Title: State v. Lucian Agnello
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003406-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3406-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Lucian Agnello,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  218 Wis. 2d 829, 581 N.W.2d 593 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998), Unpublished   
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 20, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 15, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Diane S. Sykes 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Crooks, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Steinmetz & Wilcox, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Jerome F. Buting, Pamela Moorshead and Buting & 
Williams, S.C., Brookfield and oral argument by Jerome F. Buting. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3406-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lucian Agnello,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Lucian 
Agnello, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals1 that affirmed the circuit court's finding that he 
voluntarily confessed to murdering his foster father.  Agnello 
contends that the circuit court erroneously allowed the State to 
question him about the truthfulness of his confession at the 
Goodchild2 hearing and that this error tainted the circuit 
court's finding that his confession was voluntarily given.  
Because we conclude that Agnello preserved this issue for 
appeal, that the prosecutor improperly questioned Agnello about 
                     
1 State v. Agnello, No. 96-3406-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998) (affirming judgment of Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, Diane S. Sykes, Judge). 
2 State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965).  
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
2 
the truthfulness of his confession, and that the circuit court 
based its finding in part on Agnello's responses to the improper 
questions, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause 
to the circuit court.  Additionally, we determine that on remand 
the 
State 
will 
need 
to 
prove 
Agnello's 
confession 
was 
voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence. 
¶2 
In February of 1996, the Milwaukee Police Department 
arrested Agnello in connection with the murder of his foster 
father, Theodore Agnello.  Between midnight and 1:00 a.m., the 
police transported Agnello to the downtown station and placed 
him in a standard interrogation room where he remained alone and 
handcuffed to a wall until the police began interrogating him at 
6:00 a.m.3  From approximately 6:00 a.m. to 8:20 a.m., two 
detectives questioned him about his foster father's death.  
After over a 90-minute break, two other detectives began 
interrogating him at 10:15 a.m.  This session continued, with 
significant breaks interspersed, until 3:20 p.m.   
¶3 
Whenever the police left Agnello alone in the room he 
was handcuffed to a wall; during his interrogation he was not 
handcuffed.  From the time he was placed in the room until he 
confessed, the police allowed Agnello to use the bathroom once 
                     
3 In his testimony at the Goodchild hearing, Agnello 
testified that the police began their interrogation of him 
shortly after being placed in the interrogation room.  Although 
the 
circuit 
court 
made 
no 
specific 
finding 
that 
the 
interrogation began at 6:00 a.m., it generally found the police 
detective's version of the events more compelling, which 
included testimony that the interrogation did not begin until 
6:00 a.m. 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
3 
or twice and also fed him a hamburger.  Agnello's ability to 
sleep was hampered both by the periods of interrogation and by 
being handcuffed to the wall.  At 3:20 p.m. Agnello confessed to 
murdering his foster father and signed a written confession. 
¶4 
After being charged with first degree intentional 
homicide4 and party to a crime,5 Agnello filed a motion to 
suppress his confession on two grounds.  First, Agnello alleged 
that his confession was obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because the police did not honor 
his requests for an attorney.  Second, Agnello alleged that his 
confession was not freely and voluntarily given because the 
police coerced him into confessing.  The circuit court then held 
a Miranda-Goodchild hearing at which Agnello testified.  On 
cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Q. Sir, you signed the statement at the 
end and you wrote down the words, "this is true"; is 
that correct? 
 
A. I wrote down the words? 
 
Q. Answer my question. Did you write it down? 
 
A. Yes, I was told to. 
 
Q. And you wrote down, "this is true," and you signed 
it; is that right? 
 
A. Yes, I was told to. 
 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1995-96).  Unless otherwise noted, 
all further references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 
1995-96 version. 
5 Wis. Stat. § 939.05. 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
4 
Q. And you did that because what is in the statement 
is true; is that correct? 
 
A. No. Because I was extremely tired and scared. 
 
 . . .  
 
Q. You told them that the shotgun was in Mr. Stream's 
attic; is that correct? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. And you told them that you and Mr. Stream had 
planned on this killing; is that correct? 
 
A. I don't quite remember that. 
 
Q. You could have told them that?  You don't remember 
telling them that? 
 
A. I don't remember that. 
 
Q. But you and Mr. Stream had planned this killing; is 
that correct? 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I object, Your Honor. I don't think 
that is relative6 [sic] to the purposes of this 
hearing. 
 
THE COURT:  This goes to his credibility.  Answer the 
question. 
The remainder of Agnello's cross-examination consisted of the 
prosecutor attempting to ascertain whether or not statements in 
his confession were true and Agnello evasively answering those 
questions. 
¶5 
At the close of the Miranda-Goodchild hearing the 
circuit court concluded that the police officers' testimony of 
                     
6 Both parties agree that the defense counsel was talking 
about "relevance."  It is unknown whether the defense attorney 
or the court reporter committed the error.  In any event, we 
conclude that we are dealing with a relevancy objection. 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
5 
the events was more credible than that of Agnello, in part 
because of what the court described as Agnello's "selective 
memory."  The court then concluded that the police did not run 
afoul of Miranda because Agnello did not request an attorney.7  
Finally, the court concluded that the police did not engage in 
any coercive tactics and that Agnello's confession was a 
"voluntary product of his free will."  Agnello then pled guilty 
and was sentenced to life in prison. 
¶6 
On appeal, Agnello argued that the circuit court erred 
under Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), and Jackson v. 
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), by allowing the prosecutor to 
question Agnello about the truthfulness of his confession.  The 
court of appeals concluded that Agnello waived his right to 
appeal this issue because his relevancy objection did not 
adequately apprise the circuit court of the basis of his 
objection.  In order to have a valid objection, the court of 
appeals 
reasoned 
that 
Agnello 
needed 
to 
reference 
more 
specifically the Supreme Court's rulings that the truthfulness 
of a confession may not be considered in a voluntariness 
determination.  The court of appeals determined that as it was 
stated, Agnello's objection did not adequately inform the 
circuit court of his objection and as a result did not give the 
circuit court the opportunity to assess and correct any 
constitutional error.  
                     
7 This determination is not challenged on appeal.  
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
6 
¶7 
Agnello also argued that the circuit court erred in 
concluding that his confession was voluntary.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the State's burden is a preponderance of 
the evidence and that Agnello argued to the circuit court only 
that his confession was involuntary because he was deprived of 
sleep.  Based upon a review of the circuit court's findings of 
fact, the court of appeals determined that Agnello's confession 
was voluntary. 
¶8 
On petition to this court Agnello challenges nearly 
every aspect of the court of appeals' ruling.  Specifically, he 
argues that his relevancy objection during cross-examination 
adequately preserved the issue for appeal.  Agnello contends 
that the circuit court committed constitutional error under 
Rogers and Jackson by allowing the prosecutor to question him 
about the truthfulness of his confession.  He also argues that, 
contrary to the court of appeals' decision, the State must prove 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
a 
defendant 
voluntarily 
confessed.8   
¶9 
Whether an objection adequately preserves an issue for 
appeal requires a court to apply a set of facts to a legal 
                     
8 Agnello further contends that his arguments to the circuit 
court did not rely exclusively on a lack of sleep but also 
encompassed the duration of the interrogation, the fact that he 
was handcuffed, the fact that the police used "relay teams," and 
the fact that he was deprived of food.  Ultimately, Agnello 
argues that his confession was involuntarily given.  Because we 
conclude that the circuit court erred both by permitting the 
prosecutor to probe the truthfulness of Agnello's confession and 
by relying on that error in its findings, we do not address 
these other issues. 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
7 
standard. 
 
This 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently of the legal determinations rendered by the court 
of appeals and circuit court but benefiting from their analyses. 
 In re Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998). 
  
¶10 The necessity of lodging an adequate objection to 
preserve an issue for appeal cannot be overstated.  We have 
written on numerous occasions that in order to maintain an 
objection on appeal, the objector must articulate the specific 
grounds for the objection unless its basis is obvious from its 
context.  Id.; State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 
501 (1997); State v. Marks, 194 Wis. 2d 79, 88, 533 N.W.2d 730 
(1995).  This rule exists in large part so that both parties and 
courts have notice of the disputed issues as well as a fair 
opportunity to prepare and address them in a way that most 
efficiently uses judicial resources.  Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 
405; Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 605. 
¶11 The State maintains that Agnello's relevancy objection 
was insufficient to alert the circuit court of the "specific 
ground for the objection."  See Daniel Blinka, 7 Wisconsin 
Practice:  Evidence, §103, p. 8 (1991).  It contends that the 
legal theory of relevancy advanced by Agnello was neither stated 
with sufficient specificity nor obvious and commonplace so as to 
be immediately recognized by the court.  The State contends in 
its brief that Agnello should have alerted the circuit court to 
the existence of Rogers and Jackson, although at oral argument 
it backed away slightly from this chapter and verse recitation 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
8 
requirement.  Regardless of which degree of specificity it would 
impose on Agnello, the State argues that had Agnello alerted the 
court to his concerns, both the State and the court could have 
reacted in such manner to insure that any error was eliminated 
and appellate review on this issue would have been unnecessary. 
  
¶12 There is no question that Agnello's objection was not 
as specific as it could have been.  The addition of a short 
phrase, such as "the truthfulness of a confession has no bearing 
on voluntariness," would have gone a long way to eliminate any 
confusion over the nature of the objection.  However, we have 
never required an objection to be as specific as possible to be 
effective.  All that we have required of a party is to object in 
such a way that the objection's words or context alert the court 
of its basis.  Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 405.  In this 
instance, the context of the objection and the status of the law 
in this area gravitate toward a conclusion that Agnello has 
preserved this issue for appeal. 
¶13 It is well settled constitutional law that the 
truthfulness of a confession can play no role in determining 
whether that confession was voluntarily given.  Jackson, 378 
U.S. at 376-77; Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41; State v. Hoyt, 21 
Wis. 2d 284, 293-94, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964).  This is the case 
not because coerced confessions carry an insufficient indicia of 
reliability; they may in some cases be quite reliable.  See 3 
Wigmore on Evidence § 822 (1970) (discussing commentators).  
Rather the truthfulness of a coerced confession cannot play a 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
9 
part in a voluntariness determination because such confessions, 
and the methods used to obtain them, offend the underpinnings of 
the criminal law.  Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972); 
Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41.  As a result, the State ought not be 
allowed to use illegal means to combat illegal ends.  Rogers, 
365 U.S. at 540-41. 
¶14 Rogers and Jackson have been the law for nearly 40 
years 
and 
are 
deeply 
embedded 
into 
the 
substantive 
and 
procedural criminal law of this state.  See, e.g., LaClaw v. 
State, 41 Wis. 2d 177, 184-87, 163 N.W.2d 147 (1968); State ex 
rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 30 Wis. 2d 39, 51-52, 139 N.W.2d 667 
(1966); Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 531, 139 N.W.2d 41 
(1966); Goodchild, 27 Wis. 2d at 258-65; State v. Drogsvold, 104 
Wis. 2d 247, 271-72, 311 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1981).  In 
addition to the lengthy calm in this area of the law, Goodchild 
hearings are not uncommon occurrences in the circuit courts of 
this state.  Thus, the Rogers rule is both firmly established 
and commonly applied in the circuit courts of this state.   
¶15 While judges are by no means expected to have at the 
fore of their minds the dispositive principles of every legal 
issue, the parties can reasonably expect the judge to appreciate 
those issues that are commonplace without substantial assistance 
by the litigants.  Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 471, 93 N.W.2d 
455 (1958), overruled on other grounds, Butzow v. Wausau 
Memorial Hospital, 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971); see 
also Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 758-59, 193 N.W.2d 868 
(1972).  That expectation reasonably increases when, as is the 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
10
case with Goodchild hearings, the inquiry is limited in scope 
and the possible issues are finite in number.  Goodchild, 27 
Wis. 2d at 265 ("At this hearing the defendant may take the 
stand and testify for the limited purpose of making a record of 
his version of the facts and circumstances under which the 
confession was obtained."); State v. Schultz, 148 Wis. 2d 370, 
390, 435 N.W.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1988) (Sundby, J., dissenting), 
aff'd 152 Wis. 2d 408, 448 N.W.2d 424 (1989). 
¶16 Finally, we cannot fail to mention that the language 
of Agnello's objection comes directly from the United States 
Supreme Court:  "The truth or falsity of the statement is not 
relevant to the voluntariness inquiry . . . "  Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 547 n.6 (1986); see also Twomey, 404 U.S. at 484 
n.12 
("Whether 
[the 
confession] 
be 
true 
or 
false 
is 
irrelevant . . . "). 
 
We 
have 
difficulty 
concluding 
that 
Agnello's objection was not properly stated when it parrots the 
language given by the Supreme Court.9 
¶17 Considering all of these factors, we conclude that the 
language of the objection, while not stated with utmost 
specificity, when coupled with the context of the proceeding 
                     
9 Additionally, 
this 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
pronouncement has been incorporated into the Judicial Benchbook 
and is therefore part of the information a circuit court can 
easily obtain should it be unsure of the law.  1 Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Judicial Education, Judicial Benchbook CR15-2 
(1997).  While the Benchbook may not be cited as independent 
authority for a proposition of law, State v. Johnson, 121 
Wis. 2d 237, 257, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984), the Benchbook 
in this instance merely alerts the circuit court to the law as 
directly expressed by the Supreme Court.   
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
11
sufficiently alerted the circuit court to the nature of the 
objection.  Having determined that Agnello preserved this issue 
for appeal, we also conclude that the circuit court erred in 
overruling his objection. 
¶18 Rogers 
and 
Jackson 
make 
clear 
that 
whether 
a 
confession is true or false cannot play a part in determining 
whether it was voluntarily made.  The objection followed the 
prosecutor's question of whether it was true that Agnello and a 
co-defendant "had planned this killing."  This question gets to 
the heart of the truthfulness of the confession and is far 
beyond the "limited purpose" of ascertaining the facts and 
circumstances of the confession for which a defendant may 
testify under Goodchild, 27 Wis. 2d at 265.   
¶19 The State maintains that by quizzing Agnello on the 
truthfulness of his confession, the prosecutor was merely 
attempting to impeach Agnello's testimony on direct examination. 
 Agnello testified on direct examination that he confessed 
because he was tired and wanted the ordeal to be over.  The 
State contends that the prosecutor's questioning was designed 
only to rebut Agnello's testimony and show instead that remorse 
was his real motivation for confessing.   
¶20 It is now axiomatic that a confession's truthfulness 
or falsity can have no direct bearing on a finding of 
voluntariness.  Rogers, 365 U.S. at 544.  That is to say, a 
court cannot conclude that a confession was voluntary because it 
is true.  Some courts, however, have allowed a judge to 
indirectly evaluate the confession in making a voluntariness 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
12
finding.  In such cases, the judge considers the confession for 
purposes other than to pass on its truthfulness.  See, e.g., 
Gilreath v. Mitchell, 705 F.2d 109, 110 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(evaluating confession to show that defendant was lucid and 
capable of rational choice); United States v. Kreczmer, 636 F.2d 
108, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1981) (evaluating confession to show that 
defendant was able to speak in a rational manner).   
¶21 We do not need to determine at this time whether a 
court runs afoul of Rogers by considering a confession for 
purposes other than its veracity.  A thorough review of the 
transcript reveals that the prosecutor nowhere even hinted that 
he was pursuing that line of questioning in an attempt to 
uncover the "real" motive behind Agnello's confession.  The 
questions on cross-examination do not mention Agnello's motive 
or lend the inference that impeaching Agnello's motive was 
anywhere 
within 
the 
prosecutor's 
purview. 
 
Rather, 
the 
transcript shows that the prosecutor invited the court to 
expressly consider that Agnello may well have committed the 
crime he confessed to committing.10  
                     
10 A few examples from the transcript of the prosecutor's 
cross-examination demonstrate the point: 
Q. 
And you [signed the confession] because what is 
in the statement is true; is that correct? 
 . . .  
Q. 
And 
you 
told 
Mr. 
Stream 
you 
wanted 
your 
stepfather killed; is that correct? 
 . . .  
Q. 
But you and Mr. Stream had planned the killing; 
is that correct . . . ? 
 . . .  
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
13
¶22 The existence of a circuit court error need not 
necessarily require a new hearing.  A new Goodchild hearing is 
only required if the circuit court relied on the error in 
determining that the confession was voluntarily given.  See 
Powell v. Mississippi, 540 So.2d 13, 15-16 (Miss. 1989).  This 
is essentially a harmless error determination and the State, as 
the beneficiary of the error, bears the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.  State v. 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); see also 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-08 (1991) (harmless 
error doctrine applicable to admission of involuntary confession 
at trial); State v. Childs, 146 Wis. 2d 116, 125-26, 430 N.W.2d 
353 (Ct. App. 1988).   
¶23 The error was hardly harmless, as the prosecutor's 
irrelevant line of questioning played a sizable role in the 
circuit court's ruling.  The circuit court was faced with two 
versions of the events surrounding Agnello's interrogation and 
confession and as a result needed to determine which of the two 
versions was the more believable.  There is nothing unusual for 
a circuit court to face such a task in these types of hearings. 
                                                                  
Q. 
You asked Mr. Stream to kill your stepfather 
though; is that correct? 
 . . .  
Q. 
And [the statement] was basically true; is that 
correct? 
A. 
I wouldn't go as far as basically true, no. 
Q. 
But pretty much true.  There are facts in there 
that are true; is that correct? 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
14
 See State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 602-03, 201 N.W.2d 153 
(1972).   
¶24 However, in reasoning that the police version was more 
believable, 
the 
circuit 
court 
indicated 
that 
Agnello's 
credibility 
was 
significantly 
damaged, 
in 
part, 
by 
his 
"selective memory in this case."  A review of the transcript 
reveals 
that 
the 
only 
times 
Agnello's 
memory 
could 
be 
categorized as selective were when the prosecutor sought 
information related to the truthfulness of his confession.  Had 
the improper line of questioning been absent, so too would have 
been Agnello's selective memory.  Under these circumstances, the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
that 
Agnello's 
confession 
was 
voluntarily 
given 
must 
be 
reversed, 
Agnello's 
conviction 
vacated, and the matter remanded for the purpose of conducting 
another Goodchild hearing.  
¶25 We note that there is some confusion in our law 
regarding the State's proper burden of proof for showing 
voluntariness in a Goodchild hearing.  It is clear that at a 
constitutional minimum the State must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the confession was voluntarily obtained.  
Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489.  However, in concluding that for 
federal constitutional purposes the State bears a preponderance 
burden, the Supreme Court also established that a state was 
"free, pursuant to [its] own law, to adopt a higher standard."  
Id.  Agnello contends that we have done so and urges us not to 
waiver from that position. 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
15
¶26 Initially it might appear settled that Wisconsin 
requires the State to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Indeed, prior cases suggest that proposition.11  Upon 
closer inspection, however, it is revealed that this burden's 
origin is universally traced back to Goodchild where it was 
stated without elaboration.  See, e.g., Blaszke v. State, 69 
Wis. 2d 81, 86, 230 N.W.2d 133 (1975); State v. Hernandez, 61 
Wis. 2d 253, 258, 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973); see also Twomey, 404 
U.S. at 479 n.1.  As pointed out in oral argument, this standard 
has remained untouched since Goodchild not because the court 
reasoned it to be the appropriate standard, but because until 
today it has not been specifically challenged.  See Wallace, 59 
Wis. 2d at 79-80. 
¶27 While this court does not hesitate to provide greater 
protections for its citizens under the Wisconsin Constitution, 
it does so only in cases where either the state constitution or 
"the laws of this state require that greater protection of the 
citizens' liberties . . . be afforded."  State v. Doe, 78 
Wis. 2d 161, 72, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).  Where, however, the 
language 
of 
the 
provision 
in 
the 
state 
constitution 
is 
"virtually identical" to that of the federal provision or where 
                     
11 See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 696, 482 
N.W.2d 364 (1992); Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 344, 352, 249 
N.W.2d 593 (1977); Goodchild, 27 Wis. 2d at 264-65.  But see 
State v. Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d 287, 516 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 
1994) (concluding that the standard is preponderance of the 
evidence). 
 
Technically 
Albrecht 
was 
incorrect 
in 
that 
determination under the controlling precedent at the time it was 
decided in 1994.  
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
16
no difference in intent is discernible, Wisconsin courts have 
normally construed the state constitution consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal 
constitution.  State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133, 423 
N.W.2d 823 (1988); see also Kenosha County v. C&S Management, 
Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).  Here, the 
language in Article I, section 8 of the state constitution is 
nearly identical to that contained in the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal constitution.12  We can discern no intended difference 
between the two provisions and Agnello has not directed us to 
any. 
¶28 Additionally, the preponderance standard aligns the 
burden in voluntariness determinations with the burdens in other 
pre-trial constitutional inquiries.  It is well established that 
the 
State 
must 
prove 
compliance 
with 
Miranda 
under 
the 
                     
12 The Wisconsin Constitution provides in relevant part: 
No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law, and no person for the same 
offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, 
nor may be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself or herself.  Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 8(1). 
 
The United States Constitution provides in relevant part: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
17
preponderance standard.  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 
(1986); State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 29, 556 N.W.2d 687 
(1996).  So too must the defendant bear the burden of proving a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment by 
a preponderance standard.  State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 
16, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990).   
¶29 Also, we note that reducing the State's burden at the 
Goodchild hearing does not alter the State's burden at trialto 
prove that the defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Thus, the State's ultimate burden, and the defendant's 
ultimate protection, remains intact.  Accordingly, now that the 
issue is specifically before us, we determine that the State 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's 
confession was voluntarily obtained.   
¶30 In sum, we conclude that because of the limited 
inquiry in a Goodchild hearing and the fact that Rogers and 
Jackson are well-settled areas of law, Agnello's "relevancy" 
objection 
sufficiently 
alerted 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
his 
objection 
and 
therefore 
preserved 
the 
issue 
for 
appeal.  
Additionally, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
overruling Agnello's objection because the prosecutor's line of 
questions improperly inquired into the truthfulness of Agnello's 
confession in violation of Rogers and Jackson.  This error was 
prejudicial as the circuit court relied on Agnello's answers to 
the improper questions in rendering its finding that the 
confession was voluntarily given.  Finally, we conclude that the 
State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
No. 
96-3406-CR 
 
18
defendant voluntarily confessed.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals, vacate Agnello's conviction, and remand the 
cause to the circuit court for a new Goodchild hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
1 
¶31 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (dissenting).  I dissent because 
I conclude that Agnello waived his right to review of whether 
the prosecutor's line of questioning at the Miranda-Goodchild13 
hearing violated his due process rights under the rule of Rogers 
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 
368 (1964).  Consistent with a long line of Wisconsin cases, I 
also conclude that the State must prove the voluntariness of a 
confession beyond a reasonable doubt at a Goodchild hearing.  
Further, I find that counsel for Agnello preserved his right to 
raise on appeal all police tactics used during questioning by 
specifically arguing that the totality of the circumstances 
resulted in coercion.  Finally, I determine that the circuit 
court properly found that Agnello's confession was voluntary.  
Based on these conclusions, I would affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.   
I. 
¶32 The facts of this case are particularly crucial to its 
analysis.  On the night of February 18, 1996, Agnello's foster 
father was found dead at the family home, having sustained 
gunshot wounds to his face and right shoulder.  Shortly 
thereafter, Agnello was arrested in connection with the murder. 
 He was taken to the police station between midnight and 1:00 
a.m. on February 19, 1996.   
                     
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State ex rel. 
Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
2 
¶33 According to Agnello, when he reached the station he 
was placed in "a 10 x 15 foot room with three chairs and one 
desk."  Hearing Tr., Apr. 19, 1996 at 81 [hereinafter "Tr."].  
Agnello was handcuffed to a wall whenever police officers were 
not in the room.  It appears from the record that Agnello was 
seated while handcuffed.14  Agnello testified that whenever 
police officers were not in the room, he was permitted to sleep, 
and did so.  See Tr. at 85, 89-90. 
¶34 According to the testimony of police officers at the 
Miranda-Goodchild 
hearing, 
Agnello 
sat 
alone 
in 
the 
interrogation room and had the opportunity to sleep until 
Detectives Moore and Burems entered at 6:00 a.m.15  Detectives 
Moore and Burems questioned Agnello from 6:00 a.m. to 8:20 a.m., 
taking several short breaks. Moore testified at the hearing that 
Detective Burems advised Agnello of his rights at 6:00 a.m. and 
that Agnello never asked for an attorney or exercised his right 
to remain silent.  According to Moore, Agnello did not seem 
tired nor did he complain of fatigue.  Agnello did not request 
                     
14 The record does not directly state that Agnello was 
seated while he was handcuffed.  However, police officers 
testified at the Miranda-Goodchild hearing that Agnello was 
seated during questioning. In addition, Agnello testified that 
he slept whenever the police officers left the room, at which 
time he was handcuffed.      
15 As the majority notes, Agnello's version of events 
differs from the police officers' version on several points, 
including the time at which he was first questioned.  See 
Majority op. at 2 n.3.  The circuit court found the police 
officers to be more credible, in general, than the defendant.  
See Hearing Tr., Apr. 19, 1996 at 169, 171 [hereinafter “Tr.”].  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
3 
any convenience item or bathroom break.  Agnello testified that 
he was able to drink water and sleep when the detectives 
occasionally left the room.  Agnello recalled that he fell 
asleep when the session was over.    
¶35 Agnello awoke when two new detectives, Detectives Temp 
and Olson, entered the interrogation room.  Detectives Temp and 
Olson questioned Agnello from 10:15 a.m. to 3:20 p.m., with 
breaks stretching from 11:40 a.m. to 1:15 p.m. and from 2:00 
p.m. to 2:50 p.m.  Temp testified at the Miranda-Goodchild 
hearing that at the start of the interview, he advised Agnello 
of his Miranda rights.  Agnello replied that he understood his 
rights and waived them by initialing a written waiver statement. 
 According to Temp, Agnello never requested a lawyer or asserted 
a right to silence. 
¶36 Temp stated that Agnello was given "whatever he 
requested" in regard to convenience items.  Tr. at 10.  
According to Temp, Agnello requested and received a hamburger, 
almost a full package of cigarettes, two bathroom breaks, five 
cups of coffee, and water.  Agnello's testimony substantially 
corroborates this.16   
¶37 Temp testified that both he and Olson were unarmed 
during questioning and that Agnello was unhandcuffed and was 
free to walk around the interrogation room.  According to Temp, 
neither detective ever threatened Agnello, used physical force, 
                     
16 Agnello's testimony differed slightly from Temp's in that 
he stated that he thought he had taken only one bathroom break. 
 See Tr. at 88.  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
4 
or employed coercive tactics.  Agnello, on the other hand, 
testified that Olson grabbed his hands several times, causing 
pain.  Olson denied ever touching Agnello’s hands.   
¶38 According to Temp, Agnello appeared to be sober, 
alert, and attentive throughout the questioning.  While Temp was 
present, Agnello never slept or complained of being tired.  
Olson and Temp left the room intermittently, and Agnello slept 
during those periods. 
¶39 Detective Olson wrote out Agnello's statement, in 
which he confessed to killing his foster father.  Agnello 
claimed that he could not read the statement because he was not 
wearing his glasses and was tired, so Olson read the statement 
to him.  Olson went over the statement with Agnello on a line-
by-line basis.  Any inaccuracies were crossed out and Agnello 
initialed the statement as it was read to him.  At the end of 
the statement, Agnello wrote, "this is all true," and signed the 
statement.  Tr. at 89. 
¶40 Agnello was charged with first degree intentional 
homicide as a party to the crime.  Agnello moved to suppress his 
statement on the basis of a claimed denial of counsel, and 
further, alleged that his confession was not voluntary.  
¶41 The court held a Miranda-Goodchild hearing to consider 
Agnello's motion.  During the hearing, the prosecutor elicited a 
line of testimony from Agnello (reproduced in full below)17 which 
                     
17 Following is the relevant portion of the transcript: 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
5 
                                                                  
PROSECUTOR:  Sir, you signed the statement at the end 
and you wrote down the words, "this is true"; is that 
correct? 
 
AGNELLO:  I wrote down the words? 
 
Q. 
Answer my question.  Did you write it down? 
 
A. 
Yes, I was told to. 
 
Q. 
And you wrote down, "this is true," and you 
signed it; is that right? 
 
A. 
Yes, I was told to. 
 
Q. 
And you did that because what is in the statement 
is true; is that correct? 
 
A. 
No.  Because I was extremely tired and scared. 
 
Q. 
The fact that you told them that the shotgun was 
in the attic of Mr. Stream's house, you told them 
that; is that correct? 
 
A. 
Doesn't say that in the report. 
 
Q. 
You're going to have to answer my questions.  Did 
you tell them that? 
 
A. 
In the report it says I did. 
 
Q. 
I would ask that you instruct that he answer the 
question. 
 
THE COURT:  You have to listen to the question 
very carefully and answer the question that's 
asked. 
 
Q. 
You told them that the shotgun was in Mr. 
Stream's attic; is that correct? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
And you also told them that you and Mr. Stream 
had planned on this killing; is that correct? 
 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
6 
                                                                  
A. 
I don't quite remember that. 
 
Q. 
You could have told them that?  You don't 
remember telling them that? 
 
A. 
I don't remember that. 
 
Q. 
But you and Mr. Stream had planned this killing; 
is that correct? 
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I object, your Honor.  I don't think 
that is relative [sic] to the purposes of this 
hearing. 
 
THE COURT:  That goes to his credibility.  Answer the 
question. 
 
A. 
Can you restate the question? 
 
Q. 
Yes.  You and Mr. Stream planned this killing; is 
that correct? 
 
A. 
To the best of my knowledge, no. 
 
Q. 
To the best of your knowledge, no? 
 
A. 
It happened quite a while ago, and I've been 
through a lot of trauma. 
 
Q. 
So you don't remember if you and Mr. Stream 
planned this killing; is that correct?  Is that 
fair? 
 
A. 
I don't remember. 
 
Q. 
And you had bought the shotgun that did the 
killing; is that correct? 
 
A. 
That's correct. 
 
Q. 
And you gave it to Mr. Stream; is that correct? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
And 
you 
told 
Mr. 
Stream 
you 
wanted 
your 
stepfather killed; is that correct? 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
7 
                                                                  
 
A. 
I don't remember. 
 
Q. 
You don't remember? 
 
A. 
The exact words. 
 
Q. 
Can you give me the approximate words that you 
might have used to Mr. Stream? 
 
A. 
I can't really remember. 
 
Q. 
But you and Mr. Stream had planned the killing; 
is that correct--even though you don't remember 
the exact words--is that right? 
 
A. 
As far as I remember we didn't plan it. 
 
Q. 
You asked Mr. Stream to kill your stepfather 
though; is that correct? 
 
A. 
As far as I remember I didn't. 
 
Q. 
But it's possible you could have but you just 
don't remember today; is that right? 
 
A. 
Could you say that over? 
 
Q. 
Sure.  It's possible you could have asked Mr. 
Stream to kill your stepfather, you just don't 
remember that today; is that right? 
 
A. 
Possible. 
 
Q. 
And Mr. Chandler indicated that and you indicated 
that you read the statement in front of you; is 
that right? 
 
A. 
Excuse me? 
 
Q. 
Mr. Chandler asked you the question, do you 
remember reading or reviewing prior to testifying 
today the statement in front of you; is that 
correct? 
 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
8 
Agnello now claims impermissibly pertained to the truthfulness 
of the confession.  As the quoted portion of the transcript 
indicates, 
defense 
counsel 
objected 
to 
only 
one 
of 
the 
questions, 
stating 
that 
the 
information 
sought 
was 
not 
"relative."  Tr. at 91.  The parties agree, as the majority 
noted, that the objection was intended to be a relevancy 
objection.  See Majority op. at 4 n.6.  The circuit court 
overruled the objection, finding that the information was 
relevant in assessing Agnello's credibility. 
                                                                  
A. 
Mr. Olson read it to me.  That was the only time 
that I actually heard what was on the paper. 
 
Q. 
And you remember what Mr. Olson read; is that 
right? 
 
A. 
Not exactly, no. 
 
Q. 
But you remember the gist or basically what Mr. 
Olson read to you; is that right? 
 
A. 
The basic, yeah. 
 
Q. 
And that was basically true; is that correct? 
 
A. 
I wouldn't go as far as basically true, no. 
 
Q. 
But pretty much true.  There are facts in there 
that are true; is that correct? 
 
A. 
There might have been. 
 
Q. 
You don't remember? 
 
A. 
Not that good. 
 
Tr. at 90-94.   
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
9 
¶42 At the close of the hearing, the circuit court found 
that Agnello's testimony lacked credibility.  The court found 
that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Agnello had been fully advised 
of his rights and had waived them.  The judge concluded: 
 
And so I do find beyond a reasonable doubt under all 
of the circumstances that have been testified [to] 
here today as far as Mr. Agnello’s statement to the 
police is concerned that that statement was made by 
the defendant as a voluntary product of a free will 
and that it was his own deliberate choice to make that 
statement, and that it was not coerced in any sense of 
the word. 
 
Tr. at 171.  Following the hearing, Agnello pleaded guilty to 
first degree intentional homicide, party to a crime, and was 
sentenced to life in prison. 
¶43 The court of appeals affirmed Agnello's conviction. 
First, the court of appeals concluded that Agnello waived his 
right to argue on appeal that the circuit court committed 
constitutional error under Rogers and Jackson by permitting the 
prosecutor to cross-examine Agnello regarding the truth or 
falsity of his confession.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
defense counsel's relevancy objection "failed to present the 
trial court with any information concerning either Rogers or 
Jackson," State v. Agnello, No. 96-3406-CR, unpublished slip op. 
at 6 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998), and that Agnello "failed to 
develop the argument he now makes on appeal beyond a general 
claim that the evidence was irrelevant."  Id. at 6.  
¶44 Second, the court of appeals upheld the circuit 
court's finding that Agnello's confession was voluntary.  Id. at 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
10
8.  The court noted that the State must prove a confession 
voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.18  Id.  The court 
rejected Agnello's argument that improper police practices 
rendered his confession involuntary.  Id. at 10.  The court held 
that Agnello waived his right to argue on appeal that any 
allegedly improper police tactics except sleep deprivation 
rendered his confession involuntary because he failed to raise 
those issues before the circuit court.  Id.  As to the issue of 
sleep deprivation, the court of appeals upheld the circuit 
court's 
finding 
that 
Agnello 
was 
"not 
'unduly' 
or 
'unintelligibly' fatigued" because it was not clearly contrary 
to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Tr. at 170-71). 
¶45 Judge Fine filed a concurring opinion in which he 
explained that Agnello's testimony was admissible for purposes 
other than the confession's truthfulness, such as "to gauge the 
veracity" of the defendant and to determine why the defendant 
signed the confession.  Slip op. at 3-4 (Fine, J., concurring). 
According 
to 
Judge 
Fine, 
Rogers 
does 
not 
prohibit 
such 
testimony; rather, Rogers only precludes courts from holding 
                     
18 In support of this proposition, the court cited State v. 
Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 28-29, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996); State v. 
Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 114a, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995)(per curiam on 
motion for reconsideration); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 
16 & n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990); State v. Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d 
287, 301, 516 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1994); and State v. Lee, 175 
Wis. 2d 348, 362-64, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993).   
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
11
that a confession is voluntary simply because it is true.  Id. 
at 3. 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
12
II. 
¶46 The first issue is whether Agnello's single relevancy 
objection was sufficient to preserve his right to argue on 
appeal that the above-quoted line of questioning by the 
prosecutor violated Agnello's due process rights under Rogers 
and Jackson. Based on my review of the record, I conclude that 
Agnello waived his right to raise this issue on appeal because 
his sole objection lacked the specificity and timeliness 
required by Wisconsin law. 
¶47 The majority correctly stated that "[t]he necessity of 
lodging an adequate objection to preserve an issue for appeal 
cannot be overstated."  Majority op. at 7.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 901.03(1)19 requires that an objection be both specific and 
timely in order to preserve a challenge to admitted evidence for 
appeal.  It states:  
 
(1)  Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected; and 
 
(a)  Objection.  In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent 
from the context; . . . 
 
§ 901.03(1)(emphasis added).  Specific and timely objections are 
required to allow the circuit court and/or opposing counsel to 
correct their own errors and "avoid the raising of issues on 
                     
19 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version, unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
13
appeal for the first time."  Bavarian Soccer Club, Inc. v. 
Pierson, 36 Wis. 2d 8, 15, 153 N.W.2d 1 (1967).  See also In re 
Interest of Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 
(1998).  The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
rules requiring adequate objection at the trial court level, 
which the 
Court referred 
to as 
"contemporaneous-objection 
rules," may "mak[e] a major contribution to finality in criminal 
litigation."  Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S 72, 88 (1977).  The 
Court stated that when a person charged with a crime is 
undergoing proceedings at the trial court level, 
 
[t]o the greatest extent possible all issues which 
bear on this charge should be determined in this 
proceeding:  the accused is in the courtroom, the jury 
is in the box, the judge is on the bench, and the 
witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly sworn, 
await their turn to testify.  Society's resources have 
been concentrated at that time and place in order to 
decide . . . the question of guilt or innocence of one 
of its citizens.  Any procedural rule which encourages 
the result that those proceedings be as free of error 
as 
possible 
is 
thoroughly 
desirable, 
and 
the 
contemporaneous-objection rule surely falls within 
this classification. 
 
Id. at 90.  Even claims of constitutional right are waived by 
the failure to object adequately in the circuit court.  State v. 
Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 940-41, 437 N.W.2d 218 (1989).    
¶48 This court has held that an objection is sufficiently 
specific if it "reasonably advise[s] the court of the basis for 
the objection."  Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 405 (quoting State 
v. Peters, 166 Wis. 2d 168, 174, 479 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 
1991)).  See also State v. Wedgeworth, 100 Wis. 2d 514, 528, 302 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
14
N.W.2d 810 (1981).  "The cardinal principle is that a general 
objection if overruled cannot avail the objector on appeal."  
State v. Hoffman, 240 Wis. 142, 151, 2 N.W.2d 707 (1942).  See 
also  Holmes v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 259, 271, 251 N.W.2d 56 
(1977); Peters, 166 Wis. 2d at 174.  An objection on the basis 
of relevance, without more explanation, is a general objection. 
 See Cornell v. Barnes, 26 Wis. 473, 480 (1870); State v. Boehm, 
127 Wis. 2d 351, 357, 379 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1985).20  See also 
1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 18 (1988).  To be timely, "an objection 
must be made as soon as the opponent might reasonably be aware 
of the objectionable nature of the testimony."  Holmes, 76 
Wis. 2d at 272.  See also West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 401, 
246 N.W.2d 675 (1976); Coleman v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 124, 128, 
218 N.W.2d 744 (1974); Bennett v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 727, 735, 
196 N.W.2d 704 (1972).   
¶49 Upon examination of the relevant portion of the 
transcript, I conclude that Agnello's objection did not meet the 
level of specificity and timeliness required by Wisconsin law.  
First, Agnello's objection lacked sufficient specificity.  As 
the majority noted, Agnello argues on appeal that "the circuit 
                     
20 Other jurisdictions similarly have held that objections 
on the basis of relevancy alone are too general to preserve 
specific arguments for appeal.  See, e.g., Rowland v. State, 561 
S.W.2d 304, 310 (Ark. 1978); Singletary v. State, 390 S.E.2d 
611, 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268, 
289 (Ill. 1990); Gambill v. State, 479 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Ind. 
1985); State v. Duran, 496 P.2d 1096, 1098 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); 
State v. Kaiser, 504 N.W.2d 96, 102 (S.D. 1993); Wilson v. 
State, 541 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Tx. Crim. App. 1976).  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
15
court erred under Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), and 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), by allowing the 
prosecutor to question Agnello about the truthfulness of his 
confession."  Majority op. at 5.  Agnello claims that his 
single, general relevancy objection preserved this issue for 
appeal.  Agnello's objection, however, failed to alert the court 
to his underlying argumentthe basis for the objection.  See 
Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 405.  Agnello did not clarify why the 
evidence was irrelevant to the purposes of a Miranda-Goodchild 
hearing.   
¶50 Relevance is too broad an evidentiary doctrine to be 
immediately 
associated 
with 
the 
truth 
or 
falsity 
of 
a 
confession.  While evidence may be irrelevant at a Miranda-
Goodchild hearing because, as Agnello argues, it goes to the 
truth or falsity of a the confession, see Lee v. Illinois, 476 
U.S. 530, 547 n.6 (1986), evidence may be irrelevant at such a 
hearing for any number of other reasons.  As such, a relevancy 
objection, on its own, cannot reasonably be expected to give the 
court notice that it should consider whether the questions 
violate due process under the rule of Rogers and Jackson because 
they go to truth or falsity.  Defense counsel did not make even 
the 
briefest 
mention 
of 
Rogers, 
Jackson, 
due 
process, 
truthfulness, voluntariness, or any other clarifying reference 
which might have alerted the circuit court, or opposing counsel, 
to the basis of the objection.  Consequently, I conclude that 
the objection lacked the specificity required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.03(1).  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
16
¶51 Similarly, I conclude that Agnello's objection was 
untimely.  Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
first question which arguably related to truth or falsity of the 
confession.  Likewise, he did not object to the second such 
question.  Instead, defense counsel waited until the prosecutor 
had asked, and Agnello had answered, eleven questions that 
arguably regarded the confession's truth or falsity before 
lodging his objection.  Even then, defense counsel objected to a 
question that only obliquely referred to the statement's 
truththe question, "But you and Mr. Stream had planned this 
killing; is this correct?"  Tr. at 91.  Therefore, Agnello did 
not object "as soon as [he] might reasonably be aware of the 
objectionable nature of the testimony," as is required by 
Wisconsin law.  Coleman, 64 Wis. 2d at 129.    
¶52 The majority concedes that the objection was "not 
stated with the utmost specificity," majority op. at 11, and 
that 
"[t]he 
addition 
of 
a 
short 
phrase, 
such 
as 
'the 
truthfulness of a confession has no bearing on voluntariness,' 
would have gone a long way to eliminate any confusion over the 
nature of the objection."  Majority op. at 8.  The majority 
concludes, however, that "the context of the objection and the 
status of the law in this area gravitate toward a conclusion 
that Agnello has preserved this issue for appeal."  Majority op. 
at 8-9.   
¶53 I disagree with the majority that the "context of the 
objection" suggested that Agnello's relevancy objection was in 
any way based on Rogers and Jackson.  Rather, a close inspection 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
17
of the transcript suggests precisely the opposite:  that Agnello 
was not objecting to the questions which arguably violated the 
Rogers and Jackson rule.  Defense counsel made the "relative" 
objection after the prosecutor asked, "But you and Mr. Stream 
had planned this killing; is this correct?"  Tr. at 91.  At 
best, this question might indirectly pertain to the truthfulness 
of Agnello's confession.  Before and after this question, 
however, the prosecutor asked questions which arguably related 
much more obviously and directly to the truthfulness of the 
confession.  For example, the prosecutor, after asking whether 
Agnello wrote "this is true" at the bottom of his confession, 
asked, "And you did that because what is in the statement is 
true; is that correct?"  Id. at 90.  Later, the prosecutor asked 
whether the statement was "basically true" and whether there 
were "facts in there that are true."  Id. at 93-94.  Curiously, 
defense counsel did not object to any of these questions.  Under 
such circumstances, the circuit court judge could hardly be 
expected to connect Agnello's isolated objection to the Rogers 
and 
Jackson 
argument 
he 
now 
presents, 
without 
further 
specification. 
¶54 The majority also argues that the common occurrence of 
Goodchild hearings coupled with the "lengthy calm in this area 
of the law," rendered the ground for the objection obvious.  
Majority op. at 9.  I disagree.  This case is not like Corey 
J.G., in which this court held that a party's statement, "I have 
one more motion.  I would move to dismiss for lack of 
establishment of venue,"  Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 403, was 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
18
sufficiently specific because the basis for the objection was 
obvious.  See id. at 407-408.  In Corey J.G., the motion clearly 
stated the basis of the objection:  venue.  Id. at 407.  The 
problem in Corey J.G. was that the circuit court judge failed to 
recognize that the issue of venue, when raised in a juvenile 
delinquency 
proceeding, 
required 
reference 
to 
the 
venue 
provisions of The Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48 (1993-94). 
 Id.   
¶55 In this case, in contrast, Agnello's objection did not 
inform the court of the basis of the objection:  that 
truthfulness is not relevant to a voluntariness inquiry.  See 
majority op. at 8.  The circuit court judge did not have a 
chance to apply the law, however long it had been in place, 
because she was never "reasonably advise[d]"  of the basis of 
the objection, as is required by Wisconsin law.  Corey J.G., 215 
Wis. 2d at 407.  See also Peters, 166 Wis. 2d at 174.  
¶56 The majority also seeks to justify its holding on the 
basis of the language of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 547 n.6 
(1986), which states, "The truth or falsity of the statement is 
not relevant to the voluntariness inquiry . . . ."  Majority op. 
at 10.  The majority's reasoning ignores the underlying purpose 
of the rules requiring specific and timely objections.  The 
question is not whether the United States Supreme Court has used 
the term "irrelevant" in describing evidence which goes to the 
truth or falsity of a confession.  Rather, the question is 
whether the use of the objection "relative [sic]," Tr. at 91, by 
defense counsel was sufficient to "reasonably advise" the 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
19
circuit court of the basis for the objection, allowing it to 
zero in on the source of the problem and remedy any defect.  
Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d at 407.  As has already been pointed 
out, evidence may be irrelevant for any number of reasons.  This 
court should not use the language of Lee, and, with the benefit 
of hindsight, conclude that the objection here was sufficiently 
specific.     
¶57 I am satisfied that Agnello's objection failed to 
exhibit the degree of specificity and timeliness necessary to 
preserve the Rogers and Jackson issue for appeal.  In addition, 
I am convinced that, as Judge Fine recognized and the circuit 
court found, the testimony at issue was admissible for purposes 
other than proving the truthfulness of Agnello's confession.  
Judge Fine stated in his concurring opinion: 
 
Neither Rogers nor any of its progeny, however, holds 
that inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
confession may not be had, as it was in this case, to 
gauge the veracity of a defendant who testifies as a 
witness at the suppression hearing.  Thus, Agnello 
claimed that he signed the confession because he was 
allegedly "told to" and because he "was extremely 
tired and scared."  How else is a prosecutor to 
challenge this testimony if not to posit that the real 
reason Agnello signed the confession was because he 
wanted to assuage his conscience by getting the matter 
off his chest? 
 
In my view, the trial court accurately perceived the 
distinction 
between 
holding 
a 
confession 
to 
be 
voluntary because it is true (forbidden by Rogers and 
its progeny) and disbelieving a defendant/witness's 
claim that the confession was coerced because the 
trial court credits an alternate explanation as to why 
the defendant confessed-in the aftermath of the crime, 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
20
he could not suppress his urge to tell the world about 
the bad things he did. [citation omitted.] 
Slip op. at 3-4 (Fine, J., concurring).   
¶58 I agree with Judge Fine that Agnello's testimony was 
admissible to demonstrate Agnello's lack of credibility as a 
witness.  It can be inferred from the context of the 
prosecutor's questions that they were designed to impeach 
Agnello by showing the inconsistencies between his direct 
examination statements and his cross examination statements.21  
Immediately before the cross examination questions at issue, 
Agnello was asked during his direct examination why he had 
signed the confession.  Agnello replied,  "Because I was there 
for so long I was tired.  They told me that I was never going 
[to] step foot on the outside again so I signed it and hoped 
everything would be over."  Tr. at 90.  Understandably, the 
prosecutor then attempted to impeach Agnello by eliciting 
testimony that would demonstrate that Agnello had other motives 
for signing his confession.  When viewed in context, it is clear 
that the question asked by the prosecutor near the beginning of 
cross examination, “And you [signed the statement] because what 
is in the statement is true; is that correct,” Tr. at 90, for 
example, was intended to get at why Agnello signed the 
confession, not whether the confession was true.  Indeed, 
Agnello’s answer reveals that he himself interpreted the 
                     
21 See Wis. Stat. § 906.11(2), which provides in part, "A 
witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any 
issue in the case, including credibility."   
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
21
question in this way; he answered, “No.  Because I was extremely 
tired and scared.”  Tr. at 90.    
¶59 Moreover, a circuit court may examine the manner in 
which a witness answers questions to resolve a witness's 
contradictory statements.  See State v. Owens, 148 Wis. 2d 922, 
930, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989).  There is no question that the 
circuit court viewed the exchange at issue as relevant to 
Agnello’s credibility.  See Tr. at 91.  
¶60 The transcript of the Miranda-Goodchild hearing shows 
that the circuit court did not consider the confession's 
truthfulness in its voluntariness determination.  Therefore, the 
circuit court did not violate the rule of Rogers and Jackson in 
determining that the confession was voluntary.  See U.S. v. 
Kreczmer, 636 F.2d 108, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1981); Gilreath v. 
Mitchell, 705 F.2d 109, 110 (4th Cir. 1983).  Although the court 
found Agnello's testimony to lack credibility, it is not true, 
as the majority contends, that the line of questioning at issue 
“played a sizable role in the circuit court’s ruling," majority 
op. at 14, or that "the transcript reveals that the only times 
Agnello's memory could be categorized as selective were when the 
prosecutor sought information related to the truthfulness of his 
confession."  Majority op. at 14.  The circuit court based its 
judgment as to Agnello’s credibility on several factors.22  The 
                     
22 The circuit court stated: 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
22
court never indicated the weight that it gave Agnello’s 
“selective memory” in its credibility assessment, much less 
whether it “played a sizeable role” in that assessment.  
Arguably, the numerous differences between Agnello’s testimony 
and the testimony of police detectives played the largest role 
in the circuit court’s determination of credibility.  Almost all 
                                                                  
[I]n my judgment the police officer and detective 
witnesses in this case outweigh in the credibility 
contest.  Mr. Agnello had very little credibility when 
he testified on his own behalf as evidenced by the 
manner in which he testified.  As evidenced by his 
very selective memory in this case and also as 
evidenced by his past criminal history which is in the 
record through the statement which is in the record 
here itself which casts some doubt on his own 
credibility.  And also his credibility with respect to 
his position that he did in fact request a lawyer is 
contradicted by the fact that he signed a waiver and 
that he gave a statement and signed the statement at 
various points. 
Tr. at 169-70.  The court also stated that it didn’t “buy” 
Agnello’s testimony that Detective Olson put pressure on his 
hands during questioning because Olson had testified otherwise. 
 Id. at 171.  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
23
of these discrepancies in testimony arose in portions of the 
hearing other than the questioning at issue.23  
¶61 In sum, I would hold that Agnello's objection failed 
because it lacked the specificity and timeliness required by 
Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(1995-96).  The context of this case did 
not create an environment where the grounds for the objection 
were obvious.  In addition, the objection was a general 
objection and the testimony elicited was admissible for purposes 
other than the confession's truthfulness.  Therefore, I conclude 
that Agnello's objection was insufficient to preserve the Rogers 
and Jackson issue for appeal. 
III. 
                     
23 Four examples illustrate the pervasiveness in the record 
of discrepancies between Agnello’s testimony and that of the 
detectives.  First, Agnello testified that Detectives Burems and 
Moore came into the interrogation room about three to five 
minutes after he got there and questioned him all night, but 
Moore testified that the questioning began at 6:00 a.m. and 
lasted until 8:20 a.m., and that before that, Agnello was in the 
interview room alone and had the opportunity to sleep.  See Tr. 
at 81-82, 151-53, 155.  Second, Agnello testified that none of 
the detectives informed him of his Miranda rights, whereas 
Detectives Moore and Temp both testified that Agnello had 
received his rights and Temp indicated that Agnello had signed a 
written waiver (later admitted into evidence).  See Tr. at 6, 8, 
83, 86, 152.  Third, Agnello claimed that Detective Olson 
grabbed 
or 
pressed 
on 
his 
hands 
several 
times 
during 
questioning, but both Olson and Temp testified that neither of 
them had ever touched Agnello’s hands.  See Tr. at 89, 144, 148-
49.  Finally, Agnello testified that he had requested a lawyer 
several times and had either been ignored or denied a lawyer by 
all detectives, while Moore, Temp, and Olson all testified that 
Agnello never once asked for an attorney.  See  Tr. at 20, 83-
84, 86, 94-95, 148-49, 153.            
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
24
¶62 The majority concludes that this court should require 
the State to prove that a defendant's confession was voluntary 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  See majority op. at 17.  I 
disagree.  I see no reason to depart from the long line of 
precedent establishing the rule that the State must prove 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶63 First, contrary to the majority's view, Wisconsin has 
long 
used 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
standard 
to 
determine 
voluntariness.  In State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 
244, 264-65, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), this court announced that 
"[t]he state shall have the burden of proving voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Following Goodchild, this court has 
consistently 
held 
that 
the 
State's 
burden 
in 
proving 
voluntariness is beyond a reasonable doubt.24  See, e.g., State 
v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 696, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992); Owens, 
148 Wis. 2d at 933-34; Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 344, 352, 
249 N.W.2d 593 (1977); Blaszke v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 81, 86, 230 
N.W.2d 133 (1975); Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 363, 246 
N.W.2d 801 (1976); State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis. 2d 253, 258, 212 
N.W.2d 118 (1973). 
                     
24 As the majority recognizes, State v. Albrecht, 184 
Wis. 2d 287, 301, 516 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1994), misstated the 
law at the time when it held that the State must prove 
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Majority 
op. at 15 n.11.  Albrecht incorrectly relied on State v. 
Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990), a case 
which set forth a preponderance standard as the burden of proof 
in a Fourth Amendment search and seizure suppression hearing.  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
25
¶64 In order to remain faithful to the doctrine of stare 
decisis, this court should adhere to this long line of cases.  
Just last year, this court expounded on the importance of stare 
decisis, stating that application of the doctrine "is the 
preferred course."  State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 504, 579 
N.W.2d 654 (1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991)).  When established legal precedent "is open to revision 
in every case, 'deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of 
judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'"  
Citizens Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 513, 534 
N.W.2d 
608 
(1995) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(citation 
omitted).  Consequently, this court has held that "any departure 
from 
the 
doctrine 
of 
stare 
decisis 
demands 
special 
justification."  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 504 (quoting Arizona v. 
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).  The majority has failed to 
provide any "special justification" for its abandonment of the 
Wisconsin precedent in this area.     
¶65 The fact that the United States Supreme Court has 
ruled that voluntariness need only be proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence, see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972), 
does not provide the "special justification" necessary for this 
court 
to 
cast 
aside 
Wisconsin's 
well-settled 
rule 
that 
voluntariness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the 
Court recognized in Lego, "Of course, the States are free, 
pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard.  They may 
indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values 
they find at stake."  Lego, 404 U.S. at 489.  The United States 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
26
Supreme 
Court 
specifically 
recognized 
that 
Wisconsin, 
in 
Goodchild, had already resolved the question differently.  Id. 
at 479 n.1, 489 n.17.  In Goodchild, this court carefully 
considered 
the 
appropriate 
procedure 
for 
voluntariness 
determinations in Wisconsin, taking the Wisconsin Constitution 
into account.  See Goodchild, 27 Wis. 2d at 258-265.  We adopted 
the "orthodox procedure," and in doing so, determined that the 
State must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
at 264-65.  This court may afford greater protection to a 
person's liberties under the Wisconsin Constitution than is 
afforded by the federal constitution and we have done so in the 
past.  See State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 241, 580 N.W.2d 
171 (1998); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 415, 193 N.W.2d 89 
(1923); Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249, 251 (1859).  To 
the extent that the decision in Goodchild was based upon the 
Wisconsin Constitution, it is not affected by Lego, which was 
decided under the federal constitution.  See Hansford, 219 
Wis. 2d at 241.     
¶66 Further, the majority offers no sound rationale as to 
why this court should forgo over thirty years of precedent 
merely to "align[] the burden in voluntariness determinations 
with the burdens of other pre-trial constitutional inquiries."  
Majority op. at 17.  Although both the majority and the court of 
appeals cite several cases involving Miranda inquiries in which 
a preponderance of the evidence standard was applied, see 
majority op. at 17, slip op. at 8-9, it is well-settled law that 
a Miranda inquiry is entirely different from a voluntariness 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
27
inquiry, even though a court may conduct both inquiries in the 
same hearing.  See Roney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 522, 534, 171 
N.W.2d 400 (1969).  As we stated in Roney, "A confession can be 
constitutionally antiseptic under Miranda in that it arises 
neither from interrogation nor custody, but can be involuntary 
because of coercive circumstances to which the police are not 
parties.  Accordingly, the satisfaction of the Miranda rule does 
not ipso facto satisfy the question of voluntariness . . . ."  
Id. at 533.  The Miranda rule is a prophylactic, judicially-
created rule which "may be triggered even in the absence of a 
Fifth Amendment violation,” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-
07 (1983), while the requirement that a confession must be 
voluntary derives directly from the Fifth Amendment itself.25  As 
                     
25 The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
 The Fourteenth Amendment requires states to recognize the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).  Article I, section 8 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
also 
prohibits 
compelled 
self-
incrimination.   
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
28
such, this court's holdings as to the burden of proof in one 
inquiry should not affect the other.26   
¶67 In contrast, there is good reason, beyond adherence to 
the doctrine of stare decisis, for maintaining the higher burden 
of proof:  often, the only strong evidence the State may have in 
a case is the defendant's confession.  Without that evidence, 
the State most likely will not prosecute the case.  Cases such 
as Rogers and Jackson protect a defendant from coercive tactics 
that might be used to secure a confession, by requiring that a 
court find that any confession that was obtained through 
impermissibly coercive tactics was an involuntary one and should 
be suppressed.  Maintaining the burden at beyond a reasonable 
doubt holds the State to a higher level of accountability and 
scrutiny. 
¶68 Accordingly, I conclude that this court should not 
lower 
the 
State's 
burden 
relating 
to 
voluntariness 
determinations because it would overturn over thirty years of 
precedent and because sound public policy supports maintaining 
                     
26 Recently, this court held that the State must bear the 
burden of proof on the issue of “custodial interrogation” in a 
Miranda inquiry.  See State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 347 
(1999).  We based our holding in part on the fact that the 
burden in voluntariness determinations is on the State.  See id. 
at 346-47.  Allocation of the burden of proof presents a very 
different issue than determining the substantive standard of 
proof, however.  Also, this court had never decided previously 
to Armstrong which party bore the burden of establishing the 
occurrence of a “custodial interrogation.”  Id. at 345.  In 
contrast, there is a line of cases stretching back over thirty 
years holding that the State must prove voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.     
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
29
the beyond a reasonable doubt burden.  Despite the burden 
adopted by the court of appeals, because the circuit court 
properly applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, I 
conclude that the court of appeals' determination that Agnello's 
statement was a voluntary one should be affirmed.   
IV. 
¶69 Finally, I conclude that Agnello, at the Miranda-
Goodchild hearing, adequately raised the issue of whether police 
tactics other than sleep deprivation impaired the voluntariness 
of his confession.  Applying the appropriate standard of review, 
I would uphold the circuit court’s determination that Agnello’s 
statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.  
¶70 Agnello argued on appeal that the police used improper 
tactics in questioning him, including:  (1) handcuffing Agnello 
to the interrogation room wall; (2) lengthy questioning; (3) 
isolation; (4) sleep deprivation; and (5) food deprivation.  
Slip op. at 10-11.  The court of appeals refused to consider any 
of these alleged tactics except sleep deprivation, holding that 
Agnello waived his right to raise the other tactics by failing 
to raise them at the circuit court level.  I disagree. 
¶71 During his Miranda-Goodchild hearing, Agnello made 
offers of proof regarding all of the allegedly coercive police 
tactics which he raises on appeal.27  Moreover, during his 
                     
27 Agnello testified that he was placed in an interrogation 
room and occasionally was handcuffed to its wall, that a 
detective grabbed his hand during questioning, that he was 
subjected to long periods of questioning, that he was threatened 
by police, that he received a hamburger, and that he was tired. 
 See Tr. at 81-90.     
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
30
closing argument, counsel for Agnello argued that "I think the 
totality of the circumstances here also show that the confession 
itself was simply coercive circumstances."  Tr. at 162 (emphasis 
added).  While counsel for Agnello highlighted sleep deprivation 
as arguably the most egregious offense,28 he also preserved his 
right to raise on appeal other tactics used by specifying that 
the totality of the circumstances resulted in coercion. 
¶72 Next, I consider whether the circuit court properly 
found that Agnello's confession was voluntary.  In determining 
whether a confession was voluntary a court must look at the 
totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether the 
defendant 
was 
the 
“victim 
of 
a 
conspicuously 
unequal 
confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on him by 
representatives of the state exceed[ed] the defendant’s ability 
to resist.”  State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 236, 401 N.W.2d 
759 (1987) (quoting State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 308, 128 
N.W.2d 645 (1964)).  The court must balance the defendant’s 
personal characteristics against the tactics employed by the 
police in procuring the confession.  Id.  However, "in order to 
justify a finding of involuntariness, there must be some 
affirmative evidence of improper police practices deliberately 
used to procure a confession."  Id. at 239.  If there is no such 
affirmative evidence, the analysis ends; the confession is 
voluntary.  Id. at 239-40, 245. 
                     
28 Counsel for Agnello also specifically argued that the 
fact that police had “gone on so long with their questioning” 
contributed to the coercive circumstances.  Id.    
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
31
¶73 This court will not set aside the circuit court’s 
findings of evidentiary or historical fact unless we determine 
that 
they 
are 
contrary 
to 
the 
great 
weight 
and 
clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 235.  See also Norwood, 
74 Wis. 2d at 363-64.  Consequently, any conflicts in the 
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the confession 
must be resolved in favor of the circuit court's findings.  
Norwood, 74 Wis. 2d at 364; Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 235.  We 
review 
independently 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles to the circuit court's findings of fact.  Clappes, 
136 Wis. 2d at 235. 
¶74 In this case, the circuit court found "beyond a 
reasonable doubt under all of the circumstances" that Agnello's 
confession "was not coerced in any sense of the word."  Tr. at 
171.  The court made a specific finding that the number of hours 
that Agnello was awake did not "constitute such undue fatigue as 
to render the statement involuntary."  Tr. at 170-171.  In 
addition, the court declined to accept as true Agnello's 
assertion that the police put pressure on his hand during 
questioning.  Id. at 171.  The court found the police officers' 
testimony more credible in general and also accepted the police 
detectives' version of events "over Mr. Agnello's version in 
this case under all the facts and circumstances that were 
elicited here."  Id. at 169, 171.  None of the police detectives 
testified 
to 
circumstances 
which 
even 
remotely 
could 
be 
characterized 
as coercive. 
 
Based 
on 
my 
review of the 
transcript, I conclude that these findings of the circuit court 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
32
are supported by the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  
¶75 Because the circuit court properly found that no 
coercion existed, there is no need to balance Agnello's personal 
characteristics against the police tactics used.  See Clappes, 
136 Wis. 2d at 236, 239-40, 245.  The circuit court correctly 
determined that under the totality of the circumstances, 
Agnello's confession was voluntary.29  
   
¶76 To summarize, I conclude that Agnello waived his right 
to review of whether the prosecutor's line of questioning at the 
Miranda-Goodchild hearing violated his due process rights under 
the rule of Rogers and Jackson.  Based on well-established 
Wisconsin precedent, I am convinced that the State must prove 
the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Further, I conclude that Agnello preserved his right to raise on 
appeal any police practices used during his questioning by 
specifying that the totality of the circumstances resulted in 
coercion.  Finally, I find that the circuit court properly 
determined 
that 
Agnello's 
confession 
was 
voluntary.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.   
¶77 For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                     
29 I again note that the court of appeals also upheld the 
circuit court's determination that Agnello's confession was 
voluntary.  See slip op. at 12.  
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
33
 
¶78 I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent. 
 
No. 96-3406.npc 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3