Title: Klotz v. Board of County Commissioners
Citation: 176 Kan. 325, 270 P.2d 281
Docket Number: 39,363
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 1954

176 Kan. 325 (1954)
270 P.2d 281
ROSA M. KLOTZ, Appellee,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF ELLSWORTH, KANSAS, Appellant.
No. 39,363

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 8, 1954.
John V. O'Donnell, county attorney, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
George D. Miner and Paul L. Aylward, both of Ellsworth, were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
In this action plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant, The Board of County Commissioners of Ellsworth County, to remove obstructions in a road which are *326 causing water to overflow on her adjacent lands. The appeal is from an order overruling a demurrer to the petition.
The action was commenced on September 9, 1953, by the filing of a petition which, omitting formal allegations of no consequence and its prayer, reads:
Without leveling motions of any kind or character against the *328 foregoing petition the defendant demurred thereto on the overall basis it failed to state a cause of action because it disclosed upon its face the alleged and pretended cause of action therein set forth was barred by the statute of limitations. When this demurrer was overruled the defendant perfected the instant appeal wherein it now contends the propriety of that ruling is the sole issue involved on appellate review.
It may be conceded, as appellant points out, that a pleading which shows on its face the cause of action relied on is barred by the statute of limitations (G.S. 1949, 60-306, Third) is demurrable on the ground it fails to state a cause of action. Many of our decisions so hold. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hall, 165 Kan. 358, 194 P.2d 943; Pease v. Snyder, 172 Kan. 257, 240 P.2d 134, and numerous decisions cited in Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], Limitation of Actions, § 189; West's Kansas Digest, Limitation of Actions, §§ 180, 182. On the other hand it is well to remember the rule is just as well established that unless a petition shows that fact affirmatively no demurrer lies and the bar of the statute must be pleaded to be available as a defense. See American Glycerin Co. v. Freeburne, 157 Kan. 22, 138 P.2d 468; Lorey v. Cox, 175 Kan. 66, 259 P.2d 194, and numerous other decisions listed in sections 180, 182 of West's Kansas Digest, and section 188 of Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], under the title of "Limitation of Actions."
However with direct reference to the instant pleading, which as has been previously noted was not subjected to attack prior to the filing of the demurrer, it must also be kept in mind that under the universal rule of construction referred to in Stuckey v. Shultz, 173 Kan. 343, 245 P.2d 1197, and other decisions to be found in Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.], Pleading, §§ 35, 37, also West's Kansas Digest, Pleading, §§ 26, 34 (1), (3), its allegations must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader and given the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
Having established the principles applicable in determining whether the petition states, or fails to state, a cause of action we turn to our decisions for the purpose of determining the conditions and circumstances under which plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for injunctive relief in cases where a public agency has constructed a highway in such a manner as to result in flooding the lands of adjacent property owners. There we find Murphy v. Fairmount Township, 89 Kan. 760, 133 Pac. 169, subsequently cited and adhered to *329 in Scott v. Glenwood Township, 105 Kan. 603, 604, 185 Pac. 731, which holds:
Also Kansas City v. Frohwerk, 10 Kan. App. 120, 62 Pac. 432, recently cited and reapproved in Henderson v. Talbott, 175 Kan. 615, 623, 266 P.2d 273, where it is held:
And in the opinion, in distinguishing Parker v. City of Atchison, 58 Kan. 29, 48 Pac. 631, relied on by appellant as sustaining its position the cause of action set forth in the petition now under consideration was barred by the statute of limitations, said:
Turning to the petition we have no difficulty in concluding it contained allegations which, if given the benefit of the inferences to which it is entitled, bring it squarely within the scope of the rule enunciated in the two decisions from which we have just quoted. Under such circumstances it cannot be said it affirmatively appears from the face of the petition that the cause of action therein pleaded was barred by the statute of limitations. This is so, we may add, regardless whether appellee can support the facts pleaded by the degree of proof required to sustain his cause of action or the appellant plead and establish the defense on which it now relies as the foundation for its demurrer. Therefore we are constrained to hold the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the petition.
In reaching the conclusion just announced we have rejected not overlooked, strenuous contentions advanced by appellant to the *330 effect that if this were a case where appellee was entitled to recover damages, and he was basing his right to relief on that premise his cause of action, under the confronting facts and circumstances as pleaded, would be barred by the statute of limitations. We are not disposed to here dwell at length on the arguments advanced in support of contentions on this point. It suffices to say that in our opinion they are effectively answered by what is said and held in the very recent decision of Henderson v. Talbott, 175 Kan. 615, 266 P.2d 273, particularly pages 620 to 624, incl., of the opinion, handed down by this court on January 23, 1954, approximately one month after the filing of appellant's excellent brief in the case at bar. In all fairness to counsel preparing and filing that document it should perhaps be stated, that on the basis of the logical arguments therein advanced, we are convinced appellate review of the instant ruling would not have been necessary if the decision in Henderson v. Talbott, supra, had been available at that time.
The judgment is affirmed.