Title: CASTILLO v KUNNEMAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-465
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 1982

No. 80-465 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA MANUEL CASTILLO, JR., and DEBORAH J. CASTILLO, and GARRY A . COTANT, SHARYL COTANT, Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS. DELBERT B. KUNNEMANN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, In and for the County of Park Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Berg, Coil, Stokes & Tollefsen, Eozernan, Montana Ben E. Berg, Jr. argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Loble and Pauly, Helena, Montana Lester Loble I1 argued, Helena, Montana Wellcome and Frost, Bozeman, Montana A1 Frost argued, Bozeman, Montana Swandal, Douglass & Swandal, Livingston, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Donald D. MacIntyre, D.N.R., Helena, Montana Submitted: November 30, 1981 Decided: Hht 3 f4$2 NAP, 3 - 1982 File . M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellants, Manuel and Deborah C a s t i l l o and Garry and Sharyl Cotant, appeal from an o r d e r of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, Park County, e n t e r e d on October 8, 1980. The o r d e r denied a p p e l l a n t s ' r e q u e s t f o r an i n j u n c t i o n preventing respondent, Delbert Kunnemann from d i v e r t i n g c e r t a i n water. On September 29, 1981, t h i s Court i s s u e d an opinion r e v e r s i n g t h e D i s t r i c t Court, holding i n f a v o r of a p p e l l a n t s C a s t i l l o and Cotant. A p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g was duly f i l e d . W e r e v e r s e our o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n and, w i t h modification, a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court. I n 1976, D e l b e r t Kunnemann owned a 1,275-acre ranch l o c a t e d i n t h e S h i e l d s Valley, Park County, Montana. Kunnemann owned two water r i g h t s on t h e S h i e l d s River from which he drew water t o i r r i g a t e h i s ranch. Kunnemann's water r i g h t s stemmed from a n a p p r o p r i a t i o n of 240 m i n e r ' s inches made by a Thirza Grannis on June 1, 1880, and from an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of 450 m i n e r ' s inches made by a John McNiven on August 14, 1893. Two main d i t c h e s , named a f t e r t h e r e s p e c t i v e o r i g i n a l water r i g h t s a p p r o p r i a t o r s , Grannis and McNiven, w e r e used t o t r a n s p o r t t h e water from t h e S h i e l d s River t o Kunnemann's property. On December 30, 1976, Kunnemann s o l d a 230-acre p a r c e l of h i s ranch t o J a k e Franks. The warranty deed conveying t h i s p a r c e l t o Franks contained t h e following w a t e r r i g h t g r a n t : "Together w i t h 230 m i n e r ' s inches of t h e waters of t h e S h i e l d s River appropriated by John McNiven and bearing a p p r o p r i a t i o n d a t e of t h e 1 4 t h day of August, 1 8 9 3 , and r e l a t e d d i t c h r i g h t s . " Jack Franks subdivided t h e 230-acre p a r c e l i n t o twelve smaller t r a c t s of land. The C a s t i l l o s purchased a 20-acre t r a c t from Franks on March 4 , 1977. The c o n t r a c t f o r deed between Franks and C a s t i l l o s d i d not contain a s p e c i f i c water r i g h t g r a n t b u t r a t h e r t h e following general g r a n t : "Together with t h e tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging." The Cotants purchased a 9.114-acre t r a c t from Franks on November 8 , 1979. The warranty deed given by Franks t o t h e Cotants contained t h i s language: "Together with a l l and s i n g u l a r t h e tenements, hereditaments, appurtenances, water r i g h t s and water d i t c h e s , i f any, thereunto belonging." The following diagram d e p i c t s t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e property r e t a i n e d by Delbert Kunnemann, t h e Franks subdivision, t h e C a s t i l l o and Cotant p r o p e r t i e s , and t h e Grannis and McNiven d i t c h e s : (See Drawing on Next Page) Kunnemann Property N o interconnecting l a t e r a l d i t c h e s e x i s t between t h e ~ c ~ i v e n d i t c h and t h e C a s t i l l o and Cotant p r o p e r t i e s . When Jake Franks sold t h e subdivision t r a c t s between t h e McNiven d i t c h and t h e C a s t i l l o and Cotant p r o p e r t i e s , he d i d n o t r e s e r v e any easements through which l a t e r a l d i t c h e s could be b u i l t t o t r a n s p o r t water from t h e McNiven d i t c h t o t h e C a s t i l l o and Cotant p r o p e r t i e s . During t h e 1977 and 1978 i r r i g a t i n g seasons, Kunnemann allowed C a s t i l l o t o t a k e water from t h e Grannis d i t c h t o i r r i g a t e hay crops. I n 1980, Kunnemann blocked t h e Grannis d i t c h north of t h e C a s t i l l o property, thus d i v e r t i n g a l l of t h e water flowing i n t h e Grannis d i t c h onto Kunnemannls land. A s a r e s u l t of Kunnemannls d i v e r s i o n of t h e Grannis d i t c h , C a s t i l l o s and Cotants f i l e d a complaint on J u l y 1 4 , 1980. They sought t o enjoin Kunnemann from i n t e r f e r i n g with t h e flow of water i n t h e Grannis d i t c h . The D i s t r i c t Court entered a r e s t r a i n i n g order on J u l y 2 2 , 1980, preventing Kunnemann from d i v e r t i n g t h e Grannis d i t c h water. A show cause hearing on t h e complaint was s e t f o r August 5, 1980. O n August 5, 1980, t h e p l a i n t i f f s , C a s t i l l o s and Cotants, and t h e defendant, Kunnemann, appeared with counsel and presented testimony. Following hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law on September 9 , 1980. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e C a s t i l l o s , Cotants and t h e i r predecessor i n i n t e r e s t , Jake Franks, never had possession of t h e Grannis d i t c h o r Grannis water r i g h t s . The c o u r t found t h a t Jack Franks could not convey t h e ~ r a n n i s d i t c h o r water r i g h t s a s appurtenant t o t h e C a s t i l l o o r Cotant property because such r i g h t s had never been l e g a l l y attached a s appurtenant. The c o u r t f u r t h e r found t h a t s e c t i o n 85-2-403, MCA, imposes no duty on t h e s e l l e r of r e a l property and appurtenant water r i g h t s t o f i l e a n o t i c e of such s a l e o r t r a n s f e r with t h e Department of Natural Resources. Based on these findings t h e D i s t r i c t Court dissolved t h e r e s t r a i n i n g order granted pending t h e order t o show cause and denied t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r an i n j u n c t i o n . O n September 18, 1980, C a s t i l l o s and Cotants f i l e d a motion t o amend pursuant t o Rule 59 (g) , M.R.Civ.P. O n October 8, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court entered an order denying t h e motion. C a s t i l l o s and Cotants appeal from t h i s o r d e r . Dispositive i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e a r e : 1. When Kunnemann deeded t o Franks and expressly granted t h e McNiven r i g h t s , d i d Kunnemann impliedly r e s e r v e t h e Grannis r i g h t s ? 2. I f Kunnemann e f f e c t i v e l y reserved t h e Grannis r i g h t s and severed them from t h e land t o which they had been appurtenant, d i d e x i s t i n g law r e q u i r e him t o o b t a i n approval of t h e Department of Natural Resources pursuant t o t h e provisions of t h e Montana Surface and Groundwater Act, s e c t i o n s 85-2-101, e t seq., M C A ? 3. What e f f e c t does f a i l u r e t o apply t o t h e Department of Natural Resources f o r permission t o sever have upon a conveyance? P l a i n t i f f s introduced a decree entered by t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court i n c i v i l case no. 2717, Henwood v. Hobson, which adjudicated water r i g h t s of Thirza Grannis on t h e Shields River. This decree determined t h a t t h e appropriation of 240 miner's inches made by Thirza Grannis on June 1, 1880, was appurtenant t o t h e following land: "The South h a l f of S e c t i o n Nine, a l s o a l l of S e c t i o n Seventeen, Township One South, Range Ten East." The t r a c t of land which C a s t i l l o purchased from t h e Franks' subdivision lies i n t h e south h a l f of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n nine. Additionally, Kunnemann t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e land which C a s t i l l o u l t i m a t e l y purchased had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been i r r i g a t e d by water from t h e Grannis d i t c h . This testimony was confirmed by Dan Dinsdale, son of t h e predecessor i n i n t e r e s t of Delbert Kunnemann, and by A l b e r t Palmer, a h i r e d hand who had i r r i g a t e d t h e property. Both men s t a t e d t h a t only water from t h e Grannis d i t c h had been used t o i r r i g a t e t h e land which C a s t i l l o subsequently purchased. I n Lensing v. Day and Hansen S e c u r i t y Co. (1923), 67 Mont. 382, 384, 215 P. 999, 1000, t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t ". . . a water r i g h t acquired by a p p r o p r i a t i o n , and used f o r a b e n e f i c i a l and necessary purpose i n connection with a given t r a c t of land, i s an appurtenance. . ." S e c t i o n 70-17- 1 0 1 ( 1 1 ) , MCA, e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t d i t c h e s a r e an easement which may a t t a c h t o land. Section 70-15-105, MCA, provides t h a t a ". . . t h i n g is deemed t o be i n c i d e n t a l o r appurtenant t o land when it i s by r i g h t used with t h e land f o r its b e n e f i t . . ." It i s c l e a r t h a t both by decree and b e n e f i c i a l use, t h e Grannis water - and d i t c h r i g h t s w e r e appurtenant t o C a s t i l l o ' s land. However, evidence concerning whether t h e Grannis water and d i t c h r i g h t s w e r e appurtenant t o t h e Cotant property i s n o t s o c l e a r . N o decree was admitted which declared such r i g h t s appurtenant t o t h e Cotant property. Kunnemann d i d t e s t i f y t h a t he used t h e Grannis d i t c h and Grannis water t o i r r i g a t e t h e lands south of t h e C a s t i l l o property. Cotants purchased a 9.114-acre t r a c t of land which borders t h e C a s t i l l o property immediately on t h e south. A n a e r i a l photo of t h e a r e a showed t h a t t h e Grannis d i t c h runs d i r e c t l y through t h e Cotant property. Due t o t h e proximity of t h e Cotant property t o t h a t owned by C a s t i l l o s , t h e evidence supports a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e Cotant property would have been i r r i g a t e d a t t h e same t i m e t h e C a s t i l l o property was i r r i g a t e d . W e f i n d t h e Grannis r i g h t s t o be appurtenant t o both t r a c t s . Kunnemann conveyed t h e McNiven water r i g h t together with r e l a t e d d i t c h r i g h t s . W e hold t h a t r e l a t e d d i t c h r i g h t s r e f e r t o t h e "McNiven d i t c h . " Since Kunnemann held two water and d i t c h r i g h t s , namely t h e Grannis r i g h t s and t h e McNiven r i g h t s , t h e question becomes whether conveyance of t h e McNiven r i g h t s impliedly reserved t h e Grannis r i g h t s . W e now hold t h a t such an implied r e s e r v a t i o n was e f f e c t u a t e d by t h e conveyance i n question. Section 28-3-702, MCA, provides a s follows: "All t h i n g s t h a t i n law o r usage a r e consider- ed a s i n c i d e n t a l t o a c o n t r a c t o r a s necessary t o c a r r y it i n t o e f f e c t a r e implied therefrom unless some of them a r e expressly mentioned t h e r e i n , i n which case a l l o t h e r t h i n g s of t h e same c l a s s a r e considered t o be excluded." Under t h e provisions of t h e above-quoted s t a t u t e , t h e water r i g h t not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned would be excluded. Furthermore, such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e f f e c t u a t e s t h e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . I n Lensing v. Day and Hansen Security Co., supra, t h i s c o u r t s a i d a t pp. 384-385: " I n a conveyance of a water r i g h t o r any o t h e r property, it i s t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , s o f a r as t h e same has been lawfully expressed, which must c o n t r o l t h e c o u r t s i n a construction of t h e instrument by which t h e property i s con- veyed. The general r u l e s of construction of l e g a l documents apply t o t h e instrument now under consideration. The f a c t t h a t a water r i g h t i s involved does n o t add t o o r i n any way change those r u l e s . " ~ p p l y i n g w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s of construction, and t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 28-3-702, MCA, quoted above, w e now hold t h a t respondent Kunnemann e f f e c t i v e l y reserved h i s Grannis water r i g h t and t h e r e l a t e d Grannis d i t c h r i g h t . The next i s s u e f o r r e s o l u t i o n is whether t h e Montana Surface and Groundwater Act, s e c t i o n s 85-2-101, e t seq., MCA, a p p l i e s t o water r i g h t s perfected p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e Act. Ditch r i g h t s a r e c l e a r l y n o t governed by t h e applicable s t a t u t e s . The Act is comprehensive l e g i s l a t i o n designed t o ". . . provide f o r t h e administration, c o n t r o l , and r e g u l a t i o n of water r i g h t s and e s t a b l i s h a system of c e n t r a l i z e d records of - a l l water r i g h t s . " Section 85-2- 1 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA, (emphasis added) . Under t h i s Act, an adjudica- t i o n process of a l l water r i g h t s e x i s t i n g p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973 was i n s t i t u t e d . Sections 85-2-211 through 85-2-243, MCA. Additionally, appropriations of water r i g h t s a f t e r J u l y 1, 1973 could only be made through an a p p l i c a t i o n and permit procedure governed by t h e Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. Sections 85-2-301 through 85-2- 317, MCA. P r i o r t o 1973, Montana case law c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t a water r i g h t could be t r a n s f e r r e d and disposed of a p a r t from t h e land t o which it was appurtenant. However, such t r a n s f e r could n o t adversely a f f e c t o t h e r vested r i g h t s . See Sherlock v. Greaves (1938), 106 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87; Lensing v. Day and Hansen Security Co., supra. The Surface and Groundwater Act made such t r a n s f e r s u b j e c t t o review a s follows: " ( 3 ) Without obtaining p r i o r approval from t h e department, an appropriator may -- n o t sever -- a l l o r = p a r t --- of an appropriation r i g h t ---- from t h e land t o which -- it i s appurten- a n t , . . . The department s h a l l approve t h e - proposed change i f it determines t h a t t h e proposed change w i l l n o t adversely a f f e c t t h e r i g h t s of o t h e r persons. I f t h e depart- ment determines t h a t t h e proposed change might adversely a f f e c t t h e r i g h t s of o t h e r persons, n o t i c e of t h e proposed change s h a l l be given i n accordance with 85-2-307. If t h e department then determines t h a t an objec- t i o n f i l e d by a person whose r i g h t s may be a f f e c t e d s t a t e s a v a l i d o b j e c t i o n t o t h e pro- posed change, t h e department s h a l l hold a hearing thereon p r i o r t o i t s approval o r den- i a l of t h e proposed change. Objections s h a l l meet t h e requirements of 85-2-308 ( 2 ) and hear- ings s h a l l be held i n accordance with 85-2-309." Section 85-2-403, MCA. (emphasis added.) Respondent contends t h a t t h i s provision was n o t intended t o govern water r i g h t s perfected before t h e J u l y 1, 1973, e f f e c t i v e date. However, s e c t i o n 85-2-403(3) does n o t contain s p e c i f i c language which precludes i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o water r i g h t s perfected p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973. Other provisions contained i n t h e Surface and Groundwater Act - do contain such preclusive language. For example, s e c t i o n 85-2-404, MCA, regarding abandonment of w a t e r r i g h t s s t a t e s : "(1) I f an appropriator ceases t o use a11 o r a p a r t of h i s appropriation r i g h t with t h e i n t e n t i o n of wholly o r p a r t i a l l y aban- doning t h e r i g h t o r i f he ceases using h i s appropriation r i g h t according t o its t e r m s and conditions with t h e i n t e n t i o n of n o t complying with those terms and conditions, t h e appropriation r i g h t s h a l l , t o t h a t ex- t e n t , be deemed considered abandoned and s h a l l immediately expire. " ( 2 ) I f an appropriator ceases t o use a l l o r p a r t of h i s appropriation r i g h t o r ceases using h i s appropriation r i g h t according t o its terms and conditions f o r a period of 1 0 successive y e a r s and t h e r e was water a v a i l - a b l e f o r h i s use, t h e r e s h a l l be a prima f a c i e presumption t h a t t h e appropriator has abandoned h i s r i g h t i n whole o r f o r t h e p a r t not used. " ( 3 ) This s e c t i o n -- does n o t apply t o e x i s t - i n g r i g h t s u n t i l --- they have been determined i n accordance with p a r t - 2 of - - t h i s chapter." (emphasis added.) I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e precluded a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Surface and Groundwater Act s t a t u t e s where it deemed such a c t i o n necessary. Accordingly, it was t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s apparent i n t e n t n o t t o preclude a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 85-2- 403(3), MCA, t o water r i g h t s e x i s t i n g p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973, by v i r t u e of t h e f a c t t h a t language precluding such a p p l i c a t i o n was not included i n t h e s t a t u t e . On rehearing, Kunnemann contends t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 85-2-403(3), MCA, of t h e Surface and Groundwater Act t o w a t e r r i g h t s perfected before t h e Act would v i o l a t e t h e Montana Constitution. A r t i c l e I X , Section 3, provides: " (1) A l l e x i s t i n g r i g h t s t o t h e use of any waters f o r any u s e f u l o r b e n e f i c i a l purpose a r e hereby recognized and confirmed." The s u b j e c t provision of t h e Act does n o t destroy t h e r i g h t t o use water, thus v i o l a t i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision. Rather, t h e Act e s t a b l i s h e s a procedure f o r review. The Department of Natural Resources, under t h e Act, can only deny t r a n s f e r i f o t h e r vested r i g h t s would be i n j u r e d . The law has n o t been changed. The Department has simply been given a review t o determine t h e same i s s u e t h a t could previously have been determined only by a D i s t r i c t Court. I n commenting upon t h e new provision, Montana's noted water law a u t h o r i t y , Albert Stone s a i d : "The 1973 Water -- U s e Act, R.C.M., s e c t i o n 89- 892, continues t h e policy of t h e repealed s e c t i o n 89-803, only adding t h a t any change must have t h e approval of t h e Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. So t h e case law developed under t h e p r i o r code sec- t i o n should remain a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e new sec- tion." Selected Aspects of Montana Water Law, p. 40. W e s e e nothing u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l about applying t h e mandated procedure t o r i g h t s perfected p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e Act. Therefore, we hold t h a t t h e owner of a water r i g h t e x i s t i n g p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973, must seek t h e approval of t h e Department of Natural Resources and Conservation before severing t h a t r i g h t from land t o which it is appurtenant. The r e s u l t of our determination involving t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s is, t h a t ownership of t h e Grannis water r i g h t and d i t c h r i g h t was reserved by respondent Kunnemann. However, t h e water r i g h t has remained appurtenant t o t h e land conveyed by Kunnemann t o Franks and s o t h e r i g h t reserved is q u a l i f i e d . Kunnemann must apply t o t h e Department of Natural Resources f o r permission t o sever from t h e land conveyed, t h e water r i g h t which Kunnemann owns. The same r a t i o n a l e a p p l i e s t o t h e McNiven water r i g h t . The conveyance passed t i t l e , but t h e r i g h t t o use w i l l be delayed u n t i l appropriate approval i s granted by t h e Department of Natural Resources. The r e s u l t of t h i s opinion i s t o hold t h a t : (1) t h e Montana Surface and Groundwater Act, except where it i n d i c a t e s a contrary i n t e n t , a p p l i e s t o water r i g h t s perfected p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e Act, and ( 2 ) f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e terms of t h e Act does n o t render a conveyance o r r e s e r v a t i o n void, b u t suspends a b i l i t y t o use t h e r i g h t u n t i l t h e s t a t u t o r i l y mandated permission is granted by t h e Department of Natural Resources. Judgment i n favor of Kunn d. W e Concur: J u s t i c e s John C. Sheehy and Fred J. Weber d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t : W e agree with t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e f i r s t i s s u e by t h e majority, t h a t Kunnemann impliedly reserved h i s Grannis water r i g h t and conveyed no r i g h t t o Franks o r h i s successors t o take i r r i g a t i o n water onto t h e deeded lands through t h e Grannis d i t c h a s it runs through t h e non- deeded property r e t a i n e d by Kunnemann. W e d i s a g r e e with t h e conclusion of t h e majority t h a t approval of t h e Department of Natural Resources is necessary t o e f f e c t u a t e t h e t r a n s f e r by Kunnemann t o Franks o r t h a t any r i g h t t o Kunnemann t o use t h e remaining water i s "severed" and must have Department of Natural Resources approval. A review of b a s i c Montana w a t e r l a w is u s e f u l t o demon- s t r a t e our position. W e begin with a reminder t h a t a water r i g h t and a d i t c h r i g h t a r e separate e n t i t i e s , capable of s e p a r a t e ownership. Kunnemann can own a d i t c h r i g h t without a mw-ky water r i g h t , o r a water r i g h t without a d i t c h r i g h t . B W S ~ ~ F - v. Missoula Irr. District (1931), 90 Mont. 344, P.2d ; Connolly v. Harrel (1936), 102 Mont. 295, 57 P.2d 781; McDonnell v. Huffine (1931), 4 4 Mont. 4 1 1 , 1 2 0 P.2d 792. I n t h i s case, Kunnemann s o l d t o Franks t h a t p a r t of t h e Grannis d i t c h t h a t was p a r t and p a r c e l of t h e decided property. H e reserved t o himself t h e Grannis water r i g h t which provided water t o t h a t portion of t h e Grannis d i t c h . H e had a p e r f e c t l e g a l r i g h t t o do so, s i n c e Kunnemann can own a water r i g h t without a d i t c h r i g h t . Before t h e deed t o Franks, Kunnemann, of course, owned a l l of t h e r e a l property involved here. H e owned a water r i g h t t o 240 miner's inches i n t h e Grannis d i t c h and 450 miner's inches i n t h e McNiven d i t c h . The d i t c h e s on h i s lands w e r e p a r t and p a r c e l of h i s ownership. The d i t c h e s w e r e not "appurtenant" because they were p a r t of t h e r e a l estate t h a t Kunnemann owned. This was explained i n Smith v. Denniff (1900), 24 Mont. 2 1 , 23, 2 4 , P. a s follows: "2. Section 1078 of t h e C i v i l Code d e f i n e s an 'appurtenance' a s follows: ' A t h i n g is deemed t o be i n c i d e n t a l o r appurtenant t o land when it i s by r i g h t used with t h e land f o r i t s b e n e f i t , a s i n t h e case of a way, o r w a t e r course, o r of a passage f o r l i g h t , a i r o r h e a t from o r across t h e land of another.' A 'water course from o r across t h e land of another' i s an easement, and by reference t o s e c t i o n 1250 of t h e C i v i l Code it i s p l a i n t h a t i n t h e contemplation of t h e Code an appurtenance t o land i s i n any and every c a s e an easement. For example: A. owns a p a r c e l of land, t o i r r i g a t e which he has lawfully appropriated and by r i g h t is using, water. The d i t c h through which t h e water is conveyed i s a l s o owned by him, and i s p a r t l y upon h i s land and p a r t l y upon t h e land of B. The water r i g h t is an appurtenant t o A . ' s land, and t h a t p a r t of t h e d i t c h which i s upon B . ' s land is an easement of A. t h e r e i n , and i s a l s o appurtenant t o t h e land of A . , b u t t h a t p a r t of t h e d i t c h which is upon A . ' s land is not appurtenant t h e r e t o , but i s p a r t and p a r c e l of t h e land i t s e l f . " Hence, it is c l e a r t h a t t h e p o r t i o n of t h e Grannis d i t c h t h a t lies upon t h e lands s o l d t o Franks i s not "appurtenant" t o t h a t land, but i s p a r t and p a r c e l of t h e land conveyed, Franks received no d i t c h r i g h t i n t h e Grannis d i t c h as an "appurtenance," because Franks g o t no r i g h t t o convey i r r i g a t i o n water over t h e remaining Kunnemann's land through t h e Grannis d i t c h on t h a t land. A d i t c h r i g h t on t h e land of another is an easement on t h e land of t h e o t h e r , and an easement cannot be created, granted o r t r a n s f e r r e d except by operation of law, by an instrument i n w r i t i n g , by p r e s c r i p t i o n o r eminent domain. The e f f e c t of t h e deed from Kunnemann t o Franks was t o convey t o Franks 230 miner's inches of water i n t h e McNiven d i t c h , and t h e r i g h t t o t a k e w a t e r t o t h e deeded lands through t h e McNiven d i t c h over t h e remaining Kunnemann lands. B y t h e deed, Franks received 230 miner's inches of McNiven water formerly owned by Kunnemann, and a NcNiven d i t c h r i g h t over t h e remaining Kunnemann lands a s an appurtenance t o t h e lands purchased by Franks. C a s t i l l o and Cotant are successors t o a p a r t of t h e r i g h t s deeded by Kunnemann t o Franks. They have no o t h e r claim upon Kunnemann, o r upon h i s remaining w a t e r o r d i t c h r i g h t s . They cannot g e t water through t h e Grannis d i t c h unless they acquire (1) a water r i g h t which can be d i v e r t e d a t t h e Grannis d i v e r s i o n , and ( 2 ) an easement over Kunnemann's remaining lands t o c a r r y t h e water through t h e Grannis d i t c h over Kunnemann's remaining lands t o t h e lands owned by Cotant and C a s t i l l o . A f u r t h e r r e s u l t of t h e deed t o Franks by Kunnemann i s t h a t Franks g o t t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e Grannis d i t c h which was located upon t h e deeded lands, b u t no water r i g h t because t h e Grannis water r i g h t was reserved t o Kunnemann. When C a s t i l l o and Cotant claimed w a t e r through t h e Grannis d i t c h , they w e r e claiming w a t e r f o r which n e i t h e r they nor t h e i r m u lac! predecessor Franks had a water r i g h t . See ?4e4%kq-13. Missoula Irr. D i s t r i c t , supra, f o r a reverse of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . C a s t i l l o and Cotant have no w a t e r r i g h t i n t h e Grannis d i t c h which is appurtenant t o t h e lands they now own. Kunnemann owned " e x i s t i n g r i g h t s , " t h a t i s water and d i t c h r i g h t s which e x i s t e d p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973. W e d i s a g r e e t h a t t h e owner of an e x i s t i n g r i g h t may not t r a n s f e r a w a t e r o r d i t c h r i g h t unless t h e Department of Natural Resources approves. I n a r r i v i n g a t t h e opposite conclusion, t h e majority r e l y upon a portion of s e c t i o n 85-2-403, MCA, which w e again quote f o r t h e r e a d e r ' s convenience. " (1) The right to use water under a permit or certificate of water right shall pass with a conveyance of the land or transfer by operation of law, unless specifically exempted therefrom. All transfers of interest and appropriation rights shall be without loss of priority. "(2) The person receiving the appropriation interest shall file with the Department notice of the transfer on a form prescribed by the Department. "(3) Without obtaining prior approval from the Department, an appropriator may not sever all or any part of an appropriation right . . ." We contend that the foregoing statute applies only to water rights received under a permit or a certificate of authority. It was not intended to apply to existing rights, especially since existing rights were confirmed by 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. IX, § 3. The anomaly of the majority relying on section 85-2-403, MCA is that the majority hold in this case directly opposite to the provisions of section 85-2-403(1). Under that subsection no implied reservations are recognized. If that subsection applied Kunnemann's rights to water from the Grannis ditch would have passed by the deed to Franks because they were not "specifically exempted therefrom. " We are buttressed in our contention that section 85-2-403 does not apply to existing rights because in the same part of the code, in section 85-2-401, MCA, it is provided that priority of appropriations for existing rights are to be determined by water courts. Prior to July 1, 1973, an owner of a water right could change the place of diversion, or place of use of his water right, except only to the extent he may injure others by such change. Section 89-803, R.C.M. 1947. These incidents of ownership of water rights were confirmed by 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. IX, § 3, or the constitutional provision has no meaning. The majority takes away these incidents unless the Department of Natural Resources gives approval. Not only has the majority misconceived the intent of the constitutional provision and the statutes adopted thereafter, but they have placed in doubt the rights of hundreds of water users in this state who have conveyed or received conveyances of existing rights since July 1, 1973. Such a result is not necessary here, especially since the process of adjudicating all water claims is now in full swing before the water courts, when and where all rights to the use and ownership of water will be determined. Under our view of the law here, there is no conflict with the state constitution, and we need not discuss such an issue. We would affirm the District Court in toto, --