Title: Lehman v. Bradbury
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48771
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 2002

Filed:  September 26, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

MIKE LEHMAN,
BILL MARKHAM, RONALD K. CULBERTSON,
and GILES E. PARKER,
	Plaintiffs-Respondents,
	v.
BILL BRADBURY,
Secretary of State for the State of Oregon,
	Defendant-Appellant,
	and
FRANK EIZENZIMMER,
OREGONIANS FOR FAIR TERM LIMITS,
and U.S. TERM LIMITS,					
	Intervenors-Appellants.
(CC 01-C14353; SC S48771)

	En Banc
	On plaintiffs-respondents' petition for attorney fees filed
February 12, 2002.
	Charles F. Hinkle, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, filed the
petition for attorney fees for plaintiffs-respondents.	
	Kelly W. G. Clark and Ross Day, of O'Donnell &amp; Clark, LLP,
Portland, filed the response to petition for intervenors-appellants.					
	No appearance for defendant-appellant. 	
	GILLETTE, J.
	Plaintiffs-respondents' petition for an award of attorney
fees on appeal of $35,532 is allowed against defendant-appellant
and denied against intervenors-appellants.	
		GILLETTE, J.
		In Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 233, 37 P3d 989
(2002), plaintiffs -- two former state representatives and two
voters, one from each of the former representatives' districts --
brought an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
and ORS 246.910(1) challenging the validity of Ballot Measure 3
(1992), the "Term Limits Initiative."  Plaintiffs prevailed and
now seek a joint and several award of $35,532 in appellate
attorney fees against defendant and intervenors.  Intervenors,
but not defendant, filed objections.  For the reasons set out
below, we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of
appellate attorney fees against defendant only.
		No statute or contract authorizes an award of attorney
fees to plaintiffs under the facts of this case.  Instead of such authority, plaintiffs rely on this court's inherent power,
as a court of equity, to award attorney fees on appeal in
appropriate cases.  See Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 535 P2d 541
(1975) (explaining and exercising that authority).  Plaintiffs
argue that, like the plaintiff in Deras, they are entitled to
such an award because, as described in the Deras opinion, they
brought their action "in a representative capacity" and
"succeed[ed] in protecting the rights of others as much as
[their] own."  Id. at 66.  Plaintiffs also assert that they meet
all the prerequisites for that type of an attorney-fees award, as
this court described those prerequisites in Armatta v. Kitzhaber,
327 Or 250, 287-88, 959 P2d 49 (1998), (1) because plaintiffs were
the prevailing parties in a proceeding in equity in which they
sought to "vindicate an important constitutional right applying
to all citizens without any gain peculiar to" themselves, namely,
the integrity of the Oregon constitutional amendment and
initiative processes.  Finally, plaintiffs argue that, given
intervenors' vigorous opposition to plaintiffs' arguments on the
merits, general principles of equity require that intervenors, in
addition to defendant, be liable for any attorney-fees award.  In
making that argument, plaintiffs rely in part on Holm and Holm,
323 Or 581, 919 P2d 1164 (1996), in which this court held that a
party who voluntarily intervenes in a marital dissolution case
becomes potentially liable for an award of attorney fees under
ORS 107.105(5). (2)
		We note at the outset that plaintiffs' petition for
attorney fees comports with the requirements of Oregon Rule of
Appellate Procedure 13.10(5), in that plaintiffs have stated the
total amount of attorney fees claimed and the pertinent authority
on which they rely for making the claim.  See ORAP 13.10(5)(a)
(stating that requirement).  In such cases, we generally limit
our inquiry to the objections, if any, filed by the opposing
party.  See Kahn v. Canfield, 330 Or 10, 13-14, 998 P2d 651
(2000) (so stating).  We so limit our inquiry because we are
"loath to undertake a wide-ranging, independent review * * *,
inasmuch as any questions or doubts that we might have might not
be shared by the objecting party."  Dockins v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 330 Or 1, 9, 997 P2d 859 (2000).  
		In this case, defendant has not filed objections.  Rule
13.10(9) provides, with respect to such cases:
		"In the absence of timely filed objections to a
petition under this rule, the Supreme Court * * * will
allow attorney fees in the amount sought in the
petition, except in cases in which:
		"(a) the entity from whom fees are sought was not
a party to the proceeding; or
		"(b) when the Supreme Court * * * is without
authority to award fees."
The lack of objection by defendant places this court in the
position of being asked to exercise its equitable powers without
the benefit of advocacy from both sides respecting whether to do
so.  It is arguable that, given the lack of objections, Rule
13.10(9) commits this court to award the requested fees against
defendant without further consideration.  However, because of the
extraordinary nature of the power that we exercise in Deras-type
cases, we believe that we should examine plaintiffs' petition for
fees sufficiently to satisfy ourselves that there is at least a
prima facie justification for exercising our equitable power
before we exercise our "authority" as that term is used in Rule
13.10(9).  We have done so and conclude that plaintiffs have made
that showing:  The proceeding was one in equity; the parties who
request attorney fees prevailed; those prevailing parties
vindicated an important constitutional right applying to all
citizens, and at least two of them did not gain something
peculiar to themselves.  See Armatta, 327 Or at 287-88 (setting
out those criteria).  In addition, plaintiffs' request for an
award of attorney fees comports with the applicable rules.  See
Kahn, 330 Or at 13-14 (setting that criterion).  Therefore, we
award plaintiffs the sum of $35,532 against defendant as
reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
		The remaining question is whether the court should make
a joint and several award of attorney fees against intervenors. 
As noted, plaintiffs argue that it would be "equitable" to award
attorney fees against intervenors and not just against defendant.
Plaintiffs' theory is that, if they are entitled to an award of
attorney fees against any party, then that award should run
against all opposing parties whose arguments caused plaintiffs'
counsel to expend time and effort.  Intervenors respond that a court of equity never should exercise its power to award
attorney fees against an intervening private party, because that
would discourage the public from intervening in public litigation
and, thus, would be contrary to the rationale for such awards
that the court stated in Deras and Armatta. 
		To determine whether we should award attorney fees
against an intervening party in a particular case, this court
first considers the source of its authority to award attorney
fees against any party.  If the authority to award attorney fees
flows from a statute, then the court must determine the scope of
the legislature's intent respecting such awards and carry out
that intent.  That is the exercise in which this court engaged in
Holm when it interpreted ORS 107.105(5), a statute governing
attorney fees in appeals from orders in actions for dissolution
of marriage.  The court concluded that the legislature did not
intend to exclude intervening parties from among those parties
against whom the court could award attorney fees.  Holm, 323 Or
at 587.  Because the petition for attorney fees before us does
not concern a statutory award of fees, Holm is not in point.  By
analogy, however, when the source of this court's authority to
award attorney fees flows not from a statute, but from the
court's inherent power as a court of equity, the court should
look to the equitable principles that support such awards to
determine against which party the court should award attorney
fees. 
		In Deras, this court awarded attorney fees to a plaintiff who successfully challenged, on constitutional grounds,
two statutes limiting the amounts that could be spent on certain
campaigns.  The plaintiff, at the time he filed his suit, was a
candidate for state representative; the defendant was the
Secretary of State.  Plaintiff had lost his election bid by the
time that his case reached this court.  In discussing its
decision to award attorney fees to the plaintiff, this court
noted, first, that courts of equity have the power to award
attorney fees.  272 Or at 65-66.  The court explained that courts
frequently exercise that power in cases in which the successful
plaintiff brings an action in a representative capacity and
protects others' rights in addition to the plaintiff's own.  Id.
at 66. 
		The court then turned to its own case law and observed
that it had exercised such a power to award attorney fees to the
plaintiffs in Gilbert v. Hoisting &amp; Port. Engrs., 237 Or 130, 384
P2d 136, cert den, 376 US 963 (1964).  The plaintiffs in that
case had "sued the union of which they were members to require
fair and democratic elections."  Deras, 272 Or at 66.  This court
explained that an award of attorney fees had been justified in
Gilbert because
	"'[t]he preservation of the democratic process in the
functioning of unions is a matter of primary concern,
not only to union members but to the public as well. 
Those members of the union who in good faith seek to
preserve the internal democracy of their union should
not have to bear the expense of the successful suit.'"
Deras, 272 Or at 66, quoting Gilbert at 138.  Finally, turning to
the case before it, the court explained:
		"It is beyond dispute that the interest of the
public in preservation of the individual liberties
guaranteed against governmental infringement of the
constitution is even stronger in the present case than
that present in Gilbert.  Correspondingly, plaintiff in
this case, at least as much as the plaintiffs in
Gilbert, should not be required to bear the entire cost
of this litigation[,] the benefits of which flow
equally to all members of the public."
Deras, 272 Or at 66 (emphasis added).
		Because the dispute in Deras involved only two parties,
the court's decision to award attorney fees to the plaintiff did
not require the court to discuss its reasons for awarding those
attorney fees against a particular defendant (or an intervenor). 
Indeed, this is the first case in which this court has been
called on to decide who pays, rather than who receives, attorney
fees under a Deras rationale.  Nevertheless, the emphasized
passage from Deras shows that the court's focus was on who had
benefitted from the plaintiff's efforts.  That is, the court's
decision to award attorney fees against the Secretary of State
was a means of shifting the cost of the litigation from the
plaintiff alone to the public generally, because the public
generally had benefitted from the plaintiff's successful efforts
to vindicate constitutional principles. (3)   See also Armatta, 327
Or at 289 (shift of cost of litigation from prevailing plaintiffs
alone to public at large justified because "[p]laintiffs * * *
sought to benefit all Oregonians, because they sought to defend
the integrity of the amendment and initiative processes").  That
focus helps in deciding who should pay an award of attorney fees.
		We think that a fair summary of our case law is that,
when this court chooses to exercise its inherent power to award
attorney fees, it does so against the group that ultimately
benefits from the prevailing plaintiffs' efforts -- usually, as
in this case, the people of Oregon.  And, that summary
illustrates why intervenors should not be required to pay:  They
are not a separate group that benefits from plaintiffs' success. 
There being no benefit to them, apart from the benefit that they
receive equally with all Oregonians -- a benefit they would
prefer to have done without, it would not be equitable to require
them to pay attorney fees.  We therefore sustain their objection
to plaintiffs' petition.
 		Plaintiffs-respondents' petition for an award of
attorney fees on appeal of $35,532 is allowed against defendant-appellant and denied against intervenors-appellants.
1. 	In Armatta, this court affirmed the trial court's award
of attorney fees to the plaintiffs who successfully challenged
Ballot Measure 40 (1996), a "crimes victims' rights" initiative,
on constitutional grounds.

2. 	By their interventions, intervenors-appellants became a
party.

3. 	This court's decision in Gilbert used a similar
approach.  The plaintiff union members successfully sought to
make their union's election procedures fair and democratic.  By
awarding fees against the union of which the plaintiffs were
members, this court shifted the cost of the litigation from the
plaintiffs alone to the entire group of persons -- the union --
that directly would benefit from the plaintiffs' efforts.