Title: LEHMAN v BILLMAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13810
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1978

No. 13810 I N THE SUPFEME COUIZT OF THE S T A T E OF M3NTANA 1978 Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- BARNEY R. BILLMAN, ~efendant and Appellant. Appeal f m : District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Calton and Stephens, Billings, bbntana For Respondent: Anderson, Symes, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, Montana Suhnitted on briefs: July 21, 1978 Decided: 3EP 26 1978 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal i s taken from an order issued by t h e D i s - t r i c t Court, Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, whereby a p p e l l a n t ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o provide support moneys f o r h i s minor c h i l d and h i s v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s w e r e terminated. The cause was submitted on b r i e f s t o t h i s Court; no o r a l argument w a s had. O n April 26, 1974, t h e p a r t i e s Linda Lehman (formerly Billman) and Barney Billman were divorced. The D i s t r i c t Court awarded custody of t h e c o u p l e ' s only c h i l d , Joseph Richard (Joey) t o h i s mother, Linda, and ordered t h e f a t h e r , Barney, t o c o n t r i b u t e $100 per month toward support of t h e c h i l d . Barney p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court on September 3 0 , 1975, f o r modification of t h e divorce decree, asking t h a t t h e amount of support money t o be contributed t o t h e c h i l d be reduced by 50 percent and t h a t v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s be afforded him. A hearing on t h e matter w a s postponed, ap- p a r e n t l y because Barney f a i l e d t o appear. O n February 11, 1976, Barney renewed h i s p e t i t i o n f o r modification of t h e decree i n r e s p e c t of v i s i t a t i o n , and again apparently f a i l e d t o appear a t t h e hearing on t h e motion. Seven months a f t e r Linda sought a r e s t r a i n i n g order a g a i n s t him, Barney again p e t i t i o n e d on October 25, 1976, f o r modification of t h e divorce decree, seeking (1) a d e t e r - mination of t h e amount of c h i l d support i n which he was i n arrears, ( 2 ) an order t o compel t h e c h i l d Joey e n r o l l e d i n school under t h e surname "Billman", n o t Lehman, t h e name by which t h e c h i l d was known and had been e n r o l l e d , and ( 3 ) an order enjoining t h e mother from "poisoning" t h e c h i l d ' s mind a g a i n s t Barney. After t h e November 4 , 1976, hearing on Barney's p e t i - t i o n f o r modification, of which a record was made, Judge C. B. Sande issued t h e f i r s t f i n d i n g s , conclusions and order modifying t h e decree, dated December 8, 1976, by which he d i d t h e following: 1. S e t t h e amount which Barney was i n arrears i n h i s c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n ; 2. Reduced t h e amount Barney was t o c o n t r i b u t e toward t h e support of Joey; 3. S e t a s p e c i f i c time f o r v i s i t a t i o n between Barney and Joey; 4 . Ordered t h e c h i l d t o be enrolled i n school under and go by t h e surname "Billman", even though, a s t h e c o u r t acknowledged, "The c h i l d i s n o t recognized by school au- t h o r i t i e s under t h e defendant f a t h e r ' s surname of illm man"; and 5. Enjoined t h e mother from poisoning t h e c h i l d ' s mind a g a i n s t Barney. Two f i l i n g s were made on December 13, 1976, one, a motion t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s and o r d e r , advanced by t h e mother's counsel, and t h e o t h e r a s t i p u l a t i o n regarding supervised v i s i t a t i o n . Within days, on December 22, 1976, Barney p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court, seeking, i n t e r a l i a , custody of t h e c h i l d . O n January 3 , 1977, Linda f i l e d a c r o s s - p e t i t i o n f o r modification of t h e decree t o e l i m i n a t e a l l of Barney's v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s . The following month, Judge Sande issued new f i n d i n g s , conclusions and order modifying t h e decree, dated February 2 , 1977. During t h e time between t h e two o r d e r s , numerous in- chambers conferences and interviews were conducted. P a r t i - c i p a n t s included t h e court, attorneys f o r both p a r t i e s , t h e p a r t i e s themselves, t h e paternal grandmother, c o u r t s e r v i c e s personnel, and t h e child. Certain of t h e record i s scanty, some is e n t i r e l y absent, except by reference, b u t it i s c l e a r t h a t Barney had, and l i k e l y may y e t have, what i s euphemistically re- f e r r e d t o a s a "problem with drinking". During t h e course of h i s marriage t o Linda, Barney would o f t e n drink and then engage i n v i o l e n t and abusive behavior, ranging from c a l l i n g Linda's young daughter Jody, who l i v e d with t h e couple during t h e i r marriage, nasty names, t o throwing knickknacks and running over t h e c h i l d r e n ' s toys, t o s t r i k i n g and abusing Linda i n t h e presence of t h e children. That be- havior eventually prompted Linda t o seek a divorce from Barney. I n September, 1974, Linda was married t o Stephen R. Lehman, who has developed and maintains a parent-child r e l a t i o n s h i p with Joey. I n c o n t r a s t , during t h e four years s i n c e t h e divorce, Barney has had very l i t t l e contact with Joey. I t appears t h a t although on occasion, t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d , Linda refused t o l e t Barney see him, Barney, over extended periods of t i m e , v o l u n t a r i l y neglected t o contact t h e boy. Based on t h e information garnered from t h e conferences and interviews and from t h e p r i o r hearing, the c o u r t issued t h e second order, which included t h e following findings: 1. The defendant f a t h e r has had a serious drinking problem and w a s a poor husband and f a t h e r ; he w i l l f u l l y f a i l e d t o pay c h i l d support and v o l u n t a r i l y neglected v i s i - t a t i o n of h i s c h i l d ; 2 . Because of Barney's drinking and t h e c h i l d ' s a t t i - tude toward t h e defendant, t h e mother a t times prevented v i s i t a t i o n ; 3 . Joey does n o t want c o n t a c t with Barney, and v i s i t a - t i o n can be accomplished only by physically taking t h e c h i l d a g a i n s t h i s w i l l ; 4 . Forced v i s i t a t i o n would be harmful, both mentally and emotionally, t o t h e c h i l d ; 5. The defendant i s unable t o provide a s u i t a b l e home f o r Joey, while Linda and her husband have provided an e x c e l l e n t home and p a r e n t a l c a r e f o r him; 6. The c h i l d looks t o Stephen R. Lehrnan a s h i s f a t h e r and a change i n custody would be extremely harmful t o t h e c h i l d ; 7. What support t h e defendant does provide i s n o t needed and i s a source of continuing c o n f l i c t between t h e p a r t i e s ; and 8. The p a r t i e s s o h a t e one another t h a t continued c o n t a c t between them would r e s u l t i n harm t o t h e c h i l d . After making those f i n d i n g s and considering t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d , t h e c o u r t concluded and ordered t h a t Barney's support o b l i g a t i o n be terminated and t h a t he be denied f u r t h e r v i s i t a t i o n with t h e c h i l d . O n March 2 4 , 1977, n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d by Barney's attorney. After numerous delays on a p p e l l a n t ' s p a r t over a ten-to-eleven month period, on January 20, 1978, t h i s Court, of i t s own motion, ordered t h e a p p e l l a n t t o show cause why t h e appeal should n o t be dismissed f o r f a i l u r e t o f i l e a b r i e f . A b r i e f was subsequently f i l e d on January 31, 1978. Although counsel f o r respondent argues strongly and persuasively f o r t h i s Court t o dismiss t h e i n s t a n t appeal based on a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e both t o timely-appeal and t o pursue t h e appeal with some measure of d i l i g e n c e , w e r e s t our d e c i s i o n on t h e s t a t u t o r y requirement t h a t heed be paid t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . Sections 48-332 and 48-337, R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977). I t happens t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s d i l a - t o r i n e s s i n pursuing h i s appeal i s an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r which supports our conclusion t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d i s served by upholding t h e D i s t r i c t Court's second order terminating both Barney's o b l i g a t i o n t o provide sup- p o r t moneys and h i s v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s . The D i s t r i c t Court has d i s c r e t i o n t o modify an order granting o r denying v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s whenever modification would s e r v e t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . Section 48- 337 ( 2 ) , X.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977) . B y t h e express t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e , t h e c o u r t i s required t o f i n d t h a t " v i s i t a t i o n would endanger s e r i o u s l y t h e c h i l d ' s physical, mental, moral, o r emotional health." The D i s t r i c t Court s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t " v i s i t a t i o n a t t h i s time can be accomplished only by physically taking t h e boy a g a i n s t h i s w i l l and forcing t h e v i s i t a t i o n " and t h a t "enforced v i s i t a t i o n would be mentally and emotionally harmful t o t h e c h i l d . " Those f i n d i n g s w e r e based on information provided t h e c o u r t during a series of - i n camera conferences and i n t e r - views, i n which a l l i n t e r e s t e d persons p a r t i c i p a t e d a t various t i m e s between t h e issuance of t h e two f i n d i n g s , conclusions and orders. Appellant charges t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o cause a record t o be made of t h e i n chambers i n t e r v i e w ( s ) with t h e c h i l d . Appellant com- p l a i n s of t h e lack of such record, y e t he, with and through h i s counsel, agreed t o attempt t o informally r e s o l v e t h e problem of v i s i t a t i o n , and, t o t h a t end, agreed t h a t o f f - the-record conferences and interviews were t o be held. That such agreement was made i s not disputed by appellant; f u r t h e r - more, d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t o it i s made i n t h e statement prefa- t o r y t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court's f i n d i n g s , v i z . , "This matter having come before t h e Court on opposing motions of t h e p a r t i e s , and t h e Court having heard t h e testimony taken i n previous hearings i n t h i s matter and having met i n chambers -- pursuant - t o agreement of - counsel with t h e p a r t i e s , t h e i r -- counsel, t h e p a t e r n a l grandmother, t h e minor son of t h e --- p a r t i e s , -- and t h e Court Services personnel, who has i n v e s t i - gated and a s s i s t e d i n t h e matter, t h e Court makes t h e f o l - lowing FINDINGS OF FACT." (Emphasis added.) I n order t o determine i f t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d e r r i n t h i s regard, w e must i n q u i r e whether counsel may waive t h e requirement imposed by s e c t i o n 48-334(1), R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977) , t h a t a record be made of t h e c o u r t ' s interview (s) of t h e c h i l d . Examination of a most r e c e n t decision, Easton v. Easton (1978), Mont. - I - , 574 P.2d 989, 992, 35 St.Rep. 123, 126, r e v e a l s t h a t indeed counsel may s o waive, and should he do s o , he may not l a t e r complain t h a t he was prejudiced thereby. I n Easton, t h e D i s t r i c t Court, pursuant t o agreement of counsel, required no record be made of a p a r t i c u l a r hearing. Remarking t h a t "* * * Counsel s u r e l y knows t h e t e r m 'waiver' i s generally defined a s a voluntary and i n t e n t i o n a l relinquishment of a known r i g h t , claim o r p r i v i l e g e " , Easton v. Easton, Mont. a t , 574 P.2d a t 992, 35 St.Rep. a t 126, t h i s Court took exception t o t h e o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d by defendant t h a t no record was made of t h e hearing. W e likewise t a k e exception i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Appellant may n o t waive, v o l u n t a r i l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y , a known right--here, t h e r i g h t t o have made a record of t h e court's - in camera interview(s) of the child--and later complain that the District Court erred in accomodating him. his specification of error is specious to a court of equity which considers that one's acquiescence in error takes away the right of objecting to it. Section 49-108, R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977); see Brannon v. Lewis & Clark County (1963), 143 Mont. 200, 208, 387 P.2d 706, 711. The District Court exercised the option made available to it under section 48-334 (I), R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977), and interviewed the child in chambers "to ascertain [his] wishes as to his custodian and as to visitation." Apparently the court allowed counsel for appellant and perhaps appellant himself to be present at the interview(s), in conformity with the discretion granted the court by that same statute. The court determined that the best interest of the child would be served by terminating Barney's visitation rights. We defer to that judgment, because the District Court has a superior advantage in determining these difficult problems. See Weber v. Weber (1978), Mont . - 1 - , 576 P.2d 1102, 1104, 35 St.Rep. 309, 311-12, and cases cited therein. The Montana statutes are specific in their requirements, from setting forth how a custody or support proceeding shall be entitled, section 48-315(2), R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977), to demanding that, in the absence of written consent of the parties, there be a showing of changed circumstances to support a petition for modification of a decree in respect of support, section 48-330(1) (a), R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 19771, to mandabkg that an affidavit setting forth facts sup- porting the requested modification accompany papers seeking modification of a custody decree, section 48-340, R.C.M. 1947 (Supp. 1977). Counsel's failure to comply with these s t a t u t o r y r e q u i s i t e s , a s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , is i n v i t a t i o n t o erroneous r u l i n g s and determinations p r e j u d i c i a l both t o t h e i r c l i e n t s ' r i g h t s and t o t h e system of j u s t i c e of which t h e y a r e guardians. Our r e f u s a l t o decide t h i s c a s e on procedural grounds i s n o t t o be mistaken a s c l o s i n g o u r eyes t o t h e n e c e s s i t y of complying w i t h s t a t u t o r y d i c t a t e s . A remand i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , however, would s e r v e b u t t o f u r t h e r d e l a y r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s m a t t e r and t h u s work a g a i n s t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e minor c h i l d . Because it i s t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d which is made t h e ground of o u r d e c i s i o n , w e allow t o s t a n d t h e f i n d i n g s , conclusions and o r d e r more l a t e l y i s s u e d by t h e District Court. W e Concur: #.%%4 Chief J u s t i c e