Title: State v. Kelly K. Koopmans
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001402-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-2424-CR, 94-3146-CR, 95-1402-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of  Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Kelly K. Koopmans, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  202 Wis. 2d 386, 550 N.W.2d 715 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 13, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state public defender and oral 
argument by Mary E. Waitrovich, state public defender.  
 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2424, 94-3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Kelly K. Koopmans, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before this court on 
petition for review filed by the State of Wisconsin.  The State 
seeks review of a published opinion of the court of appeals, 
State v. Koopmans, 202 Wis. 2d 386, 550 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 
1996).  The Circuit Court for Walworth County, James L. Carlson, 
Judge, denied a postconviction motion seeking resentencing filed 
by the defendant, Kelly K. Koopmans.  The court of appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit 
court.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
¶2 
On review, we consider whether a defendant may waive 
his or her statutory right pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
2 
(1995-96)
1 
to 
be 
present 
at 
sentencing 
by 
knowingly 
and 
                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, all future statutory references 
are to the 1995-96 volume.  Wis. Stat. § 971.04 provides: 
Defendant to be present. (1) Except as provided in 
subs. (2) and (3), the defendant shall be present: 
(a) At the arraignment; 
(b) At trial; 
(c) At all proceedings when the jury is being selected; 
(d) At any evidentiary hearing; 
(e) At any view by the jury; 
(f) When the jury returns its verdict; 
(g) At the pronouncement of judgment and the imposition 
of sentence; 
(h) At any other proceeding when ordered by the court. 
 
(2) 
A 
defendant 
charged 
with 
a 
misdemeanor 
may 
authorize his or her attorney in writing  to act on his 
or her behalf in any manner, with leave of the court, 
and 
be 
excused 
from 
attendance 
at 
any 
or 
all 
proceedings. 
 
(3) If the defendant is present at the beginning of the 
trial and thereafter, during the progress of the trial 
or before the verdict of the jury has been returned 
into court, voluntarily absents himself or herself from 
the presence of the court without leave of the court, 
the trial or return of verdict of the jury in the case 
shall not thereby be postponed or delayed, but the 
trial or submission of said case to the jury for 
verdict and the return  of verdict thereon, if 
required, shall proceed in all respects as though the 
defendant were present in court at all times.  A 
defendant need not be present at the pronouncement or 
entry of an order granting or denying relief under s. 
974.02 or 974.06.  If the defendant is not present, the 
time for appeal from any order under ss. 974.02 and 
974.06 shall commence after a copy has been served upon 
the attorney representing the defendant, or upon the 
defendant if he or she appeared without counsel.  
Service of such an order shall be complete upon 
mailing.  A defendant appearing without counsel shall 
supply the court with his or her current mailing 
address.  If the defendant fails to supply the court 
with a current and accurate mailing address, failure to 
receive a copy of the order granting or denying relief 
shall not be a ground for tolling the time in which an 
appeal must be taken. 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
3 
voluntarily being absent from the proceeding.  We hold that a 
defendant may not waive his or her statutory right to be present 
at sentencing even if the waiver is made knowingly and 
voluntarily.  
¶3 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Koopmans was 
charged with one count of intentional child abuse and one count 
of reckless child abuse.  The charges arose from a doctor's 
discovery of fractures in the bones of one of her daughter's legs 
and one of her arms.  After a six day jury trial, Koopmans was 
convicted on both counts.  The circuit court ordered that 
Koopmans "remain free on bond subject to its conditions" and set 
a date for sentencing.  The court set January 24, 1994, for 
sentencing and ordered Koopmans to appear personally. 
¶4 
On the date originally set for sentencing, Koopmans did 
not appear and the sentencing was adjourned until March 11, 1994. 
 On March 11, Koopmans again did not appear.  The court, 
concluding that a defendant could knowingly and voluntarily waive 
his or her right to be present at sentencing, took testimony to 
determine whether Koopmans had knowingly and voluntarily waived 
that right.  The testimony revealed that Koopmans had told her 
mother that she was leaving for Minneapolis, that Koopmans had 
planned to take her daughter and travel to Belize to meet her new 
boyfriend, and that a co-worker had driven Koopmans to the 
Milwaukee airport on January 14, 1994.  After the testimony was 
taken, 
Koopmans' 
attorney 
stipulated 
that 
Koopmans 
was 
a 
fugitive, and that her absence from the sentencing was voluntary. 
 The circuit court concluded that Koopmans was voluntarily absent 
and sentenced her in absentia.  The circuit court stayed 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
4 
imposition of the sentence for 30 days, promising resentencing if 
Koopmans should return within that time.  Koopmans, however, did 
not appear within the 30 days. 
¶5 
A federal warrant was issued for Koopmans' arrest and 
she was apprehended in Belize.  Upon her return, Koopmans filed a 
post-conviction motion seeking resentencing on the ground that 
the circuit court erred in sentencing her in absentia, and that 
she had a right to be present at sentencing under Wis. Stat. § 
971.04.  At the hearing on the motion, Koopmans' attorney argued 
that the statutory right to be present at sentencing under § 
971.04 could not be waived.  The circuit court denied the motion 
for resentencing.  Koopmans appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed Koopmans' convictions, but reversed the ruling of the 
circuit court regarding sentencing and remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
¶6 
The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 971.04 
requires a defendant's presence at sentencing.  The court 
concluded that "shall" as used in § 971.04(1) is mandatory and 
that § 971.04(3) sets forth with exclusivity the proceedings 
that may be conducted when the defendant is voluntarily absent. 
 The court of appeals stated: 
 
Thus, Wisconsin law does not merely require that a 
defendant be personally present at sentencing.  Were 
that the case, we perhaps could be persuaded that such 
[a] right can be waived.  But our legislature has gone 
further.  By the language of § 971.04(3), STATS., the 
legislature has expressly detailed which proceedings 
may go forth in the face of the defendant's voluntary 
absence.  These include the completion of the trial 
and receipt of the jury's verdict.  But at that point, 
the statute stops and no further proceedings are 
authorized.  It would have been a simple matter for 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
5 
the legislature to authorize further proceedings had 
it so desired.  It did not. 
Koopmans, 202 Wis. 2d at 399.  The State petitioned for review 
on the sentencing portion of the court of appeals decision and 
we granted review on July 29, 1996. 
¶7 
The State contends that the court of appeals' decision 
should be reversed because Wis. Stat. § 971.04 allows a defendant 
to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to be present at 
sentencing.  As a basis for this contention, the State asserts 
that "shall" as used in § 971.04(1) is directory rather than 
mandatory, and that § 971.04(3) provides an increased measure of 
protection for the right to be present at trial over the right to 
be present at the other proceedings specified in § 971.04(1). 
¶8 
Whether a defendant may waive the right to be present 
at sentencing by knowingly and voluntarily absenting himself or 
herself from the proceeding is dependent upon whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04 authorizes a circuit court to proceed with sentencing 
in the defendants absence.  Accordingly, our first duty is to 
interpret § 971.04(1).  Statutory interpretation and the 
application of a statute are questions of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Wagner Mobile, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 
Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995); Braatz v. LIRC, 174 
Wis. 2d 286, 293, 496 N.W.2d 597 (1993).  Accordingly, we owe no 
deference to the decisions of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 550 
N.W.2d 124 (1996). 
¶9 
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern 
the intent of the legislature.  Doe v. American Nat. Red Cross, 
176 Wis. 2d 610, 616, 500 N.W.2d 264 (1993).  In determining 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
6 
this intent, the court must first look at the language of the 
statute. Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 
493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  If the language of the statute clearly 
and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is the 
duty of the court to apply that intent to the case at hand and 
not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the 
statute's meaning. Id. 
¶10 We first consider the meaning of "shall" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1).  Section 971.04(1) states: 
 
Defendant to be Present. (1) Except as provided in 
subs. (2) and (3), the defendant shall be present: 
(a) At the arraignment; 
(b) At trial; 
(c) At all proceedings when the jury is being selected; 
(d) At any evidentiary hearing; 
(e) At any view by the jury; 
(f) When the jury returns its verdict; 
(g) At the pronouncement of judgment and the imposition 
of sentence; 
(h) At any other proceeding when ordered by the court. 
A plain reading of the statute suggests that so long as 
subsections (2) and (3) do not apply, a defendant must be present 
at the listed proceedings which include the imposition of 
sentence.  However, such an interpretation is based on the 
assumption that "shall" is mandatory. 
¶11 The word "shall," when used in a statute, is presumed 
to be mandatory unless another construction is necessary to carry 
out the clear intent of the legislature.  In Interest of C.A.K., 
154 Wis. 2d 612, 621, 453 N.W.2d 897 (1990).  If other language 
in the statute makes clear that "shall" was intended to be 
mandatory, we must apply that intent and not look beyond the 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
7 
statutory language.  See Kelley, 172 Wis. at 247.
2  Accordingly, 
in attempting to ascertain the intent of the legislature we first 
examine subsection (2) and (3) of Wis. Stat. § 971.04. 
¶12 Subsection (2) permits a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor to be excused from attending any or all proceedings 
and to authorize an attorney to act on his or her behalf.  
Although this subsection is not applicable in this case because 
Koopmans was charged with a felony, the mere fact that such an 
exception exists suggests that subsection (1) is mandatory.  If 
"shall" was intended to be directory it would essentially mean 
that a defendant should be present at the listed proceedings but 
that the defendant's presence would not be necessary.  If this 
were the meaning of subsection (1), there would be no need to 
create an exception to provide that a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor need not be present at court proceedings.  A 
directory construction of subsection (1) would render subsection 
(2) superfluous, a result to be avoided.  See State v. Petty, 201 
Wis. 2d 337, 355, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996); Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 
Wis. 2d 673, 680, 500 N.W.2d 649 (1993). 
¶13 The last subsection, Wis. Stat. § 971.04(3), provides 
another exception to the general rule set forth in subsection 
(1).  Subsection (3) provides in relevant part: 
 
                     
2 This court has previously found statutes containing the 
word "shall" to be unambiguous.  In Swatek v. County of Dane, 
192 Wis. 2d 47, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995), we examined a statute that 
provided in part: "the sheriff or other keeper of the jail shall 
provide appropriate care or treatment . . ."  Id. at 58.  This 
court concluded that "[t]he legislature made the requirement 
mandatory by utilizing the words 'shall provide.'"  Id.; see 
also State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1122, 501 N.W.2d 429 
(1993). 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
8 
(3) If the defendant is present at the beginning of 
the trial and thereafter, during the progress of the 
trial or before the verdict of the jury has been 
returned into court, voluntarily absents himself or 
herself from the presence of the court without leave 
of the court, the trial or return of verdict of the 
jury in the case shall not thereby be postponed or 
delayed, but the trial or submission of said case to 
the jury for verdict and the return of verdict 
thereon, if required, shall proceed in all respects as 
though the defendant were present in court at all 
times. 
This subsection allows a trial to continue when the defendant 
voluntarily absents himself or herself.  However, the application 
of this subsection is specifically limited to trial and the 
return of verdict and only applies when the defendant is present 
at the beginning of trial.  The court of appeals has held that 
subsection (3) does not apply when a defendant voluntarily 
absents himself or herself during jury selection and thus before 
the beginning of trial.  State v. Dwyer, 181 Wis. 2d 826, 836-37, 
512 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Miller, 197 
Wis. 2d 518, 521-22, 541 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1995).  Similarly, 
subsection (3) can not be read to allow a circuit court to 
proceed with sentencing in a defendant's absence, because 
sentencing occurs after the return of verdict. 
 
¶14 Considering the statute as a whole we conclude that the 
legislature intended "shall" to be mandatory.  If the legislature 
had intended subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 971.04 to allow a 
defendant to voluntarily absent himself or herself from any 
proceeding, it would not have created the exceptions in 
subsections (2) and (3) that allow a circuit court to conduct 
some proceedings in the defendant's absence under certain 
conditions.  A directory interpretation of subsection (1) renders 
much of subsections (2) and (3) meaningless and is contrary to 
Nos. 94-2424/3146, 95-1402-CR 
 
9 
the plain language of the statute.  Accordingly, we must conclude 
that "shall" as used in § 971.04(1) is mandatory; as "shall" is 
mandatory, a defendant in a felony case must be present at 
sentencing.
3 
¶15 In this case, Koopmans was present at trial, but did 
not appear on the date set for sentencing.  When the defendant 
did not appear, the circuit court set a second date for 
sentencing.  The defendant also did not appear on that date.  
Koopmans' attorney stipulated that Koopmans was a fugitive and 
her absence from sentencing was voluntary.  The circuit court 
then sentenced Koopmans in her absence.  We believe that the 
circuit court proceeded carefully and reasonably in attempting to 
resolve the situation.  However, as we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 
971.04(1) requires a defendant's presence at sentencing, we order 
that the sentence be vacated and the cause remanded to the 
circuit court for resentencing. 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                     
3 We note that the delay in sentencing will enable the 
circuit court to consider all information concerning the 
defendant.  See State v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 560 N.W.2d 256 
(1997).