Title: People v. Navarro
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S165195
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ANTHONY NAVARRO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S165195 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
02NF3143 
 
 
October 28, 2021 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, Groban, and 
Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
S165195 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Anthony Navarro of the first 
degree murder of David Montemayor and of conspiracy to 
commit his murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. 
(a)),1 as well as participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, 
subd. (a)).  The jury found true the special circumstance 
allegations that the murder was committed in the course of a 
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and in the course of a 
kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)) and was committed to 
further the activities of a criminal gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). 
Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned 
a verdict of death.  Defendant moved for a new trial and for 
modification of his sentence to life without the possibility of 
parole.  The trial court denied those motions and sentenced 
defendant to death.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. 
(b).)   
We affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution evidence 
The murder victim, David Montemayor, was the manager 
and part owner of a trucking company, Interfreight Transport, 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
located in Rancho Dominguez.  Montemayor’s sister, Deborah 
Perna, who also worked at Interfreight, disliked her brother.  
She believed that Montemayor was embezzling funds from the 
company and storing the cash in coffee cans in his garage. 
In early 2002, Perna hired Edelmira Corona to work as an 
office assistant at Interfreight.  Around May that year, Perna 
asked Corona if she knew anyone who could have Montemayor 
killed.2  Corona put her off, but Perna was persistent.  At some 
point, Perna gave Corona a handwritten note bearing 
Montemayor’s home address and telephone number and asked 
again whether Corona could arrange for Montemayor’s killing.  
Corona was again noncommittal and stashed the note in her 
desk. 
According to Corona, she introduced defendant to Perna in 
August 2002, when he came to Interfreight to deliver 
methamphetamine to Corona.3  Soon after, Perna suggested 
that Corona give defendant the note with Montemayor’s address 
and phone number and ask him to kill her brother.  When 
 
2  
Although it is not clear why Perna believed Corona could 
arrange for a killing, the evidence at trial suggested that 
Corona’s father is a high-ranking member of a criminal gang.   
3  
Corona was the only person involved in the killing to 
testify at trial, besides defendant himself.  Four other 
participants — Perna and three others, whose roles are 
discussed subsequently — were convicted of the murder after 
separate trials.  The convictions of Perna and one of the other 
participants have been affirmed on appeal.  (People v. Perna 
(July 23, 2007, G036905 [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Lopez (July 
23, 2007, G0371693 [nonpub. opn.].)  The other two were 
sentenced to death, and their automatic appeals are pending 
before this court.  (People v. Alberto Martinez, S185364, app. 
pending; People v. Armando Macias, S196185, app. pending.) 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
Corona saw defendant later and he inquired about Perna, 
Corona told him that Perna had seen his tattoos and suggested 
Corona hire him to kill Montemayor.  Defendant merely 
laughed. 
In mid-August, defendant drove Corona to northern 
California to visit her father, an inmate at the state prison at 
Pelican Bay, and her then-boyfriend, who was jailed in 
Humboldt County.  Corona told defendant that her father was a 
leader in the Mexican Mafia, a southern California prison gang.  
During the drive, Corona received a call from Perna.  When 
Perna learned Corona was with defendant, she asked whether 
Corona had mentioned the killing of Montemayor.  When 
Corona told defendant about the conversation, he asked for 
Montemayor’s address, but Corona did not have the address 
with her. 
Corona and defendant made plans to meet about another 
matter a week later, and defendant asked Corona to bring 
Perna’s handwritten note to the meeting.  Before giving 
defendant the note that day, Corona wrote “one hand” on it, 
indicating that Montemayor was an amputee.  She also told 
defendant that Perna said he could keep anything he found in 
Montemayor’s home, in particular the cash Perna believed was 
hidden in the garage.  When Corona told defendant that Perna 
wanted him to make Montemayor “disappear,” he responded, 
“yes.” 
During a later phone call, Corona asked defendant about 
the note.  He said he had lost it and asked her to get him the 
information again, but she never did so.  In early September, 
Perna asked Corona when defendant was going to kill 
Montemayor.  Corona told her defendant had lost the note and 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
“wasn’t doing anything.”  Corona never again spoke with 
defendant about Montemayor’s killing, she testified.  Although 
Perna continued to talk to Corona about having Montemayor 
killed, Corona “would just laugh at her.”  Corona ceased working 
at Interfreight soon after, on September 17, 2002. 
Montemayor’s weekday routine was to leave his Orange 
County home at 6:00 a.m., drive to Interfreight in his Ford 
Expedition, and open the business.  On the morning of October 
2, the business was already open when the other employees 
began to arrive, but Montemayor was not there.  Around 6:45 
a.m., a neighbor spotted Montemayor’s Expedition driving down 
the street near his home, followed closely by another SUV.  A 
few minutes later, shortly before 7:00 a.m., near an intersection 
about a half-mile from Montemayor’s home, several gunshots 
were heard.  Police found Montemayor’s body lying near his 
Expedition, along with spent bullet casings.  He had been killed 
by a gunshot to the head. 
At the time of the shooting, the driver of a vehicle near the 
intersection saw two men running around a vehicle, one of them 
firing a handgun.  The two men entered a blue Chevrolet Blazer 
with a license plate containing “3L” and drove off.  Soon after, a 
police officer driving an unmarked car spotted a Chevrolet 
Blazer matching the description of the vehicle seen at the site of 
the shooting.  After a high-speed chase, during which two 
firearms were thrown from the Blazer, police arrested the three 
occupants, Armando Macias, Alberto Martinez, and Gerardo 
Lopez.  One of the handguns thrown from the vehicle was later 
matched to the bullet that killed Montemayor, and the other gun 
was linked to a bullet and spent casings found at the scene of 
the shooting. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
As he was being apprehended, Macias threw a cell phone 
into nearby bushes; police later found that the cell phone was 
registered to defendant’s girlfriend.4  The phone dropped by 
Macias was determined to have been in contact with a cell phone 
used by defendant 18 times in the hour and one-half 
surrounding the killing.  Macias was also found to have a 
business card in his wallet.  Handwritten on the back was 
defendant’s gang moniker and the number of another cell phone 
linked to defendant.  Martinez’s wallet contained a piece of 
paper with “Anthony Navarro” written on it, along with 
defendant’s auto club membership number. 
On the day before Montemayor’s killing, Macias had 
rented a car.  Investigating police found Macias’s rented car 
parked in front of defendant’s home.  The Blazer used by the 
three was registered at the address of defendant’s home, 
although not in defendant’s name.  Around 9:00 a.m. on the 
morning of the killing, defendant’s wife called police to report 
that the Blazer had been stolen, but a subsequent search of the 
Blazer revealed keys in the ignition and no signs of forced entry.  
The registered owner of the Blazer never sought its release from 
police impoundment after the killing. 
In subsequent testimony, defendant acknowledged that he 
maintained a series of cell phones for the use of gang members 
who worked with him.5  Telephone records showed that one of 
 
4  
Although defendant was married at the time of the killing, 
he was romantically involved with another woman, whom we 
will refer to as his girlfriend. 
5  
In addition to the cell phone dropped by Macias, three 
other numbers were registered to defendant’s girlfriend.  A 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
the cell phones linked to defendant, with a number ending in 
“1600,” was in repeated contact with cell phones linked to 
Corona, defendant’s wife, defendant’s girlfriend, Macias, and 
Martinez in the hours preceding Montemayor’s killing.  In 
particular, the records show that Corona called the 1600 phone 
at 5:00 p.m. on the evening prior to the homicide.  Later that 
evening, the phone was used to make repeated calls to 
defendant’s wife and Corona.  Beginning around 11:00 p.m., the 
1600 phone recorded multiple calls to Macias and Martinez, 
followed throughout the night by more calls to Corona, Macias, 
and defendant’s wife.  Early the following morning, the 1600 
phone was used to call Macias and Corona.  The next day, a 
person who identified herself as “Mrs. Johnston” called 
customer service of the Nextel mobile phone company and 
changed the number assigned to the 1600 cell phone; 
defendant’s wife’s cell phone records reflected calls to Nextel 
around that time.  In addition, Corona attempted to call Macias 
four times around 6:30 a.m. on the morning Montemayor was 
killed.  Her last call connected and lasted for a minute. 
Two weeks later, police stopped defendant while he was 
driving a Lexus vehicle.  In the glove compartment of the Lexus 
were Perna’s handwritten note with Montemayor’s address and 
phone number and a CD case containing a photograph of 
Corona.  During the stop, defendant confirmed to a detective 
that he was “an older member or elder member” of the Pacoima 
Flats street gang.  Following his arrest in connection with 
Montemayor’s murder, defendant wrote several letters from jail 
 
mechanic who lived at defendant’s home prior to the killing, 
Daniel Johnston, testified that defendant used four of the five 
cell phone numbers registered in Johnston’s name.   
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
suggesting his involvement in gang activities.  Among these 
were letters to both Macias and Martinez expressing affection 
and discussing personal matters. 
A local police detective, Nathaniel Booth, testified as an 
expert concerning matters relating to street gangs.  Booth was 
a member of the gang unit of the Buena Park police department 
and had participated in a search of defendant’s home during its 
investigation of the Montemayor killing.  He testified that gang 
members are expected to “put[] in work” for the gang by 
committing crimes or violence for the benefit of the gang.  Older 
members of the gang “often are more like supervisors,” with 
younger members committing “the majority of the violent crime” 
in order to prove their mettle. 
Booth testified that gangs generally acquire a name, 
which often refers to the neighborhood in which they operate, 
and individual members are given monikers used within the 
gang.  Graffiti is used to promote the gang or individual 
members, mark turf, and challenge other gangs.  One form of 
graffiti is the “roll call,” in which a gang member records a list 
of the gang members with which that member regularly 
associates.  Tattoos are also used to indicate gang membership 
and identity.  Citing several of defendant’s tattoos, Booth 
identified him as a member of the Pacoima Flats gang, which is 
affiliated with the Mexican Mafia.  When Booth searched 
defendant’s residence, he saw words spray painted and written 
on the walls of the garage in the manner of graffiti.  Among 
others, these illustrated the words or terms PF, Droop, Droops, 
Droop Baby, Lil Droops, Crook, Pirate, Lil Pirate, Chito, Blackie, 
D’Sta, Dee, and Weaz.  Booth identified “Droopy” as defendant’s 
gang moniker, while Crook and Pirate are the monikers of 
Martinez and Macias, respectively, both of whom Booth also 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
identified as Pacoima Flats gang members.6  He identified this 
graffiti as a “very short” roll call, identifying a series of members 
who “associate together within the gang.”  Booth also identified 
Lopez as a member of the Pacoima Flats gang.  Based on this 
and other information, Booth concluded that defendant, 
Martinez, Macias, and Lopez were all members of the Pacoima 
Flats gang at the time of Montemayor’s killing and that 
Montemayor was killed for the benefit of the gang. 
2. Defense evidence 
Defendant testified that he became a member of the 
Pacoima Flats gang in 1978, at the age of 12.  He decided to 
become an informer for the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) in 2000, after the Mexican Mafia killed his cousin.  
Thereafter, he cooperated with the Los Angeles office of the FBI 
from April to October 2000, the San Diego office of the FBI from 
November 2000 to November 2001, and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for two months in mid-2002. 
As an aspect of his cooperation, defendant attended 
meetings of members of the Mexican Mafia while wearing a 
listening device and camera.  He was able to relate extensive 
information about planned gang activities.  Defendant was also 
provided funds by the FBI that he turned over to a senior 
member of the Mexican Mafia, passing the money off as 
protection payments extorted from other gang members, 
referred to as “rent.”  This enhanced defendant’s status in the 
 
6  
Subsequently, 
during 
cross-examination, 
defendant 
acknowledged that his home was a “hangout” and that “Crook” 
and “Lil Pirate 2,” painted on the garage walls, referred to 
Martinez and Macias, respectively.  “D’Sta” referred to 
defendant.   
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
gang, which in turn increased his effectiveness as an informant.  
Defendant was declared by the gang to be a llavero, or “key 
holder,” effectively the top gang member in an assigned portion 
of Pacoima.  Defendant acknowledged that he maintained “at 
least nine” cell phones at this time.  He permitted others to use 
the phones, which helped him keep track of his fellow gang 
members. 
Defendant believed that he began to be viewed with 
suspicion within the gang no later than March 2002, when he 
was arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon, a potential 
third strike crime, but was released on low bail and never 
formally charged.  He received the lenient treatment because of 
his status as an informant.  The Los Angeles FBI terminated 
defendant as an informant in 2000 because it learned that 
rumors of his cooperation were circulating within the gang. 
Defendant said he first met Corona in April 2002, when 
Macias introduced her to him.  Corona told him she was the 
daughter of Felipe Vivar, a “mafia boss” whom defendant knew 
by reputation, and that Vivar had put her in charge of gang 
activities in the area.  Corona told defendant that Vivar wanted 
him to commit a killing in Orange County.  By that time, 
defendant had been terminated as an informant, was no longer 
receiving government funds, and had stopped making rent 
payments to the gang.  He was concerned that the gang assumed 
he was collecting and withholding the payments and had 
ordered his killing. 
In June 2002, defendant was the victim of a freeway 
shooting, which he interpreted as a warning from the gang.  He 
sought a second meeting with Corona, hoping that she could 
help him set things right.  Corona told him she could arrange for 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
the removal of an order for defendant’s death, imposed by the 
gang, for a payment of $14,000.  Defendant only had $7,000, 
which he gave to her.  On this occasion, Corona gave him Perna’s 
handwritten note with Montemayor’s address and asked him to 
arrange for the killing, telling him the victim owed Vivar money.  
Defendant believed that she also told him the intended victim 
was her boss.  “One hand” was written on the note, but 
defendant did not ask what it meant.  Defendant put the note in 
the glove compartment of his Lexus. 
After this meeting, defendant attempted to report the 
requested killing to his handler for the ATF, James Starkey, but 
Starkey told defendant he was too busy and instructed 
defendant to contact Rod Rodriguez, a Los Angeles police 
detective with whom defendant had also worked.  Defendant 
thereafter spoke with Rodriguez and told him that Vivar’s 
daughter said Vivar “wanted somebody from the San Fernando 
area to come out to Orange County to kill somebody.”  Defendant 
told Rodriguez he did not know the name of the victim but had 
his address.  Because the note with the address was in his car, 
defendant was unable to provide Rodriguez the address, nor did 
he provide Corona’s phone number.  Rodriguez instructed him 
to find out the name of the intended victim, telling defendant he 
could not do anything without that name. 
Defendant acknowledged driving to northern California 
with Corona, characterizing the trip as a further attempt to 
straighten out his relations with the gang, as well as to get more 
information about the requested killing for Detective Rodriguez.  
During the drive, Corona told defendant about the money 
thought to be hidden in Montemayor’s garage, but she refused 
to give him the victim’s name.  This time, rather than asking 
defendant to commit the killing, Corona suggested that he “get 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
some homies to do it.”  Defendant thought she was not serious.  
Two weeks later, Corona paged defendant.  When he returned 
her call, she asked, “Are you going to do this?”  He told her he 
needed the address again, claiming he had lost the note.  
Although she said she would get back to him with the address, 
she never did.  Defendant testified that by the time of this 
conversation with Corona he had forgotten where he left the 
note and did not remember until it was found in the police 
search. 
Defendant testified that he believed the prosecution’s 
theory of the crime was implausible because no senior gang 
member would permit a car registered at his address to be used 
in a killing; the same is true regarding his cell phones.  Further, 
by the time of the killing defendant believed he was regarded as 
a turncoat by the gang.  Defendant had been shot at twice while 
driving on the freeway, suffering a wound the second time.  In 
addition, his car was shot at while being driven by a friend.  
After his arrest, defendant was attacked by Macias and Lopez 
while detained in a holding cell.  They stabbed him eleven times, 
calling him a “rat.” 
The account by defendant of his activities as an informant 
was largely corroborated by the testimony of law enforcement 
agents from the FBI and ATF.  Their recollections of defendant’s 
communications about the Montemayor murder plot, however, 
differed from his own.  Starkey confirmed that in early June 
2002, defendant called him and said “somebody was going to hit 
somebody.”  Defendant was unable to provide any additional 
information, such as the potential victim, location, or timing of 
the killing.  Starkey told defendant to get more information and 
to deal with Rodriguez because Starkey was busy with another 
matter.  Starkey said that if defendant had provided sufficient 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
detail to support an investigation, he would have turned to it 
immediately. 
When Rodriguez, a Los Angeles police detective in 2002, 
first met defendant, he was aware that defendant was regarded 
as an effective informant.  Because defendant was, as Rodriguez 
characterized him, a “shot caller” in the gang, he was in a unique 
position to gather information.  In July 2002, defendant called 
Rodriguez to ask if he was interested in “some type of a kidnap 
for ransom or a murder for hire case.”  At the time, defendant 
said he did not have any additional information.  In particular, 
defendant did not mention Corona or the note with the victim’s 
address and telephone number.  Rodriguez told defendant he 
needed more information, such as the name of the victim, and 
asked defendant to find out as much additional information as 
he could.  Defendant mentioned the matter again in a telephone 
call two weeks later, suggesting that the killing would occur in 
Orange County.  Rodriguez said he needed more information to 
put defendant in touch with appropriate law enforcement 
officials in Orange County.  Again, defendant did not provide 
any other information.  He said he would get back to Rodriguez, 
but he never did. 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution case in aggravation 
Laurie Fadness testified that in February 2002, several 
men entered her home and attacked three men — David 
Gallegos, Gallegos’s cousin, and a roommate of Fadness.  
Fadness had left the house that evening.  When she returned, 
she saw several unfamiliar vehicles parked in front, including a 
black SUV.  As she approached the back door, she heard “two 
loud bangs.”  Entering, she saw several men scattering toward 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
the doors.  One of them yelled, “Droopy, Jesse, let’s go!”  Gallegos 
and his cousin were bloody and in shock, and her house was a 
shambles. 
Gallegos testified that five men entered Fadness’s house 
that night.  He identified all five, without naming defendant.  
When they entered, one of the men said to Gallegos’s cousin, 
“Droopy wants to talk to you.”  The cousin responded that he 
had nothing to say to Droopy.  At that point, the men began 
beating them, and Gallegos heard two gunshots.  He later saw 
that his cousin had suffered a gunshot wound to the head.  
Gallegos acknowledged that he told police he heard the name 
“Droopy” that day and knew defendant by that name, but he 
said that defendant was not present. 
Gallegos also testified regarding an incident about six 
weeks later, in March 2002.  At that time, he was asked to 
deliver a letter to a member of the Pacoima Flats gang by a 
member of a rival gang.  Two weeks after he made the delivery, 
Gallegos learned that Droopy wanted to talk to him.  Gallegos 
was eventually taken to defendant’s house at gunpoint.  
Defendant was in the garage with several other men, including 
the men to whom Gallegos had delivered the letter.  Defendant 
asked about Gallegos’s delivery of the letter.  When Gallegos told 
them who had given it to him, defendant and the other men 
began to beat and torture him.  Eventually, Gallegos heard 
defendant say, “He’s got to go,” after which Gallegos was taken 
away and shot 14 times.  Gallegos identified defendant to police 
as one of the shooters in a photographic line up. 
Paul Parent was a mechanic hired by defendant in 
September 2001 to service the vehicles of defendant, his family, 
and his friends.  At defendant’s insistence, Parent moved into 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
defendant’s house two weeks later.  Within a few weeks, Parent 
became frightened by activities at the house and attempted to 
leave.  In retaliation, defendant and two other men beat Parent 
and broke his finger with a hammer.  Defendant thereafter 
threatened to kill Parent if he did not return to work.  A month 
later, Parent again attempted to get away from defendant’s 
house.  When his escape attempt failed, he was beaten again by 
defendant and four other men.  Defendant beat Parent on at 
least two other occasions.  In April, defendant gave Parent a van 
and granted him permission to leave, in return for Parent’s 
assistance in moving defendant’s household.  Ten minutes after 
the move was complete, defendant called Parent and said, in a 
mocking tone, “Rudy is going to shoot you.”  About two minutes 
later, Parent was shot in the back.  His recovery required six 
months of hospitalization. 
Karensa Spellman met defendant through a friend and 
began selling defendant methamphetamine.  At some point, 
defendant sought information from her about one of his rivals in 
the gang, whom she knew.  When Spellman told defendant she 
had no information, he beat and kicked her repeatedly.  He then 
locked Spellman in his garage, where she remained for two 
weeks without food before Parent helped her escape. 
The prosecution also provided evidence of two prior 
adjudicated crimes.  In 1983, when he was 16 years old, 
defendant participated with between 25 and 30 other gang 
members in the shooting of two rival gang members.  There was 
no evidence that defendant was among the shooters, and he was 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  In 1995, defendant 
arranged to meet Francisco Chavez in a parking lot to purchase 
some clothing.  When defendant arrived, he and three other men 
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15 
robbed Chavez and his wife at knifepoint.  Defendant was 
convicted of second degree robbery with use of a weapon. 
There was, in addition, testimony about the impact of 
Montemayor’s death.  His wife and daughters testified about 
their personal losses, and Montemayor’s death led to the failure 
of Interfreight, putting its employees out of work. 
2.  Defense case in mitigation 
Detective Rodriguez testified that defendant continued to 
act as an informant even after his arrest in this case, providing 
useful information to law enforcement.  Two FBI agents 
provided additional detail about defendant’s work as an 
informant for the FBI.  His cooperation was valuable and was 
undertaken at great risk, placing the lives of both defendant and 
his family members in danger.  For several years, defendant also 
had participated in outreach programs for youth directed at 
preventing gang participation.  Defendant’s brother and 
daughter testified about his positive role in their lives. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Claims 
1. Defendant’s convictions are supported by the 
evidence 
Defendant’s convictions are necessarily premised on a 
finding that he conspired with or acted as an accomplice to the 
actual killers to bring about Montemayor’s murder.  Defendant 
contends that the jury was not presented with sufficient 
evidence of his participation in such a conspiracy to support the 
convictions.  We find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
judgment. 
“When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we ask ‘ “whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
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16 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” ’  [Citation.]  Because the sufficiency of the 
evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the 
record independently for ‘ “substantial evidence — that is, 
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ that 
would support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 804 (Banks).)  In doing so, we “view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and 
presume the existence of every fact that the jury could 
reasonably have deduced from that evidence.”  (People v. Reed 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1006 (Reed).)  “We must also ‘accept logical 
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the 
circumstantial evidence.’ ”  (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 
371, 411 (Flores).)  We do not question the credibility of a 
witness’s testimony, so long as it is “not inherently improbable,” 
nor do we reconsider the weight to be given any particular item 
of evidence.  (Reed, at p. 1006; see id. at p. 1007.) 
“ ‘ “Conspiracy requires two or more persons agreeing to 
commit a crime, along with the commission of an overt act, by at 
least one of these parties, in furtherance of the conspiracy.” ’ ”  
(People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 244 (Dalton).)  “ ‘Evidence 
is sufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime “if 
it supports an inference that the parties positively or tacitly 
came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1111, italics omitted 
(Thompson).)  “Evidence of an agreement does not require proof 
that the parties met and expressly agreed; a criminal 
conspiracy can be shown through circumstantial evidence.”  
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 145.)  “If the 
agreement between the conspirators is the crux of criminal 
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17 
conspiracy, then the existence and nature of the relationship 
among the conspirators is undoubtedly relevant to whether such 
agreement was formed, particularly since such agreement must 
often be proved circumstantially.  ‘ “The existence of a 
conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, 
interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and 
during the alleged conspiracy.” ’ ”  (People v. Homick (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 816, 870, italics omitted (Homick).) 
The testimony and forensic evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, demonstrated that Perna 
wanted her brother killed and solicited Corona’s aid to that end.  
Corona, who had ties to the Mexican Mafia, contacted 
defendant, a well-positioned gang member, about that 
possibility.  By Corona’s account, she introduced Perna to 
defendant and later conveyed to him Perna’s request for the 
killing.  By defendant’s account, Corona passed on a request, 
which could have been understood as a demand, for the killing 
from a highly placed member of the Mexican Mafia.  Either way, 
it was not disputed that Corona solicited defendant to commit 
the murder, generally described the victim to him, and provided 
him a writing with the victim’s address and telephone number.  
From defendant’s acceptance of the note, which was still in his 
possession at the time of the murder, and Corona’s description 
of his conduct in accepting it, the jury could have inferred that 
he was willing to consider undertaking the assignment. 
Detective Booth testified that the typical street gang is 
disciplined and hierarchical.  Junior members of the gang are 
expected to serve the interests of more senior members; senior 
members, in turn, leave the execution of criminal activities to 
more junior members.  Defendant was a longtime member of the 
Pacoima Flats street gang.  By his own admission, he was 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
regarded as a llavero, the chief gang member in a portion of 
Pacoima.  His home was a gathering place for gang members, to 
whom he provided vehicles and cell phones.  Yet at the time of 
the murder his standing within the gang was threatened by 
rumors that he was an informant and by his failure to maintain 
the rent payments.  From this, the jury could have concluded 
that defendant had a non-financial motive to accomplish the 
murder, which could have shored up his deteriorating position 
in the gang. 
Between two and six months after Corona first proposed 
the murder, Montemayor was killed by three gang members, all 
of whom were members of the same gang as defendant.7  Two of 
the three were sufficiently close to defendant within the gang 
that their monikers were among those of a small number of 
associates painted on the walls of his garage.  In committing the 
killing, these associates used a vehicle registered to defendant’s 
address.  In the hours prior to the shooting, two of the gang 
members were repeatedly in contact with cell phones associated 
with defendant and Corona.8  Further, the 1600 cell phone 
linked to defendant was in constant communication with 
Macias, Martinez, Corona, and defendant’s wife beginning on 
the evening prior to the killing, continuing through the night 
 
7  
Corona testified that she first proposed the murder to 
defendant in August 2002, but his recollection was that the first 
conversation occurred in April. 
8  
Although the Blazer and cell phone service plans were not 
in defendant’s name, there was evidence that defendant 
registered his assets in the names of other persons, presumably 
to avoid the assets being traced to him.  The jury could therefore 
have inferred that the Blazer and the various cell phones were 
controlled by defendant. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
and into the early morning.  After the killing, attempts were 
made to obscure the connection between defendant and the 
crime by reporting stolen the vehicle used in the killing and 
changing the number of the 1600 cell phone. 
Accordingly, the evidence could be understood to 
demonstrate that:  (1) defendant, a relatively senior member of 
the Pacoima Flats, a criminal street gang, was asked or directed 
to commit the Montemayor killing by Corona, whose father was 
a highly placed gang member; (2) defendant received and 
retained Montemayor’s address and phone number from 
Corona; (3) Montemayor was subsequently killed by two 
Pacoima Flats gang members who were among a small group 
closely associated with defendant, along with a third member of 
the same gang; (4) these gang members were permitted to use 
and did use defendant’s car and cell phones in committing the 
killing; (5) the two gang members closest to defendant were in 
repeated contact with him and Corona in the hours leading up 
to the killing; and (6) defendant was similarly in constant 
communication with these two and Corona in the twelve hours 
leading to the murder.  This pattern is consistent with Detective 
Booth’s testimony about street gang culture, in which, he said, 
older members tend to supervise, while younger members are 
tasked with the actual commission of violent crime.   
As noted above, when reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a criminal conviction, we apply a deferential 
standard.  We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the 
prosecution 
and, 
taking 
that 
view, 
ask 
whether 
“ ‘ “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”  (Banks, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 804, italics omitted.)  Given defendant’s 
standing within the Pacoima Flats gang, a jury reasonably could 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
have inferred that the subordinates were enlisted to commit the 
crime on defendant’s behalf.  Further, although there is no direct 
evidence that defendant conspired with the three gang members 
to commit the crime, a jury reasonably could have concluded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant recruited and 
directed them and facilitated their commission of the killing, 
based on the shooters’ gang relationship to defendant, their use 
of a vehicle registered to defendant’s address, and the killers’ 
repeated contact with him and Corona immediately before the 
killing. 
Defendant 
offers 
several 
alternative, 
contrary 
interpretations of the evidence.  The interpretations vary in 
their plausibility, but our consideration of them is, in any event, 
constrained by our deferential standard of review.  We must 
accept the jury’s verdict if it represents a rational conclusion 
from the evidence, and, for the reasons discussed above, we find 
it so.  We analyze defendant’s interpretations below, while 
recognizing that, in the end, they address matters that were the 
jury’s to resolve. 
Defendant first contends that the foregoing evidence was 
sufficient to support only a “suspicion” that he “might” have 
been a member of the conspiracy.  This characterization 
underestimates the probative force of the evidence, which 
readily supported the conclusion that defendant was, in effect, 
the killers’ boss in a criminal enterprise.  He was solicited to 
commit the killing; his subordinates committed the shooting 
using his property; and these subordinates were in repeated 
contact with him before and during the killing.  The inference 
that the gang members were working in concert with defendant 
therefore finds solid support in the evidence.  It is true, as 
defendant argues, that there was no direct evidence of his 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
personal participation past the point of his solicitation by 
Corona, but such evidence was not required.  Given the nature 
of criminal conspiracies, it is often the case that there is no 
direct evidence of an agreement among the conspirators.  
(Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 870 [“such agreement must 
often be proved circumstantially”].)  Contrary to defendant’s 
contention, direct evidence is unnecessary when, as here, the 
circumstantial evidence permits the jury to infer beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an agreement existed. 
Defendant also contends that his mere association with 
the shooters is insufficient to support a finding that he conspired 
with them.  (See, e.g., Simmonds v. Superior Court (1966) 245 
Cal.App.2d 704, 708 [“the law recognizes that mere association 
or mere presence cannot alone furnish the basis for a charge of 
coconspiracy”].)  That is correct as a principle of law, but the 
prosecution provided evidence of more than mere association.  
As noted above, it could be concluded that defendant had a 
personal motive to commit the killing; was, pursuant to his 
standing in the gang, the shooters’ boss; permitted them to use 
his 
property 
in 
committing 
the 
crime; 
and 
was 
in 
communication with them before and at the time of the shooting. 
Defendant suggests the killing was staged in a manner 
designed to frame him, perhaps because of the suspicions that 
he was an informant.  As noted, he testified that no person in 
his position would knowingly permit gang underlings to use his 
car in committing a homicide or would communicate with those 
underlings by cell phone in the course of the crime.  Although 
these aspects of the killing certainly inculpated defendant in the 
killing, the jury was not required to accept them as the result of 
an attempt to frame him.  They could simply be explained as 
incaution. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
The jury could also have discounted defendant’s theory 
because the plot he outlined depended for its success on the 
shooters’ apprehension.  The forensic evidence used to implicate 
defendant was located because the killers were found in 
possession of it immediately after the homicide.  Had the 
shooters not been spotted, chased, and arrested, police would not 
have been able to use Macias’s cell phone to connect defendant 
to the crime.  Nor would they have found the business card 
bearing defendant’s gang moniker in Macias’s wallet, and they 
might not have been able to identify the vehicle used.  In other 
words, framing defendant in this manner would succeed only if 
the killers were caught soon after the killing.  Accepting 
defendant’s claim therefore required the jury to conclude that 
the killers’ apprehension was an integral part of the plan to 
frame him.  Although this is conceivable, the jury was by no 
means compelled to conclude that the evidence of defendant’s 
involvement in the execution of the scheme was, in effect, 
fabricated. 
Defendant contends that it “defies logic” to infer that he 
was involved in the killing after having told two law 
enforcement officers about it.  Though defendant was free to 
argue, as he did, that this evidence was helpful to him, the jury 
was entitled to discount it.  (See Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 
1007.)  Defendant knew considerably more about the planned 
killing than he told the officers, including the involvement of 
Corona and the address and telephone number of the proposed 
victim.  Yet he told the detectives little more than that a 
homicide would occur at some unspecified time in Orange 
County, perhaps involving unidentified gang “big homies.”  As a 
result, nothing defendant told the detectives would permit them 
to connect the crime, if and when it occurred, to him personally.  
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
For this reason, the jury’s conclusion that the reports did not 
preclude his subsequent participation in the murder was 
entirely rational. 
Finally, defendant contends the evidence is “just as 
consistent” with his innocence and points to several 
circumstances that, he asserts, are inconsistent with his 
participation in the killing.  In particular, defendant cites (1) his 
disclosures to law enforcement, (2) his move to Las Vegas prior 
to the killing, (3) the use of his vehicle in the crime, (4) the 
suspicions within the gang that he was an informant, and (5) his 
poor relations with his wife, who was a friend of Corona.  We 
acknowledge that these factors, if accepted as true, weighed 
against the conclusion that defendant was involved in the 
killing.  Our task in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a criminal conviction, however, is not to weigh the 
evidence to determine the most likely interpretation.  Rather, 
we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination, taking at 
face value evidence that is not inherently improbable, and 
presuming the existence of every fact reasonably deduced from 
that evidence.  (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 411; Reed, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 1006.)  We ask not whether the jury’s judgment 
was the most probable interpretation of the evidence, but simply 
whether it was a rational one.  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 
804.)  For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the 
jury’s judgment here was rational.  None of the circumstances 
cited by defendant persuades us otherwise. 
2.  Defendant failed to demonstrate that he withdrew 
from the conspiracy 
Defendant contends that, assuming he was involved in the 
homicide, he withdrew from the conspiracy by reporting the plan 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
to police.  Simply as a matter of the law of withdrawal, 
defendant’s 
conduct 
was 
insufficient. 
 
As 
defendant 
acknowledges, California law requires a withdrawing defendant 
to “ ‘notify[] the other party or parties of whom he had 
knowledge of his intention to withdraw from the commission of 
the crime and . . . [do] everything in his power to prevent its 
commission.’ ”  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 
1022, fn. omitted; see also People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 
178–179.)  Putting aside the issue of notification, the evidence is 
clear that defendant did not do “everything in his power” to 
prevent the killing.  Merely by disclosing to Rodriguez either 
Corona’s involvement or the address and phone number of the 
intended victim, defendant could have prevented the killing.  
Instead, he withheld that information. 
Defendant argues, alternatively, we should hold that “a 
person may withdraw from a conspiracy by communicating the 
pending plot to law enforcement,” although he acknowledges 
that he is unaware of any California decision announcing such 
a rule of law.  Even if we were to adopt his proposed rule, it 
would presumably require that the defendant make a more 
fulsome disclosure of the planned crime than occurred here.  As 
discussed above, defendant disclosed no genuinely useful 
information to law enforcement, while withholding information 
that likely would have permitted the officers to prevent the 
killing — for example, the address and phone number of the 
victim or Corona’s solicitation.  We decline to rule that the 
limited nature of defendant’s disclosure to the law enforcement 
officers was sufficient to constitute a withdrawal from the 
conspiracy. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
3.  The evidence was sufficient to support the special 
circumstances for murder during a robbery and 
murder during a kidnapping 
Relying on our decision in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, 
defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that he was a “major participant” in the killing, as 
required by section 190.2, subdivision (d).  Such evidence was 
unnecessary, however, because the jury necessarily found that 
defendant intended Montemayor’s death. 
Section 190.2, subdivision (d), states that a defendant can 
be sentenced under a felony murder special circumstance upon 
findings that the defendant was a “major participant” in the 
crime and acted with reckless indifference to life.  In Banks, we 
applied this subdivision in concluding that a defendant who 
participated as the getaway driver in an armed robbery that 
resulted in a killing was a not “major participant” in the robbery.  
(Id., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 807; see id. at pp. 804–807.)  Section 
190.2, subdivision (d), however, applies only to defendants who 
lacked the intent to kill and did not actually kill.  Section 190.2, 
subdivisions (b) and (c) subject defendants who were either the 
actual killer or possessed the intent to kill, respectively, to a 
felony murder special circumstance without the finding of 
further elements. 
The clear distinction between this case and Banks is the 
underlying crime.  The defendant in Banks participated in an 
armed robbery that incidentally involved a killing; defendant in 
the present case conspired to commit a murder that incidentally 
involved an attempted robbery and kidnapping.  Although not 
all of the theories of murder on which defendant was tried 
required a finding of intent to kill, both conspiracy to murder 
and a special circumstance for murder committed for the benefit 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
of a criminal street gang require that finding.  (E.g., People v. 
Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641, 642 (Beck and Cruz) 
[“ ‘all conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to 
commit premeditated and deliberated first degree murder’ ” and 
“conspiracy to commit murder may not be based on a theory of 
implied malice”]; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 
1144–1145 [street gang special circumstance requires intent to 
kill concerning a defendant who was not the actual killer].)  The 
jury was so instructed.9  In finding defendant guilty of 
conspiracy to murder and finding true the criminal street gang 
special circumstance, the jury necessarily found that he acted 
with the intent to kill Montemayor.  Defendant was therefore 
subject to the felony murder special circumstances under section 
190.2, subdivision (c). 
Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that 
defendant possessed intent to kill.  From the beginning, the 
result sought by Perna and Corona was Montemayor’s death.  
Any kidnapping was merely a means to that end, and the 
robbery was intended to compensate the killers for their efforts.  
The jury was entitled to infer that in participating in this 
scheme, defendant knew and intended that Montemayor would 
be killed.  Accordingly, neither Banks nor section 190.2, 
subdivision (d) provides a basis for reversing the special 
 
9  
Conspiracy to murder, the jury was instructed, “requires 
proof 
that 
the 
conspirators 
harbored 
express 
malice 
aforethought, namely, the specific intent to kill.”  Regarding the 
special circumstance, the jury was instructed that it was 
required to find that “such defendant with the intent to kill 
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or 
assisted any actor in the commission of the murder.” 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
circumstance findings for murder in the course of a robbery or 
kidnapping. 
4.  Sanchez error does not require reversal of 
defendant’s gang-related conviction and special 
circumstance 
Because the trial featured testimony by an expert 
concerning gang activities, we requested that the parties file 
supplemental briefing addressing the possible application of 
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).  In Sanchez, 
we held that “case-specific out-of-court statements” cited by an 
expert witness to support an expert opinion are offered for their 
truth.  (Id. at p. 684.)  Such evidence must therefore be 
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule or supported 
by competent evidence in the record.  (Id. at p. 686.)  In a 
subsequent decision, we held that a claim of error from the 
admission of Sanchez hearsay is not forfeited by a defendant’s 
failure to object at a trial that occurred prior to the issuance of 
Sanchez.  (People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 9 (Perez).) 
Defendant raises two issues under Sanchez.  First, he 
contends the prosecution’s gang expert, Detective Booth, relied 
on hearsay in testifying regarding defendant’s gang affiliation.  
Second, defendant argues that because Booth’s testimony about 
predicate criminal activity by members of the Pacoima Flats 
gang was based on hearsay, his gang-related conviction and 
special circumstance were not supported by the evidence.  
Assuming Booth’s testimony regarding defendant’s gang 
affiliation was admitted in violation of Sanchez, it was plainly 
harmless, given his own later admission of that membership. 
Although we agree with defendant that Booth’s testimony about 
predicate criminal activity was inadmissible under Sanchez, 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
that error was harmless under the circumstances, for the 
reasons stated below. 
a.  Defendant’s participation in the Pacoima Flats 
gang 
Defendant contends that Booth related the following items 
of case-specific hearsay in his testimony addressing defendant’s 
gang affiliation:  (1) defendant was a member of the Pacoima 
Flats gang; (2) defendant had been a member of the gang “all of 
his life”; and (3) defendant’s moniker within the gang was 
“Droopy.”  Defendant is correct that Booth identified hearsay 
sources when testifying to these three matters, but that does not 
necessarily make the admission of the testimony error under 
Sanchez.  Its admission was improper only if the expert’s 
testimony about the case-specific facts was not otherwise 
supported by competent evidence in the record.  (See Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686 [“What an expert cannot do is relate 
as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, 
unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or 
are covered by a hearsay exception”].)   
There was abundant competent evidence admitted at trial 
to demonstrate that defendant was a longtime member of the 
Pacoima Flats gang, notably including his own testimony, and 
that his moniker within the gang was Droopy.  Because most of 
this evidence was admitted after Booth’s testimony, however, it 
arguably cannot be cited to support admission of his testimony.  
(See, e.g., People v. Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 510 [“If 
prior unobjected testimony supported the prosecution experts’ 
case-specific testimony, the testimony was not objectionable 
under Sanchez”].)   
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
We need not resolve the propriety under Sanchez of the 
admission of Booth’s testimony about defendant’s gang 
activities because any error in the admission of this testimony 
was unquestionably harmless.  In addressing the standard for 
harmless error in the Sanchez context, we must take into 
consideration whether the erroneously admitted hearsay 
evidence was “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford v. 
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 61.  (See Valencia, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 840.)  If so, we apply the federal constitutional 
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 
(Chapman), which requires reversal unless we conclude “beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.”  (Id. at p. 24; Valencia, at p. 
840.)  If not, we apply the state law standard of People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), which requires reversal if it is 
reasonably probable the verdict would have been different had 
the error not occurred.  (Id. at p. 836; Valencia, at p. 840.) 
Here, we conclude that the admission of Booth’s testimony 
about defendant’s gang ties was harmless under either 
standard.  Competent, credible evidence establishing his gang 
membership and moniker was ultimately admitted, including, 
as noted, defendant’s own admissions.  The jury therefore would 
have learned these facts independently of Booth’s testimony. 
b.  Defendant’s membership in a criminal street 
gang 
Defendant also contends that Sanchez was violated when 
Booth relied on hearsay in testifying with respect to various 
predicate gang crimes, assertedly resulting in insufficient 
evidence to support his gang-related conviction and special 
circumstance.  Although we agree with defendant that some of 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
this evidence was admitted in violation of Sanchez, we conclude 
that its admission was harmless error. 
In contending that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his convictions, defendant misunderstands the effect of 
a finding of Sanchez error.  Evidence erroneously admitted is 
properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to 
support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission.  
(E.g., People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296–1297 
[erroneously admitted evidence is considered in deciding 
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a 
conviction, thereby permitting a retrial after a reversal for 
prejudicial error in the admission of the evidence]; see also 
People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1031 [“But the evidence 
here was admitted, and its probative value bears on the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial”].)  Sanchez error therefore 
does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence to convict.  Instead, 
the question before us, as with any other erroneously admitted 
hearsay, is whether the error in admitting that evidence was 
prejudicial.  Unlike a finding of insufficient evidence, a finding 
of prejudice does not bar retrial of the overturned conviction.  
(People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 6 [“As a general rule, 
it is well established that if the defendant secures on appeal a 
reversal of his conviction based on trial errors other than 
insufficiency of evidence, he is subject to retrial”].)  We evaluate 
defendant’s claim of error from this perspective. 
To prove defendant’s participation in a criminal street 
gang, it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that the 
Pacoima Flats gang qualified as a “criminal street gang” under 
the governing statute, section 186.22.  That statute defines 
“criminal street gang” as a group “whose members individually 
or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
criminal gang activity,” among other requirements.  (§ 186.22, 
subd. (f).)  In turn, a “pattern of criminal gang activity” is 
defined as the commission of two or more specific enumerated 
crimes, known as predicate offenses, by members of the gang.10  
(§ 186.22, subd. (e).)  The circumstances of such predicate 
offenses are case-specific facts for purposes of Sanchez, and 
expert testimony about them must be supported by competent 
evidence.  (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 839 
(Valencia) [“facts concerning particular events and participants 
alleged to have been involved in predicate offenses . . . constitute 
case-specific facts that must be proved by independently 
admissible evidence”].) 
To establish the commission of the predicate offenses 
constituting a pattern of criminal gang activity, Detective Booth 
testified about his examination of documents maintained by the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation regarding the 
crimes committed by four men he identified as members of the 
Pacoima Flats gang.  As defendant acknowledges, Booth’s 
reliance on these materials to establish the commission of the 
predicate offenses did not violate Sanchez because the 
documents were admitted into evidence.11 
Defendant persuasively argues, however, that Booth 
relied on hearsay materials in testifying that the men who 
committed these crimes were associated with the Pacoima Flats 
 
10  
Although section 186.22 has been amended since 
Montemayor’s killing, the same elements existed at the time.  
(See, e.g., People v. Zermeno (1999) 21 Cal.4th 927, 930 [citing 
the definition of a “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity,’ ” from the 
then-current version of section 186.22, subd. (e)].) 
11  
Defendant has not challenged the propriety of the court’s 
ruling in admitting this evidence, and we do not consider it. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
gang.  Booth described the basis for his conclusion that each of 
the four were gang members as an “investigation” of their 
“backgrounds.”  He did not describe the nature of the 
investigations, other than that they involved a review of 
documents maintained by local law enforcement.  Although 
Booth mentioned a few specific documents uncovered during the 
investigation and explained their role in his conclusions, many 
of the documents were not identified, and most of them appear 
not to have been introduced into evidence.  The documents he 
identified that were in evidence — notably, four packets of 
documents relating to the crimes from the Department of 
Corrections 
and 
Rehabilitation — 
contain 
little 
or 
no 
information relevant to the gang membership of the men who 
committed the crimes.  The admission of Booth’s testimony that 
these men were members of the Pacoima Flats gang was 
therefore erroneous under Sanchez. 
We conclude, however, that the error was harmless under 
either standard.  (See Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 840.)  In 
People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786 (Turner), which provides 
helpful guidance, an expert witness offered her opinion that a 
fetus killed by the defendant was viable at the time of its death, 
which was then an element of the crime of murder of a fetus.  
The conclusion was based on the contents of an autopsy report 
that was not admitted into evidence.  We found admission of the 
expert’s testimony on this point to have been in violation of 
Sanchez.  Because there was little other evidence in the record 
to support the jury’s presumed finding that the fetus was viable 
at the time of its death, we concluded that the defendant likely 
would have been acquitted of this charge in the absence of that 
testimony and reversed the fetal murder conviction.  (Id. at 
pp. 821–825.) 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
A similar evaluation of prejudice here suggests two 
separate but related inquiries.  The first, as in Turner, is 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
the Pacoima Flats gang satisfied the statutory requirements for 
a criminal street gang in the absence of Booth’s testimony about 
the crimes of the four alleged gang members.  If there was 
insufficient evidence to convict in the absence of the erroneously 
admitted testimony, the error cannot have been harmless.  The 
second inquiry, assuming sufficient evidence existed in the 
absence of the error, is whether the jury’s judgment nonetheless 
might have been different in the absence of Booth’s testimony. 
With respect to proof of the predicate offenses, the 
Attorney General argues that, in the absence of Booth’s 
testimony, the jury would have been entitled to consider for this 
purpose the crimes committed by defendant and Montemayor’s 
killers, citing People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1 (Loeun).  The 
defendant in Loeun and a fellow gang member each assaulted 
and struck a person they believed to be a member of a rival gang.  
(Id. at p. 6.)  The jury convicted the defendant of assault with a 
deadly weapon and found true an allegation that the crime was 
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, despite the 
absence of proof of any other crimes committed by alleged gang 
members.  (Id. at p. 7.)  Acknowledging that the jury could 
consider evidence of his own crime, the defendant argued that 
“to establish the requisite ‘pattern of criminal gang activity,’ the 
prosecution must in addition present evidence of at least 
one prior offense of gang activity.”  (Ibid, italics in original.)  We 
rejected the contention, finding the evidence at trial sufficient to 
support the enhancement allegation.  As we explained, section 
186.22 “allows the prosecution the choice of proving the 
requisite ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ by evidence of ‘two 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
or 
more’ 
predicate offenses 
committed 
‘on 
separate 
occasions’ or by evidence of such offenses committed ‘by two or 
more persons’ on the same occasion.  Therefore, when the 
prosecution chooses to establish the requisite ‘pattern’ by 
evidence of ‘two or more’ predicate offenses committed on a 
single occasion by ‘two or more persons,’ it can, as here, rely on 
evidence of the defendant’s commission of the charged offense 
and the contemporaneous commission of a second predicate 
offense by a fellow gang member.”  (Id. at p. 10, italics in 
original, fn. omitted; see also People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
1040, 1046.) 
Under Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1, the evidence of the 
crimes committed by defendant, Macias, Martinez, and Lopez in 
the course of the Montemayor killing was sufficient to support 
the jury’s finding that the Pacoima Flats gang qualified as a 
criminal street gang.  One of those crimes, of course, was the 
underlying homicide, a crime committed by defendant and all 
three direct participants.  Further, as demonstrated by this 
jury’s true finding of the two special circumstances, each also 
committed, at a minimum, attempted robbery and kidnapping.12  
 
12  
Even if the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to 
demonstrate that the three killers actually accomplished the 
robbery of Montemayor, both attempted and completed crimes 
qualify under section 186.22.  (Id., subd. (e) [“ ‘pattern of 
criminal gang activity’ means the commission of, attempted 
commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, . . . or 
conviction of two or more of the following offenses . . . .”].)  The 
jury could have inferred from the evidence that Montemayor 
traveled to the office that morning, opened the office, and was 
kidnapped by the killers when they forced him to return home.  
In light of the evidence that defendant was told Montemayor 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
All of these crimes qualify as a predicate offense under section 
186.22.  (Id., subds. (e)(2), (3), (15).)  Ample evidence established 
that Macias and Martinez were members of the Pacoima Flats 
gang, including defendant’s testimony that they were members 
of the gang and the presence of their gang monikers with his on 
his garage wall.  Accordingly, even disregarding Booth’s 
testimony, the record contained sufficient evidence of predicate 
offenses committed by members of the Pacoima Flats gang to 
satisfy section 186.22. 
We further conclude that admission of Booth’s testimony 
about the four individuals was harmless under either standard 
for assessing prejudice.  (See Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 
840.)  Wholly apart from evidence sufficient to satisfy the 
statutory “pattern” requirement, voluminous evidence was 
offered at trial suggesting that the Pacoima Flats gang operated 
as a criminal gang.  Defendant testified as much, describing for 
the jury his role in the gang and its activities.  As he 
acknowledged, he acted as an informant for federal agencies 
investigating the gang’s criminal activities, while acting as a 
leader in the gang.  Booth offered similar, unobjectionable 
testimony.  Because (1) the statute’s technical requirements 
were satisfied by evidence of the crimes committed in connection 
with Montemayor’s death and (2) there was copious other 
evidence that the Pacoima Flats gang operated as a street gang, 
the jury had no reason to hesitate in concluding that the 
Pacoima Flats gang qualified as a criminal street gang under 
 
kept cash in a can at his house, the jury could have inferred that 
the killers’ purpose in forcing Montemayor to return home was 
to rob him of that cash. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
the law.  Exclusion of Booth’s testimony about the other four 
purported gang members would not have changed this result. 
5.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
anticipating potentially objectionable assertions in 
defendant’s opening statement 
Prior to trial, the defense kept from the prosecution its 
decision to present testimony by defendant, but defense counsel 
disclosed this intent in confidence to the court.  During an ex 
parte hearing shortly before the parties were to deliver their 
opening statements, the trial court discussed with defense 
counsel an outline of his planned opening statement.  The court 
was concerned that a series of factual assertions contained in 
the outline had no obvious evidentiary source other than 
defendant’s planned testimony.  As the trial court recognized, 
the assertions might be viewed as objectionable by the 
prosecution, given its ignorance of defendant’s intention to 
testify and the absence of any other known witness competent 
to testify about the assertions.  In an effort to anticipate such 
objections, the court suggested that the defense either 
(1) disclose the potentially objectionable assertions to the 
prosecution, (2) disclose defendant’s intent to testify, or (3) defer 
its opening statement until the close of the prosecution’s case-
in-chief.  Defense counsel elected to defer the opening statement.  
Defendant now contends that the trial court rulings leading to 
this decision constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
We find no error.  The trial court’s rulings were a 
reasonable and proper attempt to prevent a likely disruption of 
trial while preserving the confidentiality of defendant’s intent to 
testify. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
a.  Factual background 
During pretrial proceedings, the prosecution lodged an 
objection to a defense proposal to elicit testimony from law 
enforcement officers Starkey and Rodriguez that defendant 
reported the possible killing to them.  The prosecution 
contended that defendant’s statements to the officers were both 
irrelevant and hearsay.  After a lengthy but inconclusive 
hearing on the objection, defense counsel asked for an ex parte 
hearing in camera.  There, counsel informed the court that 
defendant intended to testify, a tactical decision that counsel did 
not want to reveal to the prosecution.  The court acknowledged 
that the officers’ testimony might be admissible to corroborate 
defendant’s testimony.  The court declined to overrule the 
prosecution’s objection on that basis, however, because “I don’t 
know whether defendant [will] or will not take the stand until 
such time as he actually gets sworn in,” given his constitutional 
right not to testify. 
When the matter arose again in open court, the trial court 
ruled, without further explanation, that defendant’s statements 
to Starkey and Rodriguez were inadmissible, but it couched the 
ruling as open to reconsideration during trial, recognizing that 
“there are several contingencies that could take place.”  As a 
result of the ruling, however, the court instructed the defense 
that it could not refer, during its opening statement, “to any 
alleged statement by the defendant to Starkey or Rodriguez.” 
Defense counsel again asked for an ex parte hearing, at 
which counsel reiterated the plan to present defendant’s 
testimony. 
 
Although 
the 
court 
accepted 
counsel’s 
representation, it continued to express the belief that a “legal 
standard” prevented it from making any ruling premised on 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
defendant’s testimony because defendant could not be assumed 
to testify until he, in fact, took the stand.  Over defense 
objection, the court adhered to its ruling regarding opening 
statement, although the court modified the ruling slightly to 
permit counsel to tell the jury that defendant spoke to Starkey 
and Rodriguez soon after speaking with Corona. 
A week before the commencement of trial, the court had 
asked both parties to submit “a brief summary of your opening 
statement.”  The court did not explain the purpose of the 
request, but it appears to have been part of the court’s efforts to 
organize and control the proceedings.  On the day before opening 
statements were to be given, the court requested an ex parte 
hearing with defense counsel.  During the hearing, the court told 
counsel that it had reviewed the outline of defendant’s planned 
opening statement.13  The court was concerned because “a large 
portion of [the planned opening statement] is really predicated 
on [defendant’s testimony], and the prosecution is not aware 
that that’s going to take place.  That’s going to trigger objections 
during your opening statement . . . .”14  Further, the court 
 
13  
The court’s ex parte discussion of the outline with defense 
counsel was unusual, but the procedure has not been challenged 
by defendant.  We make no ruling regarding the propriety of this 
aspect of the court’s conduct. 
14  
The trial court’s concerns were well-founded.  The outline 
of an opening statement submitted to the court relied heavily on 
defendant’s anticipated testimony.  In addition to describing 
Navarro’s report to Starkey and Rodriguez, it provided an 
extended account of his work as an informant, including details 
that were likely known only to defendant.  Further, the outline’s 
account of defendant’s dealings with Corona differed in some 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
explained, it would sustain an objection to assertions in the 
opening statement if no witness could be identified whose 
testimony would support them.  The court suggested that, in 
order to maintain the confidentiality of defendant’s intent to 
testify, “I’m prepared to defer your opening statement until the 
prosecution completes their case-in-chief.”  As the court noted, 
“The only other alternative I would have is a disclosure at this 
juncture and during your opening statement that you plan to 
call the defendant and he will testify.” 
During the ensuing discussion, the court identified several 
matters in defendant’s proposed opening statement for which 
there was no obvious evidentiary source other than defendant.  
According to the court, these were found on a single page of the 
confidential outline.  As a possible means of obviating the need 
to defer defendant’s opening statement, the court suggested that 
defense counsel give the prosecution a copy of that page to 
determine whether the prosecution objected to any of the 
assertions.  If the prosecution raised no valid objection, the court 
noted, “then I’m going to leave the opening statement alone.”  
Although objecting to this approach, defense counsel tentatively 
agreed to the disclosure.15  At this point in the hearing, the court 
 
respects from her own account, and defendant was the only 
conceivable evidentiary source for these differences.  Given the 
defense’s decision not to disclose defendant’s intended 
testimony, it was certainly possible, as the trial court feared, 
that portions of the opening statement would be challenged by 
the prosecution as unsupported by the testimony of known 
witnesses. 
15  
This procedure would not necessarily have required the 
defense to reveal to the prosecution its plan to call defendant as 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
adjourned for lunch, with the express understanding that the 
defense could consider its options during the break. 
When the ex parte hearing resumed, defense counsel 
immediately informed the court that, in light of its rulings, “I 
think we would like to withdraw the proposed opening 
statement that we intended to use and reserve the right to 
present to the court a new and different opening statement 
predicated upon what we hear in court from the People’s case-
in-chief, as well as what we intend to introduce on the defense.”  
In response to a question from the court, counsel confirmed that 
defendant had decided to defer his opening statement until 
completion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 
b.  Discussion 
“ ‘[T]he function of an opening statement is not only to 
inform the jury of the expected evidence, but also to prepare the 
jurors to follow the evidence and more readily discern its 
materiality, force, and meaning.’ ”  (People v. Gurule (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 557, 610.)  Although the assertions made in an 
opening statement do not constitute evidence (Cox v. Griffin 
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440, 451), “the statement does offer a 
‘story line’ into which the pieces of evidence should fit.”  (People 
v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1085, fn. 19.)  “[I]t is 
requisite that when [a party] elects to make an opening 
statement the facts shall be fairly presented by counsel, and that 
there shall be no statement of facts which he cannot, or will not, 
be permitted to prove.”  (People v. Stoll (1904) 143 Cal. 689, 693–
694.)  For that reason, counsel must have a good faith belief that 
 
a witness, but the content of the outline would have made plain 
defendant’s intent to testify. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
the assertions in an opening statement are supported by 
evidence that is reasonably available and admissible.  (Hawk v. 
Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 121 (Hawk).)  This 
principle is illustrated by People v. Romero (2007) 149 
Cal.App.4th 29, which considered a claim that the trial court 
erred in permitting the defense to refer to self-defense in its 
opening statement only on the express condition that counsel 
knew the defendant would testify.  The Court of Appeal held the 
condition appropriate because defendant and the deceased 
victim were the only witnesses to the crime.  “Without testimony 
from [defendant], there would have been no evidence of the 
circumstances which led to [the victim’s] death and hence no 
evidence to support a finding of self-defense.”  (Id. at p. 44.) 
Under section 1044, the judge in a criminal trial has “the 
duty . . . to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit 
the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to 
relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious 
and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters 
involved.”  The statute “vests the trial court with broad 
discretion to control the conduct of a criminal trial.”  (People v. 
Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1048 (Hernandez).)  With 
respect to closing argument, “the trial court retains the 
discretion to ‘ensure that argument does not stray unduly from 
the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of 
the trial.’ ”  (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 446.)  We 
see no reason why the same rule should not apply to counsels’ 
opening statements, with due regard for the different functions 
of those two presentations.  We review an exercise of the court’s 
authority in controlling the trial for abuse of discretion.  (People 
v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 743.) 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
Defendant first contends the trial court erred in ruling 
that his attorney could not mention the content of defendant’s 
communications with Starkey and Rodriguez in opening 
statement.  We need not review the merits of this ruling, 
however, because it was never implemented.  In defense 
counsel’s opening statement, given at the close of the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief, counsel was permitted, without 
objection, to describe the content of defendant’s communications 
with Starkey and Rodriguez.  Further, it is not clear that the 
court’s 
ruling 
regarding 
the 
content 
of 
defendant’s 
communications with Starkey and Rodriguez was a dispositive 
or even substantial factor in defendant’s decision to defer his 
opening statement, which was motivated by an overarching 
desire to keep from the prosecution knowledge of his plan to 
testify.  Even if the court had permitted mention of defendant’s 
statements to Starkey and Rodriguez, the defense’s underlying 
dilemma remained:  The defense risked revelation of 
defendant’s intent to testify because “a large portion” of 
defendant’s planned opening statement, well beyond the 
mention of his discussions with Starkey and Rodriguez, was 
premised on defendant’s own testimony.16 
 
16  
Although we decline to review the merits of the trial 
court’s ruling barring the defense from mentioning in opening 
statement the content of defendant’s communications with the 
detectives, we share defendant’s skepticism about the trial 
court’s rationale.  The court appeared to accept that the 
communications would be admissible if defendant testified, but 
it declined to adopt this justification because defendant had not 
yet taken the stand.  With respect to inclusion of the 
communications in opening statement, however, the relevant 
consideration appears to have been defense counsel’s good faith 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
With more pertinence, defendant contends that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error by forcing the deferral of his 
opening statement until after the prosecution’s case in chief.  
Preliminarily, we note that there is nothing unprecedented 
about the deferral of an opening statement.  As a matter of 
tactics, criminal defendants are expressly authorized to defer 
opening statement in this manner.  (§ 1093, subd. (b) 
[“defendant or his or her counsel may . . . make an opening 
statement [at the beginning of trial], or may reserve the making 
of an opening statement until after introduction of the evidence 
in support of the charge”].) 
We conclude that in making the rulings leading to deferral 
of the opening statement, the trial court acted within the bounds 
of its broad discretion to manage trial proceedings.  The trial 
court’s suggestion that it was prepared to defer the defense’s 
opening statement was made in response to defendant’s resolve 
not to inform the  prosecution of his intent to testify.  In the 
ensuing discussions, the court presented counsel with a set of 
choices.  The defense could provide a copy of one page of the 
outline of its opening statement to the prosecution to determine 
whether the prosecution objected to statements in the outline, 
or it could reveal defendant’s intent to testify, or it could defer 
the opening statement.  As the court told the defense, if the 
prosecution expressed no objection to the outline, “[T]hen I’m 
going to leave the opening statement alone.”  As noted, counsel 
initially agreed to provide a copy of the page to the prosecution.  
It was only after his return from lunch that defense counsel 
 
belief that defendant would testify to the communications.  
(Hawk, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 121.)  There seems little 
question that counsel possessed such a belief. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
informed the court that defendant would defer his opening 
statement. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s actions.  
Defense counsel planned to make assertions in an opening 
statement that had no disclosed evidentiary source.  As the trial 
court recognized, it was possible that the prosecution would 
raise ostensibly well-founded objections to these assertions 
because it was unaware of defendant’s intent to testify.  Further, 
the prosecution had previously secured favorable rulings that 
appeared to cover at least some of the content of the proposed 
opening statement.  From the prosecution’s point of view, the 
assertions would have been improper because they were not 
supported by evidence that is reasonably available and 
admissible.  (See Hawk, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 121.)  Such 
objections, in turn, would have presented the trial court with the 
choice either of overruling the objections based on the defense’s 
ex parte communications about its trial strategy or sustaining 
the objections despite its knowledge that defendant planned to 
testify.  Within those confines, the court would have had little 
choice but to sustain the objections to avoid reliance on 
confidential ex parte communications.  At that point, the 
defense would have been faced with the decision either of (1) 
disclosing for the first time to the prosecutor and the jury its 
plan for defendant to testify, (2) amending its opening statement 
in light of the sustained objections, or (3) deferring its opening 
statement.  Its choices, in other words, would have been little 
different from those presented to the defense by the court at the 
ex parte hearing. 
By presenting this set of choices to the defense prior to the 
commencement of trial, the court sought to avoid the disruption 
and possible prejudice to defendant that might have occurred 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
had the objections been raised during defendant’s opening 
statement.  A trial judge has broad discretion in controlling the 
conduct of a trial, and the court’s attempt to prevent disruption 
on the first day of trial was well within that discretion.  As the 
court noted, if the prosecution did not object to the outline, 
defendant’s opening statement could proceed as planned.  If the 
prosecution objected, the defense would need to take account of 
those objections in the presentation of its opening statement.  
Had the defense been confident that it could proceed with the 
opening statement as planned without giving away defendant’s 
intent to testify, it presumably would have been willing to share 
the outline with the prosecution, as proposed by the court.  The 
defense’s decision to defer its opening statement, rather than 
disclose the outline, suggests that defense counsel recognized 
that giving the opening statement as planned was inconsistent 
with preserving the confidentiality of defendant’s intent to 
testify. 
Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling was an 
improper interference with defense counsel’s tactical decisions.  
Any interference, however, was within the trial court’s broad 
discretion.  The trial court did not prevent defendant from giving 
an opening statement or calling witnesses.  Nor did it order 
disclosure of defendant’s intent to testify or the contents of such 
testimony.  As discussed above, the trial court’s ruling merely 
sought to anticipate and prevent a possible disruption of trial.  
As a result of the court’s diligence, defense counsel had a 
meaningful opportunity to consider the options the court made 
available to avoid the disruption, and defendant chose the option 
of deferring his opening statement until after the prosecution’s 
case.  That decision presumably reflected the defense’s view of 
the best tactical course in dealing with the realities of trial, 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
which made it difficult both to rely on defendant’s testimony in 
opening statement and to keep confidential his intent to testify. 
Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the deferral of 
his opening statement, relying on a contemporary scientific 
theory of communications.  For the reasons discussed above, we 
find no error in the trial court rulings that led to the deferral of 
defendant’s 
opening 
statement, 
which 
attempted 
to 
accommodate defendant’s desire to maintain as confidential his 
intent to testify under the circumstances.  We therefore have no 
occasion to reach the issue of prejudice.17 
6.  The trial court’s discovery sanction was not 
prejudicial 
 
Defendant contends the trial court committed a 
prejudicial abuse of discretion when it imposed a discovery 
sanction that barred the defense from asking Detective 
Rodriguez whether, during a pretrial interview with one of the 
defense attorneys, Rodriguez said defendant told him about 
Corona’s involvement in the solicitation of Montemayor’s 
killing.  We find it unnecessary to rule on the propriety of the 
court’s sanction because, even presuming error, there was no 
prejudice. 
Defendant testified that he when he spoke with Rodriguez 
following his solicitation by Corona, he told Rodriguez 
“[e]verything that happened, how I met this girl, what she said 
she was, and what she wanted to happen in Orange County.”  
 
17  
For similar reasons, we reject defendant’s contention that 
the trial court’s action denied him due process of law.  Due 
process did not guarantee defendant the right to rely on the 
substance of his own testimony in opening statement while 
preserving the confidentiality of his intention to testify. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
When defense counsel asked Rodriguez about the same 
conversations 
during 
his 
direct 
testimony, 
Rodriguez’s 
recollection of the conversations was different.  According to 
Rodriguez, defendant called him to ask if he was interested in 
“some type of a kidnap for ransom or a murder for hire case.”  
Rodriguez recalled that defendant later said that “big 
homies” — that is, persons in control of the Mexican Mafia — 
were involved.  When Rodriquez asked defendant “for suspect 
information and who they thought the victim was going to be,” 
defendant responded that “he didn’t really know at that point.” 
A short time after this testimony, defense counsel asked 
Rodriguez, “Did you tell [a member of the defense] that 
[defendant] . . . said that some woman was behind this also 
trying to get the defendant to do something?”  Before Rodriguez 
was able to answer, the prosecution objected, and the trial court 
excused the jury.  Asked by the court for a foundational offer of 
proof, defense counsel told the court that Rodriguez spoke to one 
of his co-counsel “at an earlier date, I think even three years 
ago.”  In that conversation, defense counsel told the court, 
Rodriguez recalled defendant telling him “not only about the big 
homies but there was some woman involved who was trying to 
get him . . . to do something.”  Counsel said that notes were 
taken of the conversation, although, as discussed below, counsel 
subsequently recanted that claim. 
The prosecutor objected to the introduction of this 
evidence because the defense had not provided any discovery 
regarding Rodriguez’s communications with defense counsel 
about his recollection of defendant’s statements.  The trial court 
noted that the defense had disclosed two reports concerning its 
communications with Rodriguez, which the court and the 
parties had reviewed during a conference immediately prior to 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
Rodriguez’s testimony, but “that information is not contained in 
those documents.”  The court “accept[ed] the People’s 
representation” that the defense had “not disclosed that to 
them.”  Defense counsel acknowledged that this information 
might “inadvertently” have been “left . . . out.” 
The court did not believe defense counsel’s claim that he 
had made a good faith effort to comply with discovery 
obligations, recounting prior instances in which the defense had 
failed to disclose the contents of communications with Rodriguez 
and noting that counsel had earlier expressed a reluctance to 
comply with Roland v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 
154 (Roland), then-new case law requiring the disclosure of oral 
communications by potential witnesses with the defense, 
including defense counsel.  The court expressly found that the 
failure to disclose “was not a good faith error” and prohibited the 
defense from inquiring about Rodriguez’s communications with 
the defense about defendant’s statements as a “sanction” for 
failing to comply with Roland. 
During the subsequent colloquy, defense counsel admitted 
that he was by no means certain that Rodriquez had ever made 
the statement attributed to him in the objectionable question.  
Counsel “thought” co-counsel had mentioned the comment, but 
he could not find any reference to it in his notes.  He said that 
co-counsel claimed to have heard Rodriguez make the statement 
again during a meeting they held with Rodriguez the day before.  
Defense counsel himself, however, did not “remember 
[Rodriguez] exactly even saying that.”  As the discussion 
continued, counsel acknowledged that he was “not sure . . . 
where exactly I got the information from.  My recollection is, my 
feeling was, it might have [come] from [Rodriguez].”  Eventually, 
counsel conceded, “[T]his might be a lot to do over nothing.  He 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
might not even have said that exactly.  I don’t know if he said 
that for sure or not.  I’m asking a question, what else was said 
basically is what I wanted to know.” 
During subsequent cross-examination by the prosecution, 
Rodriguez was asked directly whether defendant had told him 
about Corona or her relationship with Vivar as well as many 
other details surrounding the proposed killing known to 
defendant, and Rodriguez responded that defendant had not. 
 
Section 1054.3, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: 
“The defendant and his or her attorney shall disclose to the 
prosecuting attorney:  [⁋] (1) The names and addresses of 
persons, other than the defendant he or she intends to call as 
witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or 
recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the 
statements of those persons.”  In Roland, the Court of Appeal 
interpreted the phrase “reports of the statements of those 
persons” to require a defendant (and, reciprocally, the 
prosecution) to disclose the content of any oral statements made 
by a disclosed witness to the defense, including those made 
directly to defense counsel.  (§ 1054.3, subd. (a)(1); see Roland, 
supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 165, 167.)  Defendant argues we 
should find the sanction imposed by the trial court improper 
because (1) Roland was incorrect in requiring the disclosure of 
the content of a witness’s oral statements to defense counsel or 
(2) the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that 
counsel violated section 1054.3 and in imposing the sanction.  
We have previously declined to address the propriety of Roland 
when the failure to disclose was harmless.  (Thompson, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 1102.) 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
We decline to resolve defendant’s contentions because the 
trial court’s sanction was unquestionably harmless, whether 
measured by the state law standard of Watson or the more 
exacting federal constitutional standard of Chapman.  The 
content of defendant’s communications with Rodriguez was 
unquestionably important to the defense, but the court’s 
sanction in no way prevented counsel from asking about those 
communications.  Rather, the area of inquiry forbidden to the 
defense was Rodriguez’s conversations with defense counsel 
about his communications with defendant.  The detective’s 
conversations with defense counsel were irrelevant to the trial, 
except as a means of impeachment or as an aid to memory.  
Their potential value in even that role, however, was limited.  
Because the defense had no notes reflecting Rodriguez’s 
purported comments and counsel disavowed any intent to put 
co-counsel on the stand to dispute Rodriguez’s version, the 
defense had little ability to challenge a denial by Rodriguez that 
he made the claimed remarks to co-counsel.  In a declaration 
subsequently submitted to the court, Rodriguez was, in fact, 
quoted as denying that he had told co-counsel that defendant 
had mentioned Corona.18 
 
18  
The denial was contained in a declaration submitted to the 
court in connection with the prosecution’s opposition to 
defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of a request to recall 
Rodriguez.  In the declaration, an investigator for the 
prosecution stated:  “I told Rodriguez that the defense was now 
saying that Rodriguez wanted to change his testimony.  [¶]  
Rodriguez rolled his eyes and said that all that happened in the 
hallway was that [co-counsel] had asked him whether he 
remembered Navarro telling him, during the pre-October 
conversations, that a woman was trying to drag him into a crime 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
Further, the inquiry barred to defense counsel was 
revealed to be little more than a fishing expedition when he 
conceded that he did not know whether Rodriguez had ever 
made the statement attributed to him.  As counsel eventually 
acknowledged, “I don’t know if he said that for sure or not.  I’m 
asking a question, what else was said basically is what I wanted 
to know.”  The court’s sanction did not preclude defense counsel 
from asking that question — “what else was said” by defendant 
to Rodriguez.  Finally, as noted, the prosecution thoroughly 
explored just that issue on cross-examination, and Rodriguez 
expressly testified that defendant did not tell him about 
Corona’s relationship with Vivar or her solicitation of the 
killing.  Given these circumstances, the trial court’s sanction 
precluding the defense from asking Rodriguez about his 
conversation with co-counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.19  (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; see People v. 
Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3–4.) 
 
that had been set up by the big homies.  Rodriguez said that he 
told [co-counsel] ‘no,’ he did not remember that.  Rodriguez said 
[co-counsel] then asked him ‘if it was possible’ that Navarro had 
said that to him sometime prior to October.  Rodriguez said he 
told [co-counsel] that he supposed it was literally possible that 
Navarro had told him that, but that he had no such recollection.” 
19 
In general terms, defendant contends the trial court’s 
sanction denied him a litany of constitutional rights, including 
“appellant’s right to due process of law under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable guilt and 
penalty judgment.”  For the reasons discussed, we find no 
violation of defendant’s federal constitutional rights.  
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
7.  The trial court did not err in excluding defendant’s 
post-arrest statements to Rodriguez 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding 
statements by Rodriguez regarding a conversation with 
defendant following defendant’s arrest for Montemayor’s 
murder.  We find no error. 
During redirect of Rodriguez, defense counsel asked about 
a conversation Rodriguez had with defendant after he was jailed 
for the Montemayor killing.  Following a hearsay objection, the 
trial court excused the jury and questioned Rodriguez 
concerning the conversation.  Rodriguez said that he went to the 
jail with the intent of meeting with defendant and “clos[ing] out” 
the file associated with defendant’s work as an informant.  
During their meeting, defendant explained his presence in jail 
by reference to his earlier conversations with Rodriguez, saying 
“[Y]ou remember me telling you about this kidnap case?”  
Defendant 
then 
referred, 
in 
Rodriguez’s 
recollection, 
“specifically [to] a female and . . . the big homies.”  The mention 
of a “female” was significant because Rodriguez’s and 
defendant’s accounts of their conversations prior to the killing 
had differed in this respect.  Defendant contended he had told 
Rodriguez about Corona; Rodriguez did not recall defendant 
mentioning a woman.  Defense counsel argued that evidence of 
defendant’s post-arrest statement to Rodriguez should be 
admitted as a prior consistent statement, but the trial court 
excluded it as hearsay. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling.  
Because defendant’s statement to Rodriguez was made 
following his arrest, its primary relevance to the case at hand 
was to demonstrate that defendant told Rodriguez about Corona 
when he first contacted Rodriguez — that is, it was being offered 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
53 
for its truth to bolster defendant’s assertion on the stand that he 
had told Rodriguez about Corona prior to his arrest.  The 
statement was therefore inadmissible hearsay, unless subject to 
an exception.  Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b) does 
allow admission of this type of hearsay, a prior consistent 
statement of a witness, but the exception is available only if “the 
statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or 
other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.”  (See, e.g., 
Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 234.)  By the time of defendant’s 
arrest for the Montemayor killing, a motive for fabrication had 
plainly arisen.  We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court’s exclusion of the statement as hearsay.  (People v. 
Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 820.) 
Defendant contends the statement was not hearsay 
because it was offered to prove that “appellant had disclosed the 
plot to Rodriguez.”  The contention does not avoid the hearsay 
problem.  It is true that the statement was not hearsay if the 
purpose of its admission was to prove that defendant informed 
Rodriguez of the plot at the time the statement was made, after 
defendant had been jailed.  For that purpose, however, the 
statement was excludable as irrelevant; defendant does not 
contend that his post-arrest disclosure to Rodriguez had 
probative value independent of its confirmation of his pre-arrest 
statements.  As defendant acknowledges, “what mattered was 
that he had told one of his law enforcement handlers about the 
plot in advance.”  If admitted for that purpose, however, the 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
statement was being offered to prove its truth and, as discussed 
above, was properly excluded as hearsay.20 
8.  The trial court’s other challenged evidentiary 
rulings were largely correct or did not prejudice 
defendant 
a.  Defendant’s additional hearsay claims fail 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously sustained 
hearsay objections to three questions.  We find no prejudicial 
error. 
First, defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly 
sustained a hearsay objection to a question asked of Rodriguez 
about his encounter with defendant in jail following defendant’s 
arrest for the Montemayor killing.  Defense counsel asked, “Did 
[defendant] confirm that he was [in jail] for this robbery-murder 
that he was trying to tell you about in July?”  Defendant argues 
that “[n]either the fact that [defendant] had been arrested for a 
robbery-murder nor the fact that the offense was the same one 
[defendant] had told Rodriguez about in July or August were 
offered to prove the truth of those facts but instead to show that 
[defendant] had made the statements.” 
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling.  As 
noted above, defendant’s post-arrest statements in jail about his 
earlier conversations with Rodriguez were irrelevant to the 
trial, except to corroborate his trial testimony about those 
earlier conversations.  Defendant’s “confirmation” to Rodriguez 
that he was in jail in connection with the same incident “that he 
 
20  
Because there was no error under state evidence law, 
defendant’s federal constitutional claim fails as well.  (People v. 
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1311.)  The same is true of 
each of defendant’s unsuccessful claims of evidentiary error.  
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
was trying to tell you about in July” was relevant only to prove 
that he had told Rodriguez about the possible killing in July, 
prior to its occurrence.  In that role, the confirmation would have 
been offered to prove its truth.  Defendant argues that the 
statement was offered to prove Rodriguez’s knowledge, but the 
argument does not help his claim.  Rodriguez’s knowledge of 
defendant’s statement was irrelevant, except to the extent that 
his knowledge confirmed defendant’s making of the statement. 
Second, defendant contends, and we agree, that the trial 
court erred in preventing him, on hearsay grounds, from asking 
Rodriguez about questions posed by defendant’s wife during 
telephone calls with Rodriguez.  Defendant believed that the 
nature of the questions would demonstrate that his wife was 
sexually jealous of defendant.  We agree with defendant that it 
is difficult to imagine how the wife’s questions could constitute 
objectionable hearsay.  (See, e.g., People v. Jurado (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 72, 117 [“The request for the gun, by itself, was not 
hearsay, however, because an out-of-court statement is 
hearsay only when it is ‘offered to prove the truth of the matter 
stated.’  [Citation.]  Because a request, by itself, does not assert 
the truth of any fact, it cannot be offered to prove the truth of 
the matter stated”].)  The court’s ruling was not, however, 
prejudicial because defendant was able to obtain equivalent 
information merely by asking Rodriguez directly whether 
defendant’s wife appeared to be jealous.  Rodriguez confirmed 
that she appeared to be “extremely” jealous.  Defendant does not 
point to any additional material information he was prevented 
from obtaining by the court’s ruling; the only other topic, 
defendant’s relocation to Las Vegas prior to the killing, was 
proved by other evidence. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
Finally, the trial court erred in precluding any inquiry into 
the nature of telephone calls between defendant’s wife and his 
mother on hearsay grounds.  Because the purpose of defendant’s 
questions was not to prove the truth of any particular statement 
made by either participant during these calls, but rather to show 
through defendant’s wife’s comments that she was attempting 
to find defendant, counsel’s questions did not seek hearsay 
testimony.  Through persistence, however, defense counsel was 
able to establish that the purpose of these calls was to locate 
defendant.  The court’s error was therefore harmless. 
b.  The evidence of gang activities was not excessive 
 
Defendant contends the trial court permitted the 
admission of “far more gang-related evidence than was 
necessary for the prosecution’s case.”  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court’s rulings. 
 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in permitting the 
gang expert, Detective Booth, to testify regarding certain gang 
behavior patterns that, he maintains, were not directly raised 
by the present case — for example, the connection to a 
particular geographic territory, the ways in which members are 
admitted to the gang, the value afforded violent acts within the 
gang, and the manner in which gangs control their territory.  
Defendant argues that because this was “not a typical gang 
case,” which he characterizes as “a drive-by shooting of rival 
gangs, or defense of turf, or violence for the sake of 
intimidation,” but instead was a “murder for hire,” such 
evidence served no purpose other than to engender bias. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal 
to exclude such evidence as more prejudicial than probative 
under Evidence Code section 352.  Although, as defendant 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
argues, this might not have been the type of crime associated in 
the public mind with street gangs, it was undoubtedly a product 
this type of organized crime.  Montemayor’s killing was 
accomplished by three men acting in concert, while in regular 
communication with other interested persons.  The motive for 
the crime was unclear, although various possibilities were 
raised.  Booth’s testimony about the behavior of street gangs, 
the relations among gang members, and their values placed the 
killers’ conduct in context, served to explain why three young 
men who had no known connection to the victim would commit 
such a serious crime with no apparent guarantee of financial 
gain.  We find no error in its admission. 
c.  The materials seized from Martinez’s residence 
were relevant 
Defendant next contends the trial court abused its 
discretion in permitting the introduction of items seized from 
the home of one of the killers, Martinez.  These items included 
(1) a paper containing doodles, along with the writings “Crook” 
and “Pacoima Flats,” (2) photographs of Macias and Martinez, 
and (3) a notebook containing the telephone numbers of Macias 
and Lopez.  Although these materials did not relate directly to 
defendant, they were probative of the relationships among the 
individuals and their connection to the Pacoima Flats gang.  
There was no abuse of discretion in their admission. 
d.  The evidence of predicate offenses was not 
excessive 
Defendant also contends the trial court abused its 
discretion in permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of 
more than the minimum number of predicate offenses necessary 
to demonstrate a pattern of criminal activity under section 
186.22, subdivision (e). 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
The prosecution alleged a special circumstance under 
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), which requires that the 
murder occur “while the defendant was an active participant in 
a criminal street gang” and be “carried out to further the 
activities of the criminal street gang.”  As discussed above, a 
criminal street gang is statutorily defined, in part, as an 
association of at least three persons who have engaged in “a 
pattern of criminal gang activity.”  (§ 186.22, subd. (f).)  A 
pattern of criminal gang activity, in turn, requires a 
demonstration that the alleged gang has committed “two or 
more” of a series of specified crimes.  (§ 186.22, subd. (e).)  In 
theory, therefore, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove 
the commission of only two of the listed crimes to demonstrate 
this element of the special circumstance. 
Booth was permitted to testify regarding the commission 
of three predicate offenses by three different gang members 
before defendant objected under section 352 that proof of 
additional predicate offenses was more prejudicial than 
probative.  In ruling on the objection, the trial court first noted 
that defendant had failed to object to this testimony when it was 
disclosed in outline form prior to Booth’s testimony.  The court 
then denied the objection on the merits, ruling that it was 
“prepared to give the [prosecution] some latitude” in proving the 
elements of the special circumstance.  Booth then presented 
evidence of one additional crime, a robbery committed by a 
fourth gang member. 
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing evidence of “twice as many predicate crimes than were 
needed.”  We find no abuse of discretion.  The prosecution had 
the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the jury that the 
Pacoima Flats gang was a criminal street gang, as defined in 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
section 186.22.  As part of that burden, the prosecution was 
required to demonstrate that the alleged gang had participated 
in a “ ‘pattern of criminal activity,’ ” which required the 
commission of “two or more” of the predicate offenses.  (§186.22, 
subd. (e), italics added.)  Two predicate offenses is therefore the 
minimum that the prosecution was required to prove, but proof 
of more than the minimum was consistent with this statutory 
language.  Further, the prosecution was required more 
generally to prove that the Pacoima Flats gang qualified as a 
“ ‘criminal street gang,’ ” defined in part as “any ongoing 
organization, association, or group . . . having as one of its 
primary activities the commission of one or more of” the 
predicate offenses listed in subdivision (e).  (§186.22, subd. (f).)  
In making a case under this provision of subdivision (f), the 
prosecution may need to introduce more than the bare minimum 
of predicate offenses to ensure that the jury is provided with a 
reasonable account of the “primary activities” of the gang.  Like 
the trial court, the courts of appeal have recognized that 
prosecutors must be given some latitude in this regard and have 
refused to impose an “artificial” numerical limit on the number 
of predicate offenses that may be proved.  (People v. Hill (2011) 
191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1139 [not error to allow proof of eight 
predicate offenses].) 
Section 352 serves as a brake on such proof, limiting it to 
a number of predicate offenses that is not more prejudicial than 
necessary to make the case under the elements of section 186.22.  
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that 
evidence of four predicate offenses was not excessive, 
particularly because there was no contention that any of the 
predicate offenses mentioned by Booth involved defendant. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
60 
9.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying an adjournment to permit counsel to 
interview an FBI witness 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in declining to 
delay trial proceedings to give defense counsel an opportunity to 
interview an FBI agent who had appeared to testify.  We find no 
error. 
Defendant called FBI agent Curran Thomerson to testify 
about defendant’s work as an informant.  The FBI had declined 
to make Thomerson available to the parties prior to his 
appearance to testify.  Reports concerning defendant’s work 
with the FBI had been produced to the defense, however, and 
the parties were informed that Thomerson would be made 
available to testify concerning the matters disclosed in the 
reports. 
On the morning of Thomerson’s testimony, defense 
counsel was apparently able to speak privately with him for a 
few minutes prior to the commencement of trial.  When the case 
was called, counsel asked the court for an additional fifteen 
minutes with Thomerson for the purpose of “see[ing] what areas 
we are going to concentrate on.”  The court denied the request, 
noting that “you already know what testimony you’re going to 
elicit from this witness concerning the relationship of your client 
to the FBI, and you’ve been provided adequate discovery for that 
purpose.” 
Toward the end of Thomerson’s testimony, during a break 
in the proceedings, the court asked defense counsel whether 
there was “any area [of testimony] that you think that you 
haven’t had a chance to inquire into.”  Counsel renewed his 
request for additional time to speak privately with Thomerson, 
explaining that he wanted to go over the reports produced to the 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
defense.  Counsel suggested that the court take an early lunch 
break.  The court denied that request, but it permitted defense 
counsel a “few minutes” with Thomerson to clarify a specific 
issue identified by counsel.  The court explained that counsel’s 
request “to go over the reports . . . in detail with the witness” 
was denied because, “essentially, I think everything that you 
wanted to give to the jury in the guilt phase dealing with his 
relationship with the FBI has, in fact, been presented fully.” 
Without articulating a specific legal theory or pointing to 
an offer of proof made in the trial court, defendant contends the 
trial court’s refusal to delay the trial to give counsel additional 
time with Thomerson “hampered [his] ability to present his 
defense.”  We are unaware of any principle of law that would 
have required the trial court to adjourn the trial to permit 
counsel to interview Thomerson.  The trial court has broad 
discretion to carry out its “duty” under section 1044 to “control 
all proceedings during [a criminal] trial, . . . with a view to the 
expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding 
the matters involved.”  (§ 1044; see Hernandez, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 1048.)  Counsel was seeking, in effect, a brief 
continuance of trial to permit him to interview Thomerson.  
“ ‘[T]he decision whether or not to grant a continuance of a 
matter rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  
[Citations.] 
 
The 
party 
challenging 
a 
ruling 
on 
a 
continuance bears the burden of establishing an abuse of 
discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom 
successfully attacked.’ ”  (People v Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 
650.)  On the other hand, “the trial court may not exercise its 
discretion ‘so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare.’ ”  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 390, 450.) 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
62 
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court 
abused its discretion or violated his constitutional rights by 
denying the request for a brief continuance.  There was no 
general claim that defendant lacked sufficient time to prepare 
his defense.  The only complaint involved this specific witness, 
Thomerson.  As the trial court found, defendant was provided 
with detailed reports on the subject of Thomerson’s testimony 
sufficiently in advance to allow preparation.  Further, the trial 
court did permit defense counsel a few minutes with Thomerson 
in advance of his testimony and an additional opportunity to 
speak with him regarding the single specific issue about which 
counsel expressed uncertainty.  The trial court merely denied 
defense counsel the post hoc opportunity to review with the 
witness the reports of defendant’s work to, as counsel phrased 
it, “find out what else he left out [of the reports].”  As defendant 
concedes in his brief, “[t]here may have been little more that 
[defense counsel] could have gleaned from meeting with 
Thomerson.”  Particularly given defendant’s opportunity to 
review these reports well in advance of Thomerson’s appearance 
and the abundance of evidence introduced relating to 
defendant’s activities as an informant, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court’s decision to push ahead with trial. 
Defendant also contends the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to admit the entirety of the FBI 
reports into evidence.  Those reports consisted largely of the logs 
made by law enforcement of their contacts with defendant in the 
course of his work as an informant.  Well in advance of 
Thomerson’s testimony, the trial court told counsel that “the 
nature and the quality of [defendant’s cooperation with law 
enforcement] is relevant and viable.”  But the court noted that 
the logs themselves “appear[] to be unduly time consuming and 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
63 
not relevant in many respects.”  Despite the court’s request that 
defense counsel prune the reports to redact extraneous 
materials, counsel identified for redaction only a recitation of 
defendant’s arrests and mentions of two attorneys suspected of 
criminal conduct when offering the reports into evidence.  
Consistent with its earlier expressed concern that the reports 
“contain[] many entries that are extraneous to the particular 
case,” the court denied the motion, reasoning that “the pertinent 
portions have been given to the jury in the form of testimony.” 
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision 
to exclude the reports of defendant’s activities as an informant.  
The specific details of his work were, after all, peripheral to the 
trial.  The critical issue was to demonstrate that defendant was, 
for a significant period of time, a useful and effective informant 
for law enforcement, and the lengthy testimony of defendant 
and his handlers conclusively established this.  Further, as the 
trial court noted, the “pertinent portions” of the reports were the 
subject of live testimony.  The additional details contained in the 
reports were of marginal relevance, and the trial court acted 
well within its discretion in concluding that this evidence was 
more likely to distract than inform. 
Defendant suggests the trial court’s ruling deprived him 
of a fair trial because it excluded evidence “critical” to his 
defense.  (See Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302.)  
As the trial court noted, however, the pertinent evidence 
contained in the reports was presented to the jury through the 
testimony of defendant and his handlers.  Defendant identifies 
no material, let alone critical, evidence contained in the reports 
that was not the subject of live testimony. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
64 
Defendant’s appellate brief characterizes the rulings 
challenged in this section as reflecting the trial court’s bias 
against the defense.  Defendant does not attempt to make a 
serious demonstration of judicial bias, and we find no evidence 
of bias in the foregoing rulings.  “[A] trial court’s numerous 
rulings against a party — even when erroneous — do not 
establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are 
subject to review.”  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 
1112.) 
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that the challenged 
evidentiary rulings were cumulatively prejudicial.  As discussed 
above, we have found no significant error in the trial court’s 
rulings, and any errors that did occur had no bearing on the 
jury’s judgment, whether considered alone or together. 
10.  Defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
lack merit 
a.  The prosecutor’s leading questions were not 
improper 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct when he “repeatedly prevented [defendant] from 
giving complete answers to his questions, engaged in . . . 
repeated argumentative questions and sarcastic comments, and 
engaged in questioning which had been precluded in a pretrial 
hearing.”  We find no misconduct. 
“ ‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render 
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves 
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the 
trier of fact.’  [Citation.]  ‘As a general rule a defendant may not 
complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
65 
timely fashion — and on the same ground — the defendant 
made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury 
be admonished to disregard the impropriety.’ ”  (People v. 
Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 306.)  “[T]o establish 
reversible prosecutorial misconduct a defendant must show that 
the prosecutor used ‘ “deceptive or reprehensible methods” ’ and 
that it is reasonably probable that, without such misconduct, an 
outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted.”  
(People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 510.) 
Defendant first cites a series of six leading questions 
asked during the prosecution’s cross-examination of defendant.  
Each time, the prosecutor, after hearing defendant’s negative 
response to the question, cut defendant off as he tried to explain 
his denial and moved to strike defendant’s partial, attempted 
explanation.  The trial court sustained each request to strike, 
noting that the defense could allow defendant to explain his 
answers during redirect examination. 
The Attorney General argues defendant forfeited any 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object and 
request an admonition.  Defendant did, however, repeatedly 
object to the prosecutor’s conduct.  Because the trial court 
clearly 
condoned 
the 
prosecutor’s 
approach 
to 
cross-
examination, any request for an admonition would appear to 
have been futile.  (See Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 403 [defense 
need not object and request an admonition when to do so would 
have been futile].) 
On the merits, we find no misconduct by the prosecutor, 
and defendant cites no legal authority suggesting an 
impropriety.  The prosecutor’s insistence on a yes or no answer 
to his leading questions is an accepted convention of cross-
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
66 
examination.  Generally, “[a] witness must give responsive 
answers to questions, and answers that are not responsive shall 
be stricken on motion of any party.”  (Evid. Code, § 766.)  When 
a question calls for a yes or no answer, the attempt to append 
an 
explanation 
to 
the 
answer 
is, 
strictly 
speaking, 
nonresponsive.  (E.g., People v. Davis (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 595, 
598 [“A general question alluding to a meeting at another ‘time’ 
at a given place does not invite the witness to include that which 
happened on the occasion in his answer.  The motion to strike 
should have been granted as to all that portion of the answer 
after the word ‘yes’ ”].)  The practice can be subject to abuse if, 
for example, a prosecutor asks questions premised on assumed 
facts for which the prosecutor has no good faith basis.  But that 
type of abuse is not alleged here.  The prosecutor’s questions 
were based on a reasonable reading of the evidentiary record.  
Defendant was given the opportunity, in the first instance, to 
deny the questions’ implicit accusations.  Defendant had the 
opportunity to explain those denials on redirect examination.  In 
these circumstances, we do not find the prosecutor’s conduct to 
have been so unfair as to deny due process to defendant.  
b.  The prosecutor’s allegedly aggressive cross-
examination did not rise to the level of 
misconduct 
As a second example of prosecutorial misconduct, 
defendant cites a series of questions during the prosecutor’s 
cross-examination of him that, he contends, constituted 
testimony or were argumentative or sarcastic or “denigrated 
[defendant’s] testimony and character.”  Defendant failed to 
preserve this claim by registering an objection on this ground 
and seeking an admonition.  Further, the prosecutor’s 
aggressive questioning did not constitute misconduct. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
67 
“A prosecutor is permitted wide scope in the cross-
examination of a criminal defendant who elects to take the 
stand.”  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1147 
(Gutierrez).)  “When a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own 
defense the People may ‘fully amplify his testimony by inquiring 
into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or 
by introducing evidence through cross-examination which 
explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may 
necessarily be drawn from them.’ ”  (People v. Harris (1981) 28 
Cal.3d 935, 953.)  Generally, as we explained in People v. 
Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, “A prosecutor may honestly 
urge that a defendant lied.  Convincing the jury that he did so is 
a potent weapon.”  (Id. at p. 797.) 
Defendant 
forfeited 
these 
claims 
of 
prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Although defendant did object to many of the 
questions on evidentiary grounds, he did not do so on grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct, nor did he seek an admonition from 
the court regarding this type of conduct.21  
 
21  
As to some of defendant’s claims, this failure makes it 
impossible to determine whether the prosecutor’s questions 
were improper.  On one cited instance, the prosecutor attempted 
to demonstrate that an occasion of cooperation with law 
enforcement by defendant, which occurred several years before 
trial, was undertaken for the purpose of gaining leniency.  The 
prosecutor asked, “What actually happened is a couple days 
later [the arresting officer] went down and talked to a court 
commissioner that your case was going to be in front of” to 
secure defendant’s release.  Defense counsel unsuccessfully 
objected that “[c]ounsel is testifying,” but he did not otherwise 
contest the question.  The question was not improper, however, 
merely because evidence supporting its factual premise was not 
at that time contained in the trial record, so long as the 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
68 
Even if these claims were not forfeited, we would not find 
this aspect of the prosecutor’s manner of cross-examination to 
constitute misconduct.  Defendant provides details of eleven 
separate incidents.  An example is the prosecutor’s cross-
examination regarding defendant’s decision to become an 
informant.  When defendant said he was “tired” of gang life, the 
prosecutor responded, “So in response to being tired of the gang 
life, you signed up to be a rat.”  When defendant said he chose 
that course rather than moving away because he was not 
“financially set,” the prosecutor responded, “That’s a good topic 
for conversation.  Being an informant offer[ed] monetary 
rewards, didn’t it?”  Defendant acknowledged that he needed to 
support himself, to which the prosecutor responded, “Support 
yourself by turning in friends like Philip Sanchez, is that right?”  
When defendant answered affirmatively, the prosecutor 
followed, “Is that how you view this, I’ll trade my friends in so I 
can have a few dollars for myself?” 
In a similar vein, when defendant said he did not 
remember what he meant when writing in a letter, “I got five 
signatures,” the prosecutor responded sarcastically, “Did you go 
to Dodger Stadium, get the autographs of five ballplayers?”  
When defendant answered he had no idea what the question 
meant, the prosecutor asked rhetorically, “If the author doesn’t 
know, how are we to know?”  Soon after, when defendant 
acknowledged that one purpose in writing the letter was to 
convince the recipient that he was still the llavero in his 
 
prosecutor had a good faith belief in the truth of the premise.  
Because defendant did not seek an offer of proof, however, we 
have no way of knowing the basis for the prosecutor’s question 
and, consequently, have no grounds to evaluate its propriety. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
69 
territory, the prosecutor responded, “That’s what your whole life 
was about, was keeping up that appearance, right?”  When 
defendant responded that, no, he was trying to find out 
information, presumably to relay to law enforcement, the 
prosecutor again employed sarcasm, asking, “You were very, 
very motivated to stop crime, weren’t you?” 
Defendant also highlights “aggressive” cross-examination 
about his actions immediately following the murder.  After 
defendant acknowledged that, upon first hearing press reports 
of the Montemayor’s killing, he did not contact Starkey or 
Rodriguez to tell them what he knew, the prosecutor asked, 
“[W]hy not?”  Defendant answered, “I don’t know.  I don’t know.”  
The prosecutor responded, “That’s the best you can do for us?”  
To bring the point home, the prosecutor followed up, “This is 
your whole defense, isn’t it? . . .  That you were an informant 
and you were trying to stop this murder, and somehow you got 
tossed up in this and you’re wrongly accused.  Isn’t that your 
defense?”  When defendant then said he did not remember 
whether he called Rodriguez at that time, the prosecutor 
responded, “Let me give you some time.  Think about it.  Give 
us a better answer than that, if you can.”  The prosecutor 
followed up, “Isn’t it because you were involved in the murder?” 
As these examples illustrate, the prosecutor’s questions 
were sometimes sarcastic and aggressive.  His approach, 
however, was not unfair or deceptive.  The questions cited by 
defendant generally constitute fair, if forceful, comment on 
inconsistencies 
and 
improbabilities 
in 
his 
testimony.  
Accordingly, they were not outside the “wide scope” permitted in 
the cross-examination of a criminal defendant who elects to take 
the stand.  (Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)  We find no 
misconduct. 
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70 
c.  The prosecutor’s reference to Summer Sherwood 
was not prejudicial 
During the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant, 
the questioning turned to communications between male and 
female 
inmates 
during 
defendant’s 
pre-trial 
detention, 
accomplished using piping in the jail.  The prosecutor 
established that defendant had engaged in the practice and 
asked whether he still had communications with female 
inmates.  Defendant answered that he had gotten tired of it and 
stopped.  To the prosecutor’s inquiry when he stopped, 
defendant answered, “After speaking to some girl named 
Summer.”  The prosecutor took this as a reference to Summer 
Sherwood, who was eventually sentenced to prison for 
threatening Corona to discourage her from testifying against 
defendant in this matter.  Upon defendant’s answer, the 
prosecutor responded, “Oh, the girl who went upstate for 
threatening Mira Corona?”  This appears to have been the first 
mention of Sherwood at trial. 
Defendant objected and immediately moved for a mistrial, 
contending the question constituted “intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct.”  In a subsequent colloquy, the prosecutor said that 
he had no intention of introducing evidence of Sherwood’s 
conviction prior to defendant’s mention of her name, but “[N]ow 
that [defendant] has volunteered his connection to Summer Star 
Sherwood it was something I was thinking of doing.”  The court 
took defendant’s motion for a mistrial “under submission” 
pending the prosecutor’s decision.  Defense counsel did not ask 
to strike the question nor seek a jury admonition, and the 
prosecution never presented further evidence regarding 
Sherwood. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
71 
We agree with defendant that the prosecutor’s question 
appears to have been improper, although we do not accept his 
proffered rationale.  It is “well established that the prosecuting 
attorney may not interrogate witnesses solely ‘for the purpose of 
getting before the jury the facts inferred therein, together with 
the insinuations and suggestions they inevitably contained, 
rather than for the answers which might be given.’ ”  (People v. 
Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 619; see also People v. Visciotti 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 52 [“a prosecutor may not examine a witness 
solely to imply or insinuate the truth of the facts about which 
questions are posed”].)  It is clear from the proceedings that the 
prosecutor had no intention, at the time he questioned 
defendant, 
of 
actually 
proving 
Sherwood’s 
crime 
and 
demonstrating its relevance to this matter.  He appears to have 
asked the question solely for the improper purpose of suggesting 
to the jury that the woman with whom defendant acknowledged 
speaking had been imprisoned for threatening Corona. 
Although we recognize that the prosecutor’s question was 
likely improper, it did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct; 
the question was neither deceptive nor reprehensible, nor did it 
infect the trial with such unfairness as to render the subsequent 
conviction a denial of due process.  It was a single, unanswered 
question and an isolated reference to a matter only tangentially 
related to the issues at trial.  It undoubtedly had no effect on the 
jury’s verdict. 
d.  The prosecutor’s questions regarding the reason 
for the killers’ assault on defendant were proper 
 
When defendant was incarcerated awaiting trial, two of 
the killers, Lopez and Macias, attacked him with homemade 
blades when the three were placed together in a holding cell.  
Defendant testified that he had been the subject of a “green 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
72 
light” — an order from the highest levels of the Mexican Mafia 
for his death — for some months prior to the Montemayor 
killing, due to rumors of his work as an informant.  He believed 
the stabbing occurred pursuant to the green light.  The 
prosecution, by contrast, hoped to prove that the assailants had 
learned of defendant’s work as an informant from discovery 
produced during their murder prosecutions and sought revenge 
on their own, rather than in response to orders from superiors 
in the gang.  The defense objected to the admission of evidence 
supporting this theory as speculative and, in proceedings prior 
to trial, sought to preclude it.  The trial court reserved judgment 
on the admission of the prosecution evidence, but it directed the 
prosecution not to mention this theory in its opening 
statement.22 
 
The matter came to a head during the prosecution’s cross-
examination of defendant.  The prosecution had changed its 
theory by this time, postulating that Macias and Lopez sought 
revenge because they learned from discovery in their 
prosecutions that defendant had lied to them about the reason 
for the Montemayor killing.  According to the prosecution’s 
revised theory, defendant told them that the order for the killing 
came from Mexican Mafia leaders, but in fact it was committed 
“just to curry personal favor with . . . Corona.”  The court ruled 
 
22  
Defendant contends the trial court’s comments constituted 
an in limine ruling precluding the defense from presenting 
evidence and that the prosecutor’s subsequent questions 
constituted misconduct because they violated this ruling.  In 
fact, the court made no ruling beyond precluding mention of 
these matters in an opening statement, a ruling with which the 
prosecution complied.  The court deferred to trial any 
substantive evidentiary rulings on this matter. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
73 
that the prosecution would be limited to asking defendant 
whether he had considered “that the other three co-defendants 
felt he had lied to them,” without permitting mention of the 
means by which they might have come to that conclusion.  When 
trial resumed, the prosecutor, after asking the permitted 
question, also asked defendant a series of leading questions 
premised on the theory that Macias and Lopez had learned 
defendant had lied to them, although without suggesting the 
manner in which they might have learned the truth.  The court 
overruled the defense objections, including the claim the 
questions had not been asked in “good faith.” 
 
Assuming the claim has been preserved, we find no 
misconduct.  The prosecutor’s questions simply presented to the 
jury an alternative theory to explain the assailants’ conduct, 
countering the theory articulated by defendant.  Because the 
prosecutor’s theory and questions were based on reasonable 
inferences from the evidence presented at trial, there is no 
reason to conclude they were asked in bad faith.  Further, 
because the prosecutor avoided asking defendant about the 
assailants’ motives, but simply outlined factual circumstances 
that might have explained their conduct, the questions did not 
stray into impermissible speculation. 
e.  The cumulative impact of the prosecutor’s 
conduct was not prejudicial 
 
Defendant contends the cumulative impact of the 
prosecutor’s misconduct was prejudicial.  As discussed above, 
however, we largely reject defendant’s claims of misconduct, 
either on their merits or because the claims were not preserved.  
To the limited extent the prosecutor’s conduct was improper, it 
involved issues largely peripheral to defendant’s guilt and had 
no impact on the verdict, under either test for prejudice. 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
74 
 
11.  The cumulative impact of the trial court’s 
errors was not prejudicial 
 
We have largely rejected defendant’s claims of judicial 
error.  The possible errors we did find — the court’s discovery 
sanction, its erroneous evidentiary rulings, and the admission 
of evidence in violation of Sanchez — were individually minor 
and had no material cumulative impact on the jury’s decision 
under either test for prejudice. 
B.  Penalty Phase Claims 
1.  The evidence of defendant’s involvement in prior 
criminal acts was sufficient to support their 
admission under section 190.3, factor (b) 
“In making its penalty determination, the jury is 
authorized to consider three types of aggravating evidence, ‘[t]he 
circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted 
in the present proceeding’ (§ 190.3, factor (a)), ‘[t]he 
presence . . . of criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence’ ([§ 190.3], 
factor (b)), and ‘[t]he presence . . .  of any prior felony conviction’ 
(§ 190.3, factor (c)).”  (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 
645 (Johnson).)  During the penalty phase, the prosecution 
presented evidence of several violent criminal acts by defendant 
under section 190.3, factor (b), including the armed assault at 
the home of Laurie Fadness and the shooting of mechanic Paul 
Parent.  In addition, the trial court permitted the jury to 
consider during the penalty phase a letter sent by defendant to 
a person named “Niño” that purportedly solicited the recipient 
to commit aggravated assault on another gang member.  
Regarding the two criminal incidents mentioned, defendant 
contends there was insufficient evidence of his involvement.  As 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
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75 
to the letter, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence 
that it solicited violence.  Although we find sufficient the 
evidence supporting the two incidents, we agree with defendant 
there was insufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that 
the letter solicited aggravated assault.  The erroneous 
admission of that evidence, however, was not prejudicial. 
a.  The assault at the Fadness residence 
During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented 
testimony by Laurie Fadness and David Gallegos about a violent 
assault in Fadness’s home.  When Fadness came home one 
evening, she found that Gallegos had been badly beaten and his 
cousin had been shot.  As she entered her home, the presumed 
assailants were scrambling to leave, and she heard a person she 
knew as “Primo” yell, “Droopy, Jesse, let’s go.”  As Fadness 
explained, Primo’s tone of voice at this time was not “casual.”  
“[I]t was like hollering at him, like, ‘Let’s go.’ ”  Fadness did not 
identify defendant as having been present, but she did not have 
a clear view of all the men as they hurriedly left her home.  
Gallegos testified that five men entered the house that night, 
and he identified all of them, without naming defendant; on the 
contrary, Gallegos testified affirmatively that defendant was not 
present.  Yet when the five entered, Gallegos testified, one of 
them said to Gallegos’s cousin, “Droopy wants to talk to you.”  
The assault began when the cousin responded that he had 
nothing to say to Droopy. 
 
Defendant contends that this testimony contained 
insufficient evidence of his involvement in the assault to support 
its admission as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, 
factor (b).  As we explained in People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 
475, “Section 190.3, factor (b) permits the jury to consider the 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
76 
‘presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence.’  Before the 
evidence is presented to the jury, the trial court must determine 
that the evidence offered would allow a rational trier of fact to 
decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the criminal activity alleged under factor (b).”  (Id. at p. 515.)  
“We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of other 
crimes for abuse of discretion, ‘ “and no abuse of discretion will 
be found where, in fact, the evidence in question was legally 
sufficient.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘On appeal, the test of legal sufficiency 
is whether there is substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from 
which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the 
prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial 
evidence 
and 
any 
reasonable 
inferences drawn 
from 
that evidence.’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) 
 
The jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant was a participant in the events described by 
Fadness and Gallego.  The witnesses testified concerning two 
occasions on which the assailants used the name “Droopy,” 
defendant’s gang moniker.  Fadness heard Primo use the name 
“Droopy” in a manner that suggested he was addressing Droopy 
directly, urging him to leave.  Gallegos heard one of the 
assailants tell his cousin, “Droopy wants to talk to you.”  
Although it is true, as defendant contends, that Fadness did not 
identify defendant as one of those present, it was evident from 
her testimony that she did not get a clear view of all the 
participants, who were leaving as she entered.  It is also true 
that Gallegos denied defendant’s presence, but it was for the 
jury to resolve this apparent contradiction.  The assailants’ 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
77 
references to “Droopy,” both of which could be understood to 
refer to a person present at Fadness’s home, constituted 
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was 
present.23 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient because 
there was “no evidence that [defendant] was the only Droopy 
that might have been involved in the drug trade in the San 
Fernando Valley” and argues that the person who used the 
name could have been “using [defendant’s] name to justify the 
attack.”  Defendant’s moniker, however, is sufficiently unusual 
that the jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that 
it referred to defendant.  Given the distinctive nature of the 
moniker, it was unnecessary for the prosecution to provide proof 
that no other gang member in the general area used the name.  
Further, the suggestion that the assailants were falsely using 
defendant’s name is inconsistent with the remainder of the 
witnesses’ testimony.  Gallego’s cousin, like defendant, was a 
member of the Pacoima Flats gang and presumably would have 
been familiar with defendant. 
b.  The Parent shooting 
Defendant hired Paul Parent as a mechanic and forced 
him to live at defendant’s home.  Parent testified that defendant, 
often with others, beat him on at least four occasions and broke 
his finger with a hammer after Parent attempted to leave the 
 
23  
Even if defendant were not present, we would be inclined 
to find sufficient evidence to support the admission of this 
conduct as factor (b) evidence.  The remark “Droopy wants to 
talk to you” strongly suggests that the assailants were acting at 
the behest of defendant.  As discussed above, defendant held a 
position of authority within the gang and could direct others to 
do his bidding.     
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
78 
home.  The shooting occurred after defendant had told Parent 
he would be given defendant’s van and allowed to leave if he 
helped defendant move his home furnishings.  Ten minutes after 
the move was completed, Parent was working under the hood of 
the van, which was parked near defendant’s house, when his cell 
phone rang.  Defendant said, “Rudy is going to shoot you,” in a 
tone of voice, Parent said, “like he just won the lottery.”  “Two 
minutes later,” Parent was, in fact, shot in the back by Rudy.  
Parent said that he and Rudy were on friendly terms, but Rudy, 
like Parent, worked for defendant. 
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient because it 
is possible that defendant was simply warning defendant that 
he was about to be shot, rather than being the instigator of the 
shooting.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was 
involved in the shooting.  Although defendant’s proposed 
interpretation is plausible in the abstract, to conclude that 
defendant was simply warning Parent would have been 
inconsistent with the remainder of Parent’s testimony.  
According to Parent, defendant had kept him a virtual prisoner.  
On two prior occasions when Parent attempted to leave, 
defendant enlisted others to help him beat Parent in retaliation.  
Defendant’s ostensible grant to Parent of permission to leave, 
much less to give him a van in the bargain, was wholly at odds 
with this prior conduct.  Rudy had no evident reason of his own 
to shoot Parent; the two were on good terms.  Further, defendant 
presumably could have prevented the shooting if he knew of it 
but did not approve, since Rudy worked for him.  When 
defendant called to alert Parent that he was to be shot, 
defendant gave no indication of alarm; on the contrary, he was 
exultant.  As Parent said, defendant “warned” Parent in a tone 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
79 
of voice “like he just won the lottery.”  Finally, the nearly 
instantaneous shooting by Rudy strongly suggests that the 
attack was coordinated with defendant’s cell phone call.  These 
circumstances permitted the jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant’s call was not intended merely 
to alert Parent. 
c.  The letter sent to Niño 
 
During the guilt phase, the prosecution introduced a letter 
written by defendant, largely in Spanish, to a person called 
“Niño.”  During the penalty phase, the court permitted the jury 
to consider the letter as evidence of defendant’s attempt to solicit 
an assault against two people named Chino and Sapote by 
means of force likely to cause great bodily injury under factor (b) 
of section 190.3.  Defendant contends the letter was insufficient 
in this role because (1) there was no evidence that Niño ever saw 
the letter, (2) the letter was at most a solicitation of violence, 
rather than the “use” of violence required by factor (b), and (3) 
the letter did not clearly solicit criminal violence against Chino 
and Sapote. 
We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in 
admitting this letter as evidence of the solicitation of violent 
criminal conduct.  Defendant testified that Niño was one of his 
drug customers, and the letter was intended to shore up his 
business relationship with Niño at a time when defendant was 
in jail.  It was written largely in Spanish, and the purported 
references to assaultive conduct were couched in Spanish 
language idioms that could not be understood literally — for 
example, “send that Chino dude to the penis” and “hit him in the 
mother.”  The prosecution initially sought to translate the letter 
through defendant, and he rejected the prosecutor’s suggestion 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
80 
that its language solicited violence.  Although the prosecution 
later presented a translation by a qualified Spanish translator, 
the expert conceded that “to give a completely accurate 
translation” of the letter “you would have to be very familiar 
with [the participants’] form of the casual language to know 
what they are really saying.”  The intended meaning of the 
critical phrases in the letter therefore appears too uncertain to 
permit the jury to conclude that defendant was soliciting Niño 
to commit aggravated assault.  (Contra People v. Phillips (1985) 
41 Cal.3d 29, 77 (Phillips) [written solicitation containing 
detailed instructions for the abduction of witnesses, as well as 
“directions to ‘knock out,’ ‘nail’ and ‘blast’ ” them]; see also id. at 
p. 76, fn. 30.)   
Any error in this respect, however, was harmless under 
both the state law and constitutional standards for prejudice.  
(People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 838; People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1170.)  As other aggravating 
factors, the prosecution provided evidence of a series of 
disturbing acts of violence committed by defendant or 
coordinated under his direction:  the two separate assaults 
against Gallegos, in one of which Gallegos was shot 14 times by, 
among others, defendant; the shooting of Gallegos’s cousin; five 
separate assaults on Parent, including defendant’s sadistic 
participation in Parent’s shooting; and the kidnapping of 
Spellman.  These were, of course, in addition to defendant’s 
participation in the murder of Montemayor.  It strains credulity 
to argue that, in the face of this evidence, the jury would have 
found defendant’s letter to Niño unduly persuasive in any way.  
Against a multitude of acts of extraordinary violence, the letter 
at most solicited a violent act.  Further, as noted above, the 
letter was not even clear in seeking violence.  Its impact on the 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
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81 
jury’s assessment of the appropriate penalty was undoubtedly 
negligible.  (See, e.g., Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 827.) 
2.  The trial court did not err in instructing the jury 
regarding its consideration of the facts underlying 
defendant’s prior convictions 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury that it could consider the facts underlying 
his prior convictions as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence without 
finding them true beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Section 190.3, factor (c) permits the prosecution to 
introduce evidence of prior felony convictions of a defendant as 
factors in aggravation.  To the extent the conduct underlying 
those convictions satisfies the requirements of section 190.3, 
factor (b), the jury may consider that conduct under factor (b) as 
well.  (Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 889 ([“A prior felony 
conviction for a violent crime is ‘admissible under section 190.3, 
factor (b) as proof of criminal activity by’ the defendant”].)  Here, 
defendant stipulated to three prior felony convictions for 
consideration under factor (c).  In addition, the prosecution 
introduced evidence of the conduct underlying two of the prior 
convictions and argued that this conduct could also be 
considered under factor (b).  The trial court instructed the jury 
that, in contrast to other factor (b) conduct, it was not required 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence 
demonstrated criminal conduct because defendant had already 
been convicted of the charges. 
Defendant forfeited this claim when he failed to object to 
the court’s instruction on these grounds. 
On the merits, we have consistently declined to decide 
“whether a reasonable-doubt instruction is required where the 
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82 
People seek to prove ‘conduct’ underlying the conviction other 
than the facts necessarily established.”  (People v. Hinton (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 839, 911; People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 
1123–1124 (Bacon); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 
1000.)  In light of defendant’s forfeiture, we again decline.24   
In any event, the court’s instruction was unquestionably 
harmless.  It is settled that the jury was entitled to consider the 
conduct necessarily established by the convictions without proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 
1123.)  The details of the conduct underlying these two 
convictions added little because it did not feature any conduct of 
a severity beyond that suggested by the elements of the crimes.  
Further, that conduct — defendant’s presence at a gang 
shooting and his participation in a robbery at knifepoint — 
added little to the litany of defendant’s violent conduct proved 
under factor (b). 
3.  Defendant forfeited his claim that the trial court 
erred in failing to consider his ability to pay the 
levies it imposed 
At sentencing, the trial court imposed the statutory 
maximum restitution fine of $10,000 and a victim restitution 
payment of $10,433.80.  (§ 1202.4, subds. (b), (f).)  Then, as now, 
section 1202.4 permitted a trial court to consider a defendant’s 
ability to pay in setting the amount of a restitution fine above 
 
24  
Defendant incorrectly contends that the question was 
resolved in Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d 29.  Although Phillips 
holds that factor (b) conduct must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt (id. at p. 65), it did not consider the particular interaction 
between factors (b) and (c) presented here.  As noted in the text, 
our decisions subsequent to Phillips recognize that we have yet 
to resolve the issue. 
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83 
the statutory minimum (id., subd. (c)), while it precluded the 
court from considering the defendant’s ability to pay in setting 
the amount of victim restitution (id., subd. (g)), which is 
intended to reimburse a victim’s actual economic loss (id., subd. 
(f)).  Without distinguishing between the two types of levy, 
defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing them 
without inquiring about his ability to pay, given statements in 
the probation report suggesting that he was destitute.25 
Defendant acknowledges that he forfeited this claim when 
he failed to object to imposition of the levies at sentencing.  In 
People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, we explained that “the 
law at the time of . . . sentencing called for the trial court to 
consider [the defendant’s] ability to pay in setting a restitution 
fine, and [the defendant] could have objected at the time if he 
believed inadequate consideration was being given to this 
factor.”  (Id. at p. 409.)  We have consistently followed this 
ruling, most recently in People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 
356. 
Defendant contends that we should find his claims 
preserved because “[b]oth fines are now subject to reversal” as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 
__ U.S. __ [139 S.Ct. 682, 203 L.Ed.2d 11] (Timbs).  Without 
ruling on the constitutionality of any particular fine, Timbs 
held, as a matter of law, that (1) the excessive fines clause of the 
Eight Amendment of the federal Constitution applies to the 
 
25  
The probation report was somewhat in tension with the 
testimony at trial, which implied that defendant controlled 
substantial assets at the time the murder was committed.  In 
light of our resolution of this claim, we need not resolve the 
apparent conflict. 
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states through incorporation in the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and (2) the excessive fines clause 
governs civil in rem forfeitures.  (Id., 139 S.Ct. at pp. 689, 690.)  
Because Timbs does not mention forfeiture, it has no direct 
application here, regardless of the merits of defendant’s claim.  
To the extent defendant claims he was excused from raising an 
argument under Timbs because its application of the excessive 
fines clause to state proceedings was a novel legal development 
that could not have been anticipated at the time of his 
sentencing, thereby excusing his failure to raise the issue (see, 
e.g., Perez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 8), the claim fails.  Other 
portions of the Eighth Amendment have long been held 
applicable to the states.  (E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber (1947) 329 U.S. 459, 463 [prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment applicable to states].)  The argument for 
extending these rulings to the excessive fines clause was 
sufficiently obvious that the Supreme Court had already 
assumed, well before defendant’s sentencing, that the entirety 
of the Eighth Amendment applies to the states.  (Roper v. 
Simmons 
(2005) 
543 
U.S. 
551, 
560 
[“The 
Eighth 
Amendment provides:  ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.’  The provision is applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”)  The decision in Timbs therefore did 
not relieve defendant of the obligation to raise his challenge to 
the levies in a timely manner.26 
 
26  
Alternatively, 
defendant 
contends 
his 
attorney’s 
performance was deficient in the failure to raise this objection.  
In the absence of any explanation for counsel’s conduct, we 
 
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85 
C.  Defendant’s Constitutional Challenges to 
California’s Imposition of the Death Penalty 
Fail 
Defendant raises a series of constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty statute.  He acknowledges that each 
of these arguments has been rejected by this court in past 
decisions.  As he anticipates, we decline to revisit our prior 
holdings with respect to these issues, which are listed below.  
Given the longstanding nature of our rulings, we do not reiterate 
their rationale. 
California’s death penalty laws adequately narrow the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty.  (People v. 
Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 112–113 (Morales).)  In particular, 
the special circumstances of section 190.2, which render a 
murderer eligible for the death penalty, are not so numerous 
and broadly interpreted that they fail adequately to narrow the 
class of persons eligible for death.  (Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th 
at p. 654–655; People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1224–
1225.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to 
consider the circumstances of the capital crime in its penalty 
determination, does not license the jury to impose death in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the United 
States Constitution.  (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 838 
(Vargas); People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401.) 
The laws governing imposition of the death penalty are 
not unconstitutional because they fail to provide “safeguards” 
 
conclude his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is better 
raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  (Johnson, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at pp. 653–654.) 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
86 
urged by defendant to prevent its arbitrary and capricious 
imposition.  In particular, the federal Constitution does not 
require that the jury agree unanimously on which aggravating 
factors apply.  (People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 
886, 928; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 533.)  The jury 
need not make written findings regarding the existence of 
aggravating factors.  (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 671; 
People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1007.)  Neither is the 
death penalty unconstitutional for failing to require findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance 
(other than Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) 
has been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate sentence.  
(People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 142–148; People v. 
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235.)  Finally, there is no 
Eighth Amendment requirement that our death penalty 
procedures provide for intercase proportionality review.  (People 
v. Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 113; People v. Lang (1989) 
49 Cal.3d 991, 1043.)  These conclusions are not affected by 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 or Ring v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584.  (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 131.) 
Nor does section 190.3’s use of adjectives such as 
“extreme” and “substantial” in factors (d) and (g), respectively, 
act as a barrier to the jury’s consideration of mitigating 
evidence, in violation of constitutional commands.  (Vargas, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 838; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 
270.)  The court was not required to instruct the jury that the 
statutory mitigating factors are relevant solely to mitigation, 
and the court’s instruction directing the jury to consider 
“whether or not” certain mitigating factors were present did not 
invite the jury to use the absence of such factors as an 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
87 
aggravating circumstance, in violation of state law and the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 
Cal.5th 265, 351; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 1, 123.) 
The failure to afford capital defendants the same 
procedural safeguards at the penalty phase that are afforded to 
noncapital defendants does not offend equal protection 
principles, because the two groups are not similarly situated.  
(People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 678; People v. Whalen 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 91.) 
California does not regularly use the death penalty as a 
form of punishment, and “ ‘its imposition does not violate 
international 
norms 
of 
decency 
or 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment.’ ”  (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 965.) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
88 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its 
entirety. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Navarro 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S165195 
Date Filed:  October 28, 2021  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Orange  
Judge: Francisco P. Briseño 
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Richard I. Targow, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Julie L. Garland and James William Bilderback II, Assistant 
Attorneys General, A. Natasha Cortina, Christine Friedman and 
Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Richard I. Targow 
P.O. Box 1143 
Sebastopol, CA 95473 
(707) 829-5190 
 
Christine Levingston Bergman 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101  
(619) 738-9159