Title: Eddie Simmons v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-2093
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
No. SC03-2093 
____________ 
EDDIE SIMMONS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[November 18, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review the decision in State v. Simmons, 28 Fla. L. Weekly 
D2603 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 12, 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in 
McCray v. State, 730 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we quash the Third 
District's decision and instruct the district court to remand this case to the trial 
court for further factual development so that a proper determination can be made as 
to whether the State must disclose the identity of a confidential informant-witness. 
 
 
- 2 - 
BACKGROUND 
Eddie Simmons was charged with the “sale, manufacture, delivery and/or 
possession of cocaine” based upon an alleged April 4, 2002, encounter with 
undercover Detective A. Pacheco.1  Simmons, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2603.  
During discovery, the State disclosed that Detective Pacheco utilized a confidential 
informant to gain access to the porch where the transaction allegedly took place.  
See id.  Based on events that occurred at the same location on the following day, 
April 5, 2002, Simmons was further charged with possession with intent to sell, 
manufacture or deliver cocaine and with unlawful possession of a firearm.2  See id.  
Simmons proposed a misidentification defense to the April 4 transaction, he 
contended that he was not the person who sold cocaine to Detective Pacheco.  See 
id.  Simmons's defense to the April 5 charges was that he was present in the home 
where the drugs and firearm were found, but that he had no knowledge or 
possessory interest in them.  See id. 
Seeking disclosure of the confidential informant's identity, the defense filed 
a sworn motion in both cases.  See id.  With respect to the drug transaction, case 
number 02-9992, Simmons contended that "the confidential informant/tipster 
witnessed the sale of the cocaine to Detective Pacheco on April 4."  Id.  However, 
                                        
1.  The case number relating to the April 4, 2002, charge is 02-9992. 
 
2.  The case number relating to the April 5, 2002, charges is 02-9991. 
 
 
- 3 - 
in case number 02-9991, Simmons stated "only that '[P]roof that a person other 
than the Defendant sold cocaine on April 4, would buttress the Defendant's 
assertion that he was present in the home on April 5 merely as an overnight guest 
and that he had no dominion or control over the siezed [sic] items.' "  Id. 
The State objected to the disclosure of the informant and filed opposition 
memoranda in both cases.  In the memoranda, the State contended that on April 4, 
Simmons sold cocaine to Detective Pacheco on the porch of a residence.  See id.  
The State also admitted that the confidential informant was used to gain access to 
the porch and front door of the residence, and that the informant was present at the 
time of the transaction.  See id.  Finally, the State claimed that it did not know the 
identity or the location of the confidential informant.  See id. 
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions, at which no testimony 
was presented or evidence adduced.  The defense argued that dismissal of both 
informations against Simmons was warranted because of the State's inability to 
produce the confidential informant.  See id. at D2603-04.  In response, the State 
argued that dismissal was inappropriate because the State was not aware of the 
informant's identity or whereabouts.  See id. at D2604. 
The trial court found that the identity of the confidential informant was 
sufficiently relevant to require the informant's identity.  See id. at D2604.  The trial 
court subsequently dismissed both cases.  On appeal, the Third District reversed 
 
 
- 4 - 
the order of dismissal and certified conflict with the Second District's decision in 
McCray. 
ANALYSIS 
We accepted jurisdiction in this case based upon the Third District's 
certification that its decision was in conflict with the Second District's decision in 
McCray on the issue of whether the State is required to disclose the identity of a 
confidential informant who was a witness to a controlled drug buy when the 
defendant has asserted a defense of misidentification.  This Court has recognized 
that in some instances the State has a limited privilege to withhold the identity of a 
confidential informant.  See State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1977).  This 
privilege, however, must yield where the informant's identity is relevant and 
helpful to the accused, or where the identity is essential to a fair determination of 
the cause at issue.  See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). 
On very similar facts, the parties contend that the Third District in Simmons 
and the Second District in McCray have rendered conflicting decisions.  However, 
upon review it appears to this Court that neither the trial court nor the district court 
directly addressed the State's claim that it had lost track of the informant, and that 
it was for this reason that it was unable, not unwilling, to produce him. 
Although courts have recognized that the dismissal of charges is a possible 
sanction for the State's failure to produce an informant, it appears that courts have 
 
 
- 5 - 
been reluctant to impose the sanction of dismissal when the failure is the result of 
negligence, as opposed to willful conduct on the part of the State. 
In State v. Pautier, 548 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the district court 
held that dismissal of charges is appropriate where the State's failure to produce the 
informant's identity was the result of "willful noncompliance," "calculated official 
ignorance," or "deliberate intentional activity."  However, the court noted that 
other alternatives should have been considered by the trial court before the ultimate 
sanction of dismissal was imposed, including a continuance or an evidentiary 
hearing to determine why the identity could not be produced.  The Second District 
similarly held in State v. Seago, 751 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), that the trial 
court's failure to consider other alternatives to dismissal rendered the order of 
dismissal inappropriate, and the matter was remanded for consideration of other 
alternatives. 
A similar rule has been followed in other jurisdictions.  In People v. Lesiuk, 
617 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 1993), the Court of Appeals held that where a witness's 
unavailability is in no way the fault of the prosecution, the defendant must meet a 
high burden of proof when seeking to have an indictment dismissed for failure to 
produce an informant.  The Indiana Supreme Court also echoed this sentiment in 
Raines v. State, 533 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1989), when it held that in the absence of 
bad faith on the part of the prosecution, there was no discovery violation. 
 
 
- 6 - 
In State v. Brown, 567 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997), the court held that 
dismissal of drug possession charges was not required as a matter of law, even 
though the informant could not be produced.  The court noted that such a 
determination depends on the facts of each case, and the consideration of certain 
relevant factors.  The court said: 
Relevant factors to consider when making this determination include, 
but are not limited to, the State's ability to successfully identify or 
locate an informant, the reasonableness of the State's lack of 
information, and the reasonableness of its efforts to acquire additional 
information.  In addition, as discussed below, the extent of the 
informant's knowledge of the crime charged is a relevant factor in 
making this determination. 
Id. at 312.  In People v. Velazquez, 645 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1982), the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that where the State failed to exercise reasonable effort to 
locate an informant, dismissal was appropriate. 
Because the record before this Court demonstrates that neither the trial court 
nor the district court addressed the State's claim of its inability to produce the 
informant, and because we find the present record inadequate for the purpose of 
resolving this issue, we believe this matter should be remanded to the trial court so 
that a proper evidentiary hearing can be conducted, in camera if necessary, in order 
for the issue to be properly resolved. 
 
 
- 7 - 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case does not reflect a thorough development of the facts 
necessary to determine, as a matter of law, whether disclosure of the confidential 
informant's identity is required and whether the State is able to produce the 
informant.  Therefore, we quash the Third District's decision and instruct the 
district court to remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on 
these issues by an in camera hearing if necessary. 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D02-3120 and 3D03-376 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Roy A. Heimlich, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, and Barbara A. Zappi, 
Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent