Title: Demby v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 141, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEMETRIUS DEMBY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 141, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0604011029 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 29, 2010 
Decided: December 21, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 21st day of December 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Demetrius Demby, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s October 29, 2009 order adopting the October 9, 
2009 amended report of the Superior Court Commissioner, which 
recommended that Demby’s first motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be denied.1  We find no merit to the 
appeal and, accordingly, affirm. 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in May 2006, the grand jury indicted 
Demby on charges of Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, 
Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances and Driving 
Without a Seatbelt.  Demby’s subsequent motion to suppress was denied by 
the Superior Court following a hearing in November 2006.  In April 2007, 
Demby was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of all three charged 
offenses.  In June 2007, the Superior Court declared Demby a habitual 
offender and sentenced him to on the possession conviction to life in prison 
and on the conviction of maintaining a vehicle to 1 year at Level V, to be 
suspended for 1 year at Level II.  Demby was assessed a fine on the seatbelt 
conviction.  Demby’s convictions were affirmed by this Court on direct 
appeal.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first 
motion for postconviction relief, Demby claims that a) his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance at his suppression hearing; b) the Superior 
Court erred in denying his motion to suppress; c) the Superior Court erred by 
admitting the drug evidence at trial; d) the Superior Court erred by granting 
the State’s motion for an extension of time in which to respond to his 
postconviction motion; e) his appellate counsel provided ineffective 
                                                 
2 Demby v. State, Del. Supr., No. 316, 2007, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 28, 2008). 
 
3
assistance by failing to raise certain claims; and f) the police officer 
witnesses committed perjury.3  Because this was Demby’s first 
postconviction motion and contained claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the Superior Court properly ordered that Demby’s trial and 
appellate counsel submit affidavits pursuant to Rule 61(g)(2).4    
 
(4) 
Prior to consideration of the merits of a postconviction motion 
pursuant to Rule 61, the procedural bars set forth in Rule 61(i) must first be 
applied.5  The record in this case reflects that Demby’s sixth claim of 
impropriety on the part of the police witnesses was formerly adjudicated in 
his direct appeal.  In the absence of any evidence that reconsideration of the 
claim is warranted in the interest of justice, we conclude that the claim is 
procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4).         
 
(5) 
Demby’s fourth claim that the Superior Court erred by granting 
the State’s motion for an extension to respond to his postconviction motion 
is meritless.  The Superior Court has the inherent authority to manage its 
own docket6 and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior 
                                                 
3 The record reflects that Demby did not raise either his second or third claim regarding 
suppression of the drug evidence in the Superior Court in the first instance.  As such, we 
will not address either claim in this appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 8.  The claims are procedurally 
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4) in any case because they were formerly adjudicated on 
direct appeal. 
4 Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 State v. Wright, 821 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Super. 2003). 
 
4
Court in managing the proceedings on Demby’s motion for postconviction 
relief as it did. 
 
(6) 
Demby’s first and fifth claims involve allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In order to prevail on such a claim, the defendant 
must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings 
would have been different.7  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland 
standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the 
representation was professionally reasonable.8 
 
(7) 
The record reflects that the claims of ineffective assistance 
raised by Demby in this appeal are not identical to the claims he asserted in 
his postconviction motion filed in the Superior Court.9  However, even 
assuming that the claims are properly before us, we conclude that they are 
meritless.  While Demby claims that his trial counsel failed to raise the 
proper arguments in his motion to suppress, the record does not support that 
contention.  Moreover, Demby has not demonstrated that his trial counsel 
was ineffective simply because the motion to suppress was unsuccessful.  
                                                 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
8 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
9 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
5
While Demby further claims that his trial counsel failed to challenge the 
chain of custody with respect to the drug evidence, that claim is inconsistent 
with, and belied by, the trial record.  Finally, Demby’s claim that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert on direct appeal that 
his trial counsel was ineffective is equally meritless.  This Court will not 
consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made for the first time 
on direct appeal.10 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
                                                 
10 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986).