Title: In re E.J.
Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 1258
Docket Number: S156933
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 2010

1 
 
Filed 2/1/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re E.J. on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
S156933 
 
) 
In re S.P. on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
S157631 
 
) 
In re J.S. on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
S157633 
 
) 
In re K.T. on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
S157634 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
On November 7, 2006, the voters enacted Proposition 83, the Sexual Predator 
Punishment and Control Act: Jessica‟s Law (Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 7, 2006); hereafter Proposition 83 or Jessica‟s Law).  Proposition 83 was a wide-
ranging initiative intended to “help Californians better protect themselves, their children, 
and their communities” (id., § 2, subd. (f)) from problems posed by sex offenders by 
“strengthen[ing] and improv[ing] the laws that punish and control sexual offenders” (id., 
§ 31). 
Among other revisions to the Penal Code,1 Proposition 83 amended section 
3003.5, a statute setting forth restrictions on where certain sex offenders subject to the 
lifetime registration requirement of section 2902 may reside.  New subdivision (b), added 
to section 3003.5, provides:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful 
                                              
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
Section 290 imposes upon individuals convicted of certain sex offenses a lifetime 
requirement that they register with law enforcement in the communities in which they 
reside. 
2 
 
for any person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 
2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”  
(§ 3003.5, subd. (b) (section 3003.5(b).)  The new residency restrictions took effect on 
November 8, 2006, the effective date of Proposition 83. 
Subsequent to Proposition 83‟s enactment, the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sought to enforce section 3003.5(b) as a statutory 
parole condition by serving notice on registered sex offenders released on parole after 
November 8, 2006, including these petitioners, requiring them to comply with the 
mandatory residency restrictions or face revocation of parole and reincarceration. 
The unified petition for writ of habeas corpus here before us was filed by four 
registered sex offender parolees subject to the new mandatory residency restrictions.  In 
each case, the petitioner was convicted of a sex offense or offenses, for which lifetime 
registration was required pursuant to section 290, well before the passage of Proposition 
83.  In each case, the petitioner was released from custody on his current parole after 
November 8, 2006, the effective date of the new law. 
At the threshold, petitioners contend that enforcement of section 3003.5(b)‟s 
residency restrictions as to them constitutes an impermissible retroactive application of 
the statute, in contravention of the general statutory presumption that Penal Code 
provisions operate prospectively (§ 3), because it attaches new legal consequences to 
their convictions of registrable sex offenses suffered prior to the passage of Proposition 
83.  In a closely related argument, petitioners contend that such retroactive enforcement 
of section 3003.5(b) further violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and 
California Constitutions insofar as it “ „makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission.‟ ”  (Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42.)  
Petitioners also contend section 3003.5(b) is an unreasonable, vague, and overbroad 
parole condition that infringes on various federal and state constitutional rights, including 
3 
 
their privacy rights, property rights, right to intrastate travel, and substantive due process 
rights under the federal Constitution. 
We issued orders to show cause with respect to each petitioner‟s claims, making 
them returnable before this court.  We stayed enforcement of section 3003.5(b) as to 
these four named petitioners and consolidated their actions for purposes of briefing and 
oral argument in this court. 
We have determined that petitioners‟ retroactivity and ex post facto claims, 
common to all four petitioners, can be addressed on the record currently before us.  We 
conclude they lack merit and must be denied. 
Petitioners‟ remaining claims — that section 3003.5(b) is an unreasonable, vague 
and overbroad parole condition that infringes on a number of their fundamental 
constitutional rights — present considerably more complex “as applied” challenges to the 
enforcement of the new residency restrictions in the respective jurisdictions to which 
each petitioner has been paroled.  Petitioners are not all similarly situated with regard to 
their paroles.  They have been paroled to different cities and counties within the state, and 
the extent of housing in compliance with section 3003.5(b) available to them during their 
terms of parole — a matter critical to deciding the merits of their “as applied” 
constitutional challenges — is not factually established on the declarations and materials 
appended to their petition and traverse.  With regard to petitioners‟ remaining 
constitutional claims, evidentiary hearings will therefore have to be conducted to 
establish the relevant facts necessary to decide each claim. 
The trial courts of the counties to which petitioners have been paroled are in the 
best position to conduct such hearings and find the relevant facts necessary to decide the 
remaining claims in their respective jurisdictions.  These would include, but are not 
necessarily limited to, establishing each petitioner‟s current parole status; the precise 
location of each petitioner‟s current residence and its proximity to the nearest “public or 
4 
 
private school, or park where children regularly gather” (§ 3003.5(b)); a factual 
assessment of the compliant housing available to petitioners and similarly situated 
registered sex offenders in the respective counties and communities to which they have 
been paroled; an assessment of the way in which the mandatory parole residency 
restrictions are currently being enforced in those particular jurisdictions; and a complete 
record of the protocol CDCR is currently following to enforce section 3003.5(b) in those 
jurisdictions consistent with its statutory obligation to “assist parolees in the transition 
between imprisonment and discharge.”  (§§ 3000, subd. (a)(1), 3074.) 
Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders to show cause 
previously issued with regard to each petitioner‟s remaining claims shall be ordered 
transferred to the appropriate Courts of Appeal with directions that each matter be 
transferred to the trial court in the county to which the petitioner has been paroled, for 
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Proposition 83 and CDCR’s enforcement of section 3003.5(b) 
Proposition 83 was submitted to the voters on the November 7, 2006 ballot.  The 
purpose of the initiative was described in section 2, which explains that “[s]ex offenders 
have a dramatically higher recidivism rate for their crimes than any other type of violent 
felon,” that they “prey on the most innocent members of our society,” and that “[m]ore 
than two-thirds of the victims of rape and sexual assault are under the age of 18.”  (Prop. 
83, § 2, subd. (b).)  Section 2 further declares that “Californians have a right to know 
about the presence of sex offenders in their communities, near their schools, and around 
their children” (id., subd. (g)), and that “California must also take additional steps to 
monitor sex offenders, to protect the public from them, and to provide adequate penalties 
for and safeguards against sex offenders, particularly those who prey on children.”  (Id., 
subd. (h).)  Section 2 also states, “It is the intent of the People in enacting this measure to 
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help Californians better protect themselves, their children, and their communities; it is not 
the intent of the People to embarrass or harass persons convicted of sex offenses.”  (Id., 
subd. (f).) 
As explained in the official ballot pamphlet, Proposition 83 sought to achieve its 
proponents‟ goal of creating “predator free zones around schools and parks to prevent sex 
offenders from living near where our children learn and play” through the enactment of 
mandatory residency restrictions in the form of an amendment to section 3003.5, a statute 
setting forth restrictions on where certain sex offenders subject to the lifetime registration 
requirement of section 290 may reside.  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 
2006) argument in favor of Prop. 83, p. 46 (Voter Information Guide).)  As noted, the 
initiative added new subdivision (b) to section 3003.5, making it “unlawful for any 
person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 2000 
feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”  
(§ 3003.5(b), added by Prop. 83, § 21.) 
On August 17, 2007, the Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO) of CDCR 
issued Policy No. 07-36, pertaining to the enforcement of section 3003.5(b) upon 
parolees.  (CDCR, Policy No. 07-36:  Implementation of Proposition 83, aka Jessica‟s 
Law (Aug. 17, 2007) (Policy No. 07-36).)  Under that policy, section 2616 of title 15 of 
the California Code of Regulations, setting forth grounds for revocation of parole, was 
revised to add “[v]iolation of the residency restrictions set forth in Penal Code Section 
3003.5 for parolees required to register as provided in Penal Code Section 290,” as a 
reportable ground for revocation of parole.  (Policy No. 07-36, supra, p. 1; see Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 15, § 2616, subd. (a)(15).)  The revised policy was applicable to “all parolees 
required to register as sex offenders pursuant to PC Section 290, released from custody 
on or after November 8, 2006,” including the following parolee categories:  “Initial 
[r]eleases,” “Parole [v]iolators [w]ith a [n]ew [t]erm,” “Parolees released after having 
6 
 
served a period of revocation,” and “Parolees released from any other jurisdiction‟s 
custody . . . .”3  (Policy No. 07-36, at p. 1.) 
Parole units were provided with two lists of registered sex offenders released on 
parole after November 8, 2006:  those who were in compliance, and those who appeared 
to be out of compliance with the residency restrictions of section 3003.5(b).  (Policy No. 
07-36, supra, at p. 2.)  Each parolee whose residence appeared to be out of compliance 
was to be served with a “Modified Condition of Parole Addendum” giving him 45 days 
within which to come into compliance with the residency restrictions or be subject to 
arrest and reincarceration for violating his parole.  (Id., at pp. 5, 9.) 
B.  Petitioners 
Petitioners are four registered sex offender parolees subject to the new mandatory 
parole residency restrictions. 4  As noted, in each case the petitioner was convicted of a 
sex offense or offenses for which lifetime registration was required pursuant to section 
290 well before the passage of Proposition 83.  In each case, the petitioner was released 
from prison on his current parole (after serving his latest term in prison custody for a 
nonsex offense) after November 8, 2006, the effective date of section 3003.5(b).  Each 
petitioner was thereafter served with a 45-day letter imposing the residency restrictions as 
an additional statutory condition of parole. 
                                              
3  
On October 11, 2007, the CDCR issued a revised policy for the implementation of 
section 3003.5(b), requiring noncompliant parolees to either “immediately provide a 
compliant residence or declare themselves transient.”  (CDCR, Policy No. 07-48: Revised 
Procedures for Jessica‟s Law Notice to Comply (Oct. 11, 2007) [amending  Policy No. 
07-36].) 
4  
Petitioners requested that we permit their supporting declarations to be filed under 
seal and to otherwise not disclose their identities given the particular subject matter of 
these proceedings.  In a departure from our usual practice (see Cal. Style Manual (4th ed. 
2000) § 5:9, pp. 179-180), we granted their request.  Upon transfer of the petition and 
orders to show cause previously issued on all remaining claims to the lower courts, those 
courts are free to reevaluate the necessity of conducting further proceedings under seal 
and not disclosing the identities of petitioners. 
7 
 
1.  E.J. 
Petitioner E.J. was convicted of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (2)) and robbery of an 
inhabited dwelling (former § 213.5, subd. (2)) in 1985 when he was 16 years old.  The 
forcible rape conviction subjected him to the lifelong registration requirement of section 
290.  He served four years nine months in the California Youth Authority and was 
released in October 1989.  In 1993, he was convicted of willful cruelty to a child (§ 273a, 
subd. (b)) and second degree robbery (§ 212.5).  He served two years in prison for those 
offenses.  In 2000, he was convicted of battery (§ 242) and possession of drug 
paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364).  In 2004 he was convicted of failing to 
register under section 290, sentenced to prison, and paroled once again in August 2005.  
Thereafter, he suffered numerous additional parole violations and was returned to prison 
on three separate occasions.  He was last released from prison custody on parole in 
February 2007, after the effective date of section 3003.5(b). 
According to his declaration, in September 2007, E.J. lived with his wife and their 
children in an apartment in San Francisco.  He was informed by his parole agent that his 
residence was not compliant with section 3003.5(b) and that he would have to locate 
compliant housing by October 2, 2007, or face revocation of parole.  Thereafter, because 
the original notice was defective, he was given an additional 10 days to comply.  E.J. 
claims his parole agent initially told him there was no compliant housing in San 
Francisco, but subsequently told him there is a “small area near AT&T Park that is not 
within 2,000 feet of a school or park.”  He declares, “I cannot afford to live near AT&T 
Park, as it is one of the most expensive areas in San Francisco.  In addition, I do not 
believe that I would be able to establish a secure residence near AT&T Park because I 
believe that some law enforcement officials would consider it a park where children 
regularly gather.”  At the time he prepared his declaration, E.J. was unable to move into 
compliant housing and was preparing to declare himself homeless. 
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2.  S.P. 
In 1998, petitioner S.P., then a minor, was tried as an adult and convicted by guilty 
plea of rape where the victim (a 15-year-old girl) was prevented from resisting by reason 
of an intoxicating or controlled substance.  (§ 261, subd. (a)(3).)  He served three years 
eight months in prison and was released from custody on parole in August 2001.  The 
rape conviction subjected S.P. to lifetime registration under section 290.  In 2002, he was 
convicted of knowingly receiving or concealing stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), served 
an additional four years eight months in prison, and was paroled in August 2006.  In early 
March 2007, S.P. was taken into custody and charged with a parole violation for driving 
the wrong way down a one-way street while in possession of an open container of 
alcohol.  He pled no contest and was released from custody on parole to Santa Clara 
County on March 22, 2007, after the effective date of section 3003.5(b). 
According to his declaration, in August 2007 S.P. was informed by his parole 
agent that he was in violation of the residency restrictions because the apartment where 
he lived with his mother was within 2,000 feet of a daycare facility.  He was told that if 
he did not move by October 11, 2007, he would face parole revocation and return to 
prison.  He asserts his parole agent told him that “it was my responsibility to find 
compliant housing and that he could not provide me with any assistance.”  He asked to 
transfer his parole out of Santa Clara County but was told by his parole agent that the 
process would take at least 60 days, by which time he would be in violation of the 
residency restrictions.  At the time he filed his habeas corpus petition, S.P. and his mother 
had been unable to locate compliant housing in Santa Clara County. 
3.  J.S. 
In 1985, petitioner J.S. was convicted of indecent exposure in Texas pursuant to 
Texas Penal Code section 21.08, subdivision (a), which provides, “A person commits an 
offense if he exposes his anus or any part of his genitals with intent to arouse or gratify 
9 
 
the sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another is present who 
will be offended or alarmed by his act.”  As a result of his conviction, he has been subject 
to the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 while residing in California.  (See 
Pen. Code, §§ 290, subd. (c), 290.005, subd. (a).) 
After coming to California, J.S. was convicted in 1990 of exhibiting or using a 
deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)); in 1991 of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. 
(a)); in 1999 and 2000 of battery against a current or former spouse, fiancée or cohabitant 
(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)); and in 2000 of willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or 
roommate (§ 273.5, subd. (a)).  Following this last conviction and prison term, J.S. was 
released on parole to San Diego County in March 2006.  In February 2007, his parole was 
revoked for failure to register.  He was returned to prison and again released on parole in 
May 2007, after the effective date of section 3003.5(b). 
According to his declaration, in August 2007 J.S. was informed by his parole 
agent that he would have to move from his San Diego County residence because it was 
within 2,000 feet of an elementary school and a park.  J.S. asked if he could move to 
another state; his parole agent initially agreed to help him but thereafter told him the 
process to transfer his parole out of state could not be completed before he was required 
to find housing in compliance with section 3003.5(b), and that if he could not do so he 
would have to declare himself homeless or face parole revocation and return to prison.  
He thereafter lost his state funding to pay the rent for his noncompliant housing, could 
not locate compliant housing, and declared himself homeless in late September 2007. 
4.  K.T. 
In 1990, petitioner K.T. was convicted of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (2)) and 
forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), for which he served a five-year prison 
term, and which convictions subjected him to the registration requirement of section 290.  
In 2001, he was convicted of felony grand theft (§ 487), returned to prison, and thereafter 
10 
 
released on parole in January 2006.  In June 2007, his parole was revoked based on his 
failure to register under section 290.  Following his return to prison for the parole 
revocation, he was again released on parole to San Diego County in August 2007, after 
the effective date of section 3003.5(b). 
According to his declaration, in August 2007, K.T. was served with formal notice 
that his residence was not in compliance with section 3003.5(b) because it was within 
2,000 feet of an elementary school.  At the time K.T. was living with his disabled wife, 
for whom he provided care, in a house owned by them.  At the time he submitted his 
declaration, K.T. was attempting to find compliant housing.  He further indicates he filed 
an emergency grievance request with CDCR that was denied, with his appeal currently 
pending. 
C.  The petition for writ of habeas corpus 
On October 4, 2007, E.J., S.P., J.S., and K.T. filed a unified petition for writ of 
habeas corpus seeking to temporarily and permanently enjoin CDCR from enforcing 
section 3003.5(b) against them as a statutory condition of their paroles.  Petitioners 
advance a number of challenges to the statute.  At the threshold, they contend that 
enforcement of section 3003.5(b) as to them constitutes an impermissible retroactive 
application of the statute, in contravention of the general statutory presumption that Penal 
Code provisions operate prospectively (§ 3), because it attaches new legal consequences 
to their convictions of registrable sex offenses suffered prior to the passage of Proposition 
83.  In a closely related argument, petitioners contend that such retroactive enforcement 
of section 3003.5(b) further violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States 
Constitution (art. I, § 10) and the California Constitution (art. I, § 9) because it “ „makes 
more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission.‟ ”  (Collins v. 
Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 42.)  Petitioners also contend section 3003.5(b) is an 
unreasonable, vague, and overbroad parole condition that infringes on various state and 
11 
 
federal constitutional rights, including their privacy rights, property rights, right to 
intrastate travel, and their substantive due process rights under the federal Constitution. 
On October 10, 2007, we issued an order staying enforcement of section 3003.5(b) 
as to these four petitioners.  On December 12, 2007, we issued orders to show cause with 
respect to each petitioner, returnable in this court. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Section 3003.5(b) enforced as a mandatory parole condition 
Section 3003.5(b) makes it “unlawful for any person for whom registration is 
required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 2000 feet of any public or private 
school, or park where children regularly gather.”  (§ 3003.5(b).)  In the official ballot 
pamphlet, the proponents of the initiative measure told the voters the intent behind 
section 3003.5(b) was to create “predator free zones around schools and parks to prevent 
sex offenders from living near where our children learn and play.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 83, at p. 46.)  The Legislative Analyst told the 
voters that a violation of the new provision would constitute a parole violation for 
registered sex offenders on parole as well as a misdemeanor offense.  (Id., analysis of 
Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, at p. 44.) 
Each petitioner before us is a paroled registered sex offender who specifically 
challenges CDCR‟s attempts to enforce the new statutory residency restrictions against 
him as a ground for revocation of his parole.  Section 3003.5 of the Penal Code is found 
in part 3, title 1, chapter 8 (entitled “Length of Term of Imprisonment and Paroles”) and, 
as the section‟s language reflects, its provisions are obviously intended to apply to 
“persons released on parole.”  (§ 3003.5, subd. (a), italics added.)5 
                                              
5  
The further question whether section 3003.5(b) also created a separate new 
misdemeanor offense applicable to all sex offenders subject to the registration 
requirement of section 290, irrespective of their parole status, is not before us, as there is 
no allegation or evidence that these petitioners, or any other registered sex offenders, 
12 
 
For purposes of these habeas corpus proceedings initiated by paroled registered 
sex offenders against CDCR, we therefore view petitioners as a necessarily included 
subgroup within the statutory phrase “any person[s] for whom registration is required 
pursuant to Section 290” (§ 3003.5(b)), namely, those persons for whom registration is 
required pursuant to Section 290, who were released on parole after November 8, 2006, 
the effective date of Proposition 83. 
 
B.  Retroactivity 
Petitioners first claim section 3003.5(b)‟s residency restrictions are being 
impermissibly applied retroactively to them.  Specifically, petitioners argue that because 
they committed the underlying sex offenses that gave rise to the requirement that they 
register for life pursuant to section 290 well before the voters enacted section 3003.5(b), 
the new law retroactively attaches new legal consequences to their prior convictions.  
Insofar as Jessica‟s Law fails to explicitly state that any of its provisions are retroactive, 
petitioners contend that application of the new residency restrictions to them contravenes 
section 3 of the Penal Code, which provides, as a general matter, that “No part of [the 
Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”  (§ 3.) 
“[S]ection 3 reflects the common understanding that legislative provisions are 
presumed to operate prospectively, and that they should be so interpreted „unless express 
language or clear and unavoidable implication negatives the presumption.‟ [Citation.]”  
(Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208.)  “[I]n the absence of an 
express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very 
clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended a 
retroactive application.”  (Id. at p. 1209.) 
                                                                                                                                                  
whether on parole or otherwise, have ever been separately charged with such an offense 
under the new provision. 
13 
 
We conclude section 3 is not violated here.  Each of these four petitioners was 
released from custody on his current parole and took up residency in noncompliant 
housing after section 3003.5(b)‟s effective date.  Under settled principles of law for 
determining whether a Penal Code provision is being applied prospectively or 
retroactively, it is clear that the new residency restrictions here in issue are being 
prospectively applied to petitioners. 
Under its plain language, subdivision (b) applies to “any person for whom 
registration is required pursuant to Section 290.”  (§ 3003.5(b).)  A convicted sex 
offender who becomes subject to the registration requirement of section 290 must register 
“for the rest of his or her life while residing in California, or while attending school or 
working in California. . . .”  (§ 290, subd. (b).)  Accordingly, under the plain language of 
section 3003.5(b), any convicted sex offender already subject to the lifetime registration 
requirement who is released from custody on parole, whether it be after serving a term in 
custody for an initial sex offense conviction, a new sex offense conviction, or a new 
nonsex offense conviction, becomes subject to the new mandatory residency restrictions 
for the duration of his parole term.  Should he take up residency in noncompliant housing 
after his release from custody, he will then be subject to parole revocation for a violation 
of section 3003.5(b).  It matters not, under a straightforward application of the language 
of the statute, whether the registered sex offender is being released on his current parole 
for a sex or nonsex offense.  Since he is already subject to the lifetime registration 
requirement of section 290, that status, together with his act of moving into noncompliant 
housing upon his release from custody on parole after the effective date of 
Proposition 83, subjects him to the residency restrictions of section 3003.5(b).  In 
contrast, under the dissent‟s interpretation of section 3003.5(b), all of the many thousands 
of registered sex offenders who achieved that status prior to November 8, 2006, the 
14 
 
effective date of Proposition 83, will enjoy a free lifetime pass from section 3003.5(b)‟s 
residency restrictions, irrespective of their parole status. 
Each of the four petitioners before us was convicted of one or more sex offenses 
requiring that he register for life (§ 290, subd. (b)) years before Jessica‟s Law was passed.  
However, each petitioner was not released from custody on his current parole until after the 
statute‟s effective date, and each thereafter took up residency in noncompliant housing, 
making him subject to a reportable parole violation under CDCR‟s Policy No. 07-36.  CDCR 
takes the position that the statutory presumption against retroactivity of Penal Code 
provisions (§ 3) is not implicated where, as here, the new residency restrictions are being 
applied only to registered sex offenders who were released from prison custody on parole 
and who secured noncompliant housing after the statute‟s effective date.  The relevant case 
law supports CDCR‟s position. 
The applicable test for determining whether a statute is being applied 
prospectively or retroactively was explained in People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150 
(Grant).  In that case we considered whether conviction of the crime of “continuous 
sexual abuse of a child” (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) for a course of conduct that included acts of 
child molestation committed both before and after section 288.5‟s effective date was a 
retroactive application of the statute.  We first observed:  “As the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized, „deciding when a statute operates “retroactively” is not always a 
simple or mechanical task‟ (Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244, 268) 
and „comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the 
change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and 
a relevant past event‟ (id. at p. 270).  In exercising this judgment, „familiar considerations 
of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.‟  
(Ibid.)”  (Grant, at p. 157.) 
15 
 
We went on to explain, “In general, application of a law is retroactive only if it 
attaches new legal consequences to, or increases a party‟s liability for, an event, transaction, 
or conduct that was completed before the law‟s effective date.  (Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, 269-270 & fn. 23; see also Rodriguez v. General Motors 
Corp. (9th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 396, 398; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 291; 
Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 7; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 851.)  Thus, 
the critical question for determining retroactivity usually is whether the last act or event 
necessary to trigger application of the statute occurred before or after the statute‟s effective 
date.  (Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 749, 752; McAndrews v. 
Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, N.A. (1st Cir. 1993) 989 F.2d 13, 16.)  A law is not retroactive 
„merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came 
into existence prior to its enactment.‟  (Kizer v. Hanna, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 7.)”  (Grant, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 157.) 
We concluded in Grant, “Here, defendant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse, 
as defined in section 288.5, after the court instructed the jury to return a verdict of guilty 
only if it found that one of the required minimum of three acts of molestation occurred after 
section 288.5‟s effective date.  In other words, defendant could be convicted only if the 
course of conduct constituting the offense of continuous sexual abuse was completed after 
the new law became effective.  Because the last act necessary to trigger application of 
section 288.5 was an act of molestation that defendant committed after 288.5‟s effective 
date, defendant‟s conviction was not a retroactive application of section 288.5 and therefore 
not a violation of the statutory prohibition against retroactive application of the Penal Code.”  
(Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 157-158.) 
Section 3003.5(b) places restrictions on where a paroled sex offender subject to 
lifetime registration pursuant to section 290 may reside while on parole.  For purposes of 
retroactivity analysis, the pivotal “last act or event” (Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 157) 
16 
 
that must occur before the mandatory residency restrictions come into play is the 
registered sex offender‟s securing of a residence upon his release from custody on parole.  
If that “last act or event” occurred subsequent to the effective date of section 3003.5(b), a 
conclusion that it was a violation of the registrant‟s parole does not constitute a 
“retroactive” application of the statute. 
The facts and holding in Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275 
(Bourquez) are particularly instructive here, as they involve the question whether another 
provision of Jessica‟s Law enacted by Proposition 83 was being applied prospectively or 
retroactively. 
At issue in Bourquez was that portion of Jessica‟s Law approved by the voters at 
the November 7, 2006, election that extended the commitment terms of persons 
determined to be sexually violent predators under the Sexually Violent Predator Act 
(SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) from two years to an indeterminate term.  
The petitioner in Bourquez claimed that to apply the new indeterminate term for sexually 
violent predators to individuals like himself who had pending recommitment petitions at 
the time Proposition 83 was enacted would be an impermissible retroactive application of 
the new statute.  The Bourquez court explained, “Proposition 83 is entirely silent on the 
question of retroactivity, so we presume it is intended to operate only prospectively.  The 
question is whether applying its provisions to pending petitions to extend commitment is 
a prospective application.”  (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288, italics added.) 
The Bourquez court went on to explain that, “[b]ecause a proceeding to extend 
commitment under the SVPA focuses on a person‟s current mental state, applying the 
indeterminate term of commitment of Proposition 83 does not attach new legal 
consequences to conduct that was completed before the effective date of the law.  
[Citation.]  Applying Proposition 83 to pending petitions to extend commitment under the 
17 
 
SVPA to make any future extended commitment for an indeterminate term is not a 
retroactive application.”  (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1289.) 
Significantly, the Bourquez court did not find the fact of, or dates of, the sex 
offense convictions that first qualified the defendant as a sexually violent predator to be 
controlling on his retroactivity claim.  Rather, since the relevant provision of Jessica‟s 
Law pertained to a sexually violent predator‟s current mental state, the court concluded 
that to apply the new law to a defendant already under a fixed-term commitment as a 
sexually violent predator was a prospective, and not an impermissible retrospective, 
application of the statute. 
By parity of reasoning, the provisions of Jessica‟s Law here under scrutiny — 
section 3003.5(b)‟s statutory residency restrictions — are not implicated until a convicted 
and registered sex offender is released from custody and must take up residency in the 
community to which he has been paroled.  Applying the mandatory residency restrictions 
to these four petitioners, who were released from prison on parole after the effective date 
of Jessica‟s Law, and who thus had ample notice of the necessity of securing housing in 
compliance with the restrictions at the time they moved into noncompliant housing, is 
simply not a retroactive application of the new law.  (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1289.)6 
                                              
6  
To be contrasted with the holding in Bourquez is the holding in People v. Whaley 
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779.  As in Bourquez, the provision at issue in Whaley was that 
part of Jessica‟s Law that extended the commitment terms of sexually violent predators 
under the SVPA from two years to an indeterminate term.  (Whaley, at pp. 785-786.)  
Unlike Bourquez, however, which involved a recommitment petition already pending at 
the time Jessica‟s Law was passed, in Whaley the People simply petitioned the court to 
summarily convert the defendant‟s preexisting two-year fixed-term commitment as a 
sexually violent predator into an indeterminate term under the new law after the provision 
had passed. 
18 
 
It may be that if a registered sex offender was released from custody on his 
current parole term prior to November 8, 2006, and secured noncompliant housing prior 
to that date, in which he currently resides, application of the residency restrictions to him 
would constitute an impermissible retrospective application of the statute.  Under those 
circumstances, he would not have had notice of the new 2,000-foot “predator free zone” 
restrictions prior to his release from custody on parole and the securing of his current 
residence, the conduct to which section 3003.5(b) speaks.  (See Doe v. Schwarzenegger 
(E.D.Cal. 2007) 476 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1179, fn. 1 [holding that § 3003.5(b) could not be 
applied retroactively to persons convicted of registrable offenses prior to the effective 
date of the statute “and who were paroled, given probation, or released from incarceration 
prior to that date”].)  However, all four petitioners here were released from custody on 
their current parole terms, and then secured their noncompliant housing, after the 
effective date of Jessica‟s Law.  By doing so, they violated a law already in effect, and 
application of that law to those violations is not “retroactive.” 
Contrary to petitioners‟ argument, the fact that they were all convicted of sex 
offenses giving rise to their status as lifetime registrants pursuant to section 290 well 
prior to the passage of Jessica‟s Law does not, in itself, establish that the new parole 
residency restrictions are now being applied retroactively to them.  The decision in 
People v. Mills (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1278 (Mills) succinctly explains the point in an 
analogous context. 
The defendant in Mills was convicted in 1981 of felony possession of marijuana 
for sale.  At that time, section 12021, subdivision (a) provided, “Any person who has 
been convicted of a felony under the laws of . . . California . . . who owns or has in his 
possession or under his custody or control any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable 
of being concealed upon the person is guilty of a public offense  . . . .”  (Italics added.)  
Subsequently, section 12021, subdivision (a) was amended, effective January 1, 1990, to 
19 
 
provide, “Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of . . . 
California . . . who owns or has in his or her possession or under his or her custody or 
control any firearm is guilty of a felony.”  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1044, § 3, italics added.)  
After the effective date of the amendment, defendant brought a shotgun into a sporting 
goods store to have it repaired.  His status as an ex-felon was discovered and he was 
arrested, charged, and convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 
amended section 12021, subdivision (a).  The defendant appealed, contending the 1990 
amendment to section 12021, subdivision (a) was an unconstitutional ex post facto law 
being applied to him.  (Mills, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1281-1282.) 
The Mills court first explained that the question whether a new law is being 
applied retrospectively is closely intertwined with the question whether it is an 
unconstitutional ex post facto law, because a finding that the law is being applied 
retrospectively is a threshold requirement for finding it impermissibly ex post facto.  For 
this principle Mills cited the high court‟s decision in Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 
24, which explained that “ „two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal 
law to be ex post facto:  it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring 
before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.‟ ”  (Mills, 
supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1282-1283, quoting Weaver v. Graham, supra, 450 U.S. at 
pp. 28-29.)  Generally, where a new law “retroactively increase[s] the punishment for [a] 
crime, it [is] retrospective for purposes of the ex post facto test.”  (Mills, supra, 
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285.)  “The clearest example of [an ex post facto] law is one which 
defines a new crime and applies its definition retroactively to [punish] conduct which was 
not criminal at the time it occurred.”  (Id. at p. 1282.) 
The Mills court concluded the defendant‟s conviction as a felon in possession of a 
firearm under the amended version of section 12021, subdivision (a) — which broadened 
the definition of the crime from possession of a concealable firearm to possession of any 
20 
 
firearm — was neither a retroactive application of the new law nor conviction of an ex 
post facto law.  The court explained, “Here defendant was convicted of conduct, his 
possession of a shotgun, occurring after the effective date of the statute.  His conduct was 
a violation of the new statute, rather than an increase of punishment for the earlier offense 
of possessing marijuana for sale.  Although the statute only applied to him because of his 
status as a person convicted of a felony, and the felony conviction occurred before the 
statute became effective, the fact of his prior conviction only places him into a status 
which makes the new law applicable to him.  The legal consequences of his past conduct 
were not changed — only a new law was applied to his future conduct.”  (Mills, supra, 
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286, fn. omitted.) 
The Mills court emphasized that “defendant knew, or should have known, that it 
was a crime for him to possess a shotgun after January 1, 1990.  He had fair warning of 
the new law, and he did possess a shotgun after that date.  [Citation.]  His conviction for 
doing so was not retrospective.  Although the new law applied to him because he had the 
status of a felony offender, he was not additionally punished for possessing marijuana for 
sale but rather was punished for committing a new crime, possession of a firearm by a 
felon, after the amendment to the statute became effective.  [Citation.]”  (Mills, supra, 6 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1289.) 
Here, given that petitioners were released on their current parole terms after the 
effective date of Jessica‟s Law, petitioners knew, or should have known, that they would 
be subject to a reportable parole violation if they moved into housing that did not comply 
with the newly enacted residency restrictions that took effect prior to their release.  They 
are thus presumed to have had fair notice of the new restrictions applicable to them prior 
to their release on parole and their securing of noncompliant housing.  To require 
petitioners to comply with the new residency restrictions or face a parole violation for 
failing to do so is thus not a retrospective application of the law.  Although they fall 
21 
 
under the new restrictions by virtue of their status as registered sex offenders who have 
been released on parole, they are not being “additionally punished” for commission of the 
original sex offenses that gave rise to that status.  Rather, petitioners are being subjected 
to new restrictions on where they may reside while on their current parole — restrictions 
clearly intended to operate and protect the public in the present, not to serve as additional 
punishment for past crimes. 
The dissent argues that, by finding section 3003.5(b) applies prospectively to 
lifetime sex registrants who were released on parole and moved to noncompliant housing 
after the effective date of Proposition 83, we contravene Strauss v. Horton (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 364 (Strauss), where we concluded that Proposition 8‟s state constitutional 
ban on same-sex marriage cannot be applied retroactively to same-sex couples who 
married prior to the initiative’s effective date.  The dissent is wrong.  As we explained in 
Strauss, the affected same-sex couples took affirmative steps in reliance on this court‟s 
holding in In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 that the California Constitution 
included a right to same-sex marriage.  Thus, we observed, “[w]ere Proposition 8 to be 
applied to invalidate or to deny recognition to marriages performed prior to November 5, 
2008 [the date Prop. 8 became effective], rendering such marriages ineffective in the 
future, such action would take away or impair vested rights acquired under the prior 
state of the law and would constitute a retroactive application of the measure.”  (Strauss, 
supra, at p. 472, italics added.)  In other words, unless the voters clearly provided 
otherwise, Proposition 8 could alter the future right to marry, but it could not negate or 
undo permanent legal relationships that were allowed — indeed protected — by the 
Constitution at the time they were entered into. 
Petitioners here took no affirmative action, prior to the effective date of 
Proposition 83, in reliance on an earlier state of the law that gave them a “vested right” 
against future statutory restrictions concerning where they might thereafter establish 
22 
 
residency.  Nor does Proposition 83 purport to undo any vested rights.  As applied to 
these petitioners, Proposition 83 operates only on actions they took, with fair notice of the 
new residency restrictions, after the initiative‟s effective date.  That Proposition 83‟s 
restrictions on where parolees released after its effective date may thereafter live derives 
from their prior status as lifetime sex-offender registrants does not mean the measure is 
being applied retroactively to them.  The dissent‟s attempt to invoke Strauss is thus 
unpersuasive. 
We therefore conclude petitioners‟ retroactivity claim must be rejected.  Enforcing 
section 3003.5(b)‟s residency restrictions against them is a prospective, not a 
retrospective, application of that law.7 
 
C.  Ex post facto 
Petitioners next make the closely related argument that section 3003.5(b) is an 
unconstitutional ex post facto law if retroactively applied to them.  The claim is 
unavailing given our conclusion that the law is not being applied retroactively to these 
petitioners. 
Both the United States Constitution (art. I, §§ 9 and 10) and the California 
Constitution (art. I, § 9) prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws.  In Collins v. 
Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. 37, the high court explained that an impermissible ex post 
facto law is one which “makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 
commission.”  (Id. at p. 42.)  “Through this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that 
legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their 
meaning until explicitly changed.  [Citations.]  The ban also restricts governmental power 
                                              
7  
CDCR also takes the position that if section 3003.5(b) is being applied 
retroactively to these petitioners, then the language of the initiative measure itself, as well 
as statements in the ballot pamphlet submitted to the voters, reflect that the new parole 
residency restrictions were plainly intended to have such retroactive effect.  We need not 
and do not address the contention given our conclusion that section 3003.5(b) is only 
being applied prospectively to these petitioners. 
23 
 
by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.  [Citations.] [¶]  In accord 
with these purposes, our decisions prescribe that two critical elements must be present for 
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply 
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected 
by it.”  (Weaver v. Graham, supra, 450 U.S. at pp. 28-29, some italics added, fns. 
omitted.)  This court has observed that there is no significant difference between the 
federal and state ex post facto clauses.  (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 
295-297.) 
In In re Ramirez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 931, we considered whether, under the state and 
federal ex post facto clauses, a new statutory plan for awarding prison conduct credits 
could be applied to prisoners whose crimes occurred before the effective date of the new 
scheme, but whose prison behavior that could lead to a reduction in credits was 
committed after the new scheme went into effect.  (Id. at p. 932.)  We concluded that it 
may.  (Ibid.)  Applying the test set forth in Weaver v. Graham, supra, 450 U.S. at pages 
28-29, to determine whether the new sentencing credit scheme was impermissibly 
retrospective, we explained, “For a law to be retrospective, „it must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment.‟  [Citation.]  A retrospective law violates the ex post facto 
clauses when it „substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime already 
completed, and therefore changes “the quantum of punishment.” ‟  [Citation.]  [¶]  We 
conclude that the 1982 amendments are not retrospective and therefore do not violate the 
ex post facto clauses.  Petitioner, citing [In re Paez (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 919], 
contends that the 1982 amendments relate to the original offense, not to the infraction 
committed in prison.  We disagree.  It is true that the 1982 amendments apply to 
petitioner only because he is a prisoner and that he is a prisoner only because of an act 
committed before the 1982 amendments.  Nonetheless, the increased sanctions are 
imposed solely because of petitioner‟s prison misconduct occurring after the 1982 
24 
 
amendments became effective.  In other words, the 1982 amendments apply only to 
events occurring after their enactment.  If any aspect of prison life is unconnected to a 
prisoner's original crime, it would seem to be the sanctions for his misconduct while in 
prison.  Accordingly, the 1982 amendments, which change the sanctions for that 
misconduct, do not relate to petitioner‟s original crime and are not retrospective under 
Weaver [v. Graham].”  (In re Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 936-937; see also Mills, 
supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285.) 
The rationales of In re Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.3d 931, and Mills, supra, 6 
Cal.App.4th at page 1285, apply here and support rejection of petitioners‟ ex post facto 
claim.  True, section 3003.5(b) applies to these petitioners only by virtue of their status as 
registered sex offenders, a status they achieved upon their convictions of qualifying sex 
offenses prior to the enactment of Jessica‟s Law and section 3003.5(b).  Nevertheless, the 
new residency restrictions apply to events occurring after their effective date — 
petitioners‟ acts of taking up residency in noncompliant housing upon their release from 
custody on parole after the statute‟s effective date.  It follows that section 3003.5(b) is not 
an ex post facto law if applied to such conduct occurring after its effective date because it 
does not additionally punish for the sex offense conviction or convictions that originally 
gave rise to the parolee‟s status as a lifetime registrant under section 290.  (Collins v. 
Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 42; Mills, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285.) 
 
D.  Petitioners’ remaining claims 
Petitioners further contend section 3003.5(b) is an unreasonable, vague and 
overbroad parole condition that infringes on various state and federal constitutional 
rights, including their privacy rights, property rights, right to intrastate travel, and their 
substantive due process rights under the federal Constitution.  In support of these claims, 
petitioners have appended declarations and various materials as exhibits to their petition 
25 
 
and traverse in an effort to establish a factual basis for each claim.  CDCR, in its return, 
has denied many of the allegations advanced in the petition in reliance on such exhibits. 
In contrast with the retroactivity and ex post facto issues we have addressed above, 
petitioners‟ remaining constitutional claims present considerably more complex “as 
applied” challenges to the enforcement of the new residency restrictions as parole 
violations in the particular jurisdictions to which each petitioner has been paroled.  
Petitioners are not all similarly situated with regard to their paroles.  They have been 
paroled to different cities and counties within the state, and the supply of housing in 
compliance with section 3003.5(b) available to them during their terms of parole — a 
matter critical to deciding the merits of their as applied constitutional challenges — is not 
sufficiently established by those declarations and materials to permit this court to decide 
the claims. 
For example, petitioners have appended small maps to the petition (exhibit E), 
which they argue establish that “nearly all of the cities of San Diego, Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco are off limits [to registered sex offenders released on parole].”  But the 
small maps, comprising almost indiscernible, variably shaded gray areas purporting to 
depict the scarcity of section 3003.5(b) compliant housing across the state, contain no 
dates reflecting when they were prepared, no street names or addresses, no indication of 
where these petitioners are residing in relation to the maps, no indication of the locations 
of any schools or “parks where children regularly gather,” and no legend adequately 
explaining how the maps were prepared or precisely what they purport to show.  CDCR, 
in turn, has denied the allegations made by petitioners in reliance on the maps, further 
noting petitioners have not authenticated the maps on which they purport to rely. 
As another example, petitioners allege in their traverse that section 3003.5(b) 
“makes entire cities off-limits to sex offenders, including Petitioners,” that under the 
residency restrictions, “[section 290] registrants [are] unable to find a single compliant 
26 
 
home in the cities in which they were paroled,” and that the restrictions are “so 
unreasonably broad” as to leave those to whom it applies “with no option but prison or 
homelessness, as is the case here.”  But these allegations appear to conflict with certain 
materials appended to petitioners‟ traverse, specifically, a report to the Legislature and 
Governor‟s office, prepared in January 2008 by the California Sex Offender Management 
Board (CASOMB),8 setting forth “An Assessment of Current Management Practices of 
Adult Sex Offenders in California.”  (Exhibit O; CASOMB Report.)  The CASOMB 
Report indicates, under the subheading “Current Status of Housing Compliance,” that 
“As of December 9, 2007 [13 months after § 3003.5(b) took effect, and two months after 
the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in this court], 3,884 parolees subject to 
Jessica‟s Law were under the supervision of a parole agent in California communities.  
3,166 of this population reside in compliant housing, while 718 have declared themselves 
transient. . . .  [¶] Although the 3,884 parolees represent[] the total number of offenders 
that remain in the community under parole supervision, and CDCR enforcement efforts 
have resulted in near full compliance with the housing challenges of Jessica’[s] Law, 
these offenders represent approximately half of the population subject to Jessica‟s Law 
released during this period (7516).”  (CASOMB Rep., supra, at p. 125, italics added.) 
The section 3003.5(b) housing compliance statistics reported in the CASOMB 
Report for the first year the residency restrictions were in effect are difficult to reconcile 
with petitioners‟ allegations that compliant housing has been virtually unavailable to 
them in the various communities to which they have been paroled. 
Finally, the matter of whether CDCR and, in particular, DAPO are obligated by 
law to identify compliant housing for petitioners or otherwise assist them in locating and 
                                              
8  
CASOMB comprises representatives from the Attorney General‟s office, CDCR, 
regional parole administration, the judicial branch, district attorneys‟ offices, public 
defenders‟ offices, probation departments, law enforcement agencies, as well as victims 
advocates and licensed treatment providers, among others. 
27 
 
securing such housing,9 a matter that may factor into resolution of petitioners‟ claim that 
section 3003.5(b) is being enforced against them as an unreasonable parole condition that 
infringes on a number of their fundamental constitutional rights,10 also appears disputed 
                                              
9  
It bears observing that a parole term is a component of the inmate‟s original 
sentence, and that parolees remain in the constructive custody of CDCR for the duration 
of their fixed parole terms and are not formally “discharged” from the department‟s 
custody until the expiration of the parole term.  (See §§ 3000, subd. (a)(1), 3056.)  CDCR 
has a statutory obligation to “assist parolees in the transition between imprisonment and 
discharge.”  (§§ 3000, subd. (a)(1), 3074.)  The extent to which such obligation includes 
assisting sex offender registrant parolees in identifying or securing housing in compliance 
with section 3003.5(b) in the communities to which they are paroled remains unclear. 
10  
As emphasized at the outset, petitioners here challenge only the enforcement of 
section 3003.5(b) as a statutory parole condition setting forth residency restrictions 
applicable to paroled registered sex offenders like themselves.  There is no evidence 
before us of any attempts, to date, to enforce the statute outside of that limited context.  
Accordingly, in this case, the inquiry into petitioners‟ challenge to section 3003.5(b) as 
an unreasonable statutory parole condition that infringes on their constitutional rights is 
necessarily circumscribed.  The Legislature has given the CDCR and its DAPO 
expansive authority to establish and enforce rules and regulations governing parole, and 
to impose any parole conditions deemed proper.  (§§ 3052, 3053; see Terhune v. Superior 
Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 874 (Terhune).)  “These conditions must be 
reasonable, since parolees retain constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive 
official action.”  (Ibid.; see also In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234; People 
v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84.)  “Nevertheless, the conditions may govern a 
parolee’s residence, his associates or living companions, his travel, his use of intoxicants, 
and other aspects of his life.”  (Terhune, at p. 874, italics added; see generally Morrissey 
v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 482 [parolees have fewer constitutional rights than do 
ordinary persons]; People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 531-532 (Burgener), 
overruled on other grounds in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754, 756.) 
 
The dissent suggests that “[w]hen a statutory restriction substantially impinges on 
a person‟s constitutional right to intrastate travel and does not further the statute‟s 
objective, it must be struck down as to that person.”  (Dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at 
pp. 16-17 & fn. 3 [suggesting the same result for a violation of the state constitutional 
right of privacy].)  But here, the threshold question common to all of petitioners‟ 
remaining as-applied constitutional challenges to section 3003.5(b) is whether the 
section, when enforced as a statutory parole condition against registered sex offenders, 
constitutes an unreasonable parole condition to the extent it infringes on such parolees’ 
fundamental rights.  “Although a parolee is no longer confined in prison[,] his custody 
status is one which requires and permits supervision and surveillance under restrictions 
28 
 
by the parties.  Petitioners point to a statement in CDCR‟s Policy No. 07-36 that cautions:  
“The responsibility to locate and maintain compliant housing shall ultimately remain with 
the individual parolee through utilization of available resources” (Policy No. 07-36, 
supra, at p. 2) in support of their allegation that “Respondent has provided little to no 
assistance to individual parolees attempting to find compliant housing.  Petitioners and 
other noncompliant parolees have not been informed of areas in their counties where 
compliant housing may be found.”  CDCR, in turn, “denies the allegation that it provides 
„little to no assistance to individual parolees attempting to find compliant housing‟; it 
does provide such assistance.”  
With regard to petitioners‟ remaining claims, we therefore conclude that 
evidentiary hearings will have to be conducted to establish the relevant facts necessary to 
decide each such claim.  The trial courts of the counties to which petitioners have been 
paroled are manifestly in the best position to conduct such hearings and find the relevant 
facts necessary to decide the claims with regard to each such jurisdiction.  These facts 
would include, but are not necessarily limited to, establishing each petitioner‟s current 
parole status; the precise location of each petitioner‟s current residence and its proximity 
to the nearest “public or private school, or park where children regularly gather” 
(§ 3003.5(b)); a factual assessment of the compliant housing available to petitioners and 
similarly situated registered sex offenders in the respective counties and communities to 
which they have been paroled; an assessment of the way in which the mandatory parole 
residency restrictions are currently being enforced in each particular jurisdiction; and a 
                                                                                                                                                  
which may not be imposed on members of the public generally.”  (Burgener, supra, 41 
Cal.3d at p. 531; see In re Stevens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.)  Hence, the 
limited nature of the rights retained by registered sex offenders while serving out a term 
of parole, whether it be with regard to the right to travel, to privacy, or to associate with 
persons of one‟s choosing, must inform the inquiry as to whether section 3003.5(b) 
places reasonable or unreasonable restrictions on the paroles of registered sex offenders. 
29 
 
complete record of the protocol CDCR is currently following to enforce section 
3003.5(b) in those respective jurisdictions. 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The claims that section 3003.5(b), construed as a statutory parole condition, is 
being impermissibly retroactively enforced as to these petitioners, and as thus enforced, 
constitutes an ex post facto law under the state and federal Constitutions, are denied.  For 
consideration of petitioners‟ remaining claims, the petition and orders to show cause 
previously issued are hereby ordered transferred to the Courts of Appeal as follows:  In re 
E.J. on Habeas Corpus, S156933, to the First District Court of Appeal; In re S.P. on 
Habeas Corpus, S157631, to the Sixth District Court of Appeal; In re J.S. on Habeas  
Corpus, S157633, and In re K T. on Habeas Corpus, S157634, to Division One of the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal, with directions that each matter be transferred to the trial 
court in the county to which the petitioner has been paroled for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed herein.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.1000(a).)  The 
order staying enforcement of section 3003.5(b) as to these four petitioners, previously 
issued on October 10, 2007, shall remain in effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
Before the court today are four petitioners who were convicted of a sexual offense 
before passage of Proposition 83 (Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 
2006)), who were required by law to register as sex offenders as a result and who have 
been paroled from prison after passage of Proposition 83.  All four petitioners challenge 
the attempt by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to 
enforce against them, as a statutory parole condition, Penal Code section 3003.5, 
subdivision (b) (hereafter section 3003.5(b)), which was enacted as part of Proposition 
83.  That new law prohibits sex offender registrants from living “within 2000 feet of any 
public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”  (§ 3003.5(b).)  The 
majority concludes that enforcing this 2,000-foot residency restriction against petitioners 
as a parole condition does not constitute an impermissible retroactive application of the 
law nor violate their right to be free of an ex post facto application of the law.  The 
majority remands the balance of petitioners‟ constitutional claims to the lower courts to 
permit petitioners to pursue their “as applied” challenges to enforcement of the new 
residency restrictions against them. 
I concur in the majority‟s result, but not necessarily its reasoning.  Specifically, I 
agree that for these four petitioners, all of whom were convicted of qualifying sex 
offenses before passage of Proposition 83 and who were paroled from prison after such 
passage, enforcing the 2,000-foot residency restriction as a condition of their parole 
involves no impermissible retroactive or ex post facto application of the law.  Under the 
2 
plain meaning of section 3003.5(b), the critical date is not the date of one‟s conviction for 
a qualifying sex crime, nor (contrary to the majority) the date of one‟s parole from prison.  
The critical date is instead the date one is found living in noncompliant housing.1  As the 
CDCR proposes to enforce section 3003.5(b) as a parole condition against all four 
petitioners for their living conditions now — that is, after passage of Proposition 83 — I 
agree with the majority‟s conclusion that such action by the CDCR does not violate any 
rights petitioners may possess. 
But I emphasize the narrowness of both the issue before the court and my 
agreement with the majority.  As the majority recognizes, the Legislative Analyst‟s 
description of Proposition 83 and section 3003.5(b) in the official Voter Information 
Guide stated:  “A violation of this provision would be a misdemeanor offense, as well as 
a parole violation for parolees.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) 
analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, p. 44, italics added.)  As no petitioner presently 
before the court is threatened with a misdemeanor prosecution, we address in this case 
the meaning of section 3003.5(b) only as it relates to a condition of parole, and not 
whether it is also a misdemeanor crime. 
Moreover, now before the court are four parolees who were paroled after passage 
of Proposition 83.  We thus also have no occasion here to address whether the 2,000-foot 
residency limit might apply to those who completed their paroles before the effective date 
of Proposition 83 (see, e.g., Doe v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2007) 476 F.Supp.2d 1178, 
1180 [“John Doe II”]); to those whose parole period began before, but is scheduled to 
terminate after, that date (id. at pp. 1179-1180 [“John Doe I”]); or even to the thousands 
                                              
1  
Section 3003.5(b) provides:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is 
unlawful for any person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to 
reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly 
gather.” 
3 
of persons subject to sex offender registration who, for whatever reason, are not currently 
on parole.   
Finally, like the majority, I express no opinion on petitioners‟ various other 
constitutional challenges to section 3003.5(b) and agree that we must remand these cases 
to the lower courts to permit the parties to litigate the factual issues necessary to the 
proper resolution of their respective cases. 
With those caveats, I concur in the result reached by the majority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
I. 
I respectfully dissent. 
Penal Code section 3003.5, subdivision (b) (section 3003.5(b)) cannot be applied 
to those who suffered their convictions before the date Proposition 83 (Prop. 83, as 
approved by the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006)) was enacted.  Nothing in the language 
of the proposition or in the relevant extrinsic materials supports any other conclusion.1  
Therefore, section 3003.5(b) does not apply to these petitioners and I dissent from the 
majority opinion‟s contrary conclusion. 
Before I turn to the majority opinion, I begin with a review of “well-established 
general principles governing the question whether a statutory or constitutional provision 
should be interpreted to apply prospectively or retroactively.”  (Strauss v. Horton (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 364, 470.)  There is a statutory presumption against retroactive application of 
penal laws, articulated in section 3, first enacted in 1872, which states:  “No part of [the 
Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”  This presumption is, as we 
have noted, rooted in federal “constitutional principles” reflected in such provisions as 
the ex post facto clause, the Fifth Amendment‟s takings clause, and the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution.  (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 828, 841.) 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
A statute is retroactive when it “change[s] the legal consequences of past conduct 
by imposing new or different liabilities . . . .”  (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
282, 291.)  “California continues to adhere to the time-honored principle . . . that in the 
absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively 
unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have 
intended a retroactive application.”  (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 
1188, 1208-1209, italics added.)  As we have repeatedly explained, absent an express 
declaration of retroactivity, “a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very 
clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended a 
retroactive application.”  (Id. at p. 1209, italics added.)  The key here is clarity: “a statute 
may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language of retroactivity or if 
other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature [or the 
voters] intended retroactive application.”  (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 844, second italics added.) 
Ambiguous, vague or inconclusive statements cited as proof of an intention that a 
statute be applied retroactively are not sufficient for that purpose.  “[A]t least in modern 
times, we have been cautious not to infer the voters‟ or the Legislature‟s intent on the 
subject of prospective versus retrospective operation from „vague phrases‟ [citation] and 
„broad, general language‟ [citation] in statutes, initiative measures and ballot pamphlets.”  
(Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 229-230.)  
When a statute is ambiguous regarding retroactivity, it is construed to be prospective.  
(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 841.)  Moreover, “a 
remedial purpose does not necessarily indicate an intent to apply the statute retroactively.  
Most statutory changes are, of course, intended to improve a preexisting situation and to 
bring about a fairer state of affairs, and if such an objective were itself sufficient to 
demonstrate a clear legislative intent to apply a statute retroactively, almost all statutory 
3 
provisions and initiative measures would apply retroactively rather than prospectively.”  
(Evangelatos v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d  at p. 1213.) 
The question of whether Proposition 83 was intended to apply retroactively has 
already been recognized, asked, and answered by two decisions of the Court of Appeal 
and a federal district court judge.  They unanimously concluded that Proposition 83 does 
not contain an express statement of retroactivity.  The two Court of Appeal decisions are 
People v. Whaley (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779 and Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 
156 Cal.App.4th 1275.  The provision of Proposition 83 at issue in both of those cases 
was the part of the initiative that extended the commitment terms of persons determined 
to be sexually violent predators under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) from two years to an indeterminate term.  (People v. 
Whaley, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 785-786; Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1279-1280.) 
In Bourquez, the retroactivity question was whether the new indeterminate term 
for sexually violent predators could be applied to individuals who had pending 
recommitment petitions at the time Proposition 83 was enacted.  As the starting point of 
its analysis, the court observed:  “Proposition 83 is entirely silent on the question of 
retroactivity, so we presume it is intended to operate only prospectively.  The question is 
whether applying its provisions to pending petitions to extend commitment is a 
prospective application.”  (Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1288.)  The court ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause a proceeding to extend 
commitment under the SVPA focuses on the person‟s current mental state, applying the 
indeterminate term of commitment of Proposition 83 does not attach new legal 
consequences to conduct that was completed before the effective date of the law.  
[Citation.]  Applying Proposition 83 to pending petitions to extend commitment under the 
4 
SVPA to make any future extended commitment for an indeterminate term is not a 
retroactive application.”  (Id. at p. 1289.) 
People v. Whaley involved a different twist on the question of whether the change 
in the law regarding SVPA commitments could be applied retroactively.  In Whaley, the 
People sought to amend the defendant‟s 1999 SVPA commitment, which had been for 
two years, and convert it into an indeterminate term under Proposition 83.  The trial court 
granted the People‟s motion.  On appeal, the order was reversed on the ground that 
applying Proposition 83 to a term of commitment imposed before its enactment 
constituted an impermissible retroactive application of the initiative.  (People v. Whaley, 
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796-803.)  Like the court in Bourquez, the Whaley court 
found that “[t]he language of Proposition 83 does not contain an express statement of 
retroactivity.”  (Whaley, at p. 796.)  Furthermore, “[a]lso absent is a clear indication in 
the statutory language, or in the voter information guide, that the voters intended an 
indeterminate term to be applied retroactively to completed commitment proceedings.”  
(Ibid.) 
The court considered and rejected various interpretations of the statutory language 
and language in the ballot pamphlet advanced by the People to demonstrate an intent for 
retroactive application.  Significantly, the court was not swayed even by its recognition 
“that the electorate‟s intent regarding Proposition 83 was „to strengthen and improve the 
laws that punish and control sexual offenders.‟  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 
[(Nov. 7, 2006)] text of Prop. 83, p. 138.)”  (People v. Whaley, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 801.) 
While neither Bourquez nor Whaley involved the residency restriction enacted by 
Proposition 83, Doe v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2007) 476 F.Supp.2d 1178 did.  In 
Doe, the federal district court held that section 3003.5(b) could not be applied 
retroactively to persons convicted of registrable offenses “prior to the effective date of 
5 
the statute and who were paroled, given probation, or released from incarceration prior to 
that date.”  (Doe, at p. 1179, fn. 1.)  At the outset of its analysis, the district court cited 
the settled rule that “it [was] obligated to adopt the interpretation of the law that best 
avoids constitutional problems,” and expressed its concern that “reading [Prop. 83] 
retroactively would raise serious ex post facto concerns, and the court is obligated to 
avoid doing so if it can reasonably construe the statute prospectively.”  (Id. at p. 1181.) 
Like the courts deciding Bourquez and Whaley, the district court noted that 
Proposition 83 “does not expressly address the issue of retroactivity, but it is well-
established in California that statutes operate prospectively unless there is clear evidence 
of intent to the contrary.”  (Doe v. Schwarzenegger, supra, 476 F.Supp.2d at p. 1181.)  
The court concluded “it is not „very clear‟ from extrinsic sources that the intent of the 
voters was to make [Prop. 83] retroactive.”  (Id. at p. 1182.)  The court rejected the state‟s 
assertion that language in the ballot pamphlet regarding the number of registered sex 
offenders in California, and the intent of the initiative to create predator-free zones, 
evinced a clear intention that the initiative be retroactively applied.  “First, the reference 
to the number of sex offenders in California is a neutral statement of fact, which voters 
could have reasonably construed as characterizing the scope of the problem and its 
potential expansion, rather than as purporting to address the problem in its entirety.  
Second, while the term „predator free zones‟ is troubling, it is not „very clear‟ that it 
contemplates retroactive application.  Rather, it is the type of sloganeering to be expected 
of an argument in favor of the law, not to be taken literally.  The [initiative] does not, for 
instance, bar sex offenders from entering the 2,000 feet zone around schools or parks; it 
only prohibits them from residing there.  Accordingly, voters could reasonably interpret 
the quoted language as creating a goal of establishing „predator free zones,‟ which the 
[initiative] takes one step toward achieving, albeit prospectively.”  (Ibid.) 
6 
In light of this unanimity among the courts that have addressed the retroactivity 
issue, the majority opinion‟s conclusion that application of section 3003.5(b) to these 
petitioners is prospective rather than retroactive is remarkable.  The majority opinion 
reaches this conclusion purportedly by examining the “plain language” of section 
3003.5(b) under which, it says, “any convicted sex offender already subject to the 
lifelong registration requirement who is released from custody on parole, whether it be 
after service of a term in custody for an initial sex offense conviction, a new sex offense 
conviction, or a new non-sex-offense conviction, becomes subject to the new mandatory 
parole residency restrictions for the duration of his parole term.  (§ 3003.5(b).)”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 13.) 
Citing People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, the majority opinion reasons that 
the crucial date for the retroactivity analysis in this case is not the petitioners‟ long ago 
convictions of the registrable offenses but the dates of their release on parole from recent, 
nonsexual offenses:  “Section 3003.5(b) places restrictions on where a paroled sex 
offender subject to lifetime registration pursuant to section 290 may reside while on 
parole.  For purposes of retroactivity analysis, the pivotal „last act or event‟ (Grant, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 157) that must occur before the mandatory residency restrictions 
come into play is the registered sex offender‟s securing of a residence upon his release 
from custody on parole.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) 
A plain language reading of the statute does not support the majority opinion‟s 
result.  The statute says simply:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is 
unlawful for any person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to 
reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly 
gather.”  (§ 3003.5, subd. (b).)  It does not refer to parole at all, much less bear the weight 
of interpretation that the majority opinion would give it — e.g., “any convicted sex 
offender already subject to the lifelong registration requirement who is released from 
7 
custody on parole, whether it be after service of a term in custody for an initial sex 
offense conviction, a new sex offense conviction, or a new non-sex-offense conviction, 
becomes subject to the new mandatory parole residency restrictions for the duration of 
his parole term.  (§ 3003.5(b).)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) 
Indeed, as the majority opinion acknowledges, it is not entirely clear to whom 
section 3003.5(b) applies — all registered sex offenders or only those released on parole.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12, & fn. 5.)  Enforcement of the residency restriction 
against parolees is not mandated by the plain language of the statute; it was an 
administrative decision by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR) reached eight months after Proposition 83 was enacted.  (See CDCR, Policy No. 
07-36:  Implementation of Prop. 83, aka Jessica‟s Law (Aug. 17, 2007); Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 15, § 2616, subd. (a)(15).)  Therefore, nothing in the plain language of the statute 
supports the majority opinion‟s assertion that section 3003.5(b) was intended to apply 
prospectively to parolees upon their release from custody on parole.2 
Moreover, the majority opinion‟s characterization of what constitutes the pivotal 
date for purposes of retroactivity analysis in this case is simply wrong.  These petitioners 
did not become subject to the residency restriction when they were released from custody 
on parole for nonsexual offenses; they were subject to the residency restriction by virtue 
                                              
2   
The fact that it took eight months for someone to decide how and against whom 
section 3003.5(b) was to be enforced also undermines the repeated assertions by the 
majority opinion that these petitioners were on notice that the restriction applied to them 
as soon as they were released on parole and, even less accurately, the implication that, 
armed with this knowledge, they intentionally moved into noncompliant housing.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 13, 17-20.)  If those charged with enforcing the residency restriction did 
not understand its scope or application until months after it was enacted, how can these 
petitioners be charged with notice, actual or constructive, that it applied to them at any 
point before they were served with the 45-day compliance letter?  They cannot.  How can 
they have flouted a condition of parole which had not yet been applied to them when they 
moved into residences later determined to be noncompliant?  They did not — they were 
just going home. 
8 
of their status as registered sex offenders and they acquired that status upon their 
convictions for their sex offenses.  (See People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 380 
[“the sex offender registration requirement . . . is . . . a statutorily mandated element of 
punishment for the underlying offense”]; Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 
821, 825 [§ 290 “applies automatically when a person is convicted of one of the 
enumerated offenses” (italics added)].)  Indeed, the current registration law in effect 
requires eligible offenders to register even before they are released from prison.  
(§ 290.016.)  Clearly, the registration requirement is imposed upon conviction of the 
registrable offense as are all ancillary restrictions that flow from that requirement 
including the residency restriction.  Therefore, for purposes of the retroactivity analysis 
here, the pivotal date is the date of conviction for the registerble offense. 
None of the three authorities upon which the majority opinion so heavily relies —
People v. Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th 190, Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 
Cal.App.4th 1275, and People v. Mills (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1278 — compels a different 
result because each one is distinguishable. 
Grant is factually distinguishable because it involved the violation of a statute — 
continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) — in which some events occurred before the 
date of the statute‟s effective date but others clearly occurred afterwards.  (Grant, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at p. 153.)  Additionally, the jury was instructed that it could convict the 
defendant of the offense only if it found “that one of the required minimum of three acts 
of molestation occurred after section 288.5‟s effective date.  In other words, defendant 
could be convicted only if the course of conduct constituting the offense of continuous 
sexual abuse was completed after the new law became effective.  Because the last act 
necessary to trigger application of section 288.5 was an act of molestation that defendant 
committed after section 288.5‟s effective date, defendant‟s conviction was not a 
retroactive application of section 288.5 and therefore not a violation of the statutory 
9 
prohibition against retroactive application of the Penal Code.”  (Grant, supra, 20 Cal.4th 
at pp. 157-158, first italics added.)  In this case, the conduct which is the basis for 
application of section 3003.5(b) did not straddle the effective date of Proposition 83.  
That conduct which led to petitioners‟ convictions and triggered the registration 
requirement occurred long before passage of Proposition 83. 
Borquez is also inapposite.  As the Court of Appeal observed, pending proceedings 
to extend commitment under the SVPA focus on current dangerousness and, therefore, 
the change in law that extended commitment indefinitely did not attach new legal 
consequences to past conduct.   (Borquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1289.)  In contrast, the residency restriction relates back to the original convictions for 
which the petitioners in this case were required to register as sex offenders — therefore, 
retroactive application of section 3003.5(b) does “change[ ] the legal consequences of 
past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities” (Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 291) than existed at the time of the convictions. 
In Mills, the defendant suffered a 1981 felony conviction for being in possession 
of marijuana for sale.  In 1990, he was arrested and charged with being a felon in 
possession of a firearm — a shotgun.  At the time of his 1981 felony conviction, 
however, the weapons statute proscribed possession of concealed weapons only.  It was 
not until 1989 that the statute was amended to prohibit possession of any firearm, 
effective in 1990.  (People v. Mills, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282.)  The defendant 
argued that charging him under the amended version of the weapons statute violated the 
proscription against ex post facto laws because “the 1990 change in the law increases the 
punishment for his 1981 conviction, and is therefore a prohibited ex post facto law.”  (Id., 
at p. 1283.) 
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument:  “Here defendant was convicted of 
conduct, his possession of a shotgun occurring after the effective date of the statute.  His 
10 
conduct was a violation of the new statute, rather than an increase of punishment for the 
earlier offense of possessing marijuana for sale.  Although the statute only applied to him 
because of his status as a person convicted of a felony, and the felony conviction 
occurred before the statute became effective, the fact of his prior conviction only places 
him into a status which makes the new law applicable to him.  The legal consequences of 
his past conduct were not changed — only a new law was applied to his future conduct.”  
(People v. Mills, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286, fn. omitted.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court drew an analogy to habitual offender statutes, noting that “courts 
have generally held that a statute which increased the punishment of prior offenders is not 
an ex post facto law if it is applied to events occurring after its effective date.”  (Ibid.) 
Analytically, Mills is distinguishable from the case before us.  Crucial to the 
court‟s analysis in Mills was the violation by the defendant of a penal statute that was 
unrelated to the underlying conduct which had led to his earlier conviction for drug 
possession.  In other words, the defendant was initially convicted of, and punished for, 
possession of a drug for sale. His later conviction was not related to his possession of 
marijuana but to his possession of a firearm — two entirely separate events.  It is true that 
his earlier conviction gave rise to his felon status which then became an element of the 
second offense, but he was not being punished for his felon status alone — it was his 
status plus conduct that was entirely unrelated to his earlier drug possession.  The court‟s 
reliance on habitual offender statutes reinforces this point.  While conviction for prior 
felonies may make an offender eligible for enhanced punishment if he commits a new 
crime, the conduct for which the defendant was punished in the earlier conviction is not 
the basis for the enhanced punishment for the subsequent conviction. 
In this case, however, the residency restriction applies to petitioners for no other 
reason than their status as registered sex offenders, which was triggered by the conduct 
that led to their convictions of the qualifying sex offenses.  The residency restriction has 
11 
no other object than to increase the legal disabilities imposed upon registered sex 
offenders because of their earlier conduct.  This is made abundantly clear by Proposition 
83‟s statement of purpose:  “California must also take additional steps to monitor sex 
offenders, to protect the public from them, and to provide adequate penalties for and 
safeguards against sex offenders, particularly those who prey on children.”  (Prop. 83, 
§ 2, subd. (h).)  The intent of Proposition 83 was to impose further restrictions on 
registered sex offenders based on the conduct that had led to their qualifying convictions.  
Thus, the analogy to Mills fails. 
Stripped of its analytical garb, the majority opinion‟s analysis is transparently 
bare.  The majority cannot find either in the plain language of section 3003.5(b) or in the 
ballot pamphlet an explicit statement or a clear and unavoidable implication that the 
residency restriction was intended to be applied retroactively to individuals like 
petitioners whose qualifying offenses for registration purposes occurred long before 
Proposition 83 was applied.  Instead, the majority dismisses the issue by clinging to the 
fiction that release upon parole is the pivotal date for retroactivity analysis and, therefore, 
application to these petitioners is prospective. 
Ironically, this is the same implausible argument that we unanimously repudiated 
in Strauss v. Horton, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364.  In Strauss, the interveners argued that 
Proposition 8 — banning same-sex marriages in California — applied to such marriages 
performed before enactment of the initiative, during the period when same-sex couples 
were allowed to marry by virtue of our decision in In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 757.  The argument advanced by the interveners was that, because Proposition 8 
banned same-sex marriages after its enactment “the measure is not being applied 
retroactively but rather prospectively, even if the marriages that are now (or in the future 
would be) denied recognition were performed prior to the adoption of Proposition 8.”  
(Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 471.)  We easily saw through this argument:  “Were 
12 
Proposition 8 to be applied to invalidate or to deny recognition to marriages performed 
prior to November 5, 2008, rendering such marriages ineffective in the future, such action 
would take away or impair vested rights acquired under the prior state of the law and 
would constitute a retroactive application of the law.”  (Id. at p. 472.) 
In this case, retroactive application of Proposition 83 would clearly “ „ “attach[] a 
new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past” ‟ ” (Myers, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 839; see Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 471-472), thus rendering 
it retroactive here as application of Proposition 8 would have been in that case.  The 
majority opinion thereby gives effect to an intent that was nowhere expressed in the 
initiative or the ballot pamphlet even if, in the process, our carefully developed 
retroactivity jurisprudence is eviscerated.  I cannot join in this plain and unjustified 
rejection of longstanding retroactivity principles. 
II. 
Given the majority‟s conclusion on the retroactivity issue, this case will need to be 
remanded for further proceedings.  As the majority states, the trial courts on remand must 
determine the relevant facts necessary to decide petitioners‟ as-applied challenges, which 
“would include, but is not necessarily limited to, establishing each petitioner‟s current 
parole status; the precise location of each petitioner‟s current residence and its proximity 
to the nearest „public or private school, or park where children regularly gather‟ 
(§ 3003.5(b)); a factual assessment of the compliant housing available to petitioners and 
similarly situated registered sex offenders in the respective counties and communities to 
which they have been paroled; an assessment of the way in which the mandatory parole 
residency restrictions are currently being enforced in each particular jurisdiction; and a 
complete record of the protocol CDCR is currently following to enforce section 
3003.5(b) in those respective jurisdictions.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) 
13 
Also to be considered on remand is the extent to which even moderate safety 
restrictions may infringe on the constitutional right to intrastate travel.  “The right of 
intrastate travel has been recognized as a basic human right protected by article I, 
sections 7 and 24 of the California Constitution.”  (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 1069, 1100.)  This right has been elaborated in the context of child custody 
disputes where, it has been said, the right to intrastate travel also embraces “the 
concomitant right not to travel.”  (In re Marriage of McGinnis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 473, 
480.)  “Courts cannot order individuals to move to and live in a community not of their 
choosing.”  (In re Marriage of Fingert (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1581.)   
The Courts of Appeal have struck down various probation conditions because they 
violated the constitutional right to intrastate travel.  In In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 
141 the defendant was convicted of prostitution.  The trial court imposed a condition of 
probation that barred her from entering areas of the city — Fresno — where there was 
prostitution activity.  The reviewing court struck the condition.  The court noted, with 
respect to the constitutional issues raised by the defendant that “[w]hile White‟s 
reasonable expectations regarding association and travel have necessarily been reduced, 
the restriction should be regarded with skepticism.  If available alternative means exist 
which are less violative of the constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so as to 
correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated, those alternatives should be 
used.”  (Id. at p. 150; see also People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 612, 622-623; 
People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 944-945.) 
Most recently, in People v. Smith (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1245 (Smith), the Court 
of Appeal struck down a blanket probation condition imposed on all registered sex 
offenders by the Los Angeles probation department that forbid them from leaving the 
county for any reason.  As the court observed:  “Smith has a constitutional right to 
intrastate travel [citations] which, although not absolute, may be restricted only as 
14 
reasonably necessary to further a legitimate governmental interest.”  (Id. at p. 1250.)  The 
court found no such reasonable necessity in that case, concluding, inter alia, that “the 
prohibition bears no reasonable relation to the crime.”  (Id. at p. 1252.) 
We do not consider a probation condition in the present case.  But whether section 
3003.5(b) is viewed as a parole condition or a condition imposed by statute that extends 
beyond parole, the analysis is the same:  a restriction on where an ex-offender may live 
infringes upon that person‟s right to intrastate travel, which includes as one component 
the right to choose where to live and not to live.  That right is not absolute, but the 
infringement may be imposed “only as reasonably necessary to further a legitimate 
governmental interest.”  (Smith, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.) 
It is of course true, as the majority points out, that “ „[a]lthough a parolee is no 
longer confined in prison[,] his custody status is one which requires and permits 
supervision and surveillance under restrictions which may not be imposed on members of 
the public generally.‟ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27, fn. 10, quoting People v. Burgener 
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 531.)  As the majority recognizes, however, even if the statute is 
interpreted to impose no more than parole conditions, such conditions “ „must be 
reasonable, since parolees retain constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive 
official action.‟ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27, fn. 10, quoting Terhune v. Superior Court 
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 874.)  The reasonableness of parole conditions is gauged by 
the same standard developed in the context of probation conditions in People v. 
Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, and adopted by this court in People v. Lent 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 418 (Dominguez/Lent).  As explained in Dominguez:  “A condition of 
probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, 
(2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct 
which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of 
probation and is invalid.”  (Dominguez, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 627; Lent, supra, 15 
15 
Cal.3d at p. 486.)  The Dominguez/Lent criteria applies to evaluating the reasonableness 
of parole conditions.  (People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 532; People v. Stevens 
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233; In re Naito (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1656, 1661.) 
Section 3003.5(b)‟s residency restrictions apply without exception to those who 
have committed certain enumerated sex offenses and are required to register as a sex 
offender.  However, in the case of petitioners K.T. and E.J., there is no indication from 
the record that their sexual offenses involved children, and it is unclear why they should 
be subject to the statute‟s residency restrictions, which as the majority explains, is for the 
purpose of protecting children by “creating „predator free zones around schools and parks 
to prevent sex offenders from living near where our children learn and play . . . .‟ ”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 5, quoting Voter Information Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 
83, at p. 46.)  The application of the statute to these two petitioners would appear to be 
not merely not in furtherance of the statute‟s goal, but actually contrary to that goal, since 
it would divert scarce law enforcement resources toward enforcing a restriction that has 
no demonstrable effect on increasing child safety.  Nor, if viewed strictly as a parole 
condition, would the statutory restriction appear to bear any relationship to the crimes of 
which these petitioners were convicted.  (See People v. Stevens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1233.) 
On the other hand, petitioner S.P. was convicted of raping a 15-year-old girl when 
he was 16.  Also, it is unclear whether the Texas sex offense of which petitioner J.S. was 
convicted, which has as an element the “ „intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of 
any person‟ ” involved a minor as an actual or intended or potential victim.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 8-9.)  As to S.P. and possibly to J.S., in order to determine whether the right 
to intrastate travel is violated, the severity of the restriction must be determined as well as 
whether such severity is justified in furtherance of the statutory goal. 
16 
It is not the function of courts to judge the wisdom of a statute, but it is their 
function to determine its constitutionality.  When a statutory restriction substantially 
impinges on a person‟s constitutional right to intrastate travel and does not further the 
statute‟s objective, it must be struck down as to that person.3  Whether such an outcome 
is appropriate for the as-applied challenges in the present case is a matter to be 
determined on remand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR: KENNARD, J. 
                                              
3  
The restrictions imposed by section 3003.5 (b) may also violate the right to 
privacy found in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.  (See Robbins v.  
Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 213-215 [the privacy clause‟s protection of 
individual autonomy forbids government from requiring individuals receiving public 
assistance benefits to give up their homes and live in county facilities].) 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re E. J. on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S156933 
Date Filed: February 1, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Prison Law Office, Donald Specter, Vibeke Norgaard Martin, Rachel Farbiarz; Rosen, Bien & Galvan, Ernest 
Galvan, Nura Maznavi, Loren Stewart and Shirley Huey for  Petitioners. 
 
Law Offices of Edward Baum and Edward Baum as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Christina Allbright for California Coalition on Sexual Offending and The Association for the Treatment of Sexual 
Abusers as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Alan L. Schlosser and Michael T. Risher for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Gary Steven Bowman, in pro. per., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Robert Jacob Goldenflame, in pro. per., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Mennemeier, Glassman & Stroud, Kenneth C. Mennemeier and Kelcie M. Gosling for Respondent Secretary of the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ernest Galvan 
Rosen, Bien & Galvan 
315 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
9415) 433-6830 
 
Kenneth C. Mennemeier 
Mennemeier, Glassman & Stroud 
980 9th Street, Suite 1700 
Sacramento, CA  95814-2736 
(916) 553-4000