Title: STATE EX REL OLD ELK v DISTRICT CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13332
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 1976

No. 13332 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 STATE O F M O N T A N A ex r e 1 S H A R O N O L D ELK, JR. , Relator, THE DISTRICT C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , i n and f o r t h e County of Big Horn, and t h e H O N O R A B L E CHARLES T.,UEDKE, Presiding Judge, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Moses, Kampfe, T o l l i v c r and Wright, B i l l i n g s , Montana Frank Kampfe argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John F. North, Assistant Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana James Seykora, County Attorney, argued, Hardin, Montana Submitted: A p r i l 8, 1?76 Decided : JpL - 8 1976 Filed: iqj!f!- - 8 TBL!;**~ L A. r t ~ - : i i e s ~ \ ! I : . . Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s a challenge t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the d i s t r i c t court, presented t o t h i s Court on a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of supervisory control o r other appropriate w r i t . Relator is the defendant i n a criminal action i n the d i s t r i c t court, Big Horn County. Relator i s an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians and resides within the e x t e r i o r boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. The Crow Tribe of Indians appeared and argued a s Amicus Curiae. O n November 27, 1975, a t the Hilltop Tavern located approxi- mately one mile west of Hardin, Montana, outside t h e e x t e r i o r boundary of the Crow Indian Reservation, a shooting occurred i n which one John Matt Bell was k i l l e d by a high powered r i f l e . The Big Horn County s h e r i f f ' s d e ~ a r t m e n t ~ p u r s u a n t t o an investigation, had reason t o believe t h a t Sharon Old Elk, Jr. was involved i n t h e commission of the crime and t h a t h i s vehicle, a green 1971 Plymouth Duster bearing Big Horn County, Montana, license p l a t e s 22-4259, was also involved and a t the time of t h e homicide the c a r of Sharon Old Elk, Jr. was extensively damaged on the l e f t front door. Pursuant t o investigation, a complaint was prepared f o r deliberate homicide, charging Sharon Old Elk, Jr . with t h e crime and was brought before the Honorable Kenneth Snively , J u s t i c e of the Peace a t Hardin, Montana. A n a r r e s t warrant was issued f o r one Sharon Old Elk, Jr. The warrant was delivered together with a copy of the complaint t o Sheriff Robert L. Brown. The vehicle believed t o be used during the homicide w a s spotted within the e x t e r i o r boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation on t r u s t property owned by George Old Elk 11. The s h e r i f f of Big Horn County proceeded onto the Crow Indian Reservation armed with a s t a t e a r r e s t warrant, and i n the presence of a Bureau of Indian Affairs Special Officer proceeded t o the Crow Indian Tribal Judge, Fredrick Knows H i s Gun. As a matter of formality and courtesy and knowing there was no formal extradition proceedings within the Crow Tribe and knowing the Crow Tribe had no extradition power o r s t a t u t e , the s h e r i f f of Big Horn County requested the Tribal Judge t o issue a t r i b a l court order o r similar warrant f o r the a r r e s t and apprehension of Sharon Old Elk, Jr. Judge Knows H i s Gun did not issue such a warrant and i n f a c t refused t o do so. Sheriff Robert L. Brown together with other deputies and Bureau of Indian Affairs Special Officer William Snell, proceeded t o the George Old Elk I1 residence located approximately three miles south of Crow Agency, Montana, which i s located on t r u s t property. Sheriff Brown placed r e l a t o r , Sharon Old Elk, Jr., under a r r e s t , pursuant t o the s t a t e a r r e s t warrant, and advised him of h i s constitutional r i g h t s , served a copy of the warrant and the complaint upon r e l a t o r and transported him back t o Big Horn County Courthouse a t Hardin, Montana, where the r e l a t o r was arraigned before Judge Kenneth Snively, J u s t i c e of the Peace. There i s no federal, s t a t e o r Crow Indian s t a t u t e , ordinance o r regulation authorizing the procedure of extradition t o and from an Indian reservation within the e x t e r i o r boundaries of the s t a t e of Montana. - 3 - A l l the f a c t s necessary to review the issue presented t o t h i s Court by r e l a t o r have been stipulated and admitted as evidence by the p a r t i e s . Relator contends the f a c t s surrounding h i s a r r e s t c l e a r l y show the a r r e s t was i l l e g a l since it was made pursuant t o a s t a t e a r r e s t warrant, executed by a s t a t e o f f i c e r , on an Indian person within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. The a r r e s t and subsequent transportation of r e l a t o r from the reservation by t h e sheriff of Big Horn County, establish a de facto extradition pro- cedure which r e l a t o r believes i s invalid, i l l e g a l and i n violation of h i s constitutional r i g h t s . Relator has c i t e d a l l of the recognized cases which e s t a b l i s h the unique s t a t u s of the American Indian as a c i t i z e n and t h e relationship between the Indian and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l powers of the t r i b a l government, federal government and the s t a t e government. Very simply most matters within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation a r e within the exclusive jurisdiction of the t r i b a l courts o r federal courts unless f a l l i n g specifical2y within the s t a t e ' s jurisdiction a s directed o r allowed by an a c t of Congress. There i s no disagreement as a general proposition with t h i s argu- ment of r e l a t o r . Relator r e l i e s on McClanahan v. S t a t e Tax Commis- sion of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.ed 2d 129, 135, f o r the proposition t h a t : "'* * * Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the s t a t e action infringed on the r i g h t of reservation Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and be ruled by them.'" Relator then c i t e s as h i s principal authority i n r e l a t i o n t o service of process, a r r e s t o r extradition jurisdiction by s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s over Indian residents of a reservation the case of S t a t e of Arizona ex r e l . Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683,686 (9th C i r . 1969). I n Turtle, a Cheyenne Indian, who resided on the Navajo Indian Reservation i n Arizona, was sought by the S t a t e of Oklahoma f o r t r i a l on a charge of second degree forgery. Oklahoma f i r s t applied t o the Navajo Tribal Council f o r extradition of defendant. The Navajo Tribal Court refused t o extradite, the defendant. A s a r e s u l t of a request from Oklahoma o f f i c i a l s , the Governor of Arizona ordered the extradition of the defendant, pursuant t o Arizona l a w . The s h e r i f f of Apache County, Arizona, executed the Arizona Governor's warrant by a r r e s t i n g the defendant on the reservation and confining him i n the t r i b a l j a i l . The Ninth Circuit Court held t h a t Arizona's exercise of claimed j u r i s d i c t i o n would c l e a r l y i n t e r f e r e with the r i g h t s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e Indian's self-government. The Ninth Circuit Court reached i t s decision by considering the c r i t e r i a of whether the claimed r i g h t by Arizona t o exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n by means of extradition would infringe on the r i g h t of reservation Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and t o be ruled by them o r whether the application of s t a t e authority t o e x t r a d i t e would i n t e r f e r e with reservation self-government. Relator concludes h i s argument with the request t h a t t h i s Court regard an Indian reservation, within t h e s t a t e of Montana, as a co-equal sovereign, such a s our 49 s i s t e r s t a t e s . This s i m - p l i f i e s the remedy here by application of the Uniform Criminal Extradition A c t , sections 95-3101 through 95-3136, R.C.M. 1947. This proposal may have an appealing ring the f i r s t time around, however, it would take a g r e a t deal more from our Indian c i t i z e n s than it would bestow, i f i n f a c t we had the power t o do so, which i n f a c t we do not. W e agree with the proposition t h a t i n the absence of governing a c t s of Congress, the question has always been whether state action - 5 - infringed on the r i g h t of reservation Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and t o be ruled by them. W e disagree with r e l a t o r ' s application of the Turtle case t o the i n s t a n t f a c t s t o demonstrate an interference i n the r i g h t of the Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and be governed by them. In Turtle the s i t u a t i o n is analogous t o the question before us however, the one Cmportant exception i s t h a t the Navajo Tribe of Indians had adopted a resolution i n regard t o an extradition proceeding. The Court stated: "In 1956 the Navajo Tribal Council, the t r i b a l l e g i s l a t i v e body, adopted a Resolution providing procedures f o r Indian extradition. While t h i s t r i b a l extradition law by i t s terms s p e c i f i c a l l y provides f o r extradition only t o the s t a t e s of Arizona, Utah, and N e w Mexico, it has been approved by the Commissioner f o r Indian Affairs a s provided f o r by federal law and i s now p a r t of the Navajo Tribal Code. 17 N.T.C., Sections 1841-42. The Tribe has thus codified and does now exercise i t s extradition power. This power cannot now be assumed by o r shared with the S t a t e of Arizona without 'infring[ing] on the r i g h t of reservation Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and be ruled by them.' Williams v. Lee, supra a t p. 220 of 358 U.S., a t p. 271 of 79 S.Ct." (Emphasis supplied). The Crow Tribe of Indians had no extradition code a t any time pertinent t o t h i s matter and hence Turtle would not apply. Further, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed Turtle i n S t a t e Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786, 788, wherein it held t h a t the s t a t e court could obtain jurisdiction over Indian defendants by issuing and s e w i n g process upon them while they were on the reservation. It i s interesting t o note the N e w Mexico Supreme Court indicates t h a t it had made a survey of the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l question and stated: "In an attempt t o determine whether Indian immunity from process i s necessary i n t h i s case t o protect the r i g h t of reserva.tion Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and be ruled by them, we have surveyed a number of cases and other authorities. According to some court decisions some powers reserved to Indians for their exclusive jurisdiction, and which may therefore be necessary for Indian self-government, are: jurisdiction to try an offense committed on the reservation by or against an Indian, Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L ed. 962 (1946); extradition powers, if a tribe has codified and exercises its own extradition - law, Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th.Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1003, 90 S.Ct. 551, 24 L.Ed.2d 494- (1970) * * * . I 1 (Emphasis supplied.) The New Mexico Supreme Court agrees with this Court's interpretation of Turtle in that the tribe must first have codified and exercised its own extradition laws before the rule in Turtle would apply. Further, this Court in Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 451, 452, 517 P.2d 893, in a related matter involving service of process within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, said: "Art. 111, Sec. 6 of the 1889 Montana Constitution provides : "'Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character; and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.' "Section 83-102, R.C .M. 1947, concerning jurisdiction provides : "'The sovereignty and jurisdiction of this state extend to all places within its boundaries, as estab- lished by the constitution, excepting such places as are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.' "Service was obtained pursuant to Rule 4, Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Once the district court has assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter and process has been properly served, the defendant cannot throw up a shield around herself by claiming that the state process server cannot pierce the exterior boundaries of an Indian reser- vation and serve civil process therein. "In the instant case the marriage 'contract' took place off the reservation. There has been no preemption by the federal government which could prevent the transfer of jurisdiction to the state. There is no disclaimer made and there is no infringement on the right of the tribe to govern itself. Indian country is not a federal enclave off limits to state process servers. Service of process extends to an Indian defendant served within the Fort Peck Reservation. State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786. "The myth of Indian sovereignty has pervaded judicial attempts by state courts to deal with contemporary Indian problems. Such rationale must yield to the realities of modern life, both on and off the reservation. As Judge Russell Smith recently observed in United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, (D.C.Mont.), 364 F.Supp. 192, 194: "'The blunt fact, however, is that an Indian Tribe is sovereign to the extent that the United States permits it to be sovereign---neither more nor less. 1 "Only by throwing off\ the strictures of 'Indian sovereignty can state courts enter the arena and meet the problems of the modern Indian. If Congress and the federal appellate cnurts have a better solution, let them come forward." This Court in Bad Horse also relied on Anderson, the New Mexico case discussed heretofore. Relator terminates his petition before this Court with this final plea: "CONCLUSION: This Honorable Court should take jurisdiction hereof and grant relator relief under an appropriate writ. The matter of the protection of an individual's constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law, as well as a definitive declaration of the jurisdictional authority and power of the State of Montana in regard to Indian reservations within its boundaries, are of great public 'nterest and directly affect the impartial and effective maintenance of Justice and the public's confidence in and respect for the courts. There is no other appeal or other adequate or speedy remedy at law available to the relator for the disposition of this issue." (Emphasis supplied.) Individual rights, due process, impartial and effective maintenance of justice and the public conhidence in and respect for the courts are paramount in the resolution of these kind of matters. However, these rights and duties afe owed to all citizens not only those residing within the e x t e r i o r boundaries of an Indian reservation. The c i t i z e n s of Montana generally and Big Horn County p a r t i c u l a r l y would be grossly deprived i f under t h e guise of individual due process they not only had no speedy, adequate, remedy but no remedy at a l l . This i n e f f e c t i s the position of r e l a t o r . The federal a u t h o r i t i e s have no jurisdic- t i o n pursuant t o 18 U.S.C. 5 5 1151 through 1165, a s the crime was not committed i n Indian country a s defined i n 18 U.S.C. 5 1151. Here, we do not have the s i t u a t i o n t o meet the requirements of Unlawful F l i g h t t o Avoid Prosecution, 18 U.S.C. $1073. Tribal Judge Frederick Knows His Gun had no authority to e x t r a d i t e o r under T i t l e 25, Code of Federal Regulations, t o apprehend r e l a t o r on behalf of the s t a t e of Montana f o r the crime of deliberate homicide. Finding no interference with t r i b a l self-government and t h a t the s t a t e of Montana proceeded under the only remedy available,