Title: Bell v. Casper
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101004
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
 
ABIGAIL R. BELL, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, LISA BELL 
 
v.  Record No. 101004  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 16, 2011 
JORDAN REBEKAH LYNN CASPER, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, ESTHER M. 
CHURCH, ET AL. 
 
JORDAN REBEKAH LYNN CASPER, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, ESTHER M. 
CHURCH 
 
v.  Record No. 101012 
 
CLAYTON DEVOY LYNN, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge 
 
In these appeals arising out of two cases consolidated in 
the Circuit Court of Henrico County (the "trial court"), we 
consider whether the trial court erred when it held that the 
provisions of Code §§ 55-401 et seq. (Virginia's "Slayer 
Statute"), in effect on the date of the decedent's death, 
govern the distribution of the decedent's estate in this case. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below1 
 
Sometime between June 29 and July 11, 2005, Collette Lynn 
Lockard ("Lockard") was shot and killed by her only child, 
Clayton Devoy Lynn ("Lynn") in Henrico County.  On the date of 
her death, Lockard was survived by Lynn, Lynn's daughters, 
                     
 
1 All material facts were undisputed and stipulated to by 
all parties in a Consent Order entered by the trial court on 
October 26, 2009. 
 
2 
Abigail R. Lynn Bell ("Bell") and Jordan Rebekah Lynn Casper2 
("Casper"), and her mother, Lena Rhelda Sanders-Howerton 
("Lockard's mother").  Lockard's will identified Lynn as the 
sole beneficiary of her estate, and identified no further 
beneficiaries in the event that Lynn predeceased Lockard.  
However, in June 2009, Lynn pled guilty and subsequently was 
convicted of second degree murder for killing Lockard.   
 
Thereafter, Bell, a minor child, brought an action by her 
mother and next friend, Lisa Bell, seeking declaratory judgment 
that Lynn, her biological father, be declared a "slayer" for 
purposes of the Slayer Statute and that she and Casper be 
declared the sole heirs of Lockard's estate.  Casper, also a 
minor child, filed her own declaratory judgment action by her 
next friend, Esther M. Church, seeking identical relief.  The 
two actions were consolidated for trial by order of the trial 
court in October 2009. 
 
Code §§ 55-401 through -4153 prevent Lynn, as Lockard's 
"slayer," from receiving any property or benefit from Lockard's 
estate and the parties do not contend otherwise.  Specifically, 
Code §§ 55-401 and -402 prohibit a "slayer," or one "who is 
                     
 
2 Bell does not concede that Casper is in fact Lynn's 
biological daughter, but any dispute regarding this matter is 
irrelevant given our opinion in this case. 
 
3 Former Code §§ 55-401 through -406, -411, and -414 (2003) 
were amended and reenacted in 2008.  See 2008 Acts chs. 822, 
830. 
 
3 
convicted of the murder" of the decedent, from acquiring "any 
property or . . . any benefits as the result of the death of 
the decedent."  The parties disagree, however, regarding who 
stands to inherit Lockard's estate. 
 
Former Code § 55-402 (2003), in effect at the time of 
Lockard's death provided that "[n]either the slayer nor any 
person claiming through him shall in any way acquire any 
property or receive any benefits as the result of the death of 
the decedent."  (Emphasis added.)  However, the General 
Assembly amended the Slayer Statute in 2008, after Lockard's 
death but prior to Lynn's conviction of her murder, to provide 
that "[a]n heir or distributee who establishes his kinship to 
the decedent by way of his kinship to a slayer shall be deemed 
to be claiming from the decedent and not through the slayer."  
Code § 55-403 (emphasis added). 
 
Bell and Casper argued that the 2008 version of the Slayer 
Statute governs the distribution of Lockard's estate because 
the Slayer Statute only applies once someone is determined to 
be a "slayer" as a result of his conviction of the murder of 
the decedent.  Accordingly, Bell and Casper argued that they 
are the rightful beneficiaries of Lockard's estate because, 
under the 2008 version of the Slayer Statute, they may take 
directly from Lockard, and not through Lockard's "slayer," 
Lynn.  To the contrary, Lockard's mother argued that the 
 
4 
version of the Slayer Statute in effect at the time of 
Lockard's death governs the distribution of Lockard's estate in 
this case and, as a result she is the rightful beneficiary of 
Lockard's estate, according to the laws of intestate succession 
in effect at the time of Lockard's death. 
Upon the parties' respective pleadings, memoranda of law 
and argument of counsel, the trial court held that Lockard's 
mother is the sole and rightful heir to Lockard's estate.  
Specifically, the trial court concluded that the version of the 
Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Lockard's death governs 
the distribution of her estate, and "[a]lthough the conviction 
of murder designates the killer to be the 'Slayer,' it 
logically follows that he is determined to be the 'Slayer' at 
the time of the killing."  Accordingly, the trial court held 
that, because Bell and Casper could only inherit from Lockard 
through Lynn, according to the 2005 version of the Slayer 
Statute, "the statutory scheme of intestate succession – as 
modified by the 2005 'Slayer Statute' – precludes them from 
taking anything . . . from [Lockard's] Estate."  Therefore, the 
trial court held that "the estate passes to the next living 
person who is neither the Slayer nor making a claim through the 
Slayer – in this case, [Lockard's mother]."  Bell and Casper 
timely filed their notices of appeal and we granted appeals on 
the following assignments of error: 
 
5 
For Bell, Record No. 101004: 
 
1. 
The trial court committed reversible error in finding 
that Clayton Lynn is determined to be the "Slayer" as 
of the time of the killing in 2005 in contradiction 
to the express language of the Virginia Slayer 
Statutes and thereupon ruling that Ms. Sanders-
Howerton is the sole and rightful heir to the estate 
of the decedent and that the petitioners herein have 
no valid rights or claims with respect to the 
decedent's estate. 
 
2. 
The trial court committed reversible error in finding 
that the provisions of the Virginia Slayer Statutes 
(Virginia Code Ann. § 55-401 et seq.) in effect on 
the date of the decedent's death in 2005 control the 
rights of the parties in these proceedings and 
thereupon ruling that Ms. Sanders-Howerton is the 
sole and rightful heir to the estate of the decedent 
and that the petitioners herein have no valid rights 
or claims with respect to the decedent's estate. 
 
3. 
The trial court committed reversible error in failing 
to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the 
Virginia Slayer Statutes, § 55-401, et seq., with the 
Virginia Anti-Corruption of Blood Statute, § 55-4. 
 
For Casper, Record No. 101012: 
 
1. 
The trial court erred in finding that the 2005 
Virginia Slayer Act governs the distribution of the 
decedent's estate, given that the Act has always 
defined a slayer in plain language as anyone who is 
convicted or judicially determined to have committed 
certain acts resulting in the death of the decedent, 
and the statute was not triggered until June 2009 
when the decedent's murderer pleaded guilty to her 
homicide. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred by not reconciling the inherent 
conflict between the Anti-Corruption of Blood 
Statute, Virginia Code § 55-4, and the Virginia 
Slayer Act in favor of the minor children. 
 
 
 
6 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
Whether the version of the Slayer Statute in effect at the 
time of Lockard's death in 2005, or the amended 2008 version in 
effect at the time of Lynn's conviction, is applicable to the 
facts of this case is a question of statutory interpretation.  
Accordingly, it "'presents a pure question of law and is . . . 
subject to de novo review by this Court.'" Warrington v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010) 
(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 
412, 414 (2008)). 
As with any question of statutory interpretation, our 
primary objective is " 'to ascertain and give effect to 
legislative intent,' " as expressed by the language used in the 
statute.  Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 706 S.E.2d 
879, 882 (2011) (quoting Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 
702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010)).  Additionally, " '[w]hen the 
language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language.' "  Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 
543, 549, 708 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. 
Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 
S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007)). 
 
 
 
7 
B. Virginia's Slayer Statute 
This Court previously has discussed the purposes of the 
Slayer Statute, including the General Assembly's "legislative 
recognition of a broad public policy against the acquisition of 
property rights by murder," a policy which is in complete 
agreement with the "common law maxim of ancient vintage, viz., 
that no person should be permitted to profit by his own wrong."  
Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 235-36, 269 S.E.2d 787, 788-89 
(1980).  See Code § 55-414.  Irrespective of which version of 
the Slayer Statute applies, Lynn, as Lockard's "slayer," is 
prohibited from receiving any property or benefit from 
Lockard's estate. 
Because Lockard's will identified Lynn as the sole 
beneficiary of her estate, and identified no further 
beneficiaries in the event that Lynn predeceased Lockard, 
Lockard's will lapsed.  The laws of intestate succession in 
effect at the time of Lockard's death in 2005 govern the 
distribution of her estate.  See McGehee v. Edwards, 268 Va. 
15, 20, 597 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2004); McFadden v. McNorton, 193 
Va. 455, 457, 69 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1952); Mott v. Nat'l Bank of 
Commerce, 190 Va. 1006, 1011, 59 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1950).  See 
also Schilling v. Schilling, 280 Va. 146, 150, 695 S.E.2d 181, 
183 (2010).  The determinative issue in this case is whether 
the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of 
 
8 
Lockard's death in 2005 or the version in effect on the date of 
Lynn's conviction in 2008 controls.  If the version in effect 
in 2005 controls, Lockard's mother stands to inherit Lockard's 
estate.  Former Code § 55-402 (2003); Code § 64.1-1.  If the 
amended 2008 version of the Slayer Statute controls, Bell and 
Casper stand to inherit Lockard's estate.  Code § 55-403. 
Bell and Casper argue that Code § 55-401, in defining a 
"slayer" as someone convicted of murder, dictates that the 
Slayer Statute has no application in determining who inherits 
the Decedent's estate until someone has been judicially 
determined to be a "slayer" for purposes of the statute.  
Accordingly, they argue that the version of the Slayer Statute 
in effect on the date of the slayer's conviction controls any 
distribution of the decedent's estate affected by application 
of the Slayer Statute. 
To the contrary, Lockard's mother contends that the trial 
court correctly concluded that the distribution provisions of 
the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of 
Lockard's death, "like all laws related to the distribution of 
property under Virginia's testacy and intestacy statutes," 
control the distribution of Lockard's estate.   
 
As it existed at the time of Lockard's death in 2005, the 
Slayer Statute defined "Slayer," in relevant part, as any 
person "who is convicted of the murder of the decedent."  
 
9 
Former Code § 55-401 (2003).4  Bell and Casper mistakenly rely 
upon Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Tull, 524 F. Supp. 166, 
171 (E.D. Va. 1981), for the proposition that the Slayer 
Statute becomes applicable in determining the rights of those 
who stand to inherit from a decedent only after the judicial 
determination has been made in accordance with Code § 55-401. 
 
In Tull, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia considered the application of the Slayer 
Statute to a person who had been convicted of murder but whose 
appeal had not yet been resolved by the Supreme Court of 
Virginia.  Tull, 524 F. Supp. at 168-71.  In the case before 
us, the conviction is final, and the issue is whether such an 
adjudication is effective upon the date of the death of the 
decedent or upon the date of adjudication of the slayer.  We 
agree with the trial court that "[a]lthough the conviction of 
murder designates the killer to be the 'Slayer,' it logically 
follows that he is determined to be the 'Slayer' at the time of 
the killing." 
Virginia has long recognized that the law in existence on 
the date of a decedent's death governs the distribution of the 
                     
 
4 While inapplicable to the facts of this case, the Slayer 
Statute also included in the definition of "Slayer," any person 
who, "in the absence of such conviction . . . who is determined 
by a court of appropriate jurisdiction by a preponderance of 
the evidence to have murdered the decedent."  Former Code § 55-
401 (2003). 
 
10 
decedent's estate.  See McGehee, 268 Va. at 19, 597 S.E.2d at 
102 (recognizing that "the interests of beneficiaries accrue at 
the testator's death"); McFadden, 193 Va. at 457, 69 S.E.2d at 
446 (recognizing that "the right of an adopted child to inherit 
is to be determined by the law in force at the death of the 
person from whom the inheritance is claimed."); Mott, 190 Va. 
at 1011, 59 S.E.2d at 100 (stating that "[t]he answer . . . as 
to who were the heirs at law of [the decedent] is to be found 
in the statutes of descents and distributions as supplemented 
by the adoption laws in force at the time of his death.").  See 
also Schilling, 280 Va. at 150, 695 S.E.2d at 183 (declaring 
that "a determination whether a writing offered for probate is 
a valid will applies the law in effect on the date of the 
maker's death."). 
The Slayer Statute's historical placement in the Virginia 
Code is instructive.  Virginia's first Slayer Statute was 
enacted as section 5274 of the Code of 1919.  See Life Ins. Co. 
of Virginia v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 412 (E.D. Va. 1962).  
Within the Code of 1919, the Slayer Statute was in Title 46, 
Chapter 213, entitled "Descents and Distribution."  Former Code 
§ 5274 (1919).  Upon enactment of the Code of 1950, the Slayer 
Statute was included in Title 64, Chapter 1, again entitled 
"Descent and Distribution."  Former Code § 64-18 (1950).  Only 
when a more comprehensive Slayer Statute was enacted in 1981 -
 
11 
which applied to potential acquisitions of property by a slayer 
in addition to those related to life insurance, wills, or 
intestacy – was the statute moved to Title 55, entitled 
"Property and Conveyances."  Former Code §§ 55-401 et seq. 
(1981).  However, the fact that the Slayer Statute is now 
placed in Title 55 does not change its effect upon estate 
distribution when the decedent has been murdered by a potential 
heir or legatee. 
Significantly, the version of the Slayer Statute in effect 
in 2005, by its own language, explicitly modified distribution 
of a decedent's estate by providing that "[n]either the slayer 
nor any person claiming through [the slayer] shall in any way 
acquire any property or receive any benefits as the result of 
the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as 
provided in the sections following."5  Former Code § 55-402 
(2003) (emphasis added). 
The "sections following" former Code § 55-402 (2003) 
provided both that "[t]he slayer shall be deemed to have 
predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed 
                     
 
5 Additionally, the version of the Slayer Statute in effect 
in 2005 unequivocally modified several provisions of Title 
64.1, including descent and distribution, Code §§ 64.1-01 et 
seq., the anti-lapse statute, Code § 64.1-64.1, and the Uniform 
Simultaneous Death Act, Code § 64.1-104.1 et seq.  See former 
Code §§ 55-403, -404, and -415 (2003). 
 
12 
from the estate of the decedent to the slayer under the 
statutes of descent and distribution," and that 
[t]he slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased 
the decedent as to property which would have 
passed to the slayer by devise or legacy from 
the decedent, except that [Code] § 64.1-64.1, 
preventing lapse of devises or legacies when the 
person named in the will dies before the 
testator, shall not apply. 
 
Former Code §§ 55-403 and 55-404 (2003).  The clear language of 
the statutes forecloses the ability of Bell and Casper to 
inherit Lockard's estate through the slayer.  Former Code 
§§ 55-402, -403, and -404 (2003). 
Finally, this Court has recognized "the fundamental 
principles of statutory construction that retroactive laws are 
not favored, and that a statute is always construed to operate 
prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is 
manifest."  Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408, 413, 579 S.E.2d 159, 
161 (2003).  See also Schilling, 280 Va. at 149, 695 S.E.2d at 
183.  Nothing in the amendments to the Slayer Statute made 
after Lockard's death indicates that the General Assembly 
intended such amendments to apply retroactively.  See 2008 Acts 
chs. 822, 830. 
 
Accordingly, the Slayer Statute's interplay with Virginia 
law governing descent and distribution and its longstanding 
history as a law governing descent and distribution in 
particular circumstances compel application of Virginia's well-
 
13 
established policy that the law in existence on the date of a 
decedent's death governs the distribution of the decedent's 
estate.  See McGehee, 268 Va. at 19-20, 597 S.E.2d at 102; 
McFadden, 193 Va. at 457, 69 S.E.2d at 446; Mott, 190 Va. at 
1011, 59 S.E.2d at 100.  See also Schilling, 280 Va. at 150, 
695 S.E.2d at 183.  Consequently, we hold that the version of 
the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Lockard's murder in 
2005 controls the distribution of Lockard's estate in this 
case.  As a result, we hold that the trial court was correct in 
concluding that under the laws of intestate succession at the 
time of Lockard's death in 2005, as modified by the version of 
the Slayer Statute in effect in 2005, Lockard's estate passes 
to the next living person who is neither the "slayer" nor 
making a claim through the "slayer." 
C. Corruption of Blood 
Bell and Casper contend that the version of the Slayer 
Statute in effect at the time of Lockard's death in 2005, if 
applied in this case, would violate Virginia law prohibiting 
the "corruption of blood."  Contrary to Bell's and Casper's 
assertions, however, "corruption of blood" and "forfeiture of 
estate" are not implicated by Virginia's Slayer Statute – even 
as it existed in 2005. 
Code § 55-4 provides that "[n]o suicide, nor attainder of 
felony, shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of 
 
14 
estate."  The United States Supreme Court has observed that, at 
common law, "attainder generally carried with it a 'corruption 
of blood,' which meant that the attainted party's heirs could 
not inherit his property."  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 
437, 441 (1965) (emphasis added).  Similarly, this Court has 
stated that "corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate on 
conviction of felony as at common law has been expressly 
abolished by statute.  So, in Virginia, the right of a person 
to take, hold and dispose of his property, real and personal, 
is not affected by his attainder of felony."  Haynes v. 
Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 734, 100 S.E. 471, 472 (1919) (citation 
omitted; emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Slayer Statute, as it existed in 2005, 
does not work a corruption of blood because it does not deprive 
a "slayer's" heirs the right to inherit from the "slayer" 
property properly belonging to the "slayer."  Neither does it 
work a forfeiture of estate because it does not require a 
"slayer" to forfeit his property.  Rather, former Code § 55-402 
(2003) merely prohibited a slayer from acquiring additional 
property rights as a result of his wrongdoing, which his heirs 
could subsequently claim "through him." 
In fact, we explicitly have held that the Slayer Statute 
does not violate Code § 55-4 because it "do[es] not deprive the 
murderer of any property rights, but prevent[s] his acquisition 
 
15 
of additional rights by unlawful and unauthorized means."  
Sundin, 221 Va. at 240, 269 S.E.2d at 791 (emphasis added).  In 
so holding, we recognized that "one cannot suffer an unlawful 
forfeiture of something he has gained contrary to law or the 
terms of his own undertaking."  Id.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of 
Lockard's murder in 2005 neither implicates nor violates 
Virginia's prohibition against "corruption of blood or 
forfeiture of estate."  Code § 55-4. 
III. Conclusion 
We hold that the version of the Slayer Statute in effect 
on the date of Lockard's murder in 2005 controls the 
distribution of Lockard's estate in this case.  We also hold 
that the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of 
Lockard's murder in 2005 neither implicates nor violates 
Virginia's prohibition against "corruption of blood."  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.