Title: Ex parte Citizens State Bank. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Bill McGee and Betty McGee v. Citizens State Bank)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061815
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 15, 2008

REL: 02/15/08 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061815
_________________________
Ex parte Citizens State Bank
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Bill McGee and Betty McGee
v.
Citizens State Bank)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-07-900884)
WOODALL, Justice.
Citizens State Bank ("the Bank") is a corporation; its
principal office is in Lamar County.  It is undisputed that
1061815
2
the Bank has never done business by agent in Jefferson County.
On May 11, 2007, Bill McGee and Betty McGee filed a
declaratory-judgment action against the Bank in the Jefferson
Circuit Court.  The Bank timely filed a motion to transfer the
action to the Lamar Circuit Court.  In response to the Bank's
motion to transfer, the McGees argued only "that because
[they] are residents of Jefferson County, Jefferson County
venue is proper under § 6-3-7(a)(3)," Ala. Code 1975.  
The trial court, without explanation, denied the Bank's
motion to transfer.  The Bank timely petitioned this Court for
a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its
order denying the motion and to transfer the action to Lamar
County.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
"The proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a
motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition
for the writ of mandamus."  Ex parte Alabama Great Southern
R.R., 788 So. 2d 886, 888 (Ala. 2000).  "The burden of proving
improper venue is on the party raising the issue and on review
of an order transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of
mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear showing
1061815
3
of error on the part of the trial judge."  Ex parte Finance
America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458, 460 (Ala. 1987).
Section 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, governs venue for actions
against corporate defendants.  That section provides, in
pertinent part:
"(a) All civil actions against corporations may
be brought in any of the following counties:
"(1) 
In 
the 
county 
in 
which 
a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of real property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
"(2) 
In 
the 
county 
of 
the
corporation's principal office in this
state; or
"(3) In the county in which the
plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is
an entity other than an individual, where
the plaintiff had its principal office in
this state, at the time of the accrual of
the cause of action, if such corporation
does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence; or
"(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3)
do not apply, in any county in which the
corporation was doing business by agent at
the time of the accrual of the cause of
action."
(Emphasis added.)  
1061815
4
It is undisputed that the Bank's principal office is in
Lamar County.  Further, it is undisputed that no "substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred" in Jefferson County.  Consequently, to determine
whether venue is proper in Jefferson County, we need only
apply the clear language of § 6-3-7(a)(3) to the undisputed
facts of this case.
In support of its motion to transfer, the Bank filed an
affidavit of Anthony J. Burnett, its executive vice president.
According to that affidavit, the "Bank does not, nor has it
ever done business in Jefferson County, Alabama, by an agent."
Section 6-3-7(a)(3) clearly provides that a corporation may be
sued "[i]n the county in which the plaintiff resided ... at
the time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such
corporation does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence."  Burnett's affidavit was sufficient to
make a prima facie showing that the Bank did not do business
by agent in Jefferson County.  Consequently, the burden then
shifted to the McGees to prove that the Bank did in fact
conduct business by agent in Jefferson County.  Ex parte
Silver Chiropractic Group, Inc., [Ms. 1050980, June 15, 2007]
1061815
5
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007); Ex parte Pike Fabrication,
Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Ala. 2002).  However, the McGees
offered no evidence indicating that the Bank did business by
agent in Jefferson County.  Instead, they argued, as they do
in response to the Bank's petition for the writ of mandamus,
that § 6-3-7(a)(3) allows them to sue the Bank in the county
of their residence, regardless of whether the Bank did
business by agent in that county.  The McGees' argument is
contrary to the clear language of the statute, as well as the
prior decisions of this Court.  See, e.g., Ex parte Scott
Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala. 2002).
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Bank's petition
and issue a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit
Court to vacate its order denying the Bank's motion to
transfer and to enter an order transferring the action to
Lamar County.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.