Title: Town of Mountainboro v. Treva Griffin and Benny E. Griffin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070731
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2009

REL: 01/16/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070731
____________________
Town of Mountainboro
v.
Treva Griffin and Benny E. Griffin
____________________
1070777
____________________
Treva Griffin and Benny E. Griffin
v.
Town of Mountainboro and City of Boaz
Appeals from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-07-835)
1070731 and 1070777
2
MURDOCK, Justice.
The Town of Mountainboro appeals from a judgment against
it and the City of Boaz in an action filed by Treva Griffin
and Benny E. Griffin contesting the results of an annexation
election.  The Griffins cross-appeal.  As to Mountainboro's
appeal, we reverse and remand; we dismiss the Griffins' cross-
appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 30, 2007, an election was held to determine
whether the citizens of Mountainboro favored the annexation of
their town into Boaz.  The declared result of the election was
82 votes in favor of annexation and 81 votes against
annexation.
On November 9, 2007, the Griffins, qualified electors in
Mountainboro, timely filed in the Etowah Circuit Court a
contest of the annexation election.  Mountainboro and Boaz
were named as the contestees.  The Griffins alleged that
illegal votes had been cast in favor of annexation.  It is
undisputed that the Griffins, as qualified electors of
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Section 11-42-2(8) provides:
1
"Whenever the council [of a city or town] shall
pass a resolution to the effect that the public
health or public good requires that certain
territory ... shall be brought within the limit of
the city or town:
"....
"(8) The result of such election may be
contested by any qualified elector voting at the
election in the manner providing for contest of
general municipal elections, making the city or town
the contestee." 
 
No party disputes that both Boaz and Mountainboro were
properly named by the Griffins as contestees in this case.
3
Mountainboro, had the legal right to contest the annexation
election in this manner.  See § 11-42-2(8), Ala. Code 1975.1
In 
response 
to 
the 
Griffins' 
election 
contest,
Mountainboro and Boaz (sometimes collectively referred to as
"the contestees") alleged, among other things, that illegal
votes likewise had been cast against annexation and that, if
those votes were not considered, the resulting vote totals
would favor annexation.  The Griffins challenged that
response, arguing that "counter-contests can only be commenced
by a qualified voter" and that, therefore, the contestees did
not have legal standing to defend the pro-annexation election
1070731 and 1070777
4
result by challenging the legality of votes cast against
annexation.
On December 28, 2007, the trial court held a hearing at
which ore tenus evidence was presented.  The parties
stipulated that one person who had voted against annexation
was not a qualified elector of Mountainboro and that her vote
should be struck from the total.  The Griffins offered
testimony and evidence concerning three voters who, according
to the Griffins, had cast illegal votes in favor of
annexation.  Mountainboro offered evidence in rebuttal to the
Griffins' evidence.  Also, over the objection of the Griffins,
Mountainboro presented evidence indicating that some voters
had cast illegal votes opposing annexation.  The Griffins
responded with evidence that those voters were legally
entitled to vote and that their votes against annexation were
valid.
On February 5, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment
in favor of the Griffins and against Mountainboro and Boaz.
The court found that two of the three voters challenged by the
Griffins had cast illegal votes in favor of annexation and
that their votes must be struck from the vote total.  Further,
1070731 and 1070777
5
the trial court held that neither municipality was a
"qualified elector" and, consequently, that neither was
entitled to challenge the legality of votes cast against
annexation.  The trial court's rulings resulted in final vote
totals of 80 votes in favor of annexation and 80 votes against
annexation.  Thus, the annexation was not allowed to proceed.
Mountainboro's Appeal (case no. 1070731)
On appeal, Mountainboro raises a single issue, namely,
whether it, as a contestee in the Griffins' annexation-
election contest, had standing to submit evidence of allegedly
illegal votes cast against the annexation of Mountainboro by
Boaz.  The trial court held that Mountainboro did not have
such standing, and we review that holding de novo.  "The issue
of standing presents a pure question of law, and the trial
court's ruling on that issue is entitled to no deference on
appeal."  Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899
So. 2d 949, 953 (Ala. 2004).
We conclude that the trial court incorrectly reasoned
from the fact that the governing statute expressly authorizes
"any qualified elector" of Mountainboro to contest the
declared outcome of the annexation election on the ground,
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6
among others, that illegal votes were cast in favor of the
annexation to the conclusion that Mountainboro did not have
standing to assert that illegal votes were cast against the
annexation. 
We begin our analysis with the text of the governing
statute, § 11-42-2(8).  In pertinent part, § 11-42-2(8) reads:
"The result of such [annexation] election may be contested by
any qualified elector voting at the election in the manner
provided for contest of general municipal elections, making
the city or town the contestee." (Emphasis added.)
The initial problem with the trial court's reasoning is
that the first clause of § 11-42-2(8), emphasized above, does
not say that, in the event of an election contest, the only
party to the contest that can challenge the legality of votes
cast for one side or the other is a "qualified elector."  The
first clause and its reference to a "qualified elector" is
concerned only with who can challenge the declared outcome of
an annexation election, not the grounds upon which a challenge
to that outcome may be based or the grounds upon which that
outcome may be defended.  That is, the first clause of § 11-
42-2(8) merely constitutes a legislative grant of authority to
1070731 and 1070777
7
"any qualified elector" to initiate and prosecute an election
contest. 
The trial court conflated the threshold question of who
may properly initiate the annexation-election contest itself
with the separate and different question of what grounds may
be asserted and proven by that contestant in an effort to
change the outcome of the election.  This in turn led to
apparent confusion as to the corollary question of what
grounds thereafter may be asserted and proven by a contestee
in an effort to prevent a change in the outcome of the
election.  These latter questions, as well as who may serve as
a proper "contestee" in the effort to prevent a change in the
outcome of the election, are questions not addressed by the
first clause of the first sentence of § 11-42-2(8) and its
reference to qualified electors.  To answer these latter
questions, we turn to the balance of that sentence.
The balance of the first sentence of § 11-42-2(8)
expressly provides that a contest of an annexation election is
to be conducted "in the manner provided for contest of general
municipal elections ...."  "The contest of general municipal
elections" is governed by Chapter 46 of Title 11, Ala. Code
1070731 and 1070777
8
1975.  Section 11-46-69 provides that the grounds for
contesting an election include the counting of illegal votes
in favor of the winning side, see § 11-46-69(a)(3), Ala. Code
1975; the rejection of legal votes in favor of the losing
side, see § 11-46-69(a)(4); and/or one or more of three other
grounds, see § 11-46-69(a)(1), (2), and (5), Ala. Code 1975.
The question before us in this case is whether Mountainboro
had the right not only to defend against the attempt by the
Griffins, as contestants, to prove that illegal votes were
cast in favor of the winning side, which, if deducted from the
declared vote total in favor that side, would yield a
different outcome in the election, but also to counter
whatever success the Griffins may have in proving such illegal
votes with evidence of illegal votes in favor of the losing
side, which, if deducted from the final vote total for that
side, would preserve the declared outcome of the election.  
Again, we turn to the text of the statute.  Section
11-42-2(8) expressly provides that the 
contest of an
annexation election is to be conducted in the same manner as
the contest of a general municipal election.  In that regard,
we find instructive this Court's analysis in Eubanks v. Hale,
1070731 and 1070777
9
752 So. 2d 1113, 1134 (Ala. 1999), a case involving a contest
of the 1998 election for sheriff of Jefferson County, in which
Mike Hale had been declared the winner over Jim Woodward:
"The contestants now argue that the contestee is
not entitled to present any evidence because he did
not 
file 
a 
cross-contest, 
but 
the 
contestee
correctly points out that the statutes do not
require that he file an independent 'cross-contest.'
Section 17-15-1, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"'The election of any person declared
elected to ... any office which is filled
by the vote of a single county ... may be
contested....'
"(Emphasis added [in Eubanks].)  Under the language
of the statute, then, only the election of a 'person
declared elected' may be contested.  Because
Woodward had not been declared the winner of the
sheriff's race, the statute did not authorize Hale
to file an election contest.  Section 17-15-32, Ala.
Code 1975, provides:
"'If, on the trial of the contest of
any election, ... it shall appear that any
person other than the one whose election is
contested, received or would have received,
had the ballots intended for him and
illegally rejected been received, the
highest number of legal votes, judgment
must be given declaring such person duly
elected....'
"In light of these statutes, we conclude that the
contestee is not prohibited from introducing such
evidence of votes cast illegally for [the losing
side].  Neither are the contestants foreclosed from
offering any other evidence of illegal votes that
they claimed were cast for [the winning side]."
1070731 and 1070777
10
(Final emphasis added.)
As in Eubanks v. Hale, the applicable statutes in this
case -- §§ 11-42-2(8) and 11-46-69(a), which in all material
respects is worded the same as the statute at issue in Eubanks
-- do not require the filing of a cross-contest.  As in that
case, "we conclude that the contestee is not prohibited from
introducing ... evidence of votes cast illegally for [the
losing side]."  752 So. 2d at 1134.  That is, we conclude that
Mountainboro, as a properly named contestee in this case, had
standing to try to preserve the declared outcome of the
election both by rebutting the evidence of illegal votes cast
in favor of the proposed annexation offered by the contestants
and by submitting evidence of illegal votes cast against the
proposed annexation.   
Our conclusion finds support in common sense, reason, and
fairness.  As was stated in Ex parte Hayes, 405 So. 2d 366,
370 (Ala. 1981) (quoting State v. Calumet & Hecla Consol.
Copper Co., 259 Ala. 225, 233-34, 66 So. 2d 726, 731 (1953))):
"'If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of
which is workable and fair and the other unworkable and
unjust, the court will assume that the legislature intended
1070731 and 1070777
We have not been presented in this case with the issue
2
whether an election-contest procedure whereby one side can
have removed from the vote totals illegal ballots cast against
it but the other side cannot would raise equal-protection or
due-process concerns.
Mountainboro argues in its brief that to hamstring the
3
contestee in the manner proposed by the Griffins "defies
11
that which is workable and fair.'"  Our understanding of the
statutory scheme created by the legislature for contesting
annexation elections avoids a construction that is unworkable
and unjust in favor of one that is workable and just.  It
avoids a construction whereby one side in an election contest
can have removed from the vote totals illegal ballots cast
against it but the other side cannot and thus recognizes the
fundamental importance of the right to vote and is consistent
with fundamental principles regarding the integrity of
elections.      
2
Moreover, we cannot conclude that the legislature, in
adapting § 11-46-69 to an annexation election in § 11-42-2(8),
intended to establish a process by which a contestant can
obtain a binding judgment from a court of law establishing the
legality or illegality of an annexation election by naming
someone as a "contestee," or defendant, who cannot fully
defend the outcome of that election.   If the otherwise
3
1070731 and 1070777
logic."
12
properly named defendants in such a proceeding lack the
necessary standing to fully and fairly defend the outcome of
the election, one may question not only the integrity of the
outcome achieved in such a proceeding but, indeed, whether the
proceeding enjoys the necessary adverseness of parties to make
for a "case" over which the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction in the first place.  Cf. Ex parte State ex rel.
James, 711 So. 2d 952, 960 (Ala. 1998)("'The absence of
adversary or the correct adversary parties is in principle
fatal'" 
to 
justiciability 
and 
thus 
to 
subject-matter
jurisdiction. (emphasis omitted; emphasis added) (quoting
Rogers v. Alabama Bd. of Educ. 392 So. 2d 235, 237 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1980))). 
We therefore conclude that the judgment of the trial
court is due to be reversed.  The cause is remanded for the
trial court to evaluate, consistent with this opinion, the
evidence introduced at trial by Mountainboro of the illegality
of certain votes cast against annexation and to enter a new
judgment that takes that evaluation into consideration.
1070731 and 1070777
13
The Griffins' Cross-Appeal (case no. 1070777)
In their cross-appeal, the Griffins complain that the
record contains no evidence indicating that a prior annexation
into Mountainboro of an area known as Skyland subdivision had
ever been "precleared" by the Justice Department under § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.  Therefore,
according to the Griffins, voters who reside in that area
should not have been included in the current election.  The
Griffins also complain that there had been no Justice
Department preclearance of a strip of land previously annexed
into Boaz that physically connects Mountainboro with Boaz,
establishing the connection necessary for the annexation.
Mountainboro responds by pointing out that the Griffins did
not include their objection to these votes in their complaint
in the election contest and did not make these arguments at
trial, raising them for the first time in a posttrial motion.
In any event, according to Mountainboro, the trial court
was without jurisdiction to entertain a case involving an
interpretation and application of the federal Voting Rights
Act.  It cites Singer v. City of Alabaster, 821 So. 2d 954,
957 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Mitchell v City of Prichard, 538
1070731 and 1070777
14
So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. 2001), which involved a disputes over the
validity of certain purported municipal annexations and
de-annexations), for the proposition that "'cases involving
the interpretation of the preclearance requirements of
Section 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.'"  Based on
Singer and Mitchell, the Griffins cross-appeal is due to be
dismissed.  Any relief the Griffins may seek under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act should be pursued in federal court.
1070731 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
1070777 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Lyons, J., concurs specially.
Woodall, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
1070731 and 1070777
15
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
When the legislature dictates that a statute applicable
to one circumstance shall apply to a different circumstance,
we are confronted with challenging issues of statutory
construction.  Although I am not unmindful of our obligation
to construe strictly laws governing election contests, I am
satisfied that the main opinion correctly adheres to
legislative intent.  
Section 11-42-2(8), Ala. Code 1975, expressly provides
that the town or city seeking to annex the property is
properly named as the "contestee" in a contest of an
annexation election.  Section 11-42-2(8) also contemplates
that the contest is to be conducted in the same manner as the
contest of a general municipal election.  
I consider the legislature's use of the word "contestee"
in § 11-42-2(8), when coupled with the incorporation of
procedures 
governing 
general 
municipal 
elections, 
as
sufficient indicia of intent to confer upon a municipality
named in a contest of an annexation election the same
prerogative of challenging illegal votes as enjoyed by a party
also described as a "contestee" in several instances in Title
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16
17, Chapter 16, Ala. Code 1975, who, as a candidate for
office, is of necessity a qualified elector.  Had the
legislature been disinclined to permit a municipality the
prerogative available to a contestee under the general-
election-contest statute, then it could easily have phrased §
11-42-2(8), in which the general-municipal-election-contest
statute 
is 
made 
applicable, 
without 
describing 
the
municipality as a "contestee."
1070731 and 1070777
17
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
"This Court has been unequivocal in stating that
elections normally do not fall within the scope of judicial
review."  Sears v. Carson, 551 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Ala. 1989).
"An election contest is a statutory matter, and the statute
governing the 
election must be strictly observed and
construed."  Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d 673, 680 (Ala. 2008).
"'An election contest being purely statutory, the courts are
limited in their investigation to such subjects as are
specified in the statutes.'"  Longshore v. City of Homewood,
277 Ala. 444, 446, 171 So. 2d 453, 455 (1965)(quoting 29
C.J.S. Elections § 247).  In my opinion, the Court has ignored
these 
well 
established 
principles; 
consequently, 
I
respectfully dissent.
The Court holds that Mountainboro, the municipality that
conducted the annexation election, has the legal right to
challenge the legality of certain votes cast in the election.
However, this holding is not supported by the applicable
statutes.  Having considered the unambiguous language in both
§ 11-42-2(8), Ala. Code 1975, and § 11-46-69(a)(3), Ala. Code
1975, it is clear to me that only a "qualified elector" has
1070731 and 1070777
18
standing to challenge the legality of votes cast in an
annexation election.  Any other conclusion violates the
principle that "the statute[s] governing the election must be
strictly observed and construed."  
I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the analysis
in Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. 1999), is
instructive in this case.  In its judgment, the trial court
stated:
"Hale held that once a contest is filed, it is
not necessary for the contestees to file an
independent 'cross-contest' in order to challenge
votes themselves.  In Hale, however, the contestant
and the respondent/contestee were both 'qualified
electors.'  So, Hale is not instructive on the key
issue of [Mountainboro's] standing in the case at
bar."
The trial court correctly distinguished Hale, and that case
does not support today's holding.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of
the trial court in Mountainboro's appeal.  The Griffins in
their cross-appeal, of course, have argued that the judgment
is due to be affirmed.  Consequently, I would dismiss their
cross-appeal as moot.
Stuart and Bolin, JJ., concur.