Title: People v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S070250A
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 3, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL RAYMOND JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S070250 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
CR 39376 
 
 
January 3, 2022 
(reposted with corrected editorial information) 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Lavin* 
concurred. 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
S070250 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Michael Raymond Johnson of 
first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), attempted murder (Pen. 
Code, §§ 187, 664), one count each of kidnapping and spousal 
rape (Pen. Code, §§ 207, subd. (a), 262, subd. (a)(1)), and of being 
a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, former § 12021, 
subd. (a)(1)).  It found true the special circumstances of 
intentionally killing a peace officer engaged in the performance 
of his duties, and murder during the commission of a kidnapping 
(Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(7), (17)(B)), as well as various 
sentencing enhancements.  The jury returned a verdict of death 
at the penalty phase.  The court denied the automatic motion to 
modify the verdict (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)), imposed the 
death sentence, and imposed stayed sentences for the remaining 
counts.  This appeal is automatic.  (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)  
We affirm the judgment.   
I. 
THE FACTS  
According to the evidence presented at his trial, in July 
1996, defendant armed himself and kidnapped his wife, G.A., 
from her workplace.  She eventually accompanied defendant to 
a remote mountain area where he forced her to engage in sexual 
activity.  Later that day, after defendant and G.A. had returned 
to G.A.’s home, the police, responding to a 911 call, arrived and 
removed G.A. from the house.  Defendant then shot and killed 
one officer at the scene, 26-year-old Ventura County Deputy 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
2 
Sheriff Peter Aguirre, and fired several rounds toward another 
officer, Deputy Sheriff James Fryhoff, who was able to disable 
defendant with return gunfire.   
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Defendant and G.A. married in 1985 but they had little 
contact over the following years.  They reestablished contact and 
began a romantic relationship in early 1996.  G.A., her 15-year-
old daughter from a different relationship, D.G., and D.G.’s 
boyfriend, Francisco, lived together in a one-bedroom house in 
Ojai.  Defendant began living at the house with G.A., D.G., and 
Francisco in June 1996.   
On July 14, defendant and G.A. went to a secluded 
mountain area to “make love” at a spot they had visited for this 
purpose a few times before.  They removed their clothes, but 
then defendant became angry and jealous when G.A. told him 
she had come there before with D.G.’s father.  G.A. explained to 
defendant that it was a long time ago, and G.A. and defendant 
then had sex. 
On an unspecified date around that same time, G.A. was 
at home in the shower laughing about something.  Defendant, 
who was also home, accused her of being in the shower with 
Francisco.  G.A. told defendant he was “crazy” because she had 
been alone in the bathroom and Francisco had been in the living 
room with D.G.. 
On July 15, when G.A. returned home from work, she 
learned that defendant had moved out.  On the phone, defendant 
told G.A. that she was not good enough for him and he wanted 
a divorce.  He said he moved out because he thought G.A. had 
been talking to Francisco in the shower and he was jealous.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
3 
On the afternoon of July 17, defendant came to the 
residence where G.A. worked as a housekeeper, followed her 
into the house, and threw a gun on a bed.  He had another gun 
in his pocket.  He told G.A., “I love you, I can’t leave, I have to 
stay close to you.”  G.A. told defendant that he could not stay 
with her because she needed to work.  Defendant repeatedly told 
G.A. that he had to stay with her, “every minute of every day.”  
He told her he would take her to Wisconsin but that they first 
needed to rob a bank because they did not have money.  G.A., 
who was doing laundry while they spoke, explained that she 
needed to work to support her daughter and could not leave.  
Defendant said he would take G.A. by force.  
G.A. had not seen defendant like this before. He was 
acting strangely, “crazy,” and speaking rapidly and loudly.  He 
had a pistol and became angry when G.A. tried to convince him 
to give her the pistol.  He mentioned a movie he was going to 
write that they had previously joked about, called “Crazy Love,” 
which was a story in which defendant thought he and G.A. were 
both crazy.  He told G.A. they were in the movie at that moment.   
While defendant and G.A. were still at her employer’s 
house, defendant told G.A. he wanted her to remove Francisco 
from her home.  G.A. called her daughter at G.A.’s house and 
told her that she and Francisco needed to leave, mentioning that 
defendant had two “pistolas.”  
Shortly after, G.A.’s employer called to tell G.A.  she was 
free to leave.  To convince defendant to leave, G.A. suggested 
they go for a ride.  She suggested they each leave in their own 
car, but defendant insisted they travel in one car.  They left for 
G.A.’s house. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
4 
When they arrived at G.A.’s home, D.G. and Francisco 
were still there, along with other children.  Defendant said 
everyone could stay except Francisco.  G.A. insisted that 
everyone leave because she was afraid defendant might shoot 
the children.  G.A. did not feel that she could get away from 
defendant.  She told defendant, “Let’s go cruising.”  Because he 
believed he was being followed, defendant took D.G.’s dog with 
them because it would bark when it saw people it did not 
recognize.  
They returned to the mountain spot they had visited on 
July 14.  Defendant wanted to move further up the mountains, 
but G.A. did not want to, so defendant stopped where they were.  
G.A. testified that defendant kept looking around, “scared,” and 
said that someone was following him.  They brought pillows and 
a blanket from the car, secured the dog to a tree, undressed, and 
lay down.  G.A. explained that she removed her clothes because 
defendant was removing his clothes like they had done at this 
location a few times before to have sex, but they had never before 
had sex while defendant possessed guns.  
G.A. testified at trial that defendant then got on top of her 
and tried to have sex.  She testified that defendant was unable 
to get an erection or ejaculate and did not penetrate her vagina.  
But she remembered telling Sergeant Garcia that they had sex.  
The jury heard G.A.’s grand jury testimony in which she said 
that defendant was able to insert his penis inside her vagina “a 
little bit.” 
After about 20 minutes, G.A. told defendant, “Let’s go,” 
because the mosquitos were biting her.  Defendant packed 
everything up and they left for G.A.’s home.  After they arrived 
at the house, D.G., who had left the house earlier, called G.A. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
5 
and asked if she should call the police.  G.A. said yes.  D.G. called 
and informed an emergency operator that G.A. was in danger, 
that defendant had two guns, and that he had made G.A. remove 
D.G. from the house.  D.G.  reported that defendant had a 
criminal record and was planning to rob a bank.  Police were 
dispatched to G.A.’s house.   
At the house, defendant wanted to have sex but G.A. told 
defendant to take a shower.  G.A wanted to distract defendant 
and for him to surrender to the police.  Defendant told G.A. to 
take a shower with him, so they got in the shower together.  
While showering, defendant kept the guns on a window ledge 
near his hands.  At no point that day did G.A. feel she could get 
away from defendant. 
Meanwhile, 
Deputies 
Aguirre 
and 
Steven 
Sagely 
responded to the domestic disturbance call, with Deputies 
Fryhoff and David Sparks responding as backup.  Fryhoff and 
Sparks took positions at the rear of the house while Aguirre and 
Sagely approached the front and knocked on the front door.   
Knowing it was the police, G.A. went to the front door in 
her towel.  Sagely saw G.A. appearing upset, like she had been 
crying and she was trying to speak.  As G.A. was stepping 
outside and Aguirre was stepping inside, G.A. told the officers 
that defendant had guns.  
The officers remaining outside then heard rapid gunfire 
from inside the house.  While looking in a window, Fryhoff 
observed defendant running for the front door, so Fryhoff ran 
toward the front of the house.  As he rounded the front corner, 
he saw defendant on the front lawn, face Fryhoff and fire several 
rounds toward him.  While taking cover, Fryhoff was able to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
6 
shoot defendant in the chest, and then saw him lying naked on 
his back with two guns nearby. 
The officers found Aguirre inside the house, lying on his 
back, between a wall and a large potted plant in a corner, 
“[b]leeding profusely from the face,” and struggling to breathe.  
Deputy Aguirre died from his injuries that were caused by 
gunshot wounds.  His gun was fully loaded and holstered.   
After the shootout, defendant was taken into custody and 
transported to a hospital for treatment of his chest gunshot 
wound.  Psychiatrist Donald Patterson, retained by the district 
attorney’s office, interviewed defendant that night while he was 
receiving treatment in a hospital emergency room.   
The prosecution played portions of the interview during 
the trial.  Defendant described his intense feelings of jealousy 
for G.A. and belief that she was unfaithful.  He confessed to 
kidnapping her at gunpoint.  He also described jumping out from 
behind a wall and shooting Aguirre after he saw the police 
pulling G.A. out of the house.  He described feeling as if he had 
been in a movie that afternoon but explained that he was 
conscious of what he had done and that his acts had been a 
passive suicide attempt. 
The prosecution presented expert testimony on three 
subjects — Deputy Aguirre’s gunshot wounds, bullet forensics, 
and blood spatter patterns — to support its theory that 
defendant shot and killed Aguirre in an execution style.  As to 
the first subject, Deputy Aguirre’s gunshot wounds, he suffered 
three — one in his left arm and two entering the left and right 
side of his forehead — all with exit wounds.  The medical 
examiner, who autopsied Aguirre’s body, opined:  Each of the 
head gunshot wounds likely caused instantaneous loss of 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
7 
consciousness and motor skills.  Aguirre would have been 
incapable of shielding himself once he received the first of the 
head wounds.  Based on stippling wounds on Aguirre’s right 
forehead, the gun’s muzzle was approximately 12 to 18 inches 
from Aguirre’s head when the bullet entered the right side of his 
forehead.  Stippling wounds are caused when the muzzle of a 
gun is sufficiently close to the target so that gunpowder released 
with the bullet’s discharge impacts the skin and causes injuries. 
Second, the prosecution’s ballistics expert opined:  The 
trajectory of a bullet that passed into the floor in the part of the 
house where Aguirre was shot was consistent with being the 
final shot into Aguirre.  Two magazines of ammunition found in 
a fanny pack in the home and two boxes of ammunition found in 
a suitcase in defendant’s car were consistent with those fired 
from the Colt .45-caliber and Beretta .32-caliber semiautomatic 
handguns found outside near defendant when he was arrested.   
Third, a blood spatter analyst testified about the three 
areas of blood spatter events on the walls and objects in the area 
where Deputy Aguirre was shot.  The expert opined:  One of the 
blood spatter deposits, indicating a high velocity event 
(gunshot), occurred while Aguirre’s head was about 13 inches 
from the floor, facing up, between a wall and a potted plant in 
the corner.  The bullet trajectory that went into the floor was 
consistent with the bullet wound in Deputy Aguirre’s right 
forehead that had the stippling pattern.  A spatter pattern on 
Aguirre’s hand suggested that it had been in a defensive 
position. 
The 
prosecution 
also 
presented 
evidence 
about 
defendant’s criminal record to show he faced a potential life 
sentence when he armed himself on the day of the shooting.  A 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
8 
Ventura County deputy district attorney testified as an expert 
on sentencing, that defendant had served a prison term and had 
convictions for five felonies including two serious felonies.  He 
explained that a person with two prior serious felonies faced a 
sentence of 25 years to life upon conviction of a new felony.  
Defendant’s parole officer from 1991 testified about his practice 
of reviewing with parolees the conditions of their parole prior to 
their release date, including the requirement that parolees must 
refrain from possessing firearms.  He would advise parolees that 
it is a felony for a felon to possess a firearm.  He recalled 
defendant signing a parole form that informed defendant that 
he was prohibited from possessing firearms. 
2. Defense Evidence 
To contest the prosecution’s case on premeditation, the 
defense presented wound ballistics, crime reconstruction, and 
optometry evidence, as well as evidence of defendant’s behavior 
immediately after the shooting.  To contest the special 
circumstance allegations of intentionally killing a peace officer 
engaged in the performance of his duties, and murder during the 
commission of a kidnapping, it also presented an expert on 
police practices and evidence that defendant did not kidnap G.A.   
A defense expert on wound ballistics, Dr. Martin Fackler, 
opined that based on the forensic evidence, which included 
Deputy Aguirre’s stippling wound and the angles of bullet 
trajectories within G.A.’s house, it was impossible to determine 
the sequence of the shots fired and whether Aguirre or 
defendant or both were in motion when the shots were fired.  It 
was possible that defendant shot Aguirre deliberately after 
Aguirre was on the ground, but it was also possible, and a “little” 
more likely based on the rapidity of the shots, that defendant 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
9 
shot Aguirre while defendant was running by, and Aguirre was 
falling to the ground. 
The crime scene reconstructionist similarly opined that 
the physical evidence did not support conclusions as to the 
sequence of shots fired and whether the shooting was execution 
style, but rather that the evidence was consistent with 
defendant firing the gun while either or both he and Deputy 
Aguirre were in motion and that the final shot to Aguirre’s head 
occurred while he was incapacitated and falling but not yet on 
the ground.  He viewed the “scene as a dynamic, fast-moving 
sequence of events” with continuing changes in the position and 
distance between defendant and Deputy Aguirre.  Defendant 
could have been running by as he fired the gun.  
An optometrist who examined defendant in 1994 testified 
that defendant had 20/400 vision, which meant that he could 
only see at 20 feet what a person with normal vision could see 
at 400 feet.  Movement and backlighting also affect a person’s 
vision.  A person with 20/400 vision, however, could discern 
whether a person was lying on the ground, the location of the 
person’s head, whether he was wearing a badge and gun belt, 
and whether he was bleeding.  
To show that defendant’s behavior was rash and 
delusional rather than premeditated, the defense additionally 
presented testimony of a sheriff’s deputy, that he heard 
defendant repeatedly mumbling “Hare Krishna” while he lay 
naked on the ground after the shootout with Fryhoff.  
As part of its challenge to the special circumstance of 
shooting a police officer while engaged in the performance of his 
duties, the defense presented the testimony of Roger Clark, an 
expert on police practices.  Clark opined that under the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
10 
circumstances, a reasonable and well-trained officer would not 
have concluded that exigent circumstances warranted police 
entry because the purported victim was already outside and 
nothing “was emanating from inside the house to indicate that 
there [was] a crime being committed or someone in danger 
which would create the emergency for the officer, necessitate the 
officer to go in.”  A reasonable officer would have coordinated 
with his partners instead of entering the house.  
Regarding 
the 
kidnapping 
offenses 
including 
the 
kidnapping special circumstance, the defense read into the 
evidence the following portions of Sergeant Garcia’s interview of 
G.A.:  Garcia asked G.A. if defendant made any threat like he 
would kill or shoot her if she would not come with him.  G.A. 
responded that defendant showed her the gun but did not point 
it at her and that he told G.A. that if she did not come with him, 
he would stay with her because he did not want to be without 
her for one minute.  She told Sergeant Garcia that she felt afraid 
and hurt because defendant had forced G.A. to remove her 
daughter from the house that day.  Because defendant had guns, 
G.A. explained that she was forced to leave with him so that 
there was “no danger to my children.”  Defendant did not at any 
time that day say anything to G.A. about shooting or killing 
anyone. 
3. Rebuttal Evidence 
The prosecution presented a police practices expert, who 
opined that under the circumstances, a reasonable police officer 
would determine that immediate entry into G.A.’s home was 
necessary to protect the officers and the purported victim, G.A., 
because the lighting conditions did not allow the officers to see 
inside, and because the police needed to investigate an ongoing 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
11 
domestic disturbance situation.  Without entering the house, 
Aguirre would have been unable to fulfill his role as the officer 
protecting the contacting officer because he was not in a position 
to determine where “the threat” was coming from.  A reasonable 
police officer would not believe that retreat or doing nothing was 
a safe alternative because of the limited opportunity for the 
officers to conceal themselves and the limited exit available from 
the gated property.  Officers are trained to respond quickly in 
this scenario.  
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence of the impact of 26-
year-old Aguirre’s death on his family, friends, and fellow 
officers (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a)), defendant’s criminal 
activity involving the use or threatened use of force or violence 
(id., factor (b)), and his prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)).  
Deputy Aguirre and his wife met in high school and had a 
three-year-old daughter for whom Aguirre was the primary 
caretaker while both he and his wife worked.  Aguirre’s wife 
described the pain and loss she felt.  Their daughter also felt the 
loss and had continued to ask when her father was returning.  
Aguirre’s daughter had been unable to continue kindergarten.  
Aguirre’s 
mother 
described 
Aguirre’s 
generosity, 
close 
relationship with his daughter, and educational aspirations, 
and described seeing Aguirre’s injured body at the hospital and 
the effect of his death.  Aguirre’s sister-in-law described the 
positive influence and support Aguirre had provided when she 
was struggling with substance abuse and teenage motherhood.  
Aguirre’s childhood best friend described his struggle with 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
12 
Aguirre’s death and recalled Aguirre’s positive qualities 
including his sense of humor. 
Fryhoff, Sparks, and other officers also described Aguirre 
as a kind, religious family man, and described their deep 
feelings of loss and guilt and the long-lasting impacts that 
Aguirre’s death had on the sheriff’s department.  They described 
the experience of discovering Aguirre bleeding and dying in the 
house and the trauma experienced by the sheriff’s department 
that day.  
A local teenager remembered Aguirre’s approachability 
and that he stood out as an officer who showed an active interest 
and support toward him and other teenagers in the community.  
The prosecution presented three incidents of criminal 
activity in which defendant used force or violence.  In December 
1986, defendant carjacked a woman at gunpoint, throwing her 
purse out the window when she exited her car.  Defendant had 
also robbed a McDonald’s restaurant at gunpoint.  In November 
1993, someone in a white truck hit pedestrian Johnny Reeves, 
collided with a parked vehicle, and drove away.  In 1995, 
defendant reported to the sheriff’s department that in 
November 1994, after his brother told him that gang members 
had assaulted him, defendant had gotten in his truck and 
started driving because he had decided to hit the first person 
who he saw that looked like a gang member.  He saw a 
pedestrian that he thought fit the description, hit him, and 
drove off, possibly hitting another car.  Defendant reported the 
incident to take responsibility as part of his Alcoholics 
Anonymous (AA) efforts and explained he had also reported it to 
the sheriff’s department a year earlier. 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
13 
The prosecution reminded the jury of the guilt phase 
evidence concerning defendant’s prior felony convictions.  
2. Defense Evidence  
Pursuant to Penal Code section 190.3, factors (d), (h), and 
(k), the defense presented evidence that defendant struggled 
with schizophrenia and his crimes derived from his mental 
disease, he served in the army during the Vietnam War under 
difficult conditions, he would make a positive adjustment to 
prison, he had worked as a rehabilitation counselor, and he had 
sought help for his mental health difficulties.  
Defendant served in the military starting in 1965 at age 
18 and was stationed in Vietnam under dangerous conditions.  
His battery unit second commander remembered defendant as 
a “hard worker” and a “smart kid.”  Another soldier serving in 
the same unit testified that defendant served as a radio 
telephone operator (RTO), which was a “very hazardous” 
assignment that usually required volunteers because most 
RTOs would be “cracking up or burning out.”  Defendant served 
as an RTO on more than one occasion.  Defendant was once 
found absent without leave while in Vietnam and was “issued 
an undesirable discharge certificate.” 
Defendant’s mother observed he was “quiet and 
withdrawn” after returning from the Vietnam War.  After he 
returned, he would often be gone for long periods of time and 
show up unexpectedly, homeless.  During the early 1990s, 
defendant exhibited odd behavior around food, such as having 
bad dreams when he ate pork and asking his parents to remove 
bacon fat from the refrigerator because he believed it was 
contaminating his food.  
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
14 
In 1981, defendant worked in exchange for room and board 
for Jane Siemon, a Wisconsin dairy farmer.  One day, Siemon 
sent some soup to her husband and defendant while they were 
working on the farm.  Defendant, believing Siemon was trying 
to poison him, refused to eat her cooking for the remaining 
several months on the farm. 
A Ventura County social worker performed a psychiatric 
assessment of defendant in 1994 and concluded he had organic 
delusional disorder related to brain damage from the “heavy 
use” of marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines.  She based her 
conclusion on defendant’s description of several delusions, e.g., 
that he was in an “underground” war against those who sought 
to brainwash “organic eaters” by poisoning the food, water, and 
air.  Defendant believed that “people who inhabit the real 
world,” including his parents, sought to control and read his 
mind.  Defendant’s self-reported story of hitting a pedestrian 
believing he was a gang member was evidence of delusional 
disorder.  Defendant did not appear to be seeking “benefits,” but 
instead wanted treatment because he believed himself to be a 
danger to others and wanted to rehabilitate himself so that he 
could return to work.  
A county drug and alcohol counselor saw defendant for six 
months in 1994.  Defendant had sought help because he believed 
he was a danger to himself or others.  He explained in a letter 
to the counselor that he had stolen his employer’s car, but that 
the employer had agreed “to drop all charges” if defendant would 
seek mental health treatment.  Defendant did not miss 
appointments, which he would attend by bicycling from Ventura 
to Ojai and appeared “[v]ery much” committed to his 
rehabilitation.  But defendant was also facing homelessness and 
feared returning to prison. 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
15 
County psychologist Lisa Kus diagnosed defendant in 
1994 with organic delusional disorder based on his history of 
substance abuse.  Several months later, when defendant 
returned because his delusions were persisting, she referred 
him to a psychiatrist who prescribed an antipsychotic 
medication.  Another psychiatrist on the staff, however, 
evaluated defendant and concluded that he did not need 
medication.  Dr. Kus did not diagnose defendant with 
schizophrenia because she could not rule out that his delusions 
were unrelated to his substance abuse history, but she was “very 
confident” he suffered from a delusional disorder and described 
at length the delusions he had self-reported.  She noted that 
defendant had stated that he believed he needed to maintain his 
sobriety because he did not want to go back to jail, but that he 
appeared sincere in seeking help. 
A county psychiatrist saw defendant in 1995 and 
prescribed him with Haldol, an antipsychotic medication.  The 
psychiatrist observed defendant to exhibit symptoms of delusion 
including the belief that his son wanted to harm him and had 
staged an event to intimidate him.   
Defendant earned a certificate of completion for a two-year 
alcohol and drug studies program at Oxnard College around 
1996.  Defendant’s professor in the program said defendant was 
an “excellent student.”  
Defendant volunteered as a counselor during 1995 and/or 
1996 in a Salvation Army substance abuse rehabilitation 
program.  Defendant’s supervisor, who was the director of the 
program, said defendant was a “superior” worker and “very 
committed,” “extremely caring,” and an “extremely good 
listener.”  He had one of the “highest graduation rate[s]” for his 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
16 
caseload of participants and “the actual rehabilitation of the 
men that worked for [defendant] was better than most.”  
Defendant’s supervisor at Primary Purpose, a recovery home for 
addicts where defendant worked as a paid detoxification 
specialist in 1995, rated defendant’s work as “excellent” and 
“dependable.”  Defendant listened well to the clients and 
assisted them with placement in long-term programs “very 
well.”  
Defendant’s supervisor at Tiber House, a sober living 
residence for mentally ill men, said defendant was the “best 
house manager” the facility had.  During his yearlong 
employment starting in 1995, defendant demonstrated that he 
cared “very much” about the residents, providing counseling and 
support “[e]very chance he got,” often at his own expense and 
time.  Defendant was a “very good listener,” and was viewed as 
compassionate and trustworthy.  Defendant also appeared to “be 
struggling with something,” and was committed to his own 
recovery and “constantly attending” AA meetings.  Defendant’s 
role was to counsel the residents and oversee the house, and he 
received free board in exchange.  
Psychologist Charles Hinkin, assistant professor at the 
University of California at Los Angeles School of Medicine and 
director of the neuropsychology assessment lab at the West Los 
Angeles VA Medical Center, has treated veterans for brain 
diseases including schizophrenia.  He reviewed defendant’s 
records and the police investigation files and interviewed and 
tested defendant for approximately eight hours.  Hinkin 
concluded defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia that 
manifested at approximately age 32.  
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
17 
Hinkin noted that defendant had suffered several 
paranoid delusions over the previous 20 years, some of which 
defendant had noted in his interview with Dr. Patterson upon 
his arrest, such as his belief that he was part of a world of 
organic eaters forced underground to wage war against others 
and that his parents were Nazis who wanted to poison him 
through food.  He had also believed that he was a “warrior for 
Krishna” and robbed a McDonald’s to show that “killing sacred 
cows” was evil.  He also had delusions that his father had 
molested defendant’s son, that G.A. was having an affair with 
Francisco, that he was in a movie on the day of the shooting, and 
that his son intentionally made him ill and staged a gang fight 
in order to intimidate him.  Hinkin noted that defendant also 
reported to Patterson that he had experienced a “lot of 
hallucinations” while taking Haldol. 
Hinkin explained that an example of the “flat affect” 
typical of schizophrenia was defendant’s lack of emotional 
response during the interview with Patterson and his 
explanation to Patterson that he was not feeling any emotion, 
where a normal person would have had a “huge emotional 
response” to the events on the day of the shooting.  
Hinkin testified that defendant’s various test results and 
overall history, including accounts of others such as the 
Wisconsin farmer, suggested that defendant was schizophrenic 
and not feigning mental illness.  Defendant had a significant 
score on the paranoid schizophrenia scale on a standardized test 
he took in 1974.  
Hinkin opined defendant suffered from a psychotic episode 
of schizophrenia during the shooting and the days preceding it.  
Defendant was “under the influence of extreme mental or 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
18 
emotional disturbance” that day, his capacity to conform his 
conduct to the law was impaired, and he committed the offense 
because of the disease.  Hinkin noted that defendant had 
erroneously believed that Francisco had been in the shower with 
G.A., stated he believed he was in a movie, was hysterically 
laughing according to an account by G.A. that Hinkin had 
reviewed, seemed agitated and scared, kept looking around and 
took G.A.’s dog because he thought he was being followed, and 
reported to Patterson “kind of having [a] delusion” that day. 
James Park, a psychologist and institutional adjustment 
expert, reviewed defendant’s correctional records and opined 
that defendant would be a “reasonably good prisoner” and good 
worker.  Defendant had previously received “recognition of 
outstanding performance” working on a prison building retrofit 
project.  Based on research and his experience working in the 
Department of Corrections, Park opined that older prisoners 
like defendant (age 50 at the time of trial) are more likely to 
“conform” and have a positive effect on other inmates.  
Defendant had no history of violence in his earlier 
incarcerations and was unlikely to be dangerous.  The 
prosecution questioned Park at length about Park’s background 
and work history at the Department of Corrections, and about 
prisoners’ access to exercise facilities, cable television, medical 
care, education, and visitors. 
3. Rebuttal Evidence 
The jury heard additional portions of defendant’s 
interview with Patterson.  In it, defendant described his 
evaluations by the various Ventura County mental health staff, 
the “real frightening” hallucinations he experienced while 
taking Haldol, his attendance in recovery programs, and his 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
19 
self-diagnosis of schizophrenia.  He described experiencing 
delusional thinking when in close emotional relationships such 
as with G.A. and with his son.  He explained that he did not form 
close bonds with friends or family and avoided his son because 
he would become “pretty emotional,” and his delusional thinking 
would become “amplified.”  Defendant experienced “intense 
paranoia” and a desire to kill his father when he believed he had 
molested defendant’s son.  He also described his criminal 
history, including robbing a McDonald’s as part of a “religious 
battle” and that he “sorta had that delusion today too.”  He 
explained that he had reported his delusions to prison staff 
while he was incarcerated for the McDonald’s robbery.  
Patterson had been a court-retained psychiatric expert in 
criminal and other matters for over 40 years.  He interviewed 
defendant on the night of the shooting so he could evaluate his 
mental status in that timeframe.  Defendant appeared in 
contact 
with 
reality, 
unparanoid, 
nondelusional, 
nonhallucinatory, unconfused, responsive, and coherent, and 
had well-organized speech.    
Patterson also reviewed defendant’s mental health and 
other records.  He agreed with the Ventura County mental 
health professionals’ diagnosis of organic delusional disorder 
given defendant’s 20-year history of abusing alcohol, marijuana, 
and methamphetamine, but there was not information available 
as to how often and what quantity of substances defendant had 
consumed.  The difference between delusional disorder and 
schizophrenia, Patterson opined, was that the former was 
characterized by “non-bizarre” as opposed to bizarre delusions, 
e.g., believing one’s internal organs have been replaced.  The 
belief that one was being poisoned or followed, or that a partner 
was unfaithful, were examples of non-bizarre delusions because 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
20 
such events could actually happen.  Paranoid schizophrenics are 
characterized by delusions of persecution and are suspicious of 
others.  The schizophrenic is not in contact with reality, whereas 
a person with a delusional disorder can function except in the 
areas of his or her delusion.  Patterson agreed periods of 
remission can occur when the schizophrenic individual is better 
functioning, but the paranoia is nonetheless present.  The 
schizophrenic individual tries to control exposure to upsetting 
events to avoid paranoid episodes.  
Patterson opined defendant’s delusions were substance-
induced delusions.  He acknowledged that the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-
IV) ruled out substance-based delusional disorder as a diagnosis 
if the subject had been substance free for four weeks.  Even 
though defendant had denied ingesting drugs for over two years, 
Patterson hypothesized that defendant’s belief that his father 
had molested his son was the result of drug use.  Patterson 
acknowledged that defendant had provided a lot of truthful 
information in his interview, but believed defendant was trying 
to manipulate him.  
Patterson concluded defendant was not suffering from 
delusional disorder on the day of the shooting and was able to 
wholly control his behavior.  Defendant was apparently capable 
of enjoying sexual relationships with G.A., did not lack 
motivation as evidenced by his work at Tiber House and 
Primary Purpose, maintained good eye contact during the 
interview, and was not scattered in his discussion of topics, 
which all indicated the absence of schizophrenia.  
Defendant’s classmate at Oxnard College testified that 
defendant told her he began using LSD in high school.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
21 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress His 
 
Statements Made to Patterson 
Defendant contends his rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution were 
violated when, after he had been arrested, law enforcement 
representatives repeatedly disregarded his multiple invocations 
of both his rights to silence and to have counsel present and 
ultimately coerced his confession.  The trial court found that 
defendant had invoked his rights to silence and to have counsel 
and accordingly suppressed some of his statements made during 
one of the earlier encounters with law enforcement.  The court 
found, however, that defendant initiated the later discussion 
with Patterson and knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
earlier invocation of his rights. 
Defendant argues Patterson unlawfully interrogated him 
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
(Miranda) and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 
(Edwards), ultimately obtaining his admissions and confessions 
that were subsequently admitted against him during the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief.  The Attorney General does not 
dispute that defendant initially invoked both his rights to 
silence and to have counsel present but contends defendant 
himself eventually initiated the communication with Patterson 
that led to his statements, and therefore the trial court properly 
denied the motion to suppress.  
While the issue is close, we agree with the trial court that 
the record, particularly the recorded interview, demonstrates 
that defendant initiated the conversation freely and that he 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
22 
Nonetheless, we are troubled by the earlier law 
enforcement conduct.  In a three-hour period, while defendant 
was at the hospital receiving treatment for a fresh gunshot 
wound, law enforcement officials repeatedly approached 
defendant to obtain a statement, impermissibly interviewed 
him, angrily confronted him about Aguirre’s murder, and sent a 
psychiatrist to defendant’s hospital room to interview him.  
Within this timeframe, defendant invoked his right to silence 
each time he was asked, on four occasions, and on at least two 
of those occasions also requested an attorney.  The trial court 
acknowledged that statements were taken from defendant after 
he had invoked these rights and appropriately suppressed 
statements related to them.  But we agree with the trial court 
that defendant initiated the subsequent conversation with 
Patterson and did so with a knowing and voluntary waiver and 
therefore the statements to Patterson were admissible.   
1. Factual Background 
a. Earlier Law Enforcement Contacts with 
Defendant   
After he was arrested, paramedics transported defendant 
to Ojai Valley Community Hospital at about 6:15 p.m. for 
treatment of his injuries that included the chest gunshot wound.  
At approximately 7:00 p.m., Ventura County Sheriff’s Detective 
Robert Young contacted defendant in the emergency room to 
obtain a statement about shooting Deputy Aguirre.  Defendant 
was lying in a hospital gurney, naked with a cloth over his lower 
body, handcuffed by both hands to the gurney, and connected to 
monitors, intravenous fluids, and a urinary catheter.  
Young informed defendant he was under arrest for the 
suspected murder of a police officer, advised him of his Miranda 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
23 
rights, and asked if he was willing to talk.  Defendant responded 
“no.” 
Young then informed Michael Bradbury, the District 
Attorney of Ventura County, that defendant had “refused to 
waive his Miranda rights and discuss the shooting” but had not 
requested legal counsel.  At 7:20 p.m., Bradbury approached and 
spoke with defendant at his hospital gurney in the emergency 
room to verify that defendant was “advised of [his] rights to 
remain silent,” did not want to talk to the police, and understood 
he would need to initiate further discussion if he decided to talk.  
According to Bradbury, defendant opened his eyes, and affirmed 
he did not want to talk, stating, “Yes, I feel a little bit in shock 
right now.  I may want to talk to you later.”  
A few minutes later, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Detective 
Young and district attorney investigators Richard Haas and 
Dennis Fitzgerald contacted defendant at his hospital gurney in 
the emergency room to obtain his consent to search G.A.’s 
house.1  After defendant gave consent, Haas asked defendant 
about his living situation and his occupation.  Following 
defendant’s response that he was a resident manager at a 
facility for patients with a dual diagnosis of mental illness and 
chemical dependency, Young asked defendant whether he was 
“a patient there or just the, uh, manager?”  Defendant responded 
he was the manager but that he had “been a mental health 
patient,” explaining, “two years ago I went into the mental 
health system.”  Haas asked for the name of the facility where 
 
1  
“Miranda [is] not violated when an officer ask[s] for and 
obtain[s] consent to search after the defendant had exercised his 
privilege against self-incrimination.”  (People v. James (1977) 
19 Cal.3d 99, 115 .)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
24 
defendant was the residential manager.  Defendant responded, 
“Tyber House for men with dual diagnosis.”  Haas asked if there 
was “chemical dependency as well as mental problems”; 
defendant responded, “I have both, I have what they call a dual 
diagnosis.”  Haas asked, “what was your chemical dependency?”  
Defendant responded, “marijuana.”  Haas asked, “If we had 
someone come out and talk to you like a psychiatrist, would you 
be willing to talk to him?”  Defendant responded, “Yes, the last 
time I talked to one was probably a year and a half ago.”  Haas 
asked, “[D]o you have a regular one or anything or?”  Defendant 
responded, “No.  A year and a half ago it took me nine months 
to see a psychiatrist (unintelligible) I saw a counselor and [then] 
a psychologist (unintelligible) psychiatrist.”  The investigators 
did not readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before asking 
these questions.  Haas testified at the suppression hearing that 
he would have asked defendant if he would speak to a 
psychiatrist even if defendant had invoked his right to counsel.  
As noted below, the trial court found that Haas and Young 
violated defendant’s right to silence by continuing to interview 
him after he had given consent to search the house. 
At 8:25 p.m., Detective Young returned to defendant’s 
hospital room to ask for a statement, reminding defendant he 
had purportedly told District Attorney Bradbury that he might 
be willing to speak after he felt more comfortable.  Defendant 
responded “no,” explaining, “I think I told [Bradbury] that, uh, I 
think I’m in a state of shock right now and I’m kinda confused 
so I’d rather wait to talk to a lawyer, I think that’d be a good 
idea.”  Young asked defendant if he wanted to talk to a lawyer 
and defendant responded, “I think so . . . I think that’d be a good 
idea.”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
25 
At about 8:50 p.m., just before leaving the hospital, Young 
returned to defendant’s room to address him.  Upset, Young told 
defendant that he had not just shot a “uniform” but rather had 
killed a “living, productive human being, unlike” defendant.  He 
told defendant that he wanted him to know the name of the 
deputy he had murdered, that he was 26 years old and had a 
wife and a child, and that he wanted him to remember Deputy 
Aguirre and his family “every minute of every day for the rest of 
his life.”  According to Young and a nurse who overheard the 
encounter, defendant responded that he sensed that Young was 
angry.  
b. Patterson Contacts Defendant  
Defendant was then transferred to another hospital.  
There, 
psychiatrist 
Donald 
Patterson 
began 
observing 
defendant in the hospital’s trauma observation room starting at 
approximately 9:15 p.m.  The district attorney’s office had called 
Patterson on the evening of the homicide and retained him to 
interview defendant close in time to the events that day to 
evaluate his mental state as a homicide suspect.  Patterson had 
conducted 17 such evaluations of homicide suspects on behalf of 
the district attorney’s office in the previous six years.  He 
explained that his purpose was to determine defendant’s mental 
status close in time to the earlier events that day but that 
“eliciting incriminating information” . . . “was not the purpose of 
my interview.”  
Deputy District Attorney Richard Holmes, along with a 
district attorney investigator, met Patterson at the hospital, 
gave him a tape recorder and a Miranda advisement card, and 
instructed him to contact defendant.  Patterson was aware that 
the district attorney’s office would be paying his fee.  Holmes 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
26 
informed Patterson that defendant had been advised of his 
Miranda rights and had been unwilling to talk but had stated 
he might be willing to talk later.  Holmes confirmed Patterson 
was there to engage defendant in conversation, explaining at the 
suppression hearing that he told Patterson:  “I’d like you to go 
in and do your usual thing, advise him of his rights, tell him who 
you are, who you work for, and see if he wants to talk now.” 
Holmes was unaware that defendant had invoked his 
right to counsel to Detective Young.  Had Holmes known 
defendant had invoked his right to counsel earlier in the 
evening, he would not have permitted Patterson to speak with 
defendant.  Holmes explained, “[b]ecause it’s improper.  If — if 
someone has unequivocally invoked counsel, it’s improper for 
law enforcement to contact him.  And I would — I would stay 
absolutely away from there.”  He testified further, “[I]t’s not at 
all proper if they’ve invoked their right to counsel, and I just 
simply stay away from — if somebody invokes the right to 
counsel, I would let Dr. Patterson watch and observe and that 
would be it.”  
Patterson observed defendant for about an hour during 
which a surgery resident evaluated defendant’s injuries.  In 
Patterson’s presence, defendant reported to the surgery resident 
that he was experiencing chest and neck pain, and discomfort 
and numbness, and noted to the surgery resident his 
understanding that it was “against the rules to give prisoners 
anything for pain.”  The surgery resident explained, “it’s not 
against the rules, however, the doctor needs to evaluate you 
when you’re not under the influence of any medication because 
if we give you something that altered your sensorium.  Then 
we’re not gonna be able to treat[]you appropriately so when the 
doctor says that they’ve gotten all the information that they 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
27 
need, then that will be —”  The surgery resident testified at the 
hearing that she told defendant this — that she needed to delay 
the administration of pain medication — so that the surgery 
resident could assess defendant.  Defendant was still 
handcuffed to his gurney and connected to monitors, 
intravenous fluids, and a urinary catheter.  
At approximately 10:04 p.m., Patterson introduced 
himself to defendant as “a psychiatrist from Santa Barbara.”  
Defendant responded, “I heard you were going to come here.”  
Patterson told defendant “the DA’s office [had] asked me to come 
and talk with ya.” Defendant responded, “Great.”  
Regarding defendant’s Miranda rights, Patterson told 
defendant:  “And I have to advise you of your rights the same as 
you’ve probably been advised already, namely that you don’t 
have to cooperate with us, you have the right to remain silent, 
don’t have to talk with me or ask — tell me anything about 
yourself or answer any of my questions.”  He said further, “And 
anything you say could be used against you in a court of law.  I 
will make a report of it, and you subsequently will see it, a copy 
of my report, and if you can’t afford to provide yourself an 
attorney at this point, it’s the responsibility of the County of 
Ventura to obtain such legal aid for you, get you an attorney.”  
Patterson did not tell defendant that he had the right to have an 
attorney present before and during the questioning.  
Patterson asked, “So, the next thing then in knowing these 
things, are you willing to talk with me about yourself?”  
Defendant declined to talk, explaining, “I don’t think so.  I’m 
facing very serious charges and I think I’d rather talk to a 
lawyer first.”  He stated further, “That be okay?  I think right 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
28 
now I’m in a state of shock and kind of confused and I don’t know 
that the information I’d give you would be that accurate.” 
Patterson responded, “I see.  Well, that’s your decision, 
you have to make that — ”  Defendant repeated, “that’s the 
decision I’ve made.”  Patterson responded, “I’m gonna just stay 
around here with you and let you get back from X-ray and see 
how you’re getting along and see if you still feel, feel that way 
or — [¶] . . . [¶]   — cause at some point you did say that you 
would be willing to talk to me and so —.”  He stated further, 
“And it’s up to you, you can still refuse it, but you did say that 
at one time.”  
Defendant responded, “I did say that, yeah.”  Patterson 
stated, “So I, I’ll wait a little bit and they’re gonna take you over 
to X-ray and get going and get these other things, your medical 
condition taken care of.  But I’ll be around for a little while.”  
Defendant responded, “Alright.”  
After this exchange, Patterson stepped out of the room 
momentarily to inform Deputy District Attorney Holmes, who 
had been waiting in the hallway, that defendant had refused to 
waive his Miranda rights.  Holmes testified Patterson did not 
tell him that defendant had invoked counsel but instead told 
him that defendant had declined to talk and had said he might 
be willing to talk later.  Holmes directed Patterson “to follow the 
defendant wherever he went and just observe him.”  Ventura 
County District Attorney Bradbury testified at the suppression 
hearing that in homicide investigations, the district attorney’s 
office would dispatch a psychiatrist to observe the suspect even 
if he were unwilling to talk.  Patterson followed defendant’s 
gurney when he was transported to the X-ray room at 10:05 
p.m., remained with him for about 15 minutes while his X-rays 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
29 
were taken, and then followed him at 10:21 p.m. back to the 
observation room, where they waited for the surgery resident for 
about five minutes.  Patterson stood near the foot of defendant’s 
gurney about two feet to the side.  
When the surgery resident returned, she explained to 
defendant in Patterson’s presence that doctors would operate on 
defendant to remove lead fragments from beneath his 
diaphragm but that the resident would first insert a tube into 
defendant’s chest to drain blood that had accumulated there.  A 
few seconds after this conversation, which was approximately 
20 minutes after defendant had invoked his right to counsel to 
Patterson, defendant turned to Patterson, who was then the 
only other person in the room, and said, “[s]till here, huh?”  
Patterson responded, “Yeah, just, just in case you’re — I can, I 
can, whatever.”  Defendant said Patterson had a “kind face.”  
Patterson thanked him.  Defendant stated, “The last 
psychiatrist I talked to, made me very angry, you know.”2  
Patterson asked defendant for the psychiatrist’s name.  
Defendant gave the names of two psychiatrists he had seen; 
Patterson said he did not know them.  Defendant volunteered 
 
2 
The parties’ transcripts interpret the audio of this 
comment differently.  The prosecution transcript instead 
interprets this comment as:  “The last psychiatrist I talked to, 
maybe you know him?”  The trial court did not specifically rule 
on this statement.  We adopt the defense version because 
Patterson agreed at the suppression hearing that this is what 
defendant said.  Regardless of which version we adopt, the two 
statements are not substantively different for purposes of our 
analysis, especially since the record is undisputed that 
defendant began the conversation by telling Patterson, “Still 
here, huh?”    
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
30 
information about his previous efforts to seek treatment 
through the county mental health department.  
Following a brief pause during which apparently the 
surgery resident had reentered the room and could be heard 
talking, defendant asked Patterson, “You wanna talk about it?”  
Patterson responded, “Sure.”  Defendant stated, “I’ll talk, and 
you can listen.”  Patterson agreed, and stated, “Cause you, you 
don’t mind, and we could just talk about what has happened or 
something.”  
Defendant then volunteered further information about his 
mental health history, including earlier diagnosis of organic 
delusional disorder.   Defendant explained he had attempted to 
see a psychiatrist at the county mental health department and 
become “very angry” because the psychiatrist did not think 
defendant would become a mental health patient and did not 
schedule him for another appointment.  Defendant explained 
that being in an “intense emotional relationship” had 
“amplified” his delusional thinking.  Patterson asked defendant 
questions about his delusions and whether medication had 
helped.  Defendant subsequently reiterated that being in an 
“emotional relationship” (referring to G.A.) had “[s]tirred things 
up” and that he felt like he was “in a movie” that afternoon.  
Defendant volunteered that he was “aware of everything 
that happened that day” and after responding to Patterson’s 
question about why defendant did what he did (defendant said 
he did not know why), defendant sought to limit the topics of 
conversation: 
“DEFENDANT: I think I’d be better off talking to you 
about emotional states than about actual specific facts. 
“PATTERSON: Okay. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
31 
“DEFENDANT: I’m sure my lawyer wouldn’t appreciate 
it, you know? 
“PATTERSON: Well, he can, he can get a copy of what 
you’re talking about, you know, if that’s — 
“DEFENDANT: Well, I think you, you probably deal with 
emotional 
states 
rather 
than 
facts 
anyway, 
but 
(unintelligible) if you’re giving some type of a diagnosis.”  
They continued to discuss defendant’s role as a resident 
manager at the dual diagnosis facility and his involvement with 
AA meetings.  Defendant eventually introduced a new topic, 
that he had had “another violent episode” about ten years earlier 
in which he robbed a McDonald’s restaurant.  Defendant mostly 
talked and Patterson would ask questions including whether 
defendant tried to seek help for his delusions in prison and 
whether his delusions were part of his legal defense for the 
robbery. 
Defendant explained that he diagnosed himself with 
schizophrenia after his own study and that he avoided being 
close to his family because the emotions would exacerbate his 
delusions.  Defendant explained that he married G.A. so she 
could get a green card, that they had not been in contact for 
many years, and that he recontacted her recently so he could get 
a divorce.  Patterson asked if G.A. was “involved in this thing 
tonight . . . .”  Defendant responded that he had kidnapped G.A. 
and continued to explain that he had shot Aguirre.  Regarding 
G.A., he explained, “I kidnapped her, you know” and “pulled a 
gun on her and I said we’re gonna be together forever.”  
Regarding Aguirre, defendant explained that he saw Aguirre 
enter the home and tell defendant to put his hands up.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
32 
Defendant “just jumped out and shot” Aguirre.  He explained, “I 
was getting what I wanted . . . .”  
When medical staff had arrived to move defendant, 
Patterson offered to return, stating, “I’ll see if I can come back, 
but, uh, maybe if it doesn’t bother you to talk to me anyway.”  
Defendant responded Patterson, “Yeah, you’re a very good 
listener, that’s (unintelligible).”  Defendant later explained, “I’m 
kinda, you know, uh, self-diagnosing, nobody else will diagnose 
me.”  Patterson responded, “Trying, trying to figure yourself out, 
huh?”  Defendant agreed, “Yeah, I mean I’m just confused, you 
know?”  He discussed at length his own efforts, through classes, 
reading articles, and study of the DSM-IV, to diagnose himself 
and understand his condition.  
After defendant explained “what happened” that day, 
defendant and Patterson discussed defendant’s reasons for 
speaking with Patterson:   
“DEFENDANT: I started out by just not wanting to tell 
you exactly what happened —  
“PATTERSON: Yeah. 
“DEFENDANT:  — but it ended up that way. 
“PATTERSON: Well, we went sort of round and round —  
“DEFENDANT: At this point I don’t have anything to 
lose by being honest and saying what happened. 
“PATTERSON: Yeah. 
“DEFENDANT: And I understand my lawyer’s really 
going to be pissed and so forth. 
“PATTERSON: Um-hum. 
“DEFENDANT: So then (unintelligible) 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
33 
“PATTERSON: You can certainly talk, and he’ll get what 
we’re talking about. 
“DEFENDANT: I’m sure he will, yeah. 
“PATTERSON: And uh —  
“DEFENDANT:   
And I don’t know why they, why they say 
don’t say nothing, because if you did something and people 
know you did it, there’s people (unintelligible) — 
“PATTERSON:   They saw you. 
“DEFENDANT: . . .  you know, they saw me, right.  How 
are you gonna say you didn’t?  I mean that, what are you 
accomplishing, you know, I think the situ —  I think it’s 
best to be honest, that way you get to the root of it. 
“PATTERSON:  Um-hum. 
“DEFENDANT: You know, I mean it’s not normal 
behavior. 
“PATTERSON: Um-hum. 
“DEFENDANT: It’s not, you know the average person 
wouldn’t (unintelligible) something like that. 
“PATTERSON: Yeah. 
“DEFENDANT: So you know. 
“PATTERSON:  But you have given me some insight into 
the way you were feeling and as you say a part of a —  
“DEFENDANT: Yeah, after I’d talked to you a little bit I 
thought well, it’s probably more beneficial to me to give 
him as much information as I can while I’m uh —  
“PATTERSON: While you’re fresh, fresh from it. 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
34 
“DEFENDANT: Yeah, I, I’m not under the influence of 
any chemicals or drugs yet, they’re gonna sedate me pretty 
soon.  And it’s fairly close to the time of the incident. 
“PATTERSON: Yeah. 
“DEFENDANT: And the closer the better I would think. 
“PATTERSON: Yeah. 
“DEFENDANT: You know.  Time can alter the way you 
see things.”   
When Patterson prepared to depart, defendant stated:  
“Yeah, it’s probably better if you write your report as quickly as 
possible so you can (unintelligible)” and remarked, “You had a 
kind face. . . .  I think that’s [an] asset in your business.”  
During various points in the conversation, the surgery 
resident or other medical staff entered the room to perform 
medical procedures on defendant including prepping him for the 
chest tube insertion, drawing blood, and administering local 
anesthesia and intravenous sedation.  At one point the 
conversation paused, apparently while the chest tube was 
inserted.  
c. Trial Court Findings and Rulings   
The defense moved to suppress the statements defendant 
made to Patterson, contending that the police and prosecution 
had failed to cease efforts to interrogate defendant despite his 
invocations of his rights to silence and counsel, and that 
defendant had not waived his Miranda rights nor initiated the 
discussion with Patterson.  
After a multiday hearing, the trial court found that 
defendant invoked his right to silence when Detective Young 
Mirandized him in their first encounter, Young and Investigator 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
35 
Haas violated defendant’s Miranda rights by continuing to 
question him after he had given consent to search G.A.’s house, 
and defendant later invoked his right to counsel to Young.  It 
excluded portions of the interview conducted by Young and 
Haas. 
The court found, however, that defendant initiated the 
discussion with Patterson when he said to him, “Still here, huh,” 
and that he invited Patterson to talk more, told him that he 
(defendant) would talk and that Patterson could listen, and 
picked the topic of conversation.  The court concluded that the 
subsequent contact by Patterson was attenuated from 
defendant’s earlier invocations.  The court found “as a fact the 
defendant, for whatever reason — and I believe the reason was 
he wanted to talk to the psychiatrist — initiated the 
conversation, 
controlled 
the 
conversation, 
directed 
the 
conversation and took it to the places he wished to go.”  
The court concluded that Patterson’s request to interview 
defendant after he had invoked counsel to Detective Young of 
the sheriff’s department did not violate Edwards because the 
district attorney’s office had “come down a separate path” from 
the sheriff’s department and retained Patterson for its own 
purpose of evaluating defendant’s mental state.  The court found 
that Patterson went to the hospital “for the avowed purpose of 
evaluating defendant for purposes of a determination 
concerning the defendant’s mental state post-incident and I 
think the District Attorney’s Office has no alternative but to 
pursue a line of that nature, certainly in a case such as this.”  
The trial court concluded that the audio recording of the 
interview was “[t]he most powerful and compelling evidence of 
the defendant’s understanding, knowledge, appreciation and 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
36 
willingness to participate in the conversation . . . .”  The court 
“wish[ed]” Patterson had taken an explicit Miranda waiver from 
defendant when defendant started talking to Patterson but 
concluded that defendant knowingly waived his rights because 
he twice stated that his lawyer was going to be upset that 
defendant had talked to Patterson and because defendant 
controlled the conversation and directed the topics for 
discussion.  The trial court found that defendant “knew what 
was going on.  He knew what use it would be put to.  He knew 
with whom he was speaking.  He knew what he was speaking 
of.  He discusses that he is or is not in pain, he discusses in fact 
his motivations to speak at that time before he becomes 
anesthetized or sedated, and that was important to him, that 
the facts be known at the best possible time and he tells us that 
in his statement which would be the time in closest proximity to 
the time at which these events occurred.”  Acknowledging 
defendant’s medical condition, the court concluded that the 
audio of the interview nonetheless demonstrated that defendant 
had knowingly and voluntarily participated in the interview.  
The court accordingly denied the motion to suppress. 
2. Analysis   
We address below three questions:  (1) whether law 
enforcement’s earlier contacts with defendant violated his 
Miranda 
rights; 
(2) 
whether 
defendant 
initiated 
the 
conversation that resulted in his confession; and (3) whether he 
did so with a knowing and voluntary waiver of his previously 
invoked Miranda rights.  “The Fifth Amendment provides that 
no ‘person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness 
against 
himself.’ 
 
In 
Miranda[, 
supra,] 
384 U.S.  436 . . ., the [United States Supreme] Court concluded 
that ‘without proper safeguards the process of in-custody 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
37 
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.’  Id., at 467.  Accordingly, the 
Court formulated the now-familiar “procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” ’  
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987) (quoting Miranda, 
supra, 384 U.S. at 444).  Among these is the rule that when an 
accused has ‘expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by 
the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.’  Edwards[, supra], 
451 U.S. 477, 484–485 . . . . .”  (Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 
520, 525–526, fn. omitted.)  “ ‘[I]nterrogation’ under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
the suspect.  The latter portion of this definition focuses 
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the 
intent of the police.”  (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 
291, 301, fns. omitted (Innis).)  “ ‘[N]ot all conversation between 
an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation.  The police 
may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech would 
not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating 
response.’ ”  (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 810–811 
(Hensley).)  The ban on further interrogation is intended to 
prevent police “ ‘ “from badgering a defendant into waiving his 
previously asserted Miranda rights.” ’ ”  (People v. Thomas 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 926.)  “If further conversations are 
initiated by the police when there has not been a break in 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
38 
custody, the defendant’s statements are presumed involuntary 
and inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial.”  (Ibid.) 
In reviewing Miranda claims, we “accept the trial court’s 
resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations 
of credibility, if they are substantially supported.  [Citations.]  
However, we must independently determine from the 
undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, 
whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.”  
(People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 263 (Boyer); accord, People 
v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 931.)  We review Miranda claims 
under federal constitutional standards.  (People v. Sims (1993) 
5 Cal.4th 405, 440 (Sims).)     
a. Earlier Law Enforcement Contacts Violated 
Mosley and Edwards   
We agree with defendant that his Miranda rights were 
violated at various points during the evening of July 17, 1996.  
As detailed in the factual background:  (1) Haas and Young 
approached defendant to question him a mere 10 minutes after 
defendant had confirmed to District Attorney Bradbury that he 
did not want to speak, and within a half hour of his original 
invocation to Young.  In that encounter, Haas and Young did not 
readvise defendant about his rights to remain silent and have 
the assistance of counsel.  Their questioning concerned the same 
ongoing investigation and was by one of the same officers, 
Young, who had just recently attempted to interview defendant.  
(2) Less than an hour after this questioning by Haas and Young, 
Young again returned to defendant’s gurney to ask for a 
statement concerning the same investigation.  Young did not 
readvise defendant of his rights, instead informing him that 
according to Bradbury, defendant had stated he might be willing 
to talk later.  Defendant responded by telling Young that he 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
39 
thought he had told Bradbury that he was feeling shocked and 
confused “right now” and wanted to wait to talk to a lawyer, and 
then reasserted his Miranda rights to Young.  (3) Nonetheless, 
Young again returned to defendant’s gurney about 25 minutes 
after that encounter, to berate him for murdering Aguirre.  (4) 
Seventy-five minutes after that, Patterson attempted to 
interview defendant about the same ongoing investigation.  
Within this three-hour timeframe, defendant invoked his right 
to silence each time he was asked, on four occasions, and on at 
least two of those occasions also requested an attorney.  In sum, 
prior to Patterson’s arrival, law enforcement officials had, 
within the previous three hours, twice contacted defendant 
about his willingness to provide a statement, impermissibly 
interviewed him, and angrily confronted him about Aguirre’s 
murder (after defendant had invoked counsel to the same 
officer).  The trial court found that defendant invoked his right 
to silence when Detective Young Mirandized him in their first 
encounter, and that Young and Investigator Haas violated 
defendant’s Miranda rights by continuing to question him after 
he had given consent to search G.A.’s house.  Thus, it correctly 
excluded portions of the interview conducted by Haas and 
Young.   
We also agree with defendant that the district attorney’s 
office violated Edwards by the manner in which Patterson 
requested to interview defendant after he had invoked his right 
to counsel.  As the trial court found and the Attorney General 
agrees, defendant invoked his right to counsel when Detective 
Young returned to defendant’s gurney at 8:25 p.m. to request a 
statement.  Resuming contact with a suspect at a later time for 
purposes of interview, where the suspect had earlier requested 
the assistance of counsel and remains in custody without 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
40 
counsel, is a clear violation of the rule that all efforts at 
interrogation must cease once the right to counsel is invoked.  
(Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 485.)  In Edwards, the 
defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ended, 
but the police returned the next morning for an interview.  (Id. 
at pp. 478–479.)  Edwards then waived his rights and made 
statements.  (Id. at p. 479.)  The high court ruled the statements 
inadmissible, holding that “when an accused has invoked his 
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a 
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only 
that he responded to further police-initiated custodial 
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”  (Id. at 
p. 484.)  Edwards explicitly stated that once a suspect invokes 
the right to counsel, law enforcement personnel may not resume 
interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect reinitiates 
contact.  This is a bright-line rule:  It requires all questioning 
cease after a suspect requests counsel.  “ ‘In the absence of such 
a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through “badger[ing]” 
or 
“overreaching” — 
explicit 
or 
subtle, 
deliberate 
or 
unintentional — might otherwise wear down the accused and 
persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier 
request for counsel’s assistance.’ ”  (People v. Henderson (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 1013, 1022 (Henderson), quoting Smith v. Illinois 
(1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98.)   
The Attorney General contends — as the trial court 
concluded below — that the district attorney’s office had a 
“legitimate ‘purpose’ ” in “enlist[ing] Dr. Patterson’s aid in 
observing appellant and gathering information relevant to his 
mental state, whether or not appellant wished to speak to him.”  
By this, the Attorney General can be understood to argue that 
because the district attorney’s office had another purpose 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
41 
(besides interrogation) in sending Patterson to visit defendant, 
which was to observe him, the office committed no constitutional 
violation.  The Attorney General is correct, to an extent:  Police 
officers routinely remain in the presence of suspects for 
custodial matters such as booking and transportation, even 
after the suspect has invoked his or her Miranda rights.  (E.g., 
Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1042 (Bradshaw) 
[transporting suspect to police station]; People v. Enraca (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 735, 750 (Enraca) [booking interview].)  But the 
Edwards rule “renders a [suspect’s] statement invalid if the 
authorities 
initiate 
any 
‘communication, 
exchanges, 
or 
conversations’ relating to the case, other than those routinely 
necessary for custodial purposes.”  (Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 
274, italics omitted.)   
The evidentiary hearing established the prosecution’s 
intention to send Patterson to interview defendant about his 
mental state and not merely to observe him.  The district 
attorney’s office called Patterson on the evening of the homicide 
and retained him to interview defendant close in time to the 
events that day to evaluate his mental state as a homicide 
suspect.  District attorney staff gave Patterson a tape recorder, 
Miranda card, and instructed him to advise defendant of his 
Miranda rights.  Patterson testified he went to the hospital to 
interview defendant to evaluate his post-event mental state.  He 
explained that when a district attorney’s office reaches out to 
him, “as typical when I get such a call, my question is will the 
suspect be willing to talk with me.”  Patterson did not merely 
Mirandize defendant.  Instead, Patterson did more, making 
clear to defendant that he was there to “talk” with him, 
explaining that “the DA’s office asked me to come and talk with 
ya” and after partially describing defendant’s Miranda rights, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
42 
said, “So, the next thing then in knowing these things, are you 
willing to talk with me about yourself?”  Patterson’s 
communications here, violated the bright-line rule of Edwards.  
Deputy Holmes confirmed as much that Patterson was there to 
engage defendant in conversation, explaining that he told 
Patterson:  “I’d like you to go in and do your usual thing, advise 
him of his rights, tell him who you are, who you work for, and 
see if he wants to talk now.”  Holmes testified that had he known 
defendant had invoked his right to counsel earlier in the 
evening, he would not have permitted Patterson to speak with 
defendant.  Holmes explained, “Because it’s improper.  If — if 
someone has unequivocally invoked counsel, it’s improper for 
law enforcement to contact him.  And I would — I would stay 
absolutely away from there.”  He testified further, “[I]t’s not at 
all proper if they’ve invoked their right to counsel, and I just 
simply stay away from — if somebody invokes the right to 
counsel, I would let Dr. Patterson watch and observe and that 
would be it.”  
Thus, the record clearly shows the district attorney’s 
intention that Patterson was to interview defendant for 
evidence about his mental state as part of its criminal 
investigation.  This is why Patterson arrived with a Miranda 
card and a tape recorder.  Patterson did not merely observe 
defendant in order to evaluate his mental state:  He contacted 
defendant, advised him of his Miranda rights, asked him if he 
was willing to talk about himself, responded to defendant’s 
request for counsel by reminding him that he had supposedly 
earlier agreed to talk to Patterson, and then telling defendant 
he (Patterson) would remain close by in case defendant changed 
his mind about asserting his Miranda rights.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
43 
The fact that Patterson might also have intended to 
observe defendant does not eliminate the fact that Patterson 
sought to interview defendant as directed by the district 
attorney’s office.  As Innis explained, we consider the situation 
primarily from the suspect’s perspective in determining whether 
there was interrogation.  (Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301.)  Even 
if Patterson might have permissibly gone to the hospital and sat 
silently in defendant’s room for the purpose of observing his 
behavior (a fact pattern not before us here), defendant would not 
have understood mere silent observation to be Patterson’s 
purpose from Patterson’s words and conduct:  The explanation 
Patterson gave defendant for his presence was to interview 
defendant.  Patterson told defendant, “the DA’s office asked me 
to come and talk with ya,” and after addressing defendant’s 
Miranda rights, asked defendant, “next thing then in knowing 
these things, are you willing to talk with me about yourself?”  
(See Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301 [“ ‘interrogation’ under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those 
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect.”].) 
Under settled law, a psychiatric interview of a suspect is 
interrogation if the interview contains material later to be used 
in the prosecution’s case, including evidence about a suspect’s 
mental state.  (See People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 
640; Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 466–469 [Miranda 
advisements were required prior to defendant’s pretrial 
examination by a court-retained psychiatrist, where the 
psychiatrist later testified for the prosecution]; People v. Ghent 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 750; People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
44 
449; People v. Walker (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 448, 451–456; People 
v. Montgomery (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 582, 590.)  In Estelle, 
supra, at pages 456–457, the trial court ordered a psychiatric 
examination of a defendant to determine his competency to 
stand trial.  (Id. at pp. 456–457.)  But the examining 
psychiatrist later testified for the prosecution about defendant’s 
mental status.  (Id. at pp. 459–460, 464.)  The high court held 
“the Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore, [was] directly 
involved here because the State used as evidence against 
respondent the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial 
psychiatric examination.”  (Id. at pp. 464–465.)  The court 
explained, “The considerations calling for the accused to be 
warned prior to custodial interrogation apply with no less force 
to the pretrial psychiatric examination at issue here.  
Respondent was in custody at the Dallas County Jail when the 
examination was ordered and when it was conducted. . . .  When 
Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on the 
issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the 
penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent’s future 
dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like 
that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements 
made in a postarrest custodial setting.  During the psychiatric 
evaluation, respondent assuredly was ‘faced with a phase of the 
adversary system’ and was ‘not in the presence of [a] perso[n] 
acting solely in his interest.’ ”  (Id. at p. 467.)   
In the immediate wake of the senseless murder of a 
beloved colleague, the police and district attorney were 
understandably zealous in their effort to question the apparent 
perpetrator.  But we find concerning the multiple clear 
violations of Miranda that occurred in this case through the 
repeated efforts of investigating officials to solicit defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
45 
waiver of his rights to silence and counsel, after he had 
expressed his unwillingness to talk.  That defendant invoked his 
right to remain silent does not mean police could never again 
approach him and inquire whether he was still unwilling to talk.  
(See Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 100–104.)  But it is 
one thing to reapproach a suspect about his willingness to talk 
after a “significant period of time” (id. at p. 106); it is another 
thing to reapproach the suspect to confront him or to inquire 
about his willingness to talk no less than five times in a roughly 
three-hour span.  These violations not only infringed 
defendant’s 
established 
constitutional 
rights, 
they 
also 
jeopardized the efforts of the prosecution, court, and jurors to 
have a jury weigh the charges against defendant and render a 
sentence.  We emphasize the substantial costs to the justice 
system and the lives affected when law enforcement officials, 
however well-intentioned, do not conform their own conduct to 
the law. 
b. Defendant Initiated the Conversation with 
Patterson  
Concluding that there were Miranda violations does not, 
however, resolve the question whether those violations require 
that defendant’s later statements to Patterson be suppressed.  
Like the trial court concluded below, the Attorney General 
contends defendant initiated the conversation with Patterson.  
After listening to the interview tapes admitted at trial and 
reviewing the transcripts, we agree that defendant initiated the 
later discussion that produced the statements admitted at trial.   
As noted, interrogation must cease once a suspect requests 
counsel.  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485.)  
“ ‘However, if the defendant thereafter initiates a statement to 
police, 
“nothing 
in 
the 
Fifth 
and 
Fourteenth 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
46 
Amendments . . . prohibit[s] the police from merely listening to 
his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against 
him at the trial.” ’ ”  (Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 810.)  
“ ‘After a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police officers 
may nonetheless resume their interrogation if “the suspect ‘(a) 
initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly 
and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.’ ” ’ ”  (Enraca, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 752.)  “ ‘An accused “initiates” ’ further 
communication, when his words or conduct ‘can be “fairly said 
to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more generalized 
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” ’ ”  
(People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 656 (Molano).)  This 
exception to the Edwards rule requires that the suspect initiate 
“ ‘further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police’ ” but not necessarily “the encounter at which he does so.”  
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 732 (Waidla); see also 
People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 652 (Mickey).)  Defendant 
spoke to Patterson and, as a factual matter, began the 
conversation that led to his various inculpatory statements.  
Patterson remained in defendant’s presence after their initial 
exchange but did not speak to him.  Around 20 minutes later, 
after X-rays and a brief conversation with his doctor, defendant 
asked Patterson, “Still here, huh?”  He engaged Patterson in a 
conversation about psychiatrists who had treated him and then, 
after some pauses, reconfirmed his desire to speak, asking, “You 
wanna talk about it?”  Suspects in custody have initiated further 
questioning by asking, “ ‘Well, what is going to happen to me 
now?’ ” (Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 1045–1046), or 
“ ‘What can I do for you[?],’ ‘What do you want from me?,’ and 
‘What can I do to help you[?],’ ” (Waidla, at p. 731).  Defendant’s 
question to Patterson, “Still here, huh?,” followed by defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
47 
question to Patterson if he wanted to “talk about it,” squarely 
falls within the kinds of statements we have found to constitute 
an initiation of further communication by the accused.  As the 
trial court found after an eight-day evidentiary hearing, 
defendant 
“initiated 
the 
conversation, 
controlled 
the 
conversation, directed the conversation and took it to the places 
he wished to go.” 
We must next resolve whether defendant’s renewed 
contact with Patterson should be deemed effective or instead the 
tainted product of the earlier Miranda violations, considering 
all the relevant surrounding circumstances.  “[W]e have never 
found that an initial failure to honor a defendant’s invocation — 
whether of the [right] to remain silent or the right to have 
counsel present — poses a categorical bar to the admission of 
any subsequent statement regardless of the circumstances.  
Instead, in case after case, we have held that despite the initial 
failure to honor a Miranda invocation, a voluntary confession 
obtained during a subsequent interrogation is admissible.”  
(People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 314, italics omitted 
(Krebs).)  However, as a general rule, “where law enforcement 
officers have disregarded a suspect’s previously-invoked rights 
by continuing to interrogate him, a renewal of contact by the 
defendant will be considered an ‘initiation’ only if the decision to 
renew contact was not a ‘response to’ or ‘product of’ the prior 
unlawful interrogation.”  (Mack v. State (Ga. 2014) 765 S.E.2d 
896, 903 (Mack).)  Indeed, to be valid, a defendant’s initiation 
cannot be the product of the authorities’ coercion.  (E.g., Boyer, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 275 [holding that defendant had not 
initiated the communication by calling back the officer after he 
had turned to leave in light of the officer’s comments and earlier 
unlawful interrogation]; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 78 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
48 
(Neal) [holding that defendant did not voluntarily initiate an 
interview in light of earlier impermissible interrogation and 
defendant’s youth, isolation, and “low intelligence”]; People v. 
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1046 (Bradford) [rejecting 
claim that “statement was the tainted product of earlier illegal 
interrogations”].)  Likewise, “a defendant’s decision to talk with 
police cannot be a product of police interrogation, ‘badgering,’ or 
‘overreaching,’ whether ‘explicit or subtle, deliberate or 
unintentional.’ ”  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 596 
(Davis).)  While as a matter of historical fact, a suspect may have 
started the contact with authorities, the totality of the 
circumstances might demonstrate that doing so was the product 
of earlier badgering in violation of Miranda.  (Mack, at p. 905; 
Blake v. State (Md. 2004) 849 A.2d 410, 413–414, 422.)  In Mack, 
police disregarded the suspect’s invocation of his right to stay 
silent by badgering and cajoling him to come clean for more than 
90 minutes, after similarly having ignored his invocation of 
rights on the previous day.  (Mack, at pp. 904–905 & fn. 8.)  
Approximately 10 minutes later, the suspect relented and asked 
to speak with police.  (Ibid.)  In Blake, after the suspect invoked 
his right to counsel, a detective gave the suspect a charging 
document for first degree murder stating the penalty was 
“DEATH,” even though the suspect was not eligible for the death 
penalty due to his youth.  (Blake, at p. 413.)  The Maryland high 
court concluded that the suspect’s subsequent question about 
the detective’s comment (“I bet you want to talk now, huh!”) was 
a response to interrogation rather than initiation.  (Id. at 
pp. 413–414, 422.)   
Because of the prior Miranda and Edwards violations 
described above, the defendant’s contention, echoed by the 
dissent, that defendant did not initiate the communication with 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
49 
Patterson is not without force.  And although Patterson asked 
no more questions, his action of remaining with defendant for 
the stated purpose of seeing if defendant would change his mind 
about asserting his Miranda rights could have added more 
pressure to make a statement.  Patterson remained just a few 
feet from where defendant was handcuffed to a gurney, twice 
reminded him he had earlier agreed to speak with a 
psychiatrist, and advised him that Patterson would “just stay 
around here with [defendant] and . . . see if [defendant] still 
feel[s]” that he wanted to assert his Miranda rights.  In addition, 
defendant contends that Young’s angry speech accusing 
defendant of murder could have added further pressure to 
confess.  Defendant also argues that his compromised physical 
state and related pain, shock, and confusion, would have 
compromised his ability to withstand the pressure of repeated 
attempts to obtain a statement.  (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
463, 493 (Caro) [“While a defendant’s ‘compromised physical 
and psychological condition’ alone will not render her 
statements involuntary [citation], that condition is relevant to 
the inquiry and presents an opportunity for abuse”].) 
Though these facts and circumstances make this a close 
case, the record, particularly the audio recording of defendant’s 
conversation with Patterson, reflects defendant’s “clear 
willingness and intention to talk” to Patterson.  (People v. 
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 386 (Gamache).)  As a result, 
we cannot find that defendant’s conversation with Patterson 
was caused by or the product of earlier violations.  (See, e.g., 
Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1045–1046.)   
First, the record does not reveal the sort of berating 
evident in other cases that might readily wear down a suspect 
(e.g., Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 80–83; Boyer, supra, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
50 
48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274), but instead a handful of one- to two-
minute conversations over a period of a few hours.  The trial 
court, after an extensive hearing, including sworn testimony 
from Patterson and at least 16 other witnesses, found that the 
tape-recorded discussion was a “low-key, very, very calm, 
rational — perhaps unnervingly so — discussion of what 
transpired.”  At the hearing, Patterson testified “at no point did 
I attempt to insert any strong injunction for him to talk to me 
about the crime” and that defendant “was completely alert and 
very cognizant of what he was talking to me about and without 
evidence of mental confusion or disorientation.”  We agree with 
the trial court that defendant revealed no “outward sign of 
stress, [offering] just a straight account of what happened,” and 
his statements were “un[e]xcited, unforced and voluntary . . . .”  
Examining the record as a whole, we conclude the relatively 
brief prior interrogations that occurred — even when considered 
cumulatively — did not add up to “ ‘ ‘badger[ing]” ’ ” that 
effectively wore down defendant’s will to remain silent.  
(Henderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1022.) 
Second, although Patterson should not have contacted 
defendant to request an interview, he did not ask further 
questions after defendant invoked his right to counsel.  Edwards 
does not bar further contact with a suspect, only further 
interrogation.  (See Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 728–732 
[although officer went to jail and met Waidla for express purpose 
of interrogating him, Waidla initiated the interrogation when he 
repeatedly interrupted the officer with offers of assistance 
before the officer had a chance to address and advise him of his 
Miranda rights]; Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 652 [rejecting 
argument that Edwards requires a suspect to initiate the 
meeting at which he initiates the interrogation, where the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
51 
defendant had requested an interview while officers were 
transporting him].)  Patterson immediately stopped asking 
questions when defendant invoked his right to counsel.  
Patterson soon stepped out into the hallway where Holmes 
directed Patterson “to follow the defendant wherever he went 
and just observe him.”   
 Third, the recorded interview clearly shows that 
defendant was engaging Patterson — defendant initiated the 
conversation and Patterson only responded.  (See Mickey, supra, 
54 Cal.3d at p. 648 [an initiation occurs when a suspect’s “words 
or . . . conduct” can be “ ‘fairly said to represent a desire . . . to 
open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or 
indirectly to the investigation’ ”].)  As noted above, after 
defendant requested counsel, Patterson asked no more 
questions and there was no discussion for about 20 minutes.  
Defendant then asked, “Still here, huh?”  Patterson responded, 
“Yeah, just, just in case you’re — I can, I can, whatever.”  
Defendant then remarked, “Yeah, you seem like you have a kind 
face.”  Patterson responded, “Um, thank you.”  Defendant then 
asked, “The last psychiatrist I talked to, made me very angry, 
you know.”  Patterson responded, “You know who it was?”  And 
the two discussed briefly whether Patterson knew the 
psychiatrists defendant had seen.  Defendant then stated, 
“Anyway, so two years ago I went through the county mental 
health system.”  Patterson responded, “Here in Ventura?”  
Defendant responded, “Yeah, the east end, thinking that I had 
some type of mental disorder.”  Patterson responded, “Hum.”  
Defendant volunteered, “And I saw a counselor.  I saw a 
psychologist and eventually I saw a psychiatrist.  Took about six 
months.”  Patterson verified, “To get to the psychiatrist.”  
Defendant responded, “Yeah.”  After a brief interruption to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
52 
perform a medical procedure, defendant asked Patterson, “You 
wanna 
talk 
about 
it?” 
 
Patterson 
responded, 
“Sure.  
(unintelligible)  Cause you, you don’t mind, and we could just 
talk about what has happened or something.”  Defendant 
continued the conversation, stating, “So anyway I was talking 
about the psychiatrist that I saw.”  Defendant turned the 
discussion toward his relationship with G.A. and the events 
under investigation with the comment:  “But I think this 
emotional relationship that I’ve been in for the last 
year . . . [s]tirred things up.”  Soon thereafter defendant 
continued to direct the conversation toward the events under 
investigation by saying, “[Y]ou know I, about this afternoon, I’m 
aware of everything that happened . . . .”  And from there, the 
conversation ensued, defendant talking about his mental health 
history and past diagnoses, Patterson mostly listening and 
asking occasional questions.  Contrary to defendant’s assertion, 
it was not Patterson’s question — “you know who [your last 
psychiatrist] was?” — that turned the conversation to the 
instant crime and began the discussion about the criminal 
investigation.  Rather, as the above description makes clear, it 
was defendant who turned the discussion toward his 
relationship with G.A. and the events under investigation.  Over 
the course of the next hour, defendant continued to largely direct 
the conversation and select the topics.  As the trial court 
properly found, defendant “picked the topic; he started the 
conversation.” 
Fourth, and most importantly, the record indicates that 
defendant was aware he was providing information that might 
be used against him, yet he viewed the tradeoff a worthwhile 
one.  Upon meeting defendant, Patterson Mirandized defendant 
and then asked him, “So, the next thing then in knowing these 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
53 
things, are you willing to talk with me about yourself?”  
Defendant declined to talk, explaining, “I don’t think so.  I’m 
facing very serious charges and I think I’d rather talk to a 
lawyer first.”  He stated further, “That be okay?  I think right 
now I’m in a state of shock and kind of confused and I don’t know 
that the information I’d give you would be that accurate.”   Early 
on in his discussion with Patterson, defendant said:  “I think I’d 
be better off talking to you about emotional states than about 
actual specific facts” and “I’m sure my lawyer wouldn’t 
appreciate it, you know?”  Later on in the discussion, defendant 
elaborated: “I don’t know why they, why they say don’t say 
nothing, because if you did something and people know you did 
it, there’s people . . . .  [¶] . . .  [¶]  . . . you know, they saw me, 
right.  How are you gonna say you didn’t?  I mean that, what are 
you accomplishing, you know, I think the situ — I think it’s best 
to be honest, that way you get to the root of it.  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . 
after I’d talked to you a little bit I though[t] well, it’s probably 
more beneficial to me to give him as much information as I can 
while I’m uh —  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . I, I’m not under the influence of 
any chemicals or drugs yet, they’re gonna sedate me pretty soon.  
And it’s fairly close to the time of the incident.”  Thus, as the 
trial court noted, defendant “discuss[ed] in fact his motivations 
to speak at that time before he [became] anesthetized or 
sedated, and that was important to him, that the facts be known 
at the best possible time and he tells us that in his statement 
which would be the time in closest proximity to the time at 
which these events occurred.”  The dissent posits that defendant 
may have doubted whether he was actually free to remain silent 
or to consult a lawyer before speaking with Patterson.  (Dis. 
opn., post, at pp. 11–12.)  But we need not speculate about 
defendant’s thought-process as to why he chose to speak with 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
54 
Patterson: defendant expressly detailed why he chose to speak 
to Patterson in the taped recording of the discussion.  
Defendant’s statements showed he was making a deliberate 
decision to speak with Patterson because he determined that it 
was “best to be honest.”  Defendant’s statements also show a 
clear and deliberate recognition that he wanted to speak before 
sedatives impacted his thinking.  And, his statement that “I’m 
sure my lawyer wouldn’t appreciate” him talking with Patterson 
about “specific facts,” coupled with his statement (detailed 
below) that “I understand my lawyer’s really going to be 
pissed . . . .” demonstrate that he understood he had the right to 
remain silent or consult a lawyer before talking to Patterson. 
The dissent also contends that the protection of Edwards 
is not limited to cases where the suspect was berated or where 
law enforcement employed “overt” coercion.  (Dis. opn., post, at 
pp. 2, 19.)  We agree.  As the dissent states, the question we 
must answer is whether defendant’s decision to speak with 
Patterson was in “ ‘ “response to” or “product of” the prior 
unlawful interrogation.’ ”  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 9, 20, quoting 
Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903; see also Boyer, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274.)  Our case law makes clear that the 
question of whether law enforcement officials repeatedly 
berated or badgered the suspect will naturally be relevant in 
determining whether the suspect spoke in response to the 
officials’ conduct.  (See Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 596 [“a 
defendant’s decision to talk with police cannot be a product of 
police interrogation, ‘badgering,’ or ‘overreaching,’ whether 
‘explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional’ ”]; see also Boyer, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274.)  As the dissent acknowledges: 
“Of course, where a suspect is berated, it is more likely his 
initiation was tainted by law enforcement misconduct.”  (Dis. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
55 
opn., post, at p. 20.)  We again agree.  But surely the converse is 
also true: where a suspect is not berated, though that fact is not 
dispositive, it makes it less likely his initiation was tainted by 
law enforcement misconduct.   
The dissent also argues that Patterson’s “understated 
manner” “presented [defendant] with a deliberate contrast to 
the impatient and even angry officers who had sought to 
question him earlier.”  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 10–11.)  The 
dissent argues that this fact is relevant in assessing “ ‘the entire 
sequence of events’ that night.”  (Id. at p. 10, quoting Mack, 
supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904.)  We disagree.  As the dissent 
acknowledges, the question we must answer is whether 
defendant’s decision to talk was the “ ‘ “product of” the prior 
unlawful interrogation.’ ”  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 9, 20, quoting 
Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903, italics added; see also Boyer, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 273–274.)  Though the dissent suggests 
that Patterson’s “tactics” were “unethical” (dis. opn., post, at 
pp. 5–6, 11), it appears to recognize, as it must, that Patterson’s 
conduct was lawful.  (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 296–
300.)  Patterson’s lawful conduct simply does not answer the 
question we must resolve here, i.e., whether defendant spoke to 
Patterson because the police had previously acted unlawfully.  
And if defendant ultimately decided to talk because of the 
efficacy of Patterson’s “understated manner” (dis. opn., post, at 
pp. 10–11) and because he determined that he and Patterson 
“ ‘share[d] a common interest, that their relationship is a 
[mutual] rather than an adversarial one’ ” (id. at p. 5), then 
surely defendant did not speak because of the prior unlawful 
conduct of police interrogation. 
 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
56 
Finally, the dissent asserts that the majority’s holding 
abrogates the “ ‘bright-line rule’ ” in Edwards “that all 
questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel.”  
(Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98.)  We disagree.  “[W]e 
have never found that an initial failure to honor a defendant’s 
invocation — whether of the [right] to remain silent or the right 
to have counsel present — poses a categorical bar to the 
admission of any subsequent statement regardless of the 
circumstances.  Instead, in case after case, we have held that 
despite the initial failure to honor a Miranda invocation, a 
voluntary 
confession 
obtained 
during 
a 
subsequent 
interrogation is admissible.”  (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 314, 
italics omitted.)   
In fact, the majority and dissent do not disagree on the 
applicable legal standard.  We agree that Edwards establishes 
a bright-line rule.  We agree that the question we must 
ultimately decide is whether defendant’s decision to speak with 
Patterson 
was 
the 
“ ‘product 
of’ 
the 
prior 
unlawful 
interrogation.”  (Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903.)  Where we 
disagree is in the application of this standard.  The dissent relies 
heavily on its interpretation of a single sentence Patterson 
uttered in which Patterson reminded defendant that defendant 
had previously promised to speak to him and that he would wait 
around to see if defendant changed his mind.  From this, the 
dissent surmises that defendant would have felt that he had to 
speak with Patterson or he would be “going back on his word” 
and that defendant would have felt that Patterson “was not 
satisfied with Johnson’s refusal.”  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 7–8.)  
This, coupled with Patterson’s decision to remain present for 20 
minutes without a break and without a change in location or 
personnel, indicates to the dissent that defendant’s decision to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
57 
talk was the product of prior unlawful conduct.3  (Id. at pp. 9–
14.)  But, once again, we need not rely on surmise.  We have a 
full tape of the interview itself.   
Ultimately, the operative question is whether, when 
defendant began talking to Patterson at 10:20 p.m., he did so 
freely, or he did so because of undue coercion.  As the trial court 
explained, the record itself — and most notably listening to the 
tape of defendant’s and Patterson’s conversation — establishes 
that defendant, fully aware that his statements could later be 
used against him, chose to speak with Patterson because “if you 
did something and people know you did it . . . it’s best to be 
honest.”  Our review of the audio recording demonstrates 
defendant was speaking easily and comfortably and was 
 
3  
The dissent also relies on the fact that Patterson spent 
about an hour simply observing defendant before introducing 
himself and yet defendant did not attempt to engage Patterson 
in conversation during this time.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 14.)  
However, the record further indicates that Patterson was in 
plainclothes with nothing about his appearance that would show 
he was associated with law enforcement or the district 
attorney’s office.  Defendant was on a gurney and, based upon 
defendant’s condition, Patterson was waiting for “medically . . . 
the proper time for me to talk with him about why I was there.”  
Patterson was “not trying to establish eye contact.”  Medical 
professionals were in and out and Patterson did not identify 
himself to them.  The fact that defendant did not begin a 
dialogue with a silent stranger under these circumstances does 
not inform whether he wanted to initiate further communication 
with Patterson once Patterson identified himself and stated that 
“the DA’s office asked me to come and talk with ya.”  Only after 
defendant learned that the district attorney’s office sent 
Patterson, did defendant eventually decide to speak with him, 
explaining that “after I’d talked to you a little bit I though[t] 
well, it’s probably more beneficial to me to give him as much 
information . . . .”  
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
58 
generally directing the conversation while Patterson mostly 
listened.  As the trial court concluded, that defendant “knew 
what was going on.  He knew what use it would be put to.  He 
knew with whom he was speaking.  He knew what he was 
speaking of.  He discusses that he is or is not in pain, he 
discusses in fact his motivations to speak at that time before he 
becomes anesthetized or sedated, and that was important to 
him, that the facts be known at the best possible time and he 
tells us that in his statement which would be the time in closest 
proximity to the time at which these events occurred.”  We 
therefore need not speculate about why defendant did not speak 
to Patterson before Patterson identified himself (dis. opn., post, 
at p. 14), or whether defendant felt that he was not free to 
remain silent (id. at pp. 11–12), or whether Patterson’s 
statements made defendant feel that he would be going back on 
his word if he did not speak with Patterson (id. at p. 7), or 
whether 
Patterson’s 
“understated 
manner” 
encouraged 
defendant to speak to him (id. at pp. 10–11).  We agree with the 
trial court’s conclusion that the audio recording of the interview 
was “[t]he most powerful and compelling evidence of the 
defendant’s understanding, knowledge, appreciation and 
willingness to participate in the conversation . . . .”  On this 
record, considering the entire circumstances of the interview, we 
are persuaded that defendant freely initiated the conversation 
with Dr. Patterson.   
c. Defendant Knowingly and Voluntarily Waived 
His Miranda Rights   
Apart from whether there was a legally valid initiation, 
there remains the question whether defendant voluntarily and 
knowingly waived his Miranda rights.  We conclude he did.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
59 
As 
noted 
above, 
a 
suspect 
initiates 
“further 
communication, when his words or conduct ‘can be “fairly said 
to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more generalized 
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” ’ ”  
(Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 656.)  “The initiation of further 
dialogue 
by 
the 
accused . . . does 
not 
in 
itself 
justify 
reinterrogation” (Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 440); “ ‘the burden 
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events 
indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel 
present during the interrogation’ ” (ibid.).  “The state must 
demonstrate that the suspect knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel ‘under the totality of the 
circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, 
not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’ ”  
(Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 810.)  “ ‘The waiver must be 
“voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception” [citation], and knowing in the sense that it was 
“made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it.” ’ ”  (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1086 
(McCurdy).)  “ ‘[A]n express waiver is not required where a 
defendant’s actions make clear that a waiver is intended.’ ”  
(People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1010.)  Although a 
suspect’s responses to further interrogation may not be used to 
cast doubt on the clarity of his or her initial request for counsel, 
“[s]uch subsequent statements are relevant only to the distinct 
question of waiver.”  (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at 
p. 100.)    
A prior Edwards violation is not by itself dispositive of 
whether a suspect knowingly and voluntary waived his or her 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
60 
rights.  As we have said before, “[W]e cannot conclude that an 
Edwards violation, ‘unaccompanied by any actual coercion or 
other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s 
ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory 
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is 
ineffective for some indeterminate period.’  (Oregon v. Elstad 
(1985) 470 U.S.[, 298,] p. 309.)  Rather, if the statement made 
after an Edwards violation is voluntary, ‘the admissibility of any 
subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely 
on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.’ ”  (Bradford, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1040.)  “Only if the ‘totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an 
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may 
a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been 
waived.”  (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 (Burbine).)  
Thus, our case law makes clear that earlier attempts to 
interrogate a defendant after an invocation of rights can violate 
Edwards, but a subsequent decision to speak with law 
enforcement can still be voluntary.  That is the case here.  
Regarding the requirement that the waiver be voluntary, 
we conclude that for the same reasons discussed in part 
II.A.2.b., ante, the record shows that defendant’s initiation was 
voluntary and uncoerced by law enforcement’s earlier conduct.  
Notably, there is no indication that Patterson “ ‘threatened, 
tricked, or cajoled’ ” defendant into a waiver.  (People v. 
Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160.) 
Defendant relies on Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th 63 to argue he 
did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights when he spoke 
with Patterson, asserting that law enforcement authorities 
repeatedly disregarded defendant’s efforts to remain silent and 
invoke his right to counsel during the three-and-a-half-hour 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
61 
time frame, despite defendant’s physical condition and 
expressed shock and confusion, and that Young berated 
defendant for murdering Aguirre.  
In Neal, however, the defendant invoked his right to 
counsel nine times, and the officer intentionally violated the 
defendant’s Miranda rights, applying an aggressive method of 
interrogation that he knew was improper.  “[T]he officer . . . not 
only continued the questioning improperly but badgered 
defendant, accusing him of lying, and informing defendant that 
‘this is your one chance’ to help [yourself] and that ‘if you don’t 
try and cooperate . . . , the system is going to stick it to you as 
hard as they can.’  Despite this badgering, defendant did not 
admit his guilt at that session.  After the session ended, 
however, defendant was placed in custody and kept in jail 
overnight without access to counsel or other noncustodial 
personnel and without food or drink or toilet facilities.  The 
following morning, defendant asked to speak to the officer, who 
thereafter met with him, resumed questioning, and ultimately 
obtained two confessions from him.”  (Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 68; see id. at pp. 73–75.)  Neal was an 18-year-old high school 
dropout with limited intelligence and little experience of the 
criminal justice system.  (Id. at p. 84.)   
Here, defendant not only initiated the conversation with 
Patterson, he led it.  Patterson asked few questions and 
frequently 
gave 
only 
one-word 
responses, 
encouraging 
defendant to continue speaking.  For example, after a brief 
interruption during which the surgery resident entered the 
room to conduct a medical procedure, defendant started a new 
topic, stating, “you know I, about this afternoon, I’m aware of 
everything that happened (unintelligible).”  After they discussed 
defendant’s attendance at AA meetings, defendant switched to 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
62 
a new topic, stating, “But this episode with me, just today 
(unintelligible).”  The overall picture is not of a browbeaten 
suspect whose will was overborne by a coercive interrogator, but 
of a suspect eager to tell his story to a sympathetic listener, even 
though there might be consequences for doing so.  Near the end 
of their conversation, defendant urged Patterson to “write [his] 
report as quickly as possible” and remarked, “[Y]ou had a kind 
face. . . .  I think that’s [an] asset in your business.”  Thus, the 
discussion between Patterson and defendant paints a different 
picture than in Neal.  Of significance here and in contrast to 
Neal, the record before us (including defendant’s statement that 
his lawyer was “really going to be pissed”) suggests that the 
actions of law enforcement personnel did not cause defendant to 
misunderstand the nature of his rights such to undermine the 
validity of his waiver.  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 485.) 
Regarding the requirement that the waiver be knowing 
and intelligent, the record establishes that defendant made a 
conscious choice to talk to Dr. Patterson despite knowing he was 
entitled to counsel and also knowing that, by talking to 
Patterson, he was acting against his legal interest.  First, 
defendant had been read his full Miranda rights by Detective 
Young at the start of the evening and had invoked those rights 
by refusing to talk to the police and the district attorney and 
asking for an attorney.  Second, Patterson clearly informed 
defendant at the start of the encounter that his statements could 
be used against him.  Defendant asserted his Miranda rights to 
Patterson, as he had earlier in the evening, which showed his 
understanding that he had the right to assert his rights to 
Patterson.  Defendant clearly understood that his statements 
could be used against him, telling Patterson that he was “facing 
very serious charges and I think I’d rather talk to a lawyer first.”  
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
63 
Patterson agreed, stating, “that’s your decision” and “it’s up to 
you, you can still refuse it . . . .”  Third, Patterson testified at the 
hearing on the Miranda motion that defendant appeared alert 
and cognizant during the interview, and his participation in the 
interview was unimpaired by his physical condition.  Fourth, 
and 
most 
critically, 
defendant’s 
own 
contemporaneous 
statements demonstrated a knowing waiver by defendant of his 
Miranda rights.  Early on in his discussion with Patterson, 
defendant said:  “I think I’d be better off talking to you about 
emotional states than about actual specific facts” and “I’m sure 
my lawyer wouldn’t appreciate it, you know?”  (see p. 31, ante.)  
Toward, the end of the discussion with Patterson, defendant 
again reiterated this understanding, stating: 
“DEFENDANT:   
I started out by just not wanting to tell 
you exactly what happened —   
“PATTERSON:   Yeah.  
“DEFENDANT:   
 — but it ended up that way.  
“PATTERSON:   Well, we went sort of round and round —   
“DEFENDANT:   
At this point I don’t have anything to 
lose by being honest and saying what happened.  
“PATTERSON:   Yeah.  
“DEFENDANT:   
And I understand my lawyer’s really 
going to be pissed and so forth.  
“PATTERSON:   Um-hum.  
“DEFENDANT:   
So then (unintelligible).  
“PATTERSON:   You can certainly talk, and he’ll get what 
we’re talking about.  
“DEFENDANT:   
I’m sure he will, yeah.    
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
64 
“PATTERSON:   And uh —   
“DEFENDANT:   
And I don’t know why they, why they say 
don’t say nothing, because if you did something and people 
know you did it, there’s people (unintelligible) —   
“PATTERSON:  They saw you.  
“DEFENDANT:   
 — you know, they saw me, right.  How 
are you gonna say you didn’t?  I mean that, what are you 
accomplishing, you know, I think the situ- I think it’s best 
to be honest, that way you get to the root of it.” 
These responses demonstrated defendant’s awareness of 
his rights to silence and counsel and that his statements would 
be used against him and his conscious choice to speak to 
Patterson anyway.  Specifically, defendant’s comment that his 
attorney would be angry “demonstrated his awareness of the 
consequences of talking with Dr. Patterson,” as the Attorney 
General argues, and that defendant’s agreement with 
Patterson’s statement that defendant’s attorney would “get 
what we’re talking about” demonstrated that defendant “was 
aware of his right to speak without counsel and that the 
statements would be used against him, yet he voluntarily chose 
to do so anyway.”   Defendant’s statement that “I understand my 
lawyer’s really going to be pissed and so forth” demonstrates an 
understanding that he would have a lawyer in the future and is 
a direct acknowledgment by defendant that what he was doing 
contradicted what that future lawyer would advise him to do.  
Defendant’s statement that he “started out . . . not wanting to 
tell [Patterson] exactly what happened” but concluding, “[a]t 
this point [he did not] have anything to lose by being honest and 
saying what happened” further illustrates his awareness that 
he did not have to speak and that he was waiving this right, as 
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65 
did his comment, “I don’t know why they . . . say don’t say 
nothing, because if you did something and people know you did 
it.”   
Defendant even knew Patterson would prepare a report at 
the conclusion of the interview:  When Patterson said he was 
going to leave defendant to rest before surgery, defendant 
replied, “Yeah, it’s probably better if you write your report as 
quickly as possible . . . .”  Thus, he acknowledged that Patterson 
would be writing a report on what had been said, but he spoke 
with Patterson anyway.  As the trial court observed, defendant’s 
statements make it clear defendant understood he could have a 
lawyer and that his statements could be used against him in 
legal proceedings.  
Relying upon Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. 1039 and 
Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, defendant argues that an 
additional round of Miranda warnings were necessary here 
after any initiation in order to ensure that his statement to 
Patterson was voluntary.  While initiation and waiver are 
indeed separate inquires that should not be “meld[ed]” together 
(Bradshaw, at p. 1045), these cases do not require a new 
Miranda advisement after a suspect initiates dialogue.  As the 
trial court acknowledged, an express Miranda waiver would 
certainly make this an easier case.  However, it is well settled 
that a suspect initiates “further communication, when his words 
or conduct ‘can be “fairly said to represent a desire” on his part 
“to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or 
indirectly to the investigation.” ’ ”  (Molano, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 656.)  “ ‘In the event he does in fact “initiate” ’ such further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations, ‘the police may 
commence interrogation if he validly waives his [Miranda] 
rights.’ ”  (Waidla, at pp. 727–728; see also Bradshaw, at p. 1044 
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66 
[“if a conversation taking place after the accused has ‘expressed 
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,’ is 
initiated by the accused, where reinterrogation follows, the 
burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent 
events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have 
counsel present during the interrogation”].)  For the reasons 
stated above, the waiver here was valid. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that certain aspects of the 
interaction between Patterson and defendant make this 
question close.  First, defendant never expressly revoked his 
invocations.  Instead, the waiver here was more subtle:  When 
defendant asked Patterson if he wanted to talk, Patterson 
responded, “[I]f you don’t mind and we could just talk about 
what has happened or something,” and then a conversation 
ensued.  Defendant later explained that he had not wanted to 
discuss what had happened that day but that “it ended up that 
way” and that “at this point,” which was after he had confessed, 
he had nothing to lose.  As the trial court explained, “The only 
thing lacking — and I think [defense counsel] argued this point 
and I think well argued it — was if Dr. Patterson had stopped 
and stated the Miranda, we probably wouldn’t be having this 
conversation.”  
Second, defendant’s medical condition — he had been 
shot, he was in pain, and had been given a “pretty heavy dose” 
of perhaps “local anesthesia” prior to his confession — raises 
concern about whether he would have been alert and cognizant 
during his encounters with Patterson. 
Third, there is the possibility that law enforcement’s prior 
violations of defendant’s right to counsel may have put pressure 
on defendant and made him feel like he had to talk to law 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
67 
enforcement or Patterson despite his prior invocations of his 
right to silence and to counsel.   
Last, there is the possibility that defendant was unclear 
as to whether Dr. Patterson was there to interrogate defendant 
or treat him.  Defendant may not have fully appreciated this 
distinction.  Defendant spoke to Patterson only after expressing 
potential willingness to Haas to speak with a psychiatrist in the 
context of a discussion in which defendant had described his 
earlier efforts to see mental health specialists.  In talking with 
Patterson, defendant seemed interested in getting answers 
about his schizophrenia.  He explained his efforts to get 
treatment and described his delusions and what seemed to 
worsen them.   He told Patterson, “I think you, you probably deal 
with emotional states rather than facts anyway, but 
(unintelligible) if you’re giving some type of a diagnosis.”  
Nonetheless, despite these countervailing concerns, the 
record overall establishes that defendant made a conscious 
choice to talk to Patterson despite knowing he was entitled to 
counsel and also knowing that, by talking to Patterson, he was 
acting against his legal interest.  Defendant had been read his 
full Miranda rights by Detective Young at the start of the 
evening and Patterson had clearly informed defendant at the 
start of the encounter that his statements could be used against 
him.  Defendant asserted his Miranda rights to Patterson, as he 
had earlier in the evening, which showed his understanding that 
he had the right to assert his rights to Patterson.  Most crucially, 
we have the unique benefit of being able to listen to the audio of 
the interview, which corroborates Patterson’s testimony that 
defendant appeared alert and unconfused, and convinces us, as 
it did the trial court, of “defendant’s understanding, knowledge, 
appreciation 
and 
willingness 
to 
participate 
in 
the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
68 
conversation . . . .”   (See Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 422–
423 [“Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely 
on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could 
stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the 
State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, 
the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of 
law”]; accord, People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 867.)  We 
agree with the trial court’s conclusion, described above, that 
defendant “knew what was going on.  He knew what use it would 
be put to.  He knew with whom he was speaking.  He knew what 
he was speaking of.”  We further agree the conversation was 
“un[e]xcited, unforced and voluntary . . . .”  In sum, our review 
of the audio recording reveals a defendant who is speaking 
freely, easily, and comfortably and not as the result of 
“ ‘ “intimidation, coercion, or deception . . . .” ’ ”  (McCurdy, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1086.) 
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the suppression 
motion.  Defendant’s ultimate decision to speak with Patterson 
was not the product of the earlier efforts to question him but of 
his own free will and intelligent choice, knowing he was entitled 
to, and had the option to wait for, an attorney.  Only because of 
an unusual record affording insight into defendant’s thinking 
can we conclude 
defendant’s willingness to talk was 
uninfluenced by the earlier Miranda violations.  To be clear, we 
do not hold that, after invocation, law enforcement can return 
shortly thereafter and request to interrogate the suspect.  That 
violates Edwards’s bright line rule.  Similarly, we do not hold 
that law enforcement has carte blanche permission to remain 
present after an invocation in the hope of inducing a suspect to 
talk.  Depending on the facts, such conduct could make a 
subsequent initiation and waiver involuntary.  For example, we 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
69 
could imagine a case where the subsequent statements by law 
enforcement to the suspect are more directive (e.g. “we’ll just 
stay here or follow you around until you change your mind”), 
where the duration of the officer’s presence is longer, where the 
manner in which the officer stays is more menacing or 
intimidating, or where the defendant’s ultimate decision to talk 
seems coerced based upon the defendant’s responses.  But that 
is not this case.  Every Miranda inquiry is highly fact specific, 
and here we have unique facts.  Here, Patterson explained after 
defendant invoked that “it’s up to you” and did not ask further 
questions; Patterson was present with defendant for only a 
limited time period before defendant started the conversation 
with Patterson; defendant, and not Patterson, started the 
conversation at issue; the recorded interview clearly shows that 
defendant was calm and was engaging Patterson, with 
defendant largely directing the conversation and selecting the 
topics; the record indicates that defendant was aware he was 
providing information that might be used against him, yet he 
viewed the trade-off as worthwhile; and the trial court’s 
numerous factual findings are supported by an audio recording 
that we can listen to and assess for ourselves.  On this unique 
record, we affirm.4 
 
4  
The dissent expresses concern that this holding will 
encourage law enforcement to “ ‘simply disregard the suspect’s 
requests for counsel’ ” and continue to interrogate the suspect 
with shifting and ever subtler tactics.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 21, 
quoting People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1046 (dis. opn. 
of Chin, J.).)  We disagree.  First, it is worth noting that we here 
hold that the trial court properly excluded portions of 
defendant’s prior interviews conducted by Haas and Young.  
Moreover, we acknowledge above that this is a close case and, 
 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
70 
B. Exclusion of Portions of Patterson’s Interview 
 
of Defendant 
After the trial court denied defendant’s suppression 
motion, the parties litigated what portions of the Patterson 
interview were admissible, with defendant arguing for 
admission of the entire interview but the court generally ruling 
with the prosecution in admitting only limited portions.  
Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling, contending that 
excluding a majority of the interview violated Evidence Code 
section 356 and his federal constitutional right to due process.  
The Attorney General argues the excluded portions were 
irrelevant to the question of defendant’s mental state and that 
regardless, any error was harmless.   We conclude the trial court 
acted within its discretion in redacting the statements as it did.     
1. Version of Interview Presented to Jury  
The redacted interview submitted to the jury described in 
the statement of facts ante is recounted in more detail here.  In 
the redacted interview, defendant explained that he would 
become overwhelmed by “intense emotions” and that he had 
recently been in a monthlong “very intense emotional 
relationship” with G.A. that had “[s]tirred things up.”  He 
 
on different facts, suppression of defendant’s statements to 
Patterson could have been required.  This fact alone, involving 
the 
possibility — 
litigated 
over 
several 
decades — 
of 
suppressing statements used at the trial of a defendant 
convicted of the senseless murder of a law enforcement officer, 
serves as a stark warning.  No one should take from this opinion 
the lesson that violations of constitutional rights carry no 
consequences.  Every violation jeopardizes the ability to place 
before a jury anything a suspect might say, and jeopardizes any 
conviction that might be obtained if matters that should have 
been excluded are erroneously admitted. 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
71 
explained he had married G.A. some years before as a favor so 
she could obtain a green card and that they had had no contact 
nor began dating until recently.  The week before the shooting, 
he had accused G.A. of cheating on him and she had denied it.  
He explained to Patterson that he had become intensely jealous 
of G.A. and determined to never be physically separated from 
her again.  He then confessed to kidnapping G.A. at gunpoint. 
The portion submitted to the jury also included Patterson 
and defendant’s discussion of the events surrounding the 
shooting of Aguirre.  Defendant recalled observing the police 
pull G.A. out of the house and realizing then that her family 
must have called the police.  He saw Aguirre enter the residence 
and heard Aguirre tell him to put his hands up.  Defendant 
explained that he “was kinda looking out” from behind a wall 
and “just jumped out and shot [Aguirre],” explaining that that 
was how he “reacted” to the situation. 
The submitted portions of the interview also included 
some explanation of defendant’s experience of the events that 
day.  He told Patterson that on the day of the shooting, he felt 
as if he “was in a movie.”  He recounted earlier conversations 
with G.A. in which she had urged him to write a movie because 
defendant had “done some writing” in school.  That afternoon 
when they were driving in the car after leaving G.A.’s employer’s 
residence, G.A. had reminded defendant about writing a movie 
and he had explained to her that he was writing the movie at 
that moment and that they were in the movie “acting it out.”  He 
told Patterson, “[W]hen you have guns, then that’s how you 
write a movie . . . ” and that he kept telling G.A., “[Y]ou’re in [the 
movie] right now, isn’t it exciting?”  But he explained to 
Patterson that he was “aware of everything that happened” and 
“know what I did . . . .”   He explained that he was “getting what 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
72 
[he] wanted” and that the “movie was going the way [he] wanted 
it to.”  He explained that his actions against the police that day 
had been a “passive suicide attempt.”  
2. Portions of Interview not Presented to Jury 
In the portions of the interview excluded from the jury, 
defendant and Patterson discussed defendant’s experiences 
with paranoid delusions, efforts to seek mental health 
treatment, self-diagnosis of schizophrenia, recognition that 
close emotional relationships would intensify his delusions, and 
description of prior criminal activity and incarceration as it 
related to his delusions.   Defendant stated, “I think you, you 
probably deal with emotional states rather than facts anyway, 
but (unintelligible) if you’re giving some type of a diagnosis.” 
Defendant told Patterson he had paranoid delusions.  He 
explained that about two years before Patterson’s interview of 
defendant, defendant had contacted the county mental health 
department because he thought he had a mental disorder.  He 
saw psychologist Lisa Kus (who testified in defendant’s penalty 
defense) at the county’s mental health department, and she 
diagnosed him with organic delusional disorder.  Kus referred 
defendant to a psychiatrist who prescribed Haldol.  Defendant 
stopped taking the medication after three days because it caused 
“a lot of hallucinations” that were “real frightening.”  Patterson 
told defendant that sometimes Haldol worsens hallucinations.  
When defendant went back to the county’s mental health 
department, he was seen by another psychiatrist who did not 
schedule defendant for another appointment because he did not 
think defendant “was going to be a mental health patient.”  
Defendant told Patterson he also attended “12-step 
meetings and recovery programs” for drug addiction and 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
73 
alcoholism and enrolled in a drug and alcohol counselor’s 
certificate program at Oxnard Community College.  He told 
Patterson about his job working as a resident manager at the 
facility for residents with dual diagnosis of mental disorder and 
chemical dependency.  Through information gained in these 
experiences, defendant determined he had schizophrenia. 
Defendant provided some descriptions of his delusions.  He 
explained that when he saw Kus, he had been living with his 
parents and had formed the belief they were “Nazi 
agents . . . trying to reprogram [defendant] through chemicals” 
by poisoning his food.  Defendant said he had a “paranoid 
episode” for three months after that.  Defendant responded 
affirmatively to Patterson’s question whether defendant still 
believed his father was poisoning his food.  
He described experiencing an “intense” paranoid delusion 
about three to six months before the interview with Patterson, 
in which defendant formed the belief that his father had 
molested defendant’s son when his son was approximately 7 
years old.  Defendant felt “intense” anger and avoided his father, 
thinking he would have to kill him, until he realized he was 
having a delusion. 
Regarding defendant’s accusation to G.A. a few days 
before the shooting, that she was cheating on him, defendant 
told Patterson that G.A. responded, “You’re sick, Mike, you’re 
sick in the head, you need treatment, you should go [see] the 
doctor.”  
Defendant explained he had “another violent episode” 
about 10 years earlier, in which he committed armed robbery of 
a McDonald’s restaurant while he was under the influence of 
drugs.  Patterson asked if the armed robbery was “a fall off with 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
74 
the paranoid delusional thing.”  Defendant responded, “Well you 
know the armed robbery thing was, and I, this is all in my files 
over at Hillmont, but I had the delusion — I sorta had that 
delusion today too, but uh, I was doing a religious thing.  It was 
a religious battle.  (unintelligible).  Ever heard of Krishna?  The 
Indian God, Krishna?”  Defendant explained he was Hindu and 
robbed the McDonald’s restaurant because, “I thought they were 
the demons of this world selling billions and billions of 
hamburgers.  I wanted to harm them, so I was gonna rob 
’em. . . . I wanted to scare all the people in the restaurant.” 
Patterson and defendant discussed his incarceration 
following the robbery.  Defendant told Patterson that when he 
was pending release from incarceration, he told a staff 
psychiatrist that he thought he would be harmful to himself and 
society and should not be released.  Defendant told prison staff 
that he was continuing to have “delusions with Krishna.”  
Defendant explained that he was not feeling “remorse 
now” and this was “normal” for him when he was “emotionally 
excited, to shut down.”  He described feeling like “there’s no 
emotion” but also that there was “too much emotion.  You don’t 
realize you have emotions, then you feel that controls your 
actions.” 
In addition to explaining to Patterson, in the portion 
submitted to the jury, that the intense emotions defendant 
experienced were overwhelming, defendant had also explained 
in the excluded portions of the interview that close emotional 
relationships “amplified the delusional thinking.”  He explained 
that the paranoid episodes were “triggered by, by uh, people 
that . . . are real close . . . .”  Defendant avoided seeing his son, 
at the time age 22, because it would be a “pretty emotional” 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
75 
experience, and emotions would “amplif[y] the delusional 
thinking, you know.”  He experienced his emotions as 
“disorienting and confusing and . . . uncomfortable.”   
In response to Patterson’s question about whether 
defendant’s delusions had “entirely disappear[ed],”  defendant 
explained that he still had “paranoid . . . episodes.”  The 
episodes would “come[] and go[].” 
3. Procedural and Legal Background 
The prosecution sought to admit portions of defendant’s 
statements “to explain the defendant’s actions” on the day of the 
shooting and argued that the remaining portions concerned 
evidence of defendant’s criminal, family, educational, and 
mental health history that was irrelevant “to what the 
defendant was thinking or doing on the day in question and do 
not shed any light on the issues in the case.”  The prosecution 
specifically objected on hearsay grounds to defendant’s 
comments relaying statements made by his previous treating 
clinicians. 
The defense contended that admission of the entire 
interview was necessary under his federal constitutional due 
process and confrontation rights because it was defendant’s 
explanation of why the shooting occurred.  The defense argued 
that defendant’s statements in the interview — his descriptions 
of his symptoms and earlier episodes of delusions, recounting of 
diagnosis by former mental health clinicians, and explanation 
that his paranoid delusions were amplified by intense emotional 
relationships and had resulted in earlier criminal activity — 
were in response to Patterson’s questions and an explanation 
that his paranoid delusions were present in the days leading to, 
and had resulted in, the shooting and thus were evidence of his 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
76 
mental state.  Defendant also argued that the remaining 
portions of the interview were connected to the portions offered 
by the prosecution to show defendant’s thoughts and actions 
that day, including the admitted portion in which defendant 
stated that he “just reacted” to the situation, and that the 
statements added corroboration and credibility to the admitted 
statements.  The defense argued that exclusion of the 
statements, and in particular the detailed parsing of the 
statements, would create a misleading impression that 
defendant confessed to shooting Aguirre absent any mental 
illness and that the admitted portions were all that defendant 
had told Patterson, a psychiatrist, about why he shot Aguirre.  
In sum, the defense argued that excluding all references to 
defendant’s mental illness would create a misleading impression 
of defendant’s state of mind and deprive the jury of a complete 
evaluation of defendant’s explanation of his mental state.  
The prosecution objected to admission of the entire 
statement as containing multiple layers of hearsay and that the 
defense was not calling a mental state expert in the guilt phase 
or declaring an intent to present a defense based on a mental 
disease. 
The trial court denied the defense motion to include the 
entire interview, admitting the portions requested by the 
prosecution, some additional passages the court determined to 
admit, and two specific portions requested by the defense in 
response to the court’s ruling.  Specifically, on its own, the court 
admitted portions of the discussion between Patterson and 
defendant in which defendant described feeling “these intense 
emotions that were kind of overwhelming,” that his relationship 
with G.A. had “[s]tirred things up,” that defendant had felt like 
he was “in a movie” that day but that he was “aware of 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
77 
everything that happened,” and that his conduct that day was 
his “reaction to the situation” and had possibly been a “passive 
suicide attempt,” and that defendant was “getting what [he] 
wanted, the movie was going the way [he] wanted it to.”  In 
response to defense requests, the court admitted portions in 
which defendant said he had accused G.A. of cheating on him 
the week before, which she denied, but it declined to admit the 
additional portion in which G.A. further told defendant, “You’re 
sick, Mike, you’re sick in the head, you need treatment, go to the 
doctor.” 
The court reasoned that the portions it was admitting 
were relevant to the prosecution’s offer to show defendant’s 
“state of mind” and actions that day but that defendant’s 
“subjective evaluation of his own psychological state as it 
reflects back upon what he thought he was doing in the context 
of the psychoanalysis and other treatment he had received 
throughout, other therapists” (sic) was inadmissible.  The court 
ruled that the defense could otherwise contest the state’s case 
on state of mind, malice, and premeditation such as through 
expert testimony, but could not present expert opinion through 
defendant’s statements.  The defense could also inquire into the 
circumstances of the interview, such as defendant’s condition 
and the representations made by Patterson.  In response to the 
court’s ruling, the defense reiterated its contention that 
admission of the entire interview was required and argued that 
nonetheless, the inclusion of 15 additional lines from the 
interview was at least admissible under the trial court’s own 
theory of admissibility.  As noted above, the trial court admitted 
some of the requested lines. 
During its opening statement, the prosecution quoted 
from defendant’s statements to Patterson that he felt like he 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
78 
was in a movie on the day of the shooting.  The prosecution 
stated this “wasn’t a hallucination” and quoted defendant’s 
further comments from the interview in which defendant stated 
that he had told G.A. that he was writing a movie.  The defense 
renewed its motion under Evidence Code section 356 to have the 
entire audiotape played during cross-examination, arguing in 
response to the prosecution’s comment that defendant had not 
been hallucinating, that the excised portions of the interview 
supported the defense theory that defendant was experiencing 
delusions that day, noting specifically that defendant had 
explained that he had earlier had a delusion that he was in a 
Hindu religious battle and that he had told Patterson that he 
“ ‘sort of had that delusion today too.’ ”  The trial court denied 
the motion, explaining:  
“It is one thing for a person to express subjectively, ‘This 
is my state of mind at the time,’ that is, this is what I know, this 
is what I said, this is what I did, which is what the present offer 
is, what is before the jury.  It’s a wholly different thing for them 
to have him engage in psychoanalytic theory on why he did what 
he did.   
“And, in substance, what the defense would have the 
Court do is have Mr.  Johnson become his own expert.  Not on 
his state of mind at the time, which is — you know, one is 
allowed to give one’s impressions about one’s own physical 
condition under oath.  But this is really ramblings of someone 
about former events, former states of mind, former matters 
which are wholly outside of, in my estimation, what is before the 
Court.   
“Now, let me be clear.  I think this has all really been 
rather thoroughly explored.  I am comfortable with the idea and 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
79 
the reason I allowed his expression of his then existing state of 
mind in because I think you have a right to argue whether a 
person who sees himself in a movie is a person who has actually 
formed malice.  I think ultimately I’m going to hear that 
argument from you.   
“And inasmuch as he was recounting the events and his 
then existing state of mind, that is all that is before the jury.  
However, to then allow a foray into Mr.  Johnson’s subjective 
psychoanalytic theory concerning what moves him in times past 
and how that may have some nexus with times present is not 
356.  It’s just — it’s not part of the same package.  It’s a wholly 
different issue.   
“As to his cognitive functions at the time, you know, the 
evidence will be whatever the evidence is.  And Dr. Patterson’s 
examination at this point has been markedly circumspect.  It’s 
been:  I was there, there was the person, this is what he said.  
And it was redacted to confine itself to the very narrow issues 
before the Court.   
“I could go on and give you some self-serving comments 
about how I’m comfortable with this ruling, but I’m more 
comfortable than I was before with it.  I think it’s a very clear, 
almost bright line distinction between his evaluative thinking 
reflectively and his declarative thinking about what in fact 
occurred.   
“So, the objection — the motion to offer the greater portion 
of evidence is denied, and the Court stands on its earlier ruling.” 
Evidence Code section 356 provides that “[w]here part of 
an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence 
by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired 
into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
80 
be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or 
writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, 
conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it 
understood may also be given in evidence .”  “ ‘ “The purpose of 
this section is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a 
conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a 
misleading impression on the subjects addressed.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104.)  “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts do not draw 
narrow lines around the exact subject of inquiry.  “In the event 
a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of a 
conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have 
placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the 
declarant in the course of such conversation or correspondence, 
provided the other statements have some bearing upon, or 
connection 
with, 
the 
admission 
or 
declaration 
in 
evidence. . . .” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 600 
(Clark).)  This includes admission of portions “of the same 
interview or conversation, even if they are self-serving” so long 
as they “ ‘have some bearing upon, or connection with, the 
admission . . . in evidence.’ ”  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
92, 156.)  “Evidence Code section 356 ‘ “is founded on the 
equitable notion that a party who elects to introduce a part of a 
conversation is precluded from objecting on confrontation clause 
grounds to introduction by the opposing party of other parts of 
the conversation which are necessary to make the entirety of the 
conversation understood.” ’ ”  (People v. Melendez (2016) 
2 Cal.5th 1, 26.)  “The section permits introduction only of 
statements ‘on the same subject’ or which are necessary for 
understanding of the statements already introduced.  The ‘other 
conversation’ referred to in Evidence Code section 356 must 
have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or 
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81 
declaration in evidence.”  (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 
302.)  Evidence Code section 356 “applies only to statements 
that have some bearing upon, or connection with, the portion of 
the conversation originally introduced.  [Citation.]  Statements 
pertaining to other matters may be excluded.”  (People v. 
Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 130; accord, People v. Chism 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1324.)  “Section 356 is indisputably 
‘ “subject to the qualification that the court may exclude those 
portions of the conversation not relevant to the items thereof 
which have been introduced.” ’  [Citations.]  ‘The rule is not 
applied mechanically to permit the whole of a transaction to 
come in without regard to its competency or relevancy . . . .’  
(Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 320, p. 283.)”  (People v. 
Williams (1975) 13 Cal.3d 559, 565.)  
Further, under section 352, “a trial court has broad 
discretion to exclude evidence it deems irrelevant, cumulative, 
or unduly prejudicial or time-consuming.”  (People v. Pride 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 235; see People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
929, 960 [affirming trial court’s ruling to admit portions of 
earlier testimony sought by the prosecution for context under 
Evid. Code § 356 where the court also considered and rejected 
the defense’s challenge to admission of the statement under § 
352].) 
A trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 356 is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Farley (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 1053, 1103.)   “ ‘ “[T]he scope of discretion always 
resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal 
principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . .’  Action that 
transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is 
outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ 
of discretion.” ’ ”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
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82 
531, 540.)   “To establish an abuse of discretion, defendants must 
demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was so erroneous that 
it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’  [Citations.]  A merely 
debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion.  
[Citations.]  An abuse of discretion will be ‘established by “a 
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and 
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390 .)     
4. Analysis 
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 
excluding a majority of his statement to Patterson because the 
redacted statement gave the jury an incomplete, prejudicial 
view of his mental state on the day of the crime as well as during 
the interview with Patterson.  
In the interview, defendant had explained his belief that 
he had been plagued by paranoid delusions throughout his life 
and that they had resulted in criminal activity similar to the 
events that day.   He explained that his perceptions of reality 
would be incorrect due to his mental illness.   Defendant 
observed 
that 
his 
delusions 
were 
worsened 
by 
close 
relationships, such as his parents and his son, and had 
previously resulted in homicidal thoughts.   He explained that 
as the delusions were happening, he would believe they were 
real, such as that his parents were Nazi agents trying to poison 
his food or that his father had molested defendant’s son.  
Defendant argues these explanations were part of his 
explanation 
in 
the 
admitted 
portions 
about 
becoming 
overwhelmed with feelings for G.A.; he highlights that he had 
told Patterson that his intense feelings for G.A. had amplified 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
83 
his delusional thinking.  Defendant had told Patterson that he 
had considered going to see a psychiatrist a week before the 
shooting because when he accused G.A. of cheating on him, she 
had said he was mentally ill and needed to see a doctor.   Thus, 
defendant argues, his complete statement gave meaning to his 
behavior and mental state at the time of the kidnapping, sexual 
assault, and murder.   He argues exclusion of the statements 
was prejudicial because it created a misleading impression that 
he shot Deputy Aguirre absent any mental illness and because 
it allowed the prosecution to argue defendant committed cold-
blooded first degree special-circumstances murder by urging the 
jury to “listen to that tape to hear the cold and to hear the ice” 
in defendant’ statements without the benefit of hearing the rest 
of the interview, which he argues would have given the jury 
context to evaluate the prosecution’s characterization of 
defendant’s demeanor and intent.  
We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion to 
redact the statements as it did.  First, the court admitted 
defendant’s statements that described his mental state on the 
day of the shooting.  Defendant described that he “felt these 
intense emotions that were kinda overwhelming.”   He described 
that “what happened this afternoon was like I was in a movie.”  
He described, “it was going on and I was living life and that was 
a movie.”  The court reasonably decided that defendant’s self-
diagnosis regarding prior events was unrelated to the current 
events and his description of what he was experiencing that day.  
The trial court chose to distinguish between statements 
reflecting past unrelated events versus the events on the day of 
the shooting and defendant’s analytic statements as to his mind 
versus declarative statements of what he was experiencing.  
Thus, it excluded the portions of the interview that covered 
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84 
defendant’s criminal, educational, psychiatric, and family 
history.  As the Attorney General argues, these portions were 
irrelevant to what defendant was thinking on the day of the 
shooting.  Second, the trial court informed the defense that the 
whole interview was not admissible and that the defense needed 
to be more specific about which parts it sought to admit, and 
then it considered further the specific portions the defense 
identified as admissible. The court explained that because the 
defense had sought to admit the entire interview, “I had to do it 
essentially on my own, I felt.  I felt somewhat at sea on that.  [¶]  
I’ve made the ruling.  Are there things specifically you feel 
should come in that I’m not allowing in?  Having said, ‘I want it 
all,’ can you be more precise?”  The record shows the trial court 
acted carefully in seeking to narrowly admit the portions related 
to the portions sought by the prosecution.  Third, the trial court 
informed the defense that it could present an expert to testify 
about defendant’s mental condition on the day of the shooting.  
Counsel apparently chose not to do so.  The record shows that 
the trial court carefully reviewed the interview transcript and 
discussed its reasoning with the parties and provided the 
defense an additional opportunity to argue for the inclusion of 
specific statements, before it reasonably concluded it had 
included all statements that related to defendant’s statement of 
mind on the day of the shooting.  The trial court’s decision to 
include statements that related to the defendant’s mental state 
on the day of the shooting but to exclude statements regarding 
his mental state prior to the shooting (in some cases ten years 
or more prior to the shooting) was not an abuse of discretion.    
Because the court acted within its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 356 in excluding portions of the 
statements, defendant’s related claim that the trial court 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
85 
violated his due process rights by excluding relevant evidence 
also fails.  “ ‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence 
do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present 
a defense.  Courts retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic 
power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence 
in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of 
prejudice.’ ”  (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 683; accord, 
People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 948.)  While the court 
excluded the portions of the interview it found unrelated to 
defendant’s statements about the events on the day of the 
shooting, it informed the defense it could otherwise contest the 
state’s case on state of mind, malice, and premeditation such as 
through presentation of expert testimony.  Thus, the defense 
was not precluded from presenting a defense about his state of 
mind. 
C. Admission of Defendant’s Prior Serious Felony 
 
Convictions as Evidence of Motive 
Defendant contends the trial court’s admission in the guilt 
phase of evidence of his prior crimes to demonstrate his “Three 
Strikes” status as proof of motive violated Evidence Code 
sections 1101 and 352, depriving him of his rights to a fair trial 
and due process of law, and rendering the penalty determination 
unreliable in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.   He 
also raises related prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of 
discretion claims.  Without resolving the substantive claims, we 
conclude any error was harmless.5   
 
5 
As he argued below, defendant also argues that the other 
crimes evidence was inadmissible to show intent, as distinct 
 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
86 
1. Factual and Legal Background 
To support its theory of premeditated murder, the 
prosecution moved to admit evidence that defendant had 
suffered two prior convictions in 1987 that qualified as serious 
felonies, and that he had signed a parole form in 1991 stating 
that possession of a firearm would constitute a felony.  (Evid. 
Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  The prosecutor reasoned that if 
defendant knew he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence for 
possessing firearms, then his awareness of his status supported 
an inference that he quickly shot Deputy Aguirre and attempted 
to kill Deputy Fryhoff to avoid arrest and a potential life 
sentence.  
The defense argued that such inference was speculative 
because there was no evidence defendant understood and was 
motivated by the possibility that he faced a Three Strikes 
sentence.  Defense counsel further argued that defendant may 
not have understood that his concurrent convictions in 1987 
were separate strikes since he had committed the offenses “on 
the same occasion.”  
Acknowledging that defendant’s knowledge of his status 
was “to some degree speculative,” the trial court nonetheless 
 
from motive, because his prior offenses were insufficiently 
similar to his current charges to support an inference that he 
was acting with the same intent in the current charges as he 
was in the previous offenses.  However, the prosecution did not 
argue that defendant killed Deputy Aguirre because he was 
motivated by the same intent he harbored when he committed 
the past offenses.  The prosecution only used the prior offenses 
to argue motive, i.e., defendant killed Aguirre to escape a life 
sentence because the existence of his prior convictions exposed 
him to a potential life sentence, and the jury was accordingly 
instructed only on this theory.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
87 
granted the prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence of 
defendant’s prior offenses and the parole advisement, 
concluding defendant’s criminal history was “significant 
circumstantial evidence” of motive, the absence of which would 
“misrepresent the picture of the facts” and render the killing of 
Deputy Aguirre apparently senseless.  The court explained, “the 
point is that in the space of but moments, the defendant, it is 
alleged, shot and killed a police officer with premeditation and 
deliberation.  [¶]  Operating in a vacuum, it is arguable that 
makes little, if any, sense.  The district attorney’s correct.  The 
Court is also mindful that if it admits evidence concerning the 
defendant’s criminal history, it’s terribly prejudicial.  [¶]  The 
role — the status of the defendant as a person who just happens 
to be taking a shower when police arrive and sees them, arms 
himself and shoots and kills a police officer — on its face makes 
little, if any, sense in and of itself.  [¶]  There is a total package 
here that the jury is entitled to consider.  The Court has to weigh 
how you put that together, understanding that the People’s 
theory is this is a motive-driven killing, if I understand [the 
prosecutor’s] position.  [¶]  The Court therefore is of the opinion 
that to deny the People the opportunity to show something about 
the defendant’s history would be to disable the People from 
arguing significant circumstantial evidence that runs to motive, 
which would otherwise be completely absent, and that would be 
a mis[re]presentation of the picture of the facts as they existed 
at the time.  [¶]  The Court therefore is of the opinion that the 
People will be permitted to show that the defendant had suffered 
unspecified convictions.” 
The court concluded defendant’s experience with the 
criminal justice system supported a reasonable inference that 
he understood the consequences of possessing a firearm.  Due to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
88 
the prejudicial nature of the criminal history, the court decided 
to sanitize the convictions as “unspecified priors” and give the 
jury a limiting instruction.  
In response to the ruling, the defense asked the court not 
to sanitize the two convictions, which were for assault with a 
firearm and robbery with a firearm, withdrew its request to 
bifurcate the trial of the prior conviction sentencing allegations 
and request to stipulate to defendant’s status as a convicted 
felon (which was an element of the charge of felon in possession 
of a firearm), and requested that the parties avoid the phrase 
“Three Strikes.”  Granting the requests, the court instructed the 
jury that defendant had been convicted of the offenses and 
would be subject to a 25-year-to-life sentence if he were 
convicted of possessing a firearm or committing any felony.  
The court also instructed the jury three times during the 
trial to consider the priors not as propensity or character 
evidence, but only as evidence of motive for murder and for proof 
of the charge of felon in possession of a firearm.  This first 
occurred after the prosecution presented evidence about 
defendant’s criminal record to show that defendant faced a 
potential life sentence when he armed himself on the day of the 
shooting and that his former parole officer would have advised 
defendant that possessing a firearm was a felony.  The trial 
court instructed the jury not to use the evidence to conclude 
defendant had a disposition to commit the crimes, and gave a 
similar caution before deliberations.  Second and third, the court 
also instructed the jury in the guilt and penalty phases that 
statements made by the attorneys during the trial were not 
evidence. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
89 
“ ‘Subdivision (a) of [Evidence Code] section 1101 prohibits 
admission of evidence of a person’s character, including evidence 
of character in the form of specific instances of uncharged 
misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a specified 
occasion.  Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however, that 
this rule does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct when such evidence is relevant to establish some 
fact other than the person’s character or disposition.’  (People v. 
Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393.)  ‘Evidence that a defendant 
committed crimes other than those for which he is on trial is 
admissible when it is logically, naturally, and by reasonable 
inference relevant to prove some fact at issue, such as motive, 
intent, preparation or identity.  [Citations.]  The trial court 
judge has the discretion to admit such evidence after weighing 
the probative value against the prejudicial effect.’ ”  (People v. 
Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 667 (Fuiava).)   When reviewing 
the admission of other crimes evidence to show motive, “ ‘a court 
must consider:  (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or 
disproved, (2) the probative value of the other crime evidence to 
prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any rule or 
policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant.’ ”  
(Ibid.)   
“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability 
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.)  “ ‘ “[E]vidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial 
when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, 
motivating them to use the information, not to logically evaluate 
the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
90 
side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction.  In such a 
circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the 
substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate 
purpose.” ’ ”  (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 162–163 
(Powell).)   
“ ‘ “We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings 
on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under 
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.” ’ ”  (Fuiava, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at pp. 667–668.)  As noted above, “[t]he court’s ruling 
will not be disturbed unless made ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage 
of justice.’ ”  (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 162.)   
2. Analysis 
Assuming without deciding that the admission of the prior 
crimes evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b) in the guilt and penalty phases was error, any error was 
harmless.  Considering the evidence’s impact in the guilt phase 
first, we review state law errors for prejudice under People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).  (People v. Harris (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 804, 842; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 22.)  
This requires us to examine whether it was “reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party 
would have been reached in the absence of the error.”  (Watson, 
at p. 836.)   
Our review of the record shows it was not “reasonably 
probable” defendant would have received a more favorable 
result had his prior convictions been excluded.  To prove 
defendant 
premeditated 
Deputy 
Aguirre’s 
murder, 
the 
prosecution sought to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior 
Three Strikes offenses to show defendant was motivated to shoot 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
91 
at the officers in order to escape and avoid a life sentence.  But 
the evidence was strong that defendant killed Deputy Aguirre 
under all three theories of first degree murder.  Defendant had 
confessed to the details of shooting Deputy Aguirre and 
kidnapping G.A., and acknowledged his awareness that Aguirre 
was a police officer.  He had explained seeing the police officers 
pulling G.A. out of the house and understanding then that her 
daughter had called the police.  Defendant’s confession was 
corroborated by G.A.’s testimony about the kidnapping and by 
defendant’s further actions as witnessed by Deputy Fryhoff that 
defendant fired several rounds at Fryhoff as defendant ran out 
of the house.  Further, expert testimony on gunshot wounds and 
blood splatter established that Deputy Aguirre was shot in the 
head at very close range, likely while he was on or near the 
ground.  Given all of this evidence, the jury likely would have 
concluded defendant fired at the officers while he was running 
out of the house in order to escape and avoid arrest, and 
regardless, that he premeditated the ambush murder of Deputy 
Aguirre while kidnapping G.A.  Thus, the evidence was strong 
that he premeditated the killing of Deputy Aguirre, as well as 
killed him in the course of kidnaping G.A. (felony murder 
theory), as well as jumped out from behind a wall and ambushed 
the deputy (lying-in-wait theory).   
The prior crimes evidence was not a significant part of the 
prosecution’s case; rather, the prosecutor largely focused on 
defendant’s confession as proof of his mental state and conduct.  
Defendant’s confession was a focal point of the prosecutor’s case 
on premeditation (as well as the other theories of murder).  The 
prosecutor discussed defendant’s admissions in his opening 
statements at the start of trial, played the statements for the 
jury during the trial, used them in cross-examining defense 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
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92 
witnesses, and emphasized how the statements supported the 
prosecution’s case during closing and rebuttal arguments.  In 
the opening statement, for example, the prosecutor highlighted 
that the jury was “going to hear in [defendant’s] own words the 
cold, matter-of-fact way in which he describes this murder of 
Peter Aguirre.”  The prosecutor then quoted defendant’s 
statements extensively, about kidnapping G.A. from work at 
gunpoint, going to her house and ordering her 15-year-old 
daughter to leave, observing the arrival of the police when he 
and G.A. were in the shower, observing the police pull G.A. out 
the front door, and hearing Aguirre telling him to put his hands 
up.  During the trial itself, the prosecutor played the entire 
audiotape of the redacted interview for the jury to hear.  In the 
portions played by the prosecutor, the jury heard defendant 
confess that he kidnapped G.A. from her workplace, stating, “I 
would say actually I, I kidnapped her, you know?”  The jury also 
heard defendant describe looking out from behind a wall, seeing 
the police pull G.A. out of the front door of the home, and hearing 
Deputy Aguirre tell him to put his hands up in response to which 
defendant “just jumped out and shot” him.  In the portion the 
prosecutor played for the jury, it also heard defendant explain 
that he shot Deputy Aguirre because he “just reacted” to the 
situation and that he believed he had attempted a “passive 
suicide” by his actions that day.  These direct admissions by 
defendant regarding his culpable state of mind were far more 
consequential than reference to the fact that defendant might 
have faced a life sentence for committing the crimes.     
Defendant argues admission of the evidence at the guilt 
phase was prejudicial because it permitted the jury to use 
defendant’s prior convictions as propensity evidence, increasing 
the likelihood defendant was convicted for his status as a prior 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
93 
offender.  However, the jury was twice instructed at the guilt 
phase not to treat the evidence as propensity evidence.  “We 
must assume, contrary to defendant’s theory of prejudice, that 
the jury obeyed the express language of the instruction not to 
use the other-crimes evidence to establish defendant’s character 
or his disposition to commit crimes.”  (People v. Hayes (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 577, 625.)   
Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by repeatedly arguing falsely in the guilt and 
penalty phases that defendant signed a parole form that advised 
him that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence on possession of a 
firearm.    It is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue facts that 
are not in the evidence.  (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
1146, 1207 (Linton); People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 
906.)  Regardless, without deciding whether the comments were 
misconduct, for the reasons described above, these comments 
would have been harmless because the prosecution largely 
focused on defendant’s confessions and generally argued 
defendant would have shot at the police officers to facilitate his 
escape.  Moreover, even assuming the prosecutor improperly 
conveyed to the jury that the parole form stated that defendant 
faced a 25-year-to-life sentence for possessing a firearm, it was 
undisputed that defendant was advised that possessing a 
firearm was a felony, which would have potentially subjected 
defendant to further sentencing.  In this way, even without the 
assumed error, the jury still would have heard uncontradicted 
evidence that defendant had been advised that possessing a 
firearm was a felony.  Thus, defendant would have been aware 
that he could be convicted of a felony if he, a convicted felon, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
94 
were ever apprehended with a firearm.  Thus, any error was 
harmless.6   
Defendant also argues admission of the Three Strikes 
evidence was prejudicial at the penalty phase.  Specifically, he 
argues that his “defense in the penalty phase was that [he] was 
suffering from the debilitation of paranoid schizophrenia.  The 
improper admission and use of the evidence — in light of the 
prosecution's concealment that appellant was in fact suffering 
from paranoid schizophrenia, while also denigrating the defense 
expert on this subject and arguing to the jury that appellant was 
not suffering from paranoid schizophrenia — utterly destroyed 
the defense.”  Defendant appears to be arguing that the claimed 
error in admitting the Three Strikes evidence into the trial, and 
the claimed error in denigrating his expert psychologist during 
the penalty phase, had the cumulative prejudicial effect of 
persuading the jury to conclude at the penalty phase that 
defendant killed Deputy Aguirre because he wanted to avoid 
arrest and prison and to reject the defense’s expert testimony 
that defendant killed Deputy Aguirre because he was 
experiencing schizophrenia. 
For state law errors, we review whether there was a 
“reasonable possibility” the error affected the penalty verdict.  
(People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447; People v. Ashmus 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 965.)  As discussed in part II.G.4., we 
conclude the prosecutor’s efforts to denigrate the defense expert 
would have been harmless.  The jury, moreover, learned about 
defendant’s prior violent offenses (that were the basis for the 
 
6  
For the same reasons, defendant’s related claim that he 
was prevented from responding to the prosecutor’s argument, 
even if it has merit, was also harmless error.   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
95 
Three Strikes convictions) as part of the prosecution’s 
presentation of Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) and factor (c) 
evidence on defendant’s prior criminal activity.  Thus, the jury 
would have heard about the prior convictions that were the basis 
for the Three Strikes allegations as routine penalty phase 
evidence regardless of whether they were admissible under the 
guilt phase theory that defendant shot Deputy Aguirre because 
he knew he faced a life sentence and thus sought to avoid 
arrest.7  We therefore conclude there was no reasonable 
possibility that any error in admitting defendant’s Three Strikes 
convictions prejudicially affected the penalty phase verdict. 
D. Deputy District Attorney’s Testimony About 
 
Defendant’s Criminal Record 
Defendant contends his state and federal rights to due 
process and a fair trial were violated by Deputy District 
Attorney Terence Kilbride’s testimony about defendant’s 
criminal record.  Specifically, he contends the testimony 
usurped the jury’s role in determining defendant’s prior 
convictions.  He also contends the testimony usurped the court’s 
role in instructing the jury.  We conclude there was no 
prejudicial error. 
As part of the prosecution’s evidence that defendant faced 
a potential life sentence when he armed himself on the day of 
the shooting, Kilbride testified, as an expert on sentencing, that 
defendant had served a prison term and had convictions for five 
 
7  
In determining the penalty, factor (b) of Penal Code, 
section 190.3 permits the jury to consider evidence of “criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted 
use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use 
force or violence.”  Factor (c) permits the jury to consider 
evidence of defendant’s prior felony convictions.  (Id., subd. (c).) 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
96 
felonies.  Kilbride had worked as a deputy prosecutor for 23 
years and was trained and experienced in California sentencing 
law.  He explained that Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 
were sentencing schemes under which “a serious felony 
conviction [has] substantial effects on the amount of sentence a 
person would serve.”  He explained that “serious felonies” were 
“certain statutory felonies” identified in the Penal Code.  
Kilbride testified that in reviewing defendant’s conviction 
records, he “determine[d]” that defendant was convicted of 
several felonies.  He reviewed several of defendant’s conviction 
records in the jury’s presence, explaining what information each 
document showed and explaining that two of defendant’s 
convictions, for robbery with a firearm and for assault with a 
firearm, qualified as serious felonies under the “statutory 
definition.”  He then explained that under Penal Code sections 
667 and 1170.12, a person with two prior serious felonies faced 
a sentence of 25 years to life upon conviction of a new felony.  In 
addition to admitting defendant’s conviction records and 
Kilbride’s testimony to show that defendant was motivated to 
kill Deputy Aguirre to avoid a life sentence, the prosecution 
offered the evidence to show defendant’s status as a convicted 
felon to support the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, 
and as proof of prior convictions for the sentencing 
enhancements.8  
 
8  
As explained above, after the trial court ruled against 
defendant on whether to admit defendant’s prior convictions to 
show motive, defendant withdrew his motion to bifurcate the 
trial of his prior convictions allegations, which were the basis of 
the sentencing enhancement allegations, and withdrew his 
similar request for a stipulation that defendant was a convicted 
 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
97 
At the conclusion of Kilbride’s testimony, the trial court 
instructed the jury that it was to determine (1) “whether in fact 
the defendant did suffer the felony convictions,” (2) whether the 
convictions established a motive for Deputy Aguire’s murder, 
and (3) “whether such felony convictions, if true, establish[ed]” 
that defendant was a convicted felon for purpose of the charge 
of felon in possession of a firearm.  During closing argument, the 
prosecutor informed the jury about its role in completing the 
verdict forms.  The prosecutor explained “there is a step-by-step 
process intellectually that you will need to go through to reach 
the various verdicts that the law instructs you [that] you should 
in this case.”  The prosecutor stated the jury would have to make 
several findings on the verdict form with respect to the several 
charges including a “number of findings” regarding the prior 
conviction allegations and that “all the appropriate findings are 
laid out very, very well” in Kilbride’s uncontested testimony.  
The prosecutor also told the jury, “You must find he was 
convicted, served a prison term, that they were serious felonies.  
And again, I submit to you that an examination of Mr. Kilbride's 
uncontested testimony in this will serve you well.”   
First, defendant argues Kilbride’s opinion — that 
defendant had five felony convictions including for two serious 
felonies, and that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence upon 
conviction 
of 
another 
felony — 
violated 
his 
federal 
constitutional right to have a jury find beyond a reasonable 
doubt every element of the charged offenses.  
“All criminal defendants have the right to ‘a jury 
determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of 
 
felon, which was an element of the charge of felon in possession 
of a firearm.  
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98 
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’  
(United States v. Gaudin (1995) 515 U.S. 506, 510 (Gaudin); 
accord, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 477.)”  
(People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824.)  Though “a witness 
may not express an opinion on a defendant’s guilt,” the Evidence 
Code makes clear that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion 
that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”  
(Evid. Code, § 805.)   
While 
Kilbride’s 
testimony 
aided 
the 
jury 
in 
understanding defendant’s criminal records, it was the records 
themselves that established the facts of defendant’s convictions 
for several felonies.  Kilbride reviewed the records in the jury’s 
presence to aid the jury in its understanding of the records.  His 
testimony did not take away the jury’s function of itself 
determining from the evidence whether defendant was in fact a 
convicted felon of the several prior offenses.  The fact that 
Kilbride’s testimony — that he had determined that defendant’s 
criminal records showed that defendant had committed the 
prior convictions and that some qualified as Three Strike 
offenses — might have “embrace[d] the ultimate issue,” 
Evidence Code section 805, of whether defendant was guilty of 
those convictions, did not make the testimony inadmissible.  As 
the jury was instructed by the trial court and informed by the 
prosecutor to do so, it determined whether defendant had 
suffered the prior convictions.  “Testimony in the form of an 
opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because 
it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”  
(Ibid.)   
Defendant’s cited authorities fail to support his claim that 
he was denied his right to a jury determination of every element 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
99 
of the charges.  The cited authorities generally address 
questions regarding a defendant’s right to a jury trial, which 
defendant was provided.  (Gaudin, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 507 
[whether defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by 
omission from the jury’s consideration of an element of an 
offense]; Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 146 [whether 
the defendant had a right to a jury trial on an offense subjecting 
him to punishment of up to two years]; Sandstrom v. Montana 
(1979) 442 U.S. 510, 512 [whether a jury instruction took away 
an element of an offense from the jury’s consideration by 
creating a conclusive presumption on the element].)  In keeping 
with the cited authorities, defendant was given a jury trial on 
all of the charges; the court instructed the jury on all of the 
elements of the charges and that it was to determine “what facts 
have been proved from the evidence received in the trial” and 
whether the offenses had been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and the jury entered verdicts on each count.   As such, 
defendant’s convictions as to these offenses “rest[ed] upon a jury 
determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of 
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Gaudin, supra, at p. 510.)         
Second, defendant contends Kilbride’s expert opinion 
testimony — that defendant had two felonies that qualified as 
serious felonies and so he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence upon 
conviction of another felony — was an impermissible opinion on 
the law and thus usurped the trial court’s role to instruct the 
jury on the law.   Defendant did not preserve this claim.  He 
contends he preserved it through his Evidence Code section 
1101 challenge to the other crimes evidence addressed in part 
II.C., ante.  However, when defendant argued below at the 
hearings and in his briefing, that the evidence of his prior 
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100 
convictions was inadmissible as motive evidence under Evidence 
Code section 1101, defendant did not specifically raise this 
distinct and unrelated legal challenge — that Kilbride’s opinion 
testimony usurped the trial court’s role in instructing the jury.  
(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 48 [defendant forfeited 
his claim on appeal when, even though he “objected to the 
admission of the expert’s testimony as a whole, he failed to 
object specifically on the ground he now advances and thereby 
deprived the trial court of an opportunity to make a fully 
informed ruling on the issue”].)    
Regardless, defendant’s claim that Kilbride’s expert 
testimony usurped the trial court’s role to instruct the jury 
about the law, even were we to conclude the claim has merit, is 
harmless for the reasons we discussed in part II.C, ante.  (People 
v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247, quoting Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [inadmissible expert testimony warrants 
reversal only if “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached’ ” 
absent the error].)  As we said in part II.C., ante, it was not 
reasonably probable defendant would have received a more 
favorable result had his prior convictions evidence been 
excluded because even without the evidence, the prosecution 
was able to present strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.     
E. Jury Selection Issues 
1. Denial of For Cause Challenges  
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in denying 10 for-cause challenges to prospective jurors.  
We disagree.   
Defendant used peremptory challenges to remove nine of 
the ten jurors at issue, asked for and was denied an additional 
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101 
peremptory challenge to use against seated juror (Juror No. 
3121, and expressed dissatisfaction with the jury, explaining 
that he would have used his peremptory challenges to remove 
her and other jurors on the panel had he not been forced to use 
the peremptory challenges to remove the other jurors he had 
challenged for cause.  Defendant has thus preserved his 
challenge for review.  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 75 
(Rices) [to preserve a claim of wrongful denial of a challenge for 
cause, “the defendant must (1) exercise a peremptory challenge 
to remove that prospective juror, (2) exhaust all peremptory 
challenges or somehow justify the failure to do so, and (3) 
express dissatisfaction with the jury that is ultimately 
selected”].)   
On appeal, defendant contends he was prejudiced by the 
trial court’s rulings on his for-cause motions that resulted in the 
seating of Juror No. 3121.   “A criminal defendant is entitled to 
an impartial jury.”  (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 215 
(Mickel).)  As discussed below, the trial court’s ruling was 
supported by substantial evidence.  
“A prospective juror’s opinions on the death penalty may 
support an excusal for cause if those opinions would ‘ “prevent 
or substantially impair the performance” ’ of the prospective 
juror’s duties.  ([Wainwright v.] Witt [(1985)] 469 U.S. [412,] 
424.)  A prospective juror who is incapable of ‘ “ ‘conscientiously 
consider[ing]’ ” ’ the full range of sentencing options, including 
the death penalty, should be excluded from service.  [Citation.]  
An inability to carefully and sincerely consider all sentencing 
options is distinct, however, from merely holding views about 
the death penalty, including personal opposition to capital 
punishment.  [Citation.]  Rather, so long as a prospective juror 
is willing to ‘ “temporarily set aside [his or her] own beliefs” ’ and 
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fairly consider the sentencing alternatives presented under the 
law, the prospective juror may properly serve on a capital jury.”  
(Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 215.)   
“On appeal, we review the trial court’s ‘for cause’ juror 
excusals deferentially.  If the juror’s voir dire responses conflict 
or are equivocal, we accept the trial court’s findings if supported 
by substantial evidence.”  (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 481.)  
“Where a trial court conducts in-person voir dire, we generally 
defer to the trial court’s determination as to a prospective juror’s 
true state of mind.  [Citations.]  Unlike the reviewing court, the 
trial court that has conducted voir dire has the unique benefit of 
observing a prospective juror’s credibility, tone, attitude, and 
demeanor — factors we have described as of ‘ “ ‘critical 
importance’ ” ’ in determining whether a prospective juror is 
capable of performing his or her duties as a juror.”  (Mickel, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 215.)  
Juror No. 3121 stated in her questionnaire that the death 
penalty was used too seldomly and that she would be unwilling 
to consider defendant’s background in determining the 
appropriate penalty.  She circled 10 on the scale of being 
strongly in favor of capital punishment.  However, during voir 
dire she explained that while her “philosophical opinion” would 
be that the death penalty was automatically appropriate in the 
case of a police officer killing, that she would not automatically 
vote for that sentence because “Judge Perren says that we need 
to listen to the mitigating circumstances.”  Juror No. 3121 
explained that that she could honestly consider the mitigating 
evidence:  She explained that she earlier would have 
automatically thought the death penalty was appropriate for the 
murder of a police officer based on the publicity she had read 
about the case, but she would not automatically apply the death 
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penalty now after hearing the trial court’s explanation to the 
potential jurors that “we need to listen to the mitigating 
circumstances.”  When asked if she could “honestly tell us as you 
sit here now today” that she “could disregard what [she] heard 
before,”  Juror No. 3121 responded she could if she “heard and 
saw everything presented, yes.”  When pressed further, she 
explained that prior to entering the courtroom, she had had a 
“preconceived notion that the death penalty was appropriate,” 
but upon seeing defendant, she recognized the “human 
element,” and realized she was not the “hanging judge” that she 
thought she was.  Juror No. 3121 said she could weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors before reaching a decision.  
Juror No. 3121 reiterated this response, that she could set aside 
her philosophical view and consider the evidence and give 
defendant a fair trial, the two more times she was asked about 
this.  
During voir dire, defendant challenged Juror No. 3121’s 
qualification to serve as a juror “based upon her comment that 
in a case of a first degree murder with special circumstances the 
death penalty is automatically appropriate.”  The trial court 
denied the motion.  It explained, “I think there are actually two 
moments of lucidity.  One was when she finally understood what 
the process was.  And she made one of the more profound 
statements I think we’re ever going to hear.  I had a real strong 
opinion until I actually had to look at a human being.  Then I 
had to question actually how strong I felt.  Right on the money.”  
We conclude the claim fails because substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s ruling.  While Juror No. 3121 stated in 
her questionnaire that the death penalty was not applied 
enough, that she would be unwilling to consider defendant’s 
background in determining the appropriate penalty, and that 
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she was strongly in favor of capital punishment, her voir dire 
responses amply demonstrated her ability to set aside her views 
on capital punishment and consider both sentencing options.  
She explained that while her philosophical view was that the 
death penalty was automatically appropriate in the case of a 
police officer killing, she would not automatically vote for that 
sentence and would consider the mitigating evidence.  When 
pressed further, she explained that she reconsidered her views 
upon seeing defendant in the courtroom, and that she would 
weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence before reaching 
a decision.  As described above, Juror No. 3121 gave similar 
responses when asked again about this.  Juror No. 3121’s 
comments at voir dire showed that she understood that she 
needed to consider the evidence presented at trial and not 
automatically vote for a death sentence based on her views 
about the death penalty.  Juror No. 3121’s comments thus 
demonstrated that she was willing to “ ‘ “temporarily set 
aside” ’ ” her beliefs and “fairly consider the sentencing 
alternatives presented under the law . . . .”  (Mickel, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 215.)  Thus, substantial evidence supports the 
trial court’s ruling and defendant’s claim fails.  (Caro, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 481.)  
2. Denial of Additional Peremptory Challenges 
In a variation of the preceding claim, defendant contends 
the trial court erred in denying his request for additional 
peremptory challenges in violation of his constitutional right to 
a fair trial before an impartial jury.    
“[T]o establish the constitutional entitlement to additional 
peremptory challenges argued for here, a criminal defendant 
must show at the very least that in the absence of such 
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additional challenges he is reasonably likely to receive an unfair 
trial before a partial jury.”  (People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 
659, 679; accord, People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 23.)  
Defendant bases this claim on the contention that Juror No. 
3121 was a partial juror, which is belied by the record as shown 
above.  Defendant’s claim thus fails for the same reason, that he 
fails to show that a partial juror sat on his jury.   
3. Asserted Witt Error 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the 
prosecution’s for-cause challenge to Prospective Juror Ann I. 
because the record fails to support the court’s conclusion that 
Ann I.’s capital punishment views impaired her ability to serve 
as a juror.  Defendant also argues that reversal of the guilt 
phase is required because exclusion of Ann I. in conjunction with 
the inclusion of Juror No. 3121 resulted in an unfair jury.  We 
need not reach that issue because, as shown above, the court’s 
ruling on the challenge to Juror No. 3121 is supported by the 
record.   
As for Prospective Juror Ann I., the test for Witt error is 
the same whether it involves “ ‘erroneous juror exclusion or 
inclusion.’ ”  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 564.)  As outlined 
above, a prospective juror must be excused for holding views on 
capital punishment that would “ ‘ “substantially impair” ’ ” the 
juror’s ability to serve.  (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 215.)  “A 
ruling on a cause challenge will be upheld if it is fairly supported 
by the record.”  (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 590 
(Leon).)  “[W]here the trial court has had an opportunity to 
observe the juror’s demeanor, we uphold the court’s decision to 
excuse the juror so long as it is supported by substantial 
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evidence.”  (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 659 
(Spencer).)   
The prosecution challenged Prospective Juror Ann I. 
based on her religious view that the death penalty should be 
limited to extreme cases such as multiple murders, which, as 
she explained, was “about the only time I think I could vote for 
it.”  The trial court granted the challenge, concluding that while 
Ann I. had stated her willingness to “make every effort” to 
perform her duties as a juror, each such statement was followed 
by expressions of doubt about whether she could do so.  
The record fairly supports the trial court’s determination 
that Prospective Juror Ann I.’s views on the death penalty would 
substantially impair her ability to consider both sentencing 
options.  In her questionnaire, Ann I. wrote that the death 
penalty should be a “last resort,” expressed doubt about whether 
she could “personally recommend the death sentence for another 
human being,” and felt that a life sentence was her “punishment 
of choice for all but the most extreme cases.”  During voir dire, 
she explained that she did not believe the murder of a police 
officer was the type of “extreme case” that warranted the death 
penalty.  While Ann I. stated that she would “listen to the 
evidence first,” and “hear everything” before voting, she felt that 
her belief system would make it difficult to keep an open mind 
toward the death penalty in a case involving only one murder.  
For example, she stated, “I feel that the death penalty should be 
reserved for somebody who is a habitual criminal in a serious 
way, such as someone who has murdered many times, who is a 
danger not only to one person but to many people.  And that's 
about the only time I think I could vote for it.”  She also said she 
“could not guarantee” that her “conscience [would] allow [her] to 
have an open mind, to weigh the circumstances of this one 
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107 
particular murder and make a decision fairly to both sides here.”  
When asked by the court whether she could place the “principles 
of law” above her “religious scruples,” Ann I. responded that she 
felt her religious beliefs would be “foremost.”  When asked if she 
could follow the rules of law and apply them to the facts and give 
both sides an equal hearing in the penalty phase, Ann I. 
responded, “I think so.  It’s very, very difficult because I don’t 
really believe in the death penalty as — as a good penalty.”  She 
said further, “I really don’t know whether I could do it or not.  I 
have a feeling it would be something that would weigh on me 
terrible.”  “[A]nd if I made that decision, having to live with that 
decision for the rest of my life.  I think it would be very difficult.”  
She could not see herself in a case involving one murder voting 
for death. 
Prospective Juror Ann I.’s comments support the trial 
court’s conclusion that her religious views would make it 
difficult for her to fairly consider the death penalty as a 
sentencing option in a case such as this one that involved only 
one murder.  While Ann I. said she would try to follow the rules 
and consider both options, she expressed serious doubt about 
her ability to do so.  “Time and again, [Ann I.] expressed 
uncertainty as to whether [she] could set aside [her] personal 
antipathy to the death penalty and follow the law as instructed.”  
(Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 659.)  Ann I.’s views on the death 
penalty appeared sufficiently fixed that she could not set them 
aside and fairly consider both sentencing options as they 
pertained to the particular facts of this case.  Critically, she 
stated that her “religious scruples,” rather than “principles of 
law,” would be “foremost,” and when asked if she could follow 
the law, she responded:  “I really don’t know whether I could do 
it or not.  I have a feeling it would be something that would 
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weigh on me terrible.”   Therefore, the trial court’s ruling is 
“fairly supported” by the record.  (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 
p. 590.)   
F. Prosecution’s Use of Defense Expert in a 
 
Demonstration 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion 
and violated his state and federal due process and fair trial 
rights by allowing the prosecutor, over a defense objection, to 
ask the defense wound ballistics expert to demonstrate with a 
mannequin representing Aguirre, the possible position and 
location of the gun during the firing of the two shots to Aguirre’s 
forehead.  The claim lacks merit. 
Dr. Martin Fackler had testified for the defense that based 
on his review of the evidence — the autopsy report, crime scene 
diagram, 
photographs, 
police 
reports, 
and 
witness 
statements — it was impossible to determine the sequence of the 
two shots fired to Aguirre’s forehead, the position of his head 
and whether he was in motion on impact of the bullets, and 
whether the bullet found in the floor had caused the entry into 
Aguirre’s left forehead.  He opined that the evidence supported 
two or more scenarios — that the shots were fired in a deliberate 
manner while Aguirre’s head was near the floor or fired when 
Aguirre was in motion and defendant was running past him.  
The distance and angles from which the shots were fired did not 
permit Fackler to form an opinion as to whether the parties were 
still or in motion.  In examining Fackler, the defense asked him 
to make various assumptions based on the evidence, about 
which bullet to the forehead was fired last and about the 
rapidity of the gunfire.  
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In turn, the prosecution had Fackler participate in a 
hypothetical demonstration using the murder weapon and a 
mannequin representing Aguirre lying on the ground.  The 
prosecutor asked Fackler to make assumptions, based on bullet 
ejection and trajectory patterns evidence that was provided in 
prosecution expert testimony.  
During the testimony, the defendant objected several 
times for lack of foundation and Fackler’s lack of expertise on 
the prosecutor’s area of inquiry.  The prosecutor explained that 
it was asking Fackler to assume facts based on the earlier 
testimony of the prosecution ballistics expert and then to answer 
the questions posed based on the assumed facts.  The trial court 
ultimately allowed Fackler to answer the questions.  It 
instructed the jury that the prosecution was presenting Fackler 
with a hypothetical based on the earlier prosecution ballistics 
expert’s testimony and to respond to the questions about the 
hypothetical based on his own expertise.  
On redirect examination, Fackler reiterated that it was 
difficult to conclude from the facts whether defendant fired the 
gun while standing over Aguirre or whether when he was 
running by Aguirre.  He explained that he was not an expert in 
ejection patterns.  
“ ‘ “Experimental evidence has long been permitted in 
California trial courts . . . .” ’  (People v. Bonin[, supra,] 
47 Cal.3d 808, 847.)  ‘ “Admissibility of experimental evidence 
depends upon proof of the following foundational items:  (1) The 
experiment must be relevant [citations]; (2) the experiment 
must have been conducted under substantially similar 
conditions as those of the actual occurrence [citation]; and (3) 
the evidence of the experiment will not consume undue time, 
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110 
confuse the issues or mislead the jury [citation].” ’  (Ibid.)  The 
proponent of the experimental evidence has the burden to 
show that the conditions were substantially similar but need not 
show that they were absolutely identical.”  (People v. Jackson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 342.)  “Admissibility also depends on proof, 
‘with some particularity,’ of ‘the qualifications of [the] 
individual[] testifying concerning [the] experimentation . . . .’ ”  
(People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 847 (Bonin).)  “We review 
the trial court’s decision to admit experimental evidence for 
abuse of discretion.”  (Jackson, supra, at p. 342.)   
The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the 
testimony because the record supports a conclusion that the 
experimental evidence was relevant, substantially similar to the 
actual conditions, and was not confusing or unduly time 
consuming.  First, the prosecution’s cross-examination of 
Fackler to demonstrate the position and location of the gun in 
relation to the mannequin, the ejection pattern, and the bullet 
trajectory into the floor, related to and rebutted Fackler’s 
testimony on direct examination, that it was impossible to 
determine the sequence of the forehead shots and whether the 
parties were in motion.  The evidence was thus relevant and met 
the first criterion for experimental evidence.  Second, Fackler 
had maintained this opinion on the basis of various assumptions 
the defense posed to him about the rapidity and sequence of the 
shots.  Seemingly in an effort to support its theory that 
defendant fired the final shot execution-style while Aguirre lay 
incapacitated on the ground, the prosecution likewise asked 
Fackler to make certain assumptions about the ejection pattern 
and trajectory of the bullets based on the testimony of the 
prosecution ballistics expert and asked him to demonstrate the 
position and location of the gun consistent with these 
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assumptions.  As such, the trial court would have acted within 
its broad discretion to conclude that the testimony met the 
second criterion for experimental evidence because it was based 
on the evidence of what took place during the shooting as 
provided by the testimony of the prosecution ballistics expert.  
The testimony was brief and Fackler clarified that he was not 
an expert in ejection patterns or firearms and that the position 
he was demonstrating was just one position but that there could 
be several that were consistent with the evidence about the 
trajectory and ejection patterns.  Therefore, the evidence met 
the third criterion for experimental evidence because it did not 
unduly consume time and would not have misled or confused the 
jury, given Fackler’s qualifications.  Fackler limited his 
testimony to his own knowledge and the assumptions he was 
given, clarifying where he lacked expertise.  His testimony as to 
the position of the gun did not contradict the Bonin requirement 
that the testifying individual have sufficient qualification 
concerning the experimental evidence.  
G. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct Throughout 
 
the Trial 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed multiple 
acts of prejudicial misconduct throughout the trial in violation 
of his state and federal constitutional rights.   Defendant’s 
claims fall into three general categories:  Attacking the integrity 
of defense counsel, intimidating the trial court as well as county 
staff, and attacking the integrity of defense witnesses.   At the 
hearing on defendant’s new trial motion, the trial court found 
that several of the prosecutor’s actions were improper but 
concluded that because almost all of the conduct took place 
outside the jury’s presence, there was no prejudice.  We agree.  
The allegations solely concern the lead prosecutor.  While we 
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112 
agree with the trial court that the prosecutor’s conduct was at 
times “out of bounds,” most of the conduct took place outside the 
jury’s presence or otherwise was not prejudicial or not 
misconduct.     
Defendant also presents additional misconduct claims 
that we discuss in parts II.C., II.H.1., and II.H.2.   
1. Attacking the Integrity of Defense Counsel 
Defendant identifies several instances in which the 
prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense counsel, which 
attacks he contends were cumulatively prejudicial because they 
created “a toxic trial atmosphere.”   The prosecutor, for example, 
accused trial counsel of having no basis in “any honest 
argument,” taking “some pretty cheap shots” at prosecution 
witnesses, and making “pretty nasty attacks” on an earlier 
judge.   As defendant acknowledges, all of the comments at issue 
took place outside the jury’s presence.  
“ ‘ “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks 
the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense 
counsel.”  [Citations.]  “In evaluating a claim of such misconduct, 
we determine whether the prosecutor’s comments were a fair 
response to defense counsel’s remarks” [citation], and whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks 
in an objectionable fashion [citation]. ’ ”  (People v. Seumanu 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1336–1337.)   
At the new trial hearing, the trial court concluded that 
while the prosecutor’s conduct during the trial, “was out of 
bounds in a variety of areas in this case,” it was not prejudicial 
because almost all instances took place outside the jury’s 
presence.   (The prosecutor’s conduct that took place in front of 
the jury concerned his cross-examination of defense experts, 
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113 
discussed in pt. II.G.4., post.)  This case is thus different than 
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845 (Hill), on which 
defendant relies and in which the prosecutor committed several 
acts of misconduct by disparaging defense counsel in front of the 
jury.  “ ‘An attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously 
prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself . . . .’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 832.)  Although the court here heard the prosecutor’s 
disparaging remarks toward defense counsel, the record 
demonstrates that the court was unaffected by the prosecutor’s 
comments:  In responding to defense counsel’s argument below 
that the lead prosecutor’s conduct toward trial counsel would 
have caused the trial court to “view counsel whose reputation 
[was] being slandered with a jaundiced eye,” the trial court 
responded that he observed that both defense counsel conducted 
themselves with “high ethics” throughout the trial and “I never 
sensed for a moment any of them shrunk or balked at their task 
because of [the prosecutor] who did not, retrospectively, conduct 
himself as he ought to have done.  [¶]  . . . [I]f you think I will 
gild the [lily] about [the prosecutor], it ain’t gonna happen.  [The 
prosecutor’s] conduct was not acceptable.  Ultimately, I told him 
to sit down at one point when he exploded.  Ultimately, in your 
presence . . . I told him to knock it off, his conduct was 
unprofessional.”  Thus, no prejudice is apparent because the 
record makes clear that the trial court was uninfluenced by the 
prosecutor’s comments towards defense counsel, and the jury 
did not hear the comments because they were made outside its 
presence.       
2. Intimidating the Trial Court  
Defendant contends the lead prosecutor attempted to 
intimidate the trial court on two occasions.   “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s 
misconduct . . . violates California law if it involves ‘the use of 
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114 
deceptive 
or 
reprehensible 
methods 
to 
attempt 
to 
persuade . . . the court . . . .’ ” ’ ”  (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 172.)  First, defendant asserts the prosecutor tried to 
persuade the court to deny defendant’s Miranda motion by 
arguing that suppressing defendant’s statements would 
“operate a — fraud upon the jury.”  Second, he asserts the 
prosecutor sought to intimidate the court into denying a motion 
to limit the number of uniformed officers as well as visible signs 
of mourning in the courtroom.  The prosecutor urged the court 
to find the officers’ presence necessary “to make sure that the 
atmosphere 
in 
this 
courtroom 
is . . . conducive 
to 
the 
ascertainment of justice,” arguing, “we have to make sure that 
the law enforcement community trusts that what happens here 
isn’t going to exist in an atmosphere of prejudice . . . and that 
the 12 people chosen from this community to decide what 
happens to the killer of Peter Aguirre really got a fair shake at 
what they had a right to hear . . . . I don’t know what authority 
you’d have to enforce it anyway.”  
Defendant’s claim lacks merit.  Though the prosecutor’s 
statements were perhaps hyperbolic, there is nothing directly 
threatening in the prosecutor’s remarks.  The trial court 
considered 
the 
prosecutor’s 
comment 
that 
suppressing 
defendant’s statements to Patterson would “operate a — fraud 
upon the jury” as an attack on the defense rather than the court.  
The trial court explained that “defense counsel’s motion is fully 
within the ambit of the law and is properly brought before the 
Court.  [¶]  And I perceive no improper motive by either the 
government or the defense at this point litigating what are 
customarily motions brought before the Court routinely.  And so 
I don’t perceive this to be a fraud.”  With respect to the motion 
to limit officer presence, the court responded pointedly to the 
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115 
prosecutor that it would not allow anything in the courtroom 
that “might influence the jury in its decision.”  At a later hearing 
on the defense motion for a new trial in which the defense raised 
these events as a basis for its claim that the prosecutor had 
attempted to intimidate the trial court into ruling in the 
prosecutor’s favor, the trial court responded that it had 
“attributed nothing” to the prosecutor’s comments.  Although 
defendant refers to several purportedly erroneous trial court 
rulings addressed elsewhere in his brief, which he claims are 
evidence of the prosecutor’s success in intimidating the court, 
these assertions are generally without merit and none of the 
trial court’s rulings appear to be the product of intimidation.  
(See pts. II.C., II.G.4., II.H.1.)   
3. Intimidating County Counsel and a Witness  
Defendant next asserts the prosecutor attempted to 
intimidate county counsel and, indirectly, defense witness Lisa 
Kus, a county psychologist represented by county counsel, by his 
comments to counsel and the court in the midst of a protracted 
legal battle regarding whether the prosecution had a right to 
access defendant’s mental health records.  According to 
Assistant County Counsel Patricia McCourt, who represented 
the Ventura County Mental Health Department, the prosecutor 
approached McCourt while seated in the courtroom prior to a 
hearing and “leaned over me in a very angry way, sort of leering 
down at me, and said, ‘Well, is it your intention to bring in 
perjured testimony like you always do?’ ”  For the next several 
minutes, 
McCourt 
testified, 
the 
prosecutor 
repeatedly 
approached her and accused her of being “sleazy” and 
“unethical” and conspiring with Kus to “make up lies about the 
case” and hide information.  According to McCourt, while the 
prosecutor’s behavior did not influence her, his “physical 
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116 
presence was at all times angry, intimidating, imposing . . . .”  
The courtroom bailiff interceded on McCourt’s behalf until the 
judge arrived for the hearing on defendant’s mental health 
records.  At the hearing, the prosecutor then accused the county 
of obstruction of justice, asserting that Kus, who had previously 
interviewed defendant and would testify as a defense penalty 
phase witness, had purportedly removed some “raw data” from 
defendant’s file and wrote a report “covering her butt” in 
response to prosecution efforts to obtain defendant’s files.  The 
trial court, upon learning of the prehearing encounter between 
the prosecutor and McCourt, advised counsel for both parties 
that intimidation would not be permitted in his courtroom.  The 
prosecutor responded that “this case may get very ugly before 
it’s over.”  
Defendant contends that the prosecutor intimidated Kus, 
citing as proof her testimony that she did not diagnose 
defendant with schizophrenia.  “ ‘Governmental interference 
violative of a defendant’s compulsory-process right includes, of 
course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution.  
[Citations.]  [¶]  The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct 
may take are many and varied.  They include, for example, 
statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be 
prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of 
their testimony.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]  Threatening a defense 
witness 
with 
a 
perjury 
prosecution 
also 
constitutes 
prosecutorial 
misconduct 
that 
violates 
a 
defendant’s 
constitutional rights.”  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835.)   
Nonetheless, defendant’s claim fails for lack of prejudice.  
As defendant acknowledges, McCourt testified that the 
prosecutor’s behavior did not influence her, and, as defendant 
concedes, “no evidence has yet been adduced that the 
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117 
prosecution’s threat of an investigation affected” Kus’s 
testimony.   There is no evidence that Kus omitted a 
schizophrenia diagnosis because she was intimidated by the 
lead prosecutor’s comments.  To the contrary, Kus testified she 
had not diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia because she 
did not have enough information to make such a diagnosis.  In 
addition, she testified to defendant’s benefit that defendant did 
suffer from a delusional disorder.  It does not appear that the 
prosecutor’s behavior, while reprehensible, prevented Kus from 
evaluating defendant and testifying about her findings.  
Because Kus testified for defendant and her testimony was 
unaltered, no prejudice flowed from the individual act of 
misconduct.  (See, e.g., Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835.)  
4. Attacking the Integrity of Three Defense Experts  
Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by impermissibly impugning the integrity of three 
defense experts.  First, the prosecutor allegedly committed 
misconduct by asserting facts not in evidence when he cross-
examined Roger Clark, the defense expert on police practices, 
about purported findings of nepotism and other irregularities in 
his department, and then again in arguing to the jury that the 
expert had falsified records.  
Clark’s testimony had addressed whether Aguirre acted 
within the course and scope of his duties as an officer of the law 
when he entered G.A.’s home prior to being shot.  During his 
cross-examination of Clark, the prosecutor asked him whether 
an “audit” of a unit he had formerly supervised had revealed “a 
number 
of 
irregularities” 
about 
the 
unit 
including 
“improprieties in keeping time cards.”  He asked Clark if the 
audit report had specifically found Clark “guilty of nepotism.”  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
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118 
He asked Clark whether each of the allegations in the audit 
report were false and whether he believed himself to be a victim 
of false allegations.  He asked Clark if he did not feel bitter 
toward the Sheriff’s office.  The trial court responded to defense 
counsel’s 
several 
objections 
to 
the 
prosecutor’s 
cross-
examination by instructing the prosecutor to frame questions in 
terms of whether Clark had heard or read about the audit claims 
rather than whether the audit contained those claims.  During 
the defense’s redirect examination, Clark testified that the audit 
of his department that took place after he had left the 
department did not cause him to feel “disgruntled” toward the 
Los Angeles Police Department and that he kept in touch with 
his colleagues and peers, and that his fellow administrators had 
also provided several “very favorable reviews” of his 
performance.  
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that 
there was “an audit of [Clark’s] department [that] found things 
like nepotism and irregularities in overtime cards” and 
discredited Clark’s testimony regarding whether Aguirre was 
acting in the course of his duties by commenting that Clark was 
“too busy falsifying records.”  The defense objection to the 
argument for misstating the evidence was overruled.  The trial 
court later acknowledged this was an erroneous ruling because 
the prosecutor had in fact argued facts outside the evidence.  In 
its own closing argument, the defense argued there was no 
evidence that the expert was guilty of the audit claims and 
reminded the jury of the court’s earlier instruction not to 
consider the allegations for the truth but only whether they 
affected the expert’s state of mind. 
“ ‘ “[S]tatements of facts not in evidence [that are asserted] 
by the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
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119 
constitute misconduct.” ’ ”  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
306, 335 (Rivera).)  As to the prosecutor’s argument, “They did 
an audit of [Clark’s] department and found things like nepotism 
and irregularities in overtime cards,” Clark acknowledged that 
he read or heard the audit made these findings, but testified 
they were false allegations.  Even though it appears the 
prosecutor improperly referred to facts not in the record by 
asserting that the defense expert had falsified records, this error 
was harmless.  The expert’s testimony concerned a weak part of 
the defense case — the contention that Aguirre was not acting 
within the course of his duties as a police officer when he entered 
the house in response to a highly volatile and dangerous 911 
domestic disturbance call.  Further, the expert was still able to 
testify at length for defendant on this topic and the defense 
questioned him on redirect about his lack of ill feelings towards 
the police department as a result of the audit.  Moreover, 
defense counsel was allowed to address the impeachment in 
closing argument where he argued there was no evidence of the 
audit claims and reminded the jury of the court’s instructions to 
only consider the audit allegations for how they would have 
affected the expert and not for their truth.    
Defendant 
second 
contends 
the 
prosecutor 
“made 
unsubstantiated accusations against” the defense’s prison 
expert, James Park, to the trial court during a hearing out of the 
jury’s presence, and during cross-examination, and that the 
prosecutor’s behavior infected the trial with unfairness.  Prior 
to the start of Park’s testimony, the prosecutor alleged out of the 
jury’s presence that Park, when previously employed at San 
Quentin State Prison, had allowed an attorney to smuggle a gun 
to an inmate, who then murdered several security guards.  The 
trial court denied the prosecutor’s request to inquire into that 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
120 
specific area of alleged misconduct, directing him to limit his 
inquiry generally to the expert’s career, promotions, and 
demotions.  In the cross-examination that defendant points us 
to, the prosecutor questioned Park about whether he had taken 
a stress retirement and whether he was transferred and had 
stopped working in prisons.  Defendant also points us to cross-
examination in which the prosecutor addressed prison 
photographs Park had brought to court and asked him about 
prison rules prohibiting photographs of prison facilities because 
such photographs would render the facilities less secure.  This 
questioning was in response to Park’s testimony during direct 
examination, during which he had displayed photographs he 
brought with him of various prison structures, to demonstrate 
the security features at facilities where prisoners sentenced to 
life without the possibility of parole are housed.  Park explained 
in response to the prosecutor’s cross-examination that he took 
the photographs with the warden’s consent.  The trial court later 
commented that the prosecutor’s behavior toward the expert 
was “vitriolic, unnecessary and pointless.” 
“ ‘A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her 
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render 
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves 
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the 
trier of fact.’ ”  (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
195, 306.)  However, “ ‘harsh and colorful attacks on the 
credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible.  [Citations.]  
Thus, counsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness 
may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the 
evidence, that a witness’s testimony is unbelievable, unsound, 
or even a patent “lie.” ’  ”  (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 334–
335.)  Defendant fails to explain how the prosecutor’s effort to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
121 
discredit Park by questioning his employment history and by 
attempting to discredit Park’s testimony regarding the security 
features of prisons by asking whether he had permission to take 
the prison photos qualifies as misconduct.  While, as the trial 
court’s comments suggest, the prosecutor’s questioning may well 
have been “vitriolic, unnecessary and pointless,” he did not 
question Park about topics prohibited by the trial court.  Thus, 
his cross-examination did not result in “ ‘such unfairness as to 
render the . . . denial of due process, or involve[] deceptive or 
reprehensible methods . . . .’ ”  (Silveria, supra, at p. 306.)   
Defendant’s last contention is that the prosecutor 
gestured disparagingly at defense psychology expert Charles 
Hinkin, who testified during the penalty phase that defendant 
was a paranoid schizophrenic.   As part of its motion for a new 
trial, the defense included declarations from two jurors, who 
stated that the prosecutor made “eye contact with some of the 
jurors in the jury box and he was smirking and rolling his eyes 
at the testimony of Dr. Hinkin.”  In his opposition to the motion 
for new trial, the prosecutor wrote that the expert’s “effeminate 
mannerisms and weak testimony, limited as it was by his failure 
to ask basic questions of the defendant during his interview of 
him, caused understandable reaction from the prosecution.”  
The trial court concluded the prosecutor’s conduct was “wrong-
headed and unacceptable.” 
The prosecutor’s attack of Hinkin based on, as he sees it, 
the expert’s “effeminate mannerisms,” was wholly improper and 
clearly falls outside the boundaries of permissible attack 
“ ‘focused on the evidentiary reasons why [an expert’s opinions] 
could not be trusted.’ ”  (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 335.)  This 
statement is, by any measure, offensive and inappropriate.  
Such language has no place in pleadings, in courtrooms, or 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
122 
anywhere else.  Nonetheless, for purposes of our analysis here, 
i.e., potential prejudice, the statement was not made in front of 
the jury and therefore could not prejudice defendant.  
As for the prosecutor’s smirking and eye-rolling in the 
presence of the jury, the Attorney General acknowledges that 
this is “unsuitable” conduct by counsel.  We agree.  This conduct 
is unacceptable.  (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 322–
323 [prosecutor’s action of slamming a writing pad and rolling 
eyes was misconduct]; Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 834 [audibly 
laughing during defense examination of several witnesses was 
misconduct].)  Such tactics distract the jury and risk prejudice 
to the defense.  (Hill, supra, at p. 834.)   
“If we do find misconduct occurred during the penalty 
phase, ‘we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is 
a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the jury would have 
rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not 
occurred.’ ”  (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 289 
(Ghobrial).)  We conclude there is no reasonable possibility that 
the prosecutor’s attempt to discredit this witness by smirking 
and rolling his eyes at the jurors would have influenced the jury 
in deciding its penalty verdict.  The prosecutor’s conduct in 
smirking and rolling his eyes, while inappropriate, does not rise 
to the level of a case like Hill, in which the prosecutor subjected 
the jury to an “onslaught of . . . misconduct,” embarking on a 
campaign of misleading the jury and denigrating defense 
counsel.  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 845.)  This momentary 
facial gesture by the prosecutor, though inappropriate, simply is 
not significant enough to compel us to conclude that, because of 
it, there was a “reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the 
jury would have rendered a different verdict.”  (Ghobrial, supra, 
at p. 289.)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
123 
H. Additional Penalty Phase Claims 
1. Deputy Fryhoff’s Testimony About Failing to Kill 
Defendant 
Defendant 
contends 
the 
following 
penalty 
phase 
testimony by Deputy Fryhoff  was irrelevant, inflammatory, and 
an impermissible opinion as to the appropriate sentence, and 
thus violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights and corresponding state constitutional rights: 
“Q. [Prosecutor]: Describe your emotions for us regarding 
that part of the incident, the fact that you shot Michael 
Johnson. 
“A. Um, I’m very upset with myself that I didn’t kill him. 
“Q. Is that something that you think about often? 
“A. That’s something I have to live with every day. 
“Q. Does it make you feel that somehow you were a failure 
as an officer? 
“A. Yeah.  It makes me very hostile that I wasn’t able to 
do it.” 
Prior to this testimony, defendant had objected and asked 
for a sidebar after the prosecution asked Fryhoff how he felt 
about not having killed defendant.  The trial court clarified the 
permitted area of inquiry, that Fryhoff could testify about the 
event’s impact on him, and that the court would instruct the jury 
on how it was to consider the evidence. 
At the penalty phase, “evidence may be presented by both 
the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to 
aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited 
to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense . . . .”  
(Pen. Code, § 190.3.)  “A State may legitimately conclude that 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
124 
evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder 
on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to 
whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”  (Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827.)  “Although victim impact 
testimony is admissible, the victim’s view as to the proper 
punishment is not.”  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 622 
(Smith).)  “ ‘The views of a crime victim . . . regarding the proper 
punishment has no bearing on the defendant’s character or 
record or any circumstance of the offense.’ ”  (People 
v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 487.)  “We review a trial 
court's decision to admit victim impact evidence for abuse of 
discretion.”  (Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 677.)   
Fryhoff’s testimony was not about the appropriate penalty 
verdict but rather about his own remorse and perceived failure 
concerning the shootout with defendant.  The testimony 
constituted relevant victim impact evidence because it 
demonstrated how Fryhoff felt helpless and guilty following the 
loss of his friend.  The testimony showed Fryhoff’s reasonable 
response to feeling grief and regret and the jury would have 
reasonably understood his testimony to be nothing more than 
an expression of that.  Fryhoff was not making an “impassioned 
entreaty to the jury to end his suffering and kill appellant, 
because he had passed up the chance to do so himself,” as 
defendant argues. 
The trial court further instructed the jury at the close of 
Fryhoff’s testimony that it was not to consider the testimony as 
opinion evidence on the verdict but rather as victim impact 
testimony and that the jury alone was charged with the decision 
of verdict that it was to determine after considering the factors 
in aggravation and mitigation.  The court similarly instructed 
during the penalty phase instructions.  We presume jurors 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
125 
follow a court’s instructions.  (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
166, 238.)  We therefore conclude the trial court acted within its 
discretion in admitting Fryhoff’s testimony.   
Defendant’s related claim of prosecutorial misconduct is 
also without merit.  Defendant contends the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by (1) asking Fryhoff how he felt about 
not having killed defendant, and (2) according to defendant, 
bullying the trial court into allowing Fryhoff to testify he felt 
upset and guilty for not killing defendant, and (3) arguing to the 
jury that Fryhoff would feel guilty for the rest of his life for not 
having killed the person that killed his fellow officer. 
With respect to the first misconduct contention, as 
discussed above, the prosecutor permissibly asked Fryhoff how 
he felt about not killing defendant within the parameters set by 
the trial court.   
On the second contention — that the prosecutor bullied 
the court — the prosecutor commented, at a sidebar preceding 
Fryhoff’s testimony, about the experience of officers involved in 
shootings that result in the death of fellow officers, stating, 
“Every cop that ever gets involved in a shooting carries with him 
a guilt, and this deputy carries with him a guilt, over the fact 
that he didn’t kill Michael Johnson and that is a guilt that 
haunts him every day of the rest of his life.”  He acknowledged 
that Fryhoff could not offer an opinion as to the appropriate 
sentence.  The defense then objected that the prosecutor had 
committed misconduct by inquiring into Fryhoff’s feelings about 
not killing defendant.  The prosecutor took the defense’s 
misconduct allegation as a “personal attack” and said he would 
not be “threatened.”  The prosecutor’s comments at the sidebar 
do not qualify as “bullying,” and the court did not take them as 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
126 
such, as evidenced by its neutral explanation of the type of 
testimony that would be permitted:  “The impact upon [Fryhoff] 
will be permitted and in that context you may say to him, ‘What 
are your emotions that have resulted from the events of that 
day?’ not leading him to it and what responses he gives.”  After 
further discussion, the trial court explained that Fryhoff could 
testify that he wished he had killed defendant:  “This witness is 
going to be allowed to say that in the context of what his 
emotions are, and this is a very dramatic piece of business if 
that’s in fact his feeling, but the statement to him, ‘Do you wish 
you’d killed him?’  I won’t let that in.  [¶]  On the other hand, 
what emotions he has, why he’s feeling what he’s feeling, he’ll 
be allowed to say that . . . .”     
Regarding defendant’s last contention, he alleges without 
explanation that the prosecutor’s comment during closing 
argument that Fryhoff would “go to his grave feeling guilty 
because he didn’t kill the man who killed his brother officer,” to 
which defense counsel objected, was misconduct.  However, the 
comment 
merely 
reiterated 
Fryhoff’s 
own 
permissible 
testimony.  The prosecutor was making an appropriate comment 
on the evidence — in this case victim impact evidence 
concerning the trauma felt by Fryhoff following Aguirre’s death.  
(People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1419 [“evidence that 
close friends and relatives of the victims suffered emotional 
trauma as a result of their deaths was permissible victim impact 
testimony, and the prosecutor appropriately commented on it in 
his closing argument”].)  Accordingly, we conclude there was no 
prosecutorial misconduct concerning Fryhoff’s testimony. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
127 
2. Exclusion of Defendant’s Mother’s Testimony  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding his 
mother’s testimony that she did not want him sentenced to 
death, and further erred in its manner of admonishing the jury 
regarding the testimony, and that the prosecutor erred in his 
manner of objecting to the testimony.   We find no prejudicial 
error.    
After testifying that she loved her son “very much,” 
defendant’s mother responded negatively to the question 
whether she wanted him to receive the death penalty.  The 
prosecution objected in an explosive manner.  The trial court 
cleared the courtroom and sustained the prosecutor’s objection, 
finding the testimony impermissible opinion testimony by a 
family member on the question of penalty.  It then strongly 
admonished the jury to disregard the question and response, 
stating, “You are specifically and in the strongest possible terms 
admonished to disregard the question last asked by defense 
counsel of this witness and the reply she made to it.  [¶]  The 
law of this state is clear:  The expressed feelings of family of the 
defendant are not to be considered by you on the issue of penalty 
or punishment.  The family of Deputy Aguirre did not and could 
not express its desires and respected that rule of law.  You can 
do no less.”   
Defendant argues in reliance on Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 
581, that the testimony was admissible mitigating evidence in 
the form of character testimony by a close family member.  
“Citing [Penal Code] section 190.3 and the United States 
Constitution, we have held that testimony from somebody ‘with 
whom defendant assertedly had a significant relationship, that 
defendant deserves to live, is proper mitigating evidence as 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
128 
“indirect evidence of the defendant’s character.” ’  [Citations.]  
This evidence is admitted, not because the person’s opinion is 
itself significant, but because it provides insights into the 
defendant’s character.”  (Smith, at pp. 622–623.)   
Defense counsel, however, made no offer of proof as to the 
admissibility of the excluded testimony on this ground, instead 
submitting that it was admissible as “reverse victim impact” 
evidence (but that that was “unclear”).  (By “reverse victim 
impact” evidence, counsel appeared to be referring to the impact 
defendant’s death would have on his family.)  The specific claim 
raised on appeal is thus forfeited.  (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a); 
People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 727 [concluding that 
trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining a prosecution 
objection “when defendant made no offer of proof at trial 
explaining why the witness should have been permitted to 
answer the question”].)       
Defense counsel was incorrect, moreover, about the 
admissibility of the testimony as “reverse victim impact” 
evidence.  “ ‘[W]hat is ultimately relevant is a defendant’s 
background and character — not the distress of his or her 
family.  A defendant may offer evidence that he or she is loved 
by family members or others, and that these individuals want 
him or her to live.  But this evidence is relevant because it 
constitutes indirect evidence of the defendant’s character.  The 
jury must decide whether the defendant deserves to die, not 
whether the defendant’s family deserves to suffer the pain of 
having a family member executed.’  [Citation.]  ‘In summary, we 
[reiterate] that sympathy for a defendant’s family is not a 
matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation, but that 
family members may offer testimony of the impact of an 
execution on them if by so doing they illuminate some positive 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
129 
quality of the defendant’s background or character.’ ”  (Rices, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 88.)  With the exception of the struck 
testimony about whether defendant’s mother wanted defendant 
to receive the death penalty, she was largely permitted to testify 
about her positive regard and love for her son, consistent with 
Smith and Rices. 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed 
prejudicial misconduct in his explosive manner of objecting, and 
that defendant was further prejudiced by the trial court’s 
clearing of the courtroom following the objection, and its 
strongly worded admonishment to the jury and comment that 
Aguirre’s family had respected the rule.  
As defendant notes, the trial court concluded the 
prosecutor’s manner of objecting was “intemperate.”  Putting 
aside the questions whether the prosecutor’s actions constituted 
misconduct and the trial court’s initial jury admonishment was 
error, we conclude any error was harmless because there was no 
“ ‘reasonable . . . possibility’ ” the jury would have rendered a 
life verdict (Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 289) in the absence 
of the prosecutor’s reaction and had the trial court omitted its 
initial comment that the Aguirre family had respected the rule 
prohibiting opinions on the penalty verdict.  There was no 
reasonable possibility the jury would have sentenced defendant 
to death simply because the prosecutor objected in an 
intemperate manner or because the trial court admonished 
defendant’s mother for saying she did not want her son to be 
sentenced to death.    
The court, moreover, did repeat the instruction, this time 
more generally, explaining that the jury was not to consider the 
opinion testimony of any witness including the families of either 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
130 
party:  “At the time Mrs. Johnson testified, you were instructed 
to disregard her opinion on the question of penalty or 
punishment.  I wish to clarify that point.  The question of 
penalty or punishment is yours to decide based upon the factors 
in aggravation and mitigation upon which you are now being 
instructed.  Not included is any perception you may have of the 
feelings or desires of any witness on that question, including the 
family of Deputy Aguirre and the family of Mr. Johnson or of 
any other witness.  [¶]  To the extent that you heard evidence of 
the impact of defendant’s conduct upon others it was not offered 
and cannot be considered by you as indicating the desires of the 
witnesses as to the proper punishment.  Such evidence was 
received as a component of the ‘circumstances of the crime’ 
relative to the harm caused by the crime and the 
blameworthiness of defendant.  You are expressly instructed 
that you are not to in any way consider what you may believe or 
suspect to be a witness’ desire for punishment.”  The jury was 
also instructed that it could consider “[a]ny other circumstance 
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not 
a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect 
of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers 
as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related 
to the offense for which he is on trial.”  We generally presume 
the jury would have understood, as the court instructed, that it 
was simply not to consider any witness’s opinion regarding 
punishment, and it was reasonably likely the jury would have 
understood that it was otherwise permitted to consider in its 
decision 
defendant’s 
mother’s 
unobjected-to 
testimony 
describing her love and positive regard for her son.  (People v. 
Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 770 [“We presume the jurors 
understood and followed the instructions”].) 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
131 
3. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law 
Defendant raises numerous challenges to California’s 
death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected and his 
proffered reasons for reconsideration of our holdings are 
unpersuasive:   
“ ‘Neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires 
that the penalty phase jury make unanimous findings 
concerning the particular aggravating circumstances, find all 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors.’ ”  (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1215; see 
also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235 [Nor is the 
death penalty statute unconstitutional for not requiring 
“findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) 
evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence”].)  “ ‘The United States Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial 
guarantee [citations] do not alter these conclusions.’ ”  (Linton, 
supra, at p. 1215; see also People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 
97, 141–155.)  We have rejected constitutional challenge to the 
absence of a requirement that the jury make “explicit findings 
as to any aggravating factors.”  (People v. Famalaro (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 1, 43.)  “ ‘ “Intercase proportionality review is not 
required.” ’ ”  (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 257.)  
“ ‘The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-
eligible defendants.’ ”  (Id. at p. 255.)  “ ‘ “The sentencing factor 
of ‘circumstances of the crime’ ([Pen. Code, ]§ 190.3, factor (a)) is 
not unconstitutionally vague and does not result in the arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
132 
“ ‘ “The California death penalty scheme does not violate equal 
protection by treating capital and noncapital defendants 
differently.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 257.) 
I. Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant contends that any guilt and penalty phase 
error, if not individually prejudicial, is cumulatively so.  We 
have found or assumed several errors: (1) the admission of the 
prior crimes evidence; (2) the related prosecutorial misconduct 
claim concerning argument to the jury that defendant signed a 
parole form advising him that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence 
on possession of a firearm; (3) the related claim that the defense 
was prevented from responding to this argument; (4) the related 
claim that a deputy district attorney’s expert testimony usurped 
the trial court’s role to instruct the jury about the law; (5) the 
prosecutorial misconduct claim concerning efforts to denigrate 
defense counsel; (6) the prosecutorial misconduct claim 
concerning efforts to intimidate county counsel and a witness; 
(7) the prosecutorial misconduct claims concerning efforts to 
denigrate defense experts; and (8) the prosecutorial misconduct 
claim concerning objecting in an explosive manner and the trial 
court’s initial jury admonishment.  We found any assumed or 
actual error in each of these claims individually harmless.  
Many of the misconduct claims occurred outside the presence of 
the jury or would have minimal prejudicial effect.  Reversal is 
not warranted in light of any of these errors individually, nor is 
there any cumulation of error that merits reversal. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
133 
III. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment.   
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
S070250 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Defendant Michael Raymond Johnson was convicted of 
kidnapping and raping his wife, then shooting and killing one of 
the officers who responded to the scene, 26-year-old Ventura 
County Deputy Sheriff Peter Aguirre.  The evidence established 
that Johnson killed Aguirre, but the degree of his culpability — 
in particular, his state of mind when he shot Aguirre — was a 
contested issue at trial. 
In the immediate aftermath of this tragedy, law 
enforcement officials mishandled the investigation.  After the 
shooting, Johnson was arrested and transported to the hospital 
to receive treatment for a gunshot wound to the chest.  He was 
hooked up to an IV, with a urinary catheter inserted.  Both his 
hands were handcuffed to a hospital gurney, and he was naked 
except for a cloth on his lower body.  With Johnson in this 
condition, the police and prosecution repeatedly sought to 
question him in violation of his constitutional rights.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 38–45.)  At various points, Johnson clearly invoked 
his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney.  (Edwards 
v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 (Edwards); Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).)  Yet, for three hours, the 
interrogating officers refused to honor these invocations and 
continued their attempts to obtain a statement from Johnson.  
Ultimately, they succeeded:  Johnson made a series of 
incriminating statements to Dr. Donald S. Patterson, a 
psychiatrist sent by the district attorney’s office to interview 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
2 
Johnson.  All members of this court agree that Patterson’s 
attempt to question Johnson clearly violated “his right to have 
counsel present during custodial interrogation.”  (Edwards, at 
p. 484; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.) 
Despite the raft of constitutional violations that occurred, 
today’s decision finds no error in the admission of Johnson’s 
statements because Johnson, after first declining to speak with 
Patterson, then “initiated” the conversation that led to his 
confession.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 45.)  But when a suspect 
initiates conversation as a result of prior Edwards violations, 
his statements are no more admissible than if they were 
obtained through direct questioning in violation of Edwards.  
Here, Johnson’s initiation was the product of the multiple 
constitutional violations earlier that night, including two 
violations by Patterson himself.  Indeed, Patterson’s presence 
and conduct at the hospital were the culmination of a continuous 
series of unconstitutional law enforcement tactics intended to 
get Johnson to talk. 
The court says Johnson’s initiation was not tainted by any 
prior violation of his rights because he was not badgered or 
berated and made the decision to speak with Patterson “freely.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 57–58.)  Yet neither this court’s nor the 
United States Supreme Court’s case law has ever suggested that 
the protection of Edwards — which “set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ 
that all questioning must cease after an accused requests 
counsel” (Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98 (per curiam) 
(Smith)) — is limited to cases of overt coercion by law 
enforcement.  Indeed, once a suspect has invoked the right to 
counsel, the authorities may not make any attempt to coax him 
into speaking, be it “explicit or subtle, deliberate or 
unintentional.”  (Ibid.)  Were it otherwise, law enforcement 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
3 
could use psychological manipulation, repeated rounds of 
questioning, or other tactics to “persuade [a suspect] to 
incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for 
counsel’s assistance.”  (Ibid.)  As I explain, that is exactly what 
happened here. 
It is understandable that law enforcement officials, after 
the shooting of a fellow officer, were frustrated and impatient 
with Johnson’s refusal to talk.  But the law accords every person 
the right to remain silent and the right to consult a lawyer 
before speaking to the police.  I fear that the takeaway from 
today’s decision is that even multiple violations of these basic 
rights will not result in the exclusion of an incriminating 
statement if sufficiently clever or subtle tactics are ultimately 
used to elicit it.  Because I cannot agree that Johnson’s 
statement was properly admitted, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
“[I]f a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, 
he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that 
he has the right to remain silent” and the “right to consult with 
counsel prior to questioning.”  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 
pp. 467–468, 470.)  This safeguard is necessary because “the 
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or 
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures 
which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to 
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”  
(Id. at p. 467.) 
When an accused has “expressed his desire to deal with 
the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless [he] himself initiates further 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
4 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”  
(Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485.)  As noted, “Edwards 
set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning must cease after 
an accused requests counsel.”  (Smith, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98.)  
Allowing “the continuation of custodial interrogation after a 
momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of 
Miranda,” since “repeated rounds of questioning [would] 
undermine the will of the person being questioned.”  (Michigan 
v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 102.)  By barring law enforcement 
from continuing to question someone who has invoked the right 
to counsel, “Edwards is ‘designed to prevent police from 
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted 
Miranda rights.’ ”  (Minnick v. Mississippi (1990) 498 U.S. 146, 
150.) 
On the day of the shooting in this case, Johnson was first 
approached by Detective Robert Young at 7:00 p.m.  He declined 
to talk, invoking his right to remain silent.  Twenty minutes 
later, District Attorney Michael Bradbury approached Johnson 
to make sure he did not wish to talk.  Johnson declined to give a 
statement, saying he was “in shock.”  From there, as the court 
acknowledges (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 38–45), several Miranda 
and Edwards violations occurred:  First, 10 minutes after the 
encounter with Bradbury, Young and investigator Richard Haas 
approached Johnson and began questioning him again.  Second, 
less than an hour later, around 8:25 p.m., Young again 
approached Johnson to ask if he was willing to give a statement 
regarding what happened.  Johnson remained firm in his refusal 
to speak, saying that he was “in a state of shock and . . . kinda 
confused,” and that he wanted to speak to an attorney.  No 
counsel was provided.  Instead, Young returned half an hour 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
5 
later to berate Johnson for killing Aguirre — the third violation 
that night.  Johnson still did not give a statement. 
Undaunted, the prosecution switched gears.  Johnson had 
told Haas and Young that he had a history of mental health and 
substance abuse issues, so the investigators sent a psychiatrist, 
Patterson, to see if he could get Johnson to talk.  Sending in 
Patterson violated Johnson’s rights a fourth time.  Once 
Johnson had invoked his right to counsel to Young, he could not 
be “subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel [was] made available to him.”  (Edwards, supra, 451 
U.S. at pp. 484–485; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 39–40.)  Yet 
Patterson, an agent of the district attorney’s office, went to the 
hospital and attempted to interview Johnson in direct violation 
of Edwards.  (See People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 750–751 
[finding unconstitutional a psychiatrist’s attempt to interview 
defendant after invocation of right to counsel].) 
This tactic — sending in a medical professional as an 
agent for the prosecution — is one of the oldest in the book.  (See 
Leyra v. Denno (1954) 347 U.S. 556, 559 [after days of failing to 
obtain a confession, interrogators sent in a psychiatrist under 
the guise of providing medical treatment; the suspect 
confessed].)  And it is one that Patterson was familiar with.  (See 
People v. Walker (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 448, 451 [finding 
defendant’s self-incriminating statement invalid and reversing 
conviction where “Dr. Donald S. Patterson of Santa Barbara, a 
psychiatrist,” violated Edwards by continuing to question him 
after he asked for an attorney]; id. at pp. 452, 455.)  To obtain a 
confession, police may attempt to convince a suspect “that he 
and the interrogator share a common interest, that their 
relationship is a [mutual] rather than an adversarial one.”  (Leo, 
Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
6 
(1996) 30 L. & Soc’y Rev. 259, 266.)  A psychiatrist can assume 
this position more easily than a detective or uniformed officer — 
particularly where, as here, the suspect has a prior history of 
psychiatric treatment.  But the practice has been condemned as 
unethical by professional psychiatric organizations.  (Janofsky, 
Lies and Coercion: Why Psychiatrists Should Not Participate in 
Police and Intelligence Interrogations (2006) J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 472, 475–476 [ethical principles adopted by the 
American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law bar psychiatrists from evaluating 
suspects who have not consulted with legal counsel].) 
Today’s opinion acknowledges and denounces these four 
violations but stops short of finding a fifth.  As noted, Patterson 
should not have questioned Johnson at all because Johnson had 
told Young that he wanted an attorney.  But separate and apart 
from that violation, Patterson’s conduct after Johnson again 
invoked his right to counsel in response to Patterson’s unlawful 
attempt to question him constituted a fifth violation. 
After arriving at the hospital, Patterson observed Johnson 
for an hour before introducing himself as “a psychiatrist from 
Santa Barbara.”  By this time in the night, Johnson had resisted 
multiple efforts to get him to talk.  But Patterson took a 
different, more understated approach.  Without disclosing that 
he was a forensic psychiatrist affiliated with the district 
attorney’s office, Patterson proceeded to give Miranda warnings 
to Johnson and asked if he wanted to talk.  Johnson told 
Patterson he did not wish to give a statement and wanted to 
speak to an attorney.  He said he was “in a state of shock and 
kind of confused” and was not sure he would be providing 
“accurate” information. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
7 
At this point, Patterson was required to stop interrogating 
Johnson, but he did not.  Instead, Patterson again tried to 
convince Johnson to speak to him, saying, “I’m gonna just stay 
around here with you and let you get back from X-ray and see 
how you’re getting along and see if you still feel, feel that way 
or — [¶] . . . [¶] — cause at some point you did say that you 
would be willing to talk to me and so — [¶] . . . [¶] — And it’s up 
to you, you can still refuse it, but you did say that at one time.”  
After saying this, Patterson stuck close to Johnson’s side; he 
followed Johnson when his gurney was wheeled into X-ray, 
stayed with Johnson while his X-rays were taken, then followed 
him back to his room.  Eventually, Patterson’s strategy worked:  
Johnson turned to him and said, “Still here, huh?”  The two 
began speaking; Johnson started telling Patterson about 
psychiatrists that had previously treated him, inquiring 
whether Patterson knew them.  From there, the conversation 
expanded to include Johnson’s mental health history, his past 
experiences of delusions, and, eventually, his actions related to 
the shooting. 
Patterson’s tactics were a form of interrogation.  For 
Edwards purposes, interrogation includes “not only . . . express 
questioning, but also . . . any words or actions on the part of the 
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”  (Rhode 
Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, fn. omitted; cf. maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 37.)  Patterson’s conduct was reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response in two ways.  First, Patterson 
reminded Johnson that he had previously promised to speak to 
Patterson.  The comment suggested that by not speaking to 
Patterson, Johnson was going back on his word.  This type of 
statement has been found to constitute further questioning.  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
8 
(See People v. Harris (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 640, 648 [after 
suspect invoked right to silence, sergeant’s statement, “ ‘I 
thought you were going to come back and straighten it out,’ ” 
constituted impermissible further questioning].) 
Second, by saying he would wait around to see if Johnson 
would change his mind and then following Johnson around the 
hospital, Patterson conveyed that he was not satisfied with 
Johnson’s refusal.  Patterson explicitly told Johnson that he was 
waiting until Johnson was willing to speak.  In light of his 
statement that he was waiting for Johnson to talk, Patterson’s 
persistence in following Johnson around the hospital for 20 
minutes was reasonably likely to elicit a response from Johnson. 
“ ‘ “No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to 
proceed . . . on his own terms and as if the defendant had 
requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be 
induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his 
initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney 
or not at all.” ’ ”  (People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 
1025, quoting Smith, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 99.)  Yet even after 
Johnson invoked his right to counsel to Patterson — Johnson’s 
second such invocation that evening — Patterson’s behavior 
indicated that he was there to interview Johnson and wanted 
him to talk.  Patterson’s conduct, which ultimately led to 
Johnson’s incriminating statements, amounted to further 
interrogation in violation of Edwards. 
II. 
The court concludes that Johnson’s confession is 
admissible because after invoking his right to counsel, Johnson 
initiated a conversation with Patterson.  It is true that after 
Patterson had been standing at Johnson’s side for 20 minutes, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
9 
Johnson turned to him and said, “Still here, huh?”  But this 
statement was not a valid initiation for Edwards purposes. 
Under Edwards, an initiation occurs when a suspect’s 
“words or . . . conduct” can be “ ‘fairly said to represent a desire’ 
. . . ‘to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or 
indirectly to the investigation.’ ”  (People v. Mickey (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 612, 648; see Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–
485.)  Where, as here, there has been a prior Edwards violation, 
“a renewal of contact by the defendant” constitutes an initiation 
“only if the decision to renew contact was not a ‘response to’ or 
‘product of’ the prior unlawful interrogation.”  (Mack v. State 
(Ga. 2014) 765 S.E.2d 896, 903 (Mack).)  Prior infringements of 
a defendant’s rights, “even though unavailing at the time,” 
might have “fatally tainted the spontaneity of [a defendant’s] 
subsequent statement, making it instead the product of 
inducement, provocation or subtle coercion.”  (People v. Kinnard 
(N.Y.App.Div. 1983) 470 N.Y.S.2d 828, 846; see Collazo v. Estelle 
(9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 411, 423 (Collazo) [a defendant’s 
subsequent statement is “ ‘initiated’ ” by the police, not by the 
defendant, if it is the “delayed product” of unlawful police 
conduct].) 
To determine whether there is a causal connection 
between a prior unlawful interrogation and a defendant’s later 
renewal of contact, “the entire sequence of events leading up to 
the suspect’s renewal of contact must be considered.”  (Mack, 
supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904.)  Other state high courts and federal 
courts making this assessment have asked “whether (1) there 
was a break in the stream of events sufficient to insulate the 
statement from the effect of the prior coercion, (2) it can be 
inferred that the coercive practices had a continuing effect that 
touched the subsequent statement, (3) the passage of time, a 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
10 
change in the location of the interrogation, or a change in the 
identity of the interrogators interrupted the effect of the 
coercion, and (4) the conditions that would have precluded the 
use of a first statement had been removed.”  (Collazo, supra, 940 
F.2d at p. 421; see State v. Yoh (Vt. 2006) 910 A.2d 853, 862–863 
(Yoh) [applying these factors]; Blake v. State (Md. 2004) 849 
A.2d 410, 422 (Blake) [same]; Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904 
[similar factors].) 
Here, the Attorney General has not carried his burden to 
demonstrate that Johnson’s conduct was not a product of prior 
violations.  (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 810 [“The 
state must demonstrate that . . . ‘ . . . the accused, not the police, 
reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’ ”].)  Several 
circumstances support the conclusion that Johnson’s statement 
to Patterson — “Still here, huh?” — was the product of 
Patterson’s Edwards violations. 
First, Patterson’s interrogation tactics “had a continuing 
effect 
that 
touched 
[Johnson’s] 
subsequent 
statement.”  
(Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.)  Patterson explicitly told 
Johnson that he would stay and wait to see if Johnson would 
change his mind and provide a statement.  By remaining in 
Johnson’s presence, and especially by following Johnson as he 
was moved around the hospital, Patterson continued to convey 
that he wanted Johnson to speak to him.  This behavior was 
ongoing when Johnson purportedly initiated the conversation 
with Patterson. 
Moreover, Patterson’s conduct must be considered against 
the backdrop of “the entire sequence of events” that night.  
(Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 904.)  Patterson’s understated 
manner and “ ‘kind face’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 62) presented 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
11 
Johnson with a deliberate contrast to the impatient and even 
angry officers who had sought to question him earlier.  The court 
says this contrast is not “relevant.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 55.)  
But this shifting approach by law enforcement — “alternat[ing]” 
between “a show of some hostility” and “ ‘kindhearted[ness]’ ” — 
is a familiar psychological “ploy.”  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 
p. 452; see ibid. [describing “the ‘friendly-unfriendly’ or the 
‘Mutt and Jeff’ [good cop-bad cop] act”].)  As Miranda observed, 
it is one of the “effective tactics” discussed in “various police 
manuals and texts” that “have had rather extensive use among 
law enforcement agencies.”  (Id. at pp. 448, 449, fn. 9.)  In other 
words, Patterson’s tactic was made more effective by the police 
and prosecution’s earlier unlawful attempts to question 
Johnson.  Thus, Johnson’s purported initiation to Patterson was 
the “ ‘product of’ ” a series of law enforcement tactics that 
included “the prior unlawful interrogation[s].”  (Mack, at p. 903.)  
Additionally, when a suspect’s rights are violated on 
multiple occasions, this gives the impression that law 
enforcement “w[ill] not honor [the] right to silence or . . . right to 
counsel until [the suspect] g[ives] . . . a confession.”  (People v. 
Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 82 (Neal); see id. at p. 89 (conc. opn. 
of Kennard, J.) [repeatedly ignoring a suspect’s invocations 
“unmistakably implie[s] that [he] . . . ha[s] no right to counsel 
that [law enforcement] was bound to respect”].)  Patterson was 
not the first person to refuse to accept Johnson’s invocation of 
the right to silence or right to counsel.  Time and again, Johnson 
said he did not wish to give a statement or to speak without 
consulting a lawyer, but law enforcement ignored his 
invocations.  In light of this official behavior, a reasonable 
person in Johnson’s position may well have doubted whether he 
was actually free to remain silent or to consult a lawyer before 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
12 
speaking, despite the warnings he had been given.  None of the 
events that happened in the hospital would have dispelled that 
impression; Patterson’s conduct after Johnson again invoked 
the right to counsel only further conveyed that the authorities 
would not take no for an answer. 
Second, there was no “break in the stream of events 
sufficient to insulate the statement from the effect of the prior” 
violations.  (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.)  In some cases, 
questioning ends and the suspect is allowed to leave, with the 
interrogation resuming some days later.  (Cf. Mack, supra, 765 
S.E.2d at pp. 901–902 [no break in the stream of events even 
though initial interview ended and suspect left, because the 
interrogation resumed the following day].)  Or there may be a 
pause in the questioning during which the suspect is permitted 
to leave or make a phone call.  (See, e.g., Perrine v. State (Fla. 
Ct.App. 2005) 919 So.2d 520, 523 [suspect left the police station, 
then returned 30 minutes later and gave a statement]; cf. 
Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at pp. 421–422 [no break in the stream 
of events even though suspect called his wife during a three-
hour pause in questioning].)  Here, by contrast, the violation was 
ongoing when Johnson initiated.  Patterson explicitly told 
Johnson that he would stay and wait to see if Johnson would 
change his mind and speak to him.  This behavior continued 
until the moment Johnson purportedly initiated.  Aside from 
briefly stepping out of the room to speak to the district attorney, 
Patterson remained with Johnson until he made his statement.  
All the while, Johnson was handcuffed to a gurney with no 
choice but to remain in Patterson’s presence.  No break in the 
stream 
of 
events 
insulated 
Johnson’s 
statement 
from 
Patterson’s improper interrogation. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
13 
Third, neither “the passage of time, a change in the 
location of the interrogation, [nor] a change in the identity of the 
interrogators interrupted the effect” of Patterson’s prior 
Edwards violations.  (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.)  The 
location remained the same.  Only 20 minutes passed between 
the improper interrogation and the supposed initiation.  (See 
Blake, supra, 849 A.2d at p. 422 [delay of 28 minutes was too 
short to dispel taint from first improper interrogation].)  
Moreover, Johnson’s initial statement — “Still here, huh?” — is 
naturally understood as a response to Patterson’s statements 
and conduct indicating that he would wait to see if Johnson 
would change his mind.  (See ibid. [suspect’s initiation was a 
response to statement made by interrogating officer in the prior 
improper interrogation].)  Patterson’s response to Johnson — 
“Yeah, just, just in case you’re . . .” — further suggests he stayed 
nearby in order to get Johnson to talk. 
Fourth, there was no significant change in “the conditions 
that 
would 
have 
precluded 
the 
use 
of 
a 
first 
statement.”  (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at p. 421.)  Johnson was 
in a vulnerable state from the time Patterson began 
interrogating him until the time he supposedly initiated.  Only 
a few hours had passed since Johnson was involved in a violent 
shootout with police.  He was nearly naked, handcuffed to a 
gurney, with a gunshot wound to the chest.  The record shows 
he was in pain; in Patterson’s presence, he twice asked medical 
personnel when he could obtain pain medication.  In declining 
to give a statement, Johnson consistently told authorities that 
he was “in shock” and “confused.”  His weakened physical state, 
coupled with his disorientation, made him more susceptible to 
Patterson’s interrogation tactics, and those conditions remained 
unchanged at the time Johnson supposedly initiated a 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
14 
conversation.  (See Blake, supra, 849 A.2d at p. 422 [suspect was 
“in a cold holding cell with little clothing”]; see also Mincey v. 
Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 396–402 [statements were 
involuntary in part because suspect was in the hospital, 
wounded and in pain, and expressed confusion during 
interrogation].) 
Finally, the record contains an additional feature 
indicating that Johnson in all likelihood would not have started 
a conversation if Patterson had not improperly asked to 
interview him.  Immediately after arriving at the hospital, 
Patterson spent an hour silently observing Johnson.  It was only 
after that hour elapsed that Patterson introduced himself and 
began to interrogate Johnson in violation of Edwards.  The 
record does not reveal any attempt by Johnson to engage 
Patterson in conversation during that hour, much less speak to 
him about the events of that day.  We need not wonder whether 
Johnson would have chosen to speak if his rights had not first 
been violated.  The answer is in the record:  For the entire hour 
before Patterson sought to interrogate Johnson, Johnson 
showed no inclination to speak with Patterson.  Only after 
Patterson unlawfully asked to question Johnson and unlawfully 
refused to honor Johnson’s invocation of the right to counsel did 
Johnson initiate a conversation.  On these facts, it is hard to see 
how Johnson’s purported initiation was anything but derivative 
of Patterson’s attempt to interrogate him in violation of 
Edwards.  In sum, the trial court erred in admitting Johnson’s 
statement to Patterson. 
This error was prejudicial to Johnson’s conviction for first 
degree murder.  Unsurprisingly, Johnson’s confession was a 
focal point of the prosecutor’s case:  The prosecutor discussed 
various parts of the confession in his opening statement, played 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
15 
the entire audiotape of the redacted interview for the jury, used 
Johnson’s statements in cross-examining defense witnesses, 
and 
underscored 
how 
the 
statements 
supported 
the 
prosecution’s case during closing and rebuttal arguments.  
Moreover, the prosecution used Johnson’s confession to support 
each of its three theories of first degree murder:  premeditation, 
lying in wait, and felony murder.  To support premeditation, the 
prosecutor described the shooting of Aguirre as “a cold-blooded 
execution,” emphasizing “the cold and . . . the ice” in Johnson’s 
voice when he spoke to Patterson.  The prosecutor also used 
Johnson’s statement to cross-examine defense experts regarding 
the ballistics evidence, arguing that Johnson killed Aguirre 
“execution-style” while Aguirre lay disabled on the ground.  
Second, regarding lying in wait, the prosecutor used Johnson’s 
statement to argue that he knew the police were at the door and 
deliberately ambushed Aguirre.  Third, regarding the felony-
murder theory, the prosecutor relied heavily on the fact that 
Johnson had confessed to kidnapping his wife to establish that 
the murder occurred during the course of a felony. 
Because Johnson’s own statements were highly probative 
of his conduct and state of mind, I cannot conclude “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.”  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 
24; see Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86 [“ ‘[T]he improper 
admission of a confession is much more likely to affect the 
outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, and thus 
is much more likely to be prejudicial . . . .’ ”]; Arizona v. 
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296 [“A confession is like no 
other evidence.  Indeed, ‘the defendant’s own confession is 
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be 
admitted against him . . . .  [T]he admissions of a defendant 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
16 
come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and 
unimpeachable 
source 
of 
information 
about 
his 
past 
conduct.’ ”].)  Accordingly, the murder conviction and death 
sentence cannot stand. 
III. 
Today’s opinion declines to consider these factors, instead 
focusing on the audio recording of the interview and concluding 
that “the record . . . reflects defendant’s ‘clear willingness and 
intention to talk’ to Patterson.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 49.)  
Citing Johnson’s conduct, demeanor, and various statements, 
the court says his decision to initiate a conversation with 
Patterson was made calmly and rationally, with full 
understanding of his rights.  (Id. at pp. 52–54.) 
As an initial matter, I note that the standard the court 
applies today — i.e., there is an initiation “only if the decision to 
renew contact was not a ‘response to’ or ‘product of’ the prior 
unlawful interrogation” (Mack, supra, 765 S.E.2d at p. 903; maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 47–48) — was set forth by the Georgia 
Supreme Court in a decision that itself evaluated causation by 
looking to the four factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in 
Collazo and applied by other state high courts.  (See Mack, at 
p. 904 [“In determining the causal connection between the prior 
unlawful interrogation and the suspect’s renewal of contact, the 
entire sequence of events leading up to the suspect’s renewal of 
contact must be considered, including but not limited to the 
lapse of time between the unlawful interrogation and the 
renewed contact, any change in location or in the identity of the 
officers involved from one interview to the next, and any break 
in custody between interviews.  See, e.g., Collazo, 940 F.2d at 
421; Yoh, 910 A.2d at 862; Blake, 849 A.2d at 422 . . . .”].)  It is 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
17 
no wonder today’s opinion ignores these factors:  They uniformly 
suggest that Johnson’s decision to speak with Patterson was a 
product of prior Edwards violations.  (Ante, at pp. 10–14.) 
By focusing on the interview itself and parsing Johnson’s 
and Patterson’s statements, the court misses the overall context 
in which those statements were made.  If Johnson had made the 
statements after treatment for his injury, an appreciable 
passage of time, or a significant change in location or setting, I 
might agree that he made a free and rational decision to initiate 
a conversation with Patterson.  Even if Johnson had initiated a 
conversation during the initial hour when Patterson silently 
observed Johnson, this might be a different case.  But those are 
not the facts here.  At the time he purportedly initiated a 
conversation with Patterson, Johnson was half-naked and 
handcuffed to a gurney, late at night in an emergency room, with 
a gunshot wound to the chest.  His Miranda/Edwards rights had 
been violated five (or, we can agree, at least four) times over a 
three-hour period that evening, and Patterson had been a 
lingering presence, following Johnson around the hospital after 
he had again invoked his right to counsel.  There was no break 
in the stream of events or change in conditions that might have 
separated 
Johnson’s 
purported 
initiation 
from 
law 
enforcement’s prior unlawful attempts to question him. 
 
The court further observes that “the record does not reveal 
the sort of berating evident in other cases that might readily 
wear down a suspect [citations], but instead a handful of one- to 
two-minute conversations over a period of a few hours.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 49–50.)  And although Patterson did violate 
Edwards by approaching Johnson in the first place, the court 
says that “after [Johnson] requested counsel, Patterson asked 
no more questions and there was no discussion for about 20 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
18 
minutes.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 51.)  In the court’s telling,  “[t]he 
overall picture is not of a browbeaten suspect whose will was 
overborne by a coercive interrogator, but of a suspect eager to 
tell his story to a sympathetic listener, even though there might 
be consequences for doing so.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 62.) 
But it is inaccurate to say there was no berating in this 
case; it is undisputed that Young berated Johnson earlier that 
night.  Nor is it accurate to suggest that Patterson honored 
Johnson’s refusal to speak.  Patterson responded to Johnson’s 
invocation of counsel by urging him to speak, reminding him 
that he had previously said he would speak to Patterson, and 
then following him around the hospital.  And Patterson — who 
unlawfully approached Johnson to get him to talk and 
eventually provided crucial testimony to convict him of first 
degree murder — was anything but “a sympathetic listener.” 
The court seems to reason that Johnson’s decision to speak 
to Patterson was untainted by the prior Edwards violations 
because the violations were, essentially, not that bad.  But this 
reasoning cannot be squared with high court precedent.  Again, 
“Edwards set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning must 
cease after an accused requests counsel.”  (Smith, supra, 469 
U.S. at p. 98.)  This bright-line rule is necessary because any 
attempt to coax a defendant into speaking, regardless of how it 
is undertaken, can sway a defendant to confess when he 
otherwise would not have done so.  (Ibid.)  Coercion in 
interrogation settings “can be mental as well as physical, and 
. . . the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an 
unconstitutional inquisition.”  (Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 
361 U.S. 199, 206 (Blackburn).)  The high court has repeatedly 
stressed that neither physical violence nor overt threats are 
required to create a coercive atmosphere.  (See, e.g., Miranda, 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
19 
supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467 [discussing the “inherently compelling 
pressures” of in-custody interrogation]; Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 
481 U.S. 520, 529–530 [same]; see also Culombe v. Connecticut 
(1961) 367 U.S. 568, 602 [a confession is involuntary when 
“compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or 
helps to propel the confession”].)  Even “unintentional” behavior 
can cause a defendant to confess.  (Smith, at p. 98).   
By adopting a bright-line rule, the high court sought to 
prevent increasingly “sophisticated modes of ‘persuasion’ ” from 
being used to manipulate suspects into confessing.  (Blackburn, 
supra, 361 U.S. at p. 206.)  Accordingly, this court has never 
suggested that the protection of Edwards is limited to cases of 
overt coercion by law enforcement.  (See, e.g., People v. Davis 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 596 [recognizing principle of Smith].)  
Lower courts, too, have recognized this principle.  (See People v. 
Walker, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [finding Edwards 
violation where Patterson continued to question the defendant 
after he asked for an attorney, with no indication the defendant 
had been badgered or berated].) 
The fact that Johnson was not berated, to the extent it is 
true, has limited relevance.  The question is whether the conduct 
of law enforcement — including conduct that may have exerted 
subtle pressure — would have made a reasonable person more 
likely to initiate further communication.  As noted, other courts 
have not hinged this analysis on whether a defendant was 
badgered or berated; they have instead considered whether 
various factors, such as the passage of time or a break in the 
stream of events, “insulate[d] the [defendant’s] statement from 
the effect of the prior coercion.”  (Collazo, supra, 940 F.2d at 
p. 421; see Yoh, supra, 910 A.2d at p. 862 [conducting initiation 
analysis without discussion of berating or lack thereof]; see also 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
20 
People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 274 [defendant’s initiation 
was tainted by prior violations solely because it was a result of 
the police’s improper resumption of contact, even setting aside 
earlier badgering], disapproved on another ground in People v. 
Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.)  Of course, where a 
suspect is berated, it is more likely his initiation was tainted by 
law enforcement misconduct.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 54–55.)  
But the fact that a suspect was not berated simply eliminates 
one potential source of taint; subtle pressure can take many 
forms.  As the high court recognized in Miranda, even 
“ ‘kindness’ ” and “patience” can be deployed to induce a 
confession.  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 450–451.) 
In sum, I find it hard to believe that Johnson — in a 
clearly vulnerable state, after three hours of unlawful efforts to 
question him in the face of his repeated invocations of the right 
to silence and right to counsel — somehow made a clean break 
and initiated a new conversation that “was not a ‘response to’ or 
‘product of’ the prior unlawful interrogation.”  (Mack, supra, 765 
S.E.2d at p. 903.)  After today’s decision, what is to prevent law 
enforcement from ignoring a suspect’s clear invocations and 
engaging in repeated rounds of questioning, calling in a 
psychiatrist, or applying other subtle tactics to coax the suspect 
into “initiating” a conversation?  That is precisely the type of 
conduct that Edwards’s bright-line rule seeks to prevent, and it 
is precisely the type of conduct that happened here. 
IV. 
This case involves not one, not two, not three, but five 
Miranda/Edwards violations, all of which took place while 
Johnson was handcuffed to a hospital bed, almost naked, with a 
gunshot wound to the chest.  The court calls the law enforcement 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
21 
misconduct in this case “concerning.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 44.)  
But despite its concern, the court affirms Johnson’s murder 
conviction and death sentence. 
Today’s decision tells law enforcement officials that there 
is “nothing to lose, and a useable confession to gain, if they 
simply disregard the suspect’s requests for counsel” and 
continue to interrogate the suspect with shifting and ever 
subtler tactics.  (People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1046 
(dis. opn. of Chin, J.).)  “We would be naive to assume that law 
enforcement agencies will not take advantage of the new 
evidentiary door the majority’s holding would helpfully open for 
them.”  (Ibid.; see Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda (2008) 96 
Cal. L.Rev. 1519, 1522 [police “training materials demonstrate 
how the warning and waiver regime coheres with a 
sophisticated psychological approach to police interrogation”].)  
“Unfortunately, the court’s opinion today will encourage 
precisely the sort of subterfuge by some law enforcement 
investigators, with the ensuing violation of constitutional rights, 
that Miranda sought to end.”  (Storm, at p. 1040 (dis. opn. of 
George, C. J.).) 
The right to remain silent and the right to consult a lawyer 
when questioned by the police are among the most basic 
constitutional rights we have.  Because today’s decision makes 
these essential protections for our citizenry less secure, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
I Concur: 
LAVIN, J.* 
 
 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Johnson 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S070250 
Date Filed:  January 3, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Ventura  
Judge:  Steven Z. Perren 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Anthony J. Dain, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and 
Tiffany L. Salayer for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Dane R. 
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, 
Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Lawrence M. Daniels and 
Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Anthony J. Dain 
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch LLP 
525 B Street, Suite 2200 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 515-3241 
 
Wyatt E. Bloomfield 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6145