Title: Demott v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-868
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-868 
____________ 
 
JUSTIN RANDOLPH DEMOTT,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 23, 2016] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Demott v. State, 160 So. 3d 520 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the 
Second District Court of Appeal in Callaway v. State, 658 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1995).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we hold that Demott’s special condition of probation, “you 
will not associate with anyone who is illegally using drugs,” is not 
unconstitutionally vague.  However, we also emphasize that in order to prove a 
violation of the condition, the State must prove—by a preponderance of the 
 
 
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evidence—the probationer’s knowledge that the person with whom he associated 
was illegally using drugs at the time of the alleged violation.  Our resolution of this 
case turns solely on the language that we approve in this decision.  Therefore, no 
discussion of the alleged conflict case is required.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2014, petitioner Justin Demott pled no contest to one count of aggravated 
child abuse and two counts of simple child abuse.  He was sentenced to 144 
months in state prison, followed by 60 months of drug offender probation for 
aggravated child abuse.  He received 60 months in prison on each count of simple 
child abuse, to run concurrently with the prison sentence for aggravated child 
abuse.  Because Demott was not sentenced on a specifically enumerated offense 
that permitted a sentence to drug offender probation, his drug offender probation 
was later modified to regular probation with special conditions.  The amended 
special condition at issue reads as follows: “You will abstain entirely from the use 
of . . . illegal drugs, and you will not associate with anyone who is illegally using 
drugs.”     
 
On appeal, Demott argued that the special condition prohibiting him from 
associating with anyone who is illegally using drugs is improperly vague.  Demott, 
160 So. 3d at 520.  The district court disagreed and concluded that the condition is 
no more vague than the condition approved in Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 
 
 
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(Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that prohibiting appellant from visiting places where 
drugs are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used is valid as a more precise defining of 
conduct prohibited under section 948.03, Fla. Stat. (1991)).  The court also 
concluded that the condition is no more vague than the general condition contained 
in section 948.03(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2012) (probationer shall “[n]ot associate 
with persons engaged in criminal activities”).  Id. at 521.  The court reasoned that 
“[s]ince a person illegally using drugs is engaged in criminal activities, the 
defendant’s probationary condition is expressly authorized by the statute.”  Id.  The 
district court having upheld the special condition, Demott petitioned this Court for 
review, and this Court accepted jurisdiction.   
ANALYSIS 
The issue before this Court is whether the following special condition of 
probation imposed on Demott is invalid on vagueness grounds: “. . . you will not 
associate with anyone who is illegally using drugs.”  This issue presents a pure 
question of law subject to de novo review.  Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864, 867 
(Fla. 2010) (citing Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494, 504 (Fla. 2008)).  We begin with 
a general overview of the law governing probationary sentences and then turn to 
the special condition at issue in Demott.   
 
 
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Probation, Generally 
 
The Florida Statutes governing probation are set forth in chapter 948, 
entitled “Probation and Community Control.”  Section 948.001(8), Florida Statutes 
(2015), defines probation as “a form of community supervision requiring specified 
contacts with parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as 
provided in s. 948.03.”  As this Court has observed, “the grant of probation ‘rests 
within the broad discretion of the trial judge and is a matter of grace rather than 
right.’ ”  Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Bernhardt v. 
State, 288 So. 2d 490, 494 (Fla. 1974)).  To that end, “[b]ecause probation is a 
‘matter of grace,’ even where statutes authorize a grant of probation to those who 
have been found guilty of criminal violations, trial courts are not required to extend 
the privilege.”  Id. (quoting Roberts v. State, 154 So. 2d 695, 696-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1963)).     
 
While not unfettered, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what 
probation conditions to impose.  This discretion is set forth in section 948.03(1), 
Florida Statutes (2015), which provides that the trial court is vested with the 
authority to “determine the terms and conditions of probation.”  Where a trial court 
determines that it is appropriate to sentence an offender to probation, due process 
requires that “the trial court and the probation order . . . adequately place the 
probationer on notice of conduct that is both required and prohibited during the 
 
 
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probationary period.”  Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 230 (citing Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 
183, 185 (Fla. 1978)).  “Fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be placed 
on notice as to what he [or she] must do or refrain from doing while on probation.”  
Id. (quoting Hines, 358 So. 2d at 185).    
 
“However, [p]robation orders need not include every possible restriction so 
long as a reasonable person is put on notice of what conduct will subject him or her 
to revocation.”  Id. at 235.  “[A] condition of probation should ‘provide reasonable 
individuals of common intelligence the basis to know and understand its 
meaning.’ ”  Id. (quoting Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485, 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2006)).  “Although the conditions should be clearly set out and must mean what 
they say, every detail need not be spelled out and the language should be 
interpreted in its common, ordinary usage.”  Id.   
 
A violation of probation may result in the revocation, modification, or 
continuation of probation; additionally, a probationer may be placed under 
community control, which is a more intensive form of supervision.  § 948.06(2)(a) 
& (e), Fla. Stat. (2015).  “Trial courts must consider each violation on a case-by-
case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a 
particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight 
of the evidence.”  State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis 
added).   
 
 
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Demott 
 
Section 948.03 provides a list of sixteen conditions of probation that are 
deemed a standard part of any probation sentence.  See § 948.03(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2015).  One of these standard conditions, set forth in section 948.03(1)(k), states 
that the probationer shall: “Not associate with persons engaged in criminal 
activities.”  Demott is subject to this standard condition of probation as well as the 
following special condition: “You will abstain entirely from the use of . . . illegal 
drugs, and you will not associate with anyone who is illegally using drugs.”  
Demott does not challenge the validity of section 948.03(1)(k).  However, he 
maintains that the special condition—that prohibits him from associating with 
anyone who is illegally using drugs—is vague because it does not clearly proscribe 
particular forms of conduct.  As a result, he submits, he is subject to committing an 
unintentional violation of the special condition.   
 
In Demott, the Fifth District correctly acknowledged the valid purpose of the 
special condition imposed by the trial court: “Since a person illegally using drugs 
is engaged in criminal activities, the defendant’s probationary condition is 
expressly authorized by the statute.”  Demott, 160 So. 3d at 521.  The district court 
then rejected Demott’s argument that the special condition is vague, in part 
because it “is not more vague than the condition . . . specifically authorized by 
section 948.03, Florida Statutes.”  Id.  The district court concluded: “If the statute 
 
 
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[prohibiting association with persons engaged in criminal activities] is not invalid 
then the instant condition of probation, which is simply a more precise defining of 
conduct prohibited by the statute, is not invalid.”  Id.  We agree.    
In reaching its decision, the district court concluded that the special 
condition in Demott is no more vague than the one approved by the Second 
District in Tomlinson.  In that case, the Second District upheld the condition that 
prohibited “visit[ing] places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous 
substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used.”  Tomlinson, 645 So. 2d at 1.  
The court concluded the restriction was “valid as a more precise defining of 
conduct prohibited under section 948.03(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), which states 
as an accepted condition of probation that an offender may ‘not associate with 
persons engaged in criminal activities.’ ”  Id.  We conclude that like Tomlinson, 
prohibiting Demott from associating with anyone who is illegally using drugs is a 
valid, more precise definition of associating with persons engaged in criminal 
activities.   
Moreover, the special condition in this case does not rise to the level of 
probation conditions deemed vague in other cases.  For instance, in Pratt v. State, 
516 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), the appellant, a member of an out-of-state bar 
and a Florida Bar applicant, was convicted of grand theft.  He was sentenced to ten 
years in state prison but was placed on probation after one year and ordered “not to 
 
 
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be affiliated with the legal profession.”  Id.  The appellant challenged the condition 
on vagueness grounds and prevailed because “the condition may be 
unconstitutionally vague and insufficient to apprise him of which otherwise lawful 
acts are prohibited.”  Id.  Similarly, a condition “requiring [the appellant] to ‘forfeit 
all weapons or tools’ ” was deemed vague in Zachary v. State, 559 So. 2d 105, 106 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1990).   
 
Demott is distinguishable from Pratt and Zachary, in which the challenged 
conditions of probation failed to sufficiently describe the prohibited conduct such 
that a reasonable person would understand what conduct is prohibited.  In contrast, 
in Demott, prohibiting association with someone who is illegally using drugs is 
sufficient to apprise Demott of what conduct is prohibited.    
Knowledge Requirement 
Demott asserts that the special condition must expressly require that he 
knowingly associate with someone who is illegally using drugs.  We disagree with 
Demott’s argument to the extent that we conclude that a knowledge element does 
not have to be expressly stated in the special condition.  However, while we uphold 
the special condition challenged by Demott, we clarify that a knowledge 
component is implicit in the condition, because a violation of probation must be 
willful and substantial in order to justify revocation.  Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 230.  
Thus, if Demott is accused of violating the special condition, the State would be 
 
 
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required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he willfully associated 
with persons illegally using drugs.  See Knite v. State, 102 So. 3d 691, 693-94 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2012) (holding that “where the State seeks to establish a violation based 
upon a defendant’s associating with persons engaged in criminal activity, there 
must be evidence that the defendant was aware those he was associating with were 
engaged in criminal activity”). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the special condition prohibiting Demott 
from associating with anyone who is illegally using drugs is not unconstitutionally 
vague.  We further clarify that the probationer’s knowledge is implicit in a 
violation of such a condition, and in order to prove a violation, the State is required 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the probationer’s knowledge that the 
person with whom he associated was illegally using drugs at the time of the 
violation.  We therefore approve the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Demott, to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D14-1342 
 
 
(St. Johns County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kevin Richard Holtz, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Wesley Harold 
Heidt, Bureau Chief, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent