Title: Marie's Blue Cheese Dressing, Inc. v. ANDRE'S BETTER FDS., INC.
Citation: 415 P.2d 501, 68 Wash. 2d 756
Docket Number: 38562
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1966

68 Wn.2d 756 (1966) 415 P.2d 501 MARIE'S BLUE CHEESE DRESSING, INC., Respondent, v. ANDRE'S BETTER FOODS, INC., et al., Appellants.[*] No. 38562. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. June 9, 1966. Joseph J. Carr, James D. Sawyer, and Max R. Nicolai, for appellants. *757 Wettrick, Toulouse, Lirhus &amp; Hove and Arnold J. Barer, for respondent. HUNTER, J. This cause must be remanded for trial on procedural grounds. Since we do not reach the merits, it is not necessary to detail the facts other than the procedural steps taken and the dates of the judgment and orders entered by the trial court. After trial before the court sitting without a jury, judgment was entered on August 10, 1965, in favor of the plaintiff (respondent), Marie's Blue Cheese Dressing, Inc., enjoining the defendant (appellant), Andre's Better Foods, Inc., and other named defendants, from engaging in the production, sale and distribution of any mayonnaise-based blue cheese dressing under the name of "Andre's Blue Cheese Dressing," or any other names, and from disclosing any confidential information constituting the formula and method of production of the product known as "Marie's Blue Cheese Dressing." Motion for a new trial was timely filed by the defendants. An order granting the defendants a new trial was entered on August 20, 1965. No appeal was taken therefrom within 15 days thereafter, as allowed by Rule on Appeal 33(1) (b), RCW vol. 0. On September 10, 1965, plaintiff filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order granting the defendants a new trial. On September 17, 1965, the court reinstated the original judgment of August 10, 1965, and vacated the order which granted a new trial. The defendants appeal from the September 17, 1965 order. The defendants contend that the trial court lost jurisdiction to change its order of August 20th granting the defendants a new trial, there having been no appeal therefrom within 15 days after the entry of the order under Rule on Appeal 33 (1) (b), supra. The plaintiff on the other hand contends that the trial court has jurisdiction under RCW 4.32.240 to vacate or modify the order granting a new trial on the ground of correcting a mistake. *758 The plaintiff points out that the court stated it had overlooked certain testimony when the order of August 20, 1965, granting the defendants a new trial, was entered; that when it was brought to the court's attention by the plaintiff that this testimony was overlooked, the trial court corrected this mistake by vacating the order granting a new trial and reinstating the original judgment. The plaintiff contends the trial court was entitled to take such action under RCW 4.32.240. [1] This statute does not authorize a court to correct its own mistakes, but it applies only to the modification of judgments or orders entered against a party through his own mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. [2] The plaintiff further contends that the court has inherent power to correct its own mistakes of fact, seeking to distinguish those cases in which this court has held that trial courts have no inherent power to correct errors of law. Plaintiff's choice of terminology indicates some confusion concerning the lines of distinction which have been drawn in this area. The distinction is not between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law, but between errors of law and irregularities which are extraneous to the action of the court or go to the question of the regularity of its proceedings. In Kern v. Kern, 28 Wn.2d 617, 619, 183 P.2d 811 (1947), we said: See also, Trautman, "Vacation and Correction of Judgments in Washington," 35 Wash. L. Rev. 505, 515. It is clear that the error the trial court sought to correct was not "something extraneous to the action of the court or [going] only to the question of the regularity of its proceedings." *759 [3] The plaintiff further argues that the granting of an order for a new trial is not a final order and the trial court has the inherent power to modify or vacate an order granting a new trial, citing 61 A.L.R.2d 643, 644, 645: This is not the rule in Washington. In Coyle v. Seattle Elec. Co., 31 Wash. 181, 184, 71 Pac. 733 (1903), we said: The trial court could not correct its own error after the time for appeal from the entry of the order had expired. The order granting a new trial was final for all purposes except as to the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the case at the new trial thereof and matters relating thereto. The order of September 17th, reinstating the original judgment of August 10th, is reversed; the order granting a *760 new trial is reinstated, and the cause is remanded therefor for a new trial. Costs will abide the final determination of the cause. ROSELLINI, C.J., OTT, J., and LANGENBACH, J. Pro Tem., concur. HILL, J., concurs in the result. [*] Reported in 415 P.2d 501.