Title: New Jersey v. L.H.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2019

New Jersey v. L.H. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The primary issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the interrogation techniques that included false promises of leniency induced defendant L.H. to confess to two alleged sexual assaults and one alleged attempted sexual assault and overbore defendant’s will. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s confession was voluntary. In addition, the Court also considered whether a remand was necessary because, when M.H., a victim, identified defendant from a photographic lineup, the full dialogue between M.H. and the administering officer in making the identification was not memorialized. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court determined the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement was voluntary. The failure to record the identification procedure required a remand to allow defendant the benefit of a hearing to inquire into the reliability of the identification and any other remedy deemed appropriate by the trial court. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. L.H. (A-59-17) (079974)Argued March 11, 2019 -- July 22, 2019ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the interrogation techniques that included false promises of leniency induced defendant L.H. to confess to two alleged sexual assaults and one alleged attempted sexual assault and overbore defendant’s will. In this context, the Court must determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s confession was voluntary. The Court also considers whether a remand is necessary because, when M.H., a victim, identified defendant from a photographic lineup, the full dialogue between M.H. and the administering officer in making the identification was not memorialized. Defendant, who was suspected of committing the alleged offenses, was stopped and brought to the Bloomfield police headquarters on August 6, 2011, at about 2:30 a.m. After being held for three hours, he was brought to an interview room. For the first fifty- five minutes, Detective Lieutenant Joseph Krentz and Detective Thomas Fano secured information from defendant about his education, employment, prior residences, family, and his reason for driving in Bloomfield that evening. Almost an hour into the interrogation, Detective Fano told defendant that he had a “problem.” For the next twenty minutes, while defendant deflected questions that would have implicated him in a crime, the two detectives suggested that, if defendant cooperated and incriminated himself, he would receive counseling and help, not go to jail, and remain free to raise his child. Indeed, defendant was told that the truth would set him free. The detectives’ assurances and suggestions that defendant would receive help and counseling, stay out of jail, and be there for his daughter if he cooperated were aimed at assuaging the reluctance defendant repeatedly expressed about giving up the right to remain silent. For example, Detective Krentz stated, “I just need to hear your side of the story so I can find out exactly where you are as far as getting the help you need, the right help.” Defendant asked, “The help I need is not sending me to jail is it?” Detective Krentz: “Not at all. Nobody gets rehabilitated in jail.” Detective Fano: “Yeah, I agree.” The detectives, moreover, continually minimized the nature of the assaults of which defendant was suspected, telling him, “You’re not a bad guy,” and “You didn’t hurt anybody.” 1 One hour and fourteen minutes into the interrogation, defendant began to make admissions about his involvement in the charged offenses. The interrogation ended at 8:51 a.m. -- more than three hours after it had begun. In his testimony at the hearing, Detective Krentz conceded that “[e]very time [defendant] expressed hesitancy, [the detectives] talked about the help he was going to get,” and that “it was clear . . . that 'help’ meant counseling.” The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that his will was overborne by false promises and declined to suppress his confession. Defendant also moved for an evidentiary hearing because of the failure of the police to record, electronically or otherwise, the identification procedure that led to M.H. identifying defendant as her assailant. During the fourteen earlier identification procedures, M.H. was unable to make a positive identification of her assailant. On August 8, 2011, two days after defendant’s arrest, M.H. viewed a fifteenth photographic array. In the report from that identification, the position of each photograph is given a sequential number from one to six. Next to photo position number three -- designating defendant’s photograph -- is the word “SUSPECT.” The report does not explain why the word “SUSPECT” was used rather than the six-digit number and letter assigned to every other photograph. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a hearing, and defendant entered guilty pleas to five counts in the indictment, preserving his right to appeal the denial of both his motion to suppress his confession and his motion for an evidentiary hearing. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, vacating defendant’s convictions and remanding for further proceedings. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 233 N.J. 24 (2018).HELD: The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement was voluntary. Defendant may withdraw his guilty plea. The failure to record the identification procedure as required by Delgado requires a remand to allow defendant the benefit of a hearing to inquire into the reliability of the identification and any other remedy deemed appropriate by the trial court.1. Due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s confession was voluntary and was not made because the defendant’s will was overborne. A confession which is the product of physical or psychological coercion must be considered to be involuntary and is inadmissible in evidence regardless of its truth or falsity. The voluntariness determination weighs the coercive psychological pressures brought to bear on an individual to speak against his power to resist confessing. Relevant factors include the suspect’s age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved, as well as previous encounters with law enforcement. The ultimate determination of voluntariness depends on the totality of the circumstances. (pp. 22-26) 2 2. Because a suspect will have a natural reluctance to furnish details implicating himself, an interrogating officer may attempt to dissipate this reluctance and may even tell some lies during an interrogation. Certain lies, however, may have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will and to render a confession involuntary. Thus, a police officer cannot directly or by implication tell a suspect that his statements will not be used against him because to do so is in clear contravention of the Miranda warnings. Other impermissible lies are false promises of leniency that, under the totality of circumstances, have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will. A court may conclude that a defendant’s confession was involuntary if interrogating officers extended a promise so enticing as to induce that confession. (pp. 26-30)3. The video-recorded interrogation here reveals that the detectives made (1) representations that directly conflicted with the Miranda warnings, (2) promises of leniency by offering counseling as a substitute for jail, and (3) statements that minimized the seriousness of the crimes under investigation -- all relevant factors under the totality- of-the-circumstances test. In the totality of the circumstances, given the combination of all the relevant evidence and factors, the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the interrogators’ representations to defendant did not overbear his will and induce him to confess. The detectives secured an involuntary confession. Because defendant preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the confession, defendant’s guilty plea must be vacated. (pp. 30-39)4. In State v. Delgado, the Court required that “law enforcement officers make a written record detailing the out-of-court identification procedure, including the place where the procedure was conducted, the dialogue between the witness and the interlocutor, and the results.” 188 N.J. 48, 63 (2006). The Court instructed that “[w]hen feasible, a verbatim account of any exchange between the law enforcement officer and witness should be reduced to writing,” and “[w]hen not feasible, a detailed summary of the identification should be prepared.” Ibid. Without issuing a mandate, the Court added that “electronic recordation is advisable.” Ibid. (pp. 39-40)5. Here, Detective Michael Ruggiero, who administered the photographic array, did not electronically record the identification procedure or make a “verbatim account” of the words exchanged between him and the witness. Nor is there any explanation why he did not do so. The failure to abide by the dictates of Delgado is all the more inexplicable because the identification procedure was prearranged and occurred during normal operating hours at police headquarters, where undoubtedly electronic recording devices were available. The evidentiary hearing requested by defendant would have provided defendant the opportunity to attempt to secure the information denied to him by the Delgado violation. Accordingly, the Court remands for an evidentiary hearing to explore the issue of suggestiveness in the identification process and for the determination of an appropriate remedy for the Delgado violation, which may include a jury charge on the State’s failure to follow the recordation procedures set forth in Delgado. (pp. 40-43) 3 The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. JUSTICE PATTERSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurs with the majority and the Appellate Division that the procedure used by police officers in connection with defendant’s identification by M.H. did not comport with Delgado and that a remand is needed so that the trial court may decide whether the identification procedure entailed suggestiveness and, if necessary, impose an appropriate remedy. Justice Patterson does not agree, however, that defendant’s confession should be suppressed, stressing that the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress after it reviewed the videotape of defendant’s confession and other evidence presented, made detailed factual findings, and concluded that the State had met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. In Justice Patterson’s view, neither the Appellate Division nor the majority afforded the trial court’s findings the substantial deference to which they are entitled. Although a portion of the interrogation crossed the line between proper and improper police tactics, Justice Patterson explains, the trial court’s finding that defendant’s confession was voluntary was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, including the videotape.JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE PATTERSON filed an opinion -- concurring in the remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the identification procedure and dissenting from the suppression of defendant’s confession -- in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE SOLOMON join. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 59 September Term 2017 079974 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. L.H., Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided March 11, 2019 July 22, 2019Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, of counsel and on the briefs).Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alicia J. Hubbard, of counsel and on the briefs).Farbod K. Faraji argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Gibbons, and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Farbod K. Faraji, Lawrence S. Lustberg, and Alexander Shalom, on the brief).Richard P. Lomurro argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey 1 (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland, attorneys; Richard P. Lomurro, of counsel and Christina Vassiliou Harvey, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. No piece of evidence may have greater sway over a jury than adefendant’s confession. For that reason, it is of critical importance that lawenforcement officers use interrogation techniques that will elicit confessionsby lawful means. To ensure that law enforcement officers turn square corners, NewJersey’s jurisprudence requires that the State “prove the voluntariness of aconfession beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654(1993). In their gatekeeping roles, our courts are charged with admitting intoevidence only lawfully secured confessions. False promises of leniency --promises “so enticing” that they induce a suspect to confess -- have thecapacity to overbear a suspect’s will and to render the confession involuntaryand inadmissible. See State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 383 (2014). The primary issue in this appeal is whether the interrogation techniquesthat induced defendant L.H. to confess crossed the forbidden line drawn by ourcase law. 2 In this case, the police took defendant into custody on suspicion that hehad sexually assaulted two women and attempted to sexually assault anotherwoman. During an interrogation that lasted approximately three hours, the twointerrogating detectives repeatedly promised defendant counseling, indicatingthat he would not go to jail if he cooperated. The detectives also tolddefendant that “the truth would set him free” -- advice seemingly at odds withthe Miranda 1 warning given to defendant that anything he said could be usedagainst him. More than an hour into the interrogation, defendant madeincriminating statements that implicated him in all three crimes. He wasarrested and criminally charged. Two days later, one of the victims, while viewing a photographic lineup,identified defendant as her assailant. The officer conducting the identificationdid not record the full dialogue between him and the victim, or the degree ofconfidence expressed by the victim in making the identification. Defendantclaimed that the failure to memorialize the identification procedure violatedState v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48 (2006). In pretrial hearings, the trial court determined that defendant’sconfession and the victim’s identification were admissible. The courtdetermined that the interrogating detectives did not overbear defendant’s will1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 and that defendant made a voluntary confession. The court also determinedthat defendant failed to show that the identification procedure was suggestive,entitling him to a Wade 2 hearing, or that the recordation of that procedureviolated the law. After the pretrial hearings, defendant pled guilty to variousoffenses but preserved his right to appeal the trial court’s evidentiarydecisions. The Appellate Division reversed. It held that the State failed to provethe voluntariness of the confession, finding that the detectives made falsepromises that overbore defendant’s will. It also remanded to the trial court foran evidentiary hearing to decide whether the identification procedure compliedwith Delgado and, if not, to consider the admissibility of the out-of-courtidentification and an appropriate remedy. We affirm. We hold that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement wasvoluntary. Based on that standard, the detectives overbore defendant’s will byfalse promises of leniency that assured counseling instead of incarceration, byrepresentations that conflicted with the Miranda warnings, and byminimization of the gravity of the offenses. Defendant therefore maywithdraw his guilty plea. Moreover, the failure to record the identification2 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 4 procedure as required by Delgado requires a remand to allow defendant thebenefit of both a Wade hearing to inquire into the reliability of theidentification and any other remedy deemed appropriate by the trial court. Weremand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. On May 29, 2012, an Essex County grand jury returned a twelve-countindictment, charging defendant with first-degree kidnapping of M.H. and A.D., N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1) (two counts); first-degree aggravated sexual assault ofM.H. and A.D., N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) (four counts); second-degreeaggravated assault of M.H. and A.D., N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (three counts);first-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault of V.B., N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) (one count); and third-degree terroristic threats to M.H.and A.D., N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) (two counts). The indictment alleged thatdefendant sexually assaulted M.H. on June 18, 2011 and A.D. on July 23, 2011in Bloomfield Township and attempted to sexually assault V.B. on August 4,2011 in Belleville Township. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made during aninterrogation conducted by Detective Lieutenant Joseph Krentz and DetectiveThomas Fano of the Bloomfield Police Department. Defendant argued that the 5 detectives induced his confession by making false promises that he would notface jail time, thus overbearing his will and rendering his confessioninvoluntary. The trial court held a two-day Miranda hearing to determine theadmissibility of the confession. During the State’s presentation, DetectiveKrentz testified and the video-recorded interrogation was admitted intoevidence. We discern the following facts from that record. On August 6, 2011, at about 2:30 a.m., a task force of law enforcementofficers from the Bloomfield and Belleville police departments and the EssexCounty Prosecutor’s Office, investigating the recent sexual assaults of women,stopped a motor vehicle in Bloomfield driven by defendant, who wassuspected of committing the offenses. Detective Krentz directed a patrolofficer to transport defendant to Bloomfield police headquarters. For approximately three hours at headquarters, defendant remainedeither handcuffed in a room or confined in a cell. Then, at 5:31 a.m.,Detectives Krentz and Fano led defendant into an interview room, where thedetectives sat on the opposite side of a desk from defendant. Detective Fano read defendant the Miranda warnings, advising him thathe had a right to remain silent and to have an attorney present, and thatanything he said could “be used against [him] in [a] court of law.” Defendant 6 signed the waiver-of-rights form. When defendant asked why he was beingdetained, Detective Fano responded that they would “get to that” after theyasked “a couple of basic questions,” adding, “you are here for a reason. . . .We didn’t pick you out of the tree.” For the first fifty-five minutes, the detectives secured information fromdefendant about his education, employment, prior residences, family, and hisreason for driving in Bloomfield that evening. They learned that defendantwas a high school graduate with several years of college credits and that hehad a young daughter with a former girlfriend. They also learned thatdefendant had been convicted of a sexually related offense as a result of aclaimed consensual relationship with a sixteen-year-old female when he wastwenty-one or twenty-two years old and that he was a registered sex offender. The detectives at first made no headway with defendant when inquiringabout his movements in Bloomfield several evenings earlier. The interrogationbegan in earnest when defendant denied having any familiarity with FranklinStreet -- the site of two sexual assaults against M.H. and A.D. Almost an hour into the interrogation, Detective Fano announced thatthey had been watching him, and did not “want to pussyfoot with [him].” Thedetective reminded defendant that, when arrested, he was wearing gloves, hispants were open, and condoms were found in his car. Detective Fano then told 7 defendant that he had a “problem.” For the next twenty minutes, whiledefendant deflected questions that would have implicated him in a crime, thetwo detectives suggested that, if defendant cooperated and incriminatedhimself, he would receive counseling and help, not go to jail, and remain freeto raise his child. Indeed, defendant was told that the truth would set him free. The promises of “help” and “counseling” became a consistent theme ofthe interrogation: [Detective Krentz]: We want to get you the help that you need. [Detective Fano]: You need some help, dude. You got a problem. [Detective Krentz]: We want to make sure you get the right help. [Detective Fano]: We’re here to help you. The detectives stayed on theme, repeatedly telling defendant that theywould get him the help he needed for his problem if he cooperated. A fewexamples will suffice: “I want to get you the help that you need”; “I knowwith the right help . . . you’ll be fine down the road”; “we’re also trying tohelp you rebuild for the future.” The detectives made clear that defendant had to be honest to receivecounseling and help -- and to remain free to raise his child: 8 [Detective Fano]: [W]e’re gonna help you out. You need some counseling. You need some more counseling. [Detective Krentz]: And we’re willing to get you the help that you need. .... [Detective Krentz]: So we’re willing to get you the help that you need but you gotta be honest. [Detective Fano]: You gotta be honest. [Detective Krentz]: You gotta be honest. .... [Detective Fano]: Think about your daughter. I want you to be there to raise her. . . . ’Cause women need guidance from a guy. .... [Detective Fano]: [The truth is] going to set you free. The truth -- and it is a true saying, the truth will set you free. [(emphases added).] Detective Krentz allayed concerns raised by defendant about whether hiscooperation would lead to his immediate incarceration because, as defendanttold the detectives, in his last experience with the criminal justice system, afterhe told “the truth” to the police during an interrogation, he was put in jail: [Defendant]: [I] told them the truth and I told them exactly what -- what happened, it happened that quick. 9 [Detective Fano]: Well, that’s not gonna happen -- it’s not gonna go down like that. It’s not gonna -- [Detective Krentz]: Look at me. Look at me. . . . If I’m gonna lock you up, I’m gonna tell you I’m gonna lock you up. I’m not gonna bullshit you. The detectives reassured defendant he was not facing jail: [Defendant]: Am I going to jail tonight? Is this going to be my last meal or something like that? [Detective Krentz]: No, no, not at all. [Defendant]: That’s what everybody says and then -- [Detective Krentz]: That’s TV bullshit, dude. That’s TV. The detectives’ assurances and suggestions that defendant would receivehelp and counseling, stay out of jail, and be there for his daughter if hecooperated were aimed at assuaging the reluctance defendant repeatedlyexpressed about giving up the right to remain silent: [Defendant]: I’m not trying to dig myself in a hole. .... [Defendant]: I just don’t want to jeopardize all the stuff that I’ve been trying to rebuild -- [Detective Fano]: We understand. Rebuild. . . . We want you to get more counseling so you can continue. .... 10 [Defendant]: What I’m trying to say is that I can’t afford to stop my -- my working -- I can’t afford to stop seeing my daughter.[Detective Fano]: Your life. I understand that.[Defendant]: Or being in . . . .[Detective Fano]: Right. That’s why we’re trying to talk to you. That’s why we’re trying to talk to you because of your daughter.....[Defendant]: I just feel like I’m shooting myself in the foot right now. I feel like -- I --[Detective Krentz]: Do you want help?....[Detective Krentz]: I just need to hear your side of the story so I can find out exactly where you are as far as getting the help you need, the right help.[Defendant]: The help I need is not sending me to jail is it?[Detective Krentz]: Not at all. Nobody gets rehabilitated in jail.[Detective Fano]: Yeah, I agree.[Detective Krentz]: Nobody gets rehabilitated in --[Detective Fano]: Dude, you got a little -- you got a baby daughter, you want to be around. 11 The detectives, moreover, continually minimized the nature of the sexualassaults defendant was suspected of committing: [Detective Krentz]: [Y]ou’re not a bad guy. .... [Detective Krentz]: You didn’t hurt anybody -- look at me, you didn’t hurt anybody. [Detective Fano]: Okay. You didn’t hurt anybody. [Detective Krentz]: I know you’re not a bad guy. You didn’t hurt anybody. .... [Detective Fano]: I know you’re not a bad person . . . . You don’t hurt them. .... [Detective Krentz]: [Y]ou didn’t rob them. . . . You didn’t beat them up. You treated them with respect, you treated them okay. One hour and fourteen minutes into the interrogation, defendant began tomake admissions about his involvement in the sexual assaults of M.H. andA.D. and the attempted sexual assault of V.B. The interrogation ended at 8:51a.m. -- more than three hours after it had begun. In his testimony at the Miranda hearing, Detective Krentz conceded that“[e]very time [defendant] expressed hesitancy, [the detectives] talked about the 12 help he was going to get,” and that “it was clear . . . that 'help’ meantcounseling.” B. The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that his will was overborneby false promises that, if he cooperated, he would not go to jail and insteadreceive help in the form of counseling. The court determined that “it is clearfrom the totality of the circumstances that the defendant’s confession wasknowing, voluntary and not the product of improper police procedure and/ormisconduct.” The court observed that the “good guy approach” is apermissible interrogation technique and that an interrogator’s “sympatheticattitude . . . is not in and of itself enough to render a confession involuntary.”The court found that defendant’s “retelling of his version of the attacks,”including minimizing his role, clearly shows that he was not “compelled toprovide information . . . based upon the promises made by the detectives ofhelp not jail.” The voluntariness of defendant’s confession was supported, inthe court’s view, by such factors as defendant’s age, his college education, hisprevious conviction of a sex offense, and his prior experience in the criminaljustice system in which the incriminating statement he made to the police was 13 what “caused him to end up in jail.” 3 The court acknowledged that although“the defendant may have been induced to speak by the detectives’ tactics anddemeanor, those inducements do not culminate in his will being overborne.” C. Defendant also moved for an evidentiary hearing because of the failureof the Bloomfield police to record, electronically or otherwise, theidentification procedure that led to M.H. identifying defendant as her assailant.In particular, defendant claimed that the police failed to preserve the dialoguebetween M.H. and the detective who administered the identification, asrequired by Delgado, 188 N.J. at 63, thereby depriving him of evidenceconcerning the reliability of the identification. The limited record before us is based on four-page information packetsgenerated by the Bloomfield Police Department detailing each of the fifteenphotographic arrays shown to M.H. between June 21 and August 8, 2011. 43 At the time he was interrogated, defendant was twenty-six years old and held an Associate’s Degree from a local community college. Defendant also had a criminal history. Specifically, after making an incriminating statement during an interrogation, he had pled guilty to second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. As a result of that offense, defendant was sentenced to time served and required to register under Megan’s Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. 4 Apparently, these information packets were not placed in evidence at the time defendant requested the Delgado hearing or made part of the record before the Appellate Division. 14 Each four-page information packet consists of (1) a copy of the pre-printedphoto display instructions read by M.H. or to M.H. by the officeradministering the identification; (2) the photo display report listing the numberand letter code attached to each photograph and providing space for the officerto write comments about the witness’s demeanor; (3) a copy of the sixphotographs shown to M.H. on each occasion; and (4) the identification report,partially pre-printed, that records whether M.H. made an identification and thatallows a handwritten narrative of the identification. During the fourteen identification procedures conducted between June21 and August 4, 2011, M.H. was unable to make a positive identification ofher assailant. On August 8, 2011, two days after defendant’s arrest, M.H.viewed a fifteenth photographic array administered by Detective MichaelRuggiero. According to the State, Detective Ruggiero was a “blindadministrator,” meaning that he did not know which of the six photographsdisplayed to M.H. depicted the true suspect. The photographs were of sixblack men with close-cropped hair. The photo display report indicates that the identification procedurebegan at 9:24 a.m. and ended at 9:33 a.m. with M.H. identifying defendant’sphotograph. In the report, the position of each photograph is given asequential number from one to six. Next to photo position numbers one, two, 15 four, five, and six is a six-digit number followed by a letter. Next to photoposition number three -- designating defendant’s photograph -- is the word“SUSPECT.” The report signed by Detective Ruggiero does not explain whythe word “SUSPECT” was used rather than the six-digit number and letterassigned to every other photograph. Under the category “Comments andDemeanor of Witness,” Detective Ruggiero wrote, “Calm, focused.” Next tothe line, “Did witness ask to see any photos again,” he circled the word “no.” The identification report, signed by both M.H. and Detective Ruggiero,indicates that six photographs “were displayed one at a time and were nevershown next to one another.” The following pre-printed words (notemphasized) and handwritten words (underscored) appear in the report: “Iexamined the photographs carefully until I identified photograph # 3 As beingthat of the guy who grabbed me and raped me behind the abandoned house onFranklin St. in June.” Nothing more appears in the commentary portion of thereport other than the pre-printed words that Detective Ruggiero did not makeany threats or promises or urge or prompt M.H. to choose a photograph. Nowhere in the four-page information packet for the August 8photographic array is there any recordation of any dialogue between M.H. andDetective Ruggiero before, during, or after the identification; M.H.’s level ofconfidence when making the identification; or any possible positive or 16 negative gestures of M.H., such as spontaneous affirmation or hesitation inidentifying defendant’s photograph. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a hearing withoutresponding to defendant’s argument that the failure to adequately record theidentification procedure violated Delgado. Instead, the court observed that the2001 New Jersey Attorney General Guidelines did not require the police toelectronically record photographic arrays, and cited Delgado for thatproposition. The court concluded that the identification process was“completed within the Attorney General Guidelines as they existed at the time”of the procedure. The court then found that defendant “failed to show anyevidence of suggestiveness [in the identification process] that could lead to amisidentification.” In the absence of such evidence, the court reasoned thatdefendant was not entitled to a Wade hearing to determine the reliability of theidentification. D. In accordance with a plea agreement, defendant entered guilty pleas tofive counts in the indictment: first-degree kidnapping of M.H. and A.D.; first-degree aggravated sexual assault of M.H. and A.D.; and first-degree attemptedaggravated sexual assault of V.B. The court sentenced defendant on onekidnapping count to a twenty-year state-prison term subject to the No Early 17 Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and to concurrent twenty-year terms subjectto the No Early Release Act on each of the four remaining counts. In all,defendant received an aggregate twenty-year prison sentence subject to aneighty-five percent parole disqualifier. The remaining charges in theindictment were dismissed. Defendant preserved his right to appeal the denialof both his motion to suppress his confession and his motion for an evidentiaryhearing to determine the reliability of the identification. E. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trialcourt, vacating defendant’s convictions and remanding for further proceedings.First, the Appellate Division held that the State failed to prove beyond areasonable doubt that defendant gave a “voluntary” confession to thedetectives. It determined that the trial court’s “detailed analysis” had“overlooked that the officers’ false promises of no incarceration directlynegated the Miranda warnings and induced defendant to confess.” Itacknowledged that the detectives’ offer of “counseling alone did not renderdefendant’s confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.”The Appellate Division, however, stressed that “[o]n three separate occasionsand in three different ways, the officers assured defendant that if he spoke withthem, he would not be put in jail.” It maintained that the detectives’ 18 suggestion that “a confession would only help him to obtain counseling, andwould not result in his incarceration,” contravened the Miranda warnings. Italso rejected the argument that defendant knew from his prior experience withthe police that any statement he made would be used against him because thedetectives in this case “told defendant to disregard his prior encounter with lawenforcement.” Because the false promises of no incarceration induceddefendant to speak in violation of Miranda, the Appellate Division suppresseddefendant’s confession. Second, the Appellate Division held that the trial court should haveconducted a hearing to determine whether the Bloomfield police failed torecord the photo-identification procedure in accordance with Delgado. 5 Itreasoned that the Delgado requirements were intended to expose anysuggestiveness in the identification procedure, and therefore defendant shouldnot be deprived of a Wade hearing because law enforcement failed to abide bythe dictates of Delgado. It ordered the trial court on remand to “conduct suchhearings it deems necessary to determine the admissibility of the out-of-courtidentification” and added that if the identification procedures were not5 The Appellate Division noted that the packets documenting the identification procedures were not marked in evidence or made part of the record before it. Those packets, however, are part of the record before this Court. 19 properly recorded, “Delgado does not necessarily require the court to suppressthe identification.” F. This Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 6 233 N.J. 24(2018). This Court also granted the motions of the American Civil LibertiesUnion of New Jersey (ACLU) and the Association of Criminal DefenseLawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to participate as amici curiae. II. A. The State urges that we affirm the trial court’s factfindings thatdefendant’s confession was voluntary and not the product of improperpsychological compulsion. The State maintains that “the interrogationtechniques used by the detectives did not strip defendant of his capacity forself-determination.” In particular, the State rejects the assertion that thedetectives made “explicit” promises that defendant could avoid jail if heconfessed. Rather, it claims that “the detectives implicitly promised that ifdefendant confessed, they could connect him with effective counseling.” In itsview, “[d]efendant’s statements, questions, requests, and negotiations . . .6 Before granting certification, we granted the State’s motion to expand the record to include defendant’s video-recorded statement. 20 demonstrate that his will was not overborne at any point during theinterrogation.” The State also submits that the trial court did not err in denyingdefendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability ofthe identification. The State argues that the recordation of the identificationcomplied with both the Attorney General Guidelines and Delgado and thatneither demands a verbatim record -- as opposed to a written summary -- of theidentification. It maintains that the Appellate Division took an unprecedentedstep in holding that Delgado required the trial court to conduct a hearing basedon the alleged failure of the police to make a record of the identificationprocedure. B. Defendant asks that we affirm the Appellate Division’s suppression ofhis confession. He submits that the detectives directly and falsely promisedthat he would not be jailed if he spoke the truth, contradicting the detectives’earlier assurance “that anything said can and will be used against [you] incourt,” quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 469 (1966). Defendantrejects the State’s argument that “[he], and others who have been previouslyprosecuted should know better than to trust police officers” -- that he andothers subject to prior interrogations have no excuse “for believing the veracity 21 of police assertions.” The false promises, defendant maintains, overbore hiswill and caused him to make self-incriminating statements. Defendant also submits that the failure of the police to provide averbatim account of the identification procedure, as mandated by Delgado,requires a remand for an evidentiary hearing, as ordered by the AppellateDivision. In defendant’s view, the deficiencies in recording the identificationviolated not only Delgado, but also the Attorney General’s Guidelines. C. Amicus ACDL asks this Court to adopt a rule that renders involuntary aconfession induced by a combination of false promises that the suspect willreceive counseling and avoid jail -- promises that negate the Miranda warningthat anything the suspect says can be used against him in court. Amici ACLU and ACDL both submit that the out-of-court identificationprocedure did not meet the admissibility requirements set by Delgado andtherefore the identification should be suppressed. Suppression is necessary,amici declare, because the detectives have deprived our courts of the recordnecessary to determine the reliability of the identification. III. We first address whether the alleged promises made to defendant by theinterrogating detectives -- promises that he would receive counseling and help 22 and not face jail if he spoke the truth -- violated his rights guaranteed by theUnited States Constitution and New Jersey law. The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the FifthAmendment to the United States Constitution and this State’s common law,now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E.503. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in anycriminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); 7 N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19(“[E]very natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in an action or to apolice officer or other official any matter that will incriminate him or exposehim to a penalty or a forfeiture of his estate . . . .”); N.J.R.E. 503 (same as N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19). In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, the United States SupremeCourt imposed a safeguard to protect a suspect’s right against self-incrimination from the psychological pressures inherent in a police-dominatedatmosphere that might compel a person “to speak where he would nototherwise do so freely.” 384 U.S. at 467. That safeguard mandated that asuspect subject to custodial interrogation “be adequately and effectivelyapprised of his rights.” Ibid. To that end, the Court prescribed a set of7 The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has been made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 8 (1964). 23 warnings that the police must give a suspect before an interrogation begins --warnings that, in part, instruct the suspect that “he has the right to remainsilent” and “that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law.”Id. at 479. Under our state law, at an N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, 8 the State bearsthe burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s waiver ofhis rights was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v.Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01 (2009); State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313(2000). 9 Due process also requires that the State “prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that a defendant’s confession was voluntary and was not made becausethe defendant’s will was overborne.” State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462(2005); see also Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383. “The due process test takes intoconsideration 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both thecharacteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” Dickersonv. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. 8 N.J.R.E. 104(c) provides that “[w]here by virtue of any rule of law a judge is required in a criminal action to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a statement by the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the question of its admissibility out of the presence of the jury.” 9 Under federal law, the government must “prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 168 (1986). 24 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 226 (1973)); see also Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383. Thesource of this test is the common law, which “recognized that coercedconfessions are inherently untrustworthy.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 (citingKing v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B.) (“[A] confessionforced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes inso questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it; and thereforeit is rejected.”)). Contemporary constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that [t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves. [Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 , 320-21 (1959).]Accordingly, “[a] confession which is the product of physical or psychologicalcoercion must be considered to be involuntary and inadmissible in evidenceregardless of its truth or falsity.” State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 405 (1978); seealso Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654 (“An involuntary confession can result frompsychological as well as physical coercion.”). The voluntariness determination weighs the coercive psychologicalpressures brought to bear on an individual to speak against his power to resist 25 confessing. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434. Under New Jersey and federal law,the factors relevant to the voluntariness analysis include “the suspect’s age,education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length ofdetention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, andwhether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved,” as well asprevious encounters with law enforcement. Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383 (quotingGalloway, 133 N.J. at 654); accord Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Thosefactors are “assessed qualitatively, not quantitatively,” for “the presence ofeven one of those factors may permit the conclusion that a confession wasinvoluntary.” Hreha, 217 N.J. at 384. The ultimate determination ofvoluntariness, however, will depend on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at383. Because a suspect will have a “natural reluctance” to furnish detailsimplicating himself in a crime, an interrogating officer may attempt “todissipate this reluctance and persuade the [suspect] to talk.” Miller, 76 N.J. at 403. One permissible way is by “[a]ppealing to [the suspect’s] sense ofdecency and urging him to tell the truth for his own sake.” Id. at 405. Ourjurisprudence even gives officers leeway to tell some lies during aninterrogation. See Galloway, 133 N.J. at 655; Miller, 76 N.J. at 403-04. 26 Certain lies, however, may have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s willand to render a confession involuntary. Thus, a police officer cannot directlyor by implication tell a suspect that his statements will not be used against himbecause to do so is in clear contravention of the Miranda warnings. State inInterest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 151 (2010) (“A police officer cannot directlycontradict, out of one side of his mouth, the Miranda warnings just given outof the other.” (quoting State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 268 (App. Div.2003))); see also State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 298 (App. Div. 2015)(finding impermissible an interrogator’s representation to the defendant that he“could not hurt himself and could only help himself by providing a statement”because it “contradicted a key Miranda warning”). In A.S., the interrogatingofficer violated a juvenile defendant’s rights by telling her that answeringquestions “would actually benefit her” -- an assertion at direct odds with theMiranda warning “that anything she said in the interview could be used againsther in a court of law.” 203 N.J. at 151. Other impermissible lies are false promises of leniency that, under thetotality of circumstances, have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will. SeeHreha, 217 N.J. at 383. A “free and voluntary” confession is not one extractedby “threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.” Brady v. 27 United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 753 (1970) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 542-43 (1897)). 10 “A court may conclude that a defendant’s confession was involuntary ifinterrogating officers extended a promise so enticing as to induce thatconfession.” Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383 (citing State v. Fletcher, 380 N.J. Super. 80, 89 (App. Div. 2005)). “[W]here a promise is likely to 'strip[] defendant ofhis “capacity for self-determination”’ and actually induce the incriminatingstatement, it is not voluntary.” Fletcher, 380 N.J. Super. at 89 (quoting Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. at 272-73). Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, a promise of leniency is onefactor to be considered in determining voluntariness. Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383.Courts have recognized that the danger posed by promises of leniency is thatsuch promises in some cases may have the capacity to overbear a suspect’swill and produce unreliable -- even false -- confessions. See State v. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d 714, 725 (Iowa 2012) (“Courts and commentators have longrecognized promises of leniency can induce false confessions leading towrongful convictions of the innocent.”). 11 Some courts also take into account10 “Bram and its progeny did not hold that the possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the presence and advice of counsel.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 754. 11 Courts have acknowledged that some promises of leniency -- particularly 28 an interrogator’s “minimization” of the offense when questioning the suspectas one factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. 12 State v. Hreha provides general guidance on how to assess a promise ofleniency for purposes of determining the voluntariness of a suspect’sconfession. 217 N.J. at 385-86. There, the defendant testified at a Mirandahearing that, during a custodial interrogation at his workplace, lawthose that combine an implied promise of counseling with a reduction or elimination of a custodial sentence -- have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will and cause him to surrender his fundamental right to remain silent. See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 61 A.3d 750, 758, 760 (Me. 2013) (suppressing the defendant’s statement because the “overall effect of [the interrogating officer’s] representations . . . was to establish that if [the defendant] confessed to the crimes he would get a short county jail sentence with probation”); State v. Reynolds, 145 A.3d 1256, 1258, 1263 (Vt. 2016) (suppressing the defendant’s statement because the interrogating officer’s remarks “implied that defendant would face treatment or complete absolution” if he adopted the officer’s theory of events); see also People v. Wall, 404 P.3d 1209, 1221 (Cal. 2017) (“[W]here a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the decision to confess, the confession is involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of law.” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Boyde, 758 P.2d 25 , 39 (Cal. 1988) (en banc)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 187 (2018). 12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 525-28 (Mass. 2004) (suppressing the defendant’s statement because the interrogating officer’s minimization of the crime and repeated references to the need for “counseling” suggested to the defendant that “counseling” would serve as an alternative to incarceration); see also Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 193, 202-03 (2008) (“Research shows that minimization tactics may lead people to infer by pragmatic implication that leniency in sentencing will follow from confession -- even without an explicit promise.”). 29 enforcement officers promised that, if he confessed to committing computertheft, he “could participate in a pretrial intervention (PTI) program instead offacing traditional criminal prosecution” -- a punishment that the officersdescribed as “a slap on the wrist.” Id. at 375-77. The defendant also testifiedthat the officers promised him that he could “exit the building withouthandcuffs and suggested that he would not lose his job.” Id. at 376. Duringthe Miranda hearing, the testifying officer did not deny making those promisesbut “merely asserted that he could not recollect whether any promises had beenmade.” Id. at 384. Because the trial court misconstrued the testimony at the Mirandahearing, we overturned the court’s finding of voluntariness and remanded for anew hearing. Id. at 385. On remand, we directed the court to make freshcredibility and factual findings and to determine whether the officers extendedany promises of leniency and, if so, whether those promises were likely toinduce an involuntary confession in light of the totality of the circumstances.Id. at 385-86. We now apply the principles relevant to determining voluntariness to thefacts of this case. 30 IV. We begin with our standard of review. “When faced with a trial court’sadmission of police-obtained statements, an appellate court should engage in a'searching and critical’ review of the record to ensure protection of adefendant’s constitutional rights.” Hreha, 217 N.J. at 381-82 (quoting State v.Pickles, 46 N.J. 542, 577 (1966)). Subject to that caveat, this Court generallywill defer to a trial court’s factual findings concerning the voluntariness of aconfession that are based on sufficient credible evidence in the record. SeeState v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007). Factual findings, however, that areclearly mistaken are accorded no deference. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381(2017). When factfindings are clearly mistaken, “the interests of justicedemand intervention” by an appellate court. Ibid. Simply put, “[d]eferenceends when a trial court’s factual findings are not supported by sufficientcredible evidence in the record.” Ibid. Issues of law are reviewed de novo.Hreha, 217 N.J. at 382. The video-recorded interrogation here reveals that the detectives made(1) representations that directly conflicted with the Miranda warnings,(2) promises of leniency by offering counseling as a substitute for jail, and(3) statements that minimized the seriousness of the crimes under investigation-- all relevant factors under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 31 First, the detectives advised defendant that telling the truth would behelpful to him and “w[ould] set [him] free.” That advice directly conflictedwith the Miranda warning that anything defendant said could be used againsthim. Interrogating officers are not allowed to disarm the Miranda warningsduring the interrogation by falsely asserting or suggesting that a suspect’swords will be used in his favor and not against him in court. See A.S., 203 N.J. at 151. Although defendant had experience in the criminal justice system,which ordinarily would suggest he was on notice that his words would be usedagainst him, the detectives suggested that he should disregard his priorexperience and tell the truth, in which case he would not go to jail as happenedthe last time. Second, the detectives repeatedly told defendant that they would get himhelp in the form of counseling and coupled those representations with theassurance that if he told the truth he would not go to jail. Here are but a fewexamples: [Detective Fano]: [W]e’re gonna help you out. You need some counseling. You need some more counseling. [Detective Krentz]: And we’re willing to get you the help that you need. .... 32 [Defendant]: Am I going to jail tonight? Is this going to be my last meal or something like that? [Detective Krentz]: No, no, not at all. .... [Defendant]: The help I need is not sending me to jail is it? [Detective Krentz]: Not at all. Nobody gets rehabilitated in jail. [Detective Fano]: Yeah, I agree.The detectives also reinforced the notion that a jail term would beincompatible with the needs of his daughter, who required a father in her life. Third, the detectives repeatedly minimized the nature and gravity of theof defendant’s alleged offenses -- intimating that his conduct was amenable tocounseling and rehabilitation. The detectives told defendant that he “didn’thurt anybody” or “rob them”; that he “didn’t beat them up” and “treated themwith respect”; and that he was “not a bad guy,” was “salvageable,” and could“rebuild.” One of the detectives even suggested that he wanted to getdefendant the same type of counseling his family had secured for his ownnephew. The psychologically coercive techniques illustrated above were notreferred to by the trial court, which described the detectives as lending asympathetic ear and employing the “good guy approach,” but making no 33 promises. But the record revealed much more. The trial court did not canvassthe law that identifies psychological interrogation techniques, which, in theaggregate, have the capacity to overbear a suspect’s will. 13 We agree with theAppellate Division that the trial court “overlooked that the officers’ falsepromise of no incarceration directly negated the Miranda warnings andinduced defendant to confess.” The Appellate Division conducted a“'searching and critical’ review of the record” in reversing the trial court. SeeHreha, 217 N.J. at 381-82 (quoting Pickles, 46 N.J. at 577). Such a reviewleads us as well to the conclusion that the trial court was “clearly mistaken” infinding that defendant’s confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.See S.S., 229 N.J. at 381. In determining whether the State satisfied its burden of proving beyond areasonable doubt the voluntariness of defendant’s confession, we do not lookat any one factor in isolation -- such as the statement that contradicted theMiranda warning, the promises of help and counseling coupled with theimplicit assurance he would not face jail, and the minimization of his conduct13 The dissent emphasizes the trial court’s finding that, as defendant confessed, “he -- not his interrogators -- controlled the flow of information in their exchange.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 12-13). However, a defendant’s incriminating remarks after his will is overborne are not relevant to whether his will was overborne. Statements made by defendant after the violation of his Fifth Amendment rights cannot repair the constitutional violation. 34 in the offenses he committed. Rather we view all as part of a larger tableauthat constitutes the totality of the circumstances. See Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383-84. Viewed in this light, the State failed to meet its burden that defendant’sconfession was voluntarily secured beyond a reasonable doubt by meansconsistent with our constitutional jurisprudence. The facts before us are unlike those in State v. Miller, a case in which asharply divided Court -- with three members dissenting -- found a confessionvoluntary, while acknowledging that the interrogation technique pressed thelimits of how to secure a voluntary confession by lawful means. 76 N.J. at 404-05, 408. In that case, Miller became the focus of an investigation into thebrutal murder of a seventeen-year-old female. Id. at 396-97. Two statetroopers transported Miller from the factory where he worked to a state policebarracks, where he arrived at 11:49 p.m. Id. at 397. The tape-recordedinterrogation began about two hours later and lasted fifty-eight minutes. Ibid.Miller was read and waived his Miranda rights. Ibid. The interrogating officeradvised Miller he was a suspect in the murder and a back-and-forthconversation proceeded, with Miller at first denying his involvement in thecrime. Ibid. At some point, Miller stated that “whoever did it really needshelp.” Id. at 398. In response, “[t]he officer suggested that such a person wasnot really a criminal who should be punished, but rather needed medical 35 treatment” and that “he would do all he could to help [Miller] but that [Miller]had to help himself first by talking about it.” Ibid. Miller then gave an incredible account of how he was walking with theyoung woman through a field when a knife-wielding man attacked her, of howhe attempted to defend her, and of how he panicked and took her dead bodyand dropped it off a bridge into a stream. Id. at 398. Confronted with thisaccount, the officer said, “[Y]ou killed this girl didn’t you?” Ibid. In the faceof Miller’s continued denial, the officer stated, “You’ve got to tell me thetruth. I can’t help you without the truth.” Ibid. The officer persisted thatMiller had to be “truthful with [himself].” Id. at 399. Shortly afterwards,Miller confessed. Ibid. The Court formulated the voluntariness issue by posing two questions:(1) can an interrogating officer “appeal to a suspect by telling him that he isthe suspect’s friend and wants to help him [and] that whoever killed this girl isnot a criminal who should be punished, but a person who needs medicaltreatment”; and (2) “[d]oes the officer have the right to tell the suspect that hemust help himself first by telling the truth and then the officer will do what hecan to help the suspect with his problem?” Id. at 403-04. Having formulatedthe issue, the Court conceded that the interrogation technique used “moves into 36 a shadowy area and if carried to excess in time and persistence, can cross thatintangible line and become improper.” Id. at 404. Significantly, when the United States Court of Appeals for the ThirdCircuit denied Miller’s habeas corpus petition challenging the voluntariness ofthe confession, the divided three-judge panel observed that, based on theinterrogation techniques, “if Miller had made remarks that indicated that hetruly believed that the state would treat him leniently because he was 'notresponsible’ for what he had done or that he believed that he would receivepsychiatric help rather than punishment, we might not find the confessionvoluntary.” Miller v. Fenton (Fenton), 796 F.2d 598, 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1986).By the reckoning of the majorities in both Miller and Fenton, the investigatingofficer’s interrogation techniques evidently approached the outer limit of howlawfully to secure a voluntary confession. 1414 The dissents in Miller and Fenton strongly condemned the interrogation techniques used by the investigating officer and protested that fundamental rights must be honored in cases involving even egregious crimes. Miller, 76 N.J. at 409, 423 (Conford, P.J.A.D., dissenting); Fenton, 796 F.2d at 627-28 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Miller, Judge Conford lamented that “this case signals to the law-enforcement community that the method of interrogation of this defendant resulting in the confession before us is unexceptionable and may be freely practiced.” Miller, 76 N.J. at 410 (Conford, P.J.A.D., dissenting). Similarly, in his dissent in Fenton, Judge Gibbons criticized the majority for “endorsing a thoroughly bad piece of police work” and thus sending “a signal to the police community in this circuit that is likely to have the harmful consequence of encouraging coercion of defendants 37 The interrogation techniques used in the present case -- in their totality-- go well beyond the norms haltingly approved in Miller. The interrogationhere “carried to excess in time and persistence” and “cross[ed] that intangibleline and bec[a]me improper.” See Miller, 76 N.J. at 404. 15 The defendant in this case was arrested at 2:30 a.m., transported toheadquarters, and remained handcuffed in a room or confined in a cell for thenext three hours. Not until 5:31 a.m. did the three-hour interrogation begin.Although at one point defendant indicated that he was “tired as hell,” therecord does not reveal how long defendant had gone without sleep because thedetectives did not ask during the interrogation. During the interrogation, toovercome defendant’s reluctance to speak, the detectives employed thetechniques that we have already discussed at length. The detectivesin place of acceptable methods of investigation.” Fenton, 796 F.2d at 613-14 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 15 The present case is not similar to Galloway either -- a murder case in which the defendant was interrogated for harshly shaking a three-month-old child, eventually causing the child’s death. 133 N.J. at 637-39. After repeatedly warning the defendant of his Miranda rights, the interrogating officer “used the 'theme’ that defendant had to tell him what had happened to the child so the doctors could properly treat the child.” Id. at 639. The defendant then “gave an incriminating oral account of the events surrounding the shaking of the child.” Ibid. The officer admitted that he intended to use the information as part of his criminal investigation. Id. at 653. Relying on Miller, the Court found that this deceptive interrogation technique did not render the confession involuntary. Id. at 655-57. 38 undermined the Miranda warning that defendant’s words could be used againsthim by telling him the truth would set him free; they falsely promised help andcounseling as a substitute for jail; and they minimized the seriousness of theoffenses under investigation. In the totality of the circumstances, given thecombination of all the relevant evidence and factors, the State failed to showbeyond a reasonable doubt that the interrogators’ representations to defendantdid not overbear his will and induce him to confess. Therefore, like the Appellate Division, we conclude that the detectivessecured an involuntary confession. Because defendant preserved his right toappeal the denial of his motion to suppress the confession, defendant’s guiltyplea must be vacated. V. We next address defendant’s claim that the Bloomfield police failed toproperly record the photographic-array procedure leading to M.H.’sidentification of defendant, thus entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. Thegoverning law at the time of the out-of-court identification was State v.Delgado, 188 N.J. 48 (2006). 1616 The photographic array was administered several weeks before our decision in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), and nearly a year before we promulgated Rule 3:11. See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 208, 220 (announcing on August 24, 2011 that “[t]he revised principles in this decision will apply purely prospectively”). The parties agree that this appeal is controlled by Delgado. 39 In Delgado, we exercised our supervisory powers under Article VI,Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution and required that “lawenforcement officers make a written record detailing the out-of-courtidentification procedure, including the place where the procedure wasconducted, the dialogue between the witness and the interlocutor, and theresults.” 188 N.J. at 63. We emphasized that “the dialogue between a lawenforcement officer and a witness may be critical to understanding the level ofconfidence or uncertainty expressed in the making of an identification andwhether any suggestiveness, even unconsciously, seeped into the identificationprocess.” Id. at 60. “Preserving the words exchanged between the witness andthe officer conducting the identification procedure,” we recognized, “may beas important as preserving either a picture of a live lineup or a photographicarray.” Id. at 63. We instructed that “[w]hen feasible, a verbatim account of any exchangebetween the law enforcement officer and witness should be reduced towriting,” and “[w]hen not feasible, a detailed summary of the identificationshould be prepared.” Ibid. Without issuing a mandate, we added that “[i]n thestation house where tape recorders may be available, electronic recordation isadvisable.” Ibid. Here, Detective Ruggiero, who administered thephotographic array, did not electronically record the identification procedure 40 or make a “verbatim account” of the words exchanged between him and thewitness. Nor do we have any explanation why he did not do so. Detective Ruggiero used the pre-printed forms supplied by theBloomfield police that provided certain scripted remarks to be read to or by thewitness and blank spaces for the inclusion of handwritten observations by thedetective and explanations by the witness. The police documented thephotographic array shown to M.H. and the photograph she selected. DetectiveRuggiero handwrote “[c]alm, focused” in the category for comments anddemeanor of witness. After the pre-printed words, “I examined thephotographs carefully until I identified photograph #,” either DetectiveRuggiero or M.H. wrote the number “3” signifying the photograph selectedand added that he was the “guy” who “grabbed me and raped me behind theAbandoned house on Franklin St. in June.” The four-page identificationprocedure packet does not contain the required verbatim account or a detailedsummary of the dialogue between Detective Ruggiero and M.H. The failure to abide by the dictates of Delgado is all the moreinexplicable because the identification procedure was prearranged andoccurred during normal operating hours at police headquarters, where 41 undoubtedly electronic recording devices were available. 17 The evidentiaryhearing requested by defendant would have provided defendant the opportunityto attempt to secure the information denied to him by the Delgado violation --the full dialogue between Detective Ruggiero and M.H. before, during, andimmediately after the identification; M.H.’s statement of confidence in heridentification; and evidence of any potential suggestiveness in theidentification procedure. For example, without knowing how and when theword “SUSPECT” was placed next to defendant’s photograph on the photodisplay report -- rather than the six-digit number and letter assigned to the fiveother photos in the array -- doubt is raised about whether Detective Ruggierowas a “blind administrator.” Accordingly, we remand for an evidentiary hearing to explore the issueof suggestiveness in the identification process and for the determination of anappropriate remedy for the Delgado violation. We do not suggest that thecourt is required to bar the identification. See State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213,239 (2019) (“We have not, however, created bright-line rules that call for the'suppression of reliable evidence any time a law enforcement officer makes amistake.’” (quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 303)). The trial court may17 Indeed, the Bloomfield police had video-recorded defendant’s interrogation just two days earlier. 42 consider charging the jury on the State’s failure to follow the recordationprocedures set forth in Delgado. See id. at 234-35. If such a charge is appropriate, jurors should be told that officers are required to record identification procedures . . . ; if that is not feasible, they are required to prepare a contemporaneous, verbatim written account of the procedure. If the police did not follow that practice, and, for example, did not capture the dialogue between the witness and the officer, . . . the jury may take that into account when it evaluates the identification evidence. 18 [Id. at 235.] VI. For the reasons expressed, we affirm the judgment of the AppellateDivision, which determined that the trial court erred in finding defendant’sconfession voluntary. We hold that the State failed to prove beyond areasonable doubt that defendant rendered a voluntary confession, and thereforethe confession must be suppressed. Accordingly, defendant is entitled towithdraw his guilty plea, having preserved that issue for appeal. We also hold that the police failed to prepare a contemporaneousverbatim account of the identification procedure as required by Delgado. An18 The proposed jury charge is appropriate because this case arose after Delgado but before Henderson and the adoption of Rule 3:11. Supra note 16. Today, the police must also record “a witness’ statement of confidence, in the witness’ own words.” R. 3:11(c)(7); see also Anthony, 237 N.J. at 235. 43 evidentiary hearing must be conducted prior to trial to determine whether anysuggestiveness occurred during the identification procedure, and the court alsomust determine any appropriate remedy for the Delgado violation. We remandfor proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE PATTERSON filed an opinion -- concurring in the remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the identification procedure and dissenting from the suppression of defendant’s confession -- in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE SOLOMON join. 44 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 59 September Term 2017 079974 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. L.H., Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE PATTERSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority and the Appellate Division that the procedureused by police officers in connection with defendant’s identification by M.H.,one of the three sexual assault victims in this matter, did not comport withState v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 63 (2006). Ante at ___ (slip op. at 39-43). Itherefore agree with the majority and the Appellate Division that a remand isneeded so that the trial court may decide whether the identification procedureentailed suggestiveness and, if necessary, impose an appropriate remedy. Anteat ___ (slip op. at 42-43). I do not agree, however, that defendant’s confession to two sexualassaults and one attempted sexual assault should be suppressed. Ante at ___(slip op. at 31-39). The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress after 1 it reviewed the videotape of defendant’s confession and other evidencepresented at the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, made detailed factual findings, andconcluded that the State had met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubtthat the confession was voluntary. Neither the Appellate Division nor themajority afforded the trial court’s findings the substantial deference to whichthey are entitled. I concur with the majority that a portion of the interrogation that gaverise to this appeal crossed the line between proper and improper police tactics.The interrogating officers promised defendant that he would be providedcounseling in the event that he confessed, and suggested -- notwithstanding thegravity of defendant’s crimes -- that the officers would somehow ensure thatthe counseling would be afforded to defendant outside of a prison setting.Clearly, the officers should have refrained from offering any such assurances,which could deceive and coerce a suspect less intelligent and experienced thanthis defendant. The videotape of the questioning, however, reveals defendant to be anintelligent, well-educated, self-confident veteran of the criminal justice systemwho was skeptical of the officers’ reassuring comments and presented acarefully crafted narrative of his offenses that downplayed his culpability. Asthe trial court ruled and the videotape record confirms, the officers’ statements 2 did not overbear defendant’s will or coerce his confession. In my view,therefore, the trial court’s finding that defendant’s confession was voluntarywas supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding regardingdefendant’s motion to suppress his confession. I. A. Well-settled jurisprudence sets the governing standard for this appeal.When a trial court assesses whether a videotaped confession was voluntary, itmust hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(c), in which itimposes on the State the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonabledoubt and makes factual findings with respect to the pertinent factors. State v.Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 383 (2014); State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462-63 (2005);State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 405(1978). The court’s assessment of the totality of the circumstances of a givencase -- not its application of per se rules -- is at the core of the voluntarinessdetermination. Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383. When the trial court’s determination isappealed, its factual findings are entitled to substantial deference, even if thosefindings are premised exclusively on videotaped evidence. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 376-81 (2017); see also State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395-96 (2019); 3 State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015); State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463,471 (1999). B. When the State seeks to admit a criminal defendant’s confession, it hasthe burden to show not only that the defendant was informed of his or herrights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 479 (1966), “but also that hehas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights, before anyevidence acquired through the 'interrogation can be used against him,’” Statev. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 400-01 (2009) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). Where, as here, the critical inquiry concerns the voluntariness of aconfession, “the State shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonabledoubt that a defendant’s confession was actually volunteered and that thepolice did not overbear the will of the defendant.” Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383(citing Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654); see also Knight, 183 N.J. at 462. To assess whether the State has met its burden, the trial court holds apretrial hearing to “hear and determine the question of . . . admissibility out ofthe presence of the jury.” N.J.R.E. 104(c). When a trial court decides whether a confession is voluntary, it considers“the totality of the circumstances, including both the characteristics of thedefendant and the nature of the interrogation.” Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383 (quoting 4 Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654). Relevant factors include “the suspect’s age,education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length ofdetention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, andwhether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved.” Ibid.(quoting Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654). Courts also consider “whether thedefendant has had previous encounters with law enforcement and the period oftime between when Miranda rights were administered and when defendantconfessed.” Ibid. (citing State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614 (1999)). As the Court’s jurisprudence in the separate but related context ofMiranda waivers confirms, the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis rarelygives rise to bright-line rules invalidating a confession solely because of aninterrogating officer’s conduct. The Court noted in Nyhammer that “[o]nly inthe most limited circumstances have we applied a per se rule to decide whethera defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights.” 197 N.J. at 403. Instead, the Court relies on “'fact-based assessments’ under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach” as “the proper way to decide whether a defendantvoluntarily waived his rights.” Ibid. (quoting State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108,124-25 (2007)). 5 C. As the Court has observed, in contrast to the use of physical coercion,the “use of a psychologically-oriented technique during questioning is notinherently coercive.” Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654 (citing State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 405 (1978)). The Court has acknowledged there exists “a naturalreluctance on the part of a suspect to admit to the commission of a crime andfurnish details.” Miller, 76 N.J. at 403. “Efforts by an interrogating officer todissipate . . . reluctance and persuade the person to talk are proper as long asthe will of the suspect is not overborne.” Ibid. The Court has held that “[t]hereal issue is whether the person’s decision to confess result[ed] from a changeof mind rather than from an overbearing of the suspect’s will.” Galloway, 133 N.J. at 655 (citing Miller, 76 N.J. at 405). Thus, an assessment of policeconduct is only part of the equation; the court must also determine, consideringthe totality of the circumstances, whether that conduct overbore thedefendant’s will. Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383; Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654-55.“Cases holding that police conduct had overborne the will of the defendanthave typically required a showing of very substantial psychological pressureon the defendant.” Galloway, 133 N.J. at 656. The Appellate Division’s decision in State v. Pillar illustratescircumstances in which an officer’s promise is deemed significant enough to 6 overbear a suspect’s will. 359 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 2003). There, thedefendant asked, during his custodial interrogation, whether he could tell theinterrogating officer “something 'off-the-record.’” Id. at 262. The officer toldthe defendant he was willing to listen to an “off-the-record” statement. Ibid.The defendant, reassured that any statement he made would be “off-the-record,” confessed to the sexual abuse of a child. Ibid. At a suppressionhearing, the officer testified that he “was not sure what 'off-the-record’ meant”and commented that he believed “there really is no such thing as off-the-record” once Miranda warnings have been administered. Ibid. The AppellateDivision concluded that the officer’s promise, “which defendant couldreasonably believe meant that the statement would not be used against him,clearly had the likelihood of stripping defendant of his 'capacity for self-determination.’” Id. at 272-73 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 225-26 (1973)). In two cases, the Court has considered the totality of the circumstancesand found that psychological tactics used by police in interrogating a suspectdid not overbear his will. In Galloway, a police officer represented to thedefendant that he needed to know how a child victim was injured so thatdoctors could properly treat the child; in fact, the officer’s sole objective wasto obtain the defendant’s confession. 133 N.J. at 639, 653. Rejecting the 7 defendant’s argument that his statement was involuntary, the Court concludedthat even though the detective had used “a deliberate act of deception to securea confession,” id. at 653, he had not exerted “very substantial psychologicalpressure” or overborne the defendant’s will, id. at 656. The Court relied on thedefendant’s comment, while waiting to hear whether the child victim wouldsurvive, that he was concerned about getting “blamed for this,” as well as onthe fact that defendant was asked to go to the police station to give a statementand had been repeatedly administered Miranda warnings. Id. at 657. In Miller, an interrogating officer assured the suspect in a murderinvestigation that the perpetrator was not a person who should be punished, butinstead merely needed medical treatment. 76 N.J. at 398. The officer assuredthe defendant that “he would do all he could to help [the] defendant but that[he] had to help himself first by talking about it.” Ibid. “The officer said that[the] defendant was not being completely honest with him,” and asked, “youkilled this girl didn’t you?” Ibid. The defendant disputed the officer’sassertion, and the officer stated for a second time, “You’ve got to tell me thetruth. I can’t help you without the truth.” Ibid. After the defendant’s storyregarding how the victim had been killed was shown to be incredible, theofficer stated for a third time, “be truthful with yourself.” Id. at 399. As theCourt recounted the interrogation: 8 [The] [d]efendant began to waver in his denial, saying, “This is going to kill my father.” Seizing on the reference to his father, the officer said, “[i]f the truth is out, he will understand. That’s the most important thing, not, not what has happened, Frank. The fact that you were truthful, you came forward and you said, look I have a problem. I didn’t mean to do what I did. I have a problem. This is what’s important, Frank.” Defendant then confessed. [Ibid. (third alteration in original).] As the majority notes, ante at ___ (slip op. at 35-37), the Court viewedthe interrogator’s psychological technique in Miller to be “mov[ing] into ashadowy area,” and cautioned that the technique employed, “if carried toexcess in time and persistence, can cross that intangible line and becomeimproper.” 76 N.J. at 404. It concluded, however, that as used in Miller, thetechnique did not cross such a line. Ibid. The Court noted that the previouslyconvicted defendant “was in no way deluded or misled into believing that the[questioner] was acting in any capacity other than as an interrogating policeofficer in the investigation of a serious crime.” Ibid. It also observed that theinterrogation was less than an hour long, and that the distress manifested bythe defendant after confessing was not abnormal in light of the “enormity” ofthe offense. Ibid. Reviewing the defendant’s habeas corpus petition, the United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this Court’s reasoning. Miller 9 v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 613 (3d Cir. 1986). The Third Circuit expressed“little doubt that [the interrogating officer’s] encouraging words . . . helped[the defendant] to reach his decision to unburden himself.” Ibid. The courtconcluded, however, that the technique “did not produce psychologicalpressure strong enough to overbear the will of a mature, experienced man, whowas suffering from no mental or physical illness and was interrogated for lessthan an hour at a police station close to his home.” Ibid. II. A. In this case, the trial judge did precisely what this Court’s decisionsdirect that she should do. She held a two-day hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E.104(c), during which she viewed L.H.’s videotaped confession and consideredother testimonial and documentary evidence. As the transcript of that hearingreflects, the judge critically reviewed the evidence presented by the State. The trial judge then made detailed factual findings which were recordedon eleven transcript pages and supported with citations to testimony from thehearing. Those factual findings -- many of which are omitted from themajority opinion -- fully support the trial court’s determination ofvoluntariness. 10 The trial judge accepted the uncontroverted testimony of the leadinvestigator, Detective Lieutenant Krentz of the Bloomfield PoliceDepartment, that he administered Miranda warnings to defendant, who signeda Miranda card. The judge rejected defendant’s argument that the confessionshould be suppressed because he was not informed until more than an hourinto the interrogation about the sexual offenses that prompted his arrest andinterrogation. The trial judge made detailed findings as to the conditions of defendant’sinterrogation and his demeanor during that interrogation. She noted thatdefendant was offered food, water, and the use of bathroom facilities duringthe interrogation, and that the officers took a break during the inquiry to installa second recording disk. The judge found that “defendant, throughout thestatement, appears to be calm and in no physical distress,” and that “at times[he] could be seen laughing with the detectives as he tries to seeminglyconvince them of his lack of ill-intent towards the women he assaulted.” Thejudge observed “a back and forth discussion” between defendant and thedetectives, in which defendant was “intent on minimizing his conduct duringthe encounters” with the victims, “explaining often that he wasn’t attemptingto hurt anyone.” 11 The trial judge acknowledged the detectives’ psychological tactics,including “the promises made by the detectives of help[,] not jail.” She statedthat her evaluation of those tactics relied on “a weighing of the circumstanceof pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.” In that context, the trial judge invoked several of the factors identified inthis Court’s decisions as relevant in a “totality of the circumstances” inquiry.See Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383; Knight, 183 N.J. at 462-63; Galloway, 133 N.J. at 654; Miller, 76 N.J. at 402-05. The judge noted defendant’s maturity andcollege education. She cited defendant’s status as a registered sex offenderunder Megan’s Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, observing that “[h]e is no strangerto custodial interrogation or [to] this type of proceeding.” The court found thatthe length of the interrogation -- three hours -- was not excessive “given themultiple victims and offenses covered during the interview.” She found thatthose factors weighed in favor of a finding of voluntariness. The trial judge substantially relied on defendant’s own words, noting histone and demeanor as he said those words. She inferred from defendant’scomments during the videotaped interrogation that he understood theconsequences of a confession. She found significant defendant’s statementthat in a prior case, he had made a statement to police that “caused him to endup in jail and cost him time and contact with his family.” The judge noted that 12 despite defendant’s observation that what he was saying could get him “intotrouble,” he chose to continue talking with the detectives. She commented thatwhen defendant gave his version of the sexual assaults, he “attempt[ed] todistance himself with denials of the more violent aspects of the assault,” thusconfirming that he -- not his interrogators -- controlled the flow of informationin their exchange. She cited defendant’s question to the detectives whether thevictims’ accounts of the sexual assaults comported with his own. Based on those factual findings, the trial court concluded that, under thetotality of the circumstances, the detectives’ tactics did not overbeardefendant’s will and defendant’s confession was voluntary. B. I agree with the majority that in a portion of the interrogation, theinterrogating officers traversed the line that separates proper psychologicaltactics from inappropriate assurances. Implying that defendant’s priorexperience with the criminal justice system would not be duplicated in thiscase, the officers suggested that the counseling defendant needed would bedelivered in a setting other than jail, because “[n]obody gets rehabilitated injail.” See ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). They also told him that he was “not atall” going to jail that night. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). The officers wentbeyond a mere commitment to arrange mental health counseling and instead 13 tethered the prospect of such counseling to a suggestion that defendant wouldnot be incarcerated -- at least not in the short term. Their statements wereimproper. The Court has never held, however, that a police officer’s inappropriateoffer of counseling without incarceration gives rise to a per se rule barring thesuspect’s confession. See Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 403 (noting the rarity of perse rules governing the question whether a Miranda waiver was knowing andvoluntary). Instead, the inquiry is whether, considering the totality of thecircumstances, defendant’s will was overborne by the psychological tacticsused in his interrogation. Galloway, 133 N.J. at 655; Miller, 76 N.J. at 405. In my view, the trial court’s finding that defendant’s will was notoverborne -- and that his confession was voluntary -- should be affirmed,because that finding was grounded in sufficient credible evidence in therecord. See S.S., 229 N.J. at 374; Hreha, 217 N.J. at 382; Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 268; Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471. The trial court properly considered defendant’s maturity, intelligence,education, and prior experience with the criminal justice system as providingimportant context to his videotaped interrogation. Before he set foot in theBloomfield Police Department interrogation room, defendant had experiencedfirsthand the consequences of admitting to police officers that he had 14 committed a sexual assault. As his interrogation revealed, defendant fullyunderstood the serious offenses for which he was investigated. He had everyreason to disbelieve the officers’ suggestion that the outcome of theinvestigation might be counseling rather than a custodial sentence. In the videotaped record of his interrogation, defendant’s skepticalreaction to the officers’ cajoling comments is on display. He invoked his priorexperience with law enforcement to challenge the officers’ ingratiatingremarks. From start to finish, defendant’s demeanor was consistent; he was atall times alert, confident, and assertive. 1 His confession -- obtained without1 The majority finds it significant that defendant “was arrested at 2:30 a.m., transported to headquarters, and remained handcuffed in a room or confined in a cell for the next three hours,” at which point he was interrogated. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 38). It notes that defendant stated that he was “tired as hell,” but omits defendant’s immediately preceding comment that he was “all right,” as well as his refusal of the officers’ offer of food and drink. To the extent that the majority infers that sleep deprivation is relevant to the question of voluntariness in the circumstances of this case, any such suggestion contravenes prior case law. See, e.g., W.B., 205 N.J. at 598-600 (holding that the defendant’s confession was properly admitted although he waited in an interrogation room from 11:00 p.m. to sometime after 2:00 a.m. before being questioned, and did not confess until 3:40 a.m.); Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 617-18 (holding that the defendant’s forty-four hour interrogation, which began at 12:30 a.m., did not warrant suppression of his interrogation as the questioning was not “round the clock,” the defendant was afforded breaks, and the defendant never indicated that he was too tired or hungry to continue); Galloway, 133 N.J. at 638-39, 657 (ruling that the defendant’s confession was voluntary even though he was questioned early in the morning after a sleepless night, and noting that “[a]lthough defendant may not have slept that night, he did not appear tired”). 15 repeated or prolonged questioning, intimidating conduct by the police, orphysical abuse -- closely followed the administration of Miranda warnings. Significantly, defendant did not simply affirm the officers’ allegations,but maintained control of his narrative. Defendant supplied critical detailsabout the time, location, and circumstances of each offense -- details that theofficers did not provide him. He declined, however, to admit to an importantaspect of two of the crimes: that each victim was abducted on the street anddragged to a secluded location, where each was sexually assaulted. Instead, hestressed to the officers that he treated those two victims with kindness andcourtesy before, during, and after the sexual assaults. He suggested that oncehe initiated sexual contact, neither victim objected. By defendant’s account,only the third victim -- whose screams and physical resistance foiled hisattempt to kidnap and sexually assault her -- was unwilling to engage in sexualconduct with him. 2 Remarkably, defendant pressed the officers to verify thathis version of the sexual assaults was consistent with the accounts of thevictims.2 The majority premises its decision in part on what it characterizes as the officers’ minimization of the seriousness of the crimes for which defendant was investigated. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). I do not share the majority’s view that in the setting of this case, it was improper for the officers to establish a rapport with defendant by commending him for not injuring or killing the victims. 16 Defendant’s demeanor and statements were not those of a suspect whosewill was overborne. As in Miller, the interrogating police officers embarkedon perilous ground by promising the defendant that candor would bring himthe help that he needed. See Miller, 76 N.J. at 398-99, 404. In the end,however, defendant’s decision to confess was clearly his own. I consider the trial court’s factual findings, based on the videotape ofdefendant’s confession and the other evidence presented at the N.J.R.E. 104(c)hearing, to be based on sufficient credible evidence in the record. In my view,the court’s determination of voluntariness and its admission of defendant’sconfession should be affirmed. III. I would affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Division’sdetermination. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part with the majority’sdecision, and dissent in part from that decision. 17