Title: Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP001450-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2022

2022 WI 19 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1450-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed Perkins and 
Ronald Zahn, 
          Petitioners, 
Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces 
de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, 
Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan 
Steil, Congressman Tom Tiffany, Congressman 
Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, 
Kathleen Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha,  
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge Bostelmann 
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Julie Glancey in 
her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann Jacobs  
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dean Knudson in 
his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Robert Spindell, 
Jr. in his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission and Mark Thomsen 
in his official capacity as a member of the  
Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
          Respondents, 
The Wisconsin Legislature, Governor Tony Evers, 
in his official capacity, and Janet Bewley 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader, on behalf of 
the Senate Democratic Caucus, 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 15, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 19, 2022   
 
 
 
 
2 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., 
joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners, there were briefs filed by Richard M. 
Esenberg, Anthony F. LoCoco, Lucas T. Vebber and Wisconsin 
Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee. There was oral argument 
by Richard M. Esenberg.  
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Black Leaders Organizing 
for Communities, Voces de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson and Rebecca Alwin, 
briefs, including amicus briefs, were filed by Douglas M. 
Poland, Jeffrey A. Mandell, Rachel E. Snyder, Richard A. Manthe, 
Carly Gerads and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; Mel Barnes and 
Law Forward, Inc., Madison; Mark P. Gaber (pro hac vice), 
Christopher Lamar (pro hac vice)and Campaign Legal Center, 
Washington, D.C.; Annabelle Harless (pro hac vice) and Campaign 
Legal Center, Chicago.  There was oral argument by Douglas M. 
Poland. 
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Congressmen Glenn Grothman, 
Mike Gallagher, Bryan Steil, Tom Tiffany and Scott Fitzgerald 
there were briefs, including amicus briefs, filed by Misha 
Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy, and Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders 
LLP, Chicago.  There was oral argument by Misha Tseytlin.  
 
2 
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer 
Oh, 
John 
Persa, 
Geraldine 
Schertz 
and 
Kathleen 
Qualheim, there were briefs, including amicus briefs filed by 
Charles G. Curtis, Jr. and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison; Marc Erik 
Elias (pro hac vice), Aria C. Branch (pro hac vice), Daniel C. 
Osher (pro hac vice), Jacob D. Shelly (pro hac vice), Christina 
A. Ford (pro hac vice), William K. Hancock (pro hac vice) and 
Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, D.C.  There was oral argument 
by John Devaney (pro hac vice), Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, 
D.C.   
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Citizens Mathematicians and 
Scientists Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, 
Jean-Luc Thiffeault and Somesh Jha, briefs were filed by Michael 
P. May, Sarah A. Zylstra, Tanner G. Jean-Louis and Boardman & 
Clark LLP, Madison, and David J. Bradford (pro hac vice) and 
Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago.  There was oral argument by Sam 
Hirsch (pro hac vice), Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C.  
 
For the respondents Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann, Julie Glancey, Ann Jacobs, Dean Knudson, Robert 
Spindell, Jr. and Mark Thomsen there were letter-briefs filed by 
Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, Karla Z. 
Keckhaver, assistant attorney general, Thomas C. Bellavia, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
For the intervenors-respondents the Wisconsin Legislature 
there were briefs, including amicus briefs, filed by Kevin M. 
St. John and Bell Giftos St. John LLC, Madison; Jeffrey M. 
Harris (pro hac vice), Taylor A.R. Meehan (pro hac vice), James 
P. McGlone and Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, Arlington, Virginia and 
Adam K. Mortara and Lawfair LLC, Chicago.  There was oral 
argument by Taylor A.R. Meehan. 
 
2 
 
For the intervenor-respondent Governor Tony Evers there 
were briefs filed by Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, Anthony 
D. Russomanno, assistant attorney general and Brian P. Keenan, 
assistant attorney general.  There was oral argument by Anthony 
D. Russomanno. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent Janet Bewley, State Senate 
Democratic Minority Leader on behalf of the State Senate 
Democratic Caucus there were briefs filed by Tamara B. Packard, 
Aaron G. Dumas and Pines Bach LLP, Madison.  There was oral 
argument by Tamara B. Packard. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of William 
Whitford, Hans Breitenmoser, Mary Lynne Donohue, Wendy Sue 
Johnson and Deborah Patel by Ruth M. Greenwood (pro hac vice), 
The Election Law Clinic, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA; with 
whom on the brief were law student-practitioners Mary F. Brown, 
Mark R. Haidar, Meredith A. Manda, Sarah A. Sadlier, Corey M. 
Stewart, Harvard Law School and Jakob Feltham and Hawks Quindel, 
S.C., Madison. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of Concerned 
Voters of Wisconsin by Joseph S. Goode, Mark M. Leitner, John W. 
Halpin and Laffey, Leitner & Goode, L.L.C., Milwaukee.  
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of Non-Party 
Legal 
Scholars 
by 
Allison 
Boldt, 
Robert 
Yablon 
and 
the 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed by Daniel R. Suhr, 
Thiensville. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2022 WI 19 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1450-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed Perkins and 
Ronald Zahn, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces 
de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, 
Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan 
Steil, Congressman Tom Tiffany, Congressman 
Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, 
Kathleen Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha,  
 
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann in her official capacity as a member 
of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Julie 
Glancey in her official capacity as a member of 
the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann Jacobs 
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dean Knudson in 
his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Robert 
Spindell, Jr. in his official capacity as a 
member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission 
and Mark Thomsen in his official capacity as a 
member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
 
          Respondents, 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 15, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
2 
The Wisconsin Legislature, Governor Tony Evers, 
in his official capacity, and Janet Bewley 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader, on behalf of 
the Senate Democratic Caucus, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., 
joined. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION.  On remand from the United States Supreme 
court.  Relief granted.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is an original 
action filed by Petitioners Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed 
Perkins, 
and 
Ronald 
Zahn 
to 
remedy 
malapportionment 
in 
Wisconsin's state legislative and congressional districts.  On 
March 3, 2022, this court selected legislative and congressional 
maps drawn by Governor Tony Evers.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶52, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ___ N.W.2d ___.  Upon 
a request for certiorari review by the United States Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily 
reversed the selection of the Governor's state legislative maps.  
Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. ___, 142 
S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (2022) (per curiam).  Racial motivations drove 
the Governor's selection of district lines, and the Supreme 
Court reasoned that the court relied on insufficient evidence to 
endorse such race-based decision making.  Id. at 1249-51.  The 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
7 
 
Supreme Court remanded the case to the court for further 
proceedings regarding the Wisconsin State Senate and Assembly 
maps.  Id. at 1251.   
¶2 
Upon 
review 
of 
the 
record, 
we 
conclude 
that 
insufficient evidence is presented to justify drawing state 
legislative districts on the basis of race.  The maps proposed 
by the Governor, Senator Janet Bewley, Black Leaders Organizing 
for 
Communities 
("BLOC"), 
and 
Citizen 
Mathematicians 
and 
Scientists ("CMS") are racially motivated and, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, they fail strict scrutiny.   
¶3 
By contrast, the maps proposed by the Wisconsin 
Legislature are race neutral.  The Legislature's maps comply 
with 
the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause, 
along 
with 
all 
other 
applicable federal and state legal requirements.  Further, the 
Legislature's maps exhibit minimal changes to the existing maps, 
in accordance with the least change approach we adopted in 
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
967 N.W.2d 469.  Therefore, we adopt the state senate and 
assembly maps proposed by the Legislature for the State of 
Wisconsin.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed and the 
Governor signed state legislative and congressional maps after 
the 2010 census.  Over the subsequent ten years, the population 
of Wisconsin changed; people moved away from some areas and 
people moved into others.  These changes were recognized in the 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
8 
 
2020 census, which identified a population increase in the state 
from 5,686,986 to 5,893,718.  See Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶15.  
¶5 
The Petitioners filed this original action in August 
2021 to remedy alleged malapportionment in Wisconsin's state 
legislative and congressional maps.1  In September 2021, this 
court accepted the case, and in October 2021, the court directed 
the parties to file briefs addressing what factors the court 
should consider when selecting new maps.  Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (Wis. 
Sept. 22, 2021, amend. Sept. 24, 2021); Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (Wis. 
Oct. 14, 2021).  On November 17, 2021, the court directed the 
parties to confer and, if they wished to participate in a 
discovery period, to file a joint proposed discovery plan by 
December 3, 2021.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Nov. 17, 2021). 
¶6 
On November 30, 2021, the court issued a decision 
explaining the framework by which the court would select maps.  
The court identified that under the Equal Protection Clause of 
                                                 
1 The 
Legislature 
is 
constitutionally 
tasked 
with 
responsibility to act in reapportionment.  Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 3 ("At its first session after each enumeration made by the 
authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion 
and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, 
according to the number of inhabitants.").  In 2021, after 
completion of the 2020 census, the Legislature passed new 
redistricting maps.  However, "[that] legislation did not 
survive the political process."  Johnson v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶72 n.8, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  
As a result, this court is called upon to select redistricting 
maps. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
9 
 
the United States Constitution, "a State [must] make an honest 
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of 
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as practicable."  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶24 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 577 (1964)).  This "one person, one vote" principle 
applies with less force when selecting districts for state 
legislative 
maps 
than 
it 
does 
for 
congressional 
maps.  
"Consistent with principles of federalism, states have limited 
flexibility to pursue other legitimate policy objectives, such 
as 
'maintain[ing] 
the 
integrity 
of 
various 
political 
subdivisions' 
and 
'provid[ing] 
for 
compact 
districts 
of 
contiguous territory.'"  Id., ¶26 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)).  The court 
explained that, in addition to satisfying all Equal Protection 
Clause requirements, the court must consider compliance with 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA").  Id., ¶27 (citing 52 
U.S.C. § 10301).   
¶7 
Under state law, the court recognized that the 
Wisconsin Constitution, as with the United States Constitution, 
imposes a requirement for population equality among legislative 
districts.  Id., ¶¶28-33 (citing Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3).  
Although "perfect exactness in the apportionment, according to 
the number of inhabitants, is neither required nor possible," 
"there should be as close an approximation to exactness as 
possible."  Id., ¶28 (quoting State ex rel. Attorney General v. 
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 484, 51 N.W. 724 (1892)).  Further, the 
court identified a state constitutional interest in retaining 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
10 
 
assembly districts within "county, precinct, town, [and] ward 
lines."  Id., ¶35 (quoting Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4).  The court 
recognized 
that, 
under 
federal 
one 
person, 
one 
vote 
jurisprudence, bounding districts by county lines may not be 
possible, but "the smaller the political subdivision, the easier 
it may be to preserve its boundaries."  Id.  Finally, the court 
stated that assembly districts must be "contiguous" and "in as 
compact form as practicable."  Id., ¶¶36-37 (citing Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 4).  Both the assembly and senate must have single 
member districts, and assembly districts may not be "divided in 
the formation of a senate district," i.e., senate districts must 
"nest" within assembly district boundaries.  Id., ¶37 (citing 
Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 4, 5).   
¶8 
In its November 30 decision, the court adopted the 
"least change approach," whereby the court would select maps 
that 
"comport 
with 
relevant 
legal 
requirements" 
while 
"reflect[ing] the least change necessary."  Id., ¶72 (citation 
omitted).  The court rejected the suggestion that the court 
consider partisan fairness and proportional representation of 
political parties when selecting maps.  Id., ¶¶40-52. 
¶9 
Following the court's November 17 order directing the 
parties to confer and develop a discovery plan, the parties on 
December 3, 2021, submitted a joint discovery plan.  The parties 
agreed that any discovery in this case and the legal issues 
presented therein would be completed by December 23, 2021.  They 
stipulated that no discovery "beyond the exchange of maps, 
expert disclosures, and any documents or data that a party 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
11 
 
intends to rely upon or an expert has relied upon" was 
anticipated.  As that information would be included in briefing 
with the court, the parties consequently undertook no other 
discovery.  See Johnson, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order, 
at 2 (Wis. Nov. 17, 2021) (explaining the timeline for filing 
briefing with the court).   
¶10 Between December 15, 2021, and January 4, 2022, the 
court received hundreds of pages of briefing and expert reports 
from the parties.  The court heard oral arguments on January 19, 
2022.  Between September 22, 2021, when the court first accepted 
this original action, and January 19, 2022, when the court held 
oral arguments, the court received no formal request or motion 
to permit additional discovery, beyond what was included in the 
joint discovery plan, or to modify the court's schedule to 
accommodate discovery needs. 
¶11 On January 19, 2022, the court heard a total of five 
hours of oral arguments over the course of the day.  On March 3, 
2022, the court issued a decision adopting the Governor's state 
legislative and congressional maps.  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 
¶52.  The court reasoned that the Governor's maps included the 
least alterations to preexisting maps.  Id., ¶¶26-33.  In 
addition, the court said that the Governor's maps complied with 
the Equal Protection Clause, the VRA, and the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Id., ¶¶34-51. 
¶12 After the court issued its March 3 decision, the 
Petitioners and the Legislature sought certiorari review by the 
United States Supreme Court, asserting that the court's adoption 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
12 
 
of the Governor's state legislative maps constituted a racial 
gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Congressmen Glenn Grothman, Mike Gallagher, Bryan Steil, Tom 
Tiffany, and Scott Fitzgerald ("the Congressmen") filed a 
separate appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging this court's 
selection of the Governor's congressional map.2 
¶13 On March 23, 2022, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the court's decision to select the Governor's state 
legislative maps.  The Supreme Court confirmed that, under the 
Equal Protection Clause, a state government cannot draw district 
maps on the basis of race unless the state satisfies strict 
scrutiny.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 
at 1248-49.  If the state has before it a "strong basis in 
evidence" for believing the VRA "require[s] [the state] to move 
voters based on race," and the evidence is district specific, a 
racially motivated map can satisfy strict scrutiny.  Id. at 1249 
(quoting Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ____, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1470 
(2017)).  However, the state must possess this evidence before 
it creates maps based on racial classifications.  Id. (quoting 
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996)).  
¶14 In the case before this court, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that, based on the filings and presentations made by 
the Governor, the Governor had failed to present a strong 
                                                 
2 The United States Supreme Court denied review of the 
Congressmen's appeal.  Grothman v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
21A490, 2022 WL 851726 (Mar. 23, 2022) (stay denied).  Thus, the 
March 3 decision to adopt the Governor's congressional map 
remains unchanged. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
13 
 
evidentiary basis for believing the VRA mandated the district 
lines he drew.  Id. at 1249.  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
identified that the Governor's primary explanation for his 
racially drawn maps was the fact that it was cartographically 
possible to draw them.  Id.  According to the Supreme Court, 
"[s]trict scrutiny requires much more."  Id.  Based on the 
record, the Governor's maps failed to satisfy this legal 
standard.  Id. 
¶15 The Supreme Court concluded that this court's March 3 
decision fell short because this court had concluded only that 
the "VRA might support race-based districting."  Id. (quoting 
Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶47 ("[W]e cannot say for certain on 
this record that seven majority-Black assembly districts are 
required by the VRA.")).  Strict scrutiny requires more:  it 
requires strong, district-specific evidence that race-based map 
drawing is required, not just that it "might" be required.  Id. 
at 1249-50.  The Equal Protection Clause "does not allow a State 
to adopt a racial gerrymander that the State does not, at the 
time 
of 
imposition, 
'judg[e] 
necessary 
under 
a 
proper 
interpretation of the VRA.'"  Id. at 1250 (quoting Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1472).   
¶16 Further, the Supreme Court indicated that the court 
failed to properly examine the three-step prerequisites to 
proving a VRA violation, as stated in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 46-51 (1986).  Although, in its March 3 decision, the 
court cited electoral history analysis provided by BLOC, the 
court failed to thoroughly examine whether and to what extent 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
14 
 
that report proved a VRA violation.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-50.   
¶17 Finally, the Supreme Court noted that, when the court 
examined whether under the totality of the circumstances racial 
considerations were mandated by the VRA, the court improperly 
"focused exclusively on proportionality."  Id. at 1250.  "[N]o 
single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine 
whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes 
minority voting strength."  Id. (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 
512 U.S. 997, 1020–21 (1994)). 
¶18 The Supreme Court concluded, "The question that our 
VRA precedents ask and the court failed to answer is whether a 
race-neutral alternative that did not add a seventh majority-
black 
district 
would 
deny 
black 
voters 
equal 
political 
opportunity."  Id. at 1250-51.  "Answering that question 
requires an 'intensely local appraisal' of the challenged 
district."  Id. at 1251 (quoted source omitted). 
¶19 The Supreme Court remanded the case to us for further 
proceedings.  The Court explained that we could "choose from 
among . . . other submissions."  Id.  Alternatively, the court 
could "take additional evidence if [we] prefer[ed] to reconsider 
the Governor's maps."  Id.  It instructed, however, that "[a]ny 
new 
analysis . . . must 
comply 
with 
our 
equal 
protection 
jurisprudence."  Id. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
15 
 
¶20 Five parties submitted maps for the Wisconsin Senate 
and Assembly:  the Governor, Senator Janet Bewley, BLOC, CMS, 
and the Legislature.   
¶21 In line with our November 30 decision, we apply a 
"least change approach."  We "[t]read[] [no] further than 
necessary to remedy current legal deficiencies."  Johnson, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶64.  In so doing, we "begin with the current 
boundaries and change them as little as possible."  Id., ¶73.  
Previously, the court indicated that "core retention," or the 
percentage of voters who remain in their preexisting districts, 
is an "especially helpful" metric of change.  Johnson, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ¶13.  Regardless of how much weight is given to 
core retention as a measure of change, only the Legislature's 
maps comply with the law, as we explain below.  As a matter of 
law, the Legislature's maps are superior to the available 
alternatives.    
¶22 Under the record presented before us, and with 
clarification from the Supreme Court, we conclude that the 
Legislature proposed the only legally compliant maps.  The maps 
proposed by the Legislature also reflect minimal changes to 
existing maps.  Thus, the Legislature's maps are the best, and 
only, viable proposal.  We will first analyze whether the 
proposed legislative maps comply with federal and state law.  We 
will then discuss the least-change principle.   
 
A.  Compliance With The Law 
1.  The Equal Protection Clause and the VRA 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
16 
 
¶23 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that 
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."  In recognition of this basic constitutional 
guarantee, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
"[d]istinctions 
between 
citizens 
solely 
because 
of 
their 
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people, and 
therefore 
are 
contrary 
to 
our 
traditions 
and 
hence 
constitutionally suspect."  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, Austin, 
570 U.S. 297, 309 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted); 
accord  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 
1248 (explaining that government-endorsed racial distinctions 
"are by their very nature odious" (quotations omitted)).  
¶24 The 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
strongly 
protects 
individuals from race-based classifications in redistricting.  
"Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular 
dangers.  Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may 
balkanize us into competing racial factions[.]"  Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).  "Race-based assignments [in voting 
districts] embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the 
product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts——
their very worth as citizens——according to a criterion barred to 
the Government by history and the Constitution."  Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995).  Such behavior "threatens to 
carry us further from the goal of a political system in which 
race no longer matters——a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
17 
 
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire."  
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 657.   
¶25 Classifications based on race, in redistricting just 
like in other contexts, "are constitutional only if they are 
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests."  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).  This is a 
"searching judicial inquiry," id., that rejects "any but the 
most exact connection between justification and classification."  
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (quotations removed).  The Supreme Court 
has "assumed that . . . complying with operative provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965" can serve as a compelling 
interest.  However, the government must still satisfy the narrow 
tailoring and "searching judicial inquiry" that strict scrutiny 
requires.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
978 (1996) (plurality) ("Strict scrutiny remains, nonetheless, 
strict.").  In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, there must be a 
"strong basis in evidence" that the VRA requires the drawing of 
districts on the basis of race.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 922; Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249 
(emphasizing that an observation, based on available records, 
that race-based districts "may" be required is insufficient to 
satisfy strict scrutiny). 
¶26 Section 2 of the VRA prohibits election practices and 
procedures that, in the "totality of the circumstances," create  
political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision [that] are not 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
18 
 
equally 
open 
to 
participation 
by 
members 
of 
a 
[protected] 
class 
of 
citizens . . . in 
that 
its 
members have less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice.   
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).  "[I]nteracting with social and historical 
conditions," district lines that prevent a cohesive minority 
from electing their preferred candidate "impairs the ability of 
a protected class to [exercise voting rights] on an equal basis 
with other voters."  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007.  If certain 
conditions are met in a specific location, the law may require 
the "drawing of [] majority-minority district[s]."  Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1487.  
¶27 The Supreme Court has demanded that three specific 
preconditions be met before it can conclude that the creation of 
additional majority-minority districts may be necessary:  "(1) 
the racial group is sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; 
(2) the racial group is politically cohesive; and (3) the 
majority 
vote[s] 
sufficiently 
as 
a 
bloc 
to 
enable 
it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."  
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 
425 
(2006) 
("LULAC") 
(quotations 
omitted). 
 
These 
three 
requirements are called the "Gingles preconditions."  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1250. 
¶28 Satisfaction of the Gingles preconditions does not, on 
its own, prove a VRA violation.  To meet the standard, there 
must be an established record of discriminatory, district-
specific effects.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited a 1982 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
19 
 
report from the United States Senate which lists numerous 
factors of potential significance, including, for example, the 
history and practice of state-sponsored discrimination, the 
extent to which discrimination hinders the ability of a minority 
to effectively participate in democratic elections, and the use 
of racial appeals in campaigning.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 
(citing 
Gingles, 
478 
U.S. 
at 
44-45). 
 
In 
addition, 
proportionality 
of 
effective 
minority 
districts 
to 
the 
minority's "citizen voting-age population" can be relevant to 
the totality of the circumstances analysis.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 
436; accord Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. 
Ct. at 1249 ("We have identified as relevant to the totality 
analysis several factors enumerated in the Senate Report on the 
1982 amendments to the VRA, as well as [proportionality].").  
Proportionality, 
however, 
is 
"never 
dispositive." 
 
Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1250 
(quoting 
De Grandy, 
512 
U.S. 
at 
1026 
(O'Connor, 
J., 
concurring)). 
¶29 The VRA requires an "intensely local appraisal" which 
"pars[es] . . . data at the district level" and evidences a lack 
of minority electoral opportunity, such that a race-based remedy 
is needed.  Id. at 1250-51; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432-34 (holding 
that a majority-Hispanic district was required but an existing 
map creating a majority-Hispanic district failed to satisfy the 
VRA, explaining that different Hispanic individuals in different 
locales had "differences in socio-economic status, education, 
employment, health, and other characteristics," and there was 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
20 
 
insufficient evidence of "compactness" under the first Gingles 
precondition); 
Cooper, 
137 
S. Ct. 
at 
1471-72, 
1471 
n.5 
("[G]eneralized conclusion[s]" of state-wide racial polarization 
in voting "fail[] to meaningfully (or indeed, at all) address 
the relevant local question:  whether, in a new version of 
District 1 created without a focus on race, black voters would 
encounter sufficient[] white bloc-voting to cancel [their] 
ability to elect representatives of their choice." (quotations 
omitted)).  The inquiry is emphatically not to create "the 
maximum number of majority-minority districts," regardless of 
the on-the-ground characteristics of the minority communities 
under consideration.  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1016 (reversing a 
district court's finding of § 2 violation because more Hispanic 
majority-minority districts could have been created).  In other 
words, a district-specific VRA violation must be demonstrated in 
evidence before a race-based remedy may be used.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-50 
(emphasizing that a state must have evidentiary support for a 
race-based action "before" the action is taken (citing Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. at 910)); Miller, 515 U.S. at 922; LULAC, 548 
U.S. at 437; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72, 1471 n.5.   
¶30 Without a "strong basis in evidence" that the VRA 
requires the use of race to draw legislative districts, Miller, 
515 
U.S. 
at 
922, 
race-neutral 
"traditional 
districting 
principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for 
political subdivisions" must control.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 
647; accord Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
21 
 
Ct. 1250-51 (explaining that the VRA requires the use of race in 
redistricting only when a "race-neutral alternative . . . would 
deny 
[a 
protected 
class 
of] 
voters 
equal 
political 
opportunity"). 
¶31 Here, examining the available record, we conclude that 
there is not a "strong basis in evidence" that the VRA requires 
the use of race to draw majority-black legislative districts.  
Specifically, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
here, black voters have their choice of candidate blocked by a 
cohesive and oppositional voting bloc.  See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 
436 (explaining the Gingles preconditions).  
¶32 The Governor failed to present evidence that a race-
based remedy was necessary under the VRA, but nonetheless drew 
districts on the basis of race to create seven majority-black 
districts.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. 
Ct. at 1249; Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.  The Supreme Court 
recognized that the Governor "provided almost no other evidence 
or analysis supporting his claim that the VRA required the seven 
majority-black districts that he drew."  Wis. Legislature v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249.  The Supreme Court 
further noted that the Governor's "main explanation for drawing 
the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a 
sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to 
fill it apparently embracing just the sort of uncritical 
majority-minority district maximization that we have expressly 
rejected."  Id. (citation omitted).  This is clearly in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as a race-based remedy 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
22 
 
cannot precede proof of a VRA violation.  Id. at 1249-50 (citing 
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 910).  Supreme Court precedent 
confirms this to be the case.  De Grandy specifically concluded 
that the "failure to maximize cannot be the measure of § 2."  
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1017.  
¶33 The Governor's maps were racially motivated and are 
thus subject to strict scrutiny.  To determine whether a map is 
race based, we must examine "direct evidence going to . . . [the 
map-drawer's] purpose," in addition to circumstantial evidence, 
such as "a district's shape and demographics."   Shaw v. Hunt, 
517 U.S. at 905.  In briefing and at oral argument, the Governor 
repeatedly asserted that the VRA required the drawing of seven 
majority-black districts.  He stated in his initial brief that 
the VRA "requires the drawing of majority-minority districts" 
and that his maps "create[] seven majority Black districts" 
because 
there 
is 
now 
a 
"sufficiently 
large 
and 
compact 
population of Black residents" to do so.  In the Governor's 
response brief he stated, "[S]even majority-minority Black 
districts can be drawn in Milwaukee and so 'should be.'"  In 
addition to his overt reliance on race, he indisputably drew 
districts 
to 
reach 
precise 
racial 
targets 
in 
district 
demographics.  The Governor drew seven districts all at almost 
exactly 51% black voting-age population ("BVAP"), the lowest 
BVAP being 50.2% and the highest being 51.4%.  See Miller, 515 
U.S. at 917-18 (holding that a state subordinated traditional 
redistricting 
criteria 
to 
race 
by 
noting 
the 
objective 
characteristics of the district which strongly indicated racial 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
23 
 
motivations 
as 
well 
as 
statements 
made 
by 
map 
drawers, 
confirming the use of race in drawing districts).  
¶34 The Governor did not present evidence of a VRA 
violation, despite drawing maps on the basis of race.  He 
produced no evidence of electoral history and no district-
specific evidence demonstrating that the black communities he 
moved among districts would be denied the opportunity to 
effectively 
participate 
in 
democracy 
absent 
his 
proposed 
district lines.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 
1471-72, 1471 n.5; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437.  Upon review of 
this case, the Supreme Court confirmed that "the Governor failed 
to carry his burden" of showing "the VRA required the seven 
majority-black districts that he drew."  Wis. Legislature v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249.  As the Supreme Court 
explained, "[s]trict scrutiny requires much more" than what the 
Governor produced and relied upon.3  Id.   
¶35 Importantly, the Governor had more than adequate 
opportunity to produce a sufficient record.  The court accepted 
this case in September 2021.  In November 2021, the court 
directed the Governor to confer with the other parties and 
develop a joint discovery plan, and in December 2021, an open 
                                                 
3 The dissent critiques the Supreme Court's Equal Protection 
Clause 
jurisprudence 
and 
restates 
arguments 
made 
by 
the 
dissenting justices in the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion.  
See, e.g., dissent, ¶178 (quoting Wis. Legislature v. Wis.  
Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (2022) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).  Obviously, we must follow the 
majority's directives.   
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
24 
 
discovery period was held.  Oral arguments were held on 
January 19, 2022, four months after the court accepted this case 
and two months after the parties conferred on discovery 
procedure.  Notably, in the joint discovery plan, the Governor 
stipulated that no discovery outside briefs and expert reports 
produced for the court was needed.  Not once did the Governor 
notify the court that there was a need to develop a more 
detailed record or that the procedures adopted by the court 
failed to permit adequate discovery.  The Governor chose to 
place his case on the evidentiary support included in his briefs 
and expert reports, and as the Supreme Court held, that evidence 
was not sufficient to justify racially motivated district lines.  
Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-
50. 
¶36 The same flaws of the Governor's maps exist for 
Senator Bewley's maps.  She, like the Governor, contends that 
the Gingles preconditions are met and race must be used in order 
to comply with the VRA.  Like the Governor, Senator Bewley puts 
the cart before the horse: she creates a race-based remedy 
without district-specific evidence of a VRA violation.  To 
justify her race-based measures, Senator Bewley relies on a 
single statewide general election, which, at most, suggests that 
white voters had weaker preference for the Democratic Party 
candidate than black voters.  Such evidence falls far short of 
demonstrating a VRA violation.  It fails to prove whether 
specific black communities in the Milwaukee-area within Senator 
Bewley's racially drawn districts would experience bloc-voting 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
25 
 
resistance from a white majority that could effectively and 
consistently prevent the election of black-supported candidates.  
Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-
51; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72, 
1471 n.5.  Thus, Senator Bewley's legislative maps are likewise 
disqualified as there is not a "strong basis in evidence" to 
believe that her racially motivated maps are required under the 
VRA.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 
1249-50; Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.4  
                                                 
4 Hunter 
Intervenor-Petitioners 
("Hunter") 
originally 
submitted state legislative maps.  However, Hunter seemingly 
withdrew those maps from consideration, contending that the 
court should consider the Governor's maps in lieu of their maps.  
Hunter's position was made apparent by the conclusion of 
briefing.  After opening briefing and responses, in its reply 
brief, Hunter "urge[d] adoption of the Governor's congressional 
map or, alternatively, the Hunter congressional map . . . ."  By 
contrast, 
Hunter 
did 
not 
advance 
support 
for 
its 
state 
legislative 
maps. 
 
Hunter 
stated 
that 
the 
court 
should 
"adopt[] . . . either 
the 
Governor's 
or 
BLOC's 
legislative 
maps."  At oral arguments, Hunter reiterated this position.  It 
stated that it would "stand by" its congressional maps, despite 
the Governor presenting, in Hunter's opinion, a superior 
congressional 
map. 
 
[Oral 
Arguments 
1:59.] 
 
For 
state 
legislative maps, Hunter asserted that it would "not argue for" 
its state legislature maps, reasoning that, in its view, the 
available alternatives presented by other parties were superior.  
Id.  Upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, Hunter 
stood by its decision to support the Governor's legislative 
maps.  Hunter offered only three options for the court on 
remand:  receive new evidence and "re-adopt the Governor's 
proposed maps"; "amend the boundaries of [the Governor's] 
particular districts"; or simply select the Governor's maps 
without additional analysis on the VRA.  Since Hunter filed its 
reply 
brief, 
it 
has 
neither 
affirmatively 
asserted 
nor 
implicitly 
suggested 
that 
we 
should 
consider 
its 
state 
legislative maps.  Instead, it has dedicated the entirety of its 
arguments toward opposing the Legislature's state legislative 
maps and supporting the Governor's maps.  Even if we were to 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
26 
 
¶37 Like the Governor and Senator Bewley, BLOC also 
provided maps that were racially motivated.  The evidence BLOC 
produced in support of a VRA violation, while more than either 
the Governor or Senator Bewley, nonetheless falls short of that 
required under the law.  On close examination of BLOC's 
analysis, there exists an inadequate evidentiary basis to 
support the use of race in drawing BLOC's legislative districts.  
At most, BLOC produced incomplete, regional information that was 
not sufficiently district-specific.  The record BLOC provided 
cannot overcome strict scrutiny.   
¶38 There is no doubt race was a driving factor in BLOC's 
selection of legislative districts.  BLOC argues in briefing 
that the VRA requires the use of race to draw seven majority-
black districts.  In so doing, BLOC's maps include seven bare 
majority-black districts like the Governor's maps.  BLOC's maps 
target exact 51% BVAP thresholds:  seven assembly districts vary 
between 50.2% and 52.3% BVAP.   
¶39 From the start, it is clear by examining the BVAP of 
BLOC's districts that BLOC's remedy for an alleged VRA violation 
                                                                                                                                                             
consider Hunter's maps, they would be rejected for the same 
reasons we reject Senator Bewley's maps.  Hunter argued that the 
Gingles preconditions are satisfied and we must use race to 
"create a seventh Black opportunity district."  However, Hunter 
presents no district-specific evidence that black voters in 
particular communities in the Milwaukee area are "usually" 
denied the opportunity to elect candidates they support.  League 
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425, 
432, 437 (2006) ("LULAC"); Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-51; Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ___, 
137 S. Ct. 1455, 1471-72, 1471 n.5. (2017). 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
27 
 
is to actually reduce, not increase, the population percentages 
of black voters.  In fact, the BLOC proposed "remedy" is to 
reduce minority percentage, ranging from 51% to 62% BVAP, to 
about 50%, in all six current majority-black assembly districts.  
This same feature is found in the Governor's maps.  The Supreme 
Court explicitly noted this reduction of minority percentages 
when the Court summarily reversed the Governor's maps.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1247 n.1 
(stating 
that 
the 
Governor 
"intentionally 
created 
seven 
majority-black districts" by "reducing the black voting-age 
population in the other six majority-black districts" to a 
cluster around 51% BVAP).5     
                                                 
5 Of course, this concern regarding the reduction of 
minority 
percentages 
is 
not 
the 
same 
when 
the 
Gingles 
preconditions have been satisfied and the VRA requires a 
reduction in the percentage of minorities in a given district so 
as to avoid "packing."  See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 
1007 (1994) (indicating that the VRA remedy could be necessary 
where minorities are "pack[ed] . . . into one or a small number 
of districts to minimize their influence in the districts next 
door").  However, the court is not aware of a single case where 
a court has found a sufficient evidentiary basis to apply a 
race-based remedy and subsequently reduced the percentage of 
minorities across multiple districts from safe majorities of 
around 60% to a bare 51%.  Compare, e.g., Comm. for a Fair & 
Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 
563, 582 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ("60 percent of voting-age population 
is reasonably required to ensure minorities a fair opportunity 
to elect a candidate of their choice."); Hastert v. State Bd. of 
Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting that a 
"65% minority population [or 60% minority voting-age population] 
concentration [is] generally regarded as necessary to ensure 
minorities a reasonable opportunity to control a district"); 
Baumgart 
v. 
Wendelberger, 
Nos. 
01-C-0121 
& 
02-C-0366, 
unpublished slip op., 2002 WL 34127471, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 
2002) (recognizing expert testimony that "a minority district 
requires an African–American voting age population of at least 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
28 
 
¶40 To justify the use of race in drawing district lines, 
BLOC selects eight election results to prove the existence of 
white voters blocking candidates supported by the black voters.  
Notably, BLOC's analysis focuses on five election results from 
Milwaukee County and two election results from the City of 
Milwaukee.  As part of its election analysis, it includes only 
one election from an elected office at issue, a party primary 
for the 12th assembly district in 2018.  But BLOC explicitly 
excludes that election from its bloc-voting analysis because it 
"only covers a small subset of the wider jurisdiction," i.e., it 
is district specific.  No other election analysis of senate or 
assembly districts for any other district at any other time is 
provided, and no other evidence on the existence of the Gingles 
preconditions is provided on the district level.  The BLOC 
analysis is simply devoid of district-specific evidence.  Such 
local evidence is required under the VRA to first demonstrate a 
violation, thereby necessitating a race-based remedy.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, at 1249-
51; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72, 
1471 n.5.   
¶41 Notably, BLOC does not consider any November general 
elections, when the candidates for the public offices at issue 
are selected to represent the districts at issue.  The 
Legislature notes that, in November general elections in the 
local districts at issue, the black-preferred candidate is 
                                                                                                                                                             
60% to guarantee the election of candidates of choice").     
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
29 
 
rarely, if ever blocked by a white coalition.  Although primary 
data and exogenous elections can be relevant to a VRA analysis, 
to exclude completely any consideration of the elections that 
decide who holds the seats under consideration in the districts 
under consideration is markedly at odds with standard VRA 
analysis.  See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72 (examining 
general election history of a congressional district at issue in 
the challenge); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427-28 (explaining general 
election history in the congressional district at issue); United 
States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604-12 (N.D. Ohio 
2008) (describing non-applicable elections in the context of a 
detailed review of city council general elections at issue in 
the lawsuit); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 
786, 790, 799-800 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (examining the general 
election history of specific city commissioner offices at 
issue); see also Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 
996 (D.S.D. 2004) (explaining a common hierarchy of election 
history value, when such history is available, noting that 
"[e]ndogenous elections, contests within the jurisdiction and 
for the particular office that is at issue, are more probative 
than exogenous elections").  Without a full and complete 
accounting of district-specific election results, and the extent 
to which candidates supported by the relevant black communities 
are elected to the state senate and assembly in the districts at 
issue, we cannot conclude that without the use of race, black 
voters 
in 
those 
districts 
would 
lack 
the 
same 
"opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
30 
 
to elect representatives of their choice" as would other voters.  
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).  The court must examine the "totality of 
the circumstances," not just election data supporting a race-
based remedy.  Id.  
¶42 BLOC's evidence fails because it is not district 
specific.  Even if we were to look beyond that, at best, BLOC's 
incomplete analysis shows that the black candidate of choice was 
elected in four out of the eight races.6  A 50% success rate is 
hardly strong evidence of extensive racial bloc voting such that 
the black-preferred candidate is "usually" blocked from office.  
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425; see, e.g., Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 
40 F.3d 807, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the electoral 
                                                 
6 As noted above, BLOC excluded the 2018 Democratic Party 
primary for the 12th assembly district from its bloc-voting 
analysis, reasoning that the election was too localized.  In 
that election, the black-preferred candidate was not blocked by 
a white coalition.  Thus, by excluding that election, BLOC 
contended that the black candidate of choice was blocked in four 
out of seven races, or 57% of the time.  Upon further review of 
BLOC's analysis, it is apparent that a proper VRA record cannot 
selectively exclude elections that weigh against a race-based 
remedy.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (requiring courts to examine 
the "totality of the circumstances"); see, e.g., Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1471-72 (examining general election history of a 
congressional district at issue in the challenge); LULAC, 548 
U.S. at 427-28 (explaining general election history in the 
congressional district at issue).  In fact, BLOC's reasoning 
runs 
counter 
to 
Supreme 
Court 
precedent, 
which 
mandates 
district-specific evidence of the Gingles preconditions.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-51; 
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72, 1471 
n.5.  Even if we were to look past the fatal deficiencies of 
BLOC's analysis as a whole, we do not accept BLOC's premise that 
the 2018 primary for the 12th assembly district can be excluded 
from its analysis.   
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
31 
 
history for the public offices at issue demonstrated that "47 
percent of blacks' preferred black candidates were elected" and 
thus there was "no reason to find that blacks' preferred black 
candidates have 'usually' been defeated" under Gingles).   
¶43 The Legislature noted that, despite BLOC focusing on 
county-wide 
races 
and 
including 
the 
2018 
Democratic 
Gubernatorial primary in its analysis, BLOC conspicuously 
omitted any consideration of the 2018 Democratic Lieutenant 
Gubernatorial primary in Milwaukee County.  BLOC's only response 
was 
circular:  "This 
election 
is 
less 
probative 
of 
the 
performance of districts, because it does not simulate an 
election in which white bloc voting might defeat the choice of 
Black voters."  With the addition of the 2018 Lieutenant 
Gubernatorial primary in Milwaukee County, the Legislature 
correctly notes that only four of nine races, using BLOC's own 
analysis, involve the black-preferred candidate being blocked 
from office.  This does not satisfy the Gingles preconditions 
for the local black communities at issue.   
¶44 The Supreme Court stated explicitly that reliance in 
the March 3 decision on BLOC's analysis of "eight previous 
races . . . in the Milwaukee area" was flawed because there was 
no demonstration that the Gingles preconditions were satisfied 
at the district level.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1250 (reasoning that the March 3 analysis 
on the Gingles preconditions was improper, citing BLOC's 
electoral evidence, and stating the court "made virtually no 
effort to parse that data at the district level").  The court's 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
32 
 
March 3 decision itself acknowledged that "we cannot say for 
certain on this record that seven majority-Black assembly 
districts," as proposed by the Governor and BLOC, "are required 
by the VRA."  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶47.  The Supreme Court 
has made clear that amount of evidence is inadequate to justify 
a race-based remedy.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
142 S. Ct. at 1249-50 (evidence showing the VRA "might" require 
a race-based remedy does not satisfy strict scrutiny).  Upon 
further review of BLOC's analysis, we conclude that BLOC has not 
presented sufficient evidentiary support to justify the use of 
race to draw the legislative districts it proposes.  Id.; 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.  Therefore, BLOC's maps must be 
rejected.  
¶45 CMS's maps, while performing well on several race-
neutral criteria, upon further review also fail for being race-
based.7 
 
"[S]trict 
scrutiny 
applies 
when 
race 
is 
the 
'predominant' consideration in drawing the district lines such 
that 'the legislature subordinates traditional race-neutral 
districting principles to racial considerations.'"  Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. at 907 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916).  CMS 
applied an algorithm that considered thousands of possible 
alternative maps, and it tasked the algorithm to produce a map 
that performed best on various metrics of least change, 
                                                 
7 CMS scored well on several race-neutral factors.  For 
example, CMS's maps had less than half the population deviation 
of the Governor, Senator Bewley, and BLOC.  In addition, CMS had 
hundreds fewer local government splits than the Governor, 
Senator Bewley, and BLOC.   
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
33 
 
population deviation, and local boundary splits.  In addition, 
it tasked the algorithm to produce seven assembly districts that 
had "a substantial concentration of black [voters]" and that 
elected black candidates of choice.  CMS did not concern itself 
with creating districts with exact BVAP amounts, as did the 
Governor and BLOC.  The BVAP in CMS's relevant assembly 
districts varied widely from 35% to 83.2%.   
¶46 Nonetheless, it is clear that under CMS's algorithm, 
maps would not be selected if they did not create seven 
districts with substantial black populations that also elected 
black-preferred candidates, according to its inputs of election 
data.  Although, by using cutting edge technology CMS selected a 
map 
that 
performed 
well 
in 
other 
race-neutral 
criteria, 
alternative maps run through the algorithm that could have 
performed better on those race-neutral criteria were not 
considered by CMS because they did not contain seven districts 
with specific racial characteristics.  See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. at 907 (explaining that a redistricting map was racially 
motivated, even though race-neutral criteria were considered in 
the selection of districts, because the race-neutral criteria 
"came into play only after the race-based decision had been 
made").  Therefore, we conclude that CMS's maps "subordinated 
traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial 
considerations."  Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.  
¶47 Like other parties, CMS did not present district-
specific evidence that the communities being placed in race-
based 
boundaries 
would 
be 
denied 
equal 
opportunities 
in 
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34 
 
elections and would have their choice of candidates blocked by a 
white majority coalition if CMS's racially motivated districts 
were not adopted.  52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).  In fact, CMS argued 
that the Legislature's maps——which, as explained below, are race 
neutral——would produce six effective districts for black-
preferred candidates.  In lieu of the local appraisal required 
under law, CMS cited state-wide election data to show that, on 
average, black voters in the State of Wisconsin support 
different candidates than white voters.  That is not the 
relevant local inquiry to determine the existence of the Gingles 
preconditions, sufficient to trigger a race-based remedy.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, at 1249-
51; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72, 
1471 n.5.  Creating race-based districts, as CMS does, without 
first demonstrating a VRA violation, is fundamentally and 
constitutionally flawed.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-50 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 
910).   
¶48 In contrast to the maps proposed by the Governor, 
Senator Bewley, BLOC, and CMS, the Legislature's proposed maps 
are indisputably race neutral.  No party argued and no evidence 
was provided demonstrating that the Legislature's maps were, in 
fact, not race neutral.  The Legislature affirmed multiple times 
that the maps proposed by the Governor and BLOC to create 
exactly 51% BVAP districts were a "racial gerrymander," and by 
contrast, the Legislature utilized "race-neutral criteria" to 
draw districts in the Milwaukee area, as it did for all other 
No. 
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35 
 
citizens regardless of race in the remainder of the state.  
Unlike the other parties, the Legislature never asserted that 
the Gingles preconditions required the drawing of majority-black 
districts.  To the contrary, the Legislature's expert stated 
correctly that "the electoral patterns detailed by [BLOC] raise 
serious doubts about whether the Gingles threshold standard is 
currently met."8   
¶49 The Equal Protection Clause "guarantees equal laws, 
not equal results."  Personal Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 273 (1979).  Only those maps that purposefully discriminate 
between individuals are subject to strict scrutiny.  Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. at 642.  Maps come under strict scrutiny "not 
just when they contain express racial classifications, but also 
when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a 
racial purpose or object."  Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.  The 
standard 
to 
demonstrate 
racial 
motivations 
through 
circumstantial evidence alone is high and rarely met.  The map 
must be "so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally 
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 
                                                 
8 The Legislature stated that their maps complied with the 
VRA.  A race-neutral map can comply with the VRA.  Specifically, 
a map does not violate the VRA when the Gingles preconditions 
have not been satisfied. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425.  Indeed, a 
race-neutral map is the preferred outcome, and an outcome 
explicitly contemplated by the Supreme Court.  Wis. Legislature 
v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1250-51 ("The question 
that our VRA precedents ask and the court failed to answer is 
whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add a seventh 
majority-black district would deny black voters equal political 
opportunity.").   
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36 
 
segregate[e] . . . voters on the basis of race."  Id. at 914 
(quotations omitted); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 643 (explaining 
that there are "rare [maps] that  . . . are, on their face, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race" (quotations omitted)); 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 ("This rule applies as well to a 
classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious 
pretext for racial discrimination." (Emphasis added.)).  Courts 
recognize that redistricting is a "sensitive" process which 
involves 
a 
"complex 
interplay 
of 
forces"; 
mapmakers 
are 
"presumed" to be acting in a good faith, race-neutral manner.  
Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.  
¶50 No such evidence of discriminatory intent has been 
provided, and, with the presumption of good faith in mind, we 
cannot conclude that the Legislature's maps are so highly 
irregular that they are "unexplainable on grounds other than 
race."  Miller, 515 U.S. at 913; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 643.  
Unlike the Governor and BLOC, who carefully calibrated BVAP in 
their districts, the BVAP in the Legislature's districts varies 
depending on the unique geography and community characteristics 
of those districts.  BVAP in the Legislature's districts varies 
from 45.8% to 71.5%.  In so doing, the Legislature's maps 
perform very well in race-neutral criteria.  Out of the plans 
proposed, the Legislature's maps have low population deviation 
and have a low number of local government splits, including in 
the Milwaukee-area districts.  In addition, the Legislature's 
maps include few incumbency pairings, and they move few voters 
No. 
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37 
 
into new senate districts with different election cycles.9  Those 
characteristics are seen in the Milwaukee-area districts, as 
they are throughout the state.  Further, the districts with high 
BVAP are compact and do not have "highly irregular" features 
common to racial gerrymanders.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 917 
(reasoning that, although a district did not "seem bizarre on 
its 
face," 
the 
shape 
in 
conjunction 
with 
its 
exacting 
demographic 
characteristics 
painted 
a 
"story 
of 
racial 
gerrymandering"); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 905-06 (stating a 
district was "serpentine" and "geographically non-compact by any 
objective 
standard"); 
Bush 
v. 
Vera, 
517 
U.S. 
at 
959-60 
(explaining that, based on the shape of a district, there was 
"no integrity in terms of traditional, neutral redistricting 
criteria").  When drawing districts, race-neutral considerations 
drove the Legislature's decisions; racial targets did not.  See 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (examining, to determine if a map was 
race neutral, whether the map included exact percentages of 
black voters in a district and whether the map performed poorly 
on race-neutral considerations such as compactness, contiguity, 
and 
preservation 
of 
communities 
of 
interest); 
Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 273-74 (2015) 
(listing evidence that could show a map was not race neutral, 
                                                 
9 Under the Wisconsin Constitution, senators are "chosen 
alternately from the odd and even-numbered districts for the 
term of 4 years.” Wis. Const. art. IV, § 5.  Thus, if voters are 
moved between odd and even senatorial districts, their ability 
to participate in senatorial elections could be delayed for 
several years, as compared to their original districts.   
No. 
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including exact racial demographics and splitting high numbers 
of local government boundaries); Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468 
(explaining that "[u]nconteested evidence in the record show[ed] 
that the State's mapmakers . . . purposefully established a 
racial target . . . .").   
¶51 "[I]ndividual districts [are] subject to . . . racial 
gerrymandering challenges."  Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, 
575 U.S. at 263-64.   Logically, if such challenges are brought, 
the individual district at issue must be examined.  Id.  Here, 
no such challenge has been made to the Legislature's maps.  No 
party challenged or presented evidence which would support a 
claim that any of the districts in the Legislature's maps were 
racially motivated.  In addition, no evidence was presented in 
the record that could overcome the presumption of good faith or 
show that any district lines in the Legislature's map, including 
those districts with high BVAP, were "unexplainable on grounds 
No. 
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39 
 
other than race."10  Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.  On this record, no 
available 
evidence 
exists 
showing 
that 
race 
was 
"the 
                                                 
10 The dissent indicates that the Legislature could have 
moved more black voters into Milwaukee-area districts to boost 
BVAP.  It also states that the Legislature performed well on 
core retention in the Milwaukee area and it split a village that 
contains a higher percentage of black voters.  Dissent, ¶¶189-
191. Simply because the Legislature could have drawn maps 
differently does not prove, given the "complex interplay of 
forces" in redistricting, that the Milwaukee-area districts are 
"unexplainable on grounds other than race."  Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995).  The dissent fails to examine in a 
district-specific manner how the Milwaukee-area districts could 
be rationally drawn using race-neutral criteria, such as respect 
for local boundaries and communities of interest or least 
change.  Citation to a single municipality split, in a state 
with 
thousands 
of 
local 
governments, 
as 
well 
as 
strong 
performance on race-neutral criteria such as core retention, is 
a far cry from an "obvious pretext for racial discrimination."  
Personal Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).  
High core retention, for instance, can be readily explained by 
the fact that the Milwaukee-area districts were underpopulated 
and, of course, a larger portion of the core would be retained.  
The Legislature may have reasonably believed municipal splits 
were needed to avoid ward splits, achieve least change, and 
minimize population deviation.  The dissent essentially admits 
that proof of a racial gerrymander is lacking.  It states that 
it 
has 
"no . . . submitted 
evidence" 
on 
whether 
the 
Legislature's choices in Milwaukee were driven by respect for 
communities of interest, and it contends that the maps could be 
politically motivated.  Dissent, ¶191; see Rucho v. Common 
Cause, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that claims 
of partisan motivation in map drawing is not cognizable under 
the United States Constitution); Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶39 
(reasoning that "partisan fairness presents a purely political 
question" and is not derived from an identifiable legal right).  
The dissent cites to Cooper, but that case actually supports the 
conclusion that the Legislature's maps are race neutral.  
Dissent, ¶190; see Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1466, 1468-69, 1472-78, 
1482-84 (holding that racial considerations predominated where 
mapmakers expressly stated they were moving black voters to 
comply with the VRA, altering two congressional districts to 
have almost exactly 51% BVAP, creating districts with a "finger-
like extension" and a "snakelike body," having one district with 
"stark racial borders" within the same local government, and 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
40 
 
'predominant' 
consideration 
in 
drawing 
the 
[Legislature's] 
district lines such that '[it] subordinate[d] traditional race-
neutral districting principles to racial considerations.'" Shaw 
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 907 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916).  To 
determine otherwise would be wholesale speculation.  
¶52 The Governor and BLOC argue that the Legislature's 
maps violate the VRA by having one assembly district at 45.8% 
BVAP and another at 71.5% BVAP.  However, neither the Governor 
nor BLOC cite authority standing for the position that, using 
race-neutral 
redistricting 
criteria, 
having 
low 
or 
high 
percentages of black voters in a given district on its own 
violates the VRA.  It is well established that the VRA mandates 
the use of race in redistricting only upon proof that the 
Gingles preconditions are satisfied in a potential or existing 
district.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-
72; Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 
at 1249-50.  It is true that maps can violate the VRA where 
black voters are "fragment[ed] . . . among several districts 
where a bloc-voting majority can routinely outvote them" as well 
as where black voters are "pack[ed] . . . into one or a small 
number of districts to minimize their influence in the districts 
next door."  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007.  But where there 
exists no strong evidence that an identifiable community of 
black voters is being denied equal opportunity to participate 
                                                                                                                                                             
having another district whose racial composition materially 
changed despite having "no need for significant total-population 
changes" under one person, one vote).  
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41 
 
due to the existence of the Gingles preconditions, race cannot 
be used to distribute black voters from one district to another.  
Id. at 1015 (explaining that the existence of one district with 
a high percentage of minorities and another district with a low 
percentage of minorities, by itself, shows "only that lines 
could have been drawn elsewhere, nothing more"); Gonzalez v. 
City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2008) ("But neither 
§ 2 nor Gingles nor any later decision of the Supreme Court 
speaks of maximizing the influence of any racial or ethnic 
group."); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 15 (2009) 
(plurality) ("Nothing in § 2 grants special protection to a 
minority group's right to form political coalitions.").  No 
party presents strong evidence showing the existence of the 
Gingles preconditions in individual districts, as they currently 
exist, in race-based proposals, or in the Legislature's race-
neutral maps.  Without that evidence of a VRA violation, a race-
based remedy is not justified, whether to boost BVAP in one 
district to above 50% or to lower BVAP in another district to 
below 71.5%.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. 
Ct. at 1249-51; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1471-72, 1471 n.5. 
¶53 The 
Governor 
and 
BLOC 
also 
argue 
that 
the 
Legislature's 10th assembly district, which has 45.8% BVAP, does 
not provide effective democratic opportunity for black voters.  
Thus, the Governor and BLOC aver that the Legislature's maps 
include only five effective black assembly districts.  However, 
assembly district 10 does not create a VRA violation because the 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
42 
 
Gingles preconditions are not satisfied——namely, the record does 
not demonstrate that black voters are usually denied their 
preferred candidate.  In fact, the evidence demonstrates 
otherwise.   
¶54 The Governor and BLOC point to BLOC's analysis on a 
single election result, the 2018 Democratic Gubernatorial 
Primary, to demonstrate that the 10th assembly district violates 
the VRA.  We are unaware of a single case that has found the 
existence of a strong evidentiary record, applied the VRA, and 
satisfied strict scrutiny through consideration of a single 
result from an exogenous election in a party primary.  Compare 
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427-28 (examining partisan general election 
results for the congressional district at issue); Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1470-71 (reviewing partisan general election results 
for the congressional district at issue); City of Euclid, 580 
F. Supp. 2d at 598-99 (explaining electoral history for non-
partisan general election results for the offices at issue); 
Harper, 824 F. Supp. at 790 (reviewing non-partisan general 
election results for the offices at issue).  That is a far cry 
from "strong basis in evidence" demanded by the Equal Protection 
clause.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 
at 1249; Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.   
¶55 Even so, under BLOC's own statistics, the black 
preferred candidate won in the Legislature's 10th assembly 
district by a comfortable margin.  According to BLOC, the black 
preferred candidate, Mahlon Mitchell, won a plurality of the 
vote and beat the next strongest candidate, the Governor, 39% to 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
43 
 
29%.  This indicates that the Legislature's 10th assembly 
district supports black preferred candidates, not that white 
coalitions stymie black electoral opportunity in violation of 
the VRA.   
¶56 Nonetheless, BLOC theorizes that, because there were 
many candidates on the ballot other than Mitchell and the 
Governor, it is possible white voters may have voted for the 
Governor and blocked the selection of Mitchell if those other 
candidates were not on the ballot.  This amounts to nothing more 
than speculation.  Whether and to what extent voters would have 
selected other candidates if their preferred candidates were not 
on the ballot is unknowable, lying firmly within in the realm of 
guesswork.  The Supreme Court, in this case and in several prior 
cases, has made it clear that governments cannot rely on 
presumptions, speculation, and belief to utilize race in 
redistricting and satisfy a VRA need.  See Wis. Legislature v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-51; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1470-71; Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-27; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 
at 916.  Instead, we must have a "strong basis in evidence" to 
believe the VRA would be violated if race were not used.  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249; 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.  BLOC's evidence on the Legislature's 
10th assembly district does not meet that threshold. 
¶57 Even if we were to credit BLOC's reasoning, the 
Legislature provides its own analysis on the 10th assembly 
district that contradicts BLOC's conclusions.  The Legislature 
did not rely on one election, but instead considered the 2018 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
44 
 
Democratic Lieutenant Gubernatorial Primary in addition to the 
2018 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary.  Not only did the 
Legislature find that the 10th assembly district selected the 
black-preferred candidate in the gubernatorial primary (as did 
BLOC), the Legislature also found that the 10th assembly 
district 
supported 
the 
black-preferred 
candidate 
in 
the 
lieutenant gubernatorial primary by a wide margin.  Given this 
evidence, the Legislature concluded that this district would not 
usually exhibit white coalition voting blocking black-preferred 
candidates.  In addition, CMS analyzed the Legislature's 10th 
assembly district by considering whether "the outcome in most 
general elections favors the Black candidate of choice" and 
whether 
"Mandela 
Barnes 
and 
Mahlon 
Mitchell 
[the 
black 
candidates 
of 
choice 
in 
the 
2018 
Democratic 
lieutenant 
gubernatorial and gubernatorial races] perform strongly in their 
respective 2018 Democratic primary elections."  CMS concluded 
that the Legislature's 10th assembly district was "perfectly 
effective" for black voters.  On this record, we cannot agree 
with the Governor and BLOC that the Legislature's race-neutral 
proposal would violate the VRA. 
¶58 Finally, the Governor and BLOC argue that the VRA 
requires the creation of a seventh majority-black assembly 
district.  However, as stated above, we cannot use race in 
redistricting unless there is strong evidence that the Gingles 
preconditions are satisfied in the districts being considered.  
Here, there is no strong evidentiary basis.  Furthermore, the 
court recognized in its March 3 decision that "on this record," 
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45 
 
"we cannot say for certain . . . that seven majority-black 
assembly districts are required by the VRA."  Johnson, 400 Wis. 
2d 626, ¶47.  The Supreme Court noted that contention and held 
that level of proof was inadequate to justify a race-based 
remedy.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 
at 1250 (explaining that a record showing the VRA "might" be 
violated 
"does 
not 
allow 
a 
State 
to 
adopt 
a 
racial 
gerrymander").  Consequently, we conclude that the Legislature's 
race-neutral maps do not violate the VRA simply because they do 
not include seven majority-black districts.11 
                                                 
11 The Governor and BLOC cite proportionality of black 
voters 
to 
support 
the 
creation 
of 
seven 
majority-black 
districts.  First, a VRA violation is not established solely by 
a determination that effective black districts are not in 
proportion to the statewide black voting population.  See 
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020 (rejecting the argument that 
proportionality is determinative of VRA compliance and noting 
that "[n]o single statistic provides courts with a shortcut"); 
Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1250 
("[P]roportionality is never dispositive" (citation omitted).).  
Second, proportionality is considered in a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, but the totality of the circumstances is 
considered only after the Gingles preconditions have been 
established.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425; Wis. Legislature v. Wis. 
Elec. Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1248-50.  Under the record as it 
currently exists, we cannot conclude the Gingles preconditions 
are satisfied.  Third, even if proportionality were considered, 
"the Black voting age population statewide is between 6.1% and 
6.5%."  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶48, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ___ N.W.2d ___.  Taking the highest possible 
figure, given that there are 99 assembly districts, 6.4 
majority-black assembly districts would be proportional to the 
statewide black voting population.  A proportionality analysis 
does not support the contention that six majority-black assembly 
districts would violate the VRA.   
No. 
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46 
 
¶59 The Legislature's maps are race neutral and legally 
compliant.  None of the parties have established that the 
Legislature's race-neutral maps violate the VRA.  At most, the 
parties in opposition to those maps raise arguments without 
evidence.  In fact, the Legislature would be without any 
constitutional basis for maneuvering districts to hover closer 
to 50% as was done by the Governor.  Such action would also be 
contrary to Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, and Johnson v. 
De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997.  In short, the Legislator's maps are 
indisputably race-neutral, supported by the expert testimony and 
evidence, and there is no detailed, local evidence in the record 
to demonstrate they violate the VRA.  The Governor, Senator 
Bewley, BLOC, and CMS all drew districts on the basis of race 
without the necessary proof that the Gingles preconditions were 
satisfied and that the VRA required a race-based remedy.12  Thus, 
                                                 
12 The 
dissenting 
justices 
conceded 
that 
there 
is 
insufficient proof of the Gingles preconditions to warrant a 
race-based remedy.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 400 Wis. 
2d 626, ¶47 (reasoning that the court "cannot say for certain on 
this record" that the VRA required the drawing of seven 
majority-black districts on the basis of race); see also Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, at *3 
(citing that exact quote from the court's March 3 decision and 
explaining that it was inadequate to support a race-based 
remedy).  They bemoan the lack of evidence in support of a race-
based remedy, noting that, to prove a VRA violation, parties 
must rely on extensive "discovery, sworn affidavits, and 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and experts," 
which no party chose to provide.  Dissent, ¶¶184, 198 n.28.  
They explain that the evidence in support of the Gingles 
preconditions "has not been sufficiently tested through a proper 
adversarial fact-finding process," and they conclude that we 
"cannot 
definitively 
say 
the 
Gingles 
preconditions 
are 
satisfied" in this case.  Id., ¶196.  When the Gingles 
preconditions have not been met, we cannot hold that "the VRA 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
47 
 
no maps other than the Legislature's maps satisfy the requisite 
constitutional and legal requirements for adoption.  
2.  The Equal Protection Clause and Population Equality 
¶60 As the court explained in our November 30 decision, 
the Equal Protection Clause requires states to "make an honest 
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of 
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as practicable."  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶24 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 
577).  "Consistent with principles of federalism, states have 
limited 
flexibility 
to 
pursue 
other 
legitimate 
policy 
objectives, such as 'maintain[ing] the integrity of various 
political subdivisions' and 'provid[ing] for compact districts 
of contiguous territory.'"  Id., ¶26 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 
462 U.S. at 842).  Population equality among districts is 
measured by maximum population deviation, which is the "sum of 
the percentage deviations from perfect population equality of 
the most- and least-populated districts.  For example, if the 
                                                                                                                                                             
require[s] [us] to move voters based on race."  Wis. Legislature 
v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249-50; De Grandy, 512 
U.S. at 1007 (stating that the Gingles preconditions are 
"necessary").  While the dissent goes to great lengths to make 
known its position on the "totality of the circumstances" and 
the state of race relations in Wisconsin, we will not engage in 
a debate on those issues that are not relevant to the inquiry 
here under the law.  Only when all three Gingles preconditions 
are established are we "direct[ed] to consider the totality of 
the circumstances."  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425.  Evidence of the 
Gingles preconditions is insufficient on this record to warrant 
a race-based remedy under the VRA.  Therefore, the totality of 
the 
circumstances 
discussion 
of 
the 
dissent 
is 
legally 
insufficient to support the dissent's conclusion.   
No. 
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48 
 
largest district is 4.5% overpopulated, and the smallest 
district is 2.3% underpopulated, the map's maximum population 
deviation is 6.8%."  Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. 54, 60 n.2 
(2016) (citation omitted).  
¶61 Because the maps submitted by Governor, Senator 
Bewley, BLOC, and CMS are eliminated for being racially 
motivated, we concentrate our review on the Legislature's maps.  
In maximum population deviation, the Legislature's maps perform 
exceptionally well.  The Legislature's maps recognize the 
sizable population shifts, keep Wisconsin citizens in their 
existing districts and also achieve population equality across 
districts.  The Legislature's maximum population deviation is 
.57% for the Senate and .76% for the Assembly.  This is in line 
with deviations accepted by federal courts.  Wis. State AFL-CIO 
v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 639-42 (E.D. Wis. 1982) 
(adopting maps with 1.2% deviation for the Senate and 1.74% for 
the assembly); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 870-
71 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (labeling deviations below 1% as "margin[s] 
of error" and adopting a map with a maximum population deviation 
of .52%); Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-C-0121 & 02-C-0366, 
unpublished slip op., 2002 WL 34127471 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002) 
(adopting a map with a maximum population deviation of 1.48%).  
These population shifts are also consistent with or better than 
prior redistricting plans.  Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't 
Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2012) 
(2011 assembly districts were .76% and senate were .62%).   
No. 
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49 
 
¶62 Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature's maps 
comply with the Equal Protection Clause's one person, one vote 
requirement.  
3.   The Wisconsin Constitution 
¶63 "[T]he Wisconsin Constitution requires that districts 
be compact, contiguous, and proportionally populated; they must 
respect certain local political boundaries; and the districts 
must 
'nest' 
three 
assembly 
districts 
within 
each 
senate 
district."  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶34 (citing Wis. Const. 
art. IV, §§ 3-5).  As explained above, we consider whether the 
Legislature's maps comply with the Wisconsin Constitution 
because 
the 
maps 
proposed 
by 
the 
other 
parties 
are 
unconstitutionally race based.   
¶64 Population equality and respect for local government 
boundaries are closely interlinked in Wisconsin law.  Under 
Article IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, legislative 
districts must be apportioned "according to the number of 
inhabitants."  Apportionment among districts must be "as close 
an approximation to [exact population equality] as possible."  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶28 (quoting Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 
484).  The court has long recognized that perfect population 
equality is not required, in large part due to requirements in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
that 
mapmakers 
preserve 
local 
government boundaries.  Legislative districts must be of equal 
population "subject only to (1) practical limitations in 
execution of this principle, and (2) precise constitutional 
restrictions about observance of governmental boundaries in 
No. 
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drawing district lines."  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 
22 Wis. 2d 544, 566, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964); see also Cunningham, 
81 Wis. at 485 (stating that population equality must be as 
exact as possible, but also noting that respect for local 
government boundaries "is a most important restriction on the 
power 
of 
the 
legislature 
to 
make 
an 
apportionment").  
Nonetheless, mapmakers do have a level of discretion in ensuring 
population equality.  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶36 n.20.   
¶65 Under 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
4 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, assembly districts must "be bounded by county, 
precinct, town or ward lines."  Given federal one person, one 
vote requirements, bounding every assembly district by county, 
precinct,13 town, and ward lines may not be possible.  Johnson, 
399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35 (citing Wis. State AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 
635); see also 58 Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 88, 91 (1969) ("In my 
opinion the Wisconsin Constitution no longer may be considered 
as prohibiting assembly districts from crossing county lines, in 
view of the emphasis the United States Supreme Court has placed 
upon population equality among electoral districts.").   
                                                 
13 "In one of this court's seminal cases on redistricting, 
Chief Justice Lyon explained a precinct was a form of local 
government that ceased to exist when a part of Article IV of the 
Wisconsin Constitution became fully operative."  Johnson v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶219 n.16 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) 
(citing 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Attorney 
General 
v. 
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 520, 51 N.W. 724 (1892) (Lyon, C.J., 
concurring)). "Under Article IV, 'precinct' does not mean 
election precinct."  Id. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
51 
 
¶66 However, Article IV, Section 4 must be given "full 
effect" to the extent it does not conflict with federal law.  
See H. Rupert Theobald, Equal Representation:  A Study of 
Legislative 
and 
Congressional 
Apportionment 
in 
Wisconsin, 
Wisconsin Blue Book 71, 72 (1970).  We are particularly 
skeptical of town and ward splits because "the smaller the 
political subdivision, the easier it may be to preserve its 
boundaries."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35; see also 60 
Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 101, 106 (1971) (explaining town and ward 
lines must be followed "insofar as may be consistent with 
population 
equality[.]"). 
 
In 
particular, 
"gratuitously 
break[ing] up wards," the smallest political unit in the state, 
makes little sense because they are "the basic unit of Wisconsin 
state government for voting purposes.  You vote by ward."  
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866.  For voters in the same ward to 
have 
different 
ballots 
is 
an 
"inconvenience" 
to 
the 
administration of elections and provides, at most, nominal 
"gain[s] in population equality[.]"  Id. 
¶67 The Legislature drew maps that comply with the federal 
one person, one vote requirements.  The Legislature's deviation 
was .57% for the Senate and .76% for the Assembly.  Given how 
low these deviations are, and how few local government splits 
were included in the Legislature's maps, the Legislature's maps 
are compliant with Wisconsin's equal apportionment requirements.  
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3. 
¶68 On March 3, the court opined that the Governor's maps 
complied with Wisconsin's equal apportionment requirements, and 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
52 
 
his deviations were almost double that of the Legislature.  
Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶36 ("[T]he Governor's population 
deviations——1.20% for the senate and 1.88% for the assembly——are 
well under the deviations previously adopted by the legislature 
and those prescribed by this court.").  Deviations of .57% and 
.76% are well within constitutional bounds.  Furthermore, in 
adopting its deviations, the Legislature kept the number of 
local government divisions low.  The Legislature split 53 
counties in the assembly, and it split 52 municipalities, 
including 16 towns.  In addition, the Legislature maintained 100 
percent of all ward lines.   
¶69 The Legislature's resulting number of splits fits well 
within accepted historical practice.  When federal courts drew 
maps for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses, they included a 
similar number of local government splits as the Legislature's 
maps.  Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. at 636 
(explaining that "municipal splits [were] used sparingly," and 
adopting a map with no ward splits); Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 
871 (selecting a map with 115 municipality splits and no ward 
splits); Baumgart, unpublished slip op., 2002 WL 34127471, at *7 
(adopting a map with 50 municipality splits and no ward splits).  
Further, when the 2011 maps were enacted, they had 58 county 
splits and 78 municipality splits, including 30 town splits, in 
the assembly.  Therefore, the record affirmatively demonstrates 
that the Legislature retained low population deviations while 
also limiting divisions of local governments.  The Legislature's 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
53 
 
maps sufficiently respect local government boundaries under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4.  
¶70 The 
Legislature 
has 
satisfied 
the 
remainder 
of 
Wisconsin's constitutional requirements.  The assembly districts 
are contiguous and sufficiently compact.14  Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 4.  Both senate and assembly maps include single member 
districts, and assembly districts are not divided in the 
formation of senate districts.  Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 4, 5.  
In all, the Legislature's senate and assembly maps comply with 
the Wisconsin Constitution. 
B.  Least Change 
¶71 In its November 30 decision, the court stated that it 
would 
not 
tread 
"further 
than 
necessary 
to 
remedy . . . deficiencies" of the current maps.  Johnson, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶64.  The court's selection would be driven by a 
decision 
on 
which 
map 
"comport[s] 
with 
relevant 
legal 
requirements" 
while 
still 
"reflect[ing] 
the 
least 
change 
necessary."  Id., ¶72.   
¶72 The 
Legislature 
adopted 
minimal 
changes 
to 
the 
existing maps while still complying with federal and state law.  
While other parties also limited changes to the existing maps, 
they 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
federal 
Equal 
Protection 
requirements.  No other maps comply with all legal requirements. 
The Legislature's maps address malapportionment in a least 
                                                 
14 "We 
have 
never 
adopted 
a 
particular 
measure 
of 
compactness, but the constitutional text furnishes some latitude 
in meeting this requirement."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶37.   
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2021AP1450-OA   
 
54 
 
changes way.  Therefore, the Legislature's maps are our least 
change selection.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 Upon 
review 
of 
the 
record, 
we 
conclude 
that 
insufficient evidence is presented to justify drawing state 
legislative districts on the basis of race.  The maps proposed 
by the Governor, Senator Bewley, BLOC, and CMS are racially 
motivated and, under the Equal Protection Clause, do not survive 
strict scrutiny.  By contrast, the maps proposed by the 
Wisconsin Legislature are race neutral.  The Legislature's maps 
comply with the Equal Protection Clause, along with all other 
applicable federal and state legal requirements.  Further, the 
Legislature's maps exhibit minimal changes to the existing maps.  
Therefore, we adopt the state senate and assembly maps of the 
Legislature for the State of Wisconsin. 
By the Court.—Relief granted. 
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶74 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   
"Justice is pictured blind and her daughter, the Law, 
ought at least to be color-blind."   
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) (No. 210), 1893 WL 10660, at *19.  This redistricting 
cycle proceeded in a manner heavily focused on color, supposedly 
for remedial purposes, but accomplishing nothing but racial 
animosity as showcased by the dissent's race-baiting rhetoric 
and condescension toward people of color. 
¶75 I join the majority opinion in full and write 
separately to expound on the primacy of color-blindness in Equal 
Protection jurisprudence.  Based on the record in this case, the 
Constitution mandates a color-blind remedy for the protection of 
all citizens, irrespective of color.  I also write to provide a 
thorough 
examination 
of 
this 
redistricting 
cycle, 
which 
demonstrates why the United States Supreme Court summarily 
rejected the maps selected by a majority of this court:  those 
race-based maps, which were drawn by Governor Tony Evers, 
violate the Constitution by insidiously sorting people into 
districts based on the color of their skin.  The Wisconsin 
Legislature drew its maps without regard to race——the only party 
to do so——therefore, I respectfully concur with the majority's 
decision to select them. 
I.  OUR COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 
¶76 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
rejected 
Homer 
Plessy's 
argument 
that 
racial 
segregation 
violates 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to its everlasting shame.  Plessy exists 
in our nation's history as a stain, dishonoring America's quest 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
2 
 
for equality under the law for all, which began with the 
founding. 
 
See 
The 
Declaration 
of 
Independence 
para. 
2 
(U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal[.]"); see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 
("All people are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.").  At times, the United States has strayed from this 
sacred principle, often on the basis of sham social science of 
the day promoting the repugnant notion that people of different 
races would be better off if the law distinguished between them.  
See State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶43, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 ("Social science often embodies the subjective 
beliefs of the time.  When these beliefs become enshrined as 
constitutional law, they have a long-lasting impact even if 
proved incorrect at a later date. . . .  Plessy embodied 
abhorrent 
social 
beliefs 
regarding 
the 
superiority 
and 
inferiority of people based on race.  This belief then became 
law through United States Supreme Court decision-making that was 
purporting to interpret the United States Constitution.  It took 
more than half a century to correct course because it is 
difficult to overturn constitutional precedent.").  Allowing 
social science to infect constitutional analysis inevitably 
"result[s] in grave abuses of individual rights and liberty."  
State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶46, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring), cert. denied, 141 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
3 
 
S. Ct. 881.  "Deplorable decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson 
and Buck v. Bell were rooted in evil concepts supported by social 
science and elitist mores antithetical to the Constitution.  
Ascertaining and faithfully applying the original meaning of the 
Constitution's words precludes appalling social science-based 
notions of the day from infecting constitutional analysis.  Only 
the Constitution can serve as reliable bulwark of the rights and 
liberty of the people."  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶86 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶77 Despite the United States Supreme Court's approval of 
racial segregation in Plessy, the words of Justice Harlan, the 
lone dissenter, ultimately prevailed: 
[I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, 
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling 
class of citizens.  There is no caste here. Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens.  In respect of civil 
rights, all citizens are equal before the law.  The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful.  The law 
regards man as man, and takes no account of his 
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are 
involved.  It is therefore to be regretted that this 
high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental 
law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is 
competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by 
citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis 
of race. 
163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  As 
Justice Harlan understood, "[t]he moral imperative of race 
neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause."  
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1029 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
4 
 
(Kennedy, 
J., 
concurring 
in 
part 
and 
concurring 
in 
the 
judgment)).  "As a general matter, the sorting of persons with 
an intent to divide by reason of race raises the most serious 
constitutional questions."  Id.  "Therefore, as a general rule, 
all race-based government decisionmaking——regardless of context—
—is unconstitutional."  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 752 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 
¶78 As 
a 
legal 
concept, 
color-blindness 
is 
often 
misunderstood.  See generally Peter C. Myers, The Case for 
Color-Blindness, First Principles, Sept. 2019, at 1.  Judges can 
certainly consider whether a particular government action has 
had 
a 
disparate 
impact 
on 
minorities——our 
color-blind 
Constitution 
does 
not 
countenance 
ignoring 
incidents 
of 
discrimination.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 
U.S. at 772 n.19.  Under a color-blind approach, however, this 
court may not order a remedy that purports to address racial 
discrimination by discriminating on the basis of race.  The 
Constitution prohibits this court from sorting people on the 
basis of their race.  See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 894–96 
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining the 
"first generation" of Voting Rights Act (VRA) litigation focused 
on laws inhibiting ballot access, such as "literacy tests," but 
over time, the scope of the act was reinterpreted to permit 
"vote 
dilution" 
claims, 
which 
present 
tougher 
remedial 
problems).   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
5 
 
 
¶79 The idea that a minority group's voting power has been 
diluted necessarily requires a subjective inquiry into the share 
of the vote to which that group is entitled.  See id. at 892.  
Such an inquiry represents a significant departure from the idea 
of 
"one 
person, 
one 
vote," 
a 
concept 
premised 
on 
the 
uncontroversial axiom that each person, as an individual, is 
entitled to "political equality[.]"  Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Independence, 
to 
Lincoln's 
Gettysburg 
Address, 
to 
the 
Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, 
and 
Nineteenth 
Amendments can mean only one thing——one person, one vote."). 
 
¶80 The strong evidence necessary to establish the Gingles 
preconditions ensures a collection of individuals can be fairly 
deemed, in fact, a community.  Communities of interest are 
sometimes protected as a traditional redistricting criteria.  
See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n (Johnson I), 2021 WI 87, 
¶83, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  
When the Gingles preconditions are clearly established, a race-
based 
redistricting 
plan 
provides 
a 
shield 
protecting 
communities of interest as opposed to remedy devised solely on 
the basis of race.  Unlike race-based plans, acknowledging 
people's voluntary association with one another does not offend 
individual dignity.  So long as communities of interest (or 
their individual members) are not treated differently on the 
basis of race, the Fourteenth Amendment is not offended. 
 
¶81 Imposing a race-based redistricting plan, without 
strong evidence of necessity, endorses the stereotype that 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
6 
 
people of the same race must think alike and must think 
differently than people of other races.  See Holder, 512 U.S. at 
903.  Governor Evers' plan, adopted by this court on March 3, 
imposed "distinctions . . . based upon race and color alone," 
which is "the epitome of that arbitrariness and capriciousness 
constitutionally impermissive under our system of government."  
Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(No. 1), 1952 WL 82041, at *6–7 (authored in part by Thurgood 
Marshall) (citation omitted). 
 
¶82 In addition to harming individual dignity, this 
redistricting cycle is replete with examples of the harm 
inflicted on all people when courts assume, without a strong 
evidentiary basis, that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
tolerates 
a 
particular 
method 
of 
affirmative action.  See Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 595 U.S. __, No. 21A471, slip op., at 5 (Mar. 23, 2022) 
(per curiam) (explaining "the institution that makes the racial 
distinction must have had a 'strong basis in evidence' to 
conclude that remedial action was necessary, 'before it embarks 
on an affirmative action program."  (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. 899, 910 (1996)).  Drawing people into districts based on 
race for the purpose of competing as members of a racial group 
for political power is antithetical to achieving a more 
pluralistic society.  "The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."  
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality).  
"[S]tate entities may not experiment with race-based means to 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
7 
 
achieve ends they deem socially desirable."  Id. (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
¶83 The inconclusive pseudo-science presented to this 
court fell far short of justifying race-based redistricting, as 
the majority opinion thoroughly explains.  It amounted to little 
more than selectively-cited election data, which appears to have 
been researched only after-the-fact.  That is to say, mapmakers 
seem to have used racial stereotypes, not legitimate social 
science, to heuristically draw maps that segregated people based 
on race.  No such "shortcuts"1 are allowed for proponents of 
race-based redistricting as a remedy for past discrimination.  
See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144, 184 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The record is 
devoid of any evidence that the 65% figure was a reasoned 
response to the problem of past discrimination.  It is, rather, 
clear that under the time pressure of upcoming elections, and 
'in an atmosphere of hasty dickering,' the New York Legislature 
simply accepted the standard formula from the Department of 
Justice and treated it as mandatory."  (internal citation 
omitted)). 
¶84 The dissent's ambitious attempt to paint Milwaukee 
County as the Jim Crow-era South reflects "an effort to cast out 
Satan by Beelzebub."  Frederick Douglass, Speech, The Blessings 
of Liberty and Education (Sept. 3, 1894).  The dissent would 
remedy what it perceives as racial disparities by literally 
"draw[ing] lines between the white and the black" with no 
                                                 
1 Dissent, ¶161. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
8 
 
apparent recognition that doing so replaces one devil with 
another.  See id.  A closer examination of this redistricting 
cycle and how the VRA can be misused illustrates the problem.  
II.  BACKGROUND:   
Governor Evers' People's Maps Commission, How It Might Have 
Harmed Minority Communities in Milwaukee, and His "New" Plan  
¶85 [A]t least the Republican map goal was not to 
decimate the voices of the Black and Brown communities 
of Wisconsin. . . .  I can see the agenda, Mr. 
Speaker.  And the agenda is to dilute and crack and 
cancel out the voice of minority communities.  It's 
regressive.  Just to create more Democratic seats.  
There is the intent, Mr. Speaker. 
Wisconsin Assembly Floor Session, at 2:15:09 (Nov. 11, 2021) 
(statement of Rep. Sylvia Ortiz-Velez (Assemb. District 8)), 
https://wiseye.org/2021/11/11/wisconsin-state-assemblyfloor-
session-42.   
¶86 The people have a "right to know" what happened this 
redistricting cycle.  See Hawkins v. WEC, 2020 WI 75, ¶14, 393 
Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting).  
Unfortunately, media coverage on this case, like on so many 
others, has been skewed by partisan pundits disappointed in the 
"results."  See Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶78 (majority op.) 
(quoting 
Patience 
Drake 
Roggensack, 
Tough 
Talk 
and 
the 
Institutional Legitimacy of Our Courts, Hallows Lecture (Mar. 7, 
2017), in Marq. Law., Fall 2017, at 45, 46).  See generally Tah 
v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc., 991 F.3d 231, 255 (D.C. Cir. 
2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting in part) ("There can be little 
question that the overwhelming uniformity of news bias in the 
United States has an enormous political impact. . . .   [T]he 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
9 
 
press and media do not even pretend to be neutral news 
services.").   
¶87 One media outlet went so far as to run a subheadline 
attacking the motives of the nation's highest court: "The 
justices [of the United States Supreme Court] are concerned that 
Wisconsin's legislative maps may give too much political power 
to Black people."  Ian Millhiser, Black Voters Suffer Another 
Significant Loss in the Supreme Court, Vox (Mar. 23, 2022), 
https://www.vox.com/2022/3/23/22993107/supreme-court-wisconsin-
race-gerrymander-voting-rights-act-legislature-elections-
commission.  Worse still, while accusing the justices of 
indulging an "inflammatory assumption," specifically, "[t]hat 
legislative maps with fewer Black-majority districts are often 
preferred to those that give more power to Black voters," the 
author made an inflammatory assumption of his own, seemingly 
designed to foster racial tension.  See id.; see also Mark 
Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court's Astonishing, Inexplicable Blow 
to the Voting Rights Act in Wisconsin, Slate (Mar. 23, 2022), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/supreme-court-
voting-rights-shredder-wisconsin.html.   
¶88 For context, in the early 2000s, Wisconsin had divided 
government.  Republicans controlled the assembly, Democrats 
controlled the senate, and Governor James Scott McCallum, a 
Republican, controlled the executive branch.2  The Legislature 
                                                 
 
2 Legis. Reference Bureau, Profile of the 2001 Wisconsin 
Legislature, 
Wis. 
Br. 
01-3, 
at 
1–2 
(Jan. 
3, 
2001), 
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/collection/p16831c
oll2/id/1073.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
10 
 
did not adopt a redistricting plan; a federal court redrew 
Wisconsin's state legislative maps.  Baumgart v. Wendelberger, 
No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *1, 8 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 
2002) (per curiam).  Jim Doyle, a Democrat, became governor in 
2003.  In 2009, Republicans lost control of the assembly.  At 
this time, Democrats gained what is known in political parlance 
as a "trifecta":  they had control of both houses of the state 
legislature, as well as the executive branch. 
¶89 In 2007 and again in 2009, a few Democrats introduced 
a joint resolution, which would have begun the process of 
amending the Wisconsin Constitution to significantly alter how 
district lines are drawn.  They did not succeed, leaving Article 
IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution unchanged:   
The 
members 
of 
the 
assembly 
shall 
be 
chosen 
biennially, by single districts, on the Tuesday 
succeeding the first Monday of November in even-
numbered years, by the qualified electors of the 
several districts, such districts to be bounded by 
county, precinct, town or ward lines, to consist of 
contiguous territory and be in as compact form as 
practicable. 
The 2007 proposal would have created a "state redistricting 
board," composed of the attorney general, the secretary of 
state, the state treasurer, the state superintendent of public 
instruction, and one member appointed by this court.  Analysis 
Legis. Reference Bureau, 2007 Assemb. J.R. 63.  It also would 
have "define[d] demographic and political standards for the 
drawing of legislative districts and establishe[d] a procedure 
for the drawing of legislative districting."  Id.  The 2009 
proposal would not have created a board, but it would have 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
11 
 
circumscribed the "criteria" the Legislature could consider when 
drawing districts.  Analysis Legis. Reference Bureau, 2009 
Assemb. J.R. 29. 
 
¶90 Neither resolution received a floor vote even though 
Democrats controlled the senate in 2007 and 2008 (but, by a 
small margin, not the assembly) and controlled both chambers in 
2009.  When Democrats had a trifecta, they maintained the status 
quo, i.e., allowing the Legislature substantial discretion to 
draw lines subject to gubernatorial veto.3 
 
¶91 Under the 2002 court-drawn map, Republicans gained 
control of the Legislature in 2011.  That same year, Wisconsin 
elected Republican Scott Walker governor.  The Republican-
controlled Legislature drew state legislative districts in the 
manner prescribed by Article IV, Section 3, which the governor 
signed.  2011 Wis. Act 43. 
 
¶92 In 2018, Republicans lost their trifecta.  Wisconsin 
elected a Democrat, Tony Evers, to serve as governor.  On the 
eve of the 2020 redistricting cycle, Governor Evers signed 
Executive Order No. 66 creating the "People's Maps Commission" 
(PMC), tasked with drawing redistricting maps.4  Wis. Exec. Order 
                                                 
3 This court's precedent, prohibiting the Legislature from 
enacting 
state 
legislative 
redistricting 
plans 
by 
joint 
resolution, does not comport with the Wisconsin Constitution and 
should be revisited.  See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 
WI 14, ¶¶253–59, 400 Wis. 2d 626, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., dissenting), summarily rev'd sub. nom. Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. __, No. 21A471, 
slip op. (Mar. 23, 2022) (per curiam). 
4 Governor Evers referred this court to both Executive Order 
No. 66 and the PMC's public website, specifically the "Hearings 
& Meetings" page. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
12 
 
No. 66 (2020).  Never mind the Wisconsin Constitution's 
"textually demonstrable . . . commitment" of the duty and power 
to redistrict the state to the Legislature——without any mention 
of the executive.  Johnson I, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶51 (quoting 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  
 
¶93 This commission was "the People's" in name alone.  
Regardless of its title, Governor Evers, pursuant to the statute 
he used to create the PMC, retained plenary control over it.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 14.019(1) (2019–20)5 states, "[u]nder the 
general powers of the office of the governor the governor may, 
by executive order, create nonstatutory committees in such 
number and with such membership as desired, to conduct such 
studies and to advise the governor in such matters as directed."  
Section 14.019(1)(a) continues, "[p]ersons appointed to a 
nonstatutory committee may be removed or replaced, or the 
committee may be abolished, by the governor at pleasure."  As 
the plain text of the authorizing statute indicates, the PMC was 
in no way an independent or non-partisan commission.6   
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version. 
6 So-called "independent" or "non-partisan" redistricting 
commissions have been subject to substantial criticism, even by 
commentators who decry partisan gerrymandering.  Kevin Reyes, 
Note, 
Redistricting 
or 
Rethinking? 
Why 
Proportional 
Representation May Be a Better Solution than California's 
Independent Commission, S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 655, 659–
61 (2011).  The California Citizens Redistricting Commission is 
an oft-cited example.  Under its handiwork, in 2014, Democratic 
congressional candidates received 57% of the vote statewide, but 
won 73.6% of the seats (39 of 53).  Andrew Spencer, Christopher 
Hughes & Rob Richie, Escaping the Thicket:  The Ranked Choice 
Voting Solution to America's Districting Crisis, 46 Cumb. L. 
Rev. 377, 388 (2016). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
13 
 
 
¶94 Governor Evers ordered the PMC to "prepare proposed 
maps for the Legislature to consider" which "shall, whenever 
possible": 
a. Be free from partisan bias and partisan advantage; 
b. Avoid diluting or diminishing minority votes, 
including through the practice of "packing" or 
"cracking"; 
c. Be compact and contiguous; 
d. Avoid splitting wards and municipalities; 
e.  
Retain the core populations in each district; 
f. Maintain traditional communities of interest; 
g. Prevent voter disenfranchisement. 
Exec. Order No. 66, at 2 (emphasis added).  His instruction to 
"[r]etain the core populations in each district" is particularly 
striking given the governor's attacks on the legitimacy of the 
least-change approach.  In a press release following this 
court's November 30, 2021 decision adopting the least-change 
approach, he stated, "I urged the Wisconsin Supreme Court to 
consider the maps prepared by a nonpartisan redistricting 
commission, and it's unfortunate the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
rejected those maps and decided they will only consider maps 
that make minimal changes from the gerrymandered maps we have 
now[.]"7     
                                                 
7 Press Release, Gov. Evers Submits New Redistricting Maps 
Using "Least Change" Approach Pursuant to Court Order, Office of 
the 
Governor, 
State 
of 
Wis. 
(Dec. 
15, 
2021), 
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/WIGOV/bulletins/3010fc.  
Notwithstanding Governor Evers' goal for the PMC to "[r]etain 
the core populations in each district," Attorney General Josh 
Kaul, a Democrat, declared, "[f]or a court to rule that a court-
drawn map must be based on an extreme partisan gerrymander 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶95 The PMC created a memorandum explaining how it 
understood Governor Evers' order.  Among other considerations, 
it promised to comply with relevant laws, including the VRA.8  
The PMC produced final recommendations at the eleventh hour, too 
late for thorough analysis before the Legislature was scheduled 
to consider the maps it created.9  See Written Testimony of 
Speaker Robin J. Vos, Joint Public Hearing of the Senate 
Committee on Government Operations, Legal Review, and Consumer 
Protection and the Assembly Committee on State Affairs, at 4 
(Oct. 
28, 
2021), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lc/hearing_testimony_and_m
aterials/2021/sb621/sb0621_2021_10_28.pdf 
("[T]he 
draft 
maps 
released by the commission contained inconsistent district 
numbering making our analysis difficult.").  The PMC's maps were 
of such questionable fairness and legality, many members of 
Governor Evers' party disavowed them.   
                                                                                                                                                             
[i.e., the 2011 maps] is simply stunning."  Press Release, AG 
Kaul Issues Statement on Wisconsin Supreme Court Redistricting 
Decision 
(Nov. 
30, 
2021), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/news-
media/11.30.21_Redistricting.pdf.   
 
8 Memorandum from the People's Maps Commission, Criteria for 
Drawing 
Districts, 
at 
2 
(last 
visited 
Apr. 
4, 
2022), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/PMCCriteriaMemoFINAL.pdf. 
 
9 Governor Evers held a press conference on November 2, 2021 
releasing 
the 
final 
recommendations 
of 
the 
PMC. 
 
News 
Conference, Gov. Evers on People's Maps Commission Final Maps 
Submissions (Nov. 2, 2021), https://wiseye.org/2021/11/02/news-
conference-gov-evers-on-peoples-maps-commission-final-map-
submissions/.  At this point, the legislative process was far 
along, so many legislators had already begun to evaluate the 
PMC's drafts——not their final work product. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
15 
 
¶96 Notwithstanding Governor Evers' arguments before this 
court for maximizing the number of majority-minority districts, 
the PMC proposed maps with only three Black majority districts:  
two in the assembly and one in the senate.10  Governor Evers' own 
commission proposed eliminating four Black majority districts in 
the assembly and one in the senate; nevertheless, Governor Evers 
told this court and the United States Supreme Court that the 
failure to add a Black majority district in the assembly would 
violate the VRA.11  Governor Evers' commission also significantly 
                                                 
 
10 People's Maps Commission Final Map Submissions (PMC's 
Final Maps), The People's Maps Commission (updated Nov. 3, 
2021), 
https://govstatus.egov.com/peoplesmaps/work-records 
(click "District Link Here" for either the "Assembly Map" or the 
"Senate Map"; then click "Evaluation"; then click "Population by 
Race").   
 
11 During an executive session of the Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, Legal Review, and Consumer Protection, 
the chairman, Senator Duey Stroebel, noted the PMC's assembly 
map had significantly fewer majority-minority districts than the 
Legislature's proposal; Democratic committee members had no 
response.  Executive Session of the Wisconsin Senate Committee 
on Government Operations, Legal Review, and Consumer Protection, 
at 12:37 (Nov. 4, 2021) (statement of Senator Duey Stroebel 
(Sen. 
District 
20)), 
https://wiseye.org/2021/11/04/senate-
committee-on-government-operations-legal-review-and-consumer-
protection-9/ ("[T]he last item would be majority-minority 
districts.  SB [621], six Black . . . assembly and two Black 
senate. . . .  
People's 
Maps 
Commission, 
two 
Black . . . assembly, one Black senate[.]"). 
Senator Stroebel also noted the similarity between the 
criteria established by Executive Order No. 66 and 2021 Senate 
Joint 
Resolution 
63, 
which 
established 
the 
criteria 
the 
Legislature used.  Both sets of criteria included, among other 
things, core retention.  Compare Wis. Exec. Order No. 66, at 2 
(2020) ("whenever possible . . . [r]etain the core populations 
in each district"), with 2021 S. J.R. 63 ("Retain as much as 
possible the core of existing districts").  Democrats had no 
response. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
16 
 
reduced the Hispanic population in the one of the two Hispanic 
majority districts that a federal court held were necessary for 
VRA compliance——although it did keep the Hispanic population 
above a majority.  Specifically, the PMC drew the district with 
a Hispanic population of approximately 63.3%.12  The Hispanic 
voting-age population (HVAP) in that district is currently 
67.2%.13 
¶97 The PMC expressed little concern about the VRA.14  A 
substantial 
portion 
of 
the 
public 
hearing 
discussed 
the 
purported 
harms 
of 
partisan 
gerrymandering, 
not 
racial 
gerrymandering——in fact, it permeated the entire commentary of 
one of the speakers.15 
                                                 
12 PMC's Final Maps.  I assume the PMC used voting-age 
population, although whether it did so is unclear from its 
public website. 
13 The PMC would have slightly increased the Hispanic 
population in the other Hispanic majority district; however, 
that district would have had less than a 60% Hispanic population 
nonetheless. 
14 People's Maps Commission Online Public Hearing | 4th 
Congressional District (PMC's VRA Hearing), YouTube (Jan. 14, 
2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdagL0feabA&t=2s.  Based 
on the PMC's final report, other public hearings may have 
discussed the VRA, but this particular hearing was the only one 
designated for discussion of the VRA.  The People's Maps 
Commission, 
Final 
Report 
and 
Maps 
of 
the 
People's 
Maps 
Commission, 
at 
A6 
(2021), 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/PMC/PMC_Report_Final_Full-
compressed%20(2).pdf. 
15 The speaker discussed, among other things, Gill v. 
Whitford, 
585 
U.S. __, 
138 
S. Ct. 1916 
(2018), 
and 
the 
"efficiency gap," which is a purported way to measure the 
partisan fairness of a redistricting plan that was at the heart 
of Gill. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
17 
 
¶98 The commissioners admitted their inexperience in this 
area of law.  Although the PMC invited two attorneys, both 
acknowledged they lacked competence to give legal advice about 
the VRA.  These speakers described the VRA as a "passion" but 
admitted primarily practicing other areas, such as employment 
law.16  Notably, one of the commissioners asked the speakers if 
the 
PMC's 
plans 
could 
be 
"misconstrued" 
as 
a 
"racial 
gerrymander," to which the answer was, "I guess it could be."17   
¶99 No Democrat in the assembly was willing to introduce 
the PMC's maps.  See Wisconsin Assembly Floor Session, at 
1:35:30 (statement of Speaker Robin J. Vos).  Speaker Robin J. 
Vos, a Republican, did so.  On the assembly floor, Democrats 
castigated Governor Evers for placing the Democratic Party's 
goals above minority communities' needs. 
¶100 Representative Sylvia Ortiz-Velez, a Latina Democrat 
from Milwaukee County, rose for the first time in her tenure to 
voice her concerns.  "[A]t least the Republican map goal was not 
to decimate the voices of the Black and Brown communities of 
Wisconsin," she stated.  Id. at 2:15:09 (statement of Rep. 
Sylvia Ortiz-Velez).  Among her concerns, she identified the 
PMC's proposed reduction of the HVAP in at least one Hispanic 
                                                 
16 PMC's VRA Hearing, at 1:39:14. 
17 Id. at 1:25:01.  From the commissioner's question, it 
appears the PMC (or at least some of its members) thought it 
could simply relabel the consideration of "race" as the 
consideration of a "community of interest."  Labelling does not 
fix the problem.  Only if the Gingles preconditions are 
satisfied may the treatment of a racial group as a community of 
interest be lawful. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
18 
 
majority district.  She explained the Hispanic population 
typically has low voter turnout and some members of the 
community are counted for census purposes even though they 
cannot vote.18  Id. at 2:11:35. 
¶101 Representative Ortiz-Velez also said the PMC's maps 
"promote[] a white supremacy agenda that says it's okay for 
other folks . . . who we don't choose to rule over us and make 
decisions for us."  Id. at 2:16:01.  She noted the PMC's maps 
were "unconstitutional for several reasons," and "[w]e can 
litigate that in the courts.  We know there's a third branch.  
And we'll get our justice there because the law is on our 
side[.]"  Id. at 2:15:30.  According to Rep. Ortiz-Velez, the 
PMC had "dilute[d] and crack[ed] and cancel[ed] out the voice of 
minority communities. . . .  Just to create more Democratic 
seats."  Id. at 2:16:44.  She said similar Democratic Party 
                                                 
18  Standing alone, low turnout is an unlawful basis for 
drawing a majority-minority district.  The VRA guarantees equal 
opportunity, not equal success.  United States v. Euclid Sch. 
Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2009) ("That being 
said, there is no right under the Voting Rights Act to win; 
there is, rather, a right to meaningfully compete.  While the 
effects of long-standing electoral discrimination on voter 
turnout are undeniable, there is assuredly some point at which 
potential voters must themselves come to the polls.  This is 
likely the reason that four of the five courts previously to 
consider the threshold of exclusion employ VAP in their 
treatment of the concept, as opposed to a consideration of 
historical 
turnout." 
 
(internal 
citation 
and 
citations 
omitted)).  Increasing the minority population in a district 
solely in response to low turnout actually has the troubling 
consequence of "artificially cap[ping]" minority voting power.  
Id. at 765.  The remedy for low turnout——packing minority voters 
into fewer districts——necessarily reduces the power the minority 
group could have if its members turned out at a higher rate. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
19 
 
plans were being proposed and adopted nationwide.  Id. at 
2:18:00. 
¶102 Of particular frustration to Rep. Ortiz-Velez was the 
manner in which she and other members of minority communities 
had been treated by the executive branch: 
We were shut out of the process by the executive 
branch.  We tried, Mr. Speaker.  There was a concerted 
effort by the executive branch to lock us out of the 
process so we couldn't act as a check.  I want the 
record to reflect that many members of this body, and 
at least one member of the Senate, Senator Lena 
Taylor, have repeatedly tried to stop this injustice 
before it happened.  Including myself, Mr. Speaker.  
We tried many times speaking with the Governor's 
Office and the People's Maps Commission to address our 
concerns, and we were basically dismissed, gaslighted, 
and ignored.  
Id. at 2:19:46.  On this point, she concluded, "Mr. Speaker 
there was a significant lack of responsiveness on [the] part of 
the elected officials to the particular needs of the members of 
a minority group."  Id. at 2:20:23. 
¶103 Representative LaKeshia Myers, a Black Democrat from 
Milwaukee County, spoke next.  She said, "[t]his body is based 
off population.  So I know I didn't teach math, but if you got 
almost 100 and you got 6.4 that sounds like it should be six 
seats."  Id. at 2:38:06 (Rep. LaKeshia Myers (Assemb. District 
12)).  Because the PMC's proposed assembly map proposed only 
two, she strongly encouraged her colleagues to vote against it. 
¶104 Representative Marisabel Carbrera, a Latina Democrat 
from Milwaukee County, voiced similar concerns: 
Mr. Speaker, you said a few moments ago the following 
about the People's Maps Commission's Maps.  Its 
process might have violated Wisconsin's open meetings 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
20 
 
laws, 
it 
violates 
the 
Voting 
Rights 
Act, 
more 
elections are paired, more Wisconsinites will not be 
able to vote for senators, and more counties are 
split.  I have to say Mr. Speaker, this time I happen 
to agree with you. 
Id. at 2:53:11 (statement of Rep. Marisabel Carbrera (Assemb. 
District 9)).  She concluded, "I believe the PMC did not 
accomplish its stated mission. . . .  Fair maps would not 
sacrifice the voting rights of Black and Latino voters."  Id. at 
2:53:37 (emphasis added). 
¶105 Following these speeches, the assembly voted down the 
PMC's maps by a vote of 77-21.19  For context, according to the 
official assembly profile, the assembly had 60 Republicans, 38 
Democrats, and one vacant seat.20  A substantial portion of 
Governor Evers' fellow Democrats voted against his maps.  
Executive Order 66's time had not come.  It would not be done.21 
¶106 The concerns of Democratic representatives had been 
voiced by Democratic senators just three days earlier.  Senator 
Lena C. Taylor, a Black Democrat from Milwaukee County, declared 
the PMC's maps were the worst of all options because of their 
                                                 
19 The senate also voted down the PMC's maps on a bipartisan 
vote of 22-11. 
 
20 Louisa Kamps, Profile of the 2021 Wisconsin Legislature 2 
(2021), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lrb/lrb_reports/2021_wisco
nsin_legislature_profile_5_3.pdf. 
21 DARTH SIDIOUS: 
The time has come.  Execute 
Order Sixty-Six. 
CLONE COMMANDER BACARA: 
It will be done, My Lord. 
Star Wars:  Episode III – Revenge of the Sith (Lucasfilm Ltd. 
2005). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
21 
 
utter disregard for minority communities, which she noted likely 
violated the VRA.  Wisconsin Senate Floor Session, at 1:12:04 
(Nov. 8, 2021) (statement of Sen. Lena Taylor (Sen. District 
4)), https://wiseye.org/2021/11/08/wisconsin-state-senate-floor-
session-34/.  Similar to Rep. Ortiz-Velez's comments a few days 
later, Senator Taylor explained the voters in Black majority 
districts cannot be reasonably expected to elect Black-preferred 
candidates unless the Black voting-age population (BVAP) is well 
above 50%.  Id. at 1:04:30, 1:14:00. 
¶107 Despite the turbulent history of the PMC, Governor 
Evers told this court his creation of the PMC supported his 
intervention in this case: 
[T]he Governor has ongoing involvement with the 
redistricting process.  That is embodied in the 
Governor's Executive Order #66 that creates the 
nonpartisan People's Maps Commission, which is tasked 
with seeking input and drawing impartial maps for the 
Legislature and Governor to consider.  The Commission, 
and the relevance its plan would have to the remedy 
stage 
of 
a 
redistricting 
lawsuit, 
provides 
a . . . reason for the Governor's intervention. 
He concluded, "[t]he Commission's maps would be highly relevant 
to a court's task in a reapportionment action.  The legal and 
factual considerations used by the Commission when drawing its 
maps will parallel the considerations before the court when 
addressing redistricting." 
¶108 At some point after this court granted Governor Evers' 
intervention motion, he changed his mind about the PMC.  If his 
commission 
had 
followed 
his 
direction 
to 
"whenever 
possible . . . [r]etain the core populations in each district" 
it might have produced maps that could plausibly be labelled 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
22 
 
least-change.  Exec. Order No. 66, at 2.  Although the PMC's 
maps did not do so, much of Governor Evers' "new" plan consisted 
of materials recycled from the PMC's plan.  Governor Evers, 
however, abandoned the PMC's proposal for only two Black 
majority assembly districts and only one Black majority senate 
district.  In contrast, Black Leaders Organizing for Communities 
(BLOC) proposed seven Black assembly districts and two Black 
senate districts.  As the United States Supreme Court noted in 
its decision summarily reversing this court's selection of 
Governor Evers' state legislative districts, BLOC argued, based 
on its expert's analysis, Governor Evers' proposal violated the 
VRA.  See Wis. Legislature, slip op., at 6 n.2 (citations 
omitted); see also Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n (Johnson 
II), 2022 WI 14, ¶¶91, 112, 400 Wis. 2d 626, __ N.W.2d __ 
(Ziegler, C.J., dissenting), summarily rev'd sub. nom. Wis. 
Legislature, slip. op. ("The only support presented in an 
attempt to justify race-based districts was submitted by a party 
who 
contends 
the 
Governor's 
maps 
violate 
the 
VRA:  
BLOC. . . .  No party except BLOC presented any details on the 
state and condition of minority communities in the districts at 
issue, 
and 
even 
that 
evidence 
is 
deeply 
flawed. . . .  Strikingly, under BLOC's analysis, the Governor's 
maps do not satisfy the VRA, and are thus unconstitutional.  The 
majority not only lacks evidence to support the maps it adopts, 
but the only party who even attempted to prove a VRA need 
determined those maps were illegal."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
23 
 
¶109 Governor Evers' "new" approach to the VRA was similar 
to BLOC's:  both maximized the number of majority-minority 
districts by drawing them at just above 50% BVAP primarily by 
arbitrarily adding White people as "filler[.]"22  Johnson II, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ¶72. 
Wisconsin State Legislative 
Districts 
BVAP in Governor Evers' 
Proposed Maps 
Senate District 4 
50.62% 
Senate District 6 
50.33% 
Assembly District 10 
51.39% 
Assembly District 11 
50.21% 
Assembly District 12 
50.24% 
Assembly District 14 
50.85% 
Assembly District 16 
50.09% 
Assembly District 17 
50.29% 
Assembly District 18 
50.63% 
As Chief Justice Ziegler wrote in her March 3 dissent: 
[I]t is striking how explicitly the Governor——and the 
majority——divided up Wisconsin districts solely by 
race.  While in 2011 the Legislature drew six assembly 
districts that have a majority of black voting-age 
populations ("BVAP"), ranging from 51% to 62%, the 
Governor carves seven districts by race with the 
exactness of only the most gifted social scientists.  
According to the Governor himself, he drew seven 
districts with BVAP ranging from 50.1% to 51.4%.  At 
                                                 
22 Counsel for the Citizen Mathematicians & Scientists 
warned this court at oral argument that in his many years of 
redistricting experience, he had seldom seen such a heavy focus 
on race in a judicial proceeding.  He used the phrase "White 
filler" to describe a redistricting practice of certain other 
parties, and candidly acknowledged the Legislature's Black 
opportunity districts would perform. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
24 
 
oral argument and in briefing, it was clear that race 
imbued the decisions of the Governor in drawing 
districts.  Explaining his district boundaries, he 
stated the intent was "to produce seven majority Black 
districts in the Assembly." 
Id., ¶87.  Governor Evers' approach stands in sharp contrast to 
the Legislature's, which used race neutral criteria, as the 
majority opinion explains. 
 
¶110 To achieve what Governor Evers deemed the right racial 
balance 
in 
each 
district, 
he 
disregarded 
redistricting 
principles enshrined in the Wisconsin Constitution.  Even 
assuming the Gingles preconditions are satisfied (they are not), 
he cannot subordinate these principles unless it is "reasonably 
necessary"——which it is not.  See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
979 (1996) (lead op.) ("[T]he district drawn in order to satisfy 
§ 2 must not subordinate traditional districting principles to 
race substantially more than is 'reasonably necessary' to avoid 
§ 2 liability.").  
 
¶111 Governor Evers' oddly shaped districts are numerous——
and many of the odd shapes in his plan are analogous to the 
PMC's.  For example, Governor Evers redrew Senate District 4, 
currently represented by Sen. Taylor, to extend into Waukesha 
and Ozaukee Counties.23  The result was a substantial decrease in 
BVAP.  Under his plan, Assembly District 11 would extend to 
Mequon.  In critiquing a similar feature of the PMC's map, Rep. 
Myers rhetorically asked, "[w]hy?  That's going to cross the 
                                                 
23 "By comparison, the Legislature's Senate District 4 ends 
at the Milwaukee County line and does not move a single 
individual to a new senate district."  Legislature's Resp. Br. 
at 11.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
25 
 
county line.  Doesn't make sense.  Doesn't make sense at 
all. . . .  That's not going to stick when it comes to people's 
interest.  That's not going to stick when it comes to thinking 
you're going to elect people that look like me."  Wisconsin 
Assembly Floor Session, at 2:47:55 (statement of Rep. LaKeshia 
Myers).  Without any VRA-grounded justification, Governor Evers 
violated Article IV, Section 4 the Wisconsin Construction, which 
requires 
assembly 
districts 
"to 
be 
bounded 
by 
county, . . . town, or ward lines[.]" 
 
¶112 Governor Evers' plan also would have harmed the Black 
community by forcing it to bear the brunt of disruption stemming 
from redistricting.  While demonstrating high overall core 
retention, 
Governor 
Evers 
concentrated 
major 
changes 
in 
Milwaukee County, proposing what the Legislature fairly labelled 
a "most-change Milwaukee" map.  According to the Legislature, 
Governor Evers' plan would have retained merely 72.6% of 
Milwaukee-area voters in their current district.  In accordance 
with the principles expounded in our November 30 opinion, this 
court 
rightly 
rejects 
a 
"most-change 
Milwaukee," 
as 
the 
Legislature did with a bipartisan vote months ago.  "State 
authorities" 
should 
not 
"localize 
the 
burdens 
of 
race 
reassignment" on a particular community.  United Jewish Orgs., 
430 U.S. at 174–75 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).  It leaves 
"the impression of unfairness" when a discrete and insular 
minority "disproportionately bears the adverse consequences of a 
race-assignment policy."  Id. at 175. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
26 
 
 
¶113 In contrast to Governor Evers' plan, the Legislature's 
plan does not engage in the systematic and discriminatory 
dismantling of districts in Milwaukee.  Governor Evers would 
sever 
Black 
voters' 
existing 
constituent-representative 
relationships and undermine existing voter coalitions, while 
largely preserving them for White voters.  Whether maximizing 
majority Black voting districts would actually benefit the Black 
community remains highly suspect.  Had it survived the scrutiny 
of the United States Supreme Court, Governor Evers' plan 
arguably would have limited Black communities' political power.  
Senator Taylor wrote an amicus brief to the United States 
Supreme Court explaining how Governor Evers' maps "dilute[] the 
voting strength of Black voters in Wisconsin."  Motion for Leave 
to File and Brief for Senator Lena C. Taylor  as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party, at 2, Wis. Legislature v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. __ (2022) (No. 21A471).  She 
continued, "the [Wisconsin] supreme court's conclusion——with no 
analysis whatsoever——that the Governor's map complies with the 
Voting Rights Act is clearly erroneous. . . .  It made no 
determination of whether the Governor's map——or any other——
contains seven Assembly districts with an effective Black 
majority."  Id. at 2, 11–12. 
¶114 Senator Taylor expressed concern that Governor Evers 
had drawn "bare-majority-minority-Black districts," which, as a 
practical matter, "would not be able to nominate their preferred 
candidates[.]"  Id. at 2.  She noted, "this Court has repeatedly 
explained that even majority-minority districts can violate the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
27 
 
Voting Rights Act if they do not contain a sufficiently large 
majority to provide minority voters with a realistic opportunity 
to elect candidates of their choice."  Id. at 12 (citations 
omitted).  She cited, among other decisions, Baldus v. Members 
of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, in which a 
three-judge panel in the Eastern District of Wisconsin concluded 
60.52% HVAP did not create "a functioning majority-minority 
district 
for 
Milwaukee's 
Latino 
community." 
 
849 
F. Supp. 2d 840, 858 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (per curiam). 
¶115 While the dissent decries denying the parties another 
opportunity to develop new evidence to support a different 
outcome, the dissent cannot plausibly contend the parties were 
not fully afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery when the 
case commenced.  Senator Taylor criticized Governor Evers' 
evidence, noting the governor's expert "did not perform a racial 
bloc voting analysis or a performance analysis of the Governor's 
map or any other."  Motion for Leave to File and Brief for 
Senator Lena C. Taylor  as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party, at 5.  Absent such analysis, "there is no evidence 
whatsoever that the Governor's map contains seven opportunity 
districts."  Id. at 12. 
¶116 Ultimately, Senator Taylor maintained the result, if 
not the goal, of Governor Evers' maps was something other than 
ensuring opportunity for Black voters.  Similar to the comments 
of Rep. Ortiz-Velez on the assembly floor regarding the PMC, 
Senator Taylor noted Governor Evers' plan would create seven 
"reliable Democratic district[s], but it would not provide Black 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
28 
 
voters 
with 
the 
opportunity 
that 
the 
Voting 
Rights 
Act 
requires."  Id. at 2.  That is to say, Governor Evers' concept 
of what made a Black vote effective was whatever advantaged his 
political party. 
¶117 Governor 
Evers' 
color-emphasizing 
approach 
is 
remarkably 
different 
than 
the 
Legislature's 
color-blind 
approach.  The Legislature did not consider race as a criterion 
in drawing its maps.  In Speaker Robin J. Vos's written 
testimony 
on 
the 
Legislature's 
redistricting 
bill 
(which 
contained the maps the Legislature ultimately submitted to this 
court), he explained: 
Republican Legislative employees crafted these maps 
within the confines of the state capitol and completed 
this work on their own without the involvement of 
outside 
counsel 
or 
redistricting 
experts. 
These 
employees were instructed not to consider race when 
drafting the legislative maps, instead, relying on 
classic 
redistricting 
principles, 
adjusting 
for 
population changes.24 
During his oral testimony, Speaker Vos reaffirmed the maps' race 
neutrality in response to questions from committee members.25  
Senator Devin LeMahieu, the senate majority leader, also 
                                                 
24 Written Testimony of Speaker Robin J. Vos, Joint Public 
Hearing of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Legal 
Review, and Consumer Protection and the Assembly Committee on 
State 
Affairs, 
at 
4 
(Oct. 
28, 
2021), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lc/hearing_testimony_and_m
aterials/2021/sb621/sb0621_2021_10_28.pdf (emphasis added).   
25 Joint Public Hearing of the Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, Legal Review, and Consumer Protection and 
the Assembly Committee on State Affairs, at 1:44:35 (Oct. 28, 
2021) 
(testimony 
of 
Speaker 
Robin 
J. 
Vos), 
https://wiseye.org/2021/10/28/joint-committee-on-government-
operations-and-state-affairs/.   
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
29 
 
testified the maps are race neutral:  "[W]e reached out to 
minority 
groups 
seeking 
feedback 
on 
Wisconsin's 
current 
majority-minority districts to ensure maps that fully comply 
with state and federal law.  The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
us from passing a law that discriminates on the basis of race.  
Therefore, the new maps were drafted without the use of race 
data at any point in the process to ensure compliance with the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  (emphasis added).26 
 
¶118 The Legislature has repeatedly told this court its 
maps are race neutral.  No party presented any evidence to this 
court 
calling 
into 
question 
the 
Legislature's 
attorneys' 
compliance 
with 
their 
duty 
of 
candor, 
but 
the 
dissent 
nevertheless lodges the accusation.  See SCR 20:3.3 (a)(1) ("A 
lawyer shall not knowingly:  (1) make a false statement of fact 
or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer[.]"). 
 
¶119 The dissent again betrays its misunderstanding of the 
Equal Protection Clause by proclaiming a violation based on "the 
Legislature boast[ing] that its Milwaukee-area core retention 
numbers exceeded their statewide core retention numbers."27  As 
the majority opinion makes clear, "[h]igh core retention, for 
instance, can be readily explained by the fact that the 
Milwaukee-area districts were underpopulated and, of course, a 
larger portion of the core would be retained."28  Therefore, the 
                                                 
 
26 Id. at 8:50 (testimony of Senator Devin LeMahieu (SD 9)). 
27 Dissent, ¶190. 
28 Majority op., ¶51 n.10. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
30 
 
districts are not "unexplainable on grounds other than race."29  
Under a least-change approach, as a general rule, people should 
be 
moved 
from 
overpopulated 
districts 
to 
underpopulated 
districts.  Moving people out of an underpopulated district 
(thereby reducing core retention) rarely achieves any legitimate 
redistricting goal under a least-change paradigm. 
 
¶120 The dissent continues 
to 
misunderstand 
Cooper 
v. 
Harris, 
581 
U.S. 
__, 
137 
S. Ct. 1455 
(2017), 
despite 
invoking that case in misplaced 
support 
for 
the 
dissent's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Legislature's maps violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Two 
pictures illustrate the issue in 
Cooper better than two thousand 
words could.30 
                                                 
29 Id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 
(1995)). 
30 These images are taken from the opinion in Cooper. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
¶121 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
described 
Congressional District 1 as "anchored in the northeastern part 
of the State, with appendages stretching both south and west[.]"  
Id. at 1456.  It described District 12 as "zig-zagging much of 
the way to the State's northern border."  Id.  District 1 had a 
BVAP of 52.7% and District 12 a BVAP of 50.7%.  Id. at 1466.  
Based on direct statements from a North Carolina Senate debate, 
the Court noted the map drawers had purposefully designed 
District 1 to hit "the 50%-plus target," which "had a direct and 
significant impact" on the district's configuration.  Id. at 
1469 (citation omitted).  This change was not necessary because, 
notwithstanding a lower BVAP, for twenty years District 1 had 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
32 
 
been "an extraordinarily safe district for African-American 
preferred candidates."  Id. at 1470 (citation omitted). 
 
¶122 District 12 (in its fifth appearance before the United 
States Supreme Court) was highly suspect.  Id. at 1472.  The 
defense of the district was based on it being drawn for partisan 
advantage rather than in consideration of race.  Id. at 1472–73.  
The United States Supreme Court upheld the district court's 
finding that race predominated.  Notably, the finding was based 
in part on public statements from relevant officials "that 
racial considerations lay behind District 12's augmented BVAP."  
Id. at 1475.  Discovery disclosed the VRA was largely used as a 
shield to justify a racial gerrymander.  Id.  One congressman 
testified he had been told by leaders that they "ramp[ed] the 
minority percentage in [District 12] up to over 50 percent to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act."  Id. at 1476 (second 
modification in the original).  Needless to say, in light of the 
district court's findings, the United States Supreme Court 
disdained such attempts to use racial gerrymanders for partisan 
advantage. 
III.  USING THE VRA AS A GUISE FOR PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
 
¶123 Governor Evers' maps reflect a longstanding practice 
of using the VRA as a shield to justify partisan gerrymandering.  
As a proper reading of Cooper confirms, the Constitution 
prohibits this.  Contrary to the dissent's misreading of Cooper, 
the case establishes why Governor Evers' maps raise serious 
equal protection problems while the Legislature's maps do not.  
Although this court does not consider partisan fairness in 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
33 
 
redistricting, it should be skeptical of VRA claims presented by 
partisan actors who do not even try to provide evidence 
sufficient to survive strict scrutiny.  See Johnson I, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶8 ("[T]he partisan makeup of districts does not 
implicate any justiciable or cognizable right.").  Because 
Governor Evers "intentionally creates . . . majority-minority 
district[s], race is necessarily [his] predominant motivation 
and strict scrutiny is therefore triggered."  League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 517 (2006) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); see 
Wis. Legislature, slip op., at 3 ("[W]e have held that if race 
is the predominant factor motivating the placement of voters in 
or out of a particular district, the State bears the burden of 
showing that the design of that district withstands strict 
scrutiny."  (citing Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463–64)). 
¶124 The Equal Protection Clause may tolerate affirmative 
action to the extent it can be proven necessary to provide equal 
opportunity to a racial minority; however, our color-blind 
Constitution will permit a race-based remedy only if the state 
actor has strong evidence of this necessity.  "In the absence of 
strong 
evidence 
demonstrating 
a 
VRA 
violation 
will 
result . . . [without the consideration of race], this court 
should 'unerringly and unapologetically . . . exalt[] the ideal 
of individual equality without regard to race.'"  Johnson II, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶240 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Robert Redwine, Comment, Constitutional Law:  Racial 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
34 
 
and 
Political 
Gerrymandering——Different 
Problems 
Require 
Different Solutions, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 373, 399 (1996)). 
¶125 The United States Supreme Court requires strong 
evidence of voting rights violations before race-conscious 
remedies may be imposed because "[c]lassifications of citizens 
solely on the basis of race 'are by their very nature odious to 
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality.'"  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).  "They 
threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership 
in the racial group and to incite racial hostility."  Id. 
(citing J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality)).  Race-
based redistricting "reinforces the perception that members of 
the same racial group——regardless of their age, education, 
economic status, or the community in which they live——think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the 
same candidates at the polls."  Id. at 647.  For this reason, 
race-based redistricting is antithetical to individual dignity, 
treating people as nothing more than members of a homogenous 
group by birth rather than by choice.  "[E]ven in the pursuit of 
remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race 
may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, 
suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a 
factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's 
worth or needs."  Id. at 643 (quoting United Jewish Orgs., 430 
U.S. at 173).  Our national ethos rejects such a  practice. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
35 
 
¶126 On March 3, when a majority of this court adopted a 
racial gerrymander based solely on a misapplication of the 
concept of proportional representation,31 it endorsed "[t]he use 
of a mathematical formula" that "tends to sustain the existence 
of ghettos by promoting the notion that political clout is to be 
gained or maintained by marshaling particular racial, ethnic, or 
religious groups in enclaves."  See United Jewish Orgs., 430 
U.S. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  "It suggest[ed] to the 
voter that only a candidate of the same race, religion, or 
ethnic origin can properly represent that voter's interests, and 
that such candidate can be elected only from a district with a 
sufficient minority concentration."  Id.  That premise reflects 
a 
foundational 
error; 
equal 
protection 
rejects 
racially 
proportional representation, which is based on nothing more than 
stereotypes about how people of a particular race vote. 
¶127 Another harm, acknowledged in precedent, is "[t]he 
message 
that 
such 
districting 
sends 
to 
elected 
representatives[.]"  Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.  "When a district 
obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common 
interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely 
                                                 
31 Governor Evers sought to maximize the number of majority-
minority districts, not to achieve proportional representation.  
Nevertheless, the March 3 order ignored basic mathematics and 
pretended proportionality had been achieved.  Johnson II, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ¶238 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("The 
Black voting-age population is between 6.1% and 6.5%, as Chief 
Justice Ziegler explains in her dissent.  Wisconsin has 99 
assembly seats——not 100——so, even taking the high estimate of 
6.5%, the proportional share of Black assembly districts, 
rounded to the nearest whole number, would be six, not seven (99 
× 0.065 = 6.4)."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
36 
 
to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only 
the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a 
whole.  This is altogether antithetical to our system of 
representative democracy."  Id.; see also Holder, 512 U.S. at 
908 (noting the solicitor general had reasoned (improperly), 
"the Hispanic legislators elected from Hispanic districts in 
Dade County would represent, not just the interests of the Dade 
County Hispanics, but the interests of all the Hispanics in the 
State"  (citation omitted)).  "The 'black representative's' 
function" is not "to represent the 'black interest'" but to 
represent her entire constituency.  Holder, 512 U.S. at 907 
(citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650). 
¶128 Race-based redistricting places people in a political 
echo chamber of sorts, encouraging them to see themselves and 
their circumstances as little more than the product of race and 
inhibiting 
their 
interaction 
with 
other 
races. 
 
"Racial 
gerrymandering strikes at the heart of our democratic process, 
undermining the electorate's confidence in its government as 
representative of a cohesive body politic in which all citizens 
are equal before the law."  Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 
575 U.S. 254, 283 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  As Justice 
Douglas wrote in a famous dissent: 
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, 
the multiracial, multireligious communities that our 
Constitution seeks to weld together as one become 
separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to 
religion 
rather 
than 
to 
political 
issues 
are 
generated; 
communities 
seek 
not 
the 
best 
representative but the best racial or religious 
partisan. Since that system is at war with the 
democratic ideal, it should find no footing here. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
37 
 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  "[S]eparate but better off" is as legally and 
morally flawed as "[s]eparate but equal."  Id.  
 
¶129 Another problem underlying race-based redistricting 
sometimes draws little attention:  "[A] purportedly preferential 
race assignment may in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates 
disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries."  
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (quoting United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 
172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part)).  In this case, prominent 
members of minority communities warned that Governor Evers' 
maps, regardless of intent, would harm their communities.  "At a 
minimum," this court must give "careful consideration" to the 
"operation 
of 
any 
racial 
device, 
even 
one 
cloaked 
in 
preferential garb."  United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 173.  
"[I]f any judicial detection of truly benign policies proves 
impossible or excessively crude, that alone might warrant 
invalidating any race-drawn lines."  Id. 
¶130 Had Governor Evers' assembly map stood, Black voter 
influence likely would have suffered.  Spreading Black voters 
across seven districts each with almost exactly 50% BVAP would 
have reduced "black influence" in numerous other districts.  
Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶237 n.44 ("[I]f the number of 
minority-majority districts is maximized, then it necessarily 
follows that black influence is elsewhere minimized, which 
reduces 
the 
number 
of 
districts 
in 
which 
blacks, 
fully 
participating in an integrated process, can hold the balance of 
power."  (quoting In re Apportionment of the State Legislature——
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
38 
 
1992, 486 N.W.2d 639, 654 n.66 (1992)).  For example, if two 
districts both have 100 people of voting age, including 40 Black 
people, and are able to elect Black-preferred candidates, taking 
half the BVAP from one (20 Black people) and swapping them for 
an equal number of White people of voting age in the other (20 
White people) would create a 60% BVAP in one district and a 20% 
BVAP in the other.  Because the two districts were already 
electing Black-preferred candidates, the swap just diminishes 
Black influence in one district, thereby obstructing the Black 
community in that district from electing candidates of its 
choice going forward.  The change produces a net loss for the 
Black community.    
¶131 Even if the VRA would actually require drawing seven 
Black majority districts with almost exactly 50% BVAP each, 
Governor Evers' maps were not a proper remedy.  The entire 
premise of the VRA is that past and present racism suppresses 
minority voting, producing low voter turnout.  For this reason, 
federal courts always draw remedial majority-minority districts 
well above 50%——often in excess of 60%.  See, e.g., Comm. for a 
Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 
F. Supp. 2d 563, 582 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ("60 percent of voting-age 
population is reasonably required to ensure minorities a fair 
opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice."); Hastert v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(noting that a "65% minority population [or 60% minority voting-
age 
population] 
concentration 
[is] 
generally 
regarded 
as 
necessary to ensure minorities a reasonable opportunity to 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
39 
 
control a district"); Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *5 
(recognizing expert testimony that "a minority district requires 
an African–American voting age population of at least 60% to 
guarantee the election of candidates of choice").  With BVAP 
hovering just above 50% in each district, if the districts were 
not already performing, Governor Evers' maps would not have 
resulted in Black people electing candidates of their choice. 
 
¶132 Governor Evers' "maps actually reduce the percentage 
of African-American voters in the relevant districts from their 
existing levels."  Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶107 (Ziegler, 
C.J., dissenting).  That is an odd way of counteracting an 
"allegedly overpowered . . . white majority[.]"  Id.  "The 
remedy is to cure the suppressed voter effect by giving minority 
voters greater voice, not reducing their voice."  Id.  In other 
words, if the districts were not performing, reducing their BVAP 
would exacerbate the disparity. 
 
¶133 The VRA has a long history of being misused in the 
exact way Governor Evers would apply it.  In 2011, Republicans 
in 
North 
Carolina, 
purportedly 
under 
the 
guise 
of 
VRA 
compliance, drew maps in much the same manner Governor Evers 
did.  Michael Kent Curtis, Using the Voting Rights Act to 
Discriminate:  North Carolina's Use of Racial Gerrymanders, Two 
Racial Quotas, Safe Harbors, Shields, and Inoculations to 
Undermine Multiracial Coalitions and Black Political Power, 51 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 421, 421 (2016).  First, they determined the 
BVAP on a statewide basis.  Id.  Then, they drew majority-
minority districts with just enough Black people to ensure 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
40 
 
proportional 
representation. 
 
Id. 
 
As 
one 
example, 
one 
congressional district had a mere 50.7% BVAP.  Id. at 423.  
Critics accused the Republicans of "creatively reading the 
statutory command of the VRA to require more needless and 
wasteful (for black voters) majority-black districts and more 
blacks packed into black district[s.]"  Id. at 425.  Because 
"the candidate[s] preferred by black voters [were] already 
winning by whopping majorities," the creation of majority-
minority districts became a tool for partisan gerrymandering 
instead of VRA compliance.  Id.  Cooper demonstrates the 
illegitimacy of this tactic. 
 
¶134 Because political parties may chip away at minority 
voting 
power 
by 
the 
packing 
and 
cracking 
of 
minority 
communities, all in the name of the VRA, courts must be 
vigilant.  Both packing and cracking demonstrate "how the 
creation of majority-minority districts might dilute minority 
influence in surrounding areas and can lead to an overall 
decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation[.]"  See 
Damion Waymer & Robert L. Heath, Black Voter Dilution, American 
Exceptionalism, and Racial Gerrymandering:  The Paradox of the 
Positive in Political Public Relations, 47 J. Black Studs. 635, 
644 (2016). 
 
¶135 Before this court endorses a particular form of 
affirmative action, it should have an idea of whether that 
remedy will help or harm the intended beneficiary community.  
The dissent errs by making assumptions unsupported by the 
record.  For all we know, adopting any particular number of 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
41 
 
majority-minority districts could dilute the Black vote.  In 
fact, we have good reason to believe Governor Evers' maps would 
do exactly that because a plethora of data suggests White voters 
are not inhibiting the success of Black-preferred candidates.  
Johnson II, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶186 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) 
("Milwaukee's history for at least the last ten years is that of 
crossover voting where white voters help black voters elect 
candidates of their choice.").32  If we were to draw additional 
Black majority districts, what BVAP should we set?  What BVAP 
will assure Black voters sufficient success without wasting 
their votes?  The dissent does not say because it cannot say. 
IV.  THE DISSENT'S NEWFOUND DESIRE TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
¶136 To hear their harangues on the eve of the 
election, one would suppose that the fable of Chicken 
Little was about to become a truth, and that the sky 
was actually falling[.] 
Peleg W. Chandler, The Morals of Freedom 29 (1844). 
 
¶137 The United States Supreme Court summarily reversed 
this court's March 3 decision adopting Governor Evers' state 
legislative maps.  Wis. Legislature, slip op.  Our duty on 
                                                 
32 The dissent acknowledges "Cavalier Johnson just became 
the first Black person elected to be Mayor of Milwaukee . . . .  
In 2020, David Crowley became the first Black person elected to 
be Milwaukee County Executive."  Dissent, ¶207.  The dissent 
dismisses these elections——like others discarded by the dissent—
—as somehow "different."  Although inconveniently undercutting 
the dissent's theory, this evidence is highly probative.  Mayor 
Johnson won by an overwhelming margin, obviously attracting 
numerous White voters.  Latest Election Results, Elections 
Comm'n 
(Apr. 
5, 
2022), 
https://city.milwaukee.gov/election/ElectionInformation/Election
Results (reporting unofficially Johnson won with 71.51% of the 
vote) 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
42 
 
remand is to apply the Court's per curiam opinion.  Although we 
should give the opinion of the United States Supreme Court the 
same respect we expect lower courts in Wisconsin to give our own 
opinions, the dissent instead launches an indignant attack on 
this nation's highest court.33 
 
¶138 The summary reversal occurred for a particular reason.  
As the United States Supreme Court explained, "[s]ummarily 
correcting the error gives the [Wisconsin Supreme Court] 
sufficient time to adopt maps consistent with the timetable for 
Wisconsin's August 9th primary election."  Id. at 2.  Wisconsin 
law authorizes candidates to begin circulating nomination papers 
for that primary on April 15.  Wis. Stat. § 8.15(1).  The per 
curiam 
opinion, 
undoubtedly 
by 
design, 
facilitates 
an 
                                                 
33 Rather than admitting its error, the dissent complains 
the United States Supreme Court created a new legal standard 
despite the Court's straightforward explanation of longstanding 
law.  Dissent, ¶181 ("Could this court simply explain ourselves 
further 
to 
satisfy 
the 
Court's 
newly 
voiced 
standard?"  
(emphasis added)); id., ¶201 ("The U.S. Supreme Court's decision 
appeared to set out a new standard for courts to follow in 
implementing remedial maps, but neither this court nor the 
parties knew that standard at the time of briefing."  (emphasis 
added)).  Of course, the United States Supreme Court does not 
summarily reverse a state supreme court on the basis of anything 
other 
than 
well-established 
law, 
which 
has 
been 
applied 
correctly by many other courts.  The dissent also accuses the 
United States Supreme Court of creating "further fog[]" in an 
area of the law the dissent finds "hazy," citing Justice 
Sotomayor's dissent from the per curiam opinion as support.  
Id., ¶177 (quoting Wis. Legislature, slip op., at 1 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting)).  The dissent rephrases other arguments from 
Justice Sotomayor's dissent, illustrating its own analysis is 
not based on the per curiam opinion or the law on which it is 
grounded.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
43 
 
expeditious resolution of this case so as not to cause 
unnecessary election chaos or confusion. 
 
¶139 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, this court 
cannot take more evidence at this point:  maps are needed 
immediately.  Also contrary to the dissent's ad hominem 
criticisms of the majority, this court has not taken any 
"shortcuts"34 nor has the majority "willfully shut[] its eyes and 
ears to critical information."35  As the majority opinion 
explains, this court has spent an extraordinary amount of 
resources on this case.  The dissent's suggestion to reopen the 
record to let Governor Evers present new evidence, followed by 
each party submitting its own (and perhaps competing) evidence, 
followed by even more briefing, would send this court on an 
"odyssey" even more lamentable than the one the dissent 
decries.36  Unlike Odysseus, however, this court simply cannot 
                                                 
34 Id., ¶161 ("Throughout that first stage in this epic 
journey, we took what some thought to be a shortcut by foregoing 
a full-blown adversarial fact-finding trial to test whether 
race-based bloc voting would trigger the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (VRA).").  The dissent does not disclose the identity of 
"some who thought" this.  As the majority opinion notes, the 
parties stipulated that no discovery "beyond the exchange of 
maps, expert disclosures, and any documents or data that a party 
intends to rely upon or an expert has relied on" was 
anticipated.  Majority op., ¶9.  The parties undertook no 
further discovery.  Id.  Nor did any party at any point prior to 
oral argument formally request or move to permit additional 
discovery.  Id., ¶10. 
35 Dissent, ¶182. 
36 Id., ¶157. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
44 
 
take 10 years to complete its journey.  To quote a more modern 
source, "[t]he clock's run out, time's up, over, blaow."37 
 
¶140 The dissent's suggestion that after receiving the 
United States Supreme Court's decision on March 23, this court 
could receive a substantial amount of new evidence, correctly 
analyze it (after failing to understand the evidence on March 
3), and then correctly apply the law to the facts (after failing 
to understand the law on March 3), all by April 15 is, well, 
incredible.  It took the better part of a year to get to this 
point, and any rushed attempt to create a race-based remedy 
would be inappropriate. 
 
¶141 The dissent's desired path is not only inconsistent 
with the United States Supreme Court's per curiam opinion but 
with the dissenters' prior positions in this litigation.  The 
three members of the dissent have maintained the view during 
this case (over the objection of their colleagues) that each 
party "has one shot or one opportunity[.]"38  Each party had one 
shot to engage in discovery.39  Each party was instructed it had 
only one opportunity to submit a map.  Simultaneously with the 
release of this decision, the dissenters vote to deny all 
parties 
an 
opportunity 
to 
submit 
new 
congressional 
maps 
maximizing core retention——as they did in January.  (The present 
dissenters did allow Governor Evers, however, to submit new maps 
with substantive changes.)  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶218 
                                                 
37 Eminem, Lose Yourself (2002). 
38 Id. 
39 Majority op., ¶9. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
45 
 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("The Congressmen asked 
to submit a modified map, but the same majority that now adopts 
the Governor's modified maps denied the Congressmen this 
opportunity.").   
 
¶142 The dissenters now seem to project their own actions 
onto the majority, claiming "the majority of this court 
continues to bar the submission of any additional evidence from 
the parties."40  Respectfully, it was not this majority that 
established the one shot rule but a majority that included all 
three dissenters——over the objection of three members of this 
majority.  We "continue[]" to bar nothing. 
 
¶143 As a matter of due process, "[t]he Governor's request 
for special dispensation should fare no better than that of the 
other parties who have tried to evade the Court's scheduling 
order with out-of-time submissions."41  "Permitting the Governor 
to submit new evidence is prejudicial to other parties and the 
Wisconsin voters.  It imposes costs on those other parties and 
unnecessarily prolongs these proceedings."42 
 
¶144 The chance that Governor Evers could even present new 
evidence sufficient to justify his racial gerrymander is 
questionable——despite summary reversal, lessons do not appear to 
have been learned.  In his unsolicited motion to supplement the 
record, Governor Evers indicated his new expert relied on 
truncated 
data, 
just 
like 
other 
experts 
in 
this 
case.  
                                                 
40 Dissent, ¶189 n.23 (emphasis added). 
41 Legislature's Response Letter Br. at 5. 
42 Id. at 6. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
46 
 
Specifically, he said his expert excluded races that were 
"either not competitive or were uncontested or did not feature 
white candidates running against Black candidates."43  Such 
selectivity is problematic because a performing majority-
minority district will have an incumbent who inevitably runs in 
reelections that are not competitive or are uncontested or do 
not feature White candidates.  To a degree, that is exactly what 
a VRA remedy is designed to achieve.44  See Johnson, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ¶¶189–93 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (summarizing 
many elections arbitrarily excluded in expert reports). 
 
¶145 In other cases involving elections, the dissenters 
demurred to taking any action that had the potential to disrupt 
an election.  Any procedural off-ramp is the winning argument.  
It happened just a few weeks ago.  See Teigen v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, No. 2022AP91, unpublished order (Wis. Jan. 28, 2022).  
And it happened many times before then.  Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 
                                                 
43 Governor Tony Evers' Motion to Supplement the Record at 
5. 
44 Governor Evers also told this court in his motion not to 
consider the election of Earnell Lucas, a Black man, as 
Milwaukee County Sheriff.  Id. at 7.  He cites an earlier brief 
by BLOC as justification, which stated, "this contest was unique 
because of the abnormal level of white crossover voting due to 
the 
association 
of 
the 
white 
candidate, 
Schmidt, 
with 
controversial former sheriff David Clarke."  BLOC's Br. at 29.  
Sheriff Clarke, also a Black man, was elected four times before 
retiring from the position.  There is no logical explanation for 
why this court would disregard a data point related to White 
crossover voting on the theory that the level of White crossover 
voting was abnormally high.  Again, this selectivity serves only 
to skew the evidence.  Of course when numerous counterexamples 
are discarded, Milwaukee appears to have racial bloc voting, but 
pseudo-scientific 
data 
manipulation 
cannot 
survive 
strict 
scrutiny. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
47 
 
91, ¶3, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568 (applying laches to 
dispose of 3 of 4 election challenges); id., ¶140 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Once again, the majority of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court wields the discretionary doctrine of 
laches as a mechanism to avoid answering questions of law the 
people of Wisconsin elected us to decide.  Although nothing in 
the law compels its application, this majority routinely hides 
behind laches in election law cases no matter when a party 
asserts its claims."); Hawkins v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2020 WI 
75, ¶10, 393 Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877 (per curiam) ("Even if 
we would ultimately determine that the petitioners' claims are 
meritorious, given their delay in asserting their rights, we 
would be unable to provide meaningful relief without completely 
upsetting the election."); id., ¶85 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) ("Ironically, the majority in this case adopts the 
mantra of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, caving to its 
fearmongering invocation of 'chaos' should the court dare to 
right this wrong.").  This time, the dissenters would readily 
invite chaos and disrupt an election, the per curiam opinion of 
the United States Supreme Court notwithstanding.  One wonders 
why. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
¶146 [T]here is good reason for state and federal 
officials 
with 
responsibilities 
related 
to 
redistricting, 
as 
well 
as 
reviewing 
courts, 
to 
recognize that explicit race-based districting embarks 
us on a most dangerous course.  It is necessary to 
bear in mind that redistricting must comply with the 
overriding demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1031. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
48 
 
¶147 The dissent fails to understand the dangerous voyage 
on which it would embark.  As a California judge recently wrote, 
"[w]hen faced with a problem, the immediate temptation is to 
employ the most obvious and direct solution.  In most cases, it 
isn't even fair to call this impulse a 'temptation.'  It's just 
a normal and sound approach to life."  Crest v. Padilla, No. 20 
STCV 37513, unpublished slip op., at 1 (L.A. Cnty. Superior 
Ct. Apr. 1, 2022).  Although the dissent acknowledges a lack of 
evidence sufficient to justify affirmative action,45 it still 
senses the problem exists, and it deeply wants to address this 
uneasy feeling head-on.  In many other contexts, a head-on 
approach would be ideal, "[b]ut sometimes there are constraints 
which call for additional care.  This is one of those times."  
Id.; see also id. at 2 ("The difficulty is that the Legislature 
is thinking in group terms.  But the California Constitution 
protects the right of individuals to equal treatment.  Before 
the Legislature may require that members of one group be given 
certain board seats, it must first try to create neutral 
conditions under which qualified individuals from any group may 
succeed."). 
¶148 "There's always a siren, singing you to shipwreck."  
Caitlin R. Kieran, The Drowning Girl 101 (2012).  In this case, 
the dissent responds to the smooth-sounding siren of racial 
classifications, a siren whose danger often becomes apparent 
only upon close examination.  "[I]f we're lucky we're Odysseus 
                                                 
45 Dissent, ¶196 ("[W]e cannot definitively say the Gingles 
preconditions are satisfied."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
49 
 
tied up to the ship's mast, hearing the song with perfect 
clarity, but ferried to safety by a crew whose ears have been 
plugged with beeswax.  If we're not at all lucky, we're another 
sort of sailor stepping off the deck to drown in the sea."  Id.  
At least for now, this court safely tethers its opinion to the 
constitutional command of color-blindness. 
¶149 Based on the record before this court, we have an 
obligation to proceed in a color-blind manner.  The Constitution 
compels it.  See generally Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and 
the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71 (2013); 
see also Appendix to the Pennsylvania Legislative Record XCIX 
(1867) (statement of Rep. John Mann), as quoted in Randy E. 
Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 333 (2021) ("I do not see how it is 
possible for human wisdom to frame a more perfect amendment to 
the 
Constitution 
of 
the 
United 
States 
than 
this 
section. . . .  [I]t aims to make every court in the United 
States what justice is represented to be, blind to the personal 
standing of those who come before it.  Its adoption will 
prohibit any judge in any State from looking at . . . the color 
of the skin, of any person coming before him."  (emphasis 
added)).  The only race neutral maps are the Legislature's.  I 
therefore join the majority opinion in adopting them. 
¶150 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this concurrence. 
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
1 
 
¶151 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  The United States 
Supreme Court has determined that in adopting remedial maps, 
this court needed to conduct a detailed, fact-specific Voting 
Rights 
Act 
(VRA) 
analysis——in 
effect, 
requiring 
a 
full 
adjudication of a VRA claim.  We are obligated, the Court said, 
to examine the record and determine "whether a race-neutral 
alternative that did not add a seventh majority-black district 
would deny black voters equal political opportunity."  Wis. 
Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct 1245,    , 2022 
WL 851720, at *4 (2022) (per curiam).  Absent such evidence, the 
Court held, a race-conscious remedy may not be employed.1  Id. 
¶152 As our previous opinion expressed, a majority of this 
court did not understand itself to be adjudicating a VRA claim.  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶41 n.24, 400 
                                                 
1 Members of the United States Supreme Court have commented 
that understanding and applying the requirements of the VRA to 
redistricting 
is 
a 
challenging 
and 
confusing 
enterprise.  
Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 882 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring) (order granting stay) (stating "the Court's case law 
in this area is notoriously unclear and confusing"); id. at 883 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting "considerable disagreement 
and uncertainty regarding the nature and contours of a vote 
dilution claim").  This is made doubly difficult because dangers 
abound no matter which direction one turns.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits race-motivated 
actions in most circumstances.  Maps where voters are sorted on 
the basis of race "are by their very nature odious."  Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting another source).  Yet 
the VRA——justified under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment——has 
been held to require race-motivated district drawing under 
certain circumstances.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 308 (1966); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1470 
(2017).  Applying these standards is made more problematic when, 
following the failure of the political process, a court is the 
map-drawer in the first instance (as is the case here).  The 
briefing in this case reflected this considerable confusion. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402.  Had we understood our task this 
way, this court likely would have taken a different approach to 
this litigation.  Our process of choosing from among a discrete 
group of proposals——a method recommended by several parties——was 
a poor vehicle for conducting the kind of VRA analysis the 
Supreme Court indicates we should have done.  We did not 
approach record-development with an eye toward resolving factual 
disputes, making intensely localized factual findings, or 
receiving an adversarial, district-by-district analysis of every 
proposal.  In other words, we did not conduct the sort of fact-
specific inquiry and analysis that one sees in federal VRA cases 
because we did not view our role as adjudicating a full-blown 
VRA claim.  To be sure, we attempted to comply with all relevant 
laws——much as a legislature drawing maps in the first instance 
would——and therefore sought input and briefing.  But we 
anticipated further litigation involving a fully developed Equal 
Protection or VRA claim could, and likely would, follow.2 
                                                 
2 Our opinion explained: 
To be clear, this case does not involve a claim under 
the Equal Protection Clause or VRA.  Rather, as 
remedial map-drawers, we strive to act in compliance 
with the Constitution and applicable federal laws 
necessarily relying on the more limited record before 
us.  A standard VRA claim is brought after the 
adoption of new districts.  Such a claim would proceed 
much differently, requiring a fully developed factual 
record and detailed findings regarding the performance 
of specific districts. 
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶41 n.24, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
3 
 
¶153 With this in view, complying with the directive of the 
United States Supreme Court at this stage of the proceedings 
raises some difficult challenges.  Most notably, our record is, 
at best, incomplete.  One solution could be to develop a fuller 
record, make factual findings, and adjudicate a VRA claim with a 
firmer factual foundation.  But the timing does not work.  It 
would undoubtedly require delaying statutory deadlines and 
otherwise disrupting the administration of the fall elections.  
The window of opportunity to conduct a fresh trial with new 
evidence, new briefing, and potentially new arguments is well 
past.  Supplementing the record would pose the same logistical 
challenges.  For better or worse, the only reasonable course I 
see is selecting a map based on the record we have. 
¶154 An additional difficulty with the path the Supreme 
Court tells us to pursue is determining what "race-neutral 
alternative" should serve as the baseline from which to evaluate 
whether the VRA requires a race-conscious remedial alteration.  
We cannot use the 2011 maps enacted into law.  Those are now 
unconstitutionally malapportioned and contained at least some 
race-conscious districts.  See Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov. 
Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 854-58 (E.D. Wis. 
2012).  We could construct one ourselves or with the assistance 
of an expert, but time and our institutional limitations make 
that unrealistic at this juncture.  The remaining option is to 
choose one of the proposed maps we received as the baseline.  
Only one proposal was represented as race-neutral in its 
construction:  the maps submitted by the Legislature. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
4 
 
¶155 Therefore, as I understand our charge, the United 
States Supreme Court asks us to start with a baseline race-
neutral map——the Legislature's proposal constituting our only 
feasible option.  Then we must determine whether that map 
contains a VRA violation.  If a violation exists, a race-
conscious 
remedy 
may 
be 
crafted. 
 
If 
no 
violation 
is 
established, race-conscious alterations to district lines are 
impermissible.  As the majority explains, the record, such as it 
is, does not sufficiently support the conclusion that the 
Legislature's maps violate the VRA.  Perhaps a court deciding a 
VRA challenge on a more complete record would reach a different 
result.  But I cannot conclude a violation is established based 
on the record we have before us.  That means that in light of 
the Supreme Court's clarified instructions, the Legislature's 
state senate and state assembly maps are the only legally 
compliant maps we received. 
¶156 For these reasons, I join the majority opinion. 
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶157 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  This case has 
been nothing short of an odyssey——a long wandering marked by 
many changes in fortune.  Like all odysseys, the travelers (this 
court) have had to make several navigational decisions along the 
way; unfortunately, we have taken numerous wrong turns.  The sum 
total of all that misdirection now leads us to the legally 
unacceptable maps submitted by the Legislature. 
¶158 Our initial miscalculation was embarking on this 
journey in the first place, when a majority of this court 
granted the petitioners' original action petition.  I joined the 
dissent from that grant because of the numerous "reasons for 
preferring a federal forum," not least of which was that this 
court had "no experience in drawing district maps."  Johnson v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order 
at 16, 18 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2021, amended Sept. 24, 2021) (Dallet, 
J., dissenting). 
¶159 Once the political process reached an impasse——the 
legislature failing to override the governor's veto of its 
proposed maps——the court wandered astray following the sirens' 
call of "least change."  Although rhetorically appealing, this 
"least change" approach served only to entrench the prior——and 
blatantly partisan——district maps.  I once again joined the 
dissent 
as 
"least 
change" 
had 
"potentially 
devastating 
consequences 
for 
representative 
government 
in 
Wisconsin."  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶88, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
2 
 
¶160 The anticipated pitfalls of "least change" came to 
fruition throughout this long trip as it became apparent that it 
was "unmoored from any legal requirement for redistricting" and 
"could 
not 
offer 
an 
explanation 
for 
the 
tradeoffs 
and 
discretionary decisions that are intrinsic to map-drawing."  
Johnson 
v. 
Wis. 
Elections 
Comm'n, 
2022 
WI 
14, 
¶58-59, 
400 Wis. 2d 626, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring).  Although "least change" set our sails in the wrong 
direction, in our sojourn to adopt maps acceptable for a non-
political court, we eventually made landfall on the Governor's 
maps, which adhered best to that metric. 
¶161 Throughout that first stage in this epic journey, we 
took what some thought to be a shortcut by foregoing a full-
blown adversarial fact-finding trial to test whether race-based 
bloc voting would trigger the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).1  
But rather than take us to the oasis and end our odyssey, the 
supposed shortcut only led us to more peril:  a collision at the 
shores of the U.S. Supreme Court's emergency docket.  Following 
an unprecedented summary reversal we find ourselves again 
adrift. 
¶162 In the wake of the Court's reversal, we face another 
choice 
of 
diverging 
courses 
forward:  (1) invite 
further 
briefing and fact finding on the unsettled VRA questions; 
(2) invite an expert or the parties to submit redrawn, race-
neutral maps for the Milwaukee area as Milwaukee includes the 
only race-based districts; (3) invite an expert or the parties 
                                                 
1 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
3 
 
to submit a whole new, reliably-race-neutral map; or (4) choose 
another map created by the same flawed process as the Governor's 
maps.  A majority of this court sets sail along option 4——the 
Legislature's maps——sending us careening over the waterfall. 
¶163 We are careening over the waterfall because the 
Legislature's maps fare no better than the Governor's under the 
U.S. Supreme Court's rationale.  If, according to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Governor's addition of a Milwaukee-area 
majority-minority district evinces a disqualifying consideration 
of race, then the Legislature's removal of a Milwaukee-area 
majority-minority district reveals an equally suspect, if not 
more egregious, sign of race-based line drawing.  In addition, 
if a further-developed record is required to definitively 
determine whether the Governor's seventh majority Black district 
is required then a further-developed record is also required to 
definitively determine that the Legislature's removal of a 
majority-minority district does not violate federal law.  The 
Court indicated that in a case like this where the court sits as 
the map-drawer in the first instance, the court, rather than the 
parties, are responsible for showing that the number of 
majority-minority districts required by the VRA constitutes the 
narrowly 
tailored 
remedy 
allowed 
under 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment's 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause.2 
 
In 
choosing 
the 
Legislature's maps the majority repeats this court's reversible 
mistake by again failing to implement fact-finding procedures 
                                                 
2 U.S. Const. art. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
4 
 
conducive to addressing the relevant issues under both the VRA 
and the Equal Protection Clause. 
¶164 The majority's reversible error begins with its 
willful silence on Milwaukee's history of segregation and racial 
disparity.  I start with that history because it is vital to 
appreciating why both the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA 
drive this controversy.  I then turn from how that history of 
segregation and racial disparity interacts with federal anti-
discrimination law to how that interaction should inform our 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision.  Namely, that 
response must include a process to develop the record so we can 
say with certainty how many majority-minority districts the VRA 
requires.  Yet that is not the majority's response at all, and 
so I conclude by explaining how, without that process, the 
Legislature's maps must also fail. 
I.  MILWAUKEE'S HISTORY OF RACIAL SEGREGATION AND DISPARITY AND 
FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
A.  A History of Racial Segregation and Disparities 
¶165 From the outset, the crux of this redistricting 
controversy has been the long history of racial discrimination 
in and around Milwaukee that perpetuates the current racial 
disparities 
affecting 
Milwaukee's 
minority 
communities——
particularly its Black communities.3  The 2020 census data shows 
                                                 
3 The statistics and claims set out in this discussion were 
presented 
in 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
(and 
former 
Duke 
University) Professor David Canon's expert report.  See App. to 
Merits Br. of Intervenor-Pet'rs Black Leaders Organizing for 
Communities et al. (BLOC) (Dec. 15, 2021). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
5 
 
that people who identify as Black or African American, either 
alone or in combination with other races or ethnicities, make up 
7.7 percent of Wisconsin's population.  See U.S. Census Bureau, 
Wisconsin State Profile, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/
state-by-state/wisconsin-population-change-between-census-
decade.html.  Milwaukee County contains by far the highest 
concentration 
of 
Black 
residents 
at 
28.7 
percent. 
 
Id.  
Shamefully, Wisconsin routinely ranks as one of the most 
racially disparate states in terms of housing, incarceration, 
education, income, and even infant mortality rates between Black 
and White residents. 
¶166 Those disparities result, in part, from Milwaukee's 
egregious history of race-based housing discrimination.  Dating 
back to at least the 1930s, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) created color-coded "residential security" maps that 
identified neighborhoods by their investment risk level.4  A 
neighborhood coded "red" denoted the highest risk category, 
meaning residents in red neighborhoods could almost never obtain 
mortgages.  This practice, referred to as "redlining," was 
explicitly tied to race.  The HOLC would give higher rankings to 
neighborhoods 
that 
excluded 
racial 
minorities 
through 
restrictive covenants——private contractual agreements that ran 
with the land and prohibited future property owners from selling 
                                                 
4 See Leah Foltman & Malia Jones, Univ. of Wis. Applied 
Population 
Lab, 
How 
Redlining 
Continues 
to 
Shape 
Racial 
Segregation 
in 
Milwaukee, 
WisContext 
(Feb. 
28, 
2019), 
https://www.wiscontext.org/how-redlining-continues-shape-racial-
segregation-milwaukee. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
6 
 
or leasing property to non-Caucasian people.  HOLC coded 
neighborhoods with racial minorities "red" and therefore members 
of those neighborhoods were blocked from financing necessary for 
homeownership.  By the 1940s, 16 of the 18 Milwaukee County 
suburbs used racially restrictive covenants to exclude Black 
residents which segregated Milwaukee's Black population in 
concentrated geographic areas.5  Though in 1948 Shelley v. 
Kraemer6 
declared 
racially 
restrictive 
covenants 
unconstitutional, they continued to be used and recorded until 
further banned by the 1968 Fair Housing Act.7 
¶167 The 
effects 
of 
this 
abhorrent 
history 
persist; 
Milwaukee remains the most racially segregated city in the 
nation and has the seventh-lowest rate of Black homeownership.8  
As recently as 2015, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development settled a case of racial redlining in Milwaukee 
against Associated Bank (the largest such settlement to that 
date). 
                                                 
5 See Lois M. Quinn, Racially Restrictive Covenants:  The 
Making of All-White Suburbs in Milwaukee County (1979). 
6 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
7 Although banned, many restrictive covenants remained on 
the books as an obvious signal to minority populations that they 
were not welcome in White neighborhoods, thus perpetuating the 
history of segregation.  See Quinn, supra note 5.  Some racially 
restrictive covenants remain on the books today.  Debbi Conrad, 
Do You Have a Racist Deed?, Wis. Real Est. Mag., Mar. 2021, 
at 7, https://www.wra.org/WREM/Mar21/RacistDeed/. 
8 Elissa Suh, Black Homeownership in the U.S., Policygenius 
(Dec. 1, 2020), 
https://www.policygenius.com/mortgages/black-
homeownership-rates/#black-homeownership-stats-by-metro-area. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
7 
 
¶168 Racial disparities in education also persist.  Many of 
Milwaukee's schools are "hypersegregated," meaning students of 
color make up at least 90 percent of enrollment.  In fact, the 
number of Black students in Milwaukee County that attend a 
hypersegregated school has been increasing in recent years, 
culminating 
in 
an 
almost 
identical 
percentage 
currently 
attending hypersegregated schools as did in 1965.9  This 
contributes to Wisconsin's high racial disparities in education.  
We have the largest gap between high school graduation rates for 
Black students (71.4 percent) and White students (93.8 percent) 
of any state.10 
¶169 As can be expected, such disparities in education lead 
to disparities in employment.  The unemployment rate for Black 
Wisconsinites in 2020 was almost three times that of White 
Wisconsinites.11  Wisconsin has the largest gap in median 
household income and the highest disparity in the poverty rate 
between Black and White residents in the entire country.  Black 
                                                 
9 Marc V. Levine, Univ. of Wis.-Milwaukee Ctr. for Econ. 
Dev., The State of Black Milwaukee in National Perspective:  
Racial Inequality in the Nation's 50 Largest Metropolitan Areas.  
In 65 Charts and Tables 72 (2020).  Milwaukee has the highest 
percentage of Black students attending hypersegregated schools 
of any major metropolitan area at over 70 percent. 
10 National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of 
Data, Table 1:  Public High School 4-Year Adjusted Cohort 
Graduation 
Rate 
(ACGR), 
by 
Race/Ethnicity 
and 
Selected 
Demographic Characteristics: School Year 2018-19, https://nces.e
d.gov/ccd/tables/ACGR_RE_and_characteristics_2018-19.asp. 
11 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics:  Employment status of 
the civilian noninstitutional population by sex, race, Hispanic 
or Latino ethnicity, and intermediate age, 2020 annual averages, 
https://www.bls.gov/lau/ex14tables.htm. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
8 
 
residents see disproportionately high eviction rates which are 
tied to a higher homeless population. 
¶170 Relatedly, Milwaukee's Black residents also experience 
discrepancies in healthcare and life expectancy.  Wisconsin has 
the highest infant mortality rate in the country for Black 
infants while the White infant mortality rate hovers just below 
the national average.12  Milwaukee County also showed racial 
disparities in the impact of COVID-19 with minorities seeing 
higher rates of infection, hospitalization and death.13 
¶171 Racial disparities in our criminal justice system are 
similarly abominable.  Wisconsin incarcerates Black residents at 
the highest rate in the nation——2,742 per 100,000 Black 
residents are in prison versus the national average of 1,240 per 
100,000 Black residents.  Our incarceration rate of Black 
residents is 11.9 times that of White residents.  And while 7.7 
percent of Wisconsin's population identifies as Black, Black 
residents make up an egregiously disproportionate 42 percent of 
our prison population. 14 
                                                 
12 Colin Gordon, Univ. of Iowa & Iowa Pol'y Project, Race in 
the Heartland:  Equity, Opportunity, and Public Policy in the 
Midwest 
14 
(2019) 
https://files.epi.org/uploads/Race-in-the-
Midwest-FINAL-Interactive-1.pdf. 
13 Wis. Dep't of Health Servs., COVID-19:  Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities, https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/disparities.
htm (last updated Jan. 20, 2022). 
14 See Ashley Nellis, The Sent'g Project, The Color of 
Justice:  Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons 6-7, 10, 
20 (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publicatio
ns/the-color-of-justice-2016-report/. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
9 
 
¶172 This history of segregation and racial disparity in 
Milwaukee restricts Black communities from the opportunity to 
fully 
participate 
in 
the 
political 
process. 
 
In 
the 
redistricting context, racial gerrymandering is discussed in 
terms of packing and cracking voters.  Packing occurs when the 
map lines place large numbers of one racial minority into few 
districts so that they might have as few representatives as 
possible.  Cracking occurs when the map lines spread small 
numbers of the remaining minority population across many 
districts so that their influence within those districts is 
minimal.  This is often achieved by drawing districts in funny 
shapes that wind between neighborhoods to pick up the high 
number of minority people required to pack districts.  In 
Milwaukee, however, such obvious racial gerrymandering is not 
needed; historical racial segregation already packs Black 
communities into concentrated neighborhoods that require little 
in the way of creative lines to dilute their influence at the 
voting booth.  I will refer to this as a "historical racial 
gerrymander." 
B.  Federal Anti-Discrimination Law 
¶173 The VRA's application in redistricting is designed to 
remedy precisely these kinds of historical wrongs——those that 
create current barriers to democratic participation.  Instead of 
allowing the past unconstitutional practices of redlining and 
racially restrictive covenanting to continue limiting Black 
people's opportunity to participate in our democracy, the VRA 
establishes that it is a sufficiently compelling government 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
10 
 
interest to draw districts that counteract the historical racial 
gerrymander.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 595 
U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct 1245, 1248 (2022) (per curiam). 
¶174 We must, of course, also consider the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.  And in doing so, it is 
impossible to ignore the 180-degree turn from that clause's 
purpose to how it has been wielded in this case.  Ratified 
in 1868 after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment demands 
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."  Since Brown v. Board of 
Education,15 the Equal Protection Clause has been invoked to 
desegregate this country, protect the voting rights of its 
citizens, and fight discrimination in its many forms. 
¶175 More recently, the Equal Protection Clause has been 
turned on its head and used, not to fight against the constant 
pull of our collective historical failing toward the promise of 
a better future, but to bar our government's ability to remedy 
past mistakes.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  The majority 
opinion perfectly captures this reversal by relying on cases 
pontificating that "[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial 
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions," and 
that "[r]ace-based assignments . . . embody stereotypes that 
treat individuals as the product of their race[.]"  Majority 
op., ¶24 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993), and 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995)).  This argument 
                                                 
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
11 
 
is nothing short of gaslighting, seemingly denying Milwaukee's 
history of purposeful racial segregation.  It was unrelenting 
overt racial discrimination that balkanized Milwaukee into 
"competing racial factions" and reduced Black individuals to a 
"product of their race."  The fault and responsibility to remedy 
this systemic segregation lies not with Milwaukee's residents 
but instead with the government and the society that perpetuated 
racial redlining and restrictive covenants.  Those practices 
shaped Milwaukee and that history of discrimination cannot be 
undone by force of will alone. 
¶176 The Milwaukee area perfectly demonstrates why the 
VRA's race-conscious remedy is often needed.  Segregation of 
minority communities does not happen accidentally.  If this 
country were anywhere close to living up to the "goal of a 
political system in which race no longer matters," then maybe we 
could apply the promise of Equal Protection in a race-blind 
manner.  See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.  But the overwhelming 
evidence shows that we have not lived up to that goal.  As such, 
a 
race-blind 
and 
effects-blind 
application 
of 
the 
Equal 
Protection Clause has become a sword against progress wielded by 
majority groups who fear giving away too much of their 
accumulated power.  I fervently hope it will regain its place as 
a shield against harmful discriminatory action. 
II.  THE CORRECT RESPONSE:  DEVELOP THE RECORD 
¶177 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, we erred in our 
prior decision by misapplying the test in Cooper v. Harris that 
calls for a "strong basis in evidence" in order to determine 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
12 
 
whether "good reason" existed to believe the VRA required seven 
Black majority districts.  Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 142 S Ct at 1249–50 (citing Cooper v. Harris, 581 
U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2017)).  The Court directs that we 
are to ask "whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add 
a seventh majority-black district would deny black voters equal 
political opportunity."  Id. at 1250-51.  Yet in attempting to 
correct our course through a "hazy at best" sea of federal law, 
id. at 1251 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), the Court has only 
further fogged how a court in this posture (drawing the map in 
the first instance) should balance the VRA and the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
¶178 Prior to the Court's decision, an Equal Protection 
analysis began with whether "race was the predominant factor 
motivating the [map-drawer]'s decision to place a significant 
number of voters within or without a particular district.  That 
entails demonstrating that the [map-drawer] 'subordinated' other 
factors——compactness, 
respect 
for 
political 
subdivisions, 
partisan advantage, what have you——to 'racial considerations.'"  
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463-64.  Yet, the Court's opinion did not 
first 
analyze 
whether 
race 
was 
the 
"predominant 
factor" 
motivating this court's districting decisions.  Instead, it 
appeared that the Court took this court's limited analysis 
regarding the VRA, meant only to ensure the least-change map did 
not violate that law, as evidence that race——not least change——
predominated our choice of maps.  Our March 3 opinion never 
professed as much. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
13 
 
¶179 While the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion said it was 
unclear whether this court viewed itself or the Governor as the 
map-drawer, we plainly stated that the court itself was the map-
drawer.  See Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶10 ("As a map-drawer, we 
understand our duty is to determine whether there are 'good 
reasons' 
to 
believe 
the 
VRA 
requires 
a 
seven-district 
configuration.").16  The lack of clarity the Court points to 
actually relates to an unsettled point of Equal Protection 
jurisprudence:  when a court adopts a party-submitted map, whose 
motivation is being analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause, 
the court's or the party's? 
¶180 Despite our clear declaration that "least change" 
predominated our choice of maps, and despite the purported 
purpose of "least change" as a neutral criterion to shed 
ourselves of the political baggage that would be inherent in 
party-drawn 
maps, 
the 
Court 
nonetheless 
transposed 
the 
Governor's motivations onto this court.  We are left to conclude 
that the motivations of the party submitting the map are the 
relevant motivations we must analyze going forward.  This court 
can no longer hide behind a "least change" gloss to ignore a 
party's ulterior motives. 
                                                 
16 Additionally, 
as 
the 
map-drawer 
we 
considered 
all 
information and analysis from the record collectively and were 
not limited to the Governor's admittedly scant VRA analysis.  
Thus, when analyzing the Gingles preconditions and Senate 
factors, we relied largely on the BLOC interveners' more 
thorough 
expert 
analyses——analyses 
the 
Governor 
explicitly 
adopted in most respects. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
14 
 
¶181 The U.S. Supreme Court left us with other unanswered 
questions: 
 Is the court required to fully address a VRA challenge when 
selecting a purportedly race-neutral map or have we been 
given carte blanche to ignore federal law? 
 Which race-neutral configuration was the court to use when 
analyzing the Governor’s maps given the myriad potential 
"race-neutral" district configurations in Milwaukee? 
 How do we proceed if the process we adopted prevented the 
parties from sufficiently testing the evidence necessary 
for a VRA determination? 
 Could this court simply explain ourselves further to 
satisfy the Court's newly voiced standard? 
In light of these uncertainties, and in order to avoid further 
reversible error, I believe we must implement one of the first 
three options set out above:  (1) invite further briefing and 
fact finding on the unsettled VRA questions; (2) invite an 
expert or the parties to submit redrawn, race-neutral maps for 
the Milwaukee area; or (3) invite an expert or the parties to 
submit a whole new, reliably-race-neutral map. 
¶182 The second and third options appear to be non-starters 
at this stage as this court has not commissioned a neutral map-
drawer or allowed the parties to submit new maps in accordance 
with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision.  As for the first 
option, which the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly invited, a 
majority of this court continues to refuse procedures to develop 
the record, willfully shutting its eyes and ears to critical 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
15 
 
information.  See Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 
S. Ct at 1251 ("On remand, the court is free to take additional 
evidence if it prefers to reconsider the Governor's maps rather 
than choose from among the other submissions.").  Conveniently, 
that same majority now points to the very insufficiency of 
information it perpetuates as a party's failure to carry its 
burden 
of 
proof.17 
 
However, 
it 
is 
not 
the 
parties' 
responsibility to implement fair, legal remedial maps——it's 
ours. 
¶183 The majority opinion attempts to shift the blame by 
noting that the parties stipulated through their joint discovery 
plan that they did not anticipate discovery "beyond the exchange 
of maps, expert disclosures, and any documents or data that a 
party intends to rely upon or an expert has relied upon."  But 
we had the authority, indeed the responsibility, to direct 
further discovery or examination of expert witnesses.  This 
court's initial reliance on the joint discovery plan was guided 
by the court's "least change" directive, which failed to account 
for the full and definitive Equal Protection or VRA inquiry the 
U.S. Supreme Court now demands.  This persistent imprudence in 
                                                 
17 See majority op., ¶32 ("[T]he Governor failed to present 
evidence that a race-based remedy was necessary under the 
VRA."); id., ¶57 ("On this record, we cannot agree with the 
Governor and BLOC that the Legislature's race-neutral proposal 
would violate the VRA."); id., ¶58 n.11 ("Under the record as it 
currently exists, we cannot conclude the Gingles prerequisites 
are satisfied."); id., ¶48 ("No party argued and no evidence was 
provided demonstrating that the Legislature's maps were, in 
fact, not race neutral."); id., ¶73 ("[W]e conclude that 
insufficient evidence is presented to justify drawing state 
legislative districts on the basis of race."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
16 
 
developing a record has now led us to a legally untenable 
outcome at odds with the Court's directive.  The Equal 
Protection 
and 
VRA 
claims 
usually 
litigated 
after 
the 
implementation of a remedial map must now be fully adjudicated 
as part of this decision——an impossible task on this record. 
¶184 Building that record requires work because remedial 
redistricting is complicated.  It requires a wealth of facts 
collected through discovery, sworn affidavits, and examination 
and cross-examination of witnesses and experts.  Fairness 
requires that we test every major change made in a districting 
map 
to 
verify 
that 
its 
motivations 
comport 
with 
those 
appropriate for a non-partisan court to adopt.18  This is why 
most remedial redistricting courts hold multi-day trials and 
implement court-drawn maps rather than maps selected from party 
submissions.  See, e.g., Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't 
Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012); 
Baumgart v. Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471 (E.D. 
Wis. May 30, 2002) (per curiam).  This court, in its hubris and 
desire to short-circuit a complicated process, thought it knew 
                                                 
18 Although 
this 
court 
has 
disclaimed 
a 
"fair 
maps" 
requirement as it relates to partisan gerrymandering by the 
legislature, it should be beyond dispute that we, as a non-
partisan court, cannot implement a map with blatantly partisan 
motivations.  See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, 
¶93, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Dallet, J., dissenting).  
A non-partisan judiciary goes to the very core of democracy and 
to established principles of separation of powers.  Now that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the motivations of the 
party 
whose 
map 
we 
adopt——partisan 
or 
otherwise——are 
superimposed onto this court, maintaining impartiality in 
selecting a party-drawn maps requires heightened attention to 
the reason behind every change in a district's boundaries. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
17 
 
better.  By both adopting a process that aimed to adopt a party-
submitted map despite glaring partisan motivations and limiting 
the arguments to appellate-style briefs, written expert reports, 
and oral presentation to this court, we received too thin a 
record on which to make determinations with absolute certainty. 
¶185 But we did not have to do it this way, as dissenters 
made clear at every point in our voyage.  This court could have 
arranged for proper fact finding and examination of expert 
witnesses, either in front of all of the Justices or through a 
referee (sometimes referred to as a Special Master) under Wis. 
Stat. § 751.09.  Now, following the U.S Supreme Court's 
reasoning in reversing our prior decision, one would think that 
we have no choice but to actually correct course and develop an 
appropriate record.  Yet the majority is content to make the 
same two procedural mistakes.  It bars proper fact finding and 
limits itself to our current pool of party-submitted, partisan-
motivated maps rather than adopting a process by which we could 
create a judicially appropriate map.19  The result, as the next 
                                                 
19 Without "least change" to shield the court from party 
motives, all party maps——with the possible exception of the 
Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists' maps——fail to meet a 
standard that requires both race-neutrality (as is required 
under the majority's reasoning) and partisan-neutrality (as is 
required by the non-partisan nature of this court).  But the 
majority continues to limit itself to the parties' previously 
submitted maps, concluding that "the Legislature's maps are 
superior to the available alternatives."  Majority op., ¶21.  It 
should go without saying, however, that a less illegal map is 
still 
illegal. 
 
This 
posture 
also 
ignores 
that 
other 
alternatives could have been made available to this court (for 
example, through a new round of party submitted maps adhering to 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision) but were barred from 
consideration. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
18 
 
section explains, are maps wholly unsuited for any serious 
court's approval. 
III.  THE LEGISLATURE'S MAPS 
¶186 The Legislature's maps fail for two reasons:  first, 
we are not to act as a gubernatorial veto override body; and 
second, the Legislature's maps show evidence of racially 
motivated packing and cracking that could violate both the Equal 
Protection Clause and the VRA. 
A.  Failed Political Process 
¶187 The Legislature's maps derive from a failed political 
process.  In Wisconsin, the redistricting process follows the 
same process as the enactment of any law.  Both houses of the 
legislature must pass a bill containing new maps, which is then 
presented to the governor who may approve or veto the bill, the 
latter 
of 
which 
the 
legislature 
may 
override 
with 
a 
supermajority vote.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17 & art. V, 
§ 10.  Here, the Legislature, having failed to override the 
gubernatorial veto, submitted the very same proposal to us.  By 
now implementing that failed bill, this court judicially 
overrides the Governor's veto, thus nullifying the will of the 
Wisconsin voters who elected that governor into office.  But our 
constitution provides only one avenue to override such a veto; 
no judicial override textually exists.  See Wis. Const. art. V, 
§ 10.  Nor, historically, has this court ever exercised such a 
supreme power.  By judicially enacting the very bill that failed 
the political process, a bare majority of this court, rather 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
19 
 
than 
a 
supermajority 
of 
the 
legislature, 
has 
taken 
the 
unprecedented step of removing the process of lawmaking from its 
constitutional 
confines 
and 
overriding 
a 
governor's 
veto 
ourselves. 
B.  Signs of an Equal Protection Violation 
¶188 In addition to being derived from a failed political 
process, the Legislature's maps show signs of violating the 
Equal Protection Clause.  If, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained, the Governor's addition of a majority-minority 
district sufficed to show that race predominated its proposal, 
then equally, if not more, suspect is the Legislature's removal 
of a majority-minority district.  Despite the majority opinion's 
assertions, the Legislature's maps do not appear to be race-
neutral and calling the claim "indisputable" does not make it 
so.  The Legislature's claim that it drew its maps without 
considering race, quite frankly, flies in the face of its 
transfiguration of Milwaukee's six current districts with a 
Black voting age population (BVAP) majority.20  In Milwaukee, the 
BVAP increased 5.5 percent while the White voting age population 
decreased 9.5 percent over the last decade.  Those demographic 
changes make the Legislature's draw down of BVAP percentage in 
five out of six VRA districts——one by over 12 percent——with the 
                                                 
20 The voting age population, rather than the general 
population, is the preferred number to review when dealing with 
voting districts.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ___, 
136 S. Ct. 2512 (2017) (analyzing a VRA claim using BVAP data). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
20 
 
remaining VRA district packed at 73.3 percent BVAP highly 
suspicious.21 
¶189 This suspicion is not assuaged by the Legislature's 
expert report.  That report sets out how none of the Milwaukee 
area's Black population was removed from existing VRA districts22 
(there was movement between existing VRA districts) and only 
2,046 Black people were added to any VRA district from outside 
existing VRA districts——1,625 Black individuals were moved from 
AD24 to AD10 and AD12, and 421 Black individuals were moved from 
AD13 to AD18.  See Wis. Legislature's Br., Expert Report of 
                                                 
21 The Legislature's Assembly District (AD) 10 dropped from 
59.4 percent BVAP in 2011 Wis. Act 43 to 47.2 percent; AD12 
dropped from 60.6 percent to 57 percent; AD16 dropped from 55.6 
percent to 54.1 percent; AD17 dropped from 68.4 percent to 61.8 
percent; AD18 dropped from 60.7 percent to 52.6 percent; and, 
finally, AD11 increased from an already high 65.5 percent to 
73.3 percent.  See BLOC Resp. Br. 9. 
22 Evidence indicates that when drawing the 2011 district 
maps the legislature considered race for the purpose of creating 
six majority-Black districts that would "perform" under the 
VRA's standards.  For example, in briefing for Gill v. Whitford, 
the State, which was defending the legislatively enacted maps in 
2011 Wisconsin Act 43, affirmed that "[t]o comply with the VRA, 
the staffers paid special attention to Milwaukee's Assembly 
districts.  After [the expert] and the lawyers had signed off on 
the Milwaukee districts, the staffers 'locked these districts' 
and then worked on maps of other areas of the State." (internal 
citations omitted).  Br. For Appellants at 14, Gill v. Whitford, 
585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (Jul. 28, 
2017).  Likewise, in briefing for Baldus v. Members of Wis. 
Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012), 
defendants represented that "Act 43 shifted the lines of 
assembly district 12 to encompass additional African American 
voters, thereby creating a sixth African American Assembly 
District."  Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 22, Baldus v. 
Members of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840 
(E.D. Wis. 2012), 2012 WL 7682784 (Feb. 10, 2012). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
21 
 
Dr. John Alford 6-7 (Dec. 15, 2021).  Collectively, Milwaukee's 
VRA districts needed to gain approximately 31,921 people to meet 
the ideal population after the 2020 census.  See App. of the 
Wis. Legislature 18 (Aug. 23, 2021).  This means that in adding 
the required population, approximately 6.4 percent of the people 
moved into the VRA districts were Black.  While this number is 
reasonably 
consistent 
with 
Wisconsin's 
Black 
population 
percentage as a whole, it is low when compared to the Milwaukee 
area's 
percentage 
Black 
population. 
 
For 
example, 
the 
Legislature's AD23 is above 10 percent Black, AD19 is 7 percent 
Black, and AD7 is 7.9 percent Black (not including those who 
identify as more than one race).  See Wis. Legislature's Resp. 
Br., Resp. Expert Report of Dr. John Alford 11 (Dec. 30, 2021).  
Both AD23 and AD19 were overpopulated and bordered existing VRA 
districts, but not one person was moved from either of those 
districts 
into 
underpopulated 
VRA 
districts. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Legislature's Br., Expert Report of Thomas M. Bryan 57 (Dec. 15, 
2021).  Over 7,500 people were swapped between AD7 and other 
districts (7,622 people were moved from AD7 to AD9 and 7,843 
people were moved from AD 13 to AD7) but, likewise, not one 
person was moved into existing VRA districts.  All of this could 
indicate that the Legislature targeted a certain quota of Black 
people to move into current VRA districts to keep those 
districts at "performing" VRA levels, just as they did with the 
2011 maps.23  Importantly, this is precisely the same type of 
                                                 
23 No direct examination of this kind of circumstantial 
evidence exists in the record because the procedural posture of 
this case and the court's "least change" approach did not lend 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
22 
 
racial consideration that the U.S. Supreme Court found violated 
the Equal Protection Clause when done in the Governor's map. 
¶190 Moreover, the Legislature boasted that its Milwaukee-
area core retention numbers exceeded their statewide core 
retention numbers.  See Wis. Legislature's Reply Br. 11.  Rather 
than bolstering its core retention claims, the fact that 
Milwaukee 
contains 
the 
highest 
concentration 
of 
minority 
populations24 turns this admission into circumstantial evidence 
that the Legislature impermissibly considered race when deciding 
who to move between districts.  Indeed, upon closer inspection, 
16 of the Legislature's assembly districts show a discrepancy of 
over 10 percent between the district's overall core retention 
number and the Black-only core retention.  And three of those 
districts (AD22, AD40, and AD92) exhibit a whopping discrepancy 
of over 35 percent.25  See Wis. Legislature's Br., Expert Report 
of Thomas M. Bryan 56-64 (Dec. 15, 2021).  Circumstantial 
evidence such as this can show an Equal Protection Clause 
violation, despite legislative professions of race-neutrality.  
                                                                                                                                                             
itself to a full adjudication of the merits of any Equal 
Protection or VRA claims.  Even after the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed because of this type of missing factual development, 
the majority of this court continues to bar the submission of 
any additional evidence from the parties. 
24 See 
U.S. 
Census 
Bureau, 
Wisconsin 
State 
Profile, 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/wisconsin-
population-change-between-census-decade.html. 
25 Expert analysis is needed to decipher what inferences, if 
any, can be drawn from these statistics, but the discrepancies 
certainly offer facially substantial reasons to analyze the 
Legislature's maps and their underlying motivations more fully. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
23 
 
See Cooper, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (affirming the district court's 
findings that racial considerations predominated the drawing of 
District 12 despite the State's profession that the subject 
district was drawn based on political data and that racial data 
was not even viewed by the map-drawer).  With such evidence 
contradicting the Legislature's unsupported professions of race-
neutrality, we are duty bound to investigate the actual focus 
race played in its proposed lines. 
¶191 Self-serving professions of race-neutrality should 
also be ignored because the Legislature offered no alternative 
reasons for making decisions regarding Milwaukee's districts.  
The Legislature's "least change" pretext fails when it openly 
admits its Milwaukee-area changes substantially differed from 
its treatment of the rest of the state.  Nor can the Legislature 
justify its unique redrawing of Milwaukee districts on a desire 
to keep municipalities whole; it split at least one relevant 
village, Brown Deer, by dividing its Black population between 
two districts.  Respecting "communities of interest" also fails 
to justify the Legislature's actions because no party submitted 
evidence establishing such communities.  That leaves the more 
nefarious partisan advantage reasoning——a reliable pretext for 
racial motivations. But a neutral judicial body cannot adopt a 
map on such a justification, especially now that the party's 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
24 
 
motives are imputed onto the court.26  The Legislature also has 
not, and could not, claim such a justification as this court 
barred consideration of partisanship in our redistricting 
process.  As such, no judicially acceptable justification for 
the Legislature's Milwaukee-area redistricting decisions exists. 
¶192 Finally, the majority fails to address how Milwaukee's 
two majority-Hispanic districts——ADs 8 and 9——play into their 
"race-neutral" approach.  According to the Legislature, its 
"plan keeps intact 100 percent of existing Assembly District 8, 
more than 90 percent of existing Assembly District 9, and adds 
new Hispanic population to both Assembly District 8 and 9."  
Wis. Legislature's Br. 36 (Dec. 15, 2021).  No VRA analysis as 
to those districts established that either would require race-
based distribution of the population.  Although under this 
court's original approach, all parties conceded that those 
districts were appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision 
made clear that relying on the parties' concessions cannot 
support a finding that the VRA required race-based decisions.  
Furthermore, while the 2012 Baldus decision set out the borders 
of those districts based on VRA analysis, that analysis was 
                                                 
26 The majority opinion conflates a political-gerrymandering 
claim with the uncontroversial concept that a neutral, non-
partisan court cannot act in support of purely political 
interests.  See majority op., ¶51 n.10.  As explained before, 
Rucho is not at issue in this case.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 
U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that claims of 
partisan gerrymandering stemming from legislatively enacted maps 
are nonjusticiable).  We, as a court of law, cannot implement 
blatantly partisan maps. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
25 
 
based on the previous decade's information and cannot be carried 
over wholesale.  See Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d 840. 
C.  Signs of a VRA Violation 
¶193 A majority of this court has already expressed that a 
plan containing only six majority-BVAP districts "could prove 
problematic under the VRA."  Johnson, 400 Wis. 2d 626, ¶49.  The 
Legislature's map contains only five majority-BVAP districts, 
which should give any court pause.  The Legislature's plan 
leaves a significant number of Black voters dispersed into 
surrounding majority-White districts where their voting power is 
thus 
diluted. 
 
For 
example, 
as 
mentioned 
above, 
the 
Legislature's plan unnecessarily swaps population between AD23 
and AD24, cracking Brown Deer's Black voters in the process.  
Additionally, the evidence above shows that only limited numbers 
of Black individuals were moved into existing VRA districts to 
keep them at "performing" levels while the remaining Black 
individuals were spread into surrounding, non-VRA districts such 
as AD7, AD19, AD23, and AD24 in insufficient numbers to be 
considered influential.  This may violate the VRA even if that 
distribution was not intentionally race-based. 
¶194 The VRA's applicability here turns, first, on the 
three Gingles preconditions, and second, on whether the totality 
of the circumstances shows the Legislature's lines deny minority 
voters the equal opportunity to participate in our democracy.  
Although members of this court have claimed that the three 
Gingles preconditions are not met in Milwaukee, the bulk of the 
evidence 
presented 
to 
this 
court 
supports 
the 
opposite 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
26 
 
conclusion.  The Legislature itself argued that its proposed map 
did not violate the VRA because it contained five majority-Black 
districts 
and 
one 
Black-influence 
district. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Legislature's Br. 33 (Dec. 15, 2021) ("The Milwaukee area has 
always been an area of concern for the Voting Rights Act.  The 
Legislature's plans for the Milwaukee area comply with the 
Voting Rights Act, both for Milwaukee's Black and Hispanic 
populations."). 
¶195 Examining the record we do have, the three Gingles 
preconditions are likely met in Milwaukee.  And the totality of 
the circumstances in Milwaukee show that Black voters do not 
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process.  Although this court's procedural decisions have barred 
the kind of tested expert testimony required to make definitive 
VRA determinations, that lack of evidence cuts both ways.  If we 
cannot say that seven VRA districts are required, we equally 
cannot say, based on the evidence before us, that six are 
required, or that none are required.  The majority nakedly 
proclaims that "on this record" no VRA violation can be proven, 
but this proclamation misunderstands our duty here.  A majority 
of this court failed to adopt procedures that would have allowed 
the balancing of relevant facts required under the VRA and the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Because of this failure, the majority 
opinion cannot fulfill its responsibility and determine what, as 
a matter of law, is the narrowly tailored remedy required under 
the VRA. 
1.  The Gingles Preconditions 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
27 
 
¶196 In approaching the Gingles preconditions, only one 
expert provided the bulk of the past-election analyses required.  
And those analyses indicate that the Gingles preconditions are 
met in Milwaukee.  However, members of this court, myself 
included, conclude that the evidence has not been sufficiently 
tested through a proper adversarial fact-finding process.  
Consequently, 
we 
cannot 
definitively 
say 
the 
Gingles 
preconditions are satisfied.  This is an act of judicial 
restraint based on the deficiency of process, not a finding that 
other facts or expert analysis outweigh the facts and analysis 
as set out here. 
¶197 The first Gingles precondition requires that there be 
a 
sufficiently 
large 
and 
compact 
minority 
population 
to 
constitute a district.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 400-01 (2006).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
criticized 
this 
court's 
March 
3 
analysis 
on 
the 
first 
precondition because this court deferred to the undisputed 
nature of the claim.  In doing so, the Court failed to 
acknowledge that the Governor's maps necessarily proved that 
there is a sufficiently large and compact minority population to 
constitute seven districts by proposing maps that contain seven 
contiguous and compact districts, each with over 50 percent 
BVAP.  The Governor's maps, in and of themselves, demonstrate a 
sufficiently large and compact Black population to constitute 
seven 
majority-Black 
districts. 
 
Satisfying 
the 
first 
precondition comes as no surprise given the reality that 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
28 
 
Milwaukee is one of the most geographically segregated, and 
therefore racially compact, cities in the country. 
¶198 The second and third Gingles preconditions, often 
discussed together as the need to show "racially polarized 
voting," were evidenced through an expert analysis of relevant 
elections.  See id. (setting out that the second and third 
threshold 
conditions 
require 
that 
"the 
group 
must 
be 
'politically cohesive'" and "the white majority must 'vote 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the 
minority's preferred candidate.'").  While one dissent to our 
March 3 opinion took it upon itself to formulate the only 
significant alternative analysis of previous elections, the 
races cited lacked probative value as to the presence of 
racially polarized voting.  The vast majority of the alternative 
elections 
involved 
incumbent 
candidates 
running 
entirely 
unopposed or involved major party candidates who did not face a 
major-party opponent in a general election.27  These types of 
races are not relevant or informative regarding the question of 
                                                 
27 The record of candidates running for election comes from 
state public records and is therefore "capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned."  Wis. Stat. § 902.01.  Gwen Moore was 
an established incumbent in her 2016 race and ran against only 
libertarian and independent candidates; Lena Taylor was an 
established incumbent in her 2012 race and ran against only an 
independent candidate; Lena Taylor ran unopposed in her 2016 
general election and in 2020; La Tonya Johnson ran unopposed in 
2016; and Justice Roggensack's dissent acknowledges that both 
Leon Young and Jason Fields ran unopposed in their respective 
races. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
29 
 
racially polarized voting.28  Similarly, the majority opinion 
points to BLOC's lack of analysis of November general elections 
as a fatal flaw in its analysis of racially polarized voting, 
but VRA experts often exclude partisan general election data 
because it is probative only of partisan motives that mask 
underlying racial discrepancies.  Thus, as one expert explained, 
in a strongly Democratic-voting district like those in the 
Milwaukee area, only non-partisan elections and Democratic 
primaries have the potential to reveal the presence of racially 
polarized voting.  See BLOC's Br. App. 15 (Dec. 15, 2021). 
¶199 That same expert relied on several methods to analyze 
the raw data surrounding eight such elections.  The analyses all 
led to the conclusion that racially polarized voting occurred in 
seven of the eight elections.29  Id. at 16.  The single election 
of the bunch that showed substantial White cross-over voting was 
the Milwaukee County Sheriff Democratic Primary which featured a 
candidate, Schmidt, who had served as the second in command to 
former Sheriff Clarke, a conservative and polarizing political 
figure.  It is likely that attitudes toward former Sheriff 
                                                 
28 This highly technical analysis is generally performed by 
an expert subject to cross-examination for the very reason that 
it is difficult to sift through statistical noise.  Careful 
selection of relevant and informative past races is key to a 
reliable "racially polarized voting" analysis.  Again, the 
majority of this court barred the process needed to ensure such 
an analysis. 
29 Dr. Collingwood states he used ecological regression, 
ecological inference, and homogeneous precinct analysis to 
analyze ward-level vote returns to infer individual-level voting 
behavior.  He also explains the various programs used to analyze 
the data. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
30 
 
Clarke 
lessened 
support 
for 
Schmidt, 
one 
of 
two 
White 
candidates, and increased cross-over support for the Black-
preferred candidate, Lucas.  These distorting features mean that 
race may not be as probative of racially polarized voting as the 
other seven races.  Those remaining races showed BVAP to Black 
preferred candidate correlation coefficients between .80 and 
.95, and White voting age population to White preferred 
candidate correlation coefficients between .55 and .89.30  These 
numbers show reliably high correlations between a voter's race 
and preferred candidate.31 
¶200 The third Gingles precondition also requires that 
White bloc voting usually blocks Black voters from electing 
candidates of choice.  This is, undoubtedly, the most difficult 
part of the analysis in our posture because, under a normal VRA 
challenge, it would usually require district-specific numbers.  
In some circumstances, it may not make sense to analyze 
majority-BVAP districts under this precondition because White 
voters cannot defeat a Black-preferred candidate so long as 
                                                 
30 The race with the lowest correlation coefficient, the 
State Superintendent primary with Jill Underly at .55, was low 
in part due to a split between support for three White 
candidates.  The next lowest correlation coefficient is .68. 
31 Although all of the races analyzed included Black 
candidates as the Black-preferred candidate and White candidates 
as the White-preferred candidate, this is not necessarily always 
the case.  A candidate's race does not need to reflect the same 
race as the minority voting population that prefers them. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
31 
 
voters come out in force.32  More specific analysis of racially 
polarized voting in those districts may be relevant, but the 
outcomes of races in these districts do not indicate whether 
there is sufficient White-crossover voting to remove the need 
for race-conscious districting.  This is why Dr. Collingwood did 
not analyze the AD12 Democratic primary election as part of his 
bloc voting analysis.  AD12 is already a majority-BVAP district 
and so a minority-preferred candidate cannot be blocked by a 
White majority.  Dr. Collingwood did separately find the 
existence of racially polarized voting in that election.  
Instead, Dr. Collingwood analyzed elections that cover the 
Milwaukee area and found that White bloc voting defeats the 
Black-preferred candidate in four out of seven races for a block 
rate of 57.14 percent.  If the aberrant Milwaukee County 
Sheriff's election is removed from consideration, that block 
rate rises to 66.66 percent.  This indicates that, in the 
Milwaukee area as a whole, White bloc voting does usually defeat 
the Black-preferred candidate. 
¶201 The majority opinion points to the lack of "district 
specific" analysis as another fatal flaw, but, because this case 
was not a challenge to existing districts, there were no 
districts to specifically analyze.  Thus, the experts worked 
with what they had and analyzed the Milwaukee area as a whole.  
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision appeared to set out a new 
                                                 
32 This is not a universal rule as other factors, such as 
high 
levels 
of 
non-citizen 
immigrant 
populations, 
disenfranchised populations, or populations facing other hurdles 
to voting could lower a district's minority voting force. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
32 
 
standard for courts to follow in implementing remedial maps, but 
neither this court nor the parties knew that standard at the 
time of briefing.  Yet since the Court voiced that standard, the 
majority of this court has barred all parties from submitting 
the 
necessary 
additional 
district-specific 
analysis 
of 
theoretical "race-neutral" maps.33  That forced ignorance, 
though, does not erase the evidence we do have, all of which 
evinces each Gingles precondition. 
2.  Totality of the Circumstances 
¶202 Professor David Canon set out a compelling totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis showing that Milwaukee's Black 
voters lack an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process.  Some of the relevant circumstances, called "Senate 
Factors," include: 
(1) the history of official voting-related discrimination 
in the state or political subdivision; 
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the 
political subdivision is racially polarized; 
                                                 
33 BLOC 
did 
analyze 
the 
Legislature's 
proposed 
AD10.  
Looking to what Dr. Collingwood described as the "most probative 
election," the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial primary, the Black-
preferred candidate, Mahlon Mitchell, garnered 39.3 percent of 
the vote while Governor Evers, one of multiple White candidates, 
received 29.3 percent.  The combined vote total of Governor 
Evers and the next most popular candidate, Kelda Roys, would 
have defeated Mahlon Mitchell's plurality of votes.  This 
evidence does not appear sufficient to say that AD10 would or 
would not reliably perform for Black preferred candidates.  As 
explained previously, the Legislature's map is not reliably 
race-neutral and thus even a full analysis of that map's 
performance would not satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court's directive 
to review a race-neutral option. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
33 
 
(3) the extent to which the political subdivision has used 
voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 
(4) the exclusion of members of the minority group from 
candidate slating processes; 
(5) the extent to which minority group members bear the 
effects of discrimination in areas such as education, 
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 
(6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political 
campaigns; and 
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have 
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 
According to Professor Canon's unrefuted analysis, all Senate 
Factors except factor (4) show that Black voters have less of an 
opportunity to participate in the political process than White 
voters. 
¶203 Wisconsin has a history of both official voting 
discrimination and voting practices that enhance the opportunity 
for discrimination (Senate Factors 1 and 3).  While history of 
these practices is no doubt long, relatively recent instances of 
such practices paint a sufficient picture.  First, in 2012, the 
Baldus court held that the Legislature's redistricting maps 
unlawfully diluted the voting strength of minority voters in the 
Milwaukee area.  See Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d 840.  Second, 
recent attempts to purge voter rolls of "inactive" voters would 
have disproportionately affected minority communities.  See 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
34 
 
Zignego v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 32, ¶¶9-10, 396 
Wis. 2d 391, 957 N.W.2d 208.  In 2019 a circuit court ordered 
the "inactive" voters removed from registration lists before the 
effort was stopped on appeal.  Notices were sent to individuals 
informing them that they would be removed from voter rolls if 
they failed to respond.  Significantly, over one-third of those 
notices were sent to individuals in Milwaukee County and Dane 
County——those 
with 
the 
highest 
minority 
populations.  
Additionally, minority voters were almost twice as likely to be 
incorrectly flagged as having moved as White individuals.34 
¶204 Third, during the April 2020 election, the early surge 
of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a state-wide poll worker 
shortage that necessitated polling places be consolidated.  
Milwaukee, which has the largest minority population in the 
state, was hit hardest by these consolidations.  Only 5 out of a 
usual 182 polling sites for the entire city, or 1 polling place 
for every 103,000 registered voters, remained open to this large 
minority population.  By contrast, Washington County, Ozaukee 
County, and Waukesha County each had 1 polling place for every 
7,000 
registered 
voters.35 
 
Reports 
indicate 
that 
these 
disproportionate measures greatly affected voter turnout.  One 
study 
found 
that 
approximately 
16 
percent 
of 
registered 
Milwaukee voters voted in the April 2020 primary compared to 42 
                                                 
34 Subcomm. on Elections, 117th Cong., Voting in America:  
Ensuring Free and Fair Access to the Ballot 31-33 (Jul. 2021). 
35 Kevin Morris & Peter Miller, Voting in a Pandemic:  
COVID-19 and Primary Turnout in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 58 Urb. 
Aff. Rev. 597, 598 (2021). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
35 
 
percent of registered voters who turned out in the surrounding 
Washington, Ozaukee, and Waukesha Counties.  Another study 
indicated 
that 
poll 
closures 
depressed 
voter 
turnout 
in 
Milwaukee by 8.6 percentage points with a disproportionate 
effect on Black voters.36  Within Milwaukee County, more polls 
were closed in the areas with the highest percentage of non-
White voters.37  Fourth, Wisconsin has required IDs to vote 
since 2011.  While voter ID laws have been upheld under the 
federal constitution as lawful, voting data shows such laws 
disproportionately deter racial minorities from voting.38 
¶205 Disparities in other socioeconomic categories between 
Wisconsin's 
White 
population 
and 
Milwaukee's 
minority 
populations, driven by racial discrimination, also hinder the 
ability of minority populations to effectively participate in 
the political process (Senate Factor 5).  This dissent opened by 
acknowledging Milwaukee's history of racial discrimination and 
the lasting racial disparities that history engendered.  To 
reiterate, Milwaukee's history of forced segregation created a 
historical racial gerrymander, limiting minority populations 
from the opportunity to exert influence outside of a limited 
geographic 
area. 
 
Additionally, 
the 
low 
rates 
of 
Black 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 John A. Curiel & Jesse T. Clark, Disparities in Poll 
Closures in the Age of COVID-19:  A Case Study of Wisconsin, 20 
Election L. J. 345 (2021). 
38 Michael 
G. 
DeCrescenzo 
& 
Kenneth 
R. 
Mayer, 
Voter 
Identification and Nonvoting in Wisconsin——Evidence from the 
2016 Election, 18 Election L. J. 342 (2019). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
36 
 
homeownership and high rates of evictions in Black communities 
result in more transient populations that change addresses 
frequently.  These populations may face difficulties staying 
registered under the proper address and providing necessary 
proof of address under voter ID laws.  Homeless people face 
barriers that result in as few as 10 percent of the homeless 
population showing up to the polls.39 
¶206 Wisconsin's high disparity between Black and White 
incarceration rates (the Black incarceration rate is 11.9 times 
greater than the White incarceration rate) directly affects 
opportunities to participate in the political process.  Felons 
are disallowed from voting until they have completed their 
entire sentence, which includes release from probation, parole, 
or extended supervision.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 6.03(1)(b) & 
304.078. 
 
In 
2020, 
22,371 
Black 
Wisconsinites 
were 
disenfranchised because they were incarcerated or on probation, 
parole, or extended supervision.40  Even after an ex-felon's 
                                                 
39 Dora Kingsley Vertenten, As Few As 1 in 10 Homeless 
People Vote in Elections——Here's Why, U.S. News (Oct. 15. 2020, 
10:41 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-10-
15/as-few-as-1-in-10-homeless-people-vote-in-elections-heres-
why. 
40 Chris Uggen et al., The Sent'g Project Locked Out 2020:  
Estimates of People Denied Voting Rights Due to a Felony 
Conviction 17 (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org
/publications/locked-out-2020-estimates-of-people-denied-voting-
rights-due-to-a-felony-conviction/. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
37 
 
voting rights are restored, evidence shows most will vote at 
much lower rates than the general public.41 
¶207 The myriad of other examples of racial disparity in 
Wisconsin may also account, in part, for the historically 
limited success minority candidates have had in city- and 
county-wide elections (Senate Factor 7).  Cavalier Johnson just 
became the first Black person elected to be Mayor of Milwaukee 
and only the second Black person elected to be mayor anywhere in 
Wisconsin.42  In 2020, David Crowley became the first Black 
person elected to be Milwaukee County Executive.  At the time of 
briefing, no Black office holder held a state representative, 
alderperson, or supervisor seat in any Milwaukee-area districts 
outside majority-Black districts.  While we can hope that the 
very recent successes of some city and county-wide candidates is 
an indication of long-needed change, history and common sense 
tell us that one successful minority candidate does not erase a 
long history of discrimination and racial disparity. 
¶208 The procedural posture of this remedial redistricting 
case (specifically that no Equal Protection or VRA challenge was 
before this court) coupled with the lack of rigorous expert 
analysis of past elections by any party other than BLOC and the 
lack of expert cross-examination, hampered this court's ability 
                                                 
41 Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Punishment and Democracy:  
Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons in the United 
States, 2 Persps. on Pol. 491 (Sept. 2004). 
42 Marvin Pratt became the first Black mayor of Milwaukee in 
2004, but only as acting mayor following Mayor Norquist's 
resignation. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
38 
 
to definitively decide the VRA issues in our March 3 decision.  
That said, the evidence and expert analysis before us certainly 
indicates that minorities in the Milwaukee area continue to bear 
the 
effects 
of 
discrimination 
in 
ways 
that 
limit 
their 
opportunity to participate in the democratic process. 
IV.  LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
¶209 This has been a profoundly disheartening odyssey.  The 
unavoidable political nature of remedial redistricting plagued 
us every step of the way.  Too rarely did this process present 
true questions of law——this court's only area of expertise.  At 
every change in the tide, this court seemed to choose what it 
hoped to be a short-cut to streamline our voyage, only to find 
ourselves lost and unable to do our work as a non-partisan court 
of law.  But the redistricting process is likely to stalemate 
and come before this court again in the future.  And when it 
does, I hope that we have learned our lesson.  I hope that we 
will permit a politically insulated federal court to manage the 
task.  Federal courts are better able to conduct extensive fact-
finding through trial-style litigation, a task for which we 
proved ill equipped. 
¶210 If this court does, however, cast off upon this 
odyssey again in the future, we cannot shy away from the demands 
of the process.  We must hear and test the facts.  We must 
acknowledge our responsibility to implement the best, judicially 
appropriate maps possible and to fully justify our decisions 
rather 
than 
pawning 
that 
responsibility 
off 
to 
party 
participants.  We can and should do so much better. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.jjk 
 
39 
 
¶211 The majority does not rise to that challenge; instead 
it locks our sails on a direct course to another set of maps we 
cannot call lawful.  I dissent. 
¶212 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent.