Title: STATE v ALLEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14754
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 1980

No. 14754 I N T H E SUPREME C O U X T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS . GARY ALLEN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and For t h e County of Powell, Hon. Robert J. Boyd, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Tipp, Hoven & S k j e l s e t , Missoula, Montana Tom F r i z z e l l argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ted Mizner argued, County Attorney - , D e e r Lodge, Montana Submitted: March 25, 1980 Decided: b4v ! ? 19_88 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant was convicted by a jury of criminal posses- s i o n of dangerous drugs i n t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Powell, on February 13, 1979, and received a deferred sentence. O n September 28, 1978, t h r e e o f f i c e r s responded t o a complaint by John Wilson, an apartment building manager, t h a t t h e r e w a s a loud p a r t y taking place i n an apartment rented by one Annie Smith. The o f f i c e r s proceeded t o M s . Smith's apartment b u t t h e noise and music was under c o n t r o l when they arrived. However, they d i d s m e l l t h e s t r o n g odor of burning marijuana, though they could not determine ex- a c t l y t h e apartment from which it emanated, as t h e r e were two apartment doors approximately four f e e t a p a r t . The o f f i c e r s knew t h a t t h e defendant was a frequent v i s i t o r a t M s . Smith's apartment. & e t A m & h dekndatzt and M s . Smith - s . One deputy approached t h e door t o t h e apartment beside M s . Smith's and was met by a t e n a n t who informed t h e o f f i c e r t h a t t h e apartment M s . Smith rented w a s a c r o s s t h e h a l l . The o f f i c e r s then approached M s . Smith's apartment and one of t h e o f f i c e r s knocked a t t h e door which, they testi- f i e d , swung open a t t h e f o r c e of t h e knock. When t h e door opened t h e o f f i c e r s smelled a strong odor of burning mari- juana. -atmy - o w n juvenile drug user.. The o f f i c e r s walked i n without express permission. One of t h e o f f i c e r s noticed some marijuana and drug paraphernalia on a c o f f e e t a b l e . They then a r r e s t e d t h e people i n t h e apartment and advised them of t h e i r Miranda r i g h t s . A f t e r t h e a r r e s t s w e r e made, t h e o f f i c e r s asked M s . Smith i f they could search her apartment. They d i d not have e i t h e r a search o r a r r e s t warrant. M s . Smith i n i t i a l l y refused t o consent t o t h e search, but a f t e r some coaxing by the o f f i c e r s plus t h e i r informing her t h a t they would get permission from t h e land- -- -- l o r d t o search, she f i n a l l y agreed t o t h e search. Defendant, -- a f t e r arguing with t h e o f f i c e r s , eventually a s s i s t e d them i n t h e i r search, giving them some marijuana which had been located under a coffee t a b l e and w a s not i n p l a i n view and some stems and seeds from t h e kitchen. Defendant had no marijuana on h i s person. M s . Smith rented t h e apartment and was n o t dependent on her parents f o r support although she w a s only sixteen years old. Defendant alleged he was permanently residing i n t h e apartment with M s . Smith and t h a t he paid r e n t f o r t h e apartment b u t had no contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p with the landlord. After h i s a r r e s t , defendant moved t o suppress t h e i t e m s seized i n t h e search and dismiss t h e information on t h e grounds t h a t the o f f i c e r s ' e n t r y was unlawful and t h a t the search w a s i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . A suppression hearing w a s held on December 1 4 , 1978, and b r i e f s were f i l e d . The motion t o suppress was denied. A t t h e t r i a l , t h e jury found defendant g u i l t y , and he was sentenced by the D i s t r i c t Court. From t h i s judgment and t h e d e n i a l of t h e motion t o suppress, defendant brings t h i s appeal. Defendant-appllant presents t h e followi.~g i s s u e s f o r review by t h i s Court: 1. Does a person permanently l i v i n g i n a n apartment have standing t o suppress evidence f o r an unlawful e n t r y and search when he was present on the premises? 2 - Does the smell of marijuana constitute sufficient probable cause to make a warrantless entry into and search of a home? 3. Assuming probable cause, can the police enter a private residence without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or an invitation? 4. Did Annie Smith's consent to search defeat any right of defendant to object? Defendant initially contests the officers' entry into the apartment where he was residing. He insists probable cause here was based solely upon the smell of marijuana and that this is insufficient for a search warrant, let alone a warrantless entry. Defendant submits he was permanently residing at his fiancee's apartment and that u~.lder recent Supreme Court authority the test for Fourth Amendment vio- lations is wherher the defendant had a legitimate expecta- tion of privacy in the place searched. Defendant argues he had a legitimate expectation of privacy because the place searched was his residence. Finally, defendant asserts that Montana's constitutional right to privacy protects against the type of warrantless entry which took place here. The State contends that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be asserted vicariously and argues that defendant does not have standing to object to the search of Annie Smith's apartment. The State further contends that the defendant did not have a legitimate expec- tation of privacy under the circumstances that existed in this case. The State argues that Annie Smith's consent was valid and sufficient to override defendant's objection to the search. Defendant, it is asserted, also waived any objection he had to the search when he aided the officers in t h e search of t h e apartment. The 81:ate i n s i s t s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s had s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o e n t e r t h e a p a r t - rnent and t o make t h e a r r e s t s , and t h a t once the a r r e s t w a s complete, t h e o f f i c e r s had t h e r i g h t t o make a search i n c i - d e n t t o an arrest. I n i t i a l l y w e f a c e t h e question of whether defendant had standing t o suppress t h e evidence seized. Defendant con- tends t h a t under t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court holdings i n Jones v. United S t a t e s (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, and Rakas v. I l l i n o i s (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 4 2 1 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, he had standing t o c o n t e s t an unlawful entrlr and search of t h e apartment. I n Jones t h e defendant was p r e s e n t a t t h e t i m e of t h e search of an apartment which was owned by a f r i e n d . The f r i e n d had given Jones permission t o use t h e apartment and a key t o it, with which Jones had admitted himself on t h e day of t h e search. H e had a s u i t and s h i r t a t t h e apartment and had s l e p t t h e r e f o r a night; however, h i s home w a s e l s e - where. A t t h e t i m e of t h e search, Jones was the only occu- pant of t h e apartment, t h e lessee having gone away f o r s e v e r a l days. Based on t h e above f a c t s t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court held t h a t while one wrongfully on t h e premises could n o t move t o suppress evidence obtained a s a r e s u l t of searching them, "anyone l e g i t i m a t e l y on premises where a search occurs may challenge i t s l e g a l i t y . " 362 U.S. a t 267. Despite t h e urging by t h e defendants i n Rakas t o r e l a x t h e r u l e i n Jones, t h e Court declined t o extend t h e r u l e of standing i n Fourth Amendment cases and l i m i t e d the broad language of Jones. I t s t a t e d : "We do not question t h e conclusion i n Jones t h a t t h e defendant i n t h a t case suffered a v i o l a t i o n of h i s personal Fourth Amendment r i g h t s i f t h e search i n question w a s unlawful. Nonetheless, w e believe t h a t t h e phrase ' l e g i t i m a t e l y on - -- premises' coined i n Jones c r e a t e s too broad a - - - gauge f o r measurement of Fourth Amendment r i g h t s . For example, applied literally, t h i s statement would permit a casual v i s i t o r who has never seen, o r been permitted t o v i s i t t h e basement of an- o t h e r ' s house t o o b j e c t t o a search of t h e base- ment i f t h e v i s i t o r happened t o be i n t h e kitchen of t h e house a t t h e t i m e of t h e search. Like- wise, a casual v i s i t o r who walks i n t o a house one minute before a search of t h e house commences and leaves one minute a f t e r t h e search ends would be a b l e t o c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e search. The f i r s t v i s i t o r would have a b s o l u t e l y no in- terest o r l e g i t i m a t e expectation of privacy i n t h e basement, t h e second would have none i n t h e house, and it advances no purpose served by t h e Fourth Amendment t o permit e i t h e r of them t o o b j e c t t o t h e lawfulness of t h e search. " W e think t h a t Jones on i t s f a c t s merely stands --- -- f o r t h e unremarkable proposition t h a t a person -- - - can have a l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t i n a --- - - place o t h e r than h i s own home s o t h a t t h e Fourth ------- Amendment p r o t e c t s -- him from unreasonable govern- mental i n t r u s i o n i n t o t h a t ~ l a c e . [ C i t a t i o n ~ - - - - - - L omitted.] I n defining t h e scope of t h a t i n t e r - e s t , we adhere t o t h e view expressed i n Jones and echoed i n l a t e r cases t h a t arcane d i s t i n c - t i o n s developed i n property and t o r t law between guests, l i c e n s e e s , i n v i t e e s , and t h e l i k e , ought n o t t o c o n t r o l . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. ] -- But t h e Jones statement -- t h a t a person need only be ' l e g i t i m a t e l y on premises' i n order t o c G l l e n g e t h e v a l i d i t y -- o f t h e search o f a dwelling place cannot - be taken --- i n i t s f u l l s w e e p beyond - t h e f a c t s of t h a t case. --- "Katz v. United S t a t e s , 389 U S 347 (1967), pro- v i d e s guidance i n defining t h e scope of the i n t e r e s t protected by t h e Fourth Amendment. I n t h e course of repudiating t h e d o c t r i n e de- r i v e d from Olmstead v. United S t a t e s , 277 U S 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United S t a t e s , 316 U S 129 (1942), t h a t i f p o l i c e o f f i c e r s had n o t been g u i l t y of a common-law t r e s p a s s they were n o t prohibited by t h e Fourth Amendment from eavesdropping, t h e Court i n Katz held t h a t c a p a c i t y t o claim t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Fourth Amendment depends n o t upon a property r i g h t i n t h e invaded place b u t upon whether t h e person who claims t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Amendment has a l e g i t i m a t e expectation of privacy i n t h e in- vaded place. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] Viewed - i n t h i s manner, the holding Jones --- can b e s t be explained t h e f a c t t h a t Jones had a l e g i t i - mate expectation of privacy -- i n t h e premises he was --- using and t h e r e f o r e could claim - t h e pro-- t e c t i o n of t h e Fourth Amendment with r e s p e c t - - - - t o a governmental invasion of those premises, even though h i s ' i n t e r e s t ' i n those premises might n o t have been a recognized property in- terest a t common l a w . [Citation omitted.]" Rakas v. I l l i n o i s , 439 U.S. a t 141-43. The Court went on t o f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h Rakas from Jones and s t a t e d : ". . . Jones not only had permission t o use t h e apartment of h i s f r i e n d , but had a key t o t h e apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions i n the apartment. Except with r e s p e c t t o hi r; f r i e n d , Jones had complete dominion and c o n t r o l over t h e apartment and would exclude o t h e r s from it. Likewise i n Katz, t h e defendant occupied the telephone booth, s h u t t h e door behind him t o exclude a l l o t h e r s and paid the t o l l , which 'en- t i t l e d [him]' t o assume t h a t t h e words he u t t e r [ e d l i n t o t h e mouthpiece [would] n o t be broadcast t o t h e world.' [Citation omitted.] Katz and Jones could l e g i t i m a t e l y expect prlvacy i n t h e a r e a s which w e r e t h e subject of t h e search and s e i z u r e each sought t o contest. . ." 439 U.S. a t 1 4 9 . Similarly, i n t h i s case, defendant had a l e g i t i m a t e expectation of privacy i n t h e apartment searched. H e shared it with h i s g i r l f r i e n d and except with r e s p e c t t o her had complete dominion and c o n t r o l over t h e apartment and could exclude o t h e r s from it. H e r e , a s i n Jones and Katz, t h e defendant had a l e g i t i m a t e expectation of privacy i n t h e a r e a s s u b j e c t t o t h e search and seizure. Defendant w a s , therefore, e n t i t l e d t o c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y of the search and seizure. Once it has been determined t h a t defendant w a s e n t i t l e d t o c o n t e s t the l e g a l i t y of t h e search and seizure, our a n a l y s i s must s h i f t t o t h e question of whether t h e chal- lenged search and seizure violated defendant's Fourth Amend- ment r i g h t s . "That inquiry requires a determination of whether t h e disputed search and s e i z u r e has infringed an i n t e r e s t of the defendant which t h e Fourth Amendment was designed t o protect." Rakas v. 439 U.S. Defendant contends t h a t the p o l i c e lacked s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o make a warrantless e n t r y i n t o t h e apart- ment. H e concludes, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e e n t r y w a s unlawful and any evidence seized should be suppressed. The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, contends t h a t under t h e f a c t s and circum- stances of t h i s c a s e t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s had probable cause t o believe a n o f f e n s e had been o r was being committed before they ever entered t h e apartment, and t h e r e f o r e , they had t h e r i g h t t o e n t e r t h e apartment and make t h e a r r e s t . A s t h e arrest, search and s e i z u r e w e r e made without warrants, t h e outcome of t h i s case rests on a determination of whether o r n o t t h e search and s e i z u r e w e r e made i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t . The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e , then, i s whether defendant's a r r e s t w a s lawful a t t h e o u t s e t , thereby j u s t i - fying t h e subsequent search and s e i z u r e of t h e contraband which l e d t o defendant's conviction. For purposes of t h i s decision it i s necessary t o p l a c e t h e discussion of t h e p l a i n view :;elz.lre of t h e marijuana on t h e c o f f e e t a b l e and t h e subsequent search of t h e rest of t h e house on d i f f e r e n t planes. Our reasons f o r doing so w i l l soon become obvious. The lawfulness of. defendant's arrest must be measured by t h e standards prescribed i n s e c t i o n 46-6-401, MCA. S t a t e v. Hull (1971), 158 Mont. 6, 487 P.2d 1314, 1319. This s e c t i o n provides i n p a r t : "A peace o f f i c e r may a r r e s t a person when: " ( 4 ) he b e l i e v e s on reasonable grounds t h a t t h e person is committing an offense o r t h a t t h e person has committed an offense and t h e e x i s t - i n g circumstances r e q u i r e h i s immediate a r r e s t . " Section 46-6-106, IICA, provides: "Manner of arrest without warrant. A peace officer or person making an arrest without a warrant must inform the person to be arrested of his authority, if any, of the intention to arrest him, and the cause of the arrest, ex- cept when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or In an attempt to commit an offense or is pursued immediately after its commission or after an escape or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. " This Court has on previous occasions and under similar factual situations had cause to decide the issues presented here. In State v. Hull, supra, we determined defendant's arrest was based on reasonable grounds where, prior to their entry, arresting officers had received information from an informer that a "pot party" was in progress. When the officers arrived at the scene it was obvious from the music and noise that a party was in progress. They also smelled the aroma of burning or burnt marijuana emanating from the residence. After being told by the informer, who had just left the party, that there was hashish being smoked in the house, the officers entered the residence and arrested several persons, including defendant. A search of defendant yielded an amphetamine tablet. This Court held the entry into the residence without a warrant for purposes of effect-- ing the arrest and searching defendant incident to that arrest was constitutionally and statutorily permissible, because there was sufficient probable cause to do so. Hull, 487 P.2d at 1320.: In State v. Bennett (1972), 158 Mont. 496, 493 P.2d 1077, police officers received information indicating drug activity was taking place at defendant's apartment. They were also informed that one of the defendants was a drug dealer. Additionally, the landlady informed one of the o f f i c e r s t h a t drugs possibly w e r e being used i n defendant's apartment. Based on t h e landlady's complaint and informa- t i o n received, t h e o f f i c e r s went t o defendant's apartment t o i n v e s t i g a t e . When they a r r i v e d , they observed one of t h e defendants, a suspected drug d e a l e r , e n t e r t h e apartment. Upon approaching t h e apartment they noticed the odor of burning marijuana coming from t h e open door of t h e a p a r t - ment. The o f f i c e r s entered t h e apartment, walked up a s h o r t stairway and observed t h e t h r e e defendants s i t t i n g around a t a b l e on which t h e r e was a marijuana roach and a c l e a r p l a s t i c bag containing what they believed t o be marijuana. The defendants were immediately a r r e s t e d and t h e marijuana seized. Even though t h e e n t r y and search w e r e conducted without a warrant, t h i s Court held t h e e n t r y i n t o t h e apart- ment t o a r r e s t and t h e search i n c i d e n t t h e r e t o c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l l y permissible. S t a t e v. Bennett, 493 P.2d a t 1082. I n our discussion i n Bennett, w e concluded t h a t t h e f a c t s involved t h e r e i n came within - t h e e x i g e n t circumstances exceptions -- t o t h e warrant requirement of t h e Fourth Amend- ment and Johnson v. United S t a t e s (1948), 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436. W e a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t , while t h e r e i s no "knock and announce" r u l e i n Montana, where an o f f i c e r i s attempting t o make an a r r e s t without a warrant, he has t h e duty t o inform t h e person t o be a r r e s t e d of h i s a u t h o r i t y i n so a c t i n g and t h e cause f o r s o a c t i n g unless t h e a r r e s t e d p a r t y i s taken i n t h e a c t u a l commission of t h e offense o r has escaped and i s immediately pursued. 493 P.2d a t 1081. Both Hull and Bennett were r e c e n t l y r a t i f i e d by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Means (1978), M o n t . - , 581 P.2d 406, 35 St.Rep. 673. While w e would be remiss i f w e d i d n o t voice our con- cern here t h a t a r r e s t and search warrants should be used as t h e r u l e and not t h e exception, s u f f i c i e n t exigent circum- stances e x i s t e d here, e s p e c i a l l y due t o t h e involvement of juveniles, t o j u s t i f y t h e warrantless e n t r y and a r r e s t . Therefore, under t h i s C o u r t ' s holdings i n Hull and Bennett, and based on t h e above f a c t s , w e f i n d t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly concluded t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s had s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o make t h e warrantless e n t r y and a r r e s t . The s e i z u r e of t h e marijuana on t h e t a b l e was a l s o proper under e i t h e r a " p l a i n view" theory o r a s e i z u r e i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t theory. Coolidge v. New Hamp- s h i r e (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564; S t a t e v. Hull, supra; S t a t e v. Bennett, supra; s e c t i o n 46-5- 102(3) and ( 4 ) , MCA. While t h e o f f i c e r s ' i n i t i a l e n t r y i n t o t h e apartment and t h e subsequent arrest and s e i z u r e of t h e marijuana on t h e t a b l e was v a l i d , t h e so-called "consent" search of t h e rest of t h e apartment was unlawful. There is no doubt t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t have a u t h o r i t y t o search t h e e n t i r e house. Section 46-5-102, MCA; Chime1 v. C a l i f o r n i a (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. The i n i t i a l break i n t h e o f f i c e r s ' lawful conduct came when they secured M s . Smith's "consent" t o search t h e house by fraudulent117 t e l l i n g her t h a t i f she fai.1-ed t o consent they could gain consent t o search t h e apartment from t h e landlord. When a law enforcement o f f i c e r claims a u t h o r i t y t o search a home under a warrant, Bumper v. North ~ a r o l i n a (1968), 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, o r t h r e a t e n s t o obtain a search warrant, United S t a t e s v. Boukater ( 5 t h C i r . 1969), 409 F.2d 537, o r makes a f l a t a s s e r t i o n t h a t he has come t o search, Amos v. United S t a t e s (1921), 255 U.S. 313, 4 1 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654, ". . . he anounces i n e f f e c t t h a t t h e occupant has no r i g h t t o r e s i s t t h e search. The s i t u a t i o n i s i n s t i n c t with coercion--albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where t h e r e i s coercion, t h e r e carnot be consent." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. a t The o f f i c e r s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e informed M s . Smith t h a t i f she d i d n o t consent t o t h e search they could secure consent from her landlord. M s . Smith's consent w a s based on t h i s fraudulent show of a u t h o r i t y , and, a s such, t h e consent was coerced and t h e r e f o r e i n v a l i d . One o t h e r f a c t o r makes M s . Smith's consent i n v a l i d . Section 41-5-303, MCA, of t h e Montana Youth Court Act, provides : "When a youth i s detained f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r questioning upon a matter which could r e s u l t i n a p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e youth being detained i s e i t h e r delinquent o r i n need of supervision, t h e following requirements must be m e t : " ( 1 ) The youth s h a l l be immediately and effec- t i v e l y advised of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and h i s r i g h t s under t h i s chapter. " ( 2 ) The youth may waive such r i g h t s under t h e following s i t u a t i o n s : " ( a ) when t h e youth i s under t h e age of 1 2 years, t h e p a r e n t s of t h e youth may make an e f f e c t i v e waiver; " ( b ) when t h e youth i s over t h e age of 12 years and t h e youth and h i s p a r e n t s agree, they may make an 3 f f e c t i v e waiver; and " ( c ) when t h e youth is over t h e age of 12 years and t h e youth and h i s p a r e n t s 20 n o t agree, t h e youth may make an e f f e c t i v e waiver only with advice of counsel." The record r e v e a l s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s f a i l e d t o read M s . Smith o r t h e o t h e r juveniles involved here t h e i r youth c o u r t a c t r i g h t s . Further, i n order t o e f f e c t i v e l y waive her c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s , t h e waiver must take place with t h e agreement of the youth and her p a r e n t s o r on advice of counsel. M s . Smith's p a r e n t s w e r e n o t informed nor Was counsel obtained before t h e "waiver" of r i g h t s and "consent" t o search took place. There i s no question t h a t consent t o search t h e premises required M s . Smith t o waive h e r Fourth Amendment r i g h t t o be f r e e of unreasonable searches under t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. M s . Smith lacked t h e capacity t o g i v e t h i s consent, and her consent t o search was t h e r e f o r e i n v a l i d . The S t a t e contends t h a t defendant waived h i s r i g h t t o o b j e c t t o t h e search when he helped t h e o f f i c e r s f i n d t h e contraband, c i t i n g S t a t e v. P e t e r s (1965), 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642. The f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t case and those i n P e t e r s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . I n P e t e r s t h e defendant volun- t a r i l y consented t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n and inspection of t h e c a l v e s on h i s ranch; here, t h e record r e v e a l s t h e defendant vehemently p r o t e s t e d t h e search and informed M s . Smith t h a t she d i d n o t have t o consent. I t was only a f t e r t h e o f f i c e r s i n d i c a t e d they w e r e going t o search anyway t h a t defendant helped them. These a c t i o n s do n o t c o n s t i t u t e a waiver by defendant of h i s r i g h t t o o b j e c t t o t h e search. A s t h e marijuana and seeds seized during t h e subsequent search of t h e house were " f r u i t s " of an unlawful search, t h e District Court should have suppressed them. Wong Sun v. United S t a t e s (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 4 4 1 . The D i s t r i c t Court could properly conclude t h a t prob- a b l e cause and s u f f i c i e n t exigent circumstances e x i s t e d t o j u s t i f y t h e warrantless e n t r y , a r r e s t , and s e i z u r e of t h e marijuana on t h e t a b l e . The subsequent "consent" search of t h e apartment, however, w a s unlawful, t h e r e f o r e t h e contra- band s e i z e d i n t h a t "search" should have been suppressed. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed i n s o f a r a s t h e e n t r y and i n i t i a l search and s e i z u r e of t h e contra- band on t h e c o f f e e t a b l e . The remainder of t h e judgment is vacated and set a s i d e . On oral argument it was admitted t h a t t h e q u a n t i t y of marijuana p r o p e r l y s e i z e d c o n s t i t u t e d a f e l o n y amount, and t h e r e is no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e t a i n t e d evidence has any e f f e c t on t h e remainder seized; it is t h e r e f o r e unnecessary to remand t h e cause t o the D i s t r i c t Court a s t h e r e s u l t would be unchanged. The sentence i s - t h e r e f o r e affirmed. .a. . . . - 0 - , . - . . , I - / A , : 'i t . . - / . / '/ ( ,/p,c,,--/ J u s t i c e - W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e u e J u s t i c e s Kr. Chief Justice Frank I . Haswell dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority hold that the subsequent search of the apart- ment violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti- tution and the contraband seized should not have been admitted in evidence at the trial. Nonetheless, they affirm the conviction because the remaining admissible evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. Where, as here, federal constitutional error has occurred we are required to determine whether such error constitutes harm- less or prejudicial error. The test is whether this Court can declare its belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v . California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L Ed 2d 705. The majority have not addressed this question. Here defendant was charged with possession of approximately 372 grams of marijuana, a felony. The admissible evidence to sup- port this charge consisted of several pipes and a small bag of marijuana in plain view on a coffee table in the apartment. The subsequent unlawful search uncovered a vial of seeds, a sack of stems, several small bags of marijuana, a large bag of marijuana, several small bags of seeds, a scale, a black pipe, a $100 bill and five $1 bills. The total weight of all the marijuana, both that which was admissible and that which was not, was 387.07 grams. I find no evidence that the small bag of marijuana on the coffee table (which is the only admissible marijuana) exceeded 60 grams in weight so as to constitute a felony. Without such proof, the evidence is insufficient to support the felony conviction. Additionally the jury could infer from the tainted evidence that defendant was a "pusher" or drug dealer because of the large amount of marijuana, the scales, and the money. For these reasons I can- not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not contribute to defendant's conviction. Fahy v. Connecticut (1963), 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L Ed 2d 171, nor that such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, supra. I would vacate the conviction and rexand the case to the District Court for a new trial. Chief Justice I concur with Chief Justice Haswell's dissent. Justice