Title: The Florida Bar v. Abramson
Citation: 199 So. 2d 457
Docket Number: 35819
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 1967

199 So. 2d 457 (1967)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
v.
John M. ABRAMSON, Respondent.
No. 35819.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 24, 1967.
Jerry B. Crockett, Miami, for The Florida Bar, complainant.
Allen Clements, Miami, for respondent.
DREW, Justice.
Honorable Irving Cypen, a former Circuit Judge, the referee in this disciplinary proceeding instituted by The Florida Bar, heard 130 pages of testimony by the respondent and three witnesses relative to a single charge of soliciting the legal business of three named persons.[1] In his findings and recommendations the referee stated that the principal witness against respondent, a Mr. Souter, "admitted many inconsistencies" in his testimony on direct and these were narrated in the findings. Moreover, the referee was obviously not impressed with the truthfulness or accuracy of the other witnesses. He found that the testimony of the respondent, as to the circumstances surrounding the events out of which the *458 charges arose, was true and he accepted as true the denial by the respondent of material testimony of the witnesses who testified for the Bar. He reviewed the personal history and background of respondent and, among other things, found:
The Board of Governors rejected the findings and recommendations of the referee and entered its judgment suspending respondent for "six months and thereafter until he shall demonstrate his rehabilitation and * * * pay the costs * * * in the amount of $272.65." Pertinent portions of this judgment follow:
The referee had the material advantage of having the witness before him in evaluating the evidence in this cause. Neither this Court nor the Board of Governors is in the same position to judge the truthfulness, the candor or lack of candor, manner of replying to questions or the many other intangible things that occur in the arena of such a trial. Evidentiary findings and conclusions of the trier of facts where supported by legally sufficient evidence should not lightly be set aside by those possessing the power of review. This rule is particularly applicable in disciplinary proceedings under the Integration Rule insofar as the powers of the Board of Governors are concerned. That body is a part of the accusatory process under the Integration Rule. It makes the finding of probable cause, its attorney prosecutes the charges and it enters what the Integration Rule designates as the judgment. Under such circumstances we may not constitutionally, nor have we since the adoption of Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A., accorded such judgment any effect greater than a recommendation as to the guilt and the extent of punishment, if any, to be inflicted.
Before the adoption of Article V of our Constitution effective July 1, 1957, disciplinary proceedings were carried on in substantially the same manner as at present. With reference to the power of the Board of Governors at that time we said, in Application of Harper, Fla. 1956, 84 So. 2d 700, 706, 54 A.L.R.2d 1272:
The above language is clearly applicable under amended Article V and the present disciplinary rule.
Reverting now to the judgment of the Board of Governors, we cannot accept the findings of the Board or its conclusions as to the evidence. Nor can we agree that the referee may not accept the evidence of the respondent as true, even though not corroborated. There is no rule that requires the respondent's testimony to be corroborated. The weight and credibility of such evidence, as we have stated, is peculiarly a problem for the trier of fact.[2] We do not, however, agree with the recommendation of either the Board of Governors or the referee as to the judgment which should be entered. Accepting as we do the premise that the respondent in good faith was present at the hospital in response to a telephone call, we think his conduct in pursuing the matter of employment to the point of securing the execution of an employment contract under the circumstances existing was, to say the least, an exhibition of exceedingly poor taste. We are inclined to attribute such conduct to his youth and inexperience and, in this instance, to impose a punishment of a public reprimand. Contracts of employment between attorney and client should not be entered into under such circumstances.
*461 The respondent, John M. Abramson, is hereby publicly reprimanded for such conduct. In addition he is hereby directed to pay to The Florida Bar the costs of these proceedings in the amount of $272.65 within thirty days from the date this order is filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court.
It is so ordered.
THORNAL, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS, O'CONNELL, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
[1]  The complaint was in two counts. Count #2 was abandoned by the Bar counsel at the hearing before the referee. This count charged:

"In addition to the personal solicitation above-mentioned, the respondent, John M. Abramson, solicited his professional employment by these same three persons through Dr. Albert Reinherz. It is further alleged that the said Dr. Reinherz insisted that the accident victims named above employ the respondent as their attorney. Upon their refusal to employ the respondent as their attorney, the said touter, Dr. Albert Reinherz, refused to treat these people for their injuries, which injuries were the only reason for their presence at Christian Hospital. Thereafter, because of Dr. Reinherz' refusal to treat them, the said persons left the premises and sought treatment, and were treated at Mount Sinai Hospital on Miami Beach."
[2]  See The Florida Bar v. Scott, Fla., 197 So. 2d 518, opinion filed April 5, 1967.