Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Joe E. Kremkoski
Citation: 2004 WI 150
Docket Number: 2003AP002123-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2004

2004 WI 150 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2123-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joe E. Kremkoski, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joe E. Kremkoski,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KREMKOSKI 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 21, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2004 WI 150 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2123-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joe E. Kremkoski, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joe E. Kremkoski,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's report, findings 
of fact, and conclusions of law, based on the parties' 
comprehensive 
stipulation 
that 
Attorney 
Joe 
E. 
Kremkoski 
committed five counts of professional misconduct as alleged by 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) in the complaint it filed 
in this court on August 12, 2003.  The referee recommended that a 
private reprimand be issued as a sanction for this misconduct.  
After reviewing the parties' responses to this court's order to 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
2 
 
show cause why a public reprimand should not be imposed, we 
reject the referee's recommendation and publicly reprimand 
Attorney Kremkoski for his professional misconduct.  We accept 
the referee's recommendation that Attorney Kremkoski pay all the 
costs related to this disciplinary proceeding now totaling 
$4116.33.  Also, as the referee recommended, we impose certain 
conditions upon Attorney Kremkoski's license to practice law in 
this state.1 
¶2 
Joe E. Kremkoski was admitted to practice law in this 
state on May 18, 1976, and practices in Racine.  Kremkoski's 
prior disciplinary history consists of a 1997 consensual private 
reprimand.2 
¶3 
On August 12, 2003, the OLR filed a complaint in this 
court against Kremkoski alleging five counts of professional 
misconduct.  In general, the complaint alleged misconduct 
                                                 
1 Neither Attorney Kremkoski nor the OLR has appealed from 
the referee's report and recommendation and accordingly, this 
court's review is pursuant to SCR 22.17(2) which provides, in 
pertinent part: "(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or modify 
the referee's findings and conclusions and remand the matter to 
the referee for additional findings; and determine and impose 
appropriate discipline . . . ." For the reasons explained in 
this opinion, we conclude that a public, rather than private 
reprimand as recommended by the referee, is the appropriate 
discipline to be imposed in this situation.  
2 That 1997 consensual private reprimand was for Kremkoski's 
misconduct consisting of failing to file a complaint when he knew 
the statute of limitations would soon expire; failing to inform a 
client that the statute of limitations had expired; and making 
repeated misrepresentations about receiving a $100 payment from 
the client. 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
3 
 
consisting of Kremkoski representing a client in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person's interests 
were materially adverse to the interests of a former client; 
failing to hold money in trust; failing, upon termination of 
representation, to refund an unearned advance payment of fees; 
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client; and failing to keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and comply with reasonable 
requests for information.   
¶4 
This court appointed Attorney Dennis J. Flynn to act as 
referee in this matter.  After a public hearing was scheduled by 
the referee, the parties entered into a comprehensive stipulation 
by which Attorney Kremkoski admitted to the five counts of 
professional misconduct as alleged by the OLR's complaint.  More 
specifically, Attorney Kremkoski has now stipulated to the 
following facts and admitted committing the following counts of 
misconduct. 
COUNTS 1 THROUGH 3 
¶5 
In August 2000 Kremkoski represented C.S. and filed a 
petition on C.S.'s behalf seeking a domestic injunction against 
B.V.  That injunction was granted and B.V. was barred from 
contacting C.S. for a period of two years.   
¶6 
In May 2001 B.V. asked Kremkoski to represent him on "a 
couple of misdemeanors"; Kremkoski agreed to do so for a fee of 
$500.  One of the misdemeanor counts against B.V. included an 
allegation that he had violated the domestic abuse injunction 
Kremkoski had obtained for C.S. nine months earlier.   
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Two days after B.V.'s initial appearance on the 
misdemeanor counts, Kremkoski appeared on B.V.'s behalf at his 
initial appearance on a four-count felony complaint that had been 
filed.  Kremkoski informed B.V. that due to the nature of the 
felony counts, Kremkoski required an additional "nonrefundable" 
retainer of $1500.  Kremkoski also informed B.V. that Kremkoski's 
hourly fee was $150.  There were, however, no written fee 
agreements with respect to either the $500 B.V. had paid 
Kremkoski 
for 
the 
misdemeanor 
representation 
or 
for 
the 
additional $1500 on the felony matters.  B.V. subsequently paid 
the $1500 in two installments of $750 each by checks dated May 
23, 2001, and June 4, 2001.  Kremkoski, however, did not deposit 
those checks into his client trust account.   
¶8 
On June 27, 2001, Kremkoski appeared on behalf of B.V. 
at an initial appearance on two new cases in Racine county both 
of which involved allegations of B.V.'s violation of the domestic 
abuse injunction Kremkoski had previously obtained for C.S., as 
well as a bail jumping count.  Kremkoski, however, had not 
obtained C.S.'s written consent prior to representing B.V. in 
these criminal cases.  
¶9 
C.S. later informed the assistant district attorney 
handling the cases about Kremkoski's prior representation of C.S. 
in obtaining the domestic abuse injunction that B.V. was charged 
with violating.  The assistant district attorney notified the 
circuit 
court 
and 
subsequently 
Kremkoski 
withdrew 
from 
representing B.V. in the felony and misdemeanor matters. 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
5 
 
¶10 Kremkoski's office records reflect that he worked 6.1 
hours on B.V.'s criminal matters; accordingly, at Kremkoski's 
quoted $150 per hour fee rate, he had earned fees totaling $915.  
When B.V. subsequently asked Kremkoski if he would refund any of 
the $1500 retainer B.V. had paid, Kremkoski told B.V. that the 
fee was nonrefundable.  
¶11 In November of 2001, after Kremkoski had withdrawn from 
representing B.V. in the earlier criminal cases, Kremkoski 
represented B.V. in other legal matters.  When B.V. was released 
from jail in October 2001 he again asked Kremkoski if he would 
refund any of the $1500 fee previously paid and Kremkoski 
responded that he would not do so but that B.V. should 
" . . . not worry about the fees in his other legal matters." 
¶12 This course of conduct, to which Kremkoski has now 
stipulated, led to the following three misconduct counts. 
• Count 
One: By 
representing 
B.V. 
in 
criminal matters that included B.V.'s 
alleged violations of a domestic abuse 
restraining 
order 
which 
Kremkoski 
previously obtained on behalf of a 
former client, 
Kremkoski 
represented 
another 
person 
in 
the 
same 
or 
a 
substantially related matter in which 
that person's interests were materially 
adverse to the interests of the former 
client, without obtaining the former 
client's 
consent 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:1.9(a). 
• Count Two: By failing to deposit in his 
trust account two advance payments for 
fees in a criminal matter, Kremkoski 
failed to hold in trust, separate from 
his own property, an advance fee, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.15(a). 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
6 
 
• Count Three: By failing to return any 
unearned portion of the $1500 advance 
fee 
to 
B.V. 
upon 
termination 
of 
Kremkoski's representation of B.V. in 
the criminal matters, Kremkoski, upon 
termination of representation, failed 
to take steps to the extent reasonably 
practicable 
to 
protect 
a 
client's 
interests, 
such 
as 
refunding 
any 
advance payment of fee that has not 
been 
earned, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:1.16(d). 
COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE 
¶13 B.W. retained Kremkoski to represent her in her 
divorce action; the divorce was granted on April 3, 2001, and 
the judgment was filed on April 12, 2001.  As part of the 
property division, B.W. was awarded the marital home; this 
required a transfer of her former husband's interest by 
quitclaim deed which Kremkoski was responsible for drafting.  
Kremkoski brought with him to the divorce hearing that was held 
on April 3, 2001, a quitclaim deed he had drafted for B.W.'s 
former husband to sign; however, that quitclaim deed contained 
an error and therefore could not be signed until it was 
redrafted.  Kremkoski told his client B.W. that he would redraft 
the document but despite her repeated telephone calls after the 
divorce hearing, he failed to do so.  Kremkoski also did not 
respond to many of the phone calls.  Because B.W. needed the 
quitclaim deed in order to refinance her home and take advantage 
of the then available interest rate, she had to obtain someone 
else to redraft the deed for her.  B.W. then obtained her former 
husband's signature on the redrafted quitclaim deed. 
¶14 In addition, the divorce judgment provided that B.W.'s 
former husband was to transfer to her the sum of $10,500 by a 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
7 
 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) which Kremkoski was to 
draft.  B.W. did not have access to those funds, held in her 
former husband's 401k account, until completion of the QDRO. 
¶15 From April 3, 2001, through March 11, 2002, B.W. 
frequently telephoned Kremkoski urging him to complete the QDRO.  
Kremkoski returned only one of B.W.'s phone calls and then spoke 
to a person other that B.W.  Kremkoski finally called the 401k 
plan administrator in December of 2001 and prepared a QDRO which 
he forwarded to the plan administrator.  The plan administrator, 
however, rejected that QDRO in March 2002.   
¶16 Following the commencement of the OLR investigation in 
May of 2002, Kremkoski prepared a new QDRO and sent it to the 
plan administrator on July 17, 2002.  That QDRO was accepted in 
August of 2002 and was ultimately accepted by the divorce court 
on September 27, 2002.  
¶17 This course of conduct, to which Kremkoski has now 
stipulated, led to the following two counts of misconduct. 
• Count Four: By failing to redraft the 
quitclaim deed for B.W. and by failing 
to 
timely 
complete 
B.W.'s 
QDRO, 
Kremkoski failed to act with reasonable 
diligence 
and 
promptness 
in 
representing a client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3. 
• Count Five: By failing to respond to 
B.W.'s telephone calls regarding the 
status of her quitclaim deed and her 
QDRO, Kremkoski failed to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of 
a matter and comply with reasonable 
requests for information, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.4(a). 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
8 
 
¶18 Because Kremkoski stipulated to the facts as alleged in 
the OLR's complaint, the dispute before the referee focused on 
the discipline to be recommended for Kremkoski's admitted 
misconduct regarding these five counts.  The OLR maintained that 
a public reprimand should be imposed as a sanction because the 
five counts involve both client neglect and conflicts of 
interest.  According to the OLR a public reprimand would be 
consistent with numerous prior cases in which public reprimands 
have been imposed for similar types of misconduct involving 
conflicts of interest and client neglect.  The OLR also pointed 
out that the American Bar Association's Standard for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions——1991 Edition, suggests that a public reprimand 
is an appropriate sanction for this type of misconduct and that 
according to the ABA standards, only cases involving "minor 
misconduct"——i.e., when there is little or no injury to a client, 
the public, the legal system, or the profession, and little 
likelihood of repetition by the lawyer, that a private reprimand 
is appropriate.   
¶19 Furthermore, the OLR asserted that a public reprimand 
was appropriate in this case because Kremkoski breached a 
fundamental 
duty 
to 
his 
client——the 
duty 
of 
loyalty——by 
representing B.V. after having earlier represented C.S. in 
obtaining a domestic abuse injunction against B.V.  The OLR noted 
that that conduct carried a significant risk that Kremkoski might 
reveal confidential information that C.S. had provided to him 
during the time he represented her.   
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
9 
 
¶20 In addition, the OLR asserted that Kremkoski had 
breached his duty to B.V. by failing to place the $1500 retainer 
he had received in a trust account and then in failing to return 
any of the retainer after only performing 6.1 hours of legal work 
for B.V.  The OLR asserted that the remaining amount of that 
retainer should have been immediately returned to B.V. upon 
termination of Kremkoski's representation.   
¶21 Similarly, the OLR maintained that Kremkoski had 
breached his duty to his divorce client, B.W., by failing to 
timely draft and file the quitclaim deed and the QDRO, and by 
failing to respond to her numerous telephone calls regarding the 
status of the matter.  The OLR observed that although Kremkoski 
finally redrafted the QDRO, that had occurred only after he had 
been contacted by the OLR about B.W.'s grievance. 
¶22 Finally, the OLR argued that Kremkoski's misconduct in 
this case was aggravated by the fact that he had previously been 
disciplined for neglect of a client matter.  According to the 
OLR, a public reprimand was necessary to emphasize to Kremkoski 
the serious nature of his misconduct and to deter him and other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.   
¶23 Kremkoski, on the other hand, urged the referee to 
recommend a private reprimand as an appropriate sanction.  
Kremkoski emphasized certain facts including the fact that when 
he had agreed to represent B.V., Kremkoski thought the focus of 
the criminal charges would be on the felony matters, not on 
B.V.'s alleged violation of the domestic abuse injunction which 
Kremkoski believed that C.S. had attempted to rescind after she 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
10 
 
and B.V. had reconciled.  Kremkoski also pointed out that he had 
informed B.V. that the $1500 retainer was "nonrefundable" and 
that, in any event, that retainer amounted to fees that were 
earned upon payment. 
¶24 Kremkoski also identified certain mitigating factors; 
although he conceded these factors would not necessarily excuse 
his misconduct, he believed they would explain the circumstances 
surrounding it.  For example, he pointed out that during the time 
period alleged by the OLR for this misconduct, Kremkoski and his 
wife were caring for his mother-in-law who lived with them until 
she died in September 2001.  Also during that same period, 
Kremkoski and his wife were caring for his wife's aunt who had 
Alzheimer's disease.  And finally, Kremkoski pointed out that in 
October 2001, his son was called to active duty with the Air 
National Guard and served in combat in Afghanistan for four 
months.   
¶25 The referee was persuaded by Kremkoski's claim that he 
was under stress at the critical time this misconduct occurred.  
The referee noted that although Kremkoski was not claiming that 
he was suffering from a mental illness, he was claiming that the 
number of stressors he faced during this period of time should be 
considered as mitigation of his conduct.  The referee agreed that 
the evidence was relevant and concluded that there was no need 
for expert testimony to establish a causal connection between 
these stressful events and Kremkoski's actions.  
¶26 Accordingly, the referee recommended that a private 
reprimand would be an appropriate sanction in this case because 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
11 
 
it " . . . appropriately responds to the misconduct of this case 
and also gives recognition to the mitigating factors that are 
unique to this matter." 
¶27 In addition to the private reprimand, the referee 
recommended that Kremkoski be ordered to obtain at least eight 
hours of continuing legal education focusing on ethics education 
each year for the next three years.  The referee suggested that 
special emphasis should also be on CLE seminars relating to the 
use 
and 
management 
of 
client 
trust 
accounts, 
reasonably 
responding to contacts from clients regarding the status of a 
case, conflicts of interest, utilization of written retainer 
agreements, and the timely performance of legal services by 
counsel.  In addition, the referee recommended that Kremkoski 
should inform himself about bar programs providing help to 
lawyers who are "experiencing significant, non-law-practice-
related stress."   
¶28 Finally, the referee recommended that Kremkoski be 
required to pay all the costs related to this disciplinary 
proceeding which now total $4116.33. 
¶29 As noted, this court ordered Kremkoski to show cause 
why a public reprimand should not be imposed instead of the 
private reprimand recommended by the referee.  Both Kremkoski and 
the OLR have submitted responses basically reiterating their 
arguments before the referee.  Kremkoski again urges this court 
to impose a private reprimand, and the OLR again advocates a 
public reprimand as a sanction. 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
12 
 
¶30 After reviewing the parties' arguments and respective 
positions, as well as the referee's report and analysis, we 
conclude——especially in light of the fact that Kremkoski 
previously received a private reprimand in 1997 for conduct 
involving the neglect of a client matter——that a public reprimand 
is warranted in this case in order to emphasize the serious 
nature of Kremkoski's misconduct and to deter him and other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.  
Although 
not 
unsympathetic 
to 
the 
stress 
Kremkoski 
was 
experiencing during the relevant periods, the court thinks that 
such stress does not explain Kremkoski's failure to appreciate 
the serious conflict of interest he faced by representing both 
C.S. and B.V. in the situation described in the OLR complaint.  
¶31 Under all the circumstances, we conclude that Joe E. 
Kremkoski should be publicly reprimanded for his five counts of 
misconduct as committed in this case.  We further conclude, as 
the referee recommended, that Kremkoski obtain continuing legal 
education credits focusing on the specific areas suggested by the 
referee, including at least eight hours per year for the next 
three years of continuing legal education credits dealing with 
ethics.  In addition, we conclude that Kremkoski must pay all 
costs related to this disciplinary proceeding now totaling 
$4116.33.   
¶32 IT IS ORDERED that Joe E. Kremkoski is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct.  
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Joe E. Kremkoski must obtain 
eight hours of continuing legal education each year for the next 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
13 
 
three years focusing on ethics and that during that same period, 
he shall attend continuing legal education seminars emphasizing 
the following: the use and management of client trust accounts; 
the duties of attorneys to reasonably respond to client contacts 
regarding the status of cases; the avoidance of conflicts of 
interest; the utilization of written retainer agreements; and the 
timely performance of legal services by counsel.   
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Joe E. Kremkoski pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation all the costs of this proceeding providing that if 
such costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to the court of his inability to pay the costs within 
that time, the license of Joe E. Kremkoski to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of this court. 
 
No. 
03-2123-D   
 
 
 
1
 
¶