Title: State v. Michael T. Morgan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1993AP002089-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1995

No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-2089-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Michael T. Morgan, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
NOV 21, 1995 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.  This is a review of an unpublished court 
of appeals decision reversing an order of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, the Honorable John A. Franke, suppressing a 
handgun and cocaine base found on petitioner Michael T. Morgan 
(Morgan).  Morgan was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1991-92), and possession of 
cocaine while armed, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 161.14(7)(a), 
161.41(3m), 161.48, 939.63 (1991-92).  Morgan challenged the 
legality of the pat-down search that produced the evidence leading 
to the charges.  At a hearing on May 28, 1993, the circuit court 
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.  The 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
2 
court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the circuit 
court.  We hold that the pat-down search did not violate Morgan's 
right under the federal and state constitutions to be free from 
unreasonable searches.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
 
The following facts are taken from the preliminary hearing 
and suppression hearing in this matter, and are undisputed.  City 
of Milwaukee Police Officers Peter Mulock (Mulock) and Brent 
Tidquist (Tidquist) were on patrol at four a.m. on March 1, 1993. 
 Officers Mulock and Tidquist were driving in a squad car near 
Capitol Drive in Milwaukee, an area which Officer Mulock described 
as a "fairly high-crime-rate area."  Officer Mulock also noted 
that "there was not a whole lot of traffic" on the street at that 
time.  Officers Mulock and Tidquist observed a vehicle containing 
three males driving out of an alley.  The car then made several 
turns in the space of a few city blocks, and entered another 
alley.  Having observed that the car's license plates were 
expired, the officers engaged the emergency lights on their squad 
car and stopped the vehicle.  Officer Mulock then approached the 
car and asked Morgan (the car's driver) for his operator's 
license.  Morgan rapidly checked his pockets and wallet, and 
searched some of his pockets several times; however, he was unable 
to locate the license.  According to Officer Mulock, Morgan 
"appeared nervous" while searching for his license.  Officer 
Mulock testified at the suppression hearing: 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
3 
Q:Now, Officer Mulock, not that this has ever happened, 
when I'm pulled over, I act a little nervous 
too.  Is this anything—anymore [sic] unusual 
than the usual person stopped by the police? 
A:I think so.  Yes, it was. 
Q:What was different about it? 
A:Just the look on his face.  He just appeared nervous 
and the way he was checking his pockets.  He 
was doing it extremely fast.   
 
Morgan did in fact possess a license, which was discovered in a 
later search of his wallet incident to arrest.   
 
Officer Mulock then asked Morgan to step out of the vehicle, 
and performed a pat-down search on Morgan.  
In the course of the 
pat-down search, Officer Mulock discovered a loaded .22-caliber 
pistol in Morgan's coat pocket.  Officer Mulock placed Morgan 
under arrest and conducted a custodial search of Morgan's person 
which discovered certain pills (later determined to be diazepam, 
an antianxiety drug) and a pipe showing traces of cocaine base 
residue.  According to Officer Mulock's testimony, in the event 
that he had not found the gun on Morgan, the officer would have 
placed Morgan in the back of his squad car while he or Officer 
Tidquist conducted various informational inquiries through the 
squad car's radio, such as an operator's license check and a 
criminal record check.   
 
Morgan challenged the legality of the pat-down search.  
Following a suppression hearing, the circuit court granted 
Morgan's motion to suppress.  The circuit court ruled that the 
pat-down search was impermissible under State v. Swanson, 164 
Wis. 2d 437, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991): 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
4 
 
Officer Mulock had every intention to put [Morgan] into 
some sort of custody and run a check.  He was going to 
put him in the back of the vehicle using his vehicle as 
something of a tentative booking room, run a check, and 
then either keep him in custody or release him.  I think 
it's reasonable for a police officer to do that. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
The only way I think this frisk flies is by the 
custodial search by the officer.  And while it seems to 
be reasonable, it seems to me that the way Swanson is 
written, it appears to be very deliberate, very careful, 
very intentional, that what this officer did, at least 
at the time of the pat down had not yet ripend [sic] 
into an arrest, that I have to look at this not in the 
context of what might not have happened in the next few 
minutes, not even a five or ten minute period, but that 
the moment, under Swanson at that moment, I don't 
believe there was an arrest and, therefore, I don't 
believe that—Well, at least arguably reasonable, the 
search can fly. . . . 
 
If Officer Mulock had said "What I'm going to do is put 
you in the back of my car.  I'm going to run a check on 
your license and before I do that, I'm going to search 
you.  You are going to be taken into custody and I'm 
searching you pursuant to that custody," then I believe 
that this flies.  Swanson, at least in dicta, addressed 
this problem and says the officer's unarticulated plan 
is irrelevant in determining the question of custody.   
 
 
The circuit court held that, in the absence of a "clear and 
specific record," it could not rely on the officer's testimony 
that the stop occurred in a high-crime neighborhood in determining 
the legality of the search.  In addressing the other factors the 
officer raised as justifying the search, the circuit court stated: 
 
While the time of night and the nervousness of the 
subject and the number of occupants are all factors that 
are pertinent in deciding whether there's a sufficient 
basis to conduct the pat down, they're not enough by 
themselves.  And together here there's really nothing 
more than a routine traffic stop.  People who were 
stopped with expired plates and can't find their 
licenses are often nervous . . . and I don't find that 
there 
was 
any 
nervousness 
that 
was 
not 
easily 
attributable to the fact [Morgan] could not find a 
license.  The fact that he actually did have his license 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
5 
on him is not important in assessing what the officer 
did but it's important in assessing the credibility of 
what happened here and I'm satisfied based on the 
officer's own testimony in that fact that what he was 
observing was a person nervously trying to come up with 
their driver's license and thinking it's there and not 
being able to find it. 
 
 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the pat-down 
search was permissible because the totality of the circumstances 
justified a protective search for weapons.  The court of appeals 
held that the circuit court had erroneously relied on Swanson in 
granting the defendant's motion to suppress; the court of appeals 
stated that Swanson held a search invalid because it had exceeded 
its permissible scope, and not because the officer had failed to 
inform the suspect of his intention to place the suspect in his 
squad car.  The court of appeals then held that the search of 
Morgan was supported by articulable facts in the record, including  
the "fairly-high-crime-rate area"; Morgan's driving in two 
alleys at approximately 4:00 a.m.; Morgan's nervous and 
unsuccessful efforts to produce a driver's license upon 
request; and Morgan's apparent violation of the traffic 
law by driving without a license.  We also note that 
Officer Mulock and his partner were outnumbered by the 
three occupants of the car. 
 
The court of appeals concluded: "While none of these factors in 
isolation necessarily would justify a frisk for weapons, and 
although the trial court noted the lack of a `clear and specific 
record' regarding whether the area was one of high crime, in 
combination they provide ample justification."  
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantee citizens 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
6 
the right to be free from "unreasonable searches."1  This court, 
in construing Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
consistently 
follows 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Betterly, 191 
Wis. 2d 407, 417, 529 N.W.2d 216 (1995).  Upon review of an order 
granting suppression, this court will uphold the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are against the "great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 
69, 79, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (quoting State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)).  However, deciding 
whether a search is unreasonable is a question of law that this 
court reviews without deference to the lower courts.  Betterly, 
191 Wis. 2d at 416-17.  
                     
    1  The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.  
 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  
 
Searches and seizures.  SECTION 11  The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated;  and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
7 
 
A pat down, or "frisk," is a search.  State v. Guy, 172 
Wis. 2d 86, 93, 492 N.W.2d 311, 314 (1992), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 3020 (1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 
(1968)).  The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable 
searches; in determining whether a search is reasonable, this 
court balances the need for the search against the invasion of the 
suspect's privacy entailed in the search.  Id. at 93.  Pat-down 
searches are justified when an officer has a reasonable suspicion 
that a suspect may be armed.  Id. at 94.  The officer's reasonable 
suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion."  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 
139 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).  The test is objective:  
[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger. . . .  And in 
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such 
circumstances, due weight must be given . . . to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to 
draw from the facts in light of his experience.   
Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 94 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).  Finally, 
the determination of reasonableness is made in light of the 
totality of the circumstances known to the searching officer.  
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 139-40. 
 
Morgan argues that the pat-down search conducted by Officer 
Mulock was not supported by articulable facts giving rise to a 
reasonable belief that Morgan was armed.  We hold that an officer 
making a Terry stop need not reasonably believe that an individual 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
8 
is armed; rather, the test is whether the officer "has a 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect may be armed."  Guy, 172 
Wis. 2d at 94 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); see also Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27 ("The officer need not be absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed . . . .").  In this case, then, we look to the 
totality of the circumstances known to Officer Mulock in 
determining whether an officer in his position would reasonably 
suspect that Morgan might be armed.  See Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 
at 144 (test for frisk is reasonable suspicion under totality of 
circumstances). 
 
Morgan claims that the court of appeals disregarded the 
circuit court's findings of fact in using the high-crime nature of 
the area as a factor justifying the search.  However, the record 
reveals that the circuit court did not make a factual finding that 
the area was not a high-crime area.  The circuit court stated in 
making its ruling:  
 
I think it's absolutely reasonable for police officers 
to consider where they are.  It's just not the same in 
Riverhills [sic] as it is in other parts of town.  But 
if the state wants the Court to rely on a high-crime 
area theory in justifying a Terry pat down, there has to 
be a clear and specific record made. 
 
I've discussed this issue at length and reviewed the 
applicable cases and reviewed the problems that we will 
face if we simply say whenever police are in a high-
crime area, they have the right to frisk.  Maybe that's 
reasonable in this day and age but if it's going to be 
done, it's going to have to be done with some clear and 
specific rules which we don't have right now.  We have 
Terry.  Terry doesn't allow it . . . . 
 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
9 
The circuit court did not make a finding that the area was not 
high-crime; instead, it ruled that its reading of Terry did not 
allow the consideration of the high-crime nature of an area as a 
factor justifying a search.  The court of appeals in this case was 
not disregarding the circuit court's findings of fact in 
considering the high-crime area in its analysis.  The court of 
appeals, like this court, was making its de novo determination of 
the reasonableness of the search, a question of law reviewed 
without deference to the lower courts.  Betterly, 191 Wis. 2d at 
416-17. 
 
Like the court of appeals, we find that an officer's 
perception of an area as "high-crime" can be a factor justifying a 
search.  Professor LaFave notes that "the area in which the 
suspect is found is itself a highly relevant consideration" in 
justifying a search, and that the cases "most frequently stress 
that the observed circumstances occurred in a high-crime area."  3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), at 456 (2d ed. 
1987).  In United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 102 (1994), the 
court noted: "[The searching officer] expressed concern that he 
was patrolling a high crime area of town . . . .  The location in 
which suspicious behavior occurs, like the time of day, is among 
the facts that generate reasonable inferences as to the necessary 
police response to the behavior."  See also United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 n.3 (1985) (noting that presence of 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
10 
vehicles in an area "known to be frequented by drug traffickers" 
was a factor justifying investigative stop); United States v. 
Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The reputation of an 
area for criminal activity is an articulable fact upon which a 
police officer may legitimately rely.").   
 
State supreme courts have also noted the high-crime nature of 
an area in determining the legality of a search.  In People v. 
Souza, 885 P.2d 982 (Cal. 1994), the California Supreme Court 
relied on an officer's description of an area as high-crime as a 
factor in upholding a search.  Citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682-83 
n.3, the court stated "[a]n area's reputation for criminal 
activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an 
investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 Souza, 885 P.2d at 992.  Recent decisions in several states 
endorse the use of an area's reputation as a factor.  See State v. 
Dean, 645 A.2d 634, 636 (Me. 1994); Commonwealth v. Fraser, 573 
N.E.2d 979, 982 (Mass. 1991); State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 505, 
513 (N.J. 1994).  Both the State in this case and Professor LaFave 
note other jurisdictions conforming to the rule.  See LaFave, 
supra, § 9.3(c), at 456-57 n.194 (citing, inter alia, People v. 
Cobbin, 692 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1984); State v. Freeman, 414 N.E.2d 
1044 (Ohio 1980); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 335 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1975); State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1980); State v. 
Choat, 363 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1987)).   
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
11 
 
Morgan argues that the fact that Morgan was in a supposedly 
high-crime area should not be sufficient to justify the search, or 
all residents of high-crime areas would be denied the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment.  We recognize, as did the court in People 
v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 119 (Cal. 1979), that many persons "are 
forced to live in areas that have `high crime' rates or they come 
to these areas to shop, work, play, transact business, or visit 
relatives or friends.  The spectrum of legitimate human behavior 
occurs every day in so-called high crime areas."  Furthermore, 
Professor LaFave warns that "simply being about in a high-crime 
area should not of itself ever be viewed as a sufficient basis to 
make an investigative stop."  LaFave, supra, § 9.3(c), at 457-58. 
 However, that is not the case here, because it is clear from the 
record that Officer Mulock, in making a determination that Morgan 
might have been armed, did not rely solely on the fact that he 
observed Morgan in what the officer termed a "fairly high-crime-
rate area."  Officer Mulock had seen Morgan's car leaving and 
entering two alleys in rapid succession.  Officer Mulock also knew 
that Morgan was driving a car with expired license plates, and 
observed Morgan nervously fail to locate his operator's license.  
Morgan was driving at four a.m. in a lightly-trafficked area.  The 
combination of these facts, not the mere fact that Morgan was in a 
"fairly high-crime-rate area," led to the search. 
 
In State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 206 N.W.2d 613 
(1973), 
this 
court 
found 
an 
officer's 
pat-down 
valid 
on 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
12 
substantially similar facts.  As in the instant case, the officer 
in Williamson stopped the suspect's car after observing an 
irregular pattern of driving, and the driver of the car could not 
produce a driver's license.  The stop occurred at 11 p.m.  The 
court held:  
 
Given . . . the circumstances here present, including 
the time of day and the fact that the defendant was 
driving without a driver's license on his person, and 
without any identification, the police officer was 
justified in his precautionary pat-down to determine if 
the defendant was armed and dangerous.   
 
Id. at 520.  The search in Williamson was permissible even without 
the presence of a factor present in the instant case: the high-
crime area. 
 
The court of appeals in the present matter also noted the 
time at which the stop occurred as a relevant factor.  In State v. 
Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 435, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 846 (1980), this court noted suspect activity occurring 
"in the early morning hours" as a factor justifying a stop and 
frisk.  Other jurisdictions have considered the time of day to be 
a factor in forming an officer's articulable suspicion, see United 
States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting 
time of night—9 p.m.—as a factor justifying officer's pat-down 
search).  The United States Supreme Court, in Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1983), noted that "[t]he hour was late" in 
upholding a Terry search for weapons.  Finally, Professor LaFave 
includes the time of day as one of "several other factors, none of 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
13 
which would individually justify a stopping for investigation, 
which nonetheless are properly considered together with other 
suspicious circumstances in determining whether there are grounds 
for such a brief seizure."  LaFave, supra, § 9.3(c), at 454.  We 
hold that the time of night—four a.m.—may be considered in 
determining the legality of the pat-down search of Morgan. 
 
Morgan argues that the court of appeals disregarded a finding 
of fact by the circuit court in relying on Morgan's perceived 
nervousness as a factor justifying the search.  However, the 
record shows that the circuit court specifically found that Morgan 
was nervous; the court, in making its ruling on the defendant's 
motion, stated that Morgan "nervously and repeatedly went through 
his wallet and his pockets" while searching for his license.  
Nonetheless, the circuit court considered Morgan's nervousness not 
unusual in light of the fact that a person in his situation might 
expect to be nervous: "People who were stopped with expired plates 
and can't find their licenses are often nervous . . . I don't find 
that there was any nervousness that was not easily attributable to 
the fact he could not find a license."  The circuit court, then, 
made a finding that Morgan was nervous, but discounted the 
nervousness as a factor justifying the search because it might be 
explained by Morgan's not being able to find his license.  We note 
that another explanation for Morgan's nervousness might have been 
the fact that he was carrying a loaded .22-caliber pistol and drug 
paraphernalia while speaking to an officer of the law.  We also 
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
14 
note that Officer Mulock testified that Morgan appeared more 
nervous than the "usual person stopped by the police."  We 
conclude that the court of appeals, and this court, can use 
Morgan's nervousness as a factor in its de novo determination of 
the legality of Officer Mulock's pat-down search. 
 
In the present matter, we agree with the court of appeals 
that the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Mulock 
justified a pat-down search of Morgan for weapons.  Officer Mulock 
observed the defendant driving in and out of alleyways at four 
a.m., in an area which the officer considered a high-crime area, 
and in a car with an expired license.  Officer Mulock observed 
that the defendant "appeared nervous" while failing to produce his 
operator's license.  According to Officer Mulock's later testimony 
at the suppression hearing, Morgan was more nervous than the 
typical person stopped by the police.  A reasonably prudent 
officer in the position of Officer Mulock could have concluded 
that Morgan might be armed.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (frisk is 
justified "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that . 
. . the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous").  We find that these facts, taken in combination, were 
sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to have a reasonable 
suspicion that Morgan might be armed, and justified the limited 
pat-down search for weapons which Officer Mulock conducted.   
 
No. 93-2089-CR 
 
 
 
15 
 
On this review, the State urges us to formulate a "bright-
line" rule making all searches justified when a police officer 
intends to place a suspect in a squad car.  We decline.  This case 
is simply resolved on settled Fourth Amendment law. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
No. 93-2089-CR.JPG 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
  JANINE P. GESKE, J.  (Concurring).   I fully concur in not 
only the mandate, but also in the legal analysis presented in the 
majority opinion.  I am writing this concurrence solely to address 
the dissent.   
 
As noted in the dissent, the "controlling principles of law 
applicable to this case are firmly established."  (Dissent at 1.) 
 These include the principle that the determination of whether an 
officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
pat-down must be based on the totality of the circumstances.  This 
court 
has 
often 
reiterated 
that 
"all 
of 
the 
circumstances . . . are to be considered in determining what was 
reasonable police procedure in the particular situation."  State 
v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973) (quoting 
State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 297, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972)). 
 
A court must employ common sense in its analysis of whether 
an officer, at the time of the encounter, faced a situation which 
in its entirety justified a pat-down.  Individual factors cannot 
simply be pulled out and discarded one by one.  As the Supreme 
Court noted, even "Terry itself involved a 'series of acts, each 
of them perhaps innocent' if viewed separately, 'but which taken 
together warranted further investigation.'"  United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 22 (1968)).  The facts and inferences relied upon need not all 
 
No. 93-2089-CR.JPG 
 
 
 
2 
be given equal weight but the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the officer must at least be considered. 
 
I agree with the dissent's assertion that hindsight cannot 
constitutionally be employed to justify a pat-down.  (Dissent at 
7.)   However, neither can hindsight be used to selectively 
discount facts and circumstances as they were perceived by the 
officer at the time of the encounter.  The totality of 
circumstances must be examined not from the viewpoint of one 
sitting on a judicial bench under the cold white lights of a safe 
courtroom, but rather from the viewpoint of a police officer 
standing in what he believes to be a "fairly-high-crime" area at 
4:00 a.m. next to a car with three men in it, having to make that 
split-second decision of whether, under the circumstances, to 
pat-down Morgan for the officer's own safety.  Did the officer 
have a reasonable suspicion Morgan might be armed under the 
circumstances?  At 4:00 a.m. on March 2, Officer Mullock had 
observed the car exit an alley, make several turns and then enter 
another alley at a time when there was not much traffic on the 
road.  He had observed a vehicle with expired plates which 
contained three men.  Upon stopping the car, he saw Morgan 
nervously fail to locate a driver's license despite repeatedly 
checking his pockets and wallet.   
 
The 
key, 
as 
with 
any 
Fourth 
Amendment 
question, 
is 
reasonableness.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.  I agree with the majority 
 
No. 93-2089-CR.JPG 
 
 
 
3 
in our de novo review that, under the circumstances presented to 
Officer Mullock at the time of the pat-down, his suspicion that 
Morgan may be armed was reasonable. 
 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Roland B. Day and 
Justices Donald W. Steinmetz, William A. Bablitch, Jon P. Wilcox 
and Ann Walsh Bradley join this concurring opinion. 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting).   The controlling 
principles of law applicable to this case are firmly established. 
 I disagree with the majority opinion's application of these 
principles to the facts of this case to determine the validity of 
a pat-down frisk.  The validity of a pat-down frisk is an area of 
law which is particularly fact sensitive. 
 
I agree with the circuit court's stated reasons for 
suppressing the evidence.  I conclude that the factors the 
majority relies upon to justify the pat-down search of the 
defendant do not give rise to the "reasonable suspicion" that the 
defendant was armed, as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968).  Consequently, I would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court with 
directions to reinstate its suppression order. 
 
I am particularly troubled by the majority opinion's reliance 
on the fact that the defendant was stopped in what the police 
officer described as "a high crime area or what I would consider 
[a] high crime area."  The officer failed to state the basis for 
his portrayal of the area and did not define the geographical 
locality about which he was speaking.   
 
Many of the cases cited by the majority for its ruling that a 
police officer's sweeping and imprecise characterization of an 
area as high crime can justify a pat-down frisk have demanded far 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
2 
more specificity than one can glean from the record in this case.2 
  
 
I think the circuit court was right in concluding that "if 
the state wants the Court to rely on a high-crime area theory in 
justifying a Terry pat down, there has to be a clear and specific 
record" documenting both the specific boundaries and the nature of 
the criminal activity in the area in question.  Crime itself is 
obviously a variegated phenomenon.  Some effort must be made to 
correlate the specific type of crime allegedly endemic to a 
particular area with the police officers' reasonable suspicion 
that an individual whom they intend to search is armed.  
 
No such correlation was made here.  I agree with Professor 
LaFave's conclusion that "[u]nspecific assertions that there is a 
crime problem in a particular area should be given little weight, 
at least as compared to more particular indications that a certain 
                     
     2  See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 677 
(1985) (stop lawful in area under surveillance for suspected drug 
trafficking); United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 
1984) (area of stop and pat-down had recently been victimized by 
12 unsolved burglaries); People v. Souza, 885 P.2d 982, 984 (Cal. 
1994) (stop lawful when officer described area of stop as a "high 
crime" area "known for burglaries and drug activities" and officer 
had recently make two arrests "in the exact area"); State v. Dean, 
645 A.2d 634, 634-35 (Me. 1994) (stop lawful in uninhabited area 
patrolled at the request of its owners because of numerous 
complaints of vandalism); State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 505, 505-06 
(N.J. 1994) (pat-down lawful; officer who was personally familiar 
with area of stop as a high crime area stated that he had made 
more than 100 arrests in the area). 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
3 
type of criminal conduct of the kind suspected is prevalent in 
that area."3   
 
Even were I to accept the majority's designation of the place 
of the stop as a high crime area, "even in high crime areas, where 
the possibility that any given individual is armed is significant, 
Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspicion before a frisk 
for weapons can be conducted."  Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 
334-35 n.2 (1990).  The other factors cited by the majority in 
reaching its conclusion that the state had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to search the defendant for arms do not add 
up to such "reasonable individualized suspicion."   
 
With reference to the defendant's allegedly erratic driving, 
the police officer conceded during the suppression hearing that 
the defendant violated no traffic ordinances and that nothing 
about the defendant's driving had triggered suspicion that he was 
engaged in criminal activity.  Instead, the officer began trailing 
the defendant's car because of "a general sense of unease that 
[he] had because it was late at night and the car was driving in a 
way that [he] couldn't put [his] finger on."  This testimony 
represents precisely the sort of "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch'" which is insufficient under Terry to trigger 
the requisite reasonable suspicion that a defendant is armed.  
                     
     3  3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), at 457 (2d 
ed. 1987). 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
4 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  Such a hunch stands in marked contrast to 
the facts triggering reasonable suspicion in the Williamson case 
relied upon by the majority, in which the defendant's erratic 
driving evinced an obvious effort to evade the police.  State v. 
Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 517-18, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973). 
 
I also question the majority's reliance on the officer's 
description of the defendant as nervous.  While it is true, as the 
majority opinion notes, that the officer testified to the 
defendant being more nervous than the usual person stopped by the 
police, his testimony indicates that he was neither fully sure 
that such a behavioral difference truly existed nor fully capable 
of articulating what it entailed.4  
 
The circuit court concluded that the defendant's nervousness 
was attributable to the fact that people with expired plates who 
cannot find their licenses "are often nervous."  What the officer 
was observing, the circuit court stated, "was a person nervously 
                     
     4  Q:  Now, Officer Mulock, not that this has ever happened,  
when I'm pulled over, I act a little nervous too.  Is this 
anything--anymore unusual than the usual person stopped by the 
police?   
 
 
A:  I think so.  Yes, it was. 
 
     Q:  What was different about it? 
 
     A:  Just the look on his face.  He just appeared nervous and 
the way he was checking his pockets.  He was doing it extremely 
fast.   
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
5 
trying to come up with their driver's license and thinking it's 
there and not being able to find it."   
 
This finding of historical fact is entitled to greater 
deference from this court than it received in the majority 
opinion.  As the majority opinion itself states, when this court 
reviews an order granting suppression, it must uphold the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are against the "great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Kiper, 193 
Wis. 2d 69, 79, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (quoting State v. 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)).   
 
The evidence in this record supports the inference which the 
circuit court expressly drew:  that to the limited extent that the 
officer could describe how the defendant was "more nervous" than 
the average person stopped, his description--of someone "checking 
his 
pockets" 
"extremely 
fast"--suggests 
no 
more 
than 
the 
nervousness of the average person unable to produce a driver's 
license requested by a law enforcement officer.  For the majority 
opinion to speculate as it does about other possible reasons for 
the defendant's nervousness is not only to read into the record 
facts which are not there, but also to ignore the deferential 
standard of review to which the circuit court's findings are 
entitled.   
 
I acknowledge, as this court has previously stated, that 
there can be no litmus test concerning the quantum and nature of 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
6 
information necessary to constitute the "specific and articulable 
facts" necessary to trigger the "reasonable suspicion" that a 
defendant is armed as required by Terry and its progeny.  State v. 
Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 676, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).  And I also 
recognize that a concatenation of factors individually consistent 
with 
innocent 
behavior 
may, 
under 
particular 
facts 
and 
circumstances, give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion 
which Terry requires.  Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); 
State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 835, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989).   
 
Before a concatenation of factors individually consistent 
with innocent behavior can trigger reasonable suspicion, however, 
some degree of suspicion must attach to the specific acts which, 
when combined, add up to reasonable suspicion.  United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).  Hence in Sokolow itself, for 
example, which involved a stop rather than a pat-down frisk, the 
Court pointed to the fact that the respondent traveled under an 
alias, paid for two plane tickets costing $2100 with a roll of $20 
bills, took a 20-hour flight from Honolulu to Miami but only 
stayed in Miami for 48 hours, and checked no luggage as among the 
factors triggering reasonable suspicion that the respondent was a 
drug courier and therefore justifying his brief detention.   
 
But in this case, while the defendant's expired plates 
provided the officers with a reason to stop him, none of the 
factors relied upon by the majority warrants upholding the 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
7 
subsequent pat-down frisk.  Neither the time of night, nor the 
undocumented assumption that an unspecified "area" was prone to 
crime, nor the defendant's manner of driving, nor the defendant's 
entirely 
understandable 
nervousness 
constituted 
behavior 
specifically and articulably related to a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant was armed and dangerous. 
 
Consequently, 
these 
non-specific 
and 
non-individualized 
factors do not add up to the totality of circumstances justifying 
the requisite reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed 
and dangerous.  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 
(1981); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1981).  Zero plus zero 
will always equal zero.  To conclude otherwise is to lend 
significance to "circumstances [which] describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers" and subject them to 
"virtually random seizures."  Reid, 448 U.S. at 438.   
 
One might try to justify the officers' actions in this case 
by hindsight.  The officers' frisk produced a loaded gun.  But 
hindsight does not satisfy the federal or state constitution.  One 
might also try to justify the officers' actions in this case in 
the name of crime prevention and police protection.  Crime 
prevention and police protection might well be served by allowing 
law enforcement officers to frisk everyone they stop.  But the 
federal and state constitutions do not allow such frisks.   
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
8 
 
In contrast to the majority opinion, I agree with the circuit 
court's depiction of this case as a routine traffic stop.  The 
defendant displayed no behavior to support a reasonable belief 
that he might be armed and dangerous.  Therefore I conclude that 
the circuit court was correct when it suppressed the evidence.  
 
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.   
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2089-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Michael T. Morgan, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  188 Wis. 2d 79, 524 N.W. 2d 647 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
November 21, 1995 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 7, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
JOHN A. FRANKE 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
GESKE, J., DAY, C.J., STEINMETZ, BABLITCH, 
 
 
 
WILCOX and BRADLEY, JJ, concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by William J. Tyroler, assistant state public defender; 
Calvin Malone and Rebholz, Auberry & Malone, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Calvin Malone. 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant 
the 
cause 
was 
argued 
by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 93-2089.ssa 
 
 
93-2089-CR   State v. Morgan 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Pamela Moorshead and 
Adelman, Adelman, and Murray, S.C., Milwaukee for the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation and National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).