Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. David J. Winkel
Citation: 2005 WI 165
Docket Number: 2003AP002935-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2005

2005 WI 165 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2935-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against David J. Winkel, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
David J. Winkel, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WINKEL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 13, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2005 WI 165
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2003AP2935-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against David J. Winkel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
David J. Winkel, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
Dec 13, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee that Attorney David J. Winkel be publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct, that he be ordered to 
pay restitution in the amount of $934, and that he be ordered to 
pay the costs of this proceeding. 
¶2 
On October 27, 2003 the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint and order to answer against Attorney 
Winkel.  The complaint alleged two counts of professional 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
2 
 
wrongdoing.  Count I alleged that Attorney Winkel violated SCR 
20:8.4(c)1 by submitting a fee request to the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) that misrepresented the amount of time 
spent by his firm in handling a case on behalf of client J.T.  
Count II alleges that Attorney Winkel violated SCR 20:1.5(c)2 by 
failing to enter into a written contingency fee agreement with 
J.T. and B.T. concerning the social security matter.  Winkel 
submitted an answer that denied the majority of the substantive 
allegations and denied any wrongdoing. 
¶3 
Attorney Curry First was appointed as referee in the 
matter.  Referee First conducted a hearing on December 1 and 2, 
2004.  The OLR and Attorney Winkel's counsel thereafter filed 
post-hearing 
briefs 
and 
proposed 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law. 
¶4 
Referee First filed his report and recommendation on 
June 21, 2005.  In summary, the report found that Attorney 
Winkel had not violated ethical rules concerning the execution 
of a contingency fee agreement as alleged in Count II, but had 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
2 SCR 20:1.5(c) provides in part that  
[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and 
shall state the method by which the fee is to be 
determined, including the percentage or percentages 
that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of 
settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether 
such expenses are to be deducted before or after the 
contingent fee is calculated. 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
3 
 
improperly misrepresented his firm's time and billing charges in 
submitting a fee application to the SSA as alleged in Count I.  
The referee's report agreed with the OLR's recommendation that a 
public reprimand be issued to Attorney Winkel on the billing 
issue. 
¶5 
Neither Attorney Winkel nor the OLR appealed from the 
referee's report.  Accordingly, this court's review proceeds 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).3  The referee's findings of fact are to 
be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 
562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  The referee's conclusions of law, 
however, are subject to de novo review.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718. 
¶6 
Following our review of the record, we approve and 
adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
determine that the seriousness of Attorney Winkel's misconduct 
warrants the imposition of a public reprimand.  We also agree 
with and adopt the referee's recommendation that Attorney Winkel 
be ordered to pay restitution to J.T. in the amount of $934. 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  Review; appeal. 
(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Attorney Winkel was admitted to practice in Wisconsin 
in 1984.  He is the sole shareholder in his firm, which is 
located in Neenah.  Attorney Winkel's prior disciplinary history 
includes a public reprimand in April 1998 for failing to 
adequately prepare to represent his clients and to explain their 
legal matters to them, for failing to competently represent a 
client in an estate matter, for misrepresenting that he had 
prepared a document, for failing to respond to successor 
counsel's 
requests, 
and 
for 
failing 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
disciplinary investigation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Winkel, 217 Wis. 2d 339, 577 N.W.2d 9 (1998). 
¶8 
The referee made the following factual findings.  J.T. 
and B.T., husband and wife, initially became clients of Attorney 
Winkel's firm in 1995 in connection with a tax matter.  At that 
time, they signed a retainer agreement that provided for charges 
on an hourly basis.  The retainer agreement did not mention any 
representation concerning a social security disability claim. 
¶9 
Attorney Winkel directed the work on the tax file to 
his associate.  At some point in the next several months, 
Attorney Winkel's law firm was also engaged to represent J.T. 
concerning a social security disability claim.  As found by the 
referee, Attorney Winkel urged his associate to have J.T. and 
B.T. sign a contingency fee agreement for this new matter.  
Attorney Winkel testified that he recalled the associate telling 
him that J.T. and B.T. had signed a contingency fee agreement.  
At the hearing, the associate did not recall whether the clients 
had in fact signed such an agreement or whether he had told 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
5 
 
Attorney Winkel that they had.  Ultimately, no such agreement 
was found.  Many of the associate's time slips, however, 
indicate through a billing code that his work on the social 
security matter was on a contingency fee basis. 
¶10 In January 1997, an attorney advisor for the SSA 
notified J.T. and Attorney Winkel's associate that she had 
determined that J.T. was eligible for benefits.  Within a few 
weeks after this notification, the associate left Attorney 
Winkel's firm to form his own practice.  Shortly after the 
associate left Attorney Winkel's firm, Attorney Winkel received 
a favorable final decision from the SSA.  The referee found that 
Attorney Winkel then "pressured" J.T. and B.T. to continue the 
social security matter with Attorney Winkel's firm instead of 
transferring it to the associate's new firm.  Attorney Winkel 
also convinced them to agree to present the fee petition to the 
SSA as a contingency fee arrangement because Attorney Winkel 
claimed that to do otherwise would delay the final resolution of 
J.T.'s social security claim and his receipt of back benefits.   
¶11 Prior to meeting with J.T. and B.T., Attorney Winkel 
prepared a draft fee petition to the SSA showing total hourly 
fees of $6250 and requesting a 25 percent contingency fee (which 
would have equaled a fee of $5813.45).  Attorney Winkel showed 
this draft petition to J.T. and B.T. at their in-person meeting.  
B.T. acknowledged that her husband signed the fee application, 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
6 
 
and understood and agreed to Attorney Winkel receiving a 25 
percent contingency fee on the social security recovery.4 
¶12 Because no contingency fee agreement had been filed 
with the SSA prior to the award of benefits, as described above, 
Attorney Winkel was required to submit a fee petition that 
itemized the amount of time spent on each service provided 
during the case.  Attorney Winkel prepared the itemized fee 
petition by reconstructing the amount of time that he believed 
the associate would have spent on the tasks that were performed.  
Attorney Winkel allegedly performed this reconstruction by 
estimating how long it would have taken him to perform the same 
task.   
¶13 Attorney Winkel testified that he prepared the fee 
petition using this reconstruction methodology because his 
former associate had a history of failing to record or of 
underrecording the time that he spent on a file.  Attorney 
Winkel claimed that certain tasks performed on the J.T. social 
security file were not contained in the associate's prior time 
slips.  Attorney Winkel, however, never attempted to contact his 
former associate concerning his time entries or the work 
performed on the file.  The referee concluded that Attorney 
Winkel's failure to consult his former associate stemmed from 
Attorney Winkel's inappropriate conduct in pressuring J.T. and 
B.T. to keep the social security matter with Attorney Winkel.   
                                                 
4 J.T. did not testify at the hearing. 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
7 
 
¶14 Ultimately, 
Attorney 
Winkel's 
reconstructed 
fee 
application showed 30 billable hours while the original time 
slips (as shown on informational invoices sent to J.T. and B.T.) 
showed a total of 12.8 billable hours for the same time period. 
¶15 At the hearing, the associate testified that he 
believed that his time slips and the original invoices sent to 
J.T. and B.T. were accurate concerning the work performed and 
fees charged.  He stated that he did not recall any problems 
with failing to record all of his time on the J.T. social 
security matter, although he admitted having discussions with 
Attorney Winkel generally about failing to capture all of his 
time. 
¶16 The referee found that Attorney Winkel had disclosed 
to the SSA's representative that his fee petition was based on a 
reconstruction of his firm's hourly charges.  Ultimately, the 
SSA appears to have handled the matter as if it were a 
contingent fee arrangement.  In contingency situations, social 
security regulations provide for an award of attorney's fees of 
either 25 percent of the recovery or $4000, whichever is less.  
In this instance, social security initially awarded Attorney 
Winkel fees of $5813.45 based on a calculation of 25 percent of 
the recovery, but then corrected its error and reduced the 
attorney's fees to $4,000. 
¶17 The 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Winkel's 
reconstruction methodology had resulted in him misrepresenting 
to the SSA the amount of time spent and the fees earned by his 
firm in prosecuting J.T.'s social security claim.  The referee 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
8 
 
focused on two facts that pointed in the direction of the fee 
application overstating the fees earned.   
¶18 First, the initial time slips submitted by the 
associate (and billed on invoices to J.T. and B.T.) showed a 
total billable amount of 12.8 hours while the reconstructed fee 
petition showed a total of 30 billable hours for the same time 
period.  The referee concluded that since the amount of time 
more than doubled without adequate explanation by Attorney 
Winkel, the fee application misrepresented the overall time 
actually spent on the file.  Usually, the exercise of billing 
judgment results in the reduction of time whereas here it 
resulted in the time being more than doubled.   
¶19 Second, the referee found that Attorney Winkel's 
intentional failure to consult his former associate concerning 
the fee application supported the conclusion that the fee 
application was overstated.  Indeed, Attorney Winkel admitted 
that, in certain circumstances, without his former associate's 
input he 
had 
no 
verifiable 
way 
of 
knowing 
whether the 
associate's time was inaccurate.  The referee found that 
Attorney Winkel failed to explain why he increased many of the 
associate's time entries.  The referee pointed out nine examples 
of such enhancement, and noted that logic and experience support 
only one situation where it appears that the associate may have 
underreported his time.  Moreover, if Attorney Winkel, in 
preparing the fee application, was estimating how long it would 
have taken him to perform the identified tasks, the amounts 
should not have increased by such a large amount given the fact 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
9 
 
that Attorney Winkel was much more experienced than his 
associate at prosecuting social security appeals. 
¶20 In light of the more than doubling of his firm's 
contemporaneous time entries without adequate explanation, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Winkel had misrepresented his 
firm's hourly fees on his initial application to the SSA in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).5 
¶21 Based on our review of the matter, the referee's 
findings concerning the fee application overstating the number 
of hours spent and the amount of fees earned are not clearly 
erroneous and are adopted by the court.  They support the 
referee's legal conclusion that Attorney Winkel misrepresented 
those items to the SSA in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), and we 
agree with that conclusion.  Although there may in fact have 
been a problem with the associate underreporting his time in 
certain instances, the bottom line is that Attorney Winkel's fee 
application more than doubled the amount of time his firm had 
actually recorded on the matter and Attorney Winkel failed to 
adequately explain the basis for many of the "enhanced" entries.  
The amount of the increase is simply too large to be believable. 
                                                 
5 Following the initial award of back benefits, Attorney 
Winkel successfully petitioned the SSA for a modification of the 
award based on a different beginning date.  Attorney Winkel then 
sought $1039.50 for the fees he earned on this "phase two" of 
the appeal.  The SSA awarded Attorney Winkel a fee of only $100, 
"giving consideration to the limited services provided by the 
attorney in prompting a reopening and revision."  The referee 
concluded that, although the SSA drastically reduced the 
requested fee, there was no misrepresentation involving this 
"phase two" fee request. 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
10 
 
¶22 With respect to the issue of the contingent fee 
agreement, the referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove by 
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that Attorney Winkel 
violated SCR 20:1.5(c) by failing to obtain a written contingent 
fee agreement.  Although no signed written agreement could be 
located after the matter was concluded, Attorney Winkel's firm 
always handled social security appeals on a contingency basis 
and Attorney Winkel told the associate to handle the J.T. social 
security matter in that way.  The associate subsequently told 
Attorney Winkel that he had entered into a contingency agreement 
with J.T. and B.T. and indicated on his time slips that certain 
entries were for a social security matter, which the billing 
personnel 
in 
the 
firm 
always 
handled 
as 
a 
contingency 
arrangement.  Moreover, the fee application submitted to the SSA 
that was signed by J.T. referred to a 25 percent contingency 
agreement with expenses to be reimbursed by the client.  The SSA 
ultimately accepted the fee petition with the contingent fee 
arrangement.  The referee concluded that given this evidence, 
the OLR had failed to prove under the required standard of 
clear, satisfactory and convincing proof that Attorney Winkel 
had failed to obtain a written contingency agreement.6   
¶23 We find that the referee's factual findings on this 
issue are not clearly erroneous.  Although Attorney Winkel, as 
                                                 
6 SCR 
22.16(5) 
states 
that 
"[t]he 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the respondent has 
engaged in misconduct." 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
11 
 
the sole owner of the firm, should have ensured that a copy of a 
signed contingent fee agreement was maintained in the firm's 
file, we agree with the referee's legal conclusion that the OLR 
failed to prove a violation of SCR 20:1.5(c) by clear, 
satisfactory and convincing evidence in this case. 
¶24 Having concluded that Attorney Winkel violated SCR 
20:8.4(c), we address the appropriate discipline to be imposed.  
As sought by the OLR, the referee recommended that Attorney 
Winkel be given a public reprimand.  Attorney Winkel's conduct 
did involve misrepresentation as to fees, which was designed to 
inure to his financial benefit.  The violation of the duty of 
candor also occurred in connection with a fee petition to a 
federal agency.  Moreover, the referee concluded that Attorney 
Winkel had not shown appropriate remorse for the wrongdoing.   
¶25 On the contrary side, the referee believed that the 
potential for rehabilitation supported the issuance of a public 
reprimand rather than a suspension.  The referee also noted that 
the associate's failure to record his time accurately and his 
exit from Attorney Winkel's firm were partially responsible for 
the problems with the fee application.  While those facts do not 
excuse Attorney Winkel's more than doubling of his firm's 
charges, they do explain to some degree why Attorney Winkel 
thought he needed to reconstruct his firm's time in preparing 
the fee application and do lend support to the issuance of a 
public reprimand rather than a suspension. 
¶26 Having considered the nature of Attorney Winkel's 
misconduct, the need to impress upon him the seriousness of the 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
12 
 
misconduct and the need to protect the public, the courts and 
the legal system from such conduct by Attorney Winkel or other 
attorneys, we agree that a public reprimand is appropriate 
discipline for Attorney Winkel's misconduct in this case. 
¶27 In addition to the issuance of a public reprimand, the 
referee also recommended that the court order Attorney Winkel to 
pay restitution to J.T.  Ultimately, the SSA awarded Attorney 
Winkel $4000 in fees.  Had Attorney Winkel submitted the amount 
of 
fees 
undisputedly 
earned 
by 
his 
firm 
(using 
the 
contemporaneous time entries and the prevailing hourly rates at 
the end of the representation), the referee concluded that 
Attorney Winkel's firm would have been entitled to a fee of 
$3066 out of J.T.'s recovery.  Consequently, the referee 
concluded that restitution in the amount of the difference 
between those two figures, $934, would be appropriate.  We agree 
that Attorney Winkel should pay restitution to J.T. in the 
amount of $934. 
¶28 Finally, the referee recommends that Attorney Winkel 
be ordered to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding, 
which were $9007.45, as of July 11, 2005.  We agree that 
Attorney Winkel should pay the costs of the proceeding. 
¶29 IT IS ORDERED that Attorney David J. Winkel is 
publicly reprimanded for his professional misconduct.   
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney David J. Winkel shall pay restitution to 
J.T. in the amount of $934. 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
13 
 
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney David J. Winkel pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, provided that if 
the costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of an inability to pay those costs within 
that time, the license of David J. Winkel to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of the court. 
 
No. 
2003AP2935-D   
 
 
 
1