Title: New Jersey v. Dunbrack
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2021

New Jersey v. Dunbrack Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In June 2014, police officers pulled into a parking lot of an abandoned building and found defendants Andrea Dunbrack and Gabriel Rodriguez standing near an unoccupied vehicle. The police observed the victim, N.R., lying on the ground in the fetal position, verbally unresponsive, naked, and bloodied. A small fire was ablaze nearby. N.R.’s clothes were strewn about on the ground and on the front passenger seat of Dunbrack’s car, along with his passport, wallet, and money. A gun stained with N.R.’s blood lay on the driver’s seat, and police later retrieved another gun on Dunbrack’s person. The officers arrested Dunbrack, whose feet had N.R.’s blood on them. Rodriguez fled as police approached, and police later arrested him with N.R.’s cell phone in his pocket. Rodriguez and Dunbrack were charged with robbery, among other offenses, and were tried together. A jury convicted both defendants on all charges. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court was obligated to give the lesser included theft charge sua sponte because the facts giving rise to that charge were evident from the record. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no error, “let alone plain error,” in the trial court’s omission of a theft charge: “Nothing in Dunbrack’s version of the events ‘jumps off the page’ as indicative of theft. Neither Dunbrack nor Rodriguez requested an instruction on theft, and the trial court was not required to scour the record for a combination of facts to justify giving such a lesser included jury charge.” Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Andrea K. Dunbrack; State v. Gabriel Rodriguez (A-27-19) (083008)Argued September 14, 2020 -- Decided March 22, 2021PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the trial court erred in not including theft as a lesser included offense to robbery sua sponte in its instructions to the jury. In June 2014, Hamilton police officers pulled into a parking lot of an abandoned building and found defendants Andrea Dunbrack and Gabriel Rodriguez standing near an unoccupied vehicle. The police observed the victim, N.R., lying on the ground in the fetal position, verbally unresponsive, naked, and bloodied. A small fire was ablaze nearby. N.R.’s clothes were strewn about on the ground and on the front passenger seat of Dunbrack’s car, along with his passport, wallet, and money. A gun stained with N.R.’s blood lay on the driver’s seat, and police later retrieved another gun on Dunbrack’s person. The officers arrested Dunbrack, whose feet had N.R.’s blood on them. Rodriguez fled as police approached, and police later arrested him with N.R.’s cell phone in his pocket. Rodriguez and Dunbrack were charged with robbery, among other offenses, and were tried together. N.R. testified that Rodriguez approached him at a bar in Trenton and asked him if he wanted a cheap taxi ride home. N.R. accepted the offer. Dunbrack was driving the car, Rodriguez was in the passenger seat, and N.R. sat in back. Dunbrack later stopped the car. Rodriguez then exited, opened the rear passenger door, pointed a gun at N.R., and told N.R. to hand over his money or he would be killed. N.R. testified that as he began giving Rodriguez his wallet and cell phone, Rodriguez hit him in the face with the gun. After being hit, N.R. blacked out. N.R. recalled being told to take off his clothes and testified that he thought he was going to die when Rodriguez pointed the gun at him. Dunbrack testified that she was in her vehicle when Rodriguez emerged from the bar with N.R., whom she had never seen before. Dunbrack figured Rodriguez and N.R. were going to head to more bars and sat in the back seat with N.R. while Rodriguez drove. According to Dunbrack, N.R. attempted to sexually assault her. Rodriguez then pulled over and attempted to drag N.R. out of the vehicle as the two men began fighting. Dunbrack was unable to explain how N.R.’s possessions ended up in the front passenger seat of her car, how N.R. came to be completely undressed, or how the fire was started. 1 Prior to Dunbrack’s testimony, the court held a charge conference and Dunbrack’s counsel asked the trial judge, “what about lesser includeds?” but did not mention theft. In response, the trial judge advised that, based on the testimony thus far, there was no rational basis for a lesser included charge of theft. The next day, after Dunbrack testified, Dunbrack’s attorney stated at another charge conference that there could be justification charges for self-defense and use of force in the defense of others. Dunbrack’s counsel then raised the potential applicability of “the various levels of assault” and “possibly a theft from a person or a theft in general” if there was some type of justification for the assault. Counsel noted that he “just wanted to throw that out there based on Ms. Dunbrack’s testimony.” The conversation shifted to a discussion of the justification defenses, and Dunbrack’s counsel successfully argued for the inclusion of the defenses in the jury charge. Dunbrack’s counsel never again mentioned the possibility of a theft charge, and Rodriguez’s counsel never suggested that theft should be charged. Both defense attorneys advised the court that they had no objections to the final jury charge. The jury convicted both defendants on all charges. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court was obligated to give the lesser included theft charge sua sponte because the facts giving rise to that charge were evident from the record. The Court granted certification. 240 N.J. 139 (2019).HELD: The Court finds no error, let alone plain error, in the trial court’s omission of a theft charge. Nothing in Dunbrack’s version of the events “jumps off the page” as indicative of theft. Neither Dunbrack nor Rodriguez requested an instruction on theft, and the trial court was not required to scour the record for a combination of facts to justify giving such a lesser included jury charge.1. A trial court’s determination of whether to include a charge to a lesser included offense is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). When a defendant requests a charge to a lesser included offense, the trial court is obligated to examine the record thoroughly to determine if there is a rational basis for finding that the defendant was not guilty of the higher offense charged but guilty of a lesser included offense. If a defendant did not request a charge or did not object to the omission of a charge to a lesser included offense, the Court’s appellate review assesses whether the record “clearly indicated” the charge, such that the trial court was obligated to give it sua sponte. In determining whether the facts clearly indicate that a charge should be given, the trial court is not required to scour the statutes to determine if there are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant may be guilty. The trial court is also not saddled with the burden of sifting through the record to find some combination of facts and inferences that might rationally sustain the lesser included offense. The record clearly indicates a lesser included charge if the evidence is jumping off the page. (pp. 17-18)2. A trial court should only instruct the jury on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery if there is a question whether the defendant’s act of inflicting bodily injury, using 2 force upon another or threatening another with or purposely putting him in fear of bodily injury occurred in the course of committing a theft. The Court discusses State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165 (2009), where it held that the trial court properly determined that no rational basis existed for charging theft as a lesser included offense to robbery. In Cassady, the defendant was charged with armed robbery of a bank after he approached a bank teller and passed a note requesting money. When the bank teller did not comply, the defendant raised his voice and jumped over the bulletproof glass window separating the tellers from the customers. The teller testified that she was so scared she thought he would kill her. The Court found that the facts were clear and unequivocal that this was a bank robbery and no rational jury could come to any other conclusion. (pp. 19-21)3. The Court reviews this matter using the clearly indicated standard because defense counsel did not explicitly request the theft charge. Dunbrack’s counsel’s pondering or “throwing out there” the possibility of several charges can hardly be interpreted as a request for a jury instruction. It should not be incumbent upon the trial judge to sift through the trial transcript to decipher whether musings of counsel at any point throughout the trial could be interpreted as a request for a jury charge. The importance of requiring a clear request from counsel is underscored by considerations of trial strategy. Having secured jury instructions to affirmative defenses, defense counsel could have made the strategic choice to argue for acquittal, as opposed to a lesser charge -- a choice that a sua sponte instruction by the trial court could have thwarted. (pp. 21-24)4. Similar to Cassady, the facts in this case do not obviously indicate that a theft, as opposed to robbery, might have occurred. For a theft charge to jump off the page, it would require the facts here to support a finding that the victim was not threatened in any way and was not in fear of his life during the course of the taking of his belongings. The trial court was not obligated to sift through the record to formulate a scenario in which the defendants’ act of inflicting bodily injury on N.R. occurred separate and apart from defendants stealing N.R.’s belongings. Rodriguez’s argument that the theft of N.R.’s phone occurred separate and apart from the violence and assault ignores the evidence of everything else that was taken from N.R. as he lay on the ground naked and bloodied. Dunbrack’s testimony did not make the argument that the theft and violence were unconnected. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense and use of force in the protection of others, as a result of Dunbrack’s testimony. If the jury believed Dunbrack, they were able to acquit her and Rodriguez of the most serious charges. The jury declined to do so and determined that this was a robbery. (pp. 25-27) REVERSED. Defendants’ convictions are REINSTATED and the matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 27 September Term 2019 083008 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrea K. Dunbrack, Defendant-Respondent. ______________________________________________________________ State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gabriel Rodriguez, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 14, 2020 March 22, 2021 Narline Casimir, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). 1 Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent Gabriel Rodriguez (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on the briefs). Robin Kay Lord argued the cause for the respondent Andrea K. Dunbrack (The Law Offices of Robin Kay Lord, attorneys; Robin Kay Lord, on the briefs). Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Lauren Bonfiglio, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred innot including theft as a lesser included offense to robbery in its instructions tothe jury. Defendants Gabriel Rodriguez and Andrea Dunbrack were chargedwith robbery, among other offenses. Although defense counsel brieflymentioned the possibility of a lesser included theft charge to be given to thejury, he never explicitly requested the charge. At the conclusion of trial, thejury convicted both defendants of robbery. On appeal, the Appellate Divisionreversed defendants’ convictions and held that the trial court was obligated togive the lesser included theft charge sua sponte because the facts giving rise tothat charge were evident from the record. For the reasons stated below, wereverse the decision of the Appellate Division and reinstate the convictions. 2 I. We rely heavily on the testimony at trial for the following summary. OnJune 16, 2014, Hamilton Police Officer Robert Whartenby was on patrol in thearea of South Olden and Toronita Avenues with his partner, Officer DavidWalls. At approximately 1:45 a.m., the officers turned onto Toronita Avenueand noticed a vehicle in the parking lot of an abandoned building. Thevehicle’s headlights were on and the driver’s door was open. OfficerWhartenby pulled into the parking lot next to the vehicle and noticed therewere no occupants inside, but there was a male standing on the passenger’sside of the vehicle and a female standing near the rear. The officers exited their vehicle to investigate further. Upon exiting, theofficers asked the man and the woman, later identified as defendantsRodriguez and Dunbrack, to stop. At that time, Officer Walls walked to therear of the vehicle and observed a small fire the size of a coffee can on theground. Near the fire was a naked male lying on the ground in the fetalposition. According to the officers, the man was breathing heavily, his faceand head were covered in blood, and he was not verbally responsive. Uponobserving the male on the ground, the officers attempted to secure Rodriguez,but he ran. The officers placed Dunbrack, whose feet had blood on them, inhandcuffs and secured her in the back of the patrol car. After securing 3 Dunbrack, the officers turned their attention to putting out the small fire andobtaining medical assistance for the victim, N.R. N.R. was taken to a nearbyhospital where he received sutures above his left eye and staples on his head. Inside the vehicle, Officer Whartenby observed a purse and a blood-stained handgun on the driver’s seat. Officers found the victim’s underwearand socks on the ground near the rear passenger-side tire, and his t-shirt wasnear the edge of the woods where the vehicle was parked. Foliage near thevictim appeared to contain blood. The victim’s pants, passport, and his wallet,which contained money, were on the front passenger seat. A subsequentsearch of the car revealed business cards in the trunk, including one with thename “Carlos,” the words “Cheap Cab/Taxi Baroda,” and a phone number.The same phone number appeared on another business card found in the trunkbearing Gabriel Rodriguez’s name. After officers transported Dunbrack to the police station, a femaleofficer conducted a full pat down that revealed a handgun hidden inDunbrack’s bra. Officers subsequently arrested Rodriguez at a nearby diner.In his possession were four cellphones, including one belonging to the victim. Subsequent testing of the blood on the firearm and Dunbrack’s feetconfirmed that the blood matched the victim’s DNA profile. 4 On January 18, 2015, a Mercer County Grand Jury charged Rodriguezand Dunbrack in a six-count indictment with the following: first-degreerobbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (Count I); second-degree unlawful possessionof a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count II); second-degree possession of aweapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count III); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count IV)(Dunbrack only); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawfulpurpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (Count V) (Dunbrack only); 1 and fourth-degreeresisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) (Count VI) (Rodriguez only). Rodriguez and Dunbrack were tried together before a jury fromDecember 8-15, 2016. At trial, the victim and Dunbrack testified to verydifferent accounts of what transpired in the early morning hours of June 16,2014. A. The Victim’s Testimony At trial, N.R. testified that around 7:30 p.m. the evening before, he wentto a bar in Trenton, ate dinner, drank approximately seven beers, and then leftto go to another Trenton bar, Antigua. N.R. arrived at Antigua around 10:001 The trial court granted Dunbrack’s motion to dismiss Count V at the close of the State’s case. 5 p.m. and, while there, drank approximately three more beers. At some pointaround midnight or 1:00 a.m., a man, later identified as defendant Rodriguez,approached N.R. and asked him if he wanted a cheap taxi ride home. AlthoughN.R. was not sure he could trust someone offering a cheap taxi ride, hedecided to take Rodriguez up on his offer. Rodriguez told N.R. to wait outsideand that the cheap taxi would be a gray vehicle. N.R. did as Rodriguezinstructed and waited for the car outside the bar. When the gray car pulled up, Dunbrack was driving and Rodriguez wasseated in the front passenger seat. N.R. entered the vehicle and sat behindRodriguez in the rear passenger seat. N.R. advised them of his address, but hesoon realized that Dunbrack was not driving towards his home. When N.R.protested, Dunbrack stopped the car. Rodriguez then exited, opened the rearpassenger door, pointed a gun at N.R., and told N.R. to hand over his money orN.R. would be killed. N.R. testified that as he began giving Rodriguez hiswallet and cell phone, Rodriguez hit N.R in the face with the gun. After beinghit, N.R. blacked out and the next thing he remembered was waking up in thehospital. At some point prior to blacking out, N.R. recalled being told to takeoff his clothes, but he did not have the best recollection regarding whether hetook his clothes off or defendants did so. N.R. testified that he thought he wasgoing to die when Rodriguez pointed the gun at him. 6 B. Dunbrack’s Testimony Dunbrack testified in her own defense and recounted a much differentstory. Dunbrack explained that her permanent residence was in Massachusetts,but at the time, she was working as an exotic dancer at various clubs in NewYork, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Her agent would advise her of the clubswhere she was scheduled to dance, and she would travel to different locationsin those states and stay overnight at various motels. In June 2014, Dunbrack’sdriver’s license was suspended, so Dunbrack allowed Rodriguez, whom shecalled by his nickname “Carlos,” to drive her car. Dunbrack testified that sheand Rodriguez were just friends, but previously had a romantic relationship.According to Dunbrack, Rodriguez was also from Massachusetts and used tobe Dunbrack’s neighbor. At the time of the offense, Rodriguez had beendriving Dunbrack’s car for approximately one year, and Dunbrack paidRodriguez to drive her to and from her dancing jobs at different nightclubs. Dunbrack testified that on June 15, 2014, Rodriguez drove her toAtlantic City to meet with an individual she had met at a club two nights prior.According to Dunbrack, the gentleman was on a business trip and he wantedcompany while he gambled. Dunbrack met him in Atlantic City and went toseveral establishments with him. The man paid Dunbrack for her time, but 7 there was no sexual activity involved. When Dunbrack was ready to leaveAtlantic City at approximately 9:00 p.m., she called Rodriguez and he pickedher up. Dunbrack stated that she wanted to go home, meaning back to themotel where they were staying, but Rodriguez wanted to go out. The paireventually arrived at a bar in Trenton. Rodriguez went into the bar, but Dunbrack, upset that Rodriguez did notdrive her back to the motel, stayed in the car. At one point, Dunbrack decidedto leave Rodriguez at the bar and drove off, but she returned soon thereafterbecause she felt bad about leaving. After she returned to the bar, Rodriguezemerged with another man, victim N.R. Dunbrack said she had never seenN.R. before and figured Rodriguez and N.R. were going to head to more bars.Upset because she still wanted to go home and because Rodriguez told her toget out of the driver’s seat, Dunbrack got into the back seat of the car behindthe driver’s seat. N.R. was seated in the rear passenger seat. Dunbrack testified that Rodriguez drove off and N.R. tried to talk to her,but she could not understand what he was saying because he was speakingSpanish. Dunbrack claimed that N.R. then touched her leg but she removedhis hand and told him “no.” Dunbrack testified that thereafter, N.R. startedunbuttoning and pulling off his pants and tried to get on top of her. Dunbrackstated that she tried to push N.R. off of her and asked Rodriguez, who was still 8 driving, for help. In response, Rodriguez reached over and hit N.R. in the headwith something. N.R. began bleeding as a result of the blow to the head byRodriguez.2 Dunbrack sprayed N.R. in the face with mace and then pushedand kicked him off of her. 3 After Rodriguez hit N.R., he pulled the car over, got out of the car, andattempted to drag N.R. out of the vehicle as the two men began fighting.Dunbrack testified that as soon as Rodriguez and N.R. began fighting, shethrew her purse on the front passenger seat, got out of the car, and walkedaround to the other side of the car where the men were fighting. Dunbrackstated that N.R. was completely naked at that point, but she did not knowwhere his clothes were or how he got undressed in such a short timeframe.Dunbrack also could not explain how N.R.’s pants, passport, wallet, and cashall ended up in the front passenger seat of her car. Dunbrack further testifiedthat she did not know how the small fire was started. According to Dunbrack,at one point when N.R. was lying on the ground, Rodriguez retrieved someitems from the back seat of the car, including a gun. Rodriguez handed2 A subsequent search found no evidence of blood inside the vehicle. 3 Officer Whartenby testified that he did not detect the smell of pepper spray on the victim or near the car when he arrived on the scene. 9 Dunbrack the gun and she hid it in her bra. When the police arrived,Rodriguez ran and the officers placed Dunbrack under arrest. C. On December 13, 2016, prior to Dunbrack’s testimony, the court held acharge conference. At that time, Dunbrack’s attorney generally asked, “Judge,what about lesser includeds?” Although counsel did not mention theft, inresponse, the trial judge discussed a charge of theft as a lesser included offenseof the robbery count. The trial judge stated that based on the testimony thusfar, there was no rational basis for adding theft as a lesser included offense tothe jury charge. Neither defense attorney objected or disputed the trial judge’sstatement. On December 14, 2016, after Dunbrack testified, the court held anothercharge conference. During the conference, Dunbrack’s attorney made thefollowing statements: Judge, I’m just wondering after hearing the testimony, it does appear that there could be justification here, use of force in defense of one’s self and defense of others. We heard testimony from Andrea Dunbrack that this individual was attempting what she believed to sexually assault her. And she used whatever means she could with her feet or mace to, to essentially repel that attack, called out for him. He clocked the guy in the head. And I’m just wondering if, if justification would be a charge that we should have the jury consider. And 10 if we go there, could there also be the various levels of assault rather than an actual robbery. If in fact the jury didn’t believe there was a robbery, but it could be, it could be an assault, second or third degree, even a simple assault if they thought that. And, and possibly a theft from a person or a theft in general if in fact there was some type of justification for the altercation and the assault. But then Mr. Rodriguez is leaving the scene with the phone in his pocket. Was it an actual robbery, is it a theft. So I just wanted to throw that out there based on Ms. Dunbrack’s testimony. In response, the State opposed the inclusion of justification defenses tothe jury instructions because the defense was required to provide notice ofaffirmative defenses and had not done so. The trial court thereafter engaged ina lengthy discussion with counsel focused solely on charging the justificationdefenses of self-defense and use of force in the protection of others. The Stateeventually conceded that charging the jury on the affirmative defenses wasappropriate despite the lack of notice. The trial judge and counsel for theparties subsequently worked together on revising the newly agreed-uponadditions to the jury charge. Dunbrack’s attorney never mentioned a potentialcharge to lesser included offenses again. The next morning, the trial judge asked if all parties had the opportunityto review the final jury charge and whether anyone had any comments or 11 revisions. The assistant prosecutor suggested one minor edit, and neitherdefense attorney indicated that they had any objection to the final jury charge. During summation, in discussing the robbery charge, Rodriguez’sattorney noted that the taking of property after a fight is not a robbery.Rodriguez’s attorney did not specifically argue to the jury that what occurredwas a theft, nor did he request that charge during any of the chargeconferences. Dunbrack’s attorney, who initially asked about a charge to lesserincluded offenses, focused his summation almost entirely on self-defense. After summations, the trial court read the jury instructions, whichincluded charges on justification -- self-defense and use of force in theprotection of others -- as defenses to robbery and possession of a weapon foran unlawful purpose. Specifically, the judge explained that “[t]he State has theburden to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense of self -defense is untrue.” The judge further noted that if the State failed to satisfy itsburden, then the jury “must allow the claim of self-defense and acquit thedefendant.” After concluding the instructions to the jury, the trial judge askedall counsel at sidebar, “[d]oes anybody have any objections to the charge?”All parties responded in the negative. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. On August 2, 2017, thecourt sentenced Rodriguez to an aggregate term of 16 years’ imprisonment on 12 Counts I, II, III, and VI. That same day, the trial court sentenced Dunbrack toan aggregate term of 13 years’ imprisonment on Counts I to IV. D. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed bothdefendants’ convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. Althoughdefendants individually raised several arguments on appeal, the AppellateDivision addressed only the claim that the trial judge erred in failing to chargethe jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of theft. On appeal,Rodriguez argued that a new trial was required because the trial courtneglected to charge “theft as a lesser-included alternative to robbery when thetestimony showed that theft might have been an afterthought after [the] fightwas over.” The Appellate Division held that the failure to charge theft wasreversible error. On November 12, 2019, we granted the State’s petition for certification. 240 N.J. 139 (2019). We also granted the Attorney General’s motion for leaveto appear as amicus curiae. II. A. The State argues that the Appellate Division incorrectly held that thetrial court was obligated to charge the lesser included offense of theft sua 13 sponte. The State contends that there was no evidence presented to the jurythat reasonably suggested that the theft of the victim’s possessions occurredseparate and apart from the assault. The State further argues that the AppellateDivision erroneously dismissed the other counts of convictions which wereunrelated to the robbery in Count I. The State asserts that any failure toinclude a theft charge as a lesser included offense to robbery did not impactthe State’s proofs or the jury’s findings regarding the resisting arrest andweapons offenses. The State asks this Court to reinstate those convictions aswell. B. Dunbrack agrees with the Appellate Division that the facts as presentedby Dunbrack during her testimony clearly indicated that theft should have beencharged as a lesser included offense. Dunbrack disputes the State’s claim thattheft can only be charged as a lesser included offense when there is a break inthe chain of events originating with the robbery. Dunbrack further argues thatthe robbery charge was so intertwined with the remaining charges that reversaland remand of all counts was required. Specifically, Dunbrack claims that thetheft charge, and conviction if found by the jury, would have defeated thepossession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose count. 14 Rodriguez contends that Dunbrack’s testimony supported the theory thatthe fight between Rodriguez and the victim was unrelated to the taking of thevictim’s phone. Rodriguez claims that Dunbrack’s testimony showed that “thefight had nothing to do with the theft and that Rodriguez stole complainant’sphone as an afterthought.” Rodriguez asserts that although Dunbrack’scounsel was polite in doing so, he did in fact request the theft charge duringthe charge conference, so the rational basis test, not the clearly indicated test,is warranted here. Accordingly, Rodriguez argues that the theft charge shouldhave been given because there was a rational basis for the charge.Notwithstanding Rodriguez’s position that the rational basis standard applies,he argues that the evidence nevertheless clearly indicated the theft charge, asheld by the Appellate Division. Rodriguez echoes Dunbrack’s argument thatthe Appellate Division correctly granted a new trial on the remaining counts . C. The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, reiterates many of theState’s arguments and asserts that the theft charge was not clearly indicatedand did not “jump off the page” in light of the evidence presented at trial. TheAttorney General additionally argues that the facts did not give rise to a factualbasis to include theft as a lesser included offense even if the charge had beenrequested. The Attorney General contends that the Appellate Division’s 15 decision will require theft to be charged in every robbery case. The AttorneyGeneral also asserts that a theft charge would nevertheless have prejudiced thedefendants who were seeking outright acquittals based on self-defense anddefense of others. Lastly, the Attorney General argues that under the plainerror standard, there was overwhelming evidence of defendants’ guilt, so thealleged error in charging is insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as towhether it led to an unjust result. III. A. When a defendant does not request an instruction or fails to object to itsomission in the final jury charge, we review the omission of that instructionfor plain error. State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). The plain errorstandard requires a twofold determination: (1) whether there was error; and(2) whether that error was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” R.2:10-2; that is, whether there is “a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the errorled the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached,” Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79 (omission in original) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361(2004)). If both conditions are met, reversal is warranted. See State v.Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 89 (2010); R. 2:10-2. 16 B. Under certain circumstances, it can be error for a trial court to fail tocharge a lesser included offense sua sponte. A trial court’s determination of whether to include a charge to a lesserincluded offense is governed by statute. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e), “[t]hecourt shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless thereis a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the includedoffense.” On appeal, our review is guided by whether the charge wasrequested at trial. State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 396-97 (2002) (“In assessingwhether to charge the jury on a lesser included offense, our case law applies adifferent standard based on whether or not a charge was requested by adefendant at trial.”). When a defendant requests a charge to a lesser included offense, “thetrial court is obligated . . . to examine the record thoroughly to determine ifthere is a rational basis in the evidence for finding that the defendant was notguilty of the higher offense charged but that the defendant was guilty of alesser-included offense.” State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 299 (1988). “Thefailure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense that a defendant hasrequested and for which the evidence provides a rational basis warrantsreversal of a defendant’s conviction.” Savage, 172 N.J. at 397-98. 17 If a defendant did not request a charge or did not object to the omissionof a charge to a lesser included offense, instead of reviewing the record todetermine if a rational basis existed, our appellate review assesses whether therecord “clearly indicated” the charge, such that the trial court was obligated togive it sua sponte. State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 41-42 (2006). “Anunrequested charge . . . must be given only where the facts in evidence 'clearlyindicate’ the appropriateness of that charge.” Savage, 172 N.J. at 397. In determining whether the facts in evidence clearly indicate that acharge should be given, the trial court is not required “to scour the statutes todetermine if there are some uncharged offenses of which the defendant may beguilty.” Sloane, 111 N.J. at 302. The trial court is also not saddled with theburden of sifting meticulously through the record to find “some combinati on offacts and inferences that might rationally sustain” the lesser included offense.State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985). “It is only when the facts 'clearlyindicate’ the appropriateness of that charge that the duty of the trial courtarises.” Ibid. We have explained that “the record clearly indicates a lesser-included charge . . . if the evidence is jumping off the page.” Denofa, 187 N.J.at 42. In sum, our caselaw only requires a trial court to include a charge to alesser offense that was not requested by the parties when that charge is obviousfrom the record. 18 C. Here, defendants focus on the trial court’s failure to charge theft as anincluded offense. This Court has explicitly held that “theft, by definition, is a lesser -included offense of robbery.” State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23, 39 (2008). Indeed,the robbery statute describes robbery as an aggravated form of theft: A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: (1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or (2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or (3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree. An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission. [N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a).] A trial court should only instruct the jury on theft as a lesser includedoffense of robbery if “there is a question whether the defendant’s act of'inflict[ing] bodily injury,’ 'us[ing] force upon another’ or 'threat[ening]another with [or] purposely put[ting] him in fear of bodily injury’ occurred 'inthe course of committing a theft.’” State v. Harris, 357 N.J. Super. 532, 539 19 (App. Div. 2003) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Jordan, 240 N.J.Super. 115, 119 (App. Div. 1990)). This Court considered whether theft as a lesser included offense torobbery should have been charged to the jury in State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165(2009). In Cassady, the defendant was charged with armed robbery of a bank. 198 N.J. at 169. At trial, a bank teller testified that the defendant approachedher counter and passed a note requesting money. Id. at 170. When the bankteller did not comply, the defendant raised his voice and jumped over thebulletproof glass window separating the tellers from the customers. Ibid. Theteller testified that she was “so scared [she] thought he would kill [her].” Ibid. At the end of trial, the defendant requested that theft be charged as alesser included offense to robbery. Id. at 172. The defendant argued that hedid not threaten or inflict harm upon the teller during the robbery, so a theftcharge was appropriate. Ibid. The trial court denied his request and found thedefendant’s assertion that the teller was not threatened under the facts of thecase “absolutely ludicrous.” Ibid. The jury convicted the defendant on allcounts, including robbery of the bank teller. Id. at 173. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the defendant’s robberyconviction in a split decision. State v. Cassady, 396 N.J. Super. 392, 399, 402(App. Div. 2007). The majority found that the trial court’s denial of the 20 defendant’s request to charge theft was error because the facts provided arational basis for the jury to acquit on robbery and convict on theft. Id. at 399.The dissenting judge disagreed and expressed the view that no rational jurycould conclude that the offense in question was anything other than a bankrobbery. Id. at 405 (Fuentes, J.A.D., dissenting). This Court reversed. Cassady, 198 N.J. at 169. We held that the trialcourt properly assessed the evidence in determining that no rational basisexisted for charging theft. Id. at 178-79. Quoting the Appellate Divisiondissent, we found that the facts were clear and unequivocal that “'[t]his was abank robbery: plain and simple [and] no rational jury could come to any otherconclusion.’” Id. at 179 (quoting Cassady, 396 N.J. Super. at 405). IV. A. Turning to the facts of this case, the record requires us to review thismatter for plain error using the clearly indicated standard because defensecounsel did not explicitly request the theft charge. It is undisputed that at the conclusion of all the charge conferences,summations, and the reading of the charge to the jury, both defense attorneysadvised the court that they had no objections to the final jury charge. Duringthe charge conference on December 13, 2016, prior to Dunbrack’s testimony, 21 Dunbrack’s counsel asked the trial judge, “what about lesser includeds?” butdid not specifically request a theft charge. In response, the trial judge advisedthat, based on the evidence adduced at trial to that point, there was no rationalbasis for a lesser included charge of theft. Neither of the defense attorneysmade any further statements or requests regarding lesser included offenses atthat time. The next day, after Dunbrack’s testimony, Dunbrack’s attorney advisedthe court that he “was wondering” whether “there could be justification here,use of force in defense of one’s self and defense of others.” Dunbrack’scounsel, as noted above, then raised the potential applicability of “the variouslevels of assault” before adding, “[a]nd, and possibly a theft from a person or atheft in general if in fact there was some type of justification for the altercationand the assault.” Counsel then asked rhetorically, regarding Rodriguez’sdeparture with the phone, “[w]as it an actual robbery, is it a theft[?]” and notedthat he “just wanted to throw that out there based on Ms. Dunbrack’stestimony.” Given that the focus of counsel’s statement was on the justificationdefenses, after his comments, the conversation shifted entirely to a discussionof those defenses. After successfully arguing for the inclusion of theaffirmative defenses in the jury charge, Dunbrack’s counsel never again 22 mentioned the possibility of a lesser included theft charge. And Rodriguez’scounsel neither requested nor suggested that theft should be charged duringany of the charge conferences. We do not agree with defendants that this dialog reflects a request for acharge to theft. Dunbrack’s counsel’s pondering or “throwing out there” thepossibility of several charges can hardly be interpreted as a request for a juryinstruction. In addition to his mention of the theft charge, defense counsel alsomentioned “various levels of assault” and even “simple assault,” but he did notmake an explicit request that such offenses be charged. 4 Dunbrack concedesthat trial counsel was “inartful” during the charge conference when he raisedlesser included offenses. Rodriguez notes that trial counsel was being “polite”in making the request. Whether trial counsel’s statements are viewed as“polite” or “inartful,” they were surely not direct in requesting the charge. It should not be incumbent upon the trial judge to sift through the trialtranscript to decipher whether musings of counsel at any given pointthroughout the trial could be interpreted as a request for a jury charge. Theimportance of requiring a clear request from counsel, moreover, is underscoredby considerations of trial strategy. After the trial court granted counsel’srequest for jury charges to self-defense and use of force in the protection of4 Assault was not one of the offenses charged in the indictment. 23 others, the jury was aware that they had the ability to acquit the defendants ifthey believed Dunbrack’s version of events. The inclusion of the lesserincluded theft charge, however, would have presented the jury with analternate theory of culpability aside from outright acquittal. Having securedjury instructions to affirmative defenses, defense counsel could have made thestrategic choice to argue for acquittal, as opposed to a lesser charge -- a choicethat a sua sponte instruction by the trial court could have thwarted. It is not for this Court to speculate. The fact remains that defensecounsel simply did not request the theft charge. And because counsel did notrequest the lesser included charge of theft, the applicable standard here iswhether the lesser included offense of theft was clearly indicated from thefacts presented at trial. B. Having established the proper standard, we must determine whether thefacts of this case jumped off the page such that the trial judge should havegiven the theft charge sua sponte. As detailed at length above, police arrivedon the scene to find the victim on the ground, verbally unresponsive, in thefetal position, naked, bloodied, and burned by a small fire still ablaze nearby.His clothes were strewn about on the ground and on the front passenger seat ofDunbrack’s car, along with his passport, wallet, and money. A gun stained 24 with the victim’s blood lay on the driver’s seat, and police later retrievedanother gun on Dunbrack’s person when they searched her. Rodriguez fled aspolice approached and police later arrested him with the victim’s cell phone inhis pocket. The victim testified that he thought defendants were going to killhim and that he feared for his life. Those facts, quite frankly, do not jump offthe page as the basis for a charge of theft. And for the reasons we will discuss,even Dunbrack’s version of events do not support that charge. Similar to Cassady, it is hard to consider the facts in this case -- aspresented by either side -- as obviously indicating that a theft, as opposed torobbery, might have occurred. The idea that the facts of this case “jump offthe page” as theft and therefore required the trial court to sua sponte chargetheft as a lesser included offense is as implausible as the parallel argumentfound “absolutely ludicrous” in Cassady, 198 N.J. at 172. For a theft charge tojump off the page, it would require the facts here to somehow support afinding that the victim was not threatened in any way and was not in fear of hislife during the course of the taking of his belongings. The trial court was notobligated to sift through the record to formulate a scenario in which thedefendants’ act of inflicting bodily injury on N.R. occurred separate and apartfrom defendants stealing N.R.’s belongings. 25 In summation, counsel for Rodriguez argued, without specificallymentioning the case, that this matter is similar to defendant’s claim in State v.Lopez, 187 N.J. 91 (2006), that the violence and the assault occurred separateand apart from the theft. Defense counsel stated: [T]he items that [N.R.] said he left on the seat, [Rodriguez] goes over to them. He picks up some of the items. You can infer that he picked up the cell phone then, ladies and gentlemen, but I suggest to you that that’s not a robbery. And the [j]udge will instruct you on the law and you go by the instructions on the law. But I suggest to you that’s not a robbery, ladies and gentlemen. That is the same as two people get into an altercation. After the fight, when it’s over, somebody walks away. Somebody’s knocked out. However, after the fight if somebody’s chain is broken and it’s on the ground, and the other person picks it up or their phone, and they don’t see it, and they pick it up, that may be something that’s not appropriate, but that’s not a robbery.In Lopez, we held that “where a violent fracas occurs for reasons other thantheft, and the perpetrator later happens to take property from the victim,” theperpetrator might be guilty of assault and theft “but not of robbery” because“the violence and the theft are unconnected.” Lopez, 187 N.J. at 101. Rodriguez argues that the victim’s phone, which was in his pocket at thetime of his arrest, is indicative of a theft that occurred after the violence. Butthat completely ignores the evidence of everything else that was taken from the 26 victim as both defendants stood by as he lay on the ground naked andbloodied. And Dunbrack’s testimony certainly did not make the argument thatthe theft and violence were unconnected. Although she testified that N.R.attempted to sexually assault her, leading to a fight between N.R. andRodriguez, she claimed she was completely unaware of the theft of N.R.’sphone, passport, wallet, and money. Dunbrack was unable to explain howN.R.’s possessions ended up in the front passenger seat of her car or how hecame to be completely undressed. She did not provide any insight into thecircumstances of the theft or how the fire was started. Nothing in Dunbrack’sversion of the events “jumps off the page” as indicative of theft. NeitherDunbrack nor Rodriguez requested an instruction on theft, and the trial courtwas not required to scour the record for a combination of facts to justify givingsuch a lesser-included jury charge. The trial court did, however, instruct the jury on self-defense and use offorce in the protection of others, as a result of Dunbrack’s testimony. If thejury believed Dunbrack’s version of events, they were armed with the abilityto acquit her and Rodriguez of the most serious charges. The jury , however,declined to do so. The jury determined that this was an armed robbery. If this case -- inwhich a victim’s belongings were taken and he was found beaten, bloodied, 27 and lying naked on the ground in the fetal position -- is representative of onein which a lesser included theft charge “jumps off the page,” then it is hard toimagine any robbery case that would not require such a charge. In sum, we find no error in the trial court’s omission of a theft charge,let alone plain error. V. For those reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Divisionand reinstate defendants’ convictions. We remand the matter to the AppellateDivision so that it may address the remaining issues on appeal. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE- LOUIS’s opinion. 28