Title: Com. v. Mastrangelo
Citation: 414 A.2d 54, 489 Pa. 254
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 1980

489 Pa. 254 (1980) 414 A.2d 54 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Thomas J. MASTRANGELO, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued January 21, 1980. Decided April 28, 1980. *255 *256 William J. Gallagher, West Chester, for appellant. Joan D. Lasensky, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lee Ruslander, West Chester, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN and FLAHERTY, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Thomas J. Mastrangelo, was convicted in a non-jury trial of disorderly conduct and obstructing administration of law or other governmental function. Post-verdict motions were denied. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one to twenty-three months. Appellant was also ordered to pay two $500 fines. The Superior Court affirmed per curiam and we granted appellant's petition for allowance of appeal. This case arises out of incidents that occurred in February, 1976 in the Borough of Phoenixville in Chester County. Appellant had a place of business called the "Blue Jay" on Bridge Street in Phoenixville. When the incidents in question occurred, appellant's car was parked on the street in front of his establishment. The street was metered and was being patrolled by Diane Young, a meter maid employed by the Borough. According to Young's testimony, she was patrolling the street during the morning of February 3. She ticketed appellant's car, which was illegally parked at a meter. Appellant came out of his store and shouted at her, repeatedly calling her a "fucking pig". Ms. Young walked away, but appellant continued shouting at her. On February 4, Ms. Young was again patrolling Bridge Street. She again observed appellant's car, but did not ticket it because it was legally parked. Nonetheless, appellant came out of his store and followed Ms. Young along Bridge Street, shouting at her and calling her, among other things, a "nigger lover" and a "cocksucker". Ms. Young asked appellant to leave her alone, but he continued to follow her, yelling the entire time, until she left the area. On both occasions, Ms. Young testified that bystanders on the street observed appellant's conduct; none, however, testified in court. Ms. Young also testified that appellant's actions had frightened her. In fact, Ms. Young did not patrol Bridge Street from February 5 to February 12 because of her fear of appellant. *258 Appellant first argues that the charge against him for disorderly conduct must be dismissed because the statute under which he was charged is facially invalid on the ground of vagueness or, in the alternative, is invalid as applied to him. Appellant was convicted under the disorderly conduct statute, which provides: In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926), the Court stated: In reviewing appellant's facial attack on the vagueness of the statute in question, it is important to remember, as we stated in Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 4-5, 354 A.2d 244, 245 (1976), that: Appellant argues that the disorderly conduct statute is so vague that a man of common intelligence could reasonably believe the statute made criminal the valid exercise of a protected First Amendment right. Although appellant's claim is that the statute is vague, aspects of overbreadth analysis are brought into play. As Mr. Justice Pomeroy has aptly stated: It is well-settled that when faced with a state statute, the constitutionality of which is being challenged on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, the United States Supreme Court is required to accept any narrowing and limiting construction given the statute by the state courts. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1971); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971). As the instant appeal presents this court with its first opportunity to examine the constitutionality of our disorderly conduct statute, we are thus free, and in fact obligated, to narrow and limit said statute in light of the protections guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. A state, in a valid exercise of its police power, may enact laws to protect the public peace.[1] In response to this obligation, the legislature passed the aforementioned disorderly conduct statute, which, by its terms prohibits any person from intentionally or recklessly causing or creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm by making *261 unreasonable noise. Regarding the intent element, one commentator has stated: Further, the element of "unreasonable noise" had been defined under prior law as "not fitting or proper in respect to the conventional standards of organized society or a legally construed community". Commonwealth v. Greene, 410 Pa. 111, 113, 189 A.2d 141, 143 (1963). We believe a man of common intelligence would understand what is and what is not made criminal under this statute, especially after we now make clear that the disorderly conduct statute may not be used to punish anyone exercising a protected First Amendment right. By so limiting this statute, appellant's facial attack concerning the vagueness of the disorderly conduct statute must fail. Commonwealth v. DeFrancesco, 481 Pa. 595, 393 A.2d 321 (1978). Having determined the disorderly conduct statute is not facially vague, we must now determine whether the *262 statute was constitutionally applied to appellant. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942), the Court stated: It is clear in the instant case that appellant was not exercising any constitutionally protected right; rather, in a loud, boisterous and disorderly fashion, he hurled epithets at the meter maid which we believe fit the Chaplinsky definition of fighting words. Even under our narrow construction of the disorderly conduct statute, we can find no merit in appellant's argument that the statute was invalid as applied to him. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S. Ct. 839, 843, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), the Court held that a statute could be void for vagueness if it encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Thus, if a statute's meaning is sufficiently unclear with the result of allowing unbridled police and judicial discretion to determine *263 who may be arrested and convicted, said statute should be declared unconstitutionally vague. We believe, however, that our disorderly conduct statute is not so vague as to allow the dangers above described. We thus reject appellant's vagueness attack in its entirety. Commonwealth v. DeFrancesco, supra. Appellant frames his final two issues as follows: In a footnote in Commonwealth v. Ilgenfritz, 466 Pa. 345, 347-48, 353 A.2d 387, 389 (1976), we stated: In the instant case, appellant put on a case in defense, so that the ruling on the demurrer is no longer an available issue. As in Ilgenfritz, however, we will treat the issues as a properly framed challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain appellant's convictions. Finding the evidence to be sufficient in both instances, we affirm. As we have oft stated: As previously mentioned, one is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent of breaching the public peace, he makes unreasonable noise. We believe our discussion concerning the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute as applied to appellant shows that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for that crime. Suffice it to note that appellant's criminal conduct was properly graded as a misdemeanor, since he *265 persisted in his disorderly conduct after being asked by Ms. Young to desist. The Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101 provides: Instantly, appellant, through a course of disorderly conduct, intentionally obstructed a meter maid from carrying out her lawful duties and was thus properly convicted by more than sufficient evidence. Judgments of sentence affirmed. ROBERTS, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion. FLAHERTY, J., files a dissenting opinion. ROBERTS, Justice, concurring and dissenting opinion. I agree with the majority that appellant's conviction for obstructing the administration of law must be affirmed. The record clearly establishes that appellant's abusive, threatening remarks to Ms. Young caused her fear and alarm and prevented her from properly performing her duties as a meter maid. I cannot agree, however, that the Commonwealth has produced sufficient evidence to convict appellant of disorderly conduct. There is simply nothing in this record to suggest that appellant's remarks, shocking and unpardonable as they are, produced "unreasonable noise." 18 Pa.C.S.A. *266 § 5503(a)(2). This subsection of the statute is plainly not intended to criminalize speech and I would not sanction its use in such a way. I would reverse the judgment of sentence based only on appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct and affirm judgment of sentence for obstructing the administration of law. FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting. The statute in question defines the offense as follows: Mr. Justice Manderino dissenting in Commonwealth v. Cook, 468 Pa. 249, 263, 361 A.2d 274, 281-282 (1976) said: Certainly, one does not have to strain to imagine this statute being read to restrict conduct protected by the First Amendment, and one must speculate at its meaning and application. I therefore dissent and would declare the subject statute unconstitutional on its face. [1] Comment, Public Disorder Offenses Under Pennsylvania's New Crimes Code, 78 Dick.L.R. 15 (1973).