Title: State v. Ronald A. Hansford
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000885-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0885-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ronald A. Hansford,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 19, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 27, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Sharon Ruhly, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Craig W. Albee 
and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0885-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald A. Hansford,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Patrick J. Fielder, Judge.  Reversed and caused 
remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61(1995-96).1  The issue certified to this court is whether 
Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am),2 which provides for six-person 
juries in criminal misdemeanor cases, violates art. I, § 73 or 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1995-96 volume of the statutes unless otherwise noted. 
 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) states:  "A jury in a 
misdemeanor case shall consist of 6 persons." 
The 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) 
pursuant to 1995 Wisconsin Act 427.  Although § 756.096(3)(am) 
has been repealed, the language providing for six-person juries 
in misdemeanor cases is still in effect and is now codified in 
Wis. Stat. § 756.06(2)(b) (1997-98).  See WI Order 97-2 (S. Ct. 
Order 96-08).  
3 Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
2 
art. I, § 54 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  A second issue, 
which was not certified to this court but was raised by the 
Defendant in his brief to the court of appeals, is whether the 
circuit 
court 
committed 
reversible 
error 
in 
denying 
the 
Defendant's request for a jury instruction on a common law right 
to change his name, because the circuit court concluded that 
such right is not recognized in Wisconsin.5 
¶2 
Upon 
review, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) 
violates 
art. 
I, 
§ 7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution which guarantees the right to a jury of 12 persons, 
as recognized by the common law as it existed at the time the 
Wisconsin Constitution was adopted.  See Wis. Const. art. XIV, 
                                                                  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
 
4 Article I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
The right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law.  Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute, provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. 
 
5 In our order accepting this case on certification from the 
court of appeals, we stated that "the appeal is accepted for 
consideration of all issues raised before the court of appeals." 
  
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
3 
§ 13.6 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment 
convicting the Defendant of obstructing an officer.  We also 
reverse the Defendant's conviction for bail jumping, since it 
was premised solely upon the circuit court's finding that the 
jury found the Defendant guilty of obstructing an officer.  
Because we conclude that § 756.096(3)(am) violates art. I, § 7 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, it is not necessary for us to 
determine whether the circuit court committed reversible error 
by denying the Defendant's request for a jury instruction 
regarding a common law name change.  However, for purposes of 
clarifying Wisconsin's common law, we further conclude that 
Wisconsin does recognize a common law right to change one's name 
through consistent and continuous use, as long as the change is 
not effected for a fraudulent purpose. 
I. 
¶3 
The facts relevant to our review are not in dispute.  
On June 21, 1996, the Defendant and Troy Ullman ("Ullman") had 
an altercation at a bar.  As a result, Ullman called the Madison 
Police Department and filed a report.   Eight days later, Ullman 
saw the Defendant at the same bar and again called the police.  
When the police officer arrived, Ullman pointed out the 
Defendant and informed the officer that the Defendant frequently 
used the name Bryan Storm.  The uniformed officer approached the 
                     
6 Article XIV, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
Such parts of the common law as are now in force in 
the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this 
constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of 
this 
state 
until 
altered 
or 
suspended 
by 
the 
legislature. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
4 
Defendant and asked him whether he was Ronald Hansford.  The 
Defendant replied, "No," and said his name was Bryan.  The 
officer placed the Defendant under arrest, and repeatedly asked 
the Defendant his name.  The Defendant continued to state that 
his name was Bryan Storm.  The Defendant was subsequently 
transported to jail, where he was presented with a picture of 
Ronald Hansford.  The Defendant acknowledged that it was a 
picture of himself, but did not state that his name was Ronald 
Hansford.  At the time of his arrest, the Defendant had been 
previously released on bail for charges of theft and obstructing 
an officer pending in Dane County. 
¶4 
On July 1, 1996, the State of Wisconsin ("State") 
charged the Defendant with three Class A misdemeanor offenses:  
battery contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1); obstructing an 
officer contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1); and bail jumping 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(a).  The Defendant filed a 
motion to sever the bail jumping charge from the charges of 
battery and obstructing.  The circuit court denied the motion, 
and the Defendant thereafter waived his right to a trial by jury 
with regard to the bail jumping charge.  
¶5 
On October 14, 1996, the Defendant filed another 
motion, requesting that the battery and obstructing charges be 
tried to a jury of 12 persons.  He argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am), 
which 
mandates 
six-person 
juries 
in 
misdemeanor cases, violates art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Citing several Wisconsin Supreme Court and Courts 
of Appeals' decisions, including State ex rel. Sauk County Dist. 
Attorney v. Gollmar, 32 Wis. 2d 406, 409, 145 N.W.2d 670 (1966), 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
5 
the Defendant asserted that the jury contemplated by the framers 
of the Wisconsin Constitution is a 12-person jury, and that the 
right to a trial by jury applies to criminal misdemeanor cases. 
¶6 
The circuit court denied the Defendant's motion, 
concluding that the Defendant had not proved that Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 In its oral decision, the circuit court distinguished Gollmar, 
stating that the statutory provisions addressed in Gollmar were 
distinct, and that Gollmar had been decided prior to court 
reorganization in 1978.  The circuit court further concluded 
that the Wisconsin Legislature has the authority to alter the 
required number of jurors in a misdemeanor case.   
¶7 
On October 15, 1996, the Defendant filed a proposed 
jury instruction on the common law right to change one's name by 
consistently and continuously using a new name.7  The proposed 
jury instruction was proffered as part of a theory of defense.  
The Defendant's theory of defense was that because he had 
                     
7 The text of the jury instruction requested by the 
Defendant states: 
Evidence 
has 
been 
received 
that 
the 
defendant 
has 
habitually and regularly used the name Bryan Storm.  In 
Wisconsin, there are two ways to legally change one's name. 
 First, an individual may petition a circuit court pursuant 
to the Wisconsin Statutes for an order changing his or her 
name.  Second, an individual may effect a common law name 
change.  A common law name change is effected without 
recourse to court order by simply adopting a new name and 
consistently and continuously using that name.  In deciding 
whether the defendant in this case intentionally obstructed 
an officer in the performance of his duty, by informing the 
officer that his name was Bryan Storm, you may consider 
whether the defendant had lawfully changed his name to 
Bryan Storm under the common law by usage. 
Record on appeal 21:2. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
6 
changed his name in accord with the common law, he did not 
intentionally obstruct the officer in denying that he was Ronald 
Hansford and stating that his name was Bryan Storm.  The circuit 
court denied the Defendant's request for the instruction, 
concluding that Wisconsin does not recognize a common law right 
to change one's name through consistent and continuous use.8 
¶8 
The charges of battery and obstructing an officer were 
tried to a jury of six persons.  The jury acquitted the 
Defendant of the battery charge, and convicted the Defendant of 
the obstructing charge.  Subsequently, the circuit court 
convicted the Defendant of bail jumping, citing the Defendant's 
conviction for obstructing as violating the terms of his bond.   
¶9 
The Defendant appealed his convictions on the charges 
of obstructing and bail jumping, and this court accepted 
certification of the case from the court of appeals. 
II. 
A. 
¶10 We first address the issue certified by the court of 
appeals:  whether Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) violates art. I, 
§ 7 or art. I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Whether a 
statute violates the Wisconsin Constitution is a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  See State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 
                     
8 Specifically, the circuit court judge concluded "that 
there is no legal basis upon which to find that someone may 
effectuate a change in their name as proposed by the defense."  
Record on appeal 41:14. 
 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
7 
54, 67, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997).  Although we review questions of 
law de novo, we benefit from the analyses of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.9  See Aiello v. Village of Pleasant 
Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 70, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996).  Statutes 
are 
afforded 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality. 
 
See 
Association of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee County, 199 
Wis. 2d 549, 557, 544 N.W.2d 888 (1996).  Therefore, the 
Defendant bears the burden of proving that § 756.096(3)(am) is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id.  
¶11 We first consider the language of art. I, § 7 which 
states in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . in prosecutions by indictment, or 
information, 
to 
a 
speedy 
public 
trial 
by 
an 
impartial 
jury . . . "  To determine the Defendant's rights guaranteed 
under this provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, we must 
attempt to ascertain the 
intent 
of 
the framers of the 
constitution, as well as how the right to trial by jury was 
understood at common law, at the time the constitution was 
adopted.10   
                     
9 Although the court of appeals did not decide whether Wis. 
Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) violates the Wisconsin Constitution, it 
did provide this court with a limited analysis of the issue in 
its three-page certification to this court. 
10 Article XIV, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
that the common law at the time the constitution was adopted 
remains in force.  Although the legislature has the authority to 
alter Wisconsin's common law, it may not do so contrary to the 
provisions set forth in the Wisconsin Constitution. See, e.g., 
Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, 23 (1853) ("[W]henever...the 
operation of the statute must cause a deprivation of a right 
secured by the Constitution, the courts have no alternativethe 
statute must yield."). 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
8 
¶12 The 
Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted 
in 
1848.  
Records from the constitutional conventions of 1846 and 1847-4811 
contain almost no debate about the guarantee of the right to a 
trial by jury.  The little debate there was centered around the 
guarantee of a jury trial as opposed to a trial to the court, 
rather than the requisite number of jurors.12  Thus, the issue of 
the number of jurors guaranteed by the constitution was not 
directly addressed.  However, it was referenced by a delegate 
during a debate regarding whether art. I, § 5 should prohibit 
judges from instructing juries other than as provided by 
statute.  In his speech to the convention, Charles H. Lakin, a 
delegate from Milwaukee, stated in part: 
                     
11 There were two constitutional conventions in Wisconsin.  
The Wisconsin Constitution drafted at the 1846 convention did 
not receive the necessary votes for ratification.  Thereafter, 
Governor Dodge called a special session of the legislature which 
met on October 18, 1847, and "[w]ithin ten days the body 
 . . . decided upon apportionment for sixty-nine delegates who 
should be elected on November 29, and assemble at the capitol on 
December 15 to draw up a new constitution."  Alice E. Smith, 1 
The History of Wisconsin, From Exploration to Statehood, 667 
(1985).  The delegates of the 1847-48 convention drafted a new 
constitution. 
 
The 
new 
constitution 
was 
approved 
for 
ratification, and "on April 10 [1848] Governor Dodge proclaimed 
the adoption of a constitution for Wisconsin."  Id. at 676. 
12 In his speech to the members of the constitutional 
convention of 1847-48, Charles H. Lakin stated in part: 
By the proposed amendment, if adopted, the line will be 
distinctly drawn between the bench and the jury box. 
 . . .  I wish to reinstate the ancient trial by jury, 
assigning to it its original prerogative and opening a 
great gulf between it and the bench. . . .  But what I 
complain of is that the prerogative of juries is swallowed 
up in the vortex of the bench. 
Journal of the Convention to form a Constitution for the State 
of Wisconsin, 122 (1848). 
 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
9 
 
If it be the name of trial by jury that enamours you, 
you can get something that will do as well, perhaps 
better, than flesh, and blood, and bones.  Erect 
within your temples of justice twelve hollow, graven, 
brazen images.  Have them so constructed that they 
will cast an echo; and as the dicta of the bench shall 
be hurled at them, the same will be reflected back to 
record; and if you will, you may call this, trial by 
jury. 
 
Confident am I, that every freeman would like to be 
able to say to every usurper, "thus far shalt thou 
come, and when you step over the line which divides 
you from the jury box, you tread upon ground hallowed 
and 
rendered 
sacred 
by 
the 
genius 
of 
the 
constitution." 
Journal of the Convention to form a Constitution for the State 
of Wisconsin, 124 (1848) (emphasis in original).   
¶13 The statements of Charles H. Lakin seem to indicate 
that the framers may have viewed the right to a trial by jury as 
the right to a jury of 12 persons.  However, due to the limited 
information elicited from the debates of the constitutional 
conventions, we seek guidance from decisions of this court, 
particularly those decisions that were handed down shortly after 
the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶14 Five years after the adoption of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, this court addressed the issue whether ch. 86, 
§ 16 of the Revised Statutes, which provided for a six-person 
jury in civil actions, violated Wis. Const. art. I, § 5.  See 
Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17 (1853).  This court determined that 
the right to a jury trial is the right as recognized by common 
law at the time the constitution was adopted.  See id at 20.  In 
ascertaining the right at common law, this court cited numerous 
authorities, all of which construed the right to a jury trial as 
the right to a trial by a jury of 12 persons: 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
10
 
Lord Coke . . . says:  "Of these, a trial by twelve 
men is the most frequent and common.  . . .  [I]t 
seemeth to me that the law in this case delighteth 
herself 
in 
the 
number 
of 
twelve; 
for 
there 
must . . . be twelve jurors for the trial of matters 
of fact." 
 . . .  
 
[A]lso, in Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 351, 
it is said in relation to the ordinary trial by jury 
after 
issue 
joined, 
"the 
court 
awards 
a 
writ . . . commanding the sheriff that he cause to 
come here on such a day, twelve free and lawful 
men . . . ." 
 
"[W]hat greater security can any person have in his 
life, liberty or estate, than to be sure of not being 
divested of, or injured in any of these, without the 
sense of verdict of twelve honest and impartial men of 
his neighborhood?  And hence we find the common law 
herein confirmed by Magna Charta."  Bacon's Ab., Title 
"Juries" vol. 5, p. 308.  . . .  
 
In the third volume of his Lectures on the Law of 
England, p. 199, Professor Woodesson says of trial by 
jury:  "Where no challenge is taken either to the 
whole array, or to the jurors individually, twelve of 
them are sworn to 'well and truly try the issue joined 
between the parties,'" &c. 
 
Sir Matthew Hale says (2 Hale's P.C. 161):  "But in 
case of a trial by the petit jury, it can be by no 
more nor less than twelve;"  . . .  
 
"The petit jury when sworn, must consist precisely of 
twelve, and is never to be either more or less on the 
trial of the general issue."  1 Chitty's C.L. 505. 
 
"From the earliest period of the common law, the term 
jury has had a technical and specific meaning, and has 
ever signified 'a body of twelve citizens . . . .'" 
Id. at 20-22 (emphasis in original).  Based upon these 
authorities, the Norval court concluded that right to a trial by 
jury guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution is the right to a 
jury of 12 persons as recognized by the common law as it existed 
at the time the constitution was adopted: 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
11
 
In our view of the provisions of the Revised Statutes 
concerning County Courts, where they restrict the jury 
to six persons, they conflict with the enjoyment of a 
constitutional 
right, 
secured 
to 
every 
citizen, 
namely, the right of trial by a jury of twelve men; 
and we therefore hold, that when the defendant in the 
court below was denied a trial by a jury consisting of 
twelve men, he was deprived of a right secured to him 
by the Constitution. 
Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). 
¶15 The discussion of the right to trial by jury in Norval 
is particularly significant given the make-up of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court at the time the decision was rendered.  In 1853, 
the year that Norval was written, Edward V. Whiton was the Chief 
Justice of the court.  Although the majority opinion was 
authored by Justice Samuel Crawford, Chief Justice Whiton, who 
joined the unanimous decision, had substantial insight into the 
intent of the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution.  In 1847, 
Chief 
Justice 
Whiton 
was 
an 
attorney 
practicing 
law 
in 
Janesville, Wisconsin.  See Journal of the Convention to form a 
Constitution for the State of Wisconsin, 18-19 (1848).  He was 
also a delegate at the 1847-48 convention to re-draft the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See id. 
¶16 Several years after Norval was decided, this court 
concluded that the right to a trial by jury was guaranteed to 
defendants in criminal cases under art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N.W.2d 912 
(1883).  This court rejected an argument made by Bennett that 
art. I, § 5 secured a criminal defendant's right to a jury 
trial.  However, this court determined that art. I, § 7 secured 
such a right, that right being a jury of 12 persons: 
 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
12
It may be assumed that this section [art. I, § 7] 
secures to the accused in all criminal prosecutions a 
right of trial by jury, and that the jury mentioned in 
said 
section 
means 
a 
jury 
of 
twelve 
impartial 
men,such a jury as was known to the common law and to 
the court of the territory of Wisconsin before the 
state was organized. 
Id. 
at 
75 
(citations 
omitted) 
(emphasis 
in 
original).  
Subsequently, this court reaffirmed its holding in Bennett that 
art. I, § 7 guarantees the right to a 12-person jury in criminal 
trials.  See, e.g., In re Staff, 63 Wis. 285, 295, 23 N.W. 587 
(1885)(A criminal defendant "is entitled to be tried by a jury, 
that is, a common-law jury, which must consist of twelve 
qualified jurors . . . ."); Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 
309, 114 N.W. 492 (1908) ("It is unquestioned that a common-law 
jury of twelve jurors constitutes the jury contemplated by the 
constitution.").   
¶17 Finally, in Gollmar, 32 Wis. 2d 406, this court 
considered the issue of whether an individual charged with a 
misdemeanor offense could obtain a six-person jury trial without 
the consent of the State.  Although Gollmar involved the issue 
of waiver, in its discussion, this court recognized that the 
right to a jury trial is the right to a jury of 12-persons.  See 
id. at 409.  This court also cited its previous decisions 
concluding that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by art. I, 
§ 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution extends to defendants charged 
with misdemeanors as well as felonies.  See id. at 410 (citing 
State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403 (1877); State v. Smith, 184 
Wis. 664, 200 N.W. 638 (1924); State v. Slowe, 230 Wis. 406, 284 
N.W. 4 (1939)). 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
13
¶18 In Lockwood, 43 Wis. at 403, the State filed an 
information charging the defendant with a misdemeanor offense.  
This court concluded that in a criminal misdemeanor case, "[t]he 
right to trial by jury, upon information or indictment for 
crime, is secured by the constitution . . . ." Id. at 405.  
Although the current practice is to charge misdemeanor offenses 
by summons or warrant and complaint, without indictment or 
information, we are persuaded that there is a present-day right 
to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases.  To hold otherwise would 
allow a defendant's constitutional rights to hinge upon the 
discretion of the charging body, and/or the often-changing 
judicially and legislatively created pleading procedures. 
¶19 In conclusion, the information from the constitutional 
conventions, as well as this court's decisions in Norval, 
Bennett, Staff, Jennings, Gollmar,13 and the authorities cited 
therein, lead us to conclude that a criminal defendant's right 
to a trial by jury as guaranteed by art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, is the right to a jury of 12 persons.  In 
addition, the decisions in Lockwood, Smith, Slowe, and Gollmar 
lead us to conclude that the right to a 12-person jury extends 
to all criminal defendants, regardless of whether they are 
charged with misdemeanor or felony offenses. 
¶20 Our analysis is not altered by the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970).  In Williams, the Supreme Court concluded that the Dade 
                     
13 We are not persuaded by the circuit court's attempt to 
distinguish State ex rel. Sauk County District Attorney v. 
Gollmar, 32 Wis. 2d 406, 145 N.W.2d 670 (1966), based upon the 
statutory provisions existing at that time and the fact that 
Gollmar was decided prior to the court reorganization of 1978. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
14
County Criminal Court's refusal to impanel a jury of more than 
six persons did not violate the criminal defendant's rights to a 
trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States 
Constitution, 
as 
applied 
through 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court reasoned that, although juries at 
common 
law 
generally 
consisted 
of 
12 
members, 
there 
is 
"absolutely no indication" that the framers of the United States 
Constitution intended to "equate the constitutional and common-
law characteristics of the jury."  Id. at 98-100.  Rather, the 
Supreme Court analyzed the particular functions and purposes of 
a jury and concluded that the 12-person requirement for a jury 
trial 
is 
not 
"an 
indispensable 
component 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment."  Id. at 100.14    
¶21 We decline to extend the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Williams to the Defendant's state constitutional argument in 
                     
14 Since its decision in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970), the United States Supreme Court has held that the right 
to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution must be a trial by a jury of at least six 
persons.  See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (emphasis 
supplied). 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
15
this case.15  Although Williams is binding authority regarding 
challenges to six-person juries premised upon the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, we 
recognize that the Wisconsin Constitution may afford greater 
protection than the United States Constitution.  See State v. 
Doe 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).  The history 
surrounding the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, and the 
long-standing precedent of this court interpreting the meaning 
of the right to trial by jury under our constitution, satisfy us 
that the Defendant has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
                     
15 
Notwithstanding 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision in Williams, several states still provide criminal 
defendants who are charged with misdemeanor offenses the right 
to a jury of 12-persons, either through statutory provisions, 
rules of criminal procedure, or state constitutions.  See, e.g., 
Ala. Code § 12-16-100 (1995), Ala. R. Crim. P. 18.4; Alaska R. 
Crim. P. 23; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-32-203(Michie Supp. 1997); Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code § 220 (West Supp. 1998); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. 
R. 23; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 635-26, 806-60 (1993); 725 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/115-4 (West 1996); Me. R. Crim. P. 23; Md. Rule 4-311; 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.18(1979); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 543.210 
(1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2B:23-1 (West Supp. 1998); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1201 (1997); Pa. Const. art. I, § 6; R.I. Super. Ct. 
R. Crim. P. 23; S.C. R. Crim. P. 14; S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-
18-2 (1988); Vt. R. Crim. P. 23; Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 6.1; 
W. Va. R. Crim. P. 23. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
16
Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) violates art. I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.16   
¶22 Because the Defendant was not afforded the right to a 
jury of 12 persons, as guaranteed by art. I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, his 
conviction 
for 
obstructing an 
officer must be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit 
court.  In addition, the Defendant's conviction for bail jumping 
must also be reversed and the cause remanded.   
¶23 At the time of his arrest for battery and obstructing, 
the Defendant had previously been released on bond for other 
offenses.  One of the terms of the Defendant's bond stated:  
"You shall not commit any crime."17  Record on appeal 42:8.  
Therefore, 
in 
addition 
to 
the 
charges 
for 
battery 
and 
obstructing an officer in this case, the Defendant was charged 
with bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49.   
                     
16 Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) 
violates art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, it is 
unnecessary for us to consider whether § 756.096(3)(am) also 
violates 
art. 
I, 
§ 5 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
Furthermore, we note that the Defendant did not argue a 
violation of art. I, § 5 to the circuit court.   Although the 
court of appeals' certification of the issue to this court was 
premised upon both art. I, § 7 and art. I, § 5, the Defendant's 
sole argument to the circuit court was that his right to a jury 
of 12 persons is "guaranteed by Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Record on appeal 16:2.  This court has often 
stated that we generally will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal.  See State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 
Wis. 2d 497, 504, 331 N.W.2d 320 (1983). 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.12 defines a crime as: 
conduct 
which 
is 
prohibited 
by 
state 
law 
and 
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.  Conduct 
punishable only by a forfeiture is not a crime. 
 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
17
¶24 The Defendant waived his right to a jury trial with 
regard to the bail jumping charge; therefore, the constitutional 
guarantees under art. I, § 7 of the right to a jury trial are 
not implicated.  Rather, we review the charge of bail jumping to 
determine if the evidence presented at the circuit court 
supports the conviction.  We "may not reverse a conviction 
unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the 
conviction, is so insufficient in probative value and force that 
it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting 
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990). 
¶25 There are three elements that must be met for a 
conviction of bail jumping:  (1) the individual must have been 
arrested for, or charged with, a felony or misdemeanor; (2) the 
individual must be released from custody on bond; and (3) the 
individual must have intentionally failed to comply with the 
terms of his or her bond.  See State v. Dawson, 195 Wis. 2d 161, 
170-71, 536 N.W.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Wis JI-Criminal 
1795 (Rel. No. 3412/95).  At the circuit court trial, the 
parties stipulated that the Defendant had been previously 
charged with a misdemeanor offense, and that the Defendant had 
been released on bond.  See Record on appeal 42:3.  In finding 
that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant intentionally failed to comply with the terms of his 
bond, the circuit court noted only that "a jury has found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that . . . the defendant committed the crime 
of obstructing."  Record on appeal 42:9.   
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
18
¶26 Because the bail jumping conviction was premised 
solely upon the Defendant's obstructing conviction, which we now 
reverse, the bail jumping conviction must also be reversed.  
Absent a finding that the Defendant committed a crime, the State 
has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt an element of the bail 
jumping chargethat the Defendant intentionally failed to comply 
with the term of his bond prohibiting criminal activity.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1).  The State must prove each element of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt before a Defendant may be found 
guilty.  See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 501 (citing In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).  Because we are reversing 
the Defendant's conviction for obstructing, we conclude as a 
matter of law that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
State, does not support the Defendant's conviction for bail 
jumping.  See  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 501.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the Defendant's conviction for bail jumping.   
B. 
¶27 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) violates 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 and, therefore, we reverse the 
Defendant's convictions for obstructing an officer and bail 
jumping.  Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us to consider 
whether the circuit court committed reversible error in denying 
the Defendant's request for a jury instruction on the common law 
right to change one's name.  Denial of the Defendant's request 
was based upon the circuit court's belief that Wisconsin does 
not recognize such a right.  We address the issue only to the 
extent necessary to clarify that Wisconsin does recognize the 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
19
common law right to change one's name through consistent and 
continuous use, as long as the change is not effected for a 
fraudulent purpose. 
¶28 Whether Wisconsin recognizes the common law right to 
change one's name is a question of law.  As stated, this court 
reviews questions of law de novo, benefitting from the analysis 
of the circuit court.18  See Aiello, 206 Wis. 2d at 70. 
¶29 The circuit court denied the Defendant's request for a 
jury instruction on the common law right to change one's name, 
reasoning that Wisconsin does not recognize such a right.  
Specifically, the circuit court stated that there are only two 
avenues by which an individual may change his or her name:  (1) 
by marriage or divorce; or (2) by court order pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 786.36 which states in part: 
 
Any resident of this state, whether a minor or adult, 
may upon petition to the circuit court of the county 
where he or she resides and upon filing a copy of the 
notice, with proof of publication, as required by s. 
786.37, if no sufficient cause is shown to the 
contrary, have his or her name changed or established 
by order of the court. . . . Any change of name other 
than as authorized by law is void. 
We disagree with the circuit court.  In addition to the above-
mentioned methods available to change one's name, Wisconsin 
common law recognizes a third method:   changing one's name 
                     
18 The court of appeals did not address or certify to this 
court the issue whether the circuit court committed reversible 
error by failing to instruct the jury on the common-law right to 
change one's name, absent a fraudulent purpose.  However, the 
order from this court accepting certification stated that all 
issues raised on appeal would be addressed. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
20
through consistent and continuous use, as long as the change is 
not effected for a fraudulent purpose.19 
 
¶30 In Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 140, 226 N.W.2d 
458 (1975), the issue presented was "whether upon marriage a 
woman is required by law to assume the surname of her husband." 
 In 
answering 
the 
question 
in 
the 
negative, 
this 
court 
determined that the Wisconsin Statutes did not require that a 
woman change her name upon marriage.  Rather, it concluded that 
a woman's change of surname is generally effected by continuous 
use of her husband's surname: 
 
[I]n accordance with the common law of this state, as 
frequently explained by the attorney general, a change 
of name results from marriage only if, in accordance 
with common-law principles, the surname of a married 
woman's husband is habitually used by her.  . . .  
This is no more than the recognition of a common-law 
rule that a person could change his name if it was not 
done for the purpose of fraud. 
Id. at 150-51. 
 
¶31 As stated in Kruzel, several opinions of the attorney 
general support the conclusion that a common law right to change 
one's name is recognized in Wisconsin.   
 
At common law it was the rule that in the absence of 
statutory restriction, and where it is not done for a 
fraudulent purpose, one could lawfully change his name 
at will without proceedings of any sort, merely by 
adopting another name, and for all purposes the name 
thus assumed would constitute his legal name just as 
much as if he had borne it from birth.  19 R. C. L. 
1332; 45 C. J. 381-382; L. R.A. 1915D 982. 
 
 . . .  
 
                     
19 In its brief to this court and at oral argument, the 
State conceded that Wisconsin recognizes a common law right to 
change one's name. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
21
It should be noted, however, that while applications 
under the statutes are encouraged in order that there 
may be a record of the change in name, in the absence 
of an express provision making the statutory method 
exclusive, it is held that such statutes do not 
abrogate the common law right of an individual to 
change his name without application to the courts.  45 
C.J. 382. 
20 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 627, 628, 630 (1931).  See also 21 Wis. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 528, 529 (1932)("Hence, we find that at common 
law a man might change his name as radically and as often as he 
desired, if for an honest purpose and not to the injury of third 
persons."); 35 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 178, 179 (1946)(Recognizing 
the "inherent right of a person to change his name in the 
absence of a provision making the statutory method exclusive."). 
 
¶32 The language of Wis. Stat. § 786.36 does not state 
that petition to the circuit court for an order is the exclusive 
method of changing a person's name.  Section 786.36 merely sets 
forth a detailed method of changing a name through court order. 
 The section does state that "[a]ny change of name other than 
that authorized by law is void;" however, it does not state that 
§ 786.36 is the exclusive method recognized by law.   
¶33 This court has previously stated that there is a 
common law right to change one's name, absent a fraudulent 
purpose.  See Kruzel, 67 Wis. 2d at 150-51.  This common law 
right is therefore a method "authorized by law" which is 
consistent with Wis. Stat. § 786.36.  Therefore, absent a 
fraudulent purpose, an individual in Wisconsin has the common 
law right to change his or her name through continuous and 
consistent use.   
III. 
No. 97-0885-CR 
 
22
¶34 In 
summary, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am), 
 
providing 
for 
six-person 
juries 
in 
misdemeanor cases, violates art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution which guarantees the right to a jury of 12 persons, 
as recognized by the common law as it existed at the time the 
Wisconsin Constitution was adopted.  The long-standing precedent 
of this court interpreting the right to trial by jury under our 
constitution thoroughly supports this conclusion.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the Defendant's convictions for obstructing an 
officer and bail jumping and remand the case to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We 
further conclude that a common law right to change one's name 
through 
consistent 
and 
continuous 
use 
is 
recognized 
in 
Wisconsin, as long as the change is not effected for a 
fraudulent purpose. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.