Title: In the Matter of the Estate of Downing
Citation: 2021 OK 17
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2021

In the Matter of the Estate of Downing Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary A dispute arose concerning control over a deceased individual's remains. The trial court ruled that testimony regarding Decedent's purchase of a burial plot and gravestone in 1966 was adequate evidence of a written document instructing the method and manner of handling his remains as outlined in 21 O.S. 2011 section 1158(1). In furtherance of this finding, the trial court entered a ruling compelling the surviving spouse, who was appointed as personal representative, to bury Decedent's body. The personal representative appealed, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held the Movants failed to present sufficient evidence of a document executed by the Decedent that satisfied the requirements of section 1158(1). Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DOWNING 2021 OK 17 Case Number: 118589 Decided: 04/06/2021 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VANDELL DOWNING, DECEASED APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, HONORABLE ALLEN WELCH ¶0 A dispute arose concerning control over a deceased individual's remains. The trial court ruled that testimony regarding Decedent's purchase of a burial plot and gravestone in 1966 was adequate evidence of a written document instructing the method and manner of handling his remains as outlined in 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1). In furtherance of this finding, the lower court entered a ruling compelling the surviving spouse, who was appointed as personal representative, to bury Decedent's body. Personal representative appealed, and this Court retained the matter. After reviewing the record and briefs, we now reverse the trial court's order granting injunctive relief, and hold the Movants failed to present sufficient evidence of a document executed by the Decedent that satisfies the requirements of § 1158(1). Accordingly, the trial court's order is reversed and the matter is remanded. TRIAL COURT ORDER GRANTING INJUNCTION REVERSED; MATTER REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. Jeffrey I. Crain and Leann G. Farha, CRAIN & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellant Sarita Downing, PRO SE. Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellee GURICH, J. Facts & Procedural History ¶1 Vandell Downing (Decedent) and Maxine Bailey (Bailey) met in 1982, and shortly thereafter began living together. Decedent and Bailey lived together for thirty-six (36) years and had six (6) children during this time period. The two shared household responsibilities, payment of bills, and child-rearing duties. At some point during their relationship, Decedent gave Bailey a ring as a symbol of their marital status. The parties resided together as a couple in Midwest City, Oklahoma, until Decedent's death on April 4, 2018. ¶2 On April 13, 2018, Bailey, claiming she was Decedent's common-law wife, filed a petition seeking appointment as administrator of the estate.1 Bailey alleged that Decedent may have prepared a final will, but her searches revealed no testamentary instrument. The court scheduled a hearing for May 8, 2018, and directed notice be served on all surviving heirs. ¶3 On April 18, 2018, three of Decedent's adult children, Sarita Downing, Vandella Downing, and Keith Williams (collectively "Movants") filed an application requesting an ex parte emergency temporary restraining order against Bailey and Pollard Funeral Home to prevent disposal of Decedent's body.2 The lengthy filing alleged that Bailey was not Decedent's common-law spouse, and that it was Bailey's intention to cremate Decedent contrary to his expressed wishes. In their prayer for relief, Movants requested the court legally determine inter alia: (1) Bailey was not Decedent's common-law wife; (2) as surviving adult children, Movants were entitled to statutory control over Decedent's body; and (3) Bailey be restrained from disposing of Decedent's remains. On April 20, 2018, the trial court issued an ex parte emergency order which prohibited Bailey and Pollard Funeral Home from carrying out cremation of Decedent's remains. A hearing on the merits of Movants' application was scheduled by the trial judge and notice of the ex parte emergency order was served on the respective parties. In response, Bailey filed an objection and motion to dismiss the application for a restraining order. On April 25, 2018, counsel for each party appeared, and the temporary restraining order was kept intact pending further review at an upcoming hearing on Bailey's request to be appointed administrator of the estate. ¶4 On May 8, 2018, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing scheduled on both Bailey's petition seeking appointment as administrator and review of the temporary restraining order. Prior to the hearing, Movants filed a motion to dismiss and objection to Bailey's petition for appointment, arguing Bailey was not Decedent's common-law wife. Notwithstanding, testimony was taken and Bailey was appointed as personal representative in accordance with 58 O.S. 2011 § 122(1).3 ¶5 Both parties appeared for the hearing on May 9, 2019. Although there were several matters to be presented, the focal point of the hearing and salient issue for the court's inquiry, was whether Bailey was the common-law wife of Decedent. During the hearing, Bailey testified that the couple began acknowledging their marital status following Decedent's gift of a ring. Furthermore, Bailey presented evidence supporting the couple's joint payment of household bills, declarations of their marriage to third-parties, and routine celebration of their wedding anniversary. Bailey was covered under Decedent's government-issued health insurance. Family obituaries reflected Decedent and Bailey were husband and wife. In opposition, Movants admitted into evidence an instrument dated nearly thirty (30) years prior to Decedent's death, signed by both Decedent and Bailey, stating the couple no longer claimed rights under common-law marriage.4 In response, Bailey testified that the Decedent created the document following a hostile dispute, the document was not an accurate legal representation of their marital status, and the couple thereafter continued to act as husband and wife. ¶6 On the issue of which party should control Decedent's remains, Movants presented testimony that detailed the Decedent's purchase of a burial plot and his alleged desire to be buried. Testimonial evidence consisted solely of general statements describing Decedent's opposition to cremation, his purchase of a headstone and burial plot more than fifty (50) years before his death, and alleged statements by the Decedent showing his desire to be buried. Furthermore, Movants claimed that a deed and contract supporting Decedent's purchase of a burial plot was available, but such documentation was never offered as evidence.5 During the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Movants attempted to admit an exhibit relating to an inventory of Decedent's safe-deposit box, conducted at Tinker Federal Credit Union on July 13, 2018. However, the trial court sustained a hearsay objection to admission of the exhibit.6 Despite having copies of the actual physical documents contained in the safe-deposit box, Movants never sought to admit those records into evidence. Similarly, Movants argued Decedent had purchased burial insurance, but they never presented a copy of such a policy. In fact, no documentary evidence establishing Decedent's desire to be buried was admitted into evidence. Finally, Movants placed great emphasis on the fact that Decedent was Jewish and that Bailey had converted to Judaism, as evidence of his intent to be buried rather than cremated.7 ¶7 The trial judge issued a detailed letter-ruling that outlined his findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 20, 2019.8 Simultaneously, the judge entered a formal journal entry memorializing the dispositive issues. Therein, the lower court found that "[Downing] and the Decedent were parties to a common law marriage, and that by the authority just mentioned, the Petitioner is the Decedent's surviving widow."9 Further, the ruling concluded that in accordance with 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1), "Decedent executed a written document which indicated his desire [to be buried], the contract whereby he purchased his burial plot."10 Thus, notwithstanding the finding that Bailey was Decedent's surviving widow, the district court found that the testimony regarding Decedent's contract to purchase a burial plot "is in accord with 21 O.S. § 1151(A), in that the Decedent thereby made arrangements regarding the manner in which his body shall be disposed."11 Granting a final restraining order, the trial court instructed Bailey to carry out the burial of Decedent's body in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. ¶8 Bailey timely filed her appeal from the trial court's journal entry, and we retained the matter to address the proper reading of 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158. Sarita Downing (hereinafter "Appellee") was the only Movant to enter an appearance and file a brief in this appeal. Standard of Review ¶9 At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Movants' request for injunctive relief. A judgment issuing or refusing to issue an injunction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the lower court has abused its discretion or the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 1996 OK 109, ¶ 4, 925 P.2d 546 , 549. Pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 952 (b)(2), we may reverse, vacate, or modify a judgment of the district court, where on review it appears from the nature of the case and all the facts properly before the Court, that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 2005 OK 88, ¶ 11, 125 P.3d 1219 , 1225 (footnotes omitted). Entitlement to injunctive relief must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Sharp, ¶ 5, 925 P.2d at 549. Oklahoma law allows for injunctive relief in accordance with 12 O.S. 2011 § 1381. The "grant or denial of injunctive relief are of equitable concern," Dowell v. Pletcher, 2013 OK 50, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 457 , 460, and relief should not be granted where there is a full and adequate remedy at law. Marshall v. Homier, 1903 OK 84, ¶ 3, 74 P. 368, 369. Injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted lightly." Dowell, ¶ 6, 304 P.3d at 460. ¶10 When evaluating a trial court's ruling relating to injunctive relief, an examination of legal conclusions is essential. Scott v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 2013 OK 84, ¶ 16, 313 P.3d 891, 896. Our review of a lower court's legal conclusions pertaining to injunctive relief focuses on whether such ruling was clearly erroneous. Thomas v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 2004 OK 82, ¶ 7, 102 P.3d 133 , 136. We assess such legal decisions under a de novo and non-deferential standard. Id. In exercising de novo review, "this court possesses plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the issues presented." Benedetti v. Cimarex Energy Co., 2018 OK 21, ¶ 5, 415 P.3d 43, 45. Analysis ¶11 Bailey raises a number of alleged errors in this appeal, however, our opinion addresses only whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding injunctive relief. Ultimately, our resolution of this question hinges on the trial court's statutory interpretation of 21 O.S. 2011 §§ 1151 and 1158, and application of those statutes to the facts and evidence presented. As noted, the trial judge determined that Decedent satisfied the statutory requirements in 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1), by executing a written document that meets the requirements of the State of Oklahoma. Accordingly, the trial court ordered Bailey to proceed with burial of Decedent's body. This ruling was fatally flawed because there is simply no evidence in the record of any executed written document assigning responsibility for or directing the manner/method of disposing of Decedent's remains. ¶12 An individual has the right to direct the manner of disposing his or her body. 21 O.S. 2011 § 1151(A).12 Section 1151(A) does not provide any precise guidance for how such directive is accomplished; however, 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1) fills in this gap by setting forth specific requirements. Section 1158 reads as follows: The right to control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person, the location, manner and conditions of disposition, and arrangements for funeral goods and services vests in the following order, provided the person is eighteen (18) years of age or older and of sound mind:1. The decedent, provided the decedent has entered into a pre-need funeral services contract or executed a written document that meets the requirements of the State of Oklahoma;2. A representative appointed by the decedent by means of an executed and witnessed written document meeting the requirements of the State of Oklahoma;3. The surviving spouse;4. The sole surviving adult child of the decedent whose whereabouts is reasonably ascertained or if there is more than one adult child of the decedent, the majority of the surviving adult children whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertained;5. The surviving parent or parents of the decedent, whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertained;6. The surviving adult brother or sister of the decedent whose whereabouts is reasonably ascertained, or if there is more than one adult sibling of the decedent, the majority of the adult surviving siblings, whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertained;7. The guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of the death of the decedent, if one had been appointed;8. The person in the classes of the next degree of kinship, in descending order, under the laws of descent and distribution to inherit the estate of the decedent. If there is more than one person of the same degree, any person of that degree may exercise the right of disposition;9. If the decedent was an indigent person or other person the final disposition of whose body is the financial responsibility of the state or a political subdivision of the state, the public officer or employee responsible for arranging the final disposition of the remains of the decedent; and10. In the absence of any person under paragraphs 1 through 9 of this section, any other person willing to assume the responsibilities to act and arrange the final disposition of the remains of the decedent, including the personal representative of the estate of the decedent or the funeral director with custody of the body, after attesting in writing that a good-faith effort has been made to no avail to contact the individuals under paragraphs 1 through 9 of this section. (emphasis added). We recently examined § 1158 in In re Estate of Foresee, 2020 OK 88, ¶ 8, 475 P.3d 862, 865. Like in Foresee, we are again faced with a dispute concerning which individual is given statutory priority over a deceased's remains. Bailey contends there was insufficient evidence to establish Decedent entered into a pre-need funeral services contract or a written document executed in accordance with Oklahoma law. Bailey further maintains that a contract for the purchase of burial plots, deeds for such plots, or a receipt relating to the purchase of a headstone, do not satisfy the evidentiary requirements set forth in 21 O.S. 2011 §§ 1151 and 1158(1). Appellee counters that the testimonial evidence confirmed Decedent's desire to be buried; and therefore, the trial court correctly determined Decedent had executed a written contract controlling the disposition of his remains as required in § 1158(1). ¶13 When examining statutory enactments, this Court's primary goal is to determine legislative intent through the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the statutory language. Kohler v. Chambers, 2019 OK 2, ¶ 6, 435 P.3d 109, 111. We will only employ rules of statutory construction when legislative intent cannot be ascertained (e.g., in cases of ambiguity). Christian v. Christian, 2018 OK 91, ¶ 5, 434 P.3d 941, 942. Our test for determining the ambiguity of a statute depends on whether its language is susceptible to more than one meaning. Id., ¶ 5, 434 P.3d at 942-43. ¶14 The phrase "pre-need funeral services contract" is not defined anywhere in Oklahoma's statutes, however, there are references to "contracts for prepaid funeral benefits"13 and "funeral service agreements."14 In fact, 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158b discusses certain legal documentation executed by a decedent which can be relied on by a funeral establishment "to carry out the instructions of the person . . . [who] holds the right of disposition." Section 1158b refers to the signing of a "funeral service agreement, cremation authorization form, or any other authorization for disposition . . . ." Pre-paid funeral arrangements are subject to significant regulation across the country, and Oklahoma is no exception. In this state, prepaid funeral services are supervised through the Insurance Commissioner. 36 O.S. Supp. 2013 § 6123. In fact, the Oklahoma Insurance Code specifically mandates that "[a]ll contracts for prepaid funeral benefits shall be in writing and no contract form shall be used without first being approved by the Insurance Commissioner." Id.15 The record does not contain any kind of written agreement, executed by Decedent, which relates to prepaid funeral services. Therefore, Movants failed to establish the existence of such a contract as set out in the first clause of 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1). ¶15 Title 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1) also allows a decedent to control disposition of his or her remains by executing a written document in accordance with the laws of Oklahoma. Again, this phrase has not been specifically defined by the legislature. While Appellee maintains that testimonial evidence of a contract and/or deeds for burial plots, allegedly purchased by Decedent, are enough to satisfy § 1158(1), we conclude the statute requires more. To establish the right to injunctive relief in this case, § 1158(1) required introduction of an actual written document, executed by the Decedent in accordance with Oklahoma law. Further, such document must have either assigned responsibility for Decedent's body to a specific individual, or provided express instructions on the method and manner of disposition of his remains.16 21 O.S. 2011 §§ 1151(A) and (B), 1158(1).17 The record does not include copies of any contract, deeds to burial plots, or other similar documentation directing the method/manner of disposing of his remains or assigning responsibility for those remains to an individual. Consequently, we have no way to ascertain whether Decedent even "executed" any kind of document, and such execution is clearly mandatory to invoke the second clause in § 1158(1). Moreover, ownership of a burial plot does not definitively establish that an individual has chosen interment over cremation. ¶16 Appellee has alleged that as a member of the Jewish faith, Decedent would have preferred burial to cremation. However, as we have already noted, an individual's preference concerning the handling of their body after death is not controlling unless such intent was reduced to writing and satisfied the express requirements of §§ 1151(B) or 1158(1)--that a deceased individual specifically set forth his or her intent in a writing which satisfies the statutory language.18 ¶17 A document assigning control over a decedent's body or directing the method/manner of disposal is analogous to a testamentary instrument such as a last will and testament. Oklahoma imposes strict requirements for executing a will and admitting the same to probate. For example, 84 O.S. 2011 § 55 requires a will to be evidenced in writing.19 This section codifies the legislative policy of requiring submission of the physical will itself, or at least a photocopy.20 ¶18 Where a written document is material to support the issues in a case, the original writing itself is the best evidence for proving the content of such document. Under 12 O.S. 2011 § 3002, "[t]o prove the content of a record, recording or photograph, the original record, recording or photograph is required except as otherwise provided in this Code or by other statutes." The statute's "except as otherwise provided" language then directs us to 12 O.S. 2011 §§ 3003 and 3004. Title 12 O.S. 2011 § 3003 allows for the admission of duplicates, however, this exception is inapposite to the present case as no documents are contained in the record on appeal. Title 12 O.S. 2011 § 3004 also allows for avoidance of the original record requirement if certain circumstances are met; however, subsection (4) only permits secondary evidence to establish an original record when the particular document is not closely related to a controlling issue.21 Here, the written document is the controlling issue. The record reflects that copies of the subject contracts and deeds relating to burial plots were available, but they were never offered as evidence. ¶19 To establish entitlement to injunctive relief under 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1), Movants were obligated to admit into evidence either a pre-need funeral services contract or a written document executed by Decedent in accordance with the laws of Oklahoma. However, no documentary evidence was entered into evidence by Movants at the hearing, and the lower court relied exclusively on mere testimony that a fifty-year-old contract for the purchase of a burial plot existed without accounting for its absence. Consequently, the evidence was wholly insufficient to establish the prerequisites of either §§ 1151 or 1158(1). As such, the lower court's decision to impose injunctive relief was an abuse of discretion. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 20, 561 P.2d 499 , 508. Conclusion ¶20 Considering the relevant statutory provisions and the record before us, we conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding injunctive relief. Consequently, the trial court's decision granting injunctive relief is reversed. The matter is remanded for continuation of the probate proceedings in a manner consistent with this opinion. TRIAL COURT ORDER GRANTING INJUNCTION REVERSED; MATTER REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION Kauger, Edmondson, Combs (by separate writing), Gurich and Rowe (by separate writing), JJ., concur; Darby, C.J. (by separate writing), Kane, V.C.J. (by separate writing) and Winchester, JJ. , dissent. FOOT