Title: State v. Evans
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S054710
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2008

FILED: March 27, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
GEORGE PETE EVANS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 04030588; CA A125947; SC S054710)
En Banc
On
review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued
and submitted October 2, 2007.
Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Legal Services Division, Office of Public Defense
Services, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
briefs was Louis R. Miles, Deputy Public Defender.
Susan
G. Howe, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for
respondent on review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
LINDER, J.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal
from Linn County Circuit Court.  Glen D. Baisinger, Judge.  211 Or App 162, 154
P3d 166 (2007).
LINDER, J.
During the voir dire of the prospective
jurors in this criminal case, the trial court asked whether any of them knew
defendant or the counsel for the parties.  One prospective juror responded that
she knew defendant.  When the trial court asked in what context, she explained
that she and defendant used to be friends and that she had an "outstanding
stalking order" against him.  Although the trial court excused that
prospective juror for cause, the trial court declined to grant a mistrial.  The
issue for our resolution is whether that prospective juror's comment, which was
made in the presence of the other prospective jurors, so tainted the remaining
prospective jurors as to deprive defendant of his right to an impartial jury. 
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the prospective juror's comment
was not so inherently prejudicial that the trial court had no choice but to
grant a mistrial.  Accordingly, we affirm.
For purposes of the issue presented, the
historical facts can be briefly described.  Defendant and the victim had been
friends for many years.  After residing together for a time in the victim's
residence, the two had a disagreement, and defendant moved out.  When defendant
returned to the victim's residence to recover some property, the victim and
defendant got into a physical altercation, and defendant left.  The victim then
rummaged through some of defendant's belongings, found two one-gallon jugs of
iodine, and poured their contents on the ground.  Shortly afterwards, defendant
heard about the victim's disposal of the iodine and became enraged.  He left
numerous angry, profane, and threatening voice messages on the victim's cell
phone.  Not long after defendant left those voice messages, four of defendant's
friends arrived at the victim's house, beat the victim severely, and stole his
car.  Based on defendant's role in encouraging and aiding the crimes against
the victim, defendant was charged with first-degree robbery, first-degree
burglary, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and second-degree assault.
On the day of trial, the trial court assembled a
panel of prospective jurors and began voir dire by asking several
questions of them as a group.  The trial court identified the prosecutor, the
defense counsel, and defendant.  Among the trial court's first questions was
whether any of the prospective jurors knew defendant or the parties' counsel. 
Seven answered affirmatively by raising their hands. (1)
The trial court then asked each of those prospective jurors who they knew and
in what context.  The exchange below occurred with the third juror so
questioned: 
"PROSPECTIVE
JUROR [Name]:  I know [defendant].
"THE
COURT:  Okay.  And in what context?
"PROSPECTIVE
JUROR [Name]:  Used to be a friend.  I have an outstanding stalking order
against him.
"THE
COURT:  So that would probably not be best if you served on this?
"PROSPECTIVE
JUROR [Name]:  Probably not.
"THE COURT: 
Okay.  I'll allow you to be excused."
After the trial court excused that prospective juror,
the court briefly questioned the remaining four who had raised their hands. 
Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial.  The trial court deferred a ruling on
the motion until after voir dire was complete.  In the later arguments
on defendant's motion, defendant urged that the entire panel of prospective
jurors had been "poisoned" by the reference to the stalking order
against defendant.  The prosecutor, in response, disputed that the comment was
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial.  The prosecutor also argued
that any residual prejudice from the remark could be addressed through a
curative instruction.  The trial court denied the motion, declaring that the
comment was not "egregious enough to rise to the level of a
mistrial."  The trial court offered, however, to give a curative
instruction to the jury.  Defense counsel expressed concern that such an
instruction would refocus the jurors' attention on the comment and asked if he
could "withhold" a request for such an instruction until later.  The
trial court agreed that defense counsel could request the instruction later in
the trial.  Defense counsel, however, never did so.
On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of the
motion for mistrial as an abuse of discretion, arguing that the comment by the
excused prospective juror so tainted the remaining prospective jurors as to
deprive defendant of an impartial jury trial in contravention of Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution.  The Court of Appeals rejected his argument, State
v. Evans, 211 Or App 162, 154 P3d 166 (2007), and this court thereafter
allowed defendant's petition for review.  On review, the parties largely renew
the arguments that they made to the trial court and to the Court of Appeals.
Under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, a defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to a
"public trial by an impartial jury."  See also ORS 136.001(1)
(codifying the same guarantee).  The guarantee of an impartial jury reflects
"several related concerns, including that jurors be honest, that they not
be interested in the outcome of the case, and that they be free from influence
by the parties[.]"  State v. Amini, 331 Or 384, 391, 15 P3d 541
(2000).  An impartial jury, therefore, is one that is not biased "in favor
of or against either party" and that will base its decision on the
"evidence produced at trial and legal standards provided by the trial
court."  Id.  The fact that a juror has preconceived ideas about a
matter relevant to the case does not per se mean that a juror cannot be
fair and impartial. State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013
(1998).  The touchstone of impartiality is, instead, the juror's ability to
decide the matter with an open mind -- that is, the juror's ability to set
aside any preexisting opinions or impressions and to decide the case impartially. (2)
As we have described, defendant's motion for a mistrial
was based on one prospective juror's statement during voir dire that she
had a stalking order against defendant.  The issue is not whether that
prospective juror should have been excused for cause; the trial court concluded
that she should be and removed her from the panel.  Neither is the issue
whether the reference to the stalking order was relevant and proper for a trial
jury to consider in deciding defendant's guilt or innocence of the charges; no
such evidence was used at trial, and the state agrees that it could not have
been.  The issue, rather, is whether the comment must be deemed as a matter of
law to have so prejudiced the entire panel of prospective jurors that those who
were later selected for the jury could not resolve the case impartially -- that
is, based on the evidence and the applicable law.
Defendant does not claim actual bias on the
part of the prospective jurors.  Defense counsel examined the prospective
jurors during the voir dire and, at the conclusion of his questioning, passed
the panel for cause -- in other words, defendant did not challenge any of the
remaining prospective jurors for actual bias or inability to try the case
impartially.  Defendant therefore is left to a claim of assumed bias. 
His argument is that the excused prospective juror's reference to the stalking
order was so inherently prejudicial that the remaining jurors, because they heard
it, must be assumed to have been unable to disregard what they heard and to try
the case based only on the evidence that would later be adduced at trial.  In
essence, defendant's argument is -- and must be -- that the trial court, as a
matter of law, had no choice but to grant the motion for mistrial.  See
State v. Larson, 325 Or 15, 22-25, 933 P2d 958 (1997) (motion for mistrial
is addressed to sound discretion of trial court; appellate court will not
disturb the ruling unless only one choice was legally permissible).
We have only once before considered whether a remark
made during voir dire by a prospective juror so tainted the entire panel
as to deprive a defendant of the right to an impartial jury.  In State v. Simonsen, 329 Or 288, 986 P2d 566 (1999), the defendant successfully
appealed his death sentence, and the case was remanded for a new penalty-phase
trial.  During voir dire on remand, one of the prospective jurors stated
that he had heard on the news that the defendant's earlier death sentence had
been overturned.  The trial court denied the defendant's motion to excuse the
entire jury panel for cause.  The trial court specifically instructed the
remaining jurors, however, not to consider statements made by excused prospective
jurors during voir dire.  Id. at 292. 
On direct appeal to this court, the defendant argued
that the prospective jurors' exposure to the one juror's reference to the news
account biased them and rendered them unable to try the case impartially.  Id.
at 292-93.  Emphasizing the trial court's superior vantage point in
assessing the effect of that reference, the court concluded that the trial
court's denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion.  Id. at
294.  For guidance, the court looked to two prior cases involving motions for
mistrial based on irrelevant and prejudicial statements made by witnesses during
trial.  Id. at 293-94. (3) 
As in those prior cases, where the motions were properly denied, the statement
at issue in Simonsen was "brief and inadvertent" and the
prosecutor "did not attempt to capitalize on [it]."  Id.  This
court therefore held that the "trial court, having heard the statement in
context," did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the jury
panel.  Id. (4)
This case and Simonsen are not significantly
different.  As was true of the comment made in Simonsen, the prospective
juror's reference in this case to an outstanding stalking order was isolated
and brief, was not emphasized or dwelled on, and was not used by the state in any
way.  Also, as in Simonsen, the trial court heard the statement in
context and was in the best position to gauge its effect on the other
prospective jurors in the pool.  We could, on that basis alone, affirm the
trial court's ruling in this case.
We believe, however, that one additional fact that Simonsen
and this case have in common is significant to the analysis.  Specifically,
both cases involved mistrial motions based on a prospective juror's comments during
voir dire, rather than a witness's comments during trial.  As the
discussion in Simonsen suggests, the two situations are analogous and a
comparison between them is potentially helpful.  But in assessing the
prejudicial effect of information to which a trial jury has been exposed, voir
dire is a distinctive procedural context in at least two respects.
First, voir dire is not an evidentiary phase of
the trial.  Instead, by design, it is a pretrial "quest * * * for jurors
who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."  State v. Nefstad,
309 Or 523, 534 n 6, 789 P2d 1326 (1990) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt,
469 US 412, 423, 105 S Ct 844, 83 L Ed 2d 841 (1985)).  Inquiring into the
prospective jurors' potential interest or bias in a case is a legitimate way of
selecting fair-minded individuals to serve on the jury.  See id. at 526
(prosecutors appropriately used voir dire to determine whether
prospective jurors were biased in their views on death penalty).  Voir dire
thus entails an inherent risk that the panel of prospective jurors will be
exposed to information revealed by individual prospective jurors who are
excused from the panel for cause.
Second, and relatedly, voir dire permits direct
inquiry into a prospective juror's impressions, opinions, and biases.  Thus,
when the voir dire examination exposes an entire pool of prospective
jurors to prejudicial information, the proceeding permits an actual inquiry
into whether those jurors are nevertheless willing and able to base their verdict
on the evidence adduced at trial and on the law as the trial court explains
it.  The same is not true of comments made by a witness during trial, the
prejudicial effect of which must be determined indirectly based on their
potential prejudicial effect.  See generally State v. Pratt, 316
Or 561, 583, 853 P2d 827 (1993) (deferring to trial court's assessment of
prejudicial effect of witness's improper comment based on trial court's
oversight of entire trial and presence when comment was made); State v. Farrar,
309 Or 132, 164, 786 P2d 161 (1990) (same).
Ordinarily, the fact that voir dire is a quest
for conscientious jurors, not an evidentiary phase of the trial, is a point not
likely to be lost on the pool of prospective jurors.  The record in this case confirms
that observation.  The trial court began the voir dire examination by
advising the panel:
"Each
juror must be able to judge this case fairly and objectively.  So we need to
know if any of you know anything about this case or about any people involved,
or if anyone has formed any opinion about this case or the subject matter of
the case."
The trial court conducted much of the voir dire examination itself
and probed the prospective jurors' abilities to be impartial in the trial. (5)
Counsel for both parties also examined the prospective jurors and were free to
ask any questions that they deemed necessary to satisfy themselves of each
prospective juror's impartiality.  Defense counsel, for example, asked the
prospective jurors for their assurance that they would decide the case based on
"the facts from the witness stand" and the law as given to them by
the judge.  As he concluded his examination, defense counsel reminded the
prospective jurors that each of them had promised to go into the trial with "a
blank mind," after which he passed the panel for cause.  Defense counsel
did not ask the prospective jurors during voir dire whether hearing the
reference to the stalking order against defendant affected their ability to
deliberate impartially.  Likewise, defense counsel chose not to have the panel
cautioned to disregard the comment.  To be sure, counsel probably followed that
course so that the prospective jurors would not be reminded of the comment. 
But, having failed to make that inquiry directly, defense counsel left the
evaluation of the prejudicial effect of the comment to the trial court.
Years ago, this court observed that a trial jury
"is not such a delicate instrument of justice that it can be expected to
function only when wholly free" of information -- favorable and
unfavorable -- to which the jurors may be exposed outside the evidentiary
confines of the trial itself.  State v. Gardner, 230 Or 569, 578, 371
P2d 558 (1962).  That observation is particularly apt in assessing the
prejudicial effect of the information to which prospective jurors may be
exposed during voir dire.  Just as we do not assume that potential
jurors generally will be unable to set aside any preconceived opinions or
impressions about a case, we are unwilling to assume that otherwise impartial
prospective jurors cannot disregard the kind of comment that was made in this
case.
In assessing the inherent prejudice of the excused
prospective juror's comment on the remaining members of the panel, we therefore
consider, as we did in Simonsen, the fact that the comment was singular
and brief, was not used by the prosecution to any advantage, and was assessed
"in context" by the trial court.  Equally important, the comment was
a candid response to a vital question, one asked in a proceeding that is
designed to uncover potential juror bias.  Assessing the effect of the comment
on the pool of otherwise impartial prospective jurors was particularly within
the province of the trial court, who examined the prospective jurors personally
and who observed them throughout the voir dire.  See Nefstad, 309
Or at 528, 528 n 3 (reaffirming settled principle that appellate courts give
great weight to a trial court's assessment of juror impartiality because of its
superior ability to observe demeanor, manner, and bearing while under
examination).  On this record, we cannot say that, as a matter of law,
the comment was so inherently prejudicial as to deprive defendant of his right
to an impartial jury under Article I, section 11.  The trial court therefore permissibly
exercised its discretion to deny the motion for mistrial. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. There appears to have been a total of 24 prospective jurors on the
panel in this case.  Of the seven who indicated that they knew either defendant
or counsel, two were excused for cause (the prospective juror who knew
defendant, and one who worked in law enforcement and who knew both the
prosecutor and the defense counsel).  The other five all were friends or
acquaintances of defense counsel.  None of those prospective jurors was excused
for cause.
2. ORCP 57 D(1), as supplemented by ORS
136.220, governs the various grounds on which a prospective juror may be
challenged for cause in criminal cases.  See ORS 136.210(1) (so providing).  The statutory
standards for excluding prospective jurors based on bias set out in that rule
reflect the same values and concerns as the constitutional principle.  The rule
defines actual bias as "the existence of a state of mind on the part of a
juror that satisfies the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that the
juror cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging the juror."  ORCP 57 D(1)(g).  The
rule also expressly describes what does not disqualify a juror for
cause.  In particular, the rule declares that, when a juror forms an opinion on
the merits of the cause from something that the juror may have heard or read,
"such opinion shall not of itself be sufficient to sustain the
challenge[.]"  Id.  Instead, the juror is subject to challenge for
cause only if the trial court is satisfied, "from all the circumstances
that the juror cannot disregard such opinion and try the issue
impartially."  Id.
3. The cases were State v. Pratt, 316 Or 561, 583, 853 P2d 827
(1993) (mistrial not required based on witness's isolated reference to
defendant's presence on death row) and State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 164,
786 P2d 161 (1990) (mistrial not required for improper statement made in
passing and where state did not capitalize on it).
4. Simonsen, like this case, involved a claim of inherent
prejudice and presumptive bias, rather than actual bias.  There, however, the
claim was raised through the procedural device of a motion to dismiss the jury
panel.  Here, in contrast, defendant raised the claim through a motion for
mistrial.
5. For example, in addition to asking the
jurors whether they knew defendant or counsel for the parties, the trial court
also asked them whether they had previously served as jurors; whether they had
been witnesses in court proceedings; whether they had been victims of a crime;
and whether there was anything in their personal or family history that, given
the nature of the charges, might cause them to question their own
impartiality.  Whenever a prospective juror answered affirmatively -- which
happened frequently -- the trial court asked additional questions of the
individual juror to probe his or her ability to decide the case impartially. 
The only two jurors who were excused for cause both candidly volunteered the
basis on which they were potentially biased, and both readily agreed that it
would be best for them not to serve as a juror in this matter.