Title: Florida Department Of Financial Services v. John D. Freeman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-1492
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1492 
____________ 
 
 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF  FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
JOHN D. FREEMAN,  
Appellee. 
 
[January 26, 2006] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
The Florida Department of Financial Services (Department) appeals an order 
from the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit granting John D. Freeman’s 
motion for payment of attorney’s fees in excess of the statutory maximum for 
defense counsel’s representation of Freeman for the filing of a petition for writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we vacate the trial court’s 
order and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees 
pursuant to section 27.711, Florida Statutes (2005). 
 
 
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FACTS 
 
This case involves the payment of attorney’s fees to a registry attorney in 
excess of the amounts provided for by statute.  John D. Freeman, a prisoner under 
a sentence of death, appealed to this Court the trial court’s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief.   After briefing and oral argument on the appeal by another 
lawyer, the trial court appointed attorney Frank J. Tassone (Tassone) to represent 
Freeman.  Ten days after this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief, Tassone filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion 
for rehearing.  A motion for rehearing was filed, arguing in substantial part that 
Freeman was entitled to relief based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We 
denied the motion for rehearing, and thereafter Tassone filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court based on the Ring issue he raised in 
Freeman’s motion for rehearing.  The petition for writ of certiorari was denied.   
 
After certiorari relief was denied, Tassone filed a motion in the circuit court 
for attorney’s fees and miscellaneous expenses pursuant to section 27.711, Florida 
Statutes (2005).  The motion sought fees and costs for work performed and 
expenses incurred on and after November 12, 2003; that is, for work on the petition 
for writ of certiorari.  Tassone sought a total of $27,940.74 in fees and costs.  The 
Department argued that the amount requested was unreasonable and should be 
limited to the statutory amount of $2,500 plus applicable costs.  See § 27.711 
 
 
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(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Tassone argued that because he became involved in 
Freeman’s case after the postconviction motion was denied, he did not have a 
working knowledge of the case, and therefore had to review forty boxes of record 
in order to adequately represent Freeman.  The trial court granted Tassone’s 
motion and ordered the Department to pay the fees and costs.  The Department 
filed this appeal, alleging that the circuit court departed from the essential 
requirements of law by refusing to apply the maximum fee limit prescribed by the 
statute. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Section 27.711, Florida Statutes (2005), governs the payment of fees to 
appointed counsel in postconviction capital proceedings, and is the “exclusive 
means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital 
defendant.”  Id. § 27.711(3).  Section 27.711(4) outlines the maximum amount an 
attorney is entitled to be compensated at each stage of the postconviction process.  
Section 27.711(4)(g) is particularly applicable in this case and provides: 
At the conclusion of the capital defendant’s postconviction capital 
collateral proceedings in state court, the attorney is entitled to $100 
per hour, up to a maximum of $2,500, after filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In addition, the attorney may request up to a maximum of $15,000 for approved 
incidental costs, such as investigators.  See id. § 27.711(5).  The attorney may also 
be reimbursed up to $15,000 for miscellaneous expenses, such as copying and 
 
 
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expert witness fees.  See id. § 27.711(6).  Since 1998, this particular subsection has 
provided that expenses exceeding $15,000 that are incurred under extraordinary 
circumstances may be paid at the court’s discretion.  Id.   
 
Tassone submitted to the Department two invoices for fees and costs 
associated with the preparation and filing of the petition for writ of certiorari, 
totaling $27,940.74.  The Department responded that the statute authorized 
payment of only $2,500 for attorney’s fees.  Tassone set the issue for hearing, and 
the matter was heard telephonically.  During the hearing, Tassone explained to the 
judge that he had to review the entire record because he did not represent Freeman 
during the trial, appeal, or postconviction process.  Tassone explained that at that 
time the retroactive application of Ring was a relevant issue and he had to educate 
himself to assess the applicability of such a claim in Freeman’s case.  The judge 
accepted Tassone’s explanation for incurring excessive time and expenses and 
concluded that the hours billed were reasonable.  The judge granted Tassone’s 
motion for fees and costs in its entirety.   
This Court has held that it is within the trial judge’s discretion to grant fees 
beyond the statutory maximum to registry counsel in capital collateral cases when 
“extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist.”  Olive v. Maas, 811 So. 2d 644, 
654 (Fla. 2002).  In Olive, this Court held that fees in excess of the statutory cap 
are not always awarded to registry counsel in capital collateral cases; however, 
 
 
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registry counsel is not foreclosed from requesting excess compensation “should he 
or she establish that, given the facts and circumstances of a particular case, 
compensation within the statutory cap would be confiscatory of his or her time, 
energy and talent and violate the principles outlined in Makemson and its 
progeny.”  Id.; see also Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986). 
Makemson is the seminal case for determining whether appointed counsel in 
capital cases is limited to the compensation provided within the statutory schemes 
set forth by the Legislature.  At issue in Makemson was the constitutionality of a 
statute that set a fee schedule for compensation to attorneys who represented 
capital defendants at the trial and during direct appeal stages.  This Court held that 
the statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but further indicated the statute 
could be unconstitutional if applied “in such a manner as to curtail the court’s 
inherent power to ensure the adequate representation of the criminally accused.”  
Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1112.  This Court then explained that the trial court may 
depart from the statutory fee caps and award excess fees “in extraordinary and 
unusual cases . . . to ensure that an attorney who has served the public by 
defending the accused is not compensated in an amount which is confiscatory of 
his or her time, energy and talents.”  Id. at 1115.  Inadequate compensation could 
create an economic disincentive for appointed counsel to spend more than a 
minimum amount of time on the case and discourage competent attorneys from 
 
 
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agreeing to represent indigent capital defendants.  In effect, such a lack of 
competent attorneys could jeopardize an indigent defendant’s constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of counsel.  While the defendant’s right to effective 
representation was the main focus of the Makemson decision, this Court 
nonetheless reasoned that counsel’s right to fair compensation was inextricably 
intertwined with that right.  Id. at 1112.   
The Makemson rationale, that compensation of counsel and the effectiveness 
of counsel are inextricably intertwined, was applied in the capital collateral context 
in Olive.  That rationale is also expressed in the legislative staff analysis to chapter 
99-221, Laws of Florida, which clearly articulates the Legislature’s concern with 
the fee caps in capital collateral cases.  The legislative history states specifically 
that “where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist, the fees caps established 
by s. 27.711(4), F.S., and increased by the provisions of this bill, do not prevent a 
court from ordering payment above the maximum authorized.”  Fla. S. Comm. on 
Crim. Just., CS for SC 2054, Staff Analysis 7 (March 17, 1999) (on file with the 
comm.); see also Olive, 811 So. 2d at 653; Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 
326, 328 (Fla. 1999) (Anstead, J., specially concurring).   
In this case, the Department does not contest the application of Makemson 
and its progeny to this collateral proceeding.  The Department argues that Tassone 
did not adequately establish that unusual or extraordinary circumstances 
 
 
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sufficiently existed in order to warrant compensation in excess of the statutory cap.  
The trial court granted Tassone’s request for fees in full after hearing a brief 
argument by counsel and over the objection by the State.  The trial court found that 
the $2,500 statutory maximum was not a sufficient amount for attorney’s fees 
incurred in the preparation and filing of the petition for writ of certiorari and the 
reply brief in opposition.  The trial court ordered the Department to pay Tassone 
the total amount of $27,940.74 in fees and miscellaneous expenses and cited to 
section 27.711(4)(a)-(d), (6), Florida Statutes.  In addition, the trial judge 
commented that Tassone has an excellent reputation and he was confident that 
Tassone reviewed the documents he said were necessary in order to represent his 
client competently.  However, no experts testified on behalf of counsel regarding 
such things as the necessity to research and review any particular portion of the 
record for the preparation of the petition for writ of certiorari, what would have 
been reasonable in these circumstances, or whether this case presented an 
extraordinary or unusual situation requiring fees in excess of the statutory amount.   
 
Because the trial court’s decision in a case involving attorney’s fees is based 
upon findings of fact, it will not be disturbed if supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  See, e.g., Sheppard & White, P.A. v. City of Jacksonville, 827 So. 2d 
925, 933 (Fla. 2002) (finding competent, substantial evidence supported the award 
of fees by the trial court); Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice, § 9.6 at 
 
 
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138 (2005 ed.).  Thus, we consider whether there is competent, substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s decision in this case. 
While an attorney assigned to represent a death row inmate for the first time 
at the federal appeal stage may face extraordinary or unusual circumstances 
requiring many hours of work to justify payment in excess of the statutory limits, 
the attorney has the burden of establishing facts in support of such an award.  The 
record in this case, however, provides no evidence upon which the judge could rely 
to determine if extraordinary or unusual circumstances existed to support an award 
of excess fees.  The record in this case consists of only nine pages comprising the 
motion for an order of payment of attorney’s fees, the notice of hearing, the order 
on the motion for payment of attorney’s fees, and the notice of appeal.  While the 
transcript of the hearing includes arguments of counsel, no sworn testimony was 
presented.  There is no discussion of what was contained in the boxes of record or 
how many volumes pertained to postconviction proceedings as opposed to those 
proceedings on direct appeal, etc.  The billings were not verified, there is no 
testimony regarding the propriety of the time submitted in the billings, and there is 
no testimony from any expert as to the extraordinary or unusual aspects of 
Tassone’s representation. 
 
 
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Because there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record to support 
an award of fees in excess of the statutory amounts, we remand this case to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.    
Tassone argues that the statutory scheme for the payment of attorney’s fees 
is unconstitutional as applied to him. This argument was never raised below and 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  See Turner v. State, 888 So. 2d 73, 74 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that constitutional challenge to a statute made for the 
first time on appeal would not warrant reversal of trial court’s ruling).   
Tassone also argues that the statutory fee cap under section 27.711 is 
unconstitutional on its face because all death cases are extraordinary and unusual 
and attorney’s fees should not be capped.  See, e.g., White v. Bd. of County 
Comm’rs of Pinellas County, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 1989) (finding that “all 
capital cases by their very nature can be considered extraordinary and unusual and 
arguably justify an award of attorney’s fees in excess of the current statutory fee 
cap”); see also State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993) (“A facial challenge to 
a statute’s constitutional validity may be raised for the first time on appeal only if 
the error is fundamental.”).  However, this Court has determined that statutory fee 
caps are not facially unconstitutional.  See; Olive, 811 So. 2d  at 654; Makemson, 
491 So. 2d at 1112.  The mere fact that the case is one where the death penalty 
 
 
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could be or has been imposed does not render the statutory limits facially 
unconstitutional.  
CONCLUSION 
While we appreciate the time it takes to effectively prepare for a trial, 
prepare an appeal, prepare and present a motion for postconviction relief, or 
prepare a petition for writ of certiorari in capital cases, and while we understand 
that some cases merit payment in excess of the statutory limits, the justification for 
exceeding those limits must be demonstrated by competent, substantial evidence in 
the record.  Tassone’s justification in support of exceeding the statutory limits was 
incomplete.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s order granting Freeman’s 
motion for attorney’s fees in excess of the statutory limit is not supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and 
remand this matter for a full evidentiary hearing.   
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and 
CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
CANTERO, J., concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurring. 
 
This case demonstrates an unanticipated consequence of the pilot program 
that eliminates funding for the Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel 
for the Northern Region of Florida (CCRC-North)––the costs of replacing counsel 
at an arbitrary point in the proceedings. 
 
Rather than permit former CCRC-North counsel to continue to represent 
Freeman when the office was defunded, the trial court appointed new counsel.1  
The new counsel seeks $28,000 in legal fees and costs for filing a motion for 
rehearing in this Court and a petition for a writ of certiorari on a discrete issue in 
the United States Supreme Court.  Counsel asserts, in explaining the fee request, 
that this amount is justified because he was unfamiliar with the case when he was 
appointed and had to review forty boxes of record to adequately represent 
                                          
 
 
1.  As an aside, counsel in this case was previously involved in litigation in 
this Court arising from the defunding of CCRC-North.  He was appointed in two 
other capital postconviction proceedings over the protests of the defendants who 
expressed the desire that the former CCRC counsel be allowed to continue with the 
representation.  In both Sweet v. State, 880 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2004), and Ferrell v. 
State, 880 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2004), we approved trial court appointments of registry 
counsel rather than the defendants’ former CCRC-North counsel, but remanded for 
the findings required by section 27.710(5), Florida Statutes (2003).  I pointed out 
that “the trial court appointed counsel other than [the defendant’s] CCRC-North 
counsel, with whom [the defendant] had an established and ongoing relationship.” 
Sweet, 880 So. 2d at 578 (Pariente, C.J., concurring); Ferrell, 880 So. 2d at 579 
(Pariente, J., concurring).  Although there may have been good reason to appoint 
this registry counsel over former CCRC counsel in each of these cases, it is surely 
preferable to preserve the ongoing attorney-client relationship whenever possible. 
 
 
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Freeman.  Majority op. at 3.  Had Freeman’s CCRC-North counsel continued to 
represent him, either as part of that agency or as registry counsel, the State would 
not now face a demand by new counsel for such exorbitant fees. 
 
The enactment creating the pilot program and eliminating funding for 
CCRC-North was originally limited to a single fiscal year ending July 1, 2004.  
See ch. 2003-399, § 84, Laws of Fla.  The Legislature subsequently gave the 
project an indefinite extension and directed the Auditor General to provide a 
performance review before the 2007 legislative session.  See ch. 2004-240, § 1, 
Laws of Fla. (codified in § 27.701(2), Laws of Fla. (2005)).  The performance 
review is intended “to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of using attorneys 
from the registry compared to the capital collateral regional counsels,” and “at a 
minimum, shall include comparisons of the timeliness and costs of the pilot and the 
counsels.”  Id. 
 
This case clearly implicates considerations of efficiency, timeliness, and 
costs.  It shows that when a new attorney displaces CCRC, he or she must take 
time to become familiar with the case, and will likely seek to be compensated 
accordingly.  The change in counsel thus decreases efficiency, increases costs, and 
may delay proceedings.  Substitution of private counsel for a state agency can be 
especially problematic if it occurs at or near the time a death warrant is signed.  A 
related concern is a loss in accountability when a state agency is replaced by 
 
 
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private counsel.  Only one registry attorney, often a solo practitioner, is assigned to 
each case.  See § 27.710(6), Fla. Stat. (2005) (providing that no more than one 
attorney may be appointed and compensated to represent a defendant, but allowing 
counsel to designate an assistant).  In contrast, once CCRC is assigned to a capital 
defendant, the office remains responsible for that individual’s representation 
regardless of a turnover in personnel.  Thus, there is institutional accountability to 
the Court for postconviction representation.   
Although it will be difficult for an auditor to measure effectiveness, quality 
of representation is a significant concern in a system staffed solely by counsel who 
are willing to sign up for the registry, knowing its fee caps.  Under section 
27.710(3), Florida Statutes (2005), attorneys who join the registry must agree to 
abide by its terms and conditions, including the ceilings on fees in section 
27.711(4), Florida Statutes (2005).  Some attorneys regard compensation under 
these caps to be inadequate under the circumstances of capital postconviction 
representation.  See, e.g., State v. Demps, 846 So. 2d 457, 457 (Fla. 2003) 
(addressing appeal of fee award by attorney who claimed he was entitled to 
compensation at rate higher than specified in section 27.711(4)).  Further, for the 
registry to be a viable system for competent postconviction representation, counsel 
should have a centralized source of support for research, investigation, and pooling 
of information.  This system is already built into the CCRCs.  
 
 
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Although there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of 
postconviction counsel, the credibility of our death penalty system depends in large 
part on the quality of the attorneys who undertake the representation.  In addition, 
the public has a strong interest in cost-effective representation by the attorneys 
provided to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings.  I urge the 
Legislature to take the factors discussed herein into consideration in assessing 
whether the results of the CCRC-North experiment warrant that the pilot program 
be extended, expanded, or concluded. 
ANSTEAD and CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
 
 
CANTERO, J., concurring. 
I agree to remand this case because the record “provides no evidence upon 
which the judge could rely to determine if extraordinary or unusual circumstances 
existed to support an award of excess fees.”  Majority op. at 8.  I write separately, 
however, in an attempt to offer some guidance on remand about what constitutes 
“extraordinary or unusual circumstances.” 
When we last considered this issue, we held that registry counsel may be 
awarded excess fees when “compensation within the statutory cap would be 
confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talent.”  Olive v. Maas, 811 So. 2d 644, 
654 (Fla. 2002).  Unlike the situation in Olive, however, in this case counsel signed 
 
 
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a contract with the Department of Financial Services in which he agreed to the 
statutory fee schedule.  I do not see how it would be “confiscatory” to hold him to 
the foreseeable consequences of his bargain.  Thus, any compensation above the 
statutory amount should be for work that was unforeseeable when he signed the 
contract.  Moreover, given that the statutory caps at least presumptively apply, 
even if “extraordinary or unusual circumstances” justify additional fees, the 
benchmark for those fees should continue to be the statutory caps, not the market 
rate for the work performed. 
I will first summarize our relevant precedents, up to and including Olive.  I 
will then explain how the attorney’s contract with the Department distinguishes 
this case from Olive.  Finally, I will apply the reasoning in Olive to derive an 
unforeseeability requirement and a rule that awards above the statutory caps should 
be calculated with the caps, not the market rate, as the benchmark. 
A.  The Precedents 
We first opened the door to extra-statutory compensation in Makemson v. 
Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986).  There, an attorney who represented 
an indigent criminal defendant in a first-degree murder trial sought compensation 
above the applicable statutory caps.  See § 925.036, Fla. Stat. (1981).  We held that 
the caps, while not facially unconstitutional, could be “unconstitutional when 
applied to cases involving extraordinary circumstances and unusual 
 
 
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representation.”  Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1110.  In such cases, we said, the caps 
threaten to interfere with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
with the judiciary’s “inherent power to ensure the adequate representation of the 
criminally accused.”  Id. at 1112.  Thus, we concluded that a trial court may depart 
from the caps when necessary to prevent an attorney from being “compensated in 
an amount which is confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talents.”  Id. at 
1115.   
Three years later, we announced that “virtually every capital case fits within 
[Makemson’s] standard and justifies the court’s exercise of its inherent power to 
award attorney’s fees in excess of the current statutory fee cap.”  See White v. Bd. 
of County Comm’rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989).  As we explained, the 
statutory fees for capital cases were at that time “unrealistic,” amounting to little 
more than “token compensation.”  Id. at 1379-80.  To protect the Sixth 
Amendment rights of capital defendants, we authorized additional fees in most 
capital cases. 
 
Both Makemson and White involved the representation of criminal 
defendants at trial and on direct appeal, where they have a constitutional right to 
counsel.  In Remeta v. State, 559 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1990), however, we extended 
this reasoning to executive clemency proceedings, without “reach[ing] the question 
of whether an indigent, death-sentenced prisoner has a state or federal 
 
 
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constitutional right to counsel” in that setting.  Id. at 1135 n.4.  We explained that, 
regardless of whether counsel is constitutionally required, “this state has 
established a right to counsel in clemency proceedings for death penalty cases, and 
this statutory right necessarily carries with it the right to have effective assistance 
of counsel.”  Id. at 1135.  Because the statutory fee cap threatened to undermine 
that right, see § 925.035(4), Fla. Stat. (1987), we held that courts could award extra 
compensation “when necessary to ensure effective representation” and “to prevent 
confiscatory compensation of counsel.”  Remeta, 559 So. 2d at 1135. 
 
Then, in Olive v. Maas, 811 So. 2d at 644, we went even further.  The issue 
there was whether trial courts may award more than the statutory fee caps to 
attorneys representing defendants in the postconviction context.  Of course, we 
have held many times—and have reiterated only just recently—that prisoners 
enjoy no constitutional right to such counsel.  See, e.g., Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 
1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005) (“Under Florida and federal law, a defendant has no 
constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.”).  That right is purely statutory.  
Nevertheless, by a vote of four to three, this Court held that even in such cases 
attorneys may be awarded fees above the caps “where unusual or extraordinary 
circumstances exist.”  Olive, 811 So. 2d at 654. 
The majority in Olive did not base its decision on any constitutional right to 
postconviction counsel.  Instead, it interpreted the statute—or rather, the legislative 
 
 
- 18 -
history of the statute—as allowing for fees exceeding the caps.  The statute 
provided that “[t]he fee and payment schedule in this section is the exclusive 
means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital 
defendant” in collateral proceedings.  § 27.711(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).  Yet the 
majority determined from “the legislative history and staff analysis” that the 
Legislature intended to “accommodate” an implied exception.  Olive, 811 So. 2d at 
654.  Thus, it held that registry counsel “is not forever foreclosed from seeking 
[extra] compensation should he or she establish that . . . compensation within the 
statutory cap would be confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talent.”  Id. 
 
I question this Court’s interpretation of the statute in Olive.  It appears to 
elevate the staff analysis over the statute’s plain text.  As I have previously 
explained, 
[W]here the language is clear, courts need no other aids for 
determining legislative intent.  Even if the language were not clear, 
legislative staff analyses add nothing to an investigation of legislative 
intent.  Staff analyses are not written by legislators but, as the name 
implies, by staff––that is unelected employees.  . . . Another problem 
with relying on a staff analysis is that no evidence exists that any of 
the legislators who voted for the proposed bill even read the analysis, 
much less agreed with it.  . . . The fact is that even if all the legislators 
read the staff analysis of a bill, they could disagree with it and still 
vote in favor of the bill itself.  The only text with which a legislator 
must agree is the text of the bill itself. 
Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 376 (Fla. 
2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
 
 
- 19 -
 
Thus, I am not convinced that Olive was correct.  However, because the 
parties in this case have not asked us to overrule or recede from it, I do not address 
that issue.  Nevertheless, given that Olive represents an extra-statutory remedy, and 
given that the statutory caps should mean something, the award of fees exceeding 
the cap should be determined with the caps in mind.  They should be the 
benchmark.  The exception should be narrow, applied rarely, and exceed the caps 
only to the extent necessary to prevent “confiscat[ing]” the attorney’s “time, 
energy and talent.”  Olive, 811 So. 2d at 654. 
B. The Contract 
 
This case involves the same legal issue as Olive, but is based on different 
circumstances.  In Olive, the attorney refused to sign the standard contract for 
registry counsel, fearing it would handcuff him to the statutory fee schedule.  The 
contract “tracks the language in section 27.711(3)-(4), and incorporates the entire 
compensation scheme by reference.”  Olive, 811 So. 2d at 651.  Signing the 
contract is a statutory requirement: 
Each private attorney who is appointed by the court to represent a 
capital defendant must enter into a contract with the Chief Financial 
Officer. . . . The Chief Financial Officer shall develop the form of the 
contract, function as contract manager, and enforce performance of 
the terms and conditions of the contract.  By signing such contract, the 
attorney certifies that he or she intends to continue the representation 
under the terms and conditions set forth in the contract until the 
sentence is reversed, reduced, or carried out or until released by order 
of the trial court. 
 
 
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§ 27.710(4), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added).  The attorney in Olive had not yet 
accepted an appointment.  With the case in this speculative posture, the majority 
had no opportunity to apply the law to specific facts.  It merely announced, in the 
abstract, that signing the contract would “not forever foreclose[]” the attorney from 
recovering extra fees.  811 So. 2d at 654.  Three dissenters protested that the case 
should have been dismissed for lack of standing, because the attorney “had no 
contract, no client, no case and no real facts to support his various claims.”  Id. at 
658 (Harding, J., dissenting, joined by Wells, C.J., and Quince, J.).   
Unlike the situation in Olive, this case involves real facts.  The attorney here 
did have a client, a case, and a contract with the Department.  Under that contract, 
he agreed to represent a death-sentenced prisoner whose postconviction appeal was 
pending before this Court.  Just after his appointment, we released our decision 
denying relief.  See Freeman v. State, 858 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2003).  The attorney 
responded by, first, moving for rehearing based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), and second, petitioning the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari based on the same issues.  See Freeman v. State, 541 U.S. 1010 (2004) 
(denying review).  For the latter effort, he sought $27,940.74 in fees and costs—
more than ten times the statutory maximum of $2,500 plus costs.  See 
§ 27.711(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The trial court granted the entire amount.  The 
 
 
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attorney now defends that decision as falling within Olive’s “unusual or 
extraordinary circumstances” exception. 
 
As the majority concludes, we lack a sufficient record to determine whether 
this case meets the Olive standard.  Therefore, the case must be remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing.  One issue on remand will be how the attorney’s contract with 
the Department, in which he agreed to a certain fee schedule, affects the analysis.  
We should guide the judge in that determination.  In the following sections, I 
propose two guiding principles, which I derive from Olive: (1) that compensation 
above the statutory fee schedule should be limited to work that was unforeseeable 
at the time of contracting; and (2) that even when courts award additional fees, the 
benchmark for calculating them should remain the statutory caps, not the 
attorney’s market rate.  I will explain each principle in turn. 
1. An Unforeseeability Requirement 
The first principle I derive from Olive is a requirement of unforeseeability.  
Olive held that capital collateral counsel may be paid more than the statutory limits 
when “compensation within the statutory cap would be confiscatory of his or her 
time, energy and talent.”  811 So. 2d at 654.  In cases like this one, where counsel 
has signed a contract with the Department that incorporates the statutory fee 
structure, paying him the contractual rate for the foreseeable work cannot be 
considered “confiscatory.”  I therefore interpret Olive to mean that attorneys who 
 
 
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contract with the Department may be given extra compensation only for work that 
was unforeseeable at the time of contracting.   
We have long recognized that “while there is no such thing as an absolute 
freedom of contract, nevertheless, freedom is the general rule and restraint is the 
exception.”  Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 1958); see also 
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Williams, 17 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 1944) (calling it “a 
matter of great public concern that freedom of contract be not lightly interfered 
with”).  This freedom empowers parties to join together in pursuit of mutually 
beneficial ends.  But it also “includes freedom to make a bad bargain.”  Posner v. 
Posner, 257 So. 2d 530, 535 (Fla. 1972).  Courts may not “rewrite contracts or 
interfere with freedom of contracts or substitute [their] judgment for that of the 
parties to the contract in order to relieve one of the parties from apparent hardships 
of an improvident bargain.”  Quinerly v. Dundee Corp., 31 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 
1947).  The parties are masters of their own contract, and then servants to its 
ultimate terms. 
 
I certainly do not mean to suggest that because attorneys continue to contract 
with the Department, the statutory fee schedule must be adequate.  Quite the 
contrary: I believe that, in most cases, the statutory fees fall far below the market 
rate.  Like the caps that we criticized in White, the caps for registry counsel are 
frequently “unrealistic” and amount to little more than “token compensation.”  537 
 
 
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So. 2d at 1379-80.  But the fact remains that no attorney is ever required to accept 
a registry appointment.  In this case, the attorney, if he found the statutory fee 
schedule insufficient, could have declined the appointment and sought more 
profitable work.  Conversely, the Department has a right to insist upon hiring only 
attorneys willing to accept the fee schedule.  Yet these parties chose to bind 
themselves in what they must have regarded as a mutually beneficial relationship.  
Thus, barring some exception to freedom of contract, they must be held to their 
word. 
 
Olive recognizes a limited exception to freedom of contract for “unusual or 
extraordinary circumstances” where a registry attorney’s contract with the 
Department becomes “confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talent.”  811 So. 
2d at 654.  This standard appears analogous to the commercial frustration doctrine.  
Under that doctrine, the district courts have sometimes offered relief from 
contractual obligations “where the parties could not provide themselves by the 
terms of the contract against the happening of subsequent events.”  Hilton Oil 
Transp. v. Oil Transp. Co., 659 So. 2d 1141, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); see also 
Brink v. Bank of Am., N.A., 811 So. 2d 751, 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (same).  But 
the doctrine “does not apply where the intervening event was reasonably 
foreseeable and could and should have been controlled by the provisions of such 
contract.”  Hilton Oil, 659 So. 2d at 1147; see also Home Design Ctr.––Joint 
 
 
- 24 -
Venture v. County Appliances of Naples, Inc., 563 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1990) (“Even under theories which permit a broader application of the doctrine of 
commercial frustration, the defense is not available concerning difficulties which 
could reasonably have been foreseen by the promisor at the creation of the 
contract.”).  Nor does the doctrine “excuse performance that is not impossible but 
merely inconvenient, profitless, and expensive.”  Valencia Ctr., Inc. v. Publix 
Super Mkts., Inc., 464 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). 
The words used in Olive to describe its exception to freedom of contract––
“unusual,” “extraordinary,” “confiscatory”––also imply a requirement of 
unforeseeability.  The word “confiscatory” is particularly instructive.  To 
confiscate means “[t]o appropriate (property) as forfeited to the government” or 
“[t]o seize (property) by authority of law.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 319 (8th ed. 
2004).  Nothing is forfeited or seized when an attorney receives the contractual 
price for performing foreseeable work that he agreed to perform.  It is a voluntary 
exchange, with benefits and burdens flowing in each direction.   
Under the Makemson line of cases, as with the commercial frustration 
doctrine, the mere fact that the attorney’s bargain proves less profitable or 
expedient than he might have hoped is insufficient to relieve him of his contractual 
obligations.  See Sheppard & White, P.A. v. City of Jacksonville, 827 So. 2d 925, 
931 (Fla. 2002) (“We do not read Makemson to hold . . . that it is unconstitutional 
 
 
- 25 -
to compensate an attorney at a rate that he or she believes will not cover the 
overhead or at a rate that he or she believes is not in line with his or her experience 
or reputation in the community.”) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Unterberger, 
534 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)). 
Thus, Olive strongly suggests that attorneys who sign a contract with the 
Department that incorporates the statutory fee schedule may recover compensation 
above the statutory caps only for work that was unforeseeable at the time of 
contracting.  Unless counsel can show that circumstances have somehow changed 
from the time he signed the contract, and that he should not reasonably have 
anticipated that change, Olive requires that he be held to the terms of his bargain.  
In other words, the attorney must show that the work was unforeseeable, not 
merely unprofitable. 
Here, the attorney may find it difficult to demonstrate that his work was 
unforeseeable.  He initially defended his request for extra compensation by 
explaining to the trial court: 
We got appointed after the denial of the last item in the Florida 
Supreme Court and consequently had to read the 40 boxes of material 
in order to prepare the petition for the writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court.  That’s exactly why it took those many hours. 
While undoubtedly substantial, this work appears to have been entirely 
foreseeable.  The attorney knew it was a postconviction death-penalty appeal, and 
that we had already remanded once for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective 
 
 
- 26 -
assistance claim.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, he 
knew that the record would be large and that, to understand the issues in the case, 
he would need to review both the record and the relevant caselaw.  He also knew 
that the case involved issues of federal law and consequently might be reviewable 
in the United States Supreme Court. 
The issue that the attorney ultimately emphasized in the certiorari petition––
the retroactivity of Ring––also should have been foreseen.  Ring was decided in 
June 2002, more than a year before the attorney accepted the appointment.  We 
began wrestling with its implications almost immediately.  See Bottoson v. Moore, 
833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002); King v. Moore, 831 
So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).  As we have noted, 
“virtually every postconviction appeal filed in this Court since Ring invokes that 
case.”  Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 406 (Fla. 2005).  Thus, assuming the 
attorney studied legal developments related to capital cases, as the statute requires 
registry counsel to do, see § 27.710(1), Fla. Stat. (2005), he should have 
anticipated such a claim. 
While I suspect that most, if not all, of the attorney’s work in this case was 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, the record is simply too sparse to know for 
sure.  The trial court will have to evaluate the issue on remand.  At the very least, 
however, before receiving compensation in excess of the statutory fee schedule to 
 
 
- 27 -
which he agreed, the attorney should be required to identify unforeseen 
circumstances. 
2.  The Caps as the Benchmark 
 
The second principle I derive from Olive is that even where registry counsel 
can show “unusual or extraordinary circumstances” justifying additional fees, the 
statutory caps should remain the benchmark against which further amounts are 
calculated. 
Olive recognized that the Legislature generally intended for the statutory fee 
schedule to act as a ceiling, not a floor.  The schedule is expressly identified as 
“the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a 
capital defendant” in collateral proceedings.  § 27.711(3), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The 
word “maximum” appears in the schedule eleven times, and the statute directs that, 
if desired, counsel should “seek further compensation from the Federal 
Government.”  Id.  Additionally, the statute provides that compensation for 
attorneys who withdraw or are removed from a case “may not exceed the amounts 
specified in this section.”  § 27.711(8), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Therefore, the statute 
itself dictates that, in the vast majority of cases, the fees must conform to the 
statutory caps. 
 
In a small percentage of cases, Olive did authorize additional fees.  Yet 
because Olive was based not on constitutional principles but on the legislative 
 
 
- 28 -
intent behind the statute, the caps and the Legislature’s right to determine them 
remain relevant to the calculation of additional fees.  As I noted earlier, we have 
never held that defendants enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the 
postconviction context.  That right is purely statutory.  The Legislature has granted 
it.  Therefore, the Legislature has full authority to determine its parameters.  In 
other words, because in postconviction cases the Legislature could decide not to 
grant any right to counsel at all, it can also grant a qualified right—a right to 
counsel only at specified rates.  As we have explained, “it is within the 
legislature’s province to appropriate funds for public purposes and resolve 
questions of compensation.”  White, 537 So. 2d at 1379. 
Our decision in Olive recognized as much.  We merely inferred that the 
Legislature had implied an authorization to exceed the caps in “unusual or 
extraordinary circumstances.”  Even in those cases, however, the statutory fee 
schedule remains the most––if not the only––reliable guide to what the Legislature 
regarded as an appropriate level of compensation.  In fairness to registry attorneys 
who accept usual and ordinary cases, and therefore must receive the statutory fees, 
any further compensation should be proportional to the statutory caps and, as Olive 
suggested, should be awarded only to the extent necessary to prevent 
“confiscat[ion]” of the attorney’s “time, energy and talent.”  811 So. 2d at 654.  
This amount will typically be far less than the market rate for the actual time spent 
 
 
- 29 -
on the case.  As we noted in Sheppard & White, 827 So. 2d at 931, it is not 
unconstitutional to compensate an attorney at rates that do not cover overhead or 
are not commensurate with the attorney’s experience or reputation in the 
community.  Therefore, even in exceptional circumstances the statutory caps 
should remain the benchmark against which the ultimate award is calculated.  
This case illustrates how using the caps as a benchmark would differ from 
simply multiplying the attorney’s actual hours worked by a competitive rate.  The 
statute would have capped compensation here at “$100 per hour, up to a maximum 
of $2,500” plus costs.  § 27.711(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Yet the attorney sought, 
and was awarded, $27,940.74.  He arrived at this amount by billing virtually all of 
his work at $100 per hour.  If we were to accept this method of calculation, then 
the fee schedule for registry counsel would effectively become “$100 per hour, 
with no maximum.”  That is neither what the statute says nor what Olive 
authorized.  Rather, Olive implied that the attorney must perform the foreseeable 
work for the statutory rate, and may be given extra compensation only to the extent 
necessary to prevent the confiscation of his unforeseeable efforts.  Accordingly, in 
this case, the trial court should work upward from the statutory benchmark of 
$2,500––not downward from the billed amount of $27,940.74––until it reaches a 
level of compensation that can no longer be considered confiscatory.  
 
 
- 30 -
Without retaining the caps as the benchmark in these cases, we run the risk 
that courts will, contrary to the statutory directive in section 27.711, continually 
increase compensation for registry counsel to keep pace with the cost of living.  
We then run the added risk that the Legislature, seeing its caps regularly 
disregarded, will simply strip capital defendants of any right to counsel in 
postconviction cases.  Although I believe that the statutory caps often do not 
adequately compensate registry attorneys for the valuable work they perform, I 
also believe that the proper mechanism for increasing their compensation is 
through statutory amendment, not through a series of judicial accretions. 
C. Conclusion 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision to remand the case.  On remand, I urge 
the trial court to apply the principles set forth above. 
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Donald R. Moran, Jr., Judge - Case No. 16 1986 CF 11599 A 
 
Richard T. Donelan, Jr. and William J. Thurber, IV, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Frank J. Tassone, Jr. and Rick A. Sichta of Tassone and Eler, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee