Title: Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971042
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 1998

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
GREGORY M. TWIETMEYER, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 971042 
  JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 February 27, 1998 
CITY OF HAMPTON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Walter J. Ford, Judge 
 
 
This appeal involves the validity of an interim 
ordinance adopted by the City of Hampton to impose a 
stormwater management fee on real property owners.  Gregory 
M. and Rita F. Twietmeyer (the Twietmeyers) refused to pay 
the fee.  They contend that the ordinance does not base the 
fee on a property’s contribution to stormwater runoff, and 
thus, does not comply with the enabling statute, Code § 
15.1-292.4.1  Because the Twietmeyers failed to overcome the 
ordinance’s presumption of validity, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgments against the Twietmeyers. 
I. 
 
Code § 15.1-292.42 authorized local governments to 
adopt stormwater control programs and to impose charges on 
                     
1 This section was originally codified in Code § 15.1-
292.4, but is now codified in Code § 15.2-2114.  For 
purposes of this opinion, references are to the section in 
effect at the commencement of this action. 
    
2 Code § 15.1-292.4 stated in pertinent part: 
 
property owners to finance the cost of the programs.  
Pursuant to Code § 15.1-292.4, the City adopted an interim 
stormwater management fee ordinance, Hampton City Code § 
33.1-16,3 (the Ordinance), which became effective on July 1, 
1993. 
_______________ 
 
Regulation of stormwater. – A. The governing 
body of every county, city or town, by ordinance, 
may adopt a stormwater control program consistent 
with Article 1.1 (§ 10.1-603 et seq.) of Chapter 
6 of Title 10.1, or any other state or federal 
regulation, by establishing a utility or enacting 
a system of service charges.  Any locality which 
administers a stormwater control program may 
recover costs associated with planning, design, 
land acquisition, construction, operation and 
maintenance activities.  Income derived from 
these charges shall be dedicated special revenue 
. . . .   
 
B.  The charges may be assessed to property 
owners or occupants, including condominium unit 
owners or tenants . . . and shall be based upon 
their contributions to stormwater runoff . . . . 
  
3  Section 33.1-16 of the Hampton City Code provides as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
Stormwater management fees. 
(a) Interim flat-rate stormwater management fees 
are hereby authorized for all properties in the 
city of Hampton, regardless of tax exemption, 
with the exception of property owned by the city 
of Hampton or a unit of the city which shall 
receive a full waiver of charges.  The following 
monthly rates shall apply to each month since the 
effective date of this ordinance or the last 
assessment billing, whichever constitutes the 
fewer months: 
 
 
 
 
2
At that time, the Twietmeyers jointly owned seven 
parcels of residential property in the City.  During the 
fiscal year July 1, 1993, through June 30, 1994, the 
Twietmeyers did not pay the stormwater management fees 
assessed by the City on any of their parcels of land.  
Thus, on March 18, 1996, the City filed seven motions for 
judgment against the Twietmeyers in the General District 
Court for the City of Hampton to collect the stormwater 
management fees attributed to or levied upon their parcels.  
In response, the Twietmeyers asserted that the Ordinance 
does not comply with Code § 15.1-292.4.  The general 
district court consolidated the actions and entered 
judgment against the Twietmeyers for $210.  The Twietmeyers 
then appealed to the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton. 
Neither the Twietmeyers nor the City presented any 
testimony before the circuit court.  The Twietmeyers did, 
however, introduce into evidence a Feasibility Study of 
Stormwater Management Financing Alternatives dated April 
_______________ 
Monthly Rate 
 
 
 
Residential Properties 
 
   $ 2.50 
 
 
 
Non-residential Properties 
   $12.50 
 
Residential and Non-Residential (which shall 
consist of all other properties grouped together) 
properties shall be as defined by the city 
assessor. 
 
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13, 1993, and prepared for the City by the consulting firm 
of Black & Veatch (Black & Veatch Study). The Black & 
Veatch Study recommended that the interim fee be based upon 
“equivalent residential units,” that a residential parcel 
be equal to one such unit, and that a commercial parcel be 
equal to five units.  The Study also stated that stormwater 
user fee structures are generally based on such parameters 
as impervious area, percentage of impervious area, gross 
area and intensity of development, or gross area and type 
of development. 
The Twietmeyers again argued that the Ordinance fails 
to assess the fee on the basis of a property’s contribution 
to stormwater runoff as required by Code § 15.1-292.4.  In 
support of their argument, they relied primarily on an 
Attorney General Opinion, which concluded that the 
Ordinance lacks any rational connection between the amounts 
charged and runoff contributions.  Conservation:  Flood 
Protection and Dam Safety – Stormwater Management, 1995 Op. 
Va. Att’y Gen. 91. 
After argument by the parties, the circuit court 
entered seven judgments against the Twietmeyers in the 
amount of $30 each, for a total of $210.  Each judgment 
involves a “matter not merely pecuniary.”  Code § 8.01-672.  
Thus, this Court is not prevented from exercising 
 
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jurisdiction because of the amount of each judgment.  The 
Twietmeyers appeal. 
II. 
Our review of the Twietmeyers’ challenge to the City’s 
Ordinance is guided by established principles regarding an 
ordinance’s presumption of validity: 
Municipal corporations are prima facie the sole judges 
of the necessity and reasonableness of their 
ordinances, and "the presumption of their validity 
governs unless it is overcome by unreasonableness 
apparent on the face of the ordinance or by extrinsic 
evidence which clearly establishes the 
unreasonableness.  This presumption is based upon the 
broad general principle that every intendment will be 
made in favor of the lawfulness of the exercise of 
municipal power.” 
 
Town of Narrows v. Clear-View Cable TV, Inc., 227 Va. 272, 
280, 315 S.E.2d 835, 839-40, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 
(1984) (quoting National Linen Service v. Norfolk, 196 Va. 
277, 279, 83 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1954)). Thus, for the 
Twietmeyers to prevail, the Ordinance must be unreasonable 
on its face, or they must present evidence clearly proving 
its unreasonableness.  We also “accord the trial court’s 
finding a presumption of correctness.”  Tidewater Ass’n of 
Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 241 Va. 114, 
122, 400 S.E.2d 523, 528 (1991). 
 
Applying this standard of review, we first address the 
Twietmeyers’ argument that the Ordinance is facially 
 
5
unreasonable.  They assert that, since the Ordinance 
contains only two categories of fees, residential and non-
residential, and does not differentiate between properties 
within each category on the basis of other factors such as 
impervious area or type of development, the Ordinance does 
not satisfy the mandate of Code § 15.1-292.4(B).  In sum, 
they contend that no correlation exists between the fees 
and a property’s contribution to stormwater runoff.  We do 
not agree. 
Although the Ordinance uses the term “flat rate,” it 
does not charge all properties in the City the same fee.  
Rather, the Ordinance, on its face, imposes a higher fee on 
non-residential property at a ratio of five times the fee 
imposed on residential property.4  Thus, considering the 
Ordinance solely on its face, we find that its fee 
structure is neither unreasonable nor based on some factor 
other than the amount of contribution to stormwater runoff.  
Indeed, the Attorney General, in the opinion relied on by 
the Twietmeyers, stated that “a locality adopting such 
service charges may need to impose an initial schedule of 
                     
4 The City argued that it actually had three 
classifications of property because it adopted a resolution 
in February 1994 that remitted fees charged for undeveloped 
properties, whether zoned residential or commercial.  
However, we base our decision on the two categories 
contained in the Ordinance. 
 
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charges that categorizes properties in some manner that 
only approximates, on an average basis, their respective 
runoff contributions.”  Conservation:  Flood Protection and 
Dam Safety – Stormwater Management, 1995 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 
91, 92.  Because the Ordinance differentiates between 
residential and non-residential property, we conclude that 
the fee charged bears a rational correlation to the amount 
of stormwater runoff. 
The Twietmeyers, nevertheless, argue that our decision 
in Violett v. City Council of Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 23 
S.E. 909 (1896), prescribes a different result.  We do not 
agree.  In that case, Alexandria’s charter provided that 
whenever a street was laid out, paved, or repaved, 
Alexandria could charge two-thirds of the expenses to “the 
owners of the real estate benefitted thereby.”  Id. at 562, 
23 S.E. at 909.  Alexandria, however, assessed property 
owners on the basis of the property’s frontage on the 
improved street.  We framed the question on appeal as: 
[W]hen the Legislature has delegated the 
authority to cities or towns to assess the 
expense on the lots or property benefited, 
whether such a delegation of power limits the 
municipal authorities as to the mode of making 
the assessment, or whether, having such 
authority, they may select the mode of 
apportioning the expense, and impose it by the 
front foot, square foot, or value . . . .   
 
Id. at 577-78, 23 S.E. at 914. 
 
7
 
We concluded that Alexandria’s assessment was invalid 
because the mode of assessment, the property’s frontage on 
the improved street, differed from the mode authorized, the 
property benefited by the improvement.  Id. at 580, 23 S.E. 
at 915.  Unlike the assessment in Violett, the City’s 
Ordinance does not employ an unauthorized mode of 
assessment.  On its face, the Ordinance differentiates 
between residential and non-residential property, and we 
cannot say that the differentiation bears no relation to a 
property’s contribution to stormwater runoff. 
We also find the Twietmeyers’ reliance on authorities 
discussing a municipal corporation’s taxing power to be 
misplaced.  The General Assembly granted the City the 
authority to enact the Ordinance under its police powers.  
The fee is tied directly to the administration of 
stormwater management and is not meant to raise general 
revenue.  Thus, the stormwater management fee is a 
regulation, not a tax.  City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia 
Restaurant Assoc., 231 Va. 130, 134, 341 S.E.2d 198, 200 
(1986); see also Weber City Sanitation Commission v. Craft, 
196 Va. 1140, 1151, 87 S.E.2d 153, 160 (1955) (holding that 
a charge for use and service of water system is not a tax). 
 
8
Finally, we deny the Twietmeyers’ request that the 
Court adopt the Attorney General’s Opinion that the 
Ordinance lacks any rational connection between the amounts 
charged and runoff contributions.  “While [the opinion is] 
entitled to due consideration, [it is] not binding on this 
Court.”  Virginia Restaurant Assoc., 231 Va. at 135, 341 
S.E.2d at 201. 
Since the Ordinance is not facially unreasonable and 
the Twietmeyers did not present any evidence of 
unreasonableness, the presumption of validity governs.  
Town of Narrows, 227 Va. at 280, 315 S.E.2d at 839-40. 
Therefore, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit 
court. 
Affirmed. 
CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL and 
JUSTICE KOONTZ join, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to 
uphold the validity of the ordinance at issue in this case.  
In my opinion, the threshold question to be decided is not 
whether the ordinance is reasonable or unreasonable, as the 
majority posits, but whether, in adopting the ordinance, 
the City of Hampton acted within the bounds of the 
authority granted by the General Assembly in Code § 15.1-
292.4.  Only if the threshold question is answered in the 
 
9
affirmative would the question of reasonableness ever be 
reached. 
 
In my view, the answer to the threshold question 
should be in the negative, and I think the fact that the 
City exceeded its authority appears from the face of the 
ordinance itself.  Code § 15.1-292.4 provides that service 
charges for stormwater control programs assessed to 
property owners and occupants “shall be based upon their 
contributions to stormwater runoff.”  This language clearly 
envisions some sort of individualized treatment of the 
different parcels of land in the city.  Yet, the Hampton 
ordinance authorizes flat rate stormwater management fees 
for all properties in the city.  The flat-rate language 
ignores the concept of individualized treatment and 
disregards the statutory requirement that the charges 
should be based upon contributions to stormwater runoff. 
 
Nor, in my opinion, is the situation saved for the 
City by the fact that different rates are prescribed for 
residential properties and non-residential properties.  The 
flat-rate evil of the assessment permeates the entirety of 
each of the two classes of property, still ignoring the 
concept of individualized treatment and disregarding the 
statutory requirement that the charges should be based upon 
contributions to stormwater runoff. 
 
10
 
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
 
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