Title: Johnson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 525, 1999
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RONALD N. JOHNSON,
'
'
No. 525, 1999
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court of
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the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
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Kent County
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STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Cr. A. Nos. IK99-05-0080 through 
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0083, 0087
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Plaintiff Below,
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Cr. I.D. No. 9812007273A
Appellee.
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Submitted: February 21, 2002
Decided: 
April 22, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 22nd day of April 2002, it appears to the Court that:
(1)     This is the direct appeal of Ronald N. Johnson, defendant-appellant, from
his conviction in Superior Court of the crimes of possession of a deadly weapon by
a person prohibited and simple menacing.  Johnson has several arguments on appeal.
 The first is that the testimony of two of the State=s witnesses constituted an invalid
constructive amendment to the indictment on the charge of possession of a deadly
weapon by a person prohibited.  The second is that the Superior Court erred in
allowing evidence of three of Johnson's prior felony convictions.  The third is that the
Superior Court judge erred in failing to recuse himself.  The fourth is that the Superior
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Court=s sentencing relied on a mistaken assessment of the jury verdict.  Johnson=s final
argument is that the Superior Court erred in allowing the State to relay at sentencing
statements of the victim about prior bad acts of Johnson that the victim had personally
witnessed.   None of Johnson=s arguments prevail.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the
judgment of the Superior Court.
(2)     The State charged Johnson with theft of property valued at less than one
thousand dollars,1 aggravated menacing,2 possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony,3 possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited,4
possession of a narcotic schedule II controlled substance5 and a non-narcotic schedule
I controlled substance,6 possession of drug paraphernalia,7 and first degree
kidnapping.8  The Superior Court also permitted the presentation of the charge of
menacing,9 a lesser included offense of aggravated menacing, to the jury.
                                         
1 11 Del. C. ' 841(a), (c)(1).
2 11 Del. C. ' 602(b) (AA person is guilty of aggravated menacing when by displaying what appears to be a
deadly weapon that person intentionally places another person in fear of imminent physical injury.@).
3 11 Del. C. ' 1447A(a).
4 11 Del. C. ' 1448(a).
5 16 Del. C. ' 4753.
6 16 Del. C. ' 4754.
7 16 Del. C. ' 4771.
8 11 Del. C. ' 783A.
9 11 Del. C. ' 602(a) (AA person is guilty of menacing when by some movement of body or any instrument the
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(3)     At trial, the State=s main witness was Karen Vincent, the alleged victim
and the daughter of Johnson.  Vincent, along with her own infant daughter, Alicia,
was living with the family of Daniel Ruiz, Alicia=s father.  Vincent testified that her
sister, Brianne Johnson, had called ACrime Stoppers@ to inform on the criminal
activities of their father.  On October 6, 1997, Vincent with Alicia visited Johnson.
 Johnson demanded to know who had telephoned Crime Stoppers.  Vincent testified
that he Abrought a shotgun out and laid it on the table,@ and that she became frightened
because Athe rifle was pointing towards me . . . .@  Johnson then yelled at her, pointing
his fingers at her.  Vincent revealed that her sister had called Crime Stoppers.  Vincent
claimed that Johnson then forced her to go with him to New York to visit one Elliot
Sanchez.  Before going to New York, Johnson drove them to the Ruiz house, where
Johnson stopped to get diapers for Alicia.  Vincent testified that Johnson also took
money from a box kept in Alicia=s room.  The next day, Vincent claimed that Johnson
got out of the car but left the keys in the ignition at one point, whereupon Vincent
drove off and returned to Delaware.
                                                                                                                                     
person intentionally places another person in fear of imminent physical injury.@).
(4)     Johnson claimed that Vincent=s testimony was a fabrication.  He also
attacked Vincent=s credibility.  Among other things, he introduced some evidence
tending to show an affair between Vincent and Sanchez.  He also argued that Vincent
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herself had taken the money.  The jury found Johnson guilty of possession of a deadly
weapon by a person prohibited and simple menacing.  The jury found Johnson
innocent of all the other charges against him.
(5)     Johnson=s first argument is that the testimony of two of the State's
witnesses constituted an invalid constructive amendment to the indictment=s charge
of possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited.  The indictment alleged that
Johnson possessed a shotgun, a deadly weapon, Aon or about the 6th day of October,
1997 . . . .@  Robert ALucky@ Kohland, a witness for the State, testified that Johnson
telephoned him to ask if he could borrow a shotgun.  Kohland agreed and then called
Dawn Rash, his girlfriend, to let her know that Johnson would be borrowing the
shotgun.   Kohland testified that this call took place up to a month before his birthday
(on October 7).  Rash testified that Johnson came to their apartment and borrowed the
shotgun, and that he did so sometime before Kohland=s birthday, between July and
October of 1997.
(6)     Johnson argues that the jury=s verdict must mean that the jury completely
rejected Vincent=s testimony, including her claim that Johnson had a shotgun on
October 6, 1997.  Furthermore, Johnson argues that the jury must have convicted
Johnson for possessing a deadly weapon (the shotgun) on or about the date Rash gave
the shotgun to Johnson, not Aon or about the sixth day of October, 1997 . . . .@
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(7)     This argument fails.  This Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State.10  The jury could have credited some of Vincent=s testimony but
concluded that, given Johnson=s evidence, it had a reasonable doubt as to Johnson=s
guilt on most of the charges.  It could then have combined Vincent=s testimony that
Johnson had the shotgun on October 6 with Kohland=s and Rash=s testimony that
Johnson received it some time prior to that, and concluded that there was no
reasonable doubt as to Johnson=s possession of a deadly weapon by a person
prohibited charge on October 6.  Furthermore, the jury=s verdict of not guilty on the
aggravated menacing charge does not mean that the jury necessarily rejected Vincent=s
testimony that Johnson possessed a gun, as opposed to her testimony that he used it
to threaten her.11  Moreover, the State has some leeway, when attempting
                                         
10 Tunis v. State, Del. Supr., No. 197, 1995, Berger, J. (April 8, 1996).
11 11 Del. C. ' 602(b) (requiring that a person Aintentionally place[ ] another person in fear of imminent physical
injury@ by Adisplaying what appears to be a deadly weapon@).
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to show possession of contraband, to show that a defendant acquired the contraband
some time previously.12
                                         
12 See United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that an indictment proving
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute by alleging that the defendant had taken delivery in May, July, and
August was satisfied by proof that the defendant received his shipments in April and May).
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(8)     Johnson=s second argument is that the admission of evidence that he was
a three-time felon was error.  Johnson=s charge of possession of a deadly weapon
required that he be convicted of at least one prior felony.13  In its opening argument,
the State offered to show three prior felonies to prove the charge, and drew no timely
objection.  At close of arguments, Johnson objected that the State need only have
mentioned one felony, not three.  The Court refused to rule because Johnson did not
ask for any relief.  Johnson and the State later entered into negotiations for Johnson
to stipulate to one of the convictions.  Johnson stated that he was Aunwilling to
stipulate@ unless the stipulation stated that he had Aone felony conviction.@  The State,
however, insisted on calling Johnson Aa convicted felon.@  The State reasoned that, if
Johnson decided to testify personally, the State would then impeach Johnson with all
three felonies.14  While having three felonies instead of one does not make a defendant
any more eligible to be a Aperson prohibited,@ it could well make him a less credible
witness.  The State reasoned that the jury might then be confused by the discrepancy
with the prior stipulation, and Johnson might benefit by this confusion.  Although the
                                         
13 11 Del. C. ' 1448(a)(1) (prohibiting A[a]ny person having been convicted . . . of a felony@ from owning a
deadly weapon).
14 See D.R.E. 609(a) (allowing the admission of a prior conviction to impeach a witness if, among other things,
the crime Aconstituted a felony@).
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Superior Court granted Johnson=s motion for some form of stipulation, it then denied
it based on Johnson=s refusal to agree to the State=s wording.
(9)     This Court reviews the Superior Court=s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion.15  It was not an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to agree with the
State that the stipulation Johnson insisted on presented an undue possibility of
confusion and was inferior to the State=s requested stipulation.  Johnson argues that
this ruling violated United States v. Old Chief.16  In that case, the defendant wished
to stipulate to a prior conviction as an element of an offense, while the prosecution
wished to introduce details of the prior conviction.17  The District Court ruled in favor
of the prosecution, but the United States Supreme Court ruled that the District Court
had abused its discretion.18  Even assuming arguendo that admitting three convictions
when one will do constitutes the same issue as admitting the details of one when a
stipulation of one will do, Old Chief is inapplicable.  Johnson and the State were not
arguing about whether to stipulate to one conviction B both the State and the Superior
Court were willing to do so.  Rather, Johnson insisted on wording the stipulation to
                                         
15 Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Del. 1999).
16 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
17 Id. at 175-77.
18 Id. at 191.  The United States Supreme Court based its ruling on Federal Rule of Evidence 403, id. at 180,
a rule that Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 tracks.  See D.R.E. 403 (AAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading
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state that Johnson had only Aone felony conviction.@  The Superior Court did not abuse
its discretion in ruling against Johnson on that demand.
(10)     Johnson=s third argument is that the Superior Court judge erred in failing
to recuse himself.  After the jury=s verdict and before sentencing, the Superior Court
judge informed the prosecutor and defense counsel in chambers of an ex parte contact
that he had received.  The judge had attended a social gathering held by a prosecutor
in a former case involving Johnson.  At that gathering, the former prosecutor told the
judge that Athe defendant was a bad guy, and that he had threatened his family and
himself, and he wanted to see that justice was done.@
                                                                                                                                     
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.@).
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(11)     Canon 3C of the Delaware Judges= Code of Judicial Conduct lists certain
specific situations that mandate recusal.19  Johnson has not argued that this situation
implicates this list.  Apart from Canon 3C, this Court has set forth a two-part test for
whether a judge must recuse.20  The judge must first be satisfied that the judge, "as a
matter of subjective belief,@ is free from bias.21  Here, the Superior Court stated, AI
don=t view [the contact] to have any impact on my view of the case or my decision
with regard to sentencing . . . .@  Thus, the Superior Court satisfied the subjective
prong of this analysis.  Next, the judge must examine the situation objectively to
determine whether there is Aan appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the
judge=s impartiality.@22  This Court reviews de novo the objective prong of the
analysis.23  There is no appearance of impropriety sufficient to warrant recusal here.
 This judge did not engage in any active conduct demonstrating the appearance of
impropriety.24  Moreover, Johnson=s counsel at trial admitted, and Johnson=s counsel
                                         
19 Canon 3C(a)-(e).
20 Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 255 (Del. 2001); Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745, 752-53 (Del. 1996); Los
v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991).
21 Los, 595 A.2d at 384.
22 Id. at 385.
23 Stevenson, 782 A.2d at 255 n.2.
24 Compare id. at 251, 257 n.3 (finding the appearance of impropriety when a judge who had previous contact
with a victim affirmatively requested that the case be assigned to him).
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on appeal does not deny, that the record in this case available to the Superior Court
already contained a more detailed account of Johnson=s alleged threat.25
                                         
25 Apparently, after his previous case was over, Johnson had sent the prosecutor a Christmas card stating, AYou
had fun in >81 and will be free in >83.@
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(12)     Johnson=s fourth argument is that the Superior Court=s sentencing relied
on a mistaken assessment of the jury verdict.  It is an abuse of discretion to sentence
a defendant Aon the basis of inaccurate or unreliable information.@26  It is true that the
Superior Court=s reasoning in the portion of the transcript cited by Johnson is
somewhat opaque.  The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion, however. 
Johnson=s contention that the Superior Court did not understand the jury verdict is
incorrect because the Superior Court accurately recited it.  Moreover, the portion of
the transcript Johnson cites to is not a decision on Johnson=s sentencing, but on a
motion before sentencing.  It seems odd that Johnson would complain about the
Superior Court=s reasoning here, given that it resulted in a decision favorable to
Johnson (treating his possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited charge as
a Class F felony, not a Class D felony).
                                         
26 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 843 (Del. 1992); Hamilton v. State, Del. Supr., No. 153, 1986, Holland, J.
(Nov. 12, 1987).
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(13)     Johnson=s final argument is that the Superior Court erred by allowing the
State to repeat allegations made by Vincent to the prosecutor of Johnson=s prior bad
acts at sentencing.  According to Vincent, Johnson had abused her mother, Wanda
Casper, several times.  Johnson broke Casper=s jaw by punching her, locked her in the
trunk of a car, and tied her to a tree and beat her with an axe handle.  Due process
prohibits sentencing based on information which Alacks minimum indicia of
reliability.@27  Johnson argues that the jury=s verdict showed that Vincent had proven
herself unreliable.  There is no indication whatsoever that the Superior Court relied
on these allegations.28  Thus, the Superior Court did not violate Johnson=s due process
rights.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey                   
    Chief Justice
                                         
27 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 843.
28 See, e.g., id. at 842-43 (only considering information that the Superior Court Arelied on, and clearly gave
credence to,@ and noting that A[a] due process claim will only lie in regard to information relied upon by a sentencing
court@); United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1167 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring that the information Aactually served as
the basis for the sentence@ as well as being materially false or unreliable); United States v. Ching, 672 F.2d 799, 801 (9th
Cir. 1982).