Title: People v. Lee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97239
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2004

Docket No. 97239-Agenda 14-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. IVORY 							
LEE, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 2, 2004.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Ivory Lee, was convicted of second degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1998)) and two counts of aggravated battery
with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 1998)) involving two
victims, Wile and Willis Trotter. The aggravated battery with a firearm
count for the shooting of Willis Trotter is not at issue here. Regarding
Wile Trotter, defendant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for
the second degree murder conviction, a Class 1 felony, and 15 years'
imprisonment for the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction at
issue here, a Class X felony, thus receiving a greater sentence on the
lower class felony. The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated
the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction on one-act, one-crime grounds. People v. Lee, 311 Ill. App. 3d 363 (2000).
	We denied defendant's first petition for leave to appeal but,
pursuant to our supervisory authority, we remanded the cause for
further consideration in light of People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335
(2001). On remand, the appellate court "adhered" to its original
opinion, affirming the second degree murder conviction and vacating
the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction. 343 Ill. App. 3d 431.
We then granted defendant leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and
now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND
	Defendant was indicted with (1) three counts of first degree
murder of Wile Trotter: (a) intentional murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)
(West 1998)), (b) knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West
1998)), and (c) felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1998));
(2) one count of aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile Trotter; (3)
one count of aggravated battery with a firearm of Willis Trotter; and
(4) one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS
5/24-1.1 (West 1998)). The State later dismissed the counts of felony
murder and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.
	The evidence elicited at defendant's jury trial showed the
following. On the evening of February 6, 1997, defendant and several
of his friends went to a party at Sky Harbor Inn in Springfield. The
group took along a handgun for protection, but initially left it in the
car. Approximately one hour after the group arrived at the party, twin
brothers Wile and Willis Trotter, who were allegedly known for
carrying guns, also arrived at the party. Defendant presented evidence
that Wile and Willis had previously shot at defendant and his friends,
pointed a gun at one or more of them without shooting, and shot at
other people. Following the arrival of Wile and Willis, defendant and
two of his friends went to their cars to get some drinks. At this time,
defendant retrieved the handgun from his friend's car and put it in his
waistband. The three then returned to the party.
	Shortly thereafter, defendant's group decided to leave the party.
Once outside, Willis began arguing with one of defendant's friends.
The two yelled at each other and exchanged profanities. According to
the statements of defendant and two of his friends, Willis appeared to
reach for a gun inside his pocket during the argument. Defendant
stated that because he believed Willis was reaching for a gun, he
pulled the handgun from his waistband and shot Willis.
	Defendant also believed that Wile was reaching for a gun in his
coat. Defendant shot Wile three times. Defendant and his group then
fled the scene. When police arrived, Wile told them that two of the
others in the group had shot him. Police found no weapons at the
scene. Shortly thereafter, the police stopped a car and a passenger,
later identified as defendant, ran from the car toward some nearby
houses. Police searched the remaining members of defendant's group
who were also in the car, but did not find any weapons. The group
was taken to the police station for questioning. Defendant was later
arrested. He initially claimed that he was inside the Sky Harbor Inn at
the time of the shooting. When police told him other witnesses
contradicted this claim, he signed a statement where he admitted to
shooting Wile and Willis. However, he claimed the shootings were in
self-defense.
	Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of Wile
Trotter, aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile Trotter, and
aggravated battery with a firearm of Willis Trotter. The second degree
murder conviction arose as a lesser-mitigated offense of first degree
murder. The jury found that defendant believed circumstances existed
to justify the use of deadly force, but also found that defendant's belief
was unreasonable. The court sentenced defendant to 20 years'
imprisonment for second degree murder and 15 years' imprisonment
for aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile Trotter, and 18 years'
imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm of Willis Trotter.
The 20- and 15-year sentences were to run concurrent to each other,
but consecutive to the 18-year sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing
that: (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
did not shoot the Trotters in self-defense; and (2) his convictions for
second degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile
were based on the same physical act.
	The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part. Lee, 311
Ill. App. 3d 363. We denied defendant's leave to appeal. In the
exercise of our supervisory authority, we vacated the appellate court's
judgment and directed the court to reconsider its decision in light of
People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001). Following remand, the
appellate court reached the same result. 343 Ill. App. 3d 431. The
appellate court rejected defendant's self-defense argument, concluding
that the State proved his belief that the circumstances justified the use
of deadly force was unreasonable. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 437.
	The appellate court noted that the Crespo defendant, like
defendant here, committed a series of closely related but separate acts
when he stabbed one of the victims three times in rapid succession.
343 Ill. App. 3d at 438. Here, defendant shot Wile Trotter three times.
As in Crespo, the charging instrument did not apportion the separate
acts into separate crimes. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 439. The appellate court
recognized that in Crespo the State could have charged each stab
wound as a separate crime, but did not. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 439. Nor
did the State argue that theory to the jury. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 439.
Similarly, the State did not charge each gunshot in this case as a
separate crime. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 439. Defendant's convictions for
second degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile
were, therefore, based on the same physical act. 343 Ill. App. 3d at
438-39. The appellate court then vacated the aggravated battery
conviction, stating that the one-act, one-crime principle should inure
to the benefit of the State, not defendant. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 441.
Defendant again petitioned for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315),
and we granted the petition.
	Other relevant facts will be introduced as they become pertinent
to our analysis.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Self-Defense
	First, we address defendant's argument of self-defense.
Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once a defendant raises it,
the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did not act in self-defense, in addition to proving the
elements of the charged offense. People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104,
127 (1995). The elements of self-defense are: (1) that unlawful force
was threatened against a person; (2) that the person threatened was
not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm was imminent; (4) that
the use of force was necessary; (5) that the person threatened actually
and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use of the
force applied; and (6) the beliefs of the person threatened were
objectively reasonable. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1998); see also
Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d  at 127-28. If the State negates any one of these
elements, the defendant's claim of self-defense must fail. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d  at 127-28.
	The parties' arguments on this point center on the reasonableness
of defendant's belief that the circumstances warranted the use of
deadly force. This issue involved credibility determinations made by
the jury. It is the function of the jury as the trier of fact to assess the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 428 (2002). The jury must also resolve conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d  at 428. The
relevant standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could
have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant did not act in
self-defense. People v. Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d 909, 920 (2004).
	According to defendant, all of the eyewitnesses, except Willis
Trotter, claimed that Willis Trotter had acted as if he had a gun.
Defendant also argues that several witnesses testified that both Willis
and Wile had been known to carry guns and were involved in various
shootings. As the State points out, Willis' attire of bib overalls and no
coat belied defendant's theory that Willis had reached for a gun, as it
would have been difficult to conceal a gun in that attire. Further, while
one witness claimed to have seen a black object on Willis' hip, no
witness claimed to have seen a gun. Moreover, given defendant's
escape when the police attempted to arrest him and considering his
initial false exculpatory statement to police, we cannot say that the
jury's apparent decision to believe Willis' version of events was
unreasonable. We agree with the appellate court that "[t]he evidence
showed that (1) the Trotters did not make threats to anyone on the
night of the shootings; (2) no witness observed either of the Trotters
with a gun that night; and (3) the police did not recover a gun from
either Willis or Wile or from the scene after the shootings." 343 Ill.
App. 3d at 436.
	In sum, reviewing the evidence in accord with the standard
expressed above, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's belief that the
circumstances justified the use of deadly force was unreasonable.
Therefore, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
did not act in self-defense.

B. One-Act, One-Crime
	Next, we address whether the second degree murder conviction
or the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction must be vacated
under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. As acknowledged by the State,
defendant is not bound by his waiver of the issue below. See People
v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 389 (2004) (one-act, one-crime violation
affects the integrity of the judicial process and, therefore, satisfies the
plain error rule). Defendant argues that the State has conceded and the
appellate court has held that under People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335
(2001), the three shots defendant fired at Wile constitute one crime.
Therefore, the only remaining issue is what conviction should be
vacated. The State agrees.
	This court has always held that, under the one-act, one-crime
rule, the less serious offense must be vacated. See People v. Garcia,
179 Ill. 2d 55, 71 (1997) (when multiple convictions are obtained for
offenses arising from a single act, a sentence should be imposed on the
more serious offense, and the conviction on the less serious offense
should be vacated); see also People v. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411
(1994). The question then is straightforward: Is second degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1998)) or aggravated battery with a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 1998)) the more serious crime?
	In answering this question, we turn to an instructive decision
cited by both parties, People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d 257 (1963). In
Duszkewycz, the defendant was convicted of rape and incest for the
same act. He was sentenced to 5 years' incarceration for rape and 19
to 20 years' incarceration for incest. In relevant part, we stated:
			"In the present case we are of the opinion that only one
sentence should have been imposed, and that sentence should
have been for the greater offense. The relative gravity of the
two offenses involved in the single act in this case can not
depend upon the sentences actually imposed, on the rape
charge by the jury and on the charge of incest by the judge.
A touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of
different tribunals to the same facts is required, and we
therefore turn to the appraisal made by the General
Assembly." Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261.
We then compared the relative punishments prescribed for the two
offenses and determined that rape was classified by the General
Assembly as the more serious offense. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261-62. The punishment authorized by the legislature for rape was a
definite prison term of 1 year to life to be imposed by the jury, and the
punishment authorized for incest was a 1-year to 20-year
indeterminate term to be imposed by the trial court. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261-62. Consequently, we held that rape was the more
serious offense and reversed the defendant's conviction for incest,
even though the defendant received a longer sentence for that
conviction. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 262-63.
	As with the most familiar means of determining legislative intent,
we simply use the plain language of the statutes to determine what
crime is more serious. See People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 76 (2002)
(where legislative intent can be ascertained from the plain language of
the statute itself, that intent must prevail). It is common sense that the
legislature would provide greater punishment for crimes it deems
more serious. Here, the legislature has classified aggravated battery
with a firearm as a Class X felony with a possible sentence of 6 to 30
years. 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(b) (West 1998); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3)
(West 1998). Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony with a possible
sentence of 4 to 20 years. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(d) (West 1998); 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1.5) (West 1998). Therefore, in line with Duszkewycz, the
second degree murder conviction, as the less serious offense, should
have been vacated.
	The State argues that in Duszkewycz we were somehow
concerned that two tribunals affected the sentences. While the State
correctly points out that the jury and the trial court each imposed a
sentence in Duszkewycz, we find no hint in our opinion that we based
our holding on that fact. Rather, we read Duszkewycz as standing for
the proposition that the legislature determines the relative gravity of
all offenses.
	The State's reliance on People v. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d 103, 137
(1984), vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1074, 94 L. Ed. 2d 127,
107 S. Ct. 1266 (1987), does not alter our conclusion. According to
the State, under Mack, the legislative classification is significant, but
not dispositive. In Mack, the defendant was convicted of three counts
of first degree murder for the killing of one person. Those counts
charged the defendant (1) intentionally and knowingly shot the victim;
(2) shot the victim knowing that such shooting created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim; and (3) shot
the victim while committing a forcible felony, armed robbery. While
noting that two of the three convictions must be vacated, we cited
Duszkewycz for the rule that the relative punishments prescribed by
the legislature for the offenses should determine the convictions to be
vacated. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d  at 137. All three convictions in Mack were,
however, capital crimes. Thus, the "penalty provided by the legislature
g[ave] no help in making the determination" in that case. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d  at 137. We ultimately concluded that the most serious offense
was the intentional and knowing conviction because it involved a more
culpable mental state than the others. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d  at 137. In
contrast, the two offenses here have different legislative classifications
and penalties. Therefore, there is no need to resort to Mack's reliance
on the mental states involved in the crimes.
	Similarly, the State raises a mens rea argument, citing City of
Chicago v. Hill, 40 Ill. 2d 130, 136-37 (1968). In Hill, we affirmed
the conviction for the more specific crime and vacated the conviction
for the more general crime. See Hill, 40 Ill. 2d  at 136-37 (disorderly
conduct reversed, obstructing traffic affirmed). The offenses involved
in Hill were both ordinance violations, and we noted that the city
Code did not indicate whether one violation was considered more
serious than the other. Hill, 40 Ill. 2d  at 136. This case does not
present that classification problem.
	In sum, the appellate court erred in concluding that the more
serious offense in this case was second degree murder simply because
the court opted to impose a greater prison sentence on that count.
Instead, aggravated battery with a firearm is the more serious offense,
and defendant's conviction for second degree murder must be
vacated.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the State proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant's claim of self-defense was
unreasonable. We therefore affirm the appellate court on that issue.
We also hold that when vacating an offense for one-act, one-crime
purposes in cases involving crimes of differing legislative
classifications, the seriousness of each offense must be ascertained by
the relative punishments prescribed by the General Assembly. In this
case, defendant's second degree murder conviction, a Class 1 felony,
should have been vacated rather than his aggravated battery with a
firearm conviction, a Class X felony. Accordingly, we reverse the
appellate court on this issue and remand to the appellate court with
directions to vacate defendant's second degree murder conviction in
favor of his aggravated battery with a firearm conviction, the sentence
to run consecutively to defendant's other 18-year sentence that has
not been appealed.  	
Appellate court judgment affirmed
 in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	Although I agree with the majority's conclusion on the self-defense question, I do not agree with its conclusion on the one-act,
one-crime question. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
	The majority's analysis is straightforward enough, and it begins
with the following premise: "[i]t is common sense that the legislature
would provide greater punishment for crimes it deems more serious."
Slip op. at 6. From here, the majority notes that aggravated battery
with a firearm is a Class X felony with a sentencing range of 6 to 30
years, while second degree murder is a Class 1 felony that with a
sentencing range of 4 to 20 years. Slip op. at 6-7. Then, looking no
further than the respective ranges' minimum and maximum sentences,
the majority deduces that second degree murder is, as a matter of law
and in all cases, the less serious offense.
	Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the relative seriousness
of two offenses is simply a function of the upper and lower limits of
their respective sentencing classifications, as this approach wholly
ignores what falls in between. More specifically, the majority ignores
the fact that, in crafting this state's sentencing scheme, the legislature
built in a great deal of overlap between different sentencing classes,
leaving to the sentencing court the task of defining the appropriate
punishment in a given case. The offenses at issue in this case provide
a perfect illustration. As far as the legislature is concerned, an
aggravated battery with a firearm might justify as little as 6 years in
prison or as many as 30 years in prison, depending upon the facts of
the particular case. Likewise, as far as the legislature is concerned, a
second degree murder might justify as little as 4 years in prison or as
many as 20 years in prison, depending upon the facts of the particular
case. Thus, in creating these two offenses, the legislature specifically
allowed for the possibility that, in a particular case, a second degree
murder might be more serious and therefore command a greater
sentence than an aggravated battery with a firearm.
	Given this reality, it is simply impossible to say categorically, as
the majority does, that all aggravated batteries are more serious than
all second degree murders as a matter of law. Indeed, had the
legislature felt this way, it would have created mutually exclusive
sentencing ranges, with the maximum sentence for second degree
murder falling somewhere below the minimum limit for aggravated
battery with a firearm. But this is not what the legislature did. On the
contrary, it created broad and largely overlapping sentencing ranges,
leaving it to the trial court's discretion to evaluate and ascertain the
seriousness of these and other offenses on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, I would look to the sentences actually imposed in a
given case when identifying the most serious offense.
	Significantly, Duszkewycz does not foreclose this result. In
Duszkewycz, the defendant was convicted of rape and incest, based
upon the same act. At that time, rape was punishable by a prison term
of one year to life, with sentence to be set by the jury. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1961, ch. 38, par. 490. Incest, in turn, was punishable by a prison term
of 1 to 20 years, with sentence to be set by the court. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1961, ch. 38, par. 374. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years for the
rape and 20 years for the incest. On appeal, this court held that,
because both convictions arose from the same act, only the conviction
for the greater offense could stand. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261. The
court then explained:
		"The relative gravity of the two offenses involved in the
single act in this case can not depend upon the sentences
actually imposed, on the rape charge by the jury and on the
charge of incest by the judge. A touchstone more reliable
than the subjective reaction of different tribunals to the same
facts is required, and we therefore turn to the appraisal made
by the General Assembly." Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261.
After looking to the respective sentencing ranges, the court stated: "It
is clear that the General Assembly has regarded rape as the more
serious of the two offenses involved in this case." Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 262. Accordingly, the court vacated the 20-year sentence for
incest and affirmed the 5-year sentence for rape. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 263.
	Incredibly, the majority finds "no hint" that the decision in
Duszkewycz was influenced by the fact that "two tribunals affected the
sentences." Slip op. at 7. With respect to my colleagues in the
majority, might such a "hint" not be found in the passage set out
above, which is also set out in the majority opinion? Slip op. at 6. In
the first sentence of this passage, the court explains that "[t]he relative
gravity of the two offenses involved in the single act in this case can
not depend upon the sentences actually imposed, on the rape charge
by the jury and on the charge of incest by the judge." (Emphasis
added.) Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261. This sentence seems to be
saying that, while the sentences actually imposed might ordinarily be
the standard by which the relative seriousness of multiple offenses is
governed, that standard is inapplicable where different tribunals
impose the relevant sentences. Why else would the court have limited
its holding to "the two offenses involved *** in this case"?
Conversely, if the majority is correct, and Duszkewycz "stand[s] for
the proposition that the legislature determines the relative gravity of
all offenses" (emphasis added) (slip op. at 7), would not the court in
Duszkewycz have stated that "[t]he relative gravity of the two offenses
in all cases can not depend upon the sentences actually imposed"? By
explicitly limiting its impact to the "two offenses involved *** in this
case," Duszkewycz implies that looking to legislative classifications
rather than the sentences actually imposed is the exception, not the
rule.
	The second sentence of the quoted passage only underscores this
interpretation:
		"A touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of
different tribunals to the same facts is required, and we
therefore turn to the appraisal made by the General
Assembly." (Emphasis added.) Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d  at 261.
The placement of "therefore" in this sentence confirms that the court
in Duszkewycz turned to legislative classifications only because a
touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of different
tribunals to the same facts was required. This, of course, begs the
question: Is it also necessary to turn to legislative classifications when
a touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of different
tribunals is not required? Although Duszkewycz does not expressly
say, the above passage strongly suggests that it is not. At the very
least, Duszkewycz is not nearly as dispositive of the question presented
as the majority seems to believe, and the State's argument that
Duszkewycz is distinguishable from the present case is well taken.
	The bottom line is that, in this case, the trial court clearly believed
that this particular second degree murder was more serious than this
particular aggravated battery with a firearm. The legislature
specifically allowed for this result, and I see no compelling reason to
set it aside. I therefore dissent on this point.