Title: Commonwealth v. Cassidy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11342
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2014

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SJC-11342 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TIMOTHY CASSIDY. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     September 5, 2014. - December 16, 2014. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Third-party culprit, Relevancy and 
materiality, Cumulative evidence, Hearsay, Opinion, 
Consciousness of guilt, Intoxication, Bias of government 
witness, Unavailable witness.  Fair Trial.  Constitutional 
Law, Fair trial.  Due Process of Law, Fair trial.  Jury and 
Jurors.  Witness, Unavailability.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Argument by counsel, 
Argument by prosecutor, Fair trial, Jury and jurors, 
Question by jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 8, 2008. 
 
 
The case was tried before Barbara A. Dortch-Okara, J. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Thomas M. Quinn, III, Assistant District Attorney (Yul-mi 
Cho, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In January, 2012, a jury convicted the 
defendant, Timothy Cassidy, of murder in the first degree on the 
 
 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  Represented by new 
counsel on appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial judge 
committed numerous evidentiary errors that undermined the 
defendant's right to present his defenses and deprived him of 
due process and fundamental fairness under the United States 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (2) 
defense counsel misstated evidence during his closing argument; 
and (3) the judge improperly responded to a question posed by 
the jury.  We affirm the defendant's convictions and discern no 
basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  1.  The Commonwealth's case.  We recite the 
facts the jury could have found based on the Commonwealth's 
case, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979), reserving certain details for our discussion of the 
specific issues raised.  The defendant and the victim, James 
Madonna, were best friends.2  On Tuesday, November 20, 2007, 
between 7 and 7:30 P.M., the defendant went to the victim's 
house.  The two had plans to play poker at a hotel located in an 
industrial park in Taunton.  Instead of driving together, they 
                     
 
1 The Commonwealth also had proceeded under a theory of 
deliberate premeditation, but the jury did not find the 
defendant guilty under that theory. 
 
 
2 The victim worked for a construction company that the 
defendant had owned for a short time.  The defendant sold the 
business and the victim continued to work as a finish carpenter 
for the new owner. 
 
 
drove separately.  A fellow poker player saw them leaving the 
hotel together at approximately 8:15 P.M. 
 
Telephone records confirmed that at 10:11 and 10:12 P.M., 
the defendant's wife telephoned him, asking him to bring home 
some medicine.  He went to a nearby pharmacy at 10:21 P.M. and 
purchased the medication along with a package of cigarettes.  He 
arrived home between 10:30 and 11 P.M.  He did not enter the 
house immediately, but went to the garage where he remained for 
about twenty minutes. 
 
The victim did not return home that evening.  His wife, who 
was related to the defendant,3 repeatedly called the victim's 
cellular telephone, to no avail.  She took their eldest son, 
James, out looking for the victim.  James telephoned the 
defendant, who stated that the victim, after playing poker, said 
that he was going to meet a friend. 
 
The next morning, the victim's wife telephoned the 
defendant, who told her that he had left the poker game early, 
but that the victim had stayed to continue playing.  The 
defendant went to the victim's home and joined James in looking 
for the victim.  The search was unsuccessful, and after filing a 
                     
 
3 The victim's oldest son testified that his mother and the 
defendant were cousins.  The victim's wife testified, however, 
that the defendant was a son of her cousin.  The exact relation 
is of no significance. 
 
 
missing person's report at the Taunton police department, the 
two returned to the victim's house. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the defendant suggested that they 
resume their search and look through "every single parking lot" 
in the industrial area near the hotel.  After some searching, 
the defendant suggested that James drive to a parking lot in the 
area near a particular convenience store.  James had to change 
direction to do so.  As he drove into the parking lot in the 
back of the building, James recognized his father's automobile, 
which was running. 
 
Thinking that his father was drunk and sleeping, James went 
over to the victim's automobile.  There he discovered the victim 
who, though seated in the driver's seat, was "slumped over" onto 
a cooler in the passenger seat side of the automobile.  A 
significant amount of blood was on the inside window to the 
front passenger door, and on the cooler.  The victim was 
unresponsive and his son telephoned 911.  As he was doing so, 
the defendant went to the opposite side of the automobile and 
looked inside. 
 
The victim had been shot once in the neck and four times in 
the back, left side of his head.  The medical examiner testified 
that the victim's skull had been shattered, his brain "extremely 
fragmented," and that there was "a large amount of destruction."  
She could not determine the sequence of the gunshot wounds and 
 
 
opined that the victim could have remained conscious for minutes 
after suffering the gunshot wound to the neck.  The gunshot 
wounds to the back of the victim's head, however, would have 
resulted in death within seconds.  The victim died as result of 
gunshot wounds to his head and neck, with perforations to his 
skull and brain. 
 
Police arrived at the parking lot shortly thereafter.  The 
defendant was shaken and indicated that he suffered from heart 
problems.  A police officer directed a firefighter to treat him, 
and the defendant was taken to a different area of the parking 
lot where an ambulance was parked. 
 
By the driver's side of the victim's automobile, police 
recovered cigarette ash on the door and one cigarette butt on 
the ground.  A second cigarette butt was found on the opposite 
side of the parking lot, in the vicinity of where the ambulance 
had been parked.  The cigarette butts were sent for 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, which revealed that the DNA 
recovered from them matched the defendant's DNA.4 
 
Police also recovered five .40 caliber discharged shell 
casings manufactured by Federal, one from outside the victim's 
automobile and four from the inside.  In addition, police found 
                     
 
4 The statistical significance of the deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing was presented to the jury.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 463 Mass. 402, 408 & n.10 (2012); Commonwealth v. 
Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 20 (1994). 
 
 
two spent projectiles and one spent metal jacket5 inside the 
automobile.  Three .40 caliber spent projectiles were recovered 
from the victim by the medical examiner.  The Commonwealth's 
firearms identification expert opined that, based on his 
examination, all of the discharged cartridge casings recovered 
during the investigation and all of the spent projectiles and 
the spent metal jacket were fired from the same weapon. 
 
There was evidence that the defendant was licensed to 
possess and owned a .40 caliber Star Modern Firestar 
semiautomatic pistol.  He usually kept it in the top drawer of 
his bureau, but it was missing when his wife looked a day or two 
following the victim's murder.  When police, pursuant to a 
warrant, searched the defendant's house on Friday, November 23, 
they found a fifty-round box of Smith and Wesson Federal .40 
caliber ammunition; five rounds were missing from the box.  They 
did not find the defendant's .40 caliber pistol.  Police 
eventually recovered the defendant's pistol and submitted it for 
forensic testing.6  The Commonwealth's firearms identification 
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth's firearms identification expert 
explained that a projectile can be "jacketed," meaning that 
there is a copper jacket encasing the lead core of the bullet.  
When the weapon is fired, sometimes the copper jacket and lead 
core stay intact, while other times the lead core separates from 
the jacket. 
 
 
6 The pistol was recovered almost two years later in 
November, 2009.  Although the defendant was in jail awaiting 
trial at this time, there was evidence that, while he was 
 
 
expert opined that, based on his examination, all of the 
recovered .40 caliber discharged cartridge casings had been 
fired from the defendant's pistol.  He was unable, however, to 
determine whether the recovered projectiles had been fired from 
the defendant's pistol. 
 
The Commonwealth's evidence showed that, at the time of the 
victim's murder, the defendant was experiencing significant 
financial trouble.  In connection with a franchise business the 
defendant had undertaken, he could not account for approximately 
$14,657 and had been given until November 21 either to pay back 
the money or to produce proof that deposits had been made.  He 
did neither, and continued to make excuses. 
 
The defendant, without his wife's knowledge, borrowed money 
from the victim and his wife.  In late October, 2007, the victim 
and his wife pressed the defendant to repay $30,000 on a loan of 
$25,000 that they had made to the defendant.  The victim's wife 
                                                                  
awaiting trial, he had sent a letter to his stepfather directing 
him to pick up a can of contact cement from the defendant's 
house.  The pistol was inside the can (which had been 
manufactured only recently).  In further correspondence, the 
defendant arranged for the can containing the pistol to exchange 
hands and eventually be planted under a shed at a particular 
address or under the driver's seat of a Lincoln automobile that 
would be there.  There was evidence that Kevin Hayes, the 
brother of the victim's wife, drove a Lincoln automobile.  The 
plan was thwarted, and the pistol recovered, after one of the 
people involved, Gerard Menard (a former inmate who had been 
housed with the defendant, contacted police.  No forensic 
evidence was obtained from the pistol, which had been submerged 
in paint inside the can and was not loaded. 
 
 
threatened the defendant that she would inform his wife about 
the loan if he did not pay them back by Monday, November 19 (the 
day before the victim's murder). 
 
The defendant, through the help of Kevin Hayes, who was the 
brother of the victim's wife, had borrowed $40,000 from a "loan 
shark in Brockton" (loan shark) in September or October, 2007.  
In exchange for this loan, the defendant agreed to pay $10,000 
in interest, and signed over a motorcycle and granted as 
collateral a mortgage on a parcel of land in Maine that he owned 
with his wife.7  The defendant, without telling his wife, also 
had borrowed large sums of money from her uncle.  The defendant 
further kept his wife uninformed about running up charges on 
their credit card, withdrawing money from an equity line of 
credit, and cashing a tax refund check made payable to them 
jointly without obtaining her signature.  At one point, in 
September or October of 2007, the defendant's wife asked him to 
move out of their home due to his financial dealings. 
 
The defendant spoke with police following the murder.  On 
November 21, 2007, he spoke twice with State Trooper Michael 
Cherven and Taunton police Officer Honorato M. Santos.  In the 
first interview, which started about 3:15 P.M. and was recorded, 
the defendant told them that he did not know why anyone would 
                     
 
7 The mortgage later was invalidated because the signature 
of the defendant's wife had been forged.  She was not informed 
of her husband's business with the loan shark. 
 
 
want the victim dead.  The defendant said he had left the hotel 
at 9:30 P.M.  He told police that after leaving the hotel, he 
went to a specific store and purchased a package of cigarettes.8  
The defendant informed the officers that he went to a pharmacy 
thereafter to purchase some medication for his wife.  The 
defendant acknowledged to the officers that he owned a number of 
firearms and indicated specifically what he owned, but made no 
mention of his .40 caliber pistol. 
 
The following day, November 22, near midnight, the 
defendant returned to the police station, claiming that earlier 
Hayes had taken a shotgun from his truck and "racked" it toward 
his direction.  Trooper Cherven offered the defendant police 
protection, but he declined.  Trooper Cherven asked the 
defendant if he thought Hayes had killed the victim.  The 
defendant replied that he did not. 
 
The defendant agreed to speak with police again and the 
interview was recorded.  Because the police had obtained 
additional information about the defendant's whereabouts after 
leaving the hotel with the victim, Trooper Cherven informed the 
defendant that they could not see the defendant on the 
surveillance videotape from the store at which he had claimed to 
purchase cigarettes.  The defendant insisted that he had been 
                     
 
8 Police soon thereafter learned that the store did not 
carry the brand of cigarettes that the defendant smoked, and the 
store's surveillance footage did not confirm his presence there. 
 
 
there.  When asked about receiving a loan from the victim, the 
defendant admitted to having borrowed money from the victim, but 
stated that the loan amount was $10,000.  When Trooper Cherven 
confronted him with checks concerning the $25,000 loan, the 
defendant expressed shock and insisted the he had only borrowed 
$10,000 from the victim.  The defendant told police that the 
victim owed him money.  The defendant left around 2:30 A.M. on 
November 23.  He agreed to return later for further questioning. 
 
The defendant did not return.  Instead, he stole a blank 
check from his wife's uncle, wrote himself a check for $4,000, 
cashed it, and fled.  He was arrested in Georgia in December 
after vanishing from his family with no word of his whereabouts.  
When he was arrested, he had altered his appearance and was 
using a fictitious name and address.  When apprehended, the 
defendant said, "Fuck.  Okay.  You got me -- you got me." 
 
After his arrest, the defendant was detained pending trial.  
While he was awaiting trial, the defendant on several occasions 
attempted to fabricate evidence relative to the murder, 
including an attempt to plant the murder weapon on Hayes.  See 
note 6, supra. 
 
2.  The defendant's case.  The defendant testified.  
According to him, the victim had been delivering cocaine for a 
motorcycle gang called the "Outlaws."  About one and one-half 
years before the victim was killed, the victim had a package 
 
 
delivered to one of the defendant's stores.  The defendant 
opened the package and discovered five packages of cocaine.  He 
told the victim he wanted nothing to do with it and left it 
behind one of his stores.  The defendant stated that the package 
went missing and gang members contacted him and the victim to 
let them know that they were going to be held responsible for 
the loss of the drugs and would have to reimburse the gang 
$150,000.  The gang members threatened to kill their families if 
they did not pay. 
 
To repay the gang, the defendant testified that he took 
money from his stores and obtained, with the help of Hayes, a 
loan from the loan shark for $35,000.  The money from the loan 
was to be used for a drug transaction that was to involve the 
defendant, the victim, and Hayes.  According to the defendant, 
Hayes set up the deal.  It occurred after the poker game on 
November 20, 2007, in the parking lot where the victim was 
found.  The defendant testified that he watched from the "far 
corner" of the parking lot.  He testified to the following.  The 
defendant saw Hayes leave his automobile and go over to the 
victim, who was standing outside of his automobile.  Hayes 
reached into the victim's automobile and grabbed something out 
of the front seat, then walked away.  The victim entered his 
automobile.  After a couple of minutes, a truck pulled into the 
parking lot.  Hayes went over to the driver's side of the truck 
 
 
and exchanged "bags" with the driver.  Hayes returned to his 
automobile and tossed the bag inside.  Hayes then returned to 
the victim.  The two appeared to be talking, and then Hayes shot 
the victim five times.  Hayes went over to the defendant, 
pointed the gun at him, told him to leave, and threatened him 
and his family if he "opened his mouth." 
 
The defendant testified that he did not tell anyone that 
Hayes had killed the victim because he was "scared" based on 
Hayes's threat to him.  The defendant said that on November 22, 
from a distance, Hayes had "racked" a shotgun at him and stated 
he had more guns in his possession; on the morning of the next 
day, he received a telephone call from Hayes; after this call, 
the defendant decided to leave town because he was in fear of 
his life and the lives of the members of his family.  The 
defendant admitted that, before he left, he stole $4,000 from 
his wife's uncle and altered his appearance.  He left a note to 
police inside his automobile that he abandoned during his flight 
encouraging police to "keep looking for" the victim's killer. 
 
The defendant also testified that the victim had full 
access to his home at any time.  The defendant last saw his .40 
caliber pistol with the victim, who had received his permission 
to borrow it. 
 
The defendant admitted that he had "lied from the 
beginning."  He had done so and had created various schemes from 
 
 
jail to plant and fabricate evidence because he was afraid and 
because he wanted to expose Hayes as the killer. 
 
Through the cross-examination of the Commonwealth's 
witnesses, the defendant elicited that there was a lack of 
physical evidence establishing that he had been the shooter and 
that the police investigation had been inadequate, thus laying 
the basis for a Bowden defense, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 
Mass. 472, 486 (1980).  In addition, defense counsel argued, 
relying on his cross-examination of Trooper Cherven, that the 
police had not fully investigated existing third-party culprit 
evidence that pointed to Hayes as being the shooter. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that (1) the trial judge 
committed numerous evidentiary errors that undermined his right 
to present several defenses and deprived him of due process and 
a fair trial; (2) defense counsel misstated evidence during his 
closing argument; and (3) the judge improperly responded to a 
jury question. 
 
1.  Evidentiary errors.  The defendant claims that the 
judge "repeatedly and improperly prohibited" him from 
introducing evidence relating to the adequacy of the police 
investigation pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bowden, supra.  He 
contends also that he was precluded from presenting third-party 
culprit evidence and from rebutting and responding to the 
Commonwealth's consciousness of guilt evidence.  The defendant 
 
 
argues that these erroneous rulings caused "a common threat of 
severe prejudice," depriving him of the right to present his 
defense, the right to confrontation, and the right to a 
fundamentally fair proceeding.9 
 
a.  Adequacy of the police investigation.  A defense of 
inadequate police investigation suggests to a jury "that the 
evidence at trial may be inadequate or unreliable because the 
police failed to conduct the scientific tests or to pursue leads 
that a reasonable police investigation would have conducted or 
investigated," with the result that the police may have missed 
"significant evidence of the defendant's guilt or innocence."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009).  
"Under the so-called Bowden defense, a defendant [also may] 
challenge the adequacy of a police investigation [by using] 
information concerning third-party culprits to question whether 
the police took reasonable steps to investigate the crime."  
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 316 (2009), citing 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486.  "Because any 
                     
 
9 The defendant raises more than thirty such evidentiary 
errors and does so in footnotes.  In these footnotes, he 
provides no individual legal analysis or citation to the 
relevant legal authority on which he relies.  "Briefs that limit 
themselves to 'bald assertions of error' that 'lack[] legal 
argument . . . [do not] rise[] to the level of appellate 
argument' required by [Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 
367 Mass. 921 (1975)]."  Kellogg v. Board of Registration in 
Med., 461 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2011).  Nevertheless, we reviewed 
these claims pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
conclude that they do not present any basis for relief. 
 
 
statements introduced as part of such a defense are offered not 
for their truth, but to prove that the police did not take 
'reasonable steps to investigate,' those statements are not 
hearsay."  Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 414 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Ridge, supra.  "Evidence is 
admissible to show inadequate police investigation, however, 
only if police learned of it during the course of their 
investigation."10  Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, supra, citing 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, supra at 803.  In addition, the 
judge must determine "whether the probative weight of the Bowden 
evidence exceed[s] the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
Commonwealth from diverting the jury's attention to collateral 
matters."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, supra.  "If the 
[evidence] is admitted, the Commonwealth may offer evidence 
explaining why the police did not follow that line of 
investigation."  Commonwealth v. Ridge, supra, citing 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, supra at 803 n.25. 
 
"[T]he exclusion of evidence of a Bowden defense is not 
constitutional in nature and therefore is examined under an 
abuse of discretion standard."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 
supra at 804 n.26, citing Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 
                     
 
10 In deciding whether to admit such evidence, a trial judge 
must "conduct a voir dire hearing to determine whether the 
third-party culprit information had been furnished to the 
police."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 803 
(2009). 
 
 
615, 629 (1986).  See Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 278 
(2014).  Where there has been an abuse of discretion, we review 
properly preserved challenges involving alleged Bowden 
violations for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 
Mass. at 317-318.  With regard to unpreserved challenges, and 
where there has been an abuse of discretion, we review to 
determine whether a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice occurred.  See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 450 Mass. 858, 
866, 872 (2008).  See also G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
i.  Exclusion of evidence that police were informed that 
victim's murder involved drugs.  The defendant objects to four 
instances where the judge excluded evidence that the police 
received information that the victim's murder likely involved 
drugs.  First, although we agree with the defendant that the 
judge should have permitted defense counsel to ask the victim's 
wife whether she told the police after her husband's murder that 
she believed that her husband's death was "over drugs," the 
error did not prejudice the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ridge, 455 Mass. at 317-318.  The defendant successfully 
elicited from Trooper Cherven that "numerous people," including 
the victim's wife and son, had suggested to police that the 
murder might have been connected to drugs.  The jury heard this 
information and the victim's wife's testimony would have been 
cumulative.  See Commonwealth v. Alammani, 439 Mass. 605, 611-
 
 
612 (2003) (exclusion of statements involving facts of which 
jury were already aware would have been cumulative and any 
erroneous exclusion of such statements would not have prejudiced 
defendant). 
 
The defendant's Bowden defense also was not impaired when 
the judge refused to permit defense counsel to elicit from 
Sergeant Santos whether the purported "illegitimate purpose" of 
a check from the victim to the defendant was to hide drug 
activity.  The judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding 
that there was no basis to question Santos, who had been present 
only as a witness during the questioning of the defendant, about 
this subject, and that the subject should be left for Trooper 
Cherven, the lead investigator who had conducted the 
questioning.  See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 461 
(1988) (judge properly excluded witness's testimony where 
witness had no personal knowledge of purported event).  Defense 
counsel later did ask Trooper Cherven whether he investigated 
the purpose underlying the loan and whether the loan money was 
"not for [a] legitimate reason." 
 
The defendant asserts that his Bowden defense also was 
impaired when the judge did not allow him to call a witness who 
was expected to testify that, every ten minutes during the poker 
game, he saw the victim walking outside.  The witness, however, 
did not see anything that occurred when the victim went outside.  
 
 
Thus, the judge properly refused defense counsel from asking the 
jury to infer from the expected testimony that the reason the 
victim went outside was to meet someone for a drug deal.  There 
was no error.  See Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 441 
(2012); Olson v. Ela, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 167 (1979). 
 
The defendant contends that the judge erroneously precluded 
him from calling one of the victim's brothers, Joe, as a witness 
to testify that he had given information to police concerning 
the victim's drug activities.  Joe spoke with police on November 
22, 2007.  The interview was recorded and marked for 
identification at trial.  In that interview, Joe told police 
that he thought that the victim's death had something to do with 
drugs, the victim may have been dealing drugs, and the "guys" 
from the Budweiser plant may have been involved.11  Joe also 
stated that initially he thought that his brother's death may 
have resulted from a drug overdose.  At trial, defense counsel 
objected to the exclusion of Joe's testimony on the basis that 
it should have led the police to investigate Hayes.12  Defense 
                     
 
11 There was evidence that the victim had previously worked 
at the Budweiser plant, which was close in proximity to where 
his body was found. 
 
 
12 Defense counsel argued to the judge that in the 
interview, Joe had told police that Hayes was upset at the 
victim for cheating on his sister (the victim's wife), and that 
"perhaps the last breath of Kevin Hayes' father was [']kill [the 
victim,'] and Joe thought it was curious that [the victim] was 
killed after Kevin Hayes' father had passed away two days 
 
 
counsel did not object on grounds relating to an inadequate 
investigation of the victim's alleged drug activities.  No 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice could have 
arisen from the exclusion of this evidence because the 
information had already come out at trial through other 
witnesses and would have been cumulative.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alammani, 439 Mass. at 611-612.  Further, Joe's statements in 
his police interview were clearly his personal suspicions based 
on questionable conduct by the victim (possession of a camcorder 
bag and telephone calls followed by trips to a fast food 
restaurant) that he had observed.  Joe, however, never actually 
saw any drugs.13 
 
ii.  Exclusion of evidence that police were informed of 
suspicions that Hayes may have been involved in victim's murder.  
                                                                  
earlier."  The defendant's references are taken out of context.  
In the recording, Joe acknowledged that Hayes had been aware 
that the victim had cheated on the victim's wife and had been 
angry, but Joe did not think Hayes had killed the victim.  Also, 
when discussing how people can hold grudges, Joe said that 
"someone said" that "maybe" Hayes's father's last words had been 
"kill [the victim]."  The information concerning Hayes being 
upset with the victim for having cheated on the victim's wife 
had already come out through Trooper Cherven, so its exclusion 
would not have been prejudicial to the defendant.  The latter 
information about what the victim's father may have said was 
inadmissible hearsay and improper speculation. 
 
 
13 The same points apply with regard to the defendant's 
remaining arguments concerning the victim's involvement with 
drugs.  Instances of limitation of such evidence fell within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, keeping in mind that the 
issue was a collateral one and, as it pertained to drug use by 
the victim, tended to prejudice the victim unduly. 
 
 
No prejudice to the defendant could have arisen from the 
exclusion of testimony from the defendant's stepfather regarding 
suspicion, conveyed to the police, that Hayes was involved in 
the victim's death because the evidence came in through Trooper 
Cherven.  See Commonwealth v. Alammani, 439 Mass. at 611-612. 
 
iii.  Exclusion of evidence concerning information about 
"Scotty."  Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, the judge did 
not abuse her discretion in precluding the defendant from asking 
Trooper Cherven whether Kelly Croce had told police that 
somebody named Scotty had warned her that something might 
happen.14  There was no proffer that Scotty's statement had 
anything to do with the victim's death, and the judge, based on 
the record before her, correctly determined that the proffered 
evidence likely would generate jury confusion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bright, 463 Mass. at 441.  For these same reasons, the judge 
did not abuse her discretion in handling other attempts by 
defense counsel to admit evidence regarding Scotty.  See id. 
 
iv.  Exclusion of evidence concerning Croce's boy friend.  
Because Trooper Cherven did not interview Croce's boy friend, 
the judge did not abuse her discretion in precluding the 
defendant from questioning Trooper Cherven about police 
                     
 
14 There was evidence that Hayes and the victim had been 
involved with drugs with Kelly Croce and her boy friend.  There 
was also evidence that Croce told police that Hayes was upset 
with the victim because the victim had stolen his drug contacts. 
 
 
questions posed to Croce's boy friend.  See Commonwealth v. 
Andrews, 403 Mass. at 461; Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 379 Mass. 
640, 656 (1980).  The defendant called the officer who did, 
Trooper Christopher Dumont. 
 
v.  Exclusion of evidence of how police considered 
information they received.  First, during the further recross-
examination of Trooper Cherven, the judge sustained the 
prosecutor's objection to the following question posed by 
defense counsel:  "My question is:  Did you think that maybe 
Kevin Hayes -- right after, on the Thursday or Friday after [the 
victim] was killed when Kevin Hayes is saying that he suspected 
[the defendant], did you give thought to maybe Kevin Hayes is 
trying to create evidence in case [the defendant], at some 
point, has the guts to come forward to say, Kevin Hayes killed 
him, and I saw it?"  The judge did not abuse her discretion in 
sustaining the prosecutor's objection.  The question was 
designed to elicit an answer that required the witness to accept 
an assumption not in evidence (that the defendant had "guts" to 
come forward) when such an answer would require surmise.  
Moreover, the witness had just testified that it never had 
occurred to him that Hayes was implicating the defendant because 
Hayes was fearful that the defendant would implicate him. 
 
No prejudicial error arose when the judge precluded defense 
counsel from questioning Trooper Chad Laliberte about whether 
 
 
the defendant or someone else could have placed the defendant's 
gun in the paint can or whether Trooper Laliberte considered 
whether the person who put the gun in the paint can did not 
realize the manufacturing date of the paint can.  These 
questions called for the witness to engage in speculation.  See 
Olson v. Ela, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 167.  Moreover, defense 
counsel already had elicited the information he wanted from 
Trooper Cherven who said that he knew, based on the date 
indicating when the paint can had been manufactured and based on 
the fact that the defendant at that time was incarcerated, that 
the defendant could not have been the person who placed his gun 
inside the paint can from which it was recovered. 
 
No prejudicial error occurred when the judge cut off 
further questioning of Trooper Cherven concerning whether he 
thought a notation on a check indicating a loan from the victim 
to the defendant "could have been subterfuge to cover for the 
illegitimate drug transaction."  Defense counsel already had 
elicited that Trooper Cherven did not consider this money as 
relating to drugs. 
 
vi.  Exclusion of evidence pertaining to the police 
investigation of Hayes's background.  The defendant argues that 
his Bowden defense was impaired because the judge refused to 
allow defense counsel to impeach Trooper Cherven "with questions 
as to Hayes' background that the police had themselves conveyed 
 
 
to [the defendant's stepfather]."  The line of questioning 
served to call into question Trooper Cherven's decision not to 
look more closely at Hayes as a suspect.  Although "defendants 
are entitled to reasonable latitude on cross-examination, the 
scope of such cross-examination, including the extent of 
impeachment of a witness for credibility and competency, are 
well within the judge's sound discretion."  Commonwealth v. 
Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 273 (1990).  Defense counsel was 
permitted to ask Trooper Cherven whether any background 
information on Hayes raised concerns or questions for him 
regarding Hayes's possible involvement in killing the victim.  
Trooper Cherven answered, "No."  The judge sustained the 
prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's next question which 
asked whether Trooper Cherven had considered Hayes "[a]s far as 
doing anything or things that were unsavored."  She acted within 
her discretion in so doing.  The question was improper as it 
called for an opinion concerning what "unsavored" meant.  No 
error occurred when the judge cut off questioning of Trooper 
Cherven regarding whether he had information concerning any 
involvement of Hayes with "mob people."  Trooper Cherven 
testified that he had given consideration to the fact that there 
was information that Hayes had involvement with "bookies," and 
that bookies sometimes are involved in organized crime.  This 
testimony sufficiently revealed the intimations of defense 
 
 
counsel and use of the terminology "mob people" was unduly 
inflammatory. 
 
b.  Third-party culprit.  The defendant argues that 
improper evidentiary rulings prejudicially obstructed his third-
party culprit defense.  The well-established principles 
governing the admissibility of third-party culprit evidence are 
set forth in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 800-
801, and need not be restated.  "Because the issue is one of 
constitutional dimension, we are not bound by an abuse of 
discretion standard, but rather examine the issue 
independently."  Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66-67 
(2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008). 
 
 The defendant first claims error in the judge's limitation 
of questions to Trooper Cherven concerning Hayes's attempts to 
"mislea[d]" the police.  As an initial matter, prior to trial, 
in connection with a motion in limine, defense counsel admitted 
that there were no substantial connecting links tying Hayes to 
the victim's murder.  Thus, the motion judge15 ruled that, unless 
the substantial connecting link was provided by the defendant, 
no third-party culprit evidence would be admissible at trial. 
 
That showing had not been made when Trooper Cherven 
testified.  Thus, there is no merit to the defendant's claim 
that his third-party culprit defense was impaired by his 
                     
 
15 The motion judge was not the trial judge. 
 
 
inability to question Trooper Cherven about Hayes telling police 
that he "heard" that the defendant had borrowed money from the 
loan shark (when Hayes knew in fact that the defendant had).  
Further, the proffered testimony did not establish a 
"substantial connecting link" between Hayes and the victim's 
murder.  The evidence was inadmissible.  Commonwealth v. 
Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. at 418-419. 
 
Second, the defendant claims error in the judge's 
limitation of his testimony concerning a third-party culprit.  
Once the defendant testified,16 the defendant's testimony that he 
saw Hayes shoot and kill the victim provided the "substantial 
connecting link" under the third-party culprit doctrine to 
render such evidence admissible (so long as all other 
prerequisites to admission were met).  With this point in mind, 
we turn to the defendant's claims of error. 
 
The defendant asserts that the judge erroneously refused to 
let him testify about the content of Hayes's telephone call to 
him on the morning that the defendant fled.  We conclude that 
the evidence should have been admitted, but that its exclusion, 
on this record, was harmless.  See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 
Mass. 550, 551 (2005).  Although the content of the telephone 
call was not elicited, there were telephone records 
                     
 
16 Defense counsel did not know whether the defendant would 
testify until after the close of the Commonwealth's evidence. 
 
 
corroborating the fact that the call had been made and the 
defendant was permitted to testify that when he fled, he left in 
fear for his life and in fear for the lives of his family.  
Further, the defendant testified that it was Hayes who had 
killed the victim, threatened him just after doing so, and 
threatened him by racking the shotgun at him after the murder 
had occurred.  The jury reasonably could have inferred that 
Hayes had threatened the defendant before he fled.  The 
defendant does not state in what other manner the content of the 
telephone call would have materially aided his defense. 
 
The defendant also claims that he should have been 
permitted to testify, in accordance with the third-party culprit 
doctrine, to how and when he learned that the murder weapon had 
been planted at his house, when he believed that information to 
be true, and to his opinion concerning who he believed planted 
the gun at his home.  It was made known off the record that this 
information, in the main, derived from a letter that the 
defendant had sent to his stepfather when he was in jail 
awaiting trial.  The letter was not admitted, but was marked for 
identification and we have reviewed it.17 
                     
 
17 In the letter, the defendant tells of an encounter he had 
with an unknown male inmate who attacked him in the shower.  The 
defendant wrote in the letter that he was able to obtain from 
this unknown person information that Hayes "did not kill [the 
victim], but is involved;" that Hayes told the unidentified 
inmate where the gun was; that before trial unidentified people 
 
 
 
The judge correctly determined that the proffered evidence 
constituted inadmissible hearsay.  In particular, the proffered 
testimony was based on inadmissible "layered" hearsay (i.e., the 
defendant stating what an unknown person said Hayes and other 
unidentified persons said).  See Commonwealth v. Caillot, 449 
Mass. 712, 721 (2007).  "[E]vidence based on a chain of 
statements is admissible only if each out-of-court assertion 
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule."  Commonwealth v. 
McDonough, 400 Mass. 639, 643 n.8 (1987), citing Bouchie v. 
Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527-531 (1978).  To the extent that the 
unknown inmate's statements do not offer the source of his 
information, the statements have no reliability.  The 
information also amounts to nothing more than speculation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 296 (2012).  The 
defendant's testimony on these subjects was properly excluded. 
 
In addition, the defendant's opinion concerning who had 
planted the gun was properly excluded because it called for 
speculation and was not based on personal knowledge given that 
the defendant was in jail at the time the gun was planted in the 
paint can.  See Commonwealth v. Santos, supra.  Further, even if 
the defendant had been permitted to testify how and when he 
learned that the gun had been planted in the paint can, how he 
                                                                  
were going to "leak" to police that the defendant had the gun 
and "leak" its location; and that Hayes was "making money on 
it." 
 
 
believed that information to be true, and who he believed 
planted the gun inside the paint can, that information did not 
inculpate Hayes as the shooter so the exclusion of this evidence 
would have been harmless.  Last, admission of this evidence 
could have hurt the defendant.  The unknown inmate said that 
Hayes had not killed the victim.  See note 17, supra.  The 
reference in the letter to Hayes's having being "involved" may 
have meant a cover-up after the fact or participation in the 
event underlying the killing (a drug transaction according to 
the defendant), but the reference was hardly clear.  Cf.  
Commonwealth v. Alammani, 439 Mass. at 611-612 (judge properly 
excluded hearsay evidence to show that defendant's mother 
committed crime; evidence consisted of mother's statements which 
were vague and "could have had any number of meanings"). 
 
c.  Consciousness of guilt.  Evidence of flight, 
concealment, false statements to police, destruction or 
concealment of evidence, bribing or threatening witnesses, or 
similar conduct, generally is admissible as some evidence of 
consciousness of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 
449, 453 (2008).  "[C]onsciousness of guilt, together with other 
evidence, may establish guilt."  Commonwealth v. Epsom, 399 
Mass. 254, 259 (1987), citing Commonwealth v. Porter, 384 Mass. 
647, 653 (1981).  When the Commonwealth has introduced 
consciousness of guilt evidence, a defendant may rebut it.  See 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 375 Mass. 274, 277-278 (1978), and cases 
cited; Commonwealth v. Chase, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 578, 580-581 
(1988).  To the extent a defendant offers consciousness of 
innocence evidence, "[s]uch evidence is [typically] of little 
value" because of the variety of possible motives behind the 
conduct, Commonwealth v. Oeun Lam, 420 Mass. 615, 620 (1995), 
but when admitted, it is "properly left to the give and take of 
argument, without jury instructions."  Id. at 619.  The 
relevancy and admissibility of both types of evidence is within 
the discretion of the trial judge. 
 
The defendant testified that, after he received a telephone 
call from Hayes on November 23, he fled to Georgia.  He 
testified that when he left, he was in fear of his life and the 
lives of his family, and that he was fleeing from Hayes and not 
the police.  He stated that he did not go to the police because 
he was afraid because Hayes had threatened him and his family at 
the time of the murder and after by racking a shotgun at him.  
The defendant testified that he disguised his appearance and 
abandoned his automobile along the way, leaving a note with it 
for the purpose of informing the police that they needed "to 
keep looking for [the victim's] killer." 
 
The defendant argues that he should have been permitted, in 
rebutting the Commonwealth's consciousness of guilt evidence of 
his flight, to testify to the content of Hayes's telephone call 
 
 
to him as well as the content of the note he had left with his 
automobile.  He also contends that he should have been able to 
testify that, once arrested, he wished to speak to police.  
Last, he asserts that defense counsel should have been permitted 
to ask him and Trooper Cherven questions about the defendant's 
then attorney "having contacted police to raise safety 
concerns," which the defendant asserts was relevant to his 
fearful state of mind and rebutted the Commonwealth's 
consciousness of guilt evidence.  The defendant properly 
preserved objections to these claims of error. 
 
The content of Hayes's telephone call was not offered for 
its truth, but rather insofar as relevant to the issue raised 
here, to explain why the defendant fled to Georgia.  On the 
record, however, no prejudice to the defendant resulted from the 
exclusion of this evidence.  The jury heard that Hayes had 
threatened the defendant (and his family) at the time of the 
murder, and after it by racking a shotgun at him.  The jury also 
heard that the defendant, shortly after receiving the call from 
Hayes, left the Commonwealth in a fearful state and in order to 
evade Hayes, not police.  The jury reasonably could have 
inferred from this evidence that the defendant had fled, in 
part, due to a threat made by Hayes during that telephone call. 
 
There was no error in the exclusion of the defendant's 
note, which was written after the murder and essentially 
 
 
amounted to consciousness of innocence evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 602-603 (2012); 
Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 87 (1962); Commonwealth v. 
Henry, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 432-433 (1994). 
 
Similarly, the fact that the defendant wished to speak to 
police on his arrest also constituted consciousness of innocence 
evidence and was properly excluded.  The sincerity of the 
defendant's request reasonably could be construed as unreliable.  
See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 88 (2002) 
(defendant's offer to submit to polygraph examination as 
evidence of consciousness of innocence inadmissible).  The 
defendant's remaining claims of error, relating to his attempts 
through an attorney to have his family receive protection, fall 
into this same category.18 
 
The next set of errors that the defendant raises relate to 
instances where the judge precluded him from explaining why he 
had engaged in a scheme to plant the gun. 
 
Some background is in order.  The defendant testified that 
Hayes was the shooter.  The gun used was the defendant's, but it 
was not recovered until 2009.  Following the murder and pursuant 
                     
 
18 We add that with respect to this evidence coming in 
through Trooper Cherven, the concern for the defendant's 
family's safety appeared to have come from the defendant's 
stepfather, and not from the defendant.  Thus, the evidence had 
no bearing on the defendant's state of mind or consciousness of 
innocence. 
 
 
to a warrant, the police searched the defendant's home and 
premises, but did not recover the gun.  The Commonwealth 
presented evidence that the defendant had been involved in a 
scheme involving others to have the gun planted "back" on Hayes.  
See note 6, supra.  As indicated previously, Trooper Cherven 
testified that, based on the date the paint can had been 
manufactured and the fact that the defendant was incarcerated at 
that time, police did not believe that the defendant was the 
person who had placed the gun in the paint can. 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding a 
letter (mentioned supra in connection with third-party culprit 
evidence) that was written by the defendant to his stepfather 
when the defendant was in jail awaiting trial.  The letter 
contained layered hearsay (namely, what an unknown inmate told 
the defendant that Hayes had told the unknown inmate) and was 
inherently unreliable.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 
at 88. 
 
Nor did the judge abuse her discretion in refusing to 
permit the defendant to testify who he believed possessed the 
gun after the murder.  The defendant did not have personal 
knowledge of that information and the question called for 
speculation.  See Olson v. Ela, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 167. 
 
The defendant next argues that he should have been 
permitted to testify how he had learned of the emergence of the 
 
 
gun.  The basis of his expected testimony, as revealed in the 
ensuing sidebar, was the information in the letter to his 
stepfather involving what the unknown inmate had stated that 
Hayes had told him.  See note 17, supra.  The judge properly 
excluded the evidence.  The information derived from layered 
hearsay and did not involve facts known to the defendant based 
on his personal knowledge.  Also, the information concerning how 
the defendant came to know of the emergence of the gun was not 
relevant to why he had engaged in a scheme to plant the gun on 
Hayes, the latter inquiry being relevant evidence to refute 
consciousness of guilt.  In this regard, the defendant was 
permitted to testify why he had engaged in the scheme, namely, 
that he did so in order to "put [the gun] back to where it 
belonged." 
 
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that his 
defense counsel was impermissibly prohibited from eliciting from 
a former inmate, Gerald Menard, when the defendant first raised 
the issue of the gun emerging to corroborate the fact that the 
defendant did not know about the gun at an earlier date.  Menard 
testified that the issue first arose in letters written to him 
by the defendant within a week or two from when he (Menard) had 
been released from jail, which was in October, 2009. 
 
The defendant claims that he should have been able to 
introduce statements he made to various individuals that could 
 
 
have been construed as consistent with his claim of innocence.  
The statements either maintained that Hayes had been the killer 
or that the defendant had stated he was innocent or never said 
that he had killed the victim.  The evidence was classic 
consciousness of innocence evidence, and the judge acted within 
her discretion in excluding it.  See Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 
Mass. 687, 698 (2008). 
 
d.  Other evidentiary errors.  The defendant argues that 
other errors deprived him a fair trial.  The judge did not 
impermissibly preclude defense counsel from asking Trooper 
Cherven whether the manner of the victim's killing, being 
repeatedly shot, indicated hatred.  The question impermissibly 
called for speculation.  See Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 379 
Mass. at 656. 
 
The defendant argues that it was error to exclude evidence 
of the victim's toxicology screening because the presence of 
certain drugs in his system at the time of his death bore on 
whether he was able to experience pain and suffering, thus 
preventing the jury from finding extreme atrocity or cruelty.  A 
case of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or 
cruelty may be proved by any one or more of the factors set 
forth in Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  
See Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 431 (2003).  Here, 
there was significant disproportion between the means necessary 
 
 
to cause death and those used, and a significant number of 
extensive wounds, thus establishing at least two of the Cunneen 
factors.  The possibility that the degree of the victim's 
suffering may have been impaired by drug use would not have 
prevented the jury from finding extreme atrocity or cruelty 
based on these other factors.  In these circumstances and on 
this record, no prejudice to the defendant arose. 
 
The record belies the defendant's contention that the judge 
refused to allow defense counsel to question the defendant's 
stepfather regarding his cooperation agreement with the 
Commonwealth.  The judge prohibited only one question and 
followed the governing principles set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 266 (1989), and Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 44 n.21 (2011).  There was no error. 
 
The defendant next contends that the judge allowed Trooper 
Cherven to improperly vouch for Hayes's credibility.  There was 
no improper vouching.  The full context of the exchange to which 
the defendant cites demonstrates that Trooper Cherven was not 
expressing his personal belief in Hayes's credibility, but 
rather summarized the fruits of the investigation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ahart, 464 Mass. 437, 442-443 (2013).  Our 
conclusion applies equally to the remaining challenged 
testimony, noting that such testimony occurred in the context of 
rebutting the claims of an inadequate investigation. 
 
 
 
The defendant's next argument is that the judge refused to 
permit him to answer questions and fully explain his financial 
relationship with the victim.  Again, the defendant fails to 
present the full picture of the part of the record to which he 
cites.  Regarding the first exchange to which the defendant 
objects, the defendant's answers were not responsive to the 
Commonwealth's questions and the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in attempting to move the trial along.  As to the 
second objectionable exchange, which occurred during redirect 
examination, the defendant improperly sought to introduce 
statements that he had made to the victim or statements that the 
victim had made to him.  Such statements amounted to 
inadmissible hearsay and were properly excluded.  See 
Commonwealth v. Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 350 (2003). 
 
2.  Defendant's closing argument.  The evidence at trial 
established that the victim was known to carry a pistol and not 
a revolver.  The defendant argues that his trial counsel's 
mistaken reference, in his closing argument, to the victim being 
known to carry a revolver as opposed to a gun or to a pistol19 
served to contradict the evidence suggesting that the victim was 
known to carry the defendant's .40 caliber gun.  The mistaken 
                     
 
19 There was no dispute at trial that the murder weapon was 
a .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol that was owned by the 
defendant.  The term "pistol" was used synonymously with the 
term "gun" throughout the trial. 
 
 
reference, the defendant asserts, undermined his defense, 
prejudiced his trial, and created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
For claims of ineffective of assistance of counsel in a 
capital case, which essentially is the essence of the 
defendant's claim, we review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
determine whether there exists a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 
244 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974).  Errors that arguably occur during the closing arguments 
of counsel must be "considered in the context of the entire 
argument, and in light of the judge's instructions to the jury 
and the evidence at trial."  Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 
319, 333-334 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 
412 Mass. 224, 231 (1992). 
 
Although the defendant's trial counsel initially 
incorrectly used the term "revolver," in the very next sentence, 
regarding whether the victim was licensed to carry a firearm, he 
referenced the term "gun."  Both terms, when viewing defense 
counsel's use of terminology in context, referenced the same 
thing, namely the firearm used by the victim.  Any possible 
confusion that may have arisen was cured by the judge's charge 
to the jury that explained that the arguments of counsel are not 
evidence, the jurors are to decide the case based on the 
 
 
evidence, the collective recollection of the jurors of what 
comprises the evidence is to control, and the jurors are the 
sole and exclusive judges of the facts.  In these circumstances, 
we conclude that the isolated misstatement did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
3.  Judge's response to jury question.  During 
deliberations, the jury asked the judge:  "Could defense 
[counsel] have called Kevin Hayes as a witness?"  Over the 
defendant's objection, the judge replied:  "Jurors, if 
available, a witness can be called by either party.  However, a 
defendant is not required to produce evidence, as the burden of 
proof is on the Commonwealth, the prosecution."20 
 
The defendant contends that the jury's question had no 
relevance or application unless the jury sought to determine 
whether the defense had an option to call Hayes and, if so, to 
ascribe weight to the defendant's failure to produce him at 
trial.  As a result, the defendant argues that the judge's 
response improperly permitted the jury to draw a negative 
inference against the defendant for his failure to call Hayes, 
and improperly placed a burden on the defendant to produce 
evidence.  Last, the defendant asserts that the error was 
                     
 
20 Defense counsel preferred the judge's initial proposed 
response, namely that she could not "inquire of the defense as 
to whether they could call any witnesses."  Such a statement, 
however, is not accurate or complete. 
 
 
compounded by repeated improper burden-shifting remarks made by 
the prosecutor in his closing argument. 
 
"The proper response to a jury question must remain within 
the discretion of the trial judge, who has observed the evidence 
and the jury firsthand and can tailor supplemental instructions 
accordingly."  Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 488 
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 n.11 
(1996).  "[B]efore a judge responds to a jury communication of 
legal significance . . . , counsel should be given the 
opportunity to assist the judge in framing an appropriate 
response and to place on record any objection they might have to 
the course chose by the judge."  Commonwealth v. Floyd P., 415 
Mass. 826, 833 (1993).  The judge's additional instructions 
"must be read in light of the entire charge," and the judge is 
"not required to repeat all aspects of [her] prior charge."  
Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 233-234 (1980). 
 
Here, the jury's question, and the judge's response, took 
on significance because at trial the judge declined to give the 
defendant's missing witness instruction regarding Hayes because 
the Commonwealth had legitimate tactical reasons for not calling 
him and he had been equally available to both sides, but neither 
 
 
side wished to call him.21  See Commonwealth v. Salentino, 449 
Mass. 657, 668 (2007); Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 
199 (1992), S.C., 422 Mass. 72 (1996).  She permitted, however, 
defense counsel to comment on the Commonwealth's failure to call 
him as a witness, which he did.  This was error.  Commonwealth 
v. Salentino, supra at 671 (if judge determines missing witness 
adverse inference is not appropriate in case, jury should not, 
whether by way of instruction or argument, be given option of 
drawing inference).  No prejudice arose to the defendant, 
however, because he "got more than he was entitled to in the 
first place."  Id. at 672. 
 
In these circumstances, the judge's response did not 
prejudice the defendant.  The judge followed appropriate 
procedures by consulting with counsel.  Her supplemental 
instruction, when viewed in light of the entire charge, would 
not have resulted in shifting the burden of proof to the 
defendant and would not have permitted the jury to draw an 
adverse inference against the defendant for not calling Hayes as 
a witness.  In her supplemental instruction and repeatedly in 
her earlier charge to the jury, the judge forcefully instructed 
                     
 
21 The underlying reasons concerning the Commonwealth's 
decision were not expressly stated on the record, nor was any 
explanation given concerning Hayes's availability. 
 
 
the jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proof.22  
Although the usual practice is for a judge expressly to instruct 
the jury not to draw inferences from the failure of a defendant 
to call a witness, see Commonwealth v. Franklin, 366 Mass. 284, 
293 (1974), quoting Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162, 167 
(1889), and that would have been the better practice here, a 
reasonable juror would not have construed the judge's 
instructions as permitting the jury to draw such an inference.  
We add also that the jury would not have known whether Hayes had 
been "available" to have been called.  Thus, the jury could not 
have inferred that he was available to be called by the defense 
to testify.  Examining the supplemental instruction in light of 
this factor and the circumstances, as well as the charge as a 
whole, we conclude that no prejudicial error occurred. 
 
We consider next whether the judge's response to the jury 
question was compounded by alleged improper burden-shifting 
                     
 
22 In her earlier charge, the judge also instructed as 
follows: 
 
 
"Jurors, the defendant in this case, as in every 
criminal case, is presumed innocent.  You as jurors must 
bear in mind that the law never imposes on a defendant in a 
criminal case the burden or the duty of calling any witness 
or indeed of presenting any evidence whatsoever.  This 
legal presumption of the defendant's innocence is not an 
idle theory to be discarded or disposed of by the jury by 
caprice, passion, or prejudice.  Furthermore, the defendant 
is not to be found guilty of these charges on suspicion or 
conjecture, but only on evidence produced and admitted 
before you, the jury, in this courtroom; evidence which 
establishes his guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
 
language in the prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
challenges the following statements of the prosecutor: 
 
"Now we get to the critical time frame. . . .  If 
somehow you think [that the defendant's] telling the truth 
about that . . .  now we hear, 'Oh, Kevin Hayes is 
outside.'  Again, the defendant absolutely doesn't have to 
prove anything.  This is the burden of the Commonwealth.  
This is what this country is all about.  But he got up 
there and can't prove that.  Kevin Hayes." 
 
 
"Car's backed in.  November night.  Windows down.  
Consistent with someone knowing the person?  Victim sitting 
in the seat.  Someone smoking outside, I would ask you to 
find.  Notice how [the defendant] conveniently says, 'I 
left five to six cigarettes there.  I was smoking.'  He 
knows that [a] cigarette was there.  Chief Walsh said it 
could have been up to a day.  It is not unreasonable for 
you to find, in fact very reasonable, he is puffing his 
Parliament Lights, not Parliament, chatting with the 
victim.  The victim's at ease, or sitting in his car.  He's 
got the murder weapon, knows how to use it. . . .  The only 
evidence of anything going on in that parking lot is him 
smoking and the victim executed.  There's no evidence of 
Kelly Croce or Kevin Hayes or whoever he wants; the 
Outlaws." 
 
 
"There's not one shred of credible evidence [that] 
Kevin Hayes was involved in anything.  There's not one -- 
the fact that [the loanshark] said, 'Oh, you ought to look 
at Kevin Hayes.'  Said he was kidding.  This is his sister 
whose husband was murdered.  Because he didn't like him or 
said, 'I don't like the guy,' he's going to kill him?  That 
is a smoke screen and a diversion, which is what [the 
defendant] is all about.  There is no evidence." 
 
The defendant did not object to these statements at trial.  We 
therefore review to determine whether the statements were 
improper, and if so, whether they created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140 (2007).  "We consider the remarks in 
 
 
the context of the entire argument, and in light of the judge's 
instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."  Id., 
citing Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 746 (1990). 
 
Generally, a prosecutor "cannot make statements that shift 
the burden of proof from the Commonwealth to the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 240 (1989).  Such 
burden shifting typically arises where a prosecutor offers 
direct comment on the defendant's decision not to testify, see 
Commonwealth v. Feroli, 407 Mass. 405, 409 (1990), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 324 (1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 955 (1980), or "calls the jury's attention to the 
defendant's failure to call a witness or witnesses, or . . . 'to 
contradict testimony.'"  Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 
776, 787 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 
117 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  In these cases 
"the prosecution is signaling to the jury that the defendant has 
an affirmative duty to bring forth evidence of his innocence, 
thereby lessening the Commonwealth's burden to prove every 
element of a crime."  Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, supra.  A 
prosecutor, however, "is entitled to emphasize the strong points 
of the Commonwealth's case and the weaknesses of the defendant's 
case."  Commonwealth v. Feroli, supra. 
 
We conclude that the remarks were a proper reflection on 
the weakness of the defendant's case.  See Commonwealth v. 
 
 
Bregoli, 431 Mass. 265, 275-276 (2000).  In addition, the 
remarks must be reviewed in the context of the trial, in which 
the defendant testified to the fact and argued that Hayes had in 
fact committed the murder.  The prosecutor's remarks were an 
attempt to meet the Commonwealth's essential burden "to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the third-party culprit did not 
commit the crime."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 
801.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 879, 889 (2008) 
(prosecutor's comments were attempt to meet Commonwealth's 
burden of disproving self-defense).  Even if the remarks crossed 
the line, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
arose because the judge instructed the jury repeatedly that the 
Commonwealth bore the burden of proof, the defendant has no 
burden of producing any evidence or witnesses and is presumed 
innocent, and that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.  
See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. at 788; Commonwealth v. 
Bregoli, supra at 276.  Further, "[t]he fact that the defendant 
did not object, '[a]lthough not dispositive of the issue . . . 
is some indication that the tone [and] manner . . . of the now 
challenged aspects of the prosecutor's argument were not 
unfairly prejudicial.'"  Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 
380 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 375 
(1989). 
 
 
 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We discern no 
basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.