Title: Mitchell v. Van Pelt
Citation: 265 P.2d 679, 58 N.M. 69
Docket Number: 5710
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 1954

265 P.2d 679 (1954) 58 N.M. 69 MITCHELL v. VAN PELT. No. 5710. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 12, 1954. V. A. Doggett, Raton, for appellant. Paddock, Phelps &amp; Phelps, Clayton, for administrator. A. J. Krehbiel, Clayton, for claimant. SEYMOUR, Justice. This appeal is from the denial of creditor's claim against the Administrator of the Estate of Floyd Akins, deceased. The relevant facts are: Administrator was appointed February 27, 1950 and published notice to creditors March 8, 15, 22 and 29, 1950; proof of publication of this notice was not filed by administrator until January 7, 1952. The creditor's proof of claim, however, was filed in the estate proceedings April 29, 1950; the administrator did not approve this claim and, on August 3, 1951, filed final report, reciting the filing of claim and the fact that no notice had been given by claimant nor hearing had (pursuant to Secs. 33-802 and 33-803, 1941 Comp.); on September 10, 1951, after appeal from the probate court to the district court, notice of hearing on the claim was given by claimant to administrator and objections to administrator's final report were filed by claimant praying hearing on the claim prior to closing of the estate. The single question for decision arises under Secs. 33-802 and 33-803, supra: The contention of appellant is that the filing in the administration proceedings of the proof of publication of appointment within thirty days from the last publication, as specified in Sec. 33-803, supra, is mandatory and is a part of the notice required to be given to creditors; that until such proof is filed, notice is not complete and the time has not expired for filing claims against estates and giving notice of hearing thereon. The trial court denied the claim as barred by this statute of non-claim and on the further ground of estoppel. The question is one of first impression in New Mexico. Authorities dealing with this problem in other states are limited and somewhat evenly divided. Appellant relies primarily upon two cases, Jennings v. Lowery &amp; Berry, 1927, 147 Miss. 673, 112 So. 692; and Hawkins v. Superior Court, 1913, 165 Cal. 743, 134 P. 327. In the Mississippi case, under statutes substantially like our own, the Court flatly stated 147 Miss. 673, 112 So. 694: Headnote numbered 2 of the California case states the controlling principle therein: The Hawkins case from California is cited with approval in two later cases, Oberlack v. Trusas, 1944, 67 Cal. App. 2d 238, 153 P.2d 775; and Burr v. Goodwin, 1932, 126 Cal. App. 539, 14 P.2d 808. Both Jennings v. Lowery &amp; Berry, supra, and Hawkins v. Superior Court, supra, carry strong dissenting opinions. As stated by appellant in his reply brief, "* * * dissenting opinions * * * do not make the law"; nevertheless, when the problem is one of first impression in our own jurisdiction, dissenting opinions from Courts of other states can assist this Court in determining the better of two lines of authority. The dissenting judge in Jennings v. Lowery &amp; Berry, supra, among other cogent reasons, stated: The dissenting opinion in Hawkins v. Superior Court, supra, is not helpful. However, from a reading of the subsequent California cases which approve the holding of the Hawkins case, it appears that the section of the California Code upon which that case was decided, and reading in part as follows: was amended by the legislature in 1931 and the following sentence was added to the general provisions of the section: This amendment in the California law subsequent to the decision in the Hawkins case would indicate the danger of following that case as a controlling authority. In all probability, the Hawkins decision in California resulted in the unsettling of settled estates predicted by the dissenting opinion in Jennings v. Lowery &amp; Berry, supra, thus creating the necessity for the legislature to step in and implement the statutory construction which was adopted by the California Court. In our own jurisdiction, the interpretation of this statute sought by appellant leaves unanswered many questions, the answers to which are necessary if estates are to be administered in an orderly way and established titles kept free from expensive and useless litigation. If we should say that the filing of proof of publication within thirty days after the last publication is a part of the notice, it might throw open to question the merchantability of the titles to much of the land which has passed through administration in the past six years. Further, this Court would be required to legislate in determining whether such failure on the part of the administrator required an entirely new publication or simply tolled the running of the statute of nonclaims for a period equivalent to the delay in filing by the administrator. These are only a few of the problems raised and, since these questions are not at issue in the instant case, they could not be answered here. The opposite view on this question appears in Harris v. Turner, 1938, 96 Utah 342, 85 P.2d 824, 825. Utah Revised Statutes 1933, sec. 102-9-3, provides that: The Utah statutes also provided that every administrator, immediately after his appointment, must cause a notice to be published requiring creditors to present their claims. In the particular case, the administratrix delayed a year after appointment before the first publication of notice to creditors and delayed approximately eight months after the completion of publication before filing her proof. There were other matters involved in this decision, but with regard to the particular question, the Court said: In further support of the same view is Brooks v. Fed. Land Bk. of Columbia, 1932, 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749, 752, wherein the Court stated, under somewhat similar statutes: To the same effect is the case of In re Conant's Estate, 1903, 43 Or. 530, 73 P. 1018, 1020, the opinion concluding as follows: In this problem of statutory construction, we have available two possible constructions. The construction sought by appellant, while logical and supported by cases in point from the jurisdictions of Mississippi and California, necessarily calls for a change in accepted practice which will result in substantial expense to the public. Contrary construction of the statute will not unsettle the affairs of persons who have relied upon the law as it has been accepted and applied by a majority of the lawyers and courts in this state. For that reason, it is the conclusion of this Court that that portion of Sec. 33-803, supra, here in question, is directory rather than mandatory and the failure of administrator to file proof of publication within thirty days from the completion of publication does not toll the statute of nonclaim or vitiate the required notice to creditors if it be in fact properly published. Finally, the construction here adopted receives substantial support both from the language of Sec. 33-803, supra, itself, and from the New Mexico decision In re Baeza's Estate, 1937, 41 N.M. 708, 73 P.2d 1351, 1356. The language of Sec. 33-803, supra, appearing in the latter half of that section, provides for a tolling of the time limitation prescribed by the statute in at least one enumerated event, the permanent removal of an administrator from the state. Had the legislature intended to have the time limitation tolled by a failure to file proof of publication, it is logical to suppose that it would have been included at this point. This section, itself, reduces the time for the filing of claims by creditors from one year to six months, the obvious purpose being to expedite the closing of estates. We feel that the duty placed upon the administrator to file proof of publication within thirty days from the last publication is intended for the same purpose. Appellant's *683 construction would have the effect of emasculating this purpose. In re Baeza's Estate, supra, was decided in 1937 and construed Secs. 47-504 and 47-505, 1929 Comp. Our present Secs. 33-802 and 33-803, supra, are amendments of these earlier statutes. In 1937 the statute provided that all claims against the estates of deceased persons not filed and notice given within one year from the date of the appointment of the executor or administrator would be barred. At the same time, Sec. 47-123, 1929 Comp. provided that the executor or administrator within ten days after his appointment should give public notice of his appointment by posting or publication, requiring all persons having claims against the estate of decedent to present the same within the time prescribed by law. In the particular case, the administrator published the required notice but only in English and not in Spanish as required by the publication statute. The Court determined that the clear language of Sec. 47-504, 1929 Comp. barred any claim of a creditor not filed within one year from the date of appointment, taking the position that compliance or noncompliance with the statute requiring publication of the notice could have no effect upon this statute of nonclaim. Justice Zinn, near the conclusion of his opinion, states: It is not difficult to distinguish the case before this Court in 1937 from the instant case; nevertheless, it indicates at least a strong policy on the part of this Court to enforce nonclaim statutes with workable severity for the purpose of accomplishing the ends sought by such statutes. The same policy is apparent in In re Landers' Estate, 1929, 34 N.M. 431, 283 P. 49. If, indeed, it were the legislative intent to make the filing of proof of publication a part of the notice, it is within the power of the legislature to implement Sec. 33-803, supra, in such a way that its intent can be carried out without unsettling completed affairs and rights already established. The foregoing conclusion makes unnecessary a consideration of the question of estoppel. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. It is so ordered. McGHEE, C. J., and SADLER and COMPTON, JJ., concur. LUJAN, J., not participating.