Title: In Re Shaw's Estate
Citation: 417 P.2d 942, 69 Wash. 2d 238
Docket Number: 38167
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: September 8, 1966

69 Wn.2d 238 (1966) 417 P.2d 942 In the Matter of the Estate of ELIZABETH L. SHAW, Deceased. JOHN KOHL DANKS, Appellant, v. WANDA L. BROOKS et al., Respondents[*] No. 38167. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. September 8, 1966. Gordon L. Creighton and Charles S. Helm, for appellant. Shidler, McBroom &amp; Gates, William H. Gates, Jr., James R. Irwin, and Jerry T. Haggarty, for respondents. HAMILTON, J. This is a will construction case arising out of two paragraphs in the will of Elizabeth L. Shaw, a widow, who passed away on April 3, 1963. The sole issue is whether Mrs. Shaw, by her will, intended to bequeath a portion of the residue of her estate to appellant, her grandson John Kohl Danks (formerly Ross L. Shaw, Jr.). Briefly, the pertinent familial background is as follows: The testatrix, Elizabeth L. Shaw, had three children, George S. Shaw, Margaret Mary Shaw Trapp, and Ross L. Shaw. *239 In 1930, the son Ross L. Shaw married Francis Grace Kohl. One child, appellant, was born of the marriage in the latter part of 1931. In 1933, this marriage was dissolved by divorce. The custody of appellant was awarded to his mother. Thereafter, appellant's parents remarried. Appellant's mother, Francis Grace Shaw, married one Gene Danks, who in 1940 adopted appellant and formally changed his name to John Kohl Danks. Appellant's father, Ross L. Shaw, married Wanda L. Brooks. Of this marriage two girls were born, Patricia and Kathleen Shaw. At the time Elizabeth L. Shaw executed her will (March 24, 1959) and at the time she passed away (April 3, 1963), the two girls were minors. During this interval, however, Ross L. Shaw died. All other prospective heirs survived the testatrix. The pertinent portions of the two paragraphs of testatrix' will, around which this controversy chiefly revolves, are as follows: The trial court concluded that the purport of the foregoing paragraphs and the intent of the testatrix, to be derived therefrom, was to provide only for the grand-daughters, Patricia and Kathleen Shaw, to the exclusion of appellant. Distribution of the residue of the estate was decreed accordingly, and it is from this interpretation of the will that this appeal comes. In support of his assignments of error, appellant isolates from the context of the quoted testamentary paragraphs the following language: From this language, appellant extrapolates (a) the testatrix intended a class gift to the surviving children of Ross L. Shaw, of which he is one, and (b) the trust provisions of the fourth paragraph of the will do not and cannot delimit appellant's right to share in the estate. We, as did the trial court, disagree. [1] The rules applicable to our review of the decree of distribution are succinctly stated in In re Johnson's Estate, 46 Wn.2d 308, 312, 280 P.2d 1034 (1955), as follows: *242 Furthermore, as we stated in In re Thomas' Estate, 17 Wn.2d 674, 136 P.2d 1017, 147 A.L.R. 598 (1943) and In re MacAdams' Estate, 45 Wn.2d 527, 276 P.2d 729 (1954), courts must endeavor to give effect to every part of the will being construed, and must make a reasonable effort to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent provisions, bearing in mind, however, that an unambiguous provision will not be controlled or modified by a doubtful or ambiguous provision. In the instant case, a reading of the entire will, and particularly those paragraphs quoted above, convinces us that the testatrix' intent, scheme or plan did not embrace a gift to appellant. When the last paragraph of the third paragraph is read in context with the fourth paragraph of the will, it appears certain and clear that the testatrix intended to (a) give three fourths of the third part of the residue to her son, Ross L. Shaw, if he survived her, and one fourth of the third part in trust for the benefit of and to be ultimately distributed to her granddaughters, Patricia and Kathleen, and (b) in the event of her son's intervening death, to give one fourth of the third part of the residue to his widow and three fourths in trust for the benefit of and to be ultimately distributed to the named granddaughters. Appellant's argument, based upon an isolated portion of the will and interwoven into the theory of a class gift, does not overcome the unambiguous import of the third and fourth paragraphs of the will, which, when read together, clearly order the beneficial use and ultimate distribution of all but the widow's share of the third part of the residue to her named granddaughters. The testatrix simply made no provision, and left no reasonably discernible financial room for interpolating a provision, for the benefit of appellant. To hold otherwise would amount to redrafting the will. The decree of distribution is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, FINLEY, and WEAVER, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 417 P.2d 942.