Title: Brunsdale v. Bagge
Citation: 224 N.W.2d 384
Docket Number: 9046
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 1974

224 N.W.2d 384 (1974) John E. BRUNSDALE and Karl T. Brunsdale, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. John C. BAGGE et al., Defendants and Appellees. Civ. No. 9046. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 18, 1974. *385 Vogel, Vogel, Brantner &amp; Kelly, by C. Nicholas Vogel, Fargo, for plaintiffs and appellants. Dewel E. Viker, Jr., Hillsboro, for defendants and appellees Bagge and Spokely. Harold Dronen, Hillsboro, for defendant and appellee Sorlie. JANSONIUS, Commissioner. The complaint of the plaintiffs demands delivery of a warranty deed held in escrow by the defendant George E. Sorlie; or, in the alternative, demands that the defendants John C. Bagge and LaVaughn C. Bagge specifically perform an agreement to sell and convey certain real estate to them; and, further, that the Court declare that the defendant Francis V. Spokely has no right, title, or interest in the property. The defendants Bagge and Spokely by their answer pray that the action be dismissed; that the defendant Sorlie be required to return the deed to them; and that they be allowed to complete a real estate transfer between themselves. This matter initially came before the trial court on a motion of the plaintiffs for summary judgment based upon the pleadings, answer, interrogatories, and depositions of the parties. During the hearing on the motion of the plaintiffs for summary judgment the Court and counsel became involved in a discussion which resulted in the defendants, the Bagges and Spokely, seeking and receiving permission also to move for summary judgment. All parties at that time and ever since have been in full agreement that the case be submitted on the record then existing plus such other matters as the moving parties might wish to introduce. The trial judge at the conclusion of the testimony stated that he would rather: It should be mentioned in connection with the proceeding that the time had expired within which a demand for jury could be made, the matter was at issue, and the facts fully developed. Both sides have presented the question for review in identical language, as follows: The memorandum opinion of the trial court reads, in part, as follows: The Court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be heard in the dispute, concluding as follows: Actually, this case was submitted under Rules 12(c) and 43(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. A portion of Rule 12(c) reads as follows: In this case, the parties have tacitly accepted the fact that all the matters presented to the Court constitute a full and complete record, and to try the matter anew would result in exactly the same record before the Court. N.D.R.Civ.P. 43(a). Rule 52(a) requires findings of fact and conclusions of law "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ." However, the rule also omits the requirement of findings and conclusions where "an opinion or memorandum of decision" is filed. The complete record being before the trial court, the case is distinguishable from Weidner v. Engelhart, 176 N.W.2d 509 (N.D.1970). The trial court, in its decision, states: The Brunsdales contended Spokely waived his right of first refusal. The trial court found to the contrary, quoting from and relying on the following: In Gipson v. First National Bank of Bismarck, 97 N.W.2d 671, 675 (N.D.1959), the Court said: "In Werner v. Werner, 74 N.D. 565, 23 N.W.2d 757, we held: In the case of Werner v. Werner, cited in Gipson above, the Court stresses the fact that reliance on the matters constituting equitable estoppel must be "by the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel which induced him to act or refrain from acting, to his prejudice." In this case the parties claiming the estoppel were strangers to the original transaction. The lease involved was between John C. Bagge, a defendant, and Francis V. Spokely, a defendant. This principle is set out in 28 Am. Jur.2d as follows: Although the case arrives here as a result of motions for summary judgment since the case was actually submitted on its merits as though it were completely tried, we apply Rule 52 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The determination of the trial court as set forth in the memorandum opinion is not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be set aside. [Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.] The judgment is therefore affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, JOHNSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur. The Honorable HARVEY B. KNUDSON deeming himself disqualified did not participate; the Honorable CLIFFORD JANSONIUS, Court Commissioner sitting in his place.