Title: Richard Theis v. Midwest Security Insurance Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP002552
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2000

2000 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2552 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Richard Theis,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Midwest Security Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 22, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 1, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
Gary Langhoff 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs, 
(in the court of appeals), by James W. Mohr, Jr. and Mohr & 
Anderson, S.C., Hartford, and oral argument by James W. Mohr, Jr. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief, 
(in the court of appeals), by James O. Conway and Olsen, Kloet, 
Gunderson & Conway, Sheboygan, and oral argument by James O. 
Conway. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
No. 98-2552 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard Theis,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Midwest Security Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, Gary Langhoff, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This case comes before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 
(1997-98).1 
 Midwest Security 
Insurance Company appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Sheboygan County, Hon. Gary Langhoff, Circuit Court Judge.  The 
judgment entered in favor of Richard Theis, the plaintiff, 
declared 
that 
the 
uninsured 
motorist 
provision 
of 
the 
plaintiff’s motor vehicle insurance policy with Midwest Security 
Insurance Company covered an injury to his person and property. 
¶2 
Two issues are presented.  The first issue is whether 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires Midwest Security Insurance 
Company to provide uninsured motorist coverage when a detached 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 text unless otherwise noted.  
FILED 
 
FEB 22, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
2 
piece of an unidentified motor vehicle is propelled into the 
insured’s motor vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle.  The 
piece either came from the unidentified motor vehicle that 
propelled it into the insured’s motor vehicle or was highway 
debris 
from 
another 
unidentified 
motor 
vehicle 
that 
was 
propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle by an unidentified 
motor vehicle.  We hold that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires 
that the uninsured motorist clauses of an insurance policy 
provide coverage under these circumstances.  
¶3 
The second issue is whether Midwest Security Insurance 
Company should be granted summary judgment in this declaratory 
judgment action because the plaintiff failed to present evidence 
of negligence by the driver of the unidentified motor vehicle.  
We hold that under the terms of the insurance policy, this 
evidence need not be presented in the declaratory judgment 
action. 
 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts of the case are not in dispute.  In 
March 1997, the plaintiff was driving a semi-tractor in the 
center lane of a three-lane highway in moderate traffic.  
Another semi-tractor, which has not been identified, passed the 
plaintiff’s motor vehicle on the right.  When the back of this 
passing semi-tractor was roughly 30 feet in front of the 
plaintiff’s motor vehicle, the plaintiff saw a black object 
flying at his motor vehicle.  The object crashed through the 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
3 
windshield of the plaintiff’s motor vehicle and injured the 
plaintiff.  
¶5 
The object either came off the passing semi-tractor or 
came off yet another unidentified motor vehicle and was 
propelled into the plaintiff’s vehicle by the passing semi-
tractor.  The object was identified by the circuit court as a 
leaf spring, which is a part of a semi-tractor. 
¶6 
The plaintiff sought coverage under his insurance 
policy with Midwest Security Insurance Company.  The plaintiff’s 
policy included the uninsured motorist provision set forth in 
the margin.2  Midwest Security Insurance Company denied coverage, 
                     
2 The pertinent part of the policy reads as follows: 
 
PART C – UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
 
Insuring Agreement 
A. We will pay compensatory damages which an “insured” 
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an “uninsured motor vehicle” because of 
a “bodily injury”: 
1. Sustained by an “insured”; and  
2. Caused by an accident. . . .  
C. “Uninsured motor vehicle” means a land motor 
vehicle or trailer of any type: . . .  
3. Which is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or 
owner cannot be identified and which hits: 
a. You or any “family member” 
b. A vehicle which you or any “family member” 
are “occupying”; or 
c. “Your covered auto”. 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
4 
asserting that the incident did not come within the policy’s 
uninsured motorist provision.   
¶7 
Plaintiff commenced this litigation in February 1998, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the accident was covered by 
the uninsured motorist provision of his insurance policy so that 
the plaintiff could proceed with arbitration.  Midwest Security 
Insurance Company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
plaintiff’s action should be dismissed for two reasons.  First, 
Midwest Security Insurance Company argued that the injury did 
not come within the uninsured motorist provision of the 
insurance policy.  Second, Midwest Security Insurance Company 
asserted that the plaintiff did not present evidence of the 
unidentified motorist’s negligence and therefore was not legally 
entitled to recover damages.  The circuit court concluded that 
there is coverage under the insurance policy and that the 
plaintiff is entitled to proceed with arbitration consistent 
with the terms of that policy.  Midwest Security Insurance 
Company appealed.  The court of appeals certified the case to 
this court.  
 
II 
¶8 
In a declaratory judgment action, the granting or 
denying of relief is a matter within the discretion of the 
circuit court.  Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 222 
Wis. 2d 627, 635-36, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998).  This court reviews 
                                                                  
Def. Brief-Appendix at 107. 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
5 
such 
decisions 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Id.  If the circuit court 
proceeds on an erroneous interpretation of the law, the exercise 
of discretion is erroneous.  Id. 
¶9 
In 
this 
case 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4) is at issue.  Interpretation of a statute is 
ordinarily a question of law, which this court determines 
independently, while benefiting from the analyses of the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Hull, 222 Wis. 2d at 636. 
 
III 
¶10 The first issue is whether Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) 
requires Midwest Security Insurance Company to provide uninsured 
motorist coverage when a detached piece of an unidentified motor 
vehicle is propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle by an 
unidentified motor vehicle.  The piece may have come from the 
unidentified motor vehicle that propelled it into the insured’s 
motor vehicle or was highway debris from another unidentified 
motor vehicle that was propelled into the insured’s motor 
vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle.  If the statute 
requires coverage, we need not examine the insurance policy. See 
Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 72, 339 
N.W.2d 588 (1983). 
¶11 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires that the 
uninsured motorist clauses of an insurance policy provide 
coverage when a detached piece of an unidentified motor vehicle 
is propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle by an unidentified 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
6 
motor vehicle.  The piece either came from the unidentified 
motor vehicle that propelled it into the insured’s motor vehicle 
or was highway debris from another unidentified motor vehicle 
that was propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle by an 
unidentified motor vehicle. 
¶12 We reach this result by examining the language of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4), 
case 
law 
and 
the 
purposes 
underlying 
§ 632.32(4). 
¶13 Section 632.32(4) requires insurance companies to 
provide uninsured motorist coverage, and the Midwest Security 
Insurance Company policy must meet the statutory requirements.  
Coverage omitted from an insurance policy may be compelled and 
enforced as part of that policy when the inclusion of such 
coverage is required by a statute.  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 72.  
Thus if the statute requires Midwest Security Insurance Company 
to provide coverage in this case we need not examine the policy 
language.  Accordingly, we focus our attention initially on the 
statute, which provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
(4) Required uninsured motorist and medical payments 
coverages.  Every policy of insurance subject to this 
section that insures with respect to any motor vehicle 
registered 
or 
principally 
garaged 
in 
this 
state 
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law 
for bodily injury or death suffered by any person 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a 
motor vehicle shall contain therein or supplemental 
thereto provisions approved by the commissioner:  
 
Uninsured motorist. 1. For the protection of persons 
injured who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
7 
because of bodily injury . . . in limits of at least 
$25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident.  
 
2. In this paragraph “uninsured motor vehicle” also 
includes: . . .  
 
b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-
and-run accident. 
 
¶14 Three elements must be met before uninsured motorist 
coverage is mandated by the statute.  First, the statute 
requires an unidentified motor vehicle.  In this case the 
unidentified semi-tractor 
that 
passed 
the 
insured’s 
motor 
vehicle and propelled the leaf spring into the insured’s motor 
vehicle is an unidentified motor vehicle.  This element of the 
statute is satisfied.  
¶15 Second, the statute requires that an unidentified 
motor vehicle hit the motor vehicle involved in the accident.  
Here a piece of an unidentified motor vehicle was propelled into 
the insured’s motor vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle.  
We must determine whether a piece detached from an unidentified 
motor vehicle that is propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle 
by an unidentified motor vehicle satisfies this requirement of a 
“hit.” 
¶16 Third, the statute requires that the unidentified 
motor vehicle must have run from the scene.  The unidentified 
semi-tractor that propelled the leaf spring into the insured’s 
motor vehicle in the present case did leave the scene of the 
accident, satisfying this requirement. 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
8 
¶17 Having established the first and third elements in the 
present case, we explore the second element, the requirement of 
a “hit.” 
¶18 The legislature has defined neither the word “hit” in 
the phrase “hit-and-run accident,” nor the phrase “hit-and-run 
accident” used in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  The Legislative 
Council Note adopted by the legislature explains that “[a] 
precise definition of hit-and-run is not necessary for in the 
rare case where a question arises, the court can draw the line.”3 
 The legislature apparently recognized that a vast variety of 
unpredictable scenarios can give rise to claims for uninsured 
motorist coverage. 
¶19 Our court and the court of appeals have “drawn a line” 
on uninsured motorist claims in several cases upon which Midwest 
Security Insurance Company relies.  We review those decisions to 
determine their application to the facts of this case.  
¶20 Relying on Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 115 
Wis. 2d 68, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983), Midwest Security Insurance 
Company asserts that this court has required physical contact 
between the insured’s motor vehicle and the unidentified motor 
                     
3 The Legislative Council Note in ch. 102, Laws of 1979 
states:  
"Sub (4) [of sec. 632.32] continues former sub (3) and 
former s. 632.34(5) with major editorial changes but 
without intending change of meaning except to add an 
unidentified 
hit-and-run 
vehicle 
as 
an 
uninsured 
vehicle.  A precise definition of hit-and-run is not 
necessary for in the rare case where a question 
arises, the court can draw the line." 
 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
9 
vehicle for uninsured motorist coverage to apply.  In Hayne the 
insured’s car swerved and subsequently turned over as the 
insured tried to avoid striking an unidentified oncoming motor 
vehicle.  115 Wis. 2d at 69.  This court held for the insurance 
company, 
emphasizing 
that 
“the 
clear 
statutory 
language . . . reflects a legislative intent that the statute 
apply only to accidents in which there have been physical 
contact.”  115 Wis. 2d at 74.   
¶21 The Hayne case does not govern this case.4  In Hayne no 
physical contact occurred between the insured’s motor vehicle 
and the unidentified motor vehicle.  In this case although there 
was no physical contact between two intact motor vehicles, there 
was physical contact between the insured’s motor vehicle and a 
piece detached from the unidentified motor vehicle. 
¶22 The other Wisconsin cases upon which Midwest Security 
Insurance Company relies for the physical contact requirement 
are also factually distinguishable from this case.  In Amidzich 
v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 
(1969), the first case setting forth the physical contact rule, 
an unidentified car forced the insured off the road; there was 
no physical contact between the cars.  
¶23 Amidzich 
involved 
interpretation 
of 
an 
insurance 
policy, not the uninsured motorist statute.  The insurance 
                     
4 The court in Hayne defined the issue before it as “whether 
the term ‘hit-and-run’ includes ‘miss-and-run’ or whether it 
requires an actual physical striking."  Hayne v. Progressive 
Northern Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 72.  
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
10
policy defined a hit-and-run motor vehicle as one “which causes 
bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of 
such automobile with the insured or with an automobile which the 
insured is occupying at the time of the accident.”  44 Wis. 2d 
at 50 (emphasis added).5  This court held that the plain meaning 
of the phrase “physical contact” requires an actual striking 
between the hit-and-run motor vehicle and the insured’s motor 
vehicle, at least in a situation where only two motor vehicles 
are involved.  44 Wis. 2d at 51.  Amidzich does not dictate our 
decision today because in that case there was no physical 
contact whatsoever between the insured and an unidentified motor 
vehicle or any piece thereof. 
¶24 Midwest Security Insurance Company also relies on 
Wegner v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Wis. 2d 118, 496 N.W.2d 
140 (Ct. App. 1992), which involved a three-car accident.  In 
Wegner, an unidentified car swerved into the path of a van; the 
van attempted to avoid the swerving car and veered into the path 
of the insured’s vehicle.  The insured then swerved, lost 
control of the vehicle and struck a railroad crossing tower.  
The court of appeals relied on Hayne to deny coverage.  The 
court of appeals held that the hit-and-run provision of the 
uninsured motorist statute requires that the unidentified motor 
                     
5 Our decision in that case was confined to interpreting the 
provisions of the insurance policy.  The uninsured motorist 
statute in existence at that time did not refer to hit-and-run 
accidents.  Amidzich, 44 Wis. 2d at 50-52 (referring to Wis. 
Stat. § 204.30 (5) (1965)). 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
11
vehicle and the insured’s motor vehicle have physical contact.  
See Wegner, 173 Wis. 2d at 127.6 
¶25 In Dehnel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 
Wis. 2d 14, 604 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1999), as an unidentified 
motor vehicle passed the insured’s car, a piece of ice hit the 
car’s windshield, breaking the windshield and injuring the 
insured.  The court of appeals rejected the insured’s uninsured 
motorist claim on the ground that there was no physical contact 
between 
the 
unidentified 
motor 
vehicle 
and 
the 
insured.  
Notably, the court stated, “the physical contact that occurred 
here was not between any part of the semi [tractor] and Dehnel’s 
vehicle . . . the ice was not even an integral part of the 
unidentified 
vehicle, 
such 
as 
a 
tire 
that 
had 
become 
unattached.”  Dehnel, 231 Wis. 2d at 22.  In the present case, 
unlike in Dehnel, a piece detached from an unidentified motor 
vehicle was propelled into the plaintiff’s motor vehicle by an 
unidentified motor vehicle. 
¶26 The factual distinction between these cases and the 
present case is significant.  Although the Wisconsin cases have 
interpreted the hit-and-run provision of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) 
                     
6 A more recent case, Smith v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 230 
Wis. 2d 411, 601 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1999) (petition for review 
pending), also involved a three-vehicle accident.  In Smith the 
unidentified motor vehicle struck a truck, forcing the truck 
into the insured’s lane.  The truck then struck the insured’s 
car.  The unidentified motor vehicle did not come into physical 
contact with the insured’s motor vehicle.  The court of appeals 
held there was no coverage because there was no physical 
contact.  Smith, 230 Wis. 2d at 417-18. 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
12
to require physical contact between an insured’s motor vehicle 
and an unidentified motor vehicle, they have not interpreted the 
statute to negate “physical contact” between the insured’s motor 
vehicle and a part of an unidentified motor vehicles.  
¶27 Neither the language of the statute, the existing case 
law nor the legislative history mandates a decision in this 
case.7  This court will therefore examine the legislative 
purposes in adopting the statute to discern legislative intent 
and will apply the statute in a way that fulfills the 
legislative purposes and intent.  The certification memorandum 
of the court of appeals accurately describes the two purposes 
behind the uninsured motorist statute and the purpose behind the 
“hit-and-run accident” language.  We shall examine each of these 
purposes.  
¶28 The primary purpose of the uninsured motorist statute 
is to compensate an injured person who is the victim of an 
uninsured motorist’s negligence to the same extent as if the 
uninsured motorist were insured.8  Had an identified insured 
driver negligently deposited this leaf spring on the road or 
negligently propelled the leaf spring into the plaintiff’s 
vehicle, the plaintiff would have recovered from the negligent 
                     
7 For a discussion of the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 632.32 and 
the legislative history, see the majority decision in Hayne, 115 
Wis. 2d at 76-85, and the dissent, 115 Wis. 2d at 88-95 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).   
8 See Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 591, 405 
N.W.2d 327 (1987).  See also, Wegner v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 
173 Wis. 2d 118, 126, 496 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Ct. App. 1992).   
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
13
driver’s insurance company.  This legislative purpose was not 
sufficient for the courts to allow an insured motorist to 
recover when an unidentified motor vehicle did not strike the 
insured motor vehicle, even though an identified insured motor 
vehicle may have been liable under the same circumstances.  
Nevertheless, this legislative purpose does point to allowing 
the plaintiff to recover in this case.  
¶29 A second purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is 
that the reasonable coverage expectations of an insured should 
be honored.9  The court of appeals concludes that because the 
insurance policy promises to pay compensatory damages for 
injuries an insured suffers “arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of” an uninsured motor vehicle, a reasonable 
insured would expect coverage when an unidentified motor vehicle 
propels a detached piece of an unidentified motor vehicle into 
the insured’s vehicle.  We agree with the court of appeals’ 
analysis. 
¶30 Finally, the purpose for interpreting a “hit-and–run 
accident” as requiring physical contact between the insured and 
the unidentified motor vehicle is to prevent a fraudulent claim 
about a phantom motor vehicle when the insured’s loss of control 
                     
9 Kempers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 119 
Wis. 2d 722, 734, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984); Handal v. American 
Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 2d 67, 78, 255 N.W.2d 903 
(1977) (citing Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law, sec. 6.3 
(a), at 351 (1971)); Patrick v. Head of the Lakes Coop. Elec. 
Ass’n, 98 Wis. 2d 66, 69, 259 N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 1980). 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
14
causes the accident.10  This public policy concern about fraud is 
inoperative when an unidentified motor vehicle propels a 
detached piece of an unidentified motor vehicle into the 
insured’s vehicle.  Midwest Security Insurance Company does not 
assert that the plaintiff is fabricating the account of what 
happened when his motor vehicle was struck by the leaf spring.  
Beyond this specific case, it seems unlikely that future 
claimants will be able to fraudulently assert that a piece from 
an unidentified motor vehicle was propelled into their vehicle 
by an unidentified motor vehicle.  The policy of preventing 
fraudulent claims is therefore not operative in the situation 
presented in this case. 
¶31 The three purposes underlying the uninsured motorist 
statute 
weigh 
in 
favor 
of 
our 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4) to include the plaintiff’s accident.  Furthermore, 
we cannot discern any countervailing legislative policies or 
purposes to dissuade us from adopting this interpretation of the 
statute.  We recognize that insureds and their insurers will 
                     
10 A number of courts and commentators have concluded that 
the physical contact requirement is designed to prevent drivers 
from claiming hit-and-run coverage after suffering accidents of 
their own making.  See, e.g., Berry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 556 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Mich. App. 1996); Halseth v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 
1978); State Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 507 So.2d 369, 
372 (Miss. 1987); Wegner v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Wis. 2d 
118, 127, 496 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Hayne, 115 
Wis. 2d at 94 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)); Alan I. Widiss, 
Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, § 9.2 at 565 (2d 
ed. 1999); Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 9 Couch on Insurance 
§ 123:55 (3d ed. 1997) and 1999 Supplement.  
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
15
incur a variety of unusual fact situations.  The legislature 
anticipated this problem and expected the courts to resolve the 
unusual fact situations on a case-by-case basis.  Judicial 
resolutions must be consistent with the language of the statute 
and the legislative purposes of mandated uninsured motorist 
coverage. 
¶32 Cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
differ 
in 
the 
application of uninsured motorist coverage to the fact situation 
presented in this case depending on their statutes and the 
particular insurance policy language involved, but our decision 
today is supported by existing case law.11  
 
IV 
¶33 The second issue Midwest Security Insurance Company 
raises is that the plaintiff’s declaratory action should be 
dismissed because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of 
the hit-and-run driver’s negligence.  Midwest Security Insurance 
Company relies on the policy language that states it will pay 
damages only to “an ‘insured’ legally entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ . . . .”  
                     
11 For a review of the case law on the physical contact rule 
and hit-and-run accidents, see A.S. Klein, Annotation, Uninsured 
Motorist Indorsement: Validity and Construction of Requirement 
That There be “Physical Contact” with Unidentified or Hit-and-
Run Vehicle, 25 A.L.R. 3d 1299 (1969) and 1999 Supplement; Lee 
R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 9 Couch on Insurance § 123:55-
§ 123:57 (3d ed. 1997) and 1999 Supplement; Alan I. Widiss, 
Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, Ch. 9 (2d ed. 
1999).  
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
16
Section 
632.32(4)(a) 
also 
states 
that 
uninsured 
motorist 
coverage must be available to “persons legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicles . . . .” 
¶34 A driver is generally not legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of other motor vehicles unless 
the latter have been negligent.  We agree with Midwest Security 
Insurance Company that the plaintiff cannot recover damages 
under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance policy 
unless he 
demonstrates all 
of the 
elements 
of a 
legal 
entitlement, including duty, negligence, causation, and damages. 
¶35 We agree with the plaintiff, however, that he need not 
produce evidence of negligence in this declaratory judgment 
action.  This action seeks a declaration of insurance policy 
coverage relating to a hit-and-run accident of the type 
plaintiff experienced.  The plaintiff asks only that his case be 
allowed to proceed to arbitration, at which time he will be 
required to produce evidence demonstrating a legal entitlement 
to damages.  
¶36 The insurance policy expressly covers the issue before 
us.  The policy provides that a dispute about coverage under the 
uninsured motorist provision may not be arbitrated.  But a 
dispute about whether the insured is legally entitled to recover 
damages from the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle may be 
arbitrated.12 
                     
12 The pertinent part of the “ARBITRATION” section of the 
policy provides as follows: 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
17
¶37 We agree with the plaintiff that the policy means that 
although disputes about coverage under the uninsured motorists 
provision are not to be arbitrated, all other elements of his 
claim may be arbitrated.  Midwest Security Insurance Company 
does not deny that this interpretation of the insurance policy 
is correct, and it does not state that it does not wish to abide 
by the arbitration terms of the insurance policy.  Rather it 
maintains that summary judgment is appropriate to determine 
whether there are any factual issues for arbitration.  No 
authority is cited for this proposition.  Midwest Security 
Insurance Company does not give any reason for deviating from 
the terms of the insurance policy and we are not persuaded by 
their position. 
¶38 The declaratory judgment of the circuit court merely 
states that there is coverage for this accident under the 
uninsured motorist provision of the insurance policy and that 
the plaintiff is entitled to proceed with arbitration according 
to the terms of the policy.  We agree with the judgment.  The 
plaintiff will be required to present his case for legal 
                                                                  
 
If we and an “insured” do not agree: 
Whether that “insured” is legally entitled to recover 
damages . . . from 
the 
owner 
or 
operator 
of 
an 
“uninsured motor vehicle”, then the matter may be 
arbitrated.  However, disputes concerning coverage 
under this Part [Uninsured Motorists] may not be 
arbitrated.  
 
Both parties must agree to arbitration. 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
18
entitlement to damages before the decision-maker in the case, 
whether that be an arbitrator or a court.  
¶39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment.  We hold that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires that the 
uninsured motorist clauses of an insurance policy provide 
coverage when a detached piece of an unidentified motor vehicle 
is propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle by an unidentified 
motor vehicle.  The piece either came from the unidentified 
motor vehicle that propelled it into the insured’s motor vehicle 
or was highway debris from another unidentified motor vehicle 
that was propelled into the insured’s motor vehicle by an 
unidentified motor vehicle.  Furthermore, we hold that under the 
terms of the insurance policy the plaintiff is not required to 
demonstrate negligence by the driver of the unidentified motor 
vehicle in this declaratory judgment action. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
98-2552 
 
 
1