Title: Star Direct, Inc. v. Eugene Dal Pra
Citation: 2009 WI 76
Docket Number: 2007AP000617
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2009

2009 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP617 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Star Direct, Inc. d/b/a Star Distributing, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Eugene Dal Pra, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
307 Wis. 2d 444, 745 N.W.2d 88 
(Ct. App 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel T. Dillon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs in part/dissents in part, 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioners there were briefs 
by Robert E. Shumaker and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, 
and oral argument by Robert E. Shumaker. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Gregory 
P. Seibold and Murphy Desmond S.C., Madison, and oral argument 
by Gregory P. Seibold. 
 
 
2009 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP617  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV1268) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Star Direct, Inc. d/b/a Star Distributing, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Eugene Dal Pra, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
JUL 14, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed in 
part a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, 
Daniel T. Dillon, Judge.1  Star Direct, Inc. d/b/a Star 
Distributing ("Star Direct") sued a former employee, Eugene Dal 
Pra ("Dal Pra"), for breach of two non-compete clauses.  The 
"business clause" non-compete provision prohibited Dal Pra's 
engagement in a "substantially similar or competitive" business 
                                                 
1 Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, No. 2007AP617, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2007). 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
2 
 
within his prior assigned sales territory.  The "customer 
clause" non-compete provision barred Dal Pra from interfering 
with or endeavoring to entice away current and recent past 
customers for whom he had performed services, with whom he had 
dealt, or about whom he had obtained special knowledge over the 
course of his employment.  The contract also contained a 
"confidentiality clause" that barred Dal Pra from disclosing or 
using 
certain 
information 
such 
as 
confidential 
marketing 
techniques, customer lists, and trade secrets. 
¶2 
Both Dal Pra and Star Direct moved for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court denied Star Direct's motion and 
granted Dal Pra's motion, concluding that all three restrictive 
covenants were unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.  The 
circuit court also concluded that each one of the clauses was 
indivisible from the others. 
¶3 
The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court 
that the business clause was unenforceable.  It also agreed that 
the business clause was indivisible from the customer clause, 
and thus both clauses were unenforceable.  The court of appeals 
did not separately address the reasonableness of the customer 
clause, 
nor 
did 
it 
address 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
confidentiality clause or its divisibility from the other 
clauses.  Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, No. 2007AP617, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2007). 
¶4 
The issues in this case fall into two categories.  The 
first set of issues relates to the enforceability of each of the 
three clauses——the business clause, the customer clause, and the 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
3 
 
confidentiality clause.  The question for each is whether it is 
"reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer."  Wis. 
Stat. § 103.4652 (2007—08).3  The second set of issues relates to 
the divisibility of the clauses.  We must determine whether the 
otherwise reasonable and enforceable clause or clauses are 
divisible from the unenforceable clause or clauses and therefore 
independently enforceable. 
¶5 
We conclude that the customer and confidentiality 
clauses are reasonably necessary to protect Star Direct and 
therefore enforceable.  The business clause, however, is 
overbroad and unenforceable.  We also hold that the customer and 
confidentiality clauses are divisible from the business clause 
and enforceable on their own terms.  We thus affirm in part and 
reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals, and remand 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 states as follows: 
Restrictive covenants in employment contracts.  A 
covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to 
compete with his or her employer or principal during 
the term of the employment or agency, or after the 
termination of that employment or agency, within a 
specified territory and during a specified time is 
lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the employer or principal.  Any covenant, described in 
this subsection, imposing an unreasonable restraint is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of 
the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint.  
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
4 
 
this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Star Direct engages in the business of distributing 
assorted novelties and sundries4 to convenience stores, service 
stations, truck stops, and travel centers throughout the 
Midwest.  This business is competitive, and its business model 
is premised on the relationship between route salespeople and 
their 
customers. 
 
The 
route 
salespeople 
regularly 
visit 
customers and potential customers, work to understand their 
customer's business, and endeavor to build long-term personal 
and professional relationships with them. 
¶7 
Dal Pra was a route salesperson employed by CB 
Distributors until his route was purchased, along with one other 
route, by Star Direct.  Star Direct wished to retain the 
business on these routes, so it offered Dal Pra what he admitted 
was a "very good package."  This employment offer included 
servicing a nearly identical route——the area within a 50-mile 
radius of Rockford, Illinois——as well as a $30,000 bonus upon 
the completion of 30 months of service.  Dal Pra accepted the 
offer. 
¶8 
One 
condition 
of 
Dal 
Pra's 
employment 
was 
the 
inclusion of three restrictive covenants in his employment 
contract prohibiting Dal Pra from certain post-termination 
                                                 
4 For example, cigarette lighters, gloves, sunglasses, 
aspirin, ice scrapers, combs, batteries, vitamins, cigarette 
papers, condoms, cameras, toys, and figurines. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
5 
 
activities.  Two of the restrictive covenants are contained in 
separate paragraphs of Section II.D. of the employment contract, 
entitled "Non-Compete."  A third restrictive covenant is 
contained in the immediately succeeding Section II.E., labeled 
"Confidentiality." 
¶9 
The first paragraph of Section II.D. contains what has 
been called the "customer clause."  It begins by restricting Dal 
Pra from becoming "engaged in the business of the Employer, that 
being the distribution of consumer products to service stations 
and/or convenience stores" while employed with Star Direct.  The 
paragraph then continues with the following post-termination 
stricture: 
[F]or twenty-four (24) months, after termination of 
Employee's employment with Employer, Employee shall 
not interfere with, or endeavor to entice away from 
Employer any person, firm, corporation, partnership or 
entity of any kind whatsoever which is a customer of 
Employer or CB Distributors, or which was a customer 
of Employer or CB Distributors within a period of time 
of one year prior to the termination of Employee's 
employment with Employer, for which Employee performed 
services or otherwise dealt with on behalf of Employer 
or CB Distributors or relative to which Employee 
obtained special knowledge as a result of his position 
with Employer; and Employee shall not approach any 
such customer or past customer for any such purpose or 
knowingly cooperate with the taking of any such action 
by any other person, firm, corporation, or entity of 
any kind. 
¶10 The next paragraph in Section II.D. contains what has 
been called the "business clause": 
[F]or a period of twenty-four (24) months after 
termination of Employee's employment with Employer, 
Employee 
shall 
not, 
directly 
or 
indirectly . . . become engaged in any business which 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
6 
 
is substantially similar to or in competition with the 
business of the Employer, within a fifty (50) mile 
radius of Rockford, Illinois. 
¶11 Section II.E. contains the "confidentiality clause," 
providing as follows: 
Independent 
of 
any 
obligation 
under 
any 
other 
Paragraph of this Contract, Employee shall not, at any 
time during the term of his employment with Employer 
and for a period of twenty-four (24) months following 
the termination of his employment with Employer, 
regardless 
of 
who 
initiated 
the 
termination, 
communicate, divulge or disclose for use by himself or 
any other person, firm, corporation, partnership, 
joint venture, association or other entity whatsoever, 
any information or knowledge, known, disclosed or 
otherwise obtained by him during his employment by 
Employer or CB Distributors, including but not limited 
to information and knowledge conceived, discovered or 
developed by Employee or CB Distributors and including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
any 
of 
Employer's 
or 
CB 
Distributors proprietary products or procedures, any 
of Employer's or CB Distributors trade secrets, any of 
Employer's or CB Distributors customer lists, or any 
of Employer's or CB Distributors marketing techniques 
which 
are 
not 
generally 
known 
in 
the 
business 
community, and which relate to the business of the 
Employer or CB Distributors or are in the nature of 
trade 
or 
business 
secrets 
of 
Employer 
or 
CB 
Distributors. Employee shall not at any time, during 
the period of his employment with Employer or at any 
time thereafter, copy, reproduce, retain, communicate, 
divulge or disclose to any other party the contents of 
the mailing list(s) of any of Employer's or CB 
Distributors 
customers . . . . 
Employee 
will 
have 
special pricing information and information regarding 
how Employer prices various products. This information 
is 
specifically 
held 
by 
both 
parties 
to 
be 
confidential.  In no event shall Employee reveal this 
information to any other employer or other entity.  
¶12 Dal Pra worked for Star Direct for roughly four years, 
receiving the $30,000 bonus after 30 months of service.  Dal Pra 
voluntarily quit his employment with Star Direct on August 11, 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
7 
 
2006, and immediately began his own distribution company.  It is 
undisputed, at least for purposes of our review on summary 
judgment, that Dal Pra's new company sold various products to 
convenience stores, gas stations, and truck stops within 50 
miles of Rockford, Illinois, and that some of the convenience 
stores Dal Pra sold to were past and/or current customers of 
Star Direct.  We also take as true Star Direct's claims that it 
lost customers as a result of Dal Pra's competing business. 
¶13 Star Direct sued Dal Pra on September 5, 2006, for 
breach of the business and customer clauses, seeking both 
damages and injunctive relief to prevent Dal Pra's continued 
alleged breach. 
¶14 On cross motions for summary judgment, the circuit 
court concluded that the business, customer, and confidentiality 
clauses were all unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.5  The 
circuit court also concluded that each of the three clauses was 
indivisible from and "inextricably entwined" with the other two 
under Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 348 
N.W.2d 505 (1984). 
¶15 The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court 
that the business clause was unreasonable because it barred Dal 
Pra from engaging in a "substantially similar" business whose 
products are not competitive with Star Direct.  Star Direct, 
                                                 
5 It is not entirely clear from the record why the circuit 
court made a determination on the confidentiality clause when 
Star Direct's complaint only alleged a violation of the business 
and customer clauses. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
8 
 
Inc., No. 2007AP617, unpublished slip op., ¶17.  The court of 
appeals also examined the divisibility question.  Applying 
Streiff as interpreted by Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brass, 
2001 WI App 92, 242 Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 648, the court of 
appeals concluded that the business clause was indivisible from 
the customer clause, and thus neither was enforceable.  Id., 
¶29.  The court of appeals did not evaluate the reasonableness 
of the customer clause on its own, nor did it address the 
reasonableness of the confidentiality clause or its divisibility 
from the business and customer clauses.  Id., ¶18 n.5, ¶28.  
¶16 Judge Vergeront, who authored the majority opinion for 
the court of appeals, also wrote a separate concurrence in which 
she characterized Brass's interpretation of Streiff as an 
"overly broad construction" that "will result in treating as one 
indivisible 
covenant 
practically 
all 
clauses 
restraining 
competition in an employment agreement."  Id., ¶¶32-33.  Judge 
Vergeront indicated that in her reading, Streiff did not 
articulate 
a 
broadly 
applicable 
standard 
or 
test 
for 
indivisibility.  Id., ¶32.  The particular provisions at issue 
in Streiff, she explained, were indivisible because they were 
expressly linked by the language in the other provisions such 
that compliance with one provision was required for receipt of 
benefits under another.  Id., ¶¶31-32.  She noted, however, that 
the court of appeals must follow its own published precedent 
according to Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 
246 (1997), even if it disagrees with it.  Id., ¶30. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
9 
 
¶17 Star Direct petitioned this court for review, and both 
parties have presented arguments in their briefs regarding the 
enforceability and divisibility of each of the business, 
customer, and confidentiality clauses. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 This case was determined on cross summary judgment 
motions on undisputed facts.  Therefore, we review the issues of 
law decided by the circuit court de novo.  See LaCount v. Gen. 
Cas. Co. of Wis., 2006 WI 14, ¶20, 288 Wis. 2d 358, 709 
N.W.2d 418.  Restrictive covenants not to compete are contracts, 
the interpretation of which is a matter of law also reviewed de 
novo.  NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 185 Wis. 2d 827, 836, 520 N.W.2d 
93 (Ct. App. 1994).  This case further requires us to interpret 
and apply Wis. Stat. § 103.465, which governs the enforceability 
and divisibility of restrictive covenants.  We interpret 
statutes independently, but benefit from the analysis of the 
previous courts.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶8, 291 
Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶19 Restrictive covenants in Wisconsin are prima facie 
suspect as restraints of trade that are disfavored at law, and 
must withstand close scrutiny as to their reasonableness.  
Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 611.  They are not to be construed to 
extend beyond their proper import or farther than the contract 
language absolutely requires.  Id.  Rather, they are to be 
construed in favor of the employee.  Id. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
10 
 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 governs the enforceability 
of restrictive covenants.  It contains two main principles.  
First, pre- and post-termination non-compete agreements are 
"lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are 
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer."  We 
have interpreted this as establishing five prerequisites that a 
restrictive covenant must meet in order to be enforceable under 
Wisconsin law.  A restrictive covenant must: (1) be necessary 
for the protection of the employer, that is, the employer must 
have a protectable interest justifying the restriction imposed 
on the activity of the employee; (2) provide a reasonable time 
limit; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) not be 
harsh or oppressive as to the employee; and (5) not be contrary 
to public policy.  Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 
162-67, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959).  The employer has the burden of 
proof as to the reasonableness of the non-compete.  NBZ, Inc., 
185 Wis. 2d at 840. 
¶21 The second principle in Wis. Stat. § 103.465 is that 
"[a]ny covenant . . . imposing an unreasonable restraint is 
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the 
covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint." 
¶22 We 
begin 
our 
discussion 
by 
examining 
the 
enforceability of each of the clauses, ultimately concluding 
that the business clause is unreasonable and unenforceable, but 
that the customer and confidentiality clauses are reasonable and 
enforceable.  Then, we discuss the divisibility of the clauses, 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
11 
 
concluding that each of the clauses is divisible from the 
others. 
A. 
The Enforceability of the Restrictive Covenants 
1. 
The Customer Clause 
 
¶23 The customer clause prohibits Dal Pra, for 24 months 
following termination, from interfering with or endeavoring to 
entice away a person or entity "which is a customer" or "which 
was a customer . . . within a period of time of one year prior 
to . . . termination."  The clause further specifies that 
prohibited customers are those "for which Employee performed 
services 
or 
otherwise 
dealt 
with" 
or 
"obtained 
special 
knowledge" about in the course of employment.  The provision 
also prohibits Dal Pra from approaching "any such customer or 
past customer" for prohibited purposes or cooperating with 
others toward that end.  
¶24 This provision, then, expressly prohibits interfering 
with or attempting to entice away: (1) current customers of Star 
Direct that Dal Pra serviced, dealt with, or obtained special 
knowledge about during his employment, and (2) those who were 
customers during the year prior to Dal Pra's termination ("past 
customers") whom Dal Pra serviced, dealt with, or obtained 
special knowledge about during his employment. 
¶25 The circuit court concluded that the customer clause 
is unenforceable because Star Direct has no legitimate interest 
in restricting interference with past customers——interpreted as 
those who no longer do business with Star Direct.  The court of 
appeals did not address the enforceability of the customer 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
12 
 
clause because it concluded that it was indivisible from the 
unenforceable 
business 
clause. 
 
Star 
Direct, 
Inc., 
No. 
2007AP617, unpublished slip op., ¶¶28-29. 
¶26 Dal Pra finds the customer clause objectionable for 
three reasons.  First, he argues that Star Direct has no 
legitimate protectable interest in prohibiting solicitation of 
past customers.  Second, Dal Pra maintains that the provision 
unreasonably prohibits contact with customers——both current and 
past——whom Dal Pra may not have been in contact with for years.  
Third, he alleges that Star Direct's failure to systematically 
obtain restrictive covenants shows that they are not necessary 
for its protection.  These objections are addressed to the first 
of the Lakeside Oil criteria, that is, whether the restrictions 
are necessary for Star Direct's protection.  Lakeside Oil, 8 
Wis. 2d at 163.  The parties do not seriously dispute the 
clause's sufficiency under the remaining Lakeside Oil criteria. 
¶27 To address these questions, we first look at Star 
Direct's protectable interests as a general matter and how they 
interact with the facts of this case.  Second, we address Dal 
Pra's assertion that Star Direct has no interest in its past 
customers.  Third, we address Dal Pra's contention that Star 
Direct has no interest in prohibiting competition with customers 
whom Dal Pra may not have serviced or interacted with for years.  
Finally, we discuss Dal Pra's contention that Star Direct did 
not systematically obtain non-compete agreements from its route 
salespeople, demonstrating the lack of a protectable interest.  
No. 
2007AP617   
 
13 
 
We ultimately conclude that the customer clause is reasonable 
and enforceable. 
a. Star Direct's Protectable Interests Generally 
¶28 Dal Pra was a route salesperson in a very competitive 
business.  Route salespeople generally pose an elevated threat 
to 
the 
employer's 
business 
due 
to 
the 
special 
personal 
relationships, rapport, and goodwill they develop with the 
employer's customers while in the employer's service.  See id. 
at 163-64; Chuck Wagon Catering v. Raduege, 88 Wis. 2d 740, 752-
54, 277 N.W.2d 787 (1979); see also Gary Van Zeeland Talent, 
Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202, 214-16, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978) 
(describing 
the 
special 
need 
for 
protection 
from 
route 
salespeople, but concluding that the former employee was akin to 
a non-route salesperson).  In the "typical and classical case of 
a route customer" and salesperson, "it is assumed that . . . a 
special personal relationship will develop which will continue 
even though the salesman should commence his own enterprise or 
switch employers."  Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d at 
215. 
¶29 This was true with Dal Pra.  Star Direct invested in 
Dal Pra, giving him a platform from which to foster, nurture, 
and cultivate his customer contacts and relationships.  Star 
Direct used marketing dollars to promote Dal Pra and sent him to 
industry events that further enhanced his ability to develop 
customer relationships.  The record is clear that this was and 
is a fiercely competitive, relationship-based business.  The 
customers he dealt with, then, were not simply buying product 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
14 
 
based on price or other objective factors.  As Bradley Son, Star 
Direct's President, made clear in his affidavit, personal and 
professional rapport between salespeople and customers is 
essential to a successful and profitable business.  See Lakeside 
Oil, 8 Wis. 2d at 159-60 (upholding the reasonableness and 
enforceability of a restrictive covenant against a former route 
salesperson where "[c]ustomers were obtained primarily upon the 
basis of the defendant's personal salesmanship and the faith and 
trust the defendant could engender in the customer"). 
¶30 In addition to the relationship-based nature of the 
business, Dal Pra's employment positioned him to obtain certain 
knowledge6 regarding the specific needs and wants of his 
customers, the pricing of Star Direct's products, Star Direct's 
costs, and the profit margins Star Direct earned on certain 
products.  Dal Pra, in our opinion, fits the classic description 
of the route salesperson, whose base of information and 
relationships could constitute a threat to Star Direct. 
 
b. Star Direct's Interests in Prohibiting Competition  
   with its Past Customers 
¶31 The customer clause prohibited Dal Pra from contacting 
"past customers," defined as those who purchased from Star 
                                                 
6 The customer clause limits the customer restrictions to 
past or current customers whom Dal Pra serviced, dealt with, or 
obtained special knowledge about as a result of his employment 
with Star Direct.  Dal Pra does not contend that the phrase 
"special knowledge" renders the customer clause void for 
vagueness.  His concerns, as noted above, are directed to the 
question of whether Star Direct has a protectable interest in 
such customers. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
15 
 
Direct within one year prior to his termination.  Dal Pra 
asserts that Star Direct does not have a legitimate protectable 
interest in these past customers.  The circuit court agreed, and 
so does the dissent. 
¶32 No Wisconsin case has explicitly addressed or affirmed 
an employer's interest in customers who have recently chosen to 
cease doing business with the employer.  However, Wisconsin 
courts, including this court, have reviewed provisions that 
clearly apply to past customers, and have been untroubled by 
this asserted interest. 
¶33 In Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wis., Inc. v. Hamilton, 
101 Wis. 2d 460, 304 N.W.2d 752 (1981) (hereafter "Hamilton"), 
this court considered a restrictive covenant that prohibited the 
two defendant employees from soliciting, contacting, or doing 
"any competitive business with" anyone who had been a customer 
of the company during the two years preceding termination or the 
period of their employment, whichever was shorter.  Id. at 462-
63.  Because the employees worked for more than two years, the 
two-year timeframe was applicable.  Id.  During those two years 
preceding termination, the employer had over 6,000 customers, 
only 175 of which had contact with the defendant employees.  Id. 
at 463.  Though the court did not discuss it, such a customer 
pool certainly could have included customers who had chosen to 
take their business elsewhere.  Thus, this provision prevented 
the employees from contacting both current and past customers 
with whom they may or may not have had contact.  It bears 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
16 
 
reminding that the two-year timeframe here is one year longer 
than the provision in the case at bar.   
¶34 The litigants and the courts were primarily concerned 
that this prohibited contact with customers the employees may 
not have serviced at all.  Id. at 463-64.  On review, we 
determined that the employer may have a legitimate protectable 
interest where the employees had access to important customer 
information, even if they did not personally have contact with 
those customers.  Id. at 468-69.  Though not ultimately 
determining whether the provision was valid, we reversed the 
court of appeals and circuit court who had previously found the 
provision invalid.  Id. at 471-72.   
¶35 A similar restrictive covenant was at issue in Farm 
Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, 243 
Wis. 2d 305, 627 N.W.2d 444.  In that case, for one year 
following termination, an employee who provided accounting, 
bookkeeping, and tax preparation assistance was prohibited from 
engaging in the same business activities with persons the 
employee consulted or serviced "at any time during the one year 
immediately prior to the date of separation."  Id., ¶4.  Again, 
though not discussing this point, the total world of possible 
customers that the employee could not contact included customers 
who may have chosen to no longer do business with the employer.  
We concluded that such a restriction was not invalid per se, and 
remanded to the circuit court for further fact-finding.  Id., 
¶16. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
17 
 
¶36 In a similar court of appeals case, the court 
determined that a restrictive covenant prohibiting, among other 
things, interference with a client who was a customer during the 
past two years, was reasonable as a matter of law.  Techworks, 
LLC v. Wille, 2009 WI App ___, ¶6, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.  Though again not discussed in the court's analysis, 
this provision includes customers who may have chosen to take 
their business elsewhere during the previous two years, and the 
court determined this provision was enforceable. 
¶37 As this brief review of the case law shows, Wisconsin 
courts and litigants have been untroubled by an employer's 
asserted interest in its recent past customers.  While these 
cases do not settle the matter, the customer clause is 
distinguishable from these other cases only in that it expressly 
divided the customers into two identifiable groups——current and 
past customers.  This brings the issue to the fore, and the 
question is does Star Direct have that interest vis-à-vis Dal 
Pra?7 
                                                 
7 The dissent argues that our review of the case law 
"assumes that silence on an issue signals the court's approval."  
Dissent, ¶106.  The dissent's arguments against such an 
interpretive approach are strong, but are simply inapplicable 
here.  The dissent has misread our discussion of these cases. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
18 
 
¶38 Star Direct does have an interest in prohibiting the 
solicitation of its recent past customers.  First, Dal Pra 
obtained significant knowledge regarding Star Direct's business 
that could be used against Star Direct.  If not prohibited, Dal 
Pra would be able to approach these customers with knowledge of 
Star 
Direct's 
prices 
and 
pricing 
strategies, 
proprietary 
marketing techniques, and profit margins.  He would have all the 
information a competitor would want and need to know to 
effectively undercut Star Direct. 
¶39 Second, through his employment and because of Star 
Direct's investment in him, Dal Pra would, as the customer 
clause so states, have serviced, dealt with, or have special 
knowledge about these customers.  He would know their specific 
needs and product desires, and would have a relationship history 
with many of them.  This would place him in a far better 
                                                                                                                                                             
The point of our review of the case law is far more limited 
than the dissent claims.  We explicitly state that these cases 
do not settle the matter.  The cases in fact do show both that 
courts and litigants have not flagged the implicit asserted 
interest in past customers, and that this sort of provision is 
not really all that unique.  Moreover, our conclusion that Star 
Direct does have an interest in past customers is explained 
infra ¶¶38-41.  In none of these paragraphs do we cite the cases 
just discussed for authority. 
Finally, the dissent suggests that our analysis of case law 
in Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI 75, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ 
is inconsistent with the analysis today.  That assertion is 
mistaken because, in today's majority opinion as in Horst, the 
court concluded that while the language in prior cases was 
suggestive, no case directly answered the question before the 
court.  The analysis performed in each majority opinion is the 
same. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
19 
 
position than an ordinary competitor, and give him a distinct 
advantage. 
¶40 Finally, Star Direct does have a general interest in 
winning back the business of its recent past customers.  The 
record shows this is a relationship-based and highly competitive 
business.  It takes significant effort and investment to win 
customers.  These past customers may have chosen to take their 
business elsewhere only temporarily, and would still have a 
history with Star Direct.  While an employer's prospects of 
rekindling customer relationships fades considerably over 15 
years (as in Equity Enters., Inc. v. Milosch, 2001 WI App 186, 
247 Wis. 2d 172, 633 N.W.2d 662), we believe under the facts of 
this case that an employer is entitled to an opportunity to 
recoup the considerable investment of resources it made in 
developing and fostering customer relationships and business 
opportunities that were active as recently as one year prior to 
the employee's termination. 
¶41 For the reasons articulated above, Dal Pra would not 
simply be engaging in ordinary competition with Star Direct if 
permitted to interfere with recent past customers.  He would 
have a distinct competitive advantage, and this advantage would 
be detrimental to Star Direct's business.  We render no opinion 
as to how much time must pass between a customer placing an 
order and a route salesperson's termination before the employer 
no longer has a legitimate protectable interest in that 
customer.  Our holding today under the facts of this case is 
that the interim of one year is not too long. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
20 
 
 
c. Star Direct's Interests in Prohibiting Competition  
   with Customers Dal Pra has not Recently Contacted. 
¶42 The second argument Dal Pra makes is that the non-
compete clause prohibits interference with customers whom Dal 
Pra may not have been in contact with for years.8  For example, 
the customer clause would prohibit him from soliciting a current 
or past customer whom Dal Pra might have serviced when he began 
with CB Distributors many years ago, but has had no contact with 
since.  Dal Pra argues that this provision is unreasonable. 
¶43 Dal Pra maintains that the court of appeals decision 
in Milosch mirrors this situation and is dispositive.  In 
Milosch, the employer attempted to prohibit the employee for 18 
months following termination from doing business with any 
customers of the employer with whom the employee had dealt 
during 
any 
portion 
of 
his 
15-year 
employment, 
including 
customers who may have long ago transferred their business to 
competitors.  Id., ¶15 n.4.  The court determined that a 
customer serviced 15 years earlier constituted too long a 
timeframe for the employer to have any protectable interest.  
Id. ("This restriction is unreasonable because it would prohibit 
Milosch from doing business with a customer he serviced during 
his 
first 
weeks 
of 
employment 
in 
1982 
who 
subsequently 
transferred his or her business to a competitor of Equable.") 
                                                 
8 In fact, the customer clause prohibits interference with 
current or past customers that Dal Pra might never have had 
contact with or serviced.  Such customers, however, are only on 
the prohibited customer list if Dal Pra has "special knowledge" 
about them, as described below. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
21 
 
¶44 The difference between Milosch and this case is that 
the customers in Milosch did not need to be recent or current 
customers at all; this makes all the difference.  The court of 
appeals in Milosch specifically cited the customer whom Milosch 
could have serviced during the first weeks of his employment 15 
years earlier who then took his or her business elsewhere.  Id. 
¶45 Contrary 
to 
Dal 
Pra's 
assertions, 
his 
special 
knowledge of customer needs, pricing, and profit margins means 
that there was real danger in him seeking Star Direct's current 
and past customers.  The fact that he would not necessarily have 
had recent contact with those customers does not mean Star 
Direct has no legitimate interest.  Even if Dal Pra was not the 
recent servicer of a customer, he would still have some 
relationship with that customer, important knowledge about that 
customer, or maybe most significantly, special knowledge about 
Star Direct's business and methods. 
¶46 Dal Pra's employment contract provided unambiguous 
notice of the confidential "special knowledge" Dal Pra gained 
through his employment with Star Direct.  This confidential 
information 
included 
customer 
lists, 
account 
projections, 
customer strategy information, marketing information, expense 
policy 
manuals, 
billing 
reports, 
pricing 
information 
and 
strategies, management methods and systems, contracts with 
customers, correspondence with customers, customer bids and 
proposals, and any other confidential, unique, or secret 
information.   
No. 
2007AP617   
 
22 
 
¶47 Furthermore, as we stated in Hamilton, it is "beyond 
dispute" that a former employee's possession of this type of 
"confidential business information" "may be a proper subject of 
protection by restrictive covenant," even if the information is 
related to customers with whom the former employee had not had 
any contact during his employment.  Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d at 
469.  This reasoning applies equally to customers Dal Pra may 
have serviced earlier in his employment. 
¶48 In short, Dal Pra learned information either about the 
customers and/or about Star Direct's business that would give 
him a unique advantage against Star Direct if he was allowed to 
pursue current and recent past customers, even those with whom 
he had not recently dealt.  We conclude this is reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the employer. 
 
d. Star Direct's Alleged Inconsistency in Obtaining  
        Restrictive Covenants from its Route Salespeople 
¶49 Dal Pra argues that the restrictions in the customer 
clause are unreasonable and unnecessary for Star Direct's 
protection as evidenced by Star Direct's alleged inconsistency 
in obtaining restrictive covenants from its route salespeople. 
¶50 The record is clear that Star Direct substantially 
adjusted its business practices in 2002 when the new owner took 
over the company and began requiring all new route salespeople 
to sign restrictive covenants.  The only route salespeople who 
do not have covenants not to compete are the five individuals 
who were employed before the current owner bought the company in 
2002.  As the owner stated, there was the obvious risk that the 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
23 
 
current employees would not sign them if asked to, or would 
leave and begin competing with Star Direct.  In fact, employers 
may not compel their existing employees to sign restrictive 
covenants without additional consideration.  NBZ, Inc., 185 Wis. 
2d at 837-39.  It is also clear that Star Direct assigned great 
value to the prospect of preventing competition from Dal Pra in 
particular as evidenced by its offer of a $30,000 bonus upon his 
completion of 30 months of employment.  The fact that Star 
Direct has been consistent with all new route salespeople since 
2002, when it also purchased the routes from CB Distributors, 
demonstrates sufficient consistency in obtaining non-compete 
agreements and shows that Star Direct did consider the risks 
posed by Dal Pra leaving and competing to be very real. 
¶51 In short, we are untroubled by the fact that not every 
salesperson had a non-compete agreement.  Star Direct has been 
consistent since 2002 for all new employees, and offered Dal Pra 
a $30,000 bonus for his retention, demonstrating the competitive 
risk that it legitimately fears from post-termination route 
salespeople like Dal Pra. 
e. Customer Clause Conclusion 
¶52 We decline to permit Dal Pra to usurp for his own 
benefit the customers, relationships, and opportunities that 
Star Direct paid for and invested in.  The customer clause is 
necessary for Star Direct's protection because without it there 
is nothing preventing Dal Pra from taking advantage of all of 
Star Direct's investment in its route and customers for his own 
benefit and to Star Direct's detriment.  The customer clause's 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
24 
 
time restrictions, geographic restrictions, impact on Dal Pra, 
and impact on public policy are not seriously contested by the 
parties.  We conclude, then, that the customer clause is 
reasonable and enforceable on its own merits. 
2. 
The Business Clause 
¶53 The business clause bars Dal Pra, for 24 months 
following his termination, from engaging "in any business which 
is substantially similar to or in competition with the business 
of [Star Direct], within a fifty (50) mile radius of Rockford, 
Illinois."  The circuit court and court of appeals both held 
that the business clause was unenforceable. 
¶54 The focal point of the dispute regarding the business 
clause is the "substantially similar" language.  Star Direct 
argues that a "substantially similar" business is one that is, 
by definition, competitive.  It even stated in oral argument 
that the phrase is possibly the result of an overzealous lawyer 
and should have been left out.  Dal Pra responds that this 
approach turns the phrase "substantially similar" into pure 
surplusage. 
¶55 We agree with Dal Pra and find Star Direct's argument 
unavailing.  The disjunctive "or" plainly separates one from the 
other.  A substantially similar business cannot refer to the 
same thing as a business "in competition with" Star Direct; nor 
would it be reasonable to read "substantially similar" as merely 
a subset of competitive activity as Star Direct urges.  The only 
reasonable way to read the contract language giving meaning to 
every phrase is that it attempts to bar Dal Pra not only from 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
25 
 
competitive enterprises, but also from engaging in a business 
that is substantially similar to Star Direct's business yet not 
competitive. 
¶56 An enforceable restrictive covenant must be reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the employer.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465.  We do not believe it is reasonably necessary for the 
protection 
of 
Star 
Direct 
to 
prevent 
non-competitive 
or 
otherwise 
non-deleterious business activity by its former 
employees.9  See Geocaris v. Surgical Consultants, Ltd., 100 
Wis. 2d 387, 389, 302 N.W.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that 
a surgical practice's attempt to prohibit a surgeon from 
practicing any other type of medicine, including non-competitive 
non-surgical medicine, was unreasonable).  While having Dal Pra 
engage in a non-competitive substantially similar business might 
plausibly have some de minimus or insubstantial affects on Star 
Direct, the interests do not rise to the level of being 
reasonably necessary for its protection.  A former employee 
engaged in a similar but non-competitive enterprise poses little 
if any additional danger to his former employer's business 
interests than any other member of the public engaged in 
substantially similar but non-competitive activities.  Lakeside 
Oil, 8 Wis. 2d at 163 ("An employer is not entitled to be 
protected against legitimate and ordinary competition of the 
type that a stranger could give."). 
                                                 
9 It would be somewhat odd to hold that Star Direct has a 
business interest in prohibiting non-competitive activities via 
an agreement purporting to limit competition (i.e. a non-
compete).   
No. 
2007AP617   
 
26 
 
¶57 The parties spend considerable time in their briefs 
debating what exactly a substantially similar business might or 
might 
not 
include. 
 
Star 
Direct 
argues 
for 
a 
narrow 
interpretation that essentially includes competitive business 
activities.  Dal Pra points to the statement in the contract 
defining the business of Star Direct as "the distribution of 
consumer 
products 
to 
service 
stations 
and/or 
convenience 
stores."  The precise nature of a substantially similar 
business——what products Dal Pra could plausibly sell and not 
sell——is 
unnecessary 
to 
our 
determination, 
however. 
 
As 
discussed above, it is clear that a substantially similar 
business must refer to a non-competitive business, and such a 
prohibition is not necessary for Star Direct's protection. 
¶58 In sum, we conclude that the business clause's 
restriction on engaging in a "substantially similar" business is 
overbroad and is not reasonably necessary for the protection of 
Star Direct.  Because the clause does not protect a legitimate 
business interest, we need not measure the business clause 
against the remaining four Lakeside Oil criteria for determining 
the enforceability of restrictive covenants.  The lack of any 
protectable interest means the business clause is unreasonable 
and unenforceable. 
3. 
The Confidentiality Clause 
¶59 The confidentiality clause of the employment contract 
consists of a single, convoluted paragraph beginning with an 18-
line sentence containing 20 sub-clauses separated by 19 commas.  
Put gently, it is not a model of clarity.  The confidentiality 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
27 
 
clause bars Dal Pra, for 24 months following his termination, 
from using or disclosing "any information or knowledge, known, 
disclosed or otherwise obtained by him during his employment by 
Employer or CB Distributors."  It then lists a variety of 
specific information that is to be deemed confidential and 
protected, including but not limited to knowledge "conceived, 
discovered or developed by Employee or CB Distributors," 
"proprietary products or procedures," trade secrets, customer 
lists, "marketing techniques which are not generally known in 
the business community, and which relate to the business of the 
Employer or CB Distributors or are in the nature of trade or 
business 
secrets," 
mailing 
lists, 
and 
special 
pricing 
information. 
¶60 Though Star Direct did not bring a claim under the 
confidentiality clause, the circuit court concluded that it was 
overbroad and unenforceable because it barred Dal Pra from using 
or disclosing any information.10  The court of appeals did not 
address this issue. 
                                                 
10 At the summary judgment hearing, the circuit court 
concluded that the confidentiality clause bars Dal Pra from 
disclosing or using "any information obtained during his 
employment," explaining: 
[The confidentiality clause] prevents him from saying, 
I have a good idea.  I am going to go back to these 
customers.  Their hot dogs are crummy.  I want them to 
start selling them [sic] something that I like to eat.  
Well, he can't do that because he is using information 
or knowledge that only he learned from having eaten 
the hot dogs at these places.  If he has a better 
idea, he can't use it because the restrictive covenant 
is so broad. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
28 
 
¶61 Dal Pra does not assert that the provision is 
unreasonable as to its duration, geographic scope, to himself, 
or to public policy.  Neither do we find anything in the record 
that calls these into question.  Thus, the main question is 
whether the prohibitions of the confidentiality clause are 
reasonably necessary for the protection of Star Direct.  And the 
central dispute is what the clause actually means. 
¶62 One of the running themes in this case is how broadly 
or narrowly to read restrictive covenants.  As discussed 
earlier, it is true that we read restrictive covenants in favor 
of the employee.  Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 611.  But this does 
not mean we make an effort to read a clause unreasonably in 
order to find the clause unreasonable and unenforceable against 
the employee.  Though they are disfavored at law, our task is 
still to rightly and fairly interpret non-compete agreements as 
contracts.  See Wysocki, 243 Wis. 2d 305, ¶11. ("[W]e cannot 
allow the underlying policy of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 and our 
rules of construction to overwhelm the focus of our analysis in 
what are, at their core, contract cases.")  This means we must 
interpret them reasonably so as to avoid absurd results, giving 
the words their plain meaning, reading as a whole, and giving 
effect where possible to every provision.  In re All-Star Ins. 
Corp., 112 Wis. 2d 329, 333, 332 N.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1983); 
DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing Ltd. 
P'ship, 2004 WI 92, ¶44, 273 Wis. 2d 577, 682 N.W.2d 839.  It is 
only within this framework that we interpret restrictive 
covenants in favor of the employee. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
29 
 
¶63 Here, the language of the confidentiality clause 
betrays the circuit court's interpretation.  All of the 
enumerated 
examples 
of 
protected 
information 
in 
the 
confidentiality clause are of a proprietary nature.  This is 
important for at least two reasons.  First, the inclusion of 
examples, 
particularly 
with 
modifiers 
indicating 
the 
confidential nature of the information, shows that the circuit 
court's interpretation is in error.  For example, the modifier 
"proprietary" when discussing products and procedures would be 
rendered mere surplusage if the clause truly means "any 
information."  Similarly, the clause prohibits the divulging of 
marketing techniques "not generally known in the business 
community."  Again, this language would be surplusage under the 
circuit 
court's 
approach. 
 
Additionally, 
we 
think 
the 
confidential nature of the itemized examples indicates the true 
intent of the clause.  The only reasonable construction of the 
clause considered in its totality is that it prohibits Dal Pra's 
use of confidential information of the type identified in the 
examples——information of a confidential and sensitive nature 
that, if made public or used by Dal Pra, would be deleterious to 
Star Direct's business.  All of the itemized examples fit this 
general pattern. 
¶64 Prohibiting Dal Pra from exploiting or disclosing this 
information 
is 
reasonably 
necessary 
for 
Star 
Direct's 
protection.  As already noted, the parties do not seriously 
dispute that the confidentiality clause is reasonable as to 
time, territory, to Dal Pra, and to the public or public policy.  
No. 
2007AP617   
 
30 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the confidentiality clause is 
enforceable so long as it is divisible from the unenforceable 
business clause.  That is where we now turn. 
B. 
The Divisibility of the Restrictive Covenants 
1. 
The Divisibility of Restrictive Covenants Generally 
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 provides that if "[a]ny 
covenant . . . imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, 
void and unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or 
performance that would be a reasonable restraint."  This statute 
was passed in 1957 in response to our decisions in Fullerton 
Lumber Co. v. Torberg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955), and 
its companion case Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torberg, 274 Wis. 
478, 
80 
N.W.2d 461 
(1957), 
authorizing 
courts 
to 
modify 
unreasonable covenants to make them reasonable and enforceable.  
See Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 607-09 (discussing common law blue-
penciling, which the court then departed with in the Torberg 
cases, prompting the legislature to pass Wis. Stat. § 103.465). 
¶66 In Streiff, we addressed the divisibility of clauses 
under this statute.  The restrictive covenant there provided 
that a terminated insurance agent employee could receive payment 
for extended earnings only if he refrained from certain 
competitive practices.  Id. at 603, 606-07.  After termination, 
the employer refused to pay extended earnings to the former 
agent, alleging that he had violated two of the restrictive 
provisions——one prohibiting the sale of insurance for any other 
insurer in any state in which the employer was a licensed 
insurer, and the other prohibiting the solicitation of the 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
31 
 
employer's insureds.  The employer eventually conceded that the 
first provision was unreasonably broad in its territorial scope 
and therefore unenforceable.  Id. at 605, 607.  The employer 
urged, 
however, 
that 
the 
provision 
prohibiting 
customer 
solicitation was divisible from the overbroad provision, and 
thus 
the 
covenant 
as 
a 
whole 
should 
not 
be 
declared 
unenforceable under Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  Id. at 609.  We then 
undertook to determine whether the contract's provisions were 
divisible into separate covenants. 
¶67 The provisions of the restrictive covenant in Streiff 
were textually linked via a cross-referential third provision 
such that it was impossible to read, evaluate, or apply one 
without referring to the others.  For instance, one provision 
stated that former employees would be paid extended earnings 
only if they complied with all other provisions in the contract.  
Id. at 606.  A second provision was overbroad in providing for a 
forfeiture of extended earnings if a former employee engaged in 
certain insurance related activities in any state in which the 
employer was licensed.  Id. at 606-07.  A third provision 
prohibited certain activities related to the solicitation and 
servicing of the former employer's insureds, but did not 
expressly refer to the first provision's forfeiture of extended 
earnings upon non-compliance.  Id. at 605-06. 
¶68 Thus, to know what activities were prohibited under 
the first provision in Streiff, an employee would need to refer 
to all of the provisions of the contract, including the second 
provision (which restated the penalty for non-compliance), and 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
32 
 
the third provision (which did not).  However, to understand the 
ramifications of not complying with the third provision, an 
employee would need to refer back to the first provision which 
mandated compliance with the contract in its entirety.  The 
second and third provisions in Streiff, then, were textually 
linked by the first provision and were thereby indivisibly 
intertwined. 
¶69 We therefore concluded that the provisions in Streiff, 
which cross-referenced each other and made entitlement to 
extended earnings under one provision dependent upon compliance 
with other provisions, were "intertwined and the covenant must 
be viewed in its entirety, not as divisible parts."  Id. at 613. 
¶70 In Brass, the court of appeals purported to apply 
Streiff to restrictive covenants in a factual scenario also 
involving a former insurance agent employee.  The court of 
appeals construed Streiff as providing that provisions are 
intertwined and indivisible when "they govern several similar 
types of activities and establish several time and geographical 
restraints."  Brass, 242 Wis. 2d 733, ¶11. 
¶71 The court of appeals in the present case applied 
Brass's construction of Streiff to find that the customer clause 
governed activity similar to and therefore indivisible from the 
unenforceable 
business 
clause. 
 
Star 
Direct, 
Inc., 
No. 
2007AP617, unpublished slip op., ¶26.  Judge Vergeront, the 
author of the majority opinion, observed in a concurrence, 
however, that "Streiff does not support the conclusion that the 
customer clause and the business clause are indivisible and, 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
33 
 
therefore, one covenant."  Id., ¶30.  She maintained that the 
conclusion in Streiff was based on the textual link between the 
various clauses in that case.  Id., ¶31.  She stated that she 
"would 
not 
read 
Streiff 
as 
establishing 
a 
test 
for 
indivisibility under which clauses are indivisible if they 
'govern several similar types of activities and establish 
several time and geographic restraints.'"  Id. (citing Streiff, 
118 Wis. 2d at 613).  She expressed further concern that Brass 
provides a framework in which practically all restrictive 
covenants in an employment agreement are indivisible, and that 
Streiff does not require such a result.  Id., ¶33. 
¶72 We agree with Judge Vergeront's observations.  We read 
Streiff as being premised primarily on the fact that the 
provisions were intertwined via their textual link.  Nowhere 
does Streiff purport to establish a comprehensive test or set of 
factors to be analyzed for determining whether restrictive 
covenants are indivisible. 
¶73 In fact, the court went out of its way to reserve much 
of the debate for future cases.  In its discussion of the 
history of the adoption of Wis. Stat. § 103.465, it notes that 
Wisconsin used to follow the blue-pencil rule, in which it was 
empowered to strike the overly broad language of a restraint and 
enforce the divisible valid restraints.  Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 
607-08.  Under the blue-pencil rule, however, "where the 
contract furnished no basis for dividing the restriction into 
reasonable and unreasonable portions, the whole covenant was 
void if any part of the restriction was unreasonable."  Id. at 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
34 
 
608.  As the court in Streiff explained, we departed from this 
in the Torberg cases by enforcing an invalid, indivisible 
covenant after changing a 10-year prohibition to a three-year 
prohibition.  Id. 
¶74 The court in Streiff explicitly stated that it was not 
deciding "whether a restraint which is reasonable as to 
activity, duration, and territory is enforceable under sec. 
103.465, when the agreement includes a second restraint which is 
unreasonable as to activity, duration, and territory and is 
unenforceable under sec. 103.465."  Id. at 613.  In other words, 
the court was not purporting to decide whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 overruled the common law distinction between divisible 
and indivisible contracts, or just blue-penciling of divisible 
contracts as was done in Torberg.  See id. at 609 n. 4. 
¶75 The court in Streiff, then, determined that the 
clauses in that case were indivisible, but it did not announce 
any new or comprehensive test for determining when a clause is 
divisible or not divisible under Wis. Stat. § 103.465. 
¶76 Though the question was withheld in Streiff, we now 
make clear that we believe the legislative history and text of 
the statute do not eliminate or modify the common law rules on 
divisibility.  The statute's prescriptions support this as they 
apply to any "covenant," not to the whole employment contract.  
It specifies that if a restraint is unreasonable, the rest of 
that covenant is also unenforceable.  See Wis. Stat. § 103.465. 
¶77 In practice, most restrictive covenant provisions 
cover similar types of activity, or at least have substantial 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
35 
 
overlap.  Often they will be drafted to accord with the 
employer's 
particular 
protectable 
interests. 
 
Thus, 
the 
expansive reading of Streiff offered in Brass does in fact 
render nearly all covenants not to compete unenforceable if one 
provision of one of the covenants is unreasonable.  We do not 
believe Wis. Stat. § 103.465 or Streiff compel this result. 
¶78 The foundational inquiry for determining whether a 
covenant is divisible is whether, if the unreasonable portion is 
stricken, the other provision or provisions may be understood 
and independently enforced.  This inquiry will be fact-intensive 
and depend on the totality of the circumstances.  In the context 
of multiple non-compete provisions in a contract, indivisibility 
will usually be seen by an intertwining, or inextricable link, 
between the various provisions via a textual reference such that 
one provision cannot be read or interpreted without reference to 
the other.  Restrictive covenants are divisible when the 
contract 
contains 
different 
covenants 
supporting 
different 
interests 
that 
can 
be 
independently 
read 
and 
enforced.11  
                                                 
11 This approach accords with the common law (blue-penciling 
aside), which also queried whether, if the unreasonable portion 
was excluded, the provisions could be independently read and 
understood.  See Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torberg, 270 Wis. 133, 
151, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955) (Gehl, J., dissenting) (noting that 
"the fact of divisibility must appear from the contract 
itself"); Wis. Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 47, 250 
N.W. 
819 
(1933) 
(holding 
that 
an 
unreasonable 
territory 
limitation was indivisible from the rest of the restrictive 
covenant because "the contract itself furnishe[d] no basis" for 
division); Gen. Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 572, 
243 N.W. 469 (1932) (holding that a covenant was divisible when 
the unreasonable restrictions on geography could be dropped and 
the contract still enforced on its own terms). 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
36 
 
Overlap, even substantial overlap, between clauses is not 
necessarily 
determinative. 
 
Employers 
may 
have 
several 
protectable interests that apply in similar, though not exactly 
the same, situations and it makes sense to set these out in 
separate post-termination restrictive covenants.12 
2. 
The Divisibility of the Restrictive Covenants here. 
¶79 In the case at bar, the business clause, customer 
clause, and confidentiality clause do not reference each other.  
Neither is compliance with or the benefits of one dependent upon 
compliance with or the benefits of the other.  Each deals with 
different interests.  The business clause prohibits Dal Pra from 
engaging 
in competitive or substantially similar business 
activities in Dal Pra's former sales territory.  This clause 
(though unreasonable and unenforceable as discussed above), 
protects a geographic territory.  The customer clause is focused 
on protecting Star Direct's relationships with its current and 
recent past customers, which could be undermined by the efforts 
of 
a 
former 
route salesperson if left unchecked.  The 
confidentiality clause prohibits the use or disclosure of 
confidential information. 
                                                 
12 We reject the Brass court's construction of Streiff.  We 
do not construe Streiff as announcing a rule that provisions are 
"intertwined and indivisible because they govern several similar 
types of activities and establish several time and geographical 
restraints."  Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brass, 2001 WI App 
92, ¶11, 242 Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 648.  We therefore overrule 
Brass's holding in this regard. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
37 
 
¶80 There is certainly substantial overlap between these 
provisions.  The customer clause, for example, prohibits 
engagement with certain current and recent past customers who, 
as a practical matter, will mostly be those in Star Direct's 
former sales territory, the area covered by the business clause.  
And the confidentiality clause prohibits the use of information 
that will basically prevent Dal Pra from engaging Star Direct 
customers with whom he dealt, which will be those in his former 
sales territory. 
¶81 But the interests the clauses protect are (with the 
exception of the overbroad provisions of the business clause) 
legitimate and separate interests.  The provisions are also not 
textually linked, intertwined, or mutually entangled in any way.  
In other words, one need not refer to the business clause or 
confidentiality clause, for example, to determine one's rights 
under the customer clause.  The business clause, customer 
clause, and confidentiality clause may each be read, evaluated, 
and applied independently.  Striking the overbroad business 
clause 
does 
not 
affect 
the 
independently 
sufficient 
and 
enunciated 
provisions of the customer and confidentiality 
clauses. 
¶82 For these reasons, the three clauses at issue here are 
separate, independent, and divisible covenants.  As such, the 
customer clause and confidentiality clause, which we have found 
to be reasonable, are independently enforceable despite the 
overbroad and unenforceable business clause. 
No. 
2007AP617   
 
38 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶83 We conclude that the customer and confidentiality 
clauses are reasonably necessary to protect Star Direct and 
therefore enforceable.  The business clause, however, is 
overbroad and unenforceable.  We also hold that the customer and 
confidentiality clauses are divisible from the business clause 
and enforceable on their own terms.  We thus affirm in part and 
reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals, and remand 
this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision by the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
1 
 
¶84 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting 
in 
part). 
 
The 
majority 
aptly 
explains 
that 
restrictive employment covenants are prima facie suspect and are 
permitted only to the extent absolutely necessary to protect an 
employer's legitimate interests.  Thus, the employer bears the 
burden of demonstrating that a covenant is reasonable and 
necessary for its protection.  Following these principles, I 
agree with the majority that Star Direct failed to meet its 
burden.  The business clause is overly broad and therefore 
unenforceable.   
¶85 I write separately, however, for two reasons:  (1) 
contrary to the majority, I conclude that Star Direct has not 
met its burden to demonstrate that the customer clause is 
reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate interests in past 
customers, including past customers that Dal Pra never developed 
a relationship with or serviced; and (2) I find that the new 
interpretive tool created today by the majority——that silence on 
an issue signals approval——is contrary to precedent, principles 
of judicial restraint, and makes no sense. 
I 
¶86 The circuit court focused on the restriction regarding 
past customers when it determined that the customer clause was 
unenforceable.  In rendering a determination, it stated that 
"clearly" the customer clause was "overbroad to me, without any 
question, as far as it prohibits Dal Pra from contacting people 
who had been customers of [Star Direct] within the time period 
of one year prior to the termination of his employment."  The 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
2 
 
court clarified that the covenant "involves not just ongoing 
customers——I can see the need to protect your current customers, 
but these are customers who have already said, we don't want to 
deal with you anymore."   
¶87 Contrary to the circuit court, the majority concludes 
that Star Direct not only has an interest in its current 
customers, but that its protectable interest also extends to 
those past customers who were customers within one year of Dal 
Pra's termination.  Majority op., ¶38.  It explains that Dal Pra 
would have knowledge about the customer's needs and product 
desires or Star Direct's business model, and that he "would have 
a relationship history with many of them."  Majority op., ¶39, 
see also id., ¶¶31, 42 n.8.  The majority concludes that "Star 
Direct does have an interest in prohibiting the solicitation" of 
these past customers because it has "a general interest in 
winning back the business of its recent past customers."  
Majority op., ¶¶38, 40. 
¶88 Acknowledging that no Wisconsin case has addressed an 
employer's interest in recent past customers, the majority cites 
as support several cases that did not address the question and 
indicates that silence on the issue signals approval.  It 
concludes that Wisconsin courts have been "untroubled" by an 
employer's asserted interest in past customers.  See majority 
op., ¶¶31-37.  
II 
¶89 In addition to preventing Dal Pra from soliciting Star 
Direct's current customers, the customer clause unequivocally 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
3 
 
restricts Dal Pra from contacting past customers of Star Direct.  
The 
clause 
extends 
to 
"any 
person, 
firm, 
corporation, 
partnership, or entity . . . which is a customer of [Star 
Direct] or which was a customer . . . within a period of time of 
one year prior to [Dal Pra's] termination."  Dal Pra may not 
"approach any such customer or past customer" for the purpose of 
interfering with or endeavoring to entice away that customer. 
¶90 The customer clause encompasses customers "for which 
[Dal Pra] performed services or otherwise dealt with on behalf 
of [Star Direct] or relative to which [Dal Pra] obtained special 
knowledge as a result of his position with [Star Direct.]"  The 
majority defines special knowledge as knowledge regarding the 
needs and wants of the customers and Star Direct's pricing, 
costs, and profit margins.  Majority op., ¶31.  Because Dal Pra 
is knowledgeable about Star Direct's pricing, costs, and profit 
margins, I conclude that he has "special knowledge" about all of 
Star Direct's past customers.   Therefore, all past customers 
within one year of Dal Pra's termination are within the 
restrictive covenant, including customers with whom Dal Pra 
never developed a relationship on behalf of Star Direct. 
¶91 "Where a restraint of trade is tolerated, it is 
permitted only to the extent absolutely necessary to afford 
reasonable protection."  Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. 
Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202, 218, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978).  The 
employer bears the burden of demonstrating that the covenant is 
reasonable.  NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 185 Wis. 2d 827, 840, 520 
N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1994).  Because restraints of trade are 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
4 
 
presumptively invalid, the employer must place facts in the 
record that could demonstrate that it has a protectable interest 
in the customers covered by the covenant.  It is therefore 
incumbent upon Star Direct to justify the restraint prohibiting 
Star Direct from contacting past customers. 
¶92 On review, the court looks to the evidence submitted 
by the parties.  The president of Star Direct, Bradley Son, 
submitted three affidavits to demonstrate the reasonableness of 
the restraints.   
¶93 In his first affidavit, Son explained: "The covenant 
not to compete is necessary to protect Star Distributing 
because, given the frequency with which Dal Pra came into 
contact 
with 
Star 
Distributing's 
customers 
and 
potential 
customers in the territory for which he was responsible, 
 . . . upon termination of Dal Pra's employment with Star 
Distributing, Dal Pra might be capable of taking or otherwise 
appropriating Star Distributing's business and relationships."  
He further stated: "The purpose of the [customer clause], of 
course, is to prevent Dal Pra from unfairly competing with Star 
Distributing by taking advantage of the relationship, rapport, 
and knowledge he developed by serving particular customers of 
Star Distributing."   
¶94 These statements address those current and potential 
customers with whom Dal Pra developed a relationship and served 
on behalf of Star Direct, and they justify Star Direct's 
protectable interest in those customers.  However, absent from 
this 
discussion 
is 
any 
justification 
of 
Star 
Direct's 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
5 
 
protectable interest in customers whom he did not serve, 
especially those past customers who have taken their business 
elsewhere. 
¶95 In his supplemental affidavit, Son explained that Dal 
Pra's knowledge of Star Direct's pricing and profit margins 
would allow Dal Pra to unfairly compete: "Dal Pra has special 
knowledge about the prices at which Star Distributing sold 
various products to certain customers, including the customers 
he called on."  Further, "If a competitor knew the prices that 
Star Distributing paid for its products, especially a competitor 
who was trying to 'get its foot in the door' with a customer, 
the competitor could quote a price to the customer which was 
very close to or even below Star Distributing's costs."  "[T]he 
competitor would have a 'road map' as to how to price its 
various products to compete with Star Distributing." 
¶96 Again, the supplemental affidavit explains why Star 
Direct has a protectable interest in preventing Del Pra from 
soliciting its current customers.  Yet, there is no reference to 
Star 
Direct's 
past 
customers 
and 
no 
justification 
for 
prohibiting Dal Pra from contacting those customers who no 
longer purchase products from Star Direct. 
¶97 In his second supplemental affidavit, Son asserted 
that restricting Dal Pra from enticing away current customers 
was necessary to protect Star Direct's legitimate business 
purposes:  
Precluding Mr. Dal Pra from attempting to entice away 
current customers of Star Distributing with whom he 
previously 
dealt 
with 
on 
behalf 
of 
Star 
Distributing . . . or about whom he acquired special 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
6 
 
knowledge is not unreasonable even if Mr. Dal Pra did 
not have recent contract with the customer.   
(Emphasis added.)  This statement expressly addresses Star 
Direct's protectable interest in current customers.  There is no 
mention whatsoever of past customers. 
¶98 Taken together, Son's affidavits provide facts that 
justify 
Star 
Direct's 
legitimate 
protectable 
interest 
in 
prohibiting Dal Pra from attempting to entice away Star Direct's 
current customers.  Absent from these affidavits, however, is 
any fact or rationale for restricting Dal Pra's contact with 
past customers.  Dal Pra cannot "take or otherwise appropriate" 
a business relationship if it no longer exists, and he cannot 
"interfere with, or endeavor to entice away" a customer that has 
already stopped purchasing from Star Direct on its own accord. 
¶99 Star Direct argues, and the majority agrees, that Dal 
Pra would be in a unique position to recruit customers who had 
recently stopped purchasing from Star Direct.  See majority op., 
¶38.  The majority contends that Dal Pra "would have all the 
information a competitor would want and need to know how to 
effectively undercut Star Direct."  Id.  Even so, this does not 
mean that Star Direct retains a protectable interest in these 
customers, justifying the restraint.  Although the majority 
asserts that Star Direct has a "general" interest in winning 
back recent past customers, Star Direct has failed to place into 
the record any evidence justifying this conclusion.  
¶100 Furthermore, the court of appeals has previously 
concluded that a covenant prohibiting contact with former 
customers was unenforceable.  In Equity Enterprises, Inc. v. 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
7 
 
Milosch, 2001 WI App 186, 247 Wis. 2d 172, 633 N.W.2d 662, the 
court considered a non-compete agreement that prevented an 
employee from "interfer[ing] in any way with the relationship 
between the Customers and [the employer, Equable]."  Id., ¶2.  
The agreement defined "Customer" as "any customer of Equable or 
any Related Party with whom Employee transacted business or whom 
Employee serviced on behalf of Equable during any part of 
Employee's employment."  Id.   
¶101 The 
court 
called 
the 
restriction 
"unreasonable" 
because it prohibited contact with former customers: 
This restriction is unreasonable because it would 
prohibit Milosch from doing business with a customer 
he serviced during his first weeks of employment in 
1982 who subsequently transferred his or her business 
to a competitor of Equable.  Such an overbroad 
restriction is invalid because preventing Milosch from 
contacting former Equable customers is not reasonably 
necessary to protect Equable's legitimate business 
interests.   
Id., ¶15 n.4 (emphasis added).   
¶102 The Equity Enterprises court did not establish a per 
se rule against covenants restricting contact with former 
customers. 
 
Nonetheless, 
the 
court 
again 
reaffirmed 
the 
principle that such covenants are suspect, and that the employer 
must have a legitimate protectable interest justifying the 
restriction imposed on the activity of the employee. 
¶103 The 
majority 
distinguishes 
Equity 
Enterprises 
by 
pointing out that the covenant in that case looked back 15 
years, whereas the covenant at issue here looks back only one 
year.  Majority op., ¶46.  Yet, the holding in Equity 
Enterprises was not limited to a specific number of years.  The 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
8 
 
employer has to burden to demonstrate that any restrictive 
provision is justified, and here, neither Star Direct nor the 
majority has demonstrated that it has a protectable interest in 
past customers at all.   
¶104 At a minimum, the court should remand for factfinding 
on the issue of past customers.  Based on the record provided by 
the parties, however, I conclude that no such protectable 
interest in past customers exists justifying the restraint.1 
III 
¶105 In addition to the majority's conclusion, I disagree 
with the new interpretive tool of appellate analysis created 
today by the majority.  To conclude that silence on an issue 
somehow suggests approval is not supported by precedent, 
principles of judicial restraint, or common sense.   
¶106 The majority cites as supportive a number of cases 
that did not address the question of past customers.  It asserts 
that "Wisconsin courts, including this court, have reviewed 
provisions that clearly apply to past customers, and have been 
untroubled by this asserted interest."  Majority op., ¶32.  
Although the majority acknowledges that the silence is not 
dispositive, it nevertheless cites to the silence as persuasive.  
(See ¶¶32-37, discussion of the silence in Rollins Burdick 
Hunter 
of 
Wis., 
Inc. 
v. 
Hamilton, 
101 
Wis. 2d 460, 
304 
N.W.2d 752 (1981) and Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA 
v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, 243 Wis. 2d 305, 627 N.W.2d 444.) 
                                                 
1 Because I conclude that the business clause and the 
customer clause are both unenforceable, I need not determine 
whether the covenants are divisible. 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
9 
 
¶107 The problem with the majority's approach is that it 
assumes that silence on an issue signals the court's approval.  
This assumption does not square with our case law.  I need go no 
further than to cite an opinion that is being released today, 
Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI 75, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.   
¶108 One of the issues in Horst was the correctness of the 
standard special verdict question in a strict products liability 
case involving an injured bystander.2  The standard verdict 
question asks: ". . . was the product in a defective condition 
so 
as 
to 
be 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
a 
prospective 
user/consumer?"  Wis JI——Civil 3260.  Given that the injured 
party was a bystander rather than a user or consumer, the 
plaintiffs requested that the special verdict be modified to ask 
whether the product was "in a defective condition so as to be 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
a 
prospective 
user/consumer 
or 
bystander."  Horst, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶13.  The plaintiffs pointed 
                                                 
2 The petitioners in Horst set forth two issues for review 
in their brief.  The first issue is stated as follows: 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1.  Did the trial court err when, over objection, it 
worded the § 402A special verdict question to ask the 
jury whether the Deere & Company mower "was in a 
defective condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous 
to a prospective user/consumer," rejecting plaintiff-
appellants proposed special verdict question asking 
whether the mower was in a defective condition so as 
to be unreasonably dangerous to bystanders? 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioners at vi, Horst v. Deere & 
Co., 2009 WI 75, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
10 
 
to a previous case, Howes II,3 in which a nearly identical 
proposed special verdict question was used.   
¶109 We affirmatively rejected their suggestion that our 
silence 
regarding 
the 
special 
verdict 
question 
signaled 
approval.  Instead, we stated the general rule that opinions of 
the court do not "purport to address a proposition greater than 
the legal question before the court."  Horst, __ Wis. 2d __, 
¶45.  We stated: 
In 
Howes 
II, 
the 
special 
verdict 
question 
was 
admittedly almost identical to the Horsts' proposed 
special verdict question.  But the special verdict 
question was not affirmed or intentionally addressed 
by the court.   
Id., ¶49 (emphasis added).  
¶110 The assumption that silence signals support also does 
not square with fundamental principles of judicial restraint.  A 
court generally relies on the parties to frame the issues on 
review.  When the parties do not raise an issue, we do not 
decide it.  Accordingly, the stated propositions in a court's 
opinion were considered and decided by the court and therefore 
have precedential value.  Propositions that are unstated, and 
perhaps unconsidered, do not. 
¶111 To interpret the court's silence on an issue that 
could have been implicated in a dispute as a tacit decision on 
it merits unsettles these principles.  Such a framework would 
                                                 
3 See Howes v. Deere & Co. (Howes II), 71 Wis. 2d 268, 271, 
238 N.W.2d 76 (1976) (mentioning that the following special 
verdict question was given: "Was the John Deere mower in 
question . . . defective in design so as to be unreasonably 
dangerous to a bystander?"). 
No.  2007AP617.awb 
 
11 
 
force the court to reach out and decide issues not presented by 
the parties and without full briefing and arguments on the 
merits. 
¶112 Finally, to assume that silence signals support is 
contrary to common sense.  Every case involves a complicated set 
of facts and potential legal issues.  When rendering a decision 
on the issue presented, the court must describe the facts of the 
case in order to give context to the legal principles it sets 
forth.  Potential issues may lurk, undiscovered, among the facts 
of the case.   
¶113 For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully concur 
in part and dissent in part. 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence/dissent.   
 
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶115 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Bradley's opinion.  I write separately to explain the 
rationale underlying Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  It is important to 
understand the legislature's reasoning and policy determinations 
in deciding restrictive covenant cases. 
¶116 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.465 has placed the onus on 
employers to draft reasonable restrictive employment covenants.  
As a result of § 103.465, Wisconsin courts give effect to 
reasonable covenants but do not rewrite unreasonable covenants 
to save them.   
¶117 Courts and commentators have debated the equities of 
courts' rewriting unreasonable covenants to give effect to their 
reasonable aspects.1  The Wisconsin legislature has opted to 
                                                 
1 Our court has summarized the debate as follows: 
An argument for giving effect to reasonable aspects of 
a restraint is the business need for restrictive 
covenants and the difficulty for larger businesses to 
tailor each covenant to the particular requirements of 
the individual employee.  A principal argument against 
giving effect to reasonable aspects of a restraint is 
that the employer can fashion ominous covenants which 
affect the mobility of employees because of their in 
terrorem effect on employees who respect contractual 
obligations and their effect on competitors who do not 
wish 
to 
risk 
legal 
difficulties. . . .  
The 
legislature has in sec. 103.465 instructed the court 
as to the equities between the parties.  Under sec. 
103.465 
if 
an 
indivisible 
covenant 
imposes 
an 
unreasonable restraint, the covenant is illegal, void, 
and unenforceable even as to so much of the covenant 
as would be a reasonable restraint. 
Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 614, 348 
N.W.2d 505 (1984). 
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
2 
 
require employers to draft reasonable restrictive covenants, not 
the courts. 
¶118 The legislature has adopted a balanced approach that 
accounts for the interests of employers, of employees, and of 
the public as well.  The legislature has determined the equities 
between employers, employees, and the public in Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465. 
¶119 Restrictive employment covenants serve an important 
business purpose.2   
¶120 At the same time, an employee has a liberty interest 
at 
stake 
in 
a 
restrictive 
covenant, 
a 
"fundamental 
right . . . to make choices about his or her own employment."3  
Free movement and personal liberty of employees are pre-eminent 
features of employment relations in this state.4  An employer's 
                                                 
2 "From the point of view of the employer, postemployment 
restraints are regarded as perhaps the only effective method of 
preventing 
unscrupulous 
competitors 
or 
employees 
from 
appropriating 
valuable 
trade 
information 
and 
customer 
relationships for their own benefit.  Without the protection 
afforded by such covenants, it is argued, businessmen could not 
afford to stimulate research and improvement of business methods 
to a desirably high level, nor could they achieve the degree of 
freedom of communication within a company that is necessary for 
efficient operation."  Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not 
to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 627 (1960). 
3 Heyde Cos. v. Dove Healthcare, 2002 WI 131, ¶¶22-23, 258 
Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830 (concluding that a no-hire provision 
was in violation of Wis. Stat. § 103.465 and stating that "the 
fundamental right of a person to make choices about his or her 
own employment is well-established").  
4 Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202, 
214, 267 N.W.2d 242 (l978) (quoted with approval in Farm Credit 
Servs. v. Wysocki, 243 Wis. 2d 305, ¶9). 
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
3 
 
capacity to draft restrictive covenants constrains the mobility 
of labor through in terrorem effects on employees and competing 
employers alike.5  Employees will fear violating even an 
unreasonable 
covenant, 
and 
businesses 
that 
wish 
to 
hire 
employees covered by a restrictive covenant will refrain from 
doing so to avoid the risk of legal difficulties created by the 
restrictive covenant.   
¶121 The third group with an interest in restrictive 
employment covenants is the public.  A restrictive covenant is a 
restraint of trade.6  The public has an interest in allowing the 
free movement of labor, encouraging competition rather than 
diminishing competition by menacing potential competitors, and 
encouraging the dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods.7 
¶122 Recognizing 
these 
conflicting 
interests, 
the 
legislature attempted to "balance[] the employer's business 
needs and the employee's interest in personal liberty" when 
                                                 
5 Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 614 ("[T]he employer can fashion 
ominous covenants which affect the mobility of employees because 
of their in terrorem effect on employees who respect contractual 
obligations and their effect on competitors who do not wish to 
risk legal difficulties."). 
6 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶13. 
7 "[P]ostemployment restraints reduce both the economic 
mobility of employees and their personal freedom to follow their 
own interests.  These restraints also diminish competition by 
intimidating potential competitors and by slowing down the 
dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods.  They unfairly 
weaken the individual employee's bargaining position vis-à-vis 
his employer and, from the social point of view, clog the 
market's channeling of manpower to employments in which its 
productivity is greatest."  Blake, supra note 2, at 627. 
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
4 
 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 103.465.8  The legislature accommodated the 
interests of employers by permitting the use of restrictive 
covenants that are "reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the employer."  Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  The legislature protected 
the interests of employees, however, by mandating that "[a]ny 
covenant . . . imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, 
void and unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or 
performance that would be a reasonable restraint."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465.9   
¶123 The history underlying Wis. Stat. § 103.465 reflects 
the legislature's judgment that a laissez-faire approach to 
restrictive covenants would unduly privilege the interests of 
employers over the competing interest of employees.  The 
legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 103.465 at the suggestion of a 
legislator who argued that if the courts do not strike down 
restrictive covenants "containing overly broad and invalid 
provisions . . . in [their] entirety," employers will be able to 
use their superior bargaining power "to insist upon unreasonable 
and excessive restrictions, secure in the knowledge that the 
promise will be upheld in part, if not in full."10  Section 
                                                 
8 Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 614. 
9 See also Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶13 ("[T]he explicit 
purpose of § 103.465, as plainly stated in the statute, is to 
invalidate covenants that impose unreasonable restraints on 
employees."). 
10 Streiff, 118 Wis. 2d at 608-09. 
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
5 
 
103.465 thus "was enacted to effect a policy of protecting 
weaker parties in the bargaining process," a recognized and 
important goal of public policy in the State of Wisconsin.11    
¶124 In interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 103.465, the 
courts consider the interests of both employers and employees, 
as well as the interests of the public.  The case law states 
that a restrictive covenant is enforceable if it "(1) [is] 
necessary to protect the employer; (2) provide[s] a reasonable 
time limit; (3) provide[s] a reasonable territorial limit; (4) 
[is not] harsh or oppressive to the employee; and (5) [is not] 
                                                                                                                                                             
The drafting record for Wis. Stat. § 103.465 contains a 
letter from Representative Richard E. Peterson of Waupaca County 
to the chief of the legislative reference library providing 
drafting instructions for the statute.  Representative Peterson 
requested a bill drafted to reverse Fullerton Lumber Co. v. 
Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955), in which this court 
enforced the reasonable aspects of an otherwise unreasonable 
restrictive covenant.  Representative Peterson stated that "[a]t 
the 
time 
[an 
employment 
contract 
is] 
entered 
into, 
the 
bargaining position of the two contractors appears to me to be 
relatively unequal in that the party seeking the employment 
must, if he desires employment with the contracting party, 
consent to almost any restrictive covenant imposed."  He 
concluded that the effect of the Fullerton decision was "to give 
to the employer complete latitude" in defining the scope of 
restrictive covenant, safe in the knowledge that the courts 
would enforce the covenant to any extent that it was reasonable. 
11 See Gen. Med. Corp. v. Kobs, 179 Wis. 2d 422, 432 n.7, 
507 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[S]ec. 103.465, Stats., was 
enacted to effect a policy of protecting weaker parties in the 
bargaining process: 'laws prohibiting covenants not to compete, 
or that are designed to protect a weaker party against the 
unfair exercise of superior bargaining power by another party, 
are likely to embody an important state public policy." (quoting 
Bush v. Nat'l School Studios, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 635, 642, 407 
N.W.2d 883 (1987)).  
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
6 
 
contrary to public policy."12  In keeping with the statute, 
courts apply the following canons of construction to restrictive 
covenants: "(1) they are prima facie suspect; (2) they must 
withstand 
close 
scrutiny 
to 
pass 
legal 
muster 
as 
being 
reasonable; (3) they will not be construed to extend beyond 
their proper import or further than the language of the contract 
absolutely requires; and (4) they are to be construed in favor 
of the employee."13 
 
¶125 The legislature and the courts thus avoid a one-sided, 
"pro-employer" 
or 
"pro-employee" 
analysis 
of 
restrictive 
covenants.  Reasonable covenants are enforced; unreasonable 
covenants are not enforced and are not rewritten by the courts 
to be reasonable. 
¶126 I write separately to explain the rationale underlying 
Wis. Stat. § 103.465.  The legislatively adopted policy should 
guide courts in deciding restrictive covenant cases.   
 
                                                 
12 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶16 (citing Lakeside Oil Co. 
v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 162-63, 98 N.W.2d 415 (1959)). 
13 Heyde Cos., 258 Wis. 2d 28, ¶16 (citation omitted). 
No.  2007AP617.ssa 
 
1