Title: Barbara C. Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc.
Citation: 2010 WI 93
Docket Number: 2008AP002028
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2010

2010 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2028 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Barbara C. Grygiel and Janet M. Nahorn, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Karl J. Scheife, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 102 
Reported at: 320 Wis. 2d 550, 770 N.W.2d 749 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 20,2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
David C. Resheske   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part/dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by John A. Rothstein and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by John A. Rothstein. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Lance S. 
Grady, Daniel K. Miller, and Grady, Hayes & Neary, LLC, 
Waukesha, and oral argument by Lance S. Grady. 
 
An amicus curiae brief by Debra Peterson Conrad and the 
Wisconsin REALTORS® Association, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin REALTORS® Association. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2028 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV233) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Barbara C. Grygiel and Janet M. Nahorn,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,   
 
 
v. 
 
Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc.,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Karl J. Scheife, 
 
Defendant. 
FILED 
 
JUL 20, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded to the circuit court with directions. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's decision2 
denying 
Barbara 
C. 
Grygiel's 
and 
Janet 
M. 
Nahorn's 
(collectively, 
Grygiel) 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment 
and 
                                                 
1 Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 2009 WI App 
102, 320 Wis. 2d 550, 770 N.W.2d 749. 
2 The Honorable David C. Resheske of Washington County 
presided. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
2 
 
dismissing Grygiel's complaint.3  Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc. 
(the Club) has an easement over Grygiel's property "for the 
purpose of ingress and egress as a means of access" to the 
Club's 
property. 
 
Grygiel 
alleges 
that 
Karl 
J. 
Scheife 
(Scheife), a Club member, and several invitees, crossed the 
easement and entered the Club's land for the purpose of 
accessing property located south of the Club's land.  The issues 
in this case are whether Scheife's use of the easement to 
achieve access to property other than the Club's property 
contravened the express terms of the Club's easement and, if so, 
whether Scheife committed trespass on Grygiel's property by that 
act.  We conclude that Scheife contravened the express terms of 
the Club's easement by entering Grygiel's property without 
consent and in doing so he unlawfully trespassed on Grygiel's 
land.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for entry of judgment 
granting Grygiel a declaration of trespass and an award of 
nominal damages. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Grygiel owns and 
resides on 32 acres of property in Washington County, the 
westerly side of which has access to and abuts Erin Road, a 
                                                 
3 Any counterclaims Scheife may have alleged were not 
decided by the circuit court and, therefore, are not before us. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
3 
 
public roadway.4  The Club owns 120 acres of land east of 
Grygiel's property, a portion of which abuts Grygiel's property.  
No portion of the Club's property abuts a public roadway.   
¶3 
The Club, a non-stock corporation, has 75 members and 
permits its members to use its 120 acres for hunting year round.  
Additionally, each member is permitted to bring family members, 
invitees and individuals interested in joining the Club onto the 
Club's property. 
¶4 
On March 22, 1973, Grygiel's predecessors in interest, 
Alta and David Fruit, granted the Club's predecessors in 
interest, Melvin and Arline Voigt, an easement appurtenant to 
the Club's property, permitting access to the Club's land via a 
40-foot strip across Grygiel's land.  The written easement 
recorded with the register of deeds provides in relevant part: 
David J. Fruit and Alta R. Fruit, his wife, hereby 
grant to Melvin Voigt and Arline Voigt, his wife, and 
to their heirs and assigns, an easement for the 
purpose of ingress and egress as a means of access to 
the NW-1/4 of SE-1/4, the SW-1/4 of NE-1/4, and NE-1/4 
of SW-1/4, all in Section 31, Township 9 North, Range 
10 East. 
This 
easement 
shall 
extend 
from 
the 
above 
described land West to Erin Road and shall be 40 feet 
in width. 
                                                 
4 To assist the reader, we have attached a diagram of the 
property at issue in this case.  The diagram is attached as 
Exhibit A.  This exhibit is a reproduction of an exhibit Grygiel 
submitted to the circuit court in support of her motion for 
summary judgment.  The parcel labeled "Monches 120 acres" is 
what we refer to as the Club's property.  We stress that this 
exhibit is not to scale; rather, it is a simplified diagram of 
the lots and easement at issue. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
4 
 
It is undisputed that the legal description in the easement 
describes the Club's 120 acres.  Grygiel does not dispute that 
such easement permits the Club's members and its invitees to 
cross the easement strip to access the Club's land. 
¶5 
On November 24, 2006, Scheife, who is a Club member, 
and seven other non-Club members, were deer hunting on a 100-
acre parcel of land owned by the Unrein family (Unreins).  Such 
100-acre parcel is located approximately one-quarter mile south 
of the Club's land.  Immediately to the north of the 100-acre 
parcel is another 40-acre parcel also owned by the Unreins.  
Portions of the 40-acre parcel borders the Club's land to the 
north, Grygiel's land to the west and the Unreins' 100-acre 
parcel to the south.  Scheife rents a home on the Unreins' land 
and his lease gives him hunting privileges on all of the 
Unreins' land.   
¶6 
After hunting the Unreins' 100-acre parcel, Scheife 
and the other hunters accompanying him decided to hunt on the 
Unreins' 40-acre parcel.  The hunters drove from the Unreins' 
100-acre parcel across the Club's easement, accessed via Erin 
Road, to the Club's property.  They parked their vehicles on the 
Club's property and from there crossed the Club's property, 
which required the hunters to cross over a fence, and entered 
the Unreins' adjacent 40-acre parcel.  It is undisputed that the 
hunters did not hunt on the Club's property that day.  It is 
further undisputed that the hunters could have accessed the 
Unreins' 40-acre parcel directly from the 100-acre parcel, but 
instead chose to access the 40-acre parcel from the north via 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
5 
 
the Club's property.5  Scheife said that he and his invitees 
crossed the Club's easement "for the express purposes of hunting 
the [Unreins'] 40 acres to the south." 
¶7 
After the group was done hunting, they returned to the 
Unreins' 100-acre parcel.  From there two members of the hunting 
party drove Scheife back toward the Club's easement, with the 
intention of retrieving Scheife's vehicle from the Club's 
property.  As they approached the easement from Erin Road, they 
saw that Grygiel had blocked access to the easement.  Grygiel 
then called the sheriff's department and a deputy arrived 
shortly thereafter.   
¶8 
On March 9, 2007, Grygiel filed suit against the Club 
and Scheife alleging common law trespass and breach of the terms 
and covenants set forth in the written easement.6  Specifically, 
                                                 
5 Apparently, this was a strategic decision made for 
purposes of driving deer in a particular direction. 
6 In its complaint, Grygiel also alleged a violation of a 
final judgment entered in a 1990 action declaring the Club's 
rights under the easement.  The Club commenced the 1990 action 
seeking a declaration of rights under the written easement.  The 
Club filed the suit in response to complaints by Grygiel 
regarding use of the easement by the Club's neighboring farmers 
to transport farm vehicles to their property.  The final 
judgment (1991 judgment) declared the parties have the following 
rights under the easement: 
a. 
The Defendants[, the Club,] are owners of 
land which is subject to an easement in favor of the 
predecessors in title of the Plaintiff[, Grygiel]. 
b. 
The easement was granted by Defendants' 
predecessor in title and is a recorded document dated 
March 22, 1973.  It is recorded as Document 341509 of 
Volume 539 of Records at Page 507 in the Washington 
County Register of Deeds Office. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
6 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
c. 
Under the written document, [the Club] has a 
right for ingress and egress to [the Club's] land over 
[Grygiel's] land within the 40-foot area described in 
the easement, but has no other right or interest in 
[Grygiel's] lands. 
d. 
The written instrument does not grant [the 
Club] the right to park on the easement.  Therefore, 
[the Club] may not park or allow parking of vehicles 
on (or within the area of) the easement. 
e. 
The easement may be used for ingress and 
egress to [the Club's] property by members of [the 
Club], its invitees, services vehicles and emergency 
vehicles. 
f. 
[The Club] may not extend the use of its 
easement 
rights across [Grygiel's] lands to any 
parties 
other 
than 
as 
stated 
in 
the 
preceding 
subsection (e).  Without limitation, [the Club] may 
not grant the use of the easement to still other third 
persons (e.g. farmers) as a means of gaining access to 
other properties beyond [the Club's] land. 
g. 
[The Club's] vehicles may turn around within 
the easement provided the vehicles do not go outside 
the 40-foot easement. 
[h]. [The Club] may improve the current roadway 
within the area described in the easement but any 
improvements shall only be for purposes of ingress and 
egress.  
In the instant action, on October 1, 2007, Grygiel filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment arguing that Scheife's use 
of the easement to cross onto the Unreins' property violated the 
1991 judgment.  Specifically, she argued that pursuant to the 
1991 judgment "neither the Club nor any of its members have the 
right to grant the use of the easement over to [Grygiel's] 
property to third persons as a means of gaining access to other 
properties beyond the Club's land listed in the easement."  
Moreover, Grygiel argued that "neither the Club nor any of its 
members have the right themselves" to use the easement in such a 
manner. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
7 
 
with respect to the trespass claim, Grygiel alleged that Club 
member Scheife's use of the easement to enter the Unreins' land 
via the Club's property was "outside of the limited permission 
set forth in the Easement, and thus, since their conduct on 
[Grygiel's] Property was without permission, such conduct 
constituted a trespass of [Grygiel's] Property."  In his answer, 
Scheife admitted he "did not ask for, nor did he receive, any 
permission 
from 
[Grygiel] 
. . . 
to 
come 
on 
[Grygiel's] 
Property."  Grygiel stipulated to limit her damages to an award 
of nominal damages, upon a declaration of trespass.7 
                                                                                                                                                             
On February 5, 2008, the circuit court denied the motion 
concluding that "the language of the judgment does not restrict 
the [Club] or its invitees from using the easement to gain 
access to other properties, only that it restricts third persons 
from doing so."  Moreover, during a hearing on Grygiel's second 
summary judgment motion, the circuit court dismissed the claim 
for enforcement of the 1991 judgment.   
It appears as though an argument could be made that 
Scheife's actions violated the 1991 judgment.  The judgment 
specifically stated that the "easement may be used for ingress 
and egress to [the Club's] property," that the Club "may not 
extend the use of its easement rights," including granting use 
of the easement "as a means of gaining access to other 
properties beyond [the Club's] land."  Scheife, who is a Club 
member, used the easement along with third parties to gain 
access to the Unreins' 40 acres——property beyond the Club's 
land. 
However, we decline to decide whether Scheife's acts 
violated the 1991 judgment because Grygiel did not raise the 
issue for our review.  Accordingly, we decide this case based 
only on Grygiel's alternative claims of breach of the express 
written easement and common law trespass. 
7 The stipulation provides in relevant part: 
[I]n the event the Court determines that summary 
judgment can be granted on the issue the plaintiffs 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
8 
 
¶9 
Grygiel moved for summary judgment.  In a written 
decision, the circuit court denied Grygiel's motion, concluding 
that "the defendant, Mr. Scheife, properly used the easement 
granted to the [Club] as a means of gaining access to the 
dominant estate.  The fact that he subsequently entered the 
adjoining property, with permission, does not impermissibly 
extend the use of the easement."  As a result, the circuit court 
concluded that Grygiel's "claim for trespass and breach of 
easement cannot be proven and must be dismissed." 
¶10 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed, 
relying 
on 
its 
interpretation of Millen v. Thomas, which held that "an easement 
for a specified purpose may not be enlarged such that an added 
burden is placed upon the servient estate," 201 Wis. 2d 675, 
685, 550 N.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1996).  The court of appeals 
focused its analysis on whether Scheife's use of the easement 
created an additional burden on the servient estate, Grygiel's 
property.  Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 2009 WI 
App 102, ¶14, 320 Wis. 2d 550, 770 N.W.2d 749.  The court of 
appeals concluded: 
[T]he undisputed facts indicate that when Club member 
Scheife 
and 
his 
invitees 
traveled 
the 
access 
                                                                                                                                                             
have put before the Court, and the Plaintiffs' motion 
is granted (which includes a dismissal of the one 
counterclaim as moot), then by this instrument the 
plaintiffs hereby stipulate to withdraw their request 
for actual and punitive damages in this case——and the 
need for any trial thereon——in exchange for the entry 
of an award of nominal damages on the declaration of a 
trespass together with normal statutory costs in the 
plaintiffs' favor. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
9 
 
road[, the easement,] to the Club's property, the 
burden on the servient estate was no greater than it 
would have been had the hunters remained on the Club 
property. . . .  Consequently, Grygiel's claims for 
misuse of the easement were properly dismissed. 
Id., ¶15. 
¶11 We granted review and now reverse. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 "We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court."  City of 
Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶13, 302 Wis. 2d 
599, 734 N.W.2d 428 (citing AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 
2006 WI 106, ¶14, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 835).  In order to 
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case, 
we must interpret the document creating the 1973 easement.  See 
AKG Real Estate, 296 Wis. 2d 1, ¶14.  Interpreting the language 
of a deed granting an easement is a question of law we review 
independently, but benefiting from the analyses of both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  See id. 
B.  General Principles of Easement Law 
¶13 "An easement is a liberty, a privilege, or an 
advantage 
in 
lands 
without 
profit 
and 
distinct 
from 
an 
ownership."  Union Falls Power Co. v. Marinette Cnty., 238 
Wis. 134, 138, 298 N.W. 598 (1941).  Easements may be classified 
as either appurtenant or in gross.  Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2002 WI 
App 22, ¶18, 250 Wis. 2d 1, 640 N.W.2d 178; see also Union 
Falls, 238 Wis. at 138 ("Easements are of two classes, easements 
appurtenant and easements in gross.").  In this case, our focus 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
10 
 
is on easements appurtenant as it is undisputed that the 1973 
deed granted an easement appurtenant.  Accordingly, an expanded 
review of the characteristics of easements appurtenant will be 
helpful. 
¶14 "'Appurtenant' means that the rights or obligations of 
a servitude are tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular 
unit or parcel of land."  Gojmerac, 250 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18 (citing 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  Servitudes § 1.5, at 30 (2000)).  
"An 
appurtenant 
easement 
creates 
two 
distinct 
property 
interests:  the dominant estate . . . and the servient estate."  
Id., ¶19.  The dominant estate is the estate that "enjoys the 
privileges granted by an easement," and the servient estate is 
that estate upon which the privileges are exercised.  Id. 
(citing Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis. 2d 628, 637, 566 N.W.2d 
158 (Ct. App. 1997); Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 638, 45 N.W. 
414 (1890) ("[L]ot 3, to which the easement is appurtenant, is 
the dominant estate, and lot 4, over which the easement is 
enjoyed, is a servient estate.")).  "The dominant owner does not 
obtain an estate in the servient property, but only a right to 
use the land consistent with the general property rights of the 
servient owner."  Id.   
¶15 "It is the essence of an appurtenant easement that it 
exists for the benefit of the dominant estate alone."  Id., ¶22 
(citing Vliet v. Sherwood, 35 Wis. 229, 235 (1874)).  It is 
well-settled that an easement appurtenant "can be used only in 
connection with the dominant estate to which it is appurtenant."  
Id. (citing S.S. Kresge Co. of Mich. v. Winkelman Realty Co., 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
11 
 
260 Wis. 372, 376, 50 N.W.2d 920 (1952); Restatement (Third) of 
Prop.:  Servitudes § 4.11, at 619 (2000)).8  Sicchio v. Alvey, 10 
Wis. 2d 528, 103 N.W.2d 544 (1960), reiterated this principle.  
Sicchio explained that "a right of way appurtenant to a 
particular lot cannot be used as a mode of access to another lot 
to which it is not appurtenant, even though there is no 
resulting additional burden."  Id. at 537. 
¶16 It is also well-settled that "the dominant estate 
cannot be enlarged."  Gojmerac, 250 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23.  Reise first 
stated this principle as follows:  "[I]f a person has a right of 
way over the land of another to a particular close, he cannot 
enlarge it or extend it to other closes."  Reise, 76 Wis. at 
639.   
¶17 In Reise, Cook originally owned lots 3 and 4.  Id. at 
636.  Cook sold lot 3 to Reise and also granted Reise an express 
easement over lot 4 to the west so that Reise could have ingress 
and egress to Clinton Street.  Id.  Later, Reise acquired lot 2 
to the east and then sold the dominant estate, lot 3, but 
reserved the right to use the easement across lot 4.  Id.  Reise 
argued that the terms of the express easement granted him the 
right to use the easement to access lot 2.  In its discussion, 
the court noted:  "[T]he simple question presented is, Can that 
right be maintained upon the language of the deeds?"  Id. at 
                                                 
8 Restatement (Third) of Property:  Servitudes § 4.11 (2000) 
states:  "Unless the terms of the servitude determined under 
§ 4.1 provide otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit may 
not be used for the benefit of property other than the dominant 
estate." 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
12 
 
637.  The court concluded that such right could not be 
maintained on the language of the deeds because Reise's use of 
the easement to access lot 2, a non-dominant parcel, was 
improper as it "enlarge[d] and extend[ed] the right over the 
servient estate to another lot."  Id. at 639. 
¶18 The above-stated principle applies to the extent that 
it does not conflict with the express terms of the easement.  
See Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  Servitudes § 4.11 (explaining 
that an appurtenant easement may not be used for the benefit of 
property other than the dominant estate "[u]nless the terms of 
the servitude . . . provide otherwise"). 
¶19 A written easement holder has the right to use the 
easement in accordance with the express terms of the easement 
grant.  Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 343, 254 N.W.2d 282 
(1977).  Determining whether an easement holder's use of an 
easement contravenes the express terms of the easement grant 
requires us to construe the document that grants the easement, 
often, a deed.  Id. at 342-43; Reise, 76 Wis. at 637. 
¶20 The "first step in construction of a deed is to 
examine what is written within the four corners of the deed, for 
this is the primary source of the intent of the parties."  
Rikkers v. Ryan, 76 Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 (1977).  If 
the language within the four corners of the deed is unambiguous, 
the court will not look further.  Id.  However, if the language 
granting the easement is ambiguous, meaning the deed is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation in regard 
to the grant of easement, the court may resort to extrinsic 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
13 
 
evidence in an effort to determine the intent of the parties.  
Gilbert v. Geiger, 2008 WI App 29, ¶10, 307 Wis. 2d 463, 747 
N.W.2d 188. 
¶21 In addition to the above-stated principles of law, the 
Club and Scheife contend that to determine whether certain 
conduct violates the express terms of an easement, under Millen 
we are required to analyze the added burden, if any, imposed on 
the servient estate.  The Club and Scheife misperceive the 
import of Millen. 
¶22 In Millen, the Millens purchased a lakefront lot from 
Krumme, and granted Krumme a 12-foot wide easement "for ingress 
and egress from Beaver Lake Road to Beaver Lake," over the 
property.  Millen, 201 Wis. 2d at 680.  The easement gave Krumme 
lake access from Krumme's remaining off-lake parcel.  Id.  
"Thus, the Millens' lakefront lot became the servient estate and 
Krumme's off-lake lot became the dominant estate under the law 
of easements."  Id.  Krumme eventually "conveyed her remaining 
off-lake dominant estate to Thomas together with the easement."  
Id. at 681.  Thomas owned two additional off-lake lots that 
surrounded the Krumme off-lake lot on the north, east and west 
sides.  Id. at 680.  "Thomas executed a quit-claim deed to 
herself by which she merged the legal description of the off-
lake dominant estate parcel which she had purchased from Krumme 
with the surrounding off-lake" parcels she previously owned.  
Id. at 681.   
¶23 The Millens' filed a declaratory action seeking to 
extinguish the easement, alleging that "Thomas's subsequent 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
14 
 
merger of the dominant estate with the surrounding land" she 
previously owned placed an additional burden on the servient 
estate that required termination of the easement.  See id. at 
683.  As the court of appeals reasoned through the legal 
questions presented, the court explained that "an easement for a 
specified purpose may not be enlarged such that an added burden 
is placed upon the servient estate."  Id. at 685 (citing S.S. 
Kresge Co., 260 Wis. at 376–77).  The court then explained that 
the "mere fact that the owner of the dominant estate now owns 
other abutting lands" is insufficient to demonstrate an added 
burden on the servient estate sufficient to result in the 
termination of the easement.  Id.  The court concluded that the 
Millens failed to demonstrate that an additional burden was 
placed on the servient estate such that "continued use of the 
easement is precluded as a matter of law."  Id. at 685, 683. 
¶24 Millen established that extinguishing an easement is 
appropriate when the additional burden imposed on the servient 
estate is so violative of the terms of the express easement that 
"continued use of the easement is precluded as a matter of law."  
Id. at 683.  Stated otherwise, Millen is a remedies case.  
Millen asked the court to extinguish the easement so that no use 
could be made of it whatsoever.  Millen did not decide that an 
easement must be subject to an undue additional burden before a 
court can conclude that the terms of an express easement have 
been contravened.    
¶25 Correctly 
understood, 
Millen's 
use 
of 
a 
burden 
analysis applies to those occasions when a servient estate owner 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
15 
 
seeks the remedy of extinguishment of an express easement.  
Millen's burden analysis does not apply when the servient estate 
owner simply seeks a declaration that the terms of an express 
easement have been contravened.  See id.; accord Gojmerac, 250 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶22–24, 47 (concluding that two parcels of land had 
the right to use the easement under the express terms of the 
easement grant "until such time as the Gojmeracs prove that the 
easement should be extinguished for a particular, recognized 
reason, such as that the use has increased the burden on the 
servient estate").   
¶26 We further note that S.S. Kresge Co., cited by Millen 
for the proposition that the servient estate may not be 
subjected to an added burden, similarly does not lead to the 
conclusion that we analyze whether an added burden is imposed on 
the servient estate when the gravamen of the complaint is that 
the terms of an express easement have been contravened.  This is 
so because S.S. Kresge Co. arose in the context of an easement 
that was obtained by prescription. 
¶27 In S.S. Kresge Co., the easement was in an alleyway 
leading to a barbershop located on lot 2.  S.S. Kresge Co., 260 
Wis. at 376.  The defendants then began to use lot 2, the 
dominant estate, as a retail outlet for appliances and as a 
storage warehouse for other merchandise that was to be sold 
elsewhere, which extended beyond lot 2.  Id.  The court 
concluded that this created "an added burden upon the servient 
estate."  Id. at 377.  In so concluding, the court explained 
that "[t]he owner of the servient estate is not required to wait 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
16 
 
until his property has been unreasonably burdened and thereby 
permit additional rights to be gained by prescription but he may 
proceed when any additional burden is placed upon his property."  
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶28 In the context of a prescriptive easement, where the 
rights of the parties are not expressly set forth in a written 
document but rather are created through use, the assessment of 
whether an additional burden has been placed upon a prescriptive 
easement is appropriate due to the nature of a prescriptive 
easement.  That is, the easement itself arises through use and 
an assessment of the burden that use has placed on the land of 
the servient estate over a period of time.  See Ludke v. Egan, 
87 Wis. 2d 221, 230–31, 274 N.W.2d 641 (1979) (setting forth the 
elements of an easement by prescription).  Because the scope of 
a prescriptive easement is constrained by the use that gave rise 
to the easement's creation, whether a prescriptive easement 
holder unreasonably placed an additional burden on the servient 
estate through use of the easement is relevant to determining 
whether the lawful scope of a prescriptive easement has been 
unlawfully extended.9  See S.S. Kresge Co., 260 Wis. at 376–77; 
                                                 
9 Our conclusion is supported by other prescriptive easement 
cases discussing whether the servient estate has been subjected 
to an added burden.  See, e.g., Knuth v. Vogels, 265 Wis. 341, 
345, 61 N.W.2d 301 (1953) (concluding that an easement by 
prescription for a driveway was not unlawfully extended by 
placing an increased burden on the servient estate when the 
easement holder replaced the original cinder driveway with a 
concrete driveway).   
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
17 
 
Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Merch. Corp., 4 Wis. 2d 327, 339, 
90 N.W.2d 777 (1958). 
¶29 However, in the context of an express easement, the 
foundational principles that underlie the creation of the 
easement are much different from those principles that permit 
the creation of an easement by prescription.  Moreover, 
requiring a showing of added burden in regard to proving that 
the 
terms 
of 
an 
express 
easement 
have 
been 
contravened 
encourages "difficult litigation over the question whether 
increased use unreasonably increases the burden on the servient 
estate."  Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  Servitudes § 4.11 cmt. 
b.  Grygiel notes this concern and asserts that the necessary 
case-by-case determination of whether certain conduct imposed an 
additional burden on the servient estate in the context of 
express easements would eliminate "[t]he sanctity of the owner's 
private property, the workmanship of the written easement, and 
the certainty of prior rights."   
¶30 We agree that when faced with an express easement, a 
court's focus should be on the language of the easement grant, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, assessing burden on the servient estate of an 
easement of necessity is proper.  Easements of necessity do not 
contain express terms; rather, an easement of necessity may be 
granted when an easement "'is required for the complete and 
beneficial use of the land.'"  Richards v. Land Star Grp., Inc., 
224 Wis. 2d 829, 839, 593 N.W.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 25 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses § 92, at 664 (1996)).  Richards 
correctly noted that "the issue here is not whether a written 
easement grant includes utility installation," but in the 
absence of express terms, the issue is whether the utility 
easement was necessary and "whether utility installation would 
overburden the servient estate."  Id. at 839, 842.   
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
18 
 
and not on the presence or absence of added burden, in 
determining whether certain conduct contravenes the terms of the 
express easement.  That analysis honors the expectations of the 
contracting parties and creates predictability in the respective 
parties' property rights.  Parties who negotiate a deed granting 
an express easement expect courts to enforce its terms, which we 
conclude the law requires.  See Rikkers, 76 Wis. 2d at 188. 
C.  The 1973 Easement 
¶31 As an initial matter, for the reasons we set out 
herein, we reject the Club's assertion that in order to prevail 
Grygiel must demonstrate that Scheife's conduct imposed an added 
burden on Grygiel's property.  Millen's burden analysis is not 
applicable here.  First, the Club has an express written 
easement granted by deed, not an easement by prescription, over 
Grygiel's property.  Moreover, Grygiel does not seek to 
extinguish the Club's express easement as a matter of law; 
rather, Grygiel seeks a declaration that Scheife's conduct 
contravened the express terms of the easement and that by such 
conduct Scheife committed trespass.  Because we are not 
confronted with a prescriptive easement and have not been called 
on to determine whether the Club's easement must be extinguished 
as a matter of law, we conclude that any added burden analysis 
is misplaced in this case.  See supra ¶¶21–30. 
¶32 Instead, we have been called on to determine whether 
Scheife contravened the Club's express easement by using the 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
19 
 
easement to access property other than the Club's property.10  
Case law directs us to resolve this issue by examining the 
language of the express easement.  See Hunter, 78 Wis. 2d at 
342–43; Reise, 76 Wis. at 637.  As such, our consideration 
focuses on "what is written within the four corners of the deed" 
creating the express easement.  Rikkers, 76 Wis. 2d at 188. 
¶33 We conclude that the easement is unambiguous and that 
Scheife's use of the easement to access the Unreins' 40 acres 
contravened the express terms of the easement.  By using the 
easement to access the Unreins' 40 acres, Scheife and his 
invitees used the easement for the benefit of property other 
than the dominant estate and effectively enlarged the dominant 
estate to include the Unreins' 40 acres contrary to established 
easement law. 
¶34 The Club has an easement over a 40-foot wide strip of 
Grygiel's land "for the purpose of ingress and egress as a means 
of access" to the Club's property.  By its express terms, this 
easement unambiguously limits the Club's use of the easement 
such that it may be used only to access or to leave the Club's 
                                                 
10 Both parties also argued about something referred to as a 
"home base" exception.  It is unclear what exactly the home base 
exception is.  Without so defining in its brief, Grygiel argued 
that "this Court should reject the Club's proffered 'home base 
exception.'"  However, the Club's brief stated that "the claimed 
'home base exception' . . . is a creation of Grygiel that 
misstates the position of the Club relative to this matter."  
Because neither party supports the adoption of such exception, 
we decline to address this argument. 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
20 
 
property.  As such, use of the easement to access any other 
property is outside the grant of this easement. 
¶35 Here, it is undisputed that Scheife along with his 
invitees used the easement as a means of access to the Unreins' 
40 acres, not the Club's property.  Indeed, this point was 
confirmed by Scheife's own testimony at the circuit court.  He 
averred as follows:  "On November 26th, 2006, I did drive myself 
and two other people over the easement to the Monches Fish & 
Game Club for the express purposes of hunting the [Unreins'] 40 
acres to the south.  I have never denied that."  As such, we 
conclude that Scheife's conduct contravened the express terms of 
the easement. 
¶36 As stated, the deed in this case granted an easement 
appurtenant for a specifically stated purpose——a means of access 
to the Club's property.  The Club's property, the estate that 
enjoys the privileges granted by the easement, is the dominant 
estate, and Grygiel's property, the estate that permits the 
exercise of those privileges, is the servient estate.  See 
Gojmerac, 250 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19.  By using the easement to access 
the Unreins' 40 acres, Scheife and his invitees used the 
easement to benefit property other than the dominant estate, 
contrary to well-settled law that an express, appurtenant 
easement "exists for the benefit of the dominant estate alone."  
Id., ¶22.   
¶37 Permitting the Club, its members and invitees to use 
the easement as Scheife did here would fly in the face of our 
previous statement in Sicchio, where we explained that "a right 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
21 
 
of way appurtenant to a particular lot cannot be used as a mode 
of access to another lot to which it is not appurtenant, even 
though there is no resulting additional burden."  Sicchio, 10 
Wis. 2d at 537.  Our discussion in Sicchio explicitly prohibits 
use of an express access easement to access any property other 
than the dominant estate.  Sicchio further supports our 
conclusion above that Grygiel need not demonstrate that the use 
of the easement resulted in an additional burden to Grygiel's 
property in order to prevail. 
¶38 Moreover, were we to permit the Club, its members and 
invitees to use the easement to access property other than the 
Club's property, we would be permitting the easement holder to 
"enlarge and extend the right over the servient estate to 
another lot."  See Reise, 76 Wis. at 639.  Enlarging the 
dominant 
estate 
to 
include 
the 
Unreins' 
40 
acres 
would 
contradict our past precedent.  See Gojmerac, 250 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23 
("[T]he dominant estate cannot be enlarged."). 
¶39 Because we have concluded that Scheife's use of the 
easement to access property other than the Club's contravened 
the express terms of the Club's easement, we must now determine 
whether Scheife is liable to Grygiel for trespass as a result of 
that act. 
D.  General Principles of Trespass Law 
¶40 When an easement holder contravenes the terms of an 
express easement, such contravention may result in a trespass on 
the servient estate owner's property.  "'One is subject to 
liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
22 
 
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the 
other, if he intentionally [] enters land in the possession of 
the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so 
. . . .'"  Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 146, 295 N.W.2d 
768 (Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 158, at 277 (1965)); see also Manor Enters., Inc. v. Vivid, 
Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 382, 389–90, 596 N.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158).  The plaintiff 
has the burden to establish "intentional entry and a right to 
possession."  Manor, 228 Wis. 2d at 391 (citing Prahl, 98 
Wis. 2d at 146). 
¶41 "[C]onsent to entry onto the land is a defense to an 
action for trespass . . . ."  Id.; cf. Hofflander v. St. 
Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 2003 WI 77, ¶105, 262 Wis. 2d 539, 664 
N.W.2d 545 ("Under Wisconsin law, a trespasser is 'a person who 
enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without 
a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or 
otherwise.'" (quoting Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 
836, 843, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975)).  Consent may be given expressly 
or may be implied from the conduct of the plaintiff, from the 
relationship of the parties or from custom.  Manor, 228 Wis. 2d 
at 391 (citing Prahl, 98 Wis. 2d at 147).  "[I]t is the burden 
of a defendant asserting consent to plead and prove it."  Id. at 
392 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keaton on Torts 
§ 18 n.2, at 112 (5th ed. 1984); 75 Am. Jur. 2d § 216, at 164). 
¶42 As stated, the holder of an express easement has 
consent to use the easement in accordance with the terms of the 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
23 
 
easement grant.  Hunter, 78 Wis. 2d at 343.  Beyond this, the 
owner of the servient estate has the "right to exclude others 
from his or her land" to protect "his or her land from 
trespass."  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 
617–18, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (discussing the damages that may 
be awarded for intentional trespass).  It follows then that when 
an easement holder's use of an express easement contravenes its 
express terms, absent consent or some other circumstances 
permitting lawful entry on the grantor's property, the easement 
holder may be held liable for trespass. 
¶43 The 
law 
of 
other 
jurisdictions 
supports 
this 
conclusion.  In Davenport v. Lamson, 38 Mass. 72 (1838), the 
defendant acquired a right of way over plaintiff's property, 
which was appurtenant to his three-acre lot.  The defendant 
subsequently acquired a nine-acre lot, which was "adjoining to 
and beyond the three acre lot."  Id. at 73.  The court concluded 
that the defendant's use of the easement as a means of going to 
and from his nine-acre lot violated the terms of the easement.  
Id. at 74.  As such, "the entry was unlawful and constituted a 
trespass."  Id. at 75; see also Tuthill Ranch, Inc. v. United 
States, 381 F.3d 1132, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[M]isuse of an 
easement may be a trespass to real property."); Diocese of 
Trenton v. Toman, 70 A. 606, 609 (N.J. Ch. 1908) (citing with 
support the holding in Davenport); Selvia v. Reitmeyer, 295 
N.E.2d 869, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (concluding that a right-
of-way easement used by the easement holder to access "other 
premises 
to 
which 
the 
easement 
[was] 
not 
appurtenant" 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
24 
 
"constitute[d] a trespass"); Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  
Servitudes § 8.3 cmt. b, at 496 (2000) ("[U]nauthorized use of 
an easement is generally a trespass to the servient estate for 
which damages and injunctive relief are normally granted."). 
¶44 We have determined that "nominal damages are always 
appropriate for a trespass."  Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 
530, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987) (citing Murphy v. City of Fond du 
Lac, 23 Wis. 365, 366, 23 N.W. 365 (1868)); see also Prahl, 98 
Wis. 2d at 152.  However, if proved, compensatory damages may 
also be awarded.  Jacobs, 139 Wis. 2d at 530. 
¶45 We conclude that Scheife is liable to Grygiel for 
trespass because he intentionally entered Grygiel's land without 
consent.  Grygiel, as the landowner, has the right to possession 
of 
her land. 
 Moreover, it is undisputed that Scheife 
intentionally entered Grygiel's property in order to reach the 
Unreins' 40 acres.  Indeed, Scheife concedes this point.  As 
such, Grygiel has met her burden of showing that Scheife 
intentionally entered land of which she had a right to 
possession.  See Manor, 228 Wis. 2d at 391. 
¶46 Because Grygiel has met her burden, Scheife is liable 
for trespass unless he can show he had consent to enter 
Grygiel's land.  See id.  We conclude that Scheife failed to 
meet his burden.  Scheife had consent to use the express 
easement in accordance with the terms of the easement grant.  
See Hunter, 78 Wis. 2d at 343.  Because, as we concluded above, 
Scheife's use of the easement contravened its express terms, the 
easement did not provide Scheife consent to enter Grygiel's 
No. 
2008AP2028   
 
25 
 
property.  Scheife has not pointed to anything in the record 
other than the express terms of the easement indicating that 
either he or his invitees had consent to enter Grygiel's 
property to access the Unreins' 40 acres.  Moreover, in 
Scheife's answer to Grygiel's complaint, he admitted that he did 
not have consent to enter Grygiel's property.  Accordingly, 
Scheife is liable for trespass. 
¶47 Because nominal damages are appropriate for trespass, 
Jacobs, 139 Wis. 2d at 530, and because Grygiel stipulated to 
limit her damages to "an award of nominal damages on the 
declaration of a trespass," we conclude that Grygiel is entitled 
to an award of nominal damages. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶48 The issues in this case are whether Scheife's use of 
the easement to achieve access to property other than the Club's 
property contravened the express terms of the Club's easement 
and, if so, whether Scheife committed trespass on Grygiel's 
property by that act.  We conclude that Scheife contravened the 
express terms of the Club's easement by entering Grygiel's 
property without consent and in doing so, he unlawfully 
trespassed on Grygiel's land.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
for entry of judgment granting Grygiel a declaration of trespass 
and an award of nominal damages. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with 
directions. 
Exhibit A 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2028.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  While defendant Scheife was representing 
himself, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint 
against Scheife, including the trespass cause of action.  The 
circuit court did not dismiss Scheife's counterclaim and 
explicitly 
stated 
that 
it 
was 
not 
resolving 
Scheife's 
counterclaim against the plaintiffs.  
¶50 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the order of 
the circuit court.  Scheife was the winner. 
¶51 Here, the majority interprets the easement favorably 
to the plaintiffs and then goes further.  It decides that the 
plaintiffs have a good cause of action and have made a complete 
case for trespass.  Not only that, it awards nominal damages on 
the trespass cause of action to the plaintiffs.  The trespass 
complaint may not be as simple as the majority makes out.   
¶52 In addition to consent, Scheife also asserted defenses 
in the present case of laches, estoppel, and waiver.  Scheife 
has asserted facts relating to these defenses.   
¶53 Scheife asserted that during an earlier period when 
plaintiff Nahorn was a member of the Club, the Club leased the 
40-acre Unrein parcel, and that it was then customary for 
members to access the Unrein parcel after using the easement to 
reach the Club.  Scheife queries:  "Since past practice had club 
members routinely using the easement to gain access to the 
Unrein forty acres, how could the defendant be held liable for 
something that had been done for years, with full knowledge of 
the plaintiffs?"     
No.  2008AP2028.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶54 In common-law trespass, entry onto land becomes 
privileged if made with the consent of the land's possessor.  
Consent may be express or implied and may be manifested by 
action or by inaction, or proved by other existing evidence.1  
The presence of consent will negative the existence of the tort 
of trespass under the common-law principle that no harm is done 
to a willing party ("volenti non fit injuria").2  Likewise, if 
the possessor induces the conduct of the alleged trespasser, the 
trespasser may have a defense.3  Therefore, if the possessor's 
conduct manifests a willingness that the defendant engage in 
certain conduct and the defendant acts accordingly, this 
manifestation destroys the wrongfulness of the conduct as 
between the parties; the possessor has no claim for trespass.4   
¶55 Scheife's 
assertions 
of 
his 
defenses 
were 
not 
addressed by the circuit court or court of appeals, and they are 
not addressed by this court.  It certainly appears that there is 
support in the law for Scheife's asserted defenses to trespass, 
namely laches, estoppel, waiver, and implied consent.  If 
Scheife can prove his defenses in the circuit court he may win 
on the trespass claim. 
¶56 Additionally, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
references 
a 
"stipulation" regarding nominal damages.  At ¶¶8, 47, the 
                                                 
1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 167 cmt. a (1965). 
2 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 18, 
at 112 (5th ed. 1984). 
3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164 cmt. b (1965). 
4 Keeton, supra note 2, § 17 at 113.  
No.  2008AP2028.ssa 
 
3 
 
majority states that "Grygiel stipulated to limit her damages to 
an award of nominal damages . . . ."  The stipulation filed by 
the plaintiffs states only that the plaintiffs unilaterally 
"stipulate[d]" that they would withdraw their request for actual 
and punitive damages "in exchange for the entry of an award of 
nominal damages on the declaration of a trespass."  See majority 
op., ¶10 n.7.  Neither Scheife nor the club entered this 
stipulation.  At the summary judgment hearing, Scheife argued 
that "I owe no damages" and requested that the court's ruling 
treat him separately from any ruling against the Club.   
¶57 I conclude that on the basis of the record before the 
court, the majority cannot rely on the "stipulation" (to which 
the majority refers) as binding on Scheife regarding nominal 
damages.   
¶58 I would remand the issues of the trespass, damages, 
and the counterclaim to the circuit court.  This court cannot 
grant summary judgment because there is an unresolved dispute of 
material fact regarding the defenses and the counterclaim. 
¶59 In my view, the majority's ruling raises questions of 
access to justice.  The plaintiff sued the defendants for 
trespass.  Scheife was brought to court against his will.  
Representing himself in the latter stages of this litigation, he 
has offered what appear to be viable defenses.  The majority 
neither deals with those defenses in the decision rendered today 
nor gives Scheife the opportunity to develop them before the 
circuit court, which has never ruled on them.  Scheife's 
defenses are simply ignored and disappear.  Because the court 
No.  2008AP2028.ssa 
 
4 
 
now enters judgment against Scheife on trespass and does so 
without addressing and resolving these defenses, he not only 
loses but is denied the opportunity to make his case.  Scheife 
has spent his money, time, and energy to appear in court in 
response to the plaintiffs' claims.  Surely he is entitled to 
his own day in court and the opportunity for his position to be 
fairly heard, especially when the case is being remanded and 
requires disposition of his counterclaim.  
¶60 For the reasons stated, I write separately. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2028.ssa 
 
1