Title: Hill v. Otte
Citation: 281 N.E.2d 811
Docket Number: 1270S291
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1972

281 N.E.2d 811 (1972)
W.W. HILL, Jr., As Acting Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of Indiana, Appellant,
v.
Marlyn L. OTTE, Appellee.
No. 1270S291.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 1, 1972.
*812 Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellant.
George H. Gossman, Seymour, for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
Appellee was arrested at 3:00 A.M. on May 8, 1970, for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Following his arrest appellee refused to take a breathalyzer test. This fact was certified to the appellant. After due notice appellant through his duly appointed hearing officer conducted a hearing, the result of which was the revocation of appellee's driver's license for a period of one year, pursuant to the terms of Chapter 64 of the Acts of 1969, Sections 1 and 2, Burns' Ann. St. §§ 2003c, 2003d, IC 1971, 9-4-4-1, 9-4-4-2, which has since been superseded by Public Law 130 of the Acts of 1971, Section 1.
The statute which was in force at the time of the alleged violation in question reads in part as follows:
The evidence in this case discloses testimony by the arresting officer from which a trier of fact could logically find that the appellee was under the influence of alcohol. In refusing to take the breathalyzer test the appellee stated that he preferred to have his personal physician give him a blood test. However, this was not done in view of the fact that appellee had refused the breathalyzer test offered by the police.
At 8:30 in the morning following his arrest at 3:00 A.M. the appellee was first taken before a magistrate.
The appellee appealed the action of the appellant revoking his driver's license to the Jackson Circuit Court. His complaint filed in the Jackson Circuit Court reads in part as follows:
After hearing evidence the Jackson Circuit Court rendered the following finding:
It is the appellant's contention the trial court erred in determining the appellee was deprived of his constitutional rights to have an accepted test administered for the purpose of revealing the alcoholic content of his blood. As pointed out above, the appellee refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. Therefore, under Section 1 of the act in force at that time and above quoted the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles was authorized to suspend his driver's license.
We hold the trial court was in error in holding that the appellee had a right under the statute to substitute an acceptable test in lieu of the breathalyzer test. The language of the above quoted statute is clear and unambiguous that the additional tests are available to a defendant who submits to the breathalyzer test. After so submitting to a test, the accused person is under the statute permitted a cross check by a physician, registered nurse or medical technician of his own choosing. There is nothing in the language of the statute which indicates that such tests are to be given in lieu of the breathalyzer test required by the statute. When the appellee chose to refuse the breathalyzer test, he was not entitled to the additional tests called for in the statute and was subject to the penalty of having his driver's license revoked for one year.
It is noted that the Judge of the Jackson Circuit Court also held that appellee's constitutional rights were violated because he was not taken immediately before a magistrate following his arrest. We note his arrest occurred at 3:00 A.M. and that he was taken before a magistrate at 8:30 that same morning. We hold the trial court erred in holding that this was a violation of appellee's constitutional rights. As this Court has previously held the required court appearance must take place as soon as practicable under all circumstances, but is limited to bringing an accused before a magistrate during the usual hours for conducting court. McClanahan v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 567, 112 N.E.2d 575.
For the reasons above stated the trial court is reversed.
We observe from the record that two months and three days of the one year suspension had elapsed at the time the Jackson Circuit Court ordered appellee's license restored. This cause is, therefore, remanded to the Jackson Circuit Court with direction to reinstate the remaining balance of the one year suspension ordered by the appellant.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.