Title: Jason Demetrius Stephens v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-987
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC92987
____________
JASON DEMETRIUS STEPHENS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[March 15, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Jason Demetrius Stephens.  Stephens was charged with one
count of first-degree murder, one count of armed kidnapping, six counts of armed
robbery, two counts of attempted armed robbery, one count of burglary, and one
count of aggravated battery.  He pled guilty to the armed kidnapping of Robert
Sparrow, III, armed robbery of Robert Sparrow, Jr., armed robbery of Derrick
Dixon, armed robbery of Roderic Gardner, attempted robbery of Tammy Cobb,
1  Seven people were at the house when Stephens first entered including: (1)
Robert Sparrow, III; (2) Robert Sparrow, Jr., the owner of the house and Robert
Sparrow, III's father; (3) Consuelo Brown, Robert Sparrow, III's mother; (4) Kahari
Graham, Robert Sparrow, III's six-year-old half-brother and Consuelo Brown's other
son; (5) Tracey Williams; (6) Derrick Hosea Dixon; and (7) Tammy Cobb.  Two other
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attempted robbery of David Cobb, armed burglary and aggravated battery.  The 
jury found Stephens guilty of the first-degree murder of Robert Sparrow, III and
armed robbery of Kahari Graham.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment and sentence of
death.
The overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case shows Stephens broke into
Robert Sparrow, Jr.'s house on June 2, 1997, at approximately 2 p.m., while a
number of people were present.  He robbed the people there and kidnapped a
child.  There were three or four other people with Stephens at the time he
committed these crimes.  However, Stephens refused to cooperate with the
authorities in their efforts to identify the other individuals.  One of the individuals,
Horace Cummings (Cummings), turned himself into the police and was tried with
Stephens.  The other two individuals were never apprehended.  Stephens testified at
trial that Cummings and the other unidentified individuals went to the house to buy
drugs and were unaware of his plan to rob the occupants. 
There were eight eyewitnesses in the house who testified at trial.1  While
victims entered the house after Stephens: (1) David Cobb; and (2) Roderick Gardner.
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some of the details of the eyewitness' accounts varied, they all substantially agreed
with the following summary of events.  Stephens entered the house first, carrying a
nine millimeter automatic gun.  He was standing next to Robert Sparrow, III
(Sparrow III), who was three years and four months old.  Upon seeing the gun, the
child’s mother, Consuelo Brown, physically confronted Stephens.  Stephens hit her
with the gun on the bridge of her nose.  Ms. Brown fell to the ground and her nose
began to bleed.  Stephens ejected a bullet onto the floor and informed the
occupants that the gun was loaded.  He told them that he wanted "money and
weed."  He demanded from Robert Sparrow, Jr. (Sparrow Jr.) the keys to a blue
car located outside the house.  Sparrow Jr. told Stephens the keys were with
someone who was not present at the house.
Thereafter, two other individuals entered the house.  One of the individuals
was Cummings, but the other individual was never identified.  Stephens made all the
occupants lie down on the floor as he searched their pockets for valuables.  The
unidentified individual, referred to as Plats or Dreds because of the way he wore his
hair, held the occupants of the house on the floor at gunpoint while Stephens
located a secured room where he could put them.  There was some testimony that
Sparrow III said he was being choked, but it was unclear from the record who was
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choking him.  After inspecting the house, Stephens determined the bathroom was
the most secure location to put his hostages, and he ordered six of them, including
six-year-old Kahari Graham, to crawl to the bathroom.  Sparrow III was kept
separate from the others.  
Many of the eyewitnesses testified that Stephens showed his ID and said he
was taking Sparrow III with him as insurance.  Sparrow Jr. testified Stephens
agreed he would leave the child at the corner if he was not followed.  Stephens also
testified he agreed to leave the child somewhere, but he did not know what location
the child’s father had referred to in his testimony.
After the occupants had been secured in the bathroom, Sparrow Jr.'s half-
brother, David Cobb (Cobb), and his friend, Roderick Gardner (Gardner), arrived
at the house.  Upon entry, they too were robbed and forced to crawl to the
bathroom.  One of the items Stephens took from Gardner was his car keys. 
Gardner was driving his mother's dark green Kia, which had roll-down windows
and pull-up locks.  There was testimony that Sparrow III had ridden in the Kia the
day before he was killed.  On that day, he had been scolded for rolling down the
windows and trying to open the car door while it was moving.  The record did not
reflect that Stephens had any way of knowing whether the child was capable of
rolling down the windows or opening the car door. 
2   Asphyxiation can be either strangulation or suffocation.
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When Stephens exited the house with the child, the other individuals who
Stephens testified had only gone to the house to buy drugs, were seated in the
black car they had driven to the scene.  Stephens testified the other individuals
waved him away from the black car because he had the child.  Stephens then
ordered the boy to get into the Kia.  Both cars pulled away from the house, with the
Kia following the black car.  After driving eight tenths of a mile, both cars pulled
over in a residential neighborhood.  It was approximately 2:30 p.m.  The Kia was
parked on the side of the street without the benefit of any shade.  The outside
temperature was approximately 82 degrees and sunny.  The windows in the car
were rolled up and all of the doors were closed.  At 9:25 p.m., the dark green Kia
was found.  Sparrow III was dead, his body lying face down in the passenger’s
seat with his feet angled toward the steering wheel.  The State argued Stephens
suffocated Sparrow III before leaving the car.  Stephens testified the boy was alive
when he left him in the car.
The medical examiner, Bonifacio Floro, M.D., testified that in his expert
medical opinion Robert Sparrow, III had probably died of asphyxiation.2 
However, he could not conclusively rule out hyperthermia as the cause of death. 
3   Petechiae are hemorrhages of the small veins caused by lack of oxygen.
When found on the face and in the eyes, they are typically a sign of suffocation or
strangulation.  However, this is nonspecific evidence because petechiae may also be
caused by laying a body face down after death.  Once the heart stops beating, the
blood settles in the lowest part of the body.  If the face is the lowest part of the body,
as in this case, blood settles in the face potentially resulting in petechiae of the face and
eye lining. 
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He primarily relied upon multiple “petechiae”3 in the face and eye lining as an
indication of asphyxiation.  He also noted there was a small four-millimeter scratch
on the back of the child’s neck.  Dr. Floro concluded this scratch was probably
caused by a fingernail.  Dr. Floro testified the child’s lower lip was bruised,
indicating he had been suffocated.  Dr. Floro also relied upon the lack of
fingerprints or other evidence showing the child tried to roll down the window or
open the door in concluding it was more likely that Sparrow III died from
asphyxiation than hyperthermia. 
Steven Frank Dunton, M.D., testified on the defendant’s behalf.  After
reviewing Dr. Floro's report, he concluded Sparrow III died from hyperthermia. 
Dr. Dunton relied upon the fact that there were very few signs of asphyxiation. 
However, he did admit asphyxiation can never be conclusively ruled out because it
can leave no signs at autopsy.  Dr. Dunton admitted hyperthermia by itself should
not cause petechiae, whereas asphyxiation could.  However, he went on to explain
that gravity will pull the blood down to the lowest point of the body when the heart
4   The trial court found three aggravating circumstances: prior violent felonies;
murder during the commission of a felony; and the age of the victim, all of which were
given great weight.  The trial court discussed and gave some weight to a number of
nonstatutory factors including:  volunteer church work; the defendant’s fondness for
children; employment; Stephens’ religious and supportive family; Stephens’
educational background; adjustment to incarceration; lack of  intent to kill; a
codefendant’s life sentence; and Stephens’ pleas of guilty to other offenses.
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stops pumping, causing the blood to pool to such a degree that venules rupture
resulting in petechiae.  He attributed the discoloration of the child’s lips to the
tissues drying out after death.  Therefore, he concluded Dr. Floro erred in relying
on the petechiae to diagnose the child’s death as being caused by asphyxiation.  
Based upon these facts the jury concluded Stephens was guilty of first-
degree murder.  The verdict form did not delineate between first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder. 
During the penalty phase the state offered victim impact testimony and
evidence of a prior violent felony against a sixteen-year-old girl.  Stephens offered
mitigating testimony that he was good with children, had been raised in a good
Catholic family, had an ability to work with his hands to build things, had been
deeply effected by his father's death, was remorseful for Sparrow III's death, and
was religious.  The jury recommended death by a nine to three vote.  The trial court
followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced the defendant to death for the
first-degree murder charge.4  Stephens was also sentenced to life imprisonment for
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armed kidnapping with the sentence to run consecutive to the murder sentence.  He
was sentenced to concurrent life terms for the six armed robberies with these
sentences to run consecutive to the murder and armed kidnapping sentences.
Stephens raises the following eleven points on this appeal: (1) the trial court
erred in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court erred in
denying motion for new trial; (3) the trial court erred in denying a motion to
withdraw the robbery plea involving the robbery of Derrick Dixon or erred in failing
to reduce the charge to attempted armed robbery; (4) the trial court erred in denying
the defendant’s special instruction on his theory of defense; (5) the trial court erred
in denying the defendant’s motion for a change of venue; (6) the trial court erred in
failing to conduct a Nelson inquiry; (7) the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecutor to question the defendant concerning a statement about the electric
chair; (8)  the defendant’s sentence is unlawful under Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987); (9) the trial court erred in its assessment of aggravating and mitigating
factors; (10)  the trial court erred in failing to declare section 922.10, Florida
Statutes (1997), unconstitutional; and (11) the trial court erred in failing to declare
section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional.  After carefully reviewing
the record in this case, we affirm Stephens' convictions and sentences.
Denial of Judgment of Acquittal
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Stephens first argues the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for
judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder.  This claim is both 
unpreserved for appeal and without merit.  This claim was not preserved for appeal
because Stephens' counsel made a bare bones motion for judgment of acquittal,
without any specific argument.  In Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1999), this
Court held the claim of improper denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal had
not been preserved for appeal by a boilerplate motion without specific grounds. 
We said:
     To preserve an argument for appeal, it must be
asserted as the legal ground for the objection, exception,
or motion below.  See Archer v. State, 613 So.2d 446,
448 (Fla. 1993); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338
(Fla. 1982).  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380
requires that a motion for judgment of acquittal "fully set
forth the grounds on which it is based."  See Fla. R.
Crim. Pro. 3.380(b) (emphasis added).  Here, Woods
submitted a boilerplate motion for acquittal without fully
setting forth the specific grounds upon which the motion
was based.  He did not bring to the attention of the trial
court any of the specific grounds he now urges this Court
to consider. 
Id. at 984.  See also Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1996) (holding two
claims of unconstitutionality of jury instructions pertaining to death penalty
proceedings procedurally barred because counsel failed to object with specificity);
Marquard v. State, 641 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994) (finding a particular argument not
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preserved as to the trial court's denial of motion for judgment of acquittal on
murder charge); Patterson v. State, 391 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (holding a
bare bones motion for directed verdict will not permit a defendant to raise every
possible claimed insufficiency in the evidence); De La Cova v. State, 355 So. 2d
1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (finding a bare bones motion for directed verdict does
not raise every possible claimed insufficiency in the evidence).  Furthermore, there
is sufficient evidence to support Stephens’ conviction for first-degree felony
murder.  In Woods, we reaffirmed the general rule established in Lynch v. State,
293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974), that "courts should not grant a motion for judgment
of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully
take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law."  See also
Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1997); Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685
(Fla. 1995); DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993); Taylor v. State, 583
So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1991).
Moreover, the evidence in this case supports a finding that the murder was
committed during the course of a felony.  Stephens entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of armed kidnapping.  The only question, therefore, is whether the
kidnapping had ended prior to the death of the victim.  The victim of the
kidnapping was Sparrow III, a three-year old child.  Stephens took the child from
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the house where the robberies occurred after the other occupants were herded to
the bathroom.  He put the child in the dark green Kia and drove to a location that
was not communicated to anyone.  Prior to leaving the house, Stephens indicated
he would leave the child at the corner if he was not followed.  The Kia was left
parked on the sunny side of a street with the doors closed and the windows up. 
The car was not located for approximately seven hours after it was driven from the
scene of the other crimes.  
 This was a three-year old child who was left in an automobile with the
windows and doors closed.  Earlier, the child had observed his kidnapper as he
brandished a gun and threatened the other members of the household.  Under these
circumstances it cannot be said that the kidnapping had ceased prior to the child’s
death since the child, based on his age and the totality of the circumstances, was
never at a place of safety before he died.  Cf. State v. Stouffer, 721 A. 2d 207 (Md.
1998) (finding a continuing kidnapping where the victim’s liberty was never
restored prior to his death).  
Because the death occurred during the commission of the kidnapping, there
is competent substantial evidence to support a conviction for first-degree felony
murder.
Denial of Motion for New Trial
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Next, Stephens argues the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new
trial because the manifest weight of the evidence did not support the verdict.  This
issue has not been properly preserved for appeal because Stephens' counsel made
a bare bones motion for a new trial.  Such motions are not sufficient to preserve
any specific argument for appellate review.  See Woods, 733 So. 2d at  984; see
also Geralds, 674 So. 2d at 98-99; Marquard, 641 So. 2d at 58; Patterson, 391 So.
2d at 345; De La Cova, 355 So. 2d at 1230.  Moreover, even if this issue had been
preserved for appeal, we would find no error because the claim is without merit.  A
trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.  In order to demonstrate abuse, the nonprevailing party must
establish that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. 
See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).  That standard has
not been met in this instance.  The manifest weight of the evidence proves, at a
minimum, that Stephens committed felony murder.  Accordingly, we find this
argument to be without merit.  
Reduction of Armed Robbery Plea
Stephens pled guilty to armed robbery of Derrick Dixon.  At trial Derrick
Dixon testified that Stephens searched his pockets but nothing was taken from him. 
Based on this testimony, Stephens argues the trial court erred in denying his motion
5   Prior to trial, Stephens pled guilty to several robberies including the robbery
of Derrick Dixon.  The fact of these pleas was used by Stephens in his attempt to
convince the jury that he readily admitted to the crimes he in fact committed.
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to withdraw his guilty plea and amend the charge to attempted armed robbery.  The
motion to withdraw the plea5 was made at the close of the State’s case.  Because
Stephens was not on trial for this robbery, the trial judge indicated withdrawal of
the plea could not be addressed at that point in time.  Thereafter, during the
defendant’s case, Stephens testified to the following facts concerning the robbery
of Dixon: 
A  . . . Derrick Dixon gave me $20 in denominations of two
tens.
Q  Now, you heard Derrick Dixon testify that nothing was taken
from him?
A  (laughing)
Q  But you took money from him, too, didn't you?
A  Yes, I did.
Stephens thereafter used the fact that he had entered pleas to convince the jury that
he admitted all of the crimes he committed and that he only denied those he did not
commit.
Additionally, during the jury instruction conference, the trial court noted the
fact that a judgment of acquittal had been granted the codefendant on the armed
robbery charge and indicated that Stephens’ counsel would be filing a motion to
withdraw his plea on that particular count.  No further motion on this issue was ever
6   Stephens requested three special instructions.   Special Instruction Number
1 provided:
 
If you find that there was some definitive break in the chain of
circumstances beginning with the crimes of kidnapping, robbery or
burglary, and ending with the death of Robert Sparrow, III or, if you
have a reasonable doubt about it, you should find the defendant, Jason
Demetrius Stephens not guilty of first degree felony murder. 
Special Instruction Number 2 provided:
If you find that because of the passage of time and/or the separation in
space from the felonies of kidnapping, robbery and/or burglary that those
felonies had been completed prior to the death of Robert Sparrow, III or,
if you have a reasonable doubt about it, you should find the defendant,
Jason Demetrius Stephens not guilty of first degree felony murder.
Special Instruction Number 3 provided:
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made by the defense.  Since no further motion was made, the trial court did not err
in failing to rule on the “nonexistent” motion to withdraw the plea.  Contrary to
Stephens’ assertion, the trial court in this instance did not deny a motion to
withdraw plea; he simply told the defendant to file his motion at a more appropriate
time.
Denial of Theory of Defense Instructions
Stephens urges reversal of his murder conviction, alleging the trial court erred
in denying his request for several special jury instructions concerning his theory of
defense.6  While a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of
If you find the death of Robert Sparrow, III  was not a predictable result
of the felonious acts of Jason Demetrius Stephens, or, if you have a
reasonable doubt about it, you should find the defendant, Jason
Demetrius Stephens not guilty of first degree felony murder.
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defense, the failure to give special jury instructions does not constitute error where
the instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards.  See
Palmes v. State, 397 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1981).  The trial court in the instant case gave
the standard jury instructions for first-degree felony murder.  The standard jury
instructions are presumed correct and are preferred over special instructions.  See
State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974).  Thus, Stephens has the burden of
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in giving standard
instructions.  See Phillips v. State, 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985); Williams v. State,
437 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1983).
The jury was instructed as follows on the issue of first-degree felony murder:
     Before you can find the defendant guilty of first
degree felony murder, the State must prove the following
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.  Robert Sparrow, III is dead.
2.  
(a)  The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant
was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, or a robbery, or a burglary; or
(b)  The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant
was attempting to commit a kidnapping, or a robbery, or a burglary; or
7   See, e.g., Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1997) (finding no merit to
claim that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on principals when there was
no evidence to support this theory).
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(c)  The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant
was escaping from the immediate scene of a kidnapping, or a robbery, or a
burglary.
3.  
(a)  The defendant was the person who actually killed Robert
Sparrow, III; or
(b)  Robert Sparrow, III was killed by a person other than the
defendant, but both the defendant and the person who killed Robert Sparrow, III
were principals in the commission of an attempt to commit kidnapping, or robbery,
or burglary.
In order to convict of first degree felony murder, it is not necessary for the
State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill.
The elements of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, robbery, attempted
robbery, burglary, and attempted burglary will be explained to you when I read
pages 11 and 12 of these instructions.
Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of kidnapping,
robbery, burglary, and attempts to commit these offenses.  These instructions
informed the jury that a conviction for felony murder could only be supported if the
death occurred as a consequence and while the defendant was committing or
attempting to commit one of the named felonies. 
In order to be entitled to a special jury instruction, Stephens must prove: (1)
the special instruction was supported by the evidence;7 (2) the standard instruction
8   See, e.g., Elledge v. State, 706 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1997); Branch v. State, 685
So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1996) (holding it was not error to refuse to use former standard
instruction on circumstantial evidence where jury was fully instructed on reasonable
doubt and burden of proof); Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993) (upholding
the  trial court's denial of special instruction); Hansbrough v. State, 509 So. 2d 1081
(Fla. 1987) (upholding trial court rejection of four special jury instructions on sanity
stating "the standard instructions adequately apprised the jury as to the law").
9   See, e.g., United States v. Sans, 731 F.2d 1521, 1530 (11th Cir. 1984)
(denying an instruction even though it was a correct statement of the law because it
was misleading); Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981).
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did not adequately cover the theory of defense;8 and (3) the special instruction was
a correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing.9  The trial court did
not err in denying these special instructions because Stephens failed to prove the
instructions given did not adequately cover his theory of defense or that the special
instructions were a proper statement of the law that would not mislead and confuse
the jury.  See Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 369, 376 (Fla. 1994) (trial court did not
err in denying special instructions where "[a]ll of the requested instructions [were]
either adequately covered by the standard instructions, misstate[d] the law, or were
not supported by the evidence.").  Here, Stephens adequately showed the special
instructions would have supported his theory of defense; however, he failed to
establish that the special instructions were necessary and were not likely to confuse
the jury.  
Moreover, Stephens claims he is entitled to the special instructions based
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upon the holdings in Parker v. State, 570 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and
Mills v. State, 407 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).  However, the statements upon
which the special instructions are based have been taken out of context and would
likely confuse the jury.  In both of those cases, the defendants were found guilty of
felony murder.  In Mills, which was quoted by Parker, the underlying felony was a
robbery, which occurred twenty-four hours prior to the murder.  There, the court
stated:
The fact that the taking of Meli's money and car had been
accomplished some twenty-four hours before the killing
occurred did not, under the facts of the present case,
terminate the robbery so that it could no longer constitute
the underlying felony for felony murder purposes.  In the
absence of some definitive break in the chain of
circumstances beginning with the felony and ending with
the killing, the felony, although technically complete, is
said to continue to the time of the killing.  Jefferson v.
State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla.1961).  Neither the passage of
time nor separation in space from the felonious act to the
killing precludes a felony murder conviction when it can
be said, as it can be so readily here, that the killing is a
predictable result of the felonious transaction.  Campbell
v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla.1969).
Mills, 407 So. 2d at 221 (footnote omitted).  The Mills court further explained,
"[T]the application of a rule of technical termination of the felony would produce
the absurd result that felony murder would be precluded in all instances where the
killing followed the 'completion' of the felony."  Id. at 221 n.5.  Thus, the cases
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Stephens cites in support of his argument that he was entitled to the special
instructions demonstrate that the instructions would have been, at a minimum,
confusing and misleading, if not a misstatement of the law altogether.  Accordingly,
Stephens has failed to demonstrate the trial court clearly abused its discretion in
denying the proposed special instructions.  See Sans, 731 F.2d at 1530; Parker,
641 So. 2d at 376.
Denial of Motion to Change Venue
Stephens also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of
venue.  Stephens has not demonstrated error in the trial court’s ruling.  In Rolling v.
State, 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997), this Court held the defendant has the burden of
proving community prejudice denied him the right to a fair trial.  Stephens has failed
to allege facts indicating abnormal pretrial publicity.  In addition, the trial court went
beyond the necessary precautions to ensure the jury selected was fair and impartial
by conducting individual voir dire of the potential jurors to detect any potential
juror who had been persuaded by the pretrial publicity.  Out of the 115 potential
jurors, the court leniently dismissed 40 potential jurors because it felt there was
"some reasonable doubt" that they could be fair and impartial.  Further, the court
noted two-thirds of the potential jurors, including all of the jurors who were
ultimately selected to serve on the jury, stated they could be fair and impartial. 
10   Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
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Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for a
change of venue. 
Denial of Nelson Inquiry
Next, Stephens argues the trial court erred in denying him a Nelson10 inquiry,
after he raised the issue of counsel's competency.  The record does not contain the
handwritten note Stephens presented to the trial court expressing his concerns;
however, the trial court characterized the concerns as a lack of contact between
Stephens and his attorneys.  Additionally, Stephens stated on the record that in
addition to a lack of contact he was concerned with the failure of counsel to give
him copies of paperwork.  Thus, it is apparent that Stephens voiced dissatisfaction
with counsel but did not actually question counsel’s competency.  Under such
circumstances a full Nelson inquiry is not necessary.  See Smith v. State, 641 So.
2d 1319 (Fla. 1994). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court made an adequate
inquiry into the complaint and properly remedied the problem by telling counsel to
visit Stephens more frequently and provide him with the proper records.  See Davis
v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1997).  Moreover, the record reflects Stephens
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subsequently expressed satisfaction with counsel.  For example, on December 5,
1997, Stephens swore that he discussed all aspects of this case with his attorneys,
did not want any delay, and wanted the trial to go forward as scheduled on
December 8, 1997.  Stephens did not tell the court that he was still dissatisfied with
his counsel or that the lack of communication had not been remedied.  
On December 8, 1997, Stephens also signed a "Plea of Guilty" form that
concerned charges integrally intertwined with those ultimately tried.  In the plea
form he agreed he had fully discussed all aspects of this case with his attorney.  He
also indicated to the court that he was satisfied with the services of his attorney in
the case.  In the plea colloquy, Stephens told the trial court that he had had enough
time to discuss his case with his attorneys and that he was satisfied with the
representation that they had given him in this case.  
Thus it is clear that the trial court sufficiently responded to Stephens'
complaints about his appointed counsel.  Additionally, Stephens demonstrated a
subsequent satisfaction with his counsel which shows any possible error was
harmless.  See Scull v. State, 533 So. 2d 1137, 1141 (Fla. 1988) (stating any
failings of the inquiry were mooted by defendant’s expressions of satisfaction with
counsel’s representation).
Query on Electric Chair Statement
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Stephens next alleges the trial court reversibly erred by allowing the State to
elicit testimony from him that he had asked authorities to help him get the electric
chair.  After being arrested for the crimes in this case, Stephens asked authorities if
they could help him get the death penalty.  The State claimed the statement was
relevant because it showed a conscious recognition of guilt.  However, during a
proffered cross-examination, Stephens testified that he had asked the authorities to
help him get the death penalty because of all of the crimes he had committed in his
life.  Stephens' counsel objected to the statement, arguing it was either irrelevant or
that the prejudicial impact of such statement outweighed its probative value. The
trial court overruled the objection and allowed Stephens to testify that he had asked
the authorities to help him get the death penalty because of all of the crimes he had
committed in his life, not because he felt guilty for murdering Sparrow III.  
In
order for evidence to be relevant it must have some logical tendency to prove or
disprove a fact which is of consequence to the outcome of the case.  See Charles
W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 401 (1999).  Here, the State alleged the statement
was relevant because it had a logical tendency to prove the defendant felt guilty for
murdering Sparrow III.  The defendant's state of mind at the time he made the
statement was relevant to prove a material fact.  See Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d
648 (Fla. 1995).  
-23-
Stephens also argues the statement was unduly prejudicial.  Under section
90.403, Florida Statutes (1997), relevant testimony may be excluded if the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the likelihood of unfair
prejudice.  However, the trial court should be given wide discretion in determining
whether the evidence is unduly prejudicial.  See Sims v. Brown, 574 So. 2d 131
(Fla. 1991) (finding the weighing of relevance versus prejudice or confusion is best
performed by the trial judge who is present and best able to compare the two);
Lewis v. State, 570 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding the trial judge
should be given wide discretion in determining whether evidence should be
admitted over a section 90.403 objection). 
Weighing all the evidence in this case and considering the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, we find the trial judge acted within his discretion, and any
potential error was harmless.  See  Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997);
Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997); Reaves v. State, 639 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1994).  Here, the State did not ask Stephens to tell the jury about his other crimes. 
It merely asked Stephens if he had made an agreement with the authorities that he
would tell them everything that had happened in this case if they agreed to help him
get the electric chair.  It was Stephens who went beyond that to explain that he had
asked for help in getting the electric chair for all of the other crimes he had
-24-
committed in his life.  Moreover, the jury was never told that the other crimes were
five other robberies and another murder where he shot the victim three times. 
Stephens has failed to demonstrate error in the admission of this relevant
information.
Proportionality
Stephens, citing to Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and Edmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), also argues the trial court erred in allowing the jury to
consider death as a potential sentence because his state of mind did not amount to
a reckless indifference to human life.  Thus, he argues his sentence of death is
disproportionate to the crime he committed.  We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held that
a sentence of death must be proportional to the defendant’s culpability.  Thus, in
Enmund the Court indicated that in the felony murder context a sentence of death
was not permissible if the defendant only aids and abets a felony during the course
of which a murder is committed by another and defendant himself did not kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be used.  Later,
in Tison the Court said a sentence of death in the felony murder context can be
proportional if the defendant is a major participant in the felony and the defendant’s
state of mind amounts to a reckless indifference to human life.  
-25-
In the present case, Stephens was not merely an aider or abetter in a felony
where a murder was committed by others; Stephens personally committed the
crimes of burglary and robbery.  He then personally kidnapped the child victim and
drove him to a location that was unknown to his parents.  Stephens and Stephens
alone stole the CD player out of the car and left the three-year old child in the hot,
closed car.  This record demonstrates that Stephens was indifferent to the fate of
this helpless child.  Under these circumstances the death penalty is proportional. 
See Van Poyck v. State, 564 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 1990) (finding the death
sentence proportional where the defendant was the instigator and major participant
in the underlying crimes who came to the scene “armed to the teeth” and knew
lethal force could be used).
Additionally, we find that the sentence of death in this case is proportional to
other felony murder cases where we have upheld the death sentence.  While this
case presents some unique circumstances that have not been encountered before,
we have affirmed the imposition of a death sentence in the felony murder context
with identical aggravating circumstances and similar types of mitigating evidence. 
Recently, in Lukehart v. State, No. SC90507, 2000 WL 1424534, *18 (Fla. Sept.
28, 2000), we affirmed a death sentence for a murder committed during the
perpetration of aggravated child abuse.  Three aggravating circumstances were
-26-
found:  (1) the murder was committed during the commission of a felony; (2) the
defendant had a conviction of a prior violent felony; and (3) the victim was under
the age of twelve.  In addition, a number of mitigating factors were found, including
the two statutory mitigating factors of age (the defendant was twenty-two) and
defendant’s substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  Some weight was
given to the four nonstatutory mitigating factors that Lukehart abused drugs and
alcohol; his father was an alcoholic and abusive; he was sexually abused as a child;
and he was employed.  The same three aggravating circumstances are present in
this case.  And while there are no statutory mitigating circumstances in Stephens’
case, nonstatutory mitigating relating to the defendant’s childhood, personal life,
and employment were found.  
Moreover, like Lukehart, Stephens’ prior violent felony was given great
weight and is similar to the events which led to the present murder.  In 1992
Stephens and two companions entered the home of LaTonya Jackson, a sixteen-
year-old, while she was with her boyfriend.  Stephens had a sawed-off shotgun
which he placed against Ms. Jackson’s head and threatened to kill her.  This is the
same type of home invasion which culminated in the death of Sparrow III, and
these events occurred within five years of the prior case.   
-27-
The defendant argues this case is analogous to the situations this court
addressed in Benedith v. State, 717 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1998), and Jackson v. State,
575 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991).  We disagree.  In both Benedith and Jackson the death
penalties were found disproportionate because the defendant’s state of mind did
not meet the criteria discussed in Enmund and Tison.  More specially, there was no
evidence that the defendants either did the shooting, possessed or carried a
weapon, or intended harm to any person.  In contrast, Stephens personally
abducted Sparrow III and left this three-year old child in a hot car to bake to death.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the death penalty is not
disproportionate and is based on Stephens’ personal culpability for the murder of
Sparrow III.
Assessments of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Stephens makes several arguments that the trial court erred in weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in his case.  We find the trial court acted
within its discretion in making this determination.  In reviewing the trial court’s
order, we must determine whether there is substantial, competent evidence in the
record to support the aggravators and mitigators found to exist.  See Gordon v.
State, 704 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1997); Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1996).  
First, Stephens argues the trial court improperly considered the same felonies
-28-
used to support the felony murder conviction as prior felony convictions under
section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1997).  This argument is without merit. 
Stephens was convicted of multiple felonies involving multiple victims.  Only one
of those felonies is needed for the first-degree felony murder conviction.  He
cannot complain because his criminal episode has resulted in numerous crimes and
more than one aggravating circumstance.  See, e.g., James v. State, 695 So. 2d at
1229 (Fla. 1997) (holding felonies committed contemporaneously with the capital
crime can qualify under the prior violent felony aggravator where, as here, the
criminal episode involved multiple victims).  
Next, Stephens argues the trial court erred in finding and giving great weight
to the fact that the death of this child occurred while the defendant was engaged in
or fleeing from the crimes of armed kidnapping, armed robbery and burglary with
an assault.  Stephens argues he had reached a point of safety prior to the child’s
death and, therefore, the court erred in finding this an aggravating factor.  As
previously discussed, there is substantial, competent evidence that  Sparrow III
died as a result of the felonies Stephens committed.  Therefore, this aggravator
should be upheld.     
Next, Stephens argues the trial court failed to give due consideration to his
acceptance of responsibility and remorse.  The determination of what weight, if
-29-
any, is to be given to a particular aggravating or mitigating circumstance is left
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  See Gordon v. State, 704 So. 2d 107
(Fla. 1997).  We will not disturb that determination absent an abuse of discretion. 
Since the record adequately supports the trial court's conclusions that the pleas
were made for tactical advantage and for use as argument before the jury, we will
not disturb those findings.  See Gordon, 704 So. 2d at 118; Larzelere, 676 So. 2d
at 394.  In addition, the trial judge found that Stephens appeared cavalier
throughout the trial, a factor supporting the finding that he was not truly remorseful. 
The trial court's failure to give great weight to this mitigating factor is supported by
competent, substantial evidence. 
Finally, Stephens argues the trial court erred in failing to give adequate weight
to Cummings' life sentence.  This argument is without merit because Stephens
testified Cummings did not know that he was going to the house to rob the
occupants, and he acted alone when he kidnapped Sparrow III.  Therefore, the
record adequately supports the trial court’s conclusion that Stephens and
Cummings were not equally culpable.  See  Raleigh v. State, 705 So. 2d 1324 (Fla.
1997); Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994).
Constitutionality of Section  922.10
Stephens argues section 922.10, Florida Statutes (1997), which provided for
-30-
execution by electrocution, is unconstitutional.  This argument has been rejected by
this court on numerous occasions.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla.
1997); Ferguson v. State, 105 So. 840 (Fla. 1925).  Additionally, the statute was
amended by the Legislature in January 2000 to allow for execution by either
electrocution or lethal injection, the choice being that of the defendant. 
Constitutionality of Section  921.141
Finally, Stephens argues section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1997), is
unconstitutional.  There is no merit to this argument.  See, e.g., Brown v. State, 721
So. 2d 274, 277 n.6, 283 (Fla. 1998) (rejecting multiple claims that section 921.141,
Florida Statutes (1991), is unconstitutional under the Florida and United States
Constitutions); Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 252 (Fla. 1995); King v. State, 436
So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. 1983).
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Jason Demetrius Stephens'
convictions and sentences, including his sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
-31-
WELLS, C.J., concurring.
I concur with the majority and write only to comment on proportionality.  I
do not agree with the concurring opinion that this is anything akin to a parent
leaving a child in a car.  This defendant committed a group of felonies which
involved terrorizing this child–ultimately leading to the child’s death.  Florida’s
death penalty is intended to cover this criminally caused death, and in view of the
age of the child, is proportionate, similar to our recent decision in Lukehart v. State,
No. SC90507 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000).
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the circumstances
surrounding the death in this case place it in that most narrow category of murder
cases: the most aggravated and least mitigated mandating the imposition of the
death penalty.  In essence, the majority is ordering the death penalty to be imposed
in a case that would ordinarily be considered manslaughter, and apparently doing
11Manslaughter is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being by the act,
procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification . . . and in
cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder.”  § 782.07(1),
Fla. Stat. (1999).  Whereas manslaughter by “act or procurement” does require a
showing of an intent to commit an unlawful act, manslaughter by “culpable negligence”
does not.  See Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1983).
-32-
so simply because the crime took place during the commission of another crime.11 
This decision ignores our own precedent as well as the controlling law from the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Tragically, we read from time to time of negligent parents or other caretakers
in Florida and elsewhere who may leave children alone in closed cars during warm
weather conditions.  When a tragic death occurs manslaughter charges are
sometimes brought against the caretakers for their gross neglect.  Cf. Mudd v.
State, 638 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (involving manslaughter conviction of
mother for death of seven-month-old child left in car for over eight hours;
conviction reversed because of improper admission of evidence of other
misconduct).  Numerous other examples are contained in the opinions of the
district courts where similar tragic incidents resulting in the deaths of innocent
children have been consistently treated as manslaughter or other lesser degrees of
homicide.  See, e.g., Mudd; McDaniel v. State, 566 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA
1990) (third-degree murder for death of infant son due to chronic illness and
-33-
malnutrition); Jakubowski v. State, 494 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (third-
degree felony murder for death of six-year-old victim due to child abuse).  
Like the victims involved in these similar cases, the child-victim here died as
a result of a senseless series of events instigated by the defendant, concluding with
the child’s tragic, but unintended death, when he was abandoned in a closed, but
unlocked, car by the defendant at a time when the outside temperature was in the
high eighties.  Importantly, it is undisputed here that neither the jury nor the trial
judge could conclude that the defendant intended to kill the child.  Indeed, in an
unusual, but significant gesture, the State agreed that the trial court could consider
in mitigation statements made by the jury foreman “that the jury generally did not
believe that the Defendant intended to kill.”  In addition to recording this agreement
in its sentencing order the trial court also concluded under its analysis of
“Nonstatutory Mitigating Factors” that because “the Court cannot, beyond a
reasonable doubt, find that the defendant intended to kill, requires the Court to give
this factor significant weight, which it has done.”  
However, the majority has chosen to ignore this critical factor of lack of an
intent to kill even while relying solely on a theory of felony murder to sustain the
conviction for first-degree murder.  While the legal fiction of substituting the
commission of a felony in place of intent may technically qualify this case as a first-
-34-
degree murder case, it still leaves us with a death under circumstances that Florida
courts have consistently treated as manslaughter or some other lesser degree of
homicide.  See Mudd.  We should hesitate before making such a giant leap and
elevating a crime ordinarily characterized as culpable negligence and prosecuted as
manslaughter, to one deserving of the death penalty.  Having done so, for example,
we will be hard pressed in the future not to extend this reasoning to other
comparable circumstances, such as reckless driving in flight from a robbery.  
In placing this case in the category of the “worst of the worst,” we also place
Florida’s death penalty laws in serious jeopardy of failing the United States
Supreme Court’s test for constitutionality by being narrowly drawn only to apply to
the most egregious of killings.  As conceded by the majority in its opinion, the
United States Supreme Court has expressly limited invocation of the death penalty
to those situations in which a defendant intends to kill or his conduct is so
egregious as to be tantamount to an intent to kill.  See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
In Enmund, Justice White, writing for the majority, explained: “It is
fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than
causing the same harm unintentionally.’”  See id. at 798 (quoting H.L.A. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility 162 (1968)).  The majority in Enmund pointed out
-35-
that imposing the sentence of death on a person who did not kill and neither
attempted nor intended to the kill the victim would not serve the two primary
purposes for imposing death as a form of punishment:  deterrence and retribution. 
Justice White explained the Court’s rationale:
     In Gregg v. Georgia the opinion announcing the
judgment observed that "[t]he death penalty is said to
serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."
428 U.S., at 183 (footnote omitted).  Unless the death
penalty when applied to those in Enmund's position
measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it
"is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an
unconstitutional punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
592.  We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat
that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will
measurably deter one who does not kill and has no
intention or purpose that life will be taken.  Instead, it
seems likely that "capital punishment can serve as a
deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation
and deliberation," Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463,
484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), for if a person
does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that
lethal force will be employed by others, the possibility
that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony
murder will not "enter into the cold calculus that precedes
the decision to act."  Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 186
(footnote omitted).
Id. at 798.  
Five years later, in Tison, the Supreme Court explained that its holding in
-36-
Enmund may also permit capital punishment where the defendant was a major
participant in a dangerous felony and acted with reckless disregard for human life. 
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. at 158.  The Court again focused on the
defendant’s mental state in holding “that the reckless disregard for human life
implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into
account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its
natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result.”  Id. at 157-58.  Justice O’Connor,
writing for the majority, explained:
     A critical facet of the individualized determination of
culpability required in capital cases is the mental state
with which the defendant commits the crime.  Deeply
ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the
offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be
punished.  The ancient concept of malice aforethought
was an early attempt to focus on mental state in order to
distinguish those who deserved death from those who
through "Benefit of . . . Clergy" would be spared. 23
Hen. 8, ch. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. 6, ch. 12, § 10
(1547). Over time, malice aforethought came to be
inferred from the mere act of killing in a variety of
circumstances; in reaction, Pennsylvania became the first
American jurisdiction to distinguish between degrees of
murder, reserving capital punishment to "wilful, deliberate
and premeditated" killings and felony murders.  3 Pa.
Laws 1794, ch. 1766, pp. 186-187 (1810).  More
recently, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the
-37-
plurality opinion made clear that the defendant's mental
state was critical to weighing a defendant's culpability
under a system of guided discretion, vacating a death
sentence imposed under an Ohio statute that did not
permit the sentencing authority to take into account "[t]he
absence of direct proof that the defendant intended to
cause the death of the victim." Id., at 608 (opinion of
Burger, C.J.); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982) (adopting position of Lockett plurality).  
Id. at 156.  Hence, as in Enmund, the Tison Court emphasized the critical
importance of the defendant’s mental state and level of culpability in determining
whether death is a permissible penalty.  The Court also pointed out the critical
importance of considering the absence of proof that the defendant intended to kill
the victim.  Today’s  majority ignores the Supreme Court’s admonition. 
Under Enmund and Tison, in other words, if the defendant and his cohorts
commit an armed robbery with the avowed attitude of shoot-to-kill if there is the
slightest resistance, this is tantamount to an intent to kill.  However, such a situation
is simply not involved here.  Here, we have no “shoot-to-kill” attitude or action. 
Rather, it is undisputed and conceded by all that the defendant did not intend to kill
the child, and the death occurred in a manner we have consistently treated as a
lesser degree of homicide and certainly not deserving of the death penalty.  Hence,
we have gone far astray from the United States Supreme Court’s strict limitations in
Enmund/Tison, and, in doing so have placed the Florida death penalty scheme at
-38-
constitutional risk.  Here, because the defendant committed a number of felonies
during a crime spree, including kidnapping the child-victim, he has properly been
convicted of felony murder and faces a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole even if his death sentence is set aside.  However, the
conviction for felony murder does not change the facts surrounding the actual
death, and those facts, as reflected in the statements by the jury foreman and the
trial court, do not support a finding of an intentional killing.  Rather, those facts,
like the tragic incidents involving negligent parents and caretakers cited above, while
abhorrent, prevent this case from being among the “worst of the worst” for which
the death penalty is reserved.  
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Jack M. Schemer, Judge - Case No. 97-9232 CFA
Michael R. Yokan, Jacksonville, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee