Title: New Jersey v. Ryan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2022

New Jersey v. Ryan Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In winter 1996, defendant Samuel Ryan (then aged 23) robbed a Bridgeton, New Jersey gas station at gunpoint, stealing $100 and shooting a store clerk in the process. The offense resulted in defendant’s third first-degree robbery conviction, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole pursuant to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, known as the “Three Strikes Law.” In this appeal, defendant contended the Three Strikes Law violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. He alleged that, by allowing courts to count crimes committed while under the age of eighteen as predicate offenses in sentencing defendants to mandatory life without parole, the Three Strikes Law ignored the constitutional constraints embodied in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and New Jersey v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), which prohibited imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences or their functional equivalent on juvenile offenders. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that because defendant committed his third offense and received an enhanced sentence of life without parole as an adult, this appeal did not implicate Miller or Zuber. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence was affirmed and the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Samuel Ryan (A-65-20) (085165)Argued November 29, 2021 -- Decided February 7, 2022SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether crimes committed by a defendant while under the age of eighteen may count as predicate offenses under the “Three Strikes Law,” which mandates a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a third-time offender. At the age of sixteen, defendant committed two armed robberies within two days; he was convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery in 1990. In February 1996, less than three years after his release from prison, defendant committed two more armed robberies. Defendant was indicted separately for, and convicted of, each of the two 1996 robberies. Upon defendant’s conviction for the second 1996 robbery, the State moved to sentence him to an extended term pursuant to the Three Strikes Law, predicated upon (1) his 1990 conviction, (2) his conviction for the first 1996 robbery, and (3) his conviction for the second 1996 robbery. The court sentenced defendant accordingly. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentence and thereafter filed eleven post-conviction release (PCR) petitions between 1999 and 2012. In 2018, defendant filed his twelfth PCR petition -- a motion to correct an illegal sentence -- relying on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional, and the Court’s holding in State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), that juveniles cannot be sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole. Defendant contended that his sentence was unconstitutional because his first strike occurred when he was a juvenile and the sentencing court did not consider the Miller factors before imposing a mandatory life sentence under the Three Strikes Law. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted certification. 246 N.J. 316 (2021).HELD: The Three Strikes Law and the mandatory life-without-parole sentence imposed upon defendant under that statute do not violate the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Further, Miller and Zuber have no application to adult defendants sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. 1 1. When challenging the constitutionality of a sentencing statute, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality that attaches to any legislative enactment. Where reasonable minds may differ regarding the constitutionality of a statute, courts defer to the will of the Legislature. (pp. 11-12)2. Determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution requires the following three-part inquiry: First, does the punishment for the crime conform with contemporary standards of decency? Second, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense? Third, does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective? (pp. 12-13)3. Aimed at protecting the public from offenders who repeatedly commit serious offenses, the Three Strikes Law imposes a mandatory sentence of life without parole upon any person convicted on three separate occasions of certain violent crimes, including murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, sexual assault, and robbery. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law in State v. Oliver, when -- in addition to rejecting challenges advanced under other constitutional provisions -- it made clear that the Three Strikes Law does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 162 N.J. 580, 585-89 (2000). (pp. 13-15)4. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on juvenile offenders but did not foreclose juveniles from being sentenced to life without parole. 567 U.S. at 465, 480. Instead, the Court instructed sentencing courts to take into consideration the “hallmark features” of youth, the nature of the juvenile’s environment, the effect of youthful “incompetencies” on the prosecution’s outcome, and the “possibility of rehabilitation.” See id. at 477-78. In Zuber, the Court extended application of the Miller factors to situations where a juvenile is facing a term of imprisonment that is the practical equivalent to life without parole. 227 N.J. at 429-30. (pp. 16-17)5. Applying the three-part test here, the Court notes first that the Three Strikes Law continues to conform to contemporary standards of decency: federal courts have overwhelmingly held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit counting juvenile offenses as strikes, and most states with three-strikes legislation count juvenile-age convictions as strikes where the defendant was waived up to adult court. Second, an enhanced life-without-parole sentence is not grossly disproportionate where the offense is a dangerous and violent first-degree crime. Most importantly, the punishment serves the legitimate penological objective of incapacitating serious third-time offenders. The Three Strikes Law “was a response to a genuine legislative concern that repeat offenders pose a unique danger to society.” Oliver, 162 N.J. at 589. (pp. 17-20) 2 6. The fact that the Legislature limited the definition of recidivists under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), to defendants over the age of twenty-one who committed their three qualifying crimes after turning eighteen reinforces, rather than undermines, the Court’s conclusion. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) illustrates plainly that the Legislature knows how to establish minimum ages for predicate offenses. It chose to do so in the persistent offender statute but did not include similar limits when it enacted the Three Strikes Law. It is the Legislature’s prerogative to impose a requirement in one context but not another; courts must treat that distinction as meaningful. (pp. 21-23)7. Nor do the holdings in Miller and Zuber change the outcome of the Court’s constitutional analysis. Those cases are uniquely concerned with the sentencing of juvenile offenders to lifetime imprisonment or its functional equivalent without the possibility of parole. There is nothing in Miller or Zuber that precludes application of a recidivist statute such as the Three Strikes Law to an adult defendant. Indeed, as made clear in Oliver, the enhanced sentence under the Three Strikes Law is not imposed “'as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for earlier crimes,’ but instead as a 'stiffened penalty for the latest crime.’” 162 N.J. at 586. (pp. 23-24) AFFIRMED. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that the use of Ryan’s juvenile conviction as a predicate offense for the purpose of imposing a mandatory life sentence under the Three Strikes Law violates the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. Justice Albin states that the majority’s decision in this case cannot be squared with the consolidated opinion in State v. Comer and State v. Zarate, in which the Court stressed that because “children are different from adults,” the lengthy mandatory sentences imposed against Comer and Zarate for their juvenile murder convictions were cruel and unusual under the State Constitution. State v. Comer, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op. at 4-6, 51). Justice Albin notes that, whereas Comer and Zarate are now eligible for release after serving twenty years, Ryan -- sentenced to a life term at age twenty-three -- must serve forty-seven years before he will be eligible for release, based on his juvenile conviction. In Justice Albin’s view, giving Ryan’s juvenile conviction the same constitutional weight as his adult convictions is at odds with the evolving standards of decency addressed in federal and state constitutional caselaw.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and FERNANDEZ- VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS joins. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 65 September Term 2020 085165 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Samuel Ryan, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 29, 2021 February 7, 2022James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).Daniel A. Finkelstein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Daniel A. Finkelstein, of counsel and on the briefs).Elana Wilf argued the cause for amici curiae the Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Rutgers University School of Law – Newark Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Elana Wilf, Laura Cohen, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, of the brief). 1 Dillon J. McGuire argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Dillon J. McGuire, of counsel and on the brief, and CJ Griffin, on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. In the winter of 1996, at the age of twenty-three, defendant Samuel Ryanrobbed a Bridgeton, New Jersey gas station at gunpoint, stealing $100 andshooting a store clerk in the process. The offense resulted in defendant’s thirdfirst-degree robbery conviction, and he was sentenced to life in prison withoutparole pursuant to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), known as the “Three Strikes Law.” A “legislative reaction to . . . shocking murders by paroled offenders,”the Three Strikes Law mandates a sentence of life imprisonment withoutparole for a third-time offender who had been convicted of certain serious andviolent offenses on two prior occasions. State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. 580, 583(2000). Defendant’s three strikes included two first-degree armed robberiescommitted as a sixteen-year-old juvenile; he was waived to Superior Court 11 Defendant was waived to Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 (2014), which was repealed effective March 1, 2016, by L. 2015, c. 89, § 6. The replacement waiver statute, which remains current, raised the age of eligibility for waiver to fifteen years old, among other changes. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1. 2 and prosecuted jointly for both crimes -- the first strike. After his release fromprison, at the age of twenty-three, defendant committed two first-degree armedrobberies -- the second and third strikes. 2 In this appeal, defendant contends that the Three Strikes Law violatesthe prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the EighthAmendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 ofthe New Jersey Constitution. He alleges that, by allowing courts to countcrimes committed while under the age of eighteen as predicate offenses insentencing defendants to mandatory life without parole, the Three Strikes Lawignores the constitutional constraints embodied in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), which prohibit impositionof mandatory life-without-parole sentences or their functional equivalent onjuvenile offenders. Because defendant committed his third offense and received an enhancedsentence of life without parole as an adult, we hold that this appeal does notimplicate Miller or Zuber. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s sentence andreaffirm the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law.2 Because defendant’s earlier armed robbery convictions count as a single strike, we refer to these offenses committed as an adult as defendant’s second and third offenses or strikes for purposes of the Three Strikes Law. 3 I. A. We derive the following facts from the record of the court that sentenceddefendant for his third strike. At the age of sixteen, defendant committed two armed robberies withintwo days in November 1989. First, defendant and an accomplice robbed a gasstation with a nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol. Two days later,defendant and his accomplice committed another robbery at an apartmentcomplex in Bridgeton, New Jersey with a .22-caliber rifle. Defendant waswaived to Superior Court and prosecuted as an adult for both crimesconcurrently; defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a). The court found that defendant committed a first-degreeGraves Act3 offense and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment with threeand a third years of parole ineligibility. Defendant was released on parole in May 1993. In February 1996, at theage of twenty-three, less than three years after his release from prison,defendant committed two more armed robberies. First, he and a co-defendant3 The Graves Act imposes mandatory prison sentences on defendants who commit crimes, such as robbery, while carrying a firearm, and requires extended mandatory terms for defendants who have committed more than one such offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). 4 stole cigarettes, food stamps, and $243 from a Wawa in Vineland, assaultingtwo employees in the process. Three weeks later, defendant, acting alone,committed another armed robbery at a Bridgeton gas station, where he stole$100 and shot a store clerk in the neck, fracturing his jaw. Defendant wasindicted separately for each robbery. Following trial on the Wawa robbery, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a), among other charges. The trial courtsentenced defendant to a sixty-year extended term under the Graves Act withtwenty years of parole ineligibility. Five months later, a jury convicted defendant of the gas station robbery.The State moved to sentence defendant to an extended term pursuant to theThree Strikes Law, predicated upon his 1990 conviction of two counts of first-degree robbery, his 1997 conviction of first-degree robbery, and the currentconviction. Finding that defendant had committed three first-degree armedrobberies and first-degree attempted murder, the sentencing judge granted theState’s application for an extended term sentence and imposed concurrentmandatory life sentences without parole for the armed robbery and attemptedmurder convictions. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. Defendant’sarguments included that the mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed 5 under the Three Strikes Law constituted cruel and unusual punishment. TheAppellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and life sentences withoutparole, noting that it had already found the Three Strikes Law to beconstitutional.4 We denied defendant’s petition for certification. Defendant thereafter filed eleven post-conviction relief (PCR) petitionsbetween 1999 and 2012. None were successful, and defendant remainedincarcerated. B. In 2018, defendant filed his twelfth PCR petition -- a motion to correctan illegal sentence -- relying on the United States Supreme Court’s holding inMiller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , that mandatory life-without-parole sentencesfor juvenile offenders are unconstitutional, and this Court’s holding in State v.Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, that juveniles cannot be sentenced to the functionalequivalent of life without parole. Defendant contended that his sentence wasunconstitutional because his first strike occurred when he was a juvenile andthe sentencing court did not consider the Miller factors5 before imposing amandatory life sentence under the Three Strikes Law.4 This Court affirmed the statute’s constitutionality the following year in Oliver, 162 N.J. 580. 5 Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78. 6 The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that becausedefendant received his enhanced life sentence as an adult, Miller and Zuber didnot apply. The court explained that defendant’s conviction while a juvenilecounted as a conviction in adult court for a first-degree Graves Act offense -- afirst strike. Miller and Zuber, the court further reasoned, are intended to offerincarcerated juveniles a meaningful opportunity to re-enter society uponrehabilitation, but defendant already had that opportunity and chose to returnto his violent behaviors as an adult. The court therefore held that defendantproperly received an enhanced sentence under the Three Strikes Law. The Appellate Division affirmed, adopting the trial court’s reasoningthat defendant received his mandatory life sentence as an adult and that Millerand Zuber were therefore inapposite. The court further noted that defendanthad his opportunity to re-enter society when he was released from prison in1993, but instead continued to commit even more violent crimes. This Court granted defendant’s petition for certification to considerwhether a defendant’s prior juvenile-age conviction counts as a predicateoffense under the Three Strikes Law. 246 N.J. 316 (2021). We then grantedleave to participate as amici curiae to the Association of Criminal DefenseLawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) and to the Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice 7 Clinic and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, participatingjointly (collectively, Rutgers Clinic). II. Defendant contends that allowing sentencing courts to count juvenileoffenses as strikes when imposing on defendants mandatory life-without-parole sentences violates both the Eighth Amendment of the United StatesConstitution, and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. Heargues that juvenile-age convictions are not the same as convictions foroffenses committed as an adult and therefore cannot be considered under theThree Strikes Law because juveniles are less culpable and less deserving ofsuch severe punishment than adults. Defendant notes that, in sentencing himto life without parole, the court did not apply the Miller factors to his firststrike or consider how young he was at the time of the offense. He argues thatthe Three Strikes Law’s mandatory minimum sentence of life without paroleprecludes judges from considering youth as a mitigating factor at sentencingand denies the offender a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based upondemonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Defendant also highlights that the Three Strikes Law contains nolanguage limiting its application to juvenile offenders and contends thatsentencing courts could conceivably impose mandatory life-without-parole 8 sentences even when all three offenses were committed while a juvenile.Finally, defendant argues that because the “persistent offender” statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), defines recidivists as defendants over the age of twenty-one who committed three first-, second-, or third-degree qualifying crimesafter turning eighteen, the Legislature could not reasonably have intended toinclude offenses committed as a juvenile under the Three Strikes Law. Amici advance substantially the same constitutional arguments asdefendant. The ACDL also contends that notions of fundamental fairnesspreclude counting prior juvenile convictions as predicate offenses under theThree Strikes Law. The Rutgers Clinic extends defendant’s argument further,asserting that this Court should not count any offenses committed before adefendant reaches the age of twenty-six as strikes under the Three Strikes Law. The State counters that defendant has not met his burden in proving theThree Strikes Law unconstitutional and that his sentence should therefore beaffirmed. Noting that the Legislature enacted the statute as a response toheinous crimes committed by recidivist offenders, the State asserts that, indeclining to differentiate between juvenile and adult offenses, the Legislatureintended that juvenile offenses be considered in the same way as adult offensesunder the Three Strikes Law. The State reasons that juvenile offenses areconsidered at sentencing as evidence of a likelihood to reoffend, citing 9 N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) and case law. More importantly, the State emphasizesthat offenders like defendant, who commit violent crimes as adults despitehaving served time in prison, are no longer juveniles when they are sentencedunder the Three Strikes Law, making Miller and Zuber inapplicable.Accordingly, the State insists that life without parole is a constitutionalsentence considering defendant’s propensity to reoffend. The State further notes that other courts, including eight United StatesCourts of Appeals, have held that juvenile offenses can be considered underrecidivist statutes like the Three Strikes Law. The State refutes defendant’scontention that the “persistent offender” statute is inconsistent with allowingconsideration of juvenile-age offenses under the Three Strikes Law, arguingthat the Legislature reasonably determined that the dangerous nature of first-degree crimes covered by the Three Strikes Law requires that offenders whocommitted a qualifying offense while a juvenile nevertheless should beincapacitated for life. III. A. Defendant’s PCR petition claims that his sentence imposed under theThree Strikes Law is illegal. Ordinarily a defendant must file a PCR petitionwithin the time prescribed by Rule 3:22-12, but a defendant may challenge an 10 illegal sentence at any time as provided by Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). “An 'illegalsentence’ is one 'not imposed in accordance with the law,’” including asentence that violates a constitutional safeguard. Zuber, 227 N.J. at 437(quoting State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011)). We begin our discussionhere by reviewing the applicable standards of review when considering adefendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. When challenging the constitutionality of a sentencing statute, adefendant must overcome “[t]he strong presumption of constitutionality thatattaches” to any legislative enactment. State v. Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 14 (2015)(alteration in original) (quoting Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 285 (1998)). “The foundation for that presumption is solid and clear:the challenged law 'represents the considered action of a body composed ofpopularly elected representatives’” and is entitled to judicial deference. Ibid.(quoting N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 8 (1972)). Toovercome the strong presumption of validity, the defendant must demonstratethat the statute’s “repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond reasonabledoubt.” Ibid. (quoting Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957)). Wherereasonable minds may differ regarding the constitutionality of a statute, wewill defer to the will of the Legislature. Id. at 15. We must be mindful of suchdeference while considering the Three Strikes Law in the context of the Eighth 11 Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 ofthe New Jersey Constitution. B. The ban on excessive punishment “flows from the basic precept ofjustice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to theoffense.” Zuber, 227 N.J. at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingRoper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 560 (2005)). The test to determine whetherpunishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitutionis “generally the same.” Id. at 438 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123,169 (1987)). Both the Federal and State Constitutions require the followingthree-part inquiry: First, does the punishment for the crime conform with contemporary standards of decency? Second, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense? Third, does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective? [Ibid. (quoting Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 169).] In assessing the first prong, courts look to the legislative enactments oftheir own state and other states as the best markers of contemporary standardsof decency. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68. For the second prong, courtsweigh “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 12 characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 67 (2010). Finally, for the third prong, courtsconsider whether the punishment adequately fulfills the traditional penologicalgoals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at 72-74.Application of this three-factor test to the present appeal governs whether NewJersey’s Three Strikes Law is constitutional as applied to defendant and othersfor whom one or more of the three requisite “strikes” relates to a juvenileoffense. C. Inspired by federal three-strikes legislation, our Legislature passed itsown three-strikes law in 1995. See Oliver, 162 N.J. at 583 (noting that theLegislature passed the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, L. 1995, c. 126,§ 2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a)), after the federal Violent Crime Controland Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796(1994)). Aimed at protecting the public from offenders who repeatedlycommit serious offenses, the Three Strikes Law imposes a mandatory sentenceof life without parole upon any person convicted on three separate occasions ofcertain violent crimes, including murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault,kidnapping, sexual assault, and robbery. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a). The statuteprovides that 13 [a] person convicted of a crime under any of the following: N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4; a crime of the first degree under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1, paragraphs (3) through (6) of subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; or section 1 of L. 1993, c. 221 ([ N.J.S.A.] 2C:15-2), who has been convicted of two or more crimes that were committed on prior and separate occasions, regardless of the dates of the convictions, under any of the foregoing sections or under any similar statute of the United States, this State, or any other state for a crime that is substantially equivalent to a crime under any of the foregoing sections, shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment by the court, with no eligibility for parole. [Ibid.] This Court upheld the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law morethan twenty years ago in State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. at 585-88. In that case, wefirst determined that the law does not violate the double jeopardy clause of theState and Federal Constitutions because the enhanced sentence is not imposed“'as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for earlier crimes,’ but insteadas a 'stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which was considered to be anaggravated offense because it is a repetitive one.’” Id. at 586 (quoting Witte v.United States, 515 U.S. 389 , 400 (1995)). We also concluded that the statutedid not offend separation of powers by “impermissibly increas[ing] thediscretionary power of prosecutors while stripping the judiciary of alldiscretion to craft sentences,” noting that the Legislature’s “'power to preclude 14 judicial suspension of sentences’” is inherent in the “'power to enactmandatory sentencing laws in the first place.’” Id. at 586-87 (quoting State v.Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80-81 (1983)). We likewise rejected arguments thatthe Law violates the Ex Post Facto and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 587,589-92. Most importantly for present purposes, our holding in Oliver made clearthat the Three Strikes Law does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Id. at 588-89. Applying the required “three-part inquiry,” we first found thatthe statute comports with contemporary standards of decency, as the federalgovernment and at least twenty-four other jurisdictions had enacted similarlegislation. Id. at 588. We further determined that the enhanced life-without-parole sentence is not grossly disproportionate where the offense is adangerous first-degree crime. Id. at 588-89. Finally, we concluded that theenhanced sentence was necessary to fulfill the traditional penological objectiveof incapacitating recidivist offenders, who pose a particular danger to society.Id. at 589. Whether the same result is compelled when one of the threequalifying offenses was committed when the defendant was a juvenile requiresreview of the federal and state constitutional protections embodied in Millerand Zuber, and their application to this appeal. 15 D. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment whenimposed on juvenile offenders. 567 U.S. at 465. Although the U.S. SupremeCourt stressed that sentencing courts must consider “how children aredifferent, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencingthem to lifetime in prison,” it did not foreclose juveniles from being sentencedto life without parole. Id. at 480. Instead, the Court instructed sentencingcourts to take into consideration the “hallmark features” of youth, the nature ofthe juvenile’s environment, the effect of youthful “incompetencies” on theprosecution’s outcome, and the “possibility of rehabilitation”: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features -- among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him -- and from which he cannot usually extricate himself -- no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth -- for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the 16 possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it. [Id. at 477-78 (citations omitted).] In Zuber, we built upon this federal juvenile sentencing jurisprudenceand extended application of the Miller factors to situations where a juvenile isfacing a term of imprisonment that is the practical equivalent to life withoutparole. 227 N.J. at 429-30. In doing so, we acknowledged that “Miller’sconcerns apply broadly: to cases in which a defendant commits multipleoffenses during a single criminal episode; to cases in which a defendantcommits multiple offenses on different occasions; and to homicide and non -homicide cases.” Id. at 448. We did not, however, extend Miller’s protectionsto defendants sentenced for crimes committed when those defendants wereover the age of eighteen. IV. A. Defendant asserts that the constitutional protections against cruel andunusual punishment bar application of the Three Strikes Law to any individualwho committed at least one of the predicate offenses as a juvenile.Nevertheless, application of the three-factor test for cruel and unusualpunishment utilized in Miller and Zuber to the Three Strikes Law leads us tothe same conclusion today as it did over twenty years ago in Oliver, 162 N.J. 17 580. The Three Strikes Law and its application to defendant are bothconstitutionally permissible. First, a survey of other jurisdictions demonstrates that the Three StrikesLaw continues to conform to contemporary standards of decency. FederalCourts of Appeals have overwhelmingly held that the Eighth Amendment doesnot prohibit counting juvenile offenses as strikes. See, e.g., United States v.Hunter, 735 F.3d 172, 174-76 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 461-64 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858,863-64 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1018 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Edwards, 734 F.3d 850, 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2013);United States v. Orona, 724 F.3d 1297, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 2013); UnitedStates v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2013). And most states with similar three-strikes legislation count juvenile-ageconvictions as strikes where the defendant was waived up to adult court. See,e.g., Wilson v. State, 521 S.W.3d 123, 128 (Ark. 2017); Vickers v. State, 117 A.3d 516, 519-20 (Del. 2015); State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 326, 328-29(S.C. 2002); State v. Teas, 447 P.3d 606, 619-20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019),review denied, 460 P.3d 182 (Wash. 2020); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 6-8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). Cf. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120(e)(3) 18 (providing that juvenile-age convictions in adult court count as predicateoffenses so long as the conviction resulted in a custodial sentence).6 Second, an enhanced life-without-parole sentence is not grosslydisproportionate where the offense is a dangerous and violent first-degreecrime, such as armed robbery or attempted murder, the offenses for whichdefendant here received his final strike. 7 Furthermore, as we noted in Oliver,repeat offenders are already subject to mandatory enhanced sentences underother statutes like the Habitual Offender Act and the Graves Act. See 162 N.J.at 588-89. This consistent application of extended terms reflects a legislativedetermination that such lengthy sentences are proportionate to the offensescovered by these statutes. Lastly and most importantly, the punishment serves the legitimatepenological objective of incapacitating serious third-time offenders. The6 We note that those states that have chosen to limit application of their recidivist statutes to individuals who committed their first qualifying offense when over the age of eighteen have all done so through the legislative process. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 532.080(2), (3); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-23(C); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-09(1)(c); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(b)(ii). Whether to amend our law in that way is for the Legislature to determine. 7 Despite our dissenting colleague’s insistence to the contrary, State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990), is not an “apt comparison” for analyzing the grossly disproportionate factor or any other issue in this case. See post at ___ (slip op. at 12). Our decision in Laurick is predicated on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, not the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment. 19 Three Strikes Law “was a response to a genuine legislative concern that repeatoffenders pose a unique danger to society,” as rehabilitative efforts have failedthose defendants. Oliver, 162 N.J. at 589. Accordingly, the Legislaturedetermined that an enhanced sentence of life without parole is necessary toprotect the public from the most dangerous persistent offenders. Here, defendant received his enhanced sentence on his third armedrobbery conviction, having already served three and a third years of a ten-yearprison sentence for his first offense, committed at the age of sixteen.Defendant was not only undeterred by incarceration, but his crimes committedafter release from state prison grew increasingly violent: defendant assaultedtwo Wawa employees during the commission of his first post-release offenseand then, before his arrest, shot a store clerk during his final robbery. In sum, defendant’s sentence accords with all elements of the three-parttest and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment within themeaning of the Federal or State Constitution. 88 Again, defendant challenged his sentence on the sole basis that he committed the first predicate offense while he was a juvenile. Our finding that the Three Strikes Law is valid on its face leaves open the possibility for relief via specific as-applied challenges in other cases that present unusual circumstances. 20 B. Nor do defendant and amici’s arguments regarding legislative intent, therequirements of Miller and Zuber, or other constitutional principles militate infavor of vacating defendant’s sentence. Defendant attributes significance to the fact that the Legislature limitedthe definition of recidivists under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A.2C:44-3(a), to defendants over the age of twenty-one who committed theirthree qualifying crimes after turning eighteen. He contends that this definitionshows the Legislature could not have intended to allow juvenile-age offensesto be considered under the Three Strikes Law. This argument is unavailing. The statute to which defendant pointsillustrates plainly that the Legislature knows how to establish minimum agesfor predicate offenses. It chose to do so in the persistent offender statute,which was enacted in 1978 and has been amended on numerous occasionssince then without alteration to the age requirement. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).9Yet, despite its attention to the age limits for predicate offenses in the 9 In 1979, the Legislature revealed its attentiveness to the statute’s age requirements when it amended N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) “to clarify that the defendant must be 21 at the time of the commission of the crime for which he is to be judged a persistent offender” rather than the date he is sentenced. S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 3202 9-10 (June 18, 1979); see L. 1979, c. 178, § 95. 21 persistent offender statute, the Legislature did not include similar limits whenit enacted the Three Strikes Law in 1995. See L. 1995, c. 126, § 2. Nor did itimpose such limits when it modified the Three Strikes Law in 2003 to clarifythat the strikes are established by date of the offense, not the date of theconviction, see L. 2003, c. 48, § 1, even though, by then, the statute had beenapplied for eight years without regard to the age at which the first or secondstrikes were committed. It is the Legislature’s prerogative to impose a requirement in one contextbut not another; it is our duty to treat that distinction as meaningful. See, e.g.,In re Registrant H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 423 (2020) (“The PSL provisionsdemonstrate that the Legislature knows how to tie Megan’s Law requirementsto non-Megan’s Law offenses when it chooses; it did not choose to do so insubsection (f).”). The persistent offender statute notably encompasses a widerrange of graded offenses -- first-, second-, and third-degree qualifying crimes-- than the Three Strikes Law, which is limited to certain first-degree violentoffenses. The difference in application of the two statutes reflects a deliberatechoice by the Legislature to further designate those offenses covered under theThree Strikes Law as especially egregious and requiring the defendant’sincapacitation -- even where one of the predicate offenses was committed by ajuvenile. This Court will “neither rewrite a plainly written enactment of the 22 Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other thanthat expressed by way of the plain language.” 10 State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432,443 (2020) (alteration omitted) (quoting O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488(2002)). Defendant also contends that, by counting juvenile-age crimes aspredicate offenses, the Three Strikes Law deprives the offender of ameaningful opportunity to rehabilitate and reenter society as contemplated byMiller and Zuber. Defendant insists therefore that Miller and Zuber mustnecessarily change the outcome of our constitutional analysis. We disagree. Miller and Zuber are intended to afford juveniles an opportunity forrehabilitation and ultimate release from incarceration. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (finding that “children’s . . . heightened capacity for change” necessarilylimits the “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to” life withoutparole); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 451 (noting that “it is difficult at an early age todifferentiate between the immature offender who may reform and the juvenile10 Because we will not rewrite the plain language of a legislative enactment, we likewise dismiss the Rutgers Clinic’s contention that offenses should not count as strikes under the Three Strikes Law until a defendant reaches the age of twenty-six. The Legislature has chosen eighteen as the threshold age for adulthood in criminal sentencing. Although this choice may seem arbitrary, “a line must be drawn,” and “[t]he age of [eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 23 who is irreparably corrupt”). Thus, Miller and Zuber are uniquely concernedwith the sentencing of juvenile offenders to lifetime imprisonment or itsfunctional equivalent without the possibility of parole. Defendant committed his second and third armed robberies as a twenty-three year old, and was therefore an adult being sentenced for a crimecommitted as an adult. There is nothing in Miller or Zuber that precludesapplication of a recidivist statute such as the Three Strikes Law to an adultdefendant who meets the carefully considered statutory requirements set by theLegislature. Indeed, as we made clear in Oliver, the enhanced sentence underthe Three Strikes Law is not imposed “'as either a new jeopardy or additionalpenalty for earlier crimes,’ but instead as a 'stiffened penalty for the latestcrime.’” 162 N.J. at 586 (quoting Witte, 515 U.S. at 400). The Three StrikesLaw thus applies to those offenders who “have forfeited the opportunity toattempt rehabilitation, having failed repeatedly to desist from serious criminalconduct.” State v. Galiano, 349 N.J. Super. 157, 165 (App. Div. 2002). As anadult who committed a third armed robbery, defendant satisfied the statutorypreconditions of the Three Strikes Law and was sentenced accordingly. Finally, we reject the ACDL’s argument that constitutional principles offundamental fairness preclude juvenile convictions from being counted aspredicate offenses under the Three Strikes Law. The fundamental fairness 24 doctrine “serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrarygovernmental action” where there is otherwise “no explicit statutory orconstitutional protection to be invoked.” State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548-49 (2021) (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108-09 (1995)). We apply thedoctrine “sparingly and only where the interests involved are especiallycompelling.” Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 67 (2015)). We do not find the Legislature’s policydecision to count qualifying juvenile-age crimes as strikes to be fundamentallyunfair because, as already explained, the enhanced life-without-parole sentenceis imposed only upon commission of a third, violent first-degree crime as anadult. We therefore hold that the Three Strikes Law and the mandatory life-without-parole sentence imposed upon defendant under that statute do notviolate the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Wefurther hold that Miller and Zuber have no application to adult defendantssentenced under the Three Strikes Law. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’ssentence. V. For the reasons expressed, we affirm the judgment of the AppellateDivision. 25 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS joins. 26 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Samuel Ryan, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. Today, under New Jersey’s Three Strikes Law, the majority upholdsSamuel Ryan’s mandatory term of life imprisonment imposed on account of arobbery he committed when he was sixteen years old. The Three Strikes Lawmakes that “juvenile” robbery conviction a predicate crime (the first strike) --along with the two crimes Ryan committed three weeks apart when he wastwenty-three years old (the two other strikes) -- authorizing the mandatory lifewithout parole sentence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a).1 The majority finds thatthe use of Ryan’s juvenile conviction to justify the life term does not violateour federal and state prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.1 A juvenile conviction in this opinion refers to any conviction in which a defendant under the age of eighteen committed a criminal offense and was waived up to adult court for prosecution. 1 That finding, however, can hardly be squared with this Court’sconsolidated opinion in State v. Comer and State v. Zarate, issued just onemonth ago. In those cases, we stated that “children are different from adults”because they “lack maturity, can be impetuous, are more susceptible topressure from others, and often fail to appreciate the long-term consequencesof their actions.” State v. Comer, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op. at 4)(citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 477 (2012)). Those distinguishingfactors of youth, among others, led this Court to hold that the lengthymandatory sentences imposed against Comer and Zarate for their juvenilemurder convictions were cruel and unusual under Article I, Paragraph 12 ofour State Constitution. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 5-6, 51). Comer and Zarate --and similarly situated juveniles -- are therefore eligible for release afterserving twenty years, at which time the court will assess whether they arerehabilitated and fit to reenter society. See id. at ___ (slip op. at 51). On the other hand, Ryan must serve forty-seven years before he will beeligible for release, based on his juvenile conviction. He will be seventy yearsold at that time.2 He will have been warehoused in a prison for nearly five2 A defendant convicted under the Three Strikes Law “shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment by the court, with no eligibility for parole.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a). Although sentenced to life imprisonment, “a defendant who is at least 70 years of age and who has served at least 35 years in prison 2 decades, even if he had been totally rehabilitated and fit to reenter societydecades earlier. Comer and Zarate established that culpability for juvenile crimes andadult crimes cannot be weighed on the same scale because of thedistinguishing characteristics of youth, such as immaturity and impetuosity,and because the juvenile brain is not fully developed. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 45,49). On that basis, giving Ryan’s juvenile conviction the same constitutionalweight as his adult convictions under the Three Strikes Law is at odds with theevolving standards of decency addressed in our federal and state constitutionalcaselaw. See id. at ___ (slip op. at 41); see also, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 469-71; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 58, 67 (2010). No one disputes that Ryan has committed serious crimes warrantingpunishment and a lengthy sentence. But a law that mechanically imposes agrossly disproportionate sentence, a law that strips a court from consideringthe incapacitating element of youth, and a law that denies the court alldiscretion in fashioning a sentence based on a youthful conviction cannot be. . . shall be released on parole if the full Parole Board determines that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community. ” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(e). 3 reconciled with our federal or state constitutional jurisprudence. Cf. Jones v.Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021). No law is superior to the Constitution. In Ryan’s case, and other similarcases, the Three Strikes Law must comport with the dictates of the federal andstate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. In myview, under the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 12 of our StateConstitution, judges cannot be denied discretion in determining whether ajuvenile conviction can be the basis for a predicate offense under the ThreeStrikes Law for the purpose of sentencing a twenty-three-year-old to a lifetimeof imprisonment. Additionally, I would hold that our State Constitution bars ajuvenile conviction from serving as a predicate offense under the Three StrikesLaw. The majority’s decision does not end the debate. The Legislature has thepower to conform the Three Strikes Law to its conception of the evolvingstandards of decency of a mature society -- and to bring consistency to itslegislative scheme in the Code of Criminal Justice. I would find that Ryan’s juvenile conviction cannot be considered apredicate offense for the purpose of imposing a mandatory life sentence underthe Three Strikes Law but may be considered in setting Ryan’s overallsentence for the crimes he committed when he was twenty-three years old. 4 I. In 1996, twenty-three-year-old Samuel Ryan committed serious first-degree crimes within three weeks of each other. If convicted only of thosecrimes, the court would have had discretion to sentence Ryan to prison formany decades. But because the Three Strikes Law designated a juvenileconviction as a predicate offense, the court was compelled to impose amandatory life sentence. The Three Strikes Law provides that a defendant “convicted of two ormore [violent crimes enumerated in the statute] that were committed on priorand separate occasions, regardless of the dates of the convictions . . . shall besentenced to a term of life imprisonment by the court, with no eligibility forparole.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a). The statute does not specifically exemptcrimes committed by a juvenile defendant. In 1989, Ryan pled guilty to two first-degree robberies, after he wasdenied the rehabilitative services of the juvenile court system and waived up toadult court. At the sentencing hearing, in a cry for help, his mother explainedthat her sixteen-year-old son was a troubled youth. She stated: For years I’ve been trying to give Sammy some kind of mental help that’s been ordered numerous times. It’s never been given, and I don’t believe his mental state ever has been what it should be. I know that he has a mental problem . . . . I’m not a doctor and I don’t have the means to hire a private psychiatrist to see my 5 son . . . . I don’t know what else to do but I know my son and I know he’s not all that bad. I know he’s been easily to be led, but a lot of these things that he has done I don’t believe he can help himself. He has the mind, the willingness to do right, but a lot of times he doesn’t even know why he does things himself. After balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the courtsentenced Ryan to a ten-year prison term, subject to a three-year-and-four-month period of parole ineligibility. Three years after his release from prison,Ryan committed the crimes that constituted his second and third strikes underthe Three Strikes Law. In 1997, Ryan was sentenced to life without parolebased on the first strike -- the crime he committed at age sixteen. II. The United States and New Jersey Constitutions bar cruel and unusualpunishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12. Under bothConstitutions, three questions are considered in determining whether apunishment is cruel and unusual: (1) “does the punishment for the crimeconform with contemporary standards of decency?”; (2) “is the punishmentgrossly disproportionate to the offense?”; and (3) “does the punishment gobeyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective?”State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 438 (2017) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 169 (1987)); accord Graham, 560 U.S. at 67-68. By that measure, the use 6 of Ryan’s juvenile offense as a predicate for imposing a mandatory lifesentence without parole contravenes both our Federal and State Constitutions. A. First, in my view, the imposition of a mandatory life sentence based on apredicate juvenile conviction does not “conform with contemporary standardsof decency.” Judicial decisions and recent legislative enactments are the“clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Cf.Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 331 (1989)). Our Court has acknowledged “time and again” that“children are different.” Comer, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 41). The United States Supreme Court and our Court recognize what socialscience has long understood: “children lack maturity and responsibility, whichcan lead to 'ill-considered actions’”; “they 'are more vulnerable to negativeinfluences and outside pressures’”; “their character 'is not as well formed’ asan adult’s”; and “their misconduct is not as morally culpable as an adult’s.”Id. at ___ (slip op. at 45) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 569-70(2005)). Science has taught us “that 'parts of the brain involved in behaviorcontrol continue to mature through late adolescence,’ accounting for one of the'fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.’” State in Interestof C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 69 (2018) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). 7 Our evolving jurisprudence has grown increasingly skeptical about theconstitutionality of lengthy sentences or permanent disabilities based onyouthful offenses. See id. at 68-70. Just one month ago, this Court held thatsentencing a juvenile to a mandatory thirty-year prison term without paroleeligibility for a murder conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) constitutedcruel and unusual punishment and thus violated Article I, Paragraph 12 of ourState Constitution. See Comer, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 5-6). As aconstitutional remedy, this Court now affords juveniles convicted of murderthe opportunity of judicial review of their sentences after serving twenty yearsof imprisonment -- the opportunity of establishing their rehabilitation and theirability to reenter society as productive members. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 6-7).Yet, under the majority’s decision here, Ryan, who was sentenced at the age oftwenty-three for non-homicide offenses, must serve a minimum of forty-sevenyears in prison based on a predicate juvenile conviction under the ThreeStrikes Law. Recent legislation has reinforced the notion that youth must play adiscretionary role in the imposition of sentences. In 2020, the Legislatureamended the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice to include as a mitigatingsentencing factor that the “defendant was under 26 years of age at the time ofthe commission of the offense.” L. 2020, c. 110, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 8 2C:44-1(b)(14)). Upon signing the law, Governor Murphy released astatement quoting some of the sponsors of the new law, who emphasized theimportance of weighing youth in the sentencing process: “The social,emotional and mental maturity of a youthful defendant is complex andnuanced. That very fact makes it critical for the age of a defendant to befactored by the court in criminal culpability.” Office of the Governor, PressRelease: Statement Upon Signing A. 4373 (Oct. 19, 2020). The Legislature’s recognition that “children are different” is alsoreflected in recent amendments to the juvenile waiver statute. In 2015, theLegislature raised the minimum age of waiver of a juvenile to adult court fromfourteen to fifteen, L. 2015, c. 89, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1)),and heightened the role of courts in reviewing prosecutorial decisions to waivejuveniles to adult court, L. 2015, c. 89, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2)). The sponsors’ statements attached to the bills, which increasedthe waiver age, referred to the “new research on adolescent brain developmentdisproving the presumption that juveniles who commit crimes think likeadults.” Sponsor Statement to S. 2003 8 (Apr. 28, 2014); Sponsor Statement toA. 4299 8 (Mar. 16, 2015). Currently, the Code of Criminal Justice takes an inconsistent approach tothe use of a juvenile conviction for enhanced sentencing purposes. The 9 Persistent Offender Statute, which authorizes a court to impose an extended-term sentence on a defendant, specifically prohibits consideration of anyoffense committed by that defendant when he was a juvenile. See N.J.S.A.2C:44-3(a) (defining a persistent offender, in part, as “a person who at the timeof the commission of the crime is 21 years of age or over, who has beenpreviously convicted on at least two separate occasions of two crimes,committed at different times, when he was at least 18 years of age” (emphasisadded)). Thus, under the Persistent Offender Statute, a court cannot impose anextended-term sentence -- a sentence increased from the second-degree rangeto the first-degree range -- based on a juvenile offense; yet, under the ThreeStrikes Law, the court can impose a mandatory life sentence for a youthfuloffense. The Three Strikes Law is one expression of legislative policy seeminglyat odds with other policies within the overall scheme of the Code of CriminalJustice. Those inconsistencies do not alone render the Three Strikes Lawinfirm. But the new legislative enactments reflect evolving contemporarystandards that bear on the constitutional issue before us. In assessing contemporary standards, we may look to the law of otherstates. Several jurisdictions that have a Three Strikes Law similar to NewJersey’s bar the use of a youthful offense as a predicate for imposing a 10 mandatory life term on a defendant. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-23(C);Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(b)(ii); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-4.5-95(a)(4)(E). B. Additionally, Ryan’s mandatory term of life imprisonment, based on apredicate juvenile conviction, and imposed at the age of twenty-three, is agrossly disproportionate punishment in light of our approach in Comer. Ayouthful offender, just shy of his eighteenth birthday, who commits anegregious murder will have the opportunity for a review of his thirty -yearsentence without parole eligibility after twenty years. See Comer, ___ N.J. at___ (slip op. at 51). That is so because the incapacities attributed to youth,such as lack of maturity, impulsiveness, and reckless risk-taking withoutregard to consequences, tend to lessen moral culpability. Id. at ___ (slip op. at45). Our constitutional jurisprudence strongly indicates that a juvenileconviction should not be afforded the same weight as an adult conviction andshould not be the basis in a recidivist statute for meting out the harshestpenalty in our criminal code -- a mandatory life term. An apt comparison is this Court’s decision in State v. Laurick, in whichwe placed constitutional limitations on the use of an uncounseled conviction indriving while intoxicated (DWI) cases under the relevant recidivist statute. 120 N.J. 1, 4 (1990). In Laurick, “[w]e held that a prior uncounseled DWI 11 conviction could 'not be used to increase a defendant’s loss of liberty’” forsentencing purposes upon a subsequent DWI conviction. State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 438 (2019) (quoting Laurick, 120 N.J. at 4). The basic logic ofLaurick was that the use of a prior uncounseled conviction as a predicateoffense to enhance a custodial sentence was fundamentally unjust. SeeLaurick, 120 N.J. at 16-17. The same notion of injustice applies to the use of ajuvenile conviction as a predicate offense for the Three Strikes Law. The useof a juvenile conviction for that purpose renders hollow this Court’s repeatedrefrain that “children are different.” Based on the majority’s constitutional deference to the Three StrikesLaw, a defendant who has two prior first-degree juvenile convictions may besentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole eligibility if hecommitted his third first-degree conviction at the age of eighteen. But, underthe Persistent Offender Statute, the same defendant could not even receive anextended term of imprisonment for the third conviction. Such comparisonsshed light on the grossly disproportionate outcomes that result from the currentstatutory scheme. C. Finally, punishing twenty-three-year-old Ryan with a sentence of lifewithout parole eligibility -- based on a juvenile conviction -- “go[es] beyond 12 what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective.” SeeZuber, 227 N.J. at 438. The Three Strikes Law strips the court of all discretionto determine whether incapacitating Ryan for less than forty-seven years willserve society’s desire for retribution or the need for incapacitation ordeterrence. Cf. Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1311 (holding that ajuvenile homicide offender may be sentenced to life without parole so long as“the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer . . . has discretion to impose alesser punishment”). The rigid application of the Three Strikes Law deprivesthe court of the opportunity of exercising its judgment to determine whetherRyan can be rehabilitated before his seventieth birthday. As applied in this case, the Three Strikes Law is a blunt and cruelinstrument -- ignoring Ryan’s unique circumstances and background -- andcondemns him to a lifetime behind bars, without any regard to his potential forrehabilitation and reformation and without any hope of a meaningful future. III. If, as this Court has professed in Comer, C.K., and Zuber, children aredifferent, then the use of a juvenile conviction as a predicate offense to imposea term of life imprisonment without parole eligibility is cruel and unusualpunishment under Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution.This Court has detailed at length the infirmities of youth in those opinions, and 13 yet the majority gives the same constitutional weight to the juvenile convictionas it does the two “adult” crimes committed when Ryan was twenty-three yearsold. Nor should we forget that the Legislature has decreed that when adefendant is “under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of theoffense,” age is a mitigating sentencing factor. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). No court has made the discretionary determination that Ryan is totallybeyond the pale of redemption and rehabilitation. The Three Strikes Lawoffends the Federal Constitution because it deprives the court of its discretionto fashion a sentence that does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.Cf. Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1318 (“[D]iscretionary sentencingallows the sentencer to consider the defendant’s youth, and thereby helpsensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where thatsentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.”). It also offends ourState Constitution because Ryan is denied the lookback review provided toComer and Zarate, both convicted of murder. See Comer, ___ N.J. at ___ (slipop. at 53). Although the majority rejects Ryan’s argument that the use of hisjuvenile conviction to impose a mandatory term of life imprisonmentconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the Legislature will have the finalword on the subject. The Legislature too has a constitutional obligation and an 14 abiding interest to ensure that cruel and unusual punishments are not theconsequence of its enactments. The Legislature has an interest in ensuring thatthe Code of Criminal Justice treats juvenile convictions in a consistent manner.The Legislature can amend the Three Strikes Law to account for the infirmitiesof youth and mitigate the inflexibility of imposing a mandatory life term basedon a juvenile conviction. Because I conclude that the mandatory term of life imprisonmentimposed in this case violates the federal and state prohibitions against crueland unusual punishment, I respectfully dissent. 15