Title: Matson v. Kivimaki
Citation: 200 N.W.2d 164
Docket Number: 43267
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 1972

200 N.W.2d 164 (1972) Erik MATSON, by his father and natural guardian, Robert Matson, and Robert Matson, individually, Respondents, v. Rudolph KIVIMAKI, Appellant. No. 43267. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 14, 1972. *165 Meagher, Geer, Markham &amp; Anderson and O. C. Adamson II, J. Richard Bland, and R. D. Blanchard, Minneapolis, for appellant. Mast &amp; Sweetman, St. Paul, for respondents. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and TODD, MacLAUGHLIN, and GUNN, JJ. TODD, Justice. Plaintiff Erik Matson, a minor, was bitten by a dog belonging to defendant, Rudolph Kivimaki. Erik and his father, plaintiff Robert Matson, brought this action for damages. The matter was submitted to the jury under instructions which included consideration of Minn.St. 347.22, the so-called "dog-bite statute," and, alternatively, determination of common-law liability of defendant. The jury returned a general verdict, assessing damages for the injuries sustained by the minor child and allowing recovery of medical expenses to plaintiff Robert Matson. Defendant appeals from an order of the trial court denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial and from the judgment. We reverse. The incident which gave rise to plaintiffs' claim occurred on September 5, 1968. At that time, plaintiff Erik Matson was a minor child of the age of 2½ years and resided with his parents at 2774 Dellwood Avenue, Roseville, Minnesota. The plaintiffs' next-door neighbors to the north are Jerry and Dee Scheve. Immediately abutting plaintiffs' property to the east is the property of a Dr. Gutzman, which fronts on Merrill Street. Immediately north of the Gutzman property and directly east of the Scheve property is the property of defendant, which also fronts on Merrill Street. Since there is no alleyway, the four properties have a common point of tangency at the center of their location. In 1957 defendant constructed a 4-foot high wooden fence which completely enclosed *166 his backyard. At the time of the construction of the fence, defendant, who was employed by the Minnesota Highway Department, secured the assistance of two friends, both of whom are registered civil engineers, to survey his property lines for purposes of installing the fence. It is uncontradicted in the evidence that the fence line is installed 6 inches within the property line of defendant as it abuts the Scheve property on the westerly boundary of defendant's property. Plaintiff Robert Matson had purchased his property less than one year prior to the accident. The evidence indicates that plaintiffs and defendant were acquainted as neighbors, but there was no particular social contact between the families. There is no evidence that Erik ever played in the yard of defendant; his parents had expressly told him not to go into defendant's yard. Communication with the minor child at the time of the accident was limited by reason of the fact that he had a substantial hearing loss as a result of a birth defect. There is some evidence that on occasion some of the neighborhood children did enter the yard of defendant, but Mr. Kivimaki's uncontradicted testimony is that, because of the substantial difference in age between his children and most of the other children in the neighborhood, the other children did not often come onto his property. Defendant was the owner of a 4-year-old female springer spaniel named Ruffles, who had been a family pet since she was a month old. The dog was not trained or used as a watch dog. She stood 2 to 2½ feet tall at the shoulders and weighed 40 to 50 pounds and was kept either in defendant's house or his backyard. The dog could not crawl through defendant's fence. Although Robert Matson testified that on occasion he had seen the dog charge toward the fence, barking at children playing in adjoining yards, there is no evidence that any of the neighbors, including plaintiffs, ever complained to defendant about his dog. At the farm of Mrs. Kivimaki's parents in 1967, Ruffles had nipped the hand of defendant's niece. About a year later, in the summer of 1968, Ruffles nipped the hand of defendant's nephew. In one of those cases there was no breaking of the skin, while in the other case the child's hand was scratched. The evidence is uncontradicted that both incidents occurred while the children were playing with the dog. Defendant knew of the incidents. Between 4:15 and 4:30 p. m. on September 5, 1968, defendant's son, John, who was about 14 years of age at that time, went to the kitchen for a drink of water. While standing in the kitchen looking out the rear window, he observed Erik leaning through the lower boards of defendant's rear fence where it abutted the Scheve property, with approximately half of his body through the fence. John also observed the family dog, Ruffles, lying on the ground next to the fence, apparently sleeping. He testified that Erik was waving his hands in the direction of the dog, but could not say for sure whether Erik actually struck the dog. John then testified that the dog jumped up, bit Erik in the face area, and then ran back toward the house. John ran outside and scolded the dog and then waited for his mother and father to come home to tell them of the incident, as neither of them was there at the time. At the time of the incident, Betty Matson, Erik's mother, was in her kitchen cooking. One of the Gutzman children came to the door and informed her that Erik had been bitten by the dog. She went into the back yard and observed Erik coming toward the house crying and bleeding from the area of the right eye. Medical treatment was obtained for Erik. Evidence adduced at the trial as to the damages sustained by Erik, as well as the medical damages sustained by Robert Matson, which were stipulated to, would justify the amount of the verdict returned. It is unquestioned that Erik suffered real and serious injury. However, we conclude *167 that under the law applicable herein, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover from defendant. 1. Plaintiffs rely on the wellknown rule of law in this court that on any appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and if there is any evidence whatsoever on which a jury could reasonably have based its decision, the verdict must stand. Coenen v. Buckman Building Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 197, 153 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1967); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 325, 154 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1967). 2. Applying this general rule of law to the instant case, it must be kept in mind that the matter was submitted to the jury on two separate theories of recovery, namely, the statutory right of recovery under Minn.St. 347.22, the dog-bite statute, and the right of recovery permitted by the common law. We will treat each of these separately, but it should be noted that the use of a general verdict in this type of case without the submission of special interrogatories creates extreme difficulty for an appellate court since the factual basis for applying each theory of recovery is substantially different. We strongly urge the use of a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories in the submission of this type of case to a jury. 3. Minn.St. 347.22 provides: This statute was adopted by our legislature in 1951. Prior to that time, the only right of recovery for an injury to a person resulting from a dog bite was that established under the common law.[1] In submitting the statute to the jury, the trial court properly instructed as to the elements to be considered as follows: Under the evidence in this case, it was proper to submit the first two elements to the jury. However, we hold that it was improper to submit the statutory question to the jury for consideration in *168 this case, since there is no evidence that would justify a finding that Erik was lawfully in a place he was entitled to be at the time of the incident. In making this determination as a matter of law, we have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case and find no evidence whatsoever which would allow an inference of an implied invitation for Erik to project his body through defendant's fence onto defendant's property. In constructing a substantial fence, defendant clearly manifested an intent to circumscribe his property with a barricade to increase both his right of privacy and his right to use his own property without interference from others. The fence not only served to keep others out, but permitted defendant to give his dog a limited amount of freedom while still containing the dog on his own property. The California District Court of Appeals in Fullerton v. Conan, 87 Cal. App. 2d 354, 197 P.2d 59 (1948), in considering a similar statute, had occasion to consider the question of what constitutes being lawfully on the premises.[2] In that case, plaintiff was a 5-year-old minor child, who had been taken by her mother to visit a family friend. The friend's home had a fenced-in backyard. The child was left outside with instructions to stay in the front yard while the mother went inside. Apparently, the child opened a gate in the fence, entered the backyard, and was bitten by the dog. Summarizing the plaintiff-appellant's argument, the court there wrote (87 Cal. App. 2d 356, 197 P.2d 61): The court, however, went on to hold (87 Cal. App. 2d 358, 197 P.2d 62): We hold in this case that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a finding that Erik was in a place where he was lawfully entitled to be at the time of the incident of the bite by defendant's dog and that it was error to submit to the jury for its consideration the question of statutory liability. 4-5. We must next consider whether there is any evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs that would justify a finding of common-law liability of defendant. We have previously indicated and now hold that the creation of statutory liability did not abolish the common-law right of recovery. Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 364, 61 N.W.2d 228, 231 (1953). The general rule regarding liability of the owner of a domestic animal under the common law is set forth in 3 C.J.S., Animals, § 148: Our court in Fake v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37, 38, 47 N.W. 450, 451 (1890), set forth the general common-law requirements for recovery as follows: Shortly thereafter, in Cuney v. Campbell, 76 Minn. 59, 62, 78 N.W. 878, 879 (1899), the court emphasized that two separate elements were involved: The language of both these cases was again cited with approval in Anderson v. Anderson, 259 Minn. 412, 415, 107 N.W.2d 647, 649 (1961), where we said: 6. In submitting the question of common-law liability of defendant to the jury in this case, the trial court paraphrased the so-called "attractive nuisance" instruction appearing in Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides, Instruction 328, substituting the words "vicious dog" for the phrase "structure *170 or other artificial condition" and instructing the jury as follows: Defendant objected to these instructions and requested the trial court to submit the case in accordance with the rules of Restatement, Torts, §§ 511, 512. These sections provide as follows: The type of instruction used by the trial court finds support in Restatement, Torts 2d, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1964), § 512, which would completely eliminate the present § 512 quoted above and would substitute in its place the following language: In Comment c under the proposed revision, it is stated: "If the trespasses of children are reasonably to be expected, the defendant may be required to exercise reasonable care to protect them from the animal, *171 under the rule stated in § 339." Restatement, Torts 2d, § 339, which applies to artificial conditions on land, provides: The trial court's instructions essentially included all but paragraph (e) of § 339. As a rule of general application, we hold that it is improper under the decisions in Minnesota to include in these instructions a comparison between the utility of keeping a domestic animal and the risk to the children involved. In Clark v. Brings, 284 Minn. 73, 169 N.W.2d 407 (1969), we rejected the criterion of usefulness of an animal in determining the issue of liability. The "attractive nuisance" type of instruction given by the trial court was also deficient in that it not only failed properly to instruct the jury regarding the term "vicious dog," but it also did not properly instruct the jury that its function included determining whether the dog was vicious. Taking the instruction as a whole, it presumed that the dog was vicious. In this case, the only evidence of vicious propensities of this dog were the two previous occasions involving a nipping of the hands of defendant's nephew and niece while they were playing with the dog. It is uncontradicted that defendant knew of these incidents. The only other evidence which might tend to establish viciousness was the uncorroborated testimony of plaintiff Robert Matson that he had on occasion observed the dog charge toward the fence, barking at playing children. There is no evidence that defendant knew anything about these alleged situations, and it is uncontradicted that plaintiff Robert Matson did not communicate his observations to defendant prior to the time of the injury to his son. In Clark v. Brings, supra, this court had occasion to discuss common-law right of recovery and the evidence necessary to establish viciousness of a domestic animal. That case involved an injury from a bite by a pet cat. The evidence established that the cat had once before bitten a baby sitter while she was playing with the cat and that the cat had scratched several members of the defendant's household. These incidents occurred while someone was playing with the cat. In that case, we held (284 Minn. 82, 169 N.W.2d 412): 7. Applying the same reasoning to the evidence in this case, there is no basis for submitting to the jury the question of the viciousness of this dog. Consequently, under the common-law theory of negligence, taking the findings of the jury most favorable to plaintiffs, we assume there was no provocation on the part of Erik as he approached the sleeping dog on defendant's property. The actions of the dog in this situation, however, were more in the nature of a reflex action than part of a continued course of vicious conduct known to defendant. Under the facts and evidence of this case, we hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover either under the statute or under the common law; therefore, we reverse the decision and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for defendant. Neither party is allowed costs on this appeal. Reversed. [1] An earlier statute covered situations where a dog killed, wounded, or worried domestic animals. Our court held that this statute was not applicable to harm done to human beings. Olson v. Pederson, 206 Minn. 415, 288 N.W. 856 (1939). [2] The applicable California statute at that time, while not exactly the same as the Minnesota statute, contained the same general language in requiring that a person be lawfully on private property in order to recover for injuries sustained as a result of a dog bite. Cal.Stat.1931, c. 503, § 1, provided: "The owner of any dog which shall bite any person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of such dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon the private property of such owner within the meaning of this act when he is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States of America, or when he is on such property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner thereof." [3] Restatement, Torts, § 516, provides: "A possessor of land or chattels is privileged to employ a dog or other animal, for the purpose of protecting his possession of land or chattels from intrusion, to the same extent that he is privileged to use a mechanical protective device for such purposes."