Title: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney General
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12376
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 2018

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SJC-12376 
 
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2017. - April 13, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Attorney General.  Consumer Protection Act, Investigative 
demand.  Jurisdiction, Personal, Foreign corporation, Long-
arm statute.  Due Process of Law, Jurisdiction over 
nonresident. 
 
 
 
 
Motion filed in the Superior Court Department on June 16, 
2016. 
 
 
The proceeding was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Justin Anderson, of the District of Columbia (Jamie D. 
Brooks & Theodore V. Wells, Jr., of New York, Thomas C. 
Frongillo, & Caroline K. Simons also present) for the plaintiff. 
 
Richard A. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General (Melissa A. 
Hoffer, I. Andrew Goldberg, Christopher G. Courchesne, Peter C. 
Mulcahy, & Seth Schofield, Assistant Attorneys General, also 
present) for the defendant. 
 
Wendy B. Jacobs & Shaun A. Goho, for Francis X. Bellotti & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Archis A. Parasharami, of the District of Columbia, & 
Steven P. Lehotsky, for Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
of America, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In 2015, news reporters released internal 
documents from Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) purporting to 
show that the company knew, long before the general public, that 
emissions from fossil fuels -- Exxon's principal product -- 
contributed to global warming and climate change, and that in 
order to avoid the consequences of climate change it would be 
necessary to reduce drastically global fossil fuel consumption.  
The documents also purported to establish that despite Exxon's 
knowledge of climate risks, the company failed to disclose that 
knowledge to the public, and instead sought to undermine the 
evidence of climate change altogether, in order to preserve its 
value as a company. 
Upon reviewing this information, the Attorney General 
believed that Exxon's marketing or sale of fossil fuel products 
in Massachusetts may have violated the State's primary consumer 
protection law, G. L. c. 93A.  Based on her authority under 
G. L. c. 93A, § 6, the Attorney General issued a civil 
investigative demand (C.I.D.) to Exxon, seeking documents and 
information relating to Exxon's knowledge of and activities 
related to climate change. 
3 
 
 
 
Exxon responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (7), seeking to set aside or 
modify the C.I.D.  Exxon argued that (1) Exxon is not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts; (2) the Attorney General 
is biased against Exxon and should be disqualified; (3) the 
C.I.D. violates Exxon's statutory and constitutional rights; and 
(4) Exxon's Superior Court case should be stayed pending a 
ruling on Exxon's request for relief in Federal court.1  The 
Attorney General cross-moved to compel Exxon to comply with the 
C.I.D.  A Superior Court judge denied Exxon's motion and allowed 
the Attorney General's cross motion to compel.  Exxon appealed, 
and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own 
motion.  We conclude that there is personal jurisdiction over 
Exxon with respect to the Attorney General's investigation, and 
that the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Exxon's 
requests to set aside the C.I.D., disqualify the Attorney 
General, and issue a stay.  We affirm the judge's order in its 
entirety.2 
                     
 
1 One day before filing its instant Superior Court motion, 
Exxon filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, challenging the C.I.D. on constitutional grounds not 
raised in this action.  Exxon Mobil Corp. vs. Healey, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 4:16-CV-469 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2016). 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by five former 
Massachusetts Attorneys General and the Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States of America. 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Personal jurisdiction.  Exxon's primary argument is 
that, as a nonresident corporation, it is not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts.  For a nonresident to be 
subject to the authority of a Massachusetts court, the exercise 
of jurisdiction must satisfy both Massachusetts's long-arm 
statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the requirements of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 324, 325 
(2017).  The Attorney General "has the burden of establishing 
the facts upon which the question of personal jurisdiction over 
[Exxon] is to be determined."  Droukas v. Divers Training 
Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. 149, 151 (1978), quoting Nichols 
Assocs. v. Starr, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 93 (1976). 
 
A business is a "resident," and therefore subject to the 
forum's general jurisdiction, if the business is domiciled or 
incorporated or has its principal place of business in the forum 
State.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 924 (2011).  Exxon is incorporated in New Jersey and 
headquartered in Texas.  Because "[t]he total of [Exxon's] 
activities in Massachusetts does not approach the volume 
required for an assertion of general jurisdiction," Tatro v. 
Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 772 n.6 (1994), citing 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
413-416 (1984), our inquiry in this case concerns the exercise 
5 
 
 
of specific jurisdiction.  This requires an "affiliatio[n] 
between the forum and the underlying controversy" (citation 
omitted).  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., supra at 919.  
See G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (granting jurisdiction over claims 
"arising from" certain enumerated grounds occurring within 
Massachusetts); Tatro, supra at 772, citing Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) ("The plaintiff's claim must 
arise out of, or relate to, the defendant's forum contacts"). 
 
Exxon denies any such affiliation in this case, contending 
that it "engages in no suit-related conduct" in Massachusetts.  
Here there is no "suit," however, as this matter involves an 
investigation -- a precursor to any formal legal action by the 
Attorney General.  So while our typical inquiry asks whether 
there is a nexus between the defendant's in-State activities and 
the plaintiff's legal claim(s), the investigatory context 
requires that we broaden our analysis to consider the 
relationship between Exxon's Massachusetts activities and the 
"central areas of inquiry covered by the [Attorney General's] 
investigation, regardless of whether that investigation has yet 
to indicate [any] . . . wrongdoing."  Securities & Exch. Comm'n 
vs. Lines Overseas Mgt., Ltd., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. Civ.A. 04-302 
RWR/AK (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2005).  Cf. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing 
Li, 768 F.3d 122, 141-142 (2d Cir. 2014) (personal jurisdiction 
in nonparty discovery dispute "focus[es] on the connection 
6 
 
 
between the nonparty's contacts with the forum and the discovery 
order at issue"); Matter of an Application to Enforce Admin. 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the Secs. Exch. Comm'n v. Knowles, 87 
F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident in subpoena enforcement action, which was part of 
investigation into potential violation of Federal securities 
laws, where "[t]he underlying investigation and th[e] subpoena 
. . . ar[o]se out of [nonresident's] contacts with the United 
States").  At this stage, the Attorney General is statutorily 
authorized to investigate whatever conduct she believes may 
constitute a violation of G. L. c. 93A.  G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (1).  
We therefore must construe the C.I.D. broadly, and in connection 
with what G. L. c. 93A protects. 
 
General Laws c. 93A "is a statute of broad impact" that 
prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce."  Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 693-
694 (1975).  See G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a).  "Under [G. L. c.] 93A, 
an act or practice is unfair if it falls 'within at least the 
penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established 
concept of unfairness'; 'is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous'; and 'causes substantial injury to consumers.'"  
Walsh v. TelTech Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 2016), 
quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 
7 
 
 
596 (1975).  The same protection also applies in the commercial 
context, as G. L. c. 93A extends "to persons engaged in trade or 
commerce in business transactions with other persons also 
engaged in trade or commerce."  Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 
464 Mass. 145, 155 (2013), quoting Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 
Mass. 8, 12 (1983).  See Kraft Power Corp., supra, citing G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11 ("The development of the statute . . . suggests 
that the unfair or deceptive acts or practices prohibited are 
those that may arise in dealings between discrete, independent 
business entities"). 
Our analysis of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive act 
or practice requires a case-by-case analysis, see Kattar v. 
Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 14 (2000), and is neither dependent on 
traditional concepts nor limited by preexisting rights or 
remedies.  Travis v. McDonald, 397 Mass. 230, 232 (1986).  "This 
flexible set of guidelines as to what should be considered 
lawful or unlawful under c. 93A suggests that the Legislature 
intended the terms 'unfair and deceptive' to grow and change 
with the times."  Nei v. Burley, 388 Mass. 307, 313 (1983). 
 
The Attorney General's investigation concerns climate 
change caused by manmade greenhouse gas emissions -- a 
distinctly modern threat that grows more serious with time, and 
the effects of which are already being felt in Massachusetts.  
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 
8 
 
 
U.S. 497, 521-523 (2007) (describing current and future harms 
from climate change affecting Massachusetts).  More 
particularly, the investigation is premised on the Attorney 
General's belief that Exxon may have misled Massachusetts 
residents about the impact of fossil fuels on both the Earth's 
climate and the value of the company, in violation of c. 93A. 
"Despite [Exxon's] sophisticated internal knowledge" about that 
impact, the Attorney General states, "it appears that . . . 
Exxon failed to disclose what it knew to either the consumers 
who purchased its fossil fuel products or investors who 
purchased its securities."  Because the crux of a failure to 
disclose theory is knowledge, the C.I.D. seeks "information 
related to . . . what Exxon knew about (a) how combustion of 
fossil fuels (its primary product) contributes to climate change 
and (b) the risk that climate change creates for the value of 
Exxon's businesses and assets."  The C.I.D. also seeks 
information about "when Exxon learned those facts" and "what 
Exxon told Massachusetts consumers and investors, among others, 
about [them]."  The primary question for us is whether there is 
a sufficient connection between those inquiries and Exxon's 
Massachusetts-based activities. 
9 
 
 
 
a.  Long-arm analysis.3  Massachusetts's long-arm statute, 
G. L. c. 223A, § 3, "sets out a list of specific instances in 
which a Massachusetts court may acquire personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant."  Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767.  "A 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing facts to show that the 
ground relied on under § 3 is present."  Id.  In the Superior 
Court, the Attorney General invoked the "transacting any 
business" clause of § 3, so we focus our inquiry on that 
subsection.  See G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) ("[a] court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a person . . . as to a cause of 
action in law or equity arising from the person's . . . 
transacting any business in this commonwealth").  "For 
jurisdiction to exist under § 3 (a), the facts must satisfy two 
requirements -- the defendant must have transacted business in 
Massachusetts, and the plaintiff's claim must have arisen from 
                     
 
3 The parties' arguments on the jurisdictional issues focus 
exclusively on the due process question, forgoing any analysis 
under Massachusetts's long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3.  We 
recently clarified, however, that Massachusetts courts cannot 
"streamline" the personal jurisdiction inquiry by focusing 
solely on due process considerations, under the theory that the 
limits imposed by the long-arm statute and due process are 
coextensive.  See SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 324, 
329-330 & n.9 (2017).  They are not.  Id.  "The long-arm statute 
'asserts jurisdiction over [a nonresident] to the constitutional 
limit only when some basis for jurisdiction enumerated in the 
statute has been established."  Id. at 329, quoting Good Hope 
Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 6 (1979).  We 
analyze the long-arm statute's requirement first "in order to 
avoid unnecessary consideration of constitutional questions." 
SCVNGR, Inc., supra at 325. 
10 
 
 
the transaction of business by the defendant."  Tatro, supra at 
767.  We construe these dual requirements "broadly," id. at 771, 
and conclude that they are satisfied here. 
 
In Massachusetts, Exxon operates a franchise network of 
more than 300 retail service stations under the Exxon and Mobil 
brands that sell gasoline and other fossil fuel products to 
Massachusetts consumers.  The Attorney General contends that 
this network establishes an independent basis for personal 
jurisdiction over Exxon in this matter.4  The franchise system is 
governed by a Brand Fee Agreement (BFA).  Under section 7 of the 
BFA, the "BFA Holder" pays Exxon a monthly fee for the use of 
Exxon's trademarks and to participate in Exxon's business 
services and programs at the BFA Holder's gasoline stations.  
Under section 5 of the BFA, Exxon prescribes a method for 
converting unbranded fuel to Exxon- and Mobil-branded gasoline 
by injecting certain fuel additives; these additives are to be 
obtained exclusively from suppliers identified by Exxon, and are 
inserted according to Exxon's specifications.  Under section 
7(a)(ii) of the BFA, the dollar amount of a BFA Holder's monthly 
fee is determined in part by the total amount of Exxon- and 
                     
 
4 The Attorney General also cites additional Massachusetts 
contacts besides Exxon's franchise network as grounds for our 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Exxon.  We address those 
contacts in our discussion of due process, given our conclusion 
that the "literal requirements of the [long-arm] statute are 
satisfied" through Exxon's franchise system.  Tatro v. Manor 
Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767 (1994). 
11 
 
 
Mobil-branded fuel sold at the BFA Holder's stations.  
Specifically, the monthly fee for the final five years of BFA 
shall equal the amount agreed to between the parties or an 
amount determined by "Recalculated Total Volume," which is the 
function of "the total volume of [Exxon- and Mobil-branded fuel] 
sold in the aggregate by all Direct Served Outlets" during a 
given period. 
 The sample BFA submitted to the Superior Court was struck 
between Exxon and a Massachusetts-based limited liability 
company; it states that it shall be in effect for a period of 
fifteen years, with possible extensions, and governs the 
operation of over 300 Exxon- and Mobil-branded "retail motor 
fuel outlets" located throughout the State.  This network 
represents Exxon's "purposeful and successful solicitation of 
business from residents of the Commonwealth," Tatro, 416 Mass. 
at 767, such that it satisfies the "transacting any business" 
prong of § 3 (a). 
 
The more difficult question is whether the C.I.D. "aris[es] 
from" this network of Exxon- or Mobil-branded fuel stations.  
G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a).  Exxon argues that it does not, because 
while the Attorney General's investigation is concerned 
primarily with Exxon's marketing and advertising of its fossil 
fuel products to Massachusetts consumers, Exxon does not control 
its franchisees' advertising, and hence those communications 
12 
 
 
cannot be attributed to Exxon for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction.  The judge determined that Exxon's assertion of a 
lack of control over franchisees' advertising conflicts with the 
terms of the BFA.  We agree.  Section 15(a) requires the BFA 
Holder and "its Franchise Dealers to diligently promote the sale 
of [Exxon- or Mobil-branded fuel], including through 
advertisements," and states that "Exxon[] shall have the 
authority to review and approve, in its sole discretion, all 
forms of advertising and sales promotions . . . for the 
promotion and sale of any product, merchandise or services" that 
"(i) uses or incorporates any [Exxon trademark] or (ii) relates 
to any Business operated at a BFA Holder Branded Outlet."  This 
section also obligates the BFA Holder to "expressly require all 
Franchise Dealers to . . . agree to such review and control by 
Exxon[]."5 
 
In Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 
607, 617 (2013), we applied the "right to control" test to the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, holding that "a franchisor 
                     
 
5 Exxon says that it proffered evidence below that "BFA 
holders control their own marketing," citing to certain 
provisions of the BFA and to an affidavit from Exxon's United 
States Branded Wholesale Manager, Geoffrey Doescher.  The cited-
to provisions of the BFA (sections 2[e][6] and 3[a], [h]) 
address the establishment of the franchise relationship and the 
use of Exxon's trademarks, and do not clarify control over 
advertising.  Similarly, while the Doescher affidavit states in 
conclusory fashion that Exxon does not control the "marketing 
of" or "advertisements by BFA-holders," this is belied by 
section 15(a) of the BFA. 
13 
 
 
is vicariously liable for the conduct of its franchisee only 
where the franchisor controls or has a right to control the 
specific policy or practice resulting in harm to the plaintiff."  
This test is a useful measure for determining when the conduct 
of a franchisee may be properly attributed to a franchisor, and 
we believe that it is equally well suited to our analysis of 
personal jurisdiction in this case.  By virtue of section 15(a) 
of the BFA, Exxon has the right to control the advertising of 
its fossil fuel products to Massachusetts consumers.6 
 
This leads to our conclusion that the C.I.D. "aris[es] 
from" the BFA and Exxon's network of branded fuel stations in 
Massachusetts.  G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a).  Through its control 
over franchisee advertising, Exxon communicates directly with 
Massachusetts consumers about its fossil fuel products (and 
hence we reject Exxon's assertion that it "has no direct contact 
with any consumers in Massachusetts").  This control comports 
with one of Exxon's "primary business purpose[s]" as expressed 
                     
 
6 We are not persuaded by Exxon's argument that its control 
over franchisee advertising is solely to protect its trademarks 
under Federal law.  See Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, 
Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 615 (2013) ("Under Federal law, a 
franchisor is required to maintain control and supervision over 
a franchisee's use of its mark, or else the franchisor will be 
deemed to have abandoned its mark under the abandonment 
provisions of the Lanham Act").  Section 15(a) expressly states 
that Exxon's exclusive authority to review and approve such 
advertising extends not only to advertisements that incorporate 
Exxon's trademarks, but also, more broadly, to advertising that 
"relates to any Business operated at a BFA Holder Branded 
Outlet" (emphasis added). 
14 
 
 
in section 13(a) of the BFA:  "to optimize effective and 
efficient . . . representation of [Exxon- and Mobil-branded 
fuel] through planned market and image development."  The C.I.D. 
seeks information about the nature and extent of Exxon's 
Massachusetts advertisements, including those disseminated 
through Exxon's franchisees. 
 
More broadly, the C.I.D. seeks information concerning 
Exxon's internal knowledge about climate change.  Many of the 
requests in the C.I.D. seek documents to substantiate public 
statements made by Exxon in recent years on the topic of climate 
change.  Exxon protests that its franchisees have nothing to do 
with climate change and have played no part in disseminating 
those statements, so the Attorney General's requests cannot 
"arise from" Exxon's franchise system.  Bearing in mind the 
basis for the C.I.D. and the Attorney General's investigation, 
G. L. c. 93A, we disagree. 
The statute authorizes the Attorney General to initiate an 
investigation "whenever [s]he believes a person has engaged in 
or is engaging in" a violation of G. L. c. 93A, in order "to 
ascertain whether in fact [that] person" is doing so.  G. L. 
c. 93A, § 6 (1).  A person may violate G. L. c. 93A through 
false or misleading advertising.  "Our cases . . . establish 
that advertising need not be totally false in order to be deemed 
deceptive in the context of G. L. c. 93A. . . .  The criticized 
15 
 
 
advertising may consist of a half-truth, or even may be true as 
a literal matter, but still create an over-all misleading 
impression through failure to disclose material information."  
Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 394-395 (2004).7  
In order to determine whether Exxon engaged in deceptive 
advertising at its franchisee stations, by either giving a 
misleading impression or failing to disclose material 
information about climate change, the Attorney General must 
first ascertain what Exxon knew about that topic. 
b.  Due process.  We must also determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Exxon comports with the 
requirements of due process.  The "touchstone" of this inquiry 
remains "whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum 
contacts' in the forum state."  Tatro, 416 Mass. at 772, quoting 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).  "The 
due process analysis entails three requirements.  First, minimum 
contacts must arise from some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
                     
 
7 See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.02(2) (2014) ("No statement 
or illustration shall be used in any advertisement . . . which 
may . . . misrepresent the product in such a manner that later, 
on disclosure of the true facts, there is a likelihood that the 
buyer may be switched from the advertised product to another"); 
940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.05(1)-(2) (1993) ("No claim or 
representation shall be made by any means concerning a product 
which directly, or by implication, or by failure to adequately 
disclose additional relevant information, has the capacity or 
tendency or effect of deceiving buyers or prospective buyers in 
any material respect"). 
16 
 
 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws. . . .  Second, the claim must arise 
out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum. 
. . .  Third, the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant 
must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice" (citations and quotations omitted).  Bulldog Investors 
Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 
210, 217 (2010).8 
                     
 
8 Following the Superior Court judge's decision and the 
parties' submission of their appellate briefs, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 
of Cal., San Francisco County, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (Bristol-
Myers), which addresses the exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction.  Exxon argues that Bristol-Myers controls our 
decision, but we are not persuaded.  Bristol-Myers concerned 
whether the California Supreme Court properly exercised personal 
jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident plaintiffs, despite 
the lack of any identifiable connection between those 
plaintiffs' claims and the nonresident defendant's activities in 
California.  Id. at 1778.  In concluding that there was personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs' claims, the 
California Supreme Court applied a "sliding scale approach," 
under which "the strength of the requisite connection between 
the forum and the specific claims at issue is relaxed if the 
defendant has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to 
those claims."  Id. at 1781.  The Supreme Court reversed, 
criticizing the "sliding scale approach" and reiterating the 
need for "a connection between the forum and the specific claims 
at issue."  Id.  Unlike in Bristol-Myers, the Attorney General's 
investigation is brought on behalf of Massachusetts residents, 
for potential violations occurring within Massachusetts.  
Moreover, our conclusion that there is personal jurisdiction 
over Exxon here rests not on Exxon's general Massachusetts-based 
activities, but on the nexus between certain of Exxon's 
Massachusetts-based activities and the Attorney General's 
investigation. 
17 
 
 
 
First, Exxon has purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting business activities in Massachusetts, 
with both consumers and other businesses.  As mentioned, Exxon 
is the franchisor of over 300 Exxon- and Mobil-branded service 
stations located throughout Massachusetts, and through that 
arrangement Exxon controls the marketing of its products to 
Massachusetts consumers.  In addition, Exxon admits that it 
created Massachusetts-specific advertisements for its products 
in print and radio.  Such "advertising in the forum State," 
especially when coupled with its extensive franchise network, is 
indicative of Exxon's "intent or purpose to serve the market in 
the forum State."  Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior 
Court of Cal., Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).  See 
Workgroup Tech. Corp. v. MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, 246 F. Supp. 2d 
102, 114 (D. Mass. 2003) (purposeful availment where defendant 
"had advertisements in publications that circulated in 
Massachusetts" and "purposefully derived economic benefits from 
its forum-[S]tate activities"); Gunner v. Elmwood Dodge, Inc., 
24 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 99-101 (1987) (out-of-State company's 
advertisements "aimed squarely at Massachusetts targets," which 
were directed "at establishing ongoing relationships with 
Massachusetts consumers," supported jurisdiction).  Exxon also 
operates a Web site that is accessible in Massachusetts and 
enables visitors to locate the nearest Exxon- and Mobil-branded 
18 
 
 
service station or retailer.  See Hilsinger Co. v. FBW Invs., 
109 F. Supp. 3d 409, 428-429 (D. Mass. 2015) (purposeful 
availment where nonresident defendant's Web site enabled 
visitors to contact company to learn where they can buy its 
products); Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership, 457 Mass. at 217 
(solicitation sent to Massachusetts resident, coupled with Web 
site accessible in Massachusetts, made it "reasonable for the 
[nonresident] to anticipate being held responsible in 
Massachusetts"). 
 
Further, Exxon's franchise system in Massachusetts is 
governed by a contract, the BFA.  While such a contractual 
relationship is not necessarily a "contact," Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S. at 478, when that relationship "reach[es] out beyond 
one [S]tate and create[s] continuing relationships and 
obligations with citizens of another [S]tate," the nonresident 
subjects itself to that other State's jurisdiction for claims 
related to the contract.  Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex 
rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950).  See Baskin–
Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 
38 (1st Cir. 2016) (purposeful availment where, among other 
things, defendant received monthly payments from plaintiff's 
Massachusetts headquarters).  Under the BFA, the BFA Holder pays 
Exxon a monthly fee in exchange for the use of Exxon's 
trademarks, as well as various Exxon business services and 
19 
 
 
programs, including training and uniforms; Exxon also assists 
the BFA Holder in procuring the additives necessary to create 
and sell Exxon- and Mobil-branded fuel.  Through this agreement 
Exxon has "deliberately targeted the Massachusetts economy and 
reasonably should have foreseen that, if a controversy 
developed, it might be haled into a Massachusetts court."  
Baskin–Robbins Franchising LLC, supra at 39. 
 
The Attorney General's investigation "arise[s] out of, or 
relate[s] to" these contacts.  Tatro, 416 Mass. at 772.  As 
mentioned, the Attorney General is authorized to investigate 
potential violations of G. L. c. 93A.  G. L. c. 93A, § 6.  In 
addition to prohibiting deceptive advertising to consumers, 
Aspinall, 442 Mass. at 395, c. 93A also requires honest 
disclosures in transactions between businesses.  See Kraft Power 
Corp., 464 Mass. at 155; G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  "A duty exists 
under c. 93A to disclose material facts known to a party at the 
time of a transaction."  Underwood v. Risman, 414 Mass. 96, 99-
100 (1993).  The C.I.D. seeks information relating to Exxon's 
knowledge of "the risk that climate change creates for the value 
of [its] businesses and assets," and "what Exxon told 
Massachusetts consumers and investors, among others, about those 
facts."  Possible misrepresentations or omissions about the 
threat that climate change poses to Exxon's business model are 
highly relevant to its contracts with BFA Holders, who agree, 
20 
 
 
under section 1 of the BFA, to fifteen-year terms with Exxon and 
who are required, under section 21(b), to indemnify Exxon 
against all claims and liabilities based on State consumer 
protection and environmental laws, among others. 
 
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Exxon also does 
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).  
See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 (where court has 
determined nonresident has requisite minimum contacts, party 
must "present a compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable").  Exxon 
has produced no evidence that responding to the Attorney 
General's investigation would be unreasonable.  Even assuming 
that it had, we would balance that showing with "the 
Commonwealth's interest in enforcing its laws in a Massachusetts 
forum."  Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership, 457 Mass. at 218.  
As Massachusetts's chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney 
General has a manifest interest in enforcing G. L. c. 93A.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (Attorney General may investigate 
"whenever [s]he believes" c. 93A violation has occurred); id. at 
§ 4 (Attorney General may file civil actions "in the name of the 
commonwealth"); id. at § 5 (Attorney General may seek assurances 
of discontinuance of unlawful acts or practices); id. at § 2 (c) 
21 
 
 
(Attorney General "may make rules and regulations interpreting" 
what constitutes unlawful act or practice).9 
 
2.  Exxon's challenge to the substance of the C.I.D.  Exxon 
also challenges the C.I.D. based on its content, arguing that it 
is "overbroad and unduly burdensome," as well as "arbitrary and 
capricious."  Exxon argues that these points constitute "good 
cause" warranting our modifying or setting aside the C.I.D. 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (7) ("the court may, upon motion for 
good cause shown . . . modify or set aside such demand or grant 
a protective order").  As "[t]he party moving to set aside [the] 
C.I.D.[, Exxon] bears a heavy burden to show good cause why it 
should not be compelled to respond."  CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. 
Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 539, 544 (1980).  See Attorney Gen. v. 
Bodimetric Profiles, 404 Mass. 152, 155 (1989).  The judge 
concluded that Exxon had failed to sustain that burden, and we 
review her conclusion for an abuse of discretion.  Matter of a 
                     
 
9 Because we conclude that due process is satisfied by 
virtue of the nexus between the Attorney General's investigation 
and Exxon's franchise system, we need not reach the parties' 
arguments with respect to the Attorney General's alternative 
theory that Exxon may have deceived investors with respect to 
climate change.  Although the cover letter of the C.I.D. states 
that the investigation concerns potential violations of G. L. 
c. 93A with respect to both consumers and investors, very few of 
the C.I.D.'s requests even mention investors or securities, and 
even then, those requests likewise concern Exxon's internal 
knowledge and discussions concerning climate change (in these 
requests, for the purpose of preparing securities filings or 
investor communications).  Given the focus on Exxon's knowledge, 
these requests also relate sufficiently to the Attorney 
General's consumer deception theory. 
22 
 
 
Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 
Mass. 353, 356 (1977) (Yankee Milk) ("in C.I.D. matters there 
must be, as in all discovery proceedings, a broad area of 
discretion residing in the judge"). 
 
By its terms, G. L. c. 93A, § 6, authorizes the Attorney 
General to initiate an investigation "whenever [s]he believes a 
person has engaged in or is engaging in any method, act or 
practice declared to be unlawful by this chapter."  This grants 
the Attorney General "broad investigatory powers."  Bodimetric 
Profiles, 404 Mass. at 157.  See Yankee Milk, 372 Mass. at 364 
("the Legislature [particularly in providing that the 
interrogated party must show 'good cause' why demands should not 
be honored] has indicated that the statute should be construed 
liberally in favor of the government").  Still, the statute 
imposes certain limitations on the scope of the Attorney 
General's investigative authority that we must consider. 
 
In pertinent part, § 6 (1) (b) authorizes the Attorney 
General to "examine . . . any documentary material . . . 
relevant to such alleged unlawful method, act or practice" that 
is the subject of the Attorney General's investigation.  This 
"sets forth a relevance test to define the documents the 
Attorney General may examine."  Yankee Milk, 372 Mass. at 357.  
See Bodimetric Profiles, 404 Mass. at 156.  Her power to examine 
such documents is further constrained by § 6 (5), in particular 
23 
 
 
its provision prohibiting a C.I.D. from "contain[ing] any 
requirement [that] would be unreasonable or improper if 
contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the 
[C]ommonwealth."  We have interpreted this particular provision 
to impose a "three-pronged test" intended to "balance the 
opposing interests of the investigator and the investigated."  
Yankee Milk, supra at 361 n.8.  Here, a court must consider (1) 
whether the C.I.D. "describe[s] with reasonable particularity 
the material required,"10 (2) whether "the material required is 
not plainly irrelevant to the authorized investigation,"11 and 
(3) whether "the quantum of material required does not exceed 
reasonable limits."  Id. at 360-361.  See Matter of a Civil 
Investigative Demand Addressed to Bob Brest Buick, Inc., 5 Mass. 
App. Ct. 717, 719-720 (1977) ("It cannot now be said that the 
C.I.D., as modified, was too indefinite, exceeded reasonable 
limits, or was plainly irrelevant . . . to the public interest 
sought to be protected" [citations and quotations omitted]).  
                     
 
10 This factor mirrors the particularity requirement of the 
previous section, G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (4) (c), which mandates that 
the notice of a C.I.D. "describe the class or classes of 
documentary material to be produced thereunder with reasonable 
specificity, so as fairly to indicate the material demanded."  
See Yankee Milk, 372 Mass. at 361 (observing that these two 
provisions "impose[] . . . an equivalent [specificity] 
standard"). 
 
 
11 Similarly, the relevance requirement of this second 
factor mirrors the relevance requirement of § 6 (1) (b), and we 
interpret the two to impose an identical standard. 
24 
 
 
"Violation of one of these standards [under § 6 (5)] constitutes 
'good cause' allowing the court to modify or set aside a demand" 
pursuant to § 6 (7).  Yankee Milk, supra at 359 n.7.  See Harmon 
Law Offices, P.C. v. Attorney Gen., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 830, 834-
835 (2013) ("Good cause is shown only if the moving party 
demonstrates that the Attorney General acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously or that the information sought is plainly 
irrelevant").  With these limitations in mind, we turn to the 
judge's conclusion that Exxon had not met its burden of showing 
"why it should not be compelled to respond" to the C.I.D.  CUNA 
Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 380 Mass. at 544. 
 
First, we agree with the judge that the C.I.D. describes 
with reasonable particularity the material requested, G. L. c. 
93A, § 6 (4) (c), (5), given its focus on Exxon's knowledge of 
the impacts of carbon dioxide and other fossil fuel emissions on 
the Earth's climate.  With respect to the relevance of the 
materials sought, Exxon argues that the Attorney General's 
request for historic documents dating as far back as 1976 are 
not relevant to an investigation under c. 93A, which carries a 
four-year statute of limitations.  G. L. c. 260, § 5A.  We find 
no support for Exxon's position, either in law (Exxon fails to 
cite any case) or logic.  A document created more than four 
years ago is, of course, still probative of Exxon's present 
knowledge on the issue of climate change, and whether Exxon 
25 
 
 
disclosed that knowledge to the public.  Because these materials 
are not "plainly irrelevant," Yankee Milk, 372 Mass. at 360, the 
requests are permissible under this factor. 
 
We are also not persuaded that the C.I.D.'s requests 
"exceed reasonable limits."  Id. at 361.  Documentary demands do 
so "only when they 'seriously interfere with the functioning of 
the investigated party by placing excessive burdens on manpower 
or requiring removal of critical records.'"  Bodimetric 
Profiles, 404 Mass. at 159, quoting Yankee Milk, supra at 361 
n.8.  In analyzing this point, the judge properly considered the 
fact that Exxon has already complied with a request for similar 
documents from New York's Attorney General.  The judge 
reasonably inferred that it would not be too burdensome for 
Exxon, having already complied with that request, to comply with 
the Massachusetts C.I.D., which is similar in nature.12  Exxon 
does not cite to the record before us to support a contrary 
conclusion.  Further, we have recognized that in cases such as 
this, where "the requested information is . . . peculiarly 
within the province of the person to whom the C.I.D. is 
addressed, broad discovery demands may be permitted even when 
                     
 
12 The judge wrote:  "At the hearing, both parties indicated 
that Exxon has already complied with its obligations regarding a 
similar demand for documents from the New York Attorney General.  
In fact, as of December 5, 2016, Exxon had produced 1.4 million 
pages of documents responsive to the New York Attorney General's 
request." 
26 
 
 
such a demand 'imposes considerable expense and burden on the 
investigated party.'"  Bodimetric Profiles, supra. 
 
The remainder of Exxon's challenge to the substance of the 
C.I.D. concerns its assertion that the Attorney General issued 
the C.I.D. solely as a pretext, "rendering the [C.I.D.] an 
arbitrary and capricious exercise of executive power."  Exxon 
cites to cases from other contexts to suggest that our analysis 
of the propriety of the C.I.D. must include an evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the Attorney General's reasons for issuing it.  
"There is no requirement that the Attorney General have probable 
cause to believe that a violation of . . . c. 93A has occurred.  
[She] need only have a belief that a person has engaged in or is 
engaging in conduct declared by be unlawful by . . . c. 93A.  In 
these circumstances, the Attorney General must not act 
arbitrarily or in excess of [her] statutory authority, but [s]he 
need not be confident in the probable result of [her] 
investigation."  CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 380 Mass. at 542 n.5.  
The judge determined that the Attorney General has "assayed 
sufficient grounds -- her concerns about Exxon's possible 
misrepresentations to Massachusetts consumers -- upon which to 
issue the [C.I.D]."  The Attorney General's belief that Exxon's 
conduct may violate c. 93A is all that is required under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 6 (1). 
27 
 
 
 
3.  Disqualification of the Attorney General.  Exxon also 
seeks the disqualification of the entire office of the Attorney 
General from this investigation.  Exxon bases its request on 
comments made by the Attorney General in March, 2016, at the 
press conference where she announced the commencement of her 
investigation into Exxon.  The judge denied Exxon's request, and 
we review the denial for an abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth 
v. Reynolds, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 662, 664 (1983). 
 
At the press conference, titled "AGs United for Clean 
Power," the Attorney General spoke about the basis for her 
investigation.  The relevant portion of her comments were as 
follows: 
 
"Part of the problem has been one of public 
perception, and it appears, certainly, that certain 
companies, certain industries, may not have told the whole 
story, leading many to doubt whether climate change is real 
and to misunderstand and misapprehend the catastrophic 
nature of its impacts.  Fossil fuel companies that deceived 
investors and consumers about the dangers of climate change 
should be, must be, held accountable.  That's why I, too, 
have joined in investigating the practices of Exxon . . . .  
We can all see today the troubling disconnect between what 
Exxon knew, what industry folks knew, and what the company 
and industry chose to share with investors and with the 
American public." 
 
 
Exxon argues that these comments violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.6, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1430 (2015), which prohibits any 
lawyer from making prejudicial statements to the public 
concerning an ongoing investigation.  Where a violation has 
occurred, a judge may disqualify the violator.  See Pisa v. 
28 
 
 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 724, 728-730 (1979).  The judge 
concluded that the Attorney General's comments contained no 
"actionable bias," and instead were intended only to inform the 
public of the basis for the investigation into Exxon.  We 
discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's conclusion.  The 
Attorney General is authorized to investigate what she believes 
to be violations of c. 93A.  G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (1).  As an 
elected official, it is reasonable that she routinely informs 
her constituents of the nature of her investigations.  See 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 278 (1993) (statements to 
press by prosecutor serve vital public function); Commonwealth 
v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 372-373, 378 (1999) (discussing 
prosecutor's duty to zealously advocate within ethical limits). 
 
4.  Exxon's request for a stay.  The day before filing its 
request to modify or set aside the C.I.D., Exxon filed a 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
challenging the C.I.D. on constitutional grounds not raised in 
this action.13  Exxon requested that the Superior Court judge 
                     
 
13 The Federal action was transferred to the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and on 
March 29, 2018, the District Court dismissed Exxon's complaint 
with prejudice due to Exxon's failure to state a claim and the 
preclusive effect of the Superior Court decision in this matter.  
See Exxon Mobil Corp. vs. Healey & another, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 
1:17-cv-02301 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017).  Because Exxon may 
29 
 
 
stay this matter pending the resolution of the Federal suit.  
The judge denied Exxon's request, and we review that denial for 
an abuse of discretion.  Soe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 
Mass. 381, 392 (2013). 
 
In denying Exxon's request, the judge reasoned that the 
Superior Court is better equipped than a Federal court in Texas 
to decide a matter pertaining to Massachusetts's primary 
consumer protection law, G. L. c. 93A.14  Exxon argues that this 
constitutes an abuse of discretion, and contends, somewhat 
remarkably, that there "is good reason to question the premise" 
that Massachusetts courts are more capable than out-of-State 
courts to oversee cases arising under c. 93A.  The Legislature 
designated the Superior Court as the forum for bringing a 
challenge to a C.I.D. issued under G. L. c. 93A, § 6.  See G. L. 
c. 93A, § 6 (7) ("[t]he motion may be filed in the superior 
court of the county in which the person served resides or has 
his usual place of business, or in Suffolk county").  Likewise, 
the Legislature provided that civil actions under G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 9 or 11, may be brought in the Superior Court, the Housing 
                                                                  
appeal from the Federal decision, we do not treat as moot 
Exxon's request to stay the Massachusetts proceedings. 
 
 
14 The judge also determined that "the interests of 
substantial justice dictate that the matter be heard in 
Massachusetts," citing G. L. c. 223A, § 5.  Exxon has not argued 
that it would be unfairly prejudiced by having to litigate in 
Massachusetts, and thus has not moved to dismiss under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
30 
 
 
Court, or the District Court, see G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (1), (3A), 
11, with the Superior Court retaining the broadest grant of 
jurisdiction over c. 93A claims.15  It should go without saying 
that Massachusetts courts, which routinely hear c. 93A claims, 
are better equipped than other courts in other jurisdictions to 
oversee such cases. 
 
Exxon's contention that the lower court erred in failing to 
apply the "first-filed" rule is equally unavailing.  The filing 
of a complaint in Federal court one day before a State court 
filing hardly triggers a mechanical application of the first-
filed rule.  See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Parallel Iron, LLC, 914 F. 
Supp. 2d 125, 127 (D. Mass. 2012) ("Exceptions to the [first-
filed] rule are not rare. . . .  [A court] has discretion to 
give preference to a later-filed action when that action will 
better serve the interests involved"); Bacardi Int'l Ltd. v. V. 
Suarez & Co., 719 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 640 (2013) (discouragement of forum-shopping is 
consideration when ruling on motion to stay). 
                     
 
15 Whereas the Housing Court's jurisdiction over c. 93A 
claims is restricted to those involving housing matters, see 
G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1); G. L. c. 185C, § 3, and the District 
Court has jurisdiction over actions "for money damages only," 
G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (3A), 11, the Superior Court is not so 
limited, and may hear any case under c. 93A "for damages and 
such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court 
deems to be necessary and proper."  G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1). 
31 
 
 
 
Finally, where there is only a partial overlap in the 
subject matter of two actions, a judge has considerable 
discretion when deciding whether to grant a stay.  See In re 
Telebrands Corp., 824 F.3d 982, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TPM 
Holdings, Inc. v. Intra-Gold Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. 1996) ("where the overlap between two suits is less than 
complete, the judgment is made case by case").  Exxon 
acknowledges that the Federal action "challenges the 
investigation on constitutional grounds not raised in this 
action" (emphasis added).16  The judge did not abuse her 
discretion in denying the stay.  Compare Provanzano v. Parker, 
796 F. Supp. 2d 247, 257 (D. Mass. 2011) (declining to stay 
because first-filed action was in anticipation of lawsuit in 
question, claims in cases were not identical, current action had 
proceeded further in court, and case involved application of 
Massachusetts statute). 
 
5.  Conclusion.  We affirm the order denying Exxon's motion 
to modify or set aside the C.I.D., Exxon's request to disqualify 
the Attorney General, and Exxon's motion to stay these 
proceedings.  We further affirm the order granting the Attorney 
                     
 
16 Exxon's Federal complaint for declaratory and injunctive 
relief is based on violations of Exxon's rights under the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as well as an alleged violation of the dormant 
commerce clause and an abuse of process claim. 
32 
 
 
General's cross motion to compel Exxon's compliance with the 
C.I.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.