Title: ROBERT C . FOLEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2002-SC-000222-TG
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2003

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREPROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURTOF THIS STATE. ROBERT C . FOLEY APPELLANT e$ixirxeutle avurf of 2002-SC-0222-TG APPEALED FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE CRIMINAL NO . 91-CR-0180 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT Affirming RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE In 1993, the Laurel Circuit Court imposed two death sentences upon Appellant, Robert Foley, pursuant to convictions for the murders of Harry Lynn Vaughn and Rodney Vaughn . The convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal in Foley v . Commonwealth , Ky., 942 S .W.2d 876 (1996), cert . denied , 522 U .S . 893 (1997) . The trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for RCr 11 .42 relief was subsequently affirmed in Foley v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 17 S.W.3d 878 (2000), cert . denied , 531 U .S . 1055 (2000) . This appeal is from the Laurel Circuit Court's November 2001 order denying Appellant's motion for new trial pursuant to CR 60 .02 and RCr 10 .02 . Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered exculpatory evidence indicating that a Commonwealth's witness, Aaron Caldwell, perjured himself to the detriment of Appellant's defense . Appellant's primary proof of this allegation is an affidavit from Caldwell disavowing his previous trial testimony that Appellant had approached him in jail in an attempt to solicit favorable untruthful testimony to bolster Appellant's defense . Appellant maintains that Caldwell's testimony was a critical link in the Commonwealth's case and had a significant impact on the jury . Therefore, Appellant contends that Caldwell's "fatally damning" and "absolutely false" testimony mandates relief because it secured his conviction in violation of his due process rights . Giglio v . United States , 405 U .S . 150, 92 S .Ct . 763, 31 L.Ed .2d 104 (1972) ; Commonwealth v . Spaulding , Ky., 991 S .W.2d 651 (1999) . As a preliminary matter, there is some question as to the timeliness of Appellant's motion . Pursuant to CR 60.02, a motion for relief from judgment based on allegations of newly discovered evidence or perjury "shall be made . . . not more than one year after the judgment . . . was entered . . . ." RCr 10 .06(1) provides that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence shall be made "within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment or at a later time if the court for good cause so permits ." Appellant points out that in Commonwealth v . Spaulding , supra , this Court held that a criminal conviction based on perjured testimony can be a reason of "an extraordinary nature justifying relief" pursuant to CR 60.02(f) and is subject to a reasonable time limitation rather than the one-year limitation . Caldwell's affidavit alleging that he perjured himself was notarized on March 17, 2000 . However, Appellant's motion for new trial (based on the alleged perjury) was not 2 filed until June 8, 2001 . The Commonwealth argues, as it did in the trial court, that the delay is presumptively unreasonable and that Appellant has offered no evidence to justify his delay in filing the motion . Nonetheless, the Laurel Circuit Court ruled that Appellant's motion was procedurally sufficient under Spaulding , supra . Notwithstanding preservation, we find no merit in Appellant's argument . Without reciting the convoluted factual scenario Appellant alleges occurred on the evening of the murders, he contends that the Commonwealth called Caldwell to testify at trial in an "effort to bolster its weakening case ." Caldwell testified at trial that Appellant had approached him while both were in the Laurel County Jail and asked him to testify that he (Caldwell) had run out of gas near Appellant's home on the night in question and had, in fact, witnessed another individual shoot the Vaughns . Caldwell told the jury that he reported the conversation with Appellant to authorities because it was his duty as a citizen and he thought the jurors should know that Appellant had asked him to lie . Appellant concludes that Caldwell's testimony was very persuasive since "it took the jury less than twenty minutes to reject [Appellant's] credible claims of self-defense, defense of others, and absolute innocence ." Appellant relies on Giglio v . United States , supra , wherein the United States Supreme Court reiterated that "deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice'." Id . at 153, 92 S .Ct . at 766 (quoting Mooney v . Holohan , 294 U .S . 103, 112, 55 S.Ct . 340, 342, 79 L.Ed . 791 (1935)) . In Giglio , the prosecution's only witness linking the defendant to the crime testified that no promises of immunity or leniency were made in exchange for his testimony . After the trial had concluded, defense counsel discovered 3 that one of the Assistant U . S . attorneys had, in fact, promised the witness he would not be prosecuted if he testified against the defendant. In holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial, the Court stated : [T]he Government's case depended almost entirely on Taliento's testimony ; without it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the jury . Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it . 405 U .S . at 154-155, 92 S.Ct . at 766 . We find Gi lio clearly distinguishable from the case at hand . Appellant makes the bald assertion that the Commonwealth must have known that Caldwell lied during his testimony . However, as the trial court aptly stated, "[Appellant] does not explain and cannot explain as to how the Commonwealth could know Aaron Caldwell would make statements inconsistent with his trial testimony some six or seven years after the trial ." Appellant has offered absolutely no proof that the Commonwealth had any knowledge of Caldwell's alleged perjury at the time of trial . In addition to the "knowing" and "deliberate" requirements, Giglio further mandates that Appellant show that the allegedly perjured testimony was material, false, and had a reasonable likelihood to affect the judgment of the jury . Id . at 154 (quoting Brady v . MarVIand , 373 U .S . 83, 87, 83 S .Ct . 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed .2d 215 (1963) and Napue v . Illinois , 360 U .S . 264, 271, 79 S .Ct . 1173, 1178, 3 L.Ed .2d 1217 (1959)) . Caldwell was called by the Commonwealth as a rebuttal witness to dispute Appellant's claim that he had not orchestrated a cover-up of the murders . However, contrary to the situation in Giglio where the Government's case depended almost entirely on the one 4 witness's testimony, Caldwell was merely one of several witnesses who testified as to Appellant's bad character and his attempts to cover up the crimes . We agree with the trial court's conclusion that "[t]he claim of [Appellant] that there was no . . . evidence at trial except that of Aaron Caldwell is simply and utterly false . There was . . . considerable evidence of [Appellant's] attempts to intimidate witnesses and to shift the blame for the Vaughns' death to other persons." Furthermore, the jury was aware that Caldwell was a convicted felon and was in custody at the time of Appellant's trial . Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined him and the jury had the opportunity to weigh his credibility and truthfulness . Caldwell's testimony, especially when considered in light of all of the other evidence presented, was not material to the case . Appellant has also failed to demonstrate that Caldwell's testimony at trial was actually false . Appellant's only proof of the alleged perjury is Caldwell's post-trial affidavit wherein he states that he lied about Appellant soliciting favorable testimony . The record reveals, however, that Caldwell signed a second affidavit wherein he stated that he lied in the first affidavit about being coached by the Commonwealth's attorney on what to say at trial . This Court has recognized that "post-trial affidavits from prison inmates are certainly suspect." Foley , supra , 17 S .W .3d at 887 (citing Epperson v . Commonwealth , Ky., 809 S .W .2d 835 (1991), cert . denied , 502 U .S . 1065 (1992)) . Caldwell's affidavits are certainly suspect, and there is no reason to believe that such, which were obtained over six years after his trial testimony and while he was lodged in the same prison system as Appellant, are any more reliable than his initial testimony . Indeed, "it is not 5 enough to merely show that a . . . witness has subsequently made contradictory statements or that he is willing to swear that his testimony upon the trial was false, for his later oath is no more binding than his former one." Anderson v. Buchanan , 292 Ky . 810, 168 S .W.2d 48, 53-4 (1943) . Finally, Appellant has failed to show that there was any reasonable likelihood that Caldwell's testimony affected the judgment of the jury . The evidence against him was overwhelming . Foley , supra, 942 S .W.2d at 888 . Again, we agree with the trial court that, "Given the extensive testimony otherwise available as to [Appellant's] guilt and his attempts to orchestrate a cover-up of his acts, it is clearly not probable that the absence of Aaron Caldwell's testimony would, with reasonable certainty, change the jury's verdict." Appellant argues that even if we conclude the Commonwealth was unaware that Caldwell committed perjury, if in fact he did so, Spauldinq still holds that the introduction of perjured testimony which is not known by the prosecutor, can result in a violation of due process rights and warrant a new trial . Appellant fails to recognize that even if he escapes the hurdle of proving the Commonwealth's culpability, he maintains the burden of showing "that a reasonable certainty exists as to the falsity of the testimony and that the conviction probably would not have resulted had the truth been known ." Id., 991 S .W.2d at 657 . As we have previously discussed in the context of the Giglio decision, Appellant clearly cannot satisfy that burden . This Court has emphasized that "obtaining [a new trial] is not a matter of right but the granting of it is a matter of sound judicial discretion to be exercised upon a showing of reasonable certainty." Spaulding , supra , at 656-57 (uotin Anderson , supra) . Given 6 the number of witnesses that contradicted Appellant's claims of self-defense and "absolute innocence," we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that, absent Caldwell's testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions . As such, the trial court properly denied his motion for new trial . The decision of the Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed . All concur . Counsel for Appellant Timothy T . Riddell Milton C . Toby Perch & Toby 1750 Alexandria Drive Suite 10 Lexington, KY 40504-3100 Counsel for Appellee A . B . Chandler III Attorney General Kent T . Young Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204 Susan Roncarti Assistant Commonwealth Attorney 514 West Liberty Street Louisville, KY 40202