Title: Chavez v. McFadden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 437PA18
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 437PA18 
Filed 5 June 2020 
CARLOS CHAVEZ and LUIS LOPEZ, Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
GARY McFADDEN, SHERIFF, MECKLENBURG COUNTY, Respondent. 
 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, 262 N.C. App. 196, 822 S.E.2d 121 (2018), vacating and 
remanding orders entered on 13 October 2017 by Judge Yvonne Mims Evans in 
Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 4 November 
2019. 
 
Goodman Carr, PLLC, by Rob Heroy, and Sejal Zota, for petitioners-appellants 
 
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Sean F. Perrin, for respondent-appellee 
 
Deborah M. Weissman, for Law Scholars and National Immigrant Justice 
Center, amici curiae 
 
Raul A. Pinto, for North Carolina Justice Center, amicus curiae 
 
Irena Como, Katrina Braun, Omar Jadwat, Cody Wofsy, Daniel Galindo, and 
Spencer Amdur, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (ACLU) and 
ACLU of North Carolina, et al., amici curiae 
 
Joshua S. Press, for United States Department of Justice, amicus curiae 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-2- 
The question before us in this case is whether state judicial officials acting in 
counties in which the Sheriff has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal 
government have the authority to grant applications for the issuance of writs of 
habeas corpus for and to order the release of individuals held pursuant to 
immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers.  After a thorough review of the 
record, briefs, and arguments made by the parties, we conclude that the trial court 
erred by ordering the release of petitioners Carlos Chavez and Luis Lopez because 
the record establishes that petitioners were held under a claim of federal authority 
that the trial court was required to respect.  In light of that and other determinations, 
we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, in part; reverse that 
decision, in part; vacate that decision, in part; and remand this case to the Court of 
Appeals with instructions that this case be remanded to the Superior Court, 
Mecklenburg County, with instructions to deny petitioners’ requests for the issuance 
of writs of habeas corpus and to be discharged from custody. 
On 28 February 2017, then-Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, Irwin Carmichael, 
entered into a written agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, an entity housed within the Department of Homeland Security, 
pursuant to § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g) (1996), as amended by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-
296.  In accordance with the provisions of this agreement, certified Mecklenburg 
County deputies, subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General of 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
the United States, were authorized to perform specific immigration enforcement 
functions, including, among others, the investigation, apprehension, and detention of 
undocumented aliens “to the extent consistent with State and local law.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g)(1)–(3), (5) (2018). 
On 5 June 2017, petitioner Lopez was being held in pretrial detention in the 
Mecklenburg County Jail based upon common law robbery, conspiracy, resisting a 
public officer, and misdemeanor breaking or entering charges.  On 5 July 2017, the 
District Attorney’s office voluntarily dismissed the common law robbery, conspiracy, 
and resisting a public officer charges on the grounds of insufficient evidence.  At that 
point, petitioner Lopez remained subject to a $400.00 secured bond in connection with 
the misdemeanor breaking or entering charge, which was the only charge that was 
still pending against him.  On 13 August 2017, petitioner Chavez was arrested and 
placed in pretrial detention in the Mecklenburg County Jail subject to a $100.00 cash 
bond for driving while impaired, driving without an operator’s license, interfering 
with emergency communications, and assault on a female.  At approximately 9:00 
a.m. on 13 October 2017, both petitioners became eligible for release when petitioner 
Lopez’s $400.00 bond was modified from a secured to an unsecured bond and someone 
posted petitioner Chavez’s $100.00 bond.  Even so, the Sheriff continued to hold both 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-4- 
petitioners in the Mecklenburg County Jail pursuant to immigration-related arrest 
warrants and detainers.1 
On the morning of 13 October 2017, an investigator employed by the Public 
Defender’s Office sent an e-mail to the Sheriff’s General Counsel bearing the subject 
line “Heads up-Important” for the purpose of informing the General Counsel that 
emergency writs of habeas corpus relating to petitioners would be submitted later 
that day.  At 9:12 a.m., both petitioners filed petitions seeking the issuance of a writ 
of habeas corpus based upon assertions that their continued detention in the 
Mecklenburg County Jail was unlawful because:  (1) “the detainer[s] lack[ed] 
probable cause, [were] not [ ] warrant[s], and ha[d] not been reviewed by a judicial 
official” in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) 
the Sheriff “lack[ed] authority under North Carolina General Statutes to continue to 
detain [p]etitioner[s] after all warrants and sentences ha[d] been served”; and (3) the 
Sheriff’s “honoring of ICE’s request[s] for detention violate[d] the anti-
commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment.” 
                                            
1 A Form I-200, which is entitled “Warrant of Arrest,” is an administrative arrest 
warrant issued against aliens for civil immigration violations by an authorized immigration 
officer.  8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1) (2019); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2018).  A Form I-247A is an 
“Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action” that “serves to advise another law enforcement 
agency that [DHS] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the 
purpose of arresting and removing the alien,” and “request[s] that such agency advise [DHS], 
prior to release of the alien, in order for [DHS] to arrange to assume custody, in situations 
when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.”  8 C.F.R. § 
287.7(a) (2019).  As a general proposition, the detaining “agency shall maintain custody of 
the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours.”  Id. § 287.7(d). 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-5- 
At 9:30 a.m., the General Counsel forwarded the investigator’s e-mail to Sheriff 
Carmichael; Sean Perrin, the Sheriff’s outside legal counsel; Donald Belk, a captain 
serving in the Mecklenburg County Jail; and eight other individuals in which the 
General Counsel stated that “I do not acknowledge receipt of [the investigator’s] 
emails on this topic.”  At 9:37 a.m., Captain Belk responded to the General Counsel’s 
e-mail by indicating that the office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Mecklenburg 
County had advised him that the cases “are on in [Courtroom] 5350 this morning,” 
that petitioner Lopez remained in the Sheriff’s custody, and that, since petitioner 
Chavez had already been turned over to ICE, he “should not go to court.” 
On the same morning, the trial court issued writs of habeas corpus ordering 
that petitioners be “immediately brought before a judge . . . to determine the legality 
of [their] confinement” and requiring the Sheriff to “immediately appear and file a 
return.”  Following the issuance of the trial court’s order, the investigator attempted 
to serve it at the Sheriff’s office.  After the front desk employee at the Sheriff’s Office 
refused to accept service, the investigator left the trial court’s orders at the front desk.  
In addition, the investigator served copies of the trial court’s orders upon the 
personnel working at Mecklenburg County jail, the Sheriff’s outside legal counsel, the 
office of ICE’s Chief Counsel, and an assistant district attorney. 
At 11:57 a.m., a further hearing was held before the trial court at which the 
Sheriff did not appear, either in person or through counsel.  In addition, the Sheriff 
did not file a return or produce either petitioner before the trial court.  At 12:08 p.m., 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-6- 
the trial court entered orders finding that both petitioners were being unlawfully 
detained and ordering that they be discharged from the Sheriff’s custody. 
At 2:58 p.m., the Sheriff filed written returns relating to both petitioners.  The 
return filed with respect to petitioner Chavez stated that, while he was being held in 
“exclusive” federal custody, he was physically incarcerated in the Mecklenburg 
County Jail.  The return filed with respect to petitioner Lopez stated that, “[a]t the 
time of the [p]etitioner’s filing,” he was being held in state custody and detained in 
the Mecklenburg County Jail pursuant to a $400.00 secured bond for misdemeanor 
breaking or entering and an arrest warrant and detainer that had been issued by 
DHS.  The Sheriff declined to release either petitioner and eventually delivered them 
to ICE custody. 
On 6 November 2017, the Sheriff filed petitions seeking the issuance of writs 
of certiorari with the Court of Appeals authorizing review of the trial court’s orders 
and the issuance of a writ of prohibition to preclude the trial court from ruling upon 
any further habeas corpus petitions relating to the lawfulness of the continued 
detention of persons subject to immigration-related detainers or arrest warrants.  On 
22 December 2017, the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing the Sheriff’s 
certiorari petitions and prohibiting “the trial court . . . from issuing a writ of habeas 
corpus ordering the release of a person detained by the Sheriff” pursuant to a 287(g) 
agreement and “from entering any orders or sanctions limiting the authority of the 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-7- 
Sheriff and his officers or agents, or any officer or agent of the United States, from 
carrying out the acts permitt[ed] by the agreement.” 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s orders before the Court of Appeals, the 
Sheriff argued that the trial court lacked “jurisdiction to rule on federal immigration 
matters.”  In addition, the Sheriff contended that the trial court had erred by ordering 
that petitioners be released “because [they] were being exclusively detained on 
United States Department of Homeland Security detainers and administrative 
warrants.”  In response, petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals should 
dismiss the Sheriff’s appeal on the grounds that the Sheriff had waived the right to 
assert the arguments that he was now seeking to make on appeal given that he had 
failed to raise them before the trial court and, in the alternative, because the case 
was moot.  In attempting to persuade the Court of Appeals to uphold the challenged 
trial court orders, petitioners argued that the trial court had ample authority to rule 
upon the merits of their petitions because neither petitioner was being held in federal 
custody at the time that the relevant orders had been entered.  More specifically, 
petitioners contended that: (1) the 287(g) agreement was not properly before the 
court; (2) neither federal nor state law authorized the Sheriff to detain petitioners for 
civil immigration purposes; (3) both petitioners remained in state custody when the 
trial court authorized their release; and (4) the record evidence failed to demonstrate 
that either petitioner was being lawfully held in DHS custody.  Finally, petitioners 
argued that the Court of Appeals should dismiss the Sheriff’s appeal because his 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-8- 
continued detention of petitioners violated their rights under North Carolina law and 
the state and federal constitutions. 
On 6 November 2018, the Court of Appeals filed an opinion vacating the 
challenged trial court orders on the grounds that the trial court “lacked any legitimate 
basis and was without jurisdiction to review, consider, or issue writs of habeas corpus 
for alien [p]etitioners not in state custody and held under federal authority, or to issue 
any orders related thereon to the Sheriff.”  Chavez v. Carmichael, 262 N.C. App. 196, 
216, 822 S.E.2d 131, 145 (2018).  As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the Sheriff’s appeal was not subject to dismissal for mootness on the 
grounds that this case was subject to the public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine.  Id. at 203–04, 822 S.E.2d at 137–38 (stating that “[t]he Sheriff’s appeal 
presents significant issues of public interest because it involves the question of 
whether our state courts possess jurisdiction to review habeas petitions of alien 
detainees ostensibly held under the authority of the federal government”).  According 
to the Court of Appeals, “[p]rompt resolution of this issue [wa]s essential because it 
is likely other habeas petitions will be filed in our state courts, which impacts ICE’s 
ability to enforce federal immigration law.”  Id. at 204, 822 S.E.2d at 138. 
The Court of Appeals concluded, in addressing the merits, that the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in instances like 
this one.  Id. at 206–09, 822 S.E.2d at 139–41.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
of Appeals held that “North Carolina law does not forbid state and local law 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
enforcement officers from performing the functions of federal immigration officers” 
and that “the policy of North Carolina as enacted by the General Assembly, expressly 
authorizes sheriffs to enter into 287(g) agreements to permit them to perform such 
functions.”  Id. at 209, 822 S.E.2d at 140 (citing N.C.G.S. § 128-1.1 (2017)).  In 
addition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue 
writs of habeas corpus in these cases because “[a] state court’s purported exercise of 
jurisdiction to review the validity of federal detainer requests and immigration 
warrants infringes upon the federal government’s exclusive federal authority over 
immigration matters.”  Id. at 211, 822 S.E.2d at 142.  The Court of Appeals also held 
that North Carolina courts lacked the authority to entertain petitions seeking the 
issuance of writs of habeas corpus applicable to individuals held in federal custody 
even if the relevant sheriff had not entered into a 287(g) agreement with ICE given 
that any such review of the lawfulness of immigration-related detentions 
“constitute[d] prohibited interference with the federal government’s supremacy and 
exclusive control over matters of immigration.”  Id. at 211–12, 822 S.E.2d at 142.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners had the status of detainees being 
held in federal custody and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order their 
release because the Sheriff, in detaining petitioners, was acting under the actual 
authority of the United States granted to him pursuant to the 287(g) agreement, 
under color of federal authority arising from the warrants and detainer requests, and 
as a federal officer for purposes of the 287(g) agreement.  Id. at 213–16, 822 S.E.2d 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-10- 
at 143–45.  As a result, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had been 
“without jurisdiction, or any other basis, to receive, review, or consider [p]etitioners’ 
habeas petitions, other than to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, to hear or issue writs 
of habeas corpus, or intervene or interfere with [p]etitioner[s’] detention in any 
capacity,” and remanded this case with instructions that petitioners’ habeas corpus 
petitions be dismissed.  Id. at 216–17, 822 S.E.2d at 145.  On 27 March 2019, this 
Court allowed petitioners’ petition seeking discretionary review of the Court of 
Appeals’ decision.2 
In seeking to convince us that the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the 
challenged trial court orders, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals effectively 
“issued an advisory opinion in a moot case.”  More specifically, petitioners contend 
that, “[a]fter refusing to respond to the noticed-writ issued by the superior court, and 
handing [p]etitioners over to ICE custody for deportation in contravention of that 
court’s release order, the sheriff appealed the very release order it had willfully 
mooted in an attempt to obtain an after-the-fact advisory opinion supporting its 
                                            
2 On 4 December 2018, Gary McFadden was sworn in as Sheriff of Mecklenburg 
County and terminated his office’s 287(g) agreement with ICE on the following day.  See Jane 
Webster, New sheriff tells ICE he’ll end controversial jail immigration program in 
Mecklenburg, The Charlotte Observer (Dec. 5, 2018 11:11 AM), https://perma.cc/RY8K-
MXUW.  Sheriff McFadden is substituted for former Sheriff Carmichael as the named 
respondent in this case pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 38(c) (stating that, “[w]hen a person is a 
party to an appeal in an official or representative capacity and during its pendency dies, 
resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and the person’s successor 
is automatically substituted as a party”).  Sheriff McFadden did not oppose the allowance of 
petitioners’ discretionary review petition. 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-11- 
conduct.”  According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the 
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied in this case, with 
petitioners expressing the inability to “imagine worse-suited circumstances for 
application of the discretionary public-interest exception” given that “the public 
interest exception does not overrule the long-standing rule . . . that our state’s 
appellate courts are not the proper forum for seeking advisory opinions.”  In addition, 
petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred by reaching the merits of the 
Sheriff’s challenge to the relevant trial court orders on the grounds that “the sheriff 
did not preserve his arguments” and had “defaulted by willfully failing to appear and 
to present evidence in the trial court.” 
As far as the merits of this case are concerned, petitioners argue that the trial 
court “retained jurisdiction to determine if [p]etitioners were in lawful state custody, 
and correctly found no evidence of federal custody.”  According to petitioners, the trial 
court had “the jurisdiction to review a habeas petition to determine whether the 
individual is in lawful state custody,” with the trial court having “correctly 
determined that [petitioners] were not in federal custody because the sheriff brought 
no evidence to support that claim.”  Finally, petitioners argue that “the Court of 
Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction even if the 287(g) 
agreement was invalid” on the grounds that its decision to this effect “was 
unnecessary to its conclusions.”  In support of this assertion, petitioners contend that 
“the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the habeas petitions under 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-12- 
state law” and that it “correctly determined that [p]etitioners were not in lawful state 
custody because state law does not authorize detainer arrests in the absence of a 
287(g) agreement.” 
In seeking to convince this Court to uphold the Court of Appeals’ decision in 
his favor, the Sheriff argues that the Court of Appeals “correctly addressed the merits 
of the case” on the grounds that “the public interest exception to mootness applies.”  
In addition, the Sheriff contends that the exception to the mootness doctrine 
applicable to cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” is applicable 
to this case as well.  Moreover, the Sheriff argues that “the Court of Appeals’ holding 
that a state trial court cannot rule on the legality of a federal immigration arrest 
warrant and detainer in the absence of a 287(g) agreement was dicta” given that both 
petitioners were detained pursuant to a 287(g) agreement.  The Sheriff denies having 
waived the right to challenge the lawfulness of the trial court’s orders on appeal  given 
that any party can raise the issue of jurisdiction at any time and given that the Court 
of Appeals allowed the Sheriff’s certiorari petitions. 
In addressing the merits of petitioners’ challenge to the Court of Appeals’ 
decision, the Sheriff argues that “the trial court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to rule on the legality of administrative immigration arrest warrants and 
detainers.”  In the Sheriff’s view, when local officers act pursuant to a 287(g) 
agreement, they are functioning “as federal immigration officials,” with a state 
judicial official lacking any authority to “issue writs against federal officials.”  The 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-13- 
Sheriff contends that “the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over 
immigration issues in both 287(g) jurisdictions and non 287(g) jurisdictions” and that, 
since individuals detained pursuant to immigration arrest warrants and detainers 
are being held in federal custody, “state habeas statutes cannot be used to undermine 
the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over immigration issues.” 
As a general proposition, North Carolina appellate courts do not decide moot 
cases.  In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 452, 628 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2006) (stating that this 
Court will usually “decide a case only if the controversy which gave rise to the action 
continues at the time of appeal” (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 148, 250 S.E.2d 
890, 912 (1978)).  “A case is ‘moot’ when a determination is sought on a matter which, 
when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”  Roberts 
v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass’n, 344 N.C. 394, 398–99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996) 
(quoting Moot Case, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)); see also Knox v. Serv. 
Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287, 183 L. Ed. 
2d 281, 295 (stating that “[a] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court 
to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party” (cleaned up) (quoting 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1390, 146 L. Ed. 2d 
265, 277 (2000))).  “In state courts the exclusion of moot questions from determination 
is not based on a lack of jurisdiction but rather represents a form of judicial restraint.”  
Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Envtl Mgmt. Comm’n, 368 N.C. 92, 100, 772 S.E.2d 
445, 450 (2015) (quoting Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147, 250 S.E.2d at 912).  Our purpose 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-14- 
in exercising such restraint is to ensure that this Court does not “determine matters 
purely speculative, enter anticipatory judgments, declare social status, deal with 
theoretical problems, give advisory opinions, answer moot questions, adjudicate 
academic matters, provide for contingencies which may hereafter arise, or give 
abstract opinions.”  Little v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 
689, 700 (1960), overruled on other grounds by Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Grandfather 
Home for Children, Inc., 280 N.C. 354, 185 S.E.2d 836 (1972).  As a general 
proposition, cases that have become moot should be dismissed.  Benvenue Parent-
Teacher Ass’n v. Nash Cty. Bd. of Educ., 275 N.C. 675, 679, 170 S.E.2d 473, 476 
(1969). 
The mootness doctrine is subject to exceptions, including the public interest 
exception, upon which the Court of Appeals relied, and the “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review” exception, to which the Sheriff has referred in his brief before this 
Court.  According to the first of these two exceptions, “this court may, if it chooses, 
consider a question that involves a matter of public interest, is of general 
importance[,] and deserves prompt resolution.”  Cape Fear, 368 N.C. at 100, 772 
S.E.2d at 450 (quoting N.C. State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 701, 386 S.E.2d 
185, 186 (1989) (per curiam)).  A case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” 
when the underlying conduct upon which the relevant claim rests is necessarily of 
such limited duration that the relevant claim cannot be fully litigated prior to its 
cessation and the same complaining party is likely to be subject to the same allegedly 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-15- 
unlawful action in the future.  Cooper v. Berger, 370 N.C. 392, 421, 809 S.E.2d 98, 
116 (2018) (citing Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 286, 
292, 517 S.E.2d 401, 405 (1999)). 
As all parties have conceded, the fact that both petitioners have already been 
turned over to federal immigration authorities renders this case moot.  However, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals that this case comes within the scope of the public 
interest exception to the mootness doctrine.  There can be no question but that issues 
relating to both lawful and unlawful immigration have become the subject of much 
debate in North Carolina in recent years.3  In addition, publicly available information 
provided by ICE indicates that it continues to maintain 287(g) agreements with six 
North Carolina law enforcement agencies.4  As a result of the public interest 
                                            
3 The General Assembly has considered legislation addressing the issue of whether 
North Carolina sheriffs should be required to cooperate with immigration-related arrest 
warrants and detainers.  See H.B. 370, An Act to Require Compliance with Immigration 
Detainers and Administrative Warrants, N.C. Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (N.C. 2019), 
https://perma.cc/8PR3-SNH7.  On 20 August 2019, the General Assembly ratified H.B. 370.  
Id.  On the following day, however, Governor Roy Cooper vetoed that piece of legislation.  
Governor Cooper Vetoes HB 370, NC Governor Roy Cooper (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/6SR9-H9Q8.  In addition, news media reports reflect that a number of 
candidates for sheriff “in North Carolina’s largest counties won election in 2018 after making 
high-profile promises not to work with federal immigration agents” by ending 287(g) 
agreements.  Will Doran and Virginia Bridges, Some NC sheriffs won’t work with ICE. This 
GOP-backed bill would force them to, The News & Observer (March 15, 2019, 5:16 PM), 
https://perma.cc/C8TB-SVSN. 
4 According to the ICE website, “[a]s of May 2020,” the agency has 287(g) agreements 
with eight law enforcement agencies in North Carolina: Alamance County, Cabarrus County, 
Cleveland County, Gaston County, Henderson County, Nash County, Randolph County, and 
Rockingham County.  Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, https://perma.cc/JQC3-SBFC 
(last updated May 27, 2020). 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-16- 
surrounding this issue and the fact that several law enforcement agencies across our 
State continue to operate pursuant to 287(g) agreements, we believe that the Court 
should reach the merits of the issues that are before us in this case given the 
likelihood that issues similar to those that have been debated by the parties to this 
case will continue to arise in the future.  Moreover, while the “capable of repetition, 
yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine is technically not available in 
this case given the absence of any indication that petitioners are likely to find 
themselves in the same situation that they confronted in this case in the future, the 
fact that the same issues could arise in the future in jurisdictions that continue to be 
parties to 287(g) agreements with ICE provides additional support for our conclusion 
that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine exists in this case.  As a 
result, we will now proceed to address the merits of the substantive issues that are 
before us in this case. 
The North Carolina Constitution provides that “[e]very person restrained of 
his liberty is entitled to a remedy to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove 
the restraint if unlawful, and that remedy shall not be denied or delayed,” N.C. Const. 
art. I, § 21; see also N.C.G.S. § 17-1 (2019), with the “privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus” not being subject to suspension.  N.C. Const. art. I, § 21; see also N.C.G.S. 
§ 17-2 (2019).  “Every person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty within this State, 
for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, or on any pretense whatsoever . . . may 
prosecute a writ of habeas corpus.”  N.C.G.S. § 17-3 (2019).  A petition seeking the 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-17- 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus “is the proper method by which a prisoner may 
challenge his incarceration as being unlawful.”  State v. Parks, 290 N.C. 748, 751, 228 
S.E.2d 248, 250 (1976) (citing In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540, 126 S.E.2d 581, 586 
(1962)). 
An application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, made by a party or 
any other person on that person’s behalf, N.C.G.S. § 17-5 (2019), directed to any 
superior court or appellate judge in this State, id. § 17-6, must allege, among other 
things, that the party “is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,” the location of the 
party’s imprisonment, the person restraining the imprisoned party, “[t]he cause or 
pretense of such imprisonment or restraint,” and any supporting documents.  Id. § 
17-7(1)–(3).  After a party applies for the writ, any judge empowered to do so “shall 
grant the writ without delay, unless it appear from the application itself or from the 
documents annexed that the person applying or for whose benefit it is intended is, by 
this Chapter, prohibited from prosecuting the writ.”  Id. § 17-9.  If the judge issues 
the writ of habeas corpus, “[t]he person or officer on whom the writ is served must 
make a return thereto in writing,” either immediately or within a certain period of 
time as designated by the judge, id. §§ 17-13, -14, stating whether the individual upon 
whom the writ is served “has or has not the party in his custody or under his power 
or restraint” and, if so, “the authority and the cause of such imprisonment or 
restraint” along with any documents supporting the imprisonment or restraint.  Id. 
§ 17-14(1)–(3).  After the return has been made, the judge shall 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-18- 
examine into the facts contained in such return, and into 
the cause of the confinement or restraint of such party, 
whether the same has been upon commitment for any 
criminal or supposed criminal matter or not; and if issue be 
taken upon the material facts in the return, or other facts 
are alleged to show that the imprisonment or detention is 
illegal, or that the party imprisoned is entitled to his 
discharge, the court or judge shall proceed, in a summary 
way, to hear the allegations and proofs on both sides, and 
to do what to justice appertains in delivering, bailing or 
remanding such party. 
 
Id. § 17-32.  A party petitioning for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus shall be 
discharged “[i]f no legal cause is shown for such imprisonment or restraint, or for the 
continuance thereof.”  Id. § 17-33.  Although no appeal as of right lies from an order 
entered in a habeas corpus proceeding, appellate review of such orders is available 
“by petition for certiorari addressed to the sound discretion of the appropriate 
appellate court.”  State v. Niccum, 293 N.C. 276, 278, 238 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1977) 
(citations omitted). 
Any examination of the nature and extent of a state court’s authority to 
entertain an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus made by an 
individual detained by a local law enforcement agency pursuant to immigration-
related arrest warrants and detainers necessarily involves recognition of the fact that 
federal law is entitled to take precedence over state law, particularly in the 
immigration arena.  According to the Supreme Court of the United States, “[t]he 
Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of 
immigration and the status of aliens,” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394, 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-19- 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351, 366 (2012) (citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 
1, 10, 102 S. Ct. 2977, 2982, 73 L. Ed. 2d 563, 571–72 (1982)), with this “broad, 
undoubted power” having its source in the constitutional provision authorizing 
Congress “[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 4.  Acting in reliance upon this grant of authority, Congress has enacted “extensive 
and complex” legislation concerning immigration, Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2499, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 366, with those laws constituting “the supreme Law of the 
Land,” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and having the effect of preempting state law.  
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 132 S. Ct. at 2500, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 368 (citations omitted). 
Just as a state cannot enact laws that interfere with “the preeminent role of 
the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders,” 
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10, 102 S. Ct. at 2982, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 571, state court judges cannot 
interfere with the custody and detention of individuals held pursuant to federal 
authority.  The Supreme Court of the United States outlined the applicable principles 
over a century ago.  On 10 August 1869, a court commissioner in Dane County, 
Wisconsin issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering the discharge of Edward Tarble, 
who was held in the custody of Lieutenant Stone, a recruiting officer for the United 
States Army, on the grounds that Mr. Tarble had attempted to enlist in the Army 
while under the age of eighteen and without the consent of his father.  Tarble’s Case, 
80 U.S. 397, 397–98, 20 L. Ed. 597, 598 (1872).  After ordering Lieutenant Stone to 
bring Mr. Tarble before him at once and to provide a justification for his detention, 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
id. at 398, 20 L. Ed. at 598, the commissioner, following a hearing, “held that the 
prisoner was illegally imprisoned and detained by Lieutenant Stone, and commanded 
that officer forthwith to discharge him from custody.”  Id. at 399, 20 L. Ed. at 598.  
Following a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirming the commissioner’s 
discharge order, id. at 399–400, 20 L. Ed. at 598, the United States sought and 
obtained review by the Supreme Court, id. at 400, 20 L. Ed. at 598, which held that 
“no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas 
corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent government,” 
id. at 405, 20 L. Ed. at 600, and that, “although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign 
within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and 
restricted by the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. at 405–06, 20 L. Ed. at 600.  
The Supreme Court further noted that, while the federal and state governments 
exercise their powers “within the same territorial limits,” they “are yet separate and 
distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their 
respective spheres.”  Id. at 406, 20 L. Ed. at 600.  Although “[n]either government can 
intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial 
officers with the action of the other,” when any conflict arises between the two 
governments, federal law is “the supreme law of the land.”  Id.  In light of these 
fundamental legal principles, the Supreme Court stated that;  
State judges and State courts, authorized by laws of 
their States to issue writs of habeas corpus, have 
undoubtedly a right to issue the writ in any case where a 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-21- 
party is alleged to be illegally confined within their limits, 
unless it appear upon his application that he is confined 
under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of 
the United States, by an officer of that government.  If such 
fact appear upon the application the writ should be 
refused.  If it do not appear, the judge or court issuing the 
writ has a right to inquire into the cause of imprisonment, 
and ascertain by what authority the person is held within 
the limits of the State; and it is the duty of the marshal, or 
other officer having the custody of the prisoner, to give, by 
a proper return, information in this respect.  His return 
should be sufficient, in its detail of facts, to show distinctly 
that the imprisonment is under the authority, or claim and 
color of the authority, of the United States, and to exclude 
the suspicion of imposition or oppression on his part.  And 
the process or orders, under which the prisoner is held, 
should be produced with the return and submitted to 
inspection, in order that the court or judge issuing the writ 
may see that the prisoner is held by the officer, in good 
faith, under the authority, or claim and color of the 
authority, of the United States, and not under the mere 
preten[s]e of having such authority. 
 
. . . But, after the return is made, and the State judge or 
court judicially apprised that the party is in custody under 
the authority of the United States, they can proceed no 
further.  They then know that the prisoner is within the 
dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that 
neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process 
issued under State authority can pass over the line of 
division between the two sovereignties.  He is then within 
the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States.  If he has committed an offence against their laws, 
their tribunals alone can punish him.  If he is wrongfully 
imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and 
afford him redress. 
 
. . . [T]he State judge or State court should proceed no 
further when it appears, from the application of the party, 
or the return made, that the prisoner is held by an officer 
of the United States under what, in truth, purports to be 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
the authority of the United States; that is, an authority, 
the validity of which is to be determined by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.  If a party thus 
held be illegally imprisoned it is for the courts or judicial 
officers of the United States, and those courts or officers 
alone, to grant him release. 
 
Id. at 409–11, 20 L. Ed. at 601–02 (cleaned up).  See also Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 
241, 249, 6 S. Ct. 734, 739, 29 L. Ed. 868, 870–71 (1886) (stating that “the courts and 
judges of the several States . . . cannot, under any authority conferred by the States, 
discharge from custody persons held by authority of the courts of the United States, 
or of commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the General Government acting 
under its laws” (citations omitted)).  As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the grounds that “[t]he commissioner 
was, both by the application for the writ and the return to it, apprised that the 
prisoner was within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that 
no writ of habeas corpus issued by him could pass over the line which divided the two 
sovereignties.”  Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. at 412, 20 L. Ed. at 602. 
In the exercise of its constitutional power over immigration, Congress enacted 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018).  According to 
that congressional enactment, state officers and employees are authorized to perform 
the functions of a federal immigration officer pursuant to an agreement between the 
federal government and a state or local law enforcement agency.  Id. § 1357(g)(1) 
(stating that “the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-23- 
or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the 
State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to 
perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, 
apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the 
transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out 
such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent 
consistent with State and local law”).  Any such agreement shall provide that any 
local officer acting pursuant to such an agreement “shall have knowledge of, and 
adhere to, Federal law relating to the function, and shall contain a written 
certification that the officers or employees performing the function under the 
agreement have received adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant 
Federal immigration laws.”  Id. § 1357(g)(2).  While acting pursuant to such an 
agreement, the officer “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the 
Attorney General.”  Id. § 1357(g)(3).  The General Assembly has, in turn, determined 
that “any State or local law enforcement agency may authorize its law enforcement 
officers to also perform the functions of an officer under 8 U.S.C. Section 1357(g) if 
the agency has a Memorandum of Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding for 
that purpose with a federal agency,” with “[s]tate and local law enforcement officers 
authorized under this provision [being] authorized to hold any office or position with 
the applicable federal agency required to perform the described functions.”  N.C.G.S. 
§ 128-1.1(c1) (2019).  As a result, local and state law enforcement officers performing 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-24- 
certain federal immigration functions pursuant to a 287(g) agreement between the 
federal government and a local law enforcement agency are acting under color of 
federal authority and, while acting in accordance with such an agreement, should be 
treated as federal, rather than state, officers.  See United States v. Sosa-Carabantes, 
561 F.3d 256, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[t]he 287(g) Program permits ICE to 
deputize local law enforcement officers to perform immigration enforcement activities 
pursuant to a written agreement”); see also City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 
180 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating that “[u]nder these [287(g)] agreements, state and local 
officials become de facto immigration officers, competent to act on their own 
initiative”).5 
                                            
5 The decision of the Court of Appeals contained a discussion of the extent to which a 
sheriff who had not entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government was entitled 
to detain individuals pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants or detainers.  
However, the question of whether a trial court had the authority to entertain an application 
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus petition seeking the release of an individual held 
under immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers by sheriffs who were not parties to 
a 287(g) agreement was not before the Court of Appeals in this case given that former Sheriff 
Carmichael had entered into a 287(g) agreement and allegedly claimed to have been acting 
pursuant to that agreement at the time that he detained petitioners.  As a result, any portion 
of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that addresses the authority of sheriffs who had not entered 
into 287(g) agreements with the federal government to act on the basis of immigration-
related arrest warrants and detainers constitutes mere dicta that has no binding effect in 
future cases.  See Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 536–37, 91 S.E.2d 673, 682 
(1956) (stating that statements in an opinion which are “superfluous and not needed for the 
full determination of the case” are dicta and “not entitled to be accounted a precedent” 
(citation omitted)).  As a result, in the interest of clarity, we vacate those portions of the Court 
of Appeals’ opinion that address the authority of North Carolina sheriffs who have not 
entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government to detain individuals pursuant 
to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers and express no opinion concerning the 
extent, if any, to which an individual held in the custody of a sheriff who has not entered into 
a 287(g) agreement with the federal government on the basis of an immigration-related arrest 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-25- 
According to well-established North Carolina law, a trial judge to whom an 
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has been submitted has 
jurisdiction to determine whether it has the authority to act.  Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 
N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964) (stating that “every court necessarily has 
inherent judicial power to inquire into, hear and determine the questions of its own 
jurisdiction, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine 
the question of its jurisdiction”).  In determining whether it has the authority to 
proceed when asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus at the request or on behalf of a 
person who might conceivably be held on the basis of an immigration-related arrest 
warrant or detainer, the trial judge should proceed in the manner delineated by the 
Supreme Court in Tarble’s Case.  If, when considering an application for the issuance 
of a writ of habeas corpus, the trial judge determines that the application alleges that 
the petitioner is being held on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or 
detainer by a custodian that is a party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal 
government, it must summarily deny the application for the issuance of the writ.6  
See Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. at 409, 20 L. Ed. at 601 (stating that, in the event that a 
                                            
warrant or detainer is entitled to discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding conducted 
pursuant to North Carolina state law. 
6 To be absolutely clear, the trial judge should deny, rather than dismiss, the 
application given that its inability to issue the requested writ stems from the fact that the 
petitioner is allegedly being held pursuant to an immigration-related arrest warrant or 
detainer by a sheriff who is a party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal government rather 
than because the trial judge lacks any authority at all to entertain an application for the 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus submitted by that applicant. 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-26- 
petition asserts that petitioners were “confined under the authority, or claim and 
color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of the government[,] . . . the 
writ should be refused”).  If, on the other hand, the trial judge determines that the 
application does not allege that the petitioner is being held on the basis of an 
immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer by a custodian operating pursuant to 
a 287(g) agreement, or on any other valid grounds, the trial judge has the authority 
to issue the writ and require the custodian to make a return.  Id. (stating that, if the 
application does not disclose that the petitioner is held on the basis of federal 
authority, the court may “inquire into the cause of imprisonment, and ascertain by 
what authority the person is held within the limits of the State”).  In the event that 
the custodian makes a return claiming that the petitioner is being held on the basis 
of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer based upon a 287(g) agreement 
between the custodian and the federal government, the trial judge must deny the 
petitioner’s request for discharge.7  Id. at 410, 20 L. Ed. at 601 (stating that, “after 
the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprised that the party is 
in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further” and 
must deny the writ).  On the other hand, if the custodian’s return shows no valid basis 
                                            
7 Again, for the reasons set forth in more detail above, the application for habeas 
corpus should be denied rather than dismissed, given that the obstacle to discharge is the 
applicable substantive law rather than the extent of the trial judge’s jurisdiction. 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-27- 
for the petitioner’s detention, the trial judge is required to order that the petitioner 
be discharged.  N.C.G.S. § 17-33 (2019). 
In their brief before this Court, petitioners argue that the trial court had the 
ability to “inquire into the legality” of petitioners’ detention and “make [a] threshold 
factual determination” concerning the extent to which they were lawfully detained 
pursuant to federal authority.  As we understand their argument, petitioners appear 
to be asserting that the trial court had the authority to determine the lawfulness of 
the alleged immigration-related arrest warrants or detainers upon which the Sheriff 
purported to be acting and to determine if the sheriff was acting in accordance with 
any applicable 287(g) agreement.  However, Tarble’s Case makes it clear that a state 
court simply has no power, in light of the preemptive effect of federal immigration 
laws, to look behind a sheriff’s claim that the petitioner is being held pursuant to a 
valid immigration-related process, such as an arrest warrant or ICE detainer, by an 
entity operating under a 287(g) agreement with the federal government given that 
the Sheriff claims to be operating as a de facto immigration officer in such 
circumstances.  For that reason, a trial judge who has been presented with an 
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus lacks the authority to make 
any determination concerning the validity of any immigration-related process upon 
which a custodian who has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal 
government claims to be holding the petitioner, including whether the petitioner is 
the person named in the immigration-related process, whether the process is facially 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-28- 
valid, whether the personnel employed by the custodian are properly certified, or 
whether the process has sufficient factual support, since attempting to make such 
determinations would place the trial judge in the position of making decisions that 
have been reserved for federal, rather than state, judicial officials and potentially 
interfering with the manner in which federal immigration laws are administered.8  
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 2126, 53 L. Ed. 2d 63, 71 (1977) 
(stating that “[c]ontrol over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively 
to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere”); Arizona, 567 U.S. 
at 395, 132 S. Ct. at 2498, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 366 (stating that the federal government’s 
“well-settled” power over immigration rests in “one national sovereign, not the 50 
separate states”).  As a result, in the event that a petitioner contends that he or she 
is being held unlawfully by a sheriff who is a party to a 287(g) agreement with the 
federal government on the basis of a defective immigration-related arrest warrant or 
detainer, his or her exclusive remedy lies with the federal, rather than the state, 
courts.  Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. at 410, 20 L. Ed at 601 (stating that, if a petitioner is 
“within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. . . . [and] 
                                            
8 The trial judge would, of course, have the authority to inquire into the issue of 
whether the custodian in whose custody the petitioner is being detained has, in fact, entered 
into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government that is presently in effect, with the 
actual validity of that agreement or the manner in which it is being implemented being an 
issue for the federal, rather than the state, courts. 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-29- 
wrongly imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him 
redress”).9 
In this case, petitioners’ applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus 
clearly reflect that former Sheriff Carmichael, who had entered into a 287(g) 
agreement with the federal government, claimed to be detaining both petitioners on 
the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer.  More specifically, the 
applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by both petitioners 
alleged that they were being “held at the Mecklenburg County Jail pursuant to an 
immigration detainer and I-200 Form” and “a municipal practice of honoring civil 
immigration detainers” and that the Sheriff “will likely claim that his authority is 
derived from” a 287(g) agreement.10  In view of the fact that the applications 
presented to the trial court in this case alleged that petitioners were being held on 
                                            
9 To repeat what has been said earlier, we reiterate that we are expressing no opinion 
concerning the extent, if any, to which a state or local law enforcement agency that is not a 
party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal government is entitled to detain a person on the 
basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer. 
10 The language in which the petitions are couched makes it clear that both petitioners 
conceded that the 287(g) agreement to which they alluded did, in fact, exist.  Instead of 
denying that any 287(g) agreement between former Sheriff Carmichael and the federal 
government existed, petitioners argued that the Sheriff “must show some granting of 
authority from the state to allow him to enter into such an agreement” and that “[t]o allow 
[the Sheriff] to contract with a federal agency and expand his authority would violate the 
dual principles of federalism as specified in the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”  
In other words, rather than denying that the Sheriff had entered into a 287(g) agreement 
with the federal government, petitioners asserted that the 287(g) agreement was invalid, 
which is an immigration-related issue that is reserved for decision by the federal, rather than 
the state, courts, particularly given that former Sheriff Carmichael was clearly entitled 
pursuant to North Carolina law to enter into the relevant agreement by N.C.G.S. § 128-
1.1(c1). 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-30- 
the basis of an immigration-related process by a custodian that was a party to a 287(g) 
agreement with the federal government, the applications, on their face, informed the 
trial court that its state law authority to inquire into the lawfulness of petitioners’ 
detentions had been superseded by federal law.  As a result, although the trial court 
did have the authority to make an initial determination concerning whether it had 
the authority to grant petitioners’ applications, an examination of the applications 
themselves should have led the trial court to summarily deny petitioners’ habeas 
corpus petitions. 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that, while a trial judge 
presented with an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has the 
authority to determine whether it is entitled to act upon any such petition, it should 
(1) summarily deny an application seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus 
that alleges that the petitioner is being held pursuant to an immigration-related 
arrest warrant or detainer by a sheriff who is a party to a 287(g) agreement with the 
federal government and (2) deny a petitioner’s request for discharge in the event that 
the return filed by a sheriff who has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal 
government claims that the petitioner is being held pursuant to an immigration-
related arrest warrant or detainer.  For that reason, we further hold that the trial 
court erred by failing to summarily deny the applications for the issuance of a writ of 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-31- 
habeas corpus submitted by petitioners for its consideration in this case.11  On the 
other hand, while the Court of Appeals correctly determined that petitioners were not 
entitled to be discharged from the Sheriff’s custody, it erred to the extent that (1) it 
held that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to determine whether the Sheriff, who 
had clearly entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government, claimed to 
be holding petitioners on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or 
detainer and (2) by addressing the extent to which habeas corpus relief is available 
to petitioners who are allegedly being held on the basis of immigration-related arrest 
warrants or detainers by sheriffs who are not parties to 287(g) agreements.  As a 
result, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified and affirmed, in part; reversed, 
in part; and vacated, in part, with this case being remanded to the Court of Appeals 
for further remand to the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, with instructions to 
deny petitioners’ requests for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus and to be 
discharged from custody.12 
                                            
11 In view of the fact that petitioners’ applications disclosed the existence of the 287(g) 
agreement, petitioners’ argument that the Sheriff waived the right to challenge the trial 
court’s orders is not persuasive. 
12 At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals ordered that “[a] certified copy 
of this opinion and order shall be delivered to the Judicial Standards Commission and to the 
Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar.”  Chavez, 262 N.C. App. 
at 217, 822 S.E.2d at 145.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Dietz, who was a member of the 
Court of Appeals panel that decided this case, stated that the panel was “concerned that our 
writ of prohibition [preventing the superior court from ruling on habeas petitions] may not 
have been followed with respect to other undocumented immigrants involved in other habeas 
cases not before the Court” and that copies of its opinion had been sent to the Judicial 
Standards Commission and the North Carolina State Bar to make them “aware of it, should 
there be any allegations that this Court’s writ of prohibition was ignored.”  Id. (Dietz, J., 
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-32- 
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED, IN PART; REVERSED, IN PART; VACATED, 
IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
                                            
concurring).  Aside from the fact that we are not inclined to assume that members of the trial 
bench or bar will knowingly refuse to follow orders of either this Court or the Court of 
Appeals, we have no hesitation in concluding that the issues before the Court of Appeals and 
this Court in this case were both novel and complex and that trial judges could not be 
expected to have predicted how either this Court or the Court of Appeals would decide how 
immigration-related habeas corpus petitions should be handled in advance of our decisions.  
As a result, we vacate those portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision requiring that a copy 
of its opinion be delivered to the Judicial Standards Commission and the Disciplinary 
Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar.