Title: Lawrence v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091119
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
STEVEN LAWRENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 091119 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
  February 25, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in admitting expert testimony regarding the details of 
unadjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct the expert 
learned from police reports and whether expert opinion 
testimony dependent upon the truth of those unadjudicated 
allegations is admissible into evidence. 
In 1990, Steven L. Lawrence (Lawrence) was convicted of, 
among other things, rape and sodomy and sentenced to a total of 
forty-five years imprisonment, with five years suspended.  
Prior to his scheduled release from incarceration, the 
Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to the Sexually Violent 
Predator Act (SVPA), Code §§ 37.2-900 et seq., requesting 
Lawrence’s civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. 
After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, 
Lawrence was found to be a sexually violent predator and 
committed to the Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for involuntary secure 
inpatient treatment.  Lawrence appeals, arguing that the 
circuit court erred in allowing certain evidence to be 
presented to the jury. 
Facts 
At the outset of Lawrence’s civil commitment trial, the 
Commonwealth sought to introduce into evidence a sexually 
violent predator forensic psychological evaluation prepared by 
Dr. Ilona Gravers, a licensed clinical psychologist.  Lawrence 
objected to the introduction of the document, arguing that the 
evaluation report was hearsay because it included information 
from police reports concerning various unadjudicated 
allegations of sexual misconduct and references to a previous 
polygraph test.  After argument, the circuit court sustained 
the objection and the evaluation report was not admitted into 
evidence. 
During its direct examination of Dr. Gravers, the 
Commonwealth sought to elicit testimony from her concerning the 
details of the allegations of unadjudicated sexual misconduct 
contained in the police reports.  Lawrence objected, arguing 
that such testimony would be hearsay and that any probative 
value was outweighed by undue prejudice.  The Commonwealth 
argued that Code § 8.01-401.1 authorized an expert witness to 
rely upon hearsay and to give her reasons for her opinions.  
The Commonwealth also argued that Dr. Gravers’ testimony 
 
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regarding the content of the police reports was not hearsay 
because it was not offered for the truth of the allegations but 
to show the basis for Dr. Gravers’ opinion. 
Agreeing with the Commonwealth’s position, the circuit 
court overruled Lawrence’s objections.  The circuit court did, 
however, read an instruction to the jury, which stated, 
“Testimony regarding allegations of behavior contained in 
police reports for which the Respondent has not been convicted 
was not offered or is not offered to prove that the behavior 
actually occurred, but only as the basis for the expert’s 
opinion.” 
Dr. Gravers testified regarding the details of a police 
report in which it was claimed that Lawrence was acting as a 
“pimp” for a female prostitute and would cut and burn her when 
she did not make enough money for him.  Dr. Gravers also 
discussed the allegations detailed in a police report that 
described an incident where Lawrence allegedly threatened a 
woman with a shotgun when she refused to perform sexual acts 
with him and his girlfriend.  Neither of these recounted 
incidents resulted in formal charges.  Dr. Gravers also 
testified concerning a police report that resulted in a charge 
for rape in 1975, but no conviction.  In that incident, while 
18 years old, Lawrence allegedly forcefully disrobed a 15 year-
old girl and attempted to rape or raped her.  Dr. Gravers did 
 
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not talk to any of the participants in the alleged incidents 
reported to the police.  Also, the alleged victims and 
witnesses were in some cases not identified and none were 
available to testify or to be cross-examined. 
Dr. Gravers diagnosed Lawrence with a paraphilia, a mental 
abnormality and a “personality disorder not otherwise specified 
with antisocial traits,” based partially on the unadjudicated 
allegations of sexual misconduct.  Dr. Gravers stated that the 
reported incidents led her to conclude that Lawrence had 
“intimacy deficits,” which are considered “a dynamic or a 
changeable risk factor for future sexual offending.”  On cross-
examination, Dr. Gravers stated that she relied on the 
information from the police reports in reaching the conclusion 
that there was a pattern of sexual aggression and intimacy 
deficits.  Furthermore, Dr. Gravers stated that she viewed 
Lawrence’s denials of the unadjudicated allegations as an 
indication of his “minimizing” and part of his pattern of 
“distorted thinking.”  
In addition to objecting to Dr. Gravers being allowed to 
testify concerning the details of the incidents reported to the 
police, Lawrence also objected to Dr. Gravers’ opinion 
testimony.  Lawrence objected to its admissibility claiming 
that Dr. Gravers’ opinions were based upon unreliable facts 
gleaned from the police reports concerning unadjudicated 
 
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allegations of sexual misconduct by Lawrence.  The circuit 
court overruled Lawrence’s objection.  
The Commonwealth also called Dr. Ronald M. Boggio to 
testify.  Dr. Boggio concluded that Lawrence had a history of 
sexual offending based on the various charges, police reports 
and convictions and opined that Lawrence had a high risk of 
committing sexual offenses in the future.  Dr. Boggio did not 
discuss the unadjudicated allegations in detail.  Dr. Boggio 
diagnosed Lawrence with paraphilia not otherwise specified and 
antisocial traits, but did not find that Lawrence had an 
antisocial personality disorder.  
Analysis 
 
Lawrence claims that the circuit court erred in admitting 
Dr. Gravers’ testimony regarding the details of unadjudicated 
allegations of sexual misconduct by Lawrence, because the 
testimony was hearsay and unduly prejudicial.  Lawrence argues 
that this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wynn, 277 Va. 92, 
671 S.E.2d 137 (2009), should inform, if not control, the 
resolution of the issue. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that this case is distinguishable 
from Wynn because, in this case, the circuit court decided that 
the information concerning the details in the police reports 
was not hearsay, and the circuit court issued a cautionary 
instruction to the jury.  Further, the Commonwealth argues that 
 
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even if the challenged testimony was hearsay, the admission of 
the evidence was harmless error “considering the mountain of 
information that was admitted from other sources and was 
unchallenged.” 
This Court reviews evidentiary rulings under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 
S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).   “However, ‘[a] trial court has no 
discretion to admit clearly inadmissible evidence because 
admissibility of evidence depends not upon the discretion of 
the court but upon sound legal principles.’ "  Wynn, 277 Va. at 
97, 671 S.E.2d at 139 (quoting Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. 
Puryear, 250 Va. 559, 563, 463 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1995)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
This Court defines hearsay as an out of court statement 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 6, 516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999).  It 
includes testimony given by a witness who relates what others 
have told him or what he has read.  Id.  Hearsay evidence is 
inadmissible unless it falls within one of the recognized 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.  Id.  The party attempting to 
introduce a hearsay statement has the burden of proving that 
the statement falls within one or more of the exceptions.  Id. 
at 6, 516 S.E.2d at 476-77. 
 
This Court, in Wynn, stated: 
 
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Code § 37.2-908(C) provides that an expert witness 
testifying at an SVPA trial may state the “basis for 
his opinions.”  Similarly, pursuant to Code § 8.01-
401.1, an expert witness may rely upon “facts, 
circumstances or data made known to . . . such 
witness” in formulating an opinion; those “facts, 
circumstances or data . . . , if of a type normally 
relied upon by others in the particular field of 
expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, 
need not be admissible in evidence.”  Neither of these 
statutes, however, allows for the introduction of 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence during the 
direct examination of an expert witness merely because 
the expert relied on the hearsay information in 
formulating an opinion. 
 
277 Va. at 100, 671 S.E.2d at 141. 
In Wynn, this Court specifically rejected the argument 
that the details of unadjudicated allegations of sexual 
misconduct offered by an expert on direct examination, 
supposedly to show the factual basis of an expert’s opinion, 
are not hearsay.  Id. at 99, 671 S.E.2d at 140.  Even though 
Code § 37.2-908(C) provides that an expert witness may state 
the “basis for his opinions,” that does not extend to testimony 
about the details of hearsay allegations of sexual misconduct.  
Wynn, 277 Va. at 100-02, 671 S.E.2d at 141-42.  We reasoned 
that even though an expert may rely upon hearsay allegations of 
sexual misconduct (if the information is of the type routinely 
used by experts in the given field of expertise) in formulating 
an opinion, “a litigant, nevertheless, should not be required 
to contend with [the truth of details of] such hearsay 
information because the trier of fact cannot observe the 
 
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demeanor of the speaker and the statements cannot be tested by 
cross-examination.”  Id. at 100, 671 S.E.2d at 141. 
The Commonwealth asserts that this case is distinguishable 
from Wynn because the circuit court read a limiting instruction 
to the jury.  We disagree.  Dr. Gravers’ testimony on direct 
examination improperly included numerous details about unproven 
past allegations of sexual misconduct against Lawrence.  The 
alleged victims and witnesses were in some cases not identified 
and none were available for cross-examination.  Lawrence, 
similar to the petitioner in Wynn, was faced with hearsay 
evidence about allegations of sexual misconduct.  In this 
context, the improper admission of such evidence — which cannot 
effectively be restricted to proper use or purposes in the 
minds of the jury — cannot be remedied by the giving of a 
limiting instruction.  See Coffey v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 629, 
636, 51 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1949).  We hold that the circuit court 
erred in allowing Dr. Gravers to testify on direct examination 
about the details of unadjudicated allegations of sexual 
misconduct she learned about from reading police reports. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the admission of the 
evidence, even if erroneous, was harmless error.  Harmless 
error requires a showing that the parties “had a fair trial on 
the merits and substantial justice has been reached.”  Code 
§ 8.01-678.  This Court has held that nonconstitutional error 
 
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is harmless if the reviewing court can be sure that the error 
did not influence the jury and only had a slight effect.  Clay 
v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260, 546 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 
(2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-
65 (1946)). 
 
Although Dr. Boggio testified for the Commonwealth and 
opined that Lawrence had a high risk of future sexual offenses, 
it is worth noting that, by statute, expert testimony is not 
dispositive in an SVPA determination proceeding.  Code § 37.2-
906(C).  The jury had to decide, after hearing all the expert 
and lay testimony, whether the Commonwealth had proven by clear 
and convincing evidence that Lawrence was a sexually violent 
predator.  Code § 37.2-908(C).  The details about the alleged 
sexual misconduct, which were no doubt prejudicial to Lawrence, 
would not have been introduced to the jury but for Dr. Gravers’ 
impermissible testimony.  Given the nature and extent of that 
detailed, improper testimony concerning alleged sexual 
misconduct, and the fact that, in rendering her opinion, Dr. 
Gravers indicated to the jury that she assumed those 
allegations to be true, it cannot be found with assurance that 
the evidence concerning the details of unadjudicated 
allegations of sexual misconduct did not influence the jury or 
that it had only slight effect.  See Code § 8.01-678; Clay, 262 
Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731-32.  Therefore, we hold that the 
 
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error in this case regarding the admission into evidence of 
hearsay evidence concerning allegations of sexual misconduct by 
Lawrence was not harmless. 
 
Lawrence also contends that Dr. Gravers’ opinion testimony 
had an inadequate factual foundation because it was based upon 
the truth of hearsay allegations in police reports concerning 
unadjudicated conduct.  Thus, Lawrence argues that the circuit 
court should have stricken Dr. Gravers’ expert opinion 
testimony because it was speculative and unreliable as a matter 
of law.  See Commonwealth v. Garrett, 276 Va. 590, 606, 667 
S.E.2d 739, 748 (2008). 
The Commonwealth argues that Dr. Gravers’ opinion 
testimony was admissible because Dr. Gravers did not speculate 
beyond the information she had or make any factual errors in 
terms of using the information.  Further, the Commonwealth 
contends that because experts may rely on such underlying 
information, Dr. Gravers’ expert opinion had an adequate 
factual foundation.  The Commonwealth also asserts that the 
circuit court did not err in failing to strike Dr. Gravers’ 
expert opinion testimony because although Dr. Gravers relied 
upon the allegations in the police reports, the information in 
the police reports was not the sole basis for her opinions and 
she had other additional information she relied on in reaching 
her conclusions. 
 
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In Garrett, this Court stated that an expert opinion in a 
sexually violent predator trial must have an adequate factual 
foundation.  276 Va. at 606, 667 S.E.2d at 748.  An expert may 
not “express an opinion that is speculative and unreliable as a 
matter of law.”  Id.  “Expert testimony founded upon 
assumptions that have no basis in fact is not merely subject to 
refutation by cross-examination or by counter-experts; it is 
inadmissible.”  Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 160, 606 S.E.2d 
809, 811 (2005). 
Here, the evidence indicates that Dr. Gravers, in forming 
her expert opinions, considered as true unsubstantiated 
allegations contained in police reports she read.  Dr. Gravers 
stated that the unadjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct 
contained in the police reports led her to the conclusion that 
Lawrence had a pattern of sexual aggression and intimacy 
deficits.  Dr. Gravers also stated that while her diagnosis of 
paraphilia, not otherwise specified, was primarily based on 
Lawrence’s two convictions, her conclusion that Lawrence had an 
antisocial personality disorder, not otherwise specified, 
depended on the allegations in the police reports and 
Lawrence’s pattern of antisocial behavior, as shown through 
those allegations. 
Based on this Court’s holding in Garrett, we hold that Dr. 
Gravers’ expert testimony did not have an adequate factual 
 
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foundation to the extent it was dependent upon assuming the 
truth of the hearsay allegations concerning Lawrence’s past 
sexual misconduct.  Dr. Gravers’ opinions, which were dependent 
upon the truth of hearsay allegations unsupported by evidence 
properly presented at trial, were speculative and unreliable as 
a matter of law and should not have been admitted into 
evidence. 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.  To the extent that Dr. Gravers is 
able to render opinions without assuming the truth of hearsay 
allegations that are unsupported by evidence presented at 
trial, the views expressed here will not serve to bar that 
expert testimony.  See Garrett, 276 Va. at 608, 667 S.E.2d at 
749. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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