Title: Town of Rhine v. Brock O. Bizzell
Citation: 2008 WI 76
Docket Number: 2006AP000450
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2008

2008 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP450 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Town of Rhine, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Brock O. Bizzell, Matthew A. Schuette, Jonathon 
W. Thompson, Timothy J. Van der Vaart, Andrew S. 
Wiesz, Scott R. Wiesz, and Manitowoc Area Off 
Highway Vehicle Club, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 26, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Gary Langhoff   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Joseph R. 
Cincotta and the Law Offices of Joseph R. Cincotta, Milwaukee, 
and by Paul Dirkse and O’Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong, S.C., 
Sheboygan, and oral argument by Joseph Cincotta. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Michael 
E. Lambert and Kummer, Lambert & Fox, LLP, Manitowoc, and oral 
argument by Michael E. Lambert. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Gina M. Ozelie, and Stadler, Centofanti & Phillips, S.C., 
Mequon, on behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lee Turonie, assistant 
legal counsel, Shawno, on behalf of the Wisconsin Towns 
Association. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson and 
Debra P. Conrad, Wisconsin REALTORS® Association, Madison, and 
John A. Kassner III and Murphy Desmond S.C., Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin REALTORS® Association, and oral argument by 
John A. Kassner III. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP450  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV898) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Town of Rhine, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Brock O. Bizzell, Matthew A. Schuette, Jonathon 
W. Thompson, Timothy J. Van der Vaart, Andrew 
S. Wiesz, Scott R. Wiesz, and Manitowoc Area 
Off Highway Vehicle Club, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
   
FILED 
JUL 1, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, Gary Langhoff, Judge.  Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and cause remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).1  The circuit court 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 versions unless otherwise indicated.  References to 
the Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code are to the 2005 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
2 
 
concluded that Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a),2 
"B-2 
Commercial 
Manufacturing 
or 
Processing," 
is 
unconstitutional and that the defendants' nuisance ordinance 
violations should be dismissed.  The court of appeals certified 
two issues to this court.   
¶2 
The first issue is whether Town of Rhine, Wis., 
Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face.  We 
conclude 
that 
§ 4.08(2)(a), 
the 
B-2 
District, 
is 
unconstitutional on its face because it is arbitrary and 
unreasonable in that it precludes any use as of right in the B-2 
District and such limitation bears no substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.   
¶3 
The second issue is whether the circuit court properly 
dismissed the defendants' nuisance ordinance violations.  We 
conclude that the circuit court applied a common-law definition 
of "nuisance" rather than the definition of "public nuisance" 
articulated in Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 2.02.  As a 
result, we remand to the circuit court to apply the code's 
definition of "public nuisance." 
¶4 
Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand to the circuit court for a new hearing on the public 
nuisance claim. 
                                                 
2 Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a) reads in 
part, "[t]here are no permitted uses in the B-2 District, except 
that those uses permitted in the Agricultural Land Districts A-
1, A-2 and A-3 may be authorized in conjunction with any 
conditional uses . . . . All uses are conditional and shall 
comply with the provisions of Section 4.09 of this ordinance."   
No. 
2006AP450   
 
3 
 
I. FACTS 
¶5 
On October 1, 2003, the Manitowoc Area Off Highway 
Vehicle Club, Inc., (hereinafter "the Club") purchased 77.2 
acres of land in section twelve of the Town of Rhine, Sheboygan 
County.  The zoning classification of this land has been "B-2 
Commercial Manufacturing or Processing" for 20 years.  Within 
this classification, "[t]here are no permitted uses in the B-2 
District, except that those uses permitted in the Agricultural 
Land Districts A-1, A-2 and A-3 may be authorized in conjunction 
with any conditional uses . . . . All uses are conditional and 
shall comply with the provisions of Section 4.09 [Conditional 
Uses] of this ordinance."  Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code 
§ 4.08(2)(a). 
 
Conditional 
uses 
in 
the 
"B-2 
Commercial 
Manufacturing or Processing" district include: (1) fabrication 
of consumer or industrial commodities; (2) garbage, rubbish, 
offal, industrial waste and dead animal reduction or disposal; 
(3) quarrying; (4) mining and ore processing; (5) salvage yards 
for wood, metals, papers and clothing; and (6) stockyards.3  Id. 
¶6 
After purchasing the property in 2003, club members 
used the property for riding all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and 
hunting.  On January 6, 2004, pursuant to a request by the Town 
                                                 
3 On March 1, 2005, the Town of Rhine amended the 
conditional uses in the B-2 District to include off-road vehicle 
parks.  The Club initially applied for a conditional use permit 
under the revised ordinance, but it subsequently requested that 
the application be held while the defendants sought to dismiss 
the nuisance ordinance violations.  The conditional use permit 
would have allowed ATV activity on Wednesdays and Fridays from 
10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. but not on weekends or holidays. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
4 
 
of Rhine, the Club's president appeared at a Town of Rhine board 
meeting.4  At the meeting, the Club president was asked what 
activities were occurring on the property.  The Club president 
responded that members "are a group of families that live in the 
city limits and don't own enough property to enjoy outdoor 
recreation such as hunting, horseback riding, bicycling, ATV 
riding etc." 
¶7 
Chairman Sager asked if the Club members were aware 
that the land was zoned B-2 when they purchased the land.  The 
Club president responded that the Club's attorney informed them 
that "because it was zoned business and not residential[,] the 
manner in which they are using the land should not be an issue."  
Chairman Sager then related that B-2 zones require a conditional 
use permit "for any use of the land."  He further stated that 
"an application should be directed to the Plan Commission for 
either a CUP [conditional use permit] or rezoning."  The Club 
president then asked whether he needed to apply for specific 
uses or different zoning.  Chairman Sager answered that it would 
depend on how they intended to use the land.   
¶8 
On May 19, 2004, the Club applied for a conditional 
use permit.  In the conditional use application, the Club stated 
that it wanted to use the property for recreational activities, 
such as hunting and riding ATVs.  The application stated, 
                                                 
4 The record contains minutes from the January 6, 2004, 
meeting.  The minutes are entitled: "Town of Rhine Board of 
Supervisors Regular Monthly Meeting."  Chairman Don Sager 
conducted the meeting. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
5 
 
"[t]his IS NOT a request for a commercial or industrial 
operation."  The conditional use permit was denied on September 
7, 2004.5  Although the record is unclear as to when, the Club 
also applied for the B-2 zone to be rezoned to a B-1, 
"Neighborhood Business" district.  That rezoning request was 
also denied, but it is unclear from the record when it was 
denied.   
¶9 
On 
October 
10, 
2004, 
the 
Elkhart 
Lake 
Police 
Department issued citations to six club members for violating 
the Town of Rhine's Public Nuisance Ordinance.  Town of Rhine, 
Wis., 
Municipal Code § 2.01.  On December 14, 2004, a 
consolidated trial was held for all six defendants.  The Elkhart 
Lake Municipal Court dismissed the ordinance violation due to 
insufficient evidence.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14, the 
Town of Rhine appealed the municipal court's decision to the 
Sheboygan County Circuit Court. 
¶10 On December 19, 2004, in Sheboygan County Circuit 
Court, the Town of Rhine filed a complaint that alleged two 
causes of action.  In the first cause of action, regarding the 
public nuisance violations of the ordinance, the Town of Rhine 
asked for a de novo review of the dismissed citations.  In the 
second cause of action, regarding the zoning violation, the Town 
of Rhine asked for a determination of whether the Club was 
violating the Town of Rhine's zoning code, and the Town of Rhine 
                                                 
5 Neither the minutes of this meeting nor any other source 
appears in the record that provides the board's reasoning.   
No. 
2006AP450   
 
6 
 
sought an order enjoining the Club from operating ATVs on the 
property. 
¶11 On August 29, 2005, a trial to the court was held.  On 
January 13, 2006, the circuit court issued a written decision.  
In that decision, the circuit court characterized the two issues 
as follows: (1) whether the Town of Rhine B-2 zone use 
restriction was constitutional; and (2) whether the Club's use 
of the property constituted a public nuisance.   
¶12 The circuit court concluded "that a zoning ordinance 
which bars all uses within a district is unreasonable."  It 
further stated that "a zoning ordinance which permits no uses 
within a district is confiscatory in nature and oppressive."  
Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the zoning 
ordinance was unconstitutional.  With respect to the nuisance 
claim, the circuit court determined that although the ordinance 
related to a public nuisance, the Town of Rhine's claim was an 
attempt to abate a private nuisance.  The circuit court, citing 
to 
Milwaukee 
Metropolitan 
Sewerage 
District 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658, stated 
that a nuisance is a public nuisance if "the condition or 
activity interferes with the public right or use of public 
space."  The circuit court determined that the nuisance could 
not be a public nuisance because the property at issue was not a 
public place, and the Club's activities did not affect the 
entire community.  As a result, it concluded that the Town of 
Rhine lacked standing to advance the claim.  The Town of Rhine 
appealed the circuit court's decision.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
7 
 
§ 809.61, the court of appeals certified this case to us for 
review and determination.  We accepted the certification.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 "The interpretation and application of an ordinance to 
an undisputed set of facts is a question of law, which this 
court decides de novo."  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, 
¶6, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  The constitutionality of 
an ordinance is also a question of law, which this court reviews 
de novo.  Wilke v. City of Appleton, 197 Wis. 2d 717, 726, 541 
N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1995).   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶14 The Club argues that Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a), the 
B-2 District, is unconstitutional on its face because it 
violates due process in that any use of the property is 
prohibited unless the landowner obtains a conditional use 
permit.  It further argues that there are no clear and objective 
standards for the landowner to obtain a conditional use permit.  
The Town of Rhine, on the other hand, argues that Municipal Code 
§ 4.08(2)(a) is constitutional.  It argues that the B-2 District 
does allow for certain uses of the property under a conditional 
use permit, and therefore, it is inaccurate to assert that B-2 
zoning does not allow any use.  The Town of Rhine also argues 
that Municipal Code § 4.01 sets forth adequate standards for 
obtaining a conditional use permit, and it asserts that a number 
of other municipalities have conditional use provisions similar 
to the Town of Rhine.  We conclude that § 4.08(2)(a) is 
unconstitutional on its face.   
No. 
2006AP450   
 
8 
 
A. Zoning principles 
¶15 Zoning ordinances and land use regulations have a 
useful, valid purpose, and the government has broad authority to 
enact such classifications for the purpose of promoting health, 
safety, morals or the general welfare of the community.  State 
ex rel. American Oil Co. v. Bessent, 27 Wis. 2d 537, 544-46, 135 
N.W.2d 317 (1965). 
¶16 The Town of Rhine has adopted village powers pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 61.35, which states that the powers and duties 
conferred and imposed by Wis. Stat. § 62.23, "City Planning," 
applies to village officials.  Zoning of municipalities is, 
therefore, 
accomplished 
pursuant 
to 
§ 62.23(7) 
and 
its 
subsections. 
¶17 "Zoning ordinances comprehensively assign compatible 
land uses to zoning districts throughout the community."  Daniel 
R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 1.04, at 1-4 (5th ed. 2003).  The 
municipality is generally divided into different districts, such 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
9 
 
as residential, commercial, and industrial.6  Id.  The use of 
comprehensive zoning arose in the early twentieth century, and 
the United States Department of Commerce encouraged the use of 
comprehensive zoning by publishing the model "state enabling 
act."7  1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning 
§ 1.14, at 21 (4th ed. 1996).  Comprehensive zoning earned the 
approval of this court as early as 1923.  State ex rel. Carter 
v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923); see also Village 
of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
(upholding a comprehensive zoning ordinance).  Wisconsin's 
enabling act is found in Chapter 62 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
See Wis. Stat. § 62.23. 
                                                 
6 Alternatives to traditional zoning have arisen over the 
years, such as "form based zoning" or "mixed use zoning."  S. 
Mark White, Classifying and Defining Uses and Building Forms: 
Land-Use 
Coding for Zoning Regulations, American Planning 
Association Zoning Practice, Sept. 2005, at 2-3; Sonia Hirt, The 
Devil is in the Definitions, 73 Journal of the American Planning 
Association, at 436 (Autumn 2007).  "'[F]orm-based zoning' is 
the latest trend in the planning profession."  White, supra, at 
3.  It is "based on the theory that design controls can resolve 
inconsistencies between land uses.  Design controls for [form-
based zoning] ordinances include building envelope standards, 
building 
frontage 
requirements, 
fenestration 
(window 
and 
entryway), facade coverage, and traditional façade modulation 
techniques."  Id. at 2.  In contrast, "mixed use zoning" mixes a 
number of different uses in respective zones rather than 
limiting mixed uses.  Hirt, supra, at 436.  Many urbanists 
believe that mixed use districts are the key to restoring 
vibrancy to American cities.  Id.  However, traditional "use 
districting remains the mainstay of most zoning ordinances" and 
"this is expected to continue for the foreseeable future."  
White, supra, at 3.       
7 See generally 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law 
of Zoning § 2.21, at 67-69 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the 
significance of the Standard State Zone Enabling Act).     
No. 
2006AP450   
 
10 
 
¶18 In American Oil Co., this court stated that a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance was a justified "exercise of the 
police power not only in the interest of public health, morals, 
and safety, but particularly for the promotion of public 
welfare, convenience and general prosperity."  27 Wis. 2d at 
544.  A comprehensive zoning ordinance, enacted pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23, is presumed valid and must be liberally construed 
in favor of the municipality.  American Oil Co., 27 Wis. 2d at 
546. 
¶19 In general, zoning ordinances provide landowners with 
permitted uses, which allow a landowner to use his or her land, 
in said manner, as of right.  Mandelker, supra, § 6.39, at 6-44.  
"Most ordinances impose a broad division of land uses, and, in 
addition, provide that specified uses may be established or 
maintained in named districts, only pursuant to a special 
permit . . . ."  3 Young, supra, § 21.01, at 693-94.  "Uses are 
permitted in designated districts because they are thought to be 
compatible with other uses permitted in such district."  2 
Young, supra, § 9.20, at 169. 
¶20 In addition to permitted uses, ordinances may also 
provide for conditional uses by virtue of a special use or 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
11 
 
conditional use permit.8  A conditional use, however, is 
different than a permitted use.  See S. Mark White, Classifying 
and Defining Uses and Building Forms: Land-Use Coding for Zoning 
Regulations, American Planning Association Zoning Practice, 
Sept. 2005, at 8.  While a permitted use is as of right, a 
conditional use does not provide that certainty with respect to 
land use.  See id.  Conditional uses are for those particular 
uses that a community recognizes as desirable or necessary but 
which the community will sanction only in a controlled manner.  
State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, City of 
Delafield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 701, 207 N.W.2d 585 (1973); 3 Young, 
supra, § 21.06 (discussing uses commonly subject to special 
permit requirements).   
¶21 A conditional use permit allows a property owner "to 
put his property to a use which the ordinance expressly permits 
when certain conditions [or standards] have been met."  Skelly 
Oil Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 701.  The degree of specificity of these 
                                                 
8 In Anderson's American Law of Zoning, "the term 'special 
permit' and 'exception' are not terms of art.  They will be used 
consistently [in Anderson's American Law of Zoning], but the 
ordinances employ in addition to these terms, 'conditional use,' 
'special exception,' 'special use,' and a variety of other 
combinations of descriptive words."  2 Young, supra, § 9.17, at 
162.  See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 6.54 
(5th ed. 2003) (discussing the role and function of conditional 
uses).    
No. 
2006AP450   
 
12 
 
standards may vary from ordinance to ordinance.9  3 E.C. Yokley, 
Zoning Law and Practice § 21-1, at 21-4 (4th ed. 2002) (2002 
revision by Douglas Scott MacGregor). 
¶22 A zone that provides for use of property only when a 
landowner obtains a conditional use permit may face scrutiny.  
See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use 
                                                 
9 Although general standards for determining whether a 
conditional use permit should be granted have been utilized by 
some municipalities, most ordinances provide standards that are 
more detailed.  3 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 21-1, 
at 21-4 (4th ed. 2002) (2002 revision by Douglas Scott 
MacGregor).  The more generalized standards, adopted by some 
municipalities, have simply stated that uses are allowed if they 
are in the "public interest," "general welfare," or "consistent 
with 
the 
'purpose 
or 
intent' 
of 
the 
zoning 
ordinance."  
Mandelker, supra, § 6.03, at 6-6. However, standards must be 
sufficiently specific in order to allow for judicial review.  
See 3 Young, supra, § 21.09, at 709 (discussing the specificity 
of standards).  "An ordinance fails to provide suitable 
standards where it confers on a board [] 'unlimited discretion 
to condition the issuance of the permit on the basis of such 
norms or standards as it may from time to time arbitrarily 
determine.'"  Id. at 711.  Anderson's American Law of Zoning 
provides an example of conditional use standards.  See 5 Alan C. 
Weinstein, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 34.23, at 574-75 
(4th ed. 1997).  While the example in Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning is still general in nature, it provides more guidance 
than, for example, simply allowing those uses that are in the 
"public interest" or "general welfare."  "Cases that invalidate 
[general standards, such as in the 'public interest' or 'general 
welfare,'] emphasize the unlimited discretion they confer on 
zoning agencies."  Mandelker, supra, § 6.03, at 6-6; see also 3 
Young, supra, § 21.09.  "Cases that uphold these standards 
emphasize the need for flexibility in zoning administration and 
the difficulty of drafting more precise criteria."  Mandelker, 
supra, § 6.03, at 6-6.  As noted in Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning, "a sampling of both approved and disapproved standards 
reveals 
an 
overlap 
which 
cannot 
be 
satisfactorily 
explained . . . ." 3 Young, supra, § 21.09, at 715-16. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
13 
 
Planning and Development Regulation Law 283-84 (2d ed. 2007).10  
Conditional use permits, however, remain a widely accepted tool 
of municipal planning.11  Skelly Oil Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 700-01.  
¶23 Allowing 
for 
conditional 
uses, 
in 
addition 
to 
permitted uses as of right, makes sense when one considers the 
                                                 
10 Professors Juergensmeyer and Roberts state: 
From the inception of zoning, the use of the 
special permit has grown. . . .    
 
A court will likely invalidate an ordinance that 
handles all uses by special permit.  The court in 
Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield faced a situation 
that almost went that far.  The authorities zoned the 
entire township for agricultural and residential uses, 
and no other use was possible without issuance of a 
special permit.  The court found the ordinance beyond 
the scope of the enabling statute since the zoning was 
neither uniform nor comprehensive.  It placed too many 
uses subject to "local discretion without regard to 
districts, ruled by vague and elusive criteria, [and 
was] . . . the antithesis of zoning."  The Rockhill 
court's objection may be overstated.  If the standards 
are adequate and written into the ordinance, there is 
no 
reason 
to 
require 
control 
of 
land 
use 
by 
districting rather than a case by case regulatory 
scheme. 
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use 
Planning and Development Regulation Law 283-84 (2d ed. 
2007) (footnotes omitted). 
11 However, zoning experts have differing opinions with 
respect to the value of special permit zoning, i.e., conditional 
use permits.  2 Young, supra, § 9.18, at 166.  Some experts 
believe "that the trend toward more specially permitted uses is 
unfortunate in that it narrows the number of uses which a 
landowner can establish as of right."  Id.  "The special 
requirement [or conditional use permit] is thought by these 
critics to impose too heavy a burden upon landowners by 
requiring them to resort to administrative proceedings to 
vindicate their right to use their lands."  Id. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
14 
 
purpose of the conditional use permit.  First, conditional uses 
are flexibility devices, "which are designed to cope with 
situations where a particular use, although not inherently 
inconsistent with the use classification of a particular zone, 
may well create special problems and hazards if allowed to 
develop and locate as a matter of right in [a] particular zone."  
Id. at 701; see also Gail Easley, Conditional Uses: Using 
Discretion, Hoping for Certainty, American Planning Association 
Zoning Practice, May 2006, at 2 (identifying conditional uses as 
flexibility devices).   
¶24 Second, conditional use permits are appropriate for 
"certain uses, considered by the local legislative body to be 
essential or desirable for the welfare of the community . . . , 
but not at every or any location . . . or without conditions 
being imposed . . . ."  Mandelker, supra, § 6.54, at 6-61 
(citation omitted).  Thus, those uses subject to a conditional 
use permit are necessary to the community, but because they 
often represent uses that may be problematic, their development 
is best governed more closely rather than as of right.   
¶25 "Conditional 
use 
permits"——also 
referred 
to 
as 
"conditional 
uses"——however, 
should 
not 
be 
confused 
with 
"conditional-use district zoning"12 or "conditional zoning."  In 
                                                 
12 "Conditional-Use District Zoning" is also known as 
"conditional-use 
zoning" 
or 
"special-use 
district 
zoning."  
David W. Owens, Legislative Zoning Decisions 93 (2d ed. 1999).  
For an example of a reference to conditional-use zoning, see 
Village Creek Property Owners' Association, Inc., v. The Town of 
Edenton, 520 S.E.2d 793, 796 (N.C. App. 1999). 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
15 
 
"conditional-use district zoning," "a landowner requests that 
some property be placed in a new zoning district that has no 
permitted uses, only special or conditional uses."  David W. 
Owens, Legislative Zoning Decisions 93 (2d ed. 1999).  In such 
zoning: 
[T]he ordinance text is amended to create a set of 
conditional-use 
districts. 
 
These 
conditional-use 
districts have no permitted uses as of right: no new 
use of land may be undertaken unless a special- or 
conditional-use permit is first secured.  Often there 
is one conditional-use district to correspond with 
each regular or general zoning district.  These 
conditional-use districts are "floating zones"; that 
is, they are not applied to any property until a 
petition to apply them is made by the landowner. . . . 
Id. (footnote omitted).  "Conditional zoning," on the other 
hand, is rezoning that is made "subject to the owner's 
acceptance of additional requirements that otherwise are not 
applied in the new zoning district."  Id. at 97; see also 
Mandelker, supra, § 6.62 (discussing "conditional zoning"). 
B. Constitutional principles 
¶26 The role of courts in zoning matters is limited 
because zoning is a legislative function.  Buhler v. Racine 
County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146-47, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).  An 
ordinance is presumed valid and must be liberally construed in 
favor of the municipality.  American Oil Co., 27 Wis. 2d at 546.  
The party challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance 
bears a heavy burden.  See generally 1 Young, supra, §§ 3.01, 
3.14.  In Wisconsin, "an ordinance will be held constitutional 
unless the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
16 
 
the ordinance is entitled to every presumption in favor of its 
validity."  Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West 
Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959); see also 1 
Young, supra, § 3.22 (discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard in Wisconsin).13  "Consequently, although a court may 
differ with the wisdom, or lack thereof, or the desirability of 
the zoning, the court, because of the fundamental nature of its 
power, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the zoning 
authority in the absence of statutory authorization."  Buhler, 
33 Wis. 2d at 146-47. 
¶27 Nonetheless, a properly enacted ordinance must satisfy 
constitutional requirements.  Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 
961 F.2d 1211, 1223 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that "the zoning 
power is not infinite and unchallengeable; it 'must be exercised 
within constitutional limits'").  Land use litigation generally 
arises out of the manner "in which zoning text and ordinance 
classify land into zoning districts."  Mandelker, supra, § 1.04, 
at 1-5.  Constitutional challenges may arise, for example, under 
the takings, due process, or equal protection clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions.  Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1215-16; 
see generally Mandelker, supra, ch. 2, "The Constitutional 
Framework."  Substantive due process claims with regard to land 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin is one of a minority of states that asserts a 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard to successfully challenge the 
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance.  1 Young, supra, 
§ 3.22; see also § 3.20–3.21 (discussing the "fairly debatable 
issue" and "clear and convincing evidence" standards, which are 
applied in the majority of states. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
17 
 
use regulation, as we see in this case, do not have high success 
rates.  Id., § 2.39, at 2-46; but see 1 Yokley, supra, § 3A-1(c) 
(stating that "[s]ubstantive due process claims in land use 
litigation are occurring with more frequency").  Under the due 
process clause, courts generally require that "land use controls 
must advance legitimate governmental interests that serve the 
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare."  Mandelker, 
supra, § 2.39, at 2-46 through 2-47.   
¶28 "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a state from depriving 'any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.'"14  Penterman v. 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 480, 565 N.W.2d 521 
(1997) (citation omitted); see also Laughter v. Board of County 
Comm'rs for Sweetwater County, 110 P.3d 875, 887-88 (Wyo. 2005).  
"The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects 
individuals 
from 
'certain 
arbitrary, 
wrongful 
actions 
'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.''"  Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 480 (citations omitted).  
"Substantive due process forbids a government from exercising 
'power without any reasonable justification in the service of a 
legitimate governmental objective.'"  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 
2000 WI 60, ¶45, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59 (citation 
omitted).  
                                                 
14 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides that "nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
. . . ." 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
18 
 
¶29 The United States Supreme Court has recognized a 
landowner's right to substantive due process in zoning cases.  
See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1217, 1220 (citing to Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 263 (1977); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 
(1928); [Village of] Euclid[, Ohio] v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365, 373 (1926)).  The Supreme Court has stated, "a zoning 
ordinance is unconstitutional when its 'provisions are clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare.'"  Thorp, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, ¶45 (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395). 
¶30 However, when evaluating a claim that a landowner's 
substantive due process rights have been violated, a plaintiff 
must show that he or she has been deprived of a property 
interest that is constitutionally protected.  Thorp, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, ¶46 (citing Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 480).15  "A 
property interest is constitutionally protected if 'state law 
recognizes 
and 
protects 
that 
interest.'" 
 
Thorp, 
235 
                                                 
15 But see Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶60, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, 
612 
N.W.2d 59 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting).  
Chief Justice Abrahamson, joined by Justices Bradley and Sykes, 
wrote: 
The majority [in Thorp] dismisses the plaintiffs' 
substantive due process claim based on the alleged 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 60.61(4) by noting that the 
statute does not secure plaintiffs with property 
rights in their land. [Thorp] Majority op. at ¶48.  
The opinion's language suggests that plaintiffs need a 
statutorily created right to have a property interest 
in their land.  I disagree. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d 610, ¶46.  "[I]t is well settled that the rights of 
ownership and use of property have long been recognized by this 
state." 
 
Penterman, 
211 
Wis. 2d 
at 
480. 
 
Additionally, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) provides that "[a]ll such regulations 
shall be uniform . . . for the use of land throughout each 
district, but the regulations in one district may differ from 
those in other districts."  
C. Town of Rhine's B-2 District and conditional use ordinance 
¶31 The 
Town 
of Rhine's Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a) 
governs the permitted uses of the property at issue and 
provides: 
(2) B-2 COMMERCIAL MANUFACTURING OR PROCESSING.  
(a) Permitted Uses.  There are no permitted uses 
in the B-2 District, except that those uses permitted 
in the Agricultural Land Districts A-1, A-2 and A-3 
may be authorized in conjunction with any conditional 
uses by express reference in the issued conditional 
use permit and upon such terms as the Plan Commission 
may recommend and the Town Board shall determine.  All 
uses are conditional and shall comply with the 
provisions of Section 4.09 of this ordinance. 
(b) Conditional Uses.  The following conditional 
uses may be authorized in the B-2 District pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 4.09 of this ordinance:  
1. Fabrication 
of 
consumer 
or 
industrial 
commodities.  
2. Garbage, rubbish, offal, industrial waste and 
dead animal reduction or disposal.  
3. Quarrying: 
Gravel, 
sand, 
rock, 
and 
soil 
removal and processing. (Rev. 11/04/03)  
4. Mining and ore processing.  
No. 
2006AP450   
 
20 
 
5. Salvage yards for wood, metals, papers and 
clothing.  
6. Stockyards.  
¶32 Section 4.09 of the Town of Rhine's Municipal Code 
governs conditional uses, and it outlines the process to obtain 
a conditional use permit.  "Determination of Plan Commission," 
§ 4.09(4) provides: 
The Plan Commission shall make such written 
findings and determinations as it deems appropriate 
based upon the information submitted to it and 
presented at the public hearing, and shall make a 
written recommendation to the Town Board with regard 
to such conditional use application. . . . In making 
its determinations and recommendations, the Commission 
shall be guided by the purposes, goals and intent set 
forth in or necessarily implied from Section 4.01 
[Interpretation and Purpose] and any other applicable 
sections of this ordinance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶33 Section 4.01(1), "Purpose," in relevant part outlines 
that "[t]he purpose of this ordinance is to promote the health, 
safety, morals and general welfare of the Town of Rhine by 
regulating and restricting" the use of land.  Section 4.01(2), 
"Intent," states: 
It is the general intent of this ordinance to: 
(a) Stabilize and protect property values and the 
tax base. 
(b) Recognize the needs of agriculture, forestry, 
industry and business in future growth. 
(c) Further the appropriate use of land and 
conservation of natural resources. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
21 
 
(d) Encourage 
the 
wise 
use, 
conservation, 
development and protection of the Town's water, soil, 
wetland, woodland and wildlife resources.   
(e) Preserve natural growth and cover and promote 
the natural beauty of the township. 
(f) Prevent 
overcrowding 
and 
avoid 
undue 
population concentration and urban sprawls. 
(g) Facilitate the adequate provision of public 
facilities and utilities. 
(h) Lessen congestion and promote the safety and 
efficiency 
of 
streets, 
highways 
and 
other 
transportation systems. 
(i) Provide 
adequate 
light, 
air, 
sanitation, 
drainage and open space. 
(j) Regulate the use of structures, lands and 
waters outside of shoreland areas. 
(k) Regulate lot coverage, population density and 
distribution and the location and size of structures. 
(L) Prohibit uses or structures incompatible with 
the natural characteristics, existing development or 
intended development within or adjacent to a zoning 
district. 
(m) Implement those municipal, county, watershed or 
regional plans or their components adopted by the township. 
D. Constitutionality of the Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code 
§ 4.08(2)(a), "B-2 Commercial Manufacturing or Processing" 
¶34 We conclude that Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a), the B-2 
District, is unconstitutional on its face because it is 
arbitrary and unreasonable in that it precludes any use as of 
right in the B-2 District and such limitation bears no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare.   
No. 
2006AP450   
 
22 
 
¶35 A facial substantive due process challenge, as the 
landowners have made in this case, is only one of many ways in 
which a landowner can challenge a limitation on the use of his 
or her land.  See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1215-16.  However, facial 
substantive due process challenges are rarely successful.  
Mandelker, supra, § 2.39, at 2-46.  The seminal zoning case, 
which involved a facial substantive due process challenge, is 
Euclid.16  See Mandelker, supra, § 2.06 (discussing Euclid).  In 
Euclid, 
the 
court 
upheld 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance against a facial substantive due 
process challenge.  Id. at 2-9 and 2-10.  The Village of Euclid 
adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance that zoned the area in 
question so as to allow only residential use.  See Euclid, 272 
U.S. at 379-84.  In so doing, it excluded all non-residential 
uses.  Id.  The Supreme Court noted that the exclusion of 
industrial use included even those industrial uses that are 
"neither offensive nor dangerous."  Id. at 388.  The Court 
concluded that "[i]t cannot be said that the ordinance in this 
respect 'passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character 
of a merely arbitrary fiat.'"  Id. at 389 (citation omitted).  
The Court stated:  
If it be a proper exercise of the police power to 
relegate 
industrial 
establishments 
to 
localities 
separated from residential sections, it is not easy to 
find a sufficient reason for denying the power because 
the effect of its exercise is to divert an industrial 
                                                 
16 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365 
(1926). 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
23 
 
flow from the course which it would follow, to the 
injury of the residential public, if left alone, to 
another course where such injury will be obviated.  It 
is not meant by this, however, to exclude the 
possibility of cases where the general public interest 
would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality 
that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in 
the way. 
Id. at 389-90.   
¶36 In the wake of Euclid, other cases have helped to 
clarify 
the 
discussion 
regarding 
substantive 
due 
process 
challenges to zoning.  See, e.g., Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6 (1977); Pearson, 961 F.2d 
1211.  Even so, the line between a valid or invalid exercise of 
police power remains less than clear.  As the Court noted in 
Euclid, "[t]he line which in this field separates the legitimate 
from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of 
precise 
delimitation. 
 
It 
varies 
with 
circumstances 
and 
conditions.  A regulatory zoning ordinance, which would be 
clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly 
invalid as applied to rural communities."  Euclid, 272 U.S. at 
387. 
¶37 While the line between permissible and impermissible 
zoning may not always be readily ascertainable, the requisite 
standard that must be applied for a substantive due process 
challenge is clear: we must determine whether the ordinance is 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable in the restricted sense that 
it has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
24 
 
morals or general welfare.17  Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Pearson, 
961 F.2d at 1223. 
¶38 Certainly, municipalities may regulate where and under 
what circumstances certain less desirable uses, such as salvage 
yards and stockyards, may be developed.  However, here no 
justification exists for precluding all uses in the B-2 District 
and only providing the landowner with the possibility of 
obtaining a conditional use permit.  Ordinances can be drafted 
so the acceptable uses as of right do not conflict with the 
conditional uses.  Municipalities have the power to zone 
property and restrict where particular undesirable uses may be 
                                                 
17 Recently, in Action Apartment Association, Inc. v. Santa 
Monica Rent Control Board, the Ninth Circuit discussed this 
standard when the plaintiff brought a facial substantive due 
process challenge to a rent control ordinance.  509 F.3d 1020, 
1022 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Court stated:   
The Landlords do not assert that the government 
has taken their property within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment.  They do, however, assert that the 
provisions of the rent control ordinance neither serve 
nor 
are 
rationally 
related 
to 
any 
legitimate 
government purpose, and therefore unconstitutionally 
violate their right to use their property as they see 
fit.  Specifically, they argue that the provisions are 
arbitrary, unreasonable, and unrelated to the general 
welfare because there is no legitimate interest in 
subsidizing non-housing uses of rental properties nor 
in providing new rights and affirmative defenses for 
illegal occupants, particularly where California law 
does not recognize illegal occupants as tenants.  [A] 
regulation 
that 
fails 
to 
serve 
any 
legitimate 
governmental 
objective 
may 
be 
so 
arbitrary 
or 
irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process 
Clause. . . . 
Id. at 1026 (quotations and citations omitted). 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
25 
 
developed within the municipality.  However, zoning that 
restricts the land such that the landowner has no permitted use 
as of right must bear a substantial relation to the health, 
safety, morals or general welfare of the public in order to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.  In this case, the restricted 
use of the B-2 District land does not bear a substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare. 
¶39 We note that rather than precluding all uses as of 
right in a particular zone, the more common, acceptable practice 
is to provide for permitted uses as of right, and then in 
addition to permitted uses, the ordinance may provide for 
conditional uses.  Case law, treatises, zoning journals, and the 
Town of Rhine's ordinance support this conclusion.  Moreover, at 
least one treatise comments that a zone that only provides for 
use by virtue of a conditional use permit may face scrutiny.  
See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra, § 5.24, at 283-84 (stating 
that "[a] court will likely invalidate an ordinance that handles 
all uses by special permit" or conditional use permit).     
1. Case law  
¶40 Cases from Wisconsin and other jurisdictions support 
the conclusion that the common, accepted practice is to first 
outline permitted uses and then, in addition to permitted uses, 
the ordinance may provide for conditional uses.  A number of 
cases illustrate this point, but they do not address the merits 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
26 
 
of a "no permitted uses zone."18  However, in Sheerr v. Township 
of Evesham, the Superior Court of New Jersey evaluated and 
applied the substantive due process standard to a parcel that 
provided no permitted uses and allowed use only when the 
landowner obtained a conditional use permit.  445 A.2d 46, 60-65 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).  The Sheerr court concluded 
that the ordinance was unconstitutional as-applied to the 
plaintiff's property.  Id.   
¶41 In Sheerr, the plaintiff's property was the only 
property zoned EP-1, and any use in the EP-1 zone was subject to 
a conditional use permit.  Id. at 62.  The EP-1 designation was 
based on environmental protection.  Id. at 60.  According to the 
ordinance, the property within the zone was of "unique character 
by virtue of the presence of a beech and maple hardwood forest 
with many holly trees thereon, the function of the area as a 
natural replenishing of ground water and the function of the 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 12-13, 
201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Brief of Murdock at App. 133-153 
(Wisconsin Law Library, Vol. 3227, Appendices and Briefs, 70 
Wis. 2d 562-566), Town of Richmond v. Murdock, 70 Wis. 2d 642, 
651-52, 235 N.W.2d 497 (1975); Petersen v. Dane County, 136 
Wis. 2d 501, 509, 402 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1987); Groch v. City 
of Berkeley, 173 Cal. Rptr. 534, 537-38 (Cal. App. 3d 1981); 
Laughter v. Board of County Comm'rs for Sweetwater County, 110 
P.3d 875, 878 (Wyo. 2005).  We, however, acknowledge that 
exceptions to the common, accepted practice exist.  See, e.g., 
Town of Smithfield v. Fanning, 602 A.2d 939, 940 (R.I. 1992) 
(identifying a no permitted use zone but the merits of such a 
zone were not at issue); Owen Dev. Group, Inc., v. City of 
Gearhart, 826 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Or. App. 1992) (identifying a no 
permitted use zone but the merits of such a zone were not at 
issue). 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
27 
 
area as a natural habitat for birds and other wildlife."  Id.  
However, 
the 
justifications 
for 
"the 
severe 
restrictions 
affecting 
the 
plaintiff's 
premises 
were 
demolished 
by 
plaintiff's expert witnesses and the admissions of the township 
officials."  Id.   
¶42 The Sheerr court stated that an examination of the 
"conditional uses" led it to conclude that it represented 
arbitrary legislation.  Id. at 63.  For example, possible 
conditional uses there included private recreational areas such 
as camps, golf courses, and athletic fields, but "[a]ll of these 
uses require the removal of a substantial number of trees, 
frustrating a central purpose of the EP-1 designation."  Id. at 
64.  The ordinance also conditionally permitted a number of 
commercial uses but only on a five acre lot.  Id.  The court 
concluded that a commercial use represented the "only realistic 
possibility for the use of the plaintiff's property."  Id. at 
65.  In so finding, the court considered the twelve significant 
requirements that a landowner would have to meet in order to get 
a 
conditional 
use 
permit, 
and 
as 
a 
result, 
the 
court 
characterized the likelihood of being able to use the property 
for any purpose as "very remote."  Id. at 64-65.  Accordingly, 
the court concluded that the legislation was arbitrary and the 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
28 
 
as-applied substantive due process challenge was successful.19  
Id. at 63-65.  
¶43 Here, we conclude that the B-2 District can be 
appropriately described as a "no permitted uses" zone, and we 
conclude that the no permitted uses B-2 District is arbitrary 
and unreasonable because it bears no substantial relation to 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare.  However, we 
do recognize that there may be limited circumstances in which a 
"no permitted uses" zone is a valid exercise of power because 
the restriction bears substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare.  For example, in Dur-Bar 
Realty Co. v. City of Utica, 394 N.Y.S.2d 913, 918 (N.Y.A.D. 
1977), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, concluded 
that a "no permitted uses" zone was constitutional as the parcel 
at issue was in a "Land Conservation District and represented a 
zone located in the flood plain."  Id. at 915-16, 918.  The 
"Land Conservation District" "aimed to regulate the use" of land 
in a "flood prone area."  Id. at 918.  The ordinance at issue 
today does not include a similar purpose as in Dur-Bar Realty. 
                                                 
19 While the Sheerr court determined that a "conditional use 
by permit only zone"——also referred by the Sheerr court as a "no 
permitted uses zone"——was arbitrary as applied to this property 
owner, the court noted that the relevant zoning statutes 
authorized a "conditional use by permit only zone."  The Sheerr 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
zoning 
statutes 
authorized 
"conditional use by permit only zones" so long as there were 
"definite specifications and standards" in place.   Id. at 62-
64.  In the case at issue today, the standards are generalized 
and not "definite," so no certainty exists as to a conditional 
use permit. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
29 
 
¶44 The court in Dur-Bar Realty identified several policy 
objectives for restricting use in a flood plain: 
(1) the protection of individuals who might choose, 
despite the flood dangers, to develop or occupy land 
on a flood plain; (2) the protection of other 
landowners from damages resulting from the development 
of a flood plain and the consequent obstruction of the 
flood flow; (3) the protection of the entire community 
from individual choices of land use which require 
subsequent public expenditures for public works and 
disaster relief. 
Id.  The court concluded, "[i]t is beyond question that these 
objectives, which correspond closely to the stated purposes of 
the present ordinance, may be the subject of a legitimate 
exercise of the police power."  Id.  The court further stated 
that, "'Land Conservation District' provisions do bear a 
substantial relation to legitimate governmental purpose and a 
reasonable relation to the goal of flood safety."  Id.  Thus, 
since the limitations related to flood safety, the restriction 
satisfied the relationship to the public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare. 
¶45 In its analysis, the Dur-Bar Realty court contrasted 
the "flood plain" ordinance in that case with the ordinance at 
issue in Marshall v. Village of Wappingers Falls, 279 N.Y.S.2d 
654 (N.Y.A.D. 1967).  In Wappingers Falls, there were no 
permitted uses as of right in the "Planned Residential District" 
but twelve uses were available through a special permit.  Id. at 
655-56.  The court in Wappingers Falls concluded that the 
"Planned Residential District was ultra vires because it was not 
zoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan."  Id.  The court 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
30 
 
in Dur-Bar Realty stated that the Planned Residential District 
in Wappingers Falls did not appear "in any way unusual in 
topography or location so as to justify the subjection of all 
use proposals to case by case decision."  Dur-Bar Realty, 394 
N.Y.S.2d at 916.  In contrast, the court in Dur-Bar Realty 
concluded that the flood plain ordinance was "a product of 
assessment of the character of the land in light of the public 
health and safety interests in being protected against flooding 
and other hazards that would result from building in an area 
unsuitable for intensive development."  Id. 
¶46 State ex rel. Nagawicka Island Corp. v. City of 
Delafield, supports our conclusion that precluding any use is 
unreasonable.  117 Wis. 2d 23, 343 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983).  
In Nagawicka Island, the landowner was prohibited from building 
because the island was only two acres and zoned A-1, which 
prevented building on lots of less than three acres.  Id. at 24-
25. 
 
The court 
of appeals concluded that "when zoning 
classifications restrict the enjoyment of property to such an 
extent that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose, a 
taking without due process occurs."  Id. at 27.  While we do not 
rely on our takings clause jurisprudence today, as the court of 
appeals did in Nagawicka Island, the rationale employed supports 
our conclusion that providing no use is an unreasonable 
restriction. 
¶47 In the case at hand, we conclude that the ordinance 
governing the B-2 District is arbitrary and unreasonable, in 
that it precludes any use as of right in the B-2 District and 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
31 
 
such limitation bears no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare.  Unlike in Dur-Bar 
Realty where restricting uses in a flood plain was directly tied 
to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, 
no justification exists for precluding all uses as of right in 
the B-2 District.   
2. Zoning treatises and journals 
¶48 Leading zoning treatises support the notion that 
standard zoning practices contemplate permitted uses as of right 
that can be expanded upon by the administrative zoning function.  
Professor Mandelker writes: 
The drafters of the Standard Zoning Act clearly 
contemplated a zoning process in which the uses 
designated by the zoning ordinance were permitted "as 
of 
right," 
but 
they 
also 
provided 
for 
an 
administrative zoning function.  The Standard Act 
delegated this function to the board of adjustment.  
It authorized the board to grant variances from the 
zoning ordinance in cases of hardship, as defined in 
the Act, and to grant special exceptions authorized by 
provisions in the zoning ordinance.  Many zoning 
ordinances use the term "special" or "conditional" use 
rather than "special exception. . . ."     
Mandelker, supra, § 6.39, at 6-44 (emphasis added). 
¶49 In Anderson's American Law of Zoning, the observation 
is also made that "[m]ost ordinances impose a broad division of 
land uses," and, in addition, those ordinances then provide that 
"specified uses may be established or maintained" pursuant to a 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
32 
 
special permit.  3 Young, supra, § 21.01, at 693-94.20  The Law 
of Municipal Corporations provides, "[z]oning ordinances that 
rely 
on 
the 
conditional 
use 
mechanism 
retain 
the 
usual 
residential, commercial and industrial zones specifying the uses 
permitted in each zone, and, in addition, establish conditional 
uses for each zone."  8 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 25.159 (3d ed. 2000). 
¶50 Current zoning journals also support the conclusion 
that the common, accepted zoning practice is to provide 
permitted uses as of right and then, in addition to permitted 
uses, the ordinance may provide for conditional uses.  For 
example, in an article of Zoning Practice, the author discusses 
the relationship between permitted and conditional uses.  See 
Gail Easley, Conditional Uses: Using Discretion, Hoping for 
Certainty, American Planning Association Zoning Practice, May 
2006.  The author writes, "[t]he fundamental purpose of the 
zoning ordinance is to establish districts (zones) which have a 
common set of permissible uses and a common set of site design 
standards within each."  Id. at 2.  Permissible uses are "'by-
right' uses," i.e., "the uses are named in the zoning ordinance 
                                                 
20 See, 
e.g., 
5 
Weinstein, 
supra, 
§ 32.46, 
at 
78-84 
(providing both permitted, accessory, and conditional uses in a 
residential district); § 32.49, at 94-102 (providing both 
permitted and conditional uses in a commercial district); 
§ 32.50, at 103-04 (providing both permitted and conditional 
uses 
in 
a 
general 
office 
district); 
§ 32.51, 
at 
104-09 
(providing both permitted and conditional uses in highway 
commercial district); § 32.52, at 110-16 (providing permitted, 
accessory, and conditional uses in the industrial district).   
No. 
2006AP450   
 
33 
 
and a property owner has the right to establish the use so long 
as it conforms to the standards and criteria of the zoning 
ordinance."  Id. at 2-3. 
¶51 The 
author 
then 
contrasts 
permitted 
uses 
with 
conditional uses and notes that  
there are often uses that would be welcome within the 
zoning district if additional standards could prevent 
them from undermining the purpose and intent of the 
district. . . . Business and industrial districts also 
benefit from uses other than those permitted by right.  
For example, day care centers and restaurants are 
welcome near employment centers.   
Id. at 3. 
¶52 An article of Zoning News21 cautions about heavy or 
exclusive reliance on conditional use permits.  The author 
wrote: 
Some ordinances rely too much on special and/or 
conditional uses.  Most land uses should be as-of-
right, subject to compliance with clear and objective 
standards 
and 
criteria 
for 
that 
particular 
use 
category or zoning district.  Discretionary approvals 
should 
be 
reserved 
for 
unique 
uses 
that 
defy 
regulations by objective standards.  The routine 
employment of special uses, especially without (or 
with few) standards or criteria, opens up both 
individual zoning decisions and the zoning ordinance 
provision itself to constitutional challenges as being 
arbitrary and capricious.  Even where such a challenge 
would not necessarily succeed, the uncertainty to 
landowners and citizens alike created by discretionary 
and/or standardless zoning review should be avoided. 
                                                 
21 Zoning News was a publication of the American Planning 
Association.  It is now known as the Zoning Practice, which is 
also a publication of the American Planning Association. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
34 
 
John B. Bredin, Common Problems with Zoning Ordinances, American 
Planning Association Zoning News, Nov. 2002, at 2. 
 
3. The Town of Rhine's Ordinance 
¶53 While the ordinance section at issue in this case does 
not provide for any use as of right, other sections of the Town 
of Rhine's zoning ordinance follows the more traditional 
practice of first outlining permitted uses and then, in addition 
to permitted uses, providing for conditional uses.22  For 
example, consider the permitted and conditional uses in the Town 
of Rhine Municipal Code for the following districts:  
(1) The Agricultural Land Districts.  See Town of 
Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 4.05(2)(a) and (b) 
(providing such things as grazing, horticulture, and 
nature trails as permitted uses and providing such 
things as commercial stud housing and operation as a 
conditional use).  
(2) The Residential Districts.  See Town of 
Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code §§ 4.06(1)(a) and (b), 
4.06(2)(a) and (b) (providing such things as one or 
two-family dwellings as a permitted use and providing 
such things as home occupations, involving the conduct 
of business on the premises, as a conditional use).   
(3) Conservancy Districts.  See Town of Rhine, 
Wis., Municipal Code §§ 4.07(1)(c) and (d), 4.07(2)(c) 
and (d) (providing such things as forestry and fur 
skin production as permitted use and providing all 
buildings or structures and any use of a residence for 
a home occupation as a conditional use). 
(4) Commercial Districts.  See Town of Rhine, 
Wis., Municipal Code § 4.08(1)(b) and (c) (providing 
such things as food stores, clinics, and business 
                                                 
22 See Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code ch. 4, available 
at 
http://www.co.sheboygan.wi.us/html/d_planning_zoning.htm 
(updated 04/05/06).  Click on Rhine Zoning Ordinance.  
No. 
2006AP450   
 
35 
 
offices as permitted uses and providing such things as 
alcoholic beverages stores, automotive service, and 
bars as conditional uses). 
E. The Town of Rhine's remaining arguments 
¶54 The Town of Rhine asserts that there are permitted 
uses in the B-2 District in that the landowners can use the 
property without a conditional use permit, e.g., "recreational 
uses have always been allowed as incidental to the rural nature 
of 
certain 
types 
of 
property, 
especially 
in 
relatively 
undeveloped areas as exist in the Town of Rhine."  However, 
nowhere is that outlined in the ordinance at issue.  It is only 
in the newly amended ordinance that these allowances are made.23  
The version of the ordinance governing this case, however, 
                                                 
23 On April 5, 2006, the Town of Rhine amended its own B-2 
District ordinance to provide for permitted uses in the B-2 
District. 
 
See 
Town 
of 
Rhine, 
Wis., 
Municipal 
Code 
§ 4.08(2)(b)1. and 2.  Subsection (b) provides, "Permitted uses.  
The following are permitted uses in the B-2 District:" 
1. Agriculture.  Those uses permitted in the 
Agricultural 
Land 
Districts 
pursuant 
to 
Section 
4.05(2)(a), except that no structures may be built 
without first obtaining a conditional use permit 
pursuant to Section 4.09. 
2. Passive Outdoor Recreation.  Passive, outdoor, 
recreational land uses such as arboretums, natural 
areas, wildlife areas, hiking trails, bicycle trails,  
cross-country ski trails, horse trails, picnic areas, 
gardens, fishing and hunting areas, and other similar 
land uses.  
No. 
2006AP450   
 
36 
 
states, "[t]here are no permitted uses in the B-2 District."24  
Furthermore, at the January 6, 2004 meeting, Chairman Sager 
stated that B-2 zones require a conditional use permit "for any 
use of the land."  Therefore, it is clear that a landowner must 
acquire a conditional use permit, solely at the discretion of 
the Town of Rhine, in order to use the property in any way. 
¶55 The Town of Rhine argues, under the code before us 
today, that conditional uses are permitted uses because once the 
standards have been satisfied a landowner is "entitled" to the 
conditional use.  We disagree.  First, we find authority 
contrary to the Town of Rhine's position.  See, e.g., S. Kemble 
Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 402 N.E.2d 
100, 103 (Mass. App. 1980) (stating that "[n]o one, of course, 
has an absolute right to a special permit"); S. Mark White, 
Classifying and Defining Uses and Building Forms: Land-Use 
                                                 
24 While the ordinance at issue has been amended, other 
Wisconsin municipalities seemingly have similar ordinances in 
place.  In general, constitutional challenges to repealed 
legislation are considered moot.  See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 
U.S. 119, 127-29 (1977).  However, unlike state or federal 
legislation, municipal ordinance sections like the one at issue 
here may still exist in other municipalities within the state.  
At times, we may consider a "moot issue" if it is of "great 
public importance or arises frequently enough to warrant a 
definitive decision to guide the circuit courts."  State ex rel. 
Riesch v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 
N.W.2d 219.  
Because other municipalities utilize similar 
ordinances and the Town of Rhine may easily revert to its 
previous version, we review and render a decision on the issues 
at hand.  If other municipalities have such ordinances in place 
and, like here, there is no substantial relation to public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare, those ordinances 
could be subject to constitutional challenge.  
No. 
2006AP450   
 
37 
 
Coding for Zoning Regulations, American Planning Association 
Zoning Practice, Sept. 2005, at 8 (distinguishing between 
permitted uses as of right and conditional uses).  Second, no 
authority cited by the Town of Rhine suggests that conditional 
uses are the same as permitted uses.  To support its argument, 
the Town of Rhine relies on Delta Biological Resources, Inc. v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Milwaukee, 160 Wis. 2d 905, 
910-11, 467 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, Delta simply 
does not support the Town of Rhine's contention that conditional 
uses are permitted uses.  In Delta, the court of appeals, 
relying on Skelly Oil Co., stated: "A special or conditional use 
permit is one which the zoning code allows.  A special use 
permit allows a property owner to put his or her property to a 
use expressly permitted by the zoning ordinance, but only if 
certain conditions are met."  Delta, 160 Wis. 2d at 910 
(footnote omitted) (citing Skelly Oil Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 700-
01). 
¶56 The Town of Rhine's argument is without merit.  
Permitted uses and conditional uses are different.  Even though 
conditional uses may be authorized pursuant to the ordinance, 
that does not render them uses as of right.  See Gail Easley, 
Conditional Uses: 
Using Discretion, Hoping for Certainty, 
American Planning Association Zoning Practice, May 2006, at 8 
(distinguishing 
between 
permitted 
uses 
as 
of 
right 
and 
conditional uses).  Conditional uses may be expressly permitted 
by the ordinance so long as the conditions are met, id., but 
this does not render them "permitted uses."   
No. 
2006AP450   
 
38 
 
¶57 The Town of Rhine, citing to Primeco Communications v. 
City of Mequon, argues that an entitlement to a conditional use 
exists once the landowner submits the required information in 
reasonable compliance with the requirements of a particular 
conditional use ordinance.  242 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. 2003).  
Primeco, however, does not support this argument.  In Primeco, 
the district court stated: 
Under Wisconsin law, a conditional use is one that is 
not inherently incompatible with a particular area, 
but which might create problems if permitted to locate 
there as a matter of right.  
Zoning ordinances that rely on the conditional 
use mechanism retain the usual residential, commercial 
and industrial zones specifying the uses permitted in 
each zone, and, in addition, establish conditional 
uses for each zone, which are permitted within the 
zone only if approved by the local governmental body.  
In other words, a conditional use permit allows 
property to be put to a purpose that the zoning 
ordinance conditionally allows. 
Id. at 576 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
¶58 Even if an entitlement could be created under a 
conditional use permit, the Town of Rhine's argument presumes 
that the standards here are clear and specific enough that once 
complied with, the conditional use permit shall be issued.  
However, while we do not decide the constitutionality of the 
conditional use permit section, i.e., Municipal Code § 4.09(4), 
that section does not provide certainty.  For example, the 
following standards for obtaining a conditional use permit are 
subject to significant interpretation: (1) stabilize and protect 
property values and the tax base; (2) recognize the needs of 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
39 
 
agriculture, forestry, industry, and business in future growth; 
(3) preserve natural growth and cover and promote the natural 
beauty of the township.  See Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code 
§ 4.01(2).  How does a landowner, who applies for a conditional 
use permit, establish that a garbage dump or salvage yard will 
comply with these requirements, or others in § 4.01(2), so to 
"entitle" the landowner to a conditional use permit?  These 
standards are simply not specific enough that one can reasonably 
say that any use as of right exists under the B-2 District, 
which has no permitted uses. 
¶59 In addition, the language of this ordinance does not 
support the Town of Rhine's argument that the landowner is 
entitled to a conditional use permit as of right.  No language 
exists in Municipal Codes § 4.08(2), B-2 District, or § 4.09, 
Conditional uses, that would create an entitlement to a 
conditional use permit.  The ordinance does not state for 
example: If all requirements are met, the conditional use permit 
shall be granted.  Furthermore, while discussing rules that 
generally govern conditional uses, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning states, "[t]he designation of a use in a zoning district 
as a conditional use does not constitute an authorization or 
assurance that such use will be approved."  5 Alan C. Weinstein, 
Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 34.23, at 573 (4th ed. 
1997).  While perhaps not dispositive, this assertion casts 
doubt on the Town of Rhine's entitlement argument. 
¶60 The Town of Rhine also argues that planned unit 
development zoning is the functional equivalent to Municipal 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
40 
 
Code § 4.08(2)(a), "B-2 Commercial Manufacturing or Processing."  
However, 
planned unit development districts are different 
because unlike the case before this court, planned unit 
development districts may only be established with the consent 
of the landowner.  See Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) (discussing 
planned unit developments).  The Town of Rhine argues that 
future landowners in planned unit development districts are 
bound by the restricted uses entered into by the previous 
landowner.  This, however, is an economic and quantifiable 
decision by the purchaser.  It is not that such land has no use, 
it is that such land has designated rights and obligations.  The 
landowners in the B-2 District did not make a choice to 
eliminate all permitted uses.  Rather, the landowners are 
precluded from any use unless the Town of Rhine grants a 
conditional use permit.  While the landowner who chooses to 
purchase land in the B-2 District has notice of the excessive 
restriction in the B-2 District, this does not, as we see here, 
preclude a constitutional challenge to the ordinance.   
¶61 The Town of Rhine asserts that this matter is not 
properly before the court because the Club did not follow 
through with seeking a conditional use permit.  Therefore, the 
Town of Rhine argues that we cannot determine if the Club was 
denied a conditional use permit for unreasonable or arbitrary 
reasons.  The Town of Rhine argues that if the Club was denied a 
conditional use permit for arbitrary or unreasonable reasons, 
the Club may have a regulatory taking, or as-applied challenge.  
We do not disagree that one of these claims may be available if 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
41 
 
the Club was improperly denied a conditional use permit, but the 
case at hand is a facial substantive due process challenge to 
the B-2 zoning ordinance; this is not a challenge to the 
conditional use permit section of the ordinance, and it is 
neither a takings challenge nor an as-applied challenge.25   
                                                 
25 Anderson's American Law of Zoning distinguishes between a 
taking and substantive due process challenge.  It provides: 
It is important to understand the difference 
between taking claims and substantive due process 
claims.  As discussed in the previous chapter, an 
ordinance will be struck down, despite the presumption 
of validity for legislative acts, if it is found to be 
unreasonable or arbitrary.  In general, a zoning 
ordinance or other police power land use restriction 
must be reasonably related to serving the public 
health, safety, or general welfare.  If a land use 
restriction is unreasonable or irrational, it may be 
found to violate the substantive component of the due 
process clause.  However, irrationality is not the 
standard for evaluating a taking claim. 
The Supreme Court has added confusion to the 
matter by repeatedly stating in recent cases that a 
taking is established if an ordinance does not 
"substantially 
advance 
legitimate 
state 
interests 
. . . or denies an owner economically viable use of 
his land."  The Court has never satisfactorily 
explained what the first part of the test means.  
However, writing for the majority in Nollan v. 
California 
Coastal 
Commission, 
Justice 
Scalia 
expressly 
stated 
that 
the 
taking 
test 
requires 
stricter 
review 
of 
government 
action 
than 
the 
"rational relationship" test applied to most due 
process and equal protection claims. 
An important difference under the Constitution is 
that "just compensation" must be paid to the landowner 
who has suffered a taking.  A substantive due process 
violation 
does 
not 
trigger 
the 
compensation 
requirement. . . .  
No. 
2006AP450   
 
42 
 
¶62 To be clear, after today, municipalities still have 
ample authority to regulate land use——and they should.  Such 
regulation is an appropriate legislative function; it can serve 
to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public, and it 
encourages well reasoned growth.  The issuance of conditional 
use permits also is an appropriate function for municipalities.  
Municipalities certainly have broad authority to restrict land 
use, but the district at issue today provides for no permitted 
use as of right, and the only use is garnered through the 
possibility 
of 
obtaining 
a 
conditional 
use 
permit. 
 
No 
reasonable justification exists for such excessive government 
control and restriction——especially when that government control 
is set against land use rights, and the control bears no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare. 
¶63 The Town of Rhine argues that being able to restrict 
where 
less 
desirable 
uses 
develop 
is 
"the 
fundamental 
methodology of Euclidian zoning."  We do not disagree, and 
moreover, we do not seek to limit the power of a town to 
regulate where and under what conditions land may be used.  
However, the Town of Rhine, in this case, fails to acknowledge 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is very common for a landowner to assert 
taking and substantive due process claims in the same 
action, and to leave it to the court to sort out the 
differences. 
1 Young, supra, § 3A.04, at 216-17. 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
43 
 
that it can both regulate where undesirable uses develop, and it 
can provide for permitted uses as of right. 
¶64 Precluding any permitted use and then only providing 
generalized standards for obtaining a conditional use permit 
opens the door to favoritism and discrimination.  Under this 
scenario, a town, pursuant to the ordinance, may arbitrarily 
preclude any activity on the land in question because (1) there 
are no permitted uses as a matter of right; and (2) if obtaining 
a conditional use permit is completely within the discretion of 
a town, judicial review of a denial is significantly limited 
because of the non-specific nature of the conditional use 
standards.  As a result, if such an ordinance was deemed 
acceptable, towns could preclude all uses at will and in a 
manner that virtually precludes any meaningful judicial review.  
Such a determination could open the door to abuse.  If permitted 
uses exist as of right, the impact of denying conditional uses 
is significantly decreased because the landowner has permitted 
uses as of right.  
¶65 The 
facial, 
constitutional 
challenge 
here 
is 
sustained.  This ordinance is not in balance with the rights of 
landowners.  Because the landowners have demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the ordinance at issue does not provide 
for any uses as of right, and this restriction in the B-2 
District is arbitrary and unreasonable in the sense that it does 
not bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals 
or 
general 
welfare, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Municipal 
Code 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
44 
 
§ 4.08(2)(a), the B-2 District, is unconstitutional on its face.  
Accordingly, the Club has met its burden. 
IV. NUISANCE 
¶66 The circuit court concluded that the Town of Rhine's 
allegation that its public nuisance ordinance was violated was 
actually the Town of Rhine's attempt to abate a private 
nuisance.  The circuit court did not reach its decision by 
applying the ordinance's language.  Instead, the circuit court 
concluded that the violations were for a "public nuisance."  The 
circuit court, cited to Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District 
v. 
City 
of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 
N.W.2d 658, and stated that a nuisance is a public nuisance if 
"the condition or activity interferes with the public right or 
use of public space."  The circuit court then concluded that 
because the property at issue was not a public place, and the 
Club's activities did not affect the entire community, the 
nuisance could not be a public nuisance.   
¶67 Here, the circuit court erred because it did not apply 
the definition of "public nuisance" as stated in the Town of 
Rhine's ordinance.  Instead of applying the ordinance language, 
the circuit court applied a common-law definition of "nuisance."  
The Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 2.02, "Public 
Nuisance," differs from the common-law definition and provides 
as follows: 
2.02 DEFINITIONS.  (1) PUBLIC NUISANCE.  A public 
nuisance is a thing, act, occupation, condition or use 
of property which shall continue for such length of 
time as to (a) Substantially annoy, injure or endanger 
No. 
2006AP450   
 
45 
 
the comfort, health, repose or safety of the public; 
(b) In any way render the public insecure in life or 
in the use of property; (c) Greatly offend the public 
morals or decency; (d) Unlawfully and substantially 
interfere with, obstruct or tend to obstruct or render 
dangerous for passage any street, alley, highway, 
navigable body of water or other public way or the use 
of public property. 
¶68 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit 
court for a new hearing on the nuisance action wherein the court 
will decide the issues based upon the Town of Rhine, Wis., 
Municipal Code. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶69 We conclude that the Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal 
Code § 4.08(2)(a), the B-2 District, is unconstitutional on its 
face because it is arbitrary and unreasonable in that it 
precludes any use as of right in the B-2 District and such 
limitation bears no substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare.  We further conclude that the 
circuit court applied a common-law definition of "nuisance" 
rather than the definition of "public nuisance" articulated in 
Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 2.02.  As a result, we 
remand to the circuit court for a new hearing on the public 
nuisance claim.    
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded to the circuit court.
No.  2006AP450.ssa 
 
1 
¶70 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion declares that the instant case is moot.  
Majority op., ¶54 n.23.  Nevertheless the majority writes on, 
characterizing the issue of the constitutionality of a "permit 
use 
only 
zone" 
as 
one 
"of 
great 
public 
importance."  
Simultaneously the majority opinion acknowledges that it cannot, 
and does not, determine the constitutionality of any other 
ordinance creating a "permit use only zone" similar to that of 
the Town of Rhine.  See majority op., ¶54 n.23.  Each "permit 
use only zone" ordinance, according to the majority opinion, 
must be gauged individually to determine to whether the 
ordinance has a substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare. 
¶71 I write for three reasons:   
¶72 First, I want to stress that the wisdom of a zoning 
ordinance is a decision for the municipality, not for this 
court.1   
¶73 Second, nothing in this opinion should be read to 
imply that the ordinance at issue is struck down because the 
majority opinion characterizes the Town of Rhine's zoning 
ordinance as uncommon.2  The majority opinion is mistaken that 
the Town of Rhine ordinance is very unusual.3  In any event, I do 
not read the majority opinion as stating or implying that only 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶26.   
2 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶39, 40, 50.  
3 See Brief and Appendix of Wisconsin Counties Association 
at 5-8 (citing zoning ordinances similar to the Town of Rhine's 
from 11 municipalities and counties in Wisconsin). 
No.  2006AP450.ssa 
 
2 
ordinances adopted by a majority of municipalities can pass 
constitutional muster in this court.   
¶74 Third, I want to emphasize the precepts to be gleaned 
from this lengthy opinion, many of which are basic, well-known 
principles of law that are applied in the present case.  The 
teachings of the majority opinion may be summarized as follows:    
1. A zoning ordinance, including a "permit use only 
zone," is "presumed valid and must be liberally construed 
in favor of the municipality."  Majority op., ¶26.  An 
ordinance "will be held constitutional [as a matter of 
substantive due process] unless the contrary is shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Majority op., ¶26. 
2. The challenge to the ordinance at issue is a facial 
substantive due process challenge, not an as applied 
challenge, and not an eminent domain taking challenge.4  The 
majority opinion applies, in keeping with precedent, a 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., majority op. ¶¶34, 47, 61.  Several cases upon 
which the majority opinion relies treat the challenge as an as 
applied or a takings challenge.  See, e.g., majority op. ¶¶40, 
47. 
It is very difficult to prevail upon a facial challenge to 
a statute or ordinance.  With a facial challenge, the challenger 
must show that the ordinance cannot be enforced under any 
circumstances.  See Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, 
¶44 n.9, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 749 N.W.2d 211 ("'Facial challenge' is 
defined as: 'A claim that a statute . . . always operates 
unconstitutionally.'") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 223 (7th 
ed. 1999).  Although I question whether the defendants' 
challenge is properly considered a "facial" challenge, I accept 
the defendants' characterization of their challenge for purposes 
of this review.  The majority opinion does not address any 
challenge to the "vagueness" of the standards for granting a 
conditional use.  See, e.g., majority op. ¶58. 
No.  2006AP450.ssa 
 
3 
rational basis test to determine the validity of a law 
challenged on substantive due process grounds.5 
3. An ordinance, including a "permit use only zone," 
will be invalidated as a matter of substantive due process 
under the rational basis test only if it is clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having "no substantial relation 
to the public health, safety, moral or general welfare."  
Majority op., ¶2.6  In applying the rational basis test, the 
court looks for support for the law that is challenged.7  
The support for the law need not be expressed on the face 
of the law.   
4. A "permit use only zone" is constitutional, as a 
matter 
of 
substantive 
due 
process, 
if 
it 
bears 
a 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, moral or 
general 
welfare.8 
 
A 
"permit 
use 
only 
zone" 
is 
unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process 
when it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, moral or 
general welfare.9 
5. The "permit use only zone" at issue in the instance 
case is unconstitutional because nothing in the record or 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶28-29, 34, 37. 
6 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶26, 34-38, 65. 
7 Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶184, 284 
Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440. 
8 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶43-45.     
9 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶40-42, 46. 
No.  2006AP450.ssa 
 
4 
in the Town's arguments describes a relation between the 
"permit use only zone" and the public health, safety, 
morals 
or 
general 
welfare.10 
 
The 
court 
has 
not 
independently found support for the ordinance. 
6. The majority opinion does not determine the 
constitutionality 
of 
ordinances 
of 
other 
communities 
similar to the Town of Rhine's ordinance at issue in the 
instant case.  Each such ordinance has to be examined 
individually to determine whether it bears a substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare.  In other words, the validity of an ordinance 
similar to that of the Town of Rhine's shall be determined 
on 
case-by-case 
basis, 
with 
the 
ordinance 
liberally 
construed in favor of the municipality and entitled to a 
presumption in favor of its validity.11 
¶75 I concur in the court's mandate but write separately 
for the reasons set forth. 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., majority op. ¶¶2, 65. 
11 See, e.g., majority op. ¶54 n.23.   
No.  2006AP450.ssa 
 
1