Title: Ware v. Hall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S53337
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2007

FILED: March 8, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
PERCY LEE WARE,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
GUY HALL, Superintendent,
Two Rivers Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CV050218; CA A127954; SC S53337)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 2, 2006.
James N. Varner, Newberg, argued the cause and submitted the briefs for
petitioner on review.
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette, Durham, Balmer, Kistler,
and Walters, Justices.**
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit
court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, F. J. Yraguen, Senior Judge. 204 Or App 457, 130 P3d 808 (2006).
**Carson, J., retired December 31, 2006, and did not participate in the decision of
this case.  Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.KISTLER, J.
KISTLER, J.
In this post-conviction case, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the
post-conviction petition with prejudice the same day that the petition was filed.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without opinion.  Ware v. Hall, 204
Or App 457, 130 P3d 808 (2006).  Because we conclude that the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition with prejudice, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and the
trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
We take the facts from the allegations in the post-conviction petition.  In
2002, a jury convicted petitioner of first-degree and second-degree robbery, and the trial
court imposed "an upward departure sentence under Oregon's sentencing guidelines." 
Petitioner did not appeal that conviction.  He then filed his first post-conviction petition. 
Petitioner's first post-conviction petition was not successful, and he filed this second,
successive post-conviction petition in 2005, after the United States Supreme Court issued
its decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403
(2004).
The second petition alleges primarily two grounds for relief.  First, it alleges
that the trial court imposed an upward departure sentence in violation of the rules
announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435
(2000), and Blakely.  Second, the petition alleges that petitioner's trial counsel was
constitutionally inadequate for failing to challenge his sentence on the grounds announced
in Apprendi and Blakely. (1)
In the petition, petitioner acknowledges that he previously had sought post-conviction relief from his 2002 robbery convictions.  The petition alleges, however:
"The present postconviction petition by petitioner presents federal
constitutional issues that could not have been raised by Petitioner in his first
post conviction case and he should therefore now be allowed to raise his
unlawful upward departure sentence."
The clerk's office filed the post-conviction petition on February 17, 2005,
and the trial court filed a general judgment that same day denying the petition. (2)  The
judgment states:
"The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is denied based upon the following
findings and conclusions:  Petitioner has previously pursued post-conviction
relief in Umatilla Case # CV030723."
By entering a general judgment, the court dismissed the petition with prejudice.  See ORS
18.082(3) (entering a general judgment dismisses claims for relief with prejudice unless
the court notes that it is dismissing those claims without prejudice). (3)  The record does
not reflect that the trial court provided petitioner with an opportunity to be heard before it
dismissed the petition with prejudice.  Rather, the trial court dismissed the petition on its
own motion without prior notice to petitioner or his counsel.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner acknowledged that ORS 138.550(3)
generally bars successive post-conviction petitions.  He noted, however, that ORS
138.550(3) permits a successive petition if "the court on hearing a subsequent petition
finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in
the original or amended petition."  Petitioner argued that his second petition fell within
that exception.  He contended, consistently with the allegation in his second petition, that
he reasonably could not have challenged his upward departure sentence until the United
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely in 2004.  Petitioner also argued
that ORS 138.550(3) required the trial court to hold a hearing before determining whether
his claim -- that he could not have challenged his upward departure sentence before the
Court issued its decision in Blakely -- had any merit.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment without opinion, and we allowed review.
We begin with the question whether ORS 138.550(3) required the court to
hold a hearing before dismissing petitioner's post-conviction petition with prejudice. 
Focusing on the word "hearing" in ORS 138.550(3), petitioner argues that that statute
required the trial court to provide him with an opportunity to be heard before it dismissed
his petition.  The superintendent does not dispute petitioner's reading of ORS 138.550(3);
rather, he argues that a later-enacted statute, ORS 138.525, created an exception to that
requirement and authorized the trial court to dismiss the petition without providing
petitioner any opportunity to be heard.
The parties' arguments raise three related but separate issues.  The first is
whether ORS 138.550(3) required the trial court to hold some kind of a hearing before it
dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief.  The second is whether, even if ORS
138.550(3) generally would require a hearing, ORS 138.525 creates an exception to that
requirement.  The final issue is whether, if a trial court may dismiss a petition without
providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, it may dismiss the petition with
prejudice, as the trial court did here.
ORS 138.550(3), the subsection on which petitioner relies, provides:
"All grounds for relief claimed by petitioner in a petition pursuant to
ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be asserted in the original or amended
petition, and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived, unless the
court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted
therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or
amended petition. * * *"
(Emphasis added.)  Petitioner argues that, by using the word "hearing" in ORS
138.550(3), the legislature expressed its intent that a trial court would hold some type of
hearing before deciding whether a petitioner reasonably could have raised, in the first
petition, the grounds for relief that the petitioner asserts in a later petition.
ORS 138.550(3) uses the phrase "on hearing a subsequent petition."  The
word "hearing" in that phrase refers to the act of hearing or considering a subsequent
petition.  Although the legislature's use of the word "hearing" does not refer to a specific
type of hearing, it does assume that some kind of hearing will occur.  The text of ORS
138.550(3) thus provides some support for petitioner's argument that the legislature
required trial courts to conduct hearings before dismissing successive petitions.  The
context, however, provides stronger support for petitioner's position.
The legislature enacted ORS 138.550 as part of the 1959 post-conviction
act.  See Or Laws 1959, ch 636, § 15 (enacting ORS 138.550 in substantially its present
form).  That act both created a right to post-conviction relief and established a
comprehensive set of procedures for resolving post-conviction claims.  Or Laws 1959, ch
636, §§ 3, 6-14.  ORS 138.560 sets out the procedures for filing a petition for post-conviction relief.  See Or Laws 1959, ch 636, § 6 (enacting ORS 138.560 in substantially
its present form).  ORS 138.590 authorizes indigent petitioners to file a request for
appointed counsel simultaneously with the petition and authorizes trial courts to appoint
counsel when appropriate; ORS 138.610 directs the superintendent to respond to a
petition "by demurrer, answer or motion"; and ORS 138.620 provides that the court "shall
proceed to a hearing on the issues raised" by the response.  Or Laws 1959, ch 636, §§ 6,
9, 11, and 12 (enacting relevant parts of ORS 138.560, ORS 138.590, ORS 138.610, and
ORS 138.620 in substantially their present form).
Specifically, ORS 138.620 provides:
"(1) After the response of the [superintendent] to the petition, the
court shall proceed to a hearing on the issues raised.  If the
[superintendent's] response is by demurrer or motion raising solely issues of
law, the circuit court need not order that petitioner be present at such
hearing, as long as petitioner is represented at the hearing by counsel.  At
the hearing upon issues raised by any other response, the circuit court shall
order that petitioner be present. * * *
"(2) If the petition states a ground for relief, the court shall decide
the issues raised and may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral
testimony or other competent evidence. * * *."
(Emphasis added.)  See Or Laws 1959, ch 636, § 12 (enacting ORS 138.620 in
substantially its present form) (emphasis added).
Viewed against that context, the legislature's use of the word "hearing" in
ORS 138.550(3) takes on a clearer meaning.  When the legislature used the word
"hearing" in ORS 138.550(3), it intended to refer to a "hearing" within the meaning of
ORS 138.620.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d
1143 (1993) (recognizing that, as a general rule, the same word has the same meaning
throughout a statute).
It follows that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in
this case unless, as the superintendent argues, a later-enacted statute -- ORS 138.525 --gave the trial court that authority.  That statute provides:
"(1) The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the
defendant, enter a judgment denying a meritless petition brought under ORS
138.510 to 138.680.
"(2) As used in this section, "meritless petition" means one that,
when liberally construed, fails to state a claim upon which post-conviction
relief may be granted.
"(3) Notwithstanding ORS 138.650, a judgment dismissing a
meritless petition is not appealable.
"(4) A dismissal is without prejudice if a meritless petition is
dismissed without a hearing and the petitioner was not represented by
counsel."
Focusing on subsections (1) and (4), the superintendent argues that ORS 138.525
authorizes trial courts to depart from the procedures set out in ORS 138.620 and ORS
138.550(3).  He reasons that, under ORS 138.525, a court may dismiss a successive
petition without any hearing when it is clear from the face of the petition that the petition
fails to state a claim for post-conviction relief.
We agree with the superintendent that ORS 138.525(1) recognizes that a
trial court may, on its own motion, intervene at any stage of a post-conviction proceeding
and dismiss a meritless petition.  That much follows from the text and context of ORS
138.525.  As noted, the 1959 act had established an orderly set of procedural steps for
filing a petition, appointing counsel, receiving a response from the superintendent, and
then holding some type of hearing on that response.  In enacting ORS 138.525, the
legislature provided in subsection (1) that trial courts may enter judgment on their own
motion and stated in subsection (4) the consequences of entering judgment before
appointing counsel and holding a hearing -- dismissal without prejudice.  Subsection (4)
necessarily assumes that courts may dismiss a meritless petition without following each of
the procedural steps set out in the 1959 act. (6)  We thus agree with the superintendent
that the trial court could dismiss a meritless petition without the hearing that ORS
138.550(3) contemplates.  See Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or 111, 116, 107 P3d 18 (2005)
(when statutes conflict, the later, more specific statute controls).
One last statutory issue remains -- whether the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition with prejudice.  On that issue, the superintendent recognizes that,
under ORS 138.525(4), dismissal is without prejudice if the trial court does not provide a
hearing and if counsel does not represent the petitioner.  He also recognizes that the trial
court dismissed the petition in this case with prejudice.  He argues, however, that ORS
138.525(4) permits a trial court to dismiss a meritless petition with prejudice if, as in this
case, the petitioner has counsel but no hearing. (7)
The superintendent's argument is difficult to square with the text of ORS
138.620 and ORS 138.525.  As noted, ORS 138.620 requires both a hearing and counsel,
if appropriate, before a court may dismiss a petition with prejudice. (8)  ORS
138.525(4) assumes that a court may dismiss a meritless petition without counsel and
without a hearing but only if the dismissal is without prejudice.  Nothing in the text or
context of ORS 138.525(4) suggests that the legislature intended to craft a broader
exception to the requirements in ORS 138.620 than ORS 138.525 provides; that is,
nothing suggests that a court may dismiss a meritless post-conviction petition with
prejudice if the petitioner has counsel but not some kind of a hearing.  We cannot add an
exception to the requirements of ORS 138.620 that the legislature omitted.
It follows that the trial court erred when it dismissed the post-conviction
petition with prejudice without providing petitioner or his counsel any opportunity to be
heard. Although the trial court erred, the superintendent argues that we still may affirm
the trial court's judgment.  The superintendent contends that we can hold that, even when
liberally construed, this petition fails to state a claim for post-conviction relief.  Given the
procedural posture in which this case arises, however, we decline to reach that alternative
ground for affirmance.
As noted, ORS chapter 138 contemplates two different courses for
resolving post-conviction petitions.  On the one hand, a court may appoint counsel, hold a
hearing, and, if appropriate, permit amendments to the petition.  See ORS 138.590
(authorizing appointment of counsel); ORS 138.610 (permitting amendments); ORS
138.620 (providing for hearings on petitions).  Having followed that course, a court may
dismiss the petition with prejudice.  See ORS 138.640 (describing form of judgment).  On
the other hand, a trial court may dismiss a meritless petition before appointing counsel
and without a hearing but only if it dismisses without prejudice -- a course that could
leave a petitioner free to file another post-conviction petition.  ORS 138.525.
ORS chapter 138 leaves it to the trial court, in the first instance, to decide
which course to follow.  Here, the trial court followed neither course.  Rather, it departed
from the statutory scheme and, in so doing, deprived petitioner of the opportunity either to
make a record at a hearing or to file a later petition if the court dismissed without
prejudice.  In these circumstances, we do not think it is appropriate to uphold a judgment
dismissing the petition with prejudice.  Rather, we remand this case to the trial court to
determine whether to dismiss without prejudice under ORS 138.525 or to hold a hearing
on petitioner's claim under ORS 138.620. (9)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. The petition also alleges, without further explanation, that petitioner's
sentence "violated Oregon's cruel and unusual clause, federal law, due process, and the
equal protection of the law as it was being applied to Petitioner."
2. Although the second post-conviction petition bears a stamp showing that it
was filed on February 17, 2005, the record reveals that the trial court received the petition
before that date.  On February 13, 2005, the trial court signed and dated a notation at the
end of the petition that it was dismissing the petition with prejudice because petitioner
previously had pursued post-conviction relief.  Three days later, on February 16, 2005,
the trial court signed a general judgment denying the petition for post-conviction relief. 
As noted, the court filed both the petition and the judgment dismissing the petition on
February 17, 2005.  The trial court entered the judgment in the case register on February
23.
3. The trial court's use of a general judgment is consistent with its stated intent
to dismiss the petition with prejudice.  See note 2 above (describing court's notation on
petition).
4. Although ORS 138.620 contemplates that a trial court will not resolve a
post-conviction petition without holding some type of hearing, it does not contemplate an
evidentiary hearing in every case.  Rather, ORS 138.620 distinguishes between two types
of hearings.  Subsection (1) addresses hearings on responses raising "solely issues of
law," and subsection (2) addresses the types of evidence that are admissible in hearings
when "the petition states a ground for relief."
5. As enacted in 1959, that subsection provided (and still provides), in part:
"If appointed counsel believes that the original petition cannot be
construed to state a ground for relief under ORS 138.510 to 138.680, and
cannot be amended to state a ground for relief, counsel shall, in lieu of
moving to amend the petition, inform the petitioner and notify the circuit
court of counsel's belief by filing an affidavit stating the belief and the
reasons therefor with the clerk of the circuit court. This affidavit does not
constitute a ground for denying the petition prior to a hearing upon its
sufficiency, but the circuit court may consider the affidavit in deciding upon
the sufficiency of the petition at the hearing."
ORS 138.590(5).
6. To the extent that the text and context leave any doubt about the legislature's
intent, the legislative history removes it.  See Roberts v. SAIF, 341 Or 48, 53-56, 136 P3d
1105 (2006) (looking to legislative history to confirm legislature's intent).  In explaining
why the legislature should amend House Bill 2352 to add what would become ORS
138.525, Ross Shepard of the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association told a
subcomittee that that provision would "allow for a dismissal at any time during the
proceedings of a meritless petition."  Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2352, Apr 7, 1993, Tape 70, Side A
(emphasis added).  He explained that, under the new provision, a trial court could
intervene at any point in the process set out in ORS chapter 138 and dismiss a meritless
petition -- even before the court appointed counsel.  Id.  Shepard later noted that, under
the new provision, "a judge [could] just summarily right out of the box dismis[s]" the
petition.  Id. at Tape 71, Side A. 
7. We assume that petitioner had counsel, but the issue is not free from doubt. 
Counsel filed the initial petition for post-conviction relief, which alleges somewhat
contradictorily that petitioner is proceeding pro se.
8. Under ORS 138.590, a trial court need not appoint counsel if the petitioner is not
indigent.  Moreover, even when a petitioner is indigent, he or she may choose to waive
his or her statutory right to appointed counsel and proceed pro se.
9. Given our disposition of this case, we do not reach the merits of petitioner's claims
and express no opinion on them.