Title: Leonard L. Jones v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP003306
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3306 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In re the Return of Property in: State of  
Wisconsin v. Leonard L. Jones: 
 
Leonard L. Jones,  
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Respondent.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  217 Wis. 2d 293, 577 N.W.2d 389 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 3, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Jack F. Aulick 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Prosser, J. concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins dissent 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Colleen D. Ball and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & 
Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Colleen D. Ball. 
 
 
For the respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Kenneth M. Farmer, assistant district attorney. 
 
No. 97-3306 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3306 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Return of Property in: State of  
Wisconsin v. Leonard L. Jones: 
 
Leonard L. Jones,  
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  Leonard L. Jones seeks review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision1 which affirmed the circuit 
court’s order denying his request for return of $1,783 in cash 
which was seized, along with various drug paraphernalia under 
the Uniform Controlled Substance Act (UCSA),2 during a search 
incident to his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated (OWI).  This case presents two issues for our 
review: 
                     
1 Jones v. State, No. 97-3306, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1998), was decided by a one-judge panel 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(g)(1995-96).   
2 The Uniform Controlled Substances Act is contained in ch. 
961 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  All statutory references are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 97-3306 
2 
(1)  If property is seized pursuant to a search that leads 
to a charge of a violation of the USCA, and the state has not 
initiated forfeiture proceedings, may an interested party seek 
return of the property under Wis. Stat. § 961.55.  We conclude 
that the legislature intended that the return of property 
provision 
in 
§ 961.55(3) 
can 
only 
be 
triggered 
by 
an 
unsuccessful forfeiture action brought by the state.  In all 
other situations where the state has not initiated a forfeiture 
action, we conclude that a person claiming the right to property 
seized by the authorities is limited to the procedures set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 968.20. 
(2)  If the interested party brings an action for return of 
property 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20, 
is 
cash 
considered 
“contraband” within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1), 
particularly when the charge arising out of the property seized 
during the search is ultimately dismissed?  When the state has 
not instituted forfeiture proceedings and an interested party 
seeks return of seized property under § 968.20, we conclude that 
in order to retain the property, the state must establish that 
the property is either contraband or is needed as evidence in a 
case.  For property alleged to be contraband, the state must 
establish a logical nexus between the seized property and 
illicit behavior on the part of the petitioning property owner. 
 If the property is found to be contraband, then the property 
need not be returned whether criminal charges are ultimately 
filed or not.  Even though the circuit court mistakenly placed 
the burden on the defendant to show whether the cash was or was 
No. 97-3306 
3 
not contraband, we conclude that based on the evidence of 
record, this error was harmless.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
I. 
 
¶2 
The facts are undisputed.  According to the testimony 
of Madison Police Officer Kevin Linsmeier, he received a report 
of a vehicle parked curbside on Moland Street with its engine 
running.  At the scene, he found an individual, later identified 
as Jones, seated in the driver’s seat and non-responsive.  After 
repeated knocking on the window, Jones eventually rolled the 
window down, but would not exit the vehicle.  Linsmeier 
testified that Jones’ speech was slurred, he smelled of 
intoxicants, 
and 
his 
eyes 
appeared 
glassy 
and 
dilated.  
Linsmeier believed Jones was impaired and not free to leave, so 
he threatened to break the window if Jones would not exit the 
vehicle.  Jones chose to exit the vehicle; in the process, 
Linsmeier observed him lean on the vehicle to maintain his 
balance.  Jones refused Linsmeier’s request to submit to several 
field sobriety tests.  Consequently, Linsmeier placed him under 
arrest for OWI.  
 
¶3 
Linsmeier then conducted a search of Jones and the 
vehicle incident to that arrest.  Linsmeier uncovered $1,783 in 
No. 97-3306 
4 
cash on Jones3 and he uncovered a small scale, six cigarette 
lighters, and  three pieces of charred “Chore-boy” scouring pads 
within the vehicle.4  According to Linsmeier, the “Chore-boy” is 
regularly used in a crack pipe for ingesting crack cocaine and a 
scale is a common tool that drug dealers use to measure their 
drugs for selling.  Linsmeier indicated that he did not find any 
drugs, nor did he witness an actual drug transaction. 
 
¶4 
Linsmeier testified that based on his training and 
experience, he believed the money was drug-related.  Linsmeier 
stated that crack cocaine is most often purchased as “a 20” with 
a $20 purchase price.  He further indicated that the “wads” of 
cash found on Jones are indicative of drug dealing:  “a lot of 
people that deal drugs will have their money in one part of 
their body, drug money in other parts, and then a lot of them 
want to know like exactly how much is on them so they will have 
it in set amounts like the thousand dollars in $20 bill[s].”  
Linsmeier confiscated the cash and property found in the search. 
                     
3 Linsmeier found five separate “wads” of money, three in 
Jones’ pants pocket and two in his fanny pack.  Each wad 
consisted of evenly folded bills, all facing the same direction: 
 three wads contained all $20 bills totaling $1,000, $180 and 
$60, respectively; another contained $414 in ones, fives, tens, 
twenties and one fifty; and one wad contained $129.  When asked 
where the money came from, Jones responded that it was a 
“refund.”     
4 The amended complaint also lists a “crack pipe” made out 
of a small liquor bottle and coated with a “black filmy residue” 
as being found in the vehicle.  The “crack pipe,” however, is 
not referenced anywhere else in the record nor was it mentioned 
during Linsmeier’s testimony. 
No. 97-3306 
5 
 
¶5 
Jones was subsequently charged in Madison Municipal 
Court with operating while under the influence of an intoxicant 
or controlled substance.  The court apparently entered a default 
judgment against Jones for that charge.5   
 
¶6 
Jones was also charged in Dane County Circuit Court 
with possession of drug paraphernalia as a repeater in violation 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.573(1) and 939.62.  Jones filed a 
handwritten motion for return of all money and property 
confiscated 
from 
him, 
and 
for 
dismissal 
of 
the 
drug 
paraphernalia charges on the grounds that Linsmeier lacked 
probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle.    
¶7 
Based on the undisputed testimony of Linsmeier, Dane 
County Circuit Court Judge Jack F. Aulik denied the motion.  
After finding the arrest and search to be valid, the circuit 
court then addressed the seized money:  “Whether or not [the 
money] constitutes contraband depends on a finding that it is 
property that is either used in the commission of a crime or is 
the result of the commission of a crime.”  The court noted that 
the items found in the vehicle (the scale), and on Jones (the 
Chore-boys), 
are 
generally 
used 
in 
either 
the 
use 
or 
distribution of cocaine.  Because Jones offered nothing in 
support of his burden to prove the money was not contraband, the 
                     
5 Jones’ municipal OWI conviction is not before this court 
on review.  It is unclear from the record before us what 
transpired in municipal court other than the fact that the 
conviction was entered by default judgment.   
No. 97-3306 
6 
court concluded that it was contraband and subject to forfeiture 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.20.   
¶8 
In a July 2, 1997, order, the circuit court denied 
Jones’ motion and ordered that the $1,783, which was found to be 
contraband, be forfeited to the School Fund when no longer 
needed as evidence.  The drug charges were subsequently 
dismissed by the State because Jones had received a 12-year 
prison sentence on another pending case.  Jones appealed the 
circuit court’s order.   
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
denial of Jones’ motion.  The court reasoned that the money was 
seized as a result of a search incident to arrest and under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20, the property must be returned only if Jones 
established his right to possession and that it was not 
“contraband.”  The court looked to Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1) for 
the definition of contraband.  Because those items listed in 
§ 968.13(1) are related to the commission of a crime, and 
because the list is without limitation, the court determined 
that on this record, the $1,783 was so closely related to the 
commission of a crime that it may be considered contraband.  
Jones appeals. 
II. 
¶10 The first issue presented in this case, whether the 
state must always bring forfeiture proceedings under Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.55 for property seized due to an alleged UCSA violation, 
or whether Wis. Stat. § 968.20 provides an alternative means for 
retaining property, requires that we interpret the statutes and 
No. 97-3306 
7 
their relationship.  A question of statutory interpretation is a 
question of law that we review independent of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 
2d 516, 538, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998); Morris v. Juneau County, 219 
Wis. 2d 544, 551, 579 N.W.2d 690 (1998).  Our goal, in statutory 
interpretation, is to discern and to give effect to the intent 
of the legislature.  Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d at 538.  To 
achieve this goal, we first look to the plain language of the 
statute.  Id.  If a statute is unambiguous, this court will 
apply the ordinary and accepted meaning of the language of the 
statute to the facts before it.  Id.; Swatek v. County of Dane, 
192 Wis. 2d 47, 57, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995).  If a statute does not 
clearly set forth the legislative intent, we then look to the 
scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the 
statute.  Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d at 539; Swatek, 192 
Wis. 2d at 58.   
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.55(1)6 provides that “money, 
directly or indirectly derived from or realized through the 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.55 provides in relevant part: 
961.55 Forfeitures. (1)  The following are subject to 
forfeiture: 
 . . . . 
(f)  All property, real or personal, including money, 
directly or indirectly derived from or realized through the 
commission of any crime under this chapter. 
(g)  Any drug paraphernalia, as defined in s. 961.571, used 
in violation of this chapter. 
(2)  . . . Seizure without process may be made if: 
No. 97-3306 
8 
commission of any crime” and any drug paraphernalia are subject 
to a state forfeiture action.  Seizure without process may be 
made if the seizure is incident to arrest. § 961.55(2)(a).  The 
statute further provides that any property seized but not 
forfeited shall be returned to its rightful owner, and any 
person claiming the right to possession of seized property may 
apply for its return to the circuit court for the county in 
which the property was seized.  § 961.55(3).  
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1)7 states that any person 
claiming the right to possession of property seized with or 
                                                                  
(a)  The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under 
a search warrant or an inspection under an administrative 
inspection warrant. . . .  
(3) In the event of seizure under sub. (2), proceedings 
under sub. (4) shall be instituted promptly.  All dispositions 
and forfeitures under this section and ss. 961.555 and 961.56 
shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent 
persons under sub. (1)(d)1., 2. and 4.  Any property seized but 
not forfeited shall be returned to its rightful owner.  Any 
person claiming the right to possession of property seized may 
apply for its return to the circuit court for the county in 
which the property was seized. . . .  
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20 provides: 
968.20 Return of property seized. (1) Any person claiming 
the right to possession of property seized pursuant to a search 
warrant or seized without a search warrant may apply for its 
return to the circuit court for the county in which the property 
was seized or where the search was returned.  The court shall 
order such notice as it deems adequate to be given the district 
attorney and all persons who have or may have an interest in the 
property and shall hold a hearing to hear all claims to its true 
ownership.  If the right to possession is proved to the court’s 
satisfaction, it shall order the property, other than contraband 
or property covered under sub. (1m) [dangerous weapon] or (1r) 
[firearms] or s. 951.165 [animal fighting], returned if: 
No. 97-3306 
9 
without a search warrant may apply for its return to the circuit 
court for the county in which the property was seized.  If the 
right to possession is proved to the court’s satisfaction, it 
shall order property, other than contraband, returned if it is 
not needed as evidence or all proceedings have been completed.  
Id.   
¶13 Jones argues that because the statutes overlap—both 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55 and 968.20 involve property (criminal 
contraband) that is seized by the authorities with or without a 
search warrant—this court should hold that § 961.55, the more 
specific of the two is the appropriate means by which a property 
owner may apply for return of property seized for an alleged 
connection to the USCA.  
¶14 It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
where two conflicting statutes apply to the same subject, the 
more specific controls.  American Fed. of State, County & Mun. 
Employees Local 1901 v. Brown County, 146 Wis. 2d 728, 735, 432 
N.W.2d 571 (1988).  However, the rule also states that 
“conflicts 
between 
different 
statutes, 
by 
implication 
or 
otherwise, are not favored and will not be held to exist if they 
may otherwise be reasonably construed.”  Moran v. Quality 
Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 553, 150 N.W.2d 137 
                                                                  
(a)  The property is not needed as evidence or, if needed, 
satisfactory arrangements can be made for its return for 
subsequent use as evidence; or 
(b)  All proceedings in which it might be required have 
been completed. 
No. 97-3306 
10 
(1967); see also Raisanen v. City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 504, 
516, 151 N.W.2d 129 (1967).  The statutes must be construed in a 
manner 
that 
serves 
each 
statute’s 
purpose. 
 
State 
v. 
Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 503, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998).  
¶15 Jones does not allege that the two statutes conflict. 
 Rather, he seems to argue that both Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55(3) and 
968.20(1) provide procedures for return of seized property and 
because he was charged with an alleged violation of the UCSA, he 
properly sought return under § 961.55(3).8 
¶16 Reading Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3) alone seemingly directs 
such a result.  However, when read in conjunction with Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20(1), it becomes unclear whether § 961.55(3) or 
§ 968.20(1) is the proper return provision.  Ambiguity in a 
statute can be created by the interaction of two separate 
statutes.  State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 417, 561 N.W.2d 695 
(1997)(harmonizing Wis. Stat. § 973.20 and 939.74).  Because we 
conclude that it is ambiguous which return of property statute 
should have been employed, we look to the scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statutes to discern 
the legislative intent.  Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d at 539. 
 We believe the statutes can be read together. 
                     
8 Jones, who represented himself before the court of 
appeals, 
actually 
brought 
the 
motion 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 161.55(3), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3).  Section 
161.55 was renumbered by 1995 Wis. Act 448, § 297.  Before this 
court, Jones, who is now represented by counsel, has corrected 
the mistake.     
No. 97-3306 
11 
¶17 The purpose of the forfeiture provisions of the UCSA 
is to deter drug trafficking by permitting confiscation and 
forfeiture of the means and mobility used to commit activities 
proscribed by the act.  State v. Fouse, 120 Wis. 2d 471, 478, 
355 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. S & S Meats, Inc., 92 
Wis. 2d 64, 70, 284 N.W.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1979).  In contrast, 
the return of property statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.20, established 
a simplified procedure for obtaining the return of property 
seized with or without a warrant that is neither contraband nor 
needed as evidence in a case.  Judicial Council Committee Note, 
1969, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.20 (West 1998); State v. Benhoff, 
185 Wis. 2d 600, 603, 518 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶18 While both provisions permit any person claiming the 
right to possession of property seized to apply for its return, 
we note a key difference between the two provisions.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 961.55(3), only property that is “seized but not 
forfeited shall be returned to its rightful owner”; Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 contains no such limitation.  The provision for return 
under § 961.55(3) was enacted by § 1, ch. 267, Laws of 1981.  
According to the legislative history, the § 961.55(3) return 
provision was taken directly from § 968.20 with a few changes, 
including the above quoted language.  Legislative Reference 
Bureau Analysis of 1981 Assembly Bill 606.  Because the “seized 
but not forfeited” language was not contained in the original 
provision, § 968.20, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
legislature intended a different meaning by including it within 
the forfeiture provision, § 961.55(3).  
No. 97-3306 
12 
¶19 We read the “seized but not forfeited” language of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3) to mean that the return portion of sub. 
(3) is only triggered by an unsuccessful forfeiture action 
brought by the state.  If the state decides, in its discretion, 
to initiate a forfeiture action, it has the burden of proving by 
the greater weight of the evidence that the property is subject 
to forfeiture under § 961.55.  Wis. Stat. § 961.555(3).9  If the 
state fails to meet its burden and the property is not 
forfeited, then the provision for return under § 961.55(3) is 
triggered allowing a person who believes the seized but not 
forfeited property belongs to him or her to apply for its return 
and to have a hearing on the matter.  In those instances where 
the district attorney chooses not to initiate a forfeiture 
action, then a person claiming the right to possession of 
property seized by authorities may apply for its return under 
§ 968.20(1).  We believe that this is a reasonable construction 
of both the forfeiture provisions and the return of property 
statute; such a construction provides meaning to both statutes 
and eliminates any potential conflict.   
¶20 Our construction, which provides purpose to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 961.55 and 968.20, is further supported by the legislature’s 
continued affirmation of both statutes.  We presume that the 
legislature 
enacts 
laws 
with 
full 
knowledge 
of 
existing 
                     
9  Wisconsin Stat. § 961.555(3) provides:  “The state shall 
have the burden of satisfying or convincing to a reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence that 
the property is subject to forfeiture under s. 961.55.” 
No. 97-3306 
13 
statutes.  Faber v. Musser, 207 Wis. 2d 132, 138, 557 N.W.2d 808 
(1997).  When § 961.55 was enacted in 1971, the legislature did 
not modify, limit or eliminate § 968.20.  See § 16, ch. 219, 
Laws of 1971.   In subsequent terms, the legislature continued 
to amend both § 961.55 and § 968.20 as if they were compatible. 
 See e.g., 1997 Wis. Act 192, § 32 (§ 968.20); 1997 Wis. Act 
248, §§ 778, 779 (§ 968.20); 1997 Wis. Act 220, §§ 8, 10 
(§ 961.55).  Clearly, § 961.55 and § 968.20 should be read to 
compliment rather than conflict with one another. 
¶21 Jones provides an alternative construction which he 
insists provides meaning to both Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55 and 
968.20.  He argues that when property is seized in connection 
with a potential violation of the UCSA, the state is limited to 
the forfeiture and return of property procedures prescribed in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 961.  This approach, he contends, provides 
protections for the rights of property owners and it renders 
meaning to Wis. Stat. § 968.20 which is available to claimants 
seeking return of property seized for evidence in cases not 
involving the UCSA.  
¶22 Jones’ interpretation fails to recognize that Wis. 
Stat. § 961.55 is not the only forfeiture statute contained in 
the Wisconsin criminal code.  In 1981, the Wisconsin legislature 
created general forfeiture provisions, Wis. Stat. §§ 973.075 and 
973.076.10  According to the legislative history, the general 
                     
10 The two provisions on point, Wis. Stat. §§ 973.075 and 
973.076, provide in part: 
No. 97-3306 
14 
forfeiture provisions allow for all property, including money, 
derived from or realized through the commission of any crime and 
any vehicle used to transport property or weapons used or to be 
used or received in the commission of a felony to be subject to 
                                                                  
973.075.  Forfeiture of property derived from crime and 
certain vehicles  (1)  The following are subject to seizure and 
forfeiture under ss. 973.075 to 973.077: 
(a)  All property, real or personal, including money, 
directly or indirectly derived from or realized through the 
commission of any crime. 
(b)  [vehicles used in felonies.] 
(c)  All remote sensing equipment . . . and any other 
equipment or device used in the commission of a crime relating 
to a submerged cultural resource in violation of s. 44.47. 
(d)  A tank vessel . . . . 
(5)  All forfeitures under ss. 973.075 to 973.077 shall be 
made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons under 
sub. (1)(b)1 to 3 and (d).  Any property seized but not 
forfeited shall be returned to its rightful owner.  Any person 
claiming the right to possession of property seized may apply 
for its return to the circuit court for the county in which the 
property was seized. . . .  
(6)  Sections 973.075 to 973.077 do not apply to crimes 
committed under ch. 961. 
973.076.  Forfeiture proceedings 
(1) TYPE OF ACTION; WHERE BROUGHT.  In an action brought to cause 
the forfeiture of any property specified in s. 320.30(4)(a) or 
s. 973.075(1), the court may render a judgment in rem or against 
a party personally, or both. . . .  
(2) COMMENCEMENT.  (a)  The district attorney of the county 
within which the property was seized or in which the defendant 
is convicted shall commence the forfeiture action within 30 days 
after the seizure of the property or the date of conviction, 
whichever is earlier . . . .  
No. 97-3306 
15 
forfeiture.  Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1981 
Assembly Bill 606.  The general forfeiture provisions apply to 
all 
crimes 
except 
those 
involving 
dangerous 
drugs. 
Id.; 
§ 973.075(6).  When the general forfeiture provisions were 
enacted, the forfeiture provisions relating to dangerous drug 
violations, § 961.55, were revised to include most of the 
provisions contained in the general forfeiture provisions.  
Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1981 Assembly Bill 606.  
¶23 An examination of the general forfeiture provisions 
and the drug forfeiture provisions reveals very few differences 
beyond the property subject to forfeiture under each.  Cf. Wis. 
Stat. §§ 961.55(1) and 973.075(1) to § 961.55511 and 973.076.  
                     
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.555 provides in part: 
961.555 Forfeiture proceedings. (1) TYPE OF ACTION; WHERE 
BROUGHT.  In an action brought to cause the forfeiture of any 
property seized under s. 961.55, the court may render a judgment 
in rem or against a party personally, or both.  The circuit 
court for the county in which the property was seized shall have 
jurisdiction over any proceedings regarding the property when 
the action is commenced in state court.  Any property seized may 
be the subject of a federal forfeiture action. 
(2) COMMENCEMENT. (a)  The district attorney of the county 
within which the property was seized shall commence the 
forfeiture action within 30 days after the seizure of the 
property, except that the defendant may request that the 
forfeiture proceedings be adjourned until after adjudication of 
any charge concerning the crime which was the basis for the 
seizure of the property.  The request shall be granted.  The 
forfeiture action shall be commenced by filing a summons, 
complaint and affidavit of the person who seized the property 
with 
the 
clerk 
of 
circuit 
court, 
provided 
service 
of 
authenticated copies of those papers is made in accordance with 
ch. 801 within 60 days after filing upon the person from whom 
the property was seized and upon any person known to have a bona 
fide perfected security interest in the property. 
No. 97-3306 
16 
The most notable similarities are the return provisions of 
§ 961.55(3) and § 973.075(5) and the time limitations and 
procedures imposed on district attorneys under both § 961.555(2) 
and § 973.076(2).  Although the general forfeiture provisions, 
§ 973.075 and § 973.076, are not at issue in this case, to adopt 
Jones’ position would effectively require that the state bring a 
forfeiture action for all property derived from the commission 
of any crime, drug related or otherwise.  Under such a scheme, 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20 would be superfluous.  We cannot conclude 
that the legislature intended such a result.  Wisconsin Elec. 
Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 110 Wis. 2d 530, 534, 329 
N.W.2d 178 (1983). 
¶24 We are also unpersuaded by Jones’ argument that the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55 and 961.555 are mandatory 
and jurisdictional as stated in State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 
208-09, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976).  In Rosen, the defendant was 
served with documents commencing a forfeiture action of a 
vehicle that belonged to him and which had been seized by 
police.  Id. at 203.  The forfeiture hearing was not scheduled 
within the time limits; thus, the circuit court dismissed the 
action.  Id.  This court affirmed, concluding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.555(2)(b)(1973), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 961.555, 
was mandatory and that failure to comply strictly with the time 
                                                                  
(b)  Upon service of an answer, the action shall be set for 
hearing within 60 days of the service of the answer but may be 
continued for cause of upon stipulation of the parties. . . .  
No. 97-3306 
17 
limitation 
imposed 
resulted 
in 
a 
loss 
of 
trial 
court 
jurisdiction.  Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d at 208.   
¶25 Rosen is inapposite to the case before us.  Rosen 
stands for the proposition that once a forfeiture action has 
been commenced by the state, the state must comply with the time 
limits under Wis. Stat. § 961.555(2).  In this case, a 
forfeiture action was never initiated; thus, the time limits 
were never triggered.   
¶26 In addition, the Rosen court neither addressed nor 
considered Wis. Stat. § 968.20 or its relationship with Wis. 
Stat. §§ 961.55 or 961.555.  Therefore, we conclude that Rosen 
is not controlling.  
¶27 Moreover, we find nothing, nor does Jones direct us to 
anything, in Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55, 961.555 or Rosen which 
remotely suggests that the state is required to initiate a 
forfeiture action every time property is seized for a suspected 
violation of the UCSA.  Presumably the requirement does not 
exist because district attorneys “enjoy largely unfettered 
discretion in the initiation of criminal proceedings.”  State v. 
Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 572, 297 N.W.2d 808 (1980).  It 
follows then that a district attorney may exercise this 
discretion 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
initiate 
forfeiture 
proceedings or not.   
¶28 To conclude otherwise would lead to absurd results 
which we are duty bound to avoid.  State ex rel. Sielen v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 176 Wis. 2d 101, 108, 499 
N.W.2d 657 (1993).  Effectively we would be concluding that 
No. 97-3306 
18 
while district attorneys have discretion in determining whether 
or not to prosecute and in selecting which of several related 
crimes he or she wishes to charge, he or she would have no 
discretion in deciding whether to initiate forfeiture actions.  
Cf. State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 473, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992); Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 577.  
¶29 There are several reasons why district attorneys would 
not abandon their use of the forfeiture proceedings.  First, a 
forfeiture action lies whether or not a criminal charge has been 
brought against the owner of the property seized.  State v. 
Hooper, 122 Wis. 2d 748, 751, 364 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 
1985)(under Wis. Stat. § 161.55(1)(f)(1983-84) the state is only 
required to show that the seized property was “derived from or 
realized through the commission of any crime” under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 161 (1983-84), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. ch. 961).  In 
contrast, the return of property statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.20, 
is more limited because it presupposes the existence of a case 
and the retention of property by the authorities for use as 
evidence.  See Benhoff, 185 Wis. 2d at 603 (requires the return 
of seized property that is neither contraband nor needed as 
evidence in a case); § 968.20(1)(a) and (b)(court shall return 
property, other than contraband, if property is not needed as 
evidence 
or 
all 
proceedings 
have 
been 
completed); 
§ 968.20(2)(property not required for evidence or use in further 
investigation may be returned without a hearing). 
¶30 With some property, district attorneys have no choice 
but to initiate a forfeiture action under Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55 
No. 97-3306 
19 
and 961.555.  If the property subject to forfeiture cannot be 
located; has been transferred or conveyed to, sold to or 
deposited with a third party; is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
court; has been substantially diminished in value while not in 
the actual physical custody of the law enforcement agency; or 
has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided 
without difficulty, then a district attorney may only bring a 
forfeiture action against property of a defendant not otherwise 
subject to seizure.  Wis. Stat. § 961.555(4)(a)-(e). 
¶31 In other situations, the property may be subject to 
state and federal jurisdiction.  In such a case, the first-in-
time rule applies.  The rule is that only one court may have 
jurisdiction over the res in an in rem proceeding, and therefore 
the first court to obtain in rem jurisdiction maintains it to 
the exclusion of all others, whether the court is state or 
federal.  Penn Gen. Cas. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 
(1935); United States v. One Parcel Property Located at Lot 85, 
100 F.3d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 
(1997); United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash & 
Currency, 830 F.2d 94, 95-96 (7th Cir. 1987).  Thus, when it is 
possible for two courts to have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
property, the state may be deprived of jurisdiction if it delays 
initiating a forfeiture action. 
¶32 As 
we 
have 
previously 
explained, 
“the 
district 
attorney is answerable to the people of the state and not to the 
courts or the legislature as to the manner in which he or she 
exercises prosecutorial discretion.”  Annala, 168 Wis. 2d at 
No. 97-3306 
20 
473.  “Political review through the electoral process is 
sufficient to ensure the proper application of prosecutorial 
discretion.”  Id.; Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 577.  We will not 
impair, 
without 
authority 
or 
reason, 
district 
attorneys’ 
discretionary 
decisions of 
whether 
to 
initiate 
forfeiture 
proceedings or not.  
¶33 Based on the foregoing, we see no conflict between 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.55 and 968.20 which requires us to limit the 
language of either statute.  Rather, we conclude that the 
legislature intended that the return provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.55(3) can only be triggered by a failed forfeiture action 
brought by the state.  In those situations where the state has 
not initiated a forfeiture action, we conclude that a person 
claiming the right to property seized by the authorities is 
limited to the procedures set forth in § 968.20.12  
III. 
¶34 In this case, the State did not initiate a forfeiture 
action; thus, Jones was limited to the procedures provided under 
                     
12 The dissent fails to answer several issues raised in this 
case.  The dissent does not address:  the purpose of the “seized 
but not forfeited” language added to Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3); the 
legislature’s affirmation of both Wis. Stat. § 961.55 and 
968.20; the affect of its “simple” interpretation on the general 
forfeiture provisions, Wis. Stat. § 973.075 and 973.076, the 
return 
of 
property 
statute, 
§ 968.20, 
or 
prosecutorial 
discretion.  While the dissent pays lip service to its “simple 
and straightforward interpretation” of Wis. Stat. ch. 961 
forfeiture procedures, it does so from a narrow viewpoint.  Our 
interpretation addresses not only the statutes at issue, but 
also considers the implications of our decisions on other areas 
of the law. 
No. 97-3306 
21 
Wis. Stat. § 968.20.  This brings us to the second issue before 
this court:  If the interested party brings an action for return 
of property under § 968.20, is cash considered “contraband” 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1), particularly when 
the charge arising out of the property seized during the search 
is ultimately dismissed. 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20(1) provides: 
 
(1)  Any person claiming the right to possession of 
property seized pursuant to a search warrant or seized 
without a search warrant may apply for its return to 
the circuit court for the county in which the property 
was seized or where the search warrant was returned.  
The court shall order such notice as it deems adequate 
to be given the district attorney and all persons who 
have or may have an interest in the property and shall 
hold a hearing to hear all claims to its true 
ownership.  If the right to possession is proved to 
the court’s satisfaction, it shall order the property, 
other than contraband or property covered under sub. 
(1m) or 1(r) or s. 951.165, returned if: 
 
(a)  The property is not needed as evidence or, if 
needed, satisfactory arrangements can be made for its 
return for subsequent use as evidence; or 
(b)  All proceedings in which it might be required 
have been completed.   
Pursuant to this statute, if the person seeking return has a 
right to possession of the property, if the property is not 
contraband, and if the property is not needed as evidence (or, 
if needed, arrangements can be made for its return, or all 
proceedings in which it might be required have been completed), 
then the court shall order the return of the property.  Benhoff, 
185 Wis. 2d at 603.  
No. 97-3306 
22 
¶36 The term “contraband” is not defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20.  However, we believe the Benhoff court correctly 
looked to Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1) for the definition.  Section 
968.13(1)(a) provides: 
  
(1)  A search warrant may authorize the seizure of the 
following: 
 
(a)  Contraband, which includes without limitation 
because 
of 
enumeration 
lottery 
tickets, 
gambling 
machines or other gambling devices, lewd, obscene or 
indecent written matter, pictures, sound recordings or 
motion 
picture 
films, 
forged 
money 
or 
written 
instruments and the tools, dies, machines or materials 
for making them, and controlled substances, as defined 
in s. 961.01(4), and controlled substance analogs, as 
defined in s. 961.01(4m), and the implements for 
smoking or injecting them.  Gambling machines or other 
gambling devices possessed by a shipbuilding business 
that complies with s. 945.095 are not subject to this 
section.  [Emphasis added.] 
Contraband need never be returned.  Judicial Council Committee 
Note, 1969, § 968.20, Stats. 
¶37 In construing Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), to determine 
whether cash may be included as contraband, we are to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature.  State ex rel. Jacobus 
v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 47-48, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997).  We must 
ascertain that intent by first looking to the language of the 
statute itself and giving the language its ordinary and accepted 
meaning.  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 
112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).  Only if the statutory language 
is ambiguous may we resort to outside sources to aid statutory 
construction.  Marshall-Wisconsin Co. v. Juneau Square Corp., 
139 Wis. 2d 112, 133, 406 N.W.2d 764 (1987).   
No. 97-3306 
23 
¶38 We find no ambiguity in the legislature’s provision 
that contraband includes, among other things, money that is 
related to the commission of a crime or that represents illicit 
proceeds from an unlawful sale.  We construe the listed items 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), as required by its 
language, not as a limitation on what constitutes contraband, 
but rather as several examples of items that may be considered 
contraband (and therefore subject to seizure).  Because the 
statute 
expressly 
covers 
items 
“without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration,” contraband cannot reasonably be read as limited to 
the class, type or nature of the items listed in subsec. (a).   
¶39 Jones contends, however, that money should not be 
included as contraband under the “without limitation” clause of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a).  Relying on the doctrine of ejusdum 
generis, which the State also looks to, Jones urges that all of 
the items listed in § 968.13(1)(a) are either inherently illegal 
to possess or were inherently illegal to possess when the 
legislature passed the law.  As Jones defines it, contraband is 
limited to that which is per se illegal to possess.  Because it 
is not illegal to possess money, Jones insists money does not 
fall under the purview of § 968.13(1)(a).   
¶40 The doctrine of ejusdem generis is an attempt to 
reconcile an incompatibility between specific and general words. 
 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (5th ed. 
1992).  To that end, the doctrine treats particular words as 
indicating the class and the general words as extending the 
provisions of the statute to everything embraced in that class, 
No. 97-3306 
24 
though not specifically named by the particular words.  Id.  See 
also, State v. Engler, 80 Wis. 2d 402, 408, 259 N.W.2d 97 
(1977). 
¶41 We disagree with Jones’ proposed construction and the 
conclusion based upon it.  While some of the items listed may 
have been illegal to possess in 1969, when the statute was 
enacted, they are no longer illegal to possess yet they are 
still contained in the statute.  As the State points out, 
lottery tickets are now legal to possess, but may be used or 
acquired in an illicit manner bringing them under the purview of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a).13 
¶42 It was also illegal to possess lewd, obscene or 
indecent matter in 1969,14 but such possession is now legal 
unless the matter, for example, is exposed to a child pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.11, drawn or written in public or a public 
place under Wis. Stat. § 944.23, or if it is used, exhibited or 
transferred in a manner described in Wis. Stat. § 944.21(3) and 
(4).  
                     
13 “Lottery” does not include bingo or a raffle conducted 
under ch. 563, pari-mutuel wagering conducted under ch. 562 or 
the state lottery or any multijurisdictional lottery conducted 
under ch. 565.  Wis. Stat. § 945.01(5)(am).  Thus, lottery 
tickets employed or acquired in any other manner than the above-
listed exceptions would constitute “contraband.”   
14  In 1969, whoever knowingly possessed a lewd, obscene or 
indecent written matter or lewd, obscene or indecent picture 
could be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned in the county 
jail for one year or less, or both.  Wis. Stat. § 944.22 (1977). 
 Section 944.22 was repealed in 1977.  § 98, ch. 173, Laws of 
1977.   
No. 97-3306 
25 
¶43 In addition, many of the items listed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.13(1)(a) are not per se illegal today, and were not in 
1969.  For example, the “tools, dies, machines or materials” 
used to make forged money or written instruments have many legal 
uses; however, once they are used in an illegal manner, they 
become “contraband.” 
¶44 Similarly, some of the items used to smoke or inject 
controlled substances, such as Chore-boys or syringes, have 
legal and useful purposes; however, when used as an implement to 
smoke or inject a controlled substance, they become contraband. 
 If 
implements 
to 
smoke 
or 
inject 
controlled 
substances 
constitute contraband, certainly money which is used to purchase 
or is acquired through the sale of controlled substances falls 
under the purview of Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a).   
¶45 To narrowly interpret Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) as 
Jones suggests—contraband includes only those items which are 
per se illegal—would render these items superfluous.  This is a 
result to be avoided.  Wisconsin Elec., 110 Wis. 2d at 534.  
¶46 Based on the enumerated items provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.13(1)(a), we conclude that contraband is not limited to 
materials which are per se illegal.  Rather, it is clear that 
contraband encompasses those items that are not only per se 
illegal, such as controlled substances or forged money, but also 
those items which are used, acquired or transferred illicitly.  
Money which is established to have been acquired through the 
sale of or used to purchase controlled substances certainly 
constitutes contraband under § 968.13(1)(a).    
No. 97-3306 
26 
¶47 We also note that a rule of statutory construction, 
such as ejudem generis, is employed only to determine the 
legislative intent behind an ambiguous statute.  State v. 
Tollefson, 85 Wis. 2d 162, 167, 270 N.W.2d 201 (1978).  “It is 
impermissible to apply rules of statutory construction to 
ascertain legislative intent when the legislation is clear on 
its face.”  Engler, 80 Wis. 2d at 406.  We conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) is clear on its face; contraband consists 
of items which are per se illegal as well as those legal items 
which are put to an illegal use or acquired illicitly.15   
¶48 This court in State v. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d 419, 159 
N.W.2d 1 (1968), recognized the difference between items which 
are per se illegal, and those items which are put to an illegal 
use.  One of the issues before the Voshart court was whether 
concededly obscene materials which were improperly seized had to 
be returned to the defendant or 
could be 
destroyed as 
contraband.  Id. at 434.  The court determined that it would 
frustrate the public policy of the state based on the nature of 
obscenity to return admittedly obscene materials.  Id.  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished obscenity from 
“an article put to an illegal use,” instead equating the former 
with those materials that should be destroyed because they are 
                     
15 Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) is 
unambiguous, we need not resort to legislative history to 
discern legislative intent.  Cynthia E. v. La Crosse County 
Human Serv. Dept., 172 Wis. 2d 218, 225, 493 N.W.2d 56 (1992); 
J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 962, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991).   
  
No. 97-3306 
27 
illegal to possess, such as counterfeit money, diseased cattle 
and gambling devices.  Id. at 435.  In contrast, the money in 
this case is akin to items which may constitute contraband, 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), if put to an illegal use, such 
as the “tools, dies, machines or materials” used to make forged 
money or written instruments. 
¶49 While public policy may not dictate destruction of the 
money, it certainly does not require its return to the owner.  
The legislature has declared the abuse of controlled substances 
to be a serious problem for society, Wis. Stat. § 961.001, and 
that those who illicitly traffic in controlled substances 
constitute 
a 
menace 
to 
the 
public 
health 
and 
safety, 
§ 961.001(1r).  Accordingly, the public interest in the control, 
suppression and regulation of controlled substances and those 
who traffic in them dictates that money which is used to 
purchase or is acquired in the sale of controlled substances be 
designated as contraband. 
¶50 Contrary to Jones’ assertion, our interpretation does 
not render Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(b) superfluous.  He argues 
that under subsec. (b) anything which is the fruit of or has 
been used in the commission of any crime may be seized under a 
search warrant.  Id.  If an item is neither contraband nor 
needed as evidence, a person may seek return of the property, 
and the 
court shall order 
its return under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20(1).  Benhoff, 185 Wis. 2d at 603.  Thus, while 
§ 968.20(1)(b) authorizes the seizure of items which have been 
used in the commission of a crime, these items must be returned 
No. 97-3306 
28 
to the rightful owner when they are no longer needed as evidence 
or when the proceedings have been completed.  § 968.20(1)(a) and 
(b).  Contraband, on the other hand, need never be returned.  
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1969, § 968.20, Stats.   
¶51 Jones also contends that a broad interpretation of 
contraband would lead to absurd results because the potentially 
innocent owner of the money which is seized and later found to 
be contraband is out of luck.  However, Wis. Stat. § 968.20(4) 
directs 
cities, 
towns, 
villages, 
and 
counties 
to 
adopt 
procedures for disposal of seized property.  These procedures 
are to include a presumption that if the substance appears to be 
or is reported stolen, an attempt will be made to return the 
substance to the rightful owner.  § 968.20(4).  Thus, a truly 
innocent property owner would have some recourse under the 
statute. 
¶52 We also reject Jones’ argument that if an item is the 
“fruit of a crime,” or used to commit a crime, then the criminal 
charges are critical.  According to Jones, items which are per 
se illegal need never be returned, but those items which are 
legal to possess but have been used in an illicit manner must be 
proven to be contraband in a forfeiture action or be returned to 
its rightful owner.  This contention is untenable. 
¶53 As this court stated in Voshart, when determining 
whether seized property constitutes contraband, the underlying 
criminal charges are not before us for review.  Voshart, 39 Wis. 
2d at 436.  “Where the items were in fact contraband, properly 
found 
so 
to 
be 
by 
judicial 
determination 
in 
adversary 
No. 97-3306 
29 
proceedings, 
timely 
conducted, 
offending 
no 
constitutional 
safeguards, they would be subject to confiscation rather than 
return.”  Id.  Because contraband threatens the public health, 
safety and morals, the legislature has allowed for its seizure. 
 Id. at 435.  Similarly, controlled substances and those who 
traffic them are considered a substantial menace to the public 
health and safety.  Wis. Stat. § 961.001(1r).  Certainly money 
which is either the proceeds from or used for the purchase of 
controlled substances which has been found to be contraband in a 
judicial proceeding need not be returned simply because the 
charges have been dismissed. 
¶54 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) is 
clear on its face, and that under this statute contraband is not 
limited to materials which are per se illegal.  Rather, it is 
clear that contraband encompasses those items that are not only 
per se illegal, such as controlled substances or forged money, 
but also those items which are put to an illegal use or acquired 
illicitly, 
such 
as 
the 
purchase 
or 
sale 
of 
controlled 
substances.   
IV. 
¶55 Having determined that money may constitute contraband 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), if it is established to have 
been acquired through the sale of or used to purchase controlled 
substances, the next question we are presented with is who has 
the burden of establishing this connection.  In order to remove 
any incentive a prosecutor may have to never use Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.55, the forfeiture statute, the State suggests, without 
No. 97-3306 
30 
opposition from Jones, that this court place the same burden of 
proof on the state which exists under Wis. Stat. § 961.555(3) on 
the issue of whether the property in question is contraband. 
¶56 This court, in Welter v. Sauk County Clerk of Court, 
53 Wis. 2d 178, 182 n.6, 184, 191 N.W.2d 852 (1971), addressed 
the burden of proof under Wis. Stat. § 963.04, which was 
superseded by Wis. Stat. § 968.20.  The petitioner in Welter 
sought return of some 200 items involved in the killing of a law 
enforcement officer, and the wounding of another.  Welter, 53 
Wis. 2d at 180.  The trial court denied the motion based on 
petitioner’s failure to particularize the evidentiary usefulness 
of the requested items in case a new trial were to be ordered.  
Id. at 183-84.  This court affirmed, concluding that the burden 
of proof rests with the moving party to support the motion by 
proof.  Id. at 184.  We stated, “The burden of proof upon 
petitioner was, at the least, the responsibility to identify 
items which he claimed to be without evidentiary value, and his 
reason or basis for so claiming.”  Id. at 185.   
¶57 In his motion for return of the monies seized, Jones 
identified his claim to the money, and he indicated the basis of 
his claim, in accordance with Welter.  It was the State, 
however, who argued that the money was contraband and need not 
be returned to Jones.  Wis. Stat. § 968.20.  Because the burden 
rests with the moving party to support the motion by proof, 
Welter, 53 Wis. 2d at 184, it follows that the State should have 
the burden of establishing that the property, in this case 
No. 97-3306 
31 
money, 
constitutes 
contraband 
as 
defined 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.13(1)(a), and need not be returned,  § 968.20.   
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20 is silent on this question.  
However, actions in rem are civil and fall under the civil 
procedures of Wis. Stat. ch. 801. See Wis. Stat. § 801.01; State 
v. One 1973 Cadillac, 95 Wis. 2d 641, 644, 291 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. 
App. 1980).  In addition, Wisconsin cases have applied the 
middle burden in civil actions involving criminal acts.  Wangen 
v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 
(1980).  While the return of property statute does not involve 
criminal acts, the state’s contention that the property is 
contraband implies criminal or illicit activity.  See Judicial 
Council Committee Note, 1969, § 968.20, Stats. (Contraband need 
never be returned).  Thus, the appropriate burden of proof in 
this civil matter, as with other civil actions, is proof by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence. See Wis. JI-Civil 200 
(1996); Kruse v. Horlamus Indus., Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 357, 362-63, 
387 N.W.2d 64 (1986).  We conclude that when the state contends 
that property need not be returned under § 968.20(1) because it 
constitutes contraband, the state must establish this by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence. 
V. 
¶59 In addressing whether money may constitute contraband 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.13(1)(a), 
we 
have 
concluded 
that 
property, in this case money, which has been found to have a 
significant connection to items which are illegal to possess, 
such as controlled substances, or have been acquired illicitly, 
No. 97-3306 
32 
may constitute contraband.  We also have reaffirmed that an item 
found to be contraband need never be returned regardless of 
whether the underlying criminal charges are dismissed or not.  
Further, when the state has alleged property to be contraband, 
and therefore not subject to return, we have concluded that the 
state must establish that the property is contraband by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence.  
¶60 We have yet to determine the effect of our holdings on 
the outcome of this case.  At the hearing on Jones’ motion for 
return of the property, the circuit court placed the burden of 
establishing that the money was not contraband on Jones.  This 
was in error.  The proper question and the question before us 
now is whether the State established by the greater weight of 
the credible evidence that the money was drug-related and 
therefore contraband.   
¶61 Whether a party has met its burden of proof is a 
question of law which we examine without deference to the 
circuit court’s conclusion.  Burg v. Miniature Precision 
Components, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 330 N.W.2d 192 (1983).  
However, in doing so, we must accept the circuit court’s 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to 
be given their testimony.  See id. at 12-13; In re Estate of 
Glass, 85 Wis. 2d 126, 135, 270 N.W.2d 386 (1978).  Because the 
State established, by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence, that the money was contraband, we conclude that the 
circuit court committed harmless error by placing the burden on 
the defendant. 
No. 97-3306 
33 
¶62 The 
harmless 
error 
test 
appears 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.18, which requires this court to “disregard any error or 
defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect 
the substantial rights of the adverse party.”  § 805.18(1).  
When a court has committed a procedural error, § 805.18 
precludes the court from reversing unless an examination of the 
entire proceeding reveals that the alleged error has “affected 
the 
substantial 
rights” 
of 
the 
party 
seeking 
reversal.  
§ 805.18(2); State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999).   
¶63 When determining whether the circuit court error is 
harmless, this court must determine if there is a reasonable 
possibility that but for the error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 369.  The 
State, as the beneficiary of the error, has the burden of 
showing that the error was harmless. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 
525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). 
¶64 The State has met its burden in this case.  Jones was 
arrested for OWI, and a search incident to that arrest was 
conducted of Jones and the vehicle in which he was found.  Jones 
moved to suppress the evidence and sought return of the money 
and property seized during the search.  At the motion hearing, 
Officer Linsmeier testified to the evidence he found:  a small 
scale, six cigarette lighters, three pieces of charred “Chore-
boy” scouring pads and $1,783 in cash.  Linsmeier explained that 
“Chore-boy” pads are regularly used in a crack pipe for 
ingesting crack cocaine and that a scale is a common tool that 
No. 97-3306 
34 
drug dealers use to measure drugs for sale.  The wads of cash 
were also significant:  the number of twenties in set totals, 
the separation of the money on Jones’ body, and the lack of any 
alternative explanation for the large amount of cash all 
indicated to Linsmeier that the money was drug-related.  Jones 
presented no evidence to the contrary. 
¶65 The circuit court found Linsmeier’s testimony to be 
credible 
in 
reaching 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
money 
was 
contraband.  We accept the circuit court’s findings as to the 
credibility of the testimony unless they are clearly erroneous. 
 Burg, 111 Wis. 2d at 12; Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  Based on the 
evidence presented at the hearing, we conclude that the State 
established, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, a 
logical nexus between the money and the drug paraphernalia in 
Jones’ possession such that the money falls under the purview of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) and need not be returned.16   
                     
16 In the case of forfeiture proceedings, the federal courts 
have found that money, in combination with other persuasive 
circumstantial evidence, particularly the presence of drug 
paraphernalia, 
is 
sufficient 
to establish 
probable 
cause.  
United States v. $321,470.00, United States Currency, 874 F.2d 
298, 305 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. $93,685.61 in United 
States Currency, 730 F.2d 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. $22,287.00, United States Currency, 709 F.2d 442, 449 
(6th Cir. 1983); United States v. $60,000, 763 F. Supp. 909, 
915-16 (E.D. Mich. 1991); United States v. $111,980 in United 
States Currency, 660 F. Supp. 247, 249-50 (E.D. Wis. 1987).  
Money, standing alone, however, is not sufficient to establish 
probable cause.  United States v. $506,231 in United States 
Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 568 (6th 1994); United States v. $7,850.00 in 
United States Currency, 7 F.3d 1355, 1358 (8th Cir. 1993).  
Although this case does not involve a forfeiture proceeding, the 
reasoning is certainly on point.   
No. 97-3306 
35 
¶66 We are unpersuaded that the cases cited by Jones 
dictate a different result.  Jones concedes that the four cases 
he cites all stem from a different procedural posture, but 
insists these cases provide persuasive authority for this court 
to rule in his favor.   
¶67 We do not agree.  The result in each case turned on 
whether there was credible evidence to support the circuit 
court’s factual findings, and in three cases, the reviewing 
court determined that there was credible evidence to support the 
court’s findings.  See State v. Roberts, 657 N.E.2d 547, 550 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995); State v. $7,000, 642 A.2d 967, 975 (N.J. 
1994); and People v. United States Currency, $3,108, 579 N.E.2d 
951, 956 (Ill. 1991).  Similarly, in this case, we have 
concluded that there is credible evidence to support the circuit 
court’s finding that the cash was contraband.  
¶68 In the fourth cited case, United States v. $506,231 in 
United States Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1997), 
the court of appeals reversed the district court finding no 
evidence tying the money to narcotics pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(a)(6), which allows for forfeiture of proceeds traceable 
to drug trafficking.  The court concluded that without the 
statutorily required nexus connecting the money to drugs, the 
money was not subject to forfeiture.  $506,231 in United States 
Currency, 125 F.3d at 452.  The court did not determine whether 
cash could be contraband.  We do not view the cited cases as 
controlling.  
No. 97-3306 
36 
¶69 In summary, we hold that property, in this case money, 
which has been found in a judicial proceeding to have a logical 
nexus to items which are illegal to possess, such as controlled 
substances, or have been acquired through illicit means, may 
constitute contraband as defined in Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a).  
If property is found to be contraband under § 968.13(1)(a), the 
property need not be returned to the owner whether criminal 
charges are filed or not.  Wis. Stat. § 968.20.  We also hold 
that the state is required to establish, by the greater weight 
of 
the 
credible 
evidence, 
that 
the 
property 
constitutes 
contraband.  Even though the circuit court in this case 
mistakenly placed the burden on the defendant to show whether 
the cash was or was not contraband, we conclude that based on 
the evidence presented at the hearing, this error was harmless. 
 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
97-3306.dtp 
 
1 
¶70 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    (Concurring).   This case can 
be decided without 
the 
extensive 
statutory 
interpretation 
contained in Part II of the majority opinion.  Because I have 
reservations about that interpretation, I am not prepared to 
join Part II of the opinion.  I do join Parts I, III, IV, and V, 
as well as the mandate of the court. 
¶71 This case starts with a traffic arrest.  Shortly 
before 5:00 a.m. on February 1, 1997, Madison police officer 
Kevin Linsmeier investigated a car parked in front of 2841 
Moland Street in Madison.  Linsmeier had been called to the 
scene by a city parking monitor.  He found a parked vehicle in 
the street with its engine running and saw Leonard Jones sitting 
alone in the driver's seat.  Jones appeared to be asleep or 
unconscious. 
¶72 Concerned about the man's condition, Linsmeier knocked 
on the window attempting to get Jones' attention.  Twice Jones 
responded to the knocking by hitting the accelerator with his 
foot causing the engine to rev loudly.  Eventually, Linsmeier 
pounded on the window and yelled.  He was about to break the 
glass when Jones awoke and rolled down the window. 
¶73 Immediately, the officer smelled intoxicants on Jones' 
breath.  He observed that Jones' eyes were glassy and dilated.  
He noticed that his speech was slurred.  When Jones finally got 
out of the car, he leaned against the vehicle to maintain his 
balance.  He refused to answer a question about whether he had 
been drinking and he refused to submit to field sobriety tests. 
97-3306.dtp 
 
2 
 At that point, Officer Linsmeier arrested Jones for operating a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated. 
¶74 Thereafter, Linsmeier conducted a search of Jones' 
person as well as his parked vehicle.  He made the search 
incident to an arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, 
and he seized cash, drug paraphernalia, and other items found 
during the search. 
¶75 On February 5, 1997, Jones was charged with possessing 
drug paraphernalia in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1).  In 
mid-March he responded by moving to suppress the evidence seized 
and asking for its return.  He cited former Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.55(2) in seeking return of the evidence. 
¶76 On May 29, 1997, Circuit Judge Jack Aulik conducted a 
hearing on Jones' two-part motion.  He found that Officer 
Linsmeier had probable cause for his search of the vehicle.  He 
also denied Jones' motion to return the seized property on 
grounds that the property was contraband.  He then set a jury 
trial on the pending drug paraphernalia charge.  Sixty-seven 
days later, the drug paraphernalia charge was dismissed because 
Jones had been sent to prison for other offenses. 
¶77 Although 
Judge 
Aulik 
ruled 
that 
the 
cash 
was 
contraband, he was reminded during the suppression/forfeiture 
hearing that there was an ongoing criminal case and that Wis. 
Stat. § 968.20(2) provides:  "Property not required for evidence 
or use in further investigation, unless contraband . . . may be 
returned by the officer to the person from whom it was seized 
without the requirement of a hearing."  At the time of the 
97-3306.dtp 
 
3 
hearing, Judge Aulik could not have found that the property was 
not needed as evidence or that all proceedings in which it might 
be required had been completed.  Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1)(a) and 
(b). 
¶78 As I see it, the evidence at issue here was seized 
incident to a lawful arrest that had nothing to do with the 
Uniform Controlled Substance Act.  Wis. Stat. ch. 961 (1995-96). 
 There was no obligation on the part of the State to seek 
forfeiture of this evidence under Wis. Stat. § 961.555, and 
there was no authority for Jones to seek return of the seized 
property under Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3), particularly when a drug 
case supported by the evidence was still pending. 
¶79 The majority acknowledges that the evidence was seized 
incident to an arrest for OWI.  Majority op. at 3.  The dissent, 
in asserting that Jones "had had property seized under Chapter 
961," is factually mistaken.  Dissent at 1.  The case should 
have been decided without all the troublesome interpretation in 
Part II of the opinion. 
 
 
 
97-3306.awb 
 
1 
 
¶80 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).   Since Jones was 
criminally charged under chapter 961 and had his property seized 
under chapter 961, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
legislature intended that the forfeiture stemming from those 
events should also be governed by chapter 961 forfeiture 
proceedings.  The majority concludes otherwise.  
¶81 Instead 
the 
majority 
applies 
the 
forfeiture 
proceedings of chapter 968 and unnecessarily complicates a 
relatively simple statutory procedure.  Because the majority 
fails to acknowledge a conflict between those statutory schemes, 
disregards the mandatory language of chapter 961, and in the 
process renders chapter 961 forfeiture procedure practically 
meaningless, I respectfully dissent. 
¶82 The statutory symmetry in this case is striking.  
Chapter 961 guided this case until the prosecutor failed to 
commence a forfeiture action within 30 days of the seizure of 
the property.  Jones was charged with possession of drug 
paraphernalia under Wis. Stat. § 961.573.  The police seized 
Jones’ property pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 961.55(2).  After the 
charges were dropped, Jones sought the return of his property 
under Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3).  All he now seeks is a ruling 
97-3306.awb 
 
2 
that, like the other parts of this matter, the forfeiture 
proceedings also be governed by chapter 961.17  
¶83 It is well established that “when we compare a general 
statute and a specific statute, the specific statute takes 
precedence.”  City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 
185, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995).  There can be little doubt that the 
forfeiture proceedings outlined in chapter 961 are more specific 
provisions than those contained at Wis. Stat. § 968.20.  The 
majority recognizes this fact, but circumvents this long-
standing rule of statutory construction by concluding that such 
a rule is inapplicable because no conflict exists between Wis. 
Stat. § 961.55 and § 968.20.  Majority op. at 9-10.   
¶84 I fail to see how the two provisions are not in 
conflict.  Take, for example, something as rudimentary as which 
party must initiate the proceedings.  Wisconsin Stat. § 961.555 
places the burden to initiate forfeiture proceedings on the 
                     
17 Of course, Jones’ interest is not academic.  If the 
forfeiture proceedings of chapter 961 are the required procedure 
in this case, he is automatically entitled to the return of his 
seized 
property. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 961.555 
requires 
a 
prosecutor to commence a forfeiture action 30 days from the 
seizure of the property.  It is undisputed that the prosecutor 
in this case failed to do so.   
This court has previously determined that any failure to 
follow these mandatory time limits causes the circuit court to 
lose jurisdiction, requires the proceeding to be dismissed, and 
obligates the State to return Jones’ property.  State v. Rosen, 
72 Wis. 2d 200, 204-09, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976).  Thus, if Jones 
is correct that the forfeiture proceedings in chapter 961 are 
the procedures to be followed, he is entitled to the recovery of 
his property. 
97-3306.awb 
 
3 
State; section 968.20 places the burden to initiate recovery 
proceedings on the person whose property was seized.  The 
majority sidesteps this conflict stating that the language in 
§ 961.55(3) requiring property “‘seized but not forfeited shall 
be returned to its rightful owner’” is “only triggered by an 
unsuccessful 
forfeiture 
action 
brought 
by 
the 
[S]tate.”  
Majority op. at 12 (quoting § 961.55(3)). 
¶85 Similarly, 
the 
statutes 
also 
conflict 
in 
the 
procedural requirements necessary to initiate forfeiture or 
recovery proceedings.  Under chapter 961, a prosecutor has 30 
days in which to begin forfeiture proceedings or lose the 
ability to seek forfeiture of the property.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.555(2)(a).  Section 968.20 places no time limitation on 
the initiation of proceedings.  To commence a Chapter 961 
forfeiture proceeding, a summons, complaint, and affidavit must 
be filed with the clerk of the circuit court and served on the 
property owner within 60 days.  Wis. Stat. § 961.555(2)(a).  In 
contrast, to commence a § 968.20 proceeding, an “application” 
must be made with the circuit court who then provides the 
prosecutor with “notice as it deems adequate.” 
¶86 Aside from its failure to recognize the existence of a 
statutory conflict, the majority’s interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.55 and § 961.555 fails to recognize that the forfeiture 
procedures outlined in chapter 961 are stated in mandatory 
terms.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3) states that after 
property is seized under § 961.55(2), forfeiture “proceedings 
under [§ 961.55(4)] shall be instituted promptly” (emphasis 
97-3306.awb 
 
4 
added).  Similarly, § 961.555 declares that a prosecutor “shall 
commence the forfeiture action within 30 days after the seizure 
of the property” (emphasis added).  Where the word “shall” is 
used, we presume the action to be mandatory unless the 
legislature indicates otherwise. Walworth County v. Spalding, 
111 Wis. 2d 19, 24, 329 N.W.2d 925 (1983).  Indeed, this court 
has already determined that the use of “shall” in chapter 961 
forfeiture proceedings creates mandatory obligations.  State v. 
Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976).  In short, I see 
nothing in these statutes indicating that when the State seizes 
property under Wis. Stat. § 961.55(2) it may elect to initiate 
forfeiture proceedings under chapter 961or it may elect not to. 
 The statutory language makes that act mandatory.  
¶87 Additionally, the majority opinion has the effect of 
making 
the 
chapter 
961 
forfeiture 
provisions 
practically 
meaningless.  I cannot imagine why a prosecutor would ever 
“choose” to proceed with forfeiture proceedings under chapter 
961.  Under such proceedings the prosecutor is required to file 
the action within 30 days of the seizure and face other imposed 
time limits relating to the initiation and prosecution of the 
action.  See Wis. Stat. § 961.555.  Conversely, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20, the prosecutor does not need to take any affirmative 
steps to retain the property; the burden to initiate the 
proceeding is on the person whose property has been seized. 
¶88 The case of State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 240 N.W.2d 
168 (1976), illustrates this point.  The Rosen court concluded 
that when the State commenced forfeiture proceedings under the 
97-3306.awb 
 
5 
predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 961.555, the time limits contained 
in that statute were mandatory.  Id. at 208.  Thus when a 
prosecutor failed to adhere to those time limits the circuit 
court lost jurisdiction and the proceeding had to be dismissed. 
 Id.  Why would prosecutors willingly proceed under § 961.555 
and be saddled with initiation and prosecution burdens if they 
had a choice?  The answer is that prosecutors would not if given 
the choice.   
¶89 Recognizing that this chapter 961 forfeiture “option” 
is one that no prosecutor would normally choose, the majority 
seeks to avoid the conclusion that its interpretation would make 
chapter 961 forfeiture provisions superfluous by advancing 
special circumstances in which a prosecutor would choose to 
initiate chapter 961 forfeiture proceedings.  Majority op. at 
18-19.   
¶90 The majority’s first contention is that chapter 961 
forfeiture proceedings can occur “whether or not a criminal 
charge has been brought against the owner of the property 
seized” 
juxtaposing 
that 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.20’s 
“presuppos[ition] of the existence of a case.” Id.  This is not 
only a distinction without a difference, it is not a distinction 
at all.  Both provisions have the identical language in this 
regard: 
 
[The seized property shall be returned if:] 
 
(a) The property is not needed as evidence or, if 
needed, satisfactory arrangements can be made for its 
return for subsequent use as evidence; or 
 
97-3306.awb 
 
6 
(b) All proceedings in which it might be required have 
been completed. 
Wis. Stat. § 961.55(3)(a), (b); Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1)(a), (b). 
 Notwithstanding the majority’s contentions to the contrary, it 
appears 
that 
the 
presuppositions 
underlying 
chapter 
961 
forfeiture 
proceedings and 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.20 
forfeiture 
proceedings are identical. 
¶91 Though the majority’s second and third rationales for 
a 
prosecutor’s 
continued 
use 
of 
chapter 
961 
forfeiture 
proceedings are more plausible than its first, they are still 
unpersuasive.  The majority contends that the entirety of Wis. 
Stat. § 961.55 and § 961.555 is for the purpose of obtaining 
property otherwise unattainable.  Majority op. at 19-20.  Yet, a 
solitary subsection, § 961.555(4), accomplishes that act.  The 
majority further asserts that these extensive statutes exist for 
the relatively obscure circumstance 
of 
obtaining property 
subject to concurrent jurisdiction with a foreign court.  Id.  
Yet, they do not in any way reference such a purpose.   
¶92 These second and third rationales may save the 
majority’s overall interpretation from rendering chapter 961 
forfeiture proceedings superfluous.  Even though such rationales 
are arguably plausible, when considered in conjunction with the 
majority’s dismissal of the chapter’s symmetry and mandatory 
language, it is unlikely that the legislature intended such a 
strained interpretation.   
¶93 Instead of engaging in these interpretive gymnastics, 
I would construe the statute in a simple and straightforward 
97-3306.awb 
 
7 
manner:  when the State seizes property under chapter 961, the 
State must seek to have the owner forfeit that property under 
chapter 961.18  This means that the forfeiture procedures 
outlined in chapter 961 are the sole procedures to be used in 
such cases.  Such an interpretation promotes the harmonious 
interaction between subsections of the same statute and between 
statutes in the same chapter.  Such an interpretation gives 
                     
18 The concurrence is incorrect when it states that Jones’ 
cash was “seized incident to a lawful arrest that had nothing to 
do with [chapter 961].”  Concurrence at 3.  The circuit court 
specifically determined that the officer was authorized to seize 
Jones’ cash because of chapter 961 and not merely because he had 
been arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated: 
QUESTION:  
Did you feel you had any probable cause 
to take that money, and, if so, under what statute did 
you have any probable cause to take that money? 
 
[objection omitted] 
 
THE COURT: 
I’ll make that decision.  The statute 
number is 961.55. 
 
The circuit court’s conclusion was based, at least in part, on 
the testimony of the officer: 
QUESTION:  
Based upon your training and experience 
do you have an opinion as to what the source was of 
the money that was found on Mr. Jones’ person? 
 
WITNESS:  
It’s my opinion it was drug-related 
money. 
 
Simply 
stated, 
without 
the 
discovery 
of 
the 
drug 
paraphernalia the officer could not have seized the cash.  One 
cannot get from an arrest for OWI to seizing Jones’ cash without 
the intermediate step of discovering the drug paraphernalia.  
However, by including the necessary intermediate step of 
discovering the drug paraphernalia, the seizure of the cash 
falls under chapter 961.  Wis. Stat. § 961.55(2)(a).   
97-3306.awb 
 
8 
effect to the mandatory words contained in the chapter’s 
forfeiture provisions.  Such an interpretation avoids relegating 
chapter 961 forfeiture provisions to the most exceptional of 
circumstances.  
¶94 In sum, while Wis. Stat. § 968.20 dictates the 
procedures to be followed in many forfeiture situations, it does 
not apply to forfeiture proceedings arising out of chapter 961 
seizures.  Rather, when a crime is charged under chapter 961 and 
when the seizure occurs under chapter 961, the forfeiture must 
also occur under chapter 961.   
¶95 This straightforward interpretation is consistent with 
the statutory language of § 961.55 and § 961.555 and avoids the 
special circumstances construction necessary to agree with the 
majority’s interpretation.  The State did not comply with the 
chapter 961 forfeiture procedures; Jones is therefore entitled 
to the return of his property.  Because the majority concludes 
otherwise, and in the process unnecessarily complicates a 
relatively simple statutory scheme, I respectfully dissent. 
¶96 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
97-3306.awb 
 
1