Title: Washington v. St. Charles Parish School Board
Citation: 288 So. 2d 321
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 1974

288 So. 2d 321 (1974) Dan WASHINGTON v. ST. CHARLES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD. No. 53524. Supreme Court of Louisiana. January 14, 1974. *322 Melvin P. Barre, Dist. Atty., Norman J. Pitre, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant-applicant. John F. Ward, Jr., of Glusman, Ward, Moore &amp; Lopez, Baton Rouge, for amicus curiae. Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-respondent. SANDERS, Chief Justice. Dan Washington, a teacher, brought this action against his employer, the St. Charles Parish School Board, seeking to recover some $8,100.00 allegedly due him as additional compensation pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 17:423. At the time this suit was filed, that statute provided that ". . . any person who shall have served in the armed forces of the United States during World War II or the Korean conflict shall receive credit under the minimum salary schedule provided for in R.S. 17:419-422 for the period that he served in the armed forces of the United States, to become effective in the fiscal year 1957-1958." Two opinions of the Attorney General interpreting this statute were rendered in 1957, the first year of the statute's operation. Each advised that the word "person", as used in this Act, applied only to persons already serving as teachers at the time military service began, in other words, only to teachers whose tenure was interrupted by military service. This interpretation of the statute has been followed administratively since the opinions were given, a period of 15 years. Notwithstanding contemporary construction, both lower courts extended the benefits of the act to the plaintiff, who completed his education and began service as a teacher four years after his military service terminated. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal took the phrase "any person" in its literal sense. See 274 So. 2d 909 (1973). We granted writs to consider this interpretation of the statute and pleas of laches and prescription first raised at the appellate level. La., 278 So. 2d 509. We now reverse. The operative facts are clear. The parties stipulated that the plaintiff enlisted in the United States Air Force in 1952 and served 4 years until 1956, at which time he *323 was honorably discharged. After his discharge, plaintiff attended Southern University and received a Bachelor of Science degree in August, 1960. In September of 1960, the St. Charles Parish School Board, defendant herein, employed him as a teacher, fixing his salary under the minimum salary schedule as a beginning teacher. The complete text of the statute as it then read is as follows: It is true that the bare language of this Act places no limitations of any kind upon the term "person." It is also true that the Act is a part of Chapter 2 of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, which is entitled "Teachers and Employees." In the Chapter, the words "person" and "teacher" are sometimes used indiscriminately. See, for example, Section 413 which provides that no "person shall be appointed to teach without a written contract. . . . Every teacher shall hold a certificate. . ." With reference to the statute at hand, the title of the Act provides: Within the context of this ambiguity, the responsibility of the courts is the implementation of legislative intent. As we held in In Re Hibernia Bank &amp; Trust Co., 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1936), (quoting with approval the written reasons of the trial judge): In cases such as this, moreover, settled administrative practice may serve as a fair index of legislative intent. This is, of course, the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, a doctrine approved by this Court in Dominion Land Co. v. Stark, 156 La. 124, 100 So. 244 (1924), in which we held: *324 "In State ex rel. Guillot v. Central Bank &amp; Trust Co. (In re Central Bank &amp; Trust Co.), 143 La. 1053, 79 So. 857, we said, quoting from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, par. 309: See also Delta Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, La.App., 59 So. 2d 465 (1952). Subsequent related acts of a legislature may also, in limited circumstances, provide a guide to its intent. See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 248 La. 49, 176 So. 2d 425 (1965). Here, in the first Regular Session following the decision of the Court below, the Legislature by Act No. 585 of 1972 added the following paragraph to LSA-R.S. 17:423: The stated purpose of the amendment, as given in its preamble, was to ". . . clarify the meaning and intent of such credit; . . . ." Applying the several guides to statutory interpretation, we conclude that the intent of the Legislature was to extend the benefits of the statute to teachers in service at the time of entry into the armed forces. In our opinion, the legislation was designed to avoid a salary penalty for teachers whose tenure was interrupted by military service. We so construe the statute. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff, who completed his education and began teaching after his military service, is not entitled to the benefits of the statute. This holding makes a consideration of the pleas of laches and prescription unnecessary. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, the demand of plaintiff is rejected, and this suit is dismissed at plaintiff's costs.