Title: TURLEY v MONTANA POWER CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12755
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 1975

No. 12755 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 7 5 S A M TURLEY, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - T H E M O N T A N A PWER C O M P A N Y , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : M o r r o w , Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana Edmund P. Sedivg argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Morgan, Bozeman, Montana Richard J. Andriolo argued, Bozeman, Montana - Submitted: April 8, 1975 q?,y - 9 ~ 2 T Filed : Decided : MAY - 3 '1975 I Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Montana Power Company brings t h i s appeal from a judgment entered i n a personal injury action i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, Gallatin County, i n favor of p l a i n t i f f Sam Turley. Three additional defendants, William H. Heiser, Sigrid M. Burrell and Wallace McHenry were o r i g i n a l l y named, but were dismissed midtrial on t h e i r motion without objection of p l a i n t i f f . The jury awarded p l a i n t i f f damages i n the amount of $30,000. Defendant appeals from t h i s verdict and judgment . Turley was an employee of the Big Sky Model Homes of Livingston, Montana, when he received serious i n j u r i e s while working on the roof of a Big Sky Home belonging t o one Sam Heiser. He came i n t o contact with high voltage wires which passed over the roof of t h e Heiser home. i n The home/question w a s purchased by Heiser i n October 1970, from a business known a s Premier Homes, a dealer f o r the Big Sky brand mobile homes. On October 26, 1970, Premier Homes moved t h e mobile home onto property owned by Wallace McHenry, a t a location known a s the four corners area i n Gallatin County. The McHenry property consisted of about three acres and was principally used by McHenry t o operate a grocery s t o r e and a f i l l i n g s t a t i o n . There were a number of t r a i l e r parking areas on the acreage which had been used many years before and McHenry i n 1969 allowedHeiser, h i s brother-in-law, t o s e t up h i s mobile home on the property. When he sold h i s o r i g i n a l t r a i l e r on the s i t e , Heiser was permitted t o move a new one on the acreage. The o r i g i n a l t r a i l e r was 55 f e e t long, the Big Sky t r a i l e r was 66 f e e t long. I n approximately 1954, defendant Montana Power Company constructed an e l e c t r i c a l transmission l i n e running north and south across t h e property now owned by McHenry. The poles f o r t h e l i n e s were located along the property fence l i n e s . One pole was a t t h e north end of the fence l i n e , along wfth several other poles constituting a switching s t a t i o n . The pole a t t h e south end of the property was some 290 f e e t from the north end pole. A t the t i m e of t h i s construction the Power Company received two right-of-way easment deeds, one 50 f e e t i n width, f o r the opera- t i o n of i t s lines. While there is disagreement on whether the o r i g i n a l Heiser t r a i l e r was under the power l i n e s , there is no question but t h a t the Big Sky t r a i l e r was some 1 1 f e e t under the lines. The power l i n e s were o r i g i n a l l y constructed a t a height whereby t h e lower four l i n e s transmitting 7200/12470 v o l t s , known a s the 12 KV system, were seventeen f e e t , s i x inches from ground level. The upper three w i r e s , transmitting 50,000 v o l t s , were higher. This height was well within the National Electric Safety Code. After t h e Heiser Big Sky t r a i l e r was moved under t h e l i n e s t h e lower four l i n e s , the 12 KV l i n e s , extended only f i v e feet,seven inches over the roof of the t r a i l e r . The upper l i n e s were eight fecthigher. The National Electric Safety Code pre- scribes t h a t t h e clearance height over buildings be constructed a t a minimum height of eight f e e t , and with the length of the span here, the height should have been nine f e e t , four inches. A t t h e time of moving the t r a i l e r onto the property, no one n o t i f i e d Montana Power Company t h a t the t r a i l e r was being moved under i t s l i n e s ; nor did anyone ask t o put t h e t r a i l e r on i t s easement. Premier Homes personnel did a l l of the necessary sewer and e l e c t r i c a l hook-ups, when it moved the t r a i l e r onto the s i t e . Immediately a f t e r s e t t i n g up the Big Sky t r a i l e r , Heiser began having problems with it and he requested Premier Homes t o come out and f i x t h e deficiencies he had found--such a s carpeting, panelling, plumbing, the water system, the f l o o r and these windows. Premier Homes passed/complaints on t o Big Sky Company a t Livingston and Turley was sent out by the company t o f i x them. He f i r s t arrived there on November 5 and worked t h a t day through t h e 7th, making necessary repairs. After a weekend, he returned on the 9th, a r r i v i n g about 1 p.m., t o f i x the roof. O n t h a t day he was accompanied by another Big Sky Company em- ployee, a M r . Sparr. Turley t e s t i f i e d he and Heiser went up on the roof of the t r a i l e r where Heiser pointed out t h e problems he saw on the roof. Turley decided t h a t it would be necessary t o s e a l t h e roof t o prevent leakage, Heiser agreed t h i s would be s a t i s - factory. A t t h e time t h e men were on the roof Turley observed the wires running over the t r a i l e r and was aware they were high voltage wires. Following t h e roof inspection the two men went down o f f the roof and Turley worked with h i s co-employee f o r an hour o r s o fixing windows. During t h i s time, he t e s t i f i e d , he again observed t h e power poles and the wires above him. Turley then took h i s roof r e p a i r equipment and went back on the roof and began applying s e a l e r t o the roof. A t t h a t time he again observed the wires, but did not think they would bother him, even though he i s s i x f e e t , t h r e e inches t a l l and the wires were only f i v e f e e t , seven inches over the roof. Sometime during t h i s period h i s forehead came i n t o contact with the most e a s t e r l y trans- mission l i n e r e s u l t i n g i n severe i n j u r i e s . Appellant Power Company r a i s e s s i x issues on appeal, however due t o our finding that i s s u e one, t h e f a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l court t o grant defendant's motions f o r dismissal and a directed verdict, i s controlling, only t h a t issue w i l l be dis- cussted herein. Appellant Power Company and respondent Turley recognize t h a t i s s u e one i s the controlling i s s u e and devote much of t h e i r argument t o t h i s point. Appellant r e l i e s on a recent opinion of the Court, Sprankle v. DeCock, Mont._ , 530 P.2d 457, 459, 460, 31 St.Rep. 437, and a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d therein a s controlling. Respondent Turley argues t h a t t h i s is a case where the Court must consider the evidence i n a l i g h t most favorable t o the party against whom the motion i s directed and t h a t every reasonable inference t o such evidence w i l l be given i n t h a t party's favor. Also, t h a t a cause should never be withdrawn from a jury unless the conclusion from the f a c t s necessarily follows a s a matter of law t h a t recovery cannot be had on any view which can be reasonably drawn from the f a c t s which the evidence tends t o establish. Parini v. Lanch, 148 Mont. 188, 418 P.2d 861; McIntosh v. Linder-Kind Lumber Co., 144 Mont. 1, 393 P.2d 782. Respondent c i t e s three Montana cases, Mize v. Rocky Moun- t a i n Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971; ~ o u r k e v. Butte Electric & Power Co., 33 Mont. 267, 83 P. 470; and Farnum v. Montana-Dakota Power Co., 99 Mont. 217, 43 P.2d 640, i n support because of h i s position thatlappellant was i n violation of the standards s e t by the National E l e c t r i c a l Safety Code a s t o the height from the roof of the t r a i l e r t o the wires, i t cannot escape l i a b i l i t y by pleading it did not know of the violations. Respondent argues there was a l e g a l duty on the p a r t of appellant t o inspect its l i n e s and t o know when they crossed places of habitation. Anderson v. Northern States Power Co., 236 Minn. 196, 52 N.W.2d 434, 439. W e have c a r e f u l l y examined t h e a u t h o r i t i e s r e l i e d upon by respondent and find them e i t h e r f a c t u a l l y not applicable here o r not controlling law i n view of ~ o n t a n a ' s most recent case on point, Sprankle. From all the evidence there can be but one conclusion, that respondent failed to use reasonable care under the circum- stances. He acknowledged he had observed the wires while on the ground, that he was aware they were high voltage lines, and yet he either walked into one or straightened up from his sealing job and contacted one of the lines. According to all testimony, there was nothing obstructing his view. One of respondent's witnesses testified as to what a reasonable standard of care would be under the circumstances and respondent failed in all regards to this standard propounded by Mr. Pierce, his own witness. Pierce testified a repairman, doing a like job, should have thoroughly checked the wires to determine their type and if there was any question then he should have checked the wires and poles from different angles and should not have proceeded with his work until this was done. He further testified a repairman should keep his eyes on the wires while working and not risk any chance on their height, and in every way he should keep a lookout for his own safety. Considering respondent's argument with respect to the minimum clearance standards of the National Safety Code, appellant argues that originally the power lines exceeded the minimum standards of the code in that they were seventeen feet, six inches from the ground to the lowest wire; that it had obtained right of-way easements for its lines and poles and no one had ever re- quested permission to move a mobile home onto the easement, nor did they notify appellant of the proposed move. Moving the mobile home onto the easement created a code clearance violation which some fourteen days later led to the injury of respondent. Noting respondent's reliance on Anderson on the duty to inspect, appellant cites this from the same case: "* * * but such inspection is intended primarily for the purpose of discovering and correcting defects in its lines or its apparatus. Here, the accident was not the result of defective lines or apparatus, but, instead, resulted from the creation of a dangerous condition by the a c t of a t h i r d party i n changing t h a t which had been safe t o something which became dangerous by the erection of a s t r u c t u r e which brought people i n t o close proximity with the dan- gerous l i n e s where people had not been expected t o be before. The evidence i n t h i s case does not warrant a finding of negligence based on a f a i l u r e t o inspect. 11 I n the i n s t a n t case, a s i n Anderson , which was a nearly i d e n t i c a l f a c t s i t u a t i o n , it hardly seems reasonable f o r anyone t o find t h a t a duty existed, l e t alone a breach of duty. But these questions a r e r e a l l y moot i n view of t h e law of Montana a s recently expressed by t h i s Court i n Sprankle. In Sprankle t h e t r i a l court refused t o submit the case t o a jury and granted summary judgment. This Court on review stated: I I Much of p l a i n t i f f ' s argument before us concerns the various l e g a l theories and evidentiary basis upon which a jury might find t h a t e i t h e r o r both of the defendants were negligent i n the performance of a duty owed p l a i n t i f f . This argument becomes moot i n the face of t h e undisputed f a c t s which es- t a b l i s h p l a i n t i f f ' s own negligence contributing a s a proximate cause of h i s i n j u r i e s . I I Our law requires a l l competent capable persons t o exercise ordinary care f o r t h e i r own safety, George v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 59 Mont. 162, 196 P. 869. Ordinary care has been defined a s t h a t degree of care an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under l i k e circumstances t o avoid injury. Restate- ment Second, Torts, Negligence 5462-3; Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed., §65, 416-17; Stevens v. Waldorf- Hoerner Paper Co.? 149 Mont. 306, 425 P.2d 832. This has been held t o Include the duty t o make reasonable use of one's f a c u l t i e s t o observe and avoid conditions of obvious potential danger, Pickett v. Kyger, 151 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57. I' The Court then concluded: "Viewing t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence i n the l i g h t most favorable t o him it is susceptible of but one conclu- sion--he climbed onto a farmhand loader and hoisted a long metal pole i n t o contact with high overhead power l i n e s which were c l e a r l y v i s i b l e , which he had lived and worked around f o r eight years. While ad- mittingly knowing any e l e c t r i c a l l i n e was dangerous he did not exercise ordinary care f o r h i s safety under the circumstances, which f a i l u r e proximately caused h i s i n j u r i e s . 11 In Sprankle, a s here, the controlling question turns on the matter of proximate cause and evidence a s t o whether the injured party exercised ordinary care f o r h i s own safety t o avoid coming in contact with the power line. In Sprankle the Court found that plaintiff's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. The same can be said in the instant case. Here, respondent although aware of the high voltage lines, somehow came into contact with one of them and in so doing he failed in his duty to reasonably use his faculties to observe and avoid obvious danger. This negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries, Respondent argues Sprankle can be distinguished because here there is a safety code violation. Even granting his argument, this is not a valid distinction for in Sprankle the Court was willing to concede defendant's negligence, but held that this point was moot because of plaintiff's own negligence being or contributing as a proximate cause of his injuries. Accepting respondent's argument, the same is true in the instant case. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause dismissed. Hon. E . Gardner Brownlee, District Judge, sitting for Chief Justice James T. Harrison.