Title: Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93620
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 2002

Docket No. 93620-Agenda 36-September 2002.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Sam 
Lakhia, Appellant, v. MENARDS, INC., Appellee.
Opinion filed December 5, 2002.


	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case is before us on a question of Illinois law certified by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 145 Ill.
2d R. 20. The certified question is:
		"What is the applicable statute of limitations in Illinois for
an action for damages to property based on the doctrine of
strict liability in tort when that action is brought within
the applicable statute of repose?"
For the reasons that follow, the answer to the certified question is
five years.

I. BACKGROUND
	We take the following facts from the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630
(7th Cir. 2002).
			"Prior to December 18, 1994, Sam Lakhia or a member
of his family purchased a torchiere halogen lamp in a
Menards store in Hillsdale, Illinois. The lamp was placed
in the family home in Bellwood, Illinois and situated
along the south wall near the basement stairs for the
purposes of providing ambient light. On December 18,
there was a fire in the Lakhia home that resulted in a
claim by Mr. Lakhia for $144,799.05 for property damage
and related living expenses incurred as a result of the fire.
Allstate, Lakhia's insurer and subrogee, paid the claim
and then brought this action against Menards on March
10, 1999. The jurisdiction of the district court was based
on the diverse citizenship of the parties. Menards filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
			In a hearing before the district court, the parties
disagreed with respect to the applicable statute of
limitations period for a products liability action. In
Allstate's view, the applicable statute of limitations was
five years. It relied upon the decision of the Second
District in American Family Insurance Co. v. Village
Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 385, 131 Ill. Dec.
484, 538 N.E.2d 859 (1989). Menards, on the other hand,
submitted that the applicable statute of limitations was
two years. It relied on the decisions of the First District in
McLeish v. Sony Corp. of America, 152 Ill. App. 3d 628,
105 Ill. Dec. 648, 504 N.E.2d 933 (1987) and Calumet
Country Club v. Roberts Environmental Control Corp.,
136 Ill. App. 3d 610, 91 Ill. Dec. 267, 483 N.E.2d 613
(1985).
			In discharging their responsibility to ascertain the
content of state law in diversity cases, the sitting judges of
the Northern District of Illinois have developed two
conflicting approaches when confronted with no
controlling decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois and
with conflicting decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court.
Some judges have followed the standard practice for a
district court sitting in diversity and have attempted to
predict how the Supreme Court of Illinois would resolve
the question. Others have deemed themselves bound by
the prevailing rule of the state appellate district in which
the suit would have been brought in state court, reasoning
that this approach would prevent forum shopping. The
district court in this case had followed the latter approach
in earlier cases and decided that, in the absence of explicit
guidance from this court, it would not alter its course.
Accordingly, it followed the decisions of the First District
and held that the applicable statute of limitations was two
years and dismissed the action." Allstate, 285 F.3d  at 631-33.
	On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that statutes of
limitations reflect important policy choices by the state and have
severe consequences for the administration of justice within the
state. Allstate, 285 F.3d  at 639. In addition, the Seventh Circuit
mentioned that this court is "far more familiar with the policy
choices that have been made, and [has] far more direct
responsibility for the administration of justice within the state than
do the members of [the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals]."
Allstate, 285 F.3d  at 639. The Seventh Circuit further
acknowledged that the districts of our appellate court are in
disagreement about the applicable statute of limitations for strict
liability property damage actions and that this court has not had
the opportunity to address the question squarely. Allstate, 285 F.3d 
at 639. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the intrusion of
"unguided federal precedent" into the situation would only further
destabilize this state's jurisprudence on the issue and make it more
difficult for the members of the Illinois bar to counsel their clients
accurately. Allstate, 285 F.3d  at 639. According to the Seventh
Circuit, the issue at hand is, moreover, likely to arise with
significant frequency both in state and federal forums. Allstate,
285 F.3d  at 639. As a result, the Seventh Circuit certified the
question to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 20 (145 Ill.
2d R. 20). For these same reasons, we accepted the certified
question on April 17, 2002.

II. ANALYSIS
	The dispute between our appellate districts, acknowledged by
the federal courts, arises from differing interpretations of section
13-213 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/13-213 (West 2000)). The relevant text of section 13-213 reads
as follows:
			"§13-213. Product liability.
* * *
			(b) Subject to the provisions of subsections (c) and (d)
no product liability action based on any theory of doctrine
shall be commenced except within the applicable
limitations period and, in any event, within 12 years from
the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession by a
seller or 10 years from the date of first sale, lease or
delivery of possession to its initial user, consumer, or
other non-seller, whichever period expires earlier, of any
product unit that is claimed to have injured or damaged
the plaintiff, unless the defendant expressly has warranted
or promised the product for a longer period and the action
is brought within that period.
* * *
			(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)
*** if the injury complained of occurs within any of the
periods provided by subsection (b) ***, the plaintiff may
bring an action within 2 years after the date on which the
claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have known, of the existence of the personal
injury, death or property damage, but in no event shall
such action be brought more than 8 years after the date on
which such personal injury, death or property damage
occurred." 735 ILCS 5/13-213 (West 2000).
	The other section of the Code at issue in this case is section
13-205. That section provides:
			"§13-205. Five year limitation. Except as provided in
Section 2-725 of the 'Uniform Commercial Code,'
approved July 31, 1961, as amended, and Section 11-13
of 'The Illinois Public Aid Code', approved April 11,
1967, as amended, actions on unwritten contracts,
expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, or to
recover damages for an injury done to property, real or
personal, or to recover the possession of personal property
or damages for the detention or conversion thereof, and
all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be
commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action
accrued." 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2000).
	The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Solich
v. George &amp; Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago,
Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). The statute's plain language is the
best indicator of the legislature's intent. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000). When statutory language is ambiguous, it is
appropriate to resort to extrinsic aids of construction such as an
examination of the legislative history. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997). When the language is clear, however, it will
be given effect without resort to other aids for construction.
Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 445 (2002). The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo
review. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001).
	The districts of our appellate court have construed the
language of section 13-213, reaching contrary conclusions. The
First District has construed section 13-213 as providing a specific
limitations period for products liability actions, with a statute of
repose in subsection (b) and the statute of limitations in subsection
(d), thereby trumping the limitations period for property damage
specifically provided for in section 13-205. See Calumet Country
Club v. Roberts Environmental Control Corp., 136 Ill. App. 3d at
610, 613-14 (1985). In particular, the First District has stated that
a reading of section 13-213 "reveals that a plaintiff who knows,
or should know, that a product has caused property damage must
bring his action in products liability within two years of when he
becomes aware of that damage." McLeish v. Sony Corp. of
America, 152 Ill. App. 3d 628, 630 (1987).
	Conversely, the Second District reads section 13-213 as
providing a statute of repose, with an exception to that statute of
repose in subsection (d). American Family Insurance Co. v.
Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 385, 388-89 (1989).
The Second District specifically rejected the First District's
construction of 13-213 and held that its own "interpretation is
borne out by a close examination of the language" of subsection
(d). American Family, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 388. The American
Family court reasoned that, because subsection (d) begins with the
phrase " 'Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b),' " it is
clear that subsection (d) is an exception to the general rule set out
in subsection (b) and not the applicable limitations period for
products liability actions. American Family, 182 Ill. App. 3d at
388-89. According to the American Family court:
		"This exception is that, even if a suit is not commenced
within the applicable limitations period and the statute of
repose, a suit may be brought if the injury occurred within
the statute of repose, and the suit is filed within two years
after plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.
The use of the word 'may' in section 13-213(d) provides
a clear indication that the section is providing an extra
right to plaintiffs, not limiting their actions. Section
13-213(d) is only meant to apply to situations where the
injury is not immediately discoverable. [Citation.]"
(Emphases omitted.) American Family, 182 Ill. App. 3d
at 389.
Accordingly, the court concluded that section 13-213(d) did not
replace the five-year statute of limitations for property damage
actions set out in section 13-205. American Family, 182 Ill. App.
3d at 388-89.
	While this court has not directly addressed the issue presented
by the case at hand, we have had occasion to determine the
applicable statute of limitations regarding an action for personal
injuries under section 13-213. In Golla v. General Motors Corp.,
167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995), we held that the " 'applicable limitations
period' " referred to in section 13-213, with respect to an action
for personal injuries, is found in section 13-202 of the Code.
Golla, 167 Ill. 2d  at 359. Section 13-202 "states that '[a]ctions for
damages for an injury to the person *** shall be commenced
within 2 years next after the cause of action accrued.' " Golla v.
General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 359 (1995), quoting Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 13-202, now codified as 735 ILCS
5/13-202 (West 2000).
	Our decision in Golla and the Second District's decision in
American Family are each in accord with the plain language of
section 13-213. In addition to the reasons expressed by the
American Family court, if subsection (d) of section 13-213 were
intended to be a statute of limitations, as Menards argues and the
First District has held, then there would have been no need to
mention both subsection (d) and "the applicable limitations
period" in the first sentence of subsection (b) of section 13-213.
Menards' reading of the Code would render the phrase "the
applicable limitations period" in subsection (b) mere surplusage.
See Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1996)
(the presence of surplusage should not be presumed in statutory
construction and each word, clause or sentence must, if possible,
be given some reasonable meaning), quoting Hirschfield v.
Barrett, 40 Ill. 2d 224, 230 (1968). There is no rule of statutory
construction that authorizes a court to declare that the legislature
did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.
Solich, 158 Ill. 2d  at 83. The plain language of section 13-213
refers to an applicable limitations period that is to be found outside
of that section-in section 13-202 for personal injury actions (see
Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 359) and in section 13-205 for actions
involving loss of property. See People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318,
332 (2001) (sections of a statute should be read in harmony with
one another); see also LaPorte v. R.D. Werner Co., 561 F. Supp. 189, 190 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (section 13-213(b) confirms that
strict liability claims are not governed by special limitations
provisions). In addition to LaPorte, we cite with approval three
other federal district courts that have addressed the same issue. See
Allstate Insurance Co. v. K-Mart Corp., No. 99 C 8515, slip op.
at 2-3 (N.D. Ill., March 23, 2001); Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 983, 987 (N.D. Ill.
1999); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 669 F. Supp. 854, 857 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1987). Based on substantially the
same reasoning we employ today, those cases uniformly held that
the limitations period for strict liability claims seeking recovery
for property damage is five years.
	To the contrary, Menards argues that, in Davis v. Toshiba
Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181 (1999), we in some way
disagreed with the American Family court's construction of
subsection (d) of section 13-213 and "gave the clear impression
that [s]ubsection (d) was a statute of limitations" and not an
exception to the statute of repose. Menards is mistaken. In fact, we
stated unequivocally in Davis that subsection (d) was "an
exception to the *** repose period found in subsection (b)." Davis,
186 Ill. 2d  at 185. Menards alternatively contends that subsection
(d) of section 13-213 is a specific statute of limitations that trumps
the general limitations period found in section 13-205. See
Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195
(1992) (" '[w]here there are two statutory provisions, one of which
is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other
is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular
provision must prevail' "), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954). Nevertheless, having found that subsection (d)
is an exception to the statute of repose and not a statute of
limitations at all, we need not address Menards' argument in this
regard.
	Lastly, Menards maintains that the legislative history supports
its contention that subsection (d) of section 13-213 is a statute of
limitations. Our decision in this case is, however, dictated by the
plain language of section 13-213. Therefore, we cannot accept
Menards' invitation to consider that section's legislative history.
See Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d  at 446 (when statutory language is
unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language to the
legislative history).

III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, five years is the applicable statute
of limitations in Illinois for an action for damages to property
based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort when that action is
brought within the applicable statute of repose.
Certified question answered.