Title: Martinez v. Martinez
Citation: 307 P.2d 1117, 62 N.M. 215
Docket Number: 6074
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 1957

307 P.2d 1117 (1957) 62 N.M. 215 Rose Ulibarri MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Moises MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellee. No. 6074. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 27, 1957. M.L. Armijo, Jr., Las Vegas, for appellant. H.E. Blattman, Las Vegas, for appellee. LUJAN, Chief Justice. The plaintiff-appellant instituted this action in the District Court of San Miguel County seeking an absolute divorce from the defendant-appellee on the grounds of incompatibility. In her complaint she alleged that no community property had been accumulated during the marriage. By his answer the defendant "admitted that no community property had been acquired, and that the house in which they resided was a gift to him from his father; that when defendant became ill and partly paralyzed, plaintiff told defendant that she would not look after him during his illness unless he conveyed said property to her, and that as consideration for said property the plaintiff agreed to care for and look after defendant; that defendant is not capable of looking after himself as he is paralyzed on one side; that plaintiff has failed to look after and take care of the defendant as agreed and has breached the terms of her contract; and that the said deed of conveyance by defendant to plaintiff of the said property should be set aside." By her reply the plaintiff denied all the material allegations set up in defendant's answer. The cause was tried by the court, findings of fact and conclusions of law were made, and a final decree was entered awarding an absolute divorce unto the plaintiff and ordered a cancellation of the deed held by plaintiff. From that portion of the final decree providing for cancellation of the deed plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. *1118 Thus it is that the basic question for decision is whether the husband, the defendant, deeded the property involved to plaintiff, his wife, in exchange for her promise to continue to live with him and to care for and look after him the remainder of his life, incidental to his illness, as the consideration for the conveyance as claimed by the husband; or, was the conveyance in consideration of the cancellation of a loan of $250 previously made by her father to defendant, as claimed by the wife. The trial court found this issue in favor of the husband. It was not disputed that the $250 loan had been made to defendant by plaintiff's father. It was denied, however, both by plaintiff's father and the defendant, that cancellation was a consideration for the conveyance. The loan has never been paid. The court found the following facts: Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the court concludes as a matter of law: The plaintiff assigns numerous errors on account of the trial court's action in adopting defendant's findings of fact and conclusions of law which were adverse to those submitted by her. From a careful consideration of the whole record we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the above findings, and are therefore, for the purpose of review, the facts in this case. The findings of fact are a sufficient basis for the conclusions of law and resulting final decree. Further, the court's action in refusing to adopt the plaintiff's theory of the case and her requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, was not error. The rule, under such circumstances as those in the instant case, has been considered and expounded by this court in the case of Trigg v. Trigg, 37 N.M. 296, 22 P.2d 119, and what was there said is equally applicable here, and need not be repeated. We reaffirm that holding. In conclusion, it may not be out of place to suggest that any such promise as that found by the court, aside from the undue influence and coercion it produced on defendant's mind in making the deed, as reflected in the trial court's conclusion, would afford doubtful consideration for the conveyance. As a wife, the plaintiff owed defendant the services she contracted to give in exchange for the deed. See, Annotation 73 A.L.R. beginning on page 1518. Other propositions are urged and discussed but we find them without merit and will not pass upon them. The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered. SADLER, McGHEE, COMPTON and KIKER, JJ., concur.