Title: MCCLURE v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY
Citation: 142 P.3d 390, 2006 OK 42
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2006

MCCLURE v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY Annotate this Case MCCLURE v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY 2006 OK 42 142 P.3d 390 Case Number: 103199 Decided: 06/20/2006 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DANIEL J. MCCLURE, Plaintiff, v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY, Defendant. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA ¶0 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified a single first impression question of Oklahoma law under the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Whether the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (Testing Act), We answer the question, "yes." CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. David R. Blades, Armstrong & Lowe, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for plaintiff. Steven A. Broussard, Robert A. Fitz-Patrick, Stephanie T. Gentry, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for defendant. WATT, C.J.: ¶1 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified a single first impression question of Oklahoma law to this Court under the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Whether the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (Testing Act), We answer the question "yes." Our determination is supported by: the regulatory scheme as applied to ambiguous statutory language; rules of statutory construction; and extant jurisprudence. CERTIFIED FACTS ¶2 The plaintiff, Daniel J. McClure (McClure/employee), began working for the defendant, ConocoPhillips Company (ConocoPhillips/employer), in May of 1978. On February 7, 2005, after being contacted by Ruth Betts, the employer's breath alcohol technician (BAT)4 responsible for random alcohol and drug testing5 for the employer, McClure submitted to an alcohol breath test. ¶3 The employee's initial alcohol test was conducted at approximately 10:00 a.m. using an EBT - a device which analyzes breath samples and calculates the blood alcohol concentration level. The first test indicated that the employee had a blood alcohol level of 0.055 gm/dl. Between fifteen and twenty minutes later -- after the EBT tested an "air blank" demonstrating a reading of 0.00 gm/dl, McClure submitted to a second test on the same EBT device as utilized for the initial test. The second test showed the employee with a blood alcohol level of 0.053 gm/dl. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on the same day, McClure had a blood specimen collected for an independent alcohol analysis. The test indicated a serum alcohol concentration of .0286 g/dl. It is undisputed that the two tests conducted by ConocoPhillips exceeded the employer's policy level of 0.04 gm/dl and the Oklahoma Health Department's level of 0.02 gm/dl.6 ¶4 The question certified arises from ConcocoPhillips' termination of McClure on February 8, 2005. The employee filed a complaint in the federal district court on April 14, 2005, alleging violation of the Testing Act and wrongful discharge. McClure sought: declaratory relief to determine the rights, status and other legal relationships between the parties; compensatory and punitive damages along with lost wages or, in the alternative, reinstatement with full benefits and salary; and costs and attorney fees. On November 10, 2005, McClure moved for summary judgment asserting that ConocoPhillips violated the Testing Act by failing to perform a confirmation test on the same breath sample using a different chemical means of equal or greater scientific reliability than the initial screening. Also on the 10th, the employer filed its motion for summary judgment arguing that the tests resulting in the employee's termination were conducted in full compliance with the Testing Act and the administrative rules promulgated pursuant thereto.7 ¶5 Recognizing that the lawsuit involved an issue of first impression Oklahoma law, the parties joined in a certification motion. On March 10, 2006, the federal court certified the question to this Court pursuant to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. 2001 §§1601, et seq. We set a briefing cycle which was concluded on May 9, 2006, with the simultaneous filing of McClure's reply brief and ConocoPhillips' response brief. DISCUSSION ¶6 a. Neither the Oklahoma Standards for Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, ¶7 McClure does not attack the BAT's qualifications or the procedures she utilized. Neither does the employee contest the results of either the initial or the second EBT test, nor does he allege that the device utilized was not an approved testing machine or that it malfunctioned. Rather, he argues that his termination violated the Testing Act for the reason that his initial blood alcohol test was not confirmed as contemplated by the Act.8 Because the second test was conducted utilizing the same EBT on a different breath sample than the initial test, he asserts that the second test did not meet the definition of a "confirmation test"9 within the meaning of the Testing Act. ConocoPhillips contends that neither the Testing Act nor the administrative rules promulgated in its support require an employer to confirm an initial positive breath alcohol test result by a second test performed using a different EBT on the same breath sample. We agree with this contention. ¶8 1) The Legislature's utilization of the phrase requiring that a test result be "confirmed" before an employee is subject to dismissal pursuant to ¶9 In 1993, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act , 40 O.S. 2001 §551 et. seq. The Legislature designated the State Board of Health (Board of Health) as the entity to implement and enforce the Act, granting it the "power and duty to promulgate, prescribe, amend and repeal rules for . . . the establishment and regulation of minimum testing standards and procedures . . .".10 Furthermore, the Legislature specifically provided that employers choosing to conduct drug or alcohol testing of job applicants or employees should be governed by the Testing Act's provisions and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto.11 In 1994, the Board of Health responded to the legislative directive by enacting a comprehensive set of rules for drug and alcohol testing. ¶10 The employee contends that two statutory provisions control the cause. First, he directs us to 40 O.S. 2001 §562 providing in pertinent part: "A. No disciplinary action, except for a temporary suspension or a temporary transfer to another position, may be taken by an employer against an employee based on a positive test result unless the test result has been confirmed by a second test using gas chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or an equivalent scientifically accepted method of equal or greater accuracy as approved by rule of the State Board of Health, at the cutoff levels determined by Board rule. . . ." [Emphasis added.] Second, he finds support in 40 O.S. Supp. 2005 §552 providing in pertinent part: ". . . 4. 'Confirmation test' means a drug or alcohol test on a sample to substantiate results of a prior drug or alcohol test on the same sample and which uses different chemical principles and is of equal or greater accuracy than the prior drug or alcohol test . . ." [Emphasis provided.] ¶11 McClure stresses that the highlighted language is clear and unambiguous and not subject to judicial interpretation.12 He argues that the statutory definition of a "confirmation test" as being on the same sample utilizing different chemical principles clearly negates the employer's utilization of the same EBT on a different breath sample as a basis for his termination. ConocoPhillips emphasizes that the statutorily defined term is not utilized in 40 O.S. 2001 §562 which refers instead to a "test result [which] has been confirmed." The employers' position is that there is an ambiguity in the statutes requiring this Court's interpretation. ¶12 In determining whether a statute applies to a given set of facts, we focus on legislative intent13 which controls statutory interpretation.14 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective15 considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.16 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.17 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end18 championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them.19 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.20 If a statute is ambiguous, we may defer to an administrative agency's interpretation.21 ¶13 The language of the two statutes is not so clear as to be beyond interpretation. We recognize that the Legislature may always exercise the prerogative to define words or phrases appearing in legislative enactments and, where a statute contains a definition, the definition is binding on the courts. ¶14 Here, not only did the Legislature not use the same term in the employee disciplinary provision as it did in the definitions section, it utilized the term in only two other places in the Testing Act. Section 557 of title 40 mentions confirmation tests in association with facilities doing urine analysis for "initial or confirmation tests" ¶15 Failure to use the precise language of the defined term in relation to breath alcohol tests and in the employee disciplinary provision renders the language utilized in its stead subject to judicial consideration - it is unclear whether the provisions of the defined term require an employer to scrutinize the same breath sample originally tested a second time utilizing different chemical principles before an employee may be terminated for a positive test. Certainly, there is nothing in the statutory text unambiguously requiring the utilization of such testing procedures. Furthermore, the Legislature has left the issue of all sample collection, testing and preservation to the Board of Health -- specifically leaving the issue of specimen splitting for independent analysis to the Board's discretion. ¶16 2) ¶17 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, ¶18 The Board of Health is authorized to promulgate rules and procedures for the establishment and regulation of minimum testing standards and procedures for drug and alcohol testing. ¶19 The year following the Legislature's adoption of the Testing Act, the Board of Health followed with rules. Statutory construction by agencies charged with the law's enforcement is given persuasive effect especially when made shortly after the statute's enactment. ¶20 There is an ambiguity in the statutory scheme when ¶21 3) Rules of statutory construction do not support this Court's reading of exceptions into the regulatory scheme requiring the utilization of different EBT devices on a single breath sample. ¶22 Having determined that EBTs may be utilized both for initial and confirmation breath alcohol testing, we must now address whether either the Testing Act or the agency rules require that a different device than the one utilized in the initial testing is required when a confirmation test is performed. Furthermore, we must also consider whether the same breath sample must be utilized in both tests. ¶23 The Testing Act does not designate a specific mechanism for breath alcohol testing and nothing in the agency rules require different EBTs to be available or to be utilized for initial and confirmation testing. Rather, only when an EBT fails to register 0.00 when testing an air blank before the second test is administered, is the use of a different device required. ¶24 The EBT is a highly reliable machine, approved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for breath alcohol testing. ¶25 The same rules of construction apply to administrative rules and regulations as to statutes. ¶26 4) The answer to the certification question is supported by extant jurisprudence. ¶27 It has long been settled that the federal due process clause does not require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples of suspected drunk drivers in order for results of breath-analysis tests to be admissible in criminal prosecutions. ¶28 In Mississippi Dept. of Corrections v. Gooden, 766 So. 2d 783, 785 (Miss.App. 2000), the employee argued on appeal that the confirmation test forming the basis of his discharge was inadequate because a single EBT machine was used for both the initial and the second breath alcohol test. Considering a statutory definition similar to the definition of "confirmation test" found in ¶29 More instructive is International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Federal Highway Admin., 56 F.3d 243 (D.C.Cir. 1995). In Teamsters, the Union asserted that Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) regulations and Department of Transportation (DOT) rules violated the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act. Like the Board of Health's regulations here, DOT rules required that EBTs be employed to determine an employee's alcohol level. As does McClure, the Union attacked the DOT testing regulations as defective because they did not require that a "split specimen" sample be retained when alcohol testing was performed using an EBT. The Union's charge against the FHWA regulations was based on their failure to require at least two supervisors to observe an employee before concluding that there was a reasonable suspicion of alcohol use. ¶30 The federal court dismissed both claims. As to the attack on the FHWA regulations, the court refused to read an exception into the rules requiring additional protection not specifically provided in the statutory scheme -- here, neither the statutes nor the Board of Health's rules provide that two EBT machines must be utilized in the initial and confirmation testing procedures. ¶31 In determining that it was unnecessary for breath samples to be retained for separate tests, the district court considered a statutory provision requiring that "each specimen be considered" along with the legislative directive for the DOT to adopt testing procedures for "the collection of specimen samples." Because the statutory scheme referred to "specimen samples" only in relation to urine and blood -- the Oklahoma Testing Act refers to confirmation testing in relation to urine, CONCLUSION ¶32 Regulations promulgated by the Board of Health make it clear that EBT devices are appropriate for both initial and confirmation testing. There is nothing in either the statutory or the regulatory language specifically requiring that employers utilize different machines for the first and second tests or that they preserve a breath sample from the initial test to be analyzed a second time. The question answered conforms with: the regulatory scheme as applied to ambiguous statutory language; rules of statutory construction; and extant jurisprudence. CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. WATT, C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ. - CONCUR. WINCHESTER, V.C.J., - NOT PARTICIPATING. FOOT