Title: In re Davenport
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47245
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2002

Filed: June 27, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re:  Complaint as to the Conduct of

JOHN P. DAVENPORT,
Accused.
(OSB 97-138; SC S47245)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted November 7, 2000.
	Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, argued
the cause and filed the request for review, briefs, and
additional authorities for the Oregon State Bar.
	Marc D. Blackman, Portland, argued the cause for the
accused.  With him on the brief and additional authorities was
Ransom Blackman LLP, Portland.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for two
years, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.	 
	Riggs, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, and
filed an opinion.
    *Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case;
Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate
in the decision of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (the Bar) alleged that lawyer John P. Davenport (the
accused) knowingly made several false statements under oath and
repeatedly asserted the lawyer-client privilege when he knew that
it did not apply, thereby violating Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly making false statement of law or fact in
representation of client); DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice); and DR 1-102(A)(2) (criminal act that
reflects adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness to practice law); as well as ORS 9.460(2) (conduct that
misleads court by false statement of fact) and ORS 9.527(4)
(Supreme Court may sanction lawyer for engaging in willful
deceit).  A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded that
the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS
9.460(2), and DR 1-102(A)(4), but not ORS 9.527(4) or DR 1-102(A)(2), and suspended him from the practice of law for six
months.  The Bar seeks review, asking this court to conclude that
the accused also violated ORS 9.527(4) and DR 1-102(A)(2), and to
impose a greater sanction.
		We review the trial panel's decision de novo, ORS
9.536(3); BR 10.6; however, we ordinarily give weight to the
trial panel's credibility findings, In re Trukositz, 312 Or 621,
629, 825 P2d 1369 (1992).  The Bar has the burden of establishing
the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2. 
"Clear and convincing evidence" means evidence establishing that
the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.  In re
Johnson, 300 Or 52, 55, 707 P2d 573 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
the Bar has met its burden respecting alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 1-102(A)(4), and DR 1-102(A)(2),
and suspend the accused from the practice of law for two years.
I.  FACTS
		The Bar's allegations are based solely upon responses
that the accused gave, while under oath, during a Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP) 2004 examination and a related civil
deposition.  We begin by setting out the relevant factual
background.
For several years, the Professional Liability Fund (the
PLF) (1) retained the accused and his firm to represent the PLF and
its insureds in legal malpractice cases.  Through the course of
that representation, the accused employed a defense strategy for
the PLF known as the "judgment acquisition strategy" (the
acquisition strategy). (2)  The acquisition strategy called for the
PLF to become a judgment creditor of the malpractice plaintiff by
purchasing an unpaid judgment against the plaintiff and then
executing on the judgment against the malpractice claim, thereby
forcing a sheriff's sale of that claim.  At the sale, the PLF
then would attempt to purchase the claim, and, if successful, the
PLF would have control over both sides of the malpractice case. 
In that position, the PLF ideally could dismiss the plaintiff's
case against its insured.
		The PLF wanted to keep secret its involvement in the
judgment purchases in such cases.  Consequently, the acquisition
strategy called for the PLF to purchase judgments in the name of
a shell corporation or secret partner.
The accused first implemented the acquisition strategy
for the PLF in 1991, in the Pranger matter.  In that case, the
accused, acting in the PLF's behalf, incorporated a shell
corporation, Westview Investors, Inc. (Westview), and purchased
an outstanding judgment against the plaintiff. (3)  The accused was
the incorporator and only officer, director, and shareholder of
Westview.  As such, he signed the articles of incorporation,
stock subscription, and state registration.  Using Westview as a
shell, the PLF ultimately was successful in "settling" the
Pranger matter.  In 1993, having no other need for Westview, the
accused let its corporate registration lapse.
		In July 1995, the PLF hired the accused to implement
the acquisition strategy against a malpractice claim filed by two
married couples, the Pearces and Woodfields (the plaintiff-debtors), against their bankruptcy lawyers and the lawyers' law
firm (the defendants).  The malpractice complaint alleged that
the defendants' professional negligence had prevented the
plaintiff-debtors from obtaining a full discharge through their
Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  The principal measure of damages was the
total amount of debt that went undischarged.
		At that time, the accused was the managing partner of
his law firm.  Because of his management duties, others in the
firm performed much of the substantive work necessary to
implement the acquisition strategy in the PLF's behalf on the
Pearce and Woodfield matter.  However, the accused maintained
ultimate control over the case.
		At the outset, the accused told the PLF that he was
concerned that the plaintiff-debtors' lawyers might discover the
acquisition strategy if the PLF again used Westview as the shell
corporation.  Nonetheless, with an impending trial date of August
23, 1995, the PLF needed to acquire the judgment quickly, and,
with no other suitable corporation available, Westview was
selected.  Consequently, the accused instructed his staff to
ascertain the corporate status of Westview and, if necessary, to
reinstate it.  The accused ultimately signed the reinstatement
documents, which reflected that he still was the president and
sole shareholder of Westview. 
		The accused next instructed a lawyer in his firm to
locate and to list any valid outstanding judgments against the
plaintiff-debtors.  The accused reviewed that list and had the
lawyer prepare a lengthy, detailed letter that outlined the
relevant legal issues and recommended that the PLF, using
Westview, purchase a 1987 Idaho judgment (the Wunsch judgment)
that was registered in Union County, Oregon.  After reviewing the
draft letter and making some changes, the accused signed the
letter in July 1995 and sent it to the PLF.  
		The PLF agreed with the accused's recommendation and
instructed the accused to negotiate a purchase of the Wunsch
judgment.  Using $85,000 that the PLF had provided, an associate
in the accused's firm purchased an assignment of the judgment on
August 2, 1995, and arranged to have Westview substituted as the
named creditor.  At that time, the accused was on vacation, and
another partner in the firm oversaw the purchase.  The accused,
however, stayed in touch with the partner about the case.
 		With the malpractice trial a few weeks away, lawyers at
the accused's firm immediately began efforts to execute on
Westview's newly acquired judgment against the plaintiff-debtors'
malpractice claim.  Those efforts resulted in the scheduling of a
sheriff's sale of the malpractice claim for August 21, 1995 --
two days before the malpractice trial date.  The plaintiff-debtors responded by seeking an order from the bankruptcy court
to enjoin Westview's collection activities and to prevent the
sale.  The accused appeared at a hearing on that motion as the
lawyer for Westview.
		On August 18, 1995, the bankruptcy court granted the
plaintiff-debtors' motion to enjoin the sale and tentatively
ruled that the malpractice claim was an asset of the plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy estates.  The court also reopened the
bankruptcy estates, appointed a trustee for both estates, and
appointed counsel for the trustee.  The court ordered the trustee
to obtain approval of further settlement offers from the
plaintiff-debtors or their lawyers, unless otherwise ordered. 
The court also appointed Greene, who was representing the
plaintiff-debtors in their malpractice case, as additional
counsel to the trustee.
		On the eve of the malpractice trial, the malpractice
defendants and the plaintiff-debtors reached a tentative
settlement agreement.  That agreement required the plaintiff-debtors, with the trustee's assistance, to contact their
creditors and negotiate a tentative settlement of all outstanding
claims.  After estimating the value of the remaining claims, the
parties then would try to settle the malpractice case for an
amount close to that value.  If a final settlement did not occur
by spring, then, under the agreement, the malpractice trial would
commence in April 1996.
		In August and September 1995, the trustee issued
notices to all the creditors, stating that the bankruptcy estates
had been reopened and that creditors must file proofs of claim by
December 1, 1995.  The accused received such a notice and filed
such a claim for Westview, totaling more than $99,500, in
November 1995.
Sometime before January 1996, the trustee's counsel,
together with the plaintiff-debtors' lawyers, began investigating
Westview's claim to determine if they could limit its value or
avoid it altogether.  Initially, they thought that the claim
might be invalid because the Wunsches had filed a seemingly
duplicative claim against the bankruptcy estates.  In addition,
they had discovered that the accused was the president of
Westview and thought that that fact might provide grounds to
challenge the claim on the basis of illegality. (4)
		On January 11, 1996, the lawyers for the plaintiff-debtors and the trustee collectively decided that the trustee's
counsel would schedule an FRBP 2004 examination (the
examination).  On that date, those lawyers also discussed the
possibility that the PLF somehow might be involved with Westview.
At some point, the lawyers also decided that Greene, in his
capacity as additional counsel to the trustee, would examine
Westview's representative to obtain the information necessary to
challenge Westview's claim.  The trustee's counsel contacted the
accused to schedule that examination and told the accused that
the examination would address the validity of Westview's claim;
however, he did not mention to the accused any specific theories
in respect of challenging the judgment.  The accused agreed to a
January 26, 1996, examination date.
		On January 26, 1996, the examination was held in the
accused's office.  The accused appeared at the examination as
Westview's lawyer.  Greene questioned the accused, under oath,
about Westview's structure, ownership, and business activities. 
Greene also asked how and when Westview had learned about the
Wunsch judgment, and when the accused first had learned about the
malpractice claim. 
	 	The accused had spent little time preparing for the
examination and was surprised that Greene, whom he knew to
represent the plaintiff-debtors in their malpractice claim, was
conducting the examination.  The accused quickly became concerned
that Greene's questions were leading to, and ultimately would
uncover, the connection between the PLF and Westview.  
At the beginning of the examination, the accused argued
with Greene over the relevance of his questions.  The accused
also answered several questions by stating that he either did not
know or could not remember the answers to questions without
checking Westview's records.  When told that he could take a
moment to review documents to help him answer the questions, the
accused refused to do so.  The accused also claimed lawyer-client
privilege in response to a number of questions about Westview's
structure and business activities, and its purchase of the Wunsch
judgment. (5)
		Following the examination, the accused told the PLF
that he thought that Greene's questions had been directed at
discovering the PLF's connection to Westview, but that his
responses had not disclosed the PLF's involvement.  On February
19, 1996, the trustee's counsel filed a motion to compel the
accused to answer the questions.  In response, the PLF hired
counsel to represent the accused.  The accused's lawyers
contacted the trustee's counsel and Greene, and requested that
the motion be withdrawn in exchange for answers to the questions. 
The trustee's counsel and Greene agreed.
		In February 1996, the accused's lawyers reviewed the
examination transcript, searched Westview's files for answers to
the questions concerning Westview, analyzed the accused's
assertion of the lawyer-client privilege, consulted with the PLF
on what to disclose, and ultimately recommended that the accused
change 42 of his answers.  The accused agreed and submitted a
signed correction sheet on February 21, 1996.  In one of his
corrections, the accused indicated that he had had discussions
with the PLF respecting the amount that Westview had paid for the
Wunsch judgment.
The accused's changes prompted Greene to reconvene the
examination on March 1, 1996.  At that examination, the accused
again claimed a lack of knowledge about some of the particulars
respecting his awareness of the Pearce and Woodfield bankruptcy
estates.  However, his answers about other aspects of Westview's
claim, as well as documentation that he had provided in response
to a subpoena duces tecum, revealed the connection between the
PLF and Westview, and details of the PLF's overall acquisition
strategy.  Following that examination, on March 6, 1996, Greene
deposed the accused in connection with the malpractice action. (6) 
In December 1996, Greene filed a complaint with the
Bar, alleging, among other things, that the accused had engaged
in ethical misconduct during the examination and the civil
deposition. (7)  Specifically, Greene claimed that the accused had
been untruthful about his lack of knowledge and had misused the
lawyer-client privilege to conceal the truth.  In January 1998,
following an investigation, the Bar filed a formal complaint; it
later filed an amended complaint in August 1998.
		In November 1999, after a hearing, the trial panel
found that the accused knowingly had misrepresented the truth
during the examination and, therefore, concluded that he had
violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and ORS 9.460(2).  In
addition, the trial panel concluded that those
misrepresentations, together with the accused's assertion of
lawyer-client privilege, also violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  However,
the trial panel concluded that the accused did not violate ORS
9.527(4) because his actions were not willful.  The trial panel
also concluded that the accused did not violate DR 1-102(A)(2)
because he corrected his misrepresentations within the time
allowed by law and, in the trial panel's view, the
misrepresentations at issue were not material to the examination. 
The trial panel concluded that the proper sanction was a six-month suspension.
		The Bar petitioned for review and now asks this court
to conclude that the accused also violated ORS 9.527(4) and DR 1-102(A)(2), and to impose a greater sanction.  In response, the
accused argues that he did not engage in misrepresentation, that
he properly asserted the lawyer-client privilege, and that,
therefore, he did not violate the rules as the Bar alleges.  We
address each alleged rule violation in turn.
II.  ANALYSIS
A.	DR 1-102(A)(3)
		DR 1-102(A)(3) provides:
		  "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
* * * [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation[.]"
That rule embodies acts that involve any one of four distinct
characteristics:  dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.  See In re Leonard, 308 Or 560, 569, 784 P2d
95 (1989) (so explaining).  Here, the Bar apparently proceeds
under a theory of affirmative misrepresentation.  See In re
Hiller, 298 Or 526, 532, 694 P2d 540 (1985) (misrepresentation
includes affirmative misstatement and intentional failure to
disclose material facts). (8)
		To violate DR 1-102(A)(3), an accused lawyer's
misrepresentation, "whether direct or by omission, must be
knowing, false, and material in the sense that the
misrepresentation[] would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process."  In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 53,
36 P3d 468 (2001).  When considering whether a lawyer has made an
affirmative misstatement, our inquiry focuses upon the truth or
falsity of the facts asserted.  In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 216,
13 P3d 994 (2000).
		The Bar contends that the accused made 21 affirmative
misstatements during the examination and the civil deposition. 
Specifically, the Bar asserts that the accused made the following
statements, knowing them to be false:
	(1)	he was not an officer of Westview; 
	(2)	he did not know, without reviewing his file,
whether he ever had been an officer of Westview;
	(3)	he did not remember which officer of Westview he
might have been;
	(4)	he did not believe that he ever had been a
shareholder of Westview;
	(5)	he did not know, without checking his records,
whether he ever had been a director of Westview;
	(6)	he did not know whether Westview had lawyers other
than his law firm;
	(7)	he did not know, without checking his records, who
were the directors of Westview;
	(8)	he did not know, without checking his records, who
were the officers of Westview;
	(9)	he did not know, without checking his records,
when Westview first was incorporated;
	(10)	he did not remember being involved in the
reinstatement of Westview as a corporation;
	(11)	he did not know where Westview's principal place
of business was located;
	(12)	he did not know, without checking his records,
whether he was an officer of Westview when he
signed a proof of claim in the reopened bankruptcy
estates in Westview's behalf in or about November
1995;
	(13)	he did not know, without checking his records,
whether he was a director of Westview in or about
November 1995;
	(14)	he did not know how Westview had learned about the
Wunsch judgment;
	(15)	he did not have any recollection of how he had
learned about the Wunsch judgment;
	(16)	he did not know when he first had learned about
the malpractice case;
	(17)	he did not know whether his law firm was a
shareholder of Westview;
	(18)	he did not recall whether any spouse of any
employee or lawyer in his law firm was a
shareholder in Westview;
	(19)	he did not know how he had learned about the
bankruptcy schedules in which the Wunsch judgment
had been listed;
	(20)	he did not know who had told him that the
plaintiff-debtors had filed bankruptcy; and
(21)	he had not communicated with the lawyer who
represented the malpractice defendants about the
execution on the judgment. (9)
		The accused contends that most of the responses that he
gave were factually correct.  The accused argues that, because he
had thought that the examination would focus upon only the
assignment of the Wunsch judgment, he had not reviewed Westview's
corporate records and, therefore, honestly could not remember the
exact details of Westview's ownership, management, or legal
representation.  He further asserts that other lawyers in his law
firm had been in charge of Westview's reinstatement and other
corporate work, and that he had not participated actively in
implementing the acquisition strategy because he was the "big
picture" person.  In addition, the accused claims that, when he
attended the examination, he honestly thought that he originally
had formed Westview to be an estate-planning vehicle and that his
answers pertaining to its incorporation were consistent with that
recollection.  As such, he claims that his responses of "I don't
know" or "I can't remember," and particularly those answers in
which he spoke of a need to review certain records, were not
misrepresentations.  
		The accused admits that he was the president of
Westview at the time of the examination and that his response to
the question respecting that matter was factually inaccurate. 
Nonetheless, the accused contends that, for the same reasons that
he could not remember the information sought by the other
questions, he honestly had not known that he was Westview's
president at that time.  The accused further contends that his
response during the civil deposition denying any discussions with
the lawyer representing the malpractice defendants was not a
misrepresentation because it was factually correct.
		The trial panel found that the accused's explanations
for his responses at the examination were not credible.  The
trial panel concluded that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) in
his responses respecting:  (1) his involvement in Westview's
reinstatement; (2) Westview's location; (3) the manner in which
Westview had learned about the Wunsch judgment; and (4) the
manner in which the accused had learned about the Wunsch
judgment.  The trial panel did not make findings on the other
alleged misrepresentations.
Having reviewed the record, and giving weight to the
trial panel's credibility determinations, we adopt the trial
panel's findings respecting those matters, with the exception of
the accused's answer respecting Westview's location. (10)  See BR
10.6 (after "consider[ing] each matter de novo upon the record,"
court may adopt any part of trial panel's decision).  As the
trial panel noted: 
	"The accused was the architect of the asset acquisition
strategy.  He created Westview.  He ordered its
reinstatement in July 1995 and signed the reinstatement
documents.  He also discussed at that time with the PLF
the risks of using Westview at all.  The accused chose
the judgment most appropriate to purchase.  He reviewed
and signed a letter to the PLF explaining what
judgments were available and which was the most
appropriate to purchase.  The evidence shows the
accused was very involved in using a strategy seldom
employed * * * in an important case that came to him in
a state of crisis from an important client. 
Significantly, the accused worried from the beginning
about Westview being discovered for what it really was
and he considered it very important that the identity
of the PLF be kept secret in order for this expensive
and risky strategy to succeed."
The accused's responses respecting Westview's reinstatement
(response #10) and the manner in which Westview and he personally
had discovered the Wunsch judgment (responses #14 and #15)
violated DR 1-102(A)(3):  The accused made those statements
knowing that they were false, and those statements were material
in that they could have influenced the decision-making process
respecting the validity of Westview's claim in the plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy estates.  The foregoing further supports the
conclusion that two more of the accused's statements, namely,
that he did not know when he first had learned about the
malpractice case (response #16) or how he had learned about the
plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy schedules (response #19), also
violated DR 1-102(A)(3). (11)
As an additional defense to the Bar's charges under DR
1-102(A)(3), the accused argues that, even if some of his initial
answers at the January 26, 1996, examination were false, he
nonetheless did not violate DR 1-102(A)(3) because he corrected
those responses within the time and in the manner provided by law
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 30(e). (12)  We
disagree.  In respect of those false answers that the accused
corrected, (13) his corrections did not cure his initial
misrepresentations.  Regardless of the permissibility of
transcript correction for litigation purposes, it does not matter
under DR 1-102(A)(3) whether a lawyer later changes an
affirmative misstatement if, when it was made, the lawyer knew
that it was false.  See generally In re Wyllie, 327 Or 175, 180,
957 P2d 1222 (1998) (rejecting lawyer's argument that later
corrections "cured" earlier misrepresentation); cf. In re
Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 649, 968 P2d 367 (1998) (once lawyer
intentionally has failed to disclose material facts, when lawyer
had those facts in mind, misrepresentation has occurred).  The
accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
B.	DR 7-102(A)(5)
		DR 7-102(A)(5) provides, in part:  
		"In the lawyer's representation of a client * * *,
a lawyer shall not * * * [k]nowingly make a false
statement of law or fact."
The primary difference between DR 7-102(A)(5) and DR 1-102(A)(3)
is that the former requires, as applicable here, that the
lawyer's false statement occur in the context of the lawyer's
representation of a client.  It is undisputed that the accused
appeared at the examination in behalf of his client, the PLF. 
For the same reasons that we concluded that the accused violated
DR 1-102(A)(3), we also conclude that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(5).
C.	ORS 9.460(2) and ORS 9.527(4)
		In addition to the foregoing disciplinary rule
violations, the Bar also charged the accused with violating ORS
9.460(2) and ORS 9.527(4), based upon his false statements.  ORS
9.460(2) provides that a lawyer shall "[e]mploy, for the purpose
of maintaining the causes confided to the [lawyer], such means
only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to mislead the
court or jury by any artifice or false statement of law or
fact[.]"  ORS 9.527(4) provides, in part, that "[t]he Supreme
Court may disbar, suspend or reprimand a member of the bar
whenever * * * it appears to the court that * * * [t]he member is
guilty of willful deceit * * *."
		In effect, ORS 9.460(2) and ORS 9.527(4) operate to
prohibit lawyers from making false statements, similar to DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5).  Recently, this court observed that
a determination that the same conduct has given rise to
violations of both a disciplinary rule and an applicable statute
"generally has not served to enhance the sanction that this court
has imposed for the violation or violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."  In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487, 31
P3d 414 (2001).  Because the Bar bases its statutory allegations
upon the same conduct that we already have concluded violated DR
1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5), and a decision respecting the
accused's conduct as to those statutes would not alter the nature
or extent of any sanction in this proceeding, we decline to
address whether the accused's conduct violated either ORS
9.460(2) or ORS 9.527(4).
D.	DR 1-102(A)(4)
		DR 1-102(A)(4) provides:  
	"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to   
* * * [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]"  
In assessing an alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), we first
must determine "whether [the] accused lawyer engaged in
'conduct,' by doing something that the lawyer should not have
done or by failing to do something that the lawyer was supposed
to do."  Gustafson, 327 Or at 643.  Second, we must determine
"whether that conduct occurred during the 'administration of
justice.'"  Id.  Finally, we must consider "the 'prejudice'
arising from the lawyer's conduct."  Id.
		The Bar alleges two violations of DR 1-102(A)(4). 
First, the Bar contends that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4)
by making false statements.  Second, the Bar contends that the
accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by asserting the lawyer-client
privilege when it did not apply.  As explained below, because we
agree with the Bar's first contention, we need not address its
second contention.
		As to the Bar's first contention, respecting false
statements under oath, it is fundamental that a lawyer who is
placed under oath to tell the truth has a duty to do so.  In re
Reuben G. Lenske, 269 Or 146, 168, 523 P2d 1262 (1974), cert den
420 US 908 (1975).  False statements or misrepresentations made
knowingly and in conjunction with a court proceeding violate DR
1-102(A)(4).  See Gustafson, 327 Or at 652 (so demonstrating). 
We already have concluded, in the context of DR 1-102(A)(3), that
the accused knowingly made several false statements.  By making
false statements under oath, the accused also violated DR
1-102(A)(4).
		As to the Bar's second contention, respecting allegedly 
erroneous assertion of the lawyer-client privilege, we have
determined that, in light of our conclusion that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by making false statements under oath,
any discussion respecting erroneous assertion of lawyer-client
privilege would not affect our determination of the appropriate
sanction.  Accordingly, we do not address that part of the Bar's
argument under DR 1-102(A)(4).
E.	DR 1-102(A)(2)
		DR 1-102(A)(2) provides:
	"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to   
* * *[c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law[.]"
	1.	Criminal Act
		A charge under DR 1-102(A)(2) first requires this court
to determine "what 'criminal act' the accused committed."  In re
Allen, 326 Or 107, 120-21, 949 P2d 710 (1997).  The Bar suggests
that the accused's false statements constituted the crimes of
perjury under ORS 162.065 and false swearing under ORS 162.075,
and the crimes of making a false oath or statement in a
bankruptcy proceeding under 18 USC section 152, perjury under 18
USC section 1621, and making a false declaration ancillary to a
court proceeding under 18 USC section 1623.
		Although the Oregon statutes referred to above do not
limit their application expressly to any certain proceeding, the
United States Supreme Court has held that giving false testimony
in a proceeding authorized by federal law is a crime against the
United States and that state courts therefore cannot assume
jurisdiction.  Caha v. United States, 152 US 211, 215, 14 S Ct
513, 38 L Ed 415 (1894).  Because the accused made his
misrepresentations in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, we will
not decide whether his conduct constituted a crime under Oregon
law. (14)
		Turning to the federal statutes that the Bar cites, all
essentially require proof of a false, material statement in a
covered proceeding.  18 USC §§ 1621, 152, 1623.  The primary
difference among the statutes, for our purposes here, is the
requisite criminal intent.  Perjury under 18 USC section 1621
requires proof of a willfully made false, material statement. 
See Smith v. United States, 392 F2d 169, 170 (5th Cir 1968)
(willfulness is essential element of perjury under 18 USC section
1621).  Similarly, the crime of making a false oath or statement
in a bankruptcy proceeding under 18 USC section 152 requires
proof of a specific fraudulent intent.  See United States v.
Mathies, 350 F2d 963, 967 (3rd Cir 1965) (essential element of 18
USC section 152 is that false oath be made with fraudulent
intent).  By contrast, the crime of making a false declaration
under 18 USC section 1623 requires proof of only a knowingly
made, false, material statement.  See United States v. Watson,
623 F2d 1198, 1207 (7th Cir 1980) (so stating).  After reviewing
the record, we cannot say that the Bar has met the quantum of
proof required under 18 USC sections 1621 or 152.  We turn to an
examination of the remaining criminal statute, 18 USC section
1623.
As noted, under 18 USC section 1623, it is a crime for
any person, under oath, in any proceeding before or ancillary to
any court of the United States, knowingly to make a false,
material declaration. (15)  The parties agree that the accused was
under oath at the time of the conduct in question and that the
examination qualifies as an ancillary proceeding.  Cf. U.S. v.
McAfee, 8 F3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir 1993) (sworn civil
deposition is ancillary proceeding for purposes of 18 USC section
1623).  We already have concluded, in the context of DR 1-102(A)(3), that the accused knowingly made several false
statements during the course of the examination.  The remaining
question is whether the accused's false statements were material,
for purposes of 18 USC section 1623.
		Materiality has been interpreted rather broadly under
18 USC section 1623.  A statement is material if it is related to
any proper matter of inquiry.  United States v. Ostertag, 671 F2d
262, 264 (8th Cir 1982).  However, a statement cannot be
considered material unless it is "capable of influencing the
tribunal on the issue before it."  United States v. Bell, 623 F2d
1132, 1134-35 (5th Cir 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In the context of a deposition or similar examination, the Ninth
Circuit generally has concluded that a false declaration is
material under 18 USC section 1623 if a truthful answer "is
relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration" and the
false declaration had a "natural tendency to influence, or was
capable of influencing," the decision-making body to which it was
addressed.  See U.S. v. Clark, 918 F2d 843, 846 (9th Cir 1990)
(setting out that standard under 18 USC section 1621, for
purposes of civil deposition), overruled on other grounds by U.S.
v. Keys, 95 F3d 874 (9th Cir 1996); United States v. Rahman, Nos
91-10364, 91-10365, 91-10376, 91-10416, 1992, WL 36372 at *3 (9th
Cir Dec 9 1992) (applying Clark to deposition for purposes of 18
USC section 1623).
		Here, the trial panel concluded that the accused's
statements were not material to the examination.  We disagree. 
As the Bar notes, the scope of an FRBP 2004 examination is broad
and may relate "to any matter which may affect the administration
of the debtor's estate."  FRBP 2004(b).  The accused's false
statements responded to questions that were directed at
determining:  (1) whether Westview's proof of claim, which the
accused had filed only two months before, was subject to
challenge upon grounds of illegality; and (2) whether Westview
had filed a duplicative proof of claim.  Those matters were
within the scope of the examination and were capable of
influencing the decision-making process, because they had the
potential of preventing the trustee's lawyers from ascertaining
the validity of Westview's claim against the plaintiff-debtors'
bankruptcy estates.  Consequently, we conclude that the accused's
knowing false statements were material to the examination.
		The accused argues that, even if he is found knowingly
to have made false, material declarations, he is protected by the
recantation defense set out in 18 USC section 1623(d), which
provides, in part: 
		"Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury
proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person
making the declaration admits such declaration to be
false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this
section * * *."
According to the accused, under that provision, he did not commit
a criminal act, because he corrected his testimony within the
time allowed by law.  The accused's argument fails, however,
because 18 USC section 1623(d) expressly requires that the
accused have "admit[ted] such declaration[s] to be false" at the
time when he corrected his testimony.  See also U.S. v. Tobias,
863 F2d 685, 689 (9th Cir 1988) (recantation requires unequivocal
repudiation of prior testimony).  Here, the accused consistently
has maintained that he did not knowingly make false statements. 
That is not a recantation. (16)  We therefore conclude that the
accused engaged in a criminal act as defined by 18 USC section
1623.
	2.	Fitness To Practice Law
		Our next inquiry under DR 1-102(A)(2) is whether the
accused's criminal act adversely reflects upon the accused's
"fitness to practice law."  "There must be some rational
connection other than the criminality of the act between the
conduct and the actor's fitness to practice law."  In re White,
311 Or 573, 589, 815 P2d 1257 (1991).  White identified a number
of "[p]ertinent considerations" in determining whether a criminal
act adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law:
	"[T]he lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the
act demonstrates disrespect for the law or law
enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim; the
extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and
the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal
conduct." 
Id.  Applying those factors, the accused demonstrated a
"disrespect for the law" when he knowingly made several false
statements after taking an oath not to do so.  In addition, the
accused's misrepresentations under oath resulted in both
potential injury to the legal system, by undermining the public's
trust and confidence in lawyers, and actual injury to the
plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy estates, which were required to
incur greater expense in conducting the follow-up examination. 
The accused's acts directly reflected upon his fitness to
practice law.  Therefore, we conclude that he violated DR
1-102(A)(2).	 
F.	Summary
		In sum, we conclude that the accused engaged in
misrepresentation on a number of occasions, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), and also violated DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 1-102(A)(4), and
DR 1-102(A)(2).  We now turn to the issue of sanction.
III.  SANCTION

		This court follows a well-established methodology in
determining the appropriate sanction for violations of the
disciplinary rules.  See In re Wittemyer, 328 Or 448, 459-61, 980
P2d 148 (1999) (preliminarily determining sanction after
reviewing duty violated, mental state, and injury; noting that
sanction may be adjusted based upon aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and court's case law).  Consistent with that
methodology, we refer to the American Bar Association's Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA
Standards) and Oregon case law.
A.	Duty Violated
		When the accused committed a criminal act that
reflected adversely upon his fitness to practice law and engaged
in conduct involving misrepresentation, he violated his duty to
the public to maintain his personal integrity.  ABA Standard 5.1. 
He also violated his duty to the legal system to refrain from
making a false statement in connection with a court proceeding
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.  ABA Standard 6.1
B.	Mental State
	An act is intentional if it is engaged in with "the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 7.  For the reasons discussed earlier,
we conclude that the accused acted intentionally respecting his
misrepresentations. (17)
C.	Injury Sustained
"[A]n injury need not be actual, but only potential, in
order to support the imposition of a sanction."  In re Williams,
314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992).  The accused's conduct
caused both actual and potential injury.  The accused's
misrepresentations caused potential injury to the legal system. 
The public's confidence in the integrity of the law is undermined
if lawyers reject its rules and application.  See generally In re
Barber, 322 Or 194, 212, 904 P2d 620 (1995) (lawyer who misled
court and made false written statement caused potential injury to
public confidence in legal profession).  The accused's conduct
also caused actual injury to the plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy
estates.  As noted, had he answered truthfully at the outset, the
estates would not have incurred the additional time and expense
of conducting the follow-up examination.  However, we think it
important to note that, by taking the opportunity -- as he
legally was permitted, but not required, to do for purposes of
the examination -- to correct all but one of his misstatements,
the accused significantly reduced the injury to the legal system
and the bankruptcy estates that otherwise might have flowed from
his initial misrepresentations. (18)
D.	Preliminary Determination of Sanction   
		Under the foregoing considerations, the ABA Standards
suggest that disbarment would be the appropriate sanction.  See
ABA Standard 5.11(a) (disbarment generally appropriate when
lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct in which false
swearing is necessary element).  To decide the appropriate
sanction here, we turn to the applicable aggravating and
mitigating factors, and to this court's case law.  
E.	Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
		The Bar submits that several aggravating factors are
present:  dishonest motive, ABA Standard 9.22(b); a pattern of
misconduct, ABA Standard 9.22(c); multiple offenses, ABA Standard
9.22(d); refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
conduct, ABA Standard 9.22(g); and substantial experience in the
practice of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i).  We agree that the
accused's conduct resulted in multiple rule violations and that
the accused had substantial experience in the practice of law at
the time of those violations.  We also agree -- contrary to the
trial panel's conclusion -- that the accused acted with a
dishonest motive.  Although the accused's motive was not selfish
(in that he did not engage in misconduct for any personal gain),
it was dishonest, because he acted to conceal the truth from
opposing counsel.  See generally In re Dinerman, 314 Or 308, 318,
840 P2d 50 (1992) (applying ABA Standard 9.22(b) when lawyer's
actions in client's interest amounted to misrepresentations aimed
at circumventing banking laws).
		We reject, however, the Bar's contention that the
accused engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  Although he made
several misrepresentations, they were made in the same proceeding
and pertained to the same subject.  Additionally, although the
accused consistently has maintained his factual innocence on
those matters, we hold that his refusal to admit to the Bar's
factual allegations is not an aggravating factor.  See generally
The Florida Bar v. Corbin, 701 So 2d 334, 337 n 2 (Fla 1997)
(lawyer's claim of factual innocence could not be used against
him as aggravating factor).  To invoke ABA Standard 9.22(g), the
Bar must point to some other evidence, aside from an accused
lawyer's refusal to concede the Bar's factual allegations, to
support a finding that the lawyer has refused to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his or her conduct.  See In re Devers, 328 Or
230, 243, 974 P2d 191 (1999) (refusal to acknowledge wrongful
nature of conduct evidenced by repetition of similar misconduct);
see also In the matter of Lemmons, 545 SE 2d 885, 886 (Ga 2001)
(same).  Put differently:  Every lawyer should have the
opportunity to defend against accusations respecting his or her
personal character and professional responsibility without
reprisal for doing so.
		In mitigation, we note that the accused has no previous
record of discipline.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).  In addition, the
Bar concedes that the accused cooperated in its investigation. 
ABA Standard 9.32(e). 
F.	Case Law
		We turn to consideration of this court's case law. 
This court considers false swearing under oath to be a serious
violation:
	"Of all possible acts, few are so antagonistic to the
business of judicial administration as the intentional
false swearing which seeks to baffle the search for
truth, without which justice is impossible.  Such
swearing is a flagrant insult to the dignity of the
court."  
In re Moynihan, 166 Or 200, 224, 111 P2d 96 (1941) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).  See also In re William
J. Sundstrom, 250 Or 404, 409, 442 P2d 604 (1968) (falsely
testifying under oath is among most serious charges that can be
made against lawyer).  Indeed, as discussed below, this court's
case law demonstrates that disbarment or a lengthy suspension
generally is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or knowingly
makes false statements under oath.  		
		For example, in Moynihan, 166 Or 200, this court
imposed a three-year suspension upon a lawyer who had offered
false testimony in a foreclosure hearing instituted against his
former clients and later had submitted an affidavit reiterating
that testimony.  The court concluded that the lawyer had acted
knowingly and intentionally, and with intent to mislead and
deceive the trial court.  Id. at 220-21.  The court further
concluded the accused was guilty of "false swearing," which the
court deemed "reprehensible."  Id. at 224.  The court tentatively
concluded that disbarment might be appropriate, but ultimately
imposed a three-year suspension, in light of the lawyer's lack of
a disciplinary record and a three-year delay that had occurred in
the proceedings below.  Id. at 224-26.
		Similarly, in Sundstrom, 250 Or 404, this court imposed
a five-year suspension upon a lawyer who had offered false and
willfully deceitful testimony before the trial committee in the
Bar proceeding, in addition to commingling client funds and using
those funds for his own purposes.  In discussing the appropriate
sanction, the court stated:
	"The misappropriation of clients' funds and
testifying falsely under oath are among the most
serious charges that can be made against a member of
the legal profession.  Were he an applicant for
admission to the Bar it could not be said that he has
the requisite moral character and general fitness to
practice law in this state.  We are of the opinion that
the two years' suspension recommended by the Board of
Governors does not adequately reflect the gravity of
the offenses of which the accused stands convicted. 
Permanent disbarment is justified, but a longer term of
suspension may serve the same ends and yet leave to the
accused the prospect that after rehabilitation he may
be able to re-enter his profession."
Id. at 409 (emphasis added).  See also In re Walter E.
Hutchinson, 215 Or 36, 332 P2d 637 (1958) (disbarring lawyer who
engaged in unprofessional misconduct by committing perjury,
deemed to be misdemeanor involving moral turpitude).
		More recently, in In re Staar, 324 Or 283, 924 P2d 308
(1996), this court imposed a two-year suspension upon a lawyer
who, in addition to failing to cooperate with the Bar, engaged in
misrepresentation and knowingly made false statements of fact
under oath, resulting in prejudice to the administration of
justice.  In that case, the lawyer falsely had alleged under oath
in a petition for a restraining order that she had been abused by
a man with whom she had lived.  In determining the appropriate
sanction, the court noted that the lawyer's misconduct had caused
actual and potential injury to the man named in the petition. 
Id. at 291.  The court also found the existence of one
aggravating factor (failure to cooperate) and two mitigating
factors (absence of disciplinary record and presence of mental
disability or impairment at the time of the misconduct).  Id. at
291-92.  The court emphasized that, had it not been for the
accused lawyer's mental disability or impairment, the court would
have disbarred her.  Id. at 292.  See also In re Gustafson, 333
Or 468, 41 P3d 1063 (2002) (disbarring lawyer who, among other
violations arising from same course of conduct, knowingly made
false statement of fact before tribunal and engaged in criminal
act that adversely reflected upon fitness to practice; only
aggravating factor of note was substantial experience in practice
of law; no mitigating factors).
		As can be seen from the foregoing, either disbarment or
a lengthy suspension generally is appropriate in cases involving
false statements under oath.  We note that one relatively recent
case, Dinerman, 314 Or 308, appears to depart from that pattern. 
The accused lawyer in Dinerman had participated in a scheme that
his client and a bank manager had devised, whereby the lawyer had
served as a "straw man" in taking out a bank loan in his client's
behalf, thereby allowing the client to circumvent federal loan
limits and banking laws.  The lawyer also had made a false
statement on the loan application respecting ownership of the
property offered for security for the loan.  The court concluded
that the lawyer had engaged in illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude (citing federal banking laws), misrepresentation (both
in seeking the loan and in misrepresenting ownership of certain
property), and knowingly assisting his client in illegal or
fraudulent conduct.  Id. at 313-17.  The court applied two
aggravating factors (dishonest motive and, at least at one point,
refusing to accept responsibility for the misconduct) and a
number of mitigating factors (cooperative attitude, remorse, and
good character and reputation).  Id. at 318.  The court also
explained that 10 years had passed since the lawyer's misconduct
and that the lawyer had had no additional disciplinary
violations, which "reflect[ed] positively on his fitness to
practice law."  Id. at 319.  The court ultimately imposed a 63-day suspension, citing other cases that involved
misrepresentation or dishonest conduct.  Id.
		In our view, Dinerman is distinguishable from the facts
here.  First, and most significantly, although it involved
misrepresentations and criminal conduct, Dinerman did not involve
false swearing under oath; indeed, the court did not rely upon
any case law involving false swearing in determining the
appropriate sanction.  Second, the court emphasized in Dinerman
that the absence of any disciplinary violations on the lawyer's
part during the 10-year delay in the proceedings positively
reflected upon his fitness to practice.  Finally, Dinerman
involved a number of mitigating factors that appear to have
outweighed the few aggravating factors.
G.	Appropriate Sanction
		On balance, this proceeding most closely resembles
Moynihan, which, together with most of the other case law
discussed above, suggests that a lengthy suspension is in order
here.  We have concluded that the accused acted intentionally and
with a dishonest motive, and that two additional aggravating
factors, as well as two mitigating factors, apply.  In Moynihan,
the court similarly concluded that the accused lawyer had acted
intentionally and dishonestly; the court also applied two
mitigating factors.  However, by contrast to Moynihan, wherein
the accused lawyer actively had reiterated his false testimony to
a court, the accused here took steps to correct most of his false
statements, for purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings, thereby
significantly reducing the potential and actual injury that
otherwise might have flowed from those statements.  In light of
that distinction, we conclude that a two-year suspension is
appropriate in this proceeding.
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
two years, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.
	RIGGS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
	Although I agree with the majority's finding that the
accused's conduct violated various disciplinary rules, I disagree
with the sanction and would impose a six-month suspension,
consistent with the trial panel's decision and recommendation.
	It is worth observing that this case arises under
somewhat unique circumstances in an atmosphere in which the PLF
and the Bar find themselves subjected to extensive media coverage
with heavy public criticism and a drumbeat for "corrective
action."  I write because I am troubled by what I consider to be
a very peculiar and difficult role for lawyers who are counsel to
the Professional Liability Fund (PLF) and because I believe the
trial panel's sanction was supported by the record before us.
	The majority opinion notes that the accused's
participation in the acquisition strategy is not at issue in this
proceeding.  In the sense meant by the majority, that is true. 
But the relationship of the accused to the PLF and the situation
the PLF finds itself in is the source of much of the mischief
here.  In fact, the PLF's acquisition strategy, used in the
underlying transaction here, is a relatively common strategy
among insurers.  That strategy, distasteful and untidy as it
seems in these circumstances, is nevertheless legal.  Although
the PLF was designed, in part, to provide a resource for the
public to facilitate recovery for the mistakes of the practicing
bar, it was and is, in effect, an insurance company that receives
mandatory premiums from Oregon lawyers.  In that schizophrenic
role, the PLF should be expected to serve its "policy holders" in
a businesslike, if not fiduciary, fashion.  Since PLF premiums
largely are based on claims experience as a major factor of the
cost of doing business, it follows that accepted and reasonable
insurance defense strategies designed to preserve the fisc are
appropriate.  Because preserving the fisc occasionally may be at
odds with the so-called "public responsibility" aspect of the
PLF's functions, the PLF may be forced to choose, like some
companies in the insurance marketplace sometimes do, to ignore a
moral compass.
	Here, what the accused did clearly was wrong.  He is
not a simple scapegoat.  However, I read this record to suggest
strongly that he was motivated exclusively by a desire to protect
his client (the PLF) in carrying out an unfortunate, but legal,
insurance defense strategy that depended on secrecy and stealth. 
The majority correctly points out that a dishonest motive can
exist even when a motive of personal selfish gain is not present. 
Nonetheless, as the trial panel noted, personal selfish gain is
absent here and, for me, when we consider sanctions, that is very
significant.
	The majority opinion accurately analyzes the accused's
record as a bar member.  He has no prior bar disciplinary
history.  Indeed, the record before us indicates nothing but
years of honorable practice as a senior partner in a
distinguished law firm.  Moreover, as the Bar concedes, the
accused cooperated fully with the Bar's investigation.  With that
history in mind, and in the context of the circumstances present
here, I would accept the trial panel's sanction recommendation of
a six-month suspension.  
	For those reasons, I respectfully concur with the
majority opinion on guilt and dissent insofar as the majority's 
sanction is concerned.  


1.      	The PLF is a lawyers' professional liability insurance
fund that the Bar established under ORS 9.080(2) and ORS
9.191(3).

2.      	The PLF had used that strategy on at least one occasion
that did not involve the accused.  The PLF generally encouraged
its outside counsel to use the strategy as one type of "creative
solution" to malpractice claims.

3.      	At the trial panel hearing, the accused testified that he originally had created Westview as a personal estate-planning
entity.  The accused testified that, "for some time," he had
thought that Westview had been incorporated for that purpose. 
Although he still maintains that Westview initially was created
for estate-planning purposes, he now admits that the timing of
Westview's incorporation suggests that it actually was
incorporated to implement the acquisition strategy in the Pranger
matter.

4.      	Under Idaho law, it is a misdemeanor for a lawyer to
purchase a debt, either directly or indirectly, solely with the
intent to initiate a collection action.  IC § 18-1003.  Because
the Wunsch judgment had originated in Idaho, the plaintiff-debtors' lawyers intended to use that statute to challenge
Westview's ownership of the Wunsch claim.

5.      	As already noted, the accused's responses form the
basis of the Bar's complaint against him.  They are set out in
detail later in this opinion.

6.      	Only one of the accused's statements in that deposition
-- discussed later in this opinion -- is at issue here.

7.      	We note that the accused's participation in the PLF's
overall acquisition strategy is not at issue in this proceeding. 
Although Greene's complaint to the Bar also alleged that the
lawyers involved with the acquisition strategy, including the
accused, engaged in unethical conduct by employing that strategy,
the Bar's complaint includes no allegations to that effect.  We
express no opinion respecting that issue.

8.      	After the Bar filed its formal complaint in this
proceeding, this court noted that, when the Bar alleges a
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), the better practice is for the Bar
to identify the theory or theories upon which it is proceeding. 
In re Brandt/Griffin, 331 Or 113, 138, 10 P3d 906 (2000).  The Bar's amended
complaint does not specify which of the four theories set out in
DR 1-102(A)(3) the Bar intended to pursue in this proceeding. 
However, before this court, both the accused and the Bar argue
only the theory of misrepresentation and only respecting the
allegedly false statements.  Accordingly, we analyze the Bar's DR
1-102(A)(3) allegation under that theory only.

9.      	The accused gave responses #1 to #18 at the January 26,
1996, examination; responses #19 and #20 at the March 1, 1996,
continued examination; and response #21 at the March 6, 1996,
civil deposition.

10.      	As to the accused's answer respecting Westview's
location, the record reflects that the accused elaborated on that
answer by stating that he was unsure what was being asked, given
the phrasing of the question.  When Greene rephrased the
question, the accused asserted the lawyer-client privilege.

11.      	As to the Bar's remaining allegations, we conclude,
after reviewing the record as a whole, that the Bar has failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that those statements, in
fact, were false (responses #9, #17, #18, and #21) or that the
accused knew them to be false at the time that he made them
(responses #1 to #8, #12, #13, and #20).

12.      	FRCP 30(e), applicable to bankruptcy proceedings
through FRBP 7030, provides, in part:
		"If requested by the deponent or a party before
completion of the deposition, the deponent shall have
30 days after being notified by the officer that the
transcript or recording is available in which to review
the transcript or recording and, if there are changes
in form or substance, to sign a statement reciting such
changes and the reasons given by the deponent for
making them. * * *" 

13.      	The record reflects that the accused made corrections
to all the false statements at the January 26, 1996, examination
that we have concluded constituted misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3).  However, we also have concluded that the accused made
an additional misrepresentation (respecting the plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy schedules) at the continued March 1, 1996,
examination, for which he offered no correction.

14.      	The accused was under a state oath in the civil
deposition.  However, as noted above, we have concluded that the
accused did not engage in misrepresentation during that
deposition. 

15.      	18 USC section 1623 provides, in part:
	"(a) Whoever under oath * * * in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court * * * of the United
States knowingly makes any false material declaration 
* * * shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both."

16.      	  Even if 18 USC section 1623(d) did apply to those
misstatements that the accused corrected, as already noted, the
accused did not correct an additional misrepresentation that he
made at the continued March 1, 1996, examination.  Therefore,
even if his corrections provided him with a defense, the accused
nonetheless committed a criminal act under 18 USC section 1623.

17.      	As this court recently explained in In re Flannery, 334
Or 224, 231, ___ P3d ___ (2002), a determination that an accused
lawyer acted "knowingly" for purposes of a particular rule
violation does not preclude the conclusion that the lawyer acted
"intentionally" for purposes of the sanction analysis.  In this
case, the record demonstrates that, in engaging in
misrepresentation under oath, the accused acted with the
"conscious objective or purpose," ABA Standards at 7, to conceal
the connection between the PLF and Westview.

18.      	We reiterate, however, that the fact that the accused
legally was permitted to change his answers for purposes of the
examination does not excuse his conduct respecting the charged
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).