Title: Shifflett v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140273
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 2015

VIRGINIA: 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Thursday, the 8th day of 
January, 2015. 
 
Galen Shifflett, 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against   
Record No. 140273 
 
 
 
Court of Appeals No. 1675-12-3 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered 
by the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion that the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia did not err in ruling that any alleged error by the 
Circuit Court of Rockingham County was harmless. 
Galen Shifflett (Shifflett) was charged in the Circuit Court 
of Rockingham County with aggravated sexual battery in violation of 
Code § 18.2-67.3.  A jury found Shifflett guilty, and he was fined 
$15,000 and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. 
Shifflett appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the 
circuit court erred because it allowed the Commonwealth to cross-
examine him about whether a prior felony conviction involved lying, 
cheating or stealing.  The Court of Appeals decided in Shifflett v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1675-12-3, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 12, at *1, 
*7-8 (Jan. 14, 2014) that even if the circuit court erred in 
allowing the testimony, such error was harmless because other 
corroborating facts bolstered the victim’s account of the events 
 
2 
compared to Shifflett’s.  Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction. 
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the 
alleged victim, Shifflett’s niece, that Shifflett fondled her 
breasts.  Shifflett testified that the accusations against him were 
false. 
Shifflett had previously been convicted of two felonies, one 
of which was subornation of perjury under Code § 18.2-436.  Outside 
the presence of the jury, the Commonwealth argued that it should be 
allowed to impeach Shifflett on cross-examination by asking him 
about his subornation of perjury conviction, by name.  The 
Commonwealth asserted that the subornation conviction should be 
deemed the same as a general perjury conviction.  Shifflett 
contended that the Commonwealth should not be allowed to mention 
the crime by name.  After hearing argument, the circuit court did 
not permit the Commonwealth to mention the crime of subornation of 
perjury by name, but ruled that the Commonwealth could ask 
Shifflett if he had been convicted of a crime involving lying, 
cheating or stealing. 
Thereafter, on cross-examination the Commonwealth asked 
Shifflett if he had been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude.  He answered that he had been convicted 
of two felonies.  The Commonwealth then asked Shifflett if one of 
the felonies had involved lying, cheating or stealing, and 
Shifflett answered affirmatively.  On appeal to this Court, 
Shifflett argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing 
his conviction because the circuit court allowed the Commonwealth 
 
3 
to impeach him by eliciting evidence that he had been convicted of 
a felony involving lying, cheating or stealing. 
Virginia statutory provisions and common law allow the 
Commonwealth to impeach the credibility of a testifying criminal 
defendant by asking if he has been convicted of a felony or a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-269; 
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 374, 228 S.E.2d 688, 691 
(1976) (citing McLane v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 203, 116 S.E.2d 
274, 279-80 (1960)); Va. R. Evid. 2:609(a).  Further, if the 
conviction was for perjury, the name of the offense may be used to 
impeach the defendant.  See, e.g., McAmis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 
419, 422, 304 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1983); Va. R. Evid. 2:609(a)(iii). 
Our Court has stated that admission of the fact of conviction 
of prior felonies or of misdemeanors involving lying, cheating or 
stealing is allowed because the probative value of this information 
in the jury’s determination of a defendant’s credibility as a 
witness outweighs the prejudicial effect of the information upon 
the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence.  Harmon v. 
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 446, 185 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1971).  Mention 
of the name or further details of the prior crimes is not allowed 
because of the potential prejudicial effect of such information on 
the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  
Id. 
Under the common law, felonies were considered crimes that 
reflected negatively upon the veracity of the defendant.  Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 167 Va. 526, 530-31, 189 S.E. 441, 443-44 (1937); see 
also Chrisman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 89, 93-94, 348 S.E.2d 
399, 401 (1986) (holding that felonies were "infamous" crimes of 
 
4 
"moral turpitude" that "cast doubt on the veracity of the 
convict").  Thus, unlike with a misdemeanor, there is no 
requirement that it be stated that a felony involves moral 
turpitude in order for a conviction thereof to be a basis for 
impeachment of a witness’s credibility.  A felony conviction is 
probative of a witness’s veracity regardless of the substance of 
the felony.  Regarding a misdemeanor, the fact that it involves 
moral turpitude is a necessary prerequisite for the conviction to 
be probative in the jury’s determination of the witness’s 
credibility. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the circuit court erred when 
it allowed the Commonwealth to ask Shifflett whether one of his 
felony convictions involved lying, cheating or stealing, we hold 
that the error was harmless.  In this instance, because the 
defendant was charged with sexual battery, the evidence that one of 
his felony convictions involved lying, cheating or stealing would 
only be evidence regarding his credibility, which was properly 
impeached because of his prior felony convictions. 
We will not reverse a trial court for evidentiary errors that 
were harmless to the ultimate result.  Under the harmless error 
doctrine, if there was "a fair trial on the merits and substantial 
justice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or reversed 
. . . for any . . . defect, imperfection, or omission in the 
record, or for any error committed on the trial."  Code § 8.01-678.  
In this case, we apply the standard for non-constitutional harmless 
error, which is that such error is harmless if we can be sure that 
it did not "influence the jury" or had only a "slight effect."  
Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260, 546 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 
 
5 
(2001)(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 
(1946)). 
Information concerning the name or the details of a prior 
crime of which a defendant has been found guilty, whether it is a 
felony or a misdemeanor involving lying, cheating or stealing, is 
not allowed into evidence because such information increases the 
potential of prejudice to the defendant in the jury’s determination 
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence regarding the crime charged.  
Harmon, 212 Va. at 446, 185 S.E.2d at 51.  Our Court has stated 
that the reason such evidence is excluded is because "it may mean 
more to them [the jury] than the mere fact that the defendant is a 
person of doubtful veracity."  Id.  In Harmon, the defendant 
charged with murder was being cross-examined about the details of a 
prior killing he had previously perpetrated.  Id. at 444-45, 185 
S.E.2d at 50-51.  However, as the United States Supreme Court has 
noted in discussing the issue of identifying by name a defendant’s 
prior conviction, where the prior offense is not similar to that 
for which a defendant is presently on trial, its different nature 
means "that its potential to prejudice the defendant unfairly will 
be minimal."  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997). 
In this instance, the additional information allowed into 
evidence regarding Shifflett’s felony conviction, that it involved 
lying, cheating or stealing, did not convey anything more than "the 
mere fact that the defendant is a person of doubtful veracity."  
See Harmon, 212 Va. at 444-46, 185 S.E.2d at 50-51.  It had no 
prejudicial effect as to his guilt or innocence of sexual battery.  
In other words, the fact that one of his felony convictions 
 
6 
involved lying, cheating or stealing did not in any way suggest to 
the jury that he might be more inclined to commit a sexual battery. 
In prosecutions for other offenses, the disclosure of 
information that a defendant has been convicted of a felony 
involving lying, cheating or stealing might have a prejudicial 
effect on the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence because 
the specific crime alleged involves lying, cheating or stealing.  
See, e.g., Payne v. Carroll, 250 Va. 336, 340, 461 S.E.2d 837, 839 
(1995) (holding that mentioning that a party defendant had a prior 
felony conviction involving fraud could mean more to the jury than 
she was a person of doubtful veracity because the civil case 
involved allegations of her committing fraud).  However, this case 
involves allegations of sexual battery.  Therefore, the evidence 
that one of Shifflett’s prior felony convictions involved lying, 
cheating or stealing was only probative of his credibility, which 
was already properly impeached by evidence of his felony 
convictions.  Having reviewed the whole record, including the 
testimony of all witnesses, we can conclude with fair assurance 
that Shifflett received a fair trial because the alleged error did 
not influence the jury or, at most, had only a slight effect.  
Thus, such error was harmless. 
For these reasons, the Court affirms the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals.  The appellant shall pay to the Commonwealth of Virginia 
two hundred and fifty dollars damages. 
 
7 
This order shall be certified to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and to the Circuit Court of Rockingham County, and shall 
be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
_______________ 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE MILLETTE and JUSTICE 
POWELL join, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the circuit court erred 
in permitting the Commonwealth to cross-examine Galen Shifflett 
about whether either of his two prior felony convictions were for 
crimes involving "lying, cheating or stealing," and, further I 
conclude that this error was not harmless based on the record 
before us in this appeal. 
Shifflett was indicted for aggravated sexual battery by force, 
threat or intimidation of a victim 13 or 14 years of age.  Code  
§ 18.2-67.3.  Shifflett had previously been convicted of the felony 
of eluding police, Code § 46.2-817, and the felony of subornation 
of perjury, Code § 18.2-436. 
Shifflett elected to testify at his trial.  When an accused 
elects to testify in his own defense, he places his credibility at 
issue.  In such cases, upon cross-examination of the accused, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to cast doubt upon the veracity of the 
accused by placing into evidence his prior criminal history.  
However, in order to protect against undue prejudice resulting from 
such evidence, the scope of the permissible cross-examination by 
the Commonwealth has long been limited by common law, statute, the 
decisions of this Court, and by the recently adopted Virginia Rules 
 
8 
of Evidence.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-269; Va. R. Evid. 
2:609(a)(iii); Sadoski v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069, 1070, 254 
S.E.2d 100, 101 (1979); Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 446, 
185 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1971).  In sum, as the majority here correctly 
relates, the Commonwealth is permitted to impeach the credibility 
of the accused by inquiring on cross-examination whether the 
accused previously has been convicted of any felony or a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.  The Commonwealth is 
permitted to establish the number of any such convictions, but not 
the name or nature of the underlying crimes.  The sole exception is 
that the Commonwealth may elicit evidence of a conviction for 
perjury by name. 
Shifflett had two misdemeanor convictions which were not for 
crimes of "moral turpitude," and thus were not proper evidence for 
impeachment.  However, his felony convictions for eluding police 
and subornation of perjury were properly subject to use for 
impeachment purposes.  Evidence of the latter conviction became the 
focus of this appeal. 
By a motion made during trial, Shifflett sought a ruling from 
the circuit court that would have limited the Commonwealth's cross-
examination regarding his conviction for suborning perjury.  He 
contended that the Commonwealth should be permitted to establish 
only the fact of this felony conviction but not the name of the 
underlying crime.  Shifflett conceded that Code § 19.2-269 (and Va. 
R. Evid. 2:609(a)(iii)) permits naming perjury specifically, but 
contended that this refers to the specific crime defined under Code 
§ 18.2-434, not the separate crime of subornation of perjury 
defined under Code § 18.2-436.  The Commonwealth responded that 
 
9 
subornation of perjury, although defined as a separate crime in the 
Code, is a "class of perjury" because it is "punished as prescribed 
in § 18.2-434."  Thus, the Commonwealth asserted that Code 
§ 19.2-269 was "broad enough" to allow impeachment by naming the 
offense of subornation of perjury. 
The Commonwealth also asserted that it had the right to ask 
Shifflett whether he had ever been convicted of any crime involving 
lying, cheating or stealing.  The Commonwealth maintained that it 
was not required to "use the phrase a crime of moral turpitude" and 
this was so whether the conviction was for a misdemeanor or a 
felony.  The Commonwealth then advised the circuit court that "if 
[Shifflett] takes the stand I am going to ask him whether he's been 
convicted of any felony involving lying, cheating or stealing.  And 
his answer will determine whether or not I have the ability to 
present anything else."  The circuit court, noting Shifflett's 
exception, ruled that it would permit the Commonwealth to ask 
Shifflett whether he had been convicted of any felony involving 
"lying, cheating or stealing." 
Shifflett's sole assignment of error raises the issue whether 
the circuit court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to cross-
examine him regarding the nature of either of his two prior felony 
convictions as involving lying, cheating or stealing.  Shifflett 
contends that the Commonwealth should have been permitted to adduce 
that he had been convicted of two felonies, and nothing more.  The 
Commonwealth, by assignment of cross-error, contends that the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia erred in failing to expressly hold that 
Shifflett could have been properly impeached under Code § 19.2-269 
by naming his prior suborning perjury conviction. 
 
10 
In the majority opinion of a divided panel of the Court of 
Appeals, Shifflett v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1675-12-3, 2014 Va. 
App. LEXIS 12, at *1 (January 14, 2014), and in this Court's order 
today, neither issue raised by the parties is addressed by simply 
"[a]ssuming, without deciding," that the action of the circuit 
court was error.  The majority in each decision then finds, albeit 
by different rationales, that such error was harmless.  Because, in 
my view, the provisions of Code § 19.2-269 (and Va. R. Evid. 
2:609(a)(iii)) plainly indicate that the circuit court erred, such 
an assumption is both unnecessary and unhelpful to the trial courts 
and the bar, which undoubtedly would welcome guidance regarding the 
error in this case. 
Perjury is a specific crime defined by Code § 18.2-434, in 
pertinent part, as the act of a person who under oath "willfully 
swears falsely on such occasion touching any material matter or 
thing."  Code § 18.2-435 further provides that "[i]t shall likewise 
constitute perjury for any person, with the intent to testify 
falsely," to give conflicting statements under oath in separate 
proceedings. 
By contrast, Code § 18.2-436 defines subornation of perjury as 
procuring or inducing another to commit perjury.  Although this 
crime "shall be punished as prescribed in § 18.2-434," the statute 
does not, as is the case in Code § 18.2-435, state that subornation 
of perjury "constitute[s] perjury."  It is thus clear that the 
legislature intended to define perjury and subornation of perjury 
as separate and distinct crimes, albeit crimes deserving of the 
same punishment. 
 
11 
"Statutes which are not inconsistent with one another, and 
which relate to the same subject matter, are in pari materia, and 
should be construed together; and effect should be given to them 
all, although they contain no reference to one another."  White v. 
Commonwealth, 203 Va. 816, 819, 127 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1962)(internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  We must assume that in 
using the term "perjury" in Code § 19.2-269, the General Assembly 
was aware that it had defined that crime in Code §§ 18.2-434 and 
18.2-435.  Accordingly, as used in Code § 19.2-269, the word 
"perjury" cannot be expanded beyond the definition found in Code 
§§ 18.2-434 and 18.2-435 to include subornation of perjury, a 
separate crime both at common law and under the Code.  In order to 
adopt the Commonwealth's construction of Code § 19.2-269, we would 
have to "add language to the statute . . . [or] accomplish the same 
result by judicial interpretation," which is not within the 
province or power of this Court.  Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005). 
Because the Commonwealth was not permitted to impeach 
Shifflett by naming his felony conviction as subornation of 
perjury, it is self-evident that the circuit court should not have 
permitted the Commonwealth to inquire into the nature of that 
offense as involving "lying, cheating or stealing."  While such 
questions are proper with regard to a prior misdemeanor conviction 
of the accused, conviction of a felony is, without more, the basis 
for impeaching the credibility of the accused.  Code § 19.2-269; 
Va. R. Evid. 2:609(a)(iii).  Characterizing a particular felony as 
a crime involving "lying, cheating or stealing" unduly emphasizes 
the nature of the crime and, moreover, exceeds the limitation on 
 
12 
the Commonwealth's right to cross-examine the accused with regard 
to his criminal history.  For these reasons, in my view, the 
circuit court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to inquire into 
the nature of Shifflett's felony convictions. 
I also cannot agree with the majority that this error was 
harmless.  The majority is correct that the improper admission of 
impeachment evidence does not amount to error of constitutional 
dimension and, thus, under Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 259, 
546 S.E. 2d 728, 731 (2001), reviewing courts cannot assume 
harmless error and must instead examine the entire record in order 
to decide whether "alleged error substantially influenced the 
jury."  I further agree with the majority, citing Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997), that in the typical case 
where improper impeachment is not similar to the offense for which 
a defendant is on trial, there is less potential that the evidence 
will be considered for an improper purpose or unduly prejudice the 
defendant's credibility in the eyes of the jury. 
However, this is not the typical case.  Throughout the trial, 
both the Commonwealth and Shifflett placed particular emphasis on 
the competing credibility of the complaining witness and Shifflett, 
and whether there was a motivation for either to fabricate 
testimony.  Shifflett emphasized that the alleged victim was having 
difficulty with her father's relationship with his girlfriend, 
implying that she may have fabricated the assault allegation in an 
effort to have her father "pay more attention to me."  The 
Commonwealth emphasized the fact of the complaining witness' recent 
report of the alleged assault and Shifflett's lack of credibility 
because of his prior felony convictions.  Indeed, in Shifflett's 
 
13 
motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence at the close of the 
case, the circuit court stated, "Basically we have a factual 
question and it's going to be credibility and it's a jury 
question." 
The harm of improper impeachment of a witness is that it both 
damages the witness's credibility and prejudices the jury against 
the witness's character.  See Payne v. Carroll, 250 Va. 336, 340, 
461 S.E.2d 837, 838-39 (1995) (holding that improper impeachment 
renders the witness not only unworthy of belief in the eyes of the 
jury "but also morally undeserving" of a favorable verdict).  In 
the present case, determining the credibility of the complaining 
witness and Shifflett was the paramount issue to be resolved by the 
jury.   
In the absence of any independent witness testimony or 
forensic evidence that an assault occurred, the sole aspect of the 
Commonwealth's case corroborating the testimony of the complaining 
witness was her recent complaint of the alleged assault.  Code  
§ 19.2-268.2.  Under these circumstances, permitting the 
Commonwealth to improperly impeach Shifflett's credibility by 
denominating one of his felony convictions as involving "lying, 
cheating or stealing" undoubtedly substantially influenced the 
jury's view of his testimony that no assault occurred and his 
theory that the complaining witness had an ulterior motive for 
fabricating the accusation.  Accordingly, it cannot be concluded 
that Shifflett received a fair trial, Code § 8.01-678, and that the 
error did not prejudice the jury's determination of his guilt. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals, set aside Shifflett's conviction, and remand the case 
 
14 
to the circuit court with instructions for a new trial if the 
Commonwealth be so advised. 
 
A Copy, 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk