Title: Dawson v. Town of Jackson
Citation: 2011 WI 77
Docket Number: 2009AP000120
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2011

2011 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP120 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Dale Dawson, Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Jackson, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Town of Cedarburg, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 24 
Reported at: 323 Wis. 2d 477, 780 N.W.2d 222 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Faragher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Brad M. Hoeft and Huiras, Farrell & 
Antoine, S.C., Port Washington. 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief and oral 
argument by John M. Bruce and Schober Schober & Mitchell, S.C., 
New Berlin. 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Daniel L. Sargeant and Schloemer Law Firm, S.C., 
West Bend. 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lee Turonie, Shawano, 
for Wisconsin Towns Association. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP120   
(L.C. No. 
2008CV682) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dale Dawson, Gudrun Dawson and 
Edward Thomas, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
    v. 
 
Town of Jackson, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Town of Cedarburg, 
 
       Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 
2010 WI App 24, 323 Wis. 2d 477, 780 N.W.2d 222, affirming a 
declaratory judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court, 
Patrick J. Faragher, Judge.  The case requires us to interpret 
No.  2009AP120 
 
2 
 
the phrase "acting together" in Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2)1 as it 
pertains to governing bodies deciding an application to lay out, 
alter, or discontinue a public highway on or across municipal 
lines. 
¶2 
The respondents, Dale Dawson, Gudrun Dawson, and 
Edward Thomas (the Dawsons), applied to the town boards of 
Cedarburg and Jackson to vacate part of a jointly owned public 
highway, Wausaukee Road, which is surrounded by land the Dawsons 
own.  On January 9, 2008, the two town boards held a joint 
meeting to consider the Dawsons' application.  The meeting was 
attended by three of five Cedarburg board members and all five 
Jackson board members.  At the meeting, all five Jackson board 
members voted in favor of the application to discontinue the 
road, but the three Cedarburg members voted against it.  
¶3 
On June 20, 2008, the Dawsons sought a declaratory 
judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.04 that the joint action of the 
town boards resulted in discontinuance of the road.2  The circuit 
court granted summary judgment to the Dawsons, concluding that 
under § 82.21(2), "acting together" required that all votes at 
the joint meeting be counted in the aggregate, resulting in 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 At the circuit court, Jackson was a named defendant, but 
it stipulated to the facts alleged by the Dawsons, concurred 
with the Dawsons' interpretation of the statute, and submitted a 
brief in support of the Dawsons' motion for summary judgment.  
Jackson has consistently advanced similar, if not identical, 
arguments to the Dawsons and appears in this case as a co-
respondent. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
3 
 
discontinuance.  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  Dawson, 323 Wis. 2d 477, ¶1.   
¶4 
Cedarburg presents three issues for review:  
First, does the phrase "acting together" in Wis. 
Stat. § 82.21(2) require that separate votes taken by 
two governing bodies in deciding an application to lay 
out, alter, or discontinue a public highway on or 
across municipal lines be counted in the aggregate as 
if the two bodies voted as one? 
Second, is certiorari review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.15 
the 
prescribed 
method 
of 
reviewing 
the 
decisions made at the joint meeting referenced in Wis. 
Stat. § 82.21(2), and, if so, does this method of 
review preclude a filing for declaratory judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.04? 
Third, should the Dawsons be equitably estopped 
from asserting a position "that is inconsistent with 
their prior actions and representations to the town 
boards which led up to their joint meeting [on January 
9, 
2008] 
to 
consider 
Dawsons' 
application 
to 
discontinue the town line road?" 
¶5 
We conclude the following: 
(a) The phrase "acting together" in Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) 
is ambiguous. 
(b) The phrase "acting together" does not require that the 
separate votes taken by two governing bodies in deciding an 
application to lay out, alter, or discontinue a public highway 
on or across municipal lines be counted in the aggregate as if 
the two bodies voted as one. 
(c) Wisconsin Stat. § 82.21(2) expects governing bodies 
such as town boards to come together and cooperate to resolve a 
joint application, but it does not mandate the creation of a 
combined board.  The approval of both governing bodies is 
No.  2009AP120 
 
4 
 
necessary to approve a joint application like the one from the 
Dawsons. 
(d) Wisconsin Stat. § 82.15 contemplates certiorari review 
under Wis. Stat. § 68.13 as the prescribed method for review of 
"a highway order, or a refusal to issue such an order."  Section 
68.13 establishes both the procedure and a time limit for 
seeking review of a highway order under most circumstances. 
(e) Inasmuch as the Dawsons were seeking a determination 
that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway order was not in 
accordance with law, they should have proceeded under Wis. Stat. 
§ 68.13. 
(f) The fact that the circuit court should have dismissed 
the Dawsons' request for a declaratory judgment as untimely 
under § 68.13 does not deprive the supreme court of jurisdiction 
to address an issue of law. 
(g) We do not reach the question whether the Dawsons are 
equitably estopped from asserting a position contrary to their 
representations prior to the joint meeting because, given our 
other rulings, we are not required to do so. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
Although the parties are not in complete agreement 
about the facts, the material facts are undisputed.  This case 
arises from the Dawsons' application under Wis. Stat. § 82.21 to 
discontinue a portion of Wausaukee Road, a town line highway 
that lies on and across the municipal boundary line of the towns 
of Cedarburg and Jackson.  The Town of Cedarburg (Cedarburg) is 
located in Ozaukee County; the Town of Jackson (Jackson) is 
No.  2009AP120 
 
5 
 
located in Washington County.  The Dawsons are owners of all 
property bordering the affected half-mile portion of the 
highway.  The portion of the road that the Dawsons seek to 
discontinue comes to a dead end surrounded by their property.   
¶7 
The Dawsons submitted an application to Cedarburg to 
discontinue a portion of the road in a letter from their counsel 
dated May 16, 2007.  The letter reminded members of the 
Cedarburg board that the Dawsons had made a similar application 
to the two boards in 2005.  At that time, the Jackson board 
voted unanimously to vacate the road, but the Cedarburg board, 
on a split vote, rejected the application.  The letter 
characterized Cedarburg's 2005 vote as falling "short of the 
votes needed to vacate the roadway."   
¶8 
The letter further explained that the Dawsons had 
approached the Jackson board recently, and the board had voted 
on May 10, 2007, to confirm its action two years before.  The 
letter asserted that Cedarburg would be required to publish the 
appropriate notices and hold a public hearing but that "a mutual 
meeting" with Jackson "is no longer necessary."   
¶9 
Cedarburg responded to the letter by requesting a 
joint meeting with Jackson.  The Dawsons followed up, on August 
30, 2007, with a joint application to the two towns and a letter 
containing additional discussion of statutory requirements.  
Thereafter, the two boards held a joint meeting in Jackson on 
January 9, 2008.  Three of the five Cedarburg board members were 
in attendance, with two members excused.  All Jackson board 
members were present.   
No.  2009AP120 
 
6 
 
¶10 The two boards conducted a public hearing and appear 
to have engaged in some discussion before taking a recess to 
confer separately.  The boards then voted separately.  The three 
Cedarburg board members present voted not to discontinue the 
highway; the five Jackson board members voted to support the 
application. 
¶11 Following the meeting, Jackson recorded in Washington 
County a highway order to vacate part of the road.  Despite the 
Dawsons' request, Cedarburg declined to issue a similar order in 
Ozaukee County.  When Lannon Stone Products, Inc. placed a sign 
on Wausaukee Road indicating that it had been discontinued, 
Cedarburg issued two citations to the corporation for "erecting 
a prohibited sign on streets" and for "public nuisance-
obstruct/tend to obstruct street."  These citations were issued 
on April 12, 2008. 
¶12 On June 20, 2008, the Dawsons commenced a declaratory 
judgment action in the Washington County Circuit Court seeking a 
declaration that the joint action taken by the boards had 
discontinued the road and asking that a highway order to that 
effect be issued and recorded in both counties.  The Dawsons 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  Their motion was supported 
by Jackson.  Cedarburg responded, in part, that the declaratory 
judgment action was precluded by § 82.15, which prescribes 
certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13 for a person 
aggrieved by a town's refusal to issue an order to discontinue a 
highway.  The circuit court disagreed and granted summary 
No.  2009AP120 
 
7 
 
judgment to the Dawsons determining as a matter of law that the 
towns, acting together, had authorized discontinuance.   
¶13 In its written decision, the circuit court interpreted 
the phrase "acting together" to require the towns to count their 
votes in the aggregate as if the votes had taken place in a 
single body.  The court determined that the phrase "acting 
together" was not ambiguous and that to construe the statute in 
favor of Cedarburg would render the "acting together" language 
meaningless.  The court also rejected Cedarburg’s argument that 
the Dawsons should have sought review under § 68.13 as provided 
in § 82.15.  The court said that certiorari review would not 
have provided the relief the Dawsons requested.  The circuit 
court did not address Cedarburg's estoppel claim.   
¶14 Cedarburg appealed, Dawson, 323 Wis. 2d 477, ¶5, and 
the Wisconsin Towns Association filed an amicus brief in support 
of Cedarburg's interpretation of the statute.  Id., ¶19 n.6.  
However, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that (1) "[t]he 
Dawsons properly sought a declaratory judgment rather than 
certiorari review to clarify the meaning of the term 'acting 
together'"; (2) Cedarburg had "not demonstrated the required 
elements for a claim of estoppel on appeal"; and (3) in 
interpreting § 82.21(2), "the total votes cast must be counted 
together to determine the result."  Id., ¶28.  The court stated 
that "[a]ny other interpretation of 'acting together' would be 
unreasonable and contrary to the plain language of the statute."  
Id. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
8 
 
¶15 Cedarburg petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on May 13, 2010. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 This case is on appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment.  "We review a summary judgment decision independently, 
employing the same methodology as the circuit court."  Blunt v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 2009 WI 16, ¶13, 315 Wis. 2d 612, 760 N.W.2d 
396 (citation omitted).  On a motion for summary judgment, we 
look 
to 
whether 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  The material facts in this case are not in 
dispute; the issues presented involve questions of law. 
¶17 The first issue requires us to interpret the meaning 
of "acting together" under Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2).  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶22, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 
N.W.2d 207. 
¶18 The second issue is whether a declaratory judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.04 is permitted where the legislature has 
provided a prescribed method of certiorari review in § 82.15 for 
parties aggrieved by the issuance or refusal to issue a highway 
order.  This analysis not only raises a second question of 
statutory interpretation but also implicates a question of 
jurisdiction.  See Master Disposal, Inc. v. Village of Menomonee 
Falls, 60 Wis. 2d 653, 659, 211 N.W.2d 477 (1973).  We review 
No.  2009AP120 
 
9 
 
questions of jurisdiction de novo.   Vidal v. LIRC, 2002 WI 72, 
¶14, 253 Wis. 2d 426, 645 N.W.2d 870. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶19 Cedarburg raises three issues.  We first consider the 
correct interpretation of the phrase "acting together" in Wis. 
Stat. § 82.21(2).  We next consider whether the prescribed 
method of certiorari review in § 82.15 precludes a declaratory 
judgment.  We do not reach the issue of equitable estoppel. 
A. 
"Acting Together" Under Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) 
¶20 The principal issue in this case is whether the phrase 
"acting 
together" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.21(2) 
requires 
an 
aggregation of the votes of two or more municipalities that come 
together to decide on an application "to lay out, alter, or 
discontinue a highway on the line between a town and another 
town, a city, or a village, or a highway extending from one town 
into an adjoining town, city, or village."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.21(1)   
¶21 Chapter 82 of the statutes deals with town highways.  
In the typical situation, a town board acts on an application 
"to have a highway laid out, altered, or discontinued" entirely 
within the borders of that town.  The "BASIC PROCEDURES" to be 
followed in this situation are spelled out in Subchapter II of 
ch. 82, especially Wis. Stat. §§ 82.10-82.12 and 82.15-82.18. 
¶22 In other circumstances, town line highways run "on or 
across the boundary line between a town and another town, a 
village, or a city."  See Wis. Stat. § 82.01(9).  These 
No.  2009AP120 
 
10 
 
circumstances require "SPECIAL PROCEDURES" which are spelled out 
in Subchapter III of ch. 82, especially Wis. Stat. § 82.21. 
¶23 The procedure to lay out, alter, or discontinue a town 
line highway begins in one of two ways.  Wis. Stat. § 82.21(1).  
Six resident freeholders from each affected municipality may 
deliver an application to the clerk of every town, city, or 
village that would be affected by the proposal.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.21(1)(a).  In the alternative, the governing bodies of each 
municipality may introduce a resolution to lay out, alter, or 
discontinue a town line highway.  Wis. Stat. § 82.21(1)(b).  
Both 
applications 
and 
resolutions 
must 
contain 
certain 
descriptive information.  Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2). 
¶24 "Upon completion of the requirements of sub. (1), the 
governing bodies of the municipalities, acting together, shall 
proceed under §§ 82.10 to 82.13."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶25 The Dawsons, as well as the circuit court and court of 
appeals, interpret the phrase "acting together" to require that 
the votes of the town board members in attendance at a joint 
meeting be counted in the aggregate.3  Cedarburg, on the other 
hand, contends that the phrase "acting together" should be 
interpreted as encouraging cooperation while still permitting an 
independent vote on the application by each town board.  
                                                 
3 In its only significant departure from the Dawsons' 
position, Jackson argues that the words "acting together" 
necessarily imply that the boards act "as one board."  The 
Dawsons do not adopt this argument. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
11 
 
¶26 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If 
the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry." 
 
Seider 
v. 
O'Connell, 
2000 
WI 
76, 
¶43, 
236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except for technical or 
specifically defined words or phrases.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  We interpret statutory language in context——that is, "as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46 (citing cases). 
¶27 We do not ordinarily consult extrinsic sources of 
statutory interpretation unless the language of the statute is 
ambiguous.  Id., ¶50.  A statute is ambiguous if it is capable 
of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two 
or more senses.  Id., ¶47. 
¶28 As often happens, the language of a statute may not 
itself provide sufficient guidance to resolve an interpretation 
issue.  A plain reading of the phrase "acting together" does not 
advance our understanding as to how the towns' votes should be 
counted.  The phrase "acting together" could be interpreted 
reasonably in at least two senses.  The language could be 
interpreted to mean merely that the governing bodies should meet 
and try to cooperate without losing their separate identities.  
On the other hand, it could mean that when the bodies meet, they 
become in effect a single board for the purpose of handling a 
No.  2009AP120 
 
12 
 
highway application.  We think the phrase "acting together" is 
ambiguous in the statutory section in which it appears. 
¶29  An examination of statutory context is part of the 
examination of statutory language.  Section 82.21(2) references 
other sections in the same chapter, to-wit: "Upon completion of 
the requirements of sub. (1), the governing bodies of the 
municipalities, acting together, shall proceed under ss. 82.10 
to 82.13."  (Emphasis added.) 
In the text, "acting together" precedes resort to these three 
sections.  This statutory context provides helpful, if not 
dispositive, clues, but it does not eliminate all ambiguity.   
¶30 The proponents of the aggregate theory of voting are 
dependent 
upon 
a 
literal 
reading 
of 
the 
phrase 
"acting 
together," 
but 
a 
literal 
reading 
could 
not 
be 
applied 
consistently to all actions taken under the three sections. 
¶31 For 
instance, 
§ 82.10(3)-(4) 
provides 
notice 
requirements after the boards receive an application.  All 
parties interpret 
these subsections as requiring separate 
notices by the towns.  In their August 30, 2007 application, the 
Dawsons told Jackson and Cedarburg, "With the filing of this 
application, the responsibility now falls on each respective 
Town Board to provide notice of the time and place where they 
will jointly meet to consider the applications."  (Emphasis 
added.)   
¶32 This separation is reinforced by statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 985.02 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
law, a legal notice shall be published in a newspaper likely to 
No.  2009AP120 
 
13 
 
give notice in the area or to the person affected."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 985.05(2) reads: "When any municipality has designated 
an official newspaper, all legal notices published in a 
newspaper by such municipality shall be published in such 
newspaper unless otherwise specifically required by law."  The 
two towns here had different publication requirements under 
Chapter 985, so that when they published notices, they were not 
"acting together" in any literal sense. 
¶33 Similarly, § 82.11(1) instructs the town supervisors 
to "personally examine the highway . . . that is the subject of 
an 
application . . . ." 
 
No 
one 
suggests 
that 
the 
town 
supervisors of Jackson and Cedarburg were required to go to 
Wausaukee Road at the same time to examine the highway.  In 
other words, the town board members did not examine the highway 
by literally "acting together."  
¶34 Furthermore, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.12 
governs 
highway 
orders.  Subsection (2) reads in part: "If the board determines 
under sub. (1) to lay out, alter, or discontinue any highway, it 
shall issue a highway order.  The highway order shall be 
recorded with the register of deeds for the county in which the 
highway is or will be located and shall be filed with the town 
clerk."  Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2) (emphasis added).  Although 
§ 82.12 is one of the statutory sections under which the towns, 
"acting together," are to proceed, the towns would not be 
"acting together" in time, place, or manner if they filed 
respective highway orders. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
14 
 
¶35 The 
parties point to other, unrelated statutory 
provisions to support their interpretation of "acting together."  
The Dawsons urge us to consider Wis. Stat. § 990.001, dealing 
with construction of statutes.  Section 990.001(8) provides, 
"All words purporting to give a joint authority to 3 or more 
public 
officers . . . shall 
be 
construed 
as 
giving 
such 
authority to a majority of such officers."  To achieve the 
result the Dawsons desire, this provision would have to be given 
a more expansive interpretation than it has been given to date.  
The provision has generally been construed to mean that the 
absence or disqualification of a member of a body does not 
prevent the majority of other members from acting.  Karker v. 
Bd. of Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 51 Wis. 2d 542, 546, 187 
N.W.2d 160 (1971); Rogers v. Draves, 154 Wis. 23, 26-27, 142 
N.W. 127 (1913). 
¶36 To illustrate, if two of the three board members in 
attendance from Cedarburg had voted to discontinue the highway, 
the absence of two other members would not have invalidated 
Cedarburg's approval of discontinuance.  That principle does not 
determine whether "acting together" means that individual votes 
from different towns are counted in the aggregate. 
¶37 For 
its 
part, 
Cedarburg 
points 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 83.42(5) as an example of a highway decision requiring 
separate approval by all affected municipalities.  Section 
83.42(5) governs the modification of rustic roads and provides 
that where highways are under the jurisdiction of two or more 
municipalities, they "may not be designated rustic roads or be 
No.  2009AP120 
 
15 
 
withdrawn from the rustic roads system until after approval by: 
(a) The governing bodies of all affected municipalities."  Wis. 
Stat. § 83.42(5) (emphasis added).  This section demonstrates 
that the legislature has envisioned at least one scenario in 
which a single municipality holds veto power over highway 
decisions.  However, the language in § 82.21(2) is not as 
explicit as the language in § 83.42(5), and therefore citation 
to the rustic road statute does not end our inquiry. 
¶38 As the court of appeals noted, there is "scant" case 
law interpreting the words "acting together" in the context of 
§ 83.21(2).  Dawson, 323 Wis. 2d 477, ¶22.  In State ex rel. 
City of Madison v. Walsh, 247 Wis. 317, 19 N.W.2d 299 (1945), 
this court held that the apportionment statute did not require 
all board members of every affected municipality to attend an 
apportionment session and that apportionment was to be made by 
"a majority of the members from each municipality who attend."  
Id. at 320 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 66.03(6) (1943)).  The court 
went on to hold that the term "acting together" did not prevent 
a town from forfeiting its right to participate by choosing not 
to attend the apportionment vote, as the statutory provision for 
apportionment relied on a majority of those in attendance.  Id. 
at 320-21.   
¶39 The Dawsons argue that, similar to Walsh, the phrase 
"acting together" in § 82.21(2) should lead this court to 
conclude that approval of the application is made by a majority 
of board members in attendance.  According to the Dawsons, 
because five of the eight total board members who attended the 
No.  2009AP120 
 
16 
 
joint meeting voted in favor of the application, the vote 
resulted in discontinuance.   
¶40 The ruling in Walsh does not support this analysis.  
Chapter 66 (Municipal Law) of the 1943 statutes shows how the 
statutory language in § 66.03(5) and (6) should be interpreted.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0229(1), concerning consolidation, reads in 
part: "[A] town . . . may be consolidated with a contiguous 
town, village or city, by ordinance, passed by a two-thirds vote 
of all the members of each board or council."  This language 
should be compared to the language in the statute cited in 
Walsh: "The apportionment may be made only by a majority of the 
members from each municipality who attend, and in case of 
committees [from the respective municipalities], the action must 
be affirmed by the board or council so represented."  Walsh, 247 
Wis. at 320 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 66.03(6)) (emphasis added).  
The emphasized language demonstrates that each municipality must 
approve the apportionment.  If there is any question about that, 
it is settled in subsection (8): "Appeal to Court.  In case the 
apportionment board is unable to agree, the circuit court of the 
county in which either municipality is situated, may, upon the 
petition of either municipality, make the adjustment of assets 
and liabilities."  Wis. Stat. § 66.03(8) (1943) (emphasis 
added).  "Acting together" did not mean aggregate voting under 
the 1943 statute.  
¶41 The court of appeals looked to a case from Minnesota 
to bolster its position.  Dawson, 323 Wis. 2d 477, ¶¶24-26.  In 
Skrove v. Town Board of Towns of Belmont and Christiana, 154 
No.  2009AP120 
 
17 
 
Minn. 118, 121, 191 N.W. 584 (1922), the Minnesota Supreme Court 
considered a statute governing the placement of a highway.  The 
Minnesota statute read, "[T]he town board of each of such towns, 
or a majority of each, acting together as one board, shall 
determine said petition."  Id.  The Minnesota court concluded 
that under the statute, a majority of each town board need not 
approve the order, because a majority of the combined boards was 
sufficient under the statute.  Id., ¶25.  Our court of appeals 
acknowledged that in § 82.21(2) the language "acting together" 
was not modified by the phrase "as one board," but it found that 
such 
a reading of the statute was foreseeable and not 
inconsistent with the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶26. 
¶42 We disagree with the court of appeals.  To read the 
words "as one board" into the mandate that the boards act 
together adds words to the statute that the legislature did not 
include.  We decline to read into the statute words the 
legislature did not see fit to write.  Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 
2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 ("We will not 
read into the statute a limitation the plain language does not 
evidence.").  Accordingly, we do not find Skrove persuasive or 
illuminating to our inquiry. 
¶43 In sum, examining statutory context and some case law 
in addition to plain language does not eliminate the ambiguity.  
Therefore, we turn to the statute's legislative history. 
¶44 Chapter 82 was created by 2003 Wisconsin Act 214.  Act 
214 contains extensive notes by the Joint Legislative Council’s 
Special Committee on Recodification of Town Highway Statutes.  
No.  2009AP120 
 
18 
 
Those notes indicate that Wis. Stat. § 82.21 is based on former 
§§ 80.11(1)-(6) and 80.12(01)-(02)(2001).  Note to § 60, 2003 
Wis. Act 214.   
¶45 Former § 80.11 governed highways on town lines where 
only town boards were involved, while former § 80.12 governed 
highways on and across town and other municipal boundaries.  
Former § 80.11(1) read: "Whenever it is considered necessary to 
lay out, alter, widen or discontinue a highway upon the line 
between two towns . . . it shall be done by the supervisors of 
the two towns acting together . . . ."  This section can be 
traced back to the 1870s.     
¶46 Town line roads have been the subject of state 
legislation since statehood.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 16, §§ 63, 64, 
65 (1849): 
 
Whenever it shall be deemed necessary to lay out 
a highway upon the line between two towns, such 
highway shall be laid by the supervisors of each of 
said towns, either upon said line or as near thereto 
as the situation of the ground will admit; and they 
may vary the same, either to the one side or the other 
of such line, as they may deem necessary. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 16, § 63 (1849) (emphasis added). 
 
The supervisors of each adjoining town, upon 
laying out a highway upon the line between such towns, 
shall determine what part of such highway shall be 
made and kept in repair by each town, and what share 
of the damages, if any, shall be paid by each. 
Id., § 64 (emphasis added). 
 
The supervisors of each such adjoining town shall 
proceed 
in 
all 
things 
as 
is 
required 
of 
the 
supervisors of one town in laying out highways in such 
town . . . and each town shall have all the rights and 
No.  2009AP120 
 
19 
 
be subject to all the liabilities, in relation to the 
part of such highway to be made or repaired by such 
town, as if the same were wholly located in such town. 
Id., § 65 (emphasis added). 
 
¶47 We read these statutes from 1849 as encouraging 
cooperation but preserving the independence of each town.   
¶48 These statutes had been revised by 1878.  Section 1272 
reads: 
 
Whenever it shall be deemed necessary to lay out, 
alter, widen or discontinue a highway upon the line 
between two towns, it shall be done by the supervisors 
of each of said towns acting together, either upon 
said line, or as near thereto as the situation of the 
ground will admit; and they may vary the same, either 
on one side or the other of such line, as they may 
deem necessary. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 52, § 1272 (1878) (emphasis added). 
 
The application therefor shall be . . . addressed 
to the supervisors of both towns . . . , the notice of 
the time and place for meeting to decide upon such 
application shall be signed by a majority of the 
supervisors of each town . . . , a majority of the 
supervisors of each town shall meet to decide upon 
such application and sign the order and the award of 
damages, and in all other things the proceedings shall 
be the same as are required by law in laying out, 
altering, widening or discontinuing highways within a 
town. 
Id., § 1273 (emphasis added). 
¶49 Section 1272 shows that the phrase "acting together" 
has been part of our law on town highways since at least 1878. 
¶50 In Town of Seif v. Town of Eaton, 153 Wis. 657, 661, 
140 N.W. 319 (1913), this court had occasion to interpret § 1273 
of the 1911 statutes.  The case involved an effort by the Town 
of Seif to assign part of the costs of a new town-line bridge to 
No.  2009AP120 
 
20 
 
the Town of Eaton after the Town of Seif assumed certain town-
line obligations of the Town of Weston, having been created out 
of the Town of Weston.  Although the equitable case for Eaton to 
pay its fair share of the costs of the bridge was strong, this 
court rejected any apportionment of costs based in equity, 
without a new agreement from Eaton.  The court observed: 
The statute . . . provides that a majority of the 
supervisors of one town shall meet with a majority of 
the supervisors of the other and that they shall make 
an adjustment to fit the new condition, in case all 
agree. . . .  
The 
meeting 
contemplated . . . is 
a 
meeting of at least a majority of the supervisors of 
one town with a majority of the supervisors of the 
other, and with authority, if all agree, to bind both 
towns; the result to be evidenced by an order made by 
them and filed for record in the office of the town 
clerk in each town. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶51 The court further noted that there was "no opportunity 
for the municipality [Eaton] to accept or reject" the bridge 
payment.  Id. at 664.  Consequently, the importance of the Seif 
case is that, after the phrase "acting together" had been in the 
Wisconsin highway statutes for more than 30 years, our court 
stressed the requirement of agreement among government bodies. 
¶52 The court discussed Wis. Stat. § 80.11 (1961) in Town 
of Muskego v. Town of Vernon, 19 Wis. 2d 159, 119 N.W.2d 474 
(1963).  The issue in Town of Muskego was whether Crowbar Road 
was a town line highway within the meaning of § 80.11.  Id. at 
160.  The court concluded that it was not, because it had not 
been created by joint action of the towns but rather had been 
laid out in 1845 exclusively by the road commissioners of the 
No.  2009AP120 
 
21 
 
Town of Muskego.  Id. at 165.  Although the case has language 
helpful to the Dawsons——"a legislative intent to deal with town-
line roads laid out as such by the joint action of the majority 
of supervisors of the town[s]"——that language does not focus 
squarely on the issue in this case.  Id. at 164.  Moreover, the 
case validates the Town of Vernon's refusal to participate in an 
apportionment 
meeting 
requested 
by 
the 
Town 
of 
Muskego, 
suggesting municipal independence. 
¶53 The Dawsons rely on the Town of Muskego case, saying 
that 
it 
demonstrates 
that 
this 
court 
agreed 
with 
their 
interpretation that a majority of the combined boards, rather 
than a majority of each board, is sufficient to approve a joint 
application.  They then point to the Joint Legislative Council's 
Prefatory Note to 2003 Wisconsin Act 214 which stated: "There 
are detailed notes following the sections that indicate the 
substantive change, if any.  If the note does not indicate a 
substantive change, none is intended.  If a question arises 
about the effect of any modification made by this bill, the 
special committee intends that the revisions in this bill be 
construed to have the same effect as the prior statute."   
¶54 The Dawsons argue that because the notes relevant to 
Wis. Stat. § 82.21 do not indicate an intent to make a 
substantive change, the court's interpretation in Town of 
Muskego should continue to control.  While the legislative 
history demonstrates that there was no intent to make a 
substantive change, the Dawsons' arguments are insufficient to 
override conflicting evidence in the legislative history.   
No.  2009AP120 
 
22 
 
¶55 Finally, we turn to public policy.  The practical 
effect of interpreting "acting together" to mean counting the 
votes of the town boards in the aggregate is to undermine the 
independence and autonomy of municipalities.  It also runs the 
risk 
of 
permitting 
larger municipalities——like cities and 
villages——to impose their will upon smaller municipalities 
(usually towns). 
¶56 By statute, town boards in Wisconsin may have as few 
as three supervisors and as many as five.  Wis. Stat. § 60.20.  
Villages, on the other hand, may consist of as few as two 
trustees and as many as six.  Wis. Stat. § 61.20.  Cities are 
permitted to determine the number of council members, with an 
average of six to ten members, but as many as twenty.  John A. 
Martin, City Councils and Village Boards: What Determines Their 
Size, The Municipality, November 1996.  Accordingly, the 
membership of a governing body may vary between two and twenty, 
depending on the municipality.   
¶57 This is particularly troublesome since the larger 
municipalities are likely to have more members.  Under the court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation 
of 
"acting 
together," 
the 
municipality with a larger governing membership will be more 
likely to prevail in dealing with joint applications.  While it 
is true that not all board members will vote in lockstep, the 
fact remains that under the court of appeals' construction of 
"acting together," the municipality with the larger board will 
always have the upper hand. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
23 
 
¶58 The Dawsons argue that if votes are not counted in the 
aggregate in such circumstances, there will never be a decision, 
because, as here, municipalities may not agree.  This argument 
overlooks the fact that deciding to keep the status quo is still 
a decision.  Moreover, impasse would not be completely avoided 
through adoption of the Dawsons' construction, as two boards of 
equal size voting in lockstep would not produce a majority vote 
to approve an application.    
¶59 The alternative to the status quo could be quite 
stark.  A majority vote——based purely on the size of a governing 
board——could "lay out" a new highway or "alter"——that is, expand 
or move an existing town line highway——over the opposition of a 
community with a smaller governing board.  The municipality with 
the 
larger 
board 
could 
initiate 
these 
actions 
through 
cooperative freeholders, Wis. Stat. § 82.21(1)(a), and dictate 
the outcome.  We note that the municipality could not initiate 
the process solely by introducing its own resolution, inasmuch 
as both municipalities are required to introduce a resolution 
under Wis. Stat. § 82.21(1)(b). 
¶60 We 
see 
the 
rule 
espoused 
by 
the 
Dawsons 
as 
inconsistent with two provisions in Wis. Stat. § 82.11, the 
section that contemplates a joint meeting.  First, subsection 
(1) calls on a town board to hold a public hearing "to decide, 
in 
its 
discretion, 
whether 
granting 
the 
application 
or 
resolution is in the public interest."  Id. (emphasis added).  A 
community cannot decide anything "in its discretion" if it will 
be outvoted automatically by a community with a larger board.  
No.  2009AP120 
 
24 
 
Second, subsections (2)(a) and (b) envision situations where a 
town official may be required to withdraw from voting because of 
the code of ethics.  The official's withdrawal would immediately 
disadvantage that town in an aggregate vote if the boards were 
of equal size. 
¶61 We are unpersuaded by Jackson's contention that it is 
unfair to require Jackson to maintain Wausaukee Road, which it 
voted 
to 
discontinue.4 
 
Significantly, 
Jackson's 
argument 
disregards the possibility that it could meet with Cedarburg to 
reapportion the responsibility for maintaining the road under 
§ 82.21(4)(b).  Given the extensive history of the towns' 
disagreement regarding this road, Cedarburg may be willing to 
agree to reapportionment of the road's maintenance.  Even if 
Cedarburg were unwilling to agree to reapportionment, Jackson 
could appeal the apportionment under § 82.21(5).  Upon appeal, 
the circuit court could take into account Jackson's vote to 
grant the discontinuance.   
¶62 We think it is unlikely that a town will persist in 
its opposition to an application or resolution without a valid 
reason.  The existence of a veto power does not prevent 
negotiation and compromise.  Conversely, the creation of 
authority for one community to override another without respect 
to the merit of their positions is likely to create more 
conflict than it will prevent. 
                                                 
4 Cf. Town of Whitewater v. Town of Richmond, 204 Wis. 388, 
235 N.W. 773 (1931). 
No.  2009AP120 
 
25 
 
¶63 We hold, therefore, that the phrase "acting together" 
in Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) does not require that separate votes 
taken by two governing bodies in deciding an application to lay 
out, alter, or discontinue a public highway on or across 
municipal lines, be counted in the aggregate as if the two 
boards voted as one.  Approval of both boards is necessary to 
approve a joint application like the one from the Dawsons.  If 
we 
have 
failed to assess accurately the intent of the 
legislature, the legislature is fully empowered to correct our 
understanding by amending ch. 82.  
B. 
Propriety of Declaratory Judgment 
¶64 We next consider whether Wis. Stat. § 82.15 prescribes 
a method of certiorari review that precludes seeking relief by 
declaratory judgment.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.04.  Under § 82.15, 
"Any person aggrieved by a highway order, or a refusal to issue 
such an order, may seek judicial review under s. 68.13.  If the 
highway is on the line between 2 counties, the appeal may be in 
the circuit court of either county."   
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 68.13 reads as follows:   
 
Judicial Review. (1) Any party to a proceeding 
resulting in a final determination may seek review 
thereof by certiorari within 30 days of receipt of the 
final determination.  The court may affirm or reverse 
the final determination, or remand to the decision 
maker for further proceedings consistent with the 
court's decision. 
 
(2) If 
review 
is 
sought 
of 
a 
final 
determination, the record of the proceedings shall be 
transcribed at the expense of the person seeking 
review.  A transcript shall be supplied to anyone 
requesting the same at the requester's expense.  If 
No.  2009AP120 
 
26 
 
the person seeking review establishes impecuniousness 
to the satisfaction of the reviewing court, the court 
may order the proceedings transcribed at the expense 
of the municipality and the person seeking review 
shall be furnished a free copy of the transcript.  By 
stipulation, the court may order a synopsis of the 
proceedings in lieu of a transcript.  The court may 
otherwise limit the requirement for a transcript. 
¶66 Section 
68.13 
authorizes 
certiorari 
review 
and 
provides that any party to a proceeding resulting in a final 
determination——such as the refusal to issue a highway order——may 
seek certiorari review "within 30 days of receipt of the final 
determination."  Id.5  Statutory certiorari includes a review of 
whether the entity whose decision is being reviewed proceeded on 
a correct theory of law.  Donaldson v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 2004 WI 
67, ¶73, 272 Wis. 2d 146, 680 N.W.2d 762; Cohn v. Town of 
Randall, 247 Wis. 2d 118, 633 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 2001). 
¶67 Section 82.15 appears to apply to the Dawsons.  After 
all, their complaint asserted that "Cedarburg has refused to 
issue a highway order," and they requested that the circuit 
court direct "the Town of Cedarburg to issue a highway order as 
necessary to discontinue the [] Road."   
                                                 
5 The phrase "receipt of a final determination" is not clear 
in the context of a highway order.  It could mean the date that 
one or more municipalities votes to grant or deny an application 
or resolution.  It could mean the date that a notice of that 
determination is received by an applicant, if a notice is sent.  
In this case, the Dawsons did not comply with a 30-day time 
limit under any reasonable interpretation of the statute.  
Cedarburg voted not to approve the Dawsons' application on 
January 9, 2008.  The Dawsons did not file suit until June 20, 
2008.   
No.  2009AP120 
 
27 
 
¶68 Thus, Cedarburg argues that the Dawsons should have 
pursued the certiorari review provided in Wis. Stat. § 82.15 
instead of seeking a declaratory judgment.  Cedarburg contends 
that certiorari review is the Dawsons' exclusive remedy.  It 
implies that one reason the Dawsons sought a declaratory 
judgment is that they missed the filing deadline for certiorari 
review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13, so that it was no longer 
available to them. 
¶69 In the absence of the directive in Wis. Stat. § 82.15, 
declaratory judgment would be an appropriate avenue of relief.  
However, the 1995 legislature discarded past practice for 
appealing a highway order,6 declined a proposal to permit a 
general "appeal" to the circuit court,7 and specified use of the 
certiorari review set out in § 68.13.8  This court has long held 
that where a method of review is prescribed by statute, "that 
prescribed method is exclusive."  Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 
215 Wis. 2d 370, 383, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998); State ex rel. First 
Nat'l Bank v. M&I Peoples Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 529, 538 n.6, 263 
N.W.2d 196 (1978); Master Disposal, 60 Wis. 2d at 657.  
¶70 Cedarburg's case for the exclusivity of certiorari 
review is buttressed by the statutes.  We note that § 82.15 is 
denominated a "basic procedure."  That means it applies to all 
appeals from a highway order, or a refusal to issue a highway 
                                                 
6 Cf., Wis. Stat. § 80.17 (1993). 
7 See 1995 A.B. 328, authored by Rep. Eugene Hahn. 
8 1995 Wis. Act 186. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
28 
 
order, whether the order or refusal involves a single town, or 
two towns, or a town and a city, or a town and a village.  In 
short, the appeal process governs much more than an order 
affecting a town line highway. 
¶71 The statute on certiorari review limits the time to 
appeal highway orders.  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 82.16 suggests 
that most highway orders are not open to collateral attack.9  
Thus, a decision on the availability of declaratory judgment in 
addition 
to 
certiorari 
review 
would 
have 
widespread 
ramifications. 
¶72 For the reasons outlined above, we conclude that 
certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13 is the prescribed 
method of appealing a highway order, or a refusal to issue a 
highway order, and that, as a practical matter, this means of 
appeal applied to the Dawsons.  They should have utilized 
certiorari review. 
¶73 Normally, 
a 
party 
seeking 
an 
alternative 
to 
a 
statutorily prescribed method of review must show that the 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 82.16 provides: 
 
(1) Every 
order 
laying 
out, 
altering, 
or 
discontinuing a highway under this chapter, and any 
order restoring the record of a highway, shall be 
presumptive evidence of the facts therein stated and 
of the regularity of all the proceedings prior to the 
making of the order. 
 
(2) The validity of an order described in sub. 
(1), if fair on its face, is not open to collateral 
attack, but may be challenged in an action brought 
under s. 82.15.  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2009AP120 
 
29 
 
prescribed method is inadequate to resolve the issue presented, 
Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 383-84, or inadequate to effect the 
remedy sought, Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 2000 WI 61, ¶¶4, 16, 
235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 N.W.2d 44.10  Placing this burden on the 
complaining party helps to assure that courts will honor the 
legislative plan for review. 
¶74 In Hermann, this court stated that "as a general rule 
a court lacks jurisdiction where the plaintiff fails to follow 
the required statutory procedure."  Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 383.  
The court then added, however, that this is a "rule of 'policy, 
convenience and discretion.'"  Id. (quoting Ass'n of Career 
Empls. v. Klauser, 195 Wis. 2d 602, 612, 536 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. 
App. 1995)); see also League of Women Voters v. Outagamie Cnty., 
113 Wis. 2d 313, 321, 334 N.W.2d 887 (1983) (the general rule 
that the statutory method of review is exclusive is a matter of 
                                                 
10 In Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶43, 235 
Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59, the court noted that it was possible 
to make an equal protection argument under certiorari review but 
that "monetary damages are not one of the forms of relief Wis. 
Stat. § 68.13 authorizes a court to grant." 
No.  2009AP120 
 
30 
 
policy, 
convenience 
and 
discretion 
and 
not 
a 
matter 
of 
jurisdiction).11 
¶75 Given the published decision of the court of appeals 
in this case and the fact that the primary issue briefed and 
argued by the parties centered on the legal question about 
"acting together," we have thought it both prudential and 
necessary to take up the question of statutory interpretation 
and decide it even though the request for a declaratory judgment 
should have been denied by the circuit court.  Our determination 
to take up this case should not be interpreted as a green light 
to evade the legislature's prescribed method of certiorari 
review for matters involving highway orders. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶76 We conclude that "acting together" in the context of 
Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) does not require aggregate counting of 
                                                 
11 This principle is derived from the rule that, where there 
is an administrative remedy available to a party, the party must 
first exhaust such remedy before seeking judicial relief.  See 
Nodell Inv. Corp. v. City of Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d 416, 424, 254 
N.W.2d 310 (1977); Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 
383-84, 
572 
N.W.2d 855 
(1998). 
 
There 
have 
always 
been 
exceptions, however, to this rule.  As this court noted in 
Wisconsin Collectors Asso. v. Thorp Finance Corp., "Although 
there are a number of decisions of this court which relate to 
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, none of them 
actually holds that such failure results in the court's loss of 
subject-matter jurisdiction."  Wis. Collectors Ass'n. v. Thorp 
Fin. Corp., 32 Wis. 2d 36, 46-47, 145 N.W.2d 33 (1966) (citing 
cases).  Normally matters involving highway orders present cases 
where the interests of judicial efficiency——policy, convenience, 
and discretion——require the court to decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  However, we have chosen to exercise jurisdiction 
in this case to answer the question posed by this appeal. 
No.  2009AP120 
 
31 
 
votes.  While the town boards are required by statute to come 
together and cooperate to resolve a joint application or a 
resolution, the statute does not mandate the creation of a new, 
combined board.  Approval of both boards is necessary to approve 
the joint application.   
¶77 We 
further 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.15 
contemplates certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13 as the 
prescribed method for review of "a highway order, or a refusal 
to issue such an order."  Section 68.13 establishes both the 
procedure and a time limit for seeking review of a highway order 
under most circumstances.  Inasmuch as the Dawsons were seeking 
a determination that Cedarburg's refusal to issue a highway 
order was not in accordance with law, they should have proceeded 
under Wis. Stat. § 68.13. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP120.pdr 
1 
 
 
¶78 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion, but I write in concurrence in order to 
point out that the dissent's characterization of the majority 
opinion is the opinion of a dissenting justice.  The dissent 
states, "I read the majority as limiting to highway cases the 
exercise of its discretion to reach the merits when the 
statutory method of certiorari review has not been met . . . ."1  
The majority opinion does not reach the issue of how its opinion 
may be used in the future, but rather, decides the case before 
it, which arose out of a highway order.   
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶13.   
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
1 
 
 
 
¶79 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I address 
two issues:  certiorari as the prescribed method of judicial 
review and aggregating the votes of two town boards.    
¶80 First, I conclude that the prescribed method of 
judicial review by certiorari under Wis. Stat. §§ 82.15 and 
68.13 precludes the Dawsons from bringing a declaratory judgment 
action under § 806.04.     
¶81 Second, although I conclude that the Dawsons are 
precluded from bringing this declaratory judgment action, I 
address the majority's interpretation and application of Wis. 
Stat. § 81.21(2).  I reach the same conclusion as the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  The votes of the town board should 
be aggregated.   
I 
¶82 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 82.15 and 68.13(1) authorize a 
party to a proceeding relating to highway orders to seek 
certiorari review in the circuit court within 30 days of receipt 
of the final determination.  See majority op., ¶¶64-66. 
¶83 Section 82.15 provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by 
a highway order, or a refusal to issue such an order, may seek 
judicial review under s. 68.13."  
¶84 Section 68.13(1) establishes judicial review for a 
broad range of decisions of municipal authorities:  "Any party 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
2 
 
to a proceeding resulting in a final determination may seek 
review thereof by certiorari within 30 days of receipt of the 
final determination.  The court may affirm or reverse the final 
determination, or remand to the decision maker for further 
proceedings consistent with the court's decision." 
¶85 The Dawsons failed to seek certiorari review within 30 
days of receipt of the final determination. 
¶86 Rather, the Dawsons sought review of the highway order 
through a declaratory judgment lawsuit filed six months later.   
¶87 I agree with the majority opinion that "where a method 
of review is prescribed by statute, 'that prescribed method is 
exclusive,'" majority op., ¶69, and that the Dawsons "should 
have utilized certiorari review," majority op., ¶72. 
¶88 I also agree with the majority opinion that there are 
certain exceptions to the exclusivity of a prescribed statutory 
method of certiorari judicial review.  For example, the 
statutorily prescribed method of certiorari judicial review need 
not be used when it is not plain, speedy, and adequate.  State 
ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. M&I Peoples Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 529, 
543, 263 N.W.2d 196 (1978).  The statutorily prescribed method 
of certiorari judicial review need not be used when a party 
shows that the statutory method is inadequate to resolve the 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
3 
 
issue presented or is inadequate to effect the remedy sought.  
Majority op., ¶73.1  
¶89 The case law is clear: "in all but exceptional cases," 
the statutorily prescribed certiorari judicial review is the 
exclusive remedy.  State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. M&I Peoples 
Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 529, 542, 263 N.W.2d 196 (1978).     
¶90 Thus the question becomes whether this case is an 
exceptional case and in what way.  The majority opinion does not 
claim that this is an exceptional case.  Nor do the Dawsons.  
Nor do I.   
¶91 Nevertheless, the majority opinion concludes that this 
court should use its discretion to reach the merits of this 
highway case.  Majority op., ¶75 & n.11.  I read the opinion as 
not allowing a circuit court to exercise its discretion to reach 
the merits when a party has failed to adhere in highway cases to 
the statutory method of certiorari review.  I do not know 
whether the court of appeals may exercise its discretion.  I 
read the majority as limiting to highway cases the exercise of 
its discretion to reach the merits when the statutory method of 
certiorari review has not been met: "this case should not be 
interpreted as a green light to evade the legislature's 
                                                 
1 The circuit court and court of appeals concluded that 
certiorari was inadequate to effect the remedy the Dawsons 
sought and allowed the Dawsons to proceed by declaratory 
judgment.  The majority opinion does not take this tack. 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
4 
 
prescribed method of certiorari review for matters involving 
highway orders".  Majority op., ¶75.     
¶92 
I 
am 
concerned 
that 
the 
majority 
opinion 
may 
unnecessarily raise procedural questions for future litigants 
and the courts.  I would not abandon our precedent that a court 
should adhere to the statutorily prescribed method of certiorari 
judicial review except in exceptional circumstances.  
¶93 I conclude that the declaratory judgment relief the 
Dawsons seek should be denied.  Certiorari review is prescribed 
by statute.  No exception applies in the present case.   
¶94 Nevertheless, because I disagree with the majority 
opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.21(2), I will 
briefly comment on that holding of the majority opinion.   
II 
¶95 I conclude that "acting together" to discontinue a 
town-line highway under Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) requires an 
aggregate vote count of the combined memberships of the affected 
governing bodies.  As does the majority opinion, I will (A) 
discuss 
statutory 
interpretation, 
including 
analyzing 
the 
statutory text and the text in context; (B) examine the 
statutory 
history; 
and 
(C) 
reflect 
on 
public 
policy 
considerations. 
A 
¶96 Wisconsin Stat. § 82.21(2), the statute at issue, 
provides as follows:  "Upon completion of the requirements of 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
5 
 
sub. (1), the governing bodies of the municipalities, acting 
together, shall proceed under ss. 82.10 to 82.13."  Sections 
82.10 to 82.13 set forth procedural steps, including the 
initiation of procedures, notice requirements, lis pendens, 
examination of the highway, the code of ethics for participants, 
time of determination, and recording of determination.    
¶97 Curiously, the way the majority opinion interprets 
"acting together," the town boards are always acting separately.2  
                                                 
2 The majority fails to recognize that acting together does 
not mean sacrificing individuality and individuality does not 
mean sacrificing acting together.  The majority opinion calls to 
mind a poem by Khalil Gibran that I am often asked to read when 
I officiate at weddings.  Gibran eloquently describes how 
marriage requires partners to act together, yet remain separate 
throughout their marriage.   
 
"On Marriage" 
(The Prophet, 1923) 
You were born together, and together you shall be 
forevermore. 
You shall be together when white wings of death 
scatter your days. 
Aye, you shall be together even in the silent memory 
of God. 
But let there be spaces in your togetherness, 
And let the winds of the heavens dance between you. 
Love one another, but make not a bond of love: 
Let it rather be a moving sea between the shores of 
your souls. 
Fill each other's cup but drink not from one cup. 
Give one another of your bread but eat not from the 
same loaf. 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
6 
 
The majority reads "acting together" completely out of the 
statute.  What could the legislature have meant by the phrase?  
It means nothing, says the majority. 
¶98 The majority opinion gives nary an example of when the 
two boards act together.  Each board does everything separately, 
according to the majority opinion, and thus either municipality 
has ultimate veto power over the other.  The majority suggests 
this reading avoids "absurd or unreasonable results."  Majority 
op., ¶26.   
¶99 As I read the statute, the phrase "acting together" 
means the boards are to act as a single group.  This 
interpretation gives a common meaning to the phrase "acting 
together":  doing something in a single group.   
¶100 The majority points to the notice requirements as an 
example of a procedure that must be accomplished separately.  
Nothing in the notice requirements, however, suggests that those 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sing and dance together and be joyous, but let each 
one of you be alone,  
Even as the strings of a lute are alone though they 
quiver with the same music. 
Give your hearts, but not into each other's keeping. 
For only the hand of Life can contain your hearts. 
And stand together yet not too near together; 
For the pillars of the temple stand apart, 
And the oak tree and the cypress grow not in each 
other's shadow. 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
7 
 
procedures cannot be accomplished through a collaborative effort 
of the boards of the affected municipalities. 
¶101 Contrary to the majority's assertions, the boards can 
produce a notice that encompasses the statutory requirements by 
"acting together" as a single group.  "Acting together," the 
boards can 1) determine the time and place where they will meet 
to consider the application or resolution; 2) create a legal 
description of the highway; and 3) set forth a scale map.   
¶102 The only difference between the situation in which one 
board must produce a notice that encompasses the statutory 
requirements and the situation in which two or more boards must 
do the same is that the boards "acting together" must ensure the 
notice requirements of each municipality are met.  That a notice 
must be published in two different newspapers does not restrict 
the town boards from acting together to achieve that result.  
The two boards acting together can decide on a date of a hearing 
and the wording of the notice.  And the boards, acting together, 
can then agree that, under Wis. Stat. § 82.10(3)-(4), the notice 
is placed in the appropriate media outlet prescribed for each 
municipality.  See Wis. Stat. § 985.02 (relating to notice 
requirements).   
¶103 Thus the boards would be acting together to fulfill 
the same procedural requirements that can be effectuated 
separately.  I conclude that the applicable procedural steps set 
forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 82.10 to 82.13 are consistent with the 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
8 
 
concept that the boards of the affected municipalities will act 
together as a single group. 
¶104 In sum, the very words "acting together" and their 
context in the statute support the conclusion that the boards 
act together to vote and the votes are aggregated. 
¶105 I agree with the circuit court.  It explained that 
"[i]f the legislature had meant to authorize an individual town 
to block an attempt to lay out, alter or discontinue a highway 
on a town line they could have done so simply by requiring 
approval by both towns.  A particular procedure would not have 
been necessary.  Separate approval is the opposite of acting 
together."   
B 
¶106 I now turn to the statutory history and case law that 
the majority opinion sets forth as "legislative history."  
Before the reader gets carried away in the details of this 
history, the reader should be warned there is no smoking gun 
here, concealed or visible.  All the majority can do is quote a 
passage here and there from a statute or a case and then say it 
reads the passage in a certain way to support its conclusion.  
The majority opinion's bottom line is, and can only be, that 
there is conflicting evidence in the "legislative history."  I 
agree that the "legislative history" is mixed and inconclusive.  
It can be interpreted to support either the majority opinion or 
this dissent.  
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
9 
 
C 
¶107 Finally, I turn to public policy considerations.  
Through Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2), the legislature has established a 
process to follow in laying out, altering, or discontinuing 
town-line roads lying on or across town and municipal lines.  If 
the municipalities agree on what is to be done with the highway, 
the interpretation of "acting together," as it affects vote 
counting, does not matter.  Indeed, if the communities agree, 
the statute is unnecessary.  Each community could collaborate 
and follow Wis. Stat. §§ 82.10 to 82.13 separately and get the 
desired result. 
¶108 The value of Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) is that it sets up 
a procedure to settle disagreements between towns.  Aggregating 
votes is more apt to resolve a dispute than taking separate 
votes.   
¶109 Anytime towns disagree, the status quo is maintained 
under the majority's interpretation.  That interpretation has no 
legislative purpose, as it merely affirms what would happen 
without a statute.  By aggregating votes, the statute has a 
purpose——it may resolve a stalemate when towns disagree.      
¶110 The majority points out that municipalities may have a 
different number of representatives voting for or against a 
proposal, citing that as a reason to require independent voting.  
The legislature knew that towns and municipalities may have 
different numbers of representatives.   
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
10 
 
¶111 The majority opposes the possibility that a larger 
municipality may have more control than a smaller municipality.  
The majority does not think this result is good policy and so 
avoids that result by interpreting the statute to avoid the 
impact of size discrepancies between municipalities.  But it is 
not within the judiciary's authority to sit in judgment of the 
wisdom of a statute.  A court must interpret the statute, not 
rewrite it. 
¶112 These policy determinations are appropriately the 
legislature's to make.  I would encourage the legislature to re-
examine this statutory language and unambiguously state its 
intentions regarding the statute.3   
¶113 After examining the text of Wis. Stat. § 82.21(2) and 
its context, the "legislative history," and the public policy, I 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 13.92: 
(2) Duties of the chief.  The chief of the legislative 
reference bureau shall: 
(L) In cooperation with the law revision committee, 
systematically examine and identify for revision by 
the legislature the statutes and session laws to 
eliminate 
defects, 
anachronisms, 
conflicts, 
ambiguities, 
and 
unconstitutional 
or 
obsolete 
provisions.  The chief shall prepare and, at each 
session of the legislature, present to the law 
revision committee bills that eliminate identified 
defects, anachronisms, conflicts, ambiguities, and 
unconstitutional or obsolete provisions.  These bills 
may include minor substantive changes in the statutes 
and session laws necessary to accomplish the purposes 
of this paragraph.  The chief may resubmit to the law 
revision committee in subsequent sessions of the 
legislature any bill prepared under this paragraph 
that was not enacted. 
No.  2009AP120.ssa 
11 
 
conclude, as did the circuit court and court of appeals, that 
the votes are to be aggregated.   
¶114 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.   
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