Title: Commonwealth v. Agogo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12592
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2019

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SJC-12592 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DONNE K. AGOGO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 3, 2018. - March 15, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause.  Search 
and Seizure, Body examination, Probable cause.  Probable 
Cause.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, 
Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Chelsea Division of 
the District Court Department on March 28, 2016. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by D. 
Dunbar Livingston, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Michael A. Frates for the defendant. 
 
Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The Commonwealth appeals from a District Court 
judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress 
narcotics seized from the defendant's crotch area as the result 
of a strip search that took place in a cell at the Chelsea 
police station.  The motion judge determined that police did not 
have probable cause to believe that the defendant was concealing 
contraband on his person so as to justify conducting a strip 
search.  Because we agree that the police lacked the requisite 
probable cause to believe that the defendant had concealed 
narcotics somewhere on his person that could not have been 
detected through an ordinary search procedure, we affirm. 
 
1.  Background.  We reprise the motion judge's findings of 
fact, supplemented, in part, by uncontroverted testimony at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-
Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015); Commonwealth v. Morales, 462 
Mass. 334, 335 (2012).1 
 
a.  Police surveillance.  On an evening in March of 2016, 
at approximately 9 P.M., Detective Jose Torres, Jr., and 
Lieutenant Detective David Betz of the Chelsea police department 
were conducting surveillance near Bellingham Square in Chelsea.  
Torres reported that, in his opinion, Bellingham Square is a 
                                                 
 
1 The sole witness at the hearing was Detective Jose Torres, 
Jr., of the Chelsea police department; the motion judge 
explicitly credited his testimony. 
3 
 
 
"high crime" area.  In addition, in the spring of 2016, the 
Chelsea police department had received several complaints from 
citizens regarding illicit drug activity and the solicitation of 
sexual services near Bellingham Square. 
 
The officers were sitting in an unmarked police vehicle and 
were focused particularly on a nearby multifamily apartment 
building.  They observed the defendant standing with a woman on 
the sidewalk outside the building.  While they watched, the 
defendant repeatedly entered the apartment building, remained 
inside for approximately thirty seconds, and then returned to 
the sidewalk in front of the building.  On at least one of these 
occasions, the woman accompanied the defendant inside the 
building.  Based on his training and experience in the narcotics 
unit, Torres believed that it was common for individuals engaged 
in street-level drug transactions to maintain the bulk of their 
narcotics elsewhere, so as not to have drugs on their persons if 
stopped, and to return to the "stash location" after a sale in 
order to retrieve drugs for a new sale ("re-up").  Torres 
believed that the defendant was engaging in this practice. 
 
The officers saw the defendant initiate conversations with 
several pedestrians passing by on the sidewalk.  On one 
occasion, a pedestrian stopped and spoke with the defendant; the 
two then walked around the corner, where they remained out of 
the officers' sight for approximately five to ten minutes.  
4 
 
 
Torres believed that the defendant had conducted a drug 
transaction on the side street in order to avoid being seen by 
anyone on the main street. 
 
After approximately twenty minutes of observation, and 
having become increasingly suspicious of the defendant's 
behavior, the officers saw an individual, later identified as 
James Foster, approach the defendant, who was again standing 
outside the apartment building.  Torres noticed that Foster was 
"manipulating something in his hands" as he spoke to the 
defendant; Torres believed that Foster was counting currency.  
Foster and the defendant then turned and walked around the 
corner, where they were no longer in view of the officers.2  
Because the officers believed a drug transaction was about to 
take place, they, too, rounded the corner. 
 
When the officers pulled onto the side street, they saw the 
defendant and Foster standing facing one another.  Torres 
believed that the defendant handed an item to Foster.  Torres 
could not see the item, but thought that he had just witnessed a 
hand-to-hand drug transaction; therefore, he and Betz got out of 
their vehicle and approached the two men. 
                                                 
2 The judge made no finding as to whether the defendant had 
"re-upped" before engaging with Foster, and there was no 
testimony from Torres to this effect.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 433 (2015). 
5 
 
 
 
As he approached, Torres requested that Foster remove his 
hands from his sweatshirt pocket.  Although Foster initially was 
hesitant to comply, he told Torres that it was because he had a 
knife in his front pocket.  When Torres removed the knife from 
Foster's sweatshirt pocket, he saw a clear bag containing a 
white substance, which he believed to be cocaine.  Foster 
subsequently was arrested. 
 
Torres then approached the defendant, who had been speaking 
with Betz.  The defendant appeared to be upset and animated, and 
he was not complying with Betz's demands.  Torres stated that 
the defendant had taken a "bladed" stance toward Betz and was 
pulling away from the officers.3  This led Torres to fear for his 
safety, so he determined a patfrisk was necessary.  The officers 
did not find any weapons or drugs, but they did seize a twenty 
dollar bill from the defendant.  In Torres's experience, the 
amount of suspected cocaine found on Foster's person had a 
street value of roughly twenty dollars.  The defendant was 
arrested. 
 
b.  The strip search.  The defendant was brought to the 
Chelsea police station, where officers began a routine booking 
procedure.  At some point, police suspended the booking 
procedure because the arresting officers believed that the 
                                                 
 
3 Torres explained that a bladed stance refers to a fighting 
position. 
6 
 
 
defendant could have had drugs concealed on his person.4  More 
specifically, Torres testified that, in his experience, it is 
common for street-level drug distributors to conceal drugs in 
their crotch area to avoid detection.  The officers thus 
determined that a "more thorough search of the defendant was 
necessary," and decided to conduct a strip search.  Upon being 
told that he was to comply with the strip search, the defendant 
responded in a verbally animated manner and protested that the 
officers were "not going to do that." 
 
Torres and Betz escorted the defendant to a nearby cell and 
ordered that he remove his shoes and socks, as well as his 
shirt, pants, and underwear.5  When the defendant was fully 
undressed, the two officers saw a red bandana and seized it from 
his groin area.  The bandana contained what they believed to be 
seven small bags of cocaine.  The officers returned the 
defendant's clothing, allowed him to dress, and then resumed the 
booking procedure. 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was charged with 
distribution of a class B substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A; 
conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G. L. c. 94C, § 40; and 
                                                 
 
4 The Commonwealth does not argue that an inventory search 
was conducted at any point. 
 
 
5 The record is unclear as to whether the defendant 
undressed himself or whether the officers removed his clothing. 
7 
 
 
possession with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).  
He moved to suppress the drugs seized, inter alia, on the ground 
that the drugs were obtained as a result of an unconstitutional 
strip search.  After an evidentiary hearing, the judge found 
that police did not have probable cause to conduct a strip 
search of the defendant, and allowed his motion to suppress.6 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996), 
seeking leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal, and a single 
justice of this court allowed the appeal to proceed in the 
Appeals Court.  A divided panel of that court reversed the order 
allowing the motion to suppress, see Commonwealth v. Agogo, 93 
Mass. App. Ct. 495, 506 (2018), and we allowed the defendant's 
petition for further appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of his 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. 
                                                 
 
6 The defendant also moved to suppress on the grounds that 
police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop 
and frisk, and that his arrest was not supported by probable 
cause.  The judge denied the motion on those two grounds, from 
which the defendant does not appeal.  The sole issue before us 
is whether the officers had probable cause to justify conducting 
a strip search of the defendant. 
8 
 
 
Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002).  "[O]ur duty is to make an 
independent determination of the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  
See Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996). 
 
a.  Applicable standards.  The motion judge determined that 
the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant on drug 
charges, and that they were justified, therefore, in searching 
the defendant for evidence of drugs incident to that arrest.  
Searches incident to arrest, however, "may be unconstitutional 
notwithstanding the lawful arrest, because they involve 
inspections of such a highly personal nature, or are conducted 
in such a manner, as to constitute an unreasonable intrusion on 
an individual's privacy."  Commonwealth v. Prophete, 443 Mass. 
548, 555 (2005), and cases cited.  Indeed, "strip or visual body 
cavity searches, by their very nature, are humiliating, 
demeaning, and terrifying experiences that, without question, 
constitute a substantial intrusion on one's personal privacy 
rights protected under the Fourth Amendment [to the United 
States Constitution] and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights."  Id. at 553.  As such, "before police 
may command removal of an arrested person's last layer of 
clothing, they must have probable cause to believe . . . that 
they will find a weapon, contraband, or the fruits or 
9 
 
 
instrumentalities of criminal activity that they could not 
reasonably expect to discover without forcing the arrested 
person to discard all of his or her clothing" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 553, 556.  Reasonable suspicion is not enough.  
Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 155 (2016). 
In addition to the probable cause requirement, for a strip 
search to be constitutional under the United States Constitution 
and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, "such searches also 
must be reasonably conducted."  See Morales, 462 Mass. at 342.  
It is undisputed that a strip search occurred here, and, because 
we conclude that there was no probable cause to strip search the 
defendant, we need not reach the question whether the strip 
search was reasonably conducted. 
b.  Probable cause.  In making a probable cause 
determination, "as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities[,] . . . the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [individuals], 
not legal technicians, act."  See Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 
Mass. 891, 895-896 (1990), quoting Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307, 313 (1959).  The factual and practical considerations 
known to the police at the time they concluded that a strip 
search was necessary here were as follows.  The officers 
determined that the defendant had been engaging in street-level 
drug distribution.  Based on their training and experience, they 
10 
 
 
believed that individuals engaged in street-level drug 
distribution may conceal drugs in the crotch area to avoid 
detection.  When police approached the defendant, he had taken a 
"bladed" stance, and he had displayed an animated demeanor.  He 
also had pulled away from officers prior to their decision to 
pat frisk him.  After the patfrisk, officers discovered the 
twenty dollars on the defendant's person; this amount was 
consistent with the street value of the suspected cocaine they 
found on Foster's person.  Later, at the police station, when 
police informed the defendant of his imminent strip search, he 
vocally protested. 
On these facts, it is evident that the officers had, at 
best, a reasonable suspicion that the defendant could be 
concealing contraband in his crotch.  When determining whether a 
strip search is constitutionally permissible, however, a 
reasonable suspicion is not enough.  See Prophete, 443 Mass. 
at 553 (reasonable suspicion to initiate strip search is 
sufficient under Fourth Amendment, but probable cause is 
required under art. 14).7  Probable cause requires some 
                                                 
 
7 A strip search is not as intrusive as a manual body cavity 
search, "which involves some degree of touching and probing of 
body cavities" and therefore requires "a strong showing of 
particularized need supported by a high degree of probable 
cause" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Morales, 462 Mass. 
334, 340 n.4 (2012). 
11 
 
 
affirmative indication that drugs or other contraband are being 
concealed in areas such as the crotch or groin. 
The requisite affirmative indication that contraband or 
weapons are being secreted in very private parts of the body may 
take a number of forms, as our cases have recognized.  It may be 
the sight or feel of an unusual object or protrusion that 
supplements police suspicion of drug involvement.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Clermy, 421 Mass. 325, 330-331 (1995) (police 
suspicion supplemented when, during patfrisk, they felt hard 
plastic prescription drug container hidden in defendant's 
groin); Commonwealth v. Vick, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 624-625, 
630-631 (2016) (probable cause to conduct strip search where, 
during patfrisk, officer felt hard object in cleft of 
defendant's buttocks).  When a hard object or suspicious bulge 
is detected, it is more likely to amount to probable cause if 
the confluence of factors otherwise known to police at the time 
of the strip search confirms their belief that the object is a 
weapon or contraband.  See generally 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.6(b) (5th ed. 2018) ("If the package is concealed in 
the groin area, a finding of probable cause is much more likely.  
And even if the touching does not alone supply probable cause, 
12 
 
 
it may contribute together with other facts to a probable cause 
finding" [footnote omitted]).8 
The requisite affirmative indication also may be found in 
behaviors suggesting that the defendant is hiding something 
somewhere on his person that a patfrisk reasonably could not 
discover, absent divestiture of the arrestee's clothing.  For 
example, such an indication may emerge when, during an ordinary 
search or patfrisk, the arrestee is seen notably attempting to 
block his or her groin, buttocks, breasts, or genital area from 
police view or reach.  See Prophete, 443 Mass. at 554-555 
(police suspicion supplemented when defendant twice used hands 
to protect groin area during patfrisk).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 408 (1999) (probable cause to strip 
search defendant after police saw his associate obtain from him 
two bags of cocaine, sell one bag to undercover officer, and 
return with one bag and money to defendant, who appeared to 
serve as his associate's "stash" location). 
Here, there was no affirmative indication that the 
defendant was secreting contraband or weapons in his groin area.  
                                                 
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 149, 155-156 
(2016), the detection of a hard object behind the defendant's 
testicles did not give rise to probable cause for a strip 
search.  The police had no evidence to suggest that the 
defendant was involved in drug activity, and officers already 
knew that the object was not a weapon, thereby dispelling any 
safety concerns arising from an exit order and upon which the 
attendant patfrisk was predicated. 
13 
 
 
After finding only a twenty dollar bill on the defendant and 
arresting him, the officers had nothing more than a generalized 
suspicion that this street-level drug dealer, who likely kept a 
stash of drugs in the nearby apartment building, had them on his 
person.9  The officers felt or saw nothing indicative of 
concealed contraband after searching him at the scene, and the 
defendant did not attempt, at any point, to block officers from 
reaching or viewing his groin area.  There also was no evidence 
that the officers ever saw the defendant place anything in his 
crotch, reach for his crotch, or walk in a manner consistent 
with there being an object concealed in his crotch. 
The officer's training and experience as to the general 
practices of street-level drug dealers do not constitute the 
requisite particularized indication of concealment.  Cf. Amado, 
474 Mass. at 155 (suspicion of contraband based on police 
experience and training insufficient).  Likewise, the 
defendant's behavior justifying the patfrisk at the scene 
(taking a bladed stance) is too attenuated in relation to the 
later strip search that occurred at the police station.  There, 
the defendant's animated vocal displeasure at the prospect of 
being subjected to a strip search is not the type of behavior we 
                                                 
 
9 Where police believed that a sale to Foster had just been 
consummated, there would be no likely reason why the defendant 
would continue to have had drugs on his person if he only 
retrieved enough from a stash for each sale. 
14 
 
 
have recognized as affirmatively indicative of concealment.  
Were it otherwise, the risk is that such a reaction to being 
told of an imminent strip search readily could be induced, and 
then used to justify the search.  See Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 
384 Mass. 762, 764 (1981) (police cannot "turn a hunch into a 
reasonable suspicion by inducing the conduct justifying the 
suspicion").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 99-100 
(2018) (police cannot justify warrantless search of home by 
inducing exigency).  To permit such a search in these 
circumstances, absent an affirmative indication of concealment, 
would be to authorize an inherently degrading strip search 
whenever an ordinary search of a suspected drug dealer does not 
yield evidence of the contraband police seek.  We are 
constrained by art. 14 from doing so.  See Amado, 474 Mass. at 
155. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  While we are mindful that a strip search 
may, at times, be necessary to effectuate the legitimate ends of 
law enforcement or to protect public safety, on the facts found 
by the motion judge, the police lacked probable cause to conduct 
a strip search of this defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.