Title: Ex parte Jennifer Ann Vest
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1131050
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2015

REL:02/27/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1131050
____________________
Ex parte Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron)
v.
David Jeremy Vest)
(Elmore Circuit Court, DR-01-492.02;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2120913)
BOLIN, Justice.
Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) ("the mother") petitioned this
Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Alabama
1131050
Court of Civil Appeals affirming the Elmore Circuit Court's
order imposing a five-day jail sentence for contempt.  The
contempt order arose out of a child-custody-modification
action, which we now hold was improperly filed in the Elmore
Circuit Court.
 
Facts and Procedural History
The mother and David Jeremy Vest ("the father") were
divorced in 2002 in Elmore County.  The mother was granted
custody of the parties' minor child, and the father was
granted visitation.  With the court's permission, the mother
moved to Mississippi.  In 2006, the Elmore Circuit Court
entered an agreement between the parties, modifying the
father's visitation in light of the mother's move.  The father
moved to Mobile in 2006.  
On June 10, 2010, the mother filed in the Mobile Circuit
Court a motion seeking to suspend the father's visitation and
requesting supervised visitation and psychological counseling
for the father and that the father pay for the child's
psychological counseling based on the mother's allegations
against the father.  The father was living in Mobile at the
time.  On June 24, 2010, the father filed a response in the
2
1131050
Mobile Circuit Court to the mother's motion.  The father did
not object to the venue of the Mobile Circuit Court in his
response.
On June 25, 2010, the father filed in the Elmore Circuit
Court a motion to modify custody and a motion seeking to hold
the mother in contempt for not following the modified
visitation schedule entered by the Elmore Circuit Court.
Attached to the father's motion was a child-support-
information sheet on which the father's address was listed as
being in Mobile.  On July 23, 2010, the mother filed a motion
in the Elmore Circuit Court to dismiss the father's
postdivorce proceeding on the ground that venue was not proper
in the Elmore Circuit Court because, she said, (1) she had
commenced a postdivorce proceeding in the Mobile 
Circuit 
Court
that remained pending and the father had neither objected to
venue in that proceeding nor moved the Mobile Circuit Court to
transfer that proceeding to the Elmore Circuit Court, and (2)
neither party was then living in Elmore County and the father
had lived in Mobile County for "over two years."  
On August 6, 2010, the mother amended her motion to
dismiss to further argue that the father had waived his right
3
1131050
to object to venue in the Mobile Circuit Court by admitting
that he lived in Mobile County.  The mother again asked the
Elmore Circuit Court to dismiss the father's motion to modify
custody and to hold him in contempt.  In the alternative, the
mother sought to have the father's motion transferred to the
Mobile Circuit Court. 
The Elmore Circuit Court held a hearing on the mother's
motion to dismiss during which the mother stated that she had
introduced in the Elmore Circuit Court the motion filed in the
Mobile Circuit Court without objection from the father.  The
Elmore Circuit Court, on September 29, 2010, entered an order
denying the mother's motion to dismiss.  On November 8, 2010,
the mother petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of
mandamus, which it denied, holding that the mother had failed
to establish a clear legal right to mandamus relief.  Ex parte
Vest, 68 So. 3d 881 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)("Vest I").
After the Court of Civil Appeals denied the mother's
petition for a writ of mandamus, the mother, on March 10,
2011, filed a renewed motion to dismiss the father's
postdivorce proceeding in the Elmore Circuit Court and, on
April 8, 2011, filed a second renewed motion to dismiss the
4
1131050
father's postdivorce proceeding in the Elmore Circuit Court.
The renewed motion to dismiss and the second renewed motion to
dismiss asserted that the father's postdivorce proceeding in
the 
Elmore 
Circuit 
Court 
was 
actually 
a 
compulsory
counterclaim in the postdivorce proceeding the mother had
filed in the Mobile Circuit Court and, therefore, that the
father's postdivorce proceeding in the Elmore Circuit Court
was barred by § 6–5–440, Ala. Code 1975.  Those motions also
asserted that the father's postdivorce proceeding in the
Elmore Circuit Court should be dismissed because, the mother
said, the father had waived his objection to venue in the
Mobile Circuit Court by failing to assert an objection to
venue in his response to the mother's motion initiating her
postdivorce proceeding in the Mobile Circuit Court.  The
mother attached to her motions certified copies of the motion
she had filed to initiate her postdivorce proceeding in the
Mobile Circuit Court, along with the father's response to her
motion.  On April 13, 2011, the Elmore Circuit Court entered
an order denying the motions to dismiss.
5
1131050
On April 14, 2011, the mother again petitioned the Court
of Civil Appeals for a writ of mandamus, which that court
denied, holding as follows:
"Because the mother and the parties' child had
not resided in a county in Alabama for a period of
at 
least 
three 
consecutive 
years 
immediately
preceding the filing of her postdivorce proceeding
in the Mobile Circuit Court, § 30–3–5[, Ala. Code
1975,] dictated that the proper venue for the
mother's postdivorce proceeding was the Elmore
Circuit Court, which was 'the original circuit court
rendering the final [divorce] decree.' The fact that
the father, who was not the custodial parent, was
residing in Mobile County when the mother filed her
postdivorce 
proceeding 
was 
irrelevant 
to 
the
determination of the proper venue of the mother's
postdivorce proceeding under § 30–3–5. The father
subsequently filed his postdivorce proceeding in the
Elmore Circuit Court, which was the proper venue for
that proceeding under § 30–3–5.
"Thus, in arguing that § 6–5–440 bars the
father's postdivorce proceeding because she had
previously filed a postdivorce proceeding in the
Mobile Circuit Court, the mother is asking this
court to hold that one former spouse may race to the
courthouse and file a postdivorce proceeding in an
improper venue and thereby bar the other former
spouse from filing a postdivorce proceeding in the
proper venue. The mother has cited no binding
precedent that dictates that result. Moreover, if we
were to hold that § 6–5–440 dictates such a result,
we would be encouraging former spouses to race to
the courthouse and forum shop. Consequently, we hold
that, under the particular circumstances of this
case, 
§ 
6–5–440 
does 
not 
bar 
the 
father's
postdivorce proceeding in the Elmore Circuit Court."
6
1131050
Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 566, 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)
("Vest II").  The Court of Civil Appeals overruled the
mother's application for a rehearing on October 28, 2011.
The mother petitioned this Court for certiorari review,
and this Court granted the petition.  We rejected the Court of
Civil Appeals' "race to the courthouse" rationale and stated:
"It does not follow from the principle that
venue in child-custody-modification proceedings can
be waived that a forum-shopping parent can 'file a
postdivorce proceeding in an improper venue and
thereby bar the other former spouse from filing a
postdivorce proceeding in the proper venue,' [Ex
parte] Vest, 130 So. 3d [566] at 571 [(Ala. Civ.
App. 2011)], because the respondent parent can
always object to venue in his or her first
responsive pleading in the court in which venue is
alleged to be improper. Nor does the requirement
that a party object immediately to venue or waive
the venue issue constitute a trap for the unwary,
because Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ. P., has long provided
that a defense of improper venue can be waived if
omitted from the first responsive pleading."
Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 572, 573 (Ala. 2012) ("Vest III"). 
We reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
remanded the cause to that court for further consideration of
§ 6-5-440 and any other arguments pretermitted by that court's
earlier analysis.    
On remand from this Court, the Court of Civil Appeals
further considered the mother's petition for a writ of
7
1131050
mandamus in the context of whether the mother had waived the
affirmative defense of simultaneous pending actions set 
out in
§ 6–5–440 and had failed to revive it before the Elmore
Circuit Court entered its order of April 13, 2011. The Court
of Civil Appeals noted that, because the mother had supported
her motions with material outside the pleadings, which the
Elmore Circuit Court had considered, her motions to dismiss
were automatically converted to motions for a summary
judgment.  The court thus concluded that the mother had waived
the affirmative defense set out in § 6–5–440 and had failed to
revive that defense before the trial court denied her motions
for a summary judgment.  Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 574 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2013) ("Vest IV"). The mother petitioned this Court
for certiorari review, which we denied on May 10, 2013.  Ex
parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 580 (Ala.  2013).
 On May 14, 2013, the Elmore Circuit Court ordered the
reinstatement of the father's visitation.  On May 20, 2013,
the father filed a motion seeking to hold the mother in
contempt for failing to deliver the child for visitation. 
That same day, the Elmore Circuit Court set a show-cause
hearing for June 5, 2013.  The mother's counsel withdrew, and
8
1131050
new counsel filed a motion on June 4, 2013, seeking, among
other things, additional time in which to respond.  The
hearing was held on June 5, 2013, and neither the mother nor
her counsel appeared. The court entered an order holding the
mother in contempt and imposing a five-day jail sentence.  
The mother appealed.  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
trial court's order, without an opinion.  Vest v. Vest (No.
2120913, April 25, 2014),     So. 3d     (Ala. Civ. App.
2014)(table).  The mother sought rehearing, which the Court of
Civil Appeals denied.
On June 20, 2014, the mother filed this petition for a
writ of certiorari with this Court asking us to review the
Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order
holding the mother in contempt. Before consideration of the
mother's petition and without ordering answer and briefs in
response to the petition, we suspended the Rules of Appellate
Procedure pursuant to Rule 2, Ala. R. App. P., and  ordered
the parties to show cause why this Court has authority to
address the merits of the mother's petition. In our order, we
noted that two different circuit courts of this State
presently purport to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute
9
1131050
between the parties, thus giving rise to existing and
potential conflicting orders concerning the custody of the
parties' child.  Our order was entered pursuant to this
Court's 
supervisory 
role 
as 
to 
courts 
of 
inferior
jurisdiction.  See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 833 (Ala.
2002)(Houston, J., concurring specially)("[T]he Supreme Court
of 
Alabama 
has 
constitutionally 
grounded 
supervisory 
authority
over the State courts of Alabama."); Ala. Const. 1901, Art.
VI, § 140 (Official Recomp.)("The supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction ... to issue such remedial writs or
orders as may be necessary to give it general supervision and
control of courts of inferior jurisdiction.").  The parties
were directed to address whether the issue of abatement had,
in fact, been raised in the mother's motion to dismiss filed
in the Elmore Circuit Court action on July 23, 2010, and, if
not, whether a failure to raise this defense constituted a
waiver. In addition, the parties were directed to address the
issue whether the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in
Vest IV would be binding on this Court under the doctrine of
law of the case in light of this Court's decisions in Ex parte
Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842, 846 n.4 (Ala.
10
1131050
2001)(holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not in
all circumstances require rigid adherence to rulings made at
an earlier stage of a case, particularly when the court is
convinced that its prior decision is clearly erroneous or when
an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has
occurred), and Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co., 385 So.
2d 966, 967 (Ala. 1980)("The Supreme Court is not barred from
re-examination of a previous ruling upon a subsequent appeal
of the same case."). 
Discussion
In Vest IV, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the
mother had waived the affirmative defense of § 6-5-440 because
in her motion to dismiss filed on July 23, 2010, the mother
did not expressly cite § 6-5-440, nor did she state that the
father's postdivorce proceeding filed in the Elmore Circuit
Court 
constituted 
a 
compulsory 
counterclaim 
to 
her 
postdivorce
proceeding filed in the Mobile Circuit Court.  Although the
mother did not specifically cite § 6-5-440, the mother's
motion read as follows:
"Comes now, the [mother] ... and would object to the
Motion of the [father] to Modify Custody and Hold
the [mother] in Contempt  as filed by the [father]
on June 25, 2010, based upon improper venue and
11
1131050
would further show that this matter is already
pending before the Mobile County Circuit Court and
in further support would show the following:
"1) There is currently pending, a previously
filed Motion before the Circuit Court of Mobile
County, Alabama ....
"2) Venue is no longer proper in the Circuit
Court of Elmore County, Alabama. Neither party
resides in Elmore County, Alabama, the [father]
having resided for greater than two (2) years in
Mobile County, Alabama and the [mother] residing in
the state of Mississippi.
 
"3) [The father] is well aware of the matters
currently pending in Mobile County .... Furthermore,
there has been no objection to venue in Mobile
County nor Motion to Transfer or to assert the venue
of Elmore County, Alabama, file[d] in the Mobile
County case.
"4) 
Upon 
information 
and/or 
belief, 
the 
[father]
is attempting to usurp the authority of the Circuit
Court of Mobile County where jurisdiction and venue
are proper.
"Wherefore 
the 
premises 
considered, 
[the 
mother]
prays this Honorable Court dismiss and/or strike all
motions of the [father] filed in Elmore County,
Alabama until such time as the Circuit Court of
Mobile County rules on the pending Motion plus any
further and/or different relief this Court deems
appropriate."
Given the language of the mother's motion, we disagree with
the Court of Civil Appeals' conclusion that the mother failed
to assert a defense pursuant to §  6-5-440.  
12
1131050
We note that § 6-5-440 prohibits a plaintiff from
prosecuting two actions simultaneously in different courts of
the State if the claims asserted in each action arose from the
same underlying facts.  In such a case, the defendant may
require the plaintiff to elect which action will be
prosecuted.  Where the parties' alignment (as plaintiff or
defendant) in the original suit is reversed in the subsequent
action, § 6-5-440 still applies, because it is designed to
prohibit one party from twice prosecuting the same cause of
action.  
"'The obligation imposed on a defendant
under Rule 13(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to
assert compulsory counterclaims, when read
in conjunction with Ala. Code § 6-5-440,
which prohibits a party from prosecuting
two actions for the same cause and against
the same party, is tantamount to making the
defendant 
with 
a 
compulsory 
counterclaim 
in
the first action a "plaintiff" in that
action (for purposes of § 6-5-440) as of
the time of its commencement.'"
Ex parte J.C. Duke & Assocs., Inc., 4 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Ala.
2008) (quoting Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., 729 So.
2d 849, 851 (Ala. 1999)). 
"The purpose of [§ 6-5-440] is to avoid multiplicity of
suits and vexatious litigation." Johnson v. Brown–Serv. Ins.
13
1131050
Co., 293 Ala. 549, 551, 307 So. 2d 518, 520 (1974).  Section
6-5-440 protects a party currently defending one action from
having to defend another action subsequently filed by the same
plaintiff in a different court "for the same cause" and
provides that "the pendency of the former is a good defense to
the latter." See L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator–Frye, Inc.,
454 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1984).  In sum, § 6-5-440 prohibits
simultaneous actions for the same cause against the same
parties. 
In the present case, the father filed a motion in the
Elmore Circuit Court to modify custody of the parties' minor
child.  In response, the mother, in her motion to dismiss,
clearly stated that there was an action pending in Mobile
County involving the parties' child of which the father was
aware.  She further alleged that venue was proper in Mobile
County and that the father had not objected to venue in the
Mobile Circuit Court.  The mother requested that the Elmore
Circuit Court dismiss the father's motion to modify custody
until such time as the Mobile Circuit Court addressed the
mother's motion regarding the parties' child and her
allegations against the father. The mother's motion clearly
14
1131050
put the father on notice of the affirmative defense she was
raising. 
The Court of Civil Appeals in Vest IV went on to discuss
whether the mother revived the affirmative defense of
abatement under § 6-5-440 when she renewed her motions to
dismiss on March 10, 2011, and April 8, 2011.  There is no
need for this Court to address that portion of the Vest IV
holding, however, because our discussion necessarily turns on
whether, under the facts of this case, we should apply the
law-of-the-case doctrine.  
As noted earlier, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not
in all circumstances require rigid adherence to rulings made
at an earlier stage of a case.  In Ex parte Discount Foods,
Inc., 789 So. 2d 842 (Ala. 2001) ("Discount Foods II"), this
Court determined that the Court's opinion in Ex parte Discount
Foods, Inc., 711 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 1998)("Discount Foods I"),
had been predicated on an incorrectly decided plurality
opinion.  In note 4 of the opinion in Discount Foods II, we
explained:
  "This Court is not required under the doctrine
of 'law of the case' to adhere to the decision in
Discount Foods I. Generally, the law-of-the-case
doctrine provides that when a court decides upon a
15
1131050
rule of law, that rule should continue to govern the
same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.
The purpose of the doctrine is to bring an end to
litigation 
by 
foreclosing 
the 
possibility 
of
repeatedly litigating an issue already decided. See
Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2000); see,
also, Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922
(Ala. 1987).  However, the law-of-the case doctrine
does not in all circumstances require rigid
adherence to rulings made at an earlier stage of a
case. The doctrine directs a court's discretion; it
does not limit a court's power. The law-of-the-case
doctrine is one of practice or court policy, not of
inflexible law, and it will be disregarded when
compelling 
circumstances 
call 
for 
the
redetermination of a point of law on a prior appeal;
and this is particularly true when the court is
convinced that its prior decision is clearly
erroneous or where an intervening or contemporaneous
change in the law has occurred by an overruling of
former decisions or when such a change has occurred
by 
new 
precedent 
established 
by 
controlling
authority. See State v. Whirley, 530 So. 2d 861
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 530
So. 2d 865 (Ala. 1988); Callahan v. State, 767 So.
2d 380 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Murphy v. FDIC,
supra; United States v. Escobar–Urrego, 110 F.3d
1556 (11th Cir. 1997); Heathcoat v. Potts, 905 F.2d
367 (11th Cir. 1990). The decision in Discount Foods
I failed to give effect to the parties' contractual
intent, as evidenced by the plain language of the
arbitration provision; it, therefore, was clearly
erroneous. In fact, this Court sub silentio
disapproved the rationale of Discount Foods I in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Kirton, 719 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 1998), which was
released approximately four months after the opinion
in Discount Foods I. In Kirton, this Court
specifically noted: '[W]e conclude that the language
of the arbitration provision in the 1995 customer
agreement entered into between Merrill Lynch and Ms.
Kirton is sufficiently broad to include any and all
16
1131050
controversies between them, regardless of the kind
of controversy or the date on which the controversy
occurred.' 719 So. 2d at 204."
789 So. 2d at 846 n. 4 (emphasis omitted; emphasis added).
Because the purpose of the law-of-the-case doctrine is to
protect the settled expectations of the parties and to promote
orderly development of the case, it should not be applied in
the present case.  The result of the Court of Civil Appeals'
erroneous conclusion regarding the waiver of 
abatement in Vest
IV, which was compounded and prolonged by this Court's denial
of certiorari review on May 10, 2013, is to now have two
circuit courts addressing custody issues relating to the same
child.  The father was aware of the mother's motion filed in
the Mobile Circuit Court on June 10, 2010, when he filed his
motion in the Elmore Circuit Court on June 25, 2010.  There is
a significant risk of inconsistent results in those pending
cases.  In light of the facts that this case presents a
domestic issue involving custody of a child and that there is
a distinct possibility that a sheriff's deputy could be handed
competing custody orders from the Mobile Circuit Court and the
Elmore Circuit Court involving the child, we decline to apply
the law-of-the-case doctrine here.  Accordingly,  we are not
17
1131050
bound by the Court of Civil Appeals' conclusion that the
mother waived the affirmative defense of abatement.
In the present case, the Elmore Circuit Court erred in 
not recognizing the primacy of the Mobile action when the
mother filed her motion to dismiss or to transfer the father's
motion to the Mobile Circuit Court.  Subsequently, the Court
of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that the mother had
waived the affirmative defense of abatement.  Accordingly, we
hereby suspend the provisions of Rule 39(g) and (h), Ala. R.
App. P., allowing the petitioner and the respondent to file a
brief and to request oral argument, and we grant certiorari
review of the Court of Civil Appeals' order affirming the
Elmore Circuit Court's order holding the mother in contempt
and imposing a five-day jail sentence. See Ex parte Edwards,
986 So. 2d 378 (Ala. 2007)(suspending Rule 39(g) and (h) and
summarily granting the writ of certiorari). We hold that the
mother did not waive the affirmative defense of abatement
under § 6-5-440.  The Mobile Circuit Court is the proper court
to address the mother's motion to suspend the father's
visitation because the mother filed her motion in the Mobile
Circuit Court on June 10, 2010, and the father responded to
18
1131050
that motion without challenging the venue of the Mobile
Circuit Court.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Civil Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for that
court to issue an order directing the Elmore Circuit Court to
decide whether to dismiss or to transfer the father's motion
to modify custody filed in that court on June 25, 2010. 
WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Shaw, J., dissents.
Bryan, J., recuses himself.*
*Justice Bryan was a member of the Court of Civil Appeals
when that court considered this case.
19
1131050
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the main opinion.  I write separately merely
to note in addition that, even if the defense offered by
§ 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, was not asserted by the mother in
the first motion to dismiss she filed, that fact alone would
not necessarily have resulted in a waiver of that defense. 
There is no general first-filed-motion rule (as there is in
Rule 12(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., for certain defenses) applicable
to the assertion of a defense of abatement under § 6-5-440. 
Regions Bank v. Reed, 60 So. 3d 868 (Ala. 2010), does not hold
otherwise.
20
1131050
SHAW, Justice (dissenting). 
The case before us challenges the Court of Civil Appeals'
April 2014 decision affirming, without an opinion, the trial
court's order holding Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) ("Vest") in
contempt.   I believe that the contempt order is the only
1
decision before us and the only decision that should be
addressed.  However, this Court asked the parties to file
briefs on a different issue  -- one that was settled in a 2013
2
Court of Civil Appeals' decision  on which we have previously
3
denied certiorari review.   Vest answered our request; David
4
Jeremy Vest filed a letter stating that he could not afford to
pay his attorney to do the same. 
The issue whether Vest waived her abatement defense by
failing to properly raise it in a motion filed in 2010 in the
Elmore Circuit Court is not an issue in this case.  That issue
was decided against her in the Court of Civil Appeals' 2013
decision; Vest filed a certiorari petition in this Court
Vest v. Vest (No. 2120913, April 25, 2014),     So. 3d
1
    (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (table).
I dissented from that order.  
2
Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 574 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).
3
Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 580 (Ala. 2013).
4
21
1131050
challenging that decision, but this Court denied it.  Justice
Murdock's reason for concurring with that denial is telling:
"I question the conclusion reached by the Court
of Civil Appeals in its opinion on remand from this
Court that the mother in a post-divorce proceeding
had waived her affirmative defense arising under
Ala. Code 1975, § 6–5–440, by failing to assert that
defense in a motion to dismiss or to transfer filed
in that proceeding. Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 574
(Ala. Civ. App. 2013). Because this waiver issue is
not presented in the petition for certiorari review
now before this Court, however, I concur in denying
that petition."  
Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 580, 581 (Ala. 2013) (Murdock, J.,
concurring specially) (emphasis added).  I see nothing
indicating that this Court clearly erred in denying that
petition.  
If Vest did not see the need to challenge the Court of
Civil Appeals' abatement ruling when the time was 
appropriate,
then I am not persuaded that this Court, on its own initiative
and without being asked by Vest to do so, should take the
extraordinary step of suspending the Alabama Rules of
Appellate Procedure to now address that issue.  The Court of
Civil Appeals' decision before us involves whether Vest can be
held in contempt, not whether she waived the abatement issue. 
We are reversing the 2014 decision of the Court of Civil
22
1131050
Appeals on a purported error found in a completely different
2013 decision of that court, which Vest failed to properly
challenge in this Court.  I respectfully dissent.
23