Title: Vela v. People
Citation: 484 P.2d 1204
Docket Number: C-45
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 1971

484 P.2d 1204 (1971) Consuelo Regina VELA et al., Petitioners, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. No. C-45. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. May 10, 1971. *1205 Alperstein &amp; Plaut P.C., Frank Plaut, Lakewood, for petitioners. No appearance for respondent. ERICKSON, Justice. Petitioners seek review of an Order of the Weld County District Court affirming their conviction for disturbance under 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-8-1. They contend that the County Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the charges against them, because the state statute under which they were prosecuted and convicted was superseded by applicable ordinances of the home rule city of Greeley. In purely local and municipal matters, home rule cities may exercise exclusive jurisdiction by passing ordinances which supersede state statutes. Until they do so, however, the Colorado Constitution provides that state statutes shall continue to apply. Whether a particular state statute has been superseded is governed by Article XX, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution, which states: Thus, for a state statute to be superseded by an ordinance of a home rule city, two requirements must be met. The state statute and the ordinance must be in conflict, and the ordinance must pertain to a purely local matter. Where both of these conditions exist, the state statute is clearly without effect within the jurisdiction of the home rule city. See, e. g., City and County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934). This Court, in Ray v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942), set forth several tests for determining whether a state statute and a local ordinance are in conflict. One test, which we find applicable here, is: The legislation to be examined in light of this test follows: The only difference between the Greeley ordinance and the state statute is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition by proscribing profane language and by holding additional parties responsible for the conduct enumerated. Neither piece of legislation permits or licenses what the other forbids and prohibits. Therefore, the legislation is not in conflict, and both pieces of legislation may validly coexist. In Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), this Court, in striking down an ordinance dealing with a matter of state-wide concern, announced that the "[a]pplication of state law or municipal ordinance, whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive." Later, in Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961), the theory of mutual exclusion was invalidated insofar as it related to matters of both state-wide and local interest. We now expressly overrule the dicta of both these and other cases which suggest that in strictly local and municipal matters ordinances of home rule cities apply to the exclusion of state statutes. As shown herein, state statutes are not necessarily and automatically superseded by ordinances of home rule cities. Rather, as stated by the author of the Merris case, in dissent to Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, supra, "[s]uch charter and such ordinances [of home rule cities in local and municipal matters] supersede state law in conflict therewith * * *." [Emphasis added.] Our holding that there is nothing basically invalid about legislation on the same subject, by both a home rule city and the state, does not affect the salutary holdings of the Merris case requiring criminal law safeguards to be observed in municipal prosecutions. Nor does the principle announced here affect the prohibition against double prosecution. The United States Supreme Court, in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S. Ct. 1184, 25 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1970), clearly established that dual prosecution for violation of a city ordinance and a state statute based on the same acts constitutes double jeopardy. Since the statute in issue may be upheld on the basis that it is not in conflict with the Greeley ordinance, the question of whether disturbance is strictly a local matter need not be decided. Judgment affirmed. PRINGLE, C. J., dissents.