Title: P. v. Izaguirre
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S132980
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2007

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Filed 8/16/07 (follows in sequence companion case, S132605, also filed 8/16/07)  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S132980 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Ct.App. 2/2 B169352 
JOHNNY A. IZAGUIRRE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 ) 
Super. Ct. No. BA-232697 
 
 
 ) 
 
This is a companion case to People v. Sloan (Aug. 16, 2007, S132605) __ 
Cal.4th ___ (Sloan), also filed today.  Sloan holds that enhancement allegations 
may not be considered for purposes of the rule prohibiting multiple convictions 
based on necessarily included offenses, also referred to as the multiple conviction 
rule.  (See People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351 (Pearson).)  The holding in 
Sloan is consistent with this court’s recent decision in People v. Reed (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 1224 (Reed), which held that the legal elements test, rather than the 
accusatory pleading test, should be used in determining whether conviction of a 
charged offense is barred under the rule.  Since enhancements are not legal 
elements of the offenses to which they attach, they are not considered in defining 
necessarily included offenses under that test. 
Both this case and Sloan were decided in the Court of Appeal before we 
filed our decision in Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224.  The defendant in this matter 
raised an argument not considered in Reed.  He argues that under the high court’s 
 
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decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), as interpreted 
by this court in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 (Seel) in the context of 
federal double jeopardy jurisprudence, enhancements must be treated as legal 
elements under the multiple conviction rule.  We granted the petition for review to 
consider the argument, and his further assertion that certain firearm-related 
enhancements found true by the jury themselves must be stricken under the rule as 
necessarily included within his conviction of first degree, drive-by shooting 
murder. 
As will be explained, defendant’s arguments are without merit—the 
holdings in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, are 
inapposite here and have no impact on the rule announced in Reed, supra, 38 
Cal.4th 1224.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal, fully consistent with our 
decision in Reed, shall therefore be affirmed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts are not disputed.  In the early hours of June 1, 2002, as four 
unarmed young men were leaving an after-prom party in East Los Angeles, three 
vehicles approached them.  Words were exchanged, and some of the occupants of 
the cars displayed gang signs.  Defendant, who was seated in the front passenger 
seat of one of the vehicles, urged the young men to come closer, and then fired 
several shots.  Jose Bernal died as the result of a gunshot wound to the chest.  
Lionell Rivera sustained gunshot wounds to the arm and upper torso.  Jose Chavez 
was hit in the arm, and a bullet grazed his mouth.  Eric Garcia was not hit.  
Defendant was identified as the shooter by eyewitnesses, including two of the 
surviving victims and individuals who had been in the cars. 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder with 
personal firearm use causing death, with a special circumstance found true that the 
murder was intentional and perpetrated by the discharge of a firearm from a motor 
 
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vehicle.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d), 190.2, subd. (a)(21).)1  
He was also convicted of three counts of willful, deliberate and premeditated 
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), under one count of which it was found 
that he personally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (c)), and under the remaining counts of which it was found that he 
personally discharged a firearm.(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).  He was sentenced to life 
in prison without the possibility of parole with a firearm enhancement of 25 years 
to life on the murder count, and to concurrent life terms, one with a 25-year-to-life 
firearm enhancement, and two with 20-year firearm enhancements, for the 
attempted murders.2 
The Court of Appeal granted rehearing to consider defendant’s claims that 
under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, as interpreted by this court’s recent decision 
in Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, neither the firearm discharge enhancement under 
the murder count nor the firearm-related enhancements under the attempted 
murder counts could be imposed, and indeed should have been stricken rather than 
imposed or stayed, because they were all necessarily included within the 
conviction of first degree murder with a drive-by shooting special circumstance.  
In a modified opinion after rehearing, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s 
claims.  We granted his petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant argued in the Court of Appeal that the trial court was precluded 
from imposing the various firearm-related enhancements, whether attached to the 
murder count or attempted murder counts, and further, that the trial court at 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
Additional enhancements unrelated to defendant’s claims under the 
multiple conviction rule were also found true; some were stayed, some were struck 
by the Court of Appeal on unrelated grounds. 
 
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sentencing should have struck the enhancements rather than imposed or stayed 
them, because the fact of firearm use had already been established through his 
conviction of first degree, drive-by shooting murder.3 
In this case, then, in contrast to the arguments and holding in Pearson, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d 35, Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, Sloan, supra, __ Cal.4th __, 
and other multiple-conviction-rule cases, defendant is arguing that enhancements 
themselves, rather than the convictions to which they attach, are subject to being 
struck under the multiple conviction rule.  His argument is that, under Apprendi, 
supra, 530 U.S. 466, conduct enhancements are to be treated like offenses for 
purposes of fundamental due process, including the right to jury trial and the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Based on this court’s statement 
in Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, that “ ‘Apprendi treated the crime together with its 
sentence enhancement as the “functional equivalent” of a single “greater” crime’ ” 
(id. at p. 539, fn. 2), defendant argues that conduct enhancements must be treated 
like necessarily included offenses for purposes of the multiple conviction rule. 
As the Court of Appeal below observed, “In effect, [defendant] asks us to 
hold, pursuant to Apprendi, that when a defendant is convicted of first degree 
murder on a theory of drive-by shooting, a firearm discharge enhancement or 
firearm use enhancement can never be imposed, although found true by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The court went on to reject defendant’s claim.4 
                                              
3  
In view of defendant’s life without possibility of parole sentence for first 
degree, drive-by special-circumstance murder, his claim under the multiple 
conviction rule, as a practical matter, is moot. 
4  
Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, which held that the accusatory pleading test 
is not applicable in this context, had not yet been decided.  However, in People v. 
Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, this court held that enhancements are not considered 
part of the accusatory pleading to begin with.  (Id. at pp. 96, 100-101.)  Arguably, 
Wolcott itself resolves the issue in this case and Sloan, but defendants in both 
cases seek to distinguish Wolcott on the ground it involved the specific question 
 
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Our decision in Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, explains that “Under the 
[legal] elements test, if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of 
the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the 
former.  Under the accusatory pleading test, if the facts actually alleged in the 
accusatory pleading include all of the elements of the lesser offense, the latter is 
necessarily included in the former.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 1227-1228.)  Reed held 
that “Courts should consider the statutory elements and accusatory pleading in 
deciding whether a defendant received notice, and therefore may be convicted, of 
an uncharged crime, but only the statutory elements in deciding whether a 
defendant may be convicted of multiple charged crimes.”  (Id. at p. 1231.)  Here 
we are concerned with charged crimes and enhancements.  The legal elements 
test, not the accusatory pleading test, applies. 
We nonetheless had no occasion in Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, to 
consider defendant’s argument that even under the legal elements test, Apprendi, 
supra, 530 U.S. 466, and Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, together require conduct 
enhancements to be treated the same as legal elements for the purpose of defining 
necessarily included offenses under the multiple conviction rule.  We agree with 
the Court of Appeal below that the argument is without merit. 
In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the high court held that “Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 490.)  The rule of Apprendi is grounded on the 
reasoning that “The federal Constitution requires the elements of a crime to be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt because they expose the defendant to 
                                                                                                                                      
 
whether enhancement allegations should be taken into account when identifying 
necessarily included offenses for which sua sponte instructions must be given. 
 
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punishment; likewise, the elements of a sentence enhancement must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt if there is exposure to increased punishment.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 325-326.)  The rule 
is compelled by the federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right to due process 
and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  (26 Cal.4th at p. 324.)  It is not grounded on principles of 
federal double jeopardy protection. 
Here, the firearm-related enhancements in question were submitted to the 
jury and found true beyond a reasonable doubt.  But, defendant argues, Apprendi 
requires more under this court’s interpretation of that decision in Seel. 
In Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, the defendant was convicted by a jury of 
attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)), and was found 
to have personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in connection with that 
offense.  (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).)  He argued on appeal that there was no 
substantial evidence of premeditation or deliberation.  The Court of Appeal 
agreed, concluding the finding of premeditation and deliberation had to be 
reversed, but further concluding the matter could be remanded for retrial on the 
penalty allegation under this court’s holding in People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 
652, 671 (Bright).  We granted review in Seel to consider the effect of Apprendi 
on our holding in Bright—that under the federal double jeopardy clause, a section 
664, subdivision (a) allegation prescribing a greater punishment for an attempt to 
commit murder that is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” merely constitutes a 
penalty provision, to which double jeopardy protection does not attach. 
Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, disapproved Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, on 
the double jeopardy point, observing that in Apprendi the high court stated, 
“‘[W]hen the term “sentence enhancement” is used to describe an increase beyond 
the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an 
 
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element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.’  
([Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S.] at p. 494, fn. 19.)”  (Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 
546-547.)  We reasoned in Seel that because the premeditation allegation (§ 664, 
subd. (a)), though designated a penalty provision in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 
page 669, “goes precisely to what happened in the ‘commission of the offense’ ” 
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 496) and effectively placed the defendant in 
jeopardy for an “offense” greater than attempted murder (id., at p. 494, fn. 19), the 
Court of Appeal’s finding of evidentiary insufficiency barred retrial of the 
allegation under the federal double jeopardy clause.  (Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 
pp. 548-549.) 
As defendant’s argument goes here, under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 
conduct enhancements are treated like offenses for purposes of fundamental due 
process, including the right to jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Based on Seel’s statement that “‘Apprendi treated the crime 
together with its sentence enhancement as the “functional equivalent” of a single 
“greater” crime’” (Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 539, fn. 2), such enhancements 
must now be treated like criminal offenses for purposes of sections 954 and 654, 
and the multiple conviction rule.  Defendant therefore claims the firearm-related 
enhancements alleged and found true under the murder and attempted murder 
counts are necessarily included within the offense of first degree, drive-by 
shooting murder and must be struck under the multiple conviction rule, even 
though they are not necessarily included offenses, and regardless of whether they 
were actually imposed as punishment at sentencing. 
We disagree with defendant.  Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and Seel, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, are inapposite to the issue posed here—whether 
enhancement allegations may be considered in defining necessarily included 
offenses for purposes of the multiple conviction rule.  To the extent the firearm-
 
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related enhancements in question stood to increase punishment, Apprendi’s 
holding, grounded on the Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial, requires only that they be tried to a jury and found 
true beyond a reasonable doubt, which they were.  Defendant’s argument 
overlooks the fact that the aspect of federal double jeopardy protection at issue in 
Seel is not implicated in this case.  As explained in Sloan, “ ‘[t]he Double 
Jeopardy Clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”  
[Citation.]’  (Brown v. Ohio (1977) 432 U.S. 161, 165, italics added.)  The first 
two categories of protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause . . . are . . . not 
implicated here. . . .”  (Sloan, supra, __ Cal.4th at pp. __-__ [pp. 11-12].) 
The first category of double jeopardy protection, the prohibition against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, is the constitutional 
provision that was directly implicated in Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535.  In light of 
Apprendi’s holding that enhancements that increase punishment must be treated as 
elements of an offense for purposes of Fifth and Sixth Amendment protection, we 
concluded in Seel, with regard to a second prosecution after acquittal, that our 
earlier holding in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652—that a section 664, 
subdivision (a) allegation, prescribing a greater punishment for an attempt to 
commit murder that is willful, deliberate, and premeditated, merely constitutes a 
penalty provision to which federal double jeopardy protection pertaining to retrial 
does not attach—must be disapproved. 
Our decision in Seel supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, explains that, “In contrast to a 
prior conviction allegation, a section [664, subdivision (a)] allegation requires the 
trier of fact to determine whether ‘the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated’ before imposing the term of life imprisonment with the 
 
9
possibility of parole.  ‘The defendant’s intent in committing a crime is perhaps as 
close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense “element.” ’  
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 493.)”  (Seel, at p. 549.)  We concluded the 
section 664, subdivision (a) allegation effectively placed the defendant in jeopardy 
for an “offense” greater than attempted murder, that it was tantamount to an 
element of the offense for purposes of Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis under 
Apprendi, and that the Court of Appeal’s finding of evidentiary insufficiency with 
respect to that “element” implicated the double jeopardy protection against retrial 
for the same offense after acquittal.  (Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 548-549, citing 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19.) 
Here, in contrast, the firearm-related enhancements did not serve to further 
characterize defendant’s intent in committing the drive-by shooting murder and 
attempted murders, nor effectively place defendant in jeopardy for an “offense” 
greater than the murder or the attempted murders with which he was charged, as 
was the case with the section 664, subdivision (a) enhancement in Seel.  The rule 
of Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, barring consideration of enhancements in 
defining necessarily included charged offenses under the multiple conviction rule 
does not implicate the double jeopardy clause’s protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction.  We are not here 
concerned with a retrial or “second prosecution,” but instead with a unitary trial in 
which section 954 expressly permits conviction of more than one crime arising out 
of the same act or course of conduct.  The exception to section 954 created in 
Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d 351, was specifically addressed to convictions of 
necessarily included offenses in a unitary proceeding that could lead to improper 
multiple punishments in contravention of section 654, not multiple enhancements 
 
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expressly authorized under other sentencing provisions.5  Nor does defendant’s 
claim that these conduct enhancements are the functional equivalent of completed 
offenses or convictions for purposes of the multiple conviction rule find any 
support in the case law.  Conduct enhancements cannot be imposed standing alone 
as additional punishment.  By definition, an enhancement is “an additional term of 
imprisonment added to the base term.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405 (3); 
People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101.)  For that reason alone, an 
enhancement cannot be equated with an offense.  (See People v. Chin (2003) 113 
Cal.App.4th 1260, 1265.) 
To the extent defendant claims enhancements should be considered when 
applying the multiple conviction rule to charged offenses, our holding in Reed, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th 1224, controls.  They may not.  Beyond that, Apprendi, supra, 
530 U.S. 466, requires only that the firearm-related enhancements below had to be 
found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, which they were.  Seel’s 
interpretation of the scope of the holding in Apprendi pertained to an aspect of 
federal double jeopardy protection—protection against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after acquittal—that is not implicated in this case.  (Seel, supra, 
34 Cal.4th at pp. 548-549.) 
                                              
5  
Section 12022.53, the statute authorizing the firearm-related enhancements 
here at issue (id., subds. (b) through (d)), itself contains provisions specifically 
addressed to the matter of multiple punishments arising from imposition of those 
enhancements.  (Id., subds. (f) through (j).) 
 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, and the matter remanded 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Izaguirre 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 3/8/05 – 2d Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S132980 
Date Filed: August 16, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Bob S. Bowers, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kristofer Jorstad, Jaime L. Fuster, Steven D. 
Matthews and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Edward H. Schulman 
9420 Reseda Boulevard, #530 
Northridge, CA  91324 
(818) 363-6906 
 
David F. Glassman 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2355