Title: People v. Thompkins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80673
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2000

Opinion filed June 15, 2000.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
This opinion supplements our earlier opinion of People v. Thompkins, 
181 Ill. 2d 1 (1998) (Thompkins III).
The defendant, Willie Thompkins, was convicted in the circuit court of Cook 
County of the 1980 murders of two individuals and sentenced to death. On direct 
appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence. 
People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401 (1988) (Thompkins I).
On post-conviction review, this court ordered an evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his 
sentencing hearing because his counsel failed to adequately investigate and 
present mitigating evidence. People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 
(1994) (Thompkins II). The circuit court conducted the evidentiary 
hearing and concluded that defendant was not denied effective assistance of 
counsel at sentencing. Defendant appealed directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d 
Rs. 603, 651(a). Defendant argued that the circuit court erred during the 
evidentiary hearing by refusing to allow defendant to make several offers of 
proof, by leaving the bench during another offer of proof, and by ordering 
defendant's offers of proof to be stricken from the record. Thompkins 
III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 9. We held that this combination of events resulted in 
clear and serious error. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 11-13. 
Accordingly, we ordered that the evidentiary hearing be reopened and retained 
jurisdiction over the cause. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 23-24.
On remand, the circuit court reopened the evidentiary hearing as directed. A 
record of that proceeding has been filed with this court. Supplemental briefs 
have been filed, and additional oral argument has been heard. For the reasons 
that follow, we now conclude that defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at his sentencing hearing. Consequently, we vacate defendant's death 
sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
FACTS
This court's prior opinions detail the evidence presented against defendant 
at his trial. We reiterate that evidence here only briefly and as necessary to 
resolve the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue before us. On December 23, 
1980, the bodies of Gerald Holton and Arthur Sheppard were found lying outside 
in an unincorporated area near Markham, Illinois. Both men died from gunshot 
wounds to the head. The evidence disclosed that, on December 22, 1980, 
defendant's sister-in-law, Pamela Thompkins, arranged to purchase some cocaine 
from the victims. The victims brought cocaine to Pamela's home and placed it on 
a table in the basement, where Ronnie Moore and Sandra Douglas were seated. 
Defendant appeared with a gun and told the victims, "Put *** your hands on the 
table. This is the police." Defendant and Moore then bound the victims with 
telephone cord. According to Douglas, some hours later while she and Pamela were 
upstairs in the home, she heard gunshots in the basement. She then saw a body 
being dragged to the garage, and saw Moore escort Sheppard outside. Defendant 
later called Douglas and instructed her to clean up the basement, which was 
bloody. Upon his arrest, defendant gave an oral statement to police in which he 
admitted his participation in the murders, but attempted to shift the blame to 
Moore.
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the two murders and 
several other offenses. The jury returned its verdict on June 8, 1982.
I. The 1982 Sentencing Hearing
After defendant's conviction, the State asked the circuit court to convene 
defendant's capital sentencing hearing immediately. Defense counsel requested 
the circuit court to order a presentence investigation. The circuit court 
refused defense counsel's request, stating that a presentence investigation is 
not required in a capital case. Some discussion was then held concerning whether 
defendant would waive his right to a jury for sentencing.
The next morning, on June 9, 1982, the circuit court accepted defendant's 
jury waiver for sentencing. The sentencing hearing then commenced.
Defendant was found eligible for the death penalty under the multiple-murder 
eligibility factor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3). His 
eligibility is not at issue in this appeal.
The sentencing judge heard evidence relevant to aggravation and mitigation. 
The State presented three items of aggravating evidence. In 1971, defendant was 
convicted of attempted murder and aggravated battery for shooting a man named 
Michael Weaver. The evidence in that case revealed that, in late 1970, defendant 
and some other men spoke with Weaver about whether he would remain a member of 
the Black P. Stone Nation street gang. The men accused Weaver of informing the 
Markham police department about gang activities. Ultimately, defendant and the 
men escorted Weaver to "an area of 161st and Gauger." There, defendant kissed 
Weaver on both cheeks and then shot him three or four times and left him for 
dead. Weaver survived the shooting, but was left permanently paralyzed below the 
waist. Certified records showed that defendant was sentenced to 15 to 20 years 
in prison for shooting Weaver, and was released from prison and placed on parole 
on June 30, 1975.
The second item of aggravating evidence concerned an arrest. Shortly before 
his arrest in 1981 for the Holton and Sheppard murders, defendant was arrested 
for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of a loaded firearm. The 
arresting officer testified that he stopped defendant while defendant was 
driving a stolen car. He found a loaded firearm on the car's backseat and a 
sawed-off shotgun in its trunk. Defendant's license plates were on the car, and 
the car's vehicle identification number had been replaced with a fraudulent 
number.
Lastly, the State presented a statement by Pamela Thompkins in which she gave 
further details about the Holton and Sheppard murders. According to the 
statement, while defendant was in the basement of her home with the victims, 
Pamela heard him say something like "lay down, get down on the floor, this is 
it." She also heard gunshots and then later saw blood on defendant's clothing 
and shoes. She subsequently witnessed defendant pull Holton's body out of a car 
trunk and dump it in a ditch. Pamela temporarily recanted this statement, 
following her own trial.
Defendant's case in mitigation consisted of four stipulations and the brief 
testimony of defendant's wife. The four stipulations concerned the possible 
origins of bullets used to kill Holton and Sheppard. Annetta Humphries would 
testify that, at 2:30 p.m. on December 22, 1980, she gave Holton a .357 
revolver. She never saw Holton again. Linda Novelli would testify that, on 
November 8, 1979, she witnessed Holton purchase two .357 revolvers with certain 
serial numbers from a gun shop. On December 31, 1980, Novelli gave the revolver 
with one of those serial numbers to police. The police officer who received the 
revolver from Novelli would testify that he gave it to the Illinois State Police 
Crime Lab. A forensic scientist would testify that he examined the People's 
exhibits 49 and 50, which consisted of spent projectiles, a bullet core, and 
lead fragments, and determined that they could have been fired from the revolver 
that Holton had purchased and which Novelli later gave to police.
Barbara Thompkins, defendant's wife, testified in mitigation as follows. She 
married defendant on January 31, 1976. Defendant had two daughters from a 
previous relationship. Barbara and defendant had three children together, 
Tiffany, Willie, and Marshon. She and defendant owned a home together in 
Markham. After defendant's release from prison in 1975, defendant was employed 
as a nurse's assistant at the Rehabilitation Institute in Chicago. Defendant 
attended evening classes so that he could work in respiratory therapy. Defendant 
left his job at the Rehabilitation Institute in 1976. The next day he started 
work as a paramedic at the Cook County Department of Corrections. He worked 
there full-time until the fall of 1980. In July of 1980, defendant became ill 
with sarcodosis, a rare respiratory disease. As a result of his illness, 
defendant was hospitalized for six days and left his job as a paramedic. 
Defendant then worked periodically for his father doing construction work. From 
March 1981 through December 1981, defendant was in jail awaiting trial for these 
offenses. He was scheduled to start a new job for the City of Chicago 
rehabilitating gang members on June 1, 1982. Barbara's entire direct testimony 
took up fewer than eight pages of transcript. This concluded defendant's case in 
mitigation.
The next day, on June 10, 1982, the circuit court on its own motion ordered a 
presentence investigation to be conducted. The hearing was continued until July 
1, 1982.
When the sentencing hearing was reconvened on July 1, 1982, the circuit court 
acknowledged receipt of a presentence investigation report and tendered copies 
to defense counsel and the State. The four-page report contained the following 
information about defendant: he was born on October 20, 1949; he attended three 
years of high school and completed his general equivalency diploma in 1972; he 
was enlisted in the army in 1967; he was currently unemployed but had worked as 
a paramedic and medical assistant in the past; he was married with four 
children; he lived in Markham in his own home; he was a Jehovah's Witness; he 
enjoyed family sports; he suffered from a rare lung disease; he was of sound 
mind and had no problems with alcohol or drugs; and he had a good childhood. The 
report also reiterated defendant's criminal background.
Also on July 1, 1982, defense counsel submitted over 50 personal letters to 
the circuit court on defendant's behalf in mitigation. Many of the letter 
writers were friends and fellow church members of defendant's parents. They 
described defendant as a good family man who was raised in a good, loving home 
and asked the circuit court to spare his life. Other letter writers included 
some of defendant's aunts, in-laws, neighbors, and friends. They described 
defendant as respectful and helpful, and as a loving family man. Many of the 
foregoing letter writers acknowledged, however, that they did not know defendant 
well or had lost touch with him since his childhood. One letter writer, Emitt R. 
Jordan, had been incarcerated with defendant as an adult. He described defendant 
as a decent person with "much concern about the welfare of others"; as being 
dedicated to his prison job in the tuberculosis hospital; as coming from a good 
home and family; and as a person who is dedicated to his own family and a great 
asset to them.
Closing arguments ensued. Defense counsel argued that defendant should not be 
sentenced to death for the two homicides because the State had presented no 
evidence at trial that defendant actually fired the shots which killed the two 
victims. Defense counsel pointed out that defendant claimed in his statement to 
police that his codefendant, Ronnie Moore, actually fired those shots. Next, 
defense counsel briefly asked the circuit court not to dismiss the letters 
submitted on defendant's behalf. Finally, defense counsel made a plea for life 
imprisonment.
After considering the evidence before it, the circuit court found no 
mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty and sentenced 
defendant to death. In his ruling, the circuit judge acknowledged that he had 
read and considered all the letters submitted on defendant's behalf. He found 
the letter written by Jordan to be the most relevant. The circuit judge noted 
that many of the letter writers were writing "in respect to the defendant's 
parents" and did not appear to know defendant well.
II. The Appeal in Thompkins II
On appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, defendant 
argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing because 
his counsel failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence. 
Thompkins II, 161 Ill. 2d  at 165-68. Defendant had attached the 
affidavits of his parents, siblings, children, and friends to his 
post-conviction petition in support. This court reviewed those affidavits and 
concluded that they consisted of new evidence and that they were not duplicative 
of the letters submitted at the sentencing hearing. Thompkins II, 161 Ill. 2d  at 166. After reviewing the affidavits, this court was "not sure" 
whether actual testimony from those individuals who knew defendant well "would 
not have provided the sentencing judge with a more complete portrayal of the 
defendant." Thompkins II, 161 Ill. 2d  at 167. Consequently, we ordered 
the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defense 
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present such testimony. 
Thompkins II, 161 Ill. 2d  at 167-68, 199.
The State contended in that appeal that defense counsel's strategy at the 
sentencing hearing was to argue that the State's evidence depicting defendant as 
the gunman was not so convincing that the death penalty was warranted. We stated 
in response:
We therefore determined that defense counsel's strategy of arguing that 
defendant did not actually kill the victims would not excuse a failure to 
present other mitigating evidence.
III. The 1995 Evidentiary Hearing
The circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing in December of 1995. 
Defendant presented the testimony of his trial counsel, several mitigation 
witnesses, and an investigator. Defendant also testified on his own behalf. In 
addition, defendant tendered other testimony that the circuit court excluded 
from consideration.
A. Defense Counsel
The same attorney represented defendant at trial and sentencing. Defense 
counsel was an attorney in private practice, but the circuit court appointed him 
to represent defendant. Counsel testified that he began representing defendant 
for the Holton and Sheppard murders in July of 1981, approximately one year 
before defendant's trial began. Because defendant was charged with a double 
homicide, counsel knew from the start that the State might seek the death 
penalty. He learned that the State would seek the death penalty just before 
trial.
Counsel averred that he met with defendant in preparation for defendant's 
sentencing hearing, but could not recall the number of occasions. He met with 
defendant in the courthouse anteroom and in jail; however, he never met with 
defendant in his office "specifically concerning the sentencing hearing." When 
counsel met with defendant in his office prior to defendant's trial, they 
discussed the possible penalties that defendant could receive. Counsel also 
asked defendant general questions about his background:
A colloquy then followed between defendant's post-conviction counsel and his 
trial counsel:
Counsel admitted that, although he asked defendant about his background, he 
never asked defendant to provide him with the names of persons who could help 
him prepare for the sentencing hearing.
Counsel could not recall how much time he had spent preparing for defendant's 
sentencing hearing, conducted 12 years earlier. When asked if he met with any 
members of defendant's family to prepare for the sentencing hearing, counsel 
responded that he met once with defendant's wife, but could not recall for how 
long. He also spoke with defendant's parents "but, in the sense of having an 
actual meeting [with them], I would not define it as an actual meeting." Counsel 
had no memory of meeting with any of defendant's four brothers or any of 
defendant's five children. He had no memory of defendant's daughters from 
outside his marriage. He never spoke with defendant's aunt, Margaret 
Haskell.
Counsel did not call defendant's parents to testify at sentencing because he 
did not believe that their testimony would have any impact on the case. He based 
this decision on the fact that defendant had opted for sentencing by the judge, 
rather than the jury. He admitted, however, that he did not know that defendant 
would waive the jury until, at the earliest, the night before the sentencing 
hearing began. Counsel did not call any other family members to testify at 
sentencing because he did not believe that their testimony would have any impact 
on the case and because he was not aware that some of them existed.
Counsel called defendant's wife to testify because he felt that she was "best 
able" to convey to the judge that defendant was a hard-working person who 
supported his family and "that the only reason he was out of work was because he 
had gotten ill." He admitted, however, that he was wary of "overplay[ing] the 
husband-wife relationship" because Sandra Douglas testified at trial that she 
had been dating defendant.
Counsel never met with any of defendant's supervisors or coworkers regarding 
the sentencing hearing. He never met with any of defendant's friends. He never 
sought to obtain any records concerning defendant's education, employment, 
military service or prison incarceration.
Counsel asked defendant's mother to collect letters on defendant's behalf and 
told her "what kinds of letters would be of interest." He did not participate in 
collecting the letters, and he made no effort to speak to the letter writers 
himself to see if they could testify. After receiving the letters from 
defendant's mother, he reviewed them and submitted them to the court.
On cross-examination, the State questioned counsel about his trial 
preparations. Counsel explained that, before trial, defendant took "little 
interest in the proceedings." Based on defendant's comments, counsel thought 
that defendant believed his case would never go to trial. Defendant appeared 
only sporadically for their appointments. Shortly before trial, defendant 
appeared at counsel's office and asked him to seek a continuance. Defendant told 
him that if he could find Sandra Douglas, who was scheduled to testify against 
him, then there would be no trial. Counsel refused to seek a continuance and 
from "that point on, there was a bit of enmity between the two of us." Shortly 
thereafter, defendant fired counsel and hired another attorney, who sought a 
continuance on defendant's behalf. The circuit court refused to give the new 
attorney a continuance. Defendant then rehired counsel. Counsel prepared the 
case for defendant. At that point, their relationship was "a bit distant."
Counsel advised defendant that the sentencing judge had never given the death 
penalty to anyone. Counsel believed that the judge would base his decision on 
the facts of defendant's case and his criminal background. Counsel was concerned 
about defendant's prior conviction because, in that case, defendant himself 
clearly fired the shots into the victim. Counsel testified,"[I] believed that 
since it was not clear in the record at all that Mr. Thompkins had killed anyone 
himself, that that would be the deciding factor."
Counsel explained defendant's right of allocution to him, and advised him to 
take advantage of this right. Defendant disregarded this advice.
B. Witnesses in Mitigation
Defendant's mitigation witnesses at the evidentiary hearing included a former 
chief of police, several family members and friends, a church bishop, and two 
physicians who had supervised defendant's work. All of the witnesses stated that 
they were available and would have been willing to testify at defendant's 
sentencing hearing had they been asked, but that defense counsel never contacted 
them. In addition, Barbara Thompkins testified for the second time.
i. Former Chief of Police
Robert Forberg testified that he has been the corporate purchasing manager at 
Arco Fasteners since 1981. From 1961 through 1974, Forberg was employed by the 
Markham police department. He started there as a patrol officer. In 1962, he was 
promoted to the position of youth officer. Forberg's responsibilities as a youth 
officer included investigating and processing all juvenile offenders. He also 
served on several youth community organizations. In 1966, Forberg was made chief 
of detectives and, in 1968, the chief of police.
Forberg first met defendant when defendant was about 14 years old. Forberg 
investigated defendant for minor crimes that he committed as a juvenile, such as 
shoplifting, bicycle theft, and curfew violation. As a result, they developed a 
relationship. Forberg lost touch with defendant when he was about 17 years 
old.
In the summer of 1966 or 1967, Forberg chaperoned a youth program at a roller 
skating rink in Harvey. Several small fights began. During the commotion, a 
young man whom Forberg had arrested several times came out of the crowd and 
struck Forberg on the head with a bottle. Forberg fell to the ground. The 
offender was attempting to get Forberg's service revolver, when defendant and 
another youth jumped on top of Forberg. Forberg believed that defendant acted 
"out of loyalty to protect [him]." He credited defendant with saving his 
life.
Defendant aided Forberg's police work in other ways. Forberg explained that, 
in the 1960s, there was turmoil in many communities and gangs were forming. 
According to Forberg:
"Harvey already had the Black Stone Rangers, Phoenix, Dixmore. [Defendant] 
was basically the leader of the Markham group, and through some of the 
conversations that we've had *** we prevented a lot of trouble within the 
village of Markham."
In particular, Forberg described an occurrence where approximately 200 youths 
gathered at Rosner Park:
Forberg opined that, had confrontation erupted, lives would have been lost 
because the youths were carrying baseball bats, clubs, and chains.
Defendant also assisted Forberg in organizing a basketball program for area 
youths. Defendant promoted it throughout the community and brought in "a lot of 
the troublemakers" who "we felt were destined to go down the road in the wrong 
way." On Thanksgiving, defendant worked with a local businessman and delivered 
food to poor families. During the Christmas season, defendant donated his time 
to repair broken toys to give to needy children.
On cross-examination, Forberg clarified that defendant had been the leader of 
the Kingston Green Black Stone Rangers, a street gang. Forberg was not aware of 
defendant's conviction for shooting Michael Weaver in 1970.
ii. Family Members
Defendant's mother, Essie Thompkins, testified that defendant is her eldest 
of five sons, products of a 48-year marriage. She described defendant as a 
respectful boy, who helped out at home with the chores, did well in school, was 
active in their church, and enjoyed a variety of outside activities such as 
sports and Cub Scouts. At some point, defendant served as a deacon and treasurer 
of their church and sang with the gospel choir.
Essie knew about defendant's conviction for shooting Michael Weaver. She had 
been very hurt by it because she considered Weaver, a neighborhood boy, to be 
like a son to her. After the shooting, Essie spoke with Weaver's mother, 
offering her sympathy, unaware that her own son had caused the harm.
Essie thought that defendant had learned from his prison experience because 
he became involved with a religious group and went to school to become a medical 
technician. While he was working as a medical technician, defendant lived next 
door to his parents and Essie saw him often. She described defendant's 
relationship with his wife and children as "nice." Defendant would spend time 
with his children and his "discipline to them was good."
Essie never met with defendant's defense counsel prior to trial. During the 
trial, she met his defense counsel in the courthouse lobby, where they would 
have short conversations. Defense counsel never asked her to testify at 
defendant's sentencing hearing. Essie collected the letters submitted at the 
sentencing hearing. Defense counsel informed her of the submission deadline, but 
did not tell her what type of information should be in the letters or help her 
collect them. She therefore collected letters from people who knew both her and 
defendant.
Defendant's father, Willie Thompkins, Sr., testified that defendant was a 
kind and loving son to him and his wife. They had no problems with defendant and 
depended upon him to take care of his younger brothers. After defendant was 
released from prison for the Weaver shooting, he worked for his father doing 
concrete work. Defendant was "a very good worker." At some point after his 
release, defendant moved into the house next door with his wife and family. 
Willie Sr. saw defendant often and found him to be a nice husband and a good 
family man. Defendant loved his children and had a lot of patience with them. On 
cross-examination, Willie Sr. acknowledged that defendant had taken a "different 
path" than he with his life.
Defendant's former wife, Barbara Thompkins, testified that she was no longer 
married to defendant at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Barbara clarified 
that when she married defendant in 1976, she already had one daughter, Tiffany. 
She and defendant then had two sons together. She described defendant as an 
excellent father and good provider, who treated her daughter as his own. 
Defendant was a "good husband, very understanding, very patient, very loving." 
He helped with the cooking, cleaning, and child-rearing. When she first met 
defendant, he was a practicing Jehovah's Witness and taught Barbara and others 
about the Bible. Despite the murders, she thinks defendant is a good person who 
does not deserve the death penalty.
Defendant's brother, Berwyn Thompkins, testified that the Thompkins family is 
close. As children, the five brothers spent a lot of time in church because 
their parents are religious. Defendant was a nice brother who taught his younger 
brothers how to play sports. Berwyn remained close to defendant when they became 
adults. He described defendant's relationship with his own family as nice and 
loving. Despite defendant's crimes, Berwyn believed that defendant has a 
substantial amount of good in him and a lot to offer the community.
Gia Mack and Robin Johnson are defendant's daughters by Joyce Mack, a woman 
with whom defendant lived for a time but never married. Gia testified that after 
she turned age six, she saw defendant several times a week. The family was close 
even though defendant was then married to Barbara Thompkins.
Robin testified that she was born in 1970. As a young child, her father was 
in prison. Upon defendant's release from prison, he lived with Joyce Mack and 
the girls for awhile. Later, when Robin was age 12, she lived with defendant and 
Barbara Thompkins. Robin described her "extremely close" relationship with her 
father. Even when they did not live in the same household, they did many things 
together. The time she spent with her father was important to her. Robin "looked 
up" to her father because he taught her the importance of education and family, 
and values such as patience and responsibility. He always explained to Robin why 
he was disciplining her. Her father is her "best friend" and they "talk about 
everything."
Defendant's aunt, Margaret Haskell, who had written one of the letters 
submitted at the sentencing hearing, testified that she has known defendant 
since he was two years old. As a child, defendant was well-behaved and 
respectful to his parents and others. Defendant acted the same "in her presence" 
when he reached adulthood.
iii. Friends
John Chamberlain testified that he was defendant's close friend as a 
teenager. Their parents knew each other and they all attended church together 
every Sunday. He described defendant as a "lively guy" to whom he could tell his 
problems. Also, defendant was respectful to both their parents, as he was 
"brought up right." In the late 1960s, Chamberlain joined the military. When he 
returned from service, he saw defendant on a few occasions throughout the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Defendant appeared to be the same person Chamberlain 
always knew, and he "loved his kids."
Belinda Jackson testified that she was defendant's friend during their early 
teenage years. Defendant was like a big brother to her. He protected her on one 
occasion when another guy was about to "get physical" with her. She moved away 
from the area and lost touch with defendant until 1978 or 1979. When she 
returned, defendant was married and Jackson socialized with him and his wife. 
Defendant was helpful to her, driving her to and from the train station while 
her car underwent repairs. He also paid off a loan for her when she was in 
financial trouble. Defendant was very involved with his children.
Perrena Madgett testified that she grew up with defendant and saw him daily. 
As an adult from 1968 through 1970, she and her husband regularly socialized 
with defendant and his wife. Defendant was always kind, compassionate, and 
friendly. Later, when Perrena was undergoing a divorce, defendant was the only 
friend who supported her. Defendant was respectful and a good father.
Clarencetta Thomas also grew up with defendant and saw him almost daily 
throughout their childhood and teenage years. Defendant was warm and kind. He 
was protective of the neighborhood girls; he escorted them home and talked to 
them about their problems. When Thomas became pregnant in high school, defendant 
was supportive and visited her often, even though most people shunned her. 
Thomas left Markham in 1970 or 1971. When she returned in 1972 or 1973, she 
occasionally saw defendant. She still found him to be kind, loving, and 
giving.
iv. Fellow Inmate
Emitt R. Jordan, who wrote the most relevant letter to the court in 1982, 
testified that he was incarcerated with defendant at Pontiac prison in the early 
1970s, though he did not know why defendant was there. Jordan had been sentenced 
in 1963 to a 45- to 60-year prison term for murder and armed robbery. Defendant 
worked in the prison tuberculosis hospital. Jordan considered defendant a 
friend. He talked to defendant about everything, including defendant's desire to 
get out of prison, get a job in a hospital, and take care of his family. Jordan 
thought of defendant as a "solid and upstanding" person, not an agitator. 
Defendant even broke up some fights at Pontiac. After both men were released, 
Jordan saw defendant a few times, but not between 1976 and 1982.
v. Church Bishop
Bishop Howard Hogan testified that he has been a bishop in the United 
Pentecostal Churches of Christ in Chicago for about 10 years. He wrote a letter 
submitted at the sentencing hearing. Hogan met defendant in 1975 or 1976 after 
graduating from the seminary and becoming the pastor of defendant's parents' 
congregation. Defendant's parents invited Hogan to their home for dinner at 
least once a week, where Hogan would often see and converse with defendant. They 
mainly spoke about defendant's interest in paramedics, but discussed religious 
matters and other topics as well. Hogan found defendant to be extremely 
respectful, intelligent, and loving and devoted to his wife and children. He 
often observed defendant playing with his children and sharing conversations 
with his wife and others.
On cross-examination, Hogan stated that he never saw defendant in church. He 
knew defendant well enough to testify on his behalf, but not well enough to say 
what defendant did outside his presence. Hogan learned in time about the Weaver 
shooting, but his opinion of defendant remained unchanged because he did not 
know anything about defendant's "other side."
vi. Physicians Who Supervised Defendant's Work
Dr. George Geis testified that he supervised defendant's work as a paramedic 
at the Cook County jail from about 1974 to 1977. Defendant's responsibilities 
there entailed distributing medicine and evaluating inmates' medical complaints 
to determine which required a physician's attention. Defendant performed his job 
duties "very well" and was reliable. The quality that most impressed Dr. Geis 
was that defendant performed his duties "with an unusual degree of insight," 
"calm," and "decorum," which was unusual in that milieu of general chaos, noise, 
and confusion.
Dr. Geis recalled a conversation he had with defendant concerning some of his 
criminal background. Dr. Geis was impressed by defendant's strength of character 
in taking responsibility for his past behavior. If he had been called to testify 
at defendant's sentencing hearing, he would have described defendant's crimes 
"as failings that weren't characteristic of the person that I knew" and 
"transgressions that don't really, truly reflect the core of the person that I 
knew."
Dr. Lambert King testified that he knew defendant between 1974 and 1977 when 
Dr. King was the medical director at Cermack Hospital and the Cook County jail. 
Defendant was employed as a medical corpsman, and Dr. King regularly interacted 
with him. Defendant's duties included screening inmates for health problems and 
physician referrals, distributing medicine, and responding to medical 
emergencies throughout the jail complex. Dr. King recalled that defendant was an 
enthusiastic, conscientious, and dedicated employee who did not miss work. 
Defendant's work was reliable.
C. Investigator
Appolon Beaudouin, Jr., chief investigator for the Capital Resource Center, 
testified over the State's objection that he attempted to locate the more than 
50 people who wrote letters to the court in 1982. He found some letter writers. 
Some were willing to testify at the evidentiary hearing, including Bishop Hogan 
and Emitt R. Jordan. Beaudouin, however, was not able to locate 25 to 30 of the 
letter writers, either because they were dead or left no forwarding address. The 
Capital Resource Center was not available for defense counsel to use in 
1982.
D. Defendant
Defendant testified that he was in pretrial custody from March 1981 through 
December 1981. Defense counsel began representing him in July of 1981. While 
defendant was in custody, counsel only met with him in court or in the "bullpen" 
for about 15 minutes before court appearances, and he never discussed 
preparation for a sentencing hearing.
After defendant was released on bond, he met with his counsel at court 
appearances and three or four times at his law office. During these meetings, 
counsel never discussed preparation for a sentencing hearing, never asked 
defendant to sign release forms for information, and never asked defendant for 
information about himself or for the names of any persons who might testify on 
his behalf. Later, after the trial began, counsel still did not discuss with 
defendant any preparation for a sentencing hearing.
After defendant was found guilty on June 8, 1982, counsel advised him to 
waive his right to a jury for sentencing. Defendant did so. Also after being 
found guilty, defendant asked counsel what they were going to do about 
sentencing. Counsel responded that defendant's parents and wife were collecting 
letters on his behalf. During the recess in the sentencing hearing from June 9, 
1982, until July 1, 1982, counsel did not communicate with defendant at all. 
Defendant would have assisted counsel in gathering mitigation evidence had he 
been asked.
E. Evidence Excluded by Circuit Court
On December 5, 1995, when the evidentiary hearing began, defendant proposed 
to include in his witness list four expert witnesses: Dr. Michael Gelbort, Dr. 
Myra Levick, Jeffrey Eno, and W. Jameson Kunz. The circuit court granted the 
State's motion in limine to preclude all of the expert testimony.
Defendant later filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's 
ruling regarding expert testimony or, in the alternative, leave to make offers 
of proof. The motion was supported by over 80 pages of expert affidavits, 
exhibits, and resumes. Defendant also filed the affidavits of two additional 
mitigating witnesses, Clarence McKay and Eddie Madgett.
In response, the State moved to strike the attachments and exhibits attached 
to defendant's motion to reconsider and moved to strike the affidavits of McKay 
and Madgett. The circuit court granted these requests. The circuit court also 
denied defendant's request to make offers of proof of the above, with one 
exception. The affidavit of Jeffrey Eno was allowed in the record.
Following the circuit court's final ruling, on February 9, 1996, defendant 
moved to vacate the judgment. All the material ordered stricken above was 
attached to that motion. The State again moved to strike this material, and the 
circuit court granted the motion.
Finally, the circuit court excluded the testimony of Karen Popek, the 
attorney who represented defendant on direct appeal. The circuit judge allowed 
an offer of proof of Popek's testimony to be given. The circuit judge, however, 
left the courtroom during the offer.
F. Circuit Court's Order
After considering the evidence before it, the circuit court held that 
defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing 
hearing. The court first characterized defendant as an uncooperative client. The 
court then evaluated the mitigation testimony presented by eight of defendant's 
nonfamily witnesses, Robert Forberg, Belinda Jackson, Emitt R. Jordan, Perrena 
Madgett, Clarencetta Thomas, John Chamberlain, Dr. George Geis, and Dr. Lambert 
King. The court found that none of these witnesses had any significant contact 
with defendant for several years before the double murders of which he stands 
convicted, and that their testimony related only to their impression of 
defendant's character during his childhood years. He thus dismissed their 
testimony, concluding that it would not have changed the result of the 
sentencing hearing had it been presented.
With respect to other mitigation testimony, the circuit court determined that 
it was reasonable trial strategy not to present it because it likely would have 
divulged aggravating factors. The aggravating factors identified by the court 
were evidence that Michael Weaver was a friend of the Thompkins family, that 
Sandra Douglas was defendant's mistress, and that defendant was the leader of a 
street gang. Accordingly, the court denied defendant's post-conviction petition 
and affirmed his death sentence.
IV. The Appeal in Thompkins III
Defendant appealed from the above circuit court order. Defendant argued that 
the circuit court erred during the evidentiary hearing by refusing to allow 
defendant to make his offers of proof, by leaving the bench during the offer of 
proof of Popek's testimony, and by ordering defendant's offers of proof to be 
stricken from the record. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 9. We held that 
this combination of events was error constituting an abuse of discretion. 
Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 11-13. This error worked to deprive this 
court of a proper record with which to review defendant's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 12-13. Therefore, we 
remanded the cause to the circuit court with directions to reopen the 
evidentiary hearing for the purpose of permitting defendant to make the above 
offers of proof in the court's presence. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 
13. We further directed the court to "reevaluate and reenter its evidentiary 
rulings in light of the proffers following their presentation," and to "reenter 
any other finding it deems necessary as a result of its reconsideration." 
Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 13.
Defendant additionally argued that the circuit court erred in excluding from 
evidence the affidavits of the two mitigating witnesses, Clarence McKay and 
Eddie Madgett. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 17. We directed the 
circuit court to reconsider this evidentiary ruling in light of the proper 
standard of admissibility. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 18. Relevance 
and reliability are the two factors controlling admissibility of evidence at a 
capital sentencing hearing. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 18. We 
further directed the court that, after reconsideration, it shall reenter its 
ruling and "make any other finding it deems necessary as a result." 
Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  at 18.
We retained jurisdiction over the cause. Thompkins III, 181 Ill. 2d  
at 23.
V. The Reopened Evidentiary Hearing in 1998
The circuit court reopened the evidentiary hearing as instructed. The circuit 
court heard the testimony of the four expert witnesses, as well as the testimony 
of Popek, McKay, and Madgett.
Dr. Michael M. Gelbort, a clinical psychologist specializing in 
neuropsychology, testified that tests were administered to defendant in 1995 and 
again in 1998. The results of those tests indicated that defendant's thinking 
abilities are not in the normal range, that defendant has defects in cognitive 
abilities, that defendant does not have accurate or efficient perception, and 
that defendant has reasoning difficulties. According to Dr. Gelbort, defendant 
has a brain dysfunction of some sort, which is clinically referred to as 
"Minimal Brain Dysfunction." He stated that these deficits are not new, but stem 
from some time in the past such as defendant's childhood. Dr. Gelbort made this 
determination after gathering test data and reconciling it with defendant's 
historical information. He believed that defendant gave him relatively accurate 
information about his history. Dr. Gelbort, however, never explained what 
historical information he used to determine that defendant had brain dysfunction 
as of 1982.
On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Gelbort about the large variance 
that existed between the vision and verbal memory tests. Once Dr. Gelbort 
acknowledged that no visual acuity test had been given before the vision memory 
test, the State pointed out that defendant obtained prescription glasses shortly 
after the tests were administered.
Dr. Gelbort admitted that he was not aware of defendant's work history and 
could not explain how an emergency medical technician could function with 
Minimal Brain Dysfunction. The normal or average range test score was 90 to 110, 
and defendant's test score of 90 placed him at the bottom of that range.
The State also raised several questions with respect to the scoring of the 
exams. Although defendant gave virtually identical answers on the 1995 and 1998 
exams, defendant was given the highest score of 2 for his 1995 answers and the 
lowest score of 0 for his 1998 answers. Dr. Gelbort admitted that in at least 
one of the comparisons he made a mistake scoring the exams.
The circuit court qualified and accepted Dr. Gelbort as an expert in 
neuropsychology. The court found Dr. Gelbort's testimony to be relevant and 
reliable and, thus, admitted it into evidence. The court further found that Dr. 
Gelbort's testimony indicated that in 1982 defendant's trial counsel could have 
obtained a psychological evaluation to determine if defendant had any 
psychological problems.
The State presented Dr. Edward Mahoney as a rebuttal witness. The circuit 
court qualified and accepted Dr. Mahoney as an expert in clinical and forensic 
psychology. He testified concerning the discrepancies that existed in Dr. 
Gelbort's scoring, the different ways to interpret test results, and the 
validity of test results when an incomplete battery of tests is administered. 
Dr. Mahoney analyzed the test results and was not able to conclude that 
defendant suffers from any brain deficit.
Defendant next presented the testimony of W. Jameson Kunz, an experienced 
public defender who has represented defendants in capital cases. Kunz testified 
that the performance of defense counsel at the sentencing hearing fell below 
prevailing professional norms in 1982 and that, had counsel performed reasonably 
under those norms, a substantial amount of mitigating evidence would have been 
introduced on defendant's behalf at the sentencing hearing. The circuit court 
qualified and accepted Kunz as an expert in death penalty cases. The court found 
Kunz's testimony to be relevant and reliable and, thus, admitted it into 
evidence.
Dr. Myra Levick, an art therapist, testified that she analyzed the drawings 
of Robin Johnson, defendant's daughter, to determine how Robin perceives her 
relationship with her father. According to Dr. Levick, Robin is close with her 
father and feels that he has always been there for her. Robin feels alone and 
abandoned when her father is not around. She further testified that art therapy 
was available in 1982 and could have been used at that time with similar 
results. The circuit court qualified and accepted Dr. Levick as "a psychologist 
and expert art therapist." The court found Dr. Levick's testimony to be relevant 
and reliable and, thus, admitted it into evidence.
Jeffrey Eno testified that he formerly worked as a mitigation specialist for 
the Capital Resource Center, and currently is a clinical and forensic social 
worker. He prepared a social evaluation for defendant's case in 1995. Eno 
testified extensively regarding the mitigation evidence that trial counsel could 
have uncovered on defendant's behalf in 1982 had he conducted a proper 
investigation. The circuit court qualified and accepted Eno as an expert "who 
offered an opinion concerning the extent of mitigation evidence that was 
available to trial counsel at the sentencing hearing in 1982." The court found 
Eno's testimony to be relevant and reliable and, thus, admitted it into 
evidence.
Karen Popek, defendant's attorney on direct appeal, testified at the reopened 
evidentiary hearing that when she obtained the trial file from defendant's trial 
counsel, he told her that he liked defendant and that he hoped she would be 
successful on appeal. Trial counsel never told Popek that defendant was 
uncooperative. Popek described defendant as cooperative. Defendant was 
forthcoming with information and did his own research. The circuit court found 
Popek's testimony to be relevant and reliable and, thus, admitted it into 
evidence. The court also found that Popek's testimony indicated that defendant 
was cooperative with counsel.
Lastly, at the reopened evidentiary hearing, the circuit court heard the 
testimony of the two additional mitigating witnesses. Clarence McKay testified 
that he has known defendant since childhood, when they were neighbors and 
friends. During their teenage years, defendant was a youth counselor at a summer 
fun club. He led McKay and others in sports and activities. McKay observed that 
defendant was patient and kind to children, and eager to teach.
McKay regularly saw defendant up until the time that defendant was imprisoned 
for this case. As adults, from 1975 to 1977, McKay and defendant carpooled 
together to their jobs in Chicago every day. They talked and joked during the 
rides. Defendant was prompt and would call McKay in the morning to ensure that 
he was awake. McKay recalled that, during the rides home, defendant was "always 
in a hurry to go home, to be with his family." McKay observed defendant interact 
with his own children. He cooked for them, and hugged and kissed them.
McKay is aware that defendant served time in prison in the early 1970s for 
shooting Weaver. Defendant counseled McKay not to make this same kind of 
mistake. Despite everything, McKay believes that defendant is "a regular guy 
like me," and considers him a friend.
At the request of defendant's mother, McKay wrote a letter to the trial court 
in 1982. Defendant's trial counsel, however, never contacted him or asked him to 
testify at the sentencing hearing. Had McKay been asked, he would have testified 
in 1982.
The circuit court found McKay's testimony to be relevant and reliable and, 
thus, admitted it into evidence. The court additionally admitted McKay's 
affidavit into evidence.
Eddie Madgett testified that he and defendant were good friends as children 
and remained close as adults. Madgett described defendant as a good father and 
husband. Madgett believes that defendant's life should be spared. Defense 
counsel never contacted Madgett in 1982. Madgett, however, was available at that 
time and would have testified on defendant's behalf had he been asked. The 
circuit court found Madgett's testimony to be relevant and reliable and, thus, 
admitted it into evidence. The court additionally admitted Madgett's affidavit 
into evidence.
After reviewing the 1995 evidentiary hearing and the 1982 sentencing hearing, 
the circuit court made the following additional findings. The court found that 
"there was significant and relevant mitigation evidence that was not introduced 
by trial counsel at the sentencing hearing in 1982." This mitigation evidence 
could have been presented to the sentencing judge to demonstrate that, in 
witnesses' opinions, defendant was "a good son, husband, father, friend, and 
worker"; that defendant "may have helped save the life of a youth officer who 
later became the Chief of Police of Markham"; and that defendant "was kind to 
women and protective of them."
The circuit court, however, declined to disturb the ultimate conclusion 
entered in 1995 that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at 
his sentencing hearing. The cause was then returned to this court.
ANALYSIS
This post-conviction appeal follows a full evidentiary hearing on the issue 
of whether defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 
at sentencing. A circuit court's grant or denial of post-conviction relief at 
the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
manifestly erroneous. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 
(1998).
Defendant contends that the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing 
establish that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. According to defendant, the 
evidentiary hearing showed that his counsel failed to adequately investigate and 
present mitigating evidence. He submits that the substantial mitigation evidence 
presented by his post-conviction counsel supports his claim.
In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital 
sentencing hearing, the "benchmark" must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the sentencing 
hearing cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The standard for assessing whether an attorney's performance 
at a capital sentencing hearing was constitutionally deficient is well 
established. The defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was so 
deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, 
the resulting sentence would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689-94, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-98, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-68; e.g., 
People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 55 (1997).
As to the performance prong, the defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that the challenged action of counsel might be considered sound 
trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 
104 S. Ct.  at 2065; e.g., Howery, 178 Ill. 2d  at 55. The 
United States Supreme Court has stated, with regard to the alleged failure to 
investigate:
Hence, counsel has a duty to investigate potential sources of mitigating 
evidence to present at the capital sentencing hearing, or must have a sound 
reason for not making the investigation. E.g., People v. 
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 510 (1998) (and cases cited therein); People v. 
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 170 (1995). Although courts are highly deferential 
in reviewing counsel's strategic decisions whether to present certain mitigating 
evidence, such deference is not warranted where the lack of mitigation evidence 
presented stems not from strategy, but from counsel's failure to properly 
investigate and prepare the defense. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 510, 
513-15; People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (1997); People v. 
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 535 (1995); Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 
170.
In the present case, the evidentiary hearing established that defense counsel 
failed to adequately investigate sources of mitigating evidence on defendant's 
behalf, and that he had no sound reason for failing to do so. Counsel testified 
that he began representing defendant for the underlying murders approximately 
one year before the trial began. Counsel knew from the start that the State 
might seek the death penalty. Nonetheless, counsel's testimony indicated that he 
did very little to prepare for the sentencing hearing. Counsel met with 
defendant and asked him general questions about his background and family. 
Counsel admitted, however, that he never asked defendant to provide him with the 
names of persons who could help him prepare for the sentencing hearing. When 
counsel was asked if he met with any members of defendant's family, he responded 
that he met once with defendant's wife, but could not recall the length of this 
meeting. He also spoke with defendant's parents, but never had an actual meeting 
with them. Counsel never met with any of defendant's brothers or children or 
defendant's aunt. He never met with any of defendant's supervisors, coworkers or 
friends. In addition, counsel never sought to obtain any records concerning 
defendant's education, employment, military service or prison incarceration. 
Although counsel did ask defendant's mother to collect letters on defendant's 
behalf, he did not participate in the collection of those letters, nor did he 
make any effort to speak to the letter writers himself to see if they could 
testify. Rather, counsel appeared to leave the matter of investigating to 
defendant, saying: "It was his case. It was not my case." We thus conclude that 
counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of defendant's life.
According to counsel, he decided to present defendant's wife as the sole 
mitigation witness at the sentencing hearing because he did not believe that the 
particular sentencing judge making the decision would be impacted by anything 
other than the facts of the underlying case and defendant's criminal background. 
This rationale was not an objectively reasonable basis for counsel's decision 
not to investigate mitigation evidence. As counsel admitted, he did not know 
that defendant would waive his right to a sentencing jury until the night before 
the sentencing hearing began. Thus, this rationale cannot explain why counsel 
did not investigate mitigating evidence during the year before trial began. See 
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 512 (noting that it may be objectively 
unreasonable for an attorney to wait until after the guilty verdict to begin 
preparations for an imminent capital sentencing hearing). Even more importantly, 
because counsel failed to conduct an investigation and uncover what the possible 
mitigation witnesses would have to say, he was in no position to make a reasoned 
decision whether their testimony would have any impact on the judge. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2066; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 510, 513-15; Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d  at 
385; Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 535; Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 170. 
In conclusion, counsel's rationale for failing to investigate mitigating 
evidence stemmed not from a reasonable strategy, but from an objectively 
unreasonable failure to investigate. As such, counsel's performance was 
constitutionally deficient.
We now determine whether defendant has satisfied the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test. As to this prong, the Supreme Court has explained: 
"When a defendant challenges a death sentence ***, the question is whether there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer-including an 
appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence-would have 
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not 
warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; see People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 384 (1997). A 
"reasonable probability" is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome" of the sentencing hearing. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. This court has also observed that 
"[m]itigating evidence is extremely important under the Illinois capital 
sentencing scheme." People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 194 (1992). The 
sentencer must consider the mitigating factors, weigh those against the 
aggravating factors, and determine whether the mitigating factors are sufficient 
to preclude imposition of the death penalty. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 350 (1998); see Thompkins I, 121 Ill. 2d  at 452.
In this case, at the conclusion of the reopened evidentiary hearing in 1998, 
the circuit court found that "there was significant and relevant mitigation 
evidence that was not introduced by trial counsel at the sentencing hearing in 
1982." The court further found that this mitigation evidence could have been 
presented to the sentencing judge to demonstrate that, in witnesses' opinions, 
defendant was "a good son, husband, father, friend, and worker"; that defendant 
"may have helped save the life of a youth officer who later became the Chief of 
Police of Markham"; and that defendant "was kind to women and protective of 
them." We agree with these findings.
Even a brief review of the mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary 
hearing demonstrates that a wealth of mitigation was available to defense 
counsel in 1982, none of which was investigated or presented at defendant's 
capital sentencing hearing. A former chief of police credited defendant with 
saving his life when he was a young officer. He also claimed that defendant 
aided his police work in other ways, including the prevention of a violent turf 
war between 200 youths who had gathered in a park. He further observed 
defendant's participation in charitable activities, such as delivering food to 
poor families at Thanksgiving and repairing broken toys to give to needy 
children at Christmas. Several of defendant's family members testified that 
defendant was a loving and valued son, husband, brother, and father. Several of 
defendant's friends described defendant as a good person. His female friends in 
particular related defendant's acts of kindness toward them. A fellow prison 
inmate testified that defendant broke up fights in prison. A church bishop 
related that, from his observations and conversations with defendant, he found 
defendant to be respectful, intelligent, and loving and devoted to his wife and 
children. Two physicians who supervised defendant's work as a paramedic and 
medical corpsman testified that defendant was a reliable and dedicated employee. 
They also related that defendant was entrusted with important tasks such as 
distributing medicine, responding to emergencies, and speaking with inmates with 
health problems.
Moreover, defendant's attorney on direct appeal related that defendant was 
cooperative with her and did his own research. Two additional male friends of 
defendant, Clarence McKay and Eddie Madgett, testified concerning defendant's 
positive attributes. McKay noted that he regularly saw defendant up until the 
time that defendant was imprisoned for this case. Also as adults, from 1975 to 
1977, McKay and defendant carpooled together to their jobs on a daily basis, and 
talked and joked during the rides. Defendant called McKay to ensure that he was 
awake. McKay observed defendant's desire to spend time with his family and his 
positive interactions with his children. Madgett testified that he and defendant 
remained close friends as adults. He described defendant as a good father and 
husband. He believes that defendant's life should be spared. Having reviewed all 
the mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, we are persuaded 
that, had trial counsel introduced it at the sentencing hearing, there is a 
reasonable probability that the sentencer would have concluded that the balance 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. We therefore 
conclude that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at his 
sentencing hearing.
As noted above, we agree with the findings entered by the circuit court at 
the conclusion of the reopened evidentiary hearing in 1998. Although those 
findings seem to undermine the circuit court's ultimate conclusion, in 1995, 
that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing, the 
circuit court in 1998 declined to disturb that earlier conclusion. For the 
reasons set forth both above and below, we conclude that the circuit court's 
holding that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing is manifestly erroneous.
As to prejudice, the circuit court in 1995 evaluated the mitigation testimony 
presented by eight of defendant's nonfamily witnesses, Forberg, Jackson, Jordan, 
Perrena Madgett, Thomas, Chamberlain, Dr. Geis, and Dr. King. The court found 
that none of these witnesses had any significant contact with defendant for 
several years before the double murders of which he stands convicted, and that 
their testimony related only to their impressions of defendant's character 
during his childhood years. The court therefore dismissed their testimony, 
concluding that it would not have changed the result of the sentencing hearing 
had it been presented.
Contrary to the circuit court's finding, the testimony given by these eight 
witnesses cannot be characterized as mere childhood impressions and cannot be 
limited as relating only to contacts with defendant several years before the 
underlying offenses. The underlying offenses in this case took place in 1980, 
when defendant was at least 30 years of age. Defendant's friend Chamberlain 
testified that he continued to see defendant through the early 1980s. The two 
physicians who supervised defendant's work, Drs. Geis and King, knew defendant 
as an adult in the late 1970s. It appears that friends Perrena and Jackson may 
have remained in touch with defendant until his arrest in 1981. Also, the 
testimony at the reopened 1998 evidentiary hearing by Popek, defendant's 
attorney on direct appeal, and McKay and Madgett, related to their impressions 
of defendant during the 1980s. We note, moreover, that mitigating evidence of 
the magnitude presented by these witnesses cannot be discarded for the reason 
set forth by the circuit court.
With regard to the performance prong, the circuit court gave two reasons for 
its conclusion in 1995 that counsel's performance was not deficient. First, the 
court characterized defendant as an uncooperative client. This finding cannot 
stand. The mere fact that a client is uncooperative will not excuse a failure to 
investigate in a capital case. See Perez, 148 Ill. 2d  at 192-93. 
Counsel remains obligated to conduct a reasonable investigation. Towns, 
182 Ill. 2d  at 510-13. Here, counsel did not fulfill this duty. Counsel 
testified that he never asked defendant for the names of persons to contact. 
Counsel further testified that the only other person he interviewed for 
mitigating evidence was defendant's wife. Counsel did not interview defendant's 
parents for information, despite the fact that they often appeared in court. 
Counsel interviewed no other persons, and made no effort to obtain any of 
defendant's records.
Second, as to some of the mitigation testimony, the circuit court determined 
that it was reasonable trial strategy not to present it because it likely would 
have divulged aggravating factors. The aggravating factors identified by the 
court were evidence that Michael Weaver was a friend of the Thompkins family, 
that Sandra Douglas was defendant's mistress, and that defendant was the leader 
of a street gang. The circuit court erred in rejecting defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim on this basis. As noted above, this court has repeatedly 
recognized that, although courts are highly deferential in reviewing counsel's 
strategic decisions whether to present certain mitigating evidence, such 
deference is not warranted where the lack of mitigation evidence presented stems 
not from strategy, but from counsel's failure to properly investigate and 
prepare the defense. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 513-15 (and cases cited 
therein). There is no evidence in the record that counsel made a strategic 
decision not to present additional mitigating evidence for fear of the 
aggravating evidence that could be introduced in response. Rather, the testimony 
presented at the evidentiary hearing amply demonstrated that counsel did not 
present the mitigating evidence at issue because he failed to properly 
investigate and prepare the defense.
A final matter remains to be addressed. This court has, on numerous 
occasions, rejected defendants' claims that they were prejudiced by their 
attorneys' failure to present certain mitigating evidence at the defendants' 
capital sentencing hearings, where the aggravating evidence was overwhelming and 
far outweighed the mitigating evidence. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 561-63 (1999) (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (discussing cases); see, 
e.g., People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999); People 
v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 403-07 (1998); People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 205 (1998); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 466-68 
(1995); People v. Caballero, 152 Ill. 2d 347, 366-67 (1992); People 
v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 278-80 (1991). The present case is 
distinguishable from those cases. Although some aggravating evidence exists, the 
mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing is quite substantial. A 
sentencing judge or jury may even consider it extraordinary. Consequently, the 
aggravating evidence does not so outweigh the mitigating evidence that we may 
reject defendant's claim.
The circuit court's holding that defendant was not denied effective 
assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing is hereby reversed as manifestly 
erroneous. We therefore vacate defendant's death sentence and remand this cause 
for a new sentencing hearing. The sentencing judge's conclusion that defendant 
is eligible for the death penalty remains standing. Accordingly, if the State 
seeks capital punishment for defendant on remand, only the second phase of 
defendant's capital sentencing hearing need be conducted anew. See 
Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 351; People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 
573 (1989); People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487, 523 (1988).
CONCLUSION
Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at the 
second phase of his sentencing hearing. We therefore vacate his death sentence 
and remand this cause to the circuit court of Cook County for further sentencing 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.