Title: Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Lyndon Station
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP001764
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2023

2023 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1764 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Thomas G. Miller, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Lyndon 
Station and Village Board of Lyndon Station, 
          Defendants, 
Larry Whaley and Kristi Whaley, 
          Intervenors-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 539, 980 N.W.2d 295 
PDC No: 2022 WI App 51 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau   
 
JUDGE: 
William Andrew Sharp   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kathleen Henry and Dairyland Public Interest Law, 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Kathleen Henry.  
 
For the intervenors-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Mitchell R. Olson, Zachariah J. Sibley, Michael P. Van Kleunen, 
and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Zachariah J. Sibley.  
 
 
2023 WI 46 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1764 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV178) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas G. Miller, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of 
Lyndon Station and Village Board of Lyndon 
Station, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Larry Whaley and Kristi Whaley, 
 
          Intervenors-Appellants. 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Trustee Jan Miller serves 
on the Village Board of Lyndon Station.  She cast the deciding 
vote in favor of her daughter and son-in-law's application to 
amend the Village's zoning ordinance to rezone their vacant 
residential property for commercial development.  A local 
business owner, Thomas Miller (no relation), argues that the 
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
2 
 
vote violated his right to due process because Trustee Miller 
was 
partial 
to 
her 
daughter 
and 
son-in-law's 
rezoning 
application.  We reject this argument because there is no due 
process right to impartial decision-makers when a legislative 
body like the Village Board enacts, repeals, or amends a 
generally 
applicable 
law 
like 
the 
zoning 
ordinance.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision.   
I 
¶2 
Kristi and Larry Whaley own a 1.87 acre property in 
Lyndon Station.  Although most nearby properties are zoned as 
commercial, their property was zoned as residential.   
¶3 
The Whaleys contracted to sell their property on the 
condition that it be rezoned for commercial development.  They 
then applied for rezoning pursuant to the Village's regular 
process, which proceeds as follows:  The application is first 
sent to the Village's five-member Plan Commission1 for a public 
meeting and vote on whether to recommend the zoning change.  If 
the Plan Commission recommends the change, the three-member 
Village Board then holds a public hearing at which it must 
consider statements by the applicant and anyone else who wants 
to speak.  Finally, the Village Board votes on whether to amend 
the zoning ordinance.   
                                                 
1 Although the Village Code provides for a seven-member Plan 
Commission, just five members were serving at the time the 
Whaleys submitted their application.  See Village Code § 101.4.    
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Trustee Miller serves on both the Plan Commission and 
the Village Board.  She is also Kristi Whaley's mother and lived 
with the Whaleys during the relevant period.2  Shortly after the 
Whaleys 
filed 
their 
rezoning 
application, 
some 
residents 
expressed concerns that Trustee Miller had a conflict of 
interest.3     
¶5 
The 
Plan 
Commission 
(with 
Trustee 
Miller 
participating) voted to recommend that the Village Board approve 
the Whaleys' application and amend the zoning ordinance.  
Subsequently, the Village Board held a public hearing where 
Thomas Miller and others spoke against the proposed rezoning.  
Miller owns Miller's General Store and opposed the rezoning for 
several reasons, including because the prospective buyer planned 
to redevelop the property into a chain store that would compete 
with his business.  Miller and other residents also questioned 
whether Trustee Miller had a conflict of interest that should 
preclude her from participating in the vote.   
                                                 
2 The Whaleys move to strike the facts regarding Trustee 
Miller's relationship to the Whaleys because they were not a 
part of the certiorari record compiled by the Village.  Because 
we rule for the Whaleys on the merits, we deny this motion as 
moot.   
3 The Village's attorney determined that there was no 
statutory conflict of interest under Wis. Stat. § 19.59 (2021-
22) since Trustee Miller would not receive "any monetary values 
[sic] from the [rez]oning of the property in question."  
Although Miller argued in the circuit court that Trustee 
Miller's participation in the Village Board's vote nevertheless 
violated this statute, he now concedes that it did not.  
Accordingly, we do not address § 19.59 further.     
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Trustee Miller's participation was decisive in the 
Village Board's 2-1 vote to grant the Whaleys' application and 
amend the zoning ordinance.  Miller appealed to the Village's 
Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) arguing that "[t]here was a clear 
conflict of interest involving the vote from Trustee Jan 
Miller."  The ZBA subsequently upheld the Village Board's vote 
to amend the zoning ordinance.   
¶7 
Miller sought certiorari review of the ZBA's decision 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10. 
(2021-22),4 
again 
alleging that Trustee Miller should not have participated in the 
Village Board vote.  The Whaleys intervened to defend the ZBA's 
decision.  The circuit court5 reversed the ZBA's decision, 
concluding that Trustee Miller's participation in the Village 
Board vote violated due process because she was not a fair and 
impartial decision-maker.   
¶8 
The Whaleys6 appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed.  See Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2022 WI App 51, 
¶2, 404 Wis. 2d 539, 980 N.W.2d 295.  The court of appeals 
assumed that Trustee Miller "was partial to her daughter and 
son-in-law's rezoning request," but nonetheless concluded that 
her participation in the vote did not violate due process.  See 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 The Honorable William Andrew Sharp of the Juneau County 
Circuit Court presided. 
6 Neither the Village nor the ZBA appealed the circuit 
court's decision.   
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
5 
 
id. 
¶¶26, 
33. 
 
To 
explain 
why, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
distinguished 
between 
adjudicative 
acts, 
which 
involve 
"application of [a] zoning ordinance to a particular set of 
facts and circumstances," and legislative acts like amending a 
zoning ordinance.  Id., ¶¶40-41.  For adjudicative acts, the 
court of appeals explained that due process requires an 
impartial decision-maker.  Id., ¶40.  But according to the court 
of appeals, the same is not true of legislative determinations 
like those at issue here——deciding whether to enact, repeal, or 
amend a generally applicable law like a zoning ordinance.  See 
id., ¶¶39-42.  In that context, the court of appeals held that 
an impartial decision-maker is not required.  See id.   
II 
 
¶9 
We review the ZBA's decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10., which permits statutory certiorari review of 
such decisions.  Statutory certiorari review encompasses, among 
other considerations,7 whether the ZBA "proceeded on a correct 
theory of law."  Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay, 2020 WI 
95, ¶15, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953 N.W.2d 318 (quoting another 
source).  Proceeding on a correct theory of law includes 
complying with the requirements of due process.  See Marris v. 
                                                 
7 The other considerations are: (1) whether the ZBA acted 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; 
(2) 
whether 
its 
actions 
were 
"arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will 
and not its judgment"; and (3) "whether the board might 
reasonably make the order or determination in question based on 
the evidence."  See State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. 
of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.   
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
6 
 
City of Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 24, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993).  
Whether the ZBA proceeded on a correct theory of law is a 
question of law we review de novo while according a "presumption 
of correctness and validity" to the ZBA's decision.  State ex 
rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, 
¶¶13-14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.   
III 
 
¶10  Miller's central claim is that Trustee Miller's 
participation in the Village Board's vote to amend the zoning 
ordinance violated his right to due process.8     
 
¶11 This claim is grounded in the guarantees of procedural 
due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.9  Procedural due process bars "a deprivation by 
state action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, 
                                                 
8 At times Miller's brief suggests that Trustee Miller's 
participation in the Plan Commission's decision to recommend 
that the Village Board amend the zoning ordinance also violated 
due process.  The relief he seeks, however, is "revers[al of] 
the decision of the ZBA and [Village] Board," not the Plan 
Commission.  Moreover, Miller does not develop a separate 
argument for why the requirements of procedural due process 
would differ before the Plan Commission and the Village Board.  
Accordingly, we focus solely on whether Trustee Miller's 
participation in the Village Board's vote to amend the zoning 
ordinance violated due process.   
9  Although the text of Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution differ, Miller does not argue that they provide 
different procedural due process protections.  Accordingly, we 
treat these two provisions as coextensive for purposes of this 
discussion.   
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
7 
 
liberty, or property without due process of law."  Thorp v. Town 
of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶53, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59 
(quoting Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 
473, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997)).  As this language implies, in order 
to establish a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate both: (1) the deprivation of a protected 
liberty interest——"life, liberty, or property"——by state action 
and (2) that the process he received before that deprivation 
fell short of the minimum the Constitution requires.  See Ky. 
Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989).  We 
focus on the second of these two requirements because it is 
dispositive of Miller's claim.   
 
¶12 The minimum procedural protections required by the Due 
Process Clause vary depending on the context.  See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("Due process is flexible and 
calls 
for 
such 
procedural 
protections 
as 
the 
particular 
situation demands." (quoting another source)).  "[I]n deciding 
what the Due Process Clause requires when the State deprives 
persons of life, liberty or property, the Supreme Court has long 
distinguished between legislative and adjudicative action."  
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 
U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915)).   
¶13 For adjudicative actions like deciding 
civil or 
criminal cases, "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process."  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
8 
 
136 (1955)).  Thus, even though we presume that judges act 
"fairly, impartially, and without bias," proof of a "serious 
risk of actual bias can objectively rise to the level of a due 
process violation."  Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, ¶¶21-22, 392 
Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 868).  
This standard applies not only to formal judicial proceedings 
but also to "administrative agencies which adjudicate."  Withrow 
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975).  Accordingly, when 
adjudicative acts are involved, procedural due process requires 
impartial decision-makers.  See, e.g., 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-
Dade County, 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).   
 
¶14 When legislative actions are at issue, however, those 
affected by legislation "are not entitled to any process beyond 
that provided by the legislative process."  Jones, 975 F.3d at 
1048 (emphasis in original).  That is because "[t]he act of 
legislating necessarily entails political trading, compromise, 
and ad hoc decisionmaking."  Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 
F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980).  In other words, legislators are 
partial to legislation all the time; indeed, they often run for 
office promising to use legislative power to accomplish specific 
policy objectives.  And the primary check on legislators acting 
contrary to the public interest when legislating is the 
political process.  See id. at 694; see also Bi-Metallic, 239 
U.S. at 445 (explaining that the rights of those affected by 
legislation "are protected in the only way that they can be in a 
complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those 
who make the rule").  Accordingly, because "a legislative 
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
9 
 
determination provides all the process that is due," partiality 
on the part of legislators does not violate the Due Process 
Clause.  Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 
722, 738 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting another source); see also, 
e.g., Santa Fe All. for Pub. Health & Safety v. City of Santa 
Fe, 993 F.3d 802, 818 (10th Cir. 2021); Samson v. City of 
Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2012); Grand 
River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 174 (2d 
Cir. 2005).   
¶15 Our cases similarly distinguish between legislative 
and adjudicative acts when determining what procedural due 
process protections are required.  For example, in Quinn v. Town 
of Dodgeville, 122 Wis. 2d 570, 364 N.W.2d 149 (1985), we held 
that a town board resolution blocking a county board proposal to 
amend a zoning ordinance was a legislative act.10  See id. at 
584-85; see also Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146, 
146 N.W.2d 403 (1966) ("[Z]oning is a legislative function.").  
That was because "[a]n ordinance amendment," even one that 
affects only a small amount of land or a handful of people, 
"changes the ordinance but does not execute or implement its 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.97(5)(e)6. (1983-84), now renumbered 
as Wis. Stat. § 59.59(5)(e)6., gives town boards the power to 
block certain county board amendments to zoning ordinances.   
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
10 
 
provisions."11  Quinn, 122 Wis. 2d at 584-85.  We therefore held 
that due process did not require additional notice to a 
landowner or an opportunity to be heard beyond that already 
guaranteed by statute before the town board blocked the zoning 
amendment.  See id.   
¶16 Miller argues that the distinction between legislative 
and adjudicative acts is not relevant to deciding whether due 
process requires impartial decision-makers.  Instead, he says 
that our decision in 
Marris v. City of Cedarburg, 176 
Wis. 2d 14, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993) held that there is a due 
process right to impartial decision-makers in rezoning matters, 
regardless of whether the rezoning decision at issue is 
legislative or adjudicative.   
¶17 In Marris, a landowner applied to her local zoning 
board of appeals for recognition of a legal non-conforming use 
of her property.  Id. at 19.  She argued that she was denied "a 
fair and impartial hearing under . . . common law concepts of 
due process and fair play" when the zoning board's chairperson 
indicated that he had prejudged her application.  Id. at 24; see 
also id. at 24-29.  We agreed that the landowner was denied a 
                                                 
11 "Spot zoning," "the practice whereby a single lot or area 
is granted privileges which are not granted or extended to other 
land in the vicinity . . . is not illegal per se in Wisconsin."   
Cushman v. City of Racine, 39 Wis. 2d 303, 306-07, 159 N.W.2d 67 
(1968).  It may, however, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause under certain circumstances.  See 
Buhler, 33 Wis. 2d at 145-46.  Nevertheless, Miller does not 
allege that the Board's vote to amend the Village's zoning 
ordinance 
constitutes 
spot 
zoning 
or 
violates 
the 
Equal 
Protection Clause.    
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
11 
 
fair 
hearing, 
and 
observed 
that 
"[a]lthough 
the 
parties 
characterize the Board's hearing as adjudicative, we need not 
label these proceedings quasi-legislative or [adjudicative] to 
determine whether the decision-maker must be impartial."  Id. at 
24 n.6.  Rather, we explained that "[w]e need look only to the 
characteristics of the proceeding to determine whether the 
decision-maker must be impartial."  Id.  Because the application 
required the zoning board to make "factual determinations about 
an individual property owner and then apply those facts to the 
ordinance," we held that an impartial decision-maker was 
required.  Id.   
¶18 Marris does not, as Miller asserts, hold that the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction is irrelevant to deciding 
whether due process requires an impartial decision-maker in a 
particular context.  On the contrary, Marris emphasized the 
importance of the "characteristics of the proceeding" to 
determining what process is due.  See id.  When Marris examined 
those characteristics, it held that an impartial decision-maker 
was required because "[t]he zoning decision in this case 
require[d] that the [b]oard examine a specific piece of land and 
the activities of a particular property owner," "engage in fact-
finding and then make a decision based on the application of 
those facts to the [existing zoning] ordinance."  Id. at 26.  
Thus, even though we did not label it as such, the board's 
decision in Marris was adjudicative——it focused on how to apply 
the existing zoning law to particular facts and circumstances, 
not on whether to enact, alter, or repeal the existing zoning 
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
12 
 
law.  See id.; see also Step Now Citizens Grp. v. Town of Utica 
Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 2003 WI App 109, ¶48, 264 Wis. 2d 662, 
663 N.W.2d 833 (explaining that Marris involved an adjudicative, 
not legislative, decision).  The approach in Marris is therefore 
consistent with the one taken by Quinn, which examined the 
circumstances of the specific government action at issue to 
determine whether it was legislative or adjudicative.  See 
Quinn, 
120 
Wis. 2d at 
585 
("An 
ordinance 
amendment 
is 
legislation since it changes the ordinance but does not execute 
or implement its provisions.").   
¶19 Applying that approach to this case, we hold that the 
Village Board's vote to amend the zoning ordinance and rezone 
the Whaleys' property was a legislative act.  The Village Board 
rezoned 
the 
Whaleys' 
property 
by 
amending 
the 
Village's 
generally applicable zoning ordinance.  In other words, the 
Village Board changed the law.  It did not apply existing law to 
individual facts or circumstances, as it would if it were making 
an adjudicative decision like whether to grant a variance or 
permit a legal non-conforming use.  See, e.g., State v. 
Outagamie Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶41, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376 (stating that a decision about 
whether to grant a variance excusing compliance with an 
ordinance was adjudicative); Step Now, 264 Wis. 2d 662, ¶48 
(describing 
determinations 
about 
whether 
to 
permit 
non-
conforming uses of property as adjudicative).  Moreover, unlike 
an adjudicative decision, the Village Board's amendment to the 
zoning ordinance applies "prospectively, [and does] not impos[e] 
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
13 
 
a sanction for past conduct."  L C & S, Inc. v. Warren Cnty. 
Area Plan Comm'n, 244 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2001).   
¶20 It is true, of course, that this particular amendment 
came about only after the Whaleys applied for the zoning change 
and affected only the Whaleys' property directly.  But that does 
not alter our analysis.  As we explained in Quinn, rezoning by 
amending a local government's zoning ordinance "does not lose 
its legislative character simply because the number of people 
affected or the size of the land is small."12  122 Wis. 2d at 
584.  What matters is that the Village Board made a prospective 
change by enacting, repealing, or amending existing generally 
applicable law.  The Village Board's action was thus legislative 
in nature, and for that reason, Miller was not entitled to an 
impartial decision-maker.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision.13      
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
                                                 
12 In passing, Miller's reply brief suggests that we should 
overrule Quinn.  We decline to address this argument because it 
is undeveloped.  See Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶32 
n.10, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384 (explaining that "we 
generally do not address undeveloped arguments").     
13 Because we reject Miller's claim on the merits we need 
not address the Whaleys' argument that we should vacate the 
lower courts' and ZBA's decisions because the ZBA lacked 
jurisdiction to review the Village Board's vote to amend the 
zoning ordinance under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)7.b.   
No. 
2021AP1764   
 
 
 
1