Title: Hastings v. Top Cut Feedlots, Inc.
Citation: 285 Or. 261, 590 P.2d 1210
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 21, 1979

590 P.2d 1210 (1979)
285 Or. 261
Lee HASTINGS, Respondent,
v.
TOP CUT FEEDLOTS, INC., Appellant.
No. L-10,891; SC 25468.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted October 31, 1978.
Decided February 21, 1979.
*1211 Alex M. Byler, Pendleton, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Peter H. Wells, and Corey, Byler &amp; Rew, Pendleton.
John W. Smallmon, Hermiston, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were R. William Riggs of Willner, Bennett, Riggs &amp; Bobbitt, Portland.
Before DENECKE, C.J., and HOLMAN, TONGUE, HOWELL, BRYSON and LENT, JJ.
Argued and Submitted at Pendleton October 31, 1978.
BRYSON, Justice.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover on a contract for the sale of corn silage which, in its various forms, is known as "green chop" and "pit silage." Some payment had been made under the contract; plaintiff sought judgment based on a reasonable value of $18 per ton for the silage or, alternatively, based on an agreed price of $18 per ton. Defendant asserted that it had paid the full price and, as an affirmative defense, that the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction on the disputed amount. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
We conclude that this case must be reversed on defendant's fourth assignment of error:
The only written record we have of the exchange, which occurred after the jury had returned its verdict, consists of three slips of paper upon which the jurors wrote the following:
The court orally responded to these questions from the jury but did not inform counsel and did not have a record made of his response. Defendant's counsel advised the clerk that he would be in his office and available by telephone. The only record of the court's response to the jury is his after-the-fact statement to counsel:
Defendant properly objected to this procedure and "that the communication was not put on the record."
ORS 17.325 provides as follows:
In Huntley v. Reed, 276 Or. 591, 595, 556 P.2d 122, 124 (1976), we "reluctantly conclude[d] that a violation of the statute must be treated as reversible error in a situation in which no record of any kind is made at the time of the instruction." (Emphasis added.) The reason for this rule is that in determining whether error committed by the trial court was prejudicial, we look to the entire record of the case. State v. Joseph, 252 Or. 610, 613, 451 P.2d 468 (1969); Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Or. 577, 611, 173 P.2d 596 (1946). Where, as here, there is no such record, "the trial court's determination that [a party] was not prejudiced by the instruction must either be reversed or deemed unreviewable." Huntley, supra 276 Or. at 594, 556 P.2d  at 124. The interests of justice require that the actions of trial courts be reviewable. Therefore, noncompliance with the statute is reversible error where trial counsel are not present and there is no record of what happened at the time of the instruction or communication by the court to the jury.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Huntley on several grounds. He points out that the questions of the jury were in writing and are part of the record. He contends that defendant does not claim that the trial court's recollection of his instruction was wrong or that the instruction the court said he gave was incorrect and that defendant does not challenge the recollections of the judge. However, these facts do not take this case out of the Huntley rule. ORS 17.325 is concerned with what the judge says to the jury. As we noted in Huntley, "[t]he obvious purpose of the statute is to relieve parties from the very dilemma presented here," namely, the absence of any record. 276 Or. at 594-95, 556 P.2d  at 124. We therefore cannot agree that Huntley is distinguishable. We conclude the case must be reversed on this assignment of error.
Because this case is remanded for a new trial, we discuss the other assignments of error. Defendant asserts that the trial court, over exception, gave an incorrect instruction on accord and satisfaction.[1] The court instructed the jury, in part, as follows (the language defendant took exception to is underscored):
Defendant argues that the instruction could have led the jury to believe that "in order to find an accord and satisfaction it would have had to find that the check contained the exact words `in full and final payment'." Although we are not convinced that the jury was misled, we agree that the instruction is too narrow and more latitude should be given to the jury, as stated in Lenchitsky v. H.J. Sandberg Co., 217 Or. 483, 490, 343 P.2d 523 (1959), "`that the debtor shall intend it as a satisfaction of such obligation, and that such intention shall be made known to the creditor in some unmistakable manner.'" (Emphasis theirs.)
*1213 Defendant objects to the second underscored portion of the instruction on the grounds that it allows the jury to find an accord and satisfaction only if plaintiff understood the legal effect of the writing on the check. We do not believe the jury could have so understood the instruction. The instruction is simply a paraphrase, to fit the facts of this case, of the following statement from Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 209, 508 P.2d 216, 219 (1973):
See also Pellett v. Simpson Timber Co., 266 Or. 39, 44, 511 P.2d 357 (1973); Lenchitsky v. H.J. Sandberg Co., 217 Or. 483, 490, 343 P.2d 523 (1959). This discussion should not be read as a blanket approval of the instruction or those parts of the instruction not discussed herein.
Defendant's next assignment of error refers to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a count of plaintiff's complaint. Because the evidence on retrial may not be the same, we need not now consider this assignment.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting plaintiff's exhibit 52 "as an aid to the jury in mathematical computation." The exhibit reads:
The exhibit shows the amount due from defendant to plaintiff at the listed price per ton for the agreed amount of silage (which was 8,616.8 tons) minus the $95,216.05 already paid. The problems with the exhibit, as defendant points out, are that it gives too much emphasis to round numbers as the price per ton,[2] and it also gives computations for figures that were not stated by either party to be the agreed or reasonable value of the silage. The defendant also objected to the exhibit on the ground:
The determination of whether to permit such aids to go to the jury is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Rich v. Cooper, 234 Or. 300, 312, 380 P.2d 613 (1963). Despite the problems with this exhibit, we are not prepared to say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it, particularly since the trial court gave a proper limiting instruction. It is necessary that there be evidence to support the material included in the exhibit.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
[1]  After the controversy arose, defendant sent plaintiff a check bearing the notation, "balance on Top Cut pit." Defendant contended that plaintiff's cashing the check established an accord and satisfaction.
[2]  Defendant's theory at trial was that the reasonable value of the silage was not necessarily a round number, but was a number based on the net dry weight of the crop.