Title: People v. Tenner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90394
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 2003

Docket No. 90394-Agenda 2-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								JAMES H. TENNER, Appellant.
	The defendant, James Tenner, appeals a Cook County circuit
court order dismissing his second post-conviction petition without
an evidentiary hearing. Because the defendant was sentenced to
death, his appeal lies directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R.
651(a).
	On January 10, 2003, while the defendant's petition for
rehearing was pending, former Governor George Ryan commuted
the sentences of all Illinois death row inmates, including the
defendant, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
or mandatory supervised release. The defendant's appeal primarily
concerns his competency at trial and sentencing. This appeal
survives the commutation order because fitness would remain an
issue regardless of the penalty imposed upon the defendant. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
	The defendant and Albert Sauls worked together in various
businesses throughout the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, the defendant
and Sauls each operated his own trucking company, sharing a
garage in South Chicago Heights. On the evening of September 2,
1987, Sauls and his employee, Alvin Smith, returned to the garage
after work and started repairs on one of Sauls' trucks. Sauls' wife,
Donna, and the defendant's former girlfriend, Shirley Garza, soon
arrived at the garage. Later, as Smith left the garage, he was met
outside by the defendant carrying a loaded shotgun. The defendant
forced Smith back into the garage and, once inside, ordered Smith,
Sauls, and Sauls' wife to lie on the floor. The defendant instructed
Garza to tie their wrists and ankles. The defendant then directed
everyone to his side of the garage where he had strung three
nooses over a beam. He told Garza to place a noose around the
necks of Smith, Sauls, and Sauls' wife, and he tied another noose
for Garza. With his victims incapacitated, the defendant proceeded
to harangue them for more than two hours, complaining that Sauls
and his wife had interfered with his relationship with Garza. The
defendant released Garza and sent her outside the garage. The
defendant then shot Donna Sauls in the head and Smith in the
abdomen at point-blank range. Both died. The defendant also shot
Albert Sauls in the face; he survived.
	In 1990, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first
degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, four
counts of aggravated unlawful restraint, and one count of armed
violence; he was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, we vacated
the defendant's attempted first degree murder conviction, affirmed
his other convictions, and affirmed his death sentence. See People
v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341 (1993). The United States Supreme
Court denied the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. See
Tenner v. Illinois, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 882, 114 S. Ct. 2768 (1994).
	In 1994, the defendant filed his first post-conviction petition,
alleging, inter alia, that his trial attorneys were ineffective for
failing to obtain a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. The
defendant asserted that such an evaluation would have provided
evidence to support an insanity defense at trial or a mitigating
factor at sentencing. The defendant relied upon a 1994 report from
Dr. Lyle Rossiter, Jr., an expert consulted by his post-conviction
attorney. Dr. Rossiter's report summarized his opinions "regarding
the question of whether there is a significant likelihood that James
Tenner was suffering from a state of mental and emotional distress
at the time of his September 2, 1987, offense sufficient to warrant
a psychiatric evaluation for an insanity defense or factors in
mitigation." Dr. Rossiter stated that the defendant was in "a highly
irrational state caused by a paranoid delusional disorder" on that
date and that the defendant "continues to suffer from a less
obvious but severe mental disorder which significantly impairs his
ability to communicate with [post-conviction] counsel."
According to Dr. Rossiter, this disorder is characterized by "vague,
evasive, illogical, oppositional and self-contradictory
communications and thought processes about his mental state at
the time of the offense and about his current participation in post-conviction proceedings." Dr. Rossiter concluded: "[I]t is my
opinion that his original attorney's failure to have him
psychiatrically examined for an insanity defense or for psychiatric
factors in mitigation may represent ineffective assistance of
counsel, and that Mr. Tenner is now impaired in his ability to
assist present counsel in that determination." In a supplemental
petition, the defendant also alleged that a pretrial psychiatric
evaluation would have enabled his trial attorneys to make an
informed decision "[w]hether a bona fide doubt existed as to the
defendant's fitness to cooperate with counsel and thus to stand
trial, a doubt which appears to exist in light of Dr. Rossiter's
evaluation and conclusion." The trial court dismissed the petition
without an evidentiary hearing, and the defendant appealed to this
court.
	We affirmed. See People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372 (1997).
We rejected the defendant's argument that defense counsel's
performance was deficient:
			"This is not a case in which counsel wholly failed to
investigate the defendant's background prior to trial or
sentencing. Here, defense counsel retained a mitigation
expert, who conducted an investigation into the
defendant's personal history, though counsel later decided
not to call that person as a witness either at trial or at
sentencing. Nothing in the record at that time, however,
suggested that the defendant suffered from any mental
impairment, or that there was any need to pursue a
separate inquiry into the defendant's mental condition.
***
			***
			Nothing in the defendant's record or personal history
disclosed any history of mental illness or emotional
disturbance; there was nothing to prompt a separate
inquiry into the defendant's mental condition. In rejecting
this portion of the defendant's post-conviction petition,
the judge below, who had also presided at trial, explained:
			'There was nothing to suggest a psychiatric exam in
this young Defendant's background. If there had been
anything that would have suggested [a] psychiatric
exam, I probably would have ordered it sua sponte. I've
been known to do that to satisfy myself as to the mental
competency of a defendant in front of the bench.
There's none of that in this record.'
		Like the judge below, we do not believe that counsel
acted unreasonably in failing to obtain a mental evaluation
of the defendant prior to trial." Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 380-81.
	We further held that even if the defense counsel's
performance had been deficient, the defendant suffered no
prejudice. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 381. We stated:
			"The defendant does not claim that he was insane at the
time of the offenses involved in this case, and the
defendant has failed to show that a mental evaluation
would have revealed evidence that could have resulted in
his acquittal on grounds of insanity. Notably, Dr. Rossiter
did not find that the defendant was insane when he
committed the present offenses. Although Dr. Rossiter
believed that the defendant was delusional at the relevant
time, Dr. Rossiter did not conclude that the defendant was
insane." Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 381-82.
The Supreme Court denied the defendant's second certiorari
petition. See Tenner v. Illinois, 522 U.S. 892, 139 L. Ed. 2d 163,
118 S. Ct. 231 (1997).
	The defendant then filed a 38-claim petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. The federal district court denied the defendant
relief in a lengthy unpublished order. See United States ex rel.
Tenner v. Gilmore, No. 97 C 2305 (N.D. Ill. October 8, 1998). The
defendant's habeas corpus petition does not appear in the record
before us, so we cannot determine precisely what the defendant
alleged. According to the district court, the defendant's "first two
claims" charged that his constitutional rights were violated
because a bona fide doubt about his mental competence existed,
but the state trial court did not hold a fitness hearing. The district
court rejected the State's argument that these claims were
procedurally defaulted because the defendant raised them in his
post-conviction petition only through his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim: "the general rule that claims not raised in state
proceedings are *** barred does not apply to substantive mental
competency claims." The district court then turned to the merits of
the defendant's competency "claim" and held:
			"After reviewing the record in this case, we find no
merit in Tenner's competency claim. Although the
circumstances surrounding the crime were irrational and
bizarre, that alone cannot be equated with mental
incompetence. [Citation.] Tenner has no prior history of
mental illness and there is no evidence of past
hospitalizations or treatment for a mental disorder. ***
			Tenner did not exhibit any irrational behavior or
unusual behavior during pretrial proceedings or at trial. At
trial, his testimony was lucid and he understood and
testified consistent with his trial strategy, which was to
establish that he was guilty of only second degree murder,
a noncapital offense. *** It is clear that Tenner
participated actively and meaningfully in the adversarial
process and that he was fit to do so."
	The district court reviewed the evidence offered by the
defendant, including Dr. Rossiter's 1994 report, and rejected the
defendant's assertion that a "thought disorder" characterized by
various qualities exhibited by the defendant-vagueness,
evasiveness, guardedness, opposition-rendered him unable to
understand the charges against him or to assist in his defense. The
district court observed, "Such characteristics are not so atypical of
one who has led a peaceful life but suddenly finds himself as the
perpetrator of gruesome murders." The district court concluded
that the trial court entertaining the defendant's first post-conviction petition was not unreasonable in concluding that
Tenner was competent to stand trial and that a fitness hearing was
unnecessary.
	The United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
See Tenner v. Gilmore, 184 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999). The court of
appeals noted that, though our comment that nothing in the record
should have prompted an inquiry into the defendant's mental
condition was made in the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, "it is equally apropos to the competence issue."
Tenner, 184 F.3d  at 614. The court of appeals continued:
			"Did the Supreme Court of Illinois act unreasonably in
concluding that the trial judge lacked a good reason to
doubt Tenner's mental soundness? We think that its
assessment was eminently reasonable. Even now,
Tenner's able counsel do not point to any circumstance
beyond the facts of the crime itself that should have
alerted the judge to any problem. The judge had ample
opportunity to evaluate Tenner, not only in pretrial
proceedings but also during his testimony. Tenner
responded intelligently to questions posed by his lawyer
(and those during cross-examination by the prosecutor).
His testimony was lucid and suggested an understanding
of the legal process and the nature of the charges against
him. [Citation.] Tenner now relies principally on a
psychiatric evaluation that came long after trial-and even
this evaluation is of little use, for Dr. Rossiter did not
offer an opinion about Tenner's ability to understand the
proceedings or assist his lawyer at the time of trial.
Rossiter concluded that Tenner had little understanding
of, or ability to assist his post-trial counsel with,
constitutional issues. That's true of most entirely
competent defendants; indeed, many graduates of law
school have trouble with constitutional questions from
time to time. Rossiter did not suggest that Tenner was
unable to understand the charges laid against him or to
assist in a defense against them. That is the critical issue;
so even with the benefit of hindsight it is not possible to
condemn the state court's approach as 'unreasonable.' "
(Emphases omitted.) Tenner, 184 F.3d  at 614.
The Supreme Court denied the defendant's third certiorari
petition. See Tenner v. Schomig, 528 U.S. 1052, 145 L. Ed. 2d 492, 120 S. Ct. 592 (1999).
	The defendant then filed a 13-claim, second post-conviction
petition. As he had in his federal habeas corpus petition, the
defendant challenged his fitness at trial and sentencing. The
defendant made two related claims: claim I, alleging that his
constitutional rights were denied because the trial court failed to
hold a fitness hearing despite evidence establishing a bona fide
doubt about his fitness; and claim II, alleging that his
constitutional rights were denied because he was, in fact, unfit at
trial and sentencing. As support for this set of fitness allegations,
the defendant initially relied upon Dr. Rossiter's 1994 report. The
State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. In a supplemental
response to the State's motion, the defendant added an additional
claim, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated because
this court refused to consider claims in his pro se brief on direct
appeal. The defendant also supplied a second report by Dr.
Rossiter. Dr. Rossiter's 2000 report purportedly addressed an issue
not answered in his 1994 report: "whether or not James Tenner
was fit to stand trial in March 1990 on charges of murder related
to the events of September 1987." After a "current review" of the
materials in this case, but not a current interview of the defendant,
Dr. Rossiter opined that the defendant was "more likely than not
unfit to stand trial in March 1990, and unable to assist his
attorneys *** during his subsequent post conviction proceedings."
(Emphasis added.) According to Dr. Rossiter, the defendant
suffers from a "long-standing mental disorder characterized by
paranoid and delusional thinking that leads him to deny that he is
mentally ill and to communicate in a manner that is highly
oppositional, evasive, vague, illogical, and self-contradictory."
	In its ruling on the fitness claims, the trial court reviewed the
previous post-conviction opinion from this court, as well as the
two federal court opinions. The trial court stated:
			"Now, there's a new letter from Rossiter, and in that
letter *** he offers the opinion [that the defendant] was
more likely than not unfit. In my opinion that letter is of
no use whatsoever. I have never seen a medical opinion
phrased in those terms. It[ ] almost appears to me to be
speculation or guess more likely than not, and in my
opinion has no probative value whatsoever. ***
			So as far as the evidence based-at least looking here
from an objective standpoint, there is no competent
evidence here, there is no evidence here that-you know,
when you look also at Dr. Rossiter's other [1994 report],
his sole basis [for] saying that he would be unfit was
allegedly because he refused to cooperate with
(Inaudible), but objectively looking at the record, he did
cooperate with his attorneys, he was able to cooperate
with his defense. [It] certainly is clear by his pro se filings
that he's aware of the charges against him, he knows the
function of various parties, he knows the possible
penalties, he knows the court procedure, and he's able to
communicate with counsel ***.
			*** [T]here's no merit[ ] to this issue whatsoever."
The trial court also rejected the defendant's claim regarding his
pro se brief. The defendant again appealed to this court.

ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural
mechanism through which a criminal defendant can assert "that in
the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was
a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of
the United States or of the State of Illinois or both." 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a) (West 1998); see People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,
378-79 (1998). Once a capital defendant files a post-conviction
petition, the trial court examines the petition and appoints an
attorney for the defendant, if necessary. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1)
(West 1998). The State then must answer or move to dismiss the
petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1998). If the State files a motion
to dismiss, the trial court must rule on the legal sufficiency of the
defendant's allegations, taking all well-pleaded facts as true.
People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1999). A defendant is not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations of the
petition, supported by the trial record and any accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376 (2000). Because a
trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of the defendant's allegations
is a legal determination, our review is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388.
	A post-conviction petition is a collateral attack upon a prior
conviction and sentence, not a surrogate for a direct appeal. People
v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999). Any issues which were
decided on direct appeal are barred by res judicata; any issues
which could have been raised on direct appeal are defaulted. West,
187 Ill. 2d  at 425. Further, the Act contemplates the filing of only
one petition: "Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional
rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived."
725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2000); see People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 375-76 (1988). Consequently, a defendant faces immense
procedural default hurdles when bringing a successive post-conviction petition. People v. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 198 (2000).
Because successive petitions plague the finality of criminal
litigation, these hurdles are lowered in very limited circumstances,
"where fundamental fairness so requires." People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992).
	We have defined the fundamental fairness exception to
procedural default in terms of the "cause-and-prejudice" test used
by the United States Supreme Court in the context of successive
federal habeas corpus petitions. See People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989), citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977) (fundamental fairness requires
a court to review a defaulted claim in a collateral proceeding only
when the defendant shows cognizable cause for his failure to make
a timely objection and actual prejudice resulting from the claimed
error). Recently, in People v. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, slip op. at
10 (May 23, 2002), we reaffirmed that the cause-and-prejudice test
is the analytical tool used to determine whether fundamental
fairness requires a court to make an exception to the waiver
provision of section 122-3 and to consider a claim raised in a
successive post-conviction petition on its merits. Under this test,
claims in a successive post-conviction petition are barred unless
the defendant can establish good cause for failing to raise the
claimed error in prior proceedings and actual prejudice resulting
from the error. See People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001);
Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 278-79. To establish "cause," the defendant
must show some objective factor external to the defense impeded
his ability to raise the claim in the initial post-conviction
proceeding. See Pitsonbarger, slip op. at 11, citing Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279. To establish "prejudice," the defendant must show the
claimed constitutional error so infected his trial that the resulting
conviction violated due process. See Owens, 129 Ill. 2d  at 317-18.
	In this appeal, the defendant raises three issues. First, the
defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing claims I
and II of his second post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing because Dr. Rossiter's 2000 report established
a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competency. Second, the
defendant argues that these claims were not procedurally defaulted
because he satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test with Dr.
Rossiter's 2000 report. Third, the defendant argues that the trial
court erred in dismissing claim XIV of his petition without an
evidentiary hearing because his constitutional rights were violated
when this court refused to consider the defendant's pro se brief on
direct appeal, even though it has considered pro se briefs in other
capital cases.
	The third issue merits little discussion. In short, the defendant
contends that this court violated equal protection principles in that,
as a capital defendant, he was treated differently than other capital
defendants. After the commutation order, however, the defendant
is no longer a capital defendant. This issue is moot. See People v.
Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002); cf. Lewis v. Commonwealth,
218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977) (holding that
commutation renders sentencing issues moot).
	Further, were it not moot, this issue would be procedurally
defaulted. The defendant has offered no cause, no objective factor
external to his defense, which prevented him from raising this
claim in his first post-conviction petition. The defendant filed his
pro se brief on direct appeal, and our refusal to consider it should
have been raised earlier. Though the defendant attempts to show
cause by asserting that his direct appeal and post-conviction
attorneys refused to raise the issues in his pro se brief, the
defendant mistakes the issues in the brief for the issue about the
brief itself. As the State convincingly demonstrates, every issue in
the defendant's pro se brief was addressed by either this court or
the federal courts.
	Normally, we would proceed to examine whether the first and
second issues pass the cause-and-prejudice test, but these claims
require a more nuanced analysis. Citing a federal case, James v.
Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992), which distinguishes
between procedural and substantive due process competency
claims, the defendant suggests that "because the right not to be
tried while actually incompetent is fundamental," he need not
demonstrate cause and prejudice.
	Some federal courts have identified two types of competency
claims available to a habeas corpus petitioner: "First, a petitioner
may allege that the trial court denied him or her due process by
failing sua sponte to hold a competency hearing. *** Second, a
petitioner may allege that he or she was denied due process by
being tried and convicted while incompetent." James, 957 F.2d  at
1571. That is, the prosecution of a potentially unfit defendant,
without a fitness hearing, violates procedural due process; the
prosecution of an actually unfit defendant violates substantive due
process. See Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir.
1995); Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1346 (10th Cir. 1997).
Under this rubric, a procedural due process claim is subject to
default under the cause-and-prejudice test, but a substantive due
process claim is not. See Medina, 59 F.3d at 1106-07; Nguyen,
131 F.3d  at 1346. Understandably, the defendant characterizes at
least one of his fitness claims as a substantive due process claim
to escape procedural default.
	We have not recognized a distinction between procedural and
substantive due process competency claims, and we need not do
so to decide this case. In his opening brief before us, the
defendant's arguments concerning the dismissal of both his fitness
claims are "combined" into his first issue because, as he
recognizes, the question common to both claims is whether a bona
fide doubt about his fitness at trial and sentencing existed. The
State contends that this issue has already been decided by this
court and the federal courts, and that "the law of the case"
controls. Although we disagree that the law of the case doctrine
applies, we agree that the defendant was precluded from raising
this question in his second post-conviction petition.
	The preclusion doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel,
and law of the case prevent a defendant from "taking two bites out
of the same appellate apple." People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37
(1988). Specifically, the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation
of an issue already decided in the same case. See People v.
Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 468 (1992); People v. McNair, 138 Ill.
App. 3d 920, 922 (1985) ("a determination of an issue on its
merits by an appellate court is final and conclusive upon the
parties in a second appeal in the same case, and the issues
considered and decided cannot be reconsidered by the same court
except on a petition for rehearing"). This doctrine does not apply
here because the instant case involving the defendant's second
post-conviction petition is not the same case as either that
involving his first post-conviction petition or that involving his
federal habeas corpus petition.
	Collateral estoppel, however, does apply. The collateral
estoppel doctrine bars relitigation of an issue already decided in a
prior case. See People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 386 (1994). That is,
"[t]he doctrine applies 'when a party *** participates in two
separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action
and some controlling fact or question material to the determination
of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the
former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.' " (Emphasis in
original.) People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990), quoting
Housing Authority v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Ottawa, 101 Ill. 2d 246, 252 (1984). The collateral estoppel doctrine has three
requirements: (1) the court rendered a final judgment in the prior
case; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party
or in privity with a party in the prior case; and (3) the issue
decided in the prior case is identical with the one presented in the
instant case. People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1995).
	Here, the first two requirements are easily met. This court
rendered a final judgment on the defendant's first post-conviction
petition; similarly, the federal courts rendered final judgments on
the defendant's habeas corpus petition. The defendant was a party
in each case. The sole remaining inquiry is whether the issue
decided in those cases is identical to the one presented here,
namely, whether a bona fide doubt about the defendant's fitness at
trial and sentencing existed.
	The claim before us in the defendant's first post-conviction
appeal was whether his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing
to obtain a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. But at the core
of the ineffective assistance claim was the issue of whether the
defendant's mental condition warranted examination. In fact, as
we have observed, the defendant's supplemental first post-conviction petition even asserted that a psychiatric evaluation
would have enabled his trial attorneys to make an informed
decision "[w]hether a bona fide doubt existed as to the defendant's
fitness to cooperate with counsel and thus to stand trial." In
rejecting the defendant's ineffective assistance claim, we found
that nothing in the trial record suggested the defendant suffered
from a mental disorder and nothing showed he had a history of
mental illness or emotional disturbance. See Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at
380. Although we did not use the phrase "bona fide doubt," we
decided, in effect, that the record did not contain evidence which
would have cast a doubt on the defendant's fitness.
	This very issue was also decided by the federal courts, without
the veneer of an ineffective assistance claim. The defendant's first
two federal habeas corpus claims addressed his fitness. The
federal district court found no merit to these claims: the defendant
participated in his defense, and he was fit to do so. The federal
court of appeals found our assessment that the post-conviction trial
court lacked a good reason to doubt the defendant's fitness was
"eminently reasonable." Tenner, 184 F.3d  at 614.
	The defendant contends that Dr. Rossiter's 2000 report is
"new evidence," which directly addresses for the first time the
defendant's fitness at trial and sentencing. See Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at
386 (collateral estoppel does not apply if the defendant offers
additional evidence). This position is contrary to the one taken by
the defendant in his supplemental first post-conviction petition.
There, the defendant asserted that Dr. Rossiter's 1994 report
created an apparent doubt about the defendant's competency.
More importantly, Dr. Rossiter's two reports are strikingly similar,
and his findings remain the same. A refashioned psychiatric report
drafted by a psychiatrist obtained by defense counsel, and based on
a "current review" of existing evidence, is not new evidence which
prevents collateral estoppel. We refuse to sanction piecemeal post-conviction litigation by allowing the defendant to gild previously
rejected fitness claims with self-described "new" expert reports.
See People v. White, 198 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784 (1989) ("petitioner
is barred from retrying issues actually litigated and decided in a
collateral proceeding [citation] by rephrasing essentially the same
argument"); cf. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 103 (1999) ("A
petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by rephrasing issues,
which were previously addressed, in constitutional terms").
	As we have previously noted, "It is for this court, and not Dr.
Rossiter, to determine whether there existed a bona fide doubt of
defendant's fitness." People v. Burt, No. 86898, slip op. at 12
(October 18, 2001). This issue has been decided against the
defendant by every court to consider it. We decline to consider it
again. The trial court correctly dismissed claims I and II of the
defendant's second post-conviction petition.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons that we have discussed, we affirm the
judgment of the Cook County circuit court.
Affirmed.



	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:


	I agree that the circuit court's judgment must be affirmed in
this case. I write separately, however, to express my views on
several aspects of today's opinion.
	In addressing claims I and II, the court asserts that while it
would normally examine whether the claims pass the cause and
prejudice test, "these claims require a more nuanced analysis."
Slip op. at 10. The court also states that it need not recognize the
distinction, recognized in federal courts, between procedural and
substantive due process competency claims because the common
question to each is the bona fide doubt issue, which has previously
been decided by both this court and the federal courts. Slip op. at
11. The court concludes that collateral estoppel precludes
defendant from reasserting the issue in this action. Slip op. at 11.
	It appears to me that the court views the issue raised in this
proceeding as the same issue defendant presented in his earlier
state post-conviction proceeding. See slip op. at 12. If this is the
case, I believe that the cause and prejudice test would be
inapplicable since the test is couched in terms of "cause" for the
failure to raise a claim in an earlier proceeding and prejudice
resulting therefrom. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001).
An issue that was previously litigated and is raised anew in a
successive proceeding can never fall under the ambit of the cause
and prejudice test because the issue had, indeed, been raised in the
earlier proceeding. I believe it is this fact which makes the cause
and prejudice test inapplicable in the present case and not the fact
that defendant's competency claims "require" a different analysis.
To that end, I believe that it would behoove this court to
distinguish between "same-claim" successive petitions and "new
claim" successive petitions.(1) New claims, i.e., those never before
raised, are subject to waiver, or more appropriately procedural
default, and would be excused only if the petitioner established
both cause and prejudice for the failure to raise the issue sooner.
On the other hand, same claims, i.e. those issues raised in a
previous post-conviction action, fall prey to the procedural bar of
res judicata. 
	This leads me to comment on whether the issues raised in
defendant's first state post-conviction proceeding collaterally estop
his pursuit of the competency issues in the proceeding at bar.
Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that the issue here is the
same as the issue this court confronted in defendant's first post-conviction action. There, defendant claimed that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial attorney
failed to have defendant's mental condition evaluated prior to trial
for purposes of an insanity defense. According to defendant, such
an evaluation would have revealed that defendant suffered from
mental disorders which could have given rise to a potential
insanity defense or potential mitigation evidence. The circuit court
rejected this claim, dismissing it without an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, we affirmed, holding that there was nothing in
defendant's background which would have or should have
prompted a psychological evaluation to determine defendant's
sanity at the time of the offense. As a result, trial counsel was not
deficient in failing to seek the evaluation. In so holding, we
pointed out that the post-conviction judge, who had also presided
over defendant's trial, specifically stated that " '[i]f there had been
anything that would have suggested [a] psychiatric exam, I
probably would have ordered it sua sponte. I've been known to do
that to satisfy myself as to the mental competency of a defendant
in front of the bench. There's none of that in this record.' "
Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 81. We further held that even if counsel had
been deficient, defendant had not been prejudiced because he
"failed to show that a mental evaluation would have revealed
evidence that could have resulted in his acquittal on grounds on
insanity." Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 382.
	As the foregoing reveals, in the previous case, this court never
considered the issue of defendant's competence to stand trial.
Incompetence at the time of trial is a different question from
insanity at the time of the offense. The latter is concerned with
whether a defendant appreciated the criminality of his or her
conduct and whether the defendant could conform that conduct to
the law at the time of the events in question. In contrast, questions
as to fitness to stand trial address whether, at the time of trial, a
defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings and to
assist in his or her defense. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993). In my view, our previous
decision did not speak to the question of competency to stand trial.
Instead our analysis was confined to the issue of whether counsel
was ineffective for failing to have defendant undergo a psychiatric
examination for a potential insanity defense. Although aspects of
our discussion touched upon defendant's demeanor during trial
proceedings, we made these observations in the course of
assessing whether trial counsel should have investigated the
possibility of mounting an insanity defense. We did not speak
specifically to the question of whether a bona fide doubt as to
competency existed.
	I note that the court points to a supplemental petition, filed by
defendant in his first state post-conviction petition, in which
defendant alleged that a psychiatric evaluation would have enabled
his trial attorneys to make "an informed decision" about his fitness
to stand trial. Slip op. at 2. My review of the record, however,
reveals that neither the post-conviction judge nor this court
addressed the matter of fitness in any depth. In fact, when
defendant asserted his competency claims in federal court, the
State raised the procedural bar of default, arguing that defendant
had failed to raise the matter in state court. The federal district
court, however, refused to enforce the bar, specifically noting that
incompetency claims are never subject to procedural default.
Tenner v. Gilmore, No. 97-C-2305 (N.D. III. October 8, 1998).
The fact that the State argued procedural default, coupled with the
district court's assertion of an exception to the procedural default
bar, leads me to conclude that neither the State nor the district
judge believed that the precise issue had ever been given a full
hearing in the state courts. Under these circumstances, I am
reluctant to hold that the issue decided in the first post-conviction
is "identical" to the issue presented in the case at bar.
	Nevertheless, I believe that the federal courts have spoken
definitively on the issues raised by defendant in the proceeding at
bar and that the decisions of the federal courts collaterally estop
defendant from litigating the matters anew in our state courts.
Defendant argues that Dr. Rossiter's 2000 report is new evidence
that prevents collateral estoppel from applying. Dr. Rossiter's
report, however, does not constitute new evidence-it is not based
on any recent evaluations of defendant nor does it present any new
facts regarding defendant's behavior at the time of trial. In fact,
Dr. Rossiter does not even opine that defendant was unfit at the
time of trial. Rather, he contends that defendant "was more likely
than not unfit to stand trial in March 1990." In my view, this
conclusion, based on a current review of existing evidence, does
not rise to the level necessary to preclude the application of
collateral estoppel.
	 
	 
1.      1This distinction is recognized by the federal courts in habeas corpus
proceedings. See J. Liebman &amp; R. Hertz Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure §28.2b (3d ed. 1998). Although the doctrine of
res judicata does not bar successive petitions on habeas corpus, the
United States Supreme Court has allowed the federal habeas courts to
consider dismissing a petition when the same claims have been
previously raised in an earlier federal habeas corpus proceedings and
the ends of justice would not be served by relitigation. See Wong Doo
v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 68 L. Ed. 999, 44 S. Ct. 524 (1924);
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 68 L. Ed. 989, 44 S. Ct. 519 (1924).
Congress codified the Court's holding in 1948, and in 1963 the Supreme
Court construed the provision. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148, 83 S. Ct. 1068 (1963). Same-claim petitions are
barred only if (i) the same ground presented in the subsequent case was
determined adversely to the petitioner in the first proceedings, (ii) the
previous determination was on the merits, and (iii) the ends of justice
would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent petition.
J. Liebman &amp; R. Hertz  Federal Habeas Corpus Practice &amp; Procedure
§28.2b (3d ed.1998).