Title: Haugen v. Kitzhaber
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S060761
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2013

Filed:  June 20, 2013 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
GARY D. HAUGEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
 
JOHN KITZHABER, 
Governor of the State of Oregon, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
(CC 12C16560; CA A152412; SC S060761) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
 
On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS 19.405.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted March 14, 2013. 
 
 
Harrison Latto, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff-
respondent. 
 
 
Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for 
defendant-appellant.  With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, 
and Jake J. Hogue, Assistant Attorney General. 
 
 
Bruce L. Campbell, Miller Nash LLP, filed a brief for amici curiae ACLU of 
Oregon, Inc., Oregon Justice Resource Center, and Oregon Capital Resource Center.  
With him on the brief were Elisa J. Dozono, Alexander M. Naito, Kevin Diaz, Jeffrey 
Ellis, and Erin McKee. 
 
 
BALMER, C. J. 
 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
circuit court with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion. 
 
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, 
 
  Timothy Alexander, Judge. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
BALMER, C. J. 
1 
 
 
The Governor has the power to grant clemency, including pardons, 
2 
commutations, and reprieves, pursuant to Article V, section 14, of the Oregon 
3 
Constitution.1  This case requires us to determine what constitutes a reprieve under that 
4 
constitutional provision.  Specifically, we must decide whether a reprieve must have a 
5 
stated end date, whether it may be granted only for particular purposes, and whether it 
6 
must be accepted by the recipient to be effective.   
7 
 
 
After this court affirmed Gary Haugen's aggravated murder conviction and 
8 
death sentence, he decided not to pursue further appeals, and the trial court set an 
9 
execution date.  Governor Kitzhaber subsequently issued a reprieve pursuant to Article V, 
10 
section 14, suspending Haugen's death sentence for the duration of Kitzhaber's service as 
11 
Governor.  Haugen purported to reject that grant of clemency.  He sought a judgment 
12 
declaring the reprieve ineffective and invalid, arguing that a reprieve must be accepted to 
13 
be effective, or, alternatively, that the Governor's action did not qualify as a reprieve.  
14 
The trial court agreed that a reprieve must be accepted to be effective and accordingly 
15 
ruled the Governor's grant of clemency ineffective because Haugen had rejected it.  The 
16 
Governor appealed, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this court, and this court 
17 
                                              
 
1 
Article V, section 14, provides, in part:  "He [the Governor] shall have 
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offences 
[sic] except treason, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law."   
 
2 
accepted the certification.  See ORS 19.405 (procedures for certification of appeal).2  For 
1 
the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the reprieve is valid and effective.  
2 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.   
3 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
4 
 
 
The facts are undisputed.  Gary Haugen has been an inmate in the Oregon 
5 
State Penitentiary since 1981, when he was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in 
6 
prison.  In 2007, while he was serving that sentence, a jury convicted Haugen of 
7 
aggravated murder for the murder of a fellow inmate, and the jury sentenced Haugen to 
8 
death.  This court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence of death.  State v. 
9 
Haugen, 349 Or 174, 176, 243 P3d 31 (2010). 
10 
 
 
After this court affirmed Haugen's conviction and sentence, he decided not 
11 
to pursue any further appeals.  Following two death warrant hearings, the trial court set 
12 
an execution date of December 6, 2011.  Before that date, Governor Kitzhaber issued a 
13 
reprieve, which read, in part: 
14 
 
"WHEREAS, Oregon's application of the death penalty is not fairly 
15 
and consistently applied, and I do not believe that state-sponsored 
16 
executions bring justice; 
17 
 
"NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
18 
Article V, Section 14 of the Oregon Constitution, I, John A. Kitzhaber, 
19 
                                              
 
2 
ORS 19.405(1) provides, in part: "When the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of an appeal, the court, through the Chief Judge and pursuant to appellate 
rules, may certify the appeal to the Supreme Court in lieu of disposition by the Court of 
Appeals."  Under ORS 19.405(2), "The Supreme Court * * * may accept or deny 
acceptance of the certified appeal." 
 
3 
MD, Governor of the State of Oregon, hereby grant Gary D. Haugen a 
1 
temporary reprieve of the aforementioned death sentence for the duration of 
2 
my service as Governor."  
3 
 
 
In response, Haugen sent a letter to Governor Kitzhaber purporting to reject 
4 
the reprieve.  He also filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the 
5 
reprieve was ineffective and invalid.  In his complaint, he again purported to reject the 
6 
reprieve.  Haugen then alleged that the Governor's action was beyond his constitutional 
7 
authority because the reprieve did not last for a definite period of time, was not granted 
8 
based on Haugen's particular circumstances, and suspended the operation of laws based 
9 
on the Governor's moral opposition to those laws.  Haugen also argued that the reprieve 
10 
was ineffective because a reprieve must be accepted to be effective.  The Governor 
11 
responded that the reprieve was properly granted under Article V, section 14, and was 
12 
effective regardless of Haugen's purported rejection of it. 
13 
 
 
The trial court granted Haugen's motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
14 
The court first concluded that the reprieve was not required to specify a particular date 
15 
when it would expire, because it was limited to the duration of Governor Kitzhaber's 
16 
service and therefore was temporary, "as is necessary to define the clemency as a 
17 
reprieve."  The court also reasoned that commutation of Haugen's sentence to life in 
18 
prison would be the functional equivalent of an indefinite reprieve, and the court stated 
19 
that "there is no question" that the Governor possesses the power to commute a sentence 
20 
to life in prison.  Thus, the court determined, the reprieve was not required to have a 
21 
specified end date. 
22 
 
 
In addressing Haugen's acceptance theory, the trial court traced federal and 
23 
 
4 
state case law involving pardons and other acts of clemency.3  As discussed more fully 
1 
below, some federal and state cases suggest that certain acts of clemency must be 
2 
accepted to be effective.  Although at least one United States Supreme Court case, Biddle 
3 
v. Perovich, 274 US 480, 47 S Ct 664, 71 L Ed 1161 (1927), expressly rejected that 
4 
proposition in the context of the federal clemency power, the trial court determined that 
5 
no Oregon case had relied on Biddle and that, following Biddle, at least one Oregon case 
6 
had continued to adhere to the acceptance theory discussed in prior United States 
7 
Supreme Court cases.  The trial court therefore concluded that Haugen "has the right to 
8 
reject Governor Kitzhaber's reprieve, and * * * absent acceptance a reprieve is 
9 
ineffective.  Because [Haugen] has unequivocally rejected the reprieve, it is therefore 
10 
ineffective."  Governor Kitzhaber appealed, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to 
11 
this court, and this court accepted the certification.   
12 
II.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE GOVERNOR'S CLEMENCY POWER 
13 
 
 
Before addressing the merits of the case, we must determine whether we 
14 
have authority to decide this case, which involves the exercise of an important 
15 
governmental power that the constitution entrusts to the Governor. 
16 
 
 
The "chief executive power" of the state is vested in the Governor, Or 
17 
                                              
 
3 
Although pardons, commutations, and reprieves have distinct 
characteristics, they often are referred to collectively as "acts of clemency," and the 
executive's power to grant them is referred to as the "clemency power" or "pardon 
power."  We follow that convention here and distinguish between the three different 
types of clemency only when necessary to highlight their specific meanings. 
 
5 
Const, Art V, § 1, and because the Governor is the head of an equal branch of 
1 
government, this court must not "assume the power to question the action of the 
2 
executive of the state."  Putnam v. Norblad, 134 Or 433, 439, 293 P 940 (1930).  
3 
Moreover, the Governor is responsible for determining the constitutionality of his actions 
4 
in the first instance, and, to the extent that this court may review those actions, the court 
5 
does so with that consideration in mind.  See Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or 
6 
472, 478-79, 753 P2d 939 (1988) ("Governors, legislators, and other public officials are 
7 
responsible in the first instance for determining their constitutional duties[.]").  That 
8 
principle, however, does not exempt the Governor's actions from judicial review.  See id. 
9 
at 476-77, 479 (declining to adopt argument that the court should defer to the Governor's 
10 
understanding of his constitutional powers if that understanding is "arguably correct," 
11 
because "[p]olitical institutions like any others may adapt to erroneous practices that 
12 
should not be sustained").  For example, in Lipscomb, notwithstanding the constitution's 
13 
allocation to the Governor of the power to veto legislation, this court considered whether 
14 
the Governor's power to veto provisions in bills declaring an emergency permitted the 
15 
Governor to veto any provision in such a bill, or to veto only the emergency clause.  Id. at 
16 
474. 
17 
 
 
In this case, the parties' dispute regarding this court's authority centers on 
18 
the scope of the court's authority, rather than on whether this court has authority to decide 
19 
the case at all.  Haugen argues that, even if the court cannot review the Governor's 
20 
discretionary decision to exercise the clemency power in a particular case, nothing 
21 
prevents this court from making the threshold determination of what qualifies as a 
22 
 
6 
reprieve.  The Governor agrees that the court has authority to decide this case, but argues 
1 
that, in doing so, the court does not have the authority to review the Governor's reasons 
2 
for granting the reprieve.  
3 
 
 
We previously have stated that "it is not within judicial competency to 
4 
control, interfere with, or even to advise the Governor when exercising his power to grant 
5 
reprieves, commutations, and pardons."  Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 125-26, 333 
6 
P2d 741 (1958).  That does not mean, however, that the Governor's clemency power -- 
7 
any more than the Governor's veto power reviewed in Lipscomb -- is completely beyond 
8 
the scope of judicial review.  See Lipscomb, 305 Or at 477 n 4 ("[N]o official can invoke 
9 
either 'policy' or 'politics' to avoid review of actions not authorized by law[.]").  As 
10 
discussed more fully below, this court has reviewed the validity of certain aspects of acts 
11 
of clemency in the past.  See, e.g., Ex Parte Houghton, 49 Or 232, 234-36, 89 P 801 
12 
(1907) (concluding that the Governor may attach conditions to a pardon and may enforce 
13 
those conditions).   
14 
 
 
What this court has not reviewed is the Governor's exercise of discretion in 
15 
invoking the clemency power, including the Governor's reasons for invoking that power.  
16 
Eacret, 215 Or at 127 (noting that the Governor's "discretion can not [sic] be controlled 
17 
by judicial decision").  In Eacret, this court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint filed by 
18 
a murder victim's parents, who were seeking a judgment declaring that the Governor 
19 
could not exercise his power to commute a death sentence because of his "conviction that 
20 
the death penalty is wrong."  Id. at 124.  The parents sought to limit the Governor's 
21 
clemency power so that it could be exercised based only on "considerations of justice in 
22 
 
7 
the particular case."  Id.  Thus, the parents sought to limit the Governor's exercise of 
1 
discretion in determining both who deserved clemency and why the Governor would 
2 
exercise that power.  This court, however, declined to impose such limitations.4  
3 
 
 
 In this case, Haugen does not ask the court to limit the Governor's 
4 
discretion in invoking the clemency power and instead asks the court to interpret the 
5 
meaning of "reprieve" in Article V, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution.  One of this 
6 
court's fundamental functions is interpreting provisions of the Oregon Constitution.  See 
7 
Farmers Ins. Co.  v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 697, 261 P3d 1 (2011) (noting that "this court is 
8 
the ultimate interpreter of state constitutional provisions -- subject only to constitutional 
9 
amendment by the people").  We conclude that we may reach the merits of the parties' 
10 
arguments regarding what constitutes a reprieve. 
11 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE V, SECTION 14, CLEMENCY POWER 
12 
 
 
Article V, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution, quoted in full below, 
13 
provides, in part, that the Governor "shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations, 
14 
and pardons, after conviction, for all offences [sic] except treason, subject to such 
15 
regulations as may be provided by law."  Although this court previously has decided 
16 
cases involving Article V, section 14, the court has not analyzed that provision using the 
17 
principles described in Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992), for 
18 
                                              
 
4 
The court determined that the parents lacked standing to maintain the suit 
against the Governor, but then went on to discuss principles of judicial review in relation 
to the Article V, section 14, clemency power.  Eacret, 215 Or at 124-28.  
 
8 
interpreting original constitutional provisions.  In undertaking that analysis, this court 
1 
examines the text of the constitutional provision, the historical circumstances surrounding 
2 
its adoption, and the case law, id., with the goal of identifying "the historical principles 
3 
embodied in the constitutional text" and then applying those principles "faithfully to 
4 
modern circumstances."  Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry, 339 Or 136, 142, 
5 
117 P3d 990 (2005).   
6 
 
 
The Governor argues that the text, context, historical circumstances, and 
7 
case law surrounding Article V, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution demonstrate that 
8 
the Governor's power to grant clemency under that provision is plenary.  The recipient of 
9 
a grant of clemency, the Governor argues, has no power to reject it, except, perhaps, in 
10 
cases where the grant of clemency requires the recipient to fulfill a condition, which the 
11 
recipient can decide to fulfill or not.  In making that argument, the Governor traces the 
12 
development of the clemency power from its English roots to the adoption of Article V, 
13 
section 14, of the Oregon Constitution.  The Governor also examines -- and distinguishes 
14 
-- both federal and state case law addressing the clemency power, noting that no case has 
15 
directly addressed the issue presented here. 
16 
 
 
Haugen responds by renewing the arguments that he made before the trial 
17 
court.  The reprieve exceeds the Governor's authority, he argues, because the reprieve 
18 
lacks an expiration date, is not based on Haugen's individual circumstances, and operates 
19 
to suspend laws that the Governor morally opposes.  Moreover, he argues, cases from this 
20 
court and the United States Supreme Court demonstrate that a grant of clemency must be 
21 
accepted by the recipient to be effective, and those cases do not limit the acceptance 
22 
 
9 
requirement to conditional acts of clemency.  Alternatively, Haugen argues, the 
1 
Governor's reprieve creates uncertainty surrounding whether and when he will be put to 
2 
death.  That uncertainty, he maintains, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment that 
3 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and deprives him of his 
4 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
5 
United States Constitution.5 
6 
 
 
Because this court has not previously applied the Priest analysis to Article 
7 
V, section 14, we begin with the text and history of that provision, and then examine this 
8 
court's prior cases in light of the textual and historical analysis.  After resolving the state 
9 
constitutional issue, we turn to Haugen's federal claims.  See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 
10 
611, 614, 625 P2d 123 (1981) (court addresses state constitutional issues before reaching 
11 
federal constitutional issues).   
12 
A. 
Text and Context of Article V, Section 14 
13 
 
 
Article V, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution provides: 
14 
 
"He [the Governor] shall have power to grant reprieves, 
15 
commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offences [sic] except 
16 
treason, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law.  Upon 
17 
conviction for treason he shall have power to suspend the execution of the 
18 
sentence until the case shall be reported to the Legislative Assembly, at its 
19 
next meeting, when the Legislative Assembly shall either grant a pardon, 
20 
commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence, or grant a 
21 
                                              
 
5 
The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."  The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides, in part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 
 
10 
farther [sic] reprieve. 
1 
 
"He shall have power to remit fines, and forfeitures, under such 
2 
regulations as may be prescribed by law; and shall report to the Legislative 
3 
Assembly at its next meeting each case of reprieve, commutation, or pardon 
4 
granted, and the reasons for granting the same; and also the names of all 
5 
persons in whose favor remission of fines, and forfeitures shall have been 
6 
made, and the several amounts remitted[.]" 
7 
 
 
The Oregon Constitution does not define the word "reprieve," and historical 
8 
definitions of the word provide little insight into the limitations, if any, on what qualifies 
9 
as a reprieve.  Instead, most definitions merely note that a reprieve is temporary and 
10 
delays execution of the recipient's sentence.  For example, a typical definition notes that 
11 
"this term is derived from reprendre, to take back, and signifies the withdrawing of a 
12 
sentence for an interval of time, and operates in delay of execution."  John Bouvier, 2 A 
13 
Law Dictionary 358 (1839); see also William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws 
14 
of England 387 (1769) ("A reprieve, from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawing of 
15 
a sentence for an interval of time; whereby the execution is suspended."); Noah Webster, 
16 
2 An American Dictionary of the English Language (unpaginated) (1828) (defining a 
17 
reprieve as "[t]he temporary suspension of the execution of sentence of death on a 
18 
criminal").  None of those definitions requires a reprieve to have a specified end date -- a 
19 
reprieve is "temporary" and operates "for an interval of time," but need not identify the 
20 
end date of that interval, as long as there is a definite end.  Moreover, those definitions do 
21 
not indicate that a reprieve may be granted only for a particular purpose; instead, they 
22 
define the word "reprieve" by its effect, namely, the delay of execution of the recipient's 
23 
sentence.   
24 
 
11 
 
 
Furthermore, none of the definitions that the parties identify requires a 
1 
reprieve to be accepted by the recipient to be effective.  In fact, the origin of the word --
2 
from the French "reprendre," meaning, "to take back" -- suggests that the Governor can 
3 
unilaterally "take back" the sentence imposed, rather than offering to delay execution of 
4 
the sentence subject to the recipient's acceptance.  In contrast, at least one historical 
5 
definition of "pardon" expressly notes that a valid pardon requires acceptance.  Bouvier, 2 
6 
A Law Dictionary at 215 ("To make it valid, the pardon must be accepted.").  But see 
7 
Webster, 2 An American Dictionary of the English Language (unpaginated) (providing 
8 
definition of "pardon" that does not mention acceptance).  We need not -- and do not -- 
9 
decide whether a pardon must be accepted to be valid.  We note only that none of the 
10 
definitions of "reprieve" contains a similar notion of acceptance.  
11 
 
 
The word "reprieve," of course, does not appear in isolation in Article V, 
12 
section 14, and the text surrounding that word provides important context.  The Governor 
13 
has authority to "grant" reprieves.  The use of the word "grant," in some ways, is 
14 
consistent with Haugen's acceptance argument, which relies in part on the United States 
15 
Supreme Court's characterization of a pardon as similar to a deed conveying property, 
16 
which is valid only if accepted.  See United States v. Wilson, 32 US 150, 161, 8 L Ed 640 
17 
(1833) ("A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential, and delivery is 
18 
not complete, without acceptance.").  At the time that the Oregon Constitution was 
19 
adopted, the word "grant" was commonly used to refer to property conveyances.  See, 
20 
e.g., Webster, 1 An American Dictionary of the English Language (unpaginated) 
21 
(defining "grant" as "[t]o give; to bestow or confer on without compensation, particularly 
22 
 
12 
in answer to prayer or request[,]" or "[t]o transfer the title of a thing to another, for a good 
1 
or valuable consideration; to convey by deed or writing"); Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary 
2 
at 449 ("Technically speaking, grants are applicable to the conveyance of incorporeal 
3 
rights, though in the largest sense, the term comprehends every thing that is granted or 
4 
passed from one to another, and is applied to every species of property."); Alexander M. 
5 
Burrill, 1 A New Law Dictionary and Glossary 548 (1850) (defining "to grant" as "[a]n 
6 
operative word of conveyance, particularly appropriate to deeds of grant, properly so 
7 
called, but used in other conveyances also, such as deeds of bargain and sale, and 
8 
leases").  As the United States Supreme Court suggested in Wilson, property conveyances 
9 
may require acceptance.  Thus, the word "grant" provides at least some contextual 
10 
support for Haugen's argument that, although the Governor can attempt to "convey" an 
11 
act of clemency to a person, the person must accept that clemency for it to be effective.  
12 
 
 
The use of the word "grant," however, does not, in and of itself, convert an 
13 
act of clemency into property to be conveyed subject to acceptance, particularly when 
14 
viewed in full context:  "[The Governor] shall have power to grant reprieves, 
15 
commutations, and pardons[.]"  Or Const, Art V, § 14 (emphasis added).  If the grant of 
16 
clemency could be rejected, the Governor's "power" would be more akin to the authority 
17 
to make an offer, rather than the source of the Governor's unilateral ability to set aside or 
18 
suspend a criminal sentence.  It is unlikely that the framers intended the word "power" to 
19 
have such a diminished meaning.  The original text of Article V, which discusses the 
20 
executive branch, used the word "power" to describe the Governor's clemency authority 
21 
(and generally to vest the "chief executive power" of the state in the Governor, Or Const, 
22 
 
13 
Art V, § 1) and not to describe any of the other responsibilities of the Governor.6  The 
1 
Governor's ability to grant clemency is a direct and complete check on specific actions of 
2 
the judicial branch that is entrusted to the chief executive.  Accordingly, to the extent that 
3 
limits are imposed on the clemency power, those limits must come from the constitution 
4 
itself, or from the people.  See Schick v. Reed, 419 US 256, 267, 95 S Ct 379, 42 L Ed 2d 
5 
430 (1974) ("[T]he pardoning power is an enumerated power of the Constitution and * * 
6 
* its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself.").     
7 
 
 
The Oregon Constitution does not provide the recipient of a Governor's act 
8 
of clemency with a corresponding individual right to reject that clemency.  In fact, in 
9 
describing the Governor's power to grant pardons, commutations, and reprieves, the 
10 
constitutional text does not refer to the recipient of the grant of clemency at all.  To the 
11 
extent that Article V, section 14, contemplates any limitation on the Governor's power, 
12 
                                              
 
6 
Since statehood, the Governor has had the authority to veto bills, but that 
authority was not phrased as a "power."  Former Or Const, Art V, § 15 (1857), 
renumbered as Or Const, Art V, § 15b (1916) ("Every bill which shall have passed the 
Legislative Assembly, shall, before it becomes a law be presented to the Governor, if he 
approve he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections, to that house in 
which it shall have originated, which house shall enter the objections at large upon the 
journal, and proceed to reconsider it.").  In 1916, the people added Article V, section 15a, 
to the Oregon Constitution, which provided, "The Governor shall have power to veto 
single items in appropriation bills."  (Emphasis added.)  In addition, some of the 
Governor's responsibilities enumerated outside of Article V were articulated as "powers."  
See, e.g., Or Const, Art VIII, § 1 ("The Governor shall be superintendent of public 
instruction, and his powers, and duties in that capacity shall be such as may be prescribed 
by law; but after the term of five years from the adoption of this Constitution, it shall be 
competent for the Legislative Assembly to provide by law for the election of a 
superintendent[.]" (Emphasis added.)). 
 
14 
the constitution expressly entrusts those limits to the legislative branch of government.  
1 
The legislature can regulate the Governor's clemency power, because that power is 
2 
"subject to such regulations as may be provided by law."7  Or Const, Art V, § 14.  The 
3 
constitution does not provide the recipient of an act of clemency with a similar means of 
4 
regulating the Governor's power, whether through a requirement of acceptance or some 
5 
other means.   
6 
 
 
The Oregon Constitution gives the legislature an additional check on the 
7 
Governor's clemency power in treason cases.  In contrast to the President’s clemency 
8 
power8 -- which extends to all "[o]ffences against the United States" except those 
9 
                                              
 
7 
The legislature has enacted a small number of statutory provisions 
addressing the clemency power.  ORS 144.649 - 144.670.  Most of those provisions 
address procedural issues, such as the procedure for reporting acts of clemency to the 
legislature and the procedure for applying for clemency.  The lone provision addressing 
the scope of the Governor's power, ORS 144.649, restates the Governor's constitutional 
power, but also expresses the legislature's intent to defer to the Governor's judgment 
regarding the exercise of that power: 
 
"Upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as 
the Governor thinks proper, the Governor may grant reprieves, 
commutations and pardons, after convictions, for all crimes and may remit, 
after judgment therefor, all penalties and forfeitures." 
See also Houghton, 49 Or at 234 (noting that similar language in earlier enacted 
provision "is but a restatement of the law as it exists without legislative action"). 
 
8 
The President's clemency power is set forth in Article II, section 2, of the 
United States Constitution, which provides, in part: 
 
 "The President shall * * * have Power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment."  
 
 
15 
involving impeachment -- in cases of treason, the Governor essentially can grant only a 
1 
reprieve, rather than a commutation or pardon, and the reprieve is effective only until the 
2 
legislature's next meeting.  That is, the Governor's power is limited to "suspend[ing] the 
3 
execution of the sentence" in a treason case, but only "until the case [is] reported to the 
4 
Legislative Assembly, at its next meeting."  Or Const, Art V, § 14.  At that point, the 
5 
Legislative Assembly decides whether to grant a pardon, commutation, or reprieve, or 
6 
whether to "direct the execution of the sentence."  Id.  In effect, in cases of treason, the 
7 
Governor makes the initial clemency decision, and the legislature ultimately determines 
8 
whether and what kind of clemency is appropriate.  The express limitation in the 
9 
constitution on the Governor's clemency power in cases of treason supports the 
10 
Governor's argument that, in all other cases, his power is plenary.  
11 
   
 
Haugen argues that other constitutional provisions provide additional 
12 
insight into what constitutes a reprieve.  In particular, he argues that the Governor's 
13 
primary duty is to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Or Const, Art V, § 10, 
14 
and that only the legislature has the power to suspend the operation of the laws.  See Or 
15 
Const, Art I, § 22 ("The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the 
16 
Authority of the Legislative Assembly.").  Based on those provisions, Haugen reasons 
17 
that the framers would not have intended for a reprieve to have the effect of suspending 
18 
                                              
The President's clemency power also is broader than the Governor's power in that the 
President can grant clemency at any time, while the Governor can grant clemency only 
"after conviction." Or Const, Art V, § 14. 
 
16 
the operation of the laws.  He argues that the Governor's purported reprieve suspends the 
1 
operation of the laws by effectively preventing a death sentence from being carried out in 
2 
accordance with ORS 137.463 to 137.482, and therefore it is not a reprieve.  Although 
3 
Haugen acknowledges that any reprieve may temporarily "interrupt" the operation of the 
4 
laws, he argues that the Governor's reprieve in this case suspends the laws because the 
5 
reprieve lacks an expiration date and is aimed at the laws, rather than at Haugen himself.  
6 
 
 
As an initial matter, even if the constitutional provisions that Haugen cites 
7 
required a reprieve to have an expiration date, the reprieve granted to Haugen would 
8 
satisfy that requirement.  As noted, the reprieve expires at the end of Kitzhaber's service 
9 
as Governor.  Although Haugen is correct that the expiration of the Governor's service 
10 
could occur at different points in time -- such as through death, resignation, or expiration 
11 
of his term of office -- he does not dispute that Kitzhaber's service as Governor will end, 
12 
at which point Haugen's sentence will be reinstated.  Even if the Governor's reprieve is 
13 
aimed at laws that he believes are unjust or immoral, rather than at Haugen's specific 
14 
circumstances, the effect of the reprieve here is the same as any other reprieve:  Haugen's 
15 
sentence is suspended during the period of the reprieve.  When the reprieve expires at the 
16 
end of the Governor's service, Haugen's sentence will be executed unless the Governor's 
17 
successor grants another act of clemency.  We agree with the Governor that the reprieve 
18 
suspends Haugen's sentence, rather than the laws.  The constitutional provisions that 
19 
Haugen cites do not establish that a reprieve must have a stated expiration date or cannot 
20 
be aimed at the laws, as long as its effect is to temporarily suspend the execution of a 
21 
sentence, as is the case here.  
22 
 
17 
 
 
In sum, the text and context of Article V, section 14, do not require a 
1 
reprieve to specify an end date, nor do they limit the Governor to granting reprieves only 
2 
for a particular purpose, as long as the effect of the reprieve is to delay, temporarily, the 
3 
execution of the sentence.  Moreover, the text and context do not indicate that a reprieve 
4 
must be accepted for it to be effective.  Nothing inherent in the word "reprieve" requires 
5 
the recipient's acceptance for the reprieve to be effective.  Although the word "grant" 
6 
suggests that the intended recipient must acquiesce in the reprieve, interpreting "grant" 
7 
that way would deprive the word "power" of much of its meaning.   
8 
B. 
Discussion of Article V, Section 14, at the Constitutional Convention  
9 
 
 
To better understand the scope of the Governor's clemency power, we turn 
10 
to its history.  The framers did not devote much time to debating Article V, section 14.  
11 
They did, however, discuss a provision that would have provided the legislature with an 
12 
additional check on the Governor's power.  As originally introduced, Article V, section 
13 
14, contained a provision that permitted the legislature to "constitute a council, to be 
14 
composed of officers of State without whose advice and consent the governor shall not 
15 
have power to grant pardons in any case, except such as may by law be left to his sole 
16 
power."  Claudia Burton, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857 -- 
17 
Part II (Frame of Government:  Articles III-VII), 39 Willamette L Rev 245, 365 (2003) 
18 
(quoting Article on Executive Department (As Introduced) § 14 (1857)).  One delegate 
19 
moved to strike that provision, because it was "antiquated and old fogyish," "would 
20 
increase the expense," and, most importantly, because "[h]e believed the responsibility 
21 
should be imposed upon the governor alone, and that thus the power would be exercised 
22 
 
18 
more carefully, and with better judgment."  Id. at 367 (quoting record of constitutional 
1 
convention).   Another delegate opposed that change, reasoning that "the check would 
2 
prove a salutary one."  Id.  Ultimately, that provision was removed from Article V, 
3 
section 14.  Id.  Thus, the Oregon history, although slim, indicates that the delegates 
4 
considered and rejected additional limitations on the Governor's clemency power in favor 
5 
of entrusting that power to the Governor alone.  Moreover, in considering those 
6 
limitations on the Governor's power, the delegates discussed and rejected the merits of a 
7 
"check" by another branch of government, but did not even discuss whether a similar 
8 
overriding right should be given to the recipient of the grant of clemency.  
9 
 
 
The limited debate at the constitutional convention did not include a 
10 
discussion of the meaning of the term "reprieve."  It may be that the delegates did not 
11 
discuss the meaning of that term, or additional limitations on that term, because, as 
12 
Haugen asserts, it had a well-understood meaning at the time that the constitution was 
13 
adopted.  See Schick, 419 US at 260 ("Although the authors of [the federal clemency] 
14 
clause surely did not act thoughtlessly, neither did they devote extended debate to its 
15 
meaning.  This can be explained in large part by the fact that the draftsmen were well 
16 
acquainted with the English Crown authority to alter and reduce punishments as it existed 
17 
in 1787.").  To determine if a well-established understanding of executive clemency 
18 
power existed at the time that the Oregon Constitution was adopted, we must look 
19 
beyond the constitutional convention.  Because the federal clemency power was adopted 
20 
about 70 years before the Oregon clemency power, and had been exercised by presidents 
21 
in the years before Oregon adopted Article V, section 14, we examine the federal 
22 
 
19 
clemency power and its historical origins.9   
1 
C. 
English Common Law and the History of the Federal Clemency Power 
2 
 
 
The federal clemency power derives from English common law.  See 
3 
Schick, 419 US at 266 (noting that Article II, section 2, of the United States Constitution 
4 
"derives" from the English pardoning power, even though the federal clemency power 
5 
now "flows" from the constitution); Wilson, 32 US at 160 (adopting English "principles 
6 
respecting the operation and effect of a pardon").  As the "supreme executive magistrate," 
7 
the king was entrusted "with the power of extending mercy" by granting pardons or 
8 
reprieves.  Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown and the 
9 
Relative Duties and Rights of the Subject 2, 89, 97 (1820).  Not all the king's powers, 
10 
however, were plenary.  Although the British monarch's power was hereditary, that 
11 
power -- at least by the mid-eighteenth century -- was considered to be vested in the king 
12 
"by the general consent of the people, the evidence of which general consent is long and 
13 
immemorial usage."  William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 183-
14 
84 (1765).  Accordingly, the king was expected to exercise his powers and prerogatives 
15 
for the benefit of his subjects.  Chitty, Prerogatives at 4 ("The splendour, rights, and 
16 
powers of the Crown were attached to it for the benefit of the people, and not for the 
17 
private gratification of the sovereign[.]" (Footnote omitted.)).  Moreover, the king's 
18 
                                              
 
9 
As discussed more fully below, the federal clemency power also provides 
important context, because Oregon cases interpreting Article V, section 14, at times rely 
on federal cases interpreting the federal clemency power.  
 
20 
power, to some extent, was checked by the legislative branch.  Id. at 2 ("In [England], the 
1 
legislative and executive authorities are wisely placed in different hands * * *.  [W]hen 
2 
firmly and inalienably secured in separate hands, the different branches of government 
3 
operate as a check on each other[.]"). 
4 
 
 
Despite those limitations on the king's power, for a period of time in 
5 
England, the king's power to pardon was absolute.10  William F. Duker, The President's 
6 
Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 Wm & Mary L Rev 475, 487 (1977) 
7 
("[P]rior to the seventeenth century, the English monarch's power to pardon was 
8 
absolute.").  The power to grant pardons was the "act of [the king's] government,which 
9 
[was] the most personal, and most entirely his own."  Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 
10 
389.  The pardon power was considered "the most amiable prerogative of the crown," id., 
11 
and, as the king's prerogative, it was a right enjoyed by the king alone and not shared 
12 
with his subjects.  Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 232 ("[F]or if once any one prerogative 
13 
of the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would cease to be prerogative 
14 
                                              
 
10 
Although there is some early discussion of the king's power to grant 
reprieves, historical discussions regarding the clemency power focus on the king's pardon 
power.  That difference in treatment may stem from the fact that a pardon had greater 
implications, because of its permanency, than a reprieve.  See Blackstone, 4 
Commentaries at 387 (noting that a reprieve is only temporary while a pardon is 
permanent).  Moreover, in England, judges also could grant reprieves, whereas the 
pardon power was entrusted to the king alone.  See Joseph Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise 
on the Criminal Law 757 (1841) (noting that a reprieve may be granted "by the favor of 
his majesty himself, or the judge before whom the prisoner is tried on his behalf"); 
Chitty, Prerogatives at 384 (noting that there are certain "supreme powers and 
prerogatives inherent in, and inseparably annexed to the royal character," including the 
power to pardon, which are "incommunicable" and "entrusted [to] the King alone"). 
 
21 
any longer.").  Although there were certain limitations on the king's prerogative, there is 
1 
no indication that a recipient of clemency could limit the king's prerogative to grant 
2 
clemency by rejecting an unconditional pardon.  See Chitty, Prerogatives at 7-8 
3 
(discussing "boundaries" on the "royal prerogative" and noting that the king "may pardon 
4 
offenders, but cannot prejudice civil rights and remedies," without noting other 
5 
limitations on that prerogative).  Thus, under that conception of clemency, a recipient's 
6 
acceptance would not be required for an unconditional grant of clemency to be effective. 
7 
 
 
Starting in the late seventeenth century, some limits were placed on the 
8 
king's clemency power.  See Duker, 18 Wm & Mary L Rev at 487 (noting limits imposed 
9 
in the seventeenth century); Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 393 (listing limits imposed 
10 
by statute on pardon for treason, murder, and rape).  Moreover, when the king attached 
11 
certain conditions to his grant of clemency, some authorities suggest that those conditions 
12 
had to be accepted for the grant of clemency to be effective.  See, e.g., Schick, 419 US at 
13 
261 (noting that "[t]he idea later developed that the subject's consent to transportation [as 
14 
a condition of a pardon] was necessary, but in most cases he was simply 'agreeing' that 
15 
his life should be spared").  At least in some circumstances, however, "the requirement of 
16 
consent was a legal fiction at best."  Id. (discussing clemency conditioned on 
17 
transportation to another place).  Thus, in large part, "by 1787 the English prerogative to 
18 
pardon was unfettered except for a few specifically enumerated limitations."  Id. at 262. 
19 
 
 
No authority indicates that those specifically enumerated limitations 
20 
included limitations on the reasons for which the king could grant clemency or, more 
21 
specifically, reprieves.  Although, as Haugen asserts, several recurring reasons tended to 
22 
 
22 
be the reason for granting reprieves, nothing suggests that an act of clemency had to be 
1 
granted for one of those historical reasons to qualify as a reprieve.  Compare Chitty, 
2 
Prerogatives at 97 (noting that a reprieve may be granted "from the regular operation of 
3 
law in circumstances which render an immediate execution inconsistent with humanity or 
4 
justice") and Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 387-88 (noting that reprieves may be 
5 
granted if a person sentenced to death is pregnant or insane) with Blackstone, 4 
6 
Commentaries at 390 (noting that "it [is] in [the king's] power to extend mercy, wherever 
7 
he thinks it is deserved") and Chitty, 1 Practical Treatise at 758 (noting that "[t]his 
8 
temporary mercy [of a reprieve] may be extended ex mandatio regis, or from the mere 
9 
pleasure of the crown").  Moreover, nothing suggests that reprieves were required to 
10 
carry a stated end date.  See, e.g., Chitty, Prerogatives at 98 (noting that, after the king 
11 
grants a reprieve, "the Judge of course grants the prisoner a respite, either for a limited 
12 
time or during the pleasure of his Majesty" (emphasis added)). 
13 
 
 
Similarly, when the Crown delegated the clemency power to the executive 
14 
authorities in the colonies, few limitations were imposed on that power.  Duker, 18 Wm 
15 
& Mary L Rev at 497.   Following the Revolutionary War, however, the states 
16 
"drastically curtailed the powers of their suspect executives."  Id. at 500.  In doing so, the 
17 
states did not provide recipients of acts of clemency with a right to nullify those acts by 
18 
rejecting them, but rather "provided for the ascendency of the legislative branch" while 
19 
weakening the executive clemency power.  Id.  The issue was one of the allocation of 
20 
government power, rather than the creation of individual rights. 
21 
 
 
By the time that the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857, the United 
22 
 
23 
States Supreme Court had clarified in Wilson, 32 US 150, how the English common law 
1 
had influenced interpretation of the federal constitutional clemency power.  In Wilson, the 
2 
President had granted a pardon of a defendant's death sentence, and the defendant chose 
3 
not to raise that pardon as a bar during sentencing for other, related crimes.  Chief Justice 
4 
Marshall, writing for the Court, determined that the trial court should not take judicial 
5 
notice of the pardon, because it had not been brought before the court.  Id. at 163.  In 
6 
reaching that conclusion, the Court drew on English principles and looked to English law 
7 
"for the rules prescribing the manner in which [the pardon] is to be used by the person 
8 
who would avail himself of it."  Id. at 160.  The Wilson court described those English 
9 
principles: 
10 
 
"A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted 
11 
with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is 
12 
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has 
13 
committed.  It is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, 
14 
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not 
15 
communicated officially to the court." 
16 
Id. at 160-61.  Under that description of English common law, an act of clemency would 
17 
not necessarily have to be accepted to be effective.  In particular, the Court indicated that 
18 
the pardon "exempts the individual" when it is "bestowed" on him, rather than exempting 
19 
him only after he accepts the grant of clemency. 
20 
 
 
The Court, however, went on to analogize a pardon to a deed: 
21 
"A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential, and 
22 
delivery is not complete, without acceptance.  It may then be rejected by the 
23 
person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no 
24 
power in a court to force it on him." 
25 
Id. at 161.  That part of the opinion, of course, suggested that acceptance of a pardon is 
26 
 
24 
required for it to be effective.  In applying that principle, the Court stated that, like a 
1 
deed, a pardon must be brought before the court by motion, plea, or otherwise if it is 
2 
going to serve as a bar to further sentencing.  Id. at 161-62. Therefore, although there is 
3 
strong language in Wilson regarding acceptance of a grant of clemency, the opinion also 
4 
looked the other way, suggesting that clemency can be effective absent consent.  The 
5 
inconsistent passages in Wilson, particularly when considered in light of the other 
6 
historical evidence, indicate that, at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted, there 
7 
was some support, but not necessarily a well-established understanding, for the view that 
8 
grants of clemency required acceptance to be effective. 
9 
 
 
In sum, neither the text nor the historical circumstances surrounding Article 
10 
V, section 14, unequivocally requires an act of clemency to be accepted by the recipient 
11 
to be effective; nor do they require an act of clemency to have a stated end date or to be 
12 
granted only for a particular purpose.  We turn to the case law interpreting Article V, 
13 
section 14, to determine whether it resolves those issues.  Because many of Oregon's 
14 
cases interpreting the clemency power rely on federal cases, we begin with those federal 
15 
cases. 
16 
D. 
Federal Case Law Interpreting the President's Clemency Power 
17 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the President's clemency 
18 
power in 1833, in Wilson, 32 US 150.  As noted, in that case, the President had granted a 
19 
pardon of the defendant's death sentence, but the defendant chose not to raise that pardon 
20 
as a bar during sentencing for other, related crimes.  The Court held that the defendant 
21 
could not benefit from the pardon in his sentencing for those other crimes, because he had 
22 
 
25 
not raised the pardon before the trial court.   
1 
 
 
It is important to understand what Wilson did not address.  Unlike Haugen, 
2 
the defendant in Wilson did not attempt to reject the grant of clemency from his death 
3 
sentence; rather, he chose not to raise that grant of clemency as a bar to sentencing on 
4 
related charges.  In addition, as mentioned above, although the Supreme Court indicated 
5 
that a pardon must be accepted to be effective, it reached that conclusion by analogizing a 
6 
pardon to a private deed.  Id. at 161.  In analogizing a pardon to a deed, the Court 
7 
reasoned that the pardon, "like any other deed," had to be brought before the court.  Id.  
8 
dThe Court did not conclude, let alone hold, that all grants of clemency are valid only if 
9 
accepted.  That was not the issue before the Court in Wilson.   
10 
 
 
Despite those caveats, Wilson has been cited for the proposition that a 
11 
pardon is valid only if accepted.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
12 
acceptance requirement in Burdick v. United States, 236 US 79, 35 S Ct 267, 59 L Ed 476 
13 
(1915).  In that case, Burdick, an editor for the New York Tribune, refused to answer 
14 
questions before a grand jury regarding his sources for articles about a fraud case that 
15 
was under investigation.  Id. at 84-85.  Burdick refused to testify because he said his 
16 
answers might incriminate him.  Id. at 85.  In response, the President granted Burdick "'a 
17 
full and unconditional pardon for all offenses against the United States which he * * * has 
18 
committed or may have committed, or taken part in'" in the publication of the fraud 
19 
articles.  Id. at 86 (quoting pardon).  Burdick declined the pardon and continued to refuse 
20 
to testify, and the court held him in contempt.  Id. at 86-87.  Thus, the question directly 
21 
presented in that case was the effect of an unaccepted pardon -- that is, whether 
22 
 
26 
acceptance of a pardon is necessary for it to be effective.  Id. at 87-88.  Relying on 
1 
Wilson, the Court declared 
2 
 
"[t]hat a pardon by its mere issue has automatic effect resistless by 
3 
him to whom it is tendered, forcing upon him by mere executive power 
4 
whatever consequences it may have or however he may regard it * * * was 
5 
rejected by the court [in Wilson] with particularity and emphasis.  The 
6 
decision is unmistakable." 
7 
Id. at 90.  Thus, in Burdick, the Court squarely held that a pardon must be accepted by the 
8 
recipient to be effective.  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the contempt proceedings 
9 
against Burdick. 
10 
 
 
The Supreme Court backed away from the acceptance requirement in a later 
11 
case, however, specifically stating that a grant of clemency does not require the 
12 
recipient's consent to be effective.  In Biddle, the defendant was sentenced to death 
13 
following a murder conviction, and the President commuted the sentence to life 
14 
imprisonment "'in a penitentiary to be designated by the Attorney General of the United 
15 
States.'"  274 US at 485 (quoting commutation).  After the pardon was granted and the 
16 
defendant had been transferred to a penitentiary, the defendant filed an application for a 
17 
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his transfer to a penitentiary was without his consent 
18 
and that the President's commutation was beyond his legal authority.  Id.  The Court 
19 
rejected the defendant's argument in an opinion by Justice Holmes.  Although the Court 
20 
did not cite Wilson, it rejected the often-cited principle from Wilson that a pardon is a 
21 
private act of grace: 
22 
"A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual 
23 
happening to possess power.  It is a part of the Constitutional scheme.  
24 
When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the 
25 
 
27 
public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the 
1 
judgment fixed.  Just as the original punishment would be imposed without 
2 
regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked 
3 
it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be 
4 
done." 
5 
Id. at 486 (citation omitted).  In rejecting the characterization of a grant of clemency as a 
6 
"private act of grace," the Court explicitly rejected the Wilson court's corresponding 
7 
characterization of a pardon as a private deed requiring acceptance.  The Biddle court 
8 
reasoned that requiring the recipient's consent effectively would deprive the President of 
9 
his power to grant clemency.  Id. at 487 (concluding that requiring consent "would permit 
10 
the President to decide that justice requires the diminution of a term * * * without 
11 
consulting the convict, but would deprive him of the power in the most important cases 
12 
and require him to permit an execution which he had decided ought not to take place," in 
13 
the absence of the recipient’s consent to the clemency).11  Thus, Biddle rejected the 
14 
acceptance requirement suggested in Wilson. 
15 
 
 
Haugen argues that Biddle is not persuasive, because this court consistently 
16 
has relied on the rationale set forth in Wilson when interpreting Article V, section 14, of 
17 
the Oregon Constitution.  Haugen notes that, even after the United States Supreme Court 
18 
rejected Wilson's characterization of clemency as a "private act of grace" in Biddle, this 
19 
court continued to cite and rely on Wilson.  See Fredericks v. Gladden, 211 Or 312, 323, 
20 
                                              
 
11 
The Biddle court did not overrule Burdick, 236 US 79, and instead stated 
that the reasoning of Burdick "is not to be extended to the present case."  Biddle, 274 US 
at 487-88.  The Court did not elaborate or otherwise distinguish Burdick. 
 
28 
315 P2d 1010 (1957).  Haugen reasons that, under this court's existing cases and Wilson, 
1 
he can reject the Governor's reprieve because the Governor has not demonstrated why 
2 
this court should overrule its prior decisions.  
3 
 
 
The Governor concedes that Oregon's case law has tracked early United 
4 
States Supreme Court cases.  The Governor argues, however, that none of the Oregon 
5 
cases presents the issue raised here, namely, whether the recipient of an unconditional 
6 
reprieve can render it ineffective by rejecting it.  Therefore, according to the Governor, 
7 
this court need not overrule any of its prior cases, because this is an issue of first 
8 
impression.  Moreover, the Governor notes, to the extent that the Oregon cases rely on 
9 
Wilson, Wilson is not relevant to this case, because it merely addresses whether the court 
10 
can take judicial notice of a pardon that the defendant did not bring before the court.12  
11 
Wilson, the Governor asserts, did not address the broader question of whether a grant of 
12 
clemency must be accepted to be effective. 
13 
E. 
Oregon Case Law Discussing the Governor's Clemency Power 
14 
 
 
This court first discussed acceptance of a grant of clemency in Houghton, 
15 
49 Or 232.  In Houghton, the Governor commuted Houghton's five-year sentence for 
16 
robbery to a shorter term on the condition that Houghton "'remain a law-abiding citizen.'"  
17 
Id. at 232 (quoting commutation).  After Houghton's release, the Governor revoked the 
18 
                                              
 
12 
The Governor also argues that Wilson is distinguishable because it involved 
a pardon, and, according to the Governor, courts historically have treated pardons 
differently from other forms of clemency.  Because we distinguish this court's reliance on 
Wilson on other grounds, we need not reach that argument.   
 
29 
commutation, because he determined that Houghton had violated the condition when he 
1 
was convicted of larceny.  Id. at 233.  Houghton challenged the Governor's decision, 
2 
arguing that the Governor did not have the authority to grant conditional commutations 
3 
and that the condition was therefore void, thus rendering the pardon absolute.  Id.  In 
4 
considering that argument, the court assumed, without much discussion, that a grant of 
5 
clemency could be rejected by the recipient.  Id. at 234-35 (concluding that "under a 
6 
constitution like ours a pardon is a mere act of grace" and that, in that case, "[t]he 
7 
commutation was an act of grace or favor, and [Houghton] was not obliged to accept it 
8 
unless he so desired").  The court made the same assumption in a similar case involving 
9 
revocation of a conditional reprieve:  In re Petition of Dormitzer, 119 Or 336, 249 P 639 
10 
(1926).13 
11 
 
 
Houghton and Dormitzer are distinguishable from the present case.  Both 
12 
cases involved the Governor's revocation of a grant of clemency, rather than the effect of 
13 
a recipient's rejection of that clemency.  The defendants in those cases argued for the 
14 
effectiveness of an act of clemency, not its invalidity.  Moreover, unlike the reprieve at 
15 
issue here, Houghton and Dormitzer involved conditional grants of clemency.  We need 
16 
                                              
 
13 
 In Dormitzer, 119 Or 336, the Governor revoked the previously granted 
conditional reprieve when the defendant violated the condition, and the defendant argued 
that the Governor in fact had granted him an unconditional pardon.  Id. at 338.  This court 
determined that, even if the Governor had exceeded his authority in granting the "so-
called reprieve," the defendant could not challenge the revocation because "[h]e accepted 
the favor of the Governor."  Id. at 340.  The court also rejected the defendant's argument 
that the reprieve prevented him from appealing, reasoning that he "had the right to accept 
or reject the 'reprieve.'"  Id.   
 
30 
not decide here whether a conditional grant of clemency requires acceptance to be 
1 
effective; we note only that we need not extend the reasoning in Houghton and Dormitzer 
2 
to this case because of the different nature of the clemency granted to Haugen.  Here, the 
3 
Governor's reprieve was unconditional; by its terms, it required no particular act by 
4 
Haugen to be effective.   
5 
 
 
In addition, in treating an act of clemency as "a mere act of grace," this 
6 
court in Houghton relied on cases from other states, as well as from the United States 
7 
Supreme Court, but did not undertake its own analysis of Article V, section 14, of the 
8 
Oregon Constitution.  See 49 Or at 234 (citing multiple cases from other states and a case 
9 
from the United States Supreme Court to support characterization of clemency as an act 
10 
of grace that can be rejected).  In Dormitzer, the court did not resolve whether the 
11 
Governor's action in that case qualified as a reprieve, and the court did not analyze -- or 
12 
even refer to -- Article V, section 14.  Thus, Houghton and Dormitzer are of no assistance 
13 
in resolving the issues presented in this case. 
14 
 
 
This court again assumed that a grant of clemency requires acceptance to be 
15 
effective in Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or 128, 171 P 577 (1918).  Unlike Houghton and 
16 
Dormitzer, however, Carpenter did not involve a grant of clemency.  Carpenter had been 
17 
convicted of a crime in Oregon and had been granted parole, but the Governor issued an 
18 
executive warrant to have Carpenter delivered into the custody of an agent of the state of 
19 
California, where charges also were pending against him.  Carpenter challenged the 
20 
Governor's ability to have him extradited to California.  In examining that issue, this 
21 
court discussed separation of powers and noted that the Governor could not "annul the 
22 
 
31 
action of the Circuit Court or * * * interfere with it in the execution of its own judgment."  
1 
Id. at 137.  The court acknowledged that the Governor could issue a pardon, but stated 
2 
that "even that is not effective" unless accepted by the recipient.  Id.  The court went on 
3 
to quote the language from Wilson characterizing a pardon as a deed that is valid only 
4 
when accepted.  Id.  Although the court seemed to cite Wilson as a demonstration of the 
5 
limits imposed on the Governor's clemency power, the case did not involve an act of 
6 
clemency at all and, similarly to Houghton and Dormitzer, did not provide the court with 
7 
an opportunity to engage in an independent analysis of the Governor's Article V, section 
8 
14, power. 
9 
 
 
Nonetheless, the court cited Carpenter and again cited Wilson when it 
10 
discussed the clemency power in a later case involving statutory good time credits.  In 
11 
Fredericks, 211 Or 312, an inmate was released 15 months early due to a miscalculation 
12 
of his statutory good time credits.  The inmate was returned to prison when the mistake 
13 
was discovered, and he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.  On rehearing before this 
14 
court, the defendant argued that the court had erred in its initial opinion when it 
15 
determined that the defendant had been released pursuant to a statutory power granted to 
16 
the Governor under the good time credits statute, rather than pursuant to the Governor's 
17 
exercise of his constitutional power to grant clemency.14  The court again concluded that 
18 
                                              
 
14 
Under the good time credit statute in place at the time, the Governor was 
required to approve the release of prisoners whose sentences had been completed due to 
reductions based on good time credits.  See Fredericks, 211 Or at 322-23 (discussing 
statute). 
 
32 
the inmate was improperly released due to a miscalculation of his good time credits, and 
1 
not because the Governor had granted him clemency.  Id. at 317, 322.   
2 
 
 
In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the Governor had not 
3 
followed the necessary procedure for granting a pardon, and the court quoted from 
4 
Carpenter, including the portion of Carpenter that quotes the Wilson court's 
5 
characterization of a pardon as a deed requiring acceptance to be effective.  Id. at 323, 
6 
325.  Haugen argues that Fredericks is significant because this court continued to rely on 
7 
Wilson," even though the United States Supreme Court essentially had rejected Wilson's 
8 
characterization of clemency 30 years earlier in Biddle.  See Id. at 323.  However, after 
9 
quoting Carpenter, the court in Fredericks immediately proceeded to discuss good time 
10 
credit statutes.  The court did not provide any analysis of Carpenter or Wilson, did not 
11 
apply the language that it quoted, and, other than quoting that text, did not endorse that 
12 
language.  Moreover, there was no contention in the case that a grant of clemency was 
13 
ineffective because the recipient had rejected it; on the contrary, the recipient was arguing 
14 
that the Governor had granted him clemency, rather than merely releasing him based on 
15 
good time credits. 
16 
 
 
Haugen argues that this court in Fredericks likely quoted Carpenter in 
17 
response to the dissent's assertion that the Governor possesses "complete" power of 
18 
clemency that cannot be enlarged or infringed upon by the legislature.  Id. at 327-28 
19 
(McAllister, J., dissenting).  The majority, however, agreed that the Governor is vested 
20 
with the "complete" power to grant clemency and determined that the legislature had not 
21 
invaded that power.  Id. at 319, 322.  Thus, although the court in Fredericks quoted 
22 
 
33 
Carpenter, and in turn, Wilson rather than Biddle, the court's reason for quoting that 
1 
language, at best, is unclear. 
2 
F. 
The Governor's Article V, Section 14, Power to Grant Reprieves 
3 
 
 
In sum, a number of Oregon cases contain statements suggesting that a 
4 
grant of clemency is effective only if accepted by the recipient.  Moreover, several cases 
5 
hold that the Governor can revoke a conditional grant of clemency if the recipient 
6 
attempts to benefit from the clemency without complying with the condition.  On close 
7 
examination, however, none of the Oregon cases holds that an unconditional act of 
8 
clemency is effective only on acceptance by the recipient.  And, no Oregon case involves 
9 
the situation presented here, in which a recipient has attempted to reject a grant of 
10 
clemency.   
11 
 
 
In addition, as Haugen notes, to the extent that this court's cases indicate 
12 
that acts of clemency are ineffective if rejected, the cases suggest that the recipient has 
13 
that right of rejection because grants of clemency are acts of grace.  A grant of clemency 
14 
may be an act of grace in some cases, but, as the Court stated in Biddle, under our 
15 
constitutional scheme, a grant of clemency is not a "private act of grace from an 
16 
individual happening to possess power," 274 US at 486 (emphases added).  Rather, it is 
17 
"part of the Constitutional scheme" and permits the chief executive to determine that "the 
18 
public welfare will be better served" by clemency.  Id.; see also Eacret, 215 Or at 126 
19 
(noting that "the pardoning power is not a power inherent in any officer of the state * * * 
20 
but by the constitutions of nearly all the states, it is conferred upon the executive or upon 
21 
the executive acting in conjunction with a council, board or commission").   
22 
 
34 
 
 
We recognize that, historically, governors and presidents have granted 
1 
clemency for a wide range of reasons, including reasons that may be political, personal, 
2 
or "private," and that many such decisions -- such as Governor Kitzhaber's decision here -
3 
- may be animated by both public and private concerns.15  Nonetheless, the executive 
4 
power to grant clemency flows from the constitution and is one of the Governor's only 
5 
checks on another branch of government.  As part of the system of checks and balances, 
6 
the Governor's clemency power is far from private:  It is an important part of the 
7 
constitutional scheme envisioned by the framers.   
8 
 
 
Within that scheme, limits exist on the Governor's power.  The most 
9 
fundamental limit is imposed through the actions of the people, if they choose not to 
10 
reelect the Governor.  See Eacret, 215 Or at 128 (noting that, if the Governor abuses the 
11 
clemency power, the people have recourse at the polls).  Moreover, as the text, history, 
12 
and case law surrounding Article V, section 14, demonstrate, the Governor's power may 
13 
be checked by the legislative branch, as in cases of treason convictions and through the 
14 
legislature's authority to establish regulations regarding the Governor's power.  Nothing 
15 
                                              
 
15 
In the reprieve, the Governor identified both public and personal reasons 
for granting the reprieve:  "Oregon's application of the death penalty is not fairly and 
consistently applied, and I do not believe that state-sponsored executions bring justice[.]"  
On the same day that he issued the reprieve, the Governor also issued a statement on 
capital punishment that further explained why he decided to grant a reprieve to Haugen, 
again identifying both public and personal reasons for his decision.  He discussed the two 
executions that were carried out during his first administration and noted that he regretted 
allowing those executions "both because of my own deep personal convictions about 
capital punishment and also because in practice Oregon has an expensive and unworkable 
system that fails to meet basic standards of justice."   
 
35 
in the text of the Oregon Constitution, however, provides the recipient of a grant of 
1 
clemency with a right to nullify it by rejecting it.  To the extent that the history and case 
2 
law provide limited support for such a right, they are based largely on English common 
3 
law, which, although informative, does not delineate Oregon's constitutional clemency 
4 
power. 
5 
 
 
We conclude that the Governor's reprieve of Haugen's death sentence is 
6 
valid and effective, regardless of Haugen's acceptance of that reprieve.  We agree with 
7 
Justice Holmes' comment in Biddle that the Governor's power to grant the reprieve that 
8 
he did here is  
9 
"part of the Constitutional scheme.  When [clemency is] granted it is the 
10 
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better 
11 
served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.  Just as the original 
12 
punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and 
13 
in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his 
14 
consent, determines what shall be done." 
15 
274 US at 486 (citation omitted).   
16 
 
 
We also reject Haugen's argument that the Governor's action did not qualify 
17 
as a reprieve.  As noted, even if a reprieve requires a definite end date, this reprieve 
18 
satisfies that requirement, because it will end when Kitzhaber's service as Governor ends.  
19 
In addition, Haugen's argument that a reprieve under Article V, section 14, may be 
20 
granted only for the reasons that reprieves historically were granted is without support.  
21 
Although there may have been certain common reasons for granting a reprieve in the 
22 
past, nothing in the text, history, or case law indicates that a reprieve may be granted only 
23 
for those historical reasons.  Governor Kitzhaber stated that he granted the reprieve 
24 
 
36 
because of his view that the death penalty is not "fairly and consistently applied" and his 
1 
personal belief that the death penalty does not "bring justice."  He determined that those 
2 
reasons were sufficient to issue a reprieve of Haugen's death sentence.  We are not asked 
3 
to, and we do not, review the Governor's judgment in reaching that conclusion.  The issue 
4 
is whether the Governor's action was within his constitutional authority, and we conclude 
5 
that it was.  
6 
IV.  CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
7 
 
 
Having determined that the Governor's reprieve is valid under the Oregon 
8 
Constitution, we turn to Haugen's claim under the United States Constitution.16  Haugen 
9 
argues that the reprieve subjects him to an "indefinite, prolonged period" of uncertainty 
10 
regarding whether and when he will be put to death, in violation of the Eighth 
11 
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth 
12 
Amendment's Due Process Clause.  The reprieve, Haugen argues, is an "additional 
13 
punishment" that lacks any penological justification.  The Governor responds that 
14 
Haugen cites no authority for the proposition that uncertainty regarding the date of 
15 
execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  
16 
                                              
 
16 
 In addition to the Eighth Amendment claim discussed below, Haugen 
asserts that the reprieve violates the Due Process Clause by depriving him of his liberty 
interest in his "basic autonomy as an individual" and his "inalienable right as a human 
being to form and then act according to his own conceptions about the intimate, 
unfathomable questions of life and death."  He does not cite any authority in support of 
that assertion, nor does he cite any case in which the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized such a liberty interest or in which the Court has recognized that an act of 
clemency deprives the recipient of that asserted interest.      
 
37 
 
 
The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
1 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."  The United 
2 
States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
3 
unusual punishment extends to punishments that are disproportionate to the crime.  
4 
Graham v. Florida, 560 US 48, 130 S Ct 2011, 2021, 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010) ("The 
5 
concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.").  In addressing certain 
6 
proportionality challenges to a category of punishment, the court first considers 
7 
"objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state 
8 
practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing 
9 
practice at issue."  Graham, 130 S Ct at 2022 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Then, 
10 
based on "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents" and the Court's analysis of 
11 
the Eighth Amendment itself, the Court must determine whether the punishment violates 
12 
the constitution.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In that second inquiry, the Court 
13 
considers, among other things, "whether the challenged sentencing practice serves 
14 
legitimate penological goals," because "[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological 
15 
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense."  Id. at 2026, 2028.  For 
16 
example, in Graham, the Court determined that there was no penological justification for 
17 
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole.  Id. at 2028. 
18 
 
 
The necessary predicate to Haugen's proportionality argument is that the 
19 
reprieve is a punishment similar to a criminal sentence.  The reprieve is a punishment, 
20 
Haugen asserts, because it imposes an indefinite, prolonged period during which he will 
21 
not know whether or when he will be put to death.  As Haugen himself argues, however, 
22 
 
38 
a reprieve is the temporary suspension of a criminal sentence, not the imposition of a 
1 
criminal sentence.  It is contrary to the very definition of a reprieve to classify it as 
2 
punishment.  Moreover, it makes little sense to require a penological justification for the 
3 
suspension of a criminal sentence, and Haugen cites no authority for imposing such a 
4 
requirement.   
5 
 
 
We do not doubt that being on death row, awaiting possible execution, and 
6 
facing uncertainty as to if, and when, that sentence might be carried out, exacts a toll on 
7 
people, as at least some members of the Supreme Court have recognized.  See, e.g., 
8 
Knight v. Florida, 528 US 990, 994, 120 S Ct 459, 145 L Ed 2d 370 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
9 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("It is difficult to deny the suffering inherent in a 
10 
prolonged wait for execution -- a matter which courts and individual judges have long 
11 
recognized.").  The Court has not concluded, however, that the uncertainty accompanying 
12 
that time on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Moreover, Haugen 
13 
cites no case that suggests that a reprieve or other act of clemency qualifies as cruel and 
14 
unusual punishment.  Thus, we reject Haugen's Eighth Amendment challenge.17 
15 
                                              
 
17 
In Brown v. Plata, __ US __, 131 S Ct 1910, 1928, 179 L Ed 2d 969 
(2011), the United States Supreme Court held that "[p]risoners retain the essence of 
human dignity inherent in all persons.  Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."  In that case, the Court 
found that clear and convincing evidence supported the finding of a three-judge district 
court that prison overcrowding had led to Eighth Amendment violations.  The Court held 
that a prison's failure to provide prisoners with "basic sustenance, including adequate 
medical care," constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.  Id.  Haugen does not argue 
that the reprieve in this case violates the Eighth Amendment because it is incompatible 
with the concept of human dignity (although he makes a related argument under the 
 
 
39 
 
 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to 
1 
the circuit court with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion. 
2 
                                              
Fourteenth Amendment), or that the uncertainty associated with remaining on death row 
subject to a reprieve is akin to being deprived of basic sustenance.