Title: Earl v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1506
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1506 
____________ 
 
JERMAINE EARL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
April 8, 2021 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the 
First District Court of Appeal in Earl v. State, 276 So. 3d 359, 
360-62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).  The district court certified that its 
decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the Third and Fifth 
District Courts of Appeal in Solomon v. State, 254 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2018); Vargas v. State, 188 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2016); and Burks v. State, 237 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
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The current conflict arises from differing interpretations of the 
term “illegal sentence” under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.800(a).  Because Earl does not argue that he was prejudiced by 
the court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion, however, we need not 
consider the meaning of an illegal sentence in this context.  The 
rule must be read in harmony with our statutes, which tell us that 
“the party challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has 
the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error occurred in the 
trial court.  A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an 
express finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court.”  
§ 924.051(7), Fla. Stat. (2020). 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 18, 2010, after a jury trial, Earl was convicted of one 
count of armed robbery with a firearm and one count of kidnapping 
to facilitate a felony.  The jury also indicated in the special verdict 
form that Earl was in possession of a firearm during the robbery.  
The trial court sentenced Earl to concurrent life sentences for both 
counts, designated him a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), and 
ordered him to serve 100 percent of his sentences. 
 
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On June 19, 2018, Earl filed the subject rule 3.800(a) motion.  
He argued that his life sentences are illegal because the trial court 
failed to impose ten-year mandatory minimum sentences pursuant 
to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2010) (the 10-20-life 
statute), despite the fact that the jury verdict form reflects a special 
finding that he actually possessed a firearm during the commission 
of the crime.  He asserted that the trial court’s failure to impose the 
mandatory minimum sentences rendered his sentences illegal and 
required correction.  Attached to Earl’s motion were portions of his 
judgment and sentences reflecting his convictions and his PRR 
designation, as well as a one-page excerpt of the transcript from the 
sentencing hearing where the lower court indicated that it did not 
have discretion in sentencing Earl to life on both counts. 
The postconviction court denied Earl’s rule 3.800(a) motion, 
explaining that while the sentencing judge could have imposed the 
ten-year mandatory minimum sentences, the failure to do so did 
not render Earl’s sentences illegal because it “would not have 
changed [Earl’s] incarceration by one day.”  Earl, 276 So. 3d at 360.  
Earl filed a motion for rehearing, which the postconviction court 
denied, and he appealed to the First District. 
 
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The First District dismissed the appeal because even though 
the sentencing judge was required to impose ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentences under the 10-20-life statute, Earl was not 
entitled to challenge his sentences on that ground because he 
benefited from the error.  Earl, 276 So. 3d at 360-62.  The First 
District certified conflict with the Third and Fifth Districts’ holdings 
in Solomon, Vargas, and Burks, which hold that a defendant can 
use rule 3.800(a) to challenge a trial court’s failure to impose a 
mandatory minimum term on a sentence pursuant to the 10-20-life 
statute even though the enhancement would not affect the duration 
of the sentence.  Earl, 276 So. 3d at 361-62. 
The postconviction court and the First District acknowledge 
that Earl’s life sentences are illegal because they do not contain ten-
year mandatory minimum provisions; however, both lower courts 
concluded that Earl is not entitled to relief because he benefited 
from the error.  Earl argues on appeal that he must be resentenced 
because the trial court had a duty to impose ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentences and its failure to do so renders his life 
sentences illegal. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Rule 3.800(a) states, in pertinent part: “A court may at any 
time correct an illegal sentence . . . when it is affirmatively alleged 
that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to 
that relief . . . .”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1).  The rule does not 
define the term “illegal sentence.” 
The current conflict presents the question of whether relief as 
contemplated by rule 3.800(a) may include the imposition of 
harsher sentences at a defendant’s request. 
Though the plain language of rule 3.800(a) does not expressly 
prohibit defendants from seeking to correct unlawfully lenient 
sentences, we note that defendants are not entitled to such relief 
under the rule absent a showing of prejudice.  Section 924.051, 
Florida Statutes, addresses collateral review in criminal cases.  The 
statute defines prejudicial error as “an error in the trial court that 
harmfully affected the judgment or sentence.”  § 924.051(1)(a), Fla. 
Stat.  The statute also states: 
An appeal may not be taken from a judgment or order of 
a trial court unless prejudicial error is alleged and is 
properly preserved . . . .  A judgment or sentence may be 
reversed on appeal only when an appellate court 
determines . . . that prejudicial error occurred . . . . 
 
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Id. § 924.051(3). 
The trial court did not have discretion to omit the mandatory 
minimum terms of his sentence pursuant to the 10-20-life statute.  
However, Earl did not argue that he was prejudiced by receiving a 
more lenient sentence than the trial court was required to impose.  
Nor did Earl argue that he was prejudiced by the postconviction 
court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion because the relief he 
sought was a sentence with more onerous terms than the one that 
he initially received. 
Earl is serving two mandatory life sentences as a prison 
releasee reoffender.  If the postconviction court granted Earl’s rule 
3.800(a) motion, he would be serving two mandatory life sentences 
as a prison releasee reoffender and those sentences would also 
contain ten-year mandatory minimum terms.  As the postconviction 
court noted, had Earl been granted the relief he requested, his 
sentence would not have been changed by a single day.  Therefore, 
Earl cannot show that the denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion 
resulted in harm that may be remedied on appeal. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
We approve the First District’s decision below.  To the extent 
that they are inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove the 
Third and Fifth Districts’ decisions in Solomon, Vargas, and Burks. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
– Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D18-3828 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Christine R. Davis and James Parker-Flynn of Carlton Fields, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 
Jennifer J. Moore and Robert C. Lee, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent