Title: Commonwealth v. Howard
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11128
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 2014

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SJC-11128 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CLYDE HOWARD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.    February 7, 2014. - October 2, 2014. 
 
Present:  Spina, Botsford, Gants, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Waiver of constitutional rights, Harmless error.  
Waiver.  Error, Harmless.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Prior misconduct, 
Argument by prosecutor, Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, 
Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Harmless error, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 19, 2009.  
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Wendie 
I. Gershengorn, J., and the cases were tried before her. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Jamie M. Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant, 
Clyde Howard, guilty of murder in the first degree on theories 
2 
 
of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  
The defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that:  (1) the 
motion judge erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress 
statements that he made to police both on the day of his arrest 
and on the following day during an interview with police; (2) 
the Commonwealth impermissibly focused on prior bad acts and 
character evidence during trial; (3) statements made by the 
prosecutor during his closing argument prejudiced the defendant 
and warrant a new trial; and (4) the jury instructions on mental 
impairment and the voluntariness of the defendant's statements 
were erroneous and warrant reversal of his convictions.  
Pursuant to our review of the entire case under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, we conclude that the erroneous admission of portions of 
the defendant's statement to the police, combined with other 
errors, require reversal of the defendant's conviction of murder 
in the first degree.  On remand, at the Commonwealth's option, a 
verdict of murder in the second degree may be entered in lieu of 
a new trial on the first degree murder indictment.  
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving other facts for later discussion.  On the 
morning of January 28, 2009, the victim, Maurice Ricketts, was 
                     
 
1 The jury also found the defendant guilty of unlawful 
possession of a firearm; unlawful possession of ammunition; and 
discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building.  The 
defendant does not contest those convictions in this appeal.  
 
3 
 
shot in the head and killed while at his job at Baystate Pool 
Supplies (Baystate), a pool supply distributor located in 
Cambridge.  He was shot by the defendant, who worked at Baystate 
as a handyman.   
 
Earlier that morning, at around 9 A.M., the defendant was 
asked by the Baystate branch manager Derek Roczynski and 
operations manager Michael Najarian, Jr., to buy breakfast for 
them at a local fast food restaurant.2  After breakfast, Najarian 
joined the victim in the warehouse known to Baystate employees 
as the "chemical building," located directly across the street 
from Baystate's offices and other warehouses.  Shortly after 10 
A.M., the defendant entered the front door of the chemical 
building carrying a bag of trash.  Singing and joking with 
Najarian as he passed, he walked down a pathway toward the back 
exit and out to the dumpster.  This outdoor area was known to 
employees as the "chemical backyard" (chemical yard).  After 
taking out the trash, the defendant returned through the 
chemical building and proceeded to leave through the front door, 
but then turned around, reentered, and exchanged words with the 
victim who was working nearby.  Najarian heard an "explosion of 
                     
 
2 The defendant claimed that after he returned from buying 
breakfast, and before the shooting took place, the victim came 
at him with a hammer.  At trial, Michael Najarian testified that 
the only hammers at Baystate Pool Supplies (Baystate) were 
located in his office.   
 
4 
 
yelling" between the defendant and victim, and he approached 
them, "scream[ing]" for them to stop.  Within moments, the 
defendant reached into his right pocket, pulled out a gun, and 
pointed it at the victim, who turned and ran through the 
warehouse toward the back door leading to the chemical yard.  
The defendant fired once, missing the victim, and then quickly 
followed him.  Najarian shouted twice at the defendant to "stop 
it"; each time, the defendant responded, "What?", but continued 
to pursue the victim while looking straight ahead toward the 
back door.   
 
After the two men ran out of the warehouse, Najarian ran to 
the company offices across the street where he alerted Roczynski 
and assistant manager James McGaffigan before telephoning 911.  
Roczynski and McGaffigan immediately ran toward the chemical 
building but heard shots coming from the chemical yard before 
they reached the building entrance.  They ran along the building 
toward the chemical yard and peered through an opening in the 
locked fence.  There, they saw the defendant facing the back of 
the dumpster with his arm outstretched and pointed slightly 
downward, and then heard two additional shots.  After each shot, 
Roczynski heard the victim make a grunting sound and, after the 
second, also heard the defendant mutter, "I got you."  Roczynski 
then shouted, "[W]hat the f are you doing"; the defendant 
briefly glared at him.  McGaffigan saw the defendant walk toward 
5 
 
the back door, stop, return to the dumpster area, and fire an 
additional shot.  Roczynski and McGaffigan returned to the 
entrance of the chemical building and Roczynski bumped into the 
defendant who was coming out of the door.  The defendant 
muttered, "I got to get out of here," ran to a white van, and 
drove away.   
 
Roczynski, McGaffigan, and other Baystate workers rushed to 
the chemical yard where they found the victim behind the 
dumpster, wedged between a stack of wood pallets.  He had 
suffered two gunshot wounds to the head.  Shortly thereafter, 
paramedics responded to the scene and, finding a faint pulse, 
transported him to the hospital.  During transport, the victim 
went into cardiac arrest, and medics performed cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation on him.  He was pronounced dead shortly after 
arriving at the emergency room.   
 
Later that day, at approximately 4 P.M., Sergeant Thomas J. 
Teahan of the Boston police department heard a radio broadcast 
to be on the lookout for the defendant in a white van in the 
Roxbury area.  Teahan, who was driving in Roxbury at the time, 
came across a van parked alongside the road that matched the 
description of the defendant's vehicle.  He called for backup, 
parked his vehicle to block the van, and approached the driver's 
side door on foot.  Teahan observed the defendant apparently 
asleep in the driver's seat with a cellular telephone at his 
6 
 
ear; he removed the defendant from the van and conducted a pat 
frisk to locate weapons.  When Teahan asked the defendant if he 
was carrying a firearm, he replied, "No, I threw it in the 
Charles River."  The defendant was then placed under arrest, 
handcuffed, and transported to the Boston police department 
station in Roxbury for initial booking (Roxbury booking).  At 
the station, Teahan read the defendant the Miranda rights and 
informed him that he was under arrest for murder.  During the 
booking, the defendant made several unsolicited statements to 
Teahan.   
 
Thereafter, State police Trooper Erik Gagnon and two 
Cambridge police officers transported the defendant to the 
Cambridge police department for further booking (Cambridge 
booking).  Gagnon detected the odor of alcohol on the 
defendant's breath, as well as slurred speech and a slightly 
unsteady gait while the defendant was walking, although he was 
not slipping, falling, or stumbling.  During the twenty-five 
minute ride to Cambridge, the officers did not ask the defendant 
any questions.  Nevertheless, the defendant made several 
unsolicited statements about the events that had transpired 
earlier in the day.  At around 5:15 P.M., the defendant arrived 
at the Cambridge police department where he was booked, his 
clothing was taken, and he was placed in a cell.  Thereafter, 
Gagnon and his colleagues decided that because the defendant 
7 
 
appeared "somewhat impaired," they would wait until the 
following morning to interview him.  The next morning, at 
approximately 6:30 A.M., Gagnon and Detective Daniel McNeill of 
the Cambridge police department interviewed the defendant.  
 
At trial, the defendant did not dispute that he shot and 
killed the victim.  He did not testify but presented evidence to 
show that, because of a mental impairment, he lacked the 
capacity to commit murder in the first degree at the time of the 
killing.  In particular, the defendant introduced the testimony 
of Dr. Robert Joss, a certified forensic psychologist, who 
opined that at the time of the killing the defendant had an Axis 
II personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with obsessive 
compulsive, schizoid, and paranoid features.  Joss characterized 
the defendant as having a "substantial disorder of perception, 
particularly the perception of the sort of social interactions 
that grossly impaired his judgment."  Therefore, whether the 
defendant actually was threatened or intimidated by the victim 
on the day of the killing was immaterial because the defendant 
was "predisposed to perceive [the victim] as threatening."  
Overall, Joss concluded that at the time of the killing, the 
defendant had a diminished capacity to form the intent necessary 
to premeditate deliberately or to act with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, as well as more generally the intent necessary for 
malice.    
8 
 
 
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Dr. Alison Fife, a 
psychiatrist, who testified to her opinion that at the time of 
the killing, the defendant was not suffering from any mental 
illness, mental defect, or personality disorder, and had the 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts.   
 
2.  Motion to suppress.  Before trial, the defendant moved 
to suppress statements he made after his arrest on January 28, 
2009, on the ground that they were involuntary due to his 
intoxication; he also argued that the statements made during his 
interview with police on January 29 were obtained in violation 
of his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), and his constitutional right against self-incrimination.3  
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge, who was the 
trial judge, denied the motion.  The defendant argues that the 
denial constituted error.   
 
a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
                     
 
3 The defendant argued as well that his right to a prompt 
arraignment under Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48 (1996), 
was violated because the police initially failed to advise him 
of this right and later obtained a waiver by "trickery."  The 
motion judge rejected the argument, reasoning that there was no 
Rosario violation because its safe harbor window did not begin 
to run until the defendant became sober and, in any event, the 
defendant executed a valid waiver of his Rosario rights.  See 
Rosario, supra at 56-57.  The defendant does not challenge the 
judge's ruling on appeal.  We agree with the judge's analysis, 
and do not consider the issue further.    
 
9 
 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of [her] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002).  We "make an independent 
determination of the correctness of the judge's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).  Here, in 
addition to testimony, the motion judge considered videotape 
evidence of the defendant's Cambridge booking on January 28 and 
of his interview with police on January 29.  Thus, "to the 
extent that the judge based [her] legal conclusions on facts 
found by virtue of a video recording, 'we are in the same 
position as the judge in viewing the videotape,'" and 
independently review it without deference to the motion judge.4  
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 341 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 578 n.7 (1995).   
 
b.  January 28, 2009, statements.  The defendant does not 
dispute that the statements he made at the time of his arrest, 
transport, and the Roxbury booking were spontaneous and not 
                     
 
4 However, to the extent that the motion judge relied on 
testimony and videotape evidence to make credibility 
determinations relevant to her subsidiary findings of fact, we 
"adhere to the normal standard of review . . . [and] afford such 
findings substantial deference, and accept them unless not 
warranted by the evidence" (citations and quotations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 341 (2012). 
 
10 
 
obtained through police questioning, and that therefore Miranda 
protections did not apply.5  See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 422 Mass. 
269, 271 (1996).  His sole argument is that, because he was 
intoxicated, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that his statements were voluntary.  
"The test for voluntariness is 'whether, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement, the will of the defendant was overborne to the extent 
that the statement was not the result of a free and voluntary 
act.'"  Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 595-596 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 483-484 (1998).  
Relevant factors "include whether promises or other inducements 
were made to the defendant by the police, as well as the 
defendant's age, education, and intelligence; experience with 
                     
 
5 The defendant's unsolicited statements made on January 28, 
2009, may be summarized as follows.  At the Roxbury booking, 
after learning from Sergeant Thomas J. Teahan that he would be 
charged with murder, the defendant stated:  "Oh, the individual 
transpired, huh?"; he further told Teahan, "I am not a bad guy.  
[The victim] is always fucking with me . . . [h]e's always 
grabbing me and slapping me like I'm a woman."  The defendant 
also said that the victim told him to "[p]ull your knife.  I'll 
knock you the fuck out," and that the defendant said that he 
"just went into a rage.  I know I should have known better.  He 
died, huh?  My life is pretty much over, don't you think?"  
Thereafter, the defendant was transported to Cambridge, and he 
made the following statements to Trooper Erik Gagnon during the 
twenty-five minute drive:  "I was fed up with the individual"; 
"My goose is cooked"; "If I thought this out better, I would 
have gotten a passport and made a run for it"; and "I know I'm 
going to jail, but can we drive around for a while and talk?" 
  
11 
 
the criminal justice system; and his physical and mental 
condition, including whether the defendant was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol."  Durand, supra at 596.  The mere 
presence of one or more factors "is not always sufficient to 
render the statements involuntary."  Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 
Mass. 656, 664 (1995).  Further, although "special care must be 
taken to assess the voluntariness of a defendant's statement 
where there is evidence that he was under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, an 'otherwise voluntary act is not necessarily 
rendered involuntary simply because an individual has been 
drinking or using drugs.'"  Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Mass. 
620, 627 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 
678, 685 (2001). 
 
Considering these factors, the motion judge found the 
defendant's statements to be voluntary.  There was no error.  
The defendant indisputably showed signs of intoxication.6  
However, as the motion judge found (and as the videotape of the 
Cambridge booking confirms), the defendant was not so 
intoxicated that he was stumbling or falling down -- he followed 
                     
 
6 The officers who interacted with the defendant testified, 
and the motion judge credited their testimony, that they 
detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant and observed his 
slurred speech, unsteady walking, and glassy, bloodshot eyes at 
various points from his arrest at around 4 P.M. through his 
arrival at the Cambridge police department after 5 P.M.  A 
review of the videotape of the Cambridge booking corroborates 
the testimony. 
 
12 
 
commands, answered questions, carried on conversations, and 
stood, walked, and removed his clothing without assistance.  
Further, during that booking, the defendant acknowledged that he 
had received the Miranda rights earlier and asked questions 
about his location, the charges against him, and what would 
happen to him next; all of this signifies that he was lucid, 
cognizant of his surroundings, and had some appreciation of the 
gravity of his situation.7  We agree with the motion judge's 
conclusion, "put in different terms by her, that 'although the 
defendant may have been somewhat intoxicated when he spoke to 
the police, his mind was rational and his faculties were under 
control.'"  Commonwealth v. Koney, 421 Mass. 295, 305 (1995), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 417 Mass. 60, 65 (1994).   
                     
 
7 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 627 (2012) 
(although defendant's speech was "sluggish" from influence of 
drugs, his statements were voluntary where "there [was] nothing 
to suggest that he was acting irrationally or was out of 
control, or that his denials were induced by psychological 
coercion"); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 417 Mass. 60, 65-66 (1994) 
(defendant's speech was slurred due to intoxication, but his 
statements were voluntary when police could understand him, he 
walked without difficulty, and appeared to understand 
situation); Commonwealth v. Liptak, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 80-82 
(2011) (although defendant was intoxicated, his statements were 
voluntary because he was alert, coherent, understood and 
answered questions asked of him, and spoke cogently).  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Hosey, 368 Mass. 571, 578-579 (1975) (defendant 
did not intelligently waive Miranda rights when his level of 
intoxication rendered him "extremely high," "extremely 
emotional," and "detached from reality").   
 
13 
 
 
c.  January 29, 2009, statements.  The defendant further 
argues that his motion to suppress was erroneously denied 
because, when police interviewed him on January 29, 2009, the 
officers obtained statements from him in violation of his rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.   
 
(i)  Initial Miranda warnings.  Finding the defendant awake 
and alert in his cell the morning after his arrest, Detective 
McNeill and Trooper Gagnon asked him if he would agree to be 
interviewed and, after obtaining consent, brought him to an 
interview room.  He was given coffee and a bagel, and his 
handcuffs were removed.  At the outset, McNeill, who conducted 
the majority of the interview, read the defendant the Miranda 
rights.  After the defendant indicated that he understood those 
rights, the following exchange occurred:  
 
Detective McNeill:  "Having these [Miranda] rights in mind, 
do you wish to speak to us now?"  
 
 
Defendant:  "Yeah, but -- yes, I'll speak to you but 
there's certain things that might be kind of like sensitive --"  
 
 
McNeill:  "Okay."  
 
 
Defendant:  "-- that may jeopardize me because my rights 
has been read and --"  
 
 
McNeill:  "I understand that."  
 
 
Defendant:  "And then say hey look [inaudible] the rest of 
[inaudible]." 
14 
 
 
 
McNeill:  "Again, I'm going to ask you to initial right 
here.  Right here where it says -- right here under your 
previous initials and sign right here on the line.  Just sign 
your name right there."   
 
The defendant then signed the Miranda waiver form and permitted 
the interview to be recorded.   
 
The officers began by asking the defendant about his 
upbringing, family, education, and employment.  After about 
fifteen minutes, McNeill stopped the interview and read the 
defendant a form explaining his right to prompt arraignment 
under Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996).  The 
defendant signed a Rosario waiver form and agreed to continue 
speaking with the officers but also stated that he "would kind 
of deviate from the more sensitive matters."  
 
On appeal, the defendant claims that his waivers of the 
right to remain silent in response to the administration of 
Miranda rights were conditional rather than unequivocal, and as 
a result, the officers were obligated to seek further 
clarification from him before proceeding with the interview.  At 
least with respect to the defendant's initial Miranda waiver, we 
disagree.8  The motion judge found that the defendant's words, 
"Yes, I'll speak with you," and his signature of the Miranda 
                     
 
8 The defendant's second Miranda waiver occurred after he 
invoked his right to remain silent; we consider that invocation 
in the following section of this opinion. 
 
15 
 
waiver signified an unequivocal, knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver of his right to silence.9  There was no error.  
The statement by the defendant that he may want to "deviate" 
from more "sensitive" matters merely indicated that he 
understood that he could invoke the right to remain silent, and 
might choose to do so, in the future.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 265 (1982) ("defendant has not only the 
right to remain silent from the beginning but also a continuing 
right to cut off, at any time, any questioning that does take 
place").  Accordingly, the officers were not obligated to seek 
clarification, at the time of the defendant's waiver.  See 
Clarke, 461 Mass. at 351-352.   
 
(ii)  Postwaiver statements.  After waiving his Miranda 
rights, the defendant spoke openly with the officers for 
approximately forty-five minutes, answering all questions asked 
of him.  As questioning progressed, the conversation became 
increasingly focused on the defendant's prior relationship with 
the victim and the moments leading up to the shooting.  After 
                     
 
9 This conclusion has a strong evidentiary basis in the 
record:  the defendant was alert and showed no signs of 
intoxication during the interview, see Commonwealth v. Shipps, 
399 Mass. 820, 826 (1987); he had received and acknowledged 
understanding his Miranda rights on four separate instances the 
prior day, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 864 
(2010); and there is no evidence that the officers engaged in 
trickery, coercion, or intimidation to obtain this waiver.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 Mass. 676, 688-689 (1977).  
 
16 
 
describing how the victim had approached him holding a hammer on 
the morning of the shooting, the defendant stated:   
 
Defendant:  "Then I went to [buy] the breakfast and stuff 
and then I came back.  But I would like to stop at that point 
because it [be]comes more intricate now and who knows what's 
going to happen" (emphasis added). 
 
 
McNeill:  "Okay.  But, you know, I just want to say it's 
happened." 
 
 
Defendant:  "Yeah."  
 
 
McNeill:  "There are witnesses and the employees." 
  
 
Defendant:  "Yeah.  I think --"  
 
 
McNeill:  "You know people -- Mike, Derek, Jimmy."  
 
 
Defendant:  "Yeah, Mike, yeah." 
 
 
McNeill:  "I just want to --"  
 
 
Defendant:  "But I don't know if Jimmy saw anything."  
 
 
McNeill:  "Well, they did, right.  But what did [the 
victim] say -- what just -- you just had enough of his tactic 
[inaudible] of bullying you?" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Yeah.  A lot of intimidation, yeah."    
 
 
The defendant contends that once he stated, "I would like 
to stop at that point," he invoked unequivocally his right to 
remain silent, and that, rather than honoring his request, 
McNeill began pressuring him by emphasizing that "it happened" 
and pointing out that there were witnesses to try to get him to 
talk about the incident.  The motion judge acknowledged the 
defendant's statement that he "would like to stop," but 
17 
 
determined that at no point during the interview did the 
defendant "cho[o]se to cut off questioning."     
 
A defendant who has waived his right to silence may 
subsequently invoke that right at any point during questioning.  
Bradshaw, 385 Mass. at 265.  However, in the postwaiver context, 
a subsequent invocation of the right to remain silent must be 
clear and "unambiguous[]," see Clarke, 461 Mass. at 342, quoting 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010), such that "'a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement' to be an invocation of the Miranda right."  Id., 
quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  See 
Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 161 (2007), quoting 
Commonwealth v. James, 427 Mass. 312, 314 (1988) (postwaiver 
invocation of right to silence requires that defendant show 
"expressed unwillingness to continue").  Whether the defendant 
has met this burden is a fact-specific determination to be made 
based on the totality of the circumstances.  Commonwealth v. 
Almonte, 444 Mass. 511, 519, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1040 (2005), 
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 
Mass. 71 (2007).   
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's statement 
about wanting to stop "reflect[s] nothing more than the 
defendant's desire to deviate from questioning touching on the 
shooting itself."  It is the case that "a suspect's 
18 
 
unwillingness to answer questions on a particular topic does not 
unambiguously indicate that the suspect is unwilling to continue 
speaking with police or obligate them to inquire whether the 
suspect would 'like to reassert his right to silence.'" 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 285 (2012), quoting 
Robidoux, 450 Mass. at 161 n.7.10  Cf. Commonwealth v. Sicari, 
434 Mass. 732, 748-749 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 
(2002) (prolonged silence in response to police questions); 
Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 463 (2001) (silence).  
However, considering the totality of the circumstances here, we 
disagree with the Commonwealth that the defendant's statement is 
to be read so narrowly.  There is nothing in the language of the 
defendant's entire statement, "I would like to stop at that 
point, because it [be]comes more intricate now and who knows 
what's going to happen," that qualifies or limits it to a 
particular question.    
 
A defendant's request to halt the questioning at a later 
point of an interview, or failure to answer one specific 
question, "must be interpreted in the context of his willingness 
to talk both immediately prior to and subsequent to" that point.  
                     
 
10 In Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 160 (2007), 
we concluded that there was no postwaiver invocation by the 
defendant of his right to silence when he "simply declined to 
talk about certain subjects" by stating, "I will not talk about 
my family," or stared at the interrogating officers.   
 
19 
 
Senior, 433 Mass. at 463, quoting Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 
392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984).  Here, although initially the 
defendant had indicated twice that he might want to avoid 
"sensitive" matters, in the period immediately prior to his 
statement about stopping, he had engaged in conversation with 
the officers and willingly answered every one of their questions 
without any qualification at all for approximately forty-five 
minutes; there was no indication that the defendant was 
"pick[ing] and choos[ing]" among which questions to answer.11  
See id.  In this context, his statement, "I would like to stop 
at that point," indicated that he had reached the "sensitive" 
areas that he did not want to talk about, and, accordingly, no 
longer wanted to proceed with the interview, but as he said, 
wanted "to stop."  In the circumstances, we conclude that in 
stating, "I [want] to stop at that point," the defendant invoked 
his right to silence.12 
                     
 
11 As to the period immediately following the statement, the 
Commonwealth's claim that it casts doubt on the defendant's 
invocation because he resumed answering some questions after 
refusing to answer others mischaracterizes what happened.  The 
defendant did not immediately resume speaking or even answering 
questions after indicating that he would like to "stop."  
Rather, in response to the next substantive question asked of 
him, he stated, "I don't want to answer that question."  This 
was the first time in the interview that the defendant stated 
that he did not want to answer a question posed by the officers. 
 
 
12 "Each case turns, as it must, on the specific facts."  
Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 748 (2001), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1142 (2002).  However, it is instructive to consider 
20 
 
 
We appreciate that an appellate court reviewing a police 
interview after the fact -- generally aided by a written 
transcript and, often, a videotape of the interview, both of 
which can be reviewed more than once -- is in a different 
position than the police officers who are conducting that 
interview and acting in the moment.13  Here, the testimony at the 
motion to suppress hearing reflected that at least one of the 
interrogating officers, Gagnon, and perhaps also the officers' 
supervisors who were observing the interview through a two-way 
mirror, had some question about whether the defendant's 
statement about wishing to "stop at that point" meant he was 
                                                                  
other cases, and the defendant's words about wanting to stop are 
more in line with the facts of cases in which an invocation was 
found than with those concluding the opposite.  Compare, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 282 (2013) (postwaiver 
statement that defendant could not "say any more" was clear 
invocation, precluding any further interview of defendant for 
remainder of evening, although not permanently); and 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 285 (2012) (postwaiver 
statement that "I'm not going on with this conversation" was 
clear invocation), with Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 
488-489 (2005) (postwaiver statement -- "Not right now, in a 
minute.  I need to figure some things out" -- in response to 
question whether defendant wanted to talk, was not clear 
invocation). 
 
 
13 Nonetheless, we take the word "stop" to mean what it 
says.  A suspect's or defendant's use of the word "stop," or the 
phrase, "I would like to stop at that point," in this context 
should raise a red flag for an interrogating police officer -- a 
signal that it is necessary at the very least for the officer 
immediately to pause in order to reflect on what the defendant 
has just said, and to consider whether the defendant is seeking 
to invoke his right to remain silent.  As discussed in the text, 
that is not what happened here.  
 
21 
 
terminating the interview altogether or only expressing a wish 
not to talk specifically about the actual shooting incident.14  
See Santos, 463 Mass. at 286.  Assuming this to be the case, the 
uncertainty would have permitted the officers to ask a direct 
question designed to clarify the defendant's intent.  See id. 
("The question . . . should be brief, worded only to elicit an 
affirmative or negative response concerning whether the suspect 
wants [to stop] and should not be designed to keep the suspect 
talking").  The officers here did not follow such a course, 
however.  Rather, when the defendant stated he "would like to 
stop at that point," McNeill, who was questioning the defendant 
at the time, immediately pressed on with arguments for why the 
defendant should keep speaking about the shooting incident.  It 
was only a bit later, following a series of questions by McNeill 
about the gun the defendant had used, that Gagnon abruptly 
announced a "two minute" break that actually lasted fifty-one 
minutes.  During the break the defendant was brought to the 
restroom, but otherwise kept in the interview room alone, 
                     
 
14 Gagnon testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress 
that the fifty-one minute break taken in the interview at his 
behest was taken in part because Gagnon did not "fully 
understand" what the defendant meant when the defendant said he 
wanted to stop (i.e., he did not understand whether the 
defendant meant to invoke his rights to remain silent and to 
counsel), and Gagnon wanted to "clarify" that point -- and to 
"regroup, to talk to our supervisors" who were watching the 
interview through a two-way mirror.  
 
22 
 
although he was given reading glasses and a drink.  At some 
point before the break ended, Gagnon apparently returned to the 
room and asked the defendant in substance about whether he 
wanted to continue.  According to Gagnon, this conversation, 
which was not audio recorded, lasted about three minutes, but 
there is no indication that Gagnon specifically sought 
clarification about the meaning of the defendant's earlier 
statement about wishing to stop, or that he referenced that 
earlier statement at all.15   
 
In these circumstances -- where McNeill did not seek to 
clarify but sought to keep the defendant talking, where a break 
occurred before any effort at all was made to inquire about the 
defendant's wishes about speaking to the police, and where no 
reference ever was made to the defendant's statement about 
                     
 
15 At the motion to suppress hearing, Gagnon testified to 
his memory of the substance of his conversation with the 
defendant about wanting to continue.  After this unrecorded 
conversation, the audio-recorded interview resumed with both 
officers present, and the following exchange occurred: 
 
 
McNeill:  "Since the time we took a break, there's probably 
been about a half hour break or so.  You told us you don't have 
a problem talking to us."   
 
 
Defendant:  "No." 
 
 
McNeill:  "Is that correct?" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Yes."   
 
 
The defendant was then given a fresh set of Miranda 
warnings and signed a waiver form. 
 
23 
 
wanting to stop -- we conclude that the officers "exceeded the 
narrow scope that was permitted [to clarify], and intruded into 
the defendant's invocation of his right" to remain silent.  See 
Santos, 463 Mass. at 287.   
 
When a person in custody has exercised his right to cut off 
police questioning, this does not "create a per se proscription 
of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any 
police officer on any subject[.]"  Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 
96, 102-103 (1975).  Rather, once such a person invokes this 
right, we must inquire "whether the person's right to be free 
from interrogation, once exercised, was 'scrupulously honored' 
before questioning resumed."  Commonwealth v. Atkins, 386 Mass. 
593, 598 (1982), quoting Mosley, supra at 104.  To do so, we 
consider factors such as whether "the police (1) had immediately 
ceased questioning; (2) resumed questioning 'only after the 
passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a 
fresh set of warnings'; and (3) limited the scope of the later 
interrogation 'to a crime that had not been a subject of the 
earlier interrogation'" (Mosley factors).  Clarke, 461 Mass. at 
344, quoting Mosley, supra at 106.   
 
In this case, the first and third Mosley factors 
unmistakably favor the defendant.  As to the first, when the 
defendant invoked his right to silence, the officers did not 
immediately cease questioning.  Id.  Instead, in an obvious 
24 
 
effort to "overcome the defendant's resistance to 
interrogation," Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 884-885, 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980), McNeill immediately reminded 
the defendant that the crime already had happened and that there 
were numerous witnesses, and persisted in questioning the 
defendant about the gun he had used.  Although Gagnon called for 
a break shortly thereafter, by that point, McNeill had already 
pressured the defendant to talk and had obtained additional 
substantive statements from him.16  With respect to the third 
                     
 
16 The pressure on the defendant to answer questions about 
the shooting incident continued in force after the break.  At 
that time, the defendant was given a fresh set of Miranda 
warnings and signed a waiver.  Shortly thereafter, McNeill 
broached the topic of the shooting itself, stating, "[W]hat's 
happened happened.  We just need your side of the story on how 
and why so we can put closure to this ordeal."  The defendant 
then made a series of general inculpatory statements about the 
circumstances, and his feelings, in the moments leading up to 
the shooting.  Thereafter, the officers' questions focused on 
the shooting incident.  When asked how he and the victim had 
ended up in the chemical yard together the defendant stated:  
"Can I let this one go by, this question" and McNeill responded, 
"Absolutely."  The defendant then indicated that he was willing 
to talk from the point when he left the scene of the shooting, 
and the officers respected that request for about six minutes 
before McNeill resumed questioning the defendant about the 
shooting itself.  The defendant then stated -- at least four 
times -- that he did not want to answer or that he wanted to 
leave parts out, but McNeill persisted, telling the defendant 
that his answers would allow McNeill "closure and just to put an 
end to it" and to "learn from it and understand it."  After this 
exchange, the defendant again said that he would talk only about 
the period after the shooting.  The officers respected this 
directive for about four minutes before McNeill once more urged 
the defendant to describe the incident from his perspective.  At 
that point, the defendant spoke openly about the shooting, 
describing what had occurred in the chemical yard, how the 
25 
 
Mosley factor, the officers plainly did not limit the scope of 
the later interrogation "to a crime that had not been a subject 
of the earlier interrogation."  Clarke, 461 Mass. at 344, 
quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106.  Here, there was no separate 
crime ever at issue.17  Compare Mosley, supra at 105 (no 
violation when second interrogation focused on "a crime 
different in nature and in time and place of occurrence" from 
subject of first interrogation), with Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
374 Mass. 426, 435 (1978) (when subsequent "questioning of the 
defendant was not restricted to an unrelated crime, the police 
had departed from the procedure approved in Mosley, and . . . 
the judge was warranted in finding the defendant's Miranda 
rights to have been violated").   
 
Assessment of the second Mosley factor is less clear.  The 
second factor looks at the passage of time between the 
individual's invocation of the right to remain silent and the 
resumption of police questioning.  There is no bright line that 
                                                                  
victim's "survival instincts kicked in," how the victim was 
trapped because the gate was locked, the number of shots fired, 
and how the defendant had fled the scene.  The defendant also 
stated that, ever since an incident with the victim involving a 
forklift several months earlier, discussed infra, he brought his 
gun to work "every day" without anyone else knowing. 
 
 
17 Although the defendant ultimately was convicted of 
various firearms offenses in addition to murder in the first 
degree, those charges all stemmed from the same shooting; there 
is no evidence that the officers ever were investigating the 
defendant's involvement in a separate criminal episode. 
 
26 
 
divides what would be a permissible break from one that is too 
short to be acceptable.18  Nonetheless, because there was no 
meaningful change in circumstances before and after the fifty-
one minute break between the defendant's invocation and the 
officers' return to questioning -- the defendant remained in 
police custody, was returned to the same room, and did not 
reinitiate questioning on his own, and when questioning resumed 
the same officers continued with the interview on the same 
subject -- the fifty-one minutes likely did not constitute a 
"significant period of time" sufficient to honor the defendant's 
invocation of his right to silence, even with the administration 
of a fresh set of Miranda warnings.  See Commonwealth v. 
Callender, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 158 n.5 (2012) (thirty-five-
minute break between interrogations insufficient, particularly 
in light of officers' violation of other Mosely factors).   
                     
 
18 Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882-
883, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980) (fourteen minutes 
between interrogations impermissible), with Commonwealth v. 
Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 729-730 (2012) (no violation seventeen 
hours after invocation); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 424 Mass. 266, 
269 (1997) (no violation three and one-half hours after 
invocation, fresh Miranda warnings given, and defendant never 
questioned by booking officer in first interview); Commonwealth 
v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 304 (1978) (no violation where 
invocation was previous day, fresh Miranda warnings given, and 
second interview was in different city); Commonwealth v. 
Avellar, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 616 (2007) (no violation two 
hours after invocation and fresh Miranda warnings given). 
 
27 
 
 
In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
officers did not "scrupulously honor" the defendant's invocation 
of his right to silence.  The question is whether that error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. at 
287.  To make this determination, we consider factors such as  
"the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's case; 
the relationship between the evidence and the premise of 
the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the 
frequency of the reference; whether the erroneously 
admitted evidence was merely cumulative of properly 
admitted evidence; the availability or effect of curative 
instructions; and the weight or quantum of evidence of 
guilt."   
 
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 553 (2006).   
 
The Commonwealth contends that any error in this case was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the erroneously 
admitted statements were largely cumulative of other evidence, 
and the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming.  The 
defendant disagrees, arguing that the prejudicial impact of his 
image and words on the video was too strong to be considered 
harmless.  The Commonwealth's points are not without merit:  
there is overlap between a good number of the defendant's 
statements after he invoked his right to end the interview and 
properly admitted evidence of statements he had volunteered to 
police the day before the interview, and the evidence of the 
28 
 
defendant's guilt was indeed extremely strong.  But for reasons 
we explain infra, we conclude that the erroneous admission of 
the defendant's postinvocation statement, when considered in 
combination with (1) the prosecutor's use in his closing 
argument of that statement and other improper aspects of the 
closing, and (2) errors in the judge's final instruction on 
mental impairment, was not harmless and reversal of the 
defendant's murder conviction is required.  Because the issue 
bears on our consideration of the closing argument and may arise 
at a new trial, we first consider the defendant's claims of 
error relating to the admission of prior bad act evidence.   
 
3.  Prior bad acts.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecution improperly introduced prior bad act and character 
evidence for which the unfair prejudice substantially outweighed 
its probative value.  The Commonwealth counters that the 
evidence complained of was properly admitted because it 
"established a pattern of workplace violence and hostility 
towards co-workers," and therefore was relevant and admissible 
to show the defendant's capacity to form the intent required for 
conviction; and that because the defendant touched on these same 
topics in his interview with the police, he "opened the door" to 
most of the prior bad act evidence admitted at trial.   
 
The general rule governing prior bad act evidence is well 
settled: 
29 
 
"The prosecution may not introduce evidence that a 
defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for 
the purpose of showing his bad character or propensity to 
commit the crime charged, but such evidence may be 
admissible if relevant for some other purpose. . . .  Such 
evidence can be highly prejudicial to the defendant, and 
therefore must be excluded unless it comes within one of 
the permitted uses, such as to show a common scheme, 
pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, 
identity, intent, or motive [or state of mind]."  
(Citations omitted.)  
 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224–225 (1986).  Accord 
Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 143 (2009).  
Additionally, to be admissible, a defendant's prior bad acts may 
not be too remote in time.  (Citation omitted.)  Commonwealth v. 
Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 574 (2005).  Here, the prior bad act and 
character evidence the defendant complains of includes:  (1) a 
previous incident between the defendant and the victim over a 
forklift; (2) a previous incident between the defendant and 
another Baystate employee, Miguel Carballido, over a forklift; 
and (3) derogatory comments about Haitian women that the 
defendant allegedly made in the victim's presence.  We consider 
each separately. 
 
(i)  Prior forklift incident with victim.  The Commonwealth 
presented evidence of a confrontation between the defendant and 
the victim over the use of a forklift at work that occurred in 
November, 2008, approximately three months before the victim was 
killed.  The evidence came in through the testimony of other 
Baystate employees as well as from the portion of the 
30 
 
defendant's statement to police that was properly admitted at 
trial.19  There was no error in the admission of this evidence.  
It tended to show the antagonistic character of the defendant's 
and the victim's relationship, was not too remote in time, and 
was probative of the defendant's motive, state of mind, and 
intent.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 
126-128 (2000) (evidence of violent relationship between 
defendant and victim, including two black eyes sustained by 
victim, admissible to demonstrate motive, intent, and rebut 
defendant's claim of lack of criminal responsibility); 
Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 741-742 (2000) (evidence 
of altercation between defendant and victim in month preceding 
murder properly admitted to show defendant's state of mind, 
intent, and relationship with victim).  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 289 (2011), quoting 
Robidoux, 450 Mass. at 158 ("Determinations of the relevance, 
probative value, and prejudice of such evidence are left to the 
sound discretion of the judge, whose decision to admit such 
evidence will be upheld absent clear error"). 
                     
 
19 Specifically, in his interview with police, the defendant 
described this series of events:  when the defendant used the 
forklift, the victim, who claimed to be using it, approached the 
defendant, grabbed him, "jacked him up," and said, "I'll F -- 
you up" while threatening to "knock [the defendant] out."  After 
this occurred, the defendant "got into a stinking rage" and 
backed his own vehicle into the victim's car. 
31 
 
 
(ii)  Prior forklift incident between defendant and 
Carballido.  The prosecutor elicited testimony from Baystate 
employee Miguel Carballido, who was Mexican, that for at least 
three years, the defendant, who was from Trinidad, would "always 
bother" him at work in various ways, including calling 
Carballido a racist and making comments about Mexicans.  
Carballido testified that in June, 2008, approximately six 
months before the killing, the defendant took a forklift that 
Carballido was using.  On realizing that the defendant had done 
so, Carballido physically pulled the defendant from the 
forklift, and the defendant "pulled a knife" on Carballido.  In 
response, Carballido picked up a stick and challenged the 
defendant; the defendant walked away, and the confrontation 
ended.  The day after this incident, the defendant threatened to 
shoot and kill Carballido.   
 
Throughout the defendant's statement to police, including 
the properly admitted portion, he portrayed himself as the 
victim of harassment and intimidation by both Carballido and the 
victim, and implied that they acted together to antagonize him.  
Admission of the forklift incident with Carballido served to 
rebut the defendant's assertions about the source of his hostile 
relationships with both men, thereby providing the jury with a 
complete picture of those relationships.  See Commonwealth v. 
McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 479 (2010) (defendant's cross-
32 
 
examination of police officer "opened the door" for prior bad 
act evidence on redirect to rebut implications raised by defense 
counsel); Commonwealth v. Maimoni, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 327-
328 (1996) (prior bad acts admissible, in part, to rebut 
defendant's testimony).  See also Commonwealth v. Young, 382 
Mass. 448, 463 (1981) (prior bad act evidence admissible to show 
full picture of entire relationship between defendant and 
victim).  Further, although it presents a close question, 
evidence of the defendant's state of mind toward another 
Baystate employee was arguably probative of his state of mind 
and intent toward the victim.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 
Mass. 799, 818 (2014) (defendant's abuse toward other children 
probative of his state of mind toward child who was victim of 
murder).  As such, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion 
in admitting the Carballido evidence. 
 
(iii) Defendant's comments about Haitian women.  Baystate 
employee Shane Nixon testified that, in the summer of 2008, he 
and the victim were having a conversation about the women they 
were dating, both of whom were Haitian or of Haitian descent.  
The defendant interjected, "You'd pretty much be a fool to date 
a Haitian woman."  Nixon also related that after that initial 
comment, the defendant purposely made additional negative 
remarks about Haitian women in the victim's presence and that 
these comments upset the victim.  The comments illustrated a 
33 
 
facet of the defendant's relationship with the victim -- a 
proper nonpropensity purpose -- and we cannot say that the trial 
judge abused her discretion in admitting evidence of them.20  See 
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464-465 (2004) (verbal 
fights between defendant and victim admissible to demonstrate 
defendant's hostile relationship with victim).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Mass. 180, 188 (2007); Commonwealth 
v. Robertson, 408 Mass. 747, 750-751 (1990).   
 
4.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant complains 
that the prosecutor's closing argument prejudiced his trial and 
warrants reversing his convictions.  He specifically argues that 
the prosecutor:  (1) impermissibly commented on the defendant's 
invocation of his right to silence; (2) misused -- for character 
and propensity purposes -- the prior bad act evidence that had 
been admitted solely on the issues of motive, intent, and 
relationship between defendant and victim; and (3) affirmatively 
misrepresented certain evidence.  We agree that the closing was 
improper.21 
                     
 
20 In connection with each instance of prior bad act 
evidence, the trial judge gave a thorough instruction to the 
jury about the limited purpose for which they could consider the 
evidence, and she repeated this limiting instruction in her 
final jury charge. 
 
 
21 The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's closing 
and therefore, the closing argument is subject to review under 
the substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard.  
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 796 (2011).  To the 
34 
 
 
We summarize the critical portions of the prosecutor's 
closing.  Near the beginning of his argument, the prosecutor 
told the jury that "this case started back in November of 2008" 
with the "forklift incident":   
 
"[A]fter [the forklift incident,] . . . the gun's 
coming to work. . . .  My gun, a loaded gun, it's coming 
with me because at some point sometime I'm going to use it.  
And this day, January 28th, was the time.  Premeditation 
can be a matter of seconds, and the Court will tell you, or 
it can be longer.  In this case you have both.  He was 
thinking about taking out [the victim] since early 
November."  
 
. . . 
 
 
"[D]on't ever get in his face.  Don't ever confront 
him like Miguel [Carballido] did[,] or he'll pull a knife 
on you."  
 
The prosecutor then reprised the forklift incidents with the 
victim and Carballido as well as the defendant's comments to the 
two men as follows:   
 
"He jumps on the forklift.  He does it just to 
irritate people when they're using it.  That's why he 
talked to [the victim] about, you shouldn't go out with 
Haitian women.  That's why he called Miguel a Mexican.  
It's the world of Clyde Howard." 
 
 
"Knife to Miguel; violent, rams the car in a stinking 
rage."  
 
Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor discussed the defendant's 
January 29, 2009, statement to the police, saying, 
                                                                  
extent that the defendant did not raise all of the errors 
contained in the prosecutor's closing argument, we consider them 
in the following discussion as part of our review pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
35 
 
 
"Defense counsel says, oh, he really can't remember 
the details.  Kind of having a bad day.  It's a . . . 
little fuzzy.  What did he tell the police?  I'll talk to 
you guys, but there are certain things I'm not going to 
talk about because they might incriminate me.  And the 
police say[], okay, whatever.  Those are your rights.  And 
he never wanted to go there.  He didn't want to talk about 
the gun.  He didn't want to talk about where it was.  He 
didn't want to talk about the shooting because it might 
incriminate him.  No kidding, Clyde.  He's a violent man."  
 
Toward the end of the closing, the prosecutor turned to 
testimony from the defense expert Joss, using it to undercut the 
defendant's theory of diminished capacity.  The prosecutor 
stated: 
 
"Defense counsel says there's only one Clyde Howard.  
That's not what Dr. Joss said.  He agreed with me; there 
are two sides to him.  He wants to please his superiors, 
Roczynski, Najarian, McGaffigan.  He looks down to people 
he feels are inferior to Clyde Howard and makes derogatory 
comments towards them and is arrogant towards them.  That's 
what that fancy little test showed.[22] 
 
 
"Do you know what else it showed? He has a history of 
intimidating his wife and his children -- intimidating.  
That's the other side of Clyde Howard.  He's a mean man, 
he's an intimidating man, he's a violent man who took a 
life with no justification, no reason." 
 
 
"He deserves no sympathy.  He didn't snap.  You don't 
snap when you bring a gun to work [f]or over two months 
loaded."   
 
 
These excerpts from the closing reflect essentially two 
categories of impropriety:  (1) use of portions of the 
                     
 
22 The "fancy little test" is a reference to the 
psychological testing performed by Joss as part of his 
examination of the defendant. 
 
36 
 
defendant's statements that were obtained in violation of his 
Miranda rights; and (2) propensity-based argument.  
 
a.  Miranda rights.  The prosecutor referred to the 
defendant bringing a loaded gun to work for several months at 
the beginning and the end of the closing, and also referenced 
the defendant’s unwillingness to discuss with the police either 
the shooting itself or the gun he used in the shooting.  Each of 
these references was to the portion of the defendant's statement 
that followed his invocation of the Miranda-protected right to 
cut off questioning and remain silent -- the portion that should 
not have been admitted in evidence.      
 
By including the two references to the defendant's decision 
to bring a loaded gun to work for months preceding the shooting, 
the prosecutor directly connected it to the defendant's capacity 
to form the necessary intent for deliberately premeditated 
murder.  Moreover, by making these references at the beginning 
and close to the end of the argument the prosecutor created 
bookends that served to highlight the premeditation theme.23  See 
                     
 
23 It bears emphasis that although, as the Commonwealth 
contends, there was substantial, properly admitted evidence -- 
including the volunteered statements of the defendant to the 
police the day before his custodial interview -- that the 
defendant possessed a gun on the day of the killing, apart from 
the defendant's erroneously admitted statement, no evidence was 
before the jury that the defendant had been bringing the gun, 
loaded, to work every day for two or three months before the 
killing.  See note 16, supra.   
 
37 
 
Tyree, 455 Mass. at 702-704 (prosecutor's use of 
unconstitutionally admitted evidence as organizing theme of 
closing rendered error harmful).    
 
As for the comments about the defendant's desire not to 
answer questions about the gun or the actual shooting incident, 
by arguing, "He didn't want to talk about the shooting because 
it might incriminate him," the prosecutor in effect connected 
the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent to the 
issue of his substantive guilt.  Using the invocation of Miranda 
rights to comment on a defendant's substantive guilt is strictly 
prohibited.  See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); 
Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 694 (1983), citing United 
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 175, 181 (1975).  In addition, 
this section of the prosecutor's argument sought to emphasize 
the rational thought process of the defendant during the 
interview to undercut defense's theory that he suffered from 
diminished capacity at the time of the crime.  Cf. Wainwright v. 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (defendant's post-Miranda 
silence inadmissible to prove criminal responsibility); Madhi, 
supra at 694-695 (same).   
 
b.  Prior bad acts and propensity.  As discussed, the trial 
judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence of 
certain prior bad acts committed by the defendant.  But, as the 
judge explained to the jury both when the evidence was admitted 
38 
 
and in her final charge, this evidence was only to be used for 
the limited purpose of evaluating the defendant's motive, 
intent, state of mind, or, in some instances, the nature of the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim -- not for 
assessing the defendant's character.  See Part 3, supra.  In his 
closing, the prosecutor repeatedly and quite blatantly ignored 
the judge's evidentiary limitation; the argument is laced with 
remarks describing the defendant as a "mean" and "violent man" 
likely to commit violent acts -- i.e., using the bad acts 
directly as propensity evidence and negative character evidence.  
This use is forbidden and prejudicial.  See Helfant, 398 Mass. 
at 224-225.  See also Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 
672 (2012) ("It is implicit in the general rule regarding the 
inadmissibility of prior bad acts evidence that admission of 
such evidence carries with it a high risk of prejudice to the 
defendant" [citation omitted]). 
 
The prosecutor's attempt to paint the defendant in a 
negative light reached its nadir with the reference to the 
defendant's intimidation of his family -- a reference that also 
misrepresented the evidence at trial.  The prosecutor asserted 
that the psychological testing performed by Joss showed the 
defendant had a history of intimidating his wife and children.  
Although Joss had stated at trial, in response to the 
prosecutor's question on cross-examination, that the defendant 
39 
 
had had, in the past, a history of being intimidating, there was 
no suggestion by Joss that this "history" of intimidation was 
revealed by a psychological test of the defendant.24  More to the 
point, the prosecutor transformed Joss's reference to a past 
"history" into a current character trait of the defendant, 
summarizing:  "Intimidating.  That's the other side of Clyde 
Howard.  He's a mean man, he's an intimidating man, he's a 
violent man who took a life with no justification, no reason."    
 
In sum, the prosecutor's extensive use of propensity-based 
argument in his closing was improper.  It remains to evaluate 
the impact of these improprieties and the prosecutor's erroneous 
use of portions of the defendant's statement in the argument.  
We do so in conducting our review of the entire case under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  See Part 6, infra. 
 
5.  Jury instructions.  The defendant claims error in the 
judge's final charge on mental impairment, the voluntariness of 
the defendant's statement, and the inference of malice the jury 
were permitted to draw from the intentional use of a dangerous 
weapon.25  
                     
 
24 That the defendant had a (past) history of "intimidating" 
his wife and children came from Joss's report; the specific 
quotation from the report that the prosecutor elicited during 
cross-examination was that, "[the defendant] did have a history 
from years back of being intimidating to his wife and children."  
 
 
25 The defendant's claim relating to the permissible 
inference of malice from intentional use of a dangerous weapon 
40 
 
 
a.  Mental impairment.  The judge instructed the jury on 
mental impairment following her full instructions on the 
elements of murder in the first degree committed with deliberate 
premeditation and committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
The instruction is reproduced below.26  
                                                                  
appears to be that the judge's repetition of this instruction 
immediately following each separate definition or explanation of 
a prong of malice, without any concomitant explanation that the 
mental impairment claimed by the defendant also could be 
considered in relation to each of the prongs, constituted error 
in the circumstances of this case.  See Commonwealth v. Miller, 
457 Mass. 69, 72-76 (2010).  Given our conclusion that the 
judge's instruction on mental impairment, in itself, was 
erroneous, we need not decide this point.     
 
 
26 The judge stated: 
 
"Now, when considering and determining whether the 
Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the 
elements in first degree murder by deliberate premeditation 
and/or first degree murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
you may consider the following.  In determining whether the 
Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant's intent to commit first degree murder by 
deliberate premeditation or by extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
you should consider all the credible evidence relevant to 
the defendant's intent, including any credible evidence of 
the defendant's mental impairment on the defendant. 
   
 
"In determining whether the Commonwealth has proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's knowledge at the 
particular time, you should consider all the credible 
evidence relevant to the defendant's knowledge, including 
any credible evidence of the defendant's mental impairment 
on the defendant." 
 
 
The judge repeated essentially the same mental impairment 
instruction at the end of her instruction on murder in the 
second degree.   
 
41 
 
 
The instruction in itself is confusing, given its 
suggestion that the Commonwealth was required to prove "intent 
to commit first degree murder by deliberate premeditation or by 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  The Commonwealth does not have 
such a burden.  Rather, the Commonwealth's obligation is to 
prove "malice" -- a term that certainly focuses on intent, but 
each of its prongs has a meaning distinct from "intent to commit 
murder by deliberate premeditation" or "by extreme atrocity or 
cruelty."  But of greater significance, and similar to 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, ante 410, 421-422 (2014), insofar as 
the judge's explanation of mental impairment focused solely on 
intent (and associated knowledge), the instruction never 
explained that the jury might consider the defendant's mental 
impairment in weighing whether the defendant more generally 
committed the crime with extreme atrocity or cruelty, an 
instruction that was required in substance.27  See id.; 
Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 798 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 685-686 & n.16 (1980).  
See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 62 (1999); id. at 
                     
 
27 The judge similarly failed to explain to the jury that 
they could consider the defendant's mental impairment in 
determining whether the Commonwealth had proved the defendant:  
(1) acted with malice -- any one of the three prongs; and (2) 
deliberately premeditated the victim's killing -- i.e., whether 
he thought before acting, and whether his decision to kill was 
based on reflection for some period of time.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 62 (1999; id. at 40-41, 46 (rev. 2013).  
These omissions, too, constituted error.    
42 
 
49 (rev. 2013).28  Particularly where the defendant's entire 
defense was based on his allegedly impaired mental state, the 
omission of these instructions was error.29  
 
b.  Voluntariness.  Concerning the judge's instruction on 
the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.  The judge 
stated: 
"You may consider whether the statements, if any, made by 
[the defendant] were calculated to exculpate or mitigate 
his actions, such as an inference might be drawn that he 
knew his statements to the police could have adverse 
consequences, and therefore, you may draw an inference that 
he made the statements voluntarily.  Or you may not draw 
                     
 
28 The 1999 version of the Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide (1999) reflects this point, and the 2013 version does 
so even more clearly.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
49 (rev. 2013) ("You may consider the defendant's mental 
condition at the time of the killing, including any credible 
evidence of mental impairment . . . in determining whether the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the killing with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty"); Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 62 (1999) ("More 
particularly, you may consider any credible evidence of the 
defendant's mental impairment in determining . . . whether the 
defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing the 
death of the deceased").  We urge trial judges to use these 
instructions on mental impairment in their complete form. 
 
 
29 During the charge conference that the judge held the day 
before instructing the jury, the defendant's counsel in 
substance raised the points we have just discussed in objecting 
to the Commonwealth's proposed instruction on mental impairment.  
After the judge charged the jury, however, defense counsel 
simply stated his objection "to not providing the mental 
impairment instruction that I submitted."  Because we consider 
the errors in the mental impairment instruction in combination 
with other errors in conducting the review required by G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, see Part 6, infra, we need not decide whether the 
defendant's objection to the mental impairment instruction was 
preserved.   
43 
 
that inference and you may determine that that inference is 
not reasonable."   
 
 
As the Commonwealth points out, there are cases that offer 
support for considering the fact that a defendant made an 
exculpatory statement in the course of a police interrogation in 
determining whether statements were voluntary.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 403 Mass. 575, 581 (1988); Commonwealth 
v. Vasquez, 387 Mass. 96, 99-100 (1982).  These cases, however, 
did not involve jury instructions but were reviews of denials of 
motions to suppress.  In a case such as this, where a claim of 
mental impairment is made and is central to the case, there is a 
potential for misuse by a jury, that is, a risk that the 
exculpating nature of the defendant's words or statements will 
be used as evidence of his mental capacity.  A jury instruction 
such as the one given is better left unsaid.  
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  "Our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is to consider broadly the whole case on 
the law and the facts to determine whether the verdict is 
'consonant with justice.'"  (Citation omitted.)  Gould, 380 
Mass. at 680.   
 
We have discussed previously that the admission of the 
defendant's postinvocation statement constituted error, in 
violation of the defendant's constitutional right to remain 
silent; and that, because the defendant objected to the 
44 
 
statement's admission, the error must be shown to be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 
24; Santos, 463 Mass. at 287.  Although many of the defendant's 
postinvocation remarks were cumulative, evidence that the 
defendant had been carrying a gun to work every day for two to 
three months distinctly was not, and as described in Part 4, 
supra, this admission by the defendant became an important focal 
point of the prosecutor's closing argument.  Furthermore, the 
admission of the defendant's postinvocation statement placed 
before the jury the defendant's repeated requests to the 
officers not to answer questions about the shooting itself or to 
leave parts of the narrative out, and two instances of damning 
explanation as to why the defendant chose this path:  because it 
left him appearing "guilty" (Gagnon's word)30 and as "the 
culprit" (the defendant's word).31  The jury obviously could view 
                     
 
30 At about twelve minutes after the postinvocation portion 
of the interview began, the officers' questioning zeroed in on 
the actual shooting.  As indicated, see note 16, supra, when 
asked how he and the victim ended up in the chemical yard 
together, the defendant stated:  "Can I let this one go by, this 
question" and McNeill responded, "Absolutely."  The conversation 
resumed and shortly thereafter the defendant stated, "That's not 
what happened so I want to leave that part out."  Gagnon 
responded:  "So you want to cut a certain part out because that 
leaves you guilty, and you don't want to talk about that, and I 
have no problem with that . . . .  We'll skip that section, 
okay?  That's not a problem."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
31 Later than the point in the interview described in note 
30, supra, Detective McNeill asked: 
 
45 
 
the defendant's reluctance to speak about the details of the 
shooting as reflecting repeatedly his consciousness of guilt, 
brought home even more clearly by the "guilty" and "culprit" 
remarks, which was stressed by the prosecutor in his closing.  
                                                                  
 
McNeill:  "At this time, is there anything else you want to 
share with us on the event because, again, it will allow us 
closure on the events and -- because we've already had the 
statements from the four employees.  But again to hear your side 
of the story and then how it got into the middle of the 
warehouse and out to the [d]umpster, because there's still a 
little gap there that we need to know and for my own self.  It's 
not going to affect anyone else, but it just gives me a closure 
why -- . . . ." 
 
 
Defendant:  "That part is [inaudible].  Can I leave that 
part out?" 
 
 
McNeill:  "Well, it's happened.  If you want to leave it 
out, leave it out, but it would allow me closure and just to put 
an end to it, just to get it off your chest and say, hey, here 
it is, this is what happened.  It's over and done with." 
  
 
Defendant: "I know, but that part I'd like to leave because 
-- " 
  
 
McNeill:  "But you understand my point?  So I can, you 
know, learn from it and understand it." 
 
 
Defendant:  "Well, it's just that that point -- I mean, 
that part I want to leave out because -- " 
 
 
. . .  
 
 
Gagnon:  "Clyde, what is it?  Is it the intimate details 
that's bothering you, like you don't want to talk about the 
intimate details here or like what -- let us know what's going 
on in your head as far as this."   
 
 
Defendant:  "Well, there's certain details I would like 
to leave out there because I'd have to -- I mean not to give the 
other, but this particular part here it could be construed as 
though I -- well, I'm the culprit" (emphasis added).   
 
46 
 
In addition, the specific details about the shooting incident 
and his own appreciation of the victim's state of mind (see note 
16, supra), which the defendant finally supplied to the officers 
near the end of his statement, were chilling and could certainly 
be understood by the jury as evidence of deliberate 
premeditation as well as extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The 
potential for prejudice to the defendant arising from the 
admission of the statement -- both in itself and then as used by 
the prosecutor in the closing -- is obvious. 
 
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree 
committed with deliberate premeditation and also committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Although the evidence of the 
defendant's guilt under both theories was very strong, with 
respect to deliberately premeditated murder, we cannot say that 
the erroneous admission of the defendant's postinvocation 
statement, and its use by the prosecutor in his closing, was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.32  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
32 As for the closing argument, the defendant did not object 
to it, despite his objection to various portions of evidence 
that became the basis for errors in the prosecutor's closing.  
It also is true that the prosecutor's argument contained 
substantial sections that were entirely proper.  Nevertheless, 
"[t]his is not a case in which a fleeting, isolated, improper 
statement in an otherwise proper argument could, in the context 
of the entire closing argument, be deemed nonprejudicial."  
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 132 (2013).  The 
prosecutor's comments –- those concerning the erroneously 
admitted postinvocation evidence and the improper propensity 
statements that in part found their source in the postinvocation 
47 
 
Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 549 (1990) (in determining whether error 
was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, "[t]he essential question 
is whether the error had, or might have had, an effect on the 
jury and whether the error contributed to or might have 
contributed to the verdicts").   
 
Turning to murder committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, we similarly conclude that a combination of errors 
created sufficient harm to require reversal on that theory.  As 
discussed, a number of the defendant's postinvocation statements 
that were admitted in error provided support for the jury to 
find extreme atrocity or cruelty, as did the propensity-based 
descriptions of the defendant in the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  It is true that in contrast to deliberate 
premeditation, the prosecutor did not use postinvocation 
evidence in his closing explicitly to build the case for a 
finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  At the same time, 
however, the errors in the judge's instruction on mental 
impairment had a particularly prejudicial effect.  In relation 
                                                                  
evidence -- permeated the closing, and as earlier discussed, the 
prosecutor's erroneous bookend references to the postinvocation 
evidence that the defendant was carrying a gun for several 
months before the killing focused explicitly on the defendant's 
capacity to deliberately premeditate -- an issue at the heart of 
the defense:  the defendant's argument to the jury at the end of 
the case was that he was guilty of murder in the second degree, 
not first.  Further, although the judge explained to the jury 
that closing arguments were not evidence, her charge did not 
contain any targeted instructions designed specifically to 
mitigate the effect of the argument errors.  See id. at 131. 
48 
 
to extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge's mental impairment 
instruction, which focused solely on intent and knowledge, 
missed the mark:  "Intent and knowledge are not aspects of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 797-798.33  
Rather, as was true in that case, "[i]t should have been made 
clear to the jury that they could consider evidence of mental 
impairment on the specific question whether the murder was 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Id. at 798.  "A 
jury could have found the defendant's act intentional, yet not 
extremely atrocious or cruel, due to the defendant's [mental 
impairment]. . . .  [T]he jury should reflect the community's 
conscience in determining what constitutes an extremely cruel or 
atrocious killing."  Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 Mass. 451, 
458 (1984).  See Gould, 380 Mass. at 685-686.  See also 
Gonzalez, ante at 422-423. 
 
7.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree on the theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
and deliberate premeditation is vacated.  The Commonwealth has 
                     
 
33 The potential for prejudice arising from the 
concentration on intent and knowledge of an instruction on 
mental impairment appears to be less in relation to the theory 
of deliberate premeditation.  In contrast to extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, intent is an aspect of deliberate premeditation, which 
requires the Commonwealth to prove both an intent to kill as 
well as at least some intentional reflection on the part of the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. McMahon, 443 Mass. 409, 418 
(2005).  See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 39-40 
(rev. 2013).  
 
49 
 
the option of either retrying the defendant on the murder 
indictment or accepting a reduction of the verdict to murder in 
the second degree, which was the verdict urged by the defendant 
at his first trial.34  See Gonzalez, ante 424; Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, ante 531, 532 (2014).  See also Commonwealth v. Bell, 
460 Mass. 294, 310 (2011).  The Commonwealth shall inform this 
court within fourteen days of the date this opinion issues 
whether it will retry the defendant for murder in the first 
degree or move to have the defendant sentenced to murder in the 
second degree.  After the Commonwealth so informs us, we will 
issue an appropriate rescript to the Superior Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
34 Throughout this case, the defendant consistently has 
admitted that he killed the victim.  In his opening statement to 
the jury, the defendant's counsel appeared to suggest that the 
jury should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and 
counsel later requested a manslaughter instruction as part of 
the final charge to the jury.  The judge denied the request, 
however, because she found it lacking support in the evidence.  
The defendant does not press the point on appeal, and review of 
the trial evidence leads us to agree with the judge's 
conclusion.