Title: Degenstein v. Ehrman
Citation: 145 N.W.2d 493
Docket Number: 8218
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: October 13, 1966

145 N.W.2d 493 (1966) Clarence DEGENSTEIN, by and through Philip Degenstein, his Guardian ad litem, Plaintiff, v. Jake EHRMAN, Jr., Eldon Ehrman, a minor, by Jake Ehrman, Jr., his Guardian ad litem, Larry Gehring, a minor, by Jake Gehring, his Guardian ad litem, Defendants. Eldon EHRMAN, a minor, by Jake Ehrman, Jr., his Guardian ad litem, Cross-Complainant and Respondent, v. Larry GEHRING, a minor, by Jake Gehring, his Guardian ad litem, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8218. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 13, 1966. *496 McGee, Van Sickle &amp; Hankla, Minot, for appellant. Vogel, Ulmer &amp; Bair, Mandan, and J. O. Thorson, McClusky, for respondent. Dale Jensen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). Clarence Degenstein, a minor who was a passenger in an automobile driven by Llewellyn Rauser, brought an action through his guardian ad litem against Jake Ehrman, Jr., his minor son Eldon Ehrman, and Larry Gehring, also a minor, for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred when an automobile owned by Jake Ehrman, Jr., collided with an automobile owned by Llewellyn Rauser's father. The defendant Eldon Ehrman, through his guardian ad litem, filed a cross-claim against the defendant Larry Gehring for damages Eldon suffered as a result of personal injuries incurred in the same accident. An answer was duly returned to the cross-claim. Eldon also brought a separate action against Llewellyn Rauser, the driver of the vehicle owned by Llewellyn's father, for damages for personal injuries arising out of the same accident. The claim of the plaintiff, Clarence Degenstein, was settled prior to trial of the cross-claim. Eldon's cross-claim against Larry Gehring was consolidated for trial with his claim against Llewellyn Rauser. This appeal is from the judgment of the District Court of Sheridan County based on a jury verdict in favor of the cross-complainant, Eldon Ehrman, and against the defendant Larry Gehring in the sum of $26,541, plus costs, and from the order of the district court denying the motion of the defendant Larry Gehring for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The first basic issue we are faced with on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the cross-complainant, Eldon Ehrman, was a guest in the automobile owned by his father and driven by the defendant Larry Gehring, within the intent of the North Dakota guest law, barring recovery against the said defendant based only on ordinary negligence. *497 The facts as to this issue are undisputed. The action by Eldon Ehrman is for the recovery of money damages for personal injuries he sustained as a result of an automobile accident on December 1, 1962, which occurred one mile south of Anamoose on State Highway 14. At the time of the accident Eldon was riding in a car owned by his father Jake Ehrman, Jr., and driven by his friend and school classmate, Larry Gehring. The accident occurred when the vehicle driven by Larry collided with a vehicle driven by Llewellyn Rauser. Eldon lives with his parents on a farm 3½ miles south of Anamoose. About 7:00 p. m. on a Saturday evening Eldon drove his parents to Anamoose in a 1959 Ford automobile owned by his father Jake Ehrman, Jr. When they arrived in Anamoose Eldon parked the car and went into the drugstore. His parents went to a wedding shower and party in the Vets' Hall. As Eldon came out of the drugstore he saw his friends Llewellyn Rauser and Larry Gehring driving around in a 1958 Chevrolet automobile owned by Llewellyn's father Berthold Rauser. They stopped and Eldon got into the car with them. The three drove around town in the Rauser car for a while and then drove to the Wesley Schilling farm located 5 miles southwest of Anamoose to see Llewellyn's girl friend. When they returned to Anamoose, they parked the Rauser car and got into the Ehrman car. The three then drove around town in the Ehrman car. During this time Llewellyn asked and was given permission by Eldon to drive the Ehrman car. While driving the Ehrman car, Llewellyn made a second trip to the Schilling farm to see his girl friend. When they returned to Anamoose, they decided to go to the wedding party at the Vets' Hall. At the wedding party all three had some beer. At about 10:45 p.m. Eldon and Larry left the wedding party together. At this time Larry began driving the Ehrman car and Eldon rode in the right front seat. Larry drove the Ehrman car to the old school gym, where they picked up five other boys, who got into the back seat. All were schoolmates of Larry and Eldon, and all were about fourteen or fifteen years of age. Eldon testified that he could not recall anything that happened from the time the five boys got into the back seat of the Ehrman car until after the accident. Upon leaving the old school gym, Larry, with Eldon in the front seat and the other five boys in the back seat, drove around town and then south to the intersection of Highways 52 and 14. As Larry proceeded south in the Ehrman vehicle, Llewellyn Rauser and his friend Clarence Degenstein began following in the Rauser vehicle. When Larry stopped for the stop sign at the intersection of Highways 52 and 14, the Rauser vehicle drove alongside the Ehrman vehicle. As the two vehicles drove south on Highway 14, the Ehrman vehicle was on the right side of the highway, and the Rauser vehicle was on the left side. Soon after the vehicles left the intersection, the Rauser vehicle pulled in front of the Ehrman vehicle. About a mile down the road the Rauser vehicle drove off Highway 14 at a point where it is intersected by a gravel road. The two vehicles collided when the Rauser vehicle re-entered the highway. Our guest statute reads as follows: In Ledford v. Klein, a decision rendered by this court in 1957, we said: Ledford quoted from Blashfield as follows: In Syllabus 5 of that case we said: We believe that if the status of a guest is not changed by reason of the fact that he does a part of the driving, it logically follows that the status of a host (or, as in this case, the status of the bailee of the owner) is not changed by reason of the fact that he permits his guest to do a part of the driving. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals construed the Michigan guest statute in Baldwin v. Hill, 315 F.2d 738 (6 Cir. 1963). In that case the daughter of the car's owner permitted her boy friend to drive while she remained in the front seat. An accident occurred, resulting in injury to the daughter. The court said that under Michigan law whether a person is a guest within the meaning of the guest act is a question of fact if the evidence as to the nature of the relationship between the parties is in conflict or is susceptible of different constructions, but that if the facts from which the question of host-guest relationship arises are not in dispute, it is only the legal effect of the facts which is at issue. *499 In holding that the daughter was not a guest as a matter of law the court cited with approval Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 793, 342 P.2d 998, as follows: In Baldwin the circuit court commented further as follows: As the facts from which the question of host-guest relationship arises are not in dispute in the instant case, we believe that it was proper for the trial court to decide as a matter of law that Eldon, the son of the owner of the Ehrman vehicle, was not a guest of Larry Gehring, who at the time of the accident was driving the Ehrman vehicle with Eldon's consent. Some would argue that Baldwin may be distinguished from the instant case because the State of Michigan follows the rule that a statute which is in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, whereas we have a rule of construction embodied in § 1-02-01, N.D.C.C., to the opposite effect. That section reads as follows: It is pointed out by the appellant that the leading decision, Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 A. 379, and others which have followed it, holding that an owner of an automobile who rides therein while a friend drives does not become a guest of the friend simply because he permits the friend to drive, were decided in states that follow the rule that statutes passed in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. *500 Although it may be true that Connecticut has such a rule, we believe that it is significant that the court in rendering its decision in Gledhill did not rely on or refer to such a rule to support its decision. Instead of relying on this rule to support its decision in construing the guest statute, the court said: Phelps v. Benson, a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota construing the South Dakota guest statute, was followed in Schlim v. Gau, 80 S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174, a 1962 decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota construing its own statute. These decisions are heavily relied on by the appellant in the instant case. In Phelps the court said: In Phelps the Minnesota court adopted the rule stated in the South Dakota case of Melby v. Anderson, 64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135, to the effect that as the guest statute was taken from the law of Michigan, it would be construed and interpreted in the light of the Michigan decisions relating to it before the South Dakota legislature adopted it. Accordingly, the court in Phelps quoted from the Michigan case of Naudzius v. Lahr as stating the purpose behind the enactment of its guest statute: We gather, from reading this quotation, that the Minnesota court believed that the main objective of the guest statute was the elimination of collusion, perjury, and fraud, and that a liberal construction of the statute would make it applicable to the owner or, as in the instant case, to the *502 bailee of the owner, who permits another to drive the car while he, the bailee, rides therein. We believe the true purpose of the guest statute was set forth by the United States District Court in the case of Wilson v. Workman, 192 F. Supp. 852 (Del. 1961), in which, in response to the argument that the statute was enacted to mitigate collusion among parties to automobile accidents in order to collect insurance, the court said: Idaho and California have statutes similar to ours to the effect that the rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the code, and that all provisions of the code are to be liberally construed with a view to effecting its objects. See: Idaho Code (1947) § 73-102; West's Ann.Cal.Code, Civil, § 4. We think it is also significant that these two states have held that an owner of an automobile riding therein with a friend driving does not become a guest of the friend who is driving at the time of the accident. See: Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d 925; Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 793, 342 P.2d 998; Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 152 Cal. App. 2d 723, 313 P.2d 88, at 89, and subsequent opinion, 185 Cal. App. 2d 216, 8 Cal. Rptr. 218; Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30, at 34. In construing the guest statute of Virginia, the United States Court of Appeals in Leonard v. Helms, 269 F.2d 48, at 50 (4 Cir. 1959), said: The Idaho Supreme Court in Peterson met the argument that their guest statute required a liberal construction requiring rejection of the rule adopted in the cases following Gledhill, in favor of the holding of Phelps, by pointing out that Idaho had a statute requiring that words and phrases be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language. They concluded by stating that the line of authority following Gledhill gives to the word "guest" a normal, customary construction, and that, in view of the definition of the term contained in a previous Idaho decision, the argument was without merit. *503 Section 1-02-03, N.D.C.C., is similar to § 73-102 of the Idaho code. Our statute reads as follows: We therefore conclude, for the reasons stated herein, that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that Eldon Ehrman was a guest in the automobile owned by his father and driven by his friend Larry Gehring, within the intent of the North Dakota guest law. In support of the appellant's contention that the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to justify the verdict and that the judgment should therefore be set aside, the verdict be vacated, and judgment be entered in favor of the appellant, Larry Gehring, appellant argues in his brief as follows: Questions of negligence, proximate cause, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury; it is only when the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but one conclusion therefrom that they become questions of law for the court. Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681, at 685 (N.D.1964); Vick v. Fanning, 129 N.W.2d 268 (N.D.1964). Whether a motorist is confronted with an emergency and, assuming that he was confronted with an emergency, whether he acted negligently, are also jury questions unless the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but one conclusion therefrom. Bauer v. Kruger, 114 N.W.2d 553, at 557 (N.D.1962). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Grenz v. Werre, supra, at 685. *504 The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are questions of fact for the jury to determine. Grenz v. Werre, supra, 129 N.W.2d at 685. Bearing these rules in mind, let us review the evidence pertinent to the issues raised by the appellant. The plaintiff, Eldon Ehrman, who was very seriously injured about the head and face in the accident, had no memory of what took place on the evening of the accident from the time the five boys were picked up near the old school gym in Anamoose until sometime after the accident occurred. The only conversation concerning racing that he recalled was at the time he came out of the drugstore and entered Llewellyn Rauser's car. His testimony in that respect was as follows: Michael Vannatta, who was one of the five boys in the back seat of the Ehrman car at the time of the accident, testified that sometime before the car stopped at the intersection of Highways 52 and 14, someone said: "Let's race." His testimony in that regard was as follows: He testified further as follows: He said he did not remember for sure whether Eldon said or did anything about the driving before the collision. He testified that after the race was in progress, Eldon did not object. When asked if he remembered when Ehrman put his foot on the accelerator, he answered: "He probably did, but I don't remember nothing like that." Llewellyn Rauser, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, testified concerning a conversation which took place while the two cars were parked on the south side of Highway 52 at the intersection of Highway 14, as follows: It should be noted that Llewellyn also suffered a loss of memory. His testimony concerning what he remembers of the race was as follows: Larry Grossman, a passenger in the left rear of the Ehrman car, testified that he didn't think they talked about anything while the two cars were stopped at the intersection of Highways 52 and 14, but said that the two cars raced side by side, he supposed, about up to the hill. He said he looked at the speedometer and it was about 80 when they were about in the middle of the hill. He further testified as follows: He further testified, in response to the question whether there was any objection on the part of anyone in the car about racing, that he did not recall any such objection. Concerning Larry's driving just preceding the collision, he testified as follows: On cross-examination he testified as follows: Duane Sauvageau, who was a passenger in the right rear of the Ehrman vehicle, testified that he heard something about racing that evening but gave no details relative thereto. He testified that he looked at the speedometer in the Ehrman car after the Rauser car had gone over the hill, and that they were then going about 80 miles per hour; that Larry slowed down some and then stepped on the gas again while they were going up the hill; and that he heard Eldon Ehrman say, "Step on it." His testimony concerning his observations of Eldon were as follows: On cross-examination he testified as follows: On re-cross-examination he testified as follows: Clarence Degenstein, the passenger in the Rauser vehicle, testified that he heard something about racing while the Rauser vehicle was stopped beside the Ehrman vehicle at the intersection of Highways 52 and 14, but that he was not sure who talked about racing. Concerning the race he testified as follows: Larry Gehring, the driver of the Ehrman vehicle said that he recalled no conversation about racing at the time they were stopped at the intersection of Highways 52 and 14, but that after they crossed the intersection, they in effect started to race. He stated that when they got to the bottom of the hill before they started up the hill, he was driving 65. He testified as follows concerning what happened when he got to the top of the hill: His testimony concerning Eldon's action in depressing the accelerator was as follows: He said that when he approached the Rauser car, it was facing south, that it pulled out towards the east, and that the Ehrman car was in the center of the highway when it hit the Rauser car. He testified that no one objected to his driving as he drove south, and that the race was over before the car went over the hill; that Eldon kept his foot on the gas pedal about three seconds; and that he didn't recall whether he had told the Highway Patrol officer, when interviewed a few days after the accident, about Eldon's depressing of the accelerator. Allan Lemer, another passenger in the back seat of the Ehrman vehicle, said he thought there was a conversation as to racing, but he didn't know where it took place. He said the Ehrman vehicle was going "about 55 to 60; maybe 55" at the time the Rauser vehicle pulled out on the highway. Leroy Fred, State Highway Patrolman, who investigated this accident, testified that the crest of the hill spoken of in the testimony is six-tenths of a mile south of Anamoose and that there is a flat, unobstructed stretch of highway for the next four-tenths of a mile to the intersection where the accident occurred. In response to questioning concerning the visibility, condition of the road, etc., he testified as follows: He testified that the Rauser vehicle left no skid marks but that the Ehrman vehicle laid down skid marks for 57 feet, and that from the beginning of the skid marks *511 to the resting place of the cars was approximately 131 feet; that the skid mark of 57 feet began 2 feet to the right of the center line of Highway 14 in the southbound lane of traffic; and that he identified this skid mark as the left wheels of the Ehrman vehicle. The diagram which he prepared and which was received in evidence indicated that the 57 feet of skid marks crossed the center line of Highway 14 just short of its intersection with the township road; that it extended on through the intersection on the east side of the center line; and that another 17 feet of skid marks, representing the right wheels of the Ehrman vehicle, started south of the intersection about on the center line and extended on the east side of the center line. He stated that the damage to the vehicles indicated speed. He testified that he interviewed each of the boys involved in the accident except for Larry Grossman within a few days of the accident, and that in the interview he asked each of them what was said and what was done during the one mile between the intersection of Highways 52 and 14 and the place were the accident occurred. In regard to the interview with Llewellyn Rauser he testified in part as follows: In respect to his interview with Duane Sauvageau he testified as follows: As for his interview with Larry Gehring, he testified as follows: In reviewing the aforesaid testimony and other testimony and evidence *512 submitted in the case but not set forth herein in light of the rules stated earlier, we conclude that the jury could have found that the defendant Larry Gehring negligently drove the Ehrman car at a speed in excess of the legal limit and without having it under control, and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the collision between the two cars which resulted in the personal injury to the cross-claimant. We believe also that the jury could have found that the defendant Larry Gehring failed to sustain the burden of proof by a preponderance of credible evidence as to contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the existence of an emergency which would have justified the exercise of less than ordinary care. The jury was not required to accept the testimony of Larry Gehring as to Eldon's act of depressing his foot on the accelerator (although it was not contradicted, Eldon being unable to dispute it because of his lapse of memory), because Larry was an interested party. In the 1965 case of Larson v. Meyer, this court said: In the instant case only one, Duane Sauvageau, who rode with four other boys in the rear of the Ehrman vehicle, testified as did the defendant Larry Gehring, that Eldon stepped on Larry's foot while it was on the accelerator; but it is significant that Larry stated that the car speeded up "just slightly" and Duane stated that the car did not seem to increase in speed as a result thereof, and that both testified that this act occurred after Larry had reduced speed and accordingly let up on the accelerator. As the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony is a matter for the jury to determine, we cannot say as a matter of law that Larry Ehrman's testimony was corroborated by credible testimony. In light of the fact that none of the witnesses informed the highway patrolman of Eldon's act of depressing the accelerator or his statement to the effect that the car was dead and that Larry should step on it, at the time the patrolman made his investigation within a few days of the accident when the details should have been vividly in the minds of all of the witnesses, the jury could have reasonably and logically concluded that this part of the testimony was a fabrication. Thus, they could have disregarded it. There were nine boys involved in the accident, one of whom, Henry Bichler, was not called as a witness. Eldon Ehrman testified that after he came out of the drug store and went to Llewellyn Rauser's car, Llewellyn asked him if he could race the Ehrman car, and he said no, he didn't want to. He said that this was the entire conversation about racing as far as he knew. He suffered a lapse of memory and remembered nothing that happened from the time the five boys jumped in the back seat of the car at the old school gym until after the accident. Larry Gehring testified that he did not recall any conversation about racing at the time the cars were stopped at the intersection of Highways 14 and 52. Llewellyn Rauser said that when they were on the south side of Highway 52 he had occasion to talk to the boys in the other car, that Eldon was sitting on the right-hand side of the driver of his father's car, that the subject of racing came up, and that Eldon "said it was `Okay' as long as the rest of us agreed to it." Larry Grossman testified that when the two cars were stopped at the intersection of Highways 52 and 14, he didn't think they talked about anything and that Eldon was sitting in the right-hand front seat. Duane Sauvageau was asked, "Did you hear anything about racing *513 that night?" and answered, "Yes." Allan Lemer testified that he thought there was conversation in regard to racing but did not remember what was said nor where the conversation took place. Clarence Degenstein testified that there was a conversation between the two cars at a time when the car in which he was riding was stopped beside the Ehrman car, and, on being asked if he remembered what was said, replied, "Something about racing." He said he was not sure who said it. He testified that Eldon was sitting beside Larry Gehring. In light of this varied and conflicting testimony, the jury could reasonably have believed that there was no conversation in which Eldon agreed to race; that the race, when proposed by others, was vetoed by Eldon; that the race which did take place was on impulse, participated in by the drivers and encouraged by some others but not necessarily by Eldon; and that the accident occurred after the race was over, while Larry was indisputedly in complete control of the car and thus wholly responsibile for any negligent act he committed which proximately caused the collision from which Eldon suffered his injuries. There is no evidence indicating that any of the persons involved in the accident raced earlier in the evening, although there was considerable driving done by various members of the group. Eldon therefore could not be expected to anticipate that Larry would race, especially when he (Eldon) had vetoed racing earlier in the evening. As the race lasted only four-tenths of a mile, there was little opportunity to stop the race or for Eldon to reassert control over the vehicle by re-establishing himself as the driver. Had he demanded that the car be stopped for this purpose prior to reaching the intersection of the gravel road with Highway 14, it would have been necessary to stop the car on the shoulder of the road in the nighttime, which is also hazardous, or it would have required a finding of an approach. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the collision occurred before Eldon had any real opportunity to re-establish himself as the driver. If there was little opportunity for him to re-establish himself as driver, it is of little importance that he did not orally assert his right to do so. In any case, on the state of this record we do not believe that we could say as a matter of law that Larry assumed the risk, or that he was negligent and that his negligence proximately contributed to the accident, or that an emergency existed so that the defendant was required to exercise less than ordinary care. In Bauer v. Kruger, supra, 114 N.W.2d 553 (N.D.1962), we quoted with approval from Corpus Juris Secundum as follows: It is our view that the emergency which was created in the instant case was created by the concurring faults or negligence of the drivers of the two vehicles, and, thus, that it was not an emergency "created by the negligence of another and not by his own fault." For the reasons stated the judgment and order of the trial court are hereby affirmed. TEIGEN, C. J. and KNUDSON, J., concur. *514 STRUTZ, J., concurs in the result. MURRAY, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.