Title: Ex parte Shaundalyn N. Elliott.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1160941
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2017

Rel: December 22, 2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
____________________
1160941
____________________
Ex parte Shaundalyn N. Elliott
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Shaundalyn N. Elliott
v.
Allstate Insurance Company)
(Lowndes Circuit Court, CV-17-900017)
MAIN, Justice.
Shaundalyn Elliott petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its
1160941
order transferring this case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. 
We grant the petition and issue the writ.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On June 11, 2014, Elliott, a resident of Montgomery
County, was injured in an automobile accident in the City of
Hayneville in Lowndes County.  On February 23, 2017, Elliott
filed this lawsuit in the Lowndes Circuit Court against her
automobile insurer, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"),
seeking uninsured-motorist benefits related to the accident. 
Elliot alleged that the accident was caused by a "phantom
driver," whose location is unknown.
On March 16, 2017, Allstate filed a motion to transfer
the action from the Lowndes Circuit Court to the Montgomery
Circuit Court.  The motion stated:
"1.
This is a breach of contract action wherein
[Elliott] claims uninsured motorist insurance policy
benefits against Allstate.
"2.
[Elliott] is presently and was at the time
of the motor vehicle accident in question a resident
of Montgomery County, Alabama (see Complaint).
"3.
Allstate is presently and was at the time
of the incident in question a foreign corporation
with [its] principal place of business in the State
of Illinois.
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"4.
The Allstate insurance policy in question
was entered into and issued to [Elliott] by Allstate
in Montgomery County, Alabama. ...
"5.
Upon information and belief, Allstate
states that all medical treatment which [Elliott]
claims is related to the accident in question
occurred in Montgomery County, Alabama.  Further,
Allstate does business by agent in Montgomery
County, Alabama.
"6.
Additionally, 
pursuant 
to 
the 
provisions 
of
§ 6-3-21.1, [Ala. Code 1975,] this action is due to
be transferred to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Alabama, for the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and/or in the interest of justice. 
The only nexus to Lowndes County, Alabama, is that
the accident in question occurred in Lowndes County,
Alabama."
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of Suzanne Lowe, the
insurance agent who issued the policy to Elliott.  Lowe
attested that the Allstate policy was issued to Elliott in
Montgomery County.
Elliott filed a response to the motion for a change of
venue.  In her response, Elliott argued that because the
accident and her injuries occurred in Lowndes County, Lowndes
County, which has a strong connection to the action, is a
proper venue under § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975.  She noted that
the accident was investigated by a City of Hayneville police
officer.  Citing prior precedent of this Court, Elliott argued
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that there was a strong nexus between the action and Lowndes
County so that transferring the action to Montgomery County
pursuant to § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, would be improper. 
She further noted that Allstate had provided no evidence
indicating that any party or witness would be inconvenienced
by a trial in Lowndes County. 
Following a brief hearing on the motion, the trial court,
on June 23, 2017, granted Allstate's motion for a change of 
venue.  Elliott then filed this petition.
II.  Standard of Review
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.
Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Tarver, 492 So. 2d 297,
302 (Ala. 1986). "Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995). "When we consider a mandamus petition
relating to a venue ruling, our scope of review is
to determine if the trial court [exceeded] its
discretion, 
i.e., 
whether 
it 
exercised 
its
discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner."
Id. Our review is further limited to those facts
that were before the trial court. Ex parte American
Resources Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala.
1995).'"
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Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d
371, 373 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co.,
727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998)).
III.  Analysis
Elliott argues that the trial court erred in transferring
this case to the Montgomery Circuit Court.  As an initial
matter, we note that, as the site of the underlying accident,
it is undisputed that Lowndes County is a proper venue for
this case.  See § 6-3-7(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975 ("All civil
actions against corporations may be brought ... [i]n the
county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred ....").  We further
recognize that venue would also be proper in Montgomery
County.  See § 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975 ("All civil actions
against corporations may be brought ... [i]n the county in
which the plaintiff resided ....").  Alabama's forum non
conveniens statute permits the transfer of a civil action from
one appropriate venue to another "for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, or in the interest of justice."  The
statute provides, in pertinent part: 
"(a) With respect to civil actions filed in an
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
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shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action or any claim in any civil action to any court
of general jurisdiction in which the action might
have been properly filed and the case shall proceed
as though originally filed therein."
§ 6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975.  "'A defendant moving for a
transfer under § 6-3-21.1 has the initial burden of showing
that the transfer is justified, based on the convenience of
the parties and witnesses or based on the interest of
justice.'"  Ex 
parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC,
94 So. 3d at 373 (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727
So. 2d at 789).  Furthermore, "'[w]hen venue is appropriate in
more than one county, the plaintiff's choice of venue is
generally given great deference.'" Ex parte J&W Enters., LLC,
150 So. 3d 190, 194 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Perfection
Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 312 (Ala. 2003)).
As to the "convenience of the parties" prong of § 6-3-
21.1, this Court has held that a trial court should not grant
a motion for a change of venue unless the defendant's
proffered forum is "'"'"significantly more convenient" than
the forum in which the action is filed.'"'" Ex parte First
Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 909 (Ala.
2008)(quoting Ex parte Bloodsaw, 648 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala.
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1994), quoting in turn Ex parte Johnson, 638 So. 2d 772, 774
(Ala. 1994), quoting in turn Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d
711, 714 (Ala. 1991)). Elliott argues that Allstate did not
meet its burden of establishing that a change of venue is
appropriate under the convenience-of-the-parties prong.  In
its brief before this Court, Allstate makes no argument
concerning the convenience-of-the-parties prong of § 6-3-21.1
and concedes that the only issue is whether the case is due to
be transferred "in the interest of justice."  Thus, we agree
with Elliott that the convenience-of-the-parties prong of the
forum non conveniens statute does not support transfer of the
case to Montgomery County.
Next, we turn to the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-
21.1.  This Court has stated:
"The 'interest of justice' prong of § 6–3–21.1
requires 'the transfer of the action from a county
with little, if any, connection to the action, to
the county with a strong connection to the action.' 
Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d [788,]
790 [(Ala. 1998)].  Therefore, 'in analyzing the
interest-of-justice prong of § 6–3–21.1, this Court
focuses on whether the "nexus" or "connection"
between the plaintiff's action and the original
forum is strong enough to warrant burdening the
plaintiff's forum with the action.'  Ex parte First
Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 911
(Ala. 2008).  Additionally, this Court has held that
'litigation should be handled in the forum where the
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injury occurred.'  Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414,
416 (Ala. 2006).  Further, in examining whether it
is in the interest of justice to transfer a case, we
consider 'the burden of piling court services and
resources upon the people of a county that is not
affected by the case and ... the interest of the
people of a county to have a case that arises in
their county tried close to public view in their
county.'  Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982
So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007)."
Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 540 (Ala.
2008).
Elliott argues that because the accident that caused her
injuries occurred in Lowndes County, Lowndes County has a
strong connection to this case, so that the interest of
justice should not override her choice of forum.  Indeed,
although we have cautioned that it is not a talisman, this
Court has stated that where the injury occurred is "often
assigned considerable weight in an interest-of-justice
analysis."  Ex parte Wachovia, 77 So. 3d 570, 574 (Ala. 2011). 
Our recent cases bear out this principle.  See, e.g., Ex parte
Tier 1 Trucking, LLC, 222 So. 3d 1107 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte
Wayne Farms, LLC, 210 So. 3d 586 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte Quality
Carriers, Inc., 183 So. 3d 937 (Ala. 2015); Ex pate Manning,
170 So. 3d 638 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d 295
(Ala. 2014); Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 So.
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3d 1082 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber
Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371 (Ala. 2012).  Nevertheless,
"the location where the accident occurred ... is not, and
should not be, the sole consideration for determining venue
under the 'interest of justice' prong of 6-3-21.1."  J&W
Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196-97.
Allstate, on the other hand, argues that Montgomery
County has a strong connection to the lawsuit because: (1)
Elliott resides in Montgomery County; (2) Elliott was treated
for her injuries in Montgomery County; (3) Allstate does
business by agent in Montgomery County; and (4) the insurance
policy made the basis of Elliott's claims against Allstate was
issued in Montgomery County.  Even accepting Allstate's
contention that Montgomery County has a "strong" connection to
this action, we note that Allstate must also demonstrate that
Lowndes County has a "weak" or "little" connection to the
action.  As we have explained:
"Our forum non conveniens analysis has never
involved a simple balancing test weighing each
county's connection to an action.  Rather, to compel
a change of venue under the 'interest of justice'
prong of § 6–3–21.1, the county to which the
transfer is sought must have a 'strong' nexus or
connection to the lawsuit, while the county from
which the transfer is sought must have a 'weak' or
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'little' connection to the action.  This inquiry
necessarily depends on the facts of each case."
J&W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196.
In contending that Lowndes County has "little" connection
to this action, Allstate relies primarily on our decision in
J&W Enterprises.  In that case, the plaintiff was injured in
an automobile accident in Mobile County.  The plaintiff filed
suit in Clarke County, where the defendants resided.  The
defendants filed a motion to transfer the case to Mobile
County.  Upon denial of that motion, the defendants petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus.  In denying the petition,
we reasoned:
"In the present case, the facts before this
Court do not indicate that Mobile County has a
particularly strong connection to this lawsuit.  The
accident occurred in Mobile County, and the Mobile
Police Department prepared an accident report, but
there the connections to Mobile County cease.  None
of the parties lives in Mobile County.  Cruz did not
receive treatment for his injuries in Mobile County. 
Coates and J&W have not identified any relevant
documents that are located in Mobile County.  No
eyewitnesses are located in Mobile County, and the
investigating police officer has testified that he
is willing to travel to Clarke County.  In light of
the facts before us, Mobile County's nexus to the
action is purely fortuitous -– the place on the
interstate where the accident occurred.  Although we
assign 'considerable weight' to the location where
the accident occurred, it is not, and should not be,
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the sole consideration for determining venue under
the 'interest of justice' prong of § 6–3–21.1.
"Nor is 
Clarke 
County's connection to 
the 
action
markedly weak.  Both defendants are located in
Clarke County.  Coates is a resident of Clarke
County; J&W's place of business is located in Clarke
County.  Further, it stands to reason that documents
relevant to Cruz's claims, particularly his claims
of 
negligent 
or 
wanton 
entrustment, 
hiring,
retention, and training, are located at J&W's place
of business in Clarke County.
"Given the specific facts of this case, we
cannot say that Mobile County has a significantly
stronger connection to this case than does Clarke
County so that the interest of justice will be
offended by trial in Clarke County. ..."
150 So. 3d at 196-97 (footnote omitted).
Allstate argues that, as was the case in J&W Enterprises,
Lowndes County's connection to the lawsuit is "purely
fortuitous" –- it is merely the place were the accident
occurred.  Allstate thus argues that Lowndes County has a
"little" connection to this action.  We cannot agree.
This Court's decision in J&W Enterprises should not be
read as undermining  
location-of-injury as the foremost factor
in the interest-of-justice analysis.  To the contrary, J&W
Enterprises reaffirmed our assignment of "'considerable
weight' to the location where the accident occurred."  150 So.
3d at 196.  Instead, we merely recognized in J&W Enterprises
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that the location of the accident is not the sole factor to be
considered in the interest-of-justice analysis and that there
will be circumstances, as was the case in J&W Enterprises,
where the interest of justice will not compel the case to be
heard in the venue where the accident occurred.
In this case, both Lowndes County and Montgomery County
have connections to this action.  The accident, injuries, and
police investigation occurred in Lowndes County.  On the other
hand, Elliott resides in Montgomery County, where she sought
treatment for her injuries resulting from the accident and
where the parties' contractual dealings arose.  Under the
specific facts of this case, Lowndes County's connection to
the accident is not "little" or "weak," and Montgomery County
does not have a significantly stronger connection to the case
to justify a transfer of this case under the interest-of-
justice prong of § 6-3-21.1.  Therefore, we hold that the
trial court erred in transferring this action to the
Montgomery Circuit Court.
IV.  Conclusion
For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court
exceeded its discretion in transferring this case to the
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Montgomery Circuit Court.  Accordingly, the trial court is
directed to vacate its order transferring this action from the
Lowndes Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Wise, Bryan, and
Sellers, JJ., concur.  
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.  
Murdock, J., dissents.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
The plaintiff resides in Montgomery County. The defendant
does business in Montgomery County.  The contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant was entered into in Montgomery
County.  The payment allegedly due by the defendant to the
plaintiff was due to be paid to the plaintiff in Montgomery
County. When that payment was not made to the plaintiff in
Montgomery County, the resulting alleged breach of contract
occurred in Montgomery County. If the defendant is liable to
the plaintiff for breach of contract, the gravamen of that
claim is not the automobile accident that occurred in Lowndes
County -- it is the defendant's failure to make good on a
contractual obligation to pay plaintiff insurance proceeds in
Montgomery County.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the propriety of venue in
Lowndes County under § 6-3-7(a), Ala. Code 1975, has not been
contested to this Court.  Elliot does argue, however, that,
under the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code
1975, the case should be heard in Lowndes County.  The
majority of this Court agrees.  I do not.
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Even under the extant interest-of-justice jurisprudence
of this Court, with which I have repeatedly disagreed, see,
e.g., Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d 570, 576-78
(Ala. 2011) (Murdock, J., dissenting); and Ex parte Autauga
Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745, 751–52 (Ala. 2010)
(Murdock, J., dissenting), this Court has held that "[t]he
'interest of justice' prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires 'the
transfer of the action from a county with little, if any,
connection to the action, to the County with a strong
connection to the action.'  Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co.,
727 So. 2d [788,] 790 [(Ala. 1998)]," Ex parte Indiana Mills
& Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 540 (Ala. 2008), and also that,
as a general rule, "litigation should be handled in the forum
where the injury occurred."  Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414,
416 (Ala. 2006). For the reasons stated in the first
paragraph, I see no way to conclude that Montgomery County has
little or no connection to this action or that it is not the
county where the injury -- the breach of contract -- occurred.
15