Title: State v. Romero-Georgana
Citation: 2014 WI 83
Docket Number: 2012AP000055
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2014

2014 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP55   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andres Romero-Georgana, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 347 Wis. 2d 549, 830 N.W.2d 722 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 23, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 3, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Brown  
 
JUDGE: 
Kendall M. Kelley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Sara Kelton Brelie and Byron C. Lichstein, and law student 
Diana Eisenberg,  and Frank J. Remington Center, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Madison. Oral argument by Sara Kelton 
Brelie.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
May 19 
 
2014 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP55   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF379) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andres Romero-Georgana, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 23, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals.1  The issue 
presented has been framed by the defendant as whether the 
defendant is "entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on his 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion alleging ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel for failing to raise a strong argument 
for plea withdrawal[.]" 
                                                 
1 State v. Romero-Georgana, No. 2012AP55, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013). 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
2 
 
¶2 
This 
somewhat 
innocuous 
statement 
of 
the 
issue 
requires the court to conduct a wide-ranging discussion of 
postconviction procedure before it determines whether the 
defendant's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2011-12)2 motion provides a 
sufficient reason for failing to bring his present claims in an 
earlier postconviction proceeding and whether the § 974.06 
motion alleges sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the 
defendant to relief.  As is often the case, the procedural 
history is crucial to the court's conclusions. 
¶3 
We conclude the following. 
¶4 
First, a defendant who alleges in a § 974.06 motion 
that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 
bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he 
wishes 
to 
bring 
are 
clearly 
stronger 
than 
the 
claims 
postconviction counsel actually brought.  See State v. Starks, 
2013 WI 69, ¶6, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146.  However, in 
evaluating the comparative strength of the claims, reviewing 
courts should consider any objectives or preferences that the 
defendant conveyed to his attorney.  A claim's strength may be 
bolstered if a defendant directed his attorney to pursue it. 
¶5 
Second, the defendant has not offered a sufficient 
reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise 
his § 974.06 claim in his second postconviction motion.  Without 
a sufficient reason, a defendant may not bring a claim in a 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
3 
 
§ 974.06 motion if that claim "could have been raised in a 
previously filed sec. 974.02 motion and/or on direct appeal."  
State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 517 N.W.2d 157 
(1994).  Consequently, the defendant's claim is barred. 
¶6 
Third, even if the § 974.06 motion were not barred on 
"sufficient 
reason" 
grounds, 
the 
motion 
does 
not 
allege 
sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to 
relief.  The defendant failed to allege that the plea withdrawal 
claim was clearly stronger than the resentencing claim.  He does 
not 
specifically 
state 
which 
postconviction 
attorney 
was 
ineffective 
and 
instead 
makes 
an 
ambiguous 
reference 
to 
"postconviction counsel."  The motion then focuses almost 
exclusively on trial counsel and does not provide facts 
regarding postconviction counsel's performance.  Consequently, 
the defendant's motion falls far short of what is required, and 
the circuit court properly determined that he is not entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
On April 7, 2006, the State filed a complaint charging 
Andres 
Romero-Georgana 
(Romero-Georgana) 
with 
first-degree 
sexual assault of a child under the age of 13 contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1) (2005-06).  The complaint alleged that Romero-
Georgana had sexual contact with the seven-year-old daughter of 
the woman with whom he was in a relationship.  On May 17, 2006, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender 
Carrie 
LaPlant 
(Attorney 
LaPlant) was appointed to represent Romero-Georgana.  On May 26, 
2006, 
Romero-Georgana 
waived 
his 
right 
to 
a 
preliminary 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
4 
 
examination, and an information repeating the charge in the 
complaint was filed that day.  On June 23, 2006, Romero-Georgana 
entered a plea of not guilty before Brown County Circuit Judge 
J.D. McKay.  At this arraignment, Judge McKay scheduled the case 
for trial and informed Romero-Georgana, "If you're not a citizen 
of this country, a conviction could lead to your deportation."3 
¶8 
On October 20, 2006, Romero-Georgana completed an 
English and Spanish Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form in 
which he pled no contest to first-degree sexual assault of a 
child.  As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to 
file any additional charges against the defendant and agreed not 
to make any specific sentencing recommendation.  At a plea 
hearing on November 17, 2006, Romero-Georgana entered a no-
contest plea with the aid of an interpreter.  The court accepted 
Romero-Georgana's plea and found him guilty of first-degree 
sexual assault of a child under the age of 13. 
¶9 
At the plea hearing, the circuit court failed to 
advise Romero-Georgana that he could be deported as a result of 
his plea, as required by Wis. Sat. § 971.08(1)(c) (2005-06).  
The pertinent portion of the statute provides that before 
accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall: 
Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of the 
United States of America, you are advised that a plea 
of guilty or no contest for the offense with which you 
are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion 
                                                 
3 There was an interpreter assisting at the arraignment. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
5 
 
from admission to this country or the denial of 
naturalization, under federal law." 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) (2005-06). 
¶10 Romero-Georgana's plea came more than four years after 
this court decided State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 
Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, a case in which this court emphasized 
the importance of the statutory requirement to advise the 
defendant about possible deportation as well as the statutory 
remedy of plea withdrawal.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (2005-
06). 
¶11 On January 19, 2007, Judge McKay sentenced Romero-
Georgana to 12 years of initial confinement and four years of 
extended supervision.  At the sentencing hearing, Attorney 
LaPlant stated: "We fully expect that as soon as he is released 
from custody, whenever that may be, that he will be deported 
back to Mexico.  And he does want that to happen.  He does want 
to return home as soon as he can." 
¶12 Unfortunately, 
in 
sentencing 
Romero-Georgana, 
the 
court failed to consider the sentencing guidelines on the record 
as was then required by Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) (2007-08).  
See State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364.  
The remedy for failure to comply with § 973.017(2)(a) (2007-08) 
was resentencing. 
¶13 After judgment of conviction was filed on January 23, 
2007, Romero-Georgana filed a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction 
relief, 
and 
he 
requested 
appointment 
of 
postconviction counsel.  Assistant state public defender Suzanne 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
6 
 
Hagopian (Attorney Hagopian) was appointed to represent Romero-
Georgana in postconviction and appellate proceedings. 
¶14 Several weeks later, on March 20, 2007, the U.S. 
Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) sent an Immigration Detainer——Notice of Action form to 
Dodge Correctional Institution where Romero-Georgana was serving 
his sentence.  The form advised the institution that INS had 
started an investigation to determine whether Romero-Georgana 
was subject to deportation and required that INS be notified at 
least 30 days before Romero-Georgana was released. 
A. First Postconviction Motion and Appeal 
¶15 On June 11, 2007, Attorney Hagopian filed a motion for 
extension of time to file a postconviction motion or notice of 
appeal.  In the motion, Attorney Hagopian stated that she had 
met with Romero-Georgana and, with the help of an interpreter, 
discussed two possible postconviction claims: one regarding the 
validity of the no-contest plea and the other for resentencing 
based on the court's failure to go through the sentencing 
guidelines on the record. 
¶16 On 
July 
20, 
2007, 
Romero-Georgana 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.30(2)(h) 
(2007-08) 
seeking 
resentencing 
or 
sentence 
modification in the alternative.  The postconviction motion 
alleged that the sentencing court failed to consider the 
relevant sentencing guidelines, as required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.017(2)(a) (2007-08) and Grady, 302 Wis. 2d 80, which had 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
7 
 
been decided less than a month earlier.  The motion did not 
mention any defect in the plea colloquy. 
¶17 On August 23, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing 
and denied Romero-Georgana's postconviction motion.  Attorney 
Hagopian filed a notice of appeal on August 29, 2007. 
¶18 On April 22, 2008, the court of appeals issued an 
order reversing the judgment and remanding the case for 
resentencing 
because 
Judge 
McKay 
failed 
to 
consider 
the 
sentencing guidelines on the record.  State v. Romero-Georgana, 
No. 2007AP2042-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 
2008).  Soon after the court of appeals issued its decision, 
Attorney Hagopian sent Romero-Georgana a letter explaining the 
decision 
and 
informing 
him 
of 
his 
right 
to 
judicial 
substitution.  Several weeks later, Attorney Hagopian spoke to 
Romero-Georgana 
on 
the 
phone 
and 
discussed 
judicial 
substitution.  With the help of an interpreter, Attorney 
Hagopian told Romero-Georgana that he should discuss judicial 
substitution with the attorney who would represent him at 
resentencing. 
¶19 Assistant state public defender William FitzGerald 
(Attorney FitzGerald) was appointed to represent Romero-Georgana 
at resentencing.  Attorney FitzGerald received a letter from 
Romero-Georgana on May 29, 2008, stating that Romero-Georgana 
wanted to substitute his judge.  On May 30, 2008, Attorney 
FitzGerald filed a motion requesting a judicial substitution.  A 
judicial assignment order was filed on June 6, 2008, in which 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
8 
 
Brown County Circuit Judge Kendall M. Kelley was substituted for 
Judge McKay. 
¶20 On October 1, 2008, Judge Kelley held a resentencing 
hearing, and, based in part on a recommendation in the 
presentence investigation, sentenced Romero-Georgana to 20 years 
of initial confinement and eight years of extended supervision.  
A revised judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault 
of a child under the age of 13 was filed on October 2, 2008.  On 
the same day, Attorney FitzGerald filed Romero-Georgana's notice 
of intent to pursue postconviction relief. 
B. Second Postconviction Motion and Appeal 
¶21 Attorney 
Tajara 
S. 
Dommershausen 
(Attorney 
Dommershausen) represented Romero-Georgana in postconviction and 
appellate proceedings.  On March 24, 2009, she filed a Wis. 
Stat. § 974.02 (2009-10)4 postconviction motion on behalf of 
Romero-Georgana.  The motion alleged that Attorney Hagopian had 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(1) (2009-10) states: 
A motion for postconviction relief other than 
under s. 974.06 or 974.07(2) by the defendant in a 
criminal case shall be made in the time and manner 
provided in s. 809.30.  An appeal by the defendant in 
a criminal case from a judgment of conviction or from 
an order denying a postconviction motion or from both 
shall be taken in the time and manner provided in ss. 
808.04(3) and 809.30. An appeal of an order or 
judgment on habeas corpus remanding to custody a 
prisoner committed for trial under s. 970.03 shall be 
taken under ss. 808.03(2) and 809.50, with notice to 
the attorney general and the district attorney and 
opportunity for them to be heard. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
9 
 
Romero-Georgana that on resentencing, Judge McKay would not be 
able to increase his sentence (absent a new factor) but if Judge 
McKay were substituted, the new judge could impose a longer 
sentence without having to justify the increase in time.  The 
postconviction motion did not allege that Attorney Hagopian was 
ineffective for failing to move for plea withdrawal. 
¶22 On June 5, 2009, Judge Kelley held a hearing on the 
postconviction motion and determined that neither Attorney 
Hagopian nor Attorney FitzGerald was ineffective in advising 
Romero-Georgana about judicial substitution.  Judge Kelley 
issued a written order denying the postconviction motion on July 
15, 2009.  Attorney Dommershausen filed a notice of appeal on 
July 21, 2009. 
¶23 On November 19, 2009, Attorney Dommershausen filed a 
notice of no-merit appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(2)(a) (2009-10), and she filed a no-merit report on March 
2, 2010.  After considering the no-merit report, the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment in a decision 
filed on September 9, 2010. 
¶24 In its decision, the court of appeals mentioned that 
Romero-Georgana had filed a response5 to Attorney Dommershausen's 
no-merit report in which he "raise[d] an issue regarding his 
initial no contest plea."  The court of appeals limited its 
review to the resentencing issue and determined that because 
                                                 
5 Romero-Georgana's response to Attorney Dommershausen's no-
merit report is not in the record. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
10 
 
Romero-Georgana did not raise the issue relating to the no-
contest plea in his initial appeal, he forfeited that claim.  
Romero-Georgana petitioned this court for review, which we 
denied in an order filed December 8, 2010. 
C. Third Postconviction Motion and Appeal 
¶25 On September 2, 2011, Romero-Georgana filed a pro se 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  In the § 974.06 motion, 
Romero-Georgana stated that he is a Mexican native and is not a 
citizen of the United States.  He alleged that "[p]ostconviction 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the 
circuit court failed to comply with the statutory mandate when 
it did not address Romero-Georgana personally to advise him in 
the words set forth in Wis. Stat. 971.08(1)(c) of the 
deportation consequences of his no contest plea . . . ."  The 
§ 974.06 motion alleged that when Romero-Georgana completed the 
plea questionnaire, he did not fully understand what he was 
signing because of his poor English, inadequate interpreters, 
and Attorney LaPlant's failure to advise him of the deportation 
risk.  Romero-Georgana alleged that he would have pled not 
guilty had he known that he could be deported. 
¶26 The Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion also alleged that 
"[p]ostconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 
fully explain the deportation consequences of his no contest 
plea . . . ."6  Romero-Georgana attached an Immigration Detainer—
                                                 
6 Romero-Georgana concedes in his brief that he cannot 
prevail on this claim and has therefore abandoned it. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
11 
 
—Notice of Action that indicated that an investigation had been 
initiated to determine whether Romero-Georgana was subject to 
deportation. 
¶27 In a decision and order filed on December 22, 2011, 
Judge Kelley denied Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion.  The 
circuit court concluded that the § 974.06 motion did not contain 
sufficient factual allegations to entitle Romero-Georgana to a 
hearing. 
 
The 
court 
stated: 
"Although 
Romero-Georgana's 
allegations of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel are relevant 
to the analysis, he limits his argument to what happened on the 
trial 
level. 
 
For 
the 
Court 
to 
analyze 
postconviction 
ineffectiveness, it needs facts pertaining to why postconviction 
counsel was ineffective."  Therefore, the court determined that 
Romero-Georgana was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
¶28 On January 9, 2012, Romero-Georgana filed a notice of 
appeal from his judgments of conviction and from the order 
denying his § 974.06 motion.  In a per curiam decision, the 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order denying 
Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion without a hearing.  State v. 
Romero-Georgana, No. 2012AP55, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013).  The court of appeals determined that 
Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion contained only bare-bones 
assertions and did not demonstrate why the plea withdrawal claim 
was clearly stronger than the claims raised by Attorney 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
12 
 
Hagopian.7  Id., ¶¶5-6.  Furthermore, the court concluded that 
Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion did not explain why the 
Escalona-Naranjo bar against successive postconviction motions 
did not apply.  Id., ¶7. 
¶29 Romero-Georgana petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on December 19, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶30 Whether a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion alleges a 
sufficient reason for failing to bring available claims earlier 
is a question of law subject to de novo review.  State v. 
Kletzien, 2011 WI App 22, ¶¶9, 16, 331 Wis. 2d 640, 794 
N.W.2d 920.  Similarly, whether a § 974.06 motion alleges 
sufficient facts to require a hearing is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, 
¶18, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.  If the motion does allege 
sufficient facts, "the circuit court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing."  State v. John Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 (citations omitted).  "However, if 
the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant 
to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals did not address the appeals of the 
judgments of conviction and stated, "Because an appeal from an 
order under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is not governed by Wis. Stat. 
[§ (Rule)] 809.30, the judgment of conviction is not the subject 
of this appeal."  State v. Romero-Georgana, No. 2012AP55, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013). 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
13 
 
grant or deny a hearing."  Id. (citations omitted).  We review 
the circuit court's discretionary decision to grant or deny a 
hearing under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶31 Much of this court's time is devoted to cases 
involving 
postconviction 
claims 
that 
are 
filed 
after 
a 
defendant's appeal is over.  These claims require the court to 
apply fundamental principles of postconviction review, including 
the principle that finality is important in the criminal justice 
system.  Accordingly, not every mistake will justify relief. 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06 "was 'designed to replace 
habeas corpus as the primary method in which a defendant can 
attack his conviction after the time for appeal has expired.'"  
Escalona-Naranjo, 
185 
Wis. 2d at 
176 
(quoting 
Howard 
B. 
Eisenberg, Post-Conviction Remedies in the 1970's, 56 Marq. L. 
Rev. 69, 79 (1972)).  Section 974.06 provides a mechanism for 
correcting errors when: (1) the sentence violated the United 
States 
or 
Wisconsin 
Constitution; 
(2) 
the 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the sentence 
exceeded the maximum or was "otherwise subject to collateral 
attack." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06(1); 
see 
Balliette, 
336 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶34.  A defendant may file a § 974.06 motion at any 
time "[a]fter the time for appeal or postconviction remedy 
provided in s. 974.02 has expired."  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1)-(2).  
However, the following caveat applies: 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
14 
 
All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental or amended 
motion. 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) (emphasis added). 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(4) promotes finality and 
efficiency by requiring defendants to bring all available claims 
in a single proceeding unless there exists a sufficient reason 
for not raising some claims in that initial proceeding.  
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 185-86; see State v. Aaron 
Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶40, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124 (citation 
omitted) ("The purpose behind Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is to avoid 
successive motions for relief by requiring a defendant to raise 
all grounds for relief in one motion."). 
¶34 Thus, without a sufficient reason, a movant may not 
bring a claim in a § 974.06 motion if it "could have been raised 
in a previously filed sec. 974.02 motion and/or on direct 
appeal."  See Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 173. 
¶35 A defendant need not provide a "sufficient reason" for 
a claim cognizable under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 if the defendant 
did not file a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.02 or a direct 
appeal.  State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶44 n.11, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 
N.W.2d 756; Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 
(1974).  But if the defendant did file a motion under § 974.02 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
15 
 
or a direct appeal or a previous motion under § 974.06, the 
defendant is barred from making a claim that could have been 
raised previously unless he shows a sufficient reason for not 
making the claim earlier.  Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶44. 
¶36 In 
some 
instances, 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
postconviction counsel may be a sufficient reason for failing to 
raise an available claim in an earlier motion or on direct 
appeal.  Aaron Allen, 328 Wis. 2d 1, ¶85; see Balliette, 336 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶62.  If the defendant sufficiently alleges 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel as the reason 
for failing to raise an issue earlier, "[t]he trial court can 
perform the necessary factfinding function and directly rule on 
the sufficiency of the reason."  Aaron Allen, 328 Wis. 2d 1, ¶85 
(brackets in original) (quoting State ex rel. Rothering v. 
McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 682, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) 
).  Conversely, if the defendant fails to allege why and how his 
postconviction counsel was constitutionally ineffective——that 
is, if the defendant asserts a mere conclusory allegation that 
his counsel was ineffective——his "reason" is not sufficient. 
¶37 To move beyond the initial prerequisites of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo, and to adequately raise a 
claim for relief, a defendant must allege "sufficient material 
facts——e.g., who, what, where, when, why, and how——that, if 
true, would entitle [the defendant] to the relief he seeks."  
John Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶2; see Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
¶¶58-60; 
State 
v. 
Bentley, 
201 
Wis. 2d 303, 
314-18, 
548 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
16 
 
N.W.2d 50 (1996).  If he does so, the defendant is normally 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
¶38 In sum, because Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion 
alleges that his postconviction counsel provided ineffective 
assistance, he must allege facts that support every facet of his 
claim and that, if true, would entitle him to relief. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
¶39 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
¶21.  To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate: 
(1) 
that 
his 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient; 
and 
(2) 
that 
the 
deficient 
performance was prejudicial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984). 
¶40 To prove deficiency, "the defendant must show that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness."  Id. at 688.  The defendant must overcome the 
"strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance."  Id. at 689. 
¶41 To prove prejudice, the defendant must show "that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  Id. at 687.  
The prejudice inquiry asks whether "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
17 
 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 694.8 
¶42 Romero-Georgana's motion alleges that he received 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
postconviction 
counsel 
because 
postconviction counsel failed to bring a claim that Romero-
Georgana now wishes to assert.  This allegation is different 
from an allegation that postconviction counsel did not comply 
with the defendant's requests or instructions after trial or 
that postconviction counsel failed to bring any claims at all.  
Romero-Georgana acknowledges that his postconviction counsel 
brought claims; he contends now that postconviction counsel 
brought the wrong claims. 
¶43 An allegation that postconviction counsel failed to 
bring a claim that should have been brought is an allegation 
that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, that 
it fell below the services required by an objective standard of 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687-88.  How does a reviewing court evaluate such an 
allegation? 
¶44 In 
Starks, 
349 
Wis. 2d 274, 
the 
court 
faced 
a 
situation in which postconviction counsel failed to file any 
post-trial motions, including a Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion, in 
the circuit court but made numerous arguments on appeal.  Id., 
¶4.  When postconviction counsel's performance was subsequently 
                                                 
8 The Strickland analysis and the presumption of effective 
assistance apply to postconviction counsel.  State v. Balliette, 
2011 WI 79, ¶28, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
18 
 
attacked, this court disregarded counsel's nonperformance in the 
circuit 
court 
and 
instead 
evaluated 
his 
performance 
as 
"appellate counsel."  Id. 
¶45 Starks 
adopted a "clearly stronger" standard in 
evaluating the performance of "appellate counsel."  Id., ¶6.  
That is, the court adopted the "clearly stronger" pleading 
standard for the deficiency prong of the Strickland test in 
Wisconsin for criminal defendants alleging in a habeas petition 
that they received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
due to counsel's failure to raise an issue.  Stated differently, 
the court said that "the defendant must show that 'a particular 
nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger than issues that counsel 
did present.'"  Id., ¶59 (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 
259, 288 (2000)); see Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 
1986) ("Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger 
than 
those 
presented, 
will 
the 
presumption 
of 
effective 
assistance of counsel be overcome."). 
¶46 We think this "clearly stronger" standard is equally 
appropriate 
in 
evaluating 
the 
alleged 
deficiency 
in 
an 
attorney's 
performance 
as 
postconviction 
counsel 
when 
postconviction counsel is accused of ineffective assistance on 
account of his failure to raise certain material issues before 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
The 
"clearly 
stronger" 
standard 
is 
appropriate when postconviction counsel raised other issues 
before the circuit court, thereby making it possible to compare 
the arguments now proposed against the arguments previously 
made.  However, the clearly stronger standard may not be 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
19 
 
adequate when counsel has valid reasons for choosing one set of 
arguments 
over 
another. 
 
These 
reasons 
may 
include 
the 
preferences, even the directives, of the defendant. 
¶47 Turning to Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion, we first 
consider whether Romero-Georgana provided a sufficient reason 
for failing to bring his claims in his earlier postconviction 
motions.  See Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 181-85.  We then 
consider 
the 
allegations 
of 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
postconviction counsel to determine whether Romero-Georgana has 
alleged sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to 
relief. 
B. Sufficient Reason 
¶48 Romero-Georgana acknowledges that he must allege a 
sufficient reason for failing to raise his § 974.06 claim 
earlier.  He correctly states that ineffective assistance of 
counsel may, in some cases, provide the requisite sufficient 
reason.  From there, however, his argument veers off course.  
Romero-Georgana implies that his § 974.06 motion alleges a 
sufficient reason for failing to bring the claims earlier 
because the motion alleges that his postconviction counsel 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
20 
 
(Attorney Hagopian)9 was ineffective in failing to raise a claim 
for plea withdrawal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  At this 
point, Romero-Georgana focuses on the wrong attorney. 
¶49 There were three postconviction motions in this case: 
(1) a postconviction motion filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) (2007-08) by Attorney Hagopian; (2) a Wis. 
Stat. § 974.02 (2009-10) motion filed by Attorney Dommershausen; 
and (3) a § 974.06 motion filed pro se by Romero-Georgana. 
¶50 Attorney Hagopian's alleged ineffective assistance in 
filing the first postconviction motion might have been a 
sufficient reason for failing to bring the plea withdrawal 
claim.  It might not.  In any event, although Attorney 
Hagopian's alleged ineffective assistance is an underlying claim 
in the present Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, it does not explain 
or provide a sufficient reason for Attorney Dommershausen's 
failure in the second postconviction motion to argue that 
Attorney Hagopian was ineffective for failing to seek plea 
withdrawal in the first postconviction motion. 
                                                 
9 Romero-Georgana's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion does not 
specify which of his two postconviction attorneys provided 
ineffective assistance.  Thus, we are uncertain as to where we 
should direct our analysis——a good indication that the motion 
contains fatal flaws.  Because Romero-Georgana's brief focuses 
on Attorney Hagopian, we assume, for the purpose of addressing 
Romero-Georgana's arguments, that he intended to allege in his 
§ 974.06 motion that Attorney Hagopian provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel as the underlying claim.  However, in our 
analysis of the motion itself, we note that the reference to 
"postconviction counsel" is ambiguous and renders his motion 
insufficient. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
21 
 
¶51 These are not onerous demands.  Romero-Georgana was 
required to allege two instances of ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel because his attorneys filed two prior 
postconviction motions that did not raise the issue now 
presented.10  Moreover, the Brown County Circuit Court granted 
Romero-Georgana two evidentiary hearings on these motions——and 
he was present at both hearings——but the issue now presented was 
never brought up.  In sum, Romero-Georgana was required to 
allege——in his third postconviction motion——that (1) Attorney 
Dommershausen was constitutionally ineffective in the second 
postconviction motion for failing to raise a claim about 
Attorney Hagopian's ineffectiveness for failing to bring a plea 
withdrawal claim in the first postconviction motion; and (2) 
Attorney Hagopian was constitutionally ineffective in the first 
postconviction motion for failing to raise the plea withdrawal 
claim. 
¶52 The 
first 
required 
allegations 
(against 
Attorney 
Dommershausen), if properly pleaded, might provide the requisite 
sufficient reason for failing to bring the claim earlier.  The 
                                                 
10 Romero-Georgana must provide a sufficient reason for 
failing to bring the claims he now wishes to raise in an earlier 
postconviction proceeding.  Because he offers no reason, and the 
only 
claims 
in 
his 
§ 974.06 
motion 
are 
for 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we assume that if he were to offer a 
sufficient reason, it would be Attorney Dommershausen's alleged 
ineffective assistance.  It is possible that he had other 
reasons, but none were advanced.  Thus, when we say Romero-
Georgana was required to allege ineffective assistance of 
Attorney Dommershausen as a sufficient reason for failing to 
bring his claims earlier, we say that because we can see no 
other reason for failing to bring the present claim earlier. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
22 
 
second required allegations (against Attorney Hagopian), if 
properly pleaded, might provide grounds for relief.  However, 
the required allegations have not been properly pleaded.  The 
single statement in Romero-Georgana's present § 974.06 motion 
that "[p]ostconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the issue that the circuit court failed to comply with the 
statutory mandate when it did not address Romero-Georgana 
personally to advise him in the words set forth in Wis. Stat. 
971.08(1)(c) of the deportation consequences of his no contest 
plea . . . " is ambiguous and plainly deficient because it 
refers to only one attorney ("Postconviction counsel was") and 
does not even identify that attorney.  Moreover, the statement 
is conclusory inasmuch as both attorneys made other arguments. 
¶53 When a defendant has two attorneys that share the 
classification of "postconviction counsel," a general reference 
to "postconviction counsel" is not enough.  Romero-Georgana's 
third postconviction motion was bound to fail if it did not 
allege and explain why his second postconviction motion did not 
make the claim he now seeks to make.  Attorney Dommershausen is 
simply not mentioned.  Since the § 974.06 motion does not offer 
a sufficient reason for failing to bring the current claim in 
the second postconviction motion, Romero-Georgana's motion is 
barred under § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo. 
¶54 Having concluded that Romero-Georgana is barred from 
raising his current claims, we need not go any further.  
However, we will discuss briefly the insufficiency of Romero-
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
23 
 
Georgana's § 974.06 motion to provide guidance for future 
movants. 
C. Sufficiency of Romero-Georgana's Allegations of Ineffective 
Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
¶55 Romero-Georgana 
faced 
an 
unusually 
complicated 
situation when he filed the third postconviction motion.  His 
objective was to withdraw his plea of no contest and vacate the 
judgment against him on grounds that the circuit court made an 
error in the plea colloquy and that he is likely to be deported 
because of his conviction.  This would have been a simple 
Bangert11-type motion if it had been filed shortly after Romero-
Georgana's sentencing in January 2007.  When he filed his pro se 
motion on September 2, 2011, however, he was required to justify 
the delay in making his claim.  In this case, the strongest 
potential justification appears to be the alleged ineffective 
assistance of Attorney Dommershausen for failing to complain 
about the alleged ineffective assistance of Attorney Hagopian in 
raising Romero-Georgana's statutory right to withdraw his plea. 
¶56 Because Romero-Georgana's claim is one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he was required to sufficiently allege 
that each attorney provided deficient representation and that 
each 
attorney's 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced 
him.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
                                                 
11 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
24 
 
¶57 In making his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims,12 Romero-Georgana had some difficult facts to overcome.  
First, as part of the plea deal, the State agreed not to bring 
additional charges against Romero-Georgana even though the 
complaint suggested that there were numerous occasions in which 
he committed sexual offenses against the victim.  Thus, if 
Romero-Georgana 
had 
gone 
to 
trial 
after 
successful 
plea 
withdrawal, the State would have been free to bring additional 
charges.  Second, Romero-Georgana's trial counsel stated at the 
initial 
sentencing 
that 
Romero-Georgana 
was 
eager 
to 
be 
deported, 
which 
conflicts 
with 
Romero-Georgana's 
current 
contention that he would not have entered a plea if he knew it 
could lead to deportation.  Third, Attorney Hagopian said in a 
motion to the court that she discussed a potential claim 
regarding the validity of the no-contest plea, which suggests 
that 
she 
talked 
to 
Romero-Georgana 
about 
seeking 
plea 
withdrawal.  Finally, Attorney Hagopian gave a valid reason for 
bringing 
the 
resentencing 
claim 
when 
she 
stated 
at 
the 
evidentiary hearing for the second postconviction motion that 
she thought, based on the sentencing guidelines, Romero-Georgana 
                                                 
12 Although our analysis in this section focuses on the 
sufficiency of the underlying ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim against Attorney Hagopian, it applies also to the 
sufficient reason requirement.  As discussed above, because 
Romero-Georgana did not offer any reason for failing to bring 
his present claim in his second postconviction motion, he did 
not adequately provide a sufficient reason for raising his claim 
of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in a 
§ 974.06 motion. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
25 
 
would receive a shorter sentence at resentencing.  In light of 
this factual backdrop, we turn to the motion to assess its 
sufficiency. 
1. Deficient Performance 
¶58 The 
clearly 
stronger 
standard 
applies 
to 
the 
deficiency prong of each required allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in this case.  Thus, to demonstrate that 
Attorney 
Hagopian's 
representation 
was 
deficient, 
Romero-
Georgana was required to show that the plea withdrawal claim was 
clearly stronger than the resentencing claim.  See Starks, 349 
Wis. 2d 274, ¶59.  He was required do so by alleging "sufficient 
material facts——e.g., who, what, where, when, why, and how——
that, if true, would entitle him to the relief he seeks."  John 
Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶2.  The five "w's" and one "h" 
sometimes run together, but a sufficient motion will answer all 
six questions. 
¶59 Romero-Georgana has failed to allege "who" his claim 
is about because his assertion ambiguously refers to a single 
"[p]ostconviction counsel."  Although the motion indicates that 
Attorneys Hagopian and Dommershausen did represent Romero-
Georgana, it does not specify whose conduct is at issue.  
Instead, the motion focuses on the wrong stage of the proceeding 
and 
discusses 
facts 
regarding 
trial 
counsel's 
alleged 
ineffectiveness.  If Romero-Georgana wanted to make allegations 
against Attorney Hagopian, he should have done so specifically 
in 
his 
motion 
by 
stating 
that 
"Attorney 
Hagopian 
was 
ineffective" 
rather 
than 
ambiguously 
claiming 
that 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
26 
 
"[p]ostconviction counsel was ineffective . . . ."  As the 
motion is written, it does not sufficiently state "who" provided 
ineffective assistance. 
¶60 The § 974.06 motion does allege broadly "what" conduct 
provides the basis for the ineffective assistance claim when it 
states, "Postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the issue that the circuit court failed to comply with the 
statutory mandate when it did not address Romero-Georgana 
personally to advise him . . . of the deportation consequences 
of his no contest plea."  However, it does not tell the court 
what Attorney Hagopian did that made her failure to raise the 
plea withdrawal claim ineffective.  Did she act contrary to his 
directive?  Did she fail to advise him? 
¶61 Furthermore, Romero-Georgana's § 974.06 motion does 
not sufficiently allege "where" or "when" the ineffective 
assistance occurred.  It is unclear whether his allegations 
focus on the first postconviction proceeding or the second.   
¶62 Similarly, the motion does not say "why" Attorney 
Hagopian was ineffective.  The mere fact that Attorney Hagopian 
did not pursue a plea withdrawal claim does not demonstrate 
ineffectiveness because she could have had, and presumably did 
have, good reasons for not pursuing plea withdrawal.  For 
example, Romero-Georgana could have told her to bring a claim 
for resentencing after Attorney Hagopian advised him of his 
options.  Or, as the record suggests, Romero-Georgana might have 
wanted to be deported, and Attorney Hagopian believed he would 
receive less time on resentencing.  We will not assume 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
27 
 
ineffective assistance from a conclusory assertion; Romero-
Georgana must say why the claim he wanted raised was clearly 
stronger than the claims actually raised.  His motion is devoid 
of any such explanation. 
¶63 Finally, because Romero-Georgana's motion contains 
only conclusory allegations and almost no facts relating to the 
relevant postconviction counsel, he has not demonstrated "how" 
he would prove his claims at an evidentiary hearing.  Does he 
have copies or records of communications with his postconviction 
counsel to support his claim?  Who would testify on his behalf?  
Blanket assertions of ineffective assistance are not sufficient 
to alert the court or opposing counsel how the defendant will 
prove his claim at a hearing, especially when the record 
contains facts that refute the crux of the defendant's argument. 
¶64 In sum, defendants must allege sufficient facts in 
their § 974.06 motions so that reviewing courts do not grant 
frivolous hearings.  We will not read into the § 974.06 motion 
allegations that are not within the four corners of the motion.  
Therefore, Romero-Georgana has failed to sufficiently allege 
that Attorney Hagopian was deficient. 
¶65 Because we have determined that the § 974.06 motion 
does 
not 
allege 
sufficient 
facts 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
postconviction counsel was deficient, we do not need to consider 
whether the motion sufficiently alleged prejudice.  However, we 
consider prejudice briefly to provide guidance for future 
movants. 
2. Prejudice 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
28 
 
¶66 To demonstrate prejudice, Romero-Georgana's motion 
must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
Romero-Georgana 
alleges 
in 
his 
§ 974.06 
motion 
that 
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that 
the circuit court did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) 
(2005-06) at the plea hearing.  The plea hearing transcript is 
clear that the circuit court failed to advise Romero-Georgana of 
the deportation risk as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  Thus, 
Romero-Georgana likely could have withdrawn his plea if he had 
timely brought a § 971.08(2) motion.13   
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) provides in relevant part: 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. 
In his brief, Romero-Georgana discusses the standards for 
pleading under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) at length.  However, 
because this case falls under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, the plea 
withdrawal claim under Wis. Stat. § 971.08 is relevant only to 
the question of prejudice in the context of Romero-Georgana's 
ineffective assistance claim against Attorney Hagopian.  The 
State responded to Romero-Georgana's argument relating to 
§ 971.08 by stating that "a response by the State to——and this 
court's 
consideration 
of——Argument 
section 
I 
of 
Romero-
Georgana's brief is unnecessary.  Had Romero-Georgana pursued a 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) claim in a timely manner, he might well 
have prevailed on it." 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
29 
 
¶67 However, the motion at issue is not a Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) motion.  In fact, at oral argument, Romero-
Georgana's counsel explicitly stated that Romero-Georgana was 
arguing this case as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion.  Counsel 
said, "This court's order granting review specifically asked us 
to stay within the arguments made in the petition for review, 
and that did not include an argument that this case should be 
decided as a 971.08(2) motion by itself."14  Therefore, because 
                                                 
14 Justice Bradley asked at oral argument, "Why does 
971.08(2) have to be a 974.06 motion at all?"  Romero-Georgana's 
counsel responded:  
I believe that it could have been raised as a 
straight 971.08(2) motion.  As this court knows we 
were appointed . . . after the petition for review was 
filed and the case had been decided up to that point 
under 974.06 and we believe that our client is 
entitled to relief on that basis, and so that's how 
we've construed the motion and argued it. 
Chief Justice Abrahamson continued Justice Bradley's line 
of questioning and suggested that Romero-Georgana could have 
pursued an argument based on Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  The Chief 
Justice then asked, "But you didn't take that position?"  
Romero-Georgana's counsel responded, "It's true your honor.  We 
did not."  Thus, despite being prodded at oral argument, Romero-
Georgana was clear: he is not asking this court to construe his 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion as a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion.  
Indeed, such a request would appear improper under the facts of 
this case and in light of the history of § 971.08(2).  In the 
1981-82 version of the Wisconsin Statutes, § 971.08(2) contained 
a time limit that stated, "The court shall not permit the 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no contest later than 120 days 
after conviction."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (1981-82).  The 120-
day time limit was repealed in 1983 Wis. Act 219.  A judicial 
council note explained: 
Section 971.08(2), stats., providing a 120-day 
time limit for withdrawing a guilty plea or a plea of 
no 
contest 
after 
conviction, 
is 
repealed 
as 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
30 
 
Romero-Georgana never brought a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion or 
argued for plea withdrawal in previous postconviction motions, 
he must attempt to resuscitate that claim in the present Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motion.   
¶68 A proper allegation of prejudice would state that 
Romero-Georgana would have told Attorney Hagopian to pursue the 
                                                                                                                                                             
unnecessary.  Withdrawal of a guilty plea or plea of 
no contest may be sought by postconviction motion 
under s. 809.30(1)(f), stats., or under s. 974.06, 
stats. 
Judicial Council Note, 1983 Wis. Act 219, § 43.  The Judicial 
Council Note suggests that, in general, the proper method for 
raising § 971.08 plea withdrawal claims after conviction is 
through a motion under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30, Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02, or Wis. Stat. § 974.06. 
In the present case, the notice that INS had started an 
investigation to determine whether Romero-Georgana was subject 
to deportation was dated March 20, 2007——four months before 
Attorney Hagopian filed the first postconviction motion.  In 
addition, the petitioner's brief demonstrates that Romero-
Georgana's 
Final 
Administrative 
Removal 
Order 
from 
the 
Department of Homeland Security was dated October 22, 2007, and 
he appears to have received it on November 5, 2007——almost a 
year and a half before he filed his second postconviction 
motion.  When a defendant has notice that he is likely to be 
deported and subsequently brings postconviction claims unrelated 
to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), we think it would be unwise to allow 
him to bring his claim as a § 971.08(2) motion at a later time, 
although he may be able to bring his claim as a Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion if he has a sufficient reason for the delay.  
Removing all time constraints on a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion 
would frustrate judicial efficiency by encouraging defendants to 
delay bringing those motions.  In the absence of a time limit, 
if a defendant were indifferent to deportation or wanted to be 
deported, 
the 
defendant 
would 
have 
incentive 
to 
keep 
a 
§ 971.08(2) motion in his back pocket while pursuing relief on 
other grounds.  However, that issue is not before us.  In this 
case, we need only address Romero-Georgana's motion under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 because that is the motion he brought. 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
31 
 
plea withdrawal claim if she had advised him that it was an 
option because he wanted to avoid deportation.  That allegation 
would demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that 
the proceedings would have been different if Attorney Hagopian 
had provided effective assistance of counsel.  In the absence of 
that allegation, the § 974.06 motion alleges only that Romero-
Georgana would not have pled had Attorney LaPlant informed him 
of the deportation consequences of his plea.  Thus, the 
prejudice allegation is at the wrong stage of the proceeding.  
This is a subtle point, and we might have given Romero-Georgana, 
a pro se defendant, the benefit of the doubt had the rest of his 
§ 974.06 motion been adequate.  Because he did not allege a 
sufficient reason for raising his current claim earlier and 
because he did not sufficiently allege Attorney Hagopian's 
deficient performance, we do not need to determine whether he 
was prejudiced.   
¶69 Although we liberally construe filings by pro se 
litigants, bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 
N.W.2d 384 (1983), there is a limit to our lenience.  A 
reviewing court might avert its eyes from the flaws on the 
peripheries, but it will not ignore obvious insufficiencies at 
the center of a motion.  Romero-Georgana has failed to 
sufficiently allege that Attorney Dommershausen was ineffective 
for failing to raise the ineffectiveness of Attorney Hagopian in 
the second postconviction motion.  He has failed to sufficiently 
allege that Attorney Hagopian was ineffective for failing to 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
32 
 
raise the issue of plea withdrawal in the first postconviction 
motion. 
¶70 When proceedings arrive at the Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
stage, the defendant's case has been heard; he has been 
represented 
by 
counsel; 
sometimes 
he 
has 
filed 
previous 
postconviction motions.  He has progressed through proceedings 
designed to facilitate justice and finality.  Thus, any claim of 
error must point particularly to the facts surrounding the 
alleged constitutional or jurisdictional flaws that supposedly 
vitiated the goals of the judicial system.  Romero-Georgana's 
§ 974.06 motion falls far short of what is required. 
D. Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion 
¶71 Because 
Romero-Georgana's 
motion 
is 
barred 
under 
Escalona-Naranjo and Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and because he has 
failed to sufficiently allege facts that, if true, would entitle 
him to relief, the circuit court's decision to deny Romero-
Georgana's § 974.06 motion without a hearing was not an 
erroneous exercise of discretion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶72 We conclude the following. 
¶73 First, a defendant who alleges in a § 974.06 motion 
that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to 
bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he 
wishes 
to 
bring 
are 
clearly 
stronger 
than 
the 
claims 
postconviction counsel actually brought.  See Starks, 349 
Wis. 2d 274, ¶6.  However, in evaluating the comparative 
strength of the claims, reviewing courts should consider any 
No. 
  2012AP55 
 
33 
 
objectives or preferences that the defendant conveyed to his 
attorney.  A claim's strength may be bolstered if a defendant 
directed his attorney to pursue it. 
¶74 Second, the defendant has not offered a sufficient 
reason for failing to raise his § 974.06 claim in his second 
postconviction motion.  Without a sufficient reason, a defendant 
may not bring a claim in a § 974.06 motion if that claim "could 
have been raised in a previously filed sec. 974.02 motion and/or 
on direct appeal."  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 173.  
Consequently, the defendant's claim is barred. 
¶75 Third, even if the § 974.06 motion were not barred, 
the motion does not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief.  The defendant failed to allege 
that the plea withdrawal claim was clearly stronger than the 
resentencing claim.  He does not specifically state which 
postconviction attorney was ineffective and instead makes an 
ambiguous reference to "postconviction counsel."  The motion 
then focuses almost exclusively on trial counsel and does not 
provide facts regarding postconviction counsel's performance.  
Consequently, the defendant's motion falls far short of what is 
required, and the circuit court properly determined that he is 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  As a circuit 
court judge, I handled thousands of cases.  Many of those cases 
dealt with imposing consequences and holding people accountable.  
They were required to follow the law. 
¶77 Additionally, as a supreme court justice, I have 
reviewed thousands of cases which have imposed consequences and 
held people accountable.  They were required to follow the law. 
¶78 Those experiences inform how I approach this case.  I 
come to this case with what should be the unremarkable 
observation that circuit court judges and supreme court justices 
should be held to follow the law.   
¶79 The law clearly requires judges to "personally" advise 
defendants of deportation consequences when entering a guilty 
plea.  With unusual emphasis underscoring the requirement, the 
legislature actually sets forth the explicit wording, detailing 
what the judge is to say.  Judges are to: 
Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of the 
United States of America, you are advised that a plea 
of guilty or no contest for the offense with which you 
are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion 
from admission to this country or the denial of 
naturalization, under federal law." 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 
¶80 The legislature mandates the remedy of plea withdrawal 
if 
the 
judge 
fails 
to 
personally 
explain 
deportation 
consequences.  If the prerequisites are met, the statute does 
not provide for a remedy of "maybe plea withdrawal" or "plea 
withdrawal upon compliance with a maze of conditions."  Rather, 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
the law clearly provides that the court "shall vacate" the 
judgment and "permit the defendant to withdraw the plea." 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as required by 
sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the plea 
is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this country or denial of 
naturalization, the court on the defendant's motion 
shall vacate any applicable judgment against the 
defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the 
plea and enter another plea.  
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). 
¶81 Here the circuit court judge failed to follow the law.  
He did not give the deportation warning as mandated.   
¶82 And the majority of the supreme court fails to follow 
the law. Instead of following the clear remedy of plea 
withdrawal set forth in the statute, the majority engrafts all 
sorts of conditions onto the statute.  One need almost be a 
"Philadelphia lawyer" to follow the byzantine maze of added 
conditions that the majority embraces.  
      ¶83 The 
consequence 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
unfortunate.  It is not a mere error of law but an error that 
affects life and liberty.  
¶84 For this defendant and others similarly situated, the 
majority 
appears 
to 
erase 
from 
the 
statutory 
text 
the 
legislatively mandated remedy.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
majority ignores the express language of the statute, the 
purpose 
behind 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08, 
and 
our 
case 
law 
interpreting it.   
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶85 Because I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.08 means what 
it says and that we are required to follow it, I respectfully 
dissent.    
I 
¶86 This case involves a non-citizen defendant who did not 
receive the required deportation warning.1  Paramount to the 
analysis is the language of the statute. 
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) provides that if a court 
has failed to personally inform a defendant that a plea may 
result in deportation, and it is later shown that the plea is 
likely to result in deportation, "the court on the defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea and 
enter another plea."  (Emphasis supplied.) 
¶88 Rather than follow the dictates of the statute, the 
majority imposes the restraints of Wis. Stat. § 974.06 and State 
v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), 
without questioning whether they apply.  In superimposing 
§ 974.06 and Escalona-Naranjo onto the clear words of the 
statute, the majority rewrites the statute for the defendant and 
others similarly situated.  Now they are required to meet a 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin's non-citizens include people who have lawful 
permanent resident status (a "green card"), refugees and asylees 
and certain legal nonimmigrants (including those on student, 
work, or some other temporary visas).  In addition, as of 2010, 
Wisconsin 
is 
home 
to 
an 
estimated 
100,000 
undocumented 
immigrants. Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, "Unauthorized 
Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010" (Feb. 1, 
2011), 
available 
at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/ 
reports/133.pdf. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
multitude of conditions that cannot be found anywhere in the 
statute.   
¶89 In essence, the majority's response to the clear 
legislative mandate is as follows: 
 
OK, we shall vacate and permit plea withdrawal, but only if 
the defendant alleges that second postconviction counsel 
"was 
constitutionally 
ineffective 
in 
the 
second 
postconviction motion for failing to raise a claim about 
[first 
postconviction 
counsel's] 
ineffectiveness 
for 
failing to bring a plea withdrawal claim in the first 
postconviction motion."  Majority op., ¶51. 
 
OK, we shall vacate and permit plea withdrawal, but only if 
defendant alleges that [first postconviction counsel] "was 
constitutionally ineffective in the first postconviction 
motion for failing to raise the plea withdrawal claim." 
Id., ¶51. 
 
OK, we shall vacate and permit plea withdrawal, but only if 
the defendant alleges "why and how his postconviction 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective."  Id., ¶36. 
 
OK, we shall vacate and permit plea withdrawal, but only if 
the defendant shows "sufficient reason" for not bringing 
the claim in an earlier motion or appeal.  Id., ¶34. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
 
OK, we shall vacate and permit plea withdrawal, but only if 
the defendant demonstrates that the claim now made is 
"clearly stronger" than previously made claims.2  Id., ¶46. 
 
OK, we shall vacate and permit plea withdrawal, but only if 
the defendant alleges "sufficient material facts——e.g., 
who, what, where, when, why, and how"——that if true would 
entitle the defendant to the relief sought.  Id., ¶37. 
¶90 Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) requires a defendant 
to bring a motion to withdraw under the auspices of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) indicates that a 
motion to withdraw can be brought under another statute.  
Indeed, courts have repeatedly considered motions to withdraw 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) without reference to Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
2 In its analysis, the majority extends the "clearly 
stronger" standard from State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 
274, 833 N.W.2d 146.  Majority op., ¶¶45-46.  As I explained in 
my dissent to Starks, the "clearly stronger" standard is too 
rigid and cannot practically be applied in many situations.  
Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274, ¶¶94, 98-102 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
The standard runs counter to United States Supreme Court 
precedent, which has declined to adopt bright-line standards for 
evaluating deficiency.  Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 
1406 (2011).  Further, it is inconsistent with Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984), which requires an 
evaluation of the reasonableness of an attorney's performance 
under the totality of the circumstances.   
Although the "clearly stronger" is one factor to consider 
in applying Strickland, it is not the test.  There are many 
situations in which the standard will prove unworkable. This 
case is one of those situations.  Given that it appears the 
defendant would have been successful in both the resentencing 
motion and the Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion, a court cannot 
determine 
whether 
his 
postconviction 
representation 
was 
deficient without considering whether she adequately informed 
Romero-Georgana of his options and what, if anything, Romero-
Georgana asked her to do on his behalf.   
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
§ 974.06.  See, e.g., State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 
1, 819 N.W.2d 749; State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 
173, 646 N.W.2d 1; State v. Vang, 2010 WI App 118, 328 Wis. 2d 
251, 789 N.W.2d 115; State v. Bedolla, 2006 WI App 154, 295 Wis. 
2d 410, 720 N.W.2d 158. 
¶91 The apparent reason the majority incorporates the 
§ 974.06 and the Escalona-Naranjo standard is because it 
considers the defendant's motion untimely under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2).  Majority op., ¶66.  Yet, unlike the other 
statutory procedures for postconviction motions, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) imposes no time limitations.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 809.30 and 974.02 (requiring defendant to file notice of 
appeal or motion seeking postconviction relief within 60 days 
after service of transcript or court record).  
¶92 It is impractical to expect a defendant to move timely 
to withdraw a plea on a ground for which he would have no 
knowledge.  As explained in Vang, 328 Wis. 2d 251, ¶14, "[t]he 
statute anticipates that the motion to vacate the judgment and 
withdraw the plea will be submitted following a qualifying event 
in the future and reserves the right to defendants who 
demonstrate they have suffered the particular harm."   
¶93 Notably, the qualifying event, notice of deportation, 
will often be long after the timeframes for filing for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. §§ 974.02 and 809.30 have 
expired.  One commentator observed, "it often takes more than a 
decade 
for 
the 
INS 
(now 
ICE) 
to 
initiate 
deportation 
proceedings." Cody Harris, Comment, A Problem of Proof: How 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
Routine Destruction of Court Records Routinely Destroys a 
Statutory Remedy, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1791, 1805 (2007).3  Thus, the 
majority's suggestion that Romero-Georgana's motion would be 
untimely under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) is supported neither by 
practicality nor by the text of the statute. 
II 
 
¶94 The majority's failure to honor the statutory language 
undermines not only the legislative intent as expressed by the 
clear words of the statute, but also the important purpose 
behind Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  When passed in 1985, it was 
intended to serve as a safeguard, ensuring that a non-citizen 
defendant not unwittingly plead guilty because he was unaware of 
the significant potential consequences of deportation.4  The 
                                                 
3 The majority attempts to justify its timeliness argument 
by referencing in a footnote the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08.  Majority op., ¶67 n.14.  It observes that in 
1983 the statute was amended to eliminate a 120-day time limit 
for filing motions to withdraw under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) 
because 
those 
claims 
could 
be 
brought 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 809.30, 974.02, or 974.06.  Contrary to the majority's 
suggestion, the 1983 amendment provides no illumination to our 
analysis because it predates the enactment of the current Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2).  It was not until 1985 that the legislature 
mandated the deportation warning along with its required remedy. 
As discussed above, its very language suggests that no time 
limit was intended. 
 
4 The drafting files to Wis. Stat. § 971.08 note that the 
enactment of similar legislation in other states "go[es] a long 
way to alleviate the hardship and unfairness involved when an 
alien unwittingly pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a charge 
without being informed of the immigration consequences of such a 
plea."  Drafting files, 1985 Wis. Act 252, on file with the Wis. 
Legislative Reference Bureau. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
landscape of immigration policy and practice has changed 
dramatically over the ensuing years making the need for 
safeguards even more pronounced.5   
¶95 Currently, non-citizens are being deported in record 
numbers.6  Reportedly, in the last eight years nearly two million 
people were deported.  Of those, "[t]wenty percent——or about 
394,000——of the cases involved people convicted of serious 
crimes, including drug-related offenses." Others may have 
committed only minor infractions, including traffic violations.7  
"Even long-term lawful permanent residents who have lived much 
of their lives in the United States are subject to immigration 
detention and deportation as a consequence of criminal arrest 
and conviction."  Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-
Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 105, 113 (2012). 
¶96 Commenting on the change in the immigration landscape, 
the United States Supreme Court observed how the changes have 
exacerbated the importance for non-citizens to be aware of the 
deportation consequences when entering a guilty plea:   
                                                 
5 The changes in the legal landscape are discussed in  
Vivian Chang, Where Do We Go from Here: Plea Colloquy Warnings 
and Immigration Consequences Post-Padilla, 45 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 189, 193 (2011). 
6 DHS Office of Immigration Statistics Annual Report: 
"Immigration 
Enforcement 
Actions: 
2012," 
available 
at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcem
ent_ar_2012_1.pdf. 
7 Ginger Thompson, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, 
Records Show, New York Times, Apr. 6, 2014.  
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
The importance of accurate legal advice for non-
citizens accused of crimes has never been more 
important. . . . [D]eportation is an integral part——
indeed, sometimes the most important part——of the 
penalty that may be imposed on non-citizen defendants 
who plead guilty to specified crimes.  
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). 
   
¶97 The Padilla court focused on the obligation of a 
defense attorney under the Sixth Amendment to advise non-
citizens about potential deportation consequences that arise 
from criminal convictions.  Id.  It determined that the absence 
of such advice may be the basis for a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Id. at 360.8  It did not, however, 
address the obligation of the court when presiding over the plea 
of a non-citizen in a criminal proceeding.  
¶98 In its first published post-Padilla decision, the 
Wisconsin 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
also 
referenced 
the 
severe 
consequences of deportation.  State v. Mendez, 2014 WI App 57, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  Describing the defendant, it 
noted that Mendez came to this country in 1997 when he was 
fourteen years old and never returned to Mexico.  Id., ¶3.  He 
is married to a United States citizen and together they have a 
four-year-old child who is a United States citizen.  The court 
                                                 
8 The court observed: 
Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal 
specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who 
represent clients facing criminal charges, in either 
state or federal court or both, may not be well versed 
in it.  . . . But when the deportation consequence is 
truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear. 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
observed that "despite the benefit of a great reduction in the 
length of the potential prison sentence, a rational non-citizen 
defendant might have rejected a plea bargain and risked trial 
for the chance at avoiding deportation."  Id., ¶16.  Like 
Padilla, the Mendez court focused on the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim and did not discuss the duty of a circuit court 
when accepting a guilty plea. 
¶99 The importance of deportation warnings and the duty of 
a judge to give them was addressed recently by the New York 
Court of Appeals.  People v. Peque, 3 N.E.3d 617 (2013).  It 
commented that under contemporary law, a non-citizen's removal 
upon a felony conviction "is practically inevitable," and 
described 
this 
as 
an 
"enormous 
penalty 
upon 
non-citizen 
convicts," with wide-ranging consequences for life and liberty:   
After being removed from the country, the defendant 
rarely, if ever, has further in-person contact with 
any family members remaining in America. Additionally, 
deportation effectively strips the defendant of any 
employment he or she had in this country, thus 
depriving the defendant and his or her family of 
critical financial support.  
Id. at 630-32.  Accordingly, it determined that a court was 
required to inform a defendant of the possible deportation 
consequences of entering a guilty plea.  Id. at 635. 
¶100 Several 
states 
have 
legislation 
like 
Wisconsin's 
affirmatively requiring courts to take an active role in 
informing defendants of the possible deportation consequences of 
entering a guilty plea. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. 
§ 1016.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-1j; D.C. Code § 16-713; Fla. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-93(c); Haw. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 802E-2; Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3); 
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 29D; Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01; 
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-12-210; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. 
§ 220.50(7); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1022; Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2943.031; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.385; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-
12-22; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art. 26.13(a)(4); Vt. Stat. 
Ann., tit. 13, § 6565(c)(1); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.40.200. 
¶101 This court has acknowledged that "by enacting Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) & (2), Wisconsin codified the protections 
contemplated in Padilla, but placed the duty to warn on the 
circuit court, rather than solely on the attorney."  Negrete, 
343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33 n.12.  By circumventing the remedy set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), the majority minimizes the judge's 
duty and undermines the purpose of the statute. 
III 
¶102 Our precedent interpreting the statute has strictly 
held circuit courts to the requirements in Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  
In State v. Douangmala, this court determined that Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) means what it expressly states: if the defendant 
makes the required showing, "the circuit court 'shall' vacate 
the judgment and shall permit the defendant to withdraw the 
plea."  253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶31.  The court explained that "[t]he 
word 'shall' in a statute is presumed to be mandatory unless a 
different 
construction 
is 
necessary 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
legislature's clear intent. Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
points to a different interpretation of the word 'shall' than an 
interpretation that the word signifies a mandatory act."  Id.   
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶103 Similarly, in Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23, this court 
explained that the procedures required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
are clear.  All the defendant is required to show in order to 
withdraw a plea are the two elements enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2):  
To employ Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) to withdraw his plea, 
however, the defendant's motion must first allege two 
facts: (1) that the circuit court "fail[ed] to advise 
[the] defendant [of the deportation consequences of 
the 
defendant's 
plea] 
as 
required 
by 
[§ 
971.08(1)(c)]"; and (2) that the defendant's "plea is 
likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this country[,] or denial 
of naturalization." 
Id., ¶23 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2)). 
¶104 Here, Romero-Georgana has shown what Negrete requires.  
He was not given the mandatory warning by the circuit court that 
a guilty plea could lead to his deportation and that he is now 
facing deportation.  Under the governing statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2), that is all that Romero-Georgana needed to show in 
order to withdraw his plea.  Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶31.   
¶105 I acknowledge that Romero-Georgana's pro se motion was 
on a form for Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motions.  Perhaps this is why 
the majority was misled.  However, the only citation to Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 is in the form's preprinted labels on the first 
and second pages.   Neither the text of the motion nor the 
attached affidavit makes any reference to a § 974.06 motion.  
Even the majority recognizes that "Romero-Georgana likely could 
have withdrawn his plea if he had timely brought a § 971.08(2) 
motion."  Majority op., ¶66. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶106 Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) or our precedent 
permits a reviewing court to ignore the circuit court's duty 
because of the defendant's failure to correctly label the 
motion.  A defendant's action or inaction cannot alter the duty 
of the court under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Vang, 328 Wis. 2d 
251, ¶14.  Furthermore, under our precedent, Romero-Georgana's 
confusion in selecting the wrong label does not serve as a bar 
to his claim. 
¶107 Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
a 
well-settled 
policy 
of 
liberally construing the pro se pleadings of prisoners to 
determine whether they contain a cause of action.    State v. 
Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶29 n.10, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 
(quoting  State ex rel. Terry v. Traeger, 60 Wis. 2d 490, 496, 
211 N.W.2d 4 (1973)) ("[W]e must follow a liberal policy in 
judging the sufficiency of pro se complaints filed by unlettered 
and indigent prisoners."); State ex rel. L'Minggio v. Gamble, 
2003 WI 82, ¶16, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 N.W.2d 1 ("At the outset, 
we note that it is well-settled that pro se complaints are to be 
liberally construed to determine if the complaint states any 
facts that can give rise to a cause of action."); Lewis v. 
Sullivan, 188 Wis. 2d 157, 164, 524 N.W.2d 630 (1994) ("[P]ro se 
complaints 
of 
prisoners 
must 
be 
construed 
liberally 
in 
determining whether the stated facts give rise to a cause of 
action."). 
¶108  This court has explicitly instructed courts to look 
to the contents of a pleading, not its label, to determine if 
the prisoner is entitled to relief: 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
We re-emphasize today what we have said previously. A 
court presented with a prisoner's pro se document 
seeking relief must look to the facts stated in the 
document to determine whether the petitioner may be 
entitled to any relief if the facts alleged are 
proved. Neither a trial nor an appellate court should 
deny a prisoner's pleading based on its label rather 
than on its allegations.  If necessary the court 
should relabel the prisoner's pleading and proceed 
from there. 
bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 521, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) 
(emphasis supplied). 
¶109 In this case, Romero-Georgana filed his motion without 
the assistance of an attorney.  The contents of the motion and 
attached affidavit relate to the circuit court's failure to 
inform him of the possible deportation consequences of his plea 
and the fact that he is now facing deportation.9  The only 
                                                 
9 The motion states: 
Romero-Georgana is a native of Mexico and is not a 
citizen of the United States of America.  Romero-
Georgana contends that the trial court failed to 
advise him that if he pleas no contest he may be 
deported. 
Romero-Georgana pled no contest to one count of first 
degree sexual assault of a child.  Romero-Georgana did 
through the use of the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights form verify that he did understand the question 
regarding 
deportation. 
However, 
Romero-Georgana 
contends that at the time he completed the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form that he did not 
fully understand what he was initialing due to his 
limited English skills, poor quality of interpreters 
being employed by his attorney at the time, and the 
failure of counsel to advise him of the consequences.  
Romero-Georgana contends that had he known he would be 
deported upon entering the no contest plea he would 
have instead entered a plea of not guilty and went to 
trial.   
At no time did the court during the plea colloquy 
(Plea Hearing Transcripts dated November 17, 2006, 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
citation to Wis. Stat. § 974.06 in the motion is in its pre-
printed labels.   
¶110 In an apparent attempt to deflect from the circuit 
court's and this court's failure to follow the clear statutory 
language, the majority lays blame on the back of the defendant 
who filed pro se the motion and the petition for review.  It 
quotes in both text and footnote the comment of Romero-
Georgana's attorney who was appointed after the petition for 
review was granted and who felt constrained by the order 
granting the petition which she interpreted as precluding her 
from raising a § 971.08(2) issue.  Majority op., ¶67 and n.14.10  
¶111 It is not the defendant's fault that the circuit court 
failed to give the statutorily mandated deportation warning.    
Wisconsin Stat § 971.08(1)(c) expressly provides that it is the 
duty of the circuit court to give it.   
                                                                                                                                                             
pages 2-4) advise Romero-Georgana of the deportation 
consequences of his entering a plea of no contest.  
Again, Romero-Georgana contends he would not have 
entered a plea of no contest had he fully understood 
he would have been deported. 
To verify that Romero-Georgana is indeed facing 
deportation back to his native land of Mexico he 
submits the Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action Form 
File #A097-838-176, dated March 20, 2007. (Exhibit 1) 
 
10 At oral argument Romero-Georgana's attorney stated "[a]s 
this court knows we were appointed  . . . after the petition for 
review was filed and the case had been decided up to that point 
under 974.06."  The attorney further stated "[t]his court's 
order granting review specifically asked us to stay within the 
arguments made in the petition for review, and that did not 
include an argument that this case should be decided as a 
971.08(2) motion by itself." 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
¶112 It is not the fault of the attorney appointed after 
the petition for review was granted that this court fails to 
follow the remedy mandated by the clear statutory language.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) expressly provides that if the 
preconditions are met, the remedy is "shall vacate . . . and 
permit the defendant to withdraw the plea . . . ."   
¶113 A defendant's action or inaction does not relieve the 
circuit court of its duty to give the deportation warning.  Nor 
does an attorney's action or inaction give license to this court 
to rewrite the words of a statute or circumvent the clearly 
mandated legislative remedy.  
IV 
¶114 I conclude that the language of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
is clear.  If a defendant shows that the court did not advise 
him of the possible deportation consequences of a plea and that 
the defendant is likely to be deported as a result of his plea, 
the court "shall" vacate the sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).   
¶115 The statute includes no requirement that the defendant 
follow Wis. Stat. § 974.06 to obtain such relief.  Its directive 
to the courts is mandatory and should be strictly construed.  
Accordingly, because the circuit court did not inform Romero-
Georgana of the possible deportation consequences of his plea 
and he is now facing deportation, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
requires that he be permitted to withdraw his plea. 
¶116 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
¶117 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
   
 
No.  2012AP55-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1