Title: MICHAEL J BARNES JR V KIM KRISTINE JEUDEVINE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 129606
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2006

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 26, 2006 
MICHAEL J. BARNES, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 129606 
KIM KRISTINE JEUDEVINE,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.  
Plaintiff filed this action seeking a determination of paternity for a child 
conceived while the child’s mother was married to another man.  Plaintiff alleges 
that the child was not an issue of the marriage, because he is the child’s biological 
father. 
The question presented is whether plaintiff has standing under the 
Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., to seek a determination of paternity. To 
resolve this question in this case, we must decide whether a default judgment of 
divorce that states it appears that “no children were born of this marriage and none 
are expected” is a sufficient judicial determination that the subject child was not 
the issue of the marriage. 
 
 
 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that plaintiff 
does not have standing under the Paternity Act because the default judgment is not 
clear and convincing evidence that the child was not an issue of the marriage.  We 
remand this case to the circuit court for the entry of an order of summary 
disposition for the defendant. 
I 
Defendant-appellant Kim K. Jeudevine married James V. Charles III on 
July 11, 1996. Sometime before Charles filed for divorce and before defendant 
was served with the divorce complaint on August 12, 1998, defendant learned that 
she was pregnant.  Defendant did not inform her husband that she was pregnant. 
Plaintiff Michael J. Barnes, Jr., alleges that he is the child’s biological father. 
Defendant did not respond to the complaint for divorce and did not appear 
at the divorce hearing. A default judgment of divorce was entered on November 
2, 1998. The default judgment provides:  
[I]t satisfactorily appears to this Court that there has been a 
breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects 
of matrimony have been destroyed, and there remains no reasonable 
likelihood that the marriage can be preserved; it further appearing 
that no children were born of this marriage and none are expected. 
On February 26, 1999, four months after the divorce was final, defendant 
gave birth. A birth certificate identifies plaintiff as the child’s father and an 
affidavit of parentage signed by plaintiff and defendant the day after the child’s 
2  
 
 
 
                                              
birth states that plaintiff is the father.1  Plaintiff and defendant lived together and 
raised the child for over four years, until the summer of 2003, when plaintiff and 
defendant ended their relationship.  Defendant has not allowed plaintiff to see the 
child since they stopped living together.     
On September 30, 2003, plaintiff filed a paternity action against defendant, 
alleging that he was the father of defendant’s child.  To support his contention, 
plaintiff cites the judgment of divorce between Charles and defendant that states 
“that no children were born of this marriage and none are expected.”  Plaintiff also 
cites the affidavit of parentage and the birth certificate identifying plaintiff as the 
father of the child. 
Defendant answered plaintiff’s paternity action on October 22, 2003.  She 
neither admitted nor denied plaintiff’s claimed paternity.  However, defendant 
denied that the child was born “out of wedlock,” because the child had been 
conceived while she was legally married to Charles.  Defendant admitted signing 
the affidavit of parentage and the birth certificate, but claimed that she did so 
under duress. 
On November 10, 2003, a hearing was held in the Family Division of the 
Kalamazoo Circuit Court. The court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
1 The affidavit of parentage states that by signing the document, the mother 
of the child admits that “she was not married when this child was born or 
conceived; or that this child, though born or conceived during a marriage, is not an 
issue of that marriage as determined by a court of law.”   
3  
 
 
 
 
                                              
disposition, concluding that plaintiff did not have standing to sue under the 
Paternity Act. The court found (1) that the child was conceived during the 
marriage and (2) that there was no court determination that the child was a child 
born or conceived during the marriage but is not the issue of that marriage.   
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the circuit 
court and remanded the matter to the circuit court for the reinstatement of 
plaintiff’s claim.2  The Court of Appeals held that the statement in the default 
judgment of divorce that “no children were born of this marriage and none are 
expected” was a determination by a court that the child was not an issue of the 
marriage. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff had standing to sue 
under the Paternity Act. 
Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered the clerk to 
schedule oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1) to determine whether to 
grant the defendant’s application.3  We asked the parties to include among the 
issues to be addressed: 
(1) [W]hether plaintiff lacked standing to proceed under the 
Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., where the subject child’s 
mother was married at the time of the child’s conception, see Girard 
v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231 (1991); and (2) whether the default 
judgment of divorce amounted to a judicial determination that the 
child was born or conceived during the marriage but was not the 
issue of the marriage. 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 23, 2005 (Docket No. 
252840). 
3 474 Mich 1056 (2006). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
II  
We review a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition de novo. 
Wilson v Alpena Co Rd Comm, 474 Mich 161; 713 NW2d 717 (2006).  Whether 
plaintiff has standing to bring a paternity action is a question of law that we also 
review de novo. In re KH, 469 Mich 621; 677 NW2d 800 (2004). 
III 
The Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., confers on the circuit court 
jurisdiction over proceedings involving the determination of a child’s paternity. 
One purpose of the act relevant to this case is to assure, for the sake of the child, 
that the child’s legitimacy will not be decided by mere casual inference, but only 
after specific statutory procedures are followed.   To this end, the act provides that 
a mother, a father, or in certain circumstances, the Department of Human Services, 
may bring an action in circuit court to establish paternity of a child, if that child is 
alleged to have been “born out of wedlock.”  MCL 722.714.    
The Paternity Act defines “[c]hild born out of wedlock” as  
a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the 
conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court 
has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but 
not the issue of that marriage. [ MCL 722.711(a).]  
Thus, to establish that the child was born out of wedlock, plaintiff must prove that 
either (1) the child was not born or conceived during the mother’s marriage, or (2) 
though the child was born or conceived during a marriage, a court has determined 
that the child was not the issue of the marriage.   
5  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Plaintiff filed this action alleging that he is the biological father of the 
defendant’s child. 
However, it is undisputed that defendant was married to 
another man when the child was conceived.  Plaintiff gave birth just four months 
after her divorce was final. Therefore, to have standing to seek a determination of 
paternity, it is necessary for plaintiff to establish that a court “has determined” that 
there was a child born or conceived during the marriage and that the child was not 
an issue of the marriage. We recently reemphasized that “[t]he presumption that 
children born or conceived during a marriage are the issue of that marriage is 
deeply rooted in our statutes and case law.”  In re KH, supra at 634. The 
presumption of legitimacy can be overcome only by a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence. Id. at 634 & n 24. 
In Girard v Wagenmaker, supra at 243, this Court held that in order for a 
biological father to establish standing under the Paternity Act, there must be a 
“prior court determination that a child is born out of wedlock.”  The requirement 
that there be a prior court determination is consistent with the language of the 
statute, MCL 722.711(a). As analyzed in Girard, supra at 242 (citations omitted): 
“[H]as determined” is the present perfect tense of the verb 
“determine.” The present perfect tense generally “indicates action 
that was started in the past and has recently been completed or is 
continuing up to the present time,” or shows “that a current action is 
logically subsequent to a previous recent action.” 
Girard noted that requiring a prior determination that a child is not an issue of a 
marriage comports with Michigan’s longstanding presumption that children born 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
   
or conceived during a marriage are legitimate issue of the marriage.  Girard, supra 
at 246 (citing Serafin v Serafin, 401 Mich 629, 636; 258 NW2d 461 [1977]).    
In this case, the question is whether the circuit court’s statement in the 
judgment of divorce that there appeared to be no children born of or expected from 
the marriage was a court determination of sufficient specificity to lead to the 
conclusion that this child was not an issue of the marriage.  Plaintiff asserts that 
this statement in the judgment of divorce qualifies as a court determination that the 
child was born out of wedlock and is not an issue of the marriage.  We disagree. 
A “determination” is that which sets the limits to or the bounds of something. 
Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d ed), p 375.  In its legal sense, a 
“determination” is that which “implies an ending or finality of a controversy or 
suit.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 450.  To overcome the strong 
presumption of the legitimacy of a child born or conceived during a marriage, a 
court determination must settle with finality a controversy regarding the child’s 
legitimacy. 
This Court held as much in Girard, supra at 243, by concluding that where 
there was “[n]o previous action . . . undertaken to determine the child’s paternity 
[and] no ongoing actions . . . to determine the child’s paternity,” there was no prior 
court determination that a child was not the issue of a marriage.  Because there had 
been no previous action to determine that the child was born out of wedlock, 
Girard held that a putative father did not have standing to seek paternity under the 
Paternity Act. Similarly, we stated in In re KH: 
7  
 
 
  
 
 
By requiring a previous determination that a child is born out 
of wedlock, the Legislature has essentially limited the scope of 
parties who can rebut the presumption of legitimacy to those capable 
of addressing the issue in a prior proceeding—the mother and the 
legal father . . . . If the mother or legal father does not rebut the 
presumption of legitimacy, the presumption remains intact, and the 
child is conclusively considered to be the issue of the marriage 
despite lacking a biological relationship with the father. [In re KH, 
supra at 635.] 
Consistent with Girard and In re KH, we hold that a court determination under 
MCL 722.711(a) that a child is not “the issue of the marriage” requires that there 
be an affirmative finding regarding the child’s paternity in a prior legal proceeding 
that settled the controversy between the mother and the legal father.   
In this case, the dissents assert that the legal findings necessary to meet the 
“prior adjudication” requirement for a paternity suit are established by the default 
judgment. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that “[a] default judgment is 
just as conclusive an adjudication and as binding upon the parties of whatever is 
essential to support the judgment as one which has been rendered following 
answer and contest.” Perry & Derrick Co, Inc v King, 24 Mich App 616, 620; 180 
NW2d 483 (1970). However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals conclusion 
and the dissents’ assertion that the judgment of divorce in this case constitutes a 
“court determination” that the child was not an issue of the marriage under MCL 
722.711(a). The holding in the default judgment that there were no children of the 
marriage simply does not address the similar but distinct question whether there 
was a child born or conceived during the marriage, and whether it was the issue of 
the marriage.  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In short, there have been no legal actions addressing the subject child’s 
paternity. The circuit court stated in the judgment of divorce merely that it 
appeared no children were born or expected of the marriage.  The court’s 
statement does not support a conclusion that “the court has determined [the child] 
to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of the 
marriage.” MCL 722.711(a).  This conclusion is underscored by the requirement 
that a court find clear and convincing evidence that a child is not the issue of a 
marriage to overcome the presumed legitimacy of a child born or conceived during 
a marriage. In re KH, supra at 634 n 24. The circuit court did not make a finding 
that there was a child born or conceived during the marriage that was not an issue 
of the marriage. It, therefore, cannot be reasonably asserted that there was clear 
and convincing evidence of such a finding.  For these reasons also, the court’s 
statement that it appeared that no children were born or expected of the marriage is 
not a sufficient court determination that there was a child conceived during the 
marriage that was not an issue of the marriage.   
Plaintiff also argues that the affidavit of parentage and the birth certificate 
assist him in his claim. 
Plaintiff argues that even if the judgment alone is 
insufficient, he should prevail because of the admissions inherent in these 
documents. We disagree. It was acknowledged in the affidavit of parentage and 
in the birth certificate that plaintiff was the biological father of the child.  Yet, 
despite these documents, the child is still presumed to be a legitimate issue of the 
marriage. An affidavit of parentage is a stipulation by a woman of a man’s 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
paternity under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq. 
This is not a court determination that the child was born out of wedlock, as is 
required under either the Paternity Act or the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act. 
Both acts provide that a child is born out of wedlock only when (1) the woman 
was not married at the time of the conception and birth, or (2) a court previously 
determined that the child was not an issue of the marriage.  
Further, a birth 
certificate is also not a court determination that the child was not an issue of the 
marriage. For these reasons, the affidavit of parentage and the birth certificate do 
not rebut the presumption that the child was an issue of defendant’s marriage to 
Charles. Charles is and remains the child’s legal father, and it is incorrect to 
suggest our decision leaves this child without a father.       
In this case, the subject child is presumed to be the issue of the marriage 
because the child was conceived during the marriage.  The presumption remains 
until rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.  Consequently, the 
party wishing to overcome the presumption must present evidence that the child, 
despite the date of its conception, is not the issue of the marriage and a court must 
so hold. The circuit court’s statement in the judgment of divorce that it appeared 
that there would be no children does not rebut that presumption.  Further, the legal 
father, Charles, never renounced the presumption of legitimacy.  Because the child 
was not conceived outside of marriage, and because there is no prior court 
determination that the child is not an issue of the marriage, we hold that plaintiff 
does not have standing under the Paternity Act.          
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for entry of an order of summary disposition for 
defendant. 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
MICHAEL J. BARNES, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 129606 
KIM KRISTINE JEUDEVINE,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I would deny leave to appeal in this case.  I believe that plaintiff has 
standing to pursue his action under the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq. The 
Court of Appeals did not err in finding that defendant’s default judgment of 
divorce contains a legally sufficient judicial determination that the child in 
question is not the issue of defendant’s marriage. 
THE UNDERLYING FACTS 
Plaintiff had a sexual relationship with defendant while she was separated 
from her husband. It appears that she was four months pregnant with plaintiff’s 
child when her husband, who did not know she was pregnant, was granted a 
default judgment of divorce. In it, the court stated, “it further appearing that no 
children were born of this marriage and none are expected . . . .” 
This statement from the judgment appears to be accurate.  Plaintiff and 
defendant signed an affidavit of parentage agreeing that plaintiff was the child’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
natural father. He was shown to be the father on the child’s birth certificate. 
Plaintiff, defendant, and the child lived together as a family for nearly 4 1/2 years 
before the parties separated.  The child has always believed that plaintiff is his 
father. 
Plaintiff filed this claim for recognition of his paternity so he could 
continue fathering the child.  In response, defendant neither admitted nor denied 
that plaintiff is the boy’s father.  Instead, she argued that plaintiff lacks standing to 
bring a paternity claim under applicable case law.  Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 
Mich 231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991); Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146; 673 
NW2d 452 (2003); Kaiser v Schreiber, 469 Mich 944 (2003).  The circuit court 
agreed with her. Plaintiff appealed.   
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court decision.  It concluded that 
the language in the divorce judgment that there were no children “born of this 
marriage and none are expected” was a judicial determination that the defendant’s 
former husband is not the child’s legal father.  The majority rejects this 
conclusion, observing that a child’s legitimacy should not be “decided by mere 
casual inferences . . . .” Ante at 5. 
THE MAJORITY’S ERROR 
This is not a case of mere casual inferences.  Defendant was personally 
served with the complaint for divorce that affirmatively alleged that she was not 
pregnant. She did not answer the complaint.  Nor did she contest entry of the 
default judgment of divorce. Had she done so, her son’s paternity could have 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
been, and presumably would have been, thoroughly litigated and scientifically 
determined. Her former husband’s testimony under oath that he and defendant 
had no children and expected none provided legally sufficient support for the 
court’s determination that “no children were born of this marriage and none are 
expected.” In its ruling today, this Court rewards defendant for her refusal to 
reveal the fact of her pregnancy and the identity of her child’s father while the 
divorce was pending. 
Courts speak through their orders and judgments.1  Default judgments are 
not lesser judgments by any means. Like other judgments, a default judgment of 
divorce operates as final statement of fact and law to the world.   
In the matter that is before us, the paternity action, the majority appears to 
go behind the divorce judgment to nullify one of its findings.  The finding is that 
defendant’s husband did not father any of defendant’s children.  The majority does 
this despite the fact that the finality of the judgment is central to the orderly 
administration of justice. Plaintiff, like any other nonparty to a judgment, is 
entitled to rely on the judgment’s recitation of facts and on the finality of its 
rulings. 
1 MCL 600.2106 provides, “A . . . judgment . . . of any court of record in 
this state . . . shall be prima facie evidence of . . . all facts recited therein . . . .” 
The default judgment of divorce at issue here resolved the fact that Charles did not 
father any children with defendant.  Until and unless it is reopened and amended, 
it is res judicata with respect to the findings therein. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The judgment in this case says that no children were born of the marriage. 
It follows that defendant’s son is not an issue of defendant’s marriage.  It happens 
that the judge did not know that defendant became pregnant during the marriage. 
However, the judge’s ruling that no children were born of the marriage is likely 
correct. There is no evidence, and no one is asserting, that defendant’s son is an 
issue of the marriage. There is strong evidence that plaintiff is his biological 
father. In short, there is nothing to support a finding that the divorce judge’s 
statement regarding the issue of the marriage was not accurate.   
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals panel was 
correct to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for 
reinstatement of plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiff properly relies on the default judgment 
of divorce to assert his standing to bring this paternity action.  He should have the 
opportunity to assert his paternity.  The availability of blood and DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) testing makes a determination on the question relatively 
easy and accurate. 
In this case, the majority again evidences a rigid adherence to wooden 
strictures such as the presumption of legitimacy even where, as here, the purposes 
of the presumption are not served.  The majority has exhibited a consistent pattern 
of ruling against putative fathers who seek to exercise their due process rights with 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
respect to children they claim as their own.2  Once again, the majority relies on the 
presumption of legitimacy despite strong evidence that the fact presumed to be 
true is false. In finding that defendant’s former husband is the child’s legal father, 
the Court is throwing into question part of the findings of the divorce judgment 
even though (1) the presumption of legitimacy has never been tested, and (2) the 
findings in the judgment are prima facie evidence that the child in question is not 
an issue of the marriage.   
A presumption is a procedural device.  Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich 
280, 286; 373 NW2d 538 (1985).  It operates during a legal proceeding.  A 
rebuttable presumption is subject to being overcome, in the case of the 
presumption of legitimacy, by clear and convincing evidence.  Unless the divorce 
proceeding is reopened and the judgment amended under circumstances where 
both parties have notice and the opportunity to respond, the judgment’s current 
findings are the dominant legal facts. And plaintiff can properly rely on them to 
assert his standing to pursue his paternity action.   
2 Recent cases in which the majority has denied standing or refused to 
consider granting standing to putative biological fathers for the avowed purpose of 
protecting the presumption are: McNamara v Farmer, 474 Mich 877 (2005); 
Numerick v Krull, 265 Mich App 232 (2005), lv den 474 Mich 877 (2005); In re 
KH, 469 Mich 621 (2004); Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146 (2003), lv den 
469 Mich 994 (2004); Kaiser v Schreiber, 469 Mich 944 (2003); Pniewski v 
Morlock, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals (June 5, 2003), 
Docket No. 238767, lv den 469 Mich 904 (2003); In re CAW, 469 Mich 192 
(2003). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
Surely, the presumption of legitimacy was not created to render children 
fatherless. Yet, that is precisely what the majority’s application of it does in this 
case. As a practical matter, defendant’s former husband will almost certainly 
never provide financial support for defendant’s son.  I am uncertain that the 
majority’s statement that he is the child’s legal father is correct.  It is not clear 
what status the presumption of legitimacy has in light of the findings of the 
divorce judgment. 
What is clear is that, as a practical matter, the child can expect to have no 
father in defendant’s former husband.  In the unlikely event that defendant should 
ever try to assert that her former spouse is the child’s legal father, the 
consequences are predictable. If defendant sought to and succeeded in reopening 
the divorce proceedings to obtain support for the child from her former spouse, he 
would object.  Presumably he would prove through a DNA or blood test that he is 
not the biological father.  The test results would provide the clear and convincing 
evidence that would rebut the presumption of legitimacy.   
For this reason, it is not to be anticipated that defendant will ever attempt to 
obtain a court order finding that her former spouse is the child’s father.  And 
plaintiff cannot seek to reopen the divorce case.  Killingbeck v Killingbeck, 269 
Mich App 132; 711 NW2d 759 (2005).3  In effect, the majority has blocked 
3 In Killingbeck, a child’s biological father moved to intervene in plaintiff’s 
divorce case concerning custody issues. He was not the plaintiff’s husband.  The 
Court of Appeals noted that the trial court erred in granting his motion to 
(continued…) 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
plaintiff from ever having the legal right to father and support the child.  As our 
Court observed 29 years ago, without dissent, 
“If the function of a court is to find the truth of a matter so 
that justice might be done, then a rule which absolutely excludes the 
best possible evidence of a matter in issue rather than allow it to be 
weighed by the trier of fact must necessarily lead to injustice. 
Further, when a court voluntarily blindfolds itself to what every 
citizen can see, the public must justifiably question the 
administration of law to just that extent.”  [Serafin v Serafin, 401 
Mich 629, 635-636; 258 NW2d 461 (1977), quoting the Texas Court 
of Civil Appeals in Davis v Davis, 507 SW2d 841, 847 (Tex Civ 
App, 1974).] 
CONCLUSION 
I would deny leave to appeal and remand this case to the trial court for a 
full hearing of plaintiff’s paternity claim.  Plaintiff should be accorded standing  
there. I would hold that defendant’s judgment of divorce contains an effective  
finding by the divorce court that defendant’s son was not an issue of her marriage.  
The judgment’s failure to be more specific was caused solely by defendant’s  
deception in keeping secret the fact that she was pregnant.  There is strong,  
unrefuted evidence that any presumption that plaintiff’s son was the issue of  
defendant’s marriage would be rebutted if tested.  Defendant has not chosen to test  
it; plaintiff cannot.  
(…continued)  
intervene, saying, “Domestic relations actions are strictly statutory.  The only  
parties to a divorce action are the two people seeking dissolution of their marriage.  
. . . [The biological father’s] sole recourse on any issue involving his son was in  
the paternity action, not in the divorce action.” Id. at 140 n 1.  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant should not be heard now to rely on a presumption that she 
should have asserted in the divorce court.  The majority apparently concludes that 
the presumption arose when her child was born and has force and effect outside 
and despite the language of the divorce judgment.  Even if that were true, and I 
question it, defendant should not be permitted to rely on the presumption to defeat 
plaintiff’s standing in his paternity action.  If she wishes to assert it, defendant 
should seek to reopen the divorce case.  For this Court to place the presumption of 
legitimacy over the judgment of divorce is to allow defendant to defeat plaintiff’s 
standing in the paternity action.  This is despite the fact that the presumption that 
defendant relies on likely would have been rebutted already but for her deception 
of her husband and of the divorce court.  The result is ill-reasoned and unjust. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL J. BARNES, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 129606 
KIM CHRISTINE JEUDEVINE,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. I cannot join the majority’s opinion, which would 
reverse the Court of Appeals, and which would deny plaintiff-- who no one 
disputes is the biological father of the child at issue-- the right to be the father of 
the child he has raised for over four years.  Instead, the majority would leave this 
child without a father. 
In the process, the majority would render a default 
judgment in this case meaningless; it would condone and encourage 
gamesmanship by a party to a child custody proceeding; and it would allow a party 
to prevail, in significant part because of that party’s own delinquency in failing to 
participate in an earlier judicial proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND  
Plaintiff alleges that he and defendant had a sexual relationship while 
defendant was still married to her ex-husband, James Charles.  A child was 
conceived before defendant’s divorce from Charles, but born four months after the 
divorce. Charles, who had filed for divorce, had no knowledge of the pregnancy 
because defendant did not appear in the divorce action, and the default divorce 
judgment stated that “it further appear[ed] that no children were born of this 
marriage and none are expected . . . .”  Plaintiff and defendant lived together with 
the child for nearly 4 1/2 years after the divorce and before their separation; 
thereafter, defendant apparently denied plaintiff access to the child.  Plaintiff 
claims that it has now been about 2 1/2 years since he has seen his son.   
Plaintiff filed a paternity action, but the circuit court granted summary 
disposition to defendant, ruling that the default divorce judgment did not amount 
to the prior judicial determination that Charles was not the father of the child 
conceived during the marriage, as required by Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 
231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991), and, therefore, that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a 
paternity action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the default divorce 
judgment did, in fact, constitute such a prior judicial determination.  
ANALYSIS 
The presumption that children born or conceived during a marriage are the 
issue of that marriage is deeply rooted in our statutes and has been consistently 
recognized throughout our jurisprudence.  See In re KH, 469 Mich 621, 634-635; 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
677 NW2d 800 (2004). This presumption  vindicates a number of interests, not 
the least of which include the interest of the child in not having his or her 
legitimacy called into question, the interest of the state in ensuring that children 
are properly supported, and the interest of both in assuring the effective operation 
of intestate succession. 
The presumption also reflects the recognition that 
“‘[t]here is no area of law more requiring finality and stability than family law.’” 
Id. at 635 n 27 (citation omitted). For this reason, we have held that “clear and 
convincing evidence” is required in order to overcome the presumption of 
legitimacy. Id. at 634. 
The title of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., states that the act is 
intended “to confer upon circuit courts jurisdiction over proceedings to compel 
and provide support of children born out of wedlock . . . .”  See also Van Laar v 
Rozema, 94 Mich App 619, 622; 288 NW2d 667 (1980) (“intent behind this statute 
is to provide support for illegitimate children”).  The act confers standing on the 
father of a child born out of wedlock to sue to establish paternity.  In re KH, supra 
at 631-632.  Section 1 of the act provides the relevant definition: 
(a) “Child born out of wedlock” means a child begotten and 
born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the 
date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to 
be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of 
that marriage.  [MCL 722.711 (emphasis added).] 
Thus, there are two ways to satisfy the definition of “child born out of wedlock” 
for purposes of the Paternity Act: (1) a showing that the child was neither born nor 
3  
 
 
 
conceived during the mother’s marriage or (2) a judicial determination that the 
child was not the issue of the marriage.   
In Girard, we stated that the judicial determination referred to in the statute 
was a prior determination: “For a putative father to be able to file a proper 
complaint in a circuit court, . . . a circuit court must have made a determination 
that the child was not the issue of the marriage at the time of filing the complaint.” 
Girard, supra at 242-243 (emphasis in original).  The requirement of a prior 
determination that a child is born out of wedlock reflects a legislative recognition 
that paternity claims generally arise during divorce or custody disputes.  In re KH, 
supra at 635. 
We have observed that this requirement suggests that the 
Legislature contemplated “‘situations where a court in a prior divorce or support 
proceeding determined that the legal husband of the mother was not the biological 
father of the child.’” Id. (citation omitted). Such a prior determination is exactly 
what occurred in this case. 
Defendant failed to respond to the complaint for divorce filed by her (now­
ex) husband, and a default judgment of divorce ultimately was entered.  It has long 
been the rule in this state that the entry of a default judgment has the legal effect of 
admitting all well-pleaded allegations. See, e.g., Lesisko v Stafford, 293 Mich 
479, 481; 292 NW 376 (1940); Wood v Detroit Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573, 578; 
321 NW2d 653 (1982); Kalamazoo Oil Co v Boerman, 242 Mich App 75, 79; 618 
NW2d 66 (2000). In paragraphs 5 and 6 of his complaint for divorce, Charles 
alleged that defendant was not pregnant and that no children were born during the 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
marriage. Because defendant never appeared, she was defaulted, the legal effect 
of which was her admission that she was not pregnant and that no children were 
born during the marriage. 
Although it was clearly factually incorrect that 
defendant was not pregnant on the date of the entry of the default divorce 
judgment, the legal effect of her default was an admission that she was not 
pregnant on the date of the divorce.  Because defendant never sought to set aside 
the default judgment and never appealed the judgment, it continues to stand for the 
proposition that no issue resulted from her marriage to Charles, that is, necessarily, 
that any child born after the date of the divorce was a “child born out of wedlock” 
for purposes of the Paternity Act, MCL722.711(a).        
Moreover, the default judgment states, in pertinent part: 
[I]t satisfactorily appears to this Court that there has been a 
breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects 
of matrimony have been destroyed, and there remains no reasonable 
likelihood that the marriage can be preserved; it further appearing 
that no children were born of this marriage and none are 
expected . . . .” [Emphasis added.] 
The majority suggests that this statement did not constitute an “affirmative finding 
regarding the child’s paternity,” ante at 8. I respectfully disagree.  The plain 
language of the judgment could hardly be clearer: “no children were born of this 
marriage and none are expected[.]”  Once more, “no children were born of this 
marriage and none are expected[.]” 
The trial court thus concluded, not 
unreasonably, that no children were born of the marriage of Charles and 
defendant. As such, the child later born to defendant must, for purposes of the 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
Paternity Act, MCL 722.711(a), have necessarily been a “child born out of 
wedlock.”    
The majority further suggests that it “cannot be reasonably asserted that 
there was clear and convincing evidence” to support the language in the default 
judgment. Ante at 9. Again, I must disagree.  The proofs submitted at the hearing 
consisted entirely of Charles’s testimony.  Charles testified under oath, among 
other things, that “my wife is not pregnant at this time to the best of my 
knowledge.” After hearing the testimony, the trial court stated: 
I find from the proofs submitted there has been a breakdown 
in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of 
matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable 
opportunity for the marriage to be preserved.  Accordingly, the Court 
hereby has signed the judgment as prepared and presented. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In other words, the trial court considered the evidence presented at the hearing and 
issued its judgment on the basis of that evidence.  Among the evidence presented 
was Charles’s express testimony that defendant was not pregnant.  The language 
used in the default judgment is a function of this evidence; there is no requirement 
that a pregnancy test be administered before a trial court may rely on the 
uncontradicted statement of the husband that his wife is not pregnant.  The trial 
court’s order and its statement on the record are both quite clear, and completely 
contradict the majority’s suggestion that the judgment was not supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The rule is well established that courts speak through their judgments and 
decrees . . . .” Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632 (1977); see 
also Newbold v Stewart, 15 Mich 155 (1866).  With respect to default judgments, 
the instant Court of Appeals panel observed:   
“A default judgment is just as conclusive an adjudication and 
as binding upon the parties of whatever is essential to support the 
judgment as one which has been rendered following answer and 
contest.” Perry & Derrick Co v King, 24 Mich App 616, 620; 180 
NW2d 483 (1970). See also Schwartz v City of Flint, 187 Mich App 
191, 194; 466 NW2d 357 (1991).  Respecting defaults, in their 
factual as well as legal components, is a function of the policy of 
respecting the finality of judicial judgments.  See, e.g., Nederlander 
v Nederlander, 205 Mich App 123, 126; 517 NW2d 768 (1994).  If 
the trial court’s equivocation about there merely “appearing” to be 
no children of the marriage did indeed reflect the court’s lack of 
opportunity to consider the factual matter fully, it nonetheless 
reflected no lack of legal authority behind the substance implicit in 
that unchallenged ruling. [Unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Court of Appeals, issued August 23, 2005 (Docket No. 252840), slip 
op at 2.] 
The Court of Appeals analysis regarding the force and effect of default 
judgments was entirely correct.  Defendant’s ex-husband testified in the divorce 
action that there were no children produced as a result of the marriage, and 
defendant did not appear to contest that representation, which was the legal 
equivalent of her admission of its truth.  The judgment of divorce recognized that 
no children resulted from the marriage, i.e., that Charles was not the father of any 
children. It is difficult to imagine evidence more “clear and convincing” of a fact 
than one party’s assertion of that fact under oath and the opposing party’s 
admission of that fact. Accordingly, the legal presumption that a child is factually 
7  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
the offspring of the mother’s husband was addressed and fully repudiated in this 
case by the default judgment of divorce.  The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not 
err in concluding that plaintiff had standing to bring this paternity action.1 
Moreover, I note that a finding that defendant was not pregnant with 
Charles’s child was, in fact, necessary for the trial court to have entered the default 
judgment of divorce. MCL 552.9f sets forth certain procedural requirements in an 
action for divorce and provides, in pertinent part: 
No proofs or testimony shall be taken in any case for divorce 
until the expiration of 60 days from the time of filing the bill of 
complaint, except where the cause for divorce is desertion, or when 
the testimony is taken conditionally for the purpose of perpetuating 
such testimony. In every case where there are dependent minor 
children under the age of 18 years, no proofs or testimony shall be 
taken in such cases for divorce until the expiration of 6 months from 
the day the bill of complaint is filed.  [Emphasis added.] 
Under this provision, no proofs or testimony can be heard in a divorce action in 
which children are involved until at least six months from the time of the filing of 
the complaint.2  Charles filed the divorce action on June 23, 1998, and the 
1 The majority views as significant the fact that, along with the finding that 
no children were born to or conceived by the parties during their marriage, the 
circuit court did not also make an explicit finding that a child was conceived 
during the marriage. Ante at 9. However, given the determination of the trial 
court-- that “no children were born of this marriage and none are expected”-- it is 
nothing more than a matter of logic that the child here was “conceived during a 
marriage but not the issue of that marriage.”  MCL 722.711(a). 
2 MCL 552.9f does provide an exception:  
In cases of unusual hardship or such compelling necessity as 
shall appeal to the conscience of the court, upon petition and proper 
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
                                              
  
 
 
 
 
judgment of divorce was entered on November 2, 1998.  Thus, the judgment of 
divorce granted to Charles and defendant was entered just over four months from 
the time of the filing of the complaint for divorce.  Because a court may grant a 
divorce after only 60 days have elapsed when no minor children are involved, but 
may not grant a divorce until six months have elapsed when minor children are 
involved, the trial court necessarily must have concluded from the evidence 
presented, i.e., Charles’s testimony, that defendant was not pregnant and, 
therefore, that no issue resulted from the marriage.3  While later events 
(…continued) 
showing, it may take testimony at any time after the expiration of 60 
days from the time of filing the bill of complaint. 
However, there is no indication whatsoever that this exception was invoked 
in the instant divorce. 
3 The majority recognizes that a “‘default judgment is just as conclusive as 
an adjudication and as binding upon the parties of whatever is essential to support 
the judgment as one which has been rendered following answer and contest,’” ante 
at 8, quoting Perry & Derrick Co v King, 24 Mich App 616, 620; 180 NW2d 483 
(1970). However, the majority proceeds promptly to disregard this basic principle 
by suggesting that the judgment of divorce was not a sufficient “court 
determination.” Ante at 8. Yet, as noted above, under MCL 552.9f, the finding 
that the parties produced no issue was “essential to support the judgment.”  Perry, 
supra at 620. Moreover, had defendant appeared at the divorce proceeding, an 
answer to the question whether it had been shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that Charles fathered no children would have been “rendered following 
answer and contest.” Id.  Because defendant did not appear in that action, the 
question was decided against her. As such, the fact that Charles did not father a 
child with defendant was definitively resolved by the default judgment of divorce. 
The question of what legal standard should have been used to resolve the 
underlying question, in the absence of an appeal of that issue, is irrelevant to the 
fact that the judgment resolves the question. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
subsequently proved this conclusion incorrect, they do not alter the fact that the 
trial court did, in fact, enter this finding.  A court issuing a default judgment can 
only work with the information actually presented to it, but this does not alter the 
legal effect of its factual conclusions. 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority renders the default judgment in this 
case essentially meaningless. The majority suggests, in effect, that a judicial 
determination requires that the court, in its decision-making, be fully aware of all 
the facts. However, in a default setting, where one party has failed to appear, it is 
obviously not always possible for the court to be fully aware of all the pertinent 
facts. After all, one side has chosen to deprive the court of the facts of which its 
witnesses presumably are aware.  However, this has never been thought to relieve 
the trial court of its obligation to render a “determination” in such a case on the 
basis of as many facts as have been made available to the court.  This is simply in 
the nature of default judgments.  It is for this reason, among others, that parties to 
judicial proceedings would be prudent to show up for such proceedings. 
The majority, wrongly in my view, characterizes the trial court’s order as 
an equivocation because of its references in its order to “it satisfactorily appears” 
and “it further appearing . . . .” Quite apart from the fact that such language is 
entirely unremarkable in judicial orders, and has never before been thought to 
evidence “equivocation,” the reality is that a prudent court could well choose to 
employ such language in virtually every order given that it is not omniscient and 
can only render decisions on the basis of evidence properly before it.  The 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
majority would transform entirely innocuous and customary language, routinely 
employed by courts, probably from time immemorial, into language pregnant with 
meaning, showing hesitation and uncertainty on the part of the court.  Better 
apparently for the court to affect an all-knowing certainty of facts than to reveal 
the ordinary cautiousness of a person who understands the fallibilities of the 
judicial process. The majority’s deconstruction of court orders notwithstanding,4 
whether a court states that something “appears to be,” rather than that it “is,” does 
not deprive an order of the full force of judicial authority.5  Rather, a judgment-- a 
default judgment no less than any other-- represents to the world a binding 
determination concerning the issues pertinent to the judgment, and persons may 
4 One wonders whether orders in which courts “believe” or “find” a 
particular fact satisfies the requirements of certitude established today by the 
majority. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the standard language this Court 
employs in denying a motion for reconsideration asserts that the motion is being 
denied because “it does not appear” that the initial order was entered erroneously. 
See, e.g., McDanield v Hemker, 714 NW2d 301 (2006). In light of this Court’s 
obvious “equivocation” in such circumstances, one wonders whether parties who 
have received such orders are entitled to successive motions for reconsideration 
until we are certain enough to deny such motions unequivocally. 
5 The practical consequences of the majority’s approach would be that 
default judgments would effectively always be in suspense pending additional 
information being made available to the judicial system, most typically, perhaps, 
from the defaulting party itself. While default judgments rarely constitute the 
ideal means of rendering a judicial “determination,” such a procedure nevertheless 
is necessary to the orderly administration of justice, and the factual determinations 
made in accord with a default are just as binding as facts determined in judgments 
entered with the benefit of advocacy on both sides.         
11  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
not avoid the legal effect of such a judgment by attempting to relitigate the facts 
that underlie it.6 
Here, defendant failed to appear in the divorce action.  Had she done so, she 
could have contested the trial court’s conclusion that “no children were born of 
this marriage and none are expected[.]”  Yet, by failing to appear, she failed to 
contest that conclusion, and the court entered a judgment based on the best 
information available to it at the time.  Because the power to correct this 
determination rested at all times solely in defendant, she in particular should now 
be bound by that determination, rather than being allowed to profit from her own 
dereliction, as the majority permits-- if, indeed, denying her son the right to a 
father he has known since birth can be considered “profiting.”  The majority thus 
allows a party to prevail in this case in significant part because of that party’s own 
delinquency in failing to participate in an earlier judicial proceeding.   
As already noted, one of the Legislature’s stated purposes in enacting the 
Paternity Act was “to compel and provide support of children born out of wedlock 
. . . .” Title of 1956 PA 205, MCL 722.711 et seq. The majority’s decision today 
frustrates that purpose in the case of this child.  In reversing the Court of Appeals, 
6 In arguing that the pertinent language of the divorce judgment does not 
constitute a sufficient determination that Charles was not the father of her child, 
plaintiff is essentially mounting a collateral attack on the divorce judgment. 
Because defendant did not seek leave to appeal the trial court’s order in the 
divorce proceeding (or even paricipate in the proceeding), she should not be 
allowed to collaterally attack that order in this case.  See People v Sessions, 474 
Mich 1120 (2006). 
12  
 
 
the majority ensures that plaintiff has no legal obligation to provide support for 
this child. Moreover, because it seems clear that defendant has no intention of 
bringing a claim for support against her ex-husband, and if she ever did, could not 
prevail in that claim because Charles is obviously not the child’s father, the 
majority also ensures by its decision today that this child will not receive support 
from any father. In other words, were defendant to seek support from her ex­
husband, her child would almost certainly become-- even under the majority’s 
holding-- a “child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived 
during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage,” MCL 722.711(a), affording 
plaintiff unquestionable standing to bring a paternity action.  Clearly, as shown by 
the facts of this case, defendant has no interest in that outcome.  As such, the 
majority provides defendant with its blessing to neglect to seek the support to 
which her child is entitled, solely for reasons of legal strategy.  Thus, the majority 
sanctions defendant’s legal gamesmanship at the expense of the well-being of her 
child. 
This result is especially troubling in light of the continuing concern on the 
part of both the public and the members of this Court about fathers unwilling to 
financially support their children. 
The majority here rejects a father who 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
welcomes the opportunity to take responsibility for his child, and who has acted as 
a father for more than four years, in favor of no father at all.7 
Although I believe strongly in the importance of the presumption of 
legitimacy, that presumption has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence 
in this case. Defendant’s ex-husband alleged that there were no children produced 
as a result of the marriage, and he testified to that effect at the divorce hearing. 
Defendant failed to appear at the hearing, which constituted a legal admission that 
there were no children of the marriage. The divorce judgment asserted that no 
children resulted from the marriage and, therefore, that Charles was not the father 
of any children. 
After the child was born, a birth certificate was prepared 
identifying plaintiff as the father. An affidavit of parentage was signed by the 
7 The majority argues that I am incorrect to suggest that its decision leaves 
this child without a father, and instead asserts that Charles is the child’s legal 
father. Ante at 10. However, it is the majority that is, tragically, incorrect.  The 
plain language of the judgment states that Charles is not the father of any children 
borne by defendant. Because this judgment is res judicata of the issue as between 
Charles and defendant, defendant would have to take additional action (for 
instance, bringing a motion to revise or alter the judgment under MCL 552.17[1]) 
in order for the status quo to be altered and Charles to be declared the child’s 
father. Charles doubtlessly would be shocked to learn that the majority believes 
he is the father. He is not, either biologically or legally.    
Moreover, as I have pointed out elsewhere, there is no chance that this 
status quo will ever be altered because: (a) defendant almost certainly will never 
bring a motion to revise or alter, knowing that it would be successfully challenged 
by Charles and that this would allow plaintiff to relitigate his paternity, something 
that defendant is plainly not prepared to allow; and (b) it is clear to everyone, the 
majority excepted, that the status quo accurately reflects the truth of the situation, 
namely that Charles is not the father of the child.         
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
parties.8  The parties lived together with the child as a family for over four years. 
And defendant has never denied that plaintiff is the father of her child.  Plaintiff 
was a father to a little boy-- a little boy who stands to suffer greatly from the 
majority’s decision today, both financially and emotionally.  Yet the majority 
finds that there is no “clear and convincing” evidence that Charles was not the 
father of defendant’s child. I could not disagree more strongly. 
CONCLUSION 
In adopting defendant’s position that the divorce judgment was insufficient 
to establish that her child was born out of wedlock, the majority renders a default 
judgment in this case meaningless; it condones and encourages gamesmanship by 
a party to a child custody proceeding; and it allows a party to prevail, in significant 
part, because of that party’s own delinquency in failing to participate in an earlier 
judicial proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and hold that plaintiff has standing to pursue a paternity action.  
Stephen J. Markman 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
8 The affidavit provides that the parties “consent that the name of the 
natural father may be included on the certificate of birth for the child” and that 
“the mother states that she was not married when this child was born or conceived; 
or that this child though born or conceived during marriage, is not an issue of that 
marriage as determined by a court of law.” 
15