Title: Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC18-2142, SC18-2143
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 31, 2020

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-2142 
____________ 
 
EUGENE HAM III, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-2143 
____________ 
 
LAURA FOXHALL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Respondent. 
 
December 31, 2020 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In these consolidated cases, we consider whether a unilateral attorney’s fee 
provision in a credit card contract is made reciprocal to a debtor under section 
57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2015), when the debtor prevails in an account stated 
 
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action brought to collect unpaid credit card debt.  We have for review the decision 
of the First District Court of Appeal in Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 
260 So. 3d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), which certified conflict with the decision of 
the Second District Court of Appeal in Bushnell v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 
LLC, 255 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
In Ham, the First District ruled that section 57.105(7) was inapplicable 
because the actions for account stated did not rely on the credit card contracts 
containing the fee provisions.  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 455.  Accordingly, the district 
court held that the debtors could not recover attorney’s fees.  Id.  In contrast, the 
Second District in Bushnell held that the debtor was entitled to attorney’s fees 
under section 57.105(7), reasoning that the account stated claim and the underlying 
credit card contract were inextricably intertwined.  See Bushnell, 255 So. 3d at 
477-78.   
Based on our analysis of the text of the statute, we conclude that section 
57.105(7) allows the debtors to recover reciprocal attorney’s fees.  Under section 
57.105(7)’s rule of reciprocity, if a contract provides for attorney’s fees for a party 
when that party “is required to take any action to enforce the contract,” then 
attorney’s fees are authorized for the other party if “that party prevails in any 
action . . . with respect to the contract.”  Here, the fees were authorized for the 
 
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debtors because both conditions required by the statute were met.  We approve the 
result in Bushnell and quash Ham. 
BACKGROUND 
 
After purchasing certain consumer debts from GE Capital Retail Bank (the 
Bank), Portfolio—as assignee of the Bank—filed separate actions against Eugene 
Ham III and Laura Foxhall (the debtors) in Escambia County Court.  Ham, 260 So. 
3d at 452.  “In each case, Portfolio filed a one-count complaint for common law 
account stated to collect the balance allegedly owed on a credit card account 
originating with the Bank.”  Id.  Portfolio claimed “that each debtor had a 
revolving credit card account with the Bank,” and “used the account to make 
purchases [or] cash advances resulting in an unpaid balance.”  Id.  Portfolio further 
alleged that “the Bank provided monthly credit card account statements to [each] 
debtor for the amounts due,” and neither debtor “object[ed] to the account 
statement[s].”  Id.  Portfolio sought to recover $819.74 from Ham and $3,934.69 
from Foxhall.  Id. at 452 n.1.  “Portfolio did not reference or attach the credit 
contracts to the complaints, but instead attached monthly billing statements.”  Id. at 
455. 
 
The debtors filed answers denying the substantive allegations in the 
complaints and raising affirmative defenses.  Id. at 452.  The debtors also 
requested attorney’s fees based on the underlying credit card contracts, which 
 
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authorized the Bank to recover costs and fees if required to hire an attorney to 
collect the account, and section 57.105(7), which makes provision for reciprocal 
prevailing party fees in certain circumstances if there is a unilateral contractual 
attorney’s fee clause.  Id.  The attorney’s fee provisions in the credit card contracts 
with both debtors provided for the recovery by the creditor of “collection costs,” 
“including court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees” if the creditor used the 
services of an attorney who was not the creditor’s salaried employee for 
“collect[ing]” the debtor’s account. 
 
Both cases proceeded to trial, at which the county court determined “that 
Portfolio failed to offer any admissible evidence to support the complaints.”  Id.  
Accordingly, “the court entered final judgments in favor of the debtors and 
reserved jurisdiction to address attorney’s fees and costs.”  Id. 
 
The debtors next filed motions for attorney’s fees, again claiming that the 
unilateral fee provisions in the credit card contracts were made reciprocal to them 
under section 57.105(7).  Id.  Portfolio opposed the motion for fees, arguing in part 
that because the complaints were based on account stated rather than breach of 
contract, the contractual fee provisions were not applicable.  Id. at 452-53.  The 
court found in favor of the debtors.  Id. at 453.  After the court entered its orders 
granting attorney’s fees and costs to the debtors, however, “Portfolio moved for a 
new trial with respect to the debtors’ entitlement to attorney’s fees based on an 
 
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intervening appellate decision from the” First Judicial Circuit Court for Escambia 
County: Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Grunewald, No. 
172016AP000024XXXXXX (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. Apr. 21, 2017).  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 
453.  There, the First Circuit concluded “that section 57.105(7) does not apply in a 
case in which a creditor proceeds under an account stated cause of action 
independent of any written credit card agreement the creditor has with a debtor.”  
Id. (citing Grunewald, No. 172016AP000024XXXXXX, at *3-*4).  Recognizing 
Grunewald as binding precedent, the county court granted Portfolio’s motions and 
reversed its prior judgments.  Id.  
On appeal, the First District consolidated the cases and affirmed.  Id. at 452.  
The district court acknowledged that Portfolio chose to file an account stated 
claim, which “is based on ‘the agreement of the parties to pay the amount due upon 
the accounting, and not any written instrument.’ ”  Id. at 454 (quoting Farley v. 
Chase Bank, U.S.A., 37 So. 3d 936, 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).  Therefore, 
“[b]ecause the action framed by Portfolio in these cases did not rely on the credit 
contracts containing the unilateral fee provision,” the First District “conclude[d] 
that the debtors [were] not entitled to reciprocal fees under section 57.105(7) by 
virtue of those contracts.”  Id. at 455.   
In support of this conclusion, the First District observed that a contrary 
conclusion “would undermine Portfolio’s ability to choose its cause of action.”  Id.  
 
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The court stated that Portfolio’s choice of an account stated cause of action meant 
that “had Portfolio prevailed at the trial level, it would not have been entitled to 
fees under the credit contracts either.”  Id. 
 
The court further explained that it had “not overlooked the debtors’ 
argument that” Portfolio’s claims were actions “with respect to the contract”—as 
required under section 57.105(7)—because “the credit contracts [were] 
inextricably intertwined with the account stated claims.”  Id.  The First District 
noted that the debtors primarily relied on Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 
2002), in support of their argument.  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 455.  There, this Court 
held that the prevailing party in a fraudulent misrepresentation suit was entitled to 
attorney’s fees under a contractual provision awarding fees to the party that 
succeeded in any litigation “arising out of” the contract.  Caufield, 837 So. 2d at 
379.  The Court concluded that the “misrepresentation would not have occurred” if 
not for the contract; thus, the two were “inextricably intertwined such that the tort” 
claim arose out of the contract.  Id. 
But the First District distinguished Caufield.  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 455.  The 
district court explained that “[t]he tort claim in Caufield required proving the 
existence and the breach of the contract,” while “[a]n account stated claim . . . 
requires no evidence of breach of the contract, and can exist in the absence of any 
contract at all.”  Id.   
 
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Instead, the district court found the facts more analogous to those in Tylinski 
v. Klein Automotive, Inc., 90 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 
455.  In Tylinski, a car dealership and buyers entered into two contracts related to 
the sale of a vehicle: a financing agreement, which contained an attorney’s fee 
provision, and a sales contract, which did not.  Tylinski, 90 So. 3d at 871-72.  The 
car dealership subsequently sued the buyers for breach of the sales contract.  Id. at 
872.  The buyers prevailed, but the Third District held that they were not entitled to 
fees under the provision in the financing agreement and section 57.105(7).  Id. at 
872-73.  Though the buyers argued “that both contracts were relevant because the 
sale would not have existed but for the financing,” Ham, 260 So. 3d at 456 (citing 
Tylinski, 90 So. 3d at 872), the Third District noted that “the dealership sought 
recovery under the” sales contract instead of the financing agreement, Tylinski, 90 
So. 3d at 872.  As a consequence, the Third District explained, “there [was] no 
contractual avenue for recovering attorney’s fees.”  Id. 
The First District concluded that “[t]he same reasoning applie[d]” to the case 
before it.  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 456.  “Although the debtors would not have credit 
card debt but for their contracts with the Bank,” the court noted, “Portfolio did not 
sue under the credit contracts.”  Id.  Therefore, just as in Tylinski, “there [was] no 
contractual avenue for recovering attorney’s fees.”  Id. (quoting Tylinski, 90 So. 3d 
at 872).   
 
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The district court also rejected the argument that the inclusion in Portfolio’s 
claims of contractually accrued late fees and interest charges indicated that the 
claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the credit contracts.  Id.  In addressing 
this point, the court recognized that “[t]he elements of a claim for account stated 
required Portfolio to show it had a business relationship with the debtor,” but 
concluded that the contract on which the business relationship between the creditor 
and the debtor was based was “irrelevant” to the account stated cause of action.  Id.  
Accordingly, the First District affirmed the county court’s orders denying the 
debtors’ motions for attorney’s fees.  Id.  In so ruling, the First District certified 
conflict with the Second District’s contrary decision in Bushnell, 255 So. 3d 473.  
Ham, 260 So. 3d at 456. 
Certified Conflict Case—Bushnell 
 
 
In Bushnell, Portfolio, “as the successor in interest to the original creditor,” 
brought an account stated cause of action against Katrina Bushnell to recover 
unpaid credit card debt.  Bushnell, 255 So. 3d at 474.  After Bushnell filed an 
answer raising affirmative defenses and asserting entitlement to attorney’s fees, id., 
Portfolio voluntarily dismissed the case, id. at 475.  Bushnell subsequently moved 
for attorney’s fees, based on the credit card contract—which allowed the creditor 
to recover fees if required to ask an attorney who was not an employee to collect 
an account—and section 57.105(7).  Id.  The trial court denied the motion.  Id. 
 
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On appeal, the Second District reversed.  Id. at 474.  The central dispute in 
the case, the Second District recognized, was whether the account stated claim 
“constitute[d] an action with respect to the credit card agreement” as required by 
section 57.105(7).  Id. at 476.  In answering that question, the Second District first 
looked to this Court’s opinion in Caufield.  The Second District concluded that the 
“ ‘inextricably intertwined’ test” established in Caufield was “applicable to 
determine whether an action is ‘with respect to the contract’ such that the 
reciprocity provision in section 57.105(7) applies.”  Id.  And that test was satisfied, 
the Second District explained, because “the amount due . . . [was] based on the 
debtor’s failure to pay under the credit card contract.”  Id. at 477 (emphasis 
omitted).  “[I]f there had been no credit card contract,” the court reasoned, “the 
amount due would not have accrued in the first place.”  Id. 
The Second District was “not persuaded by Portfolio’s argument that the 
application of the inextricably intertwined test to section 57.105(7) [was] 
inconsistent with Tylinski.”  Id. at 476.  The Second District explained that Tylinski 
was distinguishable because the court there “did not interpret the ‘with respect to 
the contract’ language in section 57.105(7)” in deciding whether the buyers should 
recover fees.  Id. at 477.  “Instead,” the Second District suggested, the Tylinski 
“court upheld the denial of attorney’s fees because” the buyers asserted entitlement 
to fees under the sales contract, which lacked a fee provision, rather than the 
 
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financing agreement, “which was the contract containing the fee provision.”  Id.  
Therefore, the buyers “failed to plead a proper basis for the recovery of fees.”  Id.  
In contrast, the Second District noted, Bushnell properly “asserted her claim for 
fees under a provision in the credit card agreement and section 57.105(7).”  Id.  
Concluding that “Tylinski simply [did] not apply,” id., the Second District reversed 
the order denying Bushnell’s motion for fees, id. at 478. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Resolving the certified conflict issue requires us to determine whether the 
unilateral attorney’s fee provisions in the credit card contracts are made reciprocal 
to the debtors under section 57.105(7).  Because this is a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the standard of review is de novo.  Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 
453 (Fla. 2018). 
 
In interpreting the statute, we follow the “supremacy-of-text principle”—
namely, the principle that “[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount 
concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.”  Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 
(2012).  We also adhere to Justice Joseph Story’s view that “every word employed 
in [a legal text] is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless 
the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”  Advisory Op. 
to Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration 
 
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Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in 
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69). 
We thus recognize that the goal of interpretation is to arrive at a “fair 
reading” of the text by “determining the application of [the] text to given facts on 
the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have 
understood the text at the time it was issued.”  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 
33.  This requires a methodical and consistent approach involving “faithful reliance 
upon the natural or reasonable meanings of language” and “choosing always a 
meaning that the text will sensibly bear by the fair use of language.”  Frederick J. 
de Sloovère, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 538, 541 
(1934), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 34. 
Section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes 
Section 57.105(7) provides, in relevant part: 
If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party 
when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, 
the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party 
when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or 
defendant, with respect to the contract. 
 
The parties offer competing interpretations of what is required under section 
57.105(7).  In the debtors’ view, the statute applies when two requirements are 
satisfied.  First, the contract must have “a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a 
 
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party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract,” and 
second, the other party that is seeking fees must “prevail[] in any action, whether 
as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.”  § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat.  
Portfolio, on the other hand, contends that the statute is applicable when (1) an 
action is brought to enforce a contract which contains a unilateral fee provision, 
and (2) the party not named in the fee provision prevails in that action.  According 
to Portfolio, an account stated claim cannot be considered an action to enforce a 
contract.  Portfolio also argues that it—as the party benefitting from a unilateral 
attorney’s fee provision—gives up its right to collect fees from consumers when it 
chooses to file a common law cause of action. 
 
Contrasting formulations of the statutory requirements are also found in the 
decisions below.  In both Ham and Bushnell, the district court was presented with a 
certified question of great public importance that framed the issue as whether an 
account stated claim is an action “to enforce a contract.”  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 453-
54; Bushnell, 255 So. 3d at 474.  In line with its interpretation of section 57.105(7), 
the Second District rephrased the question to ask whether the claim was one “with 
respect to the contract.”  Bushnell, 255 So. 3d at 474.  The First District, however, 
answered the question as put forth by the lower court.  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 456. 
We conclude that the result reached in Bushnell and sought by the debtors is 
supported by the text of section 57.105(7).  Section 57.105(7) applies when (1) the 
 
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contract includes “a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is 
required to take any action to enforce the contract,” and (2) the other “party 
prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the 
contract.”  § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat.  It is readily apparent that the argument presented 
by the debtors closely tracks the text of the statute while Portfolio’s argument—
which was accepted by the First District—diverges from the text.  The “enforce the 
contract” language describes what is required of the contractual provision—not of 
the claim raised by the plaintiff.  That portion of the statute is anchored by the 
phrase “[i]f a contract contains a provision.”  It presents a question that can be 
answered simply by reviewing the provisions of the contract.  The “with respect to 
the contract” language, however, presents a question that requires considering the 
claims actually litigated and determining the existence of the required relationship 
between the contract and the litigation in which the other party prevails. 
 
Here, both contracts between the creditor and debtors contained provisions 
granting the creditor the right to recover “collection costs”—“including . . . 
attorney’s fees” if the creditor used the services of an attorney who was not the 
creditor’s salaried employee for “collect[ing]” the debtor’s account.  Such a 
provision authorizing fees for the use of a lawyer to collect the account of a debtor 
is “a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to 
take any action to enforce the contract.”  § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat.  Action to collect 
 
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an account established under a contract is encompassed by the phrase “any action 
to enforce the contract.”  So the first element of section 57.105(7) is readily 
satisfied by the terms of the credit contract fee provisions. 
 
In accordance with this analysis we thus reject the proposition argued by 
Portfolio and accepted by the First District that the credit card contract fee 
provisions did not extend by their plain terms to account stated causes of action.  
There is no tenable argument that a provision authorizing fees for action to collect 
a debtor’s account does not encompass account stated claims. 
 
The only question remaining regarding the proper interpretation of the 
statute is whether the second element of that statute was met—that is, whether the 
debtors “prevail[ed] in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to 
the contract.”  Id.  Namely, whether the account stated action in which each debtor 
prevailed was an “action . . . with respect to the contract.” 
 
The phrase “with respect to” is a longer way of saying “respecting.”  
Respecting means “with regard or relation to:  REGARDING, CONCERNING.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1934 (1993 ed.).  The 
scope of “with respect to” is necessarily broader than terms such as “based on,” 
“under,” or “pursuant to.”  “With respect to” in this context requires a relationship 
with the contract containing a unilateral fee provision that may be different than 
and not as immediate as the relationship that would be required if “based on,” 
 
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“under,” or “pursuant to” were the operative language.  “[W]ith respect to” is 
inclusive of those other terms, but it sweeps more broadly.   
 
 The Supreme Court has recently recognized—in a case involving the 
interpretation of a provision of the bankruptcy code—that “[u]se of the word 
‘respecting’ in a legal context generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the 
scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that 
subject.”  Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1760 (2018).  
The Court held that a statement regarding a single asset is a “statement . . . 
‘respecting’ a debtor’s financial condition [because] it has a direct relation to or 
impact on the debtor’s overall financial status.”  Id. at 1761.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court rejected an argument—similar to the argument made in the 
dissent here—that a narrow sense of “respecting” should be employed in 
interpreting the statutory provision.  The Court stated that it found “no basis to 
conclude . . . at least in this context, that ‘related to’ has a materially different 
meaning than ‘about,’ ‘concerning,’ ‘with reference to,’ and ‘as regards’ ” and 
observed that “[t]he definitions of these words are overlapping and circular, with 
each one pointing to another in the group.”  Id. at 1759; see also Morales v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (holding that “ordinary meaning” of 
statutory phrase “relating to” “is a broad one—‘to stand in some relation; to have 
bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection 
 
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with,’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)—and the words thus express a 
broad . . . purpose”). 
 
Although the account stated claims brought by Portfolio perhaps could not 
fairly be said to be claims brought “based on,” “under,” or “pursuant to” the credit 
contracts, there is nonetheless a clear and direct relationship between the credit 
contracts and the account stated claims.  As the First District recognized, an 
essential element of an account stated cause of action is proof of the existence of a 
business relationship between the parties.  Ham, 260 So. 3d at 456; see also 
Farley, 37 So. 3d at 937 (explaining that prevailing on an account stated claim 
requires proof of “an agreement between persons who have had previous 
transactions, fixing the amount due in respect of such transactions, and promising 
payment” (emphasis added) (quoting Martyn v. Amold, 18 So. 791, 793 (Fla. 
1895))). 
The business relationship and the previous transactions between the debtors 
and the creditor were predicated on the credit card contracts.  Without those 
contracts, there would have been no business relationship or previous transactions.  
The accounts that the creditor sought to collect came into existence as a result of 
the operation of those credit card contracts.  So it is a fair reading to say that the 
account stated actions on which the debtors prevailed were actions “with regard or 
 
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relation to” those credit card contracts and that the second element of the statutory 
provision was therefore satisfied. 
We are unpersuaded by the dissent’s contention that we should adopt a 
narrow reading of “with respect to” that would preclude the award of fees to the 
debtors.  In the context of the reciprocal fee statute—which manifests a purpose to 
help level the playing field when a contract contains a unilateral attorney’s fee 
provision—the capacious phrase “with respect to” would be a very odd choice to 
signal the cramped meaning urged by the dissent.  We do not believe that it is 
reasonable to conclude that the legislature would have used a term that is generally 
recognized to have a “broadening effect” to impose the sort of limitations 
suggested by the dissent when other terms clearly denoting such limitations are 
readily available.  And the rule of “strict construction” advocated by the dissent—
whatever its merits—by no means supports an interpretation of a text that is 
unreasonable in context. 
Here, the “strict construction” advocated by the dissent would deny 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing debtor in litigation even though the prevailing 
creditor in the same litigation would be eligible for an award of fees based on the 
unilateral contract provision.  In its wholly implausible argument that the fee 
provisions in the credit card contracts afforded it no eligibility for fees in its 
account stated collection actions, the creditor shows a keen awareness of the patent 
 
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anomaly in denying fees to a prevailing debtor under section 57.105(7) even 
though the creditor would be eligible for fees under the unilateral contract 
provision if the creditor prevailed.  If the text of the statute required such an 
anomalous result, we would be bound to enforce the statute according to its terms.  
But a fair reading of the key language employed by the legislature—“with respect 
to”—which is equivalent to the “respecting” language the Supreme Court 
recognized generally to have a “broadening effect,” does not require that 
anomalous result.  Far from it. 
 
We also reject the view that allowing the debtors fees somehow precludes 
Portfolio from choosing its cause of action.  Portfolio was free to choose any action 
that might be available to enforce its rights.  The issue of fees is a separate matter 
that depends on the contractual provision relating to fees and the relationship of the 
action brought to that contract.  Portfolio could by no means after the fact choose a 
fee provision other than the one in the credit card contracts between the creditor 
and debtors.  And Portfolio had no right to alter the impact of those provisions by 
unilaterally disavowing an intent to rely on them. 
 
Finally, we find neither Caufield nor Tylinski instructive.  Caufield 
considered the scope of a bilateral fee provision and thus has no analysis 
concerning section 57.105(7).  Caufield, 837 So. 2d at 373.  Furthermore, the 
contractual language at issue in Caufield—“ ‘arising out of’ the contract”—is 
 
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different from the statutory language at issue here.  Id.  Tylinski, unlike Caufield, 
does address a unilateral fee provision.  Tylinski, 90 So. 3d at 872 & n.4.  But the 
Tylinski opinion does not engage the text of the statute.  It apparently was decided 
based on a defect in pleading.  See id. at 872.  So our analysis of the statutory text 
does not rely on either Caufield or Tylinski. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that the unilateral fee provisions in the credit card contracts are 
made reciprocal to the prevailing debtors under section 57.105(7).  Accordingly, 
we approve the result in Bushnell and quash Ham. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, and COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
MUÑIZ, J., dissents with an opinion. 
GROSSHANS, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
MUÑIZ, J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with a great deal of the majority opinion.  I agree with its invocation 
of the “supremacy of text” principle.  I agree with its two-step framework for 
interpreting section 57.105(7).  And I agree that the consolidated cases ultimately 
turn on the interpretation and application of the statutory phrase “action with 
respect to the contract.”  However, I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation 
of that phrase here. 
 
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It is undisputed that an “account stated” cause of action—the only claim in 
these cases—is not a contract action and does not depend on proof of an 
underlying contract.  It also is undisputed that Portfolio did not rely on the contract 
to prove its account stated claim, that the debtors did not rely on the contract as 
part of any defense, and that no party presented the contract as evidence at trial.  
While Portfolio perhaps could have chosen to use the contract to show its business 
relationships with the debtors, it did not do so.  Under these circumstances, the 
statute’s “action with respect to the contract” requirement for attorney’s fees is not 
satisfied. 
 
“With respect to” is a phrasal preposition, many of which “are symptoms of 
officialese, bureaucratese, or other types of verbose style.”  Bryan A. Garner, 
Grammar and Usage, in The Chicago Manual of Style para. 5.174, at 280 (17th ed. 
2017).  Garner recommends replacing such phrases with single-word prepositions 
if a single word “will do in context.”  Id.  And he adds: “For example, if about will 
replace with regard to or in connection with, a judicious editor will inevitably 
prefer to use the simpler expression.”  Id. 
 
Quite reasonably, the majority thus equates “with respect to” with the single 
word “respecting.”  As the majority notes, “respecting” has the following 
definition: “with regard or relation to: REGARDING, CONCERNING.”  
Respecting, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1993 ed.).  
 
- 21 - 
In turn, “regarding” is defined as “with respect to: CONCERNING.”  Regarding, 
Webster’s, supra.  And concerning is defined as “relating to: REGARDING, 
RESPECTING, ABOUT.”  Concerning, Webster’s, supra.   
 
This review of the relevant dictionary definitions leads to two conclusions.  
First, the phrase “with respect to” has a range of meanings.  The majority equates 
“with respect to” with “related to,” which is on the broader end of the spectrum of 
permissible meanings.  But there are equally permissible meanings on the narrower 
end of the spectrum: “regarding” or “about.”  Second, and relatedly, the majority’s 
interpretation of “with respect to” is a choice, the product of a judgment call made 
in the face of a vague statutory phrase.  The text itself does not compel the 
majority’s interpretation of the statute.   
 
This is important, because the majority’s result in this case is possible only if 
one reads the statute as using “with respect to” in the broader sense of “related to.”  
If one instead reads “with respect to” more narrowly as meaning “regarding” or 
“about,” the case must come out the other way.  An ordinary speaker of English 
would not say that a legal “action” is “about” a contract that makes no appearance 
in the case. 
 
So which understanding of “with respect to” correctly captures the meaning 
of the phrase as it is used in the context of this particular statute?  For several 
 
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reasons, I believe that interpreting “with respect to” in the narrower sense is the 
better reading of the statute. 
 
First, understanding “with respect to” as meaning “about” would have the 
effect of limiting the statute’s reach to contract actions.  And that is as it should be, 
because at the most basic level, I think a reader of this statute would most naturally 
see it as applying to contract cases and not to non-contract cases.  To my mind, this 
sentence from the Fourth District captures how an ordinary person would 
understand the thrust of the statute: “[T]he purpose behind section 57.105(7) is to 
provide mutuality of attorney’s fees as a remedy in contract cases.”  Mediplex 
Constr. of Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
Second, understanding “with respect to” in its narrower sense preserves a 
semblance of symmetry within the statute itself.  The operative sentence in its 
entirety reads: 
If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party 
when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, 
the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party 
when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or 
defendant, with respect to the contract. 
This sentence’s first clause shows that the Legislature was concerned with 
contracts that entitle only one party to attorney’s fees when that party takes “any 
action to enforce the contract.”  The second clause shows that the Legislature 
addressed this concern by effectively writing into such contracts a provision 
 
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granting the other party a right to attorney’s fees in “any action with respect to the 
contract.”  To be sure, “with respect to the contract” is broader than “enforce the 
contract,” no matter how one reads the former phrase. 
But how much broader?  It is reasonable to infer that the Legislature used 
the broader language to err on the side of the non-named party in contract actions 
that might not involve “enforcement” of the contract (for example, actions to 
construe or rescind the contract).  It is less reasonable to infer that the Legislature 
would have used the broader language to reach cases in which the contract is not 
the subject matter of the action at all.  This is especially true because the statute 
gives the unnamed party attorney’s fee rights not just as a defendant but as a 
plaintiff as well.  Adopting the majority’s broader understanding of “with respect 
to” puts the statute’s two clauses out of balance. 
The majority understandably emphasizes that the contractual attorney’s fee 
provision at issue here would have applied to an account stated action had the 
creditor prevailed.  (In these particular cases, of course, under our case law 
Portfolio could not have recovered fees because they were not pled in the 
complaints.)  But neither the majority nor I read the statute as requiring strict 
reciprocity; neither of us interprets the “with respect to the contract” clause of the 
statute as meaning that the unnamed party gets exactly the same attorney’s fee 
rights that the named party would have gotten.  Depending on the case, sometimes 
 
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the difference between the first and second clauses will mean that the unnamed 
party gets greater rights than the named party, sometimes less.  Because the 
Legislature chose not to require pure reciprocity, some imbalance between the 
statute’s first and second clauses is unavoidable; my interpretation seeks to 
minimize that imbalance. 
Third, the narrower reading of the statute is consistent with the longstanding 
“rule in Florida requir[ing] that statutes awarding attorney’s fees must be strictly 
construed.”  Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia Prof. Ass’n, 539 
So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989).  By setting a background principle of interpretation, 
this canon properly informs the way the Legislature would use and the public 
would understand a vague phrase in an attorney’s fee-granting statute.  The canon 
tells us that, in the specific context of a statutory attorney’s fee provision, the 
expected meaning of the vague phrase “with respect to” is the narrower meaning. 
Finally, understanding “with respect to” in its narrower sense would allow 
courts to administer the statute more objectively and thus more predictably.  The 
narrower meaning of “with respect to” yields a bright-line rule: if the contract with 
the unilateral attorney’s fee provision makes no appearance in the case, then the 
case is not an “action with respect to the contract.”  By contrast, the majority’s 
reading of the phrase introduces unnecessary ambiguity and difficulty of 
application.  Justice Scalia captures the problem in his inimitable style: “[A]s many 
 
- 25 - 
a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else.”  
Cal. Div. of Lab. Stds. Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
Having adopted the “related to” test, the majority applies the test reasonably 
in this case.  But the test itself defies consistent and objective application.  What 
kind of connection between a non-contract action and the “related” contract is 
sufficient to trigger the statute’s attorney’s fee provision?  Under the better reading 
of section 57.105(7), this question need not be asked. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions/Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
First District - Case Nos. 1D17-3112 and 1D17-3113 
 
(Escambia County) 
 
Robert N. Heath, Jr. of Robert N. Heath, P.A., Pensacola, Florida; and Louis K. 
Rosenbloum of Louis K. Rosenbloum, P.A., Pensacola, Florida, 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Diane G. DeWolf, Katherine E. Giddings, and Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman 
LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Janet R. Varnell of Varnell & Warwick, P.A., Lady Lake, Florida; Lynn Drysdale 
of Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Jacksonville, Florida; Craig E. Rothburd of 
Craig Rothburd, P.A., Tampa, Florida; and Arthur Rubin of We Protect 
Consumers, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
- 26 - 
 
for Amicus Curiae The National Association of Consumer Advocates 
 
Ronald S. Canter of The Law Offices of Ronald S. Canter, LLC, Boca Raton, 
Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae National Creditors Bar and Association and Florida 
Creditors Bar Association 
 
Hector E. Lora of Maurice Wutscher LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Receivables Management Association 
International, Inc.