Title: John Nierengarten v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002187
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2187 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
John Nierengarten and Betty Nierengarten,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper 
Michigan, Inc. and Chicago Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 538, 563 N.W.2d 181 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, l998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 28, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Pierce 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert W. Wing 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
                      Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating: Geske, J. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Stephen W. Hayes, Susan E. Lovern and von Briesen, 
Purtell & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee and oral arugment by Stephen W. 
Hayes. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross petitioners 
there were briefs by Edward F. Vlack, Charles E. Brady, and 
Davison V. Black, River Falls and oral argument by Charles E. 
Brady and Edward F. Vlack. 
 
 
 
 
No. 96-2187 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2187  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Nierengarten and Betty Nierengarten,  
 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Cross Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and  
Upper Michigan, Inc. and Chicago  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is on review from a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming in part 
and reversing in part the judgment of the circuit court, and 
remanding the case.  The Pierce County Circuit Court, Circuit 
Judge Robert Wing, dismissed John and Betty Nierengarten's 
("Nierengartens") claims of negligent misrepresentation and 
negligent 
placement 
against 
Lutheran 
Social 
Services 
of 
Wisconsin and Upper Michigan Inc., the agency through which they 
adopted a  child, and Lutheran Social Services' insurance 
company, Chicago Insurance Co. (collectively, "LSS").  The 
                     
1 Nierengarten v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 209 Wis. 2d 538, 563 
N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 96-2187 
 
2 
circuit court concluded in part that the Nierengartens' claims 
were barred by the expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations.  The court of appeals reversed that portion of the 
circuit court's decision dismissing the Nierengartens' claims as 
time-barred.  
¶2 
Upon review, we conclude that the Nierengartens' 
claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.54 (1993-94).2  The Nierengartens' 
claims accrued at the time their child was diagnosed with 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") on March 5, 
1990.  On March 5, 1990, the Nierengartens began incurring 
extraordinary medical expenses, i.e. those unexpected expenses 
arising from their child's special needs.  On March 5, 1990, the 
Nierengartens could identify LSS as the alleged tortfeasor, and 
they could identify the alleged wrongful conduct.  Because the 
Nierengartens did not file their claims until June 20, 1995, 
more than five years after the date on which their claims 
accrued, their claims are barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and dismiss the Nierengartens' 
claims against LSS for negligent placement and negligent 
misrepresentation as time-barred.  
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.54 states, in part: 
Injury to the person.  The following actions shall be 
commenced within 3 years or be barred: 
 
(1)  An action to recover damages for injuries to the 
person. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 1993-94 
volumes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 96-2187 
 
3 
I.  
¶3 
The following facts are relevant to our review.  In 
July of 1985, the Nierengartens contacted LSS to inquire about 
adopting a child.  The Nierengartens expressed to LSS on several 
occasions their desire to adopt a healthy child with no serious 
mental or physical handicaps.  As part of the adoption process, 
the Nierengartens and LSS signed a Korean Adoption Program 
Agreement of Understanding, which states in part: 
 
Lutheran Social Services and Eastern Child Welfare 
Society will make every effort to insure that our [the 
Nierengartens'] child is healthy, and that we have as 
much information about his/her health/family history 
as possible.  We understand, however, that Lutheran 
Social Services does not guarantee the information 
provided by Eastern Child Welfare Society will be 
absolutely accurate. 
¶4 
On April 24, 1987, LSS placed a male Korean child with 
the Nierengartens.  Prior to placement, the Nierengartens had 
received information from LSS regarding the child, including an 
initial 
social 
history, 
a 
health 
history 
and 
physical 
examination, and a pre-flight report.  These documents stated in 
part that the child was even-tempered, follows directions, 
easily adjusts to new circumstances, and was healthy and normal 
in his development.  The documents further stated that the child 
had regular eating and sleeping habits, and that the child was 
toilet trained.  LSS informed the Nierengartens that they were 
not eligible for an adoption subsidy through an adoption 
assistance program for children with special needs. 
¶5 
After placement, but prior to finalization of the 
adoption, the Nierengartens contacted LSS because they were 
concerned 
about 
behavior 
exhibited 
by 
the 
child. 
 
The 
No. 96-2187 
 
4 
Nierengartens stated that the child required an inordinate 
amount 
of 
attention; 
was 
hyperactive, 
unfocused, 
and 
uncontrolled; exhibited extreme temper tantrums; did not sleep 
well; was not toilet trained; hated new places; had difficulty 
getting 
along 
with 
his 
siblings; 
and 
was 
stubborn 
and 
uncooperative.  The Nierengartens were informed by LSS that the 
behavior exhibited by the child was normal adjustment behavior 
which would subside.  On November 3, 1987, the Nierengartens 
finalized the adoption. 
¶6 
The child's exceptional behavior continued, and he was 
subsequently diagnosed with ADHD3 on March 5, 1990.  The 
Nierengartens' family physician prescribed Ritalin for the child 
and referred the family to a psychologist for further assessment 
and 
family 
counseling. 
 
The 
Nierengartens 
began 
family 
counseling with the psychologist in March, 1990.  The child 
remained on various prescribed medications.4 
¶7 
On June 26, 1994, the child was admitted to the 
University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic Inpatient Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry Unit ("UMHC") due to his attempt to commit 
                     
3 "The essential feature of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder 
is 
a 
persistent 
pattern 
of 
inattention 
and/or 
hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequent and severe than 
is typically observed in individuals at a comparable level of 
development."  American Psychiatric Association:  Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 78 (DSM-IV 4th ed.) 
Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association, 1994. 
4 The child was prescribed several medications for treatment 
of 
the 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder 
including 
Ritalin, Cylert, and Dexedrine.  The child was also eventually 
prescribed 
Anafranil 
to 
abate 
obsessional 
thoughts 
and 
compulsive behavior and improve sleep.  The Nierengartens' 
family physician also prescribed Doral for the child to relieve 
psychotic-like symptoms. 
No. 96-2187 
 
5 
suicide.  The UMHC staff psychiatrist diagnosed the child with 
ADHD, Bipolar I Disorder,5 and Mathematics Disorder.6  The UMHC 
psychiatrist altered the child's prescriptions7 and recommended 
in part that the child be treated by a child psychiatrist for 
medication 
management, 
and 
that 
he 
engage 
in 
individual 
psychotherapy in addition to the family counseling. 
¶8 
Following 
the 
multiple 
diagnoses 
at 
UMHC, 
the 
Nierengartens decided to apply for Supplemental Security Income 
and Medical Assistance.  The Nierengartens wrote to LSS, 
requesting any additional background information regarding the 
child from Eastern Child Welfare Society ("ECWS"), including any 
familial history. 
¶9 
LSS 
contacted 
ECWS 
regarding 
the 
Nierengartens' 
request.  In December of 1994 ECWS provided translated notes 
taken by a caregiver at the Korean orphanage where the child 
stayed prior to his placement with the Nierengartens.  The 
child's psychologist reviewed the notes and indicated that, "to 
                     
5 "The essential feature of Bipolar I Disorder is a clinical 
course that is characterized by the occurrence of one or more 
Manic 
Episodes . . . or 
Mixed 
[manic 
and 
depressive] 
Episodes . . . .  Often individuals have also had one or more 
Major 
Depressive 
Episodes . . . ." 
 
American 
Psychiatric 
Association, at 350-51. 
6 "The essential 
feature 
of 
Mathematics 
Disorder is 
mathematical ability . . . that falls substantially below that 
expected 
for 
the 
individual's chronological 
age, measured 
intelligence, and age-appropriate education . . ..   A number of 
different skills may be impaired in Mathematics Disorder, 
including 
'linguistic' 
skills . . . 'perceptual' 
skills, 
'attention' skills, 
and 
'mathematical' 
skills." 
 American 
Psychiatric Association, at 50. 
7 The child's use of Dexedrine, Anafranil and Doral was 
discontinued.  Wellbutrin, Prozac, and Ativan (later changed to 
Lithium Carbonate) were prescribed. 
No. 96-2187 
 
6 
a reasonable degree of probability in the field of psychology, 
[the child] fit [the] definition of a special needs child prior 
to his adoption in 1987."  Record on Appeal 24:6. 
¶10 On June 20, 1995, the Nierengartens filed a complaint 
against LSS, asserting claims of negligent placement and 
negligent misrepresentation.8  On April 15, 1996, LSS filed a 
motion to dismiss the Nierengartens' complaint.9  LSS asserted in 
part that the Nierengartens had failed to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted, and that the Nierengartens' 
claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations set 
forth in  Wis. Stat. § 893.54. 
 
¶11 A hearing was held on LSS' motion for summary judgment 
on June 4, 1996, at which time the circuit court granted the 
motion.  Citing Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wisconsin, 
149 Wis. 2d 19, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989), the circuit court 
concluded that the Nierengartens' claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations.  The circuit court determined that the 
three-year statute of limitations set forth in Wis. Stat. 
                     
8 The Nierengartens filed an amended complaint on August 25, 
1995. 
9 As noted by the court of appeals, LSS' motion was filed as 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.   However, 
because LSS attached affidavits in support of the motion, the 
circuit court, as well as the court of appeals, were required to 
treat the motion as one for summary judgment in accord with Wis. 
Stat. § 802.06(2)(b)(1993-94).  Section 802.06(2)(b) states, in 
part: 
If on a motion . . . to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to 
state 
a 
claim 
upon 
which 
relief 
can 
be 
granted . . . matters 
outside 
of 
the 
pleadings 
are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . . 
No. 96-2187 
 
7 
§ 893.54 started to run on March 5, 1990, when the child was 
diagnosed with ADHD, because the Nierengartens began to incur 
"extraordinary [medical] expenses" at that time.  Id. at 26.  
Therefore, the circuit court reasoned that the Nierengartens 
would have had to file their claims on or before March 5, 1993. 
 Because they did not file their claims until June 20, 1995, the 
action was barred. 
 
¶12 Although the circuit court decided the case on a 
procedural issue, it also discussed the substantive issues 
raised by the parties.  In particular, with regard to the 
negligent misrepresentation claim, the circuit court determined 
that the facts did not support the Nierengartens' claim that LSS 
made false statements.  The circuit court expressly declined to 
decide the public policy issues presented by the claim of 
negligent placement.  The Nierengartens appealed. 
 
¶13 The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in 
part the circuit court judgment.  The court of appeals reversed 
that portion of the circuit court's judgment stating that the 
Nierengartens' claims were time-barred.  The court of appeals 
concluded that, in accord with Meracle, "only 'extraordinary 
expenses' are actionable."  The Nierengartens' claims accrued at 
the time the child was diagnosed with Bipolar and Mathematics 
Disorders, the court of appeals reasoned, because that was the 
time at which the Nierengartens began to incur extraordinary 
medical expenses.  Those diagnoses occurred in June of 1994, 
therefore, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
Nierengartens' claims filed in June of 1995 were not time-
barred.   
No. 96-2187 
 
8 
 
¶14 With regard to the substantive issues, the court of 
appeals reversed that portion of the circuit court's judgment 
concluding that the negligent misrepresentation claim should be 
dismissed. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
Nierengartens' affidavits in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment raised genuine issues of material fact with 
regard to their negligent misrepresentation claim.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the negligent 
placement claim, however.  It concluded that the Nierengartens' 
allegation that LSS failed to investigate the health history of 
the child did not support such a claim. 
II. 
 
¶15  This case requires us to review the circuit court's 
grant of LSS' motion for summary judgment, which presents a 
question of law.  We review motions for summary judgment de 
novo, using the same methodology as employed by the circuit 
court.  See Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 441, 442 N.W.2d 
25 (1989).  Although we review questions of law de novo, we 
benefit from the analysis of both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  See Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 
206 Wis. 2d 68, 70, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996). 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08 governs motions for summary 
judgment.  A motion for summary judgment will be granted "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
No. 96-2187 
 
9 
 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Therefore, we must consider whether 
the facts presented show that LSS is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
¶17 We first address the issue whether the Nierengartens' 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations.  The parties 
agree that the three-year statute of limitations codified in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54 governs the Nierengartens' claims against 
LSS for negligent misrepresentation and negligent placement.  
The parties also agree that the controlling case setting forth 
the time at which the Nierengartens' claims accrue is Meracle.  
Relying upon this court's decision in Meracle, LSS contends that 
the Nierengartens' claims accrued at the time the child was 
diagnosed with ADHD on March 5, 1990.  The Nierengartens, on the 
other hand, argue that their claims accrued at the time the 
child was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and Mathematics 
Disorder in June of 1994. 
 
¶18 In Meracle, this court addressed in part the issue 
whether claims filed by adoptive parents against an adoption 
agency for negligent placement and negligent misrepresentation 
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  See 
Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 22.  In that case, the Meracles 
contacted the Children's Service Society of Wisconsin ("CSS") 
and expressed their desire to adopt a normal, healthy child 
without deformities or a terminal or debilitating disease.    
¶19 Thereafter, the Meracles met with a CSS social worker 
regarding the adoption of a 23-month old child.  The social 
worker 
informed 
the 
Meracles 
that 
the 
child's 
paternal 
grandmother had died of Huntington's Disease.  However, the 
No. 96-2187 
 
10
social worker continued to state that the child's father had 
previously tested negative for the disease and, therefore, the 
child "had no more chance of developing the disease than did any 
other child."  Id. at 23.   
¶20 Over a year after the Meracles completed the adoption 
of the child, Mrs. Meracle learned through a television 
documentary that, due to the child's familial history, their 
child did have a significantly increased risk of developing 
Huntington's Disease.  Three and one-half years after this 
discovery, the Meracles' child was diagnosed with Huntington's 
Disease.   
¶21 The Meracles subsequently filed claims against CSS for 
negligent placement and negligent misrepresentation, and CSS 
brought a motion for summary judgment.  CSS argued in part that 
the Meracles claims were barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations.  Quoting Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 573, 107 
N.W. 488 (1906), this court stated that "[a] cause of action 
accrues 
where 
there 
exists 
a 
claim 
capable 
of 
present 
enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be enforced, and 
a party who has a present right to enforce it."  Meracle, 149 
Wis. 2d at 26.  Similarly stated, "a cause of action will not 
accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, not only the fact 
of injury but also that the injury was probably caused by the 
defendant's conduct or product."  Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 25-26 
(quoting Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 
N.W.2d 140 (1986)).   
No. 96-2187 
 
11
¶22 Relying on Barry and Borello, this court determined 
that the Meracles did not have an enforceable claim for 
pecuniary damage or emotional distress until they began to incur 
extraordinary expenses for their child's disease.   This court 
reasoned that "[i]t is only the extraordinary expenses, the 
unexpected expenses resulting from [the child's] special needs, 
which are actionable."  Id. at 26.  These expenses did not arise 
until the Meracles' child was diagnosed with Huntington's 
Disease. 
 
[The Meracles] could not have shown with a reasonable 
medical certainty [at the time Ms. Meracle viewed the 
documentary] that they would incur any future medical 
expenses. 
 
 . . .  
 
The Meracles did suffer an injury which could form the 
basis for a cause of action  . . . when they learned 
that [their child] had developed Huntington's Disease. 
 The Meracles had a cause of action for pecuniary 
damages at this time.  They could then demonstrate 
with reasonable medical certainty that [their child] 
would need extensive future medical care. 
Id. at 28-29. 
 
¶23 In this case, as stated, LSS asserts that the 
Nierengartens' claims accrued when their child was diagnosed 
with ADHD, because at that time, the Nierengartens could 
identify LSS as the alleged tortfeasor, they could identify the 
alleged 
wrongful 
conduct 
and, 
significantly, 
they 
began 
suffering actual pecuniary damages.  We agree. 
 
¶24 On March 5, 1990the day the Nierengartens' child was 
diagnosed with ADHDthe Nierengartens began incurring medical 
expenses for prescription medications to alleviate the child's 
symptoms associated with ADHD. See Record on appeal 27:3-4. On 
No. 96-2187 
 
12
that same day, the Nierengartens' physician referred them to a 
psychologist for family counseling, and recommended further 
individual psychological assessment for their child.  See id.  A 
follow-up appointment was also scheduled at that time.  See id. 
 At that point, the Nierengartens could identify LSS as the 
alleged tortfeasor, and could identify LSS' statements and 
placement of the child as the alleged wrongdoing.  The medical 
expenses began upon the diagnosis of ADHD and were to continue 
indefinitely. 
 
¶25 As part of their argument, the Nierengartens assert 
that the costs associated with their child's ADHD do not 
constitute "extraordinary expenses."  They state that it is 
"clear" that the ADHD diagnosis is not extraordinary, but that 
the "diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder clearly is."  Cross-Pet. 
Response Brief at 5.  They contend that the only thing 
extraordinary about ADHD is the "extraordinary commonness of its 
diagnosis and treatment."  Id. at 6.  We disagree. 
 
¶26 ADHD 
is 
recognized 
by 
the 
American 
Psychiatric 
Association as a mental disorder.  See American Psychiatric 
Association:  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 78, (DSM-IV 4th ed.) Washington, DC, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994.   Although the essential feature 
of ADHD involves a "persistent pattern of inattention and/or 
hyperactivity-impulsivity," id., the disorder manifests itself 
in multiple ways. 
 
Other symptoms include specific learning deficits such 
as 
dyslexia; 
perceptual-motor 
deficits; 
defective 
coordination; lack of response to discipline and 
antisocial 
behavior, 
especially 
in 
adolescence; 
interpersonal 
relationships 
marred 
by 
obstinacy, 
No. 96-2187 
 
13
stubbornness, 
negativism, 
bullying; 
emotional 
lability, low frustration tolerance; temper outburst. 
 In addition, neurologic examination of such children 
often uncovers "equivocal" abnormalities, or soft 
signs, 
such 
as 
transient 
strabismus, 
mixed 
and 
confused laterality, speech defects, or borderline EEG 
record. 
Psychiatric Dictionary 72 (7th ed. 1996).  In diagnosing a child 
with ADHD, a physician, psychologist or psychiatrist must 
observe several criteria in addition to the presence of 
inattention and hyperactivity. 
 
Some hyperactive-impulsive or inattentive symptoms 
that cause impairment must have been present before 
age 7 years . . . .   Some impairment from the 
symptoms must be present in at least two settings 
(e.g., at home and at school or work) . . . .   There 
must 
be 
clear 
evidence 
of 
interference 
with 
developmentally 
appropriate 
social, 
academic, 
or 
occupational functioning . . . .  The disturbance does 
not occur exclusively during the course of a Pervasive 
Developmental 
Disorder, 
Schizophrenia, 
or 
other 
Psychotic Disorder and is not better accounted for by 
another mental 
disorder 
(e.g., 
a Mood 
Disorder, 
Anxiety 
Disorder, 
Dissociative 
Disorder, 
or 
Personality Disorder . . . . 
American Psychiatric Association, at 78.  See also Nancy 
Nussbaum and Erin Bigler, Identification and Treatment of 
Attention Deficit Disorder, 5-7 (1990). 
 
¶27 The prevalence of ADHD is estimated at occurring in 
only three to five percent of the population of school-age 
children.10  See American Psychiatric Association, at 82.  The 
disorder 
creates 
challenges 
for 
one 
diagnosed 
with 
ADHD 
throughout childhood and adolescence, as well as into adulthood. 
 For 
example, 
"[i]n 
adulthood, 
restlessness 
may 
lead 
to 
                     
10 At oral argument, counsel for LSS also referenced 
statistical data indicating that only three to five percent of 
children are diagnosed with ADHD. 
No. 96-2187 
 
14
difficulty in participating in sedentary activities and to 
avoiding 
pastimes 
or 
occupations 
that 
provide 
limited 
opportunity for spontaneous movement."  Id.  
 
¶28 The dissent argues that the application of the statute 
of limitations in this case raises genuine issues of material 
fact and, therefore, this case cannot be decided on LSS' motion 
for summary judgment.  The dissent urges that a determination of 
extraordinary expenses should take into consideration such 
things as the "varying degrees of severity" of the child's ADHD, 
as well as the "actual or estimated costs associated with 
treating the child's ADHD."  Dissenting op. at 3, 4.  This court 
did not incorporate such factors in Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 26, 
when it defined extraordinary expenses as the "unexpected 
expenses resulting from [the child's] special needs," and we 
decline the invitation to consider them in this case. 
 
¶29 The degree of severity of a particular child's special 
needs will likely vary significantly from one child to another, 
regardless of what those special needs are.  Similarly, the 
exact amount of expenses related to caring for a child with 
special needs will likely vary.  However, the varying levels of 
severity and total related costs associated with ADHD, for 
example, do not negate the fact that the child in this case had 
been diagnosed with ADHDa special need that the Nierengartens 
did not expect when they expressed a desire to adopt a healthy 
child.   
¶30 The parties do not dispute that the Nierengartens' 
child was diagnosed with ADHD on March 5, 1990.  Upon the 
child's diagnosis of ADHD, the Nierengartens began to incur 
No. 96-2187 
 
15
medical expenses associated with the child's disorder.  The 
severity of the child's ADHD and the exact amount of the 
expenses incurred by the Nierengartens are irrelevant under the 
definition of "extraordinary expenses" set forth in Meracle.  We 
are not persuaded that a jury should decide whether the 
Nierengartens' claim should proceed based upon the degree of 
their child's special needs, or the fact that they may have 
incurred $500 in expenses or $500,000 in expenses.  To do so 
would be inconsistent with this court's decision in Meracle.  
 
¶31 In summary, we conclude that the Nierengartens' claim 
accrued at the time their child was diagnosed with ADHD on March 
5, 1990.  On March 5, 1990, the Nierengartens began incurring 
extraordinary medical expenses, i.e. those unexpected expenses 
arising from their child's special needs.11  See Meracle, 149 
Wis. 2d at 26.  On March 5, 1990, the Nierengartens could 
identify LSS as the alleged tortfeasor, and they could identify 
the alleged wrongful conduct.  Because the Nierengartens did not 
file their claims until June 20, 1995, more than five years 
after the date on which their claims accrued, their claims are 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  Accordingly, we dismiss the Nierengartens' 
                     
11 As stated, the extraordinary medical expenses incurred by 
the Nierengartens for their child's special needs included 
expenses for prescription medications to alleviate the child's 
symptoms associated with ADHD, referrals  to a psychologist for 
family 
counseling 
and 
further 
individual 
psychological 
assessment 
for 
their 
child, 
and 
scheduled 
follow-up 
appointments. 
No. 96-2187 
 
16
claims against LSS for negligent placement and negligent 
misrepresentation as time-barred.12 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J., did not participate.  
                     
12 Because we conclude that the Nierengartens' claims are 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54, we do not decide whether their claims 
present genuine issues of material fact, or whether their claim 
of negligent placement should be dismissed as contrary to public 
policy. 
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
1 
¶32 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE 
(Dissenting).  The majority opinion concludes that the statute 
of limitations began to run in March 1990 upon the child's 
diagnosis of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
because at that time the Nierengartens would have incurred 
"extraordinary expenses, the unexpected expenses resulting from 
[the child's] special needs."  Meracle v. Children's Serv. 
Soc'y., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989).   
¶33 I conclude that in this case a court cannot determine 
on summary judgment whether the Nierengartens' claims were 
barred 
by 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
three-year 
statute 
of 
limitations provided in Wis. Stat. § 893.54.13  I would therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals on this issue. 
¶34 To determine when a cause of action accrues, we must 
examine the cause of action alleged.  The Nierengartens sued for 
negligent misrepresentation of the health of their adopted 
child. 
¶35 Before the adoption the Nierengartens told Lutheran 
Social Services they wanted to adopt a healthy child with no 
serious mental or physical handicaps.  After the child was 
placed with the Nierengartens but before the adoption was 
                     
13 On summary judgment a court must examine the record and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party (the Nierengartens) and determine if the 
moving party (Lutheran Social Services) is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  If any genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the case should not be decided on summary judgment and 
must be submitted to a fact finder. 
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
2 
completed, 
the 
child 
exhibited 
behavioral 
difficulties.  
Lutheran Social Services reassured the Nierengartens that the 
child's behavior was "normal adjustment behavior" that "would go 
away."  Based on these representations, the Nierengartens 
proceeded to finalize the adoption in 1987.   
¶36 In 1990 the child was diagnosed with ADHD.  From that 
time on he was treated with various prescribed medications for 
ADHD.  In 1994 the University of Minnesota Hospital diagnosed 
the child with bipolar disorder and mathematics disorder.  
¶37 After the child was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, 
the Nierengartens spent $20,000 of their savings on the child's 
treatment 
between 
June 
1994 
and 
December 
1994. 
 
The 
Nierengartens 
allege 
that 
as 
a 
result 
of 
negligent 
misrepresentation 
by 
Lutheran 
Social 
Services, 
they 
are 
ineligible for a federal financial assistance program for 
adopted children with special needs.  Under this assistance 
program, an application for financial assistance must be filed 
before an adoption is finalized. 
¶38 In this case, two disputed questions of material fact 
exist, namely: (1) Does the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD 
require extraordinary expenses resulting from 
the child's 
special needs? and (2) On what date did the Nierengartens 
discover or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should they 
have discovered that their child's disorder would result in 
extraordinary expenses?  (Only "extraordinary expenses" are 
actionable under Meracle.) 
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
3 
¶39 The disputed issues of fact in this case must be 
resolved before the circuit court can determine as a matter of 
law whether the statute of limitations bars the Nierengartens' 
action.  When evidence raises a factual question involving the 
application of a statute of limitations, the question should be 
submitted to a fact finder.  See Robinson v. Mount Sinai Med. 
Ctr., 137 Wis. 2d 1, 17- 18, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987).  
¶40 According to the majority opinion's interpretation of 
Meracle, the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation did 
not accrue until the Nierengartens had "a compensable claim," 
that is, until they could demonstrate "with reasonable medical 
certainty" that their child "would need extensive future medical 
care."  Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 29-30.  
¶41 The majority opinion states that "the child in this 
case has been diagnosed with ADHDa special need that the 
Nierengartens did not expect when they expressed a desire to 
adopt a healthy child."  Majority op. at 15.  According to the 
majority 
opinion, 
the 
Nierengartens 
began 
incurring 
extraordinary expenses on the day the child was diagnosed with 
ADHD.  See majority op. at 2, 15.  The majority opinion thus 
assumes as a matter of law that ADHD is a serious physical or 
mental handicap requiring significant future medical expenses. 
¶42 I question whether this view of ADHD is correct.  A 
more reasonable view is that ADHD has varying degrees of 
severity, different manifestations and symptoms, and various 
courses of treatment among people diagnosed with it.  According 
to Psychology Today, in severe cases of ADHD a person can barely 
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
4 
function 
due 
to rampant 
disorganization or 
uncontrollable 
impulsivity, as well as low self-esteem or depression.  However, 
very mild cases of ADHD can be barely noticeable, especially in 
bright persons who adapt well.14  The Nierengartens themselves 
reported that in addition to their adopted son, they have two 
other children with ADHD but that these children do not present 
the same degree of behavioral problems as their adopted son 
does.  According to the majority opinion, the severity of ADHD 
is irrelevant.  See majority op. at 15. 
¶43 Contrary to the majority opinion's conclusion that 
ADHD is not a common disorder,15 many experts believe that ADHD 
is 
the 
United 
States' 
Number 
One 
childhood 
psychiatric 
disorder.16  According to an estimate by the National Institute 
of Mental Health, approximately one student in every classroom 
has ADHD, which comes to more than two million children (or 3 to 
5 percent).17   
                     
14 Edward M. Hallowell, What I've Learned from A.D.D., 30 
Psychology Today 3, May 15, 1997, at 40.  
15 The majority opinion writes that the Nierengartens 
"contend that the only thing extraordinary about ADHD is the 
'extraordinary commonness of its diagnosis and treatment.'  We 
disagree."  Majority op. at 13 (internal citation omitted).  
16 LynNell 
Hancock, 
Mother's 
Little 
Helper 
(Ritalin:  
Miracle Cure for Attention Deficit Disorder or Overprescribed 
Dangerous Drug?), NEWSWEEK, March 18, 1996, at 51.  
17 LynNell 
Hancock, 
Mother's 
Little 
Helper 
(Ritalin:  
Miracle Cure for Attention Deficit Disorder or Overprescribed 
Dangerous Drug?), NEWSWEEK, March 18, 1996, at 51.  
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
5 
¶44 The majority opinion treats the diagnosis of any child 
with 
ADHD 
as 
automatically 
signaling 
the 
beginning 
of 
extraordinary expenses.  Yet nearly half of pediatricians 
surveyed for a report in the Archives of Pediatric and 
Adolescent Medicine said they routinely send ADHD children home 
in an hour with a prescription.18  The majority opinion concludes 
nonetheless that with respect to determining the accrual of the 
cause of action, the amount of expenses is irrelevant.  See 
majority op. at 15.  To the majority opinion, it does not matter 
whether the Nierengartens "may have incurred $500 in expenses or 
$500,000 in expenses."  Majority op. at 16.  Any money spent on 
treating the child's ADHD qualifies as "extraordinary expenses" 
under the majority opinion. 
¶45 The majority opinion is silent about the nature and 
extent of any extraordinary expenses arising from ADHD because 
the record is silent about the specific nature of the child's 
ADHD, as well as the projected course of his disorder and its 
projected treatment regimen.  The record contains limited 
information about doctor visits and drug prescriptions, but it 
contains 
no 
information 
about 
actual 
or 
estimated 
costs 
associated with treating the child's ADHD.   
¶46 I agree with the court of appeals that the question 
whether the child's ADHD requires extraordinary expenses is a 
disputed issue of material fact that must be proved with 
                     
18 LynNell 
Hancock, 
Mother's 
Little 
Helper 
(Ritalin:  
Miracle Cure for Attention Deficit Disorder or Overprescribed 
Dangerous Drug?), NEWSWEEK, March 18, 1996, at 51. 
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
6 
reasonable medical certainty.  I further agree with the court of 
appeals that the record does not support a conclusion as a 
matter of law that the treatment of ADHD requires extraordinary 
expenses:  
 
The record does not suggest that expenses associated 
with treating ADHD in an adopted child would be 
unexpected or extraordinary.  There is no showing of 
any reasonable medical certainty in 1990 that the 
Nierengartens would incur any extraordinary medical 
expenses.  Thus, there is no showing that the 
Nierengartens suffered a pecuniary injury before 1994 
that would support a cause of action. 
 
 . . .  
 
[T]he record indicates that the extraordinary expenses 
were not incurred or foreseen until the bipolar 
diagnosis in 1994.  
Nierengarten v. Lutheran Soc. Serv., 209 Wis. 2d 538, 552-53, 
563 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted).   
¶47 Even if I were to accept as a matter of law that all 
children diagnosed with ADHD incur extraordinary expenses, a 
factual issue remains about when the Nierengartens knew or 
should have known that their child's ADHD would require 
extraordinary expenses. 
¶48 Whether the diagnosis of ADHD results in extraordinary 
expenses and on what date the Nierengartens discovered or should 
have discovered that they would incur extraordinary expenses are 
predicate factual questions that must be determined by a fact 
finder, be it the circuit court or a jury, before the circuit 
court can determine as a matter of law that the statute of 
No. 96-2187.ssa 
 
7 
limitations has run.  Accordingly I would affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court.  
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this dissent.