Title: Ex parte McLeroy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0636
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2024

Rel: May 31, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0636 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Marion Kristen McLeroy, as personal representative of 
the Estate of Nella Ruth Braswell, deceased 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: The Humane Society of the United States 
 
v.  
 
Marion Kristen McLeroy)  
 
(Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-23-902471) 
 
 
 
SC-2023-0636 
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MITCHELL, Justice.1 
 
Nella Ruth Braswell died in 2014, leaving behind 6 cats, 13 dogs, 
and an estate valued at over $2,000,000.  In her will, Braswell provided 
for the continuing care of her animals until the last one died, with the 
remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States 
("the Humane Society").    
After Braswell died, the Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will 
and opened an estate in her name.  In accordance with the terms of 
Braswell's will, the probate court appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as 
the personal representative of the estate, and McLeroy began managing 
the estate's assets.  At some point, the Humane Society became 
dissatisfied with McLeroy and had the estate proceeding removed from 
probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court.  McLeroy objected, but the 
circuit court refused to relinquish the case.  McLeroy now petitions our 
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to return the 
case to probate court.  We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
 
 
1This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court; 
it was reassigned to Justice Mitchell on March 1, 2024. 
SC-2023-0636 
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Facts and Procedural History 
During their lifetimes, Braswell and her husband amassed over 200 
acres in north Jefferson County.  Their holdings included a bar and grill, 
a 10-unit apartment building, a flea market, a gun store, and a winery.  
But after Braswell's husband died, those businesses closed and the 
condition of the properties began to deteriorate. 
A. Braswell's Will 
Braswell executed a will about a year and a half before she died.   
Her will included gifts to several close friends and family members.  
Braswell also left much of her real estate to the Humane Society and 
designated it as the residuary beneficiary of her estate.  But the most 
notable feature of Braswell's will was its creation of a trust ("the Animal 
Trust") to provide for the future care of her animals.  Braswell stated in 
her will that she wanted her animals to continue living at her home until 
they died.  To achieve that, she directed the Animal Trust to pay all 
expenses necessary for the animals' care.  Those expenses included a 
salary for the animals' caregivers and the "taxes, insurance, and all 
expenses of maintaining" Braswell's home.   
SC-2023-0636 
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Braswell's will provided guidance about how the Animal Trust 
should be funded.  Specifically, the will directed that Braswell's home 
(and the accompanying outbuildings) be placed in the Animal Trust, 
along with $100,000 from the cash in her estate.  The will also authorized 
the personal representative of Braswell's estate to sell other estate assets 
to provide funding, subject to the condition that any "funds over and 
above the amount needed to fund the trust" should be paid to the Humane 
Society.  Finally, the will stated that the Humane Society would receive 
any assets left in the Animal Trust once the last of Braswell's animals 
died.  
B. The Probate Court Opens Braswell's Estate  
After Braswell died, McLeroy submitted Braswell's will to the 
probate court, which opened an estate and appointed McLeroy as the 
personal representative.  Several months later, McLeroy returned to the 
probate court, seeking guidance about the Animal Trust and how to care 
for Braswell's animals because the trustee and caregivers named in 
Braswell's will had declined their appointments.  The probate court 
appointed McLeroy and her husband cotrustees of the Animal Trust and 
directed her to fund the trust with $370,000 from Braswell's estate.  
SC-2023-0636 
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Additionally, the probate court directed McLeroy to sell some of the land 
Braswell had owned and remit the proceeds of those sales to the Humane 
Society.  If McLeroy could not find a buyer for the land within a year, the 
probate court instructed, she was to give the land to the Humane Society. 
The materials before this Court do not reveal all that occurred 
between the parties in the nine years after Braswell's death, but it 
appears that they initially had a working relationship.  At the Humane 
Society's suggestion, McLeroy placed Braswell's animals in a local animal 
hospital because many of them were in poor health and Braswell's home 
needed significant repairs.2  As Braswell's animals died off, McLeroy and 
the Humane Society also discussed the possibility of terminating the 
Animal Trust and transferring the trust assets to the Humane Society.  
Those discussions were ultimately fruitless, however, because they could 
not agree on how much money would be needed for the surviving animals. 
McLeroy and the Humane Society also had occasional discussions 
about selling some of the land that she was managing, but no sales were 
ever completed.  There is no indication in the materials before us that 
 
2The animals eventually returned to the home, but the date of their 
return is unclear.   
SC-2023-0636 
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any land or other estate assets were ever distributed to the Humane 
Society.   
C. The Relationship Between McLeroy and the Humane Society 
Deteriorates 
 
The parties reengaged in early 2023 when a new attorney began 
handling the matter for the Humane Society.  After some initial 
discussions with McLeroy's attorney about the status of the estate, the 
Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, 
as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust.  
McLeroy's attorney responded by supplying some of the requested 
information, but she explained in an email that she was "preparing a 
final settlement for the estate and for the trust" and that additional 
information and documentation would be available "as soon as the 
petition for final settlement of the estate and the trust is completed."  
Almost two months later -- before McLeroy filed her petition to 
settle the estate and close the Animal Trust -- the Humane Society asked 
the probate court to remove McLeroy as the personal representative of 
Braswell's estate.  The Humane Society specifically argued that McLeroy 
had failed to properly manage the estate and had breached her fiduciary 
duties to both the estate and the Humane Society.  See generally § 43-2-
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290, Ala. Code 1975 (listing grounds for the removal of a personal 
representative).   
That same day, the Humane Society filed a complaint against 
McLeroy and her husband in the circuit court, thereby initiating a new 
action. In its complaint, the Humane Society alleged that McLeroy and 
her husband had improperly concealed information about the 
administration of the Animal Trust, had allowed trust assets to go to 
waste, and had failed to distribute trust assets that were not needed by 
the trust.  The Humane Society asked the circuit court to remove 
McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to direct 
their successor to distribute the trust assets that were no longer needed 
to care for Braswell's animals.  The Humane Society also asked the circuit 
court to order McLeroy and her husband to reimburse the Animal Trust 
for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.  
Notably, however, the Humane Society did not ask the circuit court to 
remove the estate proceeding from the probate court and consolidate the 
cases. 
 
 
SC-2023-0636 
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D. McLeroy Petitions the Probate Court for Final Settlement 
One month later, McLeroy petitioned the probate court to enter a 
final settlement of Braswell's estate.  McLeroy stated in her petition that 
the estate held cash assets of $618,684 and real property worth an 
estimated $1,000,000; that all gifts made by Braswell in her will had been 
paid (except for what was owed to the Humane Society); and that all other 
estate matters had been settled in accordance with the terms of 
Braswell's will.  McLeroy also stated that only one of Braswell's animals 
was still alive and that she and her husband were caring for it at their 
home.  McLeroy therefore asked the probate court to award her a sum for 
the future care of that animal and to close the Animal Trust along with 
the estate.  According to McLeroy, the only remaining issues of the estate 
and the Animal Trust involved attorney fees, any awards made as part 
of the final settlement, and finalizing the transfer of property and the 
estate's remaining assets to the Humane Society.  Along with her 
petition, McLeroy included canceled checks showing that the gifts 
Braswell had made in her will had been paid and ledgers showing the 
income earned and expenses incurred by both the estate and the Animal 
Trust.   
SC-2023-0636 
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McLeroy later amended her petition to include a statement listing 
the names and contact information of Braswell's heirs.  McLeroy then 
served those heirs and the other beneficiaries of Braswell's estate with 
notice that she had "filed her accounts, vouchers, evidence and statement 
for a final settlement."  That notice also informed the heirs and 
beneficiaries that the probate court had set a date for the final-settlement 
hearing at which they could "appear and contest" her petition for final 
settlement if they had reason to do so. 
E. The Circuit Court Removes the Administration of Braswell's 
Estate from the Probate Court 
 
Three days before the scheduled hearing, the Humane Society 
petitioned the circuit court to remove the administration of Braswell's 
estate under § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975.   The circuit court granted the 
Humane Society's petition two days later and, on the Humane Society's 
motion, consolidated the estate proceeding with the pending circuit-court 
action seeking the removal of McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of 
the Animal Trust.    
McLeroy asked the circuit court to vacate its order removing the 
estate proceeding from the probate court.  In doing so, she argued that 
the Humane Society had waited too long to seek removal because, she 
SC-2023-0636 
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said, final-settlement proceedings had already begun in the probate court 
at the time the Humane Society sought removal.  After a hearing, the 
circuit court denied McLeroy's motion, stating that "the probate court's 
jurisdiction to act upon a petition for final settlement had not attached" 
at the time of removal. 
McLeroy now petitions this Court for mandamus relief, asking us 
to issue a writ directing the circuit court to remand the estate proceeding 
to the probate court. 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's ruling on whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a case is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Ex parte 
Marshall, 323 So. 3d 1188, 1195 (Ala. 2020).  Because a challenge to a 
circuit court's removal of an estate proceeding under § 12-11-41 
implicates that court's subject-matter jurisdiction, see Ex parte Berry, 
999 So. 2d 883, 885 (Ala. 2008), mandamus review is available to 
McLeroy here.  Whether a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Id. 
 
 
SC-2023-0636 
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Analysis 
McLeroy argues that the Humane Society's petition to remove the 
administration of Braswell's estate from the probate court to the circuit 
court came too late.  According to her, the probate court had already 
begun final-settlement proceedings when the Humane Society sought 
removal, which gave that court exclusive jurisdiction over the estate 
proceeding.  The Humane Society pushes back, arguing that final 
settlement was impossible when McLeroy filed her settlement petition 
because there were still outstanding matters to resolve, including the 
Humane Society's request to remove McLeroy as personal representative.   
The Humane Society may be correct that there are outstanding 
issues to resolve before Braswell's estate can be settled.  But that does 
not prevent the final-settlement process in probate court from going 
forward -- after all, the very purpose of that process is to identify and 
resolve any issues standing in the way of final settlement.  And under 
our longstanding precedents, once a probate court begins that process, a 
circuit court no longer has any authority to divest the probate court of its 
exclusive jurisdiction over the estate proceeding.  Accordingly, McLeroy 
is entitled to the mandamus relief she seeks. 
SC-2023-0636 
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A. Removal Under § 12-11-41  
Section 12-11-41 provides that "[t]he administration of any estate 
may be removed from the probate court to the circuit court at any time 
before a final settlement thereof …."  (Emphasis added.)  For over 100 
years, this Court has applied a bright-line rule that, once the final-
settlement process for an estate has begun in the probate court, the 
circuit court may no longer acquire jurisdiction over the administration 
of the estate under § 12-11-41 (or its predecessor statutes).  See, e.g., Ex 
parte Clayton, 514 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Ala. 1987) (explaining that while 
the right of removal under § 12-11-41 is broad, that right is limited "once 
the probate court has taken steps toward a final settlement").  Neither of 
the parties before us have questioned this line of precedent or its view of 
the removal statute. 
1. Precedential Origins 
The rule limiting a party's right to remove an estate proceeding 
from a probate court to a circuit court has its origins in Carpenter v. 
Carpenter, 200 Ala. 96, 96, 75 So. 472, 472 (1917).  In Carpenter, our 
Court rejected a party's attempt to remove the administration of an 
estate from the probate court to "the court of equity," explaining that no 
SC-2023-0636 
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statute authorized "the ouster of the jurisdiction of probate courts, where 
that court has actually entered upon the exercise of its jurisdiction in and 
for a final settlement of estates …."  Id.  Seven years later, in Ex parte 
McLendon, 212 Ala. 403, 405, 102 So. 696, 698 (1924) ("McLendon I"), our 
Court specifically held that "[t]he words 'at any time before a final 
settlement,' found in the removal act, mean before proceedings for 
settlement begin, not before they are completed."  (Emphasis added.)   
Later cases have uniformly applied § 12-11-41 in accordance with 
Carpenter and McLendon I.  Two of those cases -- Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 
2d 455, 459 (Ala. 2006) ("Terry I"), and Ex parte Terry, 985 So. 2d 400, 
404 (Ala. 2007) ("Terry II") -- are particularly illustrative of the law and 
proper procedures to follow in cases involving removal petitions filed 
under § 12-11-41.   
2. The Application of § 12-11-41 in the Terry Cases 
The Terry cases involved a dispute between a father and his two 
sons about the estate of their mother.  Terry II, 985 So. 2d at 401.  The 
father, who was the administrator of the mother's estate, petitioned the 
probate court for a final settlement of the estate and submitted "an 
accounting of assets and a statement of heirs."  Id.  The probate court 
SC-2023-0636 
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then scheduled a final-settlement hearing, at which the sons appeared 
and objected to the father's accounting.  Id.  Because of the sons' objection, 
the probate court declined to enter a final settlement, instead issuing an 
order "directing discovery, setting a date for trial, and identifying the 
issues for trial."  Id. at 403.   
After "the parties engaged in discovery and a series of motions, 
responses, and hearings," the father petitioned the circuit court to 
remove the administration of the mother's estate under § 12-11-41.  Id. 
at 401.  But the probate court entered an order purporting to deny the 
petition for removal -- which had been filed in the circuit court -- because, 
in the probate court's view, "final settlement of the administration of the 
estate had begun."  Terry I, 957 So. 2d at 456.  After the circuit court 
entered its own order denying the petition for removal, the father 
petitioned this Court for mandamus review.  Id. 
a. The Terry I Court Identifies the Error of the Probate 
Court and Circuit Court But Denies the Father 
Mandamus Relief 
 
The Terry I Court concluded that both the probate court and the 
circuit court had fumbled their handling of the case.  The Court explained 
that § 12-11-41 does not require a party petitioning for removal to plead 
SC-2023-0636 
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facts establishing that the removal petition is timely; rather, the statute 
requires only the filing of a sworn petition reciting that the petitioner is 
an interested party as set forth by the statute and that, in the petitioner's 
view, "such estate can be better administered in the circuit court than in 
the probate court."  § 12-11-41; Terry I, 957 So. 2d at 457-58.  Thus, when 
a proper party files a sworn petition seeking removal under § 12-11-41, 
the circuit court should enter the order of removal as "a formality."  Id. 
at 458.  In other words, the probate court has no role in deciding whether 
removal is proper once a petition invoking § 12-11-41 has been filed in 
the circuit court.  Id.  See also Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700, 704 
(Ala. 2001) ("To allow the probate court to decide that issue as a threshold 
matter would eviscerate § 12-11-41.  … [I]t would effectively deny the 
party seeking removal the right conferred by statute to have her status 
determined by the circuit court.").   
The Terry I Court went on to explain that parties opposing removal 
under § 12-11-41 should present their arguments to the circuit court after 
removal, because the circuit court has the authority to remand an estate 
proceeding to the probate court if it determines that removal was 
improper.  957 So. 2d at 458.  Accordingly, the Terry I Court concluded 
SC-2023-0636 
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that the probate court had erred by purporting to deny the father's 
removal petition and that the circuit court had erred by not expeditiously 
granting that same petition.  Id. at 459.  Despite those errors, however, 
this Court denied the father's mandamus petition because it was directed 
to the probate court when it was the failure of the circuit court to grant 
the removal petition that was "[t]he root of the problem."  Id.  
b. The Terry II Court Affirms the Circuit Court's Order 
Remanding the Administration of the Mother's Estate 
to the Probate Court 
 
After this Court's decision in Terry I, the circuit court reexamined 
its decision denying the father's removal petition.  Terry II, 985 So. 2d at 
402.  Concluding that it had erred by denying that petition, the circuit 
court vacated its previous order and removed the administration of the 
mother's estate from the probate court.  Id.  The sons responded by asking 
the circuit court to remand the case to the probate court because, they 
said, the father's removal petition was untimely.  Id.  The circuit court 
agreed, concluding that the father "had properly petitioned the probate 
court to begin final settlement proceedings and that the probate court 
had taken jurisdiction in the case" before the father had filed his removal 
petition.  Id.  Accordingly, the circuit court remanded the administration 
SC-2023-0636 
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of the mother's estate to the probate court, after which the father filed 
the appeal that was the subject of Terry II.  Id.3   
This Court's analysis of the father's arguments in Terry II was 
straightforward.  After noting the winding course the case had taken, the 
Court stated that two things were "clear" when the father filed his 
removal petition:  (1) he had already "invoke[d] the probate court's 
jurisdiction over the final settlement of the estate by submitting his 
petitions, amendments, supplements, and accounts for a final 
settlement" and (2) "the probate court had accepted jurisdiction over the 
administration of the estate and had taken steps toward final 
settlement."  Id. at 403-04.  The Court thus concluded that, "[d]espite the 
wide latitude" § 12-11-41 generally affords an interested party to remove 
an estate proceeding, the father's removal petition was untimely.  985 So. 
2d at 404.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order 
 
3Following remand of the administration of the mother's estate to 
the probate court, the father filed both an appeal and a mandamus 
petition challenging the circuit court's remand order.  Terry II, 985 So. 
2d at 402.  This Court denied his mandamus petition on procedural 
grounds, explaining that the circuit court's order remanding the estate 
proceeding back to the probate court was a final judgment that supported 
an appeal.  Id. (citing Ex parte Kelly, 243 Ala. 184, 187, 8 So. 2d 855, 857 
(1942)).  
SC-2023-0636 
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remanding the administration of the mother's estate to the probate court.  
Id. at 404 (further noting that "this Court has consistently held that once 
final settlement proceedings have been commenced by the probate court's 
assumption of jurisdiction, removal is cut off").  
B. Applying the Terry Cases Here 
 
 
The sequence of events here mirrors what occurred in the Terry 
cases.  Specifically, the estate administrator petitioned the probate court 
to begin final-settlement proceedings; the probate court scheduled a 
final-settlement hearing and sent notice of that hearing to interested 
parties; and only then did one of the parties invoke § 12-11-41 and 
petition the circuit court to remove the estate proceeding from the 
probate court.  Applying the holdings of the Terry cases, the circuit court 
did not err by granting the Humane Society's petition for removal -- the 
court was obligated to grant that petition because it contained all that 
was required by § 12-11-41.  But after McLeroy moved the circuit court 
to reconsider, the court should have recognized that final-settlement 
proceedings had begun in the probate court before the Humane Society 
sought removal.  See McLendon I, 212 Ala. at 405, 102 So. at 698 
("Jurisdiction for final settlement in the probate court begins upon filing 
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accounts and vouchers with statement of the heirs invoking the court's 
jurisdiction for such settlement and an order entered setting day, 
directing notice, etc.").  Consequently, the Humane Society's right to 
removal had been "cut off" before it invoked § 12-11-41, and the circuit 
court erred by not granting McLeroy's request to remand the estate 
proceeding to the probate court.  Terry II, 985 So. 2d at 404. 
C. Whether Braswell's Estate is Ready for Final Settlement 
In the face of our caselaw, the Humane Society nonetheless 
maintains that its removal petition was timely because, it says, "the 
condition of the estate" when McLeroy petitioned for final settlement 
precluded any such settlement from being entered.  See § 43-2-501, Ala. 
Code 1975 ("Final settlement may be made at any time after six months 
from the grant of letters, if the debts are all paid and the condition of the 
estate in other respects will admit of it.").  Specifically, the Humane 
Society argues that its pending petition to remove McLeroy as personal 
representative -- and its corresponding claims that McLeroy breached her 
fiduciary duties -- act as a bar to final settlement until those issues are 
resolved. 
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But even if the Humane Society is right that Braswell's estate was 
not ready to be settled when McLeroy filed her final-settlement petition, 
once the probate court acted on that petition, it had exclusive jurisdiction 
to make that determination.  To be sure, the Humane Society can 
advance its arguments about why a final settlement of Braswell's estate 
should not be made to the probate court at the final-settlement hearing.  
As in the Terry cases, the probate court may decide that additional 
proceedings -- including hearings, discovery, and even a trial -- are 
necessary first.4  See Terry II, 985 So. 2d at 403.  But, as the Terry cases 
made clear, once the final-settlement process has begun in the probate 
 
4If the probate court rejects the Humane Society's argument that 
Braswell's estate is not ready for final settlement and grants McLeroy's 
petition, the Humane Society may file an appeal to either the circuit court 
or this Court.  See § 12-22-21, Ala. Code 1975 (providing "the party 
aggrieved" by the probate court's entry of final settlement with the right 
to appeal "to the circuit court or Supreme Court").  See Broughton v. 
Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 476 So. 2d 97, 103 (Ala. 1985) 
(explaining that "[r]emoval was not [the appellant's] only possible course 
of action" because even though he had "lost the right to removal [under § 
12-11-41] when the probate court entered upon final settlement," he 
could still file an appeal to the circuit court after a final judgment was 
entered); McCormick v. Langford, 516 So. 2d 643, 646 (Ala. 1987) 
(agreeing with the appellant's contention "that the [probate] court erred 
in ordering a final settlement of an estate").  The Humane Society is 
simply wrong that these procedures fail to effectively protect its due-
process rights or leave it without a remedy. 
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court, any additional proceedings that are required for final settlement 
must also be conducted in the probate court.  Id. at 404.  A party's right 
to remove an estate proceeding to the circuit court under § 12-11-41 is 
irrevocably "cut off" after that process begins.  Id.  The Humane Society's 
reliance on § 43-2-501 is therefore unfounded. 
Conclusion 
For over 100 years, this Court has held that a circuit court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction over the administration of an estate after a probate 
court begins the final-settlement process for that estate.  Thus, when the 
probate court began that process for Braswell's estate here, the Humane 
Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off.  
Because the circuit court has no jurisdiction over the administration of 
Braswell's estate, McLeroy has a clear legal right to the mandamus relief 
she seeks.  We therefore grant her petition and issue a writ directing the 
circuit court to (1) vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding 
with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her 
husband and (2) enter an order remanding the administration of 
Braswell's estate to the probate court.   
 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
SC-2023-0636 
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Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur. 
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., joins.  
Wise, J., recuses herself. 
 
 
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting). 
 
 
Marion Kristen McLeroy, who is the personal representative of the 
estate of Nella Ruth Braswell, deceased, petitioned this Court for a writ 
of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate an order 
consolidating the administration of Braswell's estate with a separate civil 
action that is pending in the circuit court against McLeroy and her 
husband and to remand the administration of Braswell's estate to the 
Jefferson Probate Court.  I respectfully dissent from this Court's decision 
to grant McLeroy's petition. 
As noted in the main opinion, Braswell died in 2014 and McLeroy, 
who was designated in Braswell's will as the personal representative of 
Braswell's estate, offered Braswell's will for probate in the Jefferson 
Probate Court.  The will was admitted, and McLeroy was appointed as 
the personal representative of Braswell's estate. 
As also noted in the main opinion, the terms of Braswell's will called 
for the creation of what the main opinion refers to as "the Animal Trust" 
to provide for the care of animals Braswell owned when she died, and 
McLeroy and her husband are cotrustees of the Animal Trust.  The 
Humane Society of the United States ("the Humane Society") is a 
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beneficiary of the Animal Trust and is to receive any trust funds that are 
not needed for the care of Braswell's animals.  The Humane Society is 
also the residuary beneficiary under Braswell's will. 
In April 2023, the Humane Society petitioned the probate court to 
remove McLeroy as the personal representative of Braswell's estate.  The 
Humane Society asserted that McLeroy had improperly commingled 
assets, had failed to properly distribute assets, had failed to provide 
meaningful responses to the Humane Society's requests for an 
accounting and for other documentation, and had allowed estate assets 
to go to waste.  The Humane Society also commenced a separate civil 
action against McLeroy and her husband in the Jefferson Circuit Court, 
seeking to remove them as trustees of the Animal Trust and to recover 
damages for their alleged breaches of duties under the Animal Trust ("the 
Animal Trust action").  The adversarial estate proceeding and the Animal 
Trust action are intertwined, as they involve virtually identical parties, 
they have overlapping claims, and the resolution of the claims in one 
action are likely to resolve claims in the other action.  
According to the Humane Society, its petition to remove McLeroy 
as the personal representative of Braswell's estate triggered duties in the 
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25 
 
probate court to set a hearing on that petition, to direct McLeroy to 
appear and answer the petition, and to hear the relevant evidence.  See 
§§ 43-2-294 & 43-2-296, Ala. Code 1975.5  However, a little less than a 
month after the Humane Society sought to remove McLeroy as personal 
representative of Braswell's estate, McLeroy filed a petition in the 
probate court seeking a final settlement of that estate.  Subsequently, the 
Humane Society petitioned the Jefferson Circuit Court to remove the 
administration of Braswell's estate from the probate court to the circuit 
court.  See § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975 (generally authorizing the removal 
of the administration of an estate from a probate court to a circuit court).  
Two days later, the circuit court entered an order removing the estate 
administration from the probate court and later consolidated the estate 
administration with the Animal Trust action.  The circuit court later 
denied McLeroy's request to reconsider and to remand the estate 
administration to the probate court, and McLeroy filed the present 
petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 
5The Humane Society also asserts that, pursuant to § 43-2-296, it 
was entitled to a jury trial on its claim that McLeroy had mismanaged 
Braswell's estate.  
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Section 12-11-41 provides that the administration of an estate may 
be removed from the probate court to the circuit court at any time before 
a final settlement of the estate: 
"The administration of any estate may be removed from 
the probate court to the circuit court at any time before a final 
settlement thereof, by any heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, 
executor, administrator or administrator with the will 
annexed of any such estate, without assigning any special 
equity …." 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
It is undisputed that a final settlement of Braswell's estate had not 
been completed by the time the Humane Society requested removal of the 
estate administration to circuit court.  According to McLeroy, however, 
the circuit court's ability to remove was cut off once "the probate court 
had commenced proceedings toward final settlement."  Petition at 6 
(emphasis added).  As McLeroy points out, notwithstanding the clear 
language in § 12-11-41 allowing removal of an estate administration from 
a probate court to a circuit court at any time before final settlement of 
the estate, this Court's precedent appears to further restrict the ability 
to remove.  See, e.g., Ex parte McLendon, 212 Ala. 403, 405, 102 So. 696, 
698 (1924) ("The words 'at any time before a final settlement,' found in 
the removal act, mean before proceedings for settlement begin, not before 
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they are completed.  The better and approved practice is to aver in the 
removal petition that no steps have been taken for a settlement in the 
probate court.").  The Humane Society, on the other hand, takes the 
position that proceedings for a final settlement simply could not formally 
begin until resolution of the Humane Society's claim that McLeroy had 
breached her duties as personal representative of the estate and 
therefore should be removed from that role.  According to the Humane 
Society, until that matter was resolved, the probate court did not have 
the power to start proceedings toward a final settlement insofar as it 
would cut off the circuit court's ability to remove the administration of 
the estate.  I agree with the Humane Society. 
 
None of the precedents upon which McLeroy relies involved the 
removal of an estate administration after a personal representative had 
attempted to begin proceedings toward final settlement of a decedent's 
estate after a party had petitioned to remove that personal 
representative for alleged malfeasance.  As the Humane Society points 
out, "[f]inal settlement [of a decedent's estate] may be made at any time 
after six months from the grant of letters, if the debts are all paid and 
the condition of the estate in other respects will admit of it." § 43-2-501, 
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28 
 
Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).  "When a bill seeks to compel a final 
settlement of a decedent's estate, it must show that the estate is ready 
for such a settlement."  Baker v. Mitchell, 109 Ala. 490, 493, 20 So. 40, 
43 (1896).  Of note, in Baker, this Court concluded that a bill removing 
the administration of a decedent's estate from the probate court, which 
suggested that the interests of the administrator of the estate were in 
some respects antagonistic and hostile to the estate, could not be 
construed as a bill seeking to compel a final settlement of the estate 
because, instead of showing that the estate was ready for a settlement, 
the bill accusing the administrator of having interests hostile to the 
estate showed the opposite, i.e., that  "the estate [was] not ready to be 
settled."  Id. (emphasis added).  In the present case, a petition to remove 
McLeroy as the personal representative of Braswell's estate for alleged 
malfeasance was pending when McLeroy petitioned for a final 
settlement.  As noted, the Humane Society points to statutes indicating 
that its petition to remove McLeroy triggered certain procedural and 
substantive requirements, such as requiring McLeroy to appear and 
answer the Humane Society's allegations of malfeasance, the setting of a 
hearing on the Humane Society's petition, and the receipt and 
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29 
 
consideration of evidence supporting (or opposing) the same.  Braswell's 
estate was not ready to be settled at the time McLeroy attempted to start 
final-settlement proceedings. 
 
I acknowledge this Court's opinion in Broughton v. Merchants 
National Bank of Mobile, 476 So. 2d 97 (Ala. 1985), although neither side 
in this dispute relies on Broughton.  In that case, Merchants National 
Bank of Mobile ("Merchants"), which was serving as the executor of a 
decedent's estate in a probate court, filed a petition for final settlement 
of the estate.  An heir of the decedent appeared at the hearing on the 
petition and filed a legal brief objecting to a final settlement and accusing 
Merchants of failing to fulfill its duties as the executor of the decedent's 
estate and as the trustee of a living trust that had existed for the benefit 
of the decedent during her life, the corpus of which was to be paid over to 
the decedent's estate upon her death.  The probate court, however, 
rejected the heir's arguments and entered a final decree settling the 
estate and finding that Merchants had properly administered the estate. 
Instead of appealing from the probate court's judgment, the heir 
filed a separate lawsuit against Merchants in the circuit court, accusing 
it of mismanaging the trust.  In holding that the heir's lawsuit was barred 
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by principles of res judicata, this Court concluded that the probate court 
in the estate proceeding had had jurisdiction to render a final-settlement 
decree "even though issues of [Merchant's alleged] negligence and 
mismanagement were raised [by the heir]."  476 So. 2d at 101. 
Although removal of an estate administration from the probate 
court to the circuit court was not an issue involved in Broughton, the 
Court in that case noted in what appears to be dicta that the heir "could 
have asserted his claims sounding in tort [against Merchants] by having 
the [estate administration] removed to the circuit court before the 
probate court had rendered its decree of final settlement."  Id. at 103.  But 
the Court also stated that "[r]emoval was not [the heir's] only possible 
course of action" in that, "[h]aving lost the right to removal when the 
probate court entered upon final settlement …, [the heir] could have 
appealed to the circuit court …."  Id. (emphasis omitted).  The Court, 
however, did not reveal exactly what it meant in referring to the probate 
court's having "entered upon final settlement."  Thus, even if the 
referenced quoted portions of Broughton were not dicta, it is not clear 
which side of this dispute they would support. 
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31 
 
 
In considering orders removing an estate administration from a 
probate court to a circuit court, this Court has stressed that a writ of 
mandamus will not issue unless the petitioner has demonstrated "a clear 
and indisputable right" to have the estate administration remanded to 
the probate court.  Ex parte Clayton, 514 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Ala. 1987).  
In the present case, in which the personal representative of a decedent's 
estate attempted to begin proceedings toward a final settlement of the 
estate shortly after the filing of a petition to remove the representative 
for alleged malfeasance, I am not convinced that it is clear and 
indisputable that the circuit court no longer had the authority to remove 
the administration of the estate from the probate court.   
From my review of the materials before the Court, it appears that 
McLeroy engaged in legal gamesmanship by filing a petition for a final 
settlement in an attempt to defeat the Humane Society's substantive 
claims when it was obvious that Braswell's estate was not ready for final 
settlement.  By allowing the Humane Society to remove the estate 
administration to the circuit court and then consolidating the estate 
administration with the Animal Trust action, the circuit court 
appropriately realized that the sum and substance of the matters were 
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the same and that consolidation would serve the interests of judicial 
economy.  The main opinion fails to appreciate that, and by directing that 
the estate administration should be remanded to the probate court, it 
creates an existential risk of inconsistent results, because the probate 
court has no jurisdiction to hear the Animal Trust action.  I would deny 
the petition for the writ of mandamus.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
Mendheim, J., concurs.