Title: State v. Ventris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S49981
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 2004

FILED:  August 19, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JOSEPH R. VENTRIS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 96-1155; CA A110810; SC S49981)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 3, 2004.
Marc D. Blackman and Kendra M. Matthews, of Ransom Blackman
LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review. 
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  Janet A. Metcalf
filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
and Balmer, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Gillette, J., dissented and filed an opinion which Carson,
C.J., joined.
*Appeal from Columbia County Circuit Court, Steven B. Reed, Judge. 183 Or App 99, 50 P3d 1274 (2002).
**De Muniz and Kistler, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
In this criminal matter, we are asked to decide whether
a finding under the aggravated murder statute, ORS 163.095(2)(d),
that defendant personally and intentionally killed the victim
requires us to conclude as a matter of law that a conviction for
"murder" based on the same event necessarily is a conviction for
intentional murder, ORS 163.115(1)(a), rather than for felony
murder, ORS 163.115(1)(b).  The question matters in this case,
because defendant faces the possibility of a longer sentence if
his conviction was for intentional murder.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted
defendant of robbery, murder, and two counts of aggravated
murder.  By concluding that defendant had committed aggravated
murder, the trial court implicitly found that defendant had
committed the murder personally and intentionally in the course
of a robbery.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
aggravated murder convictions based on an evidentiary ruling,
affirmed the convictions for murder and robbery, and remanded. 
State v. Ventris, 164 Or App 220, 991 P2d 54 (1999) (Ventris I). 
On remand, the state dropped the aggravated murder charges, and
the trial court sentenced defendant solely for felony murder and
robbery.  The state appealed defendant's sentence, and the Court
of Appeals again reversed, concluding that the trial court's
previous finding of intentionality required, as a matter of law,
that the murder conviction be treated as a conviction for
intentional murder rather than felony murder.  State v. Ventris,
183 Or App 99, 50 P3d 1274 (2002) (Ventris II).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review.  We now conclude that, under the
applicable murder statutes, a finding of intentional conduct as
an element of an aggravated murder conviction does not require
that a separate conviction for murder be treated as intentional
murder and that, in this case, the trial court's findings and the
evidence demonstrate a conviction for felony murder rather than
intentional murder.
The Court of Appeals recounted the facts as follows:
"This case arises from the murder of Vergil Crist
in Scappoose during the early morning hours of August
10, 1996.  Crist's apartment had been burglarized, and
the autopsy showed that he had been beaten on the head
and chest with a rod and stabbed 13 times.  Crist died
as a result of the stab wounds.  Circumstantial
evidence suggested that defendant had been involved in
the crime, and, ultimately, investigating officers
recovered a pair of defendant's pants that bore traces
of Crist's blood.  Thereafter, defendant confessed that
he and two unnamed accomplices had entered Crist's
apartment; that, when Crist surprised them, he had hit
Crist in the head with the metal rod; that he had run
away from the apartment, leaving his cohorts behind;
and that, when he returned 20-30 minutes later, he did
not see Crist but that his accomplices gave him a knife
with some blood on it, which he discarded, and a wallet
with cash.  Defendant insisted that he did not stab
Crist and was not present when Crist was stabbed."
Id. at 101-02 (internal citations omitted).
The indictment charged defendant with six counts of
aggravated murder, including two counts alleging that he
personally and intentionally had committed homicide in the course
of committing first-degree burglary and first-degree robbery. 
See ORS 163.095(2)(d) (defining one kind of aggravated murder). 
The indictment also charged defendant with one count of "murder"
under ORS 163.115, (1) one count of first-degree robbery under
ORS 164.415, and one count of first-degree burglary under ORS
164.225.  The murder count in the indictment stated that
defendant "unlawfully and intentionally cause[d] the death of
another human being," thus suggesting that it alleged intentional
murder under ORS 163.115(1)(a), rather than felony murder under
ORS 163.115(1)(b).  However, the indictment cited only ORS
163.115 and did not refer to a specific subsection or paragraph.
Pursuant to an agreement with the state, defendant
waived a jury trial.  After a bench trial, the trial court
announced its findings of the facts of the crime.  The court
concluded that defendant had entered the victim's apartment to
steal his belongings.  At the time of the entry, defendant was
intoxicated.  Defendant encountered the victim in the apartment,
the two struggled, and defendant stabbed the victim multiple
times.  Tests revealed that the blood on defendant's pants was
the victim's.  The trial court rejected defendant's claim that he
had entered the apartment with any accomplices and that the
accomplice or accomplices had killed the victim.
The trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of
aggravated murder, one count of murder, and one count of
first-degree robbery.  The trial court explained its reasoning in
oral findings:
"It does not make sense to me that [defendant]
would fail to name [accomplices] when his statement to
Detective McBride simply amounts to a confession to a
charge of Felony Murder.  * * *  I don't believe there
were two friends with [defendant].  I believe that
[defendant] was the sole intruder into Mr. Crist's
apartment and I believe that [defendant] killed Mr.
Crist.
"* * * * *
"In summary, I believe that [defendant] entered
Mr. Crist's apartment for the purpose of committing
theft which amounts to Burglary in the First Degree. 
When he encountered Mr. Crist he overcame Mr. Crist's
resistance to that theft by killing Mr. Crist.  The
commission of a killing during the commission of both
the burglary and then a robbery.
"I do not believe, based on the evidence, that
[defendant] killed Mr. Crist either for the purpose of
concealing his identity or to conceal the commission of
burglary or the robbery.  Count One, Aggravated Murder. 
Short version, a killing committed in the course of
committing Robbery in the First Degree, guilty.
"Count Two, Aggravated Murder, killing committed
in the course of committing Burglary in the First
Degree, guilty.
"* * * * *
"Count Seven, Murder, guilty.
"Count Eight, Robbery in the First Degree,
guilty."
The resulting judgment of conviction merged the robbery
count into the aggravated-murder count that was based on the
first-degree robbery and merged the murder count into the
aggravated-murder count that was based on the first-degree
burglary.  The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of
imprisonment for a minimum of 30 years.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had
erred in denying a motion to suppress certain evidence seized
from defendant and also had erred in excluding evidence that
would have pointed to another perpetrator's role in the murder
and thus would have undermined the trial court's implicit finding
that defendant committed the aggravated murder personally and
intentionally.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  Specifically, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to
suppress, but it reversed the convictions for aggravated murder,
holding that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence that
might have tended to suggest that another perpetrator was
responsible for the murder.  Ventris I, 164 Or App at 231-32,
234.  The Court of Appeals noted that defendant did not challenge
the convictions for robbery or murder, id. at 222 n 2, and
reversed the convictions for aggravated murder, affirmed the
convictions for murder and robbery, and remanded for further
proceedings, id. at 234.
On remand, the state did not seek to retry defendant on
the aggravated murder charges; instead, the state requested that
the trial court sentence defendant on the murder and robbery
convictions because the Court of Appeals had affirmed those
convictions.  The state and defendant, however, differed as to
whether the resulting robbery and murder sentences would run
concurrently or consecutively.  The state argued that the court
had convicted defendant of intentional murder, ORS 163.115(1)(a),
and that the murder and robbery sentences should run
consecutively.  See ORS 137.123 (explaining circumstances under
which trial court may impose sentences consecutively).  In
contrast, defendant argued that the trial court had convicted him
of felony murder, ORS 163.115(1)(b), based on a lesser-included
offense of robbery and that, as a result, the robbery conviction
would merge into the felony murder conviction, and the trial
court should sentence him solely on that conviction.  See former
ORS 161.062(1) (1997), repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 136, § 1
(setting out general rules of merger).  See also State v.
Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278-80, 779 P2d 600 (1989) (describing how
lesser-included offense merges into greater offense).
The judge who had presided over the bench trial also
acted as the sentencing judge on remand.  At sentencing, he
remarked that his understanding of the nature of the murder
conviction had been consistent.  "I believe it was felony murder,
* * * felony aggravated murder," according to the trial court:
"I firmly believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
this fact scenario started off its terrible life as a
burglary, that precipitated into a robbery, that
precipitated into a homicide.  * * *  I did find, and I
still believe, that the homicide that you committed,
Mr. Ventris, was felony murder.  It occurred in the
course of this robbery.  As a result[,] I believe, I
firmly believe, that the Robbery in the First Degree
conviction that I also found is clearly a lesser
included offense of the murder conviction I also
reached."
The judgment and sentencing order entered after remand
stated:
"That at trial this Court found that defendant had
engaged in conduct which consisted of entry into
victim's home to commit theft, that is a burglary; that
this burglary escalated into a robbery against the
victim; that the robbery escalated into a homicide
against the victim.
"That the finding of these facts to be true
requires that this Court treat the crime of Murder as
plead in Count 7 as a felony Murder.  That Robbery in
the First Degree, as set forth in Count 8, is a lesser
included offense of Murder, as set forth in Count 7.
"That the Robbery in the First Degree conviction
must, as a matter of law, merge into the Murder
conviction.  That because the Robbery in the First
Degree conviction merges into the Murder conviction as
a matter of law, this Court cannot consider sentencing
those two counts consecutively."
Because the convictions for murder and first-degree robbery were
merged under former ORS 161.062, the trial court sentenced
defendant to a single term of 25 years' imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, with lifetime post-prison supervision.
The state appealed, arguing that the trial court had
erred in merging the murder and first-degree robbery convictions. 
The murder conviction was for intentional murder, according to
the state, because the trial court originally had made a finding,
for the purposes of the aggravated murder conviction, that
defendant had acted intentionally.  As a result, in the state's
view, the trial court should have imposed separate and
consecutive sentences for the murder and robbery convictions,
rather than merging them.  Defendant, however, argued that the
trial court properly had concluded that the murder conviction was
for felony murder and, therefore, properly had merged it with the
robbery conviction.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the state that, on
remand, the trial court had "rewrit[ten] history" by
characterizing the murder conviction as one for felony murder and
not intentional murder.  Based on its review of the 1997 trial
record, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's
finding of intentionality required the trial court to treat the
unspecified separate count for murder as intentional murder:
"[W]ith due respect for the trial court, it
altered history when it characterized its original
finding of guilt as being one of felony murder, not
intentional murder.  Although, as acknowledged below,
the court's effort in that regard may very well have
been an understandable response to our reasoning in
Ventris I, the record does not support such a reading. 
The record of the May 1997 court trial is explicit: 
The court expressly found that defendant, and not some
third party, killed Crist.  The court specifically
found defendant guilty of murder based on Count 7 of
the indictment, which pleaded 'intentional' murder. 
Further, in convicting defendant of aggravated murder
on Counts 1 and 2, the court necessarily found that the
underlying murder was intentional.  Thus, when the
court found defendant guilty of murder following the
court trial -- the 'conviction' that we affirmed in
Ventris I -- that finding was one of intentional
murder, not felony murder.  That was, and is, the
reality."
Ventris II, 183 Or App at 111 (footnote omitted; emphasis in
original).
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the murder
conviction was a conviction for intentional murder rather than
felony murder, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Ventris II
that the analysis in its prior opinion, Ventris I, was internally
inconsistent.  183 Or App at 111-13.  Ventris I had reversed the
convictions for aggravated murder because of the trial court's
failure to admit evidence that might have tended to show that
defendant did not commit the murder personally and intentionally,
and had affirmed the separate murder conviction without
characterizing it as either intentional or felony murder.  Later,
Ventris II characterized that murder conviction as a conviction
for intentional murder.  Based on the reasoning in Ventris II, it
is apparent that Ventris I affirmed a conviction for intentional
murder that was based on a record from which competent evidence
had been excluded -- evidence, indeed, that the court in Ventris
I stated "went to the very core of defendant's defense" that he
did not personally commit the homicide.  Ventris I, 164 Or App at
232.  The Court of Appeals observed that it would not "pretend"
that its resolution of the issue was "clear, or even satisfying." 
Ventris II, 183 Or App at 112.  However, it placed the risk of
any ambiguity in its decision in Ventris I on defendant, because
defendant, in its view, could have clarified the nature of the
convictions by seeking reconsideration from the Court of Appeals
or review in this court.  Ventris II, 183 Or App at 112-13.  The
Court of Appeals thus reversed the trial court's decision to
merge the murder and robbery convictions.  Id. at 113.
The thrust of the state's argument is that, when a
defendant's indictment alleges that the defendant "intentionally
cause[d]" the death of the victim and the trial court finds
intentional conduct for purposes of aggravated murder under ORS
163.095(2)(d), the trial court must treat any murder count based
on the same underlying conduct as intentional murder under ORS
163.115(1)(a), rather than felony murder under ORS
163.115(1)(b). (2)  To evaluate that assertion, we must
consider the statutory definitions of murder. 
The statutory scheme describes murder as a form of
criminal homicide that occurs when, "without justification or
excuse, the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with
criminal negligence causes the death of another human being." 
ORS 163.005(1).  Criminal homicide encompasses murder,
manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide.  ORS 163.005(2). 
The murder statutes distinguish between "ordinary" murder and
murder that is accompanied by specified aggravating
circumstances.  See ORS 163.115 (murder); ORS 163.095 (aggravated
murder).  Ordinary murder has three subcategories:  intentional
murder, felony murder, and murder by abuse.  ORS 163.115(1). 
This case does not involve murder by abuse.  We now turn to the
statutory definitions of murder that are relevant to this case.
Intentional murder is defined as murder committed
intentionally:  "[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder:  When it
is committed intentionally * * *."  ORS 163.115(1)(a).
Felony murder is a form of murder that is committed
during the course of certain enumerated crimes, including
burglary and robbery: (3)
"[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder:  * * *
When it is committed by a person, acting either alone
or with one or more persons, who commits or attempts to
commit any of the following crimes and in the course of
and in furtherance of the crime the person is
committing or attempting to commit, or during the
immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another
participant if there be any, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants:
"* * * * *
"(C) Burglary in the first degree as defined in
ORS 164.225;
"* * * * *
"(G) Robbery in the first degree as defined in ORS
164.415."
ORS 163.115(1)(b). 
Aggravated murder is defined as "murder as defined in
ORS 163.115, which is committed under, or accompanied by"
statutorily defined aggravating circumstances regarding the
nature of the crime, the defendant, or the victim(s). (4)  In
other words, any of the forms of murder under ORS 163.115 --
intentional murder, felony murder, or murder by abuse -- can
become aggravated murder when the circumstances of the murder
include one or more of the specified additional elements set out
in ORS 163.095.  One form of aggravated murder is a felony murder
that is committed "personally and intentionally":
"'[A]ggravated murder' means murder as defined in
ORS 163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied
by, any of the following circumstances: 
"* * * * *
"Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(1)(b) [i.e., felony
murder], the defendant personally and intentionally
committed the homicide under the circumstances set
forth in ORS 163.115(1)(b)."
ORS 163.095(2)(d).
Nothing in the foregoing statutes requires that, if a
court finds that a defendant is guilty of aggravated murder
because the defendant acted personally and intentionally under
ORS 163.095(2)(d), such a finding also requires the court to
treat a concurrent murder charge under ORS 163.115 as intentional
murder.  Rather, under the pertinent murder statutes, a judge or
jury could find that a defendant had engaged in intentional
conduct as part of an aggravated murder conviction under ORS
163.095(2)(d) and also find the defendant guilty of felony murder
under ORS 163.115(1)(b), if those findings were supported by the
evidence.
Defendant argues that the definition of the type of
aggravated murder described in ORS 163.095(2)(d) logically and
systematically builds upon the elements that provide the
foundation for a conviction for felony murder under ORS
163.115(1)(b).  As previously explained, ORS 163.095(2)(d)
requires that the defendant personally and intentionally
committed the homicide under the circumstances set out in ORS
163.115(1)(b), the felony murder statute.  Although the statute
does not use the term, defendant is correct when he informally
characterizes aggravated murder under ORS 163.095(2)(d) as
"aggravated felony murder," because it consists of felony murder
with the additional aggravating circumstance of having been
committed personally and intentionally.  We agree with defendant
that ORS 163.095(2)(d) and ORS 163.115(1)(b) fit together in a
coherent relationship, with the additional finding of the
aggravating circumstances transforming felony murder into
aggravated murder.  By contrast, the type of aggravated murder
described in ORS 163.095(2)(d) does not have the same
relationship with intentional murder.  ORS 163.095(2)(d)
specifically mentions and incorporates the definition of felony
murder, but it makes no corresponding reference to the definition
of intentional murder under ORS 163.115(1)(a), although it does
refer to the element of intent.
Defendant's statutory argument, of course, does not
mean that if a defendant is convicted of "aggravated felony
murder," a concurrent "murder" conviction necessarily is a
conviction for felony murder, rather than intentional murder. 
Indeed, one ordinarily would expect that a conviction for
aggravated murder, which requires a finding that the defendant
"personally and intentionally" committed the murder, would lead
the judge or jury, in considering a separate nonaggravated murder
charge, to find the defendant guilty of intentional murder,
rather than felony murder.  However, the statutes discussed above
do not require that result; rather, they permit the jury or judge
to convict the defendant of either felony murder or intentional
murder.
With that statutory context in mind, we return to the
issue in this case.  We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred
in asserting that the trial court's finding of intentional
conduct under ORS 163.095(2)(d) and its verdict of "guilty" on
the murder count in the indictment, which stated that defendant
acted "intentionally," necessarily required the court to
characterize the murder conviction as intentional murder under
ORS 163.115(1)(a).  Rather, the trial court findings that
satisfied the elements of ORS 163.095(2)(d) could support a
conviction for intentional murder under ORS 163.115(1)(a) or a
conviction for felony murder under ORS 163.115(1)(b).  In light
of our understanding of the operation of the statutes, the murder
conviction set out in the original judgment of the trial court is
and remains ambiguous.  That conviction could be for either
intentional murder or felony murder, because the evidence adduced
at trial satisfied the elements of both crimes.
We therefore turn to the trial court's findings and
judgment to determine the nature of the murder conviction.  We
first consider several threshold issues regarding what materials
we properly may review in making that determination and what
standard of review we must apply.  Defendant argues that we must
accept the trial court's comments on remand after Ventris I that
the trial court had intended to convict defendant of felony
murder as findings of historical fact.  Defendant argues that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court had no
authority to revisit its findings and judgment.  We do not reach
defendant's argument regarding the effect of the trial court's
hearing after remand, because, as we discuss below, we conclude
from our review of the trial court's initial findings and the
judgment and sentencing order of June 6, 1997, that defendant's
conviction was for felony murder.
As for the standard of review, we note that different
standards apply to different determinations that the trial court
made.  In this, as in other cases, we review the factual findings
that the trial court made following trial to determine whether
the record supports those findings.  A trial court finding
supported by the record is binding on an appellate court.  State
v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993).  Here, we content
ourselves to rely on the findings that the trial court made
following trial.  Ordinarily, we review a trial court's legal
conclusions for errors of law.  Here, however, the dispute
between the parties centers not on the legal ruling that the
trial court made after remand in merging defendant's murder and
robbery convictions, but rather on the predicate for that ruling,
namely, the trial court's characterization of defendant's murder
conviction as being one for felony murder rather than for
intentional murder. (5)
Turning to the trial court's findings and orders
following trial, we find no reference to "intentional" murder. 
In the June 6, 1997, judgment and sentencing order, the trial
court noted that it had found defendant guilty of "aggravated
murder," "murder," and "robbery in the first degree."  In merging
certain of those convictions, the court stated:  "Count 8
(Robbery in the First Degree) should merge, for purposes of
conviction, into Count 1 (Aggravated Murder based on commission
of Robbery in the First Degree).  Count 7 (Murder) should merge,
for purposes of conviction, into Count 2 (Aggravated Murder based
on commission of Burglary in the First Degree)."  Those
references demonstrate that the trial court viewed the evidence
as establishing that defendant killed the victim in the course of
committing a felony.  
To find defendant guilty of aggravated murder, of
course, the trial court necessarily had to find that defendant
"personally and intentionally" had killed the victim, but nothing
in the text of the judgment and sentencing order suggests that
the "murder" conviction was for intentional murder instead of
felony murder.  Rather, the court's findings support the
conclusion that it found the defendant guilty of felony murder. 
The court noted that defendant's statement to one of the
detectives who testified at trial "simply amounts to a confession
to a charge of felony murder."  The trial court further pointed
out that the crime began as a burglary and escalated into a
homicide -- "[t]he commission of a killing during the commission
of both the burglary and then a robbery."  The words that the
trial court used to describe the crime fit more closely with the
characterization of the murder conviction as one for felony
murder under ORS 163.115(1)(b) than for intentional murder under
ORS 163.115(a).  Indeed, in its brief to this court, the state
agrees that "the trial court steadfastly believed that it had
convicted defendant of felony murder."  We therefore conclude
that defendant's conviction for murder was a conviction for
felony murder.  Moreover, we note that this court previously
resolved a similar ambiguity over whether a "murder" conviction
was for felony murder or intentional murder in favor of the
defendant.  See State v. Fish, 282 Or 53, 57, 577 P2d 500 (1978)
(ambiguous jury verdict for "murder" resolved in favor of
defendant).  Accordingly, on remand after Ventris I, the trial
court correctly sentenced defendant based on the crimes for which
he was convicted.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
GILLETTE, J., dissenting.
This case presents a simple issue, which the majority states this way:
"[W]e are asked to decide whether a finding under the aggravated murder statute, ORS 163.095(2)(d), that defendant personally and intentionally killed the victim requires us to conclude as a matter of law that a[n accompanying] conviction for 'murder' based on the same event necessarily is a conviction for intentional murder, ORS 163.115(1)(a), rather than for felony murder, ORS 163.115(1)(b)."
___ Or at ___ (slip opinion at 1).  I accept that statement, with the additional note that the indictment in this case specifically alleged that defendant had committed the murder "intentionally."  And, as so accepted, the answer is inescapable:  Of course, the conviction was for "intentional" murder.  
The majority, however, essentially asserts that, despite the fact that the trial court, by definition, originally must have found that defendant personally and intentionally killed the victim, and despite the further fact that the indictment in this case alleged in the accompanying murder count that defendant committed that murder "intentionally," defendant's conviction under that count was for felony murder only.  But, absent an express declaration at the time by the trier of fact (here, the trial court) that the conviction on the murder count was, instead, for felony murder -- and any trial court's explanation of the mental gymnastics underlying such a verdict would have been interesting to read - I see no logical (or even permissible) way to read the judgment that was entered against defendant as being for anything other than intentional murder.  The majority labors long and honorably to prove otherwise, but I am unpersuaded. 
For the reason that I have expressed, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's contrary conclusion.
Carson, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
1. 
As we explain below, an indictment for "murder" under
"ORS 163.115," without reference to the subsections and
paragraphs of that statute, is ambiguous as to the particular
type of murder the indictment charges.  ORS 163.115 contains
subparts defining intentional murder, ORS 163.115(1)(a), felony
murder, ORS 163.115(1)(b), and murder by abuse, ORS
163.115(1)(c), each of which is a distinct theory of murder.
2. 
It is true that, here, the indictment alleged that the
murder was committed intentionally.  However, the parties agree
that the evidence, rather than the indictment, determines the
nature of a murder conviction.  See, e.g., State v. Earp, 250 Or
19, 26-27, 440 P2d 214, cert den, 393 US 891 (1968) (affirming
first-degree murder conviction proved under theory of felony
murder, despite indictment charging premeditated murder).
3. 
Although the statute does not use the term "felony
murder," this court has used the term as a shorthand reference
for at least 47 years.  See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 209 Or 595,
618-19, 308 P2d 182 (1957) (illustrating point).  The concept of
finding a defendant guilty of murder for a homicide committed in
the course of another crime long has been a feature of Oregon
criminal law.  See General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch LIII, §
502, p 527 (Deady 1845-64) ("If any person shall * * * in the
commission or attempt to commit any rape, arson, robbery or
burglary, kill another, such person shall be deemed guilty of
murder in first degree.").
4. 
Aggravating circumstances that cause a murder to be
"aggravated murder" include:  murder-for-hire and soliciting
murder-for-hire, ORS 163.095(1)(a), (b); repeat offender, ORS
163.095(1)(c); murder resulting in multiple victims, ORS
163.095(1)(d); murder occurring during maiming or torture, ORS
163.095(1)(e); intentional murder of a child under 14, ORS
163.095(a)(f).  Other aggravating factors include:  the identity
of the victim, ORS 163.095(2)(a) (e.g., law enforcement officer,
judicial officer, or juror); the method of murder, ORS
163.095(2)(c) (use of explosives); or the motive, ORS
163.095(2)(e) (murder committed to conceal another crime or to
conceal identity of perpetrator).
5. 
The Court of Appeals also viewed the issue that way. 
Ventris II, 183 Or App at 101.