Title: Donald J. Harman v.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001331-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1331-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at Law. 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HARMAN 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
October 8, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
September 17, 1998 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For Donald J. Harmon there were briefs by Donald 
J Harman, LaCrosse. 
 
 
For the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility there was a brief by William J. Weigel, litigation 
counsel for the Board. 
 
No.  97-1331-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1331-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against DONALD J. HARMAN, Attorney at Law. 
FILED 
 
OCT 8, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   This is an appeal by Attorney Donald J. 
Harman from the conclusions of the referee that he engaged in 
professional misconduct by failing to commence an action timely 
on behalf of a client, not responding to a motion to dismiss 
that action, and failing to inform his client that the motion to 
dismiss had been filed. Attorney Harman also appealed from the 
referee’s recommendation that the court publicly reprimand him 
for that professional misconduct.  
¶2 
We determine that the referee properly concluded that 
Attorney Harman engaged in professional misconduct by failing to 
act promptly in his client’s legal matter and notify his client 
of a significant procedural development in it. While we are 
concerned, in light of prior reprimands he has received for 
professional misconduct, that the public reprimand sought by the 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) in this 
No.  97-1331-D 
 
2 
proceeding and recommended by the referee may not be sufficient 
to deter him from professional misconduct in the future, we 
determine that a public reprimand is the appropriate discipline 
to impose in this proceeding.  
¶3 
Attorney Harman, who was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1960 and practices in LaCrosse, was publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct twice previously. In 
1987, the court reprimanded him for having charged one client an 
excessive fee and for failing to turn over another client’s file 
upon termination of representation despite a court order to do 
so. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 137 Wis. 2d 148, 
403 N.W.2d 459. In 1989, he consented to a public reprimand from 
the Board for having acted in the presence of a conflict of 
interests, failing to maintain complete trust account records 
and render proper accountings of funds held in trust, and 
failing to cooperate in the Board’s investigation. The referee 
in the instant proceeding, Attorney Janet Jenkins, made findings 
of fact and conclusions of law based on a stipulation of the 
parties and on testimony presented at a disciplinary hearing.  
¶4 
Attorney Harman was retained in November 1991 to 
represent a client on a claim against a county and some of its 
officials concerning the client’s arrest and incarceration. One 
of the client’s claims was an allegation that the judge’s 
signature on an arrest warrant had been forged, but that claim 
was not litigated due to the lack of reliable evidence. Attorney 
Harman filed a federal civil rights action on the client’s 
behalf alleging that the client was unlawfully incarcerated for 
No.  97-1331-D 
 
3 
some eight days, as he had not been brought promptly before a 
magistrate, 
as 
required 
by 
law. 
The 
allegedly 
unlawful 
incarceration ended June 4, 1986, and the federal action was 
filed June 1, 1993, more than 18 months after the client 
retained Attorney Harman to represent him.  
¶5 
When the defendants in the action moved to dismiss the 
complaint, Attorney Harman filed nothing in response or request 
an extension of time to file a brief or other materials in 
response to the dismissal motion. Attorney Harman never notified 
his client of the motion to dismiss.  
¶6 
Eleven days after a response was to have been filed, 
the court granted the motion to dismiss and entered judgment for 
the defendants with prejudice and costs. The multiple grounds 
for the dismissal included the complaint’s having failed to 
state a claim on which relief could be granted because the 
sheriff named in the complaint no longer was in office and could 
not be sued in any official capacity and there was no allegation 
that he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of 
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the absence of any 
allegation that a policy or custom of the county caused the 
alleged deprivation of rights, and the availability of an 
adequate state tort law remedy. A fifth ground for the dismissal 
was that the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued June 4, 1986, 
and the action was filed beyond the applicable six-year statute 
of limitations.  
¶7 
The referee concluded that Attorney Harman’s failure to 
file the lawsuit within the statute of limitations constituted a 
No.  97-1331-D 
 
4 
failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3,1 as did his 
failure to respond at all to the motion to dismiss. His failure 
to communicate with the client regarding the existence of the 
motion to dismiss constituted a failure to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.4.2 As discipline for that misconduct, the referee 
recommended a public reprimand.  
¶8 
The 
referee 
rejected 
Attorney 
Harman’s 
position, 
reasserted in this appeal, that he did not fail to act with 
reasonable diligence in failing to file the action within the 
six-year statute of limitations because it would not have 
mattered if he had filed it timely, for the court held that the 
cause of action was not cognizable in federal court because a 
state court remedy was available. The referee noted that Attorney 
Harman had taken the position that his client’s claim was not 
                     
1 SCR 20:1.3 provides: Diligence 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.  
2 SCR 20:1.4 provides: Communication 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information.  
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.  
No.  97-1331-D 
 
5 
barred by the statute of limitations on the theory that the 
statute did not begin to run when the allegedly unlawful 
incarceration ended but, rather, when the client discovered that 
he had a cause of action. The referee observed that whether or 
not he was correct, Attorney Harman did nothing to challenge the 
statute of limitations ground asserted by the defendants in their 
motion to dismiss.  
¶9 
We agree. Attorney Harman filed the action believing he 
was setting forth a valid claim, and the fact that the trial 
court ultimately disagreed did not excuse his failure to file the 
action timely. Similarly without merit is Attorney Harman’s 
contention that he could not be found to have failed to act with 
reasonable diligence by failing to respond to the motion to 
dismiss because any response would have made no difference to the 
outcome of that motion. As the referee noted, Attorney Harman 
admitted that he did not realize there was no cause of action 
until the court ruled on the dismissal motion. His contention 
that he did not fail to act with reasonable diligence in failing 
to file the action within the six-year statute of limitations 
because nothing he might have done would have saved the action is 
disingenuous.  
¶10 We also reject, as did the referee, Attorney Harman’s 
position that he did not tell the client that the motion to 
dismiss had been filed because there was nothing the client could 
No.  97-1331-D 
 
6 
have told him that would have made a difference in the outcome. 
Regardless of the client’s ability to assist him, Attorney Harman 
was professionally obligated to keep the client informed of what 
was happening in his case, particularly the filing of a motion 
that, if granted, would leave the client without a case.  
¶11 In recommending a public reprimand as discipline to be 
imposed, the referee explicitly considered that notwithstanding 
the absence of serious harm to the client caused by Attorney 
Harman’s lack of diligence, there was harm to the legal 
profession, at least in the perception of the client that a 
different result might have been obtained had the action been 
filed timely and the motion to dismiss opposed.  
¶12 In this appeal, Attorney Harman pointed out a $1000 
arithmetical error in the Board’s favor set forth in its 
statement of costs. He also asserted that the Board never 
submitted an itemized accounting of the time its attorney spent 
in this disciplinary matter. In response, the Board pointed out 
that once it became aware of the error, it was corrected and an 
amended statement of costs, with a full itemization of its 
lawyer’s services, was submitted. In fact, the total costs 
remained the same, as the initial statement merely failed to set 
forth the fee of the Board’s witness.  
¶13 We adopt the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and determine that a public reprimand is the appropriate 
No.  97-1331-D 
 
7 
discipline 
for 
Attorney 
Harman’s 
professional 
misconduct 
established in this proceeding. In addition to his failure to act 
diligently and promptly in representing this client, Attorney 
Harman 
has 
demonstrated 
a 
lack 
of 
understanding 
of 
his 
professional duties and an unwillingness to take responsibility 
for his misconduct.  
¶14 IT IS ORDERED that Donald J. Harman is publicly 
reprimanded as discipline for professional misconduct.  
¶15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this proceeding, Donald J. Harman pay to the Board of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility 
the 
costs 
of 
this 
proceeding, provided that if the costs are not paid within the 
time specified and absent a showing to this court of his 
inability to pay the costs within that time, the license of 
Donald J. Harman to practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended 
until further order of the court.  
 
 
1