Title: Payne v. DeWitt
Citation: 1999 OK 93, 70OBJ3452, 995 P.2d 1088
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 1999

Payne v. DeWitt Annotate this Case Payne v. DeWitt 1999 OK 93 995 P.2d 1088 70 OBJ 3452 Case Number: 89796 Decided: 11/23/1999 Mandate Issued: 01/07/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma RICK PAYNE and JENNIFER PAYNE, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellees v. LARRY DEWITT, Defendant/Appellant. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISON IV. ¶0 A motorist, injured when his car was hit by another vehicle that fled the scene of the accident, brought a tort action against the owner of the offending vehicle. Because the defendant-owner failed to attend two scheduled depositions, the District Court, Tulsa County, P. Thomas Thornbrugh, judge, entered default judgment for the plaintiff-motorist, denied defendant's counsel the opportunity to participate in the bench hearing on damages, and awarded the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, as well as counsel fee and costs. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari previously granted upon the defendant's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S DECLARATION OF LIABILITY UPON DEFAULT AND ITS ORDER DIRECTING A BENCH TRIAL UPON DAMAGES ISSUES ARE ALLOWED TO STAND; THE SANCTIONS OF BARRING CROSS- EXAMINATION, OBJECTION TO TESTIMONY OR EXHIBITS, OR ANY OTHER PARTICIPATION IN THE POST-DEFAULT BENCH HEARING ON DAMAGES ARE SET ASIDE; THE ACTUAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS ARE REVERSED; THE NISI PRIUS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEE AND ALLOWANCE OF COSTS ARE AFFIRMED; APPEAL- AND CERTIORARI-RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEE STANDS AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF, ITS AMOUNT TO BE DETERMINED IN AN ADVERSARY POST-REMAND HEARING; AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT Ray H. Wilburn, A. Mark Smiling, Wilburn, Masterson & Smiling, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for appellant, H. Gregory Maddux, Maddux & Maddux, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for appellees. OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive question tendered on certiorari is whether there was error in the trial court's imposition of I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Rick Payne [Payne] sustained injuries on 11 November 1995 when his vehicle was rear-ended by a car owned by Larry Dewitt [owner or Dewitt]. The latter vehicle left the scene of the accident before the driver's identity could be ascertained. The car's owner was identified by a check of the car's license tag. ¶3 Payne and his wife brought a tort claim against Dewitt, alleging that he was the vehicle's driver and that his willful, wanton and reckless actions caused the accident. Payne claimed personal injury, loss of consortium for his wife, property damage to his vehicle of $8,281.20 and punitive damages. Dewitt answered, (a) denying any negligence and damages, (b) urging failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (c) alleging the causation is unrelated to Dewitt's actions, (d) asserting the negligence of third parties over whom Dewitt had no control and (e) claiming that he was not a proper party. ¶4 Because Dewitt failed to appear for a "noticed deposition" on 31 January 1997, Payne moved for sanctions and default judgment. ¶5 The trial court ruled at the May 15 hearing that Payne's motion for sanctions "should be sustained" and that he "should be entitled to fees and costs to be determined upon application". Dewitt's counsel was warned that further sanctions would be imposed if Dewitt did not appear for a court-ordered deposition on May 19. When Dewitt failed to appear at that deposition, Payne renewed his quest for default judgment and prayed for costs and counsel fee. At the May 22 hearing on the renewed motion, the trial court declared Dewitt liable upon default for want of appearance for depositional discovery and ruled that ¶6 At the beginning of the June 25 hearing, Dewitt's counsel requested a jury trial on the issue of damages as well as an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to submit evidence. The trial court denied the request and struck Dewitt's answer as sanctions for his willful obstruction of discovery by failing to attend two earlier-scheduled depositions. After trying the damages issues sans jury and without participation by Dewitt's counsel, the trial court awarded Payne actual damages of $35,906.56 ($1,849.50 for medical expenses, $335.68 for lost wages, $9,021.38 for property damage, $25,000 for pain and suffering, $2,500 for the wife's loss of consortium) and punitive damages of $38,706.56. Dewitt's counsel was allowed to participate in a severed hearing on Payne's quest for counsel fee and costs. The trial court awarded Payne a $4,450.50 counsel fee and $242.50 in costs. ¶7 The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] affirmed, pronouncing that (a) Dewitt's noncompliance with the two earlier discovery requests warranted the extreme sanction of default judgment on liability and bars his participation at the bench hearing on [995 P.2d 1092] damages and (b) the award of damages, counsel fee and costs stands supported by the record. II THE TRIAL COURT'S DECLARATION OF LIABILITY UPON DEFAULT AND ITS ORDER DIRECTING BENCH TRIAL ON DAMAGES ISSUES FOR VIOLATION OF THE DISCOVERY PROCESS ARE JUSTIFIED ON THIS RECORD ¶8 The trial court's declaration of liability upon default and order directing nonjury trial on the damages rests on statute-authorized sanctions. Section § 3237(B)(2) of the Oklahoma Discovery Code ¶9 Like its federal counterpart, § 3237 allows the trial court to sanction a disobedient party by dismissal of its claim or by a default judgment. ¶10 We hold that on this record the nisi prius declaration of liability -- for both actual and punitive damages ¶11 According to the course of the common law and upon application of orderly process, the nisi prius declaration of liability to be established by a quantum determined at a nonjury hearing on damages is a permissible and fit sanction for Dewitt's act of escaping testimonial compulsion. III THE SANCTION OF BARRING CROSS-EXAMINATION AND OTHER TRUTH-TESTING DEVICES AT THE POST-DEFAULT NONJURY HEARING ON DAMAGES IS CONTRARY TO THE ORDERLY PROCESS OF ASSESSING DAMAGES ¶12 In the assessment of damages following entry of default judgment, a defaulting party has a statutory right to a hearing on the extent of unliquidated damages. ¶13 The trial court's bar of Dewitt's participation in the post-default damages inquest robs him of statutorily-granted rights and strips him of the law's protection against an unwarranted amount of damages in violation of due process. Obstacles that unreasonably impede full disclosure of the truth are an anathema to due process. ¶14 The crippling of Dewitt by stripping him of basic due process truth-testing devices is contrary to the orderly process of assessing damages. We hence set aside the concomitant order that encroaches on Dewitt's ability to use basic truth-testing devices at the § 688 proceeding by depriving him of the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, object to testimony or exhibits, or otherwise to participate at the hearing. The nisi prius court should have left for trial the quantum of actual and of punitive damages without stripping the defendant of basic forensic devices to test the truth of Payne's evidence. ¶15 If at any post-remand stage of the § 688 proceeding want of Dewitt's testimony should be found as a barrier to a meaningful inquest into damages, the trial judge may anew address that plaintiff-encountered deficiency and fashion an appropriate sanction to prevent a clear forensic disadvantage to the plaintiff. IV THE NISI PRIUS COUNSEL-FEE AWARD AND COST ALLOWANCE IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ¶16 Payne was awarded a counsel fee of $4,450.50 (based on 38.7 hours at the rate $115 per hour) and costs of $242.50. The hours included the time spent on the motions [995 P.2d 1096] for sanctions, default judgment, and counsel fees. Dewitt's counsel was allowed to participate in the hearing on Payne's quest for an attorney's fee. ¶17 Dewitt urges the counsel-fee award is excessive. His position rests upon the following notions. ¶18 Section 3237 provides that "reasonable expenses" (including counsel fees) be awarded for failure to obey a discovery order unless the court finds that the failure to appear for the deposition was "substantially justified." ¶19 Attached to Payne's nisi prius motion for attorney's fee is a detailed list of the hours spent in the prosecution of the litigation, beginning with the initial conference to discuss the automobile accident and property damage claim. Payne sought a counsel-fee of $5,962.50 (based on 47.7 hours at an hourly rate of $125) and costs of $242.50. On our review of the record, we hold that the trial court's reduced counsel-fee allowance to Payne and allowance for costs rests on supportive evidence. Gauged by the applicable standards of review, the amount awarded is not excessive. V PAYNE'S APPEAL- AND CERTIORARI-RELATED COUNSEL FEE ¶20 Because Dewitt's misbehavior caused the satellite litigation that began with successive motions for sanctions, we direct that he bear all of the legal expenses reasonably incurred by Payne in defending against the appeal and in prosecuting the quest for certiorari. VI SUMMARY ¶21 The trial court's declaration of liability upon defendant's default and its order directing a nonjury trial of damages meets the law's criteria. ¶22 The plaintiff is entitled to an evenhanded opportunity to elicit evidence relevant to actual and punitive damages and the defendant in default an equal opportunity to test his adversary's proof by cross-examination. The trial court's sanction by its order preventing cross-examination and other due process truth-testing devices at the post-default bench hearing on damages issues contravenes the law's orderly process. ¶23 The allowance of counsel fee and costs stands supported by the record. Payne's plea for appeal- and certiorari-related counsel-fee award is granted; the trial court is authorized to set the fee's amount in a post-remand adversary hearing upon due notice to the parties. ¶24 On certiorari previously granted upon the defendant's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated; the trial court's declaration of liability upon default and its order directing a bench trial upon damages issues are allowed to stand; the sanctions of barring cross-examination, objection to testimony or exhibits, or any other participation in the post-default bench hearing on damages are set aside; the actual and punitive damages awards are reversed; the nisi prius award of attorney's fee and allowance of costs are affirmed; appeal- and certiorari-related attorney's fee stands awarded to the plaintiff, its amount to be determined in an adversary post-remand hearing; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement. ¶25 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA and BOUDREAU, JJ., concur; ¶26 KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. FOOT