Title: State v. Mitchell
Citation: 106 Ariz. 492, 478 P.2d 517
Docket Number: 2133
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 1970

106 Ariz. 492 (1970) 478 P.2d 517 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Thomas Armendarez MITCHELL, Jr., Appellant. No. 2133. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 30, 1970. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. S. Jeffrey Minker, Tucson, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice: Thomas Armendarez Mitchell, Jr., hereinafter referred to as defendant, was tried and convicted on Count I attempted kidnapping "while armed with a gun" and Count II assault with a "deadly weapon *493 or instrument, to wit: a gun" and was sentenced to a term of not less than ten years nor more than fifteen years in the Arizona State Prison, both counts to run concurrently. From his conviction and sentence he appeals. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to both counts. It was alleged that the acts were committed on November 14, 1968, upon Rebecca Mullinax in violation of A.R.S. § 13-108, § 13-110, § 13-491, as amended, and § 13-249, as amended. Defendant made a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on each count which was denied. On November 14, 1968, Rebecca Mullinax was returning to Alice Vail Junior High School. The defendant walked up behind her as she approached the school and took her by the arm. He had a gun in one hand. He told her not to scream or he would shoot her. He asked her to go to his truck, and she told him if he did not release her she would scream. He did not release her, so she screamed, at which time defendant released her, and she ran into the school. The police were notified, and, upon arrival, found a clip-type gun and a clip near the defendant's truck. Defendant told the officers he did not know how to get a bullet from the clip into the chamber of the gun. Defendant first contends that the court erred in not granting his motion for directed verdict for acquittal on Count I of the information. He states in his brief: He contends there was no evidence that defendant intended to kidnap the girl, and, in support of this contention, quotes the testimony of Rebecca Mullinax: We cannot agree with the contention of defendant that there was not an overt act toward the commission of a "substantive crime." The pointing of the gun at Rebecca Mullinax with the threat "Don't scream or I will shoot you," coupled with his trying to get her to go to the truck with him, clearly shows his attempt to kidnap her. A.R.S., § 13-491, as amended, provides, in part, as follows: The attempt was made by the use of a gun. Defendant next contends that there were multiple sentences given him, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1641, which reads as follows: We have construed this statute and held that where a single act violates more than one statute, § 13-1641, supra, protects a defendant against double punishment. In State v. Ballez, 102 Ariz. 174, 427 P.2d 125, we held: However, we have since the Ballez case further interpreted § 13-1641, supra, as holding it applicable where the offenses charged have identical components. State v. Green, 98 Ariz. 254, 403 P.2d 809. These interpretations and applications of the rule were succinctly set forth in State v. French, 104 Ariz. 359, 453 P.2d 505, wherein defendant was charged with both robbery and grand theft, in which we said: The difficulty is in applying the rule which we have set forth to the particular facts in each case as to whether the elements are identical. The practical test is to eliminate the elements in one charge and determine whether the facts left would support the other charge. Applying this test to the cases which have been decided by this Court in the past for example in State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998, app. dismissed, 375 U.S. 46, 84 S. Ct. 158, 11 L. Ed. 2d 108, the defendant was charged with rape and kidnapping. You could eliminate the facts of the kidnapping, and still have the rape, and you could eliminate the rape and still have the kidnapping. We accordingly held: In State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187, the defendant was charged with burglary and grand theft. The entering into the building with the "intent to commit grand [theft] or petty theft, or any felony * * *." constitutes burglary. It is not necessary to prove that he actually committed the theft or the other crimes enumerated. Hence, the actual theft could be eliminated, and the burglary would still stand, and the burglary could be eliminated and theft would still stand. In deciding this question we said: In State v. Green, 98 Ariz. 254, 403 P.2d 809, the defendant was charged with burglary and rape. It is plain that burglary could be committed without rape being committed, and the rape could be committed *496 without burglary being committed. The facts constituting the elements of burglary could be withdrawn from the case without disturbing proof of the elements constituting rape. In State v. French, supra, the defendant was charged with robbery and grand theft. The essential element of robbery is the taking of property, in this case the automobile, and without such taking there would be no evidence that the victim had been robbed. We accordingly held that the elements constituting the two crimes were not entirely different, and pointed out that there could have been no robbery without the taking of the property. In State v. Price, 106 Ariz. 433, 477 P.2d 523 [1970], the defendant was charged with both possession and the sale of marijuana. If you take out the possession of the marijuana then there would be no facts upon which to convict him of the sale. If there was no possession there would be no transaction. If you eliminate the facts showing the sale then you eliminate the possession. In disposing of this question, we said: This test does not conflict with the double-jeopardy holding in State v. Harvey, 98 Ariz. 70, 402 P.2d 17, where a defendant was first convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and later charged with rape, lewd and lascivious conduct. Applying the same test to the instant case without the assault with the gun there would be no evidence of an attempt to kidnap while armed with a gun, and on the other hand the evidence necessary to convict on an attempted kidnapping charge could not be withdrawn from the assault with a gun charge without having a complete lack of any proof of the latter charge. The use of the gun was an essential "element" in the proof of the attempted kidnapping while armed with a gun also in assault "with a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun." We therefore hold that the conviction of assault with a deadly weapon must be set aside and the sentence thereunder must be vacated. The next question presented by defendant was that the gun was not loaded and hence there was no assault with a deadly weapon. However, it is not necessary to pass upon this question or other questions *497 in regard to this count as the conviction of assault with a deadly weapon is set aside. Section D of § 13-491 does not provide that the kidnapping be by a person armed with a loaded gun. It merely requires that the act be committed "by a person armed with a gun." So the question of whether the gun was loaded is not involved in the instant case. The defendant contends the court erred in sentencing him to ten to fifteen years in the Arizona State Prison on Count I on the information. The sentence was within the limits of the statute. We have held that the court has wide discretion to sentence a defendant for a period somewhere between the statutory minimum and statutory maximum. We have held that we will uphold the sentence if it is within the statutory limits unless there is clear abuse of discretion. State v. Matthews, 104 Ariz. 421, 454 P.2d 566; State v. Bible, 104 Ariz. 346, 452 P.2d 700; State v. Horton, 101 Ariz. 229, 418 P.2d 385; State v. Bradley, 99 Ariz. 328, 409 P.2d 35. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the instant case. Defendant also contends that the court erred in permitting Officer Ronstadt to testify in the second half of the bifurcated trial in regard to a conversation with defendant. The officer testified from his observation of defendant that he did not appear mentally deranged. The testimony was not admitted for the purpose of showing defendant's guilt but for the purpose of showing the opportunity of the officer to observe defendant and give his opinion in regard to his sanity. He did not testify in detail as to the conversation but merely summarized it. The officer also stated that he had introduced himself and asked defendant if he had been advised of his rights and he indicated he had. However, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, is not involved in the instant case for the reason that in Miranda the Court was talking about a confession which showed guilt, while in the instant case defendant had already been convicted, and the question was only in regard to his sanity. In State v. Prewitt, 104 Ariz. 326, 452 P.2d 500, we held it was not error for the court to permit an officer to testify in regard to the sanity of a defendant based on statements and conduct of the defendant in the officer's presence, even though the opinion was based partly upon a conversation with the defendant which had been suppressed by the court. The facts are analogous to those in the instant case for the reason that the testimony was not introduced in the first trial to determine defendant's guilt, but was introduced in the second trial solely for the purpose of showing the basis upon which the officer gave his opinion as to defendant's sanity. Judgment and sentence on Count II is hereby ordered set aside; judgment and sentence on Count I affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and HAYS, JJ., concur.