Title: Michigan v. March (Opinion on Application)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 151342
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2016

PEOPLE v MARCH 
 
 
Docket No. 151342.  Argued on application for leave to appeal January 13, 2016.  
Decided June 23, 2016. 
 
Timothy P. March was charged with committing larceny in a dwelling house, 
MCL 750.360, and receiving, possessing, or concealing stolen goods worth more than $200 but 
less than $1,000, MCL 750.535(4)(a), for removing fixtures from a home that had been sold to 
John Hamood at a sheriff’s sale after a foreclosure proceeding.  The home had been owned by 
defendant’s father, who had given defendant a power of attorney that included the right to 
possess and dispose of his father’s real property.  Defendant took the fixtures from the home 
during the six-month period in which he could have redeemed the property under 
MCL 600.3240(8).  Defendant moved to quash the information, arguing alternatively that a 
person could not commit larceny of a fixture and that he could not have wrongfully taken the 
property of another because he retained both legal title and the right of possession when the 
fixtures were removed.  The court, Vera Massey Jones, J., initially denied defendant’s motion, 
but, after the prosecution conceded that defendant had the right to possess the house during the 
redemption period, granted defendant’s motion on reconsideration and dismissed the charges.  
The Court of Appeals, BORRELLO, P.J., and WILDER and STEPHENS, JJ., reversed and remanded 
in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 4, 2014 (Docket No. 317697), holding 
that under People v Sheldon, 208 Mich App 331 (1995), an “owner” of property included not 
only the titleholder but also any person whose consent was necessary before property could be 
taken, and that therefore Hamood was also an owner of the property.  Defendant applied for 
leave to appeal.  The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument under MCR 7.302(H)(1) 
on whether to grant defendant’s application or take other peremptory action.  497 Mich 1041 
(2015). 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
MCL 750.360 adopted the common law of larceny, which protects possessory rights.  
Because only defendant held possessory rights in the fixtures at the time he removed them, and 
Hamood held no such rights, defendant could not have committed larceny as charged.  Absent a 
proper larceny charge, the fixtures were necessarily not stolen goods, and the charge of receiving 
or possessing stolen goods therefore failed as well.  The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed 
and the trial court order dismissing the charges was reinstated. 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
 
1.  Defendant was charged with larceny under MCL 750.360, which provides in part that 
any person who commits the crime of larceny by stealing in any dwelling house shall be guilty of 
a felony.  The general crime of larceny is established in MCL 750.356, which provides in part 
that a person who commits larceny by stealing certain property of another, including money, 
goods, or chattels, is guilty of a crime.  Michigan has no statutory definition of larceny, and all 
the statutes addressing larceny use the term’s common-law definition.  That definition can be 
parsed into the following elements: (a) a trespassory taking and (b) the carrying away (c) of the 
personal property (d) of another (e) with intent to steal that property.  To these elements, 
MCL 750.360 added element (f): the taking occurring within the confines of the building. 
 
 
2.  At common law, “property of another” for purposes of larceny referred to property 
that someone other than the defendant had the right to possess as against the defendant at the 
time of the taking.  While the Michigan Supreme Court had not yet expressly defined “property 
of another” for purposes of the larceny statutes, its caselaw as well as caselaw from the Court of 
Appeals comported with the common-law proposition that property constitutes the “property of 
another” when someone holds the right to possess it as against the defendant at the time of the 
taking.  To determine whether another held such rightful possession, courts must examine the 
respective rights of all relevant individuals to the property and decide whether any of them held a 
right to possess the property as against the defendant at the time of the taking.  This assessment 
requires courts to consult the statutes, contracts, caselaw, and other sources that give rise to the 
individuals’ rights and define the relationship between those rights. 
 
 
3.  Defendant could not have committed larceny by taking the fixtures because, given that 
defendant had the right to possess the fixtures at the time of the alleged larceny, they did not 
constitute the “property of another.”  “Possession” is defined as the fact of having or holding in 
one’s power, the exercise of dominion over property, the right under which one may exercise 
control over something to the exclusion of others, and the continuing exercise of a claim to the 
exclusive use of a material object.  In general, possession is either actual or constructive.  
Fixtures intentionally annexed to real property become part of the mortgage security, and, upon 
foreclosure sale, title to them passes with the realty.  Therefore, whatever rights Hamood had in 
the fixtures arose from his foreclosure purchase.  A foreclosure-sale purchaser receives a deed at 
purchase that vests title at the end of the six-month redemption period if the mortgagor fails to 
redeem the property by paying the amount of the successful bid, interest on that amount, and 
various fees.  The vesting of title confers on the purchaser those rights that existed at the time 
that the mortgage subject to foreclosure was executed, as well as those the mortgagor held at any 
time thereafter, under the relation-back doctrine.  Because, in these circumstances, the purchaser 
is deemed to hold title retroactively, he or she can bring civil actions for damages done to the 
property during the redemption period; such actions may also be brought under MCL 600.3278.  
However, this interest is not a possessory right, let alone one that permits the purchaser to 
exclude the mortgagor from possession.  Only after the mortgagor fails to redeem does the 
purchaser’s interest ripen into a legal title and endow the purchaser with the right of possession.  
Hamood, as the foreclosure-sale purchaser, thus held equitable title to the property during the 
redemption period, which gave him no possessory rights.  Defendant, by contrast, held the sole 
right to possess the property.  Therefore, defendant could not, by taking the property, have 
trespassed upon the “property of another,” because no one else had the right to possess it at that 
time.  Consequently, defendant’s actions did not constitute a trespassory taking of the “property 
of another” and did not constitute larceny under MCL 750.360.  And because the property was 
not stolen, defendant did not receive, possess, or conceal stolen goods under MCL 750.535(4)(a).   
 
 
4.  The Court of Appeals erred by assuming that Hamood was the “owner” of the fixtures 
for purposes of larceny, and thus that the fixtures were the “property of another” as against 
defendant, by virtue of Hamood’s supposed right to consent to their removal.  An individual is 
not considered to “own” property because he or she may consent to its taking; rather, particular 
interests encompass the right to consent.  Consent is an attribute or function of some property 
interests that is derived from a right to control the property, which in turn is an attribute or 
function of the right to possession of the property.  The right to consent could not serve as a 
proxy for the right to possession, because neither of the sources of legal authority on which the 
court relied gives rise to the right to possession.  MCL 600.3278 does not endow the purchaser 
with a possessory right, nor does the equitable title held by Hamood. 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed; trial court order dismissing the criminal charges 
against defendant reinstated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2016 State of Michigan 
 
FILED  June 23, 2016 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 151342 
 
TIMOTHY PATRICK MARCH, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARKMAN, J.  
We consider here whether a homeowner, or another person rightfully possessing a 
home, commits criminal larceny by removing fixtures from the home after it has been 
foreclosed on and sold at a sheriff’s sale, but before the statutory redemption period has 
expired.  The trial court concluded that such removal did not constitute larceny because 
defendant was in possession of the home and fixtures at the time.  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed, finding that the foreclosure-sale purchaser’s equitable interest in the home 
signified that the fixtures constituted the “property of another” at the time of their 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
 
 
 
 
2 
removal and that defendant therefore required the purchaser’s consent before these could 
be taken.   
We conclude that our larceny law prohibits the wrongful dispossession of 
property, protecting an individual’s possessory interests from a wrongful taking.  Because 
defendant held the exclusive possessory right in the home, including its fixtures, at the 
time of the alleged larceny, he could not have wrongfully dispossessed anyone else, 
including the foreclosure-sale purchaser, of rightful possession of that property.  
Accordingly, he could not have committed larceny of the fixtures.  We therefore reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the 
criminal charges.1 
 
                                              
1 Despite the failure of the larceny charge in this case, it is possible that defendant’s 
actions might properly give rise to alternative criminal offenses.  The prosecutor here has 
indicated a belief that defendant may be guilty of at least two other offenses: 
embezzlement, MCL 750.181(1), and malicious destruction of property, MCL 750.380.  
We do not here opine on the applicability of either of these, or any other criminal offense, 
to defendant’s conduct.  Additionally, a foreclosure-sale purchaser such as Hamood is not 
without recourse, as he has various civil remedies.  One is MCL 600.3278(1), which 
provides a foreclosure-sale purchaser with the right to pursue damages against a 
mortgagor who causes injury to the property during the redemption period.  Another is 
the procedure set forth in MCL 600.3237 and MCL 600.3238, which enables the 
purchaser to inspect the property and institute summary proceedings for possession under 
MCL 600.5701 et seq. if the person then in possession is damaging the property.  
Moreover, the statute defines “damage” to include “[m]issing or destroyed structural 
aspects or fixtures.”  MCL 600.3238(11)(d).  We also emphasize that the analysis in 
larceny cases such as the instant one relies heavily on the statutory or contractual 
framework establishing the individuals’ respective rights in the property.  The conclusion 
reached here is consequently limited to circumstances in which the mortgagor retains his 
possessory rights in the property during the redemption period and does not, for instance, 
contract them away.   
 
 
3 
I.  FACTS AND HISTORY 
Defendant’s father owned a home in Westland, Michigan, which secured a 
mortgage loan.  In July 2011, he granted defendant a power of attorney that gave 
defendant the right “to possess, recover, manage, hold, control, develop, subdivide, 
partition, mortgage, lease or otherwise deal with any real property belonging” to his 
father.  Additionally, defendant could “dispose of any real property” or personal property.  
Around this time, defendant’s father also took up residence at an assisted-living home.  
Subsequently, the mortgage loan on the Westland home fell into default.  The mortgagee 
eventually foreclosed and on August 9, 2012, the home was sold at a sheriff’s sale to 
John Hamood for $33,425.80.2  On the sale date, a six-month redemption period 
commenced under MCL 600.3240(8), during which time defendant and his father could 
void the purchaser’s deed by tendering full payment of the purchase price to Hamood.  
The property went unredeemed.   
Hamood inspected the home on February 10, 2013, the day after the redemption 
period expired.  Inside, he noticed various items missing, including kitchen cabinets, the 
kitchen countertop, a furnace, duct work, interior doors, a hot water tank, and an exterior 
air conditioner.  He contacted the police the same day, informing them of his findings, 
and they initiated an investigation that resulted in a search of defendant’s home 
approximately two weeks later.  The search uncovered many of the missing items, along 
with other fixtures that had apparently been removed. 
                                              
2 The affidavit of the foreclosure-sale purchaser indicates that Vonelle Ventures, LLC 
was the actual purchaser.  It appears that Hamood operates and owns Vonelle.   
 
 
4 
Defendant was arrested and charged in a criminal information with two counts: 
committing larceny in a dwelling house, MCL 750.360, “by stealing counter tops, sink, 
furnace, doors, hot water heater, grab bars, [and] cabinets,” and receiving, possessing, or 
concealing stolen goods worth more than $200 but less than $1,000, MCL 750.535(4)(a).  
In June 2013, defendant filed his first motion to quash the information, setting forth 
alternative arguments.  First, he argued that fixtures were not the proper subject of 
larceny; that is, that one could not commit larceny of a fixture.  Second, he argued that he 
could not have wrongfully taken property of another because he retained legal title and 
the right of possession throughout the redemption period, during which time the removal 
of the fixtures had occurred.3  The latter argument was considered by the trial court, 
which denied defendant’s motion, as well as a subsequent amended motion, on the basis 
that defendant had failed to prove a right to possession.  Upon a motion for 
reconsideration, however, the prosecutor conceded that defendant had the right to possess 
the house during the redemption period.  Consequently, the trial court granted 
defendant’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed the charges. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, focusing on People v Sheldon, 208 Mich App 331, 
333-334; 527 NW2d 76 (1995), for the proposition that the “owner” of property included 
not only the titleholder of that property, but also “any other person whose consent was 
necessary before the property could be taken.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Court determined that Hamood was an “owner” of the fixtures because his 
                                              
3 In a third argument, defendant contended that the record lacked any evidence that he 
had a felonious intent.  The courts below did not address this contention, and we likewise 
decline to opine on defendant’s intent, given that he prevails here regardless of his intent. 
 
 
5 
consent was necessary before these could be taken by defendant.  People v March, 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 4, 2014 
(Docket No. 317697), p 4.  The Court inferred this right to “consent” from two sources.  
First, according to our caselaw, Hamood held equitable title to the property during the 
redemption period.  Second, MCL 600.3278(1) provides purchasers such as Hamood a 
right of action against mortgagors who damage the foreclosed property during the 
redemption period.  In light of these two sources of law, the Court concluded that “the 
items that defendant allegedly removed from the home were at least partially the 
‘property of another,’ ” and therefore that “the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the larceny and possession of stolen property charges against defendant . . . .”  
Id.  The Court also held that fixtures are proper subjects of larceny because once severed 
they become personal property.  Id. at 5.  Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court 
and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.   
We heard oral argument on the application under MCR 7.302(H)(1) on the 
following two questions:  
(1) whether the removal of fixtures by a mortgagor from the mortgaged 
premises after a sheriff’s sale but prior to the expiration of the redemption 
period may subject the mortgagor to criminal liability for larceny; and (2) 
whether fixtures taken from real property may be the subject of larceny 
under MCL 750.356(1).  [People v March, 497 Mich 1041 (2015).] 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A trial court’s decision to quash an information is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  People v Dowdy, 489 Mich 373, 379; 802 NW2d 239 (2011).  An abuse of 
discretion occurs when the trial court “chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of 
 
 
6 
principled outcomes.”  People v Musser, 494 Mich 337, 348; 835 NW2d 319 (2013).  
However, “[t]his Court reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation.”  People v 
Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 46; 753 NW2d 78 (2008).  Thus, “[t]o the extent that a lower 
court’s decision on a motion to quash the information is based on an interpretation of the 
law, appellate review of the interpretation is de novo.”  People v Miller, 288 Mich App 
207, 209; 795 NW2d 156 (2010), citing People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 
702 (2001).   
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
We begin as always by examining the language of the relevant statute, 
MCL 750.360.  As will become clear below, this language leads us in turn to the 
common-law background of larceny, which we then must also examine.  
A.  INTERPRETATION 
 
The resolution of this case depends on the proper interpretation of MCL 750.360, 
which criminalizes larceny in a building.  “The Court’s responsibility in interpreting a 
statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.”  People v Lowe, 484 
Mich 718, 721; 773 NW2d 1 (2009).  The statute is the touchstone for determining the 
Legislature’s intent, for “we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly 
expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted and the statute must 
be enforced as written.”  People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).  
We must give “plain meaning to the words actually used” in a statute.  People v Williams, 
491 Mich 164, 175; 814 NW2d 270 (2012).  Accordingly, when a statute fails to define a 
term, “we presume that the Legislature intended for the words to have their ordinary 
 
 
7 
meaning.”  People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 440; 835 NW2d 340 (2013); see also 
MCL 8.3a. 
When, however, an undefined term is one that has “a settled, definite, and well 
known meaning at common law,” we will assume that the Legislature adopted that 
meaning “unless a contrary intent is plainly shown.”  People v Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 
100; 185 NW 770 (1921), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by 
People v Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich 669, 697 n 11; 837 NW2d 415 (2013); see also 
People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 13; 340 NW2d 805 (1983).  “[T]echnical words and 
phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, 
shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”  
MCL 8.3a.  Thus, common-law terms adopted in statutes will be applied in the same 
manner in which they were applied at the time they were codified.  People v Riddle, 467 
Mich 116, 125-126; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). 
B.  MCL 750.360 
 
Our analysis then begins with the language of MCL 750.360, the statute under 
which defendant was charged with larceny:  
Any person who shall commit the crime of larceny by stealing in any 
dwelling house, house trailer, office, store, gasoline service station, shop, 
warehouse, mill, factory, hotel, school, barn, granary, ship, boat, vessel, 
church, house of worship, locker room or any building used by the public 
shall be guilty of a felony. 
The statute leaves larceny undefined, so we next turn to the so-called “simple larceny” 
statute, MCL 750.356, which implicates the “crime of larceny” referred to in 
MCL 750.360.  People v Adams, 128 Mich App 25, 31-32; 339 NW2d 687 (1983) 
 
 
8 
(labeling the statute as “simple larceny”).  MCL 750.356 establishes the general crime of 
larceny:  
(1) A person who commits larceny by stealing any of the following 
property of another person is guilty of a crime as provided in this section:  
(a) Money, goods, or chattels. 
(b) A bank note, bank bill, bond, promissory note, due bill, 
bill of exchange or other bill, draft, order, or certificate. 
(c) A book of accounts for or concerning money or goods 
due, to become due, or to be delivered. 
(d) A deed or writing containing a conveyance of land or 
other valuable contract in force. 
(e) A receipt, release, or defeasance. 
(f) A writ, process, or public record. 
(g) Scrap metal. 
As this Court observed in addressing a predecessor to MCL 750.356, “[w]e have no 
statutory definition of larceny, and all our statutes use it in its common law sense.”  
Morrissey v People, 11 Mich 327, 336 (1863).  More recently, the Court of Appeals 
reiterated this proposition: “There is no statutory definition of larceny in Michigan and all 
statutes use the term in its common-law sense.”  People v Anderson, 7 Mich App 513, 
516; 152 NW2d 40 (1967); see also Saltzman, Michigan Criminal Law: Definitions of 
Offenses (2d ed), § 7-2(a), p 528 (“Since ‘larceny’ is not defined by the statute, Michigan 
law begins with the common law definition.”).  This observation remains true today, as 
the larceny statute has retained the same general formulation since it was first enacted in 
1838 shortly after statehood.  1838 RS, part 4, tit I, ch 4, § 17 (“Every person who shall 
commit the offence of larceny, by stealing of the property of another[,] any money, goods 
 
 
9 
or chattels,” shall be punished.).4  Indeed, we have continued without interruption to 
interpret larceny statutes in light of their common-law heritage.  See, e.g., Smith-Anthony, 
494 Mich at 676-679.  
 
This Court has relied on that common law to establish the general elements of 
simple larceny: “[A]t common law simple larceny was defined as ‘the felonious taking, 
and carrying away, of the personal goods of another.’ ”  People v Randolph, 466 Mich 
532, 542-543; 648 NW2d 164 (2002), quoting 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, p *229.5  We have also described larceny as the “unlawful taking of the 
personal property of another with the felonious intent to deprive the owner of it.”  People 
v Johnson, 81 Mich 573, 576; 45 NW 1119 (1890). 
                                              
4 Subsequent statutes mirror this definition, with only immaterial distinctions in phrasing.  
See, e.g., 1846 RS, ch 154, § 18 (“Every person who shall commit the offence of larceny, 
by stealing of the property of another, any money, goods or chattels . . . .”); 1882 CL, 
ch 318, § 9140 (same but for spelling of “offense”); 1897 CL, ch 320, § 18 (same); 1915 
CL, ch 257, § 17 (“Every person who shall commit the offense of larceny by stealing 
from the person of another . . . .”); MCL 750.356 (1948) (“Any person who shall commit 
the offense of larceny, by stealing of the property of another, any money, goods or 
chattels . . . .”); MCL 750.356 (1970) (“Any person who shall commit the offense of 
larceny, by stealing, of the property of another, any money, goods or chattels . . . .”).  
Indeed, the current statute reflects even earlier statutes defining larceny in the Northwest 
Territory.  In 1795 the territorial government adopted Pennsylvania’s larceny statute, 
which punished those who had “feloniously stolen any money, goods or chattels . . . .”  A 
Law for the Trial and Punishment of Larceny, June 5, 1795, Laws of the Territory of the 
United States North-West of the Ohio (1796), p 41.  After Michigan became an 
independent territory, it enacted a statute in 1818 proscribing larceny: “if any person shall 
steal any money, goods, or chattels, . . . [that person] shall be fined . . . or whipped . . . .”  
2 Territorial Laws, Act of July 27, 1818, § 1, p 138.  Thus, the current statute tracks the 
original larceny enactments dating back two centuries, all of which left larceny 
undefined.   
5 Randolph was superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Smith-Anthony, 
494 Mich at 686 n 50. 
 
 
10 
These articulations of the common law can be parsed in turn into the following 
elements: (a) a trespassory taking and (b) the carrying away (c) of the personal property 
(d) of another (e) with intent to steal that property.6  To these elements, MCL 750.360, 
the statute addressing larceny in a building, adds one further element: (f) “the taking . . . 
occurr[ing] within the confines of the building.”  Randolph, 466 Mich at 552 n 25.  
Therefore, the prosecutor must prove each of these six elements in order to obtain a 
conviction.7 
                                              
6 This definition mirrors those found in numerous treatises.  In one leading work, larceny 
is defined as “the (1) trespassory (2) taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal 
property (5) of another (6) with intent to steal it.”  3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 
§ 19.2 (2d ed, p 62); see also Saltzman, § 7-2(a), pp 528-529.  Sir Edward Coke stated 
that “[l]arceny, by the common law, is the felonious and fraudulent taking and carrying 
away by any man or woman, of the meere personall goods of another . . . .”  3 Coke, 
Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797), p 107.  See also 1 Hale, 
History of the Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 503 (using Coke’s definition); 1 Hawkins, 
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1716), p 89.  An even older source defined the 
offense as “the treacherous taking of a corporeal movable thing of another, against the 
will of him to whom it belongs, by evil acquisition of possession or of the use.”  Horn, 
The Mirror of Justices (1895 Selden Society ed), p 25.  See also 3 Torcia, Wharton’s 
Criminal Law (15th ed), at 347 (“At common law, larceny is the trespassory taking and 
carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent permanently to 
deprive.”). 
7 The Court of Appeals has formulated an essentially identical test for larceny:  
(1) an actual or constructive taking of goods or property, (2) a carrying 
away or asportation, (3) the carrying away must be with a felonious intent, 
(4) the subject matter must be the goods or personal property of another, (5) 
the taking must be without the consent and against the will of the owner.  
[Anderson, 7 Mich App at 513, 516.] 
While this phrasing contains the term “owner,” as we will explain, it is used here with 
imprecision, and in the broader context of the development of the common law of larceny 
in Michigan, it should not be read to suggest that the law of larceny protects only those 
who hold title or an equitable interest in property.  Rather, the law of larceny focuses on 
 
 
 
11 
 
The dispute in the present case centers on element (d), whether the fixtures 
defendant took constituted the “property of another.”8  Accordingly, to resolve this case, 
we must determine the meaning of the term “property of another,” specifically, the nature 
of the interest protected by larceny-- that is, whether “property of another” means 
property in which “another” has a proprietary, possessory, or some other type of property 
interest.  The parties disagree as to whether Hamood’s interest during the redemption 
period was sufficient to transform the fixtures into the “property of another” with respect 
to defendant.  Our six-element definition of larceny does not, on its face, yield a definite 
resolution of this issue because it does not address the nature of the interest that “another” 
must have in the property.  We must then turn to larceny’s common-law background to 
explain the classes of interests that constitute the “property of another” protected by 
larceny laws against “trespassory” takings.   
C.  “PROPERTY OF ANOTHER” AT COMMON LAW 
 
At common law, “property of another” referred to property that “another” had the 
right to possess as against the defendant at the time of the taking.  In other words, if at the 
time of the taking someone other than the defendant had the right to possess the property 
                                              
the wrongful dispossession of property; that is, the law of larceny protects possessory 
rather than proprietary interests.  Thus, to be precise, we employ the more traditional 
phrasings referring to “property of another” and “trespassory” takings, rather than the 
words “owner” and “consent.” 
8 For purposes of this appeal, the parties do not dispute that defendant removed and 
carried away the property in controversy, or that the alleged larceny occurred in a 
“building” for purposes of MCL 750.360.  Nor do they dispute the property’s 
characterization as “fixtures,” at least before their severance from the house.  
 
 
12 
to the exclusion of the defendant, then it constituted the “property of another.”  It 
followed that if the defendant had the right to possess the property as against the 
complainant at the time of the taking, no larceny could occur.   
The focus on protection of possessory rights is first reflected in the prohibition of 
trespassory takings, which forms the core of larceny’s common-law roots.  As noted, 
common-law larceny was defined as the “unlawful taking of the personal property of 
another with the felonious intent to deprive the owner of it.”  Johnson, 81 Mich at 576.  It 
was the unlawful, or trespassory, “taking” that defined the fundamental nature of the 
crime: “[t]he principal factor which limited the scope of larceny was the requirement that 
the thief must take it from the victim’s possession; larceny requires a ‘trespass in the 
taking,’ as the matter is often stated.”  3 LaFave, § 19.1(a), p 57.  Or as another scholar 
noted, the “change of possession has from the earliest times been essential to larceny; so 
that there can be no larceny where there is no trespass.”  3 Holdsworth, A History of 
English Law, (1923), p 361 (citations omitted); see also Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2d 
ed, 1952), p 6 (“Trespass as an essential element of larceny simply meant taking a chattel 
from one who had possession of it.”).   
In order for the taking to be trespassory, the goods taken had to be the “property of 
another.”  An early-nineteenth-century treatise expressed this idea by emphasizing the 
victim’s possessory rights: “the goods, when taken, must be either actually or 
constructively in the possession of another . . . .”  1 Robinson, Introduction of a Justice of 
the Peace to the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace (1836), p 107.  Another 
nineteenth-century treatise expounded on this point, distinguishing proprietary rights and 
possessory rights and asserting that the latter were protected from criminal 
 
 
13 
misappropriation by the crime of larceny: “the misappropriation of property operates not 
by transferring proprietary rights, but by transferring the power of actual enjoyment of 
those rights, i.e. by dealing with the possession or custody of the thing to which they are 
attached . . . .”  3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), at 124.9  
Simply put, “larceny is committed by a wrongful taking from one who has rightful 
possession.”  State v Jackson, 251 Iowa 537, 542; 101 NW2d 731 (Iowa, 1960); see also 
2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2d ed, 
1898), p 498 (“The crime involves a violation of possession . . . .”).  Thus, larceny at 
common law protected principally against wrongful dispossessions of personal 
property.10 
                                              
9 We use Stephen’s terminology in this opinion to distinguish between “proprietary” and 
“possessory” rights.  We will define the latter term below, but here we take the 
opportunity to note that we use proprietary rights in distinction to possessory rights to 
mean all formal interests in property, such as legal title, equitable interests, or future 
interests.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed) (defining “proprietary” as, among other 
things, “[o]f, relating to, or holding as property”).  While the right to possession may well 
accompany some of these interests, such a right may be independent of them as well, 
arising from other sources such as a bailment.  And at times, these proprietary rights may 
not endow the person who holds them with the immediate right to possess the property.   
10 The common law’s protection of possession is explained by a similar rationale to that 
justifying larceny as a criminal offense: to prevent breaches of the peace.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has observed: 
In the 13th century, larceny was limited to trespassory taking: a thief 
committed larceny only if he feloniously “took and carried away” another’s 
personal property from his possession.  The goal was more to prevent 
breaches of the peace than losses of property, and violence was more likely 
when property was taken from the owner’s actual possession.  [Bell v 
United States, 462 US 356, 358; 103 S Ct 2398; 76 L Ed 2d 638 (1983)]. 
A substantial body of literature supports the notion that the law of larceny was intended 
to prevent breaches of the peace.  Green, 13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle (Cambridge: 
 
 
 
14 
 
What makes the dispossession wrongful is that the person from whom the property 
is taken holds the right to possess it as against the defendant at the time of the taking.  
This aspect of the definition of “property of another” is reflected by two rules developed 
by the courts: (a) an individual in the rightful possession of property could not steal it; 
and (b) anyone in the rightful possession could be viewed as the “owner” for purposes of 
larceny. 
The first rule is that a person in the rightful possession of property cannot steal it.  
See 3 LaFave, §§ 19.1 and 19.2.  “[Larceny] is an offence against a possessor and 
therefore can never be committed by a possessor.”  2 Pollock & Maitland, p 498 
(emphasis added).  Thus, for example, “where a man has goods in his possession by 
reason of a bailment, he cannot take them feloniously, being in possession . . . .”  
Carrier’s Case, YB 13 Edw IV, f 9, pl 5 (1473); see also Fitch v State, 135 Fla 361, 366; 
185 So 435 (1938); Hall, pp 6-7; Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 Harv L 
Rev 469, 481-482 (1976).  Even if the bailee absconded with the property during the 
bailment, that taking would not constitute larceny under the common law; because the 
bailee had acquired and maintained rightful possession of the property at the time of the 
taking, the property was not that “of another” and the taking therefore did not trespass 
upon another’s right to possess the property as against the bailee.  See Metamorphosis of 
Larceny, 89 Harv L Rev at 475 (explaining that, under common-law larceny, a bailee, or 
                                              
Harvard University Press, 2012), p 77; Steel, Taking Possession: The Defining Element 
of Theft?, 32 Melb U L Rev 1030, 1038-1039 (2008); Douglass, Rethinking Theft Crimes 
in Virginia, 38 U Rich L Rev 13, 17 (2003); Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 
Harv L Rev, 496, 497-498 (1976). 
 
 
15 
anyone in rightful possession of property, was endowed with a sort of “possessorial 
immunity” such that “those who acquired possession over chattels were not subject to 
criminal liability for subsequent misappropriation”). 
The second common-law rule is related to the first: one in the rightful possession 
of property, such as a bailee, could be considered the “owner” as against anyone else who 
took the goods from his possession.  Because, as Lord Blackstone explained, bailees had 
“immediate possession,” they were “entitled to an action . . . on account of [their] 
immediate possession . . . .”  2 Blackstone, at *396; see also Matthews, Digest of the Law 
Relating to Offences Punishable by Indictment, and by Information in the Crown Office 
(1833), pp 300-301 (noting that the “bailee, pawnee, lessee for years, carrier, or the like” 
could be characterized as the owner in a larceny indictment).  As one scholar has noted, 
either the bailor or bailee could be considered the “owner” for purposes of larceny 
because the “property is still in” the true owner, but the bailee “hath the possession . . . 
and hath the property against all the world but” the true owner.  1 Hale, History of the 
Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 512.  With respect to the thief then, the stolen goods were 
the “property of another,” because both the bailor and bailee held possessory rights as 
against the thief.  3 Coke, pp 107-108; Robinson, pp 119-120.  Further, because the bailee 
held rightful possession, even the true owner could be charged with larceny of his own 
goods if these were taken from the bailee during the bailment.  4 Blackstone, p *231; 1 
Hale, p 513.  Lord Coke linked this conclusion to the term property “of another”: the 
owner could “commit larceny” of goods bailed or loaned to another “by the felonious 
taking and carrying them away, and in judgement of law he is said in this case to take the 
goods of another” because the “bailee hath [a right to possession], or a speciall property.”  
 
 
16 
3 Coke, p 110; see also 3 LaFave, § 19.4(c), p 85 (“Sometimes the property which A 
owns is in the lawful possession of B, who has a pledge or lien interest . . . .  From A’s 
viewpoint such property is considered the ‘property of another for purposes of 
larceny . . . .’ ”).   
Taken together, these rules communicate that “property of another” requires that 
someone other than the defendant holds the right to possess the property to the exclusion 
of the defendant at the time of the taking.  To determine whether “another” holds such a 
possessory right, courts employing the common law have engaged in an examination and 
comparison of the property rights held by the defendant and other relevant parties when 
the taking occurred, looking to various rights-defining sources such as statutes to inform 
that assessment.  See, e.g., People v Zinke, 76 NY2d 8, 10-14; 556 NYS2d 11; 555 NE2d 
263 (1990) (noting that the legislature codified the common-law definition of “property 
of another” and relying on statutes to determine relevant property rights); Murphy v State, 
453 NE2d 219, 221 (Ind, 1983) (“The rights to be examined in determining whether or 
not a theft has been committed are the rights of the person in possession of the property 
and the rights of the person who took such possession from him.”); see also 50 Am Jur 
2d, Larceny, § 25, p 36 (“[T]he key to answering the question of which person has the 
greater right to possession of the property is who, at the time of commission of the 
offense, had the greater right to possession of the property.”) (emphasis added); Peterson, 
Georgia Law of Theft, 12 Mercer L Rev 308, 308 (1961) (noting that because the taking 
was out of another’s possession, “it became important to determine in whom lay rightful 
possession”).   
 
 
 
17 
D.  MICHIGAN LAW 
 
Our state’s caselaw reflects the common-law notion that the “property of another” 
requirement for larceny contemplates protecting the possessory rights of “another” who 
at the time of the taking holds a right to possess the property as against the defendant.  As 
a result, a person in rightful possession of the property at the time of the taking cannot 
commit larceny by taking that property.  
 
This Court has made clear that establishing larceny as a crime was intended to 
protect possession.  One of the ways we have done so is by recognizing that the law of 
larceny prohibits trespassory takings.  As noted above, “trespass” at common law “simply 
meant taking a chattel from one who had possession of it.”  Hall, at 6.  If there is no 
trespass because the defendant initially received possession lawfully, then larceny has not 
occurred.  For this reason, in People v Taugher, 102 Mich 598, 601; 61 NW 66 (1894), 
this Court overturned a larceny conviction in which the defendant’s “possession was 
lawful until the [owner’s] demand” for return of the property.  In a similar vein, this 
Court has recognized that “larceny was not the proper charge at common law if a person 
lawfully acquired possession of property belonging to another and subsequently 
converted it to his own use.”  People v Christenson, 412 Mich 81, 86 n 3; 312 NW2d 618 
(1981).  This is because if, when the taking occurred, the defendant had a right to possess 
the property, it was not the “property of another” in the relevant sense at the necessary 
time.  Thus, our caselaw, as with the common law, prohibits trespassory takings that 
deprive an individual of rightful possession of property.  Those on the other hand who 
come into the possession of property lawfully have not committed larceny because the 
taking and possession were not wrongful at their inception. 
 
 
18 
More directly, we have declared that possession, and not title ownership, is the 
determinative requirement in larceny crimes.  In Christenson, 412 Mich at 87, we 
observed, “As with common-law larceny, larceny by conversion [MCL 750.362] is a 
crime against possession and not against title . . . .”  This statement not only 
communicates that the law of larceny protects an individual’s possessory rights, but 
further supports the proposition that property is “of another” when someone other than 
the defendant has a right to possess that property as against the defendant, regardless of 
whether that person possesses title to it.  50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny, § 18, p 29 (citing 
Christenson in support of this specific rule); Tiffany, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of 
the State of Michigan (5th ed, 1900), p 915 (“The person alleged in the indictment to be 
the owner must, also, have, at the time of the taking, either the actual or constructive 
possession of the goods.”).11   
 
The Court of Appeals has expressed the same idea, although sometimes attended 
by the problematic term “owner,” suggesting wrongly that only proprietary rights are 
protected.  Despite this, the Court has accurately explained the rightful-possession 
requirement.  As one opinion stated, “For purposes of larceny, the ‘owner’ is the person 
who has rightful possession and control of the property.”  People v Pohl, 202 Mich App 
                                              
11 Other cases involving related crimes give further support to this interpretation.  See, 
e.g., People v Gould, 384 Mich 71, 80; 179 NW2d 617 (1970) (noting that it was 
sufficient under MCL 750.357, the statute addressing larceny from a person, for the 
taking to have been from the victim’s possession); Durand v People, 47 Mich 332, 334; 
11 NW 184 (1882) (noting, in a case of assault with intent to rob, that “[a]s against a 
wrong-doer an actual possession or custody of the goods would be sufficient”); People v 
Hooks, 139 Mich App 92, 96; 360 NW2d 191 (1984) (citing Durand to support the 
possession requirement in a criminal charge for receiving stolen property).  
 
 
19 
203, 205; 507 NW2d 819 (1993), remanded for resentencing on other grounds 445 Mich 
918 (1994).  One particularly thoughtful decision in this regard is People v Hatch, 156 
Mich App 265; 401 NW2d 344 (1986), in which an owner left his boat for repairs at a 
marina, from where it was later stolen.  Id. at 266.  At trial, a dispute occurred concerning 
the evidence necessary to prove that the taking was contrary to the owner’s will, with the 
trial court granting a motion to strike the boat’s owner as a res gestae witness, i.e., one 
who was “witness to some event in the continuum of a criminal transaction and whose 
testimony will aid in developing a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the alleged 
commission of the charged offense.”  Id. at 266-267.  The trial court granted the motion 
to strike and the Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that the “owner” for purposes of 
the alleged larceny was the marina manager who was in rightful possession of the boat at 
the time it was taken.  Id. at 267-268.  This result reflects the common law of larceny, 
which protected persons rightfully possessing property, whether they owned the property 
or not. 
 
Further supporting this conclusion is this Court’s decision in People v Jacks, 76 
Mich 218; 42 NW 1134 (1889), which Hatch cited.  In Jacks, we held that “the fact of 
non-consent to the taking may . . . be proved by any other person having knowledge of 
the facts as well as by the owner or the person having control of the property at the 
time . . . .”  Id. at 221 (emphasis added).  This suggests that larceny can occur by the 
dispossession of a rightful possessor of the property, even if that person is not the title 
owner.  It is thus reasonably well established that the rightful possessor of property can 
 
 
20 
constitute its “owner” for purposes of larceny.  Or, more accurately, the property is “of 
another” if another rightfully possesses it.12 
 
Our caselaw has also recognized that in order to constitute “property of another,” 
“another” must hold rightful possession as against the defendant at the time of the taking.  
In People v Long, 50 Mich 249; 15 NW 105 (1883), for instance, the defendant’s buggy 
was held by a man named William Gilbert pursuant to a lien.  Id. at 250.  This Court held 
that the defendant, although the true owner, was guilty of larceny where he had “secretly 
removed” the buggy from Gilbert’s possession.  Id.  “Gilbert had a lien upon the 
buggy . . . and was rightfully in possession.”  Id. at 251 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, 
this Court upheld the larceny conviction.  Id.   
By noting that Gilbert “rightfully” possessed the buggy, we recognized that the 
buggy was the “property of another,” with respect to the defendant, even though the 
defendant was the title owner.  In other words, Gilbert’s rightful possession by virtue of 
the lien gave him the right to possess the buggy as against the defendant.  And the 
defendant, regardless of any rights that might have inhered in him as title owner, lacked 
the right to possess the buggy as against Gilbert at the time of the taking.  Therefore, by 
taking the buggy, the defendant took the “property of another” and was guilty of larceny.   
                                              
12 Sheldon, 208 Mich App at 334 (“Larceny is not limited to taking property away from 
the person who holds title to that property, but also includes taking property from a 
person who has rightful possession and control of the property.”); Hooks, 139 Mich App 
at 96 (“[I]t is well-settled that a larceny can be committed by a wrongful taking from a 
person in actual possession or custody of the goods taken; ownership need not be 
show[n].”). 
 
 
21 
The same reasoning runs through Court of Appeals cases, the most prominent of 
which is People v Sheldon, 208 Mich App 331, relied on by the Court of Appeals in the 
instant case.  In Sheldon, as in Long, the larcenist owned the property he stole, which 
consisted of two impounded Cadillacs held at a car lot.  Id. at 333-334.  He was charged 
with two counts of simple larceny, MCL 750.356, which the trial court quashed because 
the lot did not own the cars.  Id.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing Hatch, 156 Mich 
App at 267, and Model Criminal Jury Instruction 22.2 to establish that the “owner” for 
purposes of larceny was not necessarily the title owner.  Instead, it noted that the owner 
could be the “ ‘actual owner’ ” or “ ‘any other person whose consent was necessary 
before the property could be taken.’ ”  Sheldon, 208 Mich App at 334-335, quoting M 
Crim JI 22.2.  The Court did not engage in an analysis of the lot’s right to consent in the 
abstract, but grounded its analysis in whether the lot had a right to possess the cars.  Id. at 
334-337.  Specifically, the Court stated that the relevant question was “whether the 
wrecker service enjoyed a right of possession sufficient to support a larceny charge at the 
time the vehicles were removed from the wrecker service’s possession.”  Id. at 334 
(emphasis added).  To determine this, the Court examined the legal authority for the lot’s 
possession of the two cars.  As to one of these, the court determined that the owner’s 
right to possess the car was conditioned on the payment of certain impoundment fees.  Id. 
at 336.  Therefore, the defendant “did not have the right to remove the vehicle . . . until 
such time as he paid the impoundment fees or posted a bond,” and unauthorized removal 
could constitute larceny.  Id.  Concerning the second car, there was no evidence that it 
had been lawfully impounded and the larceny charge in connection with its taking was 
quashed.   
 
 
22 
Accordingly, Sheldon, as with Long, comports with the common-law proposition 
that property constitutes the “property of another” when someone holds the right to 
possess it as against the defendant at the time of the taking.  In order to reach this 
conclusion, Sheldon canvassed the relevant statutes defining the rights of the respective 
parties in the property at the time of the taking, and assessed with whom rightful 
possession of the property lay-- an analysis consistent with the common-law approach 
discussed previously.  See, e.g., Zinke, 76 NY2d at 10-14.13  
In summary, while this Court has not yet had specific occasion to expressly define 
“property of another” for purposes of the larceny statutes, our caselaw reflects the 
common-law definition described above: “property of another” is any property in which 
“another” individual holds the right to possess as against the defendant at the time of the 
taking.  To determine whether “another” had such rightful possession, courts must 
examine the respective rights to the property.  This examination requires courts to 
determine both the rights of all relevant individuals to the property and whether any of 
those individuals held a right to possess the property as against the defendant.  To 
undertake this examination, courts should consult pertinent statutes, ordinances, 
                                              
13 A similar comparison-of-rights approach can be found in Michigan caselaw addressing 
whether, for purposes of armed robbery, the defendant engaged in “a felonious taking of 
property from the victim’s presence or person.”  See People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 
702, 707-708; 645 NW2d 294 (2001) (finding an illegal taking where the defendant did 
not argue he had the right to possess “when compared to [the victims’]” right to possess); 
see also People v Jones, 71 Mich App 270, 272; 246 NW2d 381 (1976) (noting that the 
victim had the right to handle the property taken at the time of the taking); People v 
Beebe, 70 Mich App 154, 159; 245 NW2d 547 (1976) (finding that the victim had a right 
to possess the goods taken as against the defendant); People v Needham, 8 Mich App 
679, 685; 155 NW2d 267 (1967) (same).  
 
 
23 
contracts, caselaw, and the like that give rise to the individuals’ rights and define the 
relationship between those rights, as the statutes did in Sheldon.  
IV.  APPLICATION 
To apply these rules in the instant case, we must determine the parties’ respective 
interests in the property during the redemption period.  As demonstrated, for defendant to 
have properly been charged with larceny, the facts must demonstrate that defendant, in 
removing the fixtures, took the “property of another.”  And for the fixtures to have been 
the “property of another,” someone other than defendant-- in this case, Hamood-- must 
have held the right to possess the property to the exclusion of defendant at the time of the 
taking.  Hamood could hold such an interest only from his purchase at the foreclosure 
sale.  In our judgment, no possessory rights inhered in Hamood as a result of the sale.  
Defendant, on the other hand, retained the exclusive possessory rights in the fixtures 
during the redemption period.  It therefore follows that defendant could not commit 
larceny under the circumstances of this case. 
A.  RESPECTIVE RIGHTS  
 
In order to ascertain the parties’ rights to possession, it is first necessary to briefly 
define possession.  “Possession” is defined as “ ‘1. [t]he fact of having or holding 
property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over property.  2. [t]he right under 
which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the 
continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object.’ ”  People v Flick, 
487 Mich 1, 12; 790 NW2d 295 (2010), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).14  In 
                                              
14 Our reliance on this general definition of “possession” here should not be taken to 
suggest that in order to have rightful possession for purposes of larceny a party must have 
 
 
 
24 
general, “possession is either actual or constructive.”  Id. at 14.  “ ‘[A] person has 
constructive possession if he “knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time 
to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or 
persons . . . .” ’ ”  Id., quoting People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989) 
(citation omitted).  “[B]are access” to the property “is not enough to constitute 
possession” for purposes of larceny offenses.  People v Gill, 12 Mich App 383, 386; 163 
NW2d 14 (1968).  See also People v Manning, 38 Mich App 662, 666-667; 197 NW2d 
152 (1972) (noting that possession requires the defendant to have been given dominion 
over the property, not simply custody).   
Turning to the present case, the parties do not dispute that the items taken were 
fixtures subject to the foreclosed-on mortgage.  Fixtures intentionally annexed to real 
property “bec[o]me part of the mortgage security, and, upon foreclosure sale, title [to 
them] passe[s] with the realty.”  Sequist v Fabiano, 274 Mich 643, 646; 265 NW 488 
(1936).  Thus, whatever rights the complainant had in the fixtures arose from his 
purchase. 
 
A foreclosure-sale purchaser receives a deed at purchase, which vests title at the 
end of the redemption period if the mortgagor fails to redeem.  The deed is described in 
MCL 600.3236 as follows: 
                                              
the right to possess the property to the complete exclusion of any and every other party.  
Indeed, multiple individuals can hold possessory rights in the same property at the same 
time, as do, for example, partners and joint tenants.  See 3 LaFave, § 19.4(c), p 85.  
Rather, as discussed earlier, the relevant inquiry in the larceny context is whether the 
party from whom the property was taken had, at the time of the taking, the right to 
possess it as against the defendant.  
 
 
25 
Unless the premises described in such deed shall be redeemed within 
the time limited for such redemption as hereinafter provided, such deed 
shall thereupon become operative, and shall vest in the grantee therein 
named, his heirs or assigns, all the right, title, and interest which the 
mortgagor had at the time of the execution of the mortgage, or at any time 
thereafter, except as to any parcel or parcels which may have been 
redeemed and canceled, as hereinafter provided; and the record thereof 
shall thereafter, for all purposes be deemed a valid record of said deed 
without being re-recorded, but no person having any valid subsisting lien 
upon the mortgaged premises, or any part thereof, created before the lien of 
such mortgage took effect, shall be prejudiced by any such sale, nor shall 
his rights or interests be in any way affected thereby.  [Emphasis added.] 
Following the sale, the mortgagor has a period of time during which to redeem the 
property by paying the amount of the successful bid, interest on that amount, and various 
fees.  MCL 600.3240(1), (2).  If the property is not redeemed within that period-- six 
months in this case, MCL 600.3240(8)-- the title to the deed becomes “operative” and 
vests in the purchaser under MCL 600.3236.  The vesting confers on the purchaser “those 
rights that existed at the time that the mortgage subject to foreclosure was executed,” In 
re Receivership of 11910 South Francis Rd, 492 Mich 208, 223; 821 NW2d 503 (2012), 
as well as those the mortgagor held “at any time thereafter,” MCL 600.3236.  In other 
words, the purchaser has “the right to have the estate which he purchased . . . .”  Stout v 
Keyes, 2 Doug 184, 187 (1845); see also Sanford v Cahoon, 63 Mich 223, 226; 29 NW 
840 (1886) (“If redemption was not made . . . the title of the purchaser became absolute, 
and related back to the time of sale.”); see also Stout, 2 Doug at 187-188 (“[I]f not 
defeated by redemption, [title] related back to the time of the purchase . . . .”).  This is 
understandably known as the ‘relation-back’ doctrine.  Wells Fargo Bank v Country 
Place Condo Ass’n, 304 Mich App 582, 593; 848 NW2d 425 (2014).  Because in these 
circumstances, the purchaser is deemed to hold title retroactively, he can pursue civil 
 
 
26 
actions for damages done to the property during the redemption period.  MCL 600.3278; 
Stout, 2 Doug at 187-188.   
 
The purchaser’s rights during the redemption period have been variously described 
as an inchoate or contingent equitable interest, but it has never been suggested that this 
interest constitutes a possessory right, let alone one that permits the purchaser to exclude 
the mortgagor from possession.  This Court has held that the purchaser acquires “an 
inchoate right to the land,” subject to defeat by redemption.  Stout, 2 Doug at 187.  The 
purchaser’s right to absolute title is “consummated” only if the premises go unredeemed.  
Id.  During the redemption period, the deed “was in the nature of an escrow; and, if not 
defeated by redemption, related back to the time of the purchase . . . .”  Id. at 187-188.  
More recent cases summarily label the purchaser’s interest as “equitable.”  As we 
explained in Dunitz v Woodford Apartments Co, 236 Mich 45, 49; 209 NW 809 (1926):  
A foreclosure of a mortgage extinguishes it.  When the amount due under 
the mortgage is paid to the mortgagee by the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale, 
the lien is destroyed, and the purchaser becomes the owner of an equitable 
interest in the mortgaged premises which ripens into a legal title if not 
defeated by redemption as provided by law.  It is not a “lien, incumbrance 
or mortgage” which the purchaser at a foreclosure sale acquires, but it is an 
interest or title, equitable in character, and with nothing to be done on his 
part to make it absolute if it is not redeemed within the period of time 
prescribed by law. 
This represents the prevailing characterization of the purchaser’s interest.  See, e.g., In re 
Receivership of 11910 South Francis Rd, 492 Mich at 223.  Thus, only after the 
mortgagor fails to redeem does the purchaser’s interest “ripen[] into a legal title[.]”  
Dunitz, 236 Mich at 49.   
 
 
27 
 
During the pendency of the redemption period, the purchaser’s rights and 
responsibilities are considerably circumscribed, with the purchaser entitled to few, if any, 
of the rights accompanying ownership.  Most relevantly for purposes of larceny, the 
purchaser lacks possessory rights, which continue in the mortgagor until the period 
expires.  As early as 1936, we remarked upon “the definite and continuous policy of this 
State to save to mortgagors the possession and benefits of the mortgaged premises, as 
against the mortgagees, until expiration of the period of redemption.”  Mass Mut Life Ins 
Co v Sutton, 278 Mich 457, 461; 270 NW 748 (1936).15  
 
Our most recent discussion of the purchaser’s rights took place in Kubczak v 
Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653; 575 NW2d 745 (1998), in which a real-estate 
agent showing foreclosed property during the redemption period was injured in a fall at 
                                              
15 This policy proceeded from an 1843 statute, 1843 PA 62, “inhibiting the action of 
ejectment [by the mortgagee] until after a foreclosure of the mortgage, and the expiration 
of the time of redemption . . . .”  Mundy v Monroe, 1 Mich 68, 70 (1848).  That statute 
currently is codified at MCL 600.2932(2), which states that “[n]o action may be 
maintained [for ejectment] by a mortgagee, his assigns, or representatives for recovery of 
the mortgaged premises, until the title to the mortgaged premises has become absolute.”  
We have consistently interpreted the statute as providing that a “mortgage gives no right 
of possession until foreclosure and sale” and expiration of the redemption period.  
Hogsett v Ellis, 17 Mich 351, 363 (1868).  See, e.g., Nusbaum v Shapero, 249 Mich 252, 
257; 228 NW 785 (1930) (“The law is well settled in this State that, as a rule, a 
mortgagee may not divest the mortgagor of possession of mortgaged premises until the 
title thereto shall have become absolute upon foreclosure of the mortgage.”); Hazeltine v 
Granger, 44 Mich 503, 505; 7 NW 74 (1880) (noting that the 1843 law was to “prevent 
the mortgagee from obtaining under his mortgage any interest beyond that of a security to 
be enforced only by sale on foreclosure, and to debar him from any right of possession”); 
Wagar v Stone, 36 Mich 364, 367 (1877) (“[U]ntil the title [in the foreclosure-sale 
purchaser] shall have become absolute upon a foreclosure of the mortgage . . . the 
mortgagor has a clear right to the possession and to the income which he may derive 
therefrom . . . .”).   
 
 
28 
the property and brought a premises liability action against the foreclosure-sale 
purchaser.  Id. at 655-658.  Because an action for premises liability is conditioned on the 
defendant’s possession and control of the land, we examined whether the purchaser had 
possession:  
[T]he bank [which purchased the property] had no legal right of 
possession during the six-month redemption period.  It is certainly true . . . 
that the Hineses, as mortgagors, had the authority to place the mortgagee-
bank in possession of the premises.  However, we have consistently given 
careful scrutiny to any transaction in which a mortgagor waives its statutory 
right of redemption.  [Id. at 660.] 
Instead, we reaffirmed the “ ‘definite and continuous policy’ ” of ensuring the 
mortgagor’s possession during the redemption period.  Id. at 660, quoting Sutton, 278 
Mich at 461.  Consequently, “a mortgagee can obtain possession” during that period, “but 
only for consideration . . . and pursuant to an explicit agreement.”  Id. at 661 (citations 
omitted).  We concluded: 
The fact that the bank was the high bidder at foreclosure proceedings did 
not grant it any rights of ownership or possession, but, rather, gave the bank 
a contingency interest in the property with respect to title ownership.  
Accordingly, any interest the bank had would not vest until after expiration 
of the redemption period.  [Id.] 
Similarly, the statutory framework addressing the purchaser’s rights during the 
redemption period supports the conclusion that purchasers lack possessory rights.  The 
Legislature has crafted a limited set of rights purchasers may enjoy during the redemption 
period; none of these suggests that the Legislature intended to grant the purchaser 
possessory rights.  Following the sale, the purchaser can conduct inspections of the 
property only by complying with the numerous provisions in MCL 600.3237 and 
 
 
29 
MCL 600.3238.16  For example, the purchaser may only inspect the inside of the property 
once, unless there is evidence that the property is being damaged.  MCL 600.3238(4).  A 
formal series of steps must be taken before the purchaser can begin summary proceedings 
under MCL 600.5701 et seq. for immediate possession of the premises.  
MCL 600.3238(5) through (11).  These provisions each severely constrain any rights the 
purchaser might have to possess or even access the property.   
These authorities compellingly indicate that the foreclosure-sale purchaser has no 
possessory interest in the property during the redemption period, while the mortgagor 
retains possessory rights.  To the extent that rights or responsibilities inhere in the 
purchaser as a result of events during that period, these arise only retroactively under the 
relation-back doctrine.  That doctrine, however, does not invest the purchaser with 
possessory rights or with any other interests during the period itself.  At that time, the 
purchaser holds no possessory rights on which the mortgagor could trespass.  Indeed, 
courts applying our precedent have found that it is the purchaser who could, in fact, 
commit a trespass against the mortgagor during the redemption period.  See, e.g., 
Kaczmarek v JPMorgan Chase, NA, opinion of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, issued June 11, 2012 (Case No. 2:11-CV-15214), pp 5-7.  
In short, the purchaser lacks possessory rights and the mortgagor enjoys possessory rights 
during the redemption period. 
 
                                              
16 These sections were enacted following the events in this case, 2014 PA 125, but they 
seem to confirm what is made manifest in the prior caselaw: purchasers lack immediate 
possessory rights. 
 
 
30 
B.  RESOLUTION 
 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that defendant here could not have 
committed larceny of the fixtures because he had the right to possess the house, and thus 
also its fixtures, at the time of the alleged larceny.  Larceny can occur only when personal 
“property of another” has been taken by trespass.  To constitute “property of another,” the 
“goods, when taken, must be either actually or constructively in the possession of 
another[.]”  1 Robinson, p 107.  Moreover, the person with possession must have the 
right to possess the property to the exclusion of the defendant.  Long, 50 Mich at 251; 
Sheldon, 208 Mich App at 334-336.  It follows that one in “lawful possession” of the 
property cannot take by trespass the “property of another.”   
This means that for defendant to have committed larceny, Hamood must have held 
a right to possess the property to the exclusion of defendant.  But Hamood did not hold 
such a right.  As the foreclosure-sale purchaser, he held equitable title to the property 
during the redemption period, which gave him no possessory rights.  Dunitz, 236 Mich at 
49.  Defendant, by contrast, held legal title and, critically for our purposes, the sole right 
to possess the property.  Kubczak, 456 Mich at 660-661.  Therefore, defendant could not 
by taking the property have trespassed upon the “property of another,” because no one 
else had the right to possess it at that time.  Consequently, defendant’s actions did not 
constitute a trespassory taking of the “property of another” and did not constitute larceny 
under MCL 750.360.  And because the property was not stolen, defendant did not 
receive, possess, or conceal stolen goods.  MCL 750.535(4)(a).  Accordingly, we must 
reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the charges 
 
 
31 
against defendant because he cannot be guilty of offenses under either MCL 750.360 or 
MCL 750.535(4)(a).17 
V.  COURT OF APPEALS 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals, we believe, erred in two 
respects: (a) it focused on Hamood’s purported right to consent rather than on his 
possessory rights; and (b) its analysis of that right to consent-- to the extent such analysis 
tracks the proper inquiry into possessory rights-- was mistaken.   
The Court of Appeals’ threshold error was in assuming that Hamood was the 
“owner” of the fixtures for purposes of larceny-- and thus that the fixtures constituted the 
“property of another” with respect to defendant-- by virtue of Hamood’s supposed “right 
to consent” to their removal, rather than by examining his specific possessory rights.  
This use of “consent” as the basis for ascertaining Hamood’s interests for purposes of 
larceny is inapt because it fails to address why Hamood enjoyed the right, or the 
authority, to consent or to deny consent for a particular taking.  That is, an individual is 
not considered to “own” property because he or she may consent to its taking; rather, 
particular interests encompass the right to consent.  Consent is an attribute or function of 
some property interests, derived from a right to control the property, which in turn is an 
attribute or function of the right to possession of the property.  Hence, “consent” is an 
                                              
17 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case involving facts very similar to the instant 
case, observed in dictum that “provisions of the criminal code, such as theft . . . or 
criminal damage to property . . . provide no criminal recourse since during the 
redemption period a mortgagor has exclusive right to possession of and title to the 
property.”  State v Zacher, 504 NW2d 468, 472-473 (Minn, 1993). 
 
 
32 
amorphous and imprecise concept except to the extent that it serves as a proxy for the 
actual right to possession. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the court’s analysis of consent was intended to 
serve as a proxy for the right to possession, it is unpersuasive because neither of the 
sources of legal authority on which the court relied gives rise to the right to possession.  
The first source relied on by the Court of Appeals was MCL 600.3278.  However, this 
statute fails to endow the purchaser with a possessory right, let alone a possessory right 
that permits the purchaser to dispossess the mortgagor.  Rather, the statute provides the 
purchaser with a civil remedy if the mortgagor damages the property during the 
redemption period:  
During the period of redemption following a foreclosure sale of 
property under this chapter, the mortgagor and any other person liable on 
the mortgage is liable to the purchaser at the sale, or the mortgagee, payee, 
or other holder of the obligation secured by the mortgage if the mortgagee, 
payee, or other holder takes or has taken title to the property at the sale 
either directly or indirectly, for any physical injury to the property beyond 
wear and tear resulting from the normal use of the property if the physical 
injury is caused by or at the direction of the mortgagor or other person 
liable on the mortgage.  [MCL 600.3278(1).] 
Nowhere does this statute purport to create a right to possession.  Indeed, the statute itself 
indicates to the contrary, providing that “[a]n action for damages under this section may 
be joined with an action for possession of the premises under [MCL 600.5701 et seq.].”  
MCL 600.3278(5).  The “action for possession” refers to summary proceedings for 
obtaining judgments of possession, and includes situations in which the person in 
possession “causes extensive and continuing physical injury to the premises[.]”  
MCL 600.5714(1)(d).  This action thus complements an action for possession, but does 
 
 
33 
not give rise to a right to possession.  Nor indeed does the statute purport even to prohibit 
damage to, or removal of property from, the premises.  Rather, it purports only to provide 
a civil remedy or recourse to a purchaser when such damage occurs.  The statute does not 
grant possessory rights in the property as a predicate for larceny. 
 
The second source relied on by the Court of Appeals was the equitable title held 
by Hamood as a result of the foreclosure sale.  This also does not suffice to grant him the 
possessory rights necessary to establish larceny.  As discussed earlier, the Court of 
Appeals did not analyze in any depth the limited nature of the equitable title derived from 
the sale, which clearly cabins the scope of the title and authority belonging to the 
foreclosure purchaser during the redemption period.  
 
The prosecutor now offers an additional reason why the court below reached the 
correct result based on Hamood’s equitable title.  Relying on the relation-back doctrine, 
the prosecutor claims that because this title related back to the foreclosure-sale date, 
defendant “at the very least” trespassed on Hamood’s constructive possession, if not also 
on his actual possession, “since the redemption option was never [in the end] exercised.”  
In support of this proposition, the prosecutor cites Wells Fargo Bank, 304 Mich App at 
590-594, in which a foreclosure-sale purchaser was held liable for condominium fees and 
assessments accruing from the purchase date.   
But Wells Fargo in particular, and the relation-back doctrine in general, are 
inapposite.  Regarding Wells Fargo, that decision turned on the Condominium Act, 
MCL 559.101 et seq., which specifically provided that the foreclosure-sale purchaser was 
not liable for condominium assessments “ ‘that became due prior to the acquisition of 
title to the [property] by that . . . purchaser.’ ”  Wells Fargo, 304 Mich App at 590-591, 
 
 
34 
quoting MCL 559.158.  The Court thus held that the purchaser was responsible for dues 
accruing after he acquired title.  This occurred when the purchaser took the equitable title, 
as the Act did not require the acquisition of “absolute title.”  Id. at 592-593.  Although the 
Court noted that the relation-back doctrine also supported its analysis, it expressly stated, 
“Our analysis of the [Act] is not reliant upon the relation-back doctrine.”  Id. at 593.   
Moreover, the doctrine cannot reasonably afford a basis for finding larceny here 
because it is premised on retroactivity; the doctrine does not afford the purchaser any 
possessory rights during the redemption period.  Larceny, by contrast, is concerned with 
the redemption period itself as it actually elapses: the taking cannot be merely 
“retroactively criminal,” but must be criminal at the time it occurs.  See Anderson, 7 
Mich App at 517, citing People v Bradovich, 305 Mich 329, 332; 9 NW2d 650 (1943); 
see also Saltzman, pp 543-544 (“Ordinarily the taking . . . must coincide with the intent to 
steal.  Thus, if the taking was lawful, a later conversion with the intent to steal might be 
larceny by conversion [MCL 750.362] or embezzlement, but it would not be larceny.”).  
It follows that only the circumstances at the time of the taking are relevant for assessing 
criminal liability, not those arising afterwards.   
Further, this Court has held that the relation-back doctrine is “remedial, and its use 
in the law is to prevent wrongs and punish trespasses. . . . As has been repeatedly 
declared in this court, it can never be so applied as to make that a wrong which was 
innocent when done . . . .”  Flint & PM R Co v Gordon, 41 Mich 420, 431; 2 NW 648 
(1879).  Thus, it cannot be used as proposed here because to do so would render the 
 
 
35 
mortgagor’s actions “wrong” only on the basis of subsequent circumstances, imposing 
criminal liability on actions that when they took place were not criminal.18 
 
Thus, even with the prosecutor’s elaborations, the Court of Appeals erred because 
there is no support for holding that the foreclosure sale purchaser’s equitable title 
combined with MCL 600.3278(1) to confer upon the purchaser a possessory interest in 
the property as against that of the mortgagor.  The Court simply failed to explain how the 
coexistence of Hamood’s equitable interest, one that is non-possessory, with a statutory 
remedy provision that is also non-possessory, results in a possessory right to the fixtures 
at the time of the taking. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The outcome in this case is mandated by MCL 750.360’s adoption of the common 
law of larceny, which protects possessory rights.  At the time defendant removed the 
fixtures, only he held possessory rights in these, and the complainant held no such rights.  
                                              
18 The prosecutor also argues that defendant’s right to possess the property during the 
redemption period does not entail a right to remove or dispose of fixtures attached to the 
property.  Citing Adams v Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co, 237 Mich App 51, 57; 602 NW2d 
215 (1999), the prosecutor contends that “property” rights are represented by a “ ‘bundle 
of sticks’ ” including rights of possession, enjoyment, and disposition.  The right to 
possess is thus distinct from the right to remove or dispose, and defendant’s rights did not 
include the latter.  This fails to persuade for two reasons.  First, the prosecutor presents 
no support for the proposition that the mortgagor who retains legal title and the right to 
possess has somehow lost the right to remove or dispose.  Second, even if defendant 
lacked such rights, removal or disposal would still not constitute larceny because it would 
not constitute a trespass upon Hamood’s interest.  It does not follow from defendant’s 
supposed lack of right to remove or dispose that Hamood has somehow obtained 
possessory rights on which defendant has trespassed.  We also reject the prosecutor’s 
argument that “defendant trespassed on Hamood’s future interest in the fixtures by 
removing them from the house.”  Larceny protects present possessory rights and the 
relevant inquiry is therefore not which possessory rights Hamood might come to enjoy in 
the future, but which possessory rights, if any, he held at the time of the alleged taking. 
 
 
36 
Accordingly, defendant could not have committed larceny by removing the fixtures.  
Absent a proper larceny charge, the fixtures were necessarily not “stolen” goods.  
Therefore, the charge of receiving or possessing stolen goods must fail as well.  For these 
reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and reinstate the trial court’s 
dismissal of the criminal charges against defendant.19   
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Joan L. Larsen 
 
                                              
19 Our resolution of this case makes it unnecessary to address the second issue on which 
oral argument was heard: “whether fixtures taken from real property may be the subject 
of larceny under MCL 750.356(1).”  March, 497 Mich at 1041.