Title: Treffry v. Taylor
Citation: 408 P.2d 269, 67 Wash. 2d 487
Docket Number: 37801
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 1965

67 Wn.2d 487 (1965) 408 P.2d 269 ROBERT C. TREFFRY et al., Respondents, v. LOUISE TAYLOR et al., Appellants.[*] No. 37801. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. November 24, 1965. The Attorney General, R. Ted Bottiger, Special Assistant, and Lloyd W. Peterson, Assistant, for appellants. Reiley &amp; Annis, by Eldon H. Reiley and Eugene I. Annis, for respondents. Lycette, Diamond &amp; Sylvester and Lyle L. Iversen, for intervenors. OTT, J. This appeal presents a single issue: Does the title to chapter 77, Laws of 1963, p. 476, "An Act providing for the registration of contractors; and prescribing penalties," violate article 2, § 19, of the state constitution, "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title"? *489 The trial court held that the act was unconstitutional for the reason that "The bonding provisions in Section 4 of said law and the insurance provision in Section 5 of The Act are not germane or related to the subject of registration." The questioned act contains 12 sections. Section 1 defines the term "contractor." Section 2 requires the contractor to procure a certificate of registration from the Department of Licenses before engaging in the contracting business, and provides penalties for violation. Section 3 prescribes the information the contractor must furnish to the department in his application for registration, prior to issuance of the certificate. Section 4, p. 477, provides: Section 5, p. 479, provides: Section 6 authorizes the Director of Licenses to issue a certificate for one year upon compliance with the provisions of the act. Section 7 prescribes the fees to be paid for registration. Section 8 requires a certificate of registration as a prerequisite to commencing an action in any court to recover for the performance of work as a contractor. Sections 9 and 10 grant certain exemptions. Section 11 is the severability clause, and § 12 declares the effective date of the act. In adjudicating the sufficiency of the title to a legislative enactment, we have adhered to the following general rules: *491 [1, 2] The title to a bill need not be an index to its contents; nor is the title expected to give the details contained in the bill. Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949); Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wn.2d 326, 142 P.2d 488 (1943); Sorenson v. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., 70 Wash. 528, 127 Pac. 102 (1912); State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728 (1908); State ex rel. Cole v. City of New Whatcom, 3 Wash. 7, 27 Pac. 1020 (1891). When the words in a title can be given two interpretations, one of which renders the act unconstitutional and the other constitutional, we adopt the constitutional interpretation and sustain the constitutionality of the act. Martin v. Aleinikoff, 63 Wn.2d 842, 389 P.2d 422 (1964); State ex rel. Dawes v. Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P.2d 376 (1963); Engen v. Arnold, 61 Wn.2d 641, 379 P.2d 990 (1963); Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959); Hammack v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., 54 Wn.2d 224, 339 P.2d 684 (1959). The test of the sufficiency of a title is that it must give notice of its object so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into its contents. Rourke v. Department of Labor &amp; Indus., 41 Wn.2d 310, 249 P.2d 236 (1952); Cory v. Nethery, supra; Sorenson v. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., supra. The title to an act may be general, and all matters incidental or germane thereto may be written into the body of the law. Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, supra; In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935); National Ass'n of Creditors, Inc. v. Brown, 147 Wash. 1, 264 Pac. 1005 (1928), and case cited. The crucial words in the questioned title are "contractors," "registration," and "penalties." Are these words sufficient notice of the object of the act so as reasonably to lead to further inquiry into the contents of the act? If so, the title meets the test of sufficiency. [3] Upon reading the title to this act, a contractor engaged in business in the state of Washington would be led to inquire whether his business was within the purview of the regulatory measure. The first section of the act would *492 give him the answer. If his business required that he register, he would then reasonably seek further information from the act to determine whether he qualified for a certificate of registration. Section 4, supra, would put him on notice that, in order to qualify and be issued a certificate of registration, he would be required to furnish a surety bond to the state for the payment of the obligations enumerated in § 4. Section 5, supra, would put him on notice that a public liability and property damage insurance policy is required. Every legislative enactment requiring registration is an exercise of the legislature's police power, and is, by its nature, regulatory of the subject matter. The word "registration" encompasses all regulatory provisions which the legislature enacts, in the proper exercise of its police power. We conclude that the title to chapter 77, Laws of 1963, gave sufficient notice of the object of the act so as reasonably to lead to further inquiry into the contents of the act, and thus meets the test of sufficiency. Does the act embrace more than one subject? [4] Since regulation is inherent in every legislative enactment requiring registration, all matters incidental and germane to registration may be written in the body of the law. In the instant case, the legislature, in the proper exercise of its discretion, has required that, as a condition precedent to the issuance of a certificate of registration, the applicant is required to establish his financial responsibility. This requirement, although regulative in nature, is germane to the subject of registration. We hold that the requirement of establishing financial responsibility does not introduce another subject, and that chapter 77, Laws of 1963, does not embrace more than one subject. The respondents contend that, although the trial court held the act unconstitutional because of a defective title, the trial court's judgment can be sustained upon any other constitutional ground within the pleadings and the proof. Respondents' pleadings further alleged that the act is unconstitutional because (1) it is violative of the due *493 process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions in that the bond or financial responsibility requirement is unreasonable and confiscatory, the act is discriminatory and creates arbitrary classifications, and requires registration as a condition precedent to maintaining an action predicated upon a construction contract, and (2) that the provisions of the act, taken as a whole, constitute imprisonment for debt in violation of art. 1, § 17, of the state constitution. Although these constitutional issues were presented to the trial court, the court did not predicate its judgment upon any of these alleged constitutional violations. We must assume that the trial court found them to be without merit. [5] A legislative enactment requiring the registration of contractors is an exercise of the police power of the state. Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960); Parrott &amp; Co. v. Benson, 114 Wash. 117, 194 Pac. 986 (1921); State v. Seattle Taxicab &amp; Transfer Co., 90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837 (1916); State v. Bowen &amp; Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149 Pac. 330 (1915). The exercise of police power by the legislature is an attribute of sovereignty. It is an essential element of the power to govern. The only limitation upon the exercise of this sovereign power by a legislative body is that the questioned enactment must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote some public interest, and that it must not be violative of any positive mandate of the constitution. Clark v. Dwyer, supra, at 432, and case cited. One who attacks the classification provisions of a legislative enactment has the burden of establishing that the classification is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and unjust. State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368, 382 P.2d 497 (1963), and cases cited. To require the furnishing of a bond to insure compliance with the law is a reasonable exercise of police power. Clark v. Dwyer, supra; State ex rel. Milwaukee Grain Elevator Co. v. Robinson, 186 Wash. 557, 59 P.2d 365 (1936); State v. Seattle Taxicab &amp; Transfer Co., supra; State v. Bowen &amp; Co., supra; Ferguson-Hendrix *494 Co. v. Fidelity &amp; Deposit Co. of Maryland, 79 Wash. 528, 140 Pac. 700 (1914); State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911). The wisdom, necessity or expediency of a legislative enactment is not subject to judicial review. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wn.2d 181, 324 P.2d 438 (1958); Bulette v. Bremerton, 34 Wn.2d 834, 210 P.2d 408 (1949); Gazzam v. Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 262, 29 Wn.2d 488, 188 P.2d 97 (1947); State ex rel. Govan v. Clausen, 108 Wash. 133, 183 Pac. 115 (1919). [6] The imposition of a fine or imprisonment for violation of a legislative enactment is not imprisonment for debt, but a statutory penalty imposed upon any person who shall knowingly and intentionally violate a lawful mandate of the legislature. Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958); Austin v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646, 93 A.L.R. 203 (1934); State v. Seattle Taxicab &amp; Transfer Co., supra. Applying the above rules to chapter 77, Laws of 1963, we hold that the standards fixed by the legislature for the registration of contractors and the classifications prescribed by the act do not violate any of the constitutional mandates relied upon by respondents. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed. FINLEY, WEAVER, HUNTER, HAMILTON, and HALE, JJ., concur. HILL, J., concurs in the result. DONWORTH, J. (dissenting) My reasons for disagreeing with the holding of the majority that the title of chapter 77, Laws of 1963, is adequate in the face of art. 2, § 19, of our constitution (which requires that the subject of a legislative bill shall be expressed in its title) may be briefly stated. The past and present legislative history of statutes and bills regulating and licensing various occupations and businesses *495 convinces me that the title of the 1963 act violates the constitutional provision referred to above. This act is the first (and only) time the legislature has used the word "registration" in the title of an act to describe regulation and licensing of an occupation or business. The appendix attached to this dissent cites the 14 prior acts and their titles. As we were advised by counsel during oral argument, the legislature has recognized the difference between the words "registration" and "regulation" by its action in the 1965 extraordinary session when legislation amending RCW 18.27.010-100 (Laws of 1963, ch. 77) was introduced in the House of Representatives (House Bill No. 292) with an amended title, reading as follows: As this court stated in In re Bale, 63 Wn.2d 83, 89, 385 P.2d 545 (1963): The bill which was originally introduced was a re-enactment of chapter 77, Laws of 1963, with a new title, in which the word "registration" was changed to read "regulation." The House passed the bill after considerable amendment activity pertaining mainly to the inclusion or exclusion of sections 4 and 5. Not once did the House consider using the word "registration" in the title of the amendatory act, even when the House Committee on Licenses removed sections 4 (requiring a bond) and 5 (requiring the public liability insurance), and advised passage without those provisions. The House itself recognized that what the bill contemplates is not mere "registration" but "regulation." House Bill No. 292 passed the House without section 4 (requiring the bond) but with section 5 (requiring the public liability insurance). The bill was sent to the Senate, where *496 its consideration was indefinitely postponed on May 7, 1965, the last day of the extraordinary session. This history is relevant because the legislature has, in effect, demonstrated that it recognizes that there is a significant difference in the meaning of "registration" and "regulation" to legislators, once the error is called to its attention. Whatever the cause of the failure of the Senate to act on the bill, there is nothing in the record of the legislature to indicate that such inaction was in any manner related to the replacement of the word "registration" with "regulation" by the House so as to correct the title of the act. It is clear that the House, and probably the Senate, entertained the belief that the present title is inadequate to cover all the provisions of the 1963 act, as required by art. 2, § 19. However, the majority opinion appears to ignore this past and present legislative history and holds that these two words are legally synonymous, although they are not synonymous according to either the dictionary or the legislative usage. I, therefore, feel compelled to discuss the merits of the issue of whether "registration" means the same as "regulation." The purpose of Const. art. 2, § 19, has been stated and restated by this court. The latest expression is in Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963): Also, see Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963), and cases cited, including Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), which state precisely the same points. In the Gruen case, there is an excellent discussion of the decisions of this court wherein it has held that a title may be restrictive or general. The *497 rules were succinctly restated by the Gruen opinion in 35 Wn.2d at 22, 23, where it was said: *498 The major issue on this appeal is whether the title, as worded by the legislature, gives adequate notice of the inclusion of requirements of bonds and insurance in order for the applicant contractor to receive a "certificate of registration." The title reads: "An Act providing for the registration of contractors; and prescribing penalties." The key word in the title with regard to this controversy is "registration." The trial court reasoned in his memorandum opinion that "registration" is a word of relatively narrow meaning, and, as used in the title of the act, indicates a listing of contractors, but not the regulation of contractors. The trial court expressed the belief that the subject matter of the provisions of sections 4 and 5, requiring bonds and insurance, respectively, is related to and germane to regulation but not to mere registration. Respondent has argued, and the trial court believed, that registration is a much narrower subject than regulation; that registration is actually only a part of an over-all program of regulation of contractors created by this act. I am of the opinion that the trial court and respondent are correct. Theirs is the most acceptable view of the problem for to hold that bonding and insurance are germane to registration is to hold that "registration" and "regulation" are synonymous. To me, the meanings of the two words are clearly different. Registration connotes merely a listing of contractors or, at most, an official certification list; regulation connotes requirements and controls established for the operation of a contracting business resulting in the licensing of persons desiring to engage in that occupation upon their compliance with certain conditions. Appellant has argued that registration is "generic." The word may be generic in the sense that there can be many kinds of registration for different purposes, but the problem is that registration normally just does not mean to the general public or to the busy legislator that bonds and insurance are required in order for a contractor to obtain a certificate of registration. Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961) at 1912, gives several meanings, none *499 of which is broad enough to give this kind of notice. As pointed out above, in referring to the appendix to this dissenting opinion, a careful examination of all statutes enacted by the legislature pertaining to licensing or regulation of various professions or businesses shows that, in every single instance where the state requires bonds or insurance, the title either broadly refers to the subject matter by characterizing the subject as regulation (i.e. relating to the regulation or licensing of an area of commerce) or specifically mentions the bond or insurance requirements. Appellant also argues that bonding and insurance may be required as prerequisites to registration, and that, by simply using the word "registration" in the title, the public is put on inquiry as to what the prerequisites to registration are. I agree that bonding and insurance may be made prerequisites to registration if they are included in the title. However, I disagree with appellant's contention that simply because "registration" is to be required, the public is put on inquiry as to the prerequisites of registration, regardless of whether the prerequisites are germane to the word "registration." I recognize that "registration" may give notice of some prerequisites, such as supplying specific information (as provided in section 3 of the act). If the registration pertained to "financial ability of contractors," it might give warning that certain financial prerequisites were involved. Sections 4 and 5 pertain to financial ability of contractors. The subject of financial ability is important in the regulation of contractors but it has relationship to registration of contractors only because both proof of financial ability and registration are related to the broader subject of regulation. Financial ability has no direct connection with registration, unless it is made a special prerequisite to qualify for registration outside the normal meaning of the word registration itself. I conclude, therefore, that the title of chapter 77, Laws of 1963, is "restrictive" within the meaning of the Gruen case, supra. *500 Reference has been made to the appendix which cites the statutes of this state regulating or licensing persons in certain businesses wherein bonds or insurance are required as prerequisites. In none of the titles of these statutes does the word "registration" even appear, although a form of registration through licensing is required as a part of the system of regulation. Neither the public nor the legislature has any warning or any way of knowing of the broad requirements and provisions of the act when the legislature suddenly introduces the new and much narrower word "registration" rather than broader words such as the word "regulation" that has heretofore been used. The natural inference is that the words "registration" and "regulation" cannot and should not be construed synonymously because heretofore "registration" has been only a possible (but not necessary) part of regulation. For the reasons stated above, I am firmly of the opinion that the constitutional requirements of art. 2, § 19, have not been met, because the title is not broad enough in scope. Of course, courts can and should construe a word reasonably, but, as the court stated in Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, supra at 23: "The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are invested with no dispensing power." As I read the majority opinion, this court is doing just that in this case. The majority attempts to equate "registration" with "regulation." It appears to me that the majority opinion has assumed its answer to the constitutional issue by looking at the body of the act before it has determined the meaning of the title, and has thus violated one of our basic rules in the application of Const. art. 2, § 19. The following quotation from the majority opinion demonstrates this misconception of our rule: In the quoted portion of its opinion, I think that the majority is in error in two respects. First, it begs the question in its first sentence, and later in its second paragraph, by an ipse dixit supported by no case authority, no examples of statutes, and no reference to even the common man's understanding of the word "register" as reflected by modern dictionaries. Indeed, the majority opinion appears to say that "registration" is broader in meaning and connotation than "regulation," when it states that the word "`registration' encompasses all regulatory provisions which the legislature enacts, in the proper exercise of its police power." As explained above, it seems to me much more appropriate to view regulation as the encompassing concept registration may be merely a part (although not a necessary part) of a regulatory scheme. The majority's use of these important terms seems to me, at least, inappropriate, and perhaps illogical. How can an unnecessary part be greater than the whole? The greater error, however, is the second one, when the majority states that a contractor may refer to the body of the act to obtain notice of what the act contains, and thereby attempts to show that its understanding of the word "registration" is correct. This is a violation of one of our basic rules for the application of Const. art. 2, § 19. The rule violated by the majority is stated in Great Northern Ry. v. Cohn, 3 Wn.2d 672, 680, 101 P.2d 985 (1940): This rule was quoted with approval and reaffirmed in Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, supra at 9. The legal authority relied on by the majority for holding that resort must be had to the examination of the body of the act in order to understand the title, appears to be its paraphrase of a part of a sentence in Rourke v. Department of Labor &amp; Indus., 41 Wn.2d 310, 249 P.2d 236 (1952). That opinion does not hold, or even suggest, by its treatment of the case, that this court or a legislator or the public must look to the sections or the body of an act to obtain notice of what the subject of the act is. In the Rourke case, in the next two paragraphs immediately following the sentence paraphrased by the majority, this court stated, at p. 312: We should note that the Rourke case was heard en banc. There was only one dissenter. As I understand the Rourke majority opinion, this court held that the title was restrictive without looking at the body of the act. It then held that several things, which were plausibly related to the title but not included within its scope, were outside the title. For example, employers were not given notice that they were within the scope of the act because the title referred only to "employees" even though it is obvious that every "employee" must have an employer, as the dissent in that case points out. Without going further into the details of the Rourke case, suffice it to say that, in my opinion, that case is no authority for the majority's statement that the sections of the act give notice to or inform anyone of anything. The constitution requires that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, which naturally eliminates the body of the act as performing this office. Of course, there is a valid reason for referring to the body of an act when applying art. 2, § 19. One must look at the body of the act to determine if it is within the scope of the title after one has determined the scope of the title. But that is not what the majority has done in this case. It has confused the issue of the meaning of "registration" by looking at the body of the act to see if, after the court learns what provisions the act contains, it can find any plausible connection of any kind between those provisions and the title. That reasoning is contrary to the decisions in both the Rourke case, supra, and the Gruen case, supra. Yet, those are cases which constitute a part of the basic authority relied on by the majority to support its position in this case. No other cases cited by the majority support their approach. In summary, it is my opinion that the title of the bill involved in this case violates the second mandate of Const. art. 2, § 19, that the subject of the bill shall be expressed *504 in the title. For this reason, I dissent from the majority opinion. I do not disagree with the majority as to the other issues raised by respondent. I would affirm the trial court's judgment on this ground, thereby effecting the dissolution of the pending injunction and the dismissal of the action. ROSELLINI, C.J., concurs with DONWORTH, J. January 27, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 408 P.2d 269.