Title: State v. Kevin D. Jennings
Citation: 2003 WI 10
Docket Number: 2001AP000507-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2003

2003 WI 10 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0507-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Kevin D. Jennings,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 16 
Reported at:  250 Wis. 2d 138, 640 N.W.2d 165 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. Konkol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Stephen M. 
Compton, Kevin Jennings, and Steven M. Compton, S.C., Delavan, 
and oral argument by Stephen M. Compton. 
 
 
2003 WI 10 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0507-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 6401) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kevin D. Jennings,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  The State of Wisconsin 
(State) petitions this court to review a decision of the court 
of appeals that reversed the conviction of Kevin D. Jennings 
(Jennings).1  At issue is whether a criminal complaint that is 
filed against a defendant, who is already incarcerated, is 
sufficient to commence a prosecution.  Based on the legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) 
(1999-2000)2 
and 
related 
                                                 
1 State v. Jennings, 2002 WI App 16, 250 Wis. 2d 138, 640 
N.W.2d 165. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
2 
 
criminal statutes that deal with the commencement of criminal 
prosecutions and warrantless arrests, we conclude that if an 
individual, like Jennings, is already in custody due to 
incarceration, 
a 
complaint 
is 
sufficient 
to 
commence 
a 
prosecution. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
On December 4, 1998, Jennings was charged with one 
count 
of 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) 
(1991-1992). 
 
According 
to 
the 
complaint, on December 5, 1992, Jennings allegedly accosted a 
Milwaukee woman, M.K., outside her home and forced her to engage 
in nonconsensual intercourse.  M.K. reported the incident and 
was taken to the Sexual Assault Treatment Center, where vaginal 
swabs were taken.   
¶3 
Jennings was identified as the suspected assailant on 
December 1, 1998, when the State Crime Lab had a "cold hit" in 
its DNA database that matched Jennings' DNA to that of M.K.'s 
assailant.  Jennings' DNA profile had been entered into the 
Crime Lab's databank on July 28, 1997, from Buccal swabs taken 
from Jennings in November 1994 when he was incarcerated at the 
Dodge Correctional Institution for conviction on another charge.   
¶4 
On December 3, 1998, two Milwaukee Police Detectives 
visited the Columbia Correctional Institution (Columbia), where 
Jennings was incarcerated for an unrelated crime, to inform 
Jennings of the DNA match and to question him about the sexual 
assault of M.K.  Jennings was given a Miranda warning, which he 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
3 
 
waived, and he spoke with the detectives for approximately two 
hours regarding the sexual assault of M.K.   
¶5 
The next day, on December 4, 1998, the Milwaukee 
County District Attorney's office filed a criminal complaint 
alleging 
that 
Jennings 
had 
committed 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault on December 5, 1992, by forcing M.K. to engage in 
nonconsensual 
penis-to-vagina 
intercourse. 
 
The 
district 
attorney's office also obtained an order to produce that 
directed the superintendent of Columbia to make Jennings 
available to the sheriff of Milwaukee County at 8:30 a.m. on 
December 5, 1998, for an initial court appearance.       
¶6 
Apparently Jennings arrived too late to make the court 
appearance on December 5th, so his initial appearance before a 
court commissioner was on December 6, 1998.  The court 
commissioner found probable cause based on the complaint and 
Jennings made a jurisdictional objection that the six-year 
statute of limitations had expired under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) 
(1997-1998).3  Jennings argued that a prosecution had not 
commenced within the six-year statute of limitations because no 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74 is entitled "Time limitations on 
prosecutions" and states:  
(1)  Except as provided in sub. (2), and s. 946.88(1), 
prosecution for a felony must be commenced within 6 
years and prosecution for a misdemeanor or for 
adultery within 3 years after the commission thereof.  
Within the meaning of this section, a prosecution has 
commenced when a warrant or summons is issued, an 
indictment is found, or an information is filed.  
(Emphasis added.)  
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
4 
 
warrant or summons had been issued, no indictment found, or 
information filed, as of December 5, 1998 —— six years after the 
sexual assault of M.K.  On December 14, 1998, the district 
attorney's office filed a criminal information alleging one 
count of second-degree sexual assault.  Jennings waived his 
right to a preliminary hearing and entered a plea of not guilty. 
¶7 
On December 30, 1998, Jennings filed a motion to 
dismiss the sexual assault charge with prejudice, claiming that 
the six-year statute of limitations had expired.  The circuit 
court denied Jennings' motion, concluding that in this case, the 
order to produce was the equivalent of a warrant or summons and 
that this was the best mechanism under the circumstances to 
bring Jennings before the court.   
¶8 
On June 21, 2000, the district attorney filed an 
amended information reducing the charge to third-degree sexual 
assault, to which Jennings pled no contest.  In the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Judge Daniel L. Konkol sentenced 
Jennings to a five-year prison term to be served consecutively 
to the sentence Jennings was then serving.  Despite entering a 
no-contest plea, Jennings reserved the right to challenge 
whether the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over him 
based on the alleged expiration of the six-year statute of 
limitations.   
¶9 
Jennings moved for post-conviction relief on January 
29, 2001, challenging the judgment of conviction and the 
sentence on the grounds that the circuit court did not have 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
him 
because 
the 
statute 
of 
No. 
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5 
 
limitations had expired.  Jennings' motion was denied, and he 
appealed the decision.   
¶10 The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court, holding that the circuit court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over Jennings because the statute of 
limitations had expired on the sexual assault charge.  The court 
of appeals determined that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is ambiguous 
in 
light 
of 
other 
criminal 
statutes 
that 
discuss 
the 
commencement of a criminal prosecution, but concluded that 
neither a complaint nor an order to produce can substitute for 
the requirement of a warrant or summons under § 939.74(1).  The 
State petitioned this court for review.          
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW   
¶11 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  State v. Busch, 217 
Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998).  The primary goal of 
statutory interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent.  
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 219 Wis. 2d 250, 271, 580 N.W.2d 233 
(1998).  A "'literal reading of a statute may be rejected if it 
would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result that does not 
reflect the legislature's intent.'"  State ex rel. Szymanski v. 
Gamble, 2001 WI App 118, ¶12, 244 Wis. 2d 272, 630 N.W.2d 570 
(quoting 
Logterman 
v. 
Dawson, 
190 
Wis. 2d 90, 
104, 
526 
N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1994)).  This court has determined that 
"[w]hen a literal interpretation produces absurd or unreasonable 
results, 
or results that 
are clearly 
at 
odds 
with the 
legislature's intent, '[o]ur task is to give some alternative 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
6 
 
meaning' to the words."  Alberte v. Anew Health Care Serv., 
Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 (quoting 
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring)).     
III. ANALYSIS 
¶12 The court of appeals agreed with the State that 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is rendered ambiguous in light of the 
language in Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) and 968.02(2), which both 
provide that a criminal complaint may commence a prosecution.4  
"Where 
statutes 
on 
the 
same 
subject 
conflict 
or 
are 
inconsistent, [the] court must make every effort to harmonize 
them in order to give effect to the purpose of each statute."  
City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 185 Wis. 2d 499, 513, 517 
N.W.2d 689 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994), 
aff'd, 
193 
Wis. 2d 168, 
532 
N.W.2d 690 (1995).        
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 967.05  Methods of prosecution.  (1) A 
prosecution may be commenced by the filing of: 
(a) A complaint; 
(b) In the case of a corporation or limited liability 
company, an information;  
(c) An indictment.  
Wis. Stat. § 968.02 
 
Issuance 
and 
filing 
of 
complaints.   
(2) After a complaint has been issued, it shall be 
filed with a judge and either a warrant or summons 
shall be issued or the complaint shall be dismissed, 
pursuant to s. 968.03.  Such filing commences the 
action.    
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
7 
 
¶13 In 
order 
to 
harmonize 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.74(1), 
967.05(1), and 968.02(2), the State essentially argues that the 
filing of a criminal complaint should satisfy the "warrant" 
requirement under § 939.74(1).  Alternatively, the State claims 
that the issuance of an order to produce should be sufficient to 
satisfy the "summons" requirement under § 939.74(1).  We first 
address whether the filing of a criminal complaint satisfies the 
"warrant" 
requirement 
under 
§ 939.74(1) 
and 
is 
therefore 
sufficient to commence a prosecution for the six-year statute of 
limitations.  Because we conclude it does, we do not address the 
State's alternative argument.     
¶14 We agree with the State and the court of appeals that 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is ambiguous when read in conjunction 
with Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) and 968.02(2); therefore, we look 
to extrinsic sources to determine the legislature's intent.  In 
order to ascertain the legislature's intent regarding the 
tolling period for the criminal statute of limitations under 
§ 939.74(1), we examine sources such as: (1) the legislative 
history of § 939.74(1); (2) related criminal statutes that deal 
with the commencement of criminal prosecutions and warrantless 
arrests; and (3) case law regarding the sufficiency of a 
complaint for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  
A.  Legislative History of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) 
¶15 The criminal statute of limitations is a well-
recognized tenet of criminal procedure that serves important 
purposes.  According to this court:  
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
8 
 
The criminal statutes of limitations serve a 
number of functions but the primary purpose is to 
protect the accused from having to defend himself 
against charges of remote misconduct.  A corollary 
purpose is to ensure that criminal prosecutions will 
be based on evidence that is of recent origin.  It 
also assures that law enforcement officials will act 
promptly 
to 
investigate 
and 
prosecute 
criminal 
activity.  This helps to preserve the integrity of the 
decision-making process in the trial of criminal 
cases.  
John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 291 N.W.2d 502 (1980).  This 
court has stated that compliance with the criminal statute of 
limitations is required for personal jurisdiction.  State v. 
Pohlhammer, 
78 
Wis. 2d 516, 
523, 
254 
N.W.2d 478 
(1977).  
Nevertheless, this court has also recognized that the protection 
provided by the criminal statute of limitations, which "is 
subject to the control of the legislature, is not a fundamental 
right."  State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989) 
(emphasis added).    
 
¶16 The 
criminal 
statute 
of 
limitations 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) 
was 
enacted 
in 
1849 
as 
part 
of 
Wisconsin's first criminal code.  The statutory section was 
originally entitled "Limitation of criminal prosecutions" and 
stated that "An indictment for a capital crime may be found at 
any period; all other indictments, for other crimes, shall be 
found, and filed within six years after the commission of the 
offence . . . ."  Wis. Stat. ch. 146, § 2 (1849).  In reviewing 
the legislative history of § 939.74(1), it appears that the six-
year statute of limitations begins to toll at the earliest point 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
9 
 
at which criminal proceedings may be commenced.  For example, 
the legislature clarified in 1943 that:  
(3) 
A 
prosecution 
shall 
be 
deemed 
to 
be 
commenced . . . from and after the taking of the 
earliest action authorized by law to initiate criminal 
proceedings, including (a) the issuance of a warrant 
by a magistrate upon a complaint duly made . . . (b) 
the finding of an indictment by a grand jury or (c) 
the filing of an information against a corporation. 
§ 3, ch. 51, Laws of 1943 (emphasis added).       
 
¶17 In 1949, the legislature made changes to Wisconsin's 
criminal procedure, which included revising the language in 
Wis. Stat. § 353.23 (current Wis. Stat. § 939.74).  See § 18, 
ch. 631, Laws of 1949.  The revisions to § 353.23(3) essentially 
streamlined and simplified the language to state: "A prosecution 
shall be deemed to be commenced and pending within the meaning 
of sections 353.21 and 353.22 from and after (a) the issuance of 
a warrant or summons, (b) the finding of an indictment or (c) 
the filing of an information."  § 18(3), ch. 631, Laws of 1949.  
According to the drafting record for ch. 631 of the Laws of 
1949, the original measure was drafted by William Platz, who was 
an Assistant Attorney General at the time.  Platz wrote a series 
of articles explaining the 1949 changes to the criminal code.  
Platz explained that the bill contained a large number of notes 
by the advisory committee, which were to serve as a guide in 
constructing the statutes.5  According to Platz, if "there [was] 
no such note to any particular section of the bill, any change 
                                                 
5 William A. Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 28, 29.   
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
10 
 
in language [was] not intended to change the meaning of the 
statute revised."6  Significantly, there was no note for § 18 of 
ch. 631, which dealt with the criminal statute of limitations 
under § 353.23.  Thus, § 353.23 appears to have been one of the 
"great many sections . . . [that was] rewritten . . . without 
[a] change in meaning."7                        
¶18 While Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) has been amended and 
revised several times from its inception, the legislative 
history of the statute does not indicate any intent to 
fundamentally 
change 
the 
point 
at 
which 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations for crimes begins to toll (i.e. the earliest action 
for initiating criminal proceedings).  For example, when the 
legislature overhauled Wisconsin's criminal code in the mid-
1950s, the criminal statute of limitations was essentially left 
unchanged.  The comment to the statutory section regarding the 
criminal statute of limitations stated that "This section is a 
restatement of the old law in regard to time limitations on 
commencing criminal prosecutions."  Legislative Council Note, 
1953, § 339.74, Stats. (enacted as Wis. Stat. § 939.74 by § 1, 
ch. 696, Laws of 1955) (emphasis added).  These comments were 
prepared as an aid for "arriving at a full understanding of the 
text of the law.  They [were] somewhat lengthy revisor's 
notes . . . given official effect by sec. 370.001 [current 
                                                 
6 Id. (emphasis added). 
7 Id.   
No. 
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11 
 
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7)]."8  Section 990.001(7) provides that "if 
the revision bill contains a note which says that the meaning of 
the statute to which the note relates is not changed by the 
revision, the note is indicative of the legislative intent."  
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7); see also George Williams Coll. v. Vill. 
of Williams Bay, 242 Wis. 311, 315, 7 N.W.2d 891 (1943) 
(revisor's 
notes 
are 
important 
in 
construing 
legislative 
intent).  Furthermore, a "revised statute is to be understood in 
the same sense as the original unless the change in language 
indicates a different meaning so clearly as to preclude judicial 
construction."  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7) (emphasis added).   
¶19 Notably, the language in the 1955 statute regarding 
the commencement of a prosecution for statute of limitations 
purposes 
is 
identical 
to 
the 
language 
in 
the 
current 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1).  Thus, if the legislature originally 
intended for the statute of limitations to begin tolling from 
the "earliest action" for initiating criminal proceedings, which 
has 
remained 
substantively 
unchanged, 
then 
the 
current 
§ 939.74(1) 
should 
be 
interpreted 
consistent 
with 
this 
understanding.  
¶20 In 
addition 
to 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74, this "earliest action" interpretation is 
supported by case law, which holds that it is not a defendant's 
                                                 
8 William A. Platz, "The Wisconsin Bar and the Proposed 
Criminal Code," Legislative History of 1955 Criminal Code, at 
16-17 (1953) (referring to comments in Bill No. 100, A. from the 
1953 legislature). 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
12 
 
notice of a warrant for his or her arrest that begins tolling 
the criminal statute of limitations, but the issuance of the 
warrant itself.  See, e.g., State v. Mueller, 201 Wis. 2d 121, 
129, 549 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1996).  In Mueller, the court of 
appeals held that a criminal prosecution "commences" within the 
meaning of § 939.74(1) on the date a warrant is issued by a 
judge, not when a warrant is executed or served on a defendant 
by the police.  Id.  Mueller illustrated that it was the 
issuance of a warrant, as the earliest action to commence a 
prosecution, that began tolling the six-year period, not the 
defendant's notice that he was being charged with a crime.     
B. 
Related 
Criminal 
Statutes: 
Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1), 
968.02(2), 968.04(1)(a) 
¶21 Consistent 
with 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1), criminal statutes that were enacted 
after § 939.74 specify that the filing of a complaint may 
commence 
a 
prosecution. 
 
For 
example, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 967.05(1), a "prosecution may be commenced by the 
filing 
of: 
(a) 
A 
complaint . . . ." 
 
Similarly, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.02(2), "[a]fter a complaint has been issued, it 
shall be filed with a judge . . . .  Such filing commences the 
action."  In attempting to harmonize § 939.74(1) with these 
statutes, the court of appeals reasoned that § 939.74 is more 
specific 
than 
§§ 967.05 
and 
968.02; 
therefore, 
§ 939.74 
prevails, even though it was enacted well before either § 967.05 
or § 968.02.  While a specific statute usually applies if it 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
13 
 
conflicts with a more general statute, we cannot accept this 
proposition when it renders an absurd result, as in this case.   
¶22 As 
illustrated 
by 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1), the statute of limitations begins to 
toll with the earliest action to commence criminal proceedings.  
In many cases, the earliest action is the issuance of a warrant, 
as identified in § 939.74(1).  However, in a situation where the 
suspect is already in custody, the issuance of a warrant seems, 
at best, superfluous since the purpose of obtaining an arrest 
warrant is to take an individual into custody.  This court 
explicitly recognized this common sense proposition in Pillsbury 
v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 92, 142 N.W.2d 187 (1966):  
If an accused is not in the custody of the police upon 
an arrest, a warrant may be necessary to assure his 
detention and appearance before the magistrate upon 
the complaint; but we think here there was no 
necessity for issuing a warrant for the defendant's 
arrest and rearresting him upon the complaint when he 
was [already] in custody . . . . 
Pillsbury, 31 Wis. 2d at 92 (emphasis added). 
 ¶23 Simply stated, "Pillsbury . . . goes no further than 
the commonsense holding that there need not be the issuance of 
another arrest warrant when a person is already being held in 
custody under another charge."  State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci, 45 
Wis. 2d 432, 443, 173 N.W.2d 175 (1970).  This court has also 
concluded that "we can think of no situation in which a 
defendant is more clearly in custody, as envisioned by the 
Miranda Court, than when the defendant is confined in a prison 
or jail."  State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 356, 588 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
14 
 
N.W.2d 606, 616-17 (1999).  The legislature could not have 
intended the absurd result of requiring the issuance of a 
warrant 
for 
statute 
of 
limitations 
purposes 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) for an individual who is already in 
custody.9  Consequently, we reverse the court of appeals and hold 
that § 939.74(1) does not trump Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) and 
968.02(2), which both provide that a prosecution may be 
commenced upon the filing of a complaint.      
¶24 The State also points to Wis. Stat. § 968.04(1)(a), 
which states that "[w]hen an accused has been arrested without a 
warrant and is in custody, . . . no warrant shall be issued and 
the complaint shall be filed forthwith with a judge."  The State 
claims 
that 
§ 968.04(1)(a) 
accurately 
describes 
Jennings' 
situation as a "warrantless arrestee in custody."  Jennings 
disputes the State's assertion, arguing that he was never 
arrested or in custody for the sexual assault of M.K. because 
                                                 
9 With all due respect, the dissent is incorrect in claiming 
that the majority opinion assumes that a prosecution can only be 
commenced under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) with the issuance of a 
warrant.  See Dissent, ¶35.  The majority opinion makes no such 
assumption.  It is undisputed that a prosecution may be 
commenced numerous ways under § 939.74(1).  Rather, the majority 
opinion focuses on one particular method for commencing a 
prosecution: the issuance of a warrant, and holds that issuing a 
warrant in order to commence a prosecution under § 939.74(1) is 
effectively satisfied by the filing of a criminal complaint when 
the defendant is already in custody.  Thus, the majority opinion 
simply addresses one of the methods for commencing a prosecution 
—— it does not conclude that is the only way to commence a 
prosecution under § 939.74(1).       
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
15 
 
his incarceration was due to an unrelated crime.  We cannot 
accept Jennings' proposition.   
¶25 We agree with the State that based on the totality of 
the circumstances in this case, it is clear that Jennings was in 
custody and in essence, under arrest, for the sexual assault 
charge when the police detectives questioned him while he was 
incarcerated at Columbia for an unrelated crime.  It is 
undisputed that the officers told Jennings that the purpose of 
their visit was to inform Jennings that his DNA matched that of 
M.K.'s assailant and to question him about the sexual assault of 
M.K.  In addition, the officers gave Jennings a Miranda warning, 
which he waived.  A reasonable person in Jennings' position 
should have known that he or she would be charged, and was 
essentially arrested for, the sexual assault of M.K. based on 
the conclusive DNA evidence and the officers' interrogation.  
Since Jennings was already physically in custody due to his 
incarceration, a warrant to bring him into custody was not 
necessary.  Rather, the next logical procedural step would be to 
file a criminal complaint, which is what the State did in this 
case.         
C.  Sufficiency of Criminal Complaint for Personal Jurisdiction 
¶26 Furthermore, there is Wisconsin case law which holds 
that a criminal complaint is sufficient to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant.  This court has clearly stated 
that a "complaint is the statutory procedure for acquiring 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant."  State v. Smith, 131 
Wis. 2d 220, 238, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).  Consequently, "the 
No. 
01-0507-CR 
   
 
16 
 
essential element of personal jurisdiction in a criminal action 
is the sufficiency of the complaint, rather than the process by 
which the defendant's presence in court is secured."  Id. at 
239.  This court has recognized that while a complaint's 
"purpose is no longer to authorize the seizure of the person of 
the defendant, it is the jurisdictional requirement for holding 
a defendant for a preliminary examination or other proceedings."  
Cullen, 45 Wis. 2d at 442-43.  Referencing earlier case law, 
this court stated that "Pillsbury makes it quite clear that the 
jurisdictional requisite for a preliminary hearing is the 
complaint not the warrant."  Id.  at 443.    
¶27 Based on all the above, we hold that when a defendant 
is already in custody due to his or her incarceration, the 
filing of a criminal complaint is sufficient to commence a 
prosecution.  Because we hold that the filing of a criminal 
complaint, without the issuance of a warrant, is sufficient to 
commence prosecution of a defendant who is already in custody, 
we do not address whether an order to produce satisfies the 
"summons" requirement under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1).   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
 
 
No.  01-0507-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree with the court of appeals that the action in the present 
case was not timely commenced.   
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74(1), a statute of limitations, 
is clear.  It establishes that the prosecution for a felony must 
commence within six years of the commission of the felony and 
that the prosecution for a misdemeanor or adultery must commence 
within three years of the commission of the misdemeanor or 
adultery.  The statute further defines precisely when a 
prosecution is deemed to have commenced for purposes of this 
particular section of the Wisconsin Statutes:  (1) when a 
warrant or summons is issued, (2) when an indictment is found, 
or (3) when an information is filed.  No mention is made of a 
complaint or an order to produce.  Section 939.74(1) reads as 
follows: 
[P]rosecution for a felony must be commenced within 6 
years and prosecution for a misdemeanor or for 
adultery within 3 years after the commission thereof.  
Within the meaning of this section, a prosecution has 
commenced when a warrant or summons is issued, an 
indictment is found, or an information is filed.10 
¶30 The majority opinion, however, concludes that the 
statute does not clearly define when a prosecution is deemed to 
have commenced for purposes of satisfying the statute of 
limitations because two other statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) 
and 968.02(2), explain situations in which a prosecution may be 
commenced by a different means——with the filing of a criminal 
                                                 
10 Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1999-2000) (emphasis added). 
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complaint.  In addition, the majority opinion concludes that a 
literal reading of the statute leads to the absurd requirement 
that a prosecutor issue a warrant for a person already in 
custody (that is, imprisoned after conviction on another 
offense) in order to satisfy the statute of limitations. 
¶31 I dissent because neither conclusion is supported by 
law or logic and both conclusions require this court to rewrite 
the statute.   
¶32 The only way the majority is able to conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) is "ambiguous when read in conjunction 
with Wis. Stat. §§ 967.05(1) and 968.02(2)" is to erase the 
phrase "within the meaning of this section" that precedes the 
explanation of when a prosecution commences for purposes of 
satisfying the statute of limitations.  It is true that one 
method of commencing a prosecution under § 967.05(1) is by 
filing a complaint.  It is also true that under § 968.02(2) a 
criminal proceeding may be commenced when a district attorney 
files a complaint.   
¶33 It does not follow, however, that either of these 
statutes renders ambiguous the language delineating the methods 
available for commencing a prosecution under § 939.74(1).  A 
statute is not ambiguous simply because it provides a more 
limited 
definition 
of 
a 
term 
than 
other 
statutes.  
Section 939.74(1) expressly states that "within the meaning of 
this section," a prosecution is commenced when a warrant or 
summons is issued, an indictment is found, or an information is 
filed.  Nowhere does the statute state that, for purposes of the 
No.  01-0507-CR.ssa 
 
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statute of limitations, a prosecution commences with the filing 
of a criminal complaint.  Thus it is plain that a prosecution 
may commence with the filing of a criminal complaint for certain 
purposes, but not for purposes of satisfying the statute of 
limitations under § 939.74(1). 
¶34 The majority's conclusion that a literal reading of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) leads to an absurd result is similarly 
flawed.  The majority argues that reading § 939.74(1) to require 
a warrant to be issued in order to toll the statute of 
limitations where, as in this case, the defendant was serving a 
sentence in prison convicted of a different crime, would be 
absurd.  The majority concludes, "[T]he legislature could not 
have intended the absurd result of requiring the issuance of a 
warrant 
for 
statute 
of 
limitations 
purposes 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) for an individual who is already in 
custody."11 
¶35 The first problem with the majority's "absurd result" 
conclusion is that it assumes a prosecution can be commenced 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) only with the issuance of a 
warrant.12  In fact, the statute considers a prosecution 
commenced with the issuance of a warrant or summons, the finding 
of an indictment, or the filing of an information.  Thus, 
nothing about § 939.74(1) requires the issuance of a warrant for 
statute of limitations purposes where an individual is in 
prison.  The statute allows other methods of commencing an 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶23. 
12 See id. 
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action for purposes of § 939.74(1); the prosecutor may, for 
example, issue a summons or file an information instead. 
¶36 The second problem with the majority's conclusion is 
that it assumes the sole purpose of issuing a warrant is to 
bring a person into custody.  The majority states, "[I]n a 
situation where the suspect is already in custody, the issuance 
of a warrant seems, at best, superfluous since the purpose of 
obtaining an arrest warrant is to take an individual into 
custody."13  As § 939.74(1) makes clear, however, there can be 
additional reasons for obtaining an arrest warrant, such as 
tolling a statute of limitations on a different crime.  Indeed, 
as the majority opinion points out, the issuance of the warrant, 
not the execution or service of the warrant, is the key for 
commencing a criminal prosecution.14 
¶37 The criminal statute of limitations is a well-
recognized tenet of criminal procedure that serves important 
purposes, including assuring that law enforcement officials act 
promptly to investigate and prosecute criminal activity.  The 
majority's interpretation of § 939.74(1) rewrites the statute to 
grant the state flexibility in commencing its prosecution, 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶22. 
14 See majority op., ¶20 (citing State v. Mueller, 201 
Wis. 2d 121, 129, 549 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
The 
majority 
opinion 
ignores an 
important 
difference 
between a filed criminal complaint and an issued warrant.  A 
prosecutor 
alone 
can 
file 
a 
criminal 
complaint.  
Wis. Stat. § 968.02(1).  By contrast, the issuance of a warrant 
requires a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.  Wis. Stat. § 968.04(1). 
No.  01-0507-CR.ssa 
 
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flexibility that the legislature did not intend for it to have 
and flexibility that undermines the important purposes behind 
the criminal statutes of limitations. 
¶38 This court has frequently dismissed civil lawsuits 
where a party has failed to follow the precise letter of the law 
when initiating litigation.15  In the criminal context, however, 
the court apparently feels no compulsion to hold the state to 
the same high standards to which it holds civil litigants.  This 
cannot be what the legislature intended. 
¶39 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶40 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18, ¶46, 250 
Wis. 2d 494, 639 N.W.2d 715 (dismissing civil complaint because 
of 
"nonprejudicial 
technicality") 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting). 
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