Title: Lynne Beauchamp v. Frank J. Amedio et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-26-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LONG, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal concerns the late filing of a notice of claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). On March 15, 1997, Lynne Beauchamp's car was rear-ended by a New Jersey Transit bus driven by Frank Amedio. On April 1, 1997, Beauchamp visited Dr. Michael Ellin, a chiropractor, complaining of neck, shoulder, and lower back pain, as well as headaches, all of which began at the time of the accident. After the initial visit, Dr. Ellin indicated that the permanency of Beauchamp's injuries was undetermined. Beauchamp sought the services of a lawyer who consulted with Dr. Ellin to determine whether Beauchamp's injuries would qualify her for non-economic damages in a suit against the State under the TCA. Based on two reports from Dr. Ellin, wherein the doctor concluded that any permanency was undetermined, the lawyer advised Beauchamp not to file a notice of claim under the TCA. Because her pain persisted, Beauchamp continued to treat with Dr. Ellin over the next several months. On October 30, 1997, Dr. Ellin reported to Beauchamp's lawyer that, based on several recent tests he had performed on Beauchamp, she had both bulging discs in her cervical spine that would not heal to their original condition and nerve damage to the neck. Based on that report, Beauchamp's lawyer submitted a notice of claim to New Jersey Transit on December 17, 1997, approximately nine months after the accident. On the same day, he filed a motion seeking an order permitting the late filing. The trial court dismissed the motion on the ground that Beauchamp had failed to establish extraordinary circumstances excusing the late filing of the notice of claim. Beauchamp appealed to the Appellate Division, which ordered a limited remand to allow her to present a new report from Dr. Ellin that indicated permanent damage. The trial court again denied the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Beauchamp's petition for certification. HELD: Under the Tort Claims Act, a notice of claim must be filed within ninety days of accrual of a cause of action. A claim accrues on the date of the accident or incident that gave rise to any injury, however slight, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private citizen. If an injured person is unaware that he or she has been injured or that a particular third party is responsible, the discovery rule tolls the date of accrual. Once a claim accrues and the ninety-day period has elapsed, the only exception to the notice requirement is where extraordinary circumstances exist to justify the late filing. Because of the confusion on this issue, Beauchamp has established extraordinary circumstances warranting the filing of a late notice of claim. 1. Under the TCA, an injured person must file a notice of claim within ninety days of the accrual of a cause of action. Generally, the date of accrual will be the date of the incident on which the act or omission took place. The exception is in the case where the victim either is unaware that he or she has been injured or does not know that a third party is responsible. The TCA provides an exception to the ninety-day notice requirement if extraordinary circumstances exist. (Pp. 4-9) 2. To ascertain whether a notice of claim has been timely filed, the following analysis must be made: 1) a determination of when the claim accrued (the discovery rule applies); 2) a determination of whether the notice of claim was filed within ninety days; and if not, 3) a decision as to the existence of extraordinary circumstances justifying a late notice of claim. (Pp. 9) 4. The issue of permanency relates to the amount of damages recoverable, not the accrual of a cause of action. To the extent that the Appellate Division opinion in Ohlweiler v. Township of Chatham suggests otherwise in dictum, it is disapproved. If accrual were to depend on the ascertainment of permanency, or the determination to file a claim, the public entity would be deprived of the benefits of prompt investigation and of the chance to correct conditions or practices that give rise to the claim. In light of the purposes of the TCA, that interpretation cannot be endorsed. (Pp. 10-15) 5. Because Beauchamp did all she could to protect her potential claim and because she relied on legal advice that was derived from the confusion on this issue, she deserves to be granted relief from the ninety-day filing requirement of the TCA. She has established extraordinary circumstances. (Pp. 15-16) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for the entry of an order allowing Beauchamp to file a late notice of claim. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, and LAVECCHIA join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. LYNNE BEAUCHAMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, and TIMOTHY BEAUCHAMP, Plaintiff, v. FRANK J. AMEDIO and NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORP., Defendants-Respondents. Argued March 27, 2000-- Decided June 8, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Robert J. Kelly, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. Jerry Fischer, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Valerie L. Egar, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by LONG, J. Beauchamp filed a notice of appeal. The Appellate Division ordered a limited remand to allow her to present a new report from Dr. Ellin that indicated permanent damage. Again, however, the trial court denied the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported opinion. Beauchamp filed a petition for certification, which we granted. 162 N.J. 197 (1999). On appeal, she argues that the lower courts erred in refusing to allow her to file a late notice of claim. a. He failed to file his claim with the public entity within 90 days of accrual of his claim except as otherwise provided in section 59:8-9[.] [N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 (footnote omitted).] Although N.J.S.A. 59:8-1 does not define the date of accrual in any significant waySee footnote 11, the comment to that section states that [i]t is intended that the term accrual of a cause of action shall be defined in accordance with existing law in the private sector. Harry A. Margolis &amp; Robert Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, 1972 Task Force Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:8-1, (Gann 2000). Ordinarily, a cause of action accrues when any wrongful act or omission resulting in any injury, however slight, for which the law provides a remedy, occurs. Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 65 (1959); Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div. 1972); Lutz v. Semcer, 126 N.J. Super. 288, 297 (Law Div. 1974), superseded by statute on other grounds noted by, Serrano v. Gibson, 304 N.J. Super. 314, 315-16 (App. Div. 1997). Generally, in the case of tortious conduct resulting in injury, the date of accrual will be the date of the incident on which the negligent act or omission took place. Fuller v. Rutgers, The State University, 154 N.J. Super. 420, 423 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 610 (1978); Torres v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 140 N.J. Super. 323, 326 (Law Div. 1976); see also Office of the Governor, News Release of William T. Cahill at 1 (June 1, 1972) (stating that under Act, claims against state must be filed within 90 days after the time of the alleged incident. ). Obviously, that coincides with the accrual date for a claim for property damage and damage such as wage loss. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. [N.J.S.A. 59:8-9]. The phrase extraordinary circumstances was added to the statute in 1994. Its purpose was to raise the bar for the filing of late notice from a fairly permissive standard to a more demanding one. Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999). [T]he amendment may have signaled the end to a rule of liberality in filing. Id. at 626 (quoting Zois v. New Jersey Sports and Expo. Auth., 286 N.J. Super. 670, 675 (App. Div. 1996)); see also S.P. v. Collier High School, 319 N.J. Super. 452, 465-66 (App. Div. 1999)(finding that neither student's youth, ignorance, nor learning disability amounted to extraordinary circumstances); Allen v. Krause, 306 N.J. Super. 448, 445 (App. Div. 1997)(reversing trial court's grant of leave to file late notice due to lack of factual findings or legal conclusions); Wood v. County of Burlington, 302 N.J. Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1997)(reversing trial court's grant of leave to file late notice of claim). That is the backdrop against which this case must be analyzed. NO. A-26 LYNNE BEAUCHAMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, and TIMOTHY BEAUCHAMP, Plaintiff, v. FRANK J. AMEDIO and NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORP., Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED June 8, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz