Title: CAMPANELLA v BOUMA
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12514
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 1974

No. 12514 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA GEORGE CAMPANELLA, a s Receiver f o r t h e use and b e n e f i t of L A R R Y C. IVERSON, INC., and i t s shareholders, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - R A L P H BOUMA, M R S . R A L P H BOUMA, h i s wife; et a l . , Defendants, Counter and/or Cross - P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, -vs - F A R M E R S STATE BANK O F CONRAD, E A R L M. BERTHELSON, and UNITED BANK O F P U E B L O (formerly A R K A N S A S V A L L E Y BANK), Counter and/or Cross Defendants and Respondents, -vs - RAY LIGHTNER and MRS. RAY LIGHTNER, h i s wife, Cross-Defendants and Respondents, -vs - C A R L 0. IVERSON and L A R R Y C. IVERSON, P e t i t i o n e r s f o r Intervention, Counter and/or Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. Hatf i e l d , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Ralph Bouma (Pro Se) appeared, Ledger, Montana K e i l and Gustafson, Conrad, Montana Dale L. K e i l appeared and Gale R. Gustafson argued, Conrad, Montana For Respondents: Dzivi, Conklin, Johnson and Nybo, Great F a l l s , Montana James W. Johnson argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana Raymond F. Koby argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Church, Harris, Johnson and Williams, Great F a l l s , Montana Cresap S. McCracken argued, Great F a l l s , Montana James, Crotty, Fopp & Paul, Great F a l l s , Montana G, Robert Crotty argued, Great F a l l s , Montana a=- - Submitted: March 19. 1974 F i l e d M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an attempted appeal by defendants Bouma from an order dated March 23, 1972, by the Honorable Paul G. Hatfield made during the pleading stages, such order designed to s e t t l e the pleadings so that issues raised by the complaint might be pursued. This unusual attempted appeal a t this stage makes our review and this opinion somewhat unorthodox. However, in an effort to aid subsequent proceedings, w e will set forth more materials than necessary to decide the appeal. In December, 1971, the respondent receiver commenced this action against the appellants Bouma for the rescission of the Bouma contract t o purchase 4,520 acres of farmland from the corporation. The history of other litigation involving the corporation dates back to 1964. The latest case be- fore this Court i n the series of cases in Cause No. 12387, Farmers State Bank Mont. of Conrad v. Iverson, e t a1 . and Bouma, reported a t , 509 P.2d 839, 30 St.Rep. 501. In that opinion a review of the long litigation was made and w e will not repeat i t here. B u t hereinafter w e will refer to that opinion. The combined order i n Pondera County Cause No. 8 9 9 delineates and describes the complex situation and w e quote the entire order as follows: "A review of the court f i l e in the above-entitled action reveals that the Plaintiff filed his complaint herein on or about December 10, 1971. Defendant Ralph Bouma filed his answer and supplemental answer on September 22, 1972, and November 28, 1972, respectively, setting forth twenty-eight separate defenses. Said Defendant filed his counterclaim, consisting of nine separate counts, on September 22, 1972. On December 19, 1972, Plaintiff filed alternative mo- tions under Rule 12, M.R.C.P. to strike Counts One, TWO, Three and Nine of said Defendant's counterclaim, or alternatively to dismiss said counts for their failure to state a claim for relief. Additionally said motion sought the dismissal of a l l of the re- maining counts upon the same ground or, alternatively, seeking an order requiring a more definite statement of said remaining counts. These alternative motions were supported by Plaintiff by a memoran- dum filed January 5, 1973, and opposed by Defendant Ralph Bouma on February 7, 1973, by a motion to quash said motions, along with other pending motions. Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum on February 22, 1973, and a hearing upon said motions was held, by order of the Court, on March 1 , 1973. The Court having considered the aforesaid motions, the memoranda i n support thereof, the argu- ments by Ralph Bouma, appearing pro se, by James W. Johnson, appear- ing for the Plaintiff, and by Gale Gustafson appearing for Defend- ant, Mrs. Ralph Bouma (over the objection of Plaintiff's counsel that Mrs. Ralph Bouma had no interest in motions going to the merits of her husband's sole counterclaim), and the court being cognizant of the condition and circumstances of the record i n this cause to date and being fully informed in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED A S F O L L O W S : "(1 ) The Motion to Quash of Defendants Ralph Bouma and Mrs. Ralph Bouma is a motion unheard of in the law of this state and on& not sanctioned by the Montana Rules of Civi 1 Procedure. Such a motion was contrary to the former practice i n this state (see State ex rel. McVay v. District Court, 126 Mont. 382, 251 P.2d 840) and is super- fluous and unauthorized i n the present practice. Said motion by said Defendants, filed herein on February 7, 1973, i s hereby stricken. The memorandum filed i n support of said Motion to Quash has been taken by the Court as a memorandum i n opposition to the alternative motions of the Plaintiff and has been considered by the court. "(2) Regarding Counts One, Two, Three and Nine of the counter- claim of Defendant Ralph Bouma, both alternative motions of Plain- t i f f ' s to strike or dismiss said Counts are well taken. For the reasons, and upon the authority cited in Plaintiff's brief, said counts fail to state a claim against Plaintiff upon which relief may be granted. I t i s unnecessary to grant such dismissal, how- ever, as a l l of said counts are frivolous, impertinent and im- material. The allegations in these four counts bear no relation- ship whatsoever to the parties or issues involved i n this case, and actually are virtually unintelligible as to a cogent theory supporting the claims for relief. B y the relief demanded, M r . Bouma wishes t o enjoin the effect of and eventually set aside previous final judgments of this court to which he was not a party. Such i s a bald and unlawful collateral attack upon those judgments which were made upon due jurisdiction, or a t least M r . Bouma has not alleged otherwise. In addition, M r . Bouma would have no standing to make such collateral attacks, even i f i t were allowable. These former judgments "affect" M r . Bouma i n that the chain of events has produced a receiver which is suing him. Since the Plaintiff receiver has alleged that he has been duly appointed and authorized and M r . Bouma has denied those allegations, the receiver's standing i s undoubtedly i n issue i n this case by the denials and defenses of M r . Bouma. Such proof as both parties are able to adduce will go toward this issue. To a small extent such issue i s involved with the allegations M r . Bouma has set forth i n these four counts of his counterclaim, and to that ex- tent such allegations are not immaterial, however they are re- dundant. I t would be an unwarranted stretching of the l e t t e r and theory of our procedural rules to allow these counts to stand. Taken as a whole, Counts One, Two, Three and Nine of Ralph Bouma's counterclaim are frivolous, redundant and impertinent, and are here- by stricken. "(3) Plaintiff ' s motion to dismiss Counts Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight of Defendant Ralph Bouma's counterclaim i s hereby denied. The allegations of Counts Seven and Eight, i f taken as true for purposes of said motion, clearly state a claim for relief against the Plaintiff corporation. The allegations of Counts Four, Five, and Six however, are deficient and antithetical i n places, and are confusing overall. Because these counts were submitted by Mr. Bouma pro se, he shall have an opportunity to clarify the nature of his alleged claims. I t would be wise for M r . Bouma to consult with counsel as t o the definition of fee simple ownership and then t o c l a r i f y Counts Four and Five as t o the exact nature o f the performance sought and the exact portions o f the a1 leged agreements g i v i n g r i s e t o such obligations. With regard t o Count Six, M r . Bouma must s t a t e h i s damages w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y both as t o the exact nature o f the damage which i s alleged t o be the breach o f the indemnity agreement and also as t o the damage which he has alleged t o have flowed from t h a t breach. It i s hereby ordered t h a t Defendant Ralph Bouma s h a l l have u n t i l A p r i l 20, 1973, t o f i l e a more d e f i n i t e statement o f Counts Four, Five and Six o f h i s counterclaim, o r s u f f e r t h e i r dismissal. "Defendant Ralph Bouma shall be given no f u r t h e r consideration whatsoever f o r being unrepresented by counsel i n t h i s action. The court recognizes h i s r i g h t t o represent himself but serious- l y questions h i s judgment i n a case o f apparently great magnitude and meaning t o him. The court has no real i n t e r e s t o r r i g h t i n questioning h i s judgment o r motives unless and u n t i l h i s conduct o f h i s own case seriously approaches the p o i n t o f hampering o r impeding the administration o f j u s t i c e o r the r i g h t s o f other p a r t i e s before the court. W e are now a t t h a t point. Specific instances shall go uncited a t t h i s time, however it i s apparent t h a t i n the past M r . Bouma has used h i s lack o f representation t o h i s advantage i n these proceedings and has also used the f a c t o f h i s w i f e ' s representation also t o h i s advantage. I n the f u - ture, counsel f o r Mrs. Bouma w i l l not be permitted t o argue o r otherwise p a r t i c i p a t e i n instances where she has no more than a tangential i n t e r e s t and M r . Bouma has the d i r e c t i n t e r e s t . If M r . Bouma wishes t o continue t o represent himself t h a t i s h i s privilege, however henceforth he w i l l be held t o the same high standards o f knowledge and s k i l l and ethics as an attorney and o f f i c e r o f t h i s court. "On September 22, 1972, Defendant Ralph Bouma f i l e d herein what he denominated as a 'cross-claim' against Ray Lightner and Mrs. Ray Lightner, h i s wife, neither o f whom were p a r t i e s t o t h i s action. On February 26, 1973, the said Lightners f i l e d a com- bined motion seeking t o dismiss said kross-claimJ f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o state a claim upon which r e l i e f could be granted, and upon several other grounds enumerated i n said motion, and also seeking t o s t r i k e said 'cross-claim' as being redundant, immaterial , impertinent and scandalous i n several enumerated respects, and also seeking a more d e f i n i t e statement. O n March 16, 1973, Defendant Ralph Bouma f i l e d a motion t o quash said combined motion. "On November 28, 1972, Defendant Ralph Bouma f i l e d herein what he denominated a 'cross-claim' against the Farmers State Bank o f Conrad, Earl M. Berthelson and the United Bank o f Pueblo, none o f which were p a r t i e s hereto. O n December 18, 1972, the Farmers State Bank and M r . Berthelson f i l e d a l t e r n a t i v e motions t o s t r i k e o r dismiss said 'cross-claim' and on December 19, 1972, the United Bank o f Pueblo f i l e d i t s motion t o dismiss f o r want o f j u r i s d i c - t i o n . On December 21 , 1972, separate memoranda were f i l e d i n support o f said motions. O n February 7, 1973, Defendant Ralph Bouma f i l e d a motion t o quash these motions o f the said banks and the said M r . Berthelson, combined w i t h the motion t o quash P l a i n t i f f ' s motions as hereinbefore referred to, together w i t h a memorandum i n support o f said motion t o quash. O n February 14, 1973, the Farmers State Bank and Mr. Berthel son f i l e d a j o i n t memorandum i n opposition to Bouma ' s motion to quash and in support of their own motions, and on February 15, 1973, the United Bank of Pueblo filed a reply memorandum to Bouma's motion t o quash, "Neither Ralph Bouma nor the Lightners have requested a hearing upon the Lightners' motions nor M r . Bouma's motion to quash them but the Court deems itself aware and informed sufficiently to rule from the face of said motions and the face of said 'cross-claim'. B y order of the Court the motions of the Farmers State Bank of Conrad, Earl M. Berthelson and the United Bank of Pueblo, and Ralph Bouma's motions to quash said motions were s e t for hearing on March 1 , 1973. The Court having considered the several motions of the parties, the memoranda i n support thereof or opposition thereto, the arguments of M r . Ray F. Koby, representing the Farmers State Bank and Earl M. Berthelson, Cresap S. McCracken representing the United Bank of Pueblo, Ralph Bouma representing himself and Gale Gustafson representing Mrs. Ralph Bouma (over the objection of M r . McCracken and Mr. Koby), and the Court being cognizant of the condition and circumstances of the record in this cause and being fully informed i n the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED A S F O L L O W S : "(1) The motion of Ralph Bouma to quash the motions of the Lightners, and the motion of Ralph Bouma to quash the motions of the Farmers State Bank, Earl M. Berthelson, and the United Bank of Pueblo are both hereby denied. Reference i s made to paragraph 1(1) of this Combined Order. The reasoning and results set forth there apply here. A s stated i n the McVay case hereinbefore re- ferred to, such a motion i s t o be regarded as superfluous, frivo- lous, confusing and bad practice. Said motions have been taken by this Court to be memoranda i n opposition to the motions sought to be quashed and have been read and considered by the Court. "(2) The motion of Ray Lightner and Mrs. Ray Lightner t o strike the 'cross-claim' of Defendant Ralph Bouma i s hereby granted. The motion of the Farmers State Bank of Conrad and Earl M . Berthelson t o strike Ralph Bouma's 'cross-claim' is hereby granted. Ralph Bouma's 'cross-claim' as pertains to the United Bank of Pueblo is hereby stricken by this Court's own motion as provided by Rule 12(f) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the motion of the Lightners for dismissal of said 'cross-claim' for i t s failure to state a claim is hereby granted. The motion of the Farmers State Bank and M r . Berthelson to dismiss the 'cross-claim' against them for its failure t o state a claim i s hereby granted. And the motion of the United Bank of Pueblo to dismiss the 'cross- claim' as pertains to that bank for this Court's lack of juris- diction over said bank and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter i s hereby granted. The remaining motions of the Lightners as set forth in their combined motions as filed herein on February 26, 1973, are deemed moot. "Neither the Farmers State Bank, Earl M. Berthelson, United Bank of Pueblo, Ray Lightner nor Mrs. Ray Lightner are parties to this action. The Montana Rules of Civi 1 Procedure do not permit nor even contemplate a cross-claim against a person or entity which is not a party. Neither 'cross-claim' cam be converted into a t h i r d party claim under Rule 14 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure as, in neither case, can the allegations or the relief sought be stretched t o state that any of these nonparties are, or may be liable to M r . Bouma for all or part of the Plaintiff ' s claim against M r . Bouma . Furthermore, neither 'cross-cl aim' sets forth facts entitling Ralph Bouma to any relief against the said non- parties. The relief sought i n said 'cross-claim' i s not such as would make the addition of any of said nonparties justifiable as necessary or proper parties. "The allegations i n the 'cross-claim' against the United Bank of Pueblo, are visibly devoid of any reference to said United Bank of Pueblo and do not support any claim for re1 ief i n favor of Ralph Bouma against said bank whatsoever. The 'summons' served upon the United Bank of Pueblo, w i t h i n the State of Colorado i s legally insufficient to obtain jurisdiction over said bank for want of meeting the minimum requirements of Montana Rules of Civil Pro- cedure Rule 4C. Nothing i n the pleadings, briefs, argument or judicial notice of this Court shows the United Bank of Pueblo to be subject t o the jurisdiction of this Court in this proceed- ing under M.R.C.P. Rule 4 B or otherwise. The relief sought against the United Bank of Pueblo, and against the Farmers State Bank of Conrad and Earl M. Berthel son are again attempts to set aside previous final judgments of this Court, with no jurisdictional deficiencies alleged, by a person who was not a party thereto. Such attempts are prohibited collateral attacks upon said judg- ments as set forth in paragraph I . of this Combined Order. "On February 28, 1973, Defendant Ralph Bouma, along w i t h Mrs. Ralph Bouma, filed a document entitled Motion to Quash and Motion For Substitution of Appearances. T h i s motion sought an order quashing the motion by the Central Bank of Montana to deposit funds into court. That motion to quash was denied i n this Court's order dated March 20, 1973, entitled Order Requiring Deposit of Money a t Interest. The remainder of the motion seeks an order requiring a different law firm to be substituted as counsel for the Farmers State Bank i n this action because of an alleged con- f l i c t of interest of said law firm from alleged previous represen- tation of certain individuals not parties to this action, namely individual members of the Iverson family who were formerly stock- holders in the corporation which i s Plaintiff herein. These motions were noticed by the Boumas for hearing on March 1 , 1973, the time s e t by the court for the hearing of other motions herein prev- iously ruled upon. However, said motions were not served upon adversaries, particularly the Farmers State Bank, until March 1 , 1973, a t the hearing of said other motions. The Court a t that time, prior to reading Bouma ' s memorandum, a1 1 owed counsel for the Farmers State Bank ten (1 0) days to f i l e a memorandum in opposition to said motion, said memorandum having been filed here- i n on March 9, 1973. The court also allowed an additional ten (10) days for Ralph Bouma to f i l e a responding memorandum in support of said motion, said memorandum having been filed herein on March 20, 1973. The court a t that time also stated i t s intention to rule upon said motion from the briefs and memoranda submitted. The court having the full benefit of the aforesaid memoranda and being fully informed i n the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for substitution of appearances filed herein by Ralph Bouma and Mrs. Ralph Bouma be, and hereby i s denied. In so ruling, the court has attempted to retain its objectivity, con- tinuing to assume that such motion was legitimately motivated, an exceedingly difficult task considering the motion i s absurd i n nature, irrelevant and scandalous i n content and basely vituper- ative i n tone. There i s no place in our judicial system for such an undignified product even i f a member of the bar had not lent his name to i t . T h i s is true apart from the truth or fa1 s i ty of the torrent of a1 l egations set forth i n M r . Bouma's memoranda. The argument and authority set forth in the memoran- dum of Farmers State Bank i n opposition t o the Boumas' motion, a t paragraph 11. thereof, i s well taken. Said motion i s un- authorized and most impertinent and should properly be stricken from the record. Since the Court's ruling i n paragraph 11. (2) hereof renders the question of the representation of Farmers State Bank moot anyway, the Court's order of denial of the motion will suffice, w i t h the caveat to Defendant Bouma and to any counsel for h i m or Mrs. Bouma that any future motions or plead- ings filed herein w i t h content of a similar nature or w i t h sim- i l a r apparent motivation will be stricken summari ly and consider- ed as contemptuous. "On March 1 , 1973, a t the time of the aforementioned hearing, counsel for Mrs. Ral ph Bouma herein, Dale L. Kei 1 , presented to the court letters purportedly signed by Carl 0. Iverson and Larry C. Iverson authorizing said counsel to additionally represent them i n these proceedings. Said counsel then proceeded to f i l e herein a motion by said persons t o intervene in these proceedings pur- suant to Rule 24 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Attached thereto was a proposed petition to be filed by said persons to set aside previous orders of this court, based upon similar or identical allegations t o those s e t forth by Defendant Ralph Bouma as Counts One, Two, Three and Nine of his counterclaim against Plaintiff herein and the same or similar to those allegations contained in said Ralph Bouma's 'cross-claim' against the Farmers State Bank, Earl M. Berthelson, and the United Bank of Pueblo, a l l of which has been hereinbefore stricken and dismissed. On March 1 , 1973, the Court allowed said counsel ten (10) days to f i l e a brief i n support of said motion to intervene and stated i t s intention to rule from briefs. Counsel for Carl 0. Iverson and Larry C. Iverson filed such memorandum herein on March 12, 1973, and appended to i t a notice of hearing upon said motion set for April 2, 1973. N o such hearing has been s e t by the Court. Further, on March 16, 1973, counsel for said Iversons filed herein a document denominated a Proposed Motion for D i squal if ication of Counsel and to Set Aside. This seeks an order to disqualify the law firm representing the Farmers State Bank upon the same grounds as the motion denied to Defendant Ralph Bouma i n the preceding paragraph and further seeks an order declaring previous orders of this Court null and void for said a1 leged conflicts of interest. Such pro- posed motion incorporates by reference a l l of the contents of the motion and the supporting memoranda and the argument pertaining to said motion for substitution of counsel by Ralph Bouma. The Court having considered the motion for intervention by Carl 0. Iverson and Larry C. Iverson, together with the memorandum i n support thereof, taking cognizance of Defendant Ral ph Bouma Is previous claims of a similar nature to the petition proposed, taking judicial notice of the final judgment of this court i n Civil Actions No. 8221 and 8073 consolidated, and deeming i t s e l f fully informed and advised i n the premises without further memo- randa from possible opposing parties and without argument, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED A S F O L L O W S : "1. That the notice of hearing upon said motion appended to the Iversons' memorandum i s hereby stricken and any hearing which the Clerk of the above-entitl ed court may have docketed for said date is hereby vacated. Such notice was contrary to the stated i n - tention of this Court, i n open court. While the Court i s not adverse to scheduling hearings for parties upon proper request, a hearing and further argument upon this motion would be superfluous. 2 The document entitled Proposed Motion For Disqualification of Counsel and To Set Aside, filed herein by Larry C. Iverson and Carl 0. Iverson i s hereby stricken. The Iversons are not parties to this action, but merely seeking to attain that status and as such have no standing to make any motions until they are parties. In addition, a l l that is set forth i n paragraph 111. herein i s appli- cable here, especially since the Iversons propose to adopt by reference the entire Bouma motion i n that regard. Simply because the Iversons would allege that said law firm a t one time represented them would not add any sanction or dignity to such a motion. I t i s evident t o the Court that such proposal, i f allowed, is merely an attempt by Mr. Bouma t o do indirectly what he cannot do directly. "3. The motion of Carl 0. Iverson and Larry C. Iverson to inter- vene i n these proceedings i s hereby denied. Nowhere in the motion or the supporting memorandum is it suggested that the Iversons have any more interest i n these proceedings than the fact that a t one time they - were stockholders in the Plaintiff corporation. Judicial notice is properly taken of the aforementioned judgment of this Court in actions numbered 8221 and 8073 ruling that said persons are no longer stockholders nor officers nor directors of said corpora- tion and therefore have no interest in it. The apparent sole pur- pose of intervention here i s a collateral attack upon said judgment, and others of this Court, which, according to the proposed petition, contains no further enabling allegations than the previous collateral attacks which were dismissed hereinbefore. Additional ly, such attempt to exert an interest i n Larry C. Iverson, Inc. would appear to be contemptuous of paragraph 6 of the order of this Court dated April 7 , 1971, and entered i n Causes No. 8221 and 8073 cons01 idated. "V. "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any further attempts t o f i l e herein any documents substantially similar or identical to those dismissed or stricken by this Combined Order will be considered contemptuous un- less preceded by a petition seeking leave of this Court to so f i l e , and an order granting such leave. "VI. "Upon the Court Is own motion IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the demand or demands for jury t r i a l filed herein are hereby stricken. The court is exercising i t s equity jurisdiction over these entire proceedings and i t i s therefore fundamental that there i s no right to a jury trial for any party. The court may well exercise i t s discretion to call an advisory jury for any or a l l factual ques- tions upon which i t would desire assistance in determination. Due and sufficient notice will be given to a l l parties i n that event." The foregoing combined order says i t a l l . The brief of appellants on appeal continues to use language, the nature of which the d i s t r i c t judge de- scribed as "absurd i n nature, irrelevant and scandalous in content and basely vituperative in tone." The appellants assert three issues on appeal, which are stated as abstract questions and do not point out any error on the part. of the t r i a l judge. Essentially a single issue i s determinative of the appeal. That is whether an order such as this striking portions of a pleading as being friv- olous, impertinent and immaterial is appealable. W e hold that i t is not. The materials stricken have to do w i t h matters previously ruled upon in Cause No. 12387 heretofore referred to. In that opinion w e said: "Extensive proceedings followed resulting i n a sheriff's sale of the pledged corporate stock to plaintiff and a judgment for plaintiff on October 2 , 1367, by the d i s t r i c t court approv- ing the sale of the stock, although i t allowed the corporation to prevent a forfeiture of i t s stock i f i t s terms of i t s Aug- ust 22, 1966 'purchase of indebtedness' agreement made i n open court were complied w i t h by October 10, 1967. This com- pliance never occurred so the judgment became final. "From this judgment an appeal to this Court was taken by de- fendants b u t never perfected. "Up to this point it is t o be noted that petitioners and appellants were not parties t o this litigation, nor i n any other causes of action being Nos. 8073 and 8221, Pondera County, both of which involve the appointment of a receiver for the Carl 0. Iverson Corporation and operation of the corporate properties. "There i s a cause of action however in which petitioners and appellants are involved as defendants, and that i s cause No. 8509, Pondera County wherein the receiver of the Carl 0. Iverson Corporation is seeking to have set aside a 'contract for deed' executed on July 17, 1968 by purported officers of the corpor- ation as seller to the petitioners as buyers, and a 'farm oper- ation ' agreement between the corporation and petitioners and appellants dated June 16, 1967. "Now going back to the original action, cause No. 7779, from which this appeal found its beginning. "Commencing w i t h July 1972, petitioners and appel 1 ants began filing i n this proceeding certain documents now known as 'Bouma papers'. These papers consist of an affidavit of dis- qualification, petition t o s e t aside judgment of October 2, 1967, motion for stay of proceedings, affidavit, application for oral hearing on motion, motion for advisory jury, brief in support of motion, motion to strike nonparties postjudgment, statement for the record and brief i n support of motion to stay proceedings, a1 1 filed pro se. "On August 29, 1972 the d i s t r i c t court entered its order, filed August 30, 1972, finding: " ' a l l of said filings of said Ralph and Mrs. Ralph Bouma in said cause are frivolous, entirely without merit, and that Ralph Bouma and Mrs. Ralph Bouma are not entitled to any relief of whatever nature in said cause, and are strangers into said cause without any right whatever to be heard or otherwise participate t herei n ; " 'NOW THEREFORE * * * " ' * * * they are hereby stricken from the above entitled cause as frivolous'. "From this order petitioners and appellants have appealed to this Court and from the date of filing the notice of appeal, September 12, 1972, are finally, publicly and openly repre- sented by counsel. " W e have experienced l i t t l e difficulty i n finding that the t r i a l court was correct and w e so hold." From the foregoing i t i s clear that the matters stricken had been ruled upon before; and aside from their lack of relevancy were res judicata. Treat- ing Boumas' pleadings stricken as an attempt to a1 lege fraud, Ralph Bouma's only interest claimed was a lien for farm crop services which he claimed t o have a t one time rendered the corporation. N o claim was alleged i n any event. I t follows that an attempted appeal from an order striking portions of the pleadings i s improper both on the merits and procedurally. In Volume 2 A of Moore's Federal Practice, p. 2424, i n discussing Rule 12, Motions to Strike, the author states: "* * * a mass of evidence unnecessarily pleaded, legal conclusions argued a t length, paragraphs seeking to retry a previous action, or obviously sham matter may be striken." This f i t s the situation here. An order striking such matters is not appealable prior t o final judgment. See State ex rel. G. F. Nat. Bk. v. District Court, 154 Mont. 336, 340, 463 P.2d 326. This leaves as the only remaining issues the d i s t r i c t court's order dismissing the stockholders of Larry C. Iverson, Inc. as determined in Pondera County Civil Action 8221; and dismissing as to Lightners. In a l l respects w e affirm. The order previously quoted is adopted i n i t s entirety. W e have not dealt w i t h other matters appearing i n the briefs such as charge of conflict of counsel, charges against other parties and counsel. We, like the d i s t r i c t judge, have striven to remain objective. W e have examined the record and caution counsel for appellants. A word to the wise should be sufficient. Bouma is i n possession of the productive farm land, harvesting the crops therefrom; and it may be that the trial judge will have to fashion procedures to force the issue to trial on the merits. Contempt powers, impoundment of the funds derived from crops and other procedures should be sufficient for the trial judge to force the issue to trial. Having examined the record, the issues and all other matters, we affirm the order. Wk concur: +- .* r . (Justice Chief Justice