Title: Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 21634 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12734
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2020

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SJC-12734 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 21634  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
May 15, 2020. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence 
of inferior courts. 
 
 
John Doe appeals from a judgment of a single justice of 
this court dismissing his complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, equitable relief, relief in the nature of 
mandamus, and extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, requesting that this court relieve Doe of the obligation to 
register with the Sex Offender Registry Board (board).  We 
affirm. 
 
"Our jurisprudence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, consistently 
reinforces the principle . . . that the extraordinary remedy of 
general superintendence is meant for situations where a litigant 
has no adequate alternative remedy."  McMenimen v. Passatempo, 
452 Mass. 178, 185 (2008) (gathering cases).  The same is true 
of requests for relief in the nature of mandamus, see Myrick v. 
Superior Court Dep't, 479 Mass. 1012, 1012 (2018), quoting Rines 
v. Justices of the Superior Court, 330 Mass. 368, 371 (1953), 
and requests for declaratory or injunctive relief, see Longval 
v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 437 Mass. 1018, 
1018–1019 (2002), citing Temple v. Marlborough Div. of the Dist. 
Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 132-133 (1985). 
 
Here, as noted by the single justice, Doe has an adequate 
alternative avenue to obtain the relief sought, that is, "a 
request to the [b]oard to be terminated, and to have an 
evidentiary hearing where he may be represented by counsel, 
2 
 
 
 
provided by public counsel if necessary.  An adverse finding by 
the [b]oard may be reviewed [in the Superior Court] pursuant to 
G. L. c. 30A." 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
John Doe, pro se. 
 
William H. Burke, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the defendant.