Title: Sheboygan County DH&HS v. Tanya M. B.
Citation: 2010 WI 55
Docket Number: 2008AP003065
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2010

2010 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP3065, 2008AP3066, 2008AP3067, 2009AP136, 
2009AP137 & 2009AP138 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Elijah W.L., Emily M.L. and Irie A.L., persons 
under the age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human 
Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Tanya M.B., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Elijah W.L., Emily M.L. and Irie A.L., persons 
under the age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human 
Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
William S.L., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 319 Wis. 2d 236, 769 N.W.2d 574 
(Ct. App 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 8, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Gary Langhoff   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner the cause was 
argued by Mary T. Wagner, assistant district attorney, with whom 
on the briefs was Joseph DeCecco, district attorney. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, Tanya M.B., there was a brief 
and oral argument by Paul G. Bonneson, and the Law Offices of 
Paul G. Bonneson, Wauwatosa. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, William L., there was a brief 
and oral argument by Thomas K. Voss, and Thomas K. Voss, 
Attorney at Law, S.C., Waukesha. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 55
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP3065, 2008AP3066, 2008AP3067, 
     2009AP136, 2009AP137 & 2009AP138 
(L.C. Nos. 
2008TP9, 2008TP10, 2008TP11, 
2008TP9A, 2008TP10A & 2008TP11A) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Elijah W.L., Emily M.L. and Irie A.L., Persons 
Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human 
Services,   
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Tanya M.B., 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Elijah W.L., Emily M.L. and Irie A.L., Persons 
Under the Age of 18: 
 
Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human 
Services,   
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
William S.L., 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed.   
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit court's decision2 
denying 
Tanya 
M.B. 
(Tanya) 
and 
William 
S.L.'s 
(William) 
(collectively, parents) post-verdict motion to dismiss the 
termination of parental rights petitions.  There are two issues 
presented for our review:  (1) Whether the dispositional orders 
contained "specific services" that are "to be provided to the 
child and family" as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
(2003-04) or by § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007-08);3 and (2) whether the 
Department met its burden at trial of proving that the 
Department "ma[d]e a reasonable effort to provide the services 
ordered by the court."  We decline to decide whether the 2003–04 
or the 2007–08 version of § 48.355(2)(b)1. governs this case 
because we conclude that under either version of the statute, 
the dispositional orders are sufficient.  The specific services 
are found in the orders' directions to the Sheboygan County 
Department of Health and Human Services (Department) to provide 
supervision, services and case management to the children and 
family coupled with the orders' detailed conditions that Tanya 
                                                 
1 Sheboygan County Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Tanya 
M.B., 
Nos. 
2008AP3065, 
2008AP3066, 
2008AP3067, 
2009AP136, 
2009AP137 and 2009AP138, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 29, 2009). 
2 The Honorable Gary Langhoff of Sheboygan County presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007–08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
3 
 
and William must meet for the children's return to them.  Those 
detailed 
conditions 
implicitly required the Department to 
provide services necessary to assist the parents in meeting the 
court ordered conditions for the return of their children.  We 
further conclude that the Department proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that it "ma[d]e a reasonable effort to 
provide the services ordered by the court." 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On February 5, 2004, Tanya overdosed on heroin while 
her three children, Elijah W.L. (Elijah), Emily M.B. (Emily) and 
Irie A.L. (Irie) (collectively, the children), were in the car 
with her.  The police were contacted and Tanya was revived.  
William was not present; he was incarcerated at that time.   
¶3 
As 
a 
result 
of 
Tanya's 
overdose 
and 
William's 
incarceration, the Department filed a petition alleging Elijah, 
Emily and Irie were children in need of protection or services 
(CHIPS).  On March 25, 2004, a disposition hearing was held and 
the circuit court found all three children in need of protection 
or services on the grounds of parental neglect pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 48.13(10).  The court entered a one-year dispositional 
order4 for each of the three children placing them under the 
supervision of the Department.  Under the original dispositional 
orders, the children remained in the home with Tanya and 
                                                 
4 Throughout the proceedings, the orders have been referred 
to as "dispositional orders,"  "CHIPS dispositional orders" and 
"CHIPS orders."  We use these terms interchangeably to refer to 
orders finding the children in need of protection or services. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
4 
 
William, 
who 
lived 
with 
Tanya's 
mother, 
Connie. 
 
The 
dispositional orders were amended on December 17, 2004, to place 
the children out of the home, but with Connie, because both 
William and Tanya were incarcerated. 
¶4 
The 
dispositional orders set forth the detailed 
conditions to be met by Tanya and William for return of their 
children.  The conditions were separated into three categories 
and the specific conditions pertaining to each category were 
listed under the heading "Explanation of Provision." 
¶5 
The first category of the conditions of return is 
"Alcohol and other drug."  Such conditions were as follows: 
Tanya B[.] and William L[.] will complete any 
recommended alcohol or drug abuse programs[,] . . . 
attend an A[lcohol and] O[ther] D[rug] A[ssessment] 
. . . if it is scheduled and they will meet with the 
[social] worker to talk about the report when the 
evaluation is finished.  Tanya and William will not 
use any illegal drugs and they will stay away from 
people who use drugs.  Tanya and William will not use 
any drugs or allow others to use drugs in their home 
or [where] their children are present.  Tanya and 
William will cooperate with the treatment program and 
they will stay in any programs until they are 
discharged.  Tanya and William will provide a urine, 
breath, blood, saliva, or hair follicle sample for 
drug or alcohol test if they are asked to do so by 
their [social] worker.  Tanya and William will 
understand that if they do not give a sample when 
asked to, their [social] worker and the Court will 
assume that they have used illegal drugs. 
The second category is "Counseling."  The conditions of return 
in this category were as follows: 
Tanya B[.] and William L[.] will complete a 
Psychological and/or a Psychosocial Evaluation if 
recommended by the social worker.  Tanya and William 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
5 
 
will go to any treatment and/or counseling programs 
that may be recommended. 
Tanya B[.] and William L[.] will complete any 
programs recommended by their [social] worker.  Tanya 
and 
William 
will 
attend 
individual 
or 
family 
counseling and they will stay in the program until 
they have completed the program. 
The third category is "Other."  The conditions of return in this 
category were as follows:  
Tanya B[.] and William L[.] will stay in touch 
and cooperate with their [social] worker[,] . . . will 
meet with the [social] worker when asked, allow the 
[social] worker into the home, with or without notice, 
and inform the [social] worker of any address or 
telephone 
number changes[,] . . . will sign all 
necessary Releases of Information and cooperate with 
their 
[social] 
worker 
to 
arrange 
any 
treatment 
programs that are required[, and] will be available to 
their 
[social] 
worker 
to 
make 
any 
necessary 
appointments and they will give their worker copies of 
any papers, which will show that they have completed 
or participated in programs. 
Tanya B[.] and William L[.] will provide their 
children with a safe, suitable, and stable home. 
Tanya B[.] will resolve all criminal charges and 
cooperate with her probation or parole officer. 
Tanya B[.] and William L[.] will show that they 
can care for and control their children and that they 
understand their children's needs.  Tanya and William 
will go to any parenting or nurturing program set up 
by the [social] worker and attend any community-based 
programs recommended by their [social] worker.  Tanya 
and William will stay in any programs until they have 
completed 
them. 
 
Tanya 
and 
William 
will 
have 
appropriate child care for their children in their 
absence.  Tanya and William will demonstrate the 
ability to use the skills in the programs that have 
been provided to them. 
¶6 
The dispositional orders were amended on November 29, 
2004, to include two additional conditions of return as a result 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
6 
 
of both parents being incarcerated.  The new conditions were as 
follows: 
1. 
William 
L[.] 
and 
Tanya 
B[.] 
shall 
independently establish and maintain an appropriate 
residence for themselves and their children upon 
release from prison and maintain that residence for a 
minimum of six months prior to the return of the 
children. 
2. 
William L[.] and Tanya B[.] shall obtain and 
maintain full-time employment upon release from prison 
for a minimum of six months prior to the return of the 
children. 
¶7 
Item six of the forms used for the dispositional 
orders was labeled:  "Services to be provided to child and 
family."  Next to that statement, there was an empty box that a 
court could check to indicate a report was attached.  The court 
did not check this box and there was no attached report listing 
the services to be provided to the children and family. 
¶8 
Item seven in the dispositional orders directed the 
Department 
to 
provide "supervision," "services" and "case 
management."5 
¶9 
The children remained under the court's protection and 
the Department's supervision for the next three years.  Then, on 
March 7, 2008, nearly four years after the court entered the 
original dispositional orders, the Department filed petitions to 
                                                 
5 The orders listed "DHSS" as the agency responsible for 
providing supervision, services and case management.  This 
acronym refers to the Department of Health and Social Services, 
Division of Social Services. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
7 
 
terminate the parental rights of Tanya and William with respect 
to Elijah, Emily and Irie. 
¶10 The court held a five-day jury trial in which all six 
termination petitions were tried together.  At trial, the 
Department presented lengthy testimony in support of its 
petitions for termination, demonstrating Tanya and William's 
failure to comply with the court ordered conditions of return.  
Trial testimony included extensive testimony on the many 
services the Department provided to William, Tanya and the 
children.  The relevant portions of such testimony are detailed 
in section II.C. infra. 
¶11 At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the 
trial, the case was submitted to the jury in the form of a 
special verdict.  The special verdict posed four questions.  The 
only question relevant to this appeal is Question 2, which 
asked:  Did the Department "make a reasonable effort to provide 
the services ordered by the court?"   
¶12 During 
its 
deliberations, 
the 
jury 
submitted 
a 
question to the court.  At the top of the page, the jury wrote 
"Ex: #3 p3."  Trial Exhibit #3 was the dispositional order for 
one of the three children.  Specifically, page three of the 
order was the page on which the detailed conditions of return 
were listed.  The jury's question was written below this 
notation.  The question asked:  "Are the explanation of 
provisions listed as the services that were ordered by the court 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
8 
 
in Question 2 of verdict?"  On the record, the court discussed 
its proposed response to the jury's question.  It stated: 
[Court]:  The Court proposes to answer the jury's 
inquiry 
by 
stating, 
"The 
court-ordered 
services 
contained in the dispositional orders and revised 
dispositional orders were the conditions the parents 
were required to meet for return of the children."  
Any objection to that response? 
[Deputy District Attorney James Van Akkeren, co-
counsel for the Department]:  No, your Honor. 
. . .  
[Attorney 
Phillip 
Hoff, 
counsel 
for 
William 
S.L.]:  No objection. 
[Jay Zierhut, guardian ad litem, counsel for 
Elijah, Emily and Irie]:  No objection. 
[Attorney Marcus Falk, counsel for Tanya M.B.]:  
No objection. 
¶13 The court submitted the proposed response to the jury.  
Approximately 
30 
minutes 
later, 
the 
jury 
submitted 
two 
additional questions to the court.  The questions and the 
court's responses were as follows: 
[Jury]:  What exactly were the services ordered 
by the court? 
[Court]:  Answer:  The obligation of the Dept. 
was 
to 
provide 
supervision 
of 
the 
case 
which 
implicitly included assisting the parents to meet the 
conditions of return of the children. 
[Jury]:  Are the services ordered by the court 
contained in the conditions of return? 
[Court]:  Answer:  No. 
¶14 Before the court answered the last two questions posed 
by the jury, Tanya moved to dismiss the petitions based on the 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
9 
 
allegation that the dispositional orders did not set forth 
"specific services" as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1.  
The circuit court noted that it would take the motion under 
advisement and that the objection was preserved. 
¶15 The jury answered the second special verdict question 
in 
the 
affirmative, 
finding 
that 
the 
Department 
made 
a 
reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court.  
The court granted judgment on the verdicts and, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 48.424(4),6 found the parents to be unfit.  Tanya renewed 
her earlier motion to dismiss the termination of parental rights 
petitions, which William joined.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  The court then held a dispositional hearing wherein it 
concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to 
terminate the parental rights of Tanya and William. 
¶16 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court erred in denying the parents' motion to dismiss 
the termination of parental rights petitions because the 
dispositional orders underlying the petitions "failed to set 
forth any court-ordered services as required by [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1."  Sheboygan County Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs. v. Tanya M.B., Nos. 2008AP3065, 2008AP3066, 2008AP3067, 
2009AP136, 2009AP137 and 2009AP138, unpublished slip op., ¶1 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2009). 
¶17 We granted review and now reverse. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(4) states in relevant part:  "If 
grounds for the termination of parental rights are found by the 
court or jury, the court shall find the parent unfit." 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
10 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶18 Our 
review 
draws 
into 
question 
the 
potential 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
(2003–04) and § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007–08).  "The interpretation 
and application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts are 
questions of law that we review independently."  Estate of 
Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 
N.W.2d 481 (quoting McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶7, 300 
Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273).  We also review as a question of 
law whether the evidence presented to a jury is sufficient to 
sustain its verdict.  State v. Booker, 2006 WI 79, ¶12, 292 
Wis. 2d 43, 717 N.W.2d 676.  However, we benefit from the 
discussion provided in previous court reviews.  Spiegelberg v. 
State, 2006 WI 75, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Dispositional Orders 
¶19 The parties dispute whether the dispositional orders 
contained "specific services" as that term is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1.  Accordingly, our inquiry is driven by our 
interpretation of § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
1.  Parties' positions 
¶20 Because the parties offer competing interpretations of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., it is instructive to examine each 
party's argument. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
11 
 
a.  Department's position 
¶21 After the parties submitted their briefs to this 
court, the Department filed a "Supplemental Authority Letter," 
which raised a new argument.  The Department pointed out that 
Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. was amended in 2007 by 2007 
Wisconsin Act 20, § 1248.  Accordingly, § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003–
04),7 which was in existence at the time the dispositional orders 
were entered, and § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007–08),8 which was the 
version in effect at the time of trial, contain different 
language. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1. 
(2003–04) 
(emphasis 
added) stated: 
(b) The court order shall be in writing and shall 
contain: 
1. The specific services or continuum of services 
to be provided to the child and family, to the child 
expectant mother and family or to the adult expectant 
mother, the identity of the agencies which are to be 
primarily 
responsible 
for 
the 
provision 
of 
the 
services ordered by the judge, the identity of the 
person or agency who will provide case management or 
coordination of services, if any, and, if custody of 
the child is to be transferred to effect the treatment 
plan, the identity of the legal custodian. 
8 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1. 
(2007–08) 
(emphasis 
added) states: 
(b) The court order shall be in writing and shall 
contain: 
1. The specific services to be provided to the 
child and family, to the child expectant mother and 
family, or to the adult expectant mother and, if 
custody of the child is to be transferred to effect 
the 
treatment 
plan, 
the 
identity 
of 
the 
legal 
custodian. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
12 
 
¶22 First, the Department contends that the 2003-04 
statute has a less exacting standard that should apply here 
because the 2003–04 statute was in effect when the court entered 
the dispositional orders and for the majority of the CHIPS 
proceedings.  The Department argues that the dispositional 
orders were sufficient under Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003–
04) because the term "if any" limited a judge's obligation to 
order services. 
¶23 Second, the Department contends that even if the court 
interprets and applies Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007–08), 
the dispositional orders were sufficient under that version of 
the statute.  It argues that the directive in the dispositional 
orders that the Department provide supervision, services and 
case management coupled with the services implicitly needed to 
assist the parents in meeting the conditions for the return of 
their children enumerate the "specific services" to be provided 
to Tanya, William and their children.9 
¶24 Third, 
the 
Department 
argues 
that 
the 
parents 
forfeited their right to object to the sufficiency of the 
                                                 
9 This argument was best articulated by the Department at 
oral argument.  However, at times, the Department's briefs 
suggested that it was conceding that the dispositional orders 
did not contain "specific services" as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1.  For example, the Department's brief stated, 
"The dispositional order itself did not specifically list 
services that the Department was required to provide."  We need 
not accept this concession of law.  See State v. Lord, 2006 WI 
122, ¶6, 297 Wis. 2d 592, 723 N.W.2d 425 ("This court, not the 
parties, decides questions of law."). 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
13 
 
dispositional orders due to their failure to object in the 
nearly four years since the orders were entered. 
b.  Parents' position 
¶25 The parents assert that the differing language between 
the 2003–04 version and the 2007–08 version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1. is inconsequential.  This is so, they assert, 
because the court order "shall contain" "specific services" 
under both versions, a standard that the parents contend was not 
satisfied here. 
¶26 The parents argue that the dispositional orders were 
insufficient under Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1.10 because they did 
                                                 
10 In their briefs, Tanya and William argued that they are 
not challenging the sufficiency of the dispositional orders; 
instead, they submit that they are challenging only the 
Department's failure to meet its burden of proof at trial.  They 
argued that the "absence of the mandatory written court-ordered 
specific services in the CHIPS dispositional orders precludes 
the petitioner from clearly and convincingly proving that it 
made a reasonable effort to comply with such orders."  However, 
the parents fail to recognize that their burden of proof 
challenge necessarily encompasses a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the underlying dispositional orders. 
The parents' briefs demonstrate this point.  Tanya's brief 
stated:  "The CHIPS dispositional orders in these cases were 
negligently drafted . . . and the orders failed to list the 
services that [the Department] was to provide to the parents."  
It went on to state that the "orders failed to identify the 
specific services required to be provided to the children and 
the family by [the Department] under the provisions of sec. 
48.355(2)(b)1."  William's brief mounted similar arguments.   
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
14 
 
not separately list the "specific services" to be provided by 
the Department.  The parents assert that in order to be 
sufficient, the box next to item six on the form used for the 
dispositional orders, indicating "[s]ervices to be provided to 
child and family," must have been checked and a separate report 
that listed the specific services to be provided must have been 
attached.  This was not done here.  On this basis, the parents 
argue that the petitions to terminate their parental rights must 
be dismissed. 
2.  General principles 
¶27 Because "[w]e assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language," statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44–45, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, 
and therefore unambiguous, our inquiry goes no further and we 
apply the statute according to our ascertainment of its plain 
meaning.  Id., ¶45. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Additionally, such a suggestion is at odds with Tanya's 
original motion to dismiss, which William later joined.  The 
initial motion was made off the record, which the court 
reiterated on the record as follows:  "Mr. Falk, [counsel for 
Tanya,] has also requested to interpose a motion to dismiss 
based upon the fact that the dispositional order does not set 
forth 
the 
specific 
services 
as 
required 
under 
Section 
48.355(2)[(b)1]." 
We conclude that the parents do challenge the sufficiency 
of the dispositional orders; therefore, we address those 
arguments.  We also address the parents' argument regarding the 
Department's alleged failure to meet its burden of proof in 
section II.C. infra. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
15 
 
¶28 In ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, we 
give the statutory language "its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning."  Id.  The scope, context and purpose of a statute 
assist us in a plain-meaning interpretation.  Id., ¶48.  
"[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . ."  
Id., ¶46.  We interpret statutes to promote, rather than 
contravene, their stated purpose.  See id., ¶49; McNeil, 300 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶16 ("[T]he purpose of a statute informs our 
interpretation of it.").  A statute may "contain [an] explicit 
statement[] of legislative purpose" or its purpose may be 
"readily apparent from its plain language."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶49. 
3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
¶29 We assume without deciding that the parents did not 
forfeit their objection to the sufficiency of the dispositional 
orders.  Therefore, we turn to the merits of the parties' 
arguments. 
¶30 We first address the issue regarding which version of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. controls in this case, either the 
2003–04 version, which was in effect when the dispositional 
orders were entered, or the 2007–08 version, which was in effect 
at the time of trial. 
¶31 Both versions of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b) state that 
the court order "shall contain" followed by a list of 13 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
16 
 
directives to the circuit court.  Our focus is on subd. 
(2)(b)1., which states that the order shall contain "[t]he 
specific services" that are "to be provided to the child and 
family."  § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003–04); § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007–08) 
(fully set out in footnotes 7 and 8, supra).  However, the 2003–
04 statute contained the additional language that the order 
shall contain the specific services "or continuum of services" 
"if any," which terms are not present in the current statute.  
Compare § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003–04) with § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007–
08).  The Department argues that the "continuum of services" 
language in the 2003–04 statute is a less exacting standard than 
"specific services."  It further argues that the "if any" 
language in the 2003–04 statute should be interpreted to mean 
that the order must list specific services only "if any" are so 
ordered. 
¶32 The 2007–08 version of the statute eliminates the 
language 
that 
the 
Department 
posits 
is 
less 
exacting.  
Therefore, any order that is sufficient under the 2007–08 
statute is necessarily sufficient under the 2003–04 statute as 
well.  Because we conclude that the orders are sufficient under 
the 2007–08 statute, and therefore under the 2003–04 statute as 
well, it is not necessary for us to determine which version of 
the statute controls here.  The dispositional orders are 
sufficient under either version. 
¶33 As stated, we conclude that the dispositional orders 
contained "specific services," as required by Wis. Stat. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
17 
 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1.11  We so conclude because § 48.355(2)(b)1. does 
not require a CHIPS dispositional order to separately list each 
individual service that the Department is to provide so long as 
the Department is ordered to provide "supervision," "services" 
and "case management" and the order also provides detailed 
conditions that the parents must complete in compliance with the 
dispositional order. 
¶34 The detailed conditions directed at changing the 
parents' conduct establish the specific services that the 
Department 
is 
to 
provide, 
either 
directly 
or 
through 
arrangements with others.  For example, one condition states:  
"Tanya and William will go to any parenting or nurturing program 
set up by the [social] worker and attend any community-based 
programs recommended by their [social] worker."  Implicit in 
                                                 
11 In its written decision and order denying the parents' 
motion to dismiss the termination of parental rights petitions, 
the circuit court concluded:  "From the court's perspective the 
CHIPS order . . . failed to comport with the mandate of [Wis. 
Stat.] § 48.355(2)(b)1., . . . in that the order did not 
delineate specific services to be provided to the children and 
family by the Department . . . ."  This conclusion conflicts 
with the circuit court's earlier response to the first jury 
question in which it informed the jury that "[t]he court-ordered 
services contained in the dispositional orders and revised 
dispositional orders were the conditions the parents were 
required to meet for return of the children." 
The court of appeals also concluded that "the dispositional 
orders fail to comply with the statutory mandate."  Sheboygan 
County, No. 2008AP3065, unpublished slip op., ¶10.  In any 
event, determining whether the dispositional orders contained 
"specific services" as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
is a question of law that we review independently. See Estate of 
Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 
N.W.2d 481. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
18 
 
this condition is an order that the Department arrange for a 
parenting or nurturing program for the parents to attend, i.e., 
a specific service.  The Department did arrange for a parenting 
program, but Tanya and William did not complete it.   
¶35 The dispositional orders also directed the Department 
to assist the parents in completing certain programs, which the 
Department may recommend in order to enable them to be reunited 
with their children.  These included "alcohol or drug abuse 
programs," 
"an 
[Alcohol 
or 
Other 
Drug] 
assessment," 
"Psychological and/or a Psychosocial Evaluation," "treatment 
and/or 
counseling 
programs" 
and 
"individual 
or 
family 
counseling." 
¶36 The detailed conditions of return set out specific 
case management services the Department was to provide.  The 
conditions required Tanya and William to "stay in touch and 
cooperate with their [social] worker," "meet with the [social] 
worker when asked," "allow the [social] worker into the home" 
and to "be available to their [social] worker to make any 
necessary appointments."  Implicit in such conditions is the 
requirement that the Department provide services to the parents 
by providing a social worker who will be available to William 
and Tanya; who will set up appointments with them; and regularly 
"stay in touch." 
¶37 The dispositional orders set out specific services 
that the Department was to provide to or arrange for the entire 
family, including the three children.  These services were to 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
19 
 
assist William and Tanya in:  "provid[ing] their children with a 
safe, suitable, and stable home"; learning to "care for and 
control 
their 
children"; 
"understand[ing] 
their 
children's 
needs"; and obtaining "appropriate child care for their children 
in their absence." 
¶38 The two conditions of return that were added in 
November 2004 required the Department to assist William and 
Tanya, upon release from prison, in obtaining and maintaining an 
appropriate residence for themselves and their children and in 
obtaining and maintaining full-time employment. 
¶39 Furthermore, the responses of counsel for Tanya, 
William and the Department to the circuit court's answer to the 
first jury question demonstrates that for almost four years all 
parties had been interpreting the dispositional orders as 
requiring the Department to arrange the services necessary to 
assist Tanya and William in meeting the court ordered conditions 
for the return of their children.  This further supports our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. in light of the 
facts of this case. 
¶40 Finally, 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1. 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
purpose 
of 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1., which is "readily apparent from its plain 
language," coupled with the "explicit . . . legislative purpose" 
of the Children's Code.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  The 
apparent purpose of § 48.355(2)(b)1. is to assure that the 
Department will arrange those services that are necessary to 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
20 
 
assist the parents in meeting the court ordered conditions for 
the return of their children.  However, how best to assist 
parents in meeting those conditions may change as the parents 
make 
progress 
or 
encounter 
difficulty 
in 
changing 
their 
behavior. 
 
For 
example, 
when 
Tanya 
and 
William 
were 
incarcerated, it would have made little sense for the circuit 
court to require the Department to visit in their homes on a 
weekly basis or to assist them in finding current employment.  
However, the Department could, and did, facilitate parenting 
classes and alcohol and drug treatment at the locations where 
Tanya and William were confined.  In that way, the Department 
continued to provide services to the parents, as the court had 
ordered, albeit with the flexibility that Tanya and William's 
current circumstances required.   
¶41 Our conclusion that the CHIPS dispositional orders are 
statutorily 
sufficient 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
explicit 
legislative purpose of the Children's Code.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.01 states in relevant part: 
(1) . . . In construing this chapter, the best 
interests of the child or unborn child shall always be 
of paramount consideration.  This chapter shall be 
liberally 
construed 
to 
effectuate 
the 
following 
express legislative purposes: 
(a) . . . The courts and agencies responsible for 
child welfare should also recognize that instability 
and impermanence in family relationships are contrary 
to the welfare of children and should therefore 
recognize the importance of eliminating the need for 
children to wait unreasonable periods of time for 
their parents to correct the conditions that prevent 
their safe return to the family. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
21 
 
. . .  
(gr) To allow for the termination of parental 
rights 
at 
the 
earliest 
possible 
time 
after 
rehabilitation 
and 
reunification 
efforts 
are 
discontinued . . . is in the best interest of the 
child. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶42 The Children's Code focuses on the best interests of 
the child.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1).  The legislature has stated 
that the best interests of the child are furthered by a 
permanent and stable home for the child.  § 48.01(1)(a).  Tanya 
and William could establish a permanent and stable home for 
their children only if they could change their conduct in ways 
that would permit them to meet the court ordered conditions for 
the 
return 
of 
the 
children. 
 
Affording 
the 
Department 
flexibility in the manner in which it provides services to the 
parents, permits the Department to accommodate the parents' 
changing needs.  This, in turn, affords the parents the best 
opportunity for reunification of their family.  Accordingly, 
both the apparent purpose underlying Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
and the explicit purpose of the Children's Code support our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
CHIPS 
dispositional 
orders 
were 
in 
compliance with § 48.355(2)(b)1.  
¶43 Tanya and William also contend that F.T. v. State, 150 
Wis. 2d 216, 441 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1989), requires dismissal 
of the petitions to terminate their parental rights.  The court 
of appeals relied on F.T. in its decision.  Sheboygan County, 
No. 2008AP3065, unpublished slip op., ¶9 & n.6.   
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
22 
 
¶44 Tanya and Williams' reliance on F.T. is misplaced.  In 
F.T., the court of appeals addressed whether the circuit court 
properly imposed sanctions for violation of the conditions of an 
order in a delinquency proceeding "where the order did not 
contain '[a] statement of the conditions with which the child 
[was] required to comply' . . . and where the court failed to 
'explain[] the conditions to the child' at the dispositional 
hearing."  F.T., 150 Wis. 2d at 218 (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) (1987–88)).  The sanctions that the 
circuit court had ordered were reversed by the court of appeals 
because the circuit court had not provided "a full explanation 
of what is necessary for compliance, and what conduct must be 
eschewed in order to avoid the sanctions which may be imposed 
for violation" when the legislature said the court "shall" so 
provide.  Id. at 227. 
¶45 F.T. 
involved 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) (1987–88).  Id. at 218.  Those 
statutes served a very different purpose in regard to the 
interests of a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding, as compared 
with the purpose § 48.355(2)(b)1. serves in a CHIPS order.  The 
apparent purpose of § 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) is to give 
notice to the juvenile of the conduct that the circuit court 
requires and the conduct the juvenile must avoid. 
¶46 The reversal of the circuit court decision in F.T. 
came about because the lack of notice in the order contravened 
the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)7. and (6)(a) (1987-88).  
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
23 
 
Stated otherwise, the decision in F.T. was driven by the failure 
of the circuit court to give notice to a juvenile in a 
delinquency proceeding, which failure of notice affected the 
juvenile's right to know of the conditions he must meet and the 
conduct he must eschew to avoid court sanctions.  See id. at 
227-28.  
¶47 In contrast, the apparent purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1. is to assure that the Department will provide 
those services necessary to assist parents in meeting the court 
ordered conditions for the return of their children.  Tanya and 
William do not claim that the CHIPS dispositional orders were 
insufficient to cause the Department to provide the necessary 
services, nor is there any proof that the Department was not 
diligent in doing so.  See section II.C. infra.  Accordingly, 
F.T. does not support William and Tanya's claim that the 
termination of their parental rights should be reversed. 
¶48 Furthermore, to accept the parents' argument and 
conclude that the dispositional orders are insufficient because 
the court failed to check a box on a form that the court used 
for the dispositional orders and to separately list how the 
Department was to provide each individual service necessary for 
the return of the children to the parents, would be to elevate 
form over substance.  See State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶41, 
255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263 ("The process we require should 
not elevate form over substance.").  This is so because William 
and Tanya do not contend that the Department failed to provide 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
24 
 
them the services that were necessary for them to meet the 
detailed conditions for return of their children and because the 
conditions under which the Department attempted to assist 
William and Tanya changed over the four years of supervision.  
Accordingly, we will not elevate form over substance in our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., and we conclude 
that the CHIPS dispositional orders are sufficient to satisfy 
the statutory requirement. 
C.  Department's Burden of Proof 
¶49 A jury's verdict must be sustained if there is any 
credible evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, to support it.  State v. DeLain, 2005 WI 52, ¶11, 280 
Wis. 2d 51, 695 N.W.2d 484.  Although we apply the standard set 
out in DeLain, we are mindful that terminations of parental 
rights "are among the most severe forms of state action," 
involving as they do "'the awesome authority of the State to 
destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental 
relationship.'"  Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 
Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 
102, 128 (1996)).  At stake for the parents is the permanent 
severance of "all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties 
and obligations existing between parent and child."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.40(2). 
¶50 "Due to the severe nature of terminations of parental 
rights, 
termination 
proceedings 
require 
heightened 
legal 
safeguards against erroneous decisions."  Evelyn C.R., 246 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
25 
 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶21.  "Before a State may sever completely and 
irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due 
process12 requires that the State support its allegations by 
. . . clear and convincing evidence."  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982); accord Oneida County Dep't of Soc. 
Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶10, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 
N.W.2d 652 ("When a fundamental liberty interest is at issue, 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
proof of parental unfitness be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence."). 
¶51 Wisconsin's Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48, 
reflects this constitutional concern.  Oneida County, 299 
Wis. 2d 637, ¶11.  When parents contest termination of their 
parental rights, the termination proceeding involves a two-step 
procedure——a factual finding of grounds for termination and a 
legal conclusion that termination is in the best interests of 
the child.  Id.; see also Wis. Stat. § 48.422; Evelyn C.R., 246 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶22-23. 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) sets out continuing need 
of protection and services as grounds for an involuntary 
termination of parental rights.  That is the grounds relied upon 
here.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1), "[a]t the fact-finding 
hearing, the petitioner must prove the allegations supporting 
                                                 
12 The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution states in relevant part:  "nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
26 
 
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence."  
Oneida County, 299 Wis. 2d 637, ¶12 (internal quotations and 
brackets omitted).  "While the legislative objective of the 
Children's Code is to promote the best interests of the child,13 
the parent's rights are a court's central focus during the 
grounds phase . . . ."  Id.  If the petitioner meets this 
evidentiary burden, the court "shall find the parent unfit" and 
advance to the second step of the termination procedure.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.424(4). 
¶53 During the second step of the termination procedure, 
the dispositional phase, "the court determines whether the best 
interests of the child are served by the termination of the 
parent's rights."  Oneida County, 299 Wis. 2d 637, ¶13 (citing 
Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23; Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 
47, ¶27, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856); Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  
If after the dispositional phase the court finds that the 
evidence warrants the termination of parental rights, "[t]he 
court may enter an order terminating the parental rights of one 
or both parents."  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(3). 
¶54 In this case, the parents allege that the circuit 
court erred during the fact-finding phase in affirming the 
jury's verdicts and finding the parents unfit.  They assert this 
was error because the Department failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1) states in relevant part:  "In 
construing this chapter, the best interests of the child or 
unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration." 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
27 
 
Department "ma[d]e a reasonable effort to provide the services 
ordered by the court" because there were no "services ordered by 
the court" in the dispositional orders.  We disagree. 
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) sets forth the requisite 
showing for a termination of parental rights on the grounds that 
a child is deemed in need of protection or services.  The four 
special verdict questions presented to the jury track the 
requisite showing of § 48.415(2). 
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.b. requires a showing 
"[t]hat the agency responsible for the care of the child and the 
family . . . has made a reasonable effort to provide the 
services ordered by the court."  Similarly, special verdict 
Question 2 asked the jury whether the Department "ma[d]e a 
reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court?"  
Pursuant to § 48.415(2)(a)2.a., the court further instructed the 
jury that: 
"[r]easonable 
effort" 
means 
an 
earnest 
and 
conscientious effort to take good faith steps to 
provide those services, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the parent or child, the level of 
cooperation 
of 
the 
parent, 
and 
other 
relevant 
circumstances of the case.  You may find the agency's 
effort was reasonable even though there were minor or 
insignificant deviations from the court's order. 
¶57 The parents base their argument that the Department 
failed to meet its burden of proof solely on the assumption that 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
28 
 
the 
dispositional 
orders 
failed 
to 
order 
any 
services.14  
However, in this decision, we previously concluded that the 
dispositional orders did in fact contain court ordered services.  
See supra Part II.B.   
¶58 We continue our discussion to demonstrate that the 
record is replete with credible evidence presented at trial that 
supports the jury's finding that the Department "ma[d]e a 
reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court." 
¶59 The Department was to provide the parents with an 
alcohol 
and 
other 
drug 
assessment 
and 
treatment. 
 
The 
Department's Division of Outpatient Services performed an 
alcohol and drug assessment for Tanya.  The Department did not 
directly administer William's assessment; instead, because he 
                                                 
14 The parents do not argue that the Department provided 
insufficient services to Tanya and William.  Quite the opposite, 
the parents concede that the Department provided them with 
extensive services during the four years this action proceeded.  
The following exchange from oral argument illustrates this 
point. 
[Court]:  Is there any insufficiency in terms of the 
evidence [or] the record that services were provided 
to the parents?   
[Counsel for Tanya]:  No.  I am not arguing that the 
parents did not receive significant services from the 
Human Services Department.  I am not making that 
argument. 
[Court]:  Is there some particular service that [the 
parents] 
should 
have 
received 
that 
they 
didn't 
receive? 
[Counsel]:  No. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
29 
 
was 
incarcerated, 
the Department of Corrections performed 
William's assessment. 
¶60 In February 2004, Ralph Radey, a certified alcohol and 
drug 
counselor 
employed 
by 
the 
Department's 
Division 
of 
Outpatient Services, agreed to provide Tanya with relapse 
prevention therapy.  She attended eight sessions and then 
dropped out of treatment.  Mr. Radey then arranged a morning 
group that suited her work schedule.  Tanya attended two 
sessions and again dropped out of treatment.  Mr. Radey sent 
Tanya numerous letters encouraging her to reinvolve herself in 
treatment.  Tanya never responded.   
¶61 As it did with Tanya, the Department offered William 
alcohol and drug treatment services through its Division of 
Outpatient Services.  William declined those services. 
¶62 In March 2006, Tanya contacted Mr. Radey again to 
enroll in relapse prevention therapy and a problem-solving 
group.  Mr. Radey testified that Tanya attended three or four 
sessions and then dropped out of treatment.   
¶63 The Department referred both William and Tanya to 
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous treatment groups, 
which they both sporadically attended.  The Department referred 
Tanya for outpatient treatment at Libertas of Sheboygan and 
Aurora Sheboygan Memorial Medical Center.  At both treatment 
centers, Tanya met with a counselor for her initial appointment 
and then failed to show up for any subsequently scheduled 
appointments. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
30 
 
¶64 Both William and Tanya received extensive alcohol and 
drug treatment from the Department of Corrections while they 
were 
incarcerated.15 
 
William 
and 
Tanya 
were 
generally 
uncooperative with regard to their alcohol and drug treatment.  
At trial, they both were of the opinion that treatment was a 
waste of time.  William described one of his treatment programs 
as "a joke," and stated that treatment would not affect his 
"ultimate choice [of] whether or not [he] will use drugs."  Ms. 
Mittlestaedt testified that "Tanya made it clear to me that 
treatment does nothing, she only goes because I make her go.  
She state[d] that . . . she is going to use if she wants to 
use." 
¶65 The Department was ordered to provide Tanya with a 
psychosocial 
evaluation. 
 
The 
Department's 
Division 
of 
Outpatient Services completed the psychosocial evaluation16 and 
clinical summary. 
¶66 The Department was ordered to provide the parents 
individual or family counseling services.  The Department 
                                                 
15 At trial, William described 16 treatment programs in 
which he has participated.  Most of the treatment programs were 
administered through the Department of Corrections in prison or 
as alternatives to revocation. 
16 The evaluation assessed all the areas of Tanya's life and 
identified any other areas of difficulty not related to alcohol 
or drugs so that the Department could assist in providing 
treatment for those problems as well.  The evaluation identifies 
such areas of difficulty by considering a person's childhood, 
legal history, familial history, education, work experience and 
using history.  Tanya's assessment diagnosis indicated she had 
polysubstance dependency in remission. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
31 
 
arranged for Tanya and William to see a counselor for couples' 
counseling sessions.  They attended counseling sessions for a 
couple of months and then stopped attending.  Tanya and William 
did 
not 
complete 
the 
counseling 
program. 
 
Further, 
the 
Department performed a complete family assessment for Tanya, 
William and their children, which consisted of gathering 
information to determine treatment goals for the family. 
¶67 The Department was ordered to assist the parents in 
learning to care for and control their children and in 
understanding their children's needs.  In its attempt to do so, 
the Department referred Tanya and William to a parenting program 
offered by the Children's Service Society and instructed them on 
how to enroll.  Neither Tanya nor William completed the 
parenting 
program. 
 
The 
Department 
provided 
Elijah 
with 
counseling services from a psychologist and psychiatrist for his 
behavioral 
issues. 
 
The 
Department 
encouraged 
Tanya 
to 
participate in Elijah's counseling sessions so she could better 
understand Elijah's needs.  Tanya declined to participate.  At 
countless meetings, Ms. Mittelstaedt discussed with William and 
Tanya how to better parent their children. 
¶68 The Department was ordered to assist the parents in 
providing their children "a safe, suitable, and stable home."  
In this regard, the Department petitioned the court to change 
the children's placement to Connie's home when, due to William 
and Tanya's drug use and extended incarceration, it became clear 
that they could not provide a safe home for the children.  The 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
32 
 
Department assisted Connie by providing parenting mentors that 
would come to her house during the week and help with the 
children; helping her enroll in a parenting class; and helping 
her obtain daycare and weekend respite care for the children.  
The Department also helped Connie obtain financial assistance 
while she cared for the children.  Connie received a monthly 
subsidy from Kinship, a program administered by the Department, 
which is available for grandparents who have grandchildren 
placed with them.   
¶69 In attempts to provide Elijah with a stable home, 
several 
times 
the 
Department 
formally 
changed 
Elijah's 
placement.  On July 22, 2005, Elijah left Connie's home, and the 
Department placed him with his maternal aunt, Christie.  The 
Department assisted Christie in obtaining low-income housing for 
her and Elijah and financial assistance.  Because Christie was 
suffering 
from 
self-mutilation, 
the 
Department 
transferred 
Elijah to a temporary receiving home so the Department could 
assess where he should be placed next.  Then, on March 24, 2006, 
Elijah returned to Connie's home.  Elijah continued to exhibit 
behavioral 
problems 
while 
at 
Connie's; 
therefore, 
on 
December 14, 2007, the Department provided Elijah with foster 
care services. 
¶70 The Department was ordered to assist the parents in 
establishing and maintaining an appropriate residence for their 
children.  Several times Ms. Mittelstaedt offered to help Tanya 
move into the Bridgeway House, a shelter for homeless women and 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
33 
 
their children, which assists mothers in getting back on their 
feet and in parenting their children.  Tanya was "very negative" 
about the Bridgeway House and refused to move there.  In 
February 2006, when Tanya was released from prison, the 
Department helped Tanya obtain affordable housing and helped her 
furnish her apartment with beds for the children, a kitchen 
table and a couch.  The Department encouraged William to obtain 
his own apartment, but he maintained a transient lifestyle 
living temporarily with friends, Tanya and Connie. 
¶71 The Department was ordered to assist the parents in 
obtaining appropriate child care in their absence.  As stated, 
the Department petitioned to change the children's placement to 
Connie's home when William and Tanya were both incarcerated. 
¶72 The Department was ordered to assist William and Tanya 
in obtaining and maintaining full-time employment for a minimum 
of six months.  William refused the Department's offer to help 
him obtain employment from a full-time employment agency.  
William explained that he preferred the quick money he obtained 
through 
the 
agencies 
that 
provided 
temporary 
employment.  
William's temporary jobs never lasted more than four or five 
months.  Additionally, the Department encouraged Tanya to obtain 
full-time employment, which she often did.  However, her 
frequent incarceration, both of her subsequent pregnancies and 
drug use prevented her from maintaining full-time employment. 
¶73 Finally, the Department was ordered to provide the 
parents a social worker who provided them with case management 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
34 
 
services.  The worker was ordered to keep in touch with the 
parents, be available to the parents and set up appointments to 
meet 
with 
the 
parents. 
 
The 
Department 
assigned 
Martha 
Mittelstaedt as William and Tanya's social worker.  Ms. 
Mittelstaedt scheduled monthly home visits with William and 
Tanya, which she increased to weekly visits in May 2007.  She 
also scheduled additional office visits and meetings upon their 
request.  Over the course of the entire proceeding, Ms. 
Mittelstaedt scheduled more than 70 meetings with William and/or 
Tanya, including visits at the prison or jail.  Ms. Mittelstaedt 
had approximately 85 phone conversations with the parents.  In 
addition to her contact with William and Tanya, Ms. Mittelstaedt 
had more than 400 phone conversations and approximately 130 
meetings with other individuals involved in this case.  These 
meetings and conversations were with Connie, Christie, the 
children and various service providers, including counselors, 
teachers, relatives, probation and parole officers and doctors. 
¶74 A relevant consideration in determining "reasonable 
effort" 
to 
provide 
services 
is 
the 
parents' 
"level 
of 
cooperation."  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.a.  William and Tanya 
frequently rejected services offered by the Department and were 
especially uncooperative with respect to their drug and alcohol 
treatment.  This is evidenced by the fact that William and Tanya 
used drugs throughout these proceedings.  The following are 
specific examples of William and Tanya's drug use. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
35 
 
¶75 On July 19, 2004, William hit a park bench, driving 
while intoxicated.  William was arrested for operating a vehicle 
while intoxicated.   
¶76 On September 10, 2004, Tanya overdosed on heroin.  
William, Elijah, Emily and Irie were present during her 
overdose.  The police later discovered that William had 
concealed in his pants the evidence of Tanya's drug use.  Tanya 
and William were both convicted of felony possession of 
narcotics.  Tanya was sentenced to 14 months in prison and 11 
months of extended supervision.  William, who was on probation 
for burglary, was sentenced to five years in prison.  William 
was released on parole on July 11, 2006.  In April 2006, before 
William was released, Tanya's probation was revoked after she 
tested positive for illegal drugs.  Tanya remained in jail until 
August 16, 
2006, 
when 
she 
was 
transferred 
to 
Taycheedah 
Correctional Institute for drug and alcohol treatment. 
¶77 On March 27, 2006, Tanya tested positive for cocaine.  
As a result, Tanya was arrested by her probation agent on 
April 7, 2006, and remained in jail until August 2006.  On 
April 23, 2007, William submitted someone else's urine to his 
social worker for a drug test.  William fled, and a warrant was 
issued for his arrest. 
¶78 On May 10, 2007, Tanya again overdosed on heroin while 
she was with William and her five-month-old son, Shannon.17  
Tanya was placed in jail on a probation hold after this incident 
                                                 
17 Tanya's son, Shannon, is not a party to this proceeding, 
and William is not Shannon's father. 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
36 
 
and remained there until May 23, 2007.  William was also 
arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant. 
¶79 On August 25, 2007, William was intoxicated and got 
into a fight with Tanya's then boyfriend.  William was convicted 
of disorderly conduct and was sentenced to six months in jail.  
As an alternative to revocation, he spent three months in an 
alcohol and drug halfway house in Waukesha, Wisconsin. 
¶80 Tanya's social worker testified that she "disappeared" 
from the beginning of November 2007 to December 19, 2007, when 
she was arrested and jailed on a probation hold.  At the time of 
trial, Tanya was still incarcerated. 
¶81 Determining reasonable effort also takes into account 
"other relevant circumstances of the case."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)2.a.  One such relevant circumstance was William 
and Tanya's unavailability due to frequent incarceration.  Ms. 
Mittelstaedt confirmed that the Department considered this in 
stating that "services were contingent upon if [William and 
Tanya] were incarcerated and if they weren't available for 
services because of their incarceration."  The foregoing 
incidents of William and Tanya's drug abuse also demonstrate how 
frequently they were incarcerated. 
¶82 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that there is 
sufficient credible evidence to support the jury's verdict that 
the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that it 
"ma[d]e a reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by 
the court." 
Nos. 2008AP3065–2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136–2009AP138 
 
37 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶83 We decline to decide whether the 2003–04 or the 2007–
08 version of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. governs this case 
because we conclude that under either version of the statute the 
dispositional orders are sufficient.  The specific services are 
found in the orders' direction to the Department to provide 
supervision, services and case management to the children and 
family coupled with the orders' detailed conditions that Tanya 
and William must meet for the children's return to them.  Those 
detailed 
conditions 
implicitly required the Department to 
provide services necessary to assist the parents in meeting the 
court ordered conditions for the return of their children.  We 
further conclude that the Department proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that it "ma[d]e a reasonable effort to 
provide the services ordered by the court." 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶84 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I would 
affirm the orders of the circuit court denying the parents' 
motions to dismiss the termination of parental rights petitions.   
¶85 I do not join the majority opinion because, in my 
opinion, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
rewrites 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b), which sets forth mandatory requirements for 
dispositional orders.1   
¶86 I begin by stating the procedural posture of the case.  
¶87 The parents contend that the jury verdict must be 
reversed because the dispositional orders failed to state 
specifically, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., 
the services the Department would provide them.  The parents 
argue that the Department did not meet its statutory burden at 
trial of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
parents failed to meet the court-ordered conditions for the 
children's return.  The parents explain that the Department 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.  
As the majority explains, the language of the 2003-04 
statute is less exacting, and therefore "it is not necessary for 
us to determine which version of the statute controls here."  
Majority op., ¶32. 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
2 
 
cannot meet this burden when the circuit court did not order the 
Department to provide specific services to the parents.2  
¶88 The majority opinion is defective in the following 
respects: 
¶89 First, the majority opinion unnecessarily writes in 
broad strokes, and mistaken ones at that.  The majority risks 
consequences——some apparent, some no doubt unforeseen——for all 
future termination of parental rights cases. 
¶90 This case should be decided, in accordance with sound 
appellate practice, on the narrowest grounds.3  In doing so, I 
conclude, as did the circuit court, that the parents forfeited 
their objection to the circuit court's deficient March 30, 2004, 
dispositional orders.  In contrast, the majority opinion chooses 
to "assume without deciding" that the parents did not forfeit 
their objection to the sufficiency of the dispositional order. 
Majority op., ¶29.  The majority inexplicably bypasses this 
opportunity for judicial restraint. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) allows for termination of 
parental rights if grounds are proved, that is, if it can be 
proven, among other factors, "that the agency responsible for 
the care of the child and family . . . has made a reasonable 
effort to provide the services ordered by the court."  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 48.345 (requires the court, in dispositions of a 
child adjudged in need of protection or services, to order an 
agency to provide specified services). 
The parents are not asserting that the Department failed to 
provide them services.  Rather, their complaint is only that the 
dispositional order did not state the specific services to be 
provided as required by the statute.  
3 State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 
(1997). 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶91 Second, in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., 
the majority fails to heed the plain words of the statute.  
Instead, the majority opinion rewrites the statute in violation 
of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
¶92 Third, in rewriting Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. to 
render the dispositional order in the present case compliant 
with the statute, the majority may present constitutional 
problems in the future.  Termination of parental rights is a 
severe form of state action and requires heightened legal 
safeguards.4  The majority lessens the legislatively prescribed 
protections afforded the parents.5 
¶93 Fourth, the court imposes unfunded mandates on county 
departments of health and human services.   
I 
¶94 This case should be decided against the parents on the 
ground of forfeiture.  Forfeiture is the failure to make the 
                                                 
4 Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶¶20-21, 246 
Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their 
child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model 
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.  Even when blood relationships are strained, parents 
retain 
a 
vital 
interest 
in 
preventing 
the 
irretrievable 
destruction of their family life.") 
5 The majority's recognition that "termination proceedings 
require 
heightened 
legal 
safeguards" 
makes 
particularly 
inexplicable its choice to lower the procedural requirements 
under § 48.355(2)(b)1. and thus the state's obligations in 
making a detailed and specific showing of the necessity of 
terminating parental rights.  Majority op., ¶50. 
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& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
4 
 
timely assertion of a right.6  A primary purpose of the 
forfeiture rule is to require the parties to give notice of the 
issue to the circuit court and allow the circuit court an 
opportunity to address it.7  The forfeiture rule guards against 
eleventh-hour surprises.8  Here the parents and the Department 
worked under the terms of the dispositional orders for over four 
years, without any parental objection to the contents of the 
orders. 
¶95 The termination proceedings at issue in the instant 
case were not initiated until nearly four years after the 
circuit court entered the dispositional orders on March 30, 
2004.  Majority op., ¶9.  For four years, the parents knew the 
content of the dispositional orders and worked under them.  Yet, 
as the majority explains, at no point in that time did the 
parents challenge the sufficiency of the dispositional order. 
Majority op., ¶39.  Absent such a challenge, the court was not 
given the opportunity to repair the dispositional orders. 
¶96 Nor did the parents raise the sufficiency of the 
dispositional order at trial.  Indeed, the issue was not raised 
until the last day of the five-day proceeding, and then only by 
the jury, not the parents.    
                                                 
6 State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 
N.W.2d 612 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993)). 
7 Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30. 
8 Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30. 
 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶97 In accordance with the law, the jury was asked to 
answer the following question: Did the Department "make a 
reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court?"  
During deliberations, the jury submitted a question asking:  
"Are [sic] the explanation of the provisions listed as the 
services that were ordered by the court in [this question] of 
verdict?"  Majority op., ¶11-12.9  Even then, the parents failed 
to register any complaint.  Rather, they consented to the 
court's proposed response without objection.  Majority op., ¶12. 
¶98 An additional 30 minutes passed and the jury persisted 
by asking two additional clarifying questions relating to the 
services to be provided: "What exactly were the services ordered 
by the court?  Are the services ordered by the court contained 
in the conditions of return?"  In response to the jury's second 
question, the circuit court responded, "No."  Majority op., 
¶¶12-15.10 
¶99 Before the circuit court sent its responses to the 
jury, the mother moved to dismiss the petitions on the 
insufficiency of the dispositional orders.  The circuit court 
took the motion under advisement.  After the circuit court 
                                                 
9 The circuit court answered as follows:  "The court-ordered 
services contained in the dispositional orders and revised 
dispositional orders were the conditions the parents were 
required to meet for return of the children."  No one objected 
to this response. 
10 In contrast, the majority concludes that the services 
ordered by the court were contained in the conditions of return. 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
6 
 
granted judgment against the parents, the mother renewed her 
motion, which was denied.    
¶100 I conclude on the basis of the facts of the present 
case 
that 
the 
parents 
forfeited 
their 
objection 
to 
the 
sufficiency of the dispositional orders.  I would therefore 
affirm the orders of the circuit court terminating parental 
rights on the ground of forfeiture.   
II 
¶101 The parents argue that the dispositional orders did 
not meet the statutory standard set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1., which provides that the circuit court shall 
issue a written order that shall contain the specific services 
to be provided to the child and family.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b) provides in relevant part as follows:  
48.355(2)(b) The court order shall be in writing and 
shall contain:  
1. The specific services to be provided to the child 
and family, to the child expectant mother and family, 
or to the adult expectant mother and, if custody of 
the child is to be transferred to effect the treatment 
plan, the identity of the legal custodian (emphasis 
added).  
¶102 The general rule is that the word "shall" in a statute 
is presumed mandatory unless a different interpretation is 
needed to carry out the clear intent of the legislature.11  The 
majority does not dispute that "shall" is mandatory in Wis. 
Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1.  The court of appeals, in In the Interest 
                                                 
11 In 
Matter 
of 
E.B., 
111 
Wis. 2d 175, 
185-86, 
330 
N.W.2d 584 (1983). 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
7 
 
of F.T., 150 Wis. 2d 216, 225, 441 N.W.2d 322 (1989), carefully 
analyzed the use of the words "shall" and "may" in various 
provisions in Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b) and interpreted the word 
"shall" to be mandatory.  The court of appeals' decision 
reflects established Wisconsin law, is persuasive, and should 
not be discarded.12  
¶103 Interpreting the word "shall" as mandatory, I conclude 
that the dispositional orders did not meet the statutory 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)2.  I attach a copy 
of the dispositional order for the reader's ease of following my 
reasoning and that of the majority.  The order is a form 
prescribed by the Judicial Conference and its use is mandated; 
the form may be supplemented.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 758.18, 
971.025; SCR 70.153.   
¶104 Item 4 of the form circuit court order is entitled 
"Conditions of supervision and/or return."  The circuit court 
inserted various acts the parents must perform.13   
                                                 
12 In the Interest of F.T., 150 Wis. 2d 216, 225, 441 
N.W.2d 322 (1989).  F.T. related to juvenile proceedings.  The 
statute at issue in F.T. is substantially similar to the present 
Wis. Stat. § 48.355.  At the time of F.T., the statute covered 
both CHIPS and juvenile proceedings.  The reasoning of F.T. 
regarding the mandatory nature of the word "shall" in the 
statute is still applicable to the present statute covering 
CHIPS cases.  
13 These conditions are based on the recommendations set 
forth in a Memo dated March 23, 2004, that the Sheboygan 
Department of Health and Human Services provided to the circuit 
court. 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶105 Item 6 of the form circuit court order is entitled 
"Services to be provided to child and family."  No services are 
listed by the circuit court.  Furthermore, the box on the form 
circuit court order entitled "see court report" is not checked.14 
¶106 Item 7 of the form circuit court order is entitled 
"Agency/person 
responsible 
for 
supervision/services/case 
management."  The letters "DHSS" were inserted by the circuit 
court.  With item 6 left blank, item 7 does not make clear, much 
less specific, what services the DHSS is to provide.  
¶107 The plain text of the statute mandates that the 
written court order shall contain the specific services to be 
provided.  The majority explicitly acknowledges the obvious, 
stating, ". . . there was no attached court report listing the 
services to be provided to the children and family."  Majority 
op., ¶7 (emphasis added).  Thus the majority concedes that the 
statutory standard was not met in the present case.   
¶108 Nevertheless, the majority soldiers on to somehow 
conclude that the dispositional orders in the present case did 
contain "specific services" as required by the statute.  The 
majority reasons as follows:  the statute does not require the 
order to "separately list each individual service that the 
Department is to provide so long as the Department is ordered to 
provide 'supervision,' 'services' and 'case management' and the 
                                                 
14 A court report prepared by the Department in connection 
with the CHIPS proceedings stated that "[t]he family will 
receive services through Sheboygan County Department of Human 
Services Child Protection Ongoing Unit."   
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
9 
 
order also provides detailed conditions that the parents must 
complete in compliance with the dispositional order."  Majority 
op., ¶33. 
¶109 The 
majority 
reaches 
the 
absurd 
and 
inherently 
contradictory conclusion that the "specific services" standard 
identifying the state's obligations for assistance was met by 
the "implicitly" required services as elucidated in the parent's 
obligations under conditions of return.15  See majority op., 
¶¶34-38.  The majority thus rules that orders that contain 
"implicitly stated services" satisfy the statutory requirement 
that orders "contain the specific services to be provided."   
¶110 The majority's very own reasoning demonstrates that 
the circuit court's dispositional order does not contain the 
specific services to be provided to the child and family as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1.16 
¶111 In contrast to the majority opinion, and certainly 
more candidly, the same circuit court judge who prepared the 
dispositional orders in March 2004 concluded at the termination 
                                                 
15 If the conditions of return are the same as the specific 
services to be provided, as the majority asserts, it is 
superfluous for the form dispositional order to separate 
services and conditions.  The form, as well as the statute, 
undercuts the majority's reasoning. 
16 The majority's fallacious interpretation is demonstrated 
by examining Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)7., which provides that 
the written court order shall contain "a statement of the 
conditions with which the child or expectant mother is required 
to comply."  By construing the conditions mandated by Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)7. as the specific services required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1., the majority merges two subsections and treats 
them as synonymous. 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
10 
 
of parental rights trial that his own orders "did not direct the 
provision of any services."  I agree with the circuit court. 
¶112 By deciding that the conditions for return satisfy the 
"specific 
services" 
requirement 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)1., the majority has created a different statutory 
provision than the legislature adopted.  The majority opinion 
violates "the principle that it is the legislature that chooses 
the words of a statute."17  The majority thus usurps a power not 
vested in this court and offends the fundamental doctrine of 
separation of powers embodied in the Wisconsin Constitution.18    
¶113 The dispositional orders in the present case do not 
comply with the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1., 
but 
the 
parents 
have 
forfeited 
their 
challenge 
to 
the 
dispositional orders.  
III 
¶114 As the majority recognizes, terminations of parental 
rights involve "'the awesome authority of the State to destroy 
permanently 
all 
legal 
recognition 
of 
the 
parental 
relationship.'"19  The legislature thus carefully mandated a 
procedure for termination of parental rights, including numerous 
matters to be included in a circuit court dispositional order. 
                                                 
17 Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, 
¶25, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781.   
18 "The separation of powers doctrine is violated when one 
branch interferes with the constitutionally guaranteed exclusive 
zone of authority vested in another branch."  Martinez v. DILHR, 
165 Wis. 2d 687, 697, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992). 
19 Majority op., ¶49 (quoting Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶20) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶115 The 
legislature 
further 
mandates 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(d) that the circuit court shall "provide a copy of a 
dispositional order relating to a child in need of protection or 
services to the child's parent . . . ."   
¶116 The purpose of detailing the matters to be included in 
the order and requiring a copy of the written order to be given 
to the parents is to advise the parents (and others) fully about 
the conditions they must meet and the assistance they can expect 
from the Department.  If, however, parents must extrapolate the 
services they are to be provided from various parts of the 
order, the notice is ineffectual.  Yet notice is an essential 
aspect of procedural due process.  
¶117 Still, the majority ignores the statutes requiring the 
circuit court to give the parents explicit, clear information.  
Instead the majority frustrates the statutory directives and the 
legislature's constitutionally protective intent by allowing 
implicit requirements to run rampant in its analysis. 
¶118 Considerations of clarity and adherence to basic 
principles of due process of law lead me to conclude that the 
majority's interpretation of the statute and the order is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
statutory 
notice 
requirement and may present constitutional due process issues in 
the future. 
IV 
¶119 In 
its 
result-oriented 
effort 
to 
save 
the 
dispositional orders here, the majority seemingly allows future 
dispositional orders to be interpreted to impose unfunded 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
12 
 
mandates on the county.  Thus the Department has won the present 
"battle" but may have lost the greater "war," that is, it may 
have lost its argument that the dispositional order should not 
be read to mandate that county health and human services 
departments "underwrite, structure, staff and provide the entire 
panoply of 'services' contemplated in these CHIPS cases."  The 
Department's brief explains: 
In the current state of national and regional economic 
recession and resulting draconian cuts in budgets for 
social services, it is highly unrealistic to presume 
that 
county Health & Human Services departments 
throughout the state, particularly those in smaller 
counties 
with 
smaller 
budgets, 
would 
have 
the 
resources to unilaterally underwrite, structure, staff 
and 
provide 
the 
entire 
panoply 
of 
'services' 
contemplated in these CHIPS cases which range from 
simple parenting classes to psychosocial evaluations 
and ongoing drug and alcohol counseling.20   
                                                 
20 Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner's Brief at 11.  
In its reply brief the Department further explains its 
position as follows:  
[T]here is not a statutory duty for the Department to 
formally provide services which are often in fact 
provided 
by 
other 
agencies . . . . 
Common 
sense 
recognizes that it [is] a rare social services 
department which has the resources to provide the 
complex multitude of classes, counseling resources, 
and, at times, inpatient treatment which parents in a 
CHIPS action may require to bring their parenting 
conduct to an acceptable level.  That has certainly 
not been the case here, where a vast majority of the 
services given to the parents were supplied by 
agencies——some governmental, some non-profit, some 
funded 
partly 
by 
county 
funds——other 
than 
the 
Department. 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6-7. 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶120 Troublingly, the majority opinion appears to do just 
what the Department has feared.  For example, item Number 7 of 
the 
form 
dispositional 
order 
is 
entitled 
"Agency/person 
responsible for supervision/services/case management."  The 
majority opinion reads these words in the form as directing the 
Department to provide "supervision," "services," and "case 
management."  The majority then turns to item 4 in the form 
dispositional order, which states "the conditions of supervision 
and/or return."  The conditions the circuit court imposed 
address only the parents' obligations to meet conditions to have 
the child returned.  From item numbers 7 and 4, the majority 
extrapolates that the circuit court ordered specific services be 
provided or "arranged" by the Department.  
¶121 Thus, one condition for return in the circuit court 
order dispositional order states that "Tanya and William will go 
to any parenting or nurturing program set up by the worker and 
attend 
any 
community-based 
programs 
recommended 
by 
their 
worker."  The condition for return imposes only an obligation on 
the parents to attend a program in the event that one is set up 
or recommended by their social worker.  Nowhere do the 
dispositional orders explicitly impose an obligation on the 
Department about a program.  Yet the majority asserts that 
"[i]mplicit in this condition is an order that the Department 
arrange for a parenting or nurturing program for the parents to 
attend, i.e., a specific service."  Majority op., ¶34 (emphasis 
added).  Other conditions imposed on the parent are similarly 
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
14 
 
transformed by the majority into an order that the Department 
provide or "arrange for" various services.  
¶122 There is no limit to the potential extrapolation of 
the Department's obligations from the conditions of return.  
Unless the court order explicitly enumerates the "specific 
services to be provided to the child and family," one can 
extrapolate from the conditions placed upon the parents many 
services that the Department becomes obligated to provide either 
directly or through arrangements with others. 
¶123 Thus 
the 
majority 
appears 
to 
impose 
unfunded 
responsibilities 
on 
the 
Department, 
emanating 
from 
the 
conditions for return imposed on the parents.  I do not think 
that the circuit court or the legislature intended this result.   
¶124 Further, while the Department is obligated to provide 
various services, see majority op., ¶34, the majority offers 
only hazy guidelines as to what the obligations are, how they 
may be adequately satisfied, and who pays for the services.  The 
majority fails to offer useful guidance to the circuit courts or 
departments about how they must now proceed.   
¶125 In sum, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. 
mandates that a circuit court dispositional order must either 
contain the specific services the court orders or explicitly 
state that no services are ordered.  A circuit court can order 
the 
specific 
services 
statutorily 
required, 
giving 
the 
Department discretion in how to provide services and the 
opportunity to change services as circumstances require.   
Nos.  2008AP3065-2008AP3067 
& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶126 In the instant case, although the dispositional order 
did not meet the statutory requirement, the parents forfeited 
any challenge to the dispositional order on the ground that the 
dispositional order did not contain the specific services to be 
provided.   
¶127 For the reasons set forth above, I concur. 
¶128 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
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& 2009AP136-2009AP138.ssa 
 
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