Title: Merrell v. Alabama Power Co.
Citation: 382 So. 2d 494
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 1980

382 So. 2d 494 (1980)
Katharine Ross MERRELL, as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard G. Ross, deceased
v.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, a Corporation.
78-709.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 25, 1980.
Rehearing Denied March 28, 1980.
*495 Joseph J. Boswell, Mobile, for appellant.
James J. Duffy, Jr., and Carroll H. Sullivan of Inge, Twitty, Duffy &amp; Prince, Mobile, Harold A. Bowron, Jr., and Steven F. Casey of Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams &amp; Ward, Birmingham, for appellee.
SHORES, Justice.
Plaintiff-Appellant Merrell, as Administratrix of the estate of Richard G. Ross, filed a wrongful death action against Alabama Power Company. Ross was piloting a small single engine airplane during inclement weather when he collided with a power line owned and maintained by the power company. The power line was located three nautical miles from the end of the runway at Bates Field in Mobile, within the area designated as the instrument approach zone. Ross died within a half hour of the collision. Merrell alleges that the power company negligently failed to mark the power line and to warn of the location and presence of the line. In her complaint, Merrell expressly disclaims any claim for punitive damages, and seeks to recover compensatory damages only. Two counts of the action are allegedly brought under Code 1975, § 6-5-410, Alabama's wrongful death statute; one count is allegedly brought under the "common law of England as controlling and applicable in the State of Alabama." The power company's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted, and Merrell appealed.
On appeal, Merrell contends that:
This Court's construction of our wrongful death statute as permitting recovery of only punitive damages is unconstitutional. It is against public policy as expressed in the common law of England to punish negligence. Even if such an interpretation was justified under the original wrongful death statute, which was entitled "An Act to Prevent Homicides," and was indexed under "Criminal Law," the legislature manifested its disapproval of this interpretation by making substantial changes in the act in the Code of 1886, and indexing it under "Proceedings in Civil Cases." This Court should correct its previous erroneous judicial interpretations and construe the existing act to provide for the assessment and recovery of compensatory damages, and punitive damages if the negligent act or omission causing death constitutes malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct. Code 1975, § 6-5-410, should be construed to be a statute which provides for both loss to survivors and loss to the estate. English and Alabama cases holding that no cause of action for wrongful death existed at common law are in error. This Court should allow a decedent's personal representative to recover for the injured person's own personal injuries and expenses incurred, which recovery should be subject to the payment of the debts and liabilities of the decedent, and allow the survivors to recover for their own benefit their loss and damages sustained as a result of the negligent act causing death.
*496 We affirm. More than one hundred years ago, this Court held that the wrongful death statute as passed by the Alabama legislature in 1872 allowed the recovery of punitive damages only. In Savannah &amp; Memphis Railroad Co. v. Shearer, Adm'x, 58 Ala. 672 (1877), the Court stated:
Later that same year, the Court stated in The South and North Alabama Railroad Company v. Sullivan, Adm'r, 59 Ala. 272 (1877):
". . . . The statute creates the righta right unknown to the common lawand provides a remedy. No other remedy can be pursued."
In Richmond and Danville Railroad Company v. Freeman, 97 Ala. 289, 11 So. 800 (1892), the Court's interpretation of the act of 1872 was challenged. There the plaintiff, as in this case, urged the Court to reconsider its holdings that only punitive damages were recoverable under the statute. In rejecting that argument, the Court, speaking through Justice McClellan, said:
After so many years, we cannot improve on the language or reasoning of Justice McClellan. We, as the Court did in 1892, fail to find any constitutional infirmity in the death statute as written by the legislature and construed by this Court. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
SHORES, Justice.
In brief in support of her application for rehearing the appellant says:
*498 The appellant candidly admits that she did not attack the constitutionality of the wrongful death statute in the trial court nor in this Court on original submission, and acknowledges that as a general rule, this Court will not decide the constitutionality of a state statute when the issue is raised for the first time in the appellate court. Riley v. Smyer, 265 Ala. 475, 91 So. 2d 820 (1957). She simply asks us to make an exception to that rule in this case. We decline to do so. The rule is an ancient one, founded on sound reasoning. Cooper v. Green, 359 So. 2d 377 (Ala.1978).
OPINION EXTENDED; APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.