Title: Shelby Insurance Co. v. Kozak
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971275
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 1998

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 971275 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
 
 
 
 
 February 27, 1998 
EDWARD A. KOZAK, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff in a 
second jury trial, the principal issue is whether the trial 
court erred in limiting that trial to the issue of damages. 
 
Edward A. Kozak (the plaintiff) filed a motion for judgment 
against Eyad Bn-Khalifa (the defendant) claiming $1.5 million in 
damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile 
collision.  The plaintiff served the motion upon both the 
defendant and Shelby Insurance Company (Shelby), which provided 
uninsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff’s employer, Daniel 
& Osborne Irrigation. 
 
The accident occurred in Richmond near the middle of the 
intersection of Augusta Avenue and Kent Road.  The speed limit 
on each road is 25 m.p.h.  Traffic running east and west on 
Augusta is controlled by stop signs erected at the intersection.  
The defendant was driving a passenger car east on Augusta 
approaching Kent.  The plaintiff was operating his employer’s 
pickup truck north on Kent approaching Augusta. 
 
The investigating officer testified that the damage to the 
pickup was “to the full front of it”; that the damage to the car 
was “[t]o the right side, the right side, all to the right 
side”; and that the defendant’s east-bound car had come to rest 
on the curb at the corner opposite the point of collision, 
facing in a westerly direction.  The officer said that the 
defendant estimated his speed approaching the intersection at 25 
m.p.h. and that he said he “never saw the sign.”  In answer to 
the officer’s inquiry, the plaintiff said that he had approached 
the intersection at 20 m.p.h. 
 
The plaintiff testified at trial that his speed was 
“twenty-five miles per hour tops”; that, when he was “2 car 
lengths” from the intersection, he saw the defendant’s car 
“[m]aybe 6 car lengths back”; and that he had “seen the stop 
sign” on Augusta but did “not know for sure” whether the 
defendant had stopped before he entered the intersection.  Asked 
by his counsel if he had testified earlier that he had been “hit 
right in front of the driver’s door on your truck”, the 
plaintiff said that “the impact was on the left front of my car.  
I don’t say it was in my door.  If I did, that was a mistake.” 
 
The plaintiff then described the injuries he had sustained 
in the collision, the medical treatment he had received, the 
suffering he had endured, the medical expenses he had incurred, 
and the wages he had lost during his convalescence.  He had 
 
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received $75,925.93 in medical bills, and he claimed $42,240 in 
lost wages. 
 
The defendant testified that he was travelling at a speed 
of 25 m.p.h. approaching the intersection.  Asked to explain his 
“version of the story of this accident”, the defendant said: 
 
Okay.  Before I get to that intersection there is a 
lot of cars parked on my right.  So I stop at the stop 
sign.  I looked to the left, then to the right, then to the 
left again.  Both was clear for me, then I moved to the 
middle of the street.  Before I get to the middle, . . . my 
friend was shouting my name and the accident happened. 
 
 
 
Aiman Al-Ammir, a passenger in the front seat of the 
defendant’s car, testified that the defendant “stopped at the 
stop sign”; that both the defendant and he “looked both ways”; 
and that he “didn’t see any cars.”  He said that, when they had 
“almost passed the middle of the intersection”, he saw the 
pickup “coming fast”; that he “yelled” out the defendant’s name; 
that “the collision took place”; and that “[o]ur car was turned 
like 180 degrees.” 
 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the plaintiff moved 
to strike the defendant’s evidence and submit the case to the 
jury limited to the question of damages.  The trial court 
overruled that motion and instructed the jury on all issues 
related to both liability and damages. 
 
The jury returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff “damages 
at $50,000.00 with no interest.”  The plaintiff moved the court 
 
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to set the verdict aside as inadequate and to limit a new trial 
to the issue of damages.  The defendant asked the court to set 
aside the verdict and grant a new trial on all issues.  The 
trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion.  The second jury 
returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff $400,000 in damages, 
and we awarded Shelby an appeal. 
I 
 
In one of three assignments of error, Shelby contends that 
the trial court erred in limiting the second trial to the issue 
of damages. 
 
In support of a motion to set aside the first verdict, the 
plaintiff’s counsel argued in the trial court that “it’s a 
compromise verdict” and that “[a] verdict of less than the 
specials, by our Supreme Court, cannot stand.”  Responding to 
that argument, the trial court said, “My rulings have been if 
the special damage is uncontested and [the verdict] is way below 
the special damages, the Court sets the verdict aside and only 
set [sic] the case for retrial on damages”. 
 
We find no error in the trial court’s denial of the 
plaintiff’s motion to submit the case to the jury at the first 
trial limited to the question of damages and in granting the 
defendant’s instruction on the definition and effect of a 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence.  Nor do we find error in 
the court’s decision to set aside the verdict in the first 
 
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trial.  But we are of opinion the court erred in limiting the 
issue in the second trial to damages. 
 
The trial court apparently applies its rulings with respect 
to setting aside verdicts and limiting the retrial to damages 
only to cases in which “the special damage is uncontested and 
[the verdict] is way below the special damages”.  However, those 
rulings overlook the decisions of this Court in cases in which 
it appears that the inadequacy of the damage award was the 
result of a compromise reached by the jury. 
 
In Rawle v. McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 177 S.E. 214 (1934), we 
defined the rules with respect to setting aside verdicts in five 
classes of cases.  Concerning the class relevant here, we said: 
 
In the fifth class of cases where . . . the evidence 
with reference to liability has probably exerted a material 
influence upon the jury in determining the amount of the 
verdict, or the evidence warrants the inference that, 
instead of deciding the question of liability, the jury has 
arbitrarily determined to make both parties bear a part of 
the burden of the injury, . . . [and] the court sets aside 
a verdict of this class, it should grant a new trial on all 
issues. 
 
 
In all five classes a sound discretion is vested in 
the trial court as to whether . . . a new trial should be 
granted upon all issues, or limited to the question of 
damages . . . .  However, in the exercise of this 
discretion it is always to be borne in mind that, before a 
new trial should be limited to the amount of damages, it 
should be reasonably clear that the misconduct or 
misconception of the jury from which the inadequacy of the 
verdict has resulted, has not extended to its determination 
of the question of liability as well as to its 
determination of the amount of damages. 
 
163 Va. at 750-51, 177 S.E. at 221. 
 
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The issue of liability at the first trial was contested.   
The jury may have accorded the recollection of the investigating 
officer that the defendant said at the time of the accident that 
he had not seen the stop sign greater weight than the testimony 
of the defendant and his friend.  And, considering the testimony 
concerning the location of the damage to the respective vehicles 
and the force of an impact sufficient to turn the defendant’s 
car from an eastward course to a westward heading, the jury 
could have rejected the plaintiff’s testimony that he was not 
exceeding the 25 m.p.h. speed limit as he approached and entered 
the intersection. 
 
Applying the principles defined in Rawle, we will reverse 
the ruling limiting the issue in the second trial to damages and 
remand the case for a new trial on all the issues. 
II 
 
In another assignment of error, Shelby contends that the 
trial court “erred in the first trial by refusing to admit the 
estimate of the Plaintiff’s speed by [the defendant’s] 
passenger.”  Because that question may arise in a new trial on 
remand, we will consider it now. 
 
Al-Ammir, the passenger in the defendant’s car, testified 
that, when he first saw the pickup, it was “two and a half car 
lengths away from the middle of the intersection where we were”; 
that it was “coming fast”; and that he “yelled” out the 
 
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defendant’s name, and “the collision took place.”  Asked if he 
could “make an estimate of the speed of the truck”, Al-Ammir 
replied, “[y]es, 45 to 50.”  The trial court sustained the 
plaintiff’s objection to the answer. 
 
In Moore v. Lewis, 201 Va. 522, 111 S.E.2d 788 (1960), we 
applied the rule that, “[i]n order to be competent to testify on 
the [speed of an automobile] the witness must have had a 
reasonable opportunity to judge the speed of the automobile.”  
We explained that when a witness has only a brief opportunity or 
interval of time to observe the speed of the vehicle, that fact 
affects only the weight of his testimony and not its competency.  
201 Va. at 525, 111 S.E.2d at 791.  In further explanation of 
the rule, we noted that 
“[a]n estimate of the speed at which an automobile was 
moving at a given time is generally viewed as a matter of 
common observation rather than expert opinion, and it is 
accordingly well settled that any person of ordinary 
experience, ability, and intelligence having the means or 
opportunity of observation, whether an expert or nonexpert, 
and without proof of further qualification may express an 
opinion as to how fast an automobile which came under his 
observation was going at a particular time.  The fact that 
the witness had not owned or operated an automobile does 
not preclude him from so testifying.  Speed of an 
automobile is not a matter of exclusive knowledge or skill, 
but anyone with a knowledge of time and distance is a 
competent witness to give an estimate; the opportunity and 
extent of observation goes to the weight of the testimony.” 
 
Id. at 525, 111 S.E.2d at 790 (citation omitted); see also 
Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 151-52; 487 S.E.2d 224, 
227 (1997). 
 
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The plaintiff argues that the trial court properly found 
that Al-Ammir was not competent to estimate the speed of the 
pickup truck because he had only “a momentary glimpse of [the 
truck] some two car lengths away.”   
 
In response, Shelby contends that, because Al-Ammir 
testified that he saw the truck at a specific distance prior to 
impact and that he could provide an estimate of speed, the trial 
court should have admitted his estimate and allowed the jury to 
determine what weight to accord the testimony.  We agree. 
 
The witness testified that he observed the automobile when 
it was two and a half car lengths away and that, moments later, 
the collision occurred.  We think this testimony was sufficient 
to show that he was a person “with a knowledge of time and 
distance” and competent “to give an estimate” of the vehicle’s 
speed.  Al-Ammir’s “opportunity and extent of observation” was a 
factor for the jury to consider in determining the weight to be 
accorded evidence relevant to the issue of liability.  We hold, 
therefore, that the trial court erred in ruling that this 
testimony was inadmissible. 
III 
 
In support of a third assignment of error, Shelby argues 
that the trial court erred in the conduct of the first trial by 
refusing to admit its proffer of a “Petition to Grant a 
Restricted Permit to Drive a Motor Vehicle” filed by the 
 
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plaintiff pursuant to Code § 46.2-391.  The petition reported 
that the plaintiff had been “addicted to and psychologically 
dependent upon the use of alcohol”; that he had incurred prior 
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol; and that 
his driver’s license had been suspended for a period of three 
years.  The petition also stated that the plaintiff had 
“presented himself for an evaluation by the John Tyler Alcohol 
Safety Action Program” and that he “is no longer addicted to 
. . . the use of alcohol . . . and he does not constitute a 
threat to . . . others with regards to the driving of a motor 
vehicle . . . .” 
 
Counsel for Shelby acknowledged at trial that he had “no 
evidence that drinking played any role in this accident.”  We 
find none of record.  Hence, the petition was inadmissible as 
irrelevant and prejudicial, see DeWald v. King, 233 Va. 140, 
146, 354 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1987), and we will uphold the trial 
court’s ruling in the first trial excluding Shelby’s proffer. 
 
Shelby also contends that the trial court “prevented Shelby 
from proving that the plaintiff’s job required him to possess a 
license and that he was claiming lost wages during a time he did 
not possess a license.”  We find no merit in that contention.  
The record of the second trial shows that the trial court 
allowed just such testimony delivered by Patrick Conner and 
Charles Osborne, respectively, the operations manager and 
 
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president of the plaintiff’s employer, witnesses called and 
interrogated by Shelby’s counsel. 
 
In summary, we will reverse the ruling of the trial court 
in the first trial limiting the second trial to the issue of 
damages, annul the judgment entered in the second trial, and 
remand the case for a new trial on all the issues. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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