Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MARCEL R RIDDLE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118181
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2002

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118181  
MARCEL R. RIDDLE,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave in this case to consider whether  
defendant is entitled to the reversal of his convictions of  
second-degree murder1 and possession of a firearm during the  
commission of a felony (felony-firearm)2 on the ground that  
1MCL 750.317.  
2MCL 750.227b.  
the trial court denied his request for a jury instruction that  
he was not required to retreat before exercising deadly force  
in self-defense while in his yard.  We affirm.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The prosecution contends that Michigan law generally  
imposes a “duty to retreat” upon a person who would exercise  
deadly force in self-defense, and that the so-called “castle  
doctrine”–providing an exception to this duty to retreat when  
a person is attacked within his dwelling–does not extend to  
the area outside the dwelling.  Defendant, on the other hand,  
contends that the castle doctrine should be extended to the  
curtilage and that he was not required to retreat when he was  
assaulted in his backyard.  
Because Michigan’s case law has become somewhat confused  
with respect to the concepts of retreat and the castle  
doctrine, 
we 
take 
this opportunity to clarify these principles  
as they apply to a claim of self-defense. We reaffirm today  
the following, according to the common-law principles that  
existed in Michigan when our murder statute was codified.  
As a general rule, the killing of another person in self­
defense by one who is free from fault is justifiable homicide  
if, under all the circumstances, he honestly and reasonably  
believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great  
bodily harm and that it is necessary for him to exercise  
2  
 
 
 
  
 
deadly force.3  The necessity element of self-defense normally  
requires that the actor try to avoid the use of deadly force  
if he can safely and reasonably do so, for example by applying  
nondeadly force or by utilizing an obvious and safe avenue of  
retreat.4  
There are, however, three intertwined concepts that  
provide further guidance in applying this general rule in  
certain fact-specific situations.  First, a person is never  
required to retreat from a sudden, fierce, and violent attack;  
nor is he required to retreat from an attacker who he  
reasonably believes is about to use a deadly weapon.5 
In  
these circumstances, as long as he honestly and reasonably  
believes that it is necessary to exercise deadly force in  
self-defense, the actor’s failure to retreat is never a  
consideration when determining if the necessity element of  
self-defense is satisfied; instead, he may stand his ground  
and meet force with force.6  That is, where it is uncontested  
3See People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502-503; 456 NW2d 10  
(1990) (opinion by RILEY, C.J.); People v Lennon, 71 Mich 298,  
300-301; 38 NW 871 (1888).  
4Pond v People, 8 Mich 150, 176 (1860); People v Doe, 1 
Mich 451, 455-456 (1850).  
5Doe, supra at 455-456; People v Macard, 73 Mich 15, 21­
22; 40 NW 784 (1888).  
6People v Kuehn, 93 Mich 619, 621-622; 53 NW 721 (1892);  
Macard, supra at 21-22; Brownell v People, 38 Mich 732, 738 
(1878); People v Lilly, 38 Mich 270, 276 (1878); Patten v  
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
 
  
that the defendant was the victim of a sudden and violent  
attack, the Court should not instruct the jury to consider  
whether retreat was safe, reasonable, or even possible,  
because, in such circumstances, the law does not require that  
the defendant engage in such considerations.7  
Second, 
Michigan 
law 
imposes 
an 
affirmative 
obligation 
to  
retreat upon a nonaggressor8 only in one narrow set of  
circumstances: A participant in voluntary mutual combat will  
not be justified in taking the life of another until he is  
deemed to have retreated as far as safely possible.9 
One who  
6(...continued) 
People, 18 Mich 313, 330-331 (1869).  
7See Beard v United States, 158 US 550, 564; 15 S Ct 962; 
39 L Ed 1086 (1895), stating that the victim of a sudden and 
violent attack is “not obliged to retreat, nor to consider 
whether he could safely retreat . . . .”  
Where, on the other hand, a factual issue has been 
presented 
for 
the 
jury’s 
resolution 
concerning 
the  
circumstances under which the defendant used deadly force—as 
is true in the case at bar—the jury should be instructed 
concerning all relevant principles for which evidentiary 
support exists.  
8We are not concerned in this case with the use of deadly 
force by one who is an initial aggressor (i.e., one who is the 
first to use deadly force against the other), as such a person 
is generally not entitled to use deadly force in self-defense. 
See Heflin, supra at 502-503; People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 
218 NW2d 136 (1974); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), pp 
1121, 1129-1133. The principles articulated in this opinion 
apply solely to those who are otherwise privileged to exercise 
deadly force in self-defense.  
9See People v Lenkevich, 394 Mich 117, 120-121; 229 NW2d 
298 (1975); Pond, supra at 174-175.  
4  
 
is involved in a physical altercation in which he is a willing  
participant–referred to at common law as a “sudden affray” or  
a “chance medley”–is required to take advantage of any  
reasonable and safe avenue of retreat before using deadly  
force against his adversary, should the altercation escalate  
into a deadly encounter.  
Third, regardless of the circumstances, one who is  
attacked in his dwelling is never required to retreat where it  
is otherwise necessary to exercise deadly force in self­
defense.  When a person is in his “castle,” there is no safer  
place to retreat; the obligation to retreat that would  
otherwise exist in such circumstances is no longer present,  
and the homicide will be deemed justifiable.  This is true  
even where one is a voluntary participant in mutual combat.10  
Because there is no indication that this “castle doctrine”  
extended to outlying areas within the curtilage of the home at  
the time of the codification of our murder statute, however,  
we decline defendant’s invitation to extend the doctrine in  
this manner; we hold instead that the doctrine is limited in  
application to the home and its attached appurtenances.11  
10See Pond, supra at 176.  
11We specifically do not address whether a person may 
exercise deadly force in defense of his habitation, and our 
holding should not be misconstrued to sanction such use of 
force as it pertains to the defense of one’s habitation. 
Rather, we hold only that a person is not obligated to retreat 
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
 
  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
On the evening of August 15, 1997, defendant and two  
friends, Robin Carter and James Billingsley, convened at  
defendant’s home.  The three men were in the backyard just  
outside defendant’s house, in the driveway near a detached  
garage, when defendant shot Carter in the legs eleven times  
with an automatic carbine rifle.
 After shooting Carter,  
defendant immediately drove to the Detroit River, where he  
disposed of the rifle. Carter, who did not have a weapon in  
his possession, was resuscitated at the scene but died as a  
result of the gunshot wounds three days later.  
Although the facts in the preceding recitation are  
undisputed, at defendant’s trial on charges of first-degree  
murder12 and felony-firearm the prosecution and the defense  
presented different versions of the events leading to the  
shooting. 
Billingsley testified for the prosecution that  
after Carter made a disparaging comment about defendant’s  
fiancée, defendant went into the house, came back outside  
armed with a rifle, and began firing at Carter. Billingsley  
stated that Carter was not armed and did not approach  
11(...continued) 
in his dwelling or its attached appurtenances before  
exercising deadly force in self-defense if he honestly and 
reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm. See n 3.  
12MCL 750.316.  
6  
 
 
defendant when he came out of the house with the weapon.  
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he intervened in  
an argument between Carter and Billingsley and that he told  
Carter, whom he considered to be “the more aggressive one,” to  
leave.  Seeing a “dark object” in Carter’s hand and believing  
it to be a gun, defendant immediately reached for his rifle,  
which he testified was in his detached garage.  Defendant  
stated that he aimed the rifle at Carter’s legs and pulled the  
trigger, intending only to scare him.  
Defendant 
requested 
that 
the 
jury 
be 
instructed, 
pursuant  
to CJI2d 7.17, that there is no duty to retreat in one’s own  
home before exercising self-defense.13
 The prosecution  
objected, contending that the instruction was not appropriate  
because the shooting took place outside the home, in the  
curtilage.
 Although defendant attempted to withdraw his  
request for CJI2d 7.17, the trial court proceeded to rule that  
the 
instruction 
was 
not appropriate under the circumstances of  
13CJI2d 7.17 provides:  
If a person [assaulted the defendant in the 
defendant’s own home / forcibly entered the  
defendant’s home], the defendant did not have to 
try to retreat or get away. 
Under those  
circumstances, the defendant could stand [his] 
ground and resist the [attack / intrusion] with as 
much force as [he] honestly and reasonably believed 
necessary at the time to protect [himself].  
7  
 
  
the case.14 
The trial court instead instructed the jury, in  
accordance with CJI2d 7.16, as follows:  
By law, a person must avoid using deadly force 
if he can safely do so.  If the defendant could  
have safely retreated but did not do so, you can 
consider that fact along with all the other  
circumstances when you decide whether he went 
farther in protecting himself than he should have.  
However, 
if 
the 
defendant 
honestly 
and  
reasonably 
believed 
that 
it 
was 
immediately 
necessary to use deadly force to protect himself 
from an [imminent] threat of death or serious 
injury, the law does not require him to retreat. 
He may stand his ground and use the amount of force 
he believes necessary to protect himself.[15]  
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense of  
second-degree murder and guilty as charged of felony-firearm.  
In his appeal before the Court of Appeals, defendant  
argued that the trial court improperly denied his request for  
a “no duty to retreat” instruction.  The Court of Appeals  
panel examined this Court’s decisions in Pond v People, 8 Mich  
150 (1860), and People v Lilly, 38 Mich 270 (1878), and held  
that defendant had a duty to retreat if safely possible before  
exercising deadly force to repel an attack unless he was  
inside his dwelling or an inhabited outbuilding within the  
curtilage.  
Because 
the shooting occurred within the curtilage  
14We assume, therefore, for purposes of this opinion that 
defendant’s claim of error was properly preserved, despite 
counsel’s offer to withdraw the request for CJI2d 7.17.  
15The jury was also given the general self-defense 
standard jury instruction, CJI2d 7.15.  
8  
 
but not in an inhabited outbuilding, the panel opined, the  
trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that  
defendant had no duty to retreat.  Unpublished opinion per  
curiam, issued October 13, 2000 (Docket No. 212111).  
We granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether  
the trial court committed error requiring reversal in denying  
defendant’s request to instruct the jury concerning the lack  
of a duty to retreat.  465 Mich 884 (2001). 
Because we  
conclude that the trial court did not err, we affirm  
defendant’s convictions.  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We are required in this case to determine under what  
circumstances a defendant must retreat before exercising  
deadly force in self-defense.  This presents a question of  
law, which we review de novo.  People v Hamilton, 465 Mich  
526, 529; 638 NW2d 92 (2002); People v Layher, 464 Mich 756,  
761; 631 NW2d 281 (2001).  
A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly  
instructed jury consider the evidence against him. People v  
Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 472; 620 NW2d 13 (2000); People v  
Mills, 450 Mich 61, 80-81; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).  When a  
defendant requests a jury instruction on a theory or defense  
that is supported by the evidence, the trial court must give  
the instruction. Rodriguez, supra at 472-473; Mills, supra at  
9  
 
  
 
 
 
81.  However, if an applicable instruction was not given, the  
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the trial  
court’s failure to give the requested instruction resulted in  
a miscarriage of justice.  MCL 769.26; Rodriguez, supra at  
473-474; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 493-494; 596 NW2d 607  
(1999).
 The defendant’s conviction will not be reversed  
unless, after examining the nature of the error in light of  
the weight and strength of the untainted evidence, it  
affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that  
the error was outcome determinative. MCL 769.26; Rodriguez,  
supra at 474; Lukity, supra at 495-496.  
IV. ANALYSIS  
A. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION  
Because Michigan’s homicide statutes proscribe “murder”  
without providing a particularized definition of the elements  
of that offense or its recognized defenses,16 we are required  
to look to the common law at the time of codification for  
guidance.  See Const 1963, art 3, § 7;17 People v Couch, 436  
16The Legislature has bifurcated all murder offenses into 
first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and second-degree murder, 
MCL 750.317.  The statutory description of these offenses has 
changed little since the first Penal Code was enacted in 1846. 
See People v Couch, 436 Mich 414, 418-421; 461 NW2d 683 (1990)  
(opinion by BOYLE, J.).  
17“The common law and the statute laws now in force, not 
repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until 
they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended 
(continued...)  
10  
 
 
Mich 414, 418-421; 461 NW2d 683 (1990).  Where a statute  
employs the general terms of the common law to describe an  
offense, courts will construe the statutory crime by looking  
to common-law definitions. See Couch, supra at 419, quoting  
Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 263; 72 S Ct 240; 96  
L Ed 288 (1952):  
“[W]here [a legislature] borrows terms of art 
in which are accumulated the legal tradition and 
meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 
attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken and the meaning 
its use will convey to the judicial mind unless 
otherwise instructed.  In such case, absence of 
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction 
with 
widely 
accepted 
definitions, 
not 
as 
a  
departure from them.”  
The criminal law, as defined at common law and codified by  
legislation, “should not be tampered with except by  
legislation,” and this rule applies with equal force to  
common-law terms encompassed in the defenses to common-law  
crimes. In Re Lamphere, 61 Mich 105, 109; 27 NW 882 (1886).  
Therefore, because our Legislature has not acted to change the  
law of self-defense since it enacted the first Penal Code in  
1846, we are proscribed from expanding or contracting the  
defense as it existed at common law.18  We therefore apply the  
17(...continued) 
or repealed.”  
18Thus, 
although 
we 
are 
certainly 
not 
oblivious 
to 
various 
policy concerns that might otherwise affect our analysis were 
(continued...)  
11  
  
common law as it was understood when the crime of murder was  
codified to clarify the concepts of retreat and the castle  
doctrine.  
B. SELF-DEFENSE AND RETREAT  
1. GENERALLY APPLICABLE RULES  
At common law, a claim of self-defense, which “is founded  
upon necessity, real or apparent,” may be raised by a  
nonaggressor as a legal justification for an otherwise  
intentional homicide. 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 138, p 609.  
When a defendant accused of homicide claims self-defense,  
[t]he question to be determined is, did the  
accused, under all the circumstances of the  
assault, as it appeared to him, honestly believe 
that he was in danger of [losing] his life, or 
great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to do 
what he did in order to save himself from such  
apparent threatened danger? [People v Lennon, 71 
Mich 298, 300-301; 38 NW 871 (1888).]  
Thus, the killing of another person in self-defense is  
justifiable homicide only if the defendant honestly and  
reasonably believes his life is in imminent danger or that  
there is a threat of serious bodily harm and that it is  
necessary to exercise deadly force to prevent such harm to  
himself.  See People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 672; 482  
NW2d 176 (1991).  
18(...continued) 
we not constrained to apply MCL 750.317 to the facts of the 
case before us, we leave the task of rendering such policy 
judgments to the Legislature.  
12  
 
 
 
We reaffirm today that the touchstone of any claim of  
self-defense, as a justification for homicide, is necessity.  
An accused’s conduct in failing to retreat, or to otherwise  
avoid the intended harm, may in some circumstances–other than  
those in which the accused is the victim of a sudden, violent  
attack–indicate a lack of reasonableness or necessity in  
resorting to deadly force in self-defense.  For example, where  
a 
defendant 
“invites 
trouble” or meets non-imminent force with  
deadly force, his failure to pursue an available, safe avenue  
of escape might properly be brought to the attention of the  
factfinder as a factor in determining whether the defendant  
acted in reasonable self-defense.19  
However, as Judge Cardozo cautioned in People v Tomlins,  
213 NY 240, 245; 107 NE 496 (1914), “[g]eneral statements to  
the effect that one who is attacked should withdraw, must be  
read in the light of the facts that led up to them.”  Thus,  
19See People v Walters, 223 Mich 676, 682-683; 194 NW 538 
(1923) (jury was properly instructed that killing was not 
justifiable if the defendant “renewed the affray” after the 
deceased abandoned it); People v Meert, 157 Mich 93, 95, 100­
101; 121 NW 318 (1909) (opining that the defendant, who 
carried a revolver to a saloon because he “was expecting” that 
he would encounter his victim there, did not act reasonably 
when he walked up to the victim and shot him because “[r]eady 
means of escape were at hand . . . and no danger was to be 
apprehended”); People v Robinson, 152 Mich 41, 47; 115 NW 997 
(1908) (instruction that the defendant, who assaulted a man in 
a barroom, had a duty to “retire” if he could safely do so 
unless he was attacked with a deadly weapon or was in the 
defense of property or others did not constitute error 
requiring reversal because the defendant was in a place of 
perfect safety when he assaulted the victim).  
13  
 
  
 
  
 
 
the generally applicable element of necessity contemplates  
three 
reticulate 
rules that are applicable in certain specific  
factual scenarios.  
2. THREE DEPARTURES FROM THE GENERAL RULE OF NECESSITY  
a. NO DUTY TO RETREAT FROM SUDDEN, VIOLENT ATTACK 
 
Although 
Michigan’s common law that was codified imposes  
a duty to avoid using deadly force, it is clear that retreat  
is 
never 
required 
in 
circumstances similar to those delineated  
in Beard v United States, 158 US 550; 15 S Ct 962; 39 L Ed  
1086 (1895), 
20 the classic American “no duty to retreat” case:  
when a person is violently attacked and it does not reasonably  
appear that it would be safe to retreat.  
The 
statement 
of 
the 
governing 
principles 
of 
self-defense  
as set forth in People v Doe, 1 Mich 451, 456-457 (1850), is  
indicative of the common-law rules that were in place when the  
Legislature 
enacted 
Michigan’s 
murder 
statutes 
just 
four 
years  
earlier. These principles remain apropos today and have not  
20  
[If a] defendant . . . had at the time 
reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith 
believed, that the deceased intended to take his 
life, or do him great bodily harm, he was not  
obliged to retreat, nor to consider whether he  
could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his  
ground, and meet any attack made upon him with a  
deadly weapon, in such way and with such force as, 
under all the circumstances, he, at the moment, 
honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to 
believe, were necessary to save his own life, or to 
protect himself from great bodily injury. [Beard,  
supra at 564 (emphasis supplied).]  
14  
 
been modified since their implicit codification more than 150  
years ago:  
First. That a man who, in the lawful pursuit 
of his business, is attacked by another under 
circumstances which denote an intention to take  
away his life, or do him some enormous bodily harm, 
may lawfully kill the assailant, provided he use  
all the means in his power, otherwise, to save his  
own life or prevent the intended harm; such as  
retreating as far as he can, or disabling his  
adversary without killing him, if it be in his  
[21]  
power. 
Secondly.
 When the attack upon him is so 
sudden, fierce and violent, that a retreat would  
not diminish, but increase his danger, he may  
instantly kill his adversary without retreating at  
all.  
Thirdly. When from the nature of the attack, 
there is reasonable ground to believe that there is 
a design to destroy his life, or commit any felony 
upon his person, the killing of the assailant will 
be 
excusable 
homicide, 
although 
it 
should  
afterwards appear that no felony was intended. 
[Emphasis supplied.]  
The rules of self-defense as provided in Doe state the  
obvious: If it is possible to safely avoid an attack then it  
is not necessary, and therefore not permissible, to exercise  
deadly force against the attacker.  However, one is never  
obliged to retreat from a sudden, fierce, and violent attack,  
because 
under 
such 
circumstances a reasonable person would, as  
a rule, find it necessary to use force against force without  
retreating.  The violent and sudden attack removes the ability  
21Thus, where a threatened attack is not imminent, the 
person 
being 
threatened may not lawfully exercise deadly force 
in self-defense.  
15  
 
 
 
  
to retreat.22  Where immediate danger to life or great bodily  
harm is threatened upon the innocent victim, he “cannot be  
required when hard pressed, to draw very fine distinctions  
concerning the extent of the injury that an infuriated and  
reckless assailant may probably inflict.” People v Brownell,  
38 Mich 732, 738 (1878). As Justice Holmes reasoned in Brown  
v United States, 256 US 335, 343; 41 S Ct 501; 65 L Ed 961  
(1921), “detached reflection cannot be demanded in the face of  
an uplifted knife.”  There, Justice Holmes concluded that “it  
is not a condition of immunity that one in that situation  
should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not  
think it possible to fly with safety . . .” Id., citing Rowe  
v United States, 164 US 546, 558; 17 Sup Ct 172; 41 L Ed 547  
(1896).23  
22To hold that an innocent person has a duty to retreat 
in the face of a violent assault would be tantamount to  
holding such a person “responsible for having brought . . . 
necessity upon himself, on the sole ground that he failed to 
fly from his assailant when he might have safely done so[.]” 
Erwin v State, 29 Ohio St 186, 199 (1876).  Indeed, the 
possibility of safe retreat cannot serve as a factor in 
determining the gravity or mortality of the peril.  To so hold  
would be to require that the assailed “avoid the necessity by 
retreating before his assailant.” Palmer v State, 9 Wy 40; 59 
P 793, 795 (1900).  
23Similarly, 
Wharton stated: “A man can only kill in self­
defense from necessity, whether he has a right to stand his 
ground, or it is his duty to retreat; but in the one case he 
can have that necessity determined in view of the fact that he 
has a right to stand his ground, and on the other hand [where 
he is involved in the sudden affray] he must show, as one 
feature of the necessity, that he has retreated to the wall.” 
(continued...)  
16  
 
  
In People v Macard, 73 Mich 15; 40 NW 784 (1888), this  
Court reaffirmed that Michigan never recognized at common law  
an obligation to retreat from a sudden and violent attack  
before codification.  In Macard, the defendant and his  
neighbor had a history of mutual animosity.  The defendant was  
standing in or near a public road in front of his home when  
his neighbor began advancing toward him from across the  
street, carrying a gun and making threats.  When the neighbor  
continued to advance despite the defendant’s warning that he  
stop, the defendant shot him.  At his trial for murder, the  
defendant asserted self-defense and argued that retreating  
would have exposed him to greater danger.  This Court reversed  
the defendant’s conviction of manslaughter and granted him a  
new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in  
instructing the jury that the defendant was justified in  
shooting “‘[i]f there was no reasonable opportunity or means  
of avoiding what the [defendant] anticipated as an assault  
with this deadly weapon”:  
Go which way [the defendant] would, he would 
only the more surely expose himself to the deadly 
aim of his antagonist.  In such case, about the 
only question for the jury to determine was, did 
the [defendant] in good faith believe this to be 
his true situation?  If he did, the jury should 
have been told [he] was fully justified. . . . To  
hold otherwise would be to destroy the right of 
self-defense. 
It was not necessary for the  
23(...continued) 
Wharton, Homicide (3d ed), § 298, p 478.  
17  
 
 
 
 
 
[defendant], if without fault, on being suddenly  
assaulted by the use of a deadly weapon upon the  
public highway or upon his own premises, to retreat  
before using his weapon. An instant of delay might 
have been at the expense of his life, and the law 
requires no man to run such risks.  [Id. at 21-22  
(emphasis supplied).]  
b. THE DUTY TO RETREAT: SUDDEN AFFRAY OR CHANCE MEDLEY  
Michigan law imposes an affirmative obligation to  
retreat, where safely possible, in one narrow set of  
circumstances: where a defendant–who is not in his “castle”–  
is voluntarily engaged in mutual, nondeadly combat that  
escalates into sudden deadly violence.  This represents the  
only type of situation in which the English common law imposed  
upon a defender an affirmative duty to “retreat to the wall,”  
Pond, supra at 174-175; Erwin, supra at 195; Perkins & Boyce,  
Criminal Law (3d ed), pp 1121-1123, 1126, and it is apparent  
from our case law that Michigan adhered to this rule at the  
time of the codification of our murder statute.  
As explained by Professors Perkins and Boyce, by  
reference to Foster, Crown Law (1762), the use of deadly force  
in self-defense at English common law was considered in light  
of the different positions of the parties involved.  The first  
scenario involved a defendant who was without fault:  
One, entirely free from fault, is the victim  
of an assault which was murderous from the  
beginning. He is under no obligation to retreat . 
. . but may stand his ground, and if he reasonably  
believes it necessary to use deadly force to save  
himself from death or great bodily harm, he is  
18  
 
 
 
  
privileged to do so. [Perkins & Boyce, supra at  
1121 (emphasis supplied).]  
Thus, at common law the innocent victim of a murderous assault  
had no affirmative duty to retreat; instead, if he reasonably  
believed that it was necessary under the circumstances to  
exercise deadly force, he could kill his assailant in self­
defense.
 This rule is consistent with the generally  
applicable rules of self-defense as codified in Michigan’s  
murder statutes, as discussed above.  See Macard, supra at 21­
22; Lennon, supra at 300-301; Brownell, supra at 738; Pond,  
supra at 177-178.  
However, an affirmative obligation to retreat applied to  
a voluntary participant in mutual combat:  
One who was the aggressor in a chance-medley 
(an ordinary fist fight, or other nondeadly 
encounter), or who culpably entered into such an 
engagement, finds that his adversary has suddenly 
and unexpectedly changed the nature of the contest 
and is resorting to deadly force.  This . . . is  
the only type of situation which requires “retreat  
to the wall.”  Such a defender, not being entirely 
free from fault, must not resort to deadly force if 
there is any other reasonable method of saving 
himself.  Hence if a reasonable avenue of escape is 
available to him he must take it unless he is in  
his “castle” at the time. [Perkins & Boyce, supra 
at 1121 (emphasis supplied).]  
Thus, the original concept of a “‘duty to retreat to the wall’  
applied not to the innocent victim of a murderous assault, but  
only to the culpable participant of a chance-medley.” Perkins  
19  
 
 
& Boyce, supra at 1225.24  This principle was recognized by  
this Court in Pond, supra at 175-176:  
In [cases in which a defensive homicide  
occurred in a sudden affray], the original assault 
not being with a felonious intent, and the danger 
arising in the heat of blood on one or both sides, 
the homicide is not excused unless the slayer does 
all which is reasonably in his power to avoid the 
necessity of extreme resistance, by retreating 
where retreat is safe, or by any other expedient 
which is attainable. He is bound, if possible, to 
get out of his adversary’s way, and has no right to 
stand up and resist if he can safely retreat or 
escape.  
Accordingly, we conclude that at the time of the codification  
of our first murder statute in 1846, the common-law rule in  
Michigan 
recognized 
only one instance in which an affirmative,  
specific duty to retreat applied, namely, when the defendant  
was the voluntary participant in mutual combat.25  
c. THE “CASTLE” DOCTRINE  
i. RETREAT IS NOT A FACTOR IN ONE’S DWELLING  
It is universally accepted that retreat is not a factor  
in determining whether a defensive killing was necessary when  
24It appears clear enough to us that “[c]ourts which 
adopted [a] ‘no-retreat rule’ [were] frequently under the 
false 
impression 
that this required departure from the English 
common law.” Perkins & Boyce, supra at 1137.  
25Perkins refers to a third situation that is not relevant  
to the matter at hand: “One who starts an encounter with a  
murderous assault upon another, or who willingly engages in 
mutual combat with malice aforethought . . . has forfeited all 
right of self-defense during that contest.” Perkins & Boyce, 
supra at 1121. That is consistent with the Michigan rule that 
one who is an aggressor may not avail himself of the defense. 
See Heflin, supra at 509. See also n 8.  
20  
   
it occurred in the accused’s dwelling:  
Regardless of any general theory to retreat as 
far as practicable before one can justify turning 
upon his assailant and taking life in self-defense, 
the law imposes no duty to retreat upon one who, 
free from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is 
attacked at or in his or her own dwelling or home. 
Upon the theory that a man’s house is his castle, 
and that he has a right to protect it and those  
within it from intrusion or attack, the rule is  
practically universal that when a person is  
attacked in his own dwelling he may stand at bay 
and turn on and kill his assailant if this is  
apparently necessary to save his own life or to 
protect himself from great bodily harm. [40 Am Jur 
2d, § 167, p 636.]  
The rule has been defended as arising from “‘an instinctive  
feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to  
require a man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his  
own house.’” People v Godsey, 54 Mich App 316, 319; 220 NW2d  
801 (1974) (citations omitted).  Moreover, in a very real  
sense a person’s dwelling is his primary place of refuge.  
Where a person is in his “castle,” there is simply no safer  
place to retreat.  
ii. THE REACH OF THE CASTLE DOCTRINE  
Defendant, who was outside his home in the driveway or  
yard between the home and a detached garage at the time of the  
homicide, contends that he was wholly excused from any  
obligation to retreat because he was in his “castle.”  We  
disagree and hold that the castle doctrine, as it applied in  
this state and as was codified in our murder statute in 1846,  
applies 
solely 
to 
the dwelling and its attached appurtenances.  
21  
Although many courts have extended the castle exception to  
other areas,26 we conclude that there is simply no basis in the  
case law of this state, contemporaneous with the enactment of  
our initial murder statute, to justify extending the rule in  
this manner.  
It is unknown whether the English common law applied the  
castle doctrine–which, as we have noted, was relevant only to  
the voluntary participant in a nondeadly encounter–to areas  
beyond the dwelling.  As noted by Professors Perkins and  
Boyce, “the scope of [the] special privilege granted to one so  
far at fault might have been limited to the actual building  
[but this] is mere speculation.” Id. at 1134-1135. Because  
the only indication we have of the castle doctrine as it  
applied in Michigan at the time of the codification of our  
murder statute is that it applied “in the dwelling,” Pond,  
26The majority of jurisdictions employing the castle 
doctrine have extended the doctrine to the curtilage 
surrounding the home.  See Dressler, Understanding Criminal 
Law (3d ed), § 18.02[C][3], p 228.  The doctrine has also been  
extended in several jurisdictions to numerous areas away from 
the dwelling: cars, businesses, and homes owned by third 
parties, to name a few.  Because the Legislature codified the 
common-law rules as they existed in 1846, this Court has no 
authority 
to 
act 
on 
different 
policy 
determinations 
concerning 
the expansion of the castle doctrine.  Thus, we leave it to 
the Legislature to decide whether there are other places in 
which a defendant’s failure to retreat cannot be considered as  
a factor in determining whether it was necessary for him to 
exercise deadly force in self-defense.  We note that many 
states have legislatively addressed the self-defense and 
retreat issues that are presented in this case.  See, e.g., 
Model Penal Code, § 3.04; Ala Code, § 13A-3-23 (1982); Conn 
Gen Stat, § 53a-19.  
22  
 
 
 
supra at 176 (emphasis supplied), we lack the authority to now  
extend this rule to areas beyond “the dwelling” itself.  
Defendant contends that this Court’s statements in Pond  
indicate that Michigan’s common law extended the castle  
doctrine to the curtilage surrounding the home. However, we  
agree with the prosecution’s contention that Pond did not in  
any way purport to extend the self-defense castle exception to  
the curtilage area surrounding the dwelling.27  With respect  
to self-defense, this Court explained in Pond that  
[t]he danger resisted must be to life, or of 
serious bodily harm of a permanent character; and 
it must be unavoidable by other means. Of course, 
we refer to means within the power of the slayer, 
so 
far 
as 
he 
is 
able 
to 
judge 
from 
the  
circumstances as they appear to him at the time.  
27The Pond Court held that, for the purpose of the 
defendant’s claim that he killed the victim in resisting a 
violent and forcible felony upon a dwelling, an outlying net­
house was “a dwelling or part of the dwelling” of the 
defendant because it was near the dwelling house and was used 
as a permanent dormitory for his servants.  Id. at 181-182; 
see also id. at 164-167. Because this Court considered the  
net-house to be a dwelling not for the purpose of the self­
defense castle doctrine but instead for the purpose of a 
completely different defense, this holding is not relevant to 
our inquiry. Moreover, whether this outlying building would  
have been considered a “dwelling” for the purpose of self­
defense is not an inquiry that aids us in determining whether 
the castle doctrine applies to open areas within the  
curtilage.  Because the Court of Appeals cited Pond for the  
proposition that the self-defense castle exception–providing 
that no person is required to retreat within his dwelling 
before 
exercising 
self-defense–extends 
to 
“inhabited  
outbuildings,” we wish simply to point out that (1) Pond does  
not stand for this proposition and (2) as the case at bar does 
not involve an inhabited outbuilding, we need express no 
opinion concerning whether the castle doctrine would apply to 
such a building.  
23  
 
 
A man is not, however, obliged to retreat if  
assaulted in his dwelling, but may use such means 
as are absolutely necessary to repel the assailant  
from his house, or to prevent his forcible entry, 
even to the taking of life.  But here, as in the 
other cases, he must not take life if he can 
otherwise arrest or repel the assailant. [Emphasis 
supplied.]  
This statement of the castle rule, taken from a case issued  
quite contemporaneously with the enactment of our murder  
statute, provides no basis from which to conclude that the  
rule applied anywhere but “in [the] dwelling,” that is, an  
inhabited building and its attached appurtenances.28  
Pond, therefore, does not allow us to conclude that the  
castle doctrine, so far as it was a part of the common law of  
this state when our murder statute was enacted, extended to  
the 
curtilage 
surrounding the dwelling.  Instead, by providing  
essentially the sole indication, contemporaneous with the  
enactment of the murder statute, concerning whether and to  
what extent any duty to retreat existed in our common law,  
Pond establishes that the castle doctrine applies in this  
State only to a residence.  Thus, for example, while the  
castle doctrine applies to all areas of a dwelling–be it a  
28Contemporaneous dictionary definitions wholly support 
our conclusion.  See, e.g., Worcester, Dictionary of the  
English Language (Brewer and Tileston, 1864), defining 
“dwelling” as “[h]abitation; place of residence; residence; 
abode; dwelling-place”; Webster’s American Dictionary of the  
English 
Language 
(1828) 
(accord); 
The 
Oxford 
English  
Dictionary (1989), providing examples of the usage of the word 
“dwelling” from the years 1340 through 1863 as meaning “[a] 
place of residence; a dwelling-place, habitation, house.”  
24  
 
  
room within the building, a basement or attic, or an attached  
appurtenance such as a garage, porch or deck–it does not apply  
to open areas in the curtilage that are not a part of a  
dwelling.  
Defendant 
additionally 
argues 
that 
Lilly 
provides 
a 
basis  
for extending the castle exception to the curtilage.  In  
Lilly, the defendant was attacked at night on his property in  
a passageway between his house and a new house that he was  
constructing.  The defendant stabbed and killed the attacker,  
a farmhand whom he had recently discharged and who had earlier  
that day threatened the defendant with extreme personal  
violence.
 At the defendant’s trial for murder, the trial  
court instructed the jury as follows:  
“If you find that . . . [the defendant] could 
have saved himself from all serious harm by 
retreating or calling for assistance, and the 
defendant so knew or believed, but that he did not 
do so; but stood his ground and resisted [the 
farmhand], and in such resistance killed [him], 
such killing would not be justifiable or excusable.  
“If 
[the 
defendant] 
believed 
that 
[the 
farmhand] came to his premises on the evening of 
the homicide with the intention of seeking a combat 
with him, and that he sought him for that purpose 
and the defendant so knew, then it was [the 
defendant’s] duty to have avoided [him], and to 
have avoided such combat by all reasonable means 
within his power, and if he chose to stand up and 
resist the assault when he might have avoided it, . 
. . such killing would not be justifiable.”  [Id.  
at 275.]  
This Court set aside the defendant’s conviction for  
manslaughter and ordered a new trial, holding that the jury  
25  
 
 
instructions improperly suggested to the jury that the facts  
would warrant findings that were not supported by the  
evidence, “especially that defendant did not make reasonable  
efforts to avoid deceased and avert his attack.” 
Id.  
Furthermore, this Court held, the instructions were improper  
because they  
indicated to the jury . . . [that] it was incumbent 
upon [the defendant] to fly from his habitation 
where his wife and children were, in order to 
escape danger instead of resisting the aggressor. 
Such is not the law.  The jury should have been 
instructed in effect that if they were satisfied 
that [the defendant] being at his own house had 
reason to believe and did believe from [the 
farmhand’s] previous and present language, manner 
and actions, and what had already taken place, that 
it was necessary to inflict the wounds he did 
inflict . . . to save his own life or to protect 
himself from danger of great bodily harm, he was 
excused.  
. . . The charge was inconsistent with the 
view here explained, and it conveyed the idea that 
if help was within call and that defendant so 
believed, then his act was not lawful self-defense. 
[Id. at 275-276.]  
We do not agree with defendant’s assertion that Lilly  
abrogates the necessity element of self-defense where the  
accused kills an assailant within the curtilage of his  
dwelling.
 Instead, Lilly reaffirms that the fundamental  
inquiry with respect to a claim of self-defense is whether the  
defendant 
reasonably believed that it was necessary to utilize  
deadly 
force 
against 
his aggressor.  Lilly further establishes  
that the defendant was not required to leave his premises–  
26  
 
    
thereby subjecting his wife and children to danger in his  
absence–or to seek aid from third parties. Lilly simply did  
not involve the castle exception.  
In short, there is no basis in our case law for supposing  
that Michigan ever recognized an extension of the doctrine  
beyond the inhabited “dwelling” itself at the time the common­
law rules were codified. Instead, we adhere to this Court’s  
formulation of the doctrine in Pond, supra at 176, that “[a]  
man is not . . . obliged to retreat if assaulted in his  
dwelling” (emphasis supplied). Thus, the castle doctrine is  
relevant only to acts of self-defense that take place in the  
dwelling; the doctrine has no application to “a conflict  
outside the home.”  People v Stallworth, 364 Mich 528, 535;  
111 NW2d 742 (1961).29  
C. APPLICATION  
In this case, defendant requested that the jury be  
instructed in accordance with CJI2d 7.17, which is titled “No  
Duty to Retreat While in Own Dwelling” and which provides that  
a person assaulted in his own home does “not have to try to  
29Accordingly, in Stallworth, this Court held that the 
jury’s rejection of the defendant’s claim of self-defense, 
resulting in a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, was not 
against the great weight of the evidence where there was 
testimony that the killing took place on the sidewalk outside 
the 
defendant’s 
dwelling: 
This 
testimony 
portrayed 
“a 
conflict 
outside the home where it would have been possible for the 
jury to conclude that defendant might have retreated to avoid  
further trouble.” Id. at 535 (emphasis supplied).  
27  
 
retreat or get away,” but may “stand his ground and resist the  
attack.”
 The trial court denied defendant’s request and  
instead instructed the jury in accordance with CJI2d 7.16,  
which is titled “Duty to Retreat to Avoid Using Deadly Force.”  
We hold that defendant was not entitled to the requested  
instruction.  Defendant was not in his dwelling or an attached  
appurtenance when he killed Carter. He was outside his home  
in the yard.  
Nevertheless, as we have explained, defendant was  
entitled to an instruction that adequately conveyed to the  
jury that he was not required to retreat if it was necessary  
for him to exercise deadly force under the circumstances as  
they reasonably appeared to him.  While we suggest that CJI2d  
7.16 be revised to further comport with the principles  
expressed in this opinion, the language of the instruction  
accurately conveyed to defendant’s jury that the baseline  
inquiry is necessity:  
By law, a person must avoid using deadly force 
if he can safely do so.  If the defendant could  
have safely retreated but did not do so, you can 
consider that fact along with all the other  
circumstances when you decide whether he went 
farther in protecting himself than he should have.  
However, 
if 
the 
defendant 
honestly 
and  
reasonably 
believed 
that 
it 
was 
immediately  
necessary to use deadly force to protect himself  
from an [imminent] threat of death or serious  
injury, the law does not require him to retreat. 
He may stand his ground and use the amount of force 
he believes necessary to protect himself.  
28  
This 
instruction 
was 
properly given under the circumstances of  
this case. 
Pursuant to this instruction, the jury was  
permitted 
only 
to 
consider whether defendant could have safely  
retreated under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared  
to him.  The second portion of this instruction further  
emphasized that there is never a duty to retreat if the  
accused reasonably and honestly believes that he is in  
imminent harm and that it is necessary to exercise deadly  
force.30  Moreover, the jury was given a comprehensive general  
self-defense instruction (CJI2d 7.15) that further explained  
the 
relevant 
principles and additionally permitted the jury to  
“consider how the excitement of the moment affected the choice  
the defendant made” in exercising deadly force.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 We hold that the cardinal rule, applicable to all claims  
of self-defense, is that the killing of another person is  
30There might be circumstances in which an instruction 
permitting the jury to consider a defendant’s failure to 
retreat would be improper; for instance, if the defendant was 
inside his dwelling when he was attacked or if the undisputed 
evidence established that he was suddenly and violently 
attacked.  See, e.g., Macard, supra. 
In such a case there  
would be no basis for an instruction allowing the defendant’s 
failure to retreat to be considered in determining whether he 
acted in lawful self-defense.  In the instant case, the 
parties disputed whether defendant had any reason whatsoever 
to believe that he was in danger.  Thus, it was properly 
within the province of the jury to determine whether defendant 
honestly and reasonably believed that it was necessary to 
exercise deadly force.  
29  
 
 
justifiable homicide if, under all the circumstances, the  
defendant honestly and reasonably believes that he is in  
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it is  
necessary for him to exercise deadly force.  As part and  
parcel of the “necessity” requirement that inheres in every  
claim of lawful self-defense, evidence that a defendant could  
have safely avoided using deadly force is normally relevant in  
determining whether it was reasonably necessary for him to  
kill his assailant.  However, (1) one who is without fault is  
never obligated to retreat from a sudden, violent attack or to  
retreat when to do so would be unsafe, and in such  
circumstances, the presence of an avenue of retreat cannot be  
a factor in determining necessity; (2) our law imposes an  
affirmative “duty to retreat” only upon one who is at fault in  
voluntarily participating in mutual nondeadly combat; and (3)  
the “castle doctrine”  permits one who is within his dwelling  
to exercise deadly force even if an avenue of safe retreat is  
available, as long as it is otherwise reasonably necessary to  
exercise deadly force.    
Defendant was not entitled to a “castle exception”  
instruction in this case because he was in his yard and not in  
his dwelling when he used deadly force.  However, defendant  
was entitled to an instruction that adequately conveyed to the  
jury that, although he was required to avoid using deadly  
force if possible, he had no obligation to retreat if he  
30  
 
honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent  
danger of great bodily harm or death and that it was necessary  
to use deadly force in self-defense.  The standard jury  
instruction 
that 
was 
given 
adequately 
imparted 
these  
principles.  Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court  
of Appeals in part and affirm defendant’s convictions for the  
reasons expressed in this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with YOUNG, J.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred in the result only.  
31