Title: Burrell v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 302, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JUSTIN BURRELL, 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
No. 302, 2018 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
   § 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
   § 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
Cr. ID No. K9805012046 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
   § 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: December 12, 2018 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 11, 2019 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Edward C. Gill, Esquire, Georgetown, Delaware for Appellant Justin Burrell. 
 
John R. Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for Appellee 
State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
2 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
Following a Superior Court jury trial, Appellant Justin Burrell—who was 
three months shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time the crimes were committed—
was convicted of first-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree robbery, second-
degree burglary, second-degree conspiracy, and four counts of possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”).  He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole for the first-degree-
murder charge plus 50 years’ imprisonment for the remaining charges.  In 2012, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama,1 which declared 
unconstitutional mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.  In response to this ruling, the Delaware General Assembly 
enacted legislation modifying the juvenile sentencing scheme.  Under the new 
statute, 11 Del. C. § 4209A, 
[a]ny person who is convicted of first degree murder for an offense that 
was committed before the person had reached the person’s eighteenth 
birthday shall be sentenced to [a] term of incarceration not less than 25 
years to be served at Level V up to a term of imprisonment for the 
remainder of the person’s natural life to be served at Level V without 
benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction.2 
 
At his resentencing, Burrell did not contest the applicability of § 4209A’s 25-
year minimum mandatory sentence to his first-degree-murder conviction, but argued 
                                         
1 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
2 11 Del. C. § 4209A. 
3 
that the court should not impose any additional statutory minimum mandatory 
incarceration for his five other convictions (first-degree robbery, second-degree 
burglary, and the three counts of PFDCF) on the grounds that such additional 
sentences would run afoul of Miller.  The Superior Court disagreed and resentenced 
Burrell to the minimum mandatory 25 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree-
murder charge plus an additional minimum mandatory 12 years’ incarceration for 
the other offenses.  In this appeal, Burrell broadens his challenge, arguing that the 
Superior Court erred when it imposed the 25-year minimum mandatory sentence for 
the first-degree-murder charge and the additional 12 years for the companion 
offenses.  Further, he claims that the sentencing statutes are unconstitutionally 
“overbroad.”  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.  
I 
William Davis was living in a mobile home located north of Dover with Dan 
and Dolly Fenwick and the Fenwicks’ nine-year-old son, Danny.  Davis, who sold 
marijuana while he lived with the Fenwicks, kept approximately $20,000 in cash in 
a safe under his bed.  In April 1998, Davis’ former roommate, William Scott, 
observed Davis remove $4,500 in cash from the safe to purchase a car.  
In May 1998, Scott developed a plan to steal Davis’ money.  He enlisted the 
help of Burrell, who was then seventeen years old, to carry out the robbery plan.  
Scott provided Burrell with a hand-drawn map of the intended robbery location.  On 
4 
May 18, 1998, the two went to the trailer park so that Scott could point out the 
Fenwick residence to Burrell.  The following morning, Scott gave Burrell a backpack 
and a handgun.  Burrell left Scott’s home and proceeded to the Fenwick residence. 
Burrell arrived at the Fenwick residence dressed in a wig, hat, sunglasses, and 
his sister’s makeup.  With the gun in his hand, Burrell knocked on the door and 
forced his way inside when Dolly answered.  Danny, who had stayed home sick from 
school that day, observed Burrell hit his mother with the gun and drag her into Davis’ 
bedroom.  Upon entering the room, Danny heard Burrell repeatedly ask “where is 
it?” and “I’ll shoot Danny, too.”  After a gunshot was fired, Burrell left the home.  
Danny went to a neighbor’s home and the police were called.  
At his trial, Burrell admitted to going to the Fenwick residence with a gun in 
his hand, forcing his way into their home, striking Dolly twice in the head with the 
gun, threatening to shoot her, and holding her hair in one hand while pointing the 
gun at her head.  He testified that the gun discharged accidentally and that he had no 
intention of killing Dolly.  When the gun went off, Dolly was crouched on the floor 
of Davis’ room and Burrell, holding her hair, was standing behind her.  The bullet 
was lodged in Dolly’s neck.  The wound was a close contact wound indicative of a 
gun being held tightly against her scalp. 
As mentioned, Burrell was found guilty of first-degree murder, manslaughter, 
first-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, second-degree conspiracy, and four 
5 
counts of PFDCF.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
probation or parole for the first-degree-murder charge, followed by an additional 50 
years’ imprisonment for the remaining charges.  All sentences were to run 
consecutively.  This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.3 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court, in Miller,4 held that mandatory life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for those under the age of 18 at the 
time of their crimes violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments.  In June 2018, the Superior Court resentenced Burrell in compliance 
with Miller.  In accordance with 11 Del. C. § 4209A, which was enacted in 2013 in 
response to Miller, the court sentenced Burrell to 25 years of Level V incarceration 
                                         
3 Burrell v. State, 766 A.2d 19 (Del. 2000).  In 2004, Burrell filed a motion for postconviction 
relief under Superior Court Rule 61.  Burrell asserted two grounds for relief: (i) that the State made 
improper remarks during the opening and closing statements that were prejudicial to him; and (ii) 
that the trial court’s jury instructions allowed the jury to reach impermissible inferences.  Finding 
that Burrell’s claims were previously raised and rejected by the court, the Superior Court 
concluded that he was not entitled to postconviction relief and denied his motion.  State v. Burrell, 
2004 WL 2829038 (Del. Super. Apr. 26, 2004).  He appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the 
denial of postconviction relief.  Burrell v. State, 2004 WL 2050317, 871 A.2d 1127 (Del. 2004) 
(Table).  Two years later, Burrell filed a second motion for postconviction relief alleging that his 
conviction for felony murder in the first degree should be vacated because the murder was not 
committed “in furtherance of” the commission of the underlying felony of robbery.  Burrell based 
his claims on this Court’s decisions in Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002), which had not 
been decided at the time of Burrell’s trial, and Chao v. State, 931 A.2d 1000 (Del. 2007).  In 
applying the Williams decision retroactively, the Superior Court found that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that the murder of Dolly Fenwick was committed in furtherance of 
the underlying robbery.  State v. Burrell, 2007 WL 3277292 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2007).  This 
Court affirmed the denial of Burrell’s second motion for postconviction relief on appeal.  Burrell 
v. State, 953 A.2d 957 (Del. 2008). 
4 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
6 
for the first-degree murder conviction.  The court also imposed the statutory 
minimum mandatory periods of incarceration for Burrell’s first-degree robbery (two 
years), second-degree burglary (one year), and three possession-of-a-firearm-
during-the-commission-of-a-felony (two years for each) convictions, bringing the 
aggregate sentence to 37 years.  This appeal followed. 
II 
We review questions of law and constitutional claims de novo.5   Ordinarily, 
we will not consider questions that have not been fairly presented to the trial court 
absent plain error.6  “[T]he doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which 
are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in 
their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which 
clearly shows manifest justice.”7 
III 
In reliance upon Miller, the cruel-and-unusual punishments provisions of the 
United States and Delaware Constitutions, and a handful of opinions from state 
courts in Iowa and Wisconsin, Burrell essentially asks us to hold that all Delaware 
statutes that call for minimum mandatory sentences are unconstitutional when 
                                         
5 Panuski v. State, 41 A.3d 416, 419 (Del. 2012). 
6 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Fisher v. State, 2003 WL 1443050, 829 A.2d 141 (Del. 2003) (Table). 
7 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 869 (1986). 
7 
applied to juveniles.8  This represents a significant departure from Burrell’s argument 
before the sentencing court, where he acknowledged that the court was required to 
impose a 25-year minimum sentence for the first-degree-murder conviction.9   
A 
Burrell contends that, under Miller, a judge should have full discretion to 
impose a sentence on juveniles without regard to minimum mandatory requirements.  
Burrell reads Miller for the sweeping proposition that, when sentencing juveniles—
even for the most serious offenses—judges “should have absolute discretion”10 and 
must disregard any minimum mandatory sentences as a matter of constitutional law.  
Burrell’s reliance on Miller is misplaced.  Miller did not denounce all 
minimum mandatory sentencing requirements for juveniles.  Miller instead—
without adopting a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles—declared that 
                                         
8 See Op. Br. 12 (“It is the defendant’s position that under Miller that in sentencing a juvenile, due 
to the unique nature of who is being sentenced, . . . the sentencing Judge should have full discretion 
without regard to minimum mandatory sentences as to the appropriate sentence.”); see also id. at 
19 (“[T]he defendant respectfully prays that this Court should hold that a sentencing scheme which 
requires minimum mandatory sentences for juvenile defendants should be held unconstitutional.”). 
9 See id. at 12 (“The defendant argued at the Superior Court that the 25 year sentence under 11 
Del. C. Sec. 4209(A) was required but that the remaining minimum mandatory time was not.  Upon 
further research it is the defendant’s position that under both the Delaware and United States 
Constitutions that no minimum mandatory sentence is required in the sentencing of a juvenile 
offender.”).  As noted, absent plain error, we typically do not consider questions that have not been 
fairly presented to the trial court.  But given the nature of Burrell’s argument—that the Superior 
Court imposed a constitutionally prohibited sentence—we will assume for the purposes of this 
opinion that, were that true, the error would be plain. 
10 Id. at 15. 
8 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.”11 
To be sure, the Miller majority, pointing to the Court’s earlier opinions in 
Roper v. Simmons12 and Graham v. Florida,13 recognized that “children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.  Because juveniles 
have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . , ‘they are less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.’”14  Therefore, a sentencing scheme that 
metes out one of the law’s harshest punishments—life without probation or parole—
to a juvenile without regard for their youth “poses too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment”15 and violates the Eighth Amendment.  But Burrell ignores the fact that 
the General Assembly responded to the concerns expressed in Miller by enacting 11 
Del. C. § 4209A, a statute that explicitly treats juveniles more leniently than their 
adult counterparts. 
In contrast to the mandatory life sentences applicable to adults convicted of 
first-degree murder, § 4209A sets a sentencing range for juveniles who are convicted 
of first-degree murder of 25 years’ imprisonment up to life imprisonment without 
                                         
11 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). 
12 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
13 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
14 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper, 560 U.S. at 69). 
15 Id. at 479. 
9 
benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction.  What is more, in the wake of 
Miller, the General Assembly also amended 11 Del. C. § 4204A to provide that 
any offender sentenced to a term of incarceration for Murder First 
Degree when said offense was committed prior to the offender’s 
eighteenth birthday shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court for 
sentence modification after the offender has served 30 years of the 
originally imposed Level V [imprisonment] sentence.16 
 
Notably, the State has conceded that, although Burrell received a 25-year 
sentence for his first-degree-murder conviction, he is nevertheless eligible to apply 
for a sentence modification after he has served 30 years of his total 37-year 
sentence.17 
Apparently recognizing that Miller’s holding does not support his position, 
Burrell also argues that, if we only read Miller together with our holding in Sanders 
v. State,18 we would see that juvenile minimum mandatory sentences are 
constitutionally forbidden.19  But Sanders says nothing of the sort.  It (or at least the 
                                         
16 11 Del. C. § 4204(A)(d)(2). 
17 In defending the Superior Court’s 37-year sentence in this case, the State noted in its answering 
brief that, at sentencing, “[t]he prosecutor pointed out that ‘the defendant does have the opportunity 
under 4204A to apply for a modification after he serves a 30-year term to have it reduced, but I 
think that the Court would have to impose sentence today with all the minimums . . . .’  This 
interpretation of the relationship between 11 Del. C. § 4209A and 11 Del. C. § 4204A(d)(2) is 
consistent with an earlier Superior Court ruling in State v. Evans, 2013 WL 7046372, at *2 (Del. 
Super. Nov. 25, 2013).”  State’s Ans. Br. 8. 
18 585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1994). 
19 Op. Br. 15 (“[L]ooking at the two part test set forth in Sanders, . . . it is respectfully suggested 
that taking that together with the Miller decision[,] . . . in the sentencing of a juvenile defendant 
Trial Judges should have absolute discretion.”). 
10 
portion cited by Burrell) stands for the unremarkable proposition that the Delaware 
Constitution, no less than the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
“demands that a death sentence be proportionate to a defendant’s culpability and that 
it accomplish some legitimate penological end.”20  Put simply, Burrell’s claim that 
Miller, when read together with Sanders, invalidates 11 Del. C. § 4209A and other 
minimum mandatory sentencing statutes when applied to juveniles, is without merit. 
B 
Although Burrell’s constitutional arguments bleed into each other, he seems 
to argue, independently from his Miller argument, that his 37-year sentence violates 
the prohibition in Article I, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution against the 
imposition of “cruel punishments.”   
But Burrell has not properly presented a state constitutional claim.  For 
starters, he did not raise this claim in the Superior Court.  Moreover, we have 
repeatedly warned that “conclusory assertions that the Delaware Constitution has 
been violated will be considered to be waived on appeal.”21 Justice Holland 
summarized the manner in which a state constitutional claim should be presented in 
terms that are directly applicable to this case: 
                                         
20 Sanders, 585 A.2d. at 147 (concluding that the imposition of the death penalty following a guilty 
but mentally ill verdict is not disproportionate under the Delaware constitution). 
21 Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630, 637 (Del. 2008) (quoting Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 n.4 
(Del. 2005)); see also Wallace, 956 A.2d at 637 n. 15. 
11 
A proper presentation of an alleged violation of the Delaware 
Constitution should include a discussion and analysis of one or more of 
the following non-exclusive criteria:  textual language, legislative 
history, preexisting state law, structural differences, matters of 
particular state interest or local concern, state traditions, and public 
attitudes.  Simply reciting that his sentence . . . violates Article I, 
section 11, without more, is a conclusory statement.22 
 
Burrell’s assertions before this Court that his sentence and the statutes under which 
he was sentenced violate the Delaware Constitution satisfy none of the above criteria 
and are conclusory statements. 
Because Burrell did not properly present his state constitutional claim to the 
Superior Court or to us on appeal, he has waived his argument that his sentence 
violated Article I, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution. 
C 
Burrell cites opinions from the Supreme Courts of Iowa and Wyoming in 
support of his request that we strike down juvenile minimum mandatory sentences.  
In State v. Null,23 the Iowa Supreme Court held that a 52½-year minimum prison 
term for a juvenile based on the aggregation of minimum mandatory sentences for 
second-degree murder and first-degree robbery triggers Miller protections—
“namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the issue of parole 
eligibility.”24  Central to the Court’s decision was its view that the 52½-year sentence 
                                         
22 Id. at 637 (quotations and footnotes omitted). 
23 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013). 
24 Id. at 71. 
12 
was the functional equivalent of a life-without parole sentence.  But Burrell cannot 
and does not say the same about his 37-year sentence, especially in light of his ability 
to seek a sentence modification under § 4204A after serving 30 years.25 
After Null, the Iowa Supreme Court went even further and, in State v. Lyle,26 
concluded that all minimum mandatory sentences of imprisonment for juvenile 
offenders are unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual clause in the Iowa 
Constitution.  Although the majority opinion in Lyle—three of the court’s seven 
justices dissented—observed that “Miller is properly read to support a new 
sentencing framework that reconsiders mandatory sentencing for all children,”27 it 
stops short of tethering its conclusion to Miller and the Eighth Amendment.   
Likewise, the facts in Bear Cloud v. State28 are also distinguishable from this 
case.  Like in Null, the Wyoming Supreme Court viewed a 45-year sentence without 
the possibility of parole to be “the functional equivalent of life without parole.”29  
Again, Burrell makes no such claim of functional equivalency here. 
Moreover, there is ample—and, we think—more persuasive authority from 
other states that rejects the approach taken by the Iowa and Wyoming courts.30  For 
                                         
25 See State’s Ans. Br. 8. 
26 854 N.W. 2d 378 (Iowa 2014).   
27 Id. at 402. 
28 334 P.3d 132 (Wy. 2014). 
29 Id. at 142. 
30 Op. Br. 16 (citing cases from Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota). 
13 
instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota made short work of a juvenile offender’s 
argument that his mandatory life sentence with the possibility of release after 30 
years violated the United States Constitution under the reasoning of Miller: 
Miller did not hold that a juvenile homicide offender could not be 
sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of release.  Instead, 
Miller held more narrowly that “a judge or jury must have the 
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances” before imposing a 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release on a juvenile.  
Appellant’s life sentence with the possibility of release after 30 years is 
not tantamount to a death sentence.  Because appellant is eligible for 
release after 30 years, his mandatory life sentence for first-degree 
murder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment and the principles of Miller.31 
 
In a similar manner, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a 30-
year minimum mandatory sentence imposed on a juvenile who was convicted of 
premeditated first-degree murder while armed.32  The court concluded that because 
the D.C. Code sentencing statute (like 11 Del. C. § 4209A) already took into account 
the juvenile offender’s youth, the appellant’s sentence did not violate the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  And appellate courts have 
                                         
31 State v. Vang, 847 N.W. 2d 248, 262-63 (Minn. 2014) (citations omitted). 
32 James v. United States, 59 A.3d 1233, 1238 (D.C. App. 2013). 
14 
reached similar conclusions in Wisconsin,33 Illinois,34 Connecticut,35 Florida,36 and 
our nearby sister state, Pennsylvania.37 
In sum, we are satisfied that the General Assembly’s response to Miller, as 
evidenced by the current version of 11 Del. C. § 4209A, which does not mandate a 
life sentence and takes into account the youth of juvenile offenders who are 
convicted of first-degree murder, as qualified by § 4204A’s sentence modification 
provision, adequately addressed the constitutional concerns identified in Miller.   
 
                                         
33 State v. Barbeau, 883 N.W. 2d 736 (Wisc. 2016) (rejecting claims, based on Miller and Lyle, that 
statutory scheme with a range of penalties for intentional homicide from a minimum mandatory 
sentence of 20 years to life imprisonment violated United States and Wisconsin Constitutions’ 
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment). 
34 People v. Banks, 36 N.E. 3d 432 (Ill. App. 2015) (upholding defendant’s minimum mandatory 
sentence of 45 years for first-degree murder with a mandatory firearm enhancement against cruel-
and-unusual punishment claim under Roper, Graham, and Miller). But cf. People v. Reyes, 63 N.E. 
3d 884, 888 (Ill. 2016) (holding “that sentencing a juvenile offender to a mandatory term of years 
that is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment,” and finding, particularly, that a 
legislatively mandated sentence of 97 years with the earliest opportunity for release after 89 years, 
when the defendant would be 105 years old, was the functional equivalent of life without parole). 
35 State v. Taylor G., 110 A.3d 338 (Conn. 2015) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the ten- and five-
year minimum mandatory sentences for first-degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child, 
respectively, violate the Eighth Amendment right to an individualized, proportionate sentence); 
see also State v. Rivera, 172 A.3d 260, 267 (Conn. App. 2017) (“[U]nder Miller, a sentencing 
court’s obligation to consider youth related mitigating factors is limited to cases in which the court 
imposes a sentence of life, or its equivalent, without parole.”) (quoting State v. Delgado, 151 A.3d 
345 (Conn. 2016)). 
36 State v. Michel, 257 So.3d 3 (Fla. 2018) (affirming sentence of life imprisonment with possibility 
of parole after 25 years against challenge under Graham and Miller). 
37 Com. v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that a statute imposing a minimum 
mandatory sentence of 35 years on a juvenile defendant convicted of murder did not violate Eighth 
Amendment as interpreted in Miller). 
15 
IV 
Finally, Burrell asserts that the Superior Court’s interpretation of the 
resentencing requirements was overbroad in violation of the Delaware and United 
States Constitution.38  We think Burrell misapplies the legal term “overbreadth,”39 
but we understand his challenge to mean this: (1) a hypothetical term-of-years 
sentence could constitute an effective life sentence in a case where a defendant was 
subject to multiple minimum mandatory sentences (e.g., numerous 25-year 
minimum mandatory terms following a mass shooting) that must be served 
consecutively, (2) because an effective life sentence is constitutionally infirm, the 
minimum mandatory and mandatory consecutive service provisions that would have 
led to such a sentence are unconstitutional, and (3) because Burrell’s sentence 
involves minimum mandatory sentences and mandatory consecutive service,40 his 
sentence is accordingly unconstitutional. 
                                         
38 Op. Br. 16–17 (“If the defendant’s suggested approach is not accepted by this Court the 
defendant respectfully submits that the way that the Trial Court interpreted its requirements at 
resentencing was overbroad in violation of the Delaware and United States Constitution.  If a 
statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct it is overbroad.  State v. 
Baker, 720 A.2d 1139 (Del. 1998).”). 
39 Where a statute is challenged on the basis of overbreadth, “a court’s first task is to determine 
whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.  If it 
does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.”  State v. Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1144 (Del. 
1998). “A statute is facially overbroad when it ‘does not aim specifically at evils within the 
allowable area of government control, but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that 
constitute an exercise of protected expressive or associational rights.”  Id. at 1145 (citations 
omitted).  No protected expressive or associational rights are implicated by Burrell’s sentencing. 
40 See 39 Del. C. § 3901 (mandatory consecutive service for certain violent crimes). 
16 
We reject Burrell’s argument for three reasons. 
First, Burrell cites no authority—nor are we aware of any—that a sentencing 
scheme that mandates sentences for criminal offenses to run consecutively with other 
sentences41 is constitutionally overbroad, at least in the sense that Burrell means. 
Second, the logical end of Burrell’s argument is that any minimum mandatory 
sentence for juveniles is constitutionally infirm, at least where the sentences must 
run consecutively.  Following Burrell’s logic, any statute requiring even a relatively 
short minimum mandatory sentence would be constitutionally invalid since such a 
minimum—compounded across sufficient charges—could add up to an effective life 
sentence, at least in theory.  But Miller does not point to such a result.  As mentioned, 
Miller does not mean that a court may never sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment 
or even life without parole.42  Rather, Miller simply stands for the proposition that, 
in the case of a single offense, a mandatory life-without-parole sentence “poses too 
great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”43  Now, it may be that the “evolving 
                                         
41 Relevant to Burrell’s sentence, 11 Del. C. §3901, while it does not prohibit all concurrent 
sentencing, mandates that “no sentence of confinement of any criminal defendant by any court of 
this State shall be made to run concurrently with any other sentence of confinement for any 
conviction . . . Manslaughter . . . [,] Murder in the first degree . . . [,] Burglary in the second degree 
. . . [, and] Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.” 
42 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); see also Kinkel v. Persson, 417 P.3d 401, 
417 (Or. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Kinkel v. Laney, 2019 WL 113226 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019); State 
v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 258 (Minn. 2014). 
43 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; id. at 483 (“youth matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most 
serious punishment”) (emphasis added). 
17 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”44 will compel the 
United States Supreme Court to rule someday that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
any minimum mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders, but Miller did not mark 
that day.  
 
Finally, even if mandatory terms-of-years imprisonments summing to an 
effective life sentence without parole were constitutionally impermissible, the 
remedy is not necessarily that the sentences must be shorter, but may be that the 
defendant must have an opportunity for parole or similar sentence abridgment within 
a constitutionally permissible time frame.  Of course, as mentioned, the State has 
conceded that Burrell has just such an opportunity here for sentence modification 
after 30 years, a term that no court has ever held to be a de facto life sentence for a 
juvenile.  Accordingly, Burrell is entitled to no additional relief under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
V 
Because we are satisfied that the sentencing scheme for offenders who are 
convicted of first-degree murder when the offense was committed before the 
offender’s eighteenth birthday passes constitutional muster under Miller, which did 
not invalidate minimum mandatory sentences for lesser offenses, and is not 
                                         
44 Miller, 567 U.S. at 469–70 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
18 
overbroad in the constitutional sense, we AFFIRM the Superior Court’s sentencing 
order.