Title: Taylor v. Lawrence
Citation: 229 Or. 259, 366 P.2d 735
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 1961

Reversed and remanded December 13, 1961.
Clifford B. Olsen, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Anderson, Franklin, Jones &amp; Olsen.
*260 Laurence Morley, Lebanon, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Morley, Thomas &amp; Orona.
Before WARNER, Presiding Justice, and SLOAN, O'CONNELL, LUSK and BRAND, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LUSK, J.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries in which the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff has appealed.
Plaintiff's fifth amended complaint, on which the case was tried, alleged the following:
The defendant, while admitting that the plaintiff sustained some personal injury to her right index finger on the occasion in question, denied the rest of the complaint and alleged as follows:
The evidence disclosed the following facts: On September 9, 1957, the plaintiff, Mrs. Taylor, and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Smitley and Mr. and Mrs. Robert Nesbitt played golf at Albany and afterwards repaired to the Smitleys' home in Lebanon for "a cocktail and a steak dinner." Other guests were the defendant, Lyon Lawrence, and his wife and Mrs. Virgie Clarke. Dinner was out of doors and before it was ready the defendant engaged in "the game" referred to in the pleadings by placing his hand on a long picnic table, stabbing at it with what is referred to as a French bread knife and withdrawing his hand before the point of the knife struck the table. While this was going on the plaintiff and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Nesbitt and Mrs. Lawrence were seated at the table. According to the plaintiff's testimony her hands were resting on *262 the table, but she did not notice what the defendant was doing because she was looking at the garden or watching Mr. Smitley tending steaks. She testified that she did not see the knife and was not aware of it until her finger was cut, when she jerked her hand off the table. The evidence on behalf of the defendant, however, was to the effect that after he had demonstrated that he could withdraw his hand quickly enough to avoid injury, he then started to play the game with Mr. Taylor and that while so engaged the plaintiff asked if she could play too and he decided to accommodate her. He testified:
1. The plaintiff assigns error to the giving of the following instructions:
To the foregoing, the plaintiff excepted as follows:
Counsel for the plaintiff have not included in their brief all the instructions on wanton misconduct. The portions omitted immediately preceded those quoted above and read as follows:
We think that it was error for the court to instruct the jury that in order for the plaintiff to prevail she must prove that "the defendant consciously was unconcerned and did not care whether or not the plaintiff was injured." The instruction imposed upon the plaintiff a heavier burden of proof than is warranted by the law as enunciated by this court in Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or 366, 354 P2d 56, and in the earlier cases of Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Or 130, 295 P2d 182, and Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or 34, 293 P2d 717.
The complaint charges the defendant with wilful or wanton misconduct. In the cited cases we approved the definition of "reckless disregard of safety" (an equivalent for wilful or wanton misconduct) given in 2 Restatement, Torts § 500, and reading as follows:
We also approved the gloss on that rule found in comment "c" to section 500 at page 1295:
In the Williamson case the court was at pains to point out that it is not necessary that defendant actually know of the risk; and that recklessness is "not necessarily a `state of mind' showing a consciousness of the danger and an election to encounter it; `recklessness' may be found in circumstances where the defendant did not appreciate the extreme risk, but where any reasonable man would appreciate it." 223 Or at 397.
The opinion continues: "It follows that in the adjudicated cases expressions such as `reckless disregard,' `reckless state of mind,' `conscious indifference,' `conscious choice of action,' are not to be taken to mean that there must be proof that defendant actually had such a state of mind; such expressions are appropriate to describe the hypothetical state of mind of the hypothetical reasonable man who, faced with the dangerous situation, nevertheless elected to encounter it." 223 Or at 397-398.
Clearly, an instruction that it must be proved that the defendant "consciously was unconcerned and did not care whether or not the plaintiff was injured" cannot be reconciled with the objective test of the Williamson case and the prior cases dealing with this subject which we have cited. See, also, Prosser on Torts (2d ed) 151.
*266 It is true that in the Williamson case the court referred with approval to the use of the expression "I don't care attitude" in instructions to convey the idea of consciousness of risk to the jurors' minds. 223 Or at 401. The trial judge, therefore, did not err in using that expression for the purpose of explaining to the jury the meaning of conscious indifference to the consequences, but it was quite a different thing for the court to inform the jury that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually had such a state of mind. The whole discussion of the question in the Williamson case is opposed to the sanctioning of such a rule.
2. The rule that instructions are to be viewed as a whole is invoked by counsel for the defendant and attention is called to the other instructions in which the court stated the law substantially as laid down in our decisions. But the difficulty here is that the instructions are contradictory because in one breath the jury were told that it is not necessary that the defendant know the risk involved because if the danger is obvious he will be presumed to be aware of it, and in the next breath they are charged that the plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously unconcerned, etc. Inconsistent or contradictory instructions are erroneous and ground for reversal because it cannot usually be determined from the verdict what rule as given by the court the jury adopted. Kelly v. Lewis Inv. Co., 66 Or 1, 9, 133 P 826. See Voight v. Nyberg, 218 Or 383, 394, 345 P2d 821, and cases there cited.
On another trial the court should avoid instructions such as those complained of and should also include the substance of comment "c" in 2 Restatement, Torts § 500, supra, to the effect that in order to establish *267 wantonness it is not necessary that the defendant himself recognized his conduct as being extremely dangerous, but it is enough that he knows, or has reason to know, of circumstances which would bring home to the realization of the ordinary, reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his conduct.
3. The only other assignment of error is based on the plaintiff's exception to the use of the expression "possible injury" in an instruction on wantonness in relation to the conduct of the plaintiff. It will be recalled that the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was a voluntary participant in "the game" and thereby wantonly and recklessly risked injury to her hand. Counsel for the plaintiff apparently concede that the facts alleged would constitute a defense if proved (see 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts 1214; Prosser on Torts (2d ed) 290); but they say that the rule governing plaintiff's conduct is the same as the rule governing his own and that the jury should be so instructed. The court did indeed tell the jury in so many words that the rule is the same in both cases, but, in explaining the rule, said: "* * * if you should find that the plaintiff herself was wanton in that she engaged in this game and submitted herself to a possible injury knowingly with reckless disregard for the possible results therefrom * * *" then in substance the plaintiff could not recover. Counsel for the defendant concede in their brief that the use of the word "possible" in this instruction was ill advised and we agree. On a new trial the words of the Restatement quoted above, "an unreasonable risk of bodily harm", or similar language, should be substituted for the language complained of.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.