Title: Cripe v. Leiter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84117
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 1998

Cripe v. Leiter (Ill. S.Ct.) 

Docket No. 84117-Agenda 20-May 1998.
ROBERTA L. CRIPE, Guardian of the Adult and 
Conservator of the Estate of Roberta A. Schmitz, Appellee, 
v. THOMAS E. LEITER et al., 
Appellants.
Opinion filed October 22, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The question presented in this appeal is whether a client 
may state a cause of action against an attorney under the Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act or Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 
et seq. (West 1992)) based upon alleged overbilling by the attorney. 
The plaintiff, Roberta L. Cripe, filed an action in the circuit court of Peoria 
County against the defendants, Thomas Leiter and The Leiter Group, charging the 
defendants with, inter alia, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. The 
circuit court dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act counts. The appellate court 
reversed. 291 Ill. App. 3d 161. We hold that the Consumer Fraud Act is not 
applicable to the plaintiff's claim that the defendants charged excessive fees 
for legal services. We therefore reverse the appellate court and affirm the 
circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act 
counts.
FACTS
The plaintiff's complaint alleges the following. August H. 
Schmitz, the husband of Roberta Schmitz, died on January 6, 1992, leaving two 
irrevocable trusts valued at approximately $583,000. Mrs. Schmitz was the sole 
beneficiary of the trusts and the First National Bank of Peoria was named as 
trustee. On February 12, 1992, Mrs. Schmitz discharged the attorney who had been 
their family attorney and who had drafted the trusts. Thereafter, attorney 
Thomas E. Leiter of The Leiter Group began representing Mrs. Schmitz in an 
attempt to transfer the trusts from First National Bank to South Side Trust and 
Savings Bank of Peoria (South Side Bank). On or about April 27, 1992, South Side 
Bank was appointed as successor trustee of the trusts. South Side Bank 
subsequently appointed attorney Leiter as the attorney for the 
trusts.
On March 12, 1992, the plaintiff, Mrs. Schmitz's daughter 
and present guardian, filed a petition for appointment of guardian for disabled 
person in Tazewell County probate court, alleging that Mrs. Schmitz lacked 
sufficient capacity to make responsible decisions about her own care and the 
management of her estate. Mrs. Schmitz retained Leiter to defend her in the 
Tazewell County guardianship proceeding. This guardianship petition was 
ultimately dismissed on Mrs. Schmitz's motion.
In December 1992, Mrs. Schmitz moved to Michigan and began 
living with the plaintiff. On March 22, 1993, the probate court of Midland 
County, Michigan, found Mrs. Schmitz to be legally incapacitated based upon the 
report of a physician that her condition was consistent with a progressive 
dementing illness such as Alzheimer's disease. A public guardian was appointed 
as Mrs. Schmitz's guardian and conservator. The plaintiff was subsequently 
appointed as successor guardian of Mrs. Schmitz by the Michigan probate 
court.
The plaintiff, in her capacity as Mrs. Schmitz's guardian, 
filed this action against Thomas Leiter and The Leiter Group in the circuit 
court of Peoria County on October 24, 1994. The complaint alleged that, between 
February 12, 1992, and June 1, 1994, South Side Bank paid $65,933.50 out of the 
Schmitz trusts to the defendants as fees for legal services. The complaint 
charged that the defendants' fees for legal services were "outrageously 
excessive and unreasonable and bear no relationship to the actual time spent by 
Attorney Leiter in allegedly representing Mrs. Schmitz as her personal attorney 
and as her trust attorney." As ultimately amended, the plaintiff's complaint 
charged the defendants with: (1) violation of the Consumer Fraud Act; (2) common 
law fraud; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) legal malpractice; and (5) 
constructive fraud. Each of the counts was premised on the allegation that the 
defendants charged excessive and unreasonable legal fees. The complaint alleged 
that the defendants' overbilling caused the Schmitz trust accounts to be 
depleted in excess of $40,000 in order to pay the defendants' excessive legal 
fees.
Only counts I and VI, the Consumer Fraud Act counts, are at 
issue in this appeal. Count I alleged that attorney Leiter charged excessive and 
unreasonable fees that bore no relationship to the actual time spent by Leiter 
in representing Mrs. Schmitz, and listed numerous examples of allegedly 
excessive charges. Count I alleged that Leiter owed Mrs. Schmitz a fiduciary 
duty both as her personal attorney and as the attorney for the trusts. As a 
result of that duty, Leiter was required to charge Mrs. Schmitz "reasonable 
attorney's fees representing the actual time, effort, and skill required to 
serve as legal counsel for the Schmitz trust accounts." Count I charged that 
Leiter engaged in the deceptive business practice of mailing out monthly 
invoices which contained outrageously excessive charges for the legal services 
performed by Leiter and which represented charges for time not spent by Leiter 
in representing Mrs. Schmitz. In addition to compensatory damages, count I 
sought recovery of attorney fees and punitive damages. Count VI reiterated the 
allegations of count I against The Leiter Group, the law firm in which Leiter 
was a partner.
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. 
The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss the Consumer Fraud Act count 
against each defendant, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1992)), on the ground that the Act does not apply to 
legal services or the billing of those services. The plaintiff's counts alleging 
fraud, constructive fraud, legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty 
against each defendant remain pending in the circuit court.
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud 
Act counts to the appellate court. The appellate court determined that the 
Consumer Fraud Act, although not applicable to the actual practice of law, is 
nonetheless applicable to the "commercial aspects" of a law practice, which 
include billing for legal services. The appellate court therefore reversed the 
dismissal of the plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act counts. 291 Ill. App. 3d 161. We 
allowed the defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 
315.
ANALYSIS
The defendants contend that the appellate court erred in 
reversing the dismissal of the plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act claims. They 
assert that the Act does not apply to claims arising out of the provision of 
legal services and that billing is a part of the provision of legal services. 
The plaintiff argues, on the other hand, that only claims arising out of the 
"actual practice of law" are exempt from the Act. She asserts that the appellate 
court correctly held that billing for legal services falls within the "business" 
aspect of the legal profession and is therefore subject to application of the 
Act.
The Consumer Fraud Act is a regulatory and remedial statute 
intended to protect consumers, borrowers and business persons against fraud, 
unfair methods of competition, and other unfair and deceptive business 
practices. Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International, 
88 Ill. 2d 279, 288 (1981). The Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate 
its purpose. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 503 (1996). 
Section 2 of the Act declares unlawful the following conduct:
"Unfair *** or deceptive acts or practices, including but 
not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, 
false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of 
any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, 
suppression or omission of such material fact *** in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce ***." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1992).
Section 10a(a) of the Act provides that "[a]ny person who 
suffers damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed by any other 
person may bring an action against such person." 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 
1992). The elements of a claim under the Act are: (1) a deceptive act or 
practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on 
the deception; and (3) that the deception occurred in the course of conduct 
involving trade or commerce. Connick, 174 Ill. 2d  at 501. The plaintiff 
need not establish any intent to deceive on the part of the defendant because 
even an innocent misrepresentation may be actionable under the Act. Smith v. 
Prime Cable, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 856 (1995). The Act allows for the 
imposition of punitive damages and for the award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a), (c) (West 1992).
This court has not previously addressed the applicability of 
the Act to the legal profession. Our appellate court has considered this 
question in several cases. In Frahm v. Urkovich, 113 Ill. App. 3d 580 
(1983), the plaintiffs brought a claim against their attorney under the Consumer 
Fraud Act claiming that the attorney's misrepresentations caused them to lose 
their entire investment in a real estate deal. The circuit court dismissed the 
consumer fraud count for failure to state a cause of action and the appellate 
court affirmed. The appellate court reasoned that:
"In essence, plaintiffs seek a broad interpretation of the 
Act which would impose statutory liability for misconduct amounting to 
professional malpractice. We do not believe, however, that even the most liberal 
statutory interpretation indicates the application of this consumer protection 
statute to the conduct of an attorney engaged in the actual practice of law and, 
accordingly, we find that plaintiffs do not fall within the class of `consumers' 
which the statute was designed to protect." Frahm, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 
582.
Frahm was followed by the appellate court in 
Lurz v. Panek, 172 Ill. App. 3d 915 (1988). In Lurz, the 
defendant attorney represented the plaintiff in a personal injury action against 
a railroad. Following a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the railroad delivered 
a check in satisfaction of the judgment to the defendant attorney. The defendant 
endorsed the check and deposited it into his client fund account. Over seven 
months later, the defendant issued a check to the plaintiff for the amount of 
the judgment less attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff filed an action against 
the defendant charging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and violation 
of the Consumer Fraud Act. Summary judgment was awarded in favor of the 
defendant on the consumer fraud count. Judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff on the remaining counts and he was awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages. The plaintiff appealed the award of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant on the consumer fraud count. The appellate court affirmed. Following 
Frahm, the court held that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to 
claims arising out of the furnishing of legal services by the legal profession. 
The court concluded that "the misconduct perpetrated by defendant in his 
capacity as an attorney representing plaintiff does not fall within the ambit of 
the Act." Lurz, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 926.
The issue was also discussed in Guess v. Brophy, 
164 Ill. App. 3d 75 (1987). That court agreed with Frahm that "the 
legislature did not intend to include the furnishing of legal services to 
clients within the [Consumer Fraud] Act." Guess, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 
79. The Guess court reasoned that the legal profession is subject to "a 
policing more stringent than that to which purveyors of most commercial services 
are subject." Guess, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 79. The court ultimately 
concluded, however, that the defendants in that case were not entitled to the 
same immunity from the Act afforded the legal profession because they were not 
acting in the capacity of lawyers representing clients.
Courts in several other states have addressed the 
applicability of consumer protection statutes to the legal profession, with 
differing results. In Rousseau v. Eshleman, 128 N.H. 564, 519 A.2d 243 
(1986), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the practice of law was 
exempt from New Hampshire's consumer protection statute, finding applicable an 
exemption for "trade or commerce otherwise permitted under laws as administered 
by any regulatory board." The court found that the supreme court's professional 
conduct committee qualified as a regulatory board within the meaning of that 
exemption. The Rousseau court concluded that, in view of the practical 
problems that might result, it was "reluctant" to interpret the statute as 
applying to the legal profession absent a "clearly expressed legislative 
intent." Rousseau, 128 N.H. at 567, 519 A.2d  at 245. The New Jersey 
appellate court also concluded that attorneys' services were not covered by a 
consumer fraud statute in Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J. Super. 56, 607 A.2d 1339 (1992). That court noted that the practice of law in the State of New 
Jersey is regulated, "in the first instance, if not exclusively," by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. The court reasoned that, "[h]ad the Legislature intended 
to enter the area of attorney regulation it surely would have stated with 
specificity that attorneys were covered under the Consumer Fraud Act." 
Vort, 257 N.J. Super. at 62, 607 A.2d  at 1342. Significantly, in a 
later case addressing an analogous issue, the New Jersey court relied on 
Illinois decisions, noting that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act was "very 
similar" to New Jersey's. Hampton Hospital v. Bresan, 288 N.J. Super. 
372, 383, 672 A.2d 725, 730 (1996) (addressing the application of the consumer 
fraud statute to hospital services).
Courts in other states have reached a contrary conclusion. 
In Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984), the 
Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington consumer protection statute 
applied to "certain entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law," including 
"how the price of legal services is determined, billed and collected." 
Short, 103 Wash. 2d  at 61, 691 P.2d  at 168. The court reasoned that 
"[t]hese business aspects of the legal profession are legitimate concerns of the 
public which are properly subject to the [Washington Consumer Protection Act]." 
Short, 103 Wash. 2d  at 61, 691 P.2d  at 168. The Short court 
also held, however, that claims arising out of the "actual practice of law," as 
opposed to the entrepreneurial aspects of the profession, are exempt from the 
Act. Short, 103 Wash. 2d  at 61, 691 P.2d  at 168. The Supreme Court of 
Connecticut has also determined that lawyers are not entitled to a blanket 
exemption from consumer protection legislation. In Heslin v. Connecticut Law 
Clinic, 190 Conn. 510, 520, 461 A.2d 938, 943 (1983), the court held that 
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act's regulation of "trade or commerce" 
did not "totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law." The court also 
stated, however, that it need not decide in that case whether the Act permitted 
regulation of "every aspect of the practice of law." Heslin, 190 Conn. 
at 520, 461 A.2d  at 943.
Our Consumer Fraud Act, like those discussed in the 
preceding cases from other jurisdictions, contains no language expressly 
excluding or including the legal profession within its ambit. Despite the 
absence of such language, there appears to be little dispute among the decisions 
addressing this issue that consumer protection statutes do not apply to claims 
arising out of the "actual practice of law." The plaintiff in this case concedes 
that the Act does not apply to such claims. We are called upon here to decide 
whether an attorney's billing for legal services is included within that 
exemption. The plaintiff urges us to hold that billing is a part of the 
"business" aspect of the practice of law, entirely separate from the "actual 
practice of law." Therefore, the plaintiff argues, attorneys' billing practices 
should be regulated by the Act. The defendants argue, to the contrary, that 
billing is a part of the provision of legal services to which the Act was not 
intended to apply. We find no indication that the legislature intended the 
Consumer Fraud Act to apply to regulate attorneys' billing practices.
Historically, the regulation of attorney conduct in this 
state has been the prerogative of this court. See People ex rel. Brazen v. 
Finley, 119 Ill. 2d 485, 494 (1988) (stating that this court has the 
inherent and exclusive authority to prescribe rules governing attorney conduct 
and to discipline attorneys for violating those rules); In re Mitan, 
119 Ill. 2d 229, 246 (1987); In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill. 2d 586, 593 
(1958). In the exercise of this power, this court administers a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme governing attorney conduct. The Illinois Rules of Professional 
Conduct adopted by this court set forth numerous requirements to which attorneys 
in this state must adhere. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 1.1 through 8.5. Violation of these 
rules is grounds for discipline. This court has appointed an Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) to supervise the "registration 
of, and disciplinary proceedings affecting, members of the Illinois bar." 134 
Ill. 2d R. 751. This court has also created a procedural scheme under which the 
ARDC operates, providing detailed regulations involving inquiry, hearing and 
review boards. 166 Ill. 2d R. 753. The purpose of this regulatory scheme is to 
protect the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession. See 
In re Towles, 98 Ill. 2d 179 (1983).
This court's regulatory scheme extends to the area of 
attorneys' fees. Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically 
addresses the subject, providing, in pertinent part:
"(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the 
lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent." 134 Ill. 2d R. 
1.5(a).
Rule 1.5 also addresses the attorney's obligation to 
communicate to the client the basis or rate of the fee. 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(b). 
Further, Rule 1.5 sets forth guidelines for contingent fee arrangements and the 
division of fees among attorneys. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 1.5(c) through (j).
An attorney who charges or collects an excessive fee in 
violation of this court's rules may be subjected to discipline. See, 
e.g., In re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507 (1989) (attorney suspended 
for one year for charging excessive legal fees to client); In re 
Kutner, 78 Ill. 2d 157 (1979) (attorney censured for charging excessive 
legal fees to client). This court has also ordered an attorney to make 
restitution to a client who was charged excessive legal fees. See In re 
Holz, 125 Ill. 2d 546 (1988). The Rules of Professional Conduct further 
provide for discipline of an attorney who engages in conduct involving fraud, 
dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation. 134 Ill. 2d R. 8.4. In addition, this 
court has created a client protection program operating under the auspices of 
the ARDC to reimburse losses caused by the dishonest conduct of attorneys in the 
course of the attorney-client relationship. 155 Ill. 2d R. 780.
Accordingly, the attorney-client relationship in this state, 
unlike the ordinary merchant-consumer relationship, is already subject to 
extensive regulation by this court. The legislature did not, in the language of 
the Consumer Fraud Act, specify that it intended the Act's provisions to apply 
to the conduct of attorneys in relation to their clients. Given this court's 
role in that arena, we find that, had the legislature intended the Act to apply 
in this manner, it would have stated that intention with specificity. See 
Vort, 257 N.J. Super. at 62, 607 A.2d  at 1342. Absent a clear 
indication by the legislature, we will not conclude that the legislature 
intended to regulate attorney-client relationships through the Consumer Fraud 
Act.
We note that, prior to the decision in this case, our 
appellate court had, since 1983, consistently held the Act to be inapplicable to 
claims arising out of the attorney-client relationship. See Frahm v. 
Urkovich, 113 Ill. App. 3d 580 (1983); Guess v. Brophy, 164 Ill. 
App. 3d 75 (1987); Lurz v. Panek, 172 Ill. App. 3d 915 (1988). The 
legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial decisions interpreting 
legislation. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity &amp; 
Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 218 (1983). The Consumer Fraud Act has been 
amended numerous times since the decisions in Frahm, Guess, 
and Lurz. The legislature has not, however, included language in the 
Act to specify that it applies to the conduct of attorneys in relation to their 
clients. In amending a statute, " ` "the legislature is presumed to 
know the construction the statute has been given and, by re-enactment, is 
assumed to have intended for the new statute to have the same effect." ' 
[Citations.]" Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 
554 (1992). The legislature's failure to alter the Act in response to these 
appellate court holdings provides further support for our conclusion that the 
legislature did not intend the Act to apply to claims arising out of the 
attorney-client relationship.
The plaintiff nonetheless argues that an attorney's billing 
is simply a "business" aspect of the practice of law and is therefore within the 
intended scope of the Consumer Fraud Act. As discussed above, however, the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme administered by this court extends to attorney 
fees. Moreover, an attorney's billing for legal services cannot be separated 
from the attorney-client relationship. Unlike ordinary merchant-consumer 
relationships, the relationship between attorney and client is fiduciary in 
nature. In re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507, 529 (1989). Although an 
attorney's fees in a particular case will generally be governed by the 
contractual arrangement between the attorney and the client, the attorney's 
fiduciary position prohibits the attorney from charging an excessive fee. See 
People v. Kinion, 97 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (1983); In re Marriage of 
Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 118 (1990). Fraudulent or excessive billing 
of a client violates the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client. Thus, an 
attorney's billing of a client is not simply a "business" aspect of the practice 
of law, but is tied to the attorney's fiduciary obligation to the client. 
Because of that fiduciary relationship, the attorney's fees are subject to 
scrutiny and regulation not applicable to the fees for most commercial services. 
The Consumer Fraud Act therefore was not intended to apply to an attorney's 
billing of a client for legal services.
Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature did not intend 
the Consumer Fraud Act to apply to regulate the conduct of attorneys in 
representing clients. We hold that, where allegations of misconduct arise from a 
defendant's conduct in his or her capacity as an attorney representing a client, 
the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply. An attorney's billing of a client for 
legal services is a part of the attorney's representation of the client and is 
therefore exempt from the Act. The circuit court properly dismissed the 
plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act counts against the defendants in this 
case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 
appellate court which reversed the circuit court's dismissal of counts I and VI 
of the plaintiff's second-amended complaint. The circuit court's dismissal of 
counts I and VI is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment 
reversed;
circuit court judgment 
affirmed.
JUSTICE HEIPLE took no part in the consideration or decision 
of this case.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The majority engages in a protracted discussion of the 
legislative intent behind the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et 
seq. (West 1992)). It is axiomatic, however, that the best indication of 
the legislature's intent is the language it employed in drafting the law. 
People v. Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d 360, 364 (1994). Where the language 
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court should not resort to other 
tools of statutory interpretation. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 
392 (1996). The court's only legitimate function is to enforce the law as 
written. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 391 (1995).
Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act declares 
unlawful
"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any 
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the 
concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that 
others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact 
*** in the conduct of any trade or commerce ***." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 
1992).
The terms "trade" and "commerce" are defined by the law to 
mean
"the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution 
of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or 
mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, 
and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the 
people of this State." 815 ILCS 505/1(f) (West 1992).
Pursuant to section 10a(a) of the Act,
"[a]ny person who suffers actual damage as a result of a 
violation of this Act committed by any other person may bring an action against 
such person." 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1992).
The term "person" 
"includes any natural person or his legal representative, 
partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business entity 
or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, 
member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof[.]" 815 ILCS 
505/1(c) (West 1992).
These provisions, which must be liberally construed to 
effect the Act's purposes (815 ILCS 505/11a (West 1992)), clearly and 
unambiguously embrace the sort of billing fraud claims advanced in counts I and 
IV of plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, defendants cannot be removed from the 
Act's coverage without holding that the legislature did not mean what the plain 
language of the statute says. No rule of construction authorizes us to do that. 
Solich v. George &amp; Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, 
Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).
Had the General Assembly intended to exclude attorneys from 
the scope of the Act, it could easily have done so, just as it excluded real 
estate salesmen and brokers, newspaper and periodical publishers, and 
individuals associated with television and radio stations. 815 ILCS 505/10b 
(West 1992). Attorneys, however, are nowhere mentioned. It is a basic rule of 
statutory construction that the expression of certain exceptions in a statute 
should be construed as an exclusion of all others. State of Illinois v. 
Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 250 (1990). Courts are not at liberty to depart 
from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, 
or conditions that the legislature did not express. Kunkel v. Walton, 
179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997). Accordingly, the absence of attorneys from the 
detailed exclusions enumerated in the statute is fatal to the majority's 
analysis. 
Holding attorneys to the same standards of honesty and fair 
dealing that apply to other business people will inevitably affect the practice 
of law. In my view, the results can only be positive. Unlike my colleagues, I am 
not concerned about encroachment on this court's authority. While it is true 
that responsibility for regulating the legal profession and disciplining 
attorneys is vested in our court, the General Assembly has made specific 
provision in the Consumer Fraud Act to avoid separation of power problems. 
Section 10b(1) of the Act exempts from coverage "[a]ctions or transactions 
specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer 
acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States." 815 ILCS 
505/10b(1) (West 1992). Accordingly, if an attorney's conduct were permissible 
under the rules we have enacted and the standards we have set, it would not be 
actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act.
The conduct alleged in this case, if proven, would not be 
permissible under the rules of our court. Although the attorneys involved might 
ultimately be subject to discipline, that is no reason to deny plaintiff her 
right to bring a statutory damage action against them. If what the attorneys did 
constituted a crime, we would surely not say that they are exempt from 
prosecution merely because they are subject to disbarment by us. The same 
principle applies here.
For the foregoing reasons, counts I and IV of plaintiff's 
complaint should not have been dismissed, and the judgment of the appellate 
court should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.