Title: P. v. Flores
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S267522
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MARLON FLORES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S267522 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B305359 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA477784 
 
 
May 2, 2024 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
Justice Evans filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
S267522 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Police officers detained defendant, Marlon Flores, on a 
dark evening in an area known for narcotics and gang activity.  
The Court of Appeal held the totality of circumstances described 
below provided reasonable suspicion for the detention.  We 
reverse.        
I.  BACKGROUND 
The following facts were adduced at the suppression 
hearing, at which Los Angeles Police Officer Daniel Guy was the 
only witness.  In May 2019, around 10:00 p.m., Officer Guy and 
his partner, Michael Marino, were on patrol in the area of 
Mariposa Avenue.  Guy considered the location to be a “known 
narcotic[s] area[]” and “gang hangout.”  He had arrested 
someone in the vicinity the night before for narcotics crimes.  As 
the officers drove by a cul-de-sac, they saw Flores standing alone 
in the street beside a Nissan parked at a red curb.  Flores looked 
at the officers, walked around the back of the car, then “ducked” 
behind it.  The officers pulled up and parked behind the Nissan.     
Officer Marino’s body camera captured the interaction 
between Flores and the officers.  The video begins as the officers 
park the patrol car but remain inside.  At 0:15 seconds, Flores’s 
head comes into view from behind the Nissan.  He is in 
darkness.  Flores stands and seems to be making a stretching 
motion with one arm.  At 0:37 seconds, he disappears from sight.  
A few seconds later, he raises his head, then drops back out of 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
view.  At 0:50 seconds, the officers step out of the car and 
approach him.  A flashlight illuminates the way.  At 0:55 
seconds, Flores appears on the camera’s recording.  He is bent 
over and facing away from the officers with both hands near his 
right shoe.  When Marino trains his flashlight on Flores, Flores 
does not look around.  He remains bent over and continues 
moving his hands near his feet.  The officers make no inquiry, 
but at 1:03, one of them tells Flores to stand up.  Flores remains 
bent over.  When Marino walks up behind Flores, Guy comes 
around the Nissan and approaches from the other side.  At 1:12, 
Marino again directs Flores to stand.  At 1:14, the officer says, 
“Hey, hurry up,” and Flores begins to straighten.  At 1:16, an 
officer tells Flores, “Your hands behind your head.”  Flores 
complies and is directly placed in handcuffs.   
Officer Guy testified that he detained Flores because he 
believed Flores acted “suspicious[ly]” by “attempting to conceal 
himself from the police” and then “pretend[ing] to tie his shoe.”  
The officer suspected Flores was “loitering for the use or sales of 
narcotics.”  Guy gave no reason why he thought so, other than 
the area and Flores’s behavior upon seeing the police.  During a 
pat-down search, the Nissan’s “blinkers activated” as if the 
officer had “hit the key fob.”  Officer Guy pointed his flashlight 
into the car and saw what looked like a drug pipe.  In response 
to the officer’s inquiries, Flores said that the Nissan was his and 
his wallet, and identification, were in the driver’s side door 
pocket.  Guy retrieved the wallet, looked inside, and found a 
folded dollar bill containing suspected methamphetamine.  
Officers also recovered a revolver from a backpack.   
The trial court denied Flores’s motion to suppress the 
evidence seized.  The court reasoned that Flores’s acts of 
“ducking,” “remaining hunched over,” and “toying with his feet,” 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
even after the officers approached and told him to stand, was 
“odd behavior” and “suspicious.”  The court observed that “any 
normal human being would stand up and say, ‘Oh, you scared 
me’ or ‘Oh, what can I help you with?’ or ‘Oh, why are you coming 
towards me?’ ”  It found Flores’s behavior “more than enough for 
this Court to find that there were articulable facts to find 
suspicion and enough for the officers to detain him, enough for 
the officers to thereafter question about identification.”   
Flores pleaded no contest to one count of carrying a loaded 
firearm.  (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a).)  In exchange, one count 
of armed possession of methamphetamine was dismissed.  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a).)  Pursuant to the 
terms of the bargain, he was ordered to serve three years’ 
probation.  Conditions included five days in county jail, 90 days 
in residential drug treatment, and 90 days of outpatient 
treatment.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a divided 
opinion.  The majority concluded that Flores was not detained 
until he was ordered to stand and put his hands behind his head.  
(People v. Flores (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 978, 989 (Flores).)  It 
found reasonable suspicion justified the detention based on the 
following facts:  (1) “Flores saw police and tried to avoid contact 
with them by ducking down behind a parked car”; (2) during the 
ducking and crouching, Flores continually moved his hands, 
keeping them out of sight of the police; (3) as they approached, 
Flores “persisted in his odd crouch position for ‘far too long a 
period of time’ ”; and (4) the activity occurred at 10:00 p.m. “on 
a cul-de-sac known for its illegal drug and gang activity.”  (Id. at 
pp. 989, 986.)  As for whether Flores was simply engaged in the 
act of tying his shoe, the majority observed that “innocent 
possibilities” exist, but an officer “would have valid suspicions if 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
the person picked an unlikely moment for the task — in the 
dark, just after seeing police, and just after ducking once 
already — and if the person took an unusually long time at it.  
The trial court found Flores kept crouching for a suspiciously 
long time.  Common sense takes context into account.”  (Id. at p. 
990; see also In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894 (Tony C.).) 
Justice Stratton opined in dissent that the detention 
began when officers parked their car, shined a light on Flores, 
and approached him from two sides.  (Flores, supra, 60 
Cal.App.5th at p. 992 (dis. opn. of Stratton, J.).)  But even if the 
detention occurred later, after Flores’s prolonged crouching, she 
was unpersuaded that reasonable suspicion was established.  
Justice Stratton accepted the trial court’s factual finding that 
Flores ducked to avoid police contact, but she noted that he had 
a right to do so.  (Id. at p. 993, citing Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 
U.S. 491, 497–498 (plur. opn. of White, J.) (Royer).)  In her view, 
Flores’s behavior was “neither abnormal nor suspicious” given 
the “deep-seated mistrust certain communities feel toward 
police and how that mistrust manifests in the behavior of people 
interacting with them.”  (Flores, at pp. 993, 994.)   
We granted review to determine whether Flores’s 
detention was justified on these facts.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a 
brief investigative . . . stop when [the officer] has ‘a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity.’  [Citations.]  ‘Although a 
mere “hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of 
suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof 
of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
less than is necessary for probable cause.’  [Citations.]  [¶]  
Because it is a ‘less demanding’ standard, ‘reasonable suspicion 
can be established with information that is different in quantity 
or content than that required to establish probable cause.’  
[Citation.]  The standard ‘depends on the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act.’  [Citation.]  Courts ‘cannot 
reasonably demand scientific certainty . . . where none exists.’  
[Citation.]  Rather, they must permit officers to make 
‘commonsense 
judgments 
and 
inferences 
about 
human 
behavior.’ ”  (Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380–381 
(Glover), italics omitted.)   
In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry), the United 
States Supreme Court first recognized the validity of a brief 
investigative detention, short of arrest, based on reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  (Id. at pp. 21–22, 27, 30.)  It 
distinguished that requirement from the more demanding 
standard of probable cause necessary to justify an arrest.  A 
review of Terry and its role in the evolution of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence provides illuminating context and 
perspective.  It demonstrates the serious consideration given to 
judicial review of police investigative conduct over more than 50 
years.   
In Terry a plainclothes detective was on foot patrol in 
downtown Cleveland, watching particularly for the presence of 
shoplifters and pickpockets.  At 2:30 in the afternoon he noticed 
two men he had not seen before standing on a corner. The 
detective did not approach the pair, but simply observed them 
for 10 to 12 minutes.  During that time the detective saw the 
men stand on the corner.  Then each separately walked down 
the street, paused to look in a particular shop window, walked 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
for a short distance past the shop, then retraced his steps, 
paused again at the same window, and rejoined his companion 
back on the corner, where they conferred.  Each man separately 
engaged in that process five or six times.  (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. 
at pp. 5–6.)  After what the Court described as the “elaborately 
casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window” (id. 
at p. 6), the men left the corner together.   
The detective decided to investigate further because he 
suspected the two men were “ ‘casing a job, a stick-up.’ ”  (Terry, 
supra, 392 U.S. at p. 6.)  He also suspected they might be armed.  
The men stopped in front of another store nearby and met with 
a third man.  The detective had seen them talk briefly with the 
third man when the pair was at the original corner from which 
they had conducted their “oft-repeated reconnaissance.”  (Ibid.)  
The detective had no more information beyond what he had 
observed.  He approached the three men, identified himself as 
an officer, and asked for their names.  (Id. at pp. 6–7.)  After 
they “ ‘mumbled something’ ” (id. at p. 7), the detective grabbed 
Terry, patted him down for weapons, and ultimately removed a 
revolver from his interior coat pocket.  A second gun was found 
in his companion’s overcoat.  (Ibid.)   
Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion of the court.  He 
began its discussion by quoting Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Botsford (1891) 141 U.S. 250, which observed:  “ ‘No right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control 
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’ ”  
(Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 9, quoting Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., at p. 251.)   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
The Chief Justice went on to note:  “We would be less than 
candid if we did not acknowledge that this question [whether 
the detective’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment] thrusts 
to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive 
area of police activity — issues which have never before been 
squarely presented to this Court.  Reflective of the tensions 
involved are the practical and constitutional arguments . . . on 
both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to 
‘stop and frisk’ . . . suspicious persons.”  (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. 
at pp. 9–10.)  
The opinion forcefully rejected the contention that a stop-
and-frisk detention is a “ ‘petty indignity.’ ”  (Terry, supra, 392 
U.S. at p. 17.)  “It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the 
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong 
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”  (Ibid.)  The 
opinion considered the argument that permitting a temporary 
detention like that involved in Terry would “only serve to 
exacerbate police-community tensions in the crowded centers of 
our Nation’s cities.”  (Id. at p. 12.)  It acknowledged that the 
“degree of community resentment aroused by particular 
practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality of 
the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security 
caused by those practices.”  (Id. at p. 17, fn. 14.)  The Terry 
majority concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
suspect the two men were engaged in criminal activity and to 
fear for his safety.  (Id. at pp. 22–23, 27–28, 30.)  As a result the 
“ ‘stop and frisk’ ” (id. at p. 10) was permitted, and the weapons 
recovered were admissible in 
the underlying criminal 
proceeding (id. at pp. 8, 30). 
In the years since Terry was decided, courts around the 
country have repeatedly addressed and applied its standards for 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
considering 
Fourth 
Amendment 
challenges 
to 
evidence 
recovered during investigative detentions.  We do the same here.   
“ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, 
express or implied, if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  [Citation.]  We exercise our independent judgment in 
determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ”  
(People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.)  In 
doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation.  Instead, “we 
must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances — the whole 
picture.’ ”  (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 8 
(Sokolow), quoting United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 
417 (Cortez).) 
We need not determine the precise moment this detention 
took place.  There is no dispute that Flores was detained before 
any incriminating evidence was recovered.  One fair 
interpretation of the facts is that Flores initially tried to avoid 
being seen by the officers.  Thereafter, and somewhat 
inconsistently, he stood and was in view for several seconds.  He 
then failed to acknowledge the officers’ approach, and sought to 
avoid interacting with them.  But as we explain, this behavior, 
along with Flores’s presence in a high crime area at night, did 
not provide a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 
that Flores was doing something illegal.   
It is settled that a person may decline to engage in a 
consensual encounter with police.  “The person approached . . . 
need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline 
to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.”  (Royer, 
supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 497–498 (plur. opn. of White, J.); accord, 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 125 (Wardlow).)  Such 
“refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the 
minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or 
seizure.”  (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437 (Bostick); 
accord, Wardlow, at p. 125.)  The reason that a truly consensual 
encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment is that the 
officer is simply approaching a person in a public place and 
engaging in “ ‘personal intercourse.’ ”  (Bostick, at p. 434, 
quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 19, fn. 16; accord, Royer, at 
p. 497 (plur. opn. of White, J.).)1  Officers, like others, may do so.  
But the officer must have legal cause to command the civilian’s 
attention and cooperation.  (Royer, at p. 498 (plur. opn. of 
White, J.).)   
Nonetheless, “the manner in which a person avoids police 
contact” may be “considered by police officers in the field or by 
courts assessing reasonable cause for” a detention.  (People v. 
Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 234 (Souza).)  The relevant inquiry 
is the “ ‘degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of 
noncriminal acts.’ ”  (Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 10, quoting 
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 243–244, fn. 13.)   
In particular, the Supreme Court has “recognized that 
nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining 
 
1  
As Terry noted:  “Street encounters between citizens and 
police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.  They range from 
wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful 
information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving 
arrests, or injuries, or loss of life.  Moreover, hostile 
confrontations are not all of a piece.  Some of them begin in a 
friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the 
injection of some unexpected element into the conversation.”  
(Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 13.) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
reasonable suspicion.”  (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 124.)  
Examples of relevant behavior include expressions of shock 
upon seeing an officer, ducking and hiding, headlong flight, a 
sudden change in direction, walking quickly away while looking 
back at the officer, and failing to acknowledge the officer’s 
attempt to engage the suspect.  (See, e.g., District of Columbia 
v. Wesby (2018) 583 U.S. 48, 59 (Wesby); Wardlow, at p. 124; 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 885 
(Brignoni-Ponce); Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 234–235, 241–
242; People v. Garcia (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 239, 243, 245–246; 
Flores v. Superior Court (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 219, 221, 224.)  
Repeated or inordinate attempts to avoid an officer may be 
particularly noteworthy.  
“[P]resence in an area of expected criminal activity” is also 
a relevant consideration.  (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 124; 
accord, Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 240–241.)  “ ‘[I]t would be 
the height of naivete not to recognize that the frequency and 
intensity’ ” of criminal activity is “ ‘greater in certain quarters 
than in others.’ ”  (Souza, at p. 241, quoting People v. Holloway 
(1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 150, 155.)  But it is equally true that a 
great many law-abiding Californians live, work, or otherwise 
find themselves in areas where criminal activity is prevalent.  
Their mere presence there cannot be said to transform them into 
suspects.  Instead, it is “a factor that can lend meaning to the 
person’s behavior.”  (People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 
532 (Limon).)  But “standing alone, [it] is not enough to support 
a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is 
committing a crime.”  (Wardlow, at p. 124; accord, Brown v. 
Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52; People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
808, 838; Souza, at p. 241.)   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
The record, considered in its totality, fails to support a 
reasonable suspicion that Flores was loitering for the purpose of 
committing a narcotics offense (as the officer suspected) or was 
otherwise engaged in “ ‘criminal activity.’ ”  (Glover, supra, 589 
U.S. at p. 380.)  An articulable and reasonable suspicion that a 
person is engaging in criminal activity is required to escalate a 
consensual encounter to a coercive detention.   
Here, Flores looked in the direction of the officers then 
walked behind a car and ducked out of sight.  As the officers 
parked, Flores raised his head, stood and stretched, then again 
disappeared from sight.  A few seconds later he raised his head 
a second time, and then dropped back out of view.  When the 
officers approached on foot, he remained bent over “toying with 
his feet.”  He did not make eye contact or otherwise acknowledge 
their attempts to engage him.  It is not out of the ordinary for a 
person to engage in a pretext such as walking in another 
direction, pretending not to hear one’s name being called, or 
feigning cell phone use to avoid an unwanted encounter.  But 
here, Flores’s apparent pretext of tying his shoe, combined with 
his repeatedly ducking down behind the car, could reasonably 
be construed as “odd” and noteworthy behavior, particularly 
when done in reaction to the sight of a uniformed police officer.  
(See Wesby, supra, 583 U.S. at p. 59; Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. 
at p. 124; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 234.)  Nonetheless, it 
bears emphasis that the standard to justify a detention is not 
satisfied simply because a person’s behavior is “odd.”  A mere 
deviation 
from 
perceived 
social 
convention 
does 
not 
automatically signal criminal behavior.  The particular conduct 
relied upon must, when considered in the totality of 
circumstances, support a reasonable suspicion that the person 
to be detained is, or is about to be, engaged in activity “relating 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
to crime.”  (Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893; accord, Souza, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.)   
The fact that Flores was present in a “known narcotic[s] 
area[],” where the officer had arrested someone for drug-related 
crimes the night before, does not tip the scales in favor of 
detention.  Notably, Officer Guy did not see Flores engage in any 
conduct suggesting he was there to buy or sell drugs or was 
otherwise involved in illegal conduct.  He did not see Flores 
interact with anyone, or retrieve or hide anything.  (See Cornell 
v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 
781; Limon, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 532–533; Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11532, subd. (b).)  He did not see anyone in the 
immediate vicinity.  No one had called for help or to report a 
crime in progress.  The hour was not particularly late.  Although 
the officer testified that he suspected Flores of “loitering,” he did 
not see Flores standing in that location for more than a few 
moments before the officers pulled up in their patrol car.2  When 
Guy approached on foot, he saw Flores moving his hands near 
his feet.  But the officer did not say Flores appeared to hide or 
discard anything.  Rather, he opined that Flores was 
“pretend[ing] to tie his shoe.”  Guy testified that the Nissan was 
parked at a red curb.  But he did not explain how Flores’s 
 
2  
Health and Safety Code section 11532 makes it a crime to 
“loiter in any public place in a manner and under circumstances 
manifesting the purpose and with the intent to commit” certain 
drug related crimes.  Section 11530, subdivision (a) defines 
“Loiter” as “to delay or linger without a lawful purpose for being 
on the property and for the purpose of committing a crime as 
opportunity may be discovered.”  Because Flores was neither 
charged with nor convicted of loitering, we need not parse the 
statutes in detail. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
presence next to an illegally parked car justified a detention 
under the totality of the circumstances.   
In referring to factors not testified to in this case, we do 
not suggest that any of them must be established to justify a 
detention.  Instead, we point out that, if present, they would be 
relevant in weighing all the circumstances bearing on whether 
a detention was justified.  Likewise, facts that may appear 
benign in some contexts may reasonably be considered less so in 
others.  Officers describing their decisions may certainly explain 
the salience of some circumstances in light of their training and 
experience.  As the high court pointed out in Cortez, supra, 449 
U.S. at page 418, a trained police officer could draw inferences 
“that might well elude an untrained person.”  But the officer 
must articulate that experience and expertise as an objective 
circumstance justifying the detention.  (Ibid.; United States v. 
Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273, 276–277; Brignoni-Ponce, 
supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 884–885.)  In evaluating what was done 
it is important to consider the reasons given for doing it.  
Requiring this articulation enables the court to determine, as a 
matter of law, whether the officer’s actions were justified in light 
of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.   
The Attorney General relies heavily on Wardlow, supra, 
528 U.S. 119 to justify Flores’s detention, but the facts of that 
case are distinguishable.  There, a four-car caravan of police 
vehicles converged on a Chicago area “known for heavy narcotics 
trafficking.”  (Id. at p. 121.)  “The officers were traveling together 
because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, 
including lookouts and customers.”  (Ibid.)  The defendant, who 
was holding an opaque bag, looked in the direction of the officers 
and fled.  (Id. at pp. 121–122.)  The court held that the 
defendant’s presence in a heavy narcotics area and his 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
“[h]eadlong flight” upon seeing the police approach “justified 
[the officer] in suspecting that [the defendant] was involved in 
criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.”  (Id. 
at pp. 124, 125.) 
Wardlow’s flight upon seeing the officers was an important 
factor in the analysis.  The high court recognized that citizens 
have the right to ignore the police and go about their business, 
and the “ ‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish 
the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention 
or seizure.’ ”  (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 125, quoting 
Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 437.)  But the court reasoned that 
“unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.  
Flight, by its very nature, is not ‘going about one’s business’; in 
fact, it is just the opposite.”  (Wardlow, at p. 125.)  “Headlong 
flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion:  
It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such.”  (Id. at p. 124.)  Seven members of the high 
court reaffirmed this holding in 2018:  “ ‘[U]nprovoked flight 
upon noticing the police,’ we have explained, ‘is certainly 
suggestive’ of wrongdoing and can be treated as ‘suspicious 
behavior’ that factors into the totality of the circumstances.  
[Citation.]  In fact, ‘deliberately furtive actions and flight at the 
approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia of mens rea.’ ”  
(Wesby, supra, 583 U.S. at p. 59, quoting Wardlow, at pp. 124–
125 & Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 66; accord, Souza, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 234–235.)   
Flores’s disinclination to engage with the officers does not 
carry the same salience as headlong flight in the totality of the 
circumstances analysis.  His acts of ducking out of sight, 
bending with his hands by his shoe, and not acknowledging the 
officers’ presence, suggest an unwillingness to be observed or 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
interact.  But they are not the “consummate act of evasion.”  
(Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 124.)  The officers certainly 
could have continued to observe Flores as he stood on the public 
street.  But the behavior here, while noteworthy, does not 
support a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in illegal 
activity.  In short, Officer Guy failed to articulate “more than an 
‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal 
activity.”  (Wardlow, at p. 124, quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 
p. 27.) 
In his answer to the amici briefs, the Attorney General 
relies on the statute that prohibits loitering for the purpose of 
engaging in certain drug related offenses to justify the 
detention.  (See fn. 2, ante.)  Health and Safety Code section 
11532 provides that a person’s attempt to “to conceal himself or 
herself or any object that reasonably could be involved in an 
unlawful drug-related activity” is a relevant circumstance in 
determining whether a person is loitering with the requisite 
criminal intent, and further provides that the relevant 
circumstances listed in the statute “should be considered 
particularly salient if they occur in an area that is known for 
unlawful drug use and trafficking . . . .”  (Id., subds. (b)(3), (c).)  
However, this pronouncement cannot supplant the standard of 
reasonable suspicion mandated by the Fourth Amendment.  In 
order to detain a citizen on suspicion of loitering, or of criminal 
activity more generally, officers must have “the level of 
suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop . . . .”  (Kolender v. 
Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 360 [discussing Pen. Code, former 
§ 647, subd. (e)]; see also id. at p. 353.)   
The facts here contrast with other cases in which we have 
upheld investigative detentions.  In Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th 224, 
an officer was patrolling at 3:00 a.m. in a residential 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
neighborhood where burglaries and drug activity were common.  
He noticed Souza and another person standing near a car 
parked at the curb, in almost complete darkness.  The officer 
pulled up behind the parked car and activated his spotlight.  
Immediately, two other people in the car bent down towards the 
floorboard area, whereupon Souza ran away.  He was 
apprehended and searched, revealing contraband.  (Id. at p. 
228.)  We held that the totality of these circumstances justified 
the detention:  “From these circumstances — the area’s 
reputation for criminal activity, the presence of two people near 
a parked car very late at night and in total darkness, and 
evasive conduct not only by defendant but by the two occupants 
of the parked car — Officer Stackhouse reasonably suspected 
that criminal activity was afoot.”  (Id. at p. 240.) 
In People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968 (Brown) “a 
citizen living in a residential neighborhood made an emergency 
call seeking police assistance because a fight was happening in 
an alley behind the citizen’s home.  The caller gave a specific 
address . . . [and] heard screaming and a reference to a loaded 
gun.  The dispatcher heard screaming as well . . . . [¶]  Within 
three minutes of dispatch [a deputy sheriff] arrived with lights 
and siren activated.  Brown, the only person in the alley, was 
driving a car away from the reported location of the fight.  It was 
after 10:30 p.m.”  (Id. at p. 986.)  The deputy yelled to Brown, 
“ ‘Hey.  Did you see a fight?’  Brown did not respond and kept 
driving.”  (Id. at p. 973.)  “Brown left the alley but drove back 
toward the scene on the main street” (id. at p. 986) and parked 
a few houses down from the house behind which the fight had 
occurred (id. at p. 973).  We concluded under these 
circumstances that “it was reasonable for [the deputy] to suspect 
the sole occupant of the alley may have been involved in the fight 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
and to effectuate a brief and minimally intrusive detention, 
which immediately yielded observations of criminal activity.”  
(Id. at p. 987.)   
Here, unlike Wardlow and Souza, there was no headlong 
flight.  The other factors discussed by Souza — early morning 
hour and multiple persons all engaged in evasive conduct — 
were likewise absent.  And, unlike Brown, there was no 
contemporary citizen request for assistance due to criminal 
activity in the location where Flores was seen.  The 
circumstances here, viewed in totality, are insufficient to 
provide reasonable suspicion that Flores was engaged in 
criminal activity.   
Our conclusion does not leave officers without the means 
to follow up on behavior they view as calling for additional 
investigation.  Flores was present in a high crime area and 
repeatedly tried to avoid being seen by, or engaging with, the 
police.  Those facts are certainly noteworthy.  The officers would 
have been well within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment to 
continue to watch Flores as he stood on the street, as did the 
detective in Terry.  They were entitled to approach Flores and 
engage him in consensual conversation.  They could have asked 
if he needed assistance, or had himself noted anything out of the 
ordinary in the vicinity.  If they made additional observations 
while doing so, those observations may have changed the 
calculus.  But Flores’s mere refusal to cooperate “d[id] not 
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a 
detention or seizure.”  (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 437; accord, 
Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 125; Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 
498 (plur. opn. of White, J.).) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
The concurring opinion emphasizes “the danger in 
considering 
‘nervous’ 
and 
‘evasive’ 
behavior,” 
including 
“ignoring or walking, driving, or running away from officers,” 
given the real world experience of minority communities with 
police violence and racial profiling.  (Conc. opn. of Evans, J., 
post, at pp. 1, 2.)  Flores, Justice Stratton in dissent below, and 
amici3 here, likewise highlight the issues of race or ethnicity and 
policing.  They build on the important concerns voiced in Terry 
and augment them with the lessons of more recent history.  
Consistent with these arguments, some out-of-state authorities 
hold that a community’s or group’s experience with law 
enforcement is a significant factor of which officers must be 
mindful and courts should consider in evaluating the objective 
reasonableness of any asserted suspicion of criminality.  (See, 
e.g., United States v. Brown (9th Cir. 2019) 925 F.3d 1150, 1156–
1157; Commonwealth v. Warren (Mass. 2016) 58 N.E.3d 333, 
342.)  In authorizing “stop and frisk” detentions, the court in 
Terry recognized that “community resentment aroused by 
particular practices is clearly relevant” to assessing the nature 
of intrusions upon “reasonable expectations of personal 
security” of those whom police encounter.  (Terry, supra, 392 
U.S. at p. 17, fn. 14.)  With respect to the standard’s application 
in a given case, the high court has consistently held that an 
objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances is the 
touchstone of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  In making that 
assessment, it is imperative that the circumstances confronting 
both the officer and the citizen be judged against an objective 
 
3  
The Office of the State Public Defender, the California 
Public Defender’s Association, and the Contra Costa County 
Public Defender’s Office have filed amicus briefs in support of 
Flores. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
standard.  (Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (2011) 563 U.S. 731, 736; 
Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 574; Terry, at pp. 
21–22.)   
We apply well-established law in concluding that the 
detention here was unauthorized.  In reaching that conclusion, 
we are not called upon to grapple with the important and 
broader issues referenced above.  Flores had the right to decline 
further interaction with the officers and, under these facts, the 
officers had no authority to compel him to do otherwise.  The 
trial court took the view that “any normal human being would 
stand up and say, ‘Oh, you scared me’ or ‘Oh, what can I help 
you with?’ or ‘Oh, why are you coming towards me?’ ”  But the 
reactions described by the court are not the only neutral ways 
that an ordinary person might interact with police, or decline 
further interaction. 
Notwithstanding today’s holding, it remains true that 
“nervous, evasive behavior” need not be ignored.  (Wardlow, 
supra, 528 U.S. at p. 124.)  It is “a pertinent factor in 
determining 
reasonable 
suspicion” 
based 
on 
all 
the 
circumstances.  (Ibid.)  Likewise, the possibility of an innocent 
explanation for evasive behavior, such as a desire to avoid police 
contact out of fear for one’s safety, does not render the behavior 
insignificant.  (Id. at p. 125; Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 
985–986; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233, 235; Tony C., supra, 
21 Cal.3d at p. 894.)  The Terry court noted that the series of 
acts initially observed by the detective might each be innocent 
in and of themselves.  (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 22–23.)  
“There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a 
street corner . . . .  Nor is there anything suspicious about people 
in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly 
or in pairs.  Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in.”  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
(Ibid.)  The court noted, however, that the particular facts the 
detective noted told a different story and justified some sort of 
further investigation.  (Id. at p. 23.)  But the crux of the case did 
not turn on whether some form of further investigation was 
proper but whether, in particular, there was justification for a 
detention, resulting in the “invasion of Terry’s personal 
security.”  (Ibid.)  Based on the totality of circumstances, 
including a reasonable suspicion the men might be armed, the 
majority concluded the officer was within his lawful scope of 
authority to seize Terry and conduct a pat-down for weapons.  
(Id. at pp. 22–23, 27–28, 30.)   
“In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that 
officers may stop innocent people.  Indeed, the Fourth 
Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic 
police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause 
to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be 
innocent.  The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply 
allowing the officer to briefly investigate further.  If the officer 
does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the 
individual must be allowed to go on his way.”  (Wardlow, supra, 
528 U.S. at p. 126; accord, Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 985–
986; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233, 235; Tony C., supra, 21 
Cal.3d at p. 894.)   
Writing separately in Wardlow, Justice Stevens discussed 
potentially innocent reasons that a person might flee from the 
police, including fear of police violence.  (Wardlow, supra, 528 
U.S. at pp. 128–135 (conc. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).)  But 
Justice Stevens did not argue that evasive behavior such as 
flight was of nominal or no significance to the reasonable 
suspicion inquiry.  Instead, he explained why the court correctly 
declined to adopt a bright line rule authorizing detention of 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
persons who flee from the police:  “ ‘[u]nprovoked, flight,’ in 
short, describes a category of activity too broad and varied to 
permit a per se reasonable inference regarding the motivation 
for the activity . . . .  The totality of the circumstances, as 
always, must dictate the result.”  (Id. at p. 136 (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Stevens, J.).)   
As a matter of precedent and as a matter of sound reason, 
the establishment of reasonable suspicion will always be 
contextual.  It will be informed by the totality of circumstances 
and objective scrutiny of the reasons given for an officer’s 
decision to infringe upon “the right of every person to enjoy the 
use of public streets, buildings, parks, and other conveniences 
without unwarranted interference or harassment by agents of 
the law.”  (Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893.) 
To be clear, officers may observe what people do in public 
places.  They may consider what they see in plain view and 
determine 
whether 
what 
they 
observe 
merits 
further 
observation, inquiry, or intervention.  They may approach 
people in public, engage them in consensual conversation, and 
take note of their appearance and behavior.  Nervous behavior 
and attempts to conceal oneself may provide relevant context.  
But before officers may detain someone they must be able to 
articulate a legally cognizable reason to infringe on that person’s 
liberty.   
The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
recognizes 
a 
measured 
framework for acceptable official intrusion upon the life of any 
individual.  Police officers and private individuals may well 
occupy the same public space and have no particular interaction.  
They may also engage in consensual encounters.  But before an 
officer can compel compliance with a show of authority, 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
articulable facts must support a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.  In the absence of such facts, the person is 
constitutionally protected and empowered to go on his or her 
way.   
The body of America’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
reflects the effort to strike a balance between the state’s 
obligation to responsibly and legitimately meet the critical 
needs of public safety with the nation’s founding and enduring 
commitment to protect the individual liberty ensured to all its 
people.  The officers’ detention of Flores, under the 
circumstances relied upon here, failed to maintain that balance.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  The 
matter is remanded with directions that the case be returned to 
the trial court to permit Flores to withdraw his no contest plea 
and the court to enter an order granting Flores’s suppression 
motion.  (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1053; People v. 
Miller (1983) 33 Cal.3d 545, 556.)   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J.
1 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
S267522 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Evans 
 
I agree with today’s opinion that the detention of 
defendant Marlon Flores was unlawful.  In bending over with 
his hands by his shoe and refraining from acknowledging the 
officers’ presence, Flores indicated he was either going about his 
business or attempting to avoid engaging with the police — both 
of which were within his rights to do.  As the majority concludes, 
the fact that Flores operated within his rights in a high crime 
area did not transform his behavior into grounds to detain him.  
Based on the totality of the circumstances, there was no 
reasonable suspicion that Flores was engaged in criminal 
activity that would justify his detention. 
I write separately to explain why one’s attempts to avoid 
engaging with the police — in whatever lawful manner — must 
be viewed with care and caution when evaluating the legality of 
a detention.  The trial court’s observations and the Attorney 
General’s arguments highlight the danger in considering 
“nervous” and “evasive” behavior in the totality of the 
circumstances analysis when devoid of real world context.  The 
trial court’s rationale for deeming Flores’s conduct “suspicious” 
was that Flores failed to act as “any normal human being” 
would, specifically that “any normal human being would stand 
up and say, ‘Oh, you scared me’ or ‘Oh, what can I help you with?’ 
Or ‘Oh, why are you coming towards me?’ ”  By expecting Flores 
to interact with the police with pleasantries — even as police 
approached him like a suspect — the trial court seemed to 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Evans, J., concurring 
2 
indicate that Flores could not decline a “consensual” interaction 
unless he behaved in a very particular way.  This is clearly not 
the law.  (See Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497–498.)  
While the Attorney General recognized Flores was within his 
legal right to decline interacting with the police, he too faulted 
Flores for failing to exercise this right in a particular manner.  
During oral argument, the Attorney General asserted that 
Flores could have “simply gotten in his car . . . [and] driven 
away,” “could have walked away,” and “could have told the 
officers that he didn’t want to engage with them.”  While these 
technically may have been legally available options, such 
actions may have been and often are perceived by law 
enforcement as escalating behavior meriting an escalated police 
response, including potential pursuit and/or use of force.  (See, 
e.g., Eisenberg, Criminal Law: Policing the Danger Narrative 
(2023) 113 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 473, 507–508.) 
Contrary to the trial court’s and Attorney General’s 
suggestions, the Fourth Amendment does not require that 
citizens engage or decline from engaging with police in a 
particular manner in order to be free from police detention.  It 
is therefore not surprising courts have concluded that 
attempting to avoid police interaction, including ignoring or 
walking, driving, or running away from officers, generally 
should have limited significance — if any — “[w]here a suspect 
is under no obligation to respond to a police officer’s inquiry.”  
(Commonwealth v. Warren (Mass. 2016) 58 N.E.3d 333, 341 
(Warren).)  A contrary conclusion, these courts have reasoned, 
would enable “ ‘the police [to] turn a hunch into a reasonable 
suspicion by inducing the [behavior] justifying the suspicion.’ ”  
(Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Evans, J., concurring 
3 
Importantly, naïve or ill-informed notions of police 
interactions 
must 
not 
shape 
our 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence and must not compromise Californians’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.  It may be a reasonable response for an 
individual to reflexively “freeze” or flee when being approached 
by officers.  (See Skalstad, Transformative Mediation Twenty 
Years Later: An Invitation to Discuss Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and Legal Ethics (2016) 1 Concordia L.Rev. 1, 17 [“the 
fight-flight-freeze response is a reflex and the product of the 
autonomic nervous system”].)  As numerous judges before us 
have recognized, many individuals — including, particularly, 
people of color — commonly hold a perception that engaging in 
any manner with police, including in seemingly casual or 
innocuous ways, entails a degree of risk to one’s safety.  (See 
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 132 (conc. opn. of 
Stevens, J.) [“Among some citizens, particularly minorities and 
those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility 
that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without 
justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be 
dangerous”].)  This perception is based on the unfortunate and 
longstanding realities of policing in many minority communities 
across the country, as well as the police killings of Oscar Grant, 
Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Akai Gurley, Tamir Rice, Calvon 
Reid, Anthony Hill, Eric Harris, Dontay Ivy, Walter Scott, 
Freddie Gray, Jr., Greg Gunn, Deravis Rogers, Terence 
Crutcher, Jordan Edwards, Dennis Plowden, Jr., Stephon Clark, 
Chinedu Okobi, George Robinson, Jimmy Atchison, Javier 
Ambler II, Ryan Twyman, Elijah McClain, Cameron Lamb, 
William Howard Green, Manuel Ellis, Breonna Taylor, Daniel 
Prude, George Floyd, Andre Hill, Calvin Wilks, Jr., Quadry 
Sanders, Jayland Walker, Tyre Nichols, Ta’Kiya Young and her 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Evans, J., concurring 
4 
unborn child, and thousands of other people in the last decade 
alone.  (See, e.g., Police Shootings Database, The Washington 
Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 
investigations/police-shootings-database/> [as of May 2, 2024].)1  
In short, police killings of Black and Brown children, men, and 
women “have occurred with distressing frequency throughout 
the country and here in California.”  (B.B. v. County of Los 
Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 30 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  Due to 
this searing history and the present day experiences of far too 
many people in the United States, for generations, legions of 
parents in minority communities have given their children “the 
talk” — detailing survival techniques for how to navigate 
interactions with police “all out of fear of how an officer with a 
gun will react to them.”  (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 254 
(dis. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).)  Given this context, it is apparent 
why attempting to avoid police officers reflects, for many people, 
simply a desire to avoid risking injury or death.  
Despite growing recognition of the deep-seated issues in 
policing in our country, it is still the case that communities of 
color disproportionately experience heightened levels of police 
scrutiny and racial profiling.  “Not only are Black people stopped 
and searched more often, but such searches are less likely to 
yield evidence or contraband.”  (People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 
Cal.5th 429, 451 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.), citing Lofstrom et al., 
Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement Stops (Oct. 2021) p. 25 
and Ayers & Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes 
in the Los Angeles Police Department (Oct. 2008) pp. 7–8.)  A 
 
1  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket number, and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
38324.htm>. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Evans, J., concurring 
5 
recent report found that out of more than 4.5 million law 
enforcement stops recorded throughout California in 2022, 
Black individuals were stopped 131.5 percent more frequently 
relative to their proportion of the population and Hispanic 
individuals comprised the largest racial group of stopped 
individuals.  (Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, 
Annual 
Report 
2024 
(Jan. 
1, 
2024) 
pp. 
6–7 
<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-
2024.pdf> [as of May 2, 2024].)  Stopped Black and Hispanic 
individuals were more likely to be searched than stopped White 
individuals, while officers arrested and handcuffed Native 
Americans at the highest rates.  (Id. at pp. 37, 42, 48–49.)  
Officers were less likely to discover contraband when searching 
individuals of every other racial or ethnic group as compared to 
White individuals.  (Id. at p. 49 [“Discovery rates were lower 
during stops with searches of all racial or ethnic groups of 
color”]; see also ibid. [“Compared to White individuals, Black 
individuals had a higher probability of being searched . . . 
despite being less likely to be found in possession of contraband 
or evidence”].)  Based on the reality illustrated by these 
statistics, attempting to avoid police officers may also reflect, for 
some people, a “desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being 
racially profiled.”  (Warren, supra, 58 N.E.3d at p. 342.) 
Today’s opinion notes that some courts have begun 
accounting for the impact of racial disparities in policing in the 
totality of the circumstances analysis.2  The opinion does not 
 
2  
Today’s opinion also discusses the statute criminalizing 
loitering for the purpose of engaging in drug activity, Health and 
Safety section 11532.  (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 12, 15.)  The legality 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Evans, J., concurring 
6 
rely on such considerations, but neither does it foreclose future 
litigants from developing arguments about how racial 
disparities in policing might inform one’s decision to avoid 
contact with the police.  While the evaluation of whether an 
individual’s behavior supports a finding of reasonable suspicion 
is an objective one, a test that fails to account for the realities of 
so many Californians would not be a reasonable one. 
I concur.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVANS, J. 
We Concur: 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
of that statute’s provisions is not directly before us.  In 2022, the 
governor signed legislation repealing Penal Code section 653.22, 
a statute criminalizing loitering for the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution.  The governor noted, “[T]he crime of loitering has 
disproportionately impacted Black and Brown women and 
members of the LGBTQ community.  Black adults accounted for 
56.1% of the loitering charges in Los Angeles between 2017–
2019, despite making up less than 10% of the city’s population.”  
(Governor Gavin Newsom, Letter to State Senators re Sen. Bill 
No. 
357 
(2021–2022 
Reg. 
Sess.) 
July 
1, 
2022 
<https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/SB357-
Signing-Message-7.01.2022.pdf> [as of May 2, 2024].)  The 
Legislature may wish to evaluate Health and Safety Code 
section 11532 to determine whether it presents similar 
constitutional concerns. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Flores 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 60 Cal.App.5th 978 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S267522 
Date Filed:  May 2, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Mildred Escobedo 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender (Contra Costa), and Gilbert Rivera, 
Deputy Public Defender, for the California Public Defenders 
Association and the Contra Costa County Public Defender as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Galit Lipa, State Public Defender, and Jessie Hawk, Deputy State 
Public Defender, for the Office of the State Public Defender as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Michael C. Keller, Chung L. Mar and 
Shezad H. Thakor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Richard L. Fitzer 
Attorney at Law 
6285 East Spring Street, 276N 
Long Beach, CA 90808 
(562) 429-4000 
 
Shezad H. Thakor 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6109