Title: Parker v. Game and Fish Com'n
Citation: 555 So. 2d 725
Docket Number: 07-58782
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 1989

555 So. 2d 725 (1989) Glenn PARKER, Sr., Glenn Parker, Jr., and Orey B. Parker v. MISSISSIPPI GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, Mississippi Bureau of Marine Resources, State of Mississippi, Chester Diaz, Henry Alexander, David Nellums, Frank Evans, and John Doe and Jane Doe. No. 07-58782. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 20, 1989. *726 D. Neil Harris, Pascagoula and Brent M. Bickham, Bickham &amp; Magee, Biloxi, for appellants. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Former Atty. Gen., Mike Moore, Atty. Gen., and Timothy L. Waycaster, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellees. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: This cause arises from a complaint of false arrest and false imprisonment filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Honorable Clinton E. Lockard, presiding. Summary judgment was entered in favor of defendants and this appeal taken, asserting as issues to be addressed: 1. Whether the plaintiffs' complaint was sufficient to notify the defendants that the plaintiffs intended to pursue a claim of malicious prosecution? 2. Whether the trial judge should have given the plaintiffs leave of court to amend their petition to include a complaint of malicious prosecution? 3. Whether the qualified immunity of law enforcement officials would shield these individual defendants from civil liability from a malicious prosecution claim? On November 19, 1984, Glenn Parker, Sr., Glenn Parker, Jr., and Orey B. Parker were arrested by conservation officers of the Mississippi Department of Wildlife Conservation in Stone County, Mississippi, charged with hunting from a public road, hunting from a motorized vehicle, and hunting deer at night with a lighting device. While to some these offenses may appear trite, the statutes prohibiting them serve a greater function than the protection of wildlife. Any citizen of a rural area of our State can quickly inform you of the highly dangerous nature of hunting from a vehicle and from a public road, and of firing high powered weapons from roadways at night or any other time for that matter. At any rate, the plaintiffs were convicted by the Stone County Justice Court. Their appeal to the Circuit Court of Stone County resulted in a hung jury after which the circuit judge sustained the Parkers' Motion for Dismissal and the case was dismissed with prejudice on February 13, 1986. On February 10, 1987, the Parkers filed their complaint of false arrest and false imprisonment in the Circuit Court of Jackson County and were met with a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann., § 15-1-35 (1972), as Amended, and that the individual defendants enjoyed immunity from these type of damages as they were acting within the course and scope of their official duties. At the hearing, the Parkers alleged for the first time that their complaint was for malicious prosecution. The trial judge held that their complaint was for false arrest and false imprisonment, actions which accrued on the date of their arrests, November 10, 1984, and were therefore barred by the one year statute of limitations. In accordance with this reasoning the trial judge granted the Motion for Summary Judgment and from this ruling, the Parkers have appealed. The Parkers urge that although they did not use the words "malicious prosecution" in their complaint, their pleadings *727 alleged sufficient factual components of a malicious prosecution claim to put the defendants on notice that such a cause of action had been asserted. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review. Short v. Columbus Rubber and Gasket Co., Inc., 535 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1988). In Pearl River County Bd. of Sup'rs. v. South East Collections Agency, Inc., 459 So. 2d 785 (Miss. 1984), this Court said: Section 15-1-35, Miss. Code Ann., (1972), as Amended, in pertinent part, states: As applied to the current situation, the Parkers' complaint for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued on the date of their arrest, November 19, 1984, and was governed by a one (1) year statute of limitation. The question before this Court is whether the February 10, 1987, complaint was sufficient to notify the defendants that a claim for malicious prosecution was also contemplated. Such an action would have accrued on February 13, 1986, when the criminal charges against the Parkers were dismissed with prejudice. Gandy v. Palmer, 251 Miss. 398, 415, 169 So. 2d 819, 827 (1964). While Rule 8 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, Rule 8 does not eliminate the necessity of stating circumstances, occurrences, and events which support the proffered claim. If the original complaint sufficiently alleged the factual components of a malicious prosecution claim, so as to put the defendants on notice, then the malicious prosecution claim is preserved. If the allegations were insufficient to put the defendants on notice, their claim is lost. In pertinent part, the complaint stated: The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution include: (1) The institution of a criminal proceeding; (2) by, or at the insistence of, the defendant; (3) the termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting the proceedings; (5) want of probable cause in the institution of the proceedings; (6) the suffering of injury or damage as a result of the prosecution. Royal Oil Co., Inc. v. Wells, 500 So. 2d 439 (Miss. 1986); Owens v. Kroger Co., 430 So. 2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1983); State For Use and Benefit of Foster v. Turner, 319 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1975). The elements of a claim for false arrest or imprisonment are two-fold. They include: (1) The detention of the plaintiff and *729 the unlawfulness of such detention; (2) Imprisonment and the falsity thereof. Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So. 2d 1205, 1208 (Miss. 1987). The gist of the Parkers' allegations revolve exclusively around their arrest and imprisonment. There is no mention of the "circumstances, occurrences, and events" which involved their prosecution. All that is alleged is that they were falsely arrested and falsely detained without probable cause. They allege neither malice nor the absence of probable cause in the institution of the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, at no point in their pleadings do the plaintiffs allege that they suffered injury or damage as a result of the prosecution. Additionally, there is no assertion that the final outcome of the criminal proceedings favored the Parkers. The only allegation which vaguely relates to an element of malicious prosecution is found in Paragraph XXII, where the Parkers state that a two day jury trial resulted in a hung jury. Nowhere in their pleadings, affidavits, or testimony do they refer to the malicious institution of criminal proceedings. It was only after the trial judge indicated that he was leaning toward granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment that the attorney for Parkers first mentioned that a claim for malicious prosecution was contemplated. The record indicates that the trial judge did not recognize that the Parkers were advancing a claim for malicious prosecution in their pleadings. On July 1, 1987, a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment was held. At this hearing, the trial judge allowed the order dismissing their criminal charges into the record for the purposes of that motion only. At the conclusion of their arguments, the following exchange occurred: The Parkers submitted affidavits in response to the motion for summary judgment in which they stated, "We were wrongfully arrested and the evidence against us is false." (Emphasis Added). None of their affidavits allege any of the elements necessary to substantiate a claim for malicious prosecution. The complaint was not sufficient to put the defendants on notice of a claim for malicious prosecution. The threshold question here is whether or not the Parkers ever actually requested leave to amend their complaint. The following exchange took place at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment: This discourse discloses that the Parkers' counsel clearly neglected to request leave to amend for a claim of malicious prosecution. A trial judge will not be put in error on a matter which was not presented to him for his decision. Cossitt v. Federated Guar. Mut. Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 436, 446 (Miss. 1989). This case must be decided on the facts contained in the record and not on assertions in the briefs. Britt v. State, 520 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Miss. 1988); Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So. 2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1973). On this record there was no motion for leave to amend and the assignment is therefore without merit. But assuming, arguendo, that a motion for leave to amend was made, the question before us would then become whether the trial judge erred in refusing this motion. Rule 15, Miss.R.Civ.P., in relevant part, states: Our scope of review of an order denying a motion for leave to amend under Rule 15 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Bourn v. Tomlinson Interest, Inc., 456 So. 2d 747, 749 (Miss. 1984). Unless we are convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion, we are without authority to reverse. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 226 (1962). While proposed amendments have been liberally permitted throughout Mississippi legal history and are encouraged under Rule 15 a party cannot fail to convey the subject matter of the proposed amendment to the trial judge and if they do so fail, no error can be predicated on the judge's failure to allow the amendment. In Price v. Price, 430 So. 2d 848, 849 (Miss. 1983), this Court said: The Watts decision rings true today as it did a century ago, when this Court said: This record discloses that the Parkers did not disclose the substance of their proposed amendment to the trial judge, and their application was properly refused. Assuming that a motion for leave to amend was properly made, the record indicates that the "motion" was made only after the trial judge had indicated that he would sustain the motion for summary judgment. The same situation occurred in the Bourn case. In affirming the lower court we said: William Iselin &amp; Co., Inc. v. Delta Auction &amp; Real Estate Co., 433 So. 2d 911, 913 (Miss. 1983), announced: We are of the opinion that even had the Parkers properly moved for leave to amend their complaint it occurred after the motion for summary judgment had been sustained and was untimely. The Parkers assert their malicious prosecution claim is not time barred because the proposed amendment "relates back" to the original complaint. Rule 15(c), Miss.R.Civ.P. permits pleadings, which would otherwise be time barred by the statute of limitations, to be amended. The comments advise that the first test for whether an amendment relates back or not is whether the amended claim arose from the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as the original complaint. "[T]he standard for determining whether amendments qualify under Rule 15(c) is not simply an identity of transaction test; although not expressly mentioned in the rule, the courts also inquire into whether the opposing party has been put on notice regarding the claim or defense raised by the amended pleading." Wright &amp; Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1497 at 495 (1971). In Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 1725, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196, 201, fn. 1 (1984), it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted this notice criteria: It appears that the Parkers' amendment fails the identity of transaction test as well as the notice criteria. The "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" which gave rise to the Parkers' original complaint was their arrest. The "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" which gave rise to their proposed amendment was their prosecution. These occurrences are separate and distinct events. As such, there is no identity between these transactions and applying the first test, the proposed amendment should not relate back to the original complaint. Secondly, applying the notice criteria, since the original complaint failed to inform defendants of litigation concerning a "particular occurrence" (i.e. the criminal prosecution), the defendants were not given "all the notice that statutes of limitation were intended to provide." The amended claim cannot be rehabilitated through the "relation back" doctrine of Rule 15(c). In Red Enterprises, Inc. v. Peashooter, Inc., 455 So. 2d 793 (Miss. 1984), quoting from Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 226 (1962), this Court said: 455 So. 2d at 795. The Parkers say that because the defendants were aware of the allegations of false arrest and false imprisonment contained in their original petition, and since a malicious prosecution action would require proving the conduct set forth in the original complaint, there would be no undue prejudice to the defendants if leave were granted. This reasoning totally ignores the fact that false arrest and malicious prosecution are separate and distinct causes of action which are comprised of entirely different elements. To allege one by no means implies the other. Allowing the Parkers to circumvent the one year statute of limitations at the defendants' expense would be unduly prejudicial and justice does not require that leave be given in the current situation. The defendants cite Red Enterprises, Inc., supra, for authority that one of the reasons for which a motion for leave to amend should be denied is the futility of the amendment. The defendants take the position that had malicious prosecution been properly alleged, the results would have been no different because the defendants were immune from liability under such a claim as they were acting within their discretion as public law enforcement officials carrying out the duties of their positions. In Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So. 2d 689, 696 (Miss. 1984), this Court said: In essence, the defendants say that even if malicious prosecution had been properly pled, that as a matter of law, they are not amenable to judgment because they enjoy qualified immunity. The defendants appear to confuse qualified with absolute immunity. They are blind to the fact that malicious prosecution is by its very nature a "malicious act," sufficient to disengage the protective shield of qualified immunity. Had an amendment been allowed, the defendants would not have been entitled to judgment on the qualified immunity issue as a matter of law because the amended pleading would allege a triable issue of fact, being: whether malicious acts were committed by the defendants which would open them to civil liability. There is no merit to this assignment of error. In conclusion, the Parkers' petition was insufficient to inform the defendants that a claim for malicious prosecution was contemplated. The trial judge was correct in sustaining the motion for summary judgment. As to their second assignment, we find no evidence that a motion for leave to amend to assert a malicious prosecution claim was ever made, and this assignment is also without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., concur. *733 DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in result only. PITTMAN, J., not participating.