Title: Ex parte Living By Faith Christian Church
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190872
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2021

Rel: November 5, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
1190872
____________________
Ex parte Living By Faith Christian Church
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Living By Faith Christian Church
v.
Young Men's Christian Association of Birmingham)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-18-349;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2180674)
1190872
STEWART, Justice.
We granted the certiorari petition of Living By Faith Christian
Church ("the Church") to consider, as a question of first impression,
whether Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., requires a trial court to hold a
hearing before entering a default judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals,
in Living By Faith Christian Church v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of
Birmingham, [Ms. 2180674, Mar. 20, 2020]  ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2020), determined that the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") did
not err in granting the application for a default judgment filed by the 
Young Men's Christian Association of Birmingham ("the YMCA") without
first holding a hearing. Based on the reasons expressed below, we agree
with the Court of Civil Appeals' determination and conclude that Rule
55(b)(2) does not require a trial court to hold a hearing on every
application or motion for a default judgment. 
Background
The Court of Civil Appeals provided the following relevant factual
and procedural history:
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"On August 14, 2018, the Young Men's Christian
Association of Birmingham ('the YMCA') commenced an action
against the Church and four of its employees, Jeremy Price,
Johnitra Price, Tavares Cook, and Jessica Cook. The YMCA's
complaint alleged that the YMCA had given the Church
permission to use one of the YMCA's buildings ('the building')
in Birmingham on a temporary basis, that the YMCA had
subsequently notified the Church that it would have to vacate
the building, and that the Church had refused to vacate the
building. As relief, the YMCA's complaint sought possession of
the building and an award of damages. All five defendants
were served with process, with Jeremy Price being served not
only individually but also as the Church's agent. On
September 7, 2018, a single answer signed by both of the
Prices and both of the Cooks was filed on behalf of all five
defendants. In the answer, the defendants described the
Church as 'a domestic non-profit corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Alabama.' Jeremy Price
signed the answer as 'Founder &  Senior Pastor, Living By
Faith Christian Church,' and Johnitra Price signed the answer
as 'Executive Pastor, Living By Faith Christian Church.' A
licensed attorney did not sign the answer on behalf of any of
the defendants.
"On October 15, 2018, the YMCA filed a motion for a
partial summary judgment against all five defendants insofar
as the YMCA's complaint sought possession of the building. On
October 22, 2018, a response opposing the YMCA's
partial-summary-judgment motion was filed on behalf of all
five defendants. Jeremy Price signed that response as 'Founder
&  Senior Pastor, Living By Faith Christian Church,' and
Johnitra Price signed that response as 'Executive Pastor,
Living By Faith Christian Church.' A licensed attorney did not
sign that response on behalf of any of the defendants.
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"Also on October 22, 2018, the YMCA filed an application
and affidavit for the entry of a default judgment ('the
application') against the Church for failure to answer or
otherwise defend, presumably based on the fact that neither
the Church's answer nor its response in opposition to the
partial-summary-judgment motion had been signed by a
licensed attorney. See, e.g., Progress Indus., Inc. v. Wilson, 52
So. 3d 500, 597 (Ala. 2010) (recognizing that the general rule
in Alabama is that a person must be a licensed attorney in
order to represent a separate legal entity, such as a
corporation, and that a pleading filed by a nonattorney
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by purporting to
represent a separate legal entity is a nullity). The YMCA
supported its application with an affidavit signed by Dan Pile,
the YMCA's president and chief operating officer, in which he
testified that the YMCA owned title to the building,
authenticated the attached deed by which the YMCA had
acquired title to the building, testified that the YMCA had
given the Church permission to use the building for Sunday
church services until the YMCA conveyed the building to the
A.G. Gaston Boys & Girls Club ('the Boys & Girls Club'),
authenticated an e-mail informing the Church that it was
permitted to use the building for Sunday church services until
the building was conveyed to the Boys & Girls Club, testified
that he had notified the Church that they would have to vacate
the building so that the YMCA could close the transfer of the
building to the Girls & Boys Club, and testified that the
Church had refused to vacate the building. The YMCA served
the application on both of the Prices and both of the Cooks, but
it did not send a service copy addressed to the Church. None
of the defendants requested a hearing regarding the
application.
"On December 12, 2018, the trial court held a hearing
regarding the partial-summary-judgment motion at which the
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YMCA's attorney, both of the Prices, and both of the Cooks
appeared. The record does not contain a transcript of that
hearing. On December 14, 2018, the trial court entered two
separate judgments. One of those judgments was a partial
default judgment against the Church insofar as the YMCA
sought possession of the building. The other judgment was a
partial summary judgment against the Prices and the Cooks
insofar as the YMCA sought possession of the building.
Neither judgment adjudicated the action insofar as the
YMCA's claim sought damages. The partial default judgment
against the Church contained a certification that it was a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The partial
summary judgment did not contain such a certification;
however, in response to a motion filed by the YMCA, the trial
court, on January 10, 2019, entered an order certifying the
partial summary judgment as a final judgment pursuant to
Rule 54(b).
"On January 14, 2019, a motion to set aside the partial
default judgment against the Church signed by Johnitra Price
as executive pastor of the Church was filed. On January 16,
2019, the YMCA filed a response to the motion to set aside the
partial default judgment in which it alleged, among other
things, that the Prices and the Cooks had been advised at the
December 12, 2018, hearing that the Church had to be
represented by a licensed attorney and that, despite being so
advised, a nonattorney had improperly filed the motion to set
aside the partial default judgment on behalf of the Church. On
January 31, 2019, the YMCA filed a motion to strike the
motion to set aside the partial default judgment on the ground
that it had been filed on behalf of the Church by a
nonattorney.
"On April 4, 2019, the trial court held a hearing at which
the Prices and the Cooks appeared but no licensed attorney
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appeared on behalf of the Church. The trial court ruled that it
could not consider arguments made by nonattorneys on behalf
of the Church and denied the motion to set aside the partial
default judgment.
"On April 15, 2019, a licensed attorney representing the
Church filed a Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for relief
from the partial default judgment. In that motion, the Church,
citing Progress Industries, Inc. v. Wilson, 52 So. 3d 500 (Ala.
2010), and Dial v. State, 374 So. 2d 361 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979),
asserted that, regardless of whether the Church had validly
defended the action through its having a nonattorney file the
September 7, 2018, answer on its behalf, the filing of that
answer on its behalf constituted an 'appearance' in the action
by the Church for purposes of Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.;
that, because the Church had appeared in the action for
purposes of Rule 55(b)(2), Rule 55(b)(2) required the YMCA to
give the Church notice of the filing of the application; that the
YMCA had not given the Church such notice; and that,
therefore, the partial default judgment against the Church had
to be set aside. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an
order denying the Church's Rule 60(b)(4) motion on May 6,
2019."
Living By Faith Christian Church,  ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes omitted).
On appeal, the Church argued, among other things, that the partial
default judgment entered against the Church was due to be vacated
because the trial court had failed to hold a hearing on the YMCA's
application for a default judgment before granting the application.  The
Church contended that, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., a trial
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court is required to hold a hearing on an application or motion for a
default judgment when the defaulting party has appeared in the action.
The Court of Civil Appeals, in affirming the trial court's denial of the
Church's Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for relief from the partial
default judgment entered against the Church, concluded: 
"[B]ased on the presence of permissive language in Rule
55(b)(2) providing that a trial court 'may' hold a hearing on an
application for a default judgment, based on the absence of any
language in Rule 55(b)(2) requiring a trial court to hold such
a hearing, based on the fact that the application itself
established the YMCA's prima facie right to possession of the
building, and based on the fact that the Church did not request
a hearing regarding the application despite having notice of
the filing of the application through its agents Jeremy Price
and Johnitra Price, we conclude that the trial court in the
present case was not required to hold a hearing on the YMCA's
application and, therefore, that the trial court did not commit
reversible error in denying the Church's Rule 60(b)(4) motion
insofar as that motion was based on the ground that the trial
court had not held a hearing regarding the application.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment."
Living By Faith Christian Church, ___ So. 3d at ___.
Standard of Review
"In reviewing a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals on
a petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court 'accords no
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the
intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de
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novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court
of Civil Appeals.' Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132,
135 (Ala.1996). Because the material facts before the Court of
Civil Appeals were undisputed, that court's review of the trial
court's ruling would be de novo as well. State Dep't of Revenue
v. Robertson, 733 So. 2d 397, 399 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). This is
particularly true where the intermediate appellate court is
construing statutory provisions. Robertson, supra; Pilgrim v.
Gregory, 594 So. 2d 114, 120 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)."
Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 308 (Ala. 2005).
Discussion
At issue in this certiorari proceeding is whether the language of Rule
55(b)(2) required the trial court to hold a hearing before entering a default
judgment. Rule 55(b)(2) states, in pertinent part:  
"If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has
appeared in the action, the party (or, if appearing by
representative, the party's representative) shall be served with
written notice of the application for judgment at least three (3)
days prior to the hearing on such application, provided,
however, that judgment by default may be entered by the court
on the day the case is set for trial without such three (3) days
notice. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order
such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall
accord a right of trial by jury pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 38[, Ala R. Civ. P.]."
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Whether Rule 55(b)(2) requires a trial court to hold a hearing on
every application or motion for a default judgment is an issue of first
impression for this Court. When interpreting a statute, a court must give
the language of the statute its plain and commonly understood meaning,
and if the language is unambiguous, the court must apply the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,
Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998). This principal of
construction also applies to a court's interpretation of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moffett v. Stevenson, 909 So. 2d 824, 826 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
In arguing that the plain language of Rule 55(b)(2) requires the trial
court to hold a hearing before ruling on an application or motion for a
default judgment, the Church points to the language of the first sentence
of the portion of the rule that we quoted above: "If the party against whom
judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the party (or,
if appearing by representative, the party's representative) shall be served
with written notice of the application for judgment at least three (3) days
prior to the hearing on such application." Because the word "hearing" in
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that sentence is preceded with the definite article "the," as opposed to the
indefinite article "a," the Church argues that the use of the definite article
requires an interpretation of the rule that compels the trial court to hold
a hearing before ruling on an application or motion for a default judgment.
The second sentence of the previously quoted portion of the rule, however,
includes permissive language that "the court may conduct such hearings
or order such references as it deems necessary and proper." See Hanover
Ins. Co. v. Kiva Lodge Condo. Owners' Ass'n, 221 So. 3d 446, 452 (Ala.
2016)(" '[O]rdinarily, the use of the word "may" indicates a discretionary
or permissive act, rather than a mandatory act.' Ex parte Mobile Cty. Bd.
of Sch. Comm'rs, 61 So. 3d 292, 294 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).").
The language of Rule 55(b)(2) is ambiguous, and the Court of Civil
Appeals has recognized the lack of clarity the rule provides. In Living By
Faith Christian Church, the Court of Civil Appeals relied, in part, on
Abernathy v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 54 So. 3d 422, 426 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2010), in which that court recognized that the rule is not clear
regarding whether hearings are required. In Abernathy, the trial court
entered a default judgment against the defendant. Id. at 424. The
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defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on the ground
that her attorney had not received a copy of the motion for a default
judgment and that, therefore, she had not received three days' notice
before the trial court entered the default judgment. Id. The trial court
denied the defendant's motion, and she appealed. The Court of Civil
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the three days'
notice contemplated in the rule is required before the entry of a default
judgment, regardless of whether the trial court decides to hold a hearing
on the motion. Id. at 426. The Court of Civil Appeals further concluded:
" That notice must be given can be assumed from the language
of the rule. Admittedly, the language of the rule is difficult to
apply when a trial court does not hold a hearing on an
application for a default judgment. However, given the purpose
of providing notice of an application for a default judgment
against a party that has appeared in the case, the requirement
that notice be provided cannot hinge on whether the trial court
holds a hearing on the application, especially given that the
notice to be given is that an application for a default judgment
has been sought, not that a hearing has been scheduled on
that application."
Id. See also Hayes v. Hayes, 472 So. 2d 646, 650 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985)(explaining that a defendant "was entitled to receive the three day
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notice before the entry of a judgment by default" but not specifying that
a hearing was required).
In interpreting the language of a rule, we can also look to the
committee comments to the rule as persuasive authority. Iverson v. Xpert
Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82, 88 (Ala. 1989)("Although the committee 
comments are not binding, they may be highly persuasive. See Thomas v.
Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1979)."). The
Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 55 state that Rule
55(b)(2) "provides for three days notice prior to entry of default judgment,
when the defendant has once appeared. Note, however, the three day
notice is not applicable when the act of default is the failure to appear
when the case is set for trial." The committee comments specify that three
days' notice is required before the entry of a default judgment; the
comments do not state that the three days' notice is required before
holding a hearing or that a hearing must be held on an application or
motion for a default judgment.
In addition, because the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were
modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Federal Rule
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55(b)(2) is substantially similar to Alabama Rule 55(b)(2),1 we can consider
as persuasive authority federal decisions construing Rule 55(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Ex parte Novus Utils., Inc., 85 So. 3d
988, 996 (Ala. 2011). Rule 55(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent
part:
"If the party against whom a default judgment is sought has
appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its
representative must be served with written notice of the
application at least 7 days before the hearing. The court may
conduct hearings or make referrals -- preserving any federal
statutory right to a jury trial -- when, to enter or effectuate
judgment, it needs to:
"(A) conduct an accounting;
"(B) determine the amount of damages;
"(C) establish the truth of any allegation by
evidence; or
"(D) investigate any other matter."
Federal courts have held that Rule 55(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., does not
require a hearing before a ruling on a default-judgment motion. See
Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In permitting, but
1See Rule 55, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee Comments on 1973
Adoption (noting the similarity between the rules).
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not requiring, a district court to conduct a hearing before ruling on a
default judgment, Rule 55(b) commits this decision to the sound discretion
of the district court."); Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 116 (2d
Cir. 2015)(citing, among other cases, Finkel, 577 F.3d at 87) ("The decision
whether to enter default judgment is committed to the district court's
discretion, ... as is the decision whether to conduct a hearing before
deciding the default judgment motion."); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v.
Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) ("An evidentiary hearing
is not a per se requirement; indeed, Rule 55(b)(2) speaks of evidentiary
hearings in a permissive tone."); and United States ex rel. Use of Time
Equip. Rental & Sales, Inc. v. Harre, 983 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the trial court erred in entering a default judgment on the
same day the plaintiff filed a second affidavit of default, because the
defendant had appeared in the action, albeit late, and was thus entitled
to three days' notice before the entry of a default judgment; the court did
not address or indicate whether the trial court had erred by not holding
a hearing). See also Segars v. Hagerman, 99 F.R.D. 274, 275 (N.D. Miss.
1983)(describing the three days' notice requirement as notice required
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before a default judgment could be entered, not as notice required before
a hearing is held). But see City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Pike (In re Pike),
79 B.R. 41, 45 and n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987)(explaining that a
defendant is entitled to "at least an opportunity for a hearing" before the
entry of a default judgment and that "the applicable portion of subsection
(b)(2) of Rule 55 ... anticipates that a hearing will be held on such
application"). Based on the consideration of the foregoing authorities,  we
conclude that Rule 55(b)(2) does not require a trial court to hold a hearing
before entering a default judgment in every circumstance and that,
instead, a trial court has the discretion to determine whether a hearing
is necessary.
The Church argues that interpreting Rule 55(b)(2) as not requiring
a hearing on every application or motion for a default judgment runs afoul
of previous holdings of this Court, and it cites Cornelius v. Browning, 85
So. 3d 954 (Ala. 2011), in arguing that the failure to hold a hearing before
entering a default judgment violates the defendant's due-process rights.
This Court's decision in Cornelius did not directly address whether the
trial court's failure to hold a hearing violated the defendant's due-process
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rights.  Instead, this Court concluded that the plaintiffs' purported
attempt to notify the defendant of the default-judgment motion by mailing
the motion to an address the plaintiffs knew was incorrect violated due
process because the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise the
defendant of the pendency of the default-judgment motion. Cornelius, 85
So. 3d at 961. In the present case, notice of the application for a default
judgment, which is absolutely required, is not at issue -- the issue is
whether the trial court must always hold a hearing before entering a
default judgment, which, as explained above, we answer in the negative.
In further support of its argument that Rule 55(b)(2) requires a
hearing, the Church analogizes the language of that rule with the
language of Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., concerning summary-judgment
motions.  Rule 56(c)(2) provides that summary-judgment motions "shall
be served at least ten (10) days before the time fixed for the hearing" and
that "any statement or affidavit in opposition shall be served at least two
(2) days prior to the hearing." The Church contends that this Court has
interpreted Rule 56(c)(2) as requiring a hearing on summary-judgment
motions and, therefore, that we should apply the same interpretation to
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Rule 55(b)(2).  This Court has stated that "Rule 56(c) does by its language
contemplate a hearing upon a motion for summary judgment." Lightsey
v. Bessemer Clinic, P.A., 495 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1986).  However, this
Court has also explained:
"In applying the provisions of Rule 56(c), trial courts are
given limited discretion. Kelly v. Harrison, 547 So. 2d 443, 445
(Ala.1989). In fact, this Court has stated that a trial court
may, within its discretion, dispense with the hearing
altogether and rule on the motion without any further
proceedings. See Pate v. Rollison Logging Equip., Inc., 628 So.
2d 337, 341 (Ala.1993). But once a hearing is set, the
requirements of procedural due process change accordingly." 
Hill v. Chambless, 757 So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. 2000). See also Pate v.
Rollison Logging Equip., Inc., 628 So. 2d 337, 341 (Ala. 1993) (holding that
disposing of summary-judgment motions after conducting a pretrial
conference was sufficient and that a trial court is not required to hold "a
special hearing, ... because the trial court has a range of discretion in
applying Rule 56(c)"). See also Hendon v. Holloway, 242 So. 3d 1000, 1005
(Ala. Civ. App. 2017)(holding that trial court was not required to allow the
defendant an opportunity to be heard orally after summary-judgment
motions were filed and noting that trial court had allowed defendant an
opportunity to respond to motions, that trial court had advised that it
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would take the motions under submission, and that defendant had not
requested a hearing). Accordingly, the Church's argument is unavailing
because, even in the context of hearings on summary-judgment motions,
our caselaw has held that the trial court is afforded some level of
discretion.2  
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the conclusion of the Court
of Civil Appeals that Rule 55(b)(2) affords a trial court discretion to
determine whether to hold a hearing before entering a default judgment,
and, therefore, we affirm that court's judgment. 
AFFIRMED.
Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.  
Parker, C.J., and Bolin and Mitchell, JJ., dissent.
2Furthermore, the dissimilarities between the purposes of Rule 55
and Rule 56 dissuade us from interpreting them synonymously. Summary-
judgment proceedings differ from default-judgment proceedings in that a
default judgment is proper when the defendant has failed to "plead or
otherwise defend," Rule 55(a), thus demonstrating the defendant's lack of
proper participation in the action, while a summary judgment is proper
when there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Ex parte
Rush, 419 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Ala. 1982).
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I believe that the language of Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., requires
a hearing on an application for a default judgment when the defaulting
party has appeared in the action. Subsection (2)'s penultimate sentence
tying its three-day-notice deadline to "the hearing" is nonsensical if no
hearing is held. And the subsection's last sentence providing that the trial
court "may" conduct a hearing refers to a different kind of hearing. 
Rule 55(b) provides:
"Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
"(1) By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
computation be made certain, the clerk ... shall enter judgment
for that amount and costs against the defendant, if the
defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear ....
"(2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to
a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor .... If
the party against whom judgment by default is sought has
appeared in the action, the party ... shall be served with
written notice of the application for judgment at least three (3)
days prior to the hearing on such application .... If, in order to
enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence
or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper ...." 
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(Emphasis added.)
When possible, we must ascribe meaning to every word of a rule and
construe the rule in such a way that gives effect to all of its provisions.
Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So. 2d
909, 913 (Ala. 2004). In the penultimate sentence of subsection (2), the
words "the hearing" strongly suggest that a hearing must be held; more
than commanding it, the sentence fundamentally assumes that one will
be held. Moreover, the Court of Civil Appeals has remarked that the
three-day notice deadline is "difficult" to apply if no hearing is held.
Abernathy v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 54 So. 3d 422, 426 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2010). That is an understatement; the deadline is impossible to apply
if no hearing is scheduled. Because, in the absence of a hearing, the words
"the hearing" have no meaning and the notice deadline cannot be given
effect as written, the rule must be interpreted as requiring a hearing.
The main opinion finds ambiguity in subsection (2) because of
permissive language in its last sentence: 
"If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry
it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other
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matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper ...." 
Rule 55(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
To understand that sentence, however, it is important to recognize
the underlying connections between subsections (1) and (2). Subsection (1)
allows a clerk of court to enter a default judgment when two conditions
are satisfied: the defendant has failed to appear, and the plaintiff's claim
is for a sum certain (or a sum that merely requires computation). "In all
other cases," Rule 55(b)(2), i.e., when one of those conditions is not
satisfied, then a default judgment can be entered only by the court under
subsection (2). The last two sentences of subsection (2) then provide for
two kinds of hearings; each kind relates to the absence of one of the
conditions in subsection (1). First, if the defendant has appeared, then
subsection (2)'s penultimate sentence requires a hearing to determine
whether to enter a default judgment: "If the party against whom judgment
by default is sought has appeared in the action, the party ... shall be
served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three
(3) days prior to the hearing on such application ...." (Emphasis added.)
Second, if the court determines that a default judgment should be entered
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but the amount of damages is not a sum certain (or if other factual issues
remain), then subsection (2)'s last sentence allows a hearing to determine
the amount of damages (or decide those other factual issues): 
"If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry
it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper ...."
(Emphasis added.)
In this way, each of subsection (2)'s last two sentences refers to a
different kind of hearing conducted for a different purpose. "[T]he hearing"
required by the penultimate sentence is to determine whether a default
judgment should be entered at all. In contrast, the hearing that the court
"may conduct" under the last sentence presumes that a default judgment
will be entered and  is held to determine the amount of damages or other
factual issues necessary for entry of the judgment. Unlike at the first kind
of hearing, at the second kind of hearing the defaulting party cannot argue
that a default judgment is improper; he can only contest the amount of
damages or other prejudgment factual issues. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 289 (2017) (explaining that "the defaulting party usually is
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entitled to participate in any hearing necessary for the adjudication of
damages" but that "[t]he [defaulting party] may not introduce evidence
tending to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action"). Further, unlike the first
kind of hearing, the second kind of hearing is not conditioned on the
defaulting party's having appeared; it is conditioned only on a need for
further fact-finding. This difference in conditions makes sense because in
some cases the defendant has not appeared but the amount of damages (or
some other fact) still needs to be established. See J & P Constr. Co. v.
Valta Constr. Co., 452 So. 2d 857 (Ala. 1984) (discussing need for hearing
on amount of damages when defaulting party had not appeared); see, e.g.,
Oliver v. Towns, 738 So. 2d 978, 799-800 (Ala. 1999) (illustrating such a
situation); Bass Pecan Co. v. Berga, 694 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (Ala. 1997)
(same). Conversely, unlike the second kind of hearing, the first kind of
hearing is not conditioned on a need for further fact-finding. It is
conditioned only on the fact that the allegedly defaulting party has
appeared. Because the two kinds of hearings are triggered by different
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conditions and are held for different purposes, the two sentences providing
for them cannot be referring to the same hearing.3
In sum, the penultimate sentence of Rule 55(b)(2) can only be read
as requiring a hearing on an application for a default judgment, when the
allegedly defaulting party has appeared, to determine whether to enter
the judgment. And the discretionary language in the last sentence of Rule
55(b)(2) does not affect that hearing requirement, because that last
sentence refers to a different kind of hearing, triggered by a different
condition and held for a different purpose. 
Bolin, J., concurs.
3As a practical matter, the two kinds of hearings do not have to be
held separately. If the allegedly defaulting party has appeared, the first
kind of hearing is held to determine whether to enter a default judgment.
If there is also a need for further fact-finding and the parties have been
apprised that it will be considered at the initial hearing, there is no reason
why that fact-finding cannot be conducted in the same hearing.
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MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting).
"Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to
follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to
consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and
logical relation of its many parts."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 24, at 167
(Thomson/West 2012).  That canon should guide our analysis here.  We're
presented with an interpretive puzzle under Alabama Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(b)(2) -- whether the court must always hold a hearing on a
motion for default judgment against an appearing defendant.  In my view,
the majority opinion fails to solve that puzzle because it reads the rule in
isolation from the rest of the rulebook.  But if we zoom out and take
account of all of our Rules of Civil Procedure, the right answer becomes
clear: the Rules allow many kinds of motions to be decided without a
hearing, but a default-judgment motion under Rule 55(b)(2) is not one of
them.
The second sentence of Rule 55(b)(2) states, in part, that an
appearing defendant "shall be served with written notice of the
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application for [default] judgment at least three (3) days prior to the
hearing on such application."  (Emphasis added.)  As Chief Justice Parker
explains, the phrase "the hearing on such application" facially
contemplates that the court will hold a hearing on the application.  Very
similar language appears in Rule 27(a)(2) ("At least thirty (30) days before
the date of hearing the notice shall be served ....") and Rule 56(c)(2) ("The
motion for summary judgment ... shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time fixed for the hearing ...."), the second of which we've long
read as requiring a hearing.  See Lightsey v. Bessemer Clinic, P.A., 495
So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1986).
That the language of these rules takes the holding of a hearing for
granted -- as opposed to explicitly stating that a hearing must be held --
is in line with the drafting approach of Rule 6(d), a general provision that
applies to all written motions under the Rules:
"A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex
parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than five (5) days before the time specified for the
hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by
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order of the court.[4]  Such an order may for cause shown be
made on ex parte application.  When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and,
except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits
may be served not later than one (1) day before the hearing,
unless the court permits them to be served at some other
time."
 
(Emphasis added.)  Outside the ex parte context, this rule clearly
contemplates (1) that every written motion will have a hearing and
(2) that notice of the time of that hearing will be served with the motion.5 
The idea of a motion decided without a hearing is foreign to every one of
the rules mentioned so far. 
4Rules 27(a)(2), 55(b)(2), and 56(c)(2) are all instances of rules that
"fix[]" "a different period."
5As noted, Rule 6(d) applies to all "written" motions.  The only
unwritten motions allowed under the Rules are those "made during a
hearing or trial," Rule 7(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added), a situation
in which the Rules do not need to mandate an additional hearing.  Rule
7(b)(1) also provides that "[t]he requirement of writing is fulfilled if the
motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion," further
underscoring the intimate connection between a written motion and its
notice of hearing (which implies that a hearing will be held).
Also worthy of notice is Rule 12(d), which provides that a motion
under Rule 12(b) or (c) "shall be heard and determined before trial on
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and
determination thereof be deferred until the trial."  Once again, the text
takes for granted that there will be a hearing; the only question under
Rule 12(d) is when.
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Of course, trial courts often dispose of motions without hearings. 
But that is not because the rules cited above do not mean what they say. 
Rather, it's because another rule expressly allows exceptions: "To expedite
its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the
submission and determination of motions not seeking final judgment
without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support
and opposition."  Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).  The court may
also deny, but not grant, "a motion to dismiss without oral hearing."  Id. 
If we read all of these rules together, the overall structure of the
regime governing motion hearings is clear.  Rule 6(d), by its terms,
requires a hearing on every written motion.  Rules like Rules 27(a)(2),
55(b)(2), and 56(c)(2), by their terms, incorporate that requirement for the
particular kinds of motions they respectively govern.  Rule 78 then
qualifies this general requirement, clearing a path -- which would not
exist absent this rule -- for courts to resolve at least some motions on the
briefs "without oral hearing."  Indeed, it's longstanding doctrine under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (on which our Rules are based) that Rule
78 is what gives trial courts authority to resolve motions without
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hearings.6
But in Alabama, Rule 78 allows such treatment only for "motions not
seeking final judgment."  See Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee
Comments on 1973 Adoption (emphasizing that "the rule prohibits the
612 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3091, at 524 (3d ed. Thomson Reuters 2014) ("Rule 78(b) permits any
district court to provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs
without oral hearing."); see Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean,
Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 411 (1st Cir. 1985); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155,
1156 (9th Cir. 1971); Goodpasture v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 434 F.2d
760, 764 (6th Cir. 1970); Rose Barge Line, Inc. v. Hicks, 421 F.2d 163, 164
(8th Cir. 1970); Hazen v. Southern Hills Nat'l Bank of Tulsa, 414 F.2d
778, 780 (10th Cir. 1969); Jordan v. County of Montgomery, Pennsylvania,
404 F.2d 747, 748 (3d Cir. 1969); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1964); Enochs v. Sisson, 301
F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1962); see also FCC v. WJR, the Goodwill Station,
Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 284 n.18 (1949) (implying distinctly, though in dicta,
that Rule 78 is the source of this authority).  True, some more recent
federal cases (like those the majority opinion cites) have overlooked Rule
78, reasoning as if the authority to dispense with a hearing is somehow
built into Rule 55(b)(2) itself.  But see Kitlinski v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 994 F.3d 224, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2021) (acknowledging that Rule 78
is the source of trial courts' authority to decide motions without hearings);
Santana v. City of Tulsa, 359 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (same);
United States v. Peninsula Commc'ns, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir.
2002) (same).  But the question is academic under the Federal Rules
because Federal Rule 78(b) covers all motions.  See Rule 78(b), Fed. R.
Civ. P. ("By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and
determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.").  Our Rule 78 does
not, meaning that -- unlike in the federal system -- there are real stakes
to where the discretion to bypass a hearing comes from.
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granting of a Motion Seeking Final Judgment such as a Motion for
Summary Judgment without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard
orally" (emphasis added)).  A motion for default judgment under
Rule 55(b)(2) seeks final judgment, so Rule 78 has no role to play here in
qualifying the requirement of a hearing that Rules 6(d) and 55(b)(2)
impose by their terms.  Read as a whole, our Rules of Civil Procedure
make clear that a court must hold a hearing on any motion for default
judgment against an appearing defendant, just as the plain language of
Rule 55(b)(2) suggests.7  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
7This conclusion does not imply an answer either way to the separate
question of whether the failure to hold a hearing is always reversible error
or might instead sometimes be harmless.  See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.;
Rule 61, Ala. R. Civ. P.  Because we granted certiorari review to decide
only whether a hearing is required under Rule 55(b)(2), I address only
that question.
30