Title: Commonwealth v. Guardado
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13315
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2023

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SJC-13315 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARLOS GUARDADO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 11, 2023. - October 26, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  License.  Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, 
Double jeopardy.  Due Process of Law, Elements of criminal 
offense.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Reconsideration, New trial, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 26, 2019. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by C. 
William Barrett, J., and the cases were tried before Paul D. 
Wilson, J. 
 
 
After review by this court, 491 Mass. 666 (2023), a motion 
for reconsideration was allowed in part. 
 
 
Elaine Fronhofer for the defendant. 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This is a companion case to Commonwealth v. 
Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (2023) (Guardado I), concerning the 
2 
 
proper remedy for the constitutional violations described 
therein.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of, 
among other things, unlawfully carrying a firearm, unlawfully 
carrying a loaded firearm, and unlawfully carrying ammunition.  
See id. at 667.  On appeal, this court determined that, in light 
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022), 
which was issued after the defendant's convictions, absence of 
licensure is an essential element of those crimes.  See Guardado 
I, supra at 690, 692.  Accordingly, we held that the trial judge 
erred when he failed to instruct the jury that, to convict the 
defendant of those crimes, they would have to find that the 
defendant lacked a firearms license.  See id. at 691.  We 
vacated the defendant's convictions and ordered that the 
Superior Court judge enter judgments of not guilty on the 
indictments, precluding the Commonwealth from retrying the 
defendant on those charges.  See id. at 694. 
 
The Commonwealth has moved for reconsideration, arguing 
that because the constitutional rule established in Bruen, 142 
S. Ct. at 2122, did not exist at the time the defendant was 
convicted, the Commonwealth should have an opportunity to retry 
the defendant.  We conclude that the Commonwealth is correct.  
Ordinarily, the prohibition against double jeopardy bars retrial 
if, as the Commonwealth concedes, there was insufficient 
3 
 
evidence at trial to establish an essential element of the 
crime.  However, the Commonwealth had no reason to introduce 
evidence of the defendant's lack of licensure under then-
prevailing law.  Because the Commonwealth is not being given a 
second bite at the proverbial apple to supply evidence that it 
was required to muster in the earlier trial, double jeopardy 
does not bar retrial. 
1.  Background.  a.  Trial.  In June 2019, a grand jury 
issued indictments charging the defendant with one count of 
illegal possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); two 
counts of illegal possession of a large capacity feeding device, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); one count of illegal possession of 
ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); and one count of illegal 
possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  The 
facts underlying those charges are recited in Guardado I, 491 
Mass. at 668-673. 
When the judge instructed the jury at trial, he did not 
include absence of a firearms license among the elements that 
the Commonwealth would have to prove for the jury to convict the 
defendant.  The defendant did not object to this omission from 
the jury instructions. 
In June 2021, the defendant was convicted on all counts 
except for one count of illegal possession of a large capacity 
4 
 
feeding device.  The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, 
and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
b.  Appeal.  The defendant argued on appeal that the judge 
erred by failing to instruct the jury that absence of licensure 
is an essential element of the crimes of unlawful possession of 
a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition.  The defendant 
relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 
2122, that the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects an individual's right to carry a firearm 
outside the home.  The defendant contended that, as a result of 
Bruen, his convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
unlawful possession of ammunition, and unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm should be reversed. 
We reviewed the defendant's argument under a standard that 
ordinarily is reserved for issues preserved at trial.  We 
reasoned that the defendant "did not have an adequate 
opportunity at the time of his trial" to object to the jury 
instructions, because the Court's decision in Bruen had not 
issued until after the defendant had been convicted.  Guardado 
I, 491 Mass. at 686.  Under the "clairvoyance exception," which 
allows a defendant to raise an unpreserved issue on appeal "when 
the constitutional theory on which the defendant has relied was 
not sufficiently developed at the time of trial," Commonwealth 
5 
 
v. Rembiszewski, 391 Mass. 123, 126 (1984), the defendant was 
entitled to review of the issue, Guardado I, supra. 
We concluded, in light of Bruen, that absence of licensure 
is an essential element of the crimes of unlawful possession of 
a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition.  See Guardado 
I, 491 Mass. at 690.  Accordingly, we held that the judge erred 
by omitting absence of licensure from his instructions on those 
crimes to the jury.  See id. at 691.  We vacated the defendant's 
convictions on the indictments charging unlawful possession of a 
firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm,1 and we remanded the matter to 
the Superior Court for entry of judgments of not guilty on those 
indictments.  See id. at 694. 
c.  Motion to reconsider.  In May 2023, the Commonwealth 
moved for reconsideration of the remedy this court issued in 
Guardado I, 491 Mass. at 694.  We granted the Commonwealth's 
motion for reconsideration in part and asked the parties to file 
briefs on the following issue:  "[W]hether the court should 
continue to hold that the remedy in [Guardado I] for an 
erroneous jury instruction relieving the Commonwealth of the 
burden of proving absence of firearm[s] licensure is vacatur of 
 
1 A defendant may not be convicted of unlawful possession of 
a loaded firearm if he or she is not convicted also of unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  See Commonwealth v. Tate, 490 Mass. 
501, 520 (2022). 
6 
 
the conviction and remand for entry of a judgment of 
acquittal. . . .  Or, should the court consider the jury 
instruction, which conformed to controlling precedent at the 
time, to be trial error that results in vacatur of the 
conviction and remand for a new trial."2 
 
2.  Discussion.  Based on their differing applications of 
the double jeopardy principle, the parties disagree as to what 
the appropriate remedy should be for the erroneous jury 
instructions.  The Commonwealth argues that we erred by ordering 
the Superior Court to enter judgments of not guilty on the 
defendant's convictions.  According to the Commonwealth, because 
the evidence it presented at trial was insufficient only because 
of a postconviction change in the law, double jeopardy does not 
bar retrial.  The defendant contends that, because the 
Commonwealth's evidence at trial was not sufficient according to 
 
2 The Commonwealth raised in its motion additional issues, 
including whether to extend the license requirement to the crime 
of unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device.  See 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  We grant the  Commonwealth's motion to 
reconsider that issue, insofar as the Commonwealth requests that 
we not address whether absence of a license is an essential 
element of that offense.  In the exercise of our discretion, we 
have decided to avoid answering an unpreserved constitutional 
claim.  We leave for another day, with the benefit of full 
briefing and argument, the question whether large capacity 
feeding devices are "arms" protected by the Second Amendment 
following Bruen.  See, e.g., Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode 
Island,  646 F. Supp. 3d 368, 385-388 (D.R.I. 2022). 
7 
 
the state of the law at the time of his appeal, double jeopardy 
requires the entry of judgments of acquittal. 
 
"At its core, the prohibition against double jeopardy, 
which flows from the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as well as the statutory and common law of 
Massachusetts, provides that 'a person cannot twice be put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.'"  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 
Mass. 491, 506 (2020), quoting Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 
Mass. 529, 534 (2012).  This prohibition protects defendants 
against the possibility that "prosecutors could treat trials as 
dress rehearsals until they secure the convictions they seek."  
Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2149 (2018).  It also 
ensures that defendants will not receive "multiple punishments" 
for the same offense.  United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 
273 (1996).  To prevent such injustices, double jeopardy 
protections forbid the Commonwealth from prosecuting the 
defendant for the same offense after a final verdict has been 
entered.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Mass. 595, 603 (2015), 
quoting Marshall, supra. 
 
The prohibition against double jeopardy generally precludes 
retrial if the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence at 
the original trial to support the defendant's conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 453 (2012).  See also 
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995), 
8 
 
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1035 (1998), citing Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1, 10 (1978) ("by reversing a conviction for 
insufficient evidence, the reviewing court is actually making a 
determination that the trial court erred in failing to direct a 
verdict of acquittal on the evidence; accordingly, the defendant 
should be treated as though he or she were acquitted").  
Otherwise, the Commonwealth would be able to take advantage of a 
trial error by presenting a stronger case the second time 
around, thereby "getting a second bite at the proverbial apple" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Claudio, 484 
Mass. 203, 208 (2020).  If, given the evidence presented at 
trial, no "trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," the Commonwealth does 
not get to try again (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brown, 
479 Mass. 600, 608, 611 (2018). 
The double jeopardy principle, however, "does not prevent 
the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting 
his conviction set aside . . . because of some error in the 
proceedings leading to conviction."  United States v. Acosta-
Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 
U.S. 1183 (2013), quoting Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38–39 
(1988).  See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 45 
(1992), S.C., 427 Mass. 414 (1998), 458 Mass. 657 (2011), and 
475 Mass. 429 (2016) (double jeopardy did not bar retrial where 
9 
 
conviction was vacated due to erroneous admission of deposition 
testimony).  Where a guilty verdict is reversed because of "an 
error in the jury instructions," the proper remedy is to remand 
for "a new trial."  Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 349 
(2016).  This holds true even when the error in the jury 
instructions resulted in a misallocation in the burden of proof.  
See Commonwealth v. Skinner, 408 Mass. 88, 94-95, 99 (1990) 
(remand for new trial because jury instructions relieved 
"government of its burden of proof on an element of a crime").  
See also United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) 
("Generally, if an erroneous jury instruction is not harmless 
error, we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial").  
In such circumstances, a retrial does not impose on the 
defendant any of the evils from which the prohibition against 
double jeopardy is intended to protect.  See Marshall, 463 Mass. 
at 534. 
Here, the Commonwealth concedes that it did not present 
evidence at trial to indicate that the defendant lacked a 
firearms license.  The Commonwealth therefore did not introduce 
sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt an 
essential element of the crimes at issue.  See Guardado I, 491 
Mass. at 690, 692 ("absence of a license is an essential element 
of the offense[s] of unlawful possession of a firearm" and 
"unlawful possession of ammunition").  Ordinarily, this would 
10 
 
establish that the "[d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause forbids a 
second trial."  See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 211, 221 
(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass. 179, 190 
(1982). 
 
We conclude, however, that this case does not present the 
same concerns.  At the time of the defendant's trial, this 
court's precedent clearly had established that absence of 
licensure was not an essential element of any of the crimes with 
which the defendant was charged.  See Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 
Mass. 162, 174 (2016).  Rather, proper licensure explicitly was 
recognized to be an affirmative defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 804-806 (2012).  Thus, given that the 
defendant did not "provide notice of intent to raise the defense 
of license" prior to trial, the Commonwealth proceeded at trial 
under the impression, created by this court's decisions, that a 
conviction did not depend on whether the defendant possessed a 
firearms license.  Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 Mass. 762, 767 
(2013).  It only was after the defendant's trial that the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Bruen, which in turn led 
this court to overturn its previous holdings and rule that 
absence of licensure is an essential element of the crimes.  See 
Guardado I, 491 Mass. at 690. 
 
Because the evidence against the defendant was insufficient 
only when viewed through the lens of a legal development that 
11 
 
occurred after trial, the Commonwealth has not "been given [a] 
fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble" at 
trial.  Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.  Further, because absence of 
licensure was not recognized as an essential element at the time 
of trial, the resulting verdict did not resolve this element of 
the offenses charged.  See Commonwealth v. Hebb, 477 Mass. 409, 
413 (2017), quoting Brown, 470 Mass. at 603-604 ("where a 
verdict does not specifically resolve all the elements of the 
offense charged, it is defective . . . and thus does not trigger 
double jeopardy protections").  A new trial is warranted so that 
the Commonwealth may have "one complete opportunity to convict" 
the defendant under the new law.  Hebb, supra, quoting Yeager v. 
United States, 557 U.S. 110, 118 (2009).  See United States v. 
Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 670 (6th Cir. 2015) ("the government 
would not be seeking a second bite at the apple but a first bite 
under the right legal test"). 
 
Here, because the Commonwealth reasonably could not have 
known we would reverse our holdings in Gouse, 461 Mass. at 807-
808; Humphries, 465 Mass. at 767; and Allen, 474 Mass. at 174, a 
judgment of acquittal is not required by principles of double 
jeopardy.  See Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. 821, 831-832 
(2012) (retrial, rather than acquittal, was appropriate remedy 
where trial judge erroneously denied defendants their 
opportunity to raise affirmative defense, because otherwise 
12 
 
Commonwealth would not have "opportunity to offer evidence in 
rebuttal").  Without the ability to gaze into the future of this 
court's and the Supreme Court's rulings, and without any notice 
from the defendant of an intent to raise the issue of licensure, 
the Commonwealth simply had no reason to believe that any 
evidence concerning licensure would be necessary.  Were the 
judgments of acquittal to stand, we would be denying the 
Commonwealth a "first opportunity to prove what it did not need 
to prove before but needs to prove now."  United States v. 
Harrington, 997 F.3d 812, 818 (8th Cir. 2021). 
 
Neither Commonwealth v. Munoz, 384 Mass. 503 (1981), nor 
Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 Mass. 341 (2016), compels a different 
result.  In Munoz, supra at 503, the defendant was convicted of 
operating an uninsured motor vehicle.  The trial judge, over the 
defendant's objection and consistent with the model jury 
instructions at the time, had instructed the jury that they 
could presume the defendant's vehicle was uninsured unless the 
defendant proved otherwise.  See id. at 505, 510.  This court 
held that the judge erroneously relieved the Commonwealth of its 
evidentiary burden, as "insurance [was] an element of the crime 
charged."  See id. at 507.  Because the Commonwealth had not 
presented evidence that the defendant's vehicle was uninsured, 
we reversed the defendant's conviction and entered judgment for 
the defendant.  See id. at 509-510. 
13 
 
According to the defendant, Munoz establishes that retrial 
is barred on an insufficient showing of evidence on an essential 
element of the offense, even if that element was established 
only through precedent after trial.  The defendant observes that 
this court entered judgment for the defendant in Munoz despite 
the Commonwealth's reliance during trial on the then-prevailing 
model jury instructions, which indicated that lack of insurance 
was not an essential element of the crime.  See id. 
We are not convinced that Munoz is on point.  Munoz did not 
involve the creation of a new rule that was then applied to the 
defendant's case.  Contrast Guardado I, 491 Mass. at 690 ("In 
the wake of Bruen, this court's reasoning in [previous 
decisions] is no longer valid").  In this case, a "new" rule 
"dictated by [a] decision" of the Supreme Court displaced the 
established and contrary law under the decisions of this court 
while the defendant's case was pending on direct review.  Id. at 
694.  By contrast, in Munoz, 384 Mass. at 507-508, the 
defendant's trial involved an error that was contrary to the 
state of the law in the Commonwealth at the time of the 
defendant's trial.  On review, this court clarified the state of 
the law given existing precedent.  See id.  See also Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 663-
664 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (distinguishing creation 
of "new constitutional rule" from "merely apply[ing] an 
14 
 
established constitutional standard to a novel set of facts").  
Moreover, in Munoz, supra at 505, the Commonwealth's error at 
trial was due not to a reliance on a directly contradictory line 
of decisions from this court, but to a reliance on model jury 
instructions, which do not have the same force of law as this 
court's decisions, and the defendant challenged the erroneous 
instructions.  The Commonwealth in Munoz therefore was required 
to prove at the time of trial that the defendant's vehicle was 
uninsured, and so was not owed a "second opportunity to prove 
what it should have proved earlier."  United States v. Weems, 49 
F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 
In Beal, 474 Mass. at 342, 345, the defendant received a 
sentencing enhancement under the Massachusetts armed career 
criminal act, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (ACCA), after the Commonwealth 
presented evidence of the defendant's certified convictions of 
assault and battery and assault and battery against a public 
official.  We held, based on an intervening Supreme Court 
decision, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
to prove that the defendant had committed a "violent crime" and 
that, as a result, double jeopardy precluded a retrial.  See id. 
at 353-354. 
Beal is not analogous.  First, at the time the Commonwealth 
tried the defendant in Beal, the law was unsettled as to whether 
a certified conviction of assault and battery or assault and 
15 
 
battery against a public official was sufficient under the ACCA, 
and, in fact, there was reason to suggest that it was not.  See 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 135, 140-142 (2010) 
(battery offense for "[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]" 
another did not qualify as violent crime under analogous Federal 
ACCA).  See also United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 257 
(1st Cir. 2011), citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
26 (2005) (conviction may serve as violent crime under Federal 
ACCA only if each possible type of offense of conviction 
qualifies as violent crime).  Second, the defendant in Beal 
objected before trial to the use of certified copies of his 
convictions to prove that he had committed a categorically 
"violent crime," and yet the Commonwealth declined to offer 
additional proof despite having the opportunity to do so.  Beal, 
474 Mass. at 354 n.12.3 
 
Other jurisdictions have held that "a defendant cannot make 
out a sufficiency challenge as to offense elements that the 
government had no requirement to prove at trial under then-
 
3 We recognize that we noted in Beal, 474 Mass. at 354 n.12, 
that remand was inappropriate because "the dispositive issue 
. . . is sufficiency of the evidence; even if the judge had 
instructed the jury properly, the result on appeal would be no 
different because the evidence the Commonwealth introduced was 
insufficient."  To the extent that Beal suggests that retrial is 
barred on double jeopardy grounds due to insufficient evidence, 
no matter the state of clearly established precedent, it is no 
longer valid precedent. 
16 
 
prevailing law."  United States v. Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083, 1090-
1091 (D.C. Cir. 2022).  See Harrington, 997 F.3d at 817-818; 
United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 176 (3d Cir. 2020), 
judgment vacated on other grounds, 142 S. Ct. 56 (2021); 
Houston, 792 F.3d at 669-670; United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 
1208, 1224-1225 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. United 
States v. McWane, Inc., 555 U.S. 1045 (2008); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 93 F.3d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1996); Weems, 49 F.3d at 
531; People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶¶ 28-31 (2023).  But 
see United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("we will remand for a new trial only if the jury could have 
returned a guilty verdict if properly instructed"). 
For example, in United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 
525-526 (4th Cir. 2003), the defendant was convicted of 
possessing child pornography under the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), which defined child pornography 
to include any image that "appears to be [depicting] a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."  The jury at the 
defendant's trial was instructed accordingly.  See id. at 530.  
Following the defendant's trial, the Supreme Court held that the 
CPPA was "overbroad and unconstitutional" because its 
prohibition of "virtual images" reached beyond what is 
permissible under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 
17 
 
234, 248-249, 251, 258 (2002).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Free Speech Coalition, the jury instructions 
erroneously had "permitted the jury to convict [the defendant] 
on . . . [an] unconstitutional basis."  Ellyson, supra at 531.  
Importantly, the Court of Appeals also held that the defendant 
could be retried, regardless of whether the evidence at trial 
was insufficient to establish that the images in the defendant's 
possession were real.  See id. at 532.  The court reasoned that 
there were no "double jeopardy concerns," because "[a]ny 
insufficiency in proof was caused by the subsequent change in 
the law under Free Speech Coalition, not the government's 
failure to muster evidence."  Id. at 533.  See United States v. 
Kim, 65 F.3d 123, 126-127 (9th Cir. 1995) (appellate court 
should not "examine the sufficiency of evidence of an element 
that the [g]overnment was not required to prove under the law 
. . . at the time of trial because the [g]overnment had no 
reason to introduce such evidence in the first place"). 
The defendant cites decisions from several United States 
Courts of Appeals to support his proposition that acquittal is 
the proper remedy.  See United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 733, 
742-743 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Mount, 161 F.3d 675, 
678 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hightower, 96 F.3d 211, 
215 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564, 1567-
18 
 
1568 (10th Cir. 1996).  However, a closer examination of these 
cases reveals that they are inapposite. 
First, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Bruno, 661 F.3d at 743 & n.2, favorably cited much of the same 
Federal precedent that we cite supra but held that the "sound 
reasons" for remand did not apply where "the government conceded 
that it would present no new evidence if [the defendant] were 
retried."  As such, a bar on retrial did not "deny the 
government an opportunity to present its evidence."  Id. at 743.  
By contrast, here, the Commonwealth makes no such concession; to 
the contrary, it seeks the opportunity to present evidence of 
lack of licensure. 
Second, the remaining three cases that the defendant cites 
-- that is, Mount, 161 F.3d 675; Hightower, 96 F.3d 211; and 
Smith, 82 F.3d 1564 -- all can be distinguished on the same 
grounds.  In each case, the government argued at trial that it 
had presented sufficient evidence to convict the defendant 
either of using or carrying a firearm in connection with drug 
trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  See Mount, supra at 678; 
Hightower, supra at 215; Smith, supra at 1566.  While the 
defendants' cases were on appeal, the Supreme Court clarified 
the "use" prong of the statute.  See Bailey v. United States, 
516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995), superseded by statute as stated in 
Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 134 (2016).  Importantly, 
19 
 
because the juries in these cases already had been instructed 
properly on the alternative "carry" prong, and because there was 
insufficient evidence to convict the defendants under this 
alternative theory, the proper remedy was vacating the 
defendants' convictions rather than remanding for a new trial.  
Mount, supra at 680-681.  Hightower, supra.  Smith, supra at 
1568. 
The defendant concedes that there are some circumstances in 
which a retrial may be the appropriate remedy for a posttrial 
legal development that causes the evidence at trial to be 
insufficient.  In particular, where the posttrial legal 
development is not "constitutionally required," such that the 
court has discretion to apply the legal development only 
prospectively, the defendant allows that the double jeopardy 
principle does not preclude a retrial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ashford, 486 Mass. 450, 453 (2020) ("Where the statutory 
interpretation at issue is not constitutionally required, . . . 
we retain some discretion to apply the rule only 
prospectively").  The defendant argues, though, that acquittal 
is the proper remedy when the legal development is a new 
constitutional rule that must be applied to cases pending on 
direct review.  See Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 
n.10 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005), citing Griffith 
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) ("newly declared 
20 
 
constitutional rule must be applied to cases pending on direct 
review").  Because the Supreme Court's decision in Bruen, 142 
S. Ct. at 2122, established a new constitutional rule, the 
defendant contends, a retrial here would violate the double 
jeopardy principle. 
We are not persuaded.  The defendant's analysis appears to 
conflate, on the one hand, whether this court was 
constitutionally required to apply to his case the new rule in 
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122, and, on the other hand, what the 
proper remedy is for a violation of the constitutional rule.  
Because Bruen was decided after the defendant's trial but while 
the case was pending on appeal, he is entitled to the benefit of 
the new rule; that is, the right to have the Commonwealth prove 
that he lacked a license.  The cited propositions from Ashford 
and Dagley do not assert that retrial is inappropriate in any 
instance where a new constitutional rule is applied to a case 
pending on direct review.  See Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 533 (proper 
remedy for new rule mandated by Supreme Court's intervening 
interpretation of First Amendment was retrial). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude 
that this court erred when it remanded to the Superior Court for 
entry of judgments of not guilty on the indictments charging 
unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of 
ammunition, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.  
21 
 
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of our prior order and 
remand to the Superior Court for a new trial on those 
indictments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.