Title: White v. Square, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S249248
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ROBERT E. WHITE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SQUARE, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent.  
 
S249248 
 
Ninth Circuit 
16-17137 
 
 Northern District of California 
3:15-cv-04539-JST 
 
 
August 12, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.  
 
1 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
S249248 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 
Here we consider a question regarding California’s Unruh 
Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.) (the Act) posed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:  Does a 
plaintiff have standing to bring a claim under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act when the plaintiff visits a business’s website with the 
intent of using its services, encounters terms and conditions 
that allegedly deny the plaintiff full and equal access to its 
services, and then leaves the website without entering into an 
agreement with the service provider?  (See White v. Square, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 2018) 891 F.3d 1174, 1175; Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 8.548, (a) & (f)(5).) 
The answer is yes.  When a plaintiff has visited a 
business’s website with intent to use its services and alleges that 
the business’s terms and conditions exclude him or her from full 
and equal access to its services, the plaintiff need not enter into 
an agreement with the business to establish standing under the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act.  In general, a person suffers 
discrimination under the Act when the person presents himself 
or herself to a business with an intent to use its services but 
encounters an exclusionary policy or practice that prevents him 
or her from using those services.  We conclude that this rule 
applies to online businesses and that visiting a website with 
intent to use its services is, for purposes of standing, equivalent 
to presenting oneself for services at a brick-and-mortar store.  
Although mere awareness of a business’s discriminatory policy 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
or practice is not enough for standing under the Act, entering 
into an agreement with the business is not required.  We express 
no view on White’s occupational discrimination claims. 
I. 
Bankruptcy attorney Robert White sued Square, Inc. 
(Square) in October 2015, alleging that Square’s seller 
agreement discriminated against bankruptcy attorneys in 
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Square offers an 
internet service that allows individuals and merchants to 
“ ‘accept electronic payments without themselves directly 
opening up a merchant account with any Visa or MasterCard 
member bank.’ ”  (White v. Square, Inc., supra, 891 F.3d at 
p. 1175.)  Square does not charge its users any fee to register for 
its services; instead, after a user has registered, Square collects 
a percentage of every transaction as well as a flat fee for each 
transaction.  Square’s terms of service state that when a user 
creates an account, the user must “ ‘confirm that you will not 
accept payments in connection with the following businesses or 
business activities: . . . (28) bankruptcy attorneys or collection 
agencies engaged in the collection of debt.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
White’s second amended complaint alleges that he 
“formed the strong, definite and specific intent” to sign up for 
and use Square’s services.  White familiarized himself with 
Square’s seller agreement by reviewing a separate lawsuit filed 
against Square by a bankruptcy law firm called shierkatz RLLP.  
He then visited Square’s website on multiple occasions and 
carefully reviewed its terms of service.  He proceeded to the page 
of Square’s website that allows a user to register for its services, 
but he declined to click the button labeled “Continue.”  Because 
White intended to use Square’s services for his bankruptcy 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
practice, he believed he could not sign the agreement without 
committing fraud.  In support of this belief, White cites a letter 
from Square’s counsel to shierkatz RLLP in which Square stated 
that “ ‘signing up for Square’s service with the intent to violate 
the applicable terms of service would be fraudulent.’ ”  (White, 
supra, 891 F.3d at p. 1176, fn. 3.)   
The district court dismissed White’s second amended 
complaint with prejudice on the ground that he lacked standing 
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act to sue Square.  The district 
court concluded that White had not attempted to use Square’s 
services and only had “mere awareness” of its discriminatory 
terms of service.  White appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which then issued the 
certification order at issue here.   In the order, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that White’s allegations “satisfy Article III’s 
requirements for a concrete and particularized injury” and that 
he has met federal constitutional standing requirements.  
(White, supra, 891 F.3d at p. 1177.) 
II. 
Standing rules for statutes must be viewed in light of the 
intent of the Legislature and the purpose of the enactment.  
(Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors 
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1377, 1385; Librers v. Black (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 114, 124.)  The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides:  
“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic 
information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, 
primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full 
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
services in all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever.”  (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b); all undesignated 
statutory references are to this code.)  Section 52, subdivision (a) 
provides:  “Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes 
any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51 . . . is 
liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any 
amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting 
without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of 
actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars 
($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the 
court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the 
rights provided in Section 51 . . . .”  And section 52, 
subdivision (c)(3) authorizes “any person aggrieved by” conduct 
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights described 
in this section to request “preventive relief, including an 
application 
for 
a 
permanent or 
temporary 
injunction, 
restraining order, or other order . . . as the complainant deems 
necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights described in 
this section.” 
The purpose of the Act is to create and preserve “a 
nondiscriminatory 
environment 
in 
California 
business 
establishments by ‘banishing’ or ‘eradicating’ arbitrary, 
invidious discrimination by such establishments.”  (Angelucci v. 
Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167 (Angelucci), 
citing Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 
72, 75–76.)  “The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each 
person’s inherent right to ‘full and equal’ access to ‘all business 
establishments.’  (§ 51, subd. (b); see Isbister, supra, 40 Cal.3d 
at p. 75.)”  (Angelucci, at p. 167.)  In enforcing the Act, courts 
must consider its broad remedial purpose and overarching goal 
of deterring discriminatory practices by businesses.  (Ibid.; see 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
Isbister, at p. 75.)  We have consistently held that “the Act must 
be construed liberally in order to carry out its purpose.”  
(Angelucci, at p. 167; see Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 
Cal.3d 24, 28 (Koire).) 
In light of its broad preventive and remedial purposes, 
courts have recognized that “[s]tanding under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act is broad.”  (Osborne v. Yasmeh (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 
1118, 1127 (Osborne).)  At the same time, we have acknowledged 
that “ ‘a plaintiff cannot sue for discrimination in the abstract, 
but must actually suffer the discriminatory conduct.’ ”  
(Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 175.)  “In essence, an 
individual plaintiff has standing under the Act if he or she has 
been the victim of the defendant’s discriminatory act.”  (Ibid. 
[“plaintiff must be able to allege injury — that is, some ‘invasion 
of the plaintiff’s legally protected interests’ ”].) 
III. 
Our cases addressing related issues under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act have involved brick-and-mortar establishments, not 
online businesses, and those cases make clear that a plaintiff 
who has transacted with a defendant and who has been subject 
to discrimination has standing under the Act. (See, e.g., 
Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 175–176.)  The question here 
is whether standing under the Act extends to a plaintiff who 
intends to transact, but has not yet transacted, with an online 
business. 
In Koire, a male plaintiff visited several “car washes on 
‘Ladies’ Day’ and asked to be charged the same discount prices 
as were offered to females.  These businesses refused his 
request.”  (Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 27, fn. omitted.)  Also, in 
response to a radio advertisement by a nightclub offering free 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
admission to “ ‘girls’ aged 18 to 21,” the plaintiff “went to [the 
nightclub] and requested free admission which was refused.”  
(Ibid.)  The plaintiff filed suit under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 
and the defendants argued that the Act, while prohibiting 
discriminatory 
exclusion 
of 
patrons 
from 
business 
establishments, does not extend to price discrimination.  We 
held that “[t]he Act’s proscription is broad enough to include 
within its scope discrimination in the form of sex-based price 
discounts.”  (Koire, at p. 30.)  There was no clear indication that 
the plaintiff, beyond requesting the price discounts, had actually 
paid a discriminatory price, and in any event, our opinion did 
not say such payment was required for standing. 
In Angelucci, four men sued a private club under the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act for charging them higher admission fees 
than it charged to women.  (Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
pp. 164–165.)  The plaintiffs had “patronized the club on several 
occasions” and had paid higher fees based on their gender.  (Id. 
at p. 165.)  The club sought dismissal on the ground that the 
plaintiffs “had not alleged they had asked the club to be charged 
at the same rate as female patrons.”  (Ibid.)  We held that 
nothing in the text of the Act requires that “before a legal action 
may be filed, the victim of the asserted discrimination must 
have demanded equal treatment and have been refused.”  
(Angelucci, at p. 168.)  Such a requirement “would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to ‘eradicate’ or 
‘eliminate’ arbitrary, invidious discrimination in places of public 
accommodation. . . .  If businesses are held not to violate the Act 
or inflict injury unless they are challenged by a patron, their 
ordinary practice may revert to discrimination, with special 
exceptions being made for individuals who happen to challenge 
the practice.”  (Id. at p. 169.)  We declined to read the Act in a 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
manner that would leave businesses free to discriminate “so 
long as these establishments agree to provide equal treatment 
to those customers knowledgeable and assertive enough to 
demand it.”  (Angelucci, at p. 169.)  We also observed that the 
Act must be understood to afford redress to “persons 
discriminated against on an occasion when there was no one 
present to receive and answer a demand for equal treatment (for 
example, persons encountering, as they did in past decades, 
racially segregated drinking fountains or restroom facilities at 
an unattended structure).”  (Angelucci, at p. 170.)  The plaintiffs 
had standing, we concluded, because each of them “was 
subjected to, and paid, defendant’s gender-based price 
differential.”  (Id. at pp. 175–176; see id. at p. 170 [“each 
plaintiff presented himself for admittance, paid the price of 
admission, and entered the establishment”].) 
Thus, Koire involved a plaintiff who presented himself for 
admittance and requested equal treatment (without paying the 
discriminatory price), and Angelucci involved plaintiffs who 
presented 
themselves 
for 
admittance 
and 
paid 
the 
discriminatory price (without requesting equal treatment).  
Angelucci confirmed that the facts in both contexts were 
sufficient for standing under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  
(Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 168–170, 173–175.)  As 
noted, we further acknowledged that “ ‘a plaintiff cannot sue for 
discrimination in the abstract, but must actually suffer the 
discriminatory conduct.’ ”  (Id. at p. 175.)  Beyond that, our 
opinion in Angelucci expressed no view on the irreducible 
minimum required for standing. 
The case before us involves a plaintiff who neither paid a 
fee nor requested equal treatment before leaving the business 
establishment — in this case, a website, not a brick-and-mortar 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
vendor.  White contends that his interaction with Square is 
analogous to a plaintiff who intends to patronize a brick-and-
mortar shop but, upon his attempted entry, sees a sign 
indicating that the business does not offer services to 
individuals based on a protected category of which he is a 
member.  According to White, websites and apps on mobile 
devices are akin to “shopping malls” or other physical 
storefronts, and that visiting a website with the intention to use 
its services is equivalent to visiting a brick-and-mortar store 
with the same intention.  Square, by contrast, contends that 
White is a plaintiff with “mere knowledge” of a business’s 
allegedly discriminatory practice and is no different than any 
person who hears of discriminatory practices from a news article 
or through word of mouth.   
In resolving this issue, we begin by observing that when a 
person 
visits 
a 
business’s 
website 
and 
encounters 
a 
discriminatory provision in the business’s terms of service, that 
person has experienced an interaction distinct from merely 
learning about a business’s discriminatory policy or practices 
secondhand.  White does not allege that he merely heard or read 
about Square’s discriminatory policy; he makes specific 
allegations detailing his repeated visits to Square’s webpage 
and his examination of its terms and conditions of service.  Thus, 
although we agree with Square that mere awareness of a 
business’s discriminatory policy or practices is not enough for 
standing, White has alleged more than mere awareness here. 
In addition, White alleges that he visited Square’s website 
and reviewed its terms of service with the specific intention to 
sign up for Square’s services and to use them in his bankruptcy 
law practice.  Angelucci does not squarely address whether this 
is sufficient to establish standing, but our reasoning is 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
suggestive.  We made clear that standing under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act extends to “persons encountering, as they did in past 
decades, racially segregated drinking fountains or restroom 
facilities at an unattended structure” — occasions “when there 
was no one present to receive and answer a demand for equal 
treatment.”  (Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 170.)  The Act 
does not require a black plaintiff in that situation to make use 
of the blacks-only facility (or make use of the whites-only facility 
in violation of the segregation policy) in order to have standing.  
It is sufficient for a plaintiff to “encounter[]” (Angelucci, at 
p. 170) an unattended facility with the intent to use it.  There is 
no doubt that such a plaintiff, even if he or she departed without 
using the facility, could properly claim he or she was “denied 
[equal] rights” and was “aggrieved by the [discriminatory] 
conduct.”  (§ 52, subd. (a), (c).)   
The same rule would apply in the case of a person who 
visited and intended to patronize an unattended establishment 
generally open to the public (e.g., a self-serve kiosk) but then 
encountered a sign prohibiting access on the basis of the 
person’s membership in a protected category.  In such 
circumstances, the person would not need to violate or attempt 
to violate the stated exclusionary policy before bringing a claim.  
The high court, adopting a similar rule under title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, explained:  “If an employer should 
announce his policy of discrimination by a sign reading ‘Whites 
Only’ on the hiring-office door, his victims would not be limited 
to the few who ignored the sign and subjected themselves to 
personal rebuffs. . . .  When a person’s desire for a job is not 
translated into a formal application solely because of his 
unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a 
victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
of submitting an application.”  (Teamsters v. United States 
(1977) 431 U.S. 324, 365–366.)  
Square notes that Angelucci said “Koire determined that 
injury occurs when the discriminatory policy is applied to the 
plaintiff — that is, at the time the plaintiff patronizes the 
business establishment, tendering the nondiscounted price of 
admission.”  (Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 175.)    In 
addition, Square relies on Surrey v. TrueBeginnings, LLC (2008) 
168 Cal.App.4th 414 (Surrey), which appears to be the only 
appellate case to examine Unruh Civil Rights Act standing in 
the context of an online business.  Surrey involved a 
matchmaking website that “offer[ed] certain free services to 
women who joined.”  (Id. at p. 417.)  The plaintiff, Steven Surrey, 
“visited TrueBeginnings’s Web site with the intent of utilizing 
its services; after discovering the discrepancy in its charges, he 
did not, however, subscribe to or pay for its services.”  (Ibid.)  
The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff lacked standing to 
claim gender discrimination under the Act:  “Because he did not 
attempt to or actually subscribe to TrueBeginnings’s services, 
Surrey did not suffer discrimination in any sense other than ‘in 
the abstract.’ ”  (Surrey, at p. 420.)  “The mere fact that Surrey 
became aware TrueBeginnings was offering a discount policy for 
women subscribers at the time he accessed its Web site did not 
constitute a denial of his antidiscrimination rights under those 
statutes.  Since Surrey did not attempt to subscribe to 
TrueBeginnings’s 
services, 
his 
interest 
in 
preventing 
discrimination is arguably no greater than the interest of the 
public at large.”  (Id. at pp. 418–419.)  According to Square, just 
as a plaintiff must “tender the purchase price” in order to 
challenge discriminatory pricing (id. at p. 416), a plaintiff must 
show “he patronized the defendant’s business by subscribing to, 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
or signing up for, its service, or by engaging in some other 
transaction making the [terms of service] applicable to him” in 
order to challenge discriminatory exclusion.   
The Court of Appeal in Osborne declined to follow Surrey’s 
“bright-line rule” that “ ‘a person must tender the purchase price 
for a business’s services or products in order to have standing to 
sue it for alleged discriminatory practices relating thereto.’ ”  
(Osborne, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1133, quoting Surrey, 
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.)  In Osborne, plaintiff John 
Flowers alleged he visited the defendants’ hotel and was refused 
a room because he was a disabled person who used a licensed 
service dog.  (Osborne, at p. 1123.)  According to his complaint, 
the defendants insisted that he pay a $300 cleaning fee on top of 
the regular room fee of $80 charged to the general public.  (Ibid.)  
Flowers did not pay or offer to pay the fee, and he sued under 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  The Court of Appeal, upon 
reviewing the case law, concluded that “[t]he application of 
section 51 has not historically turned on whether a plaintiff has 
paid a fee, or, as Surrey stated, ‘tender[ed] the purchase price 
for a business’s services or products.’ ”  (Osborne, at p. 1128.)  
Instead, Osborne explained, “[w]hen a person presents himself 
or herself to a business establishment, and is personally 
discriminated against based on one of the characteristics 
articulated in section 51, he or she has suffered a discriminatory 
act and therefore has standing under the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act. . . .  [¶] . . . The cases discussing discrimination 
under sections 51 and 52 do not focus on whether patrons who 
were personally discriminated against have alleged or proved 
that they paid a fee or were subject to unfair pricing before 
bringing a lawsuit.  Indeed, much of the legal history 
surrounding sections 51 and 52 involve plaintiffs who — like 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
Flowers and his family — were refused services, thereby making 
a purchase impossible.  To hold that plaintiffs here lacked 
standing would contradict both the language and the intent of 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.”  (Id. at pp. 1133–1134.) 
We believe Osborne states the better view.  As noted, our 
opinion in Koire contained no indication that the plaintiff had 
tendered payment for the discriminatory prices of which he 
complained.  (See Osborne, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132 
[discussing Koire].)  And Angelucci recognized that a plaintiff 
“encountering” unattended segregated facilities would have 
standing to sue; the plaintiff need not have made a request for 
equal treatment or actually used the facilities.  (Angelucci, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 170.)  Like the plaintiff Flowers in 
Osborne, White visited a business establishment with the intent 
to use its services.  The Osborne court required no further step 
of entering into a transaction with the business, and none is 
required here as well. 
Square contends that because its restriction “applies not 
to people, but to transactions,”  White “could subscribe, become 
a patron, and stop short of undertaking the transactions 
specifically prohibited by the Seller Agreement.  This is not a 
case, then, where the allegedly discriminatory conduct actually 
barred the plaintiff from signing up.”  But according to White’s 
complaint, he believed that signing up for Square’s services with 
the intention of using it in his bankruptcy practice would have 
resulted in “discriminatory termination” by Square and would 
have caused him additional injury resulting from damage to his 
“professional reputation and commercial credit.”  The letter 
from Square’s counsel to shierkatz RLLP that White cites also 
indicated that subscription to Square’s services under these 
conditions “would be fraudulent.”  It is not clear how White could 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
have subscribed to Square’s services in the circumstances here.  
In essence, what White alleges is that because of the 
discriminatory policy stated in Square’s terms of service, he was 
“refused services, thereby making a [subscription] impossible.”  
(Osborne, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134.) 
Nor do we find persuasive Square’s argument that because 
White did not sign up, he was not actually subject to Square’s 
terms of service and therefore suffered no actual or personal 
injury from any alleged discrimination.  This contention takes 
too narrow a view of the harms that the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
is intended to deter and remedy.  White elucidates this point 
with the following hypothetical:  “Suppose an African-American 
person 
approaches 
a 
brick-and-mortar 
furniture 
store, 
intending to buy a bed, and sees a sign in the window that says, 
‘We sell on credit.  (Black people must pay cash.)’  The person 
declines to enter the store.  Does that person have standing?  Yes 
. . . .  And if this person instead goes to the store’s website with 
exactly the same intent, faces exactly the same restriction, and 
declines to agree to the discriminatory term . . . , there is no 
reason why the result should differ.  Square would require this 
plaintiff to enter the bricks-and-mortar store, enter into a 
contractual relationship with the owner, and then endure the 
further humiliation of denial of credit — or to sign up on the 
defendant’s website and face the same rebuff when she later 
asks for credit.  Neither the deterrent nor the compensatory 
purposes of the Unruh Act would be served by such 
requirements.  Indeed, both would be undermined.”   
Square further contends that if a plaintiff has not signed 
up for its services, then in order to have standing “the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant applied its discriminatory policy 
on a particular occasion to prevent him personally from 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
becoming a patron in the first place.”  But an individual who 
intends to take a drink at a shopping mall and leaves upon 
encountering unattended segregated fountains, like the 
customer who walks away from the furniture store in White’s 
hypothetical above, has personally experienced the application 
of a discriminatory policy.  Similarly here, White alleges he was 
effectively refused service by Square upon visiting its website 
with the intent of subscribing and then encountering its 
allegedly discriminatory terms of service.  Our reasoning in 
Angelucci makes clear that in order to have standing, White did 
not need to contact Square to ask for an exception to the stated 
restriction or to verify that the restriction applied to him.  
(Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 170.)  Such a requirement 
would limit a business’s liability only to individuals who inquire 
and would potentially enable a business to make exceptions to 
its stated policies in order to avoid suit, even as its stated 
policies deter the lion’s share of customers belonging to a 
protected group. 
Finally, Square argues that allowing White to proceed 
would “radically expand the universe of ‘aggrieved’ persons” and 
lead to class actions that include “lead plaintiffs and absent 
class members who did not actually suffer any personal denial 
of equal rights.”  In Angelucci, we rejected a similar argument 
concerning abusive litigation, boundless statutory damages, and 
extortionate settlements.  (Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
p. 178.)  While sharing these concerns “to some degree,” we said 
they “do not supply a justification for our inserting additional 
elements of proof into the cause of action defined by the statute.  
It is for the Legislature (or the People through the initiative 
process) to determine whether to alter the statutory elements of 
proof to afford business establishments protection against 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
abusive private legal actions and settlement tactics.  It is for the 
Legislature, too, to consider whether limitations on the current 
statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken 
enforcement of the Act or place unwarranted barriers in the way 
of those persons who suffer discrimination and whose interests 
were intended to be served by the Act.”  (Id. at p. 179.)  We also 
discussed equitable defenses and constitutional limitations on 
statutory penalties as important safeguards.  (Id. at pp. 179–
180.) 
Under the rule proposed here, an individual bringing an 
Unruh Civil Rights Act claim against an online business must 
allege, for purposes of standing, that he or she visited the 
business’s website, encountered discriminatory terms, and 
intended to make use of the business’s services.  These 
requirements are sufficient to limit standing under the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act to persons with a concrete and actual interest 
that is not merely hypothetical or conjectural.  Square’s 
alternative rule, which in this case may have required White to 
risk committing fraud before being able to bring a claim, would 
not adequately serve the Act’s broad purpose of eradicating 
discriminatory business practices. 
In concluding that White has sufficiently alleged injury for 
Unruh Civil Rights Act standing, our opinion does not preclude 
Square from disputing White’s factual allegations.  Square may 
argue in a motion for summary judgment or at trial that White 
did not actually possess a bona fide intent to sign up for or use 
its services.  Our standing analysis is limited to the pleadings, 
in which White unequivocally alleges his intention to use 
Square’s services.  Nor do we express any view on whether a 
defendant violates the Act by discriminating on the basis of 
occupation or on White’s adequacy as a representative for a class 
WHITE v. SQUARE, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
of bankruptcy attorneys excluded from Square’s services.  The 
question of an individual plaintiff’s standing under the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act is distinct from the question of that plaintiff’s 
ability to serve as a representative for a class of allegedly 
aggrieved individuals.  (See Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
pp. 170–171; Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses  (1948) 
32 Cal.2d 833, 839 [finding no actionable representative suit 
where the plaintiff sought to represent all persons who stood in 
line for tickets but could not buy one because the question as to 
each individual plaintiff was whether he or she presented 
himself or herself as a “ ‘sober, moral person’ ” and sought 
admittance to the game].)  
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that a person who visits a business’s website 
with intent to use its services and encounters terms or 
conditions that exclude the person from full and equal access to 
its services has standing under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, with 
no further requirement that the person enter into an agreement 
or transaction with the business.  We disapprove Surrey v. 
TrueBeginnings, LLC, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th 414, to the extent 
it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion White v. Square, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S249248 
Date Filed: August12, 2019 
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Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
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Counsel: 
 
Moskovitz Appellate Team, Myron Moskovitz, Christopher Hu; McGrane, William McGrane; Reallaw and 
Michael J. Hassen for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
John C. Colwell for National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Melissa Riess; Linda Kilb; Lindsay Nako and Daniel Nesbit for Disability Rights Advocates, Disability 
Rights Education & Defense Fund, Impact Fund, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, 
Disability Rights California, Disability Rights Legal Center, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, Legal Aid 
at Work, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, National Federation of the Blind, National Federation 
of the Blind of California and Public Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Jeffrey Y. Wu, Jonathan H. Blavin, J. Max Rosen; Wilson 
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Colleen Bal and Joshua A. Baskin for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Diane M. Doolittle and Brett J. Arnold for 
Internet Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Myron Moskovitz 
Moskovitz Appellate Team 
90 Crocker Avenue 
Oakland, CA  94611 
(510) 384-0354 
 
Fred A. Rowley, Jr., 
Munger, Tolles & Olson 
350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-3426 
(213) 683-9100