Title: Joseph Duane Saucer v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-031
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95031
____________
JOSEPH DUANE SAUCER,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 25, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a decision on a question certified to be of great public
importance, Saucer v. State, 736 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  The district court certified the following
question: 
May the gain-time forfeiture provisions of section
944.28(2)(a) apply in criminal and collateral criminal
proceedings?   
Saucer v. State, 736 So. 2d at 12.  We answer the question in the negative. 
Further, we hold that if a writ petition challenges the petitioner’s underlying criminal
1Specifically, the First District found that Saucer had knowingly or recklessly brought false
information or evidence before the court.  Section 944.279(1) provides for discipline when a court
makes any of a number of findings including that the prisoner (1) brought a frivolous or malicious action
or appeal; (2) knowingly or recklessly brought false information or evidence before the court, or (3)
violated a law or prison regulation.  Section 944.28(2)(a) provides the Department with the statutory
authority to discipline inmates who have violated section 944.279(1) by forfeiting gain time. 
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conviction or sentence, it is a collateral criminal proceeding and thus neither section
944.28(2)(a) nor section 944.279, Florida Statutes (1999), may be used to impose
discipline or sanctions.
FACTS
Saucer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First District Court of
Appeal seeking a belated appeal from his judgment of criminal conviction and
sentence.  He asserted that his trial counsel had agreed to appeal his case but failed
to do so.  The First District appointed a special hearing officer to conduct a
hearing.  After the hearing officer found Saucer's allegations to be false, the State
asked the First District to impose sanctions pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a).  That
section provides for gain time forfeiture if a court finds that an inmate has filed,
among other things, a frivolous or untruthful lawsuit.1  The First District held that
since Saucer's habeas petition sought a belated appeal in his criminal case, the
habeas petition was a criminal action, but imposed sanctions based upon its belief
that the Legislature had amended the statutory scheme for sanctions and extended it
2However, after doing so, the First District certified a question of great public importance.
3This Court also disapproved Saucer (in Hall) to the extent that the First District held that it
could “direct” (as opposed to merely “recommend”) that the Department of Corrections sanction an
inmate by gain time forfeiture.
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to criminal proceedings.2  Judge Webster dissented.  We agree with and approve
Judge Webster’s dissenting opinion.
Recently, this Court issued its opinion in Hall v. State, 752 So. 2d 575 (Fla.
2000), holding, in pertinent part, and consistent with Judge Webster’s dissent, that
a postconviction motion and its appeal are "collateral criminal proceedings" and
sanctions cannot be invoked under section 944.28 because that statute must be
construed together with section 944.279, which prohibits the invocation of these
statutory sanctions in criminal or collateral criminal proceedings.  In Hall this Court
expressly disapproved of the First District’s decision in this case (Saucer) to the
extent that it held that recent statutory amendments to section 944.279 had intended
to allow the State to sanction an inmate by forfeiting gain time even if the
sanctioned action was criminal or collateral criminal. 3  While Saucer has already
been disapproved in part, we now address and elaborate somewhat on the question
of whether a habeas corpus petition is also a collateral criminal action for purposes
of the relevant statutes.  
CIVIL VS. CRIMINAL
4As indicated above, while section 944.28(2)(a) does not contain an express collateral criminal
prohibition, this Court held in Hall that it was tied to section 944.279, which does contain such a
prohibition.  See Hall, 752 So. 2d at 579.
5Criminal contempt proceedings may be another “true” criminal proceeding even when initiated
by a court.
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The question now posed is whether a writ petition that challenges the criminal
conviction or sentence may also be considered a “collateral criminal proceeding.” 
As noted, we held in Hall that the sanction statutes may not be utilized according to
their own terms if the subject proceeding is criminal or collateral criminal. 4  When a
civilian or private citizen brings an action in court, that action is ordinarily broadly
categorized as a civil action.  In true or pure civil actions the citizen is ordinarily
seeking to remedy a private wrong or vindicate a private right.  For example, a tort
action seeking damages for personal injury would fit that subcategory.  A civil
rights action would also fit under that subcategory, and even if the person bringing
the action is incarcerated, the controlling factor is that the private citizen-inmate is
asserting that his or her own legal rights as a human being or a citizen have been
violated.  
On the other hand, perhaps the only true criminal proceeding is the one the
State initiates against a defendant charging her with committing a criminal act.5 
Accordingly, when a person other than the State brings an action, it cannot be
6See, e.g., Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 61 (Fla. 2000) (stating that technically, habeas
corpus and other postconviction relief proceedings are classified as civil proceedings but unlike a
general civil action, where the parties seek to remedy a private wrong, habeas corpus and other
postconviction relief proceedings are used to challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence and are
civil because they are in the nature of independent collateral civil actions); see also O'Neal v.
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995) (habeas is a civil proceeding involving someone's custody rather
than mere civil liability); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(postconviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process itself, but is instead a civil action designed
to overturn a presumptively valid criminal judgment); Rozier v. State, 603 So. 2d 120, at 121 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1992) (noting that Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(e) was pertinent to postconviction collateral
remedies such as those initiated under rule 3.850 because they are in the nature of independent
collateral civil actions); State v. Lasley, 507 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (noting that like a habeas
corpus proceeding an action under rule 3.850 is considered civil in nature and collateral to the criminal
prosecution which resulted in the judgment of conviction, notwithstanding the inclusion of rule 3.850
within the criminal rules); State v. White, 470 So. 2d 1377, 1378-79 (Fla. 1985) (stating that 3.850
motions and some other writs are postconviction collateral remedies which are not steps in a criminal
prosecution but are in the nature of independent collateral civil actions governed by the practice of
appeals in civil actions); see also State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1964) (noting that
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considered purely criminal, if for no other reason than that ordinarily only the State
can initiate a criminal action.  Such other proceedings may be considered either
completely independent of a criminal action or “collateral” to it.  
COLLATERAL CRIMINAL 
When a person brings an action which challenges an underlying criminal
conviction or sentence, it obviously is intended to affect the underlying criminal
proceeding.  Since it is being brought by a private citizen seeking judicial relief, it is
often technically classified as a civil action.  However, in such instances, it would
seem that the denomination “civil” is used merely to indicate that the action is not
one brought in the proceeding initiated by the State alleging criminal actions.6 
postconviction habeas corpus proceedings are not steps in a criminal prosecution.  On the contrary,
they are in the nature of independent, collateral civil actions which are not clothed with the aspects of a
criminal prosecution); Tolar v. State, 196 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (noting that motions for relief
under rule 1 [now 3.850], like habeas corpus, are not steps in the criminal prosecution, but are in the
nature of independent, collateral civil actions, based on criminal actions; and appeals from the final
judgments are governed by practice of appeals in civil actions).  This is not to say that the State cannot
bring an action other than a criminal action since, of course, the State can bring a number of civil
actions.  For example, the State can bring a breach of contract action against a contractor, or an
eminent domain action seeking to take land for a public purpose.  In such cases, the “civil” nature of the
action refers to the subject matter, not to the person or entity bringing the action.
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Hence, when a “civil” writ petition is also referred to as “collateral criminal,” the
term actually refers to the underlying subject matter of the action, and the fact that
the petition seeks judicial relief from the judgment and sanctions imposed in the
criminal prosecution.  It is not considered a pure criminal action since it is brought
by a private party outside of the criminal prosecution that has resulted in a criminal
judgment against the affected party.
We conclude here, as we did in Hall, that the technical classification or
denomination of the pleading should not be the determining criteria, but, rather, the
subject matter or underlying proceeding from which the petitioner is seeking relief
should control.  We held in Hall that the Legislature’s intent was to curb the
improper filing of true civil actions that were patently frivolous.  Since Saucer filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First District seeking a belated appeal of
his criminal conviction, the subject matter of his petition should be characterized as
7We note that while the district court could not utilize either section 944.279 or 944.28(2)(a) to
sanction Saucer, it has long been held that the courts have inherent power to impose sanctions upon
finding a pleading frivolous or otherwise improper.  See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254,
1261 (2nd Cir. 1984) (discussing similar federal rule).  Nevertheless, when a court utilizes a specific
statute to sanction, as here, it is restricted to the strict confines of the statute.
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collateral criminal and our decision in Hall controls.  Hence, we reaffirm that
sections 944.28(2) and 944.279 may not be utilized to invoke sanctions in these
proceedings.  
Accordingly, although the district court found Saucer’s habeas petition to be
untruthful, it could not invoke section 944.28(2)(a) or 944.279 to sanction Saucer.7 
We quash the decision below, approve Judge Webster’s dissent, and remand this
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D97-4134 
Joseph Duane Saucer, pro se, Wewahitchka, Florida; and R. Mitchell Prugh of
Middleton & Prugh, P.A., Melrose, Florida,
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for Petitioner
Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent