Title: Commonwealth v. Escobar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12430
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2018

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SJC-12430 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JUSTINO ESCOBAR. 
 
 
April 18, 2018. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of 
government agents.  Due Process of Law, Plea, Disclosure of 
evidence.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of 
inferior courts.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct of 
government agents, Disclosure of evidence, New trial.  
Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of 
evidence. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Justino Escobar, pleaded guilty to cocaine 
trafficking in 2009 and was sentenced to a term of from eight to 
twelve years in State prison.  In July, 2015, he filed a motion 
for a new trial and a related motion to conduct postconviction 
discovery, seeking to have his conviction vacated pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 85 (2015), and Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014).  In his motions, Escobar argued 
that the Commonwealth had not fully investigated misconduct at 
the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug 
lab).1  In his view, the Inspector General's investigation of the 
                                                 
 
1 The now well-known saga surrounding the Hinton drug lab 
stemmed from the egregious misconduct of former laboratory 
employee Annie Dookhan.  See, e.g., Bridgeman v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 300 (2017) 
(setting forth protocol to address legacy of Dookhan's 
misconduct and to protect rights of affected defendants).  
Although the samples in Escobar's case were analyzed at the 
Hinton drug lab, in December, 2008, they were not analyzed by 
Dookhan.  Escobar, therefore, is not among the thousands of 
defendants whose cases have thus far been affected by or 
2 
 
Hinton lab was incomplete because it did not inquire into 
whether any chemist other than Annie Dookhan had acted 
improperly.2 
 
 
Escobar subsequently filed a motion to vacate his 
conviction and for the dismissal of the underlying charge as 
well as a motion for a so-called "Cotto order" pursuant to this 
court's decision in Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 97 (2015).  
After a hearing, in July, 2017, a judge in the Superior Court 
denied without prejudice the motions to vacate and for a Cotto 
order; allowed in part the motion for postconviction discovery, 
ordering limited discovery; and declined to rule on the motion 
for a new trial pending completion of that limited discovery.3  
Escobar appealed.  We allowed his application for direct 
appellate review, and affirm. 
 
 
On the basis of the record that was before her, the judge's 
rulings were correct.  As she noted, Escobar's core argument is 
that the chemist who analyzed the samples in his case, Della 
Saunders, had "testing productivity numbers" comparable to those 
of Dookhan.  In Escobar's view, this raises the question whether 
Saunders, like Dookhan, also engaged in misconduct.  In light of 
his arguments, the judge determined that some limited 
postconviction discovery was warranted, and she thus allowed, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
benefited from the protocol set forth to address Dookhan's 
misconduct. 
 
 
2 Escobar's argument stems, at least in part, from the fact 
that Sonja Farak was employed at the Hinton drug lab before she 
was employed at the Department of Public Health's State 
Laboratory Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug lab).  As is now 
known, Farak engaged in her own egregious misconduct while 
working at the Amherst drug lab.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Cotto, 471 Mass. 97, 98 (2015).  In Escobar's view, the fact 
that there has been no investigation into Farak's conduct while 
she worked at the Hinton drug lab suggests that, overall, the 
investigation into the Hinton drug lab was not sufficiently 
thorough. 
 
 
3 The length of time that passed between when Escobar first 
filed his motion for a new trial and when the Superior Court 
judge acted on that and the subsequent motions appears to have 
resulted from the Commonwealth's initial delay in responding to 
the motions as well as from a stay imposed by the Superior 
Court, in June, 2016, pending this court's decision in 
Bridgeman, supra. 
3 
 
part, Escobar's motion on this point.4  She also concluded, 
reasonably, that she could not fairly rule on Escobar's motion 
for a new trial until that limited discovery was complete. 
 
 
The judge's denials of Escobar's other motions were equally 
reasonable, and, importantly, were without prejudice.  Escobar 
premised his motion to vacate on the purported "misconduct" of 
the Inspector General for failing to fully investigate the 
goings-on at the Hinton drug lab.  In denying the motion, the 
judge stated that she found no support for Escobar's position on 
the record before her and "at this time."  She thus left the 
door open for Escobar to raise the issue again after the 
postconviction discovery that she had authorized was complete.  
Similarly, the judge's denial of Escobar's motion for a Cotto 
order turned on the fact that not only was Escobar's request too 
broad, but that whether any kind of order might be warranted 
would depend on whether Escobar's motion for a new trial 
ultimately has any merit.5 
 
 
In his appeal to this court, Escobar asks us to rule 
definitively on the substantive merits of his position -- that 
is, that the Commonwealth has a duty to investigate the Hinton 
drug lab and has committed a breach of that duty.  We decline to 
                                                 
 
4 The judge ordered the Commonwealth to produce certain 
information pertaining to Della Saunders, including 
nonprivileged portions of her personnel file; notes related to 
interviews of Saunders conducted from 2002 to present related to 
investigations of the Hinton or Amherst drug labs; a list of the 
court cases in which Saunders testified as the "certifying" 
chemist from 2005 to 2008; and available data on the numbers and 
types of drug tests that Saunders performed at the Hinton drug 
lab from 2005 to 2008. 
 
 
5 In any event, as to Escobar's motion for a Cotto order, 
the judge had no authority to issue the type of order that 
Escobar sought.  In the Cotto case, we exercised our general 
superintendence power "'to fashion a workable approach' for 
giving defendants whose evidence samples were analyzed by Farak 
at the Amherst drug lab an opportunity to discover whether, in 
fact, their cases were affected by her misconduct."  Cotto, 471 
Mass. at 114 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 
336, 352 (2014).  We indicated that "a thorough and timely 
investigation would be the appropriate course to follow" and 
also addressed the alternative, should the Commonwealth decline 
to undertake such an investigation.  Id. at 115.  The judge here 
had no such authority. 
4 
 
do so.  Escobar is in a position, in the trial court, to conduct 
the postconviction discovery that has been authorized and then 
to proceed, on the basis of whatever he may learn, with his 
motion for a new trial.  In the course of those proceedings, the 
substantive issues that he raises can be fully addressed and the 
record fully developed.  Our consideration of the case in its 
current posture, beyond what we have done here, would make 
little sense where there still remains much to be considered in 
the first instance in the trial court, and where that 
consideration will result in a more fully developed record for 
purposes of an appeal.6 
 
 
The orders of the Superior Court on Escobar's motions to 
vacate his conviction and dismiss the underlying charge; for a 
Cotto order; for postconviction discovery; and for a new trial 
are therefore affirmed.  Nothing in our decision today prevents 
either party from appealing any subsequent rulings of the trial 
court once the underlying proceedings are complete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
James P. McKenna for the defendant. 
 
Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Julia Bell Andrus, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Office of the Inspector General, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
Christopher K. Post, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
& Luke Ryan, for Robert White & another, amici curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
                                                 
 
6 Although we decline to rule, at this time, on the issue 
whether the Inspector General failed to fulfil a duty or to 
thoroughly investigate the Hinton drug lab, we note that nothing 
in the current record suggests to us that the investigation was 
inadequate.