Title: State Ex Rel. Schneider v. City of Kansas City
Citation: 228 Kan. 25, 612 P.2d 578
Docket Number: 50,979
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 1980

228 Kan. 25 (1980)
612 P.2d 578
STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. CURT T. SCHNEIDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 50,979

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 14, 1980.
Michael J. Davis, special assistant attorney general, argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Annette Eslick, assistant city attorney, argued the cause and Robert J. Watson, city attorney, was with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This appeal is from an order of the district court entered in a quo warranto action filed by the State of Kansas, on behalf of the Board of Regents, seeking a determination by what authority, if any, the City of Kansas City, Kansas, sought to require the Board of Regents to obtain a building permit and follow Kansas City building codes in the construction of a new facility at the University of Kansas Medical Center. The Board also sought equitable relief by way of a restraining order to prevent the City from enforcing its building codes. The trial court held that the Board was required to obtain a building permit and comply with the local building codes. This appeal by the Board of Regents followed. The trial court also held that as the construction was nearly complete, its ruling would only apply prospectively to future construction. The City has filed a cross-appeal from that ruling of the court.
The action was heard by the trial court upon an agreed statement of facts. In 1975, the University of Kansas embarked upon a program to build a radiation therapy facility on the campus of the Kansas University Medical Center located within the city limits of Kansas City. The proposed construction and equipment to be utilized therein would cost in excess of $3,000,000.00. Two *26 million dollars were appropriated by the Kansas legislature and approximately one million more was to be received through a grant from the federal government. The proposed radiation treatment facility would be utilized in the treatment of private patients who will pay for the services and as a part of the educational system of the Kansas University School of Medicine. In December, 1977, after funding had been assured, bids solicited and construction contracts let, the chief building inspector of Kansas City advised the general contractor that a building permit and various other city permits would be required before construction could commence. In order to obtain a building permit the plans and specifications must be approved by the City, and the construction must comply with the building, plumbing, electrical and mechanical codes adopted by the City. The proposed facility, as is true with the entire Medical Center, would be dependent upon the City's utilities for water and electricity, would tie into the City's sanitary and storm sewer systems and would rely upon the City for fire protection. The Board of Regents declined to obtain the required permits and filed this action on December 13, 1977, seeking a temporary restraining order and a determination of whether the requirements for a building permit and compliance with the City's building codes are valid. An ex parte restraining order was issued against the City on the same day. No attempt was made by the City to set aside the restraining order; construction of the radiation therapy facility has been completed and it is in operation at the Medical Center. Following the filing of briefs and various delays which occurred for one reason or another, the matter finally came to trial on February 16, 1979, and the court, on February 27, 1979, issued its memorandum decision in favor of the City.
At the outset we deem it advisable to address a procedural issue raised by the City in its cross-appeal. It is the City's contention that the district court erred in not finding that the case should have been filed by the Board of Regents rather than by the State of Kansas on the relation of the Attorney General. It is argued that the real party in interest is not named and the action is improper, having been brought in the name of the State of Kansas.
K.S.A. 60-217(a) provides in pertinent part:
*27 K.S.A. 76-713 provides in part:
In Torkelson we also stated:
It is true, and the statutes so contemplate, that in actions involving the Board of Regents it is usually named as such or the individual members are made parties in their collective capacity as the Board of Regents. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969); McCoy v. Board of Regents, 196 Kan. 506, 413 P.2d 73 (1966); Murray v. State Board of Regents, 194 Kan. 686, 401 P.2d 898 (1965); The State, ex rel., v. Regents of the University, 55 Kan. 389, 40 Pac. 656 (1895). The Board of Regents is a governmental agency created by the legislature at the specific direction of the Kansas Constitution, article 6, section 2(b). As such it is bound by any decision brought on its behalf in the name of the State of Kansas, and there is no danger of harassment of or the filing of a multiplicity of suits against the defendant. In addition, the action was brought by the attorney general who is the person designated by K.S.A. 76-713 to represent the Board of Regents in all litigation. Considering the purpose of the real party in interest statute, the trial court did not commit error in refusing to dismiss the action for failure of it to be filed in the name of the "Board of Regents," the name of the institution involved, or the *28 chief executive officer thereof. The procedural point raised by the City in its cross-appeal is without merit.
We now turn to the central issue before the court. Can the City of Kansas City require the Board of Regents to obtain a building permit and conform to its building codes for construction at the University of Kansas Medical Center? The State makes several arguments in support of its position that the construction should be free of any requirements to obtain a building permit. Among them are: (1) the Board of Regents as an agency of the state is a superior sovereign to the city and not subject to local regulation; (2) school construction is subject to a pervasive state system of planning and construction which precludes local interferences therewith; (3) that an agency of the state, when engaged in a governmental function as opposed to a proprietary one, is immune from local regulation; (4) the operation of and construction at the Medical Center is one of statewide interest as opposed to local interest and therefore does not concern local affairs and government; and (5) if local regulations may be applicable in some cases, then each individual case should be judged upon its own merits by a balancing test, and any such test would weigh heavily in favor of the State and against the City in this particular instance. The balancing test doctrine is one that has been adopted in several states in land use or zoning cases and was recently adopted by the Kansas Court of Appeals in a zoning case. Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish and Game Commission, 2 Kan. App.2d 102, 576 P.2d 230 (1978).
The City, on the other hand, in support of its position contends: (1) the Board of Regents is not a superior sovereign as both are created by constitutional provisions and that the home rule amendment (article 12, section 5) of the Kansas Constitution grants greater sovereignty to the City; (2) the home rule amendment grants authority to the City to require compliance with its building permit and code ordinances; (3) the proposed construction is a matter of local affairs rather than one of statewide concern; (4) that the Board of Regents by its use of utility, sewer and fire services of the City has consented to regulation by the City; (5) that the State does not have available manpower to insure compliance with its own building codes; and (6) that if a balancing test such as that adopted in Brown is applied, it weighs heavily in favor of the City.
*29 While a lengthy dissertation on all the various theories of the parties might provide the substance for an extensive law review article, time does not permit us to indulge ourselves in such an endeavor and the decision hereafter reached does not require it. The principal argument by the City in support of its position is that under its home rule powers granted by the Kansas Constitution, it can enforce its building codes upon state agencies, including the Board of Regents.
Article 12, section 5, of the Kansas Constitution provides in part:
....
Before the home rule amendment became effective in 1961, the state legislature possessed all legislative power with respect to municipal corporations except as its exercise was prohibited by the federal and state constitutions. Therefore, the power which the Kansas legislature exercised over the cities was plenary. The legislature granted a certain amount of autonomy to the city governments and the system worked well for years. As the cities grew, however, new needs for city regulation of various activities became necessary and, increasingly, assistance from the legislature was sought. As a result, the legislature was spending a great deal of time dealing with requests from various city officials for legislation that would enable various city governments to regulate a seemingly endless variety of local problems. The amendment was intended to do away with the need for special legislation by eliminating municipal reliance upon enabling acts. "Home rule recognizes the desirability of local initiative in solving local problems created by the proliferation of municipal services." Clark, State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislation and Home Rule, 20 Kan. L. Rev. 631, 654 (1972). For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the application of the home rule amendment see Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 509 P.2d 1130 (1973).
*30 There is no question that cities in Kansas may pass ordinances setting minimum standards for construction projects, including the adoption of building, mechanical, plumbing, electrical and similar codes. The State, on the other hand, has adopted comprehensive building codes of its own that are mandatory in the construction of all school buildings and, apparently, sometimes conflict with the codes adopted by Kansas City. Do such statutes preclude local municipalities from enforcing local building codes which are or may be in conflict therewith? We think so.
In 1972, the state legislature adopted a comprehensive fire safety and prevention act which prescribes minimum standards for school construction. K.S.A. 31-132 et seq.
K.S.A. 31-144(a) provides:
K.S.A. 31-150, prior to amendment in 1978, provided:
In 1978 and 1979, the statute was amended to bring it in line with recently updated codes together with additional requirements, including a mechanical code.
K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 31-150 provides in part:
K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 31-150a, originally adopted in 1974, makes it a class B misdemeanor for any violation of any provision of the act. We are advised that Kansas City has a similar penal ordinance mandating compliance with its local building codes. Therefore, if the Board of Regents is subject to local building codes which are in conflict with state building codes, then it is subject to city criminal penalties for following the state code or to state criminal penalties for following the city code. Such a situation would be intolerable.
Art. 6, § 2(b) of the Kansas Constitution provides:
Thus, we are faced with the question whether the home rule amendment, art. 12, § 5, authorizes Kansas City to enforce its building permit and code ordinances upon the Board of Regents who derive their authority through legislative action mandated by art. 6, § 2(b). At the outset it must be noted that the fire safety and prevention enactment of 1972 is not uniformly applicable to all cities. K.S.A. 31-144(b) makes a distinction between first and second class cities as opposed to all other cities when it comes to inspection of school buildings. Such a provision in one section of the overall enactment requires a determination under our holding in City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227 Kan. 332, 607 P.2d 459 (1980), that the act is not uniformly applicable to all cities.
While there have been numerous cases decided by our appellate courts since the passage of the home rule amendment, there are few that have dealt with the problems which arise when a municipality finds itself in conflict with the State or one of its agencies. See State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, 527 P.2d 1340 (1974). Most of our decisions under the home rule amendment have involved the resolution of conflicts between local ordinances and state statutes as they affect third parties, usually individual members of the public caught up in the apparent conflict. How then do we resolve a conflict between *32 Kansas City and the Board of Regents when the local ordinance conflicts with affirmative duties and requirements placed upon the Board of Regents by state statutes?
In the construction of state buildings, the area of school construction appears to be the only one in which the legislature has mandated statewide compliance with specific building codes. The adoption by the state legislature of comprehensive building codes would indicate that the legislature considers the construction of schools to be one of statewide importance as opposed to the local affairs of a municipality in seeking to control construction within its city limits. Insofar as institutions of higher learning under the control of the Board of Regents are concerned, we agree. It has been stipulated by the parties that the function of the radiation therapy facility is both as a hospital and a school. However, it must be conceded that the primary purpose of the Kansas University Medical Center, and all of its components, is to provide medical schooling and training to students. However, by reason of its nature as a functioning hospital the Center is not only subject to state construction codes applicable to school buildings but also to both state and federal statutes and regulations applicable to hospitals. There can be no doubt that continued expansion and construction of facilities at the Medical Center are of concern and interest to the governing officials of Kansas City and that is as it should be. The City is entitled to and should be concerned with the activities at the Medical Center. Utilities, fire protection and sewer services are some of the city services and functions affected by the existence of the Medical Center. As such, the construction is one of local concern but we think not one which is limited to local affairs of the City as contemplated by the home rule amendment. The Medical Center furnishes education and hospital services to citizens from all areas of the State of Kansas as well as from without the state and, along with all other institutions of higher learning, is under the control of the Board of Regents. The activities of the Medical Center are statewide in character and while it exerts a great impact on Kansas City, its functions are not of strictly local concern. Due to the statutes requiring statewide uniformity in the application of the various building codes to construction projects at the various institutions of higher learning under the control of the Board of Regents, such construction does not fall within the purview of *33 local affairs. It would be impossible to draw a line delineating between local affairs and those which encompass an expanded or statewide application which would be applicable to all situations which might arise. As stated by one prominent author: "No ordinance deals with an exclusively local matter and no statute regulates a matter of exclusively state-wide concern. Instead, the interests of the municipality and the state are nearly always concurrent." Clark, State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislation and Home Rule, 20 Kan. L. Rev. 631, 662 (1972). We also recognize that the same author does not recommend the approach and conclusion we reach today. Our decision, however, is limited to the parties and factual situation before us.
Similar conflicts have been before the courts of several states and generally have been resolved favorably to the board of regents or other state educational authority. In Board of Regents of Universities, etc. v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299, 356 P.2d 399 (1960), the City of Tempe attempted to impose its building codes and regulations on proposed construction at Arizona State University located within the city limits of Tempe. After setting forth the controlling constitutional and statutory provisions, the court states:
....
....
The court goes on to hold that the Board of Regents while performing a governmental function is not subject to city control in its construction at Arizona State University.
In Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956), a building contractor brought an action to enjoin the city from enforcing its building ordinance against him in connection with the construction of a public school building. The court held that the public schools of the state were a matter of statewide rather than local or municipal concern. The court also held that the state had completely occupied the field by general laws and that the city could not enact ordinances in conflict therewith. See also Regents of University of California v. City of Santa Monica, 77 Cal. App. 3d 130, 143 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1978).
The foregoing cases are representative of many jurisdictions that hold under a variety of different statutes and constitutional provisions and for a variety of reasons that a city may not interfere with construction of state schools when that construction is governed by comprehensive state statutes. Most of the cases depend upon the application of one of the traditional tests of superior sovereign, governmental-proprietary functions, or power of eminent domain. There are also a number of cases involving a variety of statutes, constitutional provisions and rationale which hold directly to the contrary. See Port Arthur Independent Sch. Dist. v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1964); Edmonds Sch. Dist. v. Mountlake, 77 Wash. 2d 609, 465 P.2d 177 (1970).
In 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 3.32 (1980), the author states:
The same author in § 5.35 states:
Thus, regardless of the reasoning of the various courts or the statutory or constitutional provisions in any particular case, the underlying rationale seems to be the same. That is, municipal regulation of school construction is unduly burdensome when such regulation conflicts with a statewide building code administered by the state authority responsible for such construction.
In Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972), the New Jersey Supreme Court in a land use or zoning case refused to apply any of the traditional tests and adopted a balancing of interests test which has become increasingly popular with the courts. In Rutgers the university sought to construct a college dormitory which would not comply with the local zoning regulations of Piscataway Township wherein the dormitory would be located. While the court held in favor of the university, it did so after balancing the interests of the state in its operation of the university against the local interests of the township. The court stated:
*36 ....
Kansas City, in addition to the home rule amendment, relies heavily on Rutgers and the recent zoning case of Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish and Game Commission, 2 Kan. App.2d 102, 576 P.2d 230 (1978). In Brown the state forestry, fish and game commission purchased two lots in 1975 in the middle of a twenty-three lot subdivision near Manhattan which had been zoned for single family residences. The commission intended to use the land for a public parking lot, complete with toilet facilities, for the convenience of its patrons using a fishing and recreation facility on the Big Blue River. The court reviewed some of the common tests to be applied, such as the "superior sovereign test," "the governmental-proprietary test," and the "eminent domain test," and rejected them all in favor of the adoption of a "balancing of interests" test as set forth in Rutgers. The Court of Appeals in Brown stated:
....
Kansas City urges that if it does not have absolute power under the home rule amendment, then we should adopt a similar "balancing of interests" test in the determination of whether its building codes apply to the Board of Regents in this case and then makes a strong argument to the effect that the balance weighs in favor of the City. The Board of Regents makes an equally strong argument that in the adoption of such a test it would weigh *38 heavily in favor of the Board. Whatever may be the merits of such a balancing of interests approach to the use of land by a state agency under city or county zoning laws, we do not feel such a test would be feasible or practical as applied to local building codes and proposed construction by the Board of Regents. For example, the 1980 session of the Legislature authorized and appropriated funds for the Board of Regents to undertake capital improvements in Kansas City, Lawrence, Manhattan, Wichita, Hays and other cities where institutions of higher learning under the control of the Board are located. To say that each of these projects should be delayed until such time as a final court determination could be made whether local building codes were applicable would not only unreasonably delay construction but in these days of uncontrolled inflation might doom the projects altogether. We decline to adopt such a position in this case.
We hold that the Board of Regents, being subject to the comprehensive building construction codes and legislation enacted by the legislature and being charged with the responsibility for all institutions of higher learning in the state and the application of such building codes uniformly thereto, is not required to obtain a building permit or be controlled by the Kansas City building codes for construction at the Kansas University Medical Center. That is not to say that there should not be cooperation between the Board of Regents and the City officials and we would assume that such cooperation would be forthcoming and will be beneficial to both. Indeed, K.S.A. 31-137 places a duty upon the City to enforce compliance with the provisions of K.S.A. 31-132 et seq. It is obvious that the two have worked in harmony in many areas through the years and that spirit of mutual respect and consideration of one for the other should, and we assume will, continue. In closing, we deem the following quote from Rutgers v. Piluso appropriate:
We have carefully considered all of the arguments and authorities of both parties but in view of our holding, there would be nothing gained by extending this opinion further.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
HERD, J.: I respectfully dissent.
Cities and counties are statutorily charged with the responsibility for urban planning. Regulations pertaining to zoning and building codes were enacted by the city pursuant to the city's power to control such planning. There should be no exemptions. The majority opinion creates one. Appellant pays no local taxes. In spite of the fact the city is required to inspect buildings and furnish initial sewer, water and electrical service installation and fire and police protection all at no cost to the State of Kansas, appellant objects to obtaining a building permit and paying an inspection fee. I believe appellant should conform to the building code. I would affirm the trial court.