Title: Granger v. Deaconess Hospital of Grand Forks
Citation: 138 N.W.2d 443
Docket Number: 8185
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 1965

138 N.W.2d 443 (1965) Beverly GRANGER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEACONESS HOSPITAL OF GRAND FORKS, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8185. Supreme Court of North Dakota. November 23, 1965. Mart R. Vogel, Fargo, and H. G. Ruemmele, Grand Forks, for appellant. Samuel Rubin, Grand Forks, and Alan L. Stiegler, Minneapolis, Minn., for respondent. *444 ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Grand Forks County dated April 21, 1964, granting the motions of the plaintiff, Beverly Granger, to: (1) strike the defense of charitable immunity contained in the answer of the defendant, Deaconess Hospital of Grand Forks; (2) suppress any reference to the plaintiff's testimony before the Grand Forks County Welfare Board; and (3) deny the defendant's request to compel further depositions of the plaintiff for discovery purposes. In this case the plaintiff sued the defendant hospital, alleging that while she was a patient in the hospital and under sedation, the hospital, through its agents, servants, and employees, negligently permitted her to smoke while lying in bed, resulting in a fire which seriously burned her, causing massive bodily injuries. The defendant included in its answer an affirmative defense that it was a charitable corporation dedicated to the relief of pain and suffering; that it is a nonprofit organization and that no part of its earnings or income have ever been or are diverted from charitable purposes, and that, as a consequence thereof, the defendant is free from tort liability under the laws of North Dakota. The first issue which we shall consider is the defendant's appeal from that part of the trial court's order which struck the defendant's affirmative defense of charitable immunity. The order granting the motion to strike the defense of charitable immunity from the answer is appealable because it strikes an affirmative defense not provable under the remaining allegations of the answer. See La Duke v. E. W. Wylie Co., 77 N.D. 592, 44 N.W.2d 204. Having held that that part of the order granting the motion to strike the defense of charitable immunity from the answer is appealable, we must now determine whether a charitable nonprofit corporate hospital is liable to a patient for injuries caused the patient through the negligence of its employees. Although we are cognizant of the dicta contained in two early decisions of this court, namely, Fawcett v. Ryder, 23 N.D. 20, 135 N.W. 800, and Boetcher v. Budd, 61 N.D. 50, 237 N.W. 650, in which this court held that private hospitals operated for profit were liable for injuries caused a patient but inferred that a different rule might apply in the case of a charitable institution, we believe that this court determined the rule to be otherwise in the case of Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247, 166 A.L.R. 99. That case involved an action for libel brought by someone other than a patient against a charitable nonprofit corporate hospital. In holding the hospital liable, this court said: Title 10 of the Rev.Code deals with corporations, and sec. 10-0101 provides: As we have never applied the doctrine of charitable immunity in our state, the case of Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College &amp; Hospital, 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769, referred to us by the appellant for its statement on the importance of stare decisis, can have no bearing. In Rickbeil, in acknowledging that courts are not in accord with reference to the liability of certain charitable hospitals, particularly those created and maintained by trusts, this court cited the case of Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137, 86 A.L.R. 487, as saying: It is significant that since Rickbeil the Michigan Supreme Court has overruled Greatrex in the case of Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1, decided in 1960. In overruling Greatrex and other decisions which followed it in the State of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court quoted at length Justice Rutledge's opinion in President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810 (1942). Because of the excellence of the discussion of the doctrine of charitable immunity by Justice Rutledge, we would like to quote him also: * * * * * * Justice Rutledge reviewed some of the reasons and policies supporting and working against general immunity as follows: The appellant hospital has indicated that a distinction should be made between a stranger to and a beneficiary of a charitable corporate hospital. We believe that Justice Rutledge's discussion of that topic is significant: It is interesting to note that the Michigan court in Parker included North Dakota among the states which they found to have abolished whatever immunity they previously had: In 1950 the Supreme Court of Iowa said: The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in overruling its previous decisions, said: In a case concerning the validity of a release from liability for future negligence, imposed as a condition for admission to a charitable research hospital, the California Supreme Court said: The following discussion of charitable immunity is contained in American Law Reports, Annotated: We conclude that the trial court was correct in striking the defense of charitable immunity from the answer. A charitable nonprofit corporate hospital is liable to a patient for the torts of its employees. The next issue with which we are presented involves the appellant's claim that the trial court erred in suppressing all testimony of the plaintiff in connection with a proceeding before the Public Welfare Board of Grand Forks County, which was then considering whether to pay for the hospital costs of the plaintiff. The court suppressed this evidence on the ground that it was confidential and privileged. Without deciding whether the testimony before the Welfare Board is privileged, we sustain the trial court on the ground that suppressing reference to that testimony by its intermediate order was not appealable. This is supported by our decision in Kennelly v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 41 N.D. 395, 170 N.W. 868, in which we held that an order sustaining exceptions to and suppressing a deposition is not appealable, as it is, in effect, merely a ruling upon evidence. That is not to say that it, as an intermediate ruling, is not ultimately reviewable upon an appeal from the final judgment. Stormon v. District Court of Pierce County, 76 N.D. 713, 38 N.W.2d 785, at 787. At this point we have not reached that stage of the proceedings, and the trial court's ruling suppressing this testimony is affirmed. The final issue confronting us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to compel further depositions of the plaintiff for discovery purposes. Our view is that this ruling of the trial court should also be sustained for the same reasons given for sustaining the trial court's ruling suppressing all reference to the testimony of the plaintiff before the Welfare Board. Interlocutory orders are not appealable unless made so by statute. Neither of these appeals come within the cases authorized by § 28-27-02, N.D.C.C. In affirming an order of the trial court sustaining plaintiff's objections to questions during her deposition on oral examination by the defendant, the Appellate Court of Illinois said: In a 1963 decision of the United States Court of Appeals, it said: For the reasons stated the appeal is dismissed, and the order of the trial court is in all things affirmed. BURKE, C. J., and STRUTZ and TEIGEN, JJ., concur. KNUDSON, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.