Title: People v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99815
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2005

Docket No. 99815-Agenda 15-September 2005. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
JAMES 							S. JOHNSON, Appellant.

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	In December 2003, defendant James "Steven" Johnson was tried
before a jury in the circuit court of Champaign County for the offense
of driving under the influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)
(West 2002). During opening and closing argument, the prosecutor
told the jury that defendant, by refusing to take a breath test, had
failed to prove to the arresting officer that he was not guilty of the
charged offense. The jury found defendant guilty and, in a divided
opinion, the appellate court upheld the conviction. 353 Ill. App. 3d
954. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal and now
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	The facts of this case are undisputed. At about 4 p.m., on
Wednesday, April 30, 2003, defendant met with a group of friends at
the Lake of the Woods Golf Course in Mahomet, Illinois, for his
weekly golf game. One of defendant's golfing friends lived in a home
situated along the golf course, near the sixth hole. Around 5 p.m.
defendant reached the sixth hole and, as was his habit, walked to this
friend's home, where he made himself a mixed drink of rum and cola,
which he then took with him on the course. The golf game finished
sometime around 8 p.m. and defendant then drove to a restaurant and
bar called Hide-Away in the Woods (the Hide-Away), where he and
his golfing friends customarily met for postgame food and drinks and
to "tally up." Defendant stayed at the Hide-Away until about 9:30
p.m. and consumed two more mixed drinks of rum and cola while he
was there. Shortly thereafter, defendant was stopped by an officer of
the Mahomet police department and charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of section 11-501(a)(2) of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2002)).
	Defendant contested the charge and a jury trial was held. At trial,
the prosecutor made an opening statement in which he outlined the
evidence he planned to present. At the end of this statement, the
prosecutor made the following remarks:
			"Finally, I believe you're going to hear that Mr. Johnson
was given the opportunity to prove to the officer that he was
not overly impaired by being offered to take what is called a
breath alcohol test to determine how much alcohol was on his
breath at the time, yet the defendant failed to do so.
			I believe at the end of this we'll have met our burden and
proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Johnson
was under the influence of alcohol and was driving a motor
vehicle in Champaign County at that time, and that influence
of alcohol impaired his ability to do so."
	Defense counsel made no objection to anything the prosecutor
said. After defendant gave his own opening statement, the State
presented its only witness, Mahomet Police Officer David Parsons.
Officer Parsons testified that, on April 30, 2003, at approximately
9:45 p.m., he activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop after he
witnessed the truck defendant was driving move past the center line
into the oncoming lane on three occasions in a 10- to 15-second
period. Defendant responded immediately, appropriately pulling to the
side of the road. Officer Parsons then approached the driver's side of
defendant's vehicle and asked defendant for his license and insurance
card. Officer Parsons testified that he immediately smelled a strong
odor of alcohol, noticed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot, and
detected a slight slurring of speech. In addition, Officer Parsons noted
that defendant gave him a registration card instead of an insurance
card, as requested, although defendant quickly complied once the
error was pointed out. Officer Parsons testified that he asked
defendant if he had been drinking and defendant admitted that he had
"a couple."
	Officer Parsons testified that he asked defendant to exit his
vehicle to take some field sobriety tests. The first test he had
defendant take was the "walk and turn" test. Officer Parsons testified
that he told defendant to listen carefully as he explained the test and
to watch closely as he demonstrated its execution. After he explained
and demonstrated the test, defendant attempted it. Office Parsons
testified that defendant did not follow the instructions-defendant
walked "normally" instead of heel-to-toe, as instructed. Furthermore,
defendant did not turn on one foot or keep his arms at his sides.
According to Officer Parsons, the test permits a person to raise his
arms only 6 inches, but defendant lifted his arms about 14 inches away
from his body in order to maintain his balance. For the above reasons,
the officer regarded defendant's performance a failure.
	Officer Parsons then gave defendant a second test, the "one-leg
stand" test. This test requires the subject to stand on one leg, with
arms to the side, for the count of 30 seconds. After hearing the
instructions and watching Officer Parsons demonstrate the test,
defendant attempted this test but put his foot down after only eight
seconds. Officer Parsons also noted that defendant swayed and lifted
his arms to keep his balance. Accordingly, defendant's performance
on the second test was deemed a failure as well.
	Officer Parsons testified that, because of his observation of
defendant's improper lane usage, because defendant smelled strongly
of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes and slightly slurred speech, and
because defendant failed the two field sobriety tests, he believed
defendant to be impaired by alcohol and, thus, placed defendant under
arrest. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of the squad
car. Officer Parsons noted that defendant commented at this time that
he didn't know why he was being arrested because he was not "that
drunk."
	Officer Parsons further testified that while they sat in the squad
car waiting for a tow truck to come and impound defendant's vehicle,
he asked defendant whether he would be willing to take a breath-alcohol test. He testified that, in conjunction with this request, he read
to defendant the "Warning to Motorists," as required by state law.
The "Warning to Motorists" was then read into the record by Officer
Parsons for the benefit of the jury. Officer Parsons testified that he did
not simply read the warning to defendant, he explained it to him,
informing defendant that even if he "blew over point 8," that is, if he
failed the test by being over the legal limit, his driver's license
suspension would be for a shorter period than if he did not submit to
testing at all.(1) Officer Parsons further explained that the minimum
penalty for a "first offender" is three months' suspension if the driver
takes the test and fails, but six months' automatic suspension if the
driver refuses to take the test. If the driver is not a first offender, the
minimum penalty is one years' suspension if the driver takes the test
and fails, but three years' automatic suspension if the driver refuses to
take the test. Officer Parsons testified that defendant indicated that he
understood the warning, but he declined to take the test.
	Officer Parsons was thoroughly cross-examined by defense
counsel. First it was established that, according to the police report,
defendant was pulled over at 9:46 p.m. and his refusal to submit to the
breath test occurred at 9:55, only nine minutes later. Thus, the field
sobriety tests and explanation of the warning all took place in under
10 minutes. Also, Officer Parsons admitted that he asked defendant to
take the test only once-while defendant was sitting, handcuffed, in the
back of the police car-and he did not give defendant a copy of the
warning when it was read to him. A copy of the warning was provided
to defendant, as required by law, but not until nearly an hour later,
when defendant was in jail. Officer Parsons also acknowledged that he
had received an award one year for making more DUI arrests than
anyone in his police department.
	When cross-examined about his initial observations of
defendant's driving, Officer Parsons admitted that defendant had not
been speeding and, except for crossing over into the other lane, had
operated his vehicle appropriately. Officer Parsons conceded that
when defendant was driving along Oak Street, before he was stopped,
there was a vehicle car in front of defendant and that it was possible
that defendant had been crossing into the other lane to determine
whether it was safe to pass. In fact, this is what defendant told the
officer when he was stopped. However, Officer Parsons insisted that
on at least one occasion, defendant crossed a double yellow line,
where it would have been illegal to pass.
	Officer Parsons was also questioned extensively about the
conditions under which defendant took the field sobriety tests. Officer
Parsons could not remember whether, when conducting the "walk and
turn" test, he used the white line on the shoulder of the road or simply
asked defendant to walk straight along an "imaginary" line. At trial,
all he could remember was what he put in his report-that defendant
did not walk in a straight line. When it was brought to his attention
that, according to the United States Department of Transportation,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the "walk and turn"
test requires a line the suspect can see, Officer Parsons responded that
he was trained that an actual line was not required. Finally, Officer
Parsons admitted that he did not attempt to correct defendant when
he walked at a normal gait and did not place his heel to his toe, as
instructed.
	On redirect, Officer Parsons agreed that there are several
indicators that a person is under the influence of alcohol and that
defendant did not exhibit every indicator. Nevertheless, defendant
crossed the center line three times, smelled strongly of alcohol and had
bloodshot eyes, and failed the field sobriety tests. The combination of
these indicators convinced Officer Parsons that defendant was
impaired.
	After Officer Parsons testified, the State rested its case.
Defendant then presented a number of witnesses in his defense. The
first witness was James Capel, the owner of the home situated along
the golf course and defendant's friend for 15 years. Capel testified that
on April 30, 2003, he played golf with defendant and saw defendant
walk to his home to get a drink at around 5 p.m. After the game,
around 8 p.m., he met up with defendant at the Hide-Away. Capel
testified that he left the restaurant before defendant, at about 9 p.m.,
and, while at the restaurant, remembered seeing defendant have one
mixed drink. Capel also testified that, when he left, defendant was
walking and talking normally. He noted that defendant normally spoke
with a slight slur or mumble, sometimes making it difficult to
understand him.
	The next witness was Daniel Stites, who was the bartender at the
Hide-Away restaurant on April 30, 2003. Daniel knew defendant well
because his parents were good friends with defendant and defendant
was Daniel's landlord. Daniel testified that defendant did not stay long
at the restaurant that night and, as far as he could remember,
defendant had one or two drinks during the time he was there. Daniel
did not remember seeing defendant leave, but testified that defendant
did not appear intoxicated or impaired by alcohol while he was at the
restaurant.
	Defendant's third witness was Jody Gordon. Jody had known
defendant for about five years and her husband had a business
relationship with defendant. She testified that she had attended a
bowling banquet at the Hide-Away on the evening of April 30, 2003,
and, at about 8:15 p.m., spoke to defendant in the bar area for a few
minutes. She testified that, although she did not speak with defendant
again before she left the restaurant at about 9 p.m., she noticed
defendant walking around the bar speaking to other people or sitting
at the other end of the bar area playing a video game. She testified
that defendant "seemed fine."
	The next witness was Miles Stites, Daniel's father and
defendant's friend for over 40 years. Stites had been having dinner at
the Hide-Away on April 30, 2003, when defendant arrived there
between 8 and 8:15 p.m. Stites was typically part of defendant's
golfing group but had not played that day because he was visiting his
sick mother in the hospital. Defendant came over to ask him how she
was doing. Stites testified that he saw defendant get a drink at the bar
and then play a video game. After the video game, defendant came
back to the bar and sat down next to Stites. They left the bar together
at about 9:30 p.m. Stites testified that defendant was walking and
talking normally and did not appear affected by the alcohol he drank.
	The last witness was defendant. With regard to April 30, 2003,
defendant admitted that he had one drink while on the golf course and
two more at the Hide-Away between 8 and 9:30 p.m. Defendant's
testimony then turned to a discussion of the traffic stop. Two
videotapes and a number of photographs of the road where Officer
Parsons first saw defendant and where the traffic stop took place were
identified by defendant and shown to the jury. Defendant admitted that
he crossed the centerline of the road twice, but claimed he did so in an
attempt to look past the vehicle in front of him to determine whether
it was safe to pass. He used the videotapes to show the painted yellow
lines on the road where he crossed the center line, disputing Officer
Parsons' claim that any attempted pass would have been illegal.
Defendant also used the videotapes to show the degree of slope in the
road near where the field sobriety tests were conducted. Defendant
testified that the two drinks he had at the Hide-Away only "relaxed"
him and did not interfere with his ability to function in any way.
	On cross-examination, defendant admitted that, with regard to
the field sobriety tests, Officer Parsons demonstrated and explained
the tests, but that he did not do the test as described because "I wasn't
paying that much attention exactly how he did it. I thought I
understood exactly how I was supposed to do it, so it's, you know,
mind and eyes." Defendant also admitted that alcohol can affect a
person's perception, memory, judgment and recall. Thus, defendant
admitted, because he had alcohol on April 30, 2003, and because he
testified that the alcohol "relaxed" him, the alcohol had some effect
and it was "possible" that his recollection of the night's events were
affected. Finally, defendant admitted that Officer Parsons had read him
the "Warning to Motorist" and that he indicated that he understood.
When it was pointed out that he refused the test knowing that he
would be facing a longer suspension of his driver's license if he
refused, defendant answered:
		"That's not the reason. At the time I was handcuffed in the
back of the car. You know, I just had two drinks. I don't
know legally how the test results with just having two drinks.
I wasn't going to put myself in that position so I declined to
take the test. I was scared. He was not acting in my favor, I
didn't feel."
	The prosecutor restated the question, asking whether defendant
had understood that the penalty would be greater for not taking the
test. Defendant said:
		"At that particular point I just wanted to-no more tests, just
get it over with."
	Following defendant's testimony, the prosecutor gave his closing
argument. The prosecutor began by admitting that "it's pretty clear
that Mr. Johnson was not falling down drunk." However, he argued
that, after jury instructions, it would also be clear that all the State had
to prove was that, as a result of drinking any amount of alcohol,
defendant's mental and physical ability was impaired to the degree that
he was not acting with reasonable care. The prosecutor suggested that
he had met this burden.
	At the close of his argument, the prosecutor stated:
		"Officer Parsons thought that [defendant] was impaired based
on his performance on the field sobriety test, based on the
alcohol that he smelled, based on watching [defendant] drive,
based on the fact that [defendant] gave him the wrong card
initially, gave him a registration card instead of an insurance
card.
			He said, you know what? I am going to give you one more
chance to prove that you're not guilty of this offence. Take
a breath test. You're aware of the penalties that might result
with this test and as a result of not taking it at all.
			You heard Mr. Johnson testify. He understood it. He knew
what he was doing. He refused. He didn't want to take the
risk. He took the stiffest penalty right off the bat. He
wouldn't take the chance to prove it once and for all."
	Defense counsel made no objections to the above remarks and in
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor never made another
reference to defendant's refusal to take the breath test.
	After being instructed, the jury deliberated for about four hours.
It returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of driving while under the
influence of alcohol. Defendant filed a posttrial motion seeking
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) or, in the alternative, a
new trial. At the hearing on the motion, defendant argued that the
evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict as a matter of
law. In the alternative, defendant argued that, because the evidence
was so closely balanced, the prosecutor's improper argument
confused the jurors and, thus, tipped the balance against the
defendant. Defense counsel admitted that the court could find the
error procedurally defaulted because he had not "caught" the error
and failed to lodge an objection at trial. Nevertheless, he argued that
the matter should be reviewed as plain error.
	In response, the prosecutor agreed that the issue was
procedurally defaulted. However, he also argued that, if the court
considered the issue on its merits, the court should find that the
remarks, though admittedly erroneous, were harmless. The prosecutor
urged the court to view the improper remarks in the context of the
entire argument and argued that, when viewed in this context, it was
clear that the remarks could not have affected the verdict.
	The trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion. The court
agreed that the prosecutor's remarks were error. Indeed, the court
found them to be an error of "[c]onstitutional magnitude." The trial
court stated that, had an objection been made, the error would have
been cured by a strongly worded admonishment to the jury. The court
also agreed that the evidence was "closely balanced." Nevertheless,
the trial judge, admitting that he was "by no means confident of [his]
position," held: "I am not convinced that a fair trial was so subverted
by the comments as to require the Court to grant the post-trial
motion." The judge noted that the error was not "overly emphasized,"
having been mentioned in a couple of lines. Accordingly, defendant's
posttrial motion was denied. Defendant appealed.
	As noted earlier, the appellate court reviewed the matter and, in
a divided opinion, upheld the verdict. First, the court rejected
defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient, holding that,
although defendant had proffered reasonable explanations for most of
his actions, his evidence "was not so strong that we can conclude that
no rational trier of fact could have convicted defendant in this case."
Next, the reviewing court held that the prosecution's opening and
closing remarks were not plain error. In fact, the appellate court held
that the prosecutor's remarks were not error at all. The court held that
"evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a breath test is relevant and
admissible" and the prosecutor's statements "drew a legitimate
inference from the evidence that was properly admitted during the
trial." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 958. One justice dissented. He believed that
the prosecutor's remarks were error and sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a new trial. 
	Defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal, which we
granted. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	In the appeal to this court, two issues are raised: (1) whether
defendant is entitled to a new trial because comments made by the
prosecutor in opening and closing argument constitute plain error, and
(2) whether defendant is entitled to a new trial because his trial
counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.
	With respect to the first issue, defendant argues that the appellate
court erred when it held that it was not improper for the prosecutor
to have told the jury, in his opening statement and closing argument,
that defendant failed to prove his innocence to the police officer by
refusing to take the breath test. Defendant contends that the
prosecutor's remarks created the inference that he had a duty to prove
he own innocence and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to him.
Defendant argues that reversal is required, despite his counsel's failure
to object, because the evidence was closely balanced and the error
denied him a fair trial.
	Similarly, in his second issue, defendant contends that, because
the prosecutor's remarks shifted the burden of proof and denied him
a fair trial, he was unfairly prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object
to the remarks. Accordingly, defendant contends he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
	Initially, we note that because defendant did not object to the
prosecutor's remarks at trial, any issue concerning the propriety of the
prosecutor's comments has been procedurally defaulted. People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (both a trial objection and a
written posttrial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an
issue for review). However, as this court recently noted in People v.
Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005):
			"[T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture
principles and allows a reviewing court to consider
unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close,
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is
serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence."
In the case at bar, defendant contends that review for plain error,
pursuant to the plain-error doctrine, is warranted because the evidence
at trial was closely balanced. We agree that, at trial, defendant
presented evidence which tended to refute much of the State's
evidence showing defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Thus,
we agree that review under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine
is warranted, despite the procedural default. Accordingly, we shall go
on to consider whether the prosecutor's remarks resulted in plain
error, that is, whether the comments were sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant reversal. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d  at 187 ("[i]n the first instance,
the defendant must prove 'prejudicial error' "); People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 623 (2000) (plain errors are reversible errors).
	One issue is at the core of both of defendant's claims-whether the
prosecutor's remarks were, in fact, improper. Clearly, there can be no
plain error if there is no error (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d  at 184; Sims, 192
Ill. 2d at 621) and, since an attorney's performance is ineffective only
if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness (People v.
Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004)), counsel cannot be deficient if he
fails to object to remarks which are not improper. Thus, before we can
determine whether there was plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel, we must first decide whether there was error.
	As noted above, the appellate court majority found that the
prosecutor's remarks were not error but, rather, legitimate inferences
drawn from properly admitted evidence. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 958. One
justice disagreed; he found the remarks to be error and believed that
the majority's ruling "sets a dangerous precedent." 353 Ill. App. 3d at
960 (Turner, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice was concerned that,
if such remarks were held to be proper, prosecutors would be
encouraged to argue, in all cases in which a driver refuses to submit
to testing, that the driver failed to prove his innocence to the police
officer who offered the test, thereby subverting the bedrock principle
that the State has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and that a defendant is never bound to prove himself innocent. 353 Ill.
App. 3d at 959-60.
	We agree with the prosecutor, the trial court judge, and the
dissenting appellate justice and find that the remarks made in opening
and closing argument, which suggest that defendant failed to prove his
innocence to the police officer by failing to take the breath test, were
improper and that, as a result, error occurred. It is true, as the
appellate court held, that evidence of a person's refusal to take a test
designed to determine the person's blood-alcohol content is admissible
and may be used to argue the defendant's consciousness of guilty. See
People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill. 2d 137, 141 (1984) (because a
driver has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test and may be
compelled by the State to take such a test, evidence of the driver's
refusal to take such a test does not violate the self-incrimination
privilege and may properly be admitted at trial); People v. Garriott,
253 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1052 (1993) (section 11-501.2(c) of the Code
provides that evidence of a refusal shall be admissible at trial of a DUI
and, thus, the legislature has determined that evidence of such a
refusal is relevant as circumstantial evidence of the driver's
consciousness of guilt). However, we believe, as did the dissenting
appellate justice, that the argument complained of in the case at bar
goes beyond such legitimate purpose and "blur[s] the distinction
between the defendant's state of mind and the State's burden of proof
and thus should not be permitted." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 960. Moreover,
like the trial judge in the case at bar, we feel strongly that the
argument here, which implied that defendant might have proven his
innocence by submitting to a breath test, is in conflict with the
constitutional principle that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty.
This type of argument should not be countenanced.
	That having been said, our finding that the prosecutor's remarks
were improper does not end our inquiry. An error, even one affecting
constitutional rights, does not necessitate reversal in every instance.
" '[T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless ***.' "
(Emphasis omitted.) Girot v. Keith, 212 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (2004),
quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705,
709, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). The question, then, is whether, in the
case at bar, the improper remarks made in opening and closing
argument were sufficiently prejudicial so as to require reversal.
	Addressing this question, we recall that any statement must be
considered in the context of the closing argument as a whole (People
v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 225 (2004)), and "[a] reviewing court will
find reversible error based upon improper comments during closing
arguments only 'if a defendant can identify remarks of the prosecutor
that were both improper and so prejudicial that "real justice [was]
denied or that the verdict of the jury may have resulted from the
error" ' " (Evans, 209 Ill. 2d  at 225, quoting People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 247-48 (1993), quoting People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 533
(1983)).
	We are mindful, too, that it is defendant who bears the burden of
persuasion on this issue. As noted in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), plain-error analysis requires the same kind of inquiry as
does harmless-error review. In both instances the crucial issue is
whether the error is so substantial that it undermines our confidence
in the jury verdict. But where the defendant has made a timely
objection and the reviewing court must decide whether the preserved
error was harmless, the State " 'bears the burden of persuasion with
respect to prejudice.' " Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d  at 363, quoting United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 520, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993). On the other hand, where, as here, the
defendant has failed to make a timely objection, a plain-error analysis
applies and " '[i]t is the defendant rather than the [State] who bears
the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.' " Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d  at 363, quoting Olano, 507 U.S.  at 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d  at 520, 113 S. Ct.  at 1778.
	In the case at bar, the State contends that defendant has not met
his burden of persuasion because the prosecutor's improper
comments, when viewed in the context of the arguments as a whole,
did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. We agree.
	The prosecutor did not rely on the fact that defendant did not
take the breath test to prove his case against defendant. The State's
witness, Officer Parsons, testified that he stopped defendant after he
observed defendant move into the on-coming lane on three occasions
and, after stopping defendant, he noted that defendant smelled of
alcohol, had slightly slurred speech, failed to produce his insurance
card when first requested, and failed two sobriety tests. Defendant
admitted, and his own trial witnesses confirmed, that defendant had at
least two alcoholic drinks shortly before his arrest. In addition, when
cross-examined at trial, defendant admitted that the alcohol he had
consumed on the night in question had "relaxed" him and, for that
reason, his own recall of the night could have been affected.
	In closing argument the prosecutor repeated what he had said in
his opening argument, i.e., that defendant had an opportunity to prove
his innocence by taking a breath test, but refused. This comment,
though improper, was brief, amounting to only a few lines of the 15-page transcribed argument. Moreover, the notion that defendant
"failed to prove his innocence" was not stressed. The prosecutor
began and ended his closing argument by explaining to the jury the
State's burden of proof. The prosecutor admitted that the evidence
showed that defendant was not "falling down drunk," but argued that
it was not necessary to prove that defendant was "falling down
drunk," only that defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The
prosecutor painstakingly reviewed all of the evidence, pointing out the
many signs of impairment that had been shown. It is noteworthy, too,
that the fact that defendant did not take the breath test was never
mentioned in rebuttal closing argument.
	Having considered the prosecutor's improper remarks in the
context of the closing argument as a whole, we find that defendant has
failed to persuade us that the verdict would not have been the same
had the improper remarks been omitted. We find that the prosecutor's
improper remarks were not so prejudicial that real justice was denied.
We are convinced that the jury verdict was unaffected by the improper
comments. We conclude that defendant was not deprived of a fair
trial, that no plain error occurred, and, thus, reversal is not warranted.
	For similar reasons, we also find that reversal in not required due
to ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are judged according to the two-prong, performance-prejudice test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2004); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27
(1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must prove not only that
defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, but also that this substandard performance caused
prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the trial result would have been different. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219-20 (2004).
	In the case at bar we have already determined that the
prosecutor's comment's were improper. It follows that defense
counsel erred by failing to lodge an objection to the remarks.
Nevertheless, even if counsel's failure to object amounts to deficient
performance, we do not find that defendant was sufficiently prejudiced
by this deficient performance. As we have already concluded, the
prosecutor's improper closing remarks did not deny defendant a fair
trial. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
failure to object, the result of the trial would be different. We
conclude, therefore, that defendant has not sustained his claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and, accordingly, reversal on
this basis is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	Although I agree with the court that the prosecutor's comments
were improper, I cannot agree with the conclusion that a new trial is
unwarranted in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
	As the court correctly notes, the error which occurred in this case
conflicts with the constitutional principle that a defendant is innocent
until proven guilty. Slip op. at 12. Therefore, in accordance with
California v. Chapman, the question we must answer in determining
if a new trial is required is whether, absent the constitutional error, "it
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned
a guilty verdict." People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 269 (1992). After
reviewing the evidence in this case and the complained-of argument,
it is not clear to me, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury verdict
was unaffected by the improper comments.
	The impropriety of the comments at issue stems from the fact that
they "reasonably could confuse the jury regarding the presumption of
innocence and burden of proof." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 960 (Turner, J.,
dissenting). The effects of juror confusion in cases like this, where this
court acknowledges the closeness of the evidence, are not readily
discernible. For this reason, I find that it is impossible to say with
certainty that the error did not help to sway the jury to a finding of
guilty as opposed to a finding of not guilty. The record reveals that
defendant called four witnesses who were with him before his arrest,
each of whom disputed that defendant displayed the signs of
intoxication allegedly observed by Officer Parsons. Defendant testified
that he did not cross the center of the road because of intoxication,
but rather because he was trying to assess whether he could safely
pass the car in front of him. Officer Parsons admitted that a car was
in front of defendant at the time he pulled him over, but that it was
illegal to pass in that area. Defendant presented the jury with
videotapes of the road where the arrest occurred, which established
that passing in that area was, in fact, legal. Given the nature of this
and the other conflicting testimony adduced at trial, I cannot discount
the possibility that the jury could have used the improper remark to tip
the balance in favor of the State. In any case, I cannot say with
certainty that the jury did not use the improper remark in that way. 
	Finally, the court's conclusion that the error was harmless does
much to dilute its recognition of the impropriety of the remark in the
first place. If making such a remark is deemed harmless in a case like
this, where the defense has successfully damaged the credibility of the
arresting officer-the sole witness for the prosecution-with videotaped
evidence, I cannot fathom under what circumstances this error will
ever be deemed harmful enough to warrant a new trial. In my opinion,
this kind of result leaves little incentive for the State to avoid making
the improper remark in future cases. 
	Thus, for the all of the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting upon denial of rehearing:
	I respectfully dissent from the court's order denying rehearing in
this case. I write separately in order to explain why I believe rehearing
should be granted.
	Defendant's position in this matter has been hampered by his
procedural default of the issue regarding the prosecutor's remarks.
Defendant's attorney did not properly preserve the issue because he
neither objected to the comments at trial nor did he include the matter
in the posttrial motion. Under our plain error rule, a defaulted issue
will only be recognized if the evidence is closely balanced or the error
is so serious that it erodes the integrity of the judicial process and
undermines the fairness of the defendant's trial. See People v. Herron,
215 Ill. 2d 167, 185-86 (2005). The court acknowledged in its opinion
that the evidence in this case was close. Thus, defendant has satisfied
the first prong of the plain error rule. I also believe that defendant has
satisfied the second prong of the rule, as well. As the court itself
states, "we feel strongly that the argument here, which implied that
defendant might have proven his innocence by submitting to a breath
test, is in conflict with the constitutional principle that a defendant
is innocent until proven guilty." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 12.
	I remind my colleagues that the constitutional presumption of
innocence "lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 39 L. Ed. 481, 491,
15 S. Ct. 394, 403 (1895). On this record, we do not, and cannot,
know the effect the prosecutor's remarks had on the jury's
deliberations. However, I submit that an argument that has the
potential to confuse the jury about the presumption of innocence and
the State's burden of proof strikes at the core of our criminal
jurisprudence and serves to compromise any verdict of guilt rendered
by that jury. In this case, it is difficult to have any confidence in the
verdict because it was reached by a jury that was given mixed
messages on the burden of proof, which in turn negatively impacted
upon defendant's constitutional right to the presumption of innocence.
Given the critical importance of the presumption of innocence in our
criminal justice system, I believe that it is questionable that this kind
of error can ever be found harmless, even in a case where the evidence
is overwhelming. However, this was not a case of overwhelming
evidence. To the contrary, this was a closely balanced case, as the
court recognized, and for that reason, it simply is impossible to say,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that "the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 711, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). My
colleagues' continuing failure to recognize these principles establishes
a troubling precedent that allows prosecutors to denigrate the
constitutional presumption of innocence with impunity.
	For these reasons, I would grant rehearing in this case and
respectfully dissent from the court's order denying defendant's
petition.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
 1Officer Parsons may have misspoke, or his testimony may have been 
incorrectly transcribed. Section 11501(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code prohibits a 
person from driving if the alcohol concentration in his or her breath is 0.08 or 
more, not 0.8 or more, as Officer Parsons' testimony seems to indicate.