Title: Daniel J.R. LaCount v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin
Citation: 2006 WI 14
Docket Number: 2003AP003258
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2006

2006 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP3258 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Daniel J.R. LaCount, by his General Guardian, 
Daniel LaCount, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Joseph W. Langer and Courtney J. Langer, 
          Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Erin E. Penza by her Natural Guardians, Don and 
Janet Penza, Molly J. Smith by her Natural 
Guardians, Marvin and Julie Smith, ABC Insurance 
Company, DEF Insurance Company, GHI Insurance 
Company and XYZ Insurance Company, 
          Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Estate of James M. Wingfield by its Personal  
Representative, Brenda K. Wingfield, Brenda K. 
Wingfield, Brett M. Wingfield by his Natural 
Guardian, Brenda K. Wingfield, Abby L. Wingfield 
by her Natural Guardian, Brenda K. Wingfield, 
Vanessa R. Van Laanen by her Natural Guardians, 
Jody G. and Virginia Van Laanen, 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents-
Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 873, 690 N.W.2d 884 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 8, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Warpinski   
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
third-party 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there were briefs by R. George Burnett, Gregory B. Conway and 
Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, and oral 
argument by R. George Burnett. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by James W. 
Mohr, Jr. and Mohr & Anderson, LLC, Hartford, and oral argument 
by James W. Mohr, Jr. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Susan R. Tyndall and 
CMT Legal Group, Ltd., Waukesha, on behalf of the Civil Trial 
Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
2006 WI 14
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP3258  
(L.C. No. 
2000CV221) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Daniel J.R. LaCount, by his General Guardian,  
Daniel LaCount,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
              v. 
 
General Casualty Company of Wisconsin,  
 
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Joseph W. Langer and Courtney J. Langer,  
 
 
Defendants-Third- 
 
Party Plaintiffs, 
 
              v. 
 
Erin E. Penza, by her Natural Guardians, Don  
and Janet Penza, Molly J. Smith, by her Natural  
Guardians, Marvin and Julie Smith, ABC  
Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company, GHI  
Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company,  
 
 
Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Estate of James M. Wingfield, by its Personal  
Representative, Brenda K. Wingfield, Brenda K.  
Wingfield, Brett M. Wingfield, by his Natural  
Guardian, Brenda K. Wingfield, Abby L.  
Wingfield, by her Natural Guardian, Brenda K.  
Wingfield, Vanessa R. Van Laanen, by her  
Natural Guardians, Jody G. and Virginia Van  
Laanen,  
 
 
Third-Party Defendants- 
FILED 
 
FEB 8, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
judgment of the circuit court for Brown County, Mark A. 
Warpinski, Judge. We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether paragraph (a) of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3) (2003-04),2 known as the omnibus coverage 
statute, compels an insurance company (here General Casualty) to 
provide separate policy limits for both the named insured (a 
father who signed an application for his minor daughter's3 driver 
license, becoming her sponsor) and for the minor whose negligent 
operation of the motor vehicle caused her vehicle to collide 
with a van and injure several persons.  The injured persons are 
the passenger in the minor's vehicle, the driver of the van (who 
was killed), and several passengers in the van.  They are 
referred to herein collectively as the injured persons.    
                                                 
1 LaCount v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., No. 2003AP3258, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2005). 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 A minor for purposes of sponsorship is a person who is 
under the age of 18 years.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.15.  
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
2 
 
¶3 
The father's liability as the sponsor for the minor 
driver's negligent operation of a motor vehicle is imposed by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.15(2)(b), 
providing 
that 
"any 
negligence . . . of a person under the age of 18 years when 
operating a motor vehicle upon the highways is imputed . . . to 
the adult sponsor who signed the application for such person's 
license.  The . . . adult sponsor is jointly and severally 
liable with such operator for any damages caused by such 
negligent . . . misconduct."4         
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 343.15(2)(b).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.15 states in relevant parts: 
(1) (a) 
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
sub. 
(4), 
the 
application of any person under 18 years of age for a 
license shall be signed and verified by either of the 
applicant's parents, or a stepparent of the applicant 
or other adult sponsor, as defined by the department 
by rule. The application shall be signed and verified 
before a traffic officer, a duly authorized agent of 
the 
department 
or 
a 
person 
duly 
authorized 
to 
administer oaths. 
. . . . 
(2)  (a) In this paragraph, "custody" does not mean 
joint legal custody as defined in s. 767.001 (1s). 
(b) Any negligence or willful misconduct of a person 
under the age of 18 years when operating a motor 
vehicle upon the highways is imputed to the parents 
where both have custody and either parent signed as 
sponsor, otherwise, it is imputed to the adult sponsor 
who signed the application for such person's license. 
The parents or the adult sponsor is jointly and 
severally liable with such operator for any damages 
caused by such negligent or willful misconduct. 
The parents of the minor in the present case are divorced.  
Only the father is the sponsor of the minor's driver license. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The injured persons and General Casualty agree (as 
does the court) that General Casualty must provide coverage for 
the liability of the father, the named insured who was the 
minor's sponsor, and for the liability of the negligent minor 
who operated the vehicle.  The injured persons and General 
Casualty disagree about the limits of General Casualty's 
liability.5  They disagree whether General Casualty's total 
potential liability for both the named insured (as the sponsor 
of the minor's application for a driver license) and the minor 
driver amounts to $1 million ($500,000 limited liability for 
each), as the injured persons claim, or $500,000, as General 
Casualty claims. 
 
¶5 
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the injured persons and against General Casualty, concluding 
that paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) requires General 
Casualty to provide the named insured (the sponsor) and his 
minor daughter with a cumulative liability of $1 million, 
although the limit of liability stated in the policy was 
$500,000 for each accident. 
¶6 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  Applying the analysis of this court's decision 
                                                 
5 While Wis. Stat. § 632.32 does not define "coverage" or 
"liability," the parties appear to agree that "coverage" refers 
to those persons to whom the policy applies (i.e., named 
insureds and omnibus insureds), while "liability," at least in 
the context of a "limit of liability," refers to the amount 
which the insurance company must pay on behalf of those who have 
coverage. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
4 
 
in Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 
N.W.2d 857, 
interpreting 
paragraph 
(b) 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(3), the court of appeals held that paragraph (a) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) (like paragraph (b)) does not prohibit 
General Casualty from applying the $500,000 policy limit as the 
limit on its total liability for both the named insured father 
and his minor daughter whose driver license he sponsored.  The 
court of appeals concluded that under both paragraphs (a) and 
(b), "[w]hether considering the owner's coverage or the driver's 
coverage, they share a single limit of liability when the 
owner's liability is not based on a separate negligent act."6     
 
¶7 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
hold that paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) does not 
require an insurance policy to provide separate limits of 
liability to both a person permissively using the covered 
vehicle and the named insured who is liable by statute for 
imputed negligence (as a sponsor for a minor's driver license) 
for the minor's negligent operation of a vehicle. 
¶8 
Furthermore, we interpret paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3) similarly to paragraph (b) regarding the application 
of policy limits to multiple insureds whose liabilities are 
covered by the same insurance policy.  The text of paragraph (a) 
of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) (and the statutory and legislative 
history of paragraph (a)) and the case law support the 
                                                 
6 LaCount v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., No. 2003AP3258, 
unpublished slip op., ¶5 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2005). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
5 
 
conclusion that neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3) requires an insurance policy to provide 
separate limits of liability to both a person permissively using 
the covered vehicle and the named insured who is liable by 
statute for imputed negligence (as a sponsor for a minor's 
driver license) for the minor's negligent operation of a 
vehicle. 
I 
¶9 
The 
following material facts are 
undisputed for 
purposes of this proceeding.  On October 15, 1999, the minor was 
negligently driving a vehicle that collided with a van; the 
driver of the van was killed, passengers in the van were 
injured, and a passenger in the vehicle driven by the minor was 
injured. 
¶10 The motor vehicle the minor was driving was insured 
under a policy in which the minor's father was the named 
insured.  The minor was explicitly named in the policy as a 
member of the family and a permissive driver of the vehicle 
covered by the policy.  The father was not in the vehicle at the 
time of the collision; his liability is based solely on the 
statute imposing joint and several liability on a sponsor of a 
minor's driver license for damage caused by the minor's 
negligent operation of a vehicle. 
¶11 The insurance policy promises to pay bodily injury 
damages for which "any insured becomes legally responsible 
because of an auto accident."  More than once the policy 
explicitly limits General Casualty's total liability for one 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
6 
 
occurrence 
under 
the 
policy 
to 
$500,000. 
 
The 
policy 
specifically states that this $500,000 limit is the most General 
Casualty will pay, regardless of the numbers of "insureds," 
claims made, or vehicles listed in the policy.7 
                                                 
7 The provision provides in relevant part: 
[T]he limit of liability shown in the Declarations for 
"each accident" for Bodily Injury Liability is our 
maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily 
injury resulting from any one auto accident.  The 
limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
accident" for property damage liability is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages to all property 
resulting from any one auto accident. 
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number 
of "insureds," claims made, vehicles or premiums shown 
in the Declarations, or vehicles involved in the auto 
accident. 
The bodily injury limit in the policy in issue was $500,000. 
 
This language appears to be consistent with the language 
used in automobile insurance policies in Wisconsin.  See, e.g., 
Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law Appendix B (5th ed. 
2004), providing the following sample language for the "LIMIT OF 
LIABILITY" section of an automobile insurance policy: 
A.  The limit of liability shown in the Declarations 
for each person for Bodily Injury Liability is our 
maximum limit of liability for all damages, including 
damages for care, loss of services or death, arising 
out of "bodily injury" sustained by any one person in 
any one automobile accident.  Subject to this limit 
for each person, the limit of liability shown in the 
Declarations for each accident for Bodily Injury 
Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all 
damages for "bodily injury" resulting from any one 
auto accident. 
. . . . 
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number 
of: 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
7 
 
¶12 The policy omits a provision stating that "[c]overage 
provided to the named insured applies in the same manner and 
under the same provisions to any person using any motor vehicle 
described 
in 
the 
policy . . . ," 
even 
though 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(3) requires this provision.8  
                                                                                                                                                             
1.  "Insureds"; 
2.  Claims made; 
3.  Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4.  Vehicles involved in the auto accident. 
8 The injured persons argue that because the insurance 
policy does not include the precise language set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3) the policy is illegal and the penalty is to 
have the limitation of liability clauses stricken. 
It appears that many automobile policies issued in this 
state have substantially the same language as appears in the 
policy in the instant case.  See Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin 
Insurance Law Appendix B (5th ed. 2004) (providing sample policy 
language).  The policy appears to comport with the requirements 
of the omnibus coverage statute by providing coverage to the 
insured and to anyone using the motor vehicle described in the 
policy and any person who has legal responsibility for the acts 
or omissions of a person for whom coverage is afforded.  That 
language, while not parroting the statues, appears to provide 
the coverage that the omnibus coverage statute requires.   
In any event, this court has held that omnibus coverage is 
imputed to every automobile insurance policy, regardless of 
whether the policy actually incorporates the language of the 
omnibus statute.  Drewek v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 207 
Wis. 445, 448, 240 N.W. 881 (1932); see Wis. Stat. § 631.15(3m) 
("A policy that violates a statute or rule is enforceable 
against the insurer as if it conformed to the statute or 
rule.").   
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
8 
 
¶13 The passenger in the minor's vehicle, Daniel LaCount, 
filed suit against the father, the minor driver, and General 
Casualty, alleging that the minor's negligent operation of the 
vehicle caused his injuries.   
¶14 The personal representative of the estate of the 
driver of the van and passengers in the van were impleaded.  
They filed a third-party complaint against the father and the 
minor driver.9  The circuit court consolidated the cases. 
¶15 On October 31, 2001, the injured persons moved for 
declaratory judgment that the General Casualty policy covered 
both the father and the minor driver separately up to $500,000 
each per accident.  In support of this motion, the injured 
persons argued that paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) 
required General Casualty to provide two policy limits.  The 
circuit court denied this motion on November 26, 2001. 
¶16 On April 2, 2003, the injured persons came before the 
circuit court again.  Having lost on the basis of paragraph (b) 
of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), this time they argued that paragraph 
(a), rather than paragraph (b), required General Casualty to 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, Schenke v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 246 
Wis. 301, 305-06, 16 N.W.2d 817 (1944), upon which the injured 
persons rely, is inapposite.  Schenke held that coverage 
exclusions in an insurance policy that violate the omnibus 
statute must be stricken from the policy. 
The policy in the present case contains no provision that 
must be stricken or reformed. 
9 In 
separate 
responses 
to the impleader, 
the 
other 
passengers of the van also filed cross-claims against the 
father, the minor driver, and General Casualty. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
9 
 
provide two policy limits.10  This time the circuit court agreed 
with the injured persons and on June 30, 2003, issued a decision 
requiring General Casualty to pay separate $500,000 limits for 
both the father (as sponsor) and the minor driver.   
¶17 On July 16, 2003, this court held in Folkman v. 
Quamme, 2003 WI 116, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857, that 
paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) does not require 
                                                 
10 In relevant parts, Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (3) provides: 
(3) Required provisions.  Except as provided in sub. 
(5), every policy subject to this section issued to an 
owner shall provide that: 
(a) 
Coverage provided to 
the named 
insured 
applies in the same manner and under the same 
provisions to any person using any motor vehicle 
described in the policy when the use is for purposes 
and in the manner described in the policy. 
(b) 
Coverage extends 
to 
any person 
legally 
responsible for the use of the motor vehicle. 
Neither the injured persons nor General Casualty contends 
that the exceptions in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5) apply in the 
present case.  The Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin argues in 
its amicus brief that § 632.32(5)(f) applies.  Paragraph (f) of 
§ 632.32(5) provides: 
A policy may provide that regardless of the number of 
policies involved, vehicles involved, persons covered, 
claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on the policy 
or premiums paid the limits for any coverage under the 
policy may not be added to the limits for similar 
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available for bodily 
injury or death suffered by a person in any one 
accident. 
Because we hold in favor of General Casualty under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3)(a), we need not address this issue. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
10 
 
separate liability policy limits if a party is liable because of 
imputed negligence.  Based on the Folkman case, on July 30, 
2003, General Casualty filed a motion in the circuit court for 
reconsideration.  The circuit court denied the motion on October 
20, 2003, stating that there is no indication that this court 
intended its Folkman decision to apply to paragraph (a) of 
§ 632.32(3). 
¶18 General Casualty moved for leave to appeal, and the 
court of appeals granted the motion.  The court of appeals held 
that Folkman should be extended to paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3) and reversed the circuit court's summary judgment 
against General Casualty.  
II 
¶19 The issue presented is whether paragraph (a) of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3), the omnibus coverage statute, compels an 
insurance company (here General Casualty) to provide separate 
policy limits for both the named insured (a father who signed an 
application for his minor daughter's driver license, becoming 
her sponsor) and for the minor whose negligent operation of the 
motor vehicle caused her vehicle to collide with a van and 
injure several persons.     
¶20 This case requires us to interpret and apply paragraph 
(a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) to undisputed facts.  The 
interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts 
is ordinarily a question of law that this court decides 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.  To the extent that our decision 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
11 
 
requires 
that 
we 
interpret 
the 
insurance 
policy, 
an 
interpretation of an insurance policy is ordinarily a question 
of law.11  Finally, because this case was decided on summary 
judgment and the material facts are not in dispute, we follow 
the standard of review set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08; we 
determine whether the circuit court correctly decided an issue 
of law in its decision on the summary judgment motion.12 
III 
¶21 The issue presented requires us to interpret paragraph 
(a) of  Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), the statute at issue in the 
present case.  To interpret paragraph (a) we must also examine 
paragraph (b).   
¶22 Paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) requires all 
motor vehicle insurance policies to provide that "[c]overage 
provided to the named insured applies in the same manner and 
under the same provisions to any person using any motor vehicle 
described in the policy when the use is for purposes and in the 
manner described in the policy." 
¶23 Paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) requires that 
all motor vehicle insurance policies provide that "coverage 
extends to any person legally responsible for the use of the 
motor vehicle."   
                                                 
11 West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Playman, 171 Wis. 2d 37, 40, 
489 N.W.2d 37 (1992). 
12 Prince v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 666, 275 N.W.2d 676 
(1979). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
12 
 
¶24 Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) 
provide as follows: 
632.32(3) Required provisions. Except as provided in 
sub. (5), every policy subject to this section issued 
to an owner shall provide that: 
(a) 
Coverage provided to 
the 
named 
insured 
applies in the same manner and under the same 
provisions to any person using any motor vehicle 
described in the policy when the use is for 
purposes and in the manner described in the 
policy. 
(b) 
Coverage extends 
to 
any person 
legally 
responsible for the use of the motor vehicle. 
¶25 The named insured in the present case (the sponsor of 
the minor's driver license) clearly falls within paragraph (b); 
he is legally responsible for the use of the motor vehicle.  The 
parties dispute whether paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) 
requires an insurance policy to provide separate limits of 
liability to both a person permissively using the covered 
vehicle and the named insured who is liable by statute for 
imputed negligence (as a sponsor for a minor's driver license) 
for the minor's negligent operation of a vehicle.   
¶26 General Casualty argues that paragraph (a) of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3), while requiring that its policy provide the 
same coverage to the minor driver as it provides to the named 
insured (the father), does not require it to provide separate 
limits of liability for both the father-sponsor and the minor 
driver, each up to $500,000.  General Casualty's position is 
that paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) applies to the 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
13 
 
minor driver and paragraph (b) applies to the father and that 
the cases decided under paragraph (b) are adverse to the father. 
¶27 In contrast, the injured persons argue that the father 
comes within paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).  They 
contend that under paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), when 
a permissive user negligently operates a vehicle, both the 
permissive user and the named insured who is liable for imputed 
negligence as a sponsor of the application for a license of a 
minor driver must be given the same limits of liability with 
respect to that accident.  In other words, the injured persons 
contend that paragraph (a) requires that whatever liability 
limit is provided to the permissive user for the accident must 
also be provided to the named insured (the father) for his joint 
and several liability as sponsor of the minor's driver license.  
We examine the arguments of the parties.  
A 
¶28 The injured persons argue that the word "apply" in 
paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), as contrasted with the 
word "extend" in paragraph (b) of § 632.32(3), gives the two 
paragraphs fundamentally different meanings.  According to the 
injured persons, the word "apply" in paragraph (a) compels 
General Casualty to do more than merely "extend" a single 
$500,000 limit of liability to be shared between the named 
insured and the permissive user.  Rather, because "apply" means 
"to put to or adapt for a special use," the injured persons 
contend that General Casualty must provide the named insured and 
the permissive user with two separate $500,000 limits of 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
14 
 
liability, for a cumulative $1 million in liability, under 
paragraph (a). 
¶29 This 
statutory 
interpretation 
argument 
is 
unconvincing.  The text of paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3) (and the statutory and legislative history of 
paragraph (a)) suggest that paragraph (a) should be interpreted 
similarly to paragraph (b) regarding the application of policy 
limits to multiple insureds whose liabilities are covered by the 
same insurance policy.     
¶30 First, the argument that a significant difference 
exists between "extend" and "apply," at least within the context 
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), is 
strained.  It seems equally reasonable to argue that the 
legislature did not intend the notions of application and 
extension of insurance coverage in the context of this statute 
to be different.   
¶31 Second, and more to the point, the injured persons 
overlook 
the 
statutory 
and 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) that undermines their position.   
¶32 In its original form, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) used 
"apply" and "extend" in a way that suggests that the legislature 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
distinguish 
between 
these 
two 
words.  
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) are derived 
from Wis. Stat. § 204.30 (1925).13  Section 204.30 stated in 
relevant part as follows: 
                                                 
13 See § 2, ch. 372, Laws of 1925. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
15 
 
(3) No such [automobile insurance] policy shall be 
issued 
or 
delivered . . . unless 
there 
shall 
be 
contained within such policy a provision reading 
substantially as follows:  The indemnity provided by 
this policy is extended to apply, in the same manner 
and under the same provisions as it is applicable to 
the named assured, to any person or persons while 
riding in or operating any automobile described in 
this policy when such automobile is being used for 
purposes and in the manner described in said policy.  
Such indemnity shall also extend to any person, firm 
or corporation legally responsible for the operation 
of such automobile.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶33 Thus, in its original 1925 version, coverage was 
"extended to apply" to "any person or persons while riding in or 
operating any automobile described in this policy when such 
automobile is being used for purposes and in the manner 
described in said policy."  In the next sentence, coverage was 
also "extend[ed]" (presumably, as in the previous sentence, "to 
apply") to "any person, firm or corporation legally responsible 
for the operation of such automobile."  Therefore, the language 
in the precursor to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) appears to undercut 
the argument made by the injured persons that there is a 
meaningful distinction between "extend" and "apply" as these 
words appear in paragraphs (a) and (b) in the present Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3). 
¶34 Subsequent statutory changes also seem to undercut the 
interpretation proffered by the injured persons.  In 1975, the 
legislature repealed Wis. Stat. § 204.30(3) (1975) and reenacted 
it as Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) (1975) to read as follows: 
(2) Coverage. 
. . . . 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
16 
 
(b) Required provisions.  Every [automobile insurance] 
policy of the kind specified in sub. (1) issued or 
delivered . . . to the owner of a motor vehicle shall 
contain a provision substantially as follows:  "The 
coverage provided by this policy applies, in the same 
manner 
and 
under 
the 
same 
provision 
as 
it 
is 
applicable to the named insured, to any person while 
riding in or operating any automobile described in 
this policy when the automobile is being used for 
purposes and in the manner described in the policy.  
Such coverage also extends to any person legally 
responsible for the operation of the automobile."14  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶35 The 1975 revision eliminated the phrase "extended to 
apply" and replaced it with "applies."  There is nothing in the 
legislative history to support the argument that the elimination 
of the word "extended" was in any way a meaningful change.  
Further, by stating that the coverage provided by the policy 
"applies" to permissive users and passengers and "also extends" 
to 
the 
person 
legally 
responsible 
for 
operation 
of 
the 
automobile, the 1975 version of the omnibus statute suggests 
that the legislature did not intend to distinguish between 
"applies" and "extends."  
¶36 In 1979, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) (1975) was repealed 
and recreated as the present paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
§ 632.32(3) as follows: 
(3) REQUIRED PROVISIONS.  Except as provided in sub. 
(5), every policy subject to this section issued to an 
owner shall provide that: 
(a) Coverage provided to the named insured applies in 
the same manner and under the same provisions to any 
person using any motor vehicle described in the policy 
                                                 
14 See § 2, ch. 375, Laws of 1975. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
17 
 
when the use is for purposes and in the manner 
described in the policy. 
(b) Coverage extends to any person legally responsible 
for the use of the motor vehicle.15  (Emphasis added.) 
¶37 In both the original 1925 statute and the 1975 
reenactment, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) 
were not separate provisions.  Paragraphs (a) and (b) were two 
sentences in a single subsection requiring insurance coverage 
for both permissive users and those legally responsible.16   
¶38 The 1975 and 1979 amendments were part of an ongoing 
effort by the Wisconsin Insurance Laws Revision Committee, the 
Legislative Council, and the Wisconsin Legislature to modernize 
Wisconsin's insurance laws.17 
¶39 Nothing in the 1979 amendments indicates that the 
meaning of the existing statute was changed by dividing Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3) into two paragraphs.  Indeed, the 1979 session 
law enacting the current statute contains a Legislative Council 
note that addresses statutory changes made as a result of the 
passage of subsections (1), (2), (4), (5), and (6) of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
15 See § 171, ch. 102, Laws of 1979. 
16 Drafting 
records 
from 
1925 
are 
unavailable. 
The 
Legislative Reference Bureau in Madison, Wis. has drafting 
records dating back only to 1927.  Neither the 1975 drafting 
records nor the 1975 Legislative Council materials contain any 
explanation of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b)(1975).  
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32 has been amended several times 
since 1979, but none of these amendments is relevant to the 
present case. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
18 
 
§ 632.32.18  The only statutory subsection for which the note 
does not describe any change is subsection (3) of § 632.32.19   
¶40 We could find nothing in the extensive materials 
prepared by the Legislative Council Insurance Laws Revision 
Committee indicating that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) was being 
changed by its division into two paragraphs.20  The court of 
appeals has commented that "[t]he legislative history of the 
omnibus coverage statute does not reflect that the legislature 
by amendment intended to 'sever' the connection between pars. 
(a) and (b) of sec. 632.32(3)."21  It appears to us also that the 
1979 revisions were not meant to accomplish a substantive change 
in the statute.22 
¶41 The contention of the injured persons that there is a 
meaningful difference between "extend" and "apply" is strained.  
                                                 
18 § 171, ch. 102, Laws of 1979. 
19 For a similar discussion of the statutory revisions, see 
Mills v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 472, 480-82, 427 
N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Playman, 171 Wis. 2d 37, 489 N.W.2d 915 
(1992).  
20 See, e.g., Legislative Council Report nos. 79-1 (Jan. 30, 
1979), 79-2 (Jan. 30, 1979), 79-6 (Mar. 23, 1979), 79-10 (Apr. 
2, 1979), 79-11 (Apr. 2, 1979); Legislative Council Insurance 
Laws Revision Committee, Committee Report No. 1 to the 1977-79 
Legislative Council (Sept. 18, 1978, revised Dec. 6, 1978). 
21 Mills v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 472, 480, 427 
N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Playman, 171 Wis. 2d 37, 489 N.W.2d 915 
(1992) (emphasis supplied). 
22 § 171, ch. 102, Laws of 1979; Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (1979). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
19 
 
As 
the 
statutory 
and 
legislative 
history 
suggests, 
any 
distinction between the words in the current statute appears to 
be the by-product of an economization of language and a 
whittling down from the 1925 version of the statute in which 
"extend" and "apply" were not intended to be different.23   
¶42 The text and statutory and legislative history of 
paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) do not support the claim 
of the injured persons that under paragraph (a) the father-
sponsor, as well as the permissive user, are each entitled to 
coverage in the amount of the limit of liability in the policy.24  
                                                 
23 The injured persons argue that if paragraph (a) of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3) provides protection to permissive users of an 
insured automobile and not to the named insured, paragraph (a) 
is unnecessary and superfluous.  They contend that because 
paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) provides protection to 
"any persons legally responsible for the use of the motor 
vehicle," the permissive driver of a motor vehicle is protected 
under paragraph (b) of § 632.32(3) because the driver is always 
legally responsible for the use of the motor vehicle. 
We agree with the injured persons that a permissive user 
would ordinarily be a person legally responsible for the use of 
the motor vehicle and therefore would fall within paragraph (b) 
as well as paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).  
However, this analysis does not require the conclusion that 
paragraph (a) must provide separate limits of liability to the 
named insured to whom negligence is imputed. 
Paragraph 
(a) 
provides 
protection 
to 
a 
group 
of 
individuals: permissive users of covered automobiles.  Paragraph 
(b) provides coverage to a broader group of individuals, 
including driver license sponsors.  Both work in tandem to 
require coverage of all of these individuals.  
24 An overwhelming majority of states and the District of 
Columbia have omnibus statutes. See 8 Lee F. Russ & Thomas F. 
Segalla, Couch on Insurance, § 111:22 (3d ed. 2004).  The 
language of the statutes differs from state to state. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
20 
 
Rather the text and statutory and legislative history of 
paragraph (a) suggest that paragraph (a) should be interpreted 
similarly to paragraph (b) regarding the application of policy 
limits to multiple insured whose liabilities are covered by the 
same insurance policy. 
B 
¶43 To succeed in their claims, the injured persons must 
overcome the case law supporting the conclusion that neither 
paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) 
requires an insurance policy to provide separate limits of 
liability to both a person permissively using a covered vehicle 
and the named insured who is liable by statute for imputed 
negligence (as a sponsor for an insured's driver license) for 
the minor's negligent operation of a vehicle. 
¶44 The injured persons initially brought their claims in 
the circuit court under paragraph (b) and failed.  They then 
based their claims on paragraph (a) in an attempt to repackage 
their claims to accomplish what case law will not permit them to 
accomplish under paragraph (b).     
¶45 The case law interpreting paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) has distinguished the limit of liability 
an insurance company must provide for two persons on the basis 
of whether their liability is grounded on active negligence or 
imputed negligence.   
                                                                                                                                                             
This 
variation 
presents 
a 
significant 
challenge 
to 
examining other state statutes to interpret § 632.32(3).  
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
21 
 
¶46 In trying to overcome the case law, the injured 
persons categorize the common-law distinction between active and 
imputed negligence as "a myth that has crept into Wisconsin 
jurisprudence" not based on any statutory language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3).   
¶47 General Casualty, on the other hand, characterizes the 
distinction as "long-standing precedent" that this court should 
follow.  A somewhat lengthy review of the case law is necessary 
to fully appreciate the arguments. 
¶48 We begin with Miller v. Amundson, 117 Wis. 2d 425, 
430-31, 345 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1984), in which the court of 
appeals applied Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b) (1977), the precursor 
to § 632.32(3), to hold that an insurance company was required 
to pay two separate maximum limits of liability to two 
individuals found causally negligent for injuries suffered by a 
child in an auto accident.  This case involves the language of 
what is now paragraph (a) of § 632.32(3). 
¶49 The Miller case involved a mother and grandmother who 
placed the mother's child in the loaded cargo bed of a pickup 
truck.  The grandmother was driving; the child's mother was a 
passenger in the truck.  The child fell out of the truck and was 
injured.  The circuit court jury found the grandmother 75 
percent negligent for not safely securing the truck's load and 
the mother 25 percent negligent for breaching her duty to 
supervise her son by allowing him to ride in the back of the 
truck.  
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
22 
 
¶50 The insurance policy was issued to the grandfather; 
the grandmother was considered a named insured; the mother was 
considered an additional insured.  The policy contained a single 
limit for bodily injury and property damage of $100,000 for 
"each occurrence."  The insurance company argued that it was 
obligated to pay no more than $100,000 in liability coverage, to 
be shared between the mother and grandmother.   
¶51 The damages exceeded the $100,000 policy limit.  The 
court of appeals reasoned that the grandmother reasonably 
expected the insurance company to pay $100,000 on her behalf.  
The court of appeals concluded that if the insurance company did 
not pay a separate $100,000 on the mother's behalf, the mother 
would not be receiving the same coverage in the same manner and 
under the same provisions as the grandmother, in violation of 
the omnibus coverage statute.  Therefore, according to the court 
of appeals, the insurance company must, by virtue of what is now 
paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), provide $100,000 
coverage each for the mother and grandmother.  "This result 
satisfies the requirements of sec. [632.32(3)(a)].  It provides 
[the grandmother] with the coverage she reasonably expected.  It 
also provides the [mother] with the coverage she is entitled to 
as an additional insured."25   
                                                 
25 Miller v. Amundson, 117 Wis. 2d 425, 430-31, 345 N.W.2d 
494 (Ct. App. 1984). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
23 
 
¶52 The Miller court never mentioned that paragraph (a) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) made any distinction between liability 
for active negligence and imputed negligence.26  
¶53 Three years later the court of appeals in Landsinger 
v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 142 Wis. 2d 138, 417 
                                                 
26 Analyzing paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), 
Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 180 Wis. 2d 661, 665-66, 510 
N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals stated that 
"separate coverage must be provided only in cases where both the 
named 
insured 
and 
the 
additional 
insured 
are 
actively 
negligent." 
For a discussion of the Miller case, see Arnold P. 
Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law, § 2.64-2.65 (5th ed. 2004). 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
in 
the 
Miller-Landsinger-Mills-
Iaquinta line of cases sometimes discusses the issue of limits 
of liability in terms of separate "occurrences."  See Iaquinta 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 180 Wis. 2d 661, 668, ("The fact that 
[Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 469, 329 
N.W.2d 150 (1983)] explained that the two acts of negligence 
coalesce into one occurrence is of no import to our decision.  
In Miller, this court based its holding on the interplay between 
the two separate acts of negligence and the omnibus statute. For 
this reason we specifically explained that it was not necessary 
to resolve the question of whether the injury was caused by one 
or two occurrences.  Thus, we conclude that Bankert in no way 
prohibits this court from applying our rationale in Miller to 
the instant case." (citation omitted)); Miller, 117 Wis. 2d at 
429 n.3 ("The trial court . . . concluded that the accident was 
two occurrences. . . . Because we conclude that the omnibus 
coverage statute controls this case, we do not resolve this 
question."); cf. Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 
Wis. 2d 469, 476-80, 329 N.W.2d 150 (1983) ("An occurrence is 
defined as an accident. This is what is insured against——not 
theories of liability.  Accordingly, when the event insured 
against involves an automobile and happens away from the 
premises, the exclusion applies."); Severude v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2002 WI App 33, ¶16, 250 Wis. 2d 655, 639 N.W.2d 772 
("The reasonable interpretation of the word occurrence is that 
it refers to the event of injury."). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
24 
 
N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1987), had to determine the application of 
paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) in the context of a 
master-servant relationship.  An individual was injured in an 
automobile accident caused by Paul, the servant of Christine, 
the insured master.  Christine's insurance policy contained a 
bodily injury limit of liability of $100,000.  
¶54 Despite this $100,000 policy limit, the Landsingers 
relied on the Miller case and argued that paragraph (b) of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(3) compelled the insurance company to make 
available separate $100,000 limits for both Christine and Paul.  
¶55 The court of appeals rejected the argument and held 
that Paul and Christine were entitled to shared coverage of a 
single $100,000 limit of liability under subparagraph (b) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).  The court of appeals reasoned that when 
the insurance company paid $100,000, "Christine received the 
same dollar-for-dollar protection as did Paul for that same 
negligence.  The liability of each was satisfied to the extent 
of that payment.  Coverage therefore has been 'extended' to both 
Paul and Christine, the two persons legally responsible for the 
use of the vehicle, as required by sec. 632.32(3)(b), Stats. 
1983."27   
¶56 The court of appeals distinguished Miller on the 
ground that Miller involved paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3), while Landsinger involved paragraph (b), and Miller 
                                                 
27 Landsinger v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 138, 
142-43, 417 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
25 
 
involved 
two 
tortfeasors, 
"each 
negligent 
in 
the 
same 
accident."28  The court of appeals explained that "[w]hether a 
person to whom the negligence of another is imputed is entitled 
to separate coverage under sec. 632.32(3)(b) was not an issue in 
Miller."29   
¶57 Focusing on paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), 
Landsinger does not provide strong support for applying the 
distinction between active negligence and imputed negligence to 
paragraph (a).   
¶58 The next case is Mills v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance 
Co., 145 Wis. 2d 472, 427 N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled 
on other grounds by West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Playman, 
171 Wis. 2d 37, 489 N.W.2d 915 (1992), considering paragraph (b) 
of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).30  In Mills, Christopher Mills was 
injured in a one-car accident while riding as a passenger in his 
father's vehicle operated by Mills' 17-year-old friend, Michael 
                                                 
28 Id. at 142. 
29 Id. 
30 Although Mills v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Co., 145 
Wis. 2d 472, 427 N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1988), has been overruled 
by this court, we include the Mills case because the court of 
appeals referred to Mills in later cases. 
Although the court of appeals has apparently treated its 
decisions as precedential even after this court has reviewed 
them, "[t]he effect of a court of appeals decision that has been 
reviewed by the court and resolved on a different issue has not 
definitively been answered."  Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 
Wis. 2d 1, 10 n.8, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997); see also State v. Gary 
M.B., 2004 WI 33, ¶44 n.1, 270 Wis. 2d 62, 676 N.W.2d 475 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
26 
 
Wintz.  The father's policy limit was $50,000 each person and 
$100,000 each occurrence.   
¶59 Michael's parents sponsored Michael's application for 
a driver license.  The issue presented was whether the Mills' 
policy had to extend $50,000 of liability each to the parents of 
Wintz.  
¶60 Relying on the Landsinger case, the court of appeals 
held in Mills that paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) did 
not mandate such a result.  The court of appeals explained its 
decision as follows: 
Landsinger, 142 Wis. 2d at 143, 417 N.W.2d at 901, 
holds that each person to whom the negligence of 
another is imputed is not entitled to policy-limits 
protection under sec. 632.32(3)(b), Stats.  Because 
the liability of Robert and Sandra Wintz [the parents] 
is based upon the imputed negligence of Michael [the 
driver son], coverage is "extended" to them as 
required by sec. 632.32(3)(b) by Wisconsin Mutual's 
policy which protects them against liability to the 
extent of the bodily injury liability limits of its 
policy.  Id.  [The Mills' insurance company's] limit-
of-liability clause does not therefore conflict with 
the omnibus coverage statute.31 
¶61 Mills, like Landsinger, construed paragraph (b) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), not paragraph (a).  
¶62 The next court of appeals decision is Iaquinta v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 180 Wis. 2d 661, 510 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 
1993), involving paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).  
                                                 
31 Mills v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 472, 479, 427 
N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Playman, 171 Wis. 2d 37, 489 N.W.2d 915 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
27 
 
Iaquinta represents an endorsement of both Miller relating to 
active negligence under paragraph (a) and the Mills and 
Landsinger cases relating to imputed negligence under paragraph 
(b).   
¶63 In Iaquinta, Tracy Monroe allowed Todd Rasmussen to 
operate her vehicle while he was intoxicated.  Rasmussen crashed 
the vehicle into a vehicle driven by Alice Iaquinta, causing 
Iaquinta to sustain permanent injuries.  Monroe's insurance 
policy had a $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence limit 
of 
liability. 
 
Monroe 
and 
Rasmussen 
were 
both 
actively 
negligent——Rasmussen for operation of the motor vehicle and 
Monroe for negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Rasmussen.   
¶64 The court of appeals agreed with Iaquinta that Monroe's 
insurance company must provide separate limits of liability for 
both Monroe and Rasmussen.32  Paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
32 For a similar result, see Haislip v. S. Heritage Ins. 
Co., 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1997), in which the Virginia Supreme 
Court held that "[e]ven though Southern Heritage's insurance 
policy contains a limitation of $25,000 per occurrence, that 
limitation, if applied, would violate the omnibus clause because 
once Southern Heritage paid the $25,000 to settle Haislip's 
claims . . . the named insured, who paid the policy premiums, 
would not receive any liability insurance coverage."  The 
Virginia Supreme Court subsequently held in Johnson v. Windsor 
Ins. Co., 597 S.E.2d 31, 33-34 (Va. 2004), that a statutory 
change in the omnibus clause explicitly provided that insurance 
companies may limit their liability regardless of the number of 
insureds under a policy. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
28 
 
§ 632.32(3) and the active negligence of two covered persons 
were at issue in Iaquinta as they were in the Miller case.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the Miller case controlled.   
¶65 In rendering the Iaquinta decision, the court of 
appeals never distinguished between paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3).  Rather, it just distinguished Miller 
from Landsinger and Mills as follows: 
We have recounted the holding of Miller in subsequent 
cases and explained that separate coverage must be 
provided only in cases where both the named insured 
and the additional insured are actively negligent.  
See 
[Landsinger 
and 
Mills]. 
 
Thus, 
where 
the 
negligence of the additional insured is merely imputed 
to the named insured, or where the named insured is 
vicariously 
liable, 
the 
holding 
of 
Miller 
is 
inapplicable and the policy limits expressed in the 
policy are unaffected by the omnibus statute.33 
                                                                                                                                                             
Many states with omnibus statutes do not require separate 
limits of liability regardless of the number of insureds who are 
actively negligent.  See, e.g., GRE Ins. Group v. Green, 980 
P.2d 963, 966, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (negligent entrustment); 
Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 14 P.3d 487, 498 (Mont. 2000) 
(same); Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. May, 972 S.W.2d 595, 
600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Schulte v. Progressive N. Ins. 
Co., 699 N.W.2d 437, 439-40 (S.D. 2005) (same); Manriquez v. 
Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex., 779 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App. 
1989) (same), disapproved of on other grounds by Trinity 
Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. 1997). 
33 Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 180 Wis. 2d 661, 666, 510 
N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
29 
 
¶66 The injured persons argue that Iaquinta is unsound 
because it merged paragraphs (a) and (b) without any discussion 
or reasoning.34 
¶67 Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 
N.W.2d 857, is a recent case in which the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court reinforced the distinction between liability based on 
active negligence and liability based on imputed negligence in 
                                                 
34 For a summary of Miller, Mills, Landsinger, and Iaquinta 
that 
recognizes 
the 
active 
negligence/imputed 
negligence 
distinction, see Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law 
§§ 2.64-.65 (5th ed. 2004).  In discussing these cases, Anderson 
does 
not 
distinguish 
between 
paragraphs 
(a) 
and 
(b) 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) in analyzing when separate limits are 
required.  Like the court of appeals in the Miller-Mills-
Landsinger-Iaquinta line of cases and this court in Folkman v. 
Quamme, 2003 WI 116, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857, Anderson 
focuses exclusively on the active negligence/imputed negligence 
distinction.   
Landsinger appears to be the only one of these cases to 
recognize any distinction between paragraphs (a) and (b).  
Landsinger v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 138, 142, 
417 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1987) ("In Miller, an automobile 
liability policy provided $100,000 coverage per occurrence. We 
held that where the named insured and an additional insured were 
each negligent in the same accident, each was entitled separate 
coverage under the provisions now in sec. 632.32(3)(a), Stats. 
 . . . Whether a person to whom the negligence of another is 
imputed is entitled to separate coverage under sec. 632.32(3)(b) 
was not an issue in Miller.").  The Landsinger court failed, 
however, to make clear whether it was relying on some (non-
apparent) distinction between paragraphs (a) and (b) or, rather, 
whether it was relying upon the active/imputed negligence 
distinction.  The Mills opinion, which was decided by the same 
three judges who decided Landsinger, makes clear that the 
distinction lies in whether the negligence was active or 
imputed.  Mills v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 472, 479, 427 
N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
30 
 
connection with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) and applied Miller (a 
paragraph (a) case) to paragraph (b). 
¶68 Folkman involved an automobile accident caused by 17-
year-old driver Keith Folkman.  Keith's mother and Keith's 
brother were riding in the vehicle driven by Keith and were 
seriously injured.  Keith was covered under an insurance policy 
that had a stated limit of liability of $25,000 per person and 
$50,000 per occurrence.   
¶69 Keith, his mother, and his brother were all "insureds" 
under the policy.  Keith's parents had liability imputed to them 
as a result of their sponsorship of Keith's application for a 
driver license.  
¶70 The Folkmans brought suit against their insurance 
company, claiming that paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) 
required the insurance company to provide separate limits of 
liability for Keith's parents.  The Folkmans argued that if each 
dollar their insurance company paid on behalf of Keith were 
subtracted from the amounts the insurance company owed the 
parents, coverage would not have been extended to them as 
required under paragraph (b). 
¶71 The Folkman court relied on all the cases set forth 
above, 
without 
distinguishing 
between 
those 
interpreting 
paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) and those interpreting 
paragraph (b).  The Folkman court seemed to merge paragraphs (a) 
and (b), viewing Miller-Iaquinta (decided under paragraph (a)) 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
31 
 
as narrowed by Landsinger-Mills (governing paragraph (b)).35  The 
court explained its approach as follows: 
In two cases [Miller and Iaquinta], the court of 
appeals interpreted the omnibus statute to double 
liability coverage, notwithstanding the limits of 
liability in the policies, because the negligence of 
two insureds in each case was viewed as a separate 
occurrence.  Under the rule in Miller and Iaquinta, 
limitation on liability conflicts with § 632.32(3)(b) 
when both the named insured and an additional insured 
that is "legally responsible for the use of the motor 
vehicle" are each actively negligent.   
However, in cases of vicarious liability, § 632.32(b) 
does not extend policy-limits protection to both the 
tortfeasor and the person or persons vicariously 
liable 
for 
the 
tortfeasor's 
wrongdoing. . . . In 
instances where someone is "legally responsible for 
the use of a motor vehicle" but where he or she has no 
liability independent of the negligence of another, a 
single liability is shared by the tortfeasor and the 
sponsor. 
 
The 
distinction 
between 
Miller 
and 
Landsinger-Mills reflects this sharing of a single 
liability.36 
                                                 
35 The court explained as follows: 
The Folkmans contend that Society [their insurance 
company] failed to extend coverage to all insureds who 
were liable for the accident, namely, Keith Folkman 
(as driver), as well as Debra Folkman and Kenneth 
Folkman, Sr. (as parent-sponsors of Keith Folkman).  
This overarching premise is false.  Society did extend 
coverage to all three insureds.  The problem the 
insureds face is not that one or more of them were not 
covered under the policy.  The problem is that the 
named insured did not purchase a greater amount of per 
occurrence liability. 
Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶60, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 
857. 
36 Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶¶63-64, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 
665 N.W.2d 857 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
32 
 
¶72 Thus, it appears that under Folkman both paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) cannot be read to compel 
an insurance company to provide a separate limit of liability to 
a sponsor of a minor's driver license, except when the sponsor 
is liable for active negligence.37   
¶73 The injured persons argue that the disposition of the 
present case should be controlled not by Folkman, but by Smith 
v. National Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 706, 205 N.W.2d 365 
(1973).  We conclude that Smith and Folkman are distinguishable 
and are not in conflict.38  
¶74 In Smith, the issue before the supreme court was 
whether 
the 
precursor 
to 
paragraph 
(a) 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(3)39 compelled an insurance company to grant the same 
                                                 
37 In Folkman, this court did not expressly apply its 
holding to paragraph (a).  However, as the text accompanying 
this footnote demonstrates, the rationale of Folkman derives 
from cases under both paragraph (a) and paragraph (b). 
38 Court of Appeals Judge Sundby, the author of the 
unanimous Mills opinion, alluded to the Smith case in a footnote 
in Mills stating that he "agrees that Landsinger controls but 
suggests that the applicability of the omnibus coverage statute 
should be reexamined in light of the legislative history of the 
statute and the cases decided thereunder, most notably Smith v. 
National Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 706, 205 N.W.2d 365 (1973)."  
The court of appeals in the present case concluded that "to the 
extent there is any inconsistency [between Smith and Folkman], 
the 
later 
decision 
(Folkman) 
by 
the 
supreme 
court 
controls . . . . [W]e perceive no inconsistencies between Smith 
and Folkman.  The General Casualty policy provides identical 
coverage to [the minor driver and the father].  They merely 
share a single limit of liability."  LaCount v. Gen. Cas. Co. of 
Wis., No. 2003AP3258, unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 30, 2005). 
39 The statute at issue was Wis. Stat. § 204.30(3) (1967). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
33 
 
policy limits to the renter of an automobile as it granted to 
the owner of the automobile.  The insurance policy issued to a 
car rental agency specified that the owners of the vehicles were 
covered with a $100,000 per person limit of liability; renters 
of the same vehicles, by contrast, were covered with a $10,000 
per person limit of liability.  After a renter of one of the 
vehicles got into an accident, the renter sued the insurance 
company on the grounds that the omnibus coverage limits of 
liability mandated that the insurance company extend the same 
limit of liability enjoyed by the owner to the renter.  The 
court held that contrary to the written terms of the policy, the 
policy must be deemed by virtue of the precursor of paragraph 
(a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) to afford the renters protection 
to the extent of the higher limits. 
¶75 Smith, in contrast to Folkman and the case at bar, did 
not concern whether the omnibus coverage statute compels an 
insurance company to make available two separate and distinct 
limits of liability for two persons.  Smith merely addressed an 
insurance company's obligation to provide the same levels of 
liability to those insured under a single policy and to the 
permissive user.  General Casualty does not contend that 
different limits are payable in the present case.  It offers its 
full limits of $500,000 for the combined liability of the minor 
driver and the father-sponsor.  General Casualty is correct to 
argue that Smith should not control the present case. 
¶76 The basic argument presented by the injured persons is 
that determining the limits of liability by distinguishing 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
34 
 
between liability based on active negligence and liability based 
on imputed negligence is flawed.  They assert that the Miller-
Landsinger-Mills-Iaquinta-Folkman cases are not well reasoned; 
that the cases rely to a large extent on dicta; that the cases 
merge paragraphs (a) and (b) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) without 
any real discussion or explanation; and that the distinction 
between liability on the basis of active negligence and imputed 
negligence in these cases has no basis in the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(3). 
¶77 These arguments have some appeal.  The reasoning of 
the cases is limited; they do merge paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) without much discussion or explanation; 
and the distinction between liability on the basis of active 
negligence and imputed negligence has no basis in the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3). 
¶78 Furthermore, the 
injured 
persons 
argue 
that the 
distinction between active negligence and imputed negligence 
makes little sense.  If requiring two actively negligent 
insureds to share one policy limit insulted the legislative 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3), as Miller held, requiring the 
named insured who is liable because of imputed negligence to 
share a limit with an actively negligent driver is similarly 
offensive.  It contradicts the expectation of policyholders who 
think they are covered for the full amount of the liability 
limit in the policy; the policyholder does not expect to share 
the liability limits.   
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
35 
 
¶79 The injured persons present the following difficult 
questions:  
From 
[the 
father's] 
perspective: 
why 
would 
the 
Legislature pass a law requiring him to be actively 
negligent in order to acquire the full insurance 
protection that he purchased?  From [the minor 
driver's] perspective: if, as Miller advised, § 3(a) 
protects drivers and named insureds alike, why should 
an actively negligent driver receive full policy 
limits in Miller but partial limits here?  The Omnibus 
Statute never mentions these senseless distinctions 
but they are the natural consequences of the Court of 
Appeals decision [in Miller].  
¶80 In contrast, General Casualty urges that the injured 
persons' reasoning that an insurance company's obligation to pay 
multiple limits depends not on the terms of the policy but on 
the number of insureds leads to absurd results.  Suppose, argues 
General Casualty, there were two sponsors.  Would there be three 
sets of limits?  Suppose there were two sponsors plus a 
permissive user who allowed another to drive the automobile.  
Would there now be four sets of limits?40   
¶81 Although 
the 
injured 
persons 
make 
interesting 
arguments, we are bound by case law since 1983, including 
Folkman, which this court decided three years ago, that has 
distinguished between liability based on active or imputed 
negligence and has apparently merged paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
                                                 
40 Danielson v. Gasper, 2001 WI App 12, 240 Wis. 2d 633, 623 
N.W.2d 182, cited by General Casualty for the proposition that 
the number of negligent insured does not affect the liability 
limits, is inapposite.  The policy in Danielson was issued in 
Minnesota, so Wis. Stat. § 632.32 did not apply.  Danielson, 240 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶9; see Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law 
§ 2.65 (5th ed. 2004). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
36 
 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) in discussing the limits of liability.  
Furthermore, the text of paragraph (a) supports the argument 
that the paragraph does not require separate limits of liability 
for the permissive user and the named insured.  The legislature 
has not amended the statute, and insurance companies have relied 
on this case law in writing policies for many years. 
¶82 While we recognize that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) is 
intended to have the remedial purpose of protecting insureds and 
third parties, and generally expanding insurance coverage,41 such 
a purpose neither requires nor permits the court to interpret 
paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(3) contrary to its text and 
its statutory and legislative history and prior case law.  For 
the reasons set forth, we hold that the text of paragraph (a) 
(and the statutory and legislative history of paragraph (a)) 
suggest that paragraph (a) should be interpreted similarly to 
paragraph (b) regarding the application of policy limits to 
multiple insureds whose liabilities are covered by the same 
insurance policy.  Twenty years of case law supports the 
conclusion that neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) of Wis. 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Nordahl v. Peterson, 68 Wis. 2d 538, 551, 229 
N.W.2d 682 (1975); Home Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 175 Wis. 2d 104, 
114, 499 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1993); Carrell v. Wolken, 173 
Wis. 2d 426, 437, 496 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992); Miller v. 
Amundson, 117 Wis. 2d 425, 429-30, 345 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 
1984); see also 8 Lee F. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on 
Insurance § 111:3 (3d ed. 2004) ("In general, the purpose is to 
increase the number of injured parties who can recover from 
insurance policies, rather than denying the injured party the 
ability 
to 
recover 
from 
available 
insurance 
because 
the 
permissive driver is otherwise uninsured."). 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
37 
 
Stat. § 632.32(3) provides separate limits of liability to both 
a person permissively using the covered vehicle and the named 
insured who is liable by statute for imputed negligence (as a 
sponsor for a minor's driver license) for the minor's negligent 
operation of a vehicle. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
¶83 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., did not participate. 
No. 
2003AP3258   
 
 
 
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