Title: STATE v OPPELT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13882
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1978

No. 13882 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA 1978 THE S T A T E O F MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . DAVID O P P E L T , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : James A. Lewis, Public Defender argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely,Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Mayo Ashley, argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls,Montana. Submitted: April 26, 1978 Decided : JUR - 8 1978 Filed: Y 1 Clerk. M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and attempted t h e f t entered by the District Court, Cascade County, upon a jury verdict. A t approximately 7:30 a.m., January 15, 1977, the Cascade County s h e r i f f ' s department notified Jerry Noble, owner and managr of Zooks Tire Center i n Great Falls, Montana, that the burglar alarm for h i s store had sounded. Noble proceeded t o h i s store where he observed a man exiting from the shop door. Noble then parked h i s car i n a manner blocking an automobile which was parked near the building. A t approximately t h i s same time, Leonard Dusek, a Zooks Tire Center salesman, arrived a t work. A s Dusek approached the door of the building, he observed a man inside the store crouching behind a counter, about eight t o ten feet from where Dusek stood. The man rose from h i s crouching position, Dusek and the man stared a t each other, and the man then fled into the shop. Dusek ran t o the north side of the building and observed three people, two were entering an automobile approximately 15 to 20 feet from where Dusek was standing. Dusek t e s t i f i e d the third person, defendant, was standing outside the vehicle and threw a bumper jack handle a t him. Noble parked h i s pickup truck a t an angle blocking the intruders' vehicle. Dusek t e s t i f i e d that defendant David Oppelt obtained a crescent wrench from the car and threw it a t Noble's pickup truck, a f t e r which defendant entered the store and collected several t i r e irons which he threw a t Noble's pickup truck. Noble t e s t i f i e d he got a very good look a t the fellow throwing the t i r e irons, and that person was defendant. When the two intruders i n the vehicle tried t o drive away, Noble rammed their car with h i s pickup truck, immobilizing t h e i r vehicle. The two people i n the auto then ran into the shop, while the man who had thrown the t i r e irons, wrench and jack handle fled the scene. Noble and Dusek entered the shop and, a f t e r an unsuccessful attempt by the intruders to escape, apprehended the two people who had been i n the car and a third person who had been hiding in the store behind a t i r e rack. Noble kicked one of the intruders several times i n an attempt t o force him t o reveal the name of the fourth conspirator who had escaped. The intruders, upon t h i s persuasive prompting by Noble, identified the fourth partici- pant i n the crime a s "Sonny" Gardipee. The s h e r i f f ' s department took the suspects into custody and e l i c i t e d from one, Robert Azure, a l i s t of four of h i s friends. Defendant was one of the people on the list. Within an hour and a half of the crime, Noble and Dusek went t o the s h e r i f f ' s office where they gave an account of the crime and a description of the man who had fled. Noble described the and 5'1OU, person as between 5'8"/ with hair t o the shoulders and a s l i g h t build. Dusek described the person a s t a l l and thin with long hair. A deputy sheriff then held photos of defendant and one other person from Robert Azure's list of friends and showed the photos t o Dusek and Noble. The two persons i n the photos f i t both Noble's and Dusek's description of the fourth conspirator. Both Noble and Dusek positively identified defendant as the fourth participant. On January 19, 1977, the state filed an Information in District Court, Cascade County, charging defendant and the three participants apprehended a t the scene of the crime with aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, attempted theft, and also with a count of criminal trespass to vehicles which was l a t e r dismissed. On March 28, 1977, the f i r s t day of t r i a l and more than two months a f t e r they had f i r s t identified defendant from the photos, the county attorney showed Noble and Dusek three or four photos from which they both again selected the photo of defendant as the photo of the fourth participant i n the crime. A t defendant's t r i a l , both Dusek and Noble identified defendant a s the fourth person involved i n the crime. The s t a t e a t t r i a l raised the issue of legal accountability, and the court gave instructions placing the theory of legal accountability be- fore the jury, although the legal accountability offense was not charged i n the Information. Defendant on appeal presen,ts two issues for review: 1. Did Noble and Dusek's in-court identification of de- fendant result from an impermissibly suggestive pretrial photo- graphic lineup? 2. Did the court e r r in allowing the state a t t r i a l to raise the issue of legal accountability, where that crime was not charged i n the Information? The factors to be considered to determine whether a pretrial showup, lineup, or photo identification i s impermissibly suggestive have been set forth by the United States Supreme Court: 'I* * * A s indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal a t the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness a t the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation * * *." Neil v. Biggers, (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 198, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L ed 2d 401,411. See also: Manson v. Brathwaite, (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 114,117, Applying these factors to t h i s case, we cannot say the p r e t r i a l photographic identification was so suggestive as t o create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The witnesses had a sufficient opportunity t o view the person a t the t i m e of the crime. Noble saw the person throwing t i r e irons from a location very close t o the pickup truck i n which Noble was s i t t i n g . Dusek stared a t the person for about five seconds while the person was inside the shop beneath a strong overhead light. Dusek again saw the person outside the shop throwing various auto tools. The witnesses' attention was focused on defendant. Noble, when he was s i t t i n g i n h i s pickup truck, t e s t i f i e d that he was only 15 t o 20 feet from the person and got a "very good" look a t him. Dusek's attention was focused on the person a s he stared a t him when he observed him inside the store. The witnesses' prior description of the person accurately described defendant, although it was not as detailed a s it might have been. Both Noble and Dusek t e s t i f i e d a s t o the person's build, height and hair length. Defendant matched the witnesses' descriptions. - The witnesses demonstrated a high level of certainty a t the photographic lineup. Each t e s t i f i e d that he had no doubt a s t o the identification; each quickly picked the photo of defendant as the photo of the criminal. Finally, the length of time between the crime and the confrontation was short. Both witnesses identified defendant a t the photographic lineup less than two hours after the crime was committed. A claim of prejudice from an allegedly defective identi- fication procedure must be evaluated by examining "the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances surrounding it." Stovall v. Denno, (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L ed 2d 1199, 1206. De- fendant claims that several factors created a "totality of circum- stances" which led to an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure. Defendant f i r s t notes that identification was made from a presentation of only two photographs. Although showing numerous photos would have been a preferable procedure, it was not unduly suggestive i n this case. The United States Supreme Court has held that identification of a criminal even by means of a one-person showup or photo presentation does not necessarily, without more, violate due process. Neil v. Biggers, supra; Stovall v. Denno, supra. In this case, the officer who conducted the photo identification stated the picture of defendant and the other man were the only two pictures he could obtain from the list of the four people Kobert Azure had given him. Moreover, the photo identification occurred not a f t e r defendant had beenstaken into police custody, but during the course of the police investigation of the crime. This was merely a proper investigation procedure rather than an attempt t o suggest to witnesses that a suspect i n custody was the one i n the photo and the one who committed the crime. See: United States v. Cantu, (7th C i r . 1972), 501 F.2d 1019, 1020; State v. Ware, (1976), 113 Ariz. 337, 554 P.2d 1264, 1266. While the use of a larger number of photos would surely have strengthened the force of the identification evidence, the defect in using only two photos " * * * goes to weight and not to substance", Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. Defendant also complains that Noble and Dusek were allowed to view the photos in the presence of each other, while the deputy sheriff held the photographs before them, Simultaneous, rather than independent exhibitions of photos to more than one witness will render a photographic identification inadmissible only if the circumstances of the identification procedure are such as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentifi- cation. United States v . Hopkins, (D.C.Cir.1972), 4 6 4 F.2d 816, 820, Here, each witness testified that he identified defendant as the criminal immediately upon seeing the photos, without prompting from the other witness or from the police officer. In the absence of any evidence of suggestiveness, this identification procedure was merely a factor which the jury could consider in evaluating the strength of the evidence. Defendant also claims that it was improper to conduct another photographic lineup prior to trial. In the absence of any evidence that the state coached the witnesses to pick defendant's picture, however, the reshowing of the photos was merely a matter on which the defense could question the witnesses during cross-examination. Buchanan v. State, (Alaska 1977), 561 P.2d 1197, 1207. Finally defendant claims that the photographic identification was unfair because the police never attempted to obtain a photo of Sonny Gardipee, the man whom the other participants i n the crime named as the criminal who had fled. At trial, however, the officer who conducted the photographic identification testified that he knew Sonny Gardipee to be a man 5'9" tall, with short hair, weighing 230 pounds. Both witnesses described the criminal as thin with shoulder length hair. Considering the totality of the circumstances and applying the four part analysis of Neil v . Biggers, supra, we cannot say that the photographic identification was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Short of this, any defects in the procedure were merely factors by which the jury could measure the weight of the identification testimony. Nor did the court err in allowing the state to introduce the theory of legal accountability at trial when that theory was not listed in the Information. This Court recently held that Montana follows the Illinois rule that "* * * an indictment need not distinguish an act performed by the accused himself and the act of another for which he is legally accountable. I I State v. Murphy, (1977), Mont . , 570 P.2d 1103, 1105, 34 St. Rep. 1174. The judgment is affirmed. JUS tice 4 We Concur: % a d . a 4 Chief Justice