Title: Aschenbrenner v. Nebraska Public Power Dist.
Citation: 206 Neb. 157, 291 N.W.2d 720
Docket Number: 42640
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 1980

291 N.W.2d 720 (1980) 206 Neb. 157 Pete ASCHENBRENNER, Jr., and Mary Aschenbrenner, husband and wife, Robert J. Aschenbrenner and Pete Aschenbrenner III, owners, and Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees, v. NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, a Public Corporation and Political Subdivision of the State of Nebraska, Appellant. No. 42640. Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 29, 1980. *722 Barlow, Johnson, DeMars &amp; Flodman, Lincoln and Raymond, Olsen &amp; Coll, Scottsbluff, for appellant. Wright &amp; Simmons and John A. Selzer, Scottsbluff, for appellees. Heard before KRIVOSHA, C. J., and BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, CLINTON, BRODKEY, WHITE, and HASTINGS, JJ. BRODKEY, Justice. Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) appeals from an order entered by the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, dismissing its appeal of an appraisers' award in a condemnation proceeding. The appellee property owners moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that NPPD failed to file an appeal bond on its appeal to the District Court pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-716 (Reissue 1976). NPPD contended that it was excused from this requirement by virtue of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 70-680 (Reissue 1976), adopted in 1971 as L.B. 310. The District Court found that the aforementioned sections could not be reconciled with each other, that § 70-680 was amendatory legislation, and that said section was unconstitutional under Neb. Const. Art. III, § 14. We reverse and remand. The principal issue presented herein is whether § 70-680 is unconstitutional. Said section provides: The Legislature, in enacting this section, clearly intended to exempt public power districts from the requirement of posting appeal and supersedeas bonds. In the Hearings on L.B. 310 Before the Public Works Comm., 82d Leg., 1st Sess. (February 4, 1971), a proponent, Del E. Dirrim, stated: The District Court found that § 70-680 violated the provisions of Neb. Const. Art. III, § 14, which section provides, in part, as *723 follows: "No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title. And no law shall be amended unless the new act contain the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed." This court has had occasion to consider the applicability of this provision of our Constitution on numerous occasions. Guidelines in this area were set out in State ex rel. Douglas v. Gradwohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975), wherein we stated: Id. at 751, 235 N.W.2d 859. Even more succinct was our statement in Blackledge v. Richards, 194 Neb. 188, 231 N.W.2d 319 (1975): Id. at 192, 231 N.W.2d 323. In examining the validity of a legislative act, this court has often stated that all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283 N.W.2d 12 (1979); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972); United Community Services v. The Omaha Nat. Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956). Of special interest in this connection is Department of Banking v. Foe, 136 Neb. 422, 286 N.W. 264 (1939). That case involved the validity of a legislative act enacted for the purpose of permitting the garnishment of salaries of public officers and employees. In holding the act to be constitutionally permissible under Neb. Const. Art. III, § 14, this court stated: The act in question, as shown by the title, discloses conclusively that it purports to be an independent separate and *724 new act, covering the entire subject to which it relates, and, as it is not amendatory, it does not run counter to section 14, art. III of the Constitution providing: "No law shall be amended unless the new act contain the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed." See, also, State v. Moorhead, 100 Neb. 298, 159 N.W. 412, and Richardson v. Kildow, 116 Neb. 648, 218 N.W. 429. In the latter case it was held: "Where a legislative act, though complete in itself, refers to another act for the procedure to be taken, the latter act, pro tanto, becomes a part of the former to the same extent as though actually incorporated therein." Id. at 427, 286 N.W. 267. With the foregoing authorities in mind, we conclude that § 70-680 is not violative of Neb. Const. Art. III, § 14. It cannot be disputed that the title of § 70-680 calls attention to and makes clear the purpose and subject matter of the statute. We believe that the situation presented in this case is directly analogous to Department of Banking v. Foe, supra, and cannot be distinguished from that case. Moreover, the reasoning employed therein is convincing. Section 70-680 is complete in and of itself, covering the entire area relating to supersedeas and appeal bonding requirements for public power districts. The District Court was therefore incorrect in finding that the legislation herein was amendatory and violative of Neb.Const. Art. III, § 14. The practical difficulty of adopting a contrary rule was well stated in De France v. Harmer, 66 Neb. 14, 92 N.W. 159 (1902), where this court said: Id. at 17, 92 N.W. 160. It is also contended that the statute violates Neb.Const. Art. III, § 18 as it grants special privileges and immunities to public power districts. That section provides: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, that is to say: . . . . . "Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever. . . ." This court has often stated that the power of classification rests with the Legislature and cannot be interfered with by the courts unless it is clearly apparent that the Legislature has by artificial and baseless classification attempted to evade and violate provisions of the Constitution prohibiting local and special legislation. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, supra; Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, supra; City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970). In State ex rel. Meyer v. Knutson, 178 Neb. 375, 379, 133 N.W.2d 577, 581 (1965), we stated: Section 70-680 does not impermissibly grant to public power districts privileges, immunities, or exclusive franchises because of classification. In fact, we believe the statute is in the public interest because it excuses public power districts *725 from the necessity of posting appeal and supersedeas bonds. Such bonds are not necessary since there is little possibility of a public power district being unable to satisfy a judgment rendered against it. The exemption from bonding requirements obviates the necessity of payment of bond premiums and decreases the costs of operation, thus aiding these bodies in minimizing their charges to the consumers. We conclude that the section does indeed promote a public interest which makes the classification reasonable. We find that § 70-680 does not violate Neb.Const. Art. III, § 18. We hold that the District Court was in error in dismissing the action and reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. CLINTON, J., not voting.