Title: Schumacher v. Rausch
Citation: 190 Kan. 239, 372 P.2d 1005
Docket Number: 42,989, 43,096
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1962

190 Kan. 239 (1962)
372 P.2d 1005
ELMER J. SCHUMACHER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
v.
FRED W. RAUSCH, JR., Appellant and Cross-Appellee, JOHN ANDERSON, JR., and ROY SHAPIRO, Defendants.
Nos. 42,989 and 43,096

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 7, 1962.
Robert E. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and William M. Ferguson, Attorney General, was with him on the brief for appellant and cross-appellee.
Stanley R. Roose, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Milford M. Magee, of Topeka, was with him on the brief for the appellee and cross-appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
The question presented by these consolidated appeals is 
Who is entitled to hold the office of Workmen's Compensation Director of the state of Kansas?
On April 13, 1959, Governor Docking appointed Elmer J. Schumacher to the office of Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, effective May 10, 1959, for a four-year term. The appointment was made under the authority of § 16, ch. 250, Laws of 1955, appearing as G.S. 1959 Supp., 74-710, the pertinent part of which reads:
Schumacher qualified, and took over and assumed the duties of the office of commissioner.
*241 At the 1961 legislative session the above-mentioned statute was repealed by § 12, ch. 243, Laws of 1961, and in its stead § 7, ch. 243, Laws of 1961, was enacted, effective June 30, 1961. It appears as G.S. 1961 Supp., 74-710, and in pertinent part reads:
On June 21, 1961, under authority of the 1961 enactment just quoted, Governor Anderson appointed Fred W. Rausch, Jr., as Workmen's Compensation Director for a term of four years, effective July 1, 1961.
In due course Rausch took over the office, despite the protests of Schumacher who claimed  and still claims  that his appointment runs until May 10, 1963.
On June 30, 1961, Schumacher filed this action in the nature of quo warranto, and for injunctive relief, against Rausch, seeking to have the rights of the parties determined. Governor Anderson and Roy Shapiro, comptroller of the state of Kansas, also were joined as defendants.
On July 1, 1961, Rausch, while assuming the duties of Workmen's Compensation Director, was served with a restraining order. On July 5, 1961, following a hearing, the restraining order was dissolved and Schumacher's motion for a temporary injunction was denied. Rausch continued in, and proceeded to perform the duties of the office, over the protests of Schumacher.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, and on September 26, 1961, all matters in controversy were heard by the trial court and taken under advisement. On January 8, 1962, the court dismissed the action as to defendants Governor Anderson and Shapiro, and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Schumacher to the effect that he was entitled to the office in question. The pertinent portion of the journal entry of judgment reads:
On January 9, 1962, defendant Rausch appealed from the adverse judgment  the appeal being docketed as case No. 42,989. On January 15th this court granted a stay of execution and Rausch has continued in the office pending disposition of the appeal.
On February 16th Schumacher filed a notice of cross-appeal from various orders adverse to him made during the litigation. On March 7th Schumacher filed a direct appeal from the identical orders and rulings from which he had previously cross-appealed. His appeal was docketed as case No. 43,096. By order of this court the two appeals were consolidated.
On May 17th Rausch filed a motion to dismiss Schumacher's appeal in case No. 43,096. On May 22nd the motion was denied with leave to renew at the hearing on the merits. Upon oral argument of the appeals, on June 8th, the motion to dismiss was renewed, and we now dispose of it.
G.S. 1949, 60-3309, provides that an appeal to this court shall be perfected within two months from the date of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.
G.S. 1949, 60-3314, reads:
On January 9th Rausch filed his notice of appeal from the adverse judgment of January 8th. Considerably more than twenty days later, Schumacher, on February 16th, filed his notice of cross-appeal. Under the plain mandate of the statute (60-3314, above) the purported cross-appeal was not filed in time and may not be considered. (Septer v. Boyles, 149 Kan. 240, 244, 86 P.2d 505; Jones *243 v. Pohl, 151 Kan. 92, 97, 98 P.2d 175; Giltner v. Stephens, 163 Kan. 37, 48, syl. 4, 180 P.2d 288; McComb v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 164 Kan. 1, syl. 2, 186 P.2d 574.)
The further question remains:
May Schumacher's "direct appeal" (docketed as case No. 43,096), filed on March 7th  and therefore within two months (60-3309, above) from the judgment of January 8th  be considered?
In our opinion it may not be.
As stated, Rausch filed his notice of appeal on January 9th. Under the plain language of the statute (60-3314, above) Schumacher had twenty days from that date within which to cross-appeal from any orders adverse to him. He did not do so within the time allowed. To permit him later to file a "direct appeal" would result in circumventing and extending the statutory time limit for a cross-appeal  and we know of no authority for such procedure.
It follows, therefore, that Schumacher's cross-appeal in case No. 42,989, and his appeal in case No. 43,096, must be and are hereby dismissed.
This brings us, then  to consideration of Rausch's appeal.
At the time of rendering its judgment that Schumacher was entitled to the office in question, the trial court filed a comprehensive memorandum opinion dealing with various questions of law raised by the parties. As we read it, however, and the journal entry of judgment (above), the real basis of the trial court's ruling appears to be that because of the inclusion of the words 
in the 1961 enactment (G.S. 1961 Supp., 74-710, above), the legislature expressly recognized that no substantial change was being made in the office of workmen's compensation commissioner by simply changing the name to workmen's compensation director; that the legislature, by the enactment of the above-mentioned language, intended that the office of workmen's compensation director was in actuality a continuation of the old office of workmen's compensation commissioner, and that the then incumbent commissioner should continue to serve in the office as director until expiration of the term existing at the time of the taking effect of the act, that is, for four years from May 10, 1959, that being the effective date of Schumacher's appointment as commissioner.
Before discussing the specific language of the 1961 enactment *244 in question we mention a few fundamental principles as having a bearing on the over-all question presented.
One is that courts are concerned only with the power of the legislature to enact statutes, and not with their wisdom, and it is not the function of the courts either to approve or condemn legislative policy. (State, ex rel., v. City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71.)
Another is that our constitution limits, rather than confers power, and thus courts look to see what it prohibits, instead of what it authorizes. (Wulf v. Kansas City, 77 Kan. 358, 367, 94 Pac. 207.)
In Jansky v. Baldwin, 120 Kan. 332, 243 Pac. 302, 47 A.L.R. 476, (opinion denying rehearing, 120 Kan. 728, 244 Pac. 1036), it was said:
Generally speaking, that which is purely a creature of the legislature is subject not only to the legislative power to create, but also to the legislative power to modify, dissolve or abolish. (State, ex rel., v. School District, 163 Kan. 650, 185 P.2d 677.)
Article 2, § 19, of our constitution authorizes the legislature to provide for the election or appointment of all officers and the filling of all vacancies not otherwise provided for in the constitution, and Article 15, § 1, thereof provides that all officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for shall be chosen or appointed as may be prescribed by law.
In support of his position Rausch calls our attention to the fact that the words 
first appeared in § 1, ch. 396, Laws of 1947, found at G.S. 1947 Supp., 74-710, which raised the salary of the workmen's compensation commissioner and increased the term of office from two to four years. In 1951 the salary of the commissioner was again increased *245 (G.S. 1951 Supp., 74-710). In 1953 the salary of the commissioner was again increased (G.S. 1953 Supp., 74-710), and the same was true in 1955 (G.S. 1955 Supp., 74-710). (The 1955 enactment was still in effect in 1959 [G.S. 1959 Supp., 74-710] and is the section under which Schumacher was appointed.) The quoted words which first appeared in the 1947 enactment were carried over and included in the enactments of 1951, 1953 and 1955, and, as heretofore noted, also are contained in the 1961 enactment under consideration. In this connection our attention is directed to that portion of G.S. 1949, 77-201, First, which reads:
and to Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 303 P.2d 197, where it was held:
and thus it is argued that the quoted words in question have reference only to the office of commissioner  which is now nonexistent.
In addition to such contention  which we feel has merit  we believe there is a patent and compelling reason why the judgment of the trial court cannot be upheld.
The 1961 enactment expressly abolished the office of commissioner. Therefore, as of June 30, 1961, the effective date of the act  no such office existed. There was no term of office as director "running" as of June 30th, for the office of director did not come into being until that date. There is nothing in the act which automatically transfers the incumbent commissioner to the office of director, and to say that Schumacher, as commissioner, should continue to serve until the expiration of the term for which he was appointed as commissioner  would mean that he would be occupying a nonexistent office.
In a situation such as this  motives of the legislature are not subject to court review. There is nothing in the constitution which prohibits the legislature from abolishing the office of commissioner and creating the office of director. That which the legislature had *246 the power initially to create  was subject later to being abolished.
Our conclusion is that from and after July 1, 1961, Rausch has been entitled to hold the office of director.
The cross-appeal by Schumacher in case No. 42,989 is dismissed. The direct appeal by Schumacher in case No. 43,096 is likewise dismissed. As to the appeal by Rausch in case No. 42,989, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.