Title: Grover Reed v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2191
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida
_________________________
Nos. SC02-2191 & SC03-558
_________________________
GROVER REED,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_________________________
GROVER REED,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,
Respondent.
[April 15, 2004]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Grover Reed appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions
the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1),
-2-
(9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s order and
deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
On direct appeal, this Court summarized the underlying facts of Reed’s
crimes as follows:
In December of 1985 Reed, accompanied by his woman friend and
two young children, arrived in Jacksonville homeless and destitute. 
Through Traveler's Aid they were given shelter in the home of the
Reverend Ervin Oermann, a Lutheran minister.  They stayed with
Reverend Oermann and his wife, Betty, for just over a week but were
asked to leave when Reverend Oermann discovered that Reed had
drug paraphernalia.  However, Reed continued to receive aid from the
Oermanns in the form of money and transportation.  Eventually the
Oermanns began to feel they were being used and withdrew all
support.  Reed resented the discontinuance of aid and vowed to get
even.
On February 27, 1986, Reverend Oermann returned home from
a night class and found his wife, Betty, dead on the living room floor. 
An autopsy showed she had been strangled, raped, and stabbed
repeatedly in the throat.  Found in the house was a distinctive baseball
cap.  For some time this cap was the only lead police had, so they
produced a television recreation of the crime and showed the cap. 
One viewer recognized the cap as being much like one Reed wore. 
Further investigation revealed that Reed was last seen wearing his cap
on the day Mrs. Oermann was killed.  Ultimately, he was arrested.
The most significant evidence of Reed's guilt may be
summarized as follows:
(a) Witnesses said they had seen Reed wearing his baseball cap
on the day of the murder before the probable time of death but not
thereafter.  They positively identified the cap as Reed's because of the
presence of certain stains and mildew.
(b) Reed's fingerprints were found on checks that had been
-3-
taken from the Oermann home and had been found in the yard.
(c) An expert witness gave testimony that hairs found on the body and in the
baseball cap were consistent with Reed's hair.
(d) Another expert witness gave testimony that the semen
found in the body could have been Reed's.
(e) Reed's cellmate, Nigel Hackshaw, gave testimony that Reed
had admitted breaking into the Oermann house and killing Mrs.
Oermann.
The jury found Reed guilty [of first-degree murder, sexual
battery, and robbery].  Neither side presented additional evidence in
the penalty phase.  After hearing arguments by counsel, the jury
recommended death by an eleven-to-one vote.  The judge delayed
sentencing in order that a presentence investigation could be
completed.  After receiving the PSI and after considering additional
mitigating evidence presented by Reed, the trial judge sentenced him
to death.  The judge found six aggravating factors [n.] and nothing in
mitigation.
[n.]  They were:  (1) The defendant was previously
convicted of other felonies involving the use or threat of
violence to the person.  (2) The capital felony was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of sexual battery.  (3) The capital felony was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest.  (4) The capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain.  (5) The capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  (6) The capital felony was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification.
Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203, 204-05 (Fla. 1990).  On direct appeal, this Court
affirmed Reed’s convictions and death sentence, striking two aggravating
circumstances, cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) and prior violent felony
1.  While the circuit court had summarily denied Reed’s ineffective
assistance claims because he invoked the attorney-client privilege, thereby
“depriv[ing] himself of any prima facie presumption of correctness,” this Court
held that Reed waived his attorney-client privilege when he filed a postconviction
motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094,
1096-97 (Fla. 1994).
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993).
-4-
convictions, but holding that the elimination of those aggravating circumstances
would not have affected Reed’s sentence because there remained four aggravating
circumstances balanced against a total absence of mitigating circumstances.  Id. at
207.
In 1992, Reed filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for
postconviction relief, which the circuit court summarily denied.  On appeal, this
Court remanded for the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Reed’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims1 and affirmed the denial of all other
claims.  See Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1994).  Thereafter, various
administrative and practical matters appear to have delayed the proceedings. 
However, in 1996, Reed filed an amended motion, the State responded, and the
circuit court eventually held a Huff2 hearing in August 2001 and an evidentiary
hearing on February 19-22, 2002.  After the Huff hearing, the circuit court
3.  Those claims were that his trial counsel failed to object to the State’s
allegedly race-based use of peremptory challenges; failed to obtain a jury
instruction that a felony murder determination is not, in itself, a sufficient
aggravator to justify the death penalty; failed to bring a motion before the trial
court to vacate the judgment and sentence after this Court struck two aggravators
on direct appeal; and failed to object to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and
CCP jury instructions.
4.  Those claims were that there was newly discovered evidence, which was
based on a State witness’s recantation, and numerous claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, which included that Reed’s counsel (1) failed to consult
independent hair, serologyst, or fingerprint experts; (2) failed to present expert
serological testimony regarding Reed’s nonsecretor status; (3) failed to present an
alibi defense; (3) failed to effectively impeach Nigel Hackshaw; (4) failed to
challenge the chain of custody; (4) failed to object to prosecutorial references to
the victim as a minister’s wife and to the negative characterizations of Reed; (5)
conceded Reed’s guilt and that the crime was heinous during closing argument; (6)
failed to present mitigating evidence of family background or psychiatric
testimony; and (7) failed to object to statements indicating that the defense had the
burden of proving mitigators outweighed aggravators.
-5-
summarily denied four of Reed’s ineffective assistance claims3 and denied all
other claims after the evidentiary hearing.4  Reed now appeals the circuit court’s
denial of twelve of his postconviction claims and petitions this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus.
RULE 3.850 APPEAL
Reed’s first claim is that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his
claim of ineffective assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to object to
peremptory strikes of several African-American jurors by the State.  As this Court
-6-
noted on direct appeal:
During the course of voir dire, the prosecutor used eight of his ten
peremptory strikes to excuse blacks from the jury.  After both sides
had expended their peremptories, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).  At this
point, Mr. Bateh, the prosecutor, asked to explain his reasons for
striking the jurors.  The court stated:
Anyway, I'm well aware if the court determines that
there's a prima facie showing of exclusion of jurors on a
racial basis that it requires the State to make some
showing to the court as to why they excluded them for
other than racial basis, which Mr. Bateh is volunteering
to do without me making a finding is what I understand
you're saying.
After listening to the prosecutor's explanation for striking the
black jurors, the following discussion ensued:
THE COURT:  All right.  The state, of course, has
submitted to a voluntary Neil inquiry, in essence, in this
regard without the Court making an initial determination
that it was necessary.  The two observations—and I don't
have the statistics in front of me, but—and I'm not basing
this decision on statistics, but I think we're all aware that
somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 percent of the
population of the registration in Duval County is black.
I'm not sure those are accurate, but I think it's in that
neighborhood.  The composition of this jury right now,
the present composition of the 12 jurors, there's two, 
which makes 16 and two-thirds of the jury is black of the
12.  There's no blacks as far as alternates are concerned.
Might I assume the victim in the case is white?
MR. BATEH:  That’s correct, Your Honor.
MR. NICHOLS:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  The defendant is white.  I don't
-7-
question his standing to raise the question.  There is a
standing to raise the question, but taking the
representations of Mr. Bateh, I find that the challenges
exercised against the blacks are not based purely upon
race or racial discrimination and, consequently, I will
deny any motion for a mistrial or more properly,
probably, a motion to strike the entire panel, but, at any
rate, I deny the motion on that basis.
Reed, 560 So. 2d at 205.  Reed argues that, after the prosecutor gave nonracially
prejudicial reasons for the strikes, his trial counsel rendered deficient performance
by not following up and pointing out that the prosecutor’s reasons were illogical. 
However, it is clear from the above summary of these proceedings that trial
counsel objected to the strikes, and the trial court took the objection into
consideration.  Although Reed alleges his counsel did not make a strong enough
argument that the jurors were challenged because of their race, the trial court
apparently assumed arguendo that that a prima facie showing had been made and
nonetheless found the prosecutor’s reasons sufficient.  Furthermore, Reed raised
the issue on direct appeal, arguing the prosecutor’s reasons did not meet the race-
neutral test mandated in Neil.  Reed’s brief to this Court challenged the validity of
each of the specific reasons given by the prosecutor, and this Court found the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reed’s motion for mistrial.  Thus, this
issue has been litigated and was properly found to be procedurally barred, "even if
-8-
couched in ineffective assistance language."  Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d
263, 265 (Fla. 1996).
Reed’s second claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding his trial counsel’s failure to retain a hair expert. 
With regard to this and all other ineffective assistance claims, the test to be applied
by the circuit court is two-pronged:  the defendant must show both that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Additionally,
this Court’s standard of review is two-pronged:  (1) this Court must defer to the
circuit court’s findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial
evidence supports them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the
deficiency and prejudice prongs.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033
(Fla. 1999) ("Thus, under Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs
are mixed questions of law and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower
court's factual findings.").
The victim was murdered approximately two months after the period when
Reed lived in the victim’s home.  After her murder, hair evidence was collected
from a baseball cap found near the body and in “sweepings” from the victim’s
clothing and pubic hair.  At trial, the State presented a hair expert, who testified
5.  Nichols testified that he reached that conclusion on the basis of the
following.  During the course of representation, Reed suggested he had consensual
sex with the victim, but someone else had killed her.  When questioned regarding
-9-
the baseball cap hairs and one hair obtained from the clothing were
microscopically the same as Reed’s head hair sample and that one of the loose
hairs found among the victim’s pubic hair was microscopically the same as Reed’s
pubic hair sample.  At the evidentiary hearing below, Reed introduced the
testimony of Dr. Dale Nute for the purpose of showing how a hair expert could
have suggested cross-examination questions revealing the comparatively low
reliability of hair comparisons and provided information regarding alternative
means of hair transference.
In rejecting many of Reed’s ineffectiveness claims, the circuit court noted
generally that Reed’s trial counsel, Richard Nichols, was and remains an
experienced defense attorney, well known to the Bar in the Fourth Circuit, who by
the time he represented Reed, had been involved in fifteen to twenty prior murder
cases both as an assistant state attorney and a criminal defense attorney.  The
circuit court found Nichols’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing to be credible and
to reveal sound tactical and ethical decisions devolved from his conclusion that
Reed effectively had admitted that he was in fact responsible for the rape and
murder of the victim.5  With specific regard to the failure to retain a hair expert,
his fingerprint on the victim’s check that was found in the backyard, Reed’s
response suggested surprise that he had dropped it.  When confronted with the
testimony of Nigel Hackshaw reporting Reed’s jailhouse confession, Reed acted
annoyed, commenting that he did not expect Hackshaw to cooperate with the State
and did not expect that his statements would be repeated.  And when asked about
witnesses who would establish an alibi, Reed intimated that it would be a waste of
trial counsel’s time to look for alibi witnesses.
-10-
the circuit court found Reed had “failed to offer anything to indicate that there was
anything incorrect about the state’s hair evidence at the trial or that there was
anything detrimental about the manner in which it was presented.”  State v. Reed,
No. 86-6123-CF at 7 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. order filed Aug. 26, 2002) (postconviction
order).  Furthermore, the court concluded that Nute’s testimony “failed to offer
anything about hair, shedding hair, or the transference of shedding hairs that
would not already be known by an experienced criminal defense lawyer.”  Id. at 8. 
Finally, the court noted that the presence of hair consistent with Reed’s hair in the
baseball cap was less significant than the positive identification of Reed’s cap
itself and testimony that it was last seen in his possession on the day of the
murder.
Essentially, the circuit court found:  (1) that there was no deficient
performance, because trial counsel had a reason to believe that efforts to test the
State’s hair evidence would be fruitless; and (2) that there was no prejudice,
because the employment of a hair expert would not have assisted the defense.  We
-11-
find no error in these conclusions.  Nute testified that if he had been employed by
trial counsel, he would have advised the defense to have reexamined the single
most critical piece of hair evidence, the pubic hair.  However, given Reed’s
incriminating statements, trial counsel could not be found deficient under the
standards of Strickland for not having the hair reexamined.  See Gudinas v. State,
816 So. 2d 1095, 1101-02 (Fla. 2002) (finding no ineffective assistance in not
pursuing DNA testing in light of incriminating statements by Gudinas to his
attorneys and other inculpating physical evidence).  Nute also testified that he
could have provided a “not very probable but . . . plausible way” the pubic hair
could have been transferred without being involved in a rape.  The circuit court
clearly found this testimony insufficient to establish the prejudice prong of
Strickland, and we agree.  Finally, regarding the head hairs, Nute testified a hair
expert could have suggested some possible scenarios to explain their presence
because “hairs are so easily shed, particularly head hairs, and they are so easily
transferred and picked up by other items of clothing that it’s—you can always
come up with a possible scenario.”  However, the fact that hairs shed and are
easily transferred is within the average person’s realm of knowledge.  We find no
error in the conclusion that trial counsel did not provide deficient performance by
failing to retain an expert to explain to him a fact commonly known.  Therefore,
6.  Although Reed’s claim here focused upon the failure to retain a hair
expert, he generally argued that trial counsel failed to test the State’s evidence as
severely as possible.  Trial counsel indicated at the evidentiary hearing that even
in cases where he believes the defendant is guilty, it is his “obligation to hold the
state’s feet to the fire and make sure the evidence is legally gathered and legally
presented and legally sufficient.”  The circuit court expressly found trial counsel’s
testimony to be credible.  But even assuming arguendo that he could have more
severely tested the State’s hair evidence by the suggestion of other means of
transference, there is no reasonable probability that but for any failure to suggest
alternative scenarios the result of the proceeding would have been different.  The
circuit court correctly noted that the identification of Reed’s hat was the more
telling evidence.  Indeed, when noting the most significant evidence, this Court
listed the hat identification and fingerprint evidence before the hair evidence.
-12-
we affirm the denial of this claim.6
Reed’s third claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to retain a serology expert and
failure to challenge the State’s blood-type evidence.  At trial, the State presented
the testimony of Paul Doleman, a crime lab analyst specializing in forensic
serology.  Doleman testified that at that time forensic serology could not produce
positive identification but, rather, could only include or exclude an individual as
part of a certain percentage of the population that could have contributed a
particular body fluid.  Doleman then testified that the victim was type O secretor
and that Reed was type O nonsecretor.  He explained a secretor “is an individual
who will demonstrate their blood type . . . in their body fluids other than blood,”
while a nonsecretor “is an individual who does not demonstrate their blood type . .
-13-
. in their other body fluids other than blood.”  Doleman tested the vaginal swab
taken from the victim and found that it contained semen.  He also detected
antigenic activity “consistent with or . . . equivalent to blood type O.”  Doleman
then stated:
Having determined the blood type and the secretor status of Betty
Oermann and having determined the blood type and the secretor
status of Grover Reed and having determined that H antigenic activity
was present on the vaginal swab, the seminal fluid and spermatozoa
were present on the vaginal swab, I am able to make a determination
that Grover Reed falls into the population, the male population, that
could have had intercourse with Betty Oermann.
During cross-examination, Reed’s trial counsel elicited further testimony that,
given the victim’s blood type and the results of the testing, the percentage of the
male population that could have been the source of the semen was approximately
fifty-six to fifty-seven percent.
Although neither the State nor trial counsel asked Doleman to elaborate
further on how he reached the conclusion that Reed could have been the source,
the conclusion is not illogical.  The implicit reasoning is that when a vaginal swab
from a woman who is known to be type O secretor is tested and that swab is found
to contain semen as well as vaginal fluid, the discovery of type O secretor alone
indicates one of two possible scenarios:  (1) that both the vaginal fluid and the
semen came from type O secretors; or (2) that the vaginal fluid came from a type
-14-
O secretor and the semen came from a nonsecretor of any blood type.  In other
words, testing in this case indicated that the semen could have derived from a type
O secretor or any type nonsecretor.  Therefore, Reed, a nonsecretor, fell within the
male population from which the semen could have derived.  Unfortunately,
because neither side asked Doleman to further explain how he reached his
conclusion, his testimony could have been interpreted as inconsistent.  This is
illustrated by a note sent to the judge from a juror prior to jury instructions, which
read in part:
[T]he witness said that he had examined the sperm in question, and
that the blood type obtained from it was the same as that of Grover
Reed.
. . .[A]s I understand it, [Reed’s] blood type can not be obtained
from his saliva or sperm.
What I would like to know is whether or not his testimony is
consistent to the fact that the sperm could and did contain Grover
Reed’s blood type.
Due to juror confusion, the judge permitted the court reporter to re-read to the jury
Doleman’s testimony on direct and cross-examination.
Reed here argues that his trial counsel should have used the information that
Reed was a nonsecretor to challenge Doleman’s conclusion and would have been
properly advised to do so if he had hired a blood-type expert.  Reed again relied on
Nute at the evidentiary hearing to support this claim.  Nute testified that if he had
-15-
been retained, he would have advised trial counsel regarding blood groups, the
concept of secretor versus nonsecretor status, and “how to ask the questions
involved in that.”  Specifically, Nute testified:
[S]ince there is no test to determine whether the—in a mixture
whether [the antigen activity] came from the semen or from the
vaginal secretion that you can’t automatically assume since you know
that the vaginal secretions have antigens in them, since she was a
secretor, you can’t automatically assume, well, the semen doesn’t. 
The semen also could have it and if there are a couple scenarios, that
depending on how much the mixture there were between the semen
and the vaginal secretion . . . that it was likely that the semen could
have come from a person, an O person who had the antigen present in
their semen which would have increased the number of people who
could have done it considerably but it would have also excluded Mr.
Reed since he was a nonsecretor and since you couldn’t tell whether
the semen itself was a—from a nonsecretor or not that point should
have been brought out very strongly in the trial.
Nute summarized his point by stating that the testing could not have indicated
whether the semen came from a nonsecretor or secretor and therefore could neither
include nor exclude Reed as the source of the semen.  However, when asked
whether “the only true thing” that could be said about the blood-type evidence was
“that the defendant could have been in that majority of all American males, 56
percent that could have contributed the semen,” Nute answered that that was
correct.  And, on cross-examination, Nute acknowledged the correctness of
Doleman’s finding that Reed fell within the fifty-six to fifty-seven percent of the
-16-
male population that could have had intercourse with the victim.
According to trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the
strategy with regard to the State’s blood-type evidence was to show that it could
not specifically identify the source and could only place someone in a large group. 
When asked if he felt relatively well versed in the science of ABO blood typing at
that time, trial counsel stated it was a “pretty simple proposition” and that he had
had many prior cases involving blood testimony.
While Reed contends that his trial counsel should have further challenged
this testimony, we find that the circuit court did not err in concluding that trial
counsel’s consultation with an independent serologist would not have changed the
statistical numbers in any way.  As explained above, Doleman’s final conclusion
that the discovery of type O secretor alone in the vaginal swab indicated that the
semen could have derived from a type O secretor or any type nonsecretor was not
illogical.  Given Nute’s own admission that Doleman correctly concluded Reed
“could have been in that majority of all American males, 56 percent that could
have contributed the semen,” we find no error in the conclusion that trial counsel’s
failure to question the manner in which Doleman reached that percentage was not
deficient performance.  Rather, it appears that trial counsel took the most
appropriate approach by eliciting Doleman’s further testimony that a very high
-17-
percentage, fifty-six to fifty-seven percent, of all males could have contributed the
semen.  Therefore, we find no error in the denial of this claim.
Reed’s fourth claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to retain a fingerprint expert.  Trial
testimony indicated that the victim kept personal checks in her wallet, after the
crime some of her checks were found on the ground in her backyard, and her
wallet was found in a canal near her house.  The State presented the testimony of
Bruce Scott, a former Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) latent
fingerprint examiner, who tested the checks for fingerprints and found one print of
value.  Scott’s comparison of that print to Reed’s known fingerprints resulted in a
positive identification.
Scott testified that he developed the latent print through a chemical
application of ninhydrin acetone solution that causes latent prints to become
visible through a chemical color reaction.  He stated that a latent print will turn a
light pink to an extremely dark purple when the solution is applied and that the
colors “usually have an indication of strength . . . meaning the concentration of the
latent print, whether the person was perspiring heavily or whether the person
would handle it normally and also how long the print possibly might have been on
that check.”  He described the print on the victim’s check as producing an
-18-
“extremely strong, quick reaction, which yielded a dark purple color.”  When
asked what was significant about that fact, Scott stated:
Well, I’m certainly not capable of dating fingerprints, which means
that this latent was made a week ago or this was three hours ago or
whatever, but after looking at hundreds of thousands of reactions and
looking at latent fingerprints, I made an opinion at that time, I was
working it on March 4, 1986, that it was a—I termed it a fresh print
or a print that, because of the dark purple reaction, because of how
the chemical reaction occurred, you’re dealing with a print
that’s—I’ve never seen one react like that older than ten days.
When asked if there was any other significance, Scott stated, “I felt the individual
at the time the latent was made was probably perspiring heavily.”  At that point,
trial counsel objected:
Your Honor, I’m going to move to have [the testimony] stricken as
being outside the field of his expertise.  He’s been qualified as a
person to make a fingerprint latent comparison analysis to say whether or not a
print came from the same person.  Frankly I have never heard someone qualified in
this area to be able—
At that point, the judge overruled the objection “subject to any cross-examination
as to whether or not he can do something.”  When the prosecutor continued this
line of questioning, trial counsel asked that the record reflect his objection to the
testimony as being outside of the field of the witness’s expertise and “not a matter
of cross-examination, but a matter of admissibility, that there’s no voir dire.”
On cross-examination, trial counsel asked Scott if he had a degree in
-19-
chemistry, physics, medicine, or pathology.  When the State objected, trial counsel
stated that his purpose was to show that any testimony regarding “what rate
somebody is sweating” was beyond Scott’s expertise.  Trial counsel then intensely
cross-examined Scott regarding environmental conditions that affect the rate at
which a fingerprint deteriorates.  Scott’s answers were generally unresponsive—a
fact acknowledged on the record by the trial judge.  But Scott conceded that
testing cannot determine on what date a print was left and that he was unaware of
the environmental conditions in which the check was kept between its discovery
and the testing of it.  Trial counsel also elicited Scott’s acknowledgment that
people perspire at different rates and that Scott did not test Reed to determine
whether he perspires more or less than the average person.
Reed here claims that his counsel was deficient for not obtaining the
assistance and testimony of a defense fingerprint expert to challenge Scott’s
testimony.  At the evidentiary hearing, Reed presented the testimony of Ronald
Fertgus, a forensic consultant and former latent print examiner.  Fertgus disagreed
with Scott’s testimony that a ninhydrin reaction reveals the print strength, the
perspiration rate of the donor, or the length of time the print had been on the item. 
He testified that there is currently no way to date a fingerprint, citing professional
publications for support.  He also stated that there is no data to support the claim
-20-
that one can determine a person was perspiring heavily when a print was left
because “[n]inhydrin works on trace amounts of amino acids so it doesn’t matter if
you sweat a lot or sweat a little.”  Fertgus could not testify, however, that Scott’s
identification of the latent print as matching Reed’s fingerprint was erroneous
because Fertgus was never asked to perform a comparison himself.
In response, the State presented the testimony of Alan Chipperfield, Reed’s
first counsel, who had turned the case over to Nichols during pretrial when a
conflict developed with the public defenders’ office.  Chipperfield testified that he
observed part of Reed’s trial and was very surprised by Scott’s testimony
regarding the freshness of the print because it was his understanding that freshness
could only be determined from surrounding circumstances, not from the print
itself.  As for Nichols, he stated at the evidentiary hearing that based on past trial
experience, he had a fair understanding of latent fingerprint comparisons at the
time of Reed’s trial.  He further testified that during the preparation of Reed’s
case, there was no reason to question Scott’s fingerprint identification, he was
aware it was FDLE policy to have a superior examiner review and verify
fingerprint identifications, and his strategy was to minimize the fingerprint’s
importance by showing that Reed previously lived in the victim’s house. 
Specifically, regarding Scott’s testimony that the fingerprint was fresh, Nichols
-21-
stated that he could not have foreseen the testimony because he had “never heard
of anybody even speculating that a print could be dated.”  But he also recalled
feeling that the jury understood after his cross-examination that Scott’s statements
on that point “appeared to be preposterous.”
In denying this claim, the circuit court noted that Reed failed to produce any
testimony indicating that the identification of the fingerprint was erroneous and
that it was well known to Nichols that fingerprints cannot be dated, as evidenced
by his objection and cross-examination.  Further, the court wrote, “it was obvious
to the jury that the fingerprint was fresh as it was found on a check to which the
defendant had no access, in a wallet to which the defendant had no access, which
had been inside the residence prior to the rape and murder of the victim, and which
was found laying in the backyard by investigating officers.”  Postconviction order
at 10.
The circuit court correctly noted that Reed failed to present evidence
indicating that Scott’s identification of the print was in error.  Rather, Reed’s
claim focuses entirely on Scott’s testimony that the print was fresh and left by
someone who was heavily perspiring.  He asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to retain a defense fingerprint expert who could have
countered those claims.  However, substantial evidence in the form of testimony
7.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
-22-
by Chipperfield, Nichols, and even Ronald Fertgus supports the conclusion that
Nichols could not have foreseen the presentation of that particular testimony. 
Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to arm himself with a defense
expert to counter  testimony that was unforeseeable.  And to the extent that Reed
might be claiming that his counsel should have retained an expert after Scott’s
testimony, such action appears to have been unnecessary.  Nichols rigorously
cross-examined Scott, eliciting his acknowledgment that a fingerprint cannot be
“dated,” environmental conditions can affect a fingerprint, he did not consider
environmental conditions when he concluded that the fingerprint was “fresh,” and
he did not factor in the varying rates of human perspiration.  As Nichols testified,
the point was made to the jury that Scott’s testimony was “preposterous.”  The
jury’s guilty verdict does not contradict this because, as the circuit court noted,
other circumstances beyond the ninhydrin reaction effectively “dated” the
fingerprint.  Furthermore, Reed’s assertion that his counsel was ineffective for not
requesting a motion for mistrial based on a Frye violation7 is undermined by the
fact that his counsel did so object, stating that the objection was “a matter of
admissibility, that there’s no voir dire—I mean there’s no predicate laid to show
that he has the expertise to render this kind of opinion.”  Therefore, we affirm the
-23-
denial of this claim.
Reed’s fifth claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to present an alibi defense.  At trial,
the victim’s husband testified that he left his wife at home at around 5:40 p.m. and
found her murdered when he returned home at 9:50 p.m.  Witness Mike Shelburne
testified that he played a game of “quarters” with Reed in the morning at the trailer
park where they both lived and later in the day went with him to the grocery store
and a friend’s house.  When they left the friend’s house at “around lunch,” the car
they were in broke down on Ricker Road.  Shelburne decided to walk home, left
Reed with the car, and did not see him again until Reed woke him at home after
dark.  Witness Debra Hipp testified she visited Reed’s girlfriend, Chris Niznik, at
around 12:45 p.m. and agreed to lend her car to Reed if he returned it by 1:30 p.m.
because she needed it then.  He did not return the car, and she spent the day at the
trailer park anxiously waiting for his return.  Between 7:30 and 8 p.m., she finally
saw Reed return on foot, running between the trailers and glancing around.  He
gave her the car keys, did not explain the missing car, and went into his trailer
without turning on the lights.  Meanwhile, Hipp’s husband had been out looking
for the car and returned around 8:15 or 8:30 p.m.  Witness Lisa Smith, Reed’s
neighbor, corroborated Hipp’s testimony, testifying she waited with Hipp and
-24-
Niznik for Reed’s return and saw Reed return home between 7:30 and 8 p.m.,
jogging through the trailer park and acting “scared” and “nervous.”  Finally,
Detective Warren testified that the distance between the location where the car
broke down and the trailer park was 5.1 miles, the distance between the trailer
park and the victim’s home was 1.2 miles, and the straightest route from where the
car broke down to the victim’s home would lead past the trailer park.
Reed presented no witnesses at trial and filed a handwritten waiver form
indicating that he maintained his innocence, was never near the victim’s home on
the day of her murder, was not with anyone between the time Shelburne left him
with the car and the time he returned home, and because he believed “no witness
could establish [an] alibi,” had instructed his counsel to call no witnesses in order
to reserve the right to present first and last closing arguments.  However, Reed
now claims that his counsel should have presented alibi testimony from Mark
Rainey, Chris Niznik, and Officer Summersill.  These witnesses testified to the
following at the evidentiary hearing.  First, Mark Rainey testified that he joined
Patrick Hipp in the search for Debra Hipp’s missing car.  They found it, towed it
back to the trailer park, did not see Reed at that time, and sat at Hipp’s trailer “for
a while” before they saw Reed “fighting with a guy named Lee.”  It was dark both
when they returned to the trailer park and when he saw Reed.  Second, Niznik
-25-
testified that Reed played cards with Shelburne in the late morning or early
afternoon and then borrowed Hipp’s car to go to the grocery store with Shelburne
at around 1 p.m.  Hours went by, and she became angry with him as she waited
with Hipp and Smith.  At some point, Smith called the police, who arrived but said
they could do nothing.  When asked what happened next, Niznik testified:  “Then
it was like starting to get dark and then he came back and it just got dark when he
came back.”  From that time on, he was with her.  Smith later called the police a
second time because Reed and Lee got into a fight.  Third, Officer Summersill
testified regarding a computer printout from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office that
indicated a call was received from lot 50 of Reed’s trailer park at 6:41 p.m., an
officer arrived at 6:57 and left at 7:43, the incident was a disturbance of the peace,
and the complainant was a Mrs. Stanford.  The printout also indicated that a
second call was received from Reed’s lot, lot 52, at 9:12 p.m., an officer arrived at
9:21 and left at 9:32, the incident was another disturbance of the peace, and the
complainant’s name was Lisa Smith.  Officer Summersill further testified that on
the day of the murder he was dispatched to a location on Ricker Road and
encountered Reed, who had been drinking and was in the back seat of a vehicle. 
His report of the incident noted Reed’s clothing but made no mention of the
unique baseball cap and indicated this contact was at 4 p.m.  He estimated that to
-26-
travel from the location where he encountered Reed to Reed’s trailer park would
take forty-five minutes to an hour by foot and five to ten minutes by car; it was
another mile from there to the murder site.
Reed’s first counsel, Chipperfield, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
investigated an alibi defense, including determining distances and the time of
sunset.  He obtained a record indicating the sun set at 6:24 p.m. on the day of the
murder, indicated in notes that he needed to “nail down” the alibi defense with
depositions of Rainey, Hipp, Niznik, and Lee, and filed a notice of alibi.  He
requested that the police preserve tapes of calls on the day of the murder but
received a letter stating that those tapes already had been reused.  Finally, although
he did not recall meeting with trial counsel, he testified that it was his practice to
talk with or even give a written summary to new counsel when a file was
transferred.
Nichols testified at the evidentiary hearing that as he understood the
available testimony, “if you took that evidence in its best light it still left enough
time relative to the fairly small distances that Mr. Reed . . . could have committed
the crime.”  He discussed an alibi defense with Reed, and Reed acknowledged it
would be a fruitless endeavor.  Nichols stated that although he believed his
obligation would be “to hold the state’s feet to the fire and make sure the evidence
-27-
is legally gathered and legally presented and legally sufficient,” even where his
client had admitted guilt to him, the presentation of an alibi witness in such
circumstances would be suborning perjury, and he would withdraw from the case
if the client pressed him to present it.
In denying this claim, the circuit court concluded that Reed failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance.  The court held
that trial counsel made a tactical and ethical decision to not attempt to establish an
alibi defense because the available testimony provided, at best, an incomplete
alibi.  We find no error in that conclusion.  Reed’s own waiver form and trial
counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing provided competent, substantial
evidence that they discussed the presentation of an alibi defense, determined that
the defense was incomplete, and chose instead to reserve the right to present first
and last closing arguments.  The record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that
this was an informed tactical decision, given the available witnesses and their
testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  Specifically, Officer Summersill’s testimony
placed Reed on Ricker Road at 4 p.m.  Rainey’s testimony did not place Reed at
the trailer park until after dark.  And Niznik’s testimony placed Reed at the trailer
park just after dark.  The sun set at 6:24 p.m.  Thus, taking the testimony in the
light most favorable to Reed, he still had approximately 2.5 hours to travel from
8.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-28-
Ricker Road to the victim’s home, commit the murder, and return to the trailer
park.  Officer Summersill stated it would take forty-five minutes to an hour to
travel by foot the distance from Ricker Road to the trailer park.  Presumably, it
would take much less time to travel from there to the victim’s home and back,
given the shorter distance between those locations.  These facts support the circuit
court’s conclusion that Reed’s alibi was, at best, incomplete as he had sufficient
time to commit the murder, especially given Hipp and Smith’s trial testimony that
Reed returned running or jogging.  Furthermore, the fact that Summersill’s report
did not list the unique baseball cap in Reed’s description would have contributed
little in the face of other testimony indicating that Reed put on his “lucky hat”
while playing cards with Shelburne earlier in the day and was never seen wearing
it again after that day.  In fact, as the circuit court correctly noted, the entire
encounter with Summersill would have discredited Reed’s prior statements to
police that he was at home the entire day.  Given the relatively low probative value
of this testimony, we cannot find error in the conclusion that trial counsel’s
decision to reserve first and last closing arguments and avoid the presentation of
potentially perjurious testimony was not deficient performance.
Reed’s sixth claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no Brady8
-29-
violation regarding a criminal investigation of Bruce Scott, the State’s fingerprint
expert.  In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), the United States
Supreme Court enunciated the three components of a true Brady violation as
follows:  “[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice
must have ensued.”  Under the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that the
suppressed evidence is material.  See id. at 282.  "[E]vidence is material only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 913 (Fla. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
Steven Platt, Bureau Chief at FDLE at the time of Reed’s case, testified at
the evidentiary hearing that Scott confessed to him in June of 1986 that he had
been consuming cocaine powder residue from evidence bags in the crime lab. 
Platt reported the confession to his superiors, and FDLE reviewed Scott’s cases
from the prior eighteen months, including his identification of Reed’s fingerprint
on April 7.  Scott was suspended on June 4 and resigned prior to June 17.  FDLE
-30-
conducted an internal investigation and involved the State Attorney’s office in
order to determine if there had been a prosecutable offense.  As cases on which
Scott had worked were brought to trial and FDLE received subpoenas for trial and
deposition, the State Attorney’s office was informed that Scott had resigned during
the course of an internal investigation.  Finally, Platt testified that Scott’s work
was always reviewed by his supervisor, Ernest Hamm, who testified at the
evidentiary hearing and lent full support to Scott’s abilities and identification.
Former Assistant State Attorney Steve Kunz testified that although the Scott
investigation was referred to the State Attorney’s office for Duval County, Scott
was not prosecuted because “there was no corpus for the criminal offense” beyond
Scott’s own admission.  The circuit court admitted a letter written by Kunz on
August 28, 1986, informing FDLE that criminal charges would not be filed against
Scott for that reason.  Kunz testified that he would have discussed the case with
his supervisor but did not recall discussing it with the prosecutor in Reed’s case,
who also testified that no one told him about the Scott investigation.  The
prosecutor further testified that had he known about it, he likely would have
notified Reed’s counsel but simply presented the testimony of Ernest Hamm
instead.
In denying Reed’s Brady claim, the circuit court cited Breedlove v. State,
-31-
580 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1991).  We agree with the circuit court that the Breedlove
decision supports the conclusion that even if this evidence was erroneously
withheld, prejudice did not ensue.  In Breedlove, this Court wrote:
While defense witnesses may be impeached only by proof of
convictions, the rule regarding prosecution witnesses has been
expanded.  Thus, this Court has stated:  “[I]t is clear that if a witness
for the State were presently or recently under actual or threatened
criminal charges or investigation leading to such criminal charges, a
person against whom such witness testifies in a criminal case has an
absolute right to bring those circumstances out on
cross-examination[.]"  Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280, 283-84 (Fla.
1976) (quoting Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA
1974)). . . .
This reasoning has been generally accepted when a state
witness has been charged with a crime. . . .
If a state witness is merely under investigation, however, the
ability to cross-examine on such investigation is not absolute. 
Instead, any criminal investigation must not be too remote in time and
must be related to the case at hand to be relevant.
580 So. 2d at 607-08.  The Court then reviewed numerous cases in support of this
conclusion.  Significantly, although Breedlove was decided after Reed’s trial,
many of the cases cited therein, including this Court’s Fulton decision, preceded
Reed’s trial.  The Breedlove decision indicates that in order for Reed to have
introduced at trial for impeachment purposes evidence of Scott’s cocaine use and
the subsequent investigation, he first would have been required to show that the
investigation was both related to Reed’s case and not too remote in time. 
9.  Reed asserts a second Brady claim that the State failed to disclose the
existence of Officer Summersill, who possessed information about Reed’s
whereabouts on the afternoon of the murder.  In its final order below, the circuit
court failed to address Officer Summersill with regard to the Brady claim. 
However, in addressing Reed’s alibi claim, the court did conclude that trial
-32-
Although the investigation occurred in the same year as Reed’s trial, it is
important to note that Scott’s testing of the fingerprints in this case was completed
prior to his confession and the investigation, and his testimony at Reed’s trial
occurred after the State Attorney’s office had already concluded it could not and
would not press charges against Scott.  More importantly, the investigation into
Scott’s cocaine use is not sufficiently related to Reed’s case to have permitted its
admission.  Unlike those cases noted in Breedlove where the particular facts
indicated that a witness had a reason to present false testimony in a specific case,
here Reed’s allegation of bias is general.  His theory does not explain why Scott
gave specific testimony in Reed’s case but rather why Scott was willing to give
testimony favorable to the State in any case.  Therefore, we agree with the circuit
court that this evidence would not have been admissible even if provided to the
defense.  Further, it is clear that Reed was not prejudiced by the lack of this
evidence.  The State could have and likely would have presented Hamm’s
testimony in substitution.  Because the third prong of Brady has not been met, we
affirm the denial of this claim.9
counsel was not ineffective in failing to discover the existence of the police report
documenting Officer Summersill’s contact with Reed.  The court concluded use of
the report at trial “would have done nothing more than to damage the defendant as
its contents certainly would have been used by the state to impeach the
defendant’s statement given to the police [that he had been home the entire day].” 
Postconviction order at 14.  The circuit court’s conclusion that Officer
Summersill’s report and testimony would have been harmful rather than helpful
implies that it also found no Brady violation because prejudice did not ensue. 
Because the timing of Officer Summersill’s contact with Reed was such that it was
neither inconsistent with the State’s evidence nor supportive of an alibi defense,
we likewise conclude that no Brady violation occurred since prejudice has not
been proven.
-33-
Reed’s seventh claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the chain of custody of
the State’s physical evidence.  At trial, Reed’s counsel stipulated to all chain-of-
custody issues, stating that he thought such testimony would unnecessarily
lengthen the trial.  Nonetheless, the State did present limited testimony regarding
the chain of custody through the testimony of Steve Leery, Carol Herring, and
Paul Doleman.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained his decision:
[M]y policy has always been to stipulate to chain of custody when I
know the state could prove it anyway, and after the pretrial discovery
showed that the chain of custody was intact I routinely have done
that.  I think that a jury is affected by everything they see you do in
the courtroom and everything you can do to subtly enhance your
credibility with them, part of which is stipulating to things that the
state is going to prove readily or stipulate to things that need to come
in the record but don’t have lots of significance and you can’t win an
argument over them anyway, I think those things are part of the subtle
signals that a jury looks at to decide whether or not they can believe
-34-
you when you are talking to them in closing arguments to tell them
why this case has defects in it.
Below, Reed neither questioned trial counsel about this issue nor presented
evidence indicating that the chain of custody was flawed.  The circuit court
concluded that trial counsel’s decision was appropriate under the circumstances
and likely enhanced his credibility before the jury by stating, “Do graciously that
which you must do anyway.”  Indeed, where counsel has reason to believe
pursuing certain lines of defense would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel does
not act unreasonably in not pursuing them.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 691 (1984).  Here, both the trial transcript and testimony at the evidentiary
hearing indicate that trial counsel believed challenging the chain of custody of the
State’s evidence would be fruitless.  Reed has presented no evidence indicating
otherwise.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.  Cf. Pope
v. State, 569 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Fla. 1990) (finding no ineffective assistance
where counsel stipulated to unavailability of State witness, thereby allowing
admission of deposition, where witness was in fact unavailable; noting to hold
otherwise “would preclude counsel from ever entering into such stipulations
which serve to avoid the unnecessary consumption of time at trial”).
Reed’s eighth claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
-35-
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s concession of guilt to a lesser included
offense.  During first and last closing arguments, Reed’s counsel emphasized two
major points:  (1) the jury should hold the State to its high burden of proof; and (2)
the jury should not make decisions based on their emotions about the crime.  More
specifically, he argued that the State’s case consisted entirely of circumstantial
evidence and did not meet the requirement that circumstantial evidence be
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  To illustrate that point,
he stated:
And what if there were testimony that he entered the house with the
intention of either asking for money and thinking there was no one
there and getting money and what if he was horrified to have found
Betty Oermann there having been murdered and raped and in that
state of confusion and drinking or whatever his—whatever his
situation was then, went ahead and took Betty Oermann’s purse and
left. . . .  Now, the question, and this may be the most significant
question that you can ask yourselves . . . can you eliminate that as a
hypothesis based on the evidence that has been presented to you. . . .
Being a thief doesn’t make you a rapist and a murderer.
. . . .
I think you can legitimately on this evidence find him guilty of
a theft and that theory is every bit as consistent with the established
facts as the speculation of the state.
Trial counsel apparently suggested this possibility because he believed the
evidence regarding the baseball cap was strong enough to place Reed at the scene
10.  Prior to this hypothesis, trial counsel stated to the jury, “Now, there’s
one thing I think that you can fairly assume. . . . I think you’re going to conclude, I
think you’re going to conclude that that’s Mr. Reed’s hat . . . that earlier in the day
he had it on and that sometime after 5:45 and before Reverend Oermann came
home that he was in the house.”
-36-
of the crime.10  Reed here claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
effectively conceding guilt of theft because by all appearances at trial, the same
person committed all three crimes of robbery, rape, and murder.
In denying this claim, the circuit court first noted that Reed offered no
evidence in its support at the evidentiary hearing and thereby abandoned the claim. 
Because the nature of the claim requires only record support and legal arguments,
which Reed made in his written closing arguments below, we reject this basis for
denial of the claim.  However, the circuit court also found that trial counsel’s
argument could not be construed as a confession of Reed’s guilt to the crimes
charged, writing, “At worst, one might opine that trial counsel suggested to the
jury that the defendant might be guilty of some lesser crime.  [But at]  least two (2)
post-Nixon cases suggest that concession to a lesser included offense . . . might
actually be the appropriate tactical decision to be made by trial counsel.”  Post-
conviction order at 18.  Indeed, this Court has said:
Sometimes concession of guilt to some of the prosecutor's claims is
good trial strategy and within defense counsel's discretion in order to
gain credibility and acceptance of the jury.
11.  Additionally, Reed claims his counsel effectively conceded the HAC
aggravating circumstance in the guilt-phase closing arguments.  The relevant
argument followed trial counsel’s discussion of the importance of the State’s high
burden of proof:
Nobody among us now is going to stand up and say that’s too tough. 
Nobody among us now is going to say you relax that standard.  This
is such a heinous event, and it is heinous, and this is such a despicable
human being and there’s no proof of that, that you should play the
odds, that you should find this man guilty on speculation . . . . When a
-37-
When faced with the duty of attempting to avoid the
consequences of overwhelming evidence of the
commission of an atrocious crime, such as a deliberate,
considered killing without the remotest legal justification
or excuse, it is commonly considered a good trial
strategy for a defense counsel to make some halfway
concessions to the truth in order to give the appearance
of reasonableness and candor and to thereby gain
credibility and jury acceptance of some more important
position.
Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 223, 230 (Fla. 2001) (quoting McNeal v. State, 409
So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)).  This was clearly trial counsel’s objective
given his concession to the jury that the baseball cap evidence was strong and the
fact that following closing arguments he requested that theft be added to the
verdict form as a lesser included offense of robbery.   Trial counsel’s testimony at
the evidentiary hearing—that he was trying to convince the jury that although
Reed may have done something, it was not premeditated murder—supports the
circuit court’s ruling.  Therefore, we affirm the denial of this claim.11
prosecutor says that to you . . . he’s saying you relax this standard . . .
you find him guilty . . . even though the testimony doesn’t stand up to
objective, rational scrutiny.
Clearly, the point of this argument was not to concede the HAC aggravator but
rather to acknowledge the brutality of the crime in an attempt to sympathize with
the jury’s emotional reaction to it, warn them against a misguided desire to convict
anyone on the basis of that emotional reaction, and ensure they held the State to its
burden of proof in the guilt phase.  Furthermore, given the facts of this case, we
cannot find that, in the absence of this comment, the HAC aggravator would not
have been found by the judge or jury.
-38-
Reed’s ninth claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to present mitigation.  The record
reflects that at the beginning of the penalty phase, Reed’s trial counsel informed
the court that he had reviewed aggravating and mitigating factors with Reed and
discussed those he believed applied.  He also stated that he informed Reed of his
right to take the stand, Reed had “steadfastly maintained his innocence,” and Reed
did not wish to take the stand.  The court then inquired of Reed, who affirmed his
counsel’s statements were true, and the penalty phase went forward with neither
side presenting additional evidence but both making penalty-phase arguments. 
After the jury delivered its eleven-to-one recommendation of a death sentence, the
judge reviewed a presentence investigation report, a psychiatric examination
report by Dr. Ernest Miller and Karen Kaldor, and mitigating evidence presented
12.  The presentence investigation report contained a socioeconomic status
report indicating:  Reed’s highest completed grade was the eighth grade; he
previously was employed as a laborer and had five jobs in the prior two years; his
father died in 1961 after being shot by his mother in self-defense; he had a one-
year-old child to whom he provided voluntary support; he was diagnosed as
suffering from lead intoxication and multiple substance abuse problems in 1981;
and he was hospitalized for approximately one month at that time due to what
Reed described as a “nervous breakdown.”  Additionally, the report contained
comments by Reed’s grandmother indicating that she never knew him to want to
hurt anyone, believed his stepfather whipped the children and withheld food, and
gained custody of her grandchildren due to Reed’s mother’s alcoholism and lack
of interest in the children.  The psychiatric examination report indicated mental
status and neurologic testing were performed on Reed, as well as an extensive
background review.  The report repeated that Reed had an eighth grade education,
was taken from his mother due to her alcoholism, and was treated in 1981 for lead
encephalopathy related to the inhalation of gas fumes.  The report reflected a
normal waking electroencephalogram and a clinical impression of substance abuse
disorder.  The past medical records reflected Reed’s long history of gasoline
sniffing, Valium abuse, and the resulting lead encephalopathy and seizure disorder
upon drug withdrawal.  They also contained doctors’ notes indicating Reed had
previously shown bizarre and abusive behavior and combativeness at home.
-39-
by Reed’s trial counsel in the form of past medical records.12
At the evidentiary hearing below, Reed presented family background
testimony by his brother, sister, and former coach, as well as mental health
testimony by psychologist James Larson.  Reed argued that, considering the
strength of the evidence against him in the guilt phase, his trial counsel should
have investigated, developed, and presented a strong body of mitigating evidence. 
In response, the State presented Reed’s trial counsel, who testified that (1) Reed
had rejected the use of testimony about his mental condition because he did not
13.  The form referenced by the circuit court is a waiver of the right to
present evidence in the guilt phase.  Therein, Reed wrote, at paragraph seven, “I
have refused to allow my attorney to ascert [sic] or put forward any defense which
assumes or implies I murdered Betty Oermann,” and, at paragraph twelve, “My
attorney has advised me that he believe[s] the chances of being sentenced to death
were hypothetically less if I pled guilty and presented mitigating psychological
evidence.”
-40-
want his counsel to argue any circumstances that would imply guilt, and (2) Reed
rejected the use of testimony by family and friends because he did not want them
involved in his trial.  He also testified that he explained to Reed prior to trial the
risk of not preparing mitigation given the high likelihood he would be convicted
and again discussed the matter with him immediately after the conviction.
In denying Reed’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
present mitigating evidence, the circuit court wrote:
[I]t was uncontroverted that the defendant specifically refused to
permit trial counsel to offer mitigation which would in any way
suggest his guilt of the crimes with which he had been charged. 
Furthermore, apparently on at least two (2) occasions, the defendant
instructed trial counsel not to involve family members in the trial. 
That the defendant gave trial counsel such instructions is confirmed
(albeit indirectly) by the handwritten waiver form signed by the
defendant.  While the form is more directly related to the defendant’s
waiver of trial evidence, paragraphs seven (7) and twelve (12)
confirm trial counsel’s testimony regarding the defendant’s
instructions declining any evidence of his guilt. It also confirms that
trial counsel and the defendant discussed the admission of
psychological evidence.
Postconviction order at 21.13  The court further noted that Reed’s brother’s
14.  We note that this conclusion is not inconsistent with this Court’s case
law.  See Sims v. State, 602 So. 2d 1253, 1257-58 (Fla. 1992) (finding no error in
trial counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence where client directed
counsel not to; “Counsel certainly has considerable discretion in preparing a trial
strategy and choosing the means of reaching the client's objectives, but we do not
believe counsel can be considered ineffective for honoring the client's wishes.”).
-41-
testimony—that he and Reed had a fight, after which Reed left Tennessee and was
never heard from again and that Reed did not contact him during the ten years
following the trial—confirmed that Reed did not want his family involved in his
defense.  The court thus concluded that Reed waived the presentation of mitigating
evidence by his instructions to his counsel and could not now be heard to
complain in postconviction proceedings.14
In addition to finding the claim precluded by Reed’s prior waiver, the circuit
court concluded, given the nature of the evidence presented at the hearing below,
that “it is highly unlikely that the jury would have considered this evidence to be
mitigating.”  Postconviction order at 24.  Specifically, regarding the family
background testimony, the court wrote:
In fact, the brother related an instance in which he had taken the
defendant into his residence because of the defendant’s destitute
situation.  During the course of that stay, the brother found that the
defendant was continuing his substance abuse and essentially evicted
him from his home.  Sometime during the course of this conflict, the
defendant threatened the brother’s wife.  These facts, had they been
heard by the jury, seem to be entirely too similar to the evidence
adduced during trial, that being that the defendant was again taken
-42-
into someone’s residence, again lost his permission to be in the
residence, and again threatened the woman of the house.  The jury
might also have heard that on one (1) occasion, the defendant had
actually physically abused his grandmother and broken her nose. . . .  
[H]ad this evidence been known to trial counsel at the time, it is likely
that he would not have opted to introduce it.  If nothing else, the
evidence would tend to support the state’s trial position that the
defendant was a substance abuser prone to violence.
. . . [H]ad these family members testified, they would have
more than likely been cross-examined by the state on the defendant’s
criminal record, his substance abuse, his propensity to violence and
his otherwise questionable character.
Postconviction order at 24.  And regarding the mental health testimony, the court
reviewed Dr. Larson’s testimony, the main conclusion of which was that Reed had
an antisocial personality disorder coupled with a narcissistic personality disorder
and found “it is all too likely that this sort of psychiatric testimony would have fit
perfectly into the picture of the defendant painted by the state at trial, a substance
abuser whose self-indulgence permitted him to commit unrestrained acts against
others, including those who had ventured to love and care for him.” 
Postconviction order at 28.
We conclude that the circuit court properly applied the law to this claim and
that competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s ruling.  First, we
note that trial counsel clearly investigated or was aware of Reed’s background and
mental health to an extent, as evidenced by the presentence investigation report,
-43-
psychiatric report, and medical records presented to the trial court for penalty-
phase consideration.  Those reports and records contained much of the mitigating
information testified to by Reed’s brother and sister.  Second, we agree with the
circuit court that even if Reed’s counsel had gone against his client’s wishes and
investigated further, the testimony that could have been presented was just as
likely to have resulted in aggravation against rather than mitigation for Reed.
An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present
mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.  See, e.g.,
Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 614-15 & n.15 (Fla. 2002); Asay v. State, 769 So.
2d 974, 988 (Fla. 2000).  Here, the family background testimony involved
numerous facts that placed Reed in a very negative light, such as that he once
broke his grandmother’s nose, abused drugs over many years, was jailed on
various occasions, continued his drug use after his brother took him in on the
condition that he stop using drugs, and threatened to kill his brother’s wife.  Not
only was this evidence negative in general but was also particularly
disadvantageous in light of the facts of the crime.  It would have opened the door
for the State to draw a parallel between Reed’s violent reaction to being evicted
from his brother’s home due to his drug use and the victim’s murder after she and
her husband discontinued assistance to Reed, also due in part to his drug use. 
-44-
Also, testimony regarding Reed’s violence toward his grandmother and threats
toward his brother’s wife would have established a pattern of violence against
women who had taken him into their homes.  As for the mental health evidence,
the circuit court correctly noted that Dr. Larson himself acknowledged certain
aspects of his examination and testimony might have been more helpful to the
State than the defense.  Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged in the past that
antisocial personality disorder is “a trait most jurors tend to look disfavorably
upon.”  Freeman v. State, 852 So. 2d 216, 224 (Fla. 2003).
We further conclude that the instant case is distinguishable from Wiggins v.
Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003), in which the United States Supreme Court found
the decision of Wiggins’ counsel not to expand their investigation into mitigation
fell below the prevailing professional standards.  The primary concern in Wiggins
was that Wiggins’ counsel’s failure to thoroughly investigate “resulted from
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment.”  Id. at 2537.  In the instant case,
however, there is competent, substantial evidence that Reed’s counsel advised
Reed of the risks of not presenting mitigation evidence and that Reed steadfastly
rejected both its investigation and presentation.  Furthermore, in Wiggins, the
Court found that his counsels’ failures prejudiced Wiggins because they never
learned of much of his life history.  Here, however, a comparison of the testimony
15.  See supra note 12.
16.  See, e.g., Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997).
-45-
given at the evidentiary hearing with the information contained in the presentence
investigation report, psychiatric examination report, and past medical records
obtained and presented by Reed’s counsel15 reveals Reed’s counsel was aware,
even without further investigation, of the family and medical facts of Reed’s
background relevant to mitigation, including that Reed’s education was limited,
his father died after being shot by his mother, his mother suffered from
alcoholism, and he was previously diagnosed as suffering from lead
encephalopathy and substance abuse problems.
Reed’s tenth claim is that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his
claim of ineffective assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to object to the
jury instruction on the aggravator of murder committed in the course of an
enumerated felony.  Because this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that
the murder in the course of a felony aggravator is an unconstitutional automatic
aggravator,16 we find this claim meritless and properly denied.
Reed’s eleventh claim is that the circuit court erred in finding no ineffective
assistance regarding his trial counsel’s failure to object to references by the
prosecutor to the victim’s husband as “Reverend” and “a minister,” as well as
-46-
testimony by State witnesses indicating that Reed was unemployed, cohabited with
his girlfriend, had illegitimate children, and was a drug abuser.  However, it is
clear from the record that in order to understand how Reed knew the victim, the
jury needed to know that, through Traveler’s Aid, Reverend Oermann met and
sheltered Reed, Niznik, and their small children when they arrived homeless and
destitute in Jacksonville.  Further, they needed to know that Reverend Oermann
was away from home at specific times on the night of the murder because he had a
church function to attend at 6 p.m.  Thus, his status as a minister was inextricably
intertwined with these necessary facts.  And, in order to understand motive, the
jury needed to know that Reed was asked to move out when Reverend Oermann
discovered he had drug paraphernalia, the Oermanns continued to provide
financial support to Reed until they determined he was not making an effort to
obtain steady employment, and thereafter Reed told Lisa Smith about these events
and vowed to “get even” with the Oermanns.  We find no error in the circuit
court’s rejection of this claim.
Reed also claims that his counsel rendered deficient performance by not
objecting to an argument made by the prosecutor at the end of his penalty-phase
closing argument that the jury should “show that defendant the same mercy and
sympathy that he showed Betty Oermann on February 27, 1986 and that was
-47-
none.”  This Court clearly disapproves of this type of argument.  See, e.g.,
Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992); Thomas v. State, 748 So.
2d 970, 985 n.10 (Fla. 1999) (“[A]sking a jury to show as much mercy to a
defendant as he showed the victim is a clear example of improper prosecutorial
misconduct, which constitutes error and will not be tolerated.”).  However, this
Court also has repeatedly found “no mercy” arguments, standing alone, do not
amount to reversible error.  See Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1130 (Fla. 2000)
(stating that “single erroneous comment was not so egregious as to require reversal
of the entire resentencing proceeding”); Richardson, 604 So. 2d at 1109
(concluding, in light of the entire record, that single comment was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla.
1989) (stating, despite fact that cumulative effect of five egregious comments
including a “no mercy” argument required reversal, "none of these comments
standing alone may have been so egregious as to warrant a mistrial").  Given the
singular nature of the prosecutor’s improper “no mercy” argument here, we find no
error in the circuit court’s holding that trial counsel’s failure to object did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, Reed asserts cumulative error.  However, because this Court affirms
the denial of each of his individual claims, we likewise affirm the denial of his
-48-
cumulative error claim.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Reed’s first claim in this petition is that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme
is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court has
consistently rejected Ring claims in postconviction cases.  See, e.g., Pace v. State,
854 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1115 (2004); Chandler v.
State, 848 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 2003); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2003);
Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2003); Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409 (Fla.
2003); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2003); Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d
380 (Fla. 2003); Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2003); Fotopoulos v. State,
838 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2002); Bruno v. Moore, 838 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2002), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 100 (2003); Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2002);
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002);
King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).  We
likewise reject Reed’s claims.
Reed’s second claim is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by
his appellate counsel’s failure to raise on direct appeal the prosecutorial comments
addressed above.  For the same reasons indicated above, we deny this claim. 
Where trial counsel’s failure to object at trial is found not to be ineffective
-49-
assistance of counsel, appellate counsel’s failure to raise the same claim on direct
appeal likewise cannot be found to constitute ineffective assistance.
In Reed’s first rule 3.850 motion, he claimed the jury instructions on all of
the aggravating circumstances in his case were unconstitutionally vague.  The
circuit court denied that claim, and this Court affirmed, stating, “This issue is
procedurally barred because Reed did not object to the instructions at trial nor did
he raise this issue on direct appeal.”  Reed, 640 So. 2d at 1096.  In his third claim
in this petition, Reed now asserts that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel by his appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. 
However, in addition to noting that this issue was not preserved for appellate
review, we further conclude that it is extremely unlikely that Reed would have
successfully appealed this issue because each of the four aggravating
circumstances that remained following Reed’s direct appeal have withstood
similar attacks.  See Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 1997) (finding
instruction of aggravating circumstance of committed while engaged in a sexual
battery does not constitute an automatic aggravator); Whitton v. State, 649 So. 2d
861, 867 n.10 (Fla. 1994) (noting the avoid arrest factor does not contain terms so
vague as to leave the jury without sufficient guidance for determining the absence
or presence of the factor); Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994)
-50-
(finding HAC aggravating circumstance was neither vague nor arbitrarily and
capriciously applied); Kelley v. Dugger, 597 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting
argument that aggravating factor of pecuniary gain was overly broad).  Appellate
counsel’s failure to appeal an unpreserved and meritless issue is not deficient
performance.
In his final claim, Reed asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel failed to bring a motion for new trial, motion for
judgment of acquittal, or other motion challenging the legal sufficiency of the
State’s case.  Citing Robinson v. State, 462 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), he
asserts his appellate counsel was per se ineffective for failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal.  To the extent that Reed claims his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, this issue is improperly
raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Furthermore, it should be noted that
trial counsel moved for directed judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the
State’s case-in-chief.  Regarding Reed’s claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, reliance on Robinson is improper.  Robinson addressed whether
the failure to timely file a motion for new trial that results in the loss of all judicial
review of the evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  This
Court retains authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence in death penalty
-51-
cases regardless of preservation of the issue.  Furthermore, although this Court did
not expressly state in its decision on direct appeal that it found the evidence
sufficient to sustain Reed’s convictions, the Court did list as the “most significant
evidence of Reed’s guilt” the following:
(a) Witnesses said they had seen Reed wearing his baseball cap
on the day of the murder before the probable time of death but not
thereafter.  They positively identified the cap as Reed's because of the
presence of certain stains and mildew.
(b) Reed's fingerprints were found on checks that had been
taken from the Oermann home and had been found in the yard.
(c) An expert witness gave testimony that hairs found on the
body and in the baseball cap were consistent with Reed's hair.
(d) Another expert witness gave testimony that the semen
found in the body could have been Reed's.
(e) Reed's cellmate, Nigel Hackshaw, gave testimony that Reed
had admitted breaking into the Oermann house and killing Mrs.
Oermann.
Reed, 560 So. 2d at 204.  Clearly, this Court found the evidence presented at trial
sufficiently supported Reed’s convictions.  If appellate counsel had challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal, we would have found no merit to that
claim.  Thus, appellate counsel’s performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial
due to the failure to argue insufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Reed’s rule
3.850 motion for postconviction relief and deny the petition for a writ of habeas
-52-
corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
I concur in all aspects of the per curiam opinion in this case except for its
discussion of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), in which the majority fails to
point out that Reed's conviction of a separate offense by unanimous jury verdict
supports an aggravator that exempts the sentence from the requirements of Ring. 
In this case, the State charged sexual battery in addition to first-degree murder,
and the jury unanimously found Reed guilty of both crimes.  The trial court's
reliance on the sexual battery conviction to support the aggravating factor of
murder in the course of a felony removes Reed's sentence from Ring's requirement
that any fact necessary for the imposition of death be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Therefore, despite the absence of a unanimous death
recommendation, Reed is not entitled to relief under Ring.  See Jones v. State, 845
So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003).
-53-
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Michael R. Weatherby, Judge - Case No. 86-6123-CF
and An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Christopher J. Anderson, Atlantic Beach, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent