Title: State v. Hicks
Citation: 525 N.E.2d 316
Docket Number: 45S03-8807-PC-611
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1988

525 N.E.2d 316 (1988)
STATE of Indiana, Appellant,
v.
Garland HICKS, Appellee.
No. 45S03-8807-PC-611.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
July 7, 1988.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Pamela Beck, Hope Fey, Deputy Public Defenders, for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
Although we agree with the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, we also note that the law stated in the dissenting opinion is correct as far as the general application of the law regarding judicial notice is concerned. State v. Hicks (1988), Ind. App., 519 N.E.2d 1276. We therefore write this opinion for the sole purpose of clarifying the application of the law as far as the unusual circumstances of this case are concerned.
*317 The statement of facts as set out in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals is reproduced verbatim, as follows:
The dissenting opinion was correct when it stated:
The State is also correct in its memorandum in support of its petition for transfer when it states that in a post-conviction case the post-conviction court cannot take judicial notice of the transcript of the evidence at the original trial; the transcript must be entered into evidence just as any other exhibit, citing Smith v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 633, 366 N.E.2d 170; Jackson v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 54, 339 N.E.2d 557.
However, in the case at bar, further developments in the case had become clearly apparent to the trial judge and to both the State and the appellee. This factual development in the case clearly indicated to the trial judge that a retrial of the post-conviction relief petition would result in a granting of the same. Situations of this nature have been recognized in other jurisdictions as set out in 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 59, wherein it is stated:
*318 In the case at bar, the trial judge was thoroughly justified in taking judicial notice of the proceedings which had in fact occurred in his court, which by a more extravagant use of judicial time would have led to the same result. There is no question that the trial court would not have erred had he refused to take judicial notice and required a full rehearing nor was he bound to grant a new trial solely on the issue of recanted testimony. Downs v. State (1985), Ind., 482 N.E.2d 716. However, his practical handling of the situation was an economical use of judicial time and saved needless time and expense to both sides of the litigation.
The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs in result without separate opinion.