Title: STATE v GRAVES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-059
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 1981

NO. 80-59 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- CHARLES HENRY GRAVES, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis & Clark, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jeffrey Sherlock argued, Helena, Montana W. William Leaphart argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley argued, County Attorney, Helena, Montana submitted: JUN 1 6 198D Decided : q q g 8 1 Filed: alN . . - - 7 1981 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant C h a r l e s Henry Graves w a s charged by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated a s s a u l t . H e w a s con- v i c t e d of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n t h e L e w i s and C l a r k County District Court and sentenced to twenty y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n w i t h t e n y e a r s supended. Defendant C h a r l e s Graves, a 20-year o l d b l a c k man w i t h a n e l e v e n t h g r a d e e d u c a t i o n , s p e n t most of A p r i l 17, 1979, d r i n k i n g b e e r w i t h f r i e n d s i n Helena, Montana. That evening d e f e n d a n t and s e v e r a l f r i e n d s went t o "Club 21" where he had s e v e r a l more d r i n k s . There he m e t a woman from Idaho who t o l d him t h a t s h e was going to "Mister Lucky's." A f t e r s h e had l e f t , C h a r l e s Graves o b t a i n e d a r i d e to Mister Lucky's a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:00 a.m. on A p r i l 18, 1979. The d e f e n d a n t approached t h e Idaho woman, s a t down n e x t t o h e r a t h e r t a b l e and began t a l k i n g w i t h h e r . The woman t o l d him t h a t s h e d i d n o t wish to be w i t h him. Graves l e f t t h e t a b l e and s a t a t t h e b a r and t h e woman from Idaho j o i n e d C r a i g Marlow, t h e d e c e d e n t , a t a n o t h e r t a b l e . A s h o r t w h i l e later t h e d e f e n d a n t approached Marlow's t a b l e to a s k t h e Idaho woman to dance. B e f o r e d e f e n d a n t could a s k h e r t o dance, C r a i g Marlow jumped up and t o l d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o s t o p h a s s l i n g t h e woman. The Idaho woman t h e n t o l d d e f e n d a n t t h a t s h e d i d n o t want t o dance and he r e t u r n e d to h i s seat a t t h e b a r . A f t e r c o n t e m p l a t i n g Marlow's a c t i o n s , Graves r e t u r n e d t o t h e table to i n q u i r e as to why Marlow was so b e l l i g e r e n t . Marlow a l l e g e d l y jumped up and made some comments about b l a c k men t h i n k i n g t h e y could g e t a l l t h e women and s a i d t h e r e wasn't enough room i n Helena f o r b l a c k s . A t t h i s p o i n t d e f e n d a n t s a i d , "Come o u t s i d e , and I ' l l b u s t your jaw." The b a r t e n d e r came o v e r and t o l d them to "Cool it ." Graves t h e n began walking away when someone y e l l e d "Take it o u t s i d e .It The d e f e n d a n t looked back, and Marlow a l l e g e d l y s a i d , "Hey Mother I?---- r come o u t s i d e . " Defendant t h e n followed Marlow o u t s i d e . Two w h i t e men, one of whom had been s i t t i n g w i t h C r a i g Marlow earlier, a l l e g e d l y followed Graves o u t s i d e . When Marlow reached t h e bottom of t h e stairs, and w h i l e d e f e n d a n t was s t i l l on t h e s t e p s , he t u r n e d and h i t d e f e n d a n t twice on t h e head. C h a r l e s Graves t h e n stabbed C r a i g Marlow t w i c e w i t h a k n i f e , once i n t h e abdomen and once i n t h e c h e s t . Graves t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was "kind of drunk" as opposed to "real drunk," t h a t he was a f r a i d a l l t h r e e w h i t e men were going t o jump him and t h a t he had stabbed t h e d e f e n d a n t b e f o r e he knew what had happened. A f t e r t h e s t a b b i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t attempted to assist o t h e r s i n l o a d i n g Marlow i n t o a v e h i c l e to be t r a n s p o r t e d to t h e h o s p i t a l . One w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t appeared to b e i n a state of shock, w h i l e o t h e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was v e r y calm and c o m p l e t e l y i n c o n t r o l of h i m s e l f . Graves went i n t o Mister Lucky's t o g e t h i s j a c k e t and t h e n began walking down A i r p o r t Road toward Helena. H e was stopped by t w o p o l i c e o f f i c e r s who were responding t o a call from P e t e Hartman, an a i r p o r t s e c u r i t y guard. Hartman t o l d t h e p o l i c e t h a t a s t a b b i n g had o c c u r r e d a t Mister Lucky's s a l o o n and t h a t he was f o l l o w i n g t h e b l a c k s u s p e c t down A i r p o r t Road. O f f i c e r Sturm proceeded to i n t e r c e p t t h e s u s p e c t and saw t h e d e f e n d a n t walking n e a r t h e S t a t e P u b l i s h i n g B u i l d i n g . Sturm p u l l e d h i s v e h i c l e up i n f r o n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t . O f f i c e r Melton and P e t e Hartman p u l l e d t h e i r v e h i c l e s up behind t h e d e f e n d a n t . Both p o l i c e o f f i c e r s were uniformed, armed and d r i v i n g marked p o l i c e cars. Hartman was a l s o armed and wearing a s e c u r i t y guard uniform. O f f i c e r Melton c a l l e d o u t to t h e d e f e n d a n t to "hold i t , " and O f f i c e r Sturm approached t h e d e f e n d a n t . Sturm asked d e f e n d a n t i f he had been involved i n an a l t e r c a t i o n a t Mister Lucky's. Graves responded t h a t he had. When asked i f a k n i f e was involved, Graves s a i d "yes" and t u r n e d t h e k n i f e o v e r to t h e p o l i c e . A t t h i s p o i n t t h e o f f i c e r n o t i c e d blood on d e f e n d a n t ' s hands and p l a c e d him under a r r e s t and gave him h i s Miranda warnings. En r o u t e to t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t made s e v e r a l remarks concerning h i s involvement i n t h e i n c i d e n t . H e was booked i n t o t h e c i t y j a i l . The same morning a t approximately 4 : 2 5 a.m., t h e d e f e n d a n t signed a w r i t t e n c o n f e s s i o n a t t h e county j a i l a f t e r once a g a i n being informed of h i s r i g h t s and a f t e r s i g n i n g a s t a t e m e n t t h a t he knew and understood h i s r i g h t s . A u r i n e sample was also t a k e n a t t h i s t i m e . A s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g was h e l d on August 30, 1979. The d e f e n d a n t s o u g h t to s u p r e s s h i s o r a l c o n f e s s i o n i n t h e p o l i c e c a r , h i s w r i t t e n c o n f e s s i o n t a k e n a t t h e county j a i l , t h e k n i f e used, and t h e u r i n e sample. The d e f e n d a n t d i d not t a k e t h e s t a n d i n t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g , b u t he d i d submit an a f f i d a v i t . The c o u r t i n i t i a l l y r e f used to a c c e p t t h e af f i d a v i t ; however, a t t h e u r g i n g of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , t h e c o u r t agreed to a c c e p t t h e a f f i d a - v i t i f d e f e n s e counsel would f u r n i s h some p r e c e d e n t f o r its a d m i t t a n c e . I n denying t h e motion to s u p p r e s s , t h e c o u r t d i d n o t r e v e a l whether or n o t t h e a f f i d a v i t was c o n s i d e r e d . The day of t h e t r i a l t h e p r o s e c u t i o n moved to endorse f i v e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . These w i t n e s s e s were connected w i t h an armed robbery which occurred t h e n i g h t b e f o r e t r i a l . The p r o s e c u t i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was involved and t o l d t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e y would f i l e a d d i t i o n a l armed robbery c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e same day. The c o u r t r e s e r v e d r u l i n g on t h e motion. N o c h a r g e s were e v e r f i l e d , n o r were t h e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s c a l l e d . Graves t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l and f u l l y admitted s t a b b i n g C r a i g Marlow. H i s o n l y d e f e n s e was s e l f - d e f e n s e . H e was con- v i c t e d of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and sentenced to twenty y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n w i t h t e n y e a r s suspended. Graves was a l s o d e s i g n a t e d a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s have been p r e s e n t e d on appeal: 1. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion to s u p p r e s s , which was based on p o l i c e proce- d u r e s and a l a c k of p r o b a b l e cause t o a r r e s t ? 2. Whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide? 3 . Whether t h e District Court committed r e v e r s i b l e error i n r e f u s i n g to g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed s e l f - d e f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n ? 4. Whether t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s p r e t r i a l conduct p r e j u d i c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s case and j u s t i f i e s r e v e r s a l ? Defendant asserts t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h i s motion t o s u p p r e s s because: (1) t h e p o l i c e f a i l e d t o conform t o mandatory p o l i c e p r o c e d u r e s ; ( 2) Miranda warnings were not g i v e n p r i o r to any q u e s t i o n i n g ; ( 3 ) t h e arrest was n o t s u p p o r t e d by p r o b a b l e cause; ( 4 ) t h e c o n f e s s i o n s and t h e r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of t h e k n i f e were i n v o l u n t a r y as a r e s u l t of t h e c o e r c i v e atmosphere and d e f e n d a n t ' s mental and emotional c o n d i t i o n ; and ( 5 ) t h e t a k i n g of t h e k n i f e c o n s t i t u t e d an unlawful w a r r a n t l e s s s e i z u r e . Defendant f i r s t contends t h a t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s f a i l e d t o comply w i t h mandatory p r o v i s i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n Montana's " s t o p and f r i s k " s t a t u t e s , s e c t i o n s 46-5-401 and 46-5-402, MCA, and t h e r e f o r e , s u p p r e s s i o n is r e q u i r e d . These s t a t u t e s and similar s t a t u t e s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s were enacted to c o d i f y t h e r u l e announced i n t h e landmark " s t o p and f r i s k " case of T e r r y v. Ohio ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. I n T e r r y , t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r stopped and i n i t i a t e d a p a t down f r i s k on two men who he r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d may be armed and dangerous. The case h e l d t h a t under s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n s , "Such a s e a r c h is a reason- a b l e s e a r c h under t h e F o u r t h Amendment, and any weapons s e i z e d may p r o p e r l y be i n t r o d u c e d i n e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e p e r s o n from whom t h e y were taken." 392 U.S. a t 31, 88 S.Ct. a t 1885, 20 L.Ed.2d a t 911. I n s h o r t , T e r r y and t h e Montana s t a t u t e s c o d i f y i n g t h e r u l e announced t h e r e i n a p p l y to a much d i f f e r e n t f a c t s i t u a t i o n t h a n o u r p r e s e n t case. I n o u r p r e s e n t case t h e r e was no " s t o p and f r i s k w . I n s t e a d t h e d e f e n d a n t was merely stopped by t h e p o l i c e and asked i n v e s t i - g a t o r y q u e s t i o n s designed to i d e n t i f y him as a w i t n e s s or a s u s p e c t i n t h e r e p o r t e d crime. The d e f e n d a n t w a s n o t f r i s k e d , n o r were t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s s e a r c h i n g f o r a dangerous weapon. A s a consequence, t h e " s t o p and f r i s k " s t a t u t e s based on t h e r u l e announced i n T e r r y do n o t a p p l y t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Turning n e x t to d e f e n d a n t ' s Miranda i s s u e , it is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Miranda does n o t a p p l y u n t i l a s u s p e c t is " i n c u s t o d y " or "deprived of h i s freedom i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way." A s was s t a t e d i n Oregon v. Mathiason ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. "Any i n t e r v i e w of one s u s p e c t e d of a crime by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w i l l have c o e r c i v e a s p e c t s to it, s i m p l y by v i r t u e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r is p a r t of a law enforcement system which may u l t i m a t e l y cause t h e s u s p e c t to be charged w i t h a crime. But p o l i c e o f f i c e r s are n o t r e q u i r e d to a d m i n i s t e r Miranda warnings to everyone whom t h e y q u e s t i o n . N o r is t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of warnings t o be imposed simply because t h e q u e s t i o n i n g t a k e s p l a c e i n t h e sta- t i o n house, o r because t h e q u e s t i o n e d p e r s o n is one whom t h e p o l i c e suspect.- Miranda warnings are r e q u i r e d o n l y where t h e r e h a s been such a r e s t r i c t i o n on a - p e r s o n ' s freedom as to r e n d e r him ' i n custody. ' It was t h a t sort of c o e r c i v e environment to which Miranda by its terms w a s made a p p l i c a b l e , and to which it is l i m i t e d . " 429 U.S. a t 495, 97 S.Ct. a t 714, 50 L.Ed.2d a t 719. I n o u r p r e s e n t case t h e d e f e n d a n t was d e f i n i t e l y n o t i n c u s t o d y when O f f i c e r Sturm asked him t h e t w o q u e s t i o n s . F u r t h e r , any d e p r i v a t i o n of freedom o c c u r r i n g was t h e r e s u l t of t h e " c o e r c i v e aspect" i n c i d e n t a l t o any c o n v e r s a t i o n between an armed, uniformed p o l i c e o f f i c e r and a s u s p e c t . A s a r e s u l t , t h e p o l i c e were n o t r e q u i r e d t o g i v e t h e Miranda warnings p r i o r to t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r y q u e s t i o n s . The d e f e n d a n t n e x t contends t h a t s u p p r e s s i o n is r e q u i r e d because of a l a c k of p r o b a b l e cause t o arrest. The f o l l o w i n g c h a i n of e v e n t s which c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s 1 knowledge o c c u r r e d p r i o r to t h e a r r e s t . The p o l i c e o f f i c e r s r e c e i v e d a c a l l from an a i r p o r t s e c u r i t y guard which r e p o r t e d t h a t a s t a b b i n g had o c c u r r e d a t Mister Lucky's and t h a t t h e b l a c k s u s p e c t was heading west on A i r p o r t Road. The s e c u r i t y guard d i d n o t i n d i c a t e how he a c q u i r e d t h e knowledge. When t h e o f f i c e r s approached, w i t h t h e informant p r e s e n t , t h e d e f e n d a n t admitted t h a t he was involved i n an a l t e r c a t i o n and t h a t a k n i f e was involved. The d e f e n d a n t t h e n handed t h e k n i f e t o t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r . A t t h i s t i m e t h e policemen observed blood o n t h e k n i f e , on d e f e n d a n t ' s hands, and on h i s c l o t h i n g . A t t h i s p o i n t t h e r e p o r t was f u l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d by d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e k n i f e , t h e blood on h i s hands and c l o t h i n g and h i s a d m i s s i o n t h a t he was involved i n a k n i f e a l t e r c a t i o n a t Mister Lucky I s . I n a case i n v o l v i n g a p a r t i a l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d i n f o r m a n t ' s t i p , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Probable c a u s e e x i s t s where ' t h e f a c t s and cir- cumstances w i t h i n [ t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s ' ] knowledge and of which t h e y had r e a s o n a b l y t r u s t w o r t h y i n f o r m a t i o n [ a r e ] s u f f i c i e n t i n t h e m s e l v e s to w a r r a n t a man of r e a s o n a b l e c a u t i o n i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t ' a n o f f e n s e h a s been or is b e i n g committed. Carroll v. United S t a t e s , 267 U.S. 132, 162." Draper v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 332. I t is obvious t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s possessed s u f f i c i e n t knowledge t o w a r r a n t a b e l i e f t h a t an o f f e n s e had been committed and t h a t it was committed by t h e d e f e n d a n t . Defendant n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c o n f e s s i o n s and t h e pro- d u c t i o n of t h e k n i f e were i n v o l u n t a r y as a r e s u l t of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s l a c k of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . Defendant relies on S t a t e v. White ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e age of t h e d e f e n d a n t , h i s l e v e l of e d u c a t i o n , and h i s l a c k of e x p e r i e n c e w i t h l a w enforcement p r o c e d u r e s are f a c t o r s to be considered i n d e t e r m i n i n g v o l u n t a r i n e s s . However, i n White, t h e c o n f e s s i o n of a 16-year-old who had been i n t e r r o - g a t e d w i t h o u t c o u n s e l p r e s e n t f o r t h r e e hours was h e l d to be v o l u n t a r y . I n White, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The age of a d e f e n d a n t minor, h i s e d u c a t i o n and h i s l a c k of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e law are also i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s to be c o n s i d e r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of a con£ e s s i o n . The d e f e n d a n t h e r e is 1 6 y e a r s o l d , is i n t h e n i n t h g r a d e and had no p r e v i o u s p o l i c e r e c o r d . However, t h e s e f a c t s a l o n e do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t to f i n d t h e c o n f e s s i o n i n a d m i s s i b l e . " 146 Mont. a t 234, 405 P.2d a t 765-766. I n c o n t r a s t w i t h White, Graves was 20 y e a r s o l d w i t h a n e l e v e n t h g r a d e e d u c a t i o n ; however, t h e r e w a s also t e s t i m o n y t h a t h e was e m o t i o n a l l y d i s t u r b e d as a r e s u l t of t h e s t a b b i n g and had consumed a l a r g e q u a n t i t y of a l c o h o l d u r i n g t h e day and evening p r i o r to t h e crime. Defendant had also been read h i s r i g h t s , had h i m s e l f r e a d them, appeared to understand t h e r i g h t s and s i g n e d a w r i t t e n waiver of h i s r i g h t s . No e v i d e n c e was p r o f f e r e d which i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t was i n c a p a b l e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e r i g h t s . Graves himself t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e i n c i - d e n t he was "kind of drunk" as opposed t o "real drunk", and t h e w r i t t e n c o n f e s s i o n was s i g n e d n e a r l y t h r e e and one-half hours later. There also was no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g c o e r c i o n o t h e r t h a n t h e atmosphere i n c i d e n t a l to any a r r e s t . I n a d d i t i o n , Graves1 p r o d u c t i o n of t h e k n i f e and i n i t i a l i n c u l p a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s were s p o n t a n e o u s r e s p o n s e s d u r i n g h i s f i r s t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e o f f i c e r s . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h i s argument is also l a c k i n g i n merit. Defendant also m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e k n i f e should be s u p p r e s s e d as a r e s u l t of a w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h and s e i z u r e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . I n d i s p o s i n g of t h i s i s s u e , w e p o i n t o u t t h a t no s e a r c h w a s involved. A p o l i c e o f f i c e r merely asked Graves i f a k n i f e was involved i n t h e a l t e r c a t i o n whereupon d e f e n d a n t s a i d "yes" and handed t h e k n i f e to t h e p o l i c e . The d e f e n d a n t asserts t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to a c c e p t h i s a f f i d a v i t a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g under S t a t e ex rel. Hansen v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 2 5 ) , 72 Mont. 245, 233 P. 126. However, t h e District Court d i d n o t r e f u s e to a c c e p t it. The c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t it would c o n s i d e r t h e a f f i d a v i t c o n t i n g e n t upon d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f u r n i s h i n g a u t h o r i t y f o r its c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Whether t h e District Court accepted or r e j e c t e d t h e af f i d a v i t is n o t a p p a r e n t from t h e r e c o r d , b u t t h e p r o p e r r e s u l t was reached i n e i t h e r e v e n t . Having a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s conten- t i o n s on t h e merits, w e f i n d t h a t he h a s n o t s u s t a i n e d h i s burden o f proof t o s u p p r e s s t h e evidence. Defendant n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e is i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i - d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e c o n v i c t i o n of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. "On a p p e a l w e examine t h e e v i d e n c e to d e t e r m i n e whether t h e ver- d i c t is supported by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . I n so d o i n g , we view t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e S t a t e . . . S u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e means such r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e as a r e a s o n a b l e mind might a c c e p t as a d e q u a t e to s u p p o r t a conclusion." S t a t e v. Merseal ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 412, 415-416, 538 P.2d 1366, 1367-68; and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . Viewing t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s l i g h t , w e f i n d t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t a convic- t i o n of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The d e f e n d a n t confessed t o t h e s t a b b i n g . H e also t e s t i f i e d "I s a i d [ t o C r a i g Marlow], come o u t s i d e and 1'11 b u s t your jaw." Another w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t a b l a c k man f i t t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e s c r i p t i o n and wearing a r e d s h i r t and w h i t e v e s t admitted af ter t h e s t a b b i n g , "I came o u t c u t t i n g . I c u t him up. T h a t ' s n o t l i k e me." O t h e r testi- mony r e v e a l s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was t h e o n l y b l a c k man a t Mister Lucky's and t h a t he was wearing a red s h i r t and w h i t e v e s t . There w a s also t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s under no com- p u l s i o n to f i g h t t h e d e c e d e n t , and he himself admitted t h a t he c o u l d have r e t u r n e d to h i s seat a t t h e b a r af ter C r a i g Marlow's i n v i t a t i o n to go o u t s i d e . I n s h o r t , t h e j u r y was p r e s e n t e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o conclude t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and t h a t h i s use of d e a d l y f o r c e was n o t j u s t i f i e d . Defendant n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e District Court s r e f u s a l t o g i v e h i s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n on s e l f - d e f e n s e v i o l a t e s t h e Due P r o c e s s Clause. The f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s were g i v e n by t h e District Court: " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 6 "To s u s t a i n t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e S t a t e must prove t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s : "FIRST: That t h e d e f e n d a n t , C h a r l e s Henry Graves, caused t h e d e a t h of C r a i g Alan Marlow; and "SECOND: T h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d so p u r p o s e l y or knowingly; and "THIRD: T h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t -- was n o t j u s t i f i e d - i n u s i n g - t h e f o r c e which -- he used. " I f you f i n d from y o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t each of t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s h a s been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h e n you s h o u l d f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y . " I f , on -- t h e o t h e r hand, ----- you f i n d from y o u r con- s i d e r a t i o n --- o f a l l t h e v i d e n c e --- t h a t any o f t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s --- h a s n o t been proved beyond a reaso- n a b l e d o u b t , -- t h e n you s h o u l d -- f i n d t h e e F e n d a n t n o t a u i l t v . " (Emphasis added.) w I n s t r u c t i o n No. 7 "Criminal homicide is m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homi- c i d e when a homicide which would o t h e r w i s e be d e l i b e r a t e homicide is committed under t h e i n £ l u e n c e of extreme mental o r emotional stress f o r which t h e r e is r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o r e x c u s e . The r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of such e x p l a n a t i o n or excuse s h a l l be determined from t h e v i e w p o i n t o f a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n i n t h e actor's s i t u a t i o n . " " I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 1 7 "A p e r s o n is j u s t i f i e d i n t h e use of f o r c e or t h r e a t t o use f o r c e a g a i n s t a n o t h e r when and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such conduct is n e c e s s a r y to defend himself or a n o t h e r a g a i n s t such o t h e r ' s imminent use of u n l a w f u l f o r c e . However, he is j u s t i f i e d i n t h e u s e of f o r c e l i k e l y to cause d e a t h or s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm o n l y i f he r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t s u c h f o r c e is n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t imminent d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm to himself or a n o t h e r o r to p r e v e n t t h e commission of a f o r - c i b l e f e l o n y . " " I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 1 ( i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t ) "To t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s pleaded n o t g u i l t y , and under t h a t p l e a he d e n i e s e v e r y material a l l e g a t i o n of t h e in£ ormat i o n a g a i n s t him, and i n o r d e r to c o n v i c t him of t h e crime charged a g a i n s t him e v e r y material f a c t n e c e s s a r y to c o n s t i t u t e such crime must be proved by t h e S t a t e by competent e v i d e n c e , beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt; and i f t h e j u r y e n t e r t a i n s any r e a s o n a b l e doubt upon any f a c t or e l e m e n t n e c e s s a r y t o cons ti t u t e t h e crime c h a r g e d , it is your d u t y t o g i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e b e n e f i t of such doubt and to a c q u i t . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g proposed i n s t r u c t i o n : "Defendant's Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3 "You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e S t a t e must prove beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d . n o t act i n s e l f - d e f e n s e . I f you f i n d t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s f a i l e d to prove beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t act i n s e l f - d e f e n s e , you must f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t not g u i l t y . I n o t h e r words, i f you have a reaso- n a b l e doubt whether or n o t t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t e d i n s e l f - d e f e n s e , your v e r d i c t must be n o t g u i l t y . " T h i s Court h a s been faced w i t h numerous cases c h a l l e n g i n g s e l f - d e f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n r e c e n t y e a r s . A s a r e s u l t , Montana l a w i n t h i s r e g a r d h a s become w e l l - s e t t l e d . S e c t i o n 45-3-102, MCA, d e f i n e s " j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e ," and s e c t i o n 45-3-115, MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t it is an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e . S i n c e it is an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , r a t h e r t h a n an element of d e l i b e r a t e homi- c i d e or m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e r e is no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t p l a c i n g t h e burden of proof upon t h e d e f e n d a n t . P a t t e r s o n v. New York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. However, " [ t l h e law i n Montana is t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e burden of p e r s u a s i o n remains on t h e S t a t e , i n o r d e r t o a v a i l h i m s e l f of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of s e l f - d e f e n s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e on t h e i s s u e s to raise a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . " S t a t e v. Lopez ( 1 9 8 0 ) I Mont. , 605 P.2d 178, 182, 37 St.Rep. 36, 41; S t a t e v. Cooper ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 589 P.2d 133, 136, 36 St.Rep. 30, 33; S t a t e v. Grady ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 168, 175, 5 3 1 P.2d 681, 684. I n S t a t e v. Azure ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mon t . , 591 P.2d 1125, 1130, 36 St.Rep. 514, 518, we s t a t e d t h a t an i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t i n g t h e p r o s e c u t i o n must prove t h e absence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt is a correct s t a t e m e n t of t h e law. P u r s u a n t to t h i s Montana l a w , i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n i n t h e p r e s e n t case, it is obvious t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d . I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 6 i n c l u d e s t h e a b s e n c e of j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e as an element of t h e crime of d e l i b e r a t e homicide; t h i s is a m i s s t a t e m e n t of t h e l a w . Absence of j u s t i f i - c a t i o n is an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e which r e q u i r e s t h e d e f e n d a n t to produce s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e b e f o r e it is placed i n i s s u e . Although we f i n d t h a t t h e District Court committed error i n g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6, o u r d i s c u s s i o n may n o t end h e r e . W e must d e t e r m i n e i f t h i s e r r o r was p r e j u d i c i a l or merely h a r m l e s s and whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to g i v e d e f e n d a n t I s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 3. I n examining s e l f - d e f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n s t h i s Court h a s r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d s e v e r a l p r i n c i p l e s which govern t h e review of c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n s . The i n s t r u c t i o n s must be viewed as a whole to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e y have l i m i t e d t h e d e f e n s e from f a i r l y p r e s e n t i n g h i s t h e o r y of d e f e n s e . The District Court need n o t g i v e r e p e t i t i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s n o r i n s t r u c t on e v e r y nuance of a t h e o r y of d e f e n s e . See S t a t e v. Bashor ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . I 614 P.2d 470, 484, 37 S t . Rep. 1098, 1113; S t a t e v. Hamilton (1980 1, Mont . , 605 P.2d 1121, 1129, 37 St.Rep. 70, 79; S t a t e v. Freeman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mon t . , 599 P.2d 368, 373, 36 St.Rep. 1622, 1628-29; S t a t e v. Azure, s u p r a , 591 P.2d a t 1130, 36 St.Rep. a t 519; S t a t e v. R e i n e r ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 950, 953-954, 35 St.Rep. 1861, 1864. I t must be noted t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 1 7 is a v e r b a t i m r e c i t a t i o n of Montana's " j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e " s t a t u t e , sec- t i o n 45-3-102, MCA. I n Bashor, Freeman, Azure and ~ e i n e r , t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n along w i t h omnibus i n s t r u c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e burden of proof and presumption of innocence. T h i s C o u r t approved t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s s t a t i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t could f a i r l y p r e s e n t h i s t h e o r y of d e f e n s e . Azure s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t a s e p a r a t e i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e burden of proof w i t h r e g a r d to s e l f - d e f e n s e would be merely r e p e t i t i v e . I n R e i n e r it was s t a t e d t h a t t h e District C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to f u r t h e r e x p l a i n d e f e n d a n t ' s burden of r a i s i n g a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of g u i l t is not p r e j u d i c i a l , and t h a t merely r e c i t i n g s e c t i o n 45-3-102, MCA, is n o t s o m i s l e a d i n g as to j u s t i f y a new t r i a l . A s we s t a t e d i n R e i n e r : " . . . t h e t e s t t o be a p p l i e d when error is p r e d i c a t e d on a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n is whether, when t h e i n s t r u c t i o n is c o n s i d e r e d as a p a r t of t h e whole body of i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n is p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e a p p e a l i n g p a r t y . S t a t e v. C a r y l (1975), 168 Mont. 414, 430, 543 P.2d 389, 398, states t h e a p p l i c a b l e r u l e : "lIn d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e f f e c t of g i v e n i n s t r u c t i o n s , a l l i n s t r u c t i o n s must be con- s i d e r e d as a whole, and i f t h e y f a i r l y t e n d e r t h e case t o t h e j u r y , t h e f a c t t h a t one i n s t r u c t i o n , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , is n o t as f u l l or a c c u r a t e as it might have been is n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . ' " 587 P.2d a t 953-954, 35 St.Rep. a t 1864. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3 m e r e l y r e p e a t s i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 6 and t h e p r e v i o u s l y quoted p o r t i o n of i n s t r u c - t i o n N o . 1, which p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e S t a t e must prove a n a b s e n c e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. The o n l y d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n and i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 6 r e g a r d i n g t h e burden of proof is t h e use of t h e term " s e l f - d e f e n s e " as opposed t o t h e use of " j u s t i f i e d i n u s i n g t h e f o r c e which he used. " I n t h i s l i g h t , i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3 is p u r e l y r e p e t i t i v e and i n no way p r e v e n t s t h e d e f e n d a n t from f a i r l y pre- s e n t i n g h i s t h e o r y of d e f e n s e . Turning t o t h e c o u r t ' s m i s s t a t e m e n t of l a w i n i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 6, we f i n d t h e e r r o r harmless. N o p r e j u d i c e was s u f f e r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t ; i n f a c t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n as g i v e n was b e n e f i c i a l to h i s d e f e n s e . I n s t e a d of i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o p u t j u s t i - f i a b l e use of f o r c e i n i s s u e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n e f f e c t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t s e l f - d e f e n s e was i n i s s u e and must be proved by t h e S t a t e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. Thus, t h e District Judge i n e s s e n c e , made a f i n d i n g of f a c t b e n e f i c i a l to t h e d e f e n d a n t which should have been made by t h e jury. Under no t h e o r y may t h i s be considered r e v e r s i b l e error. F i n a l l y , t h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h a t p r o s e c u t o r i a l miscon- d u c t p r e j u d i c e d h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e case and denied him a f a i r t r i a l . The f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n is a motion s e e k i n g t h e endorsement of f i v e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s motion was made by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n on t h e f i r s t day of t r i a l . I n a r g u i n g t h e motion, t h e county a t t o r n e y e x p r e s s e d a b e l i e f t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was involved i n a robbery a t k n i f e - p o i n t t h e evening b e f o r e t h e t r i a l and t h a t t h e addi- t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s would be needed to show a c o n t i n u i n g c o u r s e of conduct. The c o u r t r e s e r v e d r u l i n g on t h e motion s t a t i n g t h a t it p r e s e n t e d a q u e s t i o n of r e l e v a n c y and r e q u i r e d a weighing of t h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e evidence a g a i n s t its p r e j u d i c i a l impact. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e motion was not made by t h e county a t t o r n e y i n good f a i t h and t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was f o r c e d t o spend v a l u a b l e t i m e i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e a l l e g e d robbery and to change d e f e n s e t a c t i c s . However, if d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d i d spend e x t e n s i v e t i m e p r e p a r i n g to defend a g a i n s t t h i s a l l e g a t i o n h i s a c t i o n was e n t i r e l y premature. The c o u r t took t h e m a t t e r under advisement and t h e w i t n e s s e s were never endorsed upon t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e is no b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g r e v e r s i b l e error i n t h i s c o n t e x t . The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n is a f f irmed. Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: f ................................ Justices Mr. Justice John C . Sheehy, specially concurring: I concur in the result foregoing, because instruction no. 6 embodied the law of the case and denial of defendant's proposed instruction no. 3 merely avoided repetition in the instructions. Assuming, however, that in the future, prosecutors will not offer instructions such as court's no. 6, which include as an element for the State to prove that the defendant was not justified in using the force which he used, it appears that some comment is necessary as to proper instructions in a so- called self-defense case. First, I believe that merely instructing the jury, as was done in this case in instruction no. 17, in the language of the statute, section 45-3-102, MCA, respecting justified force gives the jury an abstract statement which is of little use in its determinations. In cases where the use of justified force is claimed by the defendant, the jury, at least where the evidence supports it, should be given an instruction that sets out the elements which are to be considered in determining whether the force was justified. These are: (1) the defendant must not be the aggressor; ( 2 ) the danger of harm to him must be a present one, not merely threatened at a future time, or without the present ability of carrying out a threat; (3) the force threatened must be unlawful--either criminal or tortious; (4) the person must actually believe that the danger exists, that is, use of force is necessary to avert the danger, and that the kind and amount of force which he uses is necessary; (5) his belief, in each of the aspects described, is reasonable even if it is mistaken. See, Criminal Law Commission Comment (M.C.C. 1973), section 94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947. Secondly, I believe that the jury should be instructed in a case where the defendant claims justification in the use of force that he has established his defense if he raises a reasonable doubt in the minds of the juries as to the proof by the State of the elements of the crime charged. Thirdly, I believe the jury should further be instructed that if the defendant fails to meet his burden of persuasion by raising such reasonable doubt, it remains in any event, the duty of the State to prove the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a good deal of cloudy area in the instructions which we have been approving in homicide cases where justi- fied force is claimed, not the least of which I pointed out in my dissent in State v. Bashor (19801, Mont . I 614 P.2d 470, 37 St.Rep. 1098. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later.