Title: STATE EX REL HAMLIN v DISTRICT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12574
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1973

No. 12574 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , ex re1 CHARLES E. HAMLIN, J R . , Relator, T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , i n and For t h e County of Lewis and Clark, and t h e H O N O R A B L E PETER G. MELOY, Presiding Judge, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Relator : Robert J. Sewell, Jr., argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Thomas F. Dowling, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Leif B. Erickson, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: September 28, 1973 Decided: ~ C T 9 - l g n F i l e d : 9 a l s n M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an original application for supervisory control t o review and annul an order of the d i s t r i c t court refusing t o dismiss a criminal charge against relator. Relator i s Charles E. Hamlin, Jr,, against whom an Informa- tion was f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court of Lewis and Clark County before the Hon. Peter G, Meloy, d i s t r i c t judge. Relator was charged with the criminal sale of LSD, a dangerous drug, on M a y 30, 1973. Relator moved t o dismiss the Information on the ground of entrapment a s a matter of law. A t the hearing on the motion, relator examined Merritt Everett, a deputized undercover agent of the s h e r i f f ' s office, whose testimony furnished the factual background of events leading t o the a r r e s t and charge against relator. Everett t e s t i f i e d that he came t o Helena on M a y 29, 1973, a t the request of the Lewis and Clark County s h e r i f f ' s office t o a s s i s t with the drug problem. Deputy Sheriff DeBree discussed the drug problem with Everett and showed him a l i s t of drug dealers and pushers i n Helena, some mug shots identifying them, and was given the names of some of the places that should be checked out for i l l e g a l narcotics activity. Neither r e l a t o r ' s name nor picture was contained therein, nor was relator discussed i n any of the conversation. During the l a t e afternoon and evening of M a y 29 Everett checked two locations i n Helena for i l l e g a l drug a c t i v i t y without result and finally, a t the suggestion of Deputy Sheriff Debree, went t o a bar i n East Helena arriving there about 12:45 a.m. on M a y 30. A t no time up t o t h i s point had r e l a t o r ' s name been men- tioned nor had Everett met relator. Shortly a f t e r arriving a t the East Helena bar Everett went over t o a table where relator was s i t t i n g , bought him a drink, and asked him i f he knew where Everett could get some ''stash". Relator answered, "yes, I can make a phone call, maybe I can get you a I I couple lids of marijuana. Relator went to a pay phone in the bar, made a phone call, returned to the table and told Everett there was nobody at the house he called. Everett said nothing. Everett bought relator another drink. Relator then said, " I know 11 a place we can go that they might have some. Everett said "All rightf1, relator said "~ollow me". Everett told relator what motel he was staying in and each drove his respective car to this motel. Relator parked his car there, got in ~verett's car and directed him to a house on Rodney where they might possibly get some dope. On the way there relator named another place they were could probably get some dope, if they/ unsuccessful at the house on Rodney. Everett said that would be all right. They arrived at the house on Rodney street at about 2:35 a.m. They got out of the car, knocked on the door and asked the man who answered if he had anything to smoke or weed to sell. The man said no, but he had some acid. Relator introduced Everett to this man, Everett paid him $2.00, got a pill, asked for a drink of water and pretended to take the pill. Other persons in the room appeared "starry-stoned on acid" to Everett. The man who originally answered the door asked if anyone else wanted any more acid and everybody, including Everett, said "yes". Relator and the man left the house, returned about ten minutes later, and distributed some acid to the others, including Everett. Everett and relator left the house about 5:30 a.m. and returned to the motel where Everett was staying and where relator's car was parked. Later in the morning relator returned armed to ~verett's motel room, Everett pulled out his pistol, ordered relator to lie on the floor, and placed him under arrest. On the basis of this testimony, Judge Meloy entered an order denying relator's motion to dismiss the Information, which included a rather detailed rationale of his decision. Here, we note that numerous "facts" are stated in relator's brief which are not sub- stantiated by the record before us a.nd therefore cannot be considered by this Court. Relator then f i l e d the instant proceedings i n t h i s Court seeking supervisory control t o review and annul the order of the d i s t r i c t court. The matter came on for adversary hearing before a t t h i s Court andlthe conclusion thereof was taken under advisement. The single issue for determination i s whether the Information should be dismissed on the ground that the defense of entrapment has been established as a matter of law. A t the outset w e observe that any defense capable of deter- mination without t r i a l of the general issues may be raised before t r i a l by motion t o dismiss. Section 95-1701, R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t e concedes that entrapment, i f established, i s a complete defense t o the charge against relator. Relator acknowledges the truth of Everett's testimony for the purpose of the motion. Neither party contests review of the d i s t r i c t court's order by supervisory control. W e hold that Everett's testimony does not establish entrapment a s a matter of law. Reduced t o its essentials, the testimony simply shows that Everett bought relator a couple of drinks, inquired i f relator knew where Everett could get some narcotics, and followed r e l a t o r ' s lead thereafter. A casual offer t o buy unaccompanied by pleading, begging or coercing of the accused does not constitute entrapment. State v. Harney, Mont . - -9 499 P.2d 802, 29 St.Rep. 627. Everything that happened a f t e r the i n i t i a l solicitation i n the East Helena bar was conceived and i n i t i a t e d by relator with no more than passive participation by Everett, culminating i n the procuring and distribution of LSD p i l l s t o the occupants of the house on Rodney s t r e e t by relator and another . Relator argues that where, as here, the law enforcement officers have no prior knowledge or suspicion that an individual has a propensity t o commit a dangerous drug offense and implant the idea of committing such crime i n h i s mind, they are i n f a c t inducing him t o commit a crime he had no intention of committing thereby establishing the defense of entrapment. Whatever may be said of t h i s contention a s an abstract statement of the law, the testimony here f a l l s f a r short of establishing as a matter of law that Everett implanted the idea that relator and another should procure and s e l l LSD p i l l s t o himself and other occupants of the house on Rodney s t r e e t i n the early morning hours of May 30. W e repeat the three essentials of the defense of entrapment: i n (1) Criminal intent or design originating/the mind of the police officer o r informer; (2) absence of criminal intent or design originating i n the mind of the accused; and (3) luring o r inducing the accused into committing a crime he had no intention of commit- ting. State v. Karathanos, 158 Mont. 461, 493 P.2d 326. I n the instant case, the establishment of such defense must await t r i a l and resolution by the jury of the factual issues of intent and inducement under proper instructions. Because t h i s matter i s returned t o the d i s t r i c t court for jury t r i a l , a f i n a l matter requires comment. To the extent that the ruling of the d i s t r i c t court may be interpreted t o indicate that force or coercion i s required t o establish entrapment, the opinion accompanying the ruling should be clarified. A luring or inducement of the accused t o commit a crime he had no intention of committing, whether by force and coercion or by other means, coupled with the other requirements of Karathanos i s the correct r u l e t o be followed i n the t r i a l of t h i s case. The application for supervisory control i s denied. Justice We Concur: Hon. R. D. McPhillips, District Judge, sitting for Justice John Conway Harrison.