Title: Knight v. Grimes
Citation: 127 N.W.2d 708
Docket Number: 10072
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 1964

127 N.W.2d 708 (1964) W. W. KNIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. J. W. GRIMES, Chief Engineer and Executive Officer of South Dakota State Water Resources Commission and the following named persons, as members of said Commission, to wit: Albro Ayres, E. M. Brady, Lester Brue, Carol Cronin, Lauren A. Davis, Stanley A. Johnson and John Sutton, Defendants and Respondents. No. 10072. Supreme Court of South Dakota. April 21, 1964. Rehearing Denied May 20, 1964. W. W. Knight, pro se. Frank L. Farrar, Atty. Gen., Walter Weygint, Alan Williamson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre, for defendants and respondents. BANDY, Circuit Judge. In an action seeking a declaratory judgment the plaintiff, as the owner of land overlying ground water, attacks the constitutionality of Chapters 430 and 431 of the Laws of 1955. (Now, respectively, SDC 1960 Supp. 61.01 and 61.04) He contends that these acts violate the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and sections 2 and 13 of Article VI of the South Dakota Constitution. Upon full consideration of the matter the trial judge dismissed the action. In so doing he recognized plaintiff's vested right to irrigate four acres of land by reason of prior appropriation. Many procedural questions have been raised, but as we do not consider them material to disposition of the case we proceed directly to the determinative issues. The Desert Land Act, Ch. 107, 19 Statutes at Large, 377 (43 U.S.C.A. § 321) became effective in 1877. The patents for the land involved herein were issued in 1882. They carried with them no water rights. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 55 S. Ct. 725, 79 L. Ed. 1356. In fact, on the oral argument the plaintiff conceded that the rights he claims arose under territorial and state law. We proceed on that theory. At and prior to the issuance of these patents the matter of "water rights" had been fixed by statute in Dakota Territory. By section 255 Revised Civil Code of 1877 it was provided: By the year 1955 this statute, through a series of amendments had been modified to read in SDC 61.0101 as follows: Chapter 430, Laws of 1955 expressly repealed SDC 61.0101 and substituted in lieu thereof a statute containing the following provisions: The remainder of the chapter concerns itself with procedures relating to "waters flowing in definite streams". Chapter 431, Laws of 1955 expressly repealed the provisions contained in SDC 61.04, which had been headed and described as "Regulations as to Wells", and which specifically described and referred to artesian wells. This new SDC 1960 Supp. 61.04 is particularly directed to ground water, therein described as "`Ground water', under the surface, whatever may be the geologic reservoir in which it is standing or moving". It defines vested rights as being: By SDC 1960 Supp. 61.0404 it is provided: Apparently desiring to directly involve both Chapters 430 and 431, Laws of 1955 the plaintiff offered to stipulate that both well defined streams and percolating waters were to be found under different areas of his land. The defendants declined this offer and presented evidence from which the trial judge, erroneously, we think, found that the waters under the plaintiff's land constitute a definite stream. We believe that the record shows only percolating waters to underlie the plaintiff's land. With relation to water rights, three situations could exist: (1) Where the common law had not been applied. (2) Where the common law had *711 been applied. (3) Where a statute had been enacted. Clearly, the third situation exists here and is highlighted by prior opinions of this court, particularly St. Germain Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 1913, 32 S.D. 260, 143 N.W. 124. The question, squarely presented, is as to whether the legislature may, without compensation, abolish the rule of (so-called) absolute ownership of unappropriated percolating waters and substitute the doctrine of appropriation for beneficial use under state supervision? Beyond doubt there has been an invasion of a pre-existing right or interest. It seems desirable to clearly focus on the nature of this right or interest. The notion that this right to take and use percolating water constitutes an actual ownership of the water prior to withdrawal has been demonstrated to be legally fallacious. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 1862, 43 N.H. 569, 82 Am.Dec. 179; Katz v. Walkinshaw, 1902, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663, 64 L.R. A. 236; Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 1900, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729. In fact this was recognized by this court in Metcalf v. Nelson, 1895, 8 S.D. 87, 65 N.W. 911, wherein it wrote: Likewise, this court in Deadwood Central R. Co. v. Barker, 1901, 14 S.D. 558, 86 N.W. 619, perceived that the rule was adopted to protect the landowner in the use of his own land and not as a statement of property rights in percolating water, saying: It should be noted that Section 265 of the 1877 Revised Civil Code pertaining to this matter provided: South Dakota is largely a semi-arid state. The legislature was fully justified in finding that the public welfare requires the maximum protection and utilization of its water supply. Borrowing the language of the court in Southwest Engineering Co. v. Ernst, 1955, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764, involving the constitutionality of a somewhat similar statute, the court wrote: As is summarized in 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, at page 1009 thereof: In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 1908, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828, it was written: The scope of this power is summarized in 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 302 in this language: Without intending to cast doubts on the sufficiency thereof, it is observed that the procedural portions of Chapters 430 and 431, Laws of 1955, have not been called into question and are not here before the court. The rule as to eminent domain is thus epitomized in 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6, at page 784 thereof: *714 Being convinced that the legislature was justified in believing that the public welfare requires conservation and preservation of the water supply of the state, that it is not required that irreparable damage be done before action can be taken to conserve and preserve, and that it has not been shown that the regulations adopted are unreasonable or arbitrary, the order of the trial court dismissing such action is affirmed. BIEGELMEIER, P. J., and RENTTO, HANSON and HOMEYER, JJ., concur. BANDY, Circuit Judge, sitting for ROBERTS, J., disqualified. [1] For those interested in further applications of the police power, attention is directed to Territory v. O'Connor, 1889, 5 Dak. 397, 41 N.W. 746, 3 L.R.A. 355; Nebbia v. New York, 1934, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469; State v. Finney, 1944, 65 Idaho 630, 150 P.2d 130; State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 1949, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 1921, 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, 23 A.L.R. 1322; Baumann v. Smrha, D.C., 145 F. Supp. 617; Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 1933, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5. Water rights and ground water legislation has been the subject of many law review articles, among them being those in 30 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 416; 1 Kan.L.Rev. 125; 11 Okla.L.Rev. 26; 22 Mont.L.Rev. 42; 38 N.D.L.Rev. 243 and 42 Neb.L.Rev. 721.