Title: Commonwealth v. Vaughn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 010789
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 010789     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 11, 2002 
RONNIE ANTJUAN VAUGHN 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Ronnie Antjuan Vaughn was indicted for the malicious 
wounding of Samuel Robinson in violation of Code § 18.2-51.  A 
jury in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond convicted 
Vaughn of the lesser-included offense of unlawful wounding.  A 
divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that the trial 
court erred by refusing to grant Vaughn's request that the 
jury also be instructed on the lesser-included offense of 
assault and battery.  See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 
263, 540 S.E.2d 516 (2001).  Based on review of the record and 
the applicable legal principles, this Court will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
FACTS 
 
When reviewing a trial court's refusal to give a 
proffered jury instruction, we view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.  Blondel 
v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 469, 403 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1991).  So 
viewed, the facts of this case are as follows. 
On April 11, 1997, Robinson and Vaughn were "hanging 
out."  Robinson had been drinking beer for some time.  When 
Vaughn told Robinson that he had observed another man visiting 
with Robinson's wife while Robinson was out of town, Robinson 
became visibly upset.  Robinson went to a house across the 
street and telephoned his wife, telling her to come home. 
Vaughn came into the house and the two men began to 
argue.  At one point during the argument, Vaughn attempted to 
place his hand on Robinson's arm in a conciliatory manner.  
Robinson, however, told Vaughn to "get off me," and rebuffed 
the gesture. 
When the two men returned outside, they continued to 
argue and exchange profanities.  Vaughn testified that, at one 
point, Robinson pushed Vaughn up against a wall and threatened 
to kill him and his family.  In contrast, Robinson testified 
that Vaughn told him that "he'd get his four five [.45 caliber 
handgun] and he could take care of me."  
Robinson and Vaughn separated when Robinson's wife 
arrived.  Robinson walked off with his wife.  Vaughn, afraid 
that Robinson would return and harm him, telephoned a friend 
to pick him up.  When the friend arrived, his car was full, 
but he assured Vaughn that he would return to pick up Vaughn 
in ten minutes and gave Vaughn a gun to use "just in case." 
 
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According to Vaughn, as the car was departing, Robinson 
began running toward Vaughn.  Although Vaughn told him to 
stop, Robinson continued to advance in Vaughn's direction.  
Vaughn testified that he was scared of Robinson because of the 
disparity in their sizes1 and the "lethal" nature of Robinson's 
hands.  Vaughn then fired several shots into the ground at 
Robinson's feet because he "was afraid for [his] life."  
Vaughn "kept squeezing the trigger" until there were no more 
bullets in the gun.  When Robinson's foot was hit by one of 
the shots, Robinson turned and fled, jumping over a fence on 
the side of the property.  Robinson testified that he heard 
one more shot being fired after he had begun to run away, 
although Vaughn denied shooting at Robinson as he was running 
away and no one saw Vaughn shooting at Robinson as he was 
running away.  Robinson was wounded in the foot and in the 
lower back. 
 
At trial, Vaughn denied that he intended to shoot 
Robinson, asserting instead that he was acting in self-defense 
and only fired at Robinson's feet to keep him back.  The trial 
court instructed the jury on the charges of malicious wounding 
and the lesser-included offense of unlawful wounding.  The 
court refused to give the jury instruction Vaughn proffered on 
                     
1 Robinson is six feet, one inch tall, and he weighs 
approximately three hundred pounds.  Vaughn is five feet, 
 
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the lesser-included offense of assault and battery.  Vaughn 
was convicted of unlawful wounding and was sentenced to five 
years in prison.  The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
and remanded the case for a new trial.  The Commonwealth 
appeals. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The sole issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that the defendant was entitled to a jury 
instruction on assault and battery, a lesser-included offense 
of malicious and unlawful wounding.  Malicious and unlawful 
wounding requires that the accused has the specific intent to 
"maim, disfigure, disable or kill" the victim of the attack.  
Code § 18.2-51.  The offense of assault and battery requires 
that the accused 
attempt or offer with force or violence to do a 
corporal hurt to another . . . as by striking at 
him, or even holding up one's fist at him in a 
threatening or insulting manner, or pointing a 
weapon at him within reach . . . [and] the actual 
infliction of corporal hurt on another . . . 
wilfully or in anger, whether by the party's own 
hand, or by some means set in motion by him. 
 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 679, 681-82, 36 S.E.2d 571, 572 
(1946)(original emphases omitted).  We have held that the 
intent to put another in fear of bodily harm with a threat to 
use bodily force, such as brandishing a deadly weapon, is an 
                                                                
three inches tall and he weighs approximately one hundred-
sixty pounds. 
 
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assault.  Commonwealth v. Alexander, 260 Va. 238, 241, 531 
S.E.2d 567, 568 (2000); Burgess v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 697, 
706, 118 S.E. 273, 275 (1955). 
 
There is no dispute that the evidence in this case was 
sufficient to support a finding that Vaughn intended to maim, 
disfigure, or disable Robinson.  Vaughan shot a gun aimed in 
Robinson's direction; he continued firing the gun until all 
shells were spent and continued pulling the trigger after the 
gun was empty; and Robinson was wounded by bullets from the 
gun, once in the foot or ankle and, in the course of turning 
and running from Vaughn, again in the back.  Although not 
undisputed, there was also credible evidence that the prior 
altercation between Vaughn and Robinson had ended and that 
Vaughn was the aggressor in the events that resulted in 
Robinson's injury. 
 
As Vaughn argues, the evidence in this case also shows 
that he attempted, with force, to frighten Robinson and set in 
motion the means by which Robinson was ultimately hurt.  If 
this evidence alone was sufficient to support the lesser-
included assault and battery instruction, such instruction 
would be required in every malicious or unlawful wounding case 
because every such case must include these underlying 
elements.  However, we have rejected the concept that a jury 
instruction on the lesser-included offense must always be 
 
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given.  Guss v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 13, 14, 225 S.E.2d 196, 
197 (1976).  If the evidence is sufficient to support "a 
conviction of the crime charged, and there is no independent 
evidence warranting a conviction [of the lesser-included 
offense], an instruction on the lesser-included offense need 
not be given."  Id.2  Here, where the evidence of unlawful or 
malicious wounding warrants a conviction, more than a 
scintilla of evidence must show that Vaughn did not intend to 
maim, disfigure, disable, or kill Robinson to support the 
lesser-included offense of assault and battery. 
 
Intent, like any fact, may be shown by circumstances.  It 
is "a state of mind which may be proved by a person's conduct 
or by his statements."  Howard v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 222, 
228, 148 S.E.2d 800, 804 (1966).  In this case, neither 
Vaughn's conduct or statements provide circumstantial evidence 
that he did not intend to maim, disable, disfigure, or kill 
Robinson. 
                     
 
 
2 We note that in the present case the trial court 
rejected the proffered instruction as a matter of law because 
a weapon was involved, relying on Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 
Va. 679, 36 S.E.2d. 571 (1946).  But see Code § 18.2-54; Brown 
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 111, 116, 279 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1981); 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 490, 493, 237 S.E.2d 791, 793 
(1977); Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 641, 133 S.E.2d 
305, 306 (1963); Williams v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 987, 992, 
151 S.E. 151, 152-53 (1930).  However, this appeal does not 
involve a review of the trial court's rationale for refusing 
the instruction.  
 
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Vaughn testified that he did not intend to shoot Robinson 
at all and shot only at the ground to stop Robinson from 
hurting him, but was unable to explain how Robinson was shot 
in the back.  This uncontroverted fact is inconsistent with 
Vaughan's version of the facts and his claim that he only 
intended to make Robinson retreat.  Without providing an 
alternative explanation for the resulting injury to Robinson's 
back, Vaughn has no evidence demonstrating that he did not 
intend to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill Robinson.  A 
finding of assault and battery by the jury in these 
circumstances would require denying the uncontroverted 
physical evidence and accepting Vaughn's failure to explain 
what occurred as affirmative evidence of lesser intent.  Thus, 
under these circumstances we find no evidence supporting the 
jury instruction requested by Vaughn. 
 
Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the jury 
should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense  
because Vaughn's testimony would have allowed a jury to find 
that, by shooting at the ground, "Vaughn acted only with the 
intent to do Robinson bodily harm to deter his attack, and not 
with the specific intent 'to maim, disfigure, disable, or 
kill' him."  Vaughn, 34 Va. App. 263, 267-68, 540 S.E.2d 516, 
518 (2001).  This conclusion is not based on affirmative 
evidence, but on the jury's ability to reject evidence that is 
 
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uncontroverted.  We have previously held that, although the 
jury's ability to reject evidence will support an acquittal, 
the ability to reject evidence does not supply the affirmative 
evidence necessary to support a jury instruction.  
Commonwealth v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445, 507 S.E.2d 75, 76 
(1998); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 590, 304 
S.E.2d 644, 658 (1983); Guss, 217 Va. at 15, 225 S.E.2d at 
197. 
 
Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence supporting a 
jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of assault and 
battery, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and reinstate the trial court's judgment. 
Reversed. 
 
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