Title: Dunnell v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 159, 2021
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DWAYNE DUNNELL, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 159, 2021 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1604008485A (N) 
§                      
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: December 3, 2021 
Decided: 
January 20, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Dwayne Dunnell, has appealed the Superior Court’s 
denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61.  After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
In 2016, a grand jury indicted Dunnell for several drug- and firearm-
related offenses.  The charges arose after a confidential informant advised Detective 
Bruhn of the New Castle County Drug Control Unit that a man known as “Buck” 
was selling drugs.  The informant provided two phone numbers for Buck.  Through 
further investigation, Detective Bruhn determined that Buck was a nickname for 
 
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Dunnell.  The informant reviewed a photo of Dunnell and positively identified him 
as Buck. 
(3) 
During the week of April 4, 2016, the New Castle County Police 
Department (“NCCPD”) had the same informant arrange a heroin purchase with 
Buck.  The informant called Buck in the presence of NCCPD to arrange the 
purchase, then went to a residence located at 24 Gull Turn in Newark, Delaware, to 
purchase heroin from a person known as “Dreads.”  NCCPD determined that 
Dunnell’s cousin, Kyle Dunnell (“Kyle”), listed 24 Gull Turn as his address.  They 
showed a picture of Kyle to the informant, and the informant identified the person 
in the photo as Dreads.  NCCPD used the informant to purchase heroin from 24 Gull 
Turn again during the week of April 11, 2016.  Again, the informant called Buck to 
arrange the transaction and purchased the heroin from Dreads. 
(4) 
On April 12, 2016, the investigating officers obtained a search warrant 
for 24 Gull Turn.  Officers executed the warrant on April 13, 2016.  Dunnell and 
Kyle were in the home when the warrant was executed.  The officers found no 
contraband on Dunnell or Kyle, but they found a safe in the laundry room that 
contained 3,488 bags of heroin, a loaded handgun, a loaded extended magazine, and 
a digital scale.  They found the key to the safe in the pocket of a pair of Kyle’s pants.  
They also found a bag of pink glassine baggies in the kitchen, a paystub with 
Dunnell’s name on it in the laundry room, and shotgun shells in the laundry room 
 
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and hall closet.  They found $371 in cash and two cell phones in Dunnell’s bedroom, 
two more cell phones in Kyle’s room, and another digital scale in a spare bedroom.  
NCCPD found no fingerprint or DNA evidence that connected Dunnell to the safe 
or its contents. 
(5) 
Following the search of 24 Gull Turn and the discovery of the drugs 
and gun, NCCPD obtained search warrants for a silver Lexus that was parked in the 
driveway and for a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was parked across the street.  Police 
found a fifth phone, an Alcatel flip phone, in the Lexus.  Dunnell told a detective 
that everything in the car was his and did not deny that the Alcatel flip phone was 
his when the detective later described the car’s contents when interviewing Dunnell. 
(6) 
Police then obtained search warrants to search the contents of all the 
cell phones.  One text message that was sent from the Alcatel flip phone at 2:54 a.m. 
on March 12, 2016, read “King Kong.”  Some of the heroin found in the safe was 
stamped “King Kong.”  Incoming and outgoing text messages that were found on a 
Samsung phone that had been located in Dunnell’s bedroom suggested involvement 
in drug-dealing activity. 
(7) 
On March 3, 2017, following a four-day jury trial, a Superior Court jury 
convicted Dunnell of drug dealing (Tier 4 heroin), aggravated possession of heroin, 
and second-degree conspiracy.  The jury acquitted Dunnell of the firearm offenses 
and possession of drug paraphernalia.  The Superior Court sentenced Dunnell as 
 
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follows:  for drug dealing, under the habitual-offender statute,1 to seven years of 
incarceration; for second-degree conspiracy, to two years of incarceration, 
suspended for one year of Level III probation.2  This Court affirmed on direct 
appeal.3 
(8) 
Dunnell filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior 
Court appointed postconviction counsel, who later filed a motion to withdraw after 
finding no meritorious claims to assert.  The Superior Court granted the motion to 
withdraw and denied the motion for postconviction relief, and Dunnell has appealed 
to this Court.  On appeal, Dunnell asserts three claims of ineffective assistance of 
his trial counsel and one claim of ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel.  He 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the warrants 
to search the contents of the cell phones on two grounds:  that the warrants were 
overbroad and that the affidavits presented in support of the applications for the 
search warrants did not establish a sufficient nexus between the cell phones and the 
alleged crimes.  Dunnell also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to seek a limiting instruction concerning the King Kong text message and the 
messages from the Samsung phone that suggested drug-dealing activity.  Finally, he 
 
1 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). 
2 The court merged the drug dealing and aggravated possession charges at sentencing. 
3 2018 WL 5782851 (Del. Nov. 2, 2018). 
 
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contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of 
the motion to suppress. 
(9) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.4  We review legal or constitutional 
questions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.5  The Court 
considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive 
issues.6   
(10) The claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that Dunnell asserts on 
appeal are not procedurally barred.7  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) his defense counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.8  Although not insurmountable, there is a 
strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.9  
 
4 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 
5 Id. 
6 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 756-57 (Del. 2016). 
7 See Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (“[I]neffective-assistance claims are not 
subject to Rule 61(i)(3)’s bar because they cannot be asserted in the proceedings leading to the 
judgement of conviction under the Superior Court’s rules and this Court’s precedent.”). 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
9 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
 
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The same Strickland framework applies when evaluating a claim that appellate 
counsel provided ineffective assistance.10 
(11) Dunnell asserts two ineffective-assistance claims relating to the cell-
phone search warrants.  First, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the warrants on the basis that the affidavits presented in support 
of the applications for the search warrants did not establish a sufficient nexus 
between the cell phones and the alleged crimes.  The affidavit that trial counsel 
submitted to the Superior Court in response to Dunnell’s ineffective-assistance 
claims states that counsel sought to suppress the contents of the flip phone found in 
Dunnell’s Lexus on the basis that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant 
application did not establish probable cause and that, if the motion had been 
successful, the “King Kong” text message would have been excluded from evidence 
at trial.11  Trial counsel’s affidavit further stated that he did not challenge the search 
warrants for the other cell phones because in his professional opinion the affidavits 
in support of those warrants did support a finding of probable cause.12   
(12) The Superior Court determined that counsel’s performance with respect 
to this issue was not objectively unreasonable,13 and we agree.  To the extent that 
 
10 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013). 
11 Appendix to Opening Brief, Exhibit B, at 17. 
12 Id. 
13 State v. Dunnell, 2021 WL 1716647, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2021). 
 
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Dunnell contends that trial counsel did not seek to exclude evidence from the flip 
phone, he is incorrect:  counsel filed a motion to suppress on the basis that the 
warrant to search that phone lacked probable cause and also filed a motion in limine 
that sought to exclude the text messages from that phone.  To the extent that Dunnell 
challenges trial counsel’s decision not to challenge the warrants for the other phones, 
we cannot conclude that counsel’s decision was objectively unreasonable.  The 
affidavits submitted in support of the warrants stated that Dunnell used Kyle’s 
assistance to facilitate drug transactions from 24 Gull Turn; that the affiant had used 
a confidential informant to conduct controlled purchases of heroin from that 
property; that the phones were located in Dunnell’s and Kyle’s bedrooms at 24 Gull 
Turn during the execution of a search warrant at that property; that a substantial 
amount of heroin, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm and ammunition were also found 
in the property; and that, based on the affiant’s training and experience, persons 
involved in selling drugs use their cell phones in various ways relating to drug 
sales.14  Counsel’s conclusion that there was no reasonable basis to raise a probable-
cause argument was not objectively unreasonable.15 
 
14 Appendix to Opening Brief, Exhibit A. 
15 See Hudson v. State, 2020 WL 362784, at *4 (Del. Jan. 21, 2020) (affirming denial of 
postconviction relief because counsel’s determination that applications in support of warrants to 
search electronic devices did not lack probable cause was not professionally unreasonable).  Cf. 
also Anderson v. State, 249 A.3d 785, 798 (Del. 2021) (affirming Superior Court’s denial of 
motion to suppress contents of seven cell phones where the affidavit of probable cause established 
the defendant’s participation in a drug-dealing enterprise and explained the routine use of multiple 
cell phones in drug-dealing enterprises). 
 
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(13) Second, Dunnell asserts that the warrants to search the cell phones were 
overbroad because they allowed a “top to bottom” search of the phones and did not 
limit the information to be searched to any relevant timeframe.  Relying on Taylor 
v. State,16 he contends that his counsel should have sought to suppress evidence 
obtained from the phones on those grounds.  Although Dunnell does not specifically 
identify the text messages at issue, it appears that the relevant text messages include 
(i) the March 12, 2016, “King Kong” message located on the flip phone that was 
found in Dunnell’s Lexus and (ii) a series of incoming and outgoing text messages 
that were sent during the first two weeks of April 2016, which were extracted from 
the Samsung phone that was found in Dunnell’s bedroom and which suggested drug-
dealing activity.  The investigation that led to Dunnell’s arrest was conducted in 
March and April 2016 and involved controlled buys following an informant’s 
contacts with Dunnell by phone.  Although the warrants did not include a temporal 
limitation, the text messages that were submitted into evidence were “generally 
within the time period” and scope of the criminal activity at issue.17   
(14) In Taylor, this Court held that a warrant similar to the warrants at issue 
here was an unconstitutional general warrant and reversed the defendant’s 
conviction on direct appeal.18  In contrast, this Court has rejected a claim that counsel 
 
16 260 A.3d 602 (Del. 2021). 
17 Hudson, 2020 WL 362784, at *4. 
18 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 615-17. 
 
9 
was ineffective for failing to challenge the breadth of a warrant under circumstances 
similar to those present here.19  Thus, in the circumstances of this case, which was 
tried before Taylor was decided and in which counsel sought to exclude the text 
messages on at least two other grounds, we conclude that counsel’s representation 
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.20 
(15) Dunnell also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to seek a limiting instruction when text messages, including the “King Kong” text 
message and various text messages suggesting that Dunnell was dealing drugs, were 
introduced into evidence.  The Superior Court held that trial counsel did not act 
unreasonably by not seeking a limiting instruction because, when deciding trial 
counsel’s motion in limine, the court had concluded that the text messages were not 
hearsay and were not unfairly prejudicial; thus, because the text messages were not 
admitted for a limited purpose, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance 
 
19 See Hudson, 2020 WL 362784, at *4 (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
argue that warrant to search contents of computers, video camera, and digital camera was 
overbroad, because the date of inculpatory videos was generally within the time period of the 
alleged criminal activity and a search for video files was within the scope of the alleged criminal 
activity). 
20 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (“[A] court deciding an actual 
ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts 
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. . . .  The court must then 
determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”). 
 
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by not seeking a limiting instruction.21  We find no error in the Superior Court’s 
ruling. 
(16) Finally, Dunnell contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress on the grounds that the warrant 
to search the Lexus was not supported by probable cause.  More specifically, he 
argues that the warrant application relied on uncorroborated information provided 
by a confidential informant with unproven reliability.  Appellate counsel asserted 
several arguments on Dunnell’s behalf in the direct appeal.22  In her affidavit 
submitted in response to Dunnell’s motion for postconviction relief, appellate 
counsel stated that she chose not to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress 
because she believed it was more prudent to challenge the court’s denial of Dunnell’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal, and an appeal of the motion to suppress would 
involve a fact-intensive inquiry that would bring into the record damaging facts 
linking Dunnell to the drugs, thereby weakening the argument that the Superior 
Court erroneously denied Dunnell’s motion for judgment of acquittal.23   
(17) The Superior Court held that appellate counsel’s representation was not 
professionally unreasonable because she was entitled to exercise her professional 
 
21 Dunnell, 2021 WL 1716647, at *10. 
22 See Dunnell, 2021 WL 1716647, at *3 (summarizing arguments).  See also Dunnell v. State, 
564, 2017, Docket Nos. 22, 31 (opening and reply briefs on direct appeal). 
23 Dunnell, 2021 WL 1716647, at *13. 
 
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judgment in selecting and presenting the issues with the best chance of success on 
appeal.24  We agree with the Superior Court that appellate counsel’s representation 
was not objectively unreasonable.25  Moreover, Dunnell has not established that an 
appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress was more likely to succeed than the 
issues that appellate counsel did raise.  The application in support of the warrant to 
search the Lexus did not rely solely on an uncorroborated tip from a confidential 
informant with unproven reliability.  To the contrary, the affidavit stated that the 
confidential informant had provided information that Dunnell was selling drugs from 
his vehicle; described additional investigation that the police conducted; and 
explained that NCCPD had executed a search warrant at 24 Gull Turn and had found 
a large quantity of heroin, a firearm, drug paraphernalia, and other contraband, and 
that Dunnell was located in the residence when the warrant was executed.26  In short, 
the police had developed evidence that corroborated the informant’s tip.27 
 
24 Id. 
25 See Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768, 775 (Del. 2016) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel where counsel used his professional judgment and strategic reasoning in 
selecting issues most likely to succeed on appeal). 
26 Appendix to Opening Brief, Exhibit G.  Although facts relating to the controlled buys were 
included in the applications for the warrants to search the contents of the cell phones, those facts 
do not appear to have been included in the application for the warrant to search the Lexus. 
27 See Loper v. State, 2020 WL 2843516, at *2 (Del. June 1, 2020) (determining that informants’ 
tips were corroborated by police surveillance); State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110, 1115 (Del. 2013) 
(concluding that informants’ tips that defendant was selling drugs were corroborated when officers 
stopped a man who was leaving the defendant’s house and discovered that he was in possession 
of oxycodone without a prescription).  See also McKinney v. State, 107 A.3d 1045, 1048-49 (Del. 
2014) (discussing circumstances in which officers must corroborate informant’s knowledge of the 
accused’s identity and involvement in criminal activity). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice