Title: Arlyne M. Lambrecht v. David D. Kaczmarczyk
Citation: 2001 WI 25
Docket Number: 1999AP000821
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2001

2001 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0821 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Arlene M. Lambrecht,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Heritage Insurance Company and Medicare,  
 
Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Estate of David D. Kaczmarczyk and  
American Family Insurance Group,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 23, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 31, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Kieffer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX and SYKES, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by 
Eric S. Darling and Schmidt, Darling & Erwin, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Eric S. Darling. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Mary Lee Ratzel, Sherry A. Knutson and Peterson, Johnson & 
Murray, S.C., and oral argument by Sherry A. Knutson. 
 
2001 WI 25 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 
99-0821 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :    IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Arlyne M. Lambrecht,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Heritage Insurance Company and Medicare,  
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Estate of David D. Kaczmarczyk and  
American Family Insurance Group,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, James R. Kieffer, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case is 
on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, James R. Kieffer, Circuit Court Judge.  The appeal is 
here on certification from the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.61 (1997-98).1  Arlyne M. Lambrecht, the plaintiff, 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
MAR 23, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
2 
brought this action against the Estate of David D. Kaczmarczyk 
and American Family Insurance Group, the defendants, alleging 
that David D. Kaczmarczyk, the defendant-driver, negligently 
operated his automobile, causing the plaintiff bodily injury.  
The circuit court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment.  The plaintiff appealed.  We reverse the order of the 
circuit court. 
¶2 
The complaint states a simple cause of action based on 
negligence.  Negligence is ordinarily an issue for the fact-
finder and not for summary judgment.  Summary judgment is 
uncommon in negligence actions, because the court "must be able 
to say that no properly instructed, reasonable jury could find, 
based on the facts presented, that [the defendant-driver] failed 
to exercise ordinary care."  Erickson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 
166 Wis. 2d 82, 93, 479 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 
Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 442, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989)). 
 Ordinarily a court cannot so state.  As the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals explained in Gauck v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433, 437 (5th 
Cir. 1965): 
 
Because of the peculiarly elusive nature of the term 
"negligence" and the necessity that the trier of facts 
pass upon the reasonableness of the conduct in all the 
circumstances in determining whether it constitutes 
negligence, it is the rare personal injury case which 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
3 
can be disposed of by summary judgment, even where 
historical facts are concededly undisputed.2 
¶3 
Negligence may, like other facts, be proved by 
circumstantial evidence, which is evidence of one fact from 
which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably 
be inferred.3  This case involves circumstantial evidence and the 
issue is whether negligence may be inferred from the facts.  One 
rule of circumstantial evidence is the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur.  Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an 
evidentiary rule4 that ordinarily arises at trial in determining 
the instructions the circuit court should give the jury, the 
issue was raised in this case at the summary judgment stage.  
The issue presented is whether in an automobile collision case a 
defendant negates the inference of negligence based on res ipsa 
loquitur and obtains a summary judgment simply by establishing 
that the defendant-driver suffered a heart attack at some point 
during the course of the collision, even though the defendant is 
unable to establish at what point the heart attack occurred. 
¶4 
This case raises the question of the effect of a 
defendant's going forth with evidence of non-negligence when the 
                     
2 See also 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary 
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2729 at 533 (1998).  
The Wisconsin summary judgment rule is patterned after Federal 
Rule 56.  See West's Wis. Stats. Ann. § 802.08 (1994).  In 
interpreting our rules that are patterned after federal rules, 
this court looks to federal cases and commentary for guidance. 
3 W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 39 at 242 (5th ed. 1984). 
4 University Dodge, Inc. v. Drott Tractor Co., Inc., 55 
Wis. 2d 396, 401, 198 N.W.2d 621 (1972). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
4 
complainant's proof of negligence rests on an inference of 
negligence arising from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
¶5 
To put the issue in context, we note that Professor 
Prosser has written that of all the res ipsa loquitur issues, 
the procedural effects of the defendant's evidence of a non-
actionable cause have given the courts the most difficulty.5  Our 
cases prove this point all too well. 
¶6 
We conclude that the defendants in the present case 
are not entitled to summary judgment.  First, the evidence that 
the defendant-driver suffered a heart attack at some point 
during the collision does not by itself foreclose to the 
plaintiff the benefit of an inference that the defendant-driver 
was negligent; the evidence of the heart attack does not 
completely contradict the inference of negligence arising from 
the collision itself.  Second, the defendants' evidence at 
summary judgment of the defendant-driver's heart attack is not 
sufficient to establish as a matter of law the affirmative 
                     
5 William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa 
Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 265 (1936). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
5 
defense known as "illness without forewarning."6  The defendants 
have the burden of persuasion of this affirmative defense.7 
¶7 
Because the record does not conclusively show, as a 
matter of law, that the defendant-driver's unforeseen heart 
attack preceded the collision and caused him to commit an act or 
omit a precaution that would otherwise constitute negligence, we 
conclude that genuine issues of material fact relating to 
negligence are in dispute, and the defendants should not be 
granted summary judgment. 
¶8 
We reverse the order of the circuit court granting the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
 
I 
 
¶9 
For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment, 
the facts of the collision are not in dispute, although the 
                     
6 The law in Wisconsin is that when a driver, through sudden 
illness or loss of consciousness, commits an act or omits a 
precaution that would otherwise constitute negligence, such act 
or omission is not negligence if the occurrence of such illness 
or loss of consciousness was not preceded by sufficient warning 
that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought 
reasonably to foresee that he or she, by driving an automobile, 
would subject the person or property of another or of himself or 
herself to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage.  See 
Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 
619 (1970); Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 
91, 99, 118 N.W.2d 140, 119 N.W.2d 393 (1962); Wis JICivil 
1021.2. 
7 See Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 24-25.  See also 
comment to Wis JICivil 1021.2. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
6 
facts relating to the defendant-driver's heart attack are.  In 
their motion for summary judgment the defendants summarized the 
facts, and in her response to the motion the plaintiff agreed 
with the defendants' statement of facts.  Furthermore, the 
defendants submitted an affidavit of the Waukesha police officer 
who went to the site of the collision shortly after the 
occurrence.  Attached to the affidavit were the officer's 
accident report and the Crime Management System Incident Report; 
we may also rely on these reports.8 
¶10 On February 8, 1996, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the 
defendant-driver's automobile was traveling westbound on a 
straight and dry road when it collided with three automobiles, 
two of which were in the right turn lane traveling in the same 
direction as the defendant-driver's automobile; these vehicles 
were going to turn right at the intersection and travel north.  
The third vehicle, the plaintiff's automobile, was either 
stopped at the intersection, facing south, or just starting to 
move when it was struck; this vehicle was going to turn left 
across the defendant's lane of traffic and travel eastbound.  
                     
8 See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)(3) ("affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge and shall set forth such evidentiary facts 
as would be admissible in evidence").  The defendants submitted 
the affidavit and the entire attachments.  Although the 
attachments may contain hearsay, no objection was made to them. 
 In the absence of any objection at the circuit court, an 
appellate court may consider the materials presented.  See 10A 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2722 (1998 & Supp. 2000) and cases cited 
therein; 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay 
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2738 (1998 & Supp. 2000) 
and cases cited therein. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
7 
¶11 One of the drivers whose vehicle was struck reported 
that he saw the defendant-driver in his rear view mirror coming 
up very fast; he could not tell whether the defendant-driver was 
attempting to shield his face from the bright sun or if the 
visor was down.  According to the Old Farmer's Almanac, of which 
we take judicial notice, on February 8, 1996, sunset was at 5:15 
p.m. Central Standard Time.9 
¶12 The driver-defendant's automobile rear-ended the first 
vehicle, brushed the back bumper of the second vehicle, and 
skidded across a dividing median, striking the third vehicle 
(the plaintiff's) directly in the plaintiff's side door.  On the 
basis of his personal observation, the police officer reported 
that the defendant-driver's car visor was in the down position 
at the site of the collision.  The police officer observed that 
the defendant-driver's automobile left skid marks after the 
collision with the first car.  The plaintiff claims to have 
sustained extensive bodily injuries. 
¶13 When police arrived at the scene, one officer found 
the defendant-driver lying partially outside his front passenger 
door, apparently unable to breathe.  The defendant-driver was 
not wearing a seat belt.  His head and shoulders were protruding 
out of the right front passenger door.  Soon thereafter, 
paramedics arrived at the scene, and found that the defendant-
                     
9 See http://www.almanac.com (last visited March 15, 2001); 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01 (2)(b) authorizing judicial notice of facts 
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
8 
driver was not breathing and had no pulse.  The paramedics 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant-driver 
was 
in 
ventricular 
fibrillation and defibrillated him several times.  Recognizing 
that their efforts were unsuccessful, the paramedics transported 
him to the emergency room at Waukesha Memorial Hospital.  
Attempts to revive him were unsuccessful, and a physician 
pronounced the defendant-driver dead at 5:25 p.m. 
¶14 A medical examiner performed an autopsy and determined 
that 
the 
cause 
of 
the 
defendant-driver's 
death 
was 
arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, which resulted in acute 
cardiopulmonary arrest.  In other words, the defendant-driver 
died of a heart attack. 
¶15 However, 
medical 
experts 
(through 
affidavits 
and 
depositions) disagree about when the heart attack occurred.  
According to the medical examiner, the defendant-driver suffered 
a heart attack before the initial collision.  The defendants' 
expert medical witness also stated to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that the heart attack occurred before the 
first collision.  But she further stated that it was not 
possible in this instance for any medical expert to determine 
the exact time of the heart attack based on the post-collision 
examination; the question was one of probability and likelihood. 
 The plaintiff's expert medical witness could not state with 
certainty which came first, the initial collision or the heart 
attack.  He asserted that it would be pure speculation for 
anyone to say when the heart attack occurred; it was just as 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
9 
likely that the heart attack occurred before the initial impact 
as after the initial impact. 
¶16 The defendants' medical expert stated that, regardless 
of when the heart attack occurred, the defendant-driver probably 
had between five and twenty seconds from the onset of dizziness 
and loss of blood pressure to losing consciousness. 
¶17 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that: (1) it was undisputed that the defendant-driver suffered a 
heart attack sometime before, during, or after the collision; 
(2) the medical testimony was inconclusive as to whether the 
heart attack occurred before, during, or after the collision; 
and (3) it is just as likely that the heart attack occurred 
before the collision as it is that the heart attack occurred 
after the collision and that negligence caused the collision.  
The defendants argued that they need not prove whether the heart 
attack occurred before, during, or after the collision and that 
summary judgment was proper, because to allow the case to go 
forward would force the jury to speculate on the question of 
negligence. 
¶18 Granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, the 
circuit court concluded that a res ipsa loquitur inference of 
negligence was inapplicable because it is just as likely that an 
unforeseen illness caused the collision as it is that negligence 
did.  The circuit court reasoned that the evidence that the 
defendant-driver died of a heart attack at some point before, 
during, or after the collision would permit a jury to base a 
verdict of negligence on conjecture. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
10
¶19 The plaintiff appealed, and this court took the appeal 
on certification by the court of appeals. 
 
II 
 
¶20 This case is before the court on a motion for summary 
judgment.  We summarize below the approach that an appellate 
court takes in considering such a motion.10 
¶21 An appellate court reviews a decision granting summary 
judgment independently of the circuit court, benefiting from its 
analysis.  The appellate court applies the same two-step 
analysis the circuit court applies pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  Specifically, a court first examines the pleadings 
to determine whether a claim for relief is stated and whether a 
genuine issue of material fact is presented. 
¶22 If the pleadings state a claim and demonstrate the 
existence of factual issues, a court considers the moving 
party's proof to determine whether the moving party has made a 
prima facie case for summary judgment.  If the defendant is the 
moving party the defendant must establish a defense that defeats 
                     
10 See, e.g., L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 682-84, 
563 N.W.2d 434 (l997); Kafka v. Pope, 194 Wis. 2d 234, 240, 533 
N.W.2d 491 (1995); Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 
747-48, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991); Delmore v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 510, 512-13, 348 N.W.2d 151 (1984); 
Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 
Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 752 (1981); Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980); Leszczynski v. 
Surges, 30 Wis. 2d 534, 539, 141 N.W.2d 261 (1966). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
11
the plaintiff's cause of action.  If a moving party has made a 
prima facie defense, the opposing party must show, by affidavit 
or other proof, the existence of disputed material facts or 
undisputed material facts from which reasonable alternative 
inferences may be drawn that are sufficient to entitle the 
opposing party to a trial.  
¶23 The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts 
contained in the moving party's material should be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,11 and 
doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 
are resolved against the moving party.12  The court takes 
evidentiary facts in the record as true if not contradicted by 
opposing proof.13 
¶24 In order to be entitled to summary judgment, the 
moving party, here the defendants, must prove that no genuine 
issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
¶25 The defendants in the present case contend that the 
appropriate standard for reviewing the summary judgment is 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in determining that the evidence was not sufficient to remove 
the question of causal negligence from the realm of conjecture. 
                     
11 Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d at 338. 
12 L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 684. 
13 Id. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
12
¶26 The defendants rest their contention on Peplinski v. 
Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 20, 531 N.W.2d 597 (1995). 
 But Peplinski is significantly different from the present case. 
 Peplinski is not a summary judgment case.  Peplinski involved a 
jury trial, and the issue was whether the circuit court should 
give the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur.14  As the 
supreme court explained in Peplinski, the circuit court had the 
benefit of hearing testimony and observing the witnesses at 
trial.  Under these circumstances of a trial, the supreme court 
gave deference to the circuit court's decision regarding whether 
to give a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. 
¶27 In the present summary judgment case a decision about 
the applicability of res ipsa loquitur is made on the basis of a 
paper record of affidavits and depositions.  This court and the 
circuit court are equally able to read the written record.  
Accordingly, we conclude that in this case the applicability of 
                     
14 The supreme court determined that the res ipsa loquitur 
instruction should be given when: 
(a) either a layman is able to determine as a matter 
of common knowledge or an expert testifies that the 
result which occurred does not ordinarily occur in the 
absence 
of 
negligence, 
(b) 
the 
agent 
or 
instrumentality causing 
the harm 
was 
within the 
exclusive control of the defendant, and (c) the 
evidence offered is sufficient to remove the causation 
question from the realm of conjecture, but not so 
substantial that it provides a full and complete 
explanation of the event. 
 
Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 17, 531 
N.W.2d 597 (1995). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
13
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine raised in the motion for summary 
judgment is a question of law that this court determines 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court, 
benefiting 
from 
its 
analysis. 
 
III 
 
¶28 The plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of 
negligence under Wisconsin law.  In order to constitute a cause 
of action for negligence, there must exist: (1) a duty of due 
care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; 
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
plaintiff's injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as a result 
of injury.  See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 
531, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  It is clear that duty, causation, 
and damages are not at issue here.  The parties agree that the 
defendant-driver owed a duty of care.  Additionally, there is no 
dispute as to causation: the defendant-driver's automobile 
collided with the plaintiff's and, if the defendant-driver was 
negligent, his negligence caused the plaintiff to suffer 
extensive physical injuries.  Either the defendant-driver's 
conduct was negligent or it was not. 
¶29 The complaint pleads negligence.  The historical facts 
of the collision are set forth in the record.  A reasonable 
inference may be drawn from the facts that the defendant-driver 
was negligent, contrary to the defendants' contention that no 
inference of negligence arose in this case.  The defendant-
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
14
driver was driving west, toward the sun, at 4:30 p.m. (with 
sunset at 5:15 p.m.) on a clear February day.  A driver whose 
vehicle in the right turn lane was struck by the defendant-
driver reported that he observed the defendant driving very 
fast. The road was straight and dry.  The police officer 
reported from personal observation that the defendant-driver's 
car visor was in the flipped-down position at the site of the 
collision.  A driver whose vehicle was struck by the defendant-
driver reported bright sun and could not tell whether the 
defendant-driver was shielding his eyes or the visor was down.  
There is no evidence whether the position of the visor was 
adequate to allow the defendant-driver to block out the sun.  
The defendant-driver was apparently not wearing a seat belt, and 
he was found protruding out of the passenger right front door 
from approximately just below his shoulder to the top of his 
head. 
¶30 The 
accident 
report 
diagrammed 
the 
accident, 
explaining that the defendant-driver's automobile struck three 
automobiles.  The defendant-driver's automobile struck the first 
automobile from behind, then brushed the bumper of a second 
automobile (that was also traveling west), and finally crashed 
into the plaintiff's automobile at an intersection.  Moreover, 
the officer noted that there were skid marks after the first 
collision, possibly giving rise to the inference that the 
defendant-driver had applied his brakes after hitting the first 
automobile. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
15
¶31 As we stated previously, upon a motion for a summary 
judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts 
contained in the moving party's material should be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  
¶32 Examining the historical facts, we conclude that a 
reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts is that the 
defendant-driver was negligent in operating his automobile.  
Inferences can be reasonably drawn that the defendant-driver's 
visibility was limited by the sun, he was driving fast, and his 
failure to wear a seat belt contributed to his failure to 
control his vehicle. 
¶33 Discussion of reasonable inferences leads us in this 
case because of the contentions of the defendants to the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  "[M]ost courts agree that [the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur] simply describes an inference of 
negligence."15  Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial 
evidence that permits a fact-finder to infer a defendant's 
negligence from the mere occurrence of the event.16  Most 
frequently, the inference called for by the doctrine is one that 
                     
15 2 McCormick on Evidence § 342 at 435 (John W. Strong ed., 
5th ed. 1999).  Some Wisconsin cases use the word "presumption" 
in referring to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but it is 
clear that the court is speaking of an inference. 
16 See Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 
509, 93 N.W.2d 467, 94 N.W.2d 465 (1958).  See also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. b (1965) ("A res ipsa loquitur 
case is ordinarily merely one kind of case of circumstantial 
evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer both negligence 
and causation from the mere occurrence of the event and the 
defendant's relation to it."). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
16
a court would properly have held to be reasonable even in the 
absence of a special rule.  Where this is so, res ipsa loquitur 
certainly 
need 
be 
viewed 
no 
differently 
from 
any 
other 
inference.17  Indeed commentators have suggested that the Latin 
be 
put 
aside 
and 
the 
law 
speak 
only 
about 
reasonable 
inferences.18 
¶34 The following conditions must be present before the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable: (1) the event in 
question must be of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in 
the absence of negligence; and (2) the agency of instrumentality 
causing the harm must have been within exclusive control of the 
defendant.19  When these two conditions are present, they give 
rise to a permissible inference of negligence, which the jury is 
free to accept or reject.20 
                     
17 2 McCormick on Evidence § 342 at 435. 
18 See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of 
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1936). 
19 Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ripon Cooperative, 50 Wis. 2d 
431, 436, 184 N.W.2d 65 (1971). 
20 Id.  See also Wis JICivil 1145.  The res ipsa loquitur 
jury instruction states in part: 
If you find defendant had [exclusive control] of the 
[automobile] involved in the accident and if you 
further find that the accident claimed is of a type or 
kind that ordinarily would not have occurred had 
defendant exercised ordinary care, then you may infer 
from 
the 
accident 
itself 
and 
the 
surrounding 
circumstances that there was negligence on the part of 
the defendant unless defendant has offered you an 
explanation of the accident which is satisfactory to 
you. 
 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
17
¶35 The two conditions giving rise to the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur are present in this case.  We recognize that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in every automobile 
collision case, but also recognize that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur can apply to an automobile collision case.  "It will be 
noted that the court has not said that res ipsa loquitur will 
not be applied in an automobile case.  We have said that 'the 
rule is usually not applicable,' or 'it does not apply in the 
ordinary 
case.' 
 
Inferentially, 
when 
the 
unusual 
and 
extraordinary case comes along, the rule is available."21  In 
                     
21 See Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis. 304, 310, 
41 N.W.2d 268 (1950) (applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
in an automobile collision case).  Compare, e.g., Olson v. 
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 266 Wis. 106, 111, 62 N.W.2d 549 
(1954) (concluding that "the mere fact that [a driver's] trailer 
skidded into 
[a] 
ditch 
does not 
establish 
that he was 
negligent"). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
18
this case the defendant-driver's vehicle, under the defendant-
driver's exclusive control, was driving west toward the sun at 
4:30 p.m. (with sunset at 5:15 p.m.) on a clear February 
afternoon.  The road was straight and dry.  The defendant-
driver's vehicle struck three vehicles, two of which were moving 
in the same direction as the defendant-driver; the third 
automobile, the plaintiff's, was either stopped or just starting 
to move forward.  In this summary judgment motion the record is 
viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, the non-moving party, 
and the court will therefore consider the evidence as satisfying 
these two conditions of res ipsa loquitur and as giving rise to 
an inference that the defendant-driver was negligent. 
                                                                  
For additional cases applying the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur or an inference of negligence in an automobile 
collision, see, for example, Dewing v. Cooper, 33 Wis. 2d 260, 
265, 147 N.W.2d 261 (1967) ("mere fact that the collision 
occurred with the [defendant's] vehicle leaving the travelled 
portion of the roadway and striking the parked vehicle raises an 
inference of negligence"); Bunkfeldt v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 
29 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 138 N.W.2d 271 (1965) (plaintiff met his 
burden of proof in establishing the defendant truck driver's 
negligence when he established that the truck invaded his 
traffic lane and collided with his automobile); Voigt v. Voigt, 
22 Wis. 2d 573, 126 N.W.2d 543 (1964) (unexplained movement into 
complainant's lane of traffic raises inference of negligence); 
Wood v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W.2d 610 (1956) (a 
motor vehicle's unexplained departure from the traveled portion 
of the highway gives rise to the inference of negligence); 
Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 581, 290 N.W. 194 (1940) 
("the mere operation of a car upon the wrong side of the highway 
makes at least a prima facie case of negligence and is enough, 
in the absence of an explanation which the jury is bound to 
accept, to warrant an inference of negligence on the part of its 
operator"). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
19
¶36 Thus, at least at this point in the analysis, summary 
judgment cannot be granted in favor of the defendants because a 
reasonable inference of negligence can be drawn from the 
historical facts.  "A primary purpose of the res ipsa loquitur 
rule is to create a prima facie showing of negligence thus 
relieving a claimant of the burden of going forward with proof 
of specific acts of negligence."22 
¶37 To obtain a summary judgment, the defendants must 
establish a defense that defeats the plaintiff's cause of 
action.  The defendants in this case produced evidence that the 
defendant-driver suffered an unforeseen heart attack before, 
during, or after the initial collision. 
¶38 The defendants and the plaintiff disagree whether the 
defendants' evidence defeats the plaintiff's cause of action.  
The defendants assert that their defense negates the inference 
of negligence as a matter of law, and summary judgment for the 
defendant would be appropriate.  The plaintiff disagrees. 
¶39 The defendants find support for their position in one 
line of cases and the plaintiff in another.  As the court of 
appeals correctly stated in the certification memorandum, the 
case law sends confusing and mixed signals.  The certification 
memorandum does an excellent job of setting out these two lines 
of conflicting cases, and we begin by examining the two lines of 
cases. 
                     
22 See McGuire v. Stein's Gift & Garden Ctr., 178 Wis. 2d 
379, 395, 504 N.W.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
20
¶40 The defendants argue that several cases establish the 
rule that res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in automobile crash 
cases when evidence exists of a non-actionable cause, that is, a 
cause for which the defendants would not be responsible.  This 
line of cases can be traced to Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 
172 N.W. 736 (1919), which involved a directed verdict in favor 
of the defendant.23  In Klein, the plaintiff's son was killed 
when the automobile driven by the defendant suddenly veered into 
the ditch.  There was no direct evidence of driver negligence.  
An inspection of the car after the collision revealed a blown 
left front tire.  No evidence was presented about whether the 
blow-out preceded and caused the collision or resulted from the 
collision.  The supreme court upheld the directed verdict for 
the defendant, stating that the jury could only guess whether 
negligence caused the collision.  The supreme court explained 
that a verdict cannot rest on conjecture: 
 
                     
23 We can compare a summary judgment to a directed verdict 
at trial.  The two rest on the same theory: No genuine issue of 
material fact needs to be resolved by the fact-finder; the 
moving party is entitled to have a judgment on the merits 
entered in his or her favor as a matter of law.  10A Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur L. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2713.1 at 242-43 (1998).  See also Daniel P. 
Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 
Stan. L. Rev. 491, 491 (1988) ("It is generally agreed that the 
standard [for applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) on 
summary judgment] mirrors that applied in deciding a motion for 
a directed verdict.").  But see 6 Moore's Federal Practice 
¶56.30[7][a-c] 
(3d 
ed. 
2000) 
(emphasizing 
the 
differences 
between summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law with 
respect to timing and procedural posture). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
21
The jury could have done no more than guess as to 
whether the accident was the result of careless and 
negligent operation of the car or the blow-out.  
Verdicts cannot rest upon guess or conjecture.  It is 
the 
duty 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
to 
prove 
negligence 
affirmatively, and while the inferences allowed by the 
rule or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur constitute such 
proof, it is only where the circumstances leave no 
room for a different presumption that the maxim 
applies.  When it is shown that the accident might 
have happened as the result of one of two causes, the 
reason for the rule fails and it cannot be invoked. 
Klein, 169 Wis. at 389 (second emphasis added).24 
¶41 A similar analysis was used in Baars v. Benda, 249 
Wis. 65, 23 N.W. 477 (1945), in which no direct evidence of the 
defendant's negligence was offered to explain the defendant's 
automobile leaving the road, running into a ditch, and turning 
over.  After the crash the steering wheel was found to be 
broken.  The jury found the defendant negligent as to management 
and control. 
¶42 The trial court changed the jury's answers and entered 
a judgment for the defendant, saying that the jury could only 
speculate whether the crash was caused by a sudden failure of 
the steering apparatus or by some negligent conduct on the part 
                     
24 In Hyer v. Janesville, 101 Wis. 371, 377, 77 N.W. 729 
(1898), the supreme court said: 
 
[W]here there is no direct evidence of how an accident 
occurred, 
and 
the 
circumstances 
are 
clearly 
as 
consistent with the theory that it might be ascribed 
to a cause not actionable as to a cause that is 
actionable, it is not within the proper province of a 
jury to guess where the truth lies and make that the 
foundation for a verdict. 
 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
22
of the defendant.  Either explanation was a possibility, but the 
record offered no evidence from which the jury could prefer one 
explanation of the crash to the other. 
¶43 The supreme court affirmed the trial court.  It 
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because it 
concluded that the doctrine does not usually apply to automobile 
accidents.25  Without the benefit of the inference of negligence 
and without any evidence of lack of due care, the supreme court 
concluded that the jury could only speculate whether the 
accident was caused by the defendant's negligent conduct or the 
sudden failure of the steering wheel.  Either explanation was a 
possibility but the record offered no evidence from which the 
jury could make a preference. 
¶44 The defendants in this case also rely heavily on 
language in Wood v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W.2d 
610 (1956).  The supreme court stated in Wood that the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine would not be applicable if the defense had 
conclusive evidence that the driver, whose automobile crashed 
into a tree, had a heart attack at the time of the crash, even 
though the time of the heart attack was not established.26  In 
Wood, the supreme court wrote: 
 
In order for the facts in [Wood] to have paralleled 
those in Baars v. Benda, it would be necessary for the 
                     
25 Baars v. Benda, 249 Wis. 65, 70, 23 N.W.2d 477 (1945). 
26 In Wood v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W.2d 610 
(1956), the defendant produced no admissible evidence of a heart 
attack. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
23
defendant to have produced conclusive testimony that 
Mr. Wood had sustained a heart attack at the time of 
the accident.  If such conclusive testimony had been 
produced it would not have been essential for the 
defendant to establish that the heart attack occurred 
before the jeep left the highway in order to render 
inapplicable the rule of res ipsa loquitur. 
Wood, 273 Wis. at 101-02 (emphasis added). 
¶45 Relying on Klein, Baars, and Wood, the defendants in 
the present case argue that the evidence was conclusive that the 
defendant-driver had a heart attack and the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is inapplicable.  Accordingly, the defendants assert 
that the defendant-driver's heart attack would force a jury to 
engage in speculation and conjecture in determining whether 
there was an actionable cause (negligence) or non-actionable 
cause (heart attack) of the plaintiff's injuries. 
¶46 The concept of speculation and conjecture lead the 
defendants to Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 
531 N.W.2d 597 (1995), to support their argument.  In Peplinski 
the issue at trial was whether after all the evidence had been 
introduced the complainant who has proved too much about how and 
why the incident occurred will not have the benefit of a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction.  The Peplinski court ruled that 
because the proffered evidence offered a complete explanation of 
the incident, a res ipsa loquitur instruction was superfluous.27 
                     
27 For other cases in which too specific an explanation was 
proffered, see, for example, Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ripon 
Cooperative, 50 Wis. 2d 431, 184 N.W.2d 65 (1971); Knief v. 
Sargent, 40 Wis. 2d 4, 161 N.W.2d 232 (1968); Puls v. St. 
Vincent Hospital, 36 Wis. 2d 679, 154 N.W.2d 308 (1967); Carson 
v. Beloit, 32 Wis. 2d 282, 145 N.W.2d 112 (1966); Lecander v. 
Billmeyer, 171 Wis. 2d 593, 492 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
24
 No one contends that the evidence in this case provides a 
complete explanation of the events that transpired. 
¶47 According to the defendants, this case is the flip 
side of Peplinski: the plaintiff has proved too little.  In 
Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 55 Wis. 2d 659, 668, 
201 N.W.2d 1 (1972), this court set forth the test for when a 
complainant has proved too little and the court will not give a 
res ipsa loquitur instruction.  The Turtenwald court stated that 
complainants cannot get a res ipsa loquitur instruction when "no 
evidence [exists] which would remove the causation question from 
the realm of conjecture and place it within the realm of 
permissible inferences."  Id. at 668 (emphasis added). 
¶48 On the basis of this line of cases the defendants 
argue that the conclusive evidence in the present case of the 
defendant-driver's heart attack means that this alternative non-
actionable explanation of the collision is within the realm of 
possibility and that it is just as likely that the collision was 
a result of a non-actionable cause as an actionable cause.  
According to the defendants, the inference of negligence, if it 
arose at all, has been negated by conclusive evidence of the 
heart attack, and a finding of negligence would be conjecture.  
The defendants urge this court to uphold the summary judgment in 
their favor. 
                                                                  
The 
case 
law 
recognizes 
that 
even 
when 
a 
specific 
explanation is proffered, a res ipsa loquitur instruction can be 
given in the alternative.  See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 79 
Wis. 2d 444, 448-49, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977) (quoting Szafranski 
v. Radetzky, 31 Wis. 2d 119, 141 N.W. 2d 902 (1966)). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
25
¶49 The plaintiff relies on a different line of cases.  
According to the plaintiff's line of cases, when evidence 
suggesting an alternative cause of action is inconclusive, res 
ipsa loquitur does apply and the question of negligence is for 
the jury. 
¶50 Language in the Wood case, 273 Wis. 93, a case upon 
which the defendants rely, actually also lends support to the 
plaintiff.  In Wood the automobile crashed into a tree.  The 
jury was not given a res ipsa loquitur instruction regarding the 
defendant's negligence and the trial court granted a directed 
verdict for the defendant.  The defendant's evidence of a heart 
attack had no probative value in Wood.  The Wood court reversed 
the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial, stating 
that "the mere introduction of inconclusive evidence [about the 
heart attack] suggesting another cause [than negligence] will 
not entitle the defendant to a directed verdict."28  The court 
concluded: 
 
We are constrained to hold that in a situation where 
it ordinarily would be permissible to invoke the rule 
of 
res 
ipsa 
loquitur, 
such 
as 
the 
unexplained 
departure from the traveled portion of the highway by 
a motor vehicle, resort to such rule is not rendered 
improper merely by the introduction of inconclusive 
evidence giving rise to an inference that such 
departure may have been due to something other than 
the negligence of the operator. 
Wood, 273 Wis. at 102. 
                     
28 Wood, 273 Wis. at 100 (quoting William L. Prosser, The 
Law of Torts § 43, at 216 n.20 (2d ed. 1955)). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
26
¶51 In keeping with this language from Wood, the supreme 
court has said that an inference of negligence can persist even 
after evidence counteracting it is admitted.29 
¶52 The plaintiff also points to Bunkfeldt v. Country 
Mutual Ins. Co., 29 Wis. 2d 179, 138 N.W.2d 271 (1965), in which 
a truck driver drove into the complainant's lane of traffic, 
causing a collision, and the trial court granted the complainant 
a directed verdict.  The truck driver told the police that the 
truck axle started to go sideways and he could not control the 
truck.  An inspection of the truck after the collision revealed 
that the dual wheel had completely separated from the vehicle.  
Without presenting any testimony about his own due care, the 
defendant argued that this defect represented a non-negligent 
cause of the collision.  The jury agreed with the defendant, but 
the trial court granted the complainant's motion for a directed 
verdict, which the trial court had previously taken under 
advisement. 
¶53 On appeal, the supreme court held that the jury could 
draw two reasonable inferences: (1) the dual wheel separated 
from the vehicle before the impact, and a mechanical failure, 
not the truck driver's negligence, caused the collision; or (2) 
the truck driver's negligence caused the collision. 
¶54 The supreme court ruled that the complainant had the 
burden of persuasion on the issue of the truck driver's 
                     
29 Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 510, 93 
N.W.2d 467, 94 N.W.2d 465 (1958). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
27
negligence, but the truck driver had the burden of going forward 
with evidence that the defect causing the wheel separation was 
not discoverable by reasonable inspection during the course of 
maintenance.  Bunkfeldt, 29 Wis. 2d at 183.  The court concluded 
that the complainant had met his burden in establishing the 
truck driver's negligence when he established that the truck 
invaded his traffic lane and collided with his automobile. 
¶55 The court further concluded that the evidence relating 
to the mechanical failure was insufficient to negate the 
inference of negligence that arose from the truck's invasion of 
the complainant's traffic lane, because a mechanical failure 
does not in itself establish freedom from negligence; the 
possibility exists that the mechanical failure was the result of 
faulty inspection or maintenance.  Thus the inference of 
negligence was not negated and a directed verdict for the 
complainant was proper. 
¶56 Had the supreme court followed the Klein and Baars 
rule in Bunkfeldt, it would have reversed the directed verdict 
for the complainant.  It would have stated that the inference of 
negligence arising from the incident itself was negated by 
evidence of a mechanical failure, the non-actionable cause was 
within the realm of possibility, and the jury would have had to 
resort to speculation. 
¶57 The plaintiff also relies on Voigt v. Voigt, 22 
Wis. 2d 573, 126 N.W.2d 543 (1964), in which a driver was killed 
when he drove his automobile into the complainant's lane of 
traffic.  The complainant relied on an inference of negligence 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
28
arising from the collision itself.  The defense contended that 
the deceased's automobile had skidded and that this alternative 
non-negligent conduct explained the collision.  The jury held 
for the complainant; the defendant appealed. 
¶58 The Voigt court stated the issue as follows: "Upon 
whom does the duty rest to establish the negligent or non-
negligent nature of the invasion of the wrong lane of traffic?" 
 Voigt, 22 Wis. 2d at 583.  The court answered that the 
complainant may benefit from the inference of negligence and the 
"one who invades the wrong side of the highway may be able to 
relieve himself of the inference of negligence, but the 
responsibility rests upon him to do so."  Voigt, 22 Wis. 2d at 
584. 
¶59 The Voigt court acknowledged that the burden of 
persuasion on the issue of negligence remained with the 
complainant, but the driver "has the burden of going forward 
with evidence to prove that such invasion was nonnegligent."  
Voigt, 22 Wis. 2d at 584.  Proof that the deceased driver's 
automobile skidded was not sufficient evidence to prove non-
negligence.  The defendant has the burden of going forward with 
evidence that the driver was exercising ordinary care while 
skidding to negate the inference of negligence.  
¶60 Had the supreme court followed the Klein and Baars 
rule in Voigt, it would have granted summary judgment to the 
defendant.  The defendant's explanation of a non-actionable 
cause was within the realm of possibility and would have 
justified summary judgment.  The implication of Voigt was that 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
29
the defendant's evidence was inconclusive and therefore did not 
negate the inference of negligence. 
¶61 Finally, the plaintiff relies on Dewing v. Cooper, 33 
Wis. 2d 260, 147 N.W.2d 261 (1967), in which a driver drove his 
automobile into a parked automobile, which in turn struck the 
complainant, pinning him between two automobiles.  Evidence was 
introduced that the driver suffered a heart attack.  The case 
went to the jury.  The jury found for the driver, and the 
complainant argued on appeal that inconclusive evidence about 
when the heart attack occurred was not sufficient to justify the 
jury's verdict that the collision resulted from a non-actionable 
cause.  The supreme court affirmed the jury verdict in favor of 
the driver. 
¶62 In Dewing the supreme court stated that the inference 
of negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
properly invoked.  The "mere fact that the collision occurred 
with the [defendant's] vehicle leaving the traveled portion of 
the roadway and striking the parked vehicle raises an inference 
of negligence."  Dewing, 33 Wis. 2d at 265 (citing Bunkfeldt, 29 
Wis. 2d 179).  The court also concluded that the evidence that 
the driver suffered a heart attack created a reasonable 
inference that the defendant was not negligent. 
¶63 The plaintiff reads Dewing to hold that in a case 
involving an automobile collision in which the facts give rise 
to the res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence, the evidence, 
similar to that in the present case, that the driver had a heart 
attack at some time before, during, or after the collision does 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
30
not negate the inference of the driver's negligence.  On the 
basis of Dewing, the plaintiff argues her action should survive 
summary judgment and proceed to trial. 
¶64 The defendants attempt to distinguish Dewing on the 
ground that the defense in Dewing conceded that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur was properly invoked.  This distinction is not 
persuasive.  
The 
Dewing 
court put 
its blessing on the 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in that 
automobile collision case, stating that the collision raised the 
inference of the driver's negligence.  The trier of fact could 
infer from the medical testimony that the heart attack preceded 
the collision and that the driver was not negligent.  The driver 
did not, as the complainant in Dewing urged, have to present 
conclusive evidence that an unforeseen heart attack occurred 
before the collision.  Significantly, the Dewing court declined 
to follow the defendants' argument in the present case that 
conclusive evidence that a heart attack had occurred at some 
time negated the plaintiff's inference of negligence. 
¶65 The plaintiff concludes from this line of cases that 
inconclusive evidence of a non-actionable cause does not negate 
the inference arising from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  
The uncertainty of the time of the heart attack in the present 
case means that the evidence of the heart attack is inconclusive 
evidence of a non-actionable cause, according to the plaintiff, 
and therefore presents a jury question. 
¶66 The defendants attempt to distinguish the plaintiff's 
line of cases, saying that in those cases the issue is whether 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
31
the defense carried its burden of going forward with evidence 
establishing its defense once the complainant established an 
inference of negligence.  The defendants argue that in contrast 
the plaintiff in the present case is not entitled to the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine in the first instance.  We disagree with 
the defendants. 
¶67 Here 
it 
is undisputed that 
the 
defendant-driver 
driving west toward the sun on a clear February day about three-
quarters of an hour before sunset drove his automobile into 
three automobiles.  The defendant-driver's automobile visor was 
in the down position at the site of the collision, and skid 
marks indicated that the defendant-driver may have applied the 
brakes after the initial collision.  The road was straight and 
dry.  The defendant-driver was apparently not wearing a seat 
belt.  A witness said the defendant-driver was driving fast.  
These facts are sufficient to raise an inference of negligence 
in the first instance. 
¶68 In each of the cases upon which the plaintiff relies, 
the complainant was attempting to prove negligence by relying on 
an inference of negligence arising from the facts of the 
collision: the truck drove into complainant's lane of traffic 
(Bunkfeldt); the automobile crossed over into complainant's lane 
of traffic (Voigt); the automobile hit a parked automobile 
(Dewing).  In each of these cases the issue was whether the 
defendant's evidence of a non-actionable cause negated the 
inference 
of 
the 
defendant's 
negligence 
upon 
which 
the 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
32
complainant relied.30  In each case the court said the inference 
of negligence was not negated and the issue of the alleged 
tortfeasor's negligence was for the trier of fact.  
¶69 One possible way to resolve the apparent conflict 
between the defendants' line of cases and the plaintiff's line 
of cases is that the defendants' line of cases (Klein, Baars, 
and Wood) involve single-car crashes in which the automobile 
simply ran off the road.31  The courts in each of the defendants' 
line of cases were unwilling to infer negligence from the facts 
of the crash.  Without the inference of negligence, the 
complainant had no proof of negligence. 
¶70 In contrast, the plaintiff's cases involve vehicles 
that struck other vehicles or persons.  In particular, Bunkfeldt 
and Voigt involve vehicles that crossed lanes of traffic, 
occurrences that might be characterized as violations of 
statutes governing rules of the road and thus may be viewed as 
negligence per se cases.  Negligence per se means that an 
                     
30 Zino v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 272 Wis. 21, 
24, 74 N.W.2d 791 (1956) (the burden of going forward with the 
evidence to overcome the inference of negligence when res ipsa 
loquitur applies is on the defendant; the burden of persuasion 
of negligence rests with the plaintiff). 
31 In 
Baars, 
for 
example, 
in 
which 
the 
defendant's 
automobile ran into a ditch, the plaintiff argued that an 
inference of negligence arose based on the driver's violation of 
a safety statute requiring drivers to remain on their side of 
the road.  The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that an 
automatic inference of negligence arose when the defendant had 
simply driven off the traveled portion of the road.  Baars, 249 
Wis. at 67, 70.  See also Wood, 273 Wis. at 102; Klein v. 
Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 388, 172 N.W. 736 (1919). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
33
inference of negligence is drawn from the conduct as a matter of 
law but the inference may be rebutted.32  In Dewing, no 
negligence per se is involved but the court apparently viewed 
the inference of negligence in that case as being a strong one 
arising from the facts of the case.  Thus a distinction between 
the two lines of cases is that the defendant's line of cases 
does not involve negligence per se.  The courts in the 
defendants' line of cases (Klein, Baars, and Wood) were not 
willing to view an automobile veering to the right and going off 
the road as involving a violation of a safety statute or of a 
rule of the road that would allow an inference of negligence to 
be drawn. 
¶71 This distinction between an inference of negligence 
arising from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and an inference 
of negligence arising from the doctrine of negligence per se is 
not totally persuasive, because, as this court recently noted, 
early Wisconsin case law does not draw a clear distinction 
between 
an 
inference 
of 
negligence 
arising 
from 
the 
circumstances of a case and an inference of negligence arising 
from the doctrine of negligence per se.33 
¶72 Another related way to distinguish these two lines of 
cases is on the basis of the strength of the inference of 
negligence that arises under the circumstances of the collision, 
                     
32 See Totsky v. Riteway Bus Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 29, ¶28 & 
n.6, 233 Wis. 2d 371, 607 N.W.2d 637. 
33 See Totsky, 2000 WI 29 at ¶28 n.6. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
34
that is, that the likelihood of the alleged tortfeasor's 
negligence is substantial enough to permit the complainant's 
reliance on res ipsa loquitur even if evidence is offered to 
negate the inference.34  Inferences are of varying strength, and 
the evidence necessary to negate an inference of negligence 
depends on the strength of the inference of negligence under the 
circumstantial evidence available in each case.35 
¶73 If there is a weak inference of negligence arising 
from the automobile incident, such as when an automobile veers 
off the traveled portion of a road without striking another 
vehicle, evidence of a non-actionable cause may negate that weak 
                     
34 See Reporter's Note, cmt. d, Discussion Draft (April 5, 
1999), Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Everything depends on how strong the inference is of 
likely 
defendant 
negligence 
before 
evidence 
is 
introduced 
that 
diminishes 
the 
likelihood 
of 
any 
alternative causes. . . .  If the evidence begins by 
showing that a car swerved off the highway, the motorist 
can be the target of res ipsa loquitur.  If the evidence 
more specifically shows, however, that the car swerved 
because of a sudden deflation of a tire, that evidence 
largely leaves the motorist off the res ipsa loquitur 
hook.  . . .  At the same time, if the car is only one 
week old and has been driven properly, the evidence 
suggests 
the 
likely 
negligence 
of 
the 
car 
manufacturer . . . .  If, by contrast, the car's tires 
are two years old, but if the evidence shows that six 
hours before the accident the tires had been rotated by 
an auto service station, that evidence supports a res 
ipsa loquitur claim against the station. 
35 Weggeman, 5 Wis. 2d at 510.  See also Keeton, Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 40 at 261 (noting that "[i]t takes 
more of an explanation to justify a falling elephant than a 
falling brick, more to account for a hundred defective bottles 
than for one"). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
35
inference altogether so that there is no reasonable basis on 
which a fact-finder could find negligence.  Any finding of 
negligence would have to rest on speculation and conjecture in 
such circumstances.36 
¶74 Under other circumstances, such as when a driver veers 
into other lanes of traffic or strikes stationary vehicles, the 
inference of negligence may be strong enough to survive 
alongside evidence of other, non-actionable causes.  The circuit 
court determines whether to give the jury a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction, but the fact-finder determines whether to draw the 
inferences. 
¶75 This distinction may allow us to explain why the 
Dewing court declined to follow the Wood court's conclusion that 
evidence of a heart attack that occurred before, during, or 
after a collision would have been sufficient to negate the 
inference of negligence arising from a vehicle's unexplained 
departure from the traveled portion of the highway.  In Wood, 
the inference of negligence was weak, yet the inference of 
negligence was sufficient to support the complainant's action, 
                     
36 This seems to be the point this court was drawing in 
Wood, in which it held that inconclusive evidence regarding a 
heart attack was not sufficient to rebut the inference of 
negligence arising from a vehicle’s “unexplained departure from 
the traveled portion of the highway,” although more conclusive 
evidence might have been sufficient.  Wood, 273 Wis. at 102. 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
36
when no evidence of a heart attack was produced.  See Wood, 273 
Wis. at 102.37 
¶76 In this case, evidence that the defendant-driver 
driving 
an 
automobile 
west 
toward 
the 
sun 
struck 
three 
automobiles 
on 
a 
straight, 
dry 
road 
under 
good 
weather 
conditions at 4:30 on a February afternoon (with sunset three-
quarters of an hour later) raises a strong inference of 
negligence.  Thus in the present case the inference of 
negligence arising from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
survives alongside evidence that the defendant-driver suffered a 
heart attack sometime before, during, or after the collision.  
The jury will weigh the evidence at trial and accept or reject 
this inference. 
¶77 Our approach finds support in the treatises and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, upon which we have relied in our 
res ipsa loquitur cases.38  According to the Restatement, a 
                     
37 See Reporter's Note, cmt. d, Discussion Draft (April 5, 
1999), Restatement (Third) of Torts (similarly explaining the 
res ipsa loquitur case law). 
38 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1965), provides as 
follows: 
§ 328D.  RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff 
is caused by negligence of the defendant when 
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not 
occur in the absence of negligence; 
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
and 
third 
persons, 
are 
sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
37
complainant may benefit from the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even 
where the complainant cannot exclude all other explanations.  A 
complainant "need not, however, conclusively exclude all other 
possible 
explanations" 
to 
benefit 
from 
an 
inference 
of 
negligence.39  When a defendant offers evidence that an event was 
not caused by his negligence, the inference of the defendant's 
negligence is not necessarily overthrown.  The fact-finder at 
trial and the court on summary judgment are still permitted to 
infer from the facts that the defendant was negligent.  "It is 
enough that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion 
                                                                  
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of 
the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. 
Subsection (b), which implicates the central issue in this case, 
has been criticized as "ambivalent."  The Reporter's Notes, 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 15, cmt. d, Discussion Draft 
(4/5/99) explains:  
 
The extent to which the plaintiff is required to offer 
evidence ruling out alternative explanations for the 
accident is an issue to which the Restatement Second 
of Torts provides an ambivalent response.  In black 
letter it states that res ipsa loquitur does not apply 
unless "other responsible causes" for the accident 
"are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence." . . .  
Yet in an Illustration that immediately follows, res 
ipsa is deemed appropriate without any evidence being 
offered 
that 
eliminates 
(or 
even 
reduces 
the 
likelihood of) other responsible causes.  . . .  The 
tension between the Restatement black letter and the 
Restatement Illustrations are worked out in this 
Comment.  Everything depends on how strong the 
inference is of likely defendant negligence before 
evidence is introduced that diminishes the likelihood 
of any alternative causes. 
 
39 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, cmt. e (1965). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
38
that negligence is the more probable explanation."40  This court 
stated in Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 514, 
93 N.W.2d 467 (1958), that "the evidence must afford a rational 
basis for concluding that the cause of the accident was probably 
such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence 
connected with it." 
¶78 If a defendant seeks summary judgment, he or she must 
produce evidence that will destroy any reasonable inference of 
negligence or so completely contradict it that reasonable 
                     
40 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, cmts. e and f 
(1965). 
The Restatement (cmt. e) further indicates that where "the 
probabilities are at best evenly divided between negligence and 
its absence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury 
that there is no sufficient proof."  No guidance is provided as 
to how a court should evaluate whether the probabilities are, at 
best, evenly divided such that the issue of negligence may not 
go to a jury.  
Other authorities have resisted the notion that a court's 
perspective of an even division in the inferences should be a 
basis for removing the question from the jury.  See, e.g., 
William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 
20 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 267 (1936) ("[t]he question is largely 
academic, since few if any cases are ever evenly balanced"); 9A 
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2528 at 293 (1995) (noting that federal 
courts no longer follow the rule that courts should remove 
"equally probable inferences" from the jury and stating that 
"[t]his undoubtedly reflects the fact that the courts recognize 
that they lack the ability to say whether two or more reasonable 
inferences are equal"); Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary 
Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 491, 504 
(1988) (most lower courts that have addressed the issue have 
held that the equal inferences rule is no longer valid). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
39
persons could no longer accept it.41  When a defendant moving for 
summary judgment offers exculpatory evidence so strong that 
reasonable minds can no longer draw an inference of negligence, 
a judgment for the defendant as a matter of law would be 
appropriate. 
¶79 At the summary judgment stage, we must view the heart 
attack evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  
The plaintiff has offered the deposition of an expert, who 
stated that there is no basis for determining whether the heart 
attack occurred before, during, or after the collision.  Thus, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the heart 
attack evidence at this stage does not conclusively exonerate 
the defendants of negligence.  From the opinions of the expert 
medical witnesses, the most that can be said is that it is 
equally plausible that the heart attack occurred before, during, 
or after the incident. 
¶80 The defendants argue that because the heart attack 
could have happened either before, during, or after the 
collision, reasonable minds could no longer draw an inference of 
the defendant-driver's negligence and that any inference of 
                     
41 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, cmt. o (1965) ("If 
the defendant produces evidence which is so conclusive as to 
leave no doubt that the event was caused by some outside agency 
for which he was not responsible, or that it was of a kind which 
commonly occurs without reasonable care, he may be entitled to a 
directed verdict.").  See Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts § 40 at 261; Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The 
Law of Torts § 19.12 at 1104-05 (1956). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
40
negligence is conjecture and speculation.  We disagree with the 
defendants.42 
¶81 The defendants' arguments regarding jury speculation 
seem to us to be overstated.  The U.S. Supreme Court has noted 
that all jury determinations require some level of conjecture or 
speculation and that cases should be taken away from the jury 
only when there is a complete absence of probative facts.  Where 
there is an evidentiary basis for the complainant's claim, a 
fact-finder is free to discard or disbelieve inconsistent facts. 
 See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652 (1946).  If the 
evidence might reasonably lead to either of two inferences it is 
for the jury to choose between them.  In this sense, 
circumstantial evidence is like testimonial evidence.  The fact-
finder uses its experience with people and events in weighing 
the probabilities.43 
¶82 Wisconsin case law has likewise acknowledged that 
juries may engage in some level of speculation.  See Weber v. 
                     
42 The pattern jury instruction on the burden of proof 
admonishes the jury that "if you have to guess what the answer 
should be after discussing all evidence which relates to a 
particular question, the party having the burden of proof as to 
that question has not met the required burden."  Wis JI—Civil 
200. 
The defendants also contend that the fact that the 
defendant-driver had between five and twenty seconds to react to 
sensations of dizziness does not create a jury question.  The 
defendants rely on their medical expert, who doubted whether the 
defendant-driver had sufficient time and control to pull off the 
road prior to the first impact.  A fact-finder, of course, need 
not accept this opinion. 
43 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
41
Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 191 Wis. 2d 626, 636, 530 
N.W.2d 25 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Lavender, 327 U.S. at 653). 
¶83 Numerous reasonable inferences, albeit conflicting 
ones, can be drawn from the record, considering the opinions of 
the medical experts and the circumstances of the collisions.  
The record in this case at the motion for summary judgment 
affords a rational basis for concluding that the defendant-
driver was negligent.  The inference of negligence that arises 
under the facts of this case is sufficiently strong to survive 
the defendants' inconclusive evidence of a non-negligent cause. 
¶84 The trier of fact should be afforded the opportunity 
to evaluate conflicting testimony.  Seeing and hearing the 
witnesses can assist the trier of fact in determining whether a 
reasonable probability exists that the defendant-driver was 
negligent.  As we stated in Peplinski, 193 Wis. 2d at 18: "The 
impression of a witness's testimony which the trial court gains 
from seeing and hearing the witness can make a difference in a 
decision that evidence is more than conjecture, but less than 
full and complete." 
¶85 When the parties are entitled to competing inferences 
of negligence and non-negligence, courts should not rely on 
inconclusive evidence to dispose of one of the inferences at the 
summary judgment stage.  Summary judgment is inappropriate.44  
When a defendant can offer only inconclusive evidence of a non-
                     
44 Moore's Federal Practice ¶56.11[8]; 10A Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur L. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2713.1 at 243 (1998). 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
42
negligent cause, a court should not attempt to weigh the 
probabilities of negligence created by the competing inferences; 
that is the function of the jury.45  Only when the inference of 
negligence is so weak in the first place can it be sufficiently 
negated by a competing inference of non-negligence, such that a 
jury could no longer reasonably conclude that the defendant was 
negligent.  In this limited category of cases, a court would be 
justified in granting summary judgment for the defendants. 
¶86 For these reasons, we hold that the evidence of the 
defendant-driver's heart attack does not by itself foreclose the 
plaintiff from proceeding to trial in the present case.  Quite 
simply, there exists a material issue of fact regarding whether 
the defendant-driver negligently operated his automobile.  Since 
the record, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, supports a reasonable inference of negligence, we 
hold that summary judgment must be denied. 
                     
45 The Wood court also emphasized that the jury, not the 
judge, 
weighs 
the 
contradictory 
evidence 
and 
inferences, 
assesses the credibility of witnesses, and draws the ultimate 
facts.  The Wood court, 273 Wis. at 101 (quoting Tennant v. 
Peoria and P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)), stated: 
It is not the function of a court to search the record 
for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to 
take the case away from the jury on a theory that the 
proof 
gives 
equal 
support 
to 
inconsistent 
and 
uncertain inferences . . . .  [The jury] weighs the 
contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the 
credibility 
of 
witnesses, 
receives 
expert 
instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to 
the facts.  The very essence of its function is to 
select 
from 
among 
conflicting 
inferences 
and 
conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. 
 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
43
¶87 Although 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
plaintiff 
has 
established a prima facie case of negligence sufficient to 
survive a motion for summary judgment, we note that the evidence 
that the defendant-driver suffered a heart attack gives the 
defendants two possible ways to prevail at trial.  First, the 
jury may find that the evidence regarding the timing of the 
heart attack is inconclusive but may nonetheless decline to draw 
the permissible inference of the defendant-driver's negligence 
arising from the facts of the collision itself.  Second, the 
jury may conclude, based on its evaluation of the evidence, that 
the defendants carried their burden of persuasion on the 
affirmative defense of "illness without forewarning."46 
¶88 There are essentially three elements of "illness 
without forewarning": (1) the defendant had no prior warning of 
the illness; (2) the defendant was subjected to an illness; and 
(3) the illness affected the defendant's ability to control the 
vehicle in an ordinarily prudent manner.47 
                     
46 The defendants have raised the issue of a heart attack as 
an affirmative defense in their answer, as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 802.02(3) (1997-98).  The defendants have the burden of 
persuasion 
on 
this 
affirmative 
defense. 
 
See 
Brief 
of 
Defendants-Respondents Brief at 24-25.  See also comment to Wis 
JICivil 1021.2. 
47 Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1021.2 states in part as 
follows: 
The law of Wisconsin is that where a driver, through 
sudden illness or loss of consciousness, commits an 
act or omits a precaution which would otherwise 
constitute negligence, such act or omission is not 
negligence if the occurrence of such illness or loss 
of consciousness was 
not 
preceded 
by 
sufficient 
No. 
99-0821 
 
 
44
¶89 With the burden of persuasion of the affirmative 
defense on the defendants, the defendants must show that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to the elements of the 
defense in order to be granted summary judgment.  The defendants 
have failed to establish that the heart attack preceded the 
collision.  Thus this affirmative defense is not a sufficient 
basis to grant summary judgment for the defendant.  We cannot 
hold 
as 
a matter 
of law 
that 
the 
defendant-driver has 
conclusively defended against the claim of negligence. 
¶90 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the order of the 
circuit court granting summary judgment to the defendant-driver. 
 We remand the cause 
to 
the circuit 
court 
for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
                                                                  
warning that a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence ought reasonably to foresee that he or she, 
by driving a car would, subject the person or property 
of another or of himself or herself to an unreasonable 
risk of injury or damage. 
99-0821.npc 
 
1 
¶91 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Dissenting).  The court of 
appeals certified this case, asking for our guidance in navigating 
the sea of seemingly contradictory applications of res ipsa 
loquitur.  However, instead of providing guidance for the bench 
and bar, the majority has further obfuscated the application of 
res ipsa loquitur.  In so doing, the majority has effectively 
overruled precedent established over the course of a century and 
not only undermined the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, but also 
summary judgment methodology.   
¶92 
The court of appeals certified the following issue: 
 
What is the proper methodology for determining if a 
res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence is rebutted 
as a matter of law at summary judgment?  More 
specifically, under the facts of this case, is a res 
ipsa loquitur inference of negligence rebutted as a 
matter of law at summary judgment by evidence that the 
alleged tortfeasor suffered a heart attack when the 
evidence is in conflict, or uncertain, as to whether 
the 
heart 
attack 
occurred 
before 
or 
after 
the 
accident? 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶93 
Res ipsa loquitur is applicable only where: 
 
(a) either a lay[person] is able to determine as a 
matter of common knowledge or an expert testifies that 
the result which occurred does not ordinarily occur in 
the 
absence 
of 
negligence, 
(b) 
the 
agent 
or 
instrumentality 
causing 
the harm 
was 
within the 
exclusive control of the defendant, and (c) the 
evidence offered is sufficient to remove the causation 
question from the realm of conjecture, but not so 
substantial that it provides a full and complete 
explanation of the event. 
Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 17, 531 N.W.2d 
597 (1995) (citing Lecander v. Billmeyer, 171 Wis. 2d 593, 601-02, 
99-0821.npc 
 
2 
492 N.W.2d 167 (1992)).  The majority claims that res ipsa 
loquitur is applicable where only two of these requirements are 
met:  (1) the result does not ordinarily occur in the absence of 
negligence and (2) the agency of or instrumentality of the harm 
was within the exclusive control of the defendant.  Majority op. 
at ¶34. 
¶94 
However, res ipsa loquitor is not applicable unless 
the third requirement relating to causation is also met.  The 
majority quotes what has been the rule in this state since 1898: 
 
Where there is no direct evidence of how an accident 
occurred, 
and 
the 
circumstances 
are 
clearly 
as 
consistent with the theory that it might be ascribed 
to a cause not actionable as to a cause that is 
actionable, it is not within the proper province of a 
jury to guess where the truth lies and make that the 
foundation for a verdict. 
Majority op. at ¶40 n.24 (quoting Hyer v. Janesville, 101 
Wis. 371, 377, 77 N.W. 729 (1898)).  The majority reiterates, in a 
number of variations, that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable 
where the jury would have to resort to speculation to determine 
the cause of an accident.  See e.g., majority op. at ¶40.  The 
majority also discusses a number of cases where this rule has been 
applied, namely, Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736 
(1919), Baars v. Benda, 249 Wis. 65, 23 N.W. 477 (1945).  Yet, the 
majority does not apply that rule, which has been the law in 
Wisconsin for more than 100 years, nor explain how it resolved the 
threshold issue of whether res ipsa loquitur is even applicable in 
this case.  Instead, the majority certainly seems to adopt a new 
rule that, although it may be the rule elsewhere, has never been 
99-0821.npc 
 
3 
adopted in Wisconsin, namely, that equally competing reasonable 
inferences of negligence and non-negligence should be submitted to 
the jury.  See majority op. at ¶77.  Such a rule inevitably 
requires the jury to speculate.  
¶95 
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable here because there 
is no evidence that removes causation from the realm of 
conjecture.  Based upon the police report,48 the majority concludes 
that a reasonable inference to be drawn from the defendant-
driver's striking three automobiles is that he was negligent in 
operating his automobile.  Majority op. at ¶¶30, 32.  But another, 
just as reasonable, if not more so, inference, to be drawn from 
the evidence is that the defendant-driver's heart attack caused 
the accident.  There is no evidence that one inference or 
                     
48 Indeed, the evidence the majority relies upon——the police 
report, even though submitted by defendants——includes hearsay 
and probably would not be admissible at trial.  Although the 
police officer's personal observations and measurements would be 
admissible (Wilder v. Classified Risk Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 286, 
290, 177 N.W.2d 109 (1970)), the witnesses' statements contained 
in the police report, upon which the majority relies (majority 
op. at ¶¶10, 11, 29, 30), would not be admissible.  Mitchell v. 
State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 330, 267 N.W.2d 349 (1978).  Even summary 
judgment must be based upon admissible evidence.   
The 
judgment 
sought 
shall 
be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.  . . . Supporting and 
opposing 
affidavits 
shall 
be 
made 
on 
personal 
knowledge and shall set forth such evidentiary facts 
as would be admissible in evidence. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), (3) (1997-98). 
99-0821.npc 
 
4 
explanation is more reasonable or more likely than the other.49  If 
causation is speculative, the plaintiff is not entitled to rely 
upon res ipsa loquitur, i.e., where "there is no credible evidence 
upon which the trier of fact can base a reasoned choice between 
the two possible inferences, any finding of causation would be in 
the realm of speculation and conjecture."  Merco Distrib. Corp. v. 
Commercial Police Alarm Co., Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 455, 460, 267 N.W.2d 
652 (1978).  
¶96 
The majority tries to avoid its Achilles heel by 
ignoring the requirement for the application of res ipsa loquitur 
that the plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence to show 
causation beyond conjecture.  After the majority decision, summary 
judgment will be proper in cases that may involve res ipsa 
loquitur.  The majority finds summary judgment appropriate only 
where the defendant destroys the inference of negligence or so 
completely contradicts that inference that a fact-finder cannot 
reasonably accept it.  Majority op. at ¶78.  To do this, 
defendants must come forward with evidence that "conclusively 
exonerate[s] the defendants of negligence."  Id. at ¶79.   
¶97 
Apparently, according to the majority, the defendant 
must disprove any possibility of negligence, regardless of whether 
                     
49 The majority also indicates that discussion of reasonable 
inferences leads to a discussion of res ipsa loquitur.  Majority 
op. at ¶33.  Not every reasonable inference of negligence should 
suggest that a case involves res ipsa loquitur.  If such were 
true, then, despite the majority's protestations to the contrary 
(id. at ¶35), every automobile collision would indeed raise the 
issue of res ipsa loquitur.   
99-0821.npc 
 
5 
the 
plaintiff 
has 
affirmatively 
shown 
negligence 
beyond 
conjecture.  As a consequence, in those cases where either an 
actionable or nonactionable cause resulted in an accident, now the 
plaintiff would be allowed to proceed under res ipsa loquitur, 
unless the defendant conclusively, irrefutably, and decisively 
proves that there was no negligence.   
¶98 
By eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff must 
show that the cause of the accident has been removed from the 
realm of speculation or conjecture, the majority has turned over 
100 years of precedent on its head.  See Hyer, 101 Wis. at 377.  
This court first found res ipsa loquitur applicable in an 
automobile 
collision 
case 
only 
because 
the 
inferences 
of 
nonnegligent 
causes 
had 
been 
eliminated, 
rendering 
Hyer 
inapposite.  Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis. 304, 312-13, 
41 N.W.2d 268 (1950).  In Matson, this court reiterated Hyer's 
holding, and noted that while res ipsa loquitur acted as a 
substitute for proof of negligence, "it is only where the 
circumstances leave no room for a different presumption that the 
maxim applies."  Id. at 310 (citing Klein, 169 Wis. 385).  In 
other words, only where the circumstances eliminated contrary 
inferences "until only those of negligent operation remain," will 
res ipsa loquitur apply in car accident cases.  Matson, 256 Wis. 
at 312-13.  The defendants had raised only "imaginary traffic 
conditions," but offered no evidence as to a nonactionable cause 
for the accident at issue.  Id. at 312.   Consequently, "[n]othing 
is left which can rationally explain the collision except 
negligence on the part of the driver.  There are no circumstances 
99-0821.npc 
 
6 
which leave room for a different presumption."  Id.  Accordingly, 
res ipsa loquitur was appropriate, and applicable.  The majority 
today creates a test that requires just the opposite; namely, that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable until the 
inference of negligence is eliminated or destroyed.   
¶99 
The majority has all but overruled Wood v. Indemnity 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W.2d 610 (1956).  As the 
majority notes (¶44), in Wood, had there been "conclusive 
testimony" that the driver, James Wood, had a heart attack at the 
time of the accident, there would have been no need for the 
defendant to "establish that the heart attack occurred before" the 
accident "to render inapplicable the rule of res ipsa loquitur."  
Id. at 101-02.  But there was no such conclusive testimony; 
instead, the wife of the driver, Neomi Wood, had testified that 
just as their jeep hit the gravel at the side of the road, she saw 
"Mr. Wood as stiffening out, doing something with his feet."  Id. 
at 98.  Also, a witness who saw James Wood's body after the 
accident——he had been killed by the accident——described his face 
as "grayish blue."  Id.  This is hardly irrefutable, conclusive 
testimony that James Wood had a heart attack at the time of the 
accident.  Indeed, the majority notes that "the defendant produced 
no admissible evidence of a heart attack."  Majority op. at ¶44 
n.26.  Yet, in Wood, this court did not require that the evidence 
of a heart attack irrefutably establish that the heart attack 
occurred before the accident.  Id. at 101-02.  Instead, this court 
held that if there was evidence of a non-negligent cause of the 
99-0821.npc 
 
7 
accident, the jury would have to speculate between negligence and 
non-negligence, rendering res ipsa loquitur inapplicable.50   
¶100 
Here, there is conclusive, irrefutable evidence that 
the defendant-driver had a heart attack at the time of the 
accident.  All of the experts agree.  They do not agree whether 
the heart attack occurred before or during the accident, but, 
according to Wood, the defendants need not establish that the 
heart attack occurred prior to the accident.  But that significant 
aspect of res ipsa loquitur has been obliterated by the majority. 
 Not only has Wood been effectively overturned, but so have all 
the other cases that withheld application of res ipsa loquitur 
where the circumstances indicated that the accident just as likely 
resulted from a non-negligent cause as a negligent cause.  
¶101 
The majority recognizes these cases that held that res 
ipsa loquitur is not applicable where "it is shown that the 
accident might have happened as the result of one of two causes," 
and that one cause is not negligence.  Majority op. at ¶40 (citing 
Klein, 169 Wis. at 389).  But the majority attempts to re-explain 
them, not as having competing inferences of negligence and non-
negligence, but as having "weak" inferences of negligence.  
Majority op. at ¶¶72-73.  This approach is particularly untenable 
because it requires comparing the inferences of negligence and 
non-negligence.  According to the majority, in order for the 
                     
50 Wood referred to this axiom as "the rule laid down in 
Baars v. Benda, 249 Wis. 65, 23 N.W.2d 477 (1946)."  273 Wis. at 
101.  The rule was not applicable in Wood because there was no 
evidence of a non-negligent cause.  
99-0821.npc 
 
8 
circuit court to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate 
or not, the court must evaluate whether an inference is "strong" 
or "weak."  Majority op. at ¶¶72, 73, 74, 83, 85.  This flies in 
the face of summary judgment methodology, which is to decide a 
case as a matter of law without weighing and comparing the 
evidence.  Also, such an approach "is unwise because it puts the 
court into the position of weighing the evidence and choosing 
between 
competing 
reasonable 
inferences, 
a 
task 
heretofore 
prohibited on summary judgment."  Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, 
¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 613 N.W.2d 102; see also Wis. Stat. § 802.08 
(1997-98). Indeed, the ease with which the majority gives its 
imprimatur to the weighing of evidence in deciding a summary 
judgment motion is very troublesome. 
¶102 
Nowhere has this court previously even hinted that a 
defendant needs to produce conclusive, irrefutable, and decisive 
evidence to "destroy" any inference of negligence or face a trial. 
 Rather, the test to date has been that the inferences on non-
negligent causes had to be eliminated for res ipsa loquitur to 
apply.  The majority's approach thus flies in the face of our 
precedent since Hyer, more than 100 years ago.  It also flies in 
the 
face 
of 
summary 
judgment 
methodology, 
and 
places 
an 
unacceptable 
burden 
here 
upon 
the 
defendants 
to 
disprove 
plaintiffs' claim.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶103 
I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX  
and Justice DIANE S. SYKES join in this dissent. 
 
99-0821.npc 
 
9 
 
99-0821.npc 
 
1 
 
1