Title: Matos v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 149, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES MATOS,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 149, 2015 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1003000386 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 30, 2015 
Decided: 
September 29, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 29th day of September 2015, upon careful consideration of the 
appellant’s brief under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On November 9, 2010, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
appellant, James Matos, of Arson in the Second Degree, Criminal Trespass 
in the First Degree, Reckless Endangering in the First Degree, Cruelty to 
Animals, Harassment, and three counts of Breach of Bond Conditions.  On 
January 28, 2011, the Superior Court declared Matos a habitual offender and 
sentenced him as follows:  for Arson in the Second Degree, fifteen years at 
Level V; for Reckless Endangering in the First Degree, five years at Level 
2 
 
V; for three counts of Breach of Bond Conditions, a total of six years at 
Level V;  Criminal Trespass in the First Degree, one year at Level V 
suspended for one year at Level III; for Harassment, one year at Level V 
suspended for one year at Level III; and for Animal Cruelty, one year at 
Level V suspended after six months for six months at Level III.  On direct 
appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.1 
(2) 
On March 5, 2012, Matos filed a timely motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  
Later in March and again in April 2012, Matos filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel.  By order dated April 23, 2012, a Superior Court 
Commissioner denied the motion for appointment of counsel.  By order 
dated May 9, 2012, the Commissioner denied Matos’ motion to reconsider 
the denial of counsel.   
(3) 
On January 23, 2013, after considering Matos’ postconviction 
motion as amended, the affidavits and supplemental affidavits submitted by 
Matos’ trial and appellate counsel, the State’s response to the postconviction 
motion, and Matos’ reply, the Commissioner issued a report recommending 
that the motion for postconviction relief should be denied.    By order dated 
July 26, 2013, after de novo review and consideration of Matos’ objections 
                                          
 
1 Matos v. State, 2011 WL 2732575 (Del. July 13, 2011). 
3 
 
to the Commissioner’s report and recommendation, the Superior Court 
adopted the report and recommendation and denied the postconviction 
motion.   
(4) 
Matos filed an appeal from the Superior Court’s July 26, 2013 
order denying his motion for postconviction relief.  On appeal, this Court 
concluded, based on a recent amendment to Rule 61(e)(1) and the 
circumstances in Matos’ case, that the Superior Court’s denial of counsel 
was an abuse of discretion.2  By Order dated December 5, 2013, the Court 
vacated the July 26, 2013 order denying the motion for postconviction relief, 
and remanded the case to the Superior Court for the appointment of counsel 
and further proceedings.3 
(5) 
On February 27, 2014, the Superior Court appointed counsel for 
Matos (hereinafter “Postconviction Counsel”).  Postconviction Counsel was 
ordered to file, by May 30, 2014, an amended motion for postconviction 
relief or a statement that the motion would proceed without an amendment.  
                                          
 
2 Effective May 6, 2013, the Superior Court amended Rule 61(e)(1) to provide for the 
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant’s first postconviction proceeding.    
Although Matos initiated his postconviction proceeding in 2012, prior to the effective 
date of the amendment, the Court concluded that counsel should have been appointed in 
Matos’ case. The Court notes that, in February 2014, Rule 61(e)(1) was amended to limit 
the appointment of counsel to a “first timely postconviction proceeding” (emphasis 
added).  In June 2014, Rule 61(e)(1) was further amended to distinguish between first 
timely postconviction proceedings requiring the appointment of counsel and first timely 
postconviction proceedings where counsel is appointed in the judge’s discretion.   
3 Matos v. State, 2013 WL 6459056 (Del. Dec. 5, 2013). 
4 
 
In the alternative, if Postconviction Counsel concluded, upon review of the 
record, that Matos’ postconviction motion was lacking in merit and that the 
record did not reflect another basis for relief, Postconviction Counsel could 
file a motion to withdraw under Rule 61(e)(2).  Postconviction Counsel 
requested and received an extension of time, until August 28, 2014, to file 
the amended motion for postconviction relief, the statement, or the motion to 
withdraw.  
(6) 
On August 28, 2014, Postconviction Counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw and supporting memorandum under Rule 61(e)(2).  Postconviction 
Counsel represented that he had carefully reviewed the record and 
determined that Matos’ postconviction motion was without merit and that 
the record did not suggest any other grounds for relief.  Matos filed an 
objection to Postconviction Counsel’s motion to withdraw, raising one claim 
for the Superior Court’s consideration.   
(7) 
On February 19, 2015, a Superior Court Commissioner issued a 
report recommending that Matos’ motion for postconviction relief should be 
denied, and that Postconviction Counsel should be granted leave to 
withdraw.4  The Commissioner concluded that Matos’ postconviction 
motion “is without merit and devoid of any other substantial claims for 
                                          
 
4 State v. Matos, 2015 WL 739954 (Del. Super. Comm’r Feb. 19, 2015). 
5 
 
relief,” and that Postconviction Counsel “made a conscientious effort to 
examine the record and the law and has properly determined that [Matos] 
does not have a meritorious claim” for relief.5  By order dated March 11, 
2015, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and 
recommendation, denied Matos’ postconviction motion, and granted 
Postconviction Counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
(8) 
On March 26, 2015, Matos filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s March 11, 2015 order denying his motion for postconviction relief.  
At the direction of the Clerk, Postconviction Counsel filed a formal notice of 
appeal.  Thereafter, Postconviction Counsel moved for the appointment of 
substitute counsel on the basis that Postconviction Counsel was unable to 
provide “meaningful advocacy” on appeal given his position in the Superior 
Court that the record did not suggest any grounds for relief.6  By Order dated 
April 15, 2015, the Court the granted the motion and appointed substitute 
counsel (hereinafter “Substitute Counsel”).   
                                          
 
5 Id., at *6. 
6 Effective June 1, 2015, this Court amended Rule 26(a)(2) and the Superior Court 
amended Rule 61(e)(6), formerly Rule 61(e)(2), to clarify the continuing obligations of a 
court-appointed postconviction lawyer who is granted leave to withdraw by the Superior 
Court. 
6 
 
(9) 
On July 13, 2015, Substitute Counsel filed a brief and a motion 
to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).7  Substitute Counsel asserts 
that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are 
no arguably appealable issues.  Substitute Counsel represents that he 
provided Matos with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the 
accompanying brief, and that he informed Matos of his right to submit points 
for the Court’s consideration.  Matos has not submitted any points for the 
Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and 
has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(10) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying 
brief under Rule 26(c), the Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s 
counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for 
arguable claims.8  The Court must also conduct its own review of the record 
and determine whether “the appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be 
decided without an adversary presentation.”9 
(11) In this case, having conducted “a full examination of all the 
proceedings” and having found “no nonfrivolous issue for appeal,”10 the 
                                          
 
7 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26(c) (governing appeals without merit). 
8 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
9 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 81. 
10 Id. at 80. 
7 
 
Court concludes that Matos’ appeal is “wholly without merit.”11  The Court 
is satisfied that Substitute Counsel made a conscientious effort to examine 
the record and the law and properly determined that Matos could not raise a 
meritorious claim on appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
             Justice 
                                          
 
11 See supra note 7.