Title: Flonnory v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 421, 1999, 443, 1999
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FREDDY FLONNORY,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Nos. 421 and 443, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN97-09-0726 and  
Plaintiff Below, 
§  IN97-09-0727; IN97-07-1509;  
Appellee. 
§  IN97-07-1502-1503; 1507; 1508 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§    
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  April 17, 2001 
 
 
 
 
      Decided: August 14, 2001 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and 
STEELE, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc). 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and 
REMANDED for a New Trial. 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire (argued), Brian Bartley, Esquire and 
Kester I.H. Crosse, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Thomas E. Brown, Esquire (argued), Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire 
and Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
This is a direct appeal by the defendant-appellant, Freddy Flonnory, 
following the imposition of a death sentence.1  Flonnory and Korey 
Twyman, were charged by indictment with two counts of Intentional Murder 
and related offenses.  Upon Flonnory’s application, the co-defendants’ cases 
were severed.   
After a jury trial, a guilty verdict was returned against Flonnory on all 
counts.  A penalty hearing was conducted thereafter.  The jury unanimously 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a statutory aggravating circumstance 
existed.  In addition, the jury found, by a vote of 9-3, that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  The trial judge 
sentenced Flonnory to death by lethal injection.  Additional sentences were 
imposed for the non-capital offenses. 
Flonnory has raised nine issues in this appeal.  In this decision, 
however, we consider only his contention that his right to a fair trial before 
an impartial jury, under the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
Constitution, was violated by improper highly prejudicial extraneous 
influences on his jury.  We have determined that argument is meritorious.  
Consequently, the judgments of the Superior Court must be reversed.  This 
matter is remanded for a new trial. 
                                          
 
1 Both a direct appeal as well as an automatic appeal from the death sentence were 
docketed on Flonnory’s behalf.   
 
3
Facts 
 
Angela Farmer and Danya “Duke” Adams were murdered on July 13, 
1996.  The events that lead to their deaths began two weeks earlier.  On July 
1, 1997, Richard Grantham was driving near Gander Hill in Wilmington, 
Delaware, with Adams and Dwayne Warren.  While stopped at a red light,  
Grantham saw Korey Twyman, Korey’s brother Terrell, and Freddy 
Flonnory nearby.  Korey picked up a bottle or brick and threw it at 
Grantham’s car.  Grantham drove off through the red light and went straight 
to the west side of Wilmington, where Adams retrieved his handgun.   
Adams, Grantham and Warren then drove back to the scene of the 
earlier incident looking for Korey.  As they drove towards 24th and Market 
Streets, they were approached by Korey, Flonnory and others.  Korey hit 
Grantham in the head with a bottle and Grantham was beginning to be pulled 
from the car.  Adams, however, fired several shots, causing the crowd to 
disperse and the car drove away.  One of the bullets struck Korey in the arm.  
He went to a local hospital for treatment.  Another bullet passed through 
Flonnory’s shirt but missed his body.  A third bullet hit the car belonging to 
Flonnory’s mother that was parked near the intersection.  She and her 
grandchildren were near or in the car.  Flonnory’s girlfriend had also been in 
 
4
his mother’s car.  Wilmington police responded to the incident, but 
witnesses at the scene did not cooperate with their inquiries. 
 
During the next two weeks, Korey expressed a desire to retaliate 
against Adams and the “westside boys” for the shooting.  On July 13, 1997, 
Flonnory, like Korey, told others that he wanted to retaliate for the July 1 
incident.  Flonnory tried to recruit Terrell to join him, but he declined.  
 
Shortly before midnight on July 13, 1997, Korey and Flonnory 
obtained a ride to the west side of Wilmington with Lionel “Moose” 
Robinson.  After circling the area around 6th and Madison Streets, Korey 
spotted Adams and instructed Robinson to park at 6th and Washington 
Streets.  Korey and Flonnory left the car and asked Robinson to wait for 
them to return.  The two then proceeded through an alleyway that exited 
onto the 600 block of Jefferson Street. 
 
Adams, Dwayne Warren, Angela Farmer and “Dewey” were sitting or 
standing under a tree on Jefferson Street.  According to the State, Korey and 
Flonnory stepped from the alley across the street and both started shooting.  
Angela was hit three times and fell dead from a fatal shot to the chest.  
Dewey managed to flee the scene.  Adams was struck by two bullets.  
Warren, himself struck by two bullets in the leg, tried to carry Adams behind 
a car after Adams had been shot.  Adams’ injuries, however, turned out to be 
 
5
fatal.  As he was dying, Adams said “that nigger Box” to Warren.  “Box” 
was a nickname used by Flonnory. 
 
Flonnory testified that he thought he and Korey were heading to 
“rumble” or fist-fight with young rivals.  According to Flonnory, Korey was 
armed with a gun solely in the event the rivals were armed and started 
shooting as they had two weeks before.  Flonnory testified that he followed 
Korey towards Jefferson Street through the narrow alleyway and stopped to 
urinate before fighting.  According to Flonnory, Korey drew his weapon and 
started shooting towards the others on Jefferson Street.  Flonnory said he 
heard a second, louder weapon returning fire, but he did not see who was 
returning fire.  Flonnory testified that he was not armed and did not fire a 
weapon.  When he heard return fire from the group on Jefferson Street, he 
ran away.  Korey and Flonnory both returned to Robinson’s car. 
 
The State presented evidence that contradicted Flonnory’s testimony.  
The police retrieved evidence of two different guns used in the attack.  The 
police also found no evidence to support Flonnory’s allegation that the 
victims returned fire.   
Korey and Flonnory were indicted jointly.  The cases were severed 
prior to trial.  Korey was convicted of Murder in the First Degree.  Because 
 
6
he was only fifteen at the time of the murders, Korey was not eligible for the 
death penalty. 
Improper Prejudicial Juror Contacts 
 
In the fifth week of Flonnory’s capital murder trial, juror Number Six 
reported that she had been approached by an unknown woman on the 
previous day and also that morning regarding her jury service.  The two 
encounters occurred while juror Number Six waited with other jurors in a 
remote designated parking area and while she was en route by bus with other 
jurors to the courthouse.  Juror Number Six was concerned that the unknown 
woman knew her name.  She told the bailiff of the matter, who in turn 
informed the trial judge.   
The trial judge met with the attorneys and juror Number Six.  Juror 
Number Six told the trial judge that she did not know the woman who had 
approached her.  According to juror Number Six, in the first interaction, the 
unknown woman asked if juror Number Six was serving on a jury.  Juror 
Number Six replied that she was serving on a jury but could not discuss the 
case.   
The next day, the unknown woman again approached Juror Number 
Six as she exited her car.  By then, the unknown woman had ascertained 
juror Number Six’s name and that she was a juror in Flonnory’s case.  The 
 
7
unknown woman told juror Number Six that her roommate worked at the 
prison.  The unknown woman asked if juror Number Six knew “about 
Freddy’s childhood and all that stuff” and that Flonnory had been 
incarcerated as a juvenile at Ferris.  Most significantly, the unknown woman 
told juror Number Six that Flonnory had “killed more than two people and 
they’re not allowed to let [the jury] know.”  
 
During this interview with the trial judge, juror Number Six was 
apparently concerned about her safety because the unknown woman knew 
her name.  The trial judge told juror Number Six that he would provide 
security from the bus stop to the courthouse.  The trial judge never instructed 
juror Number Six that the prejudicial statement about Flonnory’s 
involvement in a prior murder was false.  Instead, the trial judge simply   
asked juror Number Six whether this incident would affect her impartiality.  
Juror Number Six told the trial judge that this exchange with the unknown 
woman had not caused her to form any opinions and that she had no 
reservations about continuing to serve as a juror in Flonnory’s case. 
Juror Number Six also told the trial judge that the unknown woman 
had also approached two other jurors.  The trial judge then interviewed those 
two other jurors in the presence of the attorneys.  Those individuals were 
juror Number Four and juror Number Nine. 
 
8
In an interview with the trial judge, juror Number Four confirmed that 
she was questioned by the unknown woman but tried not to pay attention to 
her.  Juror Number Four stated that before reporting the contact to the bailiff, 
juror Number Six had told all of the other jurors about what had happened.  
According to juror Number Four, juror Number Six “kind of blew things out 
of proportion when she went into the jury room and started talking to 
everybody about it.”  Juror Number Four told juror Number Six that she 
should not have discussed the matter in the jury room but should have 
brought the matter to the trial judge’s attention.  Juror Number Four was 
asked by the trial judge whether this incident with the unknown woman 
would affect her impartiality.  She said it would not.   
 
The third juror, juror Number Nine, confirmed that the unknown 
woman was questioning him and the other two jurors.  He said that he had 
tried not to pay attention to her and did not remember what she said.  He told 
the unknown woman that they could not talk about the case.  The trial judge 
inquired about whether juror Number Nine could remain impartial.  He 
responded that he could. 
 
At the conclusion of the inquiry with the three jurors, none of the 
attorneys asked for additional action by the trial judge.  Accordingly, the 
trial judge did not ask any of the other jurors what they had been told by 
 
9
juror Number Six, even though juror Number Four had related that juror 
Number Six “started talking to everybody about it,” and even though he had 
sought assurance of their ability to remain impartial from juror Number Six, 
Number Four, and Number Nine.  When the full Flonnory jury panel was 
assembled in the courtroom, the trial judge issued a general admonition that 
the jurors should not discuss the case with others.  He also advised the jurors 
to contact the bailiff immediately if anyone approached them.   
 
The following morning, the trial judge advised counsel that the 
unknown woman who had been speaking with the three members of 
Flonnory’s jury had been identified as a juror in another case.  In the 
courtroom, the trial judge then advised the entire Flonnory jury that the 
unknown woman, who had been speaking with three of them during the 
previous two days, was a juror in another case.  The trial judge assured 
Flonnory’s jury that no one had reason to be concerned for their safety.   
Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial judge was obviously 
certain that all of the Flonnory jurors knew about the unknown woman’s 
contacts with the three jurors.  The unknown woman’s status as a juror in 
another case may have assuaged the Flonnory jurors’ safety concerns.  
Unfortunately, it may have also given credence to her prejudicial remarks, in 
particular, that Flonnory had committed murder before.   
 
10
 
Flonnory’s trial concluded the following day.  Two days later, on a 
Saturday, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges.  The jurors 
were then excused for a few days before the penalty phase of Flonnory’s 
capital murder trial. 
Irreparable Jury Prejudice 
 
On the Monday following the Saturday verdict, while the proceedings 
were in recess, juror Number Twelve, came to the courthouse.  The juror 
wanted to report her concerns about extraneous information that the jury had 
received.  Outside of the presence of other jurors, the trial judge convened 
the attorneys and conducted an interview with juror Number Twelve under 
oath.   
Juror Number Twelve confirmed juror Number Four’s earlier report 
that juror Number Six had actually told all of the other jurors about the 
substance of what the unknown woman had said to her before juror Number 
Six was interviewed by the trial judge.  Juror Number Twelve testified that, 
according to juror Number Six, the unknown woman had asked juror 
Number Six if she was serving on the Freddy Flonnory case, and then “went 
on to tell her . . . you know he’s been accused of murdering someone else 
before.”  Juror Number Twelve testified that Juror Number Six “said this to 
each and every one of us while we were sitting there.”   According to Juror 
 
11
Number Twelve, Juror Number Six only reported her contact with the 
unidentified woman to the bailiff upon the urging of other jurors, “but it was 
too late then.  She had already told us everything.” 
 
When questioned by the trial judge as to what other outside 
information was known to the jury, Juror Number Twelve also reported that: 
Okay.  Well, there’s – It was more than one person.  It was just 
one of the jurors, while we were deliberating, had said that the 
defendant had been in possession of a gun at nine years old.  
And I said how do you know that?  You’re not supposed to 
know these things. 
 
Juror Number Twelve identified juror Number Five as the juror who 
informed jurors of Flonnory’s alleged possession of a gun at the age of nine.  
Juror Number Twelve also reported that juror Number Nine had maintained 
his own personal notebook, which he took home every night, contrary to the 
directions of the trial judge and said that what others did not know did no 
harm.  Juror Number Twelve also said several jurors knew more than they 
were told during trial, indicating that they knew “he had previously shot 
somebody.”    
 
Juror Number Twelve testified that her improper knowledge of 
Flonnory’s alleged involvement in a prior murder affected her vote to find 
Flonnory guilty of Murder in the First Degree rather than Murder in the 
Second Degree.  Juror Number Twelve was excused briefly after this initial 
 
12
interview.  The trial judge stated:  “I do find her to be credible.  I have no 
reason to believe she is not credible.”  The trial judge also stated:  “I mean 
she said what she said.  I believe that she considered it” i.e., the statement 
from juror Number Six that Flonnory had been accused of murdering 
someone before.   
Mistrial Motion Denied 
 
At the conclusion of the interview with juror Number Twelve, the trial 
judge had grave cause for concern.  One reason for concern related to juror 
Number Nine’s disregard for the trial judge’s instruction not to keep separate 
notes of the trial.  A second reason for concern was one or more other jurors 
apparent disregard for a separate ongoing admonition not to read newspaper 
accounts of the proceedings because some of the juror information related to 
juror Number Twelve, concerning Flonnory’s prior criminal justice system 
history, closely paralleled accounts that appeared in a local newspaper.  Each 
of those matters merited an independent inquiry to evaluate their prejudicial 
impact on the ability of certain jurors individually and the entire jury panel 
collectively to proceed.2  Nevertheless, the trial judge took no action. 
                                          
 
2 It is particularly significant to note that, during the pre-trial jury voir dire, a potential 
juror was excused for cause because she had mistakenly read a newspaper article 
mentioning Flonnory’s “long history of violence and crime.”   
 
13
Those concerns paled, however, in comparison to juror Number 
Twelve’s sworn testimony regarding the unknown woman’s prior prejudicial 
contact with juror Number Six.  First, the trial judge heard a sworn account 
from juror Number Twelve, which he found to be credible, that juror 
Number Six told all of the jurors that Flonnory had previously been accused 
of murdering someone else.  Second, juror Number Twelve stated that 
highly prejudicial improper information from juror Number Six actually 
influenced her own decision to convict Flonnory of Murder in the First 
Degree.  Despite this report of presumptive prejudice with regard to the 
entire Flonnory jury panel and actual prejudice with regard to juror Number 
Twelve, the trial judge declined to interview the other jurors. 
Flonnory’s attorneys moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the trial 
judge’s interview with juror Number Twelve.  In an oral ruling, the trial 
judge denied Flonnory’s motion for a mistrial.  The trial judge noted that a 
record of juror Number Twelve’s testimony had been made for an appeal to 
this Court.   
In denying Flonnory’s motion for a mistrial, the trial judge observed 
that from ‘the justice system point of view, from a case management point of 
view, it would be better to go forward.”  The trial judge then proceeded to 
the penalty phase in this capital case.  The trial judge permitted the jury to 
 
14
hear and decide the penalty phase of Flonnory’s trial without any additional 
corrective, cautionary, or limiting instructions.   
 
In a motion for a new trial, Flonnory’s attorneys renewed their 
allegation of juror prejudice.  In denying that motion, the trial judge ruled 
that Flonnory’s right to a fair trial had not been prejudiced either by the fact 
that juror Number Six told the other jurors that Flonnory had been accused 
of murder before or by the fact that juror Number Twelve testified that juror 
Number Six’s information had actually affected her decision to find 
Flonnory guilty as charged of Murder in the First Degree.  The trial judge 
then sentenced Flonnory to death by lethal injection. 
Jury’s Democratic Function 
 
The right of one accused of a crime to have his or her case presented 
before a jury enjoys a long and distinguished heritage in Anglo-American 
law.  In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone 
wrote: 
Our law . . . wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of 
presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the 
people and the prerogative of the crown.  It was necessary, for 
preserving the admirable balance of our constitution, to vest the 
executive power of the laws in prince and yet this power might 
be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if 
exerted without check and control, by justices of oyer and 
terminer occasionally named by the crown . . . who might then . 
. . imprison, dispatch or exile any man that was obnoxious to 
the government, by an instant declaration that such is their will 
 
15
and pleasure.  But the founders of English law have contrived 
that . . . the truth of every accusation . . . should . . . be 
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals 
and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all 
suspicion.3 
 
The first jury was probably empanelled in Delaware in 1669 and 
juries were an established component of the judicial process by 1675.4  Since 
Delaware’s first constitution, adopted in the fall of 1776, Delaware has 
afforded the right to trial by jury in both criminal and civil proceedings.  The 
Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State, 
guaranteed the right to trial by jury to all citizens and included a statement 
“[t]hat trial by jury of facts where they arise is one of the greatest securities 
of the lives, liberties and estates of the people.”5 
John Dickinson, a lawyer and one of Delaware’s delegates to the 
Philadelphia Convention that drafted the United States Constitution wrote 
that “[t]rial by Jury is our birth-right.”  In a letter to Pierre S. duPont, 
Thomas Jefferson described the fact-finding function of jurors as: 
the very essence of a Republic . . . .  We of the United States . . 
. think experience has proved it safer for the mass of individuals 
composing the society to reserve to themselves personally the 
exercise of all rightful powers to which they are competent . . . . 
 
                                          
 
3 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *343, quoted in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 151-52 (1968). 
4 See Claudio v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 1278, 1290 (1991) (citing 1 J. Scharf, 
HISTORY OF DELAWARE 519 (1888). 
5 Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State § 13 (1776). 
 
16
 
Hence, with us, the people . . . being competent to judge 
of the facts occurring in ordinary life, . . . have retained the 
functions of judges of facts under the name of jurors. . . .  
 
 
I believe . . . that action by the citizens, in person in 
affairs within their reach and competence, and in all others by 
representatives chosen immediately and removable by 
themselves, constitutes the essence of a Republic. . . .6 
 
The right to a fair trial before an impartial jury of one’s peers is fundamental 
to the American criminal justice system.  The United States Supreme Court 
has held: 
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State 
Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in 
which law should be enforced and justice administered.  A right 
to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent 
oppression by the Government.  Those who wrote our 
constitutions knew from history and experience that it was 
necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges 
brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive 
to the voice of higher authority.  The framers of the 
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but 
insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.  
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his 
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge.  If the defendant preferred the common-sense 
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less 
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.  
Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State 
Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise 
of official power--a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over 
the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of 
                                          
 
6 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Pierre S. duPont (April 4, 1816), in 4 Annals of 
America 414 (Encyclopedia Britannica 1976); see 2 J. Kendall Few, In Defense of Trial 
by Jury 456 (1993). 
 
17
judges.  Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and 
Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the 
criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in 
the determination of guilt or innocence.7 
 
Jury Trial Rights 
 
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution8 and 
Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution guarantee defendants in criminal 
cases the right to have their cases brought before an impartial jury.9  The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.   
 
Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard 
by himself and his counsel, to be plainly and fully informed of 
                                          
 
7 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968). 
8 See also U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 (“The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”). 
9 The Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury is “incorporated” against the 
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal 
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which . . . would come 
within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees.”); see id. at 156 (“The deep commitment of 
the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary 
law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.”). 
 
18
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the 
witnesses in their examination face to face, to have compulsory 
process in due time, on application by himself, his friends or 
counsel, for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury; he shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or by 
the law of the land.   
 
 
An essential ingredient of this right is for jury verdicts to be based 
solely on the evidence presented at trial.10  The accused’s rights to 
confrontation, cross-examination and the assistance of counsel assure the 
accuracy of the testimony the jurors hear and safeguard the proper admission 
of other evidence.11  These rights can be exercised effectively only if 
evidence is presented to the jury only in the courtroom.12  Consequently, the 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury in a criminal proceeding, that is 
guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Delaware 
                                          
 
10 Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d at 1040 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). 
11 Smith v. State, Del. Supr., 317 A.2d 20, 23 (1974). 
12 Id. ([F]airness, and indeed the integrity of the judicial process, make it imperative that 
jurors secure information about the case only as a corporate body in the courtroom.”).; 
see also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (“In the constitutional sense, 
trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the ‘evidence 
developed’ against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom 
where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, cross-
examination, and of counsel.”). 
 
19
Constitution requires that “the jury’s verdict be based on evidence received 
in open court, not from outside sources.”13   
In construing the federal constitutional right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury, the United States Supreme Court has held that: 
[t]he theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached 
in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in 
open court, and not by an outside influence, whether of private 
talk or public print.14 
 
In Marshall v. United States,15 the Court specifically held that the exposure 
of jurors to extraneous material concerning a trial “may indeed be greater 
than when it is part of the prosecution’s evidence, for it is then not tempered 
by protective procedures.”16  The ratio decidendi of Marshall has been 
expressly adopted by this Court.17  
Proving Juror Taint 
 
It is very difficult for any defendant to prove actual prejudice within a 
jury panel.18  This difficulty is attributable to the sanctity of the jury’s 
deliberations and the common law prohibition against jurors impeaching 
                                          
 
13 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (per curiam); Hughes v. State, 
Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034 (1985). 
14 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
15 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 
16 Id. at 313. 
17 Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1046 n.16 (1985) (“Although the Supreme 
Court opinion in Marshall was issued pursuant to that court’s supervisory powers and is 
therefore binding only on the federal courts, we consider the opinion to be persuasive 
authority for the position we advocate herein.”). 
18 Massey v. State, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 1254, 1257-58 (1988). 
 
20
their own verdict.19  Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court 
have recognized, however, “that a flat prohibition against receiving post-
verdict testimony from jurors would contravene another important public 
policy:  that of ‘redressing the injury of the private litigant where a verdict 
was reached by a jury that was not impartial.’”20 
 
The need to accommodate the conflicting policies of preserving the 
sanctity of a jury’s deliberations and the defendant’s right to an impartial 
jury has resulted in the recognition of a distinction between extrinsic and 
intrinsic influences upon a jury’s verdict.21  “Since the 19th Century, the 
established rule regarding a juror’s competence to attack a verdict is that ‘a 
juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence 
of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence 
operated upon his [or her] mind.’”22  The common law prohibition against 
                                          
 
19 Sheeran v. State, Del. Supr., 526 A.2d 886, 894 (1987): 
As a general rule, a juror may not impeach his own verdict once the jury 
has been discharged.  McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915).  This 
rule promotes several public policies:  1) discouraging harassment of 
jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set aside; 2) encouraging 
free and open discussion among jurors; 3) reducing incentives for jury 
tampering; 4) promoting verdict finality; and 5) maintaining the viability 
of the jury as a judicial decision-making body.  
20 Id. at 895 (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. (citing Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892)); see also Hughes v. State, Del. 
Supr., 490 A.2d 1034 (1985). 
 
21
inquiry into the jurors’ mental processes is adhered to in Delaware.23  It has 
been codified in Delaware Rule of Evidence 606(b): 
COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS.  Inquiry into 
Validity of Verdict or Indictment.  Upon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to 
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any 
other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to 
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his 
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror 
may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror.  Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be 
precluded from testifying he received for these purposes.24 
  
Accordingly, Delaware Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits juror testimony for 
the purposes of impeaching a verdict in two instances:  (1) when “extraneous 
prejudicial information [is] improperly brought to the jury’s attention”; or 
(2) when “outside influence [is] improperly brought to bear upon any 
juror.”25  Nevertheless, inquiry into the jurors’ mental processes remains 
prohibited.26 
                                          
 
23 See Massey v. State, 541 A.2d at 1257; Burke v. State, Del. Supr., 484 A.2d 490, 500 
(1984); see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915); Sheeran v. State, Del. 
Supr., 526 A.2d 886, 894 (1987) (permitting only two exceptions, both codified in our 
Rules of Evidence).   
24 D.R.E. 606(b). 
25 Id. 
26 See id.; Burke v. State, Del. Supr., 484 A.2d 490, 500 (1984). 
 
22
Presumption of Prejudice 
 
As a general rule, when a defendant seeks to impeach a verdict for 
alleged juror misconduct, the defendant has the burden of establishing both 
the improper influence and actual prejudice to the impartiality of the juror’s 
deliberations.27  This Court has frequently analyzed the difficulty of proving 
actual prejudice, since Rule 606(b) places significant restrictions on the 
jurors’ ability to impeach their own verdict.28  In an effort to accommodate 
the evidentiary limitation imposed by Rule 606(b)’s prohibition against any 
inquiry into a juror’s mental processes, this Court has adopted an egregious 
circumstances test.29   
If a defendant can prove a reasonable probability of juror taint, due to 
egregious circumstances, that are inherently prejudicial, it will give rise to a 
presumption of prejudice and the defendant will not have to prove actual 
prejudice.30  This test raises a presumption of prejudice and achieves the 
proper balance between preserving the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations, by 
                                          
 
27 Sheeran v. State, Del. Supr., 526 A.2d 886, 896-97 (1987); Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 
490 A.2d 1034 (1985). McCloskey v. State, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 332, 337-38 (1983).  But 
cf. Barnes v. Toppin, Del. Supr., 482 A.2d 749, 753 (1984) (evidence supported trial 
court’s finding that extraneous matter probably played a role in deliberations). 
28 See e.g.,  Massey v. State, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 1254, 1259 (1988). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1257. 
 
23
adherence to Rule 606(b)’s prohibition against inquiry into a juror’s mental 
processes,31 and the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
Flonnory Presumptively Prejudiced 
Proof of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts is generally not admissible 
evidence in any criminal proceeding.32  Although there are several 
exceptions to this general rule, even relevant evidence of other crimes or 
wrongs is only admitted after the trial judge performs three important 
safeguarding functions.  First, the trial judge must make a specific 
determination that the proposed evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts 
is relevant to something fairly at issue in the trial.33  Second, even if such 
evidence is relevant, the trial judge may exclude that relevant evidence “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.”34  Third, after 
making that independent judicial determination, if the trial judge concludes 
that the relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts is admissible, 
the jury must be given a limiting instruction that restricts the jury’s use of 
the evidence to its proper scope.35   
                                          
 
31 Id. at 1259   
32 D.R.E. 404. 
33 D.R.E. 403. 
34 D.R.E. 403. 
35 D.R.E. 105; see Getz v. State, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 726 (1988). 
 
24
Most significantly, if proof of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts is 
admitted into evidence in the courtroom, the defendant has the assistance of 
counsel in not only cross-examining the witness who presents that evidence 
but also in arguing the defendant’s perspective on that evidence to the jury.  
Those protections can be exercised effectively only if evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is presented in the courtroom.36  Nevertheless, 
even with all of the foregoing procedural safeguards, it would be extremely 
unlikely that evidence of the defendant’s involvement with another homicide 
would ever be properly admitted into evidence at a defendant’s separate trial 
for murder.   
 
The threshold question is whether Flonnory has presented a case of 
egregious circumstances so inherently prejudicial as to raise a presumption 
of prejudice in his favor.  This Court has held “fairness and, indeed, the 
integrity of the judicial process, make it imperative that jurors receive 
information about the case only as a corporate body in the courtroom.”37    
The record reflects credible uncontradicted evidence that, outside of the 
courtroom, Juror Number Six became an unsworn and uncross-examined 
witness who presented inadmissible evidence to the other jurors that 
                                          
 
36 Smith v. State, Del. Supr., 317 A.2d 20, 23 (1974). 
37 Id. 
 
25
Flonnory had previously been accused of murder.38  In an analogous context, 
this Court held that a presumption of prejudice was established because 
improper juror knowledge of a defendant’s prior conviction of the very 
crime for which he is being tried is “so fraught with prejudice that the 
constitutional due process defect is not cured either by jurors’ assurances 
that they could remain impartial or by the judge’s admonition to disregard 
the knowledge.”39  Similarly, juror Number Six’s improper statement to the 
other jurors that Flonnory had previously been accused of murder – the exact 
same type of crime he stood trial for here – presented a case of egregious 
circumstances so inherently prejudicial as to raise a presumption of 
prejudice.   
The trial judge’s decision, after interviewing jurors Six, Four and 
Nine, to make no further inquiry or to give any type of curative instruction to 
the jury is difficult to understand.  The record reflects that earlier in the trial, 
the parties stipulated before the jury that Flonnory was prohibited from 
possessing a firearm because of unspecified conduct for which he had been 
adjudicated to be delinquent when he was a juvenile.  Consequently, at this 
stage of Flonnory’s trial, the jury had heard properly admitted evidence in 
                                          
 
38 Diaz v. State, Del. Supr., 743 A.2d 1166, 1180 (1999). 
39 Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1046 (1985). 
 
26
the courtroom that when Flonnory was a juvenile, he had committed an 
“unspecified” crime that would have been a felony if he had been an adult.   
The trial judge should have made certain that no juror was thinking 
that unspecified felonious conduct was a prior murder.  The trial judge 
attributes his inaction to the failure of the attorneys to make a request.  The 
United States Supreme Court has held, however, that it is the duty of the trial 
judge to take effective action to assure that the balance in a trial is not 
unfairly shifted against the accused.40 
Because the guilt phase of Flonnory’s trial had been completed when 
juror Number Twelve testified that inherently prejudicial information had 
been communicated to the other jurors by juror Number Six, there was a 
manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.41  Flonnory’s motion should have 
been granted.  Therefore, we hold that the communication of highly 
prejudicial improper and inadmissible information by juror Number Six to 
the other jurors, outside of the courtroom, violated Flonnory’s right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury under both the United States Constitution and the 
Delaware Constitution.  Consequently, Flonnory’s convictions must be 
reversed and this matter will be remanded for a new trial.   
                                          
 
40 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
41 See State v.Bailey, Del. Supr., 521 A.2d 1069 (1987). 
 
27
Actual Prejudice Established 
 
The trial judge’s questioning of juror Number Twelve extended 
beyond the parameters permitted by D.R.E. 606(b).  The trial judge should 
not have asked juror Number Twelve exactly how the extraneous prejudicial 
information affected her own deliberative process with regard to voting to 
convict Flonnory on each charge in the indictment.  Those inquiries were 
harmless, however, because within the proper bounds of permissible inquiry 
the existence of an improper extraneous prejudicial influence that 
compromised juror Number Twelve’s impartiality was established.42 
 
Consequently, the record reflects that, in addition to proving a 
presumption of prejudice, Flonnory has also established actual prejudice.  
Juror Number Twelve testified that her improper knowledge of Flonnory’s 
alleged involvement in a prior murder actually affected her vote to find 
Flonnory guilty of Murder in the First Degree.  The trial judge stated:  “I do 
find her to be credible.  I have no reason to believe she is not credible.”  The 
trial judge also stated:  “I mean she said what she said.  I believe that she 
considered it” i.e., that the statement that Flonnory had been accused of 
murdering someone before.   
                                          
 
42 McCloskey v. State, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 332 (1983); see also Barnes v. Toppin, Del. 
Supr., 482 A.2d 749 (1984). 
 
28
 
A defendant in a criminal case is denied his right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury if only one juror is improperly influenced.43  Accordingly, 
Flonnory’s demonstration of actual prejudice through the sworn testimony of 
juror Number Twelve constitutes an alternative basis for our conclusion that 
Flonnory’s convictions must be reversed.  We hold that the communication 
of highly prejudicial improper and inadmissible information from juror 
Number Six to juror Number Twelve alone, outside of the courtroom, 
violated Flonnory’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under both the 
United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution. 
Other Issues 
 
Flonnory has raised eight other issues in this appeal.  First, he submits 
that the incriminating hearsay statements of the co-defendant, Korey 
Twyman, were admitted into evidence in violation of:  11 Del. C. § 3507; 
the rule against the admission of hearsay; and his constitutional rights to 
confrontation of any witness again him.  Second, Flonnory argues that the 
trial judge lacked discretion to continue to sequester his mother after she had 
testified.   By doing so, Flonnory contends that the trial judge denied his 
constitutional rights to a public trial and equal protection of law.  Third, 
Flonnory alleges that the purported exclamation “that nigger Box” attributed 
                                          
 
43 Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1047 (quoting Styler v. State, Del. Supr., 
417 A.2d 948, 951-52 (1980)); Lovett v. State, Del. Supr., 516 A.2d 455, 475 (1986). 
 
29
to one of the decedents was not admissible pursuant to the dying declaration 
rule.  Fourth, Flonnory contends that the trial judge improperly permitted a 
police detective to vouch for the credibility of a key prosecution witness and 
permitted the jury to consider the same officer’s opinion concerning 
Flonnory’s own credibility.  Fifth, Flonnory submits that the trial judge 
erroneously deprived him of the opportunity to confront Dwayne Warren’s 
testimonial claim of a non-violent nature by forbidding inquiry concerning 
Warren’s recent arrest for armed robbery and possession of a firearm.  Sixth, 
Flonnory argues that the trial judge erred in finding Terrell Twyman’s 
statements and trial testimony to be voluntary.  According to Flonnory, 
Terrell Twyman’s six-month detention as a material witness was without 
sufficient cause.  Flonnory argues that this detention rendered Terrell 
Twyman’s trial testimony involuntary, as a matter of law, and thereby 
deprived Flonnory of a fair trial.  Seventh, Flonnory contends that the trial 
judge’s refusal to consider Flonnory’s consumption of alcohol and marijuana 
prior to the shootings in mitigation rendered the decision to impose the death 
penalty arbitrary and capricious.  Finally, Flonnory submits that his sentence 
of death is disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases. 
 
Since the first claim of error raised by Flonnory required his 
convictions to be reversed, we have decided not to address his other claims 
 
30
of error in this appeal.  We have concluded, however, that a different judge 
should be assigned to preside at Flonnory’s new trial.  We have absolutely 
no doubt that the original trial judge could fairly and impartially preside at 
Flonnory’s new trial. If Flonnory’s new trial proceeds to another penalty 
phase, however, the public’s confidence in the impartial administration of 
justice would be enhanced if Flonnory were not sentenced by a judge who 
had previously decided that a death sentence was the appropriate punishment 
for Flonnory’s conduct. 
Many of the other claims raised by Flonnory may never arise at a new 
trial or may arise in a different context.  The different judge should be free to 
rule on all issues raised at Flonnory’s new trial in the context presented at 
the time.  Accordingly we hold that none of the trial judge’s rulings at 
Flonnory’s first trial shall constitute the law of this case at his new trial.   
Conclusion 
 
 
It is regrettable that a juror from another case irresponsibly persisted 
in improperly telling several of the jurors in Flonnory’s case information she 
admitted they should not know:  Flonnory had previously been accused of 
murder.  It is also unfortunate that juror Number Six, who at the time had 
legitimate concerns for her own safety, communicated this highly prejudicial 
and inadmissible evidence to the other Flonnory jurors outside of the 
 
31
courtroom.  Perhaps there was nothing the trial judge could have done to 
avoid declaring a mistrial before the jury began deliberating Flonnory’s guilt 
or innocence.  Clearly, however, there was a manifest necessity to declare a 
mistrial when the jury deliberated with knowledge of that highly prejudicial 
information.   
Thankfully, this and other similarly egregious circumstances that 
result in compromising a jury’s impartiality are rare.  When they do occur, 
however, the integrity of the judicial process must be preserved by affording 
a defendant, like Flonnory, the right to a new fair trial before an impartial 
jury.  The judgments of the Superior Court are reversed.  This matter is 
remanded for a new trial before a different judge.