Title: Street v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 466, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEONARDO B. STREET, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 466, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID Nos. 0711018702 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
0805001296 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 17, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
May 25, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of May 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm and the Superior Court record, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Leonardo B. Street, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s July 17, 2009 denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  The appellee, 
State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of Street’s opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
In November 2007, Street was arrested and charged with Possession 
with Intent to Deliver Marijuana, Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled 
 
2 
Substances, Resisting Arrest, Driving While License Suspended or Revoked, and 
two counts of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  In May 2008, Street was arrested 
and charged with thirteen more counts of drug- and traffic-related charges, 
including Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, and 
Possession of Cocaine within 1000 Feet of a School. 
(3) 
On May 8, 2008, Street entered into a plea agreement whereby he 
agreed to plead guilty to one count each of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with 
Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Maintaining a Vehicle, and Resisting Arrest.  The State 
agreed that it would not seek to have Street declared a habitual offender, and that it 
would enter a nolle prosequi on all remaining charges from both cases.  
Immediately thereafter, as contemplated by the plea agreement, the Superior Court 
sentenced Street to forty years at Level V, suspended after twenty-five years (five 
years mandatory) and successful completion of the Greentree Program, for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  Street did not appeal. 
(4) 
On May 13, 2009, Street filed a timely motion for postconviction 
relief.  Street alleged that his defense counsel was ineffective because: 
counsel failed to explain the plea agreement correctly; 
counsel failed to file motions on behalf of [Street]; 
counsel failed to prepare for a trial; low fees resulted in 
counsel’s 
unprofessional 
conduct; 
counsel’s 
mis- 
representation of material facts put pressure on [Street] to 
take a plea; counsel advised [Street] if guilty plea was not 
taken [Street] would receive a mandatory life sentence; 
 
3 
[and] counsel advised [Street] to plead guilty to the two 
highest offenses. 
 
 
(5) 
By order dated July 17, 2009, the Superior Court denied Street’s 
postconviction motion on the basis that Street’s ineffective counsel allegations 
were conclusory and did not allege or demonstrate prejudice.  The Superior Court 
also found that Street was not coerced into pleading guilty, and that his guilty plea 
was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 
 
(6) 
On appeal, Street expands upon his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and coerced guilty plea.  Nonetheless, having reviewed the Superior Court 
record, including the transcript of Street’s guilty plea proceeding, the Court has 
determined that there is no support in the record for Street’s allegations that his 
defense counsel coerced him into pleading guilty or was otherwise ineffective.  
The Court concludes that the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief 
should be affirmed on the basis of the court’s well-reasoned decision of July 17, 
2009.       
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice