Title: In Interest of BM
Citation: 335 N.W.2d 321
Docket Number: 10407
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1983

335 N.W.2d 321 (1983) In the Interest of B.M., A Child. L.J. BERNHARDT, Director, Stark County Social Service Board, Petitioner and Appellee, v. S.M., Mother, Respondent and Appellant, J.R., Father, Respondent, James D. Geyer, Guardian ad Litem, Appellant. Civ. No. 10407. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 24, 1983. Tom Henning, Asst. State's Atty., Dickinson, for petitioner and appellee; argued by Tom Henning, Asst. States Atty., Dickinson. Freed, Dynes, Reichert &amp; Buresh, Dickinson, for S.M., respondent and appellant; argued by Eugene F. Buresh, Dickinson. James D. Geyer, guardian ad litem, Dickinson, pro se. PEDERSON, Justice. This is an appeal by B.M.'s guardian ad litem and B.M.'s mother, a child aged 14 years, challenging the termination of parental rights. Because a point of law disposes of the appeal, only a brief statement of facts is necessary. We conclude that the *322 termination was improper and we reverse the termination order. Before B.M. was born, S.M., her unwed mother, made some preliminary arrangements with a social worker at the Stark County Social Services Agency, which included signing a voluntary termination of parental rights and consent to adoption through a licensed, child-placing agency of the illegitimate child soon to be born. Before B.M. was released from the hospital, S.M. was contacted by one of the nurses who wanted to adopt B.M. Agreement apparently was reached and, accordingly, S.M. withdrew her consent for voluntary termination which she had given the social services agency and, instead, S.M. "placed" the baby in the home of the nurse. Upon learning of the "placement" of the baby, the social services agency obtained from the juvenile court an emergency shelter order, took custody of the baby, and petitioned for an involuntary termination of parental rights on the ground that the "placement" of the baby violated §§ 50-12-17 and 14-10-05, NDCC, and constituted deprivation under § 27-20-02, NDCC. Although it is not a part of the record in this case, we are informed that on the same day that the petition for termination was filed by the social services agency, the nurse filed a petition for adoption of B.M. (Ch. 14-15, NDCC, Revised Uniform Adoption Act). Action on the petition for adoption has been suspended pending disposition of this appeal. Section 50-12-17, NDCC provides: Section 14-10-05, NDCC provides: Although an argument has been made that S.M. only left her baby with the nurse for babysitting purposes, that argument is inconsistent with S.M.'s testimony and with a finding of fact made by the trial court that the baby was "placed ... [with the nurse] for purpose of adoption." A deprived child is defined in § 27-20-02(5)(b), NDCC as one who "has been placed for ... adoption in violation of law." The trial court conclusion of law that B.M. was a deprived child was supported by clear and convincing evidence and is affirmed. Under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, courts may, by order, terminate the parental rights of a parent with respect to his child if: In a parental termination proceeding, even a finding of deprivation based upon clear and convincing evidence does not provide the "triggering circumstance" to permit a shift of focus to the best interest of a child such as might be the case in a custody dispute. See In Interest of D.R.J., 317 N.W.2d 391, 394 (N.D.1982). We said in footnote 5 of In Interest of J.A., 283 N.W.2d 83, 92 (N.D.1979): After finding that B.M. was a deprived child because of the unlawful placement, the court made the following additional pertinent finding of fact: When the condition of deprivation is caused by an unlawful placement, the revocation of the placement terminates that deprivation. In this case, the placement of B.M. with the nurse was terminated by action of the juvenile court. The fact that the baby's mother is a mere child may be the basis for a conclusion that it is not in the baby's best interest to be placed in the custody of that child-mother, but that is not the issue at the moment. There is no evidence (clear and convincing, or otherwise) that supports the finding that the unlawful placement (deprivation) will continue because of S.M.'s youth. The evidence is clear and convincing that the deprivation condition has abated. Our review, being in the nature of trial de novo, does not require that we give the trial court findings the same degree of deference that we must when Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, applies. Other questions, the answers to which are not necessary to the determination of this case, need not be answered. Hospital Services v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69 (N.D.1975). Although we share in the trial court's deep concern for the prevention of black marketing or brokerage of babies (see Annotation 3 ALR4th 468, Criminal Liability"Baby Broker Acts") and the ethics of nurses, we conclude that the order terminating parental rights should be reversed and the case remanded to permit the orderly disposition of the petition for adoption which is pending. Reversed and remanded. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE, SAND and PAULSON, JJ., concur.