Title: Wintergreen Partners v. McGuireWoods
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091378
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2010

Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., and 
Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ.  
 
WINTERGREEN PARTNERS, INC., 
d/b/a WINTERGREEN RESORT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091378      
       JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 September 16, 2010 
MCGUIREWOODS, LLP 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal concerning a legal malpractice action, we 
consider whether the circuit court erred in ruling that the 
client could not prove, as a matter of law, that the judgment 
against it would have been reversed if a timely appeal had been 
filed. 
Background 
 
At the conclusion of a jury trial, the Circuit Court of 
Albemarle County entered an $8.3 million judgment against 
Wintergreen Partners, Inc. (Wintergreen), for damages arising 
out of a skiing accident at its resort.  McGuireWoods, LLP 
(McGuireWoods), as legal counsel for Wintergreen, filed a 
notice of appeal for Wintergreen, but failed to ensure that the 
trial transcripts were timely filed.  Because the issues on 
appeal required consideration of the transcripts, this Court 
dismissed Wintergreen’s petition for appeal. Wintergreen 
Partners, Inc. v. Grigg, Record No. 042956 (July 7, 2005) 
(unpublished). 
 
 
Wintergreen filed an action against McGuireWoods, its 
appellate counsel, in the Circuit Court for the City of 
Richmond, alleging legal malpractice.  McGuireWoods filed a 
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of 
law, Wintergreen could not meet the standard for proving a 
valid legal malpractice claim.  The circuit court granted 
summary judgment in favor of McGuireWoods.  Wintergreen 
appeals. 
 
On the night of January 20, 2003, Jessica Grigg (Grigg) 
was severely injured after crashing into a snow groomer as she 
descended the Eagles Swoop ski slope at Wintergreen Ski Resort.  
Wintergreen employees Brett Henyon (Henyon) and Jeffrey T. 
Eimutus (Eimutus) were transporting the snow groomer up the 
slope at the time of the collision.  
Milton Grigg, as conservator for Grigg, filed an action 
against Wintergreen and its two employees, Henyon and Eimutus, 
in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County.  The action alleged 
that Grigg was injured as the result of negligence on the part 
of Wintergreen and its two employees. 
 
The jury was instructed on general negligence and premises 
liability theories of recovery.  Instruction 13 stated, 
“Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care.  Ordinary care 
is the care a reasonable person would have used under the 
circumstances of this case.”  Instruction 10A concerned the 
 
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principle of respondeat superior, stating that “[a]n employer 
is liable for all damages proximately caused by the negligence 
of its employees.”  Jury Instruction 16 provided the following 
regarding premises liability:  
Wintergreen was an occupant of the property on 
which Jessica Grigg was an invitee.  An occupant of 
premises has the duty to an invitee: 
 
 
(1)  To use ordinary care to have the premises 
in a reasonably safe condition for an invitee’s use 
consistent with the invitation, but an occupant does 
not guarantee an invitee’s safety; and 
 
 
(2)  To use ordinary care to warn an invitee of 
any unsafe condition which the occupant knows, or by 
the use of ordinary care should know, unless the 
unsafe condition is open and obvious to a person 
using ordinary care for his or her own safety. 
 
 
If an occupant fails to perform either or both 
of these duties, then the occupant is negligent.  
 
Wintergreen did not object to Instructions 10A, 13, or 16, 
but objected generally to all instructions on the grounds that 
the circuit court should have granted its previous motion to 
strike.  Without objection, the jury was provided a verdict 
form that allowed the jury to indicate, separately for each of 
the three defendants, whether it found for or against that 
defendant.  
 
The jury found for Henyon and Eimutus but against 
Wintergreen, awarding Grigg $8.3 million in compensatory 
damages against Wintergreen.  Wintergreen challenged the 
verdict as inconsistent and filed a motion to set aside the 
 
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verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  The circuit 
court denied the motion and entered judgment for Grigg against 
Wintergreen in the amount of $8.3 million.  
Analysis  
Wintergreen’s appeal of the underlying personal injury 
judgment was dismissed because of the failure to timely file 
transcripts of the trial with this Court.  This Court has 
stated that, with respect to legal malpractice claims involving 
an appeal, the standard of review “is whether the client can 
prove that, had a timely appeal been filed, as a matter of law 
the judgment against him would have been reversed . . . .”  
Goldstein v. Kaestner, 243 Va. 169, 172, 413 S.E.2d 347, 349 
(1992). 
Wintergreen claims that the circuit court erred in 
granting summary judgment to McGuireWoods because Wintergreen 
established its legal malpractice claim under the standard set 
forth by this Court in Goldstein.  Specifically, Wintergreen 
asserts that had a timely trial transcript been filed in its 
appeal, it would have been entitled, as a matter of law, to a 
reversal of the judgment against it because of the jury’s 
inconsistent verdict in finding Wintergreen liable but 
exonerating its employees.  McGuireWoods contends that the 
circuit court did not err because two possible theories of 
recovery were presented to the jury, and the jury’s verdict 
 
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finding Wintergreen liable but exonerating Henyon and Eimutus 
was not inconsistent as a matter of law. 
 
It is well settled in Virginia that “ ‘where a master and 
servant are sued together in tort, and the master’s liability, 
if any, is solely dependent on the servant’s conduct, a verdict 
for the servant necessarily exonerates the master.’ ”  Shutler 
v. Augusta Healthcare for Women, P.L.C., 272 Va. 87, 92, 630 
S.E.2d 313, 316 (2006) (quoting Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. 
Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156, 372 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1988)); see also 
Hughes v. Doe, 273 Va. 45, 48, 639 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2007) (“the 
crux of respondeat superior liability is a finding that the 
employee was negligent”).  However, this Court recognizes 
exceptions to the rule “where the master’s liability is not 
derived solely from the servant’s acts.”  Roughton Pontiac 
Corp., 236 Va. at 156, 372 S.E.2d at 149.  The master’s 
“liability may be predicated upon evidence showing his own 
tortious acts or omissions independent of or in combination 
with the acts of the servant or upon the actions of another 
employee.  In these situations, a judgment entered against the 
master will be allowed to stand, notwithstanding the servant’s 
exoneration.”  Id. at 156, 372 S.E.2d at 149-50 (internal 
citations omitted); see also Virginia State Fair Ass’n v. 
Burton, 182 Va. 365, 370-71, 28 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1944) (holding 
that the fair association was independently negligent for 
 
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failing to keep the premises reasonably safe for invitees). 
In this case, the jury was instructed regarding both 
respondeat superior and premises liability theories concerning 
Wintergreen’s alleged negligence.  This Court has stated that 
“instructions given without objection become the law of the 
case and thereby bind the parties in the trial court and this 
Court on review.”  Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Thomas Baker Real 
Estate, Ltd., 237 Va. 649, 652, 379 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989); see 
also Ulloa v. QSP, Inc., 271 Va. 72, 80, 624 S.E.2d 43, 48 
(2006); T.L. Garden & Assocs. v. First Savings Bank of Va., 262 
Va. 28, 31, 546 S.E.2d 705, 706 (2001).  Jury Instructions 10A, 
13, and 16 and the verdict form, which allowed the jury to 
assess Wintergreen’s and the employees’ liability separately, 
were given without objection from Wintergreen.  Because 
Wintergreen neither objected nor assigned error to the 
instructions or the verdict form, they became the law of the 
case. 
Because Grigg was an invitee on Wintergreen’s premises, 
Instruction 16 permitted the jury to find that Wintergreen, as 
the occupant of the premises, failed to exercise ordinary care 
in rendering the premises reasonably safe for Grigg’s visit or 
failed to warn of unsafe conditions that were known to it and 
unknown to Grigg.  Violation of these duties supports an 
independent basis of liability against Wintergreen, separate 
 
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and apart from Wintergreen’s responsibility for any alleged 
negligence perpetrated by Henyon and Eimutus.  Wintergreen’s 
potential liability asserted in Instruction 16 is not derived 
solely from Henyon and Eimutus’ actions on the slope on the 
date of the accident; Instruction 16 provides a basis upon 
which Wintergreen could be liable for tortious acts or 
omissions in addition to and independent of the acts of Henyon 
and Eimutus.  Therefore, even though the jury found that the 
employees were not negligent, Instruction 16 permitted the jury 
to find that Wintergreen was negligent, independent of the acts 
of its employees, Henyon and Eimutus, for failing to keep the 
premises reasonably safe or for failing to warn properly.* 
Under these circumstances, we hold that, even if the 
appeal of the judgment against Wintergreen had not been 
dismissed, this Court would not have been required to reverse 
the Grigg judgment as a matter of law, because Jury Instruction 
16 supported the jury’s finding that Wintergreen could be 
liable for Grigg’s injuries independent of the acts of Henyon 
or Eimutus.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in granting McGuireWoods’ motion for summary judgment. 
                     
* McGuireWoods did not, on Wintergreen’s behalf in the 
dismissed appeal, assign error regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence proving that Wintergreen failed to keep the premises 
safe or failed to adequately warn of dangerous conditions, and 
Wintergreen has not asserted the failure to challenge the 
 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
                                                                 
sufficiency of the evidence as a basis for its malpractice 
claim.   
 
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