Title: LaCava v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 110711
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2012

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
PATRICIA MARIE LACAVA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 110711 
  
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     March 2, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
  
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in denying Patricia Marie LaCava’s motion to extend the 
time for filing transcripts under Rule 5A:8(a). 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
LaCava was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Alexandria of two counts of embezzlement, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-111.  On September 13, 2010, the court entered final 
judgment sentencing her to a term of three years’ imprisonment 
on each count, to run concurrently, and suspended the sentence 
for a period of two years subject to conditions. 
Though represented by counsel at trial, LaCava commenced 
her appeal pro se.  She filed a timely notice of appeal and 
contacted the court reporter to order transcripts of the trial 
proceedings.  The court reporter informed her that it was the 
policy of the clerk of court to order transcripts directly for 
pro se litigants.  However, the court reporter did not realize 
that LaCava had been represented by counsel at trial and 
therefore the clerk would not order her transcripts directly.  
 
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LaCava, relying in good faith on the court reporter’s 
information, believed that the clerk had ordered the 
transcripts and filed them with the record. 
LaCava subsequently secured representation by appellate 
counsel, who discovered that the transcripts had not been filed 
within the 60-day period required by Rule 5A:8(a).  Counsel 
promptly obtained the transcripts and filed them by hand, 
together with the notice of filing transcripts required by Rule 
5A:8(b), on November 17, 2010.  Counsel also served the 
Commonwealth’s attorney with the transcripts and notice of 
filing transcripts by hand the same day. 
On December 10, 2010, counsel filed a “Motion to Extend 
Deadline for Filing Transcript” (“the Motion”) in the Court of 
Appeals under Rule 5A:8(a), which states in pertinent part that 
that the 60-day period for filing transcripts “may be extended 
by a Judge of the Court of Appeals only upon a written motion 
filed within 90 days after the entry of final judgment.  Timely 
motions will be granted only upon a showing of good cause to 
excuse the delay.”  The Motion was filed on the 88th day after 
the entry of final judgment on September 13, 2010.  The Motion 
set forth the facts recited above and asserted that they 
constituted good cause for extending the 60-day period. 
The Motion further noted that the Commonwealth had not 
been prejudiced by the delay.  Because Rule 5A:8(a) provides a 
 
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period of 60 days after entry of final judgment within which to 
file transcripts and Rule 5A:8(b) provides a period of 10 days 
after the filing of transcripts within which to file and serve 
notice that transcripts had been filed, the Rules provide a 
period of up to 70 days from entry of final judgment before the 
Commonwealth would have been aware that transcripts had been 
filed.  However, in this case, the Commonwealth received the 
transcripts and the notice of filing transcripts by hand on the 
65th day after the entry of final judgment.  Finally, the 
Motion noted that the Commonwealth’s attorney “consents to the 
granting of [the Motion] and does not intend to file responses 
in opposition.”  The Commonwealth in fact filed no opposition 
to the Motion. 
On January 3, 2011, the Court of Appeals entered an order 
denying the Motion.  The order stated that 
[w]hen a motion to extend is filed after the 
expiration of the original underlying deadline 
(in this instance, 60 days after entry of final 
judgment), but before the specific deadline 
governing a motion to extend (in this instance, 
90 days after judgment), good cause must be 
shown as to why an extension was not sought by 
the original due date.  In other words, the 
“good cause” showing must present some 
persuasive reason for waiting until after the 
expiration of the underlying deadline to file 
the motion for an extension of time. 
 
Upon consideration of [the Motion], and 
applying the standard set forth above, [the 
Motion] hereby is denied. 
 
 
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LaCava filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of 
Appeals denied.  Thereafter, the Court of Appeals entered a per 
curiam order denying LaCava’s petition for appeal.  The per 
curiam order stated that 
[w]ithout a transcript or statement of facts, it 
is not possible to determine whether the issues 
raised by [LaCava] on appeal were preserved in 
the trial court.  Furthermore, it is not 
possible to determine the merits of [her] 
allegations without examining the evidence 
presented.  Therefore, the transcripts or a 
statement of facts are indispensible to a 
determination of these issues.  Accordingly, 
this appeal is denied. 
 
 (Citations omitted).  We awarded LaCava this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
LaCava argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting Rule 5A:8(a) to require her to show good cause for 
failing to file the Motion within 60 days.*  A lower court’s 
                                                 
 
* The Commonwealth asserts that LaCava’s notice of appeal 
is inadequate because it “challenges only ‘the decisions of the 
Court of Appeals denying her motion for an extension of time 
. . . and denying her motion to reconsider that ruling,” 
neither of which is the final judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
The Court therefore should not consider LaCava’s appeal, the 
Commonwealth argues, because the notice of appeal “does not 
challenge the final judgment.” 
 
This argument fails to distinguish between the 
requirements for notices of appeal and assignments of error set 
forth in our Rules and between their respective purposes.  Our 
Rules require assignments of error to “address the findings or 
rulings in the trial court or other tribunal from which an 
appeal is taken,” Rule 5:17(c)(1)(iii), because “[t]he purpose 
of assignments of error is to point out the errors . . . on 
which [an] appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, 
and to limit discussion to these points."  Yeatts v. Murray, 
 
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interpretation of the Rules of this Court, like its 
interpretation of a statute, presents a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217, 688 
S.E.2d 185, 189 (2010); Moore v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 747, 
753, 668 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2008); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 
510, 517, 659 S.E.2d 311, 315 (2008).  While conceding that the 
de novo standard of review applies, the Commonwealth 
nevertheless argues that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation 
of Rule 5A:8(a) is analogous to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of its own rules.  We disagree. 
We have said that “decisions by administrative agencies 
are given deference when they fall within an area of the 
agency’s specialized competence.”  Va. Dep't of Health v. NRV 
Real Estate, LLC, 278 Va. 181, 185, 677 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2009).  
                                                                                                                                                           
249 Va. 285, 290, 455 S.E.2d 18 (1995).  But unlike Rule 
5:17(c)(1)(iii), Rule 5:14(a) does not require an appellant to 
challenge the final judgment in a notice of appeal from the 
Court of Appeals because the purpose of the notice of appeal is 
merely to place the opposing party on notice and to direct the 
clerk to prepare the record on appeal.  Rule 5:15(a) ("The 
clerk of the Court of Appeals shall transmit all such documents 
to the clerk of this Court within 10 days after the filing of 
the notice of appeal to this Court . . . ."); see also Avery v. 
County School Board, 192 Va. 329, 330, 64 S.E.2d 767, 770 
(1951) (interpreting substantially similar language of former 
Rule 5:1 to mean that until the notice of appeal is filed, "the 
clerk is under no duty and has no authority to make up the 
record. The purpose . . . is not to penalize the appellant but 
to protect the appellee. If the required papers are not filed 
[within the time required], the appellee is entitled to assume 
that the litigation is ended, and to act on that assumption.  
Litigation is a serious and harassing matter, and the right to 
know when it is ended is a valuable right."). 
 
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However, we give little deference to an agency’s decision that 
falls outside its specialized competence, Sims Wholesale Co. v. 
Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 
(1996), and when the issue is one of statutory interpretation 
we have said an agency’s decisions “are not entitled to 
deference on judicial review.”  Va. Dep’t of Health, 278 Va. at 
185, 677 S.E.2d at 278.  
We also have said that we will defer to the State 
Corporation Commission in the interpretation of its own rules.  
See Level 3 Commc’ns. of Va. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 268 Va. 
471, 478, 604 S.E.2d 71, 74 (2004).  However, the General 
Assembly has expressly authorized the State Corporation 
Commission to prescribe its own rules of practice and 
procedure.  Code § 12.1-25.  By contrast, the General Assembly 
has empowered this Court to promulgate the rules of practice 
and procedure both for circuit courts and for the Court of 
Appeals.  Code §§ 17.1-403 and 17.1-503.  Consequently, while 
Part 5A of the Rules of this Court governs the proceedings of 
the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Part 5A remain 
precisely that – Rules of this Court.  Accordingly, this Court 
reviews the Court of Appeals’ interpretation de novo. 
The plain language of Rule 5A:8(a) provides a party 90 
days from the entry of final judgment within which to file a 
motion to extend the 60-day period within which to file 
 
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transcripts.  Nothing in the Rule provides a basis for 
distinguishing such a motion filed on the first day after the 
entry of final judgment from a motion filed on the ninetieth 
day. 
The Commonwealth argues that the Rule is ambiguous because 
the word “delay” may refer either to the delay in filing the 
transcripts in the circuit court after the 60-day period set 
forth by the Rule has expired or to the delay in filing a 
motion to extend the period if the motion itself was not filed 
in the Court of Appeals within 60 days.  This argument is 
without merit.  Nothing in the Rules imposes a 60-day period 
for the filing of such a motion.  Consequently, there is no 
basis upon which the Court of Appeals may require a party to 
show good cause for failing to file such a motion within the 
first 60 days of the 90-day period set forth in the Rule. 
The Commonwealth contends that the Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation is supported by the language of Rule 5A:8(a) 
prior to its amendment by this Court on April 1, 2010.  Former 
Rule 5A:8(a) provided that “[u]pon a written motion filed 
within 60 days after entry of the final judgment, a judge of 
the Court of Appeals may extend [the period for filing 
transcripts] for good cause shown.”  But that language was 
superseded by the present rule, which took effect on July 1, 
2010, well before the proceedings in this case.  And it is 
 
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well-settled that “when an enactment is unambiguous, extrinsic 
legislative history may not be used to create an ambiguity, and 
then remove it, where none otherwise exists.”  Taylor v. Shaw & 
Cannon Co., 236 Va. 15, 19, 372 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988) (quoting 
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985)).  
Therefore, because Rule 5A:8(a) in its present form clearly 
provides parties 90 days within which to file a motion to 
extend, the 60-day limitation set forth in former Rule 5A:8(a) 
is irrelevant. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring 
LaCava to show good cause why the Motion was not filed within 
60 days from the entry of final judgment.  However, this does 
not end the inquiry.  Rule 5A:8(a) provides that a judge of the 
Court of Appeals “may” extend the period for filing transcripts 
“upon a showing of good cause,” which LaCava alleged in her 
Motion.  We thus review the Court of Appeals’ decision to deny 
the Motion for abuse of discretion.  See AME Fin. Corp. v. 
Kiritsis, 281 Va. 384, 392, 707 S.E.2d 820, 824 (2011). 
In Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hospitals, 
Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011), we stated 
that 
[a]n abuse of discretion . . . can occur in 
three principal ways: when a relevant factor 
that should have been given significant weight 
is not considered; when an irrelevant or 
improper factor is considered and given 
 
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significant weight; and when all proper factors, 
and no improper ones, are considered, but the 
court, in weighing those factors, commits a 
clear error of judgment. 
 
In its January 3, 2011 order, the Court of Appeals 
expressly stated that its denial of the Motion was based upon 
its conclusion that LaCava was required to show good cause why 
the Motion had not been filed within 60 days from the entry of 
the final order.  That conclusion was erroneous and the order 
supplies no other factor considered by the Court of Appeals to 
support its ruling.  Because the Court of Appeals considered 
and gave significant weight to an irrelevant and improper 
factor, it abused its discretion. 
Based on our review of the facts of this case, we conclude 
that LaCava has shown good cause to extend the period for 
filing transcripts.  We therefore will vacate the Court of 
Appeals’ order denying the Motion.  We also will vacate its 
order denying LaCava’s petition for appeal because the order 
was predicated solely on the absence of a transcript or 
statement of facts.  We will remand this case to the Court of 
Appeals with directions to grant the Motion and consider 
LaCava’s petition for appeal on its merits with the transcripts 
incorporated into the record on appeal. 
Vacated and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
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I agree with the majority's interpretation of Rule 5A:8.  
However, I disagree with the majority in determining the issue of 
whether "good cause" was shown to "excuse the delay" in appellant 
filing her transcripts.  Rule 5A:8.  In my judgment, this case 
should be remanded to the Court of Appeals, directing it to make 
the "good cause" determination pursuant to the new interpretation 
of this amended rule announced in today's decision.