Title: Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002816
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2816 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Juneau County,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO, Highway Department 
Employees, Local 569, American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 
Professional Employees, American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO,  
 
Respondents-Respondents-Cross-Appellants-
 
Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  216 Wis. 2d 283, 576 N.W.2d 565 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
November 4, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 9, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. McMonigal 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondents-respondents-cross-appellants-
petitioners there were briefs by Bruce F. Ehlke, Shneidman, 
Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, Madison and 
oral argument by Bruce F. Ehlke. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-cross-respondent 
there was a brief by Mark B. Hazelbaker and Bell, Gierhart & 
Moore, S.C., Madison and oral argument by Mark K. Hazelbaker.  
 
No.  96-2816 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2816 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Juneau County, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Courthouse Employees, Local 1312,  
American Federation of State, County and  
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Highway  
Department Employees, Local 569, American  
Federation of State, County and Municipal  
Employees, AFL-CIO, Professional  
Employees, American Federation of State,  
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
FILED 
 
NOV 4, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Juneau 
County v. Courthouse Employees, 216 Wis. 2d 283, 576 N.W.2d 565 
(Ct. App. 1998), affirming in part and reversing in part a 
judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Juneau County, William 
M. McMonigal, Judge. 
¶2 
The circuit court granted a motion for summary 
judgment to the Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO and other unions (hereafter referred to collectively as the 
Unions) interpreting Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a.(1995-96) in 
No.  96-2816 
 
2 
the manner requested by the defendant Unions.  The circuit court 
ruled that the binding interest arbitration provisions set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. apply to all "municipal 
employes" as defined in § 111.70(1)(i) except insofar as they 
may have been modified by § 111.70(4)(cm)5s. pertaining to 
"school district professional employes."  This part of the 
judgment was not appealed to the court of appeals and is not 
before this court. 
¶3 
The issue in this court is the portion of the circuit 
court's judgment awarding attorney fees to the Unions under Wis. 
Stat. § 814.025(3)(b) (1995-96), which pertains to frivolous 
actions.1 
The 
circuit 
court 
held 
that 
Juneau 
County's 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 814.025 (1995-96) provides in relevant part: 
Costs upon frivolous claims and counterclaims.  (1) If 
an 
action . . . commenced 
or 
continued 
by 
a 
plaintiff . . . is found, at any time during the 
proceedings or upon judgment, to be frivolous by the 
court, the court shall award to the successful party 
costs 
determined under 
s. 814.04 
and 
reasonable 
attorney fees.  
 
 . . .  
 
(3) In order to find an action . . . to be frivolous 
under sub. (1), the court must find one or more of the 
following: 
 
 . . .  
 
(b) The party or the party’s attorney knew, or should 
have known, that the action . . . was without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.  
 
No.  96-2816 
 
3 
commencement 
of 
its 
action 
for 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. was not frivolous but that continuing the 
action became frivolous after the Unions offered not to seek 
attorney fees or costs if Juneau County would voluntarily 
dismiss the action with prejudice.  The court of appeals 
affirmed that part of the judgment holding that the commencement 
of the action was not frivolous and reversed that part of the 
judgment holding that the continuation of the action was 
frivolous.  
¶4 
The only issue before this court is whether the 
commencement or continuation of the declaratory judgment action 
by Juneau County or its attorneys was frivolous.2  The question 
presented is whether the declaratory judgment action was 
commenced or continued by Juneau County or its attorneys 
"without any reasonable basis in law or equity."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025(3)(b).  We affirm the court of appeals holding that 
neither the commencement nor continuation of the action by 
Juneau County or its attorneys was frivolous.  
I 
¶5 
For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the 
facts are not in dispute.  On October 12, 1995, Juneau County 
                     
2 Because we determine that the materials submitted by the 
Unions did not render the action frivolous, we need not 
determine whether Juneau County knew or should have known about 
materials submitted by the Unions that were readily available to 
Juneau County and its attorneys had they researched the issue of 
statutory interpretation before bringing the action.  We 
therefore do not distinguish between the commencement and the 
continuation of the action.   
No.  96-2816 
 
4 
commenced a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04 seeking a declaration that the binding interest 
arbitration provisions of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. apply 
only to school district professional employes and not to other 
county or municipal employes as defined in § 111.70.  According 
to Juneau County, the legislature intended to limit the scope of 
binding interest arbitration solely to disputes involving school 
district 
professional 
employes. 
 
As 
support 
for 
its 
interpretations of the statute Juneau County relies on the 
language of § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. italicized and quoted below, 
which was adopted by 1995 Wisconsin Act 27 and reads in 
pertinent part as follows:  
 
Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6.  'Interest arbitration.'  a. If 
in any collective bargaining unit a dispute relating 
to one or more issues, qualifying for interest 
arbitration under subd. 5s. in a collective bargaining 
unit to which subd. 5s. applies, has not been settled 
after a reasonable period of negotiation . . . either 
party, or the parties jointly, may petition the 
commission, in writing, to initiate compulsory, final 
and binding arbitration, as provided in this paragraph 
(emphasis added).3 
¶6 
Section 111.70(4)(cm)5s., which is referenced in Wis. 
Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a., was created in 19934 and states in 
relevant part as follows: 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a., as amended in 1995, is for 
our purposes substantially the same as the 1993 enactment.  See 
1993 Wis. Act. 16. 
4 1993 Wis. Act 16.  The 1995 Act did not modify Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)5s.   
No.  96-2816 
 
5 
 
'Issues subject to arbitration.' a. In a collective 
bargaining 
unit 
consisting 
of 
school 
district 
professional employes, the municipal employer or the 
labor organization may petition the commission to 
determine whether the municipal employer has submitted 
a qualified economic offer. 
¶7 
Juneau County's declaratory judgment action asked the 
circuit court to declare that Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a., as 
amended in 1995, does not require Juneau County to participate 
in binding interest arbitration with the Unions because none of 
the employes who are members of the defendant Unions are school 
district professional employes.  The Unions argued that the 
binding interest arbitration provisions apply to all county and 
municipal employes and that the italicized portion of Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. limits the circumstances under which binding 
interest 
arbitration 
is 
available 
to 
school 
district 
professional employes.5   
¶8 
Juneau County moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
asserting that the statutory language is plain and unambiguous. 
 The circuit court concluded that the statute was ambiguous 
because it was capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses.  The circuit court then 
                                                                  
The action was commenced October 12, 1995.  The 1995 
amendments to § 111.70 took effect July 1, 1996.  West's Wis. 
Stats. § 111.70, Historical and Statutory Notes (1997).  For 
purposes of this review any differences between the 1993 and 
1995 
versions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. 
are 
not 
relevant. 
5 According to the Unions, school district professional 
employes have binding interest arbitration available if the 
school district fails to submit a "qualified economic offer." 
No.  96-2816 
 
6 
ordered Juneau County and the Unions to supplement the pleadings 
with materials relating to the intention of the Wisconsin 
Legislature in enacting the 1995 amendments to Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a.  
¶9 
Juneau County advised the circuit court that it would 
not be submitting additional materials because it had not found 
any legally relevant evidence of the legislature’s intent in 
enacting the revised version of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a.  
The Unions submitted materials that will be discussed later.  
The Unions further offered to forego attorney fees and costs if 
Juneau 
County 
would 
voluntarily 
dismiss 
the 
action 
with 
prejudice.  Juneau County refused to dismiss the action. 
¶10 The essence of the Unions' position is that had Juneau 
County 
and 
its 
attorneys 
examined 
materials 
relating 
to 
legislative intent at the commencement of the action and 
thereafter, they would have known or should have known that all 
the evidence contravened their interpretation of the 1995 
amendments to Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. and that there was 
no reasonable basis in law or equity for their position. 
¶11 Although 
Juneau 
County presented 
no 
evidence of 
legislative intent to counter the materials submitted by the 
Unions, Juneau County made two arguments to the circuit court.  
First, Juneau County asserted that none of the materials offered 
by the Unions was admissible evidence of legislative intent.  
Second, Juneau County argued that the statutory provisions at 
issue should be construed by evaluating their interaction with 
other portions of Wis. Stat. § 111.70 relating to the same 
No.  96-2816 
 
7 
subject matter.  In this court, Juneau County further contends 
that adoption of the Unions' position would chill creative, 
innovative arguments that serve to advance the development of 
law.   
¶12 Following their unsuccessful attempt to get Juneau 
County to voluntarily dismiss the action, the Unions moved for 
summary judgment, seeking attorney fees and costs on the ground 
that Juneau County’s action was frivolous.  The circuit court 
granted 
the 
Unions' 
motion, 
noting 
that 
Juneau 
County's 
continuation of the action was frivolous after the Unions had 
submitted evidence of legislative intent and offered to forego 
attorney fees or costs if the action were dismissed.  The 
circuit court granted the Unions' motion and awarded the Unions 
$7,150 in costs and attorney fees. 
No.  96-2816 
 
8 
 
II 
¶13 We examine first the standard of review to be applied 
in this case.  A claim is frivolous when a party or attorney 
"knew or should have known" that the claim lacked "any 
reasonable basis in law and equity."  Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
(3)(b).  A court uses an objective standard to determine whether 
an action is frivolous.  The standard is "whether the attorney 
knew or should have known that the position was frivolous as 
determined by what a reasonable attorney would have known or 
should have known under the same or similar circumstances."  
Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 241, 517 
N.W.2d 658 (1994) (quoting Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 799, 
299 N.W.2d 856 (1981)). 
¶14 Inquiries about frivolousness involve a mixed question 
of law and fact.  Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 241 (citing State v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 582, 601-602, 302 N.W.2d 
827 (1981)).  The determination of what a party or attorney 
"knew or should have been known" is a factual question, and the 
circuit court's findings of fact will not be reversed by an 
appellate court unless the findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.17 (2). 
¶15 The ultimate conclusion of whether the circuit court's 
factual determinations 
support the 
legal determination of 
frivolousness is, however, a question of law, which this court 
determines independent of the circuit court or court of appeals, 
No.  96-2816 
 
9 
benefiting from the analyses of both courts.  Id. (citing State 
Farm, 100 Wis. 2d at 602).  
¶16 In determining whether an action is frivolous a court 
should keep in mind that a significant purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 is to help maintain the integrity of the judicial 
system and the legal profession.  Sommer, 99 Wis. 2d at 799.  
Courts and litigants should not be subjected to actions without 
substance.  A determination of frivolousness, however, is "an 
especially delicate area"; a court must be cautious in declaring 
an action frivolous, Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co, 
117 Wis. 2d 605, 613, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984), lest it stifle "the 
ingenuity, foresightedness and competency of the bar. . . ."  
Id.  "Because it is only when no reasonable basis exists for a 
claim or defense that frivolousness exists, the statute resolves 
doubts in favor of the litigant or attorney."  In re Estate of 
Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(emphasis in original).  See also Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 
Wis. 2d 628, 648, 566 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1997).6   
III 
¶17 To impose reasonable attorney fees on Juneau County 
under the frivolous action statute, the court must be satisfied 
                     
6 The court of appeals appears to have applied a different, 
more liberal standard for evaluating whether a declaratory 
judgment action under Wis. Stat. § 806.04 is frivolous under 
§ 814.025. See Juneau County, 216 Wis. 2d at 298. We can find 
nothing in either § 814.025 or § 806.04 that would support 
applying in declaratory judgment actions anything but the well-
established standard for assessing frivolous claims. 
No.  96-2816 
 
10
that Juneau County or its attorneys knew or should have known 
that the action seeking a declaration that the County was not 
required under Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. to engage in 
binding interest arbitration with the Unions was "without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity."  Wis. Stat. § 814.025(3)(b). 
 The resolution of this issue requires an analysis of the 
substantive question that Juneau County raised about the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(cm)5s. and 6.a.  
¶18 We approach the issue of frivolousness by examining 
first the text and context of the statute and then the materials 
presented by the Unions.  
¶19 The circuit court properly stated that in resolving 
the 
issue 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
presented 
in 
the 
declaratory judgment action it must examine first the statutory 
language and then the statute in context.  Therefore, the 
circuit court carefully considered the text of the provisions, 
the context of the provisions, and an affidavit submitted with 
the amicus brief of the Wisconsin Counties Association by a 
"highly skilled" University of Wisconsin English professor 
setting forth "a highly technical examination" of the clauses of 
the statutory provisions.  Following its analysis, the circuit 
court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 111.70 is "one of the more 
complex statutory provisions in the books" and that the statute 
is ambiguous and unclear because reasonable people reading the 
No.  96-2816 
 
11
statute would not come to the same conclusion.7  The circuit 
court recognized that statutory drafting is an imperfect science 
and surmised that these statutory provisions were "either poorly 
drafted, carelessly drafted, [or] carefully drafted language 
intended to create confusion."  Accordingly the circuit court 
found that Juneau County had a reasonable basis upon which to 
file the lawsuit to seek clarification of the statute.8  The 
court of appeals agreed.  
¶20 We have examined the text of the two provisions at 
issue and the context in which they appear in Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70.  Although we have not had the benefit of the English 
                     
7 The Unions argued that the statute was ambiguous.  During 
oral argument, the Unions' counsel stated that an October 1993 
Wisconsin Counties Magazine article authored by Attorney Robert 
W. Mulcahy, one of the attorneys for Juneau County, demonstrates 
that reasonable people differed about the statute and that the 
statute was unclear and ambiguous.  Attorney Mulcahy's analysis 
of the 1993 amendments is the same as the Unions' position in 
this action. 
An interpretation of a statute by people affected by it can 
be given weight, especially if the construction was accepted 
over a considerable period of time and was acquiesced in by the 
courts and legislature.  Attorney Mulcahy's interpretation of 
the statute, although contrary to the position taken by Juneau 
County, was of short duration and is not entitled to weight.  
See Mesar v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 197 Wis. 578, 581, 
222 N.W. 809 (1929); 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 48.06 at 58-59 
(5th ed. 1992). 
8 Insightfully, the circuit court observed that clarity and 
ambiguity are in the eyes of the beholder.  The circuit court 
explained:  "As reassurance of the [circuit] Court's view [that 
the language is ambiguous], we can certainly cite the litigation 
itself.  If it was not ambiguous, we wouldn't have the 
litigation.  But that tends to be the cat chasing its own tail." 
No.  96-2816 
 
12
professor's analysis of the grammatical construction of the 
statutory provisions, we agree with the circuit court that the 
language is unclear.  
¶21 The circuit court and the court of appeals disagreed 
about whether Juneau County's continuation of the action was 
frivolous considering the materials presented by the Unions.  
The circuit court concluded that under the circumstances of this 
case Juneau County's continuation of the suit was frivolous; the 
court of appeals concluded that it was not. 
¶22 To determine whether the materials presented by the 
Unions rendered the continuation of Juneau County's action 
frivolous, we must assess the materials the Unions submitted. 
¶23 Sources outside the text used to assist in the 
interpretation of a statute are referred to as extrinsic aids.  
2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 48.01 at 301-02 (5th ed. 1992).  
Such aids include available background information about the 
circumstances leading to the enactment of the statute, events 
surrounding the enactment of the statute and postenactment 
events.  Id.  This information may be found in legislative, 
executive, judicial or nongovernmental sources.  Id.  Some 
extrinsic aids are, of course, more probative than others.  For 
example, ordinarily statements from nonlegislative sources do 
not carry as much probative value as legislative statements.  
Ball v. District No. 4, 117 Wis. 2d 529, 544, 345 N.W.2d 389 
(1984). 
No.  96-2816 
 
13
¶24 The Unions submitted extrinsic aids to assist the 
circuit court in its interpretation of the 1995 amendments.  We 
will examine each in turn to evaluate its interpretive weight.  
¶25 The 
Unions 
submitted 
several 
affidavits. 
 
One 
affidavit is by Peter G. Davis, General Counsel for the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC), which is 
charged with administering Wis. Stat. § 111.70, the Municipal 
Employment Relations Act.   
¶26 Two affidavits are by Robert W. Lyons, Executive 
Director of AFSCME District Council 40, whose responsibility it 
is to track legislation and proposed legislation affecting the 
collective 
bargaining 
rights 
of 
the 
municipal 
employes 
represented by the union. 
¶27 Another affidavit is by Robert Wm. Lang, Director of 
the Legislative Fiscal Bureau.  Both the 1993 and 1995 statutory 
provisions at issue in this case were part of state budget 
bills.  It is the statutory duty of the Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau to assist the legislature in its deliberations, and to 
study and recommend alternatives to legislation regarding all 
state budgetary matters.  Wis. Stat. § 13.95(1)(1995-96).  
¶28 One 
Lyons 
affidavit 
comments 
on 
exhibits 
about 
legislative intent.  This court has previously concluded that 
commentary in an affidavit reflecting the affiant's opinion 
about 
legislative 
intent 
is 
not 
reliable 
in 
determining 
legislative intent.  Ball, 117 Wis. 2d at 545.  Although we do 
not rely on the affidavits for the affiants' conclusions about 
legislative intent, we can examine the documents attached to the 
No.  96-2816 
 
14
affidavits to determine whether they contain any information 
relevant to the interpretation of the statutory provisions. 
¶29 The attachments to the Davis affidavit are documents 
from the public files of WERC.  Most of the documents are 
communications to WERC from county board members asking WERC to 
await a 
decision 
from 
the 
courts 
before 
ruling on the 
applicability of the 1995 amendments to county employes.   
¶30 Also attached to the Davis and Lyons affidavits are 
correspondence and memoranda relating to the positions of the 
Wisconsin Counties Association and the Unions before WERC and 
the legislature.  These documents reveal that the Wisconsin 
Counties Association lobbied hard for the repeal of binding 
interest arbitration for county employes and helped to finance 
Juneau County's litigation.  These documents also evidence the 
long-term disagreement between the parties regarding the use of 
binding interest arbitration.  Although informative in supplying 
the background for both the amendment and this dispute, these 
documents 
provide 
little, 
if 
any, 
assistance 
in 
the 
determination of legislative intent.9 
¶31 Also attached to the Davis affidavit is a list of 
interest arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. subsequent to the effective date of 
                     
9 "When, however, a contemporaneous report or other document 
from a nonlegislative agency or even a private party forms a 
vital link in the chain of legislative history of a particular 
statute, such unofficial report or other document may be used to 
determine the legislative intent behind the statute."  Ball, 117 
Wis. 2d at 545.   
No.  96-2816 
 
15
1993 Wis. Act 16.  According to the Unions, the list 
demonstrates that between the summer of 1993 (after adoption of 
the 1993 statutory amendments) and sometime in 1995, WERC, the 
counties 
and 
the 
Unions 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. to apply to county employes other than 
school district professional employes.   
¶32 This list is not helpful in determining legislative 
intent because we are not sure what it signifies.  The list does 
not demonstrate that WERC expressly considered and interpreted 
the 1993 statutory provisions (which are substantially similar 
to the 1995 statute) as the Unions do.  Even if we were certain 
that WERC interpreted the 1993 statute as the Unions do, any 
interpretation by WERC was very recent and of short duration and 
would be given little, if any, weight.  See State ex rel. Parker 
v. Arendt, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699-700, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994); Sauk 
County v. WERC, 165 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 477 N.W.2d 267 (1991). 
  
¶33 A number of other documents were attached to the  
affidavits.  Some are reports of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau.10 
                     
10 See, e.g., Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Dispute 
Resolution Procedures for Municipal Employes (Informational 
Paper #83, prepared by Tony Mason, Jan. 1995); Wisconsin 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 1995-97 Wisconsin State Budget, 
Senate 
Republican 
Caucus 
Amendment, 
Modifications 
to 
Recommendations of the Assembly (June 27, 1995); Wisconsin 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau Report on the 1995-97 Wisconsin State 
Budget, Comparative Summary of Assembly Bill 150 Enacted as 1995 
Act 27 (October 1995); Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
Comparative Summary of Budget Provisions Enacted as 1995 Acts 27 
and 113 (December 1995).   
No.  96-2816 
 
16
Also included is the Governor's veto message relating to the 
amendments at issue.  We shall discuss the Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau reports and the Governor's veto message because we 
consider 
these 
documents 
most 
relevant 
to 
determining 
legislative intent. 11 
¶34 The Fiscal Bureau reports supply a chronology of 
events leading to the enactment; this chronology assists in 
determining legislative intent.  For example, one report 
compared the Assembly's and Senate's proposed 1995 amendments to 
dispute resolution procedures for municipal employes.12 According 
to this report, the Assembly would have allowed the binding 
interest arbitration provision to sunset as scheduled on July 1, 
1996, while the Senate would have repealed the sunset and 
provided for the continuation of binding interest arbitration.  
Robert Wm. Lang, Director of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
                     
11 Another attachment is the pre-final report of the Council 
on Municipal 
Collective 
Bargaining, 
which 
the 
legislature 
mandated in 1993 Wis. Act 16 § 2213p for the purpose of 
recommending to the legislature proposed changes to Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm) and (7m) following the scheduled sunset of 
binding interest arbitration on July 1, 1996.  
This court has given interpretive weight to the comments of 
legislatively created advisory committees.  See, e.g., Green Bay 
Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 34-35, 240 N.W.2d 422 
(1976).  The Council's report is, however, clearly designated as 
a "PRE-FINAL REPORT" and is marked "NOT FOR SUBMISSION TO THE 
LEGISLATURE."  We therefore do not consider it helpful in 
determining legislative intent. 
12 Legislative Fiscal Bureau Report on the 1995-97 Wisconsin 
State Budget, Comparative Summary of Assembly Bill 150 Enacted 
as 1995 Act 27 (October 1995).  
No.  96-2816 
 
17
states in his affidavit that he and his staff worked closely 
with the legislature in the adoption of the 1993 and 1995 state 
budget bills and provided drafting instructions to effect the 
Senate's position to delete the Assembly's proposed amendment to 
remove nonprotective employes from coverage of binding interest 
arbitration. 
¶35 Several of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau reports 
contain statements supporting the Unions' position that the 
legislature revised the dispute resolution procedures applicable 
to school district professional employes but did not intend to 
exclude county employes from binding interest arbitration.  
State 
Director 
Lang's 
affidavit 
interprets 
the 
Bureau's 
documents prepared under his supervision as supporting the 
Unions' position about the effect of the 1993 and 1995 
amendments.  
¶36 Reports prepared by the Legislative Fiscal Bureau are 
"official report[s] of a legislatively created committee" and 
are "clearly valid evidence of legislative intent."  Ball, 117 
Wis. 2d at 543.  See also State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 
No.  96-2816 
 
18
308-09, 577 N.W. 2d 601 (1998); In re Brandon S.S., 179 Wis. 2d 
114, 153 n.36, 507 N.W.2d 94 (1993).13   
¶37 Not all of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau reports were 
available to the legislature prior to adoption of the 1995 
amendments; some were issued after the 1995 amendments were 
adopted.  But even Legislative Fiscal Bureau reports not 
available to the legislature prior to enactment of a statutory 
provision are official interpretations by a legislative agency 
that worked with the legislature during the adoption of the 
statutory provisions in issue.  Such post-enactment legislative 
agency 
reports 
may 
therefore 
be 
of 
aid 
in 
determining 
legislative intent, although they may be less persuasive than 
reports issued prior to enactment. 
¶38 We conclude that several of the Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau reports attached to the affidavits in this case are 
competent evidence of legislative intent and support the Unions' 
interpretation of the statute.   
                     
13 The court of appeals viewed many of the documents as not 
"legislative history, as that term is usually understood, 
because they were prepared after the enactment of the 1993 
amendments to § 111.70(4) (cm)6., STATS., and because there is 
no evidence they were considered by the legislature prior to or 
during the course of the enactment of 1993 Wis. Act 16 on August 
10, 1993.  Nevertheless, they are aids commonly used in 
statutory construction."  Juneau County, 216 Wis. 2d at 296 
(emphasis in original).  We note that the declaratory judgment 
action sought interpretation of the 1995 amendments, not the 
1993 enactment, and that several documents submitted by the 
Unions were prepared before the enactment of the 1995 amendments 
and were available for legislative consideration. 
No.  96-2816 
 
19
¶39 The Governor's veto message regarding the 1995 binding 
interest arbitration provisions explained that the Governor 
would not veto the repeal of the sunset of the binding interest 
arbitration provision as applied to counties, although on 
principle he supported a sunset.  The Governor's message further 
explained that he could not repeal binding interest arbitration 
for county employes because he wanted to retain the special 
provisions for school district professional employes.  The veto 
message stated:  
 
Although I support a sunset of this law, I am placed 
in the unfortunate position of not being able to veto 
its repeal without also vetoing the repeal of the 
sunset 
of 
the 
qualified 
economic 
offer 
(QEO) 
provisions 
of 
the 
mediation-arbitration 
law 
that 
currently apply to schools.  I believe maintaining the 
QEO provisions for schools is critical to ensuring 
that schools can control spending.  However, since the 
mediation-arbitration 
law 
will 
still 
apply 
to 
counties, it will continue to be difficult for them to 
manage their employe compensation costs.14 
¶40 The court has, in prior cases, considered a governor's 
veto message as part of the legislative history and as evidence 
of legislative intent.15  It is apparent from this particular 
Governor's veto message that the Governor interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a. as applying binding interest arbitration to 
                     
14 Governor's Veto Message, Assembly J., July 27, 1995 at 
411.  
15 See, e.g., Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 537, 546-47, 342 N.W.2d 
693 (1984); American Med. Transp. of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Curtis-
Universal, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 135, 143 n.5, 452 N.W.2d 575 
(1990). 
No.  96-2816 
 
20
county employes and a different system to school district 
professional employes.  The Governor's veto message thus 
supports the Unions' interpretation of the 1995 amendments.   
¶41 Juneau County argues that none of the materials 
offered 
by 
the 
Unions 
constitutes 
competent 
evidence 
of 
legislative intent.  As evidenced by our previous discussion, 
Juneau County is in error on this point.  Several of the 
proffered Legislative Fiscal Bureau reports, as well as the 
Governor's veto message, are competent evidence of legislative 
intent and support the Unions' interpretation of the statute. 
¶42 Juneau County's view of what a court may consider in 
interpreting legislative intent is too narrow.  A court may 
consider a broad range of textual and historical evidence when 
it interprets statutes.  As we have written previously, under 
some circumstances this court has considered evidence of 
legislative intent from nonlegislative committees and other 
sources.  Ball, 117 Wis. 2d at 544.  We agree, however, with 
Juneau County that courts should be careful in what they deem 
acceptable as evidence of legislative intent. 
¶43 Balanced 
against 
the 
Unions' 
submissions 
on 
legislative intent, Juneau County presented no evidence to 
support its interpretation.  Accordingly, the Unions ask us to 
award them attorney fees for Juneau County's frivolous action.  
¶44 In determining whether an action is frivolous a court 
should keep in mind a significant purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025, namely, to help maintain the integrity of the 
judicial system and the legal profession.  Sommer, 99 Wis. 2d at 
No.  96-2816 
 
21
799. People should not be inconvenienced and their resources and 
court resources should not be wasted by frivolous actions.  At 
the same time, litigants and lawyers must have the opportunity 
to espouse legal principles in good faith without fear of 
personal loss.   
¶45 A determination of frivolousness is "an especially 
delicate area."  Radlein,  117 Wis. 2d at 613. A court should be 
cautious in declaring an action frivolous because the court does 
not 
want 
to 
stifle 
"the 
ingenuity, 
foresightedness 
and 
competency of the bar."  Id.   
¶46 The court has stated that doubts about frivolousness 
should be resolved in favor of the litigant or attorney, 
"because it is only when no reasonable basis exists for a claim 
or defense that frivolousness exists."  In re Estate of Bilsie, 
100 Wis. 2d at 350.  See also Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 648; Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 235.  Thus we must resolve any 
doubts about whether Juneau County or its attorneys knew or 
should have known that there was no reasonable basis in law or 
equity for its action in favor of Juneau County.  
¶47 This is a close case.  The ambiguity of the statute 
supports 
Juneau 
County 
seeking 
declaratory 
relief. 
 
The 
extrinsic aids support the Unions' position, and no extrinsic 
aid supports Juneau County's position.  Juneau County and its 
attorneys contended that none of the proffered legislative 
history was competent evidence of legislative intent.  This 
error contributed to Juneau County's seeking and continuing to 
seek a judicial determination.  That Juneau County's views about 
No.  96-2816 
 
22
the extrinsic aids submitted and the 1995 statute have not been 
accepted by either the circuit court or this court does not 
render the action frivolous.  See Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 243. 
¶48 The 
Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau's reports and the 
Governor's 
veto 
message 
ultimately 
prove 
persuasive 
on 
legislative intent, even though these documents do not explain 
the source of and the meaning of the ambiguous statutory 
language.  As a result, the reader continues to be somewhat 
perplexed about the text of the statute.  
¶49 Upon considering all the factors and resolving doubts 
about frivolousness in favor of Juneau County, we conclude that 
Juneau County's position that a judicial determination was 
needed was not an unreasonable conclusion.  Although persuasive, 
these extrinsic aids do not conclusively tie the legislative 
intent to the statutory language at issue in this case.  On 
final analysis, we cannot say that no reasonable basis existed 
for Juneau County's action.   
¶50 For the reasons stated herein, we hold that Juneau 
County and its attorneys did not commence or continue a 
frivolous 
claim 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.025(3)(b).  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
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