Title: P. v. Modiri
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S120238
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2006

1 
Filed 8/7/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S120238 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H023584 
SHEA MICHAEL MODIRI, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC079647 
___________________________________ ) 
 
At a crowded neighborhood party, Shea Michael Modiri (defendant) started 
and joined a group attack that left the teenage victim with multiple serious injuries.  
The evidence showed that defendant personally applied physical force to the 
victim several times.  However, chaos at the scene prevented witnesses from 
linking the victim’s injuries to a particular assailant, weapon, or blow. 
Defendant was convicted of felony assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. 
(a)(1)),1 among other things.  To enhance the sentence in any future prosecution, 
the jury sustained an allegation that, in the course of the assault, defendant 
“personally inflict[ed] great bodily injury” on the victim.  (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) 
(section 1192.7(c)(8)).) 
In People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568 (Cole), we construed similar 
personal-infliction language authorizing a present sentencing enhancement under 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
what is now section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (section 12022.7(a)).  Cole held that 
this requirement covers persons who “directly acted to cause the injury,” and 
excludes those who merely “aided or abetted the actor directly inflicting the 
injury.”  (31 Cal.3d at p. 572.) 
Here, CALJIC No. 17.20 told the jury that defendant must personally inflict 
great bodily harm.  The same instruction also said that if he participated in a group 
attack, and jurors could not decide which person inflicted which injury, the 
allegation could be sustained if defendant personally applied physical force to the 
victim either (1) of a nature that, “by itself,” could have caused great bodily injury, 
or (2) under such circumstances that the “cumulative effect” of the force used by 
all participants would have caused the injury.  (See People v. Corona (1989) 213 
Cal.App.3d 589 (Corona), review den. Nov. 30, 1989; People v. Dominick (1986) 
182 Cal.App.3d 1174 (Dominick), review den. Oct. 30, 1986; see also Judicial 
Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Inst. (2006) CALCRIM No. 3160.) 
The Court of Appeal held that CALJIC No. 17.20 prejudicially failed to 
require the personal infliction of great bodily harm under section 1192.7(c)(8).  
When defendant sought review on other grounds, we solicited briefing on whether 
the Court of Appeal was wrong.  The issue presented is whether the group beating 
theories in CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfy the personal-infliction requirement of 
section 1192.7(c)(8), as construed in Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568, and applied in 
Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589, and Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1174. 
No instructional error occurred at trial.  For 20 years, courts have upheld 
personal-infliction findings where the defendant physically joins a group attack, 
and directly applies force to the victim sufficient to inflict, or contribute to the 
infliction of, great bodily harm.  Consistent with the statutory language and the 
manner in which it has been judicially construed, the defendant need not be the 
sole or definite cause of a specific injury.  For reasons we explain, these group 
3 
beating principles have been accepted by the Legislature.  CALJIC No. 17.20 duly 
describes them.  A contrary approach would mean that those who perpetrate mob 
violence and inflict gratuitous injury would often evade enhanced punishment.  
Thus, we will reinstate the section 1192.7(c)(8) finding vacated on appeal. 
FACTS 
A.  The Evidence 
On July 22, 2000, Matthew Bour, who was 18 years old, held a party for his 
friends at the home he and his father shared.  Bour’s father was out of town when 
it occurred. 
Before the party, Bour’s father asked defendant, a 19-year-old neighbor and 
childhood friend of Bour’s, to watch the house and maintain order.  Another 
invited guest was Bour’s friend, Darren Hitt. 
About 100 people attended the party.  They occupied the front and back 
yards, and filled the house.  Bour provided beer from a keg.  Guests also brought 
their own alcohol.  Some marijuana use occurred. 
Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., while Bour managed the crowd in the front 
yard, Ryan Schon arrived with Amy Jorgenson, John Cane, and another young 
man.  Schon knew both Bour and defendant from school and sports activities.  
Years earlier, Bour and Schon had exchanged insults and threats.  There had been 
no animosity between Schon and defendant or Hitt. 
Schon’s presence created a stir at the party.  Bour expressed concern about 
it to defendant and other guests.  One partygoer, Amber Oxley, tried to warn 
Schon that he should go.  Oxley sensed that Bour and his friends might fight 
Schon. 
As he approached Bour in the yard, Schon saw about 20 or 30 people 
nearby.  Schon greeted Bour, who seemed friendly.  Oxley thought Bour’s manner 
was feigned. 
4 
Moments later, Hitt confronted Schon.  Hitt said that “somebody doesn’t 
like you.”  Schon replied, “I don’t know anybody here.” 
Defendant intervened by saying, “You know me.”  According to Schon’s 
testimony at trial, defendant spoke in a hostile tone, and bumped Schon with his 
chest.  Schon thought defendant was trying to provoke a fight.  The crowd told 
Schon to leave and threatened him.  Defendant began pushing Schon, telling him 
to leave or fight.  Separated from his friends, Schon did not want to escalate 
matters. 
Schon announced he would leave, and called for Jorgenson.  Jorgensen 
approached and began walking with Schon to their car.  Both Jorgensen and Cane 
saw the beating of Schon that ensued.  Their testimony, along with Schon’s, 
formed the basis of the prosecution case, as follows. 
Defendant pursued Schon as he headed toward the car, pushing and pulling 
Schon.  Schon tried to brush defendant away.  The crowd followed the pair as they 
entered a neighbor’s property.  All of a sudden, defendant punched Schon with his 
fist.  Schon recalled being hit on the left side of the face.  Other witnesses saw the 
punch hit his jaw or cheek. 
Schon testified that as he tried to defend himself, he looked sideways and 
saw “a big rush of people coming.”  Defendant stepped back and let the crowd 
tackle Schon, who fell to his knees.  Jorgensen and Cane saw 10 to 15 people 
swarm Schon. 
Schon further testified that he tried to stand, but was hit over the back of his 
head with a bottle and knocked down.  The same thing happened at least two more 
times.  Schon also felt kicks and blows on all sides.  He could not see the faces of 
most of his attackers.  He was certain, however, that defendant “came in and hit 
[him].” 
5 
This account was corroborated.  According to Jorgenson, defendant “just 
ran on [Schon] and jumped on [him].”  She saw defendant “in the group of guys 
that were hitting [and] kicking” Schon.  Cane likewise testified that defendant was 
“the only face” in the crowd he recognized.  However, he could not tell which 
blows hit Schon.  Cane pushed one unknown attacker off Schon.  Both Jorgenson 
and Cane heard bottles breaking.  Jorgenson saw someone hit Schon with a bottle, 
but she could not see who it was. 
The attack dissipated when Jorgenson yelled and jumped into the fray.  She 
pushed defendant away from Schon.  As she did so, she felt a bottle in defendant’s 
hand press against her hipbone.  Schon saw defendant standing next to him after 
Jorgenson intervened. 
The beating lasted from 10 or 15 seconds to one minute.  Schon rose to his 
feet, disoriented and bleeding profusely from the head.  He and Jorgenson walked 
away.  The crowd continued to taunt and threaten Schon.  Cane watched as 
defendant pursued Schon while holding a bottle.  Both Cane and Jorgenson, who 
looked back, saw defendant throw the bottle.  It crashed near Jorgenson and 
Schon. 
Immediately after the attack, defendant’s friend, Leslie LaBarbera, heard 
defendant ask for a beer.  Defendant said he had “just broke the last [bottles] over 
the guy’s head.”  LaBarbera could not recall whether defendant mentioned two or 
three bottles.  Defendant’s girlfriend, Lynelle Rose, met Hitt and other partygoers 
at a nearby park.  She testified that Hitt admitted striking Schon on the head with a 
Remy bottle, and that she saw Hitt holding a Remy bottle at the party. 
Police officers arrived at Bour’s house around 11:00 p.m.  They saw 60 
teenagers outside, many of whom ran away.  There were bloodstains and broken 
bottles on the ground, including bloody glass.  Unbroken bottles littered the yard. 
6 
Schon’s blood was found on defendant’s shoes, socks, and pants.  
According to a prosecution expert, two stains on the left leg of the pants were 
likely made with a blood-drenched hand.  One consisted of a bloody swipe, and 
the other was a heavy transfer stain.2  Schon’s blood also was found on other 
people’s clothes, including Hitt’s shoes. 
Schon received treatment at the hospital the same night.  Several cuts on his 
head were closed with staples — six on the side, and four on top.  He also suffered 
facial trauma and a broken nose.  Schon had surgery to repair his nose several days 
later.  The attack also left a large gash on his wrist, which was bandaged. 
Defendant testified at trial.  He admitted ordering Schon to leave the party 
in the presence of Hitt and others.  According to defendant, Schon first pushed him 
into the crowd, which pushed defendant back towards Schon.  Defendant punched 
Schon in the face to protect himself.  Defendant claimed the crowd tossed him into 
a rosebush, where he stayed until the attack on Schon stopped.  Defendant then 
threw a full bottle of beer in Schon’s direction.  Defendant denied saying that he 
hit Schon over the head with bottles.3 
B.  The Proceedings 
As pertinent here, defendant was charged and convicted of felony assault 
against Schon.  (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) [assault with deadly weapon or by means of 
                                              
2  
The same expert found blood spatters on the right leg of defendant’s pants.  
They had traveled through the air from a source close by.  No tests were run on 
these small stains. 
3  
The police saw scratches on defendant’s hands and leg.  A criminalist 
found traces of defendant’s own blood on his pants.  One defense witness, Gina 
Kottikas, testified that she saw defendant in the rosebush and thought he had 
“passed out” there.  Another defense witness, Tyler Folck, saw defendant fly 
backwards into the crowd, and then lost sight of him. 
7 
force likely to produce great bodily injury].)  The jury also sustained two 
allegations that made the assault conviction a “serious felony” for purposes of 
punishment in a future prosecution.  (See §§ 667, 1192.7.)  First, the jury found 
that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a bottle, in 
assaulting Schon.  (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23) (section 1192.7(c)(23)).)  Second, and 
critical here, the jury found that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury 
upon Schon during the assault.  (§ 1192.7(c)(8).)4 
In obtaining this verdict, the prosecutor argued that defendant broke bottles 
over Schon’s head, thereby committing felony assault and personally using a 
bottle under section 1192.7(c)(23).  He observed that defendant admitted such 
conduct in LaBarbera’s presence, and that blood from Schon’s head wounds 
landed on defendant’s hand and pants.  The prosecutor also argued that defendant 
personally inflicted great bodily injury under section 1192.7(c)(8) because he 
participated in the group beating that caused Schon’s broken nose, head wounds, 
and other injuries.  According to the prosecutor, defendant pushed and punched 
Schon, and hit him with fists and bottles.5 
                                              
4  
The jury also convicted defendant of simple battery, a misdemeanor, as a 
lesser included offense of battery with serious bodily injury.  (§§ 242, 243, subds. 
(a) & (d).)  Defendant was acquitted of the latter felony, which was alleged in the 
information.  The jury made no finding on the related allegation that defendant 
personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the charged battery.  
(§ 1192.7(c)(8).)  Defendant received three years’ probation, including a nine-
month jail term to be served in a work or education furlough program.  In addition, 
the jury returned verdicts against Hitt who was jointly charged with the same 
crimes as defendant.  Hitt was convicted of simple assault (§§ 240, 241, subd. (a)), 
and acquitted of all other offenses.  Hitt is not a party to proceedings in this court. 
5  
Defense counsel argued that defendant used no unlawful physical force 
against Schon.  Counsel blamed Schon for attending the party, for staying when 
told to go, and for becoming aggressive with defendant.  Any pushing or punching 
by defendant, counsel urged, occurred in self-defense — a theory on which the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
8 
As noted, defendant’s jury received CALJIC No. 17.20.  It stated that the 
section 1192.7(c)(8) allegation required them to find whether defendant personally 
inflicted great bodily injury on Schon in committing the charged crimes.  The 
instruction explained that the People bore the burden of proving the allegation, and 
that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in defendant’s favor. 
CALJIC No. 17.20 further stated that if defendant “participate[d] in a group 
beating,” and it was “not possible to determine which assailant inflicted a 
particular injury,” defendant could be found to have personally inflicted great 
bodily injury on Schon under two alternative theories or scenarios.  The first 
scenario occurred where “the application of unlawful physical force upon the 
victim was of such a nature that, by itself, it could have caused the great bodily 
injury suffered by the victim.”  The second group beating theory applied where, at 
the time the defendant “personally applied unlawful physical force to the victim,” 
he “knew” that other participants in the same incident were applying similar force, 
and he “knew, or reasonably should have known, that the cumulative effect of all 
the unlawful physical force would result in great bodily injury to the victim.”6 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
jury was instructed at trial.  Counsel theorized that defendant fell into the 
rosebush, and stayed there while the group attacked Schon.  Under this view, 
which the jury apparently rejected, defendant never struck Schon with a bottle or 
pummeled him with his fists. 
6  
As given at defendant’s trial, CALJIC No. 17.20 provided, in material part, 
as follows:  “If you find [the] defendant guilty of [one or both felonies charged in 
the information], you must determine whether [he] personally inflicted great 
bodily injury on Ryan Schon in the commission or attempted commission of the 
crime.  [¶]  ‘Great bodily injury,’ as used in this instruction, means a significant or 
substantial physical injury.  Minor, trivial or moderate injuries do not constitute 
great bodily injury.  [¶]  When a person participates in a group beating and it is 
not possible to determine which assailant inflicted a particular injury, he or she 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
9 
On appeal, defendant raised only sentencing issues under section 1192.7, 
subdivision (c) (section 1192.7(c)).  He argued that the group beating principles in 
CALJIC No. 17.20 negated the requirement of true personal infliction, and 
improperly allowed a section 1192.7(c)(8) finding based on injuries other 
assailants had caused.  Defendant also claimed the instruction tainted the section 
1192.7(c)(23) finding that he “personally” used a bottle during the crime. 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal accepted defendant’s claim of 
prejudicial instructional error concerning the personal infliction of great bodily 
injury on Schon.  In doing so, the court invalidated the second group beating 
theory in CALJIC No. 17.20.  However, the Court of Appeal declined to disturb 
the personal-use finding, concluding that the instructional error was harmless 
based on undisputed evidence that defendant threw a bottle at Schon.  Hence, only 
the section 1192.7(c)(8) finding was reversed, and the matter was remanded for a 
limited retrial on that issue.7 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
may be found to have personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim if 
(1) the application of unlawful physical force upon the victim was of such a nature 
that, by itself, it could have caused the great bodily injury suffered by the victim; 
or (2) that at the time the defendant personally applied unlawful physical force to 
the victim, the defendant knew that other persons, as part of the same incident, 
had applied, were applying, or would apply unlawful physical force upon the 
victim and the defendant then knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
cumulative effect of all the unlawful physical force would result in great bodily 
injury to the victim.  [¶]  The People have the burden of proving the truth of this 
allegation.  If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find it to be not 
true.” 
7  
Defendant also complained on appeal about the trial court’s response to the 
jury’s written request during deliberations for “clarification of ‘personal’ ” as used 
in section 1192.7(c)(8), and CALJIC No. 17.20.  After consulting with counsel, 
the court directed the jury to certain instructions it had already received, including 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
10 
Defendant sought review.  His petition renewed the instructional challenge 
to the personal-use finding, and criticized the Court of Appeal for using the bottle-
throwing incident to uphold it.  Having won on the issue below, defendant did not 
address the personal-infliction finding under section 1192.7(c)(8), the related 
instruction in CALJIC No. 17.20, or the group beating principles contained 
therein.  The Attorney General did not file an answer or separately request review. 
We granted defendant’s petition for review.  In the process, we asked the 
parties to address whether the Court of Appeal properly vacated the section 
1192.7(c)(8) finding.  We now must decide whether the group beating principles 
routinely given to juries (CALJIC No. 17.20; see CALCRIM No. 3160), for 
present and future sentencing purposes, conflict with the requirement that the 
defendant “personally inflict[ ] great bodily injury” (§ 1192.7(c)(8); see 
§ 12022.7(a)), as construed and applied by the courts.  We turn to that issue. 
DISCUSSION 
California has many sentencing statutes that increase the prison term 
otherwise available for the charged offense.  Some of them apply if the defendant 
committed the crime under aggravated circumstances.  For instance, section 
12022.7(a) mandates an additional consecutive three-year term for a defendant 
who, under certain conditions, “personally inflicts great bodily injury” while 
committing or attempting a felony.  This provision deters and punishes the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
CALJIC No. 17.20.  Having vacated the personal-infliction finding on other 
grounds, the Court of Appeal did not decide whether the trial court properly 
handled the jury note.  The parties have not briefed the issue in this court.  We do 
not address it. 
11 
infliction of gratuitous harm not inherent in the crime itself.  (People v. Jefferson 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101; People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746-747.)8 
Other statutes impose longer sentences and greater punishment on repeat 
offenders, including those with prior serious felony convictions.  (People v. 
Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 452; People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 
553.)  Examples include the habitual criminal statute (§ 667, subd. (a) [five-year 
consecutive term]), and the three strikes law.  (§ 667, subd. (e) [various sentencing 
formulas].)  These provisions incorporate the “serious felony” definition set forth 
in section 1192.7(c).  (§ 667, subds. (a)(4) & (d)(1).)  Much like the enhancement 
in section 12022.7(a), section 1192.7(c)(8) defines a serious felony to include one 
in which “the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury” on the victim.  
(§ 1192.7(c)(8); see § 1192.7(c)(23) [serious felony involves personal use of 
dangerous or deadly weapon].)9 
Defendant claims the standard instruction given at his trial omitted the 
section 1192.7(c)(8) requirement that he personally inflict great bodily injury on 
Schon.  He argues that, to a greater or lesser extent, both of the group beating 
                                              
8  
Section 12022.7 provides, in part:  “(a)  Any person who personally inflicts 
great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a 
felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive 
term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.  [¶] . . . [¶]  (f)  As used in 
this section, ‘great bodily injury’ means a significant or substantial physical injury.  
[¶]  (g)  . . .  Subdivision[ ] (a) . . . shall not apply if infliction of great bodily 
injury is an element of the offense.” 
9  
Section 1192.7(c) provides, in part:  “As used in this section, ‘serious 
felony’ means any of the following:  [¶] . . .  [¶]  (8) any felony in which the 
defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an 
accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm;  [¶]  
. . .  [¶]  (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or 
deadly weapon.” 
12 
theories in CALJIC No. 17.20 erroneously substituted the harm inflicted by others 
for the serious harm that “he, himself” must have caused.  The instruction 
primarily did so, he claims, by not requiring the jury to find that he produced a 
particular grievous injury, or wielded a particular injury-causing weapon or blow.  
Defendant insists the error was prejudicial under any applicable standard, and 
violated his federal and state due process rights. 
The Attorney General responds that CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfies section 
1192.7(c)(8) by requiring a group assailant to apply physical force directly to the 
victim to such a degree that he contributes substantially to the overall grievous 
effect.  However, the Attorney General insists, the instruction properly does not 
require the defendant, as a direct participant in a group beating or assault, to inflict 
a particular injury, or to be the sole cause of great bodily harm, where no such 
showing or finding can be made.  We agree that CALJIC No. 17.20 conforms to 
statutory law in this respect, and that no instructional error or constitutional 
violation occurred. 
Our analysis begins, of course, with the statutory language.  (See People v. 
Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 933-934.)  It seems plain that section 1192.7(c)(8) 
is not limited in the manner defendant suggests.  Commonly understood, the verb, 
“to inflict,” means “to lay (a blow) on: cause (something damaging or painful) to 
be endured: impose.”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1160; accord, 
Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 938.)  A blow is “inflict[ed]” as long as it 
hits or strikes its target, or is administered or delivered thereto.  (West’s Legal 
Thesaurus/Dict. (special deluxe ed. 1986) p. 406; Burton, Legal Thesaurus (deluxe 
ed. 1980) p. 280; accord, People v. Gonzales (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695-
1696, review den. Feb. 16, 1995 [defining “inflicts” under § 1192.7(c)(8)].)  These 
definitions suggest that section 1192.7(c)(8) contemplates physical contact of a 
forceful nature. 
13 
The term “personally,” which modifies “inflicts” in section 1192.7(c)(8), 
does not mean exclusive here.  This language refers to an act performed “in 
person,” and involving “the actual or immediate presence or action of the 
individual person himself (as opposed to a substitute, deputy, messenger, etc).”  
(Oxford English Dict., supra, at p. 599.)  Such conduct is “[c]arried on or 
subsisting between individual persons directly.”  (Ibid., accord, Webster’s 3d New 
Internat. Dict., supra, p. 1686; Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568, 572 [defining 
“personally” in § 12022.7].)  Framed this way, the requisite force must be one-to-
one, but does not foreclose participation by others. 
In short, nothing in the terms “personally” or “inflicts,” when used in 
conjunction with “great bodily injury” in section 1192.7(c)(8), necessarily implies 
that the defendant must act alone in causing the victim’s injuries.  Nor is this 
terminology inconsistent with a group melee in which it cannot be determined 
which assailant, weapon, or blow had the prohibited effect.  By its own terms, the 
statute calls for the defendant to administer a blow or other force to the victim, for 
the defendant to do so directly rather than through an intermediary, and for the 
victim to suffer great bodily injury as a result. 
The challenged instruction reasonably conveys these statutory principles.  
CALJIC No. 17.20 requires jurors to first determine the defendant’s guilt of the 
charged crime.  The instruction applies if they then decide that he “participate[d]” 
in a group beating, and that “it is not possible” to determine which assailant 
inflicted a particular injury.  (Ibid.)  Both prongs of the instruction permit a 
personal-infliction finding in this instance only if the defendant personally 
“appli[es] unlawful physical force” to the victim.  (Ibid.)  CALJIC No. 17.20 
makes clear that the physical force personally applied by the defendant must have 
been sufficient to produce great bodily injury either (1) by itself, or (2) in 
combination with other assailants.  Both group beating theories exclude persons 
14 
who merely assist someone else in producing injury, and who do not personally 
and directly inflict it themselves. 
It bears emphasis that CALJIC No. 17.20 contemplates acts that contribute 
substantially to the victim’s injured state.  By definition, “force” involves “power, 
violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon or against a person.”  (Webster’s 
3d New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 887; accord, Oxford English Dict., supra, p. 33; 
American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 686.)  Also, the instruction’s group 
beating theories preclude a section 1192.7(c)(8) finding where the defendant’s 
conduct “could [not] have,” or “would [not have],” caused or contributed to the 
requisite harm.  (CALJIC No. 17.20.)  In light of these qualifications, the 
defendant’s role in both the physical attack and the infliction of great bodily injury 
cannot be minor, trivial, or insubstantial.  The instruction thus does not conflict 
with the statutory language in the manner defendant suggests. 
Contrary to what defendant further claims, nothing in Cole, supra, 31 
Cal.3d 568, warrants a different result.  Cole construed language in an earlier 
version of section 12022.7, which, like the present one, authorizes an enhancement 
for anyone who “personally inflicts great bodily injury” on the victim.  (§ 12022.7, 
as amended by Stats. 1979, ch. 145, § 17, p. 341 (former section 12022.7).)  As we 
later explain, section 1192.7(c)(8) was enacted after section 12022.7, and 
incorporated similar language. 
In Cole, the defendant and an accomplice broke into the home of a gun 
dealer, grabbed firearms that were on a table, and started issuing orders to the 
victim.  Knowing the guns were unloaded, the victim was slow to respond.  Hence, 
the defendant ordered his accomplice to kill the victim.  The accomplice complied 
by swinging the rifle at the victim, hitting him several times and cutting his head.  
The defendant never touched the victim with a weapon or by any other means.  At 
one point, the defendant aimed the victim’s unloaded rifle at him and tried to 
15 
block his escape.  When the victim tried to grab and load another gun, the 
defendant ran from the house, apparently taking one or more firearms with him.  
The accomplice struggled with the victim, and then also fled.  The defendant was 
ultimately convicted of robbery, burglary, and grand theft.  (Id. at p. 571.) 
In reviewing the judgment, the Cole court agreed with the defendant that 
his sentence could not properly be enhanced under former section 12022.7.  (Cole, 
supra, 31 Cal.3d 568, 572, 579.)  The court held that the statute applies only to 
persons who “actually” (id. at p. 573) and “directly perform the act that causes the 
physical injury.”  (Id. at p. 579.)  The injury-producing act must be done by the 
defendant “himself,” and not by someone who merely “aided or abetted the actor 
directly inflicting the injury.”  (31 Cal.3d at p. 572; see id. at p. 575, fn. 4.)  The 
Cole court observed that while the defendant directed the attack and moved to 
block the victim’s escape, he never actually struck or injured the victim.  Hence, 
by its terms, the statute did not cover his acts.  (Id. at pp. 572, 573.) 
In reaching this conclusion, Cole emphasized that the term “personally,” as 
used in former section 12022.7, describes an act performed directly from one 
person to another.  (Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568, 572.)  The court also relied on the 
apparent purpose of the statute to impose increased penalties on those perpetrators 
who do more than merely urge their confederates to inflict harm, and who actually 
inflict such harm.  (Id. at pp. 572-573.)  The court recognized that the defendant in 
Cole, who ordered the victim killed, was arguably as culpable as the accomplice 
who actually performed the attack.  (Id. at p. 573.)  But, according to Cole, the 
Legislature sought to deter persons from actually inflicting the prohibited harm by 
enhancing their punishment, and by not imposing the same penalty on persons 
who do not personally strike or injure the victim.  (Ibid.)  Cole further noted that 
other statutes supported this view.  For instance, the rules that define aiders and 
abettors as principles in the commission of crimes, and that make those persons 
16 
derivatively liable for crimes they do not personally commit, “ ‘do not at the same 
time impose a derivatively increased punishment by reason of the manner in which 
a confederate commits the crime.’ ”  (Id. at p. 576; see § 31.) 
Thus, Cole stands for the modest proposition that a defendant personally 
inflicts great bodily harm only if there is a direct physical link between his own act 
and the victim’s injury.  Under Cole, someone who does not strike or otherwise 
personally use force upon the victim does not qualify for enhanced punishment 
where the personal infliction of harm is required.  As we have seen, CALJIC No. 
17.20 follows this rule.  However, consistent with the instruction, nothing in Cole 
precludes a person from receiving enhanced sentencing treatment where he joins 
others in actually beating and harming the victim, and where the precise manner in 
which he contributes to the victim’s injuries cannot be measured or ascertained. 
The Courts of Appeal have adhered closely to Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568.  
Consistent with our view of the relevant statutory language here and in Cole, these 
decisions have provided for 20 years that participation in a group attack may 
satisfy sections 1192.7(c)(8) and 12022.7(a) where the defendant personally uses 
force against the victim, and the precise injurious effect is unclear.  Much like the 
group beating theories expressed in CALJIC No. 17.20, two themes emerge. 
Some courts have upheld personal-infliction findings where the force 
personally used by the defendant during a group attack was serious enough that it 
may, by itself, have caused great bodily injury, even though the evidence did not 
show for certain that the defendant’s acts alone perpetrated specific harm or that 
nobody else injured the victim.  Under this approach, which is illustrated by 
Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589, 594, “the blows were delivered, [the 
defendant] joined in that delivery and the victim suffered great bodily injury.”  
(See id. at pp. 591-592, 594-595 [defendant joined other men in hitting and 
kicking victim, defendant threw unopened beer cans at victim, and victim suffered 
17 
cuts and bruises on face and body]; accord, People v. Banuelos (2003) 106 
Cal.App.4th 1332, 1334-1337, review den. June 11, 2003 [defendant joined other 
men in punching victim, defendant struck victim on jaw and body with small bat, 
and victim suffered bruises, broken jaw and head wounds]; In re Sergio R. (1991) 
228 Cal.App.3d 588, 593-594, 601-602, review den. June 4, 1991 [defendant fired 
three shotgun rounds, accomplice fired own shotgun at same time, and two victims 
were struck].) 
Other group beating cases permit a personal-infliction finding where the 
physical force the defendant and other persons applied to the victim at the same 
time combined to cause great bodily harm.  One early example is Dominick, supra, 
182 Cal.App.3d 1174, which involved a forcible restraint scenario not implicated 
in the present case.  Critical here is Dominick’s reasoning, on which Corona, 
supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589, in part relied, that the defendant’s acts involved “more 
than aiding and abetting,” and that he was “directly responsible” for the resulting 
injuries.  (Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1211; see id. at pp. 1185, 1210-
1211 [defendant grabbed rape victim’s arms and pulled her head back to allow 
accomplice to strike her throat with pole, causing victim to fall down hillside and 
break shoulder]; accord, People v. Guzman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 761, 763-764, 
review den. Apr. 12, 2000 [defendant, while driving drunk, collided with 
oncoming traffic and injured passenger].) 
Both lines of authority show that CALJIC No. 17.20 — far from offending 
sections 1192.7(c)(8) and 12022.7(a) — prevents them from being rendered 
meaningless where more than one person perpetrates an attack.  In such cases, the 
evidence is often conflicting or unclear as to which assailant caused particular 
injuries in whole or part.  Thus, as CALJIC No. 17.20 recognizes, those who 
participate directly and substantially in a group beating should not be immune 
18 
from a personal-infliction finding for the sole reason that the resulting confusion 
prevents a showing or determination of this kind. 
Defendant’s contrary view would mean that “[o]nly those whose foot could 
be traced to a particular kick, whose fist could be patterned to a certain blow or 
whose weapon could be aligned with a visible injury would be punished.  The 
more severe the beating, the more difficult would be the tracing of culpability.”  
(Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589, 594.)  Under such circumstances, all 
participants in a group attack who personally caused or contributed to the 
infliction of harm could conceivably escape enhanced punishment.  Given the 
apparent goal of deterring and punishing gratuitous violence, the drafters of 
sections 1192.7(c)(8) and 12022.7(a) could not have intended that result. 
Here, after initially punching Schon in the face, defendant was seen in the 
group of 10 to 15 people who swarmed and beat Schon after he had been knocked 
down.  The evidence suggested that defendant also struck Schon on the head with 
bottles during the melee (e.g., bloody hand/pants, LaBarbera admission, and 
thrown bottle).  However, the violence initiated by defendant and escalated by the 
group prevented any evidence or determination whether defendant’s blows were 
the exact ones that broke Schon’s nose, cut his head, or caused other trauma.  
Under CALJIC No. 17.20, a personal-infliction finding could nonetheless be made 
if defendant personally applied force to the victim, and such force was sufficient to 
produce grievous bodily harm either alone or in concert with others.  Thus, use of 
the instruction in the present case followed statutory law, as applied by the courts. 
For reasons we now explain, the history of section 1192.7(c)(8) confirms 
that it embraces the group beating scenarios described in both the appellate 
decisions and CALJIC No. 17.20.  These materials, which defendant and the 
present Court of Appeal have overlooked, undermine their contrary view. 
19 
Section 1192.7(c)(8) was enacted by the voters in 1982 as part of 
Proposition 8, also known as “The Victims’ Bill of Rights.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, § 7, p. 56 (Pamphlet).)  Together, 
section 1192.7(c)(8) and section 667, which was enacted at the same time, 
established a sentencing enhancement for any defendant convicted of a serious 
felony who was previously convicted of a serious felony.  (Pamphlet, supra, text 
of Prop. 8, § 5, p. 33.)  As originally enacted, section 1192.7(c)(8) defined a 
serious felony as one in which the defendant either “inflicts great bodily injury” or 
“uses a firearm.”  (Pamphlet, supra, text of Prop. 8, § 7, p. 56, adding 
§ 1192.7(c)(8).)  The term “personally” appeared nowhere in the 1982 version of 
section 1192.7(c)(8). 
Eventually, absence of the word “personally” to modify the conduct 
described in the 1982 version of section 1192.7(c)(8) caused some confusion in 
the courts.  In People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471 (Piper), for example, an issue 
arose whether a prior conviction of shooting at an occupied vehicle (see § 246) 
qualified as a serious felony under the 1982 version of section 1192.7(c)(8), where 
the record of conviction did not show that defendant personally used a firearm.  
(Piper, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 475-476.)  The Piper court rejected any suggestion 
that such a qualification could not reasonably be implied, and interpreted the 
statute as requiring personal firearm use.  (Id. at pp. 476, 478.)  Piper relied, 
among other things, on the lack of any explicit statutory language imposing 
derivative punishment on someone who did not perform the proscribed act 
himself.  (Id. at pp. 476-477.) 
While Piper, supra, 42 Cal.3d 471, was pending, the Legislature sought to 
clarify the circumstances under which the 1982 version of section 1192.7(c)(8) 
applied.  Hence, it amended the definition of a serious felony contained therein to 
include only those crimes in which the defendant “personally inflicts great bodily 
20 
injury” or “personally uses a firearm.”  (§ 1192.7(c)(8), as amended by Stats. 
1986, ch. 489, § 1, pp. 1808-1810 (1986 Amendment), italics added.)  The 
Governor signed the bill on July 24, 1986.  (Assem. Bill No. 3733, approved by 
Governor, July 24, 1986, 2 Assem. Final History (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 2354.) 
In limiting section 1192.7(c)(8) to defendants who “personally” inflict great 
bodily harm, the 1986 Amendment incorporated language that had existed in 
section 12022.7 since it became operative several years earlier.  (See Stats. 1976, 
ch. 1139, § 306, p. 5162, oper. July 1, 1977, as amended by Stats. 1977, ch. 165, 
§ 94, p. 679, eff. June 29, 1977, oper. July 1, 1977.)  The history of the 1986 
Amendment confirms that it was intended to “conform” the serious felony 
definition in former section 1192.7(c)(8) to the enhancement provision in former 
section 12022.7.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3733 
(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 1986, p. 2.)  The purpose was to 
“correct drafting deficiencies” with respect to the personal infliction of bodily 
harm, and to “end any confusion caused by the differences in language.”  (Ibid; 
accord, Assem. Pub. Safety Com., 3rd reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3733 
(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 1986, pp. 1-2.) 
In conforming section 1192.7(c)(8) to former section 12022.7, the 
Legislature appears to have accepted the judicial construction of the latter statute.  
As noted, that construction includes the principles that now appear in CALJIC No. 
17.20 for determining when a participant in a group attack has personally inflicted 
great bodily harm.  Two historical developments support this view. 
First, as suggested earlier, Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1174, 
concluded that a defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury under section 
12022.7, where he joins others in physically attacking the victim, and is “directly 
responsible,” at least in substantial part, for the resulting harm.  (Dominick, supra, 
at p. 1211.)  Dominick was filed on June 30, 1986.  At that time, the Legislature 
21 
had not yet enacted the 1986 Amendment, which eventually added the word 
“personally” to section 1192.7(c)(8).  (See 2 Assem. Bill No. 3733 (1985-1986 
Reg. Sess.), referred to Sen. Com. on Judiciary, June 12, 1986, and returned to 
Assem. on July 11, 2006, Assem. Final History (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 2354.) 
We have found no evidence that lawmakers believed Dominick, supra, 182 
Cal.App.3d 1174, wrongly construed the personal-infliction enhancement in 
former section 12022.7.  The legislative record also fails to suggest that Dominick 
conflicted with the serious felony definition in section 1192.7(c)(8), as originally 
enacted.  Indeed, we must assume that in reconciling the two statutes, the 
Legislature knew about Dominick’s approach to group attacks, and incorporated 
its view into the 1986 Amendment.  (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 
329 [presuming that where statutory amendment includes same language as earlier 
law on similar subject, and earlier law has been judicially construed, Legislature is 
aware of that construction and accepts it].) 
Second, the Legislature has never repudiated Dominick, supra, 182 
Cal.App.3d 1174, or its progeny, despite ample time and opportunity to do so.  
Since 1986, section 1192.7(c)(8) has been amended once, in 1998, to delete an 
extraneous term.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 13 [deleting “other” preceding “felony” 
in statute].)  In the interim, the courts had decided Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 
589, and In re Sergio, R., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 588.  Much like Dominick, these 
cases do not limit the personal infliction of bodily harm to group beatings or 
assaults in which the defendant was the sole or certain cause of specific grievous 
harm. 
In 1998, the Legislature did not amend the personal-infliction language in 
section 1192.7(c)(8) in response to these decisions.  Nor has the Legislature since 
repudiated any of the other group beating cases that apply the principles now 
appearing in CALJIC No. 17.20.  (See People v. Banuelos, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 
22 
1332; People v. Guzman, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 761.)  This history suggests that 
the Legislature approves their construction of the statute, and that defendant’s 
understanding of it is wrong.  (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 446 
[presuming that where statutory language has been judicially construed, and 
Legislature amends statute but leaves such language intact, it is aware of that 
construction and accepts it].) 
Defendant nonetheless argues that CALJIC No. 17.20 offends section 
1192.7(c)(8) in other ways.  This claim involves certain words and phrases that, he 
insists, removed the personal-infliction requirement from the jury’s consideration, 
and lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of federal and state due 
process guarantees.  We address each point in turn. 
Defendant starts with the instruction’s first group beating theory.  As noted, 
it involves “the application of unlawful physical force upon the victim” that “could 
have caused” great bodily injury “by itself.”  (CALJIC No. 17.20, italics added.)  
Defendant claims the italicized phrase invited speculation as to whether he 
personally inflicted harm, and permitted a section 1192.7(c)(8) finding based 
solely on injuries caused by other assailants in the group. 
Read in context, however, the challenged language “is not reasonably 
susceptible” to this interpretation.  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 
1221-1222, fn. 11 [instruction on personal firearm use adequately advised jury to 
rely on defendant’s own acts].)  In deciding whether the section 1192.7(c)(8) 
allegation is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is told that the defendant 
must have (1) participated in the group beating and (2) applied physical force 
directly to the victim, who (3) suffered great bodily injury as a result.  As we have 
seen, the reference to grievous harm that the defendant “could have caused” on his 
own simply embraces the scenarios in which it is impossible to know which 
assailant caused a particular injury.  By implication, this part of the instruction 
23 
preserves the necessary causal link between the defendant’s use of force and the 
victim’s injuries by foreclosing a section 1192.7(c)(8) finding where the defendant 
could not have personally inflicted the requisite harm or contributed to it at all.  
No reasonable juror would have viewed the challenged language in the manner 
defendant suggests.10 
Defendant also parses the second group beating theory.  It allows the jury to 
sustain a section 1192.7(c)(8) allegation if the defendant “personally applied 
unlawful physical force” to the victim while he “knew” others were applying 
similar force at the same time, and while he “knew, or reasonably should have 
known, that the cumulative effect of all [such] force would result in great bodily 
injury.”  (CALJIC No. 17.20, italics added.)  According to defendant, the italicized 
language should not have appeared in the instruction, because it substituted his 
knowledge of the force applied by others for the injury that he was personally 
required to inflict.  He claims this approach allowed “vicarious” liability under 
section 1192.7(c)(8) in violation of controlling law. 
The asserted error did not occur.  We have seen that section 1192.7(c)(8) 
requires the defendant to personally inflict, or contribute to the infliction of, great 
bodily harm while participating in a group attack.  (See Dominick, supra, 182 
                                              
10  
Defendant also complains because the first group beating theory mentions 
“the application of unlawful physical force,” instead of the defendant’s application 
of force.  (CALJIC No. 17.20, italics added.)  However, this language could not be 
understood as describing the acts of others.  Both before and after the challenged 
phrase, CALJIC No. 17.20 asks jurors whether “defendant” personally inflicted 
great bodily injury or personally applied force to the victim.  (Italics added.)  
Hence, the reference to “the application of unlawful physical force” logically 
describes the defendant’s own acts.  (See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
529, 594 [assuming jurors adopt common sense meaning of instructions].)  It did 
not excuse jurors from finding that he personally attacked and harmed the victim. 
 
24 
Cal.App.3d 1174, 1210-1211.)  The second group beating theory in CALJIC No. 
17.20 follows this principle by requiring the defendant to apply physical force 
directly to the victim to such a significant degree that he adds to the “cumulative” 
injurious effect.  Contrary to what defendant claims, this language does not define 
the defendant’s personal infliction of great bodily harm primarily or solely in 
terms of the harmful acts that others in the group commit. 
Moreover, we have said that section 1192.7(c)(8) simply requires an intent 
to do the act the statute proscribes.  (People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 
1222 [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as “general intent” statute], citing People v. 
Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695-1698.)11  Instead of supplanting the 
personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or 
should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary 
burden on the prosecution.  We see no basis on which defendant can complain.12 
                                              
11  
Voters recently rejected an attempt to amend section 1192.7(c)(8) to 
include a requirement that the defendant “specifically intend[ ] to” personally 
inflict great bodily injury.  (Text of Prop. 66, proposing amend. of § 1192.7(c)(8) 
at Gen. Elec. of Nov. 2, 2004, 50D West’s Ann. Pen. Code (2005 supp.) foll. 
§ 1192.7, p. 3; see Historical and Statutory Notes, 50D West’s Ann. Pen. Code 
(2006 supp.) foll. § 1192.7, p. 4 [noting rejection of amendment to this section].)  
The Legislature long ago removed from section 12022.7(a) a similar requirement 
that great bodily injury be personally inflicted “with the intent to inflict the 
injury.”  (Stats. 1995, ch. 341, § 1, p. 1851.) 
12  
Defendant argues on review, as on appeal, that CALJIC No. 17.20 tainted 
both the finding that he personally inflicted great bodily harm (§ 1192.7(c)(8)) and 
that he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon.  (§ 1192.7(c)(23).)  He 
also complains here about the harmless error analysis the Court of Appeal used to 
uphold the latter finding.  Our conclusions that the group beating principles in 
CALJIC No. 17.20 are valid, and that the instruction was properly given at trial, 
foreclose any claim that such principles wrongly infected the personal-use finding.  
Hence, we do not address the issue. 
25 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the Court of Appeal erred in determining that the second 
group beating theory in CALJIC No. 17.20 is invalid, and that the instruction 
should not have been given at defendant’s trial.  The judgment of the Court of 
Appeal is reversed insofar as it vacated the section 1192.7(c)(8) finding that 
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of felony 
assault. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that CALJIC No. 17.20 does not misstate the law 
regarding allegations of personal infliction of great bodily injury.  I also agree the 
trial court did not err by giving the instruction in this case, where the evidence 
showed defendant participated in a group attack and personally struck the victim 
with blows the jury could find caused his injuries, either by themselves or together 
with the blows of his coassailants.  I do not understand the majority’s discussion 
of People v. Dominick (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1174 to constitute approval of the 
application of personal-infliction enhancements in cases where (as in Dominick) 
the defendant’s role was limited to restraining the victim while a coassailant struck 
her (a factual scenario the majority correctly notes is “not implicated” here (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 17)), but only as endorsing the general principle that direct 
participants in group attacks are not immune from personal-infliction findings.  On 
that basis I have signed the majority opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I do not agree with the majority that the trial court here correctly instructed 
the jury on what is required, in a group beating context, for a finding under Penal 
Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), that a defendant personally inflicted great 
bodily injury.  The instruction that the trial court read to the jury, CALJIC 
No. 17.20, presented two alternative theories under which the jury could find that 
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury.  As defendant persuasively 
argues, neither theory is correct.  I agree with the Court of Appeal that the 
instruction was erroneous and that the error was prejudicial.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment setting aside the great bodily injury 
finding. 
The majority correctly explains what is required for a finding that a 
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in a group beating context.  The 
defendant must do more than merely aid or abet others who inflict great bodily 
injury; the defendant must physically participate in the injury-producing conduct.  
On the other hand, the defendant need not have acted alone, and his conduct need 
not be the sole or even the predominate cause of the great bodily injury.  The 
defendant’s physical participation need only be a substantial factor in producing 
the great bodily injury, or, in other words, the effect of the defendant’s conduct in 
producing the injury must be more than trivial or insignificant. 
2 
The trial court, however, did not accurately explain these requirements to 
the jury.  The trial court gave this explanation:  “When a person participates in a 
group beating and it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted a 
particular injury, he or she may be found to have personally inflicted great bodily 
injury upon the victim, if one, the application of unlawful physical force upon the 
victim was of such a nature that, by itself, it could have caused the great bodily 
injury suffered by the victim; or two, that at the time that the defendant personally 
applied unlawful physical force to the victim, the defendant knew that other 
persons, as part of the same incident, had applied, were applying, or would apply 
unlawful physical force upon the victim and the defendant then knew or 
reasonably should have known that the cumulative effect of all the unlawful 
physical force would result in great bodily injury to the victim.”  (Italics added.) 
There was no need or justification for a jury instruction setting forth two 
theories.  The majority succinctly summarizes the statute’s requirements in these 
terms:  “[T]he statute calls for the defendant to administer a blow or other force to 
the victim, for the defendant to do so directly rather than through an intermediary, 
and for the victim to suffer great bodily injury as a result.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 13.)  The majority adds the necessary qualification that the defendant’s conduct 
must “contribute substantially to the victim’s injured state.”  (Id. at p. 14.)  An 
instruction in these terms would have been accurate and sufficient. 
The instruction’s first theory is that a defendant personally inflicts great 
bodily injury if “the application of unlawful physical force upon the victim was of 
such a nature that, by itself, it could have caused the great bodily injury suffered 
by the victim.”  (Italics added.)  The majority concludes that the jury would have 
understood that the words “application of unlawful physical force” referred to the 
defendant’s own acts.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23, fn. 10.)  Although this is 
3 
questionable, the more serious defect in the instruction is its use of the words 
“could have caused.”   
When we say that someone “could have” done something, we mean only 
that the person had the ability or potential to do that thing.  We do not mean that 
the person actually did the thing, and often we mean the opposite.  For example, in 
the film On the Waterfront (Columbia Pictures 1954), a former boxer portrayed by 
the actor Marlon Brando famously said:  “I could have been a contender.  I could 
have been somebody, instead of a bum—which is what I am.”  With these words, 
the former boxer was expressing regret that he had never been a contender. 
Thus, to say that the defendant’s application of physical force “could have” 
caused the victim’s great bodily injury is only to say that it had the capacity or 
potential to cause such an injury, even though it may not actually have done so.  
This is not a correct description of what must be proved to support a finding of 
personal infliction of great bodily injury under Penal Code section 1192.7, 
subdivision (c)(8).  The defendant’s force must actually have caused the great 
bodily injury in the sense that it contributed to the injury in a nontrivial way. 
The instruction’s other theory is also wrong.  The second theory is that a 
defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury if “at the time that the defendant 
personally applied unlawful physical force to the victim, the defendant knew that 
other persons, as part of the same incident, had applied, were applying, or would 
apply unlawful physical force upon the victim and the defendant then knew or 
reasonably should have known that the cumulative effect of all the unlawful 
physical force would result in great bodily injury to the victim.”  In addition to the 
defendant’s application of force to the victim, this theory imposes two requirements:  
(1) the defendant must have known that others are also beating the victim; and 
(2) the defendant must have known that the cumulative effect of all the blows would 
result in great bodily injury.  The second requirement includes within it  
4 
a requirement that the cumulative effect of all the blows in fact results in great 
bodily injury. 
As the majority cautiously observes, “the reference to what the defendant 
knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional 
evidentiary burden on the prosecution.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  Although this 
aspect of the instruction’s second theory (the imposition of knowledge 
requirements) is almost certainly erroneous, it is not the aspect that misled the jury 
to defendant’s prejudice.  Defendant was harmed by the instruction’s second 
theory insofar as it stated or implied that the causation requirement for a finding of 
personal infliction of great bodily injury may be satisfied by proof that defendant 
“personally applied unlawful physical force to the victim” during an incident in 
which others were also beating the victim and that “the cumulative effect of all the 
unlawful physical force . . . result[ed] in great bodily injury to the victim.” 
What the instruction should have explained, but did not, is that when an 
injury results from the cumulative effect of multiple blows, the defendant has 
personally inflicted that injury if, but only if, the blow or blows struck by the 
defendant were a substantial factor in causing the injury.  (See People v. Catlin 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155-156; In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719-720.)  The 
“substantial factor” test is explained in a standard Judicial Council jury instruction.  
As adapted to the situation here, the instruction reads:  “There may be more than 
one cause of [great bodily injury].  An act causes [great bodily injury] only if it is 
a substantial factor in causing the [injury].  A substantial factor is more than a 
trivial or remote factor.  However, it does not have to be the only factor that causes 
the [injury].”  (See Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instrs. (2006) CALCRIM 
No. 240; see also CALJIC No. 3.41.)  The instruction’s second theory is erroneous 
because it does not explain the “substantial factor” requirement, that the 
defendant’s own conduct be more than a trivial or remote factor in causing the 
5 
great bodily injury.  A finding that the cumulative effect of multiple blows from 
different individuals resulted in great bodily injury does not exclude the possibility 
that the blow or blows inflicted by one of those individuals were only a trivial 
factor and did not contribute substantially in producing the injury. 
The majority’s defense of the instruction is unpersuasive.  In response to 
defendant’s argument that the instruction’s first theory—that defendant’s 
application of force “could have caused” the injury—“invited speculation as to 
whether he personally inflicted harm” and permitted a finding “based solely on 
injuries caused by other assailants in the group,” the majority asserts that the 
instruction told the jury “that the defendant must have (1) participated in the group 
beating and (2) applied physical force directly to the victim, who (3) suffered great 
bodily injury as a result.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, italics added.)  But the 
instruction does not state that the victim must have suffered bodily injury “as a 
result” of the physical force that defendant applied.  The instruction’s first theory 
does not require that the victim suffer any injury as a result of the defendant’s use 
of force.  The instruction’s only reference to the victim’s injury being a “result” of 
physical force is in its description of the second theory, and there the instruction 
referred to the injury being the result of the “cumulative effect” of the physical 
force applied by all participants, not by the defendant.  Thus, in asserting that the 
instruction required the jury to find that the victim suffered great bodily injury “as 
a result” of the physical force that defendant applied, the majority reads into the 
instruction a concept that simply is not there. 
In response to defendant’s argument that the instruction’s second theory is 
defective because it “substituted his knowledge of the force applied by others for 
the injury that he was personally required to inflict” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 23), the 
majority asserts that the instruction “requir[es] the defendant to apply physical 
force directly to the victim to such a significant degree that he adds to the 
6 
‘cumulative’ injurious effect” (id. at p. 24).  Here also, the majority claims to find 
in the instruction a concept that it nowhere expresses.  Nothing in the instruction 
required the jury to assess defendant’s contribution to the cumulative effect of the 
multiple blows for the purpose of determining whether it was more than a trivial or 
insubstantial factor in producing the injury. 
Given the sharply conflicting evidence in this case, the instruction’s failure 
to explain the substantial factor causation requirement resulted in prejudice to 
defendant, requiring reversal of the finding under Penal Code section 1192.7, 
subdivision (c)(8), that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury.  Because 
the Court of Appeal correctly resolved this issue, I would affirm its judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Modiri 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 112 Cal.App.4th 123 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S120238 
Date Filed: August 7, 2006 
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Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Alfonso Fernandez 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Candace Hale, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass 
and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, René A. Chacón, Laurence K. Sullivan and Dorian 
Jung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Candace Hale 
P.O. Box 775 
San Anselmo, CA  94979-0775 
(415) 460-5428 
 
Dorian Jung 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5849