Title: Towne v. Hubbard
Citation: 2000 OK 30, 3 P.3d 154, 71OBJ960
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2000

Towne v. Hubbard Annotate this Case Towne v. Hubbard 2000 OK 30 3 P.3d 154 71 OBJ 960 Case Number: 92412 Decided: 04/18/2000 Mandate Issued: 05/15/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma Fern Alice Towne, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carol Ann Hubbard, Honorable Judge of the District Court, Oklahoma County, 7th Judicial District, Respondent v. Cindy Munkres and Gerald E. Kelley, Appellees In the Matter of the Guardianship of FERN ALICE TOWNE ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT, OKLAHOMA COUNTY; CAROL ANN HUBBARD, TRIAL JUDGE. ¶0 Cindy Munkres brought in the district court a proceeding for the appointment of a guardian for her aunt, Fern Alice Towne. The trial court, on the authority of 30 O. S. 1991 §3-107(G), TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PRONOUNCEMENT Harley E. Venters, Venters & Venters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Val R. Miller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant, Fern Alice Towne. Joe S. Rolston, III, Rolston & Hamill, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee, Cindy Munkres. Gerald E. Kelley, Kelley & Kelley, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Court-Appointed Counsel for Fern Alice Towne. OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive question on this appeal is whether the trial court's inquiry, which resulted in the removal of Towne's retained counsel and his replacement by a court-appointed legal practitioner, complied with the requirements of due process of law. We answer in the negative. I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Cindy Munkres ("Munkres") filed a petition in the District Court, Oklahoma County, for the appointment of a guardian for her aunt, Fern Alice Towne ("Towne"), an 87 year old, childless widow. Munkres alleged that her aunt suffered from dementia, impairing her ability to receive and evaluate information, to provide adequately for her own physical health and safety, and to manage prudently her financial resources. It was also alleged that Towne's dementia made her susceptible to the influence of non-family members. ¶3 Towne admitted in her answer that she required assistance in managing her financial resources, but insisted that she had already arranged for whatever aid was necessary to enable her to remain living independently and managing her own personal and business affairs. She denied she was incapable of making informed, reasonable decisions regarding her own welfare and denied that she was in need of a guardian. ¶4 At a hearing on the guardianship petition, set for 29 December 1998, Towne appeared in person and through her retained attorney, Harley E. Venters ("Venters"). Despite notice stating that the guardianship petition would be addressed, the hearing was confined to an inquiry - pursuant to the terms of 30 O. S. 1991 §3-107 (G) ("§3-107 (G)") ¶5 Under questioning by the court on the record, Towne was unable to state with specificity the reason for her appearance in court, other than to say that she was involved in a dispute with her relatives. She acknowledged that she had earlier, off the record, told the court that she was not aware a guardianship petition had been filed. She appeared confused about who had brought the action and in which county the petition had been filed. She also seemed confused by the discussion of her right to a court-appointed attorney, apparently concerned about the financial obligation that would involve. When asked whether she was paying an attorney to represent her that day, she answered in the affirmative, but pronounced Venters' name incorrectly. She displayed little or no recollection of the various legal arrangements which she claimed in her answer to the guardianship petition to have entered into for the purpose of obtaining assistance in handling her financial affairs. ¶6 On the other hand, Towne knew generally that a disagreement with her niece and other relatives had brought her into court, appeared to understand the nature of a guardianship and insisted that she did not need a guardian, recalled that she had asked Harold Sinclair ("Sinclair") THE COURT: And how did you get Mr. Venters? MS. TOWNE: Well, I got him when this first arose. THE COURT: And who got him for you? MS. TOWNE: Mr. Sinclair. THE COURT: Mr. Sinclair got him for you. . . . ¶7 After completing her questioning of Towne, the court turned her attention [3 P.3d 158] to Venters, briefly and informally questioning him regarding his initial contacts with Towne. This exchange revealed that Sinclair had contacted Venters on Towne's behalf on 28 November 1998, and that Venters had gone immediately to meet with Towne and Sinclair. Venters told the court that he ascertained at that meeting that Towne needed help, that she was being pressured about a house, and that she wanted a durable power of attorney given to Sinclair. Venters then stated that he returned to his office and prepared a durable power of attorney in accordance with Towne's wishes, which Towne executed the next day, 29 November 1998. The trial judge rejected Venters' attempts to expand upon these bare facts and ignored Venters' request to present witnesses to testify regarding his independence. ¶8 Stating that she was "not persuaded that . . .[Towne] has the capacity to contract," and expressing her concern "that [Towne's] rights and her rights alone be independently represented," the trial court removed Venters as Towne's attorney, suggested Venters might want to represent Sinclair as the holder of the power under the durable power of attorney, and announced that she would appoint independent counsel for Towne. ¶9 The trial judge and the attorneys then entered into further discussion in which the court was informed that Venters had prepared estate planning documents for Towne in addition to the durable power of attorney. Venters informed the court that Towne had appointed herself and Sinclair as co-trustees of a living trust, and Munkres' attorney informed the court that Towne had appointed Sinclair, Venters, and a nephew by marriage, Norman Wright, to a trust committee, which was to provide advice to the co-trustees. Munkres' attorney also advised the court that Towne had executed a new will, which named Sinclair as her personal representative. ¶10 In her order of 5 January 1999, the trial judge found that it was Sinclair and not Towne who had selected Venters and that Venters had previously represented Sinclair. ¶11 Venters, on behalf of Towne, filed with this court an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar the trial court from removing him as Towne's attorney and replacing him with a court-appointed legal practitioner. This court recast the quest for a prerogative writ into a timely appeal from an interlocutory order in guardianship and sua sponte retained the cause for disposition. II THE RIGHT OF A PROSPECTIVE WARD IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING TO BE REPRESENTED BY A LEGAL PRACTITIONER OF HIS (OR HER) OWN CHOOSING CANNOT BE ABRIDGED BY MEANS INCONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW ¶12 A guardianship proceeding poses the risk to the prospective ward of a massive curtailment of liberty as well as of the infliction of adverse social consequences. ¶13 The United States Supreme Court and this court have both held that the state's participation in any proceeding, the result of which may be the significant restriction of a person's liberty, requires that the person be afforded the protections of due process. ¶14 The right to the assistance of legal counsel includes the right to be represented by a legal practitioner of one's own choosing. [3 P.3d 161] ¶15 Notwithstanding its constitutional status, the right to select one's own counsel is not absolute. ¶16 The statute relied upon here to disqualify Venters removes - from the attorney and client in the guardianship context - their joint responsibility of resolving the ethical concern for independence embodied in Rule 1.7 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. ¶17 The Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act ¶18 Although Towne received no notice in this case that the question of her attorney's independence could be or would be raised at the hearing, we decline to reverse the trial court's order on the basis of a defect in notice. This is so because Towne did not timely object to the lack of notice or request a continuance for further argument or for briefing. By failing timely to object and by taking part in the proceeding, Towne waived her objection to lack of notice. ¶19 The trial court's order must nonetheless be reversed for another reason. "A party's opportunity to present its case is an essential element of due process." ¶20 Because we reverse the trial court's order removing Venters as Towne's attorney on due process grounds, we need not consider here whether the record contains evidence sufficient to warrant his removal. III SUMMARY ¶21 When in the course of a guardianship proceeding, the trial court engages in a statutory inquiry into the independence of a prospective ward's retained counsel, the examination must be conducted in compliance with the requirements of due process so as to safeguard the prospective ward's fundamental right to counsel of one's choice. "The right to counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of justice." ¶22 TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PRONOUNCEMENT ¶23 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT