Title: Matter of Weisensee
Citation: 296 N.W.2d 717
Docket Number: 12729
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 1980

296 N.W.2d 717 (1980) In the Matter of the Discipline of George WEISENSEE, as an Attorney at Law. No. 12729. Supreme Court of South Dakota. September 17, 1980. R. James Zieser, Tyndall, for Disciplinary Board, The State Bar of South Dakota, for complainant. George Weisensee, pro se. WOLLMAN, Chief Justice. Following receipt of a certified copy of an order adjudging George Weisensee (respondent) guilty of the offense of attempted disposal of mortgaged property, we entered an order pursuant to SDCL 16-19-37 on April 17, 1979, suspending respondent from the practice of law pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings against him. Those proceedings having been completed, we now determine that respondent must be disbarred. Respondent and one Conroy Langloss were charged by information with the crime of attempting to dispose of mortgaged property, a violation of SDCL 32-3-47. In pertinent part the information charged: On September 11, 1978, respondent, accompanied by counsel, and Langloss appeared before the circuit court and waived preliminary hearing, whereupon the State offered to present a stipulation of facts prepared pursuant to a plea bargain agreed to by respondent. Before permitting the State to proceed, the trial court asked respondent's *718 counsel whether he would stipulate that the facts contained in the stipulation would be those adduced if the State went to trial, to which counsel replied: The State then read the following statement into the record: Following a conference between respondent and his counsel, the following colloquy took place: The trial court then indicated that it had received a statement in the nature of a plea bargain that provided, among other things, that the State would dismiss the three grand theft charges and the conspiracy charge upon which respondent had been indicted and that in return for the reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor, respondent agreed to surrender to the Supreme Court his license to practice law. On December 20, 1978, the trial court entered an order adjudging respondent to be guilty of the offense charged in the information. The order suspended the imposition of sentence against respondent and placed him on probation for a period of one year upon certain conditions, including the payment of a $500 fine, the payment of attorney fees and all outstanding checks, and the weekly attendance by respondent at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.[1] On November 8, 1979, the trial court entered an order modifying the December 20, 1978, order by eliminating the requirement of the payment of the fine and by providing that the period of probation should end on November 8, 1979. That same day the trial court entered an order dismissing the action and discharging respondent. Following our order suspending respondent from the practice of law, we referred this matter to the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar (Board) for the institution of a formal proceeding relating to the extent of the final discipline to be imposed upon respondent. SDCL 16-19-39. The Board filed its report on May 3, 1979, recommending that respondent be disbarred. Following two extensions of time for answering granted to respondent's counsel, respondent on August 16, 1979, filed an answer on his own behalf. Respondent's counsel later withdrew as counsel of record. A hearing on the Board's report and recommendation was set for October 15, 1979. Respondent failed to appear on that date, however, and in lieu of an appearance tendered his resignation from the State Bar. Respondent was advised that in view of the pending disciplinary action the Court would not accept his resignation. The hearing on the Board's report and recommendation was then rescheduled for November 9, 1979. Respondent appeared pro se at the November 9, 1979, hearing, representing to the Court that he had refrained from using alcoholic beverages since January of 1978 and that he had for some time been employed by River Park, an alcohol and drug *720 treatment center in Pierre, South Dakota, to establish programs in private industries to aid persons with alcohol or drug-related problems. He stated that the events giving rise to the charge on which he had been adjudged guilty had occurred while he was under the influence of alcohol and that he had been drinking heavily prior to the incident in question. He also referred to the action that the trial court had taken the preceding day to discharge the proceedings against him. Following the hearing, we entered an order directing respondent to file with the Court an affidavit setting forth the facts regarding his employment with River Park and his abstinence from the use of alcoholic beverages. We also remanded the matter to the Board for its consideration of the additional factual matters that had been presented to the Court by respondent at the hearing and requested that the Board file a supplemental report and recommendation. On January 22, 1980, the Board filed a supplemental report confirming the fact that respondent had abstained from the use of alcohol for some 22 months and the fact that respondent was employed by River Park. The report disputed respondent's representations to the Court that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time the offense was committed. The Board renewed its recommendation that respondent be disbarred. On February 11, 1980, respondent filed a lengthy affidavit challenging the adequacy and the fairness of the Board's investigation and in effect denying his guilt of the charge that forms the basis of this proceeding. On March 4, 1980, we granted the Board's request that the matter be continued to allow the Board to afford respondent an opportunity to appear before it. Following a meeting with respondent on April 25, 1980, the Board on May 12, 1980, submitted to the Court a supplemental report recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, that he be given credit for the time he had already spent under suspension, and that he then be reinstated upon the condition that for a period of five years respondent refrain entirely from the use of alcoholic beverages and that during that period he not commit any act that would constitute a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility that would merit imposition of discipline pursuant to SDCL 16-19. The supplemental report set forth the Board's findings that for several years prior to the incident that led to his conviction on the charge in issue here, respondent had been a severe alcoholic; that respondent's actual knowledge of and participation in the events culminating in the criminal charges were not as culpable as would appear from the bare record; that respondent's counsel had specifically stated to the trial court at the time of the arraignment that the facts contained in the stipulation were not admitted to by respondent but constituted only what the State's witnesses would testify to; that respondent's agreement to the plea bargain was to a certain degree motivated by his alcoholism and with the understanding that upon the ultimate satisfactory compliance with the terms of probation his record would be sealed and purged and that he would not stand guilty of a serious crime. The Board also found that respondent had not used alcoholic beverages of any kind since February 1, 1978, and that he has been actively involved in alcoholic rehabilitation at River Park, first on a full-time basis and more recently, because of program reductions, on a part-time basis. SDCL 16-19-36 provides in part: The statute that respondent was found guilty of having violated provides in part: SDCL 32-3-47. We think that there can be no serious question that a violation of the foregoing statute is a serious crime as that term is defined in SDCL 16-19-36. So also an attempt to commit a violation of that statute. Respondent raised in his appearance before this Court on November 9, 1979, and in the affidavit filed on February 11, 1980, the contention that the dismissal of the proceedings against him by the trial court pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-14 in effect vitiated the disciplinary proceedings based upon his conviction. We do not agree. SDCL 23A-27-13 provides that in certain cases the trial court may, without entering judgment of guilt, suspend the imposition of sentence and place a defendant on probation. SDCL 23A-27-14 provides that upon the completion of the conditions of probation, the court shall discharge the defendant. Such discharge and dismissal "shall be without court adjudication of guilt and shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime." In State v. Iverson, 269 N.W.2d 390 (S.D. 1978), and State v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 114 (S.D.1977), we held that a plea of guilty resulting in probation without entry of judgment of guilt is not a conviction. Whatever our holding might have been had the trial court in the instant case elected not to adjudge respondent guilty, we are faced with the fact that the order suspending imposition of sentence contained the following adjudication of guilt: Thus the holdings in the Iverson and Johnson cases are inapposite here. Likewise, whatever disqualifications and disabilities are released by an order of discharge and dismissal entered pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-14, the possible institution of disciplinary proceedings is not among them. See, e. g., Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949); In re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941); and Patt v. Nevada State Bd. of Accountancy, 571 P.2d 105 (Nev.1977). The question, then, is the extent of the discipline to be imposed upon respondent. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in this state on January 30, 1957. He has practiced law in Sioux Falls since that time, serving as Minnehaha County State's Attorney from January 1969 to December 1972. This is respondent's second appearance before this Court in a disciplinary matter. See In re Weisensee, 88 S.D. 544, 224 N.W.2d 830 (1975). In that case, we held that under our disciplinary rules then in effect respondent's conviction in United States District Court on a charge of failing to file a federal income tax return did not necessarily constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. We therefore dismissed the proceedings against respondent.[2] The principles governing the imposition of discipline upon an attorney were recently restated in Matter of Voorhees, 294 N.W.2d *722 646 (S.D.1980). As we said in an earlier case: In re Kunkle, 88 S.D. 269, 295, 218 N.W.2d 521, 536 (1974) (citations omitted). See also Matter of Parker, 269 N.W.2d 779 (S.D. 1978); Matter of Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D.1977); In re Rude, 88 S.D. 416, 221 N.W.2d 43 (1974). We conclude that respondent's participation in the attempted disposition of the mortgaged vehicle can only be characterized as constituting dishonesty, misappropriation, and a form of theft. What the Court said in Matter of Parker, supra, is pertinent here: 269 N.W.2d at 780-781. We are not unmindful that respondent's violation of the law may in large part have been precipitated by the circumstances resulting from his addiction to alcohol. We are also aware of the fact that it is the announced policy of this state that alcoholics be afforded treatment rather than to be subjected to criminal prosecution. SDCL 34-20A-1. But as we said in Matter of Walker, supra: 254 N.W.2d at 455. Likewise, we cannot accept respondent's contention that he is innocent of the offense of which he was found guilty by the trial court. Respondent's answer to the trial court's careful, almost anticipatory, inquiry of respondent and his counsel concerning the import of the factual statement read into the record pursuant to the stipulation belies respondent's present posture vis-a-vis that statement. Numerous affidavits and letters have been submitted in respondent's behalf by lawyers and lay persons alike. Our consideration for respondent's circumstances, however personally sympathetic we may be to his plight and however commendable may be his efforts to rescue himself and in helping to rescue others from the grip of alcoholism, must yield to the regard that we must have for the best interests of the legal profession and for the protection of the public. As we so recently said in Matter of Voorhees, supra: 294 N.W.2d at 648. We conclude that respondent's conduct as manifested by the events that led to his conviction demonstrates that he is unfit to practice law. Accordingly, a judgment of disbarment will be entered. MORGAN, J., and HALL, Circuit Judge, concur. HENDERSON and FOSHEIM, JJ., dissent. HALL, Circuit Judge, sitting for DUNN, J., disqualified. HENDERSON, Justice (dissenting). SDCL 23A-27-13 provides: In absolute contravention to this statute, the court in this case on December 20, 1978, did enter a judgment of guilt as reflected by these words: Thus, I would hold that the judgment of guilt on the original suspension of the imposition of sentence was void ab initio. SDCL 23A-27-14 states: As the record now stands, respondent has been convicted of absolutely no crime. As I read the majority opinion, it bases its disciplinary action upon the conviction of a crime under SDCL 16-19-33. The November 8, 1979, order provided: It is to be noted that respondent and his counsel made it perfectly clear that they were not admitting to the facts alleged in the information and that respondent was not pleading guilty to the information. Particularly significant is that the lower court said: "So I don't want to get cross roads here. That-either he is stipulating that these are the facts that if these witnesses were to testify and that the Court can use facts as a basis for entering any finding. Is that correct?" Counsel for respondent answered: "That is correct." And the Court asked: "Is that correct, George?" Respondent answered: "Yes, your honor." The trial court had the right and duty to make a finding but did not have the right to adjudicate guilt which was in absolute derogation of the purpose of a suspended imposition of sentence and contrary to the understanding of respondent and his attorney before the trial judge. (Emphasis supplied). Furthermore, there was a written plea bargain filed in the lower court on September 11, 1978. Paragraph three provides: "The State of South Dakota will state those facts which it would prove at trial in this matter. Defendant Weisensee will stipulate to those facts, and the court will reach its finding based upon them." (Emphasis supplied). Paragraph four of this joint plea bargain provided: "Defendant Langloss will plead guilty to the offense charged." Obviously, Weisensee plea bargained for the court to draw findings and Langloss plea bargained to entry of a guilty plea. Weisensee's plea bargain should not have been treated, as it was below, as a plea of guilt. This lawyer has the right to rely on a plea bargain not unlike any other citizen. In fairness to this lawyer, I wish to point out three findings by the Disciplinary Board in arriving at its recommendation for a suspension from the practice of law for one year: If the "conviction" falls and if there was no finding, and there was not, then what remains to disbar this attorney? If the answer is alcoholism, then the record overwhelmingly shows that his addiction has terminated, as Justice Fosheim points out. If my premise is correct, there is absolutely no presumption of unfitness. The prime purpose of the suspended sentence statutes in this state is to provide a means for nonconviction of a defendant. I do not find the two California cases and the Nevada case cited by the majority opinion to be compelling authority in view of our state statutes. The California statutes differ from ours and the Nevada case piggybacks the California rationale. The pertinent section of the California Business and Professions Code is 6101 which provides: Our statutes do not mandate disbarment upon a conviction. The majority opinion rests its case, I believe, on this so-called "conviction; " without it, there is no case against the respondent. By the majority opinion, respondent's "unfitness" is inextricably aligned with his "conviction." Therefore, I would dismiss the disbarment proceeding in totality. FOSHEIM, Justice (dissenting). As the majority opinion notes respondent's offense may in large part have been precipitated by the circumstances resulting from his addiction to alcohol. In Matter of Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D.1977), we properly refused to condone an attorney's conduct on those grounds. Here, however, upon realizing his problem and where it had taken him, respondent sought and received treatment. It appears he has now successfully abstained from the use of alcohol for over two years. Furthermore, he has become actively involved in programs to aid persons with alcohol or drug-related problems. When it comes to the discipline to be imposed, I distinguish the circumstances here, for example, with the demonstrated dishonesty of an attorney who misappropriates his client's funds. In the latter case, the lawyer is an out-right thief and there is no point in time when we can protect society with reasonable assurance that he is not likely to repeat his character weakness. On the other hand, before reverting to errors attributable to drinking, an alcoholic is likely to signal a relapse. It seems to me that the May 12, 1980, supplemental report of the Board recognized this when they mellowed their previous recommendation of disbarment to a one-year suspension with credit for the time already spent under suspension. In view of the circumstances, disbarment appears unduly harsh and fails to lend appropriate encouragement to respondent's gallant rehabilitation efforts. I prefer accepting the Board's recommendation to suspend, but, as an added safeguard, the suspension should be for three years with the recommended credit. Respondent's sobriety should in the meantime be monitored. [1] The order was entered pursuant to SDCL 23-57-4. That statute was repealed (1978 S.D. Sess.Laws ch. 178, § 577, effective July 1, 1979), and was replaced by SDCL 23A-27-13, 14, 15 and 16 as enacted (1978 S.D.Sess.Laws ch. 178, § 345) and amended (1979 S.D.Sess. Laws ch. 159, §§ 16A, 17). With some exceptions, SDCL 23A-27-13, 14, 15 and 16 are substantially identical to the repealed statute. [2] Under our present rules, the willful failure to file an income tax return is a crime that would constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension. SDCL 16-19-33; SDCL 16-19-36.