake of fact, we need not address this argument.  
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
23 
 
to Admiral's claims department, Admiral cannot claim mistake of 
fact.  Rather, any mistake made by the claims department would 
be a mistake of law, that is, a mistaken determination that 
there was coverage under the policy.  A mistake of law does not 
provide a basis for voiding a contractual obligation.  St. 
Norbert College Found., Inc. v. McCormick, 81 Wis. 2d 423, 432, 
260 N.W.2d 776 (1978).  
¶57 In any event, even if Admiral did make a mistake of 
fact, 
that 
alone 
would 
not 
be 
grounds 
for 
restitution.  
Wisconsin law is clear that there must be a mutual mistake of 
fact to void a contract.  Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Lahiff, 218 
Wis. 457, 261 N.W. 11 (1935). 
¶58 Here, there is no dispute that PCMC was aware that it 
had disclosed the Young accident prior to purchasing the policy.  
Accordingly, any mistake was not mutual, and does not provide a 
basis for voiding the funding agreement.  Thus, the circuit 
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of PCMC.    
V 
¶59 In sum, under these circumstances, although the March 
26 order arguably disposed of the entire matter in litigation 
between the parties, we cannot say on this record that it 
unambiguously did so.  Accordingly, we construe it as nonfinal, 
pursuant to our policy of construing any ambiguity to preserve 
the right of appeal.  We conclude that Admiral's appeal of the 
July 8 judgment is timely.       
¶60 Additionally, we conclude that the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 807.05 are inapplicable, and the funding agreement 
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
24 
 
is an enforceable contract.  We further conclude that under 
these circumstances, an insurer cannot recover payments based on 
an unjust enrichment theory, and Admiral's asserted mistake of 
fact does not provide grounds for voiding the contract.   
By the Court.—The orders of the court of appeals are 
reversed.  
 
   
No. 
2009AP2099   
 
 
 
1