Title: In re Murphy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 396A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 396A19 
Filed 18 December 2020 
IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 17-318 
 
J. HUNTER MURPHY, Respondent  
 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and -377 upon 
a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission entered 13 September 2019 
that respondent J. Hunter Murphy, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, Appellate 
Court Division, Court of Appeals, State of North Carolina, be censured for conduct in 
violation of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 
Conduct and for willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 31 August 2020. 
 
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by John R. Wester, Mark W. Merritt, 
Matthew W. Sawchak, and Lexi M. Fleming, Counsel for the Judicial 
Standards Commission. 
 
Robert F. Orr, PLLC, by Robert F. Orr, and The Hunt Law Firm, PLLC, by 
Anita B. Hunt, for respondent. 
 
 
ORDER OF CENSURE 
 
 
The issue before the Court is whether Court of Appeals Judge Hunter Murphy, 
respondent, should be censured for violations of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the 
North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b). For the reasons that follow, this Court orders that respondent 
be censured.  
 
On 21 March 2018, Counsel for the Commission filed a Statement of Charges 
against respondent alleging he had engaged in conduct inappropriate to his office by 
failing to establish, maintain, and enforce appropriate standards of conduct to ensure 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary; allowing his family and social 
relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment, and permitting others to 
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence respondent; 
failing to require his staff to exhibit patient, dignified and courteous conduct to 
lawyers and others with whom respondent deals in his official capacity; and failing 
to ensure his staff observed the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to him. 
In the Statement of Charges, Counsel for the Commission asserted that respondent’s 
actions were inappropriate to his judicial office and prejudicial to the administration 
of justice constituting grounds for disciplinary proceedings under Chapter 7A, Article 
30 of the North Carolina General Statutes.  
 
Respondent filed his answer on 18 May 2018. Vice-Chair Judge R. Stuart 
Albright, acting as chair of the hearing panel, struck the answer ex mero motu, and 
respondent filed his amended answer on 14 June 2018. On 6 and 7 June 2019, the 
Commission heard this matter and entered its recommendation on 13 September 
2019, which contains the following findings of fact:  
A. Background 
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1. Respondent is a judge of the Court of Appeals elected to 
an eight-year term that commenced in January 2017.  
 
2. As a judge of the Court of Appeals, Respondent is 
entitled to hire three members of his chambers staff—two 
“research assistants” or “law clerks” as they are commonly 
called, and one executive assistant or “EA.” All members of 
a judge’s chambers staff are employees at will, and can be 
fired by the employing judge for any reason at any time, as 
long as the reason is not discriminatory.  
 
3. Law clerks are responsible for researching issues raised 
in appeals, preparing memoranda for their assigned judge 
on cases to be argued, and drafting and editing opinions. In 
drafting and editing opinions, law clerks are also tasked 
with the important job of checking every citation in draft 
opinions for accuracy (referred to as cite-checking). Law 
clerks also perform a number of other tasks assigned by 
their judge. 
 
4. For his first two law clerks, Respondent hired one female 
law clerk, Lauren Suber, and one male law clerk, Clark 
Cooper. Ms. Suber had just completed a clerkship for a 
justice of the Supreme Court [of North Carolina] and 
agreed to clerk for eight months until August 2017. Mr. 
Cooper had just completed a clerkship for another judge of 
the Court of Appeals, and prior to that, had clerked for yet 
another judge of the Court of Appeals and agreed to clerk 
for two years.  
 
5. Respondent hired his close, personal friend from high 
school, Mr. Ben Tuite, to serve as both his permanent EA 
and a third law clerk. Respondent gave Mr. Tuite both 
express and implied authority to supervise and manage the 
term law clerks and the operations of his chambers.  
 
6. In March 2017, Mr. Cooper suddenly resigned after less 
than two months as Respondent’s law clerk. To replace Mr. 
Cooper, Respondent hired Mary Scruggs, who was highly 
qualified, with good academic credentials, had passed the 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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bar and practiced with a firm before being hired by 
Respondent.  
 
7. After Ms. Suber completed her clerkship in August 2017, 
she was replaced by Ms. Chelsey Maywalt. Ms. Maywalt's 
term began on August 28, 2017 and was scheduled to 
conclude in August 2018. Ms. Maywalt had excellent 
recommendations, experience and academic credentials 
and had just completed a clerkship for another judge of the 
Court of Appeals.  
 
8. Law clerks at the Court of Appeals are expected to 
comply with the Law Clerk Code of Conduct. On March 21, 
2017, Respondent attended training on the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which included review of Respondent’s duties to 
ensure that his law clerks adhere to the same standards of 
professionalism and diligence as apply to the judge. Later 
that day, after the training, Respondent was given a copy 
of the North Carolina Court of Appeals Code of Conduct for 
Staff Attorneys and Law Clerks to review and provide to 
his law clerks. Among other things, Canon 3B of the Law 
Clerk Code of Conduct requires a law clerk “to be faithful 
to the highest standards of his or her profession and 
maintain professional competence in it. He or she should 
be patient, dignified, courteous, and fair to all persons with 
whom he or she deals in the performance of his or her 
duties. He or she should diligently discharge the 
responsibilities of his or her position in an efficient, fair-
minded, and professional manner.” 
 
9. Mr. Tuite, Ms. Scruggs and Ms. Maywalt later attended 
a Court of Appeals training program on their obligations 
under the Law Clerk Code of Conduct. 
 
B. The Working Environment in Respondent’s Chambers 
 
10. When Mr. Cooper announced his resignation in March 
2017, Respondent reacted with a great deal of animosity 
that he made known to his law clerks. Respondent and Mr. 
Tuite willfully made belittling comments or jokes about 
him to the other law clerks.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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11. On one occasion, in or around June 2017, Respondent 
participated in a group text message with Mr. Tuite, Ms. 
Suber and Ms. Scruggs. In the group text, Respondent and 
Mr. Tuite exchanged profane and inappropriate comments 
and jokes about Mr. Cooper, including encouraging Ms. 
Suber to sabotage Mr. Cooper’s career plans and comparing 
Mr. Cooper to a member of the terrorist group ISIS.  
 
12. Respondent’s active participation in and condoning of 
the belittling of Mr. Cooper contributed to and enabled a 
toxic work environment in Respondent’s chambers. 
 
13. Mr. Tuite also regularly used profanity during the 
workday, belittled others and used fear and intimidation 
while interacting with and supervising the law clerks. Mr. 
Tuite frequently used the word “fuck” and referred to 
female law clerks on more than one occasion as “bitch” or 
“bitching.” 
 
14. Respondent observed and was aware of Mr. Tuite's 
regular use of profanity in his chambers and belittling 
comments about other court employees and failed to take 
action to address it when he observed or became aware of 
it. By failing to address this conduct when it occurred, 
Respondent condoned Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct 
and therefore again contributed to and enabled a toxic 
work environment. 
 
15. Mr. Tuite was dishonest and did not diligently 
discharge his duties as the EA or as a law clerk.  
 
16. Respondent was aware of Mr. Tuite’s dishonesty and 
lack of diligence. Ms. Suber in her exit interview on August 
10, 2017 specifically informed Respondent that Mr. Tuite 
was a manipulative liar who handed off his work to others 
or simply did not do it (including necessary editing and 
cite-checking), 
that 
such 
conduct 
was 
impacting 
Respondent’s reputation and would also cause him to “burn 
through law clerks,” and that Ms. Suber had concerns that 
Mr. Tuite would be rude to Ms. Maywalt and take 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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advantage of her strong work ethic. Ms. Maywalt had a 
meeting with Respondent on November 13, 2017 and 
advised Respondent that Mr. Tuite was dishonest in his 
communications with other employees at the Court of 
Appeals. Ms. Suber and Ms. Scruggs advised Respondent 
on December 2, 2017 that Mr. Tuite was dishonest in his 
communications with other employees at the Court of 
Appeals and that he failed to diligently discharge his 
duties.  
 
17. After learning of Mr. Tuite’s dishonesty and lack of 
diligence on multiple occasions, Respondent failed to 
address these issues directly with Mr. Tuite. . . 
  
18. Mr. Tuite made comments of a sexual or inappropriate 
nature in the workplace.  
 
19. In early 2017, Mr. Tuite came into the offices of Ms. 
Suber and Ms. Scruggs on separate occasions early in their 
c1erkships, and without any context closed the doors to 
their offices and told them that he likes to have 
relationships with female co-workers but that they should 
not misconstrue his efforts to spend time with them, and 
stated that he had been sexually harassed in his prior 
employment by a female co-worker who had pulled him 
into a vehicle and assaulted him after she “misconstrued” 
their relationship. Mr. Tuite also told Respondent about 
this incident, but described it in “vulgar terms.”  
 
20. Later, during a cold workday while outside with Ms. 
Suber, Mr. Tuite stated that he would like to see her in a 
“wife beater” tank top and shorts on a cold day. Mr. Tuite, 
on or about the following day, asked Ms. Suber to come into 
Respondent’s office (when Respondent was away from the 
office), kept the lights off and sat down beside her and told 
her that he “was married but not blind” or similar words in 
an apparent attempt to apologize for the inappropriate 
sexual remark from the previous day. Ms. Suber was 
offended and upset by the inappropriate and suggestive 
sexual remarks and non-apology when they occurred, felt 
unsafe as a result and feared it would occur again. Ms. 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Suber continued to be upset and uncomfortable about this 
incident when she warned Ms. Maywalt about it in October 
2017 and when she informed Respondent about it on 
December 2, 2017, and continues to feel uncomfortable 
about it to this day. Upon learning of this incident, 
Respondent dismissed Ms. Suber's concerns.  
 
21. On another occasion, during the summer of 2017, while 
reviewing a female law clerk’s application, Mr. Tuite 
intentionally and in the presence of Respondent, Ms. Suber 
and Ms. Scruggs, repeated derogatory and belittling online 
comments about the female applicant comparing her 
breasts to “fun bags.” Ms. Scruggs was offended and 
immediately expressed concern in Respondent’s presence 
about Mr. Tuite’s inappropriate treatment of this female 
law clerk applicant, but Respondent did nothing.  
 
22. By failing to act when he observed or was informed of 
Mr. Tuite’s pattern of making lewd or sexually 
inappropriate remarks in the workplace, Respondent again 
condoned Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct and thus again 
contributed to and enabled a toxic work environment. 
 
23. On August 11, 2017, Ms. Suber also informed 
Respondent about an incident in which Mr. Tuite 
intentionally ruined her engagement in July 2017 and 
stated that she was very upset about Mr. Tuite’s 
interference in her personal life. 
 
24. As a result of the toxic work environment, Ms. Suber 
was miserable and felt unsafe working in Respondent’s 
chambers. Ms. Suber also chose to decline Respondent’s 
offer to extend her clerkship past August 2017 in part 
because of the toxic work environment.  
 
25. Mr. Tuite also engaged in profane, violent and angry 
outbursts in the office while Respondent was present.  
 
26. On one occasion in September, 2017, Mr. Tuite, after 
being told of a problem with his work product, yelled “fuck” 
loud enough for everyone in Respondent’s chambers, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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including Respondent who was in his office with the door 
open, to hear, and slammed his fist on a table hard enough 
to activate a panic alarm that was attached to that table. 
Respondent did nothing to address Mr. Tuite’s profane and 
violent outburst at the time and by failing to act, condoned 
Mr. Tuite's workplace misconduct and therefore again 
contributed to and enabled a toxic work environment.  
 
27. On another occasion, on or about Friday, October 27, 
2017, during a chambers meeting to discuss hiring law 
clerks, Mr. Tuite, in Respondent’s presence, got angry at 
Ms. Maywalt, slammed his fist on his chair (which was, as 
usual, located behind or next to Respondent) and said, 
“Goddamn it, Chelsey: [then told her] to shut [her] mouth, 
and that [her] opinion did not fucking matter.” By his 
words and deeds, Mr. Tuite belittled and threatened Ms. 
Maywalt in Respondent’s presence. Respondent took no 
immediate action against Mr. Tuite except to call for a 
break and never addressed the incident with Ms. Maywalt 
or Ms. Scruggs. Later that evening, on October 27, 2017, 
Respondent emailed Mr. Tuite and asked him to apologize 
for saying that he did not care about Ms. Maywalt’s 
opinion. Respondent did not address Mr. Tuite’s use of 
profanity or the anger and intimidation associated with his 
comments. On the following Monday, October 30, 2017, Mr. 
Tuite offered a non-apology to Ms. Maywalt for his actions 
and then threatened her with a reminder that he 
influences the hiring and firing in the office.  
 
28. On or about November 13, 2017, Ms. Maywalt informed 
Respondent that Mr. Tuite continued to treat her in an 
unprofessional manner, was lying to employees in the 
Court of Appeals, and further, that Mr. Tuite’s apology for 
the October 27, 2017 incident was a non-apology that 
resulted in worse treatment by Mr. Tuite.  
 
29. Upon learning of Mr. Tuite’s ongoing misconduct 
towards Ms. Maywalt and failure to follow Respondent’s 
instructions in his email to Mr. Tuite on October 27, 
Respondent took no immediate action. By allowing this 
type of workplace behavior to take place on October 27 and 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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30, 2017 without any apparent or immediate consequences, 
Respondent again condoned Mr. Tuite’s workplace 
misconduct, thus contributing to and enabling a toxic work 
environment. 
 
C. Interactions with AOC HR and the Commission 
 
30. By November 2017, the toxic work environment in 
Respondent’s chambers and concerns about potential 
sexual harassment got to a point where a judge of the Court 
of Appeals reported his concerns to the Chief Judge.  
 
31. The Chair of the Judicial Standards Commission met 
with Respondent on November 29, 2017 to discuss Mr. 
Tuite’s treatment of the female law clerks and concerns of 
potential sexual harassment, including an allegation that 
Mr. Tuite had said to Ms. Suber, who has red hair, that he 
wanted to “fuck a red head.” The Chair advised Respondent 
of his obligations under the Code of Judicial Conduct with 
respect to the supervision of his chambers staff and 
suggested that Respondent contact the Administrative 
Office of the Courts Human Resources Department (“AOC 
HR”) for additional guidance regarding the sexual 
harassment concerns.  
 
32. As suggested by the Chair of the Judicial Standards 
Commission, Respondent contacted AOC HR on November 
29, 2017 regarding the possible sexual harassment issue. 
The following day, November 30, 2017, Respondent met 
with Ms. Leila Jabbar, the AOC employee relations 
specialist, HR policy consultant and EEO officer, and Russ 
Eubanks, the AOC manager.  
 
33. During this first face to face meeting with Ms. Jabbar 
on November 30, 2017, Ms. Jabbar asked Respondent a 
number of questions to evaluate any potential unlawful 
sexual harassment issues in his chambers. Respondent 
lacked candor when speaking to AOC HR and did not 
disclose the extent of complaints that Ms. Suber raised 
about Mr. Tuite on August 10 and 11, 2017, or any of the 
incidents he had observed prior to that date involving Mr. 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Tuite’s regular use of profanity, angry and violent 
outbursts, mistreatment of Ms. Maywalt, dishonesty or 
lewd remarks in the workplace. Instead, Respondent 
affirmatively represented to Ms. Jabbar that beyond the 
rumored “red head” comment, he was not aware of any 
other issues with Mr. Tuite’s performance.  
 
34. Respondent lacked candor and downplayed, minimized, 
and mischaracterized Mr. Tuite’s actions in his face-to-face 
meeting with Ms. Jabbar on November 30, 2017. 
Respondent did so because his conduct and judgment were 
influenced by his close personal friendship with and loyalty 
towards Mr. Tuite.  
 
35. Respondent’s lack of candor and representations to 
AOC HR on November 30, 2017 impacted the advice given 
to Respondent. Because Respondent did not disclose the 
information noted in ¶ 33 above, AOC HR only advised 
Respondent to ensure his staff that all concerns of sexual 
harassment would be taken seriously and to have them 
review the judicial branch’s workplace conduct policy and 
recent advice and legal news articles focused on sexual 
harassment in the legal profession and the judiciary. AOC 
HR also advised Respondent that he could reach out to both 
Ms. Suber and Mr. Tuite to find out if the comment was 
made.  
 
36. On Saturday, December 2, 2017, Respondent decided to 
talk directly to Mr. Tuite, Ms. Maywalt, Ms. Scruggs and 
Ms. Suber. Prior to meeting with any of them, and prior to 
ascertaining if Mr. Tuite had made any sexually 
inappropriate comments to Ms. Suber, Respondent assured 
his friend Mr. Tuite that his job was secure. 
 
37. During the conversations on December 2, 2017, the 
following occurred:  
 
a. Mr. Tuite denied making any sexually inappropriate 
comment to Ms. Suber. 
b. Respondent told Ms. Suber that he needed to ask her 
whether Mr. Tuite had made an improper sexual 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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remark to her. Before she answered, Respondent also 
advised her that he had no intention of firing Mr. Tuite. 
Ms. Suber then told Respondent about the sexually 
inappropriate remark as described in ¶ 20, that such 
comment made her uncomfortable, and that Mr. Tuite’s 
non-apology included the additional inappropriate 
remark that also made her uncomfortable. Respondent 
then asked her about the “red head” comment, and she 
advised that Mr. Tuite had not made that comment. 
Respondent then advised Ms. Suber that he had spoken 
to AOC HR about the “red head” comment and was told 
that even if true, it was not sexual harassment. Ms. 
Suber was also upset about and informed Respondent 
that Mr. Tuite continued to lie and not do his work and 
falsely impugned her work product to other employees 
in the Court of Appeals regarding an opinion that had 
to be withdrawn because of Mr. Tuite's dishonesty and 
lack of diligence.  
c. Ms. Maywalt told Respondent as she had previously 
done on November 13, 2017 that Mr. Tuite was a liar, 
that he mistreated her, and that his forced apology after 
his violent and intimidating outburst on October 27, 
2017 was a non-apology that resulted in threatening 
her that he (Mr. Tuite) had influence over hiring and 
firing. Ms. Maywalt also told Respondent directly that 
Mr. Tuite was mistreating and bullying her and that 
she felt like the next Clark Cooper based on Mr. Tuite’s 
mistreatment of her and [was] uncomfortable in 
Respondent’s chambers. Ms. Maywalt also told 
Respondent that Mr. Tuite’s angry outbursts were 
violent and personally threatening to her, including the 
incident when Mr. Tuite had punched a desk and yelled 
“fuck,” and that she did not want to be left alone with 
Mr. Tuite in Respondent’s absence the following week. 
Ms. Maywalt reiterated these concerns to Respondent 
by email and advised Respondent that she intended to 
take a personal week away from the office the following 
week because she was afraid of being alone with Mr. 
Tuite during Respondent’s absence.  
d. Ms. Scruggs told Respondent that his friendship with 
Mr. Tuite was making it difficult to address problems, 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
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and that Mr. Tuite was a liar, that his work product was 
inferior, that Mr. Tuite’s actions and behavior were 
adversely affecting how other chambers in the Court of 
Appeals interacted with Respondent’s chambers, that 
Mr. Tuite mistreated Ms. Maywalt, that Mr. Tuite’s 
bullying of Ms. MaywaIt had a negative impact on her 
as well, and that all of the law clerks had an issue with 
Mr. Tuite. Ms. Scruggs also informed Respondent about 
her concerns as to Mr. Tuite’s violent and angry 
outbursts, citing the incident when Mr. Tuite slammed 
his desk and yelled “fuck” and also told Respondent of 
another incident in which Mr. Tuite had cursed and 
thrown a draft opinion across chambers.  
 
38. After speaking with Ms. Maywalt, Ms. Scruggs and 
Ms. Suber, and learning about Mr. Tuite’s sexually 
inappropriate remarks to Ms. Suber, Respondent sent 
an email to the Chair and Executive Director of Judicial 
Standards on December 2, 2017. Instead of informing 
the Commission about the sexually inappropriate 
remark disclosed by Ms. Suber and the personally 
threatening behavior towards Ms. Maywalt and Ms. 
Scruggs, Respondent represented to the Commission 
that any rumor of sexual harassment had been 
“debunked,” that “there was not even a whiff of a 
complaint of a sexual or sexual harassment nature,” 
that he wanted Mr. Tuite to return to work as usual on 
Monday, December 4, 2017, and that he wanted to find 
out about how the “nasty rumor” about Mr. Tuite had 
been spread. Respondent also dismissed the female law 
clerks’ 
extensive 
complaints 
about 
Mr. 
Tuite’s 
workplace misconduct and threatening behavior as 
concerns about “how things are handled” inside and 
outside of chambers.  
 
39. Respondent lacked candor and downplayed, 
minimized, and mischaracterized Mr. Tuite's actions in 
his December 2, 2017 email to the Chair and Executive 
Director. Respondent did so because his conduct and 
judgment were influenced by his close personal 
friendship with and loyalty towards Mr. Tuite.  
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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40. After speaking with Ms. Maywalt, Ms. Scruggs and 
Ms. Suber, Respondent also sent an email to Ms. Jabbar 
on December 3, 2017. In his December 3, 2017 email to 
Ms. Jabbar, Respondent reported that he had spoken to 
his law clerks and again downplayed and minimized 
Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct as issues with Mr. 
Tuite’s “management style” and some “negative events” 
in the office that Ms. Maywalt had experienced. At the 
time Respondent made such representations to AOC 
HR, Respondent knew that the workplace misconduct 
reported by the female law clerks was not related to 
“management issues” or “management style” and 
instead involved Mr. Tuite’s ongoing profanity, sexually 
inappropriate comments, angry and violent outbursts, 
bullying of Ms. Maywalt, dishonesty and lack of 
diligence.  
 
41. Respondent also told Ms. Jabbar in the December 3, 
2017 email that the sexual harassment rumor involving 
Ms. Suber had been “debunked and is not an issue” 
because Ms. Suber denied the “red head” comment had 
been made, and that while Mr. Tuite had made a 
comment 
about 
her 
“clothing” 
that 
made 
her 
uncomfortable, Mr. Tuite had apologized and the 
matter was resolved. At the time Respondent made the 
representations to Ms. Jabbar in the December 3, 2017 
email, Respondent knew that Mr. Tuite’s remark went 
beyond a comment about “clothing” and was in fact a 
sexually inappropriate remark, that Ms. Suber was 
uncomfortable about Mr. Tuite’s sexually inappropriate 
remark to her, and that she did not accept Mr. Tuite’s 
non-apology because it again made her uncomfortable.  
 
42. 
Respondent 
downplayed, 
minimized 
and 
mischaracterized Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct in 
his December 3, 2017 email to Ms. Jabbar. Respondent 
did so because his conduct and judgment were 
influenced by his close personal friendship with and 
loyalty towards Mr. Tuite.  
 
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43. On Monday, December 4, 2017, after Mr. Tuite went 
to work as usual per the instructions from Respondent, 
the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals contacted 
Respondent regarding her concerns about the working 
environment in his chambers and suggested that 
Respondent close his chambers for the week he was 
gone. Respondent agreed to close his chambers for two 
days.  
 
44. On the evening of Monday, December 4, 2017, Ms. 
Maywalt contacted AOC HR and reported in detail Mr. 
Tuite’s workplace misconduct and Respondent’s lack of 
response. On Tuesday, December 5, 2017, Ms. Scruggs 
also contacted Ms. Jabbar to report her concerns about 
Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct and his close 
friendship with Respondent.  
 
45. On Tuesday, December 5, 2017, after hearing from 
Ms. Maywalt and Ms. Scruggs about Mr. Tuite’s 
extensive workplace misconduct and the close personal 
friendship between Respondent and Mr. Tuite, Ms. 
Jabbar drastically changed her advice from the 
November 30, 2017 meeting and advised Respondent 
that Mr. Tuite should be placed on immediate 
investigatory leave pending the conclusion of an AOC 
HR investigation.  
 
46. With Respondent's cooperation, AOC HR then 
investigated alleged workplace misconduct in his 
chambers, including the potential claim of unlawful 
sexual harassment. AOC HR could not fully evaluate 
the unlawful sexual harassment issue, however, 
because Ms. Suber declined to be interviewed based on 
Respondent’s representations to her on December 2, 
2017 that AOC HR had already concluded that she had 
not been sexually harassed even if the “red head” 
comment had been made.  
 
47. Respondent displayed a reckless disregard for the 
truth, lacked candor, and willfully engaged in a pattern 
of downplaying the seriousness and extensive nature of 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct to those charged with 
enforcing appropriate standards of professional conduct 
in the judicial branch.  
 
48. Notwithstanding Respondent’s knowledge of Mr. 
Tuite’s extensive workplace misconduct, from the 
period from December 1, 2017 until January 5, 2018, 
Respondent regularly assured his close personal friend 
Mr. Tuite and indicated to others that his employment 
at the Court of Appeals would continue. On December 
1, 2017 and prior to ascertaining if Mr. Tuite had made 
any sexually inappropriate comments to Ms. Suber, 
Respondent assured his friend Mr. Tuite that his job 
was secure. Mr. Tuite again texted Respondent on or 
about December 4, 2017 and stated to Respondent that 
he was “glad you have my back.” On Tuesday, December 
5, 2015, Mr. Tuite texted Respondent, to whom he 
referred to as “Dude,” and expressed concern for his job 
security. Respondent texted back and again reassured 
his close friend: “You are not losing your job. This sucks 
tremendously for everyone, especially given what I 
expect to be an easy resolution when the smoke clears.” 
On December 11, 2017, Respondent contacted Ms. 
Jabbar and informed her that he wanted Mr. Tuite to 
return to the office, to which Ms. Jabbar replied that 
Mr. Tuite “should not return to the office for any reason” 
until the investigation is complete. On January 4, 2018, 
Respondent also advised his chambers that he was 
planning for Mr. Tuite’s return to work and intended to 
move Mr. Tuite’s desk from the EA area into Ms. 
Scruggs’ private law clerk office in the hallway.  
 
49. As a result of Respondent's conduct and his 
protection of Mr. Tuite, and the resulting toxic work 
environment, Ms. Scruggs and Ms. Maywalt were 
miserable, felt unsafe and uncomfortable working in 
Respondent’s chambers and did not trust Respondent to 
accurately 
portray 
their 
reports 
of 
workplace 
misconduct to others or to protect their well-being. Ms. 
Maywalt resigned on or about December 6, 2017, 
approximately eight months early. Ms. Scruggs also 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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began to look for another job in December 2017 and 
resigned in January 2018 before her clerkship 
concluded.  
 
50. After learning on January 2, 2018 that Ms. Scruggs 
was interviewing for another position and receiving 
advice from a judicial colleague about ensuring his 
female law clerks were not uncomfortable, Respondent 
ultimately asked Mr. Tuite to resign on January 5, 
2018, which he did.  
 
(alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).  
 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Commission made the following 
conclusions of law: 
B. Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
 
3. To preserve the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct imposes 
an affirmative duty on judges to establish, maintain, and 
enforce appropriate standards of conduct in the judiciary, 
and to personally observe such standards of conduct. The 
Commission's findings of fact establish that Respondent 
failed in these duties, violating Canon 1 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.  
 
4. Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that 
judges must not allow their social or other relationships to 
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment. The 
Commission’s findings of fact establish that Respondent 
allowed his close personal friendship with Mr. Tuite to 
influence both his judicial conduct and judgment, violating 
Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
 
5. The Code of Judicial Conduct also imposes affirmative 
duties on judges to ensure the highest degree of 
professionalism among attorneys, their fellow judges, and 
any judicial branch employees or court officials subject to 
their direction and control. See, e.g., Canon 3B(3) (“A judge 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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should take or initiate disciplinary measures against a 
judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the 
judge may become aware.”); Canon 3A(3) (“A judge should 
be patient, dignified and courteous to [those] with whom 
the judge deals in the judge's official capacity, and should 
require similar conduct of lawyers, and of the judge’s staff, 
court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction 
and control”); Canon 3B(2) (“A judge should require the 
judge's staff and court officials subject to the judge’s 
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity 
and diligence that apply to the judge.”).  
 
6. With respect to young lawyers in particular, the 
Commission has also recognized that judges have “a 
compelling interest in maintaining the integrity and moral 
character of those seeking admission to practice law in 
North Carolina.”  
 
7. Moreover, in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
judges discharge their duties under Canon 3A(3) and 
Canon 3B(2) in part by requiring their law clerks to adhere 
to the standards of conduct set forth in the Law Clerk Code 
of Conduct. Among the obligations in the Law Clerk Code 
of Conduct are the duties to (1) “be faithful to the highest 
standards of his or her profession and maintain 
professional competence in it”; (2) “be patient, dignified, 
courteous, and fair to all persons with whom he or she deals 
in the performance of his or her duties”; and (3) “diligently 
discharge the responsibilities of his or her position in an 
efficient, fair-minded, and professional manner.”  
 
8. The Commission’s findings of fact establish that 
Respondent failed to require that Mr. Tuite engage in 
patient, dignified and courteous conduct towards those 
with whom Mr. Tuite dealt in his official capacity, violating 
Canon 3A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
 
9. The Commission's findings of fact further establish that 
Respondent failed to require that Mr. Tuite observe the 
standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Respondent, violating Canon 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.  
 
C. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice 
 
10. The Commission further concludes that Respondent’s 
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct amount to 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that 
brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 7 A- 376(b). See also Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Preamble (“[a] violation of this Code of Judicial Conduct 
may be deemed conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”).  
 
11. The Supreme Court first defined conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice in In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299 
(1976) as “conduct which a judge undertakes in good faith 
but which nevertheless would appear to an objective 
observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct 
prejudicial to the public esteem for the judicial office.” The 
Supreme Court further explained in Edens that the focus 
is “on the conduct itself, the results thereof, and the impact 
such conduct might reasonably have upon knowledgeable 
observers.”  
 
12. In evaluating Respondent's conduct, the Supreme 
Court also considers “fundamental principles of judicial 
decorum” rooted in the concept that ‘”[t]he place of justice 
is an hallowed place; and therefore not only the bench, but 
the foot-pace and precincts and purpose thereof, ought to 
be preserved without scandal and corruption.” The 
Supreme Court has also warned that “[a]t a time when the 
requirements of the Rule of Law subject the judiciary to 
intense and ever greater scrutiny by our citizens, the 
demands of respondent’s judicial office require[ ] him to 
comport himself with dignity, reserve, and probity. The 
integrity of the office requires that its holder project 
nothing less than the high standards of character and 
rectitude citizens should expect from their judges.”  
 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
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13. Looking to fundamental principles of judicial decorum, 
the nature and frequency of Respondent’s conduct and the 
results 
thereof, 
the 
Commission 
concludes 
that 
Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. Respondent’s conduct in 
contributing to and enabling a toxic work environment in 
his chambers and his conduct in downplaying, minimizing 
and mischaracterizing Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct to 
AOC HR and the Commission not only undermines the 
dignity of the Court of Appeals, but negatively impacted 
the court’s work product, court employees and· the 
reputation and integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, 
Respondent’s reckless disregard for the truth, lack of 
candor, and willful pattern of misrepresenting or 
downplaying Mr. Tuite’s workplace misconduct to AOC HR 
and the Commission also undermined the judiciary’s 
ability to enforce appropriate standards of professional 
conduct in the judicial branch. Finally, Respondent 
objectively displayed an extraordinary blindness to the 
seriousness of the judiciary’s efforts to ensure that all 
employees are treated respectfully and fairly in the 
workplace and caused two intelligent and respected young 
female law clerks to resign from Respondent's chambers. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, such conduct 
undoubtedly brings the judicial office into disrepute and is 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
(alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). Based on the foregoing findings 
of facts and conclusions of law, the Commission unanimously recommended that 
respondent be censured.  
When reviewing recommendations from the Commission, this Court “acts as a 
court of original jurisdiction, rather than in its typical capacity as an appellate court.” 
In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 207 (2008). The Court reviews the Commission’s 
recommendation to determine whether the Commission’s findings of fact are 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
supported by clear and convincing evidence and whether those findings support the 
conclusions of law. Subsequently, the Court exercises its independent judgment in 
determining whether the Commission’s proposed sanctions are appropriate. Id. The 
Court, however, is not bound by the Commission’s findings or conclusions and may 
make its own findings. Id. at 206. 
As an initial matter, respondent argues that the Commission’s prosecution, 
rather than investigation, of this case exceeded its statutory authority and violated 
his due process rights to a fundamentally fair investigatory process. Pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-377(a), the Commission may initiate an investigation on its own 
motion. If, after the investigation is completed, the Commission concludes that 
disciplinary proceedings should be instituted, notice and a statement of charges must 
be filed. N.C.G.S. § 7A-377(a5) (2019). Even still, no judge or justice shall be 
recommended for public reprimand, censure, suspension, or removal unless he has 
been given a hearing affording due process of law. N.C.G.S. § 7A-377(a). Thus, the 
Commission’s statutory authority is limited to investigating, hearing evidence, 
finding facts, and making recommendations.  
To that end, respondent’s due process rights are not violated simply because of 
the Commission’s dual investigative and judicial functions. Indeed prior to and after 
the disciplinary proceedings, the judge or justice’s employment is not disrupted. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s investigator and special prosecutor are employees of 
the Commission, but not voting members, and any “alleged partiality of the 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Commission is cured by the final scrutiny of this adjudicatory body.” In re Nowell, 
293 N.C. 235, 244 (1977). This Court, too, confirmed that “[i]t is well settled by both 
federal and state court decisions that a combination of investigative and judicial 
functions within an agency does not violate due process. An agency which has only 
the power to recommend penalties is not required to establish an independent 
investigatory staff.” Id. Thus, respondent’s argument that the Commission violated 
his due process rights is without merit.  
Respondent further contends that the Commission’s findings of fact lack a 
sufficient evidentiary basis. Specifically, respondent argues that the key findings do 
not implicate respondent, are premised on the assumption that the Code of Judicial 
Conduct dictates managerial standards to which a judge or justice must comply, are 
conclusory mischaracterizations, or are irrelevant. Respondent does not, however, 
contest the validity of the findings as they relate to the working environment in his 
chambers. As such, the Court will not address respondent’s general challenge that 
findings of fact 10 through 29 do not implicate respondent or amount to violations of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
Respondent, however, specifically argues that findings of fact 13, 15, 16, 25, 26 
and 27 are based on conclusory and over-exaggerated statements of witnesses. These 
specific findings, relating to Mr. Tuite’s regular use of profanity, dishonesty, and 
angry outbursts, are all supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, all three 
clerks consistently complained of Mr. Tuite’s profanity, lying, and deceit. Respondent 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
verified that he witnessed respondent yelling “fuck” loud enough for everyone in his 
chambers to hear. Respondent also indicated that there was an issue with excessive 
use of profanity by Mr. Tuite in the chambers. To that end, there was no reason for 
the Commission panel to believe that the clerks’ testimony was anything less than 
truthful. 
Ms. Jabbar testified that she believed the law clerks’ testimony and that she 
did not find Mr. Tuite credible because his recount of events was inconsistent, and he 
constantly attacked the character of his colleagues. Ms. Jabbar testified that Mr. 
Tuite also called the day after his interview and informed her that while he had 
denied an incident in his interview, after speaking with respondent, he “kind of 
recalled it.”  
Lastly, respondent contends that there is no evidentiary basis for finding that 
respondent misled or lied to either AOC HR or the Commission.  To the contrary, the 
record and testimony indicates otherwise. During his initial meeting with Ms. Jabbar, 
respondent reported only the alleged “red head” comment. When asked if there were 
any other issues with Mr. Tuite outside of this alleged comment, respondent indicated 
that there were no further issues. Respondent made this claim after being a witness 
to Mr. Tuite’s loud outbursts and inappropriate behavior and after both Ms. Suber 
and Ms. Maywalt had indicated, in private meetings with respondent, their concerns 
about Mr. Tuite during respondent’s absences.   
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Additionally, on 1 December 2017, after speaking with Ms. Jabbar, respondent 
sent an email to the Commission Chair. The email stated that AOC HR had suggested 
that because the “red head” comment was “based on hearsay and there was not any 
formal complaint, there [was] no reason to reach out to [Ms. Suber] to get 
confirmation or address head on with [Mr. Tuite] as it may upset the overall working 
relationships without need.” Ms. Jabbar, however, testified that she did not relay to 
respondent that the incident was not serious but that she actually suggested he reach 
out to Mr. Tuite and Ms. Suber to do his own investigation. Thus, after carefully 
reviewing the record and transcript, we conclude that the Commission’s findings are 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and we hereby adopt them as our own.  
Respondent also argues that the Commission’s conclusions of law are not 
supported by the evidence. We, however, agree with the Commission’s conclusion that 
respondent’s actions violated Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the North Carolina 
Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-
376(b).  
Canon 1 of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] 
judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. A judge should 
participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally 
observe, appropriate standards of conduct to ensure that the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary shall be preserved.” The abundance of evidence 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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establishes that respondent did not uphold these principles. Respondent casually 
used profanity and allowed Mr. Tuite to aggressively use profanity while in the 
workplace. And while use of profanity alone may not amount to a violation, such 
conduct, especially when directed toward employees, is unprofessional and poses 
great risk to the integrity of the judiciary. 
The evidence shows that respondent willfully engaged in vindictive behavior. 
As the Commission indicated in finding of fact 11, respondent actively engaged in a 
group text with Mr. Tuite, Ms. Suber and Ms. Scruggs, where he exchanged 
inappropriate comments. During the group message, the following exchange 
occurred: 
[Ms. Suber:] Well Clark’s firm just called me about a civil 
litigation associate interview and my concealed carry 
permit came in. It’s been a big day for this girl. 
[Respondent:] That is great, I am assuming that those 
two things would go hand in hand. 
[Mr. Tuite:] Well, shit. Your dreams could come true and 
you could work arm to arm with lark while armed. 
Seriously though, take every interview. 
[Mr. Tuite:] Okay, I got this. You go to Clark’s firm. Work 
hard for several years/decades. Get to be Clark’s boss. Call 
him in and be like: “You’re fucking done son.” It’s probably 
worth the effort. 
[Respondent:] I concur in part. Alternatively, wait until 
he files to run for some judicial seat. Then primary his ass. 
 
In addition to making these remarks, respondent ostracized Mr. Cooper while 
he was still employed by respondent by purposely excluding him from a chambers 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-25- 
lunch. While it is understandable for respondent to be frustrated by Mr. Cooper’s 
decision to resign after only two months, respondent’s behavior is not justified.  
As a judge respondent should, at all times and in all places, uphold “the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary.” A judge’s behavior not only reflects upon 
the court but also sets the tone for his chambers. To that end, respondent’s vindictive 
behavior and his failure to reprimand Mr. Tuite for engaging in similar conduct does 
not “ensure the integrity and independence of the judiciary.” Respondent allowed Mr. 
Tuite to make inappropriate and unprofessional jokes about Mr. Cooper in the 
presence of Ms. Suber and Ms. Scruggs, without consequence. Such implied approval 
did, in fact, create a toxic work environment in which the other clerks testified that 
they feared similar mistreatment.  
The evidence also shows that respondent violated his duties under Canon 1 by 
being dismissive of and turning a blind eye to comments and incidents that took place 
both within and outside of his presence. A judge cannot “establish, maintain and 
enforce appropriate standards of conduct” if he chooses to ignore egregious 
misconduct. Specifically, respondent was present for the following: (1) Mr. Tuite 
making inappropriate jokes about Mr. Cooper; (2) Mr. Tuite making comments about 
a female applicant’s “fun bags”; (4) Mr. Tuite yelling “Goddamn it Chelsey. Your 
fucking opinion doesn’t matter”; and (5) Mr. Tuite yelling “fuck” and slamming his 
fist on the desk with such force that he triggered a security alarm. In addition, 
respondent was not only present for, but participated in, a conversation with Mr. 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-26- 
Tuite about Mr. Tuite possibly having illegitimate children from high school 
relations.  
Respondent was also informed about Mr. Tuite’s dishonesty, poor work ethic, 
and bullying tactics at least twice: in Ms. Suber’s exit interview in August 2017 and 
in a meeting with Ms. Maywalt in November 2017. Still, respondent chose not to 
address these issues with Mr. Tuite. By failing to correct Mr. Tuite’s conduct, 
respondent implicitly condoned it and, as a result, the conduct continued. 
Respondent’s active participation in these events and his witnessing of demeaning 
events without taking corrective action amount to a violation of Canon 1 of the North 
Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.  
Canon 2B provides, in pertinent part, that  
[a] judge should not allow the judge’s family, social or other 
relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or 
judgment.  The judge should not lend the prestige of the 
judge’s office to advance the private interest of others 
except as permitted by this Code; nor should the judge 
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they 
are in a special position to influence the judge.   
 
Here, it is undisputed that respondent and Mr. Tuite were good friends outside 
of the workplace. It is also undisputed that respondent was aware of Mr. Tuite’s 
inability to present good work product. Respondent, himself, testified that he 
constantly had to remind Mr. Tuite of his duties. Respondent also knew that Mr. 
Tuite was not cite checking—resulting in an opinion being withdrawn. Respondent 
informed Ms. Suber on the phone that he was aware that she was not to blame for 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-27- 
the withdrawn opinion, yet Mr. Tuite faced no repercussion as a result of any of his 
failure to competently complete work assignments. According to Ms. Jabbar, 
throughout the investigation respondent also continued to show a sense of concern 
for Mr. Tuite, yet respondent never expressed concerns about the wellbeing of the law 
clerks in his chambers.  
Furthermore, after AOC HR became involved and respondent took the time to 
individually speak with all three of his law clerks, respondent continued to overlook 
the severity of the allegations against Mr. Tuite. To that end, respondent also 
attempted to minimize their concerns by relaying to AOC HR and the Commission 
that any issue of sexual harassment had been “debunked” and the only concerns to 
be addressed dealt with management style.  
Additionally, throughout the investigation, respondent seemed more 
concerned with discounting the importance of actions that occurred while he was 
absent instead of understanding the effect of Mr. Tuite’s behavior on his coworkers. 
Respondent was relieved to hear that Mr. Tuite did not make the “red head” comment, 
despite hearing from Ms. Suber that an equally inappropriate comment was made. 
Respondent then informed AOC HR that the issue was resolved when it was not.  
By failing to take action in preventing future misconduct, respondent caused 
his staff to lose faith in his ability to be impartial when Mr. Tuite’s inappropriate 
actions were apparent, regardless of the severity of their concerns. As such, 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent violated Canon 2B by allowing his personal relationship with Mr. Tuite 
to influence his conduct and judgment. 
Canon 3A(3) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] 
judge should be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, 
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in the judge’s official capacity, and 
should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of the judge’s staff, court officials and 
others subject to the judge’s direction and control.” Canon 3B(2) of the North Carolina 
Code of Judicial Conduct similarly provides that “[a] judge should require the judge’s 
staff and court officials subject to the judge’s direction and control to observe the 
standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge.”  
Because many of the instances of misconduct in this case were performed by 
Mr. Tuite, respondent argues that he cannot be held accountable for actions of others 
in his chambers. However, Canons 3A(3) and 3B(2) provide otherwise. These canons 
specifically provide that respondent should require “dignified and courteous” 
behavior of his staff. Here, respondent did not uphold these standards or require 
similar conduct from the individuals in his chambers. And while respondent asks the 
Court to look past his participation in several incidents as mere “fun,” respondent 
fails to understand the role his actions played in encouraging unacceptable behavior.  
Respondent’s vindictive behavior toward Mr. Cooper immediately before and 
after his resignation violates these canons. Respondent was neither courteous nor 
dignified, nor did he require courteous or dignified behavior from his staff. Similarly, 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent’s failure to address Mr. Tuite’s inappropriate comments about a female 
applicant, angry outbursts, and frequent use of profanity against law clerks in the 
chambers amount to violations of Canons 3A(3) and 3B(2).  
The Court recognizes that respondent was not immediately made aware of the 
entirety of Mr. Tuite’s misconduct in chambers. The incidents for which respondent 
was present, however, were sufficient to warrant corrective action with regard to Mr. 
Tuite. Instead, respondent continued to turn a blind eye. This shortcoming is not, as 
respondent contends, simply a matter of managerial style. Rather, it is a failure to 
recognize the gravity of Mr. Tuite’s sexually explicit language and profane and 
suggestive language directed toward respondent’s law clerks and the impact on the 
law clerks of such unprofessional behavior.  
Respondent’s final argument is that the Commission’s conclusion that his 
conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice” cannot be sustained. 
Subsection 7A-376(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes is referenced in the 
Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct but is not a specific canon. It provides, in 
pertinent part:  
Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme 
Court may issue a public reprimand, censure, suspend, or 
remove any judge for willful misconduct in office, willful 
and persistent failure to perform the judge’s duties, 
habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving 
moral 
turpitude, 
or 
conduct 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute.  
 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The Commission concluded that respondent’s conduct was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, because, among other things, he contributed to and enabled 
a toxic work environment in his chambers, and because his interactions with AOC 
Human Resources undermined the dignity of the Court of Appeals. We agree. 
 
The Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] violation of 
this Code of Judicial Conduct may be deemed conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” This Court 
explained that “wil[l]ful misconduct in office is improper and wrong conduct of a judge 
acting in his official capacity done intentionally, knowingly and, generally, in bad 
faith. It is more than a mere error of judgment or an act of negligence.” In re Edens, 
290 N.C. 299, 305 (1976). Furthermore, conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute is “conduct 
which a judge undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would appear to an 
objective observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to public 
esteem for the judicial office.” Id. at 305. Thus, the propriety of a judge’s conduct 
under the Judicial Code of Conduct depends on both the actual conduct and the 
impact such conduct might have on knowledgeable bystanders. Id. at 305-06. 
 
Judges play an important role in ensuring an “independent and honorable 
judiciary.” It is, therefore, essential that anyone who holds this title understand the 
magnitude of their influence. Indeed, a judge’s title alone carries a presumption that 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the individual possesses the ability to ensure order and fairness. Here, respondent 
fell short of these expectations.   
 
We find that respondent’s conduct in contributing to and enabling an 
unprofessional work environment in his chambers and his conduct in minimizing Mr. 
Tuite’s workplace misconduct not only undermined the dignity of the Court of Appeals 
but negatively impacted the work product of his clerks and ultimately the court and 
denigrated the reputation and integrity of the judiciary as a whole. Based on the 
totality of the circumstances, such conduct undoubtedly brings the judicial office into 
disrepute and is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
Because respondent has violated several canons of the North Carolina Code of 
Judicial conduct and N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, we must now decide whether to accept the 
Commission’s recommendation of censure or impose a different penalty. The 
Commission’s recommendation is that the Court censure respondent based on a 
finding that he “willfully engaged in misconduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(1).  
Censure is appropriate where the judge’s willful misconduct “does not warrant 
the suspension of the judge from the judge’s judicial duties or the removal of the judge 
from judicial office.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2. The Court finds that the Commission’s 
findings of fact establish that respondent did, in fact, willfully engage in misconduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. However, respondent’s conduct did not 
IN RE MURPHY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-32- 
rise to the level of incurring suspension or removal as contemplated in other decisions 
of this Court.  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina orders that respondent J. Hunter 
Murphy be CENSURED for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of 
the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute and willful 
misconduct in office in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. 
By order of the Court in Conference, this the 15th day of December 2020. 
Justice DAVIS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s/Earls, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the Court  
 
 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this 
the 15th day of December, 2020.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
AMY L. FUNDERBURK 
 
 
 
 
 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s/M.C. Hackney 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant Clerk