Title: JW METZ LUMBER COMPANY v. Taylor
Citation: 302 P.2d 521
Docket Number: 17996
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 1956

302 P.2d 521 (1956) J. W. METZ LUMBER COMPANY and Consolidated Underwriters, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Herbert TAYLOR and the Industrial Commission of Colorado, Defendants in Error. No. 17996. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. October 8, 1956. Rehearing Denied November 5, 1956. *522 Wood &amp; Ris, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants in error. BRADFIELD, Justice. This is an Industrial Commission case here on a writ of error to the district court of the City and County of Denver. One Herbert Taylor, an employee of the J. W. Metz Lumber Company, filed his claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation resulting from an alleged accident on May 12, 1955, at his employer's lumber yard. Consolidated Underwriters was the employer's insurer and is a party herein. The claim was referred to a referee of the Industrial Commission of Colorado who, after a hearing, found for claimant Taylor and awarded compensation. A petition for a review of the referee's award was filed and denied. The claim was then referred to the Commission which affirmed the referee's order as a final award. A petition for a review of the Commission's finding was filed with the Commission and denied. Thereupon an action was filed in the district court of Denver to set aside the final award of the Commission. The matter was tried to the court which entered its judgment affirming the award of the commission. A motion for a new trial was dispensed with. The employer brings this writ of error for a review of the judgment of the district court. For reversal of the judgment, the employer urges: A. There is no evidence of an accidental injury. B. There is no evidence of disability proximately caused by accidental injury. Claimant Taylor testified: "A. I reported back the (May) 16th. Claimant testified that after his return to work on May 16th, he waited on customers, filled bins and things that were low in stock, and as he improved, began going out into the yard on occasion and lifted sacks of cement into cars. Claimant further testified that by September 22, 1955, he was again doing heavy work, picking rebars, being reinforced steel used in concrete "twenty feet long and pretty heavy," from the ground and putting them into bins; no one assisted him, following which his back was very sore and the pain intensified. "Q. Now did you have a relapse or some such thing * * * Did it suddenly get worse * * *? A. Oh *523 yes. Well, it wasn't my back; it went to my leg. Joe Linch, a witness for claimant, testified: Beverly Morton, a witness for respondents, testified: Dr. Sherbok, a witness for claimant, testified that he is licensed to practice medicine in Colorado, his practice limited to orthopedic surgery; he first saw claimant October 10, 1955. Claimant had some very definite positive physical findings "at the first time I saw him". The written report of Dr. Gunderson, a witness for claimant, was filed and made a part of the record before the Commission *524 and under C.R.S. 1953, 81-14-3(1) was properly considered by the Commission. His report states his medical opinion of claimant: It is admitted both employer and claimant employee were subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the employer had complied with the provisions thereof requiring insurance. The sections of the act as to when compensation shall be obtained are: and Whether claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment at the lumber yard on May 12, 1955, or arose out of his employment cutting corn at his home on September 24, 1955, presented a question of fact to be determined by the referee and the Commission. They both found the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment at the employer's lumber yard on May 12, 1955. The accident was found at a "definite time," was "unexpected" and "unintended," and under the decisions of this Court would be an "accidental injury under the Compensation Act." In Central Surety &amp; Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 84 Colo. 481, 490, 271 P. 617, 621: In Carroll v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 473, 475, 195 P. 1097, 1098, 19 A.L.R. 107: In Allen v. Gettler, 94 Colo. 528, 530, 30 P.2d 1117, is stated: In United States Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 96 Colo. 571, 580, 45 P.2d 895, 899: "If the causes shown by the evidence, exertion, and excitement, were not out of the ordinary, the result was out of the ordinary and was unexpected and under rules we have laid down *525 constituted an accident." Industrial Commission v. Ule, 97 Colo. 253, 256, 48 P.2d 803. Ellermann v. Industrial Commission, 73 Colo. 20, 213 P. 120, 121: Industrial Commission v. Royal Indemnity Co., 124 Colo. 210, 236 P.2d 293, 295: The most recent expression of this Court hereon is Industrial Commission v. Corwin Hospital, 126 Colo. 358, 363, 250 P.2d 135, 137, where we quoted from In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A. 1916A, 306, as follows: The Commission's findings, when supported by competent evidence, are binding on the courts. United States Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra. The judgment is affirmed.