Title: State Ex Rel. Collins v. Superior Court
Citation: 145 Ariz. 493, 702 P.2d 1338
Docket Number: 17814-SA
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 1985

145 Ariz. 493 (1985) 702 P.2d 1338 The STATE of Arizona ex rel. Thomas E. COLLINS, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA; the Honorable Joseph D. Howe, Judge, Respondents, and David Lyle HOLDORF, Real Party in Interest. No. 17814-SA. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. July 10, 1985. Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa County Atty. by H. Allen Gerhardt and Brian Ishikawa, Deputy County Attys., Phoenix, for petitioner. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by F. Kenton Komadina, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for real party in interest. HAYS, Justice. This matter comes to us through a Petition for Special Action. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3); 17A A.R.S. Special Actions, Rules of Proc., Rule 8. On June 26, 1984, the offenses of attempted sexual assault and kidnapping occurred in Maricopa County. Defendant was listed as a suspect in the case and on August 1, 1984, a police officer went to his residence to discuss the offenses. Defendant came to the door in response to the officer's knock. The officer informed defendant that he wanted to talk with him about the June 26 incident, and asked if defendant would come down to the police station. Defendant's girlfriend, who had accompanied defendant to the door, asked if defendant would be arrested that day. The police officer said that defendant could return to his residence upon completion of questioning. Defendant accompanied the officer to the police station where he was placed in an *494 interview room. Thereafter, he was advised of his Miranda rights and answered the officer's questions as to his involvement in the June 26 offenses. The interview was tape-recorded. The police then drove defendant back to his residence. Defendant was later charged by indictment for the offenses previously indicated, and arrested. Defendant's counsel moved for an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of defendant's statement to the police. After a hearing, the trial judge granted defendant's motion to suppress the statement. The state filed a Petition for Special Action. We accepted jurisdiction. Apparently, the trial judge thought that he was required by State v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338, 615 P.2d 635 (1980), to suppress defendant's statement. This is strongly indicated by the court's ruling and findings at the conclusion of the suppression hearing. We quote a portion of the court's statement: The instant case differs from the Burr case, supra, in one vital respect. The promise in Burr was significant and persuasive enough to affect the voluntariness of the defendant's statement made in the phone call from Arizona to Alaska. There the police impliedly promised to Burr that if he gave information he would not be prosecuted. Another case which the defendant relies on is State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 439 P.2d 805 (1968). He seizes upon a sentence in that case: McFall at 236, 439 P.2d 805. The defendant McFall in that case was a drug addict. *495 An addict separated from his narcotics is an easy mark. An implied promise to return some of the drugs found on his person certainly could have affected the voluntariness of his statement or confession. The trial court here specifically found that the defendant did not rely on the promise, and that the totality of the circumstances shows that defendant's choice was completely voluntary. This appears inconsistent with the court's suppression of defendant's statement. In Burr, supra, we indicated that the promise must induce the defendant to waive his fifth amendment rights. If defendant did not rely on the promise, he certainly was not induced by it to make a statement. The order suppressing defendant's statement is vacated, the stay is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and CAMERON and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.