Title: State v. Christiansen
Citation: 217 Neb. 740, 351 N.W.2d 67
Docket Number: 800
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1984

351 N.W.2d 67 (1984) 217 Neb. 740 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Gerold D. CHRISTIANSEN, Appellant. No. 83-800. Supreme Court of Nebraska. June 22, 1984. *68 Joseph J. Vance, Omaha, for appellant. Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Linda L. Willard, Lincoln, for appellee. KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ. PER CURIAM. In his sole assignment of error defendant-appellant, Gerold D. Christiansen, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of third offense drunk driving. While we reject that assignment and affirm the conviction, we must, on the basis of plain error not assigned, vacate the sentence and reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings. In the early morning hours of February 13, 1983, an Omaha police officer was driving his cruiser southbound on Interstate 480 approaching the Leavenworth Street freeway entrance ramp. The officer noticed a vehicle on the ramp entering the freeway, the driver apply the brakes upon entering the traffic flow, proceed for a half block in the right-hand lane, and then, without signaling its intention, swerve into the center lane, nearly colliding with the officer. The officer turned on his overhead lights to stop the vehicle, and as the vehicle was being stopped, watched a woman climb from the rear seat and take the driver's position in the car. Christiansen, whom the police officer testified he saw operating the vehicle at the time of the near collision, was given field sobriety tests and transported to the police station, where a breath test revealed a .197 percent alcohol content. Christiansen was charged with negligent driving, "fourth" offense driving while intoxicated, and improper display of plates. During a bench trial before a judge of the Omaha Municipal Court, Christiansen and the three other persons riding in his vehicle testified that he was not driving the vehicle at any time during the encounter with the police officer. The municipal court judge found Christiansen guilty of driving while intoxicated, and also found that he had been convicted on at least two prior occasions of drunk driving when represented by counsel. Christiansen attacks the sufficiency of the evidence with the lone contention that his testimony and that of the three passengers in the automobile, that he was not driving the vehicle when it nearly collided with the police officer, created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The three persons testifying were his wife, his niece, and the niece's husband. The police officer specifically testified that Christiansen was operating the vehicle and that he saw Christiansen's niece climb from the back *69 seat and place herself behind the steering wheel. State v. Miner, 216 Neb. 309, 313, 343 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1984). Taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Christiansen was operating the motor vehicle. We now move on to the matter of plain error, which we can, at our option, note. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1919 (Reissue 1979); State v. Ellis, 216 Neb. 699, 345 N.W.2d 323 (1984); Neb.Ct.R. 9D(1)d (Rev.1983). At the sentencing hearing the following dialogue took place: Once the municipal court judge had placed Christiansen on probation, as we find he did by his pronouncement, the effort to sentence him otherwise was a nullity. In State v. Snider, 197 Neb. 317, 248 N.W.2d 342 (1977), the defendant was sentenced, upon violation of his probation, to a term of 1 to 2 years' imprisonment, with credit for time spent in jail awaiting the sentencing hearing. On his way out of the courtroom the defendant slammed a door. The judge, obviously unhappy with such conduct, called the defendant back and resentenced him to a term of 1 to 2 years without jail credit. We held the latter sentence ineffectual, and stated: "The rule is that a sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time it is pronounced and that a subsequent sentence fixing a different term is a nullity." Id. at 319, 248 N.W.2d at 343. See, also, State v. Kinney, 217 Neb. 701, 350 N.W.2d 552 (1984); State v. Sliva, 208 Neb. 647, 305 N.W.2d 10 (1981); State v. Cousins, 208 Neb. 245, 302 N.W.2d 731 (1981). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the matter remanded to the district court with directions to remand the cause to the municipal court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. CAPORALE, J., participating on briefs.