Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. William R. Lamb
Citation: 2015 WI 52
Docket Number: 2012AP000486-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2015

2015 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP486-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  
William R. Lamb, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
William R. Lamb, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAMB 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP486-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against William R. Lamb, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William R. Lamb, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.  Attorney William R. Lamb has appealed 
from the report of the referee, Attorney James R. Erickson, 
which found, based on Attorney Lamb's stipulation and no contest 
plea, 
that 
Attorney 
Lamb 
had 
engaged 
in 
75 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
ten 
client 
representations, that his license to practice law in Wisconsin 
should be revoked, that he should be required to pay restitution 
in the total amount of $21,580, and that he should be required 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
2 
 
to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which 
were $8,875.90 as of September 16, 2014. 
¶2 
Having considered the referee's report, the briefs of 
the parties, and the record in this matter, we determine that 
the 
referee's 
factual 
findings 
based 
on 
Attorney 
Lamb's 
stipulation are not clearly erroneous.  We reject Attorney 
Lamb's request that he be relieved of the stipulation he entered 
so that the matter can be remanded to the referee and Attorney 
Lamb can now present evidence to "correct the record."  We 
further conclude that the referee's factual findings support his 
conclusions of misconduct on the 75 counts alleged against 
Attorney Lamb.  Given Attorney Lamb's pervasive pattern of 
misconduct, including forging his client's name in order to 
convert the client's settlement funds, we determine that it is 
necessary to revoke Attorney Lamb's license to practice law in 
this state.  We also agree with the referee's recommendation 
that Attorney Lamb should be ordered to make restitution to the 
clients he has harmed and to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney Lamb was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in April 1989.  He maintained a solo legal practice 
in Menomonie.  His license has been suspended for administrative 
reasons 
and 
for 
failure 
to 
cooperate 
with 
disciplinary 
investigations since the fall of 2011.   
¶4 
This is the fourth time that Attorney Lamb has been 
the subject of professional discipline.  The first two instances 
resulted in consensual private reprimands.  In 1997 Attorney 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
3 
 
Lamb received a consensual private reprimand for failing to 
provide 
requested 
information 
during 
a 
disciplinary 
investigation.  Private Reprimand No. 1997-10.  In 2003 Attorney 
Lamb 
received 
a 
second 
consensual 
private 
reprimand 
for 
misconduct involving a failure to communicate the basis or rate 
of his fee to a client, a failure to maintain trust account 
records which would have shown whether he had placed an advanced 
fee into a client trust account or had immediately cashed the 
checks for his own use, and a failure to provide his client's 
file to successor counsel in a timely manner.  Private Reprimand 
No. 2003-28. 
¶5 
The third prior disciplinary matter resulted in a 
60-day 
suspension 
of 
Attorney 
Lamb's 
license. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Lamb, 
2011 
WI 
101, 
¶2, 
338 Wis. 2d 1, 806 N.W.2d 439 (Lamb I).  In that proceeding, 
Attorney Lamb stipulated that he had committed 21 counts of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
four 
client 
representations.  Attorney Lamb's actions tended to follow a 
general pattern.  He often accepted advanced fees, which he 
failed to hold in trust or for which he failed to provide the 
notices required for the alternative advanced fee procedure 
under Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.15(b)(4m).  He then refused 
to or failed to keep his clients reasonably informed about the 
status of their legal matters, often ignoring multiple requests 
for information from the clients.  When the clients attempted to 
obtain a refund of fees and a return of their files, Attorney 
Lamb either failed to respond or failed to comply with their 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
4 
 
requests.  When the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) asked for 
information regarding the clients' grievances, Attorney Lamb 
failed to cooperate properly with the OLR's investigations. 
¶6 
The 
OLR 
initiated 
this 
proceeding 
by 
filing 
a 
complaint and order to answer on March 7, 2012.  The original 
complaint alleged 23 counts of misconduct arising out of four 
client representations.  Attorney Lamb filed an answer, which 
admitted some of the allegations of the complaint but contended 
that the claims of misconduct were without merit and alleged 
specific 
facts 
contradicting 
some 
of 
the 
complaint's 
allegations.   
¶7 
On February 8, 2013, the OLR filed an amended 
complaint alleging the 75 counts of misconduct referenced above.  
Attorney Lamb filed an answer that again admitted some of the 
factual allegations of the amended complaint, denied most of the 
allegations, provided Attorney Lamb's view of the various client 
representations, and denied that he had violated any rules of 
professional conduct, other than perhaps failing to place 
certain advanced fees into his client trust account.  Attorney 
Lamb's answer to the amended complaint also alleged that he had 
additional personal information that he would seek to provide to 
the referee or the OLR and for which a protective order would be 
appropriate.   
¶8 
In November 2013, Attorney Lamb entered into a 
stipulation with the OLR.  In the stipulation, Attorney Lamb 
withdrew his answer to the OLR's amended complaint and pled no 
contest to each of the 75 counts of misconduct, "as set forth in 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
5 
 
the Amended Complaint."  Specifically, Attorney Lamb agreed that 
the referee "may use the allegations of the Amended Complaint as 
an adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of 
misconduct as to each misconduct count to which [Attorney] Lamb 
has pled no contest."  In the stipulation, Attorney Lamb 
explicitly 
verified 
that 
he 
understood 
the 
misconduct 
allegations and his right to contest those allegations, that he 
understood his right to consult with counsel but had decided to 
proceed on a pro se basis, and that his entry into the 
stipulation was knowing and voluntary.   
¶9 
The stipulation also called for the matter of the 
appropriate sanction to be the subject of briefs to be submitted 
by the parties.  The OLR filed a sanction brief, but Attorney 
Lamb never did so. 
¶10 Based on the stipulation Attorney Lamb entered, the 
referee issued a report containing findings of fact based on the 
allegations of the amended complaint.  He determined that those 
facts supported conclusions of law that Attorney Lamb had 
engaged in the ethical violations alleged in the 75 counts set 
forth in the amended complaint.  The referee agreed with the 
uncontested recommendation in the OLR's sanction brief that 
Attorney Lamb's license to practice law in Wisconsin should be 
revoked.  He also recommended that Attorney Lamb should be 
required to pay restitution to three individual clients, as well 
as to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (the 
Fund), which had already made payments to five other clients. 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 It is not necessary to recount the extensive factual 
findings made by the referee regarding each of the ten client 
representations at issue in this proceeding.  A summary of one 
representative example is sufficient to provide an accurate 
picture of the types of misconduct found by the referee with 
respect to most of the representations. 
¶12 In November 2010 Attorney Lamb was retained by client 
M.B. to represent him in attempting to set aside a sheriff's 
sale of M.B.'s property following the entry of a judgment 
against M.B.  As part of the oral agreement for representation, 
Attorney Lamb requested an advanced fee of $1,000 for the 
representation.  M.B. initially paid $500 in cash to Attorney 
Lamb and then sent him a check for the remaining $500 three days 
later.  Attorney Lamb did not deposit the $1000 advanced fee 
into his client trust account nor did he provide any of the 
notices required by the alternative advanced fee procedure.   
¶13 Several 
weeks 
later 
Attorney 
Lamb 
entered 
an 
appearance in the foreclosure action.  He did not, however, take 
any further action on M.B.'s behalf.  Over the next several 
weeks, M.B. telephoned Attorney Lamb multiple times, seeking 
information about the status of the matter.  Attorney Lamb 
failed to return M.B.'s calls.  Ultimately, M.B. left multiple 
messages with Attorney Lamb, repeatedly requesting a refund of 
the $1000 advanced fee he had paid to Attorney Lamb. 
¶14 Because Attorney Lamb did not provide any refund of 
the advanced fee, M.B. filed a claim with the Fund.  The Fund 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
7 
 
subsequently reimbursed M.B. for the $1000 advanced fee he had 
paid to Attorney Lamb. 
¶15 M.B. also filed a grievance with the OLR, which 
forwarded the grievance to Attorney Lamb and asked for a 
response to the substance of the grievance, an accounting of his 
fee, and a copy of his file.  When Attorney Lamb did not 
respond, the OLR e-mailed a second letter and personally served 
a third letter, each time asking for a response to its requests.  
Attorney Lamb still did not respond.   
¶16 On July 10, 2012, the OLR filed a motion seeking a 
temporary suspension of Attorney Lamb's license.  This court 
issued an order directing Attorney Lamb to show cause why his 
license should not be temporarily suspended due to his willful 
failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation.  See 
SCR 22.03(4).  When Attorney Lamb did not respond to the order, 
this court temporarily suspended Attorney Lamb's license on 
September 17, 2012.  That temporary suspension has remained in 
effect until the issuance of this opinion and order. 
¶17 Another matter addressed in the referee's report also 
merits discussion.  Attorney Lamb agreed to represent R.M., a 
friend, who had been injured in a December 2004 automobile 
accident. 
 
Attorney 
Lamb 
did 
not 
prepare 
a 
written 
fee/representation agreement.  In December 2007, Attorney Lamb 
filed a personal injury lawsuit on R.M.'s behalf.  By early 2008 
Attorney Lamb informed R.M. that the defendants had made a 
settlement offer.  R.M. instructed Attorney Lamb to complete the 
settlement. 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
8 
 
¶18 Over the ensuing years, R.M. asked Attorney Lamb on 
multiple occasions about the status of the settlement.  Attorney 
Lamb's responses falsely indicated that the settlement was close 
to 
being 
finalized, 
but 
he 
otherwise 
deferred 
answering 
questions about it.  In early 2012, after confronting Attorney 
Lamb about the settlement, R.M. obtained a copy of the 
settlement check from one of the defendants.  The check showed 
that it had been issued on March 20, 2008, made payable to 
"[R.M.] A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD."  On the 
back of the check were endorsements for "[R.M.]" and "William R. 
Lamb, for deposit only."  R.M.'s endorsement signature on the 
back of the check had been forged.  R.M. never received any of 
the settlement funds from Attorney Lamb. 
¶19 Although the settlement proceeds belonged to R.M., 
Attorney Lamb had not deposited the proceeds into his client 
trust account.  He also never notified R.M. that he had received 
the settlement proceeds or provided R.M. with an accounting of 
those proceeds. 
¶20 After learning of the conversion of the settlement 
proceeds, R.M. filed a grievance with the OLR in February 2012.  
The OLR again sent a notice of formal investigation to Attorney 
Lamb, once more asking that he respond to the allegations in the 
grievance, that he provide an accounting of his fee, and that he 
submit a copy of his file for the matter.  Although Attorney 
Lamb sent an email indicating that he had received the OLR's 
letter, he did not provide a response as requested.  The OLR 
sent two additional letters to Attorney Lamb via e-mail and by 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
9 
 
personal service, but Attorney Lamb did not respond.  The OLR 
included this matter in its July 10, 2012 motion for a temporary 
suspension.  Thus, this matter was also a basis for the court's 
September 17, 2012 temporary suspension order. 
¶21 In all, the referee concluded that Attorney Lamb had 
committed 84 separate violations of 19 different subsections of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys:1 
• SCR 20:1.32—eight counts (lack of reasonable diligence) 
• SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)3—one count (failure to consult with 
client regarding the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished) 
                                                 
1 Some of the 75 counts set forth in the complaint alleged 
violations of multiple subsections of the ethical rules. 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall: 
(1) Promptly inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance 
with 
respect 
to 
which 
the 
client's 
informed consent, as defined in SCR 20:1.0(f), is 
required by these rules;  
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client's objectives are to be 
accomplished; 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter;  
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information; and 
(5) consult with the client about any relevant 
limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
10 
 
• SCR 20:1.4(a)(3)—nine counts (failure to keep client 
reasonably informed about status of matter) 
• SCR 20:1.4(a)(4)—nine counts (failure to comply with 
reasonable client requests for information) 
• SCR 20:1.4(b)4—one count (failure to explain a matter 
so client may make informed decisions) 
• SCR 
20:1.5(a)5—seven 
counts 
(collection 
of 
an 
unreasonable fee) 
                                                                                                                                                             
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
4 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 
5 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, 
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or 
by the circumstances;  
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
11 
 
• SCR 20:1.5(b)(1)6—five counts (failure to communicate 
in writing to client the basis or rate of fees and 
expenses) 
• SCR 20:1.5(b)(2)—five counts (failure to communicate 
in writing to client the purpose and effect of 
advanced fee) 
                                                                                                                                                             
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client;   
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
6 SCR 20:1.5(b) provides: 
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
client in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on 
the same basis or rate as in the past.  If it is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
the 
total 
cost 
of 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be 
oral or in writing. Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.   
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing.  
(3) A lawyer shall promptly respond to a client's 
request for information concerning fees and expenses. 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
12 
 
• SCR 20:1.5(b)(3)—four counts (failure to respond to 
client requests regarding fees and expenses) 
• SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)7—one count (failure to hold client's 
property in trust) 
• SCR 
20:1.15(b)(4)8—eight 
counts 
(failure 
to 
hold 
advanced fees in trust until earned where alternative 
procedure not used) 
• SCR 20:1.15(d)(1)9—one count (failure to notify client 
of receipt of funds in which client has interest) 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides that  
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 
8 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provides: 
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
9 SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
13 
 
• SCR 20:1.15(d)(2)10—one 
count 
(failure 
to 
provide 
accounting of trust funds after final distribution or 
upon client request) 
• SCR 
20:1.16(d)11—seven 
counts 
(failure 
to 
refund 
unearned 
advanced 
fees 
upon 
termination 
of 
representation) 
• SCR 20:4.1(a)(1)12—one count (making false statement of 
material fact or law to third party) 
• SCR 20:8.4(b)13—one count (committing criminal acts) 
                                                                                                                                                             
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
10 SCR 20:1.15(d)(2) 
provides 
that 
"[u]pon 
final 
distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client 
or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, the 
lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding 
the property." 
11 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
12 SCR 20:4.1(a)(1) 
provides 
that 
in 
the 
course 
of 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly "make a 
false statement of a material fact or law to a 3rd person." 
13 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects." 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
14 
 
• SCR 
20:8.4(c)14—five 
counts 
(engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation) 
• SCR 22.03(2) and (6),15 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h)16—
nine counts (failure to cooperate with disciplinary 
investigation) 
                                                 
14 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
15 SCR 22.03(2) and (6) provide: 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
. . . . 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
16 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
15 
 
• SCR 
22.26(1)(a), 
(b), 
and 
(c),17 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(f)18—one count (failure to notify client, 
opposing counsel, and court of license suspension) 
¶22 In attorney disciplinary proceedings, we affirm the 
referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
                                                 
17 SCR 22.26(1) provides, in relevant part: 
On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice of 
their choice elsewhere.  
(c) Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for 
each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation.  The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence.  
18 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
16 
 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶23 The primary thrust of Attorney Lamb's appeal is that 
the factual record on which the referee relied is erroneous and 
incomplete, despite the fact that Attorney Lamb stipulated that 
the referee could rely on those facts.  Attorney Lamb contends 
that he was informed that once the formal complaint was filed, 
the only options he had were to admit or deny entire allegations 
as set forth in the complaint.  He asserts that during the time 
period of the OLR's investigation and of the determination by 
the Preliminary Review Committee (PRC) as to whether there was 
cause to proceed with specific charges in a formal complaint, he 
was impaired by alcoholism, which prevented him from submitting 
evidence to the OLR and which, in turn, prevented the PRC from 
considering the full panoply of facts when it made its cause-to-
proceed determinations on specific misconduct charges. 
¶24 Attorney Lamb acknowledges that he entered into a 
stipulation.  He claims, however, that since he had been unable 
to participate fully in the investigation process, he felt that 
once the complaint had been filed, he had no choice but to enter 
into a stipulation. 
¶25 Attorney Lamb further argues that, regardless of his 
responsibility for cooperating with the OLR's investigation and 
ensuring that both the OLR and the referee had a proper 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
17 
 
understanding of all relevant facts, the OLR has a duty to 
ensure that there is an accurate record in a disciplinary 
proceeding.   
¶26 Attorney Lamb also states that he is not challenging 
the factual findings with respect to all ten of the client 
representations at issue.  To the contrary, he is challenging 
the facts as to only six of the representations, and with 
respect to one of those representations, he is seeking to modify 
the factual findings solely on the issue of whether he earned 
the advanced fees paid by the client.  He offers one example.  
He contends that he "put a great deal of effort" into 
representing D.L., including negotiating a settlement with the 
district attorney's office.  Attorney Lamb, however, provides 
only his unsupported and broad allegation to this effect.  He 
offers no specifics and does not provide any evidence that he 
believes should be added to the record to support such a claim.  
He does not offer even general allegations as to what is 
inaccurate 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
other 
five 
client 
representations.   
¶27 The relief sought by Attorney Lamb to remedy the 
alleged inaccuracies in the record is a remand to the referee 
for further development of the factual record.  In essence, 
Attorney Lamb is asking that he be relieved of the stipulation 
he entered and that he be placed in the position he occupied 
prior to that stipulation, where he could litigate all of the 
alleged factual inaccuracies in the OLR's amended complaint. 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
18 
 
¶28 We reject Attorney Lamb's arguments and requested 
relief.  He fails to convince us that there is any legal basis 
for voiding the stipulation he entered and restarting the 
litigation of this matter.   
¶29 Although Attorney Lamb asserts that he was impaired by 
his alcoholism during the time that the OLR was conducting its 
investigation and presenting the results of that investigation 
to the PRC, he does not claim that his subsequent entry into the 
stipulation was unknowing or involuntary due to his alcoholism.  
The time period for the initial investigatory stage of this 
matter ended, at the very latest, in February 2013 when the OLR 
filed 
its 
amended 
complaint, 
adding 
a 
number 
of 
client 
representations and alleged ethical violations.  Attorney Lamb, 
however, did not enter into the stipulation until November 2013.  
He never expressly contends that he was impaired at that time, 
which is the relevant time period for determining whether he 
should be granted relief from the stipulation he entered.  In a 
motion Attorney Lamb filed with this court in May 2014, he 
asserted that he had sought treatment for his alcoholism in 
2012.  Indeed, in an April 2014 email message to the referee, 
which the referee treated as an objection to the imposition of 
costs, Attorney Lamb specifically stated that he had been 
impaired by his alcoholism "until sometime later on in 2012."  
Thus, according to Attorney Lamb's own admission, his impairment 
was no longer an impediment to responding to the charges in this 
matter after the latter part of 2012, a year before he entered 
into the stipulation.  There is simply no basis in the record to 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
19 
 
conclude that Attorney Lamb's earlier problems with alcohol 
dependency rendered his November 2013 decision to enter into the 
stipulation unknowing or involuntary. 
¶30 In addition, although Attorney Lamb claims there are 
factual inaccuracies in the record, he does not identify the 
alleged inaccuracies with specificity or provide evidence to 
demonstrate the inaccuracy.  He simply asks this court to take 
him at his word that if the court were to remand the matter back 
to the referee, he would now produce evidence that would refute 
some of the allegations in the amended complaint.   
¶31 Attorney Lamb, however, already had ample opportunity 
to present such evidence to the OLR and to the referee.  Even if 
the OLR would not have changed the charges in its amended 
complaint, that does not mean that it was futile to submit the 
evidence.  The proceedings before the referee are designed to 
find the facts as to what occurred.  Attorney Lamb clearly 
recognized that fact because his answer to the amended complaint 
did deny a substantial number of the OLR's allegations and did 
contain some of the same contentions regarding the work he 
performed for his clients.  He intentionally forfeited his right 
to contest the OLR's factual allegations, however, when he 
signed a stipulation that the referee could use the factual 
allegations of the amended complaint as the referee's factual 
findings that formed the basis for determining that he had 
committed the ethical violations alleged in the 75 counts of the 
amended complaint.   
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
20 
 
¶32 Moreover, even if Attorney Lamb's concern about the 
alleged inaccuracies in the record relates solely to the level 
of discipline and to the imposition of restitution, he was given 
the opportunity to bring the alleged inaccuracies to the 
referee's attention in connection with his sanction brief.  He 
could have submitted the additional evidence he now claims to 
have to the referee as part of an argument that his misconduct 
is not as serious as it appears, but he never filed any sanction 
brief. 
¶33 In the end, Attorney Lamb has not presented a valid 
basis for essentially vacating the referee's report and voiding 
the stipulation he entered.  Thus, we find no basis to overturn 
any of the referee's factual findings as clearly erroneous.  We 
further determine that the referee's factual findings adequately 
support the legal conclusion that Attorney Lamb engaged in the 
ethical violations contained in the 75 counts of the amended 
complaint. 
¶34 Having established the number of violations, we now 
consider the appropriate level of discipline.  Other than 
asserting that he has additional evidence that would show some 
work was done for certain clients, Attorney Lamb's brief does 
not contain an argument regarding the appropriate level of 
discipline.  He cites no prior cases as support for the 
imposition of any particular level of discipline.  Indeed, he 
specifically states in his brief that he is "not arguing or 
suggesting that the ultimate outcome will be different," 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
21 
 
although he notes there is a possibility it could be different 
if a remand to the referee were ordered.   
¶35 After considering the totality of the factors present 
in this proceeding, we conclude that the revocation of Attorney 
Lamb's license to practice law in this state is appropriate and 
necessary.  Attorney Lamb forged his client's signature so he 
could convert over $10,000 in settlement funds to his own use 
and then hid that fact from his client and friend for nearly 
four years.  That is an exceedingly serious breach of an 
attorney's core responsibility to a client.  There is also a 
clear pattern of misconduct by Attorney Lamb, both within the 
client representations at issue in this proceeding and between 
this proceeding and Lamb I.  For example, Attorney Lamb 
repeatedly accepted advanced fees from clients, did little or no 
work on those clients' matters, and repeatedly ignored requests 
by the clients for information about their legal matters, often 
resulting in significant harm to the clients.  When the clients 
filed grievances against Attorney Lamb, he repeatedly failed to 
respond to the OLR's attempts to gather information from him.  
Throughout the great majority of the proceedings before the 
referee and on appeal before this court, Attorney Lamb failed to 
express real remorse for what he did.  Only at the eleventh 
hour, when he thought this court was about to decide his case, 
did Attorney Lamb file a letter to the court offering his 
"sincere apology" for the hurt he had left in his wake.  
Although that expression of remorse is a positive step, even 
then Attorney Lamb still couched his apology in the context of 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
22 
 
his alcoholism, although he presented no evidence before the 
referee that alcoholism had caused all or even some of his 
misconduct, including his forgery of a client's signature and 
theft of over $10,000.  In the end, the balance of facts 
requires revocation. 
¶36 A revocation of Attorney Lamb's law license is 
consistent with other disciplinary cases in which we have 
revoked an attorney's license.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Kelly, 2012 WI 55, 341 Wis. 2d 104, 
814 N.W.2d 844 (revocation imposed where attorney found to have 
committed 51 counts of misconduct, including failure to exercise 
diligence, failure to communicate with clients, failure to 
refund advanced fees when work not completed, and failure to 
respond to OLR requests for information); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Fadner, 2007 WI 18, 229 Wis. 2d 54, 
727 N.W.2d 20 (revocation imposed where attorney with one prior 
private reprimand and a previous nine-month suspension engaged 
in 45 counts of misconduct arising out of ten representations). 
¶37 We now turn to the issue of restitution.  We agree 
with the referee that Attorney Lamb should be required to pay 
restitution to the Fund in the amount of $17,500, which the Fund 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
23 
 
paid to clients T.L., B.B., M.B., R.M., and W.B.19  In addition, 
we agree that he should also pay restitution directly to clients 
D.L. ($2,730), E.R. ($850), and B.O. ($500).  
¶38 Finally, we consider Attorney Lamb's appeal from the 
referee's recommendation that he pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding.  Attorney Lamb makes essentially two 
arguments as to why he should not have to pay the full costs of 
the proceeding. 
¶39 First, Attorney Lamb alleges that the costs could have 
been reduced if there had been some sort of settlement 
discussion or a mediation session between himself and the OLR.  
He contends that this would have allowed him to present the 
evidence 
he 
had 
not 
been 
able 
to 
present 
during 
the 
investigation phase due to his alcoholism.  He also asserts that 
such settlement discussions would have resulted, based in part 
on his alleged new evidence, in a negotiated settlement, which 
would have eliminated some of the costs incurred in litigating 
this matter.  He contends that he held the impression that, once 
a formal complaint had been filed, the OLR could not or would 
                                                 
19 In his letter to the court filed on December 17, 2014, 
Attorney Lamb claimed that he had reimbursed the Fund for its 
payment to R.M.  The OLR has not responded to this assertion.  
Without a finding of fact or a stipulation on this matter, we 
will still utilize the $17,500 total for restitution to the Fund 
set forth in the referee's report.  Of course, if Attorney Lamb 
has already reimbursed the Fund for the payment it made to R.M. 
or any other payments, he should be credited accordingly. 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
24 
 
not consider any of his additional evidence outside of the 
context of an evidentiary hearing or a formal mediation session. 
¶40 To the extent that Attorney Lamb is suggesting that 
the OLR should have engaged in plea bargaining with him to 
reduce the amount of litigation expenses, this court's position 
has been not to allow plea bargaining in attorney disciplinary 
cases.  See, e.g., Inglimo, 305 Wis. 2d 71, ¶85.  The OLR would 
have been operating with that understanding. 
¶41 The lack of plea bargaining, however, does not mean 
that Attorney Lamb was powerless to present his evidence to the 
OLR, 
even 
during 
the 
pendency 
of 
a 
formal 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Indeed, there was a period of discovery in this 
matter.  If Attorney Lamb had evidence in his possession that 
would have demonstrated that he did not commit certain alleged 
ethical violations, he could have produced that evidence during 
discovery (or really at any time).  In his supplemental report 
regarding costs, the referee specifically stated that, while the 
OLR had not over-litigated the case or engaged in excessive 
discovery, 
Attorney 
Lamb 
had 
"neglected 
to 
cooperate 
in 
providing required discovery" to the OLR.   
¶42 In addition, while the OLR is not authorized to engage 
in plea bargaining, it always has the ability to ask for the 
dismissal of certain counts if it determines that the evidence 
on those counts does not meet the clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing standard.  See SCR 22.16(5).  Indeed, our opinions 
document that the OLR has moved for dismissal of some pending 
counts on prior occasions while the case was still before the 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
25 
 
referee.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Mandelman, 2014 WI 100, ¶4, 358 Wis. 2d 179, 851 N.W.2d 401 (OLR 
dismissed 23 counts due to evidentiary problems during pre-
hearing phase of disciplinary proceeding); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Ruppelt, 2014 WI 53, ¶1, 354 Wis. 2d 738, 
850 N.W.2d 1 (OLR voluntarily dismissed a count pursuant to 
stipulation); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan, 
2009 WI 12, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 605, 759 N.W.2d 766 (after filing 
complaint OLR moved to dismiss one count and to modify a second 
count).  Consequently, we do not reduce the costs due to 
Attorney Lamb's claim that he could not present his alleged new 
evidence to the OLR, which allegedly extended the length of the 
disciplinary proceeding.  The proceeding was lengthened, if at 
all, by Attorney Lamb's own choice or his failure to act. 
¶43 Attorney Lamb's second argument against the imposition 
of full costs is that he lacks the current financial ability to 
pay them.  He has provided no evidence, however, to support this 
assertion.  Thus, we do not have a basis in this record to 
reduce the amount of the cost obligation.  Further, "[t]he 
court's general policy in such situations is to direct the 
attorney to provide financial information to the OLR and to try 
to negotiate a payment plan for the payment of costs over time."  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Balistrieri, 2014 WI 104, 
¶67, 358 Wis. 2d 262, 852 N.W.2d 1; see also, In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Harman, 2005 WI 89, ¶¶7-12, 282 Wis. 2d 199, 
698 N.W.2d 697 (court ordered attorney who claimed a lack of 
finances to negotiate a reasonable payment schedule with the OLR 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
26 
 
and then imposed such a schedule).  We conclude that we should 
again follow that policy in this situation. 
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of William R. Lamb to 
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this 
order. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, to the extent he has not already done so, 
William R. Lamb shall pay restitution to the Wisconsin Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection in the amount of $17,500.00, to 
client D.L. in the amount of $2,730.00, to client E.R. in the 
amount of $850.00, and to client B.O. in the amount of $500.00. 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, William R. Lamb shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payment of restitution to 
the individual clients and to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for 
Client Protection is to be completed prior to paying costs to 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that William R. Lamb shall 
comply, if he has not already done so, with the requirements of 
SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked. 
 
 
No. 
2012AP486-D   
 
 
 
1