Title: State v. Schoen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057652
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2010

FILED: April 14, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON
Respondent on Review,
v.
TERRY DEAN SCHOEN,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 04494; CA A129669; SC S057652)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 5, 2010.
Neil F. Byl, Deputy Public Defender,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services.
Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney
General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz,
Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Baker County Circuit Court, Warner
Wasley, Senior Judge. 229 Or App 427, 211 P3d 948 (2009).
BALMER, J.
This case requires us to determine
whether a reasonable jury could find that defendant "tamper[ed] * * * with
property of another," as that phrase is used in ORS 164.345(1), the
statute that defines the crime of third-degree criminal mischief.  At trial,
defendant argued that his conduct -- kicking the door of a police car in which
he had been placed following his arrest -- was insufficient to allow a conviction
for that crime.  The trial court rejected that argument, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed in a divided, en banc opinion.  State v. Schoen, 229 Or
App 427, 211 P3d 948 (2009).  We allowed review and, for the reasons set out
below, now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant interfered with the efforts
of two police officers to enter his home to investigate a report of a domestic
dispute.  The officers attempted to detain defendant, resulting in a physical
struggle between him and the officers.  After subduing defendant, the officers placed
him in the back seat of a police car.  While in the police car, defendant
kicked the door a number of times.  No evidence was introduced at trial that
the door was damaged or otherwise altered, either in function or appearance, by
defendant's acts.  Defendant was charged with assault, disorderly conduct,
harassment, and -- for kicking the car door -- third-degree criminal mischief,
ORS 164.345(1).  That statute provides:
"A person commits the crime of criminal
mischief in the third degree if, with intent to cause substantial inconvenience
to the owner or to another person, and having no right to do so nor reasonable
ground to believe that the person has such right, the person tampers or
interferes with property of another."
The criminal complaint alleged, as to
the criminal mischief charge, that defendant "did unlawfully and knowingly
tamper" with the police car.  As noted, at trial, defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal, arguing that evidence that he had kicked the door of the
police car was insufficient to prove that he had committed third-degree
criminal mischief.  Instead, he argued, the state was required to prove that
there had been damage to the police car.  The trial court denied the motion,
and a jury convicted defendant of all charges.  Defendant appealed, challenging
only the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the
criminal mischief charge.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an
en banc decision with three different opinions.  At the outset, we observe that,
although defendant was charged only with "tampering" and not with
"interfering," all three Court of Appeals opinions appear to assume
that defendant was charged with "tampering or interfering" with
property.  The two opinions that reached the merits proceeded to determine
whether defendant's conduct "tampered or interfered" with the police
car.(1) 
Indeed, the plurality opinion ultimately affirmed defendant's conviction
because "[a] reasonable factfinder could find that defendant's acts constituted
an 'interference' within the ordinary meaning of the statute."  Schoen,
229 Or App at 436 (Edmonds, J., concurring).  Although the opinions in the
Court of Appeals apparently rest on an erroneous assumption as to the nature of
the criminal mischief charge of which defendant was convicted, we nevertheless describe
the opinions briefly because they provide useful background for the discussion
that follows.  
Four members of the Court of Appeals joined
in a plurality opinion that concluded that the phrase "tampers or
interferes with property of another" in ORS 164.345(1) covers all "unwarranted
interferences with property."  Id. at 434 (Edmonds, J., concurring). 
The plurality thus rejected defendant's argument that the statute required
proof that defendant's conduct "affected" the property or impaired
the use of the property and affirmed defendant's conviction.  
Three judges agreed that defendant's
conviction for third-degree criminal mischief should be affirmed, but did so on
the grounds that defendant had failed to raise in the trial court and preserve
on appeal his argument that the state must prove conduct that
"affected" the property or its use.  Id. at 437 (Haselton, J.,
concurring).  Like the plurality opinion, Judge Haselton's concurring opinion
treated the proceedings in the trial court as though defendant had been charged
with "tampering or interfering" with the police car.  See id. at
440-41.  
Three judges dissented, concluding
that the phrase "tampers or interferes with property" requires proof
of "an effect on property that changes its physical nature or limits the
property's usefulness."  Id. at 445 (Sercombe, J., dissenting).  In
the dissent's view, defendant's conduct did not impede the use of the patrol
car or diminish or change the property for the worse so as to alter its
functionality or value.  For that reason, defendant was not guilty of
third-degree criminal mischief and his motion for judgment of acquittal should
have been granted.  Id. at 452.  
On review, defendant argues that a person
"tampers or interferes with property" for purposes of ORS 164.345(1)
when the person "appreciably alters the existing condition or use of the
property at issue."  Defendant links the word "tamper" with a
physical effect on the property and the word "interfere" with a
change or rearrangement of the property that frustrates or hinders its use. 
The state first argues that defendant failed to preserve the argument that he
asserts in this court.  On the merits, the state argues that third-degree
criminal mischief does not require the state to prove conduct that "alters
the existing condition or use of property."  In the state's view, the
statute prohibits "any act in which a person improperly and intrusively
meddles with another person's property to frustrate or inconvenience that
person."  
We first consider the issue of
preservation and then turn to the merits.  Both issues require us to focus on
the motion for judgment of acquittal in the context of the case as it was
charged and tried.  As noted, the criminal complaint did not charge defendant
with "tampering or interfering" with the police car; the count at
issue here alleged only that defendant, "with intent to cause substantial
inconvenience to Baker City, did unlawfully and knowingly tamper with a
patrol vehicle[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  The trial court's initial summary
of the case to the prospective jurors, tracking the criminal complaint,
similarly described the criminal mischief count as based on the state's
contention that defendant had "tamper[ed]" with the police car. 
(Moreover, the jury later was instructed that, to find defendant guilty of
third-degree criminal mischief, it had to find, among other things, that he had
"tampered" with the police car, again demonstrating that the trial
court and the parties correctly viewed this case as one about "tampering"
and not about "interfering.")
When defendant moved for a judgment
of acquittal, he argued that "[t]here's been no showing there's any damage
to the vehicle of any kind.  So we don't believe there's enough [evidence]
there [to support a conviction for criminal mischief]."  The trial judge
responded that there was "sufficient evidence" for the jury to hear
all the charges.  Defendant's motion, which did not use either the word "tamper"
or the word "interfere," was necessarily directed at the state's
alleged failure to prove the conduct element of third-degree criminal mischief
as that crime was charged in the criminal complaint -- that defendant
unlawfully tampered with the police car.  The trial judge's denial of
that motion also was necessarily based on his understanding that the state had
charged tampering and that defendant believed tampering required damage of some
kind.
To be sure, defendant's argument on appeal --
that the state had to show that his acts altered or changed the physical
condition or affected the use of the police car in some respect -- is a
refinement of the argument that he made to the trial court, and defendant now concedes
that the state need not prove that he physically "damaged" the police
car.  But because the element of the crime at issue in the motion for judgment
of acquittal was whether defendant had "tampered," and not whether he
had "interfered," it was plain that the motion focused the trial
court's attention on whether defendant's kicking had any physical effect on the
police car.  Thus, in our view, the "purposes of fairness and efficiency
that underlie the [preservation] requirement," State v. Stevens,
328 Or 116, 122, 970 P2d 215 (1998), were adequately served by the grounds that
defendant asserted in his motion for judgment of acquittal.  We therefore turn
to the merits of defendant's appeal.
We begin with the text of ORS 164.345(1). 
The crime of third-degree criminal mischief, as charged in this case, consists
of two elements:  (1) "tamper[ing] * * * with property of another"
when one has "no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that
[one] has such right," and (2) the "intent to cause substantial
inconvenience to the owner [of the property] or to another person."  Here,
defendant does not dispute that, by kicking the inside surface of the door of
the police car, he intended to cause substantial inconvenience to the police
officers at the scene.  Nor does he argue that he believed that he had a right
to kick the door.  His only claim is that kicking the door did not
"tamper" with property.(2)
The word "tamper" is not defined
in ORS 164.345(1), and, because it is a word of common usage, we turn first to its
ordinary meaning.  See State v. Briney, 345 Or 505, 511, 200 P3d 550
(2008) (court gives words of common usage their plain, ordinary meaning).  Although
the dictionary offers several definitions of "tamper," the parties
agree that the second definition is applicable here:  "to interfere so as
to weaken or change for the worse."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 2336 (unabridged ed 2002).  The dictionary also identifies
"meddle" as a synonym for "tamper," and under the
definition of "meddle," it distinguishes tamper from the other verb
used in the statute, "interfere," noting that "TAMPER suggests
unwarranted alteration or change, ill-advised readjustment, meddlesome
experimentation, or improper influence," while "INTERFERE suggests
taking part obtrusively and officiously in the affairs of others so as to
hinder, frustrate, check, or defeat."  Id. at 1401.  As an initial
matter, then, "tampering" with property would seem to require some improper
alteration, change, or "readjustment" of the property.
The legislative history of the crime
of third-degree criminal mischief is also helpful to our inquiry.  See State
v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (court may consider
legislative history proffered by the parties, if useful).  ORS 164.345 was
enacted as part of the 1971 revision of the Oregon criminal code.  Or Laws
1971, ch 743, § 145.  The commentary to the code noted that the new criminal
mischief sections were intended to replace the statutes that "prohibit[ed]
'interference' or 'tampering' with certain classes of property." 
Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code,
Final Draft and Report, §§ 145-147, 153 (July 1970).  The statutes to be
replaced included a variety of laws that criminalized "interference"
with various kinds of utility property.  Id.  Those statutes did not
prohibit mere unauthorized "contact" with the physical property, but
rather conduct that affected the property or its use.  They used the words
"tamper" and "interfere" along with other verbs that
suggest that some kind of adverse effect on the property or its use must be
shown.  See, e.g., former ORS 164.610 (1969), repealed by Or
Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (a person commits the crime of "interference with
water rights and appliances" if the person intentionally "cuts,
breaks down, injures, destroys, extends, alters, tampers or interferes
with or removes" property related to pumping or transporting water)
(emphasis added).  In writing the new criminal mischief statute -- which, as
noted, was intended to prohibit the same conduct as the earlier statutes -- the
drafters of the code used the verbs "tamper" and "interfere,"
but not the other verbs from the earlier statutes.  It thus appears that the
drafters intended those two words to carry forward the concept of requiring
some improper alteration of the property (tampering) or adverse effect on its
use (interfering), rather than merely any unauthorized contact with the
property.
The crux of the legal dispute here is
whether "tampering," for purposes of ORS 164.345(1), can be established
even without a showing that the property or its use was "affected" by
the defendant's conduct, as the state argues.  The Court of Appeals plurality opinion
concluded that all "unwarranted interferences with property with
the intent to cause substantial inconvenience to the owner or other persons [are]
unlawful under ORS 164.345."  Schoen, 229 Or App at 434 (Edmonds,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).  That holding, however, as previously noted, appears
to have been based on the erroneous assumption that defendant had been charged
with "interfering" with the police car, in addition to
"tampering" with the police car, and thus appears to be the
plurality's interpretation of the words "tampers or interferes,"
rather than the word "tampers" considered on its own.  The state
nevertheless continues to maintain that "tampers" refers not only to
"altering something's existing condition," but also to
"interfering with it" or simply "meddling" with it.
As the discussion above suggests, we
disagree with the state's interpretation.  The legislature set out a specific mens
rea in ORS 164.345(1) -- the intent to cause substantial inconvenience. 
But the statute does not simply criminalize all acts done with that intent. 
Rather, it also sets out a specific actus reus for third-degree criminal
mischief:  "tamper[ing] or interfer[ing] with property of another."  And,
in this case, only "tampering" was charged.  The statute, as
applicable here, thus requires some specific conduct -- tampering -- with
respect to property.  But what conduct is sufficient to violate the statute?  
The state argues that the wrongful
conduct is that which "improperly and intrusively meddles" with
another person's property with intent "to frustrate or inconvenience that
person."  Obviously, the last part of the state's proposed test is merely the
mens rea element of ORS 164.345(1) and is not disputed here.  And the
addition of the adverbs "improperly" and "intrusively" merely
emphasizes the conclusion that the "meddling" is unauthorized or wrongful
in some way; those words do not assist us in defining the kind of conduct
prohibited by the statute.  Arguably, any conduct that a person engages
in with respect to another's property could be considered "improper"
or "intrusive" if it is performed with an intent to cause substantial
inconvenience to the owner of the property (or another).  But the text,
context, and legislative history of ORS 164.345, described above, lead us to
conclude that the phrase "tampers * * * with property" was not
intended to sweep so broadly.  
As discussed above,
"tamper" ordinarily refers to a change or alteration -- ordinarily
for the worse -- in some thing (tangible or intangible).  We have found nothing
in the text, context, or legislative history of ORS 164.345 to suggest that the
legislature intended some different meaning when it used that word in the
criminal mischief statute.  The state nevertheless argues that the word
"tampers," standing alone, encompasses all (or virtually all) conduct
that is prohibited by the words "tampers or interferes."  However, those
two words, although arguably overlapping in certain respects, do point in
different directions.  Indeed, the legislature's use of both words is at
least some indication that the legislature intended "interfere" to
mean something different than "tamper."  See ORS 174.010
("[W]here there are several provisions or particulars such construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.").  It is the
word "interfere," not "tamper," that ordinarily is used in
the sense of being "in opposition" to, "at cross-purposes"
with, or hindering or frustrating a use or purpose.  See Webster's at
1178 (so defining "interfere").  We conclude that the word "tampering,"
as used in ORS 164.345(1), requires conduct that alters, rearranges, or changes
property.  
The foregoing interpretation, in our
view, captures the majority of the hypotheticals raised by the drafters of the
criminal code and discussed in the Court of Appeals opinions.(3) 
See Schoen, 229 Or App at 435-36 (Edmonds, J., concurring); id.
at 450-51 (Sercombe, J., dissenting) (both discussing hypothetical examples of
third-degree criminal mischief). Throwing a switch on a train track that could
change the path of a train or opening a gate that blocks access to a forest
service road is conduct that alters, rearranges, or changes property, and
constitutes "tampering" with property.  If done with the intent to
cause substantial inconvenience, it constitutes third-degree criminal
mischief.  Similarly, mixing up library books and reshelving them out of order
is an alteration and rearrangement of property and constitutes
"tampering" with property.  What constitutes tampering with property
for purposes of ORS 164.345(1) may depend on the nature of the property: 
merely entering a "clean room" at a manufacturing facility for
silicon wafers or touching a valuable painting with one's finger might
constitute tampering, while the same conduct with respect to other property
would not.  The actus reus element of "tamper[ing] * * * with
property" for purposes of third-degree criminal mischief may be easily met
in many cases, but it requires some showing, beyond the intent to cause
substantial inconvenience, of an appreciable physical change or rearrangement
to property.
Returning to the facts of this case,
the state does not argue that defendant's kicking damaged the police car.  Nor,
as noted, was there any evidence that the kicks altered, rearranged, or had any
effect whatever on the car.  The state thus failed to introduce evidence that
defendant "tampered" with the car.  Because the state introduced no
evidence that defendant "tamper[ed] * * * with property," the trial
court erred in not granting defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on
the third-degree criminal mischief charge.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The
Court of Appeals' assumption is understandable, as the parties, in their briefs
in that court, treated the case as though the relevant question was whether the
state had proved that defendant had "tampered or interfered" with the
police car.  We nevertheless find it appropriate to consider only whether
defendant "tampered" with the police car.  As explained more fully
below, the case was charged and tried on that theory, and the trial court, when
ruling on defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, would have understood the
criminal mischief charge to involve only tampering. 
2. Because
defendant was not charged with "interfering" with property, we have
no occasion to adjudicate the scope of that term or decide whether a reasonable
juror could conclude that defendant's conduct constituted
"interfering."  We discuss the meaning of "interfere" only
insofar as it assists in our interpretation of the word "tamper."
3. Other
conduct might constitute "interfering" with property for purposes of
ORS 164.345(1), and therefore third-degree criminal mischief, but the present
case requires us to consider only whether the charged conduct was
"tampering."