Title: Cochran v. Fairfax Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 030982
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
 
DONALD H. COCHRAN, ET AL. 
                                       OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030982        SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
                                      April 23, 2004 
FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF 
ZONING APPEALS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
VIRGINIA C. MacNEAL 
 
v.  Record No. 031770 
 
TOWN OF PULASKI BOARD OF 
ZONING APPEALS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY 
Robert M. D. Turk, Judge 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 
THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
v.   Record No. 031771 
 
JACK PENNINGTON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Alan E. Rosenblatt, Judge1
 
 
 
These three cases involve decisions by local boards of 
zoning appeals (collectively and individually, BZA) upon 
applications for variances from the local zoning ordinances.  
Although the facts and proceedings differ in each case, and 
                     
1 The record indicates that although Judge Rosenblatt 
entered the final order, the case was heard and decided by the 
Honorable Frederick B. Lowe. 
will be discussed separately, the governing principles of law 
are the same.  We therefore consider and decide the cases in a 
single opinion. 
THE FAIRFAX CASE 
 
Michael R. Bratti was the owner of a tract of land 
containing approximately 20,470 square feet, in the McLean 
area of Fairfax County.  The property was zoned R-2, a 
residential classification permitting two dwelling units per 
acre, and was improved by a home in which Bratti had resided 
for eight years.  The zoning ordinance required side yard 
setbacks of at least 15 feet from the property lines.  
Bratti's existing home fit well within the setbacks. 
 
Bratti filed an application with the BZA for four 
variances.  He proposed to demolish his existing home and 
erect a much larger house on the site.  The proposed structure 
would come within 13 feet of the northerly property line, 
rather than the 15 feet required by the ordinance, and would 
be further extended into the setback area by three exterior 
chimneys which would extend beyond the northerly wall of the 
house.  The proposed house would be 71 feet wide and 76 feet 
from front to back.  The proposed encroachment into the side 
yard setback would extend the entire 76 foot depth of the 
house. 
 
2
 
It was undisputed that Bratti's proposed house could be 
built upon the existing lot without any need for a variance by 
simply moving it two feet to the south, plus the additional 
distance required by the chimneys.  Bratti explained to the 
Board, however, that he desired to have a "side-load" garage 
on the south side of his house and that a reduction of two 
feet of open space on the south side would make it 
inconvenient for vehicles to turn into the garage.  The 
present house had a "front-load" garage which opened directly 
toward the street.  When it was pointed out to Bratti that he 
could avoid this problem by reconfiguring his proposed house 
to contain a "front-load" garage, he responded that such a 
house would have less "curb appeal" than the design he 
proposed. 
If the house were built in its proposed location, but 
reduced in size by two feet to comply with the zoning 
ordinance, there would be a resulting loss of 152 square feet 
of living space.  The topography of the lot was such that it 
rose 42 feet vertically throughout its 198-foot depth from the 
street to the rear property line.  However, there were two 
relatively level areas shown on the plans for the proposed 
dwelling, one in front of the house and one in the rear.  It 
was conceded that an additional 152 square feet of living 
space could have been constructed in either of these areas, 
 
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but Bratti explained that he wanted to use the level area in 
front of the house as a play area for children and for 
additional parking, and that he was unwilling to encroach upon 
the level area in the rear because he desired to use it as a 
large outdoor courtyard which he said was "the central idea in 
the house." 
 
The proposed dwelling had two stories.  A third story 
could have been added as a matter of right, without variances.  
Bratti conceded that this could easily be done and would more 
than accommodate the 152 square feet lost by compliance with 
the zoning ordinance, but that it would be aesthetically 
undesirable, causing the house to appear to be a "towering 
structure" as seen from the street. 
 
Over the opposition of a number of neighbors, the BZA 
granted all four variances.  The BZA made findings of fact, 
including the following:  "3. The lot suffers from severe 
topographical conditions which the applicant has worked hard 
to accommodate. . . . 5. The requests are modest."  This was 
followed by a conclusion of law: 
THAT the applicant has satisfied the Board that 
physical conditions as listed above exist which 
under a strict interpretation of the Zoning 
Ordinance would result in practical difficulty or 
unnecessary hardship that would deprive the user of 
all reasonable use of the land and/or buildings 
involved. 
 
 
4
 
The objecting neighbors petitioned the circuit court for 
certiorari.  The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County 
obtained leave of court to enter the case as an additional 
petitioner, opposing the variances.  The court, after a 
hearing, affirmed the decision of the BZA and entered an order 
dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari.  The objecting 
neighbors and the Board of Supervisors brought this appeal. 
THE PULASKI CASE 
 
Jack D. Nunley and Diana M. Nunley owned a corner lot in 
the Town of Pulaski that contained .6248 acre.  The lot was 
bounded by public streets on three sides.  A street 40 feet 
wide ran along the front of the property and the intersection 
of that street with a street approximately 30 feet wide formed 
the southeastern corner of the lot.  The 30-foot street ran 
northward from the intersection, forming the eastern boundary 
of the lot, and then curved to the west to form the lot's 
northern boundary.  The curvature was gradual, having a radius 
of 34.53 feet.  This curve formed the northeasterly corner of 
the lot. 
 
The property was zoned R-1, a residential classification 
which contained a special provision relating to corner lots: 
The side yard on the side facing the side street 
shall be at least 15 feet from both main and 
accessory structures. 
 
 
5
Town of Pulaski, Va., Zoning Ordinance, art. IV § 2.6.2 
(2002). 
 
The Nunleys petitioned the BZA for a variance from the 
required 15-foot set back to zero feet, in order to construct 
a garage at the northeast corner of the lot, the northeast 
corner of which would be placed tangent to the curving 
property line.  There was no existing garage on the property, 
and the Nunleys explained that placing a garage in this 
location would provide the easiest access to the street.  The 
topography of the lot was difficult, the curve along the 30-
foot street lying at a considerable elevation above the floor 
level of the existing house.  The garage could be constructed 
closer to the house without the need for a variance, but this 
would require construction of a ramp that would add 
considerably to the expense of the project.  Also, the Nunleys 
explained, there was a stone retaining wall, five feet in 
height, behind the house that would be weakened or destroyed 
if the garage were to be built closer to the house. 
 
Neighbors objected, pointing out to the BZA that the 
construction of the garage so close to the corner would create 
a blind area that would be dangerous for traffic coming around 
the curve on the 30-foot street.  They also complained that it 
would be an "eyesore" and would destroy existing vegetation. 
 
6
 
The BZA had some difficulty with the question whether the 
Nunleys' request involved a "hardship" as required by law.  
The BZA held four meetings to discuss the question and 
obtained an opinion from the town attorney.  The BZA 
eventually granted the Nunleys a modified variance, permitting 
an accessory structure no closer than five feet from the 
northern projected boundary and no closer than 15 feet from 
the eastern projected boundary of the property.  The modified 
variance also provided that construction should not "alter or 
destroy the aesthetic looks of existing vegetation bordering 
the northern projected boundary" of the property. 
 
Virginia C. MacNeal, a neighbor who had objected to the 
variance before the BZA, filed a petition for certiorari in 
the circuit court.  The court, in a letter opinion, affirmed 
the decision of the BZA and denied the petition for 
certiorari.  Virginia C. MacNeal brought this appeal. 
THE VIRGINIA BEACH CASE 
 
Jack and Rebecca Pennington owned a 1.25-acre parcel of 
land in a subdivision known as Avalon Terrace, in the City of 
Virginia Beach.  The property was improved by their home, in 
which they had lived for many years, and a detached garage 
containing 528 square feet which they had built in 1972.  The 
property was zoned R-10, a single-family residential 
classification permitting four dwelling units per acre.  The 
 
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ordinance contained a limitation on "accessory structures" by 
requiring that they "do not exceed five hundred (500) square 
feet of floor area or twenty (20) percent of the floor area of 
the principal structure, whichever is greater."  The size of 
the Penningtons' home was such that the 500 square-foot 
limitation applied to their property. 
 
The Penningtons applied to the BZA for a variance 
permitting accessory structures containing a total of 816 
square feet, in lieu of the 500-square foot limitation.  They 
explained that the purpose of the request was to permit the 
construction of a storage shed, 12 by 24 feet, adjacent to the 
garage, and also to bring into conformity the 28 square feet 
by which the existing garage exceeded the limitation imposed 
by the zoning ordinance. 
The Penningtons could have built the storage shed as an 
appendage or as an addition to the existing house without the 
need for any variance, but their representative explained to 
the BZA that their lot was so large that the shed would be 
nearly invisible from the street and would have no impact upon 
neighboring properties.  He contended that the obvious purpose 
of the size limitation on accessory structures, as contained 
in the ordinance, was to inhibit the erection of large, 
unsightly outbuildings on small lots.  He pointed out that the 
Penningtons' lot was so large that four dwelling sites could 
 
8
be carved out of it, and that therefore the impact of a small 
additional outbuilding would be minimal and would not 
contravene the spirit of the zoning ordinance.  He also 
pointed out that a number of the neighbors were related to the 
Penningtons and that no neighbors had any objection to their 
request. 
The zoning administrator of the City of Virginia Beach 
opposed the request, pointing out that there was no need for a 
variance because the desired storage shed could be built as an 
appurtenance to the existing house.  The zoning administrator 
had no objection to a variance to the extent of the 28 square 
feet needed to bring the existing garage into conformity with 
the zoning ordinance.  The BZA granted the variance to bring 
the garage into conformity, but denied the remainder of the 
Penningtons' request on the ground that no "hardship" existed. 
 
The Penningtons filed a petition for certiorari in the 
circuit court.  At a hearing on the petition, counsel for the 
Penningtons asserted a claim of hardship that had not been 
presented to the BZA:  Mr. Pennington was seriously ill and 
disabled.  His wife had full-time employment, was the "bread-
winner" of the family and was therefore unable to care for him 
during the day.  The Penningtons' daughter, who had recently 
graduated from college, had returned to live with the 
Penningtons and assist in the care of her father.  The storage 
 
9
shed was needed as a place to store her belongings.  The court 
ruled that a hardship existed, overruled the decision of the 
BZA and granted the Penningtons' requested variance.  The BZA 
brought this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Zoning is a valid exercise of the police power of the 
Commonwealth.  West Brothers Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 
271, 281, 192 S.E. 881, 885 (1937).  Zoning ordinances, of 
necessity, regulate land use uniformly within large districts.  
It is impracticable to tailor such ordinances to meet the 
condition of each individual parcel within the district.  The 
size, shape, topography or other conditions affecting such a 
parcel may, if the zoning ordinance is applied to it as 
written, render it relatively useless.  Thus, a zoning 
ordinance, valid on its face, might be unconstitutional as 
applied to an individual parcel, in violation of Article 1, 
§ 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
Because a facially valid zoning ordinance may prove 
unconstitutional in application to a particular 
landowner, some device is needed to protect 
landowners' rights without destroying the viability 
of zoning ordinances.  The variance traditionally 
has been designed to serve this function.  In this 
role, the variance aptly has been called an "escape 
hatch" or "escape valve."  A statute may, of course, 
authorize variances in cases where an ordinance's 
application to particular property is not 
unconstitutional.  However, the language used in 
Code § 15.1-495(b) [now § 15.2-2309(2)] to define 
"unnecessary hardship" clearly indicates that the 
 
10
General Assembly intended that variances be granted 
only in cases where application of zoning 
restrictions would appear to be constitutionally 
impermissible. 
 
Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122, 267 S.E.2d 140, 142 
(1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Therefore, the BZA has authority to grant variances only 
to avoid an unconstitutional result.  We said in Commonwealth 
v. County Utilities, 223 Va. 534, 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982): 
All citizens hold property subject to the proper 
exercise of police power for the common good.  
Sanitation Commission v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 1148, 
87 S.E.2d 153, 158 (1955).  Even where such an 
exercise results in substantial diminution of 
property values, an owner has no right to 
compensation therefor.  Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 
272 (1928), Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915).  In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Supreme Court 
held that no taking occurs in the circumstances 
unless the regulation interferes with all reasonable 
beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole. 
 
Id. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 872 (emphasis added). 
 
 
The BZA, when considering an application for a variance, 
acts only in an administrative capacity.  See Gayton Triangle 
v. Henrico County, 216 Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570 (1976).2  Under 
fundamental constitutional principles, administrative 
officials and agencies are empowered to act only in accordance 
                     
2 By contrast, when the BZA considers applications for 
special exceptions or special use permits, it acts in a 
legislative capacity and its decision must be sustained if the 
record shows the issue to be "fairly debatable."  Ames v. Town 
of Painter, 239 Va. 343, 348, 389 S.E.2d 702, 704 (1990). 
 
11
with standards prescribed by the legislative branch of 
government.  To hold otherwise would be to substitute the will 
of individuals for the rule of law.  See e.g., Thompson v. 
Smith, 155 Va. 367, 379, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1930); Bell v. 
Dorey Electric Company, 248 Va. 378, 380, 448 S.E.2d 622, 623 
(1994); York v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 665, 672, 152 S.E.2d 
259, 264 (1967); Assaid v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, 50, 18 
S.E.2d 287, 288 (1942).  The General Assembly has prescribed 
such standards regulating the authority of the BZA to grant 
variances by enacting Code § 15.2-2309(2) which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Boards of zoning appeals shall have the 
following powers and duties: 
 
. . . . 
 
(2) To authorize . . . such variance as defined in 
§ 15.2-2201 from the terms of the ordinance as will 
not be contrary to the public interest, when, owing 
to special conditions a literal enforcement of the 
provisions will result in unnecessary hardship; 
. . . as follows: 
 
. . . where by reason of exceptional topographic 
conditions or other extraordinary situation or 
condition of the piece of property . . . the strict 
application of the terms of the ordinance would 
effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the 
utilization of the property or where the board is 
satisfied, upon the evidence heard by it, that the 
granting of the variance will alleviate a clearly 
demonstrable hardship approaching confiscation, as 
distinguished from a special privilege or 
convenience sought by the applicant . . . . 
 
 
12
 
No such variance shall be authorized by the 
board unless it finds: 
 
(a) That the strict application of the ordinance 
would produce undue hardship . . . . 
 
 
Adhering to the rule in Packer, we construe the statutory 
terms "effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the 
utilization of the property," "unnecessary hardship" and 
"undue hardship" in that light and hold that the BZA has no 
authority to grant a variance unless the effect of the zoning 
ordinance, as applied to the piece of property under 
consideration, would, in the absence of a variance, "interfere 
with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as 
a whole."3  County Utilities Corp., 223 Va. at 542, 290 S.E.2d 
at 872. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Notwithstanding the presumption of correctness to which 
the decision of the BZA is entitled, Code § 15.2-2314, each of 
                     
3 The Fairfax BZA argues that in Natrella v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 451, 345 S.E.2d 295 (1986), we pointed 
out that the foregoing statutory terms are written in the 
disjunctive and therefore implied that "unnecessarily restrict 
the use of the property" meant something less than an 
unconstitutional interference with property rights, thereby 
departing from the rule in Packer.  On the contrary, Natrella 
involved the conversion of a rental apartment project into a 
condominium with no physical change to the land or buildings.  
A statute, Code § 55-79.43, expressly protected such 
conversions from the impact of zoning ordinances, a situation 
foreseen in Packer:  "A statute may, of course, authorize 
variances in cases where an ordinance's application to 
 
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the present cases fails to meet the foregoing standard.  The 
proposed house in Fairfax could have been reconfigured or 
moved two feet to the south, avoiding the need for a variance.  
Indeed, the project could simply have been abandoned and the 
existing use continued in effect.  The proposed garage in 
Pulaski could have been moved to another location on the lot, 
or the project abandoned.  The shed in Virginia Beach could 
have been built as an addition to the existing house, or the 
project abandoned.  Without any variances, each of the 
properties retained substantial beneficial uses and 
substantial value.  The effect of the respective zoning 
ordinances upon them in no sense "interfere[d] with all 
reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole." 
 
Compelling reasons were presented in favor of each of the 
applications for variances:  The desires of the owners, 
supported by careful planning to minimize harmful effects to 
neighboring properties; probable aesthetic improvements to the 
neighborhood as a whole, together with a probable increase in 
the local tax base; greatly increased expense to the owners if 
the plans were reconfigured to meet the requirements of the 
zoning ordinances; lack of opposition, or even support of the 
                                                                
particular property is not unconstitutional.”  Packer, 221 Va. 
at 122, 267 S.E.2d at 142 (emphasis added). 
 
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application by neighbors; and serious personal need, by the 
owners, for the proposed modification. 
When the impact of the zoning ordinance is so severe as 
to meet the foregoing standard, the BZA becomes vested with 
wide discretion in tailoring a variance that will alleviate 
the "hardship" while remaining "in harmony with the intended 
spirit and purpose of the ordinance."  Code § 15.2-2309(2).  
Factors such as those advanced in support of the variances in 
these cases are appropriate for consideration by the BZA in a 
case that falls within that discretionary power, but they are 
immaterial in a case in which the BZA has no authority to act.  
The threshold question for the BZA in considering an 
application for a variance as well as for a court reviewing 
its decision, is whether the effect of the zoning ordinance 
upon the property under consideration, as it stands, 
interferes with "all reasonable beneficial uses of the 
property, taken as a whole."  If the answer is in the 
negative, the BZA has no authority to go further. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgments of the 
circuit courts in each of the cases, vacate the resolutions of 
the Boards of Zoning Appeals of the County of Fairfax and the 
Town of Pulaski, respectively, reinstate the resolution of the 
Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Virginia Beach, and 
enter final judgments here. 
 
15
Record No. 030982 − Reversed and final judgment. 
Record No. 031770 − Reversed and final judgment. 
Record No. 031771 − Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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