Title: Flowers v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 264, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2004

*Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV § 12. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DAMONE FLOWERS,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 264, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 980800280 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  May 25, 2004 
Decided:  August 31, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, Justices and 
CHANDLER, Chancellor,* constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Eugene J. Maurer of Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
John Williams of the Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2
 
On this direct appeal from his conviction for the murder of Alfred Smiley 
and related charges, Damone Flowers asserts four grounds for reversal:  (1) the 
trial judge erroneously admitted an involuntary statement by a witness; (2) the 
prosecutor made unfairly prejudicial remarks during the opening statement that 
were unsupported by the evidence, thereby directly affecting the outcome of the 
trial; (3) the prosecutor recklessly elicited testimony from a witness that Flowers 
had recently been released from “jail;” and (4) a prosecution witness, during cross 
examination by defense counsel, unresponsively disclosed that defense counsel had 
represented him (the witness) on an earlier weapons charge. 
After carefully reviewing the record and considering his claims, we are 
satisfied that the trial judge acted appropriately within her discretion by admitting 
the challenged evidence and by denying the mistrial applications. We also 
conclude that two errors that did occur during trial were rendered harmless by the 
trial judge’s timely and sufficiently curative instructions.  
I. 
 
On August 1, 1998 Alfred Smiley drove a car with two passengers in the 
area of 22nd and Lamotte Streets in Wilmington.  At some point, Smiley became 
involved in an argument with several people on the street.  A gunshot fired from 
the sidewalk next to the car struck Smiley in the chest.  The car careened out of 
control on the street and came to rest against a utility pole.  Wilmington Police 
 
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responded to the call and took Smiley to the hospital where he died from the 
gunshot wound. 
 
The State charged Damone Flowers with Smiley’s murder and presented 
five witnesses at trial who were alleged to have been present at the scene of the 
shooting.  Most of the incriminating evidence was presented through pretrial taped 
statements.  Flowers presented no witnesses and did not testify.  A jury convicted 
Flowers of First Degree Murder1 and Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony.2  The trial judge denied Flowers’ motion for a new trial.3 
II. 
Flowers first argues that the taped statement of Ronetta Sudler, an 
eyewitness who identified him as the shooter, was not voluntarily obtained and 
therefore was improperly admitted.  We review the record to determine whether 
Sudler voluntarily made the out-of-court statement.4  Determining whether a 
statement is voluntary requires a “careful evaluation of all the circumstances of the 
interrogation.”5   Promises of leniency or inducements to cooperate may affect the 
reliability or trustworthiness of a statement, but they do not make a statement per 
                                                 
1 11 Del. C. s. 636(a)(1). 
2 11 Del. C. s. 1447A(a). 
3  See State v. Flowers. Del. Super., Id# 9808000280, (February 5, 2003) (Order). 
4 Black v. State, 616 A.2d 320, 323 (Del. 1992); Roth v. State, 788 A.2d 101, 108 (Del. 2001). 
5 State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d 943 (Del. 1979). 
 
4
se involuntary unless they are “so extravagant, or so impressionable as to overbear 
the person’s will and rational thinking process.”6  
During an August 11, 1998 videotaped interview conducted by Detective 
Andrew Brock, Sudler stated that she was across the street from where the shots 
were fired and that Flowers was the person firing the gun.  Sudler was not aware 
that she was being videotaped at time she made her statements to the police.  At 
trial, and after being transported from a Sussex County work release center, 
Rosetta Sudler reluctantly testified as a prosecution witness.  She testified that she 
did not remember what she had told Detective Brock in her statement and that she 
did not recall seeing Flowers with a gun at the scene of the shooting.  She further 
stated that Brock threatened to take her children from her if she did not cooperate 
and give a statement.  When the State proposed to call Detective Brock in order to 
authenticate the contradictory videotaped interview, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 
3507,7 Flowers objected on the basis that Sudler involuntarily gave the videotaped 
statement. 
                                                 
6Id. at 948. 
7 § 3507. Use of prior statements as affirmative evidence. (a) In a criminal prosecution, the 
voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial 
value.  (b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply regardless of whether the 
witness' in-court testimony is consistent with the prior statement or not. The rule shall 
likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the introducing party. 
 
 
5
The trial judge allowed voir dire examination of Sudler in order to determine 
the voluntariness of her August 11th videotaped statement.  Sudler  testified during 
voir dire that she was probably high on drugs, and possibly hallucinating, on the 
night of the shooting.  During voir dire she maintained that she could not 
remember anything about her statement, including Brock’s alleged threats to take 
her children from her if she did not cooperate.  Because voir dire produced no new 
significant, credible, evidence touching on the voluntariness of Sudler’s statement, 
defense counsel asked the trial judge to view the tape.  After viewing the tape, the 
trial judge stated: 
I believe the questions of the witness were within the realm of 
ordinary police work.  She did not want to talk- His job was to get her 
to talk, and he did.  I don’t find that the statement was involuntary, 
despite her initial unwillingness to talk.8   
 
The trial judge’s ruling acknowledges Sudler’s initial unwillingness to make a 
statement, but characterizes the police questioning as reasonably calculated to 
obtain her statement about the incident.  The trial judge, herself, viewed the tape 
and determined that Detective Brock was not so unfairly oppressive or overbearing 
that his manner compromised Sudler’s willingness to make a statement. 
The trial judge admitted Sudler’s out-of-court pretrial statement to Detective 
Brock only after making a careful factual finding that Sudler gave the statement 
                                                 
8 Trial Transcript p.3-4 (October 24, 2002). 
 
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voluntarily.  Because the record supports the trial judge’s findings, we affirm her 
denial of Flowers’ objection to the admission of the statement.   
III. 
 
Flowers next challenges remarks made during the State’s opening statement 
and summation.  On the first day of trial the prosecutor made reference to a “code 
of silence” that was set into motion after the shooting by various eyewitnesses.  
Flowers insists that the remark was unsupported by the evidence and constituted 
unfairly prejudicial, reversible error. 
 
The defense did not object to the “code of silence” reference at trial.  
Therefore, we review it for plain error.9  To be plain error, the remark must have 
affected Flowers’ substantial rights, or, generally, it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial.10  We find that, while the record is sparse, it nonetheless 
supports the State’s reference to “a code of silence” among those who witnessed 
the shooting.  Ronetta Sudler’s reluctance to confirm her videotaped interview 
suggests a change of heart arguably consistent with a pattern of silence among the 
eyewitnesses.  A reasonable inference about the existence of a code of silence may 
also be drawn based on evasive, reluctant testimony by eyewitnesses Othello 
Predeoux and Tysheik McDougall.  We find no plain error here because the State 
                                                 
9 Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940,942 (2001); Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 964-65 (Del. 2000). 
10 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993); Wainwright v. State, 504 A. 2d 1096, 
1100 (Del. 1986).  
 
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substantiated the remark’s suggested inference in the State’s opening through 
sufficient record evidence.  Flowers fails to demonstrate how the reference 
otherwise distorted the evidence so prejudicially that it unduly affected the 
outcome and deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial.   
The second challenged remark involved the prosecutor asking the jury to 
“[k]eep in mind someone approaches Mr. Mays between the time he gives his 
statement to the police…”  This remark, although the subject of an objection at 
trial, appears to have been abandoned on appeal because Flowers has altogether 
failed to develop it.11   Accordingly, we are unable to address the merits of this 
argument. 
IV. 
Flowers contends that the trial judge erred by denying his mistrial 
application on the basis that the prosecutor had recklessly elicited testimony from 
Flowers’ sister about Flowers’ recent release from jail.  Rather than grant a 
mistrial, the trial judge gave a curative instruction.  Flowers argues that the refusal 
to grant a mistrial denied him a fair trial because his defense strategy centered on 
                                                 
11 Although Flowers initially cites to a portion of the closing argument that refers to prosecution 
witness Vernon Mays, the argument in the Opening Brief then inexplicably shifts to a discussion 
of the trial testimony of witness Matthew Chamblee, without establishing the connection 
between the closing argument remark about Mays and the later trial testimony of Chamblee. 
 
8
his not testifying.12  He maintains that by allowing the jury to learn of his recent 
incarceration, he lost the benefit of this trial strategy.  Although Flowers seeks de 
novo review to determine whether an error of law occurred that affected his 
substantial rights, we review the trial judge’s denial of Flower’s motions for a 
mistrial and for a new trial for abuse of discretion.13  In so doing, we also consider 
the extent to which the trial judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard the 
reference to previous “jail” time served by Flowers cured any unfair prejudice.14    
 The State called Flower’s sister, Adrienne Dawson, for the purpose of 
establishing that Flowers, who lived with Dawson before the shooting occurred, 
fled Delaware immediately after the August 1, 1998 shooting. The prosecutor 
asked Dawson how long Flowers had lived in her house prior to August 1.  
Dawson responded: “when he came home from – I don’t remember what that was 
– I don’t remember the date, when he came home from jail.”15  Defense counsel 
immediately objected and moved for a mistrial.  After hearing arguments on the 
motion, the trial judge denied the motion and immediately gave a curative 
instruction. 
                                                 
12 If Flowers testified in his own defense, earlier convictions for second degree robbery and drug 
trafficking would likely be revealed to the jury.  Apparently Flowers’ best hope for appearing 
credible to a jury was not to testify at all. 
13 Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349, 350 (Del. 1996). 
14 Sawyer v. State, 634 A. 2d 377, 380 (Del 1993) “Even when prejudicial evidence is admitted, 
its prompt excision followed by a cautionary instruction will usually preclude a finding of 
reversible error.”  
15 Trial Transcript p. 175 (October 25, 2002) (emphasis added). 
 
9
 
Dawson’s answer was clearly unresponsive to the prosecutor’s question.  It 
is apparent from the transcript that the prosecutor did not intend to elicit a response 
that included reference to Flowers’ recent jail time and, in fact, took measures to 
prevent any reference to it by asking Dawson to respond in terms of time.  In 
denying the motion for a mistrial and, later, the motion for a new trial, the trial 
judge correctly noted that Dawson’s “vague and unsolicited” reference to Flowers 
recent “jail” time, “lessened the impact of the testimony.”16  The trial judge also 
noted that Dawson’s fleeting reference “did not reveal why the defendant was in 
prison and for how long.”17  Here, the immediate curative instruction cured any 
unfair prejudice to Flowers.  The trial judge acted appropriately within her 
discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial and the motion for a new trial. 
V. 
 
Lastly, Flowers argues that he was significantly prejudiced by another 
witnesses’ non-responsive answer.  The novel nature of this argument in the 
context of this case requires some background.  Before the selected jury was 
sworn, the State moved to disqualify defense counsel on the ground that defense 
counsel had previously represented a State’s witness, Othello Predeoux.  The trial 
was rescheduled in order to allow the parties an opportunity to brief the legal 
issues concerning disqualification.  Ultimately, the trial judge determined that 
                                                 
16 See State v. Flowers. Del. Super., Id# 9808000280, (February 5, 2003) (Order). 
17 Id.  
 
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counsel did not have a conflict of interest in representing Flowers, despite his 
previous representation of Predeoux, reasoning that all the information counsel 
would use during cross-examination was public record and would not include any 
information derived from the earlier lawyer-counsel relationship.  Moreover, the 
trial judge found that the orderly and careful presentation of relevant evidence in 
Flowers’ trial precluded any need for the jury to learn of defense counsel’s earlier 
representation of Predeoux. 
At trial, Predeoux offered direct testimony damaging to Flowers.  
Specifically, Predeoux had made a taped statement to the police in July, 2002, in 
which he was unequivocal that Flowers was the man who shot Smiley on August 1, 
1998.  Defense counsel conducted an aggressive cross-examination designed to 
impeach Predeoux’s credibility.  Defense counsel focused on the likelihood that 
Predeoux’s statement was self-serving and designed to minimize a potentially 
lengthy sentence that could result from two separate charges pending against him.  
The following exchange occurred:  
Q: (defense counsel)  Now, when you gave the statement to police you 
added a touch saying when you saw this incident you vomited, right? 
A: (Predeoux) Yes. 
Q: Because I guess you don’t like violence or it upset you to see that kind of 
violence? 
A: No, it is the first time I saw something like that before. 
Q: Okay. But you don’t have a problem with violence now, do you? 
A: Well, I mean I don’t know what you’re saying. 
Q: Well, I’m asking if it upsets you. 
A:  If you do something to me, I’m going to upset you. 
 
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Q: Maybe you didn’t just add that for effect, the vomiting part? 
A: No that’s what happened that’s what I did. 
Q: You’re certainly not a stranger to guns? 
A: No. 
Q: And guns cause violence, don’t they? 
A: Yes. 
Q: As a matter of fact, back in ’98 when we were talking about that you had 
two of them [referring to guns] on you person, did not you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: As a matter of fact, that was in September, early September of 1998, 
wasn’t it? 
A: Yes, you represented me.18 
 
Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, on the ground that the 
non-responsive reply caused counsel to lose credibility in the eyes of the jury.  He 
explained that his entire cross-examination was designed to impugn Predeoux’s 
character and establish that Predeoux was unworthy of belief. The revelation that 
defense counsel had previously represented Predeoux, amidst an aggressive cross-
examination designed to impugn Predeoux’s credibility would likely cause the jury 
to view defense counsel in a negative light – as an attorney willing to represent a 
client on one day and on a later date vigorously attack his former client when it 
suited his purposes.  Additionally, counsel argued, that negative impact and loss of 
credibility infected the entire defense and would likely be imputed to Flowers 
himself.  This unexpected turn of events, it is now claimed, unfairly prejudiced 
Flowers and adversely affected the outcome of the case. 
                                                 
18 Trial Transcript p. 118-120 (emphasis added). 
 
12
 
The State disputes that the reply was unfairly prejudicial.  Rather, the State 
argues that Flowers’ counsel “assumed” the risk of any prejudice, first by not 
withdrawing from the case, and then by cross-examining the witness about 
weapons charges on which counsel had previously represented him in a manner 
that induced Predeoux’s allegedly unfairly prejudicial comment.  Moreover, the 
State maintains, regardless of the risk that it may have caused the jury to look less 
favorably upon defendant and his counsel, Predeoux’s reply did not affect the 
outcome of the trial. 
 
We review the denial of motion for a mistrial for an abuse of the trial judge’s 
discretion.19  A trial judge is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is 
warranted.20  The extreme remedy of a mistrial is required only where no 
“meaningful and practical alternatives” are available to remedy an error at trial.21   
In this case, the potential prejudicial effect of Predeoux’s uninvited 
reference to defense counsel’s former representation is clear.  It is unlikely, 
however, that it actually affected the outcome of Flowers trial or significantly 
compromised the trial’s fairness.   
Defense counsel insisted from the outset of trial that there would be no 
conflict of interest, no compromise of confidential information and, therefore, no 
                                                 
19 Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). 
20 Ashley v. State 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del 2002). 
21 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) quoting Bailey v. State 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 
(Del. 1987). 
 
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resulting prejudice from his former representation of eyewitness Predeoux.  
Although Predeoux gave a non-responsive reply to a carefully tailored question, 
and no fault may be imputed to either defense counsel or the prosecutor,22 
apparently no one made an effort before trial to caution Predeoux to avoid any 
potentially prejudicial reference to defense counsel’s earlier representation.  
The trial judge, nonetheless, albeit after the fact, took appropriate measures 
to control the situation: she instructed the witness not to make any further reference 
to the previous representation.  She also suggested, as a curative measure, that 
defense counsel briefly question Predeoux in order to establish that the earlier 
representation had resulted in a plea agreement.  Defense counsel’s follow-up 
questions then promptly and succinctly addressed whatever damage to his 
credibility may have resulted from the disclosure that he had previously 
represented a witness testifying adversely to his current client’s interests.  We 
believe that defense counsel’s additional questions appropriately refocused the jury 
on Predeoux’s, and not defense counsel’s, credibility.   
We recognize that the presentation of credible witnesses by a competent 
criminal defense attorney is often the linchpin of an accused’s case.  Defense 
counsel is an experienced, accomplished attorney.  While the revelation that he had 
previously represented Predeoux on the criminal charge upon which he was cross-
                                                 
22 The trial judge, in denying the motion for a mistrial, found that “no prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred.”  February 5, 2003 (ORDER)  
 
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examining him may have come as a surprise to the jury, we find it highly 
improbable that defense counsel lost significant credibility in the eyes of the jury.  
Where defense counsel’s credibility is damaged or wounded in the eyes of the jury, 
that may cause prejudice and may disrupt a case.  Here, however, both the remote 
chance of the disruption creating unfair prejudice and the curative steps taken by 
the trial judge weigh favorably against the alternative, extreme remedy, of a 
mistrial. 
Finally, after carefully reviewing the record, it is clear that Predeoux’s 
uninvited response did not affect the outcome.  This case did not turn on the 
credibility of Flowers’ trial counsel; it turned on the credibility of the five 
eyewitnesses who corroborated the basic facts about the shooting and the shooter.  
Predeoux’s fleeting, volunteered, non-responsive answer did not so damage 
Flowers’ overall defense that the extreme remedy of a mistrial was the only 
meaningful or practical solution to potentially unfair prejudice.  
We conclude that the trial judge acted appropriately within her discretion 
when she denied Flowers’ motion for a mistrial. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby 
AFFIRMED.