Title: State v. Ruff
Citation: 349 N.C. 213
Docket Number: 550PA97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 550PA97
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TERRY ANTHONY RUFF
On petition for discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
7A-31 from a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 127 N.C.
App. 575, 492 S.E.2d 374 (1997), vacating in part and remanding a
judgment entered by Huffman, J., on 20 February 1996 in Superior
Court, Cleveland County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 11 March
1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Laura E. Crumpler,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Brenda S. McLain for defendant-appellee.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
Defendant was indicted on 24 July 1995 for first-degree
kidnapping and first-degree rape.  He was tried at the
12 February 1996 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Cleveland
County.  The jury found defendant guilty of both charges.  On
20 February 1996, the trial court arrested judgment on the first-
degree kidnapping conviction and entered judgment sentencing
defendant for second-degree kidnapping.  Defendant received a
minimum sentence of thirty-two months’ imprisonment for the
class E felony, which was then enhanced by sixty months pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16A, resulting in a minimum sentence of 92
months’ and a maximum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment.  In a
separate judgment, defendant was also sentenced to a consecutive
term of from 320 months’ to 393 months’ imprisonment for the
class B1 felony of first-degree rape.  Defendant gave notice of
appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals on 20 February
1996.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the part of the
judgment for kidnapping that imposed an enhanced sentence of
sixty months’ imprisonment for use of a firearm during the
commission of second-degree kidnapping.  State v. Ruff, 127 N.C.
App. 575, 585, 492 S.E.2d 374, 379-80 (1997).  For the reasons
discussed herein, we conclude that the Court of Appeals
erroneously vacated defendant’s enhanced sentence.  Accordingly,
we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s
enhanced sentence.
The State’s evidence tended to show that the victim was a
female employed by the Lutz Oil Company in Shelby, North
Carolina.  On 13 June 1995, Mr. Lutz, president of Lutz Oil
Company, asked the victim to drive to the Kings Mountain store in
order to cover for another employee while that employee went to
lunch.  The victim left her Shelby office at 12:15 p.m. and
arrived at the Kings Mountain store at approximately 12:30 p.m. 
Shortly after the victim arrived at the Kings Mountain store, she
began to clean the bathroom.  While cleaning, she heard a side
door open.  The victim left the water in the bathroom running in
order to attend to what she believed to be a customer.  The
customer, later identified as defendant, asked her for some
cigarettes.  As the victim turned around after reaching for the
cigarettes, she saw a gun pointing at her face.  While holding
the gun, defendant told the victim to be quiet and to cooperate.
Defendant then held his gun to the victim’s side and
escorted her outside to his pickup truck.  She testified that she
did not scream or try to escape because she believed defendant
would kill her if she did so.  Defendant and the victim then
traveled down Stoney Point Road.  Defendant stopped the truck and
led the victim to a field while holding the gun to her back.  At
one point, defendant stopped and took off the victim’s pantyhose,
but then continued to lead her further into the field so they
could not be seen from the road.  Once they stopped again, he
removed her shirt and told her to remove her skirt and bra. 
Defendant also removed his own clothes and removed the victim’s
underpants himself.  Defendant ordered the victim to lie down,
then proceeded to commit sexual acts against her and to rape her. 
Afterwards, defendant got dressed and unloaded his gun.  He then
said, “If I’d known it was this easy, I would never have brought
my gun.”
As the victim and defendant traveled back towards the store,
the victim convinced defendant to let her out of the truck before
arriving at the store.  After defendant let the victim out, she
ran to the store and saw a co-employee and a police officer. 
After describing defendant to the officer, she was taken to
Cleveland Memorial Hospital for examination.  The police
apprehended defendant shortly thereafter.
The State contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly
vacated the part of defendant’s sentence that was enhanced by
reason of his use of a firearm.  The State argues that in
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied
upon State v. Westmoreland, 314 N.C. 442, 334 S.E.2d 223 (1985),
and State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984).  We
agree.
In the decision below, the Court of Appeals noted that under
State v. Westmoreland, a trial court “could not aggravate [a]
sentence with acts of the defendant ‘which form[ed] the gravamen
of contemporaneous convictions of joined offenses.’”  State v.
Ruff, 127 N.C. App. 575, 583, 492 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1997) (quoting
Westmoreland, 314 N.C. at 449, 334 S.E.2d at 227-28) (second
alteration in original).  The Court of Appeals then found that
the use of a firearm was the “gravamen” of defendant’s first-
degree rape conviction, and therefore the trial court could not
use it to aggravate defendant’s second-degree kidnapping
conviction.  Id. at 585, 492 S.E.2d at 379-80.  Westmoreland and
Lattimore, the cases upon which the Court of Appeals relied in
reaching its decision in the present case, were decided under the
former Fair Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. ch. 15A, art. 81A (1988). 
However, our legislature has since repealed the Fair Sentencing
Act.  Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 538, sec. 14, 1993 N.C. Sess.
Laws 2298, 2318.  Since defendant was found guilty and sentenced
for crimes occurring after 1 October 1994, the Structured
Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. ch. 15A, art. 81B (1997), provides the
controlling law.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.10 (1997).
The firearm enhancement section of the Structured Sentencing
Act provides:
If a person is convicted of a Class A, B1, B2, C, D, or
E felony and the court finds that the person used,
displayed, or threatened to use or display a firearm at
the time of the felony, the court shall increase the
minimum term of imprisonment to which the person is
sentenced by 60 months.  The court shall not suspend
the 60-month minimum term of imprisonment imposed as an
enhanced sentence under this section and shall not
place any person sentenced under this section on
probation for the enhanced sentence.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16A(a).  This provision does not apply,
however, where “[t]he evidence of the use, display, or threatened
use or display of a firearm is needed to prove an element of the
underlying . . . felony.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16A(b)(2).
We conclude the trial court correctly applied the firearm
enhancement section in this case.  Even though the jury found
defendant guilty of first-degree rape and first-degree
kidnapping, the trial court arrested judgment on the first-degree
kidnapping conviction and entered judgment sentencing defendant
for second-degree kidnapping instead.  Defendant’s conviction and
sentence for the first-degree rape remained intact.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1340.16A requires the trial court to increase defendant’s
term of imprisonment for a felony when the trial court finds that
defendant “used, displayed, or threatened to use or display a
firearm at the time of the felony.”  Here, defendant displayed a
firearm when he kidnapped and raped the victim.  The “underlying
felony” which was enhanced by sixty months’ imprisonment under
the firearm enhancement section is second-degree kidnapping. 
Because the use or display of a firearm is not an essential
element of second-degree kidnapping, the trial court was not
precluded from relying on evidence of defendant’s use of the
firearm and enhancing defendant’s term of imprisonment pursuant
to the firearm enhancement section.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-1340.16A(b)(2).
In determining whether defendant’s sentence for second-
degree kidnapping could properly be enhanced under the firearm
enhancement section, it is irrelevant whether the use of a
firearm was the gravamen of the first-degree rape.  So long as
the use of a firearm is not an essential element of the
underlying felony for which defendant is sentenced -- here,
second-degree kidnapping -- defendant’s term of imprisonment for
that particular felony must be enhanced by sixty months.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals erred in vacating that part of defendant’s sentence which
was enhanced by the firearm enhancement section.  Therefore, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the
Superior Court, Cleveland County, for reinstatement of the
judgment for second-degree kidnapping, including the enhanced
sentence for use of a firearm.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.