Title: State v. Circuit Court for Dane County
Citation: 2011 WI 43
Docket Number: 2011AP000613-LV, 2011AP000765-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2011

2011 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP613-LV 
2011AP765-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ismael R. Ozanne 
        Plaintiff-Respondent 
     v. 
Jeff Fitzgerald, Scott Fitzgerald, Michael Ellis 
and Scott Suder, 
        Defendants, 
Douglas La Follette, 
        Defendant-Petitioner-Movant. 
__________________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin ex rel. 
Michael D. Huebsch, Secretary of the Wisconsin 
Department of Administration, 
        Petitioners, 
      v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, the Honorable 
MaryAnn Sumi Presiding, Ismael R. Ozanne, District 
Attorney for Dane County, Jeff Fitzgerald, Scott 
Fitzgerald, Michael Ellis, Scott Suder, Mark 
Miller, Peter Barca, Douglas La Follette, Joint 
Committee on Conference, Wisconsin State Senate 
and Wisconsin State Assembly 
        Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 14, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON 
BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
June 6, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
        
 COUNTY: 
        
 JUDGE: 
      
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
        
 DISSENTED: 
        
 NOT 
PARTICIPATING: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the Plaintiff-Respondent oral argument by Ismael R. 
Ozanne, Dane County District Attorney. 
  
For the Defendant-Petitioner-Movant oral argument by Roger 
A. Sage, Roger Sage Law Office, Madison, WI. 
 
 
For the petitioners oral argument by Kevin St. John, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
 
For the respondents Dane County Circuit Court, Hon. MaryAnn 
Sumi, oral argument by Marie A. Stanton, Hurley, Burish & 
Stanton, Madison, WI.   
 
For the respondents Dane County District Attorney, oral 
argument by Ismael R. Ozanne, Dane County District Attorney. 
 
For the respondent Peter Barca, oral argument by Robert J. 
Jambois, Jambois Law office, Madison, WI. 
 
For the respondent Mark Miller, oral argument by Lester A. 
Pines, Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison, WI. 
 
For the respondent Douglas La Follette, oral argument by 
Roger A. Sage, Roger Sage Law Office, Madison, WI. 
 
 
2011 WI 43
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV1244) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ismael R. Ozanne, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeff Fitzgerald, Scott Fitzgerald, Michael 
Ellis and Scott Suder, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Douglas La Follette, 
 
          Defendant-Petitioner-Movant. 
 
_______________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin ex 
rel. Michael D. Huebsch, Secretary of the 
Wisconsin Department of Administration, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Dane County, the Honorable 
Maryann Sumi Presiding, Ismael R. Ozanne, 
District Attorney for Dane County, Jeff 
Fitzgerald, Scott Fitzgerald, Michael Ellis, 
Scott Suder, Mark Miller, Peter Barca, Douglas 
La Follette, Joint Committee on Conference, 
Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State 
Assembly, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
The Court entered the following order on this date:   
 
¶1 
This court has pending before it a certification by 
the court of appeals in a petition for leave to appeal a non-
final order and accompanying motion for temporary relief in Case 
No. 
2011AP613-LV 
(L.C. 
#2011CV1244), 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  The petition for leave to appeal a non-
final order and motion arise out of a Dane County Circuit Court 
case in which Dane County District Attorney Ismael Ozanne 
alleged violations of the Open Meetings Law,  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.81, et. seq., in connection with the enactment of 2011 
Wisconsin Act 10 (the Act), commonly known as the Budget Repair 
Bill; 
¶2 
This court also has pending before it a petition for 
supervisory/original 
jurisdiction 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ (Rules) 809.70 and 809.71 in Case No. 2011AP765-W filed on 
behalf of the State of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin ex rel. 
Michael D. Huebsch, Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of 
Administration; Peter Barca has moved to dismiss this petition; 
Mark Miller and Ismael Ozanne have moved to file supplemental 
briefs; 
¶3 
On June 6, 2011, this court held oral argument in Case 
No. 2011AP765-W and Case No. 2011AP613-LV; wherein this court 
heard argument addressing whether the court should accept either 
the certification or the petition for supervisory/original 
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
3 
 
jurisdiction or both; the court also heard argument on the 
merits of the pending matters.  Based on the written submissions 
to the court and the oral arguments held on June 6, 2011; 
¶4 
IT IS ORDERED that the certification and motions for 
temporary relief in Case No. 2011AP613-LV are denied. 
¶5 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for original 
jurisdiction in Case No. 2011AP765-W is granted, State ex rel. 
La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983), 
and all motions to dismiss and for supplemental briefing are 
denied. 
¶6 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all orders and judgments of 
the Dane County Circuit Court in Case No. 2011CV1244 are vacated 
and declared to be void ab initio.  State ex rel. Nader v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., No. 2004AP2559-W, unpublished 
order (Wis. S. Ct. Sept. 30, 2004) (wherein this court vacated 
the prior orders of the circuit court in the same case).   
¶7 
This court has granted the petition for an original 
action because one of the courts that we are charged with 
supervising 
has 
usurped 
the 
legislative 
power 
which 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution grants exclusively to the legislature.  
It is important for all courts to remember that Article IV, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  “The 
legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly.”  
Article IV, Section 17 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in 
relevant part:  “(2) . . . No law shall be in force until 
published.  (3) The legislature shall provide by law for the 
speedy publication of all laws.” 
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
4 
 
¶8 
In Goodland v. Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 10 N.W.2d 180 
(1943), the court focused on fundamental separation of powers 
principles and addressed whether a court has the power to enjoin 
publication of a bill duly enacted by the legislature.  The 
court first explained that “governmental powers are divided 
among the three departments of government, the legislative, the 
executive, and judicial.”  Id. at 466-67.  The court then 
explained that the “judicial department has no jurisdiction or 
right to interfere with the legislative process.  That is 
something 
committed 
by 
the 
constitution 
entirely 
to 
the 
legislature itself.”  Id. at 467.  The court held that 
“[b]ecause under our system of constitutional government, no one 
of the co-ordinate departments can interfere with the discharge 
of the constitutional duties of one of the other departments, no 
court has jurisdiction to enjoin the legislative process at any 
point.”  Id. at 468.  The court noted that “[i]f a court can 
intervene and prohibit the publication of an act, the court 
determines what shall be law and not the legislature.  If the 
court does that, it does not in terms legislate but it invades 
the constitutional power of the legislature to declare what 
shall become law.  This [a court] may not do.”  Id.   
¶9 
Although all orders that preceded the circuit court’s 
judgment in Case No. 2011CV1244 may be characterized as moot in 
some respects, the court addresses whether a court can enjoin 
publication of a bill.  The court does so because whether a 
court can enjoin a bill is a matter of great public importance 
and also because it appears necessary to confirm that Goodland 
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
5 
 
remains the law that all courts must follow.  State v. Cramer, 
98 Wis. 2d 416, 420, 296 N.W.2d 921 (1980) (noting that we 
consider questions that have become moot “where the question is 
one of great public importance . . . or of public interest,” or 
“where the problem is likely to recur and is of sufficient 
importance to warrant a holding which will guide trial courts in 
similar circumstances”).  Accordingly, because the circuit court 
did not follow the court’s directive in Goodland, it exceeded 
its 
jurisdiction, 
invaded 
the 
legislature’s 
constitutional 
powers under Article IV, Section 1 and Section 17 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and erred in enjoining the publication 
and further implementation of the Act.    
¶10 Article IV, Section 17 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
vests the legislature with the constitutional power to “provide 
by 
law” 
for 
publication.  The legislature has set the 
requirements for publication.  However, the Secretary of State 
has not yet fulfilled his statutory duty to publish a notice of 
publication of the Act in the official state newspaper, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 14.38(10)(c).  Due to the vacation of the 
circuit court’s orders, there remain no impediments to the 
Secretary 
of 
State 
fulfilling 
his 
obligations 
under 
§ 14.38(10)(c). 
¶11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that we have concluded that in 
enacting the Act, the legislature did not employ a process that 
violated Article IV, Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
which provides in relevant part:  “The doors of each house shall 
be kept open except when the public welfare shall require 
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
6 
 
secrecy.”  The doors of the senate and assembly were kept open 
to the press and members of the public during the enactment of 
the Act.  The doors of the senate parlor, where the joint 
committee on conference met, were open to the press and members 
of the public.  WisconsinEye broadcast the proceedings live.  
Access was not denied.1  There is no constitutional requirement 
that the legislature provide access to as many members of the 
public as wish to attend meetings of the legislature or meetings 
of legislative committees.   
¶12 It has been argued to the court that the legislature 
amended Article IV, Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution by 
its enactment of the Open Meetings Law.  That argument is 
without merit.  Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution establishes the requirements that must be met in 
order to amend the Wisconsin Constitution through action 
initiated in the legislature.  Article XII, Section 1 requires 
that both houses of the legislature pass the proposed amendment 
in two successive sessions of the legislature, and then the 
proposed amendment must be submitted to the people.  It is only 
when the people have approved and ratified a proposed amendment 
initiated in the legislature that a constitutional amendment 
occurs. 
 
Milwaukee 
Alliance 
Against 
Racist 
& 
Political 
Repression v. Elections Bd., 106 Wis. 2d 593, 603, 317 N.W.2d 
420 (1982).  It is beyond dispute that the Open Meetings Law, 
                                                 
1 The transcripts of the hearings before the circuit court 
were 
filed 
with 
this 
court 
as 
part 
of 
the 
appendices 
accompanying the various motions and petitions filed herein.    
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
7 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.81, 
et 
seq., 
was 
not 
adopted 
by 
the 
constitutional process required by Article XII, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶13 It also is argued that the Act is invalid because the 
legislature did not follow certain notice provisions of the Open 
Meetings Law for the March 9, 2011 meeting of the joint 
committee on conference.  It is argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.84(3) required 24 hours notice of that meeting and such 
notice was not given.  It is undisputed that the legislature 
posted notices of the March 9, 2011 meeting of the joint 
committee on conference on three bulletin boards, approximately 
1 hour and 50 minutes before the start of the meeting.  In the 
posting of notice that was done, the legislature relied on its 
interpretation of its own rules of proceeding.  The court 
declines to review the validity of the procedure used to give 
notice of the joint committee on conference.  See Stitt, 114 
Wis. 2d at 361.  As the court has explained when legislation was 
challenged based on allegations that the legislature did not 
follow the relevant procedural statutes, “this court will not 
determine 
whether 
internal 
operating 
rules 
or 
procedural 
statutes have been complied with by the legislature in the 
course of its enactments.”  Id. at 364.  “[W]e will not 
intermeddle in what we view, in the absence of constitutional 
directives to the contrary, to be purely legislative concerns.”  
Id.  The court’s holding in Stitt was grounded in separation of 
powers principles, comity concepts and “the need for finality 
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
8 
 
and certainty regarding the status of a statute.”  Id. at 364-
65.   
¶14 The court’s recent decision in Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel v. Wisconsin Department of Administration, 2009 WI 79, 
319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700, provides no support for the 
invalidation of the Act.  In Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, a party 
contended that by ratifying a union contract the legislature 
also amended the Public Records Law to be consistent with 
Article 2/4/4 of the contract.  Id., ¶34.  In order to answer 
the question presented, the court reviewed the enactment of the 
ratifying statute to see whether Article 2/4/4 of the contract 
was enacted by bill and was published as Article IV, Section 
17(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution requires.  Id., ¶¶22, 34.  
The court concluded that the legislature did not take the 
additional constitutionally required actions that were necessary 
for amendment of the Public Records Law.  Id., ¶¶24, 35.  In so 
doing, the court did not review whether the legislature followed 
its own procedural rules in ratifying the contract, and the 
court did not invalidate any law.  The court looked only at what 
Article IV, Section 17 required in order to cause a portion of 
the union contract to become law.    
¶15 The court’s decision on the matter now presented is 
grounded in separation of powers principles.  It is not affected 
by the wisdom or lack thereof evidenced in the Act.  Choices 
about what laws represent wise public policy for the State of 
Wisconsin are not within the constitutional purview of the 
courts. 
 
The 
court’s 
task 
in 
the 
action 
for 
original 
No. 
2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W   
 
9 
 
jurisdiction that we have granted is limited to determining 
whether the legislature employed a constitutionally violative 
process in the enactment of the Act.  We conclude that the 
legislature did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution by the 
process it used.    
¶16 Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley and Justice N. Patrick Crooks concur in part and dissent 
in part from this order. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶17 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I join this 
court's order but write separately to provide additional 
background and analysis. 
I 
¶18 This case is an offshoot of the turbulent political 
times that presently consume Wisconsin.  In turbulent times, 
courts are expected to act with fairness and objectivity. They 
should serve as the impartial arbiters of legitimate legal 
issues.  They should not insert themselves into controversies or 
exacerbate existing tensions.  In the present dispute, different 
parties claim to speak for the State.  It is the inescapable 
responsibility of this court to determine the law to facilitate 
a resolution of the dispute.  
¶19 Accordingly, a majority of the court has determined 
that this litigation qualifies for and should be accepted as an 
original action under Article VII, Section 3(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The litigation presents issues of exceptional 
constitutional importance.  It is of high public interest.  It 
implicates the powers of all three branches of government.  It 
affects most public employees in Wisconsin as well as taxpayers.  
Although the defendants in State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 
2011AP613-LV, might be able to appeal the decision of the 
circuit court, the identity and posture of the defendants makes 
such an appeal problematic in the short term without the 
intervention of one or more additional parties.  The time 
required to sort out this procedure and follow the court's 
traditional briefing schedule would deny the petitioners timely 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
2 
 
relief by delaying the case until the court's next term, at the 
earliest.  The majority deems this unacceptable considering the 
gravity of the issues and the urgency of their resolution.  I am 
satisfied that this case satisfies several of the court's 
criteria for an original action publici juris, Petition of Heil, 
230 Wis. 428, 440, 284 N.W. 42 (1939), and that there are no 
issues of material fact that prevent the court from addressing 
the legal issues presented.  Wis. Prof'l Police Ass'n v. 
Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807; State 
ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 
(1983); State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 
N.W.2d 313 (1976). 
¶20 Simply stated, no matter how long we waited to 
consider a perfect appeal, the legal issues before the court 
would not change.  Whether the case is decided now or months 
from now at the height of the fall colors, the court would be 
required to answer the same difficult questions.  Delaying the 
inevitable would be an abdication of judicial responsibility; it 
would not advance the public interest. 
II 
¶21 On February 15, 2011, the Assembly's Committee on 
Assembly Organization introduced January 2011 Special Session 
Assembly Bill 11, at the request of Governor Scott Walker.  
Governor Walker said that this "budget repair bill" was intended 
to address the state's fiscal situation in both the 2009-2011 
biennium ending June 30, 2011, and the 2011-2013 biennium 
beginning July 1.  The proposed legislation included provisions 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
3 
 
requiring additional public employee contributions for health 
care and pensions, curtailing collective bargaining rights for 
most 
state 
and 
local 
public 
employees, 
and 
making 
appropriations.  Because the Bill contained appropriations, 
three-fifths of all the members of each house had to be present 
for any vote on passage to constitute a quorum.  Wis. Const. 
art. VIII, § 8. 
¶22 Special Session Assembly Bill 11 was referred to the 
Joint Committee on Finance on February 15 where a public hearing 
was held that day.  On the following day, the Joint Committee 
took executive action.  The Bill was amended and passed with an 
emergency statement attached, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 16.47(2).  
The Bill was immediately calendared for debate in the Assembly 
on February 17. 
¶23 According to its paper history, January 2011 Special 
Session Assembly Bill 11 was debated on February 17 and again on 
February 22.  It was passed on February 22 and immediately 
messaged to the Senate.  It was not received in the Senate, 
however, until February 25.  The discrepancy in the paper record 
between Assembly messaging and Senate receipt is explained by 
the fact that the Bill engendered approximately 61 consecutive 
hours of debate on the February 22 Assembly Calendar.  At least 
128 Amendments were debated in the Assembly before the Bill was 
passed.  
¶24 On February 25, the Senate read Special Session 
Assembly Bill 11 for the first time, referred it to the 
Committee 
on 
Senate 
Organization, 
withdrew 
it 
from 
that 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
4 
 
committee, and read it a second and third time.  However, the 
Senate was unable to proceed because of the absence of the 
constitutional quorum necessary to act on a bill containing 
appropriations. 
¶25 A companion bill to January 2011 Special Session 
Assembly Bill 11 had been introduced in the Senate on February 
14 by the Committee on Senate Organization.  See January 2011 
Special Session Senate Bill 11.  This Bill also was referred to 
the Joint Committee on Finance, given a public hearing on 
February 15, and favorably reported by the committee on February 
16.  It was placed on the Senate Calendar for debate on February 
17. 
¶26 On February 17, the Senate Bill was read a second 
time, amended, and ordered to a third reading.  However, as with 
the Assembly Bill eight days later, the Senate could go no 
further 
because 
all 
14 
Democratic 
Senators 
had 
absented 
themselves from the chamber before the session began.  The 14 
senators left the state and did not publicly reappear in Madison 
until March 12.  As noted, this action deprived the Senate of a 
quorum to act on any appropriation bill.  
¶27 Governor 
Walker's 
proposed 
legislation 
created 
controversy and division.  In the weeks following introduction 
of the two identical "budget repair bills," the Wisconsin State 
Capitol was the center of demonstrations against the governor.  
The building was taken over by protesters.  By and large, the 
protesters did not impede the work of state government but their 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
5 
 
presence dominated the Capitol scene and captured international 
attention. 
¶28 After several weeks of impasse, majority Republicans 
developed a strategy to pass a budget repair bill.  On March 7 
they instructed the Legislative Fiscal Bureau to strip out all 
elements of the Bill that would require a three-fifths quorum in 
the Senate.  On March 9, they called for a conference committee 
in the Senate Parlor at 6:00 p.m.  At that time, they adopted 
the stripped-down version of the Bill as an unamendable 
conference committee report.  The vote was taken over the 
objection of Assembly Minority Leader Peter Barca, who asserted 
that the conference committee meeting violated Wisconsin's Open 
Meetings Law. 
¶29 The Senate adopted the conference committee report on 
the evening of March 9.  The Assembly adopted the conference 
committee report on March 10.  The governor signed the Bill on 
March 11, 2011. 
¶30 The conference committee meeting of March 9, 2011, and 
the subsequent litigation challenging the legality of that 
meeting are the subject of this original action. 
III 
¶31 Article IV, Section 17 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads in part: 
(2) No law shall be enacted except by bill.  No 
law shall be in force until published. 
(3) The legislature shall provide by law for the 
speedy publication of all laws.  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 35.095 is entitled "Acts."1  It is 
contained in Chapter 35 of the Wisconsin Statutes entitled 
"Publication and Distribution of Laws and Public Documents."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 35.095(3) reads in part: 
PUBLICATION. (a) The legislative reference bureau 
shall publish every act . . . within 10 working days 
after its date of enactment. 
(b) The secretary of state shall designate a 
date of publication for each act . . . .  The date of 
publication may not be more than 10 working days after 
the date of enactment. 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 991.11, entitled "Effective date of 
acts," 
reads: 
"Every 
act . . . which 
does 
not 
expressly 
prescribe the time when it takes effect shall take effect on the 
day after its date of publication as designated under s. 
35.095(3)(b)."  This is the date designated by the Secretary of 
State. 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 14.38 outlines additional duties of 
the Secretary of State.  Subsection (10) reads in part that the 
Secretary of State shall: 
(c) Publish in the official state newspaper 
within 10 days after the date of publication of an act 
a notice certifying the number of each act, the number 
of the bill from which it originated, the date of 
publication and the relating clause. Each certificate 
shall also contain a notice of where the full text of 
each act can be obtained. 
¶35 Following the passage of January 2011 Special Session 
Assembly Bill 11 and its approval by the governor, Secretary of 
State Douglas La Follette announced that he would designate 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
7 
 
March 25, 2011, the last day within the 10 working days after 
enactment allowed by statute, as the date for publication of the 
Act.  He indicated that his reason for not designating an 
earlier date was to allow critics of the Act time to challenge 
the Act in court. 
¶36 On March 16, Dane County District Attorney Ismael 
Ozanne filed suit in Dane County Circuit Court against several 
legislators and Secretary of State La Follette. Ozanne's suit 
accused four Republican legislative leaders of violating the 
state's Open Meetings Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81-19.98, and 
Article IV, Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, in 
connection with the March 9, 2011, conference committee meeting.  
Ozanne asked that the circuit court declare "void" "the actions 
taken by the Joint Committee of Conference" and sought a 
judgment that the "budget repair bill" be declared "void as the 
product 
of 
voidable 
actions 
by 
the 
Joint 
Committee 
of 
Conference." 
 
He 
also 
sought 
a 
temporary 
and 
permanent 
injunction enjoining Secretary of State La Follette from 
publishing 2011 Wisconsin Act 10.  In the latter connection, he 
moved for a temporary restraining order against La Follette. 
¶37 On March 17 the Dane County Circuit Court, Maryann 
Sumi, Judge, set a hearing on Ozanne's motion for a temporary 
restraining order.  On March 18 the court held the hearing and 
granted Ozanne's motion to restrain implementation of 2011 
Wisconsin Act 10 pending further hearing.  Thereafter, Secretary 
La Follette rescinded his prior designation of March 25 as the 
date of publication.  On March 31 Judge Sumi issued an amended 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
8 
 
order to the effect that 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 had not been 
published and is not in effect. 
¶38 On May 26 Judge Sumi filed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and an opinion voiding 2011 Wisconsin Act 10. 
IV 
¶39 The first and most obvious issue presented by this 
case is whether the Dane County Circuit Court, or any court in 
Wisconsin, may enjoin the publication of an act to prevent that 
act from becoming law. The answer is "no." 
¶40 This 
precise 
issue 
was 
settled 
in 
Goodland 
v. 
Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943).  In that case, 
the governor of Wisconsin sought to enjoin the secretary of 
state from publishing an act of the legislature that the 
governor had vetoed.  Governor Goodland sought an injunction on 
grounds that the Assembly had failed to override his veto by the 
constitutionally required vote of two thirds of all members 
present.  In other words, Governor Goodland sought to prevent 
publication of the act on constitutional grounds.  Goodland, 243 
Wis. at 464-65.  The court unanimously rejected his position. 
¶41 The court was definitive that "the legislative process 
is not complete unless and until an enactment has been published 
as required by the constitution and by statute."  Id. at 466 
(emphasis added).  Then the court added: 
There is no such thing known to the law as an 
unconstitutional bill.  A court cannot deal with the 
question of constitutionality until a law has been 
duly enacted and some person has been deprived of his 
constitutional rights by its operation. 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
9 
 
Id.  Only after a law has been published may a person who is 
injured by the law challenge it in court.  Id. 
¶42 The court provided a textbook discussion of the 
separation of powers: 
It 
must 
always 
be 
remembered 
that 
one 
of 
the 
fundamental principles of the American constitutional 
system is that governmental powers are divided among 
the three departments of government, the legislative, 
the executive, and judicial, and that each of these 
departments is separate and independent from the 
others 
except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
by 
the 
constitution.  The application of these principles 
operates in a general way to confine legislative 
powers to the legislature, executive powers to the 
executive department, and those which are judicial in 
character 
to 
the 
judiciary. . . .  
While 
the 
legislature in the exercise of its constitutional 
powers is supreme in its particular field, it may not 
exercise the power committed by the constitution to 
one of the other departments. 
What is true of the legislative department is 
true 
of 
the 
judicial 
department. 
The 
judicial 
department has no jurisdiction or right to interfere 
with the legislative process.  That is something 
committed 
by 
the 
constitution 
entirely 
to 
the 
legislature 
itself. 
 
It 
makes 
its 
own 
rules, 
prescribes its own procedure, subject only to the 
provisions of the constitution and it is its province 
to determine what shall be enacted into law. 
Id. at 466-67 (emphasis added). 
¶43 In short, "no court has jurisdiction to enjoin the 
legislative process at any point."  Id. at 468 (citing cases 
from Wisconsin and other jurisdictions).  
¶44 Goodland was decided nearly 70 years ago, but it 
remains fundamental law.  In State ex rel. Althouse v. City of 
Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977), this court cited 
State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 16, 288 N.W. 454 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
10 
 
(1939), with approval, noting that "the [Martin] court pointed 
out that the question of the validity of [an] act could not be 
entertained by any court prior to its enactment."  Althouse, 79 
Wis. 2d at 112.  Justice Nathan Heffernan then quoted from 
Goodland at length and observed that, "If a court could enjoin 
publication of a bill, the [Goodland] court reasoned, it, not 
the legislature, would be determining what the law should be."  
Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 113.  Turning back to Goodland, Justice 
Heffernan repeated the statement that "no court has jurisdiction 
to enjoin the legislative process at any point."  Id. 
¶45 Goodland 
also 
was 
cited 
approvingly 
by 
Justice 
Abrahamson in State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816, 266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978) to support the principle that Article IV, 
Section 1 and Article V, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
are construed to "prohibit one branch of government from 
exercising the powers granted to other branches." 
¶46 The majority of this court now concludes that the 
circuit court exceeded its authority in prohibiting publication 
of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10.  This is not a close question. 
Wisconsin law in this regard is longstanding and completely in 
line with the law in other jurisdictions.  See Murphy v. 
Collins, 312 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Vinson v. 
Chappell, 164 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Sathre, 
110 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1961); Collins v. Horten, 111 So.2d 746 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & 
Planning Comm'n v. Randall, 120 A.2d 195 (Md. 1956); Randall v. 
Twp. Bd. of Meridian, 70 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 1955); Kuhn v. 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
11 
 
Curran, 56 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); State ex rel. 
Carson v. Kozer, 270 P. 513 (Or. 1928); State ex rel. Flanagan 
v. South Dakota Rural Credits B., 189 N.W. 704 (S.D. 1922). 
V 
¶47 Attacking the constitutionality of an act after it has 
been published is quite different from attacking its validity 
before it becomes law. This must be acknowledged.  Nonetheless, 
no useful purpose would be served by inviting a new series of 
challenges to 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 after publication of the Act 
has been completed.  
¶48 In my view, this case is governed by Stitt.  In the 
Stitt case, the court was presented with a challenge to 1983 
Wisconsin Act 3, after the act had been published.  Senator 
Stitt argued that neither the Senate nor the Assembly had ever 
referred the legislation to the Joint Survey Committee on Debt 
Management, as appeared to be required by Wis. Stat. § 13.49(6).  
This statute provided in part that a proposal authorizing the 
issuance of state debt or revenue obligations "shall not be 
considered further by either house until the committee has 
submitted a report, in writing[.]" 
¶49 The court's response was blunt: 
Because we conclude this court will not determine 
whether 
internal 
operating 
rules 
or 
procedural 
statutes have been complied with by the legislature in 
the course of its enactments, we do not address the 
question of whether sec. 13.49(6), Stats., applies to 
this 
legislation. 
 
To 
discuss 
or 
consider 
the 
petitioner's argument that the procedure mandated in 
sec. 13.49, does not apply to Act 3 because the latter 
did not create state debt or revenue obligations as 
set forth in ch. 18, would imply that this court will 
review legislative conduct to ensure the legislature 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
12 
 
complied with its own procedural rules or statutes in 
enacting the legislation. . . .  [W]e conclude we will 
not intermeddle in what we view, in the absence of 
constitutional directives to the contrary, to be 
purely legislative concerns. 
. . . .  
If the legislature fails to follow self-adopted 
procedural rules in enacting legislation, and such 
rules are not mandated by the constitution, courts 
will not intervene to declare the legislation invalid.  
The rationale is that the failure to follow such 
procedural rules amounts to an implied ad hoc repeal 
of such rules. 
 
This 
principle 
has 
been 
expressed 
in 
1 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) sec. 
7.04, p. 264, as follows: 
 
"The decisions are nearly unanimous in holding 
that an act cannot be declared invalid for failure of 
the house to observe its own rules.  Courts will not 
inquire whether such rules have been observed in the 
passage of the act.  Likewise, the legislature by 
statute or joint resolution cannot bind or restrict 
itself or its successors as to the procedure to be 
followed in the passage of legislation." 
Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d at 364, 365 (quoting 1 Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 7.04, at 264 (4th ed.)) (emphasis added). 
¶50 The court also quoted a passage from McDonald v. 
State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12, 50 N.W. 1854 (1891), where the court 
concluded that "no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain 
whether two houses have or have not complied strictly with their 
own rules in their procedure upon the bill."  Stitt, 114 
Wis. 2d at 366. 
¶51 In sum, "the legislature's adherence to the rules or 
statutes prescribing procedure is a matter entirely within 
legislative control and discretion, not subject to judicial 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
13 
 
review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by the 
constitution."  Id. at 365 (emphasis added).  
VI 
¶52 When the circuit court voided 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, 
it scrutinized the Wisconsin Open Meetings Law and concluded 
that there had been two violations of the law: 
80. A 
violation 
of 
the 
Open 
Meetings 
Law 
occurred when the Joint Committee of Conference met on 
March 9, 2011, because it failed to provide at least 
24 hours advance public notice of the meeting, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 19.84(3), and failed to 
provide even the two-hour notice allowed for "good 
cause" shown. 
81. A 
violation 
of 
the 
Open 
Meetings 
Law 
occurred when the Joint Committee of Conference met on 
March 9, 2011, and failed to provide reasonable public 
access to the meeting, as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.83(1). 
¶53 The circuit court acknowledged that Senate Chief Clerk 
Robert Marchant had advised Senate Majority Leader Scott 
Fitzgerald that no advance notice of the Joint Committee on 
Conference was required because the Senate and Assembly were in 
special session.  The court acknowledged that Marchant relied on 
Senate Rule 93(2), which provides that, when in special session, 
"notice of a committee meeting is not required other than 
posting on the legislative bulletin board[.]"  Finding of Fact 
No. 15. 
¶54 But the court found that, "No Joint Rule in effect on 
March 9, 2011, conflicts with the requirements of the Open 
Meetings Law that a public notice of every meeting of a 
governmental body must set forth the time, date, place and 
subject matter of the meeting, in a form reasonably likely to 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
14 
 
inform members of the public and news media, and that the notice 
shall be given at least 24 hours before the meeting."  Finding 
of Fact No. 19.  Thus, the court concluded: "There is no rule 
adopted by the legislature, applicable to the March 9, 2011, 
meeting of the Joint Committee of Conference, that conflicts 
with any requirement of the Open Meetings Law, within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.87(2)."  See Conclusions of Law ¶79. 
¶55 I 
am 
troubled 
by 
the 
circuit 
court's 
apparent 
indifference to this court's holding in Stitt.  The circuit 
court enjoined the publication of an act passed by the 
legislature, preventing it from becoming law.  It justified this 
action by relying on statutory provisions that apply to the 
legislature except when the legislature says they do not. 
¶56 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 19.87 
entitled, 
"Legislative 
meetings," contains four exceptions.  Subsection (1) reads in 
part as follows: "Section 19.84 shall not apply to any meeting 
of the legislature or a subunit thereof called solely for the 
purpose of scheduling business before the legislative body."  
Wis. Stat. § 19.87(1).  The circuit court could not determine 
whether the Joint Committee of Conference failed to comply with 
subsection (1) without "inquiring" deeply into legislative 
procedure, contrary to this court's decision in Stitt. 
¶57 Subsection 
(2) 
provides: 
"No 
provision 
of 
this 
subchapter which conflicts with a rule of the senate or assembly 
or joint rule of the legislature shall apply to a meeting 
conducted in compliance with such rule."  Wis. Stat. § 19.87(2).  
The circuit court second-guessed not only four legislative 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
15 
 
leaders but also the Senate Chief Clerk——an attorney——when it 
determined that no senate or assembly rule, including Senate 
Rule 93 (on which the Senate Chief Clerk relied), governed the 
notice requirements of the special session conference committee.  
The circuit court, in effect, told the Senate Chief Clerk that 
he did not know what the Senate rule meant. 
¶58 The circuit court concluded that the legislature 
should have provided public notice of the special session 
conference committee 24 hours in advance.  The court did not 
acknowledge that thousands of demonstrators stormed and occupied 
the State Capitol within a few hours of the notice that a 
conference committee meeting would be held. 
¶59 The circuit court found that 20 seats were set aside 
for the public in the Senate Parlor, but it did not report that 
the entire proceedings were broadcast on WisconsinEye and events 
were observed online by Wisconsin state senators in Illinois. 
¶60 The circuit court determined that the Senate Parlor 
did not provide adequate public access under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.87(3), 
but 
it 
overlooked 
the 
fact 
that 
conference 
committees on state budgets routinely met in the Senate and 
Assembly Parlors until the State Capitol was renovated in the 
1990s. 
¶61 The circuit court voided 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 on the 
basis of a committee meeting that lasted less than five minutes—
—in a room packed with reporters and television cameras.  This 
reality was captured on television and in photographs, one of 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
16 
 
which appeared on the front page of the Wisconsin State Journal 
on March 10, 2011 (see attached). 
¶62 The circuit court has retained jurisdiction over the 
prosecution of four legislative leaders for alleged violations 
of the Open Meetings Law, but the additional remedy it imposed 
in voiding 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 effectively punished the 
executive branch as well as legislators who were not involved in 
the meeting. 
¶63 The actions of the circuit court exceeded the court's 
authority and must be vacated. 
VII 
¶64 The Dane County District Attorney and the circuit 
court contend that these concerns are all overcome by the Open 
Meetings Law itself.  The circuit court held that, "The Open 
Meetings Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.81, et. seq., is based upon the 
constitutional 
requirement, 
applicable 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature, that '[t]he doors of each house shall be kept open 
except when the public welfare shall require secrecy.'"  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 10. 
¶65 This 
proposition 
does 
not 
withstand 
careful 
examination. 
¶66 Article IV, Section 10 was part of the original 
constitution approved in 1848.  The provision reads in full: 
 
Each 
house 
shall 
keep 
a 
journal 
of 
its 
proceedings and publish the same, except such parts as 
require secrecy.  The doors of each house shall be 
kept open except when the public welfare shall require 
secrecy.  Neither house shall, without consent of the 
other, adjourn for more than three days. 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
17 
 
¶67 The manifest purpose of this provision is to prevent 
state legislative business from being conducted in secret except 
in extremely limited circumstances.  The provision itself does 
not establish notice requirements for governmental meetings.  It 
does not dictate the size or location of governmental meeting 
rooms.  It does not apply to the executive branch or the 
judiciary or to local governments.  And it certainly does not 
bar locking the doors of the Senate or Assembly or the Capitol 
during non-business hours.  Applying the spirit of this 
constitutional provision to additional governmental meetings in 
Wisconsin has been a legislative undertaking. 
¶68 The first open meetings law was enacted in 1959.  
Chapter 289, Laws of 1959.  This means that more than a century 
passed before the legislature acted to effectively promote 
openness.  The first law provided no notice requirements.   
¶69 In 1976 this court decided Lynch v. Conta, which 
involved a private meeting of 11 members of the Joint Committee 
on Finance on March 11, 1975, during consideration of the state 
budget.  The case involved Wis. Stat. § 66.77 (1975).  The Lynch 
case led to changes in the Open Meetings Law at a special 
session of the legislature in June 1976.  Chapter 426, Laws of 
1975. 
¶70 The special session bill that was approved in 1976 
incorporated language from two Assembly amendments to 1975 
Senate Bill 630, an open meetings bill that had been heavily 
debated in both houses earlier in the session but did not pass.  
The language is now contained in Wis. Stat. § 19.81(3): 
No.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.dtp 
 
18 
 
 
In conformance with article IV, section 10, of 
the constitution, which states that the doors of each 
house shall remain open, except when the public 
welfare requires secrecy, it is declared to be the 
intent of the legislature to comply to the fullest 
extent with this subchapter. 
¶71 The rhetoric contained in the statute's "Declaration 
of Policy" does not transform the Open Meetings Law into a 
codification of Article IV, Section 10.  There is no documentary 
support for such a proposition.  Constitutional commands cannot 
be changed at the whim of the legislature; statutory provisions 
may. 
¶72 Only a clear constitutional violation would justify 
voiding 2011 Wisconsin Act 10——and then only after the Act was 
published.  There is no constitutional violation in this case. 
¶73 For these reasons, briefly stated, I join the court's 
order. 
 
 
 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶74 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I agree that the Budget Repair Bill is not 
in effect.  I further agree that the certification by the court 
of appeals should be denied.   
¶75 Moreover, I agree that the challenge to the legality 
of the Budget Repair Bill, a bill that significantly affects all 
the people of this state, presents important fundamental 
constitutional issues about the separation of powers; the roles 
of 
the 
legislative, 
executive, 
and 
judicial 
branches 
of 
government; and judicial review.   
¶76 It is exactly because the issues in the present case 
are of such constitutional and public policy importance that I 
do not join the order.  
¶77 In a case in which the court is called upon to review 
the legitimacy of the legislative process, it is of paramount 
importance that the court adhere to the Wisconsin Constitution 
and its own rules and procedures, lest the legitimacy of the 
judicial process and this court's decision be called into 
question. 
¶78 The Dane County Circuit Court took the time and made 
the effort to consider the issues carefully and write a 48-page 
decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
explaining and supporting its reasoning.  In contrast, this 
court gives this important case short shrift.  Today the 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
3 
 
majority announces for the first time that it is accepting the 
case.  And today the majority decides the case.1      
¶79 In rendering a decision, a court is to provide not 
merely an answer but also a reasoned, accurate explanation.  A 
reasoned, accurate explanation is not an inconsequential nicety 
that this court may disregard for the sake of convenience or 
haste.  It is the cornerstone of the legitimacy of judicial 
decision-making. 
¶80 At first glance, the order appears to provide some 
support for broad conclusions reached on fundamental and complex 
issues of law.  But on even casual reading, the explanations are 
clearly disingenuous, based on disinformation. 
¶81 Justice Prosser's concurrence is longer than the 
order.  The concurrence consists mostly of a statement of 
happenings.  It is long on rhetoric and long on story-telling 
that appears to have a partisan slant.  Like the order, the 
concurrence reaches unsupported conclusions.     
¶82 In hastily reaching judgment, Justice Patience D. 
Roggensack, Justice Annette K. Ziegler, and Justice Michael J. 
Gableman author an order, joined by Justice David T. Prosser, 
lacking a reasoned, transparent analysis and incorporating 
numerous errors of law and fact.  This kind of order seems to 
open the court unnecessarily to the charge that the majority has 
                                                 
1 This case came to the court at the end of March.  
Thereafter, the court issued two separate orders asking the 
parties to address numerous questions.  We held extended oral 
argument on June 6 presented by six parties.   
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
4 
 
reached a pre-determined conclusion not based on the facts and 
the law, which undermines the majority's ultimate decision. 
¶83 Justice N. Patrick Crooks explains the flaws in the 
order's and concurrence's attempt to recast the petition for 
supervisory writ as an original action.  He explains why this 
court should decide this case in an orderly appellate review of 
the circuit court's order with a full opinion.  I join his 
writing.    
¶84 I write to emphasize that in a case turning on 
separation of powers and whether the legislature must abide by 
the Open Meetings Law and the Wisconsin Constitution in adopting 
the Budget Repair Bill, it is imperative that this court 
carefully abide by its authority under the Constitution and 
follow its own rules and procedures. 
¶85 A court's failure to follow rules and a court's failure 
to provide a sufficient, forthright, and reasoned analysis 
undermine both the court's processes and the decision itself.  
Only with a reasoned, accurate analysis can a court assure the 
litigants and the public that a decision is made on the basis of 
the facts and law, free from a judge's personal ideology and 
free from external pressure by the executive or legislative 
branches, by partisan political parties, by public opinion, or 
by special interest groups.  
I 
¶86 At its most basic level this case is about the need for 
government officials to follow the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
laws. 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶87 The District Attorney's challenge to the Budget Repair 
Bill asserts that the Open Meetings Law is a codification of the 
mandates expressly provided for in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
The District Attorney relies on Article IV, Section 10, "[t]he 
doors of each house shall be kept open," and also on Article I, 
Section 4: "The right of the people peaceably to assemble, to 
consult for the common good, and to petition the government, or 
any department thereof, shall never be abridged."  
¶88 The legislature declared in the Open Meetings Law that 
the legislature would comply with the Law to the fullest extent 
"in conformance with article IV, section 10" of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.2  Statutes are interpreted to give effect to every 
word.  A court assumes that the legislature says what it means, 
and means what it says.  The words in a statute are not to be 
treated as rhetorical flair.   
¶89 Nevertheless, the Attorney General asserts that the 
legislature need not abide by the Open Meetings Law; that the 
legislature can choose when and if it will follow the Open 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 19.81 (3): "In conformance with article IV, 
section 10, of the constitution, which states that the doors of 
each house shall remain open, except when the public welfare 
requires secrecy, it is declared to be the intent of the 
legislature to comply to the fullest extent with [the Open 
Meetings Law]." 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
6 
 
Meetings Law; and that courts cannot enforce the Open Meetings 
Law against the legislature and any of its committees.3        
¶90 The legislature must play by the rules of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the laws.   
¶91 Playing by the rules and playing fair are integral to 
public trust and confidence in our government officials——
legislative, 
executive, 
and 
judicial. 
 
Public 
trust 
and 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial branch is engendered 
by a court's issuing a reasoned public decision based on public 
records after public arguments.  The judicial branch claims 
legitimacy by the reasoning of its decisions.  "Any step that 
withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view 
makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and requires 
rigorous justification."4 
¶92 Trust and confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
branch as an institution is critical at all times but especially 
when a case has high public visibility, is mired in partisan 
                                                 
3 The District Attorney and Senator Miller assert that the 
Attorney General is attacking the constitutionality of the Open 
Meetings Law by asserting that the court cannot enforce the Law 
against the legislature.  In other words, the Attorney General 
is arguing that the Open Meetings Law is categorically invalid 
with regard to the legislature.  For a discussion of a 
categorical attack on the constitutionality of a statute, see 
State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 797 N.W.2d 451.  
The Attorney General does not have the general authority to 
attack the constitutionality of the statute, without statutory 
authorization from the legislature or some other constitutional 
or 
common-law 
doctrine 
giving 
the 
Attorney 
General 
such 
authority.  State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶33, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526. 
4 Hicklin Eng'g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348-49 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
7 
 
politics, and is emotionally charged.  The need for reasoned 
judgment is at its greatest in a case such as this one, in which 
substantial public policy and budgetary decisions of the 
coordinate branches may be affected.5  The issues presented in 
this case are steeped in a politically charged environment and 
involve 
highly 
controversial 
public 
policy 
and 
budgetary 
matters.  
¶93 That the judiciary has the power of judicial review, 
that is, the power to interpret the Constitution and hear 
challenges to the constitutionality of legislative enactments, 
without pressure from the executive or legislative branches, is 
a fundamental principle of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions.  
¶94 This fundamental principle of judicial review was 
described in Federalist No. 78,6 which emphasized the importance 
of the separation of powers and of an independent judiciary to 
ensure that legislative enactments are consistent with the 
constitution.   
There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers.  
                                                 
5 As other courts have admonished, reasoned judgment is 
especially needed "when a judicial decision accedes to the 
requests of a coordinate branch, lest ignorance of the basis for 
the 
decision 
cause 
the 
public 
to 
doubt 
that 
'complete 
independence of the courts of justice [which] is peculiarly 
essential in a limited Constitution.'"  United States v. Aref, 
533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2008). 
6 The Federalist Papers, written in 1787-88, were drafted to 
promote ratification of the United States Constitution.  They 
remain 
a 
significant 
primary 
source 
for 
constitutional 
interpretation.  
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
8 
 
. . . . 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. . . .  
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by 
the judges, as a fundamental law.  It therefore 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as 
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the 
legislative body.  
¶95 Ascertaining the meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution 
and whether the enactment of the Budget Repair Bill complies 
with constitutional directives is the essence of the present 
case.  And the court must do so adhering to the Constitution, 
laws, and its own rules of procedure. 
II 
¶96 The order and Justice Prosser's concurrence are based 
on errors of fact and law.  They inappropriately use this 
court's original jurisdiction, make their own findings of fact, 
mischaracterize the parties' arguments, misinterpret statutes, 
minimize (if not eliminate) Wisconsin constitutional guarantees, 
and misstate case law, appearing to silently overrule case law 
dating back to at least 1891.  This case law recognizes a 
court's power to review legislative actions in enacting laws 
when constitutional directives are at issue. 
 
A. The Order and the Concurrence Inappropriately Use This 
Court's Original Jurisdiction. 
 
¶97 The order mistakenly asserts that the State of 
Wisconsin 
and 
Secretary 
Huebsch 
filed 
"a 
petition 
for 
supervisory/original 
jurisdiction 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
9 
 
§§ (Rules) 809.70 and 809.71."  No petition for original 
jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.70 was filed in 
this court by any party.  The petition that was filed is 
captioned "petition for supervisory writ pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.71 and for immediate temporary relief pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.52," and the text of the petition adheres to the 
caption.   
¶98 This court's authority for review is derived from the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that the court has two 
types of jurisdiction:  appellate and original.7  They are 
separate and distinct jurisdictions, serving different purposes.  
"The concept of original jurisdiction allows cases involving 
matters of great public importance to be commenced in the 
supreme court in the first instance."8  
¶99 There is nothing "original" or "in the first instance" 
here.  By commencing an original action on the court's own 
motion to review the final judgment of the circuit court, the 
order and Justice Prosser's concurrence are blending the 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(2): "The supreme court has 
appellate jurisdiction over all courts and may hear original 
actions and proceedings."  
8 Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin § 25.1 (5th ed. 2011).  See also Petition of Heil, 230 
Wis. 428, 446, 284 N.W. 42 (1938); In re Exercise of Original 
Jurisdiction, 201 Wis. 123, 229 N.W. 643 (1930). 
This case is not an original action in any sense of the 
phrase.  The Dane County Circuit Court has already issued a 
final determination regarding each and every question of fact 
and question of law that is addressed in the order. 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
10 
 
separate and distinct concepts of original and appellate 
jurisdiction.9  
                                                 
9 A petition for an original action will be granted when the 
questions presented are of such importance "to call for a speedy 
and authoritative determination by this court in the first 
instance . . . ."  Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 446, 284 N.W. 
42 (1939). 
This court has previously taken original jurisdiction in 
two cases despite an identical case pending before the circuit 
court.  In both cases the issue was narrow and an emergency 
existed with no other remedy available; an appeal could not be 
taken timely to get the person on the ballot within the 
statutory framework for printing ballots; review was necessary 
to protect Wisconsin citizens' right to vote for the candidate 
of their choosing.  See State of Wisconsin ex rel. Nader v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, No. 2004AP2559-W, unpublished 
order (2004); State ex rel. Barber v. Circuit Court for Marathon 
County, 178 Wis. 468, 190 N.W. 563 (1922). 
In the present case, there is no such exigency.  First, the 
issues presented raise fundamental constitutional principles 
relating to the powers of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government, as well as questions regarding 
the scope of the rights of the people of this State to know 
about the actions taken by their government and their right to 
access the legislative process.  The issues are not narrow, and 
the issues involve conflicting precedent.  
Second, there is no "emergency."  The Attorney General 
asserts that an emergency exists because each day the alleged 
breach of separation of powers is not resolved irreparable 
damage is done to the representative government of this State.  
But if that assertion meets the definition of "emergency," then 
any time any party asserts that a law or an action is 
unconstitutional it would constitute an "emergency" for this 
court to decide.  That's not the law of the state or country.  
The "ordinary course" of an appeal could afford the 
petitioners any warranted relief.  In the alternative, the 
legislature could pass the Budget Repair Bill in conformance 
with the Open Meetings Law, rendering the circuit court's 
determinations ineffective.  This court could still decide the 
important separation of powers issues presented.   
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶100 Why is this important?  By blending what are under our 
constitutional authority separate and distinct jurisdictions——
original and appellate——the order and concurrence attempt to 
skirt the normal standards of appellate review.  Faced with no 
record, they conjure their own facts——something this court 
should never do, regardless of whether it is exercising 
appellate or original jurisdiction.  
¶101 If this court wishes to take jurisdiction of the 
factual 
and 
legal 
issues 
presented 
in 
this 
matter, 
the 
legitimate and constitutional route is through an appeal.  And 
indeed Justice Prosser reviews the circuit court's decision as 
if this case were an appeal.  
 
B. The Order and the Concurrence Make Their Own Factual 
Findings. 
 
¶102 The order states:  "The doors of the senate and 
assembly were kept open to the press and members of the public 
during the enactment of the Act.  The doors of the senate 
parlor, where the joint committee on conference met, were open 
to the press and members of the public.  WisconsinEye broadcast 
the proceedings live.10  Access was not denied."   
                                                 
10 Press coverage is not necessarily the equivalent of 
allowing the public to be present.  Cf. Douglas v. Wainwright, 
714 F.2d 1532, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated, 468 U.S. 1206 
(1984), adhered to on remand, 739 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(relating to the constitutional guarantee of a public trial). 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶103 Footnote 1 of the order implies that these findings of 
fact are supported by the transcripts of the hearings before the 
circuit court, which were filed in "appendices accompanying the 
various motions and petitions filed herein."   
¶104 Justice Crooks, at ¶143 n.15, powerfully explains that 
reliance on information in transcripts not in the record before 
this court is a departure from settled precedent.  
 
¶105 In his concurrence, Justice Prosser makes his own 
factual findings.  Indeed, most of his concurrence is a 
statement of happenings.  Yet Justice Prosser asserts in ¶19 
"that there are no issues of material fact that prevent the 
court from addressing the legal issues presented." 
¶106 Where do all of these facts come from?  Not from the 
certification proceedings (which the order denies) or from the 
petition for supervisory writ (which the court transforms into 
an original action).  Not from the decision or final judgment of 
the Dane County Circuit Court.  Indeed, some of the "findings of 
fact" are in direct contravention of the facts found by the 
circuit court.  By casting this as an original action, the four 
justices are able to skirt facts that may impede the rush to 
their ultimate destination.  
¶107 The four justices are entitled to their opinions, but 
they are not entitled to their own facts.  This court is not a 
fact-finding court.   
¶108 If findings of fact are required in the exercise of 
our original jurisdiction, there are procedures for getting 
those facts.  Instead of adhering to those procedures, the four 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
13 
 
justices set forth their own version of facts without evidence.  
They should not engage in this disinformation. 
 
C. The Order and the Concurrence Mischaracterize the Arguments 
of the Parties. 
 
¶109 No party argues to the court, as the order claims, 
that "the legislature amended Article IV, Section 10 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution by its enactment of the Open Meetings 
Law."  The order builds a straw house so that it can blow it 
down.   
¶110 Justice Prosser suggests that the argument of the 
parties is that the Open Meetings Law is a codification of 
Article IV, Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution such that 
the statutes amend the Constitution.  Justice Prosser too builds 
a 
straw 
house 
to 
blow 
down 
with 
uncontested, 
accepted 
blackletter law that the Wisconsin Constitution cannot be 
changed by statute. 
 
D. The Order and the Concurrence Fail to Address Adequately the 
Role of the Secretary of State. 
 
¶111 The order and concurrence fail to examine carefully 
the arguments of the Secretary of State about the respective 
roles of the Secretary of State and the Legislative Reference 
Bureau in the publication of legislative acts, the printing of 
notice in the official state newspaper, and the effective date 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
14 
 
of a statute.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 14.38(10), 35.095(3)(b), 
991.11. 
 
E. The Order and the Concurrence Minimize, If Not Eliminate, The 
Wisconsin Constitutional Guarantee, Article IV, Section 10, That 
"The Doors of Each House Shall Be Kept Open." 
 
¶112 This constitutional provision, Article IV, Section 10 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, has never before been interpreted 
by this court or any Wisconsin court.  The order interprets and 
dismisses the constitutional provision in four short sentences 
without citation or rationale——an unsupported, four-sentence 
interpretation of a fundamental constitutional guarantee ensured 
by the people of Wisconsin!   
¶113 After stating its own factual findings, the order 
dismisses the significant constitutional argument with four 
words: "Access was not denied."  By this interpretation, the 
constitutional right of the people to know what its legislature 
is doing has been significantly minimized, if not eliminated. 
¶114 Instead of the order's four-sentence analysis of this 
important constitutional provision, Justice Prosser sets forth a 
two-paragraph analysis.  He goes further than the order with a 
novel interpretation of this constitutional provision.  He 
states that the "manifest purpose" of Article IV, Section 10 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution is "to prevent state legislative 
business from being conducted in secret except in extremely 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
15 
 
limited circumstances."  From whence cometh Justice Prosser's 
"manifest purpose?"  He doesn't say. 
 
F. The Order and the Concurrence Misstate Case Law, Appearing To 
Silently Overrule A Court's Power To Review Legislative Actions 
For Compliance With Constitutional Directives. 
 
¶115 The order and Justice Prosser's concurring opinion 
treat the answers to the significant questions of law presented 
as clear and beyond dispute, controlled by uncontroverted 
precedent.  The order and the concurrence do not tell the full 
legal story.   
¶116 The court of appeals certified the legal questions to 
this court because the answers are not clear and our precedent 
is 
conflicting. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
clarification is required regarding "the interaction between the 
Open Meetings Law and a line of cases dealing with the 
separation of power doctrine," citing to four cases:  Goodland 
v. Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943); State ex rel. 
Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976); State ex 
rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 
(1983); and Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Admin., 2009 WI 79, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700.   
¶117 "In sum," the court of appeals stated, "Goodland and 
Stitt appear to favor the Secretary of State's position [the 
position now forwarded by the State of Wisconsin and Secretary 
Huebsch] that courts lack authority to invalidate legislation 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
16 
 
enacted in violation of the Open Meetings Law or, at the least, 
to do so before publication.  In contrast, Lynch and Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel support the District Attorney's view." 
¶118 Neither the order nor the concurrence comes to grips 
with the issue in the present case, namely whether the Open 
Meetings 
Law 
complies 
with 
constitutional 
directives, 
specifically Article IV, Section 10 and Article I, Section 4, so 
that the court must enforce the Open Meetings Law.       
¶119 First, 
the 
order 
misrepresents 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel v. Wisconsin Department of Administration, 2009 WI 79, 
319 
Wis. 2d 439, 
768 
N.W.2d 700, 
as 
not 
involving 
the 
legislature's compliance with a statute.  In the Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
case, 
the 
court 
declared 
that 
it 
had 
jurisdiction to determine whether the legislature complied with 
Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a), a statute governing legislative 
procedure, because that statute furthered the constitutional 
directives found in Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶120 Second, the order fails to acknowledge that the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel case explained that a court will 
interpret and apply a procedural statute to determine whether 
the 
legislative 
action 
complies 
"with 
constitutional 
directives":      
[W]e need not decide whether Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) 
is 
a 
rule 
of 
legislative 
proceeding 
because 
a 
statute's terms must be interpreted to comply with 
constitutional directives.  Accordingly, even if the 
statute 
might 
otherwise 
be 
characterized 
as 
a 
legislative rule of proceeding, we may interpret the 
statute and apply it to the legislative action to 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
17 
 
determine 
whether that action complies with the 
relevant constitutional mandates.  Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); [State ex rel. La 
Follette v.] Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d [358, at] 367, [338 
N.W.2d 684 (1983)]; McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 
411-12, 50 N.W. 185 (1891).       
Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) and 
Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to 
take additional actions to amend existing law or to 
create new law, and we have jurisdiction to interpret 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, 
we 
have 
the 
authority 
to 
evaluate 
legislative 
compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).  Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d at 
367, 338 N.W.2d 684.  Accordingly, we reject WSEU's 
argument in this respect, and proceed to determine 
whether the legislature complied with § 111.92(1)(a) 
in light of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶19, 20 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
¶121 Justice Prosser fails to mention the case. 
¶122 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel case was based on at 
least three earlier cases, all concluding that a court may 
require the legislature to comply with a legislative procedural 
rule or statute if the procedural rule or statute furthers a 
constitutional directive.11 
                                                 
11 See State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 
364, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983) (A court "will not intermeddle in 
what we view, in the absence of constitutional directives to the 
contrary, to be purely legislative concerns . . . . [C]ourts 
generally consider that the legislature's adherence to the rules 
or statutes prescribing procedure is a matter entirely within 
legislative control and discretion, not subject to judicial 
review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by the 
constitution" (emphasis added).).  
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
18 
 
 
¶123 The order and Justice Prosser's concurrence put in 
jeopardy Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and prior case law that 
declares that a court may determine whether legislative action 
in enactment of a law complies with a relevant constitutional 
directive.   
¶124 Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
(and 
its 
precursors) 
correctly state the applicable principles of judicial review, 
the doctrine of separation of powers, and the functions of the 
legislature and judiciary.    
III 
¶125 In sum, the litigants and the public deserve more than 
the majority's hasty judgment.   
¶126 Each person must abide by the law.  Each branch of 
government must abide by the law.  This court must ensure that 
the law governing judicial decision-making is followed.  Justice 
Brandeis stated these principles eloquently as follows:  
In a government of laws, existence of the government 
will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously.  Our government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  
                                                                                                                                                             
See State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 695, 239 
N.W.2d 313 (1976), in which the court was asked to enforce an 
earlier version of the Open Meetings Law.  The court observed 
that the "time-honored precept, established in Marbury v. 
Madison, [provides that] the judiciary may review the acts of 
the 
legislature 
for 
any 
conflict 
with 
the 
Constitution" 
(emphasis added). 
As early as McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12, 50 N.W. 
185 (1891), substantially similar language appeared:  "The bill 
for ch. 488 was therefore regularly passed, and the chapter is a 
valid law, unless it comes within the provisions of sec. 8, art. 
VIII, of the [Wisconsin] constitution" (emphasis added). 
Nos.  2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.ssa 
 
19 
 
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy. . . . Against that 
pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set 
its face. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
¶127 The resoluteness called for by Justice Brandeis is no 
less applicable to the observance of the fundamental principles 
of the courts in our system of government.  Unreasoned judgments 
breed contempt for the law.  The majority, by sacrificing honest 
reasoning, leads us down a pernicious path.  The order today 
departs from fundamental principles.  It fails to abide by the 
court's 
Constitutional 
authority 
and 
its 
own 
rules 
and 
procedures and harms the rights of the people from whom our 
authority derives.12  The legitimate and constitutional route to 
decide the issues presented is through an appeal.   
¶128 For the reasons stated, I do not join the order. 
¶129 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this writing. 
  
                                                 
12 Our state constitution declares:  "The blessings of a 
free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to 
justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by 
frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."  Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 22. 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
1 
 
¶130 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  These matters exemplify the importance of 
compliance with procedural rules and the rule of law to the 
legitimacy of our government.  Just as there is a right way and 
a wrong way to proceed with the legislative process, there is a 
right way and a wrong way to accept the significant issues 
presented for review.  I dissent in part because, in taking 
these matters as an original action and swiftly vacating the 
circuit court's orders without sufficient examination, the 
majority has proceeded the wrong way. 
¶131 I concur in part because I agree with the majority 
that it is imperative that this court address the weighty and 
complicated 
questions 
presented 
here. 
 
It 
is 
of 
great 
significance to the people of Wisconsin whether the legislature 
is required to follow the Open Meetings Law, which apparently it 
has tied to the Wisconsin Constitution, and if so, how it may be 
held accountable.  It is important not only here where the Act 
at issue, 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, was hotly debated, but in every 
case where the legislature acts on behalf of the people.  Those 
who would rush to judgment on these matters are essentially 
taking the position that getting this opinion out is more 
important than doing it right and getting it right.  As this 
court recently stated, and as the Honorable Maryann Sumi 
repeated in her decision in regard to these matters, "The right 
of the people to monitor the people's business is one of the 
core principles of democracy."1  I also concur because I agree 
                                                 
1 Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶2, 327 
Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177. 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
2 
 
with the majority that Act 10 is not in effect, and that the 
certification and motions for temporary relief in case No. 
2011AP613-LV should be denied. 
¶132 Specifically, 
this 
case 
raises 
the 
following 
questions: (1) Is the Open Meetings Law2 enforceable against the 
legislature and, if so, what sanctions are appropriate? (2) May 
a court ever void an Act because of an Open Meetings Law 
violation? 
(3) 
May 
a 
court 
prohibit 
the 
publication, 
implementation, or effectiveness of an Act passed in violation 
of the Open Meetings Law, or must a court wait until after the 
Act is published? 
¶133 There is no question that these issues are worthy of 
this court's review.  But procedures matter——to the courts, the 
legislature, and the people of Wisconsin.  There is a right way 
to address these issues and a wrong way.  The majority chooses 
the wrong way by refusing to take this case through the 
appropriate procedural mechanism, and by rushing to issue an 
order without sufficient examination or a complete record.  I 
concur in part because I agree with the majority's decision to 
address these important questions.  I dissent in part due to the 
majority's decision to utilize inappropriately this court's 
original jurisdiction and due to its issuing a hasty order 
without 
sufficient 
consideration, 
and 
without 
adequately 
addressing all of the parties' arguments.  I am convinced that 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81-19.98 (2009-10). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
3 
 
these significant issues should be addressed through a direct 
appeal, which would allow this court to more fully resolve, with 
the benefit of a complete record, the complex legal and factual 
issues at stake. 
I 
¶134 In 
addition 
to 
the 
procedural 
morass 
that 
the 
majority's terse, hasty order attempts to sweep under the rug, 
there are important legal issues pertaining to the merits of 
these cases that it fails to fully resolve.  To explain just 
what these issues are, I first provide an overview of the legal 
landscape. 
¶135 At the center of these matters, and at the heart of 
the 
Open 
Meetings 
Law, 
is 
the 
mandate 
in 
Wisconsin's 
constitution that "[t]he doors of each house shall be kept open 
except when the public welfare shall require secrecy."3  The 
legislature enacted the Open Meetings Law, in part, to comply 
with this constitutional directive.4 
¶136 Relevant 
to this case, the legislature required 
meetings of a "governmental body" be properly noticed and open 
                                                 
3 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 10. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.81(3) provides: "In conformance with 
article IV, section 10, of the constitution, which states that 
the doors of each house shall remain open, except when the 
public welfare requires secrecy, it is declared to be the intent 
of the legislature to comply to the fullest extent with this 
subchapter."  (Emphasis added.) 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
4 
 
to the public.5  It also appeared to make it clear that these 
access 
and 
notice 
requirements 
apply 
to 
itself 
and 
its 
committees.6   The legislature authorized the district attorney 
to prosecute violations.7  And finally, it directed courts to 
enjoin or void actions taken in violation of the Open Meetings 
Law.8    
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.83(1) provides in relevant part: 
"Every meeting of a governmental body shall be preceded by 
public notice as provided in s. 19.84, and shall be held in open 
session."  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.84(3) provides in relevant part: 
"Public notice of every meeting of a governmental body shall be 
given at least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such 
meeting unless for good cause such notice is impossible or 
impractical, in which case shorter notice may be given, but in 
no case may the notice be provided less than 2 hours in advance 
of the meeting." 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.82(1) defines a "[g]overnmental body" 
as "a state or local agency, board, commission, committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and politic created 
by constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 19.87 further explicitly states that the Open Meetings 
Law "shall apply to all meetings of the senate and assembly and 
the committees, subcommittees and other subunits thereof," with 
the exception of certain meetings not at issue here.   
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.97(1) provides in relevant part that 
the Open Meetings Law "shall be enforced in the name and on 
behalf of the state by the attorney general or, upon the 
verified complaint of any person, by the district attorney of 
any county wherein a violation may occur."  Unlike the situation 
in State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶1, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 
605 N.W.2d 526, in which this court recognized that the attorney 
general's authority is statutorily defined and concluded that 
the attorney general lacked the authority to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute at issue, the Open Meetings Law 
expressly authorizes the district attorney to enforce its 
provisions.     
8 Subsections (2) and (3) of Wis. Stat. § 19.97 provide: 
(2) . . . [T]he 
attorney 
general 
or 
the 
district 
attorney may commence an action . . . to obtain such 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
5 
 
¶137 It is this court's obligation to harmonize the 
existing precedent and to apply this explicit statutory language 
to give effect to the legislative intent.  The core legal issues 
presented by this case are not as easily resolved as the 
majority's order suggests: (1) Are the Open Meetings Law's 
access 
or 
notice 
provisions 
as 
constitutionally 
based 
requirements 
enforceable 
against 
the 
legislature 
or 
its 
committees?  (2) If so, is declaring an act void among the 
sanctions a court may impose regarding a legislative action 
taken in violation of this law? (3) Does a court have the 
authority 
to 
enjoin 
the 
publication, 
implementation, 
or 
effectiveness of an act, where some part of the legislative 
process was conducted in violation of the Open Meetings Law, but 
the act was passed by the legislature and signed by the 
governor?  Instead, a review of precedent raises additional 
questions that the majority does not address.   
¶138 In Goodland v. Zimmerman, this court provided that 
"the court has power to declare invalid an act of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
other legal or equitable relief, including but not 
limited 
to 
mandamus, 
injunction 
or 
declaratory 
judgment, 
as 
may 
be 
appropriate 
under 
the 
circumstances. 
(3) Any action taken at a meeting of a governmental 
body held in violation of this subchapter is voidable, 
upon action brought by the attorney general or the 
district attorney of the county wherein the violation 
occurred. However, any judgment declaring such action 
void shall not be entered unless the court finds, 
under the facts of the particular case, that the 
public interest in the enforcement of this subchapter 
outweighs any public interest which there may be in 
sustaining the validity of the action taken. 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
6 
 
legislature which contravenes constitutional provisions.  That 
principle . . . is no longer open to debate."9  However, we also 
stated that "[t]he judicial department has no jurisdiction or 
right to interfere with the legislative process."10  In light of 
Goodland, 
may 
a 
court 
ever 
prevent 
the 
publication 
or 
implementation of an Act, or must it wait to void an Act until 
after it is published?  What if the legislature chose to impose 
a check on itself, enforceable in court, and tied to its 
constitutional mandate to provide access?  Can the court be said 
to invade the province of the legislature when the legislature 
has invited it into that process? 
¶139 In State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, we stated that 
courts will not review or void an act of the legislature based 
on its failure to comply with its own procedural rules, unless 
those rules embody a constitutional requirement.11   Consistent 
with this principle, we recently reviewed the validity of a 
legislative action based on a question of the legislature's 
compliance with a procedural statute that was tied to a 
constitutional requirement.12  So a key question is: what part of 
                                                 
9 243 Wis. 459, 470-71, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943). 
10 Id. at 467.   
11 114 Wis. 2d 358, 364-67, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983). 
12 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 
79, ¶¶19-20, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (concluding that 
"we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with 
§ 111.92(1)" because "even if the statute might otherwise be 
characterized as a legislative rule of proceeding, we may 
interpret the statute and apply it to the legislative action to 
determine whether that action complies with the relevant 
constitutional mandates"). 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
7 
 
the Open Meetings Law embodies a constitutional requirement?  If 
any 
Open 
Meetings 
Law provisions that are tied to the 
constitution were violated in this case, was the circuit court 
permitted to void the act?13 
¶140 All of these highly important questions, which define 
the respective authority and duty of the legislature and the 
courts, 
are 
left 
without 
complete 
answers 
and 
thorough 
discussion.  These cases implicate this court's obligation to 
interpret, apply and develop the law.  The tough questions 
raised by an examination of the relevant precedent could be 
resolved by a thoughtful application of the plain language of 
the Open Meetings Law to this precedent.  Instead, the majority 
brushes these questions aside in its hasty decision and fails to 
fully examine our precedent.  "Adherence to precedent must then 
be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have 
faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the 
courts."14  Justice Cardozo's admonition applies equally to 
                                                 
13 This begs another question: Does the attorney general's 
argument in the petition for a supervisory writ case, on behalf 
of the Department of Administration, amount to an attack on the 
constitutionality of the Open Meetings Law as applied to the 
legislature?  The attorney general has argued that the Open 
Meetings Law is merely "aspirational" as to the legislature 
because, according to the attorney general, courts may only 
invalidate 
a 
legislative 
act 
that 
conflicts 
with 
the 
constitution and not based on a violation of statutory rules.  
This question is significant because, as explained in City of 
Oak Creek, the attorney general has no general authority to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute.  City of Oak 
Creek, 232 Wis. 2d 612, ¶1.  
14 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 
34 (1921).   
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
8 
 
deciding the substantive issues presented here as to choosing 
the best procedural way to accept these cases for review. 
II 
¶141 For both practical and institutional reasons, the 
right way to go about answering these weighty and significant 
questions would be for these issues to be presented to this 
court as a direct appeal of the final judgment entered by the 
circuit court for Dane County.   
¶142 The practical reasons that a direct appeal makes the 
most sense are based on the desirability of deciding these 
issues with all the available information, and in the most 
focused and efficient way.  They have to do with the nuts and 
bolts of the process of receiving cases for various types of 
review at this court.  These matters did not come to us as a 
direct appeal of a judgment but rather through two separate 
methods: an appeal and certification of a temporary order and a 
rarely used process, a supervisory writ, provided by statute, 
both filed before the circuit court's findings, conclusions and 
judgment.   
¶143 Due to the unusual posture, we have no access to the 
complete record that was compiled in the circuit court that 
included the transcripts of the days of testimony taken in the 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
9 
 
circuit court,15 the exhibits entered into evidence, and the 
briefs filed there.16  Many people would likely find it puzzling 
that under these circumstances we, the highest court in the 
                                                 
15 While the majority's order implies that this court may 
consider whatever transcripts were filed in appendices to 
materials submitted to this court, that is a departure from 
settled precedent that is sure to cause grave concern among 
appellate lawyers.  State v. Kuhn, 178 Wis. 2d 428, 439, 504 
N.W.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that an appellate court is 
"limited by the record before [it] and cannot consider the 
extraneous material included in [a party's] appendix").  This 
break with precedent is yet another legal casualty of the 
majority's hasty decision.  
16 This is particularly troubling because the majority and 
Justice Prosser's concurrence appear to make many factual 
assertions.  The majority's conclusion that "the legislature did 
not employ a process that violated Article IV, Section 10 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution" is based on facts that either conflict 
with or are not found in the limited record before this court.  
Specifically, the majority states (1) "[t]he doors of the senate 
and assembly were kept open to the press and members of the 
public during the enactment of the Act," (2) "[t]he doors of the 
senate parlor, where the joint committee on conference met, were 
open to the press and members of the public," and (3) 
"WisconsinEye broadcast the proceedings live."  The source of 
the facts is unclear.  The majority's factual findings either 
conflict with or are unsupported by the circuit court's findings 
of fact in State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, which provide 
that the doors to the Senate Gallery were locked during the 
meeting and say nothing regarding the doors to the senate parlor 
or a WisconsinEye broadcast.  "Findings of fact shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses."  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).       
Justice Prosser's concurrence likewise relies on numerous 
factual assertions, some of which are based on the circuit 
court's findings of fact in Ozanne, and others whose source is 
unexplained.  It cannot be both ways——either these are purely 
legal questions that require no factual findings outside of the 
circuit court's findings of fact (which control unless found to 
be clearly erroneous) or this court needs a record and a 
resolution of disputed facts. 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
10 
 
state, cannot simply order up whatever information is needed 
from relevant court proceedings, especially since information on 
the testimony and evidence has been publicly disseminated, but 
statutes and rules prescribe the manner that cases proceed 
through the judicial system, and should be followed.  Those 
procedures matter.  When a case arrives before us in the posture 
of a direct appeal, and we grant the petition for review, 
certification or bypass,17 we have access to all the information, 
evidence and arguments that have been presented to the court 
below to answer the questions presented.  These cases did not 
arrive 
in 
that 
posture, 
and 
those 
boxes 
of 
documents, 
transcripts and evidence that we ordinarily review were not made 
available to us.  When this court heard oral arguments on the 
question of whether to take these cases and in what manner, we 
heard arguments from counsel representing six parties for more 
than six hours.  It is rather astonishing that the court would 
                                                 
17 The path most frequently taken to this court is that 
parties appeal from the circuit court judgment to the court of 
appeals, which reviews and rules, and then petition this court 
for review.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62.  However, there are 
other routes provided by statute for a case to come to this 
court without first being reviewed by the court of appeals, 
whether at the request of the parties, see Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.60 (permitting parties to petition this court for review, 
bypassing the court of appeals), or the request of the court of 
appeals itself or on motion of this court, see Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (permitting the court of appeals to send cases 
to this court by certification and authorizing this court to 
take jurisdiction of any action pending in the court of 
appeals).  In each of those instances, the record in the 
underlying case is available to this court.  
 
 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
11 
 
choose to decide to take and decide such an unusual and complex 
case without benefit of the complete record.   
¶144 The ready availability of a direct appeal by aggrieved 
parties makes this all the more puzzling.  The majority does not 
really come to grips with the obvious fact that an appeal is an 
available remedy here.  As many of the parties to these cases 
have argued, it would be a simple matter for an aggrieved party 
to intervene in this matter and file an ordinary appeal, which 
would proceed the usual way.18   This would have the added 
benefit of briefs and arguments solely focused on the merits of 
the substantive legal issues presented, what the heart of the 
case is really about, with the benefit of a complete record.  It 
would be followed by the ordinary written decision fully 
explaining this court's analysis.  And taking that path would, 
in addition, avoid creating unfortunate precedent; it would take 
                                                 
18 I would hold that there is a final decision by the 
circuit court "as to the validity of the actions taken on March 
9, 2011," (the date of the alleged Open Meetings Law violation).  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03, the circuit court's decision is 
a final, appealable judgment because it "disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties."  
Aggrieved parties may intervene after a circuit court decision 
under the permissive intervention requirements in Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09, and appeal from that decision.  M & I Marshall & 
Ilsley Bank v. Urquhart Cos., 2005 WI App 225, ¶7, 287 Wis. 2d 
623, 706 N.W.2d 335 ("This court has noted that motions to 
intervene must be evaluated 'with an eye toward disposing of 
lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is 
compatible with efficiency and due process.'”) (quoting Wolff v. 
Town of Jamestown, 229 Wis. 2d 738, 742-43, 601 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. 
App. 1999)).  I recognize that the circuit court stated that the 
separate forfeiture claims against some legislators "are held in 
abeyance pending expiration or waiver of their legislative 
immunity."  
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
12 
 
the prudent approach, considering all the relevant evidence, and 
follow the way we handle many thorny issues that are presented 
to us: without rush or impatience or needless deviation from 
well-settled practice.  For this very practical reason——having 
all the information that was presented in the circuit court for 
our review and being able to give the biggest questions 
presented our full attention——these matters, especially given 
the significant questions involved, would best be reviewed in 
the posture of a direct appeal.   
¶145 But as compelling as those practical reasons are, the 
greater reason that a direct appeal is the best way is that it 
is the procedurally correct way – no shortcuts, no cut corners, 
no unnecessary invocation of rarely used powers.  Let me be 
clear: taking this case as an original action [publici juris or 
supervisory authority] is not outside this court’s power; it is 
just the wrong choice under these circumstances.  These matters, 
after all, are at bottom about rules and procedures.  It is 
about whether the legislature's stated intent to abide by the 
Open Meetings Law provisions, in accordance with constitutional 
requirements, can be enforced by way of voiding a law resulting 
from legislative meetings that did not comply with the law.  
These matters are about the integrity of the rules that one 
branch imposes on others and apparently on itself to govern 
procedures.  Especially in light of the public focus and intense 
scrutiny we must not depart from the usual method of handling 
cases and employ a method that disposes of the issues with 
atypical speed and insufficient explanation.  As this court 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
13 
 
stated, "The independence of the judiciary and the legitimate 
exercise of judicial discretion is necessary to maintain the 
balance of power among the branches of government.  The 
judiciary 
is 
cognizant . . . that it must function within 
established rules and precedents to maintain public trust in the 
integrity of the judicial process."19  That principle is aptly 
illustrated here.  The high-profile nature of these matters only 
gives more force to the necessity of proceeding in a way that is 
least likely to undermine public confidence in the independence 
of the judiciary.  There is not only no reason to depart from 
the preferred method of direct review, there are many reasons to 
prefer it. 
¶146 Conversely, 
there 
are 
many 
infirmities 
in 
the 
alternatives that are argued by the State.  There are two cases 
before us that we considered taking for review.  I agree with 
the majority that one of them, the certification from the court 
of appeals concerning the issuance of a temporary restraining 
order in State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, is now moot, since 
a final judgment has been issued.  Accepting the certification 
is 
therefore 
no 
longer 
an 
appropriate 
course 
of 
taking 
                                                 
19 State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1124, 501 N.W.2d 429 
(1993). 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
14 
 
jurisdiction.20  The petition for a supervisory writ is the wrong 
way, because our case law makes clear that if an appeal is an 
available remedy, a petition for a supervisory writ must fail.21  
As we stated in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty, "A supervisory writ 'is considered an extraordinary and 
drastic remedy that is to be issued only upon some grievous 
exigency.'"22  We made clear in that case that "[a] petition for 
a supervisory writ will not be granted unless [among other 
things] an appeal is an inadequate remedy."23  An appeal is a 
simple matter and is not an inadequate remedy in this case, 
especially given this court's power to take a directly appealed 
case from the court of appeals on its own motion. 
¶147 These cases should not be converted into a petition 
for an original action and taken using our original jurisdiction 
for several reasons: there is nothing that merits the use of 
that power in this instance.  Such an exercise brings more of 
                                                 
20 The certification from the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. 809.61 arose from Secretary of State LaFollette's 
"petition for leave to appeal a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) issued on March 18, 2011."  The March 18, 2011, TRO no 
longer exists because it was superseded by the circuit court's 
May 26, 2011, decision.  There is no separate question presented 
by the TRO; if this court addresses the significant issues 
addressed 
above 
concerning 
the 
circuit 
court's 
permanent 
injunction, it would by definition resolve any questions 
concerning the TRO. 
21 State ex rel. Dressler v. Circuit Court for Racine Cnty, 
163 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991).   
22 2004 WI 58, ¶17, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting 
Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630). 
23 Id. (citations omitted).   
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
15 
 
the case than we need in order to answer the central issues and 
bogs us down with requiring resolution of the remaining disputed 
factual matters.24  As I noted above, it is beyond dispute that 
this court has the power to exercise its authority and take an 
original action utilizing our original jurisdiction.  But we 
exercise that extraordinary power only when we have a compelling 
reason to do so.  There is no such reason in this case.  The 
court in Petition of Heil took a very pragmatic and sensible 
approach and stated plainly the reason that taking original 
jurisdiction should be used sparingly and "on the basis of the 
nature of 
the issues involved rather than upon a mere 
consideration of convenience or expediency."25  The Heil court 
urged that the system works best when the trial and appellate 
courts play the roles that they are designed to play: 
This court is primarily an appellate court, and it 
should not be burdened with matters not clearly within 
its province if it is to discharge in a proper and 
efficient manner its primary function. Mere expedition 
of causes, convenience of parties to actions, and the 
prevention of a multiplicity of suits are matters 
                                                 
24 As I have noted previously, the majority's order does not 
give adequate consideration to the distinctions between a 
petition for a supervisory writ and a petition for an original 
action.  The attorney general originally petitioned for a 
supervisory writ and for the first time argued in Huebsch's 
reply brief that the petition for a supervisory writ could be 
"recast as a petition for original action publici juris," but no 
party has actually petitioned for an original action.  The 
majority seems to have decided to recast this petition as one 
for an original action, and now that it has done so, it should 
address the procedural problems that presented such as the lack 
of a complete record, the disputed factual issues that must now 
be resolved, and who the parties are. 
25 Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 448, 284 N.W. 42 (1939). 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
16 
 
which form no basis for the exercise of original 
jurisdiction 
of 
this 
court. 
Because 
it 
is 
the 
principal function of the circuit court to try cases 
and of this court to review cases which have been 
tried, due regard should be had to these fundamental 
considerations.26 
¶148 "Because this court is not a fact-finding tribunal, it 
generally will not exercise its original jurisdiction in matters 
involving contested issues of fact."27  There are mechanisms 
which have been utilized, such as appointment of a special 
master, perhaps a reserve judge, to conduct fact-finding under 
the 
continued 
jurisdiction/supervision 
of 
this 
court.28  
Comparing the use of such mechanisms to a direct appeal, such 
approaches are unwieldy and time-consuming.  When this court 
takes original jurisdiction, it takes the whole tangled lot of 
issues and factual disputes just as if it were the trial court.  
Three of the parties, in their letter briefs to this court, 
claim that there are unresolved factual issues concerning the 
amount of alleged fiscal harm at stake, the rules under which 
the Senate and Assembly operate, the so-called "good cause" 
exception that permits a shorter meeting notice requirement, and 
the role of the secretary of state in the publication process.  
Clearly, it is not proper to recast the supervisory writ 
petition as one for an original action and to take original 
                                                 
26 Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. at 448. 
27 Green for Wis. v. State Elections Bd., 2006 WI 120, 297 
Wis. 2d 300, 302, 723 N.W.2d 418. 
28 See Wis. Prof'l Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 
59, ¶6, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807 (referencing the reserve 
judge who supervised the stipulation of facts agreed to by the 
parties).   
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
17 
 
jurisdiction without resolving the claimed factual disputes 
presented.  While I agree with the majority that Act 10 is not 
in effect, a full and complete resolution of the factual 
questions surrounding the appropriate procedure involving a 
matter such as publication needs to be set forth. 
III 
¶149 These cases exemplify the importance of compliance 
with procedural rules and the rule of law in maintaining the 
legitimacy of our government.  Just as there is a right way and 
a wrong way to proceed with the legislative process, there is a 
right way and a wrong way to accept these issues for review.  I 
dissent in part because, in taking these matters as an original 
action and swiftly vacating the circuit court's orders without 
sufficient examination the majority has proceeded in the wrong 
way. 
¶150 I concur in part because I agree with the majority 
that it is imperative that this court address the weighty and 
complicated 
questions 
presented 
here. 
 
It 
is 
of 
great 
significance to the people of Wisconsin whether the legislature 
is required to follow the Open Meetings Law, which apparently it 
has tied to the Wisconsin Constitution, and if so, how it may be 
held accountable.  It is important not only here where the Act 
at issue, 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, was hotly debated, but in every 
case where the legislature acts on behalf of the people.  Those 
who would rush to judgment on these matters are essentially 
taking the position that getting this opinion out is more 
important than doing it right and getting it right.  As this 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
18 
 
court recently stated and as the Honorable Maryann Sumi repeated 
in her decision in regard to those matters, "The right of the 
people to monitor the people's business is one of the core 
principles of democracy."29  I also concur because I agree with 
the majority that Act 10 is not in effect, and that the 
certification and motions for temporary relief in case No. 
2011AP613-LV should be denied. 
¶151 Specifically, 
this 
case 
raises 
the 
following 
questions: (1) Is the Open Meetings Law30 enforceable against the 
legislature and, if so, what sanctions are appropriate? (2) May 
a court ever void an Act because of an Open Meetings Law 
violation? 
(3) 
May 
a 
court 
prohibit 
the 
publication, 
implementation, or effectiveness of an Act passed in violation 
of the Open Meetings Law, or must a court wait until after the 
Act is published?  
¶152 There is no question that these issues are worthy of 
this court's review.  But procedures matter——to the courts, the 
legislature, and the people of Wisconsin.  There is a right way 
to address these issues and a wrong way.  The majority chooses 
the wrong way by refusing to take this case through the 
appropriate procedural mechanism, and by rushing to issue an 
order without sufficient examination or a complete record.  I 
concur in part because I agree with the majority's decision to 
address these important questions.  I dissent in part due to the 
majority's decision to utilize inappropriately this court's 
                                                 
29 Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶2. 
30 Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81-19.98. 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
19 
 
original jurisdiction and due to its issuing a hasty order 
without 
sufficient 
consideration, 
and 
without 
adequately 
addressing all of the parties' arguments.  I am convinced that 
these significant issues should be addressed through a direct 
appeal, which would allow this court to more fully resolve, with 
the benefit of a complete record, the complex legal and factual 
issues at stake. 
¶153 For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
¶154 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON 
and 
Justice 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY 
join 
this 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
Nos. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W.npc 
 
1