Title: In re R.G.L.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99A21
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-155 
No. 99A21 
Filed 17 December 2021 
 IN THE MATTER OF: R.G.L. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 23 
November 2020 by Judge Benjamin S. Hunter in District Court, Person County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 13 December 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Thomas L. Fitzgerald for petitioner-appellee Person County Department of 
Social Services; and Matthew D. Wunsche for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Parent 
Defender, for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights 
in the minor child “Robert.”1 We affirm. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
On 29 August 2018, the Person County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
filed a petition alleging that three-year-old Robert was neglected. The juvenile 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading.  
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petition stated that a child protective services (CPS) report was filed on 14 May 2018 
alleging improper supervision, injurious environment, and substance abuse after 
Robert wandered away from the house while respondent was sleeping and a neighbor 
called 911. Respondent and Robert’s mother completed requested drug screens on 
15 May 2018. Respondent’s screens were positive for amphetamines and oxycodone, 
which he was prescribed, and oxymorphone. He admitted to running out of 
medication sooner than expected because his use exceeded the prescribed amount. 
The mother’s screens were positive for amphetamines, oxycodone, oxapam, 
oxymorphone, and marijuana metabolite; moreover, she admitted to using 
marijuana, Percocet, Adderall, and Valium. The CPS report was substantiated and 
transferred to in-home services on 27 June 2018.  
¶ 3 
 
The juvenile petition further alleged that DSS’s efforts to engage the family 
and ensure Robert’s safety were unsuccessful, and that a second CPS report was filed 
on 27 August 2018 for physical injury after the mother was charged with driving 
while impaired (DWI) on 19 July 2018 while Robert was in the vehicle. The mother 
admitted that the DWI charge was the result of her taking suboxone before driving. 
On 28 August 2018, DSS completed a home visit and found the premises to be in 
disarray. When the family was unable to identify an alternate safety provider, DSS 
filed the juvenile petition and obtained nonsecure custody of Robert.  
¶ 4 
 
Following a hearing on the juvenile petition on 11 September 2018, the trial 
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court entered an order on 25 September 2018 adjudicating Robert to be a neglected 
juvenile. The trial court found that the conditions in the home as alleged in the 
petition led to or contributed to the adjudication. The court ordered that Robert 
remain in DSS custody and that DSS develop and implement a visitation plan 
providing for at least one hour of weekly supervised visitation between Robert and 
his parents. The court further ordered both parents to submit to random drug screens 
within two hours of requests to do so and to keep DSS informed of any change of 
address.  
¶ 5 
 
The matter came on for an initial review hearing on 17 December 2018. In the 
order entered following the hearing, the trial court found that the parents attended 
an initial child and family team (CFT) meeting to develop their respective case plans 
on 27 September 2018. Respondent’s needs were identified to include employment, 
parenting skills, substance use, mental health, medical care, and housing. The court 
further found that respondent was no longer employed as of 23 November 2018; that 
he completed a mental health assessment in August 2018 that recommended 
outpatient therapy and a psychiatric evaluation for possible medication management, 
but he was a “no[-]show” for psychiatric evaluations in September and December 
2018; and that the location of the parents’ residence was unknown. The court 
identified the barriers to reunification as the needs identified in the case plan and 
found that DSS had made recommendations focused on the needs of the parents to 
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assist the parents in their stated goal of reunification. The court ordered DSS to 
retain custody of Robert and to maintain a visitation plan allowing the parents at 
least one hour of weekly supervised visitation and ordered the parents to comply with 
their case plans, follow recommendations of treatment providers, and submit to 
random drug screens within two hours of requests.  
¶ 6 
 
Following a 26 August 2019 permanency-planning hearing, the trial court 
entered an order setting the permanent plan for Robert as reunification with a 
concurrent plan of adoption. The court found that the parents had obtained 
employment and had made a down payment on a trailer in June 2019. The court 
noted the parents were working second and third shifts and had not developed a 
viable plan for childcare, and they did not have drivers’ licenses and could not legally 
transport Robert. The parents’ new trailer was found to be clean, neat, and modern, 
and to have ample space. The court additionally found that respondent attended 
weekly visitations but was consistently late, fell asleep during most visits, and was 
not always engaged with Robert during the visits; that respondent had “finally 
relented” after several months of requests that he seek medical care for sleep apnea, 
but no report of results had been made; and that the parents reported having had 
“excellent rapport” with Robert’s foster parents and they were “able to eat lunch with 
[Robert] sometimes and engage him at the church where the foster parents attend.” 
The court ordered DSS to continue the plan of at least one hour of weekly supervised 
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visitation with additional visitation as arranged with the foster parents and ordered 
the parents to develop and present transportation and childcare plans to DSS.  
¶ 7 
 
The matter came back on for a permanency-planning hearing on 2 December 
2019. The trial court found that the parents were struggling to achieve the needed 
goals. The findings show that both parents had lost their jobs, that respondent 
reported new employment that had not been verified, and that the parents had not 
presented suitable transportation or childcare plans to DSS. Respondent attributed 
his inability to stay awake to his sleep apnea, but he had not sought the requested 
medical care to address the issue despite DSS’s referral to a neurologist for a sleep 
study. The court also found that individuals who resided with the parents when 
Robert was removed from the parents’ care were still living with the parents, and 
that DSS was not able to enter the home during the most recent home visit because 
the parents were asleep and someone else answered the door. The trial court changed 
the permanent plan for Robert to adoption with a concurrent plan of reunification 
and reduced the parents’ visitation to biweekly supervised visits.  
¶ 8 
 
On 5 February 2020, DSS filed a motion to terminate the parents’ parental 
rights in Robert based on grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable 
progress to correct the conditions that led to Robert’s removal from the home. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) (2019). Respondent filed an answer opposing 
termination on 12 May 2020.  
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¶ 9 
 
Before the termination hearing occurred, the matter came back on for two 
additional permanency planning hearings on 6 July 2020 and 5 October 2020. The 
updated findings from the 6 July 2020 hearing were unfavorable to the parents. The 
trial court found that both parents reported unemployment. The court also found that 
the parents had acquired rental housing different from the trailer they were 
previously living in; that individuals with extensive criminal and child protective 
services histories were residing with the parents; and that DSS was advised that the 
parents “are under eviction status” because of their failure to pay rent since March 
2020. The court reduced the parents’ visitation to at least one hour of supervised 
visitation per month. Following the 5 October 2020 hearing, the court found that the 
parents resided in separate locations, but their accommodations were not stable; the 
parents reported unemployment; neither parent had visited Robert recently; and 
neither parent was compliant with the terms of their respective case plans.  
¶ 10 
 
The termination motion was heard on 9 November 2020. In an order entered 
on 23 November 2020, the trial court determined that grounds existed to terminate 
the parents’ parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) and that 
termination of the parents’ parental rights was in Robert’s best interests. 
Accordingly, the trial court terminated the parents’ parental rights in Robert. 
Respondent appeals.2  
                                            
2 Robert’s mother is not a party to this appeal.  
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II. 
Analysis 
¶ 11 
 
Termination of parental rights proceedings are conducted in two stages, an 
adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019).  
In the initial adjudicat[ory] stage, the trial court must 
determine whether grounds exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111 to terminate parental rights. If it determines that 
one or more grounds listed in section 7B-1111 are present, 
the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the 
court must consider whether it is in the best interests of 
the juvenile to terminate parental rights.  
In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842 (2016) (cleaned up). In his appeal, respondent 
challenges the trial court’s determinations that grounds existed to terminate his 
parental rights in Robert at the adjudicatory stage and that termination was in 
Robert’s best interests at the dispositional stage.  
A. Adjudication 
¶ 12 
 
At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the 
existence of one or more grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) by 
“clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f) (2019). We review 
a trial court’s adjudication of the existence of grounds to terminate parental rights 
“to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 
392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “A trial court’s 
finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed 
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conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary 
finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019) (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 403–
04 (1982)). Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the evidence and 
are binding on appeal. In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019) (citing Koufman v. 
Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable 
de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019) (citing In re S.N., 194 N.C. 
App. 142, 146 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368 (2009)). 
1. Findings of fact 
¶ 13 
 
In contesting the trial court’s adjudication of grounds for termination, 
respondent raises challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact. He first contends that 
the trial court failed to issue proper and sufficient findings of fact. Respondent argues 
that “[m]any” of the trial court’s findings are “verbatim recitations from the 
allegations in the termination motion” and that most of the findings are “conclusory” 
and not sufficiently detailed to permit appellate review. We disagree.  
¶ 14 
 
As we have previously explained: 
Our Juvenile Code places a duty on the trial court as 
the adjudicator of the evidence. It mandates that the court 
shall take evidence, find the facts, and shall adjudicate the 
existence or nonexistence of any of the circumstances set 
forth in G.S. 7B-1111 which authorize the termination of 
parental rights of the respondent. Section 1A-1, Rule 
52(a)(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides in 
pertinent part: In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law. This Court has held: 
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While Rule 52(a) does not require a recitation of the 
evidentiary and subsidiary facts required to prove the 
ultimate facts, it does require specific findings of the 
ultimate facts established by the evidence, admissions and 
stipulations which are determinative of the questions 
involved in the action and essential to support the 
conclusions of law reached. 
In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407–08 (2019) (cleaned up).  
¶ 15 
 
In the instant case, the trial court determined that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights to Robert pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) and (2) as follows: 
41. . . . [T]he child is a neglected juvenile and there 
is a probability of neglect will continue for the forseeable 
[sic] future pursuant to the statute because the 
[respondent-]father has not addressed the issues that 
brought the child into care;  
. . . . 
43. The [r]espondent[-]father has left his child in 
foster care for in excess of twelve months without showing 
to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt that reasonable progress 
under the circumstances has been made in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile . . . .  
In support of its determination that the statutory grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights, the court made the following findings: 
13. The parents failed to properly supervise their 
child and custody was granted to Person County DSS on 
September 11, 2018; the parents[‘] excessive and continued 
usage of controlled substances contributed to their lack of 
proper care and supervision of the child;  
14. On September 11, 2018, Person County DSS was 
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granted custody of this child, and after the parents lost 
custody, DSS offered services to them to work towards 
recovering custody of their child;  
. . . . 
23. The father has not availed himself of any services 
of DSS social workers to potentially take custody of his 
minor child;  
24. The father has not fully utilized the services 
offered by DSS;  
25. The father has not been willing to work with the 
DSS social workers to reunify himself with his child;  
26. Visitation was offered weekly to the father;  
27. That the father’s contact with the minor child 
has been limited to visitations for more than two years;  
28. That the father has not provided regular care for 
his minor child for in excess of two years;  
29. The father has not consistently taken steps to 
become clean and sober;  
30. The father has not consistently taken steps to 
become and remain employed;  
31. That the father has not provided any personal 
care or emotional support for this child during the entire 
period that the child has been in foster care;  
32. That the parents have not attempted to create a 
bond between themselves and [Robert] since the child came 
into foster care;  
33. DSS entered into a case plan with the parents, 
showing steps necessary for them to recover custody of 
their child;  
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34. The foster care social worker offered services to 
the [r]espondent parents to achieve such steps, as well as 
the goal of reunification;  
. . . . 
36. The [r]espondent[-]father declined services as 
late as December 2, 2019;  
37. That the [r]espondent parents have left this child 
in foster care for in excess of twenty-five (25) months 
without showing to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt that 
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the 
removal of the juvenile . . . ;  
38. That the actions of each of the [r]espondent 
parents are willful;  
39. That the willfulness of each of the [r]espondent 
parents continues at this time.  
¶ 16 
 
Although the findings closely track the allegations in the termination motion, 
there are differences between the findings and the allegations, such as the lengths of 
time and distinctions between parents, that show the trial court did not merely copy 
the allegations from the termination motion. The modifications indicate the trial 
court independently reviewed and judged the evidence and issued findings based 
thereon. Moreover, the findings clearly set forth the trial court’s reasoning for its 
adjudication of grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on his failure 
to engage in services offered by DSS, which resulted in the issues leading to Robert’s 
removal and adjudication going uncorrected. We reject respondent’s arguments that 
the trial court failed to issue proper and specific findings to allow for meaningful 
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appellate review.  
¶ 17 
 
In addition to his general challenges to the findings, respondent challenges 
specific findings as not supported by the evidence.  
¶ 18 
 
Respondent first challenges finding of fact 13, which states that “[t]he parents 
failed to properly supervise their child” and “the parents[’]  excessive and continued 
usage of controlled substances contributed to their lack of proper care and supervision 
of the child.” Respondent contends the finding is not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence to the extent it indicates he was responsible in any way for 
Robert’s removal and adjudication. Relying on a finding in the first review order that 
“[Robert] was initially removed due to the actions of his mother,” a finding which was 
subsequently repeated in succeeding permanency-planning orders, respondent places 
the blame for Robert’s removal solely on the mother. However, record evidence 
supports the trial court’s finding that both parents contributed to Robert’s removal 
and subsequent adjudication. The DSS social worker testified at the termination 
hearing about DSS’s intervention with the family in May 2018 when DSS received a 
CPS report alleging improper supervision, injurious environment, and substance 
abuse after three-year-old Robert wandered from the home alone while respondent 
was asleep. The social worker’s testimony indicated substance abuse concerns for 
both parents. DSS substantiated the report and began offering in-home services in 
June 2018, but efforts to engage the family to ensure Robert’s safety were 
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unsuccessful. Respondent acknowledges the social worker’s testimony but discounts 
it on grounds that the record does not indicate the social worker was involved in 
Robert’s removal, and that the social worker testified she could not remember if she 
attended the adjudication hearing. Nonetheless, the social worker testified that she 
had followed the case “[s]ince August of 2018,” and the 25 September 2018 
adjudication and disposition order was also introduced into evidence at the 
termination hearing without objection. In that order, the court found the “activities 
of the parents and/or conditions in the home of the parents [that] led to or contributed 
to the adjudication, and led to the [c]ourt’s decision to remove custody from the 
parents,” included: a CPS report that was accepted for improper supervision, 
injurious environment, and substance abuse on 14 May 2018 after Robert left the 
house while respondent was sleeping and a neighbor called 911; respondent’s 
admission that household members had a history of cocaine use; respondent’s positive 
test for prescribed and unprescribed controlled substances on 15 May 2018 and his 
admission to use exceeding the prescribed amount of his medications; and, after a 
second CPS report was accepted on 27 August 2018 following the mother’s being 
charged with a DWI while Robert was in the car, a DSS home visit on 28 August 2018 
which found the home to be in disarray. The record evidence supports finding of fact 
13. 
¶ 19 
 
Respondent also challenges the trial court’s findings that he did not participate 
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in services offered by DSS. Specifically, he challenges finding of fact 34, that the social 
worker offered services to help him achieve the goals of his case plan, and findings of 
fact 23 through 25, that he did not avail himself of the services offered and was 
unwilling to work with DSS. He also challenges the trial court’s more specific findings 
in finding of fact 29 that he did not consistently take steps to become clean and sober 
and in finding of fact 30 that he did not consistently take steps to become and remain 
employed, and that he declined services as late as 2 December 2019 as stated in 
finding of fact 36.3  
¶ 20 
 
In unchallenged finding of fact 33, the trial court found that “DSS entered into 
a case plan with the parents, showing steps necessary for them to recover custody of 
their child.” A report on the case plan and the parents’ compliance and progress 
throughout the case was admitted into evidence at the termination hearing without 
objection, and the social worker offered testimony about the case plan and the 
parents’ progress. The evidence shows the case plan included categories specifying 
steps the parents should take to address housing, employment, substance abuse, 
emotional and mental health, and parenting skills, with an additional requirement 
that respondent follow up with medical care for sleep issues. Respondent 
acknowledges DSS offered some services, but he contends that the reunification 
                                            
3 Respondent identifies the challenged finding as finding of fact 35; however, finding 
of fact 35 concerns the mother’s choosing to decline services. Finding of fact 36 addresses 
respondent’s choosing to decline services. 
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services were not significant, that there were few details in the evidence about the 
services offered and his ability to participate in the services, and that DSS made 
minimal efforts towards reunification. He asserts finding of fact 34 is not supported 
by the evidence. We are unpersuaded by respondent’s arguments. 
¶ 21 
 
We first note that respondent has not specifically challenged finding of fact 14, 
which also found that “DSS offered services to [the parents] to work towards 
recovering custody of their child.” This finding is therefore binding on appeal. See In 
re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437. Nonetheless, a review of the evidence shows that the case 
plan was developed in September 2018 and that DSS: (1) initially made referrals for 
comprehensive substance abuse treatment and a “Parents As Teachers” (PAT) 
program to address parenting skills; (2) requested random drug screens; and 
(3) established supervised visits between the parents and Robert. The case plan 
progress report indicates that DSS later provided the parents with a housing list to 
assist in their housing search. The evidence further shows that DSS staff met with 
the parents approximately every three months to review the case plan and to address 
additional concerns with the parents, which included their need for counseling, 
changes to their work schedules, and a plan of care for Robert. The social worker 
testified that she worked with the parents and local daycares to try to ameliorate 
problems with the parents’ work schedules which impeded their ability to provide all 
necessary care for Robert, but no resolution was achieved. The evidence also indicates 
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that after respondent did not address his continued sleep issues at a medical 
appointment, the social worker contacted the respondent’s doctor to get a neurology 
referral for a sleep study. The record evidence supports finding of fact 34 that services 
were offered to the respondent.  
¶ 22 
 
As to findings of fact 23 through 25 regarding respondent’s engagement with 
services and DSS, respondent argues he was willing to work towards reunification 
and did work towards reunification. He emphasizes evidence of his efforts early in 
the case but also acknowledges evidence of his waning participation later on. 
Nevertheless, he contends the evidence does not support “the broad, conclusory 
finding that [he] would not work with DSS.” Respondent accurately recounts the 
evidence. Notably, the social worker testified that both parents got off to a good start 
and made great progress in 2019, but that things took a turn for the worse between 
October and December of 2019.   
¶ 23 
 
Evidence was presented that respondent completed mental health and 
substance abuse assessments, which recommended individual therapy, group 
therapy, and a psychiatric appointment for possible medication management. In the 
case plan progress report for December 2018, DSS reported that respondent was 
scheduled to begin group therapy, have a psychiatric evaluation, and start the PAT 
program. By March 2019, DSS reported respondent was employed and would be 
working full-time in April; in addition, he was looking for housing, attending 
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medication management, and visiting with Robert, although issues with tardiness for 
visits were reported. Respondent was directed to follow up with individual therapy. 
By June 2019, the parents had made a down payment on a place to live and were to 
move in by the end of the month, and DSS reported no recent concerns with substance 
abuse. The case plan progress report indicated respondent was participating in 
medication management and the PAT program. Respondent’s progress appeared to 
continue through September 2019, but DSS reported the parents were consistently 
late for visits and respondent failed to disclose his continued sleep issues to his doctor. 
The social worker testified that she completed a home visit and determined the 
parents’ trailer was appropriate and had space for Robert, but that the parents lost 
the trailer by the end of 2019. DSS reported that by December 2019, the parents were 
not involved in substance abuse treatment or services for emotional and mental 
health, were no longer in the PAT program, and were consistently late for visits, and 
respondent had not followed up on his medical issues.  
¶ 24 
 
The record shows that the primary permanent plan for Robert was changed to 
adoption in December 2019. Since that time, DSS reported missed visits and 
respondent’s failure to engage at visits. Evidence showed that the parents were no-
shows for a requested drug screen on 3 June 2020 and that DSS reported no contact 
with the parents in the periods between DSS’s reviews of the case plan in March, 
June, and September 2020. The social worker testified respondent cancelled his first 
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neurology appointment but later reported that he had a video appointment; however, 
the social worker had been unable to verify this information. The social worker also 
testified regarding the circumstances as of the last permanency planning hearing in 
October 2020, approximately one month before the termination hearing. She stated 
the parents made minimal progress during the review period. She testified the 
parents had not established a residence for Robert to return to and had last reported 
to be living apart. She also testified that unemployment was reported in October 
2020, and the parents had not been consistent with visitation at DSS. A visitation log 
introduced into evidence showed that the parents did not respond to DSS’s attempts 
to schedule visits in July and August 2020. The social worker was unaware of further 
substance abuse treatment or emotional and mental health treatment by respondent 
in the months leading up to the termination hearing because he had not reported any 
treatment in the past year. She testified the parents had not been keeping in regular 
contact with DSS, explaining that “sometimes their voicemail is not set up and you 
can’t leave a message,” or “[w]e may leave a message and may not hear back from 
them.” The social worker testified that the needs and problems that existed at the 
initiation of the case still existed for respondent. 
¶ 25 
 
Based on the above, we agree with respondent that the evidence does not 
support finding of fact 23 that he “has not availed himself of any services.” We thus 
disregard that finding. See In re L.H., 378 N.C. 625, 2021-NCSC-110, ¶ 14 (citing In 
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re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 358 (2020) (disregarding factual findings not supported by the 
evidence)). But the evidence of respondent’s waning engagement and progress since 
late 2019 and his lack of contact with DSS throughout 2020 supports findings of fact 
24 and 25 that respondent “has not fully utilized the services offered” and “has not 
been willing to work with the DSS social workers.”  
¶ 26 
 
In regards to the trial court’s more specific findings, respondent contends that 
the trial court’s finding of fact 29 that he has not consistently taken steps to become 
clean and sober is “mostly irrelevant and not supported” because he was prescribed 
medication for ADHD and his positive drug screens for amphetamines were thus not 
indicative of substance abuse, and because his positive screens for unprescribed 
opioids and marijuana occurred more than two years before the termination hearing. 
However, as detailed above, the record evidence indicates concerns with respondent’s 
use of controlled substances, including his excessive use of prescribed medications, 
that contributed to Robert’s removal and adjudication as a neglected juvenile. 
Substance abuse was recognized as a concern from the initiation of the case and was 
addressed in respondent’s case plan. Although the evidence shows respondent 
initially participated in some treatment for medication management, the evidence 
was that he had not reported any treatment in the year preceding the termination 
hearing and was a “no-show” for the most recent requested drug screen. Finding of 
fact 29 is supported by the record evidence. 
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¶ 27 
 
Respondent also challenges finding of fact 36 that he “declined services as late 
as December 2, 2019.”4 This date corresponds with the December 2019 permanency-
planning hearing, after which the trial court changed the primary permanent plan 
for Robert to adoption. Evidence presented at the termination hearing indicated that 
respondent was not in substance abuse treatment or participating in services for 
emotional and mental health issues in December 2019, and that he had not followed 
up with his medical issues. Respondent also did not attend DSS’s quarterly case plan 
update as he had done on prior occasions. This evidence shows respondent was not 
engaged in his case plan in December 2019; however, it does not show that respondent 
refused any specific offer of services in December 2019. To the extent the trial court 
found respondent “declined” services in December 2019, we agree with respondent 
that the finding is not supported by the evidence and thus disregard the finding. See 
In re L.H., ¶ 14. 
¶ 28 
 
Lastly, respondent challenges the portions of findings of fact 32 and 55 stating 
that “the parents have not attempted to create a bond between themselves and 
[Robert] since [Robert] came into foster care” and “[Robert] has absolutely no bond at 
                                            
4 Respondent identifies the challenged finding as finding of fact 35; however, finding 
of fact 35 concerns the mother’s choosing to decline services. Finding of fact 36 addresses 
respondent’s choosing to decline services. 
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all between himself and his parents.”5 We agree with respondent that the findings 
are not supported by the evidence. The evidence tended to show that DSS facilitated 
visits to maintain the bond between Robert and the parents. Although concerns were 
reported regarding the parents’ repeated tardiness for visits and respondent’s lack of 
engagement and tendency to fall asleep during visits, the evidence was that the 
parents consistently attended weekly visits in 2018 and 2019 and attended monthly 
visits in January and February 2020 before in-person visitation was suspended for 
several months because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence was presented that the 
parents attended one additional visit with Robert at DSS in June 2020 but then failed 
to respond to attempts to schedule visits in July and August 2020. In addition to visits 
at DSS, the social worker testified that the parents had a relationship with the foster 
parents, which allowed them to have “visit[s] outside of the agency” and to participate 
in telephone and video calls with Robert. The social worker was unsure how many 
visits had taken place outside DSS’s supervision, but she explained that the parents 
would see the foster parents and Robert when the parents attended church pre-
pandemic, and the parents would communicate with the foster parents about Robert. 
The social worker testified that the parents have consistently visited with Robert 
                                            
5 Finding of fact 55 appears to be included among the findings made by the trial court 
to support its best-interests determination in the dispositional stage. Thus, it is binding if 
supported by competent evidence. See In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 560 (2020) (“We review the 
trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by 
competent evidence.” (quoting In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 793 (2020))). 
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through the foster family, noting that she was aware that the parents visited with 
Robert and the foster parents the week before the termination hearing to celebrate 
Robert’s birthday. Furthermore, although there is no testimony specifically 
concerning the bond between respondent and Robert, contrary to finding of fact 55 
that there was “absolutely no bond at all between [Robert] and his parents,” the social 
worker testified a bond existed “between the child and mom.” We hold the evidence 
does not support the challenged portions of findings of fact 32 and 55. Therefore, we 
disregard those challenged portions. See In re L.H., ¶ 14. 
¶ 29 
 
Having reviewed respondent’s challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact, 
we next consider the trial court’s adjudication of grounds for termination.  
2. Neglect  
¶ 30 
 
A trial court may terminate parental rights for neglect if it concludes the 
parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile 
“whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, 
supervision, or discipline . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s 
welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  
As we have recently explained: “Termination of parental 
rights based upon this statutory ground requires a showing 
of neglect at the time of the termination hearing or, if the 
child has been separated from the parent for a long period 
of time, there must be a showing of a likelihood of future 
neglect by the parent. When determining whether such 
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future neglect is likely, the district court must consider 
evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the 
period of past neglect and the time of the termination 
hearing.” 
In re L.H., ¶ 10 (quoting In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (cleaned up)); see also 
In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984) (“[E]vidence of neglect by a parent prior to 
losing custody of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in 
subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights. The trial court must also 
consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect 
and the probability of a repetition of neglect.”). This Court has held that “[a] parent’s 
failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of 
future neglect.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020) (quoting In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. 
App. 633, 637 (2018)). 
¶ 31 
 
Here the trial court determined in finding of fact 41 that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) “as the 
child is a neglected juvenile and there is a probability of [sic] neglect will continue for 
the forseeable [sic] future . . . because the father has not addressed the issues that 
brought the child into care.” The trial court additionally concluded that respondent 
had neglected Robert, and that the neglect was likely to continue in the future.  
¶ 32 
 
Respondent argues that the evidence and the findings of fact do not support 
the trial court’s determination that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect.  His 
argument is largely based on his assertion that he was not responsible for Robert’s 
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removal and prior adjudication as a neglected juvenile, which we have rejected, and 
his challenges to the findings of fact. 
¶ 33 
 
The record evidence and the trial court’s findings which are supported by the 
evidence in this case establish that Robert was removed from the home and 
adjudicated neglected based on both parents’ failure to properly supervise and 
provide proper care to Robert, which was related to the parents’ abuse of controlled 
substances. DSS developed a case plan with respondent that identified matters he 
needed to address to regain custody of Robert, including issues related substance 
abuse, employment, parenting skills, mental health, housing, and medical care for 
sleep problems, and DSS offered services to respondent. However, respondent only 
partially cooperated with services and with DSS. As a result, the conditions that 
existed when Robert was removed from the home and contributed to Robert’s 
adjudication as a neglected juvenile continued to exist at the time of the termination 
hearing. We hold that the evidence and the findings that respondent failed to correct 
the issues that contributed to Robert’s prior adjudication as a neglected juvenile 
support the trial court’s determination that there was a likelihood of repetition of 
neglect. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in adjudicating neglect as a ground 
for termination of respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).  
¶ 34 
 
Because “an adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is 
sufficient to support a termination of parental right,” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395 
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(citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404), we need not address respondent’s challenge to 
the trial court’s adjudication of grounds for termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2).  
B. Disposition 
¶ 35 
 
If the trial court determines that at least one ground exists to terminate 
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), “the court proceeds to the dispositional 
stage, at which the court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the 
juvenile to terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 842 (first citing In re 
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247 (1997); and then citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110). In determining 
whether termination of parental rights is in the juvenile’s best interests, 
the court shall consider the following criteria and make 
written findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid 
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the 
juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, 
custodian, or other permanent placement. 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).  
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¶ 36 
 
“The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional 
stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019) 
(citing In re D.L.W. 368 N.C. at 842). “[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s 
ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have 
been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015) (quoting 
State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 (1988)). 
¶ 37 
 
In this case, the trial court issued findings regarding each of the relevant 
criteria. The court found that at the time of the termination proceeding, Robert was 
five years old and had been in foster care for twenty-five months; that the likelihood 
of Robert’s adoption was great, as Robert’s foster parents planned to file an adoption 
proceeding as soon as he is legally free for adoption; that the permanent plan for 
Robert was adoption, and termination of parental rights was the last impediment in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan; that any bond between Robert and 
respondent was not significant;6 that the foster parents were very involved with 
Robert, and the bond between Robert and the foster parents was very strong; and 
that the foster parents had sufficient means to care for Robert. Respondent does not 
challenge any of these findings, and these findings are thus binding on appeal. See 
In re A.K.O., 375 N.C. 698, 702 (2020) (“Dispositional findings not challenged by 
                                            
6 We do not consider the challenged portion of finding of fact 55 that there is absolutely 
no bond between Robert and the parents because we have determined that portion of the 
finding is not supported by the evidence.  
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respondents are binding on appeal.” (citing In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437)).  
¶ 38 
 
Respondent instead contends the trial court abused its discretion in making its 
best-interests determination because the court “misapprehended two key points of 
law.” Neither argument directly addresses the trial court’s written findings or its 
consideration of the findings in support of its best-interests determination. 
¶ 39 
 
Respondent first argues the trial court erred when it set adoption as a 
concurrent permanent plan for Robert in the 3 February 2020 order from the 
2 December 2019 permanency-planning hearing. Respondent directs this Court’s 
attention to the trial court’s finding in the permanency-planning review order that 
“[g]uardianship would not be an appropriate plan, as there are no identified relatives 
to fill that need,” and he argues the trial court misapprehended the law because it is 
not necessary that a guardian be a relative. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-600(b) (2019) 
(contemplating the “appointment of a relative or other suitable person as guardian”). 
Respondent contends guardianship would have been the “ideal situation” in this case.  
¶ 40 
 
Although respondent notes that there was no right of appeal from the order 
changing Robert’s permanent plan, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1) (2019), he argues the 
issue is properly before this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-278 because the trial 
court had to consider Robert’s permanent plan in finding that termination of parental 
rights would aid in accomplishing the permanent plan. See N.C.G.S. § 1-278 (2019) 
(“Upon an appeal from a judgment, the court may review any intermediate order 
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involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.”). But the courts have 
long required a timely objection when review of an intermediate order is later sought 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-278. See Tinajero v. Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc., 233 
N.C. App. 748, 757 (2014) (citing Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 637, 
641–42 (2000)). The record in this case contains no indication that respondent 
previously objected to, or contested, the trial court’s exclusion of guardianship as a 
permanent plan for Robert based on any alleged misapprehension of the law. The 
challenged finding was initially made months before the termination hearing, and 
similar findings were repeated in subsequent permanency-planning orders. 
Therefore, we do not consider respondent’s collateral attack on the permanency-
planning order.  
¶ 41 
 
Moreover, we note that this Court has rejected arguments regarding the 
consideration of dispositional alternatives at this stage of a termination proceeding. 
See In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 438 (rejecting a parent’s argument that the trial court 
should have considered dispositional alternatives, such as granting guardianship or 
custody to the foster family, in order to leave a legal avenue for the children to 
maintain a relationship with the parent). Although the trial court may consider 
alternative dispositions, see In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. 285, 290 (2020) (explaining that 
the trial court “may treat the availability of a relative placement as a ‘relevant 
consideration’ [under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6)] in determining whether termination 
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of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests”), it is not required to do 
so.  
While the stated policy of the Juvenile Code is to prevent 
the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles 
from their parents, we note that the best interests of the 
juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court and 
when it is not in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned 
home, the juvenile will be placed in a safe, permanent home 
within a reasonable amount of time. 
In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 438 (cleaned up). Accordingly, when it is clear from the 
termination order that the trial court considered the relevant dispositional criteria, 
made proper findings, and made a reasoned determination that termination of 
parental rights was in the juvenile’s best interest, as the trial court did in the instant 
case, an appellate court should not second-guess the trial court’s best-interests 
determination.  
¶ 42 
 
Lastly, respondent argues the trial court misapprehended the legal effect of 
termination of parental rights when it stated 
Furthermore, I’m going to make a finding that this 
termination serves a dual purpose of looking after the best 
interest of the minor child by being in a more stable 
environment while, at the same time, allowing him to keep 
contact with his biological parents, which is not something 
that we see every day. 
Because “[a]n order terminating the parental rights completely and permanently 
terminates all rights and obligations of the parent to the juvenile and of the juvenile 
to the parent arising from the parental relationship,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1112 (2019), 
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respondent contends the court’s statement amounts to a misapprehension of the law 
and an abuse of discretion in the best-interests determination. 
¶ 43 
 
Despite the trial court’s statement at the termination hearing, the court made 
no such finding in the termination order. As detailed above, the trial court made 
findings on the relevant criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in support of its 
determination that termination of parental rights was in Robert’s best interests. 
Additionally, we do not believe the court’s statement amounts to a misapprehension 
of the law. There was no indication that the trial court misunderstood the legal effect 
of termination of parental rights. The court’s statement instead specifically 
acknowledges the unique circumstances in this case, in which the foster father, who 
was also the prospective adoptive father, testified to the family’s openness to 
facilitating an ongoing connection between Robert and his biological parents, unless 
it was unsafe to do so. We understand the court’s statement to be that termination of 
parental rights was in Robert’s best interests, but that termination in this case did 
not necessarily foreclose the possibility that Robert would keep in contact with his 
biological parents given the foster parents’ values. Accordingly, we reject 
respondent’s argument that the trial court misapprehended the legal effect of 
terminating his parental rights.   
¶ 44 
 
A review of the termination order shows that the trial court considered the 
relevant dispositional criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and made a reasoned 
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determination based on those criteria that termination of respondent’s parental 
rights in Robert was in Robert’s best interests. Because the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion, we uphold the trial court’s best-interests determination.  
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 45 
 
The trial court did not err in adjudicating neglect as a ground for termination 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Robert’s best interests. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s termination order. 
AFFIRMED.