Title: State v. Hall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S49825
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2005

FILED:  July 15, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DAVID CLYDE HALL,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 9701546CR; CA A109813; SC S49825)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 4, 2003.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Salem, argued the cause for
respondent on review.  With him on the briefs were Peter A.
Ozanne, Executive Director, and Louis R. Miles, Deputy Public
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
CARSON, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
Durham, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, and
filed an opinion in which Gillette, J., joined.
*Appeal from Klamath County Circuit Court, Richard Rambo, Judge. 183 Or App 48, 50 P3d 1258 (2002).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
CARSON, C. J.
In this criminal case, we decide two questions.  First,
under the circumstances at issue here, did the police encounter
with defendant constitute an unlawful "stop" under ORS 131.615(1)
(1995) and, consequently, also an unlawful "seizure" under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution? (1)  Second,
if so, did that unlawful stop vitiate defendant's consent to the
subsequent search of his person?  
The state charged defendant with possession of
amphetamine, ORS 475.992(4)(b), based upon evidence that a police
officer had seized during a consent search of defendant's person. 
The trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion to suppress
the state's evidence, and a jury later convicted defendant of the
charged offense.  On defendant's subsequent appeal, a majority of
the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed.  It held that,
notwithstanding the voluntariness of defendant's consent to the
search, Article I, section 9, required exclusion of the
challenged evidence because the police officer had stopped
defendant unlawfully and then had "exploited" that unlawful stop
to obtain defendant's consent.  State v. Hall, 183 Or App 48, 50
P3d 1258 (2002).  We allowed the state's petition for review. 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


Our review of the trial court's denial of defendant's
pretrial suppression motion is limited to issues of law.  We are
bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact if
constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record supports those
findings.  State v. Boone, 327 Or 307, 309, 959 P2d 76 (1998). 
If the trial court did not make express findings respecting all
pertinent historical facts, and the record contains conflicting
evidence, then we presume that the trial court found facts that
were consistent with its ultimate conclusion.  State v. Stevens,
311 Or 119, 126-27, 806 P2d 92 (1991).  With those precepts in
mind, we take the following facts from the trial court's written
findings and from the record. 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on January 8, 1997, Klamath
Falls Police Officer Deese saw defendant walking along Washington
Street near Tenth Street in Klamath Falls.  Deese was in uniform
and was driving a marked police vehicle.  As Deese drove past
defendant, he noticed defendant twice glance towards him and then
quickly look away.  After he had passed defendant, Deese observed
in his rear-view mirror that defendant had turned around to look
at him several more times.  
Based upon those observations, Deese turned his vehicle
around and drove back towards defendant.  Without activating his
overhead lights or blocking defendant's way, Deese stopped his
vehicle next to defendant and then motioned with two fingers for
defendant to approach him.  When defendant neared, Deese got out
of his vehicle and asked defendant if he had any personal
identification.  Defendant handed Deese an identification card,
which Deese used to radio the police dispatch for a warrant check
relating to defendant.  
After he had radioed the police dispatch, but before he
had received back any information, Deese returned the
identification card to defendant.  Deese noticed that defendant
appeared to be carrying something inside his jacket and asked
defendant if he was carrying any weapons, knives, or illegal
drugs.  Defendant replied that he was not.  Deese asked defendant
if he minded if Deese searched him, and defendant responded "no,
go ahead."  After patting down the exterior of defendant's
jacket, Deese reached into defendant's jacket pocket, pulled out
a small glass vial, and opened it.  Based upon the smell and the
appearance of white residue inside that vial, Deese concluded
that the vial contained methamphetamine, and he arrested
defendant for possession of a controlled substance.  Subsequent
testing established that the vial contained traces of
amphetamine.
Before trial, relying upon ORS 131.615(1) (1995),
Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, (2) defendant moved to suppress the
evidence of the vial and its contents upon the ground that that
evidence was the fruit of an unlawful police stop. (3)  He also
contended that suppression was required because he had not
consented to the search voluntarily.  After a hearing at which
both Deese and defendant testified, the trial court denied
defendant's motion, concluding that Deese's encounter with
defendant had not amounted to a stop and that defendant's consent
to the subsequent search had been voluntary. (4)  As noted,
after a trial, a jury found defendant guilty of the charged
offense.  
Defendant appealed.  Before the Court of Appeals,
defendant did not challenge the trial court's ruling that his
consent to the search had been voluntary.  Instead, he argued
only that the state's evidence was inadmissible because it had
derived from an unlawful police stop. (5)  
Sitting en banc, a majority of the Court of Appeals
reversed.  Contrary to the trial court, the Court of Appeals
unanimously concluded that Deese unlawfully had stopped defendant
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Hall, 183 Or
App at 56, 62.  In considering the effect of that illegality upon
the admissibility of the evidence from the consent search that
followed, that court also unanimously agreed that,
notwithstanding the voluntariness of defendant's consent, Article
I, section 9, required the court to exclude the state's evidence
if that evidence had derived from "exploitation" of the unlawful
stop.  Id. at 58, 63.  In deciding whether the state's evidence
in fact had derived from "exploitation" of that prior illegality,
however, the court divided over both the applicable analysis and
the result. 
According to the majority opinion, whether evidence
from a consent search derives from exploitation of prior unlawful
police conduct (6) depends upon whether the police gained
information from that illegality that provided the impetus for
the police to seek the defendant's consent.  Id. at 58 n 8, 59. 
Specifically, reaffirming the test articulated in that court's
decision in State v. Stanley, 139 Or App 526, 912 P2d 948 (1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 325 Or 239, 935 P2d 1202 (1997), the
majority opinion explained that "exploitation occurs when
unlawful police conduct reveals information that focuses police
attention on the defendant and prompts [the police] either to
seek the defendant's consent or to ask questions leading to
consent."  Hall, 183 Or App at 60 (quoting Stanley, 139 Or App at
535; internal quotation marks omitted).  In this case, the
majority opinion determined that Deese had "exploited" the
unlawful stop because that stop had allowed Deese to observe
bulges in defendant's jacket, which, in turn, had prompted his
request for defendant's consent to the search.  Id. at 59.  Based
upon that determination, the majority opinion held that the trial
court had erred by admitting the challenged evidence, and it
reversed the trial court's judgment. (7)  Id.
The dissent disagreed, taking issue both with the
majority opinion's explanation of the nature of the court's
inquiry in determining "exploitation" and with its application of
that analysis to the facts of this case.  In the dissent's view,
whether evidence derives from police exploitation of a prior
illegality is a fact-specific inquiry that depends upon the
nature of the causal connection between the unlawful police
conduct and the evidence sought to be suppressed.  Id. at 67
(Deits, C. J., dissenting).  By contrast to the majority
opinion's focus upon whether the illegality affected the
officer's actions, the dissent asserted that an exploitation
analysis concerns whether a prior illegality affected the
defendant's decision to consent.  Id. at 72 (Deits, C. J.,
dissenting).  Although stressing that no "bright-line" rule
exists, the dissent identified a number of factors that it
considered relevant to that determination, including (1) a "but-for" causal connection between the unlawful police conduct and
the evidence sought to be suppressed; (2) whether the police had
obtained information only by virtue of unlawful conduct, and
whether the defendant's knowledge that the police had such
information had been a substantial factor in the defendant's
decision to consent; (3) the presence of intervening
circumstances separating the unlawful police conduct from the
evidence sought to be suppressed; and (4) the temporal proximity
between the unlawful police conduct and the defendant's consent. 
Id. at 71 (Deits, C. J., dissenting).  Because the trial court
had not reached the question of exploitation in this case, the
dissent would have remanded the case to the trial court for that
court to determine whether the state's evidence had derived from
exploitation of the unlawful stop in light of the above-described
considerations.  Id. at 75 (Deits, C. J., dissenting).
The state petitioned this court for review, and we
allowed that petition.  On review, the state first argues that
Deese's encounter with defendant did not amount to an unlawful
stop.  Secondly, the state argues that, even if Deese unlawfully
had stopped defendant, the challenged evidence was not subject to
suppression under Article I, section 9, because defendant
voluntarily had consented to the search and defendant's voluntary
act of consenting -- not the unlawful stop -- had been the source
of the evidence from that search.  In making that second
argument, the state asks that we reconsider this court's prior
case law holding that a violation of a defendant's rights under
Article I, section 9, may affect the admissibility of evidence
from a consent search even when the voluntariness of the
defendant's consent is not at issue.  See, e.g., State v.
Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, 38-42, 854 P2d 399 (1993) (explaining
same).  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Deese's
encounter with defendant constituted an unlawful stop under ORS
131.615(1) (1995) and, consequently, also an unlawful "seizure"
under Article I, section 9.  We further decline the state's
invitation to depart from this court's precedents and, instead,
reaffirm that a violation of a defendant's rights under Article
I, section 9, may vitiate a defendant's otherwise voluntary
consent to a search.  Finally, under the facts of this case, we
conclude that the state failed to satisfy its burden in showing
that defendant's consent was sufficiently independent of the
preceding unlawful stop.  Based upon those conclusions, we affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reverse the judgment of
the trial court. 
II.  DISCUSSION
As noted above, defendant's pretrial suppression motion
relied upon ORS 131.615(1) (1995), Article I, section 9, and the
Fourth Amendment.  Because we resolve this case on state law
grounds, we do not reach defendant's federal constitutional
claim.  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316
(1983) (court considers all questions of state law before
reaching federal constitutional claims). 
A. Applicable Oregon Law  
In Oregon, both statutory and constitutional law limit
the authority of police to detain citizens.  ORS 131.615(1)
(1995), the statutory provision at issue here, provided that a
police officer temporarily may restrain, or "stop," (8) a
person only when the officer "reasonably suspects that [that]
person has committed a crime[.]"  Article I, section 9, protects
"the right of the people to be secure * * * against unreasonable
search, or seizure[.]" 
Unless a defendant's constitutional claims could result
in more complete relief, this court generally begins its analysis
by first considering a defendant's statutory claims.  See State
v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 81, 11 P3d 641 (2000) (so stating); see
also, e.g., State v. Jacobus, 318 Or 234, 864 P2d 861 (1993)
(considering whether police encounter was lawful under statutory
law before considering state constitutional claims).  Previously,
as with constitutional limits on police authority, this court has
given effect to statutes defining police authority to seize or
search a person by denying the state the use of any evidence that
it obtained in violation of such provisions.  See State v. Davis,
295 Or 227, 236-37, 666 P2d 802 (1983) (so stating); see also,
e.g., State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 964 P2d 1007 (1998)  
(suppressing evidence obtained in violation of ORS 810.410(3)(b)
(1993), amended by Oregon Laws 1999, chapter 1051, section 89). 
Because that prior decisional law mandates such a remedy for any
statutory violations in this case, (9) we begin our analysis by
considering defendant's statutory claim.  In doing so, however,
we observe that defendant does not contend that his rights under
ORS 131.615(1) (1995) are different from, or greater than, his
rights under Article I, section 9.  This court also previously
has explained that the analysis under ORS 131.615 (1995) and
Article I, section 9, is substantially the same. (10)  See
Toevs, 327 Or at 534 (so stating).  Thus, we consider whether
Deese's encounter with defendant violated ORS 131.615(1) (1995)
and whether exclusion of the state's evidence is required in
light of this court's Article I, section 9, jurisprudence.  See
id. (following same approach).  
B. Lawfulness of Police Encounter with Defendant under Oregon
Law
Because defendant challenged the admissibility of the  
state's evidence upon the ground that it derived from an unlawful
police stop, we begin our analysis by considering the lawfulness
of Deese's encounter with defendant.  This court has identified
three general categories of encounters between police officers
and citizens.  See State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 407, 813 P2d 28
(1991) (so stating).  The first category, "mere conversation"
encounters, encompasses consensual interactions between police
officers and citizens that require no justification and that do
not implicate Article I, section 9.  Id.  The second category,
temporary restraints of a person's liberty for investigatory
purposes -- or "stop[s]" under ORS 131.615(1) (1995) --
constitutes a type of "seizure" of a person under Article I,
section 9, that must be justified by a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.  Id.  The third category, arrests, also
constitutes a "seizure" of a person under Article I, section 9,
and must be justified by probable cause to believe that the
person arrested has committed a crime.  Id. 
As noted above, __ Or at __ n 4 (slip op at 5 n 4), the
trial court concluded that Deese's encounter with defendant had
been a consensual interaction that had not restrained defendant's
liberty in a manner that implicated Article I, section 9. 
Although we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical
fact if constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record
supports those findings, we must assess independently whether
those findings support the trial court's legal conclusion.  State
v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993).  In this case, we
note at the outset that the state concedes, and we agree, that
Deese's observations of defendant repeatedly turning to look at
Deese's patrol vehicle and then averting his gaze did not give
rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in any
criminal conduct. (11)  Thus, if Deese's encounter with
defendant constituted a "stop" under ORS 131.615(1) (1995), then
that encounter was unlawful, because it was not justified by the
requisite level of concern respecting possible criminal activity. 
The question before us, then, is whether the trial court
correctly ruled that Deese's encounter with defendant did not
amount to a stop. 
In Holmes, 311 Or at 409-10, this court held that a
"seizure" of a person under Article I, section 9, occurs when
either (1) a police officer intentionally and significantly
interferes with a person's liberty of movement; or (2) a person
believes that his or her liberty of movement has been so
restricted and such a belief is objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.  Police conduct interfering with a person's
liberty of movement may take the form of either physical force or
a show of authority.  State v. Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or 1, 6, 942
P2d 772 (1997).  In deciding whether police conduct implicates
Article I, section 9, the pivotal consideration is whether "the
officer, even if making inquiries a private citizen would not,
has otherwise conducted [himself or herself] in a manner that
would be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it had occurred
between two ordinary citizens."  Holmes, 311 Or at 410.  The
determination whether a person has been "seized" under Article I,
section 9, requires a fact-specific inquiry examining the
totality of the circumstances in the particular case.  Id. at
408.  
This court's prior case law provides useful guidance as
to whether Deese's encounter with defendant constituted a stop. 
In State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978), a police
officer approached the defendant as he was leaving a tavern and
asked the defendant if he would return inside.  Id. at 150-51. 
The defendant complied with the officer's request, and, once
inside the tavern, the officer asked the defendant to place his
identification card on a table.  Id. at 151-52.  After the
defendant did so, the officer explained to the defendant that the
officer was investigating a robbery, and he advised the defendant
that "[the defendant] would be on [his] way" as soon as the
officer was satisfied that the defendant had no involvement in
that crime.  Id. at 152.  On review, this court held that, at the
moment that the officer told the defendant to place his
identification card on the table and advised the defendant that
he was the subject of a criminal investigation, the officer had
seized the defendant by a show of authority for purposes of ORS
131.615 (1975), amended by Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 866, section
1, and Article I, section 9.  Id. at 165.
In State v. Painter, 296 Or 422, 676 P2d 309 (1984), a
police officer approached the defendant on the street and
requested to see the defendant's identification.  The defendant
responded to the officer's request by handing the officer both an
expired driver license and several credit cards.  While still
retaining those items, the officer ran a warrant check and
questioned the defendant about the location of his vehicle.  Id.
at 424.  On review, this court held that the officer had seized
the defendant when the officer had retained the defendant's
identification cards because that action had the practical effect
of making the defendant unable to leave.  Id. at 425.
Under the facts of this case, we similarly conclude
that Deese's encounter with defendant here constituted a "stop"
under ORS 131.615(1) (1995).  In this case, Deese's initial
actions of stopping his vehicle next to defendant and then
gesturing for defendant to approach him did not intrude upon
defendant's liberty of movement, because, even if Deese
inconvenienced defendant, his actions did not constitute a show
of authority involving conduct "significantly beyond that
accepted in ordinary social intercourse."  Holmes, 311 Or at 410. 
When Deese took defendant's identification card and radioed the
police dispatch for a warrant check, however, the consensual
nature of that encounter dissipated, and the encounter evolved
from a "mere conversation" encounter into a restraint upon
defendant's liberty of movement.  It is true that, unlike the
officers in Warner and Painter, Deese promptly returned
defendant's identification card.  Nevertheless, when Deese did
so, defendant was cognizant that Deese was investigating whether
defendant was the subject of any outstanding warrants.  Although
the state insists to the contrary, we find it difficult to posit
that a reasonable person would think that he or she was free to
leave at a time when that person is the investigatory subject of
a pending warrant check.  We further observe that, in this case,
Deese did nothing to dispel what would have been an objectively
reasonable belief that defendant was restrained from leaving
until Deese had received the results of the warrant check. 
Instead, immediately upon returning defendant's identification
card, Deese questioned defendant about whether defendant was
carrying any weapons, knives, or illegal drugs, and he asked
defendant for consent to search defendant's person.  
Under those circumstances, we conclude that the trial
court erred by ruling that Deese's encounter with defendant did
not restrain defendant's liberty so as to constitute a "stop"
under ORS 131.615(1) (1995).  Because that restraint was not
justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we
further conclude that that encounter violated both ORS 131.615(1)
(1995) and Article I, section 9. 
C. Admissibility of State's Evidence from Consent Search
Following Illegal Stop under Oregon Law
Having concluded that Deese's encounter with defendant
was unlawful, we now must consider the effect of that illegality
upon the admissibility of the state's evidence from the consent
search that followed.  In doing so, we first clarify the two
related, but distinct, ways that a violation of a defendant's
rights under Article I, section 9, may affect the validity of a
defendant's subsequent consent to a search.  See generally State
v. Weaver, 319 Or 212, 219, 874 P2d 1322 (1994) (discussing
general categories of challenges to consent searches).     
First, illegal police conduct violating a defendant's
rights under Article I, section 9, may negate a defendant's
consent to a search upon the ground that that police conduct
rendered the defendant's consent involuntary.  Id.  Although this
court previously has stated that "the burden [of persuasion] on
the police to show voluntariness when consent occurs after
illegal police conduct is greater than when no illegality has
occurred[,]" State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 502, 624 P2d 93
(1981), we reiterate here that the state's burden of persuasion
in establishing the voluntariness of a defendant's consent under
Article I, section 9, does not vary according to the lawfulness
of the circumstances in which the defendant's consent was
obtained.  See Stevens, 311 Or at 136-37 (defining state's burden
in voluntariness inquiry under Article I, section 9).  Instead,
as a threshold matter in any case in which the state relies upon
a defendant's consent to validate a warrantless search, the state
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant's consent was voluntary.  Id.  In deciding whether the
state has satisfied that burden for the purposes of Article I,
section 9, the test is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant's consent was an act of free will
or, instead, resulted from police coercion, either express or
implied.  State v. Wolfe, 295 Or 567, 572, 669 P2d 320 (1983).
Although unlawful police conduct does not alter the
state's burden in establishing the voluntariness of a defendant's
consent, the effect of that unlawful conduct upon the defendant's
capacity to exercise his or her free will is one circumstance that may be relevant to the decision whether the defendant's
consent was voluntary for purposes of Article I, section 9. 
Rodriguez, 317 Or at 38-39.  In some instances -- for example,
when a defendant consented in acquiescence to a claim of lawful
police authority -- the court's determination as to the
lawfulness of the police conduct may bear directly upon its
determination of the voluntariness of the defendant's consent. 
See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 307 Or 621, 626-27, 772 P2d 404
(1989) (Carson, J., concurring) (defendant's consent to search
involuntary when given in response to false claim of authority);
State v. Hirsch, 267 Or 613, 622, 518 P2d 649 (1974) ("'If the
officers threaten only to do what the law permits them to do, the
coercion that the threat may produce is not constitutionally
objectionable.'" (quoting State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 81, 488
P2d 1366 (1971) (O'Connell, C. J., dissenting)).  In other
circumstances, however, prior unlawful police conduct may bear
upon the court's voluntariness inquiry under Article I, section
9, because that police conduct, irrespective of any determination
as to its illegality, had the effect of coercing the defendant's
consent.  See Rodriguez, 317 Or at 38, 38 n 13 (noting same).
In addition to affecting the voluntariness of a
defendant's consent, this court also has recognized a related,
but independent, reason why police conduct violating a
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9, may vitiate a
defendant's subsequent consent to a search.  Specifically,
similarly to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 83 S Ct 407, 9 L Ed 2d 411
(1963), that a defendant's voluntary statements may be the
inadmissible "fruits" of a prior Fourth Amendment violation, this
court has held that Article I, section 9, may require exclusion
of evidence from an otherwise valid consent search upon the
ground that the defendant's consent derived from a preceding
violation of the defendant's rights under that state
constitutional provision.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 317 Or at 38-42
(so stating).  In Rodriguez, again similarly to the Supreme Court
in Wong Sun, this court described that second inquiry as an
"exploitation" inquiry. (12)  Id.    
 As discussed above, in the present case, defendant has not challenged the trial court's ruling that the state
established the voluntariness of his consent.  Thus, the only
issue before us is whether Article I, section 9, requires
exclusion of the state's evidence because defendant's consent
derived from -- or, stated differently, was obtained by
"exploitation" of -- the unlawful stop.  We turn to the state's
arguments concerning that issue now.
The state contends that, in the context of a consent
search, an "exploitation" inquiry serves only two functions --
that is, to ensure that a defendant's consent is truly voluntary
and to deter unlawful police conduct.  Based upon that premise,
the state asserts that, because the exclusionary rule for
violations of Article I, section 9 (hereafter "Oregon
exclusionary rule") is not predicated upon the same deterrence
rationale as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, this court
has erred in concluding that evidence obtained as a result of a
defendant's voluntary act -- such as a defendant's voluntary
grant of consent to a search -- similarly may be rendered
inadmissible under the Oregon exclusionary rule by a prior
violation of the defendant's rights under Article I, section 9. 
According to the state, unless unlawful police conduct caused the
defendant's consent to be involuntary, such conduct does not
affect the admissibility of evidence from a consent search under
the Oregon exclusionary rule, because a defendant's voluntary act
of consenting necessarily operates as an independent source for
any evidence that is procured in a search based upon that
consent. 
To explain our disagreement with the state's contention
that an "exploitation" inquiry in the context of an otherwise
valid consent search is incompatible with the Oregon exclusionary
rule, we begin by describing the objective -- and consequently
also the operation -- of that rule.  See State ex rel Juv. Dept.
v. Rogers, 314 Or 114, 118-19, 836 P2d 127 (1992) (applicability
of Oregon exclusionary rule determined in light of reasons for
that rule).  In doing so, we think it helpful first to contrast
that rule with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. (13)   
Although its earlier decisions sometimes suggested
other considerations at work, the United States Supreme Court for
many years consistently has identified deterrence of unlawful
police conduct as the primary purpose underlying the exclusionary
rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment.  See United States
v. Leon, 468 US 897, 905-06, 104 S Ct 3405, 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984)
(identifying deterrence function as basis of Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, but acknowledging that Court's prior decisions
sometimes implied that exclusionary rule was necessary corollary
of Fourth Amendment).  In so holding, the Supreme Court has
characterized the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a
judicially created remedial device that applies to only those
circumstances in which its remedial objectives most efficaciously
will be served.  See United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 348,
94 S Ct 613, 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974) (so stating).  Based upon that
theory, the Supreme Court has defined the breadth of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule by assessing whether the deterrence
benefits in applying that rule outweigh the costs of excluding
otherwise admissible evidence.  See Leon, 468 US at 909-10
(noting that analytical approach).
As the state correctly recognizes, this court, by
contrast, explicitly has rejected the view that the Oregon
exclusionary rule is predicated upon a deterrence rationale. 
Davis, 295 Or at 233-37.  Instead, this court has held that the
Oregon exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated rule that
serves to vindicate a defendant's personal rights.  In other
words, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures under Article I, section 9, also encompasses the right
to be free from the use of evidence obtained in violation of that
state constitutional provision. (14)  See State v. Davis, 313
Or 246, 249, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) (so stating).  In that vein,
this court has explained that the aim of the Oregon exclusionary
rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if "the
government's officers had stayed within the law."  Davis, 295 Or
at 234.  Thus, in deciding the applicability of the Oregon
exclusionary rule, the critical inquiry is whether the state
obtained the evidence sought to be suppressed as a result of a
violation of the defendant's rights under Article I, section 9. 
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 379-80, 963 P2d 642 (1998)
(holding evidence obtained following unlawful police conduct
nevertheless admissible, because evidence not obtained by virtue
of that unlawful conduct). 
Although the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to
restore a defendant to the same position as if "the government's
officers had stayed within the law," Davis, 295 Or at 234, this
court has rejected the notion that evidence is rendered
inadmissible under Article I, section 9, simply because it was
obtained after unlawful police conduct or because it would not
have been obtained "but for" unlawful police conduct.  See, e.g.,
Rodriguez, 317 Or at 40 (evidence not rendered inadmissible under
Article I, section 9, because it would not have been obtained
"but for" unlawful police conduct).  Instead, as this court
recently explained in State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 520-21, 73
P3d 282 (2003), after a defendant establishes the existence of a
minimal factual nexus -- that is, at minimum, the existence of a
"but for" relationship -- between the evidence sought to be
suppressed and prior unlawful police conduct, the state
nevertheless may establish that the disputed evidence is
admissible under Article I, section 9, by proving that the
evidence did not derive from the preceding illegality.  To make
that showing, the state must prove that either (1) the police
inevitably would have obtained the disputed evidence through
lawful procedures even without the violation of the defendant's
rights under Article I, section 9, see, e.g., Johnson, 335 Or at
522-26 (discussing principle); (2) the police obtained the
disputed evidence independently of the violation of the
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9, see, e.g., Smith,
327 Or at 379-80 (discussing principle); or (3) the preceding
violation of the defendant's rights under Article I, section 9,
has such a tenuous factual link to the disputed evidence that
that unlawful police conduct cannot be viewed properly as the
source of that evidence, see, e.g., State v. Jones, 248 Or 428,
433-34, 435 P2d 317 (1967) (discussing principle).  
In each of those above-described circumstances, the
admission of the challenged evidence does not offend Article I,
section 9, because the defendant has not been disadvantaged as a
result of the unlawful police conduct or, stated differently,
because the defendant is not placed in a worse position than if
the governmental officers had acted within the bounds of the law. 
In short, suppression of evidence in such circumstances would not
serve to vindicate the defendant's rights under Article I,
section 9, because the evidence sought to be suppressed did not
result from a violation of the defendant's rights under Article
I, section 9.  See State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455, 462-63, 918 P2d
819 (1996) (evidence not subject to suppression under Article I,
section 9, if no causal connection between evidence sought to be
suppressed and unlawful police conduct); Rodriguez, 317 Or at 39
(same).  
As noted above, in the present case, the state contends
that a defendant's voluntary act of consenting necessarily severs
the causal link between evidence that the state obtains from a
search based upon that consent and any antecedent violation of
the defendant's rights under Article I, section 9.  Starting from
that premise, the state argues that the Oregon exclusionary rule
does not require exclusion of evidence from a consent search
whenever the defendant's consent is voluntary because the
exclusion of evidence in such circumstances would not serve to
vindicate the defendant's rights under Article I, section 9.  
On the surface, the state finds some support for that
position in this court's decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383,
623 P2d 630 (1981), as well as its decisions in Kennedy, 290 Or
493, and Rodriguez, 317 Or 27.  In each of those cases, this
court concluded that the preceding violation of the defendant's
rights under Article I, section 9, did not rob the defendant's
consent of its efficacy as an independent justification for the
search that produced the disputed evidence.  Before examining
those holdings in Kennedy and Rodriguez, we first dispel the idea
that this court's Article I, section 9, holding in Quinn remains
viable law. 
In Quinn, 290 Or 383, the police discovered evidence
that implicated the defendant in a murder solely as the result of
an unlawful search of the defendant's vehicle.  Id. at 387. 
Without informing the defendant of that discovery, the police
sought and obtained the defendant's consent to search the vehicle
a second time.  Id. at 388.  The police seized the previously
discovered evidence pursuant to that second search, and, after
being confronted with that evidence, the defendant eventually
confessed to the murder.  Id. at 388-89.
On review before this court, the defendant challenged
the admissibility of evidence from the consent search under
Article I, section 9.  Purporting to embrace the analysis
articulated in Wong Sun, 371 US 471, this court rejected the
defendant's assertion that the evidence seized in the consent
search had derived from the preceding unlawful search because,
although the police had sought the defendant's consent solely as
a result of the inculpatory evidence discovered from the unlawful
search, the defendant had been ignorant of that unlawful search
at the time when he granted his consent. (15)  Id. at 396. 
Notably, in reaching that holding, this court identified
deterrence as the underlying purpose of the Oregon exclusionary
rule and also stressed that the unlawful search had resulted from
a good-faith police mistake about the state of the law.  Id. at
397.
In his concurring opinion in Weaver, 319 Or at 222-24,
Justice Gillette cautioned that this court's conclusion in Quinn
"approach[ed] being (and it may in fact be) unsupportable." 
Specifically, in light of the fact that the police had sought the
defendant's consent in Quinn only because of the discovery of
inculpatory evidence during the preceding unlawful search,
Justice Gillette opined that "[a] more direct exploitation of
illegal government activity would be difficult to posit."  Id. at
224.  For the reasons explained below, we agree with that view
and take this opportunity to overrule expressly that part of this
court's decision in Quinn.
This court repeatedly has recognized that, even when a
defendant's consent is voluntary -- that is, when the defendant's
free will has not been overcome by police coercion -- that
consent is insufficient to establish the admissibility of
evidence from a warrantless search if the state cannot prove that
the consent was independent of, or only tenuously related to, any
preceding violation of the defendant's rights under Article I,
section 9.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 317 Or at 41-42 (examining
whether defendant's voluntary consent resulted from illegal
arrest); State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 214, 895 P2d
306 (1995) (concluding that evidence obtained from presumably
voluntary consent search during illegal traffic stop was
inadmissible).  Unless the state is able to make that showing,
then the defendant's consent cannot operate to validate a
warrantless search because the defendant's consent itself derived
from a violation of the defendant's rights under that state
constitutional provision.  To not require suppression in such
circumstances would be inconsistent with the previously described
rationale underlying the Oregon exclusionary rule, that is, to
place a defendant in the same position as if the governmental
officers had acted within the bounds of the law.  See Rodriguez,
317 Or at 39 ("There may be cases in which suppression of
evidence obtained during a [voluntary] consent search may be
necessary to vindicate a defendant's rights that were violated by
earlier, unlawful police conduct.").
Although a showing of voluntariness alone is
insufficient to establish the admissibility of evidence from a
consent search following a violation of the defendant's rights
under Article I, section 9, this court also has rejected the
notion that any consent obtained after unlawful police conduct is
invalid per se, no matter how tenuously related to that unlawful
conduct.  See id. at 39-40 (noting same).  Instead, as discussed
generally above, see __ Or at __ (slip op at 26-28) (discussing
operation of Oregon exclusionary rule), the admissibility of
evidence obtained in such circumstances is a fact-specific
determination that depends upon the nature of the causal
connection between the defendant's consent and the preceding
violation of the defendant's rights under Article I, section 9. 
See Rodriguez, 317 Or at 39-40 (discussing same).  In Rodriguez,
this court framed that inquiry in this context by explaining that
a causal connection requiring suppression exists "when the police
take advantage of the circumstances of their unlawful conduct to
obtain the [defendant's] consent to search."  Id. at 40. (16) 
Although Rodriguez did not identify what factors to consider in
making that determination, this court's Article I, section 9,
jurisprudence offers some guidance.  In cases decided since
Quinn, one consideration that emerges is whether the police
sought the defendant's consent only as the result of knowledge of
inculpatory evidence stemming from a prior unlawful search.
This court's decision in State v. Carston, 323 Or 75,
913 P2d 709 (1996), illustrates the application of that
consideration. (17)  In Carston, an informant had advised the
police about a scheduled drug sale after he illegally intercepted
a cordless telephone conversation between the codefendants.  Id.
at 78.  The informant reported that a man had made arrangements
to buy $300 of "really good stuff" and had informed the seller
that he would be driving a four-door Suzuki.  Id.  Based upon
that information, the police went to the residence where the drug
transaction was scheduled to take place and then followed a four-door Suzuki as it drove away from that residence.  Id.  The
police subsequently stopped that vehicle for a traffic violation
and, during that stop, asked one of the defendants for his
consent to search the vehicle.  Id. at 79.  The defendant granted
his consent, and the police discovered drugs and drug
paraphernalia in a closed container in the vehicle.  Id.  Based
in part upon that evidence, the state charged the defendants with
manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance, ORS 475.992.
Before trial, among other things, the defendants moved
to suppress the evidence from the consent search.  The trial
court first determined that the initial stop of the vehicle had
been lawful and that officer safety concerns had justified both a
patdown search of the defendants and a limited search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle for weapons.  Id. at 86. 
The trial court then went on to rule, however, that the evidence
derived from the consent search nevertheless was inadmissible
because, after assuring their safety, the officers had questioned
the defendants about illicit drugs and had sought the defendant's
consent to search solely based upon information illegally
obtained by the informant.  Id.  On review, this court agreed
with the trial court that, in light of that causal link between
the defendant's consent and the prior unlawful search,
suppression of the evidence was required.  Id. at 86-87.
Applying that same reasoning to the facts at issue in
Quinn, it is apparent that -- although capable of reconciliation
with the deterrence rationale of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule -- this court's conclusion in that case is
untenable under Article I, section 9.  Although the police in
Quinn had conducted their first unlawful search of the
defendant's vehicle under the mistaken belief that they were
authorized to do so, the inculpatory evidence discovered during
that search unquestionably derived from a violation of the
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9.  Solely as a
result of that violation, the police then sought the defendant's
consent to search his vehicle a second time in order to seize
that previously discovered evidence.  In light of that causal
link between the violation of the defendant's rights under
Article I, section 9, and the defendant's subsequent consent, the
police cannot be said to have obtained the defendant's consent
independently of their prior unlawful conduct, and, for that
reason, that consent could not have operated as an independent
justification for the search under Article I, section 9.     
Having clarified why Quinn does not assist the state
here, we now turn to this court's decisions in Kennedy and
Rodriguez.  By contrast to the facts at issue in Quinn, the
governmental officers in Kennedy and Rodriguez did not seek the
defendant's consent only as a result of knowledge of inculpatory
evidence gained from a prior unlawful search.  Instead, each case
involved the more difficult question of the validity of a
defendant's consent given during a purportedly unlawful seizure. 
As discussed below, contrary to other of its precedents, this
court concluded in both cases that the violation of the
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9, had not destroyed
the efficacy of the defendant's consent to the search that
produced the disputed evidence.  We examine the basis of each of
those holdings in more detail below.
In Kennedy, 290 Or 493, two police officers approached
the defendant as he was preparing to exit the Portland airport
and informed him that they had information that he might be in
possession of illegal drugs.  The defendant denied that
allegation and then, without any prompting, asked the officers if
they wished to search his luggage.  Id. at 496.  The officers
accepted his invitation and subsequently discovered a small vial
with cocaine residue in the defendant's bag.  Id.  
On review, after assuming that the police interaction
with defendant had been unlawful, this court determined that the
evidence of the vial nevertheless was admissible based upon "the
absence of any coercive circumstances surrounding [the]
defendant's consent, and [the] defendant's volunteering of
consent, with no request by the police."  Id. at 506.  In
reaching that conclusion, this court stated that the validity of
the defendant's consent in such circumstances hinged upon only a
determination of voluntariness, but added that the state faced a
higher burden in establishing voluntariness when the defendant's
consent followed unlawful police conduct.  Id. at 502.  Although
we reject that formulation, see __ Or at __ (slip op at 19-20),
we do not quarrel with the underlying concern that it expresses -- namely, that Article I, section 9, requires a careful
examination of the causal connection between a preceding
illegality and the defendant's consent when the police gain a
defendant's consent after unlawful police conduct.  Although
framing that issue as one concerning "exploitation," this court
confirmed the necessity of such an inquiry in its decision in
Rodriguez.
In Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, after presenting the defendant
with an arrest warrant that may have been unlawful, the
governmental agent warned the defendant of his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel, and then asked the defendant whether
he had any drugs or guns in his apartment.  The defendant
responded to that question by stating "No, go ahead and look." 
Id. at 30.  When the agent questioned the defendant whether he
had intended to authorize a search, the defendant repeated his
willingness to allow the officers to search his apartment, and
the agents subsequently discovered two guns.  Id.  
On review, after again assuming that the defendant's
arrest had been unlawful, this court concluded that suppression
of the guns nevertheless was not required under Article I,
section 9.  After clarifying that the voluntariness of the
defendant's consent was not in question, this court explained
that the issue, instead, was whether the defendant's consent had
derived from -- or, in the words of Rodriguez, had been obtained
by "exploitation" of -- the preceding purportedly unlawful
seizure.  Id. at 38-40.  In answering that question in that case,
this court examined the circumstances of the seizure and observed
that the defendant spontaneously had offered his consent to the
search.  Id. at 41.  Although the court recognized that, but for
the unlawful arrest, the agent would not have been in a position
to accept the defendant's offer to allow a search, this court
concluded that that causal connection alone was too tenuous to
require suppression.  Id. 
Even if rejecting the state's view that voluntariness
alone is sufficient to establish the admissibility of evidence
from a consent search following an unlawful seizure, the above-described conclusion in Rodriguez, like the conclusion in
Kennedy, could be viewed as supporting the state's position that
suppression is not required in this case.  Similarly to both
Kennedy and Rodriguez, there is no evidence that Deese observed
any sign of criminal conduct during his illegal detention of
defendant that led to his request for defendant's consent to a
search. (18)  This court's decisions in Kennedy and Rodriguez,
however, do not stand for the proposition that suppression is
required only if the unlawful police conduct had allowed the
discovery of inculpatory evidence that led to a request for
consent.  Instead, this court's case law both before and after
Rodriguez makes clear that Article I, section 9, also requires
the consideration of the effect of the unlawful police conduct
upon the defendant's decision to consent, even if that conduct
did not rise to the level of overcoming the defendant's free
will.  Several cases illustrate how this court has applied that
consideration.
Although it was based upon Fourth Amendment precedents,
this court's decision in State v. Olson, 287 Or 157, 598 P2d 670
(1979), is on point.  In that case, the defendant made
inculpatory statements to the police after officers had made a
forcible nighttime entry into his residence and arrested him. 
After determining that both the entry and the subsequent arrest
has been unlawful, this court concluded that the state had failed
to show that those statements had not derived from that preceding
unlawful police conduct and, for that reason, concluded that the
statements were inadmissible under Article I, section 9.
This court reached a similar conclusion in Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206. (19)  After lawfully stopping the
defendant for making unsignaled lane changes, the officer tested
the turn signals on the defendant's vehicle and discovered that
one of them was defective.  Id. at 208.  Rather than issue a
citation, the officer instructed the defendant to repair the
signal and then advised the defendant that he was free to go. 
Id.  After making that statement, however, the officer continued
to stand with his arm on the door of the defendant's vehicle and
then asked for the defendant's consent to search the vehicle. 
Id. at 208-09.  The defendant agreed, and the officer
subsequently discovered illegal drugs in the vehicle.  Id. at
209.  On review, after finding that the officer had exceeded his
statutory authority to detain the defendant, this court rejected
the state's argument that, under the facts of that case, the
defendant's voluntary consent nevertheless established the
admissibility of the evidence from the search.  Id. at 214.
This court's decision in Toevs, 327 Or 525, offers a
final example. (20)  In that case, the officers stopped the
defendant for driving at night without the use of headlights. 
After running a records check and instructing the defendant to
turn on his lights, the officer advised the defendant that he was
free to go.  Id. at 529.  After making that statement, however,
the officer then immediately asked the defendant for his consent
to search the vehicle and questioned the defendant about whether
he was carrying any illegal drugs.  Id.  The defendant initially
withheld his consent to a search, but, after further questioning,
he admitted to the officers that he was in possession of drugs. 
Id.  On review, this court determined that the officer unlawfully
had seized the defendant at the time that he requested
defendant's consent and questioned the defendant.  Id. at 537. 
Without considering voluntariness, this court further determined
that, under the facts of that case, that illegality required the
suppression of the evidence discovered as a result of the
defendant's statements.  Id. at 537-38.  
As the above-described cases illustrate, this court's
conclusions in Kennedy and Rodriguez that suppression was not
required to vindicate those defendants' rights must be understood
in light of the specific facts of each of those cases --
particularly, the facts that those defendants both had
volunteered to allow a search without any police prompting and,
in Rodriguez, that the police had provided the defendant with
Miranda warnings before questioning him about drugs or weapons. 
In the absence of such intervening circumstances -- or other
circumstances mitigating the effect of the unlawful police
conduct -- this court has required suppression under facts
similar to those at issue in Kennedy and Rodriguez.  See, e.g.,
State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 627, 89 P3d 1163 (2004) (explaining
necessity of considering legality of stop in deciding
admissibility of defendant's presumably voluntary statements by
stating that, "if [the officer] had seized [the] defendant in
violation of her Article I, section 9, rights before he
questioned her about the bag, then his questions about the bag
also were unlawful, and the evidence that the state obtained as a
result of those questions must be suppressed"); State v. Morton,
326 Or 466, 470, 953 P2d 374 (1998) (when defendant dropped
container only after police had begun taking defendant into
custody, "the state cannot separate the act of arrest from the
dropping of the container; the seizure [of the container] can be
proper only if the arrest itself was authorized by a valid
warrant"); compare with Douglas, 260 Or 60 (regardless of
legality of police conduct, no suppression is required when
defendant granted his consent in response to prompting by his
brother-in-law, rather than police actions).
With that background in mind, we return to this case. 
In doing so, we first summarize our preceding discussion:  After
a defendant shows a minimal factual nexus between unlawful police
conduct and the defendant's consent, then the state has the
burden to prove that the defendant's consent was independent of,
or only tenuously related to, the unlawful police conduct. 
Deciding whether the state has satisfied that burden requires a
fact-specific inquiry into the totality of the circumstances to
determine the nature of the causal connection between the
unlawful police conduct and the defendant's consent.  A causal
connection requiring suppression may exist because the police
sought the defendant's consent solely as the result of knowledge
of inculpatory evidence obtained from unlawful police conduct.  A
causal connection requiring suppression also may exist because
the unlawful police conduct, even if not overcoming the
defendant's free will, significantly affected the defendant's
decision to consent.  Although determining the existence of such
a causal connection requires examination of the specific facts at
issue in a particular case, we view several considerations to be
relevant to that determination, including (1) the temporal
proximity between the unlawful police conduct and the defendant's
consent, (2) the existence of any intervening circumstances, and
(3) the presence of any circumstances -- such as, for example, a
police officer informing the defendant of the right to refuse
consent -- that mitigated the effect of the unlawful police
conduct. (21)  With those considerations in mind, we now decide
whether the state has satisfied its burden in this case.
In our view, the circumstances at issue here more
closely resemble the circumstances at issue in Dominguez-Martinez
and Toevs, rather than the circumstances at issue in Kennedy and
Rodriguez.  Similarly to the defendants in Dominguez-Martinez and
Toevs, defendant here consented to the search during an unlawful
stop.  Unlike the defendants in Rodriguez and Kennedy,
defendant's grant of consent was not spontaneous but, instead,
was made only in response to Deese's request that defendant allow
a search.  Deese made that request immediately after he had
questioned defendant about whether defendant was carrying any
weapons or illegal drugs and while he was waiting for the results
of defendant's warrant check.  Given the close temporal proximity
between the illegal detention and defendant's consent, and the
absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances
mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct, we cannot
say that the state has proved that defendant's decision to
consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding
violation of defendant's rights under Article I, section 9.  We
therefore conclude that the unlawful seizure of defendant
vitiated his consent to the search and, for that reason, the
evidence from that search is inadmissible under Article I,
section 9. 
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that, under the facts of this case,
Deese's encounter with defendant constituted an unlawful stop
under ORS 131.615(1) (1995) and, consequently, also an unlawful
"seizure" under Article I, section 9.  We also reaffirm that, to
vindicate a violation of a defendant's rights under Article I,
section 9, evidence from a search following an otherwise valid
consent is subject to suppression under the Oregon exclusionary
rule if the defendant's consent is the product of preceding
unlawful police conduct.  Finally, under the facts of this case,
we conclude that the state failed to satisfy its burden of
proving that defendant's consent was independent of, or only
tenuously related to, the preceding unlawful stop.  Based upon
those conclusions, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
DURHAM, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the police
unlawfully stopped defendant under ORS 131.615(1) (1995) and,
thus, unlawfully seized him under Article I, section 9, of the
Oregon Constitution.
The larger question in this case, however, concerns
defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress the evidence that Officer Deese searched for and seized
from defendant's pocket during the unlawful stop.  According to
the record, Deese stopped defendant, saw bulges under his jacket,
and asked for permission to search defendant's person.  In
response, defendant gave his voluntary consent to the requested
search. (22)
In this court, defendant acknowledges that his consent was
voluntary, but argues that the court should disregard his
voluntary consent because Deese exploited the prior illegal stop
to obtain permission to search.  Defendant does not argue that
the trial court must reexamine the voluntariness of his consent
in light of the unlawfulness of the initial stop and seizure.
Reduced to its essence, defendant's argument asserts that he
is entitled to the suppression of the evidence that Deese
obtained from defendant's pocket notwithstanding defendant's
voluntary consent to the exact search that Deese performed.  The
majority accepts that argument and requires suppression of the
evidence on the theory that defendant's consent was the "product"
of the unlawful initial stop and that the state did not show that
the consent was "independent of," or was "only tenuously related
to," the unlawful stop.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 45-46.)
If Officer Deese had unilaterally searched defendant's
pocket without consent, or coerced defendant such that he
overcame defendant's free will, then the majority's answer would
be correct.  But the fact that defendant voluntarily consented to
the search makes (or should make) the crucial difference in the
legal analysis of the reasonableness of the resulting search.  
Instead of focusing correctly on the voluntariness of
defendant's consent, as our cases require, the majority's
analysis turns on facts that simply are inapposite, such as the
fact that defendant's consent (even though voluntary) was "not
spontaneous" because Deese requested consent to search.  Id. at
44.  Similarly, the majority emphasizes that Deese's request
occurred immediately after Deese had questioned defendant about
whether he was carrying any weapons or illegal drugs and while he
was waiting for the results of a warrant check.  Id. at 44-45. 
Those facts lead the majority to conclude that the state has
failed to prove "that defendant's decision to consent, even if
voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9,[]" and,
consequently, the unlawful stop vitiates defendant's consent. 
Id. at 45.
The majority's approach is erroneous because it accords no
analytical weight to the key fact of defendant's voluntary
consent to the search.  Instead, the majority's analysis turns on
whether the fact that allowed the search to occur -- defendant's
voluntary consent -- was the "product" of (that is, whether the
consent is the causal result of) the unlawful stop.  According to
the majority, because that causal relationship exists (or,
rather, because the state failed to prove that that relationship
did not exist), the resulting search is unconstitutional
notwithstanding the voluntariness of defendant's consent to the
search.  But that reasoning blurs the distinction between the
circumstances of the stop that have a mere "but for" causal link
with the search and the one fact that was the genuine cause of
the search.  Because its view of the causation inquiry is faulty,
the majority simply fails to assess the significance of the fact
that triggered the search of defendant's pocket:  defendant
voluntarily consented to the search.  The majority's resulting
conclusion -- that Deese's search of defendant's pocket was
unreasonable and, thus, unlawful even though defendant
voluntarily consented to the search -- is a difficult pill to
swallow.
The majority's reasoning represents a significant departure
from the principles that have guided this court in previous
consent search cases.  First and foremost, this court has
approved of the suppression of evidence only where the police
conduct that brings the disputed evidence to light constitutes an
unreasonable invasion of privacy.  Here, Officer Deese's stop of
defendant unquestionably was an unreasonable seizure, but the act
of stopping defendant did not expose the disputed evidence to
Officer Deese.  The discovery of the disputed evidence occurred
only after defendant gave his voluntary consent to a search of
his person.  That is the legally dispositive fact.  Defendant's
voluntary consent to the search demonstrates that the disputed
evidence came to light as the result of a reasonable, not
unreasonable, search.  
The majority's approach effectively cancels the legal
significance of defendant's voluntary consent and treats the
officer's simple act of asking for permission to search as if it
were an invasion of privacy.  Heretofore, police officers
properly have understood that there is no harm in asking for
voluntary consent to conduct a search.  After today, that
understanding is in jeopardy.  As the following discussion
demonstrates, the majority's analysis results in a suppression of
evidence without the necessary predicate that our cases require: 
an unreasonable invasion of privacy.  Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent from that aspect of the majority's opinion.
Article I, section 9, creates a right in the people to be
"secure * * * against unreasonable search, or seizure * * *."  A
"search" occurs when the police invade a person's privacy
interest in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.  A
"seizure" occurs when police significantly interfere with a
person's possessory or ownership interests in property.  See
State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206-07, 729 P2d 524 (1986) (applying
those definitions).  This court vindicates that constitutional
right in a criminal prosecution by suppressing evidence that the
government has obtained in violation of that right.  Thus, a key
question in the resolution of defendant's motion to suppress
evidence is whether the police "obtained" the evidence in
defendant's pocket "in violation of" defendant's constitutional
right to privacy.
Because defendant's motion seeks suppression of evidence
that Deese searched for and seized without a warrant, the state
bears the burden to demonstrate that Deese's search and seizure
actions were reasonable and, therefore, lawful.  Despite the
absence of a warrant, a search or seizure is reasonable under
Article I, section 9, if the police comply with the requirements
of one or another of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.  See State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346, 351, 833 P2d 1278
(1992).
The state relies here on the exception for searches and
seizures conducted pursuant to a legally valid consent.  The
consent exception to the warrant requirement applies if the state
demonstrates that someone with authority to do so voluntarily
gave the police consent to search the defendant's person or
property and that the police complied with any limitations on the
scope of the consent.  State v. Weaver, 319 Or 212, 219, 874 P2d
1322 (1994).  
A violation by police of a defendant's rights under Article
I, section 9, may affect the validity of a subsequent search to
which the defendant apparently has consented because the police
conduct renders the defendant's consent involuntary.  See id. at
219.  The state has the burden of proving voluntariness by a
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119,
137, 806 P2d 92 (1994).  The trial courts bear the initial
responsibility to determine whether the state has satisfied that
burden by examining whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant's consent was an act of free will,
or, instead, resulted from express or implied police coercion. 
See State v. Wolfe, 295 Or 567, 572, 669 P2d 320 (1983).  The
totality of circumstances certainly includes the individual's
responses, emotional and physical state, maturity and
sophistication.  See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure §
8.2(e), 90-93 (4th ed 2004).  But it also embraces the manner by
which the officer conveys his request, including an admonition --
if any is given -- that the individual is not required to consent
to a search, and whether the officer, by word or deed, seeks to
hasten a consent or otherwise to bring added pressure to bear on
the individual.  The point of the trial court's comprehensive
factual inquiry is to assure that the invasion by police of the
individual's constitutionally protected privacy interest is the
product of an authentic voluntary choice and not mere resignation
to the authority of the police or the exigencies of the stop or
arrest.
Police assertion of authority or control over an individual,
either through an arrest or a lesser seizure, bears distinctively
on the question of voluntariness whether or not the police
conduct is lawful.  That is so because an officer's assertion of
control over a person's liberty implies the further authority to
maintain that control and, incident to that control, to search
the person and seize any contraband.  See LaFave, 4 Search and
Seizure § 8.2(d) at 79-80 (discussing principle and citing
authorities).  If a defendant consents in acquiescence to a claim
of lawful policy authority, the trial court properly should
conclude that the lawfulness of the assertion of police authority
determines the voluntariness of the resulting consent.  See,
e.g., State v. Williamson, 307 Or 621, 626-27, 772 P2d 404 (1989)
(Carson, J., concurring).  By contrast, unlawful police conduct
can affect a defendant's capacity to exercise his or her free
will and, thus, may undermine the voluntariness of a consent to
search for purposes of Article I, section 9.  State v. Rodriguez,
317 Or 27, 38-39, 854 P2d 399 (1993).  Finally, under certain
circumstances, the police conduct, even if lawful, may coerce the
defendant into consenting.  A coerced consent, by definition, is
not voluntary.  See Rodriguez, 317 Or at 38 n 13.  
In this case, as noted above, defendant asserts no challenge
to the trial court's implicit conclusion that defendant
voluntarily consented to Deese's request to search his
pocket. (23)  Neither does defendant raise any question about
Deese's adherence to the scope of the consent granted.  Defendant
does not contend that the trial court's error in concluding that
Deese neither stopped nor seized defendant somehow undermines, or
requires reconsideration of, the trial court's determination that
defendant's consent to the later search of his person was
voluntary.  Defendant's sole contention is that state and federal
law requires suppression of the evidence that Deese searched for
and seized from defendant's pocket, notwithstanding defendant's
voluntary consent to that search, because suppression is
necessary to vindicate the earlier violation of defendant's
rights, i.e., the unlawful stop.  
Defendant rests that argument on an application of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine that this court's cases
have discussed.  Although I ultimately reject defendant's
argument, I note that not all our cases have discussed that
doctrine in a consistent manner.  For that reason, I discuss in
detail why the contents of defendant's pocket are not subject to
suppression under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, this court
examines the nature of the connection between unlawful police
conduct and the evidence that the defendant seeks to suppress. 
In State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 624 P2d 99 (1981), this court,
relying on an explanation of that doctrine by the United States
Supreme Court, confirmed that more is required to justify a
suppression of evidence than a mere "but for" causal link between
the evidence and a prior police illegality:
"The United States Supreme Court has held that the
existence of a police illegality does not automatically
require suppression of evidence discovered subsequent
to that illegality.  In Wong Sun v. United States, 371
US 471, 83 S Ct 407, 9 Led 2d 441 (1963), the Court
rejected a 'but for' test which would require that
evidence must be suppressed if it would not have been
discovered 'but for' the illegal police actions. 
Instead, the Court said:
"'We need not hold that all evidence is
"fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it
would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police.  Rather, the more apt
question in such a case is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.'  371 US at 487-88."
Id. at 500. 
The determinative issue under that doctrine is whether,
assuming an initial police illegality, the police have obtained
("come at") the challenged evidence by an exploitation of that
illegality or, instead, have obtained it by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the taint of the initial police
illegality.  When applying that doctrine, we always must keep in
mind two distinct policy justifications that bear on the answer
to that issue.
The first is that the predicate for Oregon's
exclusionary rule is the court's responsibility to vindicate the
invasion by the police of a defendant's personal rights under
Article I, section 9, in obtaining evidence.  This court has held
that an individual's personal right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under that provision also embraces a right
to deny the state any ability to use evidence obtained in
violation of that right to convict the individual of a crime. 
See State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 249, 834 P2d 1008 (1992)
(recognizing principle).  Oregon's rights-based exclusionary rule
stands in contrast to the deterrence-based rationale that
underlies Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Because our
exclusionary rule rests on a theory of protection of a personal
right, the exclusion of evidence follows only from a
demonstration that the police obtained the evidence by violating
a right secured by Article I, section 9.  See State v. Smith, 327
Or 366, 379-80, 963 P2d 642 (1998) (where evidence obtained
after, but not by virtue of, unlawful police conduct, suppression
not required).
The second is that, when determining whether the facts
require the exclusion of evidence, this court seeks to restore a
defendant to the same position as if "the government's officers
had stayed within the law."  Davis, 295 Or at 234.  Thus, the
fact that evidence comes to police attention following, or due
only to "but for" causation by, police misconduct is insufficient
to require a suppression remedy.  Instead, the police misconduct,
rather than some other independent agency, must be the source
that causes the police to obtain the disputed evidence.  For
example, a showing that the observance of lawful procedures
inevitably would have brought the evidence to light would obviate
the need for suppression.  See State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 526,
73 P3d 282 (2003) (discussing inevitable discovery of evidence).
Relying on the above-cited authorities, defendant
argues that Deese exploited the unlawful stop, because he was in
a position to observe the bulges in defendant's coat solely by
reason of the unlawful stop.  Defendant claims that the bulges in
the coat, in turn, motivated Deese to request consent to engage
in a search of defendant's person, and that request lead
immediately to the discovery of the disputed evidence.  According
to defendant, nothing attenuated the taint of the unlawful stop
and its close factual connection to the discovery of the contents
of defendant's pocket.
Defendant's arguments fail because they do not
acknowledge the role of defendant's voluntary consent in Deese's 
discovery of the disputed evidence.  In explaining that
conclusion below, I demonstrate why several cases on which
defendant relies in reality lend him only superficial support.
In State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 623 P2d 630 (1981), this
court, relying on Wong Sun, emphasized that whether a police
illegality creates a "taint" on a subsequent search or seizure of
evidence depends on the influence of the illegality on the
defendant's exercise of free will in apparently consenting to the
search or seizure, and does not depend on the influence of the
illegality as a source of police knowledge.  This court stated:
"The nature of the causal relationship between
unlawful police action and subsequently obtained
evidence, which triggers the exclusionary rule, was
considered in the leading case of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 US 471, 83 S Ct 407, 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963),
in which the United States Supreme Court elaborated on
* * * 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine.  Under
Wong Sun, the influence of the illegality on
defendant's exercise of will, rather than the source of
police knowledge, determines whether there is taint. 
The facts of the case illustrate this principle.  Two
statements were involved in Wong Sun:  one by Toy and
one by Wong Sun.  Government agents unlawfully entered
and searched Toy's home.  Toy then and there confessed
that he had obtained narcotics from one Yee.  The
agents then went to Yee who surrendered heroin to them. 
Yee said he obtained it from Toy and Wong Sun.  The
latter two were arrested and released on recognizance. 
Several days later, Wong Sun visited the agents.  Upon
being advised of his rights, Wong Sun made a statement. 
The United States Supreme Court required suppression of
Toy's confession because it was a direct result of the
agents' unlawful entry.  Wong Sun's statement, however,
was held admissible because it was the product of
intervening events and not the product of the unlawful
entry even though the police had learned of Wong Sun's
involvement in a chain of events which began with the
unlawful arrest.
"In so holding, the court rejected what might be
called the 'but for' test under which evidence must be
excluded if any link in the chain of circumstances
leading to the evidence involves unlawful police
action.  Were that the rule, Wong Sun's confession
would have been suppressed.  Rather, the dispositive
consideration was whether Wong Sun's decision to make a
statement was a result of the illegality or due to
other factors."
Id. at 395-96 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).  
Although I criticize below another aspect of the
holding in Quinn, the passage quoted above states Oregon law
correctly.  Under the principle from Quinn emphasized above, the
trial court's wide-ranging inquiry into the voluntariness of the
defendant's consent to a search or seizure subsumes an assessment
of the impact of any police illegality on the defendant's
exercise of will in granting consent.  In the consent search
context, the determinitive issue is whether the defendant decided
to consent voluntarily or, instead, decided to do so due to other
factors, such as any taint resulting from unlawful police
conduct.  The police illegality, as Quinn noted, may provide the
police with information which, in turn, may motivate them to
request consent.  However, the decisive inquiry in the consent
context is not the police motive for seeking consent but whether
the defendant's consent, under all the circumstances, was
voluntary.
Another aspect of the analysis stated in Quinn deserves
further comment.  Quinn involved an unlawful search of the
defendant's vehicle during which the police discovered a pair of
women's underwear that linked the defendant to a murder.  Without
informing the defendant of their discovery, the police sought and
obtained the defendant's consent to search the vehicle.  The
police searched the vehicle again, seized the underwear,
confronted the defendant with that evidence, and obtained the
defendant's confession to the murder.
On review before this court, the defendant challenged
the admissibility of the underwear under Article I, section 9. 
Purporting to apply the rule in Wong Sun, this court rejected the
defendant's assertion that the initial unlawful vehicle search
had tainted his decision to consent to the second search.  The
court reasoned that the defendant had no knowledge of the illegal
first search of the vehicle and, therefore, that illegality could
not "taint" his voluntary consent to the second search.
The Quinn court's reliance on the defendant's lack of
knowledge of the first vehicle search may have been an error,
although a determination of that issue, strictly speaking, is not
essential to the correct resolution of this case.  The first
vehicle search was itself an unconstitutional invasion of the
defendant's right to privacy under Article I, section 9.  Thus,
and even if the police later seized the underwear after a second
search with the defendant's valid consent, the defendant
nevertheless may have been entitled to the suppression of that
evidence to vindicate the violation by the police of his
constitutional right of privacy during the first vehicle search. 
I leave for another day whether this court should so hold in a
case that presents that question.
Here defendant contends that, despite the voluntariness
of his consent, the illegal stop disadvantaged him by affording
the officer the opportunity to see the bulges in his jacket, thus
creating the motivation to seek consent to search.  Defendant
argues that suppression is necessary to restore him to the
position that he would have occupied had the officer not stopped
him illegally.
My previous discussion of Quinn undermines defendant's
premise that a police illegality that precedes a consent to
search may require suppression of evidence because, apart from
its impact on the voluntariness of consent, it affords the police
information that motivates them to seek consent to search. 
Despite that problem, defendant purports to find support for his
position in Rodriguez and Kennedy.  For the reasons discussed
below, I disagree.
In Rodriguez, a governmental agent arrested the
defendant at his apartment and asked whether the defendant had
any drugs or guns in the apartment.  The defendant responded by
saying, "No, go ahead and look."  The agent questioned whether
the defendant meant to authorize a search, and the defendant
again stated his willingness to permit a search.  The
governmental agents searched the apartment and discovered two
guns.  317 Or at 29-30.
On review, this court assumed that the arrest was
unlawful but rejected the claim that Article I, section 9,
required suppression of the guns.  The court noted at the outset
that the case presented no challenge to the trial court's
determination that the defendant had consented voluntarily to the
search of his apartment.  Id. at 38.  Despite certain
shortcomings that I note below, Rodriguez properly determined
that the conduct of the governmental agents did not undermine the
legitimacy of the defendant's consent to a search.  The court
also correctly observed that, where a police illegality precedes
a consent to search, suppression of evidence was an appropriate
remedy only if the police obtained the evidence in violation of a
defendant's rights.  Id. at 39.
The Rodriguez court provided two examples in which the
facts would justify suppression.  The first involved unlawful
police conduct that undermined the voluntariness of consent.  Id.
at 38.  The second involved an unlawful search or seizure that
preceded a consent search:
"Where, as here, the question of the voluntariness
of the consent has not been raised, or where the court
has determined that the consent was voluntary, unlawful
police conduct occurring before a consent search still
may affect the admissibility of evidence seized during
that search.  This is so because that unlawful conduct
-- either an unreasonable search or an unreasonable
seizure -- occurring before the consent search was a
violation of the defendant's rights, even if the
consent search by itself was not.  Put differently: 
There may be cases in which suppression of evidence
obtained during a consent search may be necessary to
vindicate a defendant's rights that were violated by
earlier, unlawful police conduct."
Id. at 39.
I note that the Rodriguez court's second example,
quoted above, reflects precisely the facts in Quinn, i.e., an
illegal search that preceded a voluntary consent to conduct
roughly the same search.  Consistent with my preceding discussion
of Quinn, I conclude that, if those facts require suppression, it
is not because the police have exploited an illegality to obtain
consent, but because the initial unconstitutional invasion of the
defendant's privacy by the police brought the challenged evidence
to light notwithstanding the defendant's subsequent consent. 
Properly understood, the court's second example entailed the
ordinary remedy -- suppression -- for an unlawful search, not an
instance of the exploitation of a prior illegality that taints
the voluntariness of a later consent.
Relying on its example of a purported "exploitation" of
a police illegality, the Rodriguez court explained:
"We think that evidence obtained during such a search
should be suppressed only in those cases where the
police have exploited their prior unlawful conduct to
obtain that consent.  Only where such exploitation
occurs can it be said that the evidence discovered
subsequently was 'obtained in violation' of a
defendant's rights under Article I, section 9."
Id. at 40.
I conclude that that attempted statement of the
pertinent issue comes up short. (24)  As the passage from Quinn
quoted above demonstrates, ___ Or at ___ (slip op. at 13-14), the
initial question under Wong Sun is whether the police have come
at the disputed evidence, not merely the facts that motivate the
police to seek the defendant's consent, by exploiting a primary
police illegality.  Additionally, Wong Sun requires a
determination whether, notwithstanding the prior illegality, the
police have acquired the evidence by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.  A defendant's
voluntary choice to consent to a search, notwithstanding a prior
police illegality, can affect significantly the answer to each
issue that Wong Sun describes.  Finally, Rodriguez, failed to
focus on the pivotal principle from Quinn, i.e., that the factor
that determines whether a prior police illegality "taints" a
discovery of evidence in a consent search is the influence of the
illegality on the defendant's exercise of will, not whether the
illegality is a source of police knowledge.
Although the Rodriguez decision cited the Quinn case,
it failed to follow correctly the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
analysis that Quinn prescribed.  The Rodriguez court should have
determined, in accordance with Quinn, that, following the police
illegality, the defendant had voluntarily consented to the search
that produced the disputed evidence, the defendant did not
challenge the voluntariness of his consent to the search, and,
consequently, the police had not obtained the evidence in
violation of the defendant's constitutional right to privacy.
There was no reason for the Rodriguez court instead to
have suggested, in contravention of the legal principle described
in Quinn, that a defendant also might obtain a suppression of
evidence by demonstrating that facts that had come to light by
reason of the prior police illegality motivated the police to
seek consent for a search.  That suggestion adopts the wrong
focus.  The critical inquiry under Quinn, in the context of a
consent search, is the voluntariness of the consent, not the
source of police knowledge that may have triggered the request
for consent.  Rodriguez incorrectly placed the emphasis on the
state of mind of the police, rather than the voluntariness of the
defendant's consent.  That approach simply avoids answering the
important analytical questions whether the police have obtained
the evidence in violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights, and whether the initial police illegality bears more than
a "but for" causal relationship to the evidence that the consent
search produced.
I turn next to Kennedy.  In that case, two police
officers approached the defendant as he was leaving the Portland
airport, asked if they could speak with defendant, and identified
themselves as officers.  The officers informed defendant that
they had information that he might be carrying illegal narcotics
on his person or in his luggage.  The defendant denied that
allegation.  Without any prompting from the officers, defendant
asked them if they wanted to search his luggage.  The officers
accepted, searched defendant's bag, and subsequently discovered a
small vial, which contained cocaine residue.  290 Or at 495-96.  
On review, this court assumed that the police encounter
with defendant had been unlawful.  It determined, however, that
the evidence was admissible due to "the absence of any coercive
circumstances surrounding [the] defendant's consent, and [the]
defendant's volunteering of consent, with no request by the
police."  Id. at 506.  Relying on Wong Sun, the court stated that
"the evidence is to be suppressed only if it is found that the
consent was gained by exploitation of the illegality or that
defendant's free will was tainted by the illegal police conduct." 
Id. at 501.  That statement, like the similar statement noted
above in Rodriguez, suggests inaccurately that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" analysis addresses the circumstances that induce
the police to request consent, rather than the voluntariness of
the consent granted.  However, consistent with the correct rule
in Quinn, the balance of the opinion in Kennedy focused on
whether the defendant consented to the search voluntarily.  The
Kennedy court held that, regardless of whether the police had
stopped the defendant illegally, the defendant had consented
voluntarily to a search of his luggage.  Id. at 506.  Thus, when
construed properly, Kennedy supports the state here, not
defendant.
I am not unmindful of defendant's concern that an
unlawful stop or arrest, and the varying sorts of pressure and
anxiety that often surround the lawful or unlawful assertion of
police authority over a citizen, easily can create a coercive
atmosphere in which citizens do not give a genuinely voluntary
consent to a search.  But a trial court is well able to examine,
and must examine, all of those concerns in the course of
determining the voluntariness issue.  That analytical inquiry
fully vindicates the rights of the defendant.  That approach is
preferable to creating an entitlement to a suppression remedy for
unlawful police conduct that merely precedes, but does not taint,
a later valid consent to a search that brings disputed evidence
to light.  Recognizing a right to suppression of evidence,
notwithstanding the voluntariness of the defendant's consent to
the search, might be consistent with the deterrence rationale
that the federal courts employ in resolving search and seizure
disputes.  However, I see no justification for doing so pursuant
to the rights-based approach that this court follows under
Article I, section 9.
The legal principles discussed above lead to a
straightforward answer on the facts of this case.  The state
obtained the evidence that defendant seeks to suppress by way of
a search of defendant's pocket.  Before the search, defendant
told Deese that he consented to that search.  After examining all
the pertinent circumstances, the trial court necessarily
concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary, and defendant
makes no challenge to that determination in this court.  
It is true that defendant gave his consent during the
course of an unlawful stop, that Deese requested defendant's
consent, and that the request occurred not long after the
unlawful stop commenced.  Deese's observations during the stop
may have aroused his suspicions.  However, Deese did not
unilaterally search for or seize any evidence in defendant's
possession.  Rather, he asked for and received voluntary consent
to search.  Although the unlawful stop has a "but for" causal
relationship to the search of defendant's pocket, that is the
most that can be said for it.  The critical inquiry is whether
any of the circumstances surrounding the stop tainted the later
search and seizure by undermining the voluntariness of
defendant's consent.  The undisputed answer to that question is
no.  Because the police did not obtain the challenged evidence in
violation of defendant's rights under Article I, section 9, the
search was reasonable.  The trial court properly denied
defendant's motion to suppress.
Finally, defendant advances in this court an argument
that the stop and subsequent search and seizure violated the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  My examination of the record satisfies me that, in
the Court of Appeals, defendant did not preserve his federal law
claim for review by this court.  Accordingly, I do not address
that claim.
Because the trial court correctly refused to suppress
the evidence seized from defendant's pocket, I respectfully
dissent from the majority's contrary determination.
Gillette, J., joins this opinion.
1. ORS 131.615(1) (1995), amended by Oregon Laws 1997,
chapter 866, section 1, provided, in part:
"A peace officer who reasonably suspects that
a person has committed a crime may stop the person
and, after informing the person that the peace
officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable
inquiry."
The 1997 Legislative Assembly amended that statute to provide
that an officer also may stop a person to make a reasonable
inquiry if the officer reasonably suspects that that person "is
about to commit a crime[.]"  Or Laws 1997, ch 866, § 1.  That
amendment does not apply to this proceeding.
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized."
2. The text of both ORS 131.615(1) (1995) and Article
I, section 9, is set out at __ Or at __ n 1 (slip op at 1 n
1).  The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 US 643, 655, 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961).
3. Defendant originally was indicted in case number
97-0081-CR, and, following a hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's pretrial suppression motion in that case. 
Subsequently, on the state's motion, the court dismissed
that indictment without prejudice, because the indictment
erroneously had charged defendant with possession of
methamphetamine, rather than amphetamine.  The state then
charged defendant with possession of amphetamine in case
number 97-1546-CR.  Because the trial court already had
heard and denied defendant's suppression motion relating to
the vial in case number 97-0081-CR, the trial court in case
number 97-1546-CR declined to rehear that motion and,
instead, adhered to the same ruling after taking judicial
notice of the record from the first suppression hearing.
4. Specifically, in its letter ruling, the trial
court stated: 
"This case is similar to State ex rel [Juv.] Dept. v. Fikes, 116 Or App 618[, 842 P2d 807]
(1992).  For the reasons set forth therein,
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied."
In Fikes, 116 Or App at 623-24, the Court of Appeals held that a
youth had not been "stopped" under ORS 131.615 (1991), amended by
Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 866, section 1, or "seized" under
Article I, section 9, or the Fourth Amendment when a police
officer had approached that youth on the street and had asked
that youth for consent to search his person.  The court further
held that the subsequent search had been lawful because the youth
voluntarily had given his consent to the search.  Id. at 624-25. 
5. Before the Court of Appeals, defendant also assigned error to the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss for
lack of a speedy trial under ORS 135.747 and Article I, section
10, of the Oregon Constitution.  The Court of Appeals rejected
that assignment of error without discussion, Hall, 183 Or App at
50, and defendant did not petition this court for review of that
part of the Court of Appeals decision. 
6. In State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, 854 P2d 399 (1993),
this court used the phrase "unlawful police conduct" as shorthand
to describe a governmental act that violated a defendant's rights
under Article I, section 9.  See id. at 38 n 12 (so noting). 
Throughout this opinion, when we use that same phrase, we use it
for that same meaning.
7. Judge Brewer joined the majority opinion in holding
that Article I, section 9, required the exclusion of the state's
evidence.  He, however, authored a separate concurring opinion to
state his agreement with the dissent that a defendant's reasons
for consenting also may be relevant to the determination whether
evidence procured during an otherwise valid consent search is
inadmissible because of police exploitation of a prior
illegality.  Hall, 183 Or App at 61-62 (Brewer, J., concurring). 
8. ORS 131.605(5) defines the meaning of the term "stop,"
contained in ORS 131.615(1) (1995), as "a temporary restraint of
a person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any
place."
9. In 1997, the legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 936 (1997), which contained a provision, now codified at ORS 136.432,
that limits the exclusion of evidence as an available remedy for
violations of statutory provisions.  Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 1. 
Because defendant committed his crime on January 8, 1997, and
because the ex post facto clause in Article I, section 21, of the
Oregon Constitution precludes the application of ORS 136.432 to
crimes committed before its effective date of June 12, 1997, we
do not consider the effect of ORS 136.432 here.  See Or Laws
1997, ch 313 (providing effective date of June 12, 1997); State
v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 215, 26 P3d 802 (2001) (ex post facto
clause in Article I, section 21, precludes application of
exclusionary limits contained in SB 936 to crimes committed
before its effective date). 
10. We acknowledge that, by requiring the police to have a
reasonable suspicion that the person "has committed a crime[,]"
ORS 131.615(1) (1995) imposed greater restrictions upon police
authority to stop a person than does Article I, section 9.  See
State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 6, 456 P2d 67 (1969) (to stop person,
police must have reasonable suspicion that person "[has] a
connection with criminal activity"); see also State v. Valdez,
277 Or 621, 625 n 4, 561 P2d 1006 (1977) (observing that,
although ORS 131.615 (1973) attempted to codify Cloman, 254 Or 1,
and Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968),
statute adopted narrower rule because legislature omitted words
"or is about to commit [a crime]" from final text of statute). 
As discussed further below, __ Or at __ (slip op at 14-15),
however, that difference is of no consequence here, because the
parties do not dispute that Deese lacked a reasonable suspicion
that defendant either had been involved in, or was about to
become involved in, any criminal activity at the time of the
encounter at issue in this case.
11. ORS 131.605 defines the term "reasonably suspects" as
"a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer
acts * * *."
12. In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court refined the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine that is applicable under the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, stating:
"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' simply because it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of
the police.  Rather, the more apt question in such
a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation
of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.'" 
371 US at 487-88 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221
(1959)).  Although Wong Sun concerned the admissibility of
inculpatory statements that two defendants had made after illegal
arrests, the Supreme Court appears to have applied that same
reasoning in deciding the admissibility of evidence from a
consent search following a violation of the defendant's rights
under the Fourth Amendment.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491,
507-08, 103 S Ct 1319, 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983) ("Because we affirm
the * * * conclusion that [the defendant] was being illegally
detained when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree
that the consent was tainted by the illegality and was
ineffective to justify the search.").  Lower federal courts also
have presumed that the analysis from Wong Sun and its progeny
concerning the admissibility of confessions under the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 US
590, 95 S Ct 2254, 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975), applies equally in the
context of consent searches.  See, e.g., United States v.
Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F 2d 407 (5th Cir 1984).
13. For an overview of the history of the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth Amendment and under Article I, section 9, see
generally Messerly, Development of the Right to Exclude Illegally
Seized Evidence in Oregon under Article I, section 9 of the
Oregon Constitution, 25 Willamette L Rev 697 (1989).
14. Before the Supreme Court held in Mapp, 367 US 643, that
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to the states,
this court had approved of the use of that rule in Oregon state
courts based upon its agreement with the Supreme Court in Weeks
v. United States, 232 US 383, 34 S Ct 341, 59 L Ed 652 (1914),
that such a rule was necessary to effectuate constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.  See
State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443, 494, 204 P 958, 206 P 290 (1922)
(stating that Oregon state courts should apply exclusionary rule
for same reasons that Supreme Court articulated in Weeks); see
also Davis, 295 Or at 233-34 (noting same history of Oregon
exclusionary rule).  Although cases subsequent to Laundy
sometimes suggested that the Oregon exclusionary rule might apply
to deter future constitutional violations, in a sequence of cases
beginning with Davis, 295 Or 227, this court reaffirmed its view
that, although deterrence may be a benefit of the Oregon
exclusionary rule, the constitutional basis for that rule is to
vindicate the defendant's personal rights.  See, e.g., State v.
Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553, 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights);
State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315, 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same);
compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397, 623 P2d 630 (1981)
(stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be
applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its
"prophylactic" purposes).
15. A number of commentators have challenged the correctness of such a reading of Wong Sun.  See, e.g., LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, at IV-88,
§ 8.2(d) (4th ed 2004) (arguing that, under Wong Sun, if "[a]
prior illegal search provides a significant lead in terms of
indicating what other evidence [the police] ought to seek or
where they ought to seek it, * * * then a consent obtained by
exploitation of that information would constitute a fruit of the
earlier illegal search.  This would be true * * * even if the
consenting party were unaware of the earlier search."); Casaccio,
Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and Tainted
Fruit, 87 Colum L Rev 842 (1987) (stating same).
16. To the extent that the above-quoted statement from
Rodriguez may be understood to suggest that a police officer's
state of mind is relevant under Article I, section 9, we do not
endorse it.  See State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or 613, 621, 801 P2d 749
(1990) ("Article I, section 9, prohibits certain governmental
action, not certain governmental states of mind.  The Oregon
Constitution does not require an inquiry into the observing
officer's thoughts to determine whether the officer's conduct
unconstitutionally violates a defendant's Article I, section 9,
rights.").   
17. Although Carston concerned a statutory violation, the
reasoning in that opinion is equally applicable in this context.
18. As discussed previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at 7),
the majority opinion from the Court of Appeals determined that
Deese had "exploited" the unlawful stop because that stop had
allowed him to observe bulges in defendant's jacket.  The record,
however, does not support a finding that anything about those
bulges (which had resulted from defendant's mittens) revealed any
criminal conduct.  For that reason, we disagree with the majority
opinion from the Court of Appeals that Deese's observation of the
bulges in defendant's jacket is significant in this case.
19. Although Dominguez-Martinez concerned a statutory
violation, the reasoning in that opinion is equally applicable in
this context.
20. Toevs also concerned a statutory violation, but the
reasoning in that opinion is equally applicable in this context.
21. As noted previously, the dissenting opinion from the
Court of Appeals identified some of these same considerations. 
See Hall, 183 Or App at 71-72 (Diets, C. J., dissenting).  In
Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 95 S Ct 2254, 45 L Ed 2d 416
(1975), the United States Supreme Court also identified some of
these considerations as relevant to deciding the admissibility of
a defendant's voluntary statements following a Fourth Amendment
violation.  See id. at 603-04 (in deciding whether Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule requires suppression of defendant's
voluntary statements following unlawful arrest, court should
consider whether police provided defendant with Miranda warnings,
along with "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct").  As discussed previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at
24-27), the Brown factor of "purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct" relates to only the deterrence rationale of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and has no applicability
to the exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9.  The other
considerations that the Supreme Court identified in Brown --
namely, whether the police had provided the defendant with
Miranda warnings (or, in the case of a consent search, with a
warning that the defendant had the right to refuse consent), the
temporal proximity between the illegality and the defendant's
confession or consent, and the presence of intervening
circumstances -- relate to the causal connection between the
preceding illegality and the defendant's confession or consent,
and, for that reason, also are relevant to the decision whether
exclusion is required to vindicate a defendant's rights under
Article I, section 9.
22. The trial court made the following express findings:
"10) The officer asked if he could search the
Defendant's person.  The Defendant indicated okay.  The
officer then did a quick pat-down and felt no weapons.
"11) The officer reached in the Defendant's jacket
and felt and removed a [vial].  Based upon his training
and experience, the officer believed the [vial]
contained controlled substance.
"This case is similar to State ex rel Juvenile
Dept. v[.] Fikes, 116 Or App 618[, 842 P2d 807] (1992). 
For the reasons set forth therein, Defendant's Motion
to Suppress is denied."
In Fikes, 16 Or App 618, the Court of Appeals rejected
a child's claim that his consent to a search by a police officer
was involuntary.  The court concluded that "child's consent was
not the product of police coercion, but was voluntarily and
knowingly given."  Id. at 625. 
In this case, the trial court made no express
determination that defendant's consent to the search was
voluntary.  However, the trial court's express findings, quoted
above, the court's citation of Fikes as "similar" to this case,
the absence of any findings that Officer Deese coerced defendant
to consent, and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress all confirm that, in the trial court's view, defendant's
consent to the search was voluntary.
23. In State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 158-59, 585 P2d 681
(1978), this court stated the following in describing this
court's authority to review a trial court's finding that a
consent to a search was voluntary:
"We now specifically hold that an appellate court
is not bound by a trial judge's finding of
voluntariness of consent to a search or seizure if the
appellate court finds the historical facts upon which
the trial judge made his finding are insufficient to
meet constitutional standards of due process.  It
follows, therefore, that neither the Court of Appeals
nor this court is bound by the implicit conclusion of
the trial judge in this case that defendant's
compliance with Myers' 'request for identification' was
voluntary."
(Footnote omitted.)  To the same effect, see State v. Kennedy,
290 Or 493, 502, 624 P2d 99 (1981), citing Warner and Ball v.
Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968).  Because defendant does
not challenge the trial court's implicit voluntariness
determination in this case, I accept that determination.
Trial courts provide valuable assistance to our
appellate courts when they make express findings of fact and
conclusions of law on critical issues, such as the voluntariness
of a defendant's consent to a search. 
24. Rodriguez purported to draw support for its approach to
exploitation from a vehicle search case, State v. Williamson, 307
Or 621, 772 P2d 404 (1989).  Rodriguez, 317 Or at 40-41. 
However, the Rodriguez court correctly observed, id. at 40 n 14,
that this court resolved Williamson "on grounds of voluntariness,
rather than simply exploitation."  Thus, the suggestion in
Rodriguez that the result in Williamson "may also be explained as
based on an exploitation analysis[]" Rodriguez, 317 Or at 40-41
(emphasis added), overstated the degree to which Williamson
supported the analysis offered in Rodriguez.