Title: Ex parte Stanley Anderson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Stanley Anderson v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061004
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2008

REL: 1/25/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061004
____________________
Ex parte Stanley Anderson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Stanley Anderson
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-04-176.70;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1943)
SEE, Justice.
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2
Stanley Anderson seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals' affirming the trial court's
judgment revoking Anderson's probation.  We reverse the Court
of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand the case.
Facts and Procedural History
Stanley Anderson was convicted in 2004 of breaking and
entering a motor vehicle and of theft of property.  The trial
court sentenced Anderson to a 15-year sentence for each
conviction, to be served concurrently; it then suspended the
sentences and placed him on supervised probation.  In 2006, at
the request of Anderson's probation officer, the Montgomery
Circuit Court held a hearing to determine whether to revoke
Anderson's probation, at which time the following conversation
took place:
"The Court: Stanley, if you admit these things, in
other words, if you say, 'Yeah, I did that, Judge,'
I've got to decide if I'm going to revoke your
probation or not revoke it.  If what I read to you
is not true, all you need to do is say 'I deny the
alleged violations.'  I will appoint a lawyer to
represent you, and we'll have a hearing at a later
date.  Do you understand all of that?
"Anderson: Yes, ma'am.
"The Court: All right.  The first one is failure to
report to your probation officer.  They haven't seen
you since May 17, 2004.  The second one is failure
1061004
Anderson was confined in Chilton County for two years,
1
while he was also serving his probationary term in Montgomery
County. 
3
to pay supervision fees.  You currently owe $90.
The third alleged violation is failure to pay court-
ordered moneys.  You currently owe $394.  The fourth
alleged violation is that you have a new arrest for
being 
in 
possession 
of 
a 
firearm, 
drug
paraphernalia, and resisting arrest.  And I got a
report that you're fighting with someone over at the
jail.  So what's going on?  Are you admitting or
denying these alleged violations?
"Anderson: Well I'm denying the firearm charge and
the other charges."
Upon further questioning by the trial judge, Anderson admitted
that he had pleaded guilty to the charges of possessing a
firearm, possessing drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest
and had completed his punishment for those convictions,  but
1
maintained that he was nevertheless innocent of the charges.
Following this admission, the judge revoked Anderson's
probation and reinstated the 15-year sentences without
appointing an attorney for him or setting a date for a
revocation hearing.  Anderson appealed to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not
complying with the requirements of Rule 27.5(a)(1) through
1061004
Rule 27.5(a)(1) through (4) provide:
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"(a) Initial Appearance.  When a probationer is
arrested pursuant to Rule 27.4(b) or Rule 27.4(c),
the probation officer shall be notified immediately
(unless the officer made the arrest), and the
probationer shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before the judge who issued the warrant or summons,
if available, or in case of an arrest without a
warrant, before the original sentencing judge, if
available; otherwise, the probationer shall be taken
before another judge of the same district or
circuit, who shall
"(1) Inform the probationer of the alleged
violation of probation and furnish the probationer
with a written copy thereof;
"(2) Inform the probationer that any statement
the probationer makes prior to the hearing may be
used against the probationer;
"(3) Advise the probationer of his or her right
to request counsel and appoint counsel to represent
an indigent probationer if the requirements of Rule
27.6(b) are met; 
"(4) Set the date of the revocation hearing
...."
Rule 27.6, "Revocation of Probation," provides in
3
subparagraphs (a) and (b):
"(a) Hearing.  A hearing to determine whether
probation should be revoked shall be held before the
sentencing court within a reasonable time after the
probationer's initial appearance under Rule 27.5.
"(b) 
Presence; 
Right 
to 
Counsel. 
 
The
4
(4)  and Rule 27.6(a) and (b) and (c)(5),  Ala. R. Crim. P.,
2
3
1061004
probationer is entitled to be present at the hearing
and to be represented by counsel.  Counsel will be
appointed to represent an indigent probationer upon
request: 
"(1) If the probationer makes a colorable claim
that the probationer has not committed the alleged
violation of the conditions or regulations of
probation or the instructions issued by the
probation officer; or
"(2) Even when the violation is a matter of
public record or is uncontested, if there are
substantial reasons that justify or mitigate the
violation 
and 
that 
may 
make 
revocation
inappropriate, and the reasons are complex or
otherwise difficult to develop or present."
There is no subparagraph (5) in Rule 27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.
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i.e., in not holding a subsequent revocation hearing and in
not allowing Anderson an opportunity to be represented by
counsel.
  
The Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpublished
memorandum affirming the trial court's revocation order on the
ground that Anderson had not preserved the issues for
appellate review because he had not raised them in the trial
court. Anderson v. State, [No. CR-05-1943, March 2, 2007] ___
So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (Welch, J., dissenting).
We granted Anderson's petition for the writ of certiorari
to determine whether the decision of the Court of Criminal
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6
Appeals to affirm the trial court's revocation order on the
basis that Anderson failed to preserve his argument for
appellate review conflicts with prior caselaw. 
Analysis
A probationer who makes his initial appearance under Rule
27.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., is entitled to a revocation hearing.
Rule 27.5(a)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P. (at the initial appearance,
the "judge ... shall ... set the date of the revocation
hearing").  At the revocation hearing, the probationer is
entitled to be represented by counsel. See Rule 27.6(b), Ala.
R. Crim. P. ("[P]robationer is entitled ... to be represented
by counsel.).  The probationer may waive his right to a
revocation hearing if he is given "sufficient prior notice of
the charges and sufficient notice of the evidence to be relied
upon" and if he "admits, under the requirements of Rule
27.6(c), that he committed the alleged violation." Rule
27.5(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.
In the present case, it appears that the judge determined
that Anderson had waived his right to a revocation hearing and
his right to counsel, because she revoked his probation during
his 
initial 
appearance 
without 
affording 
him 
representation 
by
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counsel.  The trial judge initially informed Anderson that
"[i]f what I read to you is not true, all you need to do is
say 'I deny the alleged violations.'  I will appoint a lawyer
to represent you, and we'll have a hearing at a later date."
After the judge read the violations, Anderson responded, "I'm
denying the firearm charge and the other charges."  However,
he later during the initial hearing admitted that he had not
reported to his probation officer because he did not have any
money and could not pay his supervision fees or court-ordered
moneys.  
Anderson 
also admitted during 
this initial appearance
that although he was "denying the firearm charge and the other
charges," he had pleaded guilty to those charges and had
completed his sentence related to those charges.  At no time
during the appearance did Anderson request an attorney;
however, neither did the trial judge, before revoking
Anderson's probation, ask him if he was willing to waive his
right to a revocation hearing or to counsel.  Nevertheless,
based on Anderson's admission that he had knowingly failed to
report to his probation officer and that he had pleaded guilty
to the other charges, the trial judge revoked Anderson's
probation without counsel present.
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The Court of Criminal Appeals did not reach the merits of
Anderson's appeal, affirming the trial court's order on the
ground that Anderson had not presented to the trial court the
arguments that he was entitled to counsel and a revocation
hearing, and, therefore, he had not preserved those arguments
for appellate review.  Generally, arguments not presented to
the trial court are waived on appeal. See Ex parte Helton, 578
So. 2d 1379, 1380 (Ala. 1990) ("The second issue raised by
[the defendant] ... was not properly raised at trial and thus,
was not preserved for review.").  However, in Puckett v.
State, 680 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), the Court
of Criminal Appeals recognized two exceptions to that general
rule when the case involves the revocation of probation:   
"[The Court of Criminal Appeals] has recognized, in
probation 
revocation 
proceedings, 
only 
two
exceptions to the general rule that issues not
presented to the trial court are waived on appeal:
(1) the requirement that there be an adequate
written order of revocation ..., and (2) the
requirement that a revocation hearing actually be
held."
(Citations omitted.)  In deciding that Anderson had not
preserved his arguments for appeal, the Court of Criminal
Appeals did not issue an opinion overruling Puckett or suggest
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in its unpublished memorandum that Puckett should be
overruled, nor have we been asked to overrule it.  
Anderson argues that his case falls within the second
Puckett exception because the trial court failed to hold a
revocation hearing.  We agree.
During the exchange between the trial judge and Anderson
at his initial appearance, the trial judge told Anderson that
if he denied the charges he would be afforded counsel and a
subsequent hearing would be held; however, when he denied the
charges, he was not afforded counsel and a revocation hearing
for a later date was not set.  
"A hearing ordinarily is defined, in matters not
associated with full trials, as a proceeding in which the
parties are afforded an opportunity to adduce proof and to
argue (in person or by counsel) as to the inferences flowing
from the evidence." Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala. App. 587, 590,
121 So. 2d 875, 878 (1960).  We agree with Judge Welch's
dissent from the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished
memorandum in this case.  He stated that "[i]n this case no
hearing was held.  Instead, Anderson was subjected to an
interrogation by the trial court with no meaningful
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opportunity to present any evidence." Anderson, ___ So. 2d at
___ (Welch, J., dissenting). 
Anderson has set forth facts indicating that a revocation
hearing was not held and that Anderson did not waive a
revocation hearing.  Because the failure to hold a revocation
hearing is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring
a defendant to preserve his arguments for appeal by first
raising them in the trial court, the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision is in error. 
Conclusion
For the foregoing reason, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to that court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.