Title: Downes v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 267, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM D. DOWNES, JR., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 267, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9408020702 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 18, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 15, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 15th day of August 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, William D. Downes, Jr., filed an 
appeal from the Superior Court’s May 8, 2006 order denying his second 
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
61.  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
 
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Downes’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and 
AFFIRM.  
 
(2) 
In February 1995, Downes was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, two counts of 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Burglary in the 
First Degree, Reckless Endangering in the First Degree and Assault in the 
First Degree.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 36 years at Level 
V, to be followed by probation.  This Court affirmed Downes’ convictions 
and sentences on direct appeal.2 
 
(3) 
 In this appeal, Downes claims that the trial judge had a 
personal interest in the outcome of his criminal trial, resulting in a lowering 
of the State’s burden of proof.  Downes states that, by accident, he learned 
from a fellow prisoner that the trial judge and another Superior Court judge 
frequented a place of business owned by the family of the murder victim and 
had a personal relationship with that family.  In support of his claim, 
Downes attaches an affidavit signed by the prisoner.  
 
(4) 
Downes’ convictions became final in 1996, ten years before his 
second motion for postconviction relief was filed.  Moreover, Downes failed 
to assert the claim he advances in this proceeding at trial, on direct appeal or 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Downes v. State, Del. Supr., No. 151, 1995, Hartnett, J. (Mar. 13, 1996). 
 
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in his first postconviction motion.  As such, the claim is both time-barred3 
and procedurally barred4 unless Downes can demonstrate either that the 
Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the charges against him or that there 
is a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 
violation.5   
 
(5) 
The affidavit of a prisoner should be viewed with great 
caution.6  The affidavit in this case is particularly questionable because it is 
based solely upon the “belief” of the prisoner that a personal relationship 
between the judges and the victim’s family existed.  Even if the affidavit 
were wholly trustworthy, a personal relationship between the Superior Court 
judge and the victim’s family, in and of itself, is insufficient to establish a 
disqualifying bias.7  Thus, because Downes has failed to demonstrate that a 
miscarriage of justice exempts him from the procedural bars of Rule 61,8 we 
find that the Superior Court properly denied his claim.   
 
(6)  
It is manifest on the face of Downes’ opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
                                                 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2) and (3). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
6 Johnson v. State, 410 A.2d 1014, 1015 (Del. 1980). 
7 CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 794-95 (Del. 1982). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
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by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.   
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice