Title: State v. Anthony J. Leitner
Citation: 2002 WI 77
Docket Number: 2000AP001718-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2002

2002 WI 77 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1718-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Anthony J. Leitner,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 172 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 29, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Mulroy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Mary 
E. Burke, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Shunette T. Campbell, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 77 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  00-1718-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99-CF-71) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Anthony J. Leitner,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming 
an order of the circuit court for La Crosse County, Michael J. 
Mulroy, Judge.1  
¶2 
Two issues of law are presented here: (1) Does 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 (1999-2000)2 require district attorneys and 
law enforcement agencies to expunge their records documenting 
                                                 
1 State v. Leitner, 2001 WI App 172, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 
N.W.2d 207. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
2 
 
the facts underlying an expunged record of a conviction?  (2) 
May a circuit court consider, when sentencing an offender, the 
facts underlying a record of a conviction expunged under 
§ 973.015?3   
                                                 
3 The State concedes that a circuit court may not consider 
an offender's court record of a conviction expunged under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 at an offender's sentencing proceeding for 
a subsequent offense.  State's Brief at 37. 
The present case does not address the question posed in 70 
Op. Att'y Gen. 115 (1981), that is, whether a circuit court has 
the inherent power to order expunction of criminal conviction 
records when Wis. Stat. § 973.015 does not govern those records.   
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.015 
does 
not 
define 
the 
word 
"expunge."  The present case does not address the question of 
how a court record is expunged.  In State v. Anderson, 160 
Wis. 2d 435, 441, 466 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1991), relying on an 
opinion of the attorney general, the court of appeals appears to 
have concluded that the word "expunge" in § 973.015 means 
destruction of the record and that the clerk of the circuit 
court must physically strike from the record all references to 
the name and identity of the convicted person.  See 67 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 301 (1978).  After Anderson, the Wisconsin supreme court 
issued 
Order 
No. 
97-07, 
on 
November 
3, 
1997, 
creating 
Wis. Stat. § SCR 72.06, which provides a process for expunction 
as follows: 
SCR 72.06.  Expunction.  When required by statute or 
court order to expunge a court record, the clerk of 
the court shall do all of the following:  
(1) Remove any paper index and nonfinancial court 
record and place them in the case file. 
(2) Electronically remove any automated nonfinancial 
record, except the case number. 
(3) Seal the entire case file. 
(4) Destroy expunged court records in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter.    
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The circuit court and court of appeals concluded that 
the record referred to in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is a court record 
and that § 973.015 does not require district attorneys or law 
enforcement agencies to expunge their records documenting the 
facts underlying an expunged record of a conviction.  Both 
courts further concluded that a circuit court may consider, when 
sentencing an offender, the facts underlying a record of a 
conviction expunged under § 973.015.  We agree with both courts 
on both issues and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
 
I 
¶4 
Anthony J. Leitner, the defendant, was charged with 
hit and 
run 
causing great 
bodily 
harm in 
violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1)(a) and (c) (1997-98).  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, the defendant entered a no contest plea to reckless 
driving causing great bodily harm in violation of § 346.62(4) 
(1997-98).  The plea agreement reduced the defendant's maximum 
exposure to prison from twenty-four months to eighteen months. 
¶5 
The facts are undisputed and are set forth in greater 
detail in the published decision of the court of appeals.  We 
state only those facts pertinent to the two issues presented for 
review in this court.   
¶6 
The circuit court ordered a presentence investigation 
report.  The report contained a negative assessment of the 
defendant and recommended that he serve prison time.  It also 
stated that the defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor hit 
and run and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
4 
 
injury, both of which related to an incident that had occurred 
on October 28, 1997.  This information about the prior 
convictions in the presentence investigation report came from 
the 
district 
attorney's 
case 
files. 
 
The 
presentence 
investigation report did not mention that the records of the 
1997 convictions had been expunged.   
¶7 
During sentencing, the prosecutor agreed that it was 
inappropriate to refer to the defendant's 1997 convictions 
because the court records of these convictions had been 
expunged.  The prosecutor went on, however, to recount the facts 
underlying 
the 
expunged 
records 
of 
the 
defendant's 
1997 
convictions by relying on information in the police reports and 
the district attorney's case files.  
¶8 
Although the defense counsel objected to the circuit 
court's 
consideration 
of 
the 
expunged 
records 
of 
the 
convictions, 
the 
defense 
counsel 
did 
not 
object 
to 
the 
prosecutor's recitation of facts underlying the expunged records 
of the defendant's 1997 convictions.  Indeed, the defense 
counsel also addressed the underlying facts of the expunged 
records of the defendant's 1997 convictions to emphasize the 
minor nature of the injury involved in the prior incident. 
¶9 
The circuit court sentenced the defendant to fifteen 
months in prison.  The circuit court did not consider the 1997 
convictions.  The circuit court did, however, consider the facts 
underlying the expunged records of the 1997 convictions, 
referring to them as follows:  
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
5 
 
You say you have no problem with alcohol and yet this 
is the second incident that you have been involved in 
that has resulted in your being charged with an 
alcohol-related offense, although it was not charged 
in this particular case, but certainly alcohol was 
involved. 
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed both the judgment of 
conviction and the circuit court's order denying the defendant's 
motion for resentencing.  The court of appeals held that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 does not require district attorneys or law 
enforcement agencies to destroy their records relating to 
records of convictions expunged under § 973.015.  The court of 
appeals further held that § 973.015 does not prohibit a 
sentencing court from considering the facts underlying the 
record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015. 
¶11 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  Like 
the court of appeals, we reach the merits of the issues 
presented.  We do not decide the present case on grounds of 
waiver, although the defendant failed to object at sentencing to 
the introduction of the facts underlying the expunged records of 
convictions.   
¶12 Furthermore, we decide the two issues presented, even 
though the defendant is likely to have already served his 
fifteen-month sentence, and it is arguable that the present case 
is now moot.  The parties did not raise the issue of mootness.  
The court raised it at oral argument.  The parties urged the 
court to decide the issues presented, and we do so. 
¶13 Mootness 
remains 
the 
general rule 
in 
Wisconsin.  
"Ordinarily, this court, like courts in general, will not 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
6 
 
consider a question the answer to which cannot have any 
practical effect upon an existing controversy."4  In the interest 
of judicial economy, moot cases are generally dismissed without 
discussion on the merits. 
¶14 Moot cases may, however, be decided on their merits in 
a variety of circumstances: 
[The court] will retain a matter for determination 
although that determination can have no practical 
effect on the immediate parties:  Where the issues are 
of 
great 
public 
importance; 
where 
the 
constitutionality of a statute is involved; where the 
precise 
situation 
under 
consideration 
arises 
so 
frequently that a definitive decision is essential to 
guide the trial courts; where the issue is likely to 
arise again and should be resolved by the court to 
avoid uncertainty; or where a question was capable and 
likely of repetition and yet evades review because the 
appellate process usually cannot be completed and 
frequently cannot even be undertaken within the time 
that would have a practical effect upon the parties.5   
¶15 We need not analyze the present case under each 
exception to the general mootness rule.  It is sufficient to 
state that this case falls within the exception that the issues 
presented are likely to arise again and should be resolved by 
                                                 
4 State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La 
Crosse County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).  See 
also Warren v. Link Farms, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 485, 487, 368 
N.W.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1985). 
5 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 229 (internal citations 
omitted).  See also State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 
105, ¶5, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686; State v. Santiago, 206 
Wis. 2d 3, 13 n.7, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996); Lenz v. L.E. Phillips 
Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 67, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992); In 
the Matter of G.S. v. State, 118 Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 
N.W.2d 181 (1984); State v. Seymour, 24 Wis. 2d 258, 261, 128 
N.W.2d 680 (1964). 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
7 
 
this court to avoid future uncertainty.6  Accordingly, we reach 
the merits of the present case. 
 
II 
¶16 The first issue involves whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
requires district attorneys and law enforcement agencies to 
expunge their records documenting the facts underlying an 
expunged record of a conviction.  We must interpret § 973.015.  
The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give 
effect to the legislature's intent.7  Statutory interpretation 
and the application of a statute to undisputed facts present 
issues of law that this court determines independent of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their 
analyses.8 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the expunction of 
the record of a misdemeanor conviction9 if a person is under the 
age of twenty-one at the time of the commission of the offense 
and if the circuit court determines that the person will benefit 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 66, 590 
N.W.2d 918 (1999); Fine v. Elections Bd. of the State of Wis., 
95 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 289 N.W.2d 823 (1980). 
7 State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 47-48, 559 
N.W.2d 900 (1997). 
8 Id. at 47. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.60 provides that a "crime punishable 
by imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons is a felony.  
Every other crime is a misdemeanor."  
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
8 
 
and society will not be harmed by this disposition.  Section 
973.015 reads as follows: 
(1) When a person is under the age of 21 at the time 
of the commission of an offense for which the person 
has been found guilty in a court for violation of a 
law for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for 
one year or less in the county jail, the court may 
order at the time of sentencing that the record be 
expunged upon successful completion of the sentence if 
the court determines the person will benefit and 
society will not be harmed by this disposition. 
(2) A person has successfully completed the sentence 
if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation.  Upon successful completion 
of 
the 
sentence 
the 
detaining 
or 
probationary 
authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which 
shall be forwarded to the court of record and which 
shall have the effect of expunging the record.   
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 is silent regarding whether 
the records to be expunged are records of courts, district 
attorneys, or law enforcement agencies.  The statute uses the 
word "record" three times.  In subsection (1), the statute uses 
the word "record" but does not expressly identify the nature of 
the record.  In subsection (2), the statute uses the word 
"record" twice.  First, it refers to a court of record and 
requires the detaining or probationary authority to issue a 
certificate of discharge to the court of record when the 
convicted 
person has successfully 
completed 
the 
sentence.  
Second, it states the certificate of discharge "shall have the 
effect of expunging the record."  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
9 
 
¶19 The defendant makes the following arguments to justify 
reading Wis. Stat. § 973.015 to require the expunction of not 
only court records, but also of records of district attorneys 
and law enforcement agencies relating to the record of a 
conviction expunged under § 973.015:  
 
(1) The ordinary meaning of the word "record" is not 
necessarily limited to court records. 
(2) Section 973.015 merely refers to "the record" and does 
not expressly refer to a "court record" or a "record 
of the court."  
(3) The references to a "court" in § 973.015 specify both 
the entity deciding whether a conviction is to be 
expunged and the entity that receives the certificate 
of discharge, but fails to state, because of the use 
of the passive voice, that the only entity to expunge 
a record is a court.   
(4) The word "record" in § 973.015(1) refers to the word 
"offense" and not to the word "court," indicating that 
§ 973.015 can be read to govern expunction of any 
record of the offense. 
(5) Section 973.015 has been interpreted to govern more 
records than court records.  The court of appeals has 
interpreted § 973.015 as requiring district attorneys 
to destroy the records of a person whose conviction 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
10 
 
was expunged.10  In contrast, the supreme court has 
stated that "the legislature has determined that the 
only records which may be expunged [under § 973.015] 
are 
court 
records . . . ."11 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
Wisconsin Court Records Management Committee, seeking 
a rule on the expunction of records, acknowledged that 
§ 973.015 could be read as applying not only to court 
records but also to records held by other government 
entities.  
(6) Section 973.015 refers not only to the court of 
record, but also to the detaining or probationary 
authority, indicating that entities such as a county 
jail (the detaining authority) and the Department of 
                                                 
10 In State v. Anderson, 160 Wis. 2d at 441, the court of 
appeals quoted with approval the circuit court, which stated: 
"Clearly, the purpose of expunction is just that——to, in effect, 
obliterate the record of the individual.  In fact, had the State 
followed 
[Wis. Stat. § 973.015] 
to 
the 
letter, . . . [the 
district 
attorney's] 
record 
should 
also 
have 
been 
destroyed . . . ." 
In Anderson, the court of appeals addressed whether an 
expunged conviction could be used as a "conviction" to impeach a 
witness pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 906.09(1).  Section 906.09(1) 
states in part that "[f]or the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been 
convicted of a crime or adjudicated delinquent is admissible."   
11 In the Interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 387 
N.W.2d 72 (1986) (addressing the authority of circuit courts to 
order police agencies to destroy juvenile records and stating 
that § 973.015 does not give the circuit court this authority). 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
11 
 
Corrections (the probationary authority) must also 
expunge their records.  
(7) Reading § 973.015 in pari materia with other Wisconsin 
statutes that govern records leads to the conclusion 
that the word "record" in § 973.015 is not limited to 
court records.  
(8) Section 973.015 should be interpreted to include 
records of all government entities relating to the 
record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015, 
because such a reading assures statewide consistency 
in sentencing practices.  
(9) The purpose of § 973.015 supports interpreting the 
statute to require expunction of records of all 
government entities relating to the record of a 
conviction expunged under § 973.015. 
¶20 We address each of the defendant's arguments in turn.  
We agree with the defendant's first five arguments.  The word 
"record" can refer to more records than court records.  Although 
the word "record" appears three times in Wis. Stat. § 973.015, 
it is not modified by the word "court."  The word "record" in 
§ 973.015 fails to state that the only entity to expunge a 
record is a court.  The word "record" in § 973.015(1) may be 
read to refer back to the word "offense," and not to the word 
"court."   
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
12 
 
¶21 The 
defendant 
also 
correctly 
states 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 has been interpreted as governing more 
records than court records and as being subject to alternative 
interpretations.  The court of appeals and the Wisconsin supreme 
court have, in the Anderson12 and In the Interest of E.C.13 cases 
respectively, disagreed about whether § 973.015 governs non-
court records.  The Wisconsin Court Records Management Committee 
has characterized § 973.015 as not clearly stating whether it 
governs expunction of non-court records.14   
¶22 The court of appeals in its decision in the present 
case has correctly pointed out that its statements in Anderson15 
that the district attorney should have destroyed the records 
"need not be accorded weight because there was no need or 
                                                 
12 Anderson, 160 Wis. 2d 435. 
13 In the Interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376. 
14 See petition relating to Supreme Court Order No. 97-07, 
214 Wis. 2d xiii (1997), in Drafting Record on file with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, Madison, Wisconsin.  
15 Anderson, 160 Wis. 2d at 441. 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
13 
 
attempt in Anderson to analyze whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
required any entity to destroy records."16   
¶23 This court's statements in E.C. that the legislature 
determined that the only records that may be expunged under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 are court records are more persuasive. The 
interpretation of § 973.015 was directly involved in deciding 
the issue presented in E.C.  The court in E.C. concluded that 
§ 973.015 covered only court records of certain misdemeanants 
but that § 973.015 did not authorize a circuit court to direct 
police to expunge juvenile police records.17  E.C. is not 
necessarily determinative of the issues posed in the present 
case.  Section 973.015 was not extensively briefed in the E.C. 
case, and the court's discussion of § 973.015 in E.C. does not 
take into account various arguments posed by the defendant in 
the present case.   
                                                 
16 Leitner, 247 Wis. 2d at 217, ¶50.  See also State v. 
Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) ("dictum 
is a statement in a court's opinion that goes beyond the facts 
in the case and is broader than necessary and not essential to 
the determination of the issues before it"; dictum is not 
controlling); State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 
N.W.2d 804 (1998) (it is not inappropriate for a court to 
evaluate statements in Supreme Court opinions on the basis of 
whether they constitute dicta).  But see State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981) (quoting Chase v. 
American Cartage, 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 (1922) ("It is 
deemed the doctrine of the cases is that when a court of last 
resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question 
germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, 
such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court 
which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.")). 
17 In the Interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d at 385. 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
14 
 
¶24 The Wisconsin Court Records Management Committee in 
petitioning the supreme court for rule-making on expunction 
viewed Wis. Stat. § 973.015 as being unclear whether it governs 
expunction of non-court records.18  The supreme court adopted SCR 
72.06 governing the procedure that clerks of circuit court 
should follow in expunging court records.  SCR 72.06 does not 
resolve the issues posed in the present case.    
¶25 These first five arguments of the defendant do not 
convince us that the word "record" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
refers to every record that is held by any government agency and 
that preserves information about the expunged record of a 
conviction.  These arguments do, however, require us to look 
beyond the words of § 973.015 to determine the statute's 
meaning.   
¶26 We disagree with the conclusions that the defendant 
draws in his sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth arguments when 
the 
defendant 
examines 
materials 
beyond 
the 
words 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  
¶27 We disagree with the defendant that the statutory 
reference 
to 
the 
detaining 
or 
probationary 
authority 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 indicates that these entities must also 
expunge their records.  The defendant argues that the issuance 
of the certificate of discharge, not the forwarding of the 
certificate to the court of record, has the effect of expunging 
                                                 
18 See petition relating to Supreme Court Order No. 97-07, 
214 Wis. 2d xiii (1997), in Drafting Record on file with Clerk 
of the Supreme Court, Madison, Wisconsin.   
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
15 
 
the record.  According to the defendant, the certificate of 
discharge triggers expunction of the records of the authority 
preparing the certificate and of all other government entities.  
We are not persuaded by this reasoning.   
¶28 Records relating to the facts underlying a record of a 
conviction expunged under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 might be found in 
numerous locations, including a district attorney's office, the 
Department of Corrections, the Department of Transportation, the 
Department of Health and Family Services, a public defender's 
office, an office of private counsel, or a victim's home or 
office.  No central depository or registry exists for every 
record generated in connection with a criminal prosecution.  
Section 973.015 does not instruct a court or anyone else to 
notify any other government entities or persons who may have 
records relating to the facts underlying a record of a 
conviction expunged under § 973.015.  Nor does § 973.015 provide 
a system for accomplishing such notifications.  The only 
notification that appears in § 973.015 is to the court of 
record.   
¶29 Had the legislature intended entities other than a 
circuit court to expunge their records, the legislature might 
have required the detaining or probationary entity to send a 
certificate of discharge to these other entities and would 
certainly have stated that the certificate has the effect of 
expunging their records.  Without some notice, these records 
would not, as a practical matter, be expunged.  The references 
to the certificate of discharge in Wis. Stat. § 973.015, no 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
16 
 
matter how broadly read, simply do not support the defendant's 
argument that § 973.015 requires that records other than court 
records be expunged.  
¶30 We next turn to the statutes that the defendant 
asserts are in pari materia with Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  We are 
not convinced, as the defendant urges, that these statutes 
support the conclusion that § 973.015 should be read broadly to 
require expunction of all government records of an offense when 
the record is expunged under § 973.015.  A general rule of 
statutory interpretation is that statutes dealing with the same 
subject matter should be read together and harmonized.19   
¶31 The defendant asserts that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is in 
pari materia with the public records law, because records of 
conviction are ordinarily public records subject to disclosure.  
Wisconsin's public records law, § 19.32(2), defines the word 
"record" expansively to include the records of many government 
authorities.20  Although the records described in § 973.015 are 
                                                 
19 National Exch. Bank of Fond du Lac v. Mann, 81 
Wis. 2d 352, 361, 260 N.W.2d 716 (1978); Weiss v. Holman, 58 
Wis. 2d 608, 619, 207 N.W.2d 660 (1973); Racine Educ. Assoc. v. 
WERC, 2000 WI App 149, ¶50, 238 Wis. 2d 33, 616 N.W.2d 504. 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2) defines record as follows: 
"Record" means any material on which written, drawn, 
printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information 
is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form 
or characteristics, which has been created or is being 
kept by an authority.  "Record" includes, but is not 
limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, 
charts, 
photographs, 
films, 
recordings, 
tapes 
(including computer tapes), computer printouts and 
optical disks.  "Record" does not include drafts, 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
17 
 
ordinarily subject to the general rule of disclosure pursuant to 
the public records law, we cannot say that the definition of the 
word "record" in Wisconsin's public records law should be 
carried over automatically to § 973.015.  When the legislature 
has intended to apply the public records law definition of 
"record" in another statute, it has expressly adopted the public 
records law definition.21  The legislature failed to specify that 
the word "record" in § 973.015 has the same meaning as the word 
"record" in § 19.32(2).  Without more, there is no reason to 
equate the word "record" in the two statutes. 
¶32 The second statute that is in pari materia with 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015, 
according 
to 
the 
defendant, 
is 
the 
juvenile expunction statute, § 938.355(4m).  That statute allows 
for expunction of a court's record of a juvenile's delinquency 
adjudication if the court determines that the juvenile has 
satisfactorily complied with the conditions of his or her 
dispositional order and that the juvenile will benefit and 
                                                                                                                                                             
notes, preliminary computations and like materials 
prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared 
by the originator in the name of a person for whom the 
originator is working; materials which are purely the 
personal property of the custodian and have no 
relation to his or her office; materials to which 
access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and 
published materials in the possession of an authority 
other than a public library which are available for 
sale, or which are available for inspection at a 
public library. 
21 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 19.62(6), 46.283(7), 46.284(7), 
46.2895(9), 301.35(1)(b), 940.32(1)(cr), and 947.013(1)(d).   
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
18 
 
society will not be harmed by the expunction.22  The defendant 
argues that because the juvenile expunction statute explicitly 
provides that the only record the court may expunge is the 
court's record, and because the legislature did not explicitly 
provide for expunction only of court records in § 973.015, the 
legislature intended in § 973.015 to expunge all records 
relating to a conviction expunged under § 973.015.   
¶33 Section 938.355(4m) was created as part of chapter 938 
by 1995 Wis. Act 77, § 629, which substantially revised the 
children's 
code. 
 
However, 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
§ 938.355(4m) fails to explain why it uses the words "court's 
record" instead of only the word "record" that is used in 
§ 973.015.  We agree with the State that given the numerous 
kinds of records referred to in chapter 938, it is not 
surprising that chapter 938 provisions, such as § 938.35(4m), 
are especially attuned to particular records.  Although courts 
presume the legislature chooses its words carefully, there is no 
reason for this court to conclude that the legislature intended 
                                                 
22 Section 938.355(4m) provides: 
A juvenile who has been adjudged delinquent may, on 
attaining 17 years of age, petition the court to 
expunge 
the 
court's 
record 
of 
the 
juvenile's 
adjudication.  The court may expunge the court's 
record of the juvenile's adjudication if the court 
determines 
that 
the 
juvenile 
has 
satisfactorily 
complied 
with 
the 
conditions 
of 
his 
or 
her 
dispositional order and that the juvenile will benefit 
and society will not be harmed by the expungement. 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
19 
 
the phrase "court's record" in § 938.355(4m) to mean something 
different than the word "record" means in § 973.015.23   
¶34 The 
defendant's 
penultimate 
argument 
is 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 should be interpreted to assure statewide 
consistency in sentencing practices.  The defendant contends 
that if § 973.015 is limited to court records, courts will be 
inconsistent in their use of police records and district 
attorney case files in sentencing on subsequent offenses.  
According to the defendant, if an offender is convicted in two 
different counties, the district attorney, law enforcement 
agencies, and the circuit court in the second county of 
conviction might not have access to district attorney case files 
or law enforcement agency records in the first county where the 
court record of a conviction was expunged under § 973.015.  
Reading § 973.015 to include only court records will, according 
to 
the 
defendant, 
result 
in 
arbitrary 
and 
inconsistent 
sentencing practices across the state.  
¶35 The State asserts, and we agree, that a criminal 
background check could identify prior arrests in other counties, 
                                                 
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.84(1) is another statute governing 
records.  It does not support reading the word "record" in 
§ 973.015 to include records other than court records.  
In Wis. Stat. § 165.84(1), the legislature authorized law 
enforcement agencies to return fingerprint records of a person 
arrested or taken into custody and later released or cleared of 
the offense through court proceedings.  The statute, however, 
relates specifically to fingerprint records of individuals who 
have not been convicted of a crime and does not address the 
larger issue of records relating to records of convictions 
expunged under § 973.015 and held by law enforcement agencies.  
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
20 
 
and that a prosecutor, an author of a presentence investigative 
report, or other law enforcement officer could contact law 
enforcement agencies across the state to obtain information 
about an offender.  The crux of the defendant's concern does not 
relate to the ability of courts, district attorneys, and law 
enforcement agencies to get background information on an 
offender from other counties, but rather to the convenience of 
accessing that information.  We are not persuaded that we have 
to read Wis. Stat. § 973.015 to include non-court records to 
assure statewide consistency in sentencing practices.   
¶36 The defendant's final argument is that to fulfill its 
purpose, Wis. Stat. § 973.015 should be read to require the 
expunction of all government records relating to a record of a 
conviction expunged under § 973.015.  A cardinal rule in 
interpreting statutes is that an interpretation supporting the 
purpose of the statute is favored over an interpretation that 
will defeat the manifest objective of the statute.24   
¶37 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is similar to the purpose underlying the 
Wisconsin Youthful Offenders Act (now repealed)25 and the similar 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Dairyland Fuels, Inc. v. State, 2000 WI App 
129, ¶7, 237 Wis. 2d 467, 614 N.W.2d 829 (citing Milwaukee 
County v. DILHR, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 453, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977)); 
Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.09 
(6th ed. 2000). 
25 Sections 429 and 711m, ch. 39, Laws of 1975; Anderson, 
160 Wis. 2d at 439. 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
21 
 
Federal Youth Corrections Act (now repealed).26  The defendant 
reasons that both the Wisconsin and federal youth acts and 
§ 973.015 were intended to give certain youths a new start 
without a permanent criminal record.  In order to achieve this 
objective, the defendant urges this court to read § 973.015 
liberally to govern not only court records but also the records 
of 
all 
government 
entities 
relating 
to 
the 
records 
of 
convictions 
expunged 
under 
§ 973.015. 
 
According 
to 
the 
defendant, anything less than an expunction of all such 
government records defeats the clear purpose of § 973.015. 
¶38 Although the Wisconsin legislature has not explicitly 
set forth the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.015, we agree with the 
defendant and the State that § 973.015 was enacted as a 
companion to the Wisconsin Youthful Offenders Act27 and that both 
statutes were intended to provide a break to young offenders who 
demonstrate the ability to comply with the law.  As the court of 
appeals in Anderson stated, § 973.015 "provides a means by which 
trial 
courts 
may, 
in 
appropriate 
cases, 
shield 
youthful 
offenders from some of the harsh consequences of criminal 
convictions."28  But nothing in the language or history of 
§ 973.015 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
record 
                                                 
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-
473, Title II, § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (1984). 
27 See Anderson, 160 Wis. 2d at 439-41; Note 1 to SM-36 
(1998), the Criminal Jury 
Instruction 
Committee's special 
material relating to Wis. Stat. § 973.015. 
28 Anderson, 160 Wis. 2d at 440. 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
22 
 
expunction under § 973.015 to wipe away all information relating 
to an expunged record of a conviction or to shield a 
misdemeanant from all of the future consequences of the facts 
underlying a record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015. 
¶39 We conclude that the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
is accomplished by interpreting the statute to refer only to 
court records.  Expunction of a court record of a conviction 
enables an offender to have a clean start so far as the prior 
conviction is concerned.  As the State points out, expunging the 
court record provides substantial advantages to the offender:  
An expunged record of a conviction cannot be considered at a 
subsequent sentencing; an expunged record of a conviction cannot 
be used for impeachment at trial under § 906.09(1);29 and an 
expunged record of a conviction is not available for repeater 
sentence enhancement.30   
¶40 Furthermore, district attorneys and law enforcement 
agencies have significant ongoing interests in maintaining case 
information, even when a court record of a conviction has been 
expunged under Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  Case information may 
assist in identifying suspects, determining whether a suspect 
might present a threat to officer safety, investigating and 
solving similar crimes, anticipating and disrupting future 
                                                 
29 Id. at 440-41. 
30 The 
State's 
Brief 
relies 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2) 
governing 
increased 
penalties 
for 
repeat offenders, 
which 
requires 
that 
prior 
convictions 
"remain 
of 
record 
and 
unreversed." 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
23 
 
criminal actions, informing decisions about arrest or pressing 
charges, making decisions about bail and pre-trial release, 
making 
decisions 
about 
repeater 
charges, 
and 
making 
recommendations about sentencing.31  The legislature could not 
have intended to hamper these activities without an express 
statement in § 973.015 that records held by district attorneys 
and law enforcement agencies should be expunged.  We are 
therefore 
persuaded 
that 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
§ 973.015 to authorize expunction of more than court records.   
¶41 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the words 
of Wis. Stat. § 973.015, as well as its legislative history, 
context, 
and 
purpose, 
point 
to 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
legislature intended § 973.015 to authorize the expunction of 
court records only, not other records, when the conditions set 
forth in § 973.015 are met. 
 
III 
¶42 The second issue in the present case is whether the 
circuit court erred in the sentencing proceeding when it 
considered information about the facts underlying the records of 
the 1997 convictions expunged under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 and 
therefore requires resentencing.  A defendant is entitled to 
                                                 
31 See In the Interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d at 392; 70 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 115, 229 (1981); Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
1.11(b) (3d ed. 1996); T. Markus Funk, The Dangers of Hiding 
Criminal Pasts, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 287, 302 (1998).   
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
24 
 
resentencing when a sentence is affected by a circuit court's 
reliance on an improper factor.32  
¶43 The State concedes that a circuit court cannot 
consider an offender's prior expunged record of conviction at 
the offender's sentencing proceeding for a subsequent offense.33  
According to the State, the record of conviction is, when 
expunged, a nullity.   
¶44 Although court records of expunged convictions cannot 
be 
considered 
by 
sentencing 
courts, 
nothing 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
states 
whether, 
in 
sentencing 
for 
a 
subsequent offense, a circuit court may consider the facts 
underlying a record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015.  
The facts underlying the record of a conviction expunged under 
§ 973.015 are significant to sentencing this defendant because 
the facts of his prior behavior elucidate his character, 
including the escalating harms caused by his interrelated 
intoxication and hit and run accidents.  
¶45 In Wisconsin, sentencing courts are obliged to acquire 
the "full knowledge of the character and behavior pattern of the 
convicted defendant before imposing sentence."34  A sentencing 
court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses35 and facts 
                                                 
32 Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 518, 250 N.W.2d 7 
(1977).   
33 State's Brief at 37. 
34 Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559 
(1980).   
35 Id. at 284.  
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
25 
 
related to offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted.36  
To assure that a circuit court has full information, prosecutors 
may not keep relevant information from a sentencing court.37 
¶46 If information about the underlying facts of an 
expunged conviction come from a source other than a government 
record, such as testimony of a witness, the information can be 
used by the circuit court.  It does not make sense to read 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
to 
prohibit 
a 
circuit 
court 
from 
considering the underlying facts of an expunged record of 
conviction if those facts are located in a file of a district 
attorney or law enforcement agency that is not required to be 
expunged, but nonetheless permit a circuit court to consider the 
same underlying facts supplied by another source.   
¶47 When Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is read in the context of 
the objectives of a sentencing proceeding, it is clear that the 
legislature did not intend § 973.015 to deprive sentencing 
courts of relevant information regarding an offender when that 
information is in government files relating to a record of 
conviction expunged under § 973.015.   
 
IV 
                                                 
36 State v. Bobbitt, 178 Wis. 2d 11, 16-17, 503 N.W.2d 11 
(Ct. App. 1993).    
37 State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶43, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 
N.W.2d 733 (stating that a prosecutor may not agree to keep 
relevant information from a sentencing court). 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
26 
 
¶48 In sum, we conclude the record referred to in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is a court record and that § 973.015 does 
not direct district attorneys or law enforcement agencies to 
expunge their records documenting the facts underlying an 
expunged record of a conviction.  We further conclude that the 
circuit court may consider, when sentencing an offender, the 
facts 
underlying 
a 
record 
of 
conviction 
expunged 
under 
§ 973.015.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
00-1718-CR   
 
 
 
1