Title: Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP001595-CQ
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2018

2018 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1595-CQ 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Winebow, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellee, 
     v. 
Capitol-Husting Co., Inc. and L'Eft Bank Wine 
Co. Limited, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 5, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 19, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. and 
KELLY, J. dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs filed by 
Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Gregory N. Heinen, and Foley & Lardner 
LLP, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Thomas L. 
Shriner, Jr. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellee, there was a brief filed by E. 
King Poor (pro hac vice) and Quarles & Brady LLP, Chicago, 
Illinois, with whom on the brief were Daniel M. Janssen, and 
Quarles 
& 
Brady 
LLP, 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
2018 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1595-CQ 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Winebow, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
     v. 
 
Capitol-Husting Co., Inc. and L'Eft Bank Wine 
Co. Limited, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 5, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of question of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified question 
answered in the negative and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit.  Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., 
Inc., 867 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2017); see Wis. Stat. § 821.01 
(2015-16).1  It certified the following question:  "Does the 
definition 
of 
a 
dealership 
contained 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
2 
 
§ 135.02(3)(b) 
include 
wine 
grantor-dealer 
relationships?"  
Winebow, 867 F.3d at 871. 
¶2 
Our answer to this certified question will aid the 
Seventh Circuit in determining whether Winebow, Inc.'s (Winebow) 
attempt 
to 
end 
its 
business 
relationship 
with 
two 
wine 
distributors 
is 
governed 
by 
the 
unilateral 
termination 
limitations of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WFDL).  See 
Wis. Stat. § 135.03. 
¶3 
Winebow unilaterally terminated its relationship with 
Capitol-Husting Co., Inc. and L'Eft Bank Wine Co. Limited (the 
Distributors) after becoming dissatisfied.  It argues that the 
action 
was 
permissible 
because 
the 
parties' 
business 
relationship is not an "intoxicating liquor" dealership entitled 
to the protections of the WFDL.  See §§ 135.02(3)(b), 135.066.  
On the other hand, the Distributors contend that a wine grantor-
dealer 
relationship 
is 
a 
"dealership" 
entitled 
to 
such 
protections and thus Winebow cannot unilaterally terminate its 
relationship with the Distributors absent a showing of good 
cause. 
¶4 
We conclude that a wine grantor-dealer relationship is 
not included within the definition of a dealership in Wis. Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(b). 
 
Section 135.066(2) 
provides 
the 
operative 
definition of "intoxicating liquor" for purposes of ch. 135, and 
such definition explicitly excludes wine. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the 
negative. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
3 
 
I 
¶6 
Winebow is engaged in the business of importing and 
distributing wine to downstream wholesalers.  Since 2004, 
Winebow has used Capitol-Husting as a distributor of its wines, 
and in 2009 it commenced a similar relationship with L'Eft Bank. 
¶7 
After becoming dissatisfied with the Distributors, 
Winebow abruptly terminated its relationship with them in 
February of 2015.  The parties did not have any express written 
agreement 
that 
would 
prevent 
Winebow 
from 
unilaterally 
terminating their relationships. 
¶8 
The Distributors responded to Winebow's termination by 
letter, indicating their belief that they are entitled to the 
protections of the WFDL.  Such protections would prevent Winebow 
from terminating their relationships absent "good cause."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 135.03. 
¶9 
Winebow countered by filing a declaratory judgment 
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin.  Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., 
Inc., No. 15-CV-225, slip op. at *1 (E.D. Wis. June 18, 2015).  
It sought a declaration that it has no continuing obligations to 
the Distributors.  Id. 
¶10  The District Court ruled in Winebow's favor.  It 
determined that "[w]ine is not intoxicating liquor in the 
context of the WFDL, and thus the [Distributors'] business 
relationship with Winebow is not subject to the unilateral 
termination limitations of Chapter 135."  Id. at *4. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
4 
 
¶11 The Distributors appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, contending that wine 
dealerships 
are 
per 
se 
"intoxicating 
liquor" 
dealerships 
entitled to the protections of the WFDL.  Winebow, 867 F.3d at 
867.  The Seventh Circuit certified to this court the question 
of whether the definition of "dealership" contained in Wis. 
Stat. § 135.02(3)(b) includes wine grantor-dealer relationships.  
Id. at 870-71. 
II 
¶12 Underlying this case are proposed statutory changes to 
the WFDL and the governor's partial veto of some of these 
changes.  See 1999 Wis. Act 9, §§ 2166m, 2166s.  We thus provide 
brief background on the WFDL, the proposed changes to it, and 
the partial veto. 
¶13 The WFDL provides in part that a grantor of a 
dealership may not terminate a dealership agreement without good 
cause.  Wis. Stat. § 135.03; see Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, 
Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 594, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987).  Its 
underlying purposes and policies include "[t]o promote the 
compelling interest of the public in fair business relations 
between dealers and grantors, and in the continuation of 
dealerships on a fair basis."  § 135.025(2)(a).  Additionally, 
it aims "[t]o protect dealers against unfair treatment by 
grantors, who inherently have superior economic power and 
superior bargaining power in the negotiation of dealerships[.]"  
§ 135.025(2)(b). 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
5 
 
¶14 A grantor who violates the WFDL may be subject to an 
action for "damages sustained by the dealer as a consequence of 
the grantor's violation, together with the actual costs of the 
action, including reasonable attorney fees."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 135.06.  Further, a "dealer also may be granted injunctive 
relief against unlawful termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or 
substantial change of competitive circumstances."  Id. 
¶15 However, the WFDL does not apply to all business 
relationships, but only to those defined as "dealerships."  In 
1999, the legislature sought to broaden the WFDL's reach to 
ensure that "intoxicating liquor" dealers were protected.  See 
1999 Wis. Act 9, §§ 2166m, 2166s. 
¶16 It did so by making two significant changes.  First, 
it 
amended 
the 
definition 
of 
a 
"dealership" 
to 
include 
distributors of "intoxicating liquors."  1999 Wis. Act 9, 
§ 2166m. 
 
The 
new 
definition, 
codified 
at 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(b), included within a "dealership": 
A contract or agreement, either expressed or implied, 
whether oral or written, between 2 or more persons by 
which a wholesaler, as defined in s. 125.02(21), is 
granted the right to sell or distribute intoxicating 
liquor or use a trade name, trademark, service mark, 
logotype, 
advertising 
or 
other 
commercial 
symbol 
related to intoxicating liquor.  This paragraph does 
not apply to dealerships described in s. 135.066(5)(a) 
and (b). 
1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2166m. 
¶17 This 
revised 
"dealership" 
definition 
explicitly 
incorporated the definition of "intoxicating liquor" found in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 125, which regulates alcohol beverages.  Pursuant 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
6 
 
to Wis. Stat. § 125.02(8), "vinous liquors," or in other words 
"wine," 
is 
expressly 
included 
under 
the 
umbrella 
of 
"intoxicating liquor": 
"Intoxicating liquor" means all ardent, spirituous, 
distilled or vinous liquors, liquids or compounds, 
whether medicated, proprietary, patented or not, and 
by whatever name called, containing 0.5 percent or 
more of alcohol by volume, which are beverages, but 
does not include "fermented malt beverages." 
§ 125.02(8). 
¶18 Second, the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 135.066.  
1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2166s.  This new provision expressed the 
legislature's desire for a competitive and stable wholesale 
liquor market.  See § 135.066(1).  Like the legislature's 
revised definition of "dealership," the newly enacted § 135.066 
imported 
the 
definition 
of 
"intoxicating 
liquor" 
from 
§ 125.02(8).  § 135.066(2). 
¶19 Both of these changes were included in the 1999 budget 
bill.  See 1999 Wis. Act 9.  However, Governor Tommy Thompson 
used his partial veto power to alter the revisions passed by the 
legislature.2 
                                                 
2 The governor's partial veto power arises from Article V, 
§ 10 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
which 
sets 
forth, 
"Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the 
governor, and the part approved shall become law."  Wis. Const. 
art. V, § 10(1)(b).  Pursuant to the partial veto power, the 
governor may strike out language in an appropriation measure, 
but may not add language.  See State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. 
Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 437, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988); State ex 
rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 707-08, 264 N.W.2d 539 
(1978). 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
7 
 
¶20 Specifically, the governor struck language proposed by 
the legislature from both Wis. Stat. §§ 135.02(3)(b) and 
135.066.  With respect to § 135.02(3)(b), he deleted the cross-
reference to the existing definition of "intoxicating liquor" 
found in ch. 125.3 
¶21 Edits 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.066 
were 
much 
more 
extensive. 
 
The 
governor 
eliminated 
large 
portions 
of 
                                                                                                                                                             
The partial veto power was originally a very broad power, 
but has been subsequently limited.  Originally, the governor 
could "veto individual words, letters and digits, and also may 
reduce appropriations by striking digits, as long as what 
remains after veto is a complete, entire, and workable law."  
Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 437. 
A 1990 amendment slightly limited the power, dictating that 
"the governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual 
letters in the words of the enrolled bill."  Wis. Const. art. V, 
§ 10(1)(c) (1990).  This was the version in effect when Governor 
Thompson exercised the veto at issue in this case.  A subsequent 
revision in 2008 brought Article V, § 10 to its present form, 
further limiting the partial veto power by stating that "the 
governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual 
letters in the words of the enrolled bill, and may not create a 
new sentence by combining parts of 2 or more sentences of the 
enrolled bill."  Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(c). 
3 The 
governor's 
veto 
with 
respect 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(b) was as follows: 
A contract or agreement, either expressed or implied, 
whether oral or written, between 2 or more persons by 
which a wholesaler, as defined in s. 125.02(21), is 
granted the right to sell or distribute intoxicating 
liquor, as defined in s. 125.02(8), or use a trade 
name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising 
or other commercial symbol related to intoxicating 
liquor.  This paragraph does not apply to dealerships 
described in s. 135.066(5)(a) and (b). 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
8 
 
§ 135.066(2)-(4). 
 
What 
remained 
was 
the 
sole 
sentence, 
"'Intoxicating liquor' has the same meaning given in s. 
125.02(8) minus wine."4 
                                                 
4 Observe 
that 
the 
words 
"minus" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.066(2)(a), 
formerly 
subsection 
(2)(b) 
in 
draft 
legislation, and "wine" in former subsection (2)(d) are left 
unscathed: 
(2) DEFINITIONS. In this section: 
(a) "Intoxicating liquor" has the same meaning 
given in s. 125.02(8). 
(b) "Net revenues" means the gross dollar amount 
received from the sale of intoxicating liquor 
minus adjustments for returns, discounts and 
allowances. 
(c) "Wholesaler" has the meaning given in s. 
125.02(21). 
(d) "Wine" has the meaning given in 125.02(22). 
(3) LIABILITY OF TRANSFEREE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR 
GRANTOR. 
(a) In this subsection: 
1. 
"Goodwill" 
includes 
the 
use 
of 
a 
trademark, trade name, logotype or other 
commercial 
symbol, 
and 
the 
use 
of 
a 
variation 
of 
a 
trademark, 
trade 
name, 
logotype, advertisement or other commercial 
symbol. 
2. "Transferee" means a person who acquires 
any 
asset 
or 
activity 
of 
a 
grantor's 
intoxicating liquor business and who uses 
the 
goodwill 
associated 
with 
the 
intoxicating liquor of the grantor. 
(b) A transferee shall be bound by each of the 
grantor's 
dealerships 
with 
the 
grantor's 
wholesalers and consequently shall be considered 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
9 
 
¶22 Legislative 
findings 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.066(1) and a severability provision in sub. (6) escaped 
the veto pen, but the governor struck several references to wine 
in sub. (5), a nonapplicability provision.5  The legislature did 
not override the governor's veto. 
                                                                                                                                                             
a grantor for the purposes of, and shall comply 
with, the requirements of this chapter. 
(4) CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP. 
(a) In this subsection, "successor wholesaler" 
means 
a 
wholesaler 
who 
succeeds 
to 
the 
management, ownership or control of a wholesaler 
or wholesaler's business or any part of a 
wholesaler's business by any means including by 
stock purchase, sale of assets or transfer or 
assignment of a brand of intoxicating liquor that 
is the subject of a dealership agreement. 
(b) A change in the management, ownership or 
control of a wholesaler, a wholesaler's business 
or any part of a wholesaler's business is not 
good cause for a grantor to terminate, cancel, 
fail 
to 
renew 
or 
substantially 
change 
the 
competitive circumstances of its dealership with 
a 
successor 
wholesaler 
if 
the 
successor 
wholesaler meets the grantor's reasonable and 
material qualifications for wholesaler applicants 
in effect at the time of the change. If the 
successor 
wholesaler 
meets 
the 
grantor's 
reasonable 
and 
material 
qualifications 
for 
wholesaler applicants in effect at the time of 
the 
change, 
the 
successor 
wholesaler 
shall 
succeed 
to 
the 
dealership 
rights 
of 
the 
predecessor wholesaler and the grantor shall 
continue to be bound by the dealership. 
5 In this section, the partial veto was as follows: 
(5) NONAPPLICABILITY. This section does not apply to 
any of the following dealerships: 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
10 
 
III 
¶23 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 135.02 and 135.066.  Statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law we review independently.  Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. 
Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶19, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.  We are 
not bound by the federal district court's interpretation, but it 
may aid in our analysis.  Baldewein Co. v. Tri-Clover, Inc., 
2000 WI 20, ¶10, 233 Wis. 2d 57, 606 N.W.2d 145 (citing Daanen & 
Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 400, 573 
N.W.2d 842 (1998)). 
IV 
¶24 With the preceding context and standard of review in 
hand, we examine next the specific question certified by the 
Seventh Circuit:  whether the definition of a dealership 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Dealerships in which a grantor, including any 
affiliate, division or subsidiary of the grantor, 
has never produced more than 200,000 gallons of 
intoxicating liquor in any year. 
(b) 
Dealerships 
in 
which 
the 
dealer's 
net 
revenues from the sale of all of the grantor's 
brands 
of 
intoxicating 
liquor, 
except 
wine, 
constitute less than 5% of the dealer's total net 
revenues from the sale of intoxicating liquor, 
except wine, during the dealer's most recent 
fiscal year preceding a grantor's cancellation or 
alteration of a dealership and the dealer's net 
revenues from the sale of all of the grantor's 
brands of wine constitute less than 5% of the 
dealer's total net revenues from the sale of wine 
during the dealer's most recent fiscal year 
preceding a grantor's cancellation or alteration 
of a dealership. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
11 
 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b) includes wine grantor-
dealer relationships. 
¶25 Winebow asserts that the "minus wine" definition of 
"intoxicating liquor" in Wis. Stat. § 135.066 applies to the 
entirety of ch. 135, and that consequently we should answer the 
certified 
question 
in 
the 
negative. 
 
Conversely, 
the 
Distributors contend that the definition of "dealership" in 
§ 135.02(3)(b) incorporates the definition of "intoxicating 
liquor" from ch. 125, a definition that expressly includes wine. 
¶26 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we need not further the 
inquiry.  Id. 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 135.066(2) defines "intoxicating 
liquor" as having "the meaning given in s. 125.02(8) minus 
wine."  Winebow suggests that the language of the statute 
plainly and unambiguously excludes wine from the definition of 
"intoxicating liquor" for chapter 135. 
¶28 We agree with Winebow.  Its interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 135.066(2) is supported by several considerations.  
First, contrary to the Distributors' argument, the fact that the 
definition is not located in the "definitions" section of the 
statute is not dispositive.  Neither the Distributors nor the 
dissent cite any case law that exclusively tethers definitions 
to a correspondingly labeled section of the statutes. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
12 
 
¶29 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 135.066(2) 
provides 
the 
sole 
definition of "intoxicating liquor" in ch. 135, and it excludes 
wine.  The term "intoxicating liquor" is used eleven times in 
chapter 135, but defined only once.  We aim for uniformity of 
definitions within a statutory chapter, not diversity of 
definitions.  See Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Const., Inc., 2010 WI 
74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462.  "When the same term 
is used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a reasonable 
deduction that the legislature intended that the term possess an 
identical meaning each time it appears."  Id.  For one 
definition of "intoxicating liquor" to control § 135.066 and 
another to control the rest of the chapter would run afoul of 
this maxim. 
¶30 Rather, "[s]ections of statutes relating to the same 
subject matter must be construed in pari materia."6  State v. 
Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982).  Applying 
this canon on interpretation here, we arrive at the conclusion 
that the single "intoxicating liquor" definition supplied in ch. 
135 should apply to the entirety of the chapter. 
¶31 Further, the Wis. Stat. § 135.066(2) "minus wine" 
definition would serve no purpose if limited in its application 
                                                 
6 "In pari materia" refers to statutes and regulations 
relating to the same subject matter or having a common purpose.  
In re Jeremiah C., 2003 WI App 40, ¶17, 260 Wis. 2d 359, 659 
N.W.2d 193.  The statutory construction doctrine of in pari 
materia requires a court to read, apply, and construe statutes 
relating to the same subject matter together.  Id. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
13 
 
to § 135.066 but not the remainder of ch. 135.  Outside of the 
"minus 
wine" 
definition, 
§ 135.066 
contains 
legislative 
findings, a nonapplicability provision, and a severability 
provision.  The "minus wine" language does not affect any of 
these remaining provisions.7  Limiting the application of the 
"minus wine" definition to § 135.066 would render the language a 
nullity.8 
¶32 Additionally, treatises on both the WFDL and alcohol 
regulation uniformly support our application of the "minus wine" 
definition provided by Wis. Stat. § 135.066(2).  As one treatise 
on the WFDL advises, "intoxicating liquor refers to spirits, not 
wine or beer."  Michael A. Bowen et al., The Wisconsin Fair 
                                                 
7 The dissent asserts that "[t]he definition of intoxicating 
liquor in § 135.066 retains a function even if limited to its 
specific section of ch. 135."  Dissent, ¶50.  According to the 
dissent, "[i]t applies to the legislative findings of sub. (1), 
the 
non-applicability 
provisions 
of 
sub. 
(5), 
and 
the 
severability part of sub. (6).  Id.  But if the "minus wine" 
definition applies within § 135.066 only, what is its actual 
effect?  The legislative findings are mere background and define 
no substantive rights.  Further, as the Seventh Circuit 
correctly recognized in its certification, none of the other 
provisions of § 135.066 is affected by the "minus wine" language 
of sub. (2).  See Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., Inc., 
867 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2017).  The dissent's interpretation 
thus renders the "minus wine" language superfluous. 
8 Stated differently, to read the statute to include wine 
would render "minus wine" mere surplusage, a result that must be 
avoided.  See Milwaukee Cty. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human 
Relations Comm'n, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 452-53, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977) 
(quoting Cook v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Wis. 2d 232, 239-40, 142 
N.W.2d 827 (1966) ("[S]tatutes should be so construed that no 
word or clause shall be rendered surplusage.")). 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
14 
 
Dealership Law § 4.34A at 61 (4th ed. 2012); see also id. 
(explaining that "the governor's partial vetoes of the 1999 
amendment make it clear that he intended (3)(b) to be 
inapplicable to wine wholesalers.").9 
¶33 Similarly, a treatise on Wisconsin alcohol beverages 
regulation 
opines 
that 
"the 
applicable 
definition 
of 
intoxicating liquor in Wis. Stat. ch. 135 excludes wine, such 
that 
[ch. 
135's] 
special 
WFDL 
provisions 
apply 
only 
to 
distilled-spirits distribution agreements."  Aaron R. Gary, 
Alcohol Beverages Regulation in Wisconsin § 4.66 (2nd ed. 2016). 
¶34 In the over eighteen years since the enactment of the 
"minus wine" provision, the legislature certainly could have 
acted to amend the law if it thought the commentators' 
understanding was incorrect.  However, it did not override the 
governor's veto in 1999, and it has remained silent in the 
intervening years. 
¶35 As 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
aptly 
observed 
in 
its 
certification, 
there 
is 
"no 
express 
statutory 
language" 
supporting the Distributors' position.  See Winebow, 867 F.3d at 
                                                 
9 In his veto message, Governor Thompson was explicit 
regarding the reasons for his partial veto:  "I am partially 
vetoing these provisions so that wine will be excluded from 
treatment under these changes to the Wisconsin Fair Dealership 
Law because I object to wine being treated the same as 
intoxicating liquor."  Governor's Veto Message, Act 9, at § F.4 
(Oct. 27, 1999); see State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("legislative history is sometimes consulted to confirm or 
verify a plain-meaning interpretation"). 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
15 
 
869.  Cross references to their preferred definition were 
removed from Wis. Stat. § 135.066 by Governor Thompson's partial 
veto.  Following that veto, what remains is unambiguous in its 
effect to exclude wine from the definition of "intoxicating 
liquor." 
¶36 Instead 
of 
giving 
effect 
to 
ch. 
135's 
single 
definition of "intoxicating liquor," the Distributors would have 
the court follow a path through ch. 125 to arrive at their 
preferred definition.  The Distributors' circuitous route begins 
at Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b), which references the definition of 
"wholesaler" from § 125.02(21).  Pursuant to § 125.02(21), 
"'[w]holesaler' means a person, other than a brewer, brewpub, 
manufacturer, or rectifier, who sells alcohol beverages to a 
licensed retailer or to another person who holds a permit to 
sell alcohol beverages at wholesale."  We are then directed to 
§ 125.02(1), which defines "alcohol beverages" as "fermented 
malt beverages and intoxicating liquor."  Finally, moving to 
§ 125.02(8), we arrive at the definition of "intoxicating 
liquor" as including "vinous liquors," more commonly known as 
wine. 
¶37 Our interpretation gives effect to the sole definition 
of "intoxicating liquor" located in ch. 135, one which is 
located 
in 
a 
statutory 
section 
beneath 
the 
heading, 
"Intoxicating liquor dealerships."  If the court here were to 
decide that it is acceptable to effectuate a definition from ch. 
125 that is not referenced within ch. 135, there would be no 
clear stopping point to such a practice. 
No. 
2017AP1595-CQ 
 
16 
 
¶38 In sum, we conclude that a wine grantor-dealer 
relationship is not included within the definition of a 
dealership in Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 135.066(2) provides the operative definition of "intoxicating 
liquor" for purposes of Wis. Stat. ch. 135, and such definition 
explicitly excludes wine. 
¶39 Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the 
negative and remand the cause to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
By the Court.—Certified question answered in the negative 
and cause remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit. 
 
 
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¶40 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
legislature unquestionably intended to include wine distributors 
as dealers under Wis. Stat. ch. 135 and then-Governor Tommy 
Thompson1 obviously intended to exclude them.  But legislative 
intent behind enactment of a law——or executive intent motivating 
the exercise of a veto——cannot govern statutory interpretation.  
Rather, our analysis must focus on the statutory language itself 
and "[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  A 
plain meaning interpretation of ch. 135, giving effect to every 
word, requires answering the certified question from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the affirmative:  The definition of 
a "[d]ealership" contained in Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b) includes 
wine grantor-dealer relationships.  The isolated definition in 
Wis. Stat. § 135.066(2)(a), on which the majority relies to 
reach the opposite conclusion, applies only in § 135.066.  
Because the majority's interpretation is wrong, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 135, also known as the Wisconsin 
Fair Dealership Law, governs grantor-dealer relationships and 
"shall be liberally construed and applied to promote" the 
purposes set forth in Wis. Stat. § 135.025(2), which include, 
for example, (1) fairness in business relationships between 
                                                 
1 Then-Governor Tommy Thompson will subsequently be referred 
to as "Governor." 
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dealers and grantors and in their continuation; (2) protection 
of dealers from grantors who "have superior economic power and 
superior bargaining power"; and (3) statutory rights and 
remedies for dealers.2 
¶42 The question before the court is whether the two wine 
distributors in this case are "[d]ealers" protected by ch. 135.  
The wine distributors claim dealership status, while Winebow 
insists ch. 135 does not apply to wine distributors at all.  A 
textual interpretation of ch. 135 provides a clear answer:  the 
wine distributors are "[d]ealers." 
¶43 The 
analysis 
necessarily 
starts 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02, which supplies the definitions to be used throughout 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 135 comprises eleven subsections.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 135.01 gives the title of chapter 135.  
Section 135.02 furnishes the definitions that apply throughout 
the entirety of ch. 135.  Section 135.025 details the purposes 
of the chapter, requires liberal application to meet those 
purposes, and prohibits parties from contracting away ch. 135's 
protections.  Section 135.03 explains that dealerships may not 
be altered or terminated without a showing of good cause.  
Section 135.04 
imposes 
rules 
and 
notice 
deadlines 
for 
termination or changes in a dealership.  Section 135.045 governs 
the repurchase of inventory upon termination of a dealership by 
the grantor.  Section 135.05 discusses the applicability of 
arbitration agreements in ch. 135.  Section 135.06 affords 
dealers the right to recover attorney fees and obtain injunctive 
relief in actions against grantors for violating ch. 135.  
Section 135.065 deems any violation of the chapter by a grantor 
an irreparable injury for purposes of seeking a temporary 
injunction. 
 
Section 135.066 
contains 
legislative 
findings 
specific to intoxicating liquor dealers, defines "[i]ntoxicating 
liquor," renders this section inapplicable to two types of 
dealerships, and makes the provisions in this section severable.  
Section 135.07 declares ch. 135 inapplicable to motor vehicle 
dealers, insurance businesses, and door-to-door sales of goods 
or services. 
 
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ch. 135.  Section 135.02 defines both "Dealer" and "Dealership."  
Section 135.02 provides, as material: 
In this chapter: 
(2) "Dealer" means a person who is a grantee of a 
dealership situated in this state. 
(3)  "Dealership" means any of the following: 
. . . . 
(b)  A contract or agreement, either expressed or 
implied, whether oral or written, between 2 or more 
persons by which a wholesaler, as defined in s. 
125.02(21), is granted the right to sell or distribute 
intoxicating liquor or use a trade name, trademark, 
service 
mark, 
logotype, 
advertising 
or 
other 
commercial symbol related to intoxicating liquor.  
This paragraph does not apply to dealerships described 
in s. 135.066(5)(a) and (b). 
(Emphasis added.)  To determine whether a "[d]ealership" exists 
between Winebow and the two wine distributors, we need to know 
whether the wine distributors are "wholesaler[s]." 
¶44 The language of Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b) directs us 
to the definition of "wholesaler" under Wis. Stat. § 125.02(21).3  
Section 125.02(21) defines "[w]holesaler" as "a person, other 
than a brewer, brewpub, manufacturer, or rectifier, who sells 
alcohol beverages to a licensed retailer or to another person 
who holds a permit to sell alcohol beverages at wholesale."  The 
dispute in this case revolves around whether wine is an "alcohol 
beverage" 
as 
referenced 
in 
the 
"wholesaler" 
definition.  
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 125 specifically governs the sale of 
alcohol beverages in the State of Wisconsin and addresses the 
importance 
of 
the 
three-tier 
system 
of 
"production, 
distribution, and sale."  See Wis. Stat. § 125.01. 
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Section 125.02(1) defines "alcohol beverage" as "fermented malt 
beverages and intoxicating liquor" and § 125.02(8) defines 
"[i]ntoxicating liquor" as: 
[A]ll ardent, spirituous, distilled or vinous liquors, 
liquids or compounds, whether medicated, proprietary, 
patented 
or 
not, 
and 
by 
whatever 
name 
called, 
containing 0.5 percent or more of alcohol by volume, 
which are beverages, but does not include "fermented 
malt beverages". 
(Emphasis added.)  Everyone agrees that vinous liquors include 
wine.  Construing the text of these statutes leads to the 
inexorable conclusion that the wine distributors are wholesalers 
whose agreements with Winebow create dealerships protected by 
ch. 135. 
¶45 The majority decries this interpretive exercise as a 
"practice" with "no clear stopping point."  Majority op., ¶37.  
While our judicial duty of declaring what a statute says would 
be easier if each statutory chapter confined its subject matter 
to that particular chapter, legislative enactments are rarely so 
linear.  On the scale of interpretive complexity, our task falls 
on the easy end.  Inexplicably, the majority maintains the key 
definition from Wis. Stat. ch. 125 is not referenced within 
ch. 135, see majority op., ¶37; this is of course inaccurate 
because Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b) explicitly references Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.02(21), 
which 
provides 
the 
definition 
of 
"[w]holesaler."  This cross-reference to ch. 125 (governing 
alcohol beverages) within the rather brief ch. 135 requires no 
more than reading three definitions within the same section of 
ch. 125 (i.e., § 125.02), each of which is explicitly connected.  
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Far from lacking a clear stopping point, the analysis requires 
us to start with ch. 135 and end in one section of ch. 125.  The 
majority criticizes this statutory construction as "circuitous."  
Majority op., ¶36.  Following a single cross-reference to find 
the meaning of a defined term is hardly circuitous; regardless 
of how it is characterized, it is nonetheless the only correct 
interpretation. 
II 
¶46 Although the text clearly leads to the conclusion that 
ch. 135 applies to wine grantor-dealer relationships, the 
Seventh Circuit certified the question because Wis. Stat. 
§ 135.066(2)(a) provides a seemingly contradictory definition of 
"[i]ntoxicating liquor."4  This conflicting definition, however, 
does not override the definition of "[i]ntoxicating liquor" 
within Wis. Stat. § 125.02(8). 
¶47 First, the definition of intoxicating liquor in Wis. 
Stat. § 135.066 contains no language suggesting that its 
definition applies throughout ch. 135.  In contrast, the 
definition 
of 
"intoxicating 
liquor" 
embedded 
within 
§ 135.02(3)(b) resides in the "definitions" section of ch. 135, 
which specifically says that the definitions apply "in this 
chapter"——that 
is, 
ch. 135. 
 
Because 
the 
definition 
of 
intoxicating liquor that includes wine——which is rooted in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(b)——applies 
across 
the 
chapter, 
it 
is 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 135.066(2)(a) provides:  "'Intoxicating 
liquor' has the meaning given in s. 125.02(8) minus wine." 
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textually insupportable to apply § 135.066's definition of 
"intoxicating liquor" beyond the section it inhabits. 
¶48 Second, in order to give effect to all the words used 
within ch. 135, Wis. Stat. § 135.066's definition must be 
limited to that particular section where it appears.  Allowing 
§ 135.066's definition to apply anywhere else would render the 
"[i]n this chapter" language of Wis. Stat. § 135.02 superfluous.  
If definitions outside of § 135.02 also applied throughout the 
chapter, despite the absence of express language so directing, 
§ 135.02's language rendering its definitions applicable "in 
this chapter" would amount to a bootstrap provision at best, 
merely emphasizing, but not controlling, the operation of 
ch. 135's definitions.  Because basic tenets of statutory 
construction dictate avoiding surplusage, the majority errs in 
its interpretation by creating overlapping definitions.  See 
Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 250, 493 N.W.2d 68 
(1992) (we are to construe a statute, where possible, so that no 
part of it is rendered superfluous); see also Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
174 (2012) ("If possible, every word and every provision is to 
be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda[ ]).  None 
should be ignored.  None should needlessly be given an 
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or 
to 
have 
no 
consequence."). 
 
The 
majority's 
creation 
of 
overlapping but contradictory definitions requires it to select 
one and ignore the other.  This consequence is objectionable but 
avoidable by giving effect to both definitions, as the text 
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directs us:  one applies throughout the chapter and the other 
applies only within its own section. 
¶49 Third, it is Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3) that defines 
whether a relationship between a grantor and a dealer is a 
"[d]ealership."  Wisconsin Stat. § 135.066 does not. 
¶50 The majority concludes that Wis. Stat. § 135.066's 
definition of "[i]ntoxicating liquor" must apply across the 
chapter, thereby removing ch. 135's protections from the two 
wine distributors in this case, in order to give the definition 
meaning.  I disagree.  The definition of "[i]ntoxicating liquor" 
in § 135.066 retains a function even if limited to its specific 
section of ch. 135.  It applies to the legislative findings of 
sub. (1), the non-applicability provisions of sub. (5), and the 
severability part of sub. (6). 
¶51 The effect of confining the Wis. Stat. § 135.066(2)(a) 
definition 
of 
"[i]ntoxicating 
liquor" 
to 
§ 135.066 
may 
contravene the Governor's intention in excising wine from that 
definition.  Regardless of what he intended in exercising his 
partial veto power, this is what the Governor wrote.  We give 
effect to the text, not the intentions of its drafters.  As a 
result, under sub. (1), the legislative findings regarding the 
three-tier system for distributing intoxicating liquor do not 
apply to wine dealerships.  Subsection (5) renders § 135.066 
inapplicable to certain "intoxicating liquor" dealerships whose 
production of "intoxicating liquor" does not exceed certain 
thresholds in gallons or revenue.  Because wine was struck from 
the "intoxicating liquor" definition in § 135.066(2)(a), the 
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non-applicability provision in sub. (5) does not apply to wine 
dealerships.  Finally, sub. (6) makes the provisions of 
§ 135.066 severable; under Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11), this means 
that if one section is declared invalid, the remaining sections 
shall stand unaffected.  Restricting the application of the 
§ 135.066(2)(a) definition of "intoxicating liquor" to § 135.066 
may not be what the Governor intended, but it is what he left of 
the legislation in exercising his partial veto power.  And it is 
the text, not intentions, that reigns supreme.  State ex rel. 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶41 ("a 'policy favoring conventional 
meanings 
and 
general 
understandings 
over 
obscurely 
evidenced intention of the legislators is supported in the oft-
repeated premise that intention must be determined primarily 
from the language of the statute itself'" (quoting 2A Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.08, at 40 (6th 
ed. 2000))); Scalia & Garner, supra ¶9, at 56 ("The words of a 
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, 
in their context, is what the text means."). 
¶52 The majority emphasizes the history of these statutes 
before enactment by including the full text proposed by the 
legislature, the strikethroughs made by the Governor's veto pen, 
and 
the 
Governor's 
letter 
explaining 
the 
basis 
for 
his 
substantial edits.  Placing the focus on these non-textual 
considerations improperly influenced the majority's statutory 
construction.  "It is always perilous to derive the meaning of 
an adopted provision from another provision deleted in the 
drafting process."  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
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570, 590 (2008).  This caution applies no less to provisions 
deleted by the Governor exercising his veto power. 
¶53 The majority underscores the legislature's ability to 
amend the law if it in fact disagreed with certain treatises' 
take on the effect of the Governor's partial vetoes to remove 
wine wholesalers from the fair dealership law.  This court has 
explained that legislative acquiescence is a slim reed upon 
which to support a judicial construction of a statute because 
"[n]umerous variables, unrelated to conscious endorsement of a 
statutory interpretation, may explain or cause legislative 
inaction."  Wenke 
v. 
Gehl 
Co., 
2004 
WI 
103, 
¶33, 
274 
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 
480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t [is] 
impossible 
to 
assert 
with 
any 
degree 
of 
assurance 
that 
congressional failure to act represents (1) approval of the 
status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to 
alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) 
indifference 
to 
the 
status 
quo, 
or 
even 
(5) 
political 
cowardice.").  Our judicial duty is to say what the law is, not 
to surmise meaning from legislative quiescence.  Legislative 
inaction cannot support an interpretation of the statute that is 
contrary to the plain meaning of the language used in the 
statute. 
III 
¶54 Applying a textual analysis of the language in ch. 135 
leads to but one conclusion:  wine distributors are wholesalers 
as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 135.02.  The majority 
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fixates on what the Governor struck from the legislation rather 
than what remained, thereby giving effect to what the Governor 
intended rather than what he actually signed into law.  Reading 
the pertinent provisions of ch. 135 without the obfuscating 
portions that did not survive the Governor's veto dissolves any 
ambiguity.  The majority adopts a statutory construction that 
rewrites ch. 135 by subtracting language from it, rather than 
giving effect to every word.  The majority errs.  I would answer 
the 
certified 
question 
affirmatively, 
and 
therefore, 
respectfully dissent. 
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and DANIEL KELLY join this dissent. 
 
 
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