Title: Angela M.W. v. William Kruzicki
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP002480-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-2480-W 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Angela M.W.,   
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Petitioner,  
 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
William Kruzicki, Sheriff of Waukesha  
 
 
 
County, Rexford W. Titus, III, President,  
 
 
 
Waukesha Memorial Hospital, Fred Syrjanen,  
 
 
 
Director, Lawrence Center & Director Of  
 
 
 
Chemical Dependency At Waukesha Memorial  
 
 
 
Hospital, Circuit Court for Waukesha County,  
 
 
 
The Honorable Kathryn W. Foster, Waukesha  
 
 
 
County Corporation Counsel, Thomas Farley  
 
 
 
and Assistant Corporation Counsel William  
 
 
 
Domina,   
 
 
 
 
Respondents-Respondents.  
  
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 N.W.2d 482 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 22, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 30, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE:  
KATHRYN W. FOSTER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Crooks, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
Steinmetz and Wilcox, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioner-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robin Shellow, Angela Conrad Kachelski and Law Offices of Robin 
Shellow; Peter Koneazny and American Civil Liberties Union of 
Wisconsin Foundation, both of Milwaukee and Mary Wyckoff and 
American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY and oral argument by 
Angela Conrad Kachelski and Sara Mandelbaum of the ACLU’s Womens 
Rights Project. 
 
 
For the respondents-respondents there was a brief by William 
J. Domina, Margaret M. Zimmer and Waukesha County Assistant 
Corporation Counsel, Waukesha and oral argument by William J. 
Domina and Jill C. Vento. 
 
 
Guardian ad Litem brief was filed by Jill C. Vento and 
Brenner, Brenner & Wall, Waukesha. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Carol E. Stauder, John M. Stoiber, 
Thomas L. Potter, assistant district attorneys and E. Michael 
McCann, district attorney, Milwaukee. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Stephen W. Hayes, Timothy W. 
Feeley, Susan E. Lovern and Von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee for the National Association of Counsel for Children. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Keith A. Fournier, Jeffrey A. 
Brauch and The American Center for Law & Justice, Virginia Beach, 
VA and Thomas Patrick Monaghan and New Hope Life Center\The 
American Center for Law & Justice, New Hope, KY, for the New Hope 
Life Center and The American Center for Law & Justice. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Michael H. Schaalman and Quarles & 
Brady, Milwaukee; Carol Tracy, Susan Frietsche and Women's Law 
Project, Philadelphia, PA; Lynn Paltrow, Nancy Stearns and Center 
for Reproductive Law & Policy, New York, NY; Nadine Taub  and 
Women's Rights Litigation Clinic, Newark, NJ, for the American 
Public Health Association, The Drug Policy Foundation, The 
National Black Women's Health Project, The National Center for 
Youth Law, The National Latina Health Project, The National 
Women's Health Network, The Northwest Women's Law Center, The NOW 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, 
Inc., The Wisconsin Council on Children and Families and The 
Wisconsin Women's Network. 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Angela M.W., 
 
  
Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
William Kruzicki, Sheriff of Waukesha 
County, Rexford W. Titus, III, President, 
Waukesha Memorial Hospital, Fred Syrjanen, 
Director, Lawrence Center & Director of 
Chemical Dependency at Waukesha Memorial 
Hospital, Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, The Honorable Kathryn W. Foster, 
Waukesha County Corporation Counsel, 
Thomas Farley and Assistant Corporation 
Counsel, William Domina, 
 
 
Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 22, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioner, Angela M.W., 
seeks review of a court of appeals' decision1 denying her request 
for either a writ of habeas corpus or a supervisory writ to 
prohibit the Waukesha County Circuit Court, Kathryn W. Foster, 
Judge, from continuing to exercise jurisdiction in a CHIPS 
(child alleged to be in need of protection or services) 
proceeding.  She maintains that the CHIPS statute does not 
confer jurisdiction over her or her viable fetus.  In the 
alternative, if the CHIPS statute does confer such jurisdiction, 
the petitioner contends that as applied to her, it violates her 
                     
1  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 
N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
2
equal protection and due process rights.  Because we determine 
that the legislature did not intend to include a fetus within 
the Children's Code definition of "child," we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Although we visit in the facts of this case the 
daunting social problem of drug use during pregnancy, the 
essence of this case is one of statutory construction.  The 
relevant facts are undisputed. 
¶3 
The petitioner was an adult carrying a viable fetus 
with a projected delivery date of October 4, 1995.  Based upon 
observations made while providing the petitioner with prenatal 
care, her obstetrician suspected that she was using cocaine or 
other drugs.  Blood tests performed on May 31, June 26, and July 
21, 1995, confirmed the obstetrician's suspicion that the 
petitioner was using cocaine or other drugs.     
¶4 
On July 21, 1995, the obstetrician confronted the 
petitioner about her drug use and its effect on her viable 
fetus.  The petitioner expressed remorse, but declined the 
obstetrician's advice to seek treatment.  On August 15, 1995, a 
blood test again confirmed that the petitioner was ingesting 
cocaine or other drugs.  Afterward, the petitioner canceled a 
scheduled August 28, 1995, appointment, and rescheduled the 
appointment for September 1, 1995.  When she failed to keep the 
September 1 appointment, her obstetrician reported his concerns 
to Waukesha County authorities. 
¶5 
On September 5, 1995, the Waukesha County Department 
of Health and Human Services (the County) filed a "MOTION TO 
TAKE AN UNBORN CHILD INTO CUSTODY," pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
3
48.19(1)(c) (1993-94).2  The caption read “In the Matter of: JOHN 
OR JANE DOE, A 36 Week Old Unborn Child.”  In its motion, the 
County requested an order “removing the above-named unborn child 
from his or her present custody, and placing the unborn child” 
in protective custody.  The motion was supported by the 
affidavit of the petitioner’s obstetrician, which set out the 
obstetrician’s observations and medical opinion that “without 
intervention forcing [the petitioner] to cease her drug use,” 
her fetus would suffer serious physical harm. 
¶6 
In an order filed on September 6, 1995, the juvenile 
court directed that: 
 
the [petitioner’s] unborn child . . . be detained 
under 
Section 
48.207(1)(g), Wis. 
Stats., 
by the 
Waukesha County Sheriff’s Department and transported 
to Waukesha Memorial Hospital for inpatient treatment 
and protection.  Such detention will by necessity 
result in the detention of the unborn child’s mother . 
. . . 
 
¶7 
Later that same day, before the protective custody 
order was executed, the petitioner presented herself voluntarily 
at an inpatient drug treatment facility.  As a result, the 
juvenile court amended its order to provide that detention would 
be at the inpatient facility.  The court further ordered that if 
the petitioner attempted to leave the inpatient facility or did 
                     
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references are 
to the 1993-94 volume.  Wis. Stat. § 48.19(1)(c) provides: 
48.19 Taking a child into custody. (1) A child 
may be taken into custody under any of the following: 
 
    . . . . 
 
    (c) An order of the judge if made upon a showing 
satisfactory to the judge that the welfare of the 
child demands that the child be immediately removed 
from his or her present custody. The order shall 
specify that the child be held in custody under s. 
48.207. 
 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
4
not participate in the facility’s drug treatment program, then 
both she and the fetus were to be detained and transported to 
Waukesha Memorial Hospital.    
¶8 
Also on September 6, 1995, the County filed a CHIPS 
petition in the juvenile court, alleging that the petitioner’s 
viable fetus was in need of protection or services because the 
petitioner “neglect[ed], refuse[d] or [was] unable for reasons 
other than poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, 
medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously endanger 
the physical health of the child, pursuant to Section 48.13(10) 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.”3  The County alleged that the 
petitioner's 36-week-old viable fetus had been exposed to drugs 
prenatally through the mother's drug use.  Instead of a birth 
date, the petition stated "Due Date 10/4/95."  In the space 
designated for indicating the sex of the subject child, the 
petition stated "Unknown." 
¶9 
On September 7 and 8, 1995, the juvenile court held 
detention hearings pursuant to § 48.21(1).4  At the first 
                     
3  Wis. Stat. § 48.13(10) provides: 
48.13 Jurisdiction over children alleged to be in 
need of protection or services.  The court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged 
to be in need of protection or services which can be 
ordered by the court, and: 
 
. . . . 
 
    (10) Whose parent, guardian or legal custodian 
neglects, refuses or is unable for reasons other than 
poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, 
medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously 
endanger the physical health of the child . . . . 
 
4  Wis. Stat. § 48.21(1) provides: 
48.21 Hearing for child in custody. (1) HEARING; 
WHEN HELD. (a) If a child who has been taken into 
custody is not released under s. 48.20, a hearing to 
determine whether the child shall continue to be held 
in custody under the criteria of ss. 48.205 to 48.209 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
5
hearing, the petitioner appeared by telephone, but without 
counsel.  At the second hearing, now represented by counsel, she 
appeared again by telephone, and objected to the juvenile 
court's exercise of jurisdiction.  The juvenile court rejected 
her jurisdictional challenge, and scheduled a plea hearing on 
the CHIPS petition for September 13, 1995.   
¶10 On September 13, 1995, the petitioner commenced an 
original action in the court of appeals, seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus, or, in the alternative, a supervisory writ 
staying all proceedings in the juvenile court and dismissing the 
CHIPS petition.  In support of her request, the petitioner 
asserted that Chapter 48 does not vest the juvenile court with 
jurisdiction over her or her viable fetus.  Alternatively, if 
the statute does grant such authority, the petitioner argued 
that it violates the constitutional guarantees of procedural and 
substantive due process, as well as equal protection of the 
laws. 
¶11 The court of appeals declined to stay the juvenile 
court proceedings, and issued an order on September 21, 1995, 
denying both writ petitions.  The petitioner gave birth to a 
baby boy on September 28, 1995.  Subsequently, the court of 
appeals issued an opinion supplementing its earlier order.   
¶12 A divided court of appeals determined that the 
juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction in this case.  
State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 
N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995).5  The court reasoned that the United 
                                                                  
shall be conducted by the judge or juvenile court 
commissioner within 24 hours of the time the decision 
to hold the child was made . . . . 
 
5  Judge Nettesheim authored the court of appeals' decision and 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
6
States Supreme Court, the Wisconsin legislature, and this court 
have each articulated public policy considerations supporting 
the conclusion that a viable fetus is a "person" within the 
meaning of the CHIPS statute's definition of "child."  The court 
also held that application of the CHIPS statute to the 
petitioner did not deprive her of equal protection or due 
process, since the statute was a properly tailored means of 
vindicating the State's compelling interest in the health, 
safety, and welfare of a viable fetus.  The petitioner then 
sought review in this court, raising substantially the same 
arguments she raised before the court of appeals.6 
¶13 We stress at the outset of our analysis that this case 
is not about the propriety or morality of the petitioner's 
conduct.  It is also not about her constitutional right to 
reproductive choice guaranteed under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973).  Rather, this case is one of statutory construction.  
The issue presented is whether a viable fetus is included in the 
definition of "child" provided in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2).   
¶14 The interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law which this court reviews under a de novo standard.  
Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 
N.W.2d 96 (1996).  Our primary purpose when interpreting a 
                                                                  
was joined by Judge Brown.  Judge Anderson dissented. 
6  Because the petitioner has given birth and is no longer being 
detained, this action is moot.  However, we will retain an 
otherwise moot case for determination in certain circumstances. 
 For example, we have recognized an exception to the general 
rule of dismissal for mootness when the issues presented are of 
great public importance, or the question is capable and likely 
of repetition and yet evades appellate review because the 
appellate process usually cannot be completed in time to have a 
practical effect on the parties.  See Lenz v. L.E. Phillips 
Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 67, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992); G.S. 
v. State, 118 Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 N.W.2d 181 (1984).  Because 
this case satisfies both of the cited mootness exceptions, we 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
7
statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent.  We first 
look to the language of the statute, and if the language is 
clear and unambiguous, we define the language of the statute in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning.  If the language of the 
statute is ambiguous and does not clearly set forth the 
legislative intent, we will construe the statute so as to 
ascertain and carry out the legislative intent.  In construing 
an ambiguous statute, we examine the history, context, subject 
matter, scope, and object of the statute.  Id. at 220 (citing 
Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 
519 (1996)). 
 
¶15 The statutory language at issue confers on the 
juvenile court "exclusive original jurisdiction over a child 
alleged to be in need of protection or services which can be 
ordered by the court . . . ."  § 48.13.  A "child" is defined in 
Chapter 48 as "a person who is less than 18 years of age."  
§ 48.02(2).  The petitioner contends that the Chapter 48 
definition of "child" is clear on its face, and mandates the 
conclusion that Chapter 48 uses the term "child" to mean a 
person born alive.  In support, she asserts that by having no 
"age," a fetus cannot be a person who is less than 18 years of 
age.7  The petitioner submits that it is therefore unnecessary 
for this court to construe the statute to determine its meaning. 
 In contrast, the County asserts that courts in this State and 
other jurisdictions have determined that "child" and "person" 
                                                                  
proceed to a consideration of the issues presented.  
7  As further support for her assertion of ambiguity, the 
petitioner notes that a CHIPS petition must include the subject 
child's date of birth, § 48.255(1)(a), and that other provisions 
of Chapter 48 indicate that the term "child" was not intended to 
include a fetus.  However, we decline to consider other Chapter 
48 provisions until after we have determined that the definition 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
8
are ambiguous terms.  As such, the County contends that we are 
required to look beyond the language of the statute for the 
meaning of "child." 
 
¶16 Statutory language is ambiguous if reasonable minds 
could differ as to its meaning.  Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 
196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).  While the parties' 
differing interpretations of a statute do not alone create 
ambiguity, equally sensible interpretations of a term by 
different authorities are indicative of the term's ability to 
support more than one meaning.  Id.  
¶17 Case law reveals that different courts have given 
different meanings to the terms "person" and "child."  This 
court has previously held that a viable fetus is a "person" for 
purposes of Wisconsin's wrongful death statute.  Kwaterski v. 
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 
N.W.2d 107 (1967).  On the other hand, the United States Supreme 
Court has concluded that a fetus is not a "person" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).  Perhaps most compelling, courts 
in other states have arrived at different interpretations of 
statutory language nearly identical to that in § 48.02(2).  
Compare State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (holding 
that a third trimester fetus is not "a child under eighteen 
years of age," as provided in Ohio's child endangerment 
statute), with Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at 
*3 (S.C. July 15, 1996) (concluding that a viable fetus is a 
"person under the age of eighteen," pursuant to South Carolina's 
child abuse and endangerment statute).  Against this backdrop of 
                                                                  
of "child" provided in § 48.02(2) is ambiguous.   
No. 95-2480-W 
 
9
conflicting authority, we conclude that the term "child" is 
ambiguous. 
¶18 In construing the statute, we turn first to the 
legislative history.  Chapter 48 came into existence in 1919 as 
part of a consolidation and revision of statutory provisions 
dealing generally with neglected, dependent, or delinquent 
children.  § 2, ch. 614, Laws of 1919.  The legislation defined 
a dependent or neglected child as "any child under the age of 
sixteen" meeting certain criteria.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a) 
(1919).  Twenty years later, the definitions were amended to 
raise the age limit to eighteen years.  § 2, ch. 524, Laws of 
1939.  In 1955, the legislature created a separate subsection 
for definitions, describing a child as "a person under 18 years 
of age."  § 7, ch. 575, Laws of 1955.  In 1977, the legislature 
created § 48.02(2), which defined a child as a "person who is 
less than 18 years of age."  § 5, ch. 354, Laws of 1977.  
Finally, substantial changes made to Chapter 48 in the last 
legislative 
session 
have 
left 
the 
definition 
of 
"child" 
unaltered for purposes of our analysis.  1995 Wis. Act 27, 
§ 2424; 95 Wis. Act 77, § 44; 1995 Wis. Act 275; 1995 Wis. Act 
352, § 10p; 1995 Wis. Act 448.8   
¶19  In examining the legislative history, we find the 
drafting files of the more recent amendments to the Code devoid 
of information which might illuminate our search.  We also find 
no news accounts of debate, dialogue, or even consideration of 
                     
8  These acts amended the definition of "child" to read: 
"Child" means a person who is less than 18 years of 
age, except that for purposes of investigating or 
prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a 
state or federal criminal law or any civil law or 
municipal ordinance, "child" does not include a person 
who has attained 17 years of age.  
No. 95-2480-W 
 
10
whether fetus should be included in the definition of "child" in 
Chapter 48.  Furthermore, the parties offer no specific 
historical references to support their respective positions.  
The issue of whether the Chapter 48 definition of "child" 
includes a fetus is one of a controversial and complex nature.  
One would expect heated dialogue and intense debate if the 
legislature intended to include fetus within the definition of 
"child."  Yet, we are met with legislative silence.  
¶20 The 
dissent 
maintains 
that 
the 
legislature 
has 
impliedly ratified the court of appeals' interpretation of 
§ 48.02(2), because amendments to the Code in the months since 
the court of appeals' decision have left undisturbed the 
language at issue.  Dissent at 13-15.  However, the very cases 
relied upon by the dissent demonstrate the fundamental error of 
applying the doctrine of legislative acquiescence to the present 
case. 
¶21 The 
application 
of 
the 
doctrine 
of 
legislative 
acquiescence is justified when the legislature can be "presumed 
to know that in absence of its changing the law, the 
construction put upon it by the courts will remain unchanged."  
Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) 
(quoting Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 
633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968)).  Of course, if this court has 
accepted review of a court of appeals' decision construing a 
statute, the legislature cannot be presumed to know that the 
court of appeals' interpretation "will remain unchanged."  Our 
acceptance of review makes clear that the construction given to 
a statute by the court of appeals is subject to change.  Thus, 
the doctrine presupposes the existence of a decision which, 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
11
unlike the instant court of appeals' decision, is not subject to 
further appellate review. 
¶22 This principle is confirmed by reviewing those cases 
cited by the dissent in which this court found implied 
legislative ratification of a prior decision.  We observe that 
in each case, the legislature acquiesced to a prior decision 
that was either unappealable or no longer subject to review.  
See State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 240, 247, 558 N.W.2d 375 
(1997) (finding legislative acquiescence to Moore v. State, 55 
Wis. 2d 1, 197 N.W.2d 820 (1972)); State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 
552, 566, 456 N.W.2d 143 (1990) (citing State v. Harris, 123 
Wis. 2d 231, 365 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1985), and State v. Wild, 
146 Wis. 2d 18, 429 N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1988)); Reiter, 95 Wis. 
2d at 470-72, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) (citing Schwenn v. Loraine 
Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961)); Milwaukee 
Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 252 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 83 Wis. 2d 588, 600-1, 266 N.W.2d 314 (1978) 
(citing Board of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 
637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969)); Zimmerman, 38 Wis. 2d at 632-634 
(citing McGonigle v. Gryphan, 201 Wis. 269, 229 N.W. 81 (1930), 
and Quante v. Erickson, 2 Wis. 2d 527, 87 N.W.2d 249 (1958)). 
¶23 In this case, the petitioner filed a timely petition 
for review of the court of appeals' decision, and we granted 
review on January 23, 1996.  The purported acts of legislative 
acquiescence occurred after that date.  The dissent fails to 
explain how the legislature can be presumed to possess advance 
knowledge that the court of appeals' construction of § 48.02(2) 
would "remain unchanged" upon review by this court.  The obvious 
answer is that the legislature made the amendments to the Code 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
12
with full knowledge that the court of appeals' construction of 
§ 48.02(2) was subject to alteration on further review by this 
court.  Thus, there was no unappealable decision to which the 
legislature could acquiesce.9  
¶24 We turn next to a consideration of context, examining 
the § 48.02(2) definition of "child" in conjunction with other 
relevant sections of the Code.  When attempting to ascertain the 
meaning of statutory language, we are obligated to avoid a 
construction which would result in an absurdity.  Jungbluth, 201 
Wis. 2d at 327.  With this in mind, we note that certain 
relevant sections of the Code would be rendered absurd if 
"child" is understood to include a viable fetus.  For example, 
in this case, the initial order taking the fetus into custody 
was 
issued  
pursuant to § 48.19(1)(c).  That statute allows a child to be 
taken 
into 
custody 
by 
judicial 
order 
"upon 
a 
showing 
satisfactory to the judge that the welfare of the child demands 
that the child be immediately removed from his or her present 
custody." [emphasis added].  It is obviously inappropriate to 
apply this language to a viable fetus in utero.   
¶25 Section § 48.19(2) requires the person taking a child 
into physical custody to immediately notify the parent by the 
                     
9  If the dissent's conception of legislative acquiescence were 
correct, it would follow that this court's review of court of 
appeals' cases involving construction of a statute would be 
severely restricted.  Under the dissent's reasoning, if the 
legislature has amended statutory language even tangentially 
related to the text at issue in a given case, and has not 
disturbed the court of appeals' decision, we should find 
legislative acquiescence to the court of appeals' decision.  
Thus, this court's independent determination of legislative 
intent would be limited by an inference drawn from a lack of 
legislative reaction to a court of appeals' decision in the very 
case before us.  We reject such a restriction on our direct 
review of a court of appeals' decision. 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
13
most practical means.  Yet, a pregnant woman would never need 
notification that her fetus had been taken into "physical 
custody," for she would already have such notice by virtue of 
the concomitant circumstance of her own detention.    
¶26 Section 48.20(2) requires a person taking a child into 
custody to make every effort to immediately release the child to 
its parent.  This language assumes that the child is at some 
point removed from the parent.  Again, it is axiomatic that a 
viable fetus in utero cannot be removed from a pregnant woman in 
the sense conveyed by the statute.   
¶27 By reading the definition of "child" in context with 
other relevant sections of Chapter 48, we find a compelling 
basis for concluding that the legislature intended a "child" to 
mean a human being born alive.  Code provisions dealing with 
taking a child into custody, providing parental notification, 
and releasing a child from custody would require absurd results 
if the § 48.02(2) definition of "child" included a fetus.  Each 
of the provisions addresses a critical juncture in a CHIPS 
proceeding.  Yet, each also anticipates that the "child" can at 
some point be removed from the presence of the parent.  It is 
manifest that the separation envisioned by the statute cannot be 
achieved in the context of a pregnant woman and her fetus.10  
¶28 The court of appeals determined, and the County  
asserts, that some prior decisions of this court support the 
                     
10  The dissent asserts that interpreting "child" to not include 
a fetus is to work an absurd result, "by rendering the state's 
power to protect a child dependent upon whether the child is 
inside or outside of the womb."  Dissent at 10.  This argument 
employs a circular method of reasoning, which may be summarized 
as follows:  the legislature intended the term "child" to 
include a viable fetus because the State must have the power to 
protect children.  We decline to consider an argument that 
assumes the result. 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
14
proposition that a fetus is a child under the Children's Code.  
For example, the court of appeals analogized the present case to 
those in which this court has recognized a degree of fetal 
personhood under tort law.  In support of its analogy, the court 
of appeals cited our holding in Kwaterski that "an eighth-month, 
viable unborn child, whose later stillbirth is caused by the 
wrongful act of another, is 'a person' within the meaning of 
[the wrongful death statute] so as to give rise to a wrongful-
death 
action 
by 
the 
parents 
of 
the 
stillborn 
infant."  
Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 15.   
¶29 The court of appeals also reasoned that because the 
CHIPS statute is remedial in nature, its use of "person" should 
be liberally construed to include a fetus so as to effectuate 
the statute's purpose of protecting children.  Angela M.W., 197 
Wis. 2d 558-59 (citing Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 21).  It also 
noted that in the earlier case of Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. 
Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled on other 
grounds by Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 
N.W.2d 226 (1980), this court recognized a cause of action of an 
infant for injuries sustained before birth.  In construing 
"child" to include a fetus, the court of appeals relied heavily 
on our statement in Puhl that "[i]f the common law has any 
vitality, . . . it should be elastic enough to adapt itself to 
current medical and scientific truths so as to function as an 
efficient rule of conduct in our modern, complex society."  Id. 
at 357.    
¶30 Initially, we note that this court has historically 
been wary of expanding the scope of the Children's Code by 
reading into it language not expressly mentioned within the text 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
15
of Chapter 48.11  While Chapter 48 is to be liberally construed, 
§ 48.01(2), we will not discern from the statute a legislative 
intent that is not evident.  Green County Dep't of Human Servs. 
v. H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 652, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991).  
Furthermore, a directive to construe the statute liberally to 
effectuate its purpose does not give license to liberally expand 
the definition of "child" to the stages before birth or after 
the age of 18.  The directive is to liberally construe the 
statute to effectuate its purpose of providing for the care, 
protection, and development of children.  See § 48.01(1)(b), 
(2).  The logical extension of the dissent's argument regarding 
liberal construction would expand the definition of "child" to 
the moment after conception.  No party in this case is advancing 
such a far-reaching argument.  Finally, our decisions placing 
limited legal duties upon a third person should not be read to 
confer full legal status upon a fetus.  Each must be examined to 
identify the particular rights and policies underlying the law 
that is being addressed.  
¶31 We find the tort law analogy unpersuasive in this 
context.  Instead, we agree with the United States Supreme Court 
that declaring a fetus a person for purposes of the wrongful 
death statute does no more than vindicate the interest of 
parents in the potential life that a fetus represents.  See Roe, 
                     
11  See, e.g., Green County Dep't of Human Servs. v. H.N., 162 
Wis. 2d 635, 645-46, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991) (noting that Chapter 
48 is a "carefully drawn legislative enactment which 
circumscribes judicial and administrative action in juvenile 
matters"); Breier v. E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 390, 387 N.W.2d 72 
(1986) ("The Children's Code . . . does not confer unfettered 
discretion to craft unique and unspecified remedies in juvenile 
matters"). 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
16
410 U.S. at 162.12  Indeed, we have recognized that until born, a 
fetus has no cause of action for fetal injury: 
Injuries suffered before birth impose a conditional 
liability on the tort-feasor.  This liability becomes 
unconditional, or complete, upon the birth of the 
injured separate entity as a legal person.  If such 
personality is not achieved, there would be no 
liability [to the fetus] because of no damage to a 
legal person. 
           
Puhl, 8 Wis. 2d at 356.13  For these reasons, we agree with the 
court of appeals' dissent that our tort law jurisprudence 
dealing with fetal injury has limited applicability to the 
present case. 
¶32 Similarly, we reject the County's argument that the 
protections accorded fetuses by property law have a bearing on 
the Children's Code definition of "child."  As the dissent below 
noted, "[P]roperty law does not confer the full rights of 
personhood upon the fetus.  Instead, it creates a means of 
fulfilling the intentions of testators by protecting the right 
of a fetus to inherit property upon live birth."  Angela M.W., 
197 Wis. 2d at 576 n.1 [citations omitted].  When there is no 
live birth, there is no inheritance right. 
                     
12  We disagree with the court of appeals' invocation of Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny.  Much of the court 
of appeals' discussion of Roe is devoted to establishing that 
the State has a compelling interest in the well-being of a 
viable fetus, and may act to protect that interest.  Although 
the State may have the power to act, the existence of such power 
sheds no light on the question of whether our legislature has in 
fact so acted. 
13  See also Lawrence J. Nelson, Brian P. Buggy, and Carol J. 
Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling 
Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 Hastings L.J. 703, 
733 (May 1986) ("Judicial recognition of a live-born child's 
right to recover damages for tortious prenatal injury does not 
mean that courts recognize unborn fetuses as persons with full 
legal rights.  Instead, this practice focuses on the need for 
compensation of a living person wrongfully injured rather than 
on the legal status of the fetus.").  
No. 95-2480-W 
 
17
¶33 We also find unpersuasive the court of appeals' 
citation to State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 526 N.W.2d 132 
(1994).  In Black, we held that the defendant was properly 
charged with feticide, "intentionally destroy[ing] the life of 
an unborn quick child." Wis. Stat. § 940.04(2)(a).  As we noted 
in that case, "the words of the statute could hardly be 
clearer."  Black, 188 Wis. 2d at 642.  Unlike § 48.02(2), the 
language of § 940.04(2)(a) expressly references an "unborn quick 
child."  In the present case, we lack any language approaching 
the 
unequivocal 
legislative 
statement 
contained 
in 
§ 940.04(2)(a).    While the Black court concluded that the 
legislature 
has 
acted 
to 
protect 
a 
viable 
fetus 
in 
§ 940.04(2)(a), that case offers little to aid us in construing 
the term "child" in the Children's Code.   
¶34 Black demonstrates the ease and clarity with which the 
legislature may, if it so chooses, apply a statute to the 
unborn.  In its several amendments to the Children's Code, the 
legislature has had ample opportunity to state in similarly 
clear and unambiguous terms that a fetus is a child.  Yet, the 
legislature has failed to take such action.  
¶35 We disagree with the dissent's assertion that L.K. v. 
B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) ("In re Baby Girl 
K."), has any relevance to this case.  According to the dissent, 
this court held and determined in L.K. that the word "child" as 
used in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (1981-82) includes a fetus.  
Dissent at 3, 7, 10.  Our reading of L.K. finds no language 
supporting the statements of law attributed to that case by the 
dissent. 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
18
¶36 The L.K. court held that a father's parental rights 
may be terminated based upon his conduct during the mother's 
pregnancy.  The court reached that determination based upon its 
interpretation of § 48.415(6)(b) (1981-82), which provided in 
part: 
In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child or the mother during her pregnancy . . . .14  
¶37 The court deduced from this statutory language a 
legislative intent "that a father's pre-delivery behavior be a 
                     
14  According to the dissent, the phrase "child or the mother 
during her pregnancy" exists as proof that the legislature 
intended the word "child" to include a fetus for purposes of 
Chapter 48.  Dissent at 7-8.  This selective quotation by the 
dissent underscores the infirmity of the dissent's argument.  
The disjunctive "or" between "child" and "mother" sets pregnancy 
as the time period during which a father is expected to "express 
concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being" of 
the mother. 
"Because what happens to a fetus in utero can have a significant 
impact upon the quality of life a child will have after birth," 
a father's lack of concern for or interest in the welfare of the 
mother during pregnancy should be considered for purposes of 
determining whether the father has established a substantial 
parental relationship with the child.  L.K. v. B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 
429, 439, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983).  Thus, the statute takes into 
account the father's post-birth actions toward the child, and 
his acts toward the mother during her pregnancy.  These 
alternative focuses of the § 48.415(6)(b) language quoted by the 
dissent are amply demonstrated by the most recent incarnation of 
that section, the intent of which we assume the dissent would 
agree remains the same:   
In evaluating whether a person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider . . . whether the person has ever expressed 
concern for or interest in the support, care or well-
being of the child, whether the person has neglected 
or refused to provide care or support for the child 
and whether, with respect to a person who is or may be 
the father of the child, the person has ever expressed 
concern for or interest in the support, care or well-
being of the mother during her pregnancy. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (1995-96) (emphasis added).  We see no 
basis for inferring from either version of § 48.415(6)(b) a 
legislative intent to equate a fetus with a child for purposes 
of Chapter 48. 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
19
consideration in determining whether the father had established 
a substantial parental relationship."  L.K., 113 Wis. 2d at 438. 
 It concluded "that a parent's action prior to a child's birth 
can form a sufficient basis for determining whether that parent 
has established a substantial parental relationship with the 
child."  Id. at 439.  Nowhere in the opinion does the court even 
intimate 
that 
the 
legislature 
used 
the 
word 
"child" 
in 
§ 48.415(6)(b) to include a fetus, which is not surprising, 
since such an inquiry was not necessary to resolve the issue 
presented.  We therefore conclude that L.K. is not germane to 
our analysis. 
¶38 The court of appeals' reliance on Roe, Kwaterski, 
Puhl, and Black evidences the fundamental error in its analysis. 
 While positing the correct question – whether the legislature 
intended to include a fetus within the § 48.02(2) definition of 
"child" – the court of appeals answered a distinctly different 
one – whether the legislature could, consistent with the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions, have included a fetus within 
the term "child."  Because we conclude that the legislature did 
not intend to equate a fetus with a child, we do not reach the 
question answered by the court of appeals.  
¶39 Finally, the confinement of a pregnant woman for the 
benefit of her fetus is a decision bristling with important 
social policy issues.  We determine that the legislature is in a 
better position than the courts to gather, weigh, and reconcile 
the competing policy proposals addressed to this sensitive area 
of the law.  This court is limited to ruling on the specific 
issues as developed by the record before it.  We base our 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
20
decisions on the facts as presented by adversarial parties who 
often narrow the scope of a much larger policy issue.  
¶40 This court was confronted with a similar dilemma in 
Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood County, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 
N.W.2d 881 (1981).  In Eberhardy, we acknowledged that circuit 
courts have the subject matter jurisdiction to order the 
sterilization of the mentally handicapped.  However, because the 
legislature had not yet determined the State's public policy or 
set guidelines for such sterilization, we directed the courts to 
refrain from ordering the procedure.  This court stated: 
 
This case demonstrates that a court is not an 
appropriate 
forum 
for 
making 
policy 
in 
such 
a 
sensitive area.  Moreover, irrespective of how well 
tried a case may be—and we consider the instant one to 
have been well presented and carefully considered—
there are inherent limitations in the factual posture 
of any case which make the extrapolation of judicially 
made policy to an entire area of such a sensitive 
nature as this risky indeed.  The legislature is far 
better able, by the hearing process, to consider a 
broad range of possible factual situations.  It can 
marshal informed persons to give an in-depth study to 
the entire problem and can secure the advice of 
experts . . . to explore the ramifications of the 
adoption of a general public policy . . . . 
 
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d at 570-71. 
¶41 For similar reasons, we determine that the detention 
of a pregnant woman for acts harming her fetus is a policy issue 
best addressed initially by our legislature.15  Our conclusion is 
amply illustrated by the following exchange at oral argument: 
                     
15  
Similarly, the American Medical Association Board of 
Trustees has determined that courts are an inappropriate forum 
for reconciling the conflicting interests present when a 
pregnant woman is detained in order to preserve the health of 
her fetus.  
[C]ourts 
are 
ill-equipped 
to 
resolve 
conflicts 
concerning obstetrical interventions.  The judicial 
system ordinarily requires that court decisions be 
based 
on 
careful, 
focused 
deliberation 
and 
the 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
21
GUARDIAN AD LITEM:  . . . You asked a legislative 
history question before.  1955 was the first time that 
the definition of child appeared in 48.02(2).  It was 
revamped next in 1977 where the distinction of CHIPS 
was established.  It was revisited again in 1996.  We 
cannot wait another 20-some years for the legislature 
to address this problem. 
   
JUSTICE BABLITCH:  Are you suggesting that we hold 
public hearings to determine how serious the harm must 
be before the State intervenes?  That we hold public 
hearings to determine whether or not this seriousness 
occurs in the first trimester as opposed to the third, 
or hold public hearings on any of the other myriad 
public policy ramifications that such a holding you're 
asking us to do necessarily implicates? 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM:  I agree, your Honor, that that 
would be the role that the legislature would take. 
 
JUSTICE BABLITCH:  These are questions that we're not 
equipped to deal with as a court.  We don't have the 
AMA or people coming in to testify to us, to explain 
to us the various medical ramifications.  We don't 
have ethics people coming in and explaining to us the 
ethical problems of interfering with the patient/ 
physician relationship.  We don't have people coming 
in at a public hearing to explain to us whether or not 
greater harm can come to a viable fetus for lack of 
medical care which, some people say, would be the 
result of what you want.  We're not a legislative 
body. 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM:  . . . No, you're not in the 
business of holding public policy – excuse me – public 
discussions and public forums.  That clearly is the 
arena of the legislature.  But that's exactly the 
question that this court needs to decide is are you 
willing to take on this burden and address this issue 
now, which we are asking you to do because these 
children cannot wait.  We cannot wait for extensive 
public hearings and public policies and continuous 
conflicting reports.  I don't think that you're going 
to get much different information; you're just going 
to get more of the same. 
  
¶42 This court in no way condones the conduct of the 
petitioner.  Yet, we are not free to register moral disapproval 
                                                                  
cautious consideration of all facts and related legal 
concerns. 
 
Helene A. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy:  Court-
Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially 
Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women (AMA Board of Trustees 
Report), 264 JAMA 2663, 2665 (1990). 
No. 95-2480-W 
 
22
by rewriting the Children's Code under the guise of statutory 
construction.   
¶43 Our 
search 
to 
ascertain 
and 
carry 
out 
the 
legislature's 
intent 
results 
in 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
include 
fetus 
within 
the 
definition of "child."  The legislative history sounds in 
silence.  Although the issue of whether to include a fetus 
within the definition of "child" in Chapter 48 is one of great 
social, medical, religious, and ethical significance, there is 
no record of any dialogue or consideration of the issue.  A 
reading of § 48.02(2) in context with other relevant provisions 
of the Children's Code, supports the conclusion that the 
legislature intended "child" to mean one born alive.  Despite 
ample opportunity, the legislature has not expressly provided 
that a fetus is a "child" under the Code.  We decline the 
guardian ad litem's invitation to "take on this burden" to fill 
the legislative void.  Moreover, the sensitive social policy 
issues raised in this case weigh strongly in favor of refraining 
from exercising CHIPS jurisdiction over a fetus until the 
legislature has spoken definitively on the matter. 
For the above reasons, we hold that the definition of 
"child" in § 48.02(2) does not include a viable fetus.  Because 
the court of appeals erroneously held that the § 48.02(2) 
definition of "child" includes a fetus, we reverse the decision 
of that court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
                                                                  
 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC 
¶44 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Dissenting).  I do not join the 
majority opinion because the majority has not interpreted Wis. 
Stat. § 48.02(2) (1993-94)16 in conformity with the express 
legislative purpose of the Children's Code.  I also am not 
persuaded by the majority's attempt to distinguish the present 
case from past cases in which this court has indicated that the 
definitions of "child" and "person" include a viable fetus.  
Furthermore, I find it significant that although the legislature 
amended the Children's Code last session, it did not act to 
alter the court of appeals' interpretation of § 48.02(2) in 
State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 
N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995)an interpretation in accord with the 
one set forth in this dissent.17 
¶45 Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) defines "child" as "a person who 
is less than 18 years of age."  The majority holds that the 
legislature did not intend to include a viable fetus within this 
definition of "child" based on several factors.  First, the 
majority emphasizes the lack of debate and dialogue regarding 
whether a fetus should be included in the definition of "child" 
in the legislative history of Chapter 48.  Majority op. at 11.  
Second, the majority asserts that certain relevant sections of 
the Children's Code would be rendered absurd if the definition 
                     
16  All future references are to the 1993-94 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated.  However, note that 1995 Wis. Act 275 and 
1995 Wis. Act 352, which became effective July 1, 1996, made 
significant changes to the Children's Code. 
17 The court of appeals concluded that a viable fetus is a 
"child" for the purposes of the Children's Code.  State ex rel. 
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 560, 541 N.W.2d 482 
(Ct. App. 1995).  
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
2
of "child" includes a viable fetus.  Id. at 14-15.  Finally, the 
majority concludes that Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967), in which this court 
held that the definition of "person" includes a viable fetus, is 
"unpersuasive in this context."  Id. at 15-17. 
I. 
¶46 The initial issue before the court is whether the 
definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable 
fetus.  Section 48.02(2) defines "child" as "a person who is 
less than 18 years of age." § 48.02(2) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, resolution of this issue depends upon whether the 
legislature intended the words "child" and "person" to include a 
viable fetus.  
¶47 As determined by the majority, reasonable minds could 
differ as to whether the definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus; therefore, the statute is 
ambiguous.  Majority op. at 8-10.  Accordingly, the court must 
examine extrinsic matters such as the history, context, subject 
matter, scope, and object of the statute in order to ascertain 
the legislative intent.  See, e.g., Stockbridge School Dist. v. 
DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996) (quoting 
Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 
519 (1996)).  After considering these extrinsic matters, I 
conclude that the legislature intended the word "child" in 
§ 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus for three reasons:  (1) the 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the words "child" and "person;" 
(2) the 
express 
legislative 
purpose 
of 
ch. 
48; 
and, 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
3
(3) legislative inaction to the recent court of appeals' 
decision in State ex rel. Angela M.W.. 
A. 
¶48 First, in construing a statute, a court must give 
effect to the ordinary and accepted meaning of the language.  
State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) 
(citing County of Walworth v. Spalding, 111 Wis. 2d 19, 24, 329 
N.W.2d 925 (1983)).  In light of medical knowledge concerning 
fetal development, several sources, including precedent of this 
court, indicate that the ordinary and accepted meaning of the 
words "child" and "person" includes a viable fetus.18   
¶49 For example, in Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 
Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled on other grounds by 
In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 
(1980), this court considered whether a child can recover for 
injuries allegedly caused by a car accident that occurred when 
the child was a non-viable fetus.  Although the jury returned a 
                     
18 See In Re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) 
(holding that the word "child" as used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(b) includes a fetus), appeal dismissed, Buhse v. 
Krueger, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967) (concluding 
that the word "person" includes a viable fetus for purposes of 
wrongful death statute); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 
Wis. 2d 343, 355-56 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (referring to a viable 
fetus as a "child"), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate 
of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980); Whitner v. 
State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *1 (S.C. July 15, 1996) (in 
an analogous case, the court interpreted a provision of South 
Carolina's Children's Code that defined "child" as "person under 
the age of eighteen."  The court held that the word "person," 
and therefore "child," includes a viable fetus.); American 
Heritage Dictionary 332 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "child" as "[a]n 
unborn infant; a fetus"); Black's Law Dictionary 239 (6th ed. 
1990) (defining "child" as "unborn or recently born human 
being").    
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
4
verdict in favor of the child, the circuit court struck the 
award based on Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, Co., 164 
Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).19  The Puhl court affirmed the 
circuit court's decision on other grounds, finding that there 
was not sufficient evidence of causation.  However, the court 
nonetheless considered the vitality of Lipps.  The court stated: 
  
 
What is now known as the viable theory is based on 
medical knowledge and even on common knowledge that a 
child in the viable stage can and does live separately 
in the womb of its mother and can live and exist as an 
independent person if born in that stage.  Based on 
this knowledge the courts began to allow recovery for 
injuries sustained while the child was viable.  This 
reasoning was adopted in 1933 by the supreme court of 
Canada  . . . . This reasoning has been followed by 
the 
states 
of 
Connecticut, 
Georgia, 
Illinois, 
Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Oregon. 
Puhl, 8 Wis. 2d at 355-56 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).20 
 Puhl is significant because the court used the word "child" to 
refer to a viable fetus.  Id. at 355-56.  
¶50 This court relied heavily on Puhl in Kwaterski v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 
(1967).  The Kwaterski court was asked to determine whether the 
                     
19 In Lipps, the court held that "[s]ince a non-viable child 
cannot exist separate from its mother, it must in the law of 
torts be regarded as part of its mother, and hence, being 
incapable of a separate existence, it is not an independent 
person or being to whom separate rights can accrue." Lipps v. 
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, 164 Wis. 272, 276, 159 N.W. 916 
(1916) (emphasis added). 
20  The court also stated:  "If the common law has any vitality, 
it has been argued that it should be elastic enough to adapt 
itself to current medical and scientific truths so as to 
function as an efficient rule of conduct in our modern, complex 
society." Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 357, 
99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate 
of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980). 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
5
term "person" in Wis. Stat. § 331.03 (1963) includes a viable 
fetus.  Section 331.03 provided:  
 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a 
wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect 
or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in 
every such case the person who, . . . would have been 
liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an 
action for damages notwithstanding the death of the 
person injured; provided, that such action shall be 
brought for a death caused in this state. 
     
Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). After considering Puhl in great 
detail, the Kwaterski court determined: "[T]he weight of 
authority 
continues 
the 
trend 
noticed 
in 
Puhl, 
favoring 
recognition of an unborn child as a person for purposes of 
recovery under a wrongful-death statute."  Id. at 19.  The court 
therefore held that a viable fetus is a "person" within the 
meaning of § 331.03.  Id. at 22. 
¶51 Kwaterski has significant precedential value in the 
present case because the legislature has defined "child" as a 
"person" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2).  Kwaterski therefore supports 
the proposition that the definition of "person," and hence 
"child," includes a viable fetus.  
¶52 The majority attempts to distinguish Kwaterski by 
pointing out that "the wrongful death statute does no more than 
vindicate the interest of parents in the potential life that a 
fetus represents."  Majority op. at 17-18.  Therefore, the 
majority implies that Kwaterski "has limited applicability to 
the present case" because Kwaterski does not provide the fetus 
with legal rights.  Majority op. at 18.  However, this is a 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
6
distinction without a difference, because the key issue in this 
case is not one of fetal rights.  Instead, this case centers on 
a question of statutory interpretation, just as Kwaterski did.21 
 Kwaterski is persuasive here because both Kwaterski and this 
case revolve around the question of whether a viable fetus is a 
"person" under Wisconsin statutes.  Thus, the majority's 
conclusion that Kwaterski only vindicates the interests of 
parents does not provide a logical basis for concluding that the 
Kwaterski court's interpretation of "person" is inapplicable 
here.22 
¶53 This court's decision in In re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 
2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) (L.K. v. B.B.), appeal dismissed, 
Buhse v. Krueger, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984), also supports the 
proposition that the word "child" includes a viable fetus.  In 
Baby Girl K., this court was called upon to decide whether the 
termination of parental rights under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(a)2 
could be based upon a parent's prenatal conduct.  In order to 
decide this issue, the court considered the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (1981-82),23 which read in relevant part: 
 
                     
21  Even the majority stresses from the outset that "this case is 
one of statutory construction."  Majority op. at 7.     
22 Moreover, as the Supreme Court of South Carolina has 
concluded: 
[W]e do not see any rational basis for finding a 
viable fetus is not a "person" in the present context. 
 Indeed, it would be absurd to recognize the viable 
fetus as a person for purposes of . . . wrongful death 
statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing 
child abuse. 
Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 
15, 1996). 
23  As of 1993-94, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) had not changed 
in any significant manner.  
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
7
In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child or the mother during her pregnancy . . . .  
 
Id. at 431 (emphasis added).  Based on this language, the court 
concluded: "It is clear therefore that the legislature intended 
that a father's pre-delivery behavior be a consideration in 
determining whether the father had established a substantial 
parental relationship." Id. at 438.  Furthermore, this court 
emphasized that "what happens to a fetus in utero can have a 
significant impact upon the quality of life a child will have 
after birth . . . ."  Id. at 439. 
¶54 Baby Girl K. is significant for two reasons.  First, 
this court determined that the word "child" includes a fetus 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b), a section of the Children's 
Code, when it concluded that this section authorizes a court to 
consider a parent's conduct before a child is born to determine 
whether the parent has established a substantial parental 
relationship with the child.  Id. at 438.  Second, this case 
highlights 
the 
language 
of 
§ 48.415(6)(b), 
in 
which 
the 
legislature clearly used the word "child" to refer to a fetus.  
See § 48.415(6)(b) ("child or mother during her pregnancy").24  
Thus, both the language of § 48.415(6)(b) and the court's 
                     
24  I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of this 
phrase.  See majority op. at p.20 n.14.  The focus of this 
section of the statute is on the parent's relationship with the 
child during the mother's pregnancy.  My reading of this section 
is consistent with the holding in Baby Girl K. that the father's 
actions prior to birth of his child may form a sufficient basis 
for termination of his parental rights.    
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
8
decision in Baby Girl K support the proposition that the word 
"child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus.  
¶55 The majority finds justification for its conclusion 
that the legislature did not intend to include a viable fetus in 
the definition of "child" by emphasizing the absence in the 
legislative history of any "news accounts of debate, dialogue, 
or even consideration of whether fetus should be included in the 
definition of 'child' in Chapter 48."  Majority op. at 11.  
However, lack of such legislative discussion did not prevent 
this court from holding that "person" in Wis. Stat. § 331.03 
includes a viable fetus in Kwaterski.25  
¶56 In 
addition, 
the 
majority 
considers 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.02(2) in the context of other relevant sections of the 
Children's Code.  Majority op. at 14-15.  The majority concludes 
that it would lead to an absurd result in other sections of the 
Children's Code if "child" is interpreted to include a viable 
fetus.  Id. at 14.  However, in the sections that the majority 
emphasizes, interpreting "child" to include a viable fetus will 
not lead to ridiculous results.  For example, as the majority 
                     
25  I also do not find the lack of legislative debate to be of 
significant persuasive value, given the fact that the definition 
of child was originally enacted in 1919.  Why would the 
legislature have debated whether a "child" included a viable 
fetus in 1919, since this was not such a controversial issue at 
that time?  
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the court is often 
faced with silence in the legislative history. However, when the 
legislative intent is not explicitly stated in the drafting 
files or newspapers, we do not simply decline to interpret the 
language at issue.  Instead, this court is required to consider 
extrinsic sources to ascertain the legislative intent, such as 
precedent and the purpose of the statute.  This is exactly what 
this dissent has attempted to do.  
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
9
points out, Wis. Stat. § 48.19(2) "requires the person taking a 
child into physical custody to immediately notify the parent by 
the most practical means."  Id.  If "child" is interpreted to 
include a viable fetus, § 48.19(2) will not be rendered absurd, 
since a logical reading of it requires notification to the 
father, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
mother. 
 
Likewise, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§  48.19(1)(c) refers to the removal of a child "from his or her 
present custody."  Again, this section will not be rendered 
inane, because the detention of a mother, and hence an unborn 
child, in a drug treatment program does, in effect, constitute a 
change in custody of the childthe viable fetus.  It also is 
essential to point out that interpreting the word "child" in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus does not lead to 
an absurd result, but rather allows the state to protect a 
viable 
fetus 
from 
substantial 
harm, 
consistent 
with 
the 
objectives of the Children's Code.  See infra § I B.            
¶57 Furthermore, the majority erroneously assumes that 
every provision of the Children's Code must fit before it can 
conclude that the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes 
a viable fetus.  This is an erroneous assumption, because not 
every provision of the Children's Code is applicable to all 
situations.  Common sense dictates that sections of the 
Children's Code relating to runaways will never apply to a very 
young child, i.e. a newborn.  Despite the fact that every 
section of ch. 48 is not applicable in every situation, this 
court in Baby Girl K. did not have any difficulty in holding 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
10
that the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b), a section of 
the Children's Code, includes an unborn child.  
¶58 Moreover, it is the application of the majority's 
interpretation of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) that leads to 
an absurd result, by rendering the state's power to protect a 
child dependent upon whether the child is inside or outside of 
the womb.  For example, under the majority's interpretation of 
§ 48.02(2), the state will have the power to protect an eight-
month-old child that has been born prematurely; however, the 
state will have no power to protect an eight-month-old fetus 
that is in the womb.  The Kwaterski court recognized the 
absurdity of distinguishing between a viable fetus and a born 
child in 1967.  See Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 20.  This court 
should certainly recognize the same absurdity in 1997.   
B. 
¶59 Second, the legislative objectives enunciated in the 
Children's Code support a conclusion that "child" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus.  The preamble to the 
Children's Code expressly directs that the chapter "shall be 
liberally construed to effect the objectives" set forth by the 
legislature.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(2) (emphasis added).  One of 
the objectives set forth by the legislature is "[t]o provide for 
the 
care, 
protection, 
and 
wholesome 
mental 
and 
physical 
development of children . . . ." § 48.01(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
 Section 48.01(2) also mandates that "[t]he best interests of 
the child shall always be of paramount consideration."  
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
11
¶60 This court has stated that "a 'cardinal rule in 
interpreting statutes' is to favor a construction which will 
fulfill the purpose of the statute over a construction which 
defeats the manifest object of the act."  In re Estate of 
Halsted, 116 Wis. 2d 23, 29, 341 N.W.2d 389 (1983) (quoting 
Student Ass'n, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee v. Baum, 74 
Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976)); accord UFE Inc. v. 
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 N.W.2d 
57 (1996).  We likewise have indicated that "the intent of a 
section of a statute must be derived from the act as a whole."  
Standard Theaters, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp., Div. of 
Highways, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984); Aero Auto 
Parts, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp., Div. of Highways, 78 
Wis. 2d 235, 239, 253 N.W.2d 896 (1977). 
¶61 Accordingly, the canons of statutory construction 
require the court to interpret the word "child" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.02(2) consistently with the purpose of the Children's Code, 
which is clearly to protect children at risk from harm.  There 
can be no dispute that a mother's ingestion of cocaine after her 
fetus becomes viable has a substantial impact on the physical 
development of her child in utero and ultimately after birth.26  
                     
26 See I.J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine use in pregnancy: Perinatal 
morbidity and mortality, 9 Neurotoxicol Teratol 291 (1987).  
Studies have confirmed that the cessation of cocaine use in the 
third trimester can have a significant positive impact on the 
development of the fetus.  These benefits include improved 
intrauterine growth, reduced incidences of seizures, and reduced 
incidences of premature labor which alleviates low birth weight 
and the multitude of problems associated with low birth weight 
babies.  I.J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal patterns of cocaine use 
in pregnancy: Perinatal outcome,  261 JAMA 1741 (1989); I.J. 
Chasnoff, Cocaine: Effects on pregnancy and the neonate, in 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
12
Certainly, a mother's ingestion of cocaine is not in the best 
interests of her child, born or unborn.  Moreover, what occurs 
in utero will have long lasting effects not only on the child, 
but on society as well.27  Thus, interpreting the word "child" to 
include 
a 
viable 
fetus 
fulfills 
the 
express 
legislative 
objectives of the Children's Code, by allowing the state to 
intervene to protect and care for the physical development of an 
unborn child.  Conversely, the majority's interpretation of 
"child" fails to liberally construe the Children's Code in order 
to carry out its intentions, fails to consider adequately the 
best interests of the child, and, in fact, defeats the manifest 
objectives of ch. 48.28 
C. 
¶62 Third, legislative inaction after the decision by the 
court of appeals in State ex rel. Angela M.W. indicates that the 
court correctly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2). "Legislative 
                                                                  
Drugs, Alcohol, Pregnancy, and Parenting, at 97-103 (1988). 
27 R.A. Aronson & L.H. Hunt, Cocaine use during pregnancy: 
Implications for physicians, 89(3) Wis. Med. J. 105 (1990)  
("Cocaine damaged children, particularly those from impoverished 
home environments, are at great risk for school failure and 
dropout, juvenile crime, teenage pregnancy, unemployment, and 
chronic disabilities.  According to Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-
Texas), chair of the Senate Finance Committee, government at all 
levels will soon be spending $15 billion annually to prepare 
cocaine-affected children to enter kindergarten.") 
28  The majority claims:  "The logical extension of the dissent's 
argument regarding liberal construction would expand the 
definition of 'child' to the moment after conception."  Majority 
op. at 17.  I stress that this case deals only with the issue of 
whether the words "child" and "person" include a viable fetus.  
In addition, I emphasize that the United States Supreme Court 
and this court have drawn the line at viability.  See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 
2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).   
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
13
inaction following judicial construction of a statute, while not 
conclusive, evinces legislative approval of the interpretation." 
 State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 240, 247, 558 N.W.2d 375 (1997); 
accord State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 456 N.W.2d 143 
(1990).  The presumption of legislative adoption of a judicial 
interpretation is entitled to less weight when there is nearly 
complete inaction by the legislature. Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 
2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980); Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. 
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 
35, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976).  However, "[w]here the legislature 
has made amendments to the statutory section in question and has 
not corrected the court's interpretation, the presumption of 
adoption or ratification is strengthened." York v. National 
Continental Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 2d 486, 497, 463 N.W.2d 364 (Ct. 
App.) (citing Reiter, 95 Wis. 2d at 471-72), review denied, 465 
N.W.2d 656 (1990). 
¶63 In the current case, the court of appeals' holding in 
State ex rel. Angela M.W. that the definition of "child" under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus was released on 
October 6, 1995.  This was a published decision of the court of 
appeals, which therefore had "statewide precedential effect."  
Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2);  Wolf v. F & M Banks, 193 Wis. 2d 439, 
455-56, 534 N.W.2d 877 (Ct. App.) (quoting § 752.41(2)), review 
denied, 537 N.W.2d 572 (1995); see also In re Court of Appeals 
of Wisconsin, 82 Wis. 2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149 (1978); 
Skrupky v. Elbert, 189 Wis. 2d 31, 56, 526 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 
1994). After October 6, 1995, the legislature revised the 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
14
definition of "child," and made substantial changes to the 
Children's Code in general.  Specifically, 1995 Wis. Act 352, 
§ 10p, enacted on May 23, 1996, and effective on July 1, 1996, 
directly changed the definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.02(2) of the Children's Code.  In addition, 1995 Wis. Act 
275, enacted April 22, 1996, and effective July 1, 1996, made 
extensive 
changes 
to ch. 
48 in 
general. 
 
However, the 
legislature did not alter the court of appeals' interpretation 
of "child" in either of these amendments. This legislative 
inaction following the court of appeals' decision demonstrates 
legislative 
approval 
of 
the 
court's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 48.02(2). Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d at 247; Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d at 
566; Reiter, 95 Wis. 2d at 471; Milwaukee Fed'n of Teachers, 
Local No. 252 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 83 Wis. 
2d 588, 599, 266 N.W.2d 314 (1978) (quoting Zimmerman, 38 Wis. 
2d at 633-34.29 
                     
29  I reject the majority's determination that legislative 
acquiescence to a court of appeals' decision is of no value 
because the legislature cannot be presumed to know that the 
decision will remain unchanged.  See majority op. at 11-13.  The 
grant of review in a case does not render the legislature 
powerless to clearly state its intent, especially where it is 
currently revising the very statutory language at issue.  In 
addition, the majority supports its conclusion with a portion of 
the following quote: "The legislature is presumed to know that 
in absence of its changing the law, the construction put upon it 
by the courts will remain unchanged . . . ."  Zimmerman v. 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 
648 (1968). This statement was originally made by the court ten 
years prior to the development of the court of appeals, and 
therefore could not have been intended to stand for the 
proposition that acquiescence to a court of appeals' decision 
has no significance.  Although this language was quoted by the 
court in Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 
(1980), the Reiter court in no way indicated that it was relying 
on this statement to mean anything other than what it meant in 
1968. 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
15
¶64 Despite this overwhelming support to the contrary, the 
majority has reached the conclusion that the legislature did not 
intend to include viable fetus within the definition of "child". 
 Majority op. at 25.  The majority states: "Despite ample 
opportunity, the legislature has not expressly provided that a 
fetus 
is 
a 
'child' 
under 
the 
Code. 
 
We 
decline 
the 
 . . . invitation 
to 
'take 
on 
this 
burden' 
to 
fill 
the 
legislative void."  Id.  However, interpreting the term "child" 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus does not 
constitute a "rewriting [of] the Children's Code under the guise 
of statutory construction," as the majority suggests.  Id. at 
24.  Instead, interpreting the word "child" to include a viable 
fetus fulfills the express purpose of the legislature in ch. 48, 
and is in conformity with precedent of this court.  It simply is 
not within the spirit of the Children's Code or in accordance 
with past case law to exclude a viable fetus, capable of life 
outside the womb, from the same protection afforded a born child 
under the Children's Code.  
II. 
¶65 Since I am satisfied that the legislature intended the 
definition of "child" to include a viable fetus under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.02(2), the arguments 
concerning 
the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction 
and 
the 
alleged 
violation 
of 
Angela's 
constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection 
must be addressed. 
¶66 Angela first argues that the juvenile court did not 
have original jurisdiction over her or her viable fetus under 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
16
Wis. Stat. § 48.13.30  However, the statute does not require 
jurisdiction over a parent in order to obtain jurisdiction over 
a child.  As the court of appeals determined:  "The order worked 
its custodial effect on Angela not because the juvenile court 
has asserted jurisdiction over her, but because Angela and her 
fetus are physically and biologically one." State ex rel. Angela 
M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 562.   
¶67 Accordingly, the 
pertinent 
issue 
is 
whether the 
juvenile court had jurisdiction over Angela's viable fetus.  In 
order to take a child into protective custody pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 48.19, the county must make a showing satisfactory to 
the juvenile court that the welfare of the child demands that 
the child be immediately removed from his or her present 
custody.  See § 48.19(1)(c).  In the present case, the county 
met this burden to the satisfaction of the juvenile court and, 
as a result, the order was issued.  The conclusion that "child" 
includes a viable fetus, coupled with the finding that the court 
fulfilled the requirements of § 48.19(1)(c), leads to the 
conclusion that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over 
Angela's viable fetus. 
¶68 Angela next contends that the custodial effect of the 
protective order violated her due process liberty interest under 
the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution.31 
                     
30  Section 48.13 provides in part: "The court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of 
protection or services which can be ordered by the court, 
and: . . . ."  The statute then lists eighteen scenarios in 
which the court may exercise its jurisdiction.  
31 As noted by the court of appeals, despite her invocation of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, Angela did not make a separate 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
17
 The test for violation of a fundamental liberty interest is two 
pronged.  First, in order to restrict a fundamental liberty 
interest, a challenged statute must further a compelling state 
interest.  E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, (1978); 
State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), 
petition for cert. filed, Mar. 7, 1996.  Second, the statute 
must be narrowly tailored to serve that compelling state 
interest.  E.g., Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 302. 
¶69 In regard to the state interest implicated here, the 
United States Supreme Court has determined:  
 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate 
interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is 
at viability.  This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life 
outside 
the 
mother's 
womb. 
 
State 
regulation 
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both 
logical and biological justifications. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).  Nearly twenty years 
later, the Court confirmed its position, stating:  
 
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the 
time at which there is a realistic possibility of 
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so 
that the independent existence of the second life can 
in reason and all fairness be the object of state 
protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. 
  
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).  The 
Casey Court further emphasized:  
 
[I]t must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with 
clarity in establishing not only the woman's liberty 
                                                                  
argument under the Wisconsin Constitution.  See State ex rel. 
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 564 n.16, 541 N.W.2d 
482 (Ct. App. 1995).  All of her arguments rest on cases in 
which courts considered the federal constitution.  Therefore, I 
do not address any possible implications of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
18
but 
also 
the 
State's 
"important 
and 
legitimate 
interest in potential life."  Roe, supra, at 163.  
That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too 
little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court 
in its subsequent cases.  
Id. at 871.  Thus, as determined by the United States Supreme 
Court, the state's interest in protecting the life and health of 
an unborn child becomes compelling and dominant once the fetus 
reaches viability. 
¶70 In addition, this court's decision in State v. Black, 
188 Wis. 2d 639, 526 N.W.2d 132 (1994), is also relevant.  In 
Black, the petitioner allegedly caused the death of a fetus due 
to be born in five days by assaulting the unborn child's mother. 
 The state subsequently charged Black with feticide under Wis. 
Stat. § 940.04(2)(a).32  Id. at 643.  Black argued that the 
feticide statute, due to its title of "abortion," could not be 
enforced against him.  Id. at 644.  The court held that Black 
was properly charged with feticide because the "statutory 
language 
clearly 
and 
simply 
proscribes 
the 
intentional 
destruction of a quick child." Id. at 645.  Accordingly, the 
Black court concluded that the state may enact legislation to 
protect a viable fetus in areas other than simply abortion, and, 
therefore, implicitly determined that the state has a compelling 
interest in the welfare of a viable fetus in other contexts.33  
See id. at 645. 
                     
32  Section 940.04(2)(a) (1989-90) provided in pertinent part: 
"Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the 
following may be imprisoned not more than 15 years: 
 . . . Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child; 
 . . . ."  State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 644, 526 N.W.2d 132 
(1994). 
33 Even the majority recognizes that in Black, this court 
determined that the legislature can act to protect a viable 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
19
¶71 In the present case, there is no dispute that Angela's 
child was a viable fetus when the petition was filed, that 
Angela was actively using cocaine, and that the use of cocaine 
put the child at substantial risk of great bodily harm or 
possibly death.  As such, the state has a compelling state 
interest to protect Angela's fetus under Roe34, Casey, and Black.  
¶72 The next issue therefore is whether the infringement 
on Angela's liberty is narrowly tailored to further the 
compelling state interest.  I conclude that it is.  The 
Children's Code specifies the procedures necessary to further 
the state's compelling interest in the protection of children.  
These procedures must be complied with before the state can 
exercise its right to detain and ultimately protect a child. 
¶73 In particular, the Children's Code requires the state 
to have jurisdiction over the child. See Wis. Stat. § 48.13.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.19 provides that the state's power to take a 
child into custody is limited by specifically enumerated 
regulations.  In addition, the state must conduct a hearing 
within 24 hours of the time the decision was made to hold the 
                                                                  
fetus in contexts other than abortion.  See majority op. at 19.  
34 The court of appeals succinctly summarized the significance of 
Roe to the current case when it stated:  
By recognizing that a state may intervene in an 
abortion decision after viability, Roe necessarily 
recognizes the right of the state to protect the 
potential life of the fetus over the wishes of the 
mother to terminate the pregnancy.  Why then cannot 
the state also protect the viable fetus from maternal 
conduct which functionally presents the same risk and 
portends the same resultthe death of the viable 
fetus?  
State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 552 
n.11, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
20
child in protective custody.  Wis. Stat. § 48.21.35  At the 
hearing, the juvenile court must determine whether there is 
probable cause to believe the child is within the jurisdiction 
of the court, and that the child will be subject to injury if he 
or she is not taken into protective custody.36 Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.205; Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff, Staff Brief 94-1, 
Overview of Wisconsin Law Relating To Children in Need of 
Protection or Services, at 23 (Sept. 1, 1994).  In light of all 
the statutorily imposed procedures necessary to detain a child, 
it is clear that the means by which the state's compelling 
interest is served are narrowly tailored to "attain the purposes 
and objectives of the legislation" to protect children. State v. 
Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971), aff'd, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972). 
¶74 Finally, Angela argues that if the state is allowed to 
intervene when the mother ingests cocaine, this will "open the 
door" for the state to intervene whenever a mother acts in any 
manner that is potentially harmful to her viable fetus.  Angela 
cites as examples the possibility of state intervention if a 
mother smokes or refuses to take her prenatal vitamins.   
¶75 This argument is not a realistic one because ch. 48 
contains the necessary protections against unreasonable or 
unjustified intervention by the state.  Specifically, Wis. Stat. 
                     
35 1995 Wis. Act 275, enacted April 22, 1996 and effective July 
1, 1996, changed the time of the hearing from 24 hours to 48 
hours.  
36  Section 48.205 lists several situations in which a probable 
cause showing would result in the detention of a child; however, 
only the portion relevant to this case was cited.  
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
21
§ 48.255(1)(e) requires a petition requesting that a court 
exercise jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of 
protection or services ("CHIPS petition") to state "reliable and 
credible information which forms the basis of the allegations 
necessary 
to 
invoke 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
court."  
Accordingly, the test for determining compliance with § 48.255 
is the same as that governing the sufficiency of a criminal 
complaintprobable cause.  In re Courtney E., 184 Wis. 2d 592, 
601, 516 N.W.2d 422 (1994).  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 48.13 
lists eighteen scenarios in which ch. 48 authorizes the juvenile 
court to exercise its original jurisdiction.  These scenarios 
represent situations in which the child is at substantial risk 
either because of his or her own actions or those of others.  
See § 48.13.  For example, § 48.13(10), the subsection that the 
county relies on in this case, requires that the parent has 
"neglect[ed], refus[ed] or [been] unable for reasons other than 
poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or 
dental care or shelter so as to seriously endanger the physical 
health of the child . . . ."  § 48.13(10) (emphasis added).    
¶76 Clearly, the Children's Code enables the state to 
intervene only when a child faces substantial risk.  Thus, ch. 
48 contains the necessary stopping point to protect against 
Angela's slippery slope argument.37  In fact, if this were not 
                     
37 Moreover, the Milwaukee County District Attorney noted in his 
amicus brief at 11-12 that "despite the extensive and sustained 
headline coverage of Angela's case in the Milwaukee-area media 
last fall, in the last nine months the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's Office has yet to receive a single Angela-type CHIPS 
referral . . . . [T]he 'floodgates,' if opened, have not yet 
impacted Milwaukee County."     
 
 
No. 95-2480-W.NPC   
 
22
true, then the same argument would have validity under the 
Children's Code even if the child has been born.  See Whitner v. 
State, no. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996). 
¶77 In conclusion, I am satisfied that the legislature 
intended to include a viable fetus within the definition of 
"child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2).  The ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the words "child" and "person," as established by 
Kwaterski, Puhl, and Baby Girl K., supports this conclusion.  
Furthermore, despite ample opportunity, the legislature did not 
alter the court of appeals' interpretation in State ex rel. 
Angela M.W. when it amended § 48.02(2).  The legislature's 
acquiescence 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation 
of 
§ 48.02(2) indicates that this interpretation was correct and 
acceptable to the legislature.  Finally, interpreting "child" in 
§ 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus carries out the express 
purpose of the legislature in ch. 48.  Consequently, I conclude 
that the majority's interpretation of § 48.02(2) defeats the 
legislative objectives of the Children's Code by denying its 
protections to a viable fetus, ignores established precedent, 
and 
fails 
to 
acknowledge 
the 
importance 
of 
legislative 
acquiescence to the court of appeals' decision.  
¶78 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.