Title: STEVEN J VALCANIANT V THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121141
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 489009  
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED MAY 19, 2004 
STEVEN J. VALCANIANT and KATHLEEN A. 
VALCANIANT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 121141 
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee 
and 
DE ANGELIS LANDSCAPE, INC., 
Defendant. 
PER CURIAM 
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether Detroit 
Edison Company owed plaintiff1 a legal duty to de-energize 
an overhead power line that was severed by equipment being 
operated under plaintiff’s direction. Relying on Groncki v 
1 Throughout this opinion, "plaintiff" refers only to
Steven J. Valcaniant. 
Although plaintiff’s wife, Kathleen
A. Valcaniant, is also a party to the lawsuit, her claims
are derivative. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644; 557 NW2d 289 (1996), the 
Court of Appeals held that Edison had no reason to foresee 
plaintiff’s injury because it had no reason to foresee that 
plaintiff was the cause of the fault and, as a result, did 
not owe a legal duty to plaintiff.2  We affirm. 
I 
In 1974, plaintiff purchased a four-acre gravel lot in 
Imlay City; in 1987, he opened a used car business. At all 
times, uninsulated power lines owned by Edison existed 
along the back property line. 
These lines were suspended 
more than twenty-five feet in the air. 
Plaintiff admitted 
that he was aware of the lines and the danger they posed. 
On August 15, 1995, plaintiff was injured while giving 
directions to the driver of a dump truck delivering fill 
dirt to the back portion of his property.  As the truck 
became free of the weight of its load, it rose upward and 
its highest edge severed an overhead power line. 
The 
ground was wet, and the electricity that flowed through the 
truck continued through the ground to plaintiff, who was 
standing six or seven feet away, knocking him unconscious. 
A sensor known as an automatic reclosure device 
detected the fault in the severed line almost immediately, 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 19,
2002 (Docket No. 227499). 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
and momentarily stopped the current flow. 
Because many 
faults are temporary, the sensor is designed to restart the 
current flow three times within a period of six seconds, 
checking each time to see whether the fault remains. 
If 
the fault has cleared, the sensor will allow the line to 
remain energized. 
If, after these three cycles, the fault 
remains, the sensor will completely de-energize the line. 
By 
using 
this 
sensor, 
Edison 
can 
avoid 
unnecessary 
interruptions of its customers’ service that would be 
caused by faults occasioned by a power line’s fleeting 
contact with objects like tree limbs and small animals. 
Here, the sensor operated as intended; it restarted 
the current three times and then de-energized the line when 
the fault failed to clear. 
Plaintiff suffered second­
degree burns to his back and arm from the shocks that he 
received while the sensor completed its cycles. 
II 
Plaintiff and his wife sued Edison, alleging that the 
company was liable in tort.3
 Edison moved for summary 
disposition, arguing that it owed no legal duty to 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff opposed the motion by arguing that 
Edison owed it a legal duty to de-energize the severed 
3 They also sued the contractor who operated the dump
truck. That party was later dismissed by stipulation. 
3  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
  
power line immediately. 
Plaintiff asserted that Edison 
should have foreseen that its use of the sensor could cause 
injury. 
The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied 
Edison’s motion. 
The Court of Appeals granted Edison’s application for 
leave for interlocutory appeal and reversed the decision of 
the trial court. After considering this Court’s opinion in 
Groncki, it concluded that Edison owed no legal duty to 
plaintiff and was entitled to summary disposition. 
We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to 
appeal. 468 Mich 868 (2003). 
III 
We 
review 
de 
novo 
appeals 
relating 
to 
summary 
disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 
817 (1999). The existence of a legal duty is a question of 
law.4 
Groncki, 453 Mich 649; Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 
124, 130; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). 
In determining whether a 
legal duty exists, courts examine a variety of factors, 
including “foreseeability of the harm, degree of certainty 
4 Duty concerns whether a defendant is under any legal
obligation to act for the benefit of the plaintiff.
Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 100; 490 NW2d 330 (1992).
This concept should be distinguished from the standard of
care, 
which, 
in 
negligence 
cases, 
always 
requires
reasonable conduct. 
See id. (distinguishing “between duty
as the problem of the relational obligation between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and the standard of care that
in negligence cases is always reasonable conduct”). 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  
 
 
of injury, closeness of connection between the conduct and 
injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of 
preventing future harm, and . . . the burdens and 
consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability 
for breach.” Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101 n 4; 490 
NW2d 330 
(1992) (citing Prosser & Keaton, Torts [5th ed], 
§ 53, p 359 n 24). See also Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 
443 Mich 445, 450; 506 NW2d 175 (1993). 
In this case, plaintiff does not argue that Edison 
failed to inspect the power lines, or that the lines were 
in disrepair.5  Instead, plaintiff argues that Edison had a 
legal duty to de-energize the power line immediately and 
completely after it was severed by the dump truck. 
This 
Court addressed a power company’s legal duty to de-energize 
a power line in Groncki. 
That case consolidated three 
lawsuits brought against Edison by individuals who were 
injured when equipment they were using outdoors came into 
contact with overhead power lines.6
 453 Mich 650-653 
5 As a result, this Court’s opinion in Schultz, 443
Mich 451, in which we held that the standard of care
requires a power company “to reasonably inspect and repair
wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and 
remedy hazards and defects,” is not pertinent to this case. 
6 In Groncki, a condominium complex’s maintenance 
supervisor accidentally brought an aluminum ladder into
contact with a power line twenty-one feet overhead. 
In 
Bohnert, a truck driver deployed his truck’s unloading boom
in a way that caused it to contact a power line twenty-six 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.). 
In the lead opinion, Chief 
Justice BRICKLEY concluded that the injuries suffered by the 
three plaintiffs were not foreseeable and that Edison owed 
them no legal duty. 
He added that public policy 
considerations, including the “public’s need for electric 
power at a reasonable cost,” further militated against 
imposing a legal duty under the circumstances. Id. at 661.7 
Similar considerations are implicated in this case. 
However, we need not reach the balancing required by 
Buczkowski. 
See 
Buczkowski, 
supra 
at 
101 
(“Other 
considerations may be, and usually are, more important 
[than foreseeability].”). The circumstances surrounding 
plaintiff’s 
injury 
fail 
to 
satisfy 
even 
the 
lowest 
threshold 
requirement—that 
the 
harm 
incurred 
was 
foreseeable. See Brown v Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc, 459 
Mich 874 (1998). 
feet overhead. 
Finally, in Parcher, a construction worker
used a forklift to move scaffolding and caused the 
scaffolding to contact a power line that was thirty-five
feet overhead. 
7 No other justice signed the lead opinion. 
Justice 
Boyle concurred in the result only. 
Id. at 665. 
Justice 
Weaver, joined by Justice RILEY, concurred with Chief 
Justice BRICKLEY regarding the rationale and disposition of
the claims against Edison, but dissented regarding the
liability imposed on a nonutility defendant. 
Id. at 674. 
Justice MALLETT, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, concurred in the
disposition of Bohnert and Parcher, but dissented in 
Groncki because they believed that the harm suffered by
that plaintiff was foreseeable. 
Id. at 665. 
Finally,
Justice LEVIN dissented in all three cases. Id. at 681. 
6  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
   
Edison had no obligation to anticipate that the dump 
truck operated under plaintiff’s direction would sever an 
overhead power line that was suspended more than twenty­
five feet above the ground, much less that plaintiff would 
be standing on wet ground several feet away. 
As a result, 
Edison had no legal duty to anticipate that plaintiff might 
be injured when the sensor device briefly re-energized the 
line, as it was designed to do, or to take other steps to 
prevent plaintiff’s injury. 
Because we conclude that 
plaintiff’s injuries were unforeseeable as a matter of law, 
we need not consider other variables that might militate 
against the imposition of a legal duty where harm is 
foreseeable. See Buczkowski, supra at 102.8 
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals opinion 
reversing the decision of the trial court and remanding 
this case for entry of an order of summary disposition in 
favor of Edison. MCR 7.302(G)(1). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
8 We noted in Buczkowski that “[w]here foreseeability
fails as an adequate template for the existence of a duty,
recourse must be had to the basic issues of policy
underlying 
the 
core 
problem 
whether 
the 
plaintiff’s
interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 102. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
STEVEN J. VALCANIANT and 
KATHLEEN A. VALCANIANT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 121141 
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
DE ANGELIS LANDSCAPE, INC., 
Defendant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in result only). 
The majority concludes that defendant Detroit Edison 
Company has no duty to de-energize an electrical line that 
is accidentally severed by another’s negligence. 
I find 
its analysis flawed. 
As Justice Levin recognized in Groncki v Detroit 
Edison Co,1 
this Court continues to confuse duty and 
proximate causation with respect to electric utility 
companies. 
The result has been that these companies are 
now exempt from a broad duty to exercise due care for the 
1 
453 Mich 644, 679-680; 557 NW2d 289 (1996) (Levin,
J., dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
welfare of others. Because I cannot agree that this should 
be the law, I must dissent from the analysis. 
CLARIFYING TORT LIABILITY 
Traditionally, there are four elements to a tort: 
duty, breach, causation, and damages. 
Case v Consumers 
Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000).  All but the 
last are at issue in this case. 
Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff is a 
question of law. 
Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 
NW2d 842 (1995). 
Recognition of a duty implicates various 
considerations: the relationship between the parties, the 
nature and foreseeability of the risk to be avoided, and 
the burdens and benefits of recognition. 
See Buczowski v 
McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101-103; 490 NW2d 330 (1992). Among 
strangers who lack a special relationship to one another, 
the duty owed is most basic, that of reasonable conduct 
under the circumstances. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 
443; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), citing Restatement of Torts, 2d, 
§ 283. 
Whether a defendant fulfilled or whether it breached 
its duty in a given case is a question of fact. Murdock v 
Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 53; 559 NW2d 639 (1997). 
In a 
controversy 
among 
strangers 
who 
lack 
a 
special 
relationship, the trier of fact must decide whether the 
2  
 
 
 
defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable care for 
the safety of others. 
The 
element 
of 
causation 
addresses 
whether 
a 
defendant’s breach of its duty caused the plaintiff’s 
injury. Causation has two components. The first is actual 
causation: whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the 
defendant’s breach of its duty toward the plaintiff. It is 
a question of fact, which is also resolved by the trier of 
fact. 
The second component is proximate or legal cause. 
A 
defendant’s breach of duty is said to have proximately 
caused a plaintiff’s injury only where the defendant 
reasonably could have foreseen the kind of harm that befell 
the plaintiff. 
It is unnecessary that the exact mechanism 
or sequence of events leading to the harm be reasonably 
foreseeable. 
Dobbs, Torts, Proximate Cause, ch 10, § 180, 
p 444 (2001). 
The foreseeability requirement arises from 
the principles that liability should be limited in a 
practical manner and should comport with notions of 
justice. 
Dobbs, § 181, p 446. 
Proximate cause is a 
question of law. Moning at 440. 
The effect of foreseeability on duty and proximate 
cause confounded Judges Cardozo and Andrews in the famous 
3  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
case Palsgraf v Long Island R Co2 and continues to vex 
jurists today. This Court has adopted Judge Cardozo’s view 
that whether a duty is owed depends on whether harm is 
reasonably foreseeable. See Moning at 439, 441. 
ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES OWE THE PUBLIC A BROAD DUTY 
The Court today affirms the holding in Groncki that 
inadvertent contact with overhead electric utility lines is 
not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law. 
Therefore, 
electric utilities do not owe a duty to others to take 
reasonable precautions to guard against that risk. 
I 
cannot agree. 
It is quite reasonably foreseeable that someone may 
act in negligent disregard for his own safety and contact 
an overhead electric utility line. 
I take judicial notice 
that, with respect to electrical lines, about five percent 
of all workplace fatalities each year are electrocutions. 
United States Dep’t of Labor, 2002 Census of Fatal 
Occupational 
Injuries 
(Charts), 
<http://www.bls.gov/ 
iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0001.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2004). Heavy 
equipment that reaches great heights is routinely operated 
in modern society. 
Thus, under the appropriate negligence 
analysis, electric utilities owe a duty to the general 
2 
248 NY 339; 162 NE 99 (1928). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
public to conduct their business so as not to create an 
unreasonable risk of accidental electrocution. 
As this Court has held: 
Those engaged in transmitting electricity 
are bound to anticipate ordinary use of the area
surrounding 
the 
lines 
and 
to 
appropriately
safeguard the attendant risks. 
The test to 
determine whether a duty was owed is not whether
the 
company 
should 
have 
anticipated 
the 
particular act from which the injury resulted,
but 
whether 
it 
should 
have 
foreseen 
the 
probability that injury might result from any 
reasonable activity done on the premises for 
business, work, or pleasure. . . . 
Where service wires erected and maintained 
by an electric utility company carry a powerful
electric current, so that persons coming into
contact with or proximity to them are likely to
suffer serious injury or death, the company must
exercise reasonable care to protect the public
from danger. The degree of care required is that
used by prudent persons in the industry, under 
like conditions and proportionate to the dangers
involved, to guard against reasonably foreseeable
or 
anticipated 
contingencies. 
[Schultz 
v 
Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 452-454; 506
NW2d 175 (1993) (emphasis added).] 
In short, electric companies have a duty to conduct 
themselves reasonably under the circumstances. 
In this case, the majority frames the issue as whether 
defendant had a duty to do a specific act: de-energize a 
severed line until the cause of the fault can be 
determined. 
It then treats Steven Valcaniant’s negligence 
as conclusive evidence that defendant does not owe a duty 
to perform that act. 
The majority finds that it is not 
5  
 
 
 
  
reasonably foreseeable that someone in Mr. Valcaniant’s 
position would contact the electrical line involved here. 
The majority’s analysis might be appropriate in a 
contributory negligence jurisdiction where the effect of 
the plaintiff’s negligence, even when slight, is to absolve 
the defendant of all legal liability. 
But, Michigan long 
ago abandoned this harsh tort theory. 
Placek v Sterling 
Hts, 405 Mich 638, 701; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).  Rather, a 
defendant may be liable to a negligent plaintiff to the 
extent his negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury. 
See 
MCL 600.2956. 
Here, 
it 
is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
heavy 
equipment, such as the raised bed of a dump truck, would 
contact an overhead electrical line, causing injury. Thus, 
defendant 
owed 
plaintiffs 
a 
duty 
to 
install 
its 
distribution lines in a manner that does not create an 
unreasonable risk from such a vehicle. 
I do not agree 
that, as a matter of law, electric utility companies owe 
the public no duty to take reasonable precautions to 
protect it from accidental contact with their lines. 
The 
absence of a duty encourages utility defendants to rely on 
customs in the industry and discourages innovation of new 
and safer ways to deliver electricity. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
Blind reliance on industry customs was rejected more 
than seventy years ago in the famous case of The TJ Hooper, 
60 F2d 737 (CA 2, 1932). See also 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, 
§ 295A, illus 2. There, the owners of a tugboat failed to 
furnish emergency radios to their crew, because such radios 
were not standard equipment in the industry. 
The federal 
appeals 
court 
held 
that 
reliance 
on 
custom 
was 
a 
consideration in whether the defendant acted reasonably in 
providing for the crew’s safety, but was not conclusive. 
That decision has encouraged the standard of care to evolve 
as technology advances. The same principle applies here. 
WHY SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
Once we recognize that defendant has a broad duty to 
exercise due care to protect the public, the question 
becomes whether it breached its duty. 
The jury should 
determine whether defendant acted reasonably in this case 
by placing its lines (1) high off the ground, (2) in plain 
view near the back of plaintiffs’ property, (3) away from 
easy access by the public, and (4) by installing a 
reclosure device to minimize dangerous power failures and 
protect plaintiff from being exposed to a continuous 
charge. 
The following facts are without contest: (1) plaintiff 
Stephen Valcaniant knew that defendant’s electrical lines 
7  
 
 
 
were in the air at the back of his property and that they 
were dangerous; (2) defendant had placed its lines higher 
than the height recommended by the National Electric Safety 
Code, 
American 
National 
Standards 
Institute, 
National 
Electric Safety Code, Table 232-1 (1989); (3) the lines 
remained more than seven feet above that recommendation at 
the time of the accident, even after plaintiff had raised 
the grade of the ground below; (4) had the lines been 
placed underground, they could have been susceptible to 
flooding and accidental contact with digging equipment; (5) 
defendant installed automatic reclosure devices to avoid 
unnecessarily mobilizing repair crews to restore electrical 
service interrupted by intermittent short circuits from 
tree limbs and wildlife; (6) these reclosure devices have 
become standard in the industry, and can eliminate up to 
eighty percent of power disruptions; (7) interruptions in 
electrical service can endanger lives in such ways as 
disabling medical devices and traffic signals; (8) the 
lines and equipment were in good repair. 
Considering 
today’s 
limitations 
on 
maintaining 
a 
reliable electrical system, no reasonable juror could 
disagree that defendant met its duty. 
Therefore, on the 
basis of facts and reasoning not given in the opinion per 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
curiam, I agree that the Court of Appeals properly ordered 
a grant of summary disposition for defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
I believe that the proper analysis of this case is 
that electric utility companies have a broad duty to take 
reasonable care for the safety of others. 
The commodity 
they provide carries risks from which the public must be 
protected. 
Defendant must fulfill its duty to protect the 
public against reasonably foreseeable negligent contact 
with its electrical lines. 
In this case, defendant presented unrebutted evidence 
that its actions comported with industry standards and that 
preferable alternatives are not reasonably available. 
I 
would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
direct an order entering summary disposition for defendant. 
Marilyn Kelly 
9