Title: LaRue v. Sierra Petroleum Co.
Citation: 183 Kan. 153, 325 P.2d 59
Docket Number: 40,983
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 1958

183 Kan. 153 (1958)
325 P.2d 59
LaVERN LaRUE, widow and guardian of ELNA A. LaRUE, DONNA J. LaRUE, THELMA J. LaRUE and DELWIN L. LaRUE, minor dependents of Arthur LaRue, Deceased, Appellants,
v.
SIERRA PETROLEUM COMPANY and THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees.
No. 40,983

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 10, 1958.
C.K. Sayler, of Topeka, argued the cause and L.M. Ascough and John A. Bausch, both of Topeka, and D.A. Hindman and Stanley Krysl, both of Stockton, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Clayton S. Flood, of Hays, and William F. Schell, of Wichita, argued the cause, and E.C. Flood, of Hays, and George B. Collins, Oliver H. Hughes, Robert Martin, K.W. Pringle, Jr., Thomas M. Burns and George R. Docking, all of Wichita, were with them on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is a workmen's compensation case. The claimants appeal from a judgment denying compensation.
The proceeding was instituted by LaVern LaRue, hereinafter referred to as the claimant or appellant, and widow and guardian of the minor children of Arthur LaRue, deceased, against the employer. Sierra Petroleum Company, and its insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Company.
In submitting the cause to the commissioner the parties stipulated the only controverted issues were: (1) Whether or not deceased's accidental death arose out of and in the course of employment with the respondent; (2) whether or not the claimant was wholly dependent upon the decedent for support; and (3) the amount of compensation due the claimant, if any. A hearing on such issues *154 resulted in an award to claimant and respondents appealed to the district court.
After a hearing in district court in conformity with the provisions of Laws of 1955, Chapter 250, Section 10, now G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-556, the district court found, among other things, that "the decedent's accidental death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment" and rendered judgment denying the claimant an award. This appeal followed.
The issues, to be presently discussed, will be simplified by a short factual statement, about which there can be no dispute, relating to events leading up to and resulting in the death of LaRue.
Sometime after 7:30 p.m. on the evening of June 15, 1956, Robert Delaney, a driller, and Arthur LaRue, a derrick man, who, as members of one of Sierra's drilling crews had just completed drilling a well for Sierra, near Windom, and were scheduled to report for work the next day at a new Sierra well location, four miles south of Moundridge in Harvey County, decided to leave Lyons, where they had been staying, for the purpose of going to their respective homes. LaRue lived at Stockton and Delaney at Woodston. Both towns were located slightly more than one hundred miles from Lyons and the Windom well location. After reaching this decision they started toward their homes in an automobile owned and driven by Delaney, proceeding in a northwesterly direction until they reached U.S. Highway 24. They then proceeded west on such highway to a point approximately four miles west of Alton in Osborne County when, for some unexplained reason, at about 10:30 p.m., and after having driven more than one hundred miles from Lyons, the automobile, with Delaney still driving, left the road and crashed into a tree. As the result of this accident Delaney was slightly injured and LaRue sustained serious injuries which caused his death on the same evening.
In their presentation of the cause counsel for appellant frankly concede the only questions involved on appellate review are: 1. Did Arthur LaRue receive his fatal injuries as a result of an accident which arose out of or in the course of his employment, or [1 1/2] whether his death occurred after leaving his duties of his employment. 2. Was the proximate cause of the collision killing Arthur LaRue the negligence of his employer even though he may have left the duties of his employment as defined by G.S. 44-508(K) 1949.
*155 There can be no doubt that questions hereinabove denominated 1 1/2 and 2 are pure questions of fact. Doubt might exist in the minds of some as to whether the question identified as (1) is in the same category but that too has been expressly decided by this court.
See, e.g., Gregg v. American Walnut Lbr. Co., 137 Kan. 201, 19 P.2d 463, where it is held:
For another, and more recent decision of like import, see Kafka v. Edwards, 182 Kan. 568, 569, 322 P.2d 785.
Having established that we are here concerned with an appeal from findings of fact made by a district court in a workmen's compensation proceeding we feel called upon to once again point out the jurisdiction and function of this court upon review of such findings in compensation cases.
For a comparatively recent decision dealing with the subject see Silvers v. Wakefield, 176 Kan. 259, 270 P.2d 259, where it is said:
Another recent decision is Angleton v. Foster Wheeler Construction Co., 177 Kan. 134, 276 P.2d 325, which holds:
*156 See, also, McDonald v. Rader, 177 Kan. 249, 277 P.2d 652, where it is held:
And where, in elaboration of the same subject, it is said:
And, for one of our latest reported decisions dealing with the same subject, see Madison v. Key Work Clothes, 182 Kan. 186, 318 P.2d 991, where it is said:
In the instant case we are not limited to a single finding of fact such as was involved in Kafka v. Edwards, supra. Here the trial court not only found that the accidental death of the deceased workman (LaRue) was not due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment but it made other specific findings which, we pause to note, inhere in such over-all findings. These findings read:
Many other decisions, where like principles are announced, discussed and applied, are to be found in our reports. For just a few of them see Snedden v. Nichols, 181 Kan. 1052, 1054, 317 P.2d 448; Wilbeck v. Grain Belt Transportation Co., 181 Kan. 512, 514, 313 P.2d 725; Fitzwater v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 158, 309 P.2d 681; Beaver v. Tammany Industries, 180 Kan. 440, 304 P.2d 501; Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197; Silvers v. Wakefield, 176 Kan. 259, 270 P.2d 259, and the decisions there cited.
In the face of the foregoing decisions and what has been heretofore related it is apparent the all decisive question involved in this appeal is whether the record discloses substantial evidence to sustain the factual findings made by the trial court. It would add nothing to our reports and we are not inclined to prolong this opinion by laboring the evidence adduced by the parties. It suffices to say that after a painstaking and extended examination of the entire record we are convinced such record discloses sufficient competent evidence on which that court could make each and every factual finding to which reference has been heretofore made in this opinion. That, under the decisions to which we have previously referred, means such findings cannot be disturbed and compels an *158 affirmance of the judgment. This, it may be added, must be our conclusion under the established law of this jurisdiction even though it be conceded, as appellant contends, the record discloses some evidence which, if the trial court had seen fit to give it credence, would have supported contrary findings.
The judgment is affirmed.