Title: Greenhill v. Bear Creek Dev. Authority
Citation: 519 So. 2d 938
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 1988

519 So. 2d 938 (1988)
Arvil GREENHILL
v.
BEAR CREEK DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al.
86-440.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 15, 1988.
Curtis M. Simpson, Florence, for appellant.
*939 William M. Bouldin of Guin, Bouldin &amp; Alexander, Russellville, and William Atkinson of Fite, Davis, Atkinson &amp; Bentley, Hamilton, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Plaintiff, Arvil Greenhill, appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants, Bear Creek Development Authority, Don Sibley, and Farris Taylor. We affirm.
Plaintiff purchased a recreational use permit allowing him to picnic or camp on property subject to the general supervision of the Bear Creek Development Authority (BCDA) (see § 33-15-1, et seq., Ala.Code 1975). He was subsequently arrested for using restricted areas of that property in violation of BCDA rules and regulations, and thereafter he was convicted in the Circuit Court of Franklin County of third degree criminal trespass. The plaintiff did not appeal that conviction. Instead, he later brought this lawsuit against the BCDA; its administrator, Don Sibley; and one of its park rangers, Farris Taylor.
In his complaint, the plaintiff sought damages for the defendants' alleged breach of contract, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution (count one); requested a declaratory judgment as to his rights under the recreational use permit (count two); and challenged the validity of his previous criminal conviction (count three). The trial court first granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to count three; thereafter, it held an ore tenus hearing on the plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment (count two) and entered the following order:
Subsequent to the entry of the declaratory judgment, the trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to count one.
Initially we note that the plaintiff did not appeal from the declaratory judgment. He appealed only from the summary judgment granted to the defendants.
Instead of appealing his criminal conviction, the plaintiff chose to challenge the validity of that conviction in a collateral civil proceeding seeking declaratory relief and damages. It is a well settled rule that a judgment of a court that has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties and possesses the power to render the particular judgment is immune from collateral attack. Duncan v. Kent, 370 So. 2d 288 (Ala. 1979). This case is governed by that rule; therefore summary judgment was proper as to count three.
*940 The declaratory judgment shows that the trial court found the plaintiff had violated the reasonable rules and regulations established by the BCDA concerning picnicking and camping in restricted areas of the property. The plaintiff was aware at the time of his arrest that he was in violation of those rules and regulations. These findings by the trial court, as well as the previous criminal conviction, are conclusive with respect to the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution (count one). Seybold v. Magnolia Land Co., 376 So. 2d 1083 (Ala. 1979) (breach of contract consists of the failure without legal excuse to perform any promise forming the whole or part of the contract); Carruth v. Barker, 454 So. 2d 539 (Ala.1984) (the only requisite to a valid arrest is probable cause on the part of the arresting officer; probable cause exists where facts and circumstances, of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to lead a reasonable man to believe that an offense has, in fact, been committed); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Ruby, 348 So. 2d 484 (Ala.1977) (to be successful in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: 1) a judicial proceeding initiated by the defendant, 2) that it was initiated without probable cause, 3) malice on the part of the defendant, 4) a termination of the judicial proceeding favorable to the plaintiff, and 5) damages).
We affirm the summary judgment as to counts one and three, because there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.