Title: Cockrum v. State
Citation: 234 N.E.2d 479, 250 Ind. 366
Docket Number: 31,038
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 1968

250 Ind. 366 (1968)
234 N.E.2d 479
COCKRUM
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 31,038.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 5, 1968.
Rehearing denied May 13, 1968.
*368 Sidney H. Showalter, of Columbus, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, C.J.
This is an appeal from a conviction, by a jury, for the crime of First-Degree Murder. A plea of insanity was entered by the defendant as well as one of not guilty.
The appellant drove a stolen automobile to a service station and compelled the attendant, at gun-point, to fill the car with gasoline. While the attendant filled the car's gasoline tank, appellant told him that he had spent time in prison and that he was going to kill three (3) people before the night was over.
Subsequent to this encounter, appellant went to the decedent's home, secretly entered the house and confronted the decedent and her husband with a shotgun. After some conversation, he shot the husband in the leg, and subsequently, shot the wife in the head, such wound being fatal.
When appellant was arrested in the decedent's home, he stated that he had shot said decedent.
On appeal appellant claims as errors:
In examining the first of appellant's alleged errors, the following facts should be considered. The amended indictment was returned on December 19, 1961. On January 2, 1962, the defendant was arraigned and a plea of not guilty was entered. After the cause was set for trial, the defendant filed a plea *369 of insanity on March 16, 1962. A sanity hearing was held on May 9, 1962, with the result being that the proceedings were ordered stayed by reason of the defendant being mentally incapable of standing trial.
Appellant was held at Norman Beatty Mental Hospital until April 8, 1965, when he was declared capable of standing trial and returned for trial. Counsel was appointed by the Court on May 12, 1965.
On September 14, 1965, a motion to change venue from the county was filed and granted. The cause was assigned for trial on October 1, 1965. Thereafter, on October 8, 1965, appellant filed for a change of venue from the Judge which was denied. It is the denial of this motion which appellant assigns as error.
Supreme Court Rule No. 1-12C (1964), Change of Venue in Criminal Cases, provides, in part, as follows:
Appellant maintains that since he was indicted in 1961, before the effective date of Rule 1-12C, supra, and was in the hospital during its inception; he cannot be bound by it now and is not precluded from a change of venue from the Judge.
In 1962 the proceedings for the appellant were stayed because the defendant did not have sufficient comprehension to understand the proceedings and to make his defense thereon. Upon his return for trial in 1965, he was declared capable of standing trial and was provided counsel. Rule 1-12C, supra, is a rule of procedure. It does not *370 add to or subtract from appellant's substantive rights, but merely prescribes the manner in which one may effect this right. The Supreme Court, in changing Rules, may supersede statutes. State ex rel. Blood et al. v. Gibson Circuit Court et al. (1959), 239 Ind. 394, 157 N.E.2d 475. Therefore, this rule is applicable upon its effective date which in this case was June 1, 1963.
The proceedings prior to the appellant's commitment are not controlling here. The appellant was incapable of standing trial. Upon his return he filed his motion for change of venue from the county which was granted and his cause was assigned for trial. The time for filing a motion for change of venue from the Judge under Supreme Court Rule No. 1-12C (1964) had expired, but appellant had not lost his complete right to a change of venue from the Judge and should have filed under the following provision:
However, appellant did not meet the requirements of this rule and is deemed to have waived his rights thereunder.
Appellant's second assigned error refers to the testimony of the sheriff and two (2) of his deputies concerning the sanity of the defendant. Appellant contends that a proper foundation was not laid for such testimony in that the prior testimony of each witness did not qualify them to give such an opinion.
*371 In substance, all three (3) witnesses testified as to appellant's behavior subsequent to his arrest, while incarcerated, and to their former experience with other insane persons with whom they have had contact in accordance with their respective duties as law enforcement officers.
The Trial Court committed no error in allowing this testimony into evidence.
Appellant's third alleged error concerned the Trial Court's giving of the following Instructions over objection:
He objects to these Instructions on, basically, two (2) grounds:
It is true that on their face, Instructions No. 21 and No. 25 do not establish the State's burden of proving the defendant sane at the time of the crime charged. However, Instructions No. 19 and No. 24 (as set out herein below) expressly define the State's burden in this area.
In Britt v. State (1962), 242 Ind. 548, 180 N.E.2d 235, this Court said:
In Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185, cited by appellant, a similar problem arose as is alleged in objection (2) to the Instructions in question. It is stated therein:
Flowers v. State, supra, was reversed by this Court. However, upon examination it is apparent that it was not reversed on the above grounds.
In Miller v. State of Indiana (1944), 223 Ind. 50, 58 N.E.2d 114, the following statement is made:
The test for erroneous instructions to be extracted from Miller v. State, supra, is one of misleading the jury. Instructions No. 19, No. 21 and No. 24 all contain language to the effect "of the offense charged".
In construing the instructions together as warranted by Britt v. State, supra, it is our conclusion that the jury would not be misled by these phrases, and the appellant was not harmed thereby.
Appellant's fourth alleged error concerns the Court's refusal to use defendant's tendered Instructions No. 6, No. 9 and No. 11.
Instruction No. 6, as tendered, attempts to set forth that there was no motive proven by the State for the commission of the crime. Therefore, the lack of a motive is evidence of insanity. There is presented in the testimony some evidence of a motive, that being defendant's statements pertaining to the decedent "sending him to jail." Notwithstanding this, however, the case relied upon by appellant, Goodwin v. State *376 (1884), 96 Ind. 550, for this "lack of motive theory" contains the following statement:
We conclude that this Instruction is under the category of those which point out evidence "tending to show" a fact as stated in White v. State (1899), 153 Ind. 689, 54 N.E. 763:
To summarize, Instruction No. 6 as offered by the defendant was designed to emphasize evidence of "little importance" to the jury. However, the Instruction contained no direction to the jury that they were to determine the weight of it; but, to the contrary, it stated that such evidence "... may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to his sanity", thereby overemphasizing the importance of it and misleading the jury. The Instruction was properly denied.
Defendant's tendered Instruction No. 9 attempts to instruct the jury that certain evidence admitted is solely for the purpose of determining the sanity of the defendant. Under the doctrine as recently stated in Fulmer v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 261, 230 N.E.2d 307, this would have been a valid instruction; except, instructions to the jury are not to mislead the jury nor to over-emphasize certain evidence. Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch (1931), *377 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440. Upon careful reading of the Instruction at issue, it appears to be emphasizing that the defendant had been committed to an institution for the criminally insane and that the acts all happened at a time remote from the alleged killing. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in refusing this Instruction.
Defendant's tendered Instruction No. 11 is adequately covered in Instruction Nos. 18 through 26 as given by the Trial Court. Therefore, the failure to give this Instruction will not constitute reversible error. Hinds, Executor of Estate of Sickels, Deceased v. McNair et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 34, 129 N.E.2d 553.
Appellant's last alleged error concerns the sufficiency of the evidence as to defendant's sanity and criminal responsibility. He maintains that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane due to the fact that defendant's prior commitment raised a presumption of insanity.
In its endeavor to do this, the State introduced two (2) lay witnesses and a practicing psychiatrist who testified that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime, thereby rendering him criminally responsible.
On appeal from a criminal conviction where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the Supreme Court cannot weigh the evidence but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the State, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom to determine whether the jury was warranted in returning a verdict of guilty. Gilmore v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 359, 98 N.E.2d 677; Flowers v. State, supra.
We find that the jury was so warranted. There are no valid errors raised and we affirm the conviction.
Arterburn, Hunter and Mote, JJ. concur. Jackson, J., dissents.
NOTE.  Reported in 234 N.E.2d 479.