Title: GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH
Citation: 2024 OK 43
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2024

GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH 2024 OK 43 Case Number: 121849 Decided: 06/11/2024 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. IN THE MATTER OF: PETER TOWNE GALBRAITH, II, Petitioner/Appellant, v. BELINDA GALBRAITH, Respondent/Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY; Honorable Mary Ann Godsby, Special Judge ¶0 The co-guardians of an incapacitated ward filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on behalf of their ward. The trial court held generally that the guardian did not have authority to file the petition on behalf of the ward. One of the co-guardians subsequently obtained authorization from the guardianship court to file the petition and then refiled. The wife of the ward filed a motion to dismiss alleging Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The trial court agreed and entered a more detailed judgment specifying the caselaw and statutes it believed supported the motion to dismiss. The guardian appealed the judgment to this Court and we previously retained the matter on our own motion. PREVIOUSLY RETAINED ON THIS COURT'S OWN MOTION; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS James R. Gotwals, Mary L. Gutierrez, and John C. Gotwals, Barrow & Grimm, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma for Petitioner/Appellant Emalie L. Foster, McAfee & Taft, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma for Respondent/Appellee COMBS, J.: ¶1 This matter involves the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. The guardian filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in Tulsa County, Oklahoma seeking to dissolve the marriage of an incapacitated ward from his estranged wife. The district court denied the petition on the grounds that provisions of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act as well as title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not provide authorization for a guardian to initiate divorce proceedings on behalf of a ward. Its decision was also based on decisions of this Court which preceded the enactment of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, previously known as the Oklahoma Guardianship Act.1 We disagree. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 The Petitioner, Peter Galbraith, II, (Mr. Galbraith/ward) and the Respondent, Belinda Galbraith (Mrs. Galbraith), were married on October 3, 2015, in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Prior to the marriage, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement that would terminate in ten (10) years if, (1) the parties are still married; (2) neither party is deceased; and (3) no Petition for Divorce or Petition for Separation was filed by either party prior to the date of termination of the agreement.2 Somewhere between 2018 to 2019 Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and in April 2022, she deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. Later that year, around August/September 2022, she advised Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother that she could no longer take care of Mr. Galbraith and asked if they could take care of him. Mr. Galbraith was moved out of the marital home soon thereafter. ¶3 In October 2022, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship3 over the person and property of Mr. Galbraith and Letters of Guardianship were filed in January 2023. In the same month, the co-guardians filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage in the District Court of Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma; FD-2023-49 (first divorce action) without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion on May 24, 2023. The journal entry of judgment stated that the co-guardians lacked the authority to initiate the divorce on behalf of the ward, Mr. Galbraith. The guardian, Mark Galbraith, thereafter filed with the guardianship court an Application for Authority to Pursue Legal Remedies Belonging to the Guardianship. He sought to obtain authority to pursue legal remedies of the ward. On July 24, 2023, the guardianship court granted authorization to pursue all legal actions. This order was amended on August 8, 2023, to clarify that the authorization included "instituting an action for a Dissolution of Marriage and obtaining a Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage."4 ¶4 Upon receiving authorization from the guardianship court, Mark Galbraith filed, on August 10, 2023, a second Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and verified the petition. Thereafter, Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion to dismiss arguing there was no statutory authority allowing a guardian to instigate a dissolution of marriage just as there is no authority for a guardian to decide to whom a ward should marry. On October 31, 2023, (filed December 6, 2023) the trial court entered a journal entry of judgment granting the motion. It held that a guardian did not have the authority to initiate a divorce proceeding pursuant to Scofus v. Fuller, 1954 OK 363, 280 P.2d 720 , and the post-Scofus enacted statute, 30 O.S. § 3-119, does not authorize a court to allow a guardian to initiate a divorce proceeding. As further evidence of the lack of such authority, the trial court noted that 43 O.S. § 105(C) requires the petitioner in a divorce proceeding to verify a petition for dissolution of marriage. ¶5 On December 19, 2023, Mr. Galbraith appealed the journal entry of judgment and on January 12, 2024, this Court retained the appeal on our own motion. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 An appellate court makes a de novo examination of the issues when a trial court dismisses an action. Kirby v. Jean's Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, ¶5, 222 P.3d 21 , 23. Motions to dismiss are generally viewed with disfavor. Osage Nation v. Board of Commissioners of Osage County, 2017 OK 34, ¶22, 394 P.3d 1224, 1234 (quoting American Natural Resources, LLC v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P,, 2016 OK 67, ¶6, 374 P.3d 766, 769). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must take as true all the challenged pleading's allegations together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them. Harwood v. Ardagh Grp., 2022 OK 51, ¶14, 522 P.3d 473, 477, as corrected (Sept. 19, 2022). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law that governs the claim, not the facts. MeGee v. El Patio, LLC, 2023 OK 14, ¶5, 524 P.3d 1283, 1285. Dismissal is appropriate only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or there are insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Id. ANALYSIS ¶7 This appeal is prosecuted pursuant to Rule 1.36, Okla.Sup.Ct.R, which provides for the trial court filings to serve as the appellate briefs and the assignments of error on appeal are those listed in an appellant's petition in error. Farley v. City of Claremore, 2020 OK 30, ¶10, 465 P.3d 1213, 1221. Mrs. Galbraith asserts a guardian is not authorized to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Her arguments rely largely on Scofus v. Fuller, 1954 OK 363, 280 P.3d 720, and State ex rel. Robedeaux v. Johnson, 1966 OK 157, 418 P.3d 337. The facts and holding in Scofus are distinguishable from the present case. In Scofus, the couple was married in July 1939. Scofus, 1954 OK 363, ¶2, 280 P.3d at 722. On February 16, 1940, husband (J. D. Fuller) filed a petition for divorce alleging his Native American wife (Martha) had large deposits of money with the Department of Interior and asked for $50,000.00 in alimony. Id. ¶3, 280 P.3d at 722. Martha answered and cross-petitioned for divorce. Id. Ten days later, Fuller incurred a significant head injury. Id. ¶4, 280 P.3d at 722. In May 1940, Fuller was found to be incompetent and his father was appointed his guardian. Id. ¶5, 280 P.3d at 722. In July 1940, the divorce was tried and Fuller was granted a divorce as well as support money in the amount of $10,000.00. Id. ¶6, 280 P.3d at 722. In January 1942, Fuller was adjudicated "insane" and was committed to a hospital in Vinita, Oklahoma. Id. ¶7, 280 P.3d at 722. He was released in 1949 but was never restored to competency. Id. In the meantime, Martha remarried in 1944, some four years after the divorce. Id. ¶8, 280 P.3d at 722. Her new husband was Buster Chisholm (Chisolm). Id. Martha died on July 9, 1949, and Chisholm filed an application to probate her will. Id. However, Chisholm died just weeks later on July 21, 1949. Id. Fuller through his guardian challenged the probate and claimed he was the surviving husband of Martha. Id. ¶9, 280 P.3d at 722. His claim was denied by the County Court. Id. Later, in 1951, Fuller's guardian filed a petition to vacate the divorce decree based upon the allegation that Fuller was insane at the time the decree was entered. Id. ¶11, 280 P.3d at 722-23. The County Court agreed and found the decree was void on the face of the record and Fuller was the surviving husband and forced heir of Martha. Id. ¶12, 280 P.3d at 723. The administrator of Chisholm's estate (Harry Scofus) appealed the ruling to the District Court. Id. ¶13, 280 P.3d at 723. The District Court also held the divorce decree was void on the face of the record and vacated the decree. Id. Scofus then appealed the matter to this Court alleging the divorce was valid. Id. ¶19, 280 P.3d at 723. ¶8 We held that unless a divorce decree is void on the face of the record or judgment roll, it cannot be attacked after it has remained unchallenged for more than 10 years. Id. ¶15, 280 P.3d at 723. We acknowledged that the well-established rule requires that in order to vacate a judgment upon grounds that it is void on its face the defects must be patent on the face of the record and no outside testimony is permissible to show its invalidity. Id. ¶18, 280 P.3d at 723. If extrinsic evidence is necessary, the motion to vacate must be presented within three years following the rendition of the judgment. Id. ¶33, 280 P.3d at 725; See 12 O.S. 1951, § 1038. The divorce decree, however, was rendered more than 10 years prior to the motion to vacate and extrinsic evidence was introduced to show the decree was void. Id. ¶34, 280 P.3d at 725. The trial court that granted the divorce only found Fuller to be incompetent, not insane. Id. ¶35, 280 P.3d at 725. We held it was error for the later court to admit extrinsic evidence tending to show that Fuller had been insane prior to the decree of divorce. Id. ¶35, 280 P.3d at 726. Therefore, we reversed the decision of the trial court with directions to hold the divorce decree valid. Id. ¶36, 280 P.3d at 726. ¶9 In support of her arguments, Mrs. Galbraith relies upon language in paragraph 30 of Scofus. In paragraph 30 of the opinion, the Court stated, "We think the majority rule that an insane person may not institute or maintain a divorce action by guardian or Committee, is sound and fair." Id. ¶30, 280 P.3d at 725. The trial court correctly referred to this language as dicta because it was not necessary for the Court's holding.5 The case was not decided on the personal nature of a divorce action but was instead decided upon the length of time one has to use extrinsic evidence in order to vacate a judgment. The remainder of paragraph 30 in Scofus provides: We also think the same rule should be applied to an insane person who seeks to have a divorce decree vacated because the vacation of such decree requires the same personal decision as is required by one seeking a divorce. The divorce decree severs the marital relation and requires a personal decision. The vacation of such decree restores the marriage relation where both parties are living and requires the same exercise of personal decision as is required in deciding that a divorce is desired. An insane person is incapable of making either decision. Id. ¶30, 280 P.3d at 725. Mrs. Galbraith also cites State ex rel. Robedeaux v. Johnson, wherein, we agreed with the authorities cited by Mrs. Robedeaux that an insane person, under guardianship, cannot maintain an action for divorce. 1966 OK 157, ¶15, 418 P.2d 337 , 340. ¶10 In the present case, we disagree with Mrs. Galbraith's reliance upon our decision in Scofus for several reasons. Mrs. Galbraith argued in her motion to dismiss that under Oklahoma law, a mentally incompetent person cannot institute a divorce action through a guardian, citing Scofus. However, Scofus only addressed whether an "insane" person would be prevented from filing for divorce through their guardian. Nothing in the record before this Court indicates Mr. Galbraith was ever adjudicated "insane." The record refers to him as incapacitated6, however, there is no order included in the record even making this adjudication. ¶11 Mrs. Galbraith also asserted that the decision to end a marriage is purely a personal decision and if a guardian could initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of a ward, he or she could also enter into a marriage on behalf of a ward. We find this concern unfounded. Section 1 of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides: Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract to which the consent of parties legally competent of contracting and of entering into it is necessary, and the marriage relation shall only be entered into, maintained or abrogated as provided by law. This statute provides that marriage is a civil contract and is personal, thereby requiring the consent of both parties as well as requiring those parties to be legally competent to enter into a contract. No statute granting a similar level of personal status for a dissolution of marriage has been cited. Mrs. Galbraith mainly relies upon the dicta expressed in Scofus and interprets this language to apply the same level of personal gravitas of marriage to an action for dissolution of marriage. In as much as Scofus can be interpreted to require this, we disagree with the opinion, especially considering the facts of this case and the subsequently enacted legislation. ¶12 Marriage requires the consent of both parties as well as requires those parties to be competent to contract. A marriage binds the married couple to a contract which confers special rights and responsibilities and creates a marital estate. Unlike marriage, a divorce need only be initiated by one party. Therefore, when proceedings are initiated by the other spouse, one is compelled to dissolve their marriage even when it is not desired. The purpose of the divorce is to end the legal status of the relationship and to equitably divide the marital estate as well as to provide for support, including support for the care and custody of any children of the marriage. In other words, divorce proceedings entail the division of assets, the calculation of support and the termination of any special rights granted by the marriage. Feelings set aside, it is a contract dispute that will inevitably end in the termination of the contract. A divorce clearly lacks the same level of "personal" status as that given to marriage. ¶13 Decades after Scofus and Robedeaux the Legislature enacted the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act (OGCA).7 The purpose of the OGCA includes providing protection for the rights of incapacitated persons and the management of their financial resources. 30 O.S. 2021, § 1-103 (A). The act identifies the various duties of the guardian. Guardians are required to "assure, to the extent reasonably possible, that the rights of the wards for whom they are appointed are protected." Id. § 1-103(B)(2)(a). A guardian "has only those powers over the person or the property of the ward, or both such person and property, as ordered by the court pursuant to this title." Id. § 1-119 (emphasis added). A "guardian . . . must look to the support, health and education of the ward." Id. § 1-120(A). A "guardian of the property must keep safely the property of his ward." Id. § 1-121(A). A "guardian of the property . . . shall act as a fiduciary and shall perform, diligently and in good faith, as a prudent person would in managing his own property, not with regard to speculation but with regard to conservation and growth, and the specific duties and powers assigned by the court." Id. (B) (emphasis added). A "guardian . . . of the person of an incapacitated . . . person is responsible for the care or control of the ward pursuant to the [Act], and the orders of the court . . . ." Id. § 3-118(A)(emphasis added). A "guardian . . . of the person of an incapacitated . . . person shall: . . . . c. provide any required consents or approvals on behalf of the ward as authorized by the court." Id. (B)(1)(c)(emphasis added). ¶14 In addition, the OGCA grants certain authority to the courts. It provides: B. It is the purpose of the system of general and limited guardianships for incapacitated and partially incapacitated persons established by this act to provide for the participation of such persons, as fully as possible, in the decisions which affect them. It is the intent of the Oklahoma State Legislature: 1. That the court shall exercise the authority conferred by the Oklahoma Guardianship Act so as to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the incapacitated or partially incapacitated person and make appointive and other orders only to the extent necessitated by the mental and adaptive limitations or other condition of the incapacitated or partially incapacitated person warranting the procedure; 30 O.S. 2021, § 1-103(B)(1). Section 1-114 of title 30 provides in pertinent part (emphasis added): A. In all cases the court making the appointment of a guardian has exclusive jurisdiction to control such guardian in the management and disposition of the person and property of the ward. B. The court has jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings, and has the following powers, which must be exercised in the manner prescribed by statute, to: 1. Appoint and remove guardians for minors and for incapacitated and partially incapacitated persons; 2. Issue and revoke letters of guardianship; 3. Control the conduct of guardians with regard to the care and treatment provided to their wards; 4. Control the conduct of guardians with regard to the management of the financial resources of their wards, including but not limited to the power to: a. compel guardians to submit plans, reports, inventories and accountings to the court, b. compel payment and delivery by guardians of property belonging to their wards, c. order the payment of debts, the sale of property, and order and regulate the distribution of property which has been placed under the control or management of a guardian, and d. settle the accounts of guardians; 5. Appoint appraisers of the property of wards; 6. Compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and property; 7. After a petition has been filed for appointment of a guardian for a minor, make or modify any temporary order of guardianship during the progress of the proceedings that would be in the best interest of the ward. Any such temporary order may be entered ex parte with written notice sent to all parties directing them to appear before the court, at a time and place therein specified, not more than twenty (20) days from the time of making such order, to show cause why the order should not be granted for temporary guardianship; and 8. Exercise all powers conferred by the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, Section 1-101 et seq. of this title, and to make such orders as may be necessary for the exercise of said powers. ¶15 When the Act was created in 1988, it amended existing law and enacted new sections of law. In particular, it enacted a new section of law, 30 O.S. § 3-119. The version applicable to the present matter is the current version of the statute (30 O.S. 2021, § 3-119). This section provides certain limitations on the powers of a guardian. It begins by stating "A guardian shall have no powers except as provided by the Oklahoma Statutes or given to such guardian in the orders in the guardianship proceeding." (emphasis added). It then provides a non-exhaustive list of limitations and restrictions on the guardian and the courts. This includes provisions to: a) limit a guardian's ability to withhold life-sustaining procedures from the ward without specific authorization from the court; b) prohibit both the guardian and courts from consenting to the termination of a ward's parental rights; c) prohibit a guardian from consenting to certain medical procedures without specific authorization from the court; d) prevent a guardian from prohibiting a marriage or divorce of the ward without specific authorization from the court; and e) restrict a guardian from committing a ward to a facility absent formal commitment proceedings that include independent counsel for the ward. ¶16 If the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of a statute, as in the cases of ambiguity, we must apply rules of statutory construction. YDF, Inc. v. Schlumar, Inc., 2006 OK 32, ¶6, 136 P.3d 656 , 658. The test for ambiguity in a statute is whether the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. In Matter of J.L.M., 2005 OK 15, ¶5, 109 P.3d 336 , 338. The legislative intent will be ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Colclazier, 1997 OK 134, ¶9, 950 P.2d 824 , 827; Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶8, 37 P.3d 882 , 886. This Court will not limit consideration to one word or phrase but will consider the various provisions of the relevant legislative scheme to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent and the public policy underlying the intent. YDF, Inc., 2006 OK 32, ¶6, 136 P.3d 656 , 658. ¶17 The question presented to this Court is whether the OGCA provides a court the authority to grant a guardian the power to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. We answer in the affirmative. In our review of the whole Act, the OGCA repeatedly emphasizes the court's authorization to grant powers to the guardian. It is clear from the purpose of the OGCA, the Legislature intended to provide authorization for a guardian to protect the rights of the ward as well as provide for the management of the ward's financial resources. Section 3-119 provides a list of powers that a guardian is prohibited from doing without court approval, in most cases. It is significant to this Court's review of legislative intent that the Legislature did not prohibit a court from authorizing a guardian to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. Especially, when, as here, the main if not sole reason for filing the petition for dissolution of marriage complies with one of the fundamental purposes of the Act, i.e., to protect the (growth) and management of the ward's financial resources. The guardian acts as a fiduciary of the ward's resources and here the guardian filed the petition for divorce after having been authorized to do so by the guardianship court. ¶18 All that remains of the marriage is a determination as to the equitable division of property. This division will include the review of the parties' antenuptial agreement which the parties agree provides that it will terminate in 10 years unless a petition for divorce is filed prior to the date of termination of the agreement. The guardian is protecting the rights and resources of the ward by initiating a proceeding that will effect the terms of the antenuptial agreement. Some arguments were made that these asset issues could all be handled within the guardianship proceedings without the need to file for divorce. The guardianship proceedings are not before this Court as there is no evidence that an appeal was taken from any of the guardianship court orders. The trial court's judgment dismissing the petition prevents the ward and guardian from initiating a proceeding necessary to enforce the ward's access to the courts. Mr. Galbraith and his guardian are being denied access to the courts to enforce an agreement which is asserted would provide more support for the ward.8 A denial which goes against the very purpose of the OGCA.9 ¶19 Mrs. Galbraith also cited 43 O.S. 2021, § 105(C), as another reason why a court cannot authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce proceeding. Subsection C of section 105 states that a "petition [for dissolution of marriage] must be verified as true, by the affidavit of the petitioner." Here, the petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the guardian states "the Petitioner, Peter Galbraith, II, by and through his Guardian of Person and Property, Mark Galbraith" and then the verification states that "I am acting on behalf of the Petitioner" and is signed by "Mark Galbraith" as "Guardian of the Person and Property [of] Peter Galbraith, II." In light of the provisions of the OGCA, we do not see the language in subsection C to be a bar against a guardian's verification of the petition. As mentioned, many parts of the OGCA expressly allow a court to grant powers to the guardian, e.g., § 3-119(A) provides the guardian with powers as ordered by the court in the guardianship proceedings. The guardianship court provided in its August 8, 2023, Amended Order that "the Court hereby grants the General Guardian authorization to pursue any and all legal actions . . . inclusive of instituting an action for a Dissolution of Marriage and obtaining a Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage." We find this authorization would necessarily include all powers required to effectuate the filing of the petition. Further, subparagraph c of paragraph 1 of subsection B of section 3-118 provides: B. 1. A guardian or limited guardian of the person of an incapacitated or partially incapacitated person shall: . . . . c. provide any required consents or approvals on behalf of the ward as authorized by the court. 30 O.S. 2021, § 3-118(B)(1)(c). The court clearly provided authorization for the guardian to file the petition and thus any consents or approvals necessary to do that were also authorized.10 CONCLUSION ¶20 The trial court's judgment specifically dismissed Mr. Galbraith's petition for dissolution of marriage based upon its interpretation of our decision in Scofus v. Fuller, 43 O.S. § 105(C), and 30 O.S. § 3-119. The Scofus decision concerned a ward who had been adjudicated "insane" after a decree of divorce and was decided on issues related to the vacation of a judgment. Neither fact or issue is present in this case. The Scofus dicta also spoke to the personal nature of divorce and determined a guardian could not initiate a divorce action on behalf of an "insane" ward. For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with its dicta in as much as it may be interpreted to prevent all divorce actions from being initiated by a guardian on behalf of a ward. The contention that a divorce action is of such a personal nature to be on the same level as that of marriage and therefore can only be initiated by the ward, is not well taken. There are ample provisions in the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act to support the authority of a court to grant powers to a guardian. We hold, that under the facts of this case, the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the Guardianship court from authorizing the filing of a petition for a divorce to "protect the rights of the ward" and for the "support, health and education of the ward." These powers can include the authority of the guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of the ward. This is especially true here when reading those provisions in conjunction with the purpose of the OGCA. We also hold the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The dispositive issue is whether the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. We hold that such authorization is within the powers granted to the court by law. We reverse the trial court's judgment granting Mrs. Galbraith's motion to dismiss and remand the matter for further proceedings. PREVIOUSLY RETAINED ON THIS COURT'S OWN MOTION; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS Rowe, V.C.J., Kauger, Edmondson, Combs and Darby (by separate writing), JJ., concur; Kane, C.J. (by separate writing), Winchester (by separate writing), Gurich and Kuehn (by separate writing), JJ., dissent. FOOT