Title: Singh v. Mooney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 000636
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
RAM SINGH, M.D., ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 000636     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
NATHANIEL MOONEY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
J. Robert Stump, Judge 
 
 
In this case, we determine whether an order entered in 
violation of Rule 1:13 is void ab initio or merely voidable. 
 
Nathanial Mooney filed a medical malpractice action 
against Ram Singh, M.D., Sanyogta Singh (collectively 
"Singh"), Volunteer Healthcare Systems, Inc. d/b/a Dickenson 
County Medical Center, and Sabry Radawi, M.D.,1 in March of 
1995.  By order entered October 2, 1998, Mooney was directed 
to make his expert witness available for deposition by October 
20, 1998.  The October 2 order also stated that if Mooney did 
not comply with the order, his action would be "subject to 
dismissal." 
Mooney failed to comply with the October 2 order, and, on 
October 21, Singh filed a motion to dismiss.  Copies of this 
motion and proposed order were sent to Mooney along with a 
cover letter.  In that letter, Singh requested the trial court 
to enter the dismissal order if it did "not receive any 
                     
1 Volunteer Healthcare Systems, Inc. d/b/a Dickenson 
County Medical Center, and Sabry Radawi, M.D., were nonsuited 
on September 24, 1996. 
objections from counsel for the plaintiff within ten days of 
the date of this letter."  Two days later, on October 23, the 
trial court entered the proposed order dismissing Mooney's 
action with prejudice. 
 
On September 24, 1999, Mooney filed a motion to vacate 
the October 23, 1998 order, asserting it was void because it 
did not comply with Rule 1:13.  Mooney also filed a motion for 
nonsuit. 
The trial court agreed with Mooney and held that  
" 'reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting such 
drafts . . .' of the final order was not properly given" to 
Mooney's counsel as required by Rule 1:13.  The trial court 
"in its discretion" declared the October 23, 1998 order "void 
ab initio" and granted Mooney's motion to vacate the order.  
The trial court also granted Mooney's motion for a nonsuit and 
dismissed the original action without prejudice.  We awarded 
Singh an appeal. 
On appeal, Singh presents the following single assignment 
of error:  
The trial court had no authority to vacate the final 
order and grant a nonsuit of this action on January 
7, 2000, because the trial court lost jurisdiction 
of this action twenty-one days after the entry of 
the final order on October 23, 1998. 
 
Resolution of this issue requires consideration of whether an 
order entered in violation of Rule 1:13 is void ab initio or 
 
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merely voidable.  If it is the former, it can be challenged at 
any time; if the latter, it is not subject to collateral 
attack and is subject to the limitations of Rule 1:1.  Parrish 
v. Jessee, 250 Va. 514, 521, 464 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1995).  
While some of this Court's prior cases have referred to a 
final order which did not comply with Rule 1:13 or its 
predecessor as "void," we have never directly addressed 
whether such failure renders the final order void ab initio or 
merely voidable.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude 
that the failure to comply with Rule 1:13 renders an order 
voidable, not void ab initio. 
 
The distinction between an action of the court that is 
void ab initio rather than merely voidable is that the former 
involves the underlying authority of a court to act on a 
matter whereas the latter involves actions taken by a court 
which are in error.  An order is void ab initio if entered by 
a court in the absence of jurisdiction of the subject matter 
or over the parties, if the character of the order is such 
that the court had no power to render it, or if the mode of 
procedure used by the court was one that the court could "not 
lawfully adopt."  Evans v. Smyth-Wythe Airport Comm'n, 255 Va. 
69, 73, 495 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1998)(quoting Anthony v. Kasey, 
 
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83 Va. 338, 340, 5 S.E. 176, 177 (1887)).2  The lack of 
jurisdiction to enter an order under any of these 
circumstances renders the order a complete nullity and it may 
be "impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, 
anywhere, at any time, or in any manner."  Barnes v. Am. 
Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925).  
Consequently, Rule 1:1 limiting the jurisdiction of a court to 
twenty-one days after the entry of the final order does not 
apply to an order which is void ab initio. 
In contrast, an order is merely voidable if it contains 
reversible error made by the trial court.  Such orders may be 
set aside by motion filed in compliance with Rule 1:1 or 
provisions relating to the review of final orders.  See, e.g., 
Code § 8.01-623 (bill of review); Code § 8.01-428 (relief from 
judgments). 
Keeping these principles in mind, we now turn to Rule 
1:13.  That Rule provides: 
Drafts of orders and decrees shall be endorsed by 
counsel of record, or reasonable notice of the time 
and place of presenting such drafts together with 
copies thereof shall be served by delivering . . . 
to all counsel of record who have not endorsed them.  
Compliance with this rule . . . may be modified or 
dispensed with by the court in its discretion. 
 
                     
2 A judgment obtained by extrinsic or collateral fraud is 
also void ab initio.  Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 
756, 758 (1987). 
 
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The Rule on its face allows a trial court, in its discretion, 
to dispense with the requirements of notice and endorsement.  
Such dispensation by the court need not appear on the face of 
the order.  Napert v. Napert, 261 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ 
(2001), No. 000562, decided today; Smith v. Stanaway, 242 Va. 
286, 288-89, 410 S.E.2d 610, 611-12 (1991); Rosillo v. 
Winters, 235 Va. 268, 272-73, 367 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988).  
Thus, in this context, a claim that an order does not comply 
with Rule 1:13 is a claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion in dispensing with the requirements of the Rule 
when it entered the order in question.  Abuse of discretion 
analysis involves a question of court error; it is not a 
question of the jurisdiction or authority of the court to 
enter the order. 
Review of our prior cases considering Rule 1:13 and its 
predecessor supports the proposition that the failure to 
comply with Rule 1:13 is a question of trial court error, not 
of jurisdiction.  Our cases consistently apply an abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing the action of the trial 
court.  Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W. Wyne Excavating, 
Inc., 260 Va. 137, 147, 530 S.E.2d 148, 154 (2000)(entry of 
final order without endorsement of counsel not an abuse of 
discretion); Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 
90, 93-94 (1996)(exercising discretion to dispense with 
 
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counsel's endorsement proper); Smith v. Stanaway, supra 
(dispensing with notice and endorsement requirements not abuse 
of discretion); Rosillo v. Winters, supra (dispensing with 
notice requirement abuse of discretion); Iliff v. Richards, 
221 Va. 644, 649, 272 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1980)(in exercise of 
discretion, court should have required notice); Cofer v. 
Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 837, 140 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1965)(court 
should not have dispensed with requirements of rule). 
An additional case which addressed Rule 1:13, State 
Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 207 S.E.2d 870 (1974), 
is also consistent with our treatment of the failure to comply 
with the Rule as a matter of court error, and not court 
jurisdiction.  In Easley, we held that a challenge to 
compliance with Rule 1:13 could only be raised by the party 
whose rights were prejudiced by such alleged failure.  Id. at 
202, 207 S.E.2d at 874.  Yet, as stated above, an order which 
is void ab initio can be challenged "by all persons, anywhere, 
at any time, or in any manner."  Barnes, 144 Va. at 705, 130 
S.E. at 906. 
While challenges to compliance with Rule 1:13 have 
consistently been reviewed by applying an abuse of discretion 
standard, references regarding the result of such an abuse of 
discretion have not been consistent.  For example, in Iliff, 
the Court concluded that the "failure on the part of the trial 
 
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court [to require notice under Rule 1:13] was an abuse of 
discretion amounting to reversible error" and then went on to 
conduct a harmless error analysis.  221 Va. at 649, 272 S.E.2d 
at 648.  Yet, in Rosillo, after concluding that the trial 
court abused its discretion in dispensing with the 
requirements of the Rule, the Court stated that the order 
entered "was void, thus nullifying all subsequent proceedings 
in the suit."  235 Va. at 273, 367 S.E.2d at 719.  And in 
Cofer, the Court stated that the order, entered without 
notice, was "void" and that "a void decree or order is a 
nullity and may on proper application be vacated at any time."  
205 Va. at 837, 140 S.E.2d at 665-66. 
In the absence of further clarification, the statement in 
Rosillo declaring the order "void" does not indicate whether 
the order was void ab initio or merely voidable.  Thus, 
Rosillo is not directly at odds with the statements made in 
Iliff.  However, the statements in Cofer declaring the order 
"void" and referring to a "void decree" as a nullity and 
subject to attack at any time cannot be reconciled with the 
reversible error and harmless error analysis applied in Iliff. 
Notwithstanding this inconsistency, we conclude that our 
prior cases and the principles that underlie the distinction 
between orders which are void ab initio and those merely 
voidable are consistent with the conclusion that an order 
 
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entered in violation of Rule 1:13 is voidable, not void ab 
initio.  To the extent Cofer stands for the proposition that 
an order entered in violation of Rule 1:13 is void ab initio, 
it is overruled. 
In light of this conclusion, the trial court in this case 
did not have jurisdiction to vacate the October 23, 1998 order 
because more than twenty-one days had passed.  Rule 1:1.  
Similarly the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an 
order of nonsuit.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and reinstate the October 23, 1998 order 
dismissing the action with prejudice. 
Reversed and final judgment.
 
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