Title: Potter v. Blackburn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 323, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROSEMARY POTTER,  
§ 
No. 323, 2002 
 
 
§ 
     
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant  
§ 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
JUDITH BLACKBURN, 
§ 
C.A. No:  00C-03-222 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Appellees 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 19, 20041 
Decided:  May 25, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices, 
and CHANDLER, Chancellor,2 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED 
 
 
Kenneth M. Roseman, Esquire, of Ciconte, Roseman & Wasserman, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
 
Colin M. Shalk, Esquire, of Casarino, Christman & Shalk, P.A., 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
STEELE, Justice, for the Majority: 
 
                                                 
1This case was stayed pending the decisions in Mason v. Rizzi, No. 339, 2002, 2004 Del. LEXIS 
109 (Del. Mar. 3, 2004), and Eskin v. Carden, No. 322, 2002, 2004 Del. LEXIS 81 (Del. Feb. 13, 
2004).  The last mandate in these matters was the mandate issued in Mason v. Rizzi on March 19, 
2004. 
2Sitting by designation pursuant to DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 and DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 2 & 4. 
 
 
2
 
In this appeal we consider the admissibility of portions of a physician’s 
testimony relating to causation of injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident.  
We conclude that the trial judge’s rulings on Motions in Limine challenging the 
physician’s opinions on the theory that those opinions were allegedly based upon 
the amount of property damage to colliding vehicles correctly resolved the 
underlying issues fairly presented to the Court. 
Facts 
 
On April 24, 1998, a car driven by the defendant, Judith Blackburn, rear-
ended a car driven by the plaintiff, Rosemary Potter.  Each vehicle sustained some 
damage, and following the accident Potter received medical treatment for a rotator 
cuff injury.  Potter sued Blackburn, alleging that Blackburn’s negligence caused 
Potter’s injuries.  
 
Dr. Stuart Felzer, Dr. Lyn Phillips, and Dr. Evan Crain testified for Potter 
via videotaped depositions.  All three physicians treated Potter following the 
accident, and each testified that the collision caused Potter’s injuries.  They also 
testified that the injuries resulted in Potter’s two later surgeries and incurrence of 
$25,947 in medical expenses.  
 
Dr. Erol Ger testified for Blackburn via videotaped deposition.  As part of 
his pretrial evaluation of Potter, Dr. Ger received a detailed account of the accident 
from Potter and examined Potter on August 1, 2001.  He also reviewed a 
 
3
photograph of the rear of Potter’s vehicle and Potter told him that her car had 
incurred property damage of $800.  Dr. Ger did not see a photograph of 
Blackburn’s car nor did he learn the amount of estimated repair costs to her 
vehicle.  Part of Dr. Ger’s testimony included his opinion that the collision did not 
cause Potter’s rotator cuff injury.  On cross-examination, Dr. Ger was confronted 
with a repair bill, not admitted into evidence, suggesting that the costs of repairing 
Blackburn’s vehicle exceeded $3,000. 
 
Blackburn moved in limine to exclude the causation testimony of Potter’s 
experts, and Potter moved in limine to exclude the causation testimony of Dr. Ger.  
The trial judge denied Blackburn’s motions.  That decision is not at issue in this 
appeal.  Potter argued to the trial judge that Dr. Ger improperly based his opinion 
regarding injury causation on a “view of a single photograph.”  The trial judge 
denied Potter’s motion.  During trial, Blackburn moved to exclude Dr. Ger’s 
response on cross-examination in a trial deposition that his opinion regarding 
injury causation might have changed had he known the amount of damage 
sustained by Blackburn’s vehicle.  The trial judge granted Blackburn’s motion and 
excluded that portion of the deposition cross-examination.   
 
The jury rendered a verdict of $3,140 in Potter’s favor.  Potter appeals. 
 
4
Issues on Appeal 
Potter seeks review of two evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge.  First, 
she claims that the trial judge erroneously denied her motion to exclude the expert 
testimony of Dr. Ger relating to causation.  Second, Potter claims that the trial 
judge erred by granting Blackburn’s Motion in limine to exclude a portion of the 
taped trial deposition of Dr. Ger on cross examination.  We review a trial judge’s 
decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.3  
When an appellant claims that a trial judge abused his or her discretion in 
admitting evidence, this Court will first consider whether the specific rulings were 
correct.4  If the Court determines that a trial judge abused his or her discretion, the 
Court will then consider whether the mistakes constituted significant prejudice so 
as to have denied the appellant a fair trial.5  When, however, arguments not fairly 
presented to the trial judge are presented for the first time on appeal, we review for 
plain error.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial judge’s evidentiary 
rulings. 
 
Potter’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Dr. Ger’s Expert Testimony  
 
 
On May 28, 2002, Potter’s counsel presented his motion to exclude Dr. 
Ger’s opinion that the accident did not cause Potter’s rotator cuff injury on the 
                                                 
3 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999). 
4 Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Del. 1997). 
5 Id. 
 
5
grounds that Dr. Ger based his opinion “upon his review of a single photograph”6 
and that the question for the trial judge was:  “does a medical expert have sufficient 
training or expertise to rely upon photographs of damage to reach an opinion 
concerning the cause of injury?”7  Potter’s counsel went on to argue:   
   I mean, had Dr. Ger testified that there were other bases for his opinions 
independent of his reliance upon photographs, then I think, like any other 
opinion from a doctor, it would come in, I can attack the weight.  But where 
the opinion was based solely upon his conclusion regarding the forces of 
impact, and his determination of forces of impact are dependent upon his 
view of a single photograph, then that raises a real question of whether or 
not he’s qualified to make that opinion , . . .. 
. . . 
 
 
. . . we have a doctor who’s basing his opinion upon forces of impact 
solely upon the amount of property damage to two vehicles, and he’s not 
qualified to do that.  And because that is the basis of Dr. Ger’s opinion, and 
because that’s the only opinion that he reached, then I don’t think he should 
be allowed to express that opinion.  So that’s my motion in limine.8  
(emphasis added) 
 
 
Potter’s counsel argued quite straight forwardly to the trial judge:  (1) Dr. 
Ger did not have the expertise to base an opinion on causation of the injury based 
solely upon a photo of damage to the plaintiff’s auto; (2) but, if he relied on other 
independent bases for his opinions, then “I think, like any other opinion from a 
doctor, it would come in, I can attack the weight.”9  Potter insists that the trial 
                                                 
6 Trial Transcript at 14. 
7 Id. at 14-15. 
8 Id. at 15-16. 
9 Id. at 15. 
 
6
judge erred because Dr. Ger based his opinion solely on the photo(s), and, thus, the 
opinion should not have been admitted. 
 
The trial judge clearly understood the thrust of Potter’s counsel’s argument 
and remarked that the plaintiff:  “. . . seeks to bar the portion of the deposition 
testimony of Dr. Ger where he expresses an opinion that . . . it was unlikely that the 
low-impact collision would have resulted in the particular rotator cuff injury that 
the plaintiff has based on his view of one photograph.10  (emphasis added).  In 
response to Blackburn’s counsel’s retort that his questions “completely eliminated 
the damage to the vehicle and which completely eliminated the photograph,” 
Potter’s counsel again contended that “Dr. Ger admits that he relied solely upon 
the photograph of the vehicle.”11 (emphasis added) 
 
The trial judge then ruled that . . . “the testimony that Dr. Ger gave that he, 
in part, I guess, in large part formed the opinion that he did about causation [that 
the rotator cuff injury could not have resulted from the accident] came from what 
was recounted to him by his patient . . . .”12  The trial judge then denied Potter’s 
Motion in Limine.  The trial judge’s bench ruling clearly responded directly to 
Potter’s counsel’s argument that Dr. Ger’s opinion that the accident could not have 
caused a rotator cuff injury was based solely on a review of a photograph of 
                                                 
10 Trial Transcript at 17. 
11 Id. at 21. 
12 Id. at 26. 
 
7
Potter’s vehicle.  The trial judge believed the record supported a more extensive 
basis for the opinion than merely a photo of the damage to Potter’s auto.  Even 
Potter’s counsel conceded that if there were other factors that Dr. Ger considered, 
then Dr. Ger’s opinion would be admissible.  The trial judge rejected Potter’s 
counsel’s factual premise and found that Dr. Ger’s causation opinion was, in fact, 
formed “in large part” . . . “from what was recounted to him by his patient.”   
 
Having found the opinion to be based in large part upon other factors, the 
trial judge acted appropriately within his discretion by denying the motion. 
Here, on appeal, Potter’s counsel makes a distinctly different argument.  He 
argues to us that: 
 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by admitting the opinion 
testimony of Dr. Errol Ger regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.  Dr. 
Ger’s opinion that the collision did not cause plaintiff’s injury was based 
upon the fact that plaintiff’s vehicle only sustained property damage in the 
amount of $800.00 . . . .  The Trial court admitted Dr. Ger’s opinion because 
Dr. Ger obtained the information regarding the amount of property damage 
directly from the plaintiff.13 
 
 
He further argues that the trial judge’s reasoning, though that reasoning 
relied in large part on Potter’s history, “did not establish that Dr. Ger was qualified 
to use that information to form his ultimate opinion regarding causation.”14   
 
Now, Potter’s counsel argues that Dr. Ger’s opinion was erroneously 
admitted, not on the sole basis of a view of a photo of auto damage, but on “the 
                                                 
13 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6-7. 
14 Id. at 7. 
 
8
fact that the plaintiff’s vehicle only sustained property damage in the amount of 
$800” – a fact Potter purportedly told Dr. Ger in her history.  Potter’s counsel then 
asks us to conclude that the trial judge denied Potter’s Motion in Limine on the sole 
ground that Dr. Ger based his opinion on causation on the fact that Potter told him 
that Potter’s vehicle cost $800 to repair.  Of course, that argument ignores Dr. 
Ger’s own statement about the several factors he relied upon and sidesteps two 
fundamental points arising from the premise that he relied upon more than vehicle 
damage viewed in a single photo.  First, Potter, told Dr. Ger about the accident’s 
impact on her body; and, second, the injury complained of was to the rotator cuff.  
It was not a soft tissue, subjective, mild muscle sprain or strain typical to low 
impact collisions. 
 
The trial judge serves as the gatekeeper for expert testimony.  Before an 
expert opinion may be admitted, the trial judge must ensure that the opinion is 
“relevant, reliable, validated, and, therefore, trustworthy.”15  The court must also 
determine whether the witness offering the opinion is qualified to render that 
opinion.16  This Court has adopted a five-step test for determining the admissibility 
                                                 
15Mason v. Rizzi, No. 339, 2002, 2004 Del. LEXIS 109, at *12 (Del. Mar. 3, 2004). 
16See Eskin v. Carden, No. 322, 2002, 2004 Del. LEXIS 81, at *7 (Del. Feb. 13, 2004) (“A 
witness may testify as an expert when qualified as an expert and the trial judge determines that 
the witness has scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact 
in understanding evidence or in determining a fact at issue.”). 
 
9
of opinion testimony.17  For expert testimony to be admissible, (1) the witness must 
be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education;”18 
(2) the evidence must be relevant and reliable; (3) the expert’s opinion must be 
based upon information “reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field;”19 (4) the expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;”20 and (5) the expert testimony must not 
create unfair prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury. 
 
Potter’s counsel never presented the trial judge with an opportunity to rule 
on the precise argument raised before us.  The trial judge, however, ruled correctly 
on the argument actually raised in the Motion in Limine.  Potter contends on appeal 
that Daubert21 scrutiny would have resulted in a bar to Dr. Ger’s opinion testimony 
and would have avoided an alleged inconsistency between the trial judge’s ruling 
on Potter’s Motion in Limine and Blackburn’s Motion in Limine.  Unfortunately, 
no one specifically asked the trial judge to consider the implication, if any, of 
Daubert on either motion.  
                                                 
17Cunningham v. McDonald, 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del. 1997). 
18DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 702. 
19DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 703. 
20DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 702. 
21 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 
10
This leads us to our review of the second evidentiary ruling about which 
Potter complains. 
 
Blackburn’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Dr. Ger’s Testimony  
 
 
We believe that Potter misunderstands the issue before the trial judge and 
the rationale for his ruling.  Potter appears to accept the superficial view that the 
ruling discussed above, allowing Dr. Ger to opine that the accident did not cause a 
rotator cuff injury, was based on the “sole view of a photograph showing damage” 
to Potter’s auto or on her oral representation that her vehicle repairs cost only 
$800.  Potter then concludes that the ruling must be inconsistent with the ruling 
granting Blackburn’s Motion in Limine to exclude cross-examination of Dr. Ger on 
the subject of $3,000 repair costs to Blackburn’s “striking” vehicle. 
It bears mentioning that the parties’ Motions in Limine were presented and 
argued two days apart – on May 28 and May 30, respectively.  They were not 
presented in isolation to a trial judge totally unabsorbed by other trial issues.  We 
encourage trial counsel to present arguments in a sufficiently specific format to put 
a trial judge fairly on notice of the issues and argument or recognize that an appeal 
of the ruling will be subject to a plain error analysis. 
Dr. Ger’s direct testimony did not mention photographs of the damage to 
Potter’s car nor did it include any reliance upon the repair costs, however reported 
 
11
or recorded, to either vehicle.  The trial judge correctly concluded, in our view, that 
Dr. Ger’s comments about the significance of the purported repair costs to 
Blackburn’s vehicle during cross examination (i) were outside his realm of 
expertise, (ii) raised issues upon which he did not directly testify, and (iii) referred 
to facts not admitted into evidence (the repair costs).  Dr. Ger’s expertise was 
limited to medicine.  He was simply not qualified to opine on the sufficiency of the 
forces generated during this accident and their impact on the cause of the particular 
injuries claimed in this case from a mere unverified estimate of vehicle repair 
costs.22  Under these circumstances, it would have been nonsensical to allow Dr. 
Ger to speculate about how a $3,000 repair bill related to the forces involved in 
and the injuries resulting from this particular accident.23 
                                                 
22 See Eskin v. Carden, 2004 Del. LEXIS 81 (Del., Feb. 13, 2004) (Admissible biomechanical 
testimony bridges the gap between the general forces at work in an accident determined by 
physical forces analysis (whether it be "physics" or "engineering") and the specific injuries 
suffered by the particular person who was affected by those forces. The testimony must provide 
definitive evidence that the physics of a particular accident did (or did not) cause a particular 
injury to a particular individual. A trial judge must closely scrutinize this testimony to be 
confident that it is trustworthy, i.e., relevant, reliable and validated.); Mason v. Rizzi, 2004 Del. 
LEXIS 109 (Del., Mar. 3, 2004). 
 
23 The dissent unfortunately fails to come to grips with the fact that the trial judge rightly 
concluded that Dr. Ger's opinion was not based on his view of a single photo of the plaintiff's 
vehicle.  To nonetheless allow cross examination of Dr. Ger on the basis of the $3,000 damage to 
the defendant's vehicle (as the dissent suggests) would have done three things.  First, it would 
have opened the door for the defendant to insist on the equivalent right to introduce into evidence 
the comparatively minor ($800) damage to the plaintiff's vehicle as demonstrating the minor 
impact of the collision.  Second, it would have invited Dr. Ger to opine about something (the 
force of impact based on damage to a vehicle) on which he admittedly had no expertise, thus 
placing pure speculation before the jury.  Third, it would have allowed cross examination based 
on a report of damage to the striking vehicle that was not even in evidence.  We think the trial 
 
12
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we review the trial judge’s ruling on Potter’s Motion in Limine 
for plain error because the issue presented to us was not fairly presented to the trial 
judge.  On the issue actually presented, the trial judge properly allowed Dr. Ger’s 
causation opinion into evidence because it was not premised merely on a “review 
of a single photograph.”  Further, the trial judge properly granted Blackburn’s 
Motion in Limine because it barred testimony elicited on cross examination 
regarding repair costs not admitted into evidence, on issues not testified to by Dr. 
Ger on direct examination and avoided speculation about the relationship between 
estimated vehicle repair costs and the force of impact generated in the accident.   
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior Court. 
IT IS ORDERED that the time within which a motion for reargument may 
be timely filed under Supreme Court Rule 18 is shortened to three days from the 
date of this Opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
judge reached the common sense result, a result that avoided the unwholesome consequences 
that would flow from the dissent's "let it all in" approach.        
 
 
13
Berger, J., Dissenting: 
 
 
The majority attempts to reconcile the trial court’s two evidentiary rulings 
without ever coming to grips with the fact that Potter was not allowed to cross-
examine Dr. Ger on a significant basis for his medical conclusion.  The jury heard 
Dr. Ger testify that the collision was low impact; that part of what he relied on in 
determining it was low impact was the amount of damage to Potter’s vehicle; and 
that a low-impact collision would not have caused the injuries Potter claimed were 
attributable to the accident.   The trial court did not let the jury hear the following 
testimony, elicited on cross-examination: 
 
Q.  Now part of what you relied upon in determining that this 
was a low-impact collision was the amount of damage to Mrs. Potter’s 
vehicle; isn’t that correct? 
 
 
 
 
 
A.  Correct. 
 
 
 
 
 
*         *          * 
 
 
Q.  Were you aware of the fact that it [cost] in excess of $3,000 
to repair the front of the striking vehicle? 
 
 
 
A.  No, I was not. 
 
 
 
 
 
*         *          * 
 
 
Q.  Would the information concerning the amount of damage 
that was caused to the front of the striking vehicle affect your opinion 
that this accident was a low-impact collision? 
 
 
 
A.  Yes, it would. 
 
Q.  Would the fact that this accident was not a low-impact 
collision but involved a higher impact have any effect on your opinion 
concerning the cause of Miss Potter’s injury? 
 
 
 
A. Yes, it would. 
 
 
14
 
 
Q.  Why is that? 
 
 
A.  Because if this were a high-impact collision, then I could 
see some damage being incurred to her shoulder.  If it was a low-
impact collision as I understood from her, then, as I said, I cannot see 
any correlation. 
 
The majority says it would be “nonsensical” to have allowed this testimony into 
evidence.  Perhaps so, if Dr. Ger’s other “causation” testimony had been excluded.  
After letting the jury hear why Potter’s injuries could not have resulted from this 
“low impact” collision, however, common sense dictates that the jury also hear the 
other side of that issue through the cross-examination quoted above. 
 
I would reverse for a new trial and, accordingly, I dissent.