Title: Byrns v. Allstate Insurance Company
Citation: 498 P.2d 762
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1972

498 P.2d 762 (1972)
Mabel M. BYRNS, As Guardian of the Estate of Harry Shane Byrns, a Minor, Appellant,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted April 4, 1972.
Decided June 22, 1972.
*763 E.R. Bashaw, Medford, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
Wm. V. Deatherage, Medford, argued the cause for respondent Allstate Insurance Co. On the brief were Frohnmayer &amp; Deatherage, Medford.
HOLMAN, Justice.
Plaintiff, a minor, was injured while he was a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by Jess Netherland when it was involved in an accident with a car negligently driven by an uninsured motorist. Netherland was killed, and several other passengers in the vehicle were seriously injured.
At the time of the accident, defendant insurer had in effect identical policies of automobile insurance which it had issued to Netherland and to plaintiff's mother. These policies contain uninsured motorist insurance with limits of $10,000 for any one individual and $20,000 for any one accident. Defendant acknowledged coverage of plaintiff under the Netherland policy and paid its $20,000 gross uninsured motorist limit on that policy. After the amount was apportioned among all the claimants, however, plaintiff received only $2,500, although his damages were substantially greater.
Plaintiff also made a claim under his mother's policy. Defendant conceded that plaintiff would be entitled to uninsured motorist benefits as an insured under his mother's policy except for his coverage under the policy which it had issued to Netherland. Defendant contends that the "other insurance" provision of the policy issued *764 to plaintiff's mother excludes any coverage for him thereunder.
Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment proceeding through his guardian to determine if coverage is available to him under the uninsured motorist provision of defendant's automobile insurance policy which it had issued to his mother. The trial court held that coverage was not available to plaintiff and plaintiff appealed.
The two identical policies have "other insurance" provisions, as follows:
This "other insurance" provision is the one originally applicable in plaintiff's mother's policy, the policy under which plaintiff seeks relief in this proceeding. It applies because at the time of the accident plaintiff was occupying an automobile not owned by the principal named insured (his mother) and he was also covered by other insurance (the Netherland policy).
The policies in question continue:
This is the general "other insurance" provision and the one which is applicable to plaintiff's coverage under the Netherland policy because plaintiff was an insured under that policy as an occupant of the Netherland vehicle and he had other uninsured motorist insurance available to him under his mother's policy.
We therefore start out with both policies providing coverage to plaintiff in the absence of other insurance. The policy issued to plaintiff's mother provides that if plaintiff was occupying an automobile not owned by his mother (he was), the insurance provided him shall apply only as excess over any other insurance that is available to him, whereas the Netherland policy provides that if there is other insurance (there was), the loss shall be prorated with the other insurance.
To this point, the present case is an exact factual duplication of Smith v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 240 Or. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965), with the exception that here the insurer is the same in both policies. We believe this exception is immaterial in resolving the issues under consideration. The language of the policies in Smith was slightly different than the language used in the present case, but the import is the same. In Smith we held as follows:
As a result, in Smith the clauses were disregarded in their entirety and the insured was allowed to "stack" the policies and to collect the full amount of his own policy in addition to the partial recovery he secured under the policy covering the vehicle in which he was riding. This was upon the condition that the injuries were sufficiently serious to justify the combined amount of the recoveries.
Smith is determinative of the issue of repugnancy and would be determinative of the entire matter here except for a disparity between the general "other insurance" provisions in the defendant's policy in Smith and in the defendant's policy in this case, which disparity affects only the issue of "stacking." After the "other insurance" provision in the policy issued to plaintiff's mother which relates to injuries during the occupancy of a nonowned vehicle has been voided, there still remains the general "other insurance" provision which says that if there is other insurance, the damages shall not exceed the higher of the applicable limits of the two policies and such damages shall be prorated. In Smith the "other insurance" provision which was voided contained such a limitation, but the remaining general "other insurance" provision did not.
In the above respect, the present situation is identical with that which existed in Thurman v. Signal Insurance Company, 93 Or.Adv.Sh. 1480, 491 P.2d 1002 (1971). In that case, after voiding the provision in the defendant's policy which was applicable to injuries incurred in a nonowned vehicle, we held that the remaining general "other insurance" provision, which contained the "nonstacking" limitation was applicable. In Thurman we said:
This language in Thurman is equally applicable to the identical situation in this case.
As a result, we hold that the defendant's policy afforded coverage to plaintiff. The excess "other insurance" provision which purports to cover those instances in which an insured is injured while an occupant in a nonowned vehicle is voided and the general "other insurance" provision thereupon comes into play. This general provision, however, limits the amount of plaintiff's damages to the greater of the policy limits, $10,000 in this case, which amount is prorated. Defendant is responsible to plaintiff under his mother's policy *766 for 50 per cent of plaintiff's damages, said 50 per cent not to exceed the sum of $5,000.
Defendant contends that the doctrine of conflicting uninsured motorist "other insurance" clauses laid down in Smith is no longer applicable to these facts. It argues the doctrine was abolished when the 1967 legislature[1] adopted ORS 743.792(9) (a) and (b)[2], which authorize provisions substantially similar to the ones used in these policies. The reasoning is that the legislature would not have authorized "other insurance" provisions which this court theretofore had held to be repugnant without intending to void the case law made by this court. This contention was disposed of during the pendency of this appeal in Thurman v. Signal Insurance Co., supra at 1485, 491 P.2d 1002, 1005, in a manner contrary to defendant's position. We said:
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded with the instructions to enter a judgment in conformance with this opinion.
[1]  Oregon Laws 1967, ch. 482, § 3.
[2]  "ORS 743.792. Requirements of uninsured motorist coverage.

"* * *.
"(9) (a) With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a vehicle not owned by a named insured under this coverage, the insurance under this coverage shall apply only as excess insurance over any other insurance available to such occupant which is similar to this coverage, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance.
"(b) With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying or through being struck by an uninsured vehicle, if such insured is an insured under other insurance available to him which is similar to this coverage, then the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance or such other insurance, and the insurer shall not be liable under this coverage for a greater proportion of the damages than the applicable limit of liability of this coverage bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
"* * *."