Title: Dean v. Dearing
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 011154
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DONALD A. DEAN, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 011154    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 19, 2002 
M. LEE DEARING 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this case, we are asked to determine whether a public 
official can use the "small group theory" to meet the "of and 
concerning" element of a claim for defamation. 
 
Following his confrontation with and arrest by the Elkton 
chief of police, M. Lee Dearing, the mayor of Elkton, made a 
number of statements alleging corruption, dishonesty, and 
felonious conduct by the Elkton police department.  From 
February through November 1999, Dearing accused the police 
department of intimidating witnesses, stealing property, 
harassment, misappropriation of money, and improperly 
disposing of drug and gun evidence.  These statements were 
published in newspapers serving the Elkton community.  At that 
time, the Elkton police department had from five to eight 
members. 
 
Donald A. Dean, Jr., a member of the Elkton police force, 
instituted this defamation action against Dearing on the basis 
of these statements, seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages.  Dearing filed a demurrer asserting that the motion 
for judgment did not state a cause of action for defamation 
because, inter alia, the complained of statements referred to 
conduct of the Elton police force and were not "of and 
concerning" Dean specifically.  In response, Dean, relying on 
Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 121 S.E. 912 (1924), asserted 
that he met the "of and concerning" element through the 
application of the "small group theory." 
 
The trial court sustained Dearing's demurrer and 
dismissed the motion for judgment, holding that under New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the "small group 
theory" cannot be used to satisfy the "of and concerning" 
element of defamation when such defamation is directed at a 
governmental group.  The trial court also concluded that the 
statements at issue referred to conduct by the Elkton police 
department rather than Dean's conduct and therefore Dean had 
not pled a cause of action for defamation.*  We awarded Dean an 
appeal and for the following reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
To prevail in a defamation cause of action, a plaintiff 
must establish that the alleged defamatory statements 
published were "of or concerning" him.  The Gazette, Inc. v. 
Harris, 229 Va. 1, 37, 325 S.E.2d 713, 738 (1985).  The 
exception to this general rule, recognized in Ewell v. 
                     
* One statement did refer to Dean by name, but the trial 
court concluded that this statement was not defamatory as a 
matter of law and this finding is not challenged on appeal. 
 
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Boutwell, was that if the defamatory language is directed 
towards "a comparatively small group of persons . . . and is 
so framed as to make defamatory imputations against all 
members of the small or restricted group, any member thereof 
may sue."  138 Va. at 411, 121 S.E. at 914.  Under this "small 
group theory" exception, a member of a small group need not 
show that the allegedly defamatory statements were directed 
specifically at the member bringing the action to satisfy the 
"of and concerning" element of common law defamation. 
 
The continued viability of this exception has been called 
into question when the small group is a governmental agency.  
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court 
considered a defamation action brought by a city commissioner 
who supervised the police department based on conduct ascribed 
to the police force in a newspaper advertisement.  The Alabama 
Supreme Court concluded that the "of and concerning" 
requirement was satisfied based on the "common knowledge" that 
a police commissioner was responsible for the actions of the 
police department, even though the police commissioner was not 
implicated by name or office in the offending advertisement.  
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 263.  The United States Supreme 
Court opined that references to the "police" or the "Police 
Department" could not be considered personal criticism of the 
police commissioner, even if evidence was produced that some 
 
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readers understood that the police commissioner was ultimately 
responsible for the police department and the alleged 
defamation, therefore, necessarily referenced the police 
commissioner.  Id. at 289-90.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
rejected the holding of the Alabama Supreme Court that the "of 
and concerning" element of a common law defamation action was 
met.  Id. at 288. 
Central to the Supreme Court's decision was the principle 
that prosecutions for libel of government have no place in 
American jurisprudence.  Id. at 291-92.  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that to read a general reference to the police force 
as a reference to a specific person "would sidestep" this 
principle by "transmuting criticism of government, however 
impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, 
and hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the 
government is composed."  Id. at 292.  Such a proposition 
"strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected 
area of free expression."  Id.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
concluded that "such a proposition may not constitutionally be 
utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on 
governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible 
for those operations."  Id.
New York Times v. Sullivan did not specifically address 
the "small group theory" but it did establish that a reference 
 
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to a governmental group cannot be treated as an implicit 
reference to a specific individual even if that individual is 
understood generally to be responsible for the actions of the 
identified governmental group.  The rationale of the Supreme 
Court in New York Times did, however, foreshadow the Court's 
holding in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), which 
directly addressed the "small group theory." 
In Rosenblatt, the defendant published a column in a 
newspaper raising questions about the operation of a 
recreational area in prior years when the plaintiff, under the 
direction of two elected Commissioners, supervised the 
recreational area.  There was no direct reference to the 
plaintiff, but the plaintiff's witnesses testified that they 
"read the column as imputing mismanagement and peculation" 
during plaintiff's term as supervisor.  Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 
at 79.  New Hampshire law allowed recovery by a member of a 
group if the jury found that the defamatory publication "cast 
suspicion indiscriminately on the small number of persons who 
composed the former management group, whether or not it found 
that the imputation of misconduct was specifically made of and 
concerning [the plaintiff]."  Id. at 79-80.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this theory, stating that allowing recovery on such a 
basis is "tantamount to a demand for recovery based on libel 
 
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of government, and therefore is constitutionally 
insufficient."  Id. at 83. 
 
Following the opinion in Rosenblatt, there is little 
question that the use of the "small group theory" alone as the 
basis for satisfying the "of and concerning" element of a 
common law defamation action against a governmental actor does 
not survive constitutional scrutiny.  An allegedly defamatory 
statement which imputes misconduct generally to a governmental 
group constitutes libel of government, for which there is no 
cause of action in American jurisprudence.  New York Times, 
376 U.S. at 291-92.  A member of a governmental group against 
which an allegedly defamatory statement is made can sustain a 
common law action for defamation only if that member can show 
the statement specifically implicated that member or each 
member of the group.  Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 81-82.  Such 
implication can be shown by extrinsic evidence, but evidence 
that others "understood" the implication based solely upon a 
plaintiff's membership in the referenced group will not 
satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement. 
 
Dean nevertheless asserts that alleging a cause of action 
based on the "small group theory" is sufficient to withstand a 
demurrer and that he should be allowed to proceed to trial to 
introduce evidence demonstrating that the statements in issue 
are "of and concerning" him.  We disagree. 
 
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A demurrer is based on the contention that a pleading 
does not state a cause of action or fails to state facts upon 
which the relief demanded can be granted.  Code § 8.01-273.  
Dean's pleadings contain the defamatory statements referring 
to Elkton "law enforcement," police department, or police 
force, but contain no allegations, factual or otherwise, 
addressing how the articles reference Dean specifically or 
could be understood to do so, except based on his status as a 
police officer.  As we have just discussed, the "of and 
concerning" element of common law defamation cannot be 
satisfied as a matter of law by either the "small group 
theory" or allegations and evidence that readers of allegedly 
defamatory statements understood the statements referred to a 
member of the governmental group based solely on that person's 
membership in the identified governmental group.  Rosenblatt, 
383 U.S. 79, 82-83; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258, 288-89.  
The mere conclusory statement that the articles are "of and 
concerning" Dean does not satisfy the pleading requirement of 
alleging facts upon which relief can be granted in this case, 
and therefore Dean's pleading was insufficient to withstand a 
demurrer. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in sustaining Dearing's demurrer and dismissing Dean's common 
law action for defamation. 
 
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Affirmed.
 
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