Title: Wisconsin Small Businesses United, Inc. v. Brennan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP002054-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 2020

2020 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Small Business United, Inc., Amy 
Dailey, Larry Gierach, Doug Hustedt, Sandi 
Vandervest and Tom Vandervest, 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
Joel Brennan, in his official capacity as 
Secretary of the Department of Administration, 
Peter Barca, in his official capacity as 
Secretary of the Department of Revenue and 
Carolyn Standford Taylor, in her official 
capacity as Acting Wisconsin Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 20, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and DALLET, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners, there were briefs filed by Mike B. 
Wittenwyler, Kendall W. Harrison, Zachary P. Bemis, and Godfrey 
& Kahn, S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by Kendall W. 
Harrison. 
 
 
 
2 
For the respondents there was a brief filed by Colin Roth, 
assistant attorney general, and Hannah S. Jurss, assistant 
attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, 
attorney general. There was an oral argument by Colin Roth.  
 
 
2020 WI 69 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP2054-OA 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Small Businesses United, Inc., Amy 
Dailey, Larry Gierach, Doug Hustedt, Sandi 
Vandervest and Tom Vandervest,   
 
          Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Joel Brennan, in his official capacity as 
Secretary of the Department of Administration, 
Peter Barca, in his official capacity as 
Secretary of the Department of Revenue and 
Carolyn Standford Taylor, in her official 
capacity as Acting Wisconsin Superintendent of 
Public Instruction,   
 
          Respondents, 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and DALLET, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Relief denied. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   This is an original action 
challenging whether two partial vetoes in the 2017-19 biennial 
budget exceeded the governor's constitutional authority.  While 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
2 
 
the respondents defend the vetoes on their merits, they also 
contend this challenge is too late and should be barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches.  We agree that laches should be 
applied here.  The respondents have proved the three elements of 
a laches claim——unreasonable delay, lack of knowledge a claim 
would be brought, and prejudice.  And given the reliance 
interests at stake and the need for stability and certainty in 
the enactment of state budget bills, we exercise our discretion 
to apply laches based on the facts of this case.  Accordingly, 
we dismiss the original action. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Wisconsin's practice of funding the state's operations 
and programs through biennial budget bills is nearly a century 
old.1  As points of reference, the state's fiscal year begins on 
July 1 and ends on the following June 30, and a new biennium 
commences every odd-numbered year.  Wis. Stat. § 20.002(1) 
(2017-18).2 
¶3 
Each new biennial budget is a complex collaboration 
and negotiation between the executive and legislative branches.3  
                                                 
1 See ch. 97, Laws of 1929; see also Richard A. Champagne, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Executive Budget Bills, 
1931-2019, at 1 (2020) (describing the biennial budget bill as 
"easily the most significant piece of legislation that is 
enacted during the entire legislative session"). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 See Champagne, supra, at 1-6 (outlining the biennial 
budget process and its core principles). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
3 
 
Relying on fiscal estimates and projections from the various 
branches and agencies making up state government, the governor 
creates a budget bill and submits it to the legislature.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 16.45, 16.46, 16.47.  Once received, the bill is 
referred to the Joint Committee on Finance, which reviews, 
amends, and ultimately votes to recommend the revised bill for 
legislative passage.  See § 16.47(1m); Wis. Stat. § 13.093 to 
§ 13.102.  Like any other bill, the biennial budget is then 
debated and may be amended by the two houses of the legislature.  
After passage by both houses, the bill is presented to the 
governor.  Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(a). 
¶4 
At this point, Article V, Section 10 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution gives the governor three options:  sign the whole 
bill into law, veto the whole bill, or sign the bill into law 
while vetoing parts of it.  Upon presentment, a bill becomes law 
if it receives the governor's approval and signature (or if he 
does not sign or veto it within six days (Sundays excepted)).  
Id. art. V, § 10(1)(b), § 10(3).  When vetoed in whole, a bill 
returns to the legislature and may still become law if approved 
by two-thirds of both houses.  Id. art. V, § 10(2)(a).  A third 
option is unique to appropriation bills, including biennial 
budget bills.  Namely, the governor may approve such bills in 
whole or in part.  Id. art. V, § 10(1)(b). 
¶5 
This power to partially veto appropriations bills was 
added as an amendment to the constitution in 1930, but the 
people of Wisconsin have since modified it twice.  The governor 
may not exercise his partial veto authority to create a new word 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
4 
 
by rejecting individual letters in words, nor may he create a 
new sentence by combining parts of two or more sentences.  Id. 
art V, § 10(1)(c).  After any partial veto, the governor must 
return the rejected part with objections in writing to the 
legislature for its reconsideration.  Id. art. V, § 10(2)(b).  
The legislature can override the veto if two-thirds of both 
houses agree to approve the rejected part.  Id.  Absent that, 
the enacted law remains; only parts approved by the governor 
become law.  Id. art. V, § 10(1)(b). 
¶6 
Governor Scott Walker penned the partial vetoes at the 
heart of this dispute within Wisconsin's 2017-19 biennial 
budget.  The governor signed that budget, with partial vetoes, 
and it went into effect as 2017 Wis. Act 59 on September 23, 
2017.  Two of Governor Walker's vetoes struck individual digits 
from 
dates 
written 
in 
numeral 
form. 
 
The 
petitioners 
(collectively WSBU)4 contend that these digit vetoes violated the 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
creating 
new 
words 
by 
striking individual letters in words.  Wis. Const. art. V, 
§ 10(1)(c). 
                                                 
4 The petition for original action was filed by Wisconsin 
Small Businesses United, Inc., Amy Dailey, Larry Gierach, Doug 
Hustedt, and Sandi and Tom Vandervest. 
The named respondents were Secretary of the Department of 
Administration 
Joel 
Brennan, 
Secretary 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
Peter 
Barca, 
and 
Acting 
Wisconsin 
Superintendent of Public Instruction Carolyn Standford Taylor, 
each in his or her official capacity and all represented by the 
attorney general. 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
5 
 
¶7 
The first disputed provision of Act 59 is § 1641m.  
When presented to the governor, § 1641m imposed a one-year 
moratorium on an existing law that enabled school districts to 
increase their revenue limits by adopting a resolution based on 
energy efficiency efforts.  2017 A.B. 64, § 1641m.  See 
generally Wis. Stat. § 121.91(4)(o).  To accomplish this, the 
text sent to the governor's desk proposed the revenue-limit 
adjustment be effective "only to a resolution adopted after 
December 31, 2018."  Exercising a partial veto, the governor 
struck the "1, 2" from "December 31, 2018" (December 31, 2018), 
thereby changing the date to "December 3018."  In effect, the 
proposed one-year moratorium was transformed into a one-thousand 
and one-year moratorium.  2017 Wis. Act 59, § 1641m (codified at 
§ 121.91(4)(o)4.). 
¶8 
When 
the 
governor 
received 
the 
second 
disputed 
provision of Act 59, § 2265, it would have imposed a year-long 
delay for the implementation of 2013 Wis. Act 229.   As signed 
into law in 2013, Act 229 authorized third-party lenders that 
provide credit by way of retailer-lender credit cards to take 
tax deductions for bad debts.  2017 A.B. 64, § 2265.  See 
generally 2013 Wis. Act 229.  Act 229 was originally scheduled 
to go into effect on July 1, 2015, but the 2015-17 budget moved 
the effective date to July 1, 2017.  2015 Wis. Act 55, § 4750.  
In its 2017-19 budget bill, the legislature twice used the date 
"July 1, 2017 2018" to authorize another new effective date for 
Act 229.  2017 A.B. 64, § 2265.  In other words, the law on the 
books when the bill arrived at the governor's desk had an 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
6 
 
effective date of July 1, 2017, and the legislature sought to 
delete "2017" and add the year "2018."  In exercising his veto 
pen, the governor rejected the legislature's effort to strike 
"20" and "7" and accepted the legislature's insertion of "8," 
creating a veto that looked like this:  July 1, 2017 2018.  In 
effect, each use of July 1, 2018 was changed to July 1, 2078, 
and a one-year implementation delay was turned into a sixty-one-
year delay.  2017 Wis. Act 59, § 2265. 
¶9 
The 2017-19 biennial budget, as modified by these and 
other partial vetoes, became law on September 23, 2017.  No 
vetoes were overridden by the legislature, and the biennium came 
and went. In 2019, another biennial budget was proposed, 
negotiated, passed, and signed into law.  The 2019-21 biennial 
budget went into effect as 2019 Wis. Act 9 on July 4, 2019.  It 
wasn't until October 28, 2019, nearly four months after the old 
biennium had passed and the new biennial budget had been in 
effect, that WSBU filed this petition for original action.  
Having already granted a separate petition reviewing the 
governor's partial veto powers,5 we granted WSBU's petition as 
well and heard arguments in both cases on the same day. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶10 While the respondents defend the constitutionality of 
the challenged vetoes, they also urge us not to reach the merits 
                                                 
5 Bartlett v. Evers, No. 2019AP1376-OA, slip op. (Wis. S. 
Ct. July 10, 2020) (amended petition for original action granted 
on October 16, 2019). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
7 
 
and instead bar WSBU's action pursuant to the doctrine of 
laches.  Before this term, this court has addressed the 
governor's 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
veto 
parts 
of 
appropriations 
bills 
in 
eight 
decisions; 
none 
involved 
consideration of a laches defense.  All but one of these cases 
were filed within a few months of the vetoes going into effect.6  
                                                 
6 See State ex rel. Wis. Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 
260 N.W 486 (1935) (vetoes of emergency relief budget bill, ch. 
15, Laws of 1935, published on March 27, 1935, challenge filed 
on April 2, 1935); State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 
Wis. 143, 264 N.W 622 (1936) (vetoes of provisions regulating 
motor carriers, ch. 546, Laws of 1935, published on October 4, 
1935, challenge decided by court on January 7, 1936); State ex 
rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W 662 (1940) 
(vetoes of public welfare appropriations bill, ch. 533, Laws of 
1939, published on November 18, 1939, challenge filed on 
December 2, 1939); State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 
Wis. 2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976) (vetoes of 1975-77 biennial 
budget bill, ch. 39, Laws of 1975, published on July 30, 1975, 
oral argument held on December 2, 1975); State ex rel. Kleczka 
v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978) (vetoes of 
provisions regarding public financing of election campaigns, ch. 
107, Laws of 1977, published on October 20, 1977, challenge 
filed on December 2, 1977); State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. 
Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) (vetoes of 
1987-89 biennial budget bill, 1987 Wis. Act 27, published on 
July 31, 1987, oral argument held on October 20, 1987); Citizens 
Util. Bd. v. Klauser (CUB), 194 Wis. 2d 484, 534 N.W.2d 608 
(1995) (veto of 1993-95 biennial budget bill, 1993 Wis. Act 16, 
published on August 11, 1993, challenge filed on June 13, 1994); 
Risser v. Klauser, 207 Wis. 2d 176, 558 N.W.2d 108 (1997) 
(vetoes of transportation budget bill, 1995 Wis. Act 113, 
published on December 20, 1995, challenge filed on January 4, 
1996). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
8 
 
And the lone outlier was filed within a year, well before a new 
budget bill was even proposed.7 
 
A.  Laches Generally 
¶11 Laches is an affirmative, equitable defense designed 
to bar relief when a claimant's failure to promptly bring a 
claim causes prejudice to the party having to defend against 
that claim.  Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 159, 595 
N.W.2d 423 (1999).  While formulated differently across cases 
and jurisdictions, the laches doctrine is broadly understood to 
ask whether a party delayed without good reason in raising a 
claim, and whether that delay prejudiced the party seeking to 
defend against that claim.  See State ex rel. Wren v. 
Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶14, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587 
(explaining that laches "is founded on the notion that equity 
aids the vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights to 
the detriment of the opposing party" (quoted source omitted)). 
¶12 In Wisconsin, application of laches is premised on 
proof of three elements:  (1) a party unreasonably delays in 
bringing a claim; (2) a second party lacks knowledge that the 
                                                 
7 The partial veto challenge in CUB was filed ten months 
after the vetoed biennial budget bill went into effect.  See 194 
Wis. 2d at 487-89.  While initiated later than the other veto 
cases, this original action was still filed more than eight 
months before a new biennial budget was proposed by the governor 
and more than thirteen months before a new biennial budget bill 
was published.  See S. Journal, 92d. Reg. Sess., at 73-79 
(governor's 1995-97 biennial budget message delivered to the 
legislature on February 14, 1995); 1995 Wis. Act 27 (published 
on July 28, 1995). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
9 
 
first party would raise that claim; and (3) the second party is 
prejudiced by the delay.  Id., ¶15.  The party seeking 
application of laches bears the burden of proving each element.  
Id.  Whether that burden is carried is a question of law.  
Id., ¶16.  Even if all three elements are satisfied, application 
of laches is left to the sound discretion of the court asked to 
apply this equitable bar.  Id., ¶15. 
 
B.  Laches Applied Here 
¶13 The parties dispute all three elements, and contend 
that we should exercise our discretion in their favor.  We 
consider each of these matters in turn. 
 
1.  Unreasonable Delay 
¶14 The first element requires the respondents to prove 
WSBU 
unreasonably 
delayed 
in 
bringing 
the 
suit. 
 
What 
constitutes a reasonable time will vary and depends on the facts 
of a particular case.  Foote v. Harrison, 137 Wis. 588, 590, 119 
N.W. 291 (1909) (quoting Rogers v. Van Nortwick, 87 Wis. 414, 
429, 58 N.W. 762 (1894)); see also Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, ¶18 
("Whether a delay is reasonable is case specific; we look at the 
totality of circumstances." (citation omitted)). 
¶15 There can be no dispute that WSBU's claim became 
actionable on September 23, 2017, the day 2017 Wis. Act 59 went 
into effect.  At that point, the underlying facts of the 
original action were set.  This is true even though the 
legislature could have subsequently overridden the disputed 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
10 
 
vetoes.  It is the governor's procedural use of the vetoes, not 
the substance of the underlying laws, that is at the heart of 
WSBU's challenge.  Notwithstanding, WSBU did not file its 
original 
action 
until 
October 
28, 
2019, 
well 
after 
the 
applicable biennium had closed and nearly four months after the 
new biennial budget had gone into effect. 
¶16 WSBU does not contest these basic facts.  Instead, it 
observes that other types of actions are governed by statutes of 
limitation longer than the time period at issue here, and argues 
the effect of these partial vetoes will be with us for years 
(decades in one instance, and a millennium in the other).  This 
is true, but does not demonstrate that its delay was reasonable.  
Laches is an equitable doctrine, and therefore can and regularly 
does apply even before a statute of limitation has expired.  See 
Wren, 
389 
Wis. 2d 516, 
¶13 
n.8 
(explaining 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence has long recognized laches as an equitable defense 
that operates "independently of any statute of limitations" 
(quoting Sheldon v. Rockwell, 9 Wis. 158 (*166), 162 (*181) 
(1859))); Zizzo v. Lakeside Steel & Mfg. Co., 2008 WI App 69, 
¶7, 312 Wis. 2d 463, 752 N.W.2d 889 ("Laches is distinct from a 
statute of limitations and may be found where the statute of 
limitations has not yet run.").  Moreover, it would be quite 
normal for partial vetoes to have a dramatic effect.  Many a 
legislative 
proposal 
has 
been 
irrevocably 
altered 
by 
a 
governor's partial veto pen. 
¶17 Where a litigant challenges the process by which a 
bill becomes a lawindeed whether it should even be treated as a 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
11 
 
law at alla reasonably prompt lawsuit is and should be the 
norm.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 
WI 43, ¶¶29, 36, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436 (Prosser, J., 
concurring) (bill signed by the governor on March 11, 2011, 
constitutional challenge to the bill's procedural enactment 
filed on March 16, 2011).  This is far different than a 
challenge to the substantive validity of a law, where such 
lawsuits may not even ripen until enforcement begins.  See 
Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel Cty., 656 A.2d 751, 753-55 (Md. 1995) 
(distinguishing substantive objections to statutes from belated 
challenges to their procedural enactment for purposes of 
laches); Stilp v. Hafer, 718 A.2d 290, 293-94 (Pa. 1998) 
(finding lack of due diligence in pursuing procedural challenge 
given relevant legislative record and constitutional provisions 
publicly available at the time of the law's enactment).8  Here, 
as we discuss more fully below, money has been spent, revenues 
have come in, and the books have already been closed on the 
operation of the 2017-19 biennial budget.  Cf. Schulz v. State, 
615 N.E.2d 953, 957 (N.Y. 1993) (finding an 11-month delay 
unreasonable in constitutional challenge brought against the 
                                                 
8 WSBU's reliance on a case rejecting a laches defense 
against a constitutional challenge to the substance of a law is 
misplaced given it is attacking the process by which Act 59, 
§§ 1641m and 2265 were enacted, not the substance of those 
provisions.  Cf. Cathcart v. Meyer, 88 P.3d 1050, 1058-59 (Wyo. 
2004) (rejecting laches defense against a challenge to a term-
limit 
initiative 
based 
on 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
its 
substance, explaining there was no showing of particularized 
prejudice and contrasting with a case based on a procedural 
constitutional attack, not a substantive one). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
12 
 
procedural enactment of public financing laws).  Waiting years 
after a budget bill has gone into effect to challenge whether it 
was constitutionally enacted in the first place is too long.  
See id. ("[F]iscal year 1990-1991 has come and gone and its 
financial books in this respect have been closed.  Equitable 
considerations of time, in the laches sense, may justifiably 
keep them closed . . . .").  Giving a stamp of approval to 
delayed litigation raising procedural challenges like the proper 
exercise of a partial veto would invite lawsuits over budgets of 
yesteryear and disrupt the status quo.  There must be a limit to 
when a lawsuit like this may be filed.  We conclude the 
challenge here, brought well after the previous biennium had 
passed, and after a new budget based on current law and future 
projections had taken effect, constitutes unreasonable delay.9 
 
2.  Lack of Knowledge 
¶18 We also determine the respondents lacked knowledge of 
WSBU's forthcoming claim.  The respondents assert they remained 
unaware of any potential claim until this original action was 
filed, an assertion WSBU does not deny or further dispute.  WSBU 
still contends, however, that the respondents "certainly could 
have anticipated that someone might challenge vetoes with such 
prolonged consequences."  That's possible, but only in the sense 
                                                 
9 The respondents argue for a firm cutoff at the end of the 
biennium for these kinds of challenges.  However, laches is 
always case-specific, and we need not establish such a rule to 
conclude that the delay under these circumstances was too long. 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
13 
 
that every partial veto could one day become a litigated matter.  
Based on the undisputed record before us, the respondents here 
had no advance knowledge or warning of this particular claim.  
That is sufficient to satisfy this element of a laches defense.10 
 
3.  Prejudice 
¶19 The 
final 
element 
of 
laches 
requires 
proof 
of 
prejudice resulting from the claimant's unreasonable delay.  
"What amounts to prejudice . . . depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case, but it is generally held to be 
anything that places the party in a less favorable position."  
Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, ¶32. 
¶20 The respondents argue that, given their roles in the 
state budget-making process, WSBU's delay places them in a less 
favorable position with regard to the planning and management of 
state receipts and expenditures.  The respondents' claim is 
specifically grounded in a prejudicial change to their position 
regarding the 2019-21 budget (i.e., the state's current budget).  
Collectively, this describes a form of prejudice that we have 
called economic prejudice.  See id., ¶33 & n.26 (distinguishing 
economic and evidentiary prejudice); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity 
                                                 
10 See 
Schafer 
v. 
Wegner, 
78 
Wis. 2d 127, 
133, 
254 
N.W.2d 193 (1977) (concluding party asserting laches defense 
lacked knowledge of claim given that claim had not been raised 
in a reasonable time); cf. Watkins v. Milwaukee Cty. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 422-23, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979) (noting 
the petitioner informed the respondent at the time of his 
resignation 
that 
litigation 
would 
be 
commenced 
if 
a 
corresponding hearing was not held). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
14 
 
§ 144 
(discussing 
types 
of 
prejudice 
including 
economic 
prejudice caused by a change in a responding party's position). 
¶21 Broadly speaking, every new budget bill is created 
with an understanding that earlier budgets, including any 
provisions bearing marks of former vetoes, will serve as a 
foundation.  At the direction of the governor, the respondents 
and other executive branch officers hold this understanding when 
they create department budgets and ready all of the other fiscal 
information that must be included in a biennial budget report.11  
The governor then carries the same understanding when creating 
his proposed budget and when signing the legislature's proposed 
budget into law.  See Champagne, supra, at 1 (describing the 
state budget bill as Wisconsin's most significant piece of 
legislation in part because "it contains most of the governor's 
public policy agenda for the entire legislative session"). 
¶22 Turning to the making of the 2019-21 budget, if the 
challenged vetoes from the outgoing budget are removed from the 
picture, as WSBU now pleads, there would have been cascading 
                                                 
11 The 
respondents, 
while 
acting 
in 
their 
official 
capacities, each direct and supervise a department within the 
executive branch structure.  See Wis. Stat. § 15.10 (department 
of administration); Wis. Stat. § 15.37 (department of public 
instruction); Wis. Stat. § 15.43 (department of revenue).  In 
these roles, they all have various duties related to the state 
budget-making process.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 15.04(1)(b) 
(requiring from each department a biennial compilation of a 
comprehensive program budget); Wis. Stat. §§ 16.43 and 16.46 
(requiring the secretary of administration to prepare the 
biennial state budget report); Wis. Stat. § 16.46(8) (requiring 
the department of revenue to report on estimated state revenues 
for inclusion in the budget report). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
15 
 
effects on the state's global policy calculus and budget 
outlook, as well as options available to policymakers.  For 
instance, eliminating the moratorium on the school district 
revenue-limit adjustment in Act 59, § 1641m could have led to 
property tax increases in school districts across the state.  
Even a change like this adjusts how the state's policy puzzle 
fits together.  With potentially higher property taxes, the 
respondents could have chosen to offer various offsetting 
property tax relief measures.  Maybe different revenue limits 
would have been proposed.  Maybe school district spending 
priorities would have been altered by the incentive in a way 
that would have changed their funding requests during the new 
biennium.  Likewise, according to the respondents' calculations, 
putting 2013 Wis. Act 229 into effect by undoing the partial 
veto in Act 59, § 2265 could have caused an annual decline of 
more than $10 million in sales-and-use tax revenue.  This is a 
significant 
adjustment 
to 
the 
state 
balance 
sheet. 
 
To 
compensate, policymakers could have enacted a tax increase to 
make up for lost revenue.  Or maybe they would have chosen to 
spend $10 million less per year on some other state program or 
priority. 
¶23 WSBU responds that the financial footprint of these 
budgetary programs was a "microscopic fraction" of the total 
appropriations for the 2019-21 biennium.  We disagree that $20 
million is mere change in the state's coffers.  While this 
amount of specific tax revenue seems small in comparison to the 
state's total revenues over the course of a biennium, it is 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
16 
 
still a significant sum.  The state's budget reserve provides a 
clear example of why this is so.  The reserve, which is premised 
on projections of revenues and expenditures, acts as a budget 
stabilization mechanism in times of fiscal uncertainty.12  In 
fact, state law imposes a mandatory reserve floor.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 20.003(4).  For the 2019-21 budget, the state was required to 
maintain a reserve of at least $80 million and $85 million in 
the two fiscal years.  See § 20.003(4)(L).  Two years of $10 
million in tax revenue is almost a quarter of the reserve 
required for the entire biennium. 
¶24 Even so, the point of this discussion is not the 
specific amount of revenue loss or a definitive statement 
regarding what would have happened.  The point is that 
unreasonable delay cost the respondents the opportunity to 
account for those changes in the development and passage of the 
2019-21 biennial budget.  The alternatives are not "pure 
speculation" as WSBU alleges.  These examples show that the 
2019-21 budget paid for and relied upon decisions the partial 
vetoes solidified into law more than two years earlier. 
¶25 In short, the provisions of a biennial budget are 
hardly something that can be examined in isolation.  Budget 
bills are complex and dynamic creatures, and each individual 
figure and measure incorporated within the enacted law plays a 
                                                 
12 See generally Christa Pugh, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
Budget Stabilization Fund and General Reserve Fund Requirements 
(2019) (outlining the design and purposes of Wisconsin's budget 
reserve). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
17 
 
part in an interconnected network of complementary policy 
choices.  WSBU's delay in seeking to reverse decisions from the 
2017-19 biennium deprived the respondents of the opportunity to 
take an altered policy foundation into account in subsequent 
choices.  For this, the respondents are surely placed "in a less 
favorable position."  Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, ¶32.  And that 
constitutes prejudice.13 
 
4.  Discretion 
¶26 The respondents have proved all three elements of 
laches are met in this case.  Even so, application of laches is 
within our equitable discretion.  See id., ¶15 (explaining a 
court may choose not to apply laches "if it determines that 
application of the defense is not appropriate and equitable").  
We conclude equity weighs strongly in favor of applying laches 
here. 
¶27 We have already covered the specific prejudicial 
effect to the respondents.  This by itself is weighty.  But in 
addition, every new budget generates substantial reliance 
                                                 
13 As part of their prejudice argument, the respondents 
emphasize that the challenged vetoes were made by a previous 
gubernatorial administration.  All of the respondents have been 
sued in their official capacity, which means the individual 
occupant of any given position is irrelevant to the broader 
prejudice argument.  The prejudice to the official functions of 
the named respondents is the same regardless of whether their 
priorities or policy views may be different.  In any event, the 
respondents have shown they will be prejudiced regardless of 
whether there was an intervening change in the governor's 
office. 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
18 
 
interests on behalf of both public and private parties across 
the state.  The same cascading effects of even modest changes to 
a broader policy framework are true not just within the biennial 
budget itself, but for the budgets and outlook of counties, 
municipalities, 
school 
districts, 
nonprofit 
organizations, 
colleges, road contractors, health care systems, and innumerable 
other public and private actors.14 
¶28 Part of this is the reasonable presumption that 
enacted laws, especially budget bills, can be relied upon to 
order one's affairs.  The respondents make this point in 
reference to our recent decision in Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-
Husting Co., which turned in part on the effect of partial 
vetoes in the 1999-2001 budget.  2018 WI 60, ¶¶12–22, 381 
Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631 (discussing 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2166m 
and § 2166s).  There, on a certified question from the Seventh 
Circuit, 
we 
determined 
whether 
a 
wine 
grantor-dealer 
relationship satisfied the definition of a dealership in the 
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.  Id., ¶1.  Underlying that 
question, the parties each pointed to a different statutory 
provision as containing the dispositive answer.  See id., ¶¶23, 
                                                 
14 See also 30A C.J.S. Equity § 155 ("The defense of laches 
is applied with even greater force when delay in attacking the 
legality of the collection and spending of public moneys will 
result in grave public injury were the relief sought to be 
granted."); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 145 ("The court may look at 
the disruptive effect a plaintiff's relief would have on other 
parties in determining whether laches applies to the claim.  
Thus, laches is particularly justified where the plaintiff's 
delay in pursuing a claim would have a catastrophic effect on 
the rights of many third parties." (footnote omitted)). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
19 
 
25 (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 135.02(3)(b), 135.066 (2015-16)).  To 
provide 
background, 
we 
unpacked 
the 
provisions' 
relevant 
statutory history, which included partial vetoes from nearly two 
decades earlier.  Id., ¶¶12-22.  In answering the certified 
question, we did not address the constitutionality of those 
vetoes.  But if we had done so and ruled that they were beyond 
the governor's constitutional authority, Wisconsin's commercial 
wine industry could have been radically upended given statewide 
reliance interests on a 19-year-old partial veto that was newly 
determined invalid. 
¶29 Other jurisdictions have similarly barred untimely 
challenges to alleged procedural deficiencies in the enactment 
of a law.  In so doing, these courts acknowledge the broader and 
more pervasive prejudicial effects resulting from belatedly 
undoing statutory enactments.  See, e.g., Schaeffer, 656 A.2d at 
753, 755 (emphasizing prejudice that would be caused to hundreds 
of county employees who relied on pension plan modifications 
effected 
by 
an 
ordinance 
subject 
to 
belated 
procedural 
challenge); Cole v. State ex rel. Brown, 42 P.3d 760, 764 (Mont. 
2002) 
(identifying 
prejudice 
of 
former 
officeholders 
and 
potential 
candidates 
who 
relied 
on 
presumptively 
valid 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
20 
 
constitutional 
term-limit 
initiative 
subject 
to 
belated 
procedural challenge).15 
                                                 
15 The New York Court of Appeals decision in Schulz v. State 
appears to provide a particularly fitting comparison to this 
case.  There, the court held laches should apply against a 
procedural challenge to various public financing laws that had 
been enacted 11 months earlier.  615 N.E.2d 953, 957-58 (N.Y. 
1993).  In the intervening period, significant financial 
activity was conducted in reliance on the statues.  Id.  Thus, 
amongst the "profound destabilizing and prejudicial effects from 
delay" that could affect the state in its "operation and 
maintenance 
of 
orderly 
government," 
the 
New 
York 
court 
explained:   
Appellants' demand for relief on the merits of their 
constitutional challenge would have the bonds recalled 
and refunded and the nonbond transactions nullified.  
Metaphorically, the impossibility of putting genies 
back in their bottles springs to the imagination.  
Realistically, constitutional challenges to public 
financing of such massive and profound dimension, 
possibly causing traumatic disturbance to settled 
matters of public finances and governance, should be 
undertaken 
reasonably 
promptly. 
 
To 
relax 
this 
procedural safeguard could disproportionately incur or 
threaten a greater harm to the public weal than the 
alleged constitutional transgression itself.  Undoing 
such closed financial transactions would also add 
hundreds 
of 
millions 
of 
dollars 
of 
unplanned 
expenditures to the taxpayers' burdens.  In sum, 
fiscal year 1990–1991 has come and gone and its 
financial books in this respect have been closed.  
Equitable considerations of time, in the laches sense, 
may justifiably keep them closed and do not warrant, 
in the circumstances presented here, a piecemeal 
invalidation challenge as suggested . . . . 
Id. (citation omitted). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
21 
 
¶30 Orderly state governance is premised in no small part 
on the stability and certainty of state finances.  Nowhere are 
those principles needed more than in the state's biennial 
budget.  Each budget bill is a massive undertaking that is meant 
to fully encapsulate the financing of the state's operations and 
programs over the next two years.  Our state is, to a very large 
degree, publicly and privately ordered around that single piece 
of legislation.  Judicial disturbance of biennial budgets past 
would be incredibly disruptive to the public and private affairs 
of many whose livelihoods are tied to public policy (which is to 
say, almost everyone). 
¶31 It is true that the proper interpretation of the 
governor's partial veto powers is an important question.  But 
that alone, in our view, does not counsel undoing the current 
policy framework that was crafted in reliance on the policy 
choices settled in the previous biennium.  This court has 
considered cases arising from the governor's veto authority 
before; we will surely do so again.  But it is crucial that 
claims of this sort are brought in a timely manner.  Because 
this claim was not, application of laches in this case is 
equitable and appropriate. 
                                                                                                                                                             
WSBU's citation to another New York case that distinguished 
itself from Schulz simply shows that laches is a fact-specific 
defense.  Cf. Saratoga Cty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 
798 N.E.2d 1047, 1056-57 (N.Y. 2003) (rejecting laches defense 
against a challenge to a gaming compact because, in contrast to 
Schulz, there was no showing that delay caused economic 
prejudice 
given 
the 
casino's 
operations 
had 
never 
been 
interrupted). 
No. 
2019AP2054-OA 
 
22 
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶32 WSBU challenges two partial vetoes in the biennial 
budget enacted in September 2017.  But WSBU waited until October 
2019 to file this action.  The 2017-19 biennium has closed, and 
a new biennial budget has since been enacted relying in part on 
the law enacted in 2017.  The respondents have established the 
elements of laches and demonstrated that application of the 
equitable doctrine is appropriate here.  Accordingly, we dismiss 
WSBU's original action. 
By the Court.-Relief denied. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶33 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
In 
resolving this dispute over the scope of the governor's veto 
power, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should have consulted the 
Wisconsin Constitution, under which "all governmental power 
derives 'from the consent of the governed' and government 
officials may act only within the confines of the authority the 
people give them.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1."  Wis. Legislature 
v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶66, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  Instead, the majority 
latches on to laches, an equitable doctrine that operates not as 
a jurisprudential command, but merely as a discretionary option 
for avoiding a decision on the merits.  The text of the 
constitution does not support the exercise of either veto 
challenged in this case and the court should have so declared.  
"Whenever any branch of government exceeds the boundaries of 
authority conferred by the people, it is the duty of the 
judicial branch to say so."  Id. 
¶34 Under the Wisconsin Constitution, all bills must 
originate in the legislature, and only the legislature may amend 
them.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 19.1  In the exercise of his veto 
power, the governor may approve or reject an appropriation bill, 
in whole or in part, and the approved part then becomes law.  
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Constitution, Article IV, Section 19 provides: 
Any bill may originate in either house of the 
legislature, and a bill passed by one house may be 
amended by the other. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
2 
 
Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(b).2  With respect to each of the 
bills at issue in this case, the legislature delayed the 
effective date of a law, not a bill, by one year; in exercising 
his "veto," the governor delayed their effective dates by 1000 
years and 60 years, respectively, effectively nullifying each 
law.  The constitution does not confer on the governor any 
authority to amend or otherwise rewrite a bill in this manner, 
much less abolish laws altogether. 
¶35 The governor's vetoes invaded the exclusive province 
of the legislature by amending the effective dates of laws 
previously passed by the legislature and approved by the 
governor, effectively erasing these laws from the books.  The 
people of Wisconsin never gave the governor this power.  
Nonetheless, it is not at all surprising that many governors 
have exceeded the veto authority the constitution accords them, 
because this court has repeatedly "dress[ed] up the governor as 
the people's legislative agent (with respect to appropriations 
bills)" in utter disregard for what the constitution actually 
says.  Bartlett v. Evers, 2019AP1376-OA, slip op., ¶173 (Wis. S. 
Ct. July 10, 2020) (Kelly, J., concurring in part; dissenting in 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
Article 
V, 
Section 
10(1)(b) 
provides, in relevant part: 
Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in 
part by the governor, and the part approved shall 
become law. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
3 
 
part).3  Although this court's repeated and erroneous broadening 
of the veto authority invariably contravenes the constitution's 
separation of powers, even this court's atextual interpretations 
of the veto power have never permitted a governor's repeal of 
duly enacted law.  Nor has this court ever ducked the merits 
altogether after granting an original action petition to decide 
whether a governor's veto violated the constitution.  Until now.   
¶36 Without any precedent to support its sidestepping, the 
court declines to answer the constitutional question it had 
agreed to decide.  Instead, it makes the unprecedented move of 
disposing of this case under the doctrine of laches, declaring 
the petitioners filed this action a couple months too late to 
warrant a substantive analysis, under a new rule the majority 
just made up.  The majority shirks its responsibility to decide 
a fundamental issue of constitutional law.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND  
¶37 This case arises from Governor Scott Walker's vetoes 
within the 2017-19 budget bill, namely Section 1641m and Section 
2265.  Section 1641m affected Wis. Stat. § 121.91(4)(o), the 
                                                 
3 Justice Daniel Kelly's concurrence/dissent in Bartlett v. 
Evers, 2019AP1376-OA, slip op. (Wis. S. Ct. July 10, 2020),  
thoroughly explores this court's partial veto jurisprudence and 
how it conflicts with the text of the constitution.  In that 
opinion, Justice Kelly also explains the mechanism provided by 
the Wisconsin Constitution for the enactment of laws, as well as 
the original meaning of the provisions permitting a governor to 
approve an appropriation bill "in part."  See id. (Kelly, J., 
concurring in part; dissenting in part).  I will not repeat that 
analysis in this opinion, but refer the reader to Justice 
Kelly's opinion in Bartlett. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
4 
 
statute allowing a school district to exceed revenue limits if 
it "implement[s] energy efficiency measures or" "purchase[s] 
energy efficiency products."  Id.  This has been the law since 
2009.  See Wis. Stat. § 121.91(4)(o) (2009-10).  The legislature 
decided to impose a moratorium on the "Energy Efficiency Revenue 
Limit Adjustment" for the calendar year 2018.  The legislature's 
one-year moratorium was drafted by adding subdivision 4 to 
already-existing Wis. Stat. § 121.91(4)(o).  Subdivision 4 
provided:  "Unless the resolution is adopted before January 1, 
2018, subd. 1. applies only to a resolution adopted after 
December 31, 2018."  The governor struck "1, 2" from the 
"December 31, 2018" date to change the one-year pause of the 
Energy Efficiency Adjustment into a millennium moratorium (1,000 
years) extending until December 3018. 
¶38 Section 2265 modified Wis. Stat. § 77.585, a statute 
affording retailers the ability to obtain a refund of sales tax 
paid to the State for the uncollectible amount of customer 
purchases made using retailer-issued credit cards that become 
"bad debt" as defined in the statute.  In 2013, the legislature 
amended § 77.585 to allow refunds of sales taxes paid by a 
retailer for the uncollectible amount of purchases made by 
customers using credit cards (like Visa or Mastercard) issued by 
third party lenders who partner with the retailer.  When this 
bill was enacted into law, the legislature initially delayed the 
effective date to July 1, 2015, subsequently to July 1, 2017, 
and later to July 1, 2018.  The "Private Label Credit Card Bad 
Debt Deduction" amendments would have taken effect on July 1, 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
5 
 
2018, but for the governor's use of his veto power to change the 
effective 
date 
to 
July 
1, 
2078, 
thereby 
delaying 
the 
implementation of the statute for 60 years. 
¶39 After executing his vetoes, the governor approved the 
2017-19 budget bill, which became 2017 Wisconsin Act 59 and was 
published on September 22, 2017.  The partial veto review was 
placed on the Assembly calendar for May 8, 2018 as part of the 
veto review session pursuant to Joint Rule 82(2)(a),4 but the 
Assembly did not act to override the governor's vetoes.  See 
State of Wis. Assemb. J., May 8, 2018, at 943. 
¶40 On July 4, 2019, the 2019-21 biennial budget went into 
effect.  On October 28, 2019, WSBU filed a petition with this 
court seeking to initiate an original action challenging two of 
the governor's vetoes within the 2017-19 budget.  WSBU asked the 
court to answer the following question:  "May the Governor, 
pursuant to his constitutional authority under art. V, sec. 10 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, as amended in 1990, reject 
individual parts of a date contained in an enrolled bill so as 
to 
create 
a 
new 
date 
that 
was 
never 
approved 
by 
the 
Legislature?"  The court issued an order requiring the named 
respondents to file a response to the petition, which the 
Attorney General subsequently submitted to the court on December 
6, 2019 on behalf of the respondents. 
¶41 The Attorney General's response raised concerns with 
the timing of WSBU's petition and requested the court deny the 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Jt. Rules of Senate and Assembly § 82 ("Veto 
review session, even numbered year."). 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
6 
 
petition on that basis.  Emphasizing that WSBU filed the 
petition after the 2017-19 biennium ended, the Attorney General 
asserted that "Petitioners have not acted promptly" and "[t]heir 
petition comes two years after Act 59 was published . . . and 
more than three months after the successive biennial budget bill 
was signed into law."  The Attorney General advised the court 
that the "timing of Petitioners' petition is in stark contrast 
to 
prior 
lawsuits 
challenging 
governors' 
partial 
veto 
authority"——noting other lawsuits contesting budget vetoes "were 
challenged promptly, within the same budget biennium." 
¶42 Despite knowing WSBU filed its petition after the 
2017-19 budget time period, this court granted the petitioners' 
request for this original action on the issue of whether 
Governor Walker exceeded his authority when he used his veto 
power to change the effective dates of two laws in the 2017-19 
biennial budget bill.  The court's order asked the parties to 
file briefs, and the court held oral argument in April 2020. 
II.  ORIGINAL ACTIONS & CRITERIA FOR REVIEW 
¶43 Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
confers jurisdiction on this court to hear "original actions and 
proceedings."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2).  Original action 
petitions are relatively rare and the court grants one only if 
four or more justices vote to take the case.  Wis. S. Ct. IOP 
III (Sept. 13, 2019).  Even before the vote, the respondents 
file a response brief, as they did in this case.  Wis. S. Ct. 
IOP III (Sept. 13, 2019).  The court then decides whether to 
grant the petition, having had the benefit of hearing from both 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
7 
 
sides.  "When a matter is brought to the Supreme Court for 
review, the court's principal criterion in granting or denying 
review is not whether the matter was correctly decided or 
justice done in the lower court, but whether the matter is one 
that should trigger the institutional responsibilities of the 
Supreme Court."  Wis. S. Ct. IOP III (Sept. 13, 2019).  "The 
same determination governs the exercise of the court's original 
jurisdiction."  Wis. S. Ct. IOP III (Sept. 13, 2019). 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.62(1r) enumerates "criteria for 
granting review" and provides in pertinent part: 
Supreme 
court 
review 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
judicial 
discretion, not of right, and will be granted only 
when special and important reasons are presented. The 
following, 
while 
neither 
controlling 
nor 
fully 
measuring the court's discretion, indicate criteria 
that will be considered: 
(a) A real and significant question of federal or 
state constitutional law is presented. 
(b) The petition for review demonstrates a need for 
the 
supreme 
court 
to 
consider 
establishing, 
implementing 
or 
changing 
a 
policy 
within 
its 
authority. 
(c) A decision by the supreme court will help develop, 
clarify or harmonize the law, and 
1. The case calls for the application of a new 
doctrine rather than merely the application of well-
settled principles to the factual situation; or 
2. The question presented is a novel one, the 
resolution of which will have statewide impact; or 
3. The question presented is not factual in nature but 
rather is a question of law of the type that is likely 
to recur unless resolved by the supreme court. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
8 
 
Determining whether a governor exceeded his constitutional veto 
authority in effectively repealing laws by changing their 
effective 
dates 
unquestionably 
triggers 
the 
institutional 
responsibility of this court.  At least four justices agreed and 
voted to grant the petitioners' original action petition. 
III.  THE MAJORITY'S REFUSAL TO DECIDE THE MERITS 
¶45 The majority declines to decide the constitutionality 
of Governor Walker's vetoes, a significant issue of statewide 
importance that at least four members of this court agreed 
should be resolved.  Instead, the majority denies relief based 
on the equitable doctrine of laches, which by its very nature 
rests within the discretion of the court to apply——or not.  
Although in a footnote the majority denies it,5 the majority's 
opinion establishes a rule barring challenges to a governor's 
vetoes unless filed within the biennium in which the vetoes 
occurred.  The majority concludes that because WSBU brought its 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶17 n.9.  The majority's opinion focuses 
entirely on the untimeliness of WSBU's action based on its 
filing after the relevant biennium had passed and a new biennium 
was underway.  Nevertheless, the majority denies establishing 
any laches rule with respect to veto challenges, emphasizing it 
is merely concluding WSBU waited "too long" "under these 
circumstances."  Id.  In other words, the majority knows it when 
it sees it, but it's not disclosing "it."  If the majority isn't 
establishing a laches rule (which would be helpful) and isn't  
resolving the substantive issue it said it would decide (which 
leaves an important question unanswered), then why did the court 
take this case?  If the court is declaring merely that under 
these specific facts, laches applies, then the court could have 
(and should have) simply denied the petition.  Instead, the 
majority releases an opinion providing no answer to the question 
granted and establishing no precedent.  Future litigants will 
have no idea how late is "too late" because the majority offers 
nothing to guide them.  So much for the rule of law. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
9 
 
challenge a few months after the 2017-19 biennium ended, the 
action is too late.  The majority embraces this novel laches 
argument (to which the Attorney General devoted a mere 6 pages 
of his 47-page brief) even though laches was not an issue 
presented in the petition. 
¶46 The majority denies WSBU relief based on the laches 
doctrine even though this court has never applied laches in an 
original 
action 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
governor's veto——giving WSBU no notice or warning that its veto 
challenge would be denied without answering the substantive 
question upon which this court granted WSBU's petition.  The 
court employs laches as a mechanism to avoid deciding a 
fundamental question of constitutional law and leaves these 
petitioners in the dark.  The people of Wisconsin will never 
know 
whether 
these 
vetoes 
comport 
with 
or 
violate 
the 
constitution. 
 
Nor 
will 
current 
or 
future 
governors 
or 
legislatures, unless and until the court decides to resolve this 
issue——perhaps in 60 or 1,000 years. 
¶47 The majority concludes that the Attorney General 
satisfied his burden of proving all of the elements of laches.  
I disagree.6  Even if the elements of laches were satisfied, I 
                                                 
6 The 
majority's 
questionable 
analysis 
of 
laches 
is 
unprecedented in resolving an original action challenging a 
governor's veto.  First, the majority concludes that WSBU could 
have challenged these vetoes as early as September 23, 2017——the 
effective date of the 2017-19 budget bill.  Its presumption 
ignores the time period allowed for a legislative override, 
which did not expire until May 8, 2018.  The Joint Rules of the 
Wisconsin Senate and Assembly provide that "[t]he biennial 
session schedule shall provide for a veto review session" 
between April 1 and June 30 of even-numbered years that would 
include gubernatorial vetoes or partial vetoes.  See State of 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Jt. Rules of Senate and Assembly § 82(1) & (1m)(a).  The 
partial vetoes in this case were calendared and then sustained 
on May 8, 2018, because the legislature did not act to override 
them. 
 
See 
Adverse 
Disposal, 
State 
of 
Wis. 
Assemb. J., May 8, 2018, at 943, 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/journals/assembly/
20180508.pdf. 
 
Citing 
nothing 
but 
cases 
from 
foreign 
jurisdictions, the majority perfunctorily concludes WSBU waited 
"too long" and "[t]here must be a limit to when a lawsuit like 
this may be filed," although it refuses to announce what that 
limit is.  Majority op., ¶17.  Of course, no Wisconsin law 
specifies a limit, and the one the majority invents apparently 
applies only under the circumstances in this particular case.  
Worse yet, the majority imposes its amorphous time limit 
retroactively on WSBU, who could not have foreseen its action 
would be time-barred. 
Second, "[w]hether the doctrine of laches applies is fact 
specific."  Riegleman v. Krieg, 2004 WI App 85, ¶22, 271 
Wis. 2d 798, 679 N.W.2d 857.  The existence of disputed facts 
would preclude the application of laches, but the majority 
pretends none exist.  The majority summarily concludes the 
respondents lacked knowledge of WSBU's forthcoming claim based 
solely on the respondents saying so and "[b]ased on the 
undisputed record before us."  Majority op., ¶18.  WSBU was 
never afforded the opportunity to refute the assertion and there 
is no "record" before us because this is an original action in 
which no factual development occurred.  Nevertheless, the 
majority 
concludes 
the 
respondents 
proved 
the 
"lack 
of 
knowledge" element of laches despite the absence of any 
evidentiary or testimonial evidence to support it. 
Finally, 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
of 
the 
doctrine's 
prejudice prong details a number of speculative, alternative 
actions the State might have taken if the claim against the 
budget vetoes were brought earlier: 
 "Maybe 
different 
revenue 
limits 
would 
have 
been 
proposed." 
 "Maybe school district spending priorities would have 
been altered by the incentive in a way that would have 
changed their funding requests during the new biennium." 
 "[M]aybe they would have chosen to spend $10 million less 
per year on some other state program or priority." 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
11 
 
would not apply the doctrine.  A constitutional challenge to the 
power of the governor, particularly as it implicates the 
separation 
of 
powers, 
takes 
precedence 
over 
all 
other 
considerations, 
including 
the 
economic 
consequences 
of 
invalidating a governor's veto (which relate to the remedy 
rather than the merits).  The powers constitutionally assigned 
to the legislative branch "must be kept forever separate" from 
those assigned to the executive branch "because, as Madison once 
observed, '[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person, or body of 
magistrates.' The Federalist No. 47, at 299 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶92 
(Kelly, J., concurring).  "[O]ur duty to ensure the lines do not 
cross is mandatory and non-discretionary."  Id.  Regardless, the 
reasoning underlying the majority's application of laches is 
fundamentally unsound.  The same economic consequences the 
majority invokes to justify its application of laches would 
exist if WSBU had filed this action on July 3, 2019——one day 
before the 2019-21 biennium began, and therefore presumably 
timely under the majority's new case-specific laches rule.  
Given the importance of the issue presented in this original 
action and this court's choice to take the case, the majority 
should have addressed the merits.  See Zizzo v. Lakeside Steel & 
Mfg. Co., 2008 WI App 69, ¶6 n.3, 312 Wis. 2d 463, 752 
N.W.2d 889 (Even if a court "find[s] all the elements of laches 
                                                                                                                                                             
Majority op., ¶22.  However likely those actions would have 
been, the court cannot cite anything to prove any form of 
prejudice actually occurred. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
12 
 
present, [it] may nevertheless exercise its discretion not to 
apply the doctrine."). 
¶48 In 
applying 
laches, 
the 
majority 
credits 
the 
respondents' reliance on the budget but ignores WSBU's reliance 
on the state of the law when the court granted its single-issue 
petition.  WSBU could not possibly have known that a challenge 
on October 28, 2019 to the 2017-19 budget was too late, given 
these circumstances: 
 The court granted WSBU's petition solely on the issue 
requested: 
 
"May 
the 
Governor, 
pursuant 
to 
his 
constitutional authority under art. V, sec. 10 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, as amended in 1990, reject 
individual parts of a date contained in an enrolled bill 
so as to create a new date that was never approved by the 
Legislature?" 
 The court granted WSBU's original action petition knowing 
it was filed after the 2017-19 budget biennium had 
passed. 
 The court has never granted an original action petition 
challenging a governor's veto and then declined to 
address the merits. 
 There is no prior Wisconsin case declaring that laches 
will bar a veto challenge if the petition is filed four 
months beyond the biennium to which the challenge 
applies. 
 The petitioner challenges "vetoes" that set effective 
dates 1,000 and 60 years into the future. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
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¶49 The court could have established its new laches rule 
barring post-biennium actions challenging gubernatorial vetoes 
at the same time it addressed the merits of the constitutional 
issue it agreed to decide in this case.  The laches rule could 
have been applied prospectively and all future litigants would 
have fair warning that a veto challenge must be filed before the 
biennium expires.  Instead, the court chose to blindside WSBU.  
Despite granting the petition, well-aware of its post-biennium 
timing, the court refuses to analyze whether the governor 
violated the constitution by employing his veto power to 
eliminate previously enacted law.  The court reasons that the 
political branches relied on the 2017-19 budget in developing 
the 2019-21 budget bill and if the governor had known about the 
veto challenge before the enactment of the 2019-21 budget, he 
may have acted differently.  This is an unjustifiable excuse to 
avoid deciding the fundamental question of constitutional law 
the court announced it would decide.  Any impact on the 2019-21 
budget could have been rectified through a budget repair bill 
under Wis. Stat. § 16.50(7) to address the effects of the court 
declaring the vetoes unconstitutional.  The majority took an 
unprecedented and unwarranted "pass" on the issue it said it 
would decide, leaving WSBU, the people, and current and future 
governors and legislatures with a question that may never be 
answered. 
 
Even 
more 
troubling, 
the 
court 
leaves 
these 
unconstitutional vetoes unchecked and uncorrected——threatening 
the "tripartite separation of independent governmental power" 
that constitutes "the bedrock of the structure by which we 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
14 
 
secure liberty."  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 
67, ¶3, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384. 
IV.  THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION, SEPARATION OF POWERS, 
AND APPROPRIATION VETOES 
¶50 Under 
Article 
IV, 
Section 1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, the people vested the legislative power in the 
senate and assembly:  "The legislative power shall be vested in 
a senate and assembly."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1.  Under 
Article V, Section 10 (1)(a), "Every bill which shall have 
passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be 
presented to the governor."  Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(a).  
With respect to a non-appropriation bill, the governor may 
approve and sign the bill, which then becomes a law.  See Wis. 
Const. art. V, § 10(1)(b).7  Alternatively, the governor may 
reject the bill and return it, along with his written 
objections, to the house in which the bill originated.  See Wis. 
Const. art. V, § 10(2)(a).8  The governor may approve "in whole 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Constitution, Article V, Section 10(1) provides:  
(a) Every bill which shall have passed the legislature 
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
governor. 
(b) If the governor approves and signs the bill, the 
bill shall become law. Appropriation bills may be 
approved in whole or in part by the governor, and the 
part approved shall become law. 
(c) In approving an appropriation bill in part, the 
governor may not create a new word by rejecting 
individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill, 
and may not create a new sentence by combining parts 
of 2 or more sentences of the enrolled bill. 
8 Wisconsin Constitution, Article V, Section 10(2) provides:  
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
15 
 
or in part" any appropriation bill, "and the part approved shall 
become law."  See Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(b).  Only a super 
majority of the legislature (two-thirds of the members present) 
may override the governor's veto of any bill.  See Wis. Const. 
art. V, § 10(2)(a)-(b). 
¶51 Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the governor may 
veto an appropriation bill, but only the legislature may amend 
it.  The "powers of amending and vetoing are different things, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) If the governor rejects the bill, the governor 
shall return the bill, together with the objections in 
writing, to the house in which the bill originated. 
The house of origin shall enter the objections at 
large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider the 
bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of 
the 
members 
present 
agree 
to 
pass 
the 
bill 
notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it 
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the 
other 
house, 
by 
which 
it 
shall 
likewise 
be 
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the 
members present it shall become law. 
(b) The rejected part of an appropriation bill, 
together with the governor's objections in writing, 
shall be returned to the house in which the bill 
originated. The house of origin shall enter the 
objections at large upon the journal and proceed to 
reconsider the rejected part of the appropriation 
bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of 
the members present agree to approve the rejected part 
notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it 
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the 
other 
house, 
by 
which 
it 
shall 
likewise 
be 
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the 
members present the rejected part shall become law. 
(c) In all such cases the votes of both houses shall 
be determined by ayes and noes, and the names of the 
members voting for or against passage of the bill or 
the rejected part of the bill notwithstanding the 
objections of the governor shall be entered on the 
journal of each house respectively. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
16 
 
the respective exercise of which our constitution commits to 
different branches of government."  Bartlett, 2019AP1376-OA, 
slip op., ¶180 (Kelly, J., concurring in part; dissenting in 
part).  The only clause in the constitution providing for 
amendment of a bill appears in Article IV, Section 19, which 
states:  "Any bill may originate in either house of the 
legislature, and a bill passed by one house may be amended by 
the other."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 19.  Accordingly, the 
governor can veto, but he cannot amend the law or create law.  
Bartlett, 
2019AP1376-OA, 
slip 
op., 
¶¶193-195 
(Kelly, 
J., 
concurring in part; dissenting in part) ("Our constitution 
commits the power to amend to the assembly or senate; it 
contains no suggestion that the governor might be able to 
partake of it.").  The constitution vests these powers in the 
legislature alone. 
¶52 In establishing the Wisconsin Constitution, "[t]he 
people bestowed much power on the legislature, comprised of 
their representatives whom the people elect to make the laws."  
Gabler, 
376 
Wis. 2d 147, 
¶60. 
 
As 
reflected 
in 
the 
constitutional text, "[t]he separation of powers 'operates in a 
general way to confine legislative powers to the legislature.'" 
League of Women Voters v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶35, 387 
Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 (citing Goodland [v. Zimmerman], 243 
Wis. [459] at 467, 10 N.W.2d 180).  Accordingly, "an idea may 
not become a law without the legislature having voted for it."  
Bartlett, 2019AP1376-OA, slip op., ¶195 (Kelly, J., concurring 
in part; dissenting in part).  Acting as a check on the 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
17 
 
legislature, the governor may veto only the part of a presented 
bill that represents "an idea expressing a potential complete, 
entire, and workable law"——something on which the legislature 
voted and thereby approved.  See id., ¶¶193, 195 (Kelly, J., 
concurring in part; dissenting in part).  The constitution does 
not, however, give the governor the power to create an entirely 
different idea, and the constitution decidedly does not give the 
governor the ability to unilaterally enact a law of his own 
creation on which the legislature never voted and which it 
therefore never approved.  See id., ¶195 (Kelly, J., concurring 
in part; dissenting in part). 
¶53 Precluding one branch of government from intruding on 
the exclusive powers of another branch is fundamental to 
preserving 
the 
balance 
of 
governmental 
power, 
which 
is 
ultimately designed to protect the interests of the people the 
government was formed to serve.  "To the Framers of the United 
States Constitution, the concentration of governmental power 
presented an extraordinary threat to individual liberty:  'The 
accumulation 
of 
all 
powers, 
legislative, 
executive, 
and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.' The Federalist No. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter 
ed., 
1961) . . . . 
 
As 
Madison 
explained 
when 
advocating 
for 
the 
Constitution's 
adoption, 
neither 
the 
legislature nor the executive nor the judiciary 'ought to 
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over 
the others in the administration of their respective powers.' 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
18 
 
Federalist No. 48, id. at 305 (James Madison)."  Gabler, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶4.  Joseph Story "'deemed [it] a maxim of vital 
importance'" 
that 
"'the 
three 
great 
powers 
of 
government . . . should for ever be kept separate and distinct.' 
2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States § 519, at 2-3 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 1833)."  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶3. 
¶54 Although these legal principles are pertinent to the 
vetoes challenged in this case, it is important to recognize how 
this case differs from Bartlett and all other veto cases 
previously decided by this court.  This case involves two unique 
factors.  First, the governor used his veto to change provisions 
of laws already on the books——the vetoes were not confined to 
bills waiting to become laws, but instead disturbed previously 
enacted laws.  Second, the vetoes effectively eliminated the 
laws entirely by extending their effective dates 1,000 years on 
one and 60 years on the other.  The constitution's text 
restricts the governor's ability to reject the work of the 
legislature to bills and nowhere gives the governor the ability 
to repeal laws. 
¶55 The veto power "furnishes an additional security 
against the enaction of improper laws.  It establishes a 
salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard 
the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or 
of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen 
to influence a majority of that body."  Federalist No. 73, at 
443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
19 
 
added).  As a general matter, the executive veto power may only 
prevent a bill from becoming a law; therefore, it may be 
exercised only against bills.  Nothing in the Wisconsin 
Constitution grants the governor the power to veto a law passed 
years earlier.  Even setting aside the effects of these vetoes 
on previously enacted laws, the vetoes nevertheless exceeded the 
governor's authority.  Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the 
governor's veto empowers him to negate, not create. 
V.  BOTH VETOES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
¶56 WSBU challenges two vetoes executed by Governor Walker 
with respect to the 2017-19 biennium budget.  Both vetoes 
changed effective dates of laws that had been enacted in 
earlier, non-appropriation legislation.  Both vetoes involved 
bills previously passed by the legislature and signed by the 
governor into law.  At the time of their passage, the governor 
could have vetoed either bill.  He did not.  When the 
legislature later decided to delay the effective dates for each 
law, the governor struck digits in dates and a comma, merging 
what was left to create new dates never approved by the 
legislature and set so far into the future that the governor's 
actions 
essentially 
repealed 
two 
duly-enacted 
laws. 
 
As 
explained below, neither veto "approved in whole or in part" 
something that became law, both vetoes struck something smaller 
than what constitutes a "part," and both vetoes left something 
on which the legislature never voted and which it therefore 
never approved.  Neither veto comported with the constitutional 
boundaries of the governor's authority. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
20 
 
A.  The First Veto 
¶57 The first veto involves Wisconsin's school district 
revenue limit law, see Wis. Stat. § 121.91, and the increases to 
the revenue limits for school districts that spend money to 
implement energy efficiency measures or to purchase energy 
efficiency products, see Wis. Stat. § 121.91(4)(o).  Before the 
2017-19 
budget 
bill, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.91(4)(o) 
(2015-16) 
provided: 
1. Except as provided in subd. 1m., if a school board 
adopts a resolution to do so, the limit otherwise 
applicable to a school district under sub. (2m) in any 
school year is increased by the amount spent by the 
school district in that school year on a project to 
implement energy efficiency measures or to purchase 
energy efficiency products, including the payment of 
debt service on a bond or note issued, or a state 
trust fund loan obtained, to finance the project, if 
the project results in the avoidance of, or reduction 
in, energy costs or operational costs, the project is 
governed by a performance contract entered into under 
s. 66.0133, and the bond or note issued or state trust 
fund loan obtained to finance the project is issued 
for a term not exceeding 20 years. If a school board 
issues a bond or note or obtains a state trust fund 
loan 
to 
finance 
a 
project 
described 
in 
this 
subdivision, a resolution adopted by a school board 
under this subdivision is valid for each school year 
in which the school board pays debt service on the 
bond, note, or state trust fund loan. 
1m. If a school district issues a bond or note or 
obtains a state trust fund loan to finance a project 
described in subd. 1., the amount of debt service 
included in the amount spent by the school district 
under subd. 1. is the amount paid in the calendar year 
that begins on January 1 of the school year in which 
the school district's revenue limit is increased under 
this paragraph. 
2. Any additional revenue received by a school 
district under this paragraph shall not be included in 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
21 
 
the base for determining the school district's limit 
under sub. (2m) for the following school year. 
3. If a school district issues a bond or note or 
obtains a state trust fund loan to finance a project 
described in subd. 1. and the school district's 
utility costs are measurably reduced as a result of 
the project, the school board shall use the savings to 
retire the bond, note, or state trust fund loan. 
This law had been in effect since 2009.  Section 1641m of the 
2017-19 budget bill added subdivision 4 to this statute, which 
placed a one-year moratorium on the energy efficiency increase 
to the revenue limits, prohibiting the increase for the 2018 
calendar year.  Section 1641m provided:  "Unless the resolution 
is adopted before January 1, 2018, subd. 1. applies only to a 
resolution adopted after December 31, 2018." 
¶58 Governor Walker deleted the "1" in "31" and the "2" in 
"2018" as well as the comma and space between them so the 
moratorium would not lift until December 3018:  "Unless the 
resolution is adopted before January 1, 2018, subd. 1. applies 
only to a resolution adopted after December 31, 2018."  The 
legislature 
passed 
a 
one-year 
moratorium 
on 
the 
Energy 
Efficiency Revenue Limit Adjustment, and Governor Walker's veto 
changed one year to 1,000 years.  The side-by-side chart below 
shows what the legislature approved compared to what the 
governor wrote in its place: 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
22 
 
Legislative Language 
Governor's Final Language 
121.91 (4) (o) 4. 
Unless 
the 
resolution 
is 
adopted 
before 
January 
1, 
2018, 
subd. 
1. 
applies 
only to a resolution 
adopted 
after 
December 31, 2018. 
121.91 (4) (o) 4. 
Unless 
the 
resolution 
is 
adopted 
before 
January 
1, 
2018, 
subd. 
1. 
applies 
only to a resolution 
adopted 
after 
December 3018. 
 
¶59 The governor did not actually "approve" or "reject" 
any idea passed by the legislature, either in whole or in part, 
when presented with Section 1641m of the 2017-19 budget bill.  
Instead, the governor amended a sentence by striking two digits, 
a comma, and a space to drastically change what the legislature 
wrote——effectively 
vetoing 
the 
entirety 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 121.91(4)(o)1 (which had been law since 2009).  Nothing in the 
Wisconsin Constitution authorizes the governor to amend or 
create law, and nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes 
the governor to unilaterally repeal laws (via his veto power or 
otherwise).  Despite this court's jurisprudence repeatedly 
inventing veto powers not conferred under the constitution, the 
court has never empowered the governor to change the effective 
date of a bill, much less an existing law.  See State ex rel. 
Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 434, 424 N.W.2d 385 
(1988) (allowing the so-called "digit" veto, which permits a 
governor to "veto" an appropriation amount by reducing it); 
Citizens Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 534 N.W.2d 608 
(1995) 
(allowing 
a 
governor 
to 
write 
in 
a 
different 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
23 
 
appropriation amount, provided it is an amount lower than the 
amount proposed by the legislature). 
¶60 The governor's "veto" cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  The 2017-19 budget bill imposed a one-year moratorium 
on the Energy Efficiency Revenue Limit Adjustment available to 
Wisconsin school districts under previously enacted law.  By 
excising individual digits within the date in the bill (along 
with a comma and a space), the governor imposed a 1,000-year 
moratorium on the Adjustment.  In doing so, he effectively 
repealed the law, an action the people never approved as an 
executive power under the constitution but instead reserved 
solely for the legislature.9  The governor changed the one-year 
moratorium approved by both houses of the legislature to 1,000 
years, 
creating 
a 
law 
the 
legislature 
never 
considered, 
approved, or presented.  In doing so, the governor effectively 
nullified a law that had been on the books for years, 
singlehandedly eliminating the Energy Efficiency Revenue Limit 
Adjustment.  This veto encroached on the exclusive province of 
                                                 
9 "The constitutional authority to repeal statute law 
resides exclusively with legislatures."  1A Norman Singer 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 32:3 (7th ed. Oct. 2019) 
("Power to repeal") (quoted sources omitted; emphasis added).  
See also Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶¶91-92, 391 
Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Kelly, J., concurring) ("Powers 
constitutionally vested in the legislature include the powers:  
'to declare whether or not there shall be a law; to determine 
the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; [and] 
to fix the limits within which the law shall operate.'  See, 
e.g., Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 59, 158 
N.W.2d 306 (1968) (quoting State ex rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau 
v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 505, 220 N.W. 929 (1928)).  Koschkee 
v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 
(alteration in original)."). 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
24 
 
the legislature, thereby violating the separation of powers 
reflected in the constitution, and this court should have so 
declared in order to confine current and future governors to the 
exercise of executive power as delineated in the text of the 
constitution. 
B.  The Second Veto 
¶61 The second veto involves the Private Label Credit Card 
Bad Debt Deduction.  Wisconsin law allows retailers who issue 
credit cards to customers to claim a refund of state sales taxes 
the retailers paid if the retailers are unable to collect 
payments from customers who charged purchases on the credit 
cards issued by the retailers, but then failed to pay the credit 
card bills.  Because retailers began partnering with third-party 
lenders using payment processors such as Visa or Mastercard, 
instead of using retailer-brand credit cards, the legislature 
passed a law in 2013 Wisconsin Act 229, amending the definition 
of "bad debt" in Wis. Stat. § 77.585 to include "dual purpose 
credit debts and private label credit debts."  See § 77.585 
(2013-14).  This allowed the retailer to take a tax deduction on 
bad debts arising from credit cards issued by third-party 
lenders. 
¶62 Governor Walker could have vetoed this bad debt bill 
when the legislature presented it to him in 2013.  He did not.  
He instead signed the bill into law, which was scheduled to take 
effect on July 1, 2015.  The legislature decided to delay the 
effective date until July 1, 2017, amending § 77.585's effective 
date in the 2015-17 budget bill.  In the 2017-19 budget bill, 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
25 
 
the legislature decided to delay the effective date for an 
additional year.  The legislature approved July 1, 2018 as the 
effective date for the bad debt deduction law, and included the 
following language in Section 2265 of the 2017-19 budget bill: 
Section 6(1) This act takes effect on July 1, 2017 
2018, and first applies to bad debts resulting from 
sales completed beginning on July 1, 2017 2018. 
The governor rejected the legislature's deletion of the "20" in 
"2017"; approved the deletion of the "1" in "2017"; rejected the 
legislature's deletion of the "7" in "2017"; deleted the "201" 
in "2018"; and deleted the space between the "2017" and "2018" 
to create a new effective date of "July 1, 2078."  A side-by-
side chart shows the legislative language compared to the 
governor's amended language: 
 
Legislative Language 
Governor's Final Language 
[2013 Wisconsin Act 
229] Section 6 (1) 
This 
act 
takes 
effect on July 1, 
2017 2018 and first 
applies to bad debts 
resulting from sales 
completed 
beginning 
on 
July 
1, 
2017 
2018. 
[2013 Wisconsin Act 
229] Section 6 (1) 
This 
act 
takes 
effect on July 1, 
2078 
and 
first 
applies to bad debts 
resulting from sales 
completed 
beginning 
on July 1, 2078. 
 
Like the other veto, the governor never approved anything passed 
by the legislature, in whole or in part.  Instead, he amended 
the legislature's language by rejecting the deletion of six 
digits, striking six digits, deleting two spaces, and merging 
what was left into a date 60 years in the future.  The 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
26 
 
legislature never presented a 60-years-later effective date to 
the governor and the legislature never voted on or approved a 
60-year delay. 
¶63 Similar to the other veto, the governor's actions 
effectively repealed a law previously enacted and signed by the 
governor.  Unlike the 1,000 year delay created by the other 
veto, the people will have to wait only 60 years for the law 
enacted by the legislature to take effect.  As a result, the 
current statutes contain (and every subsequently printed statute 
book for the next 60 years will contain) both the current Wis. 
Stat. § 77.585 as well as the law enacted by the legislature 
(albeit with an effective date unilaterally chosen by the 
governor), which appears in a "Note" following the current 
statute offering the following explanation:  "Sub. (1) is 
renumbered, in part, amended, in part, and created, in part, 
eff. 7-1-2078 . . . to read:"; the text of the enacted statute 
follows, as amended by the governor.10 
                                                 
10 On July 2, 2078, Wis. Stat. § 77.585 will provide: 
(1) (a) In this subsection: 
1. "Bad debt" means the portion of the sales price or 
purchase price that the seller has previously reported 
as taxable under this subchapter, and for which the 
seller has paid the tax, and that the seller or lender 
may claim as a deduction under section 166 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. "Bad debt" does not include 
financing charges or interest, sales or use taxes 
imposed 
on 
the 
sales 
price 
or 
purchase 
price, 
uncollectible amounts on tangible personal property or 
items, property, or goods under s. 77.52 (1) (b), (c), 
or (d) that remain in the seller's possession until 
the full sales price or purchase price is paid, 
expenses incurred in attempting to collect any debt, 
debts sold or assigned to 3rd parties for collection, 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
not including dual purpose credit debts and private 
label credit debts, and repossessed property or items. 
2. "Dual purpose credit card" means a credit card that 
may be used as a private label credit card or to make 
purchases from persons other than the seller whose 
name or logo appears on the card or the seller's 
affiliates or franchisees, if the credit card issuer 
is able to determine the sales receipts of the seller 
and the seller's affiliates or franchisees apart from 
any sales receipts of unrelated persons. 
3. "Dual purpose credit debt" means accounts and 
receivables that result from credit sale transactions 
using a dual purpose credit card, but only to the 
extent the account or receivable balance resulted from 
purchases made from the seller whose name or logo 
appears on the card. 
4. a. "Lender" means any person who owns a private 
label credit debt, an interest in a private label 
credit debt, a dual purpose credit debt, or an 
interest in a dual purpose credit debt, if the person 
purchased the debt or interest directly from a seller 
who remitted the tax imposed under this subchapter or 
from a third party or if the person originated the 
debt or interest pursuant to the person's contract 
with the seller who remitted the tax imposed under 
this subchapter or with a third party. 
b. "Lender" includes any person who is a member of the 
same affiliated group, as defined under section 1504 
of the Internal Revenue Code, as a lender or is an 
assignee or other transferee of a lender. 
5. "Private label credit card" means any charge card 
or credit card that identifies a seller's name or logo 
on the card and that may be used only for purchases 
from 
that 
seller 
or 
from 
any 
of 
the 
seller's 
affiliates or franchisees. 
6. "Private label credit debt" means accounts and 
receivables that result from credit sale transactions 
using a private label credit card, but only to the 
extent the account or receivable balance resulted from 
purchases made from the seller whose name or logo 
appears on the card. 
No.  2019AP2054-OA.rgb 
 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) A seller may claim as a deduction on a return 
under s. 77.58 the amount of any bad debt that the 
seller or lender writes off as uncollectible in the 
seller's or lender's books and records and that is 
eligible to be deducted as a bad debt for federal 
income tax purposes, regardless of whether the seller 
or lender is required to file a federal income tax 
return. A seller who claims a deduction under this 
paragraph shall claim the deduction on the return 
under s. 77.58 that is submitted for the period in 
which the seller or lender writes off the amount of 
the deduction as uncollectible in the seller's or 
lender's books and records and in which such amount is 
eligible to be deducted as bad debt for federal income 
tax purposes. If the seller or lender subsequently 
collects in whole or in part any bad debt for which a 
deduction is claimed under this paragraph, the seller 
shall include the amount collected in the return filed 
for the period in which the amount is collected and 
shall pay the tax with the return. 
(bm) For purposes of par. (b), a seller may compute 
the seller's bad debt deduction using an estimate, if 
the department approves the method for computing the 
estimate. The department may audit the seller's books 
and records to review the estimate and adjust the 
estimate as necessary to reflect the actual allowable 
bad debt amount. 
(c) For purposes of computing a bad debt deduction or 
reporting a payment received on a previously claimed 
bad debt, any payment made on a debt or on an account 
is applied first to the price of the tangible personal 
property, or items, property, or goods under s. 77.52 
(1) (b), (c), or (d), or service sold, and the 
proportionate share of the sales tax on that property, 
or items, property, or goods under s. 77.52 (1) (b), 
(c), or (d), or service, and then to interest, service 
charges, and other charges related to the sale. If 
payment is received on an account for which the 
balance reflects multiple sales transactions, the 
payment is applied to the sales transactions in the 
same order in which the sales transactions occurred. 
(d) A seller may obtain a refund of the tax reported 
for any bad debt amount deducted under par. (b) that 
exceeds the amount of the seller's taxable sales as 
provided under s. 77.59 (4), except that the period 
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¶64 The governor used his veto power to modify the 
effective date of a law passed years before the 2017-19 budget 
bill and set to go into effect on July 1, 2018.  The governor 
did not veto a complete idea voted on and approved by the 
legislature and presented to the governor as a bill.  His veto 
prevented existing law from taking effect for another six 
decades.  Like the other "veto," this veto also invaded the 
province of the legislature by amending——to the point of 
nullifying——an enacted law, previously passed by the legislature 
and approved by the governor. 
¶65 The people of Wisconsin never gave the governor this 
power.  It is the responsibility of this court to guard against 
                                                                                                                                                             
for making a claim as determined under s. 77.59 (4) 
begins on the date on which the return on which the 
bad debt could be claimed would have been required to 
be submitted to the department under s. 77.58. 
(e) If a seller is using a certified service provider, 
the certified service provider may claim a bad debt 
deduction under this subsection on the seller's behalf 
if the seller has not claimed and will not claim the 
same deduction. A certified service provider who 
receives a bad debt deduction under this subsection 
shall credit that deduction to the seller and a 
certified service provider who receives a refund under 
this subsection shall submit that refund to the 
seller. 
(f) If a bad debt relates to the retail sales of 
tangible personal property, or items, property, or 
goods under s. 77.52 (1) (b), (c), or (d), or taxable 
services that were sourced to this state and to one or 
more other states, as determined under s. 77.522, the 
total amount of such bad debt shall be apportioned 
among the states to which the underlying sales were 
sourced in a manner prescribed by the department to 
arrive at the amount of the deduction under par. (b).  
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the encroachment of the executive branch upon the people's 
representatives in the legislative branch.  "The significance of 
preserving clear boundaries between the branches has been 
understood since the founding of our nation[.]"  Gabler, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶60.  It is the duty of this court to be "ever 
vigilant in averting the accumulation of power by one body——a 
grave threat to liberty[.]"  Id.  When this court hears a case 
involving such encroachment by the governor via the exercise of 
veto power not authorized by the constitution, it is the duty of 
this court to check it. 
¶66 In exercising each of these vetoes, the governor 
violated the separation of powers by assuming the authority to 
legislate, a power the constitution confers on the legislature 
alone.  Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the governor may 
approve or reject a bill presented by the legislature and may 
approve "in whole or in part" an appropriation bill.  The vetoed 
part as well as the approved part must each represent a complete 
idea on which the legislature voted.  The veto cannot be used to 
change what the legislature presented; the veto cannot be used 
to create new law the legislature never approved; and the veto 
cannot be used to unilaterally erase laws enacted in previous 
years. 
¶67 These vetoes were unconstitutional, and this court 
should have so declared.  Instead, the majority leaves the 
petitioners, the governor, the legislature, and the people of 
Wisconsin without an answer to this important constitutional 
question the court told them we would resolve. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶68 The governor's vetoes challenged by WSBU transgressed 
the boundaries of executive power in unilaterally repealing 
existing laws by extending their effective dates 1,000 years and 
60 
years, 
respectively. 
 
Rather 
than 
approving 
these 
appropriation bills "in whole or in part," as permitted under 
the Wisconsin Constitution, the governor deleted digits in 
dates, a punctuation mark, and spaces in order to create new 
effective dates set far in the future.  When a governor replaces 
a law's legislatively-written effective date with his preferred 
effective 
date——one 
never 
approved 
or 
presented 
by 
the 
legislature——he assumes a power to create law, which only the 
legislature may constitutionally exercise.  Both vetoes are 
patently unconstitutional because nothing in the constitution 
authorizes a governor to unilaterally repeal existing law or 
amend 
a 
law's 
effective 
date, 
actions 
reserved 
to 
the 
legislature alone. 
¶69 The majority refuses to consider the merits despite 
having granted this original action on the sole and significant 
issue of the constitutional scope of the governor's veto power 
as exercised in the two instances presented for our review.  
Instead, the majority takes the unprecedented and completely 
discretionary step of declining to declare rights in an original 
action presenting an issue of first impression regarding the 
constitutionality of a governor's vetoes, electing to deny 
relief under the doctrine of laches.  In doing so, the majority 
shirks its duty to preserve the constitutional balance of power 
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between the political branches, abandoning the judiciary's 
pivotal role in protecting the bedrock of our structure of 
government.  I respectfully dissent. 
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this dissent. 
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