Title: In Re Estate of Wright
Citation: 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911
Docket Number: 38,129
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 1951

170 Kan. 600 (1951)
228 P.2d 911
In the Matter of the Estate of Raymond C. Wright and Ida Loraine Wright, both deceased;
HERBERT C. PIZEL and MARJORIE M. PIZEL, parents and next of kin of Donald Lee Pizel, a minor, deceased, Appellants,
v.
W.C. WRIGHT, Administrator, Appellee.
No. 38,129

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 10, 1951.
A.W. Relihan, of Smith Center, argued the cause, and Terry E. Relihan and T.D. Relihan, also of Smith Center, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
H.G. Engleman, of Salina, argued the cause, and LaRue Royce, E.S. *601 Hampton, H.H. Dunham, Jr., and John Q. Royce, all of Salina, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WERTZ, J.:
This is an action for damages for wrongful death brought by Herbert C. Pizel and Marjorie M. Pizel as the parents and next of kin of their deceased minor son, Donald Lee Pizel, against the estates of Raymond C. Wright and Ida Loraine Wright, grandparents of said decedent, both of whom were killed in the accident which took the life of their grandson. The probate court allowed the claim and an appeal was taken to the district court, where defendant's demurrer to the evidence was sustained by the court, and judgment entered against appellants. This case has been before this court before (168 Kan. 493, 214 P.2d 328) on the sole question of constitutionality of the guest statute, and the statute was held to be a proper exercise of the state's police power.
In their petition appellants alleged, in addition to the facts set forth in the opinion in this case referred to above, that they are the father and mother of Donald Lee Pizel, deceased; that W.L. Wright is the qualified and acting administrator of the estate of Raymond C. Wright and Ida Loraine Wright, both deceased, and the pertinent part of the petition, being paragraph five thereof, reads as follows:
The petition continues with a prayer for recovery for the wrongful death of Donald Lee Pizel, by reason of the reckless and wanton negligence of Raymond C. and Ida Loraine Wright, now deceased.
Appellee, administrator of the estate of Raymond C. and Ida Loraine Wright, filed his answer containing a general denial and a specific denial that the oncoming train was known to or visible to Raymond C. and Ida Loraine Wright, that they had actual notice of the danger in attempting to cross said crossing ahead of the train, that they knew or had actual knowledge that any train was then approaching said crossing, or that they intentionally drove their car onto the railroad track in reckless disregard of the consequences; and alleged that Donald Lee Pizel was at the time and place the guest of Raymond C. and Ida Loraine Wright and was being transported with them in the automobile driven by Raymond C. Wright who was not guilty of gross and wanton negligence in the operation of said automobile, and that the petitioners, as parents of said child, have no cause of action herein by reason of the provisions of G.S. 1949, 8-122b.
Appellants by way of reply denied all the allegations of the answer and specifically denied that the deceased Donald Lee Pizel was a guest of Raymond C. Wright by virtue of the mentioned statute.
Briefly, these are the facts herein: On January 4, 1948, the mothers and wives of the Flying Farmers living in the vicinity of Kanorado were preparing a breakfast at a church in that town; the deceased, Mrs. Ida Loraine Wright, was one of a committee to assist in preparation of the breakfast; she had assisted at the church on the previous day and was expected to help on the day of the fatal accident. On the morning in question, the deceased Raymond C. Wright had a conversation with his wife, Ida Loraine Wright, in which he told her he would just as soon she did not go to the church to work and asked her to call Marjorie Pizel, their daughter and mother of the twin boys, and see if she would work in her *603 place. This resulted in the telephone conversation wherein Mrs. Ida Loraine Wright called her daughter, Marjorie Pizel, and told her if she would work in her place at the church and serve that morning, to bring the twins over and she would take care of them for her. Subsequent thereto, the children were delivered by their mother to the grandparents' home and placed in the custody of Mrs. Wright. Later the same morning Mr. Wright took them in his car to the airport where they remained for a short time and then started to return to the Wright farm home. In returning to their home it was necessary for them to cross a Rock Island railroad crossing and tracks at a point a short distance east and north of the airport. Mr. Wright drove his automobile from the airport to U.S. Highway 24 which runs east and west and parallel with the Rock Island railroad tracks and drove a short distance to the highway which runs north and which is intersected by the railroad tracks about 124 feet north of Highway 24. They turned north at this point and proceeded toward the railroad crossing which is about 1/4 mile east of the airport. It was a clear day and there was nothing to obstruct the view of Mr. Wright as to the railroad tracks or the train which was approaching. As Wright left the airport in his automobile, there was a freight train approaching the crossing from the west. This train was being pulled by a Diesel engine equipped with bell and air whistle on both the front and rear of the engine, which equipment was in operation and working. There are four railroad crossings in and about the depot at Kanorado and the whistle of the freight was being sounded almost continuously down the stretch of track approaching the crossing in question. The train was traveling about 45 miles an hour; the engineer saw the Wright car at about the time the train passed the airport. The Wright car was then on Highway 24 going east. The engineer saw Wright turn north and approach the crossing; the train whistle was then blowing and the bell was ringing; the Wright car did not stop, but did appear to slow down, but continued and drove onto the track in front of the oncoming train. As a result of the collision, Mr. and Mrs. Wright and Donald Lee Pizel, one of the grandsons, were killed, the other grandson being seriously injured. At the crossing in question there were the customary crossing signs. Mr. Wright's eyesight and hearing were good; he did have an artificial leg below the knee.
On a showing of these facts, appellants rested their case. Appellee interposed a demurrer to appellants' evidence which was by *604 the court sustained. From this ruling, appellants bring the case here and assign as error the following specifications:
In ruling on the demurrer to appellants' evidence, the trial court properly gave first consideration to the capacity in which deceased was riding in his grandparents' car. Appellants contend that by doing so, the court placed the burden of proof upon them to show that the deceased was not a guest under the provisions of our guest statute. The record does not disclose such to be the case. After the jury was empaneled, the court held that the burden of going forth with proof was on appellants. It is an elementary rule of law that the burden of proof on any point is upon the party asserting it, and it was incumbent upon appellants to prove the allegations of their petition by a preponderance of the evidence. (Miller v. Kruggel, 165 Kan. 435, 195 P.2d 597; 31 C.J.S. 709; 20 Am. Jur. 134.)
Appellants contend that Donald Lee Pizel was a passenger and not a guest in the automobile and for that reason a showing of ordinary negligence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. Appellee contends there was no showing made by appellants as to the transportation of the deceased which would relieve him from the status of a guest, and that there was no showing of gross and wanton negligence which is necessary to be shown in order to establish liability under the guest statute, G.S. 1949, 8-122b, which statute is as follows:
We think the statute is clear that in order for one to recover for an injury or for his representative to recover for a wrongful death occasioned while being transported in the motor vehicle of another, claimant must, to avoid the limitations of our guest statute, affirmatively show that he was not a guest, that he was being transported for "payment" as that term is defined by our decisions hereinafter discussed, or that injury or death was caused by gross and *605 wanton negligence of the operator of the vehicle. This court has held in Srajer v. Schwartzman, 164 Kan. 241, 188 P.2d 971, that under our guest statute, in order to keep a passenger from being a guest by payment of transportation, there must be a substantial consideration of some sort moving to the operator or owner of the vehicle. In Pilcher v. Erny, 155 Kan. 257, 124 P.2d 461, plaintiff alleged she was a passenger for hire and set out the contract on which her conclusion was based. This court held that in order to show she was not a guest of defendant under our guest statute, it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove a substantial consideration moving to the operator or owner of the vehicle. To the same effect see Yarnall v. Gass and Montague, 240 Mo. App. 451; 217 S.W.2d 283; Voelkl v. Latin adm'r., 58 Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d 519; Clendenning v. Simerman, 220 Ia. 739, 263 N.W. 248; Jenkins v. Nat'l Paint &amp; Varnish Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 161, 61 P.2d 780.
In order for appellants to predicate their cause of action on mere negligence, the burden is on them to prove that decedent's status while riding in the Wright car as a passenger was not one which would exclude recovery for mere negligence as provided in our guest statute. Appellants further contend the Legislature never intended that the provisions of the guest statute should be applicable to a four-year-old child. The weight of authority is that a minor as well as an adult can be a guest even though unaccompanied by parent or guardian, even though no consent of parent or guardian is shown. (Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814, 817, 89 P.2d 866; West v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183, 81 N.E. 960; Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 Atl. 323; Audia v. DeAngelis, 121 Conn. 336, 185 Atl. 78; Langford v. Rogers, 278 Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692) See, also, 60 C.J.S. 1017. This matter was before this court and we held (Morgan v. Anderson, supra):
This brings us to the question whether there was any evidence of "payment" for deceased's transportation to make the guest statute inapplicable, and if not, whether appellants' evidence presented a prima facie case of "gross and wanton negligence." Appellants rely *606 on the following testimony of Bill Wright, son of Raymond C. and Ida Loraine Wright and brother of Marjorie M. Pizel, mother of deceased:
Appellee argues that the above testimony did not prove a contract or payment for transportation for appellants' deceased son within the meaning of our guest statute. It is unnecessary for us to reiterate the discussion contained in our many decisions construing the word "payment" as the same is used in our guest statute, inasmuch as it has been so recently defined in Sparks v. Getz, 170 Kan. 287, 225 P.2d 106:
See also Srajer v. Schwartzman, supra, Pilcher v. Erny, supra, Vogrin v. Bigger, 159 Kan. 271, 154 P.2d 111, and cases cited, analyzed and discussed therein, including those from other jurisdictions.
The evidence in the instant case discloses that the child was delivered by appellants into the unrestricted custody and care of his grandmother Mrs. Wright, as had been done on previous occasions. Nothing was said by appellants about taking the grandchildren for any ride in an automobile. The most that can be said of the mentioned telephonic conversation is that Mrs. Wright was to keep the children and the daughter was to perform her kitchen duties at the church on the day in question. As alleged in appellant's petition and as shown by the evidence, Mrs. Wright herself was a guest in the car during the ride. There was no conversation or *607 evidence to show an agreement of any kind made by Mr. Wright, owner of the automobile, with his daughter Marjorie with reference to the care or transportation of the minor child. As stated by this court in Pilcher v. Erny, supra, the exception contained in the guest statute should apply only where the payment, consideration or benefit was the chief motivating cause for the particular transportation. The most that can be said in this case is that on the morning in question, Mr. Wright, owner and driver of the automobile, was taking his wife to the airport, and that for the pleasure, benefit and enjoyment of the children, he took them along as his guests for the purpose of seeing the landings of incoming planes of the Flying Farmers, and in no event were the children paid passengers as the term has been construed by our decisions.
Again, it is unnecessary for us to reiterate the discussion contained in our many decisions defining the terms "gross and wanton negligence" inasmuch as they have so recently been discussed and our previous decisions analyzed in Bailey v. Resner, 168 Kan. 439, 214 P.2d 323, where we said:
In the instant case the evidence disclosed that the railroad tracks and highway were nearly parallel and both the automobile and train were traveling in the same direction until just before Mr. Wright turned to cross the track. The train, prior to the turn, was almost directly behind Mr. Wright's car. Airplanes were flying overhead and were flying in such direction as to make them come low over the crossing. As Wright turned to cross the tracks, he had but 124 feet in which to observe the train and stop his automobile. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Wright either heard the whistle or rumble of the train or that he saw the train, except the testimony of the engineer that almost simultaneously with the crash, Mr. Wright appeared to see the train. There is no evidence in the record to indicate a realization of the imminence of danger and a reckless disregard and complete indifference and unconcern for the probable consequences thereof. Both appellants testified that Mr. Wright had a love and affection for the child and had his best interests at heart. Moreover, there is a presumption that the deceased Mr. Wright, with the love of life common to all, exercised such due care as the circumstances permitted to protect himself from injury. (Smith v. Bassett, 159 Kan. 128, 152 P.2d 794, and cases cited therein.)
In view of this presumption and the lack of evidence to clearly overcome it, as a matter of law, we think the lower court's action in sustaining the demurrer to appellants' evidence was proper. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
WERTZ, J., (dissenting):
I cannot agree with all that has been said in the majority opinion, which fell to my lot to write. I do not agree that it was the intent of our legislature in enacting G.S. *609 1949, 8-122b, the so-called guest statute, to classify a child of tender years or a person under mental disability within the term "guest" as defined in the majority opinion. To say that a child who has been placed by its parents in the unrestricted care of another and taken by such other for a ride in a vehicle,' is a guest of the driver on such occasion, takes from the term "guest" as used in the statute, its ordinary and well accepted meaning.
Our judicial history is replete with instances of legislative acts and judicial decisions to the effect that a child is conclusively presumed to be non sui juris, incapable of committing crime, not responsible for its torts, not guilty of contributory negligence, and incapable of making a binding contract. In the light of these and many other considerations given persons under disability, can it now be said that our legislature intended to eliminate the advantageous position that a child has heretofore enjoyed? I think not. To me the statute implies that in order to become a guest one must exercise a choice in the matter, and I think that a four-year-old lacks the legal capacity to exercise that choice, just as it is incapable of responsibility for its torts and so forth. Surely the law should not be construed to say that these helpless children are bound by the same standards applicable to persons of mature years who have the ability and mentality to contract for transportation or to object and remonstrate to the manner in which the car is driven while riding in the vehicle under circumstances which make the guest statute applicable. It appears to me to be a harsh rule of law which denies the innocent victim of tender years or the mentally disabled redress against the negligent wrongdoer. (Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262.)
It is my opinion that application of the guest statute should not be extended beyond correction of the evils which it may be assumed were the motivating reasons for its enactment.
SMITH, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent.