Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Adam A. Gillette
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP002267-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2017

2017 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2267-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Adam A. Gillette, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Adam A. Gillette, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GILLETTE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 11, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs and dissents (opinion 
filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 48
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2267-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Adam A. Gillette, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Adam A. Gillette, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 11, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
and Attorney Adam A. Gillette have filed a stipulation pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.12 that Attorney Gillette's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin should be suspended for a 
period of 60 days, as discipline reciprocal to that imposed by 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
2 
 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota.1  After reviewing the matter, we 
approve the stipulation and impose the stipulated reciprocal 
discipline.  Although the stipulation did not expressly request 
that we impose the other forms of discipline imposed by the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota, we also follow our practice of 
ordering Attorney Gillette to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the Minnesota disciplinary order, including a two-
year period of probation.  We do not impose any costs in this 
stipulated matter. 
¶2 
Attorney Gillette was admitted to the practice of law 
in Minnesota in October 2003.  He was also admitted to the 
practice of law in this state in December 2009.  According to 
the stipulation, Attorney Gillette's most recent professional 
address was a law firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
¶3 
Attorney Gillette has not been the subject of previous 
professional discipline in this state.  His license to practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin, 
however, 
is 
currently 
administratively 
suspended.  In June 2016 his license was suspended for failure 
to comply with mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) 
reporting requirements.  In October 2016 his license was also 
                                                 
1 The stipulation in this matter was filed with the court on 
February 28, 2017, and was promptly taken under advisement.  On 
April 19, 2017, nearly two months later, the OLR filed a 
memorandum in support of the stipulation.  Supreme Court Rule 
22.12 does not provide a formal deadline for filing such a 
memorandum, but this belated submission arrived well after the 
court had deliberated and decided the matter.  Nothing in the 
memorandum has affected the court's decision to accept the 
stipulation. 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
3 
 
suspended for failure to pay bar dues and assessments and for 
failure to file a trust account certificate. 
¶4 
On November 21, 2016, the OLR filed a disciplinary 
complaint alleging that Attorney Gillette should be subject to 
reciprocal discipline due to a 60-day suspension imposed by the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota.  On February 28, 2017, after the 
OLR's complaint had been served on Attorney Gillette, the OLR 
and Attorney Gillette entered into a stipulation whereby 
Attorney Gillette agreed that the facts alleged in the OLR's 
complaint supported the imposition of a 60-day suspension as 
reciprocal discipline. 
¶5 
According 
to 
the 
stipulation 
and 
the 
Minnesota 
disciplinary records attached to the OLR's complaint, Attorney 
Gillette committed a number of violations of the Minnesota Rules 
of Professional Conduct (MRPC) in connection with two client 
matters.   
¶6 
In the first matter, Attorney Gillette and the firm 
with which he was associated were retained to represent a 
husband and wife in connection with possible claims against 
investment brokers due to failed investments.  The firm 
determined in April 2010 that the clients were unlikely to 
prevail on any claims.  From this point forward, Attorney 
Gillette and the firm did no further work on the matter.  
Attorney Gillette was directed to convey the firm's opinion to 
the clients.   
¶7 
Attorney Gillette, however, did not advise the clients 
of this opinion.  To the contrary, he falsely informed the 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
4 
 
husband on multiple occasions over the next five years that he 
was continuing to pursue the matter.  Attorney Gillette even 
went so far as to tell the client that the matter had been 
settled for a substantial sum of money.  Ultimately, Attorney 
Gillette reported his deception to his law firm.  In the time 
period when he had been misleading the client about the progress 
of claims against the brokers, the statute of limitations for 
any such claim expired.   
¶8 
In the second client matter, Attorney Gillette and his 
firm were retained in December 2014 by a check cashing business 
to address a situation where the client believed that its bank 
had improperly reversed a deposit.  The client paid an advanced 
fee to the law firm.  Attorney Gillette, however, failed to 
perform any work on the matter or to take any action to preserve 
any claims the client may have had against the bank.  In May 
2015 the statute of limitations expired for any claim by the 
client against the bank.  As had occurred with the first client 
matter discussed above, ultimately Attorney Gillette reported 
his neglect of the matter to his law firm. 
¶9 
Attorney 
Gillette 
stipulated 
in 
the 
Minnesota 
disciplinary proceeding that his conduct in the two client 
representations had violated MRCP 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 4.1, and 
8.4(c). 
¶10 In its October 10, 2016 disciplinary order, In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Gillette, 886 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 
2016), the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted that Attorney 
Gillette had produced evidence that during the relevant time 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
5 
 
period he had suffered from an untreated mental-health issue, 
for which he had subsequently sought treatment.  He had also 
produced evidence that he was remorseful for his misconduct.  
Ultimately, given this partially mitigating evidence, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota accepted the joint recommendation of 
the parties for a 60-day suspension of Attorney Gillette's 
license to practice law in Minnesota.  The Minnesota order also 
directed Attorney Gillette within one year to successfully 
complete the professional responsibility examination that is 
required for admission to the practice of law in that state.  
Finally, the order also placed Attorney Gillette on probation 
with a list of conditions for a period of two years following 
the reinstatement of his Minnesota license.2 
¶11 Under SCR 22.22(3),3 this court shall impose the 
identical discipline imposed in another jurisdiction, unless one 
                                                 
2 The SCR 22.12 stipulation notes that the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota 
has 
already 
conditionally 
reinstated 
Attorney 
Gillette's license to practice law in that state.  See In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Gillette, 888 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 
2016). 
3 SCR 22.22(3) provides:   
(3) The supreme court shall impose the identical 
discipline or license suspension unless one or more of 
the following is present: 
(a) The procedure in the other jurisdiction was 
so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 
constitute a deprivation of due process.  
(b) 
There 
was 
such 
an 
infirmity 
of 
proof 
establishing the misconduct or medical incapacity that 
the supreme court could not accept as final the 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
6 
 
or more of three exceptions apply.  In his stipulation with the 
OLR, Attorney Gillette states that he does not claim any of the 
exceptions in SCR 22.22(3).  He agrees that this court should 
impose the 60-day suspension of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin sought by the OLR. 
¶12 Attorney Gillette further states that the stipulation 
was not the result of plea bargaining, that he understands the 
misconduct allegations against him and his right to contest the 
matter, and that he is aware of the potential ramifications of 
the stipulated level of discipline.  He acknowledges his right 
to consult with counsel.  He asserts that he is entering into 
the stipulation knowingly and voluntarily, and that his entry 
into the stipulation represents his decision not to contest the 
misconduct allegations or the level of discipline sought by the 
OLR.   
¶13 Having reviewed the matter, we accept the stipulation 
and impose a 60-day suspension of Attorney Gillette's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin, as discipline reciprocal to that 
imposed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.   
¶14 We note, however, that the Minnesota order contained 
additional elements of discipline beyond the imposition of a 60-
day suspension of his license to practice law in that state.  
                                                                                                                                                             
conclusion in respect to the misconduct or medical 
incapacity.  
(c) 
The 
misconduct 
justifies 
substantially 
different discipline in this state.   
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
7 
 
For example, the Minnesota order directed Attorney Gillette to 
complete the professional responsibility examination required 
for admission to the bar of that state and imposed a two-year 
period of probation with a number of specified conditions.  
These elements of the Minnesota disciplinary order are generally 
not imposed in Wisconsin disciplinary proceedings.  In such 
situations, this court orders the respondent attorney to comply 
with the terms and conditions imposed by the disciplinary order 
in the other jurisdiction in order to make the discipline 
identical under SCR 22.22.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hooker, 2010 WI 13, ¶11, 322 Wis. 2d 552, 
779 N.W.2d 419; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moree, 
2004 WI 118, 275 Wis. 2d 279, 684 N.W.2d 667.  Although the 
stipulation spoke in terms of agreeing to the imposition of a 
60-day suspension, it also acknowledged these other terms and 
conditions of the Minnesota disciplinary order.  Consequently, 
we follow our practice of ordering Attorney Gillette to comply 
with them. 
¶15 Because this matter has been resolved through a 
stipulation without the appointment of a referee and the OLR has 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
8 
 
not sought the imposition of any costs, we do not impose them in 
this matter.4 
¶16 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Adam A. Gillette to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective May 31, 2017. 
¶17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Adam A. Gillette shall 
comply with all of the terms and conditions set forth in the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota's order dated October 10, 2016. In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Gillette, 886 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 
2016). 
¶18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Adam A. Gillette shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 In addition to filing a belated memorandum in support of 
the stipulation, the OLR also filed a belated statement of costs 
on April 19, 2017.  It reported counsel fees and disbursements 
in the amount of $469.00, but recommended that the court not 
assess any costs against Attorney Gillette because he had 
entered 
into 
what 
it 
characterized 
as 
a 
"comprehensive 
stipulation" that had avoided the appointment of a referee and 
"the 
expenditure 
of 
significant 
lawyer 
regulation 
system 
resources." 
No. 
2016AP2267-D   
 
9 
 
¶19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement from the 
disciplinary suspension imposed herein.5  
                                                 
5 In 
addition 
to 
obtaining 
reinstatement 
from 
the 
disciplinary suspension imposed by this order, before he is able 
to practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Gillette will also be 
required to complete the procedures for reinstatement from the 
administrative suspensions currently in effect for failure to 
comply with the mandatory CLE reporting requirements, for 
failure to pay applicable bar dues and assessments, and for 
failure to file a trust account certificate. 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶20 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I concur with the per curiam opinion 
accepting the stipulation between Attorney Gillette and OLR and 
suspending Attorney Gillette's license for 60 days as reciprocal 
discipline identical to that imposed by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota. 
¶21 I dissent from the per curiam's order requiring 
Attorney Gillette to comply with the terms and conditions 
imposed by the disciplinary order in Minnesota to make the 
discipline identical under SCR 22.22(3).  
¶22 This proceeding raises two questions for me.   
¶23 First, the proceeding raises the question whether the 
court has extended a stipulation beyond its terms.  Attorney 
Gillette and the OLR did not stipulate to any Minnesota 
discipline other than a 60-day suspension. 
¶24 Second, the proceeding raises the question of what is 
identical discipline in a reciprocal discipline matter.  Supreme 
Court Rule 22.22(3) provides that in reciprocal discipline cases 
this court "shall impose the identical discipline" imposed by 
the other state.   
¶25 Minnesota has imposed forms of discipline on Attorney 
Gillette 
that 
Wisconsin 
typically 
does 
not 
impose.  
Nevertheless, the per curiam imposes this Minnesota discipline 
on Attorney Gillette as part of Attorney Gillette's Wisconsin 
discipline. 
¶26 Two other reciprocal disciplinary proceedings have 
been pending before this court while the instant case has been 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
considered:  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Buzawa, No. 
2016AP2351-D, unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. Apr. 10, 2017; 
separate 
writing 
May 
11, 
2017), 
and 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Peiss, 2017 WI 49, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.  They too present issues about identical reciprocal 
discipline.  
I 
¶27 Attorney Gillette's stipulation with OLR reads, in 
relevant part, as follows:  
10. Gillette agrees that it would be appropriate for 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to impose the level of 
discipline sought by OLR's Director, specifically, a 
60 day suspension of Gillette's license to practice 
law in Wisconsin. (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶28 This is the only provision in the stipulation relating 
to the Minnesota or Wisconsin discipline.   
¶29 OLR's Memorandum in Support of SCR 22.12 Stipulation, 
filed on April 19, 2017, states:  "Gillette and OLR signed a SCR 
22.12 Stipulation requesting the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to 
approve 
the 
parties' 
stipulation 
and 
suspend 
Gillette's 
Wisconsin license to practice law for 60 days based upon the 
Minnesota action."1    
                                                 
1 The per curiam is critical of the length of time (about 
two months) it took the OLR to file this memorandum with the 
court.   
(continued) 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶30 It is evident from the stipulation and the OLR 
memorandum that Attorney Gillette stipulated only to the 60-day 
suspension of his license to practice law in Wisconsin.  He did 
not stipulate to any other reciprocal discipline.  He could have 
so stipulated, but he did not.  He might so stipulate if asked, 
but he has not been asked.   
¶31 Instead, the court takes a short-cut and reads the 
stipulation to include terms not stated.  To respond to this 
criticism that the court has not abided by the parties' 
stipulation, the court in n.4 tries to prove the stipulation is 
broader than its terms.  It bootstraps Litigation Counsel 
William 
Weigel's 
description 
of 
the 
stipulation 
as 
a 
"comprehensive stipulation" in his separate statement of OLR 
costs to mean that Attorney Gillette stipulated to more than the 
60-day suspension.  
¶32 Attorney 
John 
T. 
Payette, 
Assistant 
Litigation 
Counsel, not Attorney Weigel, signed the Complaint and Motion 
for reciprocal discipline on November 21, 2016, the stipulation 
                                                                                                                                                             
I am confident that the OLR Procedure Review Committee 
(Professor Marsha Mansfield, University of Wisconsin Law School, 
Reporter) will examine the time it takes each entity in the 
chain of discipline proceedings to perform its function, 
including the OLR, the Preliminary Review Committee, the 
referee, and this court.  This court's Internal Operating 
Procedures (printed in volume 6 of the Wisconsin Statutes) 
provide that per curiam opinions in attorney disciplinary 
proceedings are prepared by a court commissioner for the court's 
consideration.  Wis. S. Ct. IOP III-H (Feb. 13, 2017). 
Several years ago when I did a "time" study I found what 
appeared to be unwarranted delay at every step.          
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
with Attorney Gillette on February 28, 2017, and the OLR 
Memorandum 
on 
April 
19, 
2017. 
 
OLR 
Attorney 
Payette's 
description of the stipulation, not Attorney Weigel's obvious 
off-hand comment in a document relating to costs, is of import.  
¶33 The instant case is not consistent with Office of 
Lawyer Regulation v. Curtin, 2014 WI 90, 357 Wis. 2d 247, 849 
N.W.2d 747, or In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Milos, 
2012 WI 6, 338 Wis. 2d 316, 808 N.W.2d 128.   
¶34 In Curtin, the stipulation filed by OLR and Attorney 
Curtin requested the court to publicly reprimand Attorney Curtin 
as reciprocal discipline identical to that imposed by Arizona; 
no request was made to impose other discipline imposed by 
Arizona.  Arizona imposed a reprimand, a year of probation, and 
participation in a trust account ethics program.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court imposed only a public reprimand, not the other 
discipline imposed by Arizona.   
¶35 This court does not explain why Attorney Gillette is 
being treated differently than Attorney Curtin, although the key 
aspects of the stipulations in the two cases are the same. 
¶36 In contrast, in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Milos, 2012 WI 6, 338 Wis. 2d 316, 808 N.W.2d 128, the OLR and 
Attorney Milos stipulated to the imposition of discipline 
identical to that imposed by Illinois.  Illinois imposed a 90-
day suspension and directed Attorney Milos to complete the 
Illinois Commission's Professionalism Seminar and to reimburse 
the Client Protection Program Trust Fund.  This court ordered a 
90-day suspension and compliance "with the terms and conditions 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
set forth in the Illinois Supreme Court's order."  This court 
does not explain why Attorney Gillette is being treated the same 
as Attorney Milos although the key aspects of the stipulations 
in the two cases are different.2 
II 
¶37 The court's order imposing the Minnesota terms to make 
the discipline identical in Wisconsin relies on two prior cases: 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moree, 2004 WI 118, 275 
Wis. 2d 279, 281, 684 N.W.2d 667, and In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hooker, 2010 WI 13, 322 Wis. 2d 552, 779 
N.W.2d 419.  Neither case is applicable in the instant case.    
¶38 In Moree, unlike in the instant case, "[t]he OLR and 
Attorney 
Moree 
request 
and 
stipulate 
that 
as 
reciprocal 
discipline this court impose a three-month suspension . . . and 
order him to comply with the terms and conditions established by 
the Illinois Supreme Court."  Moree, 275 Wis. 2d at 281.  Moree 
agreed to imposition of the Illinois conditions.  See also the 
Milos case, described above. 
                                                 
2 For other cases in which the court imposed another state's 
discipline, see In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Waters, 
2016 WI 15, 367 Wis. 2d 279, 876 N.W.2d 145 (the respondent 
attorney did not respond to the court's order to show cause why 
identical reciprocal discipline was unwarranted; the court 
ordered compliance with  restitution and (unstated) conditions 
imposed by Michigan); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Manion, 2016 WI 88, 372 Wis. 2d 34, 886 N.W.2d 371 (the 
respondent attorney did not respond to the court's order to show 
cause why identical reciprocal discipline was unwarranted; the 
court "impose[d] discipline substantially identical to that 
imposed by the Supreme Court of Arizona"; Arizona had ordered 
restitution and (unstated) conditions). 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶39 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hooker, 2010 
WI 13, ¶9, 322 Wis. 2d 552, 779 N.W.2d 419, this court ordered 
Attorney Hooker to show cause why the imposition of discipline 
identical to that imposed by Colorado would be unwarranted.  
Attorney Hooker did not respond to the court order.  The court 
imposed a form of discipline imposed by Colorado even though 
Wisconsin does not typically impose that form of discipline.   
¶40 This court in the instant case has not given Attorney 
Gillette or OLR notice and an opportunity to be heard on the 
issue of what constitutes identical discipline.  Instead, this 
court unilaterally enlarges Gillette's and the OLR's stipulation 
and decides by itself and for itself what constitutes identical 
discipline.       
¶41 As far as I am concerned, this court has overstepped 
the stipulation and has not followed prior reciprocal discipline 
cases in the instant case.      
¶42 The 
instant 
case 
made 
me 
curious 
about 
other 
reciprocal discipline cases.  In searching the OLR discipline 
cases of the last five years, I found 24 reciprocal discipline 
cases to discuss in considering the instant case, In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Buzawa, 
No. 
2016AP2351-D, 
unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. Apr. 10, 2017; separate writing 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
May 11, 2017), and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peiss, 
2017 WI 49, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.3   
¶43 In most of these reciprocal discipline cases in the 
last five years, identical discipline could be and was imposed 
in Wisconsin.     
                                                 
3 In many of these cases, the respondent attorney and OLR 
stipulated to the reciprocal discipline or the respondent 
attorney responded in some fashion to the OLR's complaint.  See, 
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Silberman, 2017 WI 
10, 
373 
Wis. 2d 187, 
890 
N.W.2d 586; 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Jones, 2016 WI 86, 372 Wis. 2d 23, 886 
N.W.2d 92; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle, 2016 WI 
40, 
368 
Wis. 2d 590, 
879 
N.W.2d 114; 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Borman, 2016 WI 25, 367 Wis. 2d 543, 877 
N.W.2d 370; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Aleman, 2015 
WI 112, 365 Wis. 2d 676, 872 N.W.2d 655; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Fischer, 2014 WI 107, 852 N.W.2d 487; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Albert, 2014 WI 105, 852 
N.W.2d 488; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nickitas, 
2014 WI 12, 352 Wis. 2d 641, 843 N.W.2d 438; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Stanek, 2013 WI 41, 347 Wis. 2d 216, 830 
N.W.2d 639; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Butler, 2012 
WI 37, 340 Wis. 2d 1, 811 N.W.2d 807; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Addison, 2012 WI 38, 340 Wis. 2d 16, 813 
N.W.2d 201. 
In several of these cases, the respondent attorney did not 
answer the OLR complaint and motion for reciprocal discipline.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gonzalez, 2016 WI 87, 
372 Wis. 2d 27, 886 N.W.2d 368; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Waters, 2016 WI 15, 367 Wis. 2d 279, 876 N.W.2d 145; In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stockman, 2014 WI 113, 358 
Wis. 2d 341, 854 N.W.2d 370; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hicks, 2013 WI 9, 345 Wis. 2d 265, 826 N.W.2d 41; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Payne, 2012 WI 109, 344 
Wis. 2d 20, 821 N.W.2d 246. 
In a few of these cases the respondent attorney challenged 
the other state's disciplinary proceedings.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Selmer, 2016 WI 71, 371 
Wis. 2d 377, 882 N.W.2d 815;  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Strizic, 2015 WI 57, 362 Wis. 2d 659, 864 N.W.2d 869. 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶44 The other reciprocal discipline cases pose a variety 
of issues.  I have discussed Curtin and Milos above.  Here is a 
synopsis of some of these other reciprocal discipline cases. 
¶45 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Taber, 2012 
WI 9, 338 Wis. 2d 534, 809 N.W.2d 29, Arizona imposed a one-year 
suspension, probation with conditions, and restitution.  The 
attorney did not respond to this court's order to show cause why 
reciprocal discipline was not warranted.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court suspended the attorney's license for one year and ordered 
the attorney to comply with the terms of probation and 
restitution.  For other reciprocal discipline cases in which the 
attorney did not respond to the court's order to show cause and 
the court imposed conditions imposed by the other state not 
generally 
imposed 
in 
Wisconsin, 
see 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Waters, 2016 WI 15, 367 Wis. 2d 279, 876 
N.W.2d 145; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Manion, 2016 
WI 88, 372 Wis. 2d 34, 886 N.W.2d 371. 
¶46 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eichhorn-
Hicks, 2012 WI 18, 338 Wis. 2d 753, 809 N.W.2d 379, Minnesota 
imposed a public reprimand, a one-year suspension, and probation 
for two years with conditions.  Because the period of probation 
(without any violation) expired before this court imposed 
reciprocal discipline, the discipline imposed in Wisconsin was 
identical to that imposed by Minnesota:  a public reprimand and 
one-year suspension.  The issue in Eichhorn-Hicks was whether 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
9 
 
Wisconsin's one-year suspension should be effective as of the 
date of the order or whether it should be retroactive.4       
¶47 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nett, 2014 
WI 106, 358 Wis. 2d 300, 852 N.W.2d 486, Minnesota suspended 
Attorney Nett's Minnesota license with no right to petition for 
reinstatement for a minimum of nine months.  The attorney did 
not timely respond to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's order to 
show cause why reciprocal discipline is not warranted but sent a 
letter to the OLR stating that she did not contest the OLR's 
complaint requesting the court to suspend her license for one 
year.  This court stated it was imposing identical discipline 
and suspended the attorney's Wisconsin license for one year, not 
the nine months to which Minnesota referred.  No explanation 
appears for the one-year suspension rather than nine months. 
¶48 In sum, three cautions arise from the instant case and 
my analysis of the 24 reciprocal discipline cases in the last 
five years:  
(1) 
A stipulation is a stipulation is a stipulation.  If 
the court does not want to adhere to the stipulation, 
it 
must 
take 
appropriate 
steps 
to 
decline 
the 
stipulation. 
 
Although 
this 
court 
just 
cannot 
                                                 
4 Retroactive discipline in Wisconsin to run coterminous 
with the suspension imposed by the other state was also raised 
in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nickitas, 2014 WI 12, 
352 Wis. 2d 641, 843 N.W.2d 438. 
Retroactive imposition of discipline is an issue that comes 
up frequently in various types of discipline cases. 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
10 
 
unilaterally stretch the terms of the stipulation to 
make it suit the court's purposes, it has. 
(2) 
The court should treat similarly situated persons 
similarly.  On the basis of my five-year study, the 
case law in reciprocal discipline is not consistent.  
(3) The 
instant 
case 
and 
the 
numerous 
reciprocal 
discipline cases I summarize above are illustrative of 
foreseeable 
and 
recurring 
problems 
in 
reciprocal 
discipline.  I suggest that the OLR Procedure Review 
Committee (Professor Marsha Mansfield, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Reporter), appointed by the 
court in June 2016, review and revise the Supreme 
Court Rules imposing reciprocal identical discipline 
when a lawyer licensed in Wisconsin is disciplined in 
another state. 
¶49 For the reasons set forth, I dissent from the per 
curiam opinion imposing discipline beyond the 60-day suspension 
to which Attorney Gillette and the OLR stipulated.      
 
No.  2016AP2267-D.ssa 
 
1