Title: Harrington v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12791
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2020

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SJC-12791 
 
WENDY HARRINGTON  vs.  DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, 
trustee.1 
 
 
May 13, 2020. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
The plaintiff, Wendy Harrington, appeals from a judgment of 
a single justice of this court denying her complaint for relief 
in the nature of mandamus and for extraordinary relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Harrington sought relief from the judgment, 
and from the denial of various postjudgment motions, in the 
underlying declaratory judgment action in which she was the 
defendant.2  We affirm. 
 
Judgment entered against Harrington in the underlying 
Superior Court case on March 31, 2017.  Harrington did not file 
a timely notice of appeal from that judgment.  On April 28, 
2017, she filed a notice of intent to file a motion to vacate 
the judgment, and filed the motion to vacate the judgment on 
                                                          
 
 
1 For Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 
2007-HE1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HE1 
(Deutsche Bank). 
 
2 In 2008, Deutsche Bank foreclosed upon a piece of real 
property owned by Harrington.  Deutsche Bank purchased the 
property at auction in a subsequent foreclosure sale.  
Harrington and Deutsche Bank then negotiated a loan modification 
agreement, which involved rescission of the foreclosure sale and 
reaffirmance of Harrington's mortgage with Deutsche Bank.  
Deutsche Bank brought the underlying declaratory judgment action 
in the Superior Court to enforce the terms of the loan 
modification agreement. 
2 
 
 
 
June 14, 2018.  The motion to vacate was denied on July 31, 
2018.  Harrington filed a motion for reconsideration and a 
motion to recuse on August 24, 2018.  The latter motions were 
denied on August 31, 2018.  Harrington did not file a timely 
notice of appeal from the Superior Court's July 31, 2018, and 
August 31, 2018, rulings. 
 
On December 18, 2018, Harrington filed a "complaint in the 
nature of a petition for a writ of mandamus and to invoke the 
general superintendence power of the Supreme Judicial Court 
[pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3]" in the county court, asking the 
court, among other things, to vacate the March 31, 2017, 
judgment, as she had previously requested in her motion to 
vacate and motion for reconsideration.  In essence, Harrington 
was requesting relief from the March 31, 2017, judgment itself, 
as well as from the Superior Court's orders dated July 31, 2018, 
and August 31, 2018, denying her motion to vacate and her motion 
for reconsideration.  The single justice denied relief on June 
25, 2019, and Harrington timely appealed.3 
 
"Our general superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a 
substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide 
an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process 
has run its course."  Votta v. Police Dep't of Billerica, 444 
Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005).  See, e.g., Brown v. Fed. Nat'l Mtge. 
Ass'n, 481 Mass. 1036, 1037 (2019) (quoting same); Karimpour v. 
Supreme Judicial Court, 448 Mass. 1002, 1002 (2006) (quoting 
same).  The same is true of petitions for relief in the nature 
of mandamus.  See Myrick v. Superior Court Dep't, 479 Mass. 
1012, 1012 (2018). 
 
Here, Harrington had an adequate alternative avenue to 
obtain the relief sought, that is, an appeal to the Appeals 
Court.  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a), as amended, 464 Mass. 1601 
(2013).  She chose not to pursue that avenue, as she did not 
file a timely notice of appeal from the Superior Court judgment 
or from the orders denying her various postjudgment motions.4  
                                                          
 
 
3 Harrington later filed a notice of appeal in the Superior 
Court, but the docket reflects that she did not enter the appeal 
timely in the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 
10 (a) (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1601 (2001), after the record 
had been assembled. 
 
 
4 To the extent Harrington's complaint in the county court 
can be construed as a request for leave to file a late notice of 
3 
 
 
 
"Having failed to avail [herself] of the traditional appellate 
route to obtain an effective remedy, the petitioner is not 
entitled to invoke the extraordinary relief set forth in G. L. 
c. 211, § 3."  Lantsman v. Lantsman, 429 Mass. 1018, 1019 
(1999). 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in 
denying relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Wendy Harrington, pro se. 
 
Christopher Williamson for the defendant. 
                                                          
 
appeal in the Superior Court, Harrington also had an adequate 
alternative avenue to seek such relief, namely, a timely filed 
motion for extension of time in the Superior Court or in the 
Appeals Court.  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), as amended, 378 Mass. 
928 (1979); Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), as amended, 378 Mass. 939 
(1979).