Title: Mitchem v. Counts
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990399
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
VICKI LYNN MITCHEM 
 
v.  Record No. 990399   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   January 14, 2000 
DURWOOD L. COUNTS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY 
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider two issues: 1) whether Code 
§ 2.1-725(D) of the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA), Code 
§§ 2.1-714 through –725, bars a common law action for wrongful 
termination of employment based on a violation of public policy 
not reflected in the VHRA, when the conduct alleged also 
violates a public policy reflected in the VHRA; and 2) whether a 
violation of the public policies embodied in two criminal 
statutes may support such a common law action. 
Vicki Lynn Mitchem filed a motion for judgment against her 
former employer Durwood L. Counts,1 alleging that he had 
wrongfully discharged her from her position as an insurance 
marketing representative after she refused to engage in a sexual 
relationship with him.  Mitchem asserted that Counts repeatedly 
tried to persuade her to have a "sexual affair" with him and 
                     
 
1Counts was an insurance agent who, at all times pertinent 
to this action, employed no more than five persons. 
 
promised in return that she would receive money and "a lot of 
nice things." 
In her motion for judgment, Mitchem also asserted that, on 
many occasions, Counts "massaged her shoulders, patted her 
buttocks, touched her leg, rubbed her knee, and hugged her 
against her will."  Mitchem further alleged that on another 
occasion, Counts "pulled [Mitchem] onto his lap, wrapped both 
arms around her, and tried to kiss her on the lips."  Finally, 
Mitchem alleged that because she "steadfastly refused to enter 
into a sexual relationship with Counts," he retaliated in 
several ways and ultimately fired her in May 1998. 
Relying on these allegations, Mitchem asserted in Count I 
of her motion for judgment that her discharge violated the 
Commonwealth's public policy "that all persons . . . are 
entitled to pursue and maintain employment free of 
discrimination based upon gender."  She also claimed, among 
other things, that the Commonwealth's public policy is violated 
when a female employee "must either consent to the commission of 
a crime against her person, or engage in a conspiracy to commit 
a crime, or both, to maintain her employment."  Mitchem cited 
several sources of public policy in support of her claim, 
including the VHRA and Code §§ 18.2-57, -344, and -345.2
                     
 
2In Count II of her motion for judgment, Mitchem asserted a 
claim of assault and battery against Counts, which the trial 
 
2
Counts filed a demurrer to Count I, which the trial court 
sustained.  The court concluded, in essence, that the 1995 
amendments to the VHRA eliminated the VHRA as a source of public 
policy to support a common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination.  The trial court also held that Code §§ 18.2-57, -
344, and –345 do not articulate public policies that will 
support a common law action for wrongful termination.3  The court 
entered an order dismissing Count I of Mitchem's action with 
prejudice, and Mitchem appeals from this judgment. 
Although Mitchem based her wrongful termination action in 
part on public policies found in the VHRA and sources of law 
other than criminal statutes, she withdrew this part of her 
claim during her oral argument before this Court.  She argued 
that the criminal statutes identified in her motion for judgment 
embody a public policy against the commission of the stated acts 
of a sexual nature and, thus, that an employer is subject to a 
                                                                  
court dismissed without prejudice on Mitchem's request for a 
nonsuit. 
 
 
3The trial court also held that Mitchem could not base a 
claim for wrongful discharge on Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, the Constitution of the United States, the 
Declaration of Independence, or the Constitution of Virginia.  
In addition, the trial court concluded that because Counts' 
business had fewer than five employees, Mitchem could not seek 
recovery under the limited statutory remedies provided by Code 
§ 2.1-725(B) and (C) for workers whose employers have more than 
five but fewer than 15 employees.  Mitchem does not contest 
these rulings in this appeal. 
 
 
3
common law wrongful termination claim if he discharges an at-
will employee because she refuses to commit those criminal acts. 
Mitchem contends on appeal that she was not discharged from 
her employment because of her gender, but because she rejected 
her employer's demands that she perform sexual acts in violation 
of Code § 18.2-344, which prohibits fornication, and Code 
§ 18.2-345, which prohibits lewd and lascivious cohabitation.  
She also asserts that she was discharged because she would not 
"consent to commission of a battery upon her person," in 
violation of Code § 18.2-57.4
 
In response, Counts (the employer) argues that Code § 2.1-
725(D) abrogates Mitchem's common law cause of action because 
the allegations of wrongful termination, if proved, would 
violate the public policies reflected in the VHRA.  In support 
of this argument, the employer notes that the facts in this case 
are very similar to those alleged by a plaintiff in Lockhart v. 
Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 
                     
 
4All these crimes are classified as misdemeanors.  On brief, 
Mitchem also cited Code § 18.2-346, which prohibits acts of 
prostitution, and § 18.2–67.4, which prohibits sexual battery.  
However, since Mitchem did not cite these statutes in her motion 
for judgment, we will not consider these additional statutes in 
reviewing the trial court's action sustaining the demurrer to 
Count I.  See Breeding v. Hensley, 258 Va. 207, 212, 519 S.E.2d 
369, 371 (1999). 
 
 
4
(1994),5 in which we held that an employer's conduct and 
termination of that plaintiff violated the public policy against 
gender discrimination stated in the VHRA.  The employer also 
asserts that our decision in Conner v. National Pest Control 
Ass'n., 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398 (1999), requires dismissal 
of Mitchem's action based on our application in that case of the 
preclusive language of Code § 2.1-725(D).  Finally, the employer 
contends that criminal statutes will not support Mitchem's 
common law action because they do not "announce public policies 
in their texts" and to use the statutes in this manner would 
eviscerate the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Although Mitchem has withdrawn her reliance on the VHRA as 
a source of public policy to support her wrongful termination 
action, we nevertheless begin our analysis with the VHRA because 
its limiting provision in Code § 2.1-725(D) is the controlling 
statute in this appeal.  That provision, included in the 1995 
amendments to the VHRA, states in relevant part: 
Causes of action based upon the public policies 
reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited 
to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, 
afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights 
statutes or local ordinances.  Code § 2.1-725(D). 
 
                     
 
5This Court's opinion in Lockhart addressed two separate 
cases.  Nancy L. Wright was the plaintiff in one of the cases.  
She alleged employment discrimination based on gender, while the 
other plaintiff, Lawanda Lockhart, alleged employment 
discrimination based on race. 
 
5
Citing Doss v. Jamco, 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997), 
the trial court held that the 1995 amendments to the VHRA bar 
Mitchem from asserting a common law action for wrongful 
termination based on any of the sources of public policy set 
forth in her motion for judgment.  In Doss, we held that "in 
amending the [VHRA] by adding subsection D to Code § 2.1-725 in 
1995, the General Assembly plainly manifested its intention to 
alter the common law rule with respect to '[c]auses of action 
based upon the public policies reflected in [the VHRA].'"  Id. 
at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 446. 
 
Following Doss, we next addressed the scope of Code § 2.1-
725(D) in Conner.  There, the plaintiff alleged that she had 
asserted a valid cause of action for wrongful termination 
because, in addition to the public policy against gender 
discrimination in the VHRA, her employer's conduct violated the 
same public policy embodied in sources other than the VHRA.  257 
Va. at 288, 513 S.E.2d at 399.  We disagreed, holding that "the 
General Assembly, in enacting the 1995 amendments to the VHRA, 
eliminated a common law cause of action for wrongful termination 
based on any public policy which is reflected in the VHRA, 
regardless of whether the policy is articulated elsewhere."  Id. 
at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400. 
 
Our holdings in Conner and Doss, however, do not address 
the issues before us.  In those cases, unlike the present case, 
 
6
the plaintiffs did not identify any public policy different from 
those reflected in the VHRA as the basis for their common law 
claims.  Thus, in those cases, we did not address the central 
issue in the present appeal, whether Code § 2.1-725(D) bars a 
common law action for wrongful termination based on public 
policies not reflected in the VHRA, when the conduct alleged in 
the motion for judgment also violates a public policy reflected 
in the VHRA. 
 
This issue of first impression is raised by Mitchem's 
allegations in her motion for judgment that the employer's 
conduct violated the Commonwealth's public policies against 
fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior embodied in Code 
§§ 18.2-344 and –345.  Code § 18.2-344 provides that an 
unmarried person who voluntarily has sexual intercourse with any 
other person is guilty of fornication.  Code § 18.2–345, in 
relevant part, prohibits persons not married to each other from 
lewdly and lasciviously associating and cohabiting together. 
 
In considering whether Code § 2.1-725(D) defeats Mitchem's 
reliance on these public policies as a basis for her wrongful 
termination action, we first observe that the preclusive 
language of Code § 2.1-725(D) was enacted by the legislature in 
derogation of the common law.  Statutes in derogation of the 
common law must be strictly construed and not enlarged by 
construction beyond their express terms.  Chesapeake & O. Ry. 
 
7
Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965); see 
Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 282-83, 448 S.E.2d 625, 628 
(1994); Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 65, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 
(1992).  A statutory change in the common law is limited to that 
which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied 
by its language because there is a presumption that no change 
was intended.  Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 
S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988); Strother v. Lynchburg Trust & Savings 
Bank, 155 Va. 826, 833, 156 S.E. 426, 428 (1931).  Thus, "[w]hen 
an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by 
the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the 
extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to 
the rule."  Boyd, 236 Va. at 349, 374 S.E.2d at 302; Newport 
News v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 635, 650, 183 S.E. 514, 520 
(1936). 
 
We must construe Code § 2.1-725(D) narrowly under these 
principles because the VHRA does not encompass the entire 
subject of common law causes of action for wrongful termination 
of employment.  The relevant language of Code § 2.1-725(D) 
provides that "[c]auses of action based upon the public policies 
reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those 
actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable 
federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances."  
(Emphasis added.)  This provision, by its plain terms, abrogates 
 
8
only common law causes of action for wrongful termination that 
are based on the public policies reflected in the VHRA.  Thus, 
we conclude that Code § 2.1-725(D) does not prohibit a common 
law cause of action for wrongful termination based on the public 
policies against fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior, 
because those policies are not reflected in the VHRA. 
 
We find no merit in the employer's contention that since 
his alleged conduct also violated the public policy in the VHRA 
against gender discrimination, he cannot be subject to a 
wrongful termination action for firing an employee who refused 
to commit the crimes at issue.  First, as shown above, the plain 
language of Code § 2.1-725(D) does not contain such a 
prohibition. 
 
Second, the same conduct or occurrence can support more 
than one theory of recovery.  Balzer and Assoc. v. The Lakes on 
360, 250 Va. 527, 531, 463 S.E.2d 453, 456 (1995); see Code 
§ 8.01-272; Rule 1:4(k); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 422-23, 362 
S.E.2d 699, 705 (1987).  Moreover, when a plaintiff has alleged 
facts supporting more than one theory of recovery, the pleading 
of one theory is not rendered insufficient by the insufficiency 
of the other theory.  Balzer, 250 Va. at 531, 463 S.E.2d at 456.  
Thus, the legal insufficiency of Mitchem's allegations of 
wrongful termination based on the public policies set forth in 
 
9
the VHRA does not invalidate her claim founded on the public 
policies embodied in Code §§ 18.2-344 and –345. 
 
Third, the employer's argument is untenable because, when 
extended to its logical conclusion, the argument would permit an 
employer to discharge any employee who refuses to commit a crime 
at the employer's direction, as long as the employer's conduct 
also violates a public policy reflected in the VHRA.  The public 
policy stated in the VHRA "safeguard[s] all individuals within 
the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of race, 
color, [and] religion."  Code § 2.1-715 (emphasis added).  Thus, 
under the employer's view, an African-American employee could 
not pursue a common law action for wrongful termination if she 
were discharged for refusing to burn a cross on the property of 
another African-American with the intent to intimidate that 
person.  The African-American employee would be a member of the 
class of persons protected by the VHRA public policy because she 
would have been fired based on "unlawful discrimination because 
of race."  Id.; see City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. 
___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000), decided today; Dray v. New 
Market Poultry Prod., Inc., 258 Va. 187, 191, 518 S.E.2d 312, 
313 (1999). 
 
The burning of a cross is a felony under Code § 18.2-423.  
Under the employer's theory, the language of Code § 2.1-725(D) 
would shield the employer from a common law action for wrongful 
 
10
termination for violation of the public policy underlying Code 
§ 18.2-423, because the conduct also would violate the public 
policy against racial discrimination expressed in the VHRA. 
 
Similarly, under the employer's view, a Jewish employee 
could not maintain a common law action for wrongful termination 
if he were discharged for refusing to paint a swastika on a 
synagogue with the intent to intimidate worshipers.  This 
employee would be a member of the class of persons protected by 
the public policy stated in the VHRA because he would have been 
fired based on "unlawful discrimination because of . . . 
religion."  Code § 2.1-715; see Harris, 259 Va. at ___, ___ 
S.E.2d at ___; Dray, 258 Va. at 191, 518 S.E.2d at 313. 
 
The placement of a swastika on a synagogue is a felony 
under Code § 18.2-423.1.  Under the employer's theory, the 
language of Code § 2.1-725(D) would shield the employer from a 
common law wrongful termination action for violation of the 
public policy underlying Code § 18.2-423.1, because the 
employer's conduct also would violate the VHRA public policy 
against religious discrimination. 
 
Accordingly, we reject the employer's argument because it 
would require us effectively to amend Code § 2.1-725(D) by 
adding a provision prohibiting causes of action based on public 
policies not reflected in the VHRA.  Such a holding would usurp 
the function of the General Assembly, violate the proper 
 
11
construction of a statute in derogation of common law, and allow 
repugnant consequences that were never intended by the General 
Assembly when it enacted Code § 2.1-725(D). 
 
The employer argues, however, that the public policies 
embodied in Code §§ 18.2-344 and –345 cannot support a common 
law action for wrongful termination because those statutes do 
not expressly state such public policies.  We find no merit in 
this contention.  Laws that do not expressly state a public 
policy, but were enacted to protect the property rights, 
personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare of the general 
public, may support a wrongful discharge claim if they further 
an underlying, established public policy that is violated by the 
discharge from employment.  Harris, 259 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d 
at ___; see Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 468, 362 S.E.2d 
915, 918 (1987); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 
540, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985).  Further, as indicated above, 
to rely on such a statute in support of a common law action for 
wrongful termination, an employee must be a member of the class 
of persons that the specific public policy was designed to 
protect.  Harris, 259 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___; Dray, 258 
Va. at 191, 518 S.E.2d at 313. 
 
For example, in Bowman, we recognized a common law cause of 
action for wrongful termination based on the public policy 
underlying former Code § 13.1-32.  That statute conferred on 
 
12
stockholders the right to one vote for each outstanding share of 
stock held.  Although former Code § 13.1-32 did not expressly 
state a public policy, we held that the statute provided a basis 
for a common law action for wrongful termination brought by two 
employee stockholders of a bank.  We concluded that the statute 
embodied the public policy that a stockholder's right to vote 
shall be exercised free of duress and intimidation by corporate 
management.  229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801. 
 
In the present case, the absence of an express statement of 
public policy in Code §§ 18.2-344 and –345 does not preclude 
their use as a basis for a common law action for wrongful 
termination.  These criminal statutes were enacted for the 
protection of the general public, and Mitchem is a member of 
that class of persons whom these statutes were designed to 
protect.  See Harris, 259 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___; Miller, 
234 Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918; Dray, 258 Va. at 191, 518 
S.E.2d at 313.  Further, the public policies inherent in Code 
§§ 18.2-344 and –345 are equally, if not more, compelling than 
the public policy in Bowman that provided the basis for our 
recognition of a narrow exception to the employment-at-will 
rule. 
 
We do not share the employer's concern that recognition of 
a common law cause of action for violation of these public 
policies should be rejected as an incursion into the employment-
 
13
at-will doctrine.  We have narrowly construed the public policy 
exception to that doctrine, and we have applied that exception 
in few instances.  Certainly, the General Assembly did not 
intend that the employment-at-will doctrine or the provisions of 
Code § 2.1-725(D) serve as a shield for employers who seek to 
force their employees, under the threat of discharge, to engage 
in criminal activity.  Thus, we conclude that since Mitchem's 
common law action based on the public policies embodied in Code 
§§ 18.2-344 and –345 is not abrogated by Code § 2.1-725(D), her 
action based on those policies falls within the scope of the 
narrow public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule 
recognized in Bowman. 
 
We disagree with the employer's assertion that our holding 
in Lockhart requires a different result.  There, we approved a 
wrongful termination action involving conduct very similar to 
that alleged by Mitchem based on the public policy against 
gender discrimination in the VHRA.  247 Va. at 101-02, 439 
S.E.2d at 329-30.  However, the fact that this type of conduct 
will no longer support a theory of recovery based on the VHRA, 
or other sources of law reflecting this same public policy, does 
not affect Mitchem's alternate theory of recovery based on the 
different public policies embodied in Code §§ 18.2-344 and –345.  
Unlike the VHRA provision against gender discrimination relied 
on in Lockhart, Mitchem's theory of recovery based on Code 
 
14
§§ 18.2-344 and –345 does not rely on any public policy 
reflected in the VHRA and, thus, is not precluded by Code § 2.1-
725(D).  Also, although the conduct Mitchem alleges would be an 
"unlawful discriminatory practice" within the meaning of Code 
§ 2.1-716,6 this conduct may still form the factual basis of a 
common law cause of action for wrongful termination when that 
action is not based on a public policy reflected in the VHRA.  
See Code § 2.1-725(D). 
 
Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 
dismissing the part of Count I in which Mitchem alleged that the 
employer wrongfully discharged her in violation of the public 
policy embodied in Code § 18.2-57, which establishes the crime 
of simple assault as a Class 1 misdemeanor.  The trial court 
properly dismissed this claim because Mitchem did not allege 
that her employer discharged her for refusing to commit this 
crime.  Instead, she alleged that she was fired for refusing to 
"consent to commission of a battery upon her person."  However, 
had she consented to having the employer touch her, there would 
have been no crime of battery.  Gnadt v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. 
                     
 
 
6Code § 2.1-716 provides: "Conduct which violates any 
Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
conditions, age, marital status or disability shall be an 
'unlawful discriminatory practice' for the purposes of this 
chapter." 
 
15
App. 148, 151, 497 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1998); see Banovitch v. 
Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 219, 83 S.E.2d 369, 375 (1954).  
Thus, the public policy embodied in Code § 18.2-57 does not 
support a wrongful termination action based on this allegation.  
When the trial court has reached the correct result for the 
wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm that 
result.  Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256 Va. 294, 303, 505 
S.E.2d 196, 202 (1998); Ridgwell v. Brasco Bay Corp., 254 Va. 
458, 462, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997); Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. 
Featherstone Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 253 Va. 364, 369, 484 
S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997). 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment dismissing the part of Mitchem's action for wrongful 
termination that is based on the public policy embodied in Code 
§ 18.2-57.7  We will reverse the trial court's judgment 
dismissing the part of Mitchem's action for wrongful termination 
that is based on the public policy embodied in Code §§ 18.2-344 
and –345, and remand this remaining part of her action for 
trial.8
                     
 
 
7Since Mitchem has withdrawn from her motion for judgment 
any reliance on public policies not based on criminal statutes, 
we do not consider the trial court's rulings with regard to 
those other sources of law. 
 
 
8We distinguish our present holding from City of Virginia 
Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ____ (2000), decided 
 
16
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE 
COMPTON join, dissenting in part and concurring in part. 
 
 
I dissent in part from the majority’s decision because I 
conclude that the employee in this case has not stated a viable 
cause of action.  Thus, I would affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment sustaining the employer’s demurrer. 
 
The majority states the issue in this case as “whether Code 
§ 2.1-725(D) bars a common law action for wrongful termination 
based on public policies not reflected in the VHRA, when the 
conduct alleged in the motion for judgment also violates a 
public policy reflected in the VHRA.”  By accepting Vicki Lynn 
Mitchem’s purported distinction between being fired because of 
“sex” discrimination and being fired because she refused to 
                                                                  
today.  In that case, a police officer was discharged from his 
employment for obtaining criminal warrants charging a superior 
officer with obstruction of justice and a related offense, 
because the superior officer had directed the police officer not 
to serve certain warrants on a criminal suspect.  We held, among 
other things, that the officer did not state a valid cause of 
action for wrongful termination in reliance on the public policy 
expressed in Code § 18.2-460, which prohibits the obstruction of 
a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties.  We 
concluded that the police officer was attempting to use the 
statute as a shield to protect himself against the consequences 
of his decision to charge his superior officer with crimes.  
Unlike Mitchem in the case before us, the officer in Harris was 
not a member of the public for whose benefit the statute was 
enacted and, thus, could not state a claim for wrongful 
 
17
engage in sexual conduct that would have allegedly violated 
certain criminal laws, the majority concludes that Code § 2.1-
725(D) does not bar Mitchem’s claim.  To understand why I do not 
accept this distinction, it is important to first explain why 
the conduct in which Durwood L. Counts allegedly engaged 
constitutes “sex” discrimination in violation of a public policy 
reflected in the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA). 
Mitchem’s allegations that Counts fired her because she 
rebuffed his alleged sexual advances and refused to engage in a 
sexual relationship with him are remarkably similar to the facts 
alleged by plaintiff Wright in Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. 
Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).  In that case, 
Wright alleged that her employer “approached her from behind, 
kissed her cheek” and “‘physically seized her, grabb[ed] her and 
hugg[ed] her without her consent.’”  Id. at 101-02, 439 S.E.2d 
at 329.  She also alleged that her employer repeatedly made 
abusive, inappropriate, and harassing remarks to her, and 
ultimately told her to “get out” after she advised her employer 
that she did not intend to be subjected to that kind of 
treatment at work.  Id. at 102, 439 S.E.2d at 330. 
 
Even though she was an at-will employee, plaintiff Wright 
alleged that her termination was unlawful, and therefore 
                                                                  
discharge based on the public policy embodied in that statute.  
See also, Dray, 258 Va. at 191, 518 S.E.2d at 313. 
 
18
actionable, because it violated the public policy of Virginia as 
enunciated in the VHRA.  The trial court disagreed and sustained 
the employer’s demurrer, but this Court reversed that judgment.  
Id. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332.  We concluded that Wright had 
pled a viable cause of action based upon “sex” discrimination.  
Id. at 104, 439 S.E.2d at 331.  While not “retreat[ing] from our 
strong adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine[,]” the 
Court held 
 
that the narrow exception to that doctrine, which we 
recognized in Bowman, includes instances where, as here, 
[an] employee[] [is] terminated because of discrimination 
based upon gender . . . .  The discharge[] of . . . Ms. 
Wright [is] allegedly tortious not because [she has] a 
vested right to continued employment, but because [her] 
employer[] misused the freedom to terminate the services of 
[an] at-will employee[] on the basis of . . . gender. 
 
Id. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332. 
 
 
In reaching its decision in Lockhart, the Court concluded 
that the nature of the alleged discriminatory conduct of 
Wright’s employer fell within the scope of the public policy 
enunciated in the VHRA, “[t]o safeguard all individuals . . . 
from unlawful discrimination [in employment] because of . . . 
sex” Code § 2.1-715.  In order to hold that Wright had pled a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge based on the public 
policy enunciated in the VHRA, we necessarily had to find that 
the alleged actions of her employer fell within the scope of the 
 
19
phrase “discrimination because of . . . sex” in Code § 2.1-715.9  
Otherwise, Wright could not have utilized the VHRA as the source 
of public policy upon which to base her common law action for 
wrongful termination.  Since the decision in Lockhart, we have 
continued to categorize the type of discrimination alleged by 
Wright as “gender discrimination.”  See Lawrence Chrysler 
Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 
(1996); Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 126, 480 
S.E.2d 502, 505 (1997). 
 
Accordingly, even though Mitchem disavows any reliance on 
the VHRA, the sexual harassment that she allegedly endured prior 
to discharge, as well as Counts’ termination of her employment 
because she refused to have a sexual relationship with him, if 
proven true, would violate a public policy reflected in the 
VHRA.  The distinction that Mitchem attempts to make and which 
the majority accepts, that she was fired, not because of “sex,” 
but because she refused to engage in conduct that would have 
violated certain criminal statutes, merely places a different 
label on “sex” discrimination and thus exalts form over 
substance.  The re-labeling of her claim does nothing to alter 
                     
9 None of the other types of discrimination included in Code 
§ 2.1-715 was implicated by the facts plaintiff Wright alleged. 
 
 
20
the facts alleged by Mitchem or the law governing those 
allegations.  Thus, I do not accept that proffered distinction.10
Nevertheless, Mitchem insists that Counts discharged her 
because she refused to commit the crimes of fornication, and 
lewd and lascivious cohabitation, and would not consent to the 
commission of a battery upon her person.11  Thus, according to 
Mitchem, her termination violated the public policies contained 
in the criminal statutes making these acts unlawful, and the 
public policy that an employer cannot fire an employee for 
refusing to commit a crime.  I need not, as the majority does, 
decide whether those criminal statutes sufficiently enunciate 
public policies to support a Bowman-type cause of action by an 
at-will employee for unlawful termination because, even if they 
do, I conclude that Mitchem nonetheless is barred from 
maintaining her action against Counts.12
                     
10 Likewise, I do not believe that Mitchem stated alternative 
theories of recovery just because she alleged that her 
termination violated several public policies. 
 
11 I concur in the result the majority reaches with respect to 
Mitchem’s reliance on Code § 18.2-57 proscribing assault and 
battery, but reach that conclusion for the reasons stated in 
this dissent. 
 
12 The majority’s statement that the public policies behind the 
prohibitions against fornication, a class 4 misdemeanor 
punishable by a maximum $250 fine, and lewd and lascivious 
cohabitation, a class 3 misdemeanor punishable by a maximum $500 
fine, are “equally, if not more compelling than the public 
policy in Bowman,” which supported a stockholder’s right to vote 
free of duress and intimidation by corporate management, does 
 
21
 
After this Court’s decision in Lockhart, the General 
Assembly amended the VHRA.  One of the changes was the addition 
of subsection D to Code § 2.1-725, which prohibits a common law 
cause of action based upon the public policies reflected in the 
VHRA.  Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 254 Va. 362, 372, 492 S.E.2d 441, 
447 (1997). 
 
In Conner v. National Pest Control, Ass’n, 257 Va. 286, 513 
S.E.2d 398 (1999), we expanded upon the impact of subsection D, 
stating that “the General Assembly, in enacting the 1995 
amendments to the VHRA, eliminated a common law cause of action 
for wrongful termination based on any public policy which is 
reflected in the VHRA, regardless of whether the policy is 
articulated elsewhere.”  Id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400.  Thus, 
after Conner, an at-will employee in Virginia cannot maintain a 
cause of action based on the public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine if the public policy is one that is 
“reflected” in the VHRA, even when the employee does not rely on 
or cite the VHRA because the policy is found in other statutes. 
Even if the majority is correct in concluding that 
Virginia’s public policy protects an at-will employee from being 
terminated as a result of refusing to violate the Commonwealth’s 
criminal laws, the facts alleged in this case, if proven, would 
                                                                  
not support the majority’s conclusion that these criminal 
statutes have a sufficient public policy underlying them to 
 
22
contravene not only that public policy, but also the public 
policy of safeguarding individuals from sex discrimination in 
employment, as reflected in the VHRA.  Thus, I believe that 
Mitchem cannot maintain this cause of action.  See Conner, 257 
Va. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400. 
I recognize that the present case is slightly different 
from Conner to the extent that, in support of her claim that she 
was discharged in contravention of a public policy, Mitchem 
cites a policy not contained in the VHRA, specifically her right 
to refuse to commit a crime.  Conner, on the other hand, 
asserted that her discharge from employment violated the public 
policy against discrimination based on gender, which is a policy 
reflected in the VHRA, but she cited statutes other than the 
VHRA as the source of that public policy.  Id. at 288, 513 
S.E.2d at 399.  I believe that this is another distinction 
without a difference, and that this Court’s decision in Conner 
is controlling because, as I have already noted, Counts’ alleged 
conduct, if proven, would violate the public policies reflected 
in the VHRA.  Thus, I conclude that Mitchem’s “[c]ause[] of 
action [is one] based upon the public policies reflected in [the 
VHRA],” Code § 2.1-725(D), despite her attempt to place a 
different label on it. 
                                                                  
support a Bowman-type cause of action. 
 
23
By permitting her cause of action to proceed, the majority 
creates an avenue through which virtually all employees 
asserting allegations similar to Mitchem’s can bypass the 
General Assembly’s clear intent, as expressed in Code § 2.1-
725(D), to “abrogate the common law with respect to causes of 
action for unlawful termination of employment based upon the 
public policies reflected in the [VHRA].”  Doss, 254 Va. at 372, 
492 S.E.2d at 447.  The General Assembly’s purpose in enacting 
subsection D was to bar claims such as the one brought by Wright 
in Lockhart, yet the majority today ignores that clear intent by 
allowing allegations similar to those alleged by Wright to go 
forward despite the language of Code § 2.1-725(D). 
 
Contrary to the majority’s argument that Counts’ position 
would bar a common law wrongful termination action by an 
employee discharged for refusing to engage in intimidatory 
conduct such as burning a cross on the lawn of an African-
American, or painting a swastika on a synagogue, those causes of 
action would not be barred by Code § 2.1-725(D).  In the 
examples utilized by the majority, the discharges would not be 
in violation of the policies reflected in the VHRA because the 
employer’s act of discrimination based on race or religion would 
not be directed toward the employee, but instead would be 
directed toward a third party.  The public policies reflected in 
the VHRA are intended to prohibit discrimination in, inter alia, 
 
24
employment, on the basis of the employee’s “race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related 
medical conditions, age, marital status, or disability.”  Code 
§ 2.1-715.  Those public policies protect an employee, not a 
third party, from being the subject or object of a 
discriminatory act.  In the majority’s hypotheticals, the 
employee would not be the object of the discrimination but would 
be the person who refuses to engage in the discriminatory 
conduct.  In other words, Code § 2.1-725(D) abrogates causes of 
action based on policies reflected in the VHRA, but before those 
policies are implicated, the person against whom discriminatory 
conduct is directed must be a member of the class of persons 
protected by those policies.  Dray v. New Market Poultry Prod., 
Inc., 258 Va. 187, 191, 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1999).  See also 
Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 
sub nom. Brown v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, ___ U.S. 
___, 119 S.Ct. 1577 (1999) (under Title VII, proof that 
plaintiff is a member of a protected group is required to 
establish a prima facie case); Childress v. City of Richmond, 
134 F.3d 1205, 1209 (4th Cir.) (Luttig, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1998) (“in order to qualify as a ‘person 
aggrieved’ . . . [under Title VII], a plaintiff must be a member 
of the class of direct victims of conduct prohibited . . . and 
allege that he, not someone else, has been ‘discriminated 
 
25
against.’”) (Emphasis added); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Manuf. 
Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998) (in a Title VII 
associational discrimination case, “the key inquiries should be 
whether the employee has been discriminated against and whether 
that discrimination was ‘because of’ the employee’s race.”) 
(Emphasis added); Code § 2.1-725(B) (the plaintiff’s age, not 
that of any other person, makes age discrimination contrary to 
the Commonwealth’s public policy).13  Thus, under my view, 
employees terminated because they rightly refused to participate 
in such illegal and improper actions would not be barred by Code 
§ 2.1-725(D) from pursuing common law wrongful termination 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
My dissent may be viewed by some as sanctioning “sex” 
discrimination in the workplace.  In order to dispel any such 
misconception, I reiterate the thoughts expressed in the 
concurring opinion in Conner: 
Gender discrimination should not be countenanced in 
any manner and victims of such discrimination should be 
accorded a tort remedy that fully and fairly compensates 
                     
13 “Associational discrimination cases,” where, for example, a 
Caucasian claims he or she was discriminated against due to his 
or her relationship with an African-American, are permitted, 
Drake, 134 F.3d at 884; Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 
631 F.2d 1144, 1149-50 (4th Cir. 1980), but the hypotheticals 
presented by the majority do not fulfill the criteria for such 
an action. 
 
 
26
them for injuries caused by an employer’s repugnant 
conduct. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
However, the General Assembly of this Commonwealth has 
chosen to impose limitations on the right of a[n employee] 
to recover damages against an employer who discriminates 
. . . because of [the employee’s] gender. . . .  And, this 
Court, which does not, and constitutionally cannot, act as 
a super-legislative body, is required to apply these 
restrictions as expressed by the General Assembly. 
 
Conner, 257 Va. at 290-91, 513 S.E.2d at 400 (Hassell, J., 
concurring). 
 
Unlike the majority, I continue to believe that the proper 
role of this Court is to interpret the law as enacted by the 
General Assembly, and not to function as a “super-legislative 
body.” 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part and 
concur in part. 
 
27