Title: Crosley A. Green v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-2265
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-2265 
____________ 
 
CROSLEY A. GREEN,  
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1533 
____________ 
 
CROSLEY ALEXANDER GREEN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[January 31, 2008] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Crosley Green appeals an order of the circuit court granting in part and 
denying in part his motion to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and 
sentence of death.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  The 
State cross-appeals, challenging the trial court’s order granting Green a new 
penalty phase.  As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order and deny 
Green’s petition.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On direct appeal, we summarized the facts of the crime as follows: 
Late in the evening of April 3, 1989, Kim Hallock and [Charles] 
Flynn, whom she had dated, drove to a park in Flynn’s pickup truck.  
They parked near dunes in a wooded area and smoked marijuana.  As 
they smoked, a sheriff’s car drove by and shined its spotlight, but did 
not stop at the truck.  After the sheriff’s car passed, a man walked in 
front of the truck and stopped at the driver’s door.  He warned Hallock 
and Flynn to watch out for the police, then walked on. 
A few minutes later, Flynn stepped outside the truck to relieve 
himself.  Hallock testified that she soon heard Flynn say nervously:  
“Hold on.  Wait a minute, man.  Hold on.  Put it down.”  She retrieved 
a gun from the truck’s glove compartment and put it under some jeans 
on the seat next to her.  She testified that when she looked outside the 
truck, she saw the man she had seen earlier.  He was now walking 
around Flynn and carrying a gun.  The man ordered Flynn to the 
ground, then asked if either of them had any money.  Hallock gave 
him five dollars, but Flynn said he had no money. 
The man then tied Flynn’s hands behind his back with 
shoelaces.  While tying Flynn’s hands, the man’s gun went off but did 
not injure Flynn.  The man pulled Flynn off the ground, found a wallet 
in his pants, and threw it to Hallock, who counted $185. 
The man ordered Hallock to start the truck and to move to the 
center seat.  He put Flynn in the passenger seat and started driving.   
He forced Flynn and Hallock to ride with their heads down and held a 
                                          
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.   
 
 
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gun to Hallock’s side.  During the ride, Flynn found the gun Hallock 
had hidden under the jeans.  The man stopped the truck at an orange 
grove and tried to pull Hallock from the truck.  Hallock freed herself 
and ran around the truck, but the man caught her, threw her to the 
ground, put a gun to her head, and threatened to blow her brains out.   
Flynn got out of the truck and fired a shot, but missed the man.   
Hallock jumped into the truck and locked the doors. She testified that 
she saw the man fire a shot.  Flynn yelled for her to escape, and 
Hallock drove to a friend’s house and called the police. 
When police arrived at the orange grove, they found Flynn 
lying facedown with his hands tied behind his back.  Authorities 
found a loaded .22-caliber revolver nearby.  Flynn was alive when 
police arrived, but he stopped breathing several times and died of a 
single gunshot wound to the chest before paramedics arrived.   
Hallock later identified Green as the man she saw in the park. 
In sentencing Green to death, the trial judge found four 
aggravating factors:  (1) Green was previously convicted of a violent 
felony; (2) the capital felony was committed while Green was 
engaged in kidnapping; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary 
gain; and (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel.  
The judge found no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors.  He 
also sentenced Green to four concurrent twenty-year sentences for the 
robbery and kidnapping convictions.  These terms were to be served 
consecutively to the death sentence. 
Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 393-94 (Fla. 1994).  We affirmed Green’s sentence 
and conviction on direct appeal.2   
                                          
 
2.  Green raised nine issues on direct appeal:  (1) the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of dog scent tracking; (2) the trial court erred in denying 
Green’s motion to suppress Kim Hallock’s identifications; (3) the trial court erred 
in denying Green’s motion for the jury to view the murder scene; (4) the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on flight; (5) the trial court erred in considering as 
separate aggravating circumstances that Green committed the murder for pecuniary 
gain and that Green committed the murder during a kidnapping; (6) the trial court 
erred in finding that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (7) the trial court 
improperly refused to find mitigating circumstances; (8) the death penalty is 
disproportionate; and (9) the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator is 
 
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Green subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 
3.851, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1996), in which he raised several 
claims and subclaims.3  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, and 
subsequently granted Green a new penalty phase proceeding based on counsel’s 
failure to investigate Green’s prior New York robbery case.   
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Green raises the following six guilt phase issues on appeal:  (1) Green’s 
convictions are constitutionally unreliable as established by newly discovered 
evidence; (2) Green was denied due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), when the State suppressed evidence; (3) trial counsel provided 
                                                                                                                                        
unconstitutionally vague.  Green, 641 So. 2d at 394 n.1.  We found no merit in the 
first five issues.  As to the sixth issue, we struck the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
aggravator, but found that the error was harmless given the other three aggravating 
factors.  Id. at 396.  With regard to the seventh issue, we agreed that, although the 
sentencing order did not strictly comply with Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 
420 (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds by Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 
1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000), its requirements were met anyway.  See Green, 641 So. 2d 
at 396 n.3.  Finally, under the eighth issue, we found that, “in light of other cases, 
the three remaining valid aggravating circumstances, and no mitigators, . . . 
Green’s death sentence is proportionate.”  Id. at 396. 
 
3.  Green claimed the following:  (1) juror misconduct; (2) 
unconstitutionality of the rules prohibiting juror interviews; (3) ineffective 
assistance of counsel; (4) suppression of evidence; (5) presentation of false or 
misleading testimony; (6) newly discovered evidence negating guilt; (7) various 
issues relating to Green’s prior New York offense; (8) various issues regarding dog 
tracking evidence; (9) unconstitutionality of Florida’s application of its death 
penalty statute; (10) unconstitutionality of penalty phase jury instructions; (11) 
cruel and unusual punishment; and (12) cumulative error. 
 
 
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constitutionally ineffective assistance; (4) the trial court erred in denying relief 
with regard to dog tracking evidence; (5) the rules prohibiting Green’s lawyers 
from interviewing jurors are unconstitutional; and (6) the trial court erred in 
summarily denying Green’s claims regarding juror misconduct and counsel’s 
failure to challenge cross-race identification.  We address each in turn below.  
Because we affirm the trial court’s order granting a new penalty phase based on the 
issue raised in the State’s cross-appeal regarding Green’s prior New York robbery 
case, we do not reach the other penalty phase issues provisionally asserted in 
Green’s postconviction appeal. 
A.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
Green first argues that his convictions are constitutionally unreliable as 
established by newly discovered evidence.  To obtain a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements:  First, the evidence 
must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of 
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have 
known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly discovered evidence must 
be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones 
v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II).  Newly discovered evidence 
satisfies the second prong of this test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] 
so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting 
 
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Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996) (Jones I)).  In determining whether 
the evidence compels a new trial, the trial court must “consider all newly 
discovered evidence which would be admissible,” and must “evaluate the weight of 
both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the 
trial.”  Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991).  This determination includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence.  
 
Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted). 
 
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an 
evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s findings on questions of fact, the 
credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial 
evidence.  Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 
702 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997).  As with rulings on other postconviction 
claims, we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.  Cf. 
Hendrix v. State, 908 So. 2d 412, 423 (Fla. 2005) (reviewing de novo the trial 
court’s application of the law to the facts in ruling on a postconviction claim that 
the government withheld material evidence); Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 468 
(Fla. 2003) (reviewing de novo the application of the law to the facts on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel). 
 
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Green argues that his convictions are constitutionally unreliable in light of 
the subsequent recantations of three of the State’s guilt phase witnesses.  Green 
also argues that the trial court erred by considering new evidence of guilt at the 
evidentiary hearing, including the testimony of Layman Lane and mitochondrial 
DNA (mDNA) testing on hair fragments found in the victim’s truck.  We address 
both of these arguments in turn. 
(1)  New Evidence Negating Guilt 
First, Green argues that his convictions are constitutionally unreliable in 
light of the fact that Sheila Green, Lonnie Hillery, and Jerome Murray, three of the 
State guilt phase witnesses, have recanted their trial testimony.  The trial court 
made the following factual findings:  First, Jerome Murray testified at Green’s trial 
that, shortly after the murder, Green admitted committing it and said he was going 
to disappear.  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the defense introduced 
three out-of-court statements made by Murray in which he recanted his trial 
testimony.  In these statements, Murray stated that his entire testimony was a lie 
and that he was under pressure from law enforcement to fabricate.  However, at the 
evidentiary hearing, Murray claimed that he did not remember making these post-
trial statements because he was either tired or drunk.  When questioned about 
whether his post-sentencing statements were inconsistent with his trial testimony, 
Murray exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
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Second, Sheila Green is Crosley Green’s sister.  At Green’s trial, Sheila 
testified that the day after the homicide, Green admitted his involvement in the 
shooting to her.  Sheila had been convicted in federal court for drug offenses and 
testified against Green in return for consideration for a more lenient sentence for 
herself.  At the evidentiary hearing, Sheila testified that her testimony at Green’s 
trial was untrue and that Green never confessed to murdering Charles Flynn.   
 
Third, Lonnie Hillery is the father of Sheila Green’s child, and was her 
boyfriend at the time of Green’s trial.  Hillery also testified that Green admitted his 
involvement in the shooting to him.  At the evidentiary hearing, Hillery said that he 
made up the story as part of a plea deal to help Sheila receive a more lenient 
sentence in her case. 
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.  Jerome Murray’s out of 
court recantation would not likely produce an acquittal on retrial because it would 
only serve as impeachment to his original testimony.  Further, the postconviction 
court found both Sheila Green’s and Lonnie Hillery’s recantations incredible based 
on their responses, demeanor, and body language.  We generally defer to the trial 
judge regarding these credibility determinations.  See Melendez, 718 So. 2d at 747-
48; Blanco, 702 So. 2d at 1251; see also Bell v. State, 90 So. 2d 704, 704 (Fla. 
1956) (“[R]ecanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the 
court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true.”).   
 
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Moreover, when weighed against the other admissible evidence, the recantations of 
Jerome Murray, Sheila Green, and Lonnie Hillery do not create a reasonable 
probability of acquittal on retrial.  See Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915. 
(2)  New Evidence of Guilt 
 
Green further claims the trial court erred in considering the postconviction 
testimony of Layman Lane (who testified that, a few days after the murder, Green 
admitted shooting someone) and mDNA test results on several hairs found in 
Flynn’s truck (which did not rule out Green as a contributor).  Green cites 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), arguing that substantive evidence of guilt must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  However, Apprendi and Ring are inapplicable because they 
require a jury determination only for facts which would increase the penalty for the 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.  On a motion for postconviction 
relief alleging newly discovered evidence, the trial court is not imposing a 
sentence, but rather, is considering all admissible evidence and evaluating whether 
a new trial is warranted.  See Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915.  This includes new evidence 
of guilt.   
Moreover, even if the trial court erred in considering this evidence, such 
error was harmless.  The trial court listed a plethora of other admissible evidence 
of Green’s guilt, including:  (1) trial testimony of the surviving victim identifying 
 
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Green as the person who robbed, abducted, and shot Charles Flynn; (2) trial 
testimony of two witnesses who saw Green earlier in the evening at Holder Park, 
the location where the abduction occurred; (3) trial testimony of Deputy O’Dell  
Kiser tracking the scent from the abduction scene to Green’s sister’s residence near 
Holder Park; (4) trial testimony of Sheila Green of Green’s admission to the 
shooting, which is admissible upon retrial as substantive evidence; (5) trial 
testimony of Lonnie Hillery of Green admitting to being involved in an altercation, 
which is admissible upon retrial as substantive evidence; (6) trial testimony of 
Jerome Murray that Green killed somebody and was going to disappear.  
Therefore, the trial court’s decision did not hinge on Lane’s testimony or the 
mDNA evidence.  Even without this evidence, the dubious recantations of Murray, 
Hillery, and Sheila Green do not weaken the case against Green so as to give rise 
to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.  See Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521. 
B.  Suppression of Evidence  
Next, Green argues that he was denied due process under Brady when the 
State suppressed documents related to a box of loose photographs used in creating 
a composite drawing of the perpetrator.  Because Green fails to prove materiality, 
this claim is denied. 
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its 
possession or control that is favorable to the defense.  Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 
 
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2d 161, 168 (Fla. 2004).  To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the 
burden to show (1) that favorable evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) 
was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the 
evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  
To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that had the suppressed evidence been disclosed the jury would have 
reached a different verdict.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Way, 760 So. 2d 
at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.  The remedy of retrial for the State’s 
suppression of evidence favorable to the defense is available when “the favorable 
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light 
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  Giving deference to the trial court on 
questions of fact, this Court reviews de novo the application of the law and 
independently reviews the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence.  See 
Mordenti, 894 So. 2d at 169; Way, 760 So. 2d at 913.   
Green submitted an exhibit consisting of evidence he claims was suppressed 
by the State, including:  (1) a series of three-by-five cards with information about 
certain individuals handwritten on them; (2) police reports referring to the names 
 
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on the cards; and (3) booking photos accompanying documents titled “case 
memorandum” with names, addresses and other identifying data.  The three-by-
five cards had notations made by Sergeant Thomas Fair, supervisor of the 
homicide squad of the Brevard County Sheriff’s Department, as Kim Hallock was 
going through a box of loose photographs.  The individuals in the photographs 
corresponded to persons on the cards and other documents in Green’s exhibit.  
According to the testimony of investigating officers, Hallock viewed these 
photographs and picked out individuals who had facial characteristics similar to 
those of the perpetrator to assist a police artist in creating a composite drawing of 
the suspect.  Based on these photos, a composite drawing was created and 
circulated, and as a result, Green was developed as a suspect.  According to Green, 
the photographs were returned to wherever they came from so that, despite defense 
counsel’s efforts to find out, it became impossible to reconstruct whose 
photographs were shown to Hallock or which ones she picked out.  Green contends 
that the overwhelming likelihood is that his photo was mixed in with the loose 
photos, and that Kim Hallock did not identify him.  Green argues that this could 
have provided a new basis for impeachment of Hallock’s subsequent identification 
of Green in a photo lineup containing a photograph of Green obtained from the 
Department of Corrections.   
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel Parker first testified that he did 
not recall whether he received these documents.  Parker stated that if he had these 
documents, he would have utilized them during the course of the suppression 
hearing regarding identity.  However, later, Parker testified that he thought he did, 
in fact, receive the three-by-five cards because he believed he had the photograph 
of a person named Mitchell whom he attempted to develop as another suspect.  
Parker testified that he was aware that Hallock looked through the box of 
photographs and picked out photographs of individuals who looked similar to the 
murderer.  
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.  Notes from which a police 
or investigative report were compiled are not subject to disclosure under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(B).  See Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 
959-60 (Fla. 1996); Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1992).  Moreover, it is 
unclear whether defense counsel Parker received the documents.  And, even if 
Parker did not receive the documents, it would be speculation to conclude that 
Green’s photograph was in the initial box of loose photographs.  Therefore, Green 
fails to establish a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict had this evidence been presented.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
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Next, Green argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  In 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court established a two-prong 
standard for determining whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance.  First, a defendant must point to specific acts or omissions of counsel 
that are “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687.  Second, the defendant must 
establish prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  Claims of ineffective assistance 
present mixed questions of law and fact subject to plenary review.  Occhicone v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Fla. 2000).  This Court independently reviews the 
trial court’s legal conclusions and defers to the trial court’s findings of fact. 
Green argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for (1) 
failing to obtain and maintain a file obtained from his predecessor defense counsel; 
(2) failing to impeach Kim Hallock; (3) failing to impeach Jerome Murray; and (4) 
failing to challenge a prospective juror.    
(1)  The Defense File 
Green alleges that a file containing a photographic lineup that was proffered 
at his bond hearing, a copy of which was provided to predecessor defense counsel, 
 
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Assistant Public Defender Greg Hammel, should have been transferred and 
preserved by trial counsel, Rob Parker.  Green claims that a different photographic 
lineup was introduced at trial.  According to Green, the prior inconsistent lineup 
could have been used to impeach the testimony of Kim Hallock identifying Green 
as the perpetrator, the police who conducted the lineup, and the investigative 
methods used in this case generally.  Green further contends that the existence and 
use of the lineup also would have provided substantive evidence discrediting 
identification.   
We conclude that trial counsel Parker was not ineffective in failing to 
maintain Green’s file.  As the trial court found, this issue arose when Green told 
Parker that the photo lineup introduced at trial did not look like the one that he saw 
during the suppression hearing when he was represented by Hammel.  Hammel 
advised Parker that it appeared to be the same lineup and testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he was not aware of any different lineup.  Parker’s 
performance was not defective for failing to maintain the file because it is unclear 
whether it ever contained a different photo lineup.  For the same reason, it would 
be speculative to conclude that but for Parker’s loss or destruction of the file, the 
outcome of the postconviction proceeding would have been different.  Therefore, 
Green fails to prove both prongs of the Strickland standard.  Maharaj v. State, 778 
So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000). 
 
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(2)  Failure to Impeach Hallock 
Green claims that defense counsel Parker rendered ineffective assistance in 
failing to impeach Kim Hallock at trial with a police report containing an alleged 
prior inconsistent statement that she, rather than Green, had been the one to tie 
Charles Flynn’s hands.  According to Green, Deputy Wade Walker stated in a 
report filed in 1999 pursuant to a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) 
investigation that Hallock told him that the perpetrator made her tie Flynn’s hands 
behind his back with a shoestring.  Green argues that the information in the FDLE 
report contradicts Hallock’s subsequent statements and trial testimony that Green 
himself tied Flynn’s hands.  However, Walker was not called to testify at the 
evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, the trial court was left only with the allegations in 
Green’s postconviction motion as to what Walker purportedly said in the FDLE 
report.   
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim because Green provided no 
supporting evidence to establish that Hallock actually made this statement to 
Walker.  Furthermore, Parker was not ineffective for failing to impeach Hallock 
with this statement because Parker impeached Hallock with numerous other 
inconsistent statements.  No prejudice resulted from counsel’s failure to present 
cumulative evidence of inconsistent statements.  See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 
25, 42 (Fla. 2005); Maharaj, 778 So. 2d at 957. 
 
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(3)  Failure to Impeach Jerome Murray 
Additionally, Green claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
impeach a State’s witness, Jerome Murray.  Green argues that counsel should have 
obtained copies of Murray’s three felony convictions and used them to impeach 
Murray.  This claim is procedurally barred because it was neither raised in Green’s 
3.851 motion nor addressed by the trial court.   
(4)  Failure to Challenge a Prospective Juror 
Green argues that defense counsel Parker was ineffective for failing to seek 
to have juror Guiles excused for cause or to peremptorily strike him because of a 
statement that he made during voir dire that his niece had been murdered three 
years earlier and for failing to ask follow-up questions.  During voir dire, the 
following exchange took place: 
 
The Court:  Have any of you been the victim of a crime or has 
any member of your immediate family been the victim of a crime? 
 
. . . . 
 
Mr. Guiles:  My niece was murdered, but that’s not immediate 
family. 
 
The Court:  How long ago was that? 
 
Mr. Guiles:  Three years ago. 
 
The Court:  Three years ago? 
 
Mr. Guiles:  (Nods head.) 
 
The Court:  Where was it? 
 
Mr. Guiles:  In Naples. 
 
The Court:  Would you be able to set aside that? 
 
Mr. Guiles:  Well, it doesn’t seem like it’s the same kind of 
thing. 
 
The Court:  Would you be able to set it aside and not let it 
affect the case? 
 
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Mr. Guiles:  Yes. 
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim because Green fails to meet 
both prongs of the Strickland standard.  First, Green was not prejudiced by 
Parker’s failure to remove Guiles for cause because the trial court inquired whether 
the murder of Guiles’ niece would affect his decision in the case.  Guiles said that 
it would not.  Thus, Guiles met the test for juror competency enunciated in Davis 
v. State, 461 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. 1984) (“The test for determining juror competency 
is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely 
upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given . . . by the 
court.”).  Second, Parker did not render ineffective assistance in failing to ask 
Guiles more questions, because an allegation that there would have been a basis for 
a for cause challenge if counsel had followed up during voir dire with more 
specific questions is speculative.  Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888, 896 (Fla. 
2005); Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 939 (Fla. 2002).  Third, Parker’s 
performance was not deficient for failing to exercise a peremptory strike to remove 
Guiles.  At the evidentiary hearing, Parker testified that he was satisfied that juror 
Guiles would be able to follow the law regarding the weighing of the evidence and 
separate himself from the fact that his niece had been killed.  This decision does 
not fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  See Davis, 
461 So. 2d at 70. 
 
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D.  Dog Tracking Evidence 
Next, Green asserts that the trial court erred in denying relief with regard to 
dog tracking evidence.  Specifically, Green argues:  (1) that the State withheld 
impeaching dog track evidence in violation of Brady; (2) that the State 
affirmatively misled the jury to believe that no such evidence existed in violation 
of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); (3) that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to discover and use dog tracking evidence for impeachment purposes; 
and (4) that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on dog 
tracking evidence.  These claims are both procedurally barred and meritless. 
(1)  Procedural Bar 
These issues are procedurally barred because they either were or should have 
been raised on direct appeal.  See Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 
2006) (“[A] claim that could and should have been raised on direct appeal is 
procedurally barred.”) (citing Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1120 (Fla. 2005), 
cert. dismissed, 547 U.S. 1053 (2006), and cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 206 (2006); 
Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 234 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 103 
(2006); Robinson v. State, 913 So. 2d 514, 524 n.9 (Fla. 2005)).  Proceedings 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 are not to be used as a second 
appeal.  Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1991) (citing State v. Bolender, 
503 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1987)).  Moreover, it is inappropriate to use a different 
 
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argument to relitigate the same issue.  Id. (citing Quince v. State, 477 So. 2d 535 
(Fla. 1985)).  Allegations of ineffective assistance cannot be used to circumvent 
the rule that postconviction proceedings cannot serve as a second appeal.  Id. 
(citing Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1987); Sireci v. State, 469 So. 
2d 119 (Fla. 1985)).    
On direct appeal, Green argued that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of dog scent tracking.  This Court summarized the facts related to the dog 
track evidence in Green’s case as follows: 
 
Within hours of the murder, a police dog tracked footprints 
from the dunes area to a house where Green’s sister lived.  The 
footprints at the dune area were never identified as Green’s, but the 
trial judge admitted the scent-tracking evidence over defense 
objection because the character and dependability of the dog were 
established, the officer who handled the dog was trained, and the 
evidence was relevant.  In addition, there were indicia of reliability:  
the tracking occurred within hours of the crime and the area had been 
secured shortly after the crime occurred, both of which greatly 
reduced the danger of a trail being left after the crime and a mistaken 
scent, and there was a continuous track to the home of Green’s sister.  
The trial judge found that although the scent tracking was the only 
evidence that established Green’s identity, corroboration included 
admissions by Green, Green’s presence at the crime scene near the 
time of the crime, and Green’s presence at his sister’s house earlier 
that day.   
Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1994).  We found that the trial court did 
not err in admitting evidence of dog scent tracking because a proper predicate for 
the admission of this evidence was established.  Because the dog tracking issue 
 
- 20 -
was raised on direct appeal, Green is not permitted to relitigate it on postconviction 
appeal. 
(2)  Suppression of the Dog’s Records 
Green argues that the State withheld impeaching dog track evidence in 
violation of Brady.  We conclude that there was no Brady violation because the 
training and certification performance records of the dog (“Czar”) were available 
to defense counsel through the Criminal Justice Institute.  Also, Deputy Kiser 
provided defense counsel with Czar’s “Working Dog Training and Utilization 
Records,” early on in the discovery process, along with the synopsis of those 
records created by Assistant State Attorney White in preparation for trial.  
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
(3)  False Testimony 
Next, Green claims that the State affirmatively misled the jury to believe that 
no such evidence existed in violation of Giglio.  We affirm the trial court’s denial 
of this claim.  A claim under Giglio alleges that a prosecutor knowingly presented 
false testimony against the defendant.  A Giglio violation is demonstrated when (1) 
the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor 
knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material.  Guzman v. 
State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006).  Once the first two prongs are 
established, the false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable 
 
- 21 -
possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.  Id.  Under this standard, 
the State has the burden to prove that the false testimony was not material by 
demonstrating it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  Giglio claims 
present mixed questions of law and fact.  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 785 (Fla. 
2004).  We thus defer to those factual findings supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, but we review de novo the application of the law to the facts.  Id.    
Green argues that testimony elicited by Assistant State Attorney White from 
Deputy Kiser at trial to the effect that the dog, Czar, “had never made a mistake” 
constitutes a Giglio error.  This claim lacks merit because no false testimony was 
elicited.  The trial court found that the State did not elicit testimony at trial that 
Czar “never made a mistake.”  The State only established that Czar did not leave 
the test track and begin tracking a cross-track of a human or animal, while leading 
his handler to believe that he was on the original trail.   
(4)  Failure to Impeach the Dog’s Abilities 
Green claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and use dog 
tracking evidence for impeachment purposes.  However, counsel was not 
ineffective because the records do not contain substantive evidence with which to 
impeach the dog’s abilities.  Deputy Kiser testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
the reports note occasions that the dog refused to track, lost and regained a track, 
and missed turns but do not indicate that the dog erroneously followed a cross-
 
- 22 -
track or indicated by his behavior that he was tracking a trail of several hundred 
yards when in fact he was off the trail and just acting like he was tracking.  As 
Deputy Kiser and Bobby Mutter, the State’s expert, testified, the dog’s handler can 
tell by his behavior when the dog loses the scent.  But there was no indication that 
Czar lost the scent in this case.  Evidence was presented that the dog was tracking 
on a partly visible tennis shoe trail that led to the location of the victim Flynn’s 
truck.  The trial court determined that the visible tracks led from the area where 
Kiser started the dog (twenty yards off the road) to the area where the truck had 
been parked.  Deputy Kiser scented the dog in a sandy open area where the visible 
tracks were remote from any other visible tracks and watched the dog follow those 
continuous tracks backwards until they could no longer be seen and on to the house 
where Green stayed.  Because these records lack impeachment value, Green does 
not establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to use them, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court’s finding that Green fails to show prejudice under Strickland. 
(5)  Failure to Consult With an Expert  
Green argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert 
witness on dog tracking evidence.  Green contends that the expert could have 
reviewed the dog’s training, certification, and track records to assist the defense.  
 
- 23 -
Also, Green claims that the expert could have established for the jury that the dog 
was old and his record showed many vital mistakes in tracking.   
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim because Green has not 
established the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.  Green fails to show a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to consult with an expert, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  The State’s expert at the 
evidentiary hearing, Bobby Mutter, had more experience in training police dogs 
than the defense’s expert, Dr. Warren James Woodford.  Further, Mutter had 
personal knowledge of working with Deputy Kiser and Czar.  While Dr. Woodford 
admitted that it was possible for a dog to follow the track that was done in this case 
even if not trained and certified in variable surface tracking, Mutter testified that 
all police trailing dogs do variable surface tracking and that the track in this case 
was elementary.  The two experts testified oppositely on many factors such as the 
effect of dew on the ground, whether a six-hour-old trial is too old, whether Czar’s 
training was adequate, and whether Czar was too old.  The court found Mutter 
more credible.  This finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is, 
therefore, entitled to deference.  See Sims v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S477 (Fla. 
July 12, 2007) (“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling after an evidentiary hearing 
on an ineffective assistance claim, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s 
factual findings to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence 
 
- 24 -
. . . .”) (quoting Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006)).  Therefore, we 
affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
E.  Jurors Interviews 
Next, Green argues that the rules prohibiting his lawyers from interviewing 
jurors are unconstitutional.  Green asserts this claim solely for the purpose of 
preserving it for review and, therefore, makes no supporting allegations.  This 
Court has previously rejected constitutional challenges to Florida Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4).  See Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 957 (Fla. 
2004); State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817, 826 & n.7 (Fla. 2004); Johnson v. State, 
804 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (Fla. 2001).  Furthermore, “juror interviews are not 
permissible unless the moving party has made sworn allegations that, if true, would 
require the court to order a new trial because the alleged error was so fundamental 
and prejudicial as to vitiate the entire proceedings.”  Johnson, 804 So. 2d at 1225 
(citing Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1991)).  
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
F.  Summarily Denied Claims 
(1)  Cross-Race Identification 
Green claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying Green’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to challenge 
cross-race identification.  Generally, “a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
 
- 25 -
hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records 
in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the 
motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.”  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d).  Additionally, “where 
no evidentiary hearing is held below, we must accept the defendant’s factual 
allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record.”  Peede v. State, 748 
So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).   
Green claims that counsel should have retained an expert witness on cross-
race identification, requested a special instruction, and cross-examined Hallock on 
her ability to identify African-American people.  First, the record conclusively 
shows that Green is not entitled to relief based on his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on cross-race identification.  It is 
unlikely that such testimony would have been admitted.  See Johnson v. State, 438 
So. 2d 774, 777 (1983) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow a professor of psychology to testify as an expert witness in the 
field of eyewitness identification); see also McMullen v. State 714 So. 2d 368, 372 
(Fla. 1998) (“Johnson could be interpreted as a per se rule of inadmissibility of this 
type of testimony.”). 
Second, Green’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
jury instruction on cross-race identification is legally insufficient.  Florida does not 
 
- 26 -
have a standard instruction on cross-race identification, and there is no reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had such an 
instruction been given.  Therefore, counsel’s performance was not deficient for 
failing to request an instruction, and no prejudice resulted.  
Third, the record conclusively shows that Green is entitled to no relief based 
on his claim regarding counsel’s failure at trial to cross-examine Hallock on cross-
race identification.  At the suppression hearing, Parker cross-examined Hallock on 
her interactions with black people.  Hallock testified that she knew and 
occasionally socialized with particular black people.  Her testimony was neutral 
with regard to her ability to identify Green.  Therefore, Parker’s decision at trial 
not to cross-examine her again on this subject was not unreasonable.  Accordingly, 
Parker’s performance was not deficient under Strickland, and his failure to cross-
examine Hallock at trial did not prejudice Green. 
(2)  Juror Misconduct 
Green argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his due process 
claims based on juror misconduct.  During the guilt phase of Green’s trial, defense 
counsel made a motion for mistrial based on juror misconduct.  Tim Curtis, a 
witness for the State, testified that he saw an older gentleman in a burgundy 
Aerostar van in the parking lot.  Curtis testified that he waved at the man, and in 
response, the man raised his hand to his throat and made a slashing motion.  Curtis 
 
- 27 -
thought this man looked like one of the Green jurors.  The court questioned jurors 
Guiles and Bartholomew about the type of vehicles they drove, but neither drove a 
burgundy Aerostar van.  Curtis did not identify either Guiles or Bartholomew as 
the man he saw in the parking lot.  Therefore, the trial court denied Green’s motion 
for mistrial.   
Then, On August 6, 1999, Tim Curtis signed a document titled “Affidavit” 
and witnessed by investigators Paul J. Ciolino and Joseph M. Mourna.  This 
document states in pertinent part: 
After I testified I was in the parking lot at the courthouse when a 
juror, a white male, made a slashing motion with his finger across his 
throat, indicating to me that Green was dead.  I told a person the next 
day Green is dead knowing that a jury member had made up his mind 
to convict Crosley Green.  The next day I was brought into court to 
identify the juror prior to the hearing[.]  I had lunch with two 
detectives from the Sheriffs office who told me that if I identified this 
juror, there would be a mistrial and Crosley Green would go free.  I 
lied at the hearing.  I told the judge that I did not see the man who did 
this slashing motion in fact I did see the man and he was on the jury 
and in court the day.  I have read and reviewed this statement and it is 
true to the best of my knowledge. 
However, in his October 30, 2001, deposition, Curtis stated under oath that he did 
not write the statement.  Curtis refused to answer any questions as to whether he 
signed the statement or whether he saw a juror making the slashing gesture and 
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.  Green does not demonstrate 
how he can authenticate the writing allegedly written and signed by Tim Curtis 
 
- 28 -
recanting his former testimony that the man who made the slashing gesture was not 
on the jury.  Curtis has invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and jurors cannot be called to testify to matters that inhere to the 
verdict under section 90.607(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987).  Because this claim is 
legally insufficient, the trial court properly denied it without an evidentiary 
hearing.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000); see also Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.850(d).   
III.  THE STATE’S CROSS-APPEAL 
On cross-appeal, the State maintains that the trial court erred in ordering a 
new penalty phase because Green’s trial counsel was not ineffective in 
investigating his prior New York conviction.  We first explain the factual 
background of this claim.  We then discuss the United States Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (holding that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to review the court 
file on the defendant’s prior conviction).  Finally, applying Rompilla and the 
Strickland standard to the facts of Green’s case, we affirm the trial court’s 
determination that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the case file in 
Green’s prior New York case.   
A.  Facts 
 
- 29 -
In its well-written order, the trial court made findings of fact that are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.  During the penalty 
phase on September 27, 1990, the State presented testimony from three witnesses 
pertaining to the prior violent felony conviction.  Arguing remoteness, defense 
counsel Parker moved to exclude evidence of the New York offense.  The court 
denied that motion.  During the penalty phase charge conference, Parker objected 
to the use of the New York offense to sustain the prior violent aggravator, stating: 
I would argue that the previous felony involving violence 
because it was youthful offender status should not be considered in 
this circumstance.  However, I make that argument knowing full well 
that [Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 1990),] says there is 
no reason why you can’t consider a juvenile conviction for a violent 
crime as an aggravating circumstance. 
The court overruled that objection.  After the jury returned an eight-to-four 
advisory recommendation for the death penalty, the court ordered a presentence 
investigation.  The presentence investigation reported “JUVENILE RECORD:  
none ascertained.”  The presentence investigation listed under the Green’s adult 
record an armed robbery from Albion, New York, indicating: 
01/25/77 Adj. as youthful offender.  Indeterminate 
sentence of 0-4 years to state prison.  Parolled (sic) 
1/26/78.  A warrant for violation of parole was issued on 
8/8/78.  The defendant had been transferred to Florida 
and absconded while on supervision there. 
In his sentencing memorandum, Parker specifically argued that the State 
failed to meet its burden of establishing the prior conviction aggravator beyond a 
 
- 30 -
reasonable doubt because it never introduced into evidence a certified copy of a 
judgment and sentence as to Green’s prior conviction.  At the Spencer-type 
hearing,4 Parker further argued that, if the State proved the prior conviction 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt and that it was for a violent crime, the court 
still had to view it in light of the surrounding circumstances, including the age of 
the defendant at the time this particular crime allegedly occurred and the fact that 
he received youthful offender treatment in that regard. 
 
In his postconviction motion, Green alleged that he had never been 
convicted of armed robbery in New York, that whatever conviction he did have 
was vacated, and that counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate and 
challenge this.  An evidentiary hearing was held on this claim.  The evidence 
showed that on January 19, 1977, Green pled guilty to “robbery in the third 
degree” in the State of New York.  The robbery offense occurred in the County of 
Orleans in New York on April 18, 1976.  At the time of committing the offense, 
Green was eighteen years old.  On January 25, 1977, at the sentencing proceeding 
for that offense, Judge Hamilton Doherty pronounced the following sentence:   
Well, the Court finds that you are eligible for youthful offender 
treatment, and the conviction of robbery in the third degree is vacated 
and the finding of youthful offender is made.  That may not sound like 
                                          
 
4.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993), had not been decided at the 
time of Green’s sentencing procedure; however, the trial judge used a comparable 
procedure by having oral arguments on the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances on November 7, 1990. 
 
- 31 -
any big deal, but what that does is relieve you of a criminal record.  
You now have no criminal record in spite of the fact that this was a 
serious crime. 
. . . . 
We’re giving you that consideration because of your age.  For 
your adjudication as a youthful offender, it’s the judgment of this 
Court that you be, and you hereby are, sentenced to an indeterminate 
term not to exceed four years at the Elmira Reception – or an 
indeterminate term not to exceed four years under the supervision of 
the Department of Correctional Services of the State of New York, 
and you’re to be delivered by the Sheriff of Orleans County to the 
Reception Center at Elmira, New York, there to be dealt with in 
accordance with the law relating to your sentence.  You’re to be given 
full time – full credit for the time you’ve already served.  Remanded 
to the custody of the Sheriff.  Mr. Green, you have a right to appeal 
from this judgment.  If you intend to appeal, you should talk with Mr. 
Russelli about it.  Your appeal – notice of appeal must be filed within 
thirty days. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing in this case, Green’s trial counsel testified that he 
made no efforts to verify the New York conviction by obtaining Green’s court file 
from New York.  Counsel testified that the reason he did not attempt to obtain the 
file was because Green admitted to committing the crime. 
B.  Rompilla 
In a related case, the United States Supreme Court held that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to review the court file on the 
defendant’s prior conviction.  See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377.  Applying the 
Strickland standard, the Supreme Court stated counsel’s performance was deficient 
for several reasons.  First, counsel knew that the prosecution intended to seek the 
death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions 
 
- 32 -
indicating the use or threat of violence.  Second, the prior offense court file was 
readily available and relatively small.  Third, the prior offense was similar to the 
crime charged.  And fourth, there was a great risk that testimony about a similar 
violent crime would hamstring counsel’s chosen defense of residual doubt.  Id. at 
383-86, 389-90.  The Supreme Court determined that counsel’s lapse was 
prejudicial because “[i]f the defense lawyers had looked in the file on Rompilla’s 
prior conviction, it is uncontested they would have found a range of mitigation 
leads that no other source had opened up.”  Id. at 390.  Based on this evidence, the 
Supreme Court concluded that counsel would have built a mitigation case rather 
than relying on residual doubt.  Id. at 391.  The Supreme Court determined that the 
undiscovered mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, would likely have influenced 
the jury’s appraisal of Rompilla’s culpability.  Therefore, the likelihood of a 
different result was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id. at 376. 
C.  Analysis 
We affirm the trial court’s decision ordering a new sentencing phase because 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Green’s case.  We discuss the 
application of the performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland standard to 
the facts of this case in light of Rompilla. 
(1) Performance 
 
- 33 -
First, defense counsel Parker’s performance was deficient.  Parker knew that 
the State would submit evidence of the prior violent felony and that the prior case 
file was readily available, yet he failed to obtain and review the file.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Parker stated that he made no effort to obtain the New York 
file because Green admitted committing the crime.  However, according to 
Rompilla, “even when a capital defendant’s family members and the defendant 
himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is 
bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows 
the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing 
phase of trial.”  545 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).  Therefore, regardless of 
Green's admission to counsel, under the facts of this case, failure to obtain the 
readily available New York file constitutes deficient performance.  
The impact of this failure to obtain the New York file is amplified by the 
fact that Parker made no attempt to argue that under New York law, a youthful 
offender adjudication is not a “conviction” and, therefore, does not satisfy the prior 
violent felony conviction aggravator under Florida’s death penalty statute.  See § 
921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987).5  We look both to Florida law and to the law of 
                                          
 
5.  Under section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), the prior violent 
felony conviction aggravator is established if the State proves, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or 
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
- 34 -
the state in which the adjudication was entered to determine whether the 
adjudication constitutes a conviction for purposes of the prior violent felony 
aggravator.  See Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 939, 944 (Fla. 1995) (holding tha
out-of-state juvenile adjudication is not a conviction as defined under North 
Carolina or Florida statutes) (citing § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993); § 39.053, 
Fla. Stat. (1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-638 (1993)).  Under Florida’s youthful 
t an 
offender statute,6 youthful offender status appertains to the sentence rather than to 
                                                                                                                                        
 
6.  Section 958.03(5), Florida Statutes (2006), defines “youthful offender” as 
“any person who is sentenced as such by the court or is classified as such by the 
department pursuant to s. 958.04.”  Further, trial judges have discretion under 
section 985.565(4)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2006), to sentence defendants who 
qualify as youthful offenders either as adults, as youthful offenders, or as juveniles: 
If a child who has been transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant 
to information or waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is found to have 
committed a violation of state law or a lesser included offense for 
which he or she was charged as a part of the criminal episode, the 
court may sentence as follows: 
a. As an adult; 
apter 958;  or 
b. [As a youthful offender u]nder ch
c. As a juvenile under this section. 
Further, section 958.04(2) states: 
In lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law and 
notwithstanding any imposition of consecutive sentences, the court 
shall dispose of the criminal case as follows: 
 
(a) The court may place a youthful offender under supervision 
on probation or in a community control program, with or without an 
adjudication of guilt, under such conditions as the court may lawfully 
impose for a period of not more than 6 years. . . .   
 
- 35 -
the adjudication.  If the trial court adjudicates the defendant guilty of the charge
offense and orders a youthful offender sentence, then the adjudication counts as
conviction.  However, no conviction results if the trial court withholds adjudication 
and sentences the defendant as a youthful offender.  Thus, in Florida, youthful 
offender status does not bear on the issue of whether the adjudication constitutes a
conviction.   
d 
 a 
 
By contrast, under New York law, a youthful offender adjudication is not a 
judgment of conviction.  N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 720.10, .20, .35 (McKinney 
1995 & Supp. 2007); People v. Cook, 338 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 1975); Gold v. 
Gartenstein, 418 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1979); People v. Y.O. 2404, 291 
N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1968); People v. J.K., 520 N.Y.S.2d 986 (County Ct. 
1987).  New York youthful offender adjudications comprise both a youthful 
                                                                                                                                        
 
(b) The court may impose a period of incarceration as a 
condition of probation or community control . . . . 
 
(c) The court may impose a split sentence whereby the youthful 
offender is to be placed on probation or community control upon 
completion of any specified period of incarceration . . . . 
 
(d) The court may commit the youthful offender to the custody 
of the department for a period of not more than 6 years, provided that 
any such commitment shall not exceed the maximum sentence for the 
offense for which the youthful offender has been convicted.  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
- 36 -
offender finding and a youthful offender sentence.7  In other words, unlike the 
Florida statute, a youthful offender designation in New York relates to the entire 
adjudication, not simply the sentence.  Further, unlike the Florida statute, the New 
York statute directs courts to vacate the entire conviction and replace it with the 
youthful offender adjudication.8  Thus, under New York law, Green’s youthful 
                                          
 
7.  New York Criminal Procedure Law section 720.10 includes the following 
definitions: 
 
4. “Youthful offender finding” means a finding, substituted for 
the conviction of an eligible youth, pursuant to a determination that 
the eligible youth is a youthful offender. 
 
5. “Youthful offender sentence” means the sentence imposed 
upon a youthful offender finding. 
 
6. “Youthful offender adjudication”.  A youthful offender 
adjudication is comprised of a youthful offender finding and the 
youthful offender sentence imposed thereon and is completed by 
imposition and entry of the youthful offender sentence. 
 
8.  Section 720.20, New York Criminal Procedure Law, states that: 
 
1.  Upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court must order a 
pre-sentence investigation of the defendant.  After receipt of a written 
report of the investigation and at the time of pronouncing sentence the 
court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful 
offender. . . . 
 
3.  Upon determining that an eligible youth is a youthful 
offender, the court must direct that the conviction be deemed vacated 
and replaced by a youthful offender finding; and the court must 
sentence the defendant pursuant to section 60.02 of the penal law. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
- 37 -
offender adjudication is not a conviction and, therefore, does not support the prior 
violent felony conviction aggravator under section 921.141(5)(b).  
Instead of arguing this important distinction, Parker made a general request 
that the court consider Green’s youthful offender status, coupled with the caveat 
that “I make that argument knowing full well that [Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 
415, 418 (Fla. 1990),] says there is no reason why you can’t consider a juvenile 
conviction for a violent crime as an aggravating circumstance.”  Parker’s statement 
evinces a failure to appreciate and argue the differences between a New York 
youthful offender adjudication and a juvenile conviction.  Furthermore, neither 
Campbell nor any other Florida case has found a New York youthful offender 
adjudication to be a conviction for purposes of the prior violent felony aggravator.9   
                                          
 
9.  Campbell is inapplicable to this case.  In Campbell, we held that a 
juvenile conviction supported the prior violent felony aggravator.  We stated that 
“[t]he court correctly found that Campbell was previously convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence.  He cites no authority in support of his 
assertion that prior juvenile convictions cannot be considered in aggravation.”  Id.  
That case involved a prior juvenile conviction, rather than a youthful offender 
adjudication.  In Merck, we held that an out-of-state juvenile adjudication is not a 
conviction as defined under North Carolina or Florida statutes.  664 So. 2d at 944  
(citing § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-638 (1993)).  We 
distinguished Campbell, stating that Campbell involved juvenile “convictions” 
rather than delinquency “adjudications.”  We explained: 
Our decision in this case is not to be read to mean that 
“convictions” of individuals who are juveniles which otherwise come 
within section 921.141(5)(b) are eliminated from consideration 
because the individuals are juveniles.  Rather, our decision applies 
only to adjudications of delinquency which by statute are not 
convictions. 
 
- 38 -
Finally, the New York case file contained some potentially mitigating 
information.  The presentence investigation report indicated that Green was 
seventeen or eighteen when his father killed his mother and then killed himself.  
The report also questioned whether Green was actually involved in the New York 
crime or pled guilty to obtain release from custody.  Other documents in the file 
showed that Green’s codefendant’s case was nolle prossequied for lack of 
evidence.   
(2) Prejudice 
With regard to prejudice, counsel’s failure to obtain the New York file 
hindered Green’s opportunity to contest the prior violent felony conviction 
aggravator.  Had counsel reviewed the transcripts of Green’s New York file, he 
would have learned that Green’s youthful offender adjudication replaced the 
conviction under New York law.  This argument would have defeated the prior 
violent felony aggravator because, as stated above, New York law determines that 
a youthful offender adjudication is not a conviction.  See Merck, 664 So. 2d at 
944.10 
                                                                                                                                        
Merck, 664 So. 2d at 944.   
 
10.  This also prejudiced Green because we struck the heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel aggravator on direct appeal.  If it had been challenged, we would have struck 
the prior conviction aggravator, leaving only two aggravators to support Green’s 
death sentence:  (1) committed for pecuniary gain; and (2) committed in the course 
 
- 39 -
In addition, Parker’s failure to obtain the New York file prejudiced Green 
because it could have been used to clear up the confusion over whether Green was 
convicted of “armed” robbery or simple robbery.  According to the trial court, two 
witnesses testified that Green was convicted of a prior “armed” robbery, and the 
judge, in his order, made a finding that Green was convicted of “armed” robbery.  
As the postconviction trial court accurately noted, “[t]he fact that the [penalty 
phase] jury was left with the false impression that [Green] had been convicted of a 
prior offense in which he robbed someone with a firearm similar in nature to the 
crime charged in this case is highly prejudicial.”  As the postconviction trial court 
found, a prior conviction for armed robbery carries more weight in aggravation 
than a prior conviction for simple robbery because it implies that Green was armed 
with a deadly weapon and threatened immediate use of a dangerous instrument.  
See N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15 (McKinney 1999).  Further, in this case, a prior 
armed robbery is more aggravating than simple robbery because the murder of 
Charles Flynn also took place in the course of an armed robbery.  Therefore, there 
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the trial court would have 
found insufficient aggravation to warrant imposition of the death penalty. 
                                                                                                                                        
of a kidnapping.  Without the prior violent felony aggravator, we would have 
found Green’s death sentence to be disproportionate and reversed for resentencing. 
 
 
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Because Green was prejudiced by Parker’s deficiency in failing to obtain 
and review the New York file, we affirm the trial court’s granting of a new 
sentencing proceeding. 
IV.  THE HABEAS PETITION 
Green raises four claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  First, 
Green claims that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise 
the trial court’s error in finding that the State had established the prior violent 
felony aggravator.  Second, Green claims that the death penalty is disproportionate.  
Third, Green asserts that execution by lethal injection is cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Fourth, Green argues that his Eighth Amendment right against cruel 
and unusual punishment will be violated as he may be incompetent at the time of 
execution.  We address each of these claims in turn. 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Green alleges that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to raise the trial court’s error in finding that the State had 
established the prior violent felony aggravator.  This claim raises essentially the 
same issue with regard to Green’s prior New York youthful offender adjudication 
that was raised in his postconviction appeal and the State’s cross-appeal.  Habeas 
corpus is not to be used for additional appeals of issues that could have been or 
were raised on appeal or in other postconviction motions.  Mills v. Dugger, 559 So. 
 
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2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1990) (citing Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1988); 
White v. Dugger, 511 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1987); Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 
1377 (Fla. 1987)).  Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred. 
B.  Proportionality 
Under claim two of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Green alleges that 
the death penalty is disproportionate and that this case should be returned to the 
lower court for imposition of a life sentence.  On direct appeal, we held that 
Green’s sentence was proportionate.  Green argues that this Court should revisit its 
original proportionality review on postconviction review based on newly 
discovered evidence.  However, Green does not present any newly discovered 
evidence which would warrant a proportionality reevaluation.  Therefore, this 
claim is denied.   
C.  Lethal Injection 
Under claim three of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Green contends 
that execution by lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under the 
Florida Constitution.  We deny habeas relief based on Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 
1136 (Fla.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 850 (2006).  The numerous decisions relied on 
in Diaz addressed the precise issues raised by Green in his motion.  See Sims v. 
State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000) (holding that execution by lethal injection is 
 
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not cruel and unusual punishment); Provenzano v. State, 761 So. 2d 1097, 1099 
(Fla. 2000); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 2005); Robinson v. State, 
913 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2005); see also Lightbourne v. McCollum, 32 Fla. L. Weekly 
S687 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2007) (holding that Florida’s current lethal injection procedures, 
as actually administered through the Department of Corrections, do not violate the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution).   
D.  Green May Be Incompetent at the Time of Execution 
Finally, under claim four of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Green 
argues that his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will 
be violated as he may be incompetent at time of execution.  We deny this claim 
because it is not ripe for consideration at this time.  See Thompson v. State, 759 
So. 2d 650, 668 (Fla. 2000); Provenzano v. State, 751 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1999); Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.811(d).  This claim is premature because a claim of incompetency to 
be executed cannot be asserted until a death warrant has been issued, and no death 
warrant has been issued in this case.  Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 374 n.9 (Fla. 
2003); Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 36 (Fla. 2004).   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the trial court’s order upholding Green’s first-degree murder 
conviction and granting a new penalty phase because counsel was ineffective for 
 
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failing to investigate Green’s prior New York robbery case.  We deny Green’s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Bruce W. Jacobus, Judge - Case No. 89-4942-CFA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Mark S. Gruber, 
Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellee/Respondent