Title: Roque v. State
Citation: 664 So. 2d 928
Docket Number: 84182
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 1995

664 So. 2d 928 (1995)
Robert J. ROQUE, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 84182.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 21, 1995.
Rehearing Denied December 20, 1995.
Mark King Leban of the Law Offices of Mark King Leban, P.A., Miami, and Arturo Alvarez, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for respondent.
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review State v. Roque, 640 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), wherein the district court declared section 838.15, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), valid. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Roque.
Robert Roque was credit manager for Kelly Tractor Company and as part of his job extended credit to organizations seeking to finance construction equipment. Mr. Smith, an independent contractor, worked with Roque in locating suitable candidates for loans and was paid a commission by Kelly Tractor for each good prospect he recruited. The State alleged that Roque entered into an unauthorized side agreement with Mr. Smith wherein Smith paid Roque between thirty-three and forty percent of each commission as a "payback" on deals entered into between October 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991.
*929 Roque was charged with thirty-five counts of "commercial bribe receiving" in violation of section 838.15. The court granted Roque's motion to dismiss the charges, finding the statute unconstitutionally vague and susceptible to arbitrary application. The district court reversed, declaring the statute constitutional.
The State contends that section 838.15 is neither vague nor susceptible to arbitrary application, is expressly limited to commercial transactions, clearly states what act is prohibited, specifically enumerates the business relationships to which it applies, and contains an adequate standard of guilt. We disagree.
Section 838.15 bans commercial bribe receiving and provides in full:
§ 838.15, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990).
We have declared similar statutes invalid on various grounds:[1] Some were impermissibly vague[2] or were subject to arbitrary application.[3] The present statute suffers from similar ills.
As noted above, section 838.15 makes it a third-degree felony for an "employee" to accept a benefit in return for violating a "common law duty." Few workers in Florida, however, are aware that they owe such a "common law duty" to their employers and fewer still could define the dimensions of that duty. In fact, substantial legal research would be required by many employees to determine their obligations under the law.
Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 742, 30 So. 2d 102, 105 (1947). The statute "is too vague to give men of common intelligence sufficient warning of what is corrupt and outlawed." State v. DeLeo, 356 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1978).
Further, by its plain language the statute proscribes every violation of an employee's *930 statutory or common law duty, no matter how trivial or obscure, whether it results in harm or not. A head waiter giving preferential treatment to a big tipper or a salesperson on commission giving special service to a well-heeled customer could be subject to criminal prosecution under the plain language of the statute. Because of the statute's indiscriminate sweep, individual prosecutors must decide  based on their own subjective opinions  which violations are sufficiently substantial to warrant full-blown criminal prosecution.
DeLeo, 356 So. 2d  at 308 (footnote omitted). Section 838.15 invites arbitrary application of the law.
Based on the foregoing, we find section 838.15, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), invalid. We quash Roque.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, KOGAN, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs in result only.
[1]  See Cuda v. State, 639 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1994) (statute held invalid which provided that "a person" who "exploits an aged person ... by the improper or illegal use or management of the funds ... of such aged person ... for profit"); State v. Jenkins, 469 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1985) (statute ruled invalid which stated that "a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself ... [who] refrain[s] from performing a duty imposed upon him by law" commits a crime); State v. DeLeo, 356 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1978) (statute found invalid which provided that "a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit ... [who] violate[s] any statute or lawfully adopted regulation or rule relating to his office" commits a crime); Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 738, 30 So. 2d 102, 103 (1947) (statute held invalid which stated that "any person [who] commit[s] any act under color of authority as an ... employee of the ... State of Florida ... when such act is not authorized by law" commits a crime). But see State v. Rodriquez, 365 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1978) (statute upheld which provided that "[a]ny person who knowingly ... [u]ses, transfers, acquires, traffics, alters, forges, or possesses ... a food stamp ... in any manner not authorized by law is guilty of a crime").
[2]  See Cuda, Jenkins, DeLeo, Locklin.
[3]  See Jenkins, DeLeo.