Title: State Ex Rel. Perkins v. Cty. Super.
Citation: 247 Neb. 573, 528 N.W.2d 340
Docket Number: 1032
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 1995

528 N.W.2d 340 (1995) 247 Neb. 573 STATE of Nebraska ex rel. PERKINS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 65, also known as Venango Public School District, et al., Appellants, v. The COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF PERKINS COUNTY, Nebraska, et al., Appellees. No. S-93-1032. Supreme Court of Nebraska. March 10, 1995. *341 Robert S. Harvoy and R.K. O'Donnell, of McGinley, Lane, Mueller, O'Donnell &amp; Reynolds, P.C., Ogallala, for appellants. Lori Zeilinger, Perkins County Atty., and, on brief, Patrick R. McDermott, Grant, for appellees. WHITE, C.J., and CAPORALE, FAHRNBRUCH, LANPHIER, WRIGHT, and CONNOLLY, JJ., and BOSLAUGH, J., Retired. CAPORALE, Justice. Purporting to act under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-516.08(3) (Reissue 1994), the respondent-appellee county superintendent of schools of Perkins County, Nebraska, entered an order converting the relator-appellant Perkins County School District 65, also known as the Venango Public School District, from a Class II school district to a Class I school district. Venango and certain of its residents and taxpayers thereafter filed an action in the district court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the superintendent's order was unlawful and thus void. The district court determined otherwise and entered judgment declaring said order to be valid and proper in all respects. Asserting that the district court's judgment is erroneous, the relators thereafter successfully petitioned this court for leave to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals. We now reverse the judgment of the district court. This action inquires into the meaning of § 79-516.08(3); more specifically, the question is whether, under the facts presented, the statute authorizes the superintendent's order. The meaning of a statute is a question of law, in connection with which a reviewing court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent of that of the inferior court. In re Application of City of Grand Island, 247 Neb. 446, 527 N.W.2d 864 (1995). In order to understand § 79-516.08, we must first look to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-102 (Reissue 1994), which defines school districts as being Class I through VI either on the basis of the grades maintained by the school district or on the basis of the *342 grades maintained and the population within the territory encompassed by the school district. Grades are delineated in Neb.Rev. Stat. § 79-101 (Reissue 1994) as elementary, being grades kindergarten through eighth; and as high school, being all grades above eighth. A Class I school district maintains only elementary grades under the direction of a single school board, § 79-102(1); a Class II school district has a population of 1,000 or less and maintains both elementary and high school grades under the direction of a single board, § 79-102(2). The relevant portions of § 79-516.08 read: The superintendent based her order on her findings that Venango, a Class II school district, had contracted all of its high school students to neighboring school districts for the 1992-93 academic year and that the *343 expected student population for those high school grades would be less than 50 students for the 1993-94 academic year. The superintendent admitted, however, that Venango "is not within fifteen (15) miles of another high school on a reasonably improved highway." The issue is whether § 79-516.08(3) stands alone or whether it must be read in conjunction with § 79-516.08(2)(a). If subsection (3) stands alone, the superintendent was correct in issuing her order; if subsection (3) does not stand alone, she was wrong, because Venango is not within the specified proximity to another high school on a reasonably improved highway. In construing a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. In re Application of City of Grand Island, 247 Neb. 446, 527 N.W.2d 864 (1995); In re Application of Jantzen, 245 Neb. 81, 511 N.W.2d 504 (1994). It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by legislative language; neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. Sorensen v. Meyer, 220 Neb. 457, 370 N.W.2d 173 (1985). Effect must be given, if possible, to all the several parts of a statute; no sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided. NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 219 Neb. 296, 363 N.W.2d 362 (1985). Subsection (2)(a) of the statute under consideration provides two situations under which an existing Class II school district shall become, through the order of the county superintendent, a Class I school district. The first is when for 2 consecutive years the membership for the high school grades is less than 25 pupils. The second is when, unless subsection (3) applies, an existing Class II school district contracts with a neighboring school district or districts to provide educational services for all its high school students for a year. However, in either situation, the conversion is conditioned on there being another high school on a reasonably improved highway which is within 15 miles of the Class II school district's existing high school. In contrast, subsection (3) enumerates the criteria under which a Class II school district may contract with another school district and under what circumstances a school district that has chosen to so do may resume providing high school educational services. More specifically, subsection (3) provides an exception to the language of subsection (2)(a) which requires that a Class II school district which contracts for the education of its high school students for a year shall be thereafter converted to a Class I school district. The exception is if within the year the contracting school district's high school membership reaches at least 50. However, the language of subsection (3), providing that if the high school membership does not reach at least 50 the contracting Class II school district shall become a Class I school district "as prescribed in subsection (2)," makes subsection (3) conversions subject to the same condition as are subsection (2)(a) conversions, namely, that there be in existence another high school within 15 miles on a reasonably improved highway. Such reading of subsection (3) is consistent with the condition imposed in subsections (1) and (2)(b) and is thus in conformance with the legislative intent expressed by the entire language of § 79-516.08, considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. That condition not having been satisfied, the superintendent's order is unlawful, void, and of no force and effect. Accordingly, as presaged in the first paragraph of this opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed. REVERSED.