Title: State v. James W. Smith
Citation: 2010 WI 16
Docket Number: 2008AP001011-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2010

2010 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1011 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James W. Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 16 
Reported: 316 Wis. 2d 165, 762 N.W.2d 856 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Dietz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Shelley M. Fite, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Rebecca Rapp St. John, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1011-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF1266) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James W. Smith, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
MAR 19, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.  This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed the 
decision of the Brown County Circuit Court, Richard J. Dietz, 
Judge.  The circuit court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 
(2005-06),2 Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute, was 
constitutional as applied to Smith and denied Smith's motion to 
dismiss the charge of failure to comply with sex offender 
                                                 
1 State v. Smith, 2009 WI App 16, 316 Wis. 2d 165, 762 
N.W.2d 856. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
2 
 
registration.  Smith appealed and the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's decision.  Smith petitioned this court for 
review, which we accepted.  We affirm the court of appeals' 
decision. 
¶2 
This case requires us to decide whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45, Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute, is 
unconstitutional as applied to Smith on the grounds that it 
violates his substantive due process and equal protection 
rights.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 is constitutional 
as applied to Smith because requiring Smith to register under 
§ 301.45 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.  Smith has failed to prove that the registration 
requirements of § 301.45 as applied to him are unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On March 12, 2001, Smith pled guilty to the charge of 
false imprisonment in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.30 (1999-
2000).3  According to the criminal complaint, Smith and others 
forced a minor to ride around with them in a vehicle in order to 
collect a drug debt from the minor's friend.  Even though the 
complaint alleges that Smith and at least one other person 
physically threatened the minor in order to force him to assist 
in 
the 
search, 
there 
is 
no 
allegation 
that 
the 
false 
imprisonment entailed anything sexual.    
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.30, "False imprisonment," provides 
"Whoever intentionally confines or restrains another without the 
person's consent and with knowledge that he or she has no lawful 
authority to do so is guilty of a Class E felony." 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
However, under the unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45, Smith is required to register as a sex offender 
because he was convicted of false imprisonment of a minor.4  
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1g), "Who is covered" under "Sex 
offender registration," provides in relevant part: "[A] person 
shall comply with the reporting requirements under this section 
if he or she . . . (a) Is convicted . . . for a sex offense." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d), "Definitions," provides in 
relevant part: "(b) 'Sex offense' means a violation . . . of s. 
940.30 [false imprisonment] or 940.31 [kidnapping] if the victim 
was a minor and the person who committed the violation was not 
the victim's parent." 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
4 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin is not alone; 41 other states, and the District 
of Columbia, require individuals convicted of false imprisonment 
or kidnapping of a minor to register as sex offenders——
regardless of whether the crime was of a sexual nature.  See 
Alaska: 
Alaska 
Stat. 
§ 12.63.010(a) 
(2008 
& 
Supp. 
2009) 
(kidnapping); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3821(A)(1)-(2) 
(2001 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment); 
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-903(12)(A)(i)(q)-(r), 12-12-
905 (2009) (kidnapping and false imprisonment); Connecticut: 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250(2)(B), 54-251 (2009) (kidnapping); 
District of Columbia: D.C. Code §§ 22-4001(8)(C), 22-4014 (2001 
& 
Supp. 
2009) 
(kidnapping); 
Florida: 
Fla. 
Stat. 
§ 943.0435(1)(a)1.a. (2009) (kidnapping and false imprisonment); 
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 2009) 
(kidnapping and false imprisonment); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 846E-1, 
846E-2 
(Supp. 
2009) 
(kidnapping 
and 
unlawful 
imprisonment); Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18.8304(1)(a), 18.8307 
(2004 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); Indiana: Ind. Code Ann. §§ 11-
8-8-5(a)(11), 11-8-8-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); 
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §§ 692A.1(5)(a)-(b), 692A.2 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2009) (kidnapping and false imprisonment); Kansas: Kan. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 22-4902(a)(4)(A)-(C), 22-4906 (2007 & Supp. 2009) 
(kidnapping and criminal restraint); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 17.500(3)(a)1-2, 17.510 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2009) 
(kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment); Louisiana: La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 15:541(12)(a), 15:542 (kidnapping) (2005 & Supp. 
2010); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, §§ 11203(6)(B), 11222 
(Supp. 2009) (kidnapping and criminal restraint); Massachusetts: 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6, §§ 178C, 178E (LexisNexis 1999 & 
Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 28.722(e)(vi), 28.723 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); 
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 243.166(1b)(a)(1)(ii) (2008 & Supp. 
2009) 
(kidnapping); 
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-
23(g)(i), 45-33-25 (2004 & Sup. 2009) (kidnapping); Missouri: 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.400(2) (2000 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping and 
felonious 
restraint); 
Montana: 
Mont. 
Code 
Ann. 
§§ 46-23-
502(9)(a), 46-23-504 (2009) (kidnapping and unlawful restraint); 
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4003(1)(a)(i)(A)-(B), 29-4004  
(2008 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping and false imprisonment); Nevada: 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 179D.0357(1)-(2), 179D.240 (2006 & Supp. 
2007) (kidnapping and false imprisonment); New Hampshire: N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 651-B:1 VII(a), 651-B:2 (2007 & Supp. 2009) 
(kidnapping, criminal restraint, and false imprisonment); New 
Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-2.b.(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) 
(kidnapping, criminal restraint, and false imprisonment); New 
Mexico: N.M. Stat. §§ 29-11A-3.E.(6)-(7), 29-11A-4 (2004 & Supp. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
5 
 
Because he failed to so register, Smith was charged on December 
14, 2005, with violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(g).5 
                                                                                                                                                             
2008) 
(kidnapping 
and 
false 
imprisonment), 
declared 
unconstitutional by ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 137 
P.3d 1215, 1226 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); New York: N.Y. Correct. 
Law §§ 168-a(2), 168-f (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2010) (kidnapping 
and unlawful imprisonment); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 14-208.6(1m), 14-208.7 (2009) (kidnapping); North Dakota: 
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-15.1.a (1997 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping 
and 
felonious 
restraint); 
Ohio: 
Ohio 
Rev. 
Code 
Ann. 
§§ 2950.01(A)(9), 2950.04 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); 
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 181.594(5)(L), (p), 181.595 (2009) 
(kidnapping); Pennsylvania: Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 9795.1(a)(1) 
(2007 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws 
§§ 11-37.1-2(e)(1), 11-37.1-3 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping 
and false imprisonment); South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-
430(C)(16) (2007 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); South Dakota: S.D. 
Codified Laws §§ 22-24B-1(8), 22-24B-2 (2006 & Supp. 2009) 
(kidnapping); 
Tennessee: 
Tenn. 
Code 
Ann. 
§§ 40-39-
202(20)(A)(vi), 40-39-203 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping); 
Texas: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. §§ 62.001(5)(E), 62.051 
(Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2009) (kidnapping and unlawful restraint); 
Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (2008) (kidnapping); Vermont: 
Vt. 
Stat. 
Ann. 
tit. 
13, 
§§ 5401(10)(B)(ii), 
5402 
(2009) 
(kidnapping); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.130 (West 
2009 & Supp. 2010) (kidnapping); West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 15-12-2(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2009) (kidnapping); Wyoming: Wyo. 
Stat. 
Ann. 
§§ 7-19-301(a)(iv)(A)-(C), 
7-19-302 
(2009) 
(kidnapping, felonious restraint, and false imprisonment). 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(2)(g) provides: 
The department may send a person subject to sub. 
(1g) a notice or other communication requesting the 
person to verify the accuracy of any information 
contained in the registry.  A person subject to sub. 
(1g) who receives a notice or communication sent by 
the department under this paragraph shall, no later 
than 10 days after receiving the notice or other 
communication, provide verification of the accuracy of 
the information to the department in the form and 
manner specified by the department. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
6 
 
¶5 
On March 15, 2006, Smith brought a motion to dismiss 
the charge of failure to comply with sex offender registration 
on the basis that, as applied to him, the sex offender reporting 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 301.45 violate his due process and 
equal protection rights under the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions because the crime he committed was not sexual. 
After a hearing on April 20, 2006, the circuit court denied the 
motion and concluded that § 301.45 was constitutional as applied 
to Smith. 
¶6 
Smith then filed an interlocutory appeal, which was 
denied by the court of appeals on June 30, 2006.  On April 26, 
2007, 
Smith 
pled 
guilty 
to 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(g) for his failure to provide the registration 
information required as a result of his conviction for a "sex 
offense."6  He was sentenced to one year of confinement followed 
by one year of extended supervision. 
¶7 
Smith appealed his conviction to the court of appeals 
and challenged the constitutionality of the sex offender 
registration statute as applied to him.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's decision that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 
was constitutional as applied to Smith.  After first rejecting 
Smith's assertion that sex offender registration interferes with 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute defines "sex 
offense" to include the offense of false imprisonment "if the 
victim was a minor and the person who committed the violation 
was not the victim's parent."  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b).  
Therefore, under this statutory definition, Smith committed a 
"sex offense." 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
7 
 
fundamental liberty interests,7 the court of appeals concluded 
that § 301.45 was constitutional as applied to Smith because 
"there is a rational basis for the distinctions created by the 
legislature, the means specified in the statute, and the 
legislative goals of the statute."8  On March 18, 2009, this 
court accepted Smith's petition for review.  We now affirm the 
court of appeals' decision and conclude that § 301.45 is 
constitutional as applied to Smith. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law, which this court determines independently of both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals but still benefitting 
from their analyses.  See State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶7, 235 
Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684; State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 
370, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  A statute enjoys a presumption of 
constitutionality.  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 370.  To overcome 
that 
presumption, 
a 
party 
challenging 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality bears a heavy burden.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 
112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  It is insufficient 
for the party challenging the statute to merely establish either 
that the statute's constitutionality is doubtful or that the 
                                                 
7 The parties now agree that the registration requirements 
do not implicate any of Smith's fundamental liberty interests.  
Petitioner's brief at 15; Respondent's brief at 10. 
8 The court of appeals reasoned that Smith "overlooks the 
purpose of the statute, which is protecting the public——
specifically, children.  The goal is not to identify individuals 
guilty of a crime with a sexual element." 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
8 
 
statute is probably unconstitutional.  Id.  Instead, the party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must "prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. 
¶9 
In this case, Smith claims that Wis. Stat. § 301.45, 
Wisconsin's 
sex 
offender 
registration 
statute, 
is 
unconstitutional as applied to him.  Therefore, Smith must prove 
that as applied to him, § 301.45 is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶10 Smith 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45 
is 
unconstitutional as applied to him because it requires him to 
register as a sex offender even though his underlying conviction 
for false imprisonment of a minor was not of a sexual nature.  
Smith acknowledges, however, that § 301.45 serves a legitimate 
state interest, and accordingly, he does not raise a facial 
constitutional challenge to the statute.9  Rather, he argues that 
§ 301.45 is unconstitutional as applied to him because requiring 
him to register is irrational, arbitrary, and cannot be 
rationally related to any legitimate government interest.10  
                                                 
9 When a party raises a "facial challenge," the party 
"claim[s] that a statute is unconstitutional on its face——that 
is, that it always operates unconstitutionally."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 223 (7th ed. 1999).  In contrast, an as-applied 
challenge, as Smith raises, is a "claim that a statute is 
unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or to a 
particular party."  Id. 
10 The State argues that Smith waived the right to raise his 
"as applied" challenge by pleading guilty.  See State v. Bush, 
2005 WI 103, ¶17, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80.  We decline to 
resolve this case on that basis because of the novel issue of 
law presented and its statewide importance. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
9 
 
Smith asserts that the purpose of the statute is to protect the 
public from sex offenders and since he was not convicted of an 
offense that was sexual, he cannot be required to register under 
§ 301.45.  
¶11 We disagree with Smith and conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45 does not violate his substantive due process or equal 
protection rights.  Smith has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that as applied to him, the sex offender 
registration requirements are arbitrary or irrational.  
¶12 "This court has held the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution are the 
substantial equivalents of their respective clauses in the 
federal constitution."  State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130, 
447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) (citing State ex rel. Cresci v. Schmidt, 
62 Wis. 2d 400, 414, 215 N.W.2d 361 (1974)).  Whether reviewing 
substantive due process or equal protection, the threshold 
question is whether a fundamental right is implicated or whether 
a suspect class is disadvantaged by the challenged legislation.  
If either is the case, the challenged legislation must survive 
strict scrutiny.  In the present case, the parties agree that a 
fundamental right is not implicated and that a suspect class is 
not disadvantaged.  Thus, the challenged legislation is not 
subject to a strict scrutiny review; rather, we undergo the more 
deferential, rational basis review.  When neither a fundamental 
right has been interfered with nor a suspect class been 
disadvantaged 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
classification, 
"the 
legislative enactment 'must be sustained unless it is "patently 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
10 
 
arbitrary" and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate 
government interest.'"  McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131 (quoting 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973)).  In this as 
applied challenge, rational basis analysis requires us to search 
for any facts upon which the legislation reasonably could be 
applied to Smith.   
¶13 As explained herein, requiring Smith to register as a 
sex offender is rationally related to the state's legitimate 
interest in protecting the public, including children, and 
assisting law enforcement.  Requiring Smith to register, even 
though his conviction for false imprisonment was not of a sexual 
nature, is rationally related to the government interest in 
protecting the public and assisting law enforcement because: (1) 
false imprisonment has been linked to the commission of sexual 
assault and violent crimes against children; (2) an offender's 
sexual motive or intent may be difficult to prove or determine 
within the context of false imprisonment; and (3) false 
imprisonment places the minor in a vulnerable position because 
the offender, rather than the minor, has control over the 
minor's body and freedom of movement.  The legislature chose to 
require registration by those, like Smith, who commit the crime 
of falsely imprisoning a minor, regardless of whether that crime 
is of a sexual nature.  We must afford deference to the words 
chosen by the legislature and cannot conclude that there is no 
legitimate government interest in requiring registration of such 
offenders. 
A. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection-  
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
11 
 
Rational Basis Analysis 
¶14 "The touchstone of due process is protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of government."  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).  "Due process 'bars certain 
arbitrary, wrongful government actions.'"  State v. Quintana, 
2008 WI 33, ¶80, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (quoting State 
v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, ¶12, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 657 N.W.2d 66).  
"Substantive due process forbids a government from exercising 
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a 
legitimate governmental objective."  Quintana, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 
¶80.  To have a rational basis, substantive due process requires 
only that "the means chosen by the legislature bear a reasonable 
and rational relationship" to a legitimate government interest.  
McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 130.  Smith's substantive due process 
argument is grounded in the notion that there is no rational 
basis for requiring him to register as a sex offender because 
his conviction was not sexual.    
¶15 The equal protection clause, on the other hand, "is 
designed to assure that those who are similarly situated will be 
treated similarly."  Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 398 
N.W.2d 756 (1987).  "The equal protection clause requires that 
the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the 
classifications that it draws" and when determining if there is 
a rational basis, we must presume that the legislative action is 
valid.  Quintana, 308 Wis. 2d 615, ¶79 (citing McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d at 130).  "[T]he state retains broad discretion to 
create classifications so long as the classifications have a 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
12 
 
reasonable basis."  McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131 (citing Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971)).  Smith's equal 
protection claim is grounded in the notion that there is no 
rational basis for requiring those in his class——criminals who 
are convicted of false imprisonment of a minor where the crime 
is not of a sexual nature——to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 
because requiring such individuals to register as sex offenders 
diminishes the registry's usefulness.11 
¶16 Although substantive due process and equal protection 
may have different implications, "[t]he analysis under both the 
due process and equal protection clauses is largely the same."  
Quintana, 308 Wis. 2d 615, ¶78.  Accordingly, as a practical 
matter, the rational basis analysis applicable to Smith's 
substantive due process challenge is also relevant to his equal 
protection challenge.  The question for this court to resolve is 
whether we can conceive any facts upon which the legislation as 
applied to Smith could be reasonably based.  Stated differently, 
we must determine whether we can conceive of any rational basis 
for requiring Smith, who was convicted of false imprisonment of 
                                                 
11 We recognize that Smith's equal protection claim runs 
dangerously close to a facial constitutional challenge, although 
he raises an as-applied challenge.  To resolve Smith's as-
applied challenge, we encompass our equal protection analysis in 
our substantive due process analysis.  See Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) ("[A]n argument based on equal 
protection essentially duplicates an argument based on due 
process."); 
State 
v. 
Jorgensen, 
2003 
WI 
105, 
¶32, 
264 
Wis. 2d 157, 667 N.W.2d 318 ("[T]he analyses of the due process 
claims and equal protection claims are largely the same.").  
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
13 
 
a minor, to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 even though his 
crime was not of a sexual nature. 
¶17 The rational basis test is a deferential one.  The 
United States Supreme Court has described it as "a paradigm of 
judicial restraint."  Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 
¶18 Thus, for purposes of our constitutional analysis, we 
owe great deference to legislative action, and Smith bears the 
high burden of proving that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 as applied to 
him is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Wisconsin's Registration Legislation 
¶19 Wisconsin created a sex offender registry in 1993.  
See 1993 Wis. Act 98, § 116; Wis. Stat. § 175.45 (1993-94).  
Initially, the statute required registration only for those 
convicted of first- or second-degree sexual assault and first- 
or second-degree sexual assault of a child.  Id. 
¶20 In 1996, Wisconsin expanded sex offender registration 
by enacting 1995 Wis. Act 440, which created Wis. Stat. § 301.45 
and Wis. Stat. § 301.46 (effective June 1, 1997).12  See 1995 
Wis. Act 440, §§ 26-75.  The crime of false imprisonment of a 
minor was one of the offenses added to the sex offender registry 
in enacting Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  See 1995 Wis. Act 440, § 28.  
This expansion was subsequent to and consistent with federal 
passage of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
                                                 
12 Access to sex offender registry information was made 
available to the public beginning June 1, 2001.  See 1999 Wis. 
Act 89, § 76; Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2m)(b)1. (2001-02). 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
14 
 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994 ("Jacob 
Wetterling Act").13  See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994).  The Jacob 
Wetterling Act created a nationwide registry of individuals who 
were "convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a 
minor or who [were] convicted of a sexually violent offense."  
See id., § 14071(a)(1)(A).14  Federal funding was conditioned on 
the states enacting such legislation.  See § 14071(g)(1)-(2); 
State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 94, ¶53 n.16, 245 
Wis. 2d 310, 630 N.W.2d 164 (noting that the Jacob Wetterling 
Act "conditioned federal funding on whether states enacted sex 
offender registration and notification laws").  Consequently, 
numerous states so acted.15 
                                                 
13 The Wisconsin Department of Corrections "Sex Offender 
Community Notification" workgroup "recommended expanding the 
then current sex offender registration law to comply with the 
[Jacob Wetterling Act]."  State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 
2001 WI 94, ¶53 & n.16, 245 Wis. 2d 310, 630 N.W.2d 164 
(referencing the Legislative Reference Bureau's drafting file 
for 1995 Wis. Act 440). 
14 "The term 'criminal offense against a victim who is a 
minor' means any criminal offense in a range of offenses 
specified by State law which is comparable to . . . false 
imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent."  42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071(a)(3)(A)(ii)(1994). 
15 "The federal law and similar laws passed in each of the 
50 states resulted from 'Megan's Law,' passed in New Jersey in 
1994, requiring community notification of sex offenders residing 
in any community."  Kaminski, 245 Wis. 2d 310, ¶53 n.16 (citing 
State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶19 n.4, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 
199). 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
15 
 
¶21 Consistent with the broad scope of crimes included in 
the Jacob Wetterling Act, Wisconsin law requires automatic 
registration for defendants convicted of certain sex offenses.  
See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1g)(a).  Wisconsin's sex offender 
registration statute broadly defines "sex offense" to include 
offenses of a sexual nature against children, certain offenses 
of a sexual nature that are not dependent on the age of the 
victim, and certain other offenses without regard to whether 
they are of a sexual nature, including the offense of false 
imprisonment "if the victim was a minor and the person who 
committed the violation was not the victim's parent."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b).16  Despite the fact that the legislature 
could have required that the crime of false imprisonment of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
All 50 states have enacted sex offender registration 
legislation.  In addition to Wisconsin and the 41 states already 
mentioned, supra note 4, see Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-11-200 
(2006 & Supp. 2009); California: Cal. Penal Code § 290.001 (West 
2008); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-103 (2009); Delaware: 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4120 (2001 & Supp. 2009); Illinois: 
730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/1-3 (2008); Maryland: Md. Code Ann., 
Crim. Proc. § 11-704 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2009); Oklahoma: 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 582 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); 
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-901 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b) provides:  
"Sex 
offense" 
means 
a 
violation, 
or 
the 
solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit a 
violation, of s. 940.22(2), 940.225(1), (2) or (3), 
944.06, 948.02(1) or (2), 948.025, 948.05, 948.055, 
948.06, 948.07, 948.075, 948.08, 948.085, 948.095, 
948.11(2)(a) or (am), 948.12, 948.13, or 948.30, or of 
s. 940.30 or 940.31 if the victim was a minor and the 
person who committed the violation was not the 
victim's parent. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
16 
 
minor be of a sexual nature, the statute is devoid of any such 
requirement.17 
¶22 Conversely, the legislature did require a sexual 
component when it granted the trial courts discretion to order 
defendants who are convicted of offenses that are not referenced 
in Wis. Stat. § 301.45 to register if "the court determines that 
the underlying conduct was sexually motivated . . . and that it 
would be in the interest of public protection to have the person 
                                                 
17 The commission of false imprisonment of a sexual nature, 
if charged and convicted as such, would presumably require 
registration under another crime included within the statutory 
definition of "sex offense." 
In contrast to Wisconsin's sex offender registration 
statute, and the statutes of 41 other states, see supra note 4, 
legislation in a few states expressly provides that the crime of 
false imprisonment or kidnapping of a minor requires sex 
offender registration only if there is a sexual component to the 
crime.  See California: Cal. Penal Code § 290.001 (West 2008), 
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2010) 
(defining "sexually violent offense" as including a felony 
kidnapping violation "committed with the intent to commit a 
violation of" rape, aiding or abetting rape, sodomy, lewd or 
lascivious 
acts 
involving 
children, 
oral 
copulation, 
or 
penetration by foreign object); Illinois: 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
150/2(B)(1.5) 
(2008) (defining "sex offense" as including 
kidnapping or unlawful restraint "when the victim is a person 
under 18 years of age, the defendant is not a parent of the 
victim, [and] the offense was sexually motivated"); Ohio: Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.01(A)(10) (West Supp. 2009) (defining 
"sexually oriented offense" as including unlawful restraint with 
a sexual motivation). 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
17 
 
report."18  See Wis. Stat. § 973.048(1m).  Notably, no such 
language is present in the Wis. Stat. § 301.45 reference to 
false 
imprisonment 
of 
a 
minor. 
 
In 
fact, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.048(1m) specifically recognizes the existing reporting 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 301.45 because it contains the 
language "[e]xcept as provided in sub. (2m)."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.048(2m) is the subsection that requires registration for 
those who are convicted of a sex offense under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45.   
¶23 The legislature was well aware of its ability to carve 
out exceptions to the registration requirement.  The legislature 
provided for an exception to registration for juvenile offenders 
who engage in sexual activity as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(1m).19  Yet, the legislature retained the reporting 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.048(2m) requires registration for 
those who are convicted of a sex offense under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45.  For purposes of the court's determination of whether 
a non-Wis. Stat. § 301.45 offender registers under sub. (1m), 
the court utilizes the following definition: A "sexually 
motivated" act is defined as an act that "is for the actor's 
sexual arousal or gratification or for the sexual humiliation or 
degradation of the victim."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(5). 
19 "[T]he court shall require the person to comply with the 
reporting 
requirements 
under 
s. 
301.45 
unless 
the 
court 
determines, after a hearing on a motion made by the person, that 
the person is not required to comply under s. 301.45(1m)."  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.048(2m). 
Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1m) does exempt certain offenders 
from registration for underage sexual activity, but the court 
still must determine at a hearing that "[i]t is not necessary, 
in the interest of public protection, to require the person to 
comply with the reporting requirements under this section."  
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m)3. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
18 
 
requirement for Smith, and others like Smith, who committed the 
crime of false imprisonment of a minor, regardless of whether 
his crime was of a sexual nature.   
¶24 By crafting the Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m) exception, the 
legislature could have rationally concluded that a juvenile 
involved in a factually consensual sexual relationship with a 
child is less of a threat to public safety than someone who 
would confine or restrain a child without the child's consent.  
See State v. Joseph E.G., 2001 WI App 29, ¶12, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 
623 N.W.2d 137.  In Joseph E.G., fifteen-year-old Joseph 
challenged the constitutionality of having to register as a sex 
offender after he was convicted of false imprisonment of another 
juvenile as a party to the crime.  Id., ¶3.  Joseph and one 
Eddie Johnson forced a thirteen-year-old girl into the trunk of 
a car and later humiliated her by ordering her into a lake, 
throwing gravel at her, slapping her, and forcing her to kiss 
Johnson's clothed buttocks and suck on his finger.  Id.  The 
court of appeals distinguished Joseph's crime from the factual 
scenario 
that 
could 
relieve 
a 
juvenile 
offender 
from 
registration 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(1m). 
 
Id., 
¶12.  
Subsection 301.45(1m) "craft[s] a narrow exception to mandatory 
registration for sex offenders in cases of factually consensual 
sexual contact between two minors who, but for the age of the 
younger child, would have broken no law."  Id., ¶11.  In 
contrast to the case of sexual contact between two consenting 
minors, "the crime of false imprisonment is never consensual and 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
19 
 
never a crime solely because of the age of the victim."  Id., 
¶12. 
¶25 The legislature opted not to exempt Smith, and others 
like him, from the registration requirement despite the fact 
that his crime of false imprisonment of a minor was not of a 
sexual nature.  We must afford deference to the words chosen by 
the legislature and cannot conclude that requiring registration 
of such offenders is not rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.  
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45 as applied to Smith is 
Rationally Related to the State's Legitimate Interest in 
Protecting the Public and Assisting Law Enforcement 
¶26 Smith 
does 
not 
forward 
a 
facial 
challenge 
and 
acknowledges that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 serves a legitimate 
government interest.  As this court has recognized, Wisconsin's 
sex offender registration statute "reflect[s] an 'intent to 
protect the public and assist law enforcement' and [is] 'related 
to community protection.'"  Kaminski, 245 Wis. 2d 310, ¶41 
(quoting State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶21-22, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
605 N.W.2d 199); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003) 
(describing Alaska's sex offender registration statute as part 
of a nonpunitive scheme designed to protect the public from 
harm).  The Wisconsin Department of Corrections, which maintains 
our state's sex offender registry, notes that release of 
offender information "will further the governmental interests of 
public safety and enhance strategies for crime detection and 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
20 
 
prevention."20  In this case, to succeed on his as-applied 
challenge, Smith must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
requiring him to register as a sex offender is not rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest.   
¶27 Significantly, Smith's argument essentially boils down 
to the fact that the title of the registry and the statute's 
language unfairly characterize him as a "sex offender" because 
the crime he committed was not sexual.21  However, when a 
statute's language is unambiguous, as this one is here, sound 
principles of statutory construction require that we not look to 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Corrections, 
Sex 
Offender 
Registry 
Program 
website, 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/proginfo/sor.jsp 
(providing background on the registry program). 
21 The 
sex 
offender 
registry 
is 
available 
at 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/home.jsp.  The registry 
website contains a "Frequent Questions" section which provides 
that the registry "applies only to offenders who have violated 
certain sex crimes or other related statutes that indicate 
victimization 
of 
children 
or 
vulnerable 
persons." 
 
See 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/fyi/faq.html. 
 
The 
"Frequent 
Questions" 
section 
also 
identifies 
"False 
Imprisonment-victim was minor and not the offender's child" as a 
"registerable offense."  Prior to retrieving the results for an 
"offender search," the searcher is linked to an initial page 
regarding the purpose and scope of the registry.  This initial 
page states that the "data is being provided on the Internet to 
make the information more easily available and accessible, not 
to warn about any specific individual."  "Individuals are 
included in the registry solely by virtue of their conviction 
record 
and 
state 
law." 
 
See 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/search/sor. 
 
If 
the 
searcher agrees to proceed to the search result for Smith, his 
"Offense 
Requiring 
Registration" 
is 
specified 
as 
false 
imprisonment, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.30.  See 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/search/sor?action=offende
rdetail&offender=44302&x. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
21 
 
the title for guidance or instruction.22  The name of the 
registry and the label that is associated with Smith's crime do 
not change the fact that the statute includes his offense as one 
for which registration is required.  Renaming Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45 "Wisconsin's Crimes against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registry" or changing the phrase "sex offense" 
to "qualifying offense" makes the statute no more or less 
rational 
to 
protecting 
the 
public 
and 
assisting 
law 
enforcement.23  The registry requirement remains rationally 
related to protecting the public and assisting law enforcement 
                                                 
22 See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6) (The "titles to subchapters, 
sections, 
subsections, paragraphs and subdivisions of the 
statutes and history notes are not part of the statutes."); 
Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶25, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 
156 ("[A] title may not be used to alter the meaning of a 
statute or create an ambiguity where no ambiguity existed."). 
23 As it is unnecessary for our decision, we offer no 
opinion whether it carries a greater stigma to be a "sex 
offender" or a "violent offender against children." 
The Jacob Wetterling Act was the impetus behind Wisconsin's 
addition of false imprisonment of a minor to our sex offender 
registry act.  See Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶18 & n.4; Kaminski, 
245 Wis. 2d 310, ¶53 n.16; Memorandum from Anthony Streveler, 
Director of the Office of Sex Offender Programs to Robert 
Margolies, Legislative Liaison (November 13, 1995)(Plaintiff-
Respondent Brief, R-Ap. at 105-29); see also People v. Knox, 903 
N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (N.Y. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 552 (Nov. 
9, 2009) (noting that there was never any sexual evidence in 
relation to the abduction of Jacob Wetterling).  Wisconsin 
adopted the purpose and registration scheme from the Jacob 
Wetterling Act even though the state did not adopt the same 
title.  The legislature's choice of a title, however, does not 
dictate a finding that a statute is unconstitutional.  It is 
Smith who bears the heavy burden of proving that the statute as 
applied to him is irrational in a constitutional sense. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
22 
 
under 
the 
"crimes 
against 
children 
and 
sexually 
violent 
offender" title, just as it does under the "sex offender" title.  
The 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45 
within 
the 
constitutional boundaries of due process and equal protection.  
Requiring someone convicted of false imprisonment of a child to 
register is rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest in protecting the public——particularly children——and in 
assisting law enforcement in those efforts.  
¶28 Smith 
argues, however, that the only legitimate 
government interest of Wis. Stat. § 301.45 is to protect the 
public from sexually motivated offenders.  Accordingly, Smith 
maintains that § 301.45 can reasonably apply only to those who 
commit an offense which has a sexual element or motivation.  
Because his crime of false imprisonment of a minor was not of a 
sexual nature, Smith argues that requiring him to register is 
arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.  In so arguing, however, Smith is essentially asking 
this court to undertake a strict scrutiny review of the statute.  
This court's duty is not to determine whether requiring Smith to 
register as a sex offender is narrowly tailored to his espoused 
purpose of the statute.  Instead, our analysis concerns whether 
requiring Smith to register as a sex offender is rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest. 
¶29 The State responds to Smith's assertions by arguing 
that 
requiring 
registration 
of 
those 
convicted 
of 
false 
imprisonment of a minor, even if the crime is not of a sexual 
nature, 
is 
rationally 
related 
to 
the 
broader 
legitimate 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
23 
 
government interest in protecting the public and assisting law 
enforcement.  The State argues that requiring Smith to register 
is not arbitrary or irrational because (1) false imprisonment is 
linked to the commission of sexual assault and other violence 
against children; (2) it is difficult to determine whether false 
imprisonment has a sexual component; and (3) false imprisonment 
involves the exercise of control over a child's body that puts a 
child in a sexually vulnerable position.  The State also asserts 
that including offenders such as Smith does not diminish the 
registry's value and that Smith's complaints are more properly 
directed to the legislature.  We agree with the State. 
¶30 The 
legislature could have numerous reasons for 
requiring registration of Smith and the class like him, those 
who 
stand 
convicted 
of 
falsely 
imprisoning 
a 
minor.  
Legislatures around the country have acknowledged a nexus 
between child abductions and sexual offenses, and a majority of 
states have enacted similar legislation.24  See People v. 
Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 455-56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), aff'd, 
People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2009) (The legislative 
history of [the Jacob Wetterling Act] reflects that Congress 
intentionally included kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of a 
minor in the crimes subject to registration requirements and was 
well aware of the connection between child abduction and the 
risk of sexual abuse.).  In so requiring child abductors to 
register, the legislature may well have rationally concluded 
                                                 
24 See supra note 4. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
24 
 
that child abductions are often precursors to sexual offenses.  
See People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. 2007) ("Our 
General Assembly, like New York's legislature, recognized that 
aggravated kidnapping can be a precursor to sex offenses against 
children.").25   
¶31 Our legislature could have rationally decided that, on 
balance, it is important to warn the public and law enforcement 
                                                 
25 After the Illinois Supreme Court accepted review of 
People v. Johnson, the Illinois legislature redefined the term 
"sex offense" under the state's Sex Offender Registration Act to 
include aggravated kidnapping of a minor when "the offense was 
sexually motivated."  870 N.E.2d 415, 418 (Ill. 2007) (citing 
730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/2(B)(1.5) (2008)).  Because the 
statute's definition of "sex offense" did not hinge on sexual 
motivation at the time of the defendant's conviction of 
aggravated kidnapping of a minor, Johnson, 870 N.E.2d at 420, 
the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the 
original statute, under which the defendant was placed on the 
sex offender registry, id. at 421.  The original statute defined 
"sex offense" to include aggravated kidnapping when the victim 
is under 18 years of age, and the defendant is not the victim's 
parent.  Id. at 417.  Thus, the defendant was required to 
register 
as 
a 
sex 
offender 
even 
though 
sexual 
assault 
allegations did not accompany his conviction of aggravated 
kidnapping of a minor.  Id. at 420.  The Illinois Supreme Court 
concluded that the original statute was constitutional as 
applied to the defendant:  
The General Assembly then chose to include aggravated 
kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent in the [Sex 
Offender Registration] Act's definition of sex offense 
and, 
consequently, 
to 
impose 
a 
registration 
requirement under the Act on persons convicted of such 
an offense, regardless of whether their conduct was 
sexually motivated.  We will not question the wisdom 
of this choice.  To satisfy the rational basis test, a 
statute need not be the best method of accomplishing a 
legislative goal; it must simply be reasonable. . . . 
Id. at 426. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
25 
 
about those criminals, like Smith, who falsely imprison a minor, 
regardless of whether the State can prove a sexual component.  
Moreover, to require a second layer of proof regarding the 
sexual 
nature 
of 
the 
crime 
would 
prove 
unworkable 
and 
inconsistent.26  Imposing such a requirement would frustrate the 
purpose of the statute and confuse the legitimate goals of the 
legislature.  
¶32 The legislature may have considered those instances 
where 
intervening 
circumstances 
prevent 
an 
abductor 
from 
committing a sexual offense.  Perhaps with this consideration in 
mind, the protection of society and children was properly 
elevated so as to include Smith in the registry regardless of 
whether there is proof that the crime he committed was sexual.  
Is a person who falsely imprisons a minor with the purpose to 
commit a sexual assault less dangerous to the public if the 
assault is thwarted, the child cannot be found, or the child 
cannot communicate about the crime?  An abductor's intentions or 
                                                 
26 If the sexual nature of Smith's conviction for false 
imprisonment had to be assessed, numerous questions quickly 
surface: (1) Must there be a formal pleading?  If so, what must 
be contained within such a pleading?  (2) What attack may be 
leveled against the pleading and what standard applies to allow 
the allegations to survive?  (3) Is a special hearing required?  
If so, when?  By whom?  Are there witnesses or merely an offer 
of proof?  (4) Who bears the burden of proof?  (5) What is the 
burden?  (6) What proof is required and is there a right to 
cross examination?  Significantly, the legislature did provide 
courts instruction regarding how to conduct a hearing when 
deciding whether certain underage offenders may be exempt from 
registering for underage sexual activity.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(1m).  
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
26 
 
actions cannot always be proven or alleged, particularly when a 
child is missing or the body is decomposed.  The protection of 
the public and children is furthered by the fact that the 
statute does not require that the State prove what the abductor 
must have been thinking or whether the abductor committed a 
sexual act.  The legislature chose to protect the public and 
assist law enforcement by requiring certain offenders, like 
Smith, to register regardless of whether proof exists as to the 
crime's sexual underpinnings. 
¶33 We know that a sexual motive or purpose is not 
otherwise an element of the crime of false imprisonment of a 
minor, yet our legislature clearly selected those convicted of 
that crime for sex offender registration.  Smith's argument 
essentially asks that we rewrite the elements of the crime.  We 
decline the invitation. 
¶34 If the legislature intended that Smith be required to 
register only if the false imprisonment of a minor was sexual, 
the requirement would most often prove redundant because the 
offender would likely already register because of the child 
sexual assault provisions of the statute.  Instead, the 
legislature opted to protect the public from those who abduct 
children, regardless of whether a sex crime can be proven.  
People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (N.Y. 2009), cert. denied, 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
27 
 
130 S.Ct. 552 (Nov. 9, 2009).27  The legislation itself is 
unambiguous and provides for mandatory registration of those 
                                                 
27 New 
York's 
high 
court 
recently 
upheld 
the 
constitutionality of a statute almost identical to ours.  See 
Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149.  In Knox, three defendants challenged the 
constitutionality of New York's Sex Offender Registration Act 
(SORA) as applied to them because SORA required them to register 
as sex offenders even though their crimes involved no actual, 
intended or threatened sexual misconduct.  Id. at 1151.  One of 
the defendants, Judy Knox, pled guilty to attempted kidnapping 
after she grabbed the arm of an eight-year-old girl and tried to 
pull her away from a park.  Id. at 1150.  A second defendant, 
Eliezer Cintron, was convicted of unlawful imprisonment of two 
children after he locked his girlfriend and her one- and two-
year-old children in an apartment for several days.  Id. at 
1150-51.  Finally, Francis Jackson pled guilty to attempted 
kidnapping after he abducted his employee-prostitute's son in 
retaliation for the woman trying to quit her job.  Id. at 1151.  
The trial court required all three defendants to register as sex 
offenders under SORA, and the high court affirmed.  Id. 
Similar to the statute challenged in our case, New York's 
SORA requires sex offender registration for any person convicted 
of 
certain 
crimes, 
including 
unlawful 
imprisonment 
and 
kidnapping provided the victim is less than 17 years old and the 
offender is not the parent of the victim.  Id. (citing N.Y. 
Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2010)).  
The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that the state 
legislature had a rational basis for requiring the three 
defendants to register as sex offenders: 
In deciding not to exclude defendants and others 
similarly 
situated 
from 
the 
category 
of 
"sex 
offenders," the Legislature could have considered not 
only that cases where the term is unmerited are few, 
but also that the process of separating those cases 
from the majority in which it is justified is 
difficult, cumbersome and prone to error.  It could 
rationally have found that the administrative burden, 
and the risk that some dangerous sex offenders would 
escape registration, justified a hard and fast rule, 
with no exceptions. . . . 
Id. at 1154. 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
28 
 
convicted of false imprisonment "if the victim was a minor and 
the person who committed the violation was not the victim's 
parent."  See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b).  The legislature 
conditioned registration for that crime on the victim being a 
minor, rather than on the State being able to prove sexual 
motivation.  "'The legislature has the responsibility for 
enacting 
laws 
reflecting 
society's 
appreciation 
of 
the 
seriousness of one crime as opposed to another.'"  Radke, 259 
Wis. 2d 13, ¶29 (internal citation omitted) (holding that more 
severe penalty for Class B felony "serious child offense" under 
"two strikes" law than Class A felony homicide offense under 
"three strikes" law did not violate due process). 
¶35 Additionally, it is conceivable that the legislature 
considered that one "who would confine or restrain a child 
without the child's consent is a greater potential threat to 
public safety than a person involved in a factually consensual 
sexual relationship with a child."  See Joseph E.G., 240 Wis. 2d 
481, ¶12.  Smith stands convicted of falsely imprisoning a 
minor.  The act of restraining a minor's freedom of movement by 
falsely imprisoning that victim is an act of control.28  
Similarly, the crime of sexual assault has been described as one 
that involves an offender's desire to exert control over the 
victim.29  Because of an offender's control over the whereabouts 
                                                 
28 See Wis JI——Criminal 1275 "False Imprisonment." 
29 Wisconsin Coalition Against Sexual Assault describes 
sexual assaults as acts of violence: 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
29 
 
of the child, the victim of a false imprisonment is in a 
vulnerable position.  It is reasonable that the public not be at 
"risk 
that 
some 
dangerous 
sex 
offenders 
would 
escape 
registration," particularly those who falsely imprison a minor.  
Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1154.  The particularly high rates of 
recidivism 
for 
both 
successful 
and 
unsuccessful 
sexually 
motivated 
offenders 
are rational concerns for legislative 
action.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (recognizing that Alaska's 
legislature "could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense 
provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism"); Johnson, 
870 N.E.2d at 424-25 (finding the New York lower court's opinion 
in Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 460, "particularly well reasoned" 
and agreeing that "[i]f the legislature may impose enhanced 
criminal sanctions on defendants who create a risk of violence——
as it does with enhanced sentences for offenses committed with 
                                                                                                                                                             
[Sexual] [a]ssaults are motivated primarily out 
of a sense of entitlement and/or a need to feel 
powerful by controlling, dominating, or humiliating 
the victim.  Victims/survivors of sexual assaults are 
forced, coerced, and/or manipulated to participate in 
unwanted sexual activity.   
If you examine the situations in which sexual 
abuse occurs, there is always a perceived or real 
power differential.  The perpetrator feels entitled to 
take advantage of another person and believes that he 
or she can get away with the crime either because the 
victim will be afraid to tell, or because s/he is 
unlikely to be believed if s/he does tell. 
Sexual 
Assault 
Information, 
http://www.wcasa.org/info/index.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 
2010). 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
30 
 
firearms——it 
certainly 
may 
impose 
noncriminal 
registration 
requirements 
on 
defendants 
who 
create 
a 
risk 
of 
sexual 
assault"). 
¶36 Any or all of these reasons militate against the 
statute being deemed unconstitutional as applied to Smith both 
under the federal constitution and our state constitution.  
Smith has not proven that as applied to him the registration 
requirements are arbitrary or irrational.  See Knox, 903 N.E.2d 
at 1154 ("In short, the Legislature had a rational basis for 
concluding that, in the large majority of cases where people 
kidnap or unlawfully imprison other people's children, the 
children either are sexually assaulted or are in danger of 
sexual assault."); Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415 (Registration for 
kidnapping 
a 
child, 
within 
the 
Illinois 
Sex 
Offender 
Registration Act, was rationally related to the government 
purpose of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement by 
facilitating ready access to information about sex offenders, 
"regardless of whether this offense was sexually motivated.")   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶37 Despite Smith's concessions that the statute is 
facially 
constitutional, 
that 
procedural 
due 
process 
is 
satisfied,30 and that rational basis review applies to his 
                                                 
30 See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 
(2003) (holding that Connecticut's sex offender registry law 
does not violate procedural due process by not providing for a 
hearing on dangerousness because the registry is based on the 
conviction itself, which "a convicted offender has already had a 
procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest"). 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
31 
 
challenge,31 he essentially demands a different and higher level 
of judicial scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45.  Smith requests that this court narrowly tailor 
the legislation to his satisfaction, impose a definition that he 
finds more palatable, and adopt the stated purpose of the 
legislation which he espouses.  In making these requests of the 
court, Smith's arguments blur the lines between substantive and 
procedural 
due 
process, 
between 
facial 
and 
as-applied 
challenges, and between rational basis review and strict 
scrutiny. 
¶38 In reality, our proper judicial role is one of 
restraint and deference.  Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 
576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("Our form of government provides for one 
legislature, not two.").  For the purpose of Smith's as-applied 
challenge, the issue is whether requiring Smith to register as a 
sex offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 is rationally related to 
a legitimate government interest.  Smith has failed to prove 
otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶39 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the legislature 
determined that offenders who are convicted of certain statutes 
must register as sex offenders.  Smith was convicted of an 
                                                 
31 See Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 718-20 (7th Cir. 
2008) (concluding that Wisconsin's sex offense registration 
statute "imposes minimal restrictions on a registrant's physical 
liberty" that are "collateral consequences of a conviction"); 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003) (finding that Alaska's Sex 
Offender Registration Act imposed a "more minor condition of 
registration" that is not the "magnitude of restraint [making] 
individual assessment appropriate"). 
No. 
2008AP1011-CR   
 
32 
 
offense for which registration is required.  We have outlined 
numerous conceivable, rational reasons why the legislature could 
have so chosen to include registration for Smith, who was 
convicted of false imprisonment of a minor, regardless of 
whether his crime was of a sexual nature.  Smith fails to 
establish that any of these conceivable policy decisions are 
arbitrarily or irrationally applied to him.  
¶40 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 is constitutional 
as applied to Smith because requiring Smith to register under 
§ 301.45 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.  Smith has failed to prove that the registration 
requirements of § 301.45 as applied to him are unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶41 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  When James 
Smith was 17 years old, he was convicted of falsely imprisoning 
another 17-year-old boy for the purpose of collecting a drug 
debt.  Smith, the State, the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, and the majority all agree that "there is no allegation 
that the false imprisonment entailed anything sexual."  Majority 
op., ¶3.  Nevertheless, based on this conviction, the majority 
concludes that there is a rational basis for making Smith 
register as a sex offender. 
¶42 The 
majority rejects Smith's assertion that the 
purpose of the sex offender registry is to protect the public 
from sex offenders.  Id., ¶¶9-10, 28.  Rather, it concludes that 
the legislative purpose behind the sex offender registry is to 
"protect the public and assist law enforcement."  Id., ¶¶26, 29.  
It determines that there is nothing arbitrary about requiring 
Smith to register as a sex offender because "Smith was convicted 
of an offense for which registration is required" and because 
the legislature could have concluded that "in the large majority 
of cases where people kidnap or unlawfully imprison other 
people's children, the children either are sexually assaulted or 
are in danger of sexual assault."  Id., ¶¶39, 36 (quoting New 
York v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (N.Y. 2009)).  
¶43 Two essential errors drive the majority's analysis.  
First, the majority fails to carefully define the purpose of the 
statute.  Its broad statement of the statutory purpose evinces 
an unwillingness to provide meaningful review.  Second, the 
majority mischaracterizes Smith's challenge.  In so doing, the 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
majority blurs the distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges and ducks the constitutional challenge that is the 
subject of this appeal. 
¶44 As a result of these errors, the majority abdicates 
its responsibility to determine whether there is a rational 
basis for requiring Smith to register as a sex offender.  
Contrary to the majority, when I examine the legislative purpose 
behind the sex offender registry, I conclude that there is no 
rational basis for making Smith register as a sex offender when 
everybody acknowledges that there was nothing sexual about his 
offense.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶45 The majority opinion has set forth the test to 
determine the constitutionality of a statutory requirement under 
rational basis review as follows: Does the means selected by the 
legislature bear a reasonable and rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental purpose (or interest or objective) 
advanced by the statute?  See majority op., ¶¶11, 12.1  
Therefore, the question presented here is: Does requiring Smith 
to register as a sex offender because he was convicted of false 
imprisonment of a minor who was not his child bear a reasonable 
and rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose?  
¶46 Analyzing and articulating the legitimate governmental 
purpose is the first and often most important step in 
determining the constitutionality of a statute.  The rational 
                                                 
1 Although the majority uses "purpose," "interest," and 
"objective" 
interchangeably, 
for 
consistency, 
I 
will 
use 
"purpose."  
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
basis test depends on a careful description of the governmental 
purpose.  However the purpose is stated by the court——carefully, 
carelessly, narrowly, broadly, or far ranging——it often becomes 
determinative of whether the statute passes constitutional 
muster. 
 
Thus, 
there 
is 
substantial 
need 
for 
accuracy, 
specificity, and analysis when articulating the nature of the 
government's legitimate purpose.  
¶47 Unfortunately, 
the 
majority 
fails 
to 
carefully 
identify the legitimate governmental purpose advanced by the sex 
offender registry, Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  It declares that the 
purpose advanced by the sex offender registry is "to protect the 
public and assist law enforcement."  ¶¶10, 13, 26, 27.  This 
statement of the governmental purpose is far too broad to permit 
meaningful due process or equal protection review.     
¶48 With the governmental purpose stated so broadly, 
mandatory "sex offender" registration would be justified for 
many disparate offenses, even offenses that have no nexus 
whatsoever to a sexual crime or even to the risk of such a 
crime.  A conviction for violating most provisions of the 
Wisconsin Criminal Code could trigger mandatory "sex offender" 
registration 
to 
advance 
the 
purpose 
of 
"assisting 
law 
enforcement."  Further, because traffic offenders may create a 
danger to the public, any offender found guilty of a traffic 
infraction could be required to register as a "sex offender."  
Applying the broad purpose articulated by the majority, the 
court would necessarily conclude that registration requirements 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
for most criminal and traffic offenses are rationally related to 
the "purpose" underlying the sex offender registry.    
¶49 As authority for its rendition of the governmental 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the majority cites a quotation 
from State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶21, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199.  Majority op., ¶26.  Its reliance on Bollig is a 
classic example of a court yanking a quotation out of context to 
give the illusion of adhering to precedent.  
¶50 Bollig was decided nearly ten years ago under a prior 
version of the statute and in a much different context than at 
issue in this case.  At issue in Bollig was whether a failure to 
inform a defendant of his registry requirements at the time he 
entered a guilty plea was a violation of his constitutional 
rights.  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶1.  The court held that the 
statute did not "evince the intent to punish sex offenders, but 
rather reflect[ed] the intent to protect the public and assist 
law enforcement."  Id., ¶21.  Thus, the registry requirement was 
not a direct consequence of conviction but rather, it was merely 
a "collateral consequence."  Id., ¶27.  Because the statute was 
non-punitive, the court determined that a plea colloquy need not 
explicitly state the registry requirement, and the defendant was 
not entitled to withdraw his plea.  Id.   
¶51 The focus in Bollig was not on the legitimate 
governmental purpose of Wis. Stat. § 301.45 as it pertains to a 
substantive due process or equal protection analysis.  Rather, 
the Bollig court's focus was on whether the statute qualified as 
a direct consequence of conviction for purposes of a plea 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
colloquy.  At the time Bollig was decided, dissemination of the 
sex offender registry was limited.2  Thus, the court concluded 
that 
the 
registry 
was 
not 
"akin 
to 
traditional 
shaming 
punishments" because the statute "[did] not allow for the 
indiscriminate 
publication 
of 
a 
sex 
offender's 
vital 
information."  Id., ¶¶23-24.  A general expression that the 
statute is non-punitive——the statute is not designed to punish 
but rather is designed to "protect the public and help law 
enforcement"——was a sufficient statement of the legislative 
intent for the purposes of the issue in that case.   
¶52 However, the analysis in Bollig regarding the purpose 
of 
the 
sex 
offender 
registry 
law 
is 
not 
a 
sufficient 
articulation of a legitimate governmental purpose under an equal 
protection or substantive due process review.  By superimposing 
the legislative intent found in Bollig onto a due process and 
equal 
protection 
challenge, 
the 
court 
waters 
down 
its 
constitutional analysis.  
¶53 The level of generality of the majority's statement of 
the legitimate governmental purpose makes a mockery of the 
rational basis test and evinces the majority's unwillingness to 
conduct any form of meaningful judicial review.  It signals, in 
essence, the court's refusal to test legislation under the equal 
protection and substantive due process provisions of the federal 
and state constitutions.  Under the majority's approach, the 
people of the state lose "the touchstone of due process [] 
                                                 
2 Bollig was decided several months before 1999 Wis. Act 89 
created Wis. Stat. § 301.46(5n), requiring an Internet site 
providing sex offender information.   
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
government."  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). 
¶54 The actual governmental purpose advanced by Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45 is easily identified.  It may be stated simply as 
protecting 
people——especially 
children——from 
sexual 
crimes.  
This purpose is evinced by the types of offenses that trigger 
the registration requirement,3 the title of the registry,4 and 
the legislative history of the Jacob Wetterling Act.5   
                                                 
3 In addition to child kidnapping and false imprisonment, 
the following offenses trigger mandatory registration: sexual 
exploitation by therapist; sexual assault (first, second, or 
third degree); incest; sexual assault of a child (first or 
second degree); engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of 
the same child; sexual exploitation of a child; trafficking of a 
child (defined as trafficking for the purpose of commercial sex 
acts or sexually explicit performance); causing a child to view 
or listen to sexual activity; incest with a child; child 
enticement for the purpose of having sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with the child; child enticement for the purpose of 
causing the child to engage in prostitution; child enticement 
for the purpose of exposing a sex organ to the child or causing 
the child to expose a sex organ; child enticement for the 
purpose of recording the child engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; use of a computer to facilitate a child sex crime; 
soliciting a child for prostitution; sexual assault of a child 
placed in substitute care; sexual assault of a child by a school 
staff person or a person who works or volunteers with children; 
exposing a child to harmful material or harmful descriptions or 
narrations; possession of child pornography; child sex offender 
working with children; human trafficking if the trafficking is 
for the purposes of a commercial sex act.  Aside from kidnapping 
and false imprisonment, every one of the crimes triggering 
mandatory registration contains a sexual element.   
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
II 
¶55 It may be that the legislature's choice to include the 
crime of false imprisonment of a minor is rationally related to 
the 
legitimate 
governmental purpose of protecting people, 
especially children, from sexual crimes.  The legislature could 
have concluded that false imprisonment of a child is often a 
precursor to sexual abuse or exploitation of that child, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The registry's title is consistent with the public 
explanation of the registry's purpose.  The homepage of the sex 
offender registry website states: "[This website] will [] serve 
to enhance public awareness about sexual violence in our 
communities and provide valuable information about the ways in 
which individuals and communities can protect themselves and 
those they love from acts of sexual violence."  Wisconsin Dep't 
Corrections, 
Sex 
Offender 
Registry, 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/home.jsp 
(last 
visited 
Nov. 25, 2009).  The homepage links to a page containing notices 
and disclaimers, which claims: "This law requires registration 
of individuals who have been convicted of certain sexual 
offenses."  Wisconsin Dep't Corrections, Notices & Disclaimers, 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/disclaimer.jsp 
(last 
visited Nov. 25, 2009). 
5 When the Jacob Wetterling Act was initially introduced in 
1992, the sponsor stated: "[This Act] may require some of us to 
choose between two interests.  On one hand, we must protect 
children from sexual abuse and exploitation.  On the other hand, 
there are those whose priority is in protecting convicted child 
sex offenders from the inconvenience of registering their 
addresses once a year."  In 1993, the sponsor explained: "Sexual 
crimes against children are more pervasive than we would like to 
believe. . . . The tragedy of sexual abuse and molestation of 
children is compounded by the fact that child sex offenders tend 
to be serial offenders."  "Under the Jacob Wetterling bill, a 
registration requirement would be triggered by the conviction of 
a sexual crime against a child."  
The 
majority 
opinion 
appears 
to 
agree 
that 
false 
imprisonment was included as an offense triggering registration 
because of a purported link to sexual assault.  See majority 
op., ¶¶31-33.   
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
that an individual who has falsely imprisoned a child should be 
required to register in order to protect other children from the 
risk of sexual crimes.  
¶56 This appears to be the conclusion advanced by the 
majority——that the "nexus" between false imprisonment of a child 
and a sexual crime against that child justifies the registration 
requirement.  See majority op., ¶30.  The majority states: "[I]n 
the large majority of cases where people kidnap or unlawfully 
imprison other people's children, the children either are 
sexually assaulted or are in danger of sexual assault."  
Majority op., ¶36 (quoting Knox, 903 N.E. 2d at 1154) (emphasis 
added).   
¶57 Here, however, we need not decide whether the statute 
survives a facial challenge because Smith makes an as-applied 
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.  He contends 
that 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
facts 
of 
his 
underlying 
false 
imprisonment 
conviction, 
forcing 
him 
to 
register 
is 
not 
rationally related to the governmental purpose of protecting the 
public from sexual crimes.  Despite reiterating the phrase "as 
applied to Smith" countless times,6 the majority does not 
undertake 
an 
analysis 
appropriate 
to 
an 
as-applied 
constitutional challenge. 
¶58 A 
defendant 
may 
challenge 
a 
statute 
as 
being 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied.  "[A] facial 
challenge requires the court to examine the words of the statute 
                                                 
6 See majority op., ¶¶1, 2, 7, 12, 16, 36, 40. 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
on a cold page and without reference to the defendant's 
conduct."  People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 35 (N.Y. 2003).   
¶59 By contrast, "an as-applied challenge calls on the 
court to consider whether a statute can be constitutionally 
applied to the defendant under the facts of the case."  Id.  The 
court must assess the merits of the defendant's as-applied 
challenge 
by 
"considering 
the 
facts 
of 
his 
case, 
not 
hypothetical facts in other situations."  State v. Hamdan, 2003 
WI 113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.   
¶60 "In an as-applied challenge, if the statute in 
question cannot be constitutionally applied to the litigant, 
then she will prevail without having to show that no set of 
circumstances 
exists 
under 
which 
the 
statute 
could 
be 
constitutionally applied to someone else."  Michael C. Dorf, 
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. 
Rev. 235, 239 (1994); see also State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 
1205 (Fla. 2004) (holding that as applied to the facts of the 
case where the State conceded that the crime contained no sexual 
element and the circumstances of the crime belied any sexual 
motive, 
mandatory 
sex 
offender 
registration 
violated 
the 
defendant's due process of law); State v. Small, 833 N.E.2d 774 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that as applied to the facts of 
the defendant's conviction for kidnapping, the registration 
requirements were unconstitutional).   
¶61 Because Smith poses an as-applied challenge, the 
majority must tie the legitimate government purpose underlying 
the sex offender registry to the facts of Smith's case.  Smith 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
contends that there is no rational basis for making him register 
because it is undisputed "that his underlying conviction had no 
sexual element or motivation."7  Thus, the question presented is 
whether the registration requirement is constitutional even 
though it is undisputed that Smith's crime of false imprisonment 
was not sexually motivated and involved no sexual act or 
misconduct. 
¶62 The majority ducks the actual question presented by 
flipping it on its head.  Instead, it chooses to tackle a far 
easier question: is there a rational basis for making Smith 
register even if a prosecutor cannot prove that his crime had a 
sexual 
element 
or 
motivation? 
 
See 
majority 
op., 
¶31 
("regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
State 
can 
prove 
a 
sexual 
component"); id. ("to require a second layer of proof regarding 
the sexual nature of the crime"); id., ¶32 ("regardless of 
whether there is proof that the crime he committed was sexual"); 
id. ("regardless of whether proof exists as to the crime's 
sexual underpinnings"); id., ¶34 ("regardless of whether a sex 
crime can be proven").   
¶63 To answer 
this question, the majority addresses 
hypothetical facts.  It asks: "Is a person who falsely imprisons 
                                                 
7 Smith was originally charged with party to the crime of 
taking a hostage, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.305 and 939.05.  
A conviction for hostage taking is not a crime that triggers 
mandatory sex offender registration.  Smith pled down to false 
imprisonment, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.30.  It is clear from 
the sentencing transcript that neither the sentencing judge nor 
the author of the presentence investigation contemplated the 
possibility that Smith would be required to register as a sex 
offender under the statute. 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
a minor with the purpose to commit a sexual assault less 
dangerous to the public if the assault is thwarted, the child 
cannot be found, or the child cannot communicate about the 
crime?"  Majority op., ¶32 (emphasis added).  It states further: 
"An abductor's intentions or actions cannot always be proven or 
alleged, particularly when a child is missing or the body is 
decomposed."  Id. (emphasis added).   
¶64 These hypothetical inquires are not applicable here, 
and none of the majority's analysis justifies the inclusion of 
Smith based on the facts of his case.  As a result, the majority 
fails 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
statute 
is 
arbitrary 
or 
irrational as applied to Smith and fails to squarely address the 
claim in this appeal.   
¶65 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that there is no 
rational basis for requiring Smith, who committed no sexual 
offense, to register as a sex offender.  The government purpose 
of protecting the public——particularly children——from sexual 
crimes is not reasonably related to the requirement imposed by 
law that he register as a sex offender.  To the contrary, the 
governmental purpose may be undermined by requiring non-sex 
offenders to register.  When the registry is clogged by 
offenders who bear no meaningful relationship to its legislative 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
purpose, the court undermines the legislative purpose in 
creating the registry.8   
¶66 The majority holds its analysis up as "a paradigm of 
judicial restraint."  Majority op., ¶17.  To the contrary, I 
conclude that it has abdicated its responsibility.  The majority 
fails to provide meaningful review, thus depriving citizens of 
the touchstone of due process protection of the individual 
against 
arbitrary 
action 
of 
the 
government. 
 
By 
mischaracterizing the defendant’s challenge, it blurs the 
distinction 
between 
as-applied 
and 
facial 
challenges.  
                                                 
8 A recent news report indicates that "[t]he sheer numbers 
of sex offenders on the registries in all 50 states . . . are 
overwhelming to local police departments and, at times, to the 
public, who may not easily distinguish between those who must 
register because they have repeatedly raped children and those 
convicted of nonviolent or less serious crimes, like exposing 
themselves in public."  Monica Davey, Case Shows Limits of Sex 
Offender Alert Programs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2009.  The mother 
of Jacob Wetterling, who has been an activist against sexual 
violence since her son was kidnapped, commented: "The thing that 
is hard to remember is that all people on a registry are not the 
same, and we need to distinguish between them."  Id.  So much 
the more so for James Smith, who was convicted of a crime where 
there is no indication of a sexual motivation or element. 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
Ultimately, by ducking the actual facts of this case, it 
diminishes the effectiveness of the registry in protecting the 
public——especially children——from sexual crimes.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2008AP1011-CR.awb 
 
1