Title: Ardaneh v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13481
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 7, 2023

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SJC-13481 
 
HAMID REZA ARDANEH  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
November 7, 2023. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Hamid Reza Ardaneh, is awaiting trial on 
indictments for rape, strangulation or suffocation, and other 
offenses.  See Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 492 Mass. 1019, 1019 
(2023)(Ardaneh [No. 3]).  Acting on his own behalf, he filed 
papers in the county court citing G. L. c. 211, § 3 (general 
superintendence); G. L. c. 249, § 5 (relief in the nature of 
certiorari); G. L. c. 278, § 28E (certain interlocutory 
appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (interlocutory appeals in Federal 
court); and Mass. R. Crim. P. 15, as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 
(2017) (certain interlocutory appeals), seeking review of the 
denial of various pretrial motions and correction of other 
alleged errors.1  A single justice of this court considered the 
papers and denied all requests for relief, and Ardaneh appeals.  
We affirm. 
 
 
After his appeal was entered in this court, Ardaneh filed a 
brief, as well as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. 
Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  That rule applies 
when a single justice "denies relief from an interlocutory 
ruling in the trial court," and requires the appellant to "set 
forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot 
adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment 
in the trial court or by other available means."  Id.  This 
obligation coincides with the burden borne by a petitioner 
 
 
1 Among the papers were a motion to discharge counsel and a 
motion to recuse the Superior Court judge.  We consider both 
motions pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
2 
 
seeking extraordinary relief to demonstrate the absence or 
inadequacy of alternative remedies.  See, e.g., Ardaneh (No. 3), 
492 Mass. at 1020; Chawla v. Appeals Court, 482 Mass. 1001, 1002 
(2019).  Regardless of whether rule 2:21 applies to all of 
Ardaneh's claims, a review of his submissions and the record 
before the single justice leads us to conclude that the single 
justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying 
relief. 
 
 
This is the fourth time that Ardaneh has sought some form 
of extraordinary relief from this court arising out of the same 
underlying criminal proceedings.  In each of the three prior 
appeals, the court affirmed the judgments denying relief.  See 
Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1019; Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 487 
Mass. 1030, 1031 (2021) (Ardaneh [No. 2]); Ardaneh v. 
Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2020) (Ardaneh [No. 1]).  
Each time, we concluded that Ardaneh failed to demonstrate that 
review of his claims could not adequately be obtained in the 
trial court or on appeal from any conviction.  See Ardaneh (No. 
3), 492 Mass. at 1021; Ardaneh (No. 2), 487 Mass. at 1030, 
quoting Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006 ("to the extent that 
Ardaneh seeks relief 'from what he perceive[s] to be general 
injustices done to or imposed on him' in the trial court, '[h]is 
claims [do] not present a situation warranting extraordinary 
superintendence relief directly from this court'").  We reach 
the same conclusion here. 
 
 
As he has previously, "Ardaneh claims very generally and 
among other things that he has been falsely accused of the 
criminal conduct for which he was indicted; that he has 
exculpatory evidence to prove his innocence; that the evidence 
does not support the indictments; that his constitutional 
rights, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, 
have been violated; and that he has been improperly detained."  
Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1019.  See Ardaneh (No. 2), 487 
Mass. at 1030; Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1005-1006.  Without 
overly retreading the same ground, to the extent that Ardaneh 
seeks review of issues related to motions to suppress, although 
he could seek leave from the single justice to "appeal an order 
determining a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial," Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), there is "no right to appeal (as 
[Ardaneh] has done here) from a single justice's denial of leave 
to appeal."2  Azubuko v. Commonwealth, 464 Mass. 1002, 1002 n.1 
 
 
2 Ardaneh also cites 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), which applies to 
interlocutory appeals in Federal court.  It does not apply to 
Ardanah's request for an interlocutory appeal in State court.  
3 
 
(2012).  He "'can still raise his challenge to the suppression 
ruling [and related issues] in a direct appeal if he is 
convicted after trial.'"  Torres v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 
1010, 1011 (2021), quoting Goguen v. Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 
1006, 1006 (2010). 
 
 
To the extent Ardaneh challenges the denial of a motion to 
dismiss, "'[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal 
case is not appealable until after trial, and we have indicated 
many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent 
that rule.'"  Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1020, quoting 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002).  The same 
is true when such a motion is predicated on speedy trial claims.  
See Flood v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1015, 1017 (2013) (no right 
to interlocutory review of motion to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds).  Likewise, the denial of Ardaneh's motion to recuse 
the Superior Court judge may be addressed in a direct appeal.  
See Torres, 487 Mass. at 1011.  The same is also true of 
Ardaneh's motion to discharge counsel.  See Glawson v. 
Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 1021, 1021 (2005).  To the extent 
Ardaneh challenges the denial of other motions seeking 
additional forms of relief, or raises other claims of error, he 
similarly failed to demonstrate that review of those matters 
cannot adequately be obtained on direct appeal following any 
conviction.  See, e.g., Tavares v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 1044, 
1044 (2019).  The single justice neither erred nor abused his 
discretion in denying relief.3  See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 
Mass. 22, 25 (2019). 
 
Cf. Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 367 
Mass. 464, 468 (1975). 
 
 
3 Two other points bear mention.  First, with respect to 
Ardaneh's allegation that the single justice failed to "[r]eview 
the motions to [s]uppress, motions to [d]ismiss, and motions to 
[g]rant [a]ppropriate [r]elief," there is nothing to support that 
claim.  Moreover, as stated, we have reviewed the record and 
agree with the single justice that relief was not warranted. 
 
 
Second, to the extent that Ardaneh complains that the trial 
court record was not assembled and transferred to the county 
court, there was no error.  To the extent the argument concerns 
Ardaneh's requests for extraordinary relief, it was his "burden 
to create a record -- not merely to allege but to demonstrate, 
i.e., to provide copies of the lower court docket entries and 
any relevant pleadings, motions, orders . . . or other parts of 
the lower court record necessary to substantial [his] 
4 
 
 
As noted supra, this is Ardaneh's fourth attempt to seek 
extraordinary relief from this court -- arising from the same 
underlying criminal proceedings -- to correct alleged errors 
that may be reviewed on the ordinary course of trial and appeal.  
See Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1021; Ardaneh (No. 2), 487 
Mass. at 1030; Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006.  In Ardaneh 
(No. 3), supra, we cautioned Ardaneh that "further attempts to 
obtain [extraordinary] relief in similar circumstances may 
result in the imposition of sanctions."  This case was pending 
in the county court at the time Ardaneh (No.3) was decided.  
Although we do not impose sanctions now, we emphasize that 
Ardaneh is on notice that "further attempts to obtain 
[extraordinary relief] in similar circumstances may result in 
the imposition of sanctions."  Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Hamid Reza Ardaneh, pro se. 
 
allegations" that relief is warranted.  Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428 
Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  To the 
extent the argument concerns Ardaneh's application for 
interlocutory review, the single justice did not authorize an 
interlocutory appeal, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), and no 
assembly was required pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8, as appearing 
in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019).  See Ramos v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 
1004, 1004 (2020).