Title: People v. Nelson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S181611
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2012

1 
 
Filed 1/12/12 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S181611 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G040151 
SAMUEL MOSES NELSON, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 04ZF0072 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The 15-year-old defendant in this case was tried as an adult and convicted 
of the murder of 72-year-old Jane Thompson, and of five first degree burglaries 
relating to the residences of Thompson and two other women.  The evidence 
featured defendant’s confessional statements to sheriff’s investigators during a 
custodial interrogation.  The investigators had apprised defendant of his right to 
remain silent and right to have the assistance of counsel pursuant to Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda),1 and it is undisputed that defendant made 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights at the outset of the 
interrogation.  The question is whether defendant made a postwaiver invocation of 
                                              
1  
The right to counsel for purposes of custodial interrogation implicates the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and must be distinguished 
from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which attaches upon the initiation of 
formal criminal proceedings.  (U.S. Const., 5th & 6th Amends.; see People v. 
Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1123 (Gonzalez) [discussing McNeil v. 
Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 177-178].) 
 
 
2 
 
his Miranda rights by asking several times to speak to his mother or by making 
certain other statements while being questioned.  If he did, then the investigators’ 
failure to stop the interrogation compelled suppression of the statements he made 
after the invocation. 
In Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 (Davis), the United States 
Supreme Court held that once a suspect has waived his Miranda rights, any 
subsequent assertion of the right to counsel must be articulated “sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney.”  (Davis, at p. 459.)  This standard 
likewise applies to assertions of the right to remain silent.  (Berghuis v. Thompkins 
(2010) 560 U.S. __, __ [130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260].) 
We hold that juveniles claiming a postwaiver invocation of their Miranda 
rights are properly subject to the Davis standard.  Applying that standard, we 
conclude the trial court did not err in finding that defendant’s requests to speak to 
his mother and other statements were not sufficiently clear to require cessation of 
the interrogation.  Accordingly, defendant’s confessional statements were properly 
admitted at trial, and the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal must be 
reversed. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Samuel Moses Nelson turned 15 years old in April 2004.  Later 
that month, he burglarized Katherine Parks’s home and took two purses.  In May 
2004, he burglarized Sheryl Adler’s home and took two wallets and a checkbook.  
On June 18, 2004, defendant burglarized the home of his 72-year-old neighbor, 
Jane Thompson, taking a credit card.  On June 26, 2004, Thompson was found 
dead in her home.  The cause of death was massive blunt-force head trauma, with 
multiple skull fractures and brain hemorrhaging. 
 
3 
 
On June 28, 2004, investigators Daniel Salcedo and Brian Sutton of the 
Orange County Sheriff’s Department spoke with defendant outside his home.  
Defendant claimed he had no idea who might have killed Thompson, and said he 
was willing to take a lie detector test. 
After further investigation, Salcedo and Sutton returned to defendant’s 
home on June 29, 2004.  Defendant agreed to discuss the case with them, and was 
driven to the sheriff’s office in Santa Ana.  In a videotaped interview, the 
investigators asked some preliminary questions and then advised defendant of his 
right to counsel and right to remain silent under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.  
Defendant affirmed that he understood his rights and expressed a willingness to 
speak with the investigators. 
During the interview, defendant admitted entering Thompson’s house and 
taking some jewelry, her credit card, and her purse.  Despite these admissions, he 
denied responsibility for Thompson’s murder.  About three and a half hours into 
the session, the investigators asked defendant if he wanted to take a polygraph test, 
and defendant asked to call his mother.  When the investigators asked the reason 
for the call, he said he wanted to “let her know what’s happening” and also to 
“talk to her about it” and “see what I should do.”  The investigators continued with 
their questions, which defendant answered.  As the interrogation progressed and 
defendant became aware of the evidence against him, he changed his story several 
times and ultimately confessed to the burglaries of the Parks and Adler residences.  
He also made additional requests to call his mother and was permitted several 
times to try to reach her.  Although he was unable to contact his mother, he did 
call and speak to his grandmother and brother.  At one point defendant indicated 
he wanted the investigators to leave him alone because, in his words, they were 
“getting on me for something I didn’t do.”  At other points defendant declined to 
take a polygraph test, because his relatives had told him in a telephone call that 
 
4 
 
they did not want him to “take the test” or “do anything” until a lawyer or his 
mother got there. 
Finally, toward the end of the interview, defendant asked to have “a few 
minutes to myself” and answered affirmatively when investigators offered him a 
pencil and paper to write down his feelings.  The investigators left the room after 
telling defendant this was his chance to explain what happened and to “[d]o the 
right thing.”  On their way out, they again allowed defendant to telephone his 
mother and brother.  When the investigators returned, defendant said he had not 
written anything and asked, “Do you think I could be alone until my family gets 
here?  They should be here in like 10 minutes?”  The investigators told defendant 
they were “real tired” of his playing games, reiterated he should take this 
opportunity to say what happened in his own words, and left once more.  
Defendant then wrote out a statement and later explained that he entered 
Thompson’s house in the middle of the night as she dozed on her living room sofa, 
and that he used his hammer to strike her head repeatedly when she suddenly 
stirred.2 
                                              
2  
The investigators asked defendant to sign and date his written statement, 
which he did.  Then defendant read his statement aloud as follows.  “I went into 
her house to take some stuff for, I really needed money for Colorado.  I, I walked 
by her and she woke up.  I freaked out and I hit her in her in the head several 
times.  I didn’t think she was dead though but she was on the ground snoring after 
I hit her.  I didn’t know what to do so I ran out of the house and went home.  I 
didn’t go back after that.  I feel so bad about what I did it’s indescribable.  The 
hardest part was keeping it, keeping it a secret and, uh, trying to act normal.  I’m 
very sorry to everyone for what I’ve done and I don’t expect forgiveness from 
anyone, at least not for a while, a long time.  I think there’s something wrong with 
me and I would like some help.  That’s it.”  After reading this statement aloud, 
defendant made a more detailed confession in a second interview. 
 
5 
 
Defendant was charged with two counts of first degree burglary relating to 
the Parks and Adler residences, another three counts of first degree burglary 
relating to Thompson’s residence, and one count of murder.  It was also alleged 
that he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon and that his crimes against 
Thompson involved a vulnerable victim. 
Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude his custodial confessions 
from trial.  Specifically, he contended that investigators Salcedo and Sutton 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights by continuing to interrogate him despite his 
various requests to speak with his mother and requests to be alone.  After the trial 
court denied this motion, defendant waived his right to a jury and submitted to a 
bench trial.  The court found him guilty as charged. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed in part but reversed the convictions relating 
to the murder and the Parks and Adler burglaries.  Based on defendant’s age, 
experience, maturity, sophistication, and the length, intensity, and content of the 
interrogation, a majority of the court concluded that defendant’s purpose in 
making his first request to speak with his mother was to secure her assistance in 
protecting his Fifth Amendment rights.  Accordingly, it held, any and all 
statements made after that request were obtained in violation of Miranda, supra, 
384 U.S. 436, and inadmissible.  Conversely, the dissenting justice would have 
upheld the admissibility of the confessional statements, because from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer, defendant did not unambiguously and 
unequivocally assert his Miranda rights.  We granted the People’s petition for 
review. 
DISCUSSION 
Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of statements made 
during a custodial interrogation must be reviewed under federal constitutional 
standards.  (People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1163-1164 (Lessie).)  Before 
 
6 
 
addressing whether defendant invoked his Miranda rights by asking to speak with 
his mother, we explain why the investigators’ questioning of defendant up to that 
point satisfied those standards. 
“Under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution, as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .’  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)  
‘In order to combat [the] pressures [of custodial interrogation] and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must 
be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights’ to remain silent and to have 
the assistance of counsel.  (Miranda, at p. 467.)  ‘[I]f the accused indicates in any 
manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an attorney, interrogation must 
cease, and any statement obtained from him during interrogation thereafter may 
not be admitted against him at his trial’ [citation], at least during the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief [citations].”  (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1162.)  “Critically, 
however, a suspect can waive these rights.”  (Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 
__, __ [130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219].)  To establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights, the 
prosecution must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 
425 (Williams); see Lessie, at p. 1169.) 
Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires “an evaluation 
of the defendant’s state of mind” (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 428) and 
“inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” (Fare v. 
Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725 (Fare)).  When a juvenile’s waiver is at 
issue, consideration must be given to factors such as “the juvenile’s age, 
experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the 
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”  (Ibid. [juvenile’s request 
 
7 
 
for his probation officer was not a per se invocation of his Miranda rights, and 
totality of the circumstances supported finding of a voluntary and knowing 
waiver]; Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1169-1170 [no connection between 
criminally experienced 16-year-old suspect’s decision to waive rights and his 
request to speak with his father before answering questions].) 
Here, the trial court determined that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.  The Court of Appeal agreed, noting 
the following circumstances:  “At the time of his interview, Nelson was 15 years 
old.  He had two prior arrests, the most recent resulting in a several month stay in 
juvenile hall.  Before Nelson was questioned, the detective advised him they 
needed to go through the ‘formality’ of a Miranda right advisement.  Nelson 
agreed he had heard the warning before and specifically told the detective he 
understood he had the right to remain silent.  Nelson said he understood he could 
stop the detective at any time if he did not understand what rights he was waiving.  
His voluntary responses to the deputies’ subsequent questions indicate he 
understood his Miranda rights and waived them.” 
The record fully supports this determination, and defendant concedes the 
validity of his waiver.  Although he “did not expressly waive his Miranda rights, 
he did so implicitly by willingly answering questions after acknowledging that he 
understood those rights.”  (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169.)  Moreover, the 
investigators’ failure to seek additional consent from a parent did not invalidate 
defendant’s waiver.  (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 378-379; In re 
Bonnie H. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 563, 577.)  Accordingly, there is no dispute that 
defendant was properly questioned during the first part of the interview. 
We now turn to the issue at hand:  Were the investigators required to halt 
their questioning when, three and a half hours into the session, defendant first 
asked to speak to his mother, and thereafter repeated that request several times and 
 
8 
 
made references to a lawyer and to being left alone?  As we shall explain, we find 
the analysis in Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, controlling. 
A.  The Davis Standard Governing Postwaiver Invocations of Rights 
Under Miranda 
In Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, the United States Supreme Court 
meticulously addressed the principles applicable to an adult suspect’s postwaiver 
invocation of Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation.  Although law 
enforcement officers are free to question a suspect who knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waives his rights under Miranda, “if a suspect requests counsel at 
any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a 
lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.”  
(Davis, at p. 458 [relying on Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485].)  
The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a 
constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule “ ‘designed to prevent 
police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda 
rights.’ ”  (Davis, at p. 458 [quoting Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 
350].) 
Whereas the question whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary calls for an evaluation of the suspect’s state of mind, the same cannot be 
said for determining whether a suspect’s postwaiver statement requires the 
immediate cessation of police questioning.  (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 428.)  
Davis could not make this more plain:  “To avoid difficulties of proof and to 
provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry.  
[Citation.]  Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, 
some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire 
for the assistance of an attorney.’  [Citation.]”  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 458-
459.) 
 
9 
 
Under the Davis standard, it is not enough that a suspect makes a reference 
to an attorney “that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.”  (Davis, 
supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459; see McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 178 [“the 
likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test . . . ”].)  
Rather, the suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney.”  (Davis, at p. 459; see Williams, supra, 
49 Cal.4th at p. 432; Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1126 [“question is not what 
defendant understood himself to be saying, but what a reasonable officer in the 
circumstances would have understood defendant to be saying”].) 
Thus, because a postwaiver invocation determination contemplates 
reference to a reasonable officer’s understanding of a suspect’s statements in light 
of known or objectively apparent circumstances, the suspect’s subjective desire for 
counsel is not relevant.  As Davis explained, while “requiring a clear assertion of 
the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who — because of fear, 
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons — will not 
clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a 
lawyer present,” it is the Miranda warnings themselves, which — when given to 
the suspect and waived prior to questioning — are “ ‘sufficient to dispel whatever 
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’ ”  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at 
p. 460.)  Even though officers may ask questions to clarify whether the right to 
counsel is being invoked, they are not obligated to do so.  (Id. at p. 461.) 
The requirement of an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion likewise 
applies to a suspect’s invocation of the right to silence.  (Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
supra, 560 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260]; accord, People v. Martinez (2010) 
47 Cal.4th 911, 947-949 [officers need not clarify whether defendant is invoking 
 
10 
 
right to silence].)  Not only is there “no principled reason to adopt different 
standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to 
remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel” (Berghuis, at p. 2260), but 
applying different rules “would be difficult for law enforcement officials to 
implement in the interrogation setting, especially where the suspect’s ambiguous 
statements may relate to both the right to counsel and the right to remain silent” 
(People v. Martinez, at p. 949). 
The rationale for requiring clarity is to protect lawful investigative activity, 
an obviously vital component of effective law enforcement.  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly emphasized that voluntary confessions are “ ‘a proper element in 
law enforcement’ ” and “ ‘ “essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, 
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.” ’ ”  (Maryland v. Shatzer, 
supra, 559 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1222].)  Hence, after a suspect makes a 
valid waiver of the Miranda rights, the need for effective law enforcement weighs 
in favor of a bright-line rule that allows officers to continue questioning unless the 
suspect clearly invokes the right to counsel or right to silence. 
There are important practical and policy reasons supporting this rule.  
When the interrogating officers “reasonably do not know whether or not the 
suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of questioning 
‘would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity,’ . . . because it would needlessly prevent 
the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect 
did not wish to have a lawyer present.”  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 460, citation 
omitted.)  Likewise, in the right to silence context, “[i]f an ambiguous act, 
omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would 
be required to make difficult decisions about an accused’s unclear intent and face 
the consequence of suppression ‘if they guess wrong.’ ”  (Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
 
11 
 
supra, 560 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  In such circumstances, 
suppression of a voluntary confession “would place a significant burden on 
society’s interest in prosecuting criminal activity.”  (Ibid.) 
Applying the reasonable-officer approach, Davis agreed with the lower 
courts that the petitioner’s remark to investigators — “ ‘Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer’ ” — was not a clear and unambiguous assertion of the Miranda right to 
counsel.  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 462.)  Similarly, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
the high court determined that a suspect’s silence for nearly three hours during a 
custodial interrogation did not reflect an unambiguous assertion of the Miranda 
right to silence.  (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at 
pp. 2259-2260].) 
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on the matter, there appears no 
persuasive basis for exempting juveniles from Davis’s reasonable-officer standard.  
The interest in protecting lawful investigative activity is equally weighty in the 
adult and juvenile contexts.  (See Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461.)  At the same 
time, juveniles subject to custodial interrogation are adequately protected by the 
following safeguards. 
First, any custodial confession by a juvenile generally is not admissible if 
the juvenile did not receive proper advisement of the right to counsel and right to 
remain silent, or if the juvenile did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waive such rights.  As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “the primary protection 
afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings 
themselves.  ‘[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an 
attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation 
process.’ ”  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 460.) 
Second, as in the case of an adult’s Miranda waiver, determining the 
validity of a juvenile’s waiver necessitates inquiry into all the circumstances 
 
12 
 
surrounding a challenged interrogation, including “the juvenile’s age, experience, 
education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to 
understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and 
the consequences of waiving those rights.”  (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725.)  
Thus, for purposes of waiver determinations, courts must consider a juvenile’s 
state of mind, as well as all other circumstances, including a request for a parent, 
in order to ascertain whether the juvenile “in fact knowingly and voluntarily 
decided to forgo” his or her Miranda rights.  (Fare, at p. 725.)  This approach 
allows the necessary flexibility for courts “to take into account those special 
concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and 
education and with immature judgment, are involved.”  (Ibid.) 
Finally, courts must use “ ‘special care in scrutinizing the record’ ” to 
evaluate a claim that a juvenile’s custodial confession was not voluntarily given.  
(Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1166-1167 [quoting Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 
U.S. 596, 599].)  “If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when [a 
juvenile’s] admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that 
the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or 
suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of 
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”  (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 55.)  
Consequently, even when a juvenile has made a valid waiver of the Miranda 
rights, a court may consider whether the juvenile gave a confession after being 
“ ‘exposed to any form of coercion, threats, or promises of any kind, [or] trickery 
or intimidation . . . .’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 383.)3  The 
                                              
3  
Defendant does not contest the trial court’s finding that no physical or 
psychological coercion impeded the voluntariness of his statements.  At the 
hearing on the in limine motion, defendant had acknowledged that the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
13 
 
constitutional safeguard of voluntariness ensures that any custodial admission 
flows from the volition of the juvenile, and not the will of the interrogating 
officers.4 
Because juveniles have these protections, and because the need for effective 
law enforcement is the same in the adult and juvenile contexts, we are persuaded 
that juvenile postwaiver invocations are properly evaluated under the Davis 
standard.  (Cf. Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725 [holding juveniles and adults 
subject to same approach for Miranda waiver determinations].)  Accordingly, once 
a juvenile suspect has made a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, any subsequent 
assertion of the right to counsel or right to silence during questioning must be 
articulated sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
investigators allowed him to use the bathroom during the interview and did not 
withhold food or drink from him.  He also admitted there were no threats, no 
weapons, no handcuffs, and no promises made during the investigation. 
 
4  
Additionally, article 15 of division 2, part 1, chapter 2, of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code provides statutory protections to certain juveniles.  When an 
officer takes a minor to a place of confinement pursuant to that article, the officer 
“shall take immediate steps to notify the minor’s parent, guardian, or a responsible 
relative that such minor is in custody and the place where he is being held.”  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 627, subd. (a).)  Within an hour after taking the minor into 
custody, the officer shall also advise the minor of the right to completed telephone 
calls to a designated adult and to an attorney.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 627, subd. 
(b).)  Although it appears that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression 
of a minor’s in-custody statements when this statute has been violated (see Lessie, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1161 & fn. 2), the threat of criminal sanctions provides a 
powerful incentive for statutory compliance.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 627, subd. (b) 
[any officer who “willfully deprives” the minor of the “right to make such 
telephone calls is guilty of a misdemeanor”].) 
 
14 
 
would understand the statement to be an invocation of such rights.  (Davis, supra, 
512 U.S. at p. 459; see Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260].) 
B.  Application of the Davis Standard in the Instant Case 
Consistent with Davis, the standard of review — like the standard 
applicable in the trial court — focuses on “whether, in light of the circumstances, a 
reasonable officer would have understood a defendant’s reference to an attorney 
[or other individual] to be an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel, 
without regard to the defendant’s subjective ability or capacity to articulate his or 
her desire for counsel, and with no further requirement imposed upon the officers 
to ask clarifying questions of the defendant.”  (Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 
p. 1125; accord, Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 460-462; People v. Martinez, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at pp. 947-949 [right to silence].)  As a reviewing court, we “ ‘accept 
the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of 
credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”  (Gonzalez, at p. 1125; see 
Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169; People v. Martinez, at p. 949.)  Although we 
review the record and independently decide whether the challenged statements 
were obtained in violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, we may “ ‘give great 
weight to the considered conclusions’ ” of the trial court.  (People v. Jennings 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 979; see People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 
1239.) 
Here, investigators Salcedo and Sutton questioned defendant for over five 
hours, and the entire interrogation was both recorded and transcribed.  At the 
hearing on the motion in limine, the trial court stated it had reviewed the videotape 
and considered what transpired at the interrogation.  The court also received 
testimony from Salcedo and Sutton, as well as from defendant himself.  Defendant 
acknowledged he had understood the Miranda rights that were read to him at the 
 
15 
 
start of the interrogation, and admitted there were no threats, no weapons, no 
handcuffs, and no promises from the investigators during the investigation.  
Defendant said he knew what an attorney was, because he had been represented by 
an attorney in juvenile court.  Defendant had agreed to speak with the 
investigators, because he felt it would “seem funny” if he did not do so.  He 
explained that, as the hours went on, he was “sort of being worn down” and 
getting tired and stressed as the investigators got tougher in their questioning.  
Defendant also admitted having lied to the investigators during the interrogation.  
The recording of the interview showed that defendant was deceptive throughout 
the five-hour session and admitted to wrongdoing only when confronted with 
evidence or caught in a lie. 
In announcing its ruling, the trial court made an explicit finding that, based 
on its reading of the transcripts, listening to testimony, and viewing the recorded 
interview, defendant had “zero credibility.”  Then, after determining that 
defendant had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda 
rights at the outset of the interrogation, the court addressed the issue at the heart of 
this matter.  Summarizing the details of the interrogation and viewing defendant’s 
statements in context, the court found that, whenever defendant requested to speak 
to his mother, he did so because he wanted to tell his mother what was going on 
and to ask her what he should do.  The court further found that, even if defendant 
subjectively desired attorney assistance, his statements were objectively 
ambiguous because they were limited to the issue whether or not he should take 
the polygraph test.5  That is, although defendant indicated reluctance to take the 
                                              
5  
For this conclusion, the court specifically referenced defendant’s statements 
to the investigators that his grandmother and brother told him to refrain from 
taking the test until he talked to his mother or an attorney. 
 
16 
 
test without speaking to his mother or a lawyer, he “continued to consent to 
voluntarily talk” to the authorities on other topics.  The court also observed that, 
“even though in his own mind he thought his mother was [only] ten minutes 
away,” defendant went ahead and signed a written confession without waiting for 
her arrival.  Relying on Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, the court found that defendant 
did not invoke his Miranda rights, and that even if there was a request for an 
attorney, it was ambiguous and did not require cessation of the interview.  As we 
shall explain, the trial court’s conclusions are both legally and factually supported. 
As a legal matter, we have already recognized in the waiver context that a 
juvenile’s request to speak with a parent is neither a per se nor a presumptive 
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights.  (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1168.)6  
There is an obvious reason for this:  “the parental role does not equate with the 
attorney’s role in an interrogation by police.”  (People v. Maestas (1987) 194 
Cal.App.3d 1499, 1510, fn. 9.)  Where, as here, a juvenile has made a valid waiver 
of his Miranda rights and has agreed to questioning, a postwaiver request for a 
parent is insufficient to halt questioning unless the circumstances are such that a 
reasonable officer would understand that the juvenile is actually invoking — as 
opposed to might be invoking — the right to counsel or silence.  (See Davis, 
supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 458-459.) 
Our review of the transcribed and videotaped interview finds ample support 
for the trial court’s resolution of the conflicting inferences that may be gleaned 
from defendant’s various requests and statements.  (Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 
                                              
6  
Lessie disapproved People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, which held that, 
in the absence of evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, a minor’s request to 
see a parent must be construed to indicate an invocation of Fifth Amendment 
rights.  (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1162-1168.) 
 
17 
 
p. 1125.)  After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant was open and responsive to 
questioning on any topic.  Defendant, who was 15 years old, appeared confident 
and mature.  About three and a half hours into the interview, the investigators 
asked why defendant hurt Thompson and whether he was willing to take a 
polygraph test.  Defendant responded by asking to call his mother, and, when 
asked the reason for the call, he offered no indication that he wanted an attorney or 
that he did not want to talk further.  Instead, he specifically stated he wanted to let 
his mother “know what’s happening” and to ask her what he should do because he 
was being accused of murder.  On this record, the trial court properly concluded 
that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would not have viewed defendant’s 
request to call his mother as a clear and unequivocal invocation of the Miranda 
rights.  (See People v. Maestas, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1509.) 
As the interrogation proceeded, defendant asked several more times to call 
his mother when the investigators again asked about a polygraph test, or why he 
hurt Thompson.  The investigators generally did not inquire into the reasons for 
the subsequent requests, but defendant clarified a second time that he wanted to let 
his mother know “what’s going on right now” and where he was.  Given the 
circumstances surrounding each of defendant’s requests, a reasonable officer 
would not have understood any of them as an unambiguous assertion of Miranda 
rights.  Although defendant became increasingly upset during the interview, and 
quieter toward the end, the questioning properly continued because defendant 
never communicated an intent to stop the interview altogether.  (See Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at pp. 2262-2263].) 
Defendant also informed the investigators that his grandmother and brother 
told him not to take a polygraph test “until my mom or a lawyer is here,” and that 
those family members “don’t want me to do anything until a lawyer or my mom is 
here.”  Taken in context, these statements did not convey an unambiguous request 
 
18 
 
to halt all questioning, or a clear unwillingness to continue the interview without a 
lawyer.  Rather, as the trial court observed, a reasonable officer could have 
understood defendant’s statements as conveying a reluctance to take a polygraph 
test without first speaking to an attorney or his mother.  Where, as here, the 
suspect makes a conditional invocation of counsel limited to the administration of 
a polygraph test, officers need not terminate the entire interrogation.  (People v. 
Martinez, 47 Cal.4th at p. 952; see also Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-
1127 [defendant conditionally wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged]; 
People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 122-123 [defendant would not talk about an 
unrelated killing without an attorney present].)  Furthermore, questioning need not 
halt simply because a suspect refuses, either conditionally or outright, to take a 
polygraph test.  (E.g., People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 952; People v. 
Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 824-825 [16-year-old suspect’s unwillingness to 
speak to polygraph administrator was not a general assertion of his right to remain 
silent].) 
Likewise, defendant did not unambiguously assert his right to silence when 
he told the investigators at one point that he did not care who might be caught for 
Thompson’s murder, “as long as you guys leave me alone.”  A reasonable officer 
in the circumstances could view that statement as an expression of frustration with 
the investigators’ repeated refusal to accept his denial of guilt for the murder.  (See 
Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 433 [mere “ ‘expressions of passing frustration or 
animosity’ ” toward officers do not invoke the right to silence]; People v. 
Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 977, 978 [“ ‘I’m not going to talk,’ ” and 
“ ‘That’s it.  I shut up,’ ” reflected “only momentary frustration and animosity” 
toward the questioning officer].) 
Nor did defendant make a clear invocation when, toward the end of the 
interview, he asked the investigators for “a few minutes to myself” and for time to 
 
19 
 
“be alone until my family gets here.”  Notably, defendant clarified, when asked, 
that he simply wanted time to “be alone” and to “think about stuff” before writing 
out a statement about what happened to Thompson.  In neither of these instances 
did defendant indicate, clearly or otherwise, that he was asserting his right to 
remain silent. 
On this record, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying 
defendant’s in limine motion.  A reasonable officer in the circumstances would not 
have understood defendant’s requests to call his mother, or any of his other 
statements, to be unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of his Miranda 
rights.7  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 460-462; Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 
560 U.S. at p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  Accordingly, investigators Salcedo and 
Sutton were not required to stop their questioning, and defendant’s custodial 
statements were properly admitted at trial. 
                                              
7  
While this case was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2394], which 
addressed custody determinations for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings.  In 
that case, the high court held that a child suspect’s age, when known to the 
interrogating officer or objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, is relevant to 
the determination whether, considering all the objective circumstances of an 
interrogation, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would understand his 
freedom to terminate police questioning and leave.  (Id. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at 
p. 2406].)  Contrary to defendant’s assertions, nothing in J.D.B. calls for 
application of a subjective test to determine juvenile postwaiver invocations.  
While J.D.B.’s analysis generally supports the view that a juvenile suspect’s 
known or objectively apparent age is a factor to consider in an invocation 
determination, knowledge of defendant’s age would not have altered a reasonable 
officer’s understanding of defendant’s statements in the circumstances here.  As 
indicated, defendant, who was 15 years old, appeared confident and mature. 
 
20 
 
C.  Inapplicability of the Miranda Waiver Test 
The Court of Appeal held that Davis’s objective approach was 
inappropriate for juveniles and declined to assess defendant’s postwaiver 
statements from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer.  Instead, the court relied on 
Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707, and Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1152, to hold that the 
postwaiver invocation determination required an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances in order to ascertain whether a juvenile suspect intended to assert 
the Miranda rights.  Upon considering defendant’s age, experience, maturity, and 
sophistication, as well as the length, intensity, and content of the entire 
interrogation, the court found that defendant’s purpose when he first requested to 
speak with his mother was to secure her assistance to protect his Fifth Amendment 
rights.8 
                                              
8  
The Court of Appeal explained its conclusion as follows.  “After 
considering Nelson’s age, experience, maturity, sophistication, the length, 
intensity, and content of the interrogation, we conclude Nelson’s purpose in 
requesting to speak with his mother was to secure her assistance to protect his 
Fifth Amendment rights.  Further evidence of Nelson’s desire to invoke his 
Miranda rights is evidenced by his various requests to end the conversation about 
the murder.  His words and conduct were inconsistent with ‘a present willingness 
to discuss the case freely and completely.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  In short, the 
record reflects a juvenile who persisted in his attempts to seek his mother’s 
assistance in protecting his rights, who numerous times indicated he did not want 
to continue speaking, and after over five hours of interrogation submitted to the 
deputies[’] insistence that he write out a confession.”  Although the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that defendant was “no stranger to the criminal justice 
system” and was allowed “to make numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact his 
mother,” it noted the additional circumstances that defendant was “ ‘really 
hungry’ ” after four hours of questioning, that he was “repeatedly tearful,” and that 
he was a year younger and subjected to much lengthier interrogation than the 
juvenile suspects in Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707, and Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1152. 
 
 
21 
 
The Court of Appeal’s analysis is flawed in two significant respects.  First, 
the court erred by focusing on what defendant may have subjectively wanted, 
instead of considering how a reasonable officer would have understood 
defendant’s statements in the circumstances presented.  Fare and Lessie are 
inapposite because those decisions addressed whether the juveniles involved made 
valid waivers of their Miranda rights.  (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 726-727; 
Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1169-1170.)  Here there is no dispute that 
defendant understood and voluntarily waived his rights, and the only question is 
whether he subsequently invoked the right to have counsel present or the right to 
silence.  It has long been settled that “[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct 
inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together.”  (Smith v. 
Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98; see People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 
p. 951.)  Accordingly, Fare and Lessie do not support substitution of a subjective 
test in place of Davis’s objective approach when evaluating whether a juvenile 
suspect, having waived the Miranda rights, later asserted the right to counsel or 
right to silence.  (See People v. Martinez, at p. 951.) 
Second, it is correct that the objectively apparent circumstances in which a 
suspect made a postwaiver statement are relevant to an officer’s understanding of 
the statement as an assertion of Miranda rights.  But contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s analysis, a finding of a sufficiently clear invocation cannot be predicated 
upon unrelated discussions or events that occurred after the statement was made.  
Officers may, of course, try to clarify ambiguous statements (Davis, supra, 512 
U.S. at p. 461), but generally a statement either is, or is not, an assertion of the 
right to counsel (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 97-98).  Thus, while the 
length, intensity, and content of an entire interrogation are relevant in assessing 
whether a suspect who waived the Miranda rights was subsequently coerced into 
involuntarily confessing (Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 727; People v. Richardson 
 
22 
 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 992-993; cf. People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 80-85), 
we do not consider such circumstances because that contention is not at issue here.  
(See ante, fn. 3.) 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
Consistent with Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, we hold that, once a juvenile 
suspect has made a valid waiver of his or her Miranda rights, any subsequent 
assertion of the right to counsel or right to silence during questioning must be 
articulated sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be an invocation of such rights.  Because this 
standard is an objective one, the invocation determination does not call for an 
evaluation of the juvenile’s state of mind or subjective desire.  We caution, 
however, that a particular statement found insufficiently clear in the circumstances 
of one case may nonetheless be deemed an unambiguous and unequivocal 
invocation when considered in the context of another case. 
On this record, we find the trial court properly determined that a reasonable 
officer would not have understood defendant to be clearly and unequivocally 
asserting his Miranda rights when he asked to speak to his mother, or when he 
indicated his relatives did not want him to take a polygraph test without first 
speaking to his mother or a lawyer, or when he made references to being left 
alone.  Accordingly, the investigators were not required to halt the interrogation at 
any point, and defendant’s incriminating statements were admissible at trial.  We  
 
23 
 
 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court 
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Nelson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/5/10 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S181611 
Date Filed: January 12, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Frank F. Fasel 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mary Woodward Wells, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rourke F. Stacy, Public Defender (Los Angeles) and Ji Seon Song, Public Defender (Contra Costa) for 
Pacific Juvenile Public Defender Center, Los Angeles County Public Defender, Contra Costa County 
Public Defender, Los Angeles County Alternate Public Defender, Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile 
Law and Policy and the Center for Wrongful Convictions of Youth as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Steven T. Oetting, 
Elizabeth A. Hartwig and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mary Woodward Wells 
Post Office Box 3069 
Del Mar, CA  92014 
(858) 481-5341 
 
Rourke F. Stacy 
Public Defender 
210 W. Temple Street, 19th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-3002 
 
Donald W. Ostertag 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2278 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Nelson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/5/10 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S181611 
Date Filed: January 12, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Frank F. Fasel 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mary Woodward Wells, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rourke F. Stacy, Public Defender (Los Angeles) and Ji Seon Song, Public Defender (Contra Costa) for 
Pacific Juvenile Public Defender Center, Los Angeles County Public Defender, Contra Costa County 
Public Defender, Los Angeles County Alternate Public Defender, Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile 
Law and Policy and the Center for Wrongful Convictions of Youth as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Steven T. Oetting, 
Elizabeth A. Hartwig and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mary Woodward Wells 
Post Office Box 3069 
Del Mar, CA  92014 
(858) 481-5341 
 
Rourke F. Stacy 
Public Defender 
210 W. Temple Street, 19th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-3002 
 
Donald W. Ostertag 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2278