Title: Wyatt v. State; Wyatt v. Buss
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-655, SC09-556
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-655 
____________ 
 
THOMAS ANTHONY WYATT,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-556 
____________ 
 
THOMAS ANTHONY WYATT,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
EDWIN G. BUSS, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 8, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Thomas Anthony Wyatt, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the 
denial of his amended and supplemental motions for postconviction relief filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Through his postconviction 
 
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motions, Wyatt challenges his first-degree murder convictions and sentences of 
death for the commission of a May 1988 triple homicide occurring at a Vero 
Beach, Florida, Domino‘s Pizza restaurant.  Wyatt also petitions this Court for writ 
of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
Wyatt raises numerous claims before this Court but focuses primarily on two of 
those claims: the State presented expert testimony on comparative bullet lead 
analysis (CBLA), which evidence has now established is no longer a reliable 
science, and newly discovered evidence shows that a critical State witness testified 
untruthfully at trial.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the postconviction 
court‘s denial of relief and deny Wyatt‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On May 13, 1988, Wyatt and his codefendant, Michael Lovette, escaped 
from a North Carolina prison road gang and fled to Florida, engaging in a spree of 
crimes along the way, including the murders of three Domino‘s Pizza employees in 
Vero Beach and the murder of Cathy Nydegger near Tampa, which occurred just 
days apart.  In a joint indictment, the State of Florida charged Wyatt and Lovette 
with the following crimes: four counts of first-degree premeditated murder, one 
count of sexual battery, three counts of kidnapping, two counts of robbery with a 
firearm, three counts of grand theft, one count of arson, and one count of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Prior to trial, the court severed the 
 
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three Domino‘s murder counts from the Nydegger murder count and also severed 
the firearm possession count from the other charges.1  Wyatt and Lovette were 
tried separately.2 
The evidence presented at Wyatt‘s trial on the Domino‘s murder counts 
revealed the following.  On May 16, 1988, Wyatt and Lovette stole a 1983 Cadillac 
Seville with a red-burgundy body and white canvas top in Jacksonville, Florida, 
and then drove down the east coast of Florida to the Vero Beach/Yeehaw Junction 
area near State Road 60.  At sometime between 11:00 and 11:45 p.m. on May 17, 
both men entered a Vero Beach Domino‘s Pizza restaurant armed with handguns.  
While Lovette held William Edwards, the store manager, at gunpoint in the office 
until the time lock on the store‘s safe opened, Wyatt took Frances Edwards, who 
was William Edwards‘ wife, and Matthew Bornoosh, a deliveryman, to the 
                                         
 
1.  In a related postconviction case, Wyatt also challenges his first-degree 
murder conviction and resulting death sentence arising from the murder of Cathy 
Nydegger.  He raises nearly identical postconviction claims to those raised here, 
and a separate opinion will address those claims.  See Wyatt v. State, No. SC08-
656 (Fla. oral argument held Apr. 6, 2011). 
 
2.  Wyatt‘s codefendant, Michael Lovette, was convicted on all counts and 
sentenced to death.  See Lovette v. State, 636 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1994).  On 
direct appeal, the Court upheld all of Lovette‘s convictions, except for the sexual 
battery offense, but vacated his sentences of death and remanded for a new 
penalty-phase proceeding because Lovette disclosed facts of the crime during a 
confidential mental health examination without waiving his attorney/client 
privilege and the mental health expert testified at trial.  Id. at 1308-09.  Lovette‘s 
case did not return to this Court, and the postconviction order notes that Lovette 
was resentenced to three consecutive life sentences. 
 
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restroom in the back of the restaurant.  Wyatt forced Bornoosh to remove his 
Domino‘s shirt, and Lovette put it on. 
During the course of the robbery, Wyatt raped Frances Edwards.  After the 
safe opened, the men retrieved money from inside the safe, and Wyatt shot all 
three victims to death: William Edwards was shot in the head and chest; Frances 
Edwards was shot in the head; and Matthew Bornoosh was shot in the left ear and 
head.  Thereafter, Wyatt and Lovette fled the scene in the stolen Cadillac, heading 
west along State Road 60 toward Clearwater.  On their way, the men burned the 
Cadillac and hitched a ride with a truck driver, who later identified Wyatt as one of 
the hitchhikers.  Matthew Bornoosh‘s shirt was recovered on the side of State Road 
60 between where the burnt Cadillac was found and where the Domino‘s was 
located.  Handwriting found on several May 18 motel registration cards recovered 
from various motels located in Brandon and Clearwater, Florida, matched samples 
taken from both Wyatt and Lovette. 
At some point, the men then decided to go their separate ways.  After 
spending several weeks on the west coast of Florida, Wyatt stole another vehicle 
and returned to South Carolina.  On July 7, 1988, when a police officer stopped a 
stolen truck in which Wyatt was a passenger, Wyatt ran but was eventually caught 
and arrested. 
In January 1991, the jury found Wyatt guilty as charged.  Throughout trial, 
 
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Wyatt instructed his counsel that he did not want any witnesses called in 
mitigation.  However, on the eve of the penalty-phase proceeding, Wyatt changed 
course and requested that counsel put on the testimony of his mother and sister.  At 
the time of this request, Wyatt‘s mother suffered from a mental disorder and was 
unable to testify.  Her condition was worsening, and there was no prognosis as to 
when, or if, she would ever be able to testify.  Wyatt‘s sister had pregnancy 
complications and could not travel to testify for five months.  As a result, Wyatt‘s 
counsel moved for a continuance of the penalty phase based on each witness‘s 
unavailability, which the trial court denied.  Following this denial, Wyatt entered a 
written waiver of five statutory mitigating circumstances,3 which the court found to 
be freely and voluntarily given.  After a brief penalty phase, the jury unanimously 
recommended death as to each of the three Domino‘s murders.  
The trial court followed the jury‘s recommendation and found that the 
evidence established the following seven aggravators: (1) the murders were 
committed while Wyatt was under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) Wyatt was 
                                         
 
3.  In a written waiver executed prior to the penalty phase, Wyatt waived the 
following statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) lack of significant history of prior 
criminal activity; (2) commission while under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional distress; (3) the victim was a participant in Wyatt‘s conduct or 
consented to the act; (4) Wyatt acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person; and (5) the capacity of Wyatt to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired.   
 
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previously convicted of a violent felony; (3) Wyatt was engaged in the commission 
of felonies when the murders were committed; (4) the murders were committed for 
the purpose of avoiding arrest; (5) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; 
(6) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (7) the 
murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  The trial court did not 
assign a specific weight to these aggravators and found that no mitigating 
circumstances had been established.  
On direct appeal,4 this Court affirmed Wyatt‘s convictions and death 
sentences.  Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. 1994).  However, the Court 
struck the CCP aggravator as not supported by the evidence, but concluded that 
                                         
 
4.  Wyatt raised the following claims on direct appeal: (1) the trial court 
erred in conducting voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in denying Wyatt‘s motions 
to suppress physical evidence and statements; (3) the trial court erred in admitting 
testimony regarding DNA evidence; (4) it was reversible error to allow the State to 
inform the jury that Wyatt was an escaped convict; (5) the trial court erred in 
allowing collateral crime and character evidence to be admitted; (6) the shackling 
of Wyatt was prejudicial and resulted in reversible error; (7) the trial court erred in 
refusing to permit a proffer on whether Wyatt‘s fingerprints were illegally 
obtained; (8) the medical examiner‘s testimony was speculative; (9) the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury; (10) the prosecutor‘s improper closing remarks 
resulted in fundamental error; (11) the trial court improperly denied Wyatt‘s 
motion for continuance of the penalty phase so that defense counsel could present 
mitigation; (12) the CCP and HAC aggravators are unconstitutional; (13) the trial 
court erred by allowing evidence during the penalty phase that was outside the 
scope of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (14) the trial court improperly 
admitted evidence of Wyatt‘s prior violent felonies and a photograph; (15) the use 
of hearsay during the penalty phase violated the Confrontation Clause; (16) the 
prosecutor‘s closing argument during the penalty phase was improper; and (17) 
Florida‘s death-penalty sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. 
 
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eliminating this aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
in light of the six remaining aggravating circumstances and the lack of mitigation.  
Id.  This Court also found that ―the record [was] clear that Wyatt effectively 
waived presentation of mitigating evidence‖ and that ―the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by refusing to suspend the penalty proceedings indefinitely.‖  Id. at 
1340. 
Wyatt‘s postconviction proceedings spanned several years in light of 
complex public-records litigation.  When Wyatt filed his final amended motion, he 
raised a total of twenty-seven claims, some of which included multiple subclaims.5  
                                         
 
5.  Wyatt‘s final amended motion raised the following claims: (1) the State 
withheld public records in violation of Florida law; (2) section 119.19, Florida 
Statutes (Supp. 1998), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are 
unconstitutional on their face and as applied to Wyatt and both violate the 
separation of powers; (3.I.) ineffective assistance of counsel for (A) counsel‘s 
cumulative error; (B) counsel‘s use of cocaine during trial; (C) failing to object to 
perpetuation of testimony from lead investigator Ronald Blanton; (D) failing to 
object to testimony of Larry Bouchette; (E) failing to properly object to the 
prosecutor forcing Wyatt to testify as to veracity of State‘s witnesses; (F) failing to 
object to questions regarding Wyatt‘s collateral crimes; (G) failing to object to 
testimony from Rick Lindsey; (H) failing to object to testimony of Darrell Booth; 
(I) failing to investigate Wyatt‘s drug and alcohol problem; (J) failing to rebut 
testimony of Patrick McCoombs; and (K) failing to secure a complete mental 
health evaluation; (3.II.) the trial court erred in: (A) failing to suppress unrecorded 
oral statements Wyatt made while in custody; (B) permitting McCoombs to testify 
regarding the ―convict code‖; (C) denying the motion to exclude DNA evidence; 
(D) refusing to instruct the jury on third-degree murder; (E) failing to conduct an 
individual voir dire of prospective jurors on the issue of pretrial publicity and their 
views regarding the death penalty; and (F) allowing cumulative error; (3.III.) the 
State erred by: (A) conducting improper cross-examination of Wyatt; (B) 
misstating evidence; (C) having an improper relationship with McCoombs; (D) 
 
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making improper comments during the penalty-phase closing; and (E) permitting 
cumulative error; (4) Wyatt‘s convictions are unreliable because of newly 
discovered evidence of McCoombs‘ fabricated testimony; (5) the State withheld 
material and exculpatory evidence and presented misleading testimony in regard to 
McCoombs; (6) counsel was ineffective for failing to move for individual voir dire 
in regard to pretrial publicity; (7) counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an 
adequate mental health evaluation and to provide necessary information to the 
mental health consultant in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); 
(8.I.) trial counsel was ineffective with respect to: (A) the introduction of gruesome 
photographs during the guilt and penalty phases and (B) the penalty-phase 
testimony regarding details of Wyatt‘s prior violent felony and (8.II.) appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to properly litigate these issues on appeal; (9) 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (A) adequately investigate mitigating 
evidence; (B) inform Wyatt of all available mitigation before he waived its 
presentation; and (C) proffer mitigating evidence to the trial judge before 
sentencing; (10) the penalty-phase jury instruction improperly shifted the burden of 
proof, and counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this instruction; (11) the 
jury received inadequate guidance on the avoid arrest and CCP aggravators, and 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge both; (12) the ―during commission 
of a felony‖ aggravator is unconstitutional, the jury instruction on that aggravator 
was inadequate, and counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge both; (13) the 
―pecuniary gain‖ aggravator is unconstitutional, the jury instruction on that 
aggravator was inadequate, and counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
both; (14) the ―under the sentence of imprisonment‖ aggravator is unconstitutional, 
the jury instruction on that aggravator was inadequate, and counsel was ineffective 
for failing to challenge both; (15) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the 
HAC aggravator because it did not apply, the jury instruction on that aggravator 
was unconstitutional, and counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge both; 
(16) counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on mercy or 
sympathy; (17) trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to litigate the 
issue that the trial court and prosecutor misled the jury by minimizing its role in 
sentencing; (18) the rule prohibiting the defendant from interviewing jurors is 
unconstitutional and denies the defendant effective assistance of postconviction 
counsel; (19) Florida‘s method of execution is unconstitutional; (20) Florida‘s 
capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional; (21) counsel was ineffective for 
failing to ensure that a complete record was available on direct appeal; (22) this 
Court‘s harmless-error analysis with respect to the elimination of the CCP 
aggravator was constitutionally inadequate; (23) counsel was ineffective for failing 
to preserve the issue of Wyatt‘s shackling for appeal; (24) the trial court and jury 
 
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Following two separate Huff6 hearings, the postconviction court ordered that an 
evidentiary hearing take place on claim 3 (ineffective assistance of counsel and 
judicial and prosecutorial misconduct), claim 4 (newly discovered evidence), claim 
5 (Brady7 and Giglio8 violations), claim 6 (ineffective assistance of counsel during 
jury selection), claim 7 (ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate 
and prepare for the penalty phase), claim 9 (ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to investigate mitigating evidence), and claim 26 (newly discovered 
evidence on the discontinuation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of 
CBLA). 
At the first evidentiary hearing, Wyatt presented the testimony of several 
witnesses, and the State did not put on any evidence.  Before the postconviction 
court ruled upon Wyatt‘s final amended motion, Wyatt filed a supplement to his 
amended motion pending before the court.  In this supplement, Wyatt raised four 
                                                                                                                                   
used unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions as aggravators in violation of 
Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988); (25) Wyatt‘s convictions and 
sentences are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (26) 
newly discovered evidence exists regarding a 2005 press release issued by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which announced that agency‘s discontinuation of 
CBLA; and (27) Florida‘s lethal injection statute and procedures are 
unconstitutional. 
 
6.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
7.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
8.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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additional grounds for postconviction relief, numbered claims 28 through 31.9  The 
court designated the supplement as a successive postconviction motion and denied 
Wyatt leave to amend.  The court issued a sixty-page order denying all claims 
related to Wyatt‘s final amended motion (claims 1 through 27).  Following Wyatt‘s 
appeal of those claims, he filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction to litigate the 
supplement, which this Court initially denied.  Consequently, the postconviction 
court stayed Wyatt‘s supplement pending his appeal of claims 1 through 27. 
On January 23, 2009, Wyatt filed another motion to relinquish jurisdiction 
after postconviction counsel came into possession of letters, dated August 7 and 
October 22, 2008, from the FBI stating that at Wyatt‘s trial, an FBI agent testified 
regarding CBLA in a manner that exceeded the limits of the science and could not 
be supported by the agency.  This Court granted Wyatt‘s motion, allowing Wyatt 
leave to amend his previous supplement to include this claim and further directing 
the postconviction court to hold an evidentiary hearing on both the allegations 
regarding CBLA and the further allegations that State witness, Patrick McCoombs, 
                                         
 
9.  These four claims, which resume the numerical order set forth in Wyatt‘s 
final amended postconviction motion, were as follows: (28) Florida‘s lethal 
injection procedures are unconstitutional; (29) the Department of Corrections 
improperly delegated its authority to the Attorney General‘s Office to create and 
implement lethal injection procedures; (30) newly discovered evidence based on 
November 2007 reports by 60 Minutes and the Washington Post that FBI expert 
testimony exceeded the limits of CBLA science; and (31) newly discovered 
evidence from Emilio Bravo that State witness, Patrick McCoombs, lied at trial. 
 
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lied at trial.  These claims were to be considered cumulatively with Wyatt‘s prior 
postconviction claims.  Thereafter, the postconviction court lifted the stay on 
Wyatt‘s supplemental motion, and Wyatt filed an amended supplemental 
postconviction motion, specifically revising claim 30 to include allegations 
regarding his receipt of the 2008 FBI letters. 
In June 2009, the postconviction court determined that an additional 
evidentiary hearing would be held on claim 30 (challenging CBLA evidence) and 
claim 31 (inmate Emilio Bravo‘s statement that McCoombs lied at trial).  The State 
conceded that CBLA evidence had been ―withdrawn by the FBI and [was] no 
longer supported by the scientific community.‖  At the second evidentiary hearing, 
Wyatt presented the testimony of several witnesses to support his challenges to the 
CBLA evidence used at trial and the truthfulness of McCoombs‘ testimony.  The 
State again did not put on any evidence.  Following the evidentiary hearing, the 
postconviction court issued another order denying relief as to Wyatt‘s final four 
claims. 
This appeal follows, and Wyatt simultaneously petitions this Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  RULE 3.850 CLAIMS 
Wyatt raises multiple issues in his appeal of the postconviction court‘s 
 
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denial of relief.10  Initially, we note that Wyatt‘s claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for improperly conceding, or failing to object, to the admissibility of 
gruesome photographs is insufficiently argued and therefore waived for the 
purposes of appeal.11  In addition, we also find that three other claims—Wyatt‘s 
                                         
 
10.  Wyatt argues: (1)(A) the 2008 FBI letter concerning CBLA testimony 
constitutes newly discovered evidence that would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial, (B) because the FBI had knowledge of the flaws in CBLA at the time of 
Wyatt‘s trial, the State‘s knowing presentation of FBI Special Agent John Riley‘s 
false testimony violated Giglio, (C) the State‘s failure to disclose that Agent 
Riley‘s testimony was unscientific and unsound violated Brady, and (D) to the 
extent defense counsel failed to challenge CBLA as ―junk science,‖ they rendered 
ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); (2)(A) 
the State withheld material impeachment material regarding witness Patrick 
McCoombs in violation of Brady, (B) the State allowed for the presentation of 
McCoombs‘ false testimony in violation of Giglio, and (C) newly discovered 
evidence exists that McCoombs‘ trial testimony was fabricated, and if presented to 
the jury would probably produce an acquittal or lesser sentence on retrial; (3) the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claims that counsel was 
ineffective for (A) improperly conceding, or failing to object, to the admissibility 
of unnecessary, cumulative, and gruesome photographs presented to the jury, (B) 
not objecting to the admission of penalty-phase testimony detailing Wyatt‘s prior 
violent felonies, and (C) failing to properly preserve the issue that he was shackled 
throughout trial; (4) Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 and section 119.19, 
Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally restrict his right to public-records access under 
the Florida and United States Constitutions and violate the separation of powers; 
(5) the penalty-phase jury instructions given at trial were unconstitutional; and (6) 
Florida‘s death penalty statute is unconstitutional and death by electrocution or 
lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
11.  See Geralds v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly S503, S513 (Fla. Sept. 16, 
2010) (denying habeas claim regarding the admission of gruesome and cumulative 
photographs as insufficiently pled because defendant failed to specify which 
photographs he was challenging, did not articulate why the photographs were 
particularly inflammatory, and did not explain why they were inadmissible under 
governing case law). 
 
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claims that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his allegations that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of testimony 
detailing Wyatt‘s prior violent felonies and for failing to preserve the issue that he 
was shackled throughout trial, and his claim that the penalty-phase jury 
instructions were unconstitutional—are procedurally barred, without merit, or 
both.12  We next address in more detail the remainder of Wyatt‘s postconviction 
claims. 
CBLA Claims 
 
In his first issue on appeal, Wyatt raises four subclaims regarding CBLA 
evidence that the State proffered through the testimony of FBI Special Agent John 
                                         
 
12.  As to the testimony regarding Wyatt‘s prior violent felonies, this claim 
is without merit because the record demonstrates that counsel repeatedly, and 
strenuously, objected to the State‘s elicitation of specific details concerning 
Wyatt‘s prior crimes.  With regard to the shackling issue, this claim was raised and 
decided on direct appeal, see Wyatt, 641 So. 2d at 1340 n.4, and is therefore 
procedurally barred, see Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 562 (Fla. 2010).  
This claim lacks merit as well since the record demonstrates that counsel did, in 
fact, preserve this issue for appeal by objecting.  Finally, as to Wyatt‘s substantive 
challenge to the constitutionality of the jury instructions used during the penalty 
phase, this claim is procedurally barred because ―[c]laims regarding the adequacy 
or constitutionality of jury instructions should be raised on direct appeal.‖  Israel v. 
State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008); see also Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 
650, 665 (Fla. 2000) (―The substantive challenges to these jury instructions are 
procedurally barred because Thompson could have raised these claims on direct 
appeal.‖). 
We also deny Wyatt‘s claim that the postconviction court erred in failing to 
attach portions of the record to its order summarily denying relief because in the 
order, the court stated its rationale for the summary denial.  See Demps v. Dugger, 
714 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. 1998). 
 
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Riley at Wyatt‘s trial in 1991.  Specifically, Wyatt argues as follows: (1) the 2008 
letter issued by the FBI in this case constitutes newly discovered evidence that 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial; (2) because the FBI had knowledge 
of the flaws in CBLA at the time of Wyatt‘s trial, the State‘s knowing presentation 
of Agent Riley‘s false testimony violated Giglio; (3) the State‘s failure to disclose 
that Agent Riley‘s testimony was unscientific and unsound violated Brady; and (4) 
to the extent that defense counsel failed to challenge CBLA as ―junk science,‖ 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland. 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the 2008 letter clearly 
qualified as newly discovered evidence; thus, the postconviction court erred in 
finding that the claim was procedurally barred and that the letter did not constitute 
newly discovered evidence.  Regardless of these errors, we affirm the 
postconviction court‘s denial of relief because Wyatt cannot demonstrate that 
consideration of the letter would probably produce an acquittal on retrial under the 
newly discovered evidence standard.  As to the Brady and Giglio claims, there is 
no basis for concluding that the State withheld favorable evidence under Brady or 
knowingly presented false evidence at the original trial under Giglio.  After the 
FBI discovered the errors in the original CBLA evidence introduced at trial, Wyatt 
was made aware of these errors by letter.  Finally, we reject Wyatt‘s 
ineffectiveness claim because the record shows that trial counsel retained an 
 
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independent expert to evaluate the FBI‘s comparative bullet lead analysis, and the 
expert provided counsel with no basis to challenge that analysis. 
Background Facts  
At trial, the State employed the testimony of Agent Riley to link bullets 
recovered from the victims‘ bodies with bullets identified to be in Wyatt‘s 
possession subsequent to the murders.  Agent Riley testified as an expert on 
CBLA, which compares the elemental composition of lead bullets for forensic 
value.  Specifically, Agent Riley opined that by comparing the elemental 
composition of the respective bullets, he was able to determine that the bullets 
found inside the victims and the bullets Wyatt was known to possess after the 
murders ―came from the same box of ammunition . . . or from another box of 
ammunition that was manufactured at the same place, on or about the same date.‖  
Agent Riley qualified his explanation, stating that this was not ―the only box that 
was manufactured that had this composition,‖ but that ―it came from a batch of 
bullets made . . . at the same factory on or about the same date.‖ 
Since Wyatt‘s trial, various studies, including a February 10, 2004, report 
issued by the National Research Council (NRC), have undermined the scientific 
reliability of the correlation Agent Riley drew at trial.  On September 1, 2005, the 
FBI, which was the only agency conducting CBLA in the United States, issued a 
press release announcing that the agency was discontinuing its use of CBLA.  
 
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Several years later, the State received a letter from the FBI dated August 7, 2008, 
which referenced Wyatt‘s case and stated in pertinent part: 
After reviewing the testimony of the FBI‘s examiner, it is the 
opinion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory that the 
examiner stated or implied that the evidentiary specimen(s) could be 
associated to a single box of ammunition.  This type of testimony 
exceeds the limits of the science and cannot be supported by the FBI. 
Your office is encouraged to consult appellate specialists in 
your jurisdiction to determine whether you have any discovery 
obligations with respect to the finding stated above.  As directed by 
the Department of Justice, we are notifying the Chief Judge of the 
court in which this case was tried of the results of our review by 
copying him or her on this letter. 
Additionally, you should be aware that the FBI is cooperating 
with the Innocence Project.  The Innocence Project is interested in 
determining whether improper bullet lead analysis testimony was 
material to the conviction of any defendant, and, if so, to ensure 
appropriate remedial actions are taken. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The State later supplied this letter to Wyatt‘s postconviction 
counsel.  After conducting two evidentiary hearings, the postconviction court 
denied relief on Wyatt‘s CBLA claims. 
Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
 
Wyatt first contends that the postconviction court erred in its two-fold ruling 
that the FBI letter in this case did not constitute newly discovered evidence and 
that a claim relating to the letter‘s subject matter was procedurally time-barred 
because it should have been raised within a year from the date the 2004 NRC 
report was issued.  On appeal, the State subscribes to the same position as the 
postconviction court‘s ruling.   
 
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As an initial matter, the State contends that Wyatt‘s claim is procedurally 
time-barred because a motion for postconviction relief in a capital case must be 
filed within one year from the date the new facts become known.  According to the 
State, Wyatt should have raised this claim within one year from the date the NRC 
issued its February 10, 2004, report, which undermined the scientific reliability of 
the testimony that Agent Riley gave at trial, or one year from September 1, 2005, 
the date the FBI issued a press release announcing it was discontinuing its usage of 
CBLA.  We reject the State‘s position.   
The record reflects that unlike the NRC report or the FBI press release, the 
2008 letter was based on the FBI‘s own review of Agent Riley‘s 1991 testimony in 
this case.  Although the letter did not invalidate all of Agent Riley‘s testimony, the 
agency clearly determined that his statement or implications ―that the evidentiary 
specimen(s) could be associated to a single box of ammunition . . . exceed[ed] the 
limits of science and [could not] be supported by the FBI.‖  In contrast, neither the 
2004 NRC report nor the 2005 press release involved a concession that the 
testimony the FBI offered in past cases was unreliable and were only prospective 
in nature.  Thus, we hold that a newly discovered evidence claim predicated upon a 
case-specific letter from the FBI discrediting the CBLA testimony offered at trial is 
not procedurally barred if timely raised.  In the present case, upon receipt of the 
FBI‘s 2008 letter, Wyatt timely filed a supplemental motion for postconviction 
 
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relief, alleging that the letter constituted newly discovered evidence warranting a 
new trial, and, therefore, this claim is not time-barred. 
We now turn to the merits of Wyatt‘s newly discovered evidence claim.  
This Court has held that a defendant bears the burden of establishing two 
requirements in order for a conviction to be set aside on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence: (1) the asserted evidence must have been unknown by the 
trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that 
the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of 
diligence; and (2) the newly discovered evidence must be of such a nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Jones v. State (Jones II), 709 So. 
2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  The postconviction court held that the 2008 letter did not 
fall within the confines of the first prong of the ―newly discovered evidence‖ test 
because the evidence was not ―in existence at the time of trial,‖ relying on a 
statement in Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976, 987 (Fla. 2007).  Wyatt challenges 
this ruling, asserting that the postconviction court erred in relying on this statement 
from Kearse.  For the reasons that follow, we agree with Wyatt and recede from 
the statement in Kearse—which involved different circumstances—that the 
evidence ―must have existed . . . at the time of trial.‖  Id. 
In Jones v. State (Jones I), 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991), this Court defined the 
first prong of the newly discovered evidence as facts that ―must have been 
 
- 19 - 
unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial‖ and that 
―the defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence.‖  
591 So. 2d at 916 (quoting Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1979)).  In 
Jones II, we reaffirmed our abidance with that definition.  See Jones II, 709 So. 2d 
at 521.  In Kearse, we addressed a claim regarding newly discovered evidence 
where the defendant asserted a newly discovered evidence claim based on a mental 
health expert‘s conduct, which occurred after the resentencing proceeding and 
involved a different defendant in a different state.  Kearse, 969 So. 2d at 987.  This 
Court rejected his claim, summarily holding that the allegations failed to meet 
either prong of the Jones II test.  In our analysis, we noted that ―the evidence did 
not exist at the time of the resentencing.‖  Id.  We now clarify that the language 
―must have existed . . . at the time of trial,‖ which was promulgated by this Court 
in Kearse and applied by the postconviction court in this case, has never been a 
part of newly discovered evidence analysis and was an incorrect recitation of the 
test set forth in the Jones decisions.13 
This holding is in accord with our prior decisions, which have recognized 
newly discovered evidence claims predicated upon new testing methods or 
                                         
 
13.  To the extent that Porter v. State, 653 So. 2d 374, 380 (Fla. 1995), and 
Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 871 (Fla. 2003), utilize language similar to that 
found in Kearse, we also conclude that such statements constitute incorrect 
recitations of the definition for newly discovered evidence. 
 
- 20 - 
techniques that did not exist at the time of trial, but are used to test evidence 
introduced at the original trial.  See, e.g., Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 798 
(Fla. 2007) (―There is no dispute that the DNA evidence concerning the pubic hair, 
showing that it did not belong to the victim, is newly discovered evidence.‖); 
Hildwin v. State, 951 So. 2d 784, 788-89 (Fla. 2006) (holding that new DNA 
testing of evidence indicating that semen and saliva on victim‘s panties and 
washcloth excluding defendant as source and which refuted the trial serology 
evidence constituted newly discovered evidence).  Moreover, we have also 
recognized newly discovered evidence claims predicated upon a witness who 
testified at trial but then subsequently recanted his or her testimony; the witness‘s 
recantation, which did not exist at the time of trial, constituted newly discovered 
evidence.  See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 992-93 (Fla. 2009) (recognizing 
the statements made by State witness after trial acknowledging that defendant did 
not confess to the crime was newly discovered evidence of recantation).14 
We reaffirm our continued adherence to the definition adopted by this Court 
                                         
 
14.  That is not to say that all new evidence, although not in existence at the 
time of trial but related to a case, is the equivalent of newly discovered evidence 
for the purposes of establishing a postconviction claim.  See, e.g., Kearse, 969 So. 
2d at 987 (holding that evidence of conduct by State‘s expert witness in a separate, 
federal criminal case that postdated the appellant‘s trial did not constitute newly 
discovered evidence of impeachment material); Porter, 653 So. 2d at 379-80 
(denying appellant‘s claim that his good prison conduct after trial constituted 
newly discovered evidence for the purposes of his original trial in which a death 
sentence was imposed).   
 
- 21 - 
in Jones I and Jones II: under the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test, 
the asserted evidence must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or 
by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense 
counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.  See Jones II, 709 So. 
2d at 521.  Here, the 2008 letter explicitly states that Agent Riley‘s testimony that 
the ―evidentiary specimen(s) could be associated to a single box of ammunition . . . 
exceed[ed] the limits of science and [could not] be supported by the FBI.‖  
Although the FBI did not actually write the letter until August 2008, more than 
fifteen years after Wyatt‘s trial, the flaws inherent in CBLA science were unknown 
or not publicly acknowledged at the time of trial.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
case-specific letter authored by the FBI in this case constitutes newly discovered 
evidence because the letter consists of facts that Wyatt could not have known at the 
time of trial, and Wyatt or defense counsel could not have known of the facts by 
the use of diligence. 
With these determinations in mind, we now turn to the second prong of the 
test set forth in Jones I and Jones II.  We conclude that Wyatt cannot prevail 
because he is unable to demonstrate that consideration of the 2008 letter would 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Importantly, the State did not base its 
case on the CBLA evidence alone; the jury obviously credited the extensive 
testimony offered by other witnesses who linked Wyatt to the murders.  Testimony 
 
- 22 - 
presented at trial revealed the following facts: DNA evidence matching Wyatt‘s 
DNA was found inside one of the victims; Wyatt admitted to stealing the 
distinctively colored Cadillac, being less than a mile from the Domino‘s on the 
night of the murders, and possessing a 38-caliber pistol; Wyatt made inculpatory 
statements to law enforcement officers after his arrest in South Carolina; all the 
victims were shot with the same 38-caliber weapon; and one witness observed that 
a red and white vehicle was parked outside the Domino‘s at a quarter to midnight 
on May 17 and when she returned with the police at midnight, the vehicle was no 
longer there.  Further, Agent Riley‘s CBLA testimony simply linked the bullets 
found inside the victims to bullets that Wyatt possessed after the crime; the 
testimony did not indicate whether Wyatt, in fact, purchased those bullets or fired 
the murder weapon.  Therefore, we ultimately conclude that the newly discovered 
2008 letter regarding Agent Riley‘s unreliable testimony was not of such nature 
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 
Giglio Claim 
Wyatt next contends that the State violated Giglio because the State failed to 
correct false testimony given by Agent Riley.  In support, Wyatt asserts that Agent 
Riley‘s testimony that the FBI‘s CBLA analysts were able to give an opinion as to 
whether a certain bullet originated from a certain box of ammunition was false 
because the 2008 letter categorically rejects that proposition.  Wyatt further 
 
- 23 - 
contends that Agent Riley falsely testified that the FBI‘s analysts conducted 
voluminous research on the composition of various bullets.  The postconviction 
court denied relief on this claim, finding that Wyatt presented no evidence that the 
prosecutor had knowledge of these alleged falsehoods.  We agree. 
To establish a Giglio violation, Wyatt must show that: ―(1) the testimony 
given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the 
statement was material.‖  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003).  
―[T]he false evidence is material if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.‖  Id. at 506 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  ―The State, as the beneficiary of the Giglio violation, 
bears the burden to prove that the presentation of false testimony at trial was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Id.  Giglio claims present mixed questions 
of law and fact.  Accordingly, this Court defers to those factual findings supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law 
to the facts.  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 2008). 
Wyatt first argues that Agent Riley‘s testimony, in which Riley stated that he 
was able to give an opinion as to whether bullets originated from a certain box of 
ammunition, was false because the FBI rejected that position in the 2008 letter it 
issued in this case.  Wyatt‘s postconviction expert, statistician Dr. Clifford 
Spiegelman, established that the 2008 letter was the first time the FBI actually 
 
- 24 - 
acknowledged that the testimony offered by Agent Riley in Wyatt‘s case exceeded 
the limits of science and could not be supported by the FBI.  As a result, it 
logically follows that the prosecutor could not correct false testimony based on 
information contained in a letter written and issued to the State over fifteen years 
after the conclusion of Wyatt‘s trial.  We therefore conclude that Wyatt‘s reliance 
on the 2008 letter to establish a Giglio violation is misplaced. 
As to Wyatt‘s second argument, he takes issue with Agent Riley‘s testimony 
that the FBI ―had to do a lot of research‖ and had ―a lot of base data in order to 
reach conclusions‖ regarding CBLA.  At the time of Wyatt‘s trial, CBLA appeared 
to be an accepted science.  During the evidentiary hearings, forensic metallurgist 
William Tobin testified that his own ―pioneering research‖ uncovering the flaws in 
CBLA did not begin until 1999 and that he did not publish his first study on the 
subject until 2004 or 2005.  Tobin further acknowledged that CBLA had been used 
in courts for forty years, that the FBI was the only laboratory that routinely offered 
such bullet lead comparisons, and that prior to 1991, CBLA was admitted in an 
overwhelming majority of cases and generally accepted by courts.  However, 
Tobin‘s current research reflected that the FBI never conducted any meaningful or 
comprehensive studies of the underlying assumptions used in the practice of CBLA 
and that the comparative aspect of the science was never wholly subjected to peer 
review.  Along similar lines, Dr. Spiegelman testified that when compiling data for 
 
- 25 - 
the 2004 NRC report, the FBI presented no comprehensive or meaningful research 
studies to establish the underlying premise of CBLA.   
Based on the evidentiary hearing testimony, it is arguable that Agent Riley‘s 
testimony to the effect that the FBI had ―a lot of base data‖ and had performed ―a 
lot of research‖ may have been false at the time of trial.  Yet, even if we were to 
assume that Agent Riley‘s testimony in this regard were false, the postconviction 
court properly found that Wyatt presented no evidence that the prosecutor had 
knowledge of these alleged falsehoods.  As Wyatt‘s own experts indicated, 
research uncovering flaws in CBLA did not surface until well after Wyatt‘s trial.  
Thus, Wyatt has failed to satisfy the second prong of Giglio, and we therefore deny 
relief on this claim. 
Brady Claim 
Next, Wyatt argues that the State suppressed favorable evidence in violation 
of Brady.  Specifically, Wyatt contends that the State failed to disclose that the 
CBLA technique to which Agent Riley testified at trial was unscientific and 
unsound and that there was a lack of comprehensive research necessary to ensure 
the reliability of CBLA results.   
To meet the requirements of Brady, Wyatt must show that (1) favorable 
evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant 
 
- 26 - 
was prejudiced.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also 
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, the 
defendant must demonstrate ―a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would 
have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial.‖  Smith v. 
State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 296).  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.  See Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.   
There is no question the 2008 letter and research showing that Agent Riley‘s 
testimony regarding the bullet match cannot be supported by science are favorable.  
This claim fails, however, because Wyatt has not satisfied the second prong of 
Brady.  Wyatt‘s own experts testified that neither the 2008 letter nor any 
comprehensive research uncovering the flaws in CBLA existed until well after 
Wyatt‘s trial in 1991.  Accordingly, the State could not have willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed such information.  See Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 
998 n.10 (Fla. 2006) (―The State could not suppress information that was not 
available.‖); Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 235 (Fla. 2005) (concluding that 
because favorable information contained within a report did not exist until after 
defendant‘s trial, defendant ―fail[ed] to establish that the State ‗either willfully or 
inadvertently‘ suppressed the information‖).  We therefore affirm the 
postconviction court‘s denial of relief on this claim. 
 
- 27 - 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
In his final CBLA claim, Wyatt contends that counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to challenge the faulty premise underlying Agent Riley‘s 
CBLA testimony to the extent that counsel could have known that CBLA was 
―junk science.‖  Following the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Strickland, this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to 
be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546 (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 
932 (Fla. 1986)).  We deny this claim because Wyatt has failed to establish that 
counsel was deficient.   
At the 2007 evidentiary hearing, defense attorney Diamond Litty testified 
that prior to Wyatt‘s trial, the defense retained Dr. Raymond Hart, a metallurgist, 
to review the FBI‘s analysis of the bullet lead in this case.  Litty explained that 
because Dr. Hart did not render an opinion favorable to the defense, counsel chose 
not to proffer his testimony at trial.  Further, as previously stated, Wyatt‘s own 
experts testified that comprehensive research uncovering the flaws in CBLA did 
not exist until well after Wyatt‘s trial.  Accordingly, Wyatt has failed to meet the 
 
- 28 - 
first prong of the Strickland standard.  See Smith, 931 So. 2d at 801 (denying 
defendant‘s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge an FBI 
expert‘s testimony regarding CBLA under the first prong of Strickland where 
counsel hired an expert to examine the CBLA evidence in order to challenge it, the 
expert found no problems with the FBI analysis, and defendant‘s own expert 
admitted at the postconviction hearing that no research, including the expert‘s own 
research, was available to challenge the FBI evidence at retrial). 
Claims Regarding State Witness Patrick McCoombs 
Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
 
With regard to Patrick McCoombs, a key State witness at trial, Wyatt 
contends that newly discovered evidence shows that McCoombs fabricated his 
testimony on the stand and that if the jury was aware of this information, it would 
probably have acquitted him or he would probably have received a lesser sentence.  
While the parties and postconviction court use the word ―recantation‖ in discussing 
this claim, Wyatt is not raising an actual recantation claim because McCoombs 
testified during the evidentiary hearing that he was not recanting his trial 
testimony.  Instead, Wyatt is asserting that new evidence demonstrates that 
McCoombs fabricated his trial testimony and that this evidence would be 
admissible in a retrial to impeach McCoombs‘ original trial testimony.  In support 
of his claim, Wyatt relies principally upon the perpetuated testimony of inmates 
 
- 29 - 
Scott Rollins and Dennis Morrison, as well as the affidavit of inmate Emilio 
Bravo,15 all of whom asserted that McCoombs allegedly admitted that his trial 
testimony against Wyatt was ―significantly untruthful‖ while he was serving a 
prison sentence at ADX Florence, a federal maximum security prison in Colorado. 
During trial, McCoombs provided incriminating testimony against Wyatt.  
He testified that he was housed in the Greenville County Jail in South Carolina 
from mid-March to mid-May of 1989, and that during this time period, he was in 
the cell next to Wyatt prior to Wyatt‘s extradition to Florida.  During the course of 
numerous conversations the two men shared, Wyatt relayed to McCoombs intimate 
details about the Domino‘s robbery and murders.  Specifically, Wyatt reported to 
McCoombs that he had committed a crime at a pizza restaurant in Vero Beach with 
an individual named Michael Lovette, whom McCoombs had never met.  Wyatt 
informed McCoombs that after shooting the manager, who had begged for his life, 
Wyatt told the others that they ―were dead‖ because he could not leave any 
witnesses.  According to Wyatt, the woman began to cry and ―the Cuban‖ started 
                                         
 
15.  When the parties attempted to perpetuate the deposition testimony of 
Bravo, Bravo refused to submit to cross-examination.  As a result, Bravo‘s 
testimony was not offered at the evidentiary hearing, and only his affidavit was 
available.  The postconviction court accepted the defense‘s argument that Bravo‘s 
affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence, but ruled that the affidavit would 
not constitute substantive evidence because it was inadmissible hearsay and Bravo 
was never declared to be ―unavailable‖ under section 90.804(1), Florida Statutes 
(2009).  We agree with this ruling. 
 
- 30 - 
praying.  Because Wyatt did not want to hear the woman crying, he shot her in the 
head.  Wyatt also stuck the gun in ―the Cuban‘s‖ ear and said something to the 
effect of ―[l]isten real close because you are going to hear it coming.‖  Wyatt then 
shot ―the Cuban‖ in the ear, but because the shot was not fatal, Wyatt shot him 
again in the head.  According to McCoombs, Lovette was at the front counter 
wearing ―the Cuban‘s‖ Domino‘s shirt while the shootings occurred. 
At the 2007 evidentiary hearing, through their perpetuated testimony, 
inmates Rollins and Morrison both testified that McCoombs admitted that his trial 
testimony was untruthful.  However, when pressed for specifics, Rollins could not 
recall any of the details regarding what McCoombs said, other than that it had 
something to do with the police requesting McCoombs to find out certain 
information about guns and advising McCoombs that if Wyatt did not discuss this 
matter, McCoombs should say that he heard Wyatt admit to statements about guns.  
According to Morrison, McCoombs admitted that Wyatt did not confess and that 
McCoombs had received the information to which he testified at trial from the 
police.  Morrison also stated McCoombs reported to him that the police wanted 
Wyatt to discuss the location of a gun, which the police already possessed, and told 
McCoombs that he should testify that Wyatt did reveal this fact, even if he did not.  
During the hearing, McCoombs denied that he had lied at trial. 
The postconviction court reviewed all of the testimony and found that 
 
- 31 - 
McCoombs‘ testimony at the evidentiary hearing was more credible than the 
testimony of Rollins and Morrison.  Of particular importance to the postconviction 
court, McCoombs‘ trial testimony included statements that were consistent with, 
and corroborated by, other trial testimony and evidence, including: the Domino‘s 
employees were taken to the bathroom during the robbery; Wyatt pistol-whipped 
the restaurant‘s manager before killing him; Matthew Bornoosh had been shot with 
a gun that was placed inside his ear; Wyatt had stolen a car in Madeira Beach, 
Florida; and Wyatt used two types of bullets to kill the victims.  Wyatt attempted 
to prove that McCoombs learned about this information from other sources 
because Wyatt allegedly shared legal documents with McCoombs while they were 
housed together.  However, as the postconviction court noted, Wyatt did not prove 
a source for McCoombs‘ knowledge other than Wyatt sharing the information 
himself because the only discovery document Wyatt may have had at the time both 
men were housed in the Greenville facility was the State‘s extradition affidavit, 
which did not contain the facts to which McCoombs testified at trial.  Moreover, 
these facts had not been released to the media. 
When ―evaluating a trial court‘s order, ‗this Court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court on . . . the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight to be given to the evidence,‘ provided its order is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.‖  Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 709 (Fla. 2007) (quoting  
 
- 32 - 
Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001)).  Under this standard, this Court is 
―highly deferential to the trial court‘s judgment on the issue of credibility.‖  Archer 
v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1196 (Fla. 2006).  This is because ―the trial judge is 
there and has a superior vantage point to see and hear the witnesses presenting the 
conflicting testimony.‖  State v. Spaziano, 692 So. 2d 174, 178 (Fla. 1997).  Here, 
the postconviction court denied relief, holding that McCoombs‘ testimony was 
more credible than the inmates‘ testimony and was consistent with the record.  The 
record provides competent, substantial evidence supporting the postconviction 
court‘s findings.  In fact, it is unclear whether the statements made by Rollins and 
Morrison concerning the gun would have any relevance to this case because no 
murder weapon was ever found or presented at trial.  Their statements would be 
inadmissible during retrial as substantive evidence, and even if admitted to 
impeach McCoombs, they would do little to refute facts conclusively established 
by the record due to their lack of detail, and their testimony would not weaken the 
evidence of Wyatt‘s role in this crime.  Thus, we affirm the postconviction court‘s 
ruling on this claim.16 
                                         
 
16.  As a corollary claim, Wyatt contends that McCoombs could be 
impeached at retrial with his evidentiary-hearing testimony in which he gave 
inconsistent responses when questioned about why he wrote his 2002 recantation 
letter, which he later withdrew.  However, the postconviction court found 
McCoombs‘ testimony to be credible and that he did not recant his trial testimony 
but merely made veiled threats of recantation to call attention to the harsh 
 
- 33 - 
Undisclosed Federal Sentence Reduction Agreement 
Wyatt also contends that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose 
evidence of an agreement it made with McCoombs that in exchange for testifying, 
McCoombs would receive mitigation of his federal sentence.  Wyatt further alleges 
that McCoombs‘ testimony at trial that he was not receiving any benefit was false, 
and, by failing to correct this testimony, the State violated Giglio.  The 
postconviction court denied these interrelated claims, finding that Wyatt presented 
no evidence to refute the testimony of McCoombs and State prosecutor David 
Morgan that at the time of the Wyatt trials in 1991, an agreement for sentence 
mitigation did not exist.  A review of the record supports the postconviction court‘s 
findings, and we affirm the court‘s denial of these claims. 
At the time of Wyatt‘s trial on the Domino‘s murder counts in 1991, 
McCoombs was serving a federal sentence for his role in a South Carolina armed 
bank robbery.  When called as a State witness, McCoombs testified that neither the 
State nor the federal government promised him anything in exchange for his 
testimony.  McCoombs specifically stated that because he was in federal, and not 
State, custody, he did not believe any type of assistance from Florida officials 
would be possible and that his federal sentence was fixed pursuant to federal 
                                                                                                                                   
conditions of confinement eleven years after he was a government witness at 
Wyatt‘s trial.  These findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
 
- 34 - 
guidelines.  Moreover, McCoombs never asked the State for a reduction in the 
sentence he was currently serving.  On redirect, McCoombs reiterated that he had 
nothing to gain by testifying, was not promised anything in exchange for testifying, 
that his sentence had not been altered, and only noted that he was supposed to be 
placed in the witness protection program within the federal prison system.   
Likewise, at the evidentiary hearing, prosecutor Morgan testified that 
McCoombs had never requested anything in return for his testimony except for 
protection because he was concerned that Wyatt would use inside contacts to ―get 
at him.‖  Morgan only promised McCoombs that he would do his best to ensure 
that authorities were made aware that McCoombs should be properly protected.  
On February 12, 1992, prosecutor Morgan wrote a letter to federal authorities 
stating that McCoombs had assisted the State in Wyatt‘s cases and recommending 
sentence mitigation for McCoombs.  However, this was not based on any prior 
agreement.  An Assistant United States Attorney in South Carolina subsequently 
filed a motion for a reduction in McCoombs‘ federal sentence based on this letter.  
The federal court ultimately granted the motion and reduced McCoombs‘ sentence 
by around twenty months.   
The first prong of Brady requires Wyatt to demonstrate that ―the State 
possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or 
impeaching.‖  Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003).  While this Court 
 
- 35 - 
has previously held that evidence that a witness is receiving a benefit in exchange 
for testifying could be subject to a Brady challenge, see Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 
508-09, and Morgan did testify that he sent a letter to federal authorities 
recommending sentence mitigation, there was no evidence that a deal was in fact 
made, as the postconviction court correctly found. 
Wyatt asserts that the lack of a ―smoking gun document‖ evidencing such an 
agreement is not dispositive of this claim.  However, there is no record evidence 
that the prosecutor‘s post-trial letter to the federal government demonstrated proof 
of a pretrial agreement of assistance in exchange for McCoombs‘ trial testimony.  
Wyatt has failed to meet his burden of showing there was, in fact, an agreement 
and thus the existence of evidence to withhold, and we therefore deny his Brady 
claim.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1115-16 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting 
defendant‘s Brady claim that State suppressed information regarding a deal that 
State witness would receive gain time for his sentence in exchange for testifying 
because even though State did in fact write a letter on witness‘s behalf, there was 
no evidence that an agreement between the witness and the State was made). 
 
Wyatt‘s Giglio claim suffers from the same problem.  Giglio requires Wyatt 
to demonstrate that ―the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony.‖  
Green, 975 So. 2d at 1106.  Because the record is devoid of evidence to support his 
contention that Morgan‘s letter or post-trial assistance rendered McCoombs‘ trial 
 
- 36 - 
testimony false or misleading in any way, Wyatt has failed to demonstrate that he 
is entitled to relief under Giglio.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 580 (Fla. 
2008) (denying defendant‘s Giglio claim because ample evidence in the record 
supported the trial court‘s finding that no promise of leniency in exchange for 
favorable testimony between the State and a key trial witness existed, and that, 
therefore, witness‘s testimony denying that any promise had been made was not 
false).17 
Penalty Phase Ineffectiveness 
In his next claim, Wyatt contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence for the penalty phase.  
He first alleges that his waiver of mitigation was invalid because defense counsel 
failed to conduct an adequate penalty-phase investigation into Wyatt‘s social 
history, which would have unearthed substantial mitigating evidence relating to 
                                         
 
17.  Wyatt similarly contends that the State‘s post-trial assistance to 
McCoombs in the years following his trial (i.e., through phone calls, letters, and 
public-records assistance) evidences proof of a pretrial, clandestine ―quid pro quo‖ 
agreement that the State failed to disclose in violation of Brady and rendered 
McCoombs‘ trial testimony false in violation of Giglio.  Wyatt supports these 
claims only with speculation, and we therefore deny relief.  See Maharaj v. State, 
778 So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000) (―Postconviction relief cannot be based on 
speculation or possibility.‖).  In addition, to the extent that Wyatt asserts that the 
State‘s misconduct in this case precluded him from effectively cross-examining a  
key State witness or presenting a defense, Wyatt has failed to fully brief and argue 
these points, and he has therefore waived them for the purposes of this appeal.  See 
Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla. 1997) (―Coolen‘s failure to fully 
brief and argue these points constitutes a waiver of these claims.‖). 
 
- 37 - 
Wyatt‘s troubled childhood, and hence, counsel could not advise him regarding the 
ramifications of waiving mitigation.  Wyatt also asserts that trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate and present the testimony of a mental-health expert, and 
further, that counsel failed to proffer to the trial court mitigating evidence 
regarding his mental health in light of his waiver of mitigation. 
Waiver of Mitigation and Counsel’s Failure to Proffer Evidence 
We review this claim in the context of Wyatt‘s waiver of mitigation at trial.  
As this Court found on direct appeal, ―Wyatt instructed his counsel throughout the 
trial that he did not want any witnesses called in mitigation,‖ and ―the record [was] 
clear that Wyatt effectively waived presentation of mitigating evidence.‖  Wyatt, 
641 So. 2d at 1340.  Wyatt contends as a threshold matter that trial counsel were 
ineffective because they failed to proffer all available mitigation prior to Wyatt‘s 
waiver in violation of this Court‘s holding in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 
1993).  In Koon, this Court outlined the proper procedure by which trial courts 
must abide when a defendant waives the presentation of mitigating evidence: 
[C]ounsel must inform the court on the record of the defendant‘s 
decision.  Counsel must indicate whether, based on his investigation, 
he reasonably believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be 
presented and what that evidence would be.  The court should then 
require the defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has 
discussed these matters with him, and despite counsel‘s 
recommendation, he wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase 
evidence. 
 
Id. at 250.  ―The underlying purpose for this framework is to protect against ‗the 
 
- 38 - 
problems inherent in a trial record that does not adequately reflect a defendant‘s 
waiver of his right to present any mitigating evidence.‘ ‖  Waterhouse v. State, 792 
So. 2d 1176, 1184 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Koon, 619 So. 2d at 250).  However, this 
Court‘s decision in Koon was issued more than two years after Wyatt‘s January 
1991 penalty phase, and the Koon decision applied only prospectively.  See Allen 
v. State, 662 So. 2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1995).  Thus, ―[t]rial counsel cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to foresee Koon.‖  Anderson v. State, 822 So. 2d 1261, 1268 
(Fla. 2002). 
 
Regardless of Koon‘s applicability, the record reflects that during several 
exchanges in which Wyatt informed the trial court of his decision to waive 
mitigation, defense counsel noted on the record that Wyatt‘s mother and sister 
could be used to establish mitigation relating to Wyatt‘s upbringing and abusive 
childhood.  Defense attorney Ernon Sidaway also explained that he was aware of, 
and would have available, family members and non-family members who could 
testify as to possible mitigation.  Later, at Wyatt‘s sentencing hearing, defense 
counsel acknowledged that he caused subpoenas to be issued for several witnesses 
for the sake of penalty-phase testimony, but those witnesses did not appear in light 
of Wyatt‘s specific instructions.  The record also shows that the trial court did 
engage in several on-the-record colloquies with Wyatt to ensure that his decision to 
waive mitigation was knowing and voluntary.  In addition, prior to the penalty 
 
- 39 - 
phase, Wyatt signed an express waiver of five statutory mitigating circumstances.  
Thus, the purpose sought by the Koon decision was essentially accomplished in 
this case, and Wyatt is not entitled to relief. 
Investigation into Wyatt’s Personal and Family Life 
Wyatt argues that penalty-phase counsel failed to conduct a reasonable 
investigation into certain aspects of Wyatt‘s personal and family life (i.e., his social 
history), which would have unearthed substantial mitigating evidence that could 
have been presented at trial.  He contends that this error rendered his waiver of 
mitigation invalid.  In support, Wyatt relies principally on the evidentiary-hearing 
testimony of Dr. Faye Sultan, a clinical psychologist, who spoke to several of 
Wyatt‘s family members and a family friend, all of whom reported that Wyatt had 
a troubled childhood characterized by physical and emotional abuse at the hands of 
his father and stepfather, a mentally ill mother who was neglectful and diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, and a drug and alcohol abuse problem beginning in middle 
school and that he suffered sexual abuse at the hands of an elementary school 
teacher.   
This Court‘s precedent establishes that ―a defendant may waive the 
presentation of mitigation evidence so long as [his or] her waiver is knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently made.‖  State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 204 (Fla. 
2008).  However, the Court has also ―recognized that a defendant‘s waiver of his 
 
- 40 - 
right to present mitigation does not relieve trial counsel of the duty to investigate 
and ensure that the defendant‘s decision is fully informed.‖  Grim v. State, 971 So. 
2d 85, 100 (Fla. 2007).  As explained in State v. Pearce, 994 So. 2d 1094, 1102 
(Fla. 2008), irrespective of a defendant‘s waiver of mitigation, 
an attorney‘s obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty 
portion of a capital case cannot be overstated because this is an 
integral part of a capital case.  See State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 
1113 (Fla. 2002) (citing Rose [v. State], 675 So. 2d 567 [(Fla. 1996)] 
(holding that an attorney‘s failure to conduct a reasonable 
investigation for possible mitigating evidence may render counsel‘s 
assistance ineffective)).  Although a defendant may waive mitigation, 
he should not do so blindly.  Counsel must first investigate and advise 
the defendant so that the defendant reasonably understands what is 
being waived and reasonably understands the ramifications of a 
waiver.  The defendant must be able to make an informed, intelligent 
decision. 
 
Consistent with Pearce, Wyatt contends that trial counsel did not adequately 
investigate possible mitigating evidence regarding Wyatt‘s personal and family life 
during childhood and adolescence and that counsel failed to apprise him of such 
evidence, the results of which rendered his waiver of mitigation invalid.  
 
 The record in this case demonstrates that contrary to Wyatt‘s contention, 
counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into Wyatt‘s personal history and 
family life and informed him of the results of that investigation before Wyatt 
decided to waive the presentation of mitigation.  Both Sidaway and Litty testified 
at a hearing during the trial proceedings that despite their client‘s wishes, they still 
continued to develop mitigation by retaining an investigator and traveling to North 
 
- 41 - 
and South Carolina to interview Wyatt‘s family members, non-family members, 
and neighbors.  Sidaway and Litty were aware of potentially helpful mitigation 
regarding Wyatt‘s personal and family life, did in fact obtain and review relevant 
records, were prepared to present at least twelve witnesses in mitigation, and had 
subpoenas issued, but not delivered, for the witnesses who had been notified that 
they might be called to testify.  At the 2007 evidentiary hearing, Litty confirmed 
that throughout her investigation into Wyatt‘s childhood for potential mitigation, 
she would present her findings to Wyatt as potential mitigation, but Wyatt refused 
to allow her to offer it even after she tried to persuade him.  We conclude that 
defense counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into Wyatt‘s personal and 
family life prior to his decision to waive mitigation and that Wyatt‘s waiver was 
not rendered invalid.  We therefore affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of this 
claim. 
Failure to Investigate and Present Evidence of Brain Impairment 
Lastly, Wyatt argues that defense counsel failed to secure a complete 
neuropsychological evaluation that would have led to the discovery of brain 
impairment.  In support, he cites at length to the postconviction testimony of Dr. 
Ernest Bordini who Wyatt asserts testified that Wyatt suffered from frontal lobe 
impairment.  The postconviction court denied this claim, finding that Wyatt cited 
no authority entitling him to the appointment of a neuropsychologist after having 
 
- 42 - 
first been appointed a psychologist and a neurologist.  Based on the facts of this 
case, we agree. 
 
During the 2007 evidentiary hearing, Litty testified that the defense retained 
Dr. Sheldon Rifkin, a psychologist well known in the legal community, to conduct 
a psychological evaluation of Wyatt.  Litty further testified that in examining 
Wyatt, Dr. Rifkin conducted a battery of psychological tests, the results of which 
led Dr. Rifkin to opine that Wyatt was sane and competent to stand trial.  Litty 
explained that Dr. Rifkin did not find any evidence of a closed-head injury.  
Following the issuance of his initial report, Dr. Rifkin requested from Litty 
additional medical records regarding a motorcycle accident in which Wyatt was 
involved years prior to the murders to rule out closed-head injury.  Upon receipt of 
those records, Dr. Rifkin concluded that he could not find evidence of any kind of 
brain damage resulting from the motorcycle accident.  Litty testified that she 
reviewed Dr. Rifkin‘s evaluation with Wyatt.  Despite Dr. Rifkin‘s findings, Litty 
retained a neurologist, Dr. David MacMillan, to conduct a neurological 
examination on Wyatt.  However, like Dr. Rifkin, Dr. MacMillan did not find any 
evidence of head injury or any other information that the defense could have used 
for mitigation purposes.  Litty finally explained that an MRI conducted after 
Wyatt‘s trial on the Domino‘s murder counts but before Wyatt‘s trial for the 
Nydegger murder revealed no objective signs of brain damage or mental injury or 
 
- 43 - 
disorder.  In connection with the postconviction proceedings, Wyatt offered the 
testimony of Dr. Bordini, a neuropsychologist, who interviewed and administered 
standard neuropsychological tests to Wyatt.  Dr. Bordini saw a ―pattern of frontal 
lobe difficulties‖ including ―some mild frontal lobe difficulties in planning, 
inhibition, [and] sequencing‖ and opined that frontal lobe damage most likely 
occurred as the result of a motorcycle accident in 1984. 
 
 In cases with facts similar to those that are presented here, ―[t]his Court has 
established that defense counsel is entitled to rely on the evaluations conducted by 
qualified mental health experts, even if, in retrospect, those evaluations may not 
have been as complete as others may desire.‖  Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 918 
(Fla. 2009) (quoting Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377-78 (Fla. 2007)); see also 
Stewart v. State, 37 So. 3d 243, 251-52 (Fla. 2010).  Similar to Reese, Stewart, and 
Darling, where this Court affirmed the denial of ineffective assistance claims based 
on counsel‘s failure to obtain neuropsychological testing, defense counsel in this 
case relied on the opinions of two mental health experts.  Dr. Rifkin suggested that 
Wyatt be evaluated by a neurologist, Dr. MacMillan, and defense counsel followed 
that suggestion.  Neither Dr. Rifkin nor Dr. MacMillan found any evidence of 
brain damage or head injury, and Wyatt did not establish that any mental health 
expert had recommended to defense counsel that Wyatt undergo 
neuropsychological testing.  Further, an MRI conducted after Wyatt‘s first trial but 
 
- 44 - 
before his second trial in the Nydegger case revealed no objective signs of brain 
damage, mental injury, or disorder.  ―A fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
Even if the evaluations by Drs. Rifkin and MacMillan were somehow incomplete 
or inadequate when compared to the opinion of others, such as Dr. Bordini‘s, 
defense counsel cannot be rendered ineffective for relying on the expert 
evaluations conducted by Drs. Rifkin and MacMillan at the time.  That is, Wyatt 
―did not prove that a reasonable trial attorney should have known to not rely on the 
conclusions offered by the mental health experts who evaluated him.  Thus, he did 
not prove that his counsel was deficient.‖  Stewart, 37 So. 3d at 253. 
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of relief on these 
claims. 
Restriction on Right of Access to Public Records 
Without resorting to any case law for support, Wyatt essentially argues that 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 and section 27.2081, Florida Statutes 
(2006),18 unconstitutionally restrict his right to public-records access under the 
                                         
 
18.  Wyatt alleges that section 119.19, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional.  
However, section 119.19 was renumbered as section 27.2081, Florida Statutes, on 
October 1, 2005.  See ch. 2005-251, § 39, Laws of Fla. 
 
- 45 - 
Florida and United States Constitutions because both provisions impermissibly 
mandate that his demand for public records not be ―overly broad or unduly 
burdensome‖ and that he make his own search for records.  We disagree. 
Section 27.7081 and rule 3.852 pertain only to the production of records for 
capital postconviction defendants.  See § 27.7081(13), Fla. Stat. (2009); Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.852(a)(1).  These provisions do not prevent a capital defendant from 
making postconviction public records requests.  In fact, upon the issuance of this 
Court‘s mandate, records relating to a capital defendant‘s case are automatically 
required to be delivered to the postconviction repository.  § 27.7081(7)(b)(1), (3), 
Fla. Stat. (2009); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(g)(3)(A), (D).  Should the agency 
receiving an additional request object to that request, a hearing will be conducted, 
during which the agency will advise the defendant as to why it cannot comply and 
what narrowing information would be required in order to comply with such a 
request.  See Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002) (―When a capital 
defendant claims that a state agency is withholding pertinent public records, the 
trial court should hold a hearing regarding such claims.‖).  This Court has 
―consistently held that a defendant must plead with specificity the outstanding 
public records he seeks to obtain.‖  Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1273 (Fla. 
2005).  As the Court has acknowledged, ―rule 3.852 ‗is not intended to be a 
procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable 
 
- 46 - 
claim for postconviction relief.‘ ‖  Moore, 820 So. 2d at 204 (quoting Glock v. 
Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 2001)).  Likewise, section 27.7081 provides for 
nearly identical methods of access to public records in capital postconviction cases.  
Requiring that a capital defendant‘s additional request be timely made after a 
diligent search and that this request not be overly broad or unduly burdensome 
places a reasonable restriction on access to these records.  See Allen v. 
Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 66 (Fla. 2000) (―[T]he Legislature has the prerogative 
to place reasonable restrictions on the right of public records access . . . .‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  This is because a capital defendant‘s additional request 
follows the State agencies‘ initial delivery to the repository.  We conclude the 
requirement that a defendant make a diligent search through records already 
produced and narrow his or her request to provide adequate notice to the agency 
from which he or she seeks information is reasonable in the context of capital 
postconviction claims. 
With respect to Wyatt‘s as-applied challenge to section 27.7081 and rule 
3.852, he has not alleged any particular records that were sought but denied under 
either provision in his case.  Accordingly, Wyatt‘s facial and as-applied 
constitutional challenges to both provisions lack merit.19 
                                         
 
19.  Wyatt also alleges that both provisions infringe upon his federal 
constitutional rights, but he has not cited any authority demonstrating a federal 
right to public-records access.  Wyatt further argues that both provisions violate the 
 
- 47 - 
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
In his final postconviction claim, Wyatt challenges the constitutionality of 
Florida‘s death penalty statute and claims that both electrocution and lethal 
injection violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution for preservation purposes only.  We deny relief because the Court has 
consistently rejected these claims, and Wyatt has not made any additional 
allegations that would call into question the State‘s current methods of execution.  
See, e.g., Stewart, 37 So. 3d at 262 (holding that Florida‘s current lethal injection 
protocol is constitutional); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1080-82 (Fla. 
2008) (upholding the constitutionality of Florida‘s capital-sentencing scheme and 
lethal-injection protocol); Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 441 (Fla. 2005) (denying 
defendant‘s claim that Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme violates due process 
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment on its face and as applied because the 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed and upheld Florida‘s death 
penalty statute). 
II.  HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
In his habeas corpus petition, Wyatt argues that certain omissions by his 
appellate counsel on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate 
                                                                                                                                   
separation of powers, but this claim was insufficiently pled and therefore waived 
for the purposes of appeal. 
 
- 48 - 
counsel.20  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 
213 (Fla. 2009).  To grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel, this Court must resolve the following two issues: 
[W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 
So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986)).  Under this standard, ―[t]he defendant has the burden 
of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 
                                         
20.  Wyatt also argues that this Court failed to conduct a constitutionally 
adequate harmless-error analysis on direct appeal and that the HAC and CCP 
aggravators, and their respective instructions, are unconstitutional.  We reject these 
claims because ―habeas corpus petitions are not to be used for additional appeals 
on questions which could have been, should have been, or were raised on appeal or 
in a rule 3.850 motion.‖  Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100, 105 (Fla. 1994) 
(quoting Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989)).   
We also reject Wyatt‘s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to assert that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional 
because this Court has on numerous occasions rejected similar constitutional 
challenges to rule 4-3.5(d)(4), and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to raise a nonmeritorious claim.  See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 
459 (Fla. 2009) (rejecting claim that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) violated due process rights as 
well as the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Power v. State, 886 
So. 2d 952, 957 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting contention that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) violated 
defendant‘s right of access to courts under Article I, Section 21, of the Florida 
Constitution). 
 
- 49 - 
520 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000)).  
Importantly, ―[i]f a legal issue would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate 
counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel‘s performance 
ineffective.‖  Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1175-76 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000)). 
Record on Appeal 
Wyatt first argues that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance due 
to an incomplete record on direct appeal.  He contends that ―critical portions of the 
record were missing‖ and specifically refers to an instance where the jury 
questioned the court during deliberations, the lack of a penalty-phase charge 
conference, and off-the-record ―instructions‖ that occurred at record pages 3616, 
3617, and 3618.  Wyatt asserts that in light of these alleged omissions, appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that a proper record was provided to 
this Court.  The record directly refutes this claim.  
In December 1992, appellate counsel filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction 
for reconstruction of two portions of the record alleged to be missing: the penalty-
phase charge conference and the circumstances under which the jury‘s guilt-phase 
deliberation question was answered.  At the August 1993 relinquishment hearing, 
there was first a discussion regarding the question posed by the jury during the 
 
- 50 - 
guilt-phase deliberations.  The prosecutor recalled that during deliberations, the 
trial court received a note from the jury and showed it to both counsel for the State 
and counsel for Wyatt.  The trial court ordered the jury to rely on the instructions, 
and there were no objections.  As to the discussion of the penalty-phase charge 
conference, the trial court found that the record on appeal spoke for itself, that it 
coincided with the court‘s recollections, and that this Court could take the record 
on appeal as ―settled record.‖  Upon review of the record, the trial court found that 
there was a sufficient discussion of the penalty-phase instructions, that the standard 
jury instructions were used, absent the mitigators that Wyatt waived, and that the 
trial court did not believe defense counsel raised any specific objections to such 
instructions.  Following this relinquishment hearing, appellate counsel challenged 
the penalty-phase instructions on direct appeal.  This Court held adversely to 
Wyatt, concluding that because defense counsel did not object to these instructions, 
this issue was not preserved.  See Wyatt, 641 So. 2d at 1341. 
Wyatt has failed to establish that appellate counsel was deficient in any 
regard since counsel filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction to reconstruct portions 
of the record alleged to have been missing and actually challenged the penalty-
phase instructions on appeal.  Even if appellate counsel were deficient, Wyatt 
cannot establish prejudice because he has failed to demonstrate how the record on 
appeal remained incomplete following the reconstruction hearing or to link a 
 
- 51 - 
meritorious appellate claim to the allegedly missing record.  See Henry v. State, 
937 So. 2d 563, 577 (Fla. 2006) (―Therefore, without any specificity as to how 
Henry has been prejudiced by the omissions in the record, denial of this claim is 
warranted under the applicable law.‖); Armstrong v. State, 862 So. 2d 705, 721 
(Fla. 2003) (―Armstrong has failed to link a meritorious appellate issue to the 
allegedly missing record and thus cannot establish that he was prejudiced by its 
absence.‖).  Therefore, Wyatt is not entitled to relief on this claim.21  
Motion for Mistrial during Voir Dire 
Wyatt next contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the trial court‘s denial of a motion for mistrial made during voir dire.  In 
particular, Wyatt claims that the trial court‘s commentary caused the venire to 
believe that a penalty-phase proceeding would be inevitable, resulting in error that 
warranted mistrial.  This claim is without merit. 
When placed in context, Wyatt cites the following commentary made by the 
trial judge during voir dire as the basis for this claim: 
THE COURT:  . . .  Again, members of the jury and of the jury panel, 
upon a finding of guilty in the guilt phase of this case of first-degree 
                                         
21.  To the extent Wyatt argues that this Court was unable to review the 
complete record on appeal or satisfy its obligations under Delap v. State, 350 
So. 2d 462, 462-63 (Fla. 1977), this substantive claim is procedurally barred 
because it could have been raised on direct appeal.  See Green, 975 So. 2d at 1115.  
It is also without merit since Wyatt has failed to show that portions of the record 
were missing, and if so, the specific prejudice he incurred in light of those alleged 
omissions.  See Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 163 (Fla. 2002). 
 
- 52 - 
murder or of—that is premeditated murder or felony murder, we then 
go into a phase called penalty. 
 
It‘s a separate proceeding in which each side can present 
testimony, argument, or whatever.  At the end of that, I will give you 
certain criteria that you are to use in determining your 
recommendation to the Court on whether you should recommend to 
the Court either the death penalty or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for twenty-five years. 
 
Those include certain aggravating circumstances and certain 
mitigating circumstances, which I will not go into now.  Suffice it to 
say, will you all agree if we reach that stage—I‘m not saying that we 
will, but if we reach that stage, will you all agree that you will be 
bound by the instructions of this Court—on reaching that stage, that 
you will be bound by the instructions of this Court in determining 
your recommendation to the Court? 
 
Will you all agree to do that? 
 
I think that ends it. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Immediately thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
which the trial court denied.   
 
Even if appellate counsel had raised the trial court‘s denial of Wyatt‘s 
motion for mistrial as an issue on direct appeal, it would have been meritless.  This 
Court reviews a trial court‘s ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 371 (Fla. 2008).  In this case, 
the trial court‘s statements did not impermissibly lead the potential jury into 
believing that a penalty phase would be inevitable in light of Wyatt‘s guilt.  
Although the trial court mentioned that the trial would proceed to a penalty phase, 
it prefaced that statement by explaining to the jury that a penalty phase would only 
be appropriate upon a finding of guilt.  The trial court then again emphasized that a 
 
- 53 - 
penalty phase was not absolute through its use of conditional language such as ―if 
we reach that stage—I‘m not saying we will, but if we reach that stage.‖  
(Emphasis added.)  Moreover, the trial court‘s commentary about penalty-phase 
procedure was in direct response to, and prompted by, defense counsel questioning 
a prospective juror about factors the jury should consider in not recommending the 
death penalty.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Wyatt‘s motion for mistrial, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
raise this meritless issue on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of relief, 
and we also deny Wyatt‘s habeas petition. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Indian River County,  
Lisa Davidson, Judge – Case No. 88-748CF(CTS 1-3) 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel L. Day and M. 
Chance Meyer, Assistant CCR Counsel, South Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
- 54 - 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
Seth E. Miller and Michael J. Minerva, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of 
Innocence Project of Florida, Inc., and The Innocence Network, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae