Title: DeBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson
Citation: 2011 WI 64
Docket Number: 2009AP000564
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2011

2011 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP564 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
DeBoer Transportation, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Charles Swenson, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 54 
324 Wis. 2d 485, 781 N.W. 2d 709 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 06, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward F. Zappen, Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by John R. Jokela, John Jokela Law Firm LLC, 
Wausau. 
For the Plaintiff-Appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Michael J. Lauterback, Nash Law Group Attorneys at 
Law, S.C., Wisconsin Rapids. 
 
 
2011 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP564 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV175) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
deBoer Transportation, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles Swenson, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a published 
opinion of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit court's 
order2 affirming the Labor and Industry Review Commission's 
(LIRC) 
opinion 
and 
order 
requiring 
deBoer 
Transportation 
(deBoer) to pay Charles Swenson (Swenson) $36,193.66 in back pay 
                                                 
1 deBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 2010 WI App 54, 324 
Wis. 2d 485, 781 N.W.2d 709. 
2 The Honorable Edward F. Zappen, Jr. of Wood County 
presided.  
No. 
2009AP564   
 
2 
 
for deBoer's unreasonable refusal to rehire Swenson following 
Swenson's work-related injury.  The issue presented to this 
court 
is 
whether, 
under Wisconsin's worker's compensation 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) (2009-10),3 deBoer refused to 
rehire Swenson without reasonable cause.  Specifically, we must 
determine whether, in reaching its conclusion that deBoer failed 
to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson, LIRC 
applied an unreasonable interpretation of § 102.35(3), or based 
its conclusion on findings of fact that were not supported by 
credible and substantial evidence in the record.   
¶2 
We hold that in reaching its conclusion that deBoer 
failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3).  LIRC concluded that 
deBoer did not show reasonable cause because deBoer failed to 
adequately explain why it would be an unreasonable burden to 
change its check-ride policy so that Swenson could meet his 
personal care obligations.  Section 102.35(3), however, does not 
require an employer to change its legitimate and long-standing 
safety policies in order to assist an employee in meeting 
personal obligations.  Therefore, by adding this requirement 
into the statute, LIRC contravened the words of the statute.   
¶3 
Additionally, we hold that LIRC's conclusion that 
deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
3 
 
that the check-ride policy was pretext, was not supported by 
credible and substantial evidence.   
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals that remanded for dismissal of Swenson's claim against 
deBoer. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Facts 
¶5 
Many of the relevant facts are based on the findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted by LIRC.  However, 
because this case requires us to review whether LIRC's findings 
of facts are supported by credible and substantial evidence, we 
review the record independently.  When we derive material facts 
from sources other than the ALJ's decision, we so note. 
¶6 
Wausau Carriers, a trucking company, hired Swenson as 
a truck driver in 2003.  Swenson drove a commercial motor 
vehicle, i.e., a semi-truck with a sleeping area.  Swenson drove 
a "daily" or "local" route, leaving around midnight and 
returning at 10 a.m.  This route allowed him to be home during 
the day.   
¶7 
Driving a route that allowed Swenson to be home during 
the day was convenient for Swenson because he was the primary 
caregiver for his terminally ill father.  Swenson was able to 
care for his father during the day and, therefore, did not need 
to hire a daytime nurse.  However, because Swenson's father 
needed around-the-clock assistance, a state-provided nurse cared 
for him at night when Swenson was working.   
No. 
2009AP564   
 
4 
 
¶8 
On August 1, 2005, deBoer took over Wausau Carriers.  
DeBoer retained Swenson as an employee, and Swenson continued to 
drive the same route.  Shortly thereafter, on August 23, 2005, 
Swenson sustained a work-related injury to his left knee.4  As a 
result of the injury, Swenson was unable to work until 
January 22, 2006.  During the time he was unable to work, 
Swenson received worker's compensation benefits.   
¶9 
Initially upon returning to work, Swenson worked in 
deBoer's office.  His doctors cleared him to return to his 
regular duties on February 27, 2006.  When deBoer learned from 
the worker's compensation adjuster that Swenson was cleared to 
return to his regular duties, Cindy Vogel (Vogel), deBoer's 
worker's compensation administrator, sent Swenson a letter5 
explaining deBoer's reorientation process for drivers who have 
been off work, for any reason, for more than two months.  
Specifically, the letter advised Swenson to:  "Please note your 
Professional Driver work manual, driver[s] off work for more 
than 2 months are required to complete orientation, complete a 
minimum of one trip with another driver to regain the skills 
necessary to safely operate a commercial motor vehicle and pass 
DOT re-certification tests."   
¶10 The manual referred to in Vogel's letter contains two 
provisions relevant to this appeal.  First, under the section 
                                                 
4 The parties agree the injury was work related. 
5 Facts relating to the letter are taken from Vogel's 
testimony and the letter itself.  Both are part of the record 
before us. 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
5 
 
entitled 
"Work 
Related 
Accidents 
or 
Illnesses," 
and 
the 
subsection "Employees returning to work," the manual states 
that: 
Drivers who are off work for any reason for more 
than 2 months are required to:  
1. 
Complete orientation 
2. 
Complete a minimum of one trip with another 
driver to regain the necessary skills that were not 
used while off work. 
Second, under the section "Leaves of Absence" and the subsection 
"Workers' Compensation Leave," the manual states, "Drivers who 
are [out] of work for any reason for more than 2 months are 
required to complete orientation and begin as a 2nd seat driver 
and progress through the regular procedures to regain the 
necessary skills that were not used while off work." 
¶11 In 
addition 
to 
referencing 
the 
orientation 
requirements set forth in deBoer's manual, Vogel's letter 
notified Swenson that arrangements for his re-certification 
drug-test and classroom orientation had been made for Monday, 
February 27, and Tuesday, February 28.  Swenson complied with 
deBoer's orientation requirements scheduled for the week of 
February 27.  He took the drug-test and participated in the 
classroom training.  In addition, he completed the road test 
required by the Department of Transportation (DOT).  The DOT 
road test took approximately 15 minutes and included driving a 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
6 
 
commercial truck down a highway, turning the truck around, and 
backing it up.6  Swenson passed this test.  
¶12 When Swenson completed the orientation, Dan Garcia 
(Garcia), 
deBoer's 
safety director, contacted Swenson and 
advised Swenson that pursuant to deBoer's safety policy, Swenson 
was required to go on an overnight check-ride with a certified 
driver before returning to work.  Swenson was told the check-
ride could last anywhere from a few days to weeks.  Upon 
learning that the check-ride would potentially require him to be 
away from home for an extended time period, Swenson informed 
Garcia that he would be unable to do the check-ride because he 
needed to be home daily to care for his ailing father.  Swenson 
requested that Garcia find someone to train him locally or, in 
the alternative, that deBoer pay for a nurse to care for his 
father while he was on the check-ride.  
¶13 DeBoer was unwilling to accede to Swenson's requests.  
Garcia testified that he was unable to consent to Swenson's 
first request because none of the drivers currently driving day 
routes were "driver trainers."7  He explained that deBoer had 
                                                 
6 The details of the DOT road test are taken from Swenson's 
testimony at the administrative hearing. 
7 Garcia explained what made driver trainers distinct from 
the typical driver at deBoer:  "Those individuals have been 
approved by management, and upon approval have been sent to 
school for five days worth of classes to learn how to not only 
teach but evaluate a person's skills to see whether or not they 
are capable of doing this job in a safe manner; [they have] also 
been trained to communicate back to that person and back to 
management what they [] saw and of course this is done again to 
ensure safety."   
No. 
2009AP564   
 
7 
 
already dispatched a driver from out-of-state to come to 
Wisconsin to take Swenson on his check-ride.  DeBoer also 
refused to cover the expenses of a day nurse to care for 
Swenson's father while he was away on the check-ride.   
¶14 Swenson investigated the cost of hiring a daytime 
nurse to care for his father.  Finding daytime assistance too 
costly, Swenson again refused to complete the check-ride.  
Following Swenson's refusal to go on the check-ride, deBoer 
discharged Swenson.  
B.  Procedural History 
a.  Administrative hearing and decision 
¶15 Based on the above circumstances, Swenson sought 
benefits 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.35(3)8 
alleging 
deBoer 
unreasonably refused to rehire him.  On December 29, 2006, he 
requested an administrative hearing by the Department of 
Workforce 
Development, Worker's Compensation Division.  A 
hearing was held before an ALJ.9  
¶16 At the administrative hearing, Garcia acknowledged 
that the check-ride was not required by the DOT or any federal 
regulations.  He stated, however, that liability and safety are 
                                                                                                                                                             
This testimony, and Garcia's assertion that there were not 
driver trainers driving local routes, was taken from the 
administrative hearing transcript.  It is uncontroverted. 
8 See infra section II.B. for a discussion of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.35(3). 
9 Judge Mary Lynn Endter was the presiding ALJ.    
No. 
2009AP564   
 
8 
 
"[a]bsolutely [the] Number 1 concern" of deBoer.  He explained 
that the check-ride policy is in place to meet these concerns:  
[The] policy is set in place to protect people and the 
public, we have to make sure that the trucks that we 
put out there on the road and the drivers we put in 
those trucks on the road are qualified, safe drivers, 
and the road test, the brief road test that is done in 
orientation does not suffice to [do] that, it doesn't 
give us enough information to know that the driver and 
the truck is qualified to fully handle the day-in and 
day-out duties of that job.  
Similarly, Vogel explained:  
[T]he whole idea of the skills assessment trip is 
these people are off for . . . and out of the tractors 
and off the public highways for a given period of time 
which can even change seasons, you know, they may get 
hurt in the summertime, they return when the road 
changes, do they have these skills, can they get in 
and out, are they safe, have they recovered to the 
point where they can operate this vehicle?  No, we 
can't make an exception. 
Vogel also testified that in the 25 years she has worked as the 
worker's compensation coordinator for deBoer, an exception to 
the check-ride policy had not been granted.  She stated that she 
was unaware of a single driver who was off work for more than 60 
days who did not go on a check-ride.  Vogel stressed that it was 
deBoer's intention to rehire Swenson.10   
¶17 Following the May 2007 hearing, the ALJ issued a 
written decision.  After noting that this case was "[i]n many 
ways [] a tie" and "[i]n baseball, the tie goes to the runner," 
the ALJ concluded that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire 
                                                 
10 The majority of this testimony was taken from the hearing 
transcript as well as LIRC's dissenting opinion. 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
9 
 
Swenson and was, therefore, liable to Swenson for a year of lost 
wages.   
¶18 First, the ALJ found that Swenson did not quit his 
employment with deBoer.  Rather, Swenson was at all times 
interested in continuing his employment.  Therefore, because 
Swenson was an employee who was injured in the course of 
employment and was not rehired, Swenson had met his prima facie 
case under Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3).  The burden then shifted to 
deBoer to show reasonable cause for its failure to rehire 
Swenson.   
¶19 The ALJ acknowledged that under Wisconsin case law an 
employer is allowed to refuse to rehire an employee for 
legitimate business reasons.  She also acknowledged that the 
check-ride policy ensured that drivers returning to work were 
safe which, in the ALJ's words, is "certainly a legitimate 
concern."  Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that in this case 
deBoer used its check-ride policy as pretext for its refusal to 
rehire Swenson:  "This was a case where one could infer that 
deBoer was not interested in keeping Mr. Swenson as an employee 
and used its policy on check-rides as its reason even though Mr. 
Swenson had mitigating circumstances."  
¶20 The ALJ then went on to highlight that deBoer could 
have changed its check-ride policy so that Swenson could satisfy 
his personal care obligations: 
Mr. Swenson was not asking deBoer for an exception to 
the policy requiring [the check-ride].  He was asking 
if some alternative arrangement could be made for the 
check-ride.  As best as one can tell from the 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
10 
 
testimony of the two deBoer witnesses, alternatives 
were not explored.  They took a blind approach to this 
policy and for them that was the end of it.  Was that 
a 
reasonable 
approach 
given 
Mr. 
Swenson's 
circumstances?  In short, it was not.  
This is not a case where Mr. Swenson had 
restrictions and deBoer could not provide work to 
accommodate those restrictions.  DeBoer would not be 
required to make work for Mr. Swenson under the 
statute.  But if an employer can provide suitable work 
with some accommodations, then why would an employer 
not attempt to find some accommodation for the type of 
problem Mr. Swenson was faced with?   
Based on the ALJ's findings that the check-ride was pretext and 
that deBoer could have changed the policy so that Swenson could 
meet his personal care obligations, the ALJ concluded that 
deBoer had not met its burden to show that it had reasonable 
cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson. 
b.  LIRC's decision 
¶21 DeBoer appealed the ALJ's decision to LIRC.  LIRC 
issued a two-paragraph memorandum opinion, in which it agreed 
with the findings and order of the ALJ.  Swenson v. deBoer 
Transp., Inc., WCD No. 2005-030091 (LIRC Feb. 27, 2008).  LIRC 
began its opinion by stating that it "concurred" with the ALJ's 
opinion.  Id. at 2.  It then continued: 
[T]he employer did not credibly explain how the 
applicant's fitness to resume over-the-road driving 
could only have been evaluated by an overnight road 
trip.  If it was night driving the employer was 
concerned about, it could have required the applicant 
to have gone out with an observer on a night driving 
trip, with a return home the following morning.  This 
would have been precisely the type of route the 
applicant had driven in his pre-injury employment.  
The employer's unyielding insistence that there be an 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
11 
 
extended 
overnight 
trip 
was 
unexplained 
and 
unreasonable. 
The simple accommodation the applicant requested 
for the testing process was reasonable, and it would 
not have jeopardized any of the employer's safety 
concerns. 
 
The 
applicant 
merely 
asked 
for 
an 
alternative schedule so that he could care for his 
terminally ill father, but the employer gave no 
explanation for failing to even consider this request.  
As noted by the administrative law judge, the employer 
had the burden of demonstrating reasonable cause for 
discharging the applicant, but failed to carry that 
burden. The employer's safety director refused to 
discuss any possible accommodation with the applicant, 
resulting in what constituted a discharge.  
Id.  LIRC then concluded that it was reasonable to infer that 
Swenson's injury played a role in deBoer's refusal to rehire 
Swenson:  "The employer's actions evinced an unreasonable 
disregard for the applicant's circumstances, leading to the 
credible inference that the work injury did play a part in the 
discharge."  Id.   
¶22 Commissioner Robert Glaser filed a dissenting opinion.  
Id. 
at 
3. 
 
According 
to 
Commissioner 
Glaser, 
deBoer 
"unambiguously demonstrated that it acted reasonably [when it 
refused to rehire Swenson], and that because of the applicant's 
actions it had good cause not to rehire him."  Id.  Commissioner 
Glaser underscored that the uncontroverted testimony at the 
administrative hearing illustrated that the purpose of the 
check-ride was to ensure the safety of deBoer's drivers and the 
public.  Id. at 3-4.  Moreover, Swenson was entirely capable of 
fulfilling the check-ride, as evidenced by the fact that Swenson 
testified he would go on the check-ride if deBoer would pay for 
daytime nursing care for his father.  Id. at 4.  Given the 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
12 
 
uncontroverted facts adduced at the hearing, Commissioner Glaser 
concluded, "In this case the only credible evidence of record 
demonstrates that there was no violation of the statute."  Id. 
at 5. 
c.  Circuit court decision 
¶23 DeBoer sought circuit court review, naming Swenson and 
LIRC.  DeBoer alleged that LIRC acted without or in excess of 
its powers when it concluded that deBoer unreasonably refused to 
rehire Swenson.11  Specifically, deBoer alleged that LIRC's facts 
were not supported by the evidence. 
¶24 After briefings and a hearing on the matter, the 
circuit court issued an oral ruling affirming LIRC's decision.  
The circuit court first concluded that based on the record, it 
cannot be inferred that Swenson was fired because of his knee 
injury.  The circuit court called the inference "preposterous" 
because there was "no evidence to support it."  Nonetheless, the 
circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision based on deBoer's work 
manual.  The court found the policy nebulous with regard to 
overnight trips.  Because, in the court's opinion, Swenson did 
everything required by the written policy, the circuit court 
summarily concluded that it must give deference to LIRC. 
d.  Court of appeals decision 
¶25 DeBoer appealed and the court of appeals, in a 
published decision, reversed and remanded for dismissal of 
Swenson's claim.  deBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 2010 WI App 
                                                 
11 Pl.'s Compl. 1-2. 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
13 
 
54, ¶20, 324 Wis. 2d 485, 781 N.W.2d 709.  The court of appeals 
concluded that LIRC's decision requiring deBoer to demonstrate 
why accommodating Swenson's personal obligations by changing its 
check-ride policy would have compromised safety or caused a 
financial burden on deBoer was erroneous.  Id., ¶12.  According 
to the court of appeals, this "amounts to an incorrect 
interpretation of the statute because it requires something more 
than reasonable cause."  Id.  The court opined that by enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3), the legislature did not intend to 
"require employers to assess which non-work, non-injury-related 
requests merit accommodations and which do not" and that it was 
not unreasonable under § 102.35(3) for deBoer to refuse to 
adjust to the "non-work, non-injury-related issue in Swenson's 
life."  Id., ¶¶15-16.   
¶26 With regard to pretext, the court of appeals concluded 
that LIRC's pretext analysis added "nothing to its reasonable 
cause analysis [because] [t]he commission's sole reason for 
finding that deBoer's check-ride requirement was a pretext was 
deBoer's failure to present evidence that it would have been an 
unreasonable burden to accommodate Swenson in providing care for 
his father."  Id., ¶19. 
¶27 The court of appeals did not decide what level of 
deference to afford LIRC's decision in this case because LIRC 
engaged 
in 
an 
unreasonable 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.35(3).  Id., ¶10.  According to the court of appeals, 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
14 
 
"[a]n unreasonable application of a statutory standard will not 
be upheld under any level of deference." 12  Id. 
¶28 We granted review and now affirm the court of 
appeals.13   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶29 When reviewing a worker's compensation claim, we 
review LIRC's decision, not the decisions of the circuit court 
or court of appeals.  Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶14, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.  In this case, we are asked to 
review LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show "reasonable 
cause" for its refusal to rehire Swenson.  Reasonable cause is a 
mixed question of fact and law.  Ray Hutson Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
LIRC, 186 Wis. 2d 118, 122, 519 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶30 "LIRC's findings of historic fact must be upheld on 
review if there is credible and substantial evidence in the 
record on which reasonable persons could rely to make the same 
findings."  Begel v. LIRC, 2001 WI App 134, ¶5, 246 Wis. 2d 345, 
631 N.W.2d 220; Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).14   
                                                 
12 Judge Dykman filed a dissenting opinion in which he 
opined that he would give great weight deference to LIRC, and 
under this great weight standard, "LIRC was entitled to believe 
that no useful purpose would be served by requiring Swenson to 
take an extended overnight trip when his future employment would 
have nothing to do with that type of driving."  deBoer, 324 
Wis. 2d 485, ¶34.    
13 Of note, LIRC was a party to this case in the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  However, it did not file a 
petition for review in this court or participate in our review. 
14 Under Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6): 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
15 
 
¶31 Once the facts are established, whether they give rise 
to reasonable cause under Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) requires us to 
examine the construction of the statute and its application to 
the facts.  "The construction of a statute and its application 
to undisputed facts are questions of law that we [] review 
independently."  Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶14; see also 
Ray Hutson, 186 Wis. 2d at 122 ("Once the facts are established, 
whether they give rise to reasonable cause is a question of 
law."). 
 
However, 
when 
reviewing 
administrative 
agency 
decisions, depending on the circumstances, we may give deference 
to the agency's interpretation of a statute.  Cnty. of Dane, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, ¶14.   
¶32 We employ one of three levels of deference in 
reviewing an administrative agency's statutory interpretation 
and application:  great weight deference, due weight deference, 
or de novo review.  Id. 
¶33 We afford an agency's interpretation and application 
of a statute great weight deference if the following four 
requirements are met: 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the commission's order or award depends on any 
fact found by the commission, the court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the commission as 
to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any 
finding of fact.  The court may, however, set aside 
the commission's order or award and remand the case to 
the commission if the commission's order or award 
depends on any material and controverted finding of 
fact that is not supported by credible and substantial 
evidence.  
No. 
2009AP564   
 
16 
 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
(2) 
the 
interpretation of the statute is one of long-standing; 
(3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) the 
agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and 
consistency in the application of the statute.  
Id., ¶16 (quoting Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 
2005 WI 93, ¶39, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768) (internal 
modifications omitted).  Under great weight deference, the 
agency's interpretation and application of a statute must be 
reasonable.  Id.; Kuhnert v. Advanced Laser Machining, Inc., 
2011 WI App 23, ¶9, 331 Wis. 2d 625, 794 N.W.2d 805.  An 
agency's interpretation "is unreasonable and may be reversed by 
a reviewing court if it directly contravenes the words of the 
statute or the federal or state constitution, if it is clearly 
contrary to the legislative intent, history, or purpose of the 
statute, or if it is without rational basis."  Brown v. LIRC, 
2003 WI 142, ¶19, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 N.W.2d 279.  As long as 
the interpretation and application are reasonable, we will 
uphold an agency decision even if there are other, more 
reasonable, interpretations.  Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 
¶16. 
¶34 We afford an agency's interpretation and application 
of a statute due weight deference "when 'the agency has some 
experience in an area, but has not developed the expertise which 
necessarily places it in a better position to make judgments 
regarding the interpretation of the statute than a court.'"  
Id., ¶17 (quoting Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶42); see also 
Pick 'n Save Roundy's v. LIRC, 2010 WI App 130, ¶15, 329 Wis. 2d 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
17 
 
674, 791 N.W.2d 216 (concluding that LIRC's interpretation and 
application of a statute were appropriate for great weight 
deference).  When employing due weight deference, we uphold the 
agency's interpretation and application as long as it is 
reasonable and another interpretation is not more reasonable.  
Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶17. 
¶35 Lastly, we afford an agency's interpretation and 
application of a statute no deference, reviewing it de novo, 
"when the issue before the agency is clearly one of first 
impression" or "when an agency's position on an issue has been 
so inconsistent as to provide no real guidance."  Id., ¶18 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  When we review a decision 
de novo, we engage in our own independent analysis of the 
statute and its application to the facts, benefitting from the 
agency and prior court decisions.  State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 
108, ¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4; Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 
¶14. 
¶36 The parties dispute under which standard we should 
review LIRC's interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.35(3) in this case.  Swenson argues that we should employ 
great weight deference, while deBoer contends that we should 
employ a de novo standard of review.  However, we agree with the 
court of appeals that we need not decide the applicable standard 
of review here because LIRC's statutory interpretation and 
application 
is 
unreasonable, 
and 
therefore, 
it 
will 
not 
withstand any level of deference.  deBoer, 324 Wis. 2d 485, ¶10.  
As discussed above, even under the great weight standard of 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
18 
 
review, an agency's statutory interpretation and application 
must be reasonable.  Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. DOT, 2010 WI 15, 
¶¶11-13, 323 Wis. 2d 294, 779 N.W.2d 423.   
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 102.35(3):  
Unreasonable Refusal to Rehire 
¶37 This case requires us to review LIRC's interpretation 
and application of Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3).  The relevant portion 
of § 102.35(3) provides: 
Any employer who without reasonable cause refuses 
to rehire an employee who is injured in the course of 
employment, where suitable employment is available 
within the employee's physical and mental limitations, 
upon order of the department and in addition to other 
benefits, has exclusive liability to pay to the 
employee the wages lost during the period of such 
refusal, not exceeding one year's wages.  
¶38 The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) is to protect 
injured workers.  West Allis Sch. Dist. v. DILHR, 116 Wis. 2d 
410, 422, 342 N.W.2d 415 (1984).  As we have explained: 
It is clear from the plain words of the statute 
that its purpose is to prevent discrimination against 
employees who have previously sustained injuries and 
to see to it, if there are positions available and the 
injured employee can do the work, that the injured 
person goes back to work with his former employer.   
 
Id.  Section 102.35(3) must be liberally construed to effectuate 
this purpose.  Id. at 421-22.  In other words, § 102.35(3) "must 
be liberally construed to afford the aggrieved worker additional 
compensation."  Id. at 422.   
¶39 Wisconsin courts employ a burden-shifting approach 
when an employee brings a Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) claim for 
unreasonable refusal to rehire.  Under this approach, the 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
19 
 
employee must first make a prima facie case of an unreasonable 
failure to rehire.  It is undisputed that as part of the prima 
facie case, the employee must show that:  (1) the claimant was 
an employee of the employer from which he or she seeks 
benefits;15 (2) the claimant was injured in the scope of 
employment; and (3) subsequent to the injury, the employer 
refused to rehire the employee.16  See, e.g., West Bend Co. v. 
LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 110, 123, 438 N.W.2d 823 (1989); Dielectric 
Corp. v. LIRC, 111 Wis. 2d 270, 330 N.W.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1983); 
Groh v. Alyson Tool Corp., WC No. 2004-002455 (LIRC Nov. 30, 
2006); John D. Neal & Joseph Danas, Jr., Worker's Compensation 
Handbook § 8.28-.31 (6th ed. 2010) [hereinafter "Neal, Worker's 
Compensation"].  
¶40 However, there is a potential inconsistency in the 
case law with regard to the third element of the prima facie 
case——that the employer refused to rehire the employee.  Some 
cases require as part of this element, a showing that the 
employer refused to rehire the employee because of the work-
related injury.  See, e.g., Ray Hutson, 186 Wis. 2d at 122; Hill 
v. LIRC, 184 Wis. 2d 101, 111, 516 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1994).  
                                                 
15 "Employee" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 102.07.  See also 
West Bend Co. v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 110, 118-119, 438 N.W.2d 823 
(1989) (discussing whether the claimant was an "employee" for 
the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3)). 
16 While not at issue here, we note that at least one court 
has listed as an additional element of the prima facie case that 
the employee must show that he or she applied for rehire.  Hill 
v. LIRC, 184 Wis. 2d 101, 111, 516 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
20 
 
Other cases, however, do not require the employee to show why 
the employer refused to rehire the employee, instead requiring 
only a showing that the employer refused to rehire, without 
tying the refusal to any particular reason.  West Allis, 116 
Wis. 2d at 424-25; Dielectric, 111 Wis. 2d at 278.  See also 
Neal, Worker's Compensation § 8.32.  
¶41 The potential inconsistency in the law is best 
demonstrated by our decision in West Bend.  In West Bend, we set 
forth the elements of a Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) prima facie case, 
twice.  In our first expression of the requirement, citing West 
Allis and Dielectric, we stated that the employee's prima facie 
case is met "[a]fter an employe[e] shows that she has been 
injured in the course of employment and subsequently is denied 
rehire."  West Bend, 149 Wis. 2d at 123.  We did not specify 
that the employee must show that she was denied rehire because 
of the injury.  However, in our second expression of the 
requirement, we stated that the last element of the prima facie 
case is that the employee has "been denied rehiring because of 
the injury sustained in her work."  Id. at 126 (emphasis added). 
¶42 While we take the opportunity to underscore this 
potential inconsistency in the case law, we save its resolution 
for another day.  Even if we conclude, most favorably to 
Swenson, that an employee is not required to show that the 
refusal to rehire was because of the injury, Swenson still is 
not entitled to back pay because deBoer had reasonable cause not 
to rehire him.  Therefore, deciding whether an employee must 
prove he or she was denied rehire because of the injury is not 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
21 
 
necessary for the disposition of this case.  See Gross v. 
Hoffman, 
227 
Wis. 
296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (only 
dispositive issues need be addressed).   
¶43 Moving on, when the employee brings forth facts that 
support all the elements of a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the employer to show reasonable cause for its refusal 
to rehire the claimant.  West Bend, 149 Wis. 2d at 123; Ray 
Hutson, 186 Wis. 2d at 122.  We have defined "reasonable cause" 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) to mean that "an employer, if there 
is suitable employment available, can [] refuse to rehire [only] 
for a cause or reason that is fair, just, or fit under the 
circumstances."  West Allis, 116 Wis. 2d at 426. 
¶44 An example of when an employer showed there was 
reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire a previously injured 
employee is ably described by the court of appeals decision, Ray 
Hutson, 186 Wis. 2d 118.  In Ray Hutson, the employee, Tooley, 
was one of a five-person parts sales staff in Ray Hutson 
Chevrolet's (Hutson) sales department.  Id. at 121.  Tooley 
sustained a work-related injury and while he was on leave 
recuperating from the injury, Hutson realized that it could 
operate the sales department without Tooley.  Id.  Consequently, 
when Tooley was ready to return to work, Hutson refused to 
rehire him as a parts salesperson, and instead offered him a 
lower paying position in a different department.  Id.  Tooley 
rejected this offer and brought an unreasonable refusal to 
rehire claim under Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3).  Id.  Noting that it 
was uncontroverted that Hutson eliminated Tooley's position to 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
22 
 
save costs, the court of appeals concluded that Hutson had met 
its burden to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire 
Tooley.  Reasonable cause is shown, the court held, when an 
employer makes a business decision in order to reduce costs.  
Id. at 123.  
¶45 Consistent 
with 
Ray 
Hutson, 
and 
of 
particular 
importance here, Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) does not contain a 
requirement 
that 
employers 
change 
their 
legitimate 
and 
universally applied business policies to meet the personal 
obligations of their employees.  We note that there are 
instances in Wisconsin employment statutes where employers are 
required 
to 
make 
certain 
modifications. 
 
Particularly, 
"accommodation" comes into play under Wisconsin's employment 
discrimination statutes.  Specifically, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.34(1)(b), 
"[e]mployment 
discrimination 
because 
of 
disability" includes "[r]efusing to reasonably accommodate an 
employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a 
hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business."  
See also Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, 264 
Wis. 2d 
200, 
664 
N.W.2d 
651 
(requiring 
the 
employer 
to 
accommodate a worker's disability in a case brought under 
§ 111.34(1)(b)).  Section 111.34(1)(b) has no application in a 
refusal to rehire claim under § 102.35(3). 
C.  LIRC's decision 
¶46 We begin by setting out the elements of Swenson's Wis. 
Stat. § 102.35(3) claim that are not at issue here.  With regard 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
23 
 
to Swenson's prima facie case, Swenson has satisfied all three 
elements.17  First, there is no dispute that Swenson was an 
employee of deBoer.  Second, the parties agree that Swenson was 
injured in the scope of employment.  Third, the ALJ made an 
unchallenged finding of fact that deBoer refused to rehire 
Swenson, i.e., that Swenson did not quit.  Because all the 
elements of the prima facie case are satisfied, the burden 
shifts to deBoer to show reasonable cause for its refusal to 
rehire Swenson.  LIRC's conclusion that deBoer did not show 
reasonable cause for refusing to rehire is at the heart of this 
case.  
¶47 As set forth above, the issue in this case is whether 
LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause 
for its refusal to rehire Swenson is based on an unreasonable 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3), or 
whether LIRC's conclusion is dependent on findings of fact that 
are not supported by credible and substantial evidence in the 
record.  We have identified two rationales on which LIRC's 
conclusion is grounded.  First, LIRC grounds its conclusion on 
its finding that deBoer did not explain why it couldn't modify 
its check-ride policy and, thereby, assist Swenson in meeting 
                                                 
17 As discussed above, there is a potential inconsistency in 
the case law with regard to the third element of the prima facie 
case.  Namely, it is unclear whether the employee is required to 
show that the employer refused to rehire him because of the 
injury.  We again emphasize that we are not deciding this issue 
today, and are assuming solely for the sake of this opinion that 
Swenson was not required to show that the refusal to rehire was 
due to his work-related injury.  
No. 
2009AP564   
 
24 
 
his personal care obligations.  Second, LIRC found that deBoer's 
strict adherence to its check-ride policy was pretext for its 
underlying motive, i.e., Swenson's work-related injury, in 
failing to rehire Swenson.  
¶48 Taking each in turn, we begin with LIRC's conclusion 
that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for its refusal to 
rehire Swenson because deBoer refused to modify its check-ride 
policy in order to assist Swenson in meeting his personal care 
obligations.  Notably, LIRC adopted the ALJ's finding that the 
safety concerns of deBoer that the check-ride policy is meant to 
address are "certainly [] legitimate."  Moreover, nowhere in its 
opinion did LIRC conclude that requiring Swenson to complete the 
check-ride 
was 
unreasonable. Instead, LIRC concluded that 
deBoer's failure to explain why it couldn't modify the check-
ride so that Swenson could complete it was unreasonable.  
Swenson, WCD No. 2005-030091, at 2.  As LIRC stated, "[i]f it 
was night driving the employer was concerned about, it could 
have required the applicant to have gone out with an observer on 
a night driving trip, with a return home the following morning."  
Id. 
¶49 LIRC went on to more explicitly underscore that it was 
deBoer's failure to "accommodate" Swenson's personal situation 
that drove its decision on whether deBoer had reasonable cause 
to refuse to rehire Swenson.  LIRC opined, Swenson "merely asked 
for an alternative schedule so that he could care for his 
terminally ill father" and that this "simple accommodation the 
applicant requested for the testing process was reasonable, and 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
25 
 
it would not have jeopardized any of the employer's safety 
concerns."  Id. (emphasis added).  This language illustrates 
that 
LIRC's 
review 
was 
focused 
on 
whether 
deBoer 
acted 
reasonably when it chose not to compromise its check-ride policy 
so that Swenson could meet his personal care obligations.  In 
other 
words, 
LIRC 
reviewed 
whether 
deBoer 
demonstrated 
reasonable cause for its refusal to adjust to Swenson's personal 
obligations.  By engaging in this type of review, LIRC was 
requiring deBoer to put forth evidence that it would have been 
an unreasonable burden to change its check-ride policy so that 
Swenson could meet his personal care obligations. 
¶50 Under Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3), however, the employer is 
not required to change valid business protocol to adjust for an 
injured employee's personal obligations.  Under § 102.35(3), the 
employer must show only that it had "reasonable cause" to refuse 
to rehire an employee.  An employer is not obligated to change 
its long-standing and legitimate safety policies under the plain 
language of § 102.35(3) for the sake of assisting an employee to 
meet his personal obligations.   
¶51 Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals that 
requiring deBoer to show the unreasonableness of Swenson's 
requested modifications to the check-ride policy "amounts to an 
incorrect interpretation of the statute because it requires 
something more than reasonable cause" for refusing rehire.  
deBoer, 324 Wis. 2d 485, ¶12.  Specifically, what LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
"reasonable 
cause" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.35(3) required was that deBoer deviate from a long-
No. 
2009AP564   
 
26 
 
standing safety policy in order to assist Swenson in a personal 
matter.  It is unreasonable to conclude, from the language of 
the 
statute 
or 
applicable 
case 
law, 
that 
when 
enacting 
§ 102.35(3), the legislature intended to burden employers by 
mandating that they change legitimate business policies to 
assist employees with meeting personal obligations.  As the 
court of appeals noted, "it is not reasonable to suppose that 
the legislature intended to impose on employers the burden of 
judging which non-work, non-injury-related requests need to be 
accommodated if reasonably possible."  Id., ¶15. 
¶52 Furthermore, although LIRC did not mention ch. 111 of 
Wisconsin's statutes in its opinion when it required deBoer to 
"accommodate" 
Swenson, 
it 
appears 
LIRC 
was, 
mistakenly, 
incorporating the accommodation requirements for employees with 
disabilities set forth in ch. 111 into Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3).  
In particular, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b), employment 
discrimination because of a disability includes:  "Refusing to 
reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's 
disability 
unless 
the 
employer 
can 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, 
enterprise 
or 
business." 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Under 
§ 111.34(1)(b), 
employers are required to make reasonable 
accommodations for employees with disabilities.18  See, e.g., 
                                                 
18 Notably, Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) does not require an 
employer to accommodate an employee's personal obligations, such 
as child or elder care, rather, it requires the employer to 
reasonably accommodate the employee's disabilities.  We do not 
intend to imply that it requires accommodations for personal 
obligations. 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
27 
 
Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200.  A careful reading of LIRC's 
opinion 
illustrates 
that 
LIRC, 
perhaps 
subconsciously, 
erroneously 
subsumed 
the 
§ 111.34(1)(b) 
"accommodation" 
requirements into § 102.35(3).  
¶53 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) does not contain 
"accommodation" 
requirements 
like 
those 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.34(1)(b).  Section 102.35(3) does not require an employer 
to change its long-standing and universally applied safety 
policies. 
 Accordingly, LIRC unreasonably interpreted and 
applied 
§ 102.35(3) 
when 
it 
based 
its 
reasonable 
cause 
determination on its finding that deBoer failed to explain why 
it would be unreasonable to change its check-ride policy.  As 
stated above, even under the greatest deference to LIRC's 
decision, we will reverse an agency's statutory interpretation 
and application if it is unreasonable.  Cnty. of Dane, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, ¶16.  Consequently, LIRC's order that deBoer pay 
Swenson 
back 
pay 
cannot 
stand 
on 
LIRC's 
"accommodation" 
rationale.   
¶54 We now turn to LIRC's pretext rationale for concluding 
that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for refusing to 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
28 
 
rehire Swenson.19  Pretext is a finding of fact.  Ray Hutson, 186 
Wis. 2d at 124.  As aforementioned, we must uphold LIRC's 
findings of fact if "there is credible and substantial evidence 
in the record on which reasonable persons could rely to make the 
same findings."  Begel, 246 Wis. 2d 345, ¶5.   
¶55 LIRC's finding of pretext was grounded in deBoer's 
failure to explain why, instead of the check-ride, deBoer could 
not complete a night trip with another driver, returning home in 
the morning, as well as deBoer's "unyielding insistence that 
there be an extended overnight trip" and failure to adjust to 
Swenson's scheduling needs.  Swenson, WCD No. 2005-030091, at 2.  
LIRC, therefore, concluded that deBoer's "actions evinced an 
unreasonable 
disregard 
for 
the 
applicant's 
circumstances, 
leading to the credible inference that the work injury did play 
                                                 
19 The court of appeals highlighted that "[t]he law is 
unclear on whether the question of pretext is subsumed in the 
reasonable cause analysis or whether, instead, pretext is a 
separate issue that is addressed only after an employer 
establishes reasonable cause."  deBoer, 324 Wis. 2d 485, ¶19.  
In discussing this lack of clarity, the court cited Ray Hutson 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. LIRC, 186 Wis. 2d 118, 123-24, 519 N.W.2d 713 
(Ct. App. 1994), in which the court of appeals addressed pretext 
only after it established that the employer's business decision 
to reduce costs constituted reasonable cause to refuse to rehire 
the employee.  We think, however, that the correct manner under 
which to analyze pretext when reviewing a claim for benefits 
under Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) is to treat the pretext argument as 
subsumed in the reasonable cause analysis.  Most significantly, 
§ 102.35(3) refers to "reasonable cause," not "pretext."  An 
employer has the burden to show that it had reasonable cause to 
refuse to rehire the employee.  An employer will fail to meet 
this burden if it is found that the alleged reason for the 
discharge was actually pretext for an underlying, unreasonable 
motivation.  Therefore, when analyzing § 102.35(3), pretext 
usually is not a separate issue. 
No. 
2009AP564   
 
29 
 
a part in the discharge."  Id.  Or, stated more explicitly, that 
the check-ride was pretext.  
¶56 We begin by pointing out that a primary reason LIRC 
found pretext was that deBoer failed to present evidence that it 
would have been an unreasonable burden to adjust to Swenson's 
personal obligations.  As discussed above, LIRC's focus on 
deBoer's failure to change its check-ride policy to assist 
Swenson in meeting his personal obligations was based on an 
erroneous 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.35(3).  
Consequently, deBoer's failure to present evidence that it would 
have been an unreasonable burden to change its check-ride policy 
for the sake of Swenson's personal care obligations cannot be 
used as a rationale for LIRC's pretext finding.20 
¶57 Even more, we conclude that there was not credible and 
substantial evidence in the record to support LIRC's finding of 
pretext.  Simply stated, we agree with Commissioner Glaser that 
"[t]here is no credible evidence that the applicant's work 
injury was a motive entering into the employer's actions, or 
                                                 
20 We conclude that LIRC's finding that deBoer did not 
explain why it could not change its check-ride policy to assist 
Swenson was not supported by substantial and credible evidence.  
Rather, the evidence shows that deBoer's reasons for not 
modifying its check-ride policy were fully explained and 
uncontroverted.  Garcia explained why deBoer could not offer the 
change Swenson requested.  He testified that check-rides must be 
completed by "driver trainers" and none of the drivers running 
day routes met this qualification.  Garcia explained that 
"driver trainers" had been approved by management to hold this 
position, and had gone through specialized training where they 
learned how to instruct and evaluate other drivers.  There was 
no evidence rebutting this testimony.  
No. 
2009AP564   
 
30 
 
that the employer acted in anything other than good faith."  Id. 
at 3.   
¶58 First, the evidence adduced at the administrative 
hearing established that deBoer mandates the check-ride for 
safety reasons.  Both Garcia and Vogel testified that the 
purpose of the check-ride was to ensure the safety of the public 
and the drivers.  See supra section II.B.a.  The ALJ accepted 
the policy's safety rationale, calling it a "legitimate concern" 
and cautioning that her order "should not be construed to find 
that safety was not a legitimate concern." 
¶59 In addition, testimony was unrebutted that check-rides 
had been required of employees returning to work for over 20 
years and that an exception to the policy had never been made.  
Vogel explained that the policy is in place for safety reasons:  
[T]he whole idea of the skills assessment trip is 
these people are off for . . . and out of the tractors 
and off the public highways for a given period of time 
which can even change seasons, you know, they may get 
hurt in the summertime, they return when the road 
changes, do they have these skills, can they get in 
and out, are they safe, have they recovered to the 
point where they can operate this vehicle?  
¶60 Finally, all the evidence shows that, were it not for 
Swenson's refusal to complete the check-ride, deBoer would have 
kept him as an employee.  For instance, in an effort to rehire 
Swenson, deBoer reoriented him and dispatched a driver trainer 
from out-of-state to come to Wisconsin and take Swenson on his 
check-ride.  
No. 
2009AP564   
 
31 
 
¶61 Given 
these 
uncontroverted 
facts——the 
check-ride 
policy had a legitimate safety rationale, it had been in place 
over 20 years, no returning driver had ever been exempt from the 
policy, and deBoer had taken all necessary steps under its 
reorientation policy to reinstate Swenson——we conclude there is 
no credible and substantial evidence in the record on which 
reasonable persons could rely to make a finding of pretext in 
this case.21  There is simply no evidence that deBoer failed to 
rehire Swenson for any reason other than his refusal to comply 
with deBoer's legitimate safety policy.  Accordingly, LIRC's 
conclusion that deBoer lacked reasonable cause because the 
check-ride policy was pretext has no factual support in the 
record.  
                                                 
21 The dissent argues that LIRC's finding of pretext is 
supported by the evidence because the record reveals that 
Swenson did not learn that the check-ride would be multi-day 
until "the very day that deBoer had scheduled the check-ride to 
begin."  Dissent, ¶¶78-84.  First, we underscore that both the 
work manual and letter from Vogel put Swenson on notice that he 
would have to complete the check-ride.  Swenson, not deBoer, was 
privy 
to 
Swenson's 
caretaking 
responsibilities. 
 
Nothing 
prevented Swenson, when he was first made aware of the check-
ride requirement, from inquiring into what the check-ride would 
entail.   
More importantly, however, even if Swenson did not learn 
that the check-ride would be an overnight trip until the day he 
was scheduled to leave, the dissent's reliance on this fact is 
misplaced.  The pretext finding was not based on the time at 
which Swenson was notified of the duration of the check-ride.  
Rather, the finding of pretext was based on deBoer's failure to 
consider modifying its check-ride policy so that Swenson would 
be home during the day to care for his father.  We have reviewed 
the rationale for the pretext finding and see no discussion of 
the timing to which the dissent refers.   
No. 
2009AP564   
 
32 
 
¶62 In sum, LIRC's opinion depended on an unreasonable 
interpretation and application of "reasonable cause" in Wis. 
Stat. § 102.35(3) and a finding of fact that was not supported 
by credible and substantial evidence in the record.  For that 
reason, we reverse LIRC, and hold that Swenson is not entitled 
to back pay.  We thereby affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals that remanded the case for dismissal of Swenson's 
claim.22 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 We hold that in reaching its conclusion that deBoer 
failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3).  LIRC concluded that 
deBoer did not show reasonable cause because deBoer failed to 
adequately explain why it would be an unreasonable burden to 
change its check-ride policy so that Swenson could meet his 
personal care obligations.  Section 102.35(3), however, does not 
require an employer to change its legitimate and long-standing 
safety policies in order to assist an employee in meeting 
                                                 
22 In reaching this conclusion, we do not diminish the 
importance of Swenson's role in caring for his ailing father.  
We offer our sincerest appreciation to Swenson, as well as all 
other Wisconsin citizens, who act as unpaid primary caregivers 
for elderly and small children who need such care.  Nonetheless, 
despite the extremely sympathetic facts we are presented with 
today, and our admiration for Swenson's commitment to his 
father, we are unable to rewrite Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) or 
pretend additional evidence was presented to support the pretext 
finding.  Statutory changes are for the legislature, not this 
court.  See Interior Woodwork Co. v. Jahn, 163 Wis. 193, 195, 
157 N.W. 772 (1916) ("This court has no right or power to amend 
the statutes.").  
No. 
2009AP564   
 
33 
 
personal obligations.  Therefore, by adding this requirement 
into the statute, LIRC unreasonably interpreted and applied the 
words chosen by the legislature.   
¶64 Additionally, we hold that LIRC's conclusion that 
deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding 
that the check-ride policy was pretext, was not supported by 
credible and substantial evidence.   
¶65 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals that remanded for dismissal of Swenson's claim against 
deBoer. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
1 
 
¶66 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The resolution 
of this case should be a simple matter.  The Labor and Industry 
Review Commission (LIRC) made a finding of fact that deBoer's 
asserted reason for refusing to rehire Swenson was pretextual.  
The issue presented by this case is whether there is substantial 
and credible evidence in the record that supports this finding 
of pretext.   
¶67 When reviewing an agency's finding of fact, an 
appellate court is supposed to search the record for reasons to 
uphold it.  Rather than searching for reasons to uphold the 
agency's finding of fact, the majority scours LIRC's decision, 
searching for reasons to reverse it.  It goes through elaborate 
gymnastics to undermine the agency's finding of fact and 
ultimate 
conclusion. 
 
Because 
I 
conclude 
that 
there 
is 
substantial and credible evidence to support LIRC's finding of 
fact——evidence that the majority either glosses over or ignores—
—I respectfully dissent.      
I 
¶68 The majority acknowledges that deBoer has the burden 
to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson, and 
that reasonable cause is defined as a reason that is fair, just, 
or fit under the circumstances.  Majority op., ¶43.  It agrees 
that LIRC made a finding of fact that deBoer's asserted business 
reason for refusing to rehire Swenson was pretextual.  Id., ¶54.  
It recognizes that LIRC's findings of fact must be upheld on 
review if there is substantial and credible evidence in the 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
2 
 
record on which reasonable persons could rely to make the same 
findings.  Id., ¶30.       
¶69 Nevertheless, the majority does not squarely address 
LIRC's finding of pretext.  Rather than searching the record for 
evidence to sustain this finding of fact that the reason was 
pretextual, the majority takes deBoer's pretextual reason at 
face value.  It implies that Swenson was seeking an "exception" 
to deBoer's long-standing policy, and it finds that Swenson's 
"refusal to comply with deBoer's legitimate safety policy" was 
the reason deBoer refused to rehire him.  Id., ¶¶59, 61.   
¶70 Having jettisoned the required analysis, the majority 
focuses its analysis on straw man diversions.  It asserts: "An 
employer is not obligated to change its long-standing and 
legitimate safety policies under the plain language of [Wis. 
Stat.] § 102.35(3) for the sake of assisting an employee meet 
his personal obligations."  Id., ¶50.  It further contends that 
"LIRC, perhaps subconsciously, erroneously subsumed" the ch. 111 
accommodation requirements for employees with disabilities, and 
that "LIRC's order that deBoer pay Swenson back pay cannot stand 
on LIRC's 'accommodation' rationale."  Id., ¶¶52-53.      
II 
¶71 The employment-at-will doctrine generally permits an 
employer to discharge an at-will employee "for good cause, for 
no cause, or even for cause morally wrong."  Batteries Plus, LLC 
v. Mohr, 2001 WI 80, ¶16, 244 Wis. 2d 559, 628 N.W.2d 364.  
Under Wisconsin's workers compensation statute, however, this 
calculus shifts when an employee has been injured on the job.  
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
3 
 
An employer may be liable for up to one year of lost wages if it 
fails to demonstrate that it had reasonable cause to refuse to 
rehire an injured employee.  Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3). 
¶72 As the majority explains, "[a]n employer will fail to 
meet [its burden to show that it had reasonable cause to refuse 
to rehire the employee] if it is found that the alleged reason 
for the discharge was actually pretext . . . ."  Majority op., 
¶54 n.19.  When the employer's asserted reason is found to be a 
pretext, it follows that the employer's asserted reason was not 
the actual reason that the employer refused to rehire the 
injured employee.  Accordingly, a pretextual reason cannot be 
considered reasonable cause for refusal to rehire, and if the 
employer's asserted reason is found to be pretextual, the 
employer fails to meet its burden.   
¶73 The determination of whether the purported reason 
given by the employer is a pretext is a finding of fact.  Id., 
¶54 (citing Ray Hutson Chevrolet, Inc. v. LIRC, 186 Wis. 2d 118, 
124, 519 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1994)).  "When one or more 
inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the drawing of one of 
such permissible inferences by the commission is an act of fact-
finding, and the inference is conclusive on the court."  Farmers 
Mill of Athens, Inc. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 576, 580, 294 
N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1980).1 
                                                 
1 The workers compensation statute specifically provides 
that "[t]he findings of fact made by the commission acting 
within 
its 
powers 
shall, 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
fraud, 
be 
conclusive," Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1), and that "a court may set 
aside the commission's award if it "depends on any material and 
controverted finding of fact that is not supported by credible 
and substantial evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).   
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
4 
 
¶74 LIRC's findings of fact are given deference in great 
part because they are based on the administrative law judge's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.  Witness 
credibility is readily gauged by an examiner present at the 
hearing who can observe the witness's demeanor, mannerisms, tone 
of voice, and other visual and aural cues.  It is less easily 
assessed by an appellate court's review of a cold transcript.  
Accordingly, "[t]his court does not weigh the evidence or pass 
upon the credibility of the witnesses; rather, the weight and 
credibility of evidence is to be determined by LIRC."  Ide v. 
LIRC, 224 Wis. 2d 159, 165, 589 N.W.2d 363 (1999).   
¶75 After hearing all of the evidence and evaluating the 
credibility of the witnesses, the administrative law judge 
found: "This was a case where one could infer that deBoer was 
not interested in keeping Mr. Swenson as an employee and used 
its policy on check-rides as its reason[.]"  LIRC "adopt[ed] the 
findings and order in that decision as its own."     
¶76 On review, a court's role "is to search the record to 
locate credible evidence that supports LIRC's factual findings."  
Ide, 224 Wis. 2d at 165.  Here, the majority either glosses over 
or ignores the substantial and credible evidence which supports 
the finding that deBoer's asserted business reason for refusing 
to rehire Swenson was pretextual.    
¶77 DeBoer asserted that it terminated Swenson because he 
refused to go on a multi-day check-ride, as was mandated by 
deBoer's policy.  It is notable, however, that deBoer has no 
written policy governing the duration of check-rides or setting 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
5 
 
forth any requirement that the check-ride constitute a multi-day 
trip.  Rather, its written policy merely provides that returning 
drivers "complete a minimum of one trip" of unspecified 
duration: 
Drivers who are off work for any reason for more than 
2 months are required to: 
1. Complete orientation 
2. Complete a minimum of one trip with another driver 
to regain the necessary skills that were not used 
while off work.   
¶78 The record further reveals that Swenson was not 
informed that the check-ride would constitute a multi-day trip 
which would interfere with his caretaking obligations until the 
very day that deBoer had scheduled the check-ride to begin.  
Cindy 
Vogel, 
deBoer's 
workers 
compensation 
administrator, 
discussed the check-ride with Swenson on several occasions in 
the months prior to his reorientation.  Nevertheless, Vogel 
never informed Swenson that the check-ride would constitute a 
multi-day trip.   
¶79 Swenson was injured in August of 2005.  Vogel 
testified that in November, she spoke with Swenson about the 
requirements for returning to work, but they did not discuss any 
details of the check-ride.  She testified further that in 
December, she told Swenson "[t]hat he would go out with a 
trainer and then they would go [on] one trip is how I explained 
it to him, and that would give him the opportunity to reacquaint 
his skills and to ease back into actually driving the truck[.]"  
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
6 
 
There is no indication that Vogel informed Swenson that the 
check-ride might constitute a multi-day trip.     
¶80 On February 22, 2006, shortly before Swenson began 
reorientation, Vogel sent Swenson a letter that briefly listed 
the requirements he must fulfill prior to returning to work.  
The letter mentioned the check-ride requirement, but again, 
without setting forth any detail.  It did not inform Swenson 
that any arrangements had been made for the check-ride.  It did 
not provide any scheduled date, and again, it failed to inform 
Swenson that the check-ride could constitute a multi-day trip: 
Please note your Professional Driver work manual, 
drivers off work for more than 2 months are required 
to complete orientation, complete a minimum of one 
trip 
with 
another 
driver 
to 
regain 
the 
skills 
necessary to safely operate a commercial motor vehicle 
and pass DOT re-certification tests. 
The following arrangements have been made: 
Monday 
– 
February 
27, 
2006 
3:15 
pm 
DOT 
re-
certification 
drug 
and 
physical 
Dragt 
Chiropractic/Alliant Health, Marshfield WI.  A map to 
their facility is enclosed.  
Tuesday – February 28, 2006 8:00 am Orientation, 
deBoer Blenker WI, check in at the reception desk and 
ask for Gerald.   
¶81 It is clear from the record that it was not until the 
very day that Swenson was expected to leave on the check-ride 
that he was informed that it would constitute a multi-day trip 
lasting anywhere from a few days to two weeks.  The record 
reveals that Swenson completed the reorientation on March 1.  On 
that day, deBoer's safety director, Dan Garcia, first informed 
Swenson that a driver had been dispatched from Texas to take him 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
7 
 
on the check-ride, that he was expected to depart on the check-
ride that very day, and that if he did not go he would be 
processed as a quit.   
¶82 In an email documenting the incident, Garcia wrote: 
"Charles completed his re-orientation on 3/1/06.  We had 
scheduled a driver trainer to pick him up on that same day to 
take him out for his 'check ride' to ensure safety. . . . I 
informed Charles that he would have to do this and he flat out 
refused to go."   
¶83 On March 2, within one day of Swenson's refusal, 
Garcia sent the following email: "Charles has refused to go with 
a trainer to perform his required check ride upon returning to 
work.  Due to his refusal, he will be processed as a quit 
effective immediately."      
¶84 Given this timeline of events set forth above, a 
reasonable person could infer that deBoer had not implemented 
its check-ride policy in good faith.  A reasonable person might 
wonder why deBoer had the time and foresight to dispatch a 
driver from Texas to arrive on March 1, but did not have the 
foresight to give Swenson any advance notice of the start date 
or duration of the trip.   
¶85 There is evidence in the record to support an 
inference 
that 
deBoer 
knew 
about 
Swenson's 
caretaking 
responsibilities.  When deBoer first acquired the trucking 
business in August of 2005, it gave Swenson a short survey, 
explaining that "[t]his survey will be used to help deBoer 
Transportation, Inc., meet your needs."  Swenson wrote: "I have 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
8 
 
to be home from 3:00 p.m. to midnite Mon. [through] Thurs. and 
by 1 p.m. on Fri. to take care of my father[.]"  Swenson filled 
out an identical survey on February 28, 2006, the day before 
deBoer fired him.  Swenson wrote: "I take care of my dad; he has 
spinal cancer.  I need to be home at nite to take care of him."    
¶86 A reasonable person could infer that deBoer knew that 
Swenson would be unable to drop everything to go on a check-ride 
for an indeterminate duration with no advance notice, and that 
it had engineered the details in a way that would force 
Swenson's refusal.  LIRC's finding of fact is supported by 
substantial and credible evidence, and it should be upheld.   
III 
¶87 Rather than searching the record to locate the 
substantial and credible evidence that supports LIRC's finding 
of fact, the majority engages in diversion.  It warps the facts 
and the agency's decision in an attempt to convert the inquiry 
into a question of law.   
¶88 The majority begins by implying that Swenson was 
seeking an exception from the check-ride policy.  See majority 
op., ¶¶59, 61.  Yet, this implication is contrary to LIRC's 
finding of fact.  In reliance on the administrative law judge's 
findings, LIRC determined that Swenson "intended to do the 
check-ride" and that he "was not asking deBoer for an exception 
to the policy requiring it." 
¶89 Next, the majority sets up a straw man to knock down.  
It contends, "[a]n employer is not obligated to change its long-
standing and legitimate safety policies under the plain language 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
9 
 
of [Wis. Stat.] § 102.35(3) for the sake of assisting an 
employee meet his personal obligations."  Majority op., ¶50.  
This assertion may be accurate——but it misses the mark.  
¶90 If deBoer was using its long-standing policy as a 
pretext for refusing to rehire Swenson, then Swenson's refusal 
to go on the check-ride was not the actual reason that deBoer 
refused 
to 
rehire 
him. 
 
DeBoer's 
pretextual 
reason 
for 
terminating Swenson cannot constitute reasonable cause.   
¶91 Finally, the majority erects and then swings at yet 
another straw man.  Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34 provides that 
employment discrimination includes "[r]efusing to reasonably 
accommodate 
an 
employee's 
or 
prospective 
employee's 
disability[.]"  The majority seizes on the fact that LIRC used 
the word "accommodation" when it affirmed the administrative law 
judge's 
decision. 
 
It 
contends 
that 
LIRC 
"perhaps 
subconsciously, erroneously subsumed" the ch. 111 accommodation 
requirements for employees with disabilities, and that "LIRC's 
order that deBoer pay Swenson back pay cannot stand on LIRC's 
'accommodation' rationale."  Majority op., ¶¶52-53.   
¶92 The majority misconstrues LIRC's analysis.  To support 
its determination that the check-ride policy was pretext, the 
administrative law judge relied on the fact that "alternatives 
were not explored" and that Garcia "took a blind approach to 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
10 
 
this policy and for them that was the end of it."2  LIRC agreed.  
It explained: "The simple accommodation [Swenson] requested for 
the testing process was reasonable, and it would not have 
jeopardized any of the employer's safety concerns. . . . [T]he 
employer gave no explanation for failing to even consider this 
request."   
¶93 LIRC made no reference to Wis. Stat. ch. 111, and its 
use of the word "accommodation" cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as a reference to the chapter 111 requirements for accommodating 
employees with disabilities.  Rather, LIRC appeared to have used 
the word "accommodation" in the colloquial sense.  The fact that 
deBoer took a "blind approach" and that "alternatives were not 
explored" strengthened the inference that "deBoer was not 
interested in keeping Mr. Swenson as an employee and used its 
policy on check-rides as its reason." 
¶94 Once the majority's diversions are cast aside, the 
proper analysis is straightforward.  Swenson made a prima facie 
case that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire him.  As 
demonstrated above, LIRC found that deBoer's asserted reason was 
pretext, and that finding is supported by substantial and 
credible evidence.  Because I would uphold LIRC's decision, I 
respectfully dissent.        
                                                 
2 The administrative law judge explained: "[Swenson] was 
asking if some alternative arrangement could be made for the 
check-ride.  As best as one can tell from the testimony of the 
two deBoer witnesses, alternatives were not explored.  They took 
a blind approach to this policy and for them that was the end of 
it."  
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
11 
 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
  
 
No.  2009AP564.awb 
 
 
 
1