Title: Smith v. Humane Society of the United States
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95175
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2017

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
MARY ANN SMITH, d/b/a SMITH’S 
  ) 
KENNEL, 
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant, 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC95175 
  ) 
THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE 
  ) 
UNITED STATES and MISSOURIANS   ) 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF DOGS, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondents. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DENT COUNTY 
The Honorable Ronald D. White, Judge  
Mary Ann Smith filed a petition against the Humane Society of the United States 
(“HSUS”) and Missourians for the Protection of Dogs, alleging various statements made 
in documents related to the ballot initiative, the “Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act,” 
were defamatory and placed her in a false light.  Specifically, Ms. Smith alleged the 
specific statements were defamatory because they falsely stated or implied her kennel 
was one of the worst “puppy mills” in Missouri, according to the research done by HSUS, 
had “atrocious” and “unconscionable” state and federal animal welfare violations, and 
had a variety of other specific animal welfare violations.  Ms. Smith further alleged the 
statements placed her in a false light by misrepresenting the activities and conduct of both 
Opinion issued April 25, 2017
2 
 
her and her kennel and by associating her kennel with those that had more severe animal 
welfare violations.   
HSUS moved to dismiss, contending Ms. Smith could not maintain her defamation 
claims because the statements in the documents were “absolutely privileged opinions,” 
because “ratings, rankings and grades are inherently subjective,” and because Ms. Smith 
failed to plead any facts cognizable under a false light cause of action.  Missourians for 
the Protection of Dogs joined the motion to dismiss filed by HSUS and further contended 
the claims against it should be dismissed because none of the statements in the various 
documents were attributable to them.  The circuit court dismissed the petition on the 
motion filed by HSUS “for the reasons set forth in [d]efendant’s motion.”  The circuit 
court did not rule on the separate ground for dismissal offered by Missourians for the 
Protection of Dogs.   
Ms. Smith appeals, arguing that there is no absolute privilege for opinions and that 
she pleaded facts that, taken as true, entitled her to relief on her defamation and false light 
claims.  Because none of the statements pleaded in the defamation claims were actionable 
as a matter of law and because she did not plead any facts cognizable in a false light claim, 
the circuit court did not err in dismissing the petition.  The circuit court’s judgment is 
affirmed. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
On November 2, 2010, Missouri citizens were slated to vote on the ballot-initiative 
Proposition B, the “Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act,” advocated for by the Humane 
3 
 
Society of Missouri and Missourians for the Protection of Dogs.1  To urge voters to 
support the ballot initiative, on October 5, 2010, HSUS published a 27-page report titled 
“Missouri’s Dirty Dozen:  A report on some of the worst puppy mills in Missouri,” as 
well as a four-page summary of the report.  Both were paid for by Missourians for the 
Protection of Dogs.  In conjunction with these reports, Missourians for the Protection of 
Dogs issued a news release and HSUS Chief Executive Officer Wayne Pacelle authored 
a short article that was circulated to e-mail subscribers of his blog. 
 
In the introduction of the Dirty Dozen report, HSUS explained the purpose and 
methodology of the report: 
Researchers at The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) have 
spent weeks poring over state and federal inspection reports, investigators’ 
photographs, and enforcement records received via the Freedom of 
Information Act to compile a list of some of the worst puppy mills in 
Missouri, known as “Missouri’s Dirty Dozen.” 
 
The purpose of the report is to demonstrate current problems that could be 
addressed by the passage of Proposition B . . . .  Under Proposition B, the 
Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act, many of these dealers’ horrific 
violations would be backed by stronger enforcement opportunities. 
 
All of the puppy mills on the Dirty Dozen list are licensed by the USDA, 
the state, or both . . . .  Some sell puppies to pet stores and others over the 
Internet.  One thing they have in common is atrocious violations of basic 
humane standards for the dogs in their care. 
 
HSUS also explained how it selected the individual kennels included in the Dirty Dozen 
report: 
                                              
1 On December 28, 2009, the Missouri secretary of state certified the ballot title for the 
proposed ballot initiative.  State ex rel. Humane Soc’y of Mo. v. Beetem, 317 S.W.3d 669, 
671 (Mo. App. 2010).   
4 
 
Missouri’s Dirty Dozen were selected as examples of some of the worst 
licensed kennels in the state, based upon the number and severity of state 
and/or federal animal welfare violations.  Availability of photographs to 
verify the conditions was also a factor in some cases. 
 
Some of the violations described in federal and state kennel inspection 
reports include thin-coated breeds like Italian greyhounds shivering in the 
cold in temperatures as low as 9-degrees, dogs with open oozing or bleeding 
sores, underweight dogs with their entire skeletal structures showing, and 
sick or dying puppies who had not been treated by a vet.   
 
One kennel made the list because it noted on a proposed USDA program of 
veterinary care that the owner intended to dispose of unwanted dogs “by 
clubbing the dogs” . . . . 
 
The Dirty Dozen report then stated that Proposition B would address “many of these 
dealers’ horrific violations” by creating “stronger enforcement” and more protections.   
Following this introduction, the Dirty Dozen report included specific information 
about 12 kennels under the heading “The Dirty Dozen” and eight kennels under the 
heading “Dishonorable Mentions.”  The kennels were not numerically ranked, and no 
information was included regarding the order of entries.  The entry for each kennel 
included the kennel’s name, the owner or owners of the kennel, the kennel’s current state 
or federal licenses, and information summarizing and quoting various animal welfare 
violations.   
The Dirty Dozen report included Ms. Smith’s kennel as one of the “Dirty Dozen.”  
Her kennel was the sixth kennel on the list of 12.  The entry read: 
A Decade of Problems 
 
Mary Ann Smith – Smith’s Kennel 
• Salem, MO 
• USDA license: 43-A-2296 – USDA licensed from Aug. 1996 
through August 2011 
5 
 
• MDA license #: 3258 – MDA licensed through 2010 
 
Smith’s Kennel has a history of repeat USDA violations stretching back 
more than a decade, including citations for unsanitary conditions; dogs 
exposed to below-freezing temperatures or excessive heat without adequate 
shelter from the weather; dogs without enough cage space to turn and move 
around freely; pest and rodent infestations; injured and bleeding dogs, dogs 
with loose, bloody stools who had not been treated by a vet, and much more. 
 
The entry also included direct quotations from the inspection reports.  One or more 
dogs in her kennel had been reported as having cherry eye, interdigital cysts, extremely 
long toenails, bloody feces, green matter in their eyes, and hair loss.  It was further 
reported that her outdoor facilities had little bedding for the dogs even during freezing 
temperatures.  A 2008 inspection report stated the issues with her kennel “remain[ed] 
constant with each inspection and more issues ha[d] surfaced since the last inspection.”  
The entry for Smith’s Kennel contained no photographs.  The summary report associated 
with the Dirty Dozen report summarized the introduction of the Dirty Dozen report and 
included the lists of the “Dirty Dozen” and “Dishonorable Mentions.”   
The news release issued in conjunction with the reports was titled:  “Dog 
Advocates Release New Report on Missouri’s ‘Dirty Dozen,’ Some of the State’s Most 
Deplorable Puppy Mills: Missourians encouraged to vote ‘Yes’ on Proposition B to curb 
puppy mill cruelty.”  The news release announced the publication of the Dirty Dozen 
report, which it said included “some of the most deplorable puppy mills in the state[.]”  It 
further stated that the “Dirty Dozen” were included in the report because they “repeatedly 
depriv[ed] dogs of the basics of humane care, such as food, shelter from the heat and cold 
and/or basic veterinary care . . . and based in some cases on conditions seen in 
6 
 
photographs taken by investigators earlier this year.”  The news release continued with a 
summary description of some of the specific violations of the first three “puppy mills” 
included in the Dirty Dozen report.  The news release concluded by stating that 
Proposition B would stop the violations reported at the puppy mills, such as dogs being 
“crammed into small and filthy cages, denied veterinary care, exposed to extremes of heat 
and cold, and given no exercise or human affection.”  While the examples of the specific 
violations listed in the news release did not apply to each and every kennel in the report, 
some of the violations, such as a lack of shelter from the cold, did apply to Ms. Smith’s 
kennel.  Neither Ms. Smith’s name nor the name of her kennel was included in the news 
release.   
Mr. Pacelle also circulated an article titled “A Dozen More Reasons for Supporting 
Missouri’s Prop B,” following the release of the Dirty Dozen report.  The article describes 
the report as a “painstakingly documented report synthesiz[ing] information gleaned from 
state and federal inspection reports, including enforcement records, animal care 
violations, and photographs” that “identified these Dirty Dozen puppy mills and eight 
dishonorable mentions.”  Like the news release, the article detailed a few specific 
violations included in the Dirty Dozen report without mentioning the name of any specific 
kennel.  The news release did not include Mrs. Smith’s name nor the name of her kennel.   
 
On November 2, 2010, Missouri voters passed Proposition B, which was to take 
effect in November 2011 as the Canine Mill Cruelty Prevention Act, section 273.345, 
RSMo Supp. 2011.  Following the law’s passage, state legislators almost immediately 
began to introduce bills to repeal or amend the act.  This included legislation from            
7 
 
Ms. Smith’s son, Representative Jason Smith, who was the Missouri house majority whip.  
On March 9, 2011, the day after the Missouri Senate gave its preliminary approval to pass 
SB 113 to repeal the Act, HSUS published an updated 26-page report, titled “Update 
Report: Missouri’s Dirty Dozen,” along with an associated news release.  
 
The updated Dirty Dozen report stated:  “Most of the worst puppy mills in Missouri 
are still licensed . . . indicating the ongoing need for the protections that Proposition B, 
The Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act, will provide.”  The updated report listed the 
status of the kennels that had been designated as the “Dirty Dozen” and “Dishonorable 
Mentions” in the original report.  It also included six new kennels.  As before, the lists 
were not numerically ranked. 
 
The individual entry for Ms. Smith’s kennel was titled “Chronically Problematic 
Puppy Mill Linked to MO Lawmaker Currently Attacking Prop B.”  It listed her USDA 
and MDA licenses as active “despite ongoing repeat violations.”  The entry summarized 
the previous violations at her kennel, such as “unsanitary conditions; dogs exposed to 
below-freezing temperatures or excessive heat without adequate shelter from the weather; 
dogs without enough cage space to turn and move around freely; pest and rodent 
infestations; injured and bleeding dogs, dogs with loose, bloody stools who had not been 
treated by a vet, and much more.”  The updated report also included a photograph of a 
dog that was reported to have congenital health problems.  It also noted her son “was once 
listed in state records as a co-owner of her kennel and has been an outspoken opponent of 
Proposition B.”  The updated Dirty Dozen report concluded with a synopsis of the act and 
the various bills that had been introduced to repeal or amend the act.  It urged Missouri 
8 
 
citizens to “make brief, polite phone calls to their state senator, representative, and 
governor to ask them to respect the will of the voters – by voting ‘NO’ on any bill that 
seeks to weaken or overturn Prop B.”   
 
On the same day, HSUS issued a news release announcing the updated report.  The 
news release noted the preliminary passage of SB 113, stating, “leaders of the repeal effort 
repeatedly claimed on the Senate floor last night that licensed breeders are not a problem.”  
The news release stated that, because many of the “worst puppy mills in the state are still 
licensed,” Proposition B “must be allowed to take effect in November, as approved by 
Missouri voters, to address the cruelty.”  The news release noted, “[M]any [of the puppy 
mills are] still depriving dogs of the basics of humane care, such as shelter from the bitter 
cold, adequate food and water, and basic veterinary care for illness or injuries” and have 
a disregard for “even the most minimal humane care standards for dogs.”  As before, 
while not every violation listed in the news release applied to each kennel, some of the 
violations were applicable to Ms. Smith’s kennel.  
 
Ms. Smith sued HSUS and Missourians for the Protection of Dogs, alleging claims 
of defamation and false light.  In her fourth amended petition, Ms. Smith alleged in Count 
I, defamation – negligence, that specific statements from the Dirty Dozen report, the 
October 5, 2010 news release, the article, the updated Dirty Dozen report, and the March 
9, 2011 news release were “false, scandalous, and defamatory” and “falsely impl[ied] that 
there [were] other, undisclosed objective facts known to the [d]efendants which 
support[ed] the false statements made by defendants.”  Ms. Smith did not allege any of 
9 
 
the statements reporting specific violations of her kennel were false.  Rather, she claimed 
the Dirty Dozen report generally defamed her and placed her in a false light. 
Ms. Smith specifically alleged the following statements were defamatory: 
From the Dirty Dozen Report: 
• Ms. Smith’s kennel was one of the “Dirty Dozen.” 
• Ms. Smith’s kennel was among “the worst puppy mills in Missouri.” 
• “Missouri’s Dirty Dozen were selected as examples of some of the worst 
licensed kennels in the state, based upon the number and severity of state and/or 
federal animal welfare violations.” 
• The “availability of photographs to verify the conditions was also a factor [of 
being selected as one of the Dirty Dozen] in some cases.”   
• “One thing [the Dirty Dozen] have in common is atrocious violations of basic 
humane standards for dogs in their care.”   
 
From the October 5, 2010 news release:  
 
• “These puppy mills were singled out from the hundreds of high-volume 
commercial breeders in Missouri for repeatedly depriving dogs of the basics of 
humane care, such as food, shelter from heat and cold and/or basic veterinary 
care according to state and/or federal inspection reports for each dealer[.]” 
• “At puppy mills in Missouri, dogs are crammed into small and filthy cages, 
denied veterinary care, exposed to extremes of heat and cold, and given no 
exercise or human affection.”   
• “These puppy mills have an undeniable record of unconscionable violations of 
the minimal humane care standards in place, according to [HSUS’s] study of 
their records.”   
 
From the article: 
 
• “HSUS researchers identified these Dirty Dozen puppy mills and eight 
dishonorable mentions” and “[t]his painstakingly documented [Dirty Dozen 
report] synthesizes information gleaned from state and federal inspection 
reports, including enforcement records, animal care violations, and 
photographs, and reveals shocking abuses and mistreatment of dogs at the 
state[’]s largest puppy mills.”   
 
 
 
10 
 
From the updated Dirty Dozen report: 
 
• “[M]ost of the worst puppy mills in Missouri are still licensed.” 
• “Mary Ann Smith, [of] Smith’s Kennel, Salem” was one of the “worst puppy 
mills” still licensed. 
• “Smith’s Kennel remains both USDA licensed and MDA licensed through 
2011 despite ongoing repeat violations.” 
 
From the March 9, 2011 news release: 
 
• “Missourians for the Protection of Dogs released a new report today 
demonstrating major continuing problems in licensed puppy mills.” 
• “[M]any of the worst puppy mills in the state are still licensed and in business 
six months after their histories were made public [in the Dirty Dozen report][.]” 
• “The licensed puppy mills identified in this [updated Dirty Dozen] report have 
an undeniable record of flagrant disregard for even the most minimal humane 
care standards for dogs.”   
 
Count I further alleged defendants were negligent in publishing the statements 
because they failed “to conduct a full and complete investigation of:”  (1) “[her] kennel;” 
(2) “the other dirty dozen dog kennels reference[d] in [the] report;” and (3) “‘the hundreds 
of high-volume commercial breeders in Missouri’ referenced in [the] report.”  Ms. Smith 
alleged these statements damaged her reputation by depriving her dog kennel of “valuable 
business associations in the dog raising and selling business” and causing her “to suffer 
humiliation, embarrassment, hurt, mental anguish, pain and suffering and has and will in 
the future be deprived of public confidence and social and business associations.” 
 
Count II, defamation – false statements, contained the same allegation that the 
above statements were “false, scandalous, and defamatory” and “falsely impl[ied] that 
there [were] other, undisclosed objective facts known to [d]efendants which support[ed] 
the false statements made by defendants.”  In this count, however, Ms. Smith alleged 
11 
 
defendants published the alleged defamatory statements “with knowledge that such 
statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether such statements were true or 
false at a time when the [d]efendants had doubts as to whether such statements were true.”  
Because Ms. Smith alleged the defendants’ actions were done “knowingly, intentionally, 
[and] in conscious disregard for and in reckless indifference to [her] interests and 
welfare,” she requested punitive damages.  
 
In Count III, invasion of privacy – false light, she alleged the above statements 
misrepresented Ms. Smith and her kennel with reckless disregard for the truth and placed 
her in a false light by falsely implying:  
1) her kennel was a “puppy mill” and “was as bad as and engaged in the 
same conduct as the other kennels listed in the report” that had more 
severe state or federal animal welfare violations;  
2) she “committed ‘atrocious violations of basic humane care standards for 
the dogs in her care;’”  
3) she was a cruel and inhumane person;  
4) her dogs “developed interdigital cysts from being ‘forced to stand 
continually on wire flooring;” 
5) she and her kennel “were singled out from the hundreds of high volume 
commercial breeders in Missouri for repeatedly depriving dogs of the 
basics of human care, according to state and/or federal state inspection 
reports for each dealer;”  
6) her kennel was “among the worst of the worst and repeatedly deprived 
dogs of the basics of humane care;”  
7) her “dogs received little to no medical care, lived in squalid conditions 
with no exercise, socialization, or human interaction, and are confined 
inside cramped wire cages for life[,] . . . crammed into small cramped 
cages, denied veterinary care, exposed to the extremes of heat and cold, 
and given no exercise or human affection;”  
8) her kennel’s “violations were ‘horrific,’” and that the state and federal 
inspections reports of [her] and her kennel ‘reveal[ed] shocking abuses 
and mistreatment of dogs;” and 
9) regarding the updated report, implied that her kennel “continued to have 
violations similar to those in the original [report].” 
 
12 
 
Ms. Smith further alleged these statements placed her in a false light because they 
were made “in public without any acknowledgment of explanatory facts and 
circumstances which, when added to the facts recited in the reports and news releases, 
would naturally tend to create a less objectionable public opinion of [her] and her kennel.”    
Ms. Smith alleged the statements “contained unreasonable and highly 
objectionable publicity” regarding Ms. Smith and her kennel, placing her “in a false light 
[by] attribut[ing] to her characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false,” which was 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”  Ms. Smith alleged the defendants made the 
statements “in reckless[] disregard as to the[ir] falsity” with “knowledge that they 
misrepresented” Ms. Smith and her kennel or “with reckless disregard for whether they 
misrepresented [Ms. Smith] . . . at a time when Defendants had serious doubts as to 
whether such statements truthfully describe [Ms. Smith and her kennel].”  Ms. Smith 
alleged injuries and damages from:  “be[ing] deprived of valuable business associations 
in the dog raising and selling business;” having “her privacy invaded, her history, 
activities and beliefs misrepresented, and her right to be left alone [] compromised and 
degraded;” and present and future “mental anguish, emotional distress, as well as personal 
humiliation and embarrassment from the invasions of her privacy,” which has and will 
require counseling and medical costs.  Because Ms. Smith alleged the defendants’ actions 
were done “knowingly, intentionally, in conscious disregard for and in reckless 
indifference to [her] interests and welfare,” she also requested punitive damages. 
HSUS moved to dismiss Ms. Smith’s fourth amended petition for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 55.27(a)(6).  HSUS contended            
13 
 
Ms. Smith could not maintain her defamation claims because the statements in the reports 
and associated documents were absolutely privileged “opinions” and because “ratings, 
rankings and grades are inherently subjective.”  HSUS argued Ms. Smith could not 
maintain her false light claim because her allegations under this claim were “untrue 
statements” that sounded in defamation or, in the alternative, were privileged as matters 
of legitimate public interest.  Missourians for the Protection of Dogs joined the motion to 
dismiss.  In addition, Missourians for the Protection of Dogs argued that Ms. Smith’s 
claims against them should be dismissed because they did not write any of the statements 
in the documents.  
 
The circuit court sustained the motion to dismiss filed by HSUS and joined by the 
Missourians for the Protection of Dogs “for the reasons set forth in [d]efendant’s motion.”  
The circuit court did not rule on the separate ground for dismissal offered by the 
Missourians for the Protection of Dogs.  Ms. Smith appealed, contending that the circuit 
court erred in sustaining the defendants’ motion to dismiss because there is no absolute 
privilege for opinions, and that she pleaded facts that, taken as true, entitled her to relief 
on both her defamation and false light claims.  After an opinion by the court of appeals, 
this Court granted transfer.  MO. CONST. art. V, sec. 10.  
Standard of Review 
A judgment sustaining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted is reviewed de novo.  Avery Contracting, LLC v. Niehaus, 492 
S.W.3d 159, 161-62 (Mo. banc 2016).  “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim” 
is solely a test of “the adequacy of a plaintiff’s petition.”  Id. at 162.  Exhibits attached to 
14 
 
the petition are reviewed as part of the petition.  Rule 55.12.  The facts alleged in the 
petition are assumed to be true, and all reasonable inferences are liberally construed in 
favor of the plaintiff.  Avery, 492 S.W.3d at 162.  “[T]he petition is reviewed in an almost 
academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized 
cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.”  Nazeri v. Mo. Valley 
Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993). 
No Actionable Defamation Claims Were Pleaded 
 
Ms. Smith contends the statements in the reports, summaries, news releases, and 
article were not protected statements of “opinion,” as HSUS and Missourians for the 
Protection of Dogs contend, but were or implied “false statements of fact” that are not 
constitutionally protected.  Moreover, Ms. Smith contends the conclusion that her kennel 
was one of the “Dirty Dozen” was not “subjective” because “the report fail[ed] to state 
that the matter [was] only the Defendants’ opinion” and instead relied on “underlying 
objective facts, both disclosed and undisclosed.”  HSUS and Missourians for the 
Protection of Dogs contend the statements are “absolutely privileged” statements of 
opinion and that “ratings, rankings, lists and grades are inherently subjective” and, 
therefore, cannot be the basis of a defamation claim.   
 
Defamation law protects an individual against harm to his or her reputation.  Henry 
v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. banc 1985).  “[T]o prevail on a defamation 
claim,” both public-figure and private-figure plaintiffs must prove “1) publication, 2) of 
a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published 
with the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff’s reputation.”  Farrow v. 
15 
 
Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 598-99 (Mo. banc 2013) (internal citations 
omitted).   
To determine whether a statement is defamatory, “the alleged defamatory words 
must be considered in context, giving them their plain and ordinarily understood 
meaning.”  Nazeri, 860 S.W.2nd at 311.  To allow the “breathing space” necessary for 
free expression and debate under the First Amendment, certain statements, such as 
statements of “opinion” not provable as false, cannot be the basis of a defamation claim.  
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).  “Whether an alleged statement is capable of being treated as 
an opinion or as an assertion of fact is a question of law . . . .”  Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314.   
As noted by the Supreme Court of the United States, the need to balance the 
protection of an individual’s reputation with freedom of expression has shaped the 
boundaries of state defamation law insofar as these boundaries are contoured by 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press and the attendant commitment to 
maintain “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues.  Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986).  As discussed in New York Times,  
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public 
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our 
decisions.  The constitutional safeguard, we have said, was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.  The maintenance of the opportunity 
for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive 
to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, 
an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental 
principle of our constitutional system.  
 
. . . .  
16 
 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 
1213, the [Supreme] Court declared:  
 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, 
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may 
seem the rankest error to his neighbor.  To persuade others to 
his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts 
to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, 
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement.  But 
the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, 
that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these 
liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion 
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.   
 
That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be 
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that 
they need to survive.  
 
376 U.S. at 269, 271 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 
In light of these concerns with free expression, the Supreme Court has held there 
can be no liability under state defamation law for statements of opinion.  Gertz, 418 U.S. 
at 339-40.  In Gertz, the Supreme Court stated:  “Under the First Amendment there is no 
such thing as a false idea.  However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas.”  Id.  Following Gertz, Missouri adopted an absolute privilege for expressions of 
opinion, broadly holding that any alleged defamatory statements that “can be 
characterized as ‘opinions,’” are “subject to the First Amendment absolute privilege.”  
Henry, 690 S.W.2d at 787.  
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990), the Supreme Court 
clarified that Gertz was not “intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for 
anything that might be labeled ‘opinion’” because expressions of “opinion” may, in fact, 
17 
 
“often imply an assertion of objective fact.”  But contrary to Ms. Smith’s contention, 
Milkovich did not wholly abandon the constitutional protection for an “opinion.”   
The Supreme Court in Milkovich held that a statement labeled as an “opinion” can 
be the basis of an actionable defamation claim if the alleged “opinion” statement implies 
an assertion of objective facts.  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.  Accordingly, some statements 
about matters of public concern may not be protected “opinion” even if so labeled.  Id.  
This does not mean, however, that all statements of opinion are actionable.  Id. at 19.  To 
be liable under state defamation law, opinion statements about matters of public concern 
“must be provable as false.”  Id.  If opinion statements are not provable as false, these 
statements are still protected.  Notably, the Supreme Court in Milkovich also cited the 
holding in  Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-
CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-286 (1974), that to safeguard free expression and public 
debate, words used as “rhetorical hyperbole,” “lusty and imaginative expression[s] of [] 
contempt,” and “loose” language cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.   
Id. at 16-17.   
Three years after Milkovich, in Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314, this Court recognized 
Milkovich’s rejection of an absolute privilege for “anything that might be labeled 
‘opinion.’”  This Court further adopted the Milkovich “test” to determine whether a 
statement is actionable, holding that “[t]he test to be applied to an ostensible ‘opinion’ is 
whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement implies an assertion of 
objective fact.”  Id.  This Court again recognized this test in Overcast v. Billings Mutual 
Insurance Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Mo. banc 2000). 
18 
 
Turning to the specific allegations in her petition, Ms. Smith does not assert any 
of the state or federal violations attributed to her are false.  Rather, she claims that 
including her kennel in the report as one of the “Dirty Dozen” and one of the “worst 
puppy mills in Missouri” is defamatory because it implies her kennel had more, and more 
severe, violations of federal or state animal welfare violations than other kennels in 
Missouri and because the general statements in the report about the 12 “puppy mills,” 
which were based on the specific violations found during state and federal inspections of 
the “Dirty Dozen,” imply the existence of objective facts that are false when applied to 
her kennel.   
Ms. Smith contends the statements are actionable because HSUS and Missourians 
for the Protection of Dogs did not clearly state that they were giving opinions.  Milkovich, 
however, does not require this.  Instead, review is confined to whether, as a matter of law, 
the statements relating to public concerns are provable as false or could reasonably be 
interpreted as implying objective facts provable as false.  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.   
Ms. Smith first contends the statement that her kennel is a “puppy mill” is a factual 
statement that can be proven false.  She asserts HSUS and Missourians for the Protection 
of Dogs defined “puppy mill” by including the following statement in the news release 
for the original report: “At puppy mills in Missouri, dogs are crammed into small and 
filthy cages, denied veterinary care, exposed to extremes of heat and cold, and given no 
exercise or human affection.”   Ms. Smith contends whether these conditions existed at 
Ms. Smith’s kennel is a factual statement that can be proven or disproven. 
19 
 
In considering whether statements are defamatory, the “defamatory words must be 
considered in context.”  Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 311.  Whether a statement alleged to be 
defamatory is actionable is a question of law.  Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314.  The words in 
an allegedly defamatory statement must “be taken in the sense which is most obvious and 
natural and according to [the] ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they 
are addressed.”  Id.   In context, as part of the news release for the original report, the 
sentence Ms. Smith contends is a “definition” of puppy mill is not intended as a definition.  
Considering the purpose of the news release to inform the public about the contents of 
the report, the allegedly defamatory statement is not a “definition” but is a description of 
a few of the violations found at the puppy mills.  Importantly, neither this statement nor 
the news release as a whole states that these violations are applicable to Ms. Smith’s 
kennel.  In fact, neither Ms. Smith’s name nor the name of her kennel is included in the 
news release.   
Because the term “puppy mill” was not defined in the report, “[t]o determine the 
ordinary meaning of a term, this Court consults standard English language dictionaries.” 
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Repub. Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. banc 1997).  As 
such, a dictionary definition of a “puppy mill” is “a commercial farming operation in 
which purebred dogs are raised in large numbers.”  Merriam Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 1010 (11th ed. 2009).  As cited by Ms. Smith, another dictionary defines 
“puppy mill” as “[a]n establishment that breeds puppies for sale, typically on an intensive 
basis and in conditions regarded as inhumane.” Oxford Living Dictionaries, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/puppy_farm (last visited March 28, 2017).   
20 
 
Even if Ms. Smith is correct that the term “puppy mill” as used by HSUS and 
Missourians for the Protection of Dogs in the report has a negative connotation, a negative 
connotation alone does not make it actionable.  As used in the report, the term “puppy 
mill” is imprecisely used as “rhetorical hyperbole” and a “lusty and imaginative 
expression of the contempt” of political advocates during a hotly contested political 
campaign that cannot, therefore, “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts.”  
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17 (quoting Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284-86); see also 
Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314 (considering whether a term is too “imprecise” to be 
actionable).  Accordingly, statements that Ms. Smith’s kennel is a “puppy mill” are not 
actionable as a matter of law.   
Ms. Smith further contends that including her kennel in a report of the “worst 
puppy mills in Missouri” implies her kennel had more, and more severe, federal or state 
animal welfare violations than other kennels in Missouri.  This contention presupposes, 
however, that whether her kennel had more “severe” violations than other kennels in 
Missouri is a statement that can be provable false by undisclosed facts.  Whether              
Ms. Smith’s kennel had more state or federal animal welfare violations than other kennels 
listed in the reports or other kennels licensed in Missouri is an objective fact that is 
provable false.  But in this case, this alone does not make her defamation claims 
actionable.   
While the report lists this as one reason a kennel may have been included in the 
report, the report does not state Ms. Smith’s kennel was included solely based on the 
number of violations.  Instead, the report states that kennels were chosen based on the 
21 
 
“number” and the “severity” of the violations, repeated violations over a period of time, 
as well as, “in some cases,” the availability of photographs.  The “severity” of a kennel’s 
violations is, however, subjective and is not provable as false.  A ranking or list, which 
includes the subjective interpretation of data, leads to subjective conclusions that cannot 
be provable as false.  See, e.g., Castle Rock Remodeling, LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of 
Greater St. Louis, Inc., 354 S.W.3d 234, 242-43 (Mo. App. 2011) (company’s Better 
Business Bureau rating based on a subjective interpretation of data and not actionable as 
a matter of law); see also Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(hotel’s inclusion on a list of “dirtiest” hotels not a provable fact because term “dirtiest” 
is hyperbolic and “inherently subjective”); Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors 
Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007) (“junk” credit rating based on a subjective 
and discretionary weighing of factors not provable false). 
Unlike the “number” of violations, which can be quantified, the “severity” of a 
kennel’s violations is based purely on a subjective assessment.  Likewise, while the report 
may not have included the violations from every kennel HSUS researched, these 
undisclosed violations cannot be proven false because whether they are more “severe” 
than Ms. Smith’s violations cannot be objectively assessed.  Accordingly, whether          
Ms. Smith’s kennel was one of the “Dirty Dozen” or one of “the worst licensed kennels 
in the state” is a subjective assessment based on the “number” and the “severity” of her 
22 
 
kennel’s state and federal violations, which is not provable as false, and, therefore, as a 
matter of law does not present a basis for an actionable defamation claim. 2   
Moreover, the specific statements Ms. Smith objects to are not, in fact, those 
statements specifically referring to her kennel but are instead statements generally about 
the conduct of the “Dirty Dozen.”  These statements aggregated some of the specific 
violations found and, while not every violation was applicable to each kennel, some of 
the specific violations were, in fact, applicable to Ms. Smith.  
But considering these statements in “the sense which is most obvious and natural 
and according to [the] ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are 
addressed,” Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 311 (internal quotations omitted), the list of conduct 
found to be, for example, “inhumane,” did not apply to all 12 kennels.  Because specific 
violations were listed for each kennel, statements about the conduct of the “Dirty Dozen” 
are clearly not intended to apply to each and every kennel. 
Likewise, the general statements that the kennels included in the report had 
“atrocious violations of basic humane standards,” “unconscionable violations of minimal 
humane care standards,” “major continuing problems,” and an “undeniable record of 
flagrant disregard for even the most minimal humane care standards” are not objective 
facts and do not imply objective facts provable as false.  What is an “atrocious,” 
“unconscionable,” “major,” or “flagrant” violation is purely subjective.  
                                              
2 Additionally, insofar as Ms. Smith suggests that her kennel was included in the report 
as one of the “Dirty Dozen” due to her son’s opposition to Proposition B and not because 
her kennel was one of the “worst,” this assertion does not affect the determination that 
the statements in the report were subjective and, therefore, not provable as false.   
23 
 
Additionally, in the context of a disputed ballot initiative, these words are the kind 
of “lusty, imaginative expression[s] of [] contempt” that cannot “reasonably [be] 
interpreted as stating actual facts[.]”  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17 (quoting Letter Carriers, 
418 U.S. at 284-86).  For example, in Letters Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284-86, the Supreme 
Court held the use of the word “traitor” was not actionable when it was used amidst a 
labor dispute, was used “in a loose, figurative sense,” and was “merely rhetorical 
hyperbole” and a “a lusty and imaginative expression of [] contempt.” See also Greenbelt 
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).  The Supreme Court held that 
“provid[ing] protection for statements that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating 
actual facts’ about an individual . . . provides assurance that public debate will not suffer 
for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally 
added much to the discourse of our Nation.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted).   
Because whether Ms. Smith’s kennel had more “severe” animal welfare violations 
than other kennels was a subjective assessment not provable as false and did not imply 
any objective facts provable as false, these statements are not actionable as a matter of 
law.  Moreover, statements that her kennel had “atrocious,” “unconscionable,” “major,” 
and “flagrant” violations and statements that her kennel was a “puppy mill” do not include 
or imply objective facts that are provable as false because they reflect a subjective 
interpretation of data.  Ms. Smith’s petition did not allege any actionable statements and 
the circuit court did not err in dismissing her defamation claims.  
 
24 
 
No Cognizable False Light Claim Was Pleaded 
This Court has not previously recognized the tort of false light invasion of privacy 
as a cause of action.  Ms. Smith notes the court of appeals recognized false light as a cause 
of action in Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 323 (Mo. App. 2008), as have 
32 states and the District of Columbia.   
 
Ms. Smith contends she has pleaded factual allegations sufficient to establish a 
false light invasion of privacy action.  In particular, she argues her false light claim does 
not replicate her defamation claims because it is “based on the false implications of the 
context of the report, not particular false statements.”  Accordingly, she maintains that 
“even if the factual statements in the report are, taken individually, accurate,” the 
“misleading context of the ‘Dirty Dozen’ reports and news releases attributes to Plaintiff[] 
characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false” and, therefore, places her and her kennel 
“before the public in a false position,” depriving her dog kennel of valuable business 
associations and degrading and compromising her right to be left alone.  Ms. Smith, 
however, also asserts such “false implications” in her defamation claims.   
 
This Court has refused to recognize false light invasion of privacy claims when the 
claim “is nothing more than the classic defamation action where one party alleges that the 
other published a false accusation concerning a statement of fact.”  Sullivan v. Pulitzer 
Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480-81 (Mo. banc 1986); see also Farrow, 407 S.W.3d at 
600.  “Recovery for untrue statements that cause injury to reputation should be 
defamation.”  Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 317.  A claim for false light invasion of privacy is 
properly dismissed if recovery should be in defamation.  Id. at 317.   
25 
 
 
Although this Court has refused to recognize a false light invasion of privacy 
claim, in Sullivan, this Court acknowledged: 
It may be possible that in the future Missouri courts will be presented with 
an appropriate case justifying our recognition of the tort of ‘false light 
invasion of privacy.’ The classic case is when one publicly attributes to the 
plaintiff some opinion or utterance, whether harmful or not, that is false, 
such as claiming that the plaintiff wrote a poem, article or book which 
plaintiff did not in fact write. Another situation, although possibly 
actionable under defamation law, is when one uses another's likeness in 
connection with a story that has no bearing on the plaintiff. 
 
709 S.W.2d at 480 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 
In Meyerkord, the case Ms. Smith urges this Court to follow, a corporation’s 
former employee was listed as the registrant for a website that was used during a viral 
marketing campaign.  276 S.W.3d at 321.  The viral marketing campaign and the former 
employee subsequently became the subject of public “concern, suspicion, and 
accusations.”  Id.  The employee filed a false light invasion of privacy action because the 
former employer failed to remove his name as the registrant, causing injury to his 
reputation and standing in the community.  Id. at 321-22.  The court of appeals held the 
facts presented were dissimilar to those in a defamation case and, therefore, “properly 
present the issue of false light invasion of privacy.”  Id. at 325.  The facts in Meyerkord, 
however, are inapposite to the facts in the case at bar.   
In her petition, Ms. Smith alleges the report placed her in a false light because it 
falsely implied her dogs “developed interdigital cysts from being forced to stand 
continually on wire flooring,” falsely implied her kennel “continued to have violations 
similar to those in the original [report],” and falsely implied her dogs “received little to 
26 
 
no medical care, lived in squalid conditions with no exercise, socialization or human 
interaction, and are confined inside cramped wire cages for life[,] . . . [and] exposed to 
extremes of heat and cold.”  These allegations concern statements of fact or allegations 
of erroneous assessments of statements of fact.  Accordingly, Ms. Smith should have, but 
did not, seek recovery for these allegedly untrue statements of fact in her defamation 
claims.  
 
Ms. Smith’s petition further alleges the quotations from the state and federal 
animal welfare violation reports and the photograph of an allegedly “sick dog” were either 
“taken out of context” or “edited.”  Under a defamation claim, statements “imply a false 
assertion of fact” if they are “either incorrect or incomplete, or if [the] assessment of them 
is erroneous.”  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).  Ms. Smith’s allegations 
assert the facts were presented in an incomplete or erroneous way.  These allegations, 
therefore, imply false statements of fact that should have been, but were not, pleaded in 
her defamation claims.  Accordingly, because Ms. Smith does not make any allegations 
cognizable as a false light invasion of privacy claim, it is not necessary for this Court to 
denominate a new cause of action for this tort at this time.  
Conclusion 
The Dirty Dozen report stated Ms. Smith’s kennel was included as “an example of 
some of the worst licensed kennels in the state” and was “singled out from hundreds of 
high-volume commercial breeders” based on the “number” and the “severity” of her 
kennel’s state and federal violations.  Because these statements were subjective 
assessments not provable as false and did not imply any objective facts provable as false, 
27 
 
these statements are not actionable as defamation as a matter of law.  Moreover, 
statements that her kennel had “atrocious,” “unconscionable,” “major,” and “flagrant” 
violations and statements that her kennel was a “puppy mill” are not and do not imply 
objective facts that are provable as false and, instead, are imprecisely used as “lusty, 
imaginative expression[s] of [] contempt” that cannot “reasonably [be] interpreted as 
stating actual facts[.]”  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17 (quoting Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 
284-86).  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Ms. Smith’s defamation 
claims.   
Additionally, because Ms. Smith does not make any allegations that would be 
cognizable as a false light invasion of privacy claim, the circuit court did not err in 
dismissing her false light invasion of privacy claim.  The circuit court’s judgment is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
Fischer, Stith, Draper, Wilson 
and Russell, JJ., concur.