Title: Tulsa Co. F.O.P., Lodge No. 188 v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa Co.
Citation: 2000 OK 2, 71OBJ111, 995 P.2d 1124
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2000

Tulsa Co. F.O.P., Lodge No. 188 v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa Co. Annotate this Case Tulsa Co. F.O.P., Lodge No. 188 v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa Co. 2000 OK 2 995 P.2d 1124 71 OBJ 111 Case Number: 92626 Decided: 01/12/2000 Mandate Issued: 03/03/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma TULSA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE NUMBER 188, MYRA KAY EBERLE, TOMMY M. FIKE, LAURA MCINTIRE, RUSSELL FRANK PORTER, JOHN EDWARD SCHONHOLTZ and DEBBIE ANN WALTERS, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TULSA COUNTY AND TULSA COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY, Defendants/Appellees. STANLEY GLANZ, SHERIFF OF TULSA COUNTY, Plaintiffs/Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TULSA COUNTY, AND TULSA COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY, Defendants/Appellees, and OKLAHOMA SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION, Intervenor/Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TULSA COUNTY, AND TULSA COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY, Defendants/Appellants. [995 P.2d 1126] APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURT, TULSA COUNTY; Honorable David Peterson, Judge, Honorable Gregory K. Frizzell, Judge. ¶0 This opinion disposes of both of the above styled appeals. Plaintiffs seek to have Okla. Stat. tit.19, § 744 and Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 41, the statutes allowing jail-privatization, declared unconstitutional, seek a determination that Tulsa County Criminal Justice Authority has exceeded its power by contracting with private company for operation and maintenance of new jail and a determination that the Legislature improperly altered the duties of the office of sheriff. On motions for summary judgment, trial courts upheld statutes against constitutional challenge, found that Tulsa County Criminal Justice Authority was authorized to contract with private company for maintenance and operation of jail, and Legislature permissibly altered duties of the sheriff. This Court retained both matters for disposition. TRIAL COURTS' JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED. James Thomas, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Thomas D. Frasier, Steven Hickman, Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Michael H. Thompson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Appellants, Tulsa County Deputy Sheriff's Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge Number 188, Myra Kay Eberle, Tommy M. Fike, Laura Mcintire, Russell Frank Porter, John Edward Schonholtz and Debbie Ann Walters, Frederick S. Esser, Shelley Clemens, Washington County District Attorney, Bartlesville, Oklahoma, For Appellant, Stanley Glanz, Sheriff of Tulsa County. Reuben Davis, Mary L. Lohrke, Boone, Smith, Davis, Hurst & Dickman, Tulsa, Oklahoma, For Appellant, Oklahoma Sheriff's Association. C.S. Lewis, III, Gretchen M. Schilling, Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Tulsa, Oklahoma, For Appellees, Tulsa County Criminal Justice Authority. Tim Harris, Dick A. Blakeley, Office of the Tulsa County District Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, For Appellees, Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County. HODGES, J. I. ISSUES ¶1 Three issues are presented for this Court's review: (1) whether title 19, section 744 and title 57, section 41, the statutes allowing jail-privatization, are [995 P.2d 1127] constitutionally infirm; II. FACTS ¶2 When the United States Justice Department investigated the Tulsa County jail system in 1994, it found that the condition of the jail violated the constitutional rights of prisoners and detainees. As part of a settlement agreement, Tulsa County agreed to build a new county jail by November 1998, to be occupied by February 1999. ¶3 On September 12, 1995, Tulsa County voters approved a sales tax increase for the construction and operation of a new county jail. The Tulsa County Commissioners created a public trust, the TCCJA, to administer the proceeds of the sales tax increase and the construction and operation of the new jail. On July 24, 1998, the TCCJA contracted with Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) for the management and operation of the new county jail. ¶4 The Tulsa County Sheriff's Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge Number 188 and a group of taxpayers sought a declaration that the TCCJA had wrongly been formed under title 60, rather than title 19, and that the delegation of jail operations to a private entity was unconstitutional. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that the TCCJA had not been properly created and that the delegation issue was therefore moot. An appeal was taken from this judgment. In the first appeal in this case, this Court reversed the trial court, holding that the TCCJA had been properly formed under the general trust provisions of title 60, section 176. ¶5 On remand, the trial court, concluding that the jail-privatization statutes were valid, denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the County's cross motion for summary judgment. Once again, an appeal was taken (Appeal No. 92,626), this time by the plaintiffs. In a separate case, Stanley Glanz, Sheriff of Tulsa County, brought suit against the same defendants, and the Oklahoma Sheriffs' Association intervened. The [995 P.2d 1128] issues in both cases were the same. The trial court in the second case (Appeal No. 93,503) denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's cross motions for summary judgment. The issues preserved for this Court's review are the same in both appeals. This Court retained both of the appeals for review of the presented issues. This Court, sua sponte, raised the issue of the effect of article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution on jail privatization statutes, ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing this issue, and heard oral arguments on the issue. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 In the present appeals, the plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of section 744 of title19 and of section 41 of title 57, both of which authorize counties to enter into contracts with private entities for the operation of county prison facilities. Where the constitutionality of a legislative act is challenged, there is a presumption in favor of its validity, and this Court is not at liberty to evaluate the desirability or wisdom of the act. IV. DELEGATION AND ADEQUATE STANDARDS ¶7 The plaintiffs argue that the Legislature has improperly delegated its rule-making authority by allowing the county to establish procedures for jail operation. This Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether the statutory provisions allowing counties to privatize their jails is an unlawful delegation of legislative power. ¶8 Oklahoma's non-delegation doctrine is rooted in articles IV and V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Section 1 of article IV provides for the separation of the three branches of government. Section 1 of article V requires that "[t]he Legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a Legislature consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives. . . ." Based on section 1 of article V, it is a well-settled rule that "the legislature must not abdicate its responsibility to resolve fundamental policy making. . . . "7 ¶9 This prohibition does not forbid the Legislature from delegating power to implement its statutorily-mandated policies.8 Even though the Legislature may not delegate the power to make laws, it can delegate the authority to make rules and regulations in the implementation of statutory enactments.9 To prevent the Legislature's role from being usurped, its ability to delegate rule-making authority is subject to the condition that the statutory scheme "must establish [the legislative] policies and set out definite standards for the exercise of any agency's rule making power."10 While it is well settled in this jurisdiction that the power to determine the policy of the law is primarily legislative and cannot be delegated, the power to make rules of a subordinate character in order to carry out the policy legislatively determined and to apply that policy to varying factual conditions, although sharing the attributes of legislative exercise of power, is in its major sense an administrative duty which may be delegated properly to an administrative body by the Legislature.11 ¶10 When interpreting statutes, the intent of the Legislature controls, and to [995 P.2d 1129] ascertain the legislative intent, all statutory provisions upon a particular subject will be considered and given effect as a whole.12 An examination of all relevant statutory provisions is specific of the legislative intent that county jails would be subject to the same standards whether operated by the sheriff or a private entity. Section 744 of title 19 of the Oklahoma Statutes authorizes private operation of county prisons and provides that such jail "services shall meet any standards prescribed and established for county jails, including but not limited to standards concerning internal and perimeter security, discipline of inmates, employment of inmates, and proper food, clothing, housing, and medical care."13 Also relevant is section 68 of title 57 which states "any state law governing jails shall apply to jail facilities operated by a private prison contractor."14 ¶11 There are extensive guidelines already in place which have long applied to county-operated prisons and, under section 744 of title 19 and section 68 of title 57, apply to privately-operated prisons. Section 192 of title 74 requires certain standards for many areas of jail operations such as: admission and release procedures, security, sanitary conditions, diet, clothing, living space, discipline, prisoners' rights, staff training, safety, prisoner supervision and segregation of females, minors and the infirm. Under section 192 of title 74, the State Health Department is required to inspect county jails once a year and violations are to be reported to the district attorney. The Oklahoma Administrative Code, title 310, section 670, sets out additional standards for jail operations. These standards, under which counties have operated their jails, apply to and are nonetheless sufficient for private-jail operations. ¶12 The Legislature has enacted policy addressing how prisons should be operated and allowing privatization. Because the Legislature has provided that all county jails are subject to the same standards whether operated by a county or a private company, it is not necessary for the Legislature to create entirely new standards for privately-operated county jails when adequate standards already exist. The authority to set county-specific rules for the operation of county jails may be delegated because the rules are of subordinate character and necessary to carry out the legislatively-mandated policies. Each county's individualized policies and procedures will differ depending upon the resources and facilities that it has at its disposal. Further, these policies and procedures are subordinate to the myriad of statutes and regulations which govern jails and prisons. When all provisions concerning county jail facilities are viewed as a whole, there are adequate standards for the county to follow in implementing jail procedure. ¶13 Plaintiffs rely heavily on City of Okla. City v. State ex rel. Okla. Dept of Labor, [995 P.2d 1130] ¶14 The Minimum Wage Act, as amended by the Legislature, required the Oklahoma Labor Commissioner to adopt the prevailing wage as determined by the Federal Department of Labor. In declaring the amendment unconstitutional, this Court said: "the Act has provided no definite standards or articulated safeguards for the United States Department of Labor to follow in implementing the legislative policy declared in the Act." ¶15 The Department of Labor case is distinguishable from the present case. In the Department of Labor case, the Legislature did not make any attempt to impose existing standards on the Federal Department of Labor. Instead, the federal agency was given the power to determine the prevailing wage in Oklahoma with no direction from the Oklahoma Legislature. Unlike in Department of Labor, here existing standards apply to county jails whether operated by a county or a private company. Counties are ultimately responsible for insuring that their jails meet legislative and administrative standards. The only difference is that the counties now have the option to contract for private operation. In the case of privately-operated county jails, there has been no open ended delegation made as was the case in Department of Labor. ¶16 Plaintiffs argue that CCA is unlawfully being permitted to establish policies and procedures for the new jail. However, the plaintiffs have misstated the facts of the case. The management contract between CCA and the TCCJA states that CCA "shall submit to the Authority (TCCJA), for review and approval, proposed Policies and Procedures." V. DUTIES OF SHERIFF ¶17 Plaintiffs also contend that the jail privatization statutes are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because they allow counties to alter the duties of sheriff. The Office of Sheriff is constitutionally created "subject to change by the legislature." [995 P.2d 1131] ¶18 The language of article 17, section 2 specifically gives the Legislature the exclusive power to change the duties of the Office of Sheriff. Not only does the Legislature have the power to alter the duties of the Office of Sheriff, it has the power to abolish the office ¶19 By authorizing the various counties to contract with private entities for the operation of county jails, the Legislature must have foreseen that such action would alter the duties of sheriff. The purpose and object of the challenged provisions is to allow for jail privatization. The Legislature cannot accomplish its object without altering the duties of sheriff. We therefore find that the Legislature's intent was to alter the duties of sheriff and that it has not assigned the power to do so to the counties as argued by the plaintiffs. VI. TCCJA'S AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT ¶20 Also at issue is whether the TCCJA exceeded its authority as a public trust by entering into a contract with CCA. Title 60 allows public trusts to be established "for the furtherance and accomplishment of any authorized and proper public function or purpose . . . ." ¶21 We have held that a valid public trust could operate a public parking facility, which amounted to the operation of a business for public purposes, even though only the State held the constitutional power to engage in an occupation or business for public purposes. ¶22 The plaintiffs argue that the TCCJA, by contracting CCA for the operation of the jail, has exceed its authority under the sales tax proposition which was adopted by a vote of the Tulsa County taxpayers. The TCCJA was created not by the sales tax measure, but by the Tulsa County Commissioners. The TCCJA's authority is thus governed, not by the sales tax measure, but by the authority granted by the Tulsa County Commissioners, part of which was to provide for the operation of the new jail. VII. LOCAL OR SPECIAL LAWS ¶23 Finally we address the impact of article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution which provides: The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing: . . . Granting divorces; Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts; . . . Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts. . . . In their briefs, the appellees and the Sheriff agree that the contested statutes do not offend article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, the Fraternal Order of Police and taxpayers, appellants in appeal number 92,626, argue that the statutes, as applied, create an impermissible dichotomy in the duties of sheriff of the different counties. We disagree. ¶24 We first note that the jail privatization statutes apply the same to every county. Every county in the state has the option of privatizing its jail system; no counties are deprived of this option. Each county is given authority to determine whether privatization of its county jail is feasible for the particular county. ¶25 Even if the privatization statutes create a dichotomy among the counties within the state, they are not constitutionally offensive. In Sanchez v. Melvin, ¶26 More recently, in Nelson v. Nelson, ¶27 The jail privatization statutes operate equally on all counties in the state. They provide each county the freedom to decide for itself whether privatization of its jails is the most feasible approach for the individual county. The same opportunity is provided all counties. The fact that some smaller counties reject privatization does not diminish the fact that they are given that choice the same as larger counties. For these reasons, we find that the jail privatization statutes do not offend article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. IX. CONCLUSION ¶28 In conclusion, we note that even though the use of private contractors to operate jails and prisons has recently been renewed, privatization of jails is not a new phenomenon. [995 P.2d 1133] ¶29 While some federal courts have assumed "the propriety of confinements" in privately owned and operated prisons, ¶30 We conclude that the Legislature has not unlawfully delegated rule-making authority to the counties by allowing them to enter into contracts for private operation of county jails. Operating procedure for county jails is a subordinate matter which may properly be determined by each county. The Legislature has provided adequate standards for jail operations to assist the counties in implementing jail privatization. Under article 17, section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the Legislature had the power to alter the duties of the Office of Sheriff, and it exercised this power when it enacted the legislation allowing jail privatization. Further, the TCCJA, is a valid public trust and did not exceed its authority by entering into a contract with CCA. The privatization statutes are not special or local laws prohibited by article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Thus, the judgments of both district court cases are affirmed. TRIAL COURTS' JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED. ¶31 Summers, C.J., Hargrave, V.C.J., Hodges, Lavender, Kauger, Watt, JJ., Simms, SJ., (sitting in lieu of Boudreau J. who disqualified), Hansen, SJ., (sitting in lieu of the seat left vacant by Wilson, J.) - concur. ¶32 Opala, J. dissents. FOOT