Title: Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer, etc. v. Robert M. Ervin, Et Al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1319
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1317 
____________ 
 
CHARLIE CRIST, et al.,  
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT M. ERVIN, et al.,  
Appellees. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1319 
____________ 
 
ALEX SINK, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, etc., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT M. ERVIN, et al.,  
Appellees. 
 
[November 4, 2010] 
REVISED OPINION 
POLSTON, J. 
Appellants (collectively referred to as the State) argue that the trial court 
erred by ruling that statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to the general 
 
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revenue fund are unconstitutional.1  We agree and reverse the trial court as 
explained below. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On June 3, 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment and declared 
unconstitutional sections of the Florida Statutes that direct portions of civil action 
filing fees to the general revenue fund.  Specifically, the trial court ruled that 
provisions of sections 28.24(1)(a), 28.241(a)(2)(d), 28.241(2), 34.041(1)(b), and 
28.2455, Florida Statutes (2009), are unconstitutional and void.   
The trial court concluded that, through these statutes, the Legislature has 
imposed an unconstitutional tax because litigants’ filing fees are sent to the general 
revenue fund to be spent on unrelated government activities.  The trial court stated 
that it is of no consequence that the Legislature appropriates to the courts an 
amount greater than the amount generated by the first $80.00 of the filing fees.  
The trial court explained that ―[t]he Legislature is simply taxing one group of 
citizens and spending the money on unrelated governmental activities, which is 
illegal and unconstitutional.‖  Citing Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 117 So. 
385 (Fla. 1928), and Farabee v. Board of Trustees, 254 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971), the 
                                          
 
 
1.  Appellants Governor Crist, et al., and Chief Financial Officer Sink 
appealed the judgment of the circuit court to the First District Court of Appeal, 
which certified to this Court that the judgment is of great public importance, 
affects the proper administration of justice throughout the State, and requires 
immediate resolution by this Court.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(5), 
Fla. Const. 
 
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trial court determined that depositing a portion of the filing fees into the general 
revenue fund denies access to the courts.  The trial court order also stated that the 
provisions at issue ―deny the citizens of this state the right to have their courts 
adequately funded, in violation of Article V, Section 14 and the due process, equal 
protection, [and] right to jury trial guarantees . . . accorded under the Florida 
Constitution.‖  The trial court severed the offending provisions, enjoined the State 
from enforcing them, and ordered the State to ―ensure that the injunction is 
reflected in the financial operations of this state.‖   
II.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX DENYING ACCESS TO COURTS 
The trial court ruled that statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to the 
general revenue fund are an unconstitutional tax denying access to courts.  The 
Appellees argue that the trial court’s ruling is correct because the statutes are 
unconstitutional both facially and as applied.  The State asserts that the statutes are 
facially constitutional because there is a set of circumstances whereby the statutes 
can be constitutional, namely if the Legislature appropriates more to the costs of 
the administration of justice than the amount of civil filing fees deposited into the 
general revenue fund.  Moreover, the State argues that the statutes are 
constitutional as applied because the Legislature has in fact appropriated more to 
support the administration of justice than the amount of fees deposited into the 
general revenue fund.  We agree with the State.  Directing a portion of the filing 
 
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fees to the general revenue fund for further appropriation is an accounting 
mechanism reasonably related to the governmental purpose of funding the 
administration of justice.  See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1997) 
(―Generally, a state statute must be upheld if it meets the rational relationship test; 
that is, if there is any reasonable relationship between the act and the furtherance of 
a valid governmental objective.‖ (quoting trial court’s order)).   
A.  Facial Constitutional Challenge 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo 
review.  See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002).  ―While 
we review decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are obligated to accord 
legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged 
legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.‖  Fla. Dep’t of 
Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fla. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005)).  Further, ―in a 
facial constitutional challenge, we determine only whether there is any set of 
circumstances under which the challenged enactment might be upheld.‖  Id. at 265.  
―If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of 
inquiry ends.‖  State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1977).     
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides that ―[t]he courts 
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be 
 
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administered without sale, denial or delay.‖  The statutory provisions at issue 
transfer a portion of civil filing fees paid by litigants in circuit courts, county 
courts, and appellate courts into the general revenue fund.  See §§ 28.241(1)(a)1.a.; 
28.241(1)(a)2.d.; 28.241(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) ($80 of each civil litigant’s filing fee 
in circuit court and appellate courts must be deposited into the general revenue 
fund); § 34.041(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (―The first $80 of the filing fee collected 
[for civil actions in county court] under subparagraph (a)4. shall be remitted to the 
Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.‖); § 28.2455, 
Fla. Stat. (2009) (ordering annual transfer of any funds in excess of amount needed 
for clerks’ budgets from the clerks of court trust fund to the general revenue fund).    
In State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1994) (citing City of 
Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1992)), this Court defined a tax as ―an 
enforced burden imposed by sovereign right for the support of the government, the 
administration of law, and the exercise of various functions the sovereign is called 
on to perform.‖  In contrast, we defined user fees as ―charges based upon the 
proprietary right of the governing body permitting the use of the instrumentality 
involved.  Such fees share common traits that distinguish them from taxes:‖   
they are charged in exchange for a particular governmental service 
which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by 
other members of society; and they are paid by choice, in that the 
party paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental 
service and thereby avoiding the charge.  
 
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Port Orange, 650 So. 2d at 3 (citations omitted).   
 
In Flood, we addressed whether a statute establishing a docket fee to be used 
for a law library and other general county purposes was an invalid tax on litigants.  
The statute provided that each plaintiff in a circuit court had to pay a docket fee of 
$10, which was to be deposited into a special fund for establishing and maintaining 
a law library in the county.  Flood, 117 So. at 386.  The statute also provided that 
―any balance remaining thereafter [was] to be used and applied as said board [of 
county commissioners] may from time to time deem best for general county 
purposes.‖  Id. (quoting ch. 12004, Laws of Fla. (1927)).  We concluded that the 
fee was a tax repugnant to the right of access to courts contained in Florida’s 
Constitution, reasoning as follows: 
 
It is clear that to call this a fee is a misnomer.  It is a tax levied 
and collected for a county purpose, if the establishment of a law 
library may be considered a county purpose.  No part of the so-called 
fee is appropriated for the payment of any services rendered by the 
clerk rendering the service in the case. 
. . . .   
. . .  The act is clearly an attempt to levy a tax on those who 
must bring their causes into court and to require the payment of such 
tax for the benefit of the public treasury, and is an abrogation of the 
administration of right and justice. 
 
Id. at 387. 
 
 
Thereafter, in Farabee, we addressed a challenge to a statute allocating a 
portion of a new $10 filing fee to the Lee County Law Library.  ―Under the 
statutory formula the Law Library received $3.00 plus 20% of $10.00 or a total 
 
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allocation of $5.00 out of each filing fee paid to the Clerk.‖  Farabee, 254 So. 2d at 
3.  This Court in Farabee rejected the Clerk’s argument, which was based upon 
Flood, that the portion of the filing fee payable to the law library was an 
unconstitutional tax on litigants.  Id. at 5.  We concluded that the law library was 
―essential to the administration of justice today, and it is appropriate that its cost be 
assessed against those who make use of the court systems of our state.‖  Id.  We 
distinguished Farabee from our prior decision in Flood by pointing out in particular 
that Flood involved a fee that was used to fund general county purposes: 
We deem it especially significant in Flood, that the balance of 
the funds remaining after adequate provision for the law library were 
to be used for ―general county purposes‖ as directed by the board of 
county commissioners.  Since at least part of the fee was available to 
the county for the building of roads, schools, and so on, it could not be 
said that the fee levied was a cost of the administration of justice. 
 
Id.  This Court in Farabee also receded from its prior language in Flood that may 
have indicated that a law library was not essential to the justice system.  Id. 
 
Based upon our decisions in Flood and Farabee, a statutory filing fee is not 
considered an unconstitutional tax repugnant to court access if the fee is used to 
fund the costs of the administration of justice.  There is no requirement in the 
Florida Constitution that the very money paid for filing fees be used to fund the 
administration of justice.  Money is fungible.  See generally 53A Am. Jur. 2d 
Money § 18 (2006) (―Money is in its nature severable; one coin or note has the 
same essential qualities and value possessed by any other of like denomination.  In 
 
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other words, money is fungible or interchangeable.‖) (footnotes omitted); Williams 
Mgmt. Enters., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (―[A]s 
Blackstone noted, normally money is fungible property, like grain, cotton, etc., 
which, if commingled with other similar money, is incapable of specific 
identification . . . .‖).  Once the filing fees are commingled with other state money 
in the general revenue fund, the filing fees lose their separate character and become 
interchangeable with the other state money.  Therefore, the Legislature would be 
using the filing fees to fund the administration of justice if it funds the justice 
system at a level at least equal to the amount of filing fees that is commingled with 
other state money in the general revenue fund.   
Accordingly, the statutes, on their face, do not constitute an unconstitutional 
tax.  See City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d at 256 (explaining that a statute is only 
facially unconstitutional if ―no set of circumstances exists under which the statute 
would be valid‖). 
B.  As-Applied Constitutional Challenge 
The only portion of Appellees’ challenge that could be considered an as-
applied challenge relates to the trial court’s finding that the Legislature in 2008 
appropriated over $50 million of the amount generated from the increased civil 
filing fees to the Department of Corrections for prison operations.  However, 
because the Legislature appropriated more to support the administration of justice 
 
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than the amount of civil fees deposited into the general revenue fund, the filing fee 
statutes were applied in a constitutional manner.  
According to the trial court’s order, the total cumulative filing fees deposited 
into the general revenue fund for fiscal year 2008-2009 was $186,961,960.23.  In 
contrast, the Legislature appropriated over $1 billion to support the judicial branch 
and justice administration for fiscal year 2008-2009.  Ch. 2008-152, § 4 (justice 
administration appropriations), § 7 (judicial branch appropriations), Laws of Fla; 
Ch. 2009-1, § 4, § 7 (reductions in 2008-2009 appropriations).2  For the judicial 
branch alone, the Legislature appropriated over $433 million for fiscal year 2008-
2009, more than $387 million of which was specifically appropriated from general 
revenue.  Ch. 2008-152, § 7 (judicial branch appropriations), Laws of Fla; Ch. 
2009-1, § 7 (reductions in 2008-2009 appropriations), Laws of Fla.  Because the 
Legislature funded the costs of the administration of justice with far more than the 
amount of filing fees deposited into the general revenue fund, the filing fee statutes 
are not operating as an unconstitutional tax.        
The Alabama Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Fox v. Hunt, 
619 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. 1993).  Based upon the Texas Supreme Court decision in 
LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1986), the plaintiff in Fox argued that a 
                                          
 
 
2.  It is undisputed that more was spent for the judicial branch and for the 
administration of justice than was collected as filing fees.  Accordingly, there is no 
issue in the case as to what must be included as administration of justice. 
 
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statutory jury fee was actually an unconstitutional tax on the right to a jury trial 
because a portion of the fee was paid into Alabama’s general fund.  Fox, 619 So. 
2d at 1366.  However, the Alabama court noted that in 1989-90 the State of 
Alabama spent over $59 million more on its judicial system than the amount 
collected from the jury fees.  Id. at 1367.  As a result, the Alabama Supreme Court 
held that the jury fee did not constitute an unconstitutional tax, reasoning as 
follows: 
This Court would have to deny the economic reality of the 
Legislature’s funding the judiciary in favor of an accounting artifice in 
order to hold that any portion of the jury trial fees collected by the 
circuit court clerks actually went to programs, other than the judiciary, 
funded through the state’s general fund. 
Id.   
In LeCroy, the Texas Supreme Court held that a statute, which directed a 
portion of filing fees to go to state general revenues, was an unconstitutional tax on 
the right of access.  Because a portion of the filing fees was allocated to Texas’ 
general revenue fund, the Texas court concluded that ―the money goes to other 
statewide programs besides the judiciary.‖  713 S.W.2d at 341.  The Texas 
Supreme Court reasoned as follows: 
The $11 million in general revenues raised from the fee flows out of 
the treasury at random.  Since the judiciary accounts for only 
approximately 1/2 of 1% of state funding, 99.5% of the revenue 
generated from the fee must go to other programs besides the 
judiciary. 
 
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Id. at 341 n.9.  However, as the dissent in LeCroy pointed out, this logic is quite 
flawed: 
The court holds that ―filing fees that go to state general revenues—in 
other words, taxes on the right to litigate that pay for other programs 
besides the judiciary—are unreasonable impositions on the state 
constitutional right of access to the courts.‖  The court thus implies 
that if the $50 increase went into a special fund for the benefit of the 
courts, the act would be constitutional.  As the state observes, 
however, a special fund is no more than an accounting device.  Since 
dollars are fungible and more money will be spent on the court system 
than will be taken in under Section 32, it is absurd to conclude money 
collected from fees ―will pay for other programs besides the 
judiciary.‖  The state’s annual share of the filing fee is expected to be 
approximately $11,000,000 while the State’s annual cost will be over 
$52,000,000.  See Art. of May 27, 1985, ch. 980, art. IV, 1985 Tex. 
Sess. Law Serv. 7284 (Vernon).  As long as the State pays more in 
financing the judiciary than the courts receive in user fees, the court’s 
logic is flawed.  This court need not presume that any portion of the 
fee increase goes to support general welfare programs unrelated to the 
court system.  If any presumption is to be made, it should be in favor 
of the validity of the statute.   
Id. at 345-46 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).  Like the Alabama Supreme Court, we 
decline to adopt the contrary reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court in LeCroy.  
See Fox, 619 So. 2d at 1366-67. 
III.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL FUNDING OF COURTS 
The trial court ruled that the filing fee statutes ―also deny the citizens of this 
state the right to have their courts adequately funded in violation of article V, 
section 14, and the due process, equal protection, [and] right to jury trial 
 
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guarantees . . . accorded under the Florida Constitution.‖  The filing fee statutes at 
issue are not contrary to article V, section 14 of the Florida Constitution.   
Section 14 details the following funding requirements for Florida’s justice 
system: 
 
(a) All justices and judges shall be compensated only by state 
salaries fixed by general law.  Funding for the state courts system, 
state attorneys’ offices, public defenders’ offices, and court-appointed 
counsel, except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), shall be 
provided from state revenues appropriated by general law. 
 
 
(b) All funding for the offices of the clerks of the circuit and 
county courts performing court-related functions, except as otherwise 
provided in this subsection and subsection (c), shall be provided by 
adequate and appropriate filing fees for judicial proceedings and 
service charges and costs for performing court-related functions as 
required by general law.  Selected salaries, costs, and expenses of the 
state courts system may be funded from appropriate filing fees for 
judicial proceedings and service charges and costs for performing 
court-related functions, as provided by general law.  Where the 
requirements of either the United States Constitution or the 
Constitution of the State of Florida preclude the imposition of filing 
fees for judicial proceedings and service charges and costs for 
performing court-related functions sufficient to fund the court-related 
functions of the offices of the clerks of the circuit and county courts, 
the state shall provide, as determined by the legislature, adequate and 
appropriate supplemental funding from state revenues appropriated by 
general law. 
 
 
(c) No county or municipality, except as provided in this 
subsection, shall be required to provide any funding for the state 
courts system, state attorneys’ offices, public defenders’ offices, 
court-appointed counsel or the offices of the clerks of the circuit and 
county courts performing court-related functions.  Counties shall be 
required to fund the cost of communications services, existing radio 
systems, existing multi-agency criminal justice information systems, 
and the cost of construction or lease, maintenance, utilities, and 
 
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security of facilities for the trial courts, public defenders’ offices, state 
attorneys’ offices, and the offices of the clerks of the circuit and 
county courts performing court-related functions.  Counties shall also 
pay reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses of the state 
courts system to meet local requirements as determined by general 
law. 
 
 
(d)  The judiciary shall have no power to fix appropriations. 
 
 
Based upon this plain language, the court-related functions of the clerks’ 
offices are to be funded entirely from filing fees and service charges unless 
constitutionally required to be supplemented by other state revenues.  Furthermore, 
section 14 requires state revenues appropriated by general law to fund the court 
system, state attorneys’ offices, public defenders’ offices, and court-appointed 
counsel.  However, subsection 14(b) gives the Legislature the option of using filing 
fees to fund ―[s]elected salaries, costs, and expenses of the state courts system . . . 
as provided by general law.‖  There is no language in section 14 of article V (or 
any provision of the Florida Constitution) that prevents the Legislature from 
exercising its option to use filing fees to fund the administration of justice by 
directing certain portions of the filing fees to the general revenue fund before it 
then appropriates this money to the costs of the administration of justice.   
The trial court’s ruling that the statutes violated the due process, equal 
protection, and right to jury trial provisions of the Florida Constitution appears to 
be premised upon a determination that Florida’s courts are inadequately funded.  
But because the trial court’s order does not include any reasoning or additional 
 
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findings of fact supporting its conclusion, we agree with the State that there is not 
competent substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s 
determination that Florida courts are unconstitutionally underfunded.  The trial 
judge simply took judicial notice of underfunding based upon the fact that he had 
recently received a two-percent reduction in his salary.  But this is not evidence 
that the judicial branch is unconstitutionally underfunded.  And while this Court 
has stated that Florida’s court system is operationally underfunded, see, e.g., In re 
Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 29 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 2010), we have 
not determined that the judiciary is underfunded to the point of it being a violation 
of the constitution.  Moreover, we agree with the State that the trial court’s ruling 
on this claim is based upon the Appellees’ erroneous position that the cause of 
underfunding is the existence of the challenged statutes rather than specific 
appropriations decisions. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The filing fee statutes, on their face, do not constitute an unconstitutional tax 
because the Legislature may appropriate more to the administration of justice than 
the amount of civil fees deposited into the general revenue fund, and because the 
Legislature has in fact done so, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied.  
The statutes do not conflict with section 14 of article V of the Florida Constitution, 
and the record in this case does not otherwise support the trial court’s ruling that 
 
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the courts are unconstitutionally underfunded.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial 
court, lift the injunction, and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
Certified Judgments of Trial Courts in and for Leon County – Frank Elwyn 
Sheffield, Judge, Case No. 2009-CA-001386  – An Appeal from the District Court 
of Appeal, First District, Case No. 1D10-2972 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, Courtney 
Brewer, Deputy Solicitor General, Jon A. Glogau, Chief, Complex Litigation, 
Tallahassee, Florida; Richard T. Donelan, Jr., Chief Counsel, and Kate M. Pingolt, 
Florida Department of Financial Services, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
  
for Appellants 
 
Sidney L. Matthew of Sidney L. Matthew, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida and Davisson 
F. Dunlap, Jr. of Dunlap and Shipman, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellees 
 
Kimberly A. Ashby of Akerman Senterfitt, Orlando, Florida and Clifford C. Higby 
of Bryant and Higby, Panama City, Florida, on behalf of the Trial Lawyers Section 
of The Florida Bar; and C. Howard Hunter and Landis V. Curry of Hill Ward 
Henderson, P.A., Tampa, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Chapter of the American 
Board of Trial Advocates, 
 
 
as Amici Curiae