Title: State v. Parker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119PA20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-64 
No. 119PA20 
Filed 11 June 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
BRANDON ALAN PARKER 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, 269 N.C. App. 629, 839 S.E.2d 83 (2020), finding no error in 
a judgment entered on 12 June 2018 by Judge Ebern T. Watson III in Superior Court, 
Sampson County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 26 April 2021.  
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Michael T. Wood, Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State-appellee.  
 
Michael E. Casterline for defendant-appellant.  
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
On June 11, 2018, a Sampson County jury found defendant Brandon Alan 
Parker guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon.  After the jury returned its verdict, 
defendant pleaded guilty to attaining habitual felon status.  Defendant appealed, and 
on February 4, 2020, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals found no error in 
defendant’s conviction, concluding that the prosecutor’s statements during closing 
argument were not grossly improper.  Defendant petitioned this Court for 
discretionary review. 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
On March 5, 2015, Michael Harbin, Carlos James, Derrick Copeland, and an 
unidentified male went to Garland, North Carolina, to purchase marijuana from Jafa 
McKoy.  Harbin drove a Toyota Camry with James and Copeland inside, while the 
unidentified male followed them in a Ford Explorer.  
¶ 3 
 
The men arrived in Garland between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m.  The unidentified 
driver of the Ford Explorer parked at a nearby apartment complex and remained 
there while Harbin, James, and Copeland drove to a house at a different location.  
When Harbin, James, and Copeland arrived, two men were standing outside.  
Copeland recognized McKoy standing near the front porch, and McKoy introduced 
the other man, who was on the porch, as “P.”  Copeland described “P” as being about 
six feet and two inches tall, weighing around 240 pounds, and having “a Muslim-type 
beard, brown skin, [and] tattoo on the upper cheek.”  Harbin stated that the man on 
the porch was wearing a red hat, and was “[l]ike a bigger, burley (sic) dude.” 
¶ 4 
 
Upon arrival, McKoy informed the men that the marijuana was not there. 
Harbin, James, and Copeland then left the house and drove to a nearby gas station 
to buy cigarettes.  The three men left the gas station around 11:13 a.m. and returned 
to the house. 
¶ 5 
 
When they returned, McKoy and “P” were outside of the house and a compact 
car, that was not previously present, was parked outside.  Copeland and Harbin 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
exited the Camry while James remained inside.  McKoy told Copeland that the 
marijuana was in the compact car.  As Copeland and Harbin walked toward the car, 
“P” jumped off the porch, pulled out a revolver, and moved toward the Camry.  At the 
same time, McKoy pulled out a gun and began firing at Copeland and Harbin.  
Copeland and Harbin escaped to the woods, and they made their way to the Ford 
Explorer parked at the nearby apartment complex.  Copeland, Harbin, and the 
unidentified male traveled back to the house to look for James.  After failing to locate 
James, Harbin called 911 around 12:24 p.m. 
¶ 6 
 
Around 12:30 p.m., Freddie Stokes, a resident of the house, returned home and 
saw a body in his driveway.  Stokes called 911, and Sampson County EMS 
subsequently arrived at the house to find James dead in the driveway.  James died 
from a single gunshot wound to the head.  
¶ 7 
 
On March 9, 2015, defendant was identified by Copeland from a photographic 
lineup as the man McKoy introduced as “P.”  Copeland stated that he had eighty-five 
to ninety percent confidence in his identification of defendant.  
¶ 8 
 
Thirteen days after the homicide, on March 18, 2015, defendant learned that 
law enforcement was looking for him, and defendant called the police and went to the 
sheriff’s office.  The same day, Agent William Brady with the North Carolina State 
Bureau of Investigation interviewed defendant.  Initially, defendant denied being 
present at the house where James was killed.  However, approximately seventeen 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
minutes into the interview, defendant admitted he was at the house that morning 
but claimed that he left by 8:30 or 9:00 a.m.  The same day that defendant was 
interviewed by Agent Brady, the State obtained a search warrant for defendant’s cell 
phone records, including defendant’s cell site data.  
¶ 9 
 
At trial, Copeland and Harbin testified for the State.  During their testimony, 
neither Copeland nor Harbin positively identified defendant in the courtroom as the 
man they knew as “P.”  The State also presented testimony from Jane Peterson, who 
was dating defendant in March 2015.  Peterson testified about defendant’s 
appearance and stated that in March 2015, defendant had a close-cut beard and 
tattoos on his arm and face.  During Peterson’s testimony, the State introduced, for 
illustrative purposes, a photograph of defendant’s upper torso that showed defendant 
had a tattoo on his chest.  Defendant objected to the introduction of the photograph.  
¶ 10 
 
The trial court, in ruling on the admissibility of the photograph, stated the 
following: 
In this case, you have someone who has testified she 
was in a close relationship on the date in question. She’s 
also testified that she has a memory of his physical 
appearance at the time. She’s testified that over your 
suggestion that it was a peace sign, that his right hand 
appears to be raised in example of a peace sign, as a 
layperson might interpret that one way or another. And 
there’s nothing ominous about a peace sign, of course. 
That’s her layperson interpretation and her opinion of the 
sign that was given by the person in the photograph using 
their right hand.  
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
The individual in the photograph is bare from the 
waist up, appearing to have a white, baseball-type cap 
placed on his head and his right hand raised in some type 
of gesture. It does not show him in the company of any 
other individuals. It does not show him in a menacing or 
compromising position. It does show tattoos that she has 
now said she believes were the same, not different, than 
what she has testified about in her earlier recollections.  
The hat, itself, appears to be white in color, to have 
a brim, and then have some established marking on it that 
might represent a sports affiliate, the New York Yankees, 
of some sort. But it is a neutral color, white. And it is not 
very graphic as to what the tattoos might say or appear to 
be, but it does appear to show ink markings upon the chest 
and/or upper torso of the subject in the photograph itself. 
Those are not immutable characteristics. Those are things 
that have been placed upon an individual by choice.  
Tattoos are things that you mark yourself with by 
choice. Those are not things you are born with. And if you 
place them on your person, you do so in a way that 
permanently identifies you right, wrong, or indifferent. 
You subject yourself to that. And, in this case, any of those 
markings were placed there without any rebuttal at this 
time, not forcibly, but upon request of the individual that 
displayed them so proudly in the photograph, and that’s 
not substantially prejudicial, in my opinion. It is 
admissible for illustrative purposes. 
¶ 11 
 
In addition, the State tendered Special Agent Michael Sutton with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as an expert witness on historical cell site analysis and 
cellular technology.  Agent Sutton testified that defendant’s phone was used on March 
5, 2015, from approximately 8:09 a.m. to 9:57 a.m. in an area of Garland that included 
the house in question.  Between 9:57 a.m. and no later than 11:38 a.m., defendant’s 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
phone could not be identified because it was not in use.  At 11:49 a.m., defendant’s 
phone was determined to be located in Clinton, North Carolina. 
¶ 12 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following three statements 
without objection that mentioned defendant having a chest tattoo:  
And they gave you a description of a guy, Muslim-type 
beard, big, burley (sic), larger than Jafa. They knew Jafa. 
They could tell the difference between this guy and Jafa. A 
tattoo on his chest, the same guy who was seen on the 
porch, pulling the revolver from his waistband. The same 
type of weapon that killed the victim.  
. . . . 
. . . The man that Michael Harbin described as a big, burley 
(sic) guy with a beard and a hat pulled low who gets up, 
pulls out a revolver, and walks towards Carlos. The man 
on the porch that Derrick Copeland described as 6’2, big 
with a beard, called P, with a tattoo on his chest, who got 
up, and pulled out a revolver, and went towards Carlos in 
the car. That’s what Mr. Copeland said. 
. . . . 
Ms. Peterson told you what the defendant looked 
like back on March 5, 2015. He looks a little different today. 
But she told you that back in March of 2015 he looked like 
this big, burley (sic) guy with a beard, even a low hat and 
a tattoo on his chest, just like Mr. Copeland told you. 
¶ 13 
 
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:  
The final arguments of the lawyers are not evidence but 
are given to assist you in evaluating the evidence. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Now if, in the course of making a final argument, a 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
lawyer attempts to restate a portion of the evidence and 
your recollection of the evidence differs from that of the 
lawyer, you are as jurors in recalling and remembering the 
evidence, to be guided exclusively by your own recollection 
of the said evidence. 
¶ 14 
 
During the jury charge after closing arguments, the trial court similarly 
instructed the jury as follows:  
Now, members of the jury, you have heard the 
evidence and the arguments of counsel. If your recollection 
of the evidence differs from that of the attorneys, you are 
to rely solely upon your recollection. Your duty is to 
remember the evidence, whether called to your attention or 
not. 
¶ 15 
 
Defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and not guilty 
of the remaining charges.  Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to attaining 
habitual felon status, and he was sentenced to a minimum of 105 months to a 
maximum of 138 months in prison.  Defendant entered notice of appeal. 
¶ 16 
 
In a published opinion filed February 4, 2020, the Court of Appeals determined 
that the State’s closing argument did not constitute prejudicial error and that 
defendant failed to show that trial court erred in not intervening ex mero motu.  State 
v. Parker, 269 N.C. App. 629, 639, 839 S.E.2d 83, 90 (2020).  Defendant filed a petition 
for discretionary review, which this Court allowed on June 3, 2020.  
II. 
Analysis 
¶ 17 
 
“Arguments of counsel are largely in the control and discretion of the trial 
court.  The appellate courts ordinarily will not review the exercise of that discretion 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
unless the impropriety of counsel’s remarks is extreme and is clearly calculated to 
prejudice the jury.”  State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 111, 322 S.E.2d 110, 122 (1984). 
“When defendant does not object to comments made by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments, only an extreme impropriety . . . will compel this Court to hold that the 
trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an 
argument that defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when 
originally spoken.”  State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 786, 467 S.E.2d 685, 693 
(1996).   
The standard of review for assessing alleged 
improper closing arguments that fail to provoke timely 
objection from opposing counsel is whether the remarks 
were so grossly improper that the trial court committed 
reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu. In 
other words, the reviewing court must determine whether 
the argument in question strayed far enough from the 
parameters of propriety that the trial court, in order to 
protect the rights of the parties and the sanctity of the 
proceedings, should have intervened on its own accord and: 
(1) precluded other similar remarks from the offending 
attorney; and/or (2) instructed the jury to disregard the 
improper comments already made.  
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002) (citation omitted).   
¶ 18 
 
A “[g]rossly improper argument is defined as conduct so extreme that it renders 
a trial fundamentally unfair and denies the defendant due process.”  State v. Fair, 
354 N.C. 131, 153, 557 S.E.2d 500, 517 (2001).  A “trial court is not required to 
intervene ex mero motu unless the argument strays so far from the bounds of 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
propriety as to impede defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  State v. Smith, 351 N.C. 251, 
269, 524 S.E.2d 28, 41 (2000) (quoting State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 84, 505 S.E.2d 97, 
111 (1998)).  
¶ 19 
 
Defendant contends that the three statements referencing defendant’s chest 
tattoo were not supported by the evidence, and as a result, the trial court committed 
reversible error when it failed to intervene ex mero motu.  In essence, defendant 
argues that in the absence of intervention by the trial court ex mero motu, 
misstatements of evidence by an attorney during closing arguments entitles the 
opposing party to a new trial.  We decline to impose a perfection requirement on the 
attorneys and trial courts of this State, ever mindful that parties are “entitled to a 
fair trial but not a perfect one.”  State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 536, 220 S.E.2d 495, 
510 (1975) (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1984). 
¶ 20 
 
Here, rather than stating that the individual on the porch identified as “P” had 
a tattoo on his face, the prosecutor stated that the tattoo was on his chest.  At trial, 
Copeland, Harbin, and Peterson all testified to defendant’s appearance.  While there 
was evidence admitted that showed defendant had a chest tattoo, neither Copeland 
nor Harbin identified “P” as having a chest tattoo.  Copeland described the man on 
the porch as being about six feet and two inches tall, weighing around 240 pounds, 
and having “a Muslim-type beard, brown skin, [and] tattoo on the upper cheek.”  
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Harbin stated that the man on the porch was wearing a red hat pulled low and had a 
bigger, burly build.  According to Harbin, this was the individual that pulled out a 
revolver, jumped off the porch, and walked towards the Camry.   
¶ 21 
 
Defendant admitted to being at the house the morning of March 5, 2015, and 
defendant’s cell site data placed his phone in the vicinity of the house on the morning 
of the shooting and traveling away from the location in the hours following the 
incident.  Two witnesses placed an individual matching defendant’s appearance at 
the scene.  Those characteristics were confirmed by Peterson as matching defendant’s 
appearance in March 2015.   
¶ 22 
 
This Court has found that “improper remarks include statements of personal 
opinion, personal conclusions, name-calling, and references to events and 
circumstances outside the evidence, such as the infamous acts of others.”  Jones, 355 
N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106.   
[I]n cases of clear-cut violations—those couched as appeals 
to a jury’s passions or that otherwise resulted in prejudice 
to a defendant—this Court has not hesitated to overturn 
the results of the trial court. State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 
165–67, 181 S.E.2d 458, 459–60 (1971) (reversing 
defendant’s rape conviction because of the prosecutor’s 
“inflammatory and prejudicial” closing argument, in which 
the prosecutor described defendant as “lower than the bone 
belly of a cur dog”); see also State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 
659–61, 157 S.E.2d 335, 344–47 (1967) (holding that the 
prosecutor committed reversible error by, inter alia, calling 
defendants “storebreakers” and expressing his opinion that 
a witness was lying).  
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Id. at 129, 558 S.E.2d at 105; see also State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 266, 555 S.E.2d 
251, 273 (2001) (holding that the trial court erred in not intervening ex mero motu 
when the prosecutor impermissibly commented on the defendant’s right to remain 
silent during sentencing by stating, “he decided just to sit quietly. He didn’t want to 
say anything that would ‘incriminate himself’ ”). 
¶ 23 
 
The statements in this case stand in stark contrast to remarks this Court has 
previously held to be grossly improper.  This is not the case where an attorney 
engages in name-calling, makes statements of opinion, intrudes upon constitutional 
rights, or references events outside of the evidence.  See Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 
S.E.2d at 106.  This is a case where an attorney mistakenly summarized evidence 
during her closing argument.  Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor’s 
misstatements about the location of the tattoo were intentional, much less “clearly 
calculated to prejudice the jury.”  Huffstetler, 312 N.C. at 111, 322 S.E.2d at 122.   We 
fail to see how the conflation of the location of defendant’s tattoos in conjunction with 
the other evidence of defendant’s appearance at trial was an extreme or gross 
impropriety.  See Fair, 354 N.C. at 153, 557 S.E.2d at 517.   
¶ 24 
 
Defendant further contends that statements and arguments by attorneys to 
the jury may be afforded greater weight and that the danger of unfair prejudice 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
results from even unintentional misstatements of the evidence.1  However, the plain 
language of the trial court’s instructions to the jury acknowledges and contemplates 
that attorneys may mistakenly summarize the evidence during closing arguments.   
¶ 25 
 
The jurors were specifically instructed that they were to “be guided exclusively 
by [their] own recollection” of the evidence any time their “recollection of the evidence 
differs from that of the attorneys.”  The jury heard the instructions immediately 
before and after closing arguments.  “Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions 
given to them by the court.” State v. Price, 344 N.C. 583, 593, 476 S.E.2d 317, 323 
(1996) (quoting State v. Johnson, 341 N.C. 104, 115, 459 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1995)).  
There is no evidence in the record from which we can conclude that the jurors failed 
to follow the trial court’s instructions concerning the manner in which they should 
consider closing arguments by counsel.   
¶ 26 
 
Moreover, defendant’s argument would permit attorneys to sit back in silence 
during closing arguments but then claim error whenever a trial court fails to address 
or otherwise correct a misstatement of the evidence.  See generally State v. Tart, 372 
N.C. 73, 81, 824 S.E.2d 837, 842–43 (2019) (“In circumstances in which a defendant 
in his or her role as an obvious interested party in a criminal trial fails to object to 
the other party’s closing statement at trial, yet assigns as error the detached trial 
 
1 The opposite may well be true.  Jurors may be distrustful of attorneys who repeatedly 
misstate the evidence, thus, compromising the prospect of a successful outcome. 
STATE V. PARKER  
2021-NCSC-64 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
judge’s routine [silence] during closing arguments in the absence of any objection, 
this Court has consistently viewed the appealing party’s burden to show prejudice 
and reversible error as a heavy one.”).  Trials are not carefully scripted productions.  
Absent extreme or gross impropriety in an argument, a judge should not be thrust 
into the role of an advocate based on a perceived misstatement regarding an 
evidentiary fact when counsel is silent.  
¶ 27 
 
The misstatements by the prosecutor appear to be mistakes in arguing the 
evidence admitted at trial for which defendant did not lodge an objection, and 
defendant has failed to meet his heavy burden.  Based on the circumstances 
presented in this case, the misstatements by the prosecutor during closing arguments 
were not extreme or grossly improper, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it declined to intervene ex mero motu.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the Court of Appeals.  
AFFIRMED.