Title: Roberts v. Edwards
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 609, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBIN W. ROBERTS,  
§ 
§ 
No. 609, 2001 
Respondent Below, § 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Family Court of the  
§ 
State of Delaware in and for New 
              v. 
 
§ 
Castle County 
§ 
§ 
File No. CN95-11353 
ROXANNE EDWARDS, 
§ 
 
§ 
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:   July 17, 2002 
Decided:     October 30, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice,  HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 30th day of October 2002, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) This is the appeal of Robin W. Roberts (“Husband”), respondent-appellant, 
from the judgment of the Family Court during an ancillary hearing regarding alimony 
and the division and allocation of marital property.  
(2) Husband raises the following three issues on appeal:  (a) the Family Court 
disregarded the statutory factors contained in 13 Del. C. § 1512; (b) the Family Court 
incorrectly entered Husband’s child support obligation to Wife into a standard 
spreadsheet used to calculate alimony (the “FinPlan” calculation); and (c) the Family 
 
 
- 2 - 
Court failed to consider issues between the parties as to certain marital assets.  We 
affirm the judgment of the Family Court with respect to the first issue and remand on 
issues (b) and (c) so that the Family Court may make the appropriate findings and 
rulings. 
(3) The Family Court held a hearing on October 12, 2001, to determine the 
disposition of the marital assets.  At the end of the hearing, the court made a ruling 
dividing the marital estate 55% to 45% in favor of Wife.  The court then stated that the 
parties “should be able to work out the actual accounting figures,” but also stated, “If 
you can’t do it, you come back here at ten o’clock Monday morning and we’ll all go over 
it together.”  Husband then observed that the parties had “some outstanding issues.”  
The Family Court later stated, “Do you want to agree on it, you can do that.  And you 
want to come back at ten o’clock or can you do the accounting yourselves?”  Wife’s 
counsel responded, “I think [Husband’s counsel] and I can do it.”  Husband’s counsel 
responded, “We can try.” 
(4)   Subsequently, the Family Court issued a disposition in the case.1  It divided 
the marital estate 55% to 45% in favor of Wife2 and divided the marital home 75% to 
                                                 
1Edwards v. Roberts, Del. Fam., C.A. No. CN95-11353 (Oct. 12, 2001). 
2Id. at 3. 
 
 
- 3 - 
25% in favor of Wife.3  In addition, the court awarded Wife alimony of $825 per 
month.4  On October 18, 2001, Husband’s counsel informed the Family Court by letter 
that a meeting to resolve “the issues not resolved by the above referenced ancillary 
hearing” had failed, and requested “the Court schedule approximately two hours to 
address the outstanding property division issues not resolved by the Court on October 
12, 2001.”  
(5)   On October 22, 2001, Husband filed a Motion for Reargument requesting 
that the alimony award be modified to reflect the school tuition of the parties’ daughter 
as an expense for Wife.  Husband further requested that his share of the marital home 
be increased from 25% to 30%.  In a letter decision and order dated November 16, 
2001, the Family Court adjusted the division of the marital home according to 
Husband’s request but declined to modify the alimony amount.  Subsequently, 
Husband brought this appeal. 
                                                 
3Id. at 5. 
4Id. at 6. 
 
 
- 4 - 
(6)   Husband’s first claim is that the Family Court failed to consider the statutory 
factors contained in 13 Del. C. § 1512(c) when determining the alimony award.  After 
speaking to counsel for Husband regarding an alimony award at the October 12th 
hearing, the Family Court noted, “I ought to tell you that based on my application of 
the statutory factors . . . [this case] would be a sixty/forty case.”  Moreover, the Family 
Court specifically discussed several factors (such as “age, education, earning ability, work 
history, [and] the expectation of acquiring assets”) as outlined in section 1512(c).  The 
Family Court’s decision on a petition for alimony “will not be disturbed on appeal if . . . 
its decision reflects due consideration of the statutory factors found in 13 Del. C. § 
1512. . . .”5  Here the Family Court considered the statutory factors of 13 Del. C. § 
1512.  Accordingly, with regard to the first issue on appeal we affirm the judgment of 
the Family Court. 
(7)   Husband next argues the Family Court incorrectly entered Husband’s child 
support obligation to Wife in its FinPlan calculation.  The FinPlan calculation attached 
to the Family Court’s October 12th decision lists “Child Support” on line 23.  No child 
support amount is entered on line 23, either as income to Wife or expense to Husband.  
                                                 
5Deshields v. Harris, 2000 Del. LEXIS 351, at *3-4 (Del. Supr.) (quoting Gray v. Gray, 503 A.2d 198, 201 
(Del. 1986)). 
 
 
- 5 - 
(8) In its October 12th decision, the Family Court modified Husband’s expenses 
by “adding his $611 child support obligation.”6  There was, however, no similar input of 
child support as income to Wife.  To insure the integrity of the FinPlan calculation, the 
Family Court should have re-calculated the FinPlan with the child support payment at 
Line 23, its designated place on the calculation.  On the record before this Court, the 
Family Court’s failure to properly account for child support allows the child support 
payment to count as an expense to Husband without also counting as income for Wife. 
 For this reason, we remand this matter to the Family Court to perform proper 
accounting.  The Family Court may address any collateral issues that arise as a result of 
the re-calculation using its best discretion.  
(9)   Finally, Husband contends the Family Court failed to consider issues 
between the parties regarding certain marital assets. The Family Court is “accorded wide 
latitude in the fixing of property division incident to a decree of divorce under 13 Del. 
                                                 
6Edwards v. Roberts, Fam. Ct., F. No. CN95-11353 (Oct. 12, 2001). 
 
 
- 6 - 
C.  § 1513.”7  This Court reviews such ancillary ruling under an abuse of discretion 
standard.8   
                                                 
7Berg v. Brownell, 2000 Del. LEXIS 118, at *1 (Del. Supr.). 
8Id. 
 
 
- 7 - 
(10)   Husband contends there were issues left unresolved by the Family Court 
after the hearing on October 12, 2001.  Wife argues that these issues were not 
presented in a timely manner and hence Husband waived his right to have the Family 
Court resolve the issues.  Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.9  The standard for finding waiver in Delaware is quite exacting.10  Based 
on the record before us, we cannot say that Husband either voluntarily or intentionally 
waived his right to have the Family Court resolve the disputed property issues.  As there 
was no waiver here the trial court erred by failing to address the remaining marital 
assets.  We, therefore, remand this issue to the Family Court to rule on the remaining 
disputed property. 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED for 
proceedings in accordance with this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
        /s/ E.  Norman Veasey  
                           Chief Justice 
                                                 
9Id. (quoting Realty Growth Inv. v. Council of Unit Owners, 435 A.2d 450, 456 (Del. 1982)). 
10Am. Family Mortgage Corp. v. Acierno, 1994 Del. LEXIS 105, at *13 (Del. Supr.).