Title: Faircloth v. Faircloth
Citation: 339 So. 2d 650
Docket Number: 48368
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 1976

339 So. 2d 650 (1976)
Richard L.K. FAIRCLOTH, Petitioner,
v.
Barbara Hall FAIRCLOTH, Respondent.
No. 48368.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 18, 1976.
John S. Winnie of Winnie, Winnie &amp; Uhrig, Gainesville, for petitioner.
Peter Enwall of Enwall &amp; Silverman, Gainesville, for respondent.
ROBERTS, Justice.
We have for review by petition for certiorari granted the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Faircloth v. Faircloth, reported at 321 So. 2d 87 (Fla. App. 1, 1975), which conflicts with this Court's decision in State ex rel. Trezevant v. McLeod, 126 Fla. 229, 170 So. 735 (1936), and the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Ratner v. Ratner, 297 So. 2d 344 (Fla.App. 3, 1974), thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
The final judgment of dissolution of marriage between respondent and petitioner ordered that petitioner pay monthly child support of $200, one-half of the mortgage payments, taxes and assessments on the marital home, and provide maintenance thereof, that he pay lump sum alimony in the amount of $2,070.79 over an 18-month period together with attorney's fees of $1,500 to be paid in 12 monthly installments. Upon appeal, this final judgment was affirmed.
Subsequently, a petition and motion for adjudging petitioner in contempt of court for failure to abide by the final judgment of marriage dissolution was filed. Contempt hearing was held on September 30, 1975 (22 1/2 months after final judgment of dissolution) at which evidence was adduced showing that none of the lump sum alimony had been paid nor had appellant made any contribution toward the mortgage, taxes, assessments or maintenance of the marital home; that petitioner was $930 in arrears in child support payments and had paid nothing on attorney's fees; that petitioner conveyed his undivided one-half interest in *651 the marital home to a third person putting it beyond reach for satisfying his obligations under the final judgment. Furthermore, appellant had made no attempt to secure modification of the final judgment.
The trial court entered an order adjudging petitioner to be in contempt and stated in pertinent part:
The judgment of contempt was appealed to the District Court. Inter alia, petitioner therein argued that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt without making an express finding that petitioner had the present ability to pay the $4,300 required. The District Court affirmed relative to the issues raised on certiorari to this Court and found:
We disagree with the District Court of Appeal, First District, insofar as it has determined that the trial court may forgo an express finding that petitioner had the present ability to comply with the order of the trial court. We hold a trial judge must make an affirmative finding that either (1) the petitioner presently has the ability to comply with the order and willfully refuses to do so, or (2) that the petitioner previously had the ability to comply, but divested himself of that ability through his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and purpose of the order.
This Court expressly stated in State ex rel. Trezevant v. McLeod, supra, as follows:
In Ratner v. Ratner, 297 So. 2d 344 (Fla. App. 3, 1974), relying on this Court's decision in Trezvant, supra, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, explicated:
We approve the following logic and reasoning of Judge Smith in his cogent dissent to the decision here under review concerning the burden of proof and intentional or neglectful acts by the defaulting party to avoid compliance with the court order:
Having considered the other points raised by petitioner relative to appointment of counsel, we find them to be without merit.
*653 For the reasons expressed the decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause remanded with directions to remand to the trial court to make such affirmative finding of ability if supported by the record or otherwise vacate the order of contempt.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.