Title: Gibbs v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 203, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
EDWARD GIBBS,
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No.  203, 2006
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below–Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for Sussex County in S03-06-
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0519I.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Cr.  ID No.  0305016899
Appellee.
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Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
Submitted: September 7, 2006
Decided:
November 30, 2006
O R D E R
This 30  day of November 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s
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opening brief and appendix, the State’s motion to affirm and the Superior Court
record, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Edward Gibbs, filed an appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61(“Rule 61").  The appellee, State of Delaware, has
moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Gibbs’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.
We agree and affirm.
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(2)
In October 2003, a Superior Court jury convicted Gibbs of Escape
after Conviction.  At his sentencing in December 2003, Gibbs moved to dismiss
his counsel as incompetent.  The Superior Court denied the motion but, after
conducting the requisite colloquy, allowed Gibbs to proceed pro se.  The
Superior Court declared Gibbs a habitual offender and sentenced him to twenty
years at Level V with credit for time served, followed by six months at Level
IV work release.
(3)
In his pro se direct appeal, Gibbs alleged that (i) his conviction by
an all-white jury deprived him of a fair trial;  (ii) he was entitled to a jury
instruction on a lesser-included offense; (iii) the Superior Court erred when
instructing the jury; (iv) there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction; (v) the sentence imposed violated the Eighth Amendment; (vi) his
due process rights were violated; and (vii) his defense counsel was ineffective.
In his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Gibbs reiterated the allegations
of incompetence that he had previously raised in his motion to dismiss counsel
as well as new allegations.
(4)
By order dated February 4, 2005, this Court affirmed the Superior
Court’s judgment as to all of Gibbs’ claims except for his claim of ineffective
Gibbs v.  State, 2005 WL 535011 (Del.  Supr.). 
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Id. ¶ 20.
2
State v.  Gibbs, 2006 WL 1149161 (Del.  Super.  Ct.)
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assistance of counsel.   The Court deferred consideration of the ineffective
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counsel claim to give Gibbs an opportunity to raise the allegations in their
entirety in the Superior Court, and the Superior Court to rule on them after
developing an appropriate record.2
(5)
On August 11, 2005, Gibbs filed a motion for postconviction relief
and separate motions for the appointment of counsel, an evidentiary hearing,
and recusal of the trial judge.  Among other claims, Gibbs alleged that his
defense counsel was ineffective, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try
him, and the Superior Court failed to inquire into his conflict with his defense
counsel.
(6)
The Superior Court directed that Gibbs’ defense counsel (“his
counsel”) file an affidavit in response to the allegations of ineffectiveness.  His
counsel filed a lengthy affidavit opposing the allegations.  By order dated
March 29, 2006, the Superior Court denied Gibbs’ motion for postconviction
relief.   This appeal followed.
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(7)
On appeal Gibbs argues some but not all of the claims that he
raised in his postconviction motion.  To the extent Gibbs has not briefed claims
Somerville v.  State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del.  1997).
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See Johnson v.  State, 765 A.2d 926, 929 (Del.  2000) (deferring consideration of
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plain error claims on direct appeal and remanding to Superior Court to rule in the first
instance on  postconviction motion); Shockley v.  State, 2006 WL 1277809 (Del.  Supr.)
(declining consideration of postconviction claims that were neither raised nor ruled upon in
the Superior Court).                     : 
Younger v.  State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.  1990).
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Del.  Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(3) (2006).  
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that he raised on postconviction relief, those claims on appeal are deemed
waived and abandoned.4
(8)
In a claim that he raised, but on which the Superior Court declined
to rule, Gibbs argues that this Court erred when deferring consideration of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.  The Court concludes
that Gibbs’ claim is without merit.5
(9)
When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction
motion pursuant to Rule 61, this Court first must consider the procedural
requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues.   Rule
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61(i)(3) bars from consideration any ground for relief that was not raised in the
proceedings leading to the conviction unless the petitioner can establish (i)
cause for failing to timely raise the claim and (ii) actual prejudice.   Rule
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Del.  Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(5) (2006).
8
See Del. Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  7(b) (2006) (providing that an offense may be
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prosecuted by information if the defendant waives prosecution by indictment).
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61(i)(5) provides in part that the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) shall not apply
to a jurisdictional claim.8
(10)
Gibbs argues on appeal that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction
to try him because of an invalid waiver of preliminary hearing.  The record
reflects, however, that Gibbs waived his preliminary hearing and was properly
charged by information.   Gibbs’ jurisdictional claim is barred pursuant to Rule
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61(i)(3), as he has provided no basis under Rule 61(i)(5) to excuse the
procedural default.
(11)
Gibbs argues on appeal that the Superior Court failed to inquire
into the conflict with his counsel.  The sentencing transcript reflects, however,
that the Superior Court thoroughly considered Gibbs’ conflict with his counsel.
Gibbs’ claim to the contrary is barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3), as he has not
demonstrated a basis under Rule 61(i)(5) upon which to excuse the procedural
default.
(12)
Gibbs argues on appeal that his counsel was ineffective.  To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gibbs must show that (i)
Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
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his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (ii) the deficiencies in his counsel’s representation caused actual
prejudice.10
(13)
The Court has carefully considered Gibbs’ allegations ineffective
counsel in conjunction with the record.  The record supports the Superior
Court’s findings that his counsel’s performance was reasonable and/or that
Gibbs did not demonstrate that alleged error on the part of his counsel was
prejudicial to his case.
(14)
We find it manifest on the face of the opening brief that the
judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed.   The issues on appeal are
controlled by settled Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs
Justice