Title: Malbrough v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 062570
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2008

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
 
RONALD WAYNE MALBROUGH, JR. 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 062570  
          January 11, 2008 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we must determine whether, under the 
facts presented, a defendant’s Fourth Amendment protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure were infringed by a 
consent search of his person, conducted by police at a 
roadside stop, after he had been told that he was free to 
leave. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  In the early 
afternoon of February 25, 2004, Ronald Wayne Malbrough, Jr., 
was operating a light blue Cadillac in a residential area in 
Chesterfield County.  He was stopped by Officer Stephen 
Fortier of the Chesterfield County Police Department because 
the Cadillac bore license plates registered to another vehicle 
and because a rejection sticker was displayed on its 
windshield.  There were two passengers in the car with 
Malbrough, one in the front seat and one in the rear.  Officer 
Fortier displayed his cruiser’s flashing blue lights when 
making the stop and they continued to flash throughout his 
 
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encounter with Malbrough.   Fortier parked his cruiser on the 
side of the road behind the Cadillac at the entrance to a 
subdivision. 
 
Officer Fortier saw a handgun lying in plain view on the 
center console of the Cadillac as he walked up to the driver’s 
window and at the same time Malbrough told him that he had a 
handgun in the car.  Officer Fortier told all the occupants of 
the car to keep their hands where he could see them and 
retrieved the handgun from Malbrough without incident.  
Fortier took the handgun back to his cruiser and announced on 
his police radio that he had recovered a weapon from the 
Cadillac.  Two other police vehicles, driven by Officers Neal 
Flatt and Richard Holmes, respectively, arrived at the scene 
almost simultaneously.  One parked on the side of the road 
behind Fortier’s cruiser and the other parked on the side of 
the road ahead of the Cadillac but far enough ahead that 
“[t]here was plenty of room between the vehicles,” such that 
Malbrough “would have been able to pull his vehicle out.”  The 
flashing blue lights of Officers Fortier's and Flatt's police 
vehicles continued to operate throughout the encounter but 
Holmes believed it likely that those on his vehicle did not. 
 
Officer Fortier returned to the Cadillac and asked 
Malbrough for his driver’s license and registration.  
 
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Malbrough handed these to Fortier, who took them back to his 
cruiser to verify them. 
 
While Fortier was thus engaged, Officer Holmes walked up 
to the Cadillac and spoke to Malbrough.  At Holmes’ request, 
Malbrough stepped out of the Cadillac.  Holmes had responded 
to a complaint at an earlier date, reporting that shots had 
been fired at night, in another residential subdivision 
nearby, from a “Cadillac, a large, older model, which fit the 
description of the vehicle in question.”  Holmes told 
Malbrough about that incident, asked him if he knew anything 
about it, was satisfied with his answers, and concluded that 
he had no reason to detain him or question him further.  This 
exchange lasted no more than three minutes. 
 
While the foregoing conversation was going on, Officer 
Flatt, who was a firearms instructor, walked up to Officer 
Fortier’s cruiser.  Fortier handed Flatt the weapon Malbrough 
had handed him.  Flatt “cleared” the weapon, a loaded .45 
caliber semi-automatic pistol, and put it under his waistband 
in the small of his back.  It remained there throughout the 
encounter and none of the participants made any further 
mention of it. 
 
Meanwhile, Officer Fortier had determined that 
Malbrough’s license and registration were “facially valid” and 
his computer check revealed no problems with them.  He took 
 
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the documents back to the Cadillac, and, because Malbrough was 
still talking to Officer Holmes at the front of the vehicle, 
placed the driver’s license and registration on the Cadillac’s 
front seat.  Fortier asked both passengers to step out of the 
car and asked them to consent to a search.  They agreed.  He 
searched them and found no contraband.  He checked their names 
on his computer and found that they were not “wanted.”  
Fortier then “told Malbrough that his information was all on 
the driver’s seat of his car and that he was free to leave.” 
 
After making that statement, Fortier asked Malbrough for 
permission to search the Cadillac.  Malbrough agreed.  
Fortier’s search revealed no weapons or drugs in the car, 
which was “fairly clean.”  Fortier asked Malbrough “if he had 
anything illegal on his person.”  Malbrough said no.  Fortier 
asked Malbrough for permission to search his person.  
Malbrough “started pulling items from his pockets.”  Fortier 
told him “not to put his hands in his pockets . . . I would do 
the checking.”  Malbrough “told [Fortier] it was all right,” 
turned away from Fortier, and “raised [his] hands in the air.” 
In Malbrough’s right front trouser pocket, Fortier found 
plastic bags containing marijuana, “rock” cocaine, and powder 
cocaine.  Fortier arrested Malbrough.  The confrontation, from 
traffic stop to arrest, lasted about 13 minutes. 
 
5
 
Malbrough was indicted by a grand jury for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute and for possession of a 
firearm while in possession of cocaine.  He filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of 
his person, which the trial court denied.  He subsequently 
entered conditional “Alford” pleas of guilty to the firearm 
charge and to the lesser charge of simple possession of 
cocaine, preserving his right to appeal the trial court’s 
ruling denying his motion to suppress.  The court imposed a 
sentence of three years confinement on the cocaine charge, all 
of which was suspended, and a sentence of two years 
confinement, to be served, on the firearm conviction. 
 
Malbrough appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals, which initially denied his appeal by a per curiam 
opinion.  Malbrough requested review by a three-judge panel, 
which granted his petition, heard oral argument, and affirmed 
the convictions by a majority opinion, one judge dissenting.  
We awarded him an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
Malbrough concedes that Officer Fortier’s traffic stop 
was lawful and does not challenge any of the activities of the 
police that took place prior to the time he was asked to 
consent to a search of his person.  At that time, he contends, 
he was unlawfully seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment 
 
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protections against unreasonable search and seizure, the 
warrantless search of his person was unlawful, and the results 
of the search, as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” should 
have been suppressed. 
 
The applicable standard of review is well settled.  The 
question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is 
always “a question of fact to be determined from all the 
circumstances.”  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 
(1973)).  In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence claiming a violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.  The burden 
is on the defendant to show that the trial court committed 
reversible error.  We are bound by the trial court’s factual 
findings unless those findings are plainly wrong or 
unsupported by the evidence.   We will review the trial 
court’s application of the law de novo.  Ward v. Commonwealth, 
273 Va. 211, 218, 639 S.E.2d 269, 272 (2007).  Nevertheless, 
an appellate court “should take care both to review findings 
of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight 
to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and 
local law enforcement officers.”  Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 
 
7
260 Va. 232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000) (quoting Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). 
 
Police officers are free to engage in consensual 
encounters with citizens, indeed, it is difficult to envision 
their ability to carry out their duties if that were not the 
case.  See Parker v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 96, 101-02, 496 
S.E.2d 47, 50 (1998).  In a series of decisions, however, the 
Supreme Court has limited lawful “consensual encounters” to 
circumstances in which “a reasonable person would feel free 
'to disregard the police and go about his business.' ”  
Reittinger, 260 Va. at 236, 532 S.E.2d at 27 (quoting Florida 
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).  The “reasonable 
person” test is objective, and presumes an innocent person 
rather than one laboring under a consciousness of guilt.  
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437-38.  The consensual encounter becomes 
a seizure “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force 
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty 
of a citizen.”  Id. at 434.  
 
Accordingly, the issue of fact presented to the trial 
court by Malbrough’s motion to suppress was whether, when 
Officer Fortier asked him for permission to search his person, 
a reasonable person, under all the surrounding circumstances, 
would have believed that he was not free to leave, or rather, 
felt free to disregard the request and “go about his 
 
8
business.”  Id., see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 
Malbrough argued before the trial court and on appeal 
that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the 
scene for a number of reasons.  At the time he was asked to 
consent to the search of his person, Malbrough was “in the 
midst of three armed police officers with his vehicle flanked 
in the front and back by two cruisers with flashing blue 
lights;” his pistol was being withheld by the police and there 
was no indication when, if ever, he could recover it; and his 
driver’s license and registration cards had not been handed 
back to him but were on the front seat of his car.  He also 
made the argument that the offenses that led to his initial 
traffic stop were still ongoing:  The rejection sticker and 
improper plates were still displayed on his car, and even 
though he had not been given a summons for those offenses, he 
would be committing a further infraction if he drove away. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that there was nothing 
unreasonable in the presence of three officers, in view of the 
presence of three occupants in the Cadillac having a loaded 
firearm in plain view; that the officers’ cruisers were parked 
in such a way that they would not obstruct the Cadillac if 
Malbrough wished to leave; that the flashing blue lights were 
operating for safety reasons to warn approaching traffic of 
 
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vehicles stopped on the side of the road; that Malbrough gave 
the firearm voluntarily to Officer Fortier before the officer 
had even asked for it; that Malbrough never requested its 
return and that no further mention was ever made of it;1 that 
Malbrough’s driver’s license and registration cards had indeed 
been returned to him when Fortier placed them on the front 
seat and told Malbrough they were there and that he was free 
to leave. 
 
The Commonwealth also pointed out that, although 
Malbrough had been questioned about a shooting by Officer 
Holmes, Holmes was obviously satisfied with Malbrough’s 
responses and made no objection when Fortier told Malbrough 
that he was free to leave.  Finally, there was no evidence 
that any of the officers drew or brandished their weapons, 
touched the occupants of the Cadillac except with their 
consent, used hostile tones of voice, accused them of 
wrongdoing or made any intimidating gestures.  Indeed, at the 
time Fortier made his request to search Malbrough, the police 
                     
1 The Commonwealth acknowledges that Officer Flatt’s 
retention of the weapon might have given Malbrough a claim 
against the police, but argues that it did nothing to make him 
think he was not free to leave.  The Commonwealth argues that 
cases interpreting police retention of a defendant’s personal 
property as a restriction of his freedom of movement focus on 
items necessary for travel, such as driver’s licenses, car 
keys, passports, airline tickets, and the like.  See, e.g., 
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.4(a) n.81 (4th ed. 
2004). 
 
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present at the scene had indicated to the occupants of the 
Cadillac that they had no reason to question or detain them 
further.  Compare McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 200-
01, 487 S.E.2d 259, 262-63 (1997) (reasonable person would 
conclude that he is not free to leave when police indicate he 
is suspected of criminal activity). 
 
Malbrough relies on our decision in Reittinger, where we 
held a purported consent search following a roadside traffic 
stop to have been an unlawful seizure of the person because, 
in the circumstances of that case, a reasonable person would 
not in fact have felt free to go even after a police officer 
had told him he was free to do just that.  Reittinger, 260 Va. 
at 237, 532 S.E.2d at 28.  This case differs from Reittinger 
in several respects.  There, the defendant was stopped along a 
road in a rural area in the nighttime.  After deciding not to 
issue a summons for a defective headlight, a deputy sheriff 
told him he was free to leave.  Thereafter, while two other 
armed deputies flanked his car, one of them asked him to 
consent to a search.  When the defendant failed to give 
consent, the deputy repeated the request a second time and 
then a third.  The defendant never gave express consent to a 
search, but simply exited his vehicle, whereupon the deputy 
patted him down and found contraband.  Id. at 234-35, 532 
S.E.2d at 26.  Here, by contrast, the search occurred in 
 
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daylight in a residential area.  The police on the scene were 
equal in number to the occupants of the Cadillac.  There was 
no evidence of any intimidating behavior on the part of the 
police.  Malbrough clearly gave his consent to the search, 
before it took place, in response to a single request by the 
officer. 
 
The most significant distinction between Reittinger and 
the present case is that in Reittinger, the trial judge, who 
alone had the opportunity to look the witnesses in the eye and 
weigh their credibility, expressly found that the deputy 
effectively seized Reittinger without probable cause because a 
reasonable person in the circumstances would conclude that his 
detention continued and that he was not free to leave.  Id. at 
236, 532 S.E.2d at 27.2  Here, the trial court, after analyzing 
all the attendant circumstances, made the opposite finding and 
concluded that a reasonable person would have felt free to 
ignore the request and leave the scene when Fortier asked 
Malbrough to consent to a search of his person. 
 
There is good reason for the rule that appellate courts 
must defer to the factual findings of the trial judge in 
Fourth Amendment cases.  The fact patterns in such cases 
arrive in infinite variety, seldom or never exactly 
 
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duplicated.  Moreover, they involve consideration of nuances 
such as tone of voice, facial expression, gestures and body 
language seldom discernable from a printed record.  The 
controlling inquiry is the effect of such matters on a 
reasonable person in the light of all the surrounding 
circumstances.   
 
The test is necessarily imprecise, because it 
is designed to assess the coercive effect of police 
conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on 
particular details of that conduct in isolation.  
Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty 
prompting a person to conclude that he is not free 
to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular 
police conduct at issue, but also with the setting 
in which the conduct occurs.   
 
Parker, 255 Va. at 102, 496 S.E.2d at 50 (quoting Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).  In the present case, 
there was no evidence of any coercive conduct on the part of 
the police after Malbrough was told that he was free to leave. 
 
 The Supreme Court perceptively held, by the language 
quoted above from Ornelas, that the inferences drawn from the 
evidence in such cases by trial judges, who have personally 
heard and observed the witnesses, are entitled to deference.  
We accord that deference to the trial court’s finding here. 
                                                                
2 Despite making that factual finding, the trial court 
ruled that the subsequent “pat down” search was justified for 
the deputies’ protection. 
 
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Conclusion 
 
We cannot say from the record that the trial court’s 
finding was “plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.”  
Ward, 273 Va. at 218. 639 S.E.2d at 272.  Malbrough did not 
carry his burden of showing that the trial court committed 
reversible error, and we find no error in the application of 
the law by that court or by the Court of Appeals.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The material and undisputed 
facts surrounding the encounter of Ronald Wayne Malbrough, Jr. 
with the police on the afternoon of February 25, 2004 are 
amply recited in the majority opinion and need not be repeated 
in detail here.  Likewise, the principles of law applicable to 
the resolution of Malbrough’s claim that the conduct of the 
police violated his Fourth Amendment rights as well as the 
principles governing our standard of review of that issue are 
well established and recited by the majority.  Under those 
facts and principles of law, the ultimate focus of the 
analysis of the issue presented is whether a reasonable 
person, under the particular factual circumstances of this 
 
14
case, would have believed that he was free to disregard the 
request of the police to search his person and to leave the 
scene of the encounter.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
434 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980); see also Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 236, 
532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000).  In my view, no reasonable person 
could possibly believe himself free to leave the scene under 
the coercive circumstances of this police encounter. 
 
In this case, Officer Stephen Fortier stopped the blue 
Cadillac car operated by Malbrough because the Cadillac bore 
license plates registered to another vehicle and because a 
rejection sticker was displayed on its windshield.  This 
routine traffic stop quite appropriately evolved into a patent 
and serious concern for the safety of the officer when Officer 
Fortier approached the Cadillac and observed in plain view a 
loaded handgun on the center console.  The officer retrieved 
the gun during Malbrough’s acknowledgement that it belonged to 
him.  Officer Fortier placed the gun in his police cruiser and 
called for “backup” on his police radio.  Responding to that 
call, Officers Neal Flatt and Richard Holmes arrived 
immediately at the scene in separate police cruisers.  
Thereafter, the police searched the two passengers in the 
Cadillac as well as the vehicle.  While these searches were 
being conducted, Officer Holmes asked Malbrough to step out of 
 
15
the Cadillac.  Malbrough complied and the two men moved to a 
location between the front of the Cadillac and the rear of 
Officer Holmes’ police cruiser.  There, Officer Holmes 
questioned Malbrough regarding an incident that had previously 
occurred several miles away in which shots reportedly had been 
fired from a Cadillac generally fitting the description of 
Malbrough’s Cadillac. 
Officer Holmes concluded that he did not have a basis to 
charge Malbrough for the earlier shooting.  Nothing in the 
record, however, suggests that Officer Holmes informed 
Malbrough that he was no longer under suspicion for the 
earlier crime; nor did Officer Holmes advise Malbrough that he 
was free to go.  Rather, as the questioning by Officer Holmes 
was concluding, Officer Fortier approached and advised 
Malbrough that his driver’s license and registration were on 
the driver’s seat of the Cadillac and that Malbrough was “free 
to leave.”  Nevertheless, Officer Fortier immediately asked 
Malbrough for consent to search his person for drugs or 
weapons.  At that time, Malbrough’s handgun was in Officer 
Flatt’s waistband.  The officers did not tell Malbrough how or 
when the gun would be returned to him if he decided to leave 
the scene without consenting to the search of his person by 
Officer Fortier. 
 
16
 
The majority correctly notes that the test for 
determining whether a reasonable person under all of the 
circumstances would have believed that he was not free to 
leave the scene of a police encounter is “necessarily 
imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive 
effect of police conduct.”  Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
567, 573 (1988).  For this reason, isolated conduct of the 
police, such as a statement that “you are free to leave,” must 
be considered in view of all the surrounding circumstances. 
 
The circumstances of this case are more compelling in 
that regard than those upon which our decision in Reittinger 
were premised.  In Reittinger, we held that a reasonable 
person would not have believed that he was free to leave even 
after the police had advised the driver of a stopped vehicle 
that he was free to go.  Here, two police officers in separate 
police cruisers responded to the scene of the traffic stop 
because Officer Fortier had radioed for backup after he had 
taken possession of Malbrough’s handgun.  Malbrough was made 
aware by Officer Holmes that the focus of his questions was a 
recent and nearby incident involving a shooting from a 
Cadillac matching the description of Malbrough’s Cadillac in 
several aspects.  Beyond question, a reasonable person under 
these circumstances would have concluded that the police were 
then concerned with resolving the rational suspicion that 
 
17
Malbrough and his vehicle were implicated in the shooting 
incident rather than a concern with the traffic violations 
that prompted the stop by Officer Fortier.  While Officer 
Holmes may have concluded that he had no basis to detain 
Malbrough further relating to the shooting incident, he did 
not convey that subjective conclusion to Malbrough.  The 
police had conducted searches of the passengers in the 
Cadillac as well as the vehicle because they had discovered 
the presence of Malbrough’s gun; only Malbrough remained 
unsearched.  The police retained possession of Malbrough’s gun 
and had not indicated how or when the gun might be returned to 
him.  At that point in the encounter, despite Officer 
Fortier’s statement that he was free to leave, a reasonable 
person would not have believed that Malbrough was free to 
leave until there was some objective indication from Officer 
Holmes that such was the case as a result of his subjective 
conclusion that Malbrough was not going to be detained in 
connection with the shooting incident that Officer Holmes was 
investigating. 
 
There is no question that the police in this case had the 
right to temporarily seize Malbrough’s handgun for their 
safety until their investigation at the scene of the traffic 
stop was completed.  However, under the particular 
circumstances of this case, I would hold that Malbrough was 
 
18
unlawfully seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
and, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming 
the trial court’s judgment in refusing to suppress the product 
of that unlawful seizure. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, vacate Malbrough’s conviction, and remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial if the Commonwealth were so 
advised.