Title: Jackson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-2090
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 2015

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-2090 
____________ 
 
KIM JACKSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[August 27, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction of 
first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and the 
death sentence.   
FACTS 
 
Debra Pearce was stabbed to death in her kitchen on or around October 17, 
2004.  The murder remained unsolved until 2008, when DNA from a hair found on 
Pearce’s body was matched to Kim Jackson and a fingerprint found in blood on the 
sink above Pearce’s body was also matched to Jackson.   
 
- 2 - 
The Murder 
Pearce was last seen by her mother between midnight and 1:30 a.m. on 
October 15 to 16, 2004.  Pearce was discovered late in the evening on October 18, 
or in the early morning hours of October 19, by a neighbor and friend of Pearce 
who purchased drugs from her and used them at the house.  That evening, the 
friend walked past Pearce’s house and saw that the gate was open.  Over the 
previous days, he had called her several times, but received no answer, and he had 
noticed that her van was not in her driveway.  When he approached the house, he 
saw that the sliding glass door was open.  He entered and found Pearce’s body.  He 
returned to his house and called the police.   
The medical examiner determined that the cause of Pearce’s death was 
hypovolemic shock due to vascular hemorrhage as a result of stab wounds to the 
neck and shoulder—in layman’s terms, Pearce bled to death as a result of a fatal 
stab wound to her neck that struck her jugular vein and a fatal stab wound to her 
chest/shoulder area that struck her subclavian artery and vein.  The stab wound to 
the chest pierced through Pearce’s bra, sliced her left breast, continued across into 
the right side of her chest, and pierced her scapula.  The knife, which had been left 
in Pearce’s chest, was only five inches long, but it had penetrated seven to eight 
inches into her body.  The blow with the knife was forceful enough to pierce the 
 
- 3 - 
scapula and break off a 3/4 inch area of bone, and the wound would have caused a 
significant amount of blood loss as well as an arterial blood spurt pattern.   
The medical examiner also found several other injuries.  Because the body 
was in the early stages of decomposition, the medical examiner could not 
determine whether certain injuries were lacerations or incisions.  One such injury 
was a superficial wound to Pearce’s forehead, and another was a wound to her left 
cheek.  Additionally, there were two wounds to Pearce’s chin—one where the 
blade entered, and the other where the blade exited.  Pearce also had two cuts 
across her ear, a scrape or abrasion on the left side of her head that indicated she 
had been hit or her body was dragged, and five shallow cuts on the left side of her 
head.  Her right eye was bruised from a forceful blow.  Additionally, Pearce had 
two lacerations/incisions to her right forehead that were jagged, due to either a 
knife with a dull blade, or the blade of a knife being raggedly ripped across her 
skin.   
The medical examiner could not be certain as to whether Pearce was 
conscious throughout the attack, but stated that it was possible because she bled to 
death—she was not knocked unconscious, her spinal cord was not severed, and no 
major organs were involved.  Additionally, Pearce’s right pinky finger had a deep 
cut that penetrated the tendons and was consistent with a defensive wound.  Pearce 
also had a cut on the back of her left forearm that went from shallow to deep, 
 
- 4 - 
which could have occurred while she attempted to ward off a blow.  Further, the 
medical examiner testified that minor blunt-force injuries which were present—
including those to her forehead, head, and ear—demonstrated that she struggled.   
A crime scene reconstructionist was called to Pearce’s house on October 19, 
and he noted that Pearce, who was face-down on the kitchen floor below the sink, 
had been dead for some time.  The reconstructionist retrieved a dark-colored hair 
from the back of Pearce’s right calf that appeared out of place.  He observed the 
knife that had been left in Pearce’s chest and also found a second knife beneath her 
body.1  Additionally, the reconstructionist found significant blood spatter in the 
kitchen and determined that the spatter around the sink was consistent with either a 
weapon being swung back, or from the impact when the weapon was swung down.  
He also discovered a fingerprint in blood on the lip of the sink.   
The reconstructionist utilized luminal testing on red stains detected on the 
rug outside of the kitchen, which revealed an impression left by a person wearing a 
sock, and another impression left by a person wearing a shoe.  He testified that it 
appeared as though the person who left the tread dragged his or her feet, and the 
tread appeared to lead toward the master bathroom.  He could not determine 
                                          
 
1.  The small knife located under Pearce tested positive for the presence of 
blood, and presented a mixed profile with Pearce as a major contributor.  Two to 
three other DNA profiles were present on the knife, and Jackson was excluded as 
being one of the possible contributors.   
 
- 5 - 
whether the impressions had been left by more than one person and stated that it 
was possible more than one person had been at the scene.   
The investigation revealed that around the time of the murder, an eyewitness 
saw three individuals near the back of Pearce’s house.  The lead detective spoke 
with two of these individuals, who admitted that they took several items from the 
house, including a television, a VCR, and a DVD player.  However, no forensic 
evidence linked these individuals to the home or Pearce.   
Fingerprints that were found at Pearce’s house were submitted to the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) latent print unit in Jacksonville.  The 
analyst there determined that none of the prints were of value.  However, the lead 
detective discovered that the Pinellas County unit possessed equipment that could 
enhance latent prints, and the sink was transported there so that more detail could 
be obtained from the latent fingerprint located on the sink.  Although the 
equipment did not prove to be particularly useful, the Pinellas County latent print 
unit examined the photographs of the sink fingerprint and determined that it was of 
value.  However, no match for the fingerprint was found at that time.  The lead 
detective also submitted photographs of several of the prints lifted from Pearce’s 
house to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The FBI determined that 
among the prints it received, one latent fingerprint was of value (the sink 
 
- 6 - 
fingerprint), and one latent palm print was of value.  The FBI was also unable to 
match either print to any known individual at that time.   
Identification 
 
It was only later that FDLE matched DNA extracted from the hair that was 
found on Pearce’s calf to Jackson.2  After receiving this information, the lead 
detective located Jackson in Georgia, where he had been incarcerated since 2005.  
During an interview with Jackson on January 22, 2008, the lead detective asked 
whether Jackson knew Pearce or had been to her house.  The detective showed 
Jackson a photograph of Pearce, as well as several pictures of her house.  Jackson 
asserted that he had never met or seen Pearce, and had never been to her house.   
 
After Jackson was identified as a suspect, latent print analysts with the FBI 
and Pinellas County were asked to compare Jackson’s known prints with the 
fingerprint from the sink.  Jacqueline Slebrch, the FBI latent print examiner, 
examined the photograph of the sink fingerprint.3  She noted spots or distortion on 
the fingerprint, and that the fingerprint was one of multiple prints left on top of 
                                          
 
2.  The record does not clearly state when the identification was made.  
However, the lead detective testified that he located Jackson after he obtained the 
DNA and fingerprint evidence, and the interview of Jackson occurred in January 
2008.   
 
3.  Slebrch was not the first FBI analyst to examine the prints, which were 
first examined by an analyst who later left the FBI.  Slebrch performed her own 
analysis, and her conclusions matched those made by the first FBI analyst.   
 
- 7 - 
each other.  However, she determined that the print was of value and matched the 
right ring finger of Jackson.  With respect to when the fingerprint could have been 
placed on the sink, Slebrch testified that she had never encountered a situation in 
which a fingerprint was left and, at a later date, captured and preserved by being 
coated in a substance such as blood, but that such an occurrence could be possible.  
She also explained that when a person has an excess amount of blood or other 
substance on his or her hand and then touches a surface, the substance will be 
pushed between the friction ridges on a fingerprint, and an imprint of the furrows 
will be left on the surface.  She testified that this is a factor to consider when 
looking at a latent print such as the sink fingerprint.   
 
The sink fingerprint was also examined by William Schade, who worked for 
the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office.  Like Slebrch, he concluded that the sink 
fingerprint matched the right ring finger of Jackson, and that the fingerprint was 
left on the sink while Jackson’s finger was coated in a wet substance, such as 
blood.  When Schade made the comparison, he had no knowledge that Slebrch had 
also concluded that the sink fingerprint matched the right ring finger of Jackson.   
 
However, during trial, Jackson presented the testimony of Michelle Royal, 
the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office latent print analyst who concluded that the sink 
fingerprint was of no value and could not be used to identify any suspect.  She 
nonetheless testified that even prints of no value can be used to exclude suspects,  
 
- 8 - 
and acceded both that Jackson could not be excluded as the individual who left the 
sink fingerprint, and that similarities existed between the sink fingerprint and the 
known print of Jackson.   
Alibi 
 
Jackson presented as an alibi that he visited Adel, Georgia, between October 
15, 2004, and October 22, 2004, to celebrate his birthday with his family, which he 
did every year for a weekend around his birthday.  His birthday is October 13, 
which fell on a Wednesday in 2004.  October 15 was the Friday that followed his 
birthday.  The testimony of Jackson and his wife, sister, and father presented as an 
alibi that his cousin drove him to Adel on Friday, October 15, and he did not return 
until after the murder occurred.  He had intended to return on Sunday with his 
cousin, but did not, and later obtained money from a friend for bus tickets, missed 
the initial bus, and eventually returned to Jacksonville by bus on October 22.  The 
friend who provided Jackson with bus money testified that she recalled that 
Jackson visited her work place in October 2004, but she could not recall the date.   
Jackson testified that he knew Pearce through her boyfriend, had met her 
between five and ten times, and had been to her house approximately five times.  
He had previously purchased crack cocaine from Pearce’s boyfriend, as well as 
from Pearce.  He also testified that he and Pearce had become comfortable 
interacting with each other, and that she would let him enter her house.   
 
- 9 - 
Jackson explained that when he was interviewed by the lead detective, he 
did not admit that he knew Pearce or that he had been to her house because he 
knew the detective was investigating a homicide, wished to distance himself from 
Pearce, and did not want to be implicated in something he did not do.  He also 
testified that he did not recognize Pearce in the photograph he was shown during 
the interview because it was in black and white, and she appeared dead in the 
photograph.   
Jackson testified that he had been at Pearce’s house one week before his trip 
to Adel, and he helped move a couch while he was there.  Jackson explained that 
his fingerprint could be on the sink because he had removed a rag from the garbage 
disposal and placed his hand on the sink while he looked under it.  He admitted 
that his hands were not bloody when he repaired the disposal, and that this 
occurred months before the murder.   
In rebuttal, the State presented the lead detective, who testified that Pearce’s 
vehicle was found on the same road where Jackson resided at the time of the 
murder.  The vehicle was approximately one to one and a half miles from his 
residence.  However, no evidence connected Jackson to the vehicle.4   
                                          
 
4.  The upholstery covering of the armrest tested positive for blood, and the 
DNA profile matched Pearce.  Additionally, a mixed DNA profile with Pearce as 
the major contributor was found on the steering wheel cover of the vehicle.  The 
DNA results with respect to the second contributor were inconclusive, but the 
FDLE DNA analyst testified that the second contributor was male.    
 
- 10 - 
Because the evidence suggested that another person may have been present 
during the murder—i.e., the footprints and the second knife with DNA that did not 
match Pearce or Jackson—the State requested that a principal instruction be given.  
The trial court agreed, and a principal instruction was read to the jury.  On April 
17, 2013, the jury found Jackson guilty of the first-degree murder of Debra Pearce.   
Penalty Phase 
During the penalty phase, the State presented the victim impact statements 
of Pearce’s mother and daughter.  The parties stipulated to two aggravating 
circumstances: (1) Jackson was on probation at the time of the murder, and (2) 
Jackson was previously convicted of three violent felonies.5  Additionally, despite 
the stipulation, the State presented the testimony of the victims of two of the prior 
violent felonies.  The victim of the armed robbery testified that Jackson robbed her 
at gunpoint while she was at work.  The surveillance video of the event was played 
for the jury.  The victim of the aggravated assault testified that he worked for the 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation and, while he was assigned to purchase cocaine 
while undercover in the Adel area, he unsuccessfully attempted to purchase crack 
                                          
 
5.  These felony convictions were: (1) a 1988 conviction for robbery; (2) a 
1992 conviction for aggravated assault; and (3) a 2006 conviction for armed 
robbery.  Jackson was on probation at the time of the murder for the 1992 
aggravated assault conviction.  The trial court ultimately based the aggravating 
circumstance of prior violent felony only on the second two felony convictions 
because there was no indication that the 1988 robbery, which was from Georgia, 
actually involved violence.   
 
- 11 - 
from Jackson.  However, when he approached another individual, Jackson ran up, 
pushed the individual out of the way, pulled his shirt up, and pulled out a gun.   
Jackson presented the testimony of forensic psychologist Dr. Jerry Valente, 
who met with Jackson twice to determine whether he was competent for trial.  Dr. 
Valente performed a standardized intelligence test on Jackson, and determined that 
Jackson is of low-average intelligence.  Specifically, Jackson’s IQ is within a 10-
point range of 84.  His brain is fully developed and he completed the 12th grade.  
Dr. Valente testified that Jackson displayed no evidence of psychosis, neurosis, or 
hallucinations, and was cooperative, well-mannered, and respectful of authority.  
Dr. Valente described Jackson’s psychological profile as flat and with nothing of 
clinical significance.   
Jackson also presented several people who testified with respect to his 
positive attributes, including that he: (1) was good at sports; (2) worked well with 
others; (3) coached and participated in softball; (4) was a role model and a leader; 
(5) was caring, supportive, and kind; (6) was upbeat; (7) motivated and encouraged 
others; (8) was dependable; (9) was helpful; (10) was humble; (11) was respectful; 
(12) was religious and attended prayer meetings; (13) spoke well of and displayed 
genuine concern for others; (14) regretted and was sorry for certain actions during 
his life, and wished to be and do better; (15) was a hard worker, who did good 
work, was prompt, and did not complain about long hours; (16) was protective; 
 
- 12 - 
(17) was trusted around and good with children; and (18) would be a positive 
influence in others’ lives.   
Jackson’s father testified that he was in the Army when Jackson was a child 
and was stationed at various locations both within and outside of the United States.  
When the father was stationed in the United States, Jackson spent summers at the 
army bases.  When the father was stationed out of the country, Jackson lived with 
his grandfather.  The father described Jackson as a good child who had friends and 
played sports.  He attended Jackson’s games when he could, but often could not 
because of his work.  The father believed that Jackson would be a productive 
person and would assist other prisoners if given a life sentence.  He stated that he 
has a good relationship with Jackson and would continue to be involved in 
Jackson’s life.   
Several other family members testified, including Jackson’s sister, half-
sister, daughter, stepson, and wife.  Jackson’s sister and half-sister testified that he 
was a good influence and played sports.  Jackson’s sister testified he was 
protective of her as a child and taught her sports.  Jackson’s daughter and stepson 
testified that Jackson encouraged them to make good choices in life.  His stepson 
testified that Jackson was a better influence and father figure than his biological 
father.  Both the stepson and Jackson’s wife described him as a good father and 
 
- 13 - 
husband.  Additionally, his family members stated that Jackson is positive and that 
they intend to maintain a relationship with him during his incarceration.   
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of a Georgia Department of 
Corrections employee, who testified that Jackson received nine disciplinary reports 
in 2007.   
On April 26, 2013, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of 8 
to 4.  The jury form required the jury to indicate whether Jackson played a 
significant role in the homicide of Debra Pearce.  The jury unanimously found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson played a significant role in the homicide.   
During the Spencer6 hearing, the State presented victim impact statements of 
Pearce’s mother and sister.  The defense presented the testimony of a mitigation 
specialist, who testified that he spoke with Jackson’s best friend, who would have 
been able to provide mitigation with respect to good deeds by Jackson.7  The friend 
agreed to appear during the guilt phase, but then failed to respond to all attempts to 
contact him.  The mitigation specialist stated that the friend had told him Jackson 
was in Adel in 2004 for Jackson’s birthday.   
                                          
 
6.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).   
 
 
7.  The State objected to the mitigation specialist’s testimony on the basis of 
hearsay, and the testimony was admitted only to assist the trial court in assessing 
the mitigating evidence already presented and to explain the steps taken by the 
investigator to contact the friend.   
 
 
- 14 - 
On October 1, 2013, the trial court sentenced Kim Jackson to death for the 
murder of Debra Pearce.  The trial court found the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of three aggravating circumstances: (1) Jackson had 
previously been convicted of two felonies that involved the use or threat of 
violence (great weight); (2) Jackson was under felony probation at the time of the 
murder (great weight); and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC) (great weight).   
Jackson presented numerous nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  The 
trial court found that sixty-six had been established, and grouped them into twelve 
categories.  Additionally, within the twelve categories, the trial court often 
discussed several factors together in assigning them weight.  The trial court found 
that Jackson did not prove the mitigating circumstance that he is religious/faith 
based and guided his daughter spiritually.  
The first category of mitigation found by the trial court is that Jackson is a 
good father and husband and shares the love of his family.  The trial court found 
twenty-four mitigating circumstances within this category: (1) Jackson is a good 
father to his daughter (moderate weight); (2) Jackson encouraged his daughter to 
study (some weight); (3) Jackson encouraged his daughter to go to college (some 
weight); (4) Jackson encouraged his daughter to grow beyond Nashville, Georgia 
(some weight); (5) Jackson is involved in his daughter’s life and taught her right 
 
- 15 - 
from wrong (some weight); (6) Jackson’s daughter intends to maintain a 
relationship with Jackson (some weight); (7) Jackson and his daughter love each 
other (moderate weight); (8) Jackson assumed the role of stepfather and went 
beyond his legal responsibilities (moderate weight); (9) Jackson was involved in 
raising his stepson (moderate weight); (10) Jackson is a good father to his stepson 
(moderate weight); (11) Jackson has been a good role model to his stepson (some 
weight); (12) Jackson taught his stepson the value of hard work (some weight); 
(13) Jackson taught his stepson to have a good work ethic (some weight); (14) 
Jackson taught his stepson and they worked together for more than one year (some 
weight); (15) Jackson encouraged his stepson to study (some weight); (16) Jackson 
was a good athlete and instructed his stepson athletically (slight weight); (17) 
Jackson provided emotional encouragement to his stepson8 (some weight); (18) 
Jackson and his stepson love each other (moderate weight); (19) Jackson’s stepson 
maintains a relationship with him and communicates with him through his mother 
(slight weight); (20) Jackson’s stepson intends to continue a relationship with him 
(slight weight); (21) Jackson is a good husband, friend, and companion (moderate 
weight); (22) Jackson’s wife will continue to foster a relationship with and visit 
                                          
 
8.  This mitigating factor was presented with two parts: that Jackson 
encouraged his stepson to join the military and that he provided emotional 
encouragement.  However, the trial court found that Jackson did not establish that 
he encouraged his stepson to join the military.     
 
- 16 - 
him while he is incarcerated (some weight); (23) Jackson was a good provider to 
his stepson (some weight); and (24) Jackson was a good provider to his family 
(some weight).   
The second category is that Jackson is a good sibling and son, and he shares 
the love of his relatives in Georgia.  The trial court found eleven mitigating 
circumstances within this category: (25) Jackson assumed the role of protector and 
role model to his younger sister (slight weight); (26) Jackson was a good influence 
on his sister (slight weight); (27) Jackson encouraged his sister through difficulties 
as she grew up (slight weight); (28) there is mutual love and respect between 
Jackson and his sister (slight weight); (29) Jackson’s sister will maintain a 
relationship with him while he is incarcerated (slight weight); (30) Jackson is a 
good son and has been good to his father as an adult (slight weight); (31) Jackson 
is respectful and polite to his father (slight weight); (32) Jackson has a good 
relationship with his father (slight weight); (33) Jackson’s father will continue to 
foster their relationship while Jackson is incarcerated (slight weight); (34) Jackson 
visited his father, family, and friends in Adel, Georgia (slight weight); and (35) 
Jackson was active in his church9 (slight weight).   
                                          
 
9.  This mitigating factor was presented with two parts: that Jackson 
supported his family to the best of his ability in a very poor town and was active in 
his church.  However, the trial court found that Jackson did not establish that he 
provided support to his family.    
 
- 17 - 
The third category is that Jackson experienced a difficult childhood and 
upbringing, and the trial court found nine mitigating circumstances within this 
category: (36) Jackson’s mother worked long hours to support the family and, 
therefore, was not home as he grew up (slight weight); (37) Jackson’s mother 
passed away (slight weight); (38) the passing of Jackson’s mother was hard on him 
(slight weight); (39) Jackson’s father was in the U.S. Army and was overseas in 
some underdeveloped, dangerous areas (slight weight); (40) Jackson’s father was 
not home for long periods of time and could not be with his son (slight weight); 
(41) Jackson did not have a strong male role model growing up (slight weight); 
(42) Jackson did not have good adult guidance (slight weight); (43) Jackson was 
raised by various relatives and lived in a dysfunctional family (slight weight); and 
(44) Jackson was raised in poverty (slight weight).   
The fourth category is that Jackson is a nice, generous, helpful person and 
friend, and the trial court found six mitigating circumstances within this category: 
(45) Jackson has a good reputation in Adel, Georgia as a nice and good person 
(slight weight); (46) Jackson was not known by his friends to be violent (slight 
weight); (47) Jackson was not a trouble-maker as a child or teenager (slight 
weight); (48) Jackson was humble, generous, and helped others (some weight); 
(49) Jackson was a good and trusted friend (slight weight); and (50) Jackson is 
trustworthy and has a good heart (some weight).   
 
- 18 - 
The fifth category is that Jackson is athletic, dependable, and helped children 
learn sports.  The trial court found five mitigating circumstances within this 
category: (51) Jackson was a good athlete and coached softball for the area 
children (slight weight); (52) Jackson volunteered his time to children and their 
families, was a great mentor for youngsters, and taught them about patience (slight 
weight); (53) Jackson was a nurturing and caring person with children, was very 
dependable, and was trusted and reliable (slight weight); (54) Jackson was an 
excellent athlete, dependable, and a good teammate (slight weight); and (55) 
Jackson was proud of and a good representative of his softball team (slight 
weight).   
The sixth category is that Jackson is a polite, respectful person.  The trial 
court found three mitigating circumstances within this category: (56) Jackson was 
a gentleman and respectful of women (slight weight); (57) Jackson was not rude to 
friends or strangers (slight weight); and (58) Jackson was polite, respectful, and 
had good manners (slight weight).   
The seventh category is that Jackson is religious, and the trial court found 
two mitigating circumstances within this category: (59) Jackson believes in and 
gave himself to God (some weight); and (60) Jackson and his wife hosted church 
functions at their home (some weight).   
 
- 19 - 
The eighth category is that Jackson is a hard worker.  The trial court found 
two mitigating circumstances within this category: (61) Jackson is a productive and 
hard worker (some weight); and (62) Jackson grasps artistic concepts easily, 
perseveres through hard work, and is a good project worker (some weight).   
The final categories each contain only one mitigating circumstance: (63) 
Jackson had a positive outlook on life (slight weight); (64) Jackson’s friends and 
associates will continue to foster a relationship with and visit him while he is 
incarcerated, which the trial court found to be established as to Jackson’s family, 
but not as to his friends (some weight); (65) Jackson has low-average intelligence 
(slight weight); and (66) Jackson respects the judicial process and has been polite 
and cooperative throughout these proceedings (some weight).   
In its sentencing order, the trial court addressed the instruction it read to the 
jury during the penalty phase with respect to whether Jackson played a significant 
role in Pearce’s murder.  The trial court recognized that the instruction approved 
by this Court with respect to Enmund/Tison10 addresses the defendant’s state of 
mind, which was not included in the instruction read in this case.11  However, the 
                                          
 
10.  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982).   
 
11.  The language of the instruction approved by this Court provides: “In 
order for you to recommend a sentence of death in this case you must find [the 
Defendant] was a major participant in the crime of robbery or burglary and that 
 
- 20 - 
trial court noted that Enmund/Tison concern the proportionality of the death 
penalty for the crime of felony murder where the defendant is only a minor 
participant in the offense and does not have the requisite mental state that amounts 
to a reckless indifference to human life.  Because Jackson was convicted based on 
a theory of premeditation—not felony murder—and the jury was never instructed 
with respect to felony murder, the trial court concluded that Enmund/Tison do not 
apply.   
The trial court weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
circumstances, and noted that the mitigating evidence demonstrated that Jackson 
had a good home and family life, many friends, did not lack for the necessities in 
life, did not suffer any abuse or trauma as a child, and did not have any mental 
health issues.  The trial court stated that the image of Jackson as a good friend, 
father, and husband starkly contrasted with his commission of a brutal and savage 
murder, as well as the earlier armed robbery.  The trial court concluded that the 
aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating circumstances and imposed a 
sentence of death.   
This direct appeal followed.   
ANALYSIS 
 
                                          
 
[the Defendant’s] state of mind at the time amounted to [reckless] indifference to 
human life.”  Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 366 (Fla. 2005).   
 
- 21 - 
Sufficiency 
 
Jackson’s conviction is based on the circumstantial evidence of the sink 
fingerprint and the hair discovered on Pearce’s calf.  When the evidence of guilt is 
wholly circumstantial, it must be inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence.  See Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 188 (Fla. 2010).  Evidence that 
provides nothing more than a suspicion that the defendant was the perpetrator of 
the crime is insufficient to sustain the conviction.  See Ballard v. State, 923 So. 2d 
475, 482 (Fla. 2006) (citing Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631-32 (Fla. 1956)).  
However, the State is not required to rebut all possible hypotheses that could be 
inferred from the evidence.  See Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 557 (Fla. 
2010) (citing State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1989)).  Instead, it is required 
to present evidence that is inconsistent with the version of events given by the 
defendant during trial.  Id.; see also Smith v. State, 139 So. 3d 839, 845 (Fla.) 
(“The relevant inquiry regarding whether the circumstantial evidence of guilt is 
inconsistent with the defense’s theory of innocence is based on the evidence 
presented and the theory argued to the jury at trial.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 711 
(2014).  When there is an inconsistency between the evidence presented by the 
State and the theory of innocence presented by the defendant, the issue is one for 
the jury and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Law, 559 So. 2d at 188.   
 
- 22 - 
 
After the State rested, Jackson moved for a judgment of acquittal on the 
basis that the circumstantial evidence presented by the State was insufficient to 
sustain the conviction.  Specifically, Jackson contended that the expert testimony 
did not establish when the fingerprint and hair were left in Pearce’s home.  The 
trial court ruled the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
negated all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and denied the motion.   
On appeal, Jackson contends that the evidence is insufficient to exclude 
every reasonable theory of innocence for the following reasons: (1) Jackson had an 
alibi for the murder, i.e., he was in Georgia to celebrate his birthday; (2) the latent 
fingerprint found on the sink was not of sufficient value for comparative purposes; 
(3) the sink fingerprint could have been left prior to the murder; (4) the hair could 
have been left at Pearce’s home on an earlier date and transferred onto the body 
after the murder; and (5) there is insufficient evidence of premeditation.  
Alternatively, Jackson asserts that even if he were present during the murder, there 
is no evidence that he was an active participant in the murder.   
 
The jury was presented with two mutually exclusive theories of what 
occurred—either Jackson committed the murder, or he was in Adel when the 
murder occurred.  The State introduced competent, substantial evidence that 
contradicted Jackson’s alibi, and, accordingly, the trial court properly denied 
Jackson’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  Because of this, it became the role of 
 
- 23 - 
the jury to decide the factual issues presented in this case.  The jury was free to 
reject the alibi defense when presented with an alternate and inconsistent version 
of events by the State.  This is especially true because Jackson made inconsistent 
statements with regard to his relationship with Pearce.  See Carpenter v. State, 785 
So. 2d 1182, 1195 (Fla. 2001); see also Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 
1995).  The challenges Jackson raises with respect to the identification and timing 
of the sink fingerprint, the hair, and his participation in the murder are all issues 
that were properly presented to and decided by the jury.  Because the jury’s 
determination is supported by competent, substantial evidence, it will not be 
overturned by this Court.  Perry v. State, 801 So. 2d 78, 84 (Fla. 2001).   
Sink Fingerprint 
The latent fingerprint relied on by the State was lifted from the lip of the 
sink above where Pearce was discovered.  Jackson asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that the fingerprint belonged to him to the exclusion of all 
reasonable inferences.  However, the State presented the testimony of two 
fingerprint experts whose qualifications were not questioned or contested during 
trial.  Those experts identified the fingerprint as a match to the right ring finger of 
Jackson.  Thus, the State presented evidence with respect to the identification of 
the print that was sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal and, 
therefore, this was an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. 
 
- 24 - 
With respect to the timing of the fingerprint, the crime scene 
reconstructionist testified without objection that the sink fingerprint was left while 
Jackson’s finger was coated in Pearce’s still-wet blood:   
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Now, with regard to this print, there’s not a 
way to determine—and I’m going to use a phrase—which came first, 
in a sense, the print was there and the blood came after or the blood 
was there and the print went through it.  There’s not a way to 
determine that, is there? 
 
RECONSTRUCTIONIST:  Well, there is with regard to [the] 
fingerprint at the sink.  That was transferred from a hand to the sink so 
the blood is on the hand and then gets transferred to the sink. 
 
The reconstructionist further testified that the sink fingerprint was a transfer 
impression that was not left before the attack and could not have been there before 
the blood.   
Counsel alleged for the first time during oral arguments that the 
reconstructionist was not qualified to state this opinion.  Even if, as a crime scene 
reconstructionist rather than a fingerprint expert, he was not qualified to testify that 
the fingerprint was a blood transfer print, Pinellas County fingerprint expert 
Schade also testified that fingerprints that are left in a wet substance are distinctive: 
SCHADE:  Now, I should point out that the [photograph of the sink 
fingerprint] is a print that was left in a wet substance.  Now, when I 
told you before about touching a surface and leaving behind the 
impression of your fingers, that’s assuming that the surface of those 
ridges are coming in contact and that’s what’s left behind, is the 
moisture that’s on the surface of the ridges.  Even when you get dirt 
and grease on your hands or paint, if you touch something, most times 
you’ll leave an impression of the ridges.  The furrows are not 
 
- 25 - 
touching.  Only the ridges are.  But what happens on a print when the 
fingers or the palms are covered in a wet surface, heavy perspiration 
or another foreign substance, when you touch, you’re actually 
squeezing that substrate, you’re squeezing the matrix into the furrows, 
and so the ridges are not the white part, they’re the black—I’m sorry.  
I got that backwards.  The ridges are not the black part that was 
developed, they are the white part, because the substance was pushed 
into the furrows.   
I’m not sure if I’m making sense, but it’s a tonal reversal.  It’s 
very common when you’re dealing with prints left in a foreign 
substance. . . .  
 
PROSECUTOR:  Would that be common on, let’s say, a bloody 
fingerprint? 
 
SCHADE:  Yeah, blood is an example of a foreign substance. . . . 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  This testimony supports the conclusion that Jackson’s finger 
was coated in wet blood before he touched the sink.   
 
Further, the testimony provided by Slebrch also alludes to this theory.  
Slebrch testified: 
SLEBRCH:  What can happen if you get an excess amount of blood 
or any substance on your hand and then touch a surface with a certain 
amount of pressure, that will push any of the substance coating your 
fingers and coating those friction ridges into the spaces in between the 
ridges or the furrows and that will end up being behind the impression 
of the furrows. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  And is that something you take into account when 
looking at latent prints like this? 
 
SLEBRCH:  Yes.  
 
Thus, Slebrch indicated that the sink print was left while Jackson’s finger was 
coated in an excess amount of blood.   
 
- 26 - 
In contrast, no affirmative evidence was presented in the record that the 
fingerprint could have been left at an earlier date and was then coated and 
preserved by Pearce’s blood.  The sole comment relied on by Jackson for this 
proposition did not establish that such a scenario was even possible in this case.  
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Slebrch: 
There’s been some discussion in this trial about the possibility that a 
latent print was left behind on this object, on a sink, and that later 
blood kind of preserved that print or captured it by going on top of it, 
similar to the way black powder would be applied to a latent print to 
preserve and capture that.  Have you ever seen anything like that in 
your training and experience? 
 
Slebrch responded that she had not.  During cross examination, defense counsel 
elicited the following responses: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Now, Ms. Slebrch, you—when [the 
prosecutor] was asking you a moment ago if you had ever seen where 
blood had been dropped and then a print had gone through it, you 
stated that you had never seen that before, is that right?  
 
SLEBRCH:  That’s correct.  I had never seen that.  
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Does that mean that that could never happen? 
 
SLEBRCH:  No, it’s possible that that could occur. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  The emphasized portion of this testimony is not evidence 
that Jackson’s theory of events is possible based on the evidence in this case.  
Rather, this is simply a statement that such an event may, generally and in some 
hypothetical set of circumstances, be possible.  Such vague testimony that does not 
 
- 27 - 
relate to any actual evidence is not sufficient to prevent the case from being 
decided by the jury. 
Hair Evidence 
The DNA expert testified that the hair found on the back of Pearce’s calf 
provided a complete DNA profile of Jackson, and the presence of a complete DNA 
profile demonstrated that the hair had been forcibly removed.  She explained that 
there are three stages of hair growth: (1) the first stage, in which hair has a fleshy 
root with DNA cells and is growing and firmly attached to the head; (2) the second 
stage, during which the root begins to die, the hair no longer actively grows, and 
only a partial DNA profile may be present; and (3) the third stage, during which 
hair is no longer attached to the root, may be naturally shed, and is unsuitable for 
DNA testing.  She also testified that normal handling, such as brushing or running 
a hand through hair, would not be sufficient to forcibly remove hair in the first 
stage of growth.  However, once hair has been removed, it may be transferred from 
one object to another, and there is no way to determine when the hair was 
removed.   
 
Jackson’s theory of innocence is that the hair was removed prior to the 
murder, possibly while he moved a couch at Pearce’s house, and was transferred 
onto Pearce by a cat or when she sat on the couch.  However, the State presented 
evidence that a struggle occurred between Pearce and her attacker—i.e., the 
 
- 28 - 
defensive wounds and Jackson’s forcibly removed hair.  Also, the crime scene 
reconstructionist testified that he found the hair on the back of Pearce’s calf, it was 
not attached in any way to the calf, and that had Pearce stood up, the hair would 
have fallen off.  Because of this, it is not reasonably possible that the hair was 
transferred onto Pearce’s leg prior to the attack.  The theory that a cat deposited the 
hair onto the body after the murder stretches the bounds of reason.  Additionally, 
as discussed below, the combination of the hair with the sink fingerprint provides 
sufficient evidence to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.   
Circumstantial Evidence Cases 
 
The presence of both the hair and the fingerprint distinguishes this case from 
other circumstantial cases in which only one piece of evidence connected the 
defendant to the murder scene.  For example, in Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 
258 (Fla. 1982), the defendant’s fingerprints were lifted from a knife found on a 
table in the victims’ house, a grocery bag found next to a chair, and the packaging 
for a knife that was found near one of the victims.  The victims had been shot to 
death in their home.  Id. at 257.  The defendant testified that he knew the nephew 
of one victim, who lived in the home, and that during a visit to the home a day 
prior to the murders, he helped organize the garage.  Id. at 258.  He explained that 
he needed a knife to cut boxes, and was told to use a knife that was in a bag on the 
dining room table.  Id.  Notably, fingerprints that did not match the defendant were 
 
- 29 - 
found in the house on the handcuffs that restrained one victim, the knife packaging, 
and in the bedrooms and closets that had been ransacked.  Id.  This Court noted 
that the evidence presented by the State did not establish when the defendant’s 
fingerprints were left at the house and was not inconsistent with the defendant’s 
theory that the fingerprints had been left prior to the murder.  Id. at 257.  
Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant’s fingerprints, which were the only 
evidence offered by the State, did not provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to 
support the convictions.  Id.  
 
Similarly, in Shores v. State, 756 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a burglary conviction where the only 
evidence that implicated the defendant was the presence of his fingerprint on a box 
of ammunition in a drawer that was ransacked.  The district court noted that there 
was no evidence with regard to when the fingerprint had been left on the box, and 
when identity in a circumstantial case is established exclusively by fingerprint 
evidence, there must be evidence that the print could have been left only at the 
time the crime was committed.  Id. (citing C.E. v. State, 665 So. 2d 1097, 1098 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996)).  Moreover, the district court noted that when a fingerprint is 
found on an item that was accessible to the public, the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction.  Id. at 116.  The defendant in Shores alleged that his 
fingerprint could have been on the ammunition box before the victim purchased it, 
 
- 30 - 
and there was no evidence that refuted this hypothesis.  Id.  The court determined 
that this scenario was comparable to other Florida cases in which the evidence was 
held to be insufficient, including one case in which the defendant’s fingerprints 
were found on a candy bar wrapper purchased by the victim from the same store 
where the defendant shopped, Leonard v. State, 731 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1999), and another case in which the defendant’s fingerprints were found on a 
gumball machine in a store, Mutcherson v. State, 696 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1997).  
 
Instead, this case is more comparable to Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 
157 (Fla. 2002), in which the circumstantial evidence included not only a 
fingerprint, but also DNA evidence in the form of semen.  In Darling, the 
defendant asserted that he had consensual sex with the victim, and she was then 
killed by another person.  Id. at 156.  However, the evidence of sexual assault 
combined with the lack of any evidence that the defendant had a relationship with 
the victim was inconsistent with this theory.  Id.  Additionally, this Court rejected 
the defendant’s contention that the presence of his fingerprint on a lotion bottle in 
the victim’s bathroom was not compelling and insufficient to establish guilt 
pursuant to Jaramillo and Shores.  Id. at 157.  The Court concluded that the 
fingerprint combined with the evidence of rape and DNA evidence distinguished 
 
- 31 - 
the case from those in which fingerprint evidence, standing alone, was held to be 
insufficient.  Id.   
 
Similarly, the evidence here includes the blood transfer fingerprint as well as 
Jackson’s forcibly removed hair.  The presence of both pieces of evidence that are 
unique to Jackson distinguishes this case from circumstantial cases that are based 
on a sole piece of evidence.  Further, the evidence is inconsistent with the theory 
that Jackson was in Adel at the time of the murder and supports the conclusion that 
Jackson was inside Pearce’s home and struggled with her at the time of the murder.   
Moreover, the cases relied on by Jackson are distinguishable.  In Ballard, 
over one hundred fingerprints were lifted from the crime scene, four of which were 
from the bedframe near where one of the two victims was found.  Ballard, 923 So. 
2d at 479.  One of the prints on the bedframe belonged to the defendant.  Id.  
Additionally, six hairs were found in the hand of one of the victims, three of which 
belonged to the victim, two that were too short to provide sufficient information, 
and one that belonged to the defendant.  Id. at 479-80. This hair was in the third 
phase of growth, and there was no cellular tissue on it, so the expert could not 
determine whether the hair was forcibly removed or naturally shed.  Id. at 480.  
Additionally, five unidentified forcibly removed hairs were also discovered in the 
house, and hundreds of hairs in total were recovered.  Id.   
 
- 32 - 
Other evidence suggested that the defendant may not have been the killer.  A 
week prior to the murders, a person affiliated with a street gang shot at the house, 
and the State presented no evidence that definitively ruled out the gang members as 
the perpetrators.  Id. at 485.  One victim was known to sell marijuana and hide cash 
within the home.  Id. at 477.  Additionally, the vehicle that belonged to one victim 
was found in the woods approximately one mile from the defendant’s residence 
with blood and fingerprints in it, but neither the blood nor the fingerprints 
belonged to the defendant.  Id.  Finally, bloody fingerprints that did not match 
those of the defendant were found on a barbell and a curl bar located in the room 
where the second victim was found.  Id. at 479.  This Court held that the 
circumstantial evidence in Ballard was not sufficient to support the conviction.  Id. 
at 483.  The defendant had been a regular visitor at the home, and the Court 
concluded that the hair and fingerprint evidence could have been left during one of 
his many visits.  Id.  Accordingly, the evidence was not inconsistent with his 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  Id. at 485-86.  
 
Jackson contends that this case is comparable to Ballard.  Like in Ballard, 
there was other hair and fingerprint evidence.  A total of five hairs were found in 
Pearce’s home, three of which were not suitable for DNA testing, one that matched 
Pearce, and one that matched Jackson.  A palm print was lifted from a doorjamb 
inside the house that remained unidentified, but Jackson was excluded as a person 
 
- 33 - 
who could have left the print.  Other latent prints were also found in the house.12  
Additionally, items had been stolen from the home by three individuals who were 
seen leaving from the back of the house before Pearce was discovered.  Finally, the 
DNA on the second knife, and the sock and footwear impressions, suggested that 
more than one person could have been involved in the murder.   
 
However, despite these similarities, significant distinctions render Ballard 
inapplicable.  For example, the hair found in this case had been forcibly removed, 
whereas the hair in Ballard could have been naturally shed.  Additionally, unlike in 
Ballard, there were no hairs other than the defendant’s found on Pearce.  With 
respect to the print evidence, the sink fingerprint was left in wet blood, and placed 
Jackson above or near the body during the murder.  In Ballard, there was no 
evidence as to when the defendant’s fingerprint was left on the bed.  923 So. 2d at 
484.  Moreover, in Ballard many fingerprints remained unidentified.  Id. at 479.  
Here, the only print that remained unidentified was the palm print left on a 
doorjamb.   
With respect to the evidence of other crimes (here, the stolen property; in 
Ballard, the drive-by shooting), there is no evidence that any violent crimes had 
been directed towards Pearce around the time of the murder.  Further, the lead 
                                          
 
12.  There is no testimony with respect to how many prints were lifted from 
the home.  However, Royal testified that she received twelve latent lift cards.   
 
 
 
- 34 - 
detective testified that he identified the individuals who entered the home, and he 
spoke with two of them, who admitted that they took a television.  However, no 
forensic evidence linked these individuals to the house.   
This Court’s opinion in Cox v. State, 555 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989), also relied 
on by Jackson, is equally inapplicable.  In Cox, the evidence against the defendant 
included that: (1) O-type blood, the same type as the defendant’s, was found in the 
car of the victim; (2) the tongue of the defendant had been bitten off and appeared 
to have been bitten by a person other than the defendant; (3) a hair that was 
consistent with that of the defendant was found in the vehicle of the victim; and (4) 
a print that appeared to be made by a military-type boot was found in the victim’s 
vehicle, and the defendant was in the military at the time of the crime, but no 
comparison was performed on the print found in the vehicle and the defendant’s 
boots.  Id. at 353.  This Court held the circumstantial evidence to be insufficient.  
Id.  However, the evidence here is more compelling.  The hair found on Pearce was 
tested for DNA and matched Jackson, thus placing him in Pearce’s house.  The 
blood transfer print demonstrates that he was in the house during the murder.  In 
contrast, nothing in Cox conclusively linked the defendant to the victim.  Id.   
 
The third case relied on by Jackson, Lindsey v. State, 14 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 
2009), is even less comparable.  In Lindsey, the Court summarized the 
circumstantial evidence as follows: 
 
- 35 - 
(1) a Crown Royal bag containing jewelry was taken during the 
robbery of Big Dollar pawn shop; (2) [the defendant’s ex-wife] found 
a Crown Royal bag containing jewelry in a closet of an apartment 
where she sometimes stayed with [the defendant] and several other 
individuals, including [another individual who had been convicted for 
the second-degree murder of the victim and the robbery of the pawn 
shop]; (2) [the defendant] eventually sold the jewelry from the bag in 
the closet at a flea market; [and] (3) [the defendant told another 
inmate] that [the inmate] should always kill witnesses to crimes and 
that [the defendant] had to do that. 
 
Id. at 215-16.  In addition, a fingerprint that matched the defendant was found on a 
pawn shop slip dated several weeks before the murder.  Id. at 214.  The Court held 
this evidence insufficient to establish that the defendant was in the pawn shop at 
the time of the murder.  Id. at 216.  As previously discussed, the evidence here 
places Jackson in Pearce’s house during the murder.   
Active Participant 
 
Jackson alleges for the first time on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to 
establish that he was an active participant in the murder.  Jackson relies on the 
evidence that more than one person may have been in the home to assert that he 
may merely have been present during the killing.  However, where a conviction is 
based on circumstantial evidence, the State is not required to contradict every 
possible version of events.  See Smith, 139 So. 3d at 845.  Rather, the State is 
required to present evidence that contradicts the theory of innocence presented by 
the defendant during trial.  Id.  Further, this claim is not preserved because it was 
not asserted before the jury.   
 
- 36 - 
 
Moreover, even if this claim had been preserved, it is without merit.  The 
evidence presented during trial establishes that Jackson was at the sink above 
where Pearce’s body was found with her wet blood on his hand.  The forcibly 
removed hair suggests that Pearce engaged in a struggle with Jackson prior to her 
death.  Moreover, the jury heard evidence that more than one person may have 
been present, was given a principal instruction, and convicted Jackson of first-
degree murder.  The jury was additionally given a special interrogatory during the 
penalty phase that asked whether Jackson played a significant role in the homicide 
of Pearce.  Again, the jury found that he did.  Thus, although the parties did not 
assert before the jury that more than one person was present during the murder, the 
jury found that Jackson was an active participant, and its decision is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.   
Premeditation 
 
Whether premeditation exists is a question of fact for the jury, as is whether 
the State has presented evidence to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of 
innocence.  Premeditation is a fully formed and conscious purpose to kill, and can 
be formed up to even only a moment before a killing occurs, but must exist for a 
sufficient time to permit reflection as to the nature and probable result of the act.  
Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943-44 (Fla. 1998) (citing Coolen v. State, 696 So. 
2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1997)).  When a victim is deliberately stabbed with a knife 
 
- 37 - 
several times in vital organs, as occurred here, the manner of death can provide 
circumstantial evidence of premeditation.  See Perry, 801 So. 2d at 85-86.  The 
wounds here are similar to those in cases where this Court determined 
premeditation was established.   
In Perry, the victim was stabbed four times in the chest and three times in 
the neck, and also suffered a defensive wound to the thumb.  Id. at 81.  Four of 
these wounds would have been fatal individually.  Id. at 86.  One stab wound 
penetrated the chest bone of the victim, which required extensive force and 
demonstrated the injury was carefully inflicted in a deliberate manner so as to 
effectuate death.  Id.  Similarly, in Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 452 (Fla. 
2002), the victim suffered two major knife wounds to the neck, and the second 
blow was sufficiently deep to nick the victim’s vertebrae.  This Court concluded 
that the use of a knife to stab the victim in this manner was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s conclusion that the murder was premeditated.  Id.  
 
Here, the State presented as circumstantial evidence of premeditation the 
multiple and violent stab wounds inflicted with a knife, many of which were to 
Pearce’s head.  Additionally, the stab wounds to the neck and chest were both fatal.  
Because the knife was left in Pearce’s chest, it is likely that the neck wound was 
inflicted first.  Thus, even after Jackson had fatally wounded Pearce in the neck, he 
stabbed her again in the chest and with such force that the five-inch knife 
 
- 38 - 
penetrated approximately eight inches into Pearce’s body and broke off a piece of 
her scapula.  Accordingly, the nature, number, and manner of these wounds 
provides competent, substantial evidence to support the jury finding of 
premeditated murder.   
 
This case is distinguishable from Green, 715 So. 2d at 940; Coolen, 696 So. 
2d at 738; and Kirkland v. State, 684 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1996), relied on by Jackson.  
In each case, the State relied exclusively on the nature and number of stab wounds 
to establish premeditation, and this Court held the circumstantial evidence to be 
insufficient.  In both Green and Coolen, the evidence reasonably supported a 
scenario in which the killings resulted from an escalated fight.  715 So. 2d at 944; 
696 So. 2d at 742.  Here, because Jackson relied exclusively on an alibi defense, 
the only possible conclusions from the evidence presented during trial were that 
Jackson was not present, or he committed a premeditated killing.  With respect to 
Kirkland, the nature and number of wounds is not comparable to those inflicted on 
Pearce.  Additionally, the Court in Kirkland noted that the defendant had an IQ in 
the sixties.  684 So. 2d at 735.13  Jackson has an IQ within a ten-point range of 
eighty-four.  Accordingly, this case is closer to Perry and Morrison than to Green, 
Coolen, or Kirkland.   
                                          
 
13.  Kirkland was decided prior to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(holding unconstitutional the execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities).   
 
- 39 - 
 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Jackson’s claims with respect to the 
sufficiency of the evidence.   
Closing Statements 
 
During trial, Schade testified with respect to changes in the testimony given 
by fingerprint experts over the last ten to twenty years.  For example, the 
prosecutor asked Schade to explain how laboratories have changed over the years, 
and Schade responded: 
Well, we’ve always talked about the science of fingerprints, 
however, we did not always adhere to some of the other principles of 
science that are now coming to the forefront.  Science is never 
absolute, one hundred percent certain.  Science always leaves the door 
open for additional information, additional examination, and even 
changing conclusions.  Early on, and as recently as 15 years ago, 
fingerprint people were trained you examine the evidence carefully, 
you come to a conclusion and you stand by it, come hell or high 
water.  It was weakness to say, well, I’m reconsidering my opinion.  
And that’s a big change for us.  It’s still is very difficult sometimes to 
think that, you know, we can no longer say we’re one hundred percent 
certain, this is a one hundred percent match.  
Those terms are no longer allowed in court and that’s really 
holding to the [tenets] of science.  It’s just the way it is.  It’s a 
preponderance of evidence, it’s a conclusion that, you know, it can be 
possible or plausible conclusions but science never says one hundred 
percent.  That’s a big change for us to go from the days of it’s my 
opinion, I’m a hundred percent and I will not be swayed to 
reconsidering. 
 
In addition, when the State cross-examined Royal, the following exchange 
occurred: 
PROSECUTOR:  Okay.  Now, would you agree with the concept that 
if an identification is made, for example, when you come into court 
 
- 40 - 
and you say that matches that person, that that’s a hundred percent 
accurate? 
 
ROYAL:  That is correct. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Okay.  Is there any doubt in your mind whatsoever 
when you make those decisions? 
 
ROYAL:  No, the identification is made then I’m a hundred percent 
certain that the unknown print was identified to a set of known prints. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  And that’s the way you’ve been taught to operate? 
 
ROYAL:  That is how I operate. 
 
During closing statements, the prosecutor made the following remark: 
Now, Michelle [Royal] is a good woman.  I’ve put her on the 
stand before in many cases to convict defendants of crimes.  She’s just 
wrong on this one.  It happens.  It was interesting, the reason I asked 
her this question about the hundred percent and the reason why Bill 
Schade spent all that time talking about the change is Michelle Royal 
is old school.  She was taught you walk into court, it’s a hundred 
percent, no doubt, this is the way I am.  She’s also taught that once a 
lab makes a decision, that decision is final.  She runs that lab, she 
made the call that wasn’t a print of value and she’s going to stand by 
that conclusion because that’s what she does in court.  A hundred 
percent.   
Bill Schade told you that’s really not where the business—not 
where the expertise is going.  You saw a lot of that from the FBI.  
Jacqueline Slebrch.  She’s the new school.  She’s been taught new.  
That’s why they’re doing the whole blind verifications.  That’s why 
they’re doing those things.  Regardless, he admits it’s his print. 
 
No objection was made to this remark, and as such, we review it for fundamental 
error.  Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 837 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
275 (2013).  An error is not fundamental unless it reaches down into the validity of 
 
- 41 - 
the trial itself to the extent that the guilty verdict could not have been obtained in 
the absence of the error.  Id. 
To the extent that the prosecutor’s closing statement compared “old school” 
and “new school” methodology, these remarks were related to testimony that was 
presented to the jury.  Where the jury is to decide a matter based on the testimony 
of competing experts, it is the job of the attorney to highlight how the testimony of 
the expert presented by the opposing party differs from that of his or her own 
expert and explain why the opposing expert’s opinion is flawed.  Counsel must 
attempt to persuade the jury why it should credit one expert over another by 
attacking the opposing expert’s credentials and distinguishing the methods and 
procedures used by each expert.   
However, it is impermissible to vouch for the credibility of a witness, see 
Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2008), assert personal 
knowledge, see Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 
1028 (Fla. 2000), or comment on facts outside the evidence presented during trial, 
see Bigham v. State, 995 So. 2d 207, 214 (Fla. 2008).  To the extent that the 
prosecutor vouched for or asserted personal belief as to the credibility of Royal, 
asserted personal knowledge of how she operates, commented on matters outside 
the evidence presented during trial, or bolstered the testimony of Slebrch, we 
conclude that any error was not fundamental.   
 
- 42 - 
During trial, the State presented two qualified latent print experts who 
identified the sink fingerprint.  Slebrch testified that after she received her 
bachelor’s degree in chemistry, she then completed an approximately eighteen-
month training program with the latent print unit at the FBI.  This training included 
written and oral exams, moot courts, oral boards, comparison and processing 
exams, and a comprehensive qualifications exam.  To maintain her qualifications, 
she is required to complete an annual comparison test.  She explained that the FBI 
uses standard operating procedures to ensure the latent print analysts report 
accurate results.  One of these procedures is the use of blind verification in which 
another qualified examiner who has no knowledge of the case or the conclusion of 
the original examiner conducts an independent analysis, comparison, and 
evaluation of the latent print.  With respect to Schade, he worked as a latent print 
expert for over forty years.  He received training from both the Nassau County 
Police Department in New York and the FBI Academy in Quantico.  He is a 
member of the International Association for Identification and has been certified 
by that organization as a fingerprint examiner since 1978.  Accordingly, two 
qualified experts presented testimony in which they concluded that the sink 
fingerprint belonged to Jackson, and there is no reasonable possibility that the 
comment by the prosecutor about the fingerprint experts is such that the guilty 
 
- 43 - 
verdict could not have been reached without it.  See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 
1125, 1140 (Fla.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 193 (2014).   
HAC 
 
Jackson asserts that the HAC aggravating circumstance was impermissibly 
vicariously applied to him.  The trial court addressed in its sentencing order 
whether HAC may be applied to Jackson in light of the request by the State that a 
principal instruction be given.  The trial court found the following: 
 
In this case, the Court has no trouble finding that the Defendant 
was “particularly physically involved” in the murder of Debra Pearce.  
The Defendant testified that he wasn’t present when the crime 
occurred.  Clearly the jury rejected the Defendant’s claim of alibi 
when it found him guilty of Premeditated First Degree Murder.  With 
the jury’s rejection of the Defendant’s alibi claims, and no testimony 
from the Defendant, or anyone else, that specifically identified anyone 
other than the Defendant who could have done the actual killing, the 
overwhelming conclusion to reach is that the Defendant directly 
caused the victim’s death.   
 
However, even if there was an unknown assailant that did the 
actual killing, the forensic evidence linking the Defendant to the crime 
scene supports the determination that the Defendant was “particularly 
physically involved” in killing Debra Pearce.  The Defendant’s 
fingerprint left in the victim’s blood next to the kitchen sink not only 
identified the Defendant as a suspect, but also indicated that he was 
present while the victim’s blood was still fresh and had not dried up.  
The imprint was, therefore, made close to the time that the victim 
struggled with her attacker.  Also, a hair expert testified during the 
guilt phase that the hair found on the victim’s calf matching the 
Defendant’s DNA profile was a pulled hair containing the root, not 
one that was cut or clipped with a sharp instrument.  As such, this 
evidence was consistent with a finding that the Defendant engaged in 
some type of struggle with the victim, again, at or near the time of her 
death.   
 
 
- 44 - 
Additionally, the jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt via a penalty 
phase special interrogatory that Jackson played a significant role in the homicide of 
Pearce.  Where an aggravating circumstance is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, it will not be overturned on appeal.  See, e.g., Guardado v. State, 965 So. 
2d 108, 115 (Fla. 2007).   
 
As previously discussed, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 
support the jury conviction for first-degree, premeditated murder to the exclusion 
of all reasonable theories of innocence that were presented during trial.  The 
evidence presented during trial establishes that: (1) Jackson had the wet blood of 
Pearce on his hand and touched the sink above where Pearce was found; (2) a hair 
that had been forcibly removed from Jackson was found on Pearce such that it 
would have fallen off had she stood up; (3) Pearce suffered defensive wounds; and 
(4) Jackson lied and denied knowing Pearce or ever having been to her house until 
confronted with the evidence against him.  This evidence supports the jury 
determination that Jackson struggled with Pearce and ultimately stabbed her to 
death.  Accordingly, the HAC aggravating circumstance was not applied 
vicariously in this case, and this claim is without merit.   
 
Moreover, this case is not comparable to Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 
2005), relied on by Jackson.  In Perez, the evidence conclusively established that 
two identified individuals were present during the murder.  Id. at 356.  The 
 
- 45 - 
defendant admitted that he and two other individuals went to the victim’s house to 
steal her car.  Id. at 355.  He also admitted that he witnessed his codefendant stab 
the victim, and he then ran through the house behind the codefendant, who stole 
various items.  Id. at 356.  However, the defendant consistently asserted that his 
codefendant committed the murder of his own accord and without prior discussion.  
Id. at 381.  Because there was no evidence that the defendant directed the murder, 
knew that the victim would be killed, or knew how the victim would be killed, this 
Court struck the HAC aggravator as applied to him.  Id.  Notably, in Perez, this 
Court expressed concern that the trial court did not address the line of cases that 
requires a showing that the defendant directed or knew that the victim would be 
killed and how the victim would be killed where HAC is applied vicariously.  Id.   
 
Here, the evidence was merely ambiguous as to whether more than one 
person was present during the murder.  Although a second knife was found under 
Pearce with DNA on it that did not match either Jackson or Pearce, there is no 
evidence that this knife was used during the attack.  Further, in contrast to the 
defendant in Perez, Jackson never asserted until this appeal that he was present and 
simply not active in the murder.  Accordingly, this case is not comparable to Perez. 
Additionally, even though Jackson does not appear to dispute that HAC 
applies to the murder, we note that competent, substantial evidence supports this 
aggravating circumstance, which has been consistently upheld in cases where the 
 
- 46 - 
victim was repeatedly stabbed.  See, e.g., Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 134 
(Fla. 2001).  Here, Pearce suffered defensive wounds to her arms and several 
lacerations or abrasions to her head and face.  Her shirt had been twisted around 
her body and displaced.  The medical examiner testified that he could not be 
certain whether Pearce was conscious throughout the attack but, because she bled 
to death, it is possible.  He additionally testified that she was not immediately 
stabbed in a major organ, “so it would take sometime [sic], especially if the jugular 
was the first one and then the scap—the chest one is later.”  Thus, the evidence 
indicates that Pearce, who was at home and in her kitchen, struggled against an 
attacker armed with a knife during a vicious attack and attempted, unsuccessfully, 
to ward off numerous blows aimed at her face, neck, and chest.  Accordingly, 
competent, substantial evidence supports this aggravating factor with regard to the 
murder itself.   
Proportionality 
 
Jackson asserts that the death penalty cannot be imposed because it violates 
the requirement of individualized punishment delineated by Enmund and Tison.  
However, Enmund and Tison do not apply to this case, which was prosecuted 
exclusively on the basis of premeditated first-degree murder.  No felony murder 
instruction was read to the jury.  In Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 190-91 (Fla. 
1991), this Court explained the holdings of Enmund and Tison:   
 
- 47 - 
In Enmund and Tison, the Court said that the death penalty is 
disproportional punishment for the crime of felony murder where the 
defendant was merely a minor participant in the crime and the state’s 
evidence of mental state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill.  
Mere participation in a robbery that resulted in murder is not enough 
culpability to warrant the death penalty, even if the defendant 
anticipated that lethal force might be used . . . .   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Accordingly, the Enmund/Tison claim raised by Jackson is 
without merit.   
 
Jackson also asserts that the death sentence is disproportionate.  In each case 
that imposes the death penalty, the Court performs a comprehensive analysis to 
determine whether the crime is among the most aggravated and least mitigated.  
See Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 601 (Fla. 2006).  The Court considers the 
totality of the circumstances and compares the case with other capital cases so as to 
ensure uniform application of the death sentence.  Id.   
Here, the three aggravating factors of prior violent felony conviction (based 
on two convictions), murder committed while on felony probation, and HAC were 
each given great weight.  These aggravating factors were weighed against sixty-six 
mitigating circumstances, many of which were substantially similar and related to 
Jackson’s positive attributes as a father, husband, friend, and worker.  Of the sixty-
six mitigating circumstances, the trial court found that thirty-six warranted only 
slight weight, twenty-three warranted some weight, and only seven warranted 
 
- 48 - 
moderate weight.  The trial court did not give any mitigating circumstance great 
weight.   
Proportionality is not a comparison of the number of circumstances, but 
instead is a qualitative review of the totality of the circumstances and the 
underlying basis that supports the application of each circumstance.  See Simpson 
v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1148 (Fla. 2009).  This Court has previously held the death 
sentence to be proportionate despite the finding of a large number of mitigating 
circumstances.  See Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 215, 228 (Fla. 2010) (holding 
death sentence proportionate where cold, calculated, and premeditated and HAC 
were weighed against four statutory mitigating factors and forty-eight nonstatutory 
mitigating factors); see also Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 n.2, 696 (Fla. 
1997) (holding death sentence proportionate where five aggravating circumstances 
were weighed against thirty-one nonstatutory mitigating factors, most of which 
were cumulative and general in nature).  Here, although the trial court found a 
large number of mitigating factors, they are repetitive and involve positive aspects 
of Jackson’s life, whereas the three aggravating factors demonstrate an individual 
who repeatedly commits violent criminal acts.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
underlying bases for the aggravating circumstances in this case are weightier than 
those that support the mitigating circumstances.   
 
- 49 - 
Moreover, prior violent felony and HAC are among the weightiest 
aggravating circumstances.  See Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1167.  Jackson does not 
challenge the weight applied to the aggravating factors, but to support his assertion 
that the death penalty is disproportionate, he contends that the prior violent felony 
and felony probation factors are relatively weak.  Jackson asserts that because one 
felony conviction was used to support both the prior violent felony and felony 
probation aggravating circumstances, neither is compelling.  However, the trial 
court considered two convictions when it weighed the prior violent felony 
aggravating circumstance.  One conviction was for an armed robbery that occurred 
only months after the murder of Pearce.  Additionally, although no shots were fired 
during either felony, the trial court specifically noted that:  
the videotape of the . . . robbery shows an individual who, with all 
deliberate intent and absolutely no hesitation, walked into the lobby of 
a hotel, immediately pointed a handgun at an innocent victim, and 
demanded money.  [The victim of the aggravated assault], likewise, 
provided the description of an individual involved in a narcotics 
transaction that was willing to brandish a handgun despite the risks 
presented by such an act. 
 
The court further concluded that the felony probation aggravating circumstance 
warranted enhanced weight because Jackson was on probation for a violent crime 
when he committed the murder.   
The Court has held the death penalty to be proportionate in cases that 
involve similar aggravating and mitigating circumstances to those here.  In Duest 
 
- 50 - 
v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 45, 47 (Fla. 2003), the death sentence was affirmed where 
the victim was stabbed twelve times, and three aggravating circumstances—prior 
violent felony (on the basis of two convictions), murder committed during a 
robbery or for pecuniary gain, and HAC—were weighed against twelve non-
statutory mitigating circumstances.  Of the mitigating circumstances, two 
warranted great weight—that the defendant had a physically and emotionally 
abusive childhood, and that he experienced childhood traumatization and 
deprivation of love.  Id. at 38 n.3.  Similarly, in Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 
972-73, 979-80 (Fla. 2001), this Court held the death sentence to be proportionate 
where the victim had been stabbed seven times and the two aggravating 
circumstances of prior violent felony and HAC were weighed against three 
statutory mitigating circumstances (the defendant suffered from an extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, the defendant’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired, and the defendant was sixty-
nine at the time of the murder), and nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.   
The cases relied on by Jackson are not comparable.  In Larkins v. State, 739 
So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1999), the aggravating factors of prior violent felony and 
pecuniary gain were weighed against two statutory mitigating factors and eleven 
nonstatutory mitigating factors.  The Court noted that the most serious aggravator 
 
- 51 - 
(prior violent felony) was based on two convictions that occurred almost twenty 
years before the murder, and the defendant had led a comparatively crime-free life 
in the interim.  Id. at 95.  The Court specifically noted that HAC was not present in 
that case.  Id.  With respect to mitigation, the defendant in Larkins presented 
evidence of an extensive history of mental and emotional problems and brain 
damage.  Id. at 94.   
In contrast, HAC was found in this case.  Additionally, Jackson had no 
mental health or emotional mitigation, and the forensic psychologist testified that 
there was nothing clinically significant in Jackson’s psychological profile.  Further, 
Jackson did not lead a relatively crime-free life and had violent felony convictions 
for acts both before and after the murder.  When the trial court weighed the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it specifically noted: “From the 
evidence, the Defendant has consistently led an entirely separate life from the one 
known to his family and friends that involved a repeated willingness to resort to 
violent criminal acts to further his intentions.”   
In Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 1998), the aggravating 
circumstances of prior violent felony (based on four convictions) and murder 
committed during a burglary merged with pecuniary gain were weighed against the 
statutory mitigating circumstance of young age and six nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances.  This Court noted that although the prior violent felony aggravating 
 
- 52 - 
circumstance was properly found, it was not strong when considered in light of the 
facts of the case because it was based in part on the aggravated assault committed 
by the defendant on his brother, who testified that he was not injured, and the 
incident was a misunderstanding.  Id. at 238.  Two of the other felonies were based 
on contemporaneous convictions as a principal to crimes simultaneously 
committed by a codefendant.  Id.  For these reasons, the Court vacated the death 
sentence.  Id.  In contrast, neither of the felonies that formed the basis for the prior 
violent felony aggravating circumstance here was committed during the murder.  
Additionally, the weighty circumstance of HAC was found.   
 
The other cases relied on by Jackson are equally uncompelling.  See 
Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Fla. 1997) (death penalty vacated 
where the murder was “an unplanned, senseless murder committed by a nineteen-
year-old, with a long history of mental illness, who was under the influence of 
alcohol and drugs at the time”); Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996) 
(holding death sentence disproportionate where the murder was the result of a 
robbery gone bad, and the aggravating circumstances of prior violent felony and 
murder committed during the course of an armed robbery/pecuniary gain were not 
compelling given the underlying facts); Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019, 1023 
(Fla. 1986) (holding death sentence disproportionate where “the murder . . . was 
 
- 53 - 
the result of a heated, domestic confrontation and the killing, although 
premeditated, was most likely upon reflection of a short duration”).   
 
Accordingly, we hold the death sentence to be proportionate in this case.   
Ring 
 
Jackson asks that we revisit prior decisions that hold that Florida’s death 
penalty statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment under the principles 
announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000).  We decline to revisit the numerous decisions that hold that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate the United States Constitution 
under Ring or Apprendi.  See, e.g., Abdool, 53 So. 3d at 228 (“This Court has also 
rejected [the] argument that this Court should revisit its opinions in Bottoson v. 
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 
2002).”); see also Duest, 855 So. 2d at 49.  Moreover, this Court has repeatedly 
held that Ring does not apply where the trial court found the aggravating factors of 
prior violent felony and felony probation, both of which are present in this case.  
See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98, 116 (Fla. 2012); Hodges v. State, 55 
So. 3d 515, 540 (Fla. 2010). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Jackson’s conviction and sentence of 
death. 
 
- 54 - 
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
James Hunt Daniel, Judge - Case No. 162008CF010726AXXXMA 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada Margaret Carey, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Patrick M. Delaney, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee