Title: CHERYL BYNUM V THE ESAB GROUP INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119005
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2002  
SHERYL BYNUM,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119005  
THE ESAB GROUP, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
This product liability litigation has an extensive  
history.
 It is now before this Court on defendant’s  
application for leave to appeal. We reverse the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals and the order of the circuit court that  
granted plaintiff’s motion for new trial.  The judgment of no  
cause of action is reinstated.  
I  
Plaintiff was injured in 1988 while operating a robotic  
welding system that was manufactured by defendant. The case  
has been tried three times. 
In the first trial, the jury  
  
awarded 
plaintiff 
$50,000 
for 
economic 
and 
noneconomic 
damages  
and reduced the award by finding that plaintiff had been  
partially at fault for her injuries.  The trial court granted  
plaintiff’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict  
regarding her negligence, and additur of $849,750 or a new  
trial.
 The trial court agreed with plaintiff that the  
comparative negligence verdict was contrary to the evidence.  
It ordered a new trial, limited to the issue of damages. At  
the conclusion of the second jury trial, a verdict in excess  
of $2 million was returned. The defendant appealed both the  
decision granting a second trial and the verdict of the second  
trial.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not  
err in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but  
said the second trial should not have been limited to  
determination of damages.  The Court of Appeals ordered a new  
trial on all issues.1  This Court denied the defendant’s  
application for leave to appeal and the plaintiff’s  
application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant.2  
The matter was returned to the circuit court where a  
third trial was held.  The jury returned a verdict of no cause  
of action. 
The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment  
1 
  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 4, 1996 
(Docket No. 173473).  
2  455 Mich 865 (1997).  
2  
 
 
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new  
trial.  The trial court granted the motion for a new trial  
following an evidentiary hearing on plaintiff’s claim that  
several jurors failed to disclose racial biases.3  The trial  
court reasoned that under MCR 2.611 a new trial was required  
because of juror misconduct even though the court could not  
and did not conclude that the jury verdict was tainted by the  
alleged undisclosed prejudice.  
The defendant sought leave to appeal.  The Court of  
Appeals 
granted 
defendant’s 
application 
and 
stayed 
trial 
court  
proceedings pending resolution of the appeal.4
 Following  
submission of the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the  
trial court’s order granting a new trial.5  The Court found no  
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.  No error was  
perceived in the trial court’s crediting the testimony that  
jurors were biased, but failed to reveal that bias in voir  
dire.  The Court said the bias would have provided a valid  
basis for a challenge for cause.  
We review the trial judge’s factual findings for clear  
3 
 The plaintiff and her trial attorney were African- 
Americans. There were no African-American jurors.  
4  Unpublished order, entered May 3, 1999 (Docket No. 
218309). One judge dissented.  
5 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 23, 2001 
(Docket No. 218309).  
3  
  
  
error. 
People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912  
(2001).  The decision to grant a new trial is reviewed for  
abuse of discretion. Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich  
29, 34; 632 NW2d 912 (2001).  Where the trial court  
misapprehends the law to be applied, an abuse of discretion  
occurs. Miller v Varilek, 117 Mich App 165, 170; 323 NW2d 637  
(1982).  We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the  
judgment on the jury verdict in the last trial.  
II  
Jurors are presumed to be qualified. 
The burden of  
proving the existence of a disqualification is on the party  
alleging it.  People v Collins, 166 Mich 4, 9; 131 NW 78  
(1911).
 Voir dire is the process by which litigants may  
question prospective jurors so that challenges to the  
prospective jurors can be intelligently exercised. People v  
Harrell, 398 Mich 384, 388; 247 NW2d 829 (1976).  Prospective  
jurors are subject to challenge for cause under MCR 2.511(D).6  
6 Presumably, had the matter been explored on voir dire 
in this trial, plaintiff would have relied on MCR 2.511(D)(3), 
(4), or (5), to challenge the jurors. The rules states:  
(D) Challenges for Cause.  The parties may 
challenge jurors for cause, and the court shall 
rule on each challenge.  A juror challenged for 
cause may be directed to answer questions pertinent 
to the inquiry. It is grounds for a challenge for 
cause that the person . . . :  
* * *  
4  
The voir dire in this case was of a general nature.  The  
plaintiff’s inquiries to the jury panel did not raise the  
question of racial prejudice, except for a passing mention by  
counsel about the desire not to have racial issues injected  
into the case.  It was the duty of counsel to ferret out  
potential bases for excusing jurors. See People v Scott, 56  
Mich 154; 22 NW 274 (1885).  No challenges for cause were made  
to the three jurors who became the subject of plaintiff’s  
motion for new trial.  However, on the basis of a posttrial  
evidentiary 
hearing, 
the trial court determined that the three  
jurors lied during voir dire and found that misconduct to be  
flagrant.  Without determining the effect on the verdict or  
whether counsel would have exercised challenges to the jurors  
if different answers had been given, the trial court concluded  
plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. We disagree.  
III  
The 
jurors 
who 
were questioned at the evidentiary hearing  
averred that racial prejudice did “not in any way” affect the  
(3) is biased for or against a party or 
attorney;  
(4) shows a state of mind that will prevent 
the person from rendering a just verdict, or has 
formed a positive opinion on the facts of the case 
or on what the outcome should be;  
(5) has opinions or conscientious scruples  
that would improperly influence the person's 
verdict . . . .  
5  
  
verdict.  Contrary to plaintiff’s claims of bias against her,  
the 
record 
reveals 
that 
jurors 
commented 
sympathetically 
among  
themselves about the plight of the plaintiff.  Plaintiff  
relied on the testimony of one juror who said she inferred  
from various comments that others on the jury panel possessed  
racial animus.7  The trial court accepted, on the sole basis  
of this juror’s testimony, plaintiff’s claim that the three  
jurors concealed their racial animus during voir dire and that  
the animus had been palpable.8  
Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.  A finding  
is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to  
support it, the reviewing court, on the whole record, is left  
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been  
made. Tuttle v Dep’t of State Hwys, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d  
244 (1976).  
The sole testimony presented in support of plaintiff’s  
7 Such comments consisted of the following: (a) One juror 
allegedly talked about being on the freeway in Los Angeles at 
the same time O. J. Simpson was being pursued.  (b) One juror 
testified that defense counsel, an African-American, insulted 
another 
juror’s 
intelligence by explaining the phrase “in lieu 
of.” (c) One juror allegedly asked whether defense counsel, 
an African-American, thought he was Johnny Cochran. (d) One 
juror allegedly declined to discuss a John Grisham book, “A 
Time to Kill,” characterizing it as a “racial book.”  (e) One 
juror allegedly observed that the mother of the plaintiff, who 
was an African-American, was white or “light complected.”  
8 The complaining juror was one of two dissenting jurors 
in a six to two jury verdict.  
6  
claim of juror misconduct during voir dire came from a juror  
who was not able to point to specific comments of other jurors  
that evidenced racial animus.  Rather, the juror relied on her  
subjective impressions of the motivations and meanings of the  
comments of the other jurors. 
In this regard, it is  
significant that the plaintiff’s claim for a new trial is  
based on hearsay statements of jurors that are said to be  
indicative of possible bias.  The challenged jurors, when  
questioned posttrial, denied such bias.  The testimony of the  
single juror who said she perceived racial overtones in the  
comments of her fellow jurors comes perilously close to being  
the type of impeachment of a verdict found impermissible in  
Shiner v Detroit, 150 Mich App 420; 387 NW2d 872 (1986).  
We also are concerned with the adequacy of the facts  
supporting the findings of the trial court. The categorical  
denial of bias by the challenged jurors was entitled to some  
weight, particularly when balanced against the tentative  
impression of the sole juror who alleged the presence of  
racial animus.  The juror making the bias allegations was  
repeatedly asked for specific examples of the racial animus  
she attributed to her fellow jurors.  She was unable to recall  
more than a few innocuous comments that do not demonstrate the  
level of racial animus that would have led to disqualification  
of the juror making the comment. 
Our review on the whole  
7  
 
 
record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a  
mistake has been made.  The jurors were not asked during voir  
dire about their racial attitudes or if such attitudes would  
affect their ability to judge the case impartially. Further,  
absent proof of actual prejudicial effect on the verdict or  
proof that a challenge for cause would have been successful,  
it was an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial.  Citizens  
Commercial & Sav Bk v Engberg, 15 Mich App 438; 166 NW2d 661  
(1968), McDonough Power Equipment, Inc v Greenwood, 464 US  
548; 104 S Ct 845; 78 L Ed 2d 663 (1984).  As we have recently  
stated, a grant of a new trial is governed by MCR 2.611(A)(1).  
The rule clearly requires that a party seeking a new trial  
establish that substantial rights were materially affected.  
Kelly, supra at 38. No such determination or claim was made  
in this case.  
There was no finding by the trial court that any juror  
lied during voir dire about racial bias. 
Absent a  
determination 
that 
juror 
misconduct 
occurred, 
MCR  
2.611(A)(1)(b), the plaintiff cannot establish either actual  
prejudice under Engberg or that her substantial rights were  
materially affected as set forth in Kelly.9  The grant of a  
new trial was contrary to the facts and the court rule and  
9 The trial court incorrectly relied on People v Kage, 
193 Mich App 49; 483 NW2d 424 (1992), which was reversed by 
this Court, 439 Mich 1022 (1992).  
8  
 
 
 
 
thus an abuse of discretion.  
IV  
The order granting a new trial is reversed.  The  
plaintiff’s 
application 
for 
leave 
to 
appeal 
as 
cross-appellant  
is denied. 
We remand the case to the trial court for  
reinstatement of the judgment on the jury verdict.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.  
KELLY, J., would not decide this case by opinion per  
curiam, but would grant or deny leave to appeal.  
9