Title: Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12604
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2019

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SJC-12604 
 
FELICE GAMMELLA1  vs.  P.F. CHANG'S CHINA BISTRO, INC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 6, 2018. - April 12, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Minimum Fair Wage Law.  Labor, Wages, 
Minimum wage.  Practice, Civil, Class action, Moot case.  
Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 25, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for class certification was heard by Peter M. 
Lauriat, J., and a motion to dismiss was heard by Mark A. 
Hallal, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was ordered 
by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Stephen S. Churchill for the plaintiff. 
 
Lisa Stephanian Burton (Danielle Y. Vanderzanden also 
present) for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Mark D. Stern for Mark D. Stern P.C. 
                     
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated.  
2 
 
 
 
Audrey Richardson, Joseph Michalakes, & Shannon Liss-
Riordan for Immigrant Worker Center Collaborative & another. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Kevin Costello for Center for Health Law & Policy 
Innovation of Harvard Law School. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The plaintiff Felice Gammella worked greeting 
customers, helping out behind the bar, taking food to tables, 
and assembling delivery orders at several Boston-area 
restaurants operated by the defendant P.F. Chang's China Bistro, 
Inc.  He alleges on behalf of himself and a putative class of 
similarly situated employees that the defendant had a common 
practice of violating the "reporting pay" or "three-hour" 
requirement of 454 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.04(1) (2015), which 
requires employers to pay employees three hours' wages at no 
less than the minimum wage if they report for a scheduled shift 
of three or more hours but are involuntarily dismissed before 
they have worked three hours.  The plaintiff brings suit under 
the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 150 (Wage Act), and what is known 
as the minimum fair wage law, G. L. c. 151, § 20 (collectively, 
wage laws).2 
                     
2 General Laws c. 149, § 150 (Wage Act), allows an employee 
to bring suit for wages wrongfully withheld under G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148.  General Laws c. 151, § 20, allows an employee who is 
paid by an employer "less than the minimum fair wage to which 
the person is entitled under or by virtue of a minimum fair wage 
regulation" to bring suit to recover "the full amount of the 
minimum wages less any amount actually paid to him by the 
employer." 
3 
 
 
 
At issue is whether (1) either of the wage laws specify a 
different standard for class certification from that set forth 
in Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, as amended, 471 Mass. 1491 (2015) (rule 
23); (2) the numerosity requirement for class certification 
under rule 23 is satisfied when a plaintiff provides reasonable 
information to infer that there are hundreds of employees who 
reported for their scheduled shifts of three or more hours but 
received less than three hours of pay, but there are a variety 
of potential reasons why an employee would not receive the three 
hours of pay, some of which are justified and others of which 
are not, and the defendant has failed to identify in its records 
why any employee received less than three hours of pay and 
refused to provide in discovery the names of the employees 
involved; (3) an offer of judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
68, 365 Mass. 835 (1974) (rule 68) or tender of an offer to the 
only named plaintiff in a putative class action can cause the 
plaintiff's claim to become moot when the plaintiff rejects the 
offers and informs the court of his intention to appeal the 
denial of class certification. 
We conclude that rule 23 provides the correct standard for 
determining class certification in a claim under the wage laws.  
Because we hold that the plaintiff met his burden of 
demonstrating numerosity under that rule, we reverse the denial 
of the plaintiff's motion for class certification on this 
4 
 
 
ground.  And because the plaintiff did not accept either of the 
defendant's offers and informed the court of his intention to 
appeal from the denial of class certification, we also hold that 
the defendant's motion to dismiss for mootness was improperly 
granted.  We accordingly reverse the motion judges' orders and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.3 
 
1.  Background and procedural history.  The plaintiff 
worked at the defendant's restaurants for most of the period 
from 2007 to 2015.  As required by the employer, the plaintiff 
and other employees clocked in and out of a timekeeping system.  
The hours recorded in the timekeeping system formed the basis 
for the employees' compensation.  Like the servers, bartenders, 
hosts, and other staff employed by the defendant, the plaintiff 
was compensated on an hourly basis at the minimum wage. 
 
The plaintiff brought suit in November 2014 under the wage 
laws on behalf of himself and a putative class of employees who 
allegedly had been denied pay for reporting to work (reporting  
pay) in violation of a regulation of the Division of 
Occupational Safety, issued pursuant to G. L. c. 151, requiring 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the plaintiff by the Center for Health Law & Policy Innovation 
of Harvard Law School, the Immigrant Worker Center Collaborative 
and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, and Mark 
D. Stern P.C; and in support of the defendant by the New England 
Legal Foundation. 
5 
 
 
that "[w]hen an employee who is scheduled to work three or more 
hours reports for duty at the time set by the employer, and that 
employee is not provided with the expected hours of work, the 
employee shall be paid for at least three hours on such day at 
no less than the basic minimum wage."  454 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 27.04(1).4  In his deposition, the plaintiff testified that, on 
numerous occasions, despite being scheduled to work three or 
more hours, he was involuntarily dismissed and forced to clock 
out before he had worked three hours.5  He stated that, in these 
instances, he was not given three hours' pay but only paid for 
his actual hours worked. 
 
Although the defendant claimed that its policy was to 
comply with the three hour reporting pay requirement, it 
produced no evidence in discovery that it had ever done so.6  In 
                     
 
4 This regulation was formerly 455 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 2.03(1) (2003). 
 
5 The plaintiff stated that the defendant's managers would 
always tell him that "you're cut" or "we're not busy, you're 
cut."  The plaintiff suggested that the managers involuntarily 
dismissed him in the hope that he would quit. 
 
6 The defendant claimed that it posted the reporting pay 
requirement on posters in all its restaurants and distributed a 
manual to its managers explaining that, under Massachusetts law, 
employees were to receive three hours of "show up pay" at no 
less than the minimum wage "regardless of whether actual work is 
assigned," the only specified exception being if the "employee 
was originally scheduled to work for fewer than three hours."  
It also claimed that its managers were able to adjust the hours 
6 
 
 
particular, the defendant produced reports revealing that, in 
twenty instances involving the plaintiff, and in approximately 
7,000 instances involving hundreds of other employees, the 
defendant did not provide reporting pay when the plaintiff and 
these employees were scheduled to work a shift of three or more 
hours but clocked out before they had worked three hours.7  These 
reports did not reflect why the employees clocked out before 
working three hours of a scheduled shift.  Nor did the defendant 
have a system in place to record the reasons why such employees 
would leave early.  Moreover, the reports only identified the 
other employees by their employee number, and the defendant did 
not fulfill the plaintiff's discovery requests for the identity 
of all the employees.8 
                     
that an employee clocked into the time-keeping system so that 
the employee received reporting pay when appropriate. 
 
 
7 The defendant produced the reports in response to 
discovery requests that sought to identify instances from 2011 
to 2015 when the plaintiff and any other employees "were 
scheduled to work a shift of more than three hours but were 
instructed to clock out after working fewer than three hours of 
that shift."  In response to a request for information 
concerning the "number of hours paid" in these circumstances, 
the defendant stated that its "employees are paid for the number 
of hours worked" (emphasis added). 
 
8 The defendant provided the identities of the managers at 
the locations where the plaintiff worked to the plaintiff.  
Despite the plaintiff's discovery requests for the names of all 
the other employees, the defendant refused to provide the 
information on the grounds that it was "confidential," the 
plaintiff was not entitled to class-wide discovery with respect 
7 
 
 
 
In his deposition testimony, the defendant's regional vice-
president of operations admitted that he had no way of knowing 
if the hundreds of employees on the report had been 
involuntarily dismissed.  Nonetheless, the vice-president 
claimed that employees often voluntarily asked and were granted 
permission to leave before three hours of their shifts had 
elapsed.  He further testified that the defendant's practice was 
not to provide reporting pay in those circumstances, or in cases 
where the defendant's managers decided to close a restaurant 
early due to inclement weather, ordered an employee to leave 
work early for violating company policy, or solicited volunteers 
to leave early because a restaurant was not busy. 
 
Following discovery, the plaintiff moved to certify a class 
comprising "[a]ll [defendant's] hourly employees who worked in 
Massachusetts at any time from November 25, 2011 to the present, 
and who had at least one shift where they were scheduled to work 
three or more hours but worked less than three hours, including 
without limitation" all the employees identified by employee 
number on the defendant's report who had worked less than three 
hours of a scheduled shift without receiving reporting pay.  The 
                     
to the names, and the "[p]laintiff [did] not need the names and 
contact information of putative class members to advance class 
certification."  Instead, the defendant proposed to provide "a 
random, representative sample of employee names and contact 
information."  The plaintiff did not pursue this offer. 
8 
 
 
defendant opposed the motion.9  After a hearing on the motion, 
the judge denied class certification. 
 
In his written decision, the judge determined that the 
defendant neither provided the plaintiff with reporting pay nor, 
based on its timekeeping records, had it "identified a single 
instance" from 2011 to 2015 where it had provided reporting pay 
to any other Massachusetts employee who had been scheduled for a 
shift of three or more hours but worked less than three hours.  
The judge nonetheless concluded that, pursuant to an opinion 
letter from the Executive Office of Labor and Workforce 
interpreting the reporting pay requirement, an employer did not 
have to provide reporting pay where an employee chose to leave 
work before three hours of a scheduled shift had elapsed 
"'completely on a voluntary basis,' free from any express or 
implied pressure from the employer."10  Relying on the opinion 
letter, the judge redefined the plaintiff's proposed class to 
"contain only employees who were involuntarily cut before three 
                     
 
9 The defendant attached twenty affidavits from its managers 
and employees to its opposition to the plaintiff's motion for 
class certification.  The plaintiff moved to have these 
affidavits struck or disregarded on the grounds that they had 
not previously been disclosed, despite his request for the 
identities of putative class members.  The judge did not 
consider the affidavits in his decision, and accordingly we do 
not rely on them here. 
 
10 See Minimum Wage Opinion Letter 1-26-09, available at 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/26/MW%20Opinion%200
1-26-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XNR-YU28]. 
9 
 
 
hours and employees who were offered a choice to leave before 
three hours, but that choice was 'not free from express or 
implied pressure from the employer' (i.e., the employee was 
essentially involuntarily cut)."  He found that it was 
"impossible . . . to determine from the time-keeping 
records . . . whether there are any employees who would fall 
into this class."  He thus concluded that the class was 
insufficiently numerous to satisfy the certification 
requirements of rule 23. 
 
After the plaintiff's class certification motion had been 
denied, the defendant made two offers to the plaintiff that 
purported to provide complete relief on his individual claim.  
Pursuant to rule 68, the defendant first made an offer (rule 68 
offer) to have judgment entered against it for $962.08 plus 
prejudgment interest as well as costs and attorney's fees 
associated with the plaintiff's individual claim, while expressly 
excluding any fees related to his class-based claims.  In the 
rule 68 offer, the defendant "expressly denie[d] all . . . 
liability and denie[d] [p]laintiff's allegations," and explained 
that the offer would "resolve, finally and fully, the claims and 
causes of action alleged by [p]laintiff" and that "[i]f this 
offer is accepted, no further relief shall be granted to 
[p]laintiff."  The offer provided that it "shall expire if not 
accepted in the manner and within the timeframe provided in Rule 
10 
 
 
68," specifically that if the plaintiff did not accept the offer 
within ten days, "it is deemed withdrawn."11  The plaintiff did 
not accept the offer. 
 
Subsequently, the defendant made an offer in the form of a 
certified check for $1,732.50 and an accompanying letter (tender 
offer) that were both hand delivered to the plaintiff's counsel.  
The letter explained that the offer would "tender[] complete 
relief on the individual claim" because the "amount tendered is 
more than what [the plaintiff] could hope to obtain if he were 
to prevail at trial."  Like the rule 68 offer, the letter stated 
that the defendant would pay reasonable attorney's fees, costs, 
and interest with respect to the plaintiff's individual claim.  
The letter further stated that "[s]hould you choose to not 
respond to or reject this tender, we will seek to dismiss this 
action."  As with the rule 68 offer, the tender offer was 
rejected by the plaintiff. 
 
The defendant then moved to dismiss the case on the grounds 
that through its rule 68 offer and tender offer it had 
                     
 
11 The defendant's offer of judgment pursuant to Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 68, 365 Mass. 835 (1974) (rule 68 offer), stated that it 
would be deemed withdrawn if not accepted within ten days.  
However, the defendant later stated that the rule 68 offer had 
remained open for fourteen days.  The defendant appears to have 
confused rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides for a fourteen-day offer window, with the State rule, 
which provides for a window of ten days. 
11 
 
 
"voluntarily presented [the plaintiff] all available statutory 
damages for his individual claims."12  Regardless of the 
plaintiff's refusal to accept those offers, the defendant 
argued, "[d]ismissal is appropriate as to the named 
[p]laintiff's individual claims because they are moot and [the 
plaintiff] no longer has a concrete, personal stake in this 
matter.  Moreover, there are no class claims pending because the 
Court denied [p]laintiff's Motion for Class Certification" and 
plaintiff "had the opportunity to file an interlocutory appeal 
of the class certification denial and elected not to do so."  In 
short, the defendant argued, the plaintiff "does not have 
standing to serve as a class representative for any putative 
class" he might seek to revive.  The plaintiff opposed the 
motion, arguing that unaccepted settlement offers could not 
render moot the claims of a named plaintiff in a class action 
and that, because he had no right to take an interlocutory 
appeal, his right to appeal the denial of his motion for class 
certification "remain[ed] a live issue." 
                     
 
12 The defendant calculated the plaintiff's total damages 
based on the twenty instances where its timekeeping records 
revealed that the plaintiff had been scheduled to work three or 
more hours but in fact worked less than three hours.  The total 
came to $425.13, including trebling under the Wage Act.  The 
plaintiff does not seem to dispute that the monetary amounts of 
the offers would be sufficient to satisfy his claimed individual 
damages. 
12 
 
 
 
The motion judge held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.  
The defendant's counsel stated at the hearing that, if its 
motion were granted, the plaintiff still could take "an appeal 
of the denial of class certification."  The judge granted the 
defendant's motion on the grounds that the "plaintiff has been 
provided with complete relief as to his individual claims by the 
defendant and accordingly those claims are moot.  The court 
therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter."  
The judge also noted that the plaintiff's motion for class 
certification had earlier been denied.  In his order of 
dismissal, the judge instructed the plaintiff to submit an 
affidavit and documents supporting an award of fees and costs.  
The parties subsequently entered into a stipulation for 
attorney's fees and costs with respect to the plaintiff's 
individual claim.  The stipulation was incorporated into the 
final judgment entered by the judge.  We transferred the 
defendant's appeal from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Certification standard for class 
actions under Wage Act or minimum fair wage law.  As a threshold 
matter, we address the plaintiff's argument that the wage laws 
"confer[] rights greater than those conferred more generally" 
under rule 23 with respect to class action litigation.  To 
achieve class certification, rule 23 (a) requires plaintiffs to 
show that:  "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
13 
 
 
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class."  Additionally, 
under rule 23 (b), plaintiffs must show that the "questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair 
and efficient adjudication of the controversy."  By contrast, 
G. L. cc. 149 and 151 simply authorize an allegedly aggrieved 
employee to "prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or 
for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action 
for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred and for the full 
amount of the minimum wages less any amount actually paid to him 
by the employer" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 151, § 20.  See 
G. L. c. 149, § 150.  See also note 13, infra. 
The plaintiff argues that a more lenient class 
certification standard should thus be inferred from these 
provisions of the wage laws.  The defendant argues that the 
statutory authorization of a private right of action, including 
the right to bring a class action, does not alter the 
certification standards set out in rule 23, and thus that the 
motion judge correctly applied these standards to a class action 
14 
 
 
brought under the wage laws.  We agree with the defendant, and 
accordingly we hold that rule 23 provides the correct framework 
for analyzing a certification claim brought under the Wage Act 
or the minimum fair wage law. 
We begin with the text of the wage laws.  See Northeast 
Energy Partners, LLC v. Mahar Regional Sch. Dist., 462 Mass. 
687, 692 (2012) ("The starting point of our analysis is the 
language of the statute" [citation omitted]).  As mentioned, 
both G. L. c. 149, § 150, and G. L. c. 151, § 20, allow an 
aggrieved employee to bring suit against his or her employer "on 
his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly 
situated."  The legislative history of these statutes makes 
clear that the primary purpose of this language is to authorize 
class actions in statutes that did not previously provide for 
class actions.  Indeed, the Wage Act had no private right of 
action until this provision was added.13  With this purpose in 
                     
13 The Legislature added this provision to several sections 
of the Wage Act in 1993.  See St. 1993 c. 110, §§ 177-179 
(amending G. L. c. 149, §§ 27F, 27G, 27H, 150).  We have 
recognized that its primary purposes in doing so was to create a 
private right of action in a statute that previously had been 
enforced only by the Commonwealth.  See Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 
Mass. 240, 246 (2013) (1993 amendments to Wage Act created 
private right of action); Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 
171 n.8 (2012) (same). 
 
By contrast, the minimum fair wage law, G. L. c. 151, § 20, 
provided for individual actions from its inception, but did not 
provide for class actions.  See St. 1947, c. 432, § 1.  In 2008, 
15 
 
 
mind, it is clear that a "civil action" for "others similarly 
situated" simply refers to the "substantive right to bring a 
class proceeding."  Machado v. System4 LLC, 465 Mass. 508, 514-
515, S.C., 466 Mass. 1994 (2013).  It does not define the class 
certification standards themselves.  Those standards are 
provided by rule 23. 
Moreover, nothing in the statutory text or legislative 
history suggests that the Legislature meant to create a lower 
standard for class certification than rule 23 when it added this 
provision to the wage laws.  See Northeast Energy Partners, LLC, 
462 Mass. at 692 (statutory text to be "considered in connection 
with the cause of its enactment" to discern legislative intent 
[citation omitted]).  By contrast, where we have departed from 
rule 23, the statutory language has provided a clear basis for 
doing so.  In particular, the statutory language authorizing 
class actions under a provision of the consumer protection 
statute, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2), "differs in significant respects 
                     
the Legislature amended this statute to provide for a civil 
action to be brought by an allegedly aggrieved employee "in his 
own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others 
similarly situated" (emphasis added).  St. 2008, c. 80, § 7. 
This provision is worded identically to that conferring a 
private right of action in the Wage Act, and we thus infer a 
similar legislative intent to create a "substantive right to 
bring a class proceeding" where none had previously existed.  
Machado v. System4 LLC, 465 Mass. 508, 514, S.C., 466 Mass. 1004 
(2013). 
16 
 
 
from that of [rule 23]."  Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 
Mass. 381, 391 (2004).  That statute contains highly detailed 
language that closely follows the specific certification 
requirements of rule 23, while deliberately omitting some of 
those requirements.14  For that reason, we have "recognized that 
the requirements for class certification under the statutory 
class action provision in § 9 (2) are easier to satisfy than 
under [rule 23]."  Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 201 
(2009).  The class action provision of the wage laws do not 
contain this sort of specific discussion of certification 
requirements.  Nor does the legislative history of the wage laws 
reveal that the Legislature meant to replace the general 
criteria for class certification in rule 23 with different 
criteria for a class action brought under the wage laws. 
Moreover, it is clear from our previous application of rule 
23 to class actions brought under the wage laws in Salvas v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 371-372 (2008), that rule 
                     
 
14 General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (2) was enacted before the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure (including rule 23) were 
adopted.  See Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 201 (2009).  
It was "obviously written in the light of [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23], 
but some of the restrictions in the Federal rule were omitted."  
Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 40 (1975).  In 
particular, it "omits the requirements of Federal Rule 23 (b) 
(3) and of our Rule 23 (b) that the common questions 
'predominate' over individual questions and that the class 
action be 'superior' to other available methods for fair and 
efficient adjudication."  Id. 
17 
 
 
23 has the necessary structure and adaptability to advance the 
"very legitimate policy rationales underlying the Legislature's 
decision to provide for class proceedings under the Wage Act," 
in particular the need to deter violations of the law and allow 
certain plaintiffs to come forward on behalf of others in the 
class who may fear retaliation.  Machado, 465 Mass. at 515 
(2013).  See id. at 515 n.12 (discussing these rationales).  As 
we observed in Salvas, supra at 371, where we reversed a motion 
for decertification of a putative class of hourly employees 
asserting claims under the wage laws, "One of the great 
strengths of the rule 23 class action device is its plasticity.  
Case-by-case considerations of practicality and fairness have 
enabled rule 23 certification decisions to adapt appropriately 
to a variety of contexts, even within the same litigation."  In 
particular, we stated in Salvas, supra at 369, that rule 23 
serves the "policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism," namely "to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to 
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights" (citation 
omitted).  We have thus recognized that rule 23 is well suited 
to class action litigation in the employment context, including 
under the Wage Act and the minimum fair wage law. 
In short, consistent with our decision in Salvas, we apply 
rule 23 to claims under the wage laws at issue here.  There is 
18 
 
 
no indication from the text or legislative history of these wage 
laws that the Legislature intended to modify the class 
certification criteria contained in rule 23.  Additionally, we 
have recognized that the adaptable requirements of rule 23 well 
serve the policy rationales supporting class actions in the 
employment context.  We thus hold that the motion judge 
correctly used the rule 23 factors to analyze a claim brought 
pursuant to the wage laws at issue here. 
b.  Denial of class certification.  We review the judge's 
decision not to certify the plaintiff's proposed class under 
rule 23 for an abuse of discretion.  Salvas, 452 Mass. at 361.  
Although a judge has "broad discretion" whether to grant or deny 
class status, "[i]ndicia of an abuse of discretion include 
errors of law. . . such as when a judge . . . denies class 
status by imposing, at the certification stage, the burden of 
proof that will be required of the plaintiffs at trial."  Id. at 
361 (quotation and citation omitted).  The error exemplified 
above is exactly what occurred here. 
The judge denied certification on the grounds that the 
plaintiff had failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement 
contained in rule 23 (a), which mandates that the class be "so 
19 
 
 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."15  As 
discussed above, the plaintiff identified as putative class 
members hundreds of unnamed employees who, on approximately 
7,000 occasions, worked less than three hours on shifts 
scheduled for three or more hours but did not receive reporting 
pay.  The defendant did not maintain records explaining why any 
of these employees left early and admitted it could not know if 
they had been involuntarily dismissed.  And the defendant 
refused to provide the identities of these employees to the 
plaintiff in response to his discovery requests. 
At the class certification stage, this is "information 
sufficient to enable the motion judge to form a reasonable 
judgment that the class meets the requirements of rule 23" with 
                     
15 "Despite its moniker, the numerosity requirement is less 
about the number of class members than it is about the 
impracticability of joinder of the several parties."  J. 
Greaney, K.C. Adam, & L. M. Scalisi, Deconstructing Rule 23:  A 
Comparison of Massachusetts and Federal Class-Action Litigation, 
§ 2.3.1 at 11 (2013).  In turn, the "determination of 
practicability should depend upon all the circumstances 
surrounding a case."  Reporter's Notes (1973) to Rule 23 (a) 
(1), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 
508 (LexisNexis 2018-2019), quoting Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 
836 (2d Cir. 1968).  Because the wording of the numerosity 
requirement is identical to that of its counterpart in Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23, we may look to Federal decisions for guidance in 
interpreting this provision.  See Baldassari, 369 Mass. at 40 
(rule 23 "was written in the light of the Federal rule").  
"However, to the extent that rule 23 relaxes some of the 
requirements imposed on plaintiffs under the Federal rule, our 
analysis may, in certain respects, differ."   Weld v. Glaxo 
Wellcome Inc., 434 Mass. 81, 86 n.7 (2001). 
20 
 
 
respect to the numerosity requirement (citation omitted).  
Salvas, 452 Mass. at 363.  The combination of thousands of 
instances of nonpayment to hundreds of employees, the absence of 
any record keeping justifying the nonpayments, and a refusal to 
provide the names of the employees involved, made it reasonable 
to infer that the number of plaintiffs would satisfy the 
numerosity requirement.  See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 297 F.R.D. 
185, 189 (D. Mass. 2014), quoting McCuin v. Secretary of Health 
& Human Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 167 (1st Cir. 1987) (court may 
draw "'reasonable inferences from the facts presented to find 
the requisite numerosity,'"); W.B. Rubenstein, 1 Newberg on 
Class Actions § 3.13 at 215 (5th ed. 2011) (1 Newberg on Class 
Actions) (court is to make "commonsense assumptions regarding 
the number of putative class members"). 
 
The motion judge should also have recognized that the 
dollar amount that each employee could potentially recover was 
likely to be too small for individual suits to be practicable 
and that employees bringing such individual suits had reason to 
fear retaliation.  See W.B. Rubenstein, 7 Newberg on Class 
Actions § 23.18 at 665 (5th ed. 2017) (7 Newberg on Class 
Actions) (discussing factors relevant to numerosity 
determination in employment context).  See also Salvas, 452 
Mass. at 369 (permitting "small recoveries" is "policy at the 
very core of the class action mechanism" [citation omitted]).  
21 
 
 
In concert, all these considerations demonstrate that the 
plaintiff met the class certification threshold for the 
numerosity requirement.  See 7 Newberg on Class Actions, supra 
at § 23.18, at 667 ("the numerosity requirement is easily met in 
most employment cases, as in most class actions generally"). 
The motion judge nonetheless concluded that it could not 
make the numerosity determination "[w]ithout a more specific 
numerical allegation or evidence, particularly considering that 
not all employee departures before three hours are necessarily 
eligible for reporting pay."  He further concluded that such 
uncertainty meant that he could not "reasonably determine that 
there is a sufficient number of class members such that class 
certification would be a better approach than joinder of 
individual plaintiffs."  As we have previously stated, however, 
the burden, at the class certification stage, "is of a different 
order than the party's burden of proof at trial."  Salvas, 452 
Mass. at 363.  "[N]either the possibility that a plaintiff will 
be unable to prove his allegations, nor the possibility that the 
later course of the suit might unforeseeably prove the original 
decision to certify the class wrong, is a basis for declining to 
certify a class which apparently satisfies the Rule."  Id. at 
363, quoting Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 434 Mass. 81, 84-85 
(2001).  Uncertainty as to the number of plaintiffs, due to the 
possibility of affirmative defenses regarding some of the 
22 
 
 
plaintiffs, is not a grounds for denying class certification, at 
least when hundreds of employees are affected by an apparent 
prohibited "class-wide practice" and the employer's own record-
keeping deficiencies cause the uncertainty.  Cf. Salvas, supra 
at 357, 367. 
   Indeed, this was the case in Salvas.  There, the defendant 
employer likewise argued that class certification should be 
denied because some employees might have voluntarily skipped 
breaks, and hence would not have been injured by the employer's 
allegedly unlawful policy of denying breaks.16  Id. at 356 & 
n.53.  We disagreed, explaining that voluntariness was a 
"disputed issue of material fact with regard to an affirmative 
defense" that the employer might offer at trial.  Id. at 367.  
And we held that the possible presence of some "uninjured class 
members" should not defeat certification where there was 
sufficient evidence to infer a prohibited class-wide payment 
practice.  Id. at 357, 370.  Cf. Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 
800 F.3d 360, 380 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[p]laintiffs need not prove 
that every member of the proposed class has been harmed before 
the class can be certified"); 1 Newberg on Class Actions, supra 
at § 2:3 (Supp. 2018) ("possibility that a well-defined class 
                     
 
16 In Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 346 
(2008), the plaintiff employees claimed that they had been 
denied meal and rest breaks.  The defendant employer argued that 
some employees voluntarily skipped breaks.  Id. at 356. 
23 
 
 
will nonetheless encompass some class members who have suffered 
no injury" is "generally unproblematic").  See Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 816 (1976) (trial judge deciding class certification motion 
"is necessarily bound to some degree of speculation by the 
uncertain state of the record on which he must rule").17 
In Salvas, we also rejected the motion judge's reliance on 
the defendant's own record-keeping deficiencies as a grounds to 
deny class certification.  Salvas, 452 Mass. at 356-357, 367.  
The fact that the defendant's time-keeping "records were mute" 
as to the reasons for the missed breaks did not support the 
denial of certification where it was sufficiently clear that 
there was an unlawful over-all policy.  Another instructive case 
is Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993), where a 
class of public assistance applicants alleged that their 
applications had been delayed beyond the time required by law, 
but the defendants had failed to maintain records explaining the 
reasons for the delays, and hence it was unknown whether 
                     
17 The plaintiff concedes that employees who voluntarily 
"asked to leave early" would not be entitled to reporting pay, 
although he disputed that employees who the defendant asked to 
volunteer would truly have left voluntarily.  Additionally, the 
defendant offers no justification for why it would not owe 
reporting pay in other circumstances when it required an 
employee to leave work early, such as closing a restaurant for 
inclement weather. 
24 
 
 
particular delays were due to applicant error.  The court in 
Robidoux concluded that the "[p]laintiffs have presented 
documentary evidence of delays in a sufficient number of cases 
to meet the numerosity requirement" and that the defendants 
"cannot prevail by claiming that delays are due to applicant 
fault and meanwhile fail[ing] to document its claim."  Id.  
Here, as in Salvas and Robidoux, we conclude that record-keeping 
deficiencies do not provide justification for the denial of 
class certification.  This is particularly true because, as 
discussed infra, a judge has the discretion to decertify the 
class if it turns out that the numerosity determination was 
incorrect.  See Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 
302 n.8 (2008), quoting School Comm. of Brockton v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 423 Mass. 7, 14 n. 
12 (1996) and General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 160 (1982).18 
                     
 
18 The judge compounded this burden of proof error when he 
redefined the proposed class to "contain only employees who were 
involuntarily cut before three hours and employees who were 
offered a choice to leave before three hours, but that choice 
was 'not free from express or implied pressure from the 
employer' (i.e., the employees was involuntarily cut)."  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
explained:  "A case can't proceed as a class action if the 
plaintiff seeks to represent a so-called fail-safe class -- that 
is, a class that is defined so that whether a person qualifies 
as a member depends on whether the person has a valid claim" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  McCaster v. Darden 
Restaurants, Inc., 845 F.3d 794, 799 (7th Cir. 2017).  See In re 
25 
 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the judge abused 
his discretion when he concluded that the plaintiff did not 
satisfy the numerosity requirement in the instant case.  We 
accordingly vacate the order denying class certification on the 
basis of the numerosity requirement and remand for further 
                     
Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(inappropriate to "certify[] what is known as a 'fail-safe 
class' -- a class defined in terms of the legal injury").  A 
fail-safe class is impermissible because "a class member either 
wins or, by virtue of losing, is defined out of the class and is 
therefore not bound by the judgment" (citation omitted).  
McCaster, supra.  In the Seventh Circuit case, the class was 
defined impermissibly because plaintiffs "sought to represent a 
class of '[a]ll persons separated from hourly employment with 
[their employer] in Illinois between December 11, 2003, and the 
conclusion of this action[] who were subject to [the employer's] 
Vacation Policy . . . and who did not receive all earned 
vacation pay benefits.'"  Id.  "Under this definition class 
membership plainly turns on whether the . . . employee has a 
valid claim. That is a classic fail-safe class."  Id. 
 
The judge essentially did the same here, contrary to the 
purpose of class actions. See 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 3:6 
at 171-172 ("liability-begging definitions" result in "head[s] I 
win, tails you lose" scenario because any putative class members 
to whom defendant is not found liable are not in class, not 
bound by judgment, and can continue to litigate same issue at 
expense of judicial economy and contrary to purpose of class 
actions).  Although a judge has discretion to redefine a class, 
that discretion must be exercised "in accord with the purposes 
sought to be achieved by class actions," as defined by the 
standards set out in rule 23.  Salvas, 452 Mass. at 363, quoting 
Sniffin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 
723 (1981).  See Sniffin, supra at 724 (discussing purposes of 
class action, including efficient and effective use of judicial 
resources, in overturning denial of class certification based on 
numerosity).  We thus conclude that the judge committed error. 
26 
 
 
consideration of the other factors bearing on class 
certification.19 
c.  Mootness.  We next consider whether the motion judge 
properly dismissed the plaintiff's case for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  As mentioned, the plaintiff's class 
certification motion had been denied and the plaintiff had not 
yet appealed when the defendant moved to dismiss the case.  The 
judge dismissed the entire case on the grounds that the 
defendant's rule 68 offer and tender offer provided the 
plaintiff with "complete relief as to his individual 
claims . . . and accordingly those claims are moot."  We review 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.  See 
Indeck Me. Energy, LLC v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, 454 
Mass. 511, 516 (2009). 
 
We begin by considering whether an unaccepted rule 68 
settlement offer or a monetary tender designed to satisfy the 
individual claims of a named plaintiff in a putative class 
action can render those individual claims moot, thus leading to 
dismissal of the entire case, even when the class certification 
                     
 
19 Remand is appropriate because, in the absence of any 
findings or conclusions with respect to the other class 
certification factors, we cannot determine whether the judge 
exercised his discretion as to these factors properly.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lys, 481 Mass. 1, 5 (2018) (remanding case where 
judge did not exercise discretion).  See also Lonergan-Gillen v. 
Gillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 748 (2003) (same). 
27 
 
 
decision has not yet been appealed.  Regarding the effect of a 
rule 68 offer, we are instructed by the United States Supreme 
Court's consideration of the issue in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. 
Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (Campbell).  There, a plaintiff in 
a putative class action suit had not yet moved for class 
certification when the defendant offered the plaintiff his 
individual monetary damages as well as requested injunctive 
relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.  Id. at 667-668.  The 
plaintiff rejected the offer, and the defendant moved to dismiss 
both the individual and class claims for mootness.  Id. at 668.  
The Supreme Court, relying on "basic principles of contract 
law," id. at 670, held that an "unaccepted settlement offer or 
offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case," id. at 672, 
because "with no settlement offer still operative, the parties 
remained adverse," id. at 670-671.  Because the individual claim 
was not moot, the putative class claims also "retain[ed] 
vitality."  Id. at 672. 
 
Here, as mentioned, following the denial of the motion for 
class certification, the defendant first made a rule 68 offer 
and then made a tender offer to the plaintiff in amounts that 
purported to satisfy his individual monetary damages.  The 
defendant concedes that the rule 68 offer "was not accepted" by 
the plaintiff.  We see no reason to apply a different analysis 
to a lapsed and unaccepted offer under rule 68 from that which 
28 
 
 
the Supreme Court in Campbell applied to an offer made pursuant 
to the analogous Federal rule:  both rules, for example, state 
that an offer will expire within a certain time frame, explain 
that an offer not accepted is deemed withdrawn, and penalize a 
party who rejects an offer by requiring the rejecter to pay the 
offeror's costs from the date of the offer if the rejecter 
ultimately receives a less favorable judgment.20  Moreover, the 
defendant expressly stated in its rule 68 offer that the 
plaintiff need not accept the offer.  Under basic principles of 
contract law, we accordingly conclude that the suit of a 
plaintiff who rejects a defendant's offer of judgment under rule 
68 is not rendered moot because the parties remain adverse.  
See, e.g., Lambert v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 449 Mass. 119, 123 
                     
 
20 As explained in the Reporter's Notes (1973) to Rule 68, 
Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 1382 
(LexisNexis 2018-2019), "[w]ith one slight exception 
[Massachusetts] Rule 68 is the same as Federal Rule 68."  In 
relevant part, the State rule provides that a "party defending 
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to 
allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property 
or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then 
accrued.  If within 10 days after the service of the offer the 
adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, 
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance 
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk 
shall enter judgment.  An offer not accepted shall be deemed 
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a 
proceeding to determine costs.  If the judgment exclusive of 
interest from the date of offer finally obtained by the offeree 
is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the 
costs incurred after the making of the offer."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 
68, 365 Mass. 835 (1974). 
29 
 
 
(2007) ("axiomatic" principle of contract law that parties must 
agree on material terms of contract and intend to be bound by 
that contract [citation omitted]).  For that reason, the class 
claims likewise "retain[ed] vitality."  Campbell, 136 S. Ct. at 
672. 
 
The defendant nonetheless argues that this case is 
distinguishable from Campbell because, in addition to its rule 
68 offer, it made the plaintiff a tender offer in the form of a 
certified check that was also in an amount purportedly providing 
complete relief on the plaintiff's individual claim.  It is true 
that the Supreme Court expressly left open in Campbell the 
question whether the defendant's deposit of the "full amount of 
the plaintiff's individual claim in an account payable to the 
plaintiff," followed by the court's entry of "judgment for the 
plaintiff in that amount," could render moot the individual 
claim of a named plaintiff who has not yet moved for class 
certification.  Campbell, 136 S. Ct. at 672.  Here, however, the 
plaintiff had moved for class certification.  See Deposit Guar. 
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (Roper).21  Furthermore, 
                     
21 The plaintiff's decision not to take an interlocutory 
appeal from the class certification decision did not waive his 
right to appeal. See Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 
Mass. 609, 613 (1980) ("failure to raise a given issue on an 
interlocutory appeal . . . in no way prejudices a party's 
ability to secure review of such an issue on appeal following 
final judgment").  See also M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 
30 
 
 
like most courts to have considered that open issue, we do not 
find the defendant's distinction between its tender offer and 
its rule 68 offer persuasive:  "[a]lthough the means are 
technically different, the result is the same."  1 Newberg on 
Class Actions, supra at § 2:15, at 133.22  The defendant concedes 
                     
F.3d 237, 248 n.15 (5th Cir. 2018) ("because an interlocutory 
appeal is permissive rather than mandatory, the [appellant] 
retains the right to challenge the class certification following 
the ultimate disposition of the case on the merits"). 
 
22 Most Federal courts have reacted with "suspicion or 
outright hostility" to attempts by defendants to render moot 
putative class actions by tendering full relief to the named 
plaintiff with respect to his or her individual claims.  K. 
Christakis, J. Pilgrim, & J. Morrissey, "So You're Telling Me 
There's A Chance!":  The Post-Campbell-Ewald Possibility of 
Mooting a Class Action by "Tender" of Complete Relief, 71 
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 237, 253 (2017).  See, e.g., Ung v. 
Universal Acceptance Corp., 190 F. Supp. 3d 855, 861 (D. Minn. 
2016) (rejecting defendant's argument that unaccepted tender 
offer rendered putative class representative's individual claim 
moot because "a rejected tender works in exactly the same way as 
a rejected offer under [Federal] Rule 68 . . . . Hence, there is 
no reason to treat a rejected tender of payment any differently 
than a rejected offer of payment" [citation omitted]); Getchman 
vs. Pyramid Consulting, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 4:16 CV 1208 
CDP, slip op. at 8 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017) (rejecting 
defendant's argument that unaccepted tender offer rendered 
putative class representative's individual claim moot because "a 
tender offer of settlement via a check that was subsequently 
refused and returned . . . is not materially different 
than . . . an offer of settlement"). 
By contrast, Demmler vs. ACH Food Companies, Inc., U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 15-13556-LTS, slip op. at 8 (D. Mass. June 9, 
2016) held that, despite the named plaintiff's rejection of a 
check from the defendant providing full monetary relief on his 
individual claim, dismissal was warranted because no "live case 
or controversy exist[ed]" under art. III of the United States 
Constitution.  Because "art. III does not apply to State 
31 
 
 
that the plaintiff rejected its tender offer.  Under similar 
principles of contract law, we conclude that the suit of a 
plaintiff who rejects a defendant's tender offer is not rendered 
moot.  See Barron Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk 
& Dedham Group, 469 Mass. 800, 805 (2014) (parties may reject 
tender offers and litigate their claims).  Because the 
individual claims are live, the class claims likewise would 
continue. 
 
Furthermore, it is well settled under Federal law that, 
even where a named plaintiff's individual claim is rendered 
moot, class claims may remain live where the plaintiff has yet 
to appeal from the denial of a motion for class certification.  
1 Newberg on Class Actions, supra at § 2:15, at 74 (Supp. 2018) 
(describing "well-settled" Federal rule under which "mooting of 
the named plaintiff's claims after a decision on class 
certification" -- including denial of class certification -- 
                     
courts," however, we need not follow this reasoning.  LaChance 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757, 771 n.14 (2016).  
See Weld, 434 Mass. at 88 ("State courts . . . are not burdened 
by [Federal] jurisdictional concerns and, consequently, may 
determine, particularly when class actions are involved, that 
concerns other than standing, in its most technical sense, may 
take precedence").  See also S.L. Kafker & D.A. Russcol, 
Standing at a Constitutional Divide:  Redefining State and 
Federal Requirements for Initiatives after Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229, 251 (2014) ("Standing in 
state courts is governed by a different set of constraints and 
considerations than those limiting and guiding the federal 
courts. . . . [T]he states are not bound by Article III"). 
32 
 
 
"does not moot the class action" [emphasis omitted]).  See, 
e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 
404, (1980) ("an action brought on behalf of a class does not 
become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's substantive 
claim, even though class certification has been denied").  Roper 
is particularly relevant.  In that case, as here, the 
plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied; the 
defendant provided complete tender to the named plaintiffs in 
the amounts of their individual claims, which the plaintiffs 
rejected; and the trial judge entered judgment over the named 
plaintiffs' objections.  Roper, 445 U.S. at 329-330.  The Court 
concluded that this was error:  although a "final judgment fully 
satisfying named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would 
preclude their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment," the 
plaintiffs would nonetheless retain the "right to take an appeal 
on the issue of class certification."  Id. at 333.23  It 
explained that to "deny the right to appeal simply because the 
defendant has sought to 'buy off' the individual private claims 
                     
23  The Court also held that the claims of the named 
plaintiffs were not moot because they retained an "individual 
interest" in an award of class-wide attorney's fees.  Deposit 
Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 
(1980) (Roper).  To the extent that the Roper decision suggests 
that an unaccepted tender offer can render a named plaintiff's 
individual claim moot, id. at 333, this is not the case under 
Massachusetts law, as we are not bound by Art. III requirements, 
and apply our own standing rules.  See note 22, supra. 
33 
 
 
of the named plaintiffs . . . would frustrate the objectives of 
class actions" and "invite waste of judicial resources" by 
requiring multiple plaintiffs with low-value claims to bring 
suit.  Id. at 339.  See id. at 341 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(rule requiring named plaintiff to "accept a tender" of his or 
her "individual claims" would "give the defendant the practical 
power to make the denial of class certification questions 
unreviewable").  We conclude that, even if the individual 
plaintiff's claim had become moot, this reasoning would apply 
here.  We thus reject the defendant's argument that a plaintiff 
"has had [his or her] bite at the class action 'apple'" and 
faces dismissal for mootness when he or she has not yet appealed 
the denial of a motion for class certification.24 
 
We recognize that the mootness issue is particularly 
important in this case because no other named plaintiff has yet 
been identified.  Given the hundreds of potential plaintiffs 
affected by the failure to provide reporting pay, and the 
possibility of further discovery, we do not consider this to be 
                     
 
24 This conclusion is consistent with our previous decisions 
on mootness in the class action context.  In those cases, we 
recognized that class claims should not be rendered moot where 
the defendant voluntarily stopped the complained of conduct as 
to the named plaintiff but not necessarily to the broader 
putative class.  See Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 
Mass. 745, 753, 756 (2016); Gonzalez v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 407 Mass. 448, 452 (1990); Wolf v. Commissioner of 
Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975). 
34 
 
 
a proper grounds to deny certification.  1 Newberg on Class 
Actions, supra at § 3:13, at 211 (not fatal to certification 
that the plaintiff did "not allege the . . . specific identity 
of proposed class members."  Cf. Weld, 434 Mass. at 84 (only 
single named plaintiff had standing).  As mentioned, the 
plaintiff did not know the identities of the putative class 
members because the defendant used aggressive discovery tactics 
to maintain a strategic "information monopoly."  1 Newberg on 
Class Actions, supra at § 3:13, at 213 n.4, quoting Jackson v. 
Foley, 156 F.R.D. 538, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).  While claiming that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to class-wide discovery, for 
example, the defendant was able to obtain affidavits from 
employees in the plaintiff's putative class to support its own 
case.  The plaintiff did not have an opportunity to identify 
those employees who did not receive reporting pay, learn the 
reasons why, and invite their participation in the class action.  
Certification should not be thwarted where the defendant's 
opposition is based on information in the defendant's possession 
that the defendant itself asserted plaintiff did not need and 
then used strategically against the plaintiff. 
Although we conclude that neither the plaintiff's 
individual nor his class claims are moot, we emphasize that the 
remaining certification factors, for example whether the 
plaintiff is a typical class representative, still need to be 
35 
 
 
decided on remand.  And even if certification is granted, we 
further emphasize that a "decision as to class certification is 
not immutable" and that "after a certification order is entered, 
the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent 
developments in the litigation" (citation omitted).  Kwaak, 71 
Mass. App. Ct. at 302 n.8. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
denial of the plaintiff's motion for class certification and the 
granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss.  We remand the 
matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.