Title: CITY OF LAWTON v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL 24
Citation: 2002 OK 1, 41 P.3d 371, 73OBJ128
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 2002

CITY OF LAWTON v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL 24 Annotate this Case CITY OF LAWTON v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL 24 2002 OK 1 41 P.3d 371 73 OBJ 128 Case Number: 95122 Decided: 01/08/2002 Mandate Issued: 02/01/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA CITY OF LAWTON, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff/Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL 24, Bargaining Agent, and DAMION SEAN HART, Defendants/Appellees ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. III ¶0 In a proceeding to vacate an arbitration award (for reinstatement to employment)with a counterclaim for the award's confirmation, the District Court, Comanche County, Roy D. Moore, judge, gave summary relief to the defendants on some but not all the issues pressed by the counterclaim. The City's quest for the award's vacation was denied. The City appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari granted upon the City's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO GO FORWARD WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO A TIMELY POSTJUDGMENT APPELLATE REVIEW Frank V. Jensen, Lawton, Oklahoma, for Appellant James R. Moore, Douglas D. Vernier, James Moore and Associates, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellees. OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in not dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction? We answer in the affirmative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 The City of Lawton [City] terminated the employment of Damion Hart [Hart], a police officer. He challenged the discharge by filing a grievance with the City. Upon its denial he demanded grievance arbitration asserted as authorized by a collective bargaining agreement II THE JULY 24 ORDER DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN APPEALABLE DISPOSITION ¶4 Although the City's petition in error states that the appeal is from summary judgment that disposed of all claims by the parties, it also notes that "any issues as to the calculation of the backpay award" stood undecided and their resolution postponed "for later hearing, if necessary." According to the petition in error, the parties anticipate filing at nisi prius a stipulation on the amount of the compensation due Hart. ¶5 This appeal is prosecuted from an unappealable order that stops short of rendering judgment. To serve as a judgment, the adjudication here on review would have been required to determine all the issues tendered by the counterclaim for confirmation of the arbitration decision. III THE JURISDICTIONAL FLAW CANNOT BE CURED (AND THE APPEAL SAVED FROM DISMISSAL) BY AN IMPERMISSIBLE POSTAPPEAL NISI PRIUS STIPULATION TENDERED ON CERTIORARI ¶6 The City has attempted to cure the jurisdictional flaw by attaching to its certiorari brief a copy of a postappeal stipulation filed in the trial court. The parties [ 41 P.3d 375 ] inform us that by this stipulation there are no longer any disputed issues left to be decided and that no other nisi prius hearings will be necessary. The City's mid-certiorari attempt to cure the jurisdictional flaw by its effort to diminute, in this fashion, the record for appeal comes too late. ¶7 The supplementation sought to be made is unauthorized. This is so because the material had neither been tendered to the trial court during the pre-order stages nor had been acted upon when the decision on review was made. A. The July 24 Order Cannot Be Reached For Nunc Pro Tunc Correction ¶8 The jurisdictional defect that taints this appeal cannot be cured by a nunc pro tunc correction. Orders nunc pro tunc are designed neither to bring into the record what a court might or should have done nor what it might or should have intended to do. The function of a nunc pro tunc entry is to amend a judgment in order to make it speak the truth about what actually transpired or was considered and adjudged. B. The Postappeal Stipulation is Coram Non Judice¶10 The parties in essence would have this court overlook its lack of jurisdiction over the appealed case because they now appear to agree that the appeal should not be dismissed. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties or even by one's failure to complain. IV THE CITY'S MID-CERTIORARI ATTEMPT TO CURE THE JURISDICTIONAL ERROR BY HAVING ITS APPEAL RECAST AS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO REVIEW A CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER COMES TOO LATE ¶11 In the event the order is held not to have been appealable, the City requests that the court do not dismiss its flawed appeal but rather recast it as a certiorari proceeding to review a certified interlocutory order. ¶12 The City originally secured a "conditional" certification of the July 24 order that was tendered here for corrective relief. The last sentence of that order clearly expresses doubt about the decision's appealable quality.26 The text of the order states that "[t]o the extent this Journal Entry of Judgment is not considered a final judgment, it is hereby certified that an immediate appeal, if so desired by either party, will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation." (emphasis supplied). The certification was intended to make the July 24 ruling legally fit for prejudgment certiorari review authorized by the terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 952(3)(b).27 ¶14 Had the City correctly designated its petition as one for certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order (rather than as [ 41 P.3d 377 ] an appeal), its review quest would have been reached for immediate consideration on whether its certiorari petition should be granted. If certiorari had been granted, the case would have been retained for this court's disposition. Because the petition in error adroitly masked that the July 24 disposition had been certified as an interlocutory order and that there is (or may be) a jurisdictional defect in presenting the case as an appeal, the paperwork was treated (by this court and by the Court of Civil Appeals) as an appeal from "summary judgment." ¶15 The City now calls for recasting of the ill-fated appeal into a petition for certiorari. It urges that at this stage of the proceedings the court should not elevate form over substance and instead recast rather than dismiss this appeal. We hold that the City's mid-certiorari revelation of the true nature of the July 24 disposition comes much too late for relief by prejudgment certiorari review. That choice should have been offered this court when the case was initially filed rather than when the court's jurisdiction now stands confined to postappeal certiorari review of the COCA opinion. At this certiorari stage, the court no longer enjoys the same range of discretion in choosing among competing alternatives which would have been affordable when the case originally came for consideration. ¶16 Because the July 24 order is neither an appealable decision nor was brought here for prejudgment review by a petition for certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order, the City's appeal must fail. V SUMMARY ¶17 This appeal is prosecuted from an unappealable order that fails to adjudicate all the issues tendered below. At this stage of the case the jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by a nunc pro tunc correction of the record. Neither can the appeal be recast into a petition for certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order. This court's jurisdiction must now stand limited to certiorari review of the COCA opinion. Any postappeal nisi prius action in the case, called for by the parties' tendered stipulation, would be coram non judice. It is simply too late for the City to cure the jurisdictional flaw and to prevent the appeal's dismissal. ¶18 On certiorari granted upon the City's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated; the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the cause remanded for further proceedings to go forward without prejudice to a timely postjudgment appellate review. ¶19 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, KAUGER, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur; ¶20 SUMMERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. FOOT