Title: Ex Parte Free
Citation: 910 So. 2d 753
Docket Number: 1031473
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 2005

910 So. 2d 753 (2005)
Ex parte Dorothy FREE.
(In re Dorothy Free
v.
Alan B. Lasseter and Church, Seay &amp; Minor, P.C.)
1031473.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 7, 2005.
*754 Mark D. Morrow, Tuscaloosa, for petitioner.
A. Joe Peddy and J. Craig Lewis of Smith, Spires &amp; Peddy, P.C., Birmingham, for respondents.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Dorothy Free sued Alan B. Lasseter and Church, Seay &amp; Minor, P.C., an Alabama professional corporation with whom Lasseter practiced law, to recover money damages on claims alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent suppression, conversion, negligence, and wantonness, as a result of Lasseter's legal representation of Free in a workers' compensation action. The action also sought a judgment declaring that the defendants' fee exceeded the statutory maximum of 15% allowed in a workers' compensation case by $38,087.79, which amount, Free argues, rightly belongs to her. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Free appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal, without opinion. Free v. Lasseter (No. 2021019, April 30, 2004), ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (table). Free petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, and now we reverse and remand.
Free alleged the following facts in her complaint:
Defendants moved to dismiss Free's claims and her declaratory-judgment action because, they asserted, 1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; 2) the defendants are legal-service providers pursuant to the Alabama Legal Service Liability Act and only one form and cause of action can be brought against them pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-572 and § 6-5-573; 3) the attorney fees were approved by the court and 4) are not in violation of Alabama law; 5) Free did not contest the settlement agreement and/or the attorney-fee award, although she was given an opportunity to do so; and 6) Free is attempting to collaterally attack a prior order of the court through an independent action.
Free moved to strike the fifth and sixth grounds of the motion to dismiss. The trial court did not rule on the motion to *756 strike before granting the motion to dismiss.
Free's complaint states several causes of action. Rule 2, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "There shall be one form of action to be known as `civil action.'" Rule 8(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
Free's complaint complies with the Legal Service Liability Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-572(1) and § 6-5-573; and with Rule 8(a) and (e)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. In presenting her case, it will be necessary for Free to prove that the defendants breached the applicable standard of care (Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-580(1)) as it relates to each cause of action. However, it is not necessary to allege a breach of the applicable standard of care to survive a motion to dismiss. Rule 8(e)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. Even so, in her complaint, Free alleges that attorney N. DeWayne Pope expressed his concern regarding the defendants' attorney fee after a settlement in the amount of $195,000 was reached. The defendants did not refute in the motion to dismiss or in the exhibits attached to the motion Free's allegation regarding Pope's concern.
The defendants' assertion that the court approved the attorney fees and that they are not illegal (grounds 3 and 4 of the motion to dismiss) is a denial of the allegations of the complaint that the attorney fees were excessive and is not a ground for dismissal. The trial court treated the defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss, not a motion for a summary judgment, because the case action summary shows the following entry: "6/19/03  The Court finds the motion to dismiss is to be granted and costs are taxed as paid. Dan C. King."
The defendants' assertion in their motion to dismiss that Free did not contest the settlement agreement or the attorney-fee award is immaterial when the complaint alleges that relevant information relating to the settlement and attorney fees was misrepresented to and/or suppressed from Free and seeks damages as a result of that misrepresentation and suppression. This was not a ground for dismissal, and Free moved to strike that ground. The trial court erred in refusing to strike this as a ground for the motion to dismiss.
Free also moved to strike paragraph 6 of the motion to dismiss. The trial court did not rule on Free's motion to strike before it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part:
Black's Law Dictionary 686 (8th ed.2004) defines "fraud on the court" as follows: "In a judicial proceeding, a lawyer's or party's misconduct so serious that it undermines or it intended to undermine the integrity of the proceeding."
The allegations of the complaint are such that this Court cannot say as a matter of law that the defendants' actions did not constitute fraud on the court. The *757 trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. Therefore, we reverse its order and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.