Title: State v. Garcia
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1870
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1870 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
TONY GARCIA, 
Respondent. 
 
August 25, 2022 
 
COURIEL, J. 
We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal in Garcia v. State, 279 So. 3d 148, 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), 
which affirmed the Respondent’s conviction for arson but found 
that his due process rights were violated because his sentence may 
have been based, at least in part, on a factor the trial court was not 
permitted to consider:  Garcia’s misconduct while out on bond.1  
Finding that the trial court committed no fundamental error, we 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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quash the Fourth District’s decision to the extent that it requires 
the trial court to resentence the Respondent. 
I 
On June 11, 2014, Tony Garcia’s mortgage lender sent him 
notice that, in a month, his home would be sold at foreclosure.  
Seventeen days later, Garcia’s neighbor saw the house go up in 
flames and called 911.  The State charged Garcia with arson for 
setting fire to the place.  Garcia’s first trial ended in a hung jury, 
and, with his second trial pending, a judge released him on bond. 
As the evidence later heard by the sentencing judge would 
establish, Garcia made a menace of himself while out on bond.  On 
one occasion, while driving with a suspended license, he left the 
scene of a car crash and was arrested.  Another day, shaking and 
crying as he did, Garcia aimed a gun in the face of a neighbor who 
had stopped by Garcia’s house to pick up some tools and have a 
beer; the neighbor did not call the police.  Just two days after that 
episode, the police were summoned to Garcia’s ex-wife’s house, 
where Garcia had gone to retrieve guns from a safe.  They found 
him banging on her door, acting in a manner that to them 
suggested intoxication, mental disturbance, or both.  Garcia 
 
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denounced an officer on the scene with a racial epithet; the officer 
deescalated the situation and gave Garcia a ride home. 
No sooner had Garcia gotten out of the officer’s car than he 
struck up an argument with his neighbor, threatening to shoot him 
and the officer who had driven him home.  The officer, at that point 
having heard enough, took Garcia to a mental health facility and 
sought to have him involuntarily examined under the Baker Act.2  
Not an hour later, Garcia had walked out of the facility and was on 
the street again.  Another officer, having received a tip about 
Garcia’s whereabouts, found him eating chicken wings and drinking 
beer at a local bar and returned him to the mental health facility. 
Learning all this, the trial court expressed its concern for the 
safety of Garcia and of the community and revoked Garcia’s bond.  
He would await retrial on his arson charge in jail.  While there, as 
the trial court would later learn, his threatening conduct continued.  
 
 
2.  Section 394.463, Florida Statutes, allows a law 
enforcement officer to take into custody and deliver to an 
appropriate facility any person displaying specified signs of mental 
illness, including signs that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that 
without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm 
to himself or others in the near future.”  § 394.463(1)(b)(2), Fla. 
Stat. (2014). 
 
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On a call with his ex-wife, Garcia said that he would break his 
daughter-in-law’s neck if he ever saw her again.  On another call, 
he told his ex-wife that he wanted to summon a gang to his 
daughter-in-law’s house but was hesitant to do so knowing they 
would also “take out” his grandson. 
Garcia proceeded to his second trial and was convicted of first-
degree arson.3  The judge ordered a presentence investigation 
report.  The report showed that Garcia had a 12th-grade education; 
that he was unemployed due to disability; that he had a criminal 
history (one conviction for battery and one for the time he drove on 
a suspended license while out on bond); and that his minimum and 
maximum permissible sentences were 34.8 months and 360 
 
 
3.  In both trials, the jury heard evidence about the foreclosure 
of the home and about how the fire may have been started; 
evidence, for example, that firefighters found a leaking propane 
tank in the living room—the valve left open—and gas cylinders lying 
around the kitchen, one of which was in a closed toaster oven.  In 
the second trial, however, the jury also heard that Garcia had given 
up on keeping the home, supported by evidence that he made no 
effort to pay the mortgage.  They also heard from the officer who 
first notified Garcia of the fire.  As the officer entered a local bar 
where he heard he might find Garcia, Garcia raised his hand and 
said, “I’m here,” suggesting Garcia knew that the police would be 
looking for him.  According to the officer, Garcia seemed 
unsurprised when the officer told him there was an “incident” at his 
house. 
 
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months, respectively.  The report concluded that Garcia failed to 
cooperate with the court and the law, and that despite suffering 
from stomach cancer and being confined to a wheelchair, he was a 
threat to himself and society. 
Garcia moved for a downward departure from the lowest 
permissible sentence as calculated under the Criminal Punishment 
Code; he wanted a sentence of probation.  He argued that he was 
severely ill with terminal cancer and required significant medical 
attention to maintain his current state of health.  The State, for its 
part, recommended a sentence of 84 months.  In its sentencing 
submission, it laid out Garcia’s conduct while out on bond, 
including his threats to witnesses, argued that the defendant’s 
conduct had callously endangered the lives of neighbors and first 
responders, and argued Garcia had proffered no evidence that he 
required specialized medical treatment. 
 
The sentencing court conducted the analysis we required in 
Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999), and declined to depart 
from the minimum sentence.  It said: 
I’ve taken into consideration all the evidence, the 
PSI, the state’s argument, the defense’s argument . . . . 
Now, based on all the evidence, the severity of the crime, 
 
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the issues that were testified to, this is [a] very, very sad 
situation all around, it really is.  But even if I could 
depart, I do not believe I should depart and therefore, I’m 
sentencing Mr. Garcia to the 84 months that the state is 
requesting with restitution paid to [the lender], state 
court costs and an adjudication. 
 
 
On direct appeal to the Fourth District, Garcia claimed the 
sentencing court imposed a vindictive sentence.  Garcia, 279 So. 3d 
at 150.  The Fourth District affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
Id. at 151.  It found that the trial court committed fundamental 
error by considering an impermissible sentencing factor—“namely, 
incidents of misconduct occurring after the charged offense.”  Id. at 
150.  The Fourth District held that “although the trial court did not 
impose a vindictive sentence, the State has failed to meet its burden 
to show that the trial court did not impermissibly rely upon 
appellant’s post-arrest misconduct in sentencing him.”  Id. at 151. 
For the proposition that a sentencing court may not consider a 
defendant’s postarrest misconduct, the Fourth District relied on our 
decision in Norvil v. State, 191 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 2016).  Garcia, 279 
So. 3d at 150.4  It noted that “[c]ourts applying Norvil have held that 
 
4.  This case provides no occasion to reconsider Norvil.  For 
one thing, defense counsel in that case preserved an objection to 
the trial court’s consideration of postarrest misconduct.  And, also 
 
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a trial court may not consider subsequent, uncharged misconduct 
when sentencing a defendant for the primary offense.”  Id.  
Declining to find that, as Garcia had argued, the trial court imposed 
a vindictive sentence, the Fourth District nonetheless reversed on 
Garcia’s alternative theory that the trial court committed 
fundamental error when it considered impermissible sentencing 
factors.  It found that the State had failed to sustain what the 
Fourth District characterized as the State’s burden “to show that 
the trial court did not rely on impermissible factors in sentencing,” 
even though “the trial court made no comment indicating that it 
had considered appellant’s subsequent misconduct in imposing 
sentence.”  Id. at 150 (quoting Strong v. State, 254 So. 3d 428, 432 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). 
II 
 
Whether it is fundamental error for a trial judge to consider 
evidence of any postarrest misconduct in fashioning a sentence is a 
pure question of law, which we review de novo.  Cromartie v. State, 
70 So. 3d 559, 563 (Fla. 2011). 
 
unlike this case, that one turned on an interpretation of chapter 
921, Florida Statutes (2010). 
 
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A 
We have maintained a general rule that an appellate court 
should confine parties’ arguments to those raised in the courts 
below.  See Ashford v. State, 274 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1973) (“It is 
well established that this Court will not consider issues not 
presented to the trial court unless fundamental error can be 
shown.”); Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948, 950 (Fla. 1977) (“Except 
where the error is fundamental, an appellate court must confine 
itself to a review of those questions which were before the trial court 
and upon which a ruling adverse to the appealing party was 
made.”).  We have recognized an exception to the general rule, 
however, where the error complained of for the first time on appeal 
is fundamental error.  Ashford, 274 So. 2d at 518; Gibson, 351 So. 
2d at 950. 
Nobody disputes that Garcia failed to preserve his claim for 
review with a contemporaneous objection.  Garcia’s counsel did not 
object to the State’s discussion of his misconduct while on bond at 
all, let alone on the basis that the court impermissibly considered 
Garcia’s postarrest misconduct.  As we have stated previously: 
 
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The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is 
based on practical necessity and basic fairness in the 
operation of a judicial system.  It places the trial judge on 
notice that error may have been committed, and provides 
him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the 
proceedings.  Delay and an unnecessary use of the 
appellate process result from a failure to cure early that 
which must be cured eventually. 
 
Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).  In light of Garcia’s 
failure to preserve the issue, appellate review is conditioned on 
finding that the trial court’s alleged consideration of Garcia’s 
postarrest misconduct constitutes fundamental error. 
In the sentencing context, we have found fundamental error 
very rarely.  For example, courts have found such error where 
courts have imposed an illegal sentence.  See Bain v. State, 730 So. 
2d 296, 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum sentence as an illegal sentence in excess of the statutory 
maximum despite the lack of objection in the lower court); Parks v. 
State, 765 So. 2d 35, 35-36 (Fla. 2000) (holding the defendant’s 
sentence of twelve years’ probation illegal despite the lack of an 
objection because it exceeded the statutory maximum for the third-
degree felonies of which he had been convicted).  We have also 
found fundamental error where a judge implemented an arbitrary 
 
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policy of rounding up sentences, Cromartie, 70 So. 3d at 564; where 
the sentencing guidelines used violated the single subject provision 
of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution, Harvey v. State, 
848 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 2003); and where the court imposed a 
sentence departing upward from the sentencing guidelines but 
failed to give reasons for doing so, Thogode v. State, 763 So. 2d 281, 
281-82 (Fla. 2000). 
This case is different.  The sentencing judge heard argument 
on a motion for downward departure seeking a sentence of 
probation.  In considering the defendant’s amenability to such a 
sentence, the court considered “all the evidence”—admittedly 
including evidence about incidents that it previously considered in 
revoking Garcia’s bond.  Garcia, 279 So. 3d at 150.  The sentencing 
judge gave no indication of having given weight to any arrest or 
charge supported merely by probable cause.5  The court had before 
 
 
5.  The U.S. Supreme Court long ago decided that a 
defendant’s conduct, proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 
may be considered by a sentencing court.  United States v. Watts, 
519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (“[W]e have held that application of the 
preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due 
process.” (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 
(1986) (“Like the court below, we have little difficulty concluding 
that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due 
 
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it, in addition to the evidence that is the subject of this appeal, 
Garcia’s previous conviction for aggravated battery and adjudication 
of guilt for driving with a suspended license.  It had heard, having 
sat through two trials, evidence about the care with which Garcia’s 
home had been primed for combustibility—and thus maximum 
danger to his neighbors and first responders.  It heard from 
Garcia’s ex-wife regarding his medical issues and about the fact 
that she had called the police because of his having made 
 
process.”)), overruled on other grounds in Alleyne v. United States, 
570 U.S. 99 (2013)).  Thus the federal courts of every circuit allow a 
sentencing judge to consider a defendant’s conduct—even if it has 
been the subject of an acquitted charge—as long as the conduct 
itself is established by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Steven 
M. Salky and Blair G. Brown, The Preponderance of Evidence 
Standard at Sentencing, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 907, 913 n.33 (1992) 
(collecting cases); see, e.g., United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 
1452 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Relevant conduct of which a defendant was 
acquitted nonetheless may be taken into account in sentencing for 
the offense of conviction, as long as the government proves the 
acquitted conduct relied upon by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”).  This reliance on facts supported by a preponderance of 
the evidence speaks to why consideration of an arrest, standing 
alone, raises due process concerns: an arrest—again, standing 
alone—is supported only by a determination of probable cause.  
Here, of course, the sentencing court did not consider an arrest of 
Garcia’s on any charge, standing alone; it considered his conduct 
while out on bond, and had indeed made a ruling on evidence 
relating to that conduct in revoking his bond, prior to sentencing. 
 
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intoxicated threats at her door.  In light of all these considerations, 
looking at a sentencing range between 34.8 and 360 months, the 
court reasoned that a sentence of 84 months was appropriate.  We 
cannot say that this determination reflects the trial court’s having 
committed fundamental error on the order of an illegal sentence.  
See Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976) (“We 
recognize that the constitutional parameters of the trial judge’s 
discretion in the area of sentencing are wide indeed.”).  That 
conclusion would fit oddly indeed with settled—and recently 
reaffirmed—federal law.  See Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 
2389, 2398 (2022) (“There is a ‘long’ and ‘durable’ tradition that 
sentencing judges ‘enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information they 
may consider’ at an initial sentencing proceeding.” (citing Dean v. 
United States, 581 U.S. 62, 66 (2017))); Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and since the American 
colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England 
practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a 
wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist 
him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be 
imposed within limits fixed by law.”); United States v. Booker, 543 
 
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U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a 
judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a 
statutory range.”). 
III 
 
Because we do not find fundamental error in Garcia’s 
unpreserved claim, we quash the decision of the Fourth District to 
the extent it requires that the Respondent be resentenced. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, LAWSON, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
While judges are appropriately vested with latitude in the 
discretion used to determine appropriate sentences, their discretion 
is by no means unfettered and must always be exercised subject to 
proper sentencing considerations and within the applicable 
sentencing parameters. 
 
In this case, the trial court improperly considered the post-
arrest misconduct that Garcia committed while out on bond.  
 
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However, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Garcia is not 
entitled to relief because the trial court’s error did not amount to 
fundamental error, a more stringent standard of review than the 
harmless error standard that would have applied had a 
contemporaneous objection been made when the improper evidence 
was presented. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
Fourth District – Case No. 4D17-3751 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. 
Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Paul Patti, III, Assistant Attorney 
General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Claire V. Madill, Assistant 
Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
for Respondent