Title: Anita Bedwell v. Debbie Hiltz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200219
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 29, 2021

Rel: October 29, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300
Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
_________________________
1200217
_________________________
Debbie Hiltz
v.
Anita Bedwell
_______________________
1200219
_______________________
Anita Bedwell
v.
Debbie Hiltz
Appeals from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-20-75)
BRYAN, Justice.
Debbie Hiltz appeals, and Anita Bedwell cross-appeals, from a
judgment of the Etowah Circuit Court ("the circuit court"), in an election
contest, declaring Bedwell, the contestee, the winner of an election for the
Office of City Council, Place 1, in Rainbow City.  See § 11-46-70, Ala. Code
1975 ("If the party whose election is contested is found to have been duly
and legally elected, judgment must be entered declaring him entitled to
have and to hold the office to which he was so elected.").  We affirm the
circuit court's judgment in Hiltz's appeal, and we dismiss Bedwell's cross-
appeal.
Background
Hiltz and Bedwell were candidates for the Office of City Council,
Place 1, in Rainbow City in an August 25, 2020, election.  On September
1, 2020, the City Council of Rainbow City certified the results of the
election, with a final tally of 879 votes in favor of Hiltz and 880 votes in
favor of Bedwell.  Bedwell was declared the winner of the election.  See §
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11-46-55(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("If it appears that any candidate ... has
received a majority of the votes cast for that office ..., the municipal
governing body shall declare the candidate elected to the office ....").
On September 3, 2020, Hiltz filed in the circuit court an election
contest pursuant to § 11-46-69, Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in
relevant part: 
"(b) Any contest of ... an election [for an office of a city or
town] must be commenced within five days after the result of
the election is declared.  Such contest shall be instituted in the
manner prescribed by Section 17-15-29[, Ala. Code 1975,] and,
except as otherwise provided in this article [i.e., Article 2,
Chapter 46, Title 11, Ala. Code 1975], all proceedings relative
to contests of elections to municipal offices shall be governed
by the provisions of Articles 2 and 3, Chapter 15, Title 17 of
this Code, insofar as they are applicable."
"Section 17-15-29 is now codified at § 17-16-56.  Articles 2 and 3, Chapter
15 of Title 17, are now codified at §§ 17-16-47 through -62 and §§ 17-16-63
through -76, respectively."  Smith v. Burkhalter, 28 So. 3d 730, 735 n.5
(Ala. 2009); see also Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d 673, 685 n.5 (Ala. 2008). 
 In pertinent part, § 17-16-56, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"If the contest is of an election to ... any office of a city or
town not in this article [i.e., Article 3, Chapter 16, Title 17,
Ala. Code 1975,] otherwise provided for, the party contesting
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must file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the
county in which the election was held, a statement in writing,
verified by affidavit, of the grounds of the contest as provided
in this article and must give good and sufficient security for
the costs of the contest, to be approved by the clerk.  ...  The
contest is triable by the court without the intervention of a
jury and must be heard and tried in precedence of all other
cases, civil or criminal, standing for trial in the court."
The verified statement filed by Hiltz in the circuit court asserted
that, during the canvassing of provisional ballots, a number of provisional
ballots were not counted "for various reasons."  See § 11-46-55(a)("If the
certification results of provisional ballots cast at the election have been
received from the board of registrars prior to the first Tuesday next after
the election, ... the municipal governing body, at any special or regular
meeting, may canvas the results before the first Tuesday next after the
election.").  Hiltz contended that she had reason to believe that multiple
provisional ballots that had not been counted should have been counted
and that the result of the election could have changed if those ballots had
been counted.  See § 11-46-69(a)(4)(listing "[t]he rejection of legal votes"
as one cause for contesting an election to an office of a city or town).  The
circuit court set a bond for the election contest in the amount of $5,000,
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which Hiltz posted.
On September 10, 2020, Bedwell filed a motion to dismiss the
election contest, asserting that Hiltz had failed to explain how not
counting the provisional ballots identified in her verified statement was
error.  Hiltz filed a response to Bedwell's motion to dismiss, contending,
among other things, that Hiltz had complied with all the statutory
requirements to contest the election.  On September 21, 2020, the circuit
court entered an order denying Bedwell's motion to dismiss.
On September 24, 2020, Bedwell filed an answer to Hiltz's verified
statement contesting the election.  As a "first special defense," Bedwell
asserted that the decision reached by the Etowah County Board of
Registrars to reject nine provisional ballots "should be final."  See § 11-46-
4(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("It shall be the duty of the various boards of
registrars to conduct an identification program of electors residing in the
municipality and eligible to vote in municipal elections ...."); and § 11-46-
55(a).  As a "counterclaim," Bedwell asserted that two additional
provisional ballots -- respectively cast by K.T. and by J.T. -- were not
counted but should have been.
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Hiltz thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Bedwell's "counterclaim." 
In summary, Hiltz argued that the request for relief styled in Bedwell's
answer as a "counterclaim" was, in actuality, an election contest.  Hiltz
argued that Bedwell had not complied with the statutory requirements for
asserting an election contest and that her "counterclaim" should,
therefore, be dismissed.  The circuit court denied Hiltz's motion to dismiss. 
Hiltz then filed an answer to Bedwell's "counterclaim," essentially
asserting the same argument set out in her motion to dismiss.  Thus,
altogether, Hiltz and Bedwell collectively challenged 11 provisional ballots
that had not been counted.
After conducting a trial, see § 17-16-56, the circuit court entered an
order on November 18, 2020, identifying 6 of the 11 challenged provisional
ballots that it determined should not be counted.  Included in that group
was the ballot of G.D.C.  The circuit court ordered that the five remaining
provisional ballots would be opened and counted the next day.  On
November 19, 2020, the circuit court entered an order stating that five
provisional ballots had been opened and counted.  Included in that group
were the ballots of K.T., J.T., and M.C., all of whom had voted for Bedwell. 
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Also included in that group were the ballots of L.M. and G.C.,1 both of
whom had voted for Hiltz.
With the eligible provisional ballots included, the circuit court
determined that the final tally of votes was 881 votes in favor of Hiltz and
883 votes in favor of Bedwell.  The circuit court declared Bedwell to be the
winner of the election.  See § 11-46-70, Ala. Code 1975.
Hiltz thereafter filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit
court's judgment.  Among other things, Hiltz argued that the circuit court
had wrongfully excluded the provisional ballot of G.D.C.  In response to
Hiltz's postjudgment motion, the circuit court entered an order stating
that G.D.C.'s ballot would be allowed but that the circuit court would not
open it because a single vote in favor of either Hiltz or Bedwell would not
change the outcome of the election.  The circuit court denied all other
relief sought in Hiltz's postjudgment motion.  Hiltz appealed, and Bedwell
cross-appealed.
Analysis
1The circuit court's judgment actually refers to this voter as "C.G." 
It appears that the voter's initials were simply transposed.
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I. Hiltz's Appeal (case no. 1200217)
Hiltz asserts three primary arguments on appeal.  We consider each
in turn.
A. Bedwell's "Counterclaim"
On appeal, Hiltz first argues that the circuit court erred by
permitting Bedwell to assert a "counterclaim."  Hiltz contends that
Bedwell should not have been permitted to rely on the provisional ballots
of K.T. and J.T., which the circuit court ultimately determined should be
counted in the final tally of votes cast for Bedwell.  In support of her
argument, Hiltz correctly asserts that, under this Court's precedent,
statutes governing election contests must be strictly construed.  See
Fluker v. Wolff, 46 So. 3d 942, 950 (Ala. 2010)(" 'An election contest is a
statutory matter, and the statute governing the election must be strictly
observed and construed.  Watters v. Lyons, 188 Ala. 525, 66 So. 436
(1914).'  Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d 673, 680 (Ala. 2008).").  
Hiltz argues that, by permitting Bedwell to identify two provisional
ballots that Bedwell believed should be counted as a "counterclaim" to
Hiltz's election contest, the circuit court effectively allowed Bedwell to
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bring her own election contest and that Bedwell's election contest
circumvented certain requirements set out in § 11-46-69 and § 17-16-56
because: (1) Bedwell did not file her "counterclaim" within five days of
when the results of the election were declared, (2) Bedwell's
"counterclaim" was not accompanied by a sworn statement specifying the
statutory grounds of her contest, and (3) Bedwell was not required to post
a bond as security for the contest.  In her reply brief, Hiltz asserts that her
argument may present "a case of first impression."  Hiltz's reply brief at
23.
However, as Bedwell points out in response, this Court has
previously explained that there is no statutory basis for the winner of an
election to initiate a contest to the votes received by a candidate who lost
an election.  In Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. 1999), the Court
considered a contest to an election for the office of sheriff of Jefferson
County, which contest had been dismissed by the Jefferson Circuit Court. 
On appeal, the contestants argued, among other things, that this Court
should render a judgment in their favor because the contestee did not file
a "cross-contest."  Id. at 1134.  The Court stated: "[T]he contestee correctly
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points out that the statutes do not require that he file an independent
'cross-contest.' "  Id.
In addressing the contestants' argument, this Court quoted from
former § 17-5-1, Ala. Code 1975, the precursor to § 17-16-40, Ala. Code
1975.  Then, as now, the pertinent language of the relevant statute
provided: " 'The election of any person declared elected to ... any office
which is filled by the vote of a single county ... may be contested ....' "
Eubanks, 752 So. 2d at 1134.  The Court reasoned as follows: 
"Under the language of the statute, then, only the election of
a 'person declared elected' may be contested.  Because
Woodward had not been declared the winner of the sheriff's
race, the statute did not authorize Hale[, who had been
declared the winner of the race,] to file an election contest."
Id.  
Similar to the language used in § 17-16-40, § 11-46-69, contains the
following pertinent language with regard to municipal elections: "(a) The
election of any person declared elected to any office of a city or town may
be contested by any person who was at the time of the election a qualified
elector of such city or town ....' "  Thus, this Court's decision in Eubanks
demonstrates that Bedwell was not statutorily authorized to initiate a
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contest to challenge the votes received by Hiltz because Hiltz was not
"declared elected to" the office of city council.  § 11-46-69(a).  Therefore,
the relevant provisions of § 11-46-69 and § 17-16-56 governing the
requirements for the initiation of an election contest did not apply to
Bedwell's "counterclaim," because the relief Bedwell sought was
categorically not a challenge to the "election of [the] person declared
elected to" the office of city council.  § 11-46-69(a).
In her reply brief, Hiltz suggests that Eubanks is distinguishable
because the Eubanks Court specifically noted that the contestee in that
case had complied with the requirements of former § 17-15-21, Ala. Code
1975, the precursor to § 17-16-48, Ala. Code 1975, which states, in
relevant part:
"No testimony must be received of any illegal votes or of
the rejection of any legal votes in any contested election
commenced under the provisions of this article [i.e., Article 3,
Chapter 16, Title 17, Ala. Code 1975,] unless the party
complaining thereof has given to the adverse party notice in
writing of the number of illegal votes and by whom given and
for whom given, and at what precinct or voting place cast, or
the number of legal votes rejected, and by whom offered, and
at what precinct or voting place cast, which the party expects
to prove on the trial."
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See Eubanks, 752 So. 2d at 1133.  However, Hiltz has not argued that
Bedwell did not comply with the requirements set out in  § 17-16-48.  As
explained above, Hiltz's argument is that Bedwell was obligated to satisfy
the identified provisions of § 11-46-69 and § 17-16-56 for initiating an
election contest as a prerequisite to identifying additional provisional
ballots that she believed should be counted.  For the reasons already
explained, Hiltz's argument in that regard lacks merit, and Eubanks is
not materially distinguishable on this point.
The heart of the issue raised by Hiltz's argument is actually whether
Bedwell properly could, during the course of litigating the election contest
already initiated by Hiltz, identify as a "counterclaim" provisional ballots
that she believed should have been counted -- but were not -- in addition
to those provisional ballots Hiltz was already contending should be
counted.  As explained above, Hiltz has identified no statute prohibiting
such a practice; the statutes Hiltz cites pertain only to the initiation of
election contests.  Again, this Court's decision in Eubanks is instructive.
Specifically, the Eubanks Court also considered whether, in the
election contest at issue in that case, the declared winner of the election
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should also be permitted to present evidence.  In resolving that question,
the Eubanks Court cited the precursor to § 17-16-59, Ala. Code 1975,
which provides, in relevant part:
"If, on the trial of the contest of any election, ... it shall
appear that any person other than the one whose election is
contested, received or would have received, had the ballots
intended for the person and illegally rejected been received,
the highest number of legal votes, judgment must be given
declaring such person duly elected ...."
The Eubanks Court stated: "[W]e conclude that the contestee is not
prohibited from introducing such evidence of votes cast illegally for
Woodward.  Neither are the contestants foreclosed from offering any other
evidence of illegal votes that they claimed were cast for Hale."  752 So. 2d
at 1134.
With regard to municipal elections, § 11-46-70 contains nearly
identical language to that found in § 17-16-59: 
"If, on the trial of the contest of any municipal election,
it shall appear that any person other than the one whose
election is contested, received or would have received, had the
ballots intended for him and illegally rejected been received,
the requisite number of votes for election, judgment must be
entered declaring such person duly elected ...."
Thus, this Court's decision in Eubanks indicates that, during the trial of
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Hiltz's election contest to determine whether the conditions of § 11-46-70
that could result in Hiltz's winning the election had been met, the circuit
court properly permitted Bedwell to present evidence of additional
provisional ballots that she believed should have been counted in response
to Hiltz's allegations.
Bedwell cites additional cases in support of her position that
contestees are permitted to raise issues of their own in election contests. 
For instance, this Court's decision in Town of Mountainboro v. Griffin, 26
So. 3d 407 (Ala. 2009), involved an annexation election.  The declared
result of the election was that a greater number of votes had been cast in
favor of annexation.  Certain qualified electors initiated an election
contest.  "In response to the ...  election contest, [the Town of]
Mountainboro and [the City of] Boaz (sometimes collectively referred to
as 'the contestees') alleged, among other things, that illegal votes likewise
had been cast against annexation and that, if those votes were not
considered, the resulting vote totals would favor annexation."  Griffin, 26
So. 3d at 408.  The contestants argued that the contestees did not have
"legal standing to defend the pro-annexation election result by challenging
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the legality of votes cast against annexation."  Griffin, 26 So. 3d at 408-09. 
 "[T]he trial court held that neither municipality was a 'qualified elector'
and, consequently, that neither was entitled to challenge the legality of
votes cast against annexation."  Griffin, 26 So. 3d at 409.  On appeal, this
Court reversed the trial court's judgment as it related to the Town of
Mountainboro, which, it appears, was the only contestee that had
appealed.
In so doing, the Griffin Court distinguished between initiating an
annexation election and defending the outcome of such an election.  The
Griffin Court noted that § 11-42-2(8), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in
pertinent part, that "[t]he result of [an annexation] election may be
contested by any qualified elector voting at the election in the manner
provided for contest of general municipal elections, making the city or
town the contestee."  See Griffin, 26 So. 3d at 409.  In determining that
the Town of Mountainboro was not prohibited from defending the outcome
of the annexation election, the Griffin Court relied on this Court's decision
in Eubanks:
"As in Eubanks v. Hale, [752 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. 1999),] the
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applicable statutes in this case -- [Ala. Code 1975),] §§ 11-42-
2(8) and 11-46-69(a), which in all material respects is worded
the same as the statute at issue in Eubanks -- do not require
the filing of a cross-contest.  As in that case, 'we conclude that
the contestee is not prohibited from introducing ... evidence of
votes cast illegally for [the losing side].'  752 So. 2d at 1134. 
That is, we conclude that Mountainboro, as a properly named
contestee in this case, had standing to try to preserve the
declared outcome of the election both by rebutting the evidence
of illegal votes cast in favor of the proposed annexation offered
by the contestants and by submitting evidence of illegal votes
cast against the proposed annexation.
"Our conclusion finds support in common sense, reason,
and fairness." 
Griffin, 26 So. 3d at 411.  The Griffin Court continued:
"Moreover, we cannot conclude that the legislature, in
adapting § 11-46-69[, Ala. Code 1975,] to an annexation
election in § 11-42-2(8), [Ala. Code 1975,] intended to establish
a process by which a contestant can obtain a binding judgment
from a court of law establishing the legality or illegality of an
annexation election by naming someone as a 'contestee,' or
defendant, who cannot fully defend the outcome of that
election.  If the otherwise properly named defendants in such
a proceeding lack the necessary standing to fully and fairly
defend the outcome of the election, one may question not only
the integrity of the outcome achieved in such a proceeding but,
indeed, whether the proceeding enjoys the necessary
adverseness of parties to make for a 'case' over which the court
has subject-matter jurisdiction in the first place."
26 So. 3d at 411 (footnote omitted).  We conclude that the considerations
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articulated in Griffin regarding the ability of contestees to defend against
an election contest apply with equal measure to the circumstances of this
case and Bedwell's "counterclaim."
Hiltz argues in her reply brief that Griffin is distinguishable
because, she says, the contestees in that case did file a " 'counter-
contest[].' "   26 So. 3d at 408.  However, the language from Griffin that
Hiltz cites indicates only that the contestants in that case had referred to
the contestees' responsive allegations as a " 'counter-contest[].' "  Id.  There
is no indication from this Court's decision in Griffin that the contestees in
that case had attempted to satisfy the pertinent provisions of § 11-46-69
or § 17-16-56 as a prerequisite to asserting their allegations, and, more
importantly, there was no holding by this Court that the contestees were
obligated to do so.
As another example, in Fluker, 46 So. 3d at 945, the declared winner
of a mayoral election "responded" to the allegations raised in an election
contest by "claiming that illegal votes were cast in favor of [the contestant]
and that legal votes in [the contestee]'s favor were rejected and that if
both were taken into account his vote tally would still exceed [the
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contestant]'s."  The trial court ultimately determined that the contestant
had received the most legal votes, and the contestee appealed.  Although
the Fluker Court rejected the contestee's appellate arguments and
affirmed the trial court's judgment, it did not do so on the ground that the
contestee was not permitted to challenge additional votes in the election
contest already initiated by the contestant.
Jacobs v. Ryals, 401 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1981), also involved a mayoral
election.  A losing candidate initiated an election contest, challenging
certain votes.  The contestee "counterclaimed," challenging certain votes
that had been cast for the contestant.  Jacobs, 401 So. 2d at 777.  The trial
court conducted a trial and ultimately declared that the final tally of votes
resulted in a tie, after rejecting, among others, the two votes identified by
the contestee and adding certain others.  The trial court ordered that a
new election should be conducted, and the contestant appealed.  The
Jacobs Court affirmed the portion of the trial court's judgment ordering
that a new election should be conducted after holding, among other things,
that the trial court was correct in rejecting the votes identified in the
contestee's "counterclaim." 
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In her reply brief, Hiltz argues that Fluker and Jacobs are
distinguishable primarily because, she says, the statutory-compliance
arguments that she asserts in this case were not asserted in those cases
and the contestees in those cases were permitted to raise the pertinent
issues without objections from the contestants.  However, as explained
above, this Court's decision in Eubanks considered arguments
substantially similar to those asserted by Hiltz in this case and rejected
them.  The practices described in Fluker and Jacobs are consistent with
the pertinent holding from Eubanks, and we agree with Bedwell that
Fluker and Jacobs further illustrate how Hiltz's position contradicts the
historical interpretation of the statutory scheme at issue.
As another example, Bedwell also cites Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So.
2d 1083 (Ala. 2005), which, like the present case, involved a city-council
election.  The challenger lost the election and filed an election contest,
challenging certain ballots.  The contestee, "responded by contesting
certain votes that [the contestee] sa[id] were illegal or ineligible and that
had been included in the tally for [the contestant]."  Waltman, 913 So. 2d
at 1084.  In its judgment, the trial court declared the contestant to be the
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winner of the election.  The contestee appealed.  After considering the
contestee's arguments on appeal, the Waltman Court reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded the cause for the contestee to be declared
the winner of the election.  Hiltz does not directly address the procedural
history of Waltman in her reply brief.
In light of the foregoing cases cited by Bedwell on appeal, we cannot
reverse the circuit court's judgment based on Hiltz's argument that
Bedwell could not properly identify as a "counterclaim" additional
provisional ballots that she believed should be counted in the election
contest initiated by Hiltz without first satisfying the pertinent
requirements of § 11-46-69 and § 17-16-56.  As explained, the relevant
provisions of those statutes govern the initiation of election contests, and
Bedwell's "counterclaim" was not such a contest.  Therefore, the portions
of those statutes that Hiltz invokes on appeal did not apply to Bedwell's
"counterclaim."  Moreover, the cases cited by Bedwell demonstrate that
contestees should be, and have historically been, permitted to defend the
outcomes of elections by raising responsive issues in an election contest
initiated by another party.
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B. The Provisional Ballots of K.T. and J.T.
Hiltz next argues that the circuit court erred by counting the ballots
of K.T. and J.T. in the tally of votes cast for Bedwell.  The basis of Hiltz's
argument appears to be that, during Bedwell's case-in-chief at trial,
Bedwell did not present specific evidence establishing that the provisional
ballots of K.T. and J.T. should have been counted.  Hiltz appears to argue
that, by failing to do so, Bedwell did not make a prima facie showing
regarding the merits of her "counterclaim."  See, e.g., Waltman, 913 So.
2d at 1089 ("[I]t is the responsibility of a party seeking to have a vote
excluded to make a prima facie showing that the vote was illegally cast."). 
However, as Bedwell points out in response, Bedwell proffered evidence
during Hiltz's case-in-chief regarding the ballots of K.T. and J.T.
The provisional ballots of K.T. and J.T., who resided at the same
address, were not initially counted because it was determined by the
board of registrars that their address was not located within the city
limits of Rainbow City.  During Hiltz's case-in-chief, Bedwell offered
copies of the provisional ballots, and they were admitted as evidence. 
Bedwell's counsel also elicited testimony from Beth Lee, the Rainbow City
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Clerk, who testified that the address was, in fact, located within the city
limits of Rainbow City.  Additionally, Bedwell called Lee to testify as the
only witness in her case-in-chief.  Although Bedwell's counsel did not
revisit Lee's testimony concerning K.T. and J.T., Lee was asked about
other voters, and Bedwell offered as evidence a map demarcating the
corporate boundaries of Rainbow City, which was admitted.
Thus, based on the foregoing evidence, Bedwell made a prima facie
showing that K.T. and J.T. were eligible to vote in the city-council
election.  See Hawkins v. Persons, 484 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (Ala. 1986)("A
person is eligible to vote in a municipal election if he is a qualified elector
of Alabama who has resided in the city in which he seeks to vote for at
least 30 days prior to the election and if he has properly registered to vote
in the county in which the city is located at least 10 days before the
election.  See ...  Section 11-46-38, Code of Alabama (1975).").  Hiltz cites
no authority indicating that Bedwell could meet her initial burden of
proving her "counterclaim" exclusively via the evidence presented in
Bedwell's case-in-chief.
Once Bedwell made a prima facie showing in support of her
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"counterclaim," the burden then shifted to Hiltz to rebut the evidence
presented by Bedwell.  See, e.g., Fluker, 46 So. 3d at 955 ("As the
contestant, Wolff had the burden of showing that W.M.H.'s vote was
illegally cast. ...  Wolff did so, and the burden then shifted to Fluker to
present evidence indicating that W.M.H.'s vote was legally cast.").  On
appeal, Hiltz identifies no evidence indicating that K.T. and J.T. did not,
in fact, reside within the city limits of Rainbow City.
To the extent that Hiltz is challenging the credibility and weight of
the evidence presented by Bedwell, we note that the applicable standard
of review requires that this Court give a presumption of correctness to the
circuit court's findings based on ore tenus testimony and documentary
evidence.  See Fluker, 46 So. 3d at 950 (" 'The [ore tenus] rule applies to
"disputed issues of fact," whether the dispute is based entirely upon oral
testimony or upon a combination of oral testimony and documentary
evidence.'  Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791,
795 (Ala. 2000)(citing Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala. 1995)).' "). 
In light of the foregoing, we cannot reverse the circuit court's judgment
based on Hiltz's argument that Bedwell failed to make a prima facie
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showing that the provisional ballots of K.T. and J.T. should have been
counted.
C. The Provisional Ballot of G.D.C.
Next, Hiltz argues that the circuit court erred by deciding in its
postjudgment order that, although eligible, the ballot of G.D.C. should not
be opened.  The circuit court concluded that a single vote in favor of either
Hiltz or Bedwell would not change the outcome of the election because
Bedwell had won the election by receiving 883 votes, as compared with the
881 votes received by Hiltz.  Hiltz contends that it was impermissible for
the circuit court to declare Bedwell the winner of the election by an
"indeterminate" amount of votes.  Hiltz's brief at 27.  Hiltz asserts that
this Court considered a similar argument in Ex parte Vines, 456 So. 2d 26
(Ala. 1984).  However, Hiltz's citation to this Court's decision in Ex parte
Vines does not demonstrate reversible error by the circuit court.
In Ex parte Vines, one of four voting machines malfunctioned during
a mayoral election.  As a result, Ed Yeargan, the candidate who was
declared to have received the third most votes in the election, was
deprived in the certified results of the election of all the votes that had
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been cast for him on the malfunctioning machine.  Yeargan initiated a
declaratory-judgment action, and the trial court set aside the election and
ordered that another election be conducted.  However, the trial court
ordered that only the voters who had cast their votes on the
malfunctioning machine on the day of the election would recast their votes
in the new election.
The candidate who was declared to have received the second most
votes in the certified results of the original election, Robert Vines, then
filed a petition for the writ of prohibition in this Court, arguing that the
trial court had exceeded its discretion in ordering that a new election be
conducted, at which only a portion of the electorate would be permitted to
vote.  This Court agreed after considering the various possible outcomes
of an election contest that are authorized under § 11-46-70:
"If, on the trial of the contest of any municipal election,
it shall appear that any person other than the one whose
election is contested, received or would have received, had the
ballots intended for him and illegally rejected been received,
the requisite number of votes for election, judgment must be
entered declaring such person duly elected, and such judgment
shall have the force and effect of investing the person thereby
declared elected with full right and title to have and to hold
the office to which he is declared elected.
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"If it appears that no person has or would have had, if
the ballots intended for him and illegally rejected had been
received, the requisite number of votes for election, judgment
must be entered declaring this fact, and such fact must be
certified to the municipal governing body and the vacancy in
the office, election to which had been contested, shall be filled
in the manner prescribed by law for filling the vacancy in such
office.
"If the person whose election is contested is found to be
ineligible to the office, judgment must be entered declaring the
election void, and the fact must be certified to the municipal
governing body. The vacancy in such office shall be filled in the
manner prescribed by law.
"If the party whose election is contested is found to have
been duly and legally elected, judgment must be entered
declaring him entitled to have and to hold the office to which
he was so elected."
The Ex parte Vines Court stated:
"Candidate Yeargan did not contend, nor could he, that
had the votes intended for him not been illegally rejected in
[the malfunctioning machine], he would have received the
requisite number of votes for election as mayor (one half of the
votes cast plus one).  Instead, it was his contention that if he
received the number of votes to which he was entitled, he
would be eligible for a run-off position in the coming election.
"Therefore, the second paragraph of § 11-46-70[, Ala.
Code 1975,] controls, and, once it was shown that no person
'ha[d] or would have had, if the ballots intended for him and
illegally rejected had been received, the requisite number of
votes for election,' the trial court should have entered
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judgment 'declaring this fact.'  Thereupon, the court should
have ordered another election held to fill the office of mayor.
"There is simply no statutory authority for holding an
election limited to [the votes cast on the malfunctioning
machine] and also limited to those electors who voted in the
July 10 election."
456 So. 2d at 29.  The Court concluded that "[t]he only statutory remedy
... was to order another election," and it granted Vines's petition for the
writ of prohibition.  Id.
In this case, however, the circuit court did not determine that no
person had received the requisite number of votes for election, as was the
case in Ex parte Vines.  In this case, the circuit court determined that
Bedwell had received the requisite number of votes for election. 
Therefore, the final paragraph of § 11-46-70 controls in this case, as
opposed to the second paragraph of § 11-46-70, which controlled in Ex
parte Vines.
Section 11-46-55(a) provides, in relevant part: "If it appears that any
candidate ... in the election has received a majority of the votes cast for
that office ... the municipal governing body shall declare the candidate
elected to the office ...."  Thus, Bedwell was required to receive a majority
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of the legal votes cast to win the election.  The circuit court's judgment
determined that 881 legal votes had been cast for Hiltz and that 883 legal
votes had been cast for Bedwell.  The circuit court's postjudgment order
determined that one additional legal vote, G.D.C.'s vote, had been cast. 
Thus, altogether, the circuit court determined that 1,765 (881 + 883 + 1)
legal votes had been cast in the election.  
Therefore, 883 votes constituted a majority of the legal votes cast. 
See § 11-46-55(b)("If a single office is to be filled at the election and there
is more than one candidate therefor, then the majority of the votes cast for
the office in the election shall be ascertained by dividing the total votes
cast for all candidates for the office by two, and any number of votes in
excess of one half of the total votes cast for all candidates for the office
shall be a majority within the meaning of subsection (a).").  Because the
circuit court determined that Bedwell had received 883 legal votes, it
properly concluded that "the party whose election [wa]s contested [wa]s
found to have been duly and legally elected."  § 11-46-70.
Hiltz contends that Ex parte Vines stands for the proposition that
"a final vote tally must be certified."  Hiltz's brief at 28.  However, the
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relevant statement from Ex parte Vines, 456 So. 2d at 29, actually
provided: "If one of the candidates receives a majority as defined by § 11-
46-55(b), [Ala. Code 1975,] he shall be certified as elected thereunder,"
which, as explained, is what the circuit court did in this case.  Hiltz cites
no authority demonstrating that the circuit court committed reversible
error by declining to open the provisional ballot of G.D.C.  Although the
circuit court ultimately determined in its postjudgment order that
G.D.C.'s ballot had been lawfully cast, Bedwell had already met the
statutory requirements for winning the election under 11-46-55(a) and,
consequently, for prevailing in the election contest under § 11-46-70. 
Therefore, there was no statutory reason to determine for whom G.D.C.
had voted, and we cannot reverse the circuit court's judgment based on
this argument.
II. Bedwell's Cross-Appeal (case no. 1200219)
In her cross-appeal, Bedwell argues that the circuit court erred by
determining that the provisional ballots of L.M., G.C., M.C., and G.D.C.
should be counted.  G.C. and M.C. resided at the same address, and
G.D.C. was their son who had resided with them at some point but had
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also resided at a different address.  With regard to L.M., G.C., and M.C.,
Bedwell argues that the circuit court incorrectly applied § 17-3-33, Ala.
Code 1975, which contains provisions concerning "liners," or voters who
reside on property that is intersected by territorial lines.  With regard to
G.D.C., Bedwell argues that he did not register to vote with his current
address within 10 days of the election.  See Hawkins, 484 So. 2d at 1074.
Hiltz responds to Bedwell's arguments in her reply brief.  However,
Bedwell also states that the issues raised in her cross-appeal are moot if
this Court determines that the provisional ballots of K.T. and J.T., which
are discussed in Section I of this opinion addressing Hiltz's appeal, were
properly allowed by the circuit court.  Bedwell's brief at 11.  In other
words, Bedwell contends that, so long as the provisional ballots of K.T.
and J.T. are included in the tally of votes cast for Bedwell, the circuit
court properly declared her to be the winner of the election, regardless of
whether the circuit court incorrectly determined that the provisional
ballots of L.M., G.C., M.C., and G.D.C. should be counted.  She states:
"The cross-appeal is relevant only in the event this Court should
determine that the ... votes [of K.T. and J.T.] for Bedwell were improperly
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added."  Bedwell's brief at 21.
As explained in Section I of this opinion, Hiltz has failed to
demonstrate on appeal that the circuit court erred by counting the votes
of K.T. and J.T. that were cast in Bedwell's favor.  Thus, the circuit court
properly declared Bedwell the winner of the August 25, 2020, election for
the Office of City Council, Place 1, in Rainbow City.  Therefore, according
to the brief submitted in support of her cross-appeal, Bedwell's appellate
arguments are moot, and she seeks no further relief in this Court.
Conclusion
Although Hiltz indicates on appeal that one of her arguments might
present a question of first impression for this Court, the cases cited by
Bedwell in response demonstrate that the Court has already considered
and rejected in previous cases arguments that were substantially similar
to the alleged question of first impression raised by Hiltz.  Moreover,
Hiltz's other arguments are not supported with adequate authority
demonstrating reversible error by the circuit court.  In light of the
foregoing, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed in Hiltz's appeal.
According to Bedwell's appellate brief, the issues she raises in her
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cross-appeal are moot if this Court determines that Hiltz's appeal lacks
merit.  Thus, because Hiltz's appellate arguments are not meritorious,
Bedwell's cross-appeal is moot.  Therefore, Bedwell's cross-appeal is
dismissed. 
1200217 -- AFFIRMED.
1200219 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
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