Title: People v. Dameron
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87443
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2001

Docket No. 87443-Agenda 2-January 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								TONY J. DAMERON, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the Kane County circuit court, the
defendant, Tony Dameron, was convicted of first degree murder
for killing his three-month-old daughter. The defendant waived his
right to a sentencing-phase jury, and the trial court found him
eligible for the death penalty. The court then found no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to preclude the death penalty and
sentenced the defendant to death. That sentence has been stayed
pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b);
134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).
	We affirm the defendant's conviction, but we reverse his
death sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
BACKGROUND
	Rachel Dameron was born on May 23, 1995. She lived with
her mother, Cynthia Michniewicz, her one-year-old half-brother,
Christopher Thornton, and her father, the defendant, in an Aurora
apartment.
	The defendant was unemployed, and he would baby-sit
Christopher and Rachel while Michniewicz worked. On August
29, 1995, the defendant told Michniewicz he planned to attend a
sobriety party at a local restaurant. He assured her that he would
return around 9 p.m. to watch the children, so she could leave for
work. When the defendant failed to arrive, Michniewicz left him
a note saying she took the children to the Alejandros' house.
Neighbors Deborah and David Alejandro (Deborah and David)
occasionally cared for Christopher and Rachel.
	The defendant did not attend a sobriety party. Instead, he
walked to several Aurora bars where he drank beer and hard liquor
from 5 p.m. to 1 a.m. When the defendant came home around 1:30
a.m., he saw Michniewicz's note and went to the Alejandros'
house to retrieve the children. Deborah gave him Rachel.
Christopher was sleeping, so he remained with the Alejandros.
	At trial, the defendant testified that he brought Rachel to their
apartment, took her upstairs to bed, and went downstairs to shoot
some heroin. When Rachel began crying, he went back upstairs to
attend to her. As the defendant was taking her downstairs for a
bottle, he dropped her. The defendant saw Rachel was not
breathing; he told her to wake up and smacked her face to revive
her. The next thing the defendant remembered was Michniewicz
waking him later that morning.
	Michniewicz returned to the apartment around 6:30 a.m. and
found the defendant sleeping in bed. She woke him to ask about
the children, and he told her that both children had stayed with the
Alejandros overnight. Michniewicz got into bed to sleep for
several hours. According to the defendant, he arose and went to
the children's playroom. Inside the closet, he saw Rachel's lifeless
body wrapped in a towel. The defendant put Rachel and the towel
into plastic bags and then into a canvas duffel bag. He placed the
duffel bag inside the closet and returned to bed. The defendant
woke Michniewicz around 9:30 a.m. She asked if she should
retrieve the children from the Alejandros; he said he would.
Around 10:30 a.m., Michniewicz left to meet a friend from work,
and the defendant visited the Alejandros to get Christopher. The
defendant soon returned to the Alejandros and told David that
Rachel had been kidnapped. David drove the defendant to a pay
telephone to call the police.
	An Aurora police officer was dispatched to the defendant's
apartment around 11:30 a.m. The officer met the defendant, who
reported that he had left Rachel in her car seat outside their
apartment while he went inside to warm a bottle for her; when he
returned, she was gone. Aurora police investigator Randall Place
soon arrived at the defendant's apartment and spoke with the other
police officer. Officer Place briefly surveyed the apartment, then
asked the defendant to accompany him to the police station. The
defendant agreed, locked the apartment, and left with Officer
Place.
	At the police station, the defendant gave Officer Place
background information about his relationship with Michniewicz.
The defendant gave his keys to the police, who returned to the
apartment to search for Rachel. Inside the playroom closet, an
officer found the canvas duffle bag. He opened it and found two
white plastic bags. The officer felt a damp towel inside the second
plastic bag. He looked inside and saw a baby's arm or leg. Around
2:30 p.m., Officer Place received a call from the defendant's
apartment that Rachel was dead.
	Officer Place gave Miranda warnings to the defendant and
told him that Rachel had been found inside the apartment. When
this statement elicited no reaction from the defendant, Officer
Place asked the defendant to tell the police what he knew about
Rachel. The defendant responded that he had killed Rachel-that he
had dropped her on the stairs.
	An autopsy revealed at least 37 types of injuries to Rachel's
body, including blunt force trauma, skull and spine fractures,
various other bone fractures, brain injury, contusions,
strangulation marks, and lacerations of the liver and genital area.
Rachel also had been exposed to water; her body had been washed.
Rachel's head was deformed and discolored, and her brain was
liquified. Blood and brain matter seeped from her right ear. Her
vagina was dilated and stretched, and her vaginal and anal areas
were torn. Not all of these injuries could be explained by falling
down stairs; Rachel's injuries were not accidental. The forensic
pathologist who performed the autopsy surmised that Rachel had
been wielded by the legs and swung against a smooth, hard surface
more than 10 times. This beating caused her death.
	On September 18, 1998, the jury convicted the defendant of
first degree murder. On September 21, 1998, the trial court found
him eligible for the death penalty on two grounds: the defendant
murdered a person during an attempted aggravated criminal sexual
assault (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West 1996)); and the defendant
murdered a person under 12 years of age, and the death resulted
from "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1996)). On October
6, 1998, after a two-week aggravation/mitigation hearing, the court
sentenced the defendant to death. This appeal followed. See 134
Ill. 2d R. 603.
ANALYSIS
	The defendant's appeal raises eight issues. These issues fall
into three categories: guilt-phase issues, sentencing-phase issues,
and issues attacking the constitutionality of the Illinois death
penalty statute.
1. Guilt-Phase Issues
	The defendant first contends he was denied a fair trial
because, on direct examination by the State, Officer Place
mentioned the defendant's post-Miranda-warning request for an
attorney. On this legal issue, we review the record de novo. People
v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 307 (1999).
	During direct examination by the State, Officer Place testified
that he gave Miranda warnings to the defendant. The State
questioned Officer Place about his interview with the defendant:
			"Q. What did he say to you at that time?
			A. The second time I said Tony, you need to tell us
what you know, and he said I killed her, I was drunk and
I was taking her downstairs to fix her a bottle an [sic] I
dropped her on the stairs.
			Q. And in response to that question did you know she
was dead what did he say?
			A. Umm, at that point he said that she was dead, she
was dead. Again, no eye contact, just stared straight
ahead.
			Q. Did you ask him whether or not he believed she was
dead?
			A. Umm, that question was asked, and he stated that
she-that she in fact was dead.
* * *
			Q. And what did he say after that if anything?
			A. Umm-Officer Snyder asked him: When you knew
Rachel was dead, what did you do with the body? At that
point he said: I can't remember. I just freaked out. I can't
remember.
			And then in turn I asked him after that: Was the amount
of alcohol you drank was that a factor in you dropping
Rachel on the stairs? And he stated: No, it wasn't. It was
all me. And then he took a breath, he said: It was all my
fault.
			And then at that point he looked up, he did make eye
contact with me, and he stated that he wanted to talk to an
attorney, and I didn't ask him anymore questions."
	Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, and the
State conceded Officer Place's statement was improper. The trial
court denied the defendant's mistrial motion. Instead, the court
barred the State from making further references to Officer Place's
testimony about the defendant's request for an attorney or Place's
testimony about the defendant's eye contact during the interview.
The court also offered to give a curative jury instruction. After
conferring with the defendant, defense counsel declined this offer,
stating any instruction would only highlight the improper
testimony and compound any error.
	In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held
that the prosecution generally cannot use a defendant's post-Miranda-warning silence for impeachment purposes without
violating due process. People v. Pegram, 124 Ill. 2d 166, 176
(1988). The Doyle rule also applies to a defendant's post-Miranda-warning request for an attorney. See Wainwright v. Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284, 295 n.13, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623, 632 n.13, 106 S. Ct. 634, 640 n.13 (1986); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 432
(1989).
	A violation of the Doyle rule, however, may constitute
harmless error. People v. Miller, 96 Ill. 2d 385, 395 (1983). We
have recognized at least five factors for a court to consider in
determining whether a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) the party who elicited the testimony about
the defendant's silence; (2) the intensity and frequency of the
references to the defendant's silence; (3) the use that the
prosecution made of the defendant's silence; (4) the trial court's
opportunity to grant a mistrial motion or to give a curative jury
instruction; and (5) the quantum of other evidence proving the
defendant's guilt. People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 467-68
(1992); People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 354-55 (1992); Lucas,
132 Ill. 2d at 432-33; Miller, 96 Ill. 2d  at 396; accord People v.
Warren, 217 Ill. App. 3d 778, 783 (1991) (enumerating factors).
	In Miller, the State on cross-examination asked the defendant
why he failed to tell his exculpatory story to the police after his
arrest. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial
court sustained the objection, denied the mistrial motion, and
instructed the jury to ignore the State's question "for the time
being."
	We held that the Doyle violation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Miller, 96 Ill. 2d  at 396. Although the State
asked the question, it was a brief reference to the defendant's
silence which the State never revisited. Miller, 96 Ill. 2d  at 396.
Further, the court issued a prompt curative instruction, and the
record contained sufficient admissible evidence of the defendant's
guilt. Miller, 96 Ill. 2d  at 396.
	In Lucas, the State asked the defendant's mother about
conversations she had with the defendant, and she answered, "The
investigators had told me that [the defendant] had asked for a
lawyer." The defense objected and moved for a mistrial. The court
sustained the objection, but denied the mistrial motion. The court
admonished the defendant's mother not to make further references
to the defendant's silence, and the court accepted a defense request
not to give a curative instruction to avoid drawing the jury's
attention to the testimony.
	We again held that the Doyle violation was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d  at 433. The defendant's
mother volunteered the brief comment, and the State made no
further references to the defendant's request for an attorney. Lucas,
132 Ill. 2d  at 432-33. The court sustained a defense objection to
the comment, the defense declined the court's offer to give a
curative instruction, and the record contained overwhelming
evidence of the defendant's guilt. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d  at 433.
	In Patterson, a police officer, on direct examination by the
State, testified that the defendant said he understood his Miranda
warnings. The police officer stated that he next asked the
defendant, "Do you wish to answer questions, at this time?" The
assistant State's Attorney then asked what the defendant replied.
When the police officer answered "No," the defense moved for a
mistrial. The trial court found the error was harmless and curable
with a jury instruction. The court told the jury to disregard the
comment, and the State made no further mention of the
defendant's post-arrest silence.
	We agreed with the trial court: the Doyle violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 468.
Although the State elicited the police officer's testimony, the brief
statement during a lengthy trial was not egregious, and the curative
jury instruction was clear. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 467. The
prosecution did not rely on the defendant's silence, and the
admissible evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt. Patterson,
154 Ill. 2d  at 467.
	Here, the State elicited Officer Place's testimony on the
defendant's request for an attorney, but the statement was so brief
and isolated that defense counsel asked the trial court not to
highlight the improper testimony by giving a curative jury
instruction. The court barred further references to this statement
and to Place's comments about the defendant's eye contact, and
the State never returned to this testimony. Finally, the State
presented strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. The Doyle
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
	The defendant next contends he was denied a fair trial because
the involuntary manslaughter jury instructions told the jury that the
State bore the burden to prove him guilty of that offense, but the
State urged the jury to find him not guilty of manslaughter. We
already have rejected this argument (People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 463 (1996); Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 442-43), and the defendant
offers no reason for us to reconsider our earlier holdings. Here, the
instructions properly stated the burden of proof and did not
prevent the jury from considering evidence which would have
allowed an involuntary manslaughter conviction. We affirm his
first degree murder conviction.
2. Sentencing-Phase Issues
	The defendant first contends his sentencing jury waiver was
invalid. We review this legal issue de novo. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d  at
307.
	In June 1997, the defendant filed a pro se "Motion for
instruction that the jury is to presume that if sentenced to life, the
defendant will spend the remainder of his natural life in prison."
This motion was based upon our holding in People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 262 (1988). "[A] Gacho instruction is required in a
capital sentencing hearing where a sentence of natural life in
prison is the only available alternative to the death penalty."
People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 407 (2000); accord People v.
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 73-74 (1998); see Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Criminal, No. 7C.05 (3d ed. 1992).
	Public Act 89-203, effective on July 21, 1995, rewrote section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections. After this
amendment, section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code provided:
			"(a) *** [A] sentence of imprisonment for a felony
shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this
Section, according to the following limitations:
				(1) for first degree murder,
* * *
					(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a
term of natural life imprisonment when the death
penalty is not imposed if the defendant,
* * *
						(ii) is a person who, at the time of the
commission of the murder, had attained the age
of 17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an
individual under 12 years of age ***." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996).
This section applied to the defendant. At the time he was
sentenced, the defendant could receive only life imprisonment or
death.
	In the hearing on the defendant's pro se motion, however,
defense counsel erroneously stated that this court had held Public
Act 89-203, and therefore section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii), violated the
single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, the
defense believed the defendant was not entitled to a Gacho
instruction: "I would have asked for such an instruction, *** but
it's not a mandatory situation now, and so certainly can't tell the
jury if he doesn't get the death penalty he's going to get life,
because that may not be the case." The State agreed that this law
was unconstitutional and that the defendant was not entitled to a
Gacho instruction. The court spoke to the defendant about "well-settled principles" of informing the jury about sentencing
alternatives only when a life sentence is the only alternative to the
death penalty. Defense counsel withdrew the motion; the
defendant assented.(1)
	On several subsequent court dates, the court and the defense
discussed whether the defendant would waive a sentencing jury.
That question was left unresolved. In August 1998, the court
indicated it would limit the defendant's peremptory challenges
from 20 to 14. On August 25, 1998, shortly before the trial date,
the defendant waived his right to a sentencing-phase jury.(2)
	"The right to a sentencing jury in a capital case is a statutory,
not a constitutional, right." People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271,
289 (1987); see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1996). Like a guilt-phase jury waiver, a sentencing-phase jury waiver must be
knowing and intelligent. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 156
(1996); People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (1992). Whether
a defendant's waiver of a sentencing jury is knowing and
intelligent depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 508 (1992).
	The defendant contends his decision to waive a sentencing
jury was not knowing and intelligent. The defendant claims that he
would not have waived a sentencing jury if he had received correct
advice from the trial court and, consequently, the Gacho
instruction he requested. The State, however, argues that the
Gacho-instruction ruling did not affect the defendant's waiver
decision because he waived a jury only after the court limited his
peremptory challenges.
	The State refers us to People v. Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d 116
(1992). In Maxwell, the trial court ruled that evidence of prior
offenses committed by the defendant would be admissible at trial.
Defense counsel advised the trial court that the defendant wished
to waive a sentencing jury for three reasons: first, defense counsel
believed the judge might be more lenient than a sentencing jury;
second, defense counsel wanted to avoid death-qualifying the
guilt-phase jury; and third, defense counsel wanted to avoid
submitting the sentencing decision to a jury aware of the
defendant's criminal record. Defense counsel incorrectly believed
uncharged offenses were inadmissible in an aggravation/mitigation
hearing; she was unaware that other-crimes evidence was
admissible at sentencing. On direct appeal to this court, the
defendant contended his jury waiver was invalid because he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
	We acknowledged defense counsel's error, but we held this
error was irrelevant to the defendant's waiver decision. Maxwell,
148 Ill. 2d  at 145. The defendant's jury waiver, whether or not it
was premised on a misunderstanding of evidence law,
accomplished defense counsel's strategic goal: preventing the
sentencing jury from hearing about the defendant's criminal
record. Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d  at 144-45. We concluded that
counsel's error was not professionally unreasonable and that the
defendant suffered no prejudice: "[D]efense counsel would have
offered the same recommendation if she had known that the
evidence of the defendant's other crimes would later be admissible
at the sentencing hearing." Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d  at 145; accord
People v. Maxwell, 173 Ill. 2d 102, 116 (1996) (post-conviction
petition appeal).
	Maxwell is distinguishable. The legal error in this case, unlike
the error in Maxwell, precluded the defendant's strategic goal. The
defendant wanted a sentencing jury instructed that its options were
limited to a life sentence or a death sentence. More importantly,
unlike the record in Maxwell, the record here contains no
independent reasons for the defendant's sentencing jury waiver.
The defendant filed his own Gacho-instruction motion, and
defense counsel stated that he would have asked for a Gacho
instruction if he thought the defendant was entitled to one. After
the defendant received erroneous advice and withdrew his pro se
motion, he faced two choices: sentencing by the judge or
sentencing by a jury, which would not receive a Gacho instruction
limiting its options to life or death. When the court trimmed the
defendant's peremptory challenges, he soon chose to waive a
sentencing jury. We reasonably can conclude an incorrect Gacho-instruction ruling irreparably tainted the defendant's waiver
decision.
	Finally, the legal error here, unlike the error in Maxwell, was
not limited to the defense. Every legal professional in this case
erroneously advised the defendant that he was not entitled to a
Gacho instruction. We have held a sentencing jury waiver may be
invalid when a defendant receives erroneous legal advice from the
trial court. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d  at 162 ("the State's argument does
not address or mitigate the fact that the trial judge misstated the
law and misled the defendant into believing that a sentencing jury
waiver was required if he wished to waive a jury for trial"); see
People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 335 (1990) ("The record
shows that defendant made the waiver decision after talking with
his attorney *** and before talking to the judge; so defendant's
waiver decision was not based, even in part, on the judge's
misstatement of law"). Here, defense counsel's erroneous advice
was consistent with that of the trial court. The defendant's
sentencing jury waiver was invalid.
	Although our resolution of the jury waiver issue is sufficient
to reverse the defendant's death sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing, we turn to the defendant's second sentencing
contention because of the importance of the issue involved. The
defendant also contends he was denied a fair sentencing hearing
because the trial judge relied extensively upon evidence outside
the record in deciding to impose the death penalty. The defendant
specifies two improper sources: a social science book (F.
Butterfield, All God's Children: The Bosket Family and the
American Tradition of Violence (1995)) and a transcript of
sentencing comments made by the judge's father in a 1966 murder
trial.
	Initially, we note the State argues the defendant forfeited
review of this issue by failing to object at the time the court
imposed its sentence. But "[a]pplication of the waiver rule *** is
less rigid where the basis for the objection is the circuit judge's
conduct." People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); see People
v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 266 (1986) ("To preserve any error of
the court made at that time [sentencing], it was not necessary for
[defense] counsel to interrupt the judge and point out that he was
considering the wrong factors in aggravation"). Again, we review
this legal issue de novo. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d  at 307.
	"A determination made by the trial judge based upon a private
investigation by the court or based upon private knowledge of the
court, untested by cross-examination, or any of the rules of
evidence constitutes a denial of due process of law." People v.
Wallenberg, 24 Ill. 2d 350, 354 (1962); accord People v.
Thunberg, 412 Ill. 565, 567 (1952); People v. McMiller, 410 Ill. 338, 342 (1951).
	We turn to the trial court's sentencing comments regarding
the social science book:
			"As I listened to the evidence in this case, particularly
the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, which took
the better part of two weeks, I could not help but feel that
I've heard this case before. And I went to my library and
retrieved my copy of a book that was published in the year
1995 entitled All God's Children, the Bosket Family and
The American Tradition of Violence.
			In this case I believe I heard evidence going back three
generations in the family of Tony Dameron. The author of
the book which I mentioned is an individual by the name
of Fox Butterfield, who was, at least at the time this book
was published, an editor of the New York Times. This is
a nonfiction book. It deals with a family known as the
Boskets from about the time of the American Revolution
until the publication of this book in 1995. I feel compelled
to make some reference to observations which the author
makes in the epilogue portion of the book. The items to
which I wish to make reference in my initial thinking
turned out to be quite lengthy, so I have tried to narrow
that down.
			The significance of this volume to the case at hand is
because of the striking resemblance that the family from
which the defendant comes bears to the family of a person
known by the name of Willie Bosket. And Mr. Butterfield
points out the following:
				'In the closing years of the twentieth century, the
number of young boys committing murder has reached
epidemic proportions. Between 1985 and 1993
homicides by 15- to 19-year-old males in the United
States jumped more than 150 percent, almost all of
them involving guns. Willie Bosket is no longer an
anomaly. Stories like his have become all too familiar
as the staple of nightly television news.
				'In the face of this plague of violence, it is easy to
despair. The politicians, reading from the public
opinion polls, have a ready answer: more prisons, tough
three-strikes-and-you're-out jail sentences, and laws to
try juveniles as adults in criminal courts. Some state
legislators have boasted that they have "abolished
childhood" by providing for children as young as age
six to be sent to adult court. By 1995, there were 1.5
million people incarcerated in state and federal prisons
and in local jails around the nation. Another 100,000
youths were confined in juvenile institutions. These
numbers have tripled in the past two decades.'
			In talking about prisons he observes:
				'Prisons have another disadvantage-they are a heavy
financial burden. In 1995 the cost of running the
nation's prison system-along with probation and parole
departments-is running close to fifty billion dollars a
year, up from a mere four billion dollars in 1975.
Keeping a juvenile in New York's division for Youth
for a year now costs $75,000; you could send three
students to Harvard for the same money. In many states,
new laws mandating longer prison terms have forced
local governments into prison construction programs
that are the fastest rising item in their budget. California
has reduced funding for its once excellent state college
and university system to help pay for its growing
number of prisons.
				'Boiled down to its core, everything criminologists
have learned about crime in recent research is that most
adolescents who become delinquent, and the
overwhelming majority of adults who commit violent
crimes, started very young. They were impulsive,
aggressive, irritable children who would not obey their
parents, bullied their neighbors, and acted out when
they got to school. By first and second grade, teachers
can usually identify them in class. They find it difficult
to learn, and fall behind in school. Because they are
accustomed to getting their way by physical force, they
see no reason to change. They actually like the way they
act, and this makes it increasingly difficult to reverse
their antisocial proclivities.'
			And the last reference I make to this treatise is as
follows:
				'In certain ways the rest of the globe has come to
look more like America since the worldwide upsurge in
crime in the 1960s. British homes are now more likely
to be burgled than American ones. Cars in France are
stolen more frequently than in the United States. But in
homicide, we retain our longtime lead. In 1991, the
most recent year for which figures are available, young
men between 15 and 24 in the United States were
murdered at the rate of 37.2 per 100,000. That is almost
ten times higher than the next closest industrialized
country, Italy, and 60 times greater than the homicide
rate among the same age group in England. This is not,
as some people might suppose, merely a disparity
created by the racial composition in our inner cities.
When minorities are factored out, America still has a
disturbingly disproportionate murder rate.
				'In the past few years, perhaps guided by the sudden
popularity of the term "dissing" in movies and rap
music, sociologists and psychologists have begun to
recognize the impact of the notion of disrespect. New
curriculums designed to teach alternate, more peaceful
ways to settle conflicts, have appeared in thousands of
classrooms across the country. Think of the
consequences before you act, is their message. You
don't have to use your fists, or a gun, when someone
insults you. Whether these modern-day civics lessons
are effective is unclear. They may reduce pushing in the
cafeteria line; by themselves, they may not stop
shooting on the street corner.' "
	The State characterizes the judge's comments as a mere
prelude to his sentence. The State relies upon People v. Griffith,
158 Ill. 2d 476 (1994). In Griffith, the trial judge, in sentencing the
defendant, noted that an inmate convicted of murder and sentenced
to natural life imprisonment would return to the general prison
population after one year of disciplinary segregation. The court
said that only the death penalty would deter an inmate already
serving a life sentence from killing fellow inmates and prison
officials.
	We held: "These comments were but one aspect of the judge's
articulation of his rationale for imposition of the death sentence
and were not error. In rendering a sentence, a trial judge is
presumed to have relied upon only competent and reliable
evidence." Griffith, 158 Ill. 2d  at 497. We concluded the defendant
did not overcome this presumption because he offered no evidence
the judge's "rhetorical comments" served as an improper basis for
the death penalty. Griffith, 158 Ill. 2d  at 497.
	The defendant urges us to consider People v. Rivers, 410 Ill. 410 (1951). In Rivers, two teenage girls were indicted for first
degree murder. At the close of the State's case, the defendants
moved for a directed verdict. The trial judge expressed doubt
about the State's case and asked the prosecution to reindict the
girls for conspiracy to commit murder. The judge continued the
case for two months. When the case resumed, the judge displayed
a markedly changed attitude. Without opening the case for
additional evidence, he sua sponte interrogated the girls' fathers
about whether the guns the girls used were registered. The judge
asserted this case involved "a cold-blooded, premeditated killing"
and stated, "Murders by youngsters are on the rampage
everywhere. Almost daily we read of atrocious killings by
juveniles, with some new, shocking angle to the tragedy. Teen-age
murderers have been pampered too often, to the point of national
alarm and disgust." The judge added, "Society cannot long endure
such appalling conditions. It makes law enforcement extremely
difficult. According to the State's Attorney, *** there are over
400,000 unlicenced, and unregistered guns in Chicago, most of
which are exposed to potential murderers and youngsters." Rivers,
410 Ill.  at 415-16. The girls were convicted of murder and
sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. In addressing defense
counsel about arguing a new trial motion, the judge said, "I don't
think you can add to what has been said to me over these weeks
[of recess]." Rivers, 410 Ill.  at 418.
	We reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.
Rivers, 410 Ill.  at 419. We observed:
			"[T]he deliberations of the trial judge are limited to the
exhibits offered and admitted in evidence and the record
made before him in open court. Any private investigation
by the court, either during the trial of the cause or while
the motion for new trial is pending, constitutes a denial to
the defendant of the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law. [Citation.] The defendant in any criminal
proceeding has an inherent and constitutional right that all
proceedings against him shall be open and notorious, and
in his presence, and any inquiry or any acquisition of
information or evidence outside of open court and outside
of the presence of the defendant is prejudicial error. ***
He has a right to rely upon his constitutional guarantee
that nothing shall be considered against him except the
competent evidence introduced in open court, in his
presence, by the witnesses who confront him." Rivers,
410 Ill.  at 416-17.
The record showed "some private investigation" during the two-month recess. Rivers, 410 Ill.  at 418. The defendants'
constitutional rights were violated, regardless of whether this
investigation had an innocent purpose or yielded benign results.
Rivers, 410 Ill.  at 419.
	The comments in this case more closely resemble those in
Rivers than those in Griffith. In Griffith, the judge briefly alluded
to his knowledge of Illinois' penal system. Like the judge in
Rivers, the judge in the defendant's case spoke at length about
social science statistics and vague generalizations about crime he
uncovered through his own investigation. An excerpt from the
Butterfield book recited by the judge also conflicts with evidence
in this case.
	According to the judge, Butterfield wrote that unnamed
criminologists have learned adults who commit violent crimes
begin as bullies: "Because they are accustomed to getting their
way by physical force, they see no reason to change. They actually
like the way they act, and this makes it increasingly difficult to
reverse their antisocial proclivities." All God's Children, at 327.
	Dr. Eric Ostrov, the defendant's forensic psychology expert,
was described by the trial court as "well qualified in his field of
expertise." Dr. Ostrov testified in the aggravation/mitigation
hearing that the defendant suffered from two personality disorders:
borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder.
Dr. Ostrov opined the defendant was not a psychopath, "a person
who has no empathy or feelings for another individual, cold,
calculating, only out for their ownselves, egotistical, destructive if
they need to be." Instead, according to Dr. Ostrov, the defendant
did care for people and felt genuine remorse about his violence
toward Rachel and its consequences for others. In a stipulated
affidavit, Dr. Ostrov added the symptoms of both borderline and
antisocial personality disorders dissipate around age 40.
	We next turn to the judge's reference to sentencing comments
made by his father, a Kane County circuit judge, in a 1966 murder
case:
			"And in thinking about this case, I also recalled in the
summer of 1966 my father before me was called upon to
pass sentence in a case which bears substantial
resemblance to this case. At that time I was a lawyer of
about five years' experience-I'll take that back, that was
before I even became a lawyer. But I remembered how he
anguished at home over what he should do. And what he
did in that case is of no consequence here today, but what
he said in relationship to the circumstances in which he
found himself at that time applies to the circumstances
which I find myself in at this time.
			And on July 8th of 1966 in the case of the People of the
State of Illinois versus Veronica Crews, case number
66-904, he said in part as follows:
				'I take it that it goes without saying that when any
man or woman is elected to the bench no one forces
them to that position, no one makes them accept that
position.
				'When one human being accepts that position and
signs his oath of office and raises his hands to follow
the laws of the constitution of the State of Illinois, he or
she alone assumes those burdens, that he or she, the
same as I, is the only person responsible for the
decisions that he or she gives, the sentences that are
handed out. And I am the only person who must live
with my own conscience.'
			He also stated: 'I am here to carry out the laws as I find
them as fairly and impartially as I know how within the
limits of my own capabilities, but I cannot in my
experience recall to mind a more horrible death than is
witnessed in this case.'
			I can say the same thing in this case, particularly when
it comes to the manner in which Rachel Renee Dameron
died."
	 By recalling his father's anguish over imposing a death
sentence and by comparing the brutality of the 1966 case to that in
the defendant's case, the judge aligned himself with his father in
imposing the death penalty. Again, the judge looked outside the
record.(3)
	In the hearing on the defendant's post-trial motion, the judge
said, "[N]othing contained in that [Butterfield] volume or any of
the other dozens of volumns [sic] that I have read over the years
dealing with matters of criminal jurisprudence *** controlled any
portion of my decision in this case." A judge need not give
controlling weight to the improper evidence to trigger our reversal;
even giving "very little weight" is improper. People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259, 274 (1988) (victim impact statements). Here, the judge
felt compelled to comment upon the Butterfield book and
acknowledged its significance to the defendant's case. He also
noted the substantial resemblance between the defendant's case
and the 1966 case over which his father presided. Additionally, the
judge's comments about and quotations from the Butterfield book,
together with his references to his father's comments, comprise
nearly half of his total sentencing comments. The judge's
references to these sources show that he gave some weight to
them.
	In Rivers, we stated: "When a defendant in a criminal case
waives trial by jury and submits his rights and liberty to a judge,
that judge is in the identical position of the jury and all the
recognized rules for the protection of the defendant's rights apply
with equal force. [Citation.] It is axiomatic that any unauthorized
information reaching the jury is prejudicial error." Rivers, 410 Ill. 
at 419. We reach the same conclusion here. "[T]he trial court may
search within reasonable bounds for facts in an inquiry relative to
aggravation and mitigation. Here, the trial court's search passed
such bounds and was improper." Crews, 38 Ill. 2d  at 339. Our
resolution of this issue alone is sufficient to reverse the
defendant's death sentence and remand for a new sentencing
hearing.
	The trial judge sought alternative avenues of information in
his effort to reach the correct result. Unfortunately, that effort led
to the error here. Accordingly, in order to remove any suggestion
of unfairness, this case should be assigned to a different judge on
remand.
3. Constitutionality of the Illinois Death Penalty Statute
	The defendant challenges the constitutionality of the Illinois
death penalty statute. The defendant contends the statute is
unconstitutional because it places the mitigating evidence burden
of proof on the capital defendant; because it allows the sentencer
to weigh a vague aggravating factor, "any other reason"; and
because it inevitably will allow an innocent person to be executed.
We repeatedly have rejected these arguments, recently in People
v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 357-59 (2000). Accord People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 220 (1998). We adhere to our earlier decisions.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we affirm the defendant's
first degree murder conviction, vacate his death sentence, and
remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Conviction affirmed;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that Dameron's murder conviction
should not be disturbed, but that we should vacate his sentence of
death and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new
sentencing hearing. I write separately because I would further hold
that the State should not be permitted to seek the death penalty on
remand. Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that Dameron's
challenge to this state's death penalty law is meritorious. For the
reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty
law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I,
section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
It is therefore void and unenforceable.
	Because the death penalty law is unconstitutional, Dameron
must now be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(j) (West 1996). At the time Dameron murdered Rachel,
Public Act 89-203 had just taken effect. Under that statute, a
defendant who had attained the age of 17 and been found guilty of
murdering an individual under 12 years of age had to be given a
term of imprisonment of natural life when the death penalty was
not imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996). As the
majority points out, however, Public Act 89-203 was invalidated
by our court in People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), on the
grounds that it violated the single subject clause of the Illinois
Constitution. Accordingly, on remand, Dameron must be
resentenced under the unamended provisions of the Unified Code
of Corrections as they existed prior to the effective date of Public
Act 89-203. See People v. Coleman, 311 Ill. App. 3d 467, 477
(2000).
1.      1The confusion surrounding the defendant's Gacho motion resulted
from a misreading of our opinion in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499
(1997), which held Public Act 89-428 violated the single subject rule
of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 89-428 added section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(vi) to the code. This provision applied to defendants
under age 17, "found guilty of murdering a person under 12 years of age
and the murder is committed during the course of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnaping." 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(vi) (West 1996). This provision did not apply to
the defendant because he was more than 17 years old when Rachel was
killed.
	Ultimately, after the defendant's sentencing proceedings, we held
that Public Act 89-203 also violated the single subject rule. People v.
Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999).

2.      2The defendant received a lengthy waiver admonition from a
different judge than the judge who ruled on the jury instruction request,
limited the defendant's peremptory challenges, and ultimately tried the
case. The defendant does not contend this admonition was inadequate.

3.      3In People v. Crews, 38 Ill. 2d 331 (1967), we reversed the
defendant's conviction and remanded for resentencing because the trial
court relied on unreliable information in imposing the death penalty.
The trial court subsequently reimposed the death penalty. In a second
appeal, we reversed her sentence and imposed a 20- to 35-year sentence
because the trial court's sentence was excessive. People v. Crews, 42 Ill. 2d 60, 66 (1969).