Title: Nudell v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94679
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 17, 2003

Docket No. 94679-Agenda 11-May 2003.
MICHAEL NUDELL, Appellant, v. THE FOREST PRESERVE 							DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether the 35-day period for filing a
complaint under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101
et seq. (West 1998)) begins to run on the date that the agency decision
is deposited in the United States mail or on the date that the decision
is actually received by the party affected by the decision. The appellate
court held that the 35-day period begins to run on the date that the
agency decision is deposited in the United States mail. 333 Ill. App.
3d 518. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the
appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Plaintiff, Michael Nudell, filed a complaint for administrative
review of a decision of the Civil Service Commission of Cook County
(the Commission) terminating his employment as a police officer with
defendant, Forest Preserve District of Cook County (the District).
Plaintiff began his employment as a District police officer in October
1987. On June 12, 1997, plaintiff was suspended by the District for 29
days following an internal investigation and predisciplinary hearing
concerning allegations of sexual harassment and insubordination. The
Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing, found that the charges
against plaintiff were sustained, and ordered termination of plaintiff's
employment as a police officer. The Commission deposited a copy of
its decision addressed to plaintiff's attorney in the United States mail
on March 25, 1998. Due to the relocation of the attorney's office, the
decision was not received by the attorney until April 6, 1998.
	Plaintiff filed his complaint in the circuit court of Cook County
on May 5, 1998. The District filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the complaint was not timely
because it was filed more than 35 days from the date that the
Commission mailed the decision to plaintiff. The circuit court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss. The circuit court then upheld the
Commission's finding that plaintiff was insubordinate, but rejected a
finding that plaintiff had violated Cook County's policy against sexual
harassment. The circuit court found that there was an insufficient
record to establish a violation of the policy against sexual harassment,
and remanded the matter to the Commission for further findings on
that issue.
	Upon remand, and following further hearing, the Commission
again found that the charges against plaintiff were sustained and
ordered the termination of plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff filed a
second complaint for administrative review in the circuit court on
December 2, 1999. The circuit court set aside the findings of the
Commission. The circuit court held that the charges of sexual
harassment were vague and were not directed to specific conduct. The
circuit court stated that the only charge surviving scrutiny was the
charge of insubordination. The circuit court concluded that discharge
was too harsh a penalty for the offense of insubordination, and held
that plaintiff's punishment should be no more than the 29-day
suspension that plaintiff already had served.
	The Commission appealed the circuit court's ruling. The
appellate court noted that section 3-103 of the Administrative Review
Law (735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1998)) provides that a complaint for
review of a final administrative decision must be filed within 35 days
from the date that a copy of the decision to be reviewed is served
upon the party affected by the decision. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 522. The
appellate court further noted that section 3-103 provides that a
decision is served when it is deposited in the United States mail. 735
ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1998). In this case, the Commission deposited
a copy of its decision in the United States mail on March 25, 1998.
333 Ill. App. 3d at 522. The thirty-fifth day from March 25, 1998, was
April 29, 1998. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 522-23. Plaintiff's initial complaint,
however, was not filed until May 5, 1998, and therefore was not
timely. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 522. The appellate court held that the
circuit court should have granted the District's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's initial complaint for administrative review because the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the complaint. 333 Ill. App. 3d
at 523. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the circuit court's
order. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 523.
	This court then granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	The Administrative Review Law provides that parties to a
proceeding before an administrative review agency shall be barred
from obtaining judicial review of an agency's administrative decision
unless review is sought within the time and manner set forth in the
statute. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 1998). With regard to the time for
filing a complaint for administrative review, section 3-103 provides,
in pertinent part:
			"Every action to review a final administrative decision
shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the
issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a
copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon
the party affected by the decision[.]
* * *
			The method of service of the decision shall be as provided
in the Act governing the procedure before the administrative
agency, but if no method is provided, a decision shall be
deemed to have been served either when personally delivered
or when a copy of the decision is deposited in the United
States mail, in a sealed envelope or package, with postage
prepaid, addressed to the party affected by the decision at his
or her last known residence or place of business." 735 ILCS
5/3-103 (West 1998).
	The parties agree that no method of service is provided in the
statute governing the proceedings before the Commission (see 55
ILCS 5/3-14011 through 3-14015 (West 1998)), so that section
3-103 applies to determine the date of service of the administrative
decision. The parties disagree, however, concerning whether the
portion of section 3-103 providing that "a decision shall be deemed
to have been served *** when deposited in the United States mail" in
fact means that a decision is deemed to have been served when
deposited in the United States mail, or actually means that a decision
is deemed to have been served when received by the party affected
thereby. The parties note that there are conflicting decisions from this
court that support either interpretation of section 3-103. Where this
court has adopted conflicting interpretations of the same statute, the
duty of this court is to clarify and resolve its previous decisions.
Williams v. Crickman, 81 Ill. 2d 105, 111 (1980). Because the issue
in this case concerns the interpretation of a statute, the issue presents
a question of law and our review is de novo. King v. Industrial
Comm'n, 189 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (2000).
	In support of its interpretation, the District cites Cox v. Board of
Fire &amp; Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 399 (1983), which the
appellate court relied on in finding that plaintiff's initial complaint was
untimely. In Cox, this court stated that the "statutory provision
[section 3-103, formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 267] is
clear and unequivocal. Since the statute which governed the
proceeding before the defendant board [citation] provides no method
of service, the decision was served when deposited in the United
States mail." Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 403.
	In response, plaintiff claims that Cox is both an aberration and is
distinguishable. Plaintiff cites Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349 (1990), and Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554 (1999), in
support of his claim that his complaint was timely because it was filed
within 35 days of his receipt of the administrative decision. In Lockett,
this court stated: "[a]s noted previously, section 3-103 of the act
provides that an action to review an administrative decision shall be
commenced 'by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons
within 35 days' of receipt of the decision being appealed." (Emphases
omitted.) Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d  at 354. Subsequently, in Carver, this
court quoted the preceding statement from Lockett. See Carver, 186 Ill. 2d  at 559.
	Plaintiff argues that this court should reverse the appellate court's
decision to follow Cox. Plaintiff claims that the language at issue in
Cox is obiter dictum, and thus is not binding as authority or precedent.
Plaintiff then argues that even if the remark in Cox would be
considered judicial dictum rather than obiter dictum, the comments in
Lockett and Carver have the same significance as the comment in Cox.
Accordingly, because the comments in Lockett and Carver are this
court's most recent pronouncements on the issue, those comments
should supersede the earlier statement in Cox.
	This court has explained the difference between obiter dictum
and judicial dictum. We have noted that:
			"The term 'dictum' is generally used as an abbreviation of
obiter dictum, which means a remark or opinion uttered by
the way. Such an expression or opinion as a general rule is
not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis
rule. [Citation.] On the other hand, an expression of opinion
upon a point in a case argued by counsel and deliberately
passed upon by the court, though not essential to the
disposition of the cause, if dictum, is a judicial dictum.
[Citations.] And further, a judicial dictum is entitled to much
weight, and should be followed unless found to be erroneous.
[Citation.] Even obiter dictum of a court of last resort can be
tantamount to a decision and therefore binding in the absence
of a contrary decision of that court. [Citation.]" Cates v.
Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 80 (1993).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, we first must examine the
statements in Cox, Lockett and Carver to determine whether those
statements were dictum, and if so, whether the statements were obiter
dictum or judicial dictum.
	In Cox, the plaintiff filed an action in the circuit court seeking
review of a decision of the board of fire and police commissioners of
the City of Danville under the Administrative Review Law. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 400-01. The circuit court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint was not timely
filed. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 401. The circuit court noted that the complaint
had been filed within the 35-day period fixed by section 3-103, but
nonetheless was not timely because the summons was not issued until
the thirty-sixth day. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 401. The appellate court
affirmed. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 401.
	In his appeal to this court, the plaintiff argued that this court first
had to "decide whether the 35-day period commenced with the date
of mailing of the notice of decision or whether the act of mailing
served merely to create a rebuttable presumption that the notice of
decision was received." Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 402. The plaintiff cited this
court's decision in Pearce Hospital Foundation v. Illinois Public Aid
Comm'n, 15 Ill. 2d 301 (1958), in support of his claim that the time
for filing a complaint under the Administrative Review Law begins to
run upon receipt of the notice of decision. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 402. This
court disagreed with plaintiff, noting that the court in Pearce Hospital
was not presented with the question of whether the section 3-103
statutory period began to run from the date of mailing or the date of
receipt of the notice of decision. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 402-03. We then
stated that:
			"The statutory provision is clear and unequivocal. Since
the statute which governed the proceeding before the
defendant board (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 10-2.1-17)
provides no method of service, the decision was served when
deposited in the United States mail." Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 403. 
This court then agreed with the plaintiff that he should not be denied
his day in court due to the failure of the clerk's office to issue the
summonses on the day they were delivered, as the issuance of
summons is mandatory and not jurisdictional. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 403-04. We noted that the plaintiff had acted with diligence in presenting
the summonses to the clerk and held that, on the record, plaintiff's
action was timely commenced. Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 404.
	Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that our statement in Cox
that the 35-day period commences when a decision is deposited in the
United States mail is judicial dictum and not obiter dictum. The issue
of whether the 35-day period begins to run upon the date that the
decision was mailed or the date that the decision was received was
argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon by this court. See
Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 80.
	In contrast, we find that the statements at issue in Lockett and
Carver were obiter dictum. See Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 80. At issue in
Lockett was whether the superintendent of the Chicago police
department was a necessary party to the plaintiff's action for
administrative review and, if so, whether the failure to join the
superintendent as a party and to issue summons could be cured by
amendment made after the expiration of the 35-day period. Lockett,
133 Ill. 2d  at 352. This court determined that the superintendent was
a necessary party and further held that plaintiff's failure to show that
he had made a good-faith effort to issue summons on the
superintendent within the 35-day statutory period required dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint. Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d  at 355-56. It was in
addressing whether the circuit court had properly denied plaintiff leave
to amend his complaint to join the superintendent as a defendant that
this court stated: "section 3-103 of the act provides that an action to
review an administrative decision shall be commenced 'by the filing of
a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days' of receipt
of the decision being appealed. [Emphases omitted.] (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1985, ch. 110, par. 3-103 [now 735 ILCS 5/3-103].)" Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d  at 354.
	As a preliminary matter, we note that this statement may simply
have been a misstatement concerning the language in section 3-103.
In stating that a complaint must be filed within 35 days of receipt of
the decision being appealed, this court cited section 3-103, which
expressly provides that service occurs when a decision is deposited in
the United States mail, not when the decision is received by the party.
In any event, the statement or misstatement concerning section 3-103
did not address a point in the case argued by counsel or deliberately
passed upon by this court. Accordingly, the statement was at best
obiter dictum, which is not binding as authority or precedent within
the stare decisis rule. See Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 80.
	Similarly, in Carver, the issue was whether the trial court had
properly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for administrative review
for failure to have the summons issued timely. Carver, 186 Ill. 2d  at
556. In addressing whether the plaintiff had shown that she made a
"good-faith" effort to comply with section 3-103 and have her
summons issued within 35 days after the defendant mailed its decision
to her, this court quoted the portion of Lockett stating that "section
3-103 of the Act requires that an action for administrative review 'be
commenced "by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons
within 35 days" of receipt of the decision being appealed.'"  Carver,
186 Ill. 2d  at 559, quoting Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d  at 354. This court then
noted that it had distinguished the requirement of a timely filed
complaint, which is jurisdictional, from the requirement of a timely
issued summons, which is mandatory but not jurisdictional. Carver,
186 Ill. 2d  at 559. This court concluded that plaintiff had not made a
"good-faith" effort to secure issuance of summons in her case and,
therefore, affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to
have the summons timely issued. Carver, 186 Ill. 2d  at 561.
	As in Lockett, the statement in Carver concerning section 3-103
did not address a point in the case argued by counsel or deliberately
passed upon by this court. The court in Carver simply quoted Lockett
in generally discussing section 3-103. Accordingly, the statement in
Carver also was at best obiter dictum. See Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 80.
Obiter dictum of a court of last resort can be tantamount to a decision
and therefore binding only in the absence of a contrary decision of that
court. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 80. Cox, which directly addressed the issue
of when the 35-day period in section 3-103 begins to run, reached a
holding which was contrary to the statements in Carver and Lockett. 
	Based upon the foregoing, we find that Cox rather than Lockett
and Carver sets forth the correct statement of law concerning section
3-103. In so holding, we note that in support of his claim that Cox is
an aberration, plaintiff argues that on at least one other occasion, this
court has focused on the receipt of notice when determining whether
service is effective. See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202 (1985). In addition, plaintiff
claims that the appellate court on several occasions has applied the
same interpretation of section 3-103 as the courts in Lockett and
Carver. See Keller v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity &amp;
Benefit Fund, 245 Ill. App. 3d 48 (1993); Poturalski v. Police Board
of the City of Chicago, 228 Ill. App. 3d 864 (1992); A-1 Security
Services, Inc. v. Stackler, 61 Ill. App. 3d 285 (1978).
	We are not persuaded that the decisions cited by plaintiff compel
a different result in this case. In Fredman, the issue was whether the
35-day period set forth in section 3-103 ran from the date that the
agency decision was issued or the date that the plaintiff's motion for
rehearing was denied. Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 206. The
court in Fredman never addressed the issue of whether the 35-day
period set forth in section 3-103 runs from the date the decision is
deposited in the United States mail or the date the decision is received
by the party. Similarly, the appellate court in both Keller and
Poturalski never addressed the issue of whether a complaint for
administrative review must be filed within 35 days of the mailing of or
the receipt of an agency decision. In addition, although the court in A-1 Security Services did address whether a complaint for administrative
review must be filed within 35 days of receipt of the agency decision
or the mailing of the agency decision, the court in A-1 relied upon
Pearce Hospital Foundation v. Illinois Public Aid Comm'n, 15 Ill. 2d 301 (1958), to find that the date of service of an administrative
decision is the date it is received. A-1 Security Services, 61 Ill. App.
3d at 287. In Cox, this court rejected the argument that Pearce
Hospital stands for the proposition that the time for filing a complaint
for administrative review runs from the date notice was received. Cox,
96 Ill. 2d  at 402. We noted in Cox that the issue in Pearce Hospital
"was whether the order of the agency was an administrative decision
from which an appeal could be taken" and that the case "did not
present the question whether the statutory period commenced to run
from the date of mailing or the date of receipt." Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 402-03.
	In contrast, in those cases where the appellate court did address
whether a complaint for administrative review must be filed within 35
days of the mailing or the receipt of an agency decision, the appellate
court consistently has held that a complaint for administrative review
must be filed within 35 days of the mailing of the decision. See
Laristos, Inc. v. City of Chicago License Appeal Comm'n, 309 Ill.
App. 3d 59, 65 (1999) ("the LAC served its order on [plaintiff] ***
when the staff assistant deposited a copy of the order in the mail with
the correct address and postage"); Board of Education of St. Charles
Community Unit School District, No. 303 v. Adelman, 137 Ill. App.
3d 965, 968 (1985) ("it has been provided by statute and rules of
procedure that such a decision of this administrative agency will be
deemed served when mailed, and it is clear plaintiff's petition for
administrative review of this decision was thus not timely filed [on the
thirty-sixth day after the date of mailing]"); Schlobohm v. Police
Board, 122 Ill. App. 3d 541, 544 (1984) ("Since service in this case
was not personally made, under the [Administrative Review] Act it
was served when deposited in the United States mails. *** The
language of section 4 [now section 3-103] makes no exception for
certified or registered mail"); Ellis v. Miller, 119 Ill. App. 3d 579
(1983) (affirming circuit court's dismissal of action as untimely where
plaintiff's complaint for administrative review was not filed within 35
days of the date of mailing the final administrative decision); Chin v.
Department of Public Aid, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 1140 (1979) ("trial
court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint which was filed 42
days after the decision was deposited in the mail"); Thompson v.
Illinois Civil Service Comm'n, 63 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (1978) ("the
explicit language of section 4 [now section 3-103] states that a
decision is deemed to have been served when deposited in the mail").
	Plaintiff then claims that Cox can be read to support his position.
Plaintiff observes that we stated in Cox that "[a]n established rule of
statutory construction in this jurisdiction is that courts will 'liberally
construe a right to appeal so as to permit a case to be considered on
its merits.'" Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 403, quoting Glasco Electric Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 86 Ill. 2d 346, 351-52 (1981).
	This statement, however, concerned the issuance of summons,
which is mandatory and not jurisdictional. See Cox, 96 Ill. 2d  at 403-04. In contrast, the requirement that a complaint for administrative
review be filed within the specified time limit is jurisdictional.
Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 210-11. As set forth in article VI,
section 9, of the 1970 Constitution, the circuit court enjoys "original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters" and "such power to review
administrative action as provided by law." (Emphasis added.) Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. If the mode of procedure for administrative
review, as provided by law, is not strictly followed, no jurisdiction is
conferred on the circuit court. Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 210.
Section 2 of the Administrative Review Law provides that unless
review of an administrative decision is sought within the time and
manner provided in the statute, the parties to the proceeding before
the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial
review. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 1998). Consequently, the filing of
a complaint within the 35-day time limit is required to confer subject
matter jurisdiction upon the circuit court. Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 211; see also Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 338-39 (2002) (discussing Fredman
Brothers and the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction in the
administrative review area). If a complaint is not timely filed, even a
liberal construction of the right to appeal cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon the court. For the same reason, we also reject
plaintiff's claim that section 3-103 should be liberally construed
because the Administrative Review Law is part of the Code of Civil
Procedure (the Code), which provides in section 1-106 (735 ILCS
5/1-106 (West 1998)) that the Code should be liberally construed.
	Finally, plaintiff argues that a ruling in his favor would be
consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 105(b)(2), which provides
that service by certified or registered mail "is not complete until the
notice is received by the defendant." 134 Ill. 2d R. 105(b)(2). Plaintiff
notes that the decision in this case was sent by certified mail, so that
it was not served until received by plaintiff's attorney. As the District
observes, however, plaintiff has waived any claim that Rule 105(b)(2)
applies in this case by failing to raise this issue in the circuit court, the
appellate court, or in his petition for leave to appeal to this court. See
Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill. 2d 420, 429 (2002)
("parties may not raise arguments for the first time on appeal.") In any
event, as additionally noted by the District, Rule 105(b)(2) concerns
additional relief against parties in default and notice thereof, and has
no application to the Administrative Review Law. See 134 Ill. 2d R.
105(b)(2).
	Section 3-103 could not be more clear: "a decision shall be
deemed to have been served *** when a copy of the decision is
deposited in the United States mail, in a sealed envelope or package,
with postage prepaid, addressed to the party affected by the decision
at his or her last known residence or place of business." (Emphasis
added.) 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2000). There is no rule of
construction that allows a court to declare that the legislature did not
mean what the plain language of the statute imports. People v.
Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). Accordingly, to the extent that
our decisions in Lockett and Carver suggest that section 3-103 means
"when received" rather than "when deposited," we find that the
statements in those cases are in error and are overruled.
	In light of our finding that plaintiff's complaint was not timely
filed pursuant to section 3-103, we need not address plaintiff's second
argument that this court should affirm the circuit court's finding that
the Commission violated plaintiff's right to due process and that
discharge was too harsh a penalty for the offense of insubordination.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.