Title: Santa Fe Day Spa, LLC v. Brenda Russell a/k/a Brenda Corrigan (Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court: CV-09-1143). Affirmed. No Opinion.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120338
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2014

REL: 02/28/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120338
____________________
Santa Fe Day Spa, LLC
v.
Brenda Russell a/k/a Brenda Corrigan
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-09-1143)
MURDOCK, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(E), Ala. R. App. P.
1120338
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Because I believe that material issues of fact are
evident in the record of this case, I dissent from affirming
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant
Brenda Russell a/k/a Brenda Corrigan.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Richard Cowden and Gail Cowden, owners of the Santa Fe
Day Spa, LLC ("Santa Fe"), hired Corrigan as a hair stylist in
June 2005. She signed a "Non-compete Contract" ("the
contract") in which she agreed not to work in the same
business as the spa within a five-mile radius for one year
after the termination of her employment. In October 2009
Corrigan left the Santa Fe Day Spa to work for RL Salon, a
business located within two miles of the Santa Fe Day Spa.
Santa Fe sued Corrigan seeking liquidated damages of six
months of salary and alleging that Corrigan had violated the
contract, 
including 
converting 
proprietary 
customer
information, and that she had intentionally interfered with
Santa Fe's business relationship with its customers. 
The 
trial
court entered a summary judgment for Corrigan, its only
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reasoning being the conclusory statement that "[Santa Fe] has
not met its evidentiary burden."
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing a summary judgment, we apply the same
standard as did the trial court: Did Corrigan demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and, if so, is she
entitled to judgment as a matter of law? Dow v. Alabama
Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004).
III. Analysis
Section 8-1-1, Ala. Code 1975, generally prohibits
contracts restraining trade with certain exceptions:
"(a) 
Every 
contract 
by 
which 
anyone 
is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind otherwise than is
provided by this section is to that extent void.
"(b) ... [O]ne who is employed as an agent,
servant or employee may agree with his employer to
refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar
business and from soliciting old customers of such
employer within a specified county, city, or part
thereof so long as the ... employer carries on a
like business therein."
Section 8-1-1 does not apply to independent contractors.
Premier Indus. Corp. v. Marlow, 292 Ala. 407, 411, 295 So. 2d
396, 399 (1974). The definition of an 
"independent 
contractor"
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is one whose work is not controlled by the employer. "'For one
to be an employee, the other party must retain the right to
direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well
as the result to be accomplished, or in other words, not only
what shall be done, but how it shall be done.'" 292 Ala. at
411-12, 295 So. 2d at 399 (quoting Odess v. Taylor, 282 Ala.
389, 396, 211 So. 2d 805, 811 (1968)). 
Because evidence in the record indicates that Santa Fe
trained and instructed Corrigan as to how to work with its
customers, whether Corrigan is characterized as an 
employee 
or
an independent contractor is an issue of fact unsuitable for
resolution at the summary-judgment stage. Evidence indicating
that Corrigan was an independent contractor is that she was
paid on a commission basis and that she received an IRS 1099
form, as opposed to a W-2 form. Other evidence indicating that
she functioned as an employee of Santa Fe is that she was
expected to work regular business days and hours and that all
the equipment she used belonged to Santa Fe. Because all
factual inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmovant,
here Santa Fe, on a motion for a summary judgment, the issue
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1120338
whether Corrigan was an independent contractor is one for a
jury to determine under proper instructions.
In my view, Santa Fe also presented substantial evidence
showing that Corrigan had converted proprietary customer
information. According to the affidavit of Richard Cowden, a
security camera recorded Corrigan printing out Santa Fe's
entire customer list and leaving the premises with it. Also,
60% of the calls listed in Corrigan's cellular-telephone
records in the two months after the termination of her
employment were to or from Santa Fe customers. In the six
weeks after the termination of her employment, 34 of her 59
pre-booked appointments at Santa Fe canceled or did not show.
Corrigan claims that the customer information was not
confidential because hair stylists kept "jump journals" with
customer names and styling preferences. But although these
journals recorded customers' names and their styling and
product preferences, the journals did not, according to
evidence in the record, contain telephone and address
information. These facts create a reasonable inference, as
stated in Cowden's affidavit, that Corrigan was "soliciting
clients from information [she had] obtained or gleaned from
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Santa Fe Day Spa business records." See Capital Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Thorough-Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994)
(noting that, in evaluating a motion for a summary judgment,
"the court is to view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party").
At a minimum, genuine issues of fact exist as to whether
Santa Fe's customer information was confidential and whether
Corrigan improperly appropriated it.
IV. Conclusion
Because "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge," Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), I dissent
from the no-opinion affirmance of the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Corrigan.
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