Title: Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S253458
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
DAVID KAANAANA et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S253458 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B276420 and B279838 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC496090 
 
 
March 29, 2021 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.   
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
S253458 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
California’s prevailing wage law is a minimum wage 
provision that generally applies to those employed on public 
works.  Different provisions define the term “public works” in 
various contexts.  As relevant here, the term includes “work 
done” for certain types of government districts.  (Lab. Code, 
§ 1720, subd. (a)(2).)1  Plaintiffs are contract workers who act as 
belt sorters for a county sanitation district.  We hold that their 
work falls within the definition of public works in section 1720, 
subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter section 1720(a)(2)).   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Los Angeles County Sanitation District No. 2 (the District) 
maintains and operates a system for the transfer and disposal 
of refuse.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 4741.)  The Downey Area 
Recycling and Transfer Facility and the Puente Hills Material 
Recovery Facility are part of that system.  At these warehouse-
style sites, refuse is received, recyclables are removed, and the 
residual waste is transferred to landfills.   
Defendant Barrett Business Services, Inc. (Barrett) 
contracted with the District to provide belt sorters and others to 
staff and operate the two facilities.  These workers were under 
Barrett’s supervision and not considered District employees.  In 
 
1  
Further unspecified section references are to the Labor 
Code. 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
each site, refuse is deposited onto a conveyor belt and manually 
sorted.  Belt sorters remove nonrecyclable materials, clear 
obstructions, sort recyclables, and put them into containers.   
Plaintiffs in this class action sued Barrett and a former 
manager on behalf of all belt sorters employed at the two 
locations from April 2011 to September 2013.  The complaint 
alleged causes of action for failure to:  (1) pay minimum and/or 
prevailing wages; (2) pay overtime at prevailing wage rates; (3) 
provide meal periods; and (4) timely pay all wages owed at the 
time of termination.  It also alleged unfair business practices 
and sought both civil penalties and restitution of wages.  
Plaintiffs alleged their work fell under section 1720(a)(2), 
entitling them to prevailing wage compensation.  Barrett moved 
to strike plaintiffs’ prevailing wage allegations, arguing they 
were not entitled to those wages because the District does not 
fall under the statutory definition of a covered district and 
plaintiffs’ labor was not the type of work covered by section 
1720(a)(2).  The trial court granted the motion to strike.2   
In a split decision, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court’s ruling on the motion to strike.  The majority concluded 
that plaintiffs’ belt sorting qualified as public work under 
 
2  
An order granting a motion to strike is interlocutory and 
generally not subject to immediate review absent extraordinary 
circumstances.  (See Oeth v. Mason (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 805, 
808.)  After the trial court granted Barrett’s motion, the parties 
stipulated to certain facts and trial proceeded on plaintiffs’ other 
claims.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
section 1720(a)(2).3  (Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. 
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 778, 798 (Kaanaana).)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
There is no factual dispute about the kind of work 
plaintiffs performed.  Whether they were entitled to the 
prevailing wage because their labor fell under the applicable 
statutory definition of “public works” is a question of law we 
review de novo.  (City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial 
Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949 (City of Long Beach).) 
Since the original public works statutes were passed 
nearly 90 years ago, the Legislature has enacted many 
provisions relating to public works.  Lawmakers have used 
various formulations to describe what they intended to 
designate as public works for purposes of these enactments.  
When different formulations are used over the evolving history 
of a concept, often reflecting the prevailing forces of the times or 
the realities at play in different segments of the workplace, 
courts 
occasionally 
encounter 
the 
need 
for 
statutory 
interpretation.  This is one such case.   
The essence of Barrett’s argument is that some definitions 
of public work are limited to labor that generally involves 
construction.  Perforce, they urge that all public works 
provisions should be interpreted as so limited.  The particular 
 
3  
The Court of Appeal also addressed plaintiffs’ other trial 
claims, and Barrett challenged those holdings in its petition for 
review.  We limited the scope of review to the question of 
whether plaintiffs were employed on public works.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
provision at issue here does not include the limitation Barrett 
insists upon.   
B. 
The Statutory Framework 
California’s prevailing wage law was first enacted in 1931 
as an uncodified measure.4  (Public Wage Rate Act or 1931 Act; 
Stats. 1931, ch. 397, §§ 1‒6, p. 910‒912.)  Congress enacted a 
federal counterpart (40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.) the same year.  
Both sets of legislation responded to the dire economic 
conditions of the Great Depression, when private construction 
diminished severely and “the oversupply of labor was exploited 
by unscrupulous contractors to win government contracts . . . .”  
(State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. 
Duncan (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 289, 294 (Duncan); see also 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu (1981) 450 U.S. 754, 773–
774.)  The goal of prevailing wage laws was to give local 
contractors and labor a fair opportunity to work on public 
building projects that might otherwise be awarded to 
contractors 
who 
hired 
cheaper 
out-of-market 
labor.  
(Universities Research Assn., at p. 774.)   
The overarching purpose of the prevailing wage law is to 
“protect and benefit employees on public works projects.”  
(Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985 
(Lusardi).)  “This general objective subsumes within it a number 
of specific goals:  to protect employees from substandard wages 
that might be paid if contractors could recruit labor from distant 
 
4  
The prevailing wage law replaced an earlier law that 
“required payment of at least $2 per day for labor on public 
works.”  (State Building & Construction Trades Council of 
California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 2 (City 
of Vista), citing Stats. 1897, ch. 88, § 1, p. 90.)   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
cheap-labor areas; to permit union contractors to compete with 
nonunion contractors; to benefit the public through the superior 
efficiency of well-paid employees; and to compensate nonpublic 
employees with higher wages for the absence of job security and 
employment benefits enjoyed by public employees.”  (Id. at p. 
987.)  Courts liberally construe the law to fulfill these purposes.  
(City of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 949–950; see also 
Azusa Land Partners v. Department of Industrial Relations 
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 (Azusa).)   
Generally, prevailing wages must be paid to all those 
“employed on public works” (§ 1771), including those “employed 
by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract 
for public work”5 (§ 1772).  This requirement only applies to 
work performed under contract, not to “work carried out by a 
public agency with its own forces.”  (§ 1771.)  The body awarding 
a public work contract must obtain the prevailing wage rate for 
each type of worker needed.  (§ 1773.)  A “contractor to whom 
the contract is awarded . . . shall pay not less than the specified 
prevailing rates of wages to all workmen employed in the 
execution of the contract.”  (§ 1774.)  A contractor who fails to do 
so is liable for the deficiency and subject to a penalty.  (§ 1775.)  
The statutory obligation to pay prevailing wages is independent 
of any contractual requirement.  (Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 
 
5  
The prevailing wage law uses the plural term “public 
works” as well as the singular term “public work.”  (See §§ 1720, 
subd. (a)(1) & (2), 1770, 1771, 1772.)  We use the terms 
interchangeably. 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
pp. 981–982.)  Prevailing wages must be paid regardless of any 
private agreement.  (Id. at p. 988.)   
“Public works” is a term of art defined by section 1720 and 
the sections that follow.  (See §§ 1720(a), 1720.2‒1720.9.)  The 
protections afforded by the prevailing wage laws only extend to 
activities that qualify as public work.  Section 1720(a) sets out 
eight separate definitions of the term.  It provides in full that 
“[a]s used in this chapter,[6] ‘public works’ means all of the 
following: 
[¶] 
(1) 
Construction, 
alteration, 
demolition, 
installation, or repair work done under contract and paid for in 
whole or in part out of public funds, except work done directly 
by a public utility company pursuant to order of the Public 
Utilities Commission or other public authority.  For purposes of 
this paragraph, ‘construction’ includes work performed during 
the design, site assessment, feasibility study, and other 
preconstruction phases of construction, including, but not 
limited to, inspection and land surveying work, regardless of 
 
6  
The chapter mentioned is chapter 1 of part 7 of division 2 
of the Labor Code, entitled “Public Works.”  It will be referred to 
as the “Public Works Chapter.”  In addition to the above-noted 
prevailing wage provisions, it contains the following statutes 
governing aspects of employment on public works: (1) section 
1778, which makes it a felony to take for one’s own use wages 
earned by a worker for services rendered upon any public work; 
(2) section 1779, which makes it a misdemeanor to charge or 
collect a fee to assist any person in procuring or registering for 
public work; and (3) section 1811, which limits to eight hours 
the workday of any worker employed on public work.  When the 
Labor Code was codified in 1937, this chapter also contained a 
statute prohibiting the employment of those who were not 
United States citizens.  (Public Works Alien Employment Act; 
Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1850, p. 246, amended by Stats. 1973, ch. 
77, § 19, pp. 129‒130.)  The significance of these other statutes 
is explained below. 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
whether any further construction work is conducted, and work 
performed during the postconstruction phases of construction, 
including, but not limited to, all cleanup work at the jobsite.  For 
purposes of this paragraph, ‘installation’ includes, but is not 
limited to, the assembly and disassembly of freestanding and 
affixed modular office systems.  [¶] (2) Work done for irrigation, 
utility, reclamation, and improvement districts, and other 
districts of this type.  ‘Public works’ does not include the 
operation of the irrigation or drainage system of any irrigation 
or reclamation district, except as used in Section 1778 relating to 
retaining wages.  [¶] (3) Street, sewer, or other improvement 
work done under the direction and supervision or by the 
authority of any officer or public body of the state, or of a 
political subdivision or district thereof, whether the political 
subdivision or district operates under a freeholder’s charter or 
not. [¶] (4) The laying of carpet done under a building lease-
maintenance contract and paid for out of public funds. [¶] (5) 
The laying of carpet in a public building done under contract and 
paid for in whole or in part out of public funds.  [¶] (6) Public 
transportation demonstration projects authorized pursuant to 
Section 143 of the Streets and Highways Code. [¶] (7) (A) 
Infrastructure project grants from the California Advanced 
Services Fund pursuant to Section 281 of the Public Utilities 
Code. [¶] (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the Public Utilities 
Commission is not the awarding body or the body awarding the 
contract, as defined in Section 1722.  [¶] (8) Tree removal work 
done in the execution of a project under paragraph (1).”  (Italics 
added.) 
This case involves the italicized definition, which contains 
three basic elements:  (1) work; (2) done for an irrigation, utility, 
reclamation, improvement, or other similar district (a covered 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
district); except (3) the operation of an irrigation or drainage 
system for an irrigation or reclamation district (irrigation 
exclusion).  This dispute revolves around the first element.  
Barrett concedes that the District is a covered district and that 
the irrigation exclusion does not apply.7  But Barrett argues that 
the only “work” covered by section 1720(a)(2) is the work of 
“[c]onstruction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair” 
described in the inclusive detail of section 1720, subdivision 
(a)(1) (hereafter section 1720(a)(1)).8    Because plaintiffs’ sorting 
duties did not involve any of those activities, Barrett argues they 
were not employed on public works under section 1720(a)(2).  
Plaintiffs counter that the term “work” encompasses a broader 
range of activities, including their own.   
In essence, Barrett argues the construction and 
installation provision (§ 1720(a)(1)) modifies the covered district 
provision (§ 1720(a)(2)).  Plaintiffs argue section 1720(a) sets out 
eight independent definitions of “public work.”  Plaintiffs have 
the better argument. 
 
7  
On appeal, Barrett argued plaintiffs’ work fell within that 
exclusion because it was the “operational” work of the District.  
The court concluded Barrett had waived the argument by failing 
to raise it in the motion to strike.  Nevertheless, the court held 
plaintiffs’ work did not fall within the exclusion because the 
“operation of a recycling system for a sanitation district is not 
the operation of an irrigation or drainage system of an irrigation 
or reclamation district.”  (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 798.)  Barrett does not challenge that conclusion.   
8  
To avoid needless repetition, we refer to all of the activities 
encompassed 
in 
section 
1720(a)(1) 
as 
construction 
or 
installation work, or construction-type work. 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
C. 
Analysis 
Familiar principles guide our consideration.  Our 
fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and 
effectuate the law’s purpose, giving the statutory language its 
plain and commonsense meaning.  (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 469, 476.)  We examine that language in the context 
of the entire statutory framework to discern its scope and 
purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.  
(Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)  “If the language is clear, courts 
must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal 
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the 
Legislature did not intend.  If the statutory language permits 
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and 
public policy.”  (Ibid.)  The wider historical circumstances of a 
law’s enactment may also assist in ascertaining legislative 
intent, supplying context for otherwise ambiguous language.  
(See California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 
Cal.3d 836, 844.)   
Unlike the construction and installation provision of 
section 1720(a)(1), the covered district provision defines public 
work not in terms of the tasks performed but in terms of the 
governmental district for which it is done.  It does not set out an 
assortment of activities as the construction and installation 
provision does.  Instead, the covered district provision simply 
refers to “work.”  Standing on its own, this generic term may 
embrace myriad endeavors.  However, words used in a statute 
are considered in context, not isolation.  Bearing this context in 
mind, it appears the Legislature intended the covered district 
provision to include a wider array of tasks than construction-
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
type labor.  Other provisions in section 1720(a) contain limiting 
language when defining street and sewer work, carpet laying, 
demolition and infrastructure projects, and tree removal as 
public work.  The covered district definition does not.  It speaks 
only of “work.”  This lack of any limiting language is significant.  
Moreover, the legislative history of the statute and surrounding 
provisions indicate the language used by the Legislature 
reflected an informed choice.   
 
1. 
Statutory Definitions of Public Works 
 
 
a. 
Section 1720, subdivision (a) 
When the Public Wage Rate Act was enacted in 1931, the 
law’s application was expressly limited to workers engaged in 
construction work.  (See Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Whitsett 
(1932) 215 Cal. 400, 415–416.)  The law’s operative provision 
required payment of prevailing wages “to all laborers, workmen 
and mechanics employed by or on behalf of” the state or a local 
government “engaged in the construction of public works, 
exclusive of maintenance work.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 
910, italics added.)  The law’s definitional provision made clear 
that this construction limitation also applied to work done for 
covered districts.  It specified that the following activities “shall 
be held to be ‘public works’ within the meaning of this act”: (1) 
“[c]onstruction work done for irrigation, utility, reclamation, 
improvement and other districts, or other public agency or 
agencies, public officer or body”; (2) “street, sewer and other 
improvement work done under the direction and supervision or 
by the authority of any officer or public body of the state, or of 
any political subdivision, district or municipality thereof”; and 
(3) “construction or repair work done under contract, and paid 
for in whole or in part out of public funds, other than work done 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
directly by any public utility company pursuant to order of the 
railroad commission or other public authority.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 
397, § 4, pp. 911‒912, italics added.)   
In 1937, the Legislature enacted the Labor Code, 
incorporating the core provisions of the Public Wage Rate Act 
into the newly codified Public Works Chapter.  (See Stats. 1937, 
ch. 90, §§ 1720‒1721, 1724, 1726‒1729, 1770‒1777, pp. 241‒
244.)  In section 1720, the Legislature set out the three 
definitions of public works that would apply to this new chapter.  
Two of the definitions were substantively identical to those in 
the Public Wage Rate Act.  The covered district provision was 
not.  The Legislature changed that definition in two ways.  First, 
it added the irrigation exclusion and, second, it removed the 
word “construction” as a modifier of “work.”9       
When the Legislature alters statutory language, “as for 
example when it deletes express provisions of the prior version,” 
 
9  
As enacted, section 1720 provided that “[a]s used in this 
chapter, ‘public works’ means: [¶] (a) Construction or repair 
work done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of 
public finds, except work done directly by any public utility 
company pursuant to order of the Railroad Commission or other 
public authority. [¶] (b) Work done for irrigation, utility, 
reclamation and improvement districts, and other districts of 
this type.  ‘Public work’ shall not include the operation of the 
irrigation or drainage system of any irrigation or reclamation 
district, except as used in sections 1850 to 1854 of this code 
relating to employment of aliens, and section 1778 relating to 
retaining wages. [¶] (c) Street, sewer or other improvement work 
done under the direction and supervision or by the authority of 
any officer or public body of the State, or of any political 
subdivision 
or 
district 
thereof, 
whether 
such 
political 
subdivision or district operates under a freeholder’s charter or 
not.”  (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720, p. 241.)   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
the presumption is that it intended to change the law’s meaning.  
(Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 461.)  Here, the 
Legislature’s deletion of the word “construction” indicates an 
intent to expand, beyond construction work, the assortment of 
activities that would qualify as public works when done for a 
covered district.  (Cf. County of Los Angeles v. State of California 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 55.)10   
Barrett concedes the Legislature removed the word 
“construction” from the covered district provision.  But it argues 
that apart from this “ambiguous deletion,” there is no evidence 
the Legislature intended to enlarge section 1720(a)(2)’s 
application beyond “publicly funded construction or repair 
projects.”  Barrett points to section 2, which provides that 
insofar as its provisions “are substantially the same as existing 
provisions relating to the same subject matter, [they] shall be 
construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not as 
new enactments.”  Barrett also points to this court’s statements 
in City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th 547, that when the Legislature 
“established the Labor Code in 1937, it replaced the 1931 Public 
Wage Rate Act with a revised, but substantively unchanged, 
version of the same law” and that “the prevailing wage law’s 
general purpose and scope remain largely unchanged.”  (City of 
 
10  
Barrett 
and 
amici 
curiae 
argue 
that 
plaintiffs’ 
interpretation of section 1720(a)(2) would make the prevailing 
wage law applicable to every type of contract worker doing work 
for a covered district, including accountants, lawyers, and other 
professionals.  They urge this was not the Legislature’s intent.  
We need not specify the precise outer boundaries of section 
1720(a)(2) here.  For our purposes, it suffices to observe that the 
prevailing wage law is designed to protect laborers, workers, 
and mechanics employed on public works (see §§ 1771, 1723) 
and that plaintiffs fall squarely within that class.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
Vista, at p. 555.)  Based on those authorities, Barrett contends 
that the “codification of the 1931 Act into the present-day Labor 
Code was not meant to overhaul existing law in general, or 
subsection 1720(a)(2) in particular.” 
Barrett’s characterization sweeps too broadly and 
overlooks important qualifiers in the authorities it cites.  Section 
2, as might be expected in a new codification of existing law, 
points to the nature of the transition.  Insofar as the 
codifications are substantially the same as existing provisions 
they are to be construed as restatements, not new enactments.  
If the Legislature intended the codification to make no changes 
from the 1931 Act, it could simply have adopted the existing 
language or been more categorical and said in section 2 that any 
change wrought by codification was not intended to modify 
existing law.  It did neither.  The covered district provision it 
codified is not substantially the same as the comparable 
provision in the 1931 Act.  This court’s general characterizations 
in City of Vista do not suggest to the contrary.  That case did not 
address the scope of the covered district provision or any other 
provision in the prevailing wage law.  It also used qualifying 
language similar to section 2.   
Other textual indications in the three definitions adopted 
in 1937 support a conclusion that section 1720(a)(2) covers more 
than just construction-type work.  First, the other two public 
works definitions clearly referred to the specific kinds of work 
included: “[c]onstruction . . . or repair work” and “[s]treet, sewer 
or other improvement work.”  (§ 1720, former subds. (a), (c), 
renumbered as subds. (a)(1), (a)(3) by Stats. 2001, ch. 938, § 2, 
pp. 7509‒7510, italics added.)  The Legislature chose not to 
employ such limitations as to work done for covered districts.  It 
is not for us to insert a limitation the Legislature excluded.  (See 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
1111, 1118.)  A court “may not rewrite a statute, either by 
inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a 
presumed intent that is not expressed.”  (Cornette v. Department 
of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73–74.)    
Second, section 1720(a)(2) excludes from its definition of 
public works the operation of an irrigation or drainage system.  
This exclusion would be unnecessary if the scope of section 
1720(a)(2) were limited to construction-type work, as Barrett 
argues.  The Legislature “does not engage in idle acts, and no 
part of its enactments should be rendered surplusage if a 
construction is available that avoids doing so.”  (Mendoza v. 
Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1087.)   
Barrett reads this exclusionary language differently.  It 
starts from the premise that the covered district provision only 
applies to construction-type work, and thus that the operation 
of an irrigation or drainage system is not “public works” under 
that definition.  It then contends that the exclusionary language 
should be read to mean that such operational work is included 
in the definition of “public works,” but only for purposes of 
section 1778 and the now-repealed Public Works Alien 
Employment Act.  This argument does not withstand scrutiny.  
It depends on a reading which adds the word “construction” to 
the first sentence of the statute, a reading we have already 
rejected.  Moreover, if the Legislature intended section 
1720(a)(2) to work as proposed, it could have done so by limiting 
the subdivision’s reach to construction-type work, as it did in 
section 1720(a)(1), and then adding that “the operation of the 
irrigation or drainage system of an irrigation or reclamation 
district” also qualified as public works for limited purposes.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
The plain language of section 1720(a)(2), when read in 
context, indicates that its scope is not limited to construction-
type work.  That interpretation serves the prevailing wage law’s 
purposes.  It protects those who work under contract for covered 
districts from substandard wages, benefits the public through 
the superior efficiency of well-compensated workers, and results 
in higher wages to make up for lack of job security and benefits 
that normally attach to public employment. 
The proposed Labor Code, drafted by the California Code 
Commission in 1936, also supports a conclusion the Legislature 
intended to broaden the range of activities that would qualify as 
public work when done for a covered district.  The preface to the 
proposed Labor Code explained that its purpose was to “present 
in a single statute all of the existing statutory law relating to 
[the] subject” of labor, including “conditions of employment.”  
(Cal. Code Com. Office, Proposed Lab. Code (1936) p. v. (1936 
Proposed Labor Code).)  The public works definitions eventually 
codified in section 1720 were taken word for word from the 
Commission’s proposed code.  (See 1936 Proposed Lab. Code, 
§ 1720, p. 85.)  The proposed code thus provides guidance in 
interpreting the codified statute.  (Cf. Fluor Corp. v. Superior 
Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1175, 1194–1195 [reviewing the 
proposed Ins. Code to interpret the Ins. Code].)   
In a note to proposed section 1720, the Code Commission 
explained how it devised each definition of “public works.”  The 
commission stated that subdivision (a) of the proposed statute, 
the substance of which is now the construction and installation 
provision (§ 1720(a)(1)), was taken “verbatim” from the 
analogous definition of public works in the 1931 Act.  (1936 
Proposed Lab. Code, note to § 1720, p. 85.)  The covered district 
provision (§ 1720(a)(2)), on the other hand, was crafted from four 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
separate 
statutes 
governing 
aspects 
of 
public 
works 
employment.  (1936 Proposed Lab. Code, note to § 1720, p. 85.)  
Those statutes were the 1931 Act, the Public Works Alien 
Employment Act, and former sections 653c and 653g of the 
Penal Code.11  (1936 Proposed Lab. Code, note to § 1720, p. 85.)  
A brief summary of the scope of each provision illuminates the 
scope of the definition eventually adopted.   
As noted, the 1931 Act only applied to “construction work.”  
(Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 4, pp. 911‒912.)  The Public Works Alien 
Employment Act was also adopted in 1931.  (Stats. 1931, ch. 398, 
§§ 1‒5, pp. 913‒915.)  It prohibited any contractor acting “upon 
any public work” from employing anyone who was not a United 
States citizen.  (Stats. 1931, ch. 398, § 1, p. 913.)  It identified as 
“ ‘public work’ within the meaning of this act” any “[w]ork done 
for irrigation, utility, reclamation, improvement and other 
districts, or other public agency or agencies, public officer or 
body.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 398, § 3, p. 914.)  This definition did not 
limit its application to construction work.   
Former section 653c of the Penal Code, enacted in 1905, 
established an eight-hour workday for “any laborer, workman, 
or mechanic employed upon any of the public works of,” or “upon 
work done for,” the state or any political subdivision.  (Stats. 
1905, ch. 505, § 1, p. 666.)  It did not define public works or 
otherwise set out its scope.  In 1929, the Legislature amended 
the statute to embrace “[w]ork done for irrigation, utility, 
 
11  
The Code Commission also cited former section 653d of the 
Penal Code, which made it a felony to take, keep, or receive the 
wages of any laborer upon public works.  (Stats. 1905, ch. 505, 
§ 2, p. 667.)  That statute, however, did not specifically define 
the term “public works” or delineate its scope.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
reclamation and improvement districts, and other districts of 
this type . . . ; provided, however, that nothing in this section 
shall apply to the operation of the irrigation or drainage system 
of any irrigation or reclamation district.”  (Stats. 1929, ch. 793, 
§ 1, p. 1603.)  Two points are noteworthy.  Again, the definition 
of public works was not limited to construction work for covered 
districts.  And the Legislature demonstrated its ability to create 
exceptions or limitations when it so intended.   
Former section 653g of the Penal Code made it a crime to 
charge a fee to register or place any person in public work, or to 
give information as to where such employment might be 
procured.  (Stats. 1933, ch. 174, § 1, p. 620.)  It defined the “term 
‘public work’ as used in this section” to include “construction, 
alteration and repair work done for irrigation, utility, 
reclamation and improvement districts, and other districts of 
this type.”  (Stats. 1933, ch. 174, § 1, p. 621.)  Similar to the 1931 
Act, this definition limited the activities that qualified as public 
work when done for a covered district to construction, alteration, 
and repair work.   
The operative provisions of each of these enactments were 
placed in the Public Works Chapter when the Labor Code was 
passed.12  The Code Commission’s explanatory note makes clear 
the definition of public work adopted for the covered district 
provision was an amalgam of different existing statutes.  These 
various enactments demonstrate that the Legislature knew how 
 
12  
(See Stats. 1937, ch. 90, §§ 1720‒1721, 1724, 1726‒1729, 
1770‒1777, pp. 241‒244 [1931 Act]; Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1850, 
p. 246 [Public Works Alien Employment Act]; Stats. 1937, ch. 
90, § 1811, p. 245 [former § 653c of the Pen. Code]; Stats. 1937, 
ch. 90, § 1779, p. 244 [former § 653g of the Pen. Code]; Stats. 
1937, ch. 90, § 1778, p. 244 [former § 653d of the Pen. Code].) 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
to limit the definition of public work to construction-type work 
but knowingly eschewed such a limitation in drafting section 
1720(a)(2).  That it did so undermines Barrett’s argument that 
the unlimited term “work” in section 1720(a)(2) must be 
restricted by the different formulation in section 1720(a)(1).   
 
 
b. 
Barrett’s Other Arguments 
Barrett argues the other seven definitions of “public 
works” in the current version of section 1720(a) describe 
activities that “consist of or [are] closely allied with the 
‘construction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair’ of 
public infrastructure.”  Relying on the principle “that words 
grouped in a list should be given related meaning” (Third 
National Bank v. Impac Limited, Inc. (1977) 432 U.S. 312, 322), 
Barrett urges that the term “work” in section 1720(a)(2) should 
be similarly limited in scope.  This argument’s premise is 
unsupported.   
The types of projects included in section 1720(a)’s 
definitions of “public works” reflect no clear common theme, but 
rather a scattershot series of subjects.  Section 1720(a)(4) and 
section 1720(a)(5) apply to carpet laying.  Section 1720(a)(6) 
covers specific types of public transportation demonstration 
projects.  Section 1720(a)(8) treats some tree removal work as 
public works.  Barrett’s argument might have force if the other 
parts of section 1720(a) centered around a unified type of work, 
but it has limited purchase given the actual breadth of topics 
treated as public works by the statute as written.  Contrary to 
Barrett’s assertion, the language of the other definitions shows 
that the Legislature knows how to circumscribe the range of 
activities that qualify as public works when it chooses to do so.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
Relying on the principle of in pari materia, Barrett argues 
the term “work” in section 1720(a)(2) must be limited to 
construction work to make that statute consistent with other 
statutes defining public works.  Barrett points to sections 
1720.2, 1720.3, 1720.6, 1720.7, and 1750, subdivision (b)(1).   
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they 
relate to the same person or thing, or class of persons or things, 
or have the same purpose or object.  (Walker v. Superior Court 
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.)  Such statutes should “be 
construed together so that all parts of the statutory scheme are 
given effect.”  (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 
1090–1091.)  “Identical language appearing in separate 
provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be 
accorded the same interpretation.”  (Walker, at p. 132.)   
The first four statutes cited by Barrett provide that for 
certain limited purposes, including the application of prevailing 
wage laws, the term “public works” also means:  (1) “any 
construction work done under private contract,” if certain 
conditions exist (§ 1720.2); (2) the hauling of certain refuse from 
a public works site to an outside disposal location (§ 1720.3, 
subd. (b)); (3) “any construction, alteration, demolition, 
installation, or repair work done under private contract,” if 
certain conditions exist (§ 1720.6); and (4) “any construction, 
alteration, demolition, installation, or repair work done under 
private contract on a project for a general acute care hospital” 
(§ 1720.7).  Barrett points out that each of these statutes limits 
the activities that qualify as public works to construction or 
infrastructure-related work.  It urges us to similarly limit the 
types of activities that qualify as public works under section 
1720(a)(2) to harmonize the statutes.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
But the principle of harmonization does not authorize 
courts to rewrite statutes.  (State Dept. of Public Health v. 
Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 956.)  Where the 
Legislature chooses to define the same term differently in two 
different provisions, neither definition should be “rewritten 
under the guise of an in pari materia construction.”  (People v. 
Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 328.) 
The last cited statute, section 1750, subdivision (b)(1), 
defines the phrase “public works project” for purposes of article 
1.5 of the Public Works Chapter.  That article addresses the 
rights of a nonwinning bidder to sue a winning bidder when the 
winning bidder violated the law to secure the bid.  (§ 1750, subd. 
(a)(1).)  It defines the phrase “ ‘public works project’ ” as “the 
construction, 
repair, 
remodeling, 
alteration, 
conversion, 
modernization, improvement, rehabilitation, replacement, or 
renovation of a public building or structure.”  (§ 1750, subd. 
(b)(1).)  Barrett urges that the meaning of public works in 
section 1720(a)(2) should be similarly limited.  Obviously, the 
phrase “public works project” is different from the term “public 
work.”  “Public works project” is used to denote the scope of the 
contract put out for bid.  There is no indication that, when the 
Legislature addressed the availability of civil litigation among 
private parties, it intended to amend or limit the scope of the 
term “public work” in other contexts. 
Next, Barrett argues that statutes outside the Labor Code 
show that the term “public works” is commonly understood as 
being limited to “construction of works to be owned by and used 
for the benefit of the public.”  Barrett points to the following 
statutes:  Health and Safety Code section 50675.4, subdivision 
(c)(2); Health and Safety Code section 50898.2, subdivision 
(c)(1)(E); Health and Safety Code section 125290.65, subdivision 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
(b)(1)(E); Public Utilities Code section 3354; Government Code 
section 63036; Government Code section 5956.8; Streets and 
Highways Code section 27189; and Fish and Game Code section 
1350, subdivision (a).  All but the last of these provisions 
mandate payment of prevailing wages on construction projects 
authorized or funded by various state laws and programs.13  
According to Barrett, these statutes show that the Legislature 
has consistently applied prevailing wage requirements only to 
construction- and infrastructure-related work activities.   
This argument fails for two reasons.  First, the fact 
construction projects authorized by other statutes must comply 
with prevailing wage laws does not mean that those laws only 
apply to construction projects.  Second, each of the statutes 
Barrett cites was enacted years after and did not purport to 
amend section 1720(a)(2).14  They provide little insight as to 
what the Legislature intended when it enacted the covered 
district provision.   
 
13  
Fish and Game Code section 1350, subdivision (a) provides 
that agreements between the Department of Fish and Wildlife 
and other agencies to provide for the construction, management, 
or maintenance of facilities are not exempt from prevailing 
wages laws.   
14  
(See Stats. 1957, ch. 754, § 1 [adding § 1350 to Fish & G. 
Code]; Stats. 1957, ch. 1455, § 1 [adding § 27189 to Sts. & Hy. 
Code]; Stats. 1994, ch. 94, § 1 [adding § 63036 to Gov. Code]; 
Stats. 1996, ch. 1040, § 1 [adding § 5956.8 to Gov. Code]; Stats. 
1999, ch. 637, § 2 [adding § 50675.4 to Health & Saf. Code]; 
Stats. 2000, ch. 957, § 2 [adding § 50898.2 to Health & Saf. 
Code]; Stats. 2001, 1st Ex. Sess. 2001–2002, ch. 10, § 1 [adding 
§ 3354 to Pub. Util. Code)].)  Section 125290.65 was added to the 
Health and Safety Code by an initiative measure, Proposition 
71, as approved by voters in November 2004.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
Finally, Barrett points to Public Contract Code sections 
1101, 7103, subdivision (e), and 22200, subdivision (a), each of 
which defines the terms “public work” or “public works contract” 
for limited purposes.  But again, these definitions only apply for 
the limited purposes involved.  They do not apply to the Public 
Works Chapter.   
 
2. 
Case Law and Administrative Decisions 
The parties argue that case law and administrative 
decisions 
interpreting 
section 
1720(a)(2) 
support 
their 
respective positions.   
 
 
a. 
Case Law  
Plaintiffs rely on three cases: Reclamation Dist. No. 684 v. 
Department of Industrial Relations (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1000 
(Reclamation Dist. No. 684); Azusa, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 1; 
and Reliable Tree Experts v. Baker (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 785 
(Reliable Tree Experts).  Each case tangentially addressed 
whether labor other than construction and installation qualified 
as public work.   
Azusa is the most relevant of the three.  In that case, a 
developer challenged a ruling that contract workers doing 
construction work for a group of government entities, including 
a community facilities district, were entitled to prevailing wages 
under section 1720(a)(1).  (Azusa, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
10–13.)  The developer argued that some of the work qualified 
as public work under section 1720(a)(2), because it was done for 
a covered district, and that only that work should be subject to 
prevailing wage requirements.  It urged that, if all the work 
were deemed to be covered by section 1720(a)(1), section 
1720(a)(2) would be rendered superfluous.  (Azusa, at p. 19.)  
The Court of Appeal rejected that argument, concluding that not 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
all of section 1720(a)(2) is “subsumed” by section 1720(a)(1).  
(Azusa, at p. 20.)  The court reasoned that section 1720(a)(2) 
covered work done for a narrower range of government entities, 
but that it applied to a broader range of tasks.  (Azusa, at p. 20.)  
While section 1720(a)(1) was limited to construction-type work, 
section 1720(a)(2) had “no similar limitation as to the type of 
work that may be performed for improvement districts.”  (Azusa, 
at p. 20.)  Though Azusa did not address whether the work done 
for the district was public work under section 1720(a)(2), the 
case sheds light on our understanding of the broader statutory 
scheme.  Most significantly, Azusa treated section 1720(a)(1) 
and section 1720(a)(2) as separate provisions with “equal 
dignity.”  (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.)  This 
treatment undermines Barrett’s argument that any of section 
1720(a)’s definitions limits another one of its definitions.  The 
same can be said for the other two cases plaintiffs cite.  (See 
Reclamation Dist. No. 684, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 
[“[t]he general rule is that any work done for a reclamation 
district is ‘public work’ ”]; see also Reliable Tree Experts, supra, 
200 Cal.App.4th at p. 795, fn. 8.)   
 
 
b. 
Administrative decisions 
The Legislature has granted the Director of the 
Department of Industrial Relations (Department) “quasi-
legislative authority to determine coverage of projects or types 
of work under the prevailing wage laws.”  (§ 1773.5, subd. (d).)  
Although ultimate responsibility for statutory interpretation 
rests with the courts, an agency’s interpretation “is ‘one among 
several tools available to the court’ when judging the [statute’s] 
meaning and legal effect.”  (Oxbow Carbon & Minerals, LLC v. 
Department of Industrial Relations (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 538, 
546; see also City of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 951.)  
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
An agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference if it is long-
standing, consistent, and contemporaneous.  (Duncan, supra, 
162 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.)  A vacillating position warrants no 
deference.  (Ibid.)  Such is the case here.   
The trial court relied on a 2006 Department decision15 in 
granting Barrett’s motion.  The question was whether workers 
hauling biosolids for a sanitation district were entitled to 
prevailing wages.  (Orange County Biosolids, supra, at p. 1.)  The 
Department concluded they were not, stating, “[T]he most 
reasonable way to define the scope of section 1720(a)(2) is to 
require that the work fall within one of the types of covered work 
enumerated” in section 1720(a)(1).  (Orange County Biosolids, at 
p. 4.)  Because the hauling of biosolids was “not an activity 
encompassed by” section 1720(a)(1), it was “not covered work 
under section 1720(a)(2).”  (Orange County Biosolids, at p. 4.)   
In an amicus brief, the District and others urge us to defer 
to the interpretation of section 1720(a)(2) in Orange County 
Biosolids.  They argue plaintiffs’ position contradicts the 
Department’s long-standing interpretation of section 1720(a)(2).  
They assert the Department has ruled three times in the last 15 
years that the activities encompassed by section 1720(a)(2) must 
be limited to those listed in section 1720(a)(1).  They cite Orange 
County Biosolids and two other Department decisions.  (See 
Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2006-022 (Jan. 12, 
 
15  
(Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2005-009 
(Apr. 21, 2006)  <https:www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/ 
year2006/2005-009.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021] (Orange County 
Biosolids)).  All Internet citations in this opinion are archived 
by 
year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
2007) 
<https:www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2007/2006-
022.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021]; Dept. of Industrial Relations, PW 
Case 
No. 
2005-039 
(Apr. 
25, 
2007) 
<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2007/2005-
039.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].)   
Deference to these decisions is unwarranted.  The 
Department’s interpretation in these decisions is neither long-
standing nor consistent.  Contrary to amici curiae’s argument, 
these decisions do not span 15 years.  All three were issued 
within a 13-month period in 2006 and 2007.  Before and after 
that time, the Department gave a broader meaning to the term 
work in section 1720(a)(2).  In 2002, the Department concluded 
that the hauling and disposing of wastewater materials for a 
utility district qualified under section 1720(a)(2) “because it is 
work done for a utility district.”  (Dept. of Industrial Relations, 
PW 
Case 
No. 
2002-005 
(July 
1, 
2002) 
p. 
2 
<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2002/2002-
005.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].)  Later the same year, it 
concluded the inspecting and testing of sewer lines for a 
sanitation district was subject to prevailing wage requirements 
because it was “work done for” a covered district.  (Dept. of 
Industrial Relations, PW Case No. 2001-068 (July 19, 2002) p. 6 
<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2002/2001-
068.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].)  Finally, the Department ruled 
in 2016 “that maintenance of equipment for a water district 
constituted a public work” under section 1720(a)(2).  (Kaanaana, 
supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 796, citing Dept. of Industrial 
Relations, 
PW 
Case 
No. 
2015-016 
(Feb. 
5, 
2016) 
<https://www.dir.ca.gov/OPRL/coverage/year2016/2015-
016.pdf> [as of Mar. 29, 2021].)  None of those decisions 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
suggested that the range of activities that qualify as “work” 
under section 1720(a)(2) is limited by section 1720(a)(1).   
Where, as here, an administrative body has repeatedly 
changed its stance on the scope of a statute over a short period, 
its position does not warrant the deference it might typically be 
accorded.  (See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 
40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105, fn. 7.)  Moreover, as the Court of Appeal 
noted, Department has “de-designated” these past decisions as 
precedential, suggesting Department has concluded they should 
not be entitled to deference.  (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 795.)  Finally, the issue here is “a pure one of statutory 
interpretation”; thus, Department has no “ ‘ “comparative 
interpretative advantage over the courts.” ’ ”  (Duncan, supra, 
162 Cal.App.4th at p. 304; see also Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 
236.)   
 
3. 
Other Claims 
Barrett argues there is no logical reason why the 
Legislature would have applied the prevailing wage laws to a 
broader range of activities when done for covered districts than 
for other government agencies.16  But it offers no reason to think 
that belt sorters materially differ from laborers whose work falls 
under the other provisions of section 1720(a), in terms of their 
 
16  
Barrett cites Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765 for 
support.  The case is inapposite.  Westbrook addressed a claim 
by San Francisco voters that the state Constitution’s two-thirds 
majority approval requirement for incurring public debt (Cal. 
Const., art. XI, § 18) violated their equal protection rights by 
weighting individual votes differently.  (Westbrook, at p. 781.)  
The opinion manifestly involves a completely different question 
from that presented here.   
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
vulnerability to exploitation, their risk of receiving substandard 
wages, or their need for higher compensation to make up for the 
lack of benefits normally associated with public employment.   
Neither the statute nor its legislative history explains why 
the Legislature singled out work done for covered districts in 
section 1720(a)(2).  But the fact remains that it did.  The 
Legislature is permitted to attack problems one step at a time, 
deciding in which context an issue is most pressing.  “Such line 
drawing is the province of legislative bodies, and ‘the precise 
coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment [are] virtually 
unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to 
approach a perceived problem incrementally.’ ”  (California 
Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 210.) 
D. 
Conclusion 
The most reasonable interpretation of “public works” in 
section 1720(a)(2) is that it is not limited by a different definition 
set out in section 1720(a)(1).  This interpretation gives effect to 
all parts of the covered district provision and recognizes the 
difference between definitions based on the tasks performed and 
section 1720(a)(2), whose coverage turns on the governmental 
entity for which the work is done.  The belt sorters’ labor 
qualifies as “public works” under section 1720(a)(2).   
 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
S253458 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
I agree with the majority opinion, which I have signed.  
The result in this case follows from the text of Labor Code 
section 1720, which defines the term “public works” much more 
broadly when the work is performed for irrigation districts, 
utility districts, and others of a similar type than when it is 
performed for any other kind of public agency.  Wherever the 
outer limits of this special districts definition may lie, the belt-
sorting work performed by plaintiffs in this case falls well within 
its scope.  I write separately, however, to call attention to the 
seeming incongruity in the statute we are interpreting:  Why, 
precisely, did the Legislature choose to treat work for utility and 
other covered districts so differently from work for other public 
agencies?  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)  Whatever reasons the 
Legislature may once have had, they have been lost in the mists 
of time.  Now, more than 80 years after the statute was first 
enacted, the Legislature may wish to revisit the issue.  
Part of the mystery stems from the nature of the statutory 
definition in Labor Code section 1720.  It so happens that this is 
a prevailing wage case, but section 1720 is not part of the 
prevailing wage law.  It is, rather, the product of a 1930’s 
consolidation of a series of public works definitions, each 
adopted to apply only to an individual statute, into a single 
omnibus definition simultaneously applicable to a chapter’s 
worth of statutory protections — including, but not at all limited 
to, the prevailing wage law.  (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720, p. 241; 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
2 
see Stats. 1929, ch. 793, § 1, p. 1603 [prior definition for eight-
hour day statute]; Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 4, pp. 911–912 [prior 
definition for the Prevailing Wage Act]; Stats. 1931, ch. 398, § 3, 
p. 914 [prior definition for the Public Works Alien Employment 
Act]; Stats. 1933, ch. 174, § 1, p. 621 [prior definition for 
prohibition on charging fees to place workers in public work].)  
That consolidation resulted in a multiprong definition under 
which irrigation, utility, reclamation, improvement, and similar 
special districts, alone among public agencies, were singled out 
to have an apparently broader slice of their activities treated as 
public works.  (See Lab. Code, § 1720, former subd. (b), enacted 
by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 1720, p. 241; Lab. Code, § 1720, subd. 
(a)(2).) 
This is at least a little peculiar.  There is nothing 
immediately and obviously distinctive about irrigation districts, 
reclamation districts, and the like, that explains why they 
should be singled out in this fashion.  The prong of the definition 
governing irrigation and other special districts first appeared, 
in substantially similar form, in a maximum-hour law.  (See 
Stats. 1929, ch. 793, § 1, p. 1603.)  It is not clear why the 
maximum-hour law had included a special definition for the 
covered districts, however, nor is it clear why the Legislature 
saw fit to apply the same definition for purposes of all of the 
other public works protections in the Labor Code.  Certainly the 
Legislature is entitled to draw such distinctions.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 27.)  But if the Legislature had a considered reason 
for this differential treatment of various kinds of public 
agencies, that reason is not readily apparent from the historical 
record. 
This feature of the statutory public works definition was 
apparently obscure enough that, for decades after its enactment, 
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
 
3 
it appears no one thought to apply the language of the special 
districts definition to the sort of work plaintiffs here perform.  
That omission does not license us to disregard the language of 
the governing definition, which is most naturally read to cover 
such work, and the majority opinion rightly declines to do so.  
But it does suggest that any incongruity in the scope of public 
works coverage for these districts, as opposed to other public 
entities, may simply have flown under the radar until now.  
With today’s decision, that is no longer the case.  Whether the 
result is desirable policy is a matter beyond our purview, but it 
is not beyond the Legislature’s.  The Legislature can, if it sees 
fit, adjust the statutory definition to align with its current 
conception of the appropriate scope of the prevailing wage law 
and the other protections to which the definition applies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc.   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 29 Cal.App.5th 778 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S253458 
Date Filed: March 29, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles  
Judge:  John Shepard Wiley, Jr.    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Hayes Pawlenko, Matthew B. Hayes and Kye D. Pawlenko for Plaintiffs and Appellants.    
 
Hinshaw & Culbertson, Frederick J. Ufkes and Filomena E. Meyer for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre, Claire Hervey Collins and Paul J. Beck for County 
Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County, League of California Cities, California State Association 
of Counties, California Special Districts Association, California Association of Sanitation Agencies and 
Association of California Water Agencies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kye Pawlenko 
Hayes Pawlenko LLP 
595 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 303 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(626) 808-4357 
 
Frederick J. Ufkes 
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 
350 S. Grand Ave., Suite 3600 
Los Angeles, Ca 90071 
(310) 909-8058