Title: Earls v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47326
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2000

FILED: APRIL 6, 2000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
KEVIN C. EARLS,
Petitioner,
	v.
HARDY MYERS,Oregon Attorney General,
Respondent.
(SC S47326)
	En Banc
	On petition to review ballot title.
	Argued and submitted March 22, 2000.
	Bruce A. Bishop, Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, P.C., Salem,
argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner.  With him
on the petition was James E. Mountain, Jr., Salem.
	Rolf Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.  With
him on the memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	DURHAM, J.
	Ballot title certified as modified.  This decision shall
become effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
	Van Hoomissen, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which 
Riggs, J., joined.
	DURHAM, J.
	Petitioner seeks review of a ballot title for a proposed
initiative measure.  Petitioner is an elector who timely
submitted comments concerning the Attorney General's draft ballot
title.  Therefore, he is entitled to petition for review of the
Attorney General's certified ballot title.  ORS 250.085(2).
	In addition to defining the terms used and limiting its
scope, the proposed measure would enact the following provisions
as a statute:
"SECTION 2.  All managed health care plans offered
by a managed care entity, all health insurance policies
and all casualty insurance policies provided to
residents of Oregon shall:
		"(1) Provide for patient freedom of choice of
health care physician and primary care physician among
all physicians providing medical services within the
physician's professional scope of practice; and
		"(2) Provide the same policy benefits, rate of
reimbursement and extent of covered expenses for all
health care physicians and primary care physicians
provided the physician is providing care within that
physician's professional scope of practice.
		"SECTION 3.  (1) All managed care plans offered by
a managed care entity, all health insurance policies
and all casualty insurance policies subject to sections
1 to 5 of this 2000 Act may require the enrollee or
insured person to select a health care physician as a
primary care physician.  Selection of a primary care
physician limits the applicability of section 2(1) of
this 2000 Act to the selected primary care physician
and referrals by the primary care physician to other
health care physicians.  Enrollees and insured persons
are permitted to change primary care physicians at
will, except that a managed care plan, health insurance
policy or casualty insurance policy may restrict the
enrollee or insured person to changing primary care
physician no more than twice in a 12-month period.
		"(2) An enrollee or insured person has the right
to select a health care physician or primary care
physician in accordance with the following categories:
		"(a) For medical services, a Doctor of Medicine or
a Doctor of Osteopathy licensed in accordance with ORS
chapter 677, or a Doctor of Chiropractic licensed in
accordance with ORS chapter 684;
		"(b) For dental care service, a Doctor of Medical
Dentistry or a Doctor of Dental Science as licensed in
accordance with ORS chapter 679; and
		"(c) For vision care services, a Doctor of
Medicine licensed in accordance with ORS chapter 677 or
a Doctor of Optometry licensed in accordance with ORS
chapter 683."
	The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title for the measure:
 "REQUIRES:  FREEDOM TO CHOOSE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER; EQUAL REIMBURSEMENT, COVERAGE

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote requires
patient's freedom to choose health care provider;
requires equal reimbursement rates, coverage.
		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote rejects requiring
freedom to choose health care provider; rejects equal
reimbursement rates, coverage.
		"SUMMARY:  Modifies health care provider
contracting options by requiring health and casualty
insurance policies, managed health care plans to
provide same reimbursement rates, coverage, regardless
of care provider.  For medical services, allows
patient's choice of physician or chiropractor as
primary care, health care provider.  For vision
services, allows choice of ophthalmologist,
optometrist.  Patients may change primary care
provider, but can be limited to two changes over twelve
months.  Excludes Oregon Medical Assistance Program,
Oregon Health Plan, student health insurance programs,
public employee benefits, inmates, workers'
compensation."
	Petitioner objects to each segment of the Attorney
General's ballot title.  We review those objections in order,
bearing in mind that we must decide only whether the Attorney
General's ballot title complies substantially with statutory
requirements.  ORS 250.085(5). (1)  See also Mabon v. Kulongoski,
325 Or 121, 126, 934 P2d 403 (1997) ("The review statutes do not
authorize this court to draft a 'better' or 'improved' title;
substantial compliance with the requirements stated in ORS
250.035 is sufficient.").
	Petitioner first challenges the Attorney General's
ballot title caption.  The ballot title caption must reasonably
identify, within 10 words, the subject matter of the measure. 
ORS 250.035(2)(a) (1997). (2)  To determine whether a caption
accurately states the subject matter of a proposed initiative
measure, "we examine the text of the measure itself  * * *."  Doell v. Myers, 328 Or 635, 640, 984 P2d 266 (1999).  
	Petitioner first argues that the Attorney General's
caption fails to identify the subject matter of the measure
because it does not mention how the measure would change the ways
in which physicians and other specified health care providers may
contract and be paid for their services.  The Attorney General
responds that the caption reasonably identifies the subject
matter of the measure because it states that the measure
"requires * * * equal reimbursement, coverage," thereby informing
voters that the subject of the measure encompasses the options
for insurers and managed health care plans when contracting with
health care providers.  
	We agree with the Attorney General.  The measure
requires that specified health care plans and insurance policies
"[p]rovide the same policy benefits, rate of reimbursement and
extent of covered expenses" to specified health care providers. 
The phrase "requires * * * equal reimbursement, coverage"
reasonably identifies that subject matter within the constraints
of the word limitation imposed on the caption and, thus,
substantially complies with statutory requirements.  
	Petitioner further argues that the caption uses
terminology that is not objective.  Particularly, petitioner
contends that the phrase "freedom to choose" is inappropriate for
a ballot title because it is not neutral and might mislead voters
into supporting the proposal without understanding its true
effects.  The Attorney General responds that the phrase "freedom
to choose" accurately identifies the subject matter of the
measure by indicating that the measure would prevent insurers and
managed health care plans from restricting patients' freedom to
choose their own health care providers.  The Attorney General
further observes that the phrase mirrors wording used in the
measure itself.  
	We agree with petitioner that, in this context, the
phrase "freedom to choose" is likely to prejudice voters
regarding the measure.  See Marr v. Thornton, 237 Or 503, 504,
392 P2d 458 (1964) (deleting phrase "right-to-work" from ballot
title caption as slogan that amounted to argument for measure and
that likely would create prejudice).  It is true that the phrase
"freedom to choose" appears in the measure itself.  However the
Attorney General and this court are not constrained to certify a
ballot title that is slanted toward passage or defeat of the
measure.  See Dirks v. Myers, 329 Or 608, 616, 993 P2d 808 (2000)
(court has resisted attempts to incorporate into ballot title
terms or phrases that "tend more to promote or defeat passage of
the measure than to describe its substance accurately."). 
Proponents of a measure are not entitled to engineer a favorable
ballot title by incorporating politically inflated terms or
phrases in the text of the measure in order to advance its
passage.  Cf. Bernard v. Keisling, 317 Or 591, 596-97, 858 P2d
1309 (1993) (court will not hesitate to look beyond words of
measure if those words obfuscate subject, chief purpose, summary,
or major effect of measure). 
	We have considered petitioner's other objections to the
caption and reject them without further discussion.  
	We conclude that petitioner is correct that the caption
does not comply substantially with statutory requirements and
requires modification to remove the phrase "freedom to choose." 
To remedy that problem, we rephrase the caption to state that the
measure would afford to patients the opportunity to select their
health care provider.  Additionally, because the phrase "freedom
to choose" also appears in the "yes" and "no" vote result
statements, and conveys the same meaning in those contexts, we
make similar conforming changes to those parts of the ballot
title to conform to the changes that we make to the caption.  See
Garst v. Myers, 329 Or 529, 535, 992 P2d 451 (1999) (following
that practice).
	As a consequence of the foregoing discussion, we modify
the caption as follows:
PATIENTS MAY CHOOSE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER; REQUIRES EQUAL REIMBURSEMENT, COVERAGE
	In challenging the Attorney General's "yes" and "no"
result statements, petitioner repeats his criticisms of the
Attorney General's caption.  As discussed above, we agree in part
with those criticisms and adopt corresponding changes to bring
the "yes" and "no" result statements into substantial compliance
with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c) (1997).  In addition, we agree
with petitioner that the Attorney General's "no" vote result
statement is misleading.  That is so because, by using the term
"rejects," the "no" vote result statement incorrectly implies
that a rejection of the measure might cause voters to lose their
present opportunity to select a health care provider and to
receive existing equal (or other) rates for reimbursement and
coverage under managed care plans and insurance contracts now in
effect.  As petitioner correctly points out, the "no" vote result
statement should state accurately what voters would retain, under
their existing legal or contractual arrangements, if they defeat
the measure.
	We modify the "yes" and "no" vote result statements as
follows:
		RESULT OF "YES" VOTE:  "Yes" vote would permit
patients to choose health care provider; requires equal
reimbursement rates, coverage.
		RESULT OF "NO" VOTE:  "No" vote retains current
options to choose health care provider, and obligations
regarding reimbursement, coverage.
	Finally, petitioner challenges the Attorney General's
summary.  We have considered petitioner's arguments and conclude
that the Attorney General's summary complies substantially with
ORS 250.035(2)(d) (1997).  Accordingly, we do not alter the
Attorney General's summary.
	We certify to the Secretary of State the following
ballot title:
PATIENTS MAY CHOOSE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER; REQUIRES EQUAL REIMBURSEMENT, COVERAGE

		RESULT OF "YES" VOTE:  "Yes" vote would permit
patients to choose health care provider; requires equal
reimbursement rates, coverage.
		RESULT OF "NO" VOTE:  "No" vote retains current
options to choose health care provider, and obligations
regarding reimbursement, coverage.
		SUMMARY:  Modifies health care provider
contracting options by requiring health and casualty
insurance policies, managed health care plans to
provide same reimbursement rates, coverage, regardless
of care provider.  For medical services, allows
patient's choice of physician or chiropractor as
primary care, health care provider.  For vision
services, allows choice of ophthalmologist,
optometrist.  Patients may change primary care
provider, but can be limited to two changes over twelve
months.  Excludes Oregon Medical Assistance Program,
Oregon Health Plan, student health insurance programs,
public employee benefits, inmates, workers'
compensation.
	Ballot title certified as modified.  This decision
shall become effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J., dissenting
	I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the Attorney
General's certified ballot title substantially complies with the
requirements of ORS 250.035 (1997).  ORS 250.085(5).
	The unspoken premise on which this court's modification
decision is based is that it does not violate the principle of
separation of powers for this court to rewrite a certified ballot
title.  See Rooney v. Kulongoski (Elections Division #13), 322 Or
15, 55, 902 P2d 1143 (1995) (Unis, J., dissenting) (arguing that
judicial modification of ballot titles offends Article III,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution); Sizemore v. Kulongoski,
322 Or 229, 237, 905 P2d 1146 (1995) (Durham, J., concurring)
(same).  The court should revisit that premise.
	Riggs, J., joins in this opinion.

1. 	ORS 250.085(5) provides:
	"The court shall review the title for substantial
compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035, and
shall certify a title meeting this standard to the
Secretary of State."

2. 	The 1999 Legislature amended ORS 250.035 (2) (1997) in
several respects.  Or Laws 1999, ch 793, § 1.  However, section 3
of that 1999 enactment provides in part:
		"(1) The amendments to ORS 250.035 by section 1 of
this 1999 Act do not apply to any ballot title prepared
for:
		"(a) Any initiative petition that, if filed with
the Secretary of State with the required number of
signatures of qualified electors, will be submitted to
the people at the general election held on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in November 2000[.]"
The present proposed measure is one of those to which the 1999
act does not apply.  We therefore apply the pertinent provisions
of ORS 250.035 (2) (1997).