Title: In re J.M.J.-J
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 300A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 300A19  
Filed 5 June 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.M.J.-J. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 16 May 
2019 by Judge Wesley W. Barkley in District Court, Caldwell County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 4 May 2020 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Lucy R. McCarl, Staff Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Caldwell County 
Department of Social Services. 
 
Poyner Spruill LLP, by Christopher S. Dwight and John M. Durnovich, for 
appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
 
Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his 
parental rights to J.M.J.-J. (Julie).1 After careful consideration of respondent’s 
challenges to the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights, we affirm. 
                                            
1 The minor child, J.M.J-J., will be referred to throughout this opinion by the 
pseudonym “Julie” to protect the identity of the child and for ease of reading. 
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 22 August 2017, the Caldwell County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
obtained nonsecure custody of Julie and filed a juvenile petition alleging that Julie 
was a neglected and dependent juvenile. At that time, Julie was living with her 
mother, and DSS alleged that Julie had a Child Protective Services history which 
included allegations of living in a home with substance abuse, improper supervision, 
and improper care. DSS claimed that Julie’s mother had failed to address serious 
issues of substance abuse and mental health concerns which had placed Julie at risk 
of harm, as well as that Julie lacked an appropriate alternative caregiver.  
DSS filed an amended juvenile petition on 6 September 2017 that provided 
further details concerning the mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues.  It 
also contained allegations regarding respondent and his role in Julie’s circumstances. 
DSS alleged that respondent had an extensive criminal history that included charges 
pertaining to domestic violence and controlled substances. Additionally, DSS claimed 
that respondent had reported to a social worker his “knowledge of [Julie’s] mother[’s] 
on-going substance use, and [her] failure to take any action in regards to [Julie’s] 
safety.”  
On 29 November 2017, Julie was adjudicated to be a neglected and dependent 
juvenile. Respondent did not contest the allegations contained in either the original 
juvenile petition or the amended juvenile petition. On the same date as the 
adjudication, the trial court entered a separate disposition order. The trial court 
ordered that custody of Julie should remain with DSS. The trial court further ordered 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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that respondent should complete a case plan and attend all visitation with Julie as 
ordered by the trial court, but conditioned visitation with Julie on respondent’s 
completion of “one drug screening that is negative for all illegal and/or non-prescribed 
controlled substances, and begin[ning] participat[ion] in the activities of his case plan 
with [DSS] and as ordered by the court.”  
The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 30 May 2018. At that 
time, respondent had visited with Julie only once since she had been in DSS custody. 
Respondent had not begun parenting education classes as required by his case plan.  
A hair follicle drug screen administered to respondent yielded a positive result for the 
presence of hydrocodone and oxycodone. A home study for respondent’s residence had 
been completed but was denied. Consequently, on 14 June 2018, the trial court 
entered an order in which it authorized DSS to cease reunification efforts with both 
parents and changed the primary permanent plan for Julie to adoption.  
On 2 August 2018, DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 
respondent and Julie’s mother. DSS alleged grounds to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights to Julie based on neglect and abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (7) (2019). On 16 May 2019, the trial court entered an order concluding 
that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on both grounds 
alleged in the petition. The trial court further concluded that termination of 
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent’s parental rights was in Julie’s best interests.2 Accordingly, the trial court 
terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals. 
Respondent argues that several of the trial court’s findings of fact are not 
supported by the evidence and that the trial court erred in concluding that grounds 
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights. A termination of parental rights 
proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. 
§§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 
(1984). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence of at least one ground for termination 
under Section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1109(e)–(f). We review a trial court’s adjudication “to determine whether the findings 
are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253 (citing In 
re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982)). If the petitioner meets its 
burden during the adjudicatory stage, “the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, 
at which the court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to 
terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 
(2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110 (2015)). 
                                            
2 The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of Julie’s mother, but she 
did not appeal the order and is not a party to the proceedings before this Court. 
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In this case, the trial court concluded that the ground of neglect existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights.  The tribunal also concluded that petitioner 
DSS had established the existence of the ground of abandonment. With only one 
ground being required to be present under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 in order to proceed to 
the dispositional stage of a termination proceeding, we begin our analysis here with 
a consideration of the ground of neglect. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). Section 
7B-1111(a)(1) allows for termination of parental rights based upon a finding that 
“[t]he parent has . . . neglected the juvenile” within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(15). Id. A neglected juvenile, in turn, is statutorily defined, in pertinent part, as 
a juvenile “whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper 
care, supervision, or discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the 
juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  
Generally, when a termination of parental rights is based upon a 
determination of neglect, “if the child has been separated from the parent for a long 
period of time, there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future 
neglect by the parent.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167 (citing In re 
Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713–15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231–32 (1984)). “When determining 
whether such future neglect is likely, the district court must consider evidence of 
changed circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect and the time of 
the termination hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 212, 835 S.E.2d. 425, 430 (2019) 
(citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232).  
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court made 
unchallenged findings of fact including, inter alia, that Julie had been adjudicated to 
be a neglected and dependent juvenile in November 2017, that during the 
adjudication hearing respondent “stood mute,” and that respondent had been 
employed at a furniture company prior to being incarcerated on 19 September 2018 
for the sale and delivery of crack cocaine and for having attained the status of an 
habitual felon. “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported 
by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 
831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) (citation omitted).  
While the aforementioned findings of fact are not disputed by respondent, he 
nonetheless challenges other specific findings of fact which are pertinent to the 
neglect basis for termination of parental rights. Firstly, we address his contention 
that the portion of Finding of Fact 14 that states that Julie’s mother did not have 
placement options for Julie at the time that the juvenile petition was filed was not 
supported by the evidence. Respondent asserts that he consistently sought custody of 
Julie and that at the time of Julie’s removal from the mother’s home, respondent “had 
gainful employment, suitable housing, and no known parenting deficiencies.” 
Respondent claims, however, that DSS did not consider him for placement. We are 
not persuaded by this contention. In its prior adjudication order, the trial court found 
as a fact that when the juvenile petition and the amended juvenile petition were filed, 
Julie’s mother lacked an appropriate alternative childcare arrangement. Respondent 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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did not appeal from the trial court’s adjudication order, and therefore he is bound by 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating the challenged portion of Finding 
of Fact 14. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 409, 831 S.E.2d at 60 (citing King v. Grindstaff, 
284 N.C. 348, 356, 200 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1973)) (stating that because the challenged 
findings of fact concerned facts that were stipulated to by the respondent-mother 
when the juvenile was adjudicated neglected, and the respondent-mother did not 
appeal from the adjudication order, she was bound by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel from relitigating the findings of fact).  
Respondent next challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 26 that describes his 
case plan as requiring him to “complete a Comprehensive Clinical Assessment (CCA) 
with RHA Behavioral Health, to address mental health, substance abuse, and 
domestic violence issues and comply with any and all recommendations.” (Emphasis 
added). Respondent contends that this finding, as worded, suggests that he had 
mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues that needed to be 
addressed by his case plan. Respondent asserts that this implication is not supported 
by the evidence. In support of this contention, respondent cites the testimony of the 
foster care social worker who described the purpose of the CCA as being “to see if 
there were any mental health concerns, substance abuse concerns, [or] domestic 
violence concerns.” (Emphasis added). Respondent’s argument lacks support. 
Initially, we note that the disposition order entered on 29 November 2017 similarly 
stated that respondent was required to follow a case plan that included completing a 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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CCA addressing “mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues.” 
Respondent is barred once again by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from 
relitigating this issue. Id. Secondly, in light of respondent’s extensive criminal 
history, which included domestic violence, substance abuse, and pending drug-related 
charges, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to impose the requirements of his 
case plan, nor was it erroneous for the trial court to describe the case plan as 
addressing these issues in the event that the CCA showed that such issues were 
present.  
Respondent next argues that Finding of Fact 27 is erroneous for several 
reasons. This finding states the following: 
27. 
[Respondent] completed a CCA with RHA on 
February 26, 2018. At the time of the Assessment, 
Respondent father [ ] denied any substance abuse issues. 
He completed a hair follicle drug screen on February 21, 
2018, which was positive for Oxycodone and Hydrocodone. 
[DSS] requested that Respondent father [ ] follow up with 
RHA in order to have a re-assessment. Respondent father 
[ ] refused to go back to RHA or engage in any substance 
abuse treatment due to his work schedule. 
 
First, respondent contends that there was insufficient competent evidence that he 
tested positive for hydrocodone and oxycodone. Respondent argues that although the 
foster care social worker testified that she told respondent of his positive drug screen, 
she never actually testified that his hair sample on 21 February 2018 contained 
hydrocodone and oxycodone. Respondent further contends that DSS failed to lay a 
foundation for the social worker’s knowledge of the results of the drug screen. Once 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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again, we are not persuaded. The trial court took judicial notice of all prior orders in 
the court file, and the trial court’s finding of fact at issue is supported by a 
permanency planning order entered on 14 June 2018 which found as a fact that 
respondent tested positive for hydrocodone and oxycodone. Although the permanency 
planning order is subject to a lower standard of evidentiary proof than a termination 
of parental rights determination, this Court has acknowledged that “[a] trial court 
may take judicial notice of findings of fact made in prior orders, even when those 
findings are based on a lower evidentiary standard because where a judge sits 
without a jury, the trial court is presumed to have disregarded any incompetent 
evidence and relied upon the competent evidence.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 410, 831 
S.E.2d at 60 (citing Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell, 301 N.C. 689, 694, 273 S.E.2d 281, 
285 (1981)).  
 
Respondent also challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 27 that states that 
he “refused to go back to RHA or engage in any substance abuse treatment due to his 
work schedule.” Respondent contends that there was no evidence that he was ever 
advised to engage in substance abuse treatment, nor was there clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that he had a substance abuse problem. Respondent additionally 
argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he refused to go 
back to RHA due to his work schedule. Respondent claims that he was given one 
opportunity to return to RHA, and on that particular day, he admits telling the social 
worker that he could not go to RHA due to work obligations. Respondent submits that 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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DSS never attempted to accommodate his work schedule and never consulted with 
him before arranging appointments for him. Respondent reasons that “[a] refusal to 
do something on one day is not a refusal ever to do it.” We find that some of the 
elements contained in Finding of Fact 27 are supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence, although a portion of this finding was not sufficiently proven.  
Based on respondent’s positive drug screen for hydrocodone and oxycodone, 
coupled with his pending drug-related criminal charges at the time, the trial court 
could reasonably infer that respondent had a substance abuse problem. See In re 
D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167–68 (2016) (stating that it is the trial 
court’s duty to consider all of the evidence, pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, 
and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom); see also Scott v. 
Scott, 157 N.C. App. 382, 388, 579 S.E.2d 431, 435 (2003) (stating that when the trial 
court sits as fact-finder, it is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given to 
the evidence, and it is not the role of the appellate courts to substitute their judgment 
for that of the trial courts). Regarding respondent’s refusal to go to RHA, the social 
worker testified that she called respondent following his positive drug screen and 
asked respondent to go to RHA to complete another assessment. The social worker 
stated that respondent told her that “[h]e was not going back to RHA to take drug 
classes because that would make him look bad.” Based on this testimony, the trial 
court could reasonably infer that respondent refused to go back to RHA. We conclude, 
however, that the evidence does not support the specific portion of the finding of fact 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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that states that respondent refused to return to RHA due to his work schedule. Thus, 
we disregard this particular portion of Finding of Fact 27. 
Respondent next challenges the portions of Finding of Fact 28 that state that 
respondent “specifically refused” to submit to drug screens on 29 March 2018 and 
27 June 2018. As to the 29 March 2018 drug screen, respondent represents that he 
was asked to “drop everything on a moment’s notice, including leaving food in the 
oven, to get in a car operated by DSS employees, and be driven directly to a lab where 
he would receive [the] drug test.” Respondent argues that this request by DSS was 
unreasonable, while his unwillingness to comply with the request was not 
unreasonable. As to the 27 June 2018 drug screen, the social worker testified that 
when asked to submit to the drug screen on said date, respondent told the social 
worker that he would not be able to pass the drug screen. Respondent opines that the 
trial court’s finding of fact based on this testimony, that respondent refused to submit 
to the drug screen that had been arranged, “suggests a desire to hide the truth,” which 
he claims is misleading. We are not persuaded.  
At the termination hearing, when asked whether DSS was able to screen 
respondent for the presence of controlled substances, the social worker testified that 
DSS was not able to do so because respondent “refused.” As to the 29 March 2018 
drug screen, the social worker testified that respondent stated “[h]e was just waking 
up and he was cooking.” As to the 27 June 2018 drug screen, the social worker 
testified that respondent “said he would not be able to pass so he wasn’t going to go.” 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The social worker’s testimony regarding respondent’s reactions to these respective 
drug screen administrations clearly supports the trial court’s finding that respondent 
“refused” to go with DSS for a drug screen on each of the two occasions. Although 
respondent contends that the circumstances of the drug screens should have led to a 
different finding, it was for the trial court to determine the reasonable inferences to 
be made from the social worker’s testimony. In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d 
at 167–68; Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C. App. at 388, 579 S.E.2d at 435. 
Respondent further challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 28 that states 
that DSS had made eleven unsuccessful attempted drug screens. Respondent argues 
that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding 
of fact. Respondent’s rationale for his position is the layered argument that because 
there was no evidence of any actual contact between DSS and respondent concerning 
the nine drug screens other than the ones attempted on 29 March 2018 and 27 June 
2018, and because there was no evidence that respondent was made aware of DSS’s 
attempt to screen him for drugs on these dates, then the trial court had no basis to 
find that he refused those attempted drug screens. DSS concedes that the evidence 
presented on this matter only demonstrates that respondent was unavailable to be 
tested. Thus, we disregard this portion of Finding of Fact 28. 
Respondent next challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 31 that states that 
he failed to approach his employer to request a modification of his work schedule so 
that respondent could visit with Julie. We note that respondent conceded during 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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cross-examination at the termination hearing that he never went to his superior to 
ask for such a modification. Respondent’s own testimony therefore directly supports 
this finding of fact.  
Respondent further argues that there is no evidence to support the segment of 
Finding of Fact 31 that states that the trial court would have been inclined to grant 
weekend visitation with Julie to respondent in order to accommodate his work 
schedule. We disagree. We agree with the Court of Appeals that “[i]t is well-
established that a trial court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings.” In re 
J.C.M.J.C., 834 S.E.2d 670, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019). Here, the same assigned trial 
judge presided over this case’s proceedings from the time of the adjudication hearing 
through the termination hearing. As a result, the assigned trial judge had actual 
knowledge, in his capacity as the trial court, of his own inclinations and therefore 
could take judicial notice regarding whether the trial court would have granted 
weekend visitation to respondent. Consequently, we overrule respondent’s challenge 
to this finding of fact.  
Respondent argues that Finding of Fact 32 is not supported by the evidence. 
That finding of fact states the following: 
32. Respondent father [ ] has willfully failed and refused to 
correct any of the conditions which led [Julie] to come into 
the care of [DSS]. These conditions still exist as of this 
hearing. Respondent father [ ] has not attended a 
parenting class nor has he sought and/or obtained any 
domestic violence treatment and/or counseling. In addition, 
the conditions which led [Julie] to come into the care of 
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[DSS] will in all likelihood continue to exist in the 
reasonably foreseeable future such that [Julie] will be 
unable to safely come into the care of Respondent father [ ]. 
 
Respondent contends that nearly all of the allegations relating to Julie’s 
removal from the home concerned Julie’s mother. He asserts that no evidence 
indicated that he “willfully failed and refused” to correct substance abuse and mental 
health problems of Julie’s mother, and further asserts that his case plan never 
required domestic violence counseling or treatment. We are not persuaded. While it 
may be true that respondent had no role in the mother’s substance abuse and mental 
health issues, Julie’s placement in foster care after her removal from the mother’s 
home was predicated on the fact that she could not be placed with respondent. As 
stated previously herein, to address the issues which prevented Julie’s placement 
with respondent, the trial court first ordered that respondent must engage in a case 
plan which included domestic violence, mental health, and substance abuse 
components and comply with all recommendations. Second, in the order ceasing 
reunification efforts, the trial court found as a fact that respondent “informed the 
social worker on October 17, 2017, that he was waiting until he goes to court for 
pending drug charges before he begins services identified on his case plan.” Third, as 
indicated earlier, respondent tested positive for hydrocodone and oxycodone and 
refused to complete two drug screens. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence 
in the record supports this finding of fact.  
 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Respondent next challenges the portions of Findings of Fact 34 and 35 that 
state that his only requirement before resuming visits with Julie was the attainment 
of negative drug screens. Respondent claims that this determination is inaccurate, 
because the dispositional order suspended his visits until respondent began to 
participate in the activities of his case plan. Respondent contends that DSS never 
referred him to parenting classes, therefore he was unable to complete that part of 
his case plan. Respondent goes on to conclude that there was never a time that he 
had the ability to participate in all of the activities of his case plan and to therefore 
gain visitation privileges. We agree in part and disagree in part with respondent’s 
position on these two findings of fact.  
The disposition order entered on 29 November 2017 states that respondent 
could engage in visitation with Julie upon his completion of “one drug screening that 
is negative for all illegal and/or non-prescribed controlled substances, and [upon] 
begin[ning] participating in the activities of his case plan.” (Emphasis added.). Thus, 
the portion of Finding of Fact 34 that states that the only requirement for respondent 
to visit with Julie prior to 30 May 2018 was the attainment of a negative drug screen 
is incorrect. 
Finding of Fact 35 states that the only requirement for respondent to visit with 
Julie from 30 May 2018 until his incarceration was the completion of two negative 
drug screens. This finding is supported by the record. The permanency planning order 
entered on 14 June 2018 expressly shows that respondent’s completion of two 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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negative drug screens was the sole prerequisite to visitation and that respondent’s 
visitation was not conditioned upon respondent participating in the activities of his 
case plan. Regardless of whether respondent was required to engage in the activities 
of his case plan prior to being allowed to visit with Julie, the record is clear that 
respondent never completed any negative drug screens, and therefore never satisfied 
this condition precedent to visitation. Thus, DSS’s purported failure to refer 
respondent to parenting classes had no effect on his ability to visit with Julie.  
Respondent further argues that even if he had complied with the trial court’s 
prerequisites to visitation, Julie was living in Anson County and New Hanover 
County prior to the termination hearing and the distance from his residential county 
of Caldwell County to where Julie was located made visitation less feasible. It is 
worthy to note, however, that respondent testified at the termination hearing that he 
did not learn of Julie’s whereabouts until the termination hearing. Because 
respondent was unaware of Julie’s residential placements and her geographical 
distance from respondent, these issues could not have had a dampening effect on 
respondent’s desire to visit with Julie or on his ability to see her.  
In Findings of Fact 34 and 35, the trial court again found that respondent had 
refused to complete drug screens on 29 March 2018 and 27 June 2018. The trial court 
also found that respondent was “not at home during other times when [DSS] 
attempted to drug screen him.” We have already determined that the trial court could 
reasonably infer, based on competent evidence adduced at the termination hearing, 
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that respondent refused to submit to the drug screens. The trial court additionally 
found as a fact that respondent was “not at home” during additional attempts by DSS 
to obtain a drug screen from him. As observed earlier in our analysis, DSS concedes 
that the evidence demonstrates respondent’s unavailability to be tested for the 
presence of controlled substances. Ultimately, we conclude that these portions of 
Findings of Fact 34 and 35 properly reflect the evidence in the record.  
Respondent next argues that the portions of Finding of Fact 36 that state that 
he had no contact with Julie and failed to send her cards or gifts were not supported 
by the record. Respondent asserts that the record contains no evidence that he had 
the ability to write to Julie or to send her cards or gifts after his incarceration. 
Respondent also contends that there was no evidence that Julie’s foster parents 
would allow him to contact her or send her cards or gifts. We note that the trial court 
did not make any finding of fact regarding whether respondent did or did not have 
the ability to contact Julie or to send her cards or gifts; the trial court’s finding of fact 
merely states that respondent did not do so. This finding is supported by the social 
worker’s testimony that following respondent’s incarceration, respondent never sent 
Julie any cards or gifts and never asked DSS to forward any letters to the child. The 
social worker further testified that respondent’s last visit with Julie occurred on 1 
September 2017. Respondent’s argument does not relate to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support this finding of fact, but instead relates to the legal conclusion of 
his neglect and willful abandonment of Julie. See In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 82, 833 
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S.E.2d 768, 776 (2019) (“[T]he trial court failed to make any findings of fact regarding 
whether respondent-father had the ability to contact [DSS] and [his daughter] while 
he was incarcerated, with such findings being necessary in order for the trial court to 
make a valid determination regarding the extent to which respondent-father’s failure 
to contact [his daughter] and [DSS] . . . was willful.”). Finding of Fact 36 reflects the 
social worker’s testimony, and we thus conclude it is supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence.  
Respondent also challenges Findings of Fact 7 and 33. Finding of Fact 7 
concerns respondent’s last known address; Finding of Fact 33 relates to the ground 
of willful abandonment. However, because we conclude these findings were not 
necessary to support the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights for neglect, we refrain from engaging in an unnecessary 
review of respondent’s challenges to those two findings of fact. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 
at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404, 293 S.E.2d at 133).  
Respondent next argues that the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its 
conclusion that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights due to neglect. 
Respondent represents that he had no role in Julie’s removal from the mother’s home. 
Respondent contends that there was no evidence that he lacked parenting skills or 
that he suffered from any condition arising from mental health, substance abuse, or 
domestic violence concerns that could harm Julie or place her at a substantial risk of 
harm. Thus, respondent asserts that his failure to complete his case plan does not 
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affect his fitness to parent Julie and consequently is not relevant to the conclusion of 
neglect. Respondent further contends that the findings of fact do not support a 
conclusion of neglect by abandonment because no evidence was presented and no 
findings of fact were made regarding his ability to remain in contact and 
communication with Julie while he was incarcerated. We disagree with respondent’s 
position.  
First, we do not accept respondent’s contention that the trial court’s conclusion 
of neglect was erroneous because he was not responsible for the conditions that 
resulted in Julie’s placement in DSS custody. This Court has explained that “[i]n 
determining whether a child is neglected, the determinative factors are the 
circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or culpability of the 
parent.” In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. at 154, 804 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting In re Montgomery, 
311 N.C. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252). In In re M.A.W., this Court held that a prior 
adjudication of neglect based on a mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues 
was “appropriately considered” by the trial court as “relevant evidence” in 
proceedings to terminate the parental rights of a father who was incarcerated at the 
time of the prior adjudication. Id. at 153, 804 S.E.2d at 517; see also In re C.L.S., 245 
N.C. App. 75, 78–79, 781 S.E.2d 680, 682–83 (affirming termination of a father’s 
parental rights on the ground of neglect where the father was incarcerated and 
paternity was not established until after a prior adjudication of neglect based on the 
mother’s substance abuse), aff’d per curiam, 369 N.C. 58, 791 S.E.2d 457 (2016). It is 
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therefore not necessary that the parent whose rights are subject to termination be 
responsible for the prior adjudication of neglect.  
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondent’s claim that he played no part 
in the prior adjudication of neglect. As we stated previously, although respondent 
may have had no role in the mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues, 
Julie’s removal from the mother’s home and resulting placement in foster care were 
also largely due to the fact that the juvenile could not be placed with respondent. To 
address the issues which prevented Julie’s placement with respondent, the trial court 
ordered respondent to engage in a case plan which included domestic violence, mental 
health, and substance abuse components and to comply with all recommendations. 
Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of the order. 
Second, we are not persuaded by respondent’s claim that there was no evidence 
that he had the ability to remain in contact and communication with Julie while he 
was incarcerated but chose not to do so, to the extent that his incarceration 
contributed to his lack of interaction with the child. This Court has stated: 
A parent’s incarceration may be relevant to the 
determination of whether parental rights should be 
terminated, but “[o]ur precedents are quite clear—and 
remain in full force—that ‘[i]ncarceration, standing alone, 
is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental 
rights decision.’ ” Thus, respondent’s incarceration, by 
itself, cannot serve as clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence of neglect. Instead, the extent to which a parent’s 
incarceration . . . support[s] a finding of neglect depends 
upon an analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances, 
including the length of the parent’s incarceration.  
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 282–83, 837 S.E.2d 861, 867–68 (2020) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, similar to the circumstances in In re K.N., the trial court failed 
to conduct such an analysis. However, pertinent aspects of respondent’s incarceration 
here distinguish this case from In re K.N. In In re K.N., the father was already 
incarcerated at the time that he entered into his case plan. Id. at 276, 837 S.E.2d at 
864. Respondent here, on the other hand, was not incarcerated until 19 September 
2018, almost twelve months after he entered into his case plan and more than twelve 
months since he last visited Julie.  
The trial court’s findings in this case reveal circumstances similar to those in 
In re M.A.W. In In re M.A.W., this Court found that “the evidence of [the father’s] 
prior neglect does not stand alone,” noting the father’s long history of criminal activity 
and substance abuse and his stipulation to the allegations of neglect that led to the 
juvenile’s adjudication as a neglected juvenile. 370 N.C. at 154, 804 S.E.2d at 517. 
The father in In re M.A.W. also admitted to being aware of the mother’s substance 
abuse issues. Id. Similarly, in the instant case, respondent has an extensive criminal 
history, with many of his past offenses involving controlled substances. The trial 
court also found, as previously mentioned, that respondent “stood mute” when the 
allegations in the amended juvenile petition were presented. Furthermore, the 
amended juvenile petition contains an allegation that respondent was aware of the 
mother’s ongoing substance abuse and took no action to ensure Julie’s safety.  
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Additional facts supporting the trial court’s conclusion that there was a 
likelihood of repetition of neglect included its finding of fact that respondent had last 
visited with Julie in September 2017 and took no action to be a part of Julie’s life. 
Thus, respondent had not developed a relationship with Julie and had not 
demonstrated an ability to care for her. Furthermore, prior to his incarceration, 
respondent made no attempt to comply with his case plan or to address the barriers 
to reunification that had been identified by the trial court. Respondent tested positive 
for hydrocodone and oxycodone, refused two drug screens, and failed to go to RHA. 
We therefore conclude that “[t]he trial court properly found that past neglect was 
established by DSS and that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect[,]” id. at 
156, 804 S.E.2d at 518, because the trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that 
respondent’s circumstances had not changed so as to render him fit to care for Julie 
at the time of the termination hearing. See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d 
at 232 (explaining that the trial court must consider evidence of changed 
circumstances since the adjudication of past neglect, and that the determinative 
factors are the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the 
child at the time of the termination hearing). Thus, we hold that the trial court did 
not err in adjudicating neglect as a ground to terminate respondent’s parental rights 
to Julie pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 
The trial court’s conclusion that a ground for termination existed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is sufficient in and of itself to support the termination of 
IN RE J.M.J.-J. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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respondent’s parental rights. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 413, 831 S.E.2d at 62. 
Furthermore, respondent does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination of his parental rights was in Julie’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s 
parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.