Title: Kelli Jo Trusley v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 41S01-0506-CR-282
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2005

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Kimberly S. Robinson 
Steve Carter 
Indianapolis, IN 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
 
Deputies Attorney General 
 
Indianapolis, IN 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 41S01-0506-CR-282 
 
KELLI JO TRUSLEY, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court, No. 41D02-0110-CF-158  
The Honorable Cynthia S. Emkes, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 41A01-0403-CR-109  
_________________________________ 
 
June 17, 2005 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
Appellant Kelli Jo Trusley received an enhanced sentence for reckless homicide.  Her 
appeal requires us to consider whether various aggravators used to enhance the sentence were 
proper under Blakely v. Washington.   
 
We conclude that three of the aggravating circumstances the court found were improper 
under Blakely.  Two were proper based on admissions during the sentencing hearing.  
Considering the weight of these two as against the mitigating factors, we conclude that the 
enhanced sentence should not be affirmed, and thus remand for a new sentencing. 
 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Kelli Jo Trusley provided day care services to a child named Brian Small.  On February 
27, 2001, Brian was placed in Trusley’s care.  During the time Small was in Trusley’s care, he 
fell out of the bed she had placed him in for a nap.  Apparently, Trusley did not discover that 
Small had fallen from the bed until sometime after the fall.1  Although Trusley attempted to 
resuscitate Small after she discovered him on the bedroom floor, he died as a result of the 
injuries sustained in the fall.2
 
A grand jury indicted Trusley for neglect of a dependent, a class B felony. Ind. Code 
Ann. § 35-46-1-4 (West 2004).  The State later amended the indictment to charge Trusley with 
reckless homicide as a class C Felony.  Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-5 (West 2004).  Trusley pled 
guilty to the reckless homicide charge. 
 
The trial court found five aggravating circumstances: 1) the age of the victim; 2) that 
Trusley was in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment at a penal facility; 3) that 
imposition of a sentence less than an enhanced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the 
crime; 4) the nature and circumstances of the crime; and 5) that Trusley was in a position of trust 
with the victim. (Sent. Tr. at 69-78.)  The court also found three mitigating factors: 1) Trusley’s 
lack of a criminal history; 2) that prolonged incarceration would result in hardship to her 
dependents; and 3) that the crime was unlikely to occur again.  (Sent. Tr. at 78-79.)  After 
weighing these circumstances, the court sentenced Trusley to the maximum term of eight years, 
with two years suspended to probation. 
                                                 
1 It is unclear exactly how long Small lay on the floor after his fall before being discovered.  The State’s doctor and 
a doctor retained by the defense, both indicated that Small had likely fallen about twenty to forty-five minutes before 
he was discovered.  (Appellant’s App. 54-55; 86-87.)  Trusley, however, told investigators that she discovered Small 
no more than fifteen minutes after his fall. (Sent. Tr. 43-44.) 
2 It is also unclear how far Small actually fell.  Trusley insisted that she placed Small on the lower level of a bunk 
bed, approximately eighteen inches off the floor.  (Sent. Tr. at 44.) The doctors involved in the case disagreed with 
Trusley and indicated that the injuries Small sustained from the fall were caused by a fall from a height of about five 
feet. (Appellant’s App. 57, 83-84.) 
 
2
 
Trusley appealed her sentence, arguing that her sentence was improperly enhanced 
because the aggravating factors were neither found by a jury nor admitted in accordance with the 
holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).  Trusley also argued, in 
more general terms, that the court improperly applied the aggravators, and failed to consider 
additional mitigating factors.  
 
The Court of Appeals agreed with Trusley that the aggravators were improper under 
Blakely and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.  Trusley v. State, 818 N.E.2d 110, 112 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) vacated.  We grant transfer. 
 
 
I. Admitting the Victim’s Age 
 
 
The first aggravator used to enhance Trusley’s sentence was the age of the victim.  The 
State argues that this aggravator was proper because Indiana’s sentencing scheme declares that it 
is an aggravating circumstance if the victim is under twelve years of age.  Ind. Code Ann. § 35-
38-1-7.1(a)(4)(West 2004).  The question for Blakely purposes, however, is not whether a trial 
court can enhance a sentence based on this aggravator, but whether the fact that Brian Small was 
under twelve was properly established. 
 
The Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey declared that “other than the fact of prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 
490 (2000).  As clarified in Blakely, the statutory maximum of which the Court spoke was “the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  Blakely, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S.Ct. at 2537.  We recently 
held that Blakely was applicable to Indiana’s sentencing scheme because our presumptive term 
constituted the statutory maximum as defined in Blakely.  Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 683 
(Ind. 2005).  Consequently, we held that to enhance a sentence under Indiana’s then existing 
 
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system “the sort of facts envisioned by Blakely as necessitating a jury finding must be found by a 
jury . . . .” Id. at 686. 
 
 
Blakely is not concerned, primarily, with what facts a judge uses to enhance a sentence, 
but with how those facts are found.  Under Blakely, a trial court in a determinate sentencing 
system such as Indiana’s may enhance a sentence based only on those facts that are established 
in one of several ways: 1) as a fact of prior conviction; 2) by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; 
3) when admitted by a defendant; and 4) in the course of a guilty plea where the defendant has 
waived Apprendi rights and stipulated to certain facts or consented to judicial factfinding.  See 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, 2541; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 
738, 756 (2005). 
 
 
The only evidence before the sentencing court was that the victim was just ten months 
old. Trusley’s attorney, in summing up his argument about sentencing, sensibly and 
professionally acknowledged the existence of that fact by saying: 
 
However, the Court has to consider not only aggravating factors, such as the 
imposition of a suspended sentence would . . . depreciate the seriousness of the 
crime. And also, that the victim [of the] crime was less than twelve years of age, 
and in her care. 
 
(Sent. Tr. at 57.) (emphasis added).3  We conclude that this statement by counsel is 
sufficient to constitute an admission by Trusley that Small was under twelve at the time 
of his death.4  
 
The recent Supreme Court ruling in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. __, 125 
S.Ct. 1254 (2005), supports this conclusion.  In that case, the Court considered what 
sources a trial court may properly consult in determining whether a prior conviction 
                                                 
3 While the strategic consideration of whether to acknowledge such a fact would be altered by the Blakely decision, 
it might still serve a client well to do so.  And as our disposition will demonstrate, it has not been adverse to the 
client’s sentencing claim in this case. 
4 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756 (2005)(“Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in 
Apprendi: Any fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts 
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added).  
 
 
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contained the necessary elements to serve as a predicate violent felony under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act.  Following the reasoning of a previous decision which had limited 
the scope of inquiry to statutory elements, charging documents, and jury instructions, the 
Court concluded that in pleaded cases, the “closest analogs to jury instructions . . . would 
be the statement of factual basis of the charge . . . shown by a transcript of plea colloquy 
or by written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable findings 
of fact adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea.” Id. at 1259-60. 
 
Although Shepard was concerned with the appropriate sources of factual 
information regarding prior convictions, read broadly it establishes the appropriate 
sources a court may consult in determining whether a fact concerning the commission of 
a crime has been adequately established during a plea hearing in order to pass Sixth 
Amendment muster.  
 
 
In this case, defense counsel’s statement occurred during such a “plea colloquy,” 
and the trial court properly considered the age of the victim as an aggravating 
circumstance.  
 
 
II. Judicial Statements About the Moral/Penal Weight of Facts 
 
 
The second aggravator is that Trusley was in a position of trust with the victim.  In a 
recent case we stated that a defendant’s “Sixth Amendment rights are not implicated when the 
language of an aggravator is meant to describe the factual circumstances, not to serve as a fact 
itself.”  Morgan v. State, __ N.E.2d __, 2005 WL 1403925 at *4 (Ind. June 15, 2005).  In 
Morgan, the trial judge took note of the defendant’s multiple prior convictions and observed that 
previous convictions had failed to rehabilitate the offender.  We categorized such statements as 
“observations [that] merely describe the moral or penal weight of [underlying facts].” Id.  
 
 
Because such observations do not involve impermissible judicial fact-finding, but rather 
reflect “the efforts of a judge to describe in a concise manner what the underlying facts mean, 
 
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and why they demonstrate that a particular defendant deserves an enhanced sentence,” we 
concluded that their use did not violate the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at *5.  Nevertheless, we also 
held that to satisfy the requirements of Blakely such statements must be  “1) supported by facts 
otherwise admitted or found by a jury and 2) meant as a concise description of what the 
underlying facts demonstrate and therefore [rely] upon a legal determination otherwise reserved 
as a power of the judge.” Id. 
 
 
In establishing the factual basis of the plea in this case, the following exchange occurred 
between Trusley and her lawyer: 
 
 
Lawyer: And again, you were a daycare provider for him [Small] and you 
had custody of him during the period of time in which he died? 
 
Trusley: Yes. 
 
(Plea Tr. at 10.) 
 
Judge Vaidik, dissenting in this case, commented that “these admissions are sufficient to 
establish that Trusley was in a position of trust with the victim.” Trusley, 818 N.E.2d at 114 
(Vaidik, J., dissenting) vacated.  She is correct.  The aggravator is an attempt to articulate the 
obvious nature of the relationship that existed between the defendant and the victim at the time 
the crime was committed.   
 
Of course, as we said in Morgan, judicial statements such as “in a position of trust” 
cannot “serve as separate aggravating circumstances.”  Morgan, __ N.E.2d at __, 2005 WL 
1403925 at *4.  The trial court in Morgan, however, had enumerated both prior convictions and 
failure to rehabilitate as aggravating circumstances.  We held that the judicial statement merely 
described the moral/penal weight of the prior convictions and could not serve as a “separate 
aggravating circumstance[]” in addition to the fact of prior conviction.  Id. 
 
Here, the court did not enhance the sentence on the grounds that Trusley was both in a 
position of trust and Small’s day care provider.  Rather, it supported the position of trust 
aggravator by reference to the admitted fact that Trusley was Small’s day care provider.  This 
 
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was an appropriate legal observation about properly established facts and constituted a legitimate 
aggravating circumstance. 
 
 
Disposition 
 
There were three other aggravating circumstances found by the trial court: that Trusley 
was in need of incarceration; that the imposition of anything other than an enhanced sentence 
would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; and the nature and circumstances of the crime.  
None of these can be supported by facts found according to the procedural dictates mandated by 
Blakely.   
 
 
Of the five aggravators found by the trial court, three were improperly considered.  
Although it is frequently stated that “a single aggravator is sufficient to support an enhanced 
sentence,” the existence of an aggravator does not relieve trial or appellate judges from the 
obligation to consider what weight to assign a particular aggravator and to balance the 
aggravators and mitigators.   
 
 
In this case, examining the two properly found aggravators against the three substantial 
mitigating circumstances found by the trial court leaves us unable to say with confidence that the 
enhanced sentence should be affirmed on appeal. 
 
 
We remand to the trial court with instructions to afford the State an election to prove 
additional aggravating circumstances to a jury.  Should the State forgo this election, the trial 
court should reconsider the appropriate sentence based on the two proper aggravators and the 
three mitigators identified above. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker, JJ.,  concur 
 
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