Title: Athay v. STATE, DEPT. OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Citation: 626 P.2d 965
Docket Number: 16504
State: Utah
Issuer: Utah Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1981

626 P.2d 965 (1981) Audrey Lynne ATHAY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Utah, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, REGISTRATION DIVISION, et al., Defendants and Appellants. No. 16504. Supreme Court of Utah. February 19, 1981. Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Leon A. Halgren, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants. David K. Robinson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. SWAN, District Judge: Defendants appeal from a memorandum decision of the trial court which found that Section 58-25-2, U.C.A., 1953, had been unconstitutionally applied by the defendants and ordered that the plaintiff be seated for the subsequent psychological examination. Defendants seek to have the decision of the trial court reversed, or in the alternative: (1) a dismissal of the action for further administrative review as provided in Section 58-1-32 and Section 58-1-35.1, U.C.A., 1953; or (2) a remand to the trial court for a full hearing on the merits. Audrey Lynne Athay, the plaintiff and respondent herein, applied to the Utah Department of Business Regulation to be seated for the forthcoming psychologist examination. This examination is one of the requirements that must be met in the State of Utah to receive a certificate to practice as a psychologist. On April 27, 1977, the Director of the Department of Registration, one of the defendants herein, wrote the plaintiff and advised her that the representative committee for the psychology profession refused to seat the respondent until she had taken two additional courses on a graduate level in basic psychology. Defendants contend that in this decision the committee, sometimes referred to as "the Board," was acting pursuant to Section 58-25-2(2), *966 U.C.A., 1953, which requires that every applicant must: Acting on the report of the committee, the Department of Registration refused to allow the plaintiff to be seated for the examination, pursuant to Section 58-1-13(3), U.C.A., 1953, because her program of studies was not deemed to be "primarily psychological." Subsequent review by the Director supported the prior decision of the committee and the refusal to allow the plaintiff to be seated was affirmed. On June 13, 1977, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, alleging among other things that Section 58-25-2(2), U.C.A., 1953, was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, and was unconstitutionally applied. On February 8, 1979, the plaintiff moved in said court for a "declaratory judgment" on the previously filed action. In a memorandum opinion dated April 6, 1979, the trial court granted plaintiff's request and found that Section 58-25-2(2) as applied to the plaintiff was an "arbitrary administrative usurpation of the legislative function" and deprived respondent "of her rights of due process of law." The following part of the trial court's decision is relevant to this appeal: The defendants urge on appeal that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies, which she could have pursued under 58-1-32 allowing for a request for a full hearing, and 58-1-35, by appealing to the Director who could have called an "appeal" board to hear the matter. The plaintiff contends that this issue was never raised in the trial court, and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The record supports the plaintiff's position. The claim now made by appellants could have been raised in the answer to plaintiff's complaint, but no answer appears to have been filed. It could have been raised in defendants' motion to dismiss, but was not, the only grounds for that motion being the alleged failure to file in the district court within 30 days from the administrative ruling of the Director. No reference to the claim was made in any of the affidavits filed by appellants, and the claim cannot be raised now. The defendants' further points on appeal deal with the claim that the trial court's judgment went beyond the scope of review, that "arbitrariness" can only be determined after a full hearing in the trial court, and that the failure to establish guidelines is not an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power. Defendants complain that the trial court's decision was "based only on affidavits, pleadings and one memorandum," that filed by the plaintiff. A review of the record, however, shows that plaintiff engaged in extensive discovery proceedings, viz., plaintiff's first request for production of documents (8 with several sub-parts), plaintiff's first interrogatories and request for admissions (12 with numerous sub-parts) and plaintiff's second request for production of documents. The pertinent responses and answers are: The legislative grant of authority to the administrative agency is necessarily in general language. It is the responsibility of the administrative body to formulate, publish and make available to concerned persons rules which are sufficiently definite and clear that persons of ordinary intelligence will be able to understand and abide by them.[1] The trial court's memorandum decision demonstrates its reliance on defendants' admissions as showing a violation of the principles just stated. The defendants filed no pleading that alleged a need for a further hearing, and filed no response to the plaintiff's memorandum in support of motion for declaratory judgment. A further hearing could have added nothing to alter the basis of the court's finding that the failure to establish guidelines for a curriculum or a criteria for course content which is "primarily psychological," constituted arbitrary action and deprived plaintiff of her rights of due process of law.[2] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. MAUGHAN, C.J., and HALL, J., concur. STEWART, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein; SWAN, District Judge, sat. CROCKETT and WILKINS, JJ., do not participate herein. [1] See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.1971); Harnett v. Board of Zoning, Subdivision and Building Appeals, 350 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (D.St. Croix 1972). [2] See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 792 (4th Cir.1977); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976); Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm., 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973), appeal after remand, 20 Or. App. 91, 530 P.2d 887 (1975); see also, White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir.1976); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2nd Cir.1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir.1964); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, pp. 128-140, Sec. 7:26, (2d ed. 1979).