Title: Ernest Whitfield V. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-651
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-651 
____________ 
 
ERNEST WHITFIELD,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 3, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Ernest Whitfield was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death.  We affirmed his conviction.  See Whitfield v. State, 706 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 
1997).  He now appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion for 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
affirm the circuit court’s order denying the motion on all issues. 
 
 
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I. FACTS 
 
In early June 1995, Whitfield visited the home of Clarentha Reynolds to 
seek money from Reynolds, Willie Mae Brooks, and Estella Pierre.1  Pierre and 
Whitfield had previously dated.  When they refused, Whitfield attempted to take 
Pierre’s purse.  Reynolds, however, grabbed him in a headlock and forcibly ejected 
him.  Before leaving, Whitfield threatened, “I’m going to kill all three of you 
bitches.” 
 
Whitfield again visited the home in the predawn hours of June 19, weeks 
after making the threat.  He asked Brooks to let him enter but she refused and 
returned to bed.  A short time later Whitfield forcibly entered the home, armed 
himself with an eight-inch kitchen knife, and proceeded to the room where Brooks 
slept beside her infant son.  Whitfield raped Brooks and threatened to kill her and 
her son if she screamed.  He then proceeded to Reynolds’s room, where she slept 
with her five children.  About ten minutes later, Reynolds, bloodied and near death, 
stumbled into Brooks’s room.  A medical examiner would later testify that she had 
been stabbed twenty-one times, many of the wounds penetrating her flesh up to 
seven inches.  She told Brooks that Whitfield had stabbed her.  Brooks and 
Reynolds’s twelve-year-old son escaped through a window and ran for help.  
Whitfield fled.  Shortly after the police arrived, Reynolds died.   
                                          
 
 
1.  The facts are taken from Whitfield’s direct appeal.  See Whitfield, 706 
So. 2d at 2-3. 
 
 
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Whitfield was apprehended later that day.  He admitted the stabbing and led 
police to the murder weapon.  He also told them that he had been high on crack 
cocaine at the time of the crime. 
 
At trial, Whitfield presented a defense of voluntary intoxication by crack 
cocaine.  His expert witness, a clinical psychologist named Dr. Regnier, testified 
that Whitfield exhibited classic symptoms of cocaine abuse and opined that there 
was reasonable doubt of premeditation.  The State’s expert testified in rebuttal that 
Whitfield had the capacity to form specific intent at the time of the crime, and cited 
the fact that Whitfield was arrested within two hours of the murder and did not 
appear intoxicated.  The expert also opined that the manner in which the crime was 
committed showed planning ability. 
 
The jury convicted Whitfield of armed burglary, sexual battery with a deadly 
weapon, and first-degree murder.  At the penalty phase, Whitfield presented 
evidence through Dr. Regnier of his impoverished background and deprived 
childhood as well as his severe drug dependence and his intoxication at the time of 
the crime.  The State presented evidence of Whitfield’s prior violent crimes.  The 
jury recommended the death penalty.  The trial judge followed the 
recommendation, finding three aggravators: “prior violent felonies (two prior 
aggravated batteries and contemporaneous sexual battery of another victim in this 
 
 
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case); commission in the course of a burglary; and that the murder was heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel.”  Whitfield, 706 So. 2d at 3. 
 
On appeal of the conviction and sentence, Whitfield raised five issues.2  This 
Court found no merit to any of them and affirmed his convictions. 
 
In May 2002, Whitfield filed his amended 3.850 motion, raising twenty-one 
claims.  In a thorough sixty-page order, the circuit court denied relief on all of 
them.  Whitfield now raises six issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
guilt phase for failing to adequately investigate and present a voluntary 
intoxication defense to the offenses of first-degree murder, burglary, and armed 
sexual battery and for failing to hire a defense expert in the field of toxicology; (2) 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase for failing to adequately 
investigate, prepare, and present the defense case as a result of the speedy trial 
requirements set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191; (3) ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate and present Whitfield’s 
case at the penalty phase by not discovering and presenting additional witnesses; 
(4) ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase for failing to request a 
                                          
 
 
2.  These were: (1) error in removing Whitfield from the courtroom during 
jury selection; (2) erroneous admission of testimony regarding the incident at 
Reynolds’s house several weeks before the crime, in which Whitfield threatened 
the victims; (3) improper comments by the prosecutor and introduction of 
irrelevant evidence; (4) the judge’s erroneous response to a jury question about the 
meaning of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and (5) failure to 
find certain mitigating factors and erroneous evaluation of the aggravating factors. 
 
 
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jury instruction pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); (5) 
ineffective assistance at the penalty phase for failing to object to the prosecution’s 
presentation of nonstatutory aggravators in the form of statements to the jury that 
Whitfield’s prior crimes all involved female victims and were committed in the 
presence of children; and (6) violations of Whitfield’s rights under Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), by failing to obtain an adequate mental health 
examination and failing to provide necessary information to the mental health 
expert. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Whitfield presents six issues on appeal.  We discuss at length only the first 
three.  As to issues four and five, we summarily affirm because Whitfield presents 
merely conclusory arguments.  See Cooper v. State, 856 So. 2d 969, 977 n.7 (Fla. 
2003) (rejecting the argument that the “lower court erred in its summary denial of 
these claims,” and finding such “speculative, unsupported argument of this type to 
be improper”); see also Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 1063 n.12 (Fla. 2003) 
(“[T]he purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the 
points on appeal.  Merely making reference to arguments below without further 
elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues.”) (quoting Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 
2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990)); LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 240 (Fla. 1998) 
(upholding the summary denial of a postconviction motion because the defense 
 
 
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alleged no facts to substantiate its conclusory claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel).  As to issue six, we also affirm because, insofar as it states a proper Ake 
claim, it should have been raised on direct appeal.  See Marshall v. State, 854 So. 
2d 1235, 1248 (Fla. 2003) (holding an Ake claim contained within an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim “procedurally barred because it could have been raised 
on direct appeal”); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 203 n.4 (finding Ake claim 
procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal); Cherry v. 
State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he claim of incompetent mental 
health evaluation is procedurally barred for failure to raise it on direct appeal.”).  
Insofar as it alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue an Ake 
claim, Whitfield has failed to show either deficient performance or prejudice. 
 
We discuss below Whitfield’s arguments on issues one through three, all of 
which assert, on different theories, that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judged under the following 
standard: 
An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner 
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense.  To establish deficient 
performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s 
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 
 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  The prejudice prong of the analysis 
 
 
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“requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  466 U.S. at 687.  Accordingly, in 
order to succeed on his claims, Whitfield must establish both deficient 
performance and prejudice. 
We begin by examining Whitfield’s claim that trial counsel were ineffective 
for failing to properly present his defense of voluntary intoxication.  Next we 
consider Whitfield’s claim that counsel were ineffective for proceeding with 
speedy trial.  Finally, we consider Whitfield’s claim that counsel should have 
called additional witnesses at the penalty phase. 
A. Voluntary Intoxication 
 
Whitfield first claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
adequately present a voluntary intoxication defense to first-degree murder, 
burglary, and armed sexual battery.  The defense of voluntary intoxication is only 
valid for specific intent crimes such as first-degree murder and armed burglary.  
See Straitwell v. State, 834 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (noting that 
“[v]oluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent crimes such as burglary and 
petit theft”); Carter v. State, 801 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (recognizing 
voluntary intoxication as a defense to specific intent crimes).  The defense is not 
available for general intent crimes.  See Straitwell, 834 So. 2d at 920 (“[Voluntary 
intoxication] is not a defense to general intent crimes such as sexual battery.”); 
 
 
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Bland v. State, 563 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (recognizing attempted 
sexual battery as a general intent crime for which the defense of voluntary 
intoxication is not available).  Therefore, the circuit court properly rejected 
Whitfield’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to properly present 
the defense of voluntary intoxication for the crime of sexual battery with a deadly 
weapon.  We address only the claim as it relates to Whitfield’s convictions for 
armed burglary and first-degree murder. 
 
Whitfield argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to call four 
witnesses: Dinah Giles, Harriet Miller, Evelyn Ford, and Peggy LaRue.  These 
witnesses, Whitfield argues, should have been called to corroborate the voluntary 
intoxication defense.  From their testimony at the evidentiary hearing, these 
witnesses apparently would have testified about Whitfield’s history of drug use as 
well as his impoverished background.  Whitfield fails to establish either deficient 
performance or prejudice, however, as to any of these witnesses. 
 
In denying Whitfield relief on this issue, the circuit court found as follows: 
[T]he Court finds that at trial, substantial evidence was presented 
concerning Whitfield’s use of cocaine.  The defense accomplished this 
through the testimony of lay witnesses and Dr. Regnier.  Any 
additional testimony set forth by any of the witnesses, who testified at 
the evidentiary hearing[,] would have been cumulative. 
 
We have affirmed denials of relief in similar circumstances.  In Cole v. State, 841 
So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2003), for example, the defendant argued that defense counsel was 
 
 
- 9 -
ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses to corroborate his drug abuse 
problems.  Id. at 414 n.3.  The circuit court rejected the claim without an 
evidentiary hearing because, in its opinion, defense counsel had introduced 
sufficient evidence of Cole’s drug use so that “[a]ny additional evidence of drug 
and alcohol use would have been cumulative of that actually presented.”  Id. at 
425.  Cole’s trial attorneys, like Whitfield’s, had produced evidence of Cole’s drug 
abuse through lay witnesses and an expert witness.  We affirmed: 
 
We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Cole was 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present what the trial court 
found would have been cumulative evidence.  See Valle v. State, 705 
So. 2d 1331, 1334-35 (Fla. 1997) (affirming trial court’s summary 
denial of ineffective assistance claim based on allegation that trial 
counsel failed to present cumulative evidence). 
 
Id.   
 
We also faced a similar situation in Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 
2002).  Marquard claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call 
witnesses to testify as to his drug problems and abuse suffered as a child.  Id. at 
429.  Defense counsel had introduced this information solely through their expert 
witness.  Id.  We agreed with the circuit court’s denial of the claim: 
Although other witnesses could have provided more details relative to 
Marquard’s early life, counsel is not required to present cumulative 
evidence.  Accordingly, we do not find that Marquard’s counsel was 
ineffective in his representation. 
 
 
 
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Id. at 429-30 (citing Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 957 (Fla. 2000) (“Failure to 
present cumulative evidence is not ineffective assistance of counsel.”)). 
 
According to our precedents, therefore, trial counsel have significant leeway 
in determining how to present such evidence.  In Whitfield’s case, defense counsel 
presented significant evidence of Whitfield’s drug use problems through several 
witnesses, including their expert witness, Dr. Regnier, police officers, and lay 
witness Estella Brooks Pierre.  Pierre had been in a relationship with Whitfield in 
1995 and for a period the two cohabited.  She testified at trial that Whitfield had a 
drug problem and that she had spoken with him at the time about getting help, but 
that he never sought rehabilitation.  She noted that when he would get paid at work 
he would disappear for days at a time and that his eyes would enlarge when he was 
under the influence of drugs.  She also testified that after he was shot, the drug 
problem worsened. 
 
Dr. Regnier testified concerning Whitfield’s long history of drug use, 
including his Baker Act hospitalization.  He also testified that he had consulted 
with family members and acquaintances who described Whitfield’s drug use as 
well as his demeanor while under the influence.  Dr. Regnier believed that 
Whitfield’s paranoid disposition was the result of his cocaine use.  Finally, Dr. 
Regnier concluded that he believed Whitfield “was under a lot of cocaine” on the 
day of the murder. 
 
 
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Defense counsel questioned a police officer on cross-examination about 
Whitfield’s words and actions when he was arrested.  The officer testified that 
Whitfield told him that he had smoked as much as $500 worth of crack cocaine on 
the eve of the crime.  Another officer testified that Whitfield told him upon his 
arrest that he had “smoked a large amount of cocaine the night before.” 
 
Having presented this testimony, trial counsel made a strategic decision not 
to call additional witnesses.  Counsel cannot be held ineffective for these strategic 
decisions: “Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative 
courses of action have been considered and rejected.”  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 
2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998) (quoting State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 
1987)). 
 
Whitfield argues that trial counsel nevertheless should have presented the 
testimony of Dinah Giles, Harriet Miller, Evelyn Ford, and Peggy LaRue.  But trial 
counsel either considered and rejected calling these witnesses or could not have 
known about them.  Moreover, their testimony would have been cumulative to 
what was presented.   
 
As to Giles, trial counsel Williams, now Judge Williams, testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he knew who Giles was, interviewed her, had her 
interviewed by his expert Dr. Regnier, and made a conscious choice not to call her 
 
 
- 12 -
to the stand.  Ms. Syprett,3 co-counsel along with Judge Williams, testified as 
follows regarding the decision not to present Giles or Whitfield’s mother: 
[T]hey were not good historians, they were inarticulate, and the real 
problem with them was that they were, what I call malleable.  I mean 
they would say one thing but it would have been very easy for a 
prosecutor to take what they have said and have them unsay it in the 
cross-examination.  So we did not feel confident or comfortable in 
relying upon them as our star witnesses in the guilt phase. 
 
The other thing is, you know, we know the jury pools that we 
get in Sarasota County, and they were not what I would call 
sympathetic witnesses, they would not have helped Mr. Whitfield.  
They were well intentioned, they wanted to help Mr. Whitfield, but I 
believed—we believed that Dr. Regnier could present the exact same 
information in a much more articulate, convincing, firmer manner that 
would hopefully persuade the jury. 
 
Trial counsel clearly considered alternative means of proceeding and in their 
professional judgment decided not to call Giles to the stand. 
 
As to Harriet Miller, Judge Williams testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
he knew of Miller and decided not to call her as a witness because of Whitfield’s 
prior conviction for a violent crime against her.  Trial counsel considered the 
possibility of calling Miller but decided that the potential negative impact of Miller 
as a witness outweighed any useful testimony she might provide.  Furthermore, 
Miller’s testimony would have provided the prosecution a potential opportunity to 
explore Whitfield’s violent tendencies.  See Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 298 
(Fla. 1990) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where proposed testimony 
                                          
 
 
3.  At the time of Whitfield’s trial, Ms. Syprett’s last name was Scott. 
 
 
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would have revealed information that “would have shown [defendant’s] violent 
tendencies”). 
 
As to Evelyn Ford, Judge Williams could not recall ever hearing her name 
from Whitfield.  The circuit court found that “Whitfield did not provide this name 
to his defense attorneys, and further he has failed to demonstrate any prejudice in 
his attorneys’ failure to call her as a witness.”  As is the case with Giles’s 
testimony, Ford’s testimony would have been cumulative.  Furthermore, Ford’s 
testimony, like Miller’s, would have had the further liability of opening up for 
exploration Whitfield’s violent tendencies.  See id. 4 
 
Finally, as to Peggy LaRue, she did testify at Whitfield’s trial—as a State 
witness.  Among other things, she testified that when she encountered Whitfield on 
the morning after the murder, he appeared to have big eyes, was talking fast, and 
looked nervous.  She stated that she believed that Whitfield was under the 
influence of cocaine that morning.  LaRue’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
added nothing new.  Her testimony also would have been cumulative. 
 
Trial counsel made a conscious decision to use Dr. Regnier as their main 
witness.  He was used as a medical expert and also to introduce Whitfield’s family 
medical history and his background into the record.  When asked at the evidentiary 
hearing why they chose Dr. Regnier, Syprett responded that it was a judgment call 
                                          
 
 
4.  Ford testified that when under the influence of drugs, Whitfield had 
broken a window in his mother’s home and punched his stepfather. 
 
 
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based on their interviews with the potential witnesses.  When asked a similar 
question, Judge Williams responded as follows: 
A: For a variety of reasons.  Number one, I think Dr. Regnier is an 
excellent psychologist.  He has an excellent rapport I think with 
jurors.  Jurors tend to like him.  Also, there were issues in terms of the 
defendant’s personalty (sic) that I felt Dr. Regnier would be better 
able to handle than another psychologist. 
Q: And through Dr. Regnier you were able to in essence, able to get in 
all of his family background? 
A: Yes. 
Q: All of his history? 
A: Yes. 
Q: All the interviews with family members and other persons involved 
in his life? 
A: Yes. 
 
With the testimony of Dr. Regnier, trial counsel obtained a voluntary intoxication 
jury instruction.  According to the circuit court, “the record reveals that the defense 
requested, and the court gave the voluntary intoxication jury instruction at trial as a 
defense to first-degree murder and armed burglary.”  See also Whitfield, 706 So. 
2d at 2 (stating that Whitfield’s defense was based on voluntary intoxication).  The 
circuit court concluded: “Because the voluntary intoxication defense was 
investigated, presented, and considered by the jury at trial, Whitfield is not entitled 
to relief.”  Whitfield has failed to show either prejudice or deficient performance in 
trial counsel’s failure to call additional witnesses. 
 
Whitfield also claims under this issue that trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to hire a toxicology expert.  As with the failure to present additional 
 
 
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witnesses, Whitfield fails to establish prejudice or deficient performance.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Whitfield presented the testimony of Dr. Mash, an expert in 
the field of toxicology and the effects of crack cocaine drug abuse on the brain.  
She testified as to the effects on cognitive function of long-term crack cocaine 
abuse and commented that a severe addict would have difficulty distinguishing 
right from wrong.  She also testified regarding urine and hair analyses that could 
have been performed on Whitfield that would have indicated whether he had in 
fact taken crack cocaine.  However, Dr. Mash did not indicate that she would be 
able to determine Whitfield’s exact level of crack cocaine exposure at the time of 
the murder.  Specifically, she stated that had a urine sample been taken on June 21, 
1995,5 two days after the crime, the markers in the urine “would be consistent with 
an individual who had used cocaine, and then depending on the amounts that were 
in the urine, will give you, again, some indication of the level of use.  It’s not 
absolute, as it has been pointed out, as blood is the ultimate measure.”6  Further, 
Dr. Mash opined that Whitfield is a “very severe crack-cocaine addict” and that 
“[h]is level of dependency on crack-cocaine was very severe and he was 
dysfunctional, I believe, due to his severe use of crack cocaine.” 
                                          
 
 
5.  This is the date when Judge Williams was appointed to represent 
Whitfield.  Obviously, neither Williams nor Syprett could have obtained samples 
before then. 
 
6.  According to Dr. Mash, to obtain a meaningful measure, a blood test 
needed to be performed within forty-five to ninety minutes after Whitfield ingested 
the cocaine. 
 
 
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Syprett testified at the evidentiary hearing that after her initial meeting with 
Whitfield she contacted two different labs about the possibility of determining his 
level of intoxication at the time of the murder.  Syprett specifically recalled 
speaking with a toxicologist about this possibility and was told “it’s nonsensical 
what you are trying to do.”  At a pretrial conference, Syprett stated on the record 
that upon Whitfield’s request that they take a urine sample for analysis to 
determine his level of intoxication at the time of the murder, she “spoke to not one 
but definitely two and possibly three local authorities” about the possibility of 
taking urine samples for this purpose and “was advised that it wouldn’t show what 
[Whitfield] wanted us to show.”  Syprett stated that based on the information she 
received, she and co-counsel decided “that it was not going to serve any useful 
purpose” to take a urine sample and have it tested. 
 
In denying Whitfield’s claim below, the circuit court stated: 
 
While Whitfield’s postconviction motion alleged that Mash 
would provide testimony concerning additional mitigating evidence 
not presented during the penalty phase, the Court finds that she did 
not specifically identify any statutory or nonstatutory mitigators that 
could have been set forth but were not.  Judge Rapkin further made 
the following findings concerning Whitfield’s substance abuse in the 
final sentencing order: 
 
 
“I believe that the defendant is a cocaine addict, 
and that he probably did use cocaine some time shortly 
before the murder.” 
 
“The defendant suffered from chronic crack cocaine 
addiction.” 
 
 
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Dr. Mash’s testimony does not establish that trial counsel were ineffective.  Trial 
counsel made a reasonable choice based on available information not to obtain a 
toxicology expert.  Further, Dr. Mash’s testimony does not indicate that, had a 
urine sample been taken, an accurate reading of the level of cocaine in Whitfield’s 
body at the time of the murder would have been established.  Her testimony merely 
confirms what Dr. Regnier’s testimony, along with other lay witnesses and police 
testimony, established at trial—that at the time of the murder Whitfield was under 
the influence of crack cocaine.  The trial court recognized this in its sentencing 
order.  Whitfield cannot establish deficient performance or prejudice on this issue. 
B. Speedy Trial 
 
Against the advice of his trial lawyers, Whitfield emphatically, 
unequivocally, and repeatedly demanded a speedy trial.7  Now he claims that trial 
counsel were ineffective as a result.  He argues that making a demand for speedy 
                                          
 
 
7.  Whitfield made these demands on several occasions in open court.  In 
one pretrial hearing Whitfield personally demanded speedy trial at least five times, 
stating: “It’s also in my best interest I would like to exercise my rights, and my 
rights are asking you to grant me a speedy trial.”; “So I’m asking you to grant me 
that motion for a speedy trial.  I’m exercising my rights . . . I am open and willing 
to sign anything for me to have a speedy trial . . . I want a speedy trial.”; “But I—I 
want to exercise my right, and that is my right, constitutional right to—for a 
speedy trial.”; “I want a formal speedy trial.  That’s my right.  That is my 
constitutional right . . . I do not want to delay this . . . because a lot of people will 
get hurt, a lot of things will come out, all right, and I would like to protect a lot of 
people.”; “That’s what I had notarized to get this speedy trial in process, right.” 
 
 
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trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 is a strategic decision within 
the province of counsel’s discretion.  Because we determine that no prejudice 
resulted from the speedy trial demand, we need not consider whether counsel 
provided deficient performance by acquiescing in Whitfield’s desire to request 
speedy trial.  See Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 736 n.2 (Fla. 2005) (declining to 
reach prejudice prong where no deficient performance found); Sweet v. State, 810 
So. 2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002) (declining to reach the question of deficient 
performance where the Court determined that no prejudice existed); Stewart v. 
State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001) (“[B]ecause the Strickland standard requires 
establishment of both [deficient performance and prejudice] prongs, when a 
defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into 
whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”). 
The time constraints placed on the defense team because of the speedy trial 
timeline did not prejudice Whitfield’s defense.  It is true that Dr. Regnier testified 
at trial that he was unable to form an ultimate opinion as to voluntary intoxication 
because he had insufficient data.  However, at the evidentiary hearing below he 
testified that the reason for his inability was not the speedy trial demand but 
Whitfield’s deliberate refusal to cooperate.8  Despite these difficulties and the time 
                                          
 
 
8.  Dr. Regnier testified that regarding his psychological tests on Whitfield, 
“had he cooperated, time would not have been an issue.”  Further evidentiary 
hearing testimony established that Whitfield admitted to Dr. Regnier that he hoped 
 
 
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constraints of speedy trial, the defense team, as noted earlier, obtained a voluntary 
intoxication jury instruction.  Furthermore, the trial court noted in its final 
sentencing order that it believed Whitfield was a severe crack cocaine addict and 
was under the influence on the morning of the murder. 
Despite his behavior at trial, Whitfield has cooperated with his current 
defense team.  However, other than one additional witness, Freddy Lewis Stanley 
Atkins (discussed below), who could have offered only cumulative evidence of 
Whitfield’s background, the current defense team has based their case on 
essentially the same information presented at trial.  Whitfield has presented two 
new experts who testified that, in their opinion, Whitfield was incompetent to 
make strategic decisions and that Dr. Regnier’s examination of Whitfield was 
insufficient.  But an ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be based on a 
defendant’s procurement of new experts with different opinions.  See Phillips v. 
State, 894 So. 2d 28, 39 (Fla. 2004) (“The fact that [defendant] now has new 
experts does not indicate that his counsel was ineffective, where counsel did 
investigate and present evidence on the[] issues.”).  Whitfield does not present any 
significant new evidence that would have been discovered and presented had 
                                                                                                                                        
that neither his attorneys nor the prosecution would be ready for trial because of 
his speedy trial demand.  He also told Dr. Regnier that he hoped this situation 
would bring about a mistrial or provide him with many grounds for appeal. 
 
 
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speedy trial not been demanded.  Whitfield cannot establish prejudice on these 
facts. 
C. Additional Witnesses 
 
In his third issue, Whitfield argues that trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to call additional witnesses to corroborate evidence of Whitfield’s 
background.  Whitfield claims that counsel should have discovered Freddy Lewis 
Stanley Atkins and called him to testify about Whitfield’s family history.  Atkins is 
an important community leader and politician in Sarasota.  Early in his career he 
worked for a family counseling program called Storefront.  While there, Atkins 
was assigned to counsel Whitfield’s family.  Whitfield claims that trial counsel 
should have discovered Atkins and called him to corroborate evidence about 
Whitfield’s family history. 
However, Whitfield never mentioned Atkins’s name to his trial lawyers.  
Neither did his family.  Judge Williams testified at the evidentiary hearing that he 
recognized Atkins’s name but that it was never mentioned by Whitfield, his family, 
or the investigator on the case.  He further testified that it was very difficult to 
obtain information from Whitfield and that he “received very little support in terms 
of [Whitfield’s family] getting information.”  Syprett testified that Whitfield never 
mentioned Atkins’s name and that she was “surprised when [she] saw [Atkins] 
sitting in the hall” at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
- 21 -
Even assuming trial counsel should have found and presented Atkins, 
Whitfield cannot demonstrate prejudice.  Despite Whitfield’s lack of cooperation, 
the defense managed to elicit through their expert significant facts about 
Whitfield’s background.  Dr. Regnier testified that Whitfield “suffered from a 
polydrug dependence that was chronic of long term, spanning some nine years,” 
and that Whitfield also suffered from posttraumatic stress because of his gunshot 
wound.9  Dr. Regnier also testified that Whitfield additionally was “suffering from 
a major depression also of long standing.”  This depression was “manifested by a 
series of suicidal ideation and one serious attempt.”  Regnier also noted Whitfield’s 
Baker Act commitment.  Because of these facts, his review of the record, and his 
interviews with Whitfield’s family, Dr. Regnier opined that at the time of the 
murder Whitfield was suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance, a 
statutory mitigator. 
 
At trial, Dr. Regnier testified at length about Whitfield’s childhood and 
upbringing.  Dr. Regnier began his testimony on Whitfield’s childhood: 
[T]his world I’m about to describe is not one that we easily see and 
it’s very difficult for me to describe, even though I have a lot of 
firsthand knowledge of it. 
 
It is not a world that one wants to remember and America 
doesn’t like to remember . . . . We like to keep it hidden and so do I.  
Any of us who gets out of this world wants to forget it. 
                                          
 
 
9.  Dr. Regnier testified that Whitfield had flashbacks and was extremely 
paranoid that his assailants were going to find him and shoot him again. 
 
 
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It is a world where nothing is permanent.  It is a world of fear.  
It is a world of hunger.  It is a world of psychological and spiritual 
hunger.  It is a world of isolation and loneliness.  It is a world of 
parents, the adults in our world are dysfunctional.  They don’t nurture.  
They don’t feed. 
 
In fact, they do the opposite.  They hurt.  They inflict physical, 
emotional and spiritual harm in children. 
Q:  Did you discover this in Mr. Whitfield’s early childhood? 
A:  This is exactly the world he comes from. 
Q:  And was that at the hands of his father or his mother? 
A:  This is at the hands of every adult in his life.  It’s not just the 
mother or the father.  It’s every adult that this young man comes in 
contact with as a child. 
 
His father never accepted him as a son. 
 
Dr. Regnier proceeded to describe a very difficult childhood where Whitfield’s 
father repeatedly beat him and his mother.  He described Whitfield’s earliest 
memory as one of “his father holding a gun after beating his mother to a bloody 
pulp, holding a gun to her head and threatening to shoot her, and Ernest 
[Whitfield].”  Dr. Regnier also described Whitfield’s impoverished surroundings, 
how the children in the family sometimes went hungry, and how Whitfield was 
hospitalized as a child because of an infection caused by worms. 
 
Whitfield cannot establish prejudice.  Any testimony Atkins could have 
provided in Whitfield’s defense would have been cumulative to that provided by 
Dr. Regnier.  As discussed above, trial counsel are not ineffective for failing to 
present cumulative evidence.  See Marquard, 850 So. 2d at 429-30 (“[C]ounsel is 
not required to present cumulative evidence.”).  Furthermore, Atkins’s testimony 
would only have added to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of Whitfield’s 
 
 
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impoverished background.  The sentencing court found no statutory mitigators but 
considered the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: 
[C]ooperation with authorities (little or no weight); impoverished 
background (considerable weight); crack cocaine addiction 
(substantial weight); Whitfield’s abandonment by his father and his 
mother’s alcoholism (some weight); and that Whitfield was the victim 
of a near fatal shooting but forgave his assailant (little or no weight). 
 
Whitfield, 706 So. 2d at 3.  The court, therefore, considered all of the nonstatutory 
mitigation that could have been provided by the additional witnesses.  In light of 
the three strong aggravators in this case, “prior violent felonies (two prior 
aggravated batteries and contemporaneous sexual battery of another victim in this 
case); commission in the course of a burglary; and that the murder was heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel,” the sentence would not have been different had the sentencing 
court given more weight to the nonstatutory mitigators.  Id. 
 
Whitfield also claims that trial counsel should have called Whitfield’s 
mother, Leola Rich.  As previously discussed, trial counsel had strategic reasons 
for not calling Whitfield’s family members to the stand.  According to counsel’s 
judgment, Rich would not have made a good witness because she was, among 
other things, “inarticulate” and a poor historian.  Furthermore, Rich appeared at 
Whitfield’s trial in a state of visible intoxication.  Counsel had good strategic 
reasons for not calling Rich to testify.  There was no deficient performance or 
prejudice because of counsel’s failure to call Rich to the stand. 
 
 
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Whitfield also claims that trial counsel should have discovered and 
presented William Peterson as a witness at the penalty phase.  Peterson was 
Whitfield’s employer at the time of the murder.  Peterson testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that Whitfield was a good worker who never had any 
disciplinary problems, was always on time or early for work, and never missed 
work.  Trial counsel could not recall if Peterson had been specifically mentioned in 
the investigation but he did recall that he had discussed Whitfield’s employment 
history with the investigator and with other persons who had knowledge and had 
specifically chosen not to call any witnesses on this issue.  Peterson’s testimony 
could have been relevant as nonstatutory mitigation.  However, such testimony 
would be inconsistent with the defense’s theory that Whitfield was a severe crack 
cocaine addict and would disappear for days at a time.  Defense counsel made a 
reasonable strategic decision not to present evidence of Whitfield’s employment 
history.  Furthermore, counsel’s failure to present the testimony of Peterson does 
not undermine our confidence in the outcome of this case considering the strong 
aggravating factors found by the trial court.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (To 
establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 
 
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III. Conclusion 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
Whitfield’s postconviction motion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County,  
Donald E. Pellecchia, Judge - Case No. 95-1588CF 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle Region and Peter 
J. Cannon, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel – Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine V. 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee