Title: Ingram v. Dover Associates Venture, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 145, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM P. INGRAM and MARGARET 
ANNE INGRAM, 
 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants 
Below-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
DOVER ASSOCIATES JOINT VENTURE, 
RONALD B. HIRSCH, HOWARD G. 
COHEN, STEPHEN SCHUSTER, JOHN 
COLLISON, MARY BETH COLLISON, 
ALAN L. KRUTT, and KEVIN S. 
CUMMINGS, 
 
Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs Below-Appellees. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 145, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  C.A. No. 99C-09-006 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 7, 2005 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: March 9, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 9th day of March 2005, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellants, William and Margaret Ingram, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s opinion, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on their counterclaim resulting from the Ingrams’ default on a series of 
commercial notes and mortgages.  We find no merit to the Ingrams’ appeal.  
Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
2
(2) 
The record reflects that the Ingrams and their company, 1101 Stone 
Associates, LLC (“Stone”), executed and delivered to Dover Associates a series of 
seven commercial notes and seven mortgages as part of the security for a loan 
commitment of $1,150,000.  The mortgages and notes fell into and remained in 
default after an interest payment was not made in January 1997.  The Ingrams 
received written notice of the default in June 1997.  Thereafter five different 
lawsuits were filed involving this loan.  The end result of these various lawsuits 
included, among other things, that control of Stone was transferred to Dover 
Associates, the Ingrams’ lender liability claims against Dover Associates were 
dismissed with prejudice, and Dover Associates’ counterclaim in this action was 
preserved.  Also, in September 2003, the bankruptcy court denied the 
dischargeability of the Ingrams’ indebtedness. 
 
(3) 
After considering Dover Associates’ motion for summary judgment 
and the Ingrams’ response, the Superior Court held that the issues the Ingrams’ 
attempted to raise were previously adjudicated against the Ingrams in other 
litigation and were barred from relitigation under the doctrines of collateral 
estoppel and res judicata.  The Superior Court found the record to be 
uncontroverted that the Ingrams had failed to make payment on the loan and that 
Dover Associates, therefore, was entitled to judgment in personam on the notes 
and to judgment in rem on the secured properties. 
 
3
(4) 
In their opening brief on appeal, the Ingrams assert that the Superior 
Court abused its discretion in failing to allow them to amend their answer to the 
counterclaim and in granting summary judgment without holding a hearing on the 
amount of the deficiency.  Having carefully considered the parties’ respective 
positions, we find it manifest that the judgment of the Superior Court should be 
affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court’s well-reasoned decision dated March 
18, 2004.  The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Ingrams’ 
motion to amend because the issues and defenses the Ingrams wanted to add either 
were irrelevant, were beyond the scope of the limited defenses allowed in a 
foreclosure action or were otherwise barred.  The Superior Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment because there were no genuine issues of material fact 
and Dover Associates was entitled judgment as a matter of law.*   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
* See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., 678 A.2d 533, 535 (Del. 1996).