Title: Commonwealth v. Williams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12560
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 2019

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SJC-12560 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STANLEY WILLIAMS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 3, 2018. - April 9, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Evidence, Scientific test, Relevancy and materiality, Self-
defense.  Self-Defense.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction 
relief.  Statute, Construction.  Homicide. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 16, 2004. 
 
 
A postconviction motion for forensic testing, filed on 
April 10, 2018, was considered by Constance M. Sweeney, J. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Isaac N. Saidel-Goley, Sarah L. 
Rosenbluth, Sara J. van Vliet, & Sharon L. Beckman, for New 
England Innocence Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Enacted in 2012, see St. 2012, c. 38, G. L. 
c. 278A (chapter 278A) allows those who have been convicted but 
2 
 
 
assert factual innocence to have access to forensic and 
scientific testing of evidence and biological material that has 
the potential to prove their innocence.  G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  
Here, we address whether the defendant, who claims that no crime 
occurred, may make a prima facie case for a chapter 278A 
request, which, as relevant here, includes (1) asserting factual 
innocence, and (2) providing information demonstrating that the 
testing has the potential to result in evidence that is material 
to his identity as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case.  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), (d).  For the 
reasons discussed below, we conclude that he may.1 
Statutory framework.  As an initial matter, only a 
defendant who "asserts factual innocence of the crime for which 
[he or she] has been convicted" is eligible to request 
postconviction forensic testing pursuant to chapter 278A.  G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2.  Those eligible to request such testing must 
satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in chapter 278A, 
which consist of two procedural stages:  a motion stage and, if 
the motion is allowed, a hearing stage.  Commonwealth v. Wade, 
467 Mass. 496, 501 (2014) (Wade II), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016). 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the New 
England Innocence Project, the Boston College Innocence Program, 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and Dennis Maher. 
 
3 
 
 
First, pursuant to § 3, the individual seeking the analysis 
must present by way of motion "information demonstrating that 
the analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the moving party's identification as the perpetrator 
of the crime in the underlying case," among other things.2  G. L. 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 278A, § 3 (b), requires that the movant 
provide the following: 
 
 
"(1) the name and a description of the requested 
forensic or scientific analysis; 
 
 
"(2) information demonstrating that the requested 
analysis is admissible as evidence in courts of the 
commonwealth; 
 
 
"(3) a description of the evidence or biological 
material that the moving party seeks to have analyzed or 
tested, including its location and chain of custody if 
known; 
 
 
"(4) information demonstrating that the analysis has 
the potential to result in evidence that is material to the 
moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the 
crime in the underlying case; and 
 
 
"(5) information demonstrating that the evidence or 
biological material has not been subjected to the requested 
analysis because: 
 
 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed 
at the time of the conviction; 
 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of 
the conviction; 
 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party's 
attorney were not aware of and did not have reason to be 
aware of the existence of the evidence or biological 
material at the time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
4 
 
 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4).  In addition, the movant must include an 
affidavit "stating that [he or she] is factually innocent of the 
offense of conviction and that the requested forensic or 
scientific analysis will support the claim of innocence."  G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (d).  If it chooses, the Commonwealth may provide a 
response "to assist the court" in determining whether the 
defendant's motion meets the preliminary statutory requirements.  
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).  However, the motion stage is 
"essentially nonadversarial."  Wade II, 467 Mass. at 503. 
If the court finds that the preliminary requirements at the 
motion stage have been satisfied and allows the motion, the 
parties proceed to the next step in the process, in which the 
Commonwealth must file a response that "include[s] any specific 
legal or factual objections that [it] has to the requested 
analysis."  G. L. c. 278A, § 4 (c).  The court then will hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  G. L. c. 278A, § 6.  At the hearing, the 
movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each of 
                     
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying 
case was aware at the time of the conviction of the 
existence of the evidence or biological material, the 
results of the requested analysis were admissible as 
evidence in courts of the commonwealth, a reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought the analysis and 
either the moving party's attorney failed to seek the 
analysis or the judge denied the request; or 
 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
 
5 
 
 
the factors enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), including that 
"the requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to [his or her] identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime."3  See G. L. c. 278A, §§ 3 (e), 6, 
7 (b) (4).  If such a showing is made, the court shall allow the 
requested forensic or scientific analysis, the results of which 
may be used to support a motion for a new trial.  See G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b); Wade II, 467 Mass. at 505. 
                     
 
3 The defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; 
 
"(2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to 
establish that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such that the 
results of the requested analysis would lack any probative 
value; 
 
"(3) that the evidence or biological material has not been 
subjected to the requested analysis for any of the reasons 
in [§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v)]; 
 
"(4) that the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case; 
 
"(5) that the purpose of the motion is not the obstruction 
of justice or delay; and 
 
"(6) that the results of the particular type of analysis 
being requested have been found to be admissible in courts 
of the commonwealth." 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b). 
 
6 
 
 
Here, we are concerned with whether a defendant who alleges 
lawful self-defense (1) is eligible to move for chapter 278A 
testing in the first instance by asserting factual innocence as 
required by G. L. c. 278A, § 2; and (2) is able to provide 
"information demonstrating that the analysis has the potential 
to result in evidence that is material to [his or her] 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case" as required by G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4). 
 
Background and prior proceedings.  In 2004, the defendant 
was indicted for murder and unlawful possession of a firearm and 
ammunition.  One year later, the defendant pleaded guilty to the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter, as well as the 
associated weapons charges, and received a sentence of from 
eighteen to twenty years in State prison.4 
 
At the change of plea hearing, the Commonwealth presented 
the following facts.  The defendant and the victim approached 
one another and engaged in a loud verbal argument, and then a 
physical altercation ensued.  A witness observed the victim 
appear to reach for his waistband.  The defendant then took a 
firearm and shot the victim, causing the victim to fall to the 
                     
 
4 The defendant also received a sentence of from three to 
five years in State prison on the weapons charges, to be served 
concurrently with the sentence on the manslaughter charge. 
7 
 
 
ground.  The defendant shot again.  He ran away for a short 
period of time, but he returned, fired again, and then fled. 
 
Although the defendant agreed to the Commonwealth's 
recitation of the facts during his change of plea colloquy, he 
now disputes those facts and asserts his innocence, claiming 
that he acted in self-defense.  He alleged in the affidavit 
accompanying his chapter 278A motion that he grabbed the 
victim's wrist when the victim pulled out a gun, and pushed 
against the victim, at which time he heard two gunshots in close 
succession.  The defendant further alleged that he did not take 
the gun with him when he fled, and that he did not return to 
shoot the victim again.5 
 
The defendant filed two chapter 278A motions in 2013 and 
2016; both were denied.6  In 2018, the defendant filed his third 
chapter 278A motion, requesting that clothing recovered from the 
victim be tested for traces of gunshot residue and that shell 
casings recovered at the crime scene be tested for fingerprints.  
                     
 
5 Pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (d), a judge is precluded 
from using a moving party's guilty plea in the underlying case 
or any incriminating statements made by the movant in finding 
that identity was not or could not have been a material issue in 
the underlying case. 
 
6 The defendant filed these motions pro se and subsequently 
appealed from the orders denying them.  The denial of the 2013 
motion was affirmed.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1121 (2014).  The appeal from the denial of the 2016 
motion was stayed at the defendant's request. 
8 
 
 
The defendant claimed that forensic testing of this evidence 
would show that the weapon belonged to the victim and that the 
defendant shot the victim in self-defense. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a response asserting that the 
defendant was not eligible to request relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2, and that the requested analysis did not meet the 
requirement of G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4).  In a margin 
endorsement, the motion judge denied the defendant's motion "for 
the reasons set forth in the Commonwealth's opposition."  The 
defendant appealed, and we granted his application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying his chapter 278A motion because (1) the defendant 
properly asserted his factual innocence and (2) the requested 
testing has the potential to result in evidence that is material 
to his identification as the perpetrator of the crime.  See 
G. L. c. 278A, §§ 2, 3 (b) (4), (d).  We review the defendant's 
claims on a de novo basis.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 
Mass. 72, 75 (2016) (questions of statutory interpretation are 
reviewed de novo). 
As an initial matter we note that, as is the case with all 
statutes, chapter 278A must be interpreted "according to the 
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
9 
 
 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Millican, 
449 Mass. 298, 300 (2007).  We have previously recognized that 
the Legislature's stated purpose in enacting G. L. c. 278A was 
"to remedy the injustice of wrongful convictions of factually 
innocent persons by allowing access to analyses of biological 
material with newer forensic and scientific techniques . . . 
[to] provide a more reliable basis for establishing a factually 
correct verdict than the evidence available at the time of the 
original conviction."  Wade II, 467 Mass. at 504, quoting 2011 
Senate Doc. No. 753 and 2011 House Doc. No. 2165.  "The 
Legislature intended G. L. c. 278A to make postconviction 
forensic testing easier and faster than it had been for 
defendants who sought such testing in conjunction with motions 
for new trials pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 
435 Mass. 1501 (2001)."7  Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 
301 (2017). 
                     
 
7 "A motion for a new trial [pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001),] is discretionary 
and may be denied without a hearing, and a defendant is not 
entitled to obtain scientific testing of evidence unless he 
makes a prima facie showing that the test results would warrant 
a new trial" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 505 (2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016). 
10 
 
 
As mentioned supra, "the threshold determination to be made 
at the preliminary stage, pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 3, . . . 
is essentially nonadversarial," Wade II, 467 Mass. at 503; the 
Commonwealth may, but need not, provide an initial response.  
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).  And although the motion judge makes a 
preliminary determination as to whether a defendant has included 
all the information required by § 3 based on a review of the 
motion and the supporting documentation, it is not until the 
hearing stage that the defendant must prove the assertions that 
he or she makes in that motion.  See Wade II, supra at 503-504, 
quoting G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (c).  At the motion stage, "[t]he 
judge does not 'make credibility determinations, or . . . 
consider the relative weight of the evidence or the strength of 
the case presented against the [defendant] at trial.'"  Moffat, 
478 Mass. at 296, quoting Wade II, supra at 505-506.  In other 
words, at the motion stage, the movant's burden is low.  See 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 124-125 (2015). 
With these factors in mind, we begin with the plain 
language of the provisions at issue.  See Commonwealth v. 
LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 821 (2016). 
1.  Eligibility requirement.  Chapter 278A makes the 
assertion of factual innocence both a threshold requirement for 
seeking postconviction forensic testing, G. L. c. 278A, § 2, and 
an element of the prima facie case a movant must make before a 
11 
 
 
court will order an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to 
allow such testing, G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (d). 
The chapter defines "factually innocent" as "a person 
convicted of a criminal offense who did not commit that 
offense."  G. L. c. 278A, § 1.  The Commonwealth contends that 
the defendant's claim of self-defense is essentially a claim of 
legal innocence but not factual innocence.  The defendant argues 
that because he alleges facts demonstrating that he was 
convicted based on acts taken in lawful self-defense, he 
properly may assert his factual innocence of manslaughter, the 
crime of which he was convicted.  We agree with the defendant. 
"By employing the phrase 'factually innocent' in G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (d), the Legislature clearly intended to require a 
moving party to assert that the party did not commit the offense 
of which the party was convicted; an assertion of legal 
innocence, such as a belief in an entitlement to a reversal 
based on insufficient evidence or a procedural fault, would not 
meet the plain terms of the statute."  Wade II, 467 Mass. at 
515.  The Commonwealth reasons that because the defendant does 
not deny having committed the act of homicide, he may be legally 
innocent, but cannot claim factual innocence.  This position is 
both contrary to our self-defense jurisprudence and a misreading 
of chapter 278A. 
12 
 
 
First, "we have long recognized that self-defense negates 
the element of 'unlawfulness.'"  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 
Mass. 684, 688 (1976).  See Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
295, 303 (1850) ("Homicide may be lawful or unlawful . . . .  It 
may also be justifiable, and of course lawful, in necessary 
self-defence").  Our jurisprudence has considered self-defense a 
factual issue, as it is directly correlated with the underlying 
facts of the case and whether the defendant acted justifiably 
under the circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 
163, 166-167 (2008).  When a defendant asserts that he or she 
acted in self-defense, the trier of fact must consider whether 
the defendant had "a reasonable ground to believe" that he or 
she "was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm," 
from which the only way to save him- or herself was by using 
deadly force; whether, after availing him- or herself "of all 
proper means to avoid physical combat," resort to deadly force 
was necessary; and whether the amount of force used by the 
defendant "was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of 
the case."  Id. at 167. 
 
Importantly, a claim of self-defense in a homicide case is 
not related to a flaw in the proceedings or a failure on the 
part of the Commonwealth to prove the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Nor is it a mere procedural maneuver to avoid 
a guilty finding.  Rather, a claim of self-defense is a claim 
13 
 
 
that the homicide was justified and, here, for purposes of 
chapter 278A, it is a claim that the movant is factually 
innocent of manslaughter. 
Second, chapter 278A requires the movant to "assert[] 
factual innocence of the crime for which the person has been 
convicted" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  Thus, the 
defendant need not allege that he did not shoot the victim; he 
need only assert that, because he acted in self-defense, he did 
not commit manslaughter, the crime of which he was convicted.  
This assertion meets the "factual innocence" requirement.8 
Accordingly, if a defendant asserts in the affidavit 
accompanying his or her chapter 278A motion that he or she was 
convicted based on acts that do not constitute a crime, the 
defendant has satisfied the threshold eligibility requirement 
set forth in chapter 278A.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 2. 
2.  Section 3 (b) (4) requirement.  At the motion stage of 
chapter 278A, the movant must include in his or her motion 
"information demonstrating that the [requested] analysis has the 
potential to result in evidence that is material to the moving 
                     
 
8 The defendant here asserts, as he must pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A (chapter 278A), that he is factually innocent of 
manslaughter, and that the testing he seeks has the potential to 
fully exonerate him.  Our holding is thus limited to those cases 
in which the defendant alleges that no crime occurred (as 
compared to a case in which a defendant alleged that he or she 
committed a lesser included offense). 
14 
 
 
party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4). 
The Commonwealth claims that the defendant failed to meet 
this requirement, arguing that the identity of the perpetrator 
was not at issue because the fact that the defendant shot the 
victim is undisputed.  In contrast, the defendant claims that, 
as he alleges that no crime occurred, he was wrongly identified 
as "the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case."  
Therefore, the defendant argues that he properly asserted that 
the testing has the potential to be material in proving this 
point.  Reading the provision in full, and in conjunction with 
the statute as a whole, we conclude that chapter 278A may be 
utilized by those defendants who assert that they are innocent 
because no crime occurred. 
In the context of the statute, it is not "identity" broadly 
defined that is at issue; the concept has a particular meaning 
within chapter 278A.  "Identity" is specifically defined in the 
statute as "the moving party's identity as the perpetrator of 
the offense for which the moving party was convicted in the 
underlying case" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 278A, § 1.  
Correspondingly, in G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), the question of 
"the moving party's identification" is referenced in connection 
with "the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case" 
(emphasis added).  Thus, rather than generally referring to the 
15 
 
 
person who took the action, "identification" refers to the 
person who perpetrated the crime in the underlying case.  Here, 
it is undisputed that the defendant was the actor; both sides 
agree that the defendant shot the victim.  However, the 
defendant denies having committed the crime in the underlying 
case, i.e., manslaughter, because he claims self-defense. 
According to the Commonwealth, the use of "the" rather than 
"a" to modify "perpetrator" in the phrase "the perpetrator of 
the crime" in G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), presupposes that "the 
crime" occurred, and the testing must be relevant to determining 
whether the defendant was "the perpetrator" of that crime.  That 
is, the definite article indicates that the Legislature meant to 
refer only to circumstances in which a crime was committed and 
the movant seeks forensic testing that will exclude him or her 
as the perpetrator (and will instead demonstrate the existence 
of a third-party culprit).  This interpretation is flawed in 
that it fails to take into account all of the words in the 
provision.  That is, it renders superfluous the phrase "the 
crime in the underlying case."  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 
527, 537 (2015) ("we 'give effect to all words of a statute, 
assuming none to be superfluous'" [citation omitted]). 
Indeed, nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b) (4), indicates that the Legislature intended to limit 
requests under the chapter to cases in which the movant alleges 
16 
 
 
that someone else, i.e., a third-party culprit, committed the 
crime.9  "We do not read into the statute a provision which the 
Legislature did not see fit to put there, nor add words that the 
Legislature had an option to, but chose not to include."10  
Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial 
Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006). 
On a practical level, a defendant who claims that no crime 
occurred is in the same position as a defendant who claims that 
                     
9 Likewise, nothing in G. L. c. 278A, § 3, or in any other 
provision of chapter 278A suggests that those who claim that no 
crime occurred are barred from relief under the statute.  See 
Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2017) ("When the 
meaning of any particular section or clause of a statute is 
questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts 
of the statute:  otherwise the different sections of the same 
statute might be so construed as to be repugnant, and the 
intention of the [L]egislature might be defeated" [citation 
omitted]).  Indeed, G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (d), requires simply that 
a movant provide an affidavit accompanying his or her chapter 
278A motion that states that the requested testing will support 
a "claim of innocence." 
 
 
10 We note that during the floor debate in both the House 
and the Senate on what would become chapter 278A, although some 
legislators who spoke in support of the bill referenced third-
party culprit scenarios, no legislator sought to limit the 
postconviction access testing to defendants who claimed that 
there was a third-party culprit involved.  See State House News 
Service (House Sess.), Feb. 8, 2012, at 5 (statement of Rep. 
John V. Fernandes); State House News Service (House Sess.), Feb. 
8, 2012, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Eugene L. O'Flaherty); State 
House News Service (Senate Sess.), July 28, 2011, at 2-3 
(statement of Sen. Cynthia Stone Creem).  See Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting Wright v. 
Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996) 
(statutory interpretation must be supported by history of 
statute). 
17 
 
 
he or she did not commit the crime that occurred:  both assert 
innocence and, if true, neither is more culpable than the other.  
Absent statutory language to the contrary, there is no reason to 
treat these two categories of defendants differently.  Moreover, 
considering the structure of the statute, it would be illogical 
to interpret chapter 278A so that a defendant who alleges that 
no crime occurred would be eligible to move for testing pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278A, § 2, only to be stymied at the motion stage by 
never being able to clear the G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), 
hurdle, especially given that the Legislature intentionally set 
the bar low at the motion stage.  See Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 
572, 578-579 (2006) ("we will not adopt a construction of a 
statute that creates 'absurd or unreasonable' consequences" 
[citation omitted]). 
Finally, a liberal reading of G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), 
fully comports with the purpose of chapter 278A, i.e., "to 
remedy the injustice of wrongful convictions of factually 
innocent persons" by "provid[ing] a more reliable basis for 
establishing a factually correct verdict," Wade II, 467 Mass. at 
504; our reading also aligns with the oft-stated rule that 
remedial statutes are to be interpreted broadly, see, e.g., Neff 
v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 73 
(1995). 
18 
 
 
Accordingly, a defendant who asserts that the requested 
testing has the potential to result in evidence that is material 
to his or her identity as the perpetrator of the crime because 
no crime in fact occurred satisfies the § 3 (b) (4) requirement.  
Here, the defendant has satisfied that threshold burden by 
asserting that he acted in lawful self-defense.11 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
the G. L. c. 278A, § 3, motion is reversed.  The case is hereby 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
11 Of course, in order to obtain the testing the defendant 
seeks, he still must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence each of the factors enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b), including that "the requested analysis has the 
potential to result in evidence that is material to the moving 
party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  Here, that means 
that the defendant will have to demonstrate by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the analysis has the potential to result in 
evidence that is material to proving that no crime occurred.