Title: Davis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 250, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RONALD J. DAVIS, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 250, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0909017385 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                       Submitted: June 8, 2011 
 
Decided:    July 27, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 27th day of July 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Ronald J. Davis, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s April 25, 2011 order denying his motion for 
correction of illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(a).  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the 
 
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Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in January 2010, Davis plead guilty to 
Escape in the Second Degree pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, 
wherein Davis admitted that he was eligible for sentencing as an habitual 
offender under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a).  Davis was sentenced as an 
habitual offender to 2 years of Level V incarceration, to be followed by 1 
year of Level III probation.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his Criminal 
Rule 35(a) motion for correction of illegal sentence, Davis claims that the 
Level III portion of his sentence should be stricken because he was 
sentenced to 2 years, and not 3 years at Level V. 
 
(4) 
Relief under Rule 35(a) is available where the sentence 
imposed exceeds the statutorily authorized limits, violates double jeopardy, 
is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, 
is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain as to its substance or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction 
did not authorize.2 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
 
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(5) 
The Superior Court had the authority to sentence Davis to 2 
years of Level V incarceration, as that is the maximum sentence permitted 
by Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1252 and 4205(b) (7).  Those statutes govern 
Class G felonies such as second degree escape.  Moreover, under Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 4204(1), the sentencing judge was required to impose an 
additional period of probation of not less than 6 months to facilitate the 
defendant’s transition back into society.  Under that statute, that 
probationary period may, at the discretion of the court, be in addition to the 
maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by the applicable criminal 
statute.  Nor does Davis’ probationary sentence of 1 year at Level III violate 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4333(b), which specifies maximum probationary 
terms for particular crimes.  Because Davis’ sentence was legal under Rule 
35(a), the Superior Court correctly denied his motion for correction of illegal 
sentence.   
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice