Title: 135 Wells Avenue, LLC v. Housing Appeals Committee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12253
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12253 
 
135 WELLS AVENUE, LLC  vs.  HOUSING APPEALS COMMITTEE & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2017. - November 13, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & 
Cypher, JJ.2 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, Property, Use of municipal property.  
Real Property, Deed, Restrictions.  Housing.  Zoning, 
Housing appeals committee, Low and moderate income housing, 
Board of appeals:  jurisdiction.  Permit. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
January 14, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Daniel P. Dain for the plaintiff. 
 
Maura E. O'Keefe, Assistant City Solicitor (Jonah Temple, 
Assistant City Solicitor, also present) for zoning board of 
appeals of Newton & another. 
                                                 
 
1 Zoning board of appeals of Newton and city of Newton. 
 
 
2 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Pierce O. Cray, Assistant Attorney General, for Housing 
Appeals Committee. 
 
Paul E. Bouton, Stephen P. LaRose, & Christopher R. Minue, 
for Citizens' Housing and Planning Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The plaintiff, 135 Wells Avenue, LLC 
(135 Wells), owns a 6.3-acre parcel of land in Newton (site), in 
an area known as Wells Avenue Office Park (property), which is 
zoned for limited manufacturing use.  As is all of the property, 
the site is subject to a restrictive covenant owned by the city 
of Newton (city); among other things, the city's deed 
restriction permits only certain of the uses ordinarily allowed 
in a limited manufacturing zone, limits the size and setbacks of 
buildings, and requires that a certain portion of the land 
remain open space.  The city also owns an abutting 30.5-acre 
parcel with a deed restriction requiring that it be used only 
for conservation, parkland, or recreational use. 
 
135 Wells seeks to construct a 334-unit residential rental 
unit complex on the site, with eighty-four of the units (twenty-
five per cent) reserved as affordable housing, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 40B, §§ 20-23.  In order to proceed with development of the 
project, in May, 2014, 135 Wells asked the city's board of 
aldermen (aldermen) to amend the deed restriction to allow a 
residential use at the site, and to permit construction in the 
nonbuild zone; the aldermen declined to modify the deed 
3 
 
 
 
restriction.  At the same time, 135 Wells applied to the city's 
zoning board of appeals (ZBA)3 for a comprehensive permit to 
develop the mixed-income project.  The ZBA denied the permit 
application, on the ground that it lacked authority under G. L. 
c. 40B, § 21, to amend the deed restriction, an interest in land 
held by the city.  135 Wells appealed from the ZBA's decision to 
the housing appeals committee of the Department of Housing and 
Community Development (HAC).  The HAC affirmed the ZBA's 
decision that the ZBA lacked authority to amend the deed 
restriction.  135 Wells then sought judicial review of the HAC's 
decision, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, in the Land Court.  A judge 
of that court denied the motion of 135 Wells for judgment on the 
pleadings and allowed the defendants' cross motions; in doing 
so, he noted that this court had confirmed more than fifty years 
previously that the city's deed restriction is a valid property 
interest, granted to it by a private land holder, and properly 
recorded at the registry of deeds.  See Sylvania Elec. Prods. 
Inc. v. Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 430 (1962) (Sylvania).  The judge 
                                                 
 
3 In Newton, the board of aldermen act as both the 
legislative body for the city and, in separate proceedings, as 
the city's zoning board and permit granting authority under the 
police powers.  In March, 2015, during the pendency of these 
proceedings, the board of aldermen changed its name to the "city 
council."  As do the parties, the housing appeals committee of 
the Department of Housing and Community Development (HAC), and 
the Land Court judge, we refer to the board of aldermen 
(aldermen) as it was known during the proceedings before the HAC 
and the Land Court. 
4 
 
 
 
also concluded, as had the HAC, that Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Groton v. Housing Appeals Comm., 451 Mass. 35 (2008) (Groton) 
was controlling, and that the HAC does not have authority under 
G. L c. 40B to order the city to relinquish its property 
interest. 
 
135 Wells appealed to the Appeals Court and also sought 
direct appellate review; we allowed the application for direct 
appellate review.  On appeal, 135 Wells argues that we should 
conclude that the negative easement is not a property interest 
in land; revise our holding in Groton and conclude that the HAC 
does have authority to modify certain types of property 
interests in land; or, in the alternative, determine that the 
purposes for which the restrictive covenant was enacted are now 
incapable of being attained, and, consequently, that the 
restrictive covenant should be declared null and void. 
 
We decline each of these suggestions and affirm the judge's 
decision granting judgment on the pleadings to the defendants.4 
 
1.  Facts and prior proceedings.  In support of their cross 
motions for judgment on the pleadings, the parties filed 
stipulations of fact, and also relied upon the facts set forth 
in Sylvania.  The parties agreed that there were no material 
facts in dispute and that judgment as a matter of law was 
                                                 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Citizens' Housing 
and Planning Association. 
5 
 
 
 
appropriate.  We recite the facts based on the judge's decision 
and the undisputed facts in the record. 
 
In 1960, Sylvania Electric Products (Sylvania Electric) 
held an option to purchase a 180-acre parcel of land in the city 
on which it intended to build a manufacturing plant.  Sylvania 
Electric petitioned the aldermen to reclassify a portion of the 
property from residential use to a limited manufacturing zoning 
district.  Under the proposed arrangement, the city would obtain 
an option to purchase a 30.5-acre portion of the 180-acre 
parcel, which would be benefited by use restrictions on the 
remaining 153.6-acre servient estate.  The aldermen approved the 
zoning reclassification -- rezoning the parcel from residential 
to limited manufacturing use -- and authorized the mayor to 
purchase the option to buy the 30.5-acre dominant estate.5 
In 1969, the city exercised its option to purchase the 
30.5-acre parcel, and, on May 27, 1969, recorded the deed from 
Sylvania Electric's successor in interest at the registry of 
deeds.  The deed refers to the 30.5-acre dominant estate 
purchased by the city as "[p]arcel 2," and the remaining 123.1-
acre servient estate as "[p]arcel 1."  The deed states that the 
restrictions it sets forth are "appurtenant to . . . the granted 
                                                 
 
5 Abutters challenged the change in the zoning ordinance as 
illegal "spot zoning."  See Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. 
Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 429 (1962).  This court affirmed the 
aldermen's reclassification as a valid exercise of the zoning 
power.  Id. at 436. 
6 
 
 
 
premises [the city's dominant parcel 2],"6 and "are hereby 
imposed on the adjoining . . . [servient] [p]arcel 1."  The deed 
also provides that the restrictions "shall continue in force for 
a period of ninety-nine (99) years from December 1, 1968."7  As 
described by the judge, the deed restrictions include provisions 
"limiting the floor area of buildings to be constructed on the 
premises; requiring that a percentage of the ground area be 
maintained in open space not occupied by buildings, parking 
areas or roadways; imposing setbacks, height restrictions, and a 
buffer zone; restricting the number and type of signs and the 
type of lighting; and limiting the use of buildings to certain, 
but not all, of the uses permitted in a limited manufacturing 
district."  The deed further provides, "No building or structure 
shall be erected on said [p]arcel 1, or on any one subparcel or 
group of subparcels constituting [p]arcel 1, without the prior 
approval of the . . . [a]ldermen with respect to the following 
specific items:  finished grading and topography, drainage, 
parking, and landscaping." 
                                                 
 
6 Parcel 2 also has a deed restriction which provides that, 
for "ninety-nine (99) years from [the purchase] date, no 
buildings or structures shall be erected or maintained on the 
granted premises except for recreation, conservation or parkland 
purposes (but this shall not be deemed to prohibit construction 
of fences thereon)." 
 
 
7 The restrictions in the deed also are properly termed a 
"restrictive covenant" or a "negative easement."  See 
Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 662-663 & n.7 (2007). 
7 
 
 
 
 
Sylvania Electric ultimately decided not to locate its 
plant in the city.  From 1971 to 2014, a number of entities 
purchased portions of parcel 1 from successor private owners.  
Some of these purchasers sought amendments to the deed 
restrictions from the aldermen, as the elected representatives 
of the city, to permit uses other than the explicitly authorized 
subset of limited manufacturing uses allowed in the deed 
restrictions.  During that time, the aldermen approved 
approximately twenty amendments to the deed restrictions, 
allowing uses such as a retail store and food service area, 
secular and religious schools, medical offices and a physical 
rehabilitation center, tennis courts, a health club, a dance 
school, a gymnastics academy, a day care center, a "bouncy 
house," and a skating rink.  None of these amendments authorized 
a modification for residential development. 
In 2014, 135 Wells purchased a 6.3-acre subparcel of 
parcel 1; at the time of purchase, the parcel was located in a 
limited manufacturing zoning district and was subject to the 
restrictive covenant, which, among other things, precluded any 
residential use.  In May, 2014, 135 Wells sought a modification, 
waiver, or release of the deed restriction from the aldermen, to 
permit a residential use and to allow development in the no-
build zone.  It also filed an application with the ZBA for a 
comprehensive permit under G. L. c. 40B to build a 334-unit 
8 
 
 
 
residential rental complex, with eighty-four of those units to 
be affordable housing.  In its G. L. c. 40B application, 
135 Wells requested that the ZBA "waive" the deed restrictions 
and permit this residential use.  In November, 2014, the 
aldermen denied the petition for an amendment to the deed 
restrictions.  In January, 2015, the ZBA ruled that it lacked 
authority under G. L. c. 40B to waive or modify the deed 
restrictions. 
135 Wells appealed to the HAC.  The HAC determined after a 
hearing that "the deed restriction conveyed to the [c]ity . . . 
is not a requirement or regulation for the purposes of G. L. 
c. 40B, § 20, and the waiver or amendment sought by the 
developer is not a permit or approval under G. L. c. 40B, § 21."  
Accordingly, the HAC affirmed the ZBA's determination that it 
lacked authority to amend the deed restriction. 
In January, 2016, 135 Wells sought review of the HAC's 
decision in the Land Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  It 
argued, first, that G. L. c. 40B provided the ZBA the authority 
to allow the requested amendment; second, that the aldermen's 
actions in allowing the amendments to the deed restrictions were 
functionally equivalent to the permitting decisions issued by 
the ZBA, and should be recognized as such rather than as 
modifications of interests in land; and, third, that the 
existing uses of the parcel and its condition were so 
9 
 
 
 
drastically different from what originally was intended that the 
purpose of the deed restrictions could not be achieved, and thus 
that the restrictive covenant was no longer enforceable. 
After the parties agreed that all material facts necessary 
to resolution of the matter were not in dispute, and that 
judgment as a matter of law was appropriate, the parties filed 
cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, on the legal 
question whether the ZBA or the HAC had authority under G. L. 
c. 40B to amend the deed restrictions.  The judge determined 
that neither the ZBA nor the HAC had authority under G. L. 
c. 40B to require the city to amend the deed restriction so as 
to allow the requested residential use.  As had the HAC, the 
judge declined to revisit the conclusion in Sylvania that the 
deed restriction is a valid property interest owned by the city.  
After thoroughly reviewing the current uses, the judge concluded 
also that the restrictive covenant continued to benefit the city 
and remained enforceable because parcel 1 continued to be an 
exclusively commercial property, with designated open space and 
a number of protections, including a buffer zone, between the 
developed area and the Charles River. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Decisions of the HAC are reviewed "in 
accordance with the provisions of [G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5),(6)]."  
G. L. c. 40B, § 22. 
10 
 
 
 
 
In order to place 135 Wells's claims in context, we briefly 
review the purposes underlying the Legislature's addition of the 
affordable housing act to G. L. c. 40B.  In October, 1969, the 
Legislature adopted "An Act providing for the construction of 
low or moderate income housing in cities and towns in which 
local restrictions hamper such construction," adding four new 
sections to G. L. c. 40B.8  See St. 1969, c. 774.  The affordable 
housing act was intended to address the affordable housing 
crisis in much of Massachusetts, see Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Lunenburg v. Housing Appeals Comm., 464 Mass. 38, 39-40 (2013) 
(Lunenburg), by ensuring that local municipalities did not make 
use of their zoning powers to "exclude low and moderate income 
groups," see Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals 
Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 347 (1973) (Hanover), and by simplifying 
the process by which a developer may obtain approval of an 
affordable housing project through a unified permitting process.  
See Lunenburg, supra at 40-41. 
 
After the 1969 amendments to G. L. c. 40B, a developer who 
seeks to build a housing development that contains at least 
twenty-five per cent affordable housing (intended for those 
                                                 
 
8 The affordable housing act was enacted in August, 1969.  
See St. 1969, c. 774.  The deed restrictions at issue here were 
put in place in the option to purchase in 1960; the city 
executed the option agreement in July, 1960, and recorded it in 
the Middlesex South registry of deeds.  The city exercised the 
option and purchased parcel 2 on May 22, 1969, before the 
statute became effective. 
11 
 
 
 
earning less than eighty per cent of the medium income in the 
area) may apply directly to the zoning board of appeals of a 
local municipality for a "comprehensive permit," rather than 
applying to each individual agency that typically would have 
control over some subset of the necessary permits.  See G. L. 
c. 40B § 21; Dennis Hous. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Dennis, 439 Mass. 71, 76-77 (2003).  The municipality's zoning 
board of appeals, in turn, has authority to review the 
application in its entirety, to override local requirements or 
regulations, and to issue "permits or approvals" to the same 
extent, and with the same authority, as any of those local 
agencies.  Id. at 76-77. 
 
We have addressed the affordable housing act requirements 
under G. L. c. 40B in a number of decisions in the intervening 
years, see, e.g., Lunenburg, 464 Mass. at 39-44; Standerwick v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 28-29 (2006) 
(Standerwick); Hanover, 363 Mass. at 346-347, but we have not 
previously been squarely confronted with a case involving a 
municipally-owned negative easement. 
 
The provisions in G. L. c. 40B allowing a local zoning 
board to issue "permits or approvals," and to dispense with 
certain "requirements or regulations," enable a zoning board of 
appeals to issue the types of authorizations usually issued by 
local agencies.  This authority is intended to simplify the 
12 
 
 
 
application process and to ensure that local obstacles are not 
put in place, thus enabling more affordable housing projects to 
be completed.  Standerwick, supra ("We have long recognized that 
the Legislature's intent in enacting G. L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23, is 
to provide relief from exclusionary zoning practices which 
prevented the construction of badly needed low and moderate 
income housing in the Commonwealth" [quotations omitted]). 
 
We have emphasized that the power to issue "permits or 
approvals" and to dispense with "requirements or regulations" is 
broader than merely the power to issue zoning variances.  See 
Board of Appeals of Maynard v. Housing Appeals Comm., 370 Mass. 
64, 67-69 (1976) (Maynard).  For instance, in Maynard, we stated 
that the HAC could dispense with a town's requirement that a 
developer perform its agreement to extend a sewer line to an 
affordable housing development, pursuant to its power to 
dispense with "requirements or regulations" under G L. c. 40B.  
Maynard, supra at 68-69.  More generally, we have applied a 
functional definition to the phrase "permits or approvals."  See 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sunderland v. Sugarbush Meadow, LLC, 
464 Mass. 166, 188 n.3 (2013) (Sunderland).  We have said that 
"permits or approvals" are the authorizations given out by local 
permitting agencies, and the types of permissions that these 
agencies typically grant.  See Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury 
13 
 
 
 
v. Housing Appeals Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 755-756 (2010) 
(Amesbury); Groton, 451 Mass. at 40. 
 
a.  The ZBA's authority to amend the restrictive covenant.  
135 Wells maintains that the amendment it seeks is the 
functional equivalent of a "permit[] or approval[]" within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 40B, and not a modification of a property 
interest.  It contends that the ordinary dictionary meanings of 
the words "permit or approval" include modifications and 
amendments, and this definition must be applicable with respect 
to the requested amendment of the restrictive covenant at issue 
here.  It contends also that the process established by the 
aldermen for authorizing amendments to the restrictive covenant 
is the functional equivalent of the process used by the ZBA for 
issuing permits or approvals under the zoning power, such that 
there is no distinction between them, and the ZBA is authorized 
to modify the deed restrictions in the same manner as it may 
issue permits and approvals.  In addition, 135 Wells suggests 
that the recorded deed restrictions, which were determined to be 
a valid property interest held by the city in 1962, see 
Sylvania, 344 Mass. at 435-436, are not in fact a legitimate 
property interest, but, rather, merely zoning restrictions. 
 
General Laws c. 40B, § 21, provides in relevant part: 
 
"The board of appeals . . . shall have the same power 
to issue permits or approvals as any local board or 
official who would otherwise act with respect to such 
14 
 
 
 
application, including but not limited to the power to 
attach to said permit or approval conditions and 
requirements with respect to height, site plan, size or 
shape, or building materials." 
 
 
135 Wells maintains that the meaning of the phrase "permits 
or approvals" encompasses modification to a restrictive 
covenant.  135 Wells bases this argument on dictionary 
definitions of the words "permit" ("a written warrant or 
license"), Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1683 
(1961), and "approval" ("the act of approving"), id. at 106.  It 
then argues that the phrase "permits or approvals," in this 
context, includes within its ambit amendments to a restrictive 
covenant where, as here, the provisions in the restrictive 
covenant are similar to those applicable to a zoning decision, 
and the processes followed by the ZBA and the aldermen in making 
decisions under both G. L. c. 40B § 21, and G. L. c. 40, § 3, 
are similar.  135 Wells maintains also that there are distinct 
differences in kind between a property interest that is an 
affirmative easement and a property interest that is a negative 
easement, and thus that this court's jurisprudence relative to 
the authority of a zoning board of appeals with respect to 
positive easements is inapplicable to negative easements.  We 
are not persuaded. 
In interpreting a statute, we begin with its plain 
language, as the best indication of legislative intent.  
15 
 
 
 
Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  We interpret 
particular language within a statutory provision with respect to 
the statute as a whole.  Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 
358 (2013).  Where a term is not defined in a statute, "the 
dictionary definition is helpful, but it should not be 
dispositive."  Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 391 Mass. 581, 587 
(1984). 
As 135 Wells contends, the authority of a zoning board of 
appeals under G. L. c. 40B is broad.  See Amesbury, 457 Mass. at 
755-758.  When acting pursuant to its authority granted by G. L. 
c. 40B, a zoning board of appeals "has the same scope of 
authority as any town or city board of survey, board of health, 
board of subdivision control appeals, planning board, building 
inspector or the officer or board having supervision of the 
construction of buildings or the power of enforcing municipal 
building laws, or city council or board of selectmen. . .  In 
other words, . . . the power of [a zoning board of appeals] 
derives from, and is generally no greater than, that 
collectively possessed by these other bodies."  (Citations 
omitted.)  Id. at 756.  The extent of this authority does not, 
however, attain the level that 135 Wells ascribes to the ZBA 
when it issues permits or approvals pursuant to G. L. c. 40B, 
§ 21. 
16 
 
 
 
While 135 Wells relies upon dictionary definitions for the 
meaning of the terms "permits or approvals" under G. L. c. 40B, 
there is little reason to turn to dictionary definitions in 
interpreting the statutory language here, as the language of 
G. L. c. 40B § 21, itself defines the term "permits or 
approvals" in several respects.  The statute first delineates 
the types of local agencies that may grant permits or approvals 
(i.e., "local board[s] or official[s]"), and then enumerates the 
types of authorizations that fall within the statutory meaning 
of permits or approvals, (e.g., "conditions and requirements 
with respect to height, site plan, size or shape, or building 
materials"). 
This court previously has interpreted the statutory phrase 
"permits or approvals" in the same manner, noting the types of 
local agencies that may grant permits or approvals, and 
enumerating the types of authorizations that fall within the 
category of permits or approvals.  Groton, 451 Mass. at 40.  We 
have considered the phrase "permit or approval" in G. L. c. 40B, 
§ 21, with reference to the type of authorization given, 
concluding that it "refers to building permits and other 
approvals typically given . . . by . . . separate local 
agencies."  Groton, supra.  Examples of permits or approvals 
include "action typically required by local permitting 
authorities with respect to 'height, site plan, size or shape, 
17 
 
 
 
or building materials.'"  Id., citing G. L. c. 40B, § 21.  See 
Sunderland, 464 Mass. at 181-183 (G. L. c. 40B, § 21, grants 
zoning board authority to issue permits that fire chief 
ordinarily would issue, such as allowing building to be 
constructed higher than town fire department can reach with its 
highest ladder truck).  We also have determined that "permits or 
approvals" under the affordable housing act are not limited to 
such zoning-related actions.  See Maynard, 370 Mass. at 68-69 
(HAC could dispense with, as requirement or regulation not 
consistent with local needs, performance of developer's 
agreement to extend public sewer line as condition of permit).  
In sum, we have applied a functional definition to the term 
"permits or approvals."  See Sunderland, supra; Amesbury, 457 
Mass. at 756-757; Groton, 451 Mass. at 40.  We have said that 
permits or approvals are authorizations given out by local 
permitting agencies, and the types of permissions that these 
agencies typically grant.  See Groton, supra. 
Although 135 Wells attempts to distinguish Groton, 451 
Mass. at 39, and maintains the case would be applicable to these 
facts only if it were significantly extended, we agree with the 
judge's conclusion that Groton is controlling here.  In that 
case, we considered whether, under its G. L. c. 40B authority to 
grant "permits or approvals," a local zoning board of appeals 
(board) had authority to modify a municipal property right, and 
18 
 
 
 
to require the town to grant the developer of a proposed low 
income housing project an easement to travel over land owned by 
the town in order to access the proposed development.  Id. at 
36-39.  The board had concluded that the project did not meet 
minimum safety standards because, inter alia, the driveway was 
partially obstructed by vegetation on land owned by the town, 
and because there was only one access road.  Id. at 38-39.  When 
the developer asked the town to allow it to build a second 
access road over the town's land and to clear the vegetation, 
the town refused.  Id.  The developer then appealed to the HAC, 
arguing that the easement it sought was a "permit or approval" 
within the meaning of G. L. c. 40B.  Groton, supra at 39.  The 
HAC vacated the board's denial, and directed the town to grant 
an easement over the town's property in order to construct the 
second access road and to remove the obstructing vegetation.  
Id. at 37-38. 
We determined that the board could not be required to order 
the town to grant an easement over town land pursuant to the 
board's power to grant permits or approvals under G. L. c. 40B, 
based on the fundamental distinction between the disposition of 
a property right and the allowance of a permit or approval.  
Groton, supra at 40-41.  Allowing the board to require the town 
to grant an easement over municipally-owned property to a 
private developer would be to take away a real property right 
19 
 
 
 
from the town, an action fundamentally different action from the 
types of "permits or approvals" that G. L. c. 40B authorizes a 
local zoning board to undertake.  Id.  "An order directing the 
conveyance of an easement . . . cannot logically or reasonably 
derive from, or be equated with, a local board's power to grant 
'permits or approvals.'"  Id. at 40, quoting G. L. c. 40B, § 20.  
See Reynolds v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Stow, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 
339, 350 (2015) ("[G. L. c. 40B] has no taking component within 
it"). 
135 Wells contends nonetheless that the amendments that 
have been made to the restrictive covenant are the functional 
equivalent of permits or approvals because they are functionally 
the same as authorizations that have been deemed permits or 
approvals in other contexts, and because the process that the 
aldermen followed in allowing these amendments was essentially 
the same as the process the ZBA used in considering whether to 
allow permits or approvals under G. L. c. 40B.9  135 Wells argues 
that the process of applying for an amendment involves an 
application to the aldermen, who serve essentially as a "local 
                                                 
9 The judge characterized 135 Wells's functional equivalence 
argument as "[135 Wells] is making an 'if it walks like a duck 
and quacks like a duck' argument:  if the [a]ldermen act like a 
zoning board in waiving and amending the [r]estrictions, they 
should be treated as one for the purposes of [G. L.] c. 40B, and 
their waivers of the [r]estrictions should be subject to the 
[ZBA's] authority to issue permits and waive other regulations 
under c. 40B." 
20 
 
 
 
board," a review procedure, and the issuance of an authorization 
that affects the way that land may be used, similar to the 
process for seeking G. L. c. 40B approval. 
It is clear, however, that the aldermen's allowance of 
prior amendments to the restrictive covenants were not the 
functional equivalent of permits or approvals; the aldermen were 
not sitting as a local permitting authority when allowing the 
amendments pursuant to G. L. c. 40, § 3, and the amendments, 
which affected a real property interest held by the city, were 
not the same types of permissions as regulations concerning 
"building construction and design, siting, zoning, health, 
safety, [or] environment."10  Amesbury, 457 Mass. at 749.  See 
Groton, 451 Mass. at 40. 
                                                 
10 135 Wells claims on appeal that if the amendment process 
is indeed the disposition of a real property right, and not the 
issuance of a "permit of approval," the aldermen's amendments to 
the restrictive covenant were improper because the city did not 
follow the procedures for the disposition of municipally-owned 
property set forth in G. L. c. 40, §§ 3, 15; G. L. c. 30B, § 16, 
and certain city ordinances.  Therefore, the argument continues, 
the amendments were not dispositions of real property, but 
instead were permits or approvals. 
 
We need not consider whether any of these statutes 
concerning the disposition of municipally-owned real property 
are applicable to the modification of real property rights, such 
as restrictive covenants, at issue here.  Even if that were the 
case, and even if the aldermen did not follow the procedures set 
forth for the disposal of municipally-owned property in allowing 
the previous amendments, a conclusion we do not reach, the 
question has no bearing on whether the amendments were permits 
or approvals which the ZBA had authority to issue pursuant to 
21 
 
 
 
Moreover, notwithstanding 135 Wells's argument that a 
negative easement is somehow qualitatively different from a 
positive easement in terms of ownership rights, it points to no 
authority, and we are aware of none, that would suggest a 
property right to be protected from certain conditions occurring 
on another's land, such as building restrictions, is somehow 
less of a right than an easement to pass over a corner of 
another's property en route to one's own.  See Sylvania, 344 
Mass. at 430.  To the contrary, we have concluded previously 
that both affirmative and negative easements are to be treated, 
equally, as easements.  See Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 
663 (2007). 
Nor has 135 Wells offered any reason to support its 
implicit suggestion that Sylvania should be overruled because an 
interest in land cannot constitute a restriction such as these, 
that closely resemble provisions of the zoning laws.11  Despite 
                                                                                                                                                             
G. L. c. 140B, and thus is not dispositive of any issue before 
us. 
 
 
11 135 Wells argues, hypothetically, that a decision in 
favor of the ZBA and the HAC would allow municipalities to 
influence private landowners to create deed restrictions so as 
to prevent the development of affordable housing. It posits that 
towns or private individuals could acquire real property and 
limit the types of authorizations encompassed within "permits or 
approvals," by restricting access to municipal utilities and 
services such as sewer lines, water lines, streets, and sidewalk 
access, through restrictive covenants no longer subject to the 
requirements of G. L. c. 40B. 
 
22 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The HAC suggests that this concern is best addressed 
through a "bad faith exception" under which a local zoning board 
of appeals would examine the provisions of a restrictive 
covenant owned by a municipality and make a determination 
whether the restrictive covenant was created in good faith.  In 
this view, if the restrictive covenant was created in good 
faith -- for purposes other than avoiding the municipality's 
obligations under G. L. c. 40B -- then the holding in Groton 
would apply, and a local zoning board of appeals would have no 
authority under G. L. c. 40B  to modify a restrictive covenant 
under.  But, if the ZBA determines that the restrictive covenant 
was created in bad faith -- to avoid the municipality's 
obligations under G. L. c. 40B -- then the ZBA could modify the 
restrictive covenant as part of its power to issue "permits or 
approvals." 
 
 
In his written decision, the judge discussed earlier 
determinations in these proceedings which concluded that there 
was no bad faith at issue here, given that the language and 
purpose of the option agreement were established years before 
G. L. c. 40B was adopted.  The judge noted that we have held 
open the possibility of using a bad faith exception in cases 
where a town uses eminent domain to take property in order to 
avoid a development of low-income housing pursuant to c. 40B.  
See Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Burlington, 399 
Mass. 771, 777 (1987); Chelmsford v. DiBiase, 370 Mass. 90, 95 
(1976) ("We are not understood as passing on a situation in 
which good faith or public purpose is negated"). 
 
 
We note that, should such a question arise in a future 
case, we do not ascribe to the HAC's view that it may apply a 
bad faith exception and order a municipality to take actions 
that otherwise would be beyond its statutory authority.  
Nonetheless, a plaintiff is not left without a remedy in such 
cases, as bad faith may form part of a claim for review of an 
HAC decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. 
 
 
As to another concern raised by 135 Wells, that a 
conclusion that the ZBA lacks authority to modify conditions on 
city-owned land would permit municipalities to refuse to provide 
access to roads, sewers, electrical hookups, or other utilities, 
that issue was clearly decided in Maynard v. Housing Appeals 
Committee, 370 Mass. 64, 68-69 (1976).  Accordingly, the HAC 
retains the authority to dispense with local requirements or 
regulations, as is necessary to ensure the completion of a G. L. 
c. 40B project.  Nonetheless, that power clearly does not 
23 
 
 
 
their similarity to zoning provisions, the deed restrictions are 
a property interest, a restrictive covenant on land, that cannot 
be abrogated by any act by a zoning board.  See Killorin v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 658-659 
(2011) ("litigation to enforce zoning provisions is not a 
proceeding affecting the title to land or the use and occupation 
thereof, as contemplated by [restrictions created by deed, 
instrument, or will pursuant to G. L. c. 184, § 23]" [quotation 
omitted]). 
Finally, 135 Wells's claim that G. L. c. 40B may be deemed 
to allow abrogation of municipal property rights, where it may 
not be used to modify corporate or individual property rights, 
unsupported by any citation, is unavailing. 
b.  Changing conditions and continued enforceability of the 
restrictive covenant.  In the alternative, 135 Wells argues that 
the restrictive covenant is invalid because the nature of the 
property has changed such that the covenant no longer provides 
the benefit intended when it was purchased.  135 Wells contends 
that the covenant is no longer valid because it purports to 
ensure that the property remains a limited manufacturing 
district, and yet there are no manufacturing uses on the 
property. 
                                                                                                                                                             
include the ability to alter real property rights, including 
restrictive covenants. 
24 
 
 
 
Restrictions on the use of property are valid only if they 
are beneficial.  "No restriction shall in any proceeding be 
enforced . . . unless it is determined that the restriction is 
at the time of the proceeding of actual and substantial benefit 
to a person claiming rights of enforcement."  G. L. c. 184, 
§ 30.  In general, we have noted that restrictions on land are 
disfavored and should be as limited as possible.  See Stop & 
Shop Supermkt. Co. v. Urstadt Biddle Props., Inc., 433 Mass. 
285, 290 (2001); G. L. c. 184, § 23 (restrictions in deed that 
are "unlimited as to time" are limited to term of thirty years).  
That is not the case, however, for restrictions on municipally-
owned land; municipal deed restrictions are explicitly exempt 
from the provisions of G. L. c. 184, § 30, and are enforceable 
in perpetuity. 
A restrictive covenant may no longer be valid where a 
"neighborhood [has] deteriorated or changed its character to 
such an extent, from the time the restriction was laid on to the 
time of trial, that enforcing the restriction according to its 
terms would be merely quixotic -- failing to serve the grantor's 
original purpose and impeding present desirable and feasible 
uses."  Cogliano v. Lyman, 370 Mass. 508, 512 (1976).  On the 
other hand, if "the neighborhood [is] still maintaining its 
essential character, although against some odds, with the 
restriction serving, as it was intended to serve, to reduce 
25 
 
 
 
those odds or prevent their getting longer," then the 
restriction remains valid.  Id. 
In this case, while the property does not support any 
manufacturing uses (and apparently never did),12 and thus is not 
being used for the precise purpose for which the restrictive 
covenant was created, the restrictions still provides valuable 
benefits to the city.  See G. L. c. 184, § 30.  The judge found 
that the covenant restricts all residential use of the land, 
while maintaining an active economic district, protecting 
certain areas as open space, and maintaining buffer zones which 
protect the Charles River from encroaching development.  This 
benefits the city's parcel, which itself is restricted to being 
used for conservation or parkland, as well as the owners of the 
neighboring parcels.  See Cogliano v. Lyman, 370 Mass. at 512.  
Therefore, we agree that the nature of the district has not 
changed so much as to invalidate the restrictive covenant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                                                 
 
12 The city notes that the nature of manufacturing in 
general has changed substantially since Sylvania Electric sought 
to purchase the property in 1960, and that a light manufacturing 
use would be rare given current economic conditions.