Title: Taylor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 321, 2002, 344, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 14, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MILTON E. TAYLOR,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§ Nos. 321 & 344, 2001
§        Consolidated
v.
§
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ of the State of Delaware in and for
§ New Castle County 
Plaintiff Below,
§ Cr. A. No. IN00-04-0180 and
Appellee.
§ Cr. ID No. 0003016874
Submitted: November 4, 2002
Decided:
April 30, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices and
HARTNETT, Justice, (Retired),* constituting the Court En Banc.
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire (argued) and Todd E. Conner, Esquire, Assistant
Public Defenders, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire (argued), Thomas E. Brown, Esquire, and
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
WALSH, Justice:
________________
*Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 38 and 29 Del. C. § 5610.
2
This is an appeal from the Superior Court following the imposition of a death
sentence.  The appellant, Milton Taylor (“Taylor”), was convicted of Murder in the
First Degree for causing the death of his girlfriend, Theresa Williams (“Williams” or
the “Victim”).  During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously found the
existence of two aggravating factors: that the Victim was pregnant, and that Taylor
had previously been convicted of violent felonies.  The jury determined by a vote of
ten to two that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances.  The trial judge concurred with the jury’s determinations and sentenced
Taylor to death.  This appeal followed.  
Taylor raises three issues in this appeal.  First, Taylor claims that the unfolding
and reading of a confession letter, discovered during an inventory search, violated his
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Next, Taylor asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), rendered Delaware’s death penalty statute
unconstitutional, and as such, his death sentence must be reversed.  Finally, Taylor
argues that the imposition of the death sentence in this case was disproportionate to
similar sentences in similar cases.  We find that Taylor’s claims of error lack merit,
and accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
1  Williams was the single mother of four children.  Her two older children were apparently
at school during this time.  
3
I.
On the morning of March 23, 2000, Steven Butler (“Butler”), a maintenance
worker at the Compton Townhouse complex in Wilmington, was awaiting the arrival
of some contractors when he discovered two unattended children playing in the
courtyard.  He recognized the children, ages two and four, as those belonging to
Williams.1  Before he left to supervise the contractors, Butler instructed the children
to stay away from the street until their mother came outside to join them.  
Williams and her sister, Tawana Ricks (“Ricks”), previously planned to do
some shopping together that morning, but Williams never arrived at the predetermined
location.  When Ricks could not reach her sister by telephone she decided to visit
Williams’ home.  Ricks arrived at the Compton Townhouse complex and discovered
her sister’s two youngest children, unsupervised and playing in the vicinity of her
sister’s home.  As Ricks was knocking on the locked door to Williams’ home,
Nathaniel Henry (“Henry”), Williams’ uncle, arrived to deliver some furniture.  Ricks
and Henry grew increasingly concerned as their attempts to locate Williams failed.
Butler then joined Ricks and Henry.  Upon Ricks’ urging, Butler agreed to open
Williams’ door.  Once inside, Butler and Henry discovered Williams’ badly beaten
2  The parties stipulated that Taylor was not the biological father of the fetus removed from
Williams’ body.  
3  A “flyer” had been passed around the station-house with Taylor’s picture and a description
of the events of March 23, 2000.
4  Initially, Taylor gave the officers a false name.  He was taken into custody without
incident, however, and apparently said to the officers “you know what this is about, just put the cuffs
on me.”
4
and bloody body concealed beneath a blanket with a bicycle on top.  Williams was
bleeding from her nose and had a cord wrapped around her neck.  Williams was not
breathing and Butler called 911.  Williams was pronounced dead at the scene.  An
autopsy later revealed that Williams was strangled, beaten and cut.  The autopsy also
revealed that Williams was pregnant, and that the baby died as a result of Williams’
death.2  
Taylor was identified as a suspect in the murder when police learned that he had
a relationship with Williams and that he had been seen in the vicinity of her home on
the morning of March 23, 2000.  On March 25, 2000 the police received a tip that
Taylor was standing at a pay phone on the corner of 9th and Madison Streets.  The
police responded to the tip and placed Taylor under arrest.  Although the arresting
officers were aware that Taylor was wanted for questioning in regard to Williams’
murder,3 the purpose for the arrest was an outstanding bench warrant.4
At the police station, Taylor was taken to an interview room where Officer
Ronald Muniz (“Muniz”) began routine inventory procedures.  Muniz removed a
5  The confession read in pertinent part:
My name is Milton E. Taylor, I was born on 11-15-68, my Social Security
number is 222-52-1649.  I am wanted by the Wilmington police for the murder of
Theresa Irene Williams a.k.a. Treety.
I confess that I did kill Treety and left Terrel and her daughter outside
because I couldn’t hurt either one of them.  After I strangled her I stuck a long
kitchen knife in her mouth and cut something in her throat.
***
The parties stipulated that Taylor wrote the Confession Letter.   
5
folded piece of paper from the front pocket of Taylor’s hooded sweatshirt and placed
it on the table.  Shortly thereafter, Detective James Diana (“Diana”) entered the room,
picked up the piece of paper, opened it and began to read it.  He quickly realized that
the paper contained a handwritten confession (the “Confession Letter”)5 and therefore
removed the letter from the other inventoried items so that it could be included as
evidence. 
The Confession Letter provided the basis for a search warrant for the Victim’s
car which was found parked on a street in New Castle.  Inside the car the police found
a thirteen-inch knife wrapped in a bloodstained tee shirt.  The blood on the shirt
matched the Victim’s blood type.  During the investigation it became clear that the
apparent motive for the murder was that Taylor’s current girlfriend had given him an
ultimatum: end all contact with Williams or lose the current girlfriend.  Taylor had
6
apparently gone to see Williams to end contact with her and killed her in the process.
Taylor did not testify at trial, nor did he offer any witnesses.  
The trial court instructed the jury on both First and Second Degree Murder, but
denied the defense request for an instruction on Manslaughter.  On March 31, 2001,
the jury found Taylor guilty of First Degree Murder.  At the penalty phase, the jury
found, by votes of 12 to 0 respectively, the existence of two statutory aggravating
factors: that the Victim was pregnant, and that Taylor had previously been convicted
of violent felonies.  The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 10 to 2, and
after careful, independent consideration, the trial judge accepted the jury’s
recommendation and sentenced Taylor to death.     
II.
We review “Constitutional claims de novo to determine if the trial court
committed an error of law.”  Fink v. State, 2003 Del. LEXIS 92, * 14 (Del. Feb. 21,
2003) (citing Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 375 (Del. 1999)).  We also review the
trial judge’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo since the factual basis for the
claim is undisputed.  Id.  In essence, Taylor argues that by unfolding the Confession
7
Letter and reading it the police exceeded the scope of the inventory search, and thus
violated the strictures of the Fourth Amendment which is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Accordingly, Taylor argues that the trial judge
erred by admitting the Confession Letter.  We disagree.
A routine inventory search is a well-defined exception to the warrant
requirement, and thus does not violate the United States Constitution.  See Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976)).  In addition to ensuring officer safety, such routine procedures for the
inventory of property also protect the police against claims of “theft, vandalism, or
negligence[,]” and also ensure that such property will be safe while in police custody.
See generally Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987).  Indeed, the  United
States Supreme Court has held that “it is not ‘unreasonable’ for police, as part of the
routine procedure for incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or
article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures.”
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648 (footnote omitted). 
As the Superior Court noted, the Wilmington Police Department’s detailed
written policies concerning inventory searches provide for the “seizing, cataloging and
storing [of] an arrested person’s...papers[.]” State v. Taylor, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS
103, *4 (Mar. 20, 2001).  Although these procedures do not expressly provide for the
8
reading of papers seized during a routine inventory search, we conclude that the
reading of such papers is necessary to properly catalogue and store the item.
Additionally, we agree with the trial judge that the weight of authority permits police
officers to read papers they seize during an inventory search.  Id. at *6 n.1.
Accordingly, we find that the trial judge properly denied the motion to suppress the
Confession Letter.          
III.
Based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), Taylor challenges the constitutionality of his sentence which was
imposed under the 1991 version of Section 4209.  We resolved this issue in Brice v.
State, 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003), and on the basis of Brice, we have rejected
challenges similar to those advanced here by Taylor.  See Norcross 816 A.2d 757
(Del. 2003); Reyes, 2003 Del. LEXIS 170, * (Mar. 25, 2003).  We continue to adhere
to our decision in Brice with regard to the issues raised by Ring.     
At the close of the State’s case, the prosecutor read into the record a number of
stipulations entered into by the parties.  Most important among these – for purposes
of the finding of an aggravating circumstance under Section 4209 – was the fact that
6  The actual stipulation as read into the record states that: “the defendant is excluded as the
biological father of the fetus removed from Theresa Williams.”  In addition to this stipulation, the
autopsy report as testified to by the Medical Examiner revealed that Williams was pregnant.
9
the Victim was pregnant at the time of her death.6  Accordingly, this aggravating
factor was established, beyond a reasonable doubt, at the guilt phase, and Taylor was
not entitled to a separate finding of this aggravating factor at the penalty phase.
Indeed, to require the jury to find the existence of a fact stipulated to by the parties,
would cause unnecessary confusion and could lead to absurd results.  The State also
submitted evidence at the penalty phase of Taylor’s previous convictions of violent
felonies in 1994.  Just as an aggravating circumstance that is stipulated to by the
parties may not produce a different result at the penalty phase, the fact of prior
convictions of violent felonies, when submitted to the jury in a reliable format, may
not lead to a contrary finding by the jury at the penalty phase.
It is important to note that the jury was not instructed that by its verdict at the
guilt phase it had established an aggravating circumstance as required by Section
4209.  Cf. Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. 2003) (“The jury was instructed,
as required by 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(2), that a statutory aggravating factor had been
established by its verdict that the murder was committed during an attempted Robbery
First Degree.”).  Nevertheless, the jury was instructed that when the parties stipulate
7  In his instructions to the jury during the penalty phase, the trial judge stated, “I also remind
you that the comments of counsel are not evidence but simply argument.  The only exception to this
is where the lawyers stipulate or agree that certain evidence is true.”  As previously noted, the
parties stipulated that Taylor was not the biological father of the fetus removed from the victim’s
body.  The effect of this stipulation was an admission that the victim was in fact pregnant.
10
to the existence of a fact, that fact is established beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Accordingly, the jury’s 12 to 0 findings of the aggravating factors in this case satisfy
Ring, and also satisfy Delaware’s unanimity requirement with respect to reasonable
doubt.  The jury’s findings were therefore the functional equivalent of performing its
duties in the narrowing phase consistent with  Ring and the standards announced by
this Court in Brice.
IV.
We are called upon by statute to independently review Taylor’s sentence in
order to determine whether: (1) the evidence supports a finding of at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance; (2) the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily or
capriciously; or (3) the sentence is disproportionate when compared to similar cases.
See 11 Del. C. § 4209(g)(2); accord Reyes v. State, 2003 Del. LEXIS 170, *31 (Mar.
25, 2003).  
11
A.
In this case, there is no doubt that the evidence supports the finding of the
statutory aggravating circumstances.  The parties stipulated that the Victim was
pregnant, and Taylor had previously been convicted of various violent felonies.  See
11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(p), (i).
B.
Furthermore, the imposition of the death penalty in this case was not arbitrary
or capricious.  After carefully weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 10 to 2.  Likewise, the trial judge
carefully considered the evidence, as well as the jury’s recommendation, and
sentenced Taylor to death.  See State v. Taylor, 2001 WL 1456688, * (Del. Super. July
5, 2001).  
Among the mitigating circumstances considered by the trial judge were that
Taylor was most likely abused as a child, that he has family members who love him
and will miss him when he is gone, and that he “holds himself responsible for the
killing and he attempted an apology” for the murder of Williams.  Id. at *4.  Against
these mitigating circumstances, and in addition to the statutory aggravating
circumstances noted above, the trial judge considered the brutal nature of the crime,
8  Taylor argues that his death sentence is invalid because he “waived” his opportunity to
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial.  As discussed above, however, the
trial court considered evidence of mitigation, and thus Taylor’s argument is unpersuasive.  We do
not agree with Taylor that “meaningful proportionality review” is impossible because he “waived”
his opportunity to offer additional evidence of mitigation.  
9  Of course, as we often note in our statutory review of death sentences under Section 4209,
a “definitive comparison of the ‘universe’ of cases is almost impossible.”  See, e.g., Pennell, 604
A.2d at 1376.
12
the impact of the murder on the Victim’s family, Taylor’s “atrocious criminal record”
and the unlikelihood of his rehabilitation in prison.  Id. *2-4.
The trial judge concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances, and he imposed the death penalty.  Because this finding is
“the product of a deliberate, rational and logical deductive process” it is neither
arbitrary nor capricious.  Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298, 310 (Del. 1992) (citing
Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1992)).8
C.
Finally, we must compare the imposition of the death penalty in this case to the
“universe” of death penalty cases in order to ensure9 the proportionality of the
sentence.  We have compared Taylor’s sentence with other First Degree Murder cases
that have proceeded to a death penalty hearing.  See, e.g., Red Dog, 616 A.2d at 311
10  “Cases governed by the 1991 amendment to Section 4209 are most persuasive, but earlier
cases may still be considered.”  Lawrie v. State, 634 A.2d 1336, 1350 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1048 (1994).
11   See Appendix A attached.
12  Taylor urges that Antonio Taylor is strikingly similar to his case, and thus the imposition
of the death penalty in his case is disproportionate.  We disagree.  The defendant in Antonio Taylor
was found to have committed the murder under “extreme emotional distress,” Antonio Taylor, 685
13
(citations omitted).10  In particular, we “look[] to the factual background of relevant
cases to determine the proportionality of the sentence imposed.”  See, e.g., Clark v.
State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Del. 1996) (citation omitted).11  After careful review, we
determine that imposition of the death penalty in this case is proportionate with the
penalties imposed in similar cases.
As with other defendants sentenced to death in Delaware, Taylor was found
guilty of the unprovoked, cold-blooded killing of a defenseless person.  E.g. Norcross,
816 A.2d at 769; Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 677 (Del. 2001); Zebroski v. State,
715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998); Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996); Weeks v. State,
653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 823 (Del. 1994); Dawson v.
State, 637 A.2d 57, 68 (Del. 1994); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 950-951 (Del.
1994); Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 343 (Del. 1993).  Furthermore, this case is
similar to other cases where the victim was a current or former lover.  See Capano,
781 A.2d at 677; Weeks, 653 A.2d at 274;  Gattis, 637 A.2d at 823; but see Taylor
(Antonio) v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996) (“Antonio Taylor”).12   The manner of
A.2d at 350, whereas here no such argument was made.  Although the death penalty may have been
warranted in Antonio Taylor, the qualitative nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
are distinguishable.  See Capano, 781 A.2d at 678. 
14
death inflicted in this case was extremely brutal with the victim being strangled as
well as stabbed and left to die under circumstances precluding discovery and the
chance of medical assistance.  Accordingly, Taylor’s case is substantially similar to
other cases where the death penalty was imposed, and we therefore hold that the
imposition of the death penalty in this case was proportionate.
V.
After careful review of the record in this matter, we conlcude that the
imposition of the death penalty in this case is appropriate under Section 4209 of title
11 of the Delaware Code.  Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court sentencing
Taylor to death for the murder of Theresa I. Williams is AFFIRMED.  Pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 18, the time within which a motion for reargument may be filed
in this matter is shortened to seven days from the date of this Opinion.
HARTNETT, Justice (Retired) concurring:
15
I disagree that it was proper for the jury to have found by less than a unanimous
vote that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  See
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2001); Article I § 4 and Article IV § 19 of the
Delaware Constitution.  However, I recognize that this Court’s ruling in Brice v. State,
815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003), is binding until set aside, and I therefore concur in the
result herein.
16
Milton E. Taylor v. State, Nos. 321 and 344, 2001, Opinion Decided April 30, 2003;
Supplement on Motion for Reargument.
On Motion for Reargument
     Submitted: May 7, 2003
     Decided:    May 14, 2003
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 18, Appellant Milton Taylor (“Taylor”) filed
a motion for reargument on May 7, 2003 from this Court’s opinion affirming his death
sentence.  Taylor (Milton) v. State, 2003 Del. LEXIS 262, * (April 30, 2003).  Upon
review of Taylor’s motion, we conclude that he is indeed correct that the Court’s
opinion misconstrues the circumstances surrounding the life sentence imposed in
Taylor (Antonio) v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996) (hereinafter Antonio Taylor).  
We stated that “[Antonio Taylor] was found to have committed the murder
under ‘extreme emotional distress,’...whereas here no such argument was made.”
Taylor, 2003 Del. LEXIS 262, *17 n.12 (emphasis supplied).  The portion of Antonio
Taylor that we relied upon provides in pertinent part: “At trial, Taylor’s position was
that he had stabbed Young while acting under the influence of extreme emotional
distress, which reduced his crime from intentional murder to manslaughter.”  Antonio
Taylor, 685 A.2d at 350.  In fact, the jury rejected the notion that Antonio Taylor
acted under extreme emotional distress, and accordingly convicted him of Murder
First Degree.  Id. at 349.  
17
This distinction does not alter the result in this case.  The fact remains that the
“qualitative nature” of the mitigating evidence presented in Antonio Taylor caused the
jury in that case to impose a life sentence.  While certain aspects of emotional distress
are implicit in both cases because both killings occurred in a domestic setting,  the mix
of mitigating evidence was different here and the jury concluded that it did not
outweigh the aggravating factors.  Moreover,  Antonio Taylor is of limited value for
comparative purposes because it was a case  in which the death penalty was not
imposed and  thus was  not, itself,  the subject  of a proportionality  analysis by this
Court.  We adhere to our view that the death sentence imposed in this case meets the
standard of proportionality.  Accordingly, Taylor’s motion for reargument is
DENIED.        
*The universe of cases prior to 1991 is set forth in appendices to prior opinions by this Court,
and those appendices are incorporated herein by reference. See, e.g., Lawrie v. State, Del. Supr., 643
A.2d 1336, 1352-56 (1994).
18
APPENDIX A*
Name:
Meri-Ya C. Baker
Criminal ID:
90011925DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 360, 1992, 1993 WL 557951, Holland, J. 
(Dec. 30, 1993)
Name:
Jermaine Barnett
Criminal ID:
9506017682
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life (following second penalty hearing)
Decision on appeal:
749 A.2d 1230 (2000) (remanding for new sentencing)
Name:
Hector S. Barrow
Criminal ID:
9506017661
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life (following second penalty hearing)
Decision on appeal:
749 A.2d 1230 (2000) (remanding for new sentencing)
Name:
Tyreek D. Brown
Criminal ID:
9705011492
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 314, 1998, 1999 WL 485174, Hartnett, J. (Mar. 1,
1999)
19
Name:
Justin L. Burrell
Criminal ID:
9805012046
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
766 A.2d 19 (2000)
Name:
Luis G. Cabrera
Criminal ID:
9703012700
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
747 A.2d 543 (2000)
Name:
Thomas J. Capano
Criminal ID:
9711006198
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
781 A.2d 556 (2001)
Name:
James B. Clark, Jr.
Criminal ID:
9406003237
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
672 A.2d 1004 (1996)
Name:
Charles M. Cohen
Criminal ID:
90001577DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No direct appeal taken
Name:
James T. Crowe, Jr.
Criminal ID:
9508008979
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 333, 1997, 1998 WL 736389, Walsh, J. (Oct. 8, 1998)
20
Name:
David F. Dawson
Criminal ID:
88K00413DI
County:
New Castle (venue changed)
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
637 A.2d 57 (1994)
Name:
Curtis Demby
Criminal ID:
9412011308
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:
744 A.2d 976 (2000)
Name:
Byron S. Dickerson
Criminal ID:
90011926DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 353, 1992, 1993 WL 541913, Veasey, C.J. (Dec. 21,
1993)
Name:
Cornelius E. Ferguson
Criminal ID:
91009926DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
642 A.2d 772 (1994)
Name:
Donald Flagg
Criminal ID:
9804019233
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No direct appeal taken
Name:
Robert A. Gattis
Criminal ID:
90004576DI
County:
New Castle
21
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
637 A.2d 808 (1994)
Name:
Arthur Govan
Criminal ID:
92010166DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 363, 1993, 1995 WL 48359, Walsh, J. (Jan. 30, 1995)
Name:
Robert W. Jackson, III
Criminal ID:
92003717
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
684 A.2d 745 (1996)
Name:
David Jones
Criminal ID:
9807016504
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
798 A.2d 1013 (2002)
Name:
Mark A. Kirk
Criminal ID:
9612002650
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 532, 1997, 1999 WL 415802, Berger, J. (Apr. 29,
1999)
Name:
David J. Lawrie
Criminal ID:
92K03617DI
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
643 A.2d 1336 (1994)
22
Name:
Thomas M. Magner
Criminal ID:
9509007746
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 224, 1997, 1998 WL 666726, Walsh, J. (July 29, 1998)
Name:
Frank W. Moore, Jr.
Criminal ID:
92S03679DI
County:
Sussex
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 214, 1993, 1994 WL 202289, Holland, J. (May 9,
1994)
Name:
Adam Norcross
Criminal ID:
0002006278
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
816 A.2d 757 (2003)
Name:
Jack F. Outten
Criminal ID:
92000786DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
650 A.2d 1291 (1994)
Name:
James W. Perez
Criminal ID:
93001659
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 207, 1993, Moore, J. (Feb. 3, 1994)
Name:
James Allen Red Dog
Criminal ID:
91001754DI
County:
New Castle
23
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
616 A.2d 298 (1992)
Name:
Luis Reyes
Criminal ID:
9904019329
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
2003 WL 1617920 (Mar. 25, 2003)
Name:
Jose Rodriguez
Criminal ID:
93001668DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 466, 1993, 1994 WL 679731, Walsh, J. (Nov. 29,
1994)
Name:
Richard Roth
Criminal ID:
9901000330
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
788 A.2d 101 (2001)
Name:
Reginald N. Sanders
Criminal ID:
91010161DI
County:
New Castle (venue changed)
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment (following 1992 resentencing)
Decision on appeal:
585 A.2d 117 (1990) (remanding for new sentencing)
Name:
Nelson W. Shelton  
Criminal ID:
92000788DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
652 A.2d 1 (1995)
24
Name:
Steven W. Shelton
Criminal ID:
92000787DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
650 A.2d 1291 (1994)
Name:
Donald J. Simmons
Criminal ID:
92000305DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No direct appeal taken
Name:
Brian David Steckel
Criminal ID:
9409002147
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
711 A.2d 5 (1998)
Name:
Willie G. Sullivan
Criminal ID:
92K00055
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
636 A.2d 931 (1994)
Name:
Ralph Swan
Criminal ID:
0002004767
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
2003 WL 1869609 (Apr. 9, 2003)
Name:
Antonio L. Taylor
Criminal ID:
9404018838
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
25
Decision on appeal:
685 A.2d 349 (1996)
Name:
Charles H. Trowbridge
Criminal ID:
91K03044DI
County:
Kent
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No. 234, 1995, 1996 WL 145788, Veasey, C.J. (Mar. 4,
1996)
Name:
James W. Virdin
Criminal ID:
9809015552
County:
Kent 
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
780 A.2d 1024 (2001)
Name:
John E. Watson
Criminal ID:
91008490DI
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
No direct appeal taken
Name:
Dwayne Weeks  
Criminal ID:
92010167
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
653 A.2d 266 (1995)
Name:
Joseph Williams
Criminal ID:
9809018249
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Life
Decision on appeal:
2003 WL 1740469 (Apr. 1, 2003)
Name:
Roy R. Williamson
26
Criminal ID:
93S02210DI
County:
Sussex
Sentence:
Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal:
669 A.2d 95 (1995)
Name:
Jermaine M. Wright
Criminal ID:
91004136
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death 
Decision on appeal:
671 A.2d 1353 (1996)
Name:
Craig A. Zebroski
Criminal ID:
9604017809
County:
New Castle
Sentence:
Death
Decision on appeal:
715 A.2d 75 (1998)
27