Title: Orndorff v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 051478
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2006

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,* S.J. 
 
JANICE LARUE ORNDORFF 
 
v.  Record No. 051478   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
April 21, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether a circuit court erred in 
refusing to grant a defendant’s motion for a new trial based on 
after-discovered evidence of a mental disorder that allegedly 
would support an insanity defense. 
Janice Larue Orndorff (Orndorff) was indicted by a grand 
jury in Prince William County for crimes involving the death of 
her husband, Goering G. Orndorff (Goering).  In a jury trial in 
the circuit court, Orndorff was convicted of second-degree 
murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-32, and use of a firearm in 
the commission of murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. 
After the jury found Orndorff guilty of these offenses, but 
before the sentencing phase of the trial, Orndorff moved for a 
new trial based on after-discovered evidence.  She contended 
that this new evidence would show that at the time of the murder 
she suffered from dissociative identity disorder (DID),1 which 
                                                 
* Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
1 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
states that the four diagnostic criteria of DID are: 
 
2
she alleged would support an insanity defense.  At Orndorff’s 
request, the circuit court agreed to delay ruling on the motion 
for a new trial until after the completion of the sentencing 
phase.  The jury fixed Orndorff’s sentence at 32 years’ 
imprisonment for the murder and three years’ imprisonment for 
the firearms offense.  The circuit court denied Orndorff’s 
motion for a new trial and imposed sentence in accordance with 
the jury verdict. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court’s judgment and vacated the two convictions, 
holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying 
the motion for a new trial, and remanded the case to the circuit 
court.  Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 368, 605 S.E.2d 
307 (2004).  After the Court of Appeals granted the 
Commonwealth’s petition for a rehearing en banc, a majority of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(A) [t]he presence of two or more distinct identities 
or personality states (each with its own relatively 
enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and 
thinking about the environment and self)[;] (B) [a]t 
least two of these identities or personality states 
recurrently take control of the person's behavior[;] 
(C) [i]nability to recall important personal 
information that is too extensive to be explained by 
ordinary forgetfulness[; and] (D) [t]he disturbance is 
not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance, (e.g., blackouts or chaotic behavior during 
[a]lcohol [i]ntoxication) or a general medical 
condition, (e.g., complex partial seizures). 
 
The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 300.14, at 487 
(4th ed. 1994). 
 
3
the Court of Appeals approved the circuit court’s denial of the 
motion for a new trial and affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment.  Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 822, 613 S.E.2d 
876 (2005). 
I. 
The evidence at trial showed that Orndorff and Goering were 
married in 1993.  By early 2000, they were experiencing serious 
problems in their marriage.  Orndorff contacted her mother-in-
law frequently and expressed concerns about Goering’s fidelity.  
Goering’s mother testified that Orndorff said that she would see 
“[her husband] dead before he [left her] for another woman.”  
However, Goering’s mother stated that she was not alarmed by the 
threat and noted that Orndorff also “consistently [stated] that 
she loved Goering” and that “he’s [her] whole life and that’s 
what [she] live[s] for.” 
Also during this period, Orndorff contacted Thomas G. 
Underwood, a friend and attorney who previously had represented 
both Orndorff and Goering.  Orndorff expressed concern about 
Goering’s drinking and possible infidelity, as well as the 
safety of her two sons from a previous marriage who still lived 
at home.  Orndorff asked Underwood to represent her in a 
potential divorce proceeding, but he declined based on his past 
representation of Goering.  Underwood instead agreed to refer 
 
4
her to another lawyer.  Orndorff also asked Underwood to prepare 
a will for her that left all her property to her children. 
During the afternoon of March 20, 2000, Underwood informed 
Orndorff that the lawyer he had recommended was unavailable to 
meet with her for about a week.  Orndorff, sounding unconcerned 
about the delay, mentioned to Underwood that she and Goering 
planned to have dinner that evening on the occasion of their 
anniversary. 
Earlier that day, Orndorff’s mother-in-law contacted 
Goering inquiring about the state of his marriage.  She 
testified that her son stated, “[T]hings are worse, I’ve had all 
I can take, I’m leaving tonight.” 
That night, the Orndorffs went to dinner as planned.  When 
they returned home, Judd L. Bond, Orndorff’s son, observed 
Goering yelling and “stomping around.”  Bond left the house 
shortly thereafter. 
At 8:37 p.m., Orndorff telephoned Underwood and reported 
that she had shot her husband, stating that he had approached 
her holding a knife and a baseball bat.  She stated that Goering 
was still alive and asked Underwood to come to the house.  After 
learning that Orndorff had not summoned an ambulance, Underwood 
told her to contact a “911” operator immediately.  Because 
Orndorff sounded “hysterical,” Underwood also telephoned “911” 
shortly after he finished speaking with her. 
 
5
At 8:39 p.m., Orndorff spoke with a “911” operator and 
stated that she had shot her husband after he approached her 
holding a baseball bat and a knife.  She also told the operator 
that she was afraid to “come out of hiding” in the house because 
her husband was alive, had gained possession of the gun, and was 
trying to kill her. 
During the approximately hour-long conversation with the 
“911” operator, Orndorff’s tone alternated between lucid and 
hysterically disoriented.  At times, she spoke calmly and called 
the operator by name.  At other times, however, she seemed 
unable to discern with whom she was speaking.  Occasionally, she 
asked to speak to her “mommy,” and at one point appeared to be 
addressing her mother directly.  Several times during the 
telephone conversation, Orndorff cried hysterically without 
responding to the operator’s questions and repeatedly asked for 
help, stating, “He is going to kill me.” 
A transcript of the “911” telephone conversation revealed 
that several of Orndorff’s statements were confusing and 
contradictory.  Orndorff said at one point that she did not know 
whether she was sitting down.  Asked where in the house she was 
hiding, Orndorff indicated that it was dark and stated that she 
was unaware of her location.  Although Orndorff initially stated 
that her husband was on the kitchen floor, she later said that 
she did not know where he was.  Additionally, she admitted 
 
6
knowing Underwood but stated that she had not contacted him that 
night. 
About 9:30 p.m., one of the police officers responding to 
the Orndorff residence opened the front door.  Orndorff 
approached the door with a cordless telephone in her hand.  When 
the officer signaled for her to come out of the house, she 
turned around and retreated inside.  A few minutes later, 
Orndorff ran out of the house screaming that her husband was 
trying to kill her. 
Officer Robert J. McHale testified that Orndorff appeared 
to be “hysterical.”  Detecting the smell of alcohol, McHale 
asked her if she had been drinking.  She calmly replied that she 
had consumed a “couple of glasses of wine with dinner,” and then 
resumed her former hysterical demeanor. 
The police found Goering’s body in the kitchen lying 
facedown with a baseball bat in the left hand and a knife pinned 
underneath the body in the right hand.  He had been shot five 
times: once in the left palm, three times in his torso, and once 
in the top of his head.  On a table in the kitchen, the police 
found a handgun next to a telephone book, which had been opened 
to a page that included Underwood’s telephone number. 
The evidence further showed that in July 2000, Orndorff 
approached Maura J. Workman, with whom both Orndorff and Goering 
were acquainted.  According to Workman, Orndorff said that she 
 
7
was facing imprisonment and offered to pay Workman $10,000 if 
she would testify that Goering had physically abused Orndorff.  
Workman testified that she had never seen Goering act in an 
abusive manner toward his wife and did not accept Orndorff’s 
offer. 
II. 
Orndorff was indicted for the first-degree murder of her 
husband and for use of a firearm during the commission of 
murder.  Before trial, Orndorff gave notice that she intended to 
present psychiatric and psychological evidence that she suffered 
from amnesia after the shooting.  She sought to present this 
evidence to rebut the anticipated argument that her behavior on 
the night of the murder was calculated to deceive the police.  
She conceded that her evidence did not support an insanity 
defense. 
At a pretrial hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion to 
exclude this evidence, Orndorff presented testimony from Dr. 
Susan J. Fiester, a forensic psychiatrist, and Dr. Wilfred G. 
van Gorp, a clinical psychologist, who both had been retained to 
assess Orndorff’s mental state.  After being qualified by the 
court to present expert testimony, these witnesses testified 
that Orndorff suffered from various mental disorders, including 
post-traumatic stress disorder and “dissociative disorder not 
otherwise specified.”  Dr. Fiester described that dissociative 
 
8
disorder as the diagnosis indicated when a patient’s symptoms 
meet many of the criteria of a specific dissociative disorder 
but do not “fit it exactly.”  Dr. Fiester and Dr. van Gorp based 
their diagnoses on personal interviews with Orndorff, Orndorff’s 
inability to remember the events surrounding her husband’s 
death, her behavior during the “911” telephone conversation, 
transcripts of her interviews with the police, and a review of 
her prior history. 
Dr. Fiester and Dr. van Gorp both testified that Orndorff 
had a propensity to dissociate, meaning that she periodically 
divorced her emotions and actions from her conscious awareness, 
and had experienced a dissociative state caused by the trauma of 
her husband’s death.  Neither witness opined that Orndorff 
suffered from DID or any other mental disorder that allegedly 
would support an insanity defense.  Dr. Fiester stated that she 
found “no evidence that [Orndorff] was legally insane at the 
time of the offense” nor any evidence that she killed her 
husband because of an irresistible impulse.  After hearing this 
evidence, the circuit court ruled that the mental health experts 
would be permitted to testify about the nature of dissociative 
amnesia but would not be allowed to testify that they had 
actually examined or diagnosed Orndorff. 
At trial, the Commonwealth argued that Orndorff’s post-
shooting demeanor was a ruse designed to conceal her guilt.  The 
 
9
Commonwealth presented witnesses who qualified as experts in the 
fields of autopsy and bloodstain analysis.  These witnesses 
testified that the forensic evidence indicated Orndorff had 
arranged the weapons in Goering’s hands after the shooting.  
However, Orndorff presented a forensic medical expert, who 
challenged this assertion and testified that the relative 
locations of Goering’s body and the weapons were physiologically 
possible.  Defense counsel argued that Orndorff shot her husband 
in self-defense, and that her behavior afterward could be 
attributed to a dissociative episode caused by the trauma she 
had just experienced.  Consistent with her pretrial 
representation, Orndorff did not argue that she was legally 
insane at the time of the offense.  The jury found Orndorff 
guilty of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the 
commission of murder. 
Shortly after her conviction, before the sentencing phase 
of the trial was to begin, Orndorff exhibited unusual behavior.  
She told jail personnel that she was 12 years old and did not 
belong in the “strict school” because she had done nothing 
wrong.  As a result of this behavior, Orndorff underwent 
additional mental evaluations. 
According to Dr. Fiester, Orndorff was unaware of both her 
age and location.  “Her understanding of the situation,” Dr. 
Fiester testified, “was that she’s in dire fear because she’s a 
 
10
child and she’s done something wrong and she has no idea what it 
is and why she’s where she is.”  Dr. Fiester noted that 
Orndorff’s symptoms, in addition to fitting the profile of a 
dissociative episode, also suggested that she had a psychiatric 
illness.  Dr. Fiester explained: 
It could raise the question of whether she might have 
problems with her reality testing; whether there is a 
psychotic part of the picture; whether there is what’s 
called a dissociative identity disorder, which is what 
used to be known in the past as a multiple personality 
disorder; or some other type of dissociative disorder. 
 
Concluding, Dr. Fiester opined that Orndorff suffered from a 
“severe mental illness” that rendered her incompetent to assist 
counsel in her defense. 
Dr. van Gorp stated his opinion regarding this new behavior 
in a letter to defense counsel: 
It is my firm opinion that this decline and abrupt 
change in [Orndorff’s] mental state represents a state 
of regression and dissociation, producing a fugue-like 
state in which she has regressed to the identity she 
had as a child.  At the very least, this represents 
dramatic regression in a person who has seriously 
dissociated: that is, in lay terms, she has become 
overwhelmed by the stress of her circumstances, and 
cannot consciously process what has happened to her.  
As a response, she has "split off" from her conscious 
experience, and regressed to a child-like state, now 
believing she is in school in Union City, Tennessee, 
where she apparently grew up.  This altered identity 
also raises the possibility of an even more serious 
condition, in which dissociation is more pervasive, 
and a multiple personality disorder must be seriously 
considered and psychologically and psychiatrically 
ruled out. 
 
 
11
Based on these evaluations, the circuit court determined 
that Orndorff was not competent to participate in the sentencing 
phase of her trial.  The court entered an order committing her 
to Central State Hospital (Central State) for evaluation and 
treatment pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1.  Orndorff remained at 
Central State for eight months under the care of Dr. Greg J. 
Wolber, a psychologist who headed Central State’s forensic 
evaluation team, and Dr. Daniel Sheneman, the attending 
psychiatrist for the behavioral unit in which Orndorff was 
placed.  Dr. Sheneman diagnosed Orndorff as having post-
traumatic stress disorder. 
Dr. Wolber conferred with Dr. Paul F. Dell, a clinical 
psychologist and an authority on dissociative disorders.  Dr. 
Dell diagnosed Orndorff as having DID.  After consulting with 
Dr. Dell, Dr. Fiester and Dr. van Gorp revised their diagnoses 
and concurred that Orndorff suffered from DID.  Dr. Wolber and 
Dr. Sheneman, however, disagreed with this new diagnosis and 
concluded that Orndorff did not suffer from DID.  After 
considering these various opinions, the circuit court certified 
that Orndorff was competent to participate in the sentencing 
phase of her trial. 
Immediately before the sentencing phase began, Orndorff 
filed a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered 
evidence.  However, defense counsel requested that the circuit 
 
12
court defer its ruling on the motion so that evidence of the new 
diagnosis of DID could be presented as mitigation evidence 
during the sentencing phase of the trial.  Defense counsel 
represented that Orndorff would offer that same evidence in 
support of her new trial motion.  The circuit court agreed to 
this procedure and postponed ruling on the motion for a new 
trial until the sentencing phase was completed. 
During the sentencing phase, Dr. Dell testified that after 
he observed in Orndorff manifestations of three separate “alter” 
personalities, he concluded that she suffered from DID.  In 
addition to the host personality of Janice Orndorff, Dr. Dell 
identified: (1) “Jacob,” a strong, forceful male “protector” 
personality; (2) “Jean Bugineau,” a French-speaking personality; 
and (3) “Janice Nanney,” a 12-year-old child.  Dr. Dell noted 
that DID is difficult to diagnose because the “alter” 
personalities do not appear to be visibly different from the 
host personality and, being “cautious,” do not announce their 
presence.  He testified that Orndorff’s “911” telephone 
conversation contained evidence of her “switching” between 
personalities. 
Dr. van Gorp described the interplay between Orndorff’s 
different personalities, stating that the “alter” personalities 
are “walled off usually from the conscious experience of the 
host personality” and each “has his or her own basic memories.”  
 
13
According to Dr. van Gorp, DID is an uncommon condition, and it 
can be difficult to diagnose because the “switching” of 
personalities that indicates the presence of the illness only 
occurs during periods of stress.  Dr. van Gorp noted that, in 
retrospect, Orndorff’s comments during the “911” conversation 
were consistent with those likely made by one suffering from 
DID.  However, he stated that the only indicators at that time 
of a possible DID condition were the references to “mommy,” 
which, standing alone, were insufficient to establish a 
diagnosis of DID. 
Dr. Fiester testified that she was only able to reach a 
diagnosis of DID after witnessing Orndorff present “as a twelve-
year-old girl” following her conviction and on learning of the 
repeated reemergence of that same “alter” personality.  
According to Dr. Fiester, the manifestation of an “alter” 
personality is necessary for a diagnosis of DID.  In response to 
testimony that Orndorff told others that she could “make herself 
be twelve years old,” Dr. Fiester stated that persons suffering 
from DID are often frightened by its effects and want to believe 
that they have control over the process even though they do not. 
Dr. Richard J. Loewenstein, a psychiatrist and authority on 
trauma disorders and dissociative disorders, also diagnosed 
Orndorff as having DID after witnessing her childlike and 
protector “alter” personalities.  Noting that most individuals 
 
14
suffering from DID report a history of significant childhood 
trauma, Dr. Loewenstein testified that Orndorff told him that 
her mother had whipped Orndorff with a switch and locked her 
alone in a room for long periods when she was a child.  
Orndorff, however, had not previously reported this history to 
her other doctors. 
Dr. Loewenstein remarked that other episodes from 
Orndorff’s past also were consistent with symptoms of DID.  He 
cited the fact that over a period of several years, Orndorff had 
been observed in a trance-like state, had been forgetful on a 
chronic basis, and had experienced behavioral “swings.” 
According to Dr. Loewenstein, the Janice, or “host,” 
personality had no memory of shooting her husband, but a 
“protector alter” appeared to have a clear recollection.  Dr. 
Loewenstein was able to observe one of the “protector alters,” 
who stated that it and the “Jean alter” had done the shooting.  
Dr. Loewenstein opined that “at the time of the murder, 
[Orndorff] was overwhelmed by symptoms of [DID]” and therefore 
“her mental state at the time of the crime should lead to a 
finding of legal insanity by Virginia law under the 
‘irresistible impulse’ test of the insanity statutes.”  All 
medical expert witnesses presented by the defense testified that 
they did not believe that Orndorff was malingering. 
 
15
Dr. Sheneman testified that he only observed the 
manifestation of the 12-year-old persona in Orndorff and stated 
that he was not convinced that this presentation qualified as a 
distinct identity.  As a result, he explained that he did not 
think that Orndorff met the criteria for DID.  Dr. Sheneman also 
testified that the childhood abuse Orndorff described was not of 
the severe type normally found in people suffering from DID. 
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Angela M. 
Valentine, who was Orndorff’s cellmate before Orndorff was 
committed to Central State and upon Orndorff’s return to the 
jail.  Valentine testified that Orndorff said that “she could 
act like she was twelve years old when she got good and ready 
. . . so she could, you know, beat the doctors at Central 
State.” 
During the competency hearing and the sentencing phase of 
the trial, Orndorff disrupted the proceedings with verbal 
outbursts, challenging statements made by the prosecutors.  
After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned its sentencing 
verdict, and the circuit court denied Orndorff’s motion for a 
new trial.  The court stated that Orndorff had failed to show 
that she could not have obtained the evidence of her DID 
condition for use at trial through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, and that she failed to demonstrate that this 
 
16
additional evidence should produce an opposite result in another 
trial.  The court noted: 
In part, I conclude that [such evidence] would not 
produce opposite results on the merits at another 
trial because the jury did, in fact, hear all this.  
They heard[,] in essence, her entire position, that 
she had DID, that there were multiple personalities, 
in fact, . . . another personality is the one that 
committed the murder . . . . 
 
The circuit court sentenced Orndorff in accordance with the 
jury verdict.  Orndorff appealed from the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
III. 
The Court of Appeals’ panel that reversed and vacated 
Orndorff’s convictions concluded that she met the “reasonable 
diligence” requirement for a new trial set forth in Odum v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983).  
Orndorff, 44 Va. App. at 400, 605 S.E.2d at 323.  Addressing the 
Odum “materiality” requirement, the panel held that “the 
[circuit] court abused its discretion in relying on the jury’s 
apparent rejection of Orndorff’s mitigating evidence at 
sentencing as grounds for concluding that such evidence would 
not produce a different result at the guilt phase.”  Id. at 401-
02, 605 S.E.2d at 324.  The panel stated that it is “no surprise 
[that already] having found Orndorff to be a murderer and a 
liar, the jury apparently found her belated mitigating evidence 
of insanity unpersuasive.”  Id. at 402, 605 S.E.2d at 324.  The 
 
17
panel then assumed the truth and accuracy of Orndorff’s after-
discovered evidence and held that such evidence “present[s] a 
viable defense of legal insanity under the doctrine of 
irresistible impulse” and would produce opposite results on the 
merits at another trial.  Id. at 404, 605 S.E.2d at 325. 
In reaching a different result on rehearing en banc, the 
Court of Appeals first concluded that the circuit court did not 
err in holding that Orndorff was competent to stand trial in the 
sentencing phase.  Orndorff, 45 Va. App. at 845-46, 613 S.E.2d 
at 887-88.  Second, the Court observed that Orndorff had 
exhibited symptoms of DID prior to trial, including the “911” 
telephone conversation in which she asked for her “mommy” while 
speaking to an operator.  Thus, the Court held that the post-
trial “diagnosis of DID was really just a different diagnosis of 
a known condition” that could have been made before trial in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.  Id. at 841-42, 613 S.E.2d at 
885-86. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the jury’s 
apparent rejection of the after-discovered evidence at 
sentencing as the basis for concluding that Orndorff failed to 
show that the new evidence should produce opposite results at 
another trial.  Id. at 844, 613 S.E.2d at 887.  The Court 
observed that the jury heard conflicting expert testimony 
 
18
concerning whether Orndorff met the diagnostic criteria for DID, 
as well as testimony from Valentine, Orndorff’s cellmate, that 
Orndorff bragged about being able to manipulate her behavior at 
will.  Id. at 843, 613 S.E.2d at 886.  Concluding that “the jury 
discounted the new diagnosis of DID and sentenced [Orndorff] to 
far in excess of the minimum sentence for the offense,” the 
Court of Appeals held that “[a] new trial presenting the same 
evidence to a new jury would not produce a different result.”  
Id. at 843-44, 613 S.E.2d at 886-87.  We awarded Orndorff an 
appeal. 
IV. 
We first consider whether the circuit court erred in 
holding that Orndorff was competent to stand trial in the 
sentencing phase after being treated at Central State.  Orndorff 
argues that the evidence showed that she was not competent at 
this point in the trial, and that the dissociative episodes she 
experienced during the sentencing phase further support this 
conclusion.  We disagree with Orndorff’s arguments. 
Under Code § 19.2-169.1(E), the party alleging that a 
criminal defendant is incompetent to participate in her defense 
bears the burden of proof on this issue by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  The determination whether a defendant is 
competent is based on whether the defendant lacks substantial 
capacity to understand the criminal proceedings against her or 
 
19
is incapable of assisting counsel in her defense.  Id.; Burns v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 336, 541 S.E.2d 872, 891 (2001).  The 
United States Supreme Court has explained in greater detail that 
the standard for competency to stand trial “is whether the 
defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with [her] 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and 
has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against [her].’ ”  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 
396 (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 
(1960) (per curiam)). 
The determination whether a criminal defendant is competent 
to stand trial is a question of fact that will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless plainly wrong.  See United States v. Robinson, 
404 F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Verduzco-
Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Bailey 
v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 746, 529 S.E.2d 570, 583-84 
(2000).  In conducting our review, we consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party on this issue in the circuit court.  Dixon v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 34, 37, 613 S.E.2d 398, 399 (2005); Tucker 
v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 492, 604 S.E.2d 66, 67 (2004). 
We hold that the circuit court’s competency determination 
is supported by the evidence and is not plainly wrong.  The 
court received evidence from Dr. Wolber and Dr. Sheneman, who 
 
20
each concluded that Orndorff did not suffer from DID but had 
several less serious conditions, including post-traumatic stress 
disorder, which did not render her unable to understand the 
proceedings or to assist counsel in her defense.  These 
witnesses reached their conclusions during extensive contact 
with Orndorff over the eight-month period that she remained at 
Central State.  After assessing the progress of Orndorff’s 
treatment at Central State, they determined that they had been 
successful in “desensitizing” her to certain topics, such as 
crime scene photographs and accounts of the shooting, which 
would be most likely to cause her to dissociate in the 
courtroom. 
Dr. Wolber and Dr. Sheneman also stated that Orndorff could 
exercise some volitional control over the timing and duration of 
her dissociative episodes.  Dr. Sheneman further explained that 
he had identified methods that could be used to stop these 
episodes should they occur during trial.  Based on all these 
observations and assessments, Dr. Wolber and Dr. Sheneman both 
concluded that Orndorff was competent to participate in the 
sentencing phase of her trial. 
Although there was conflicting testimony regarding the 
issue of Orndorff’s competency, the circuit court chose to rely 
on the testimony of Dr. Wolber and Dr. Sheneman.  Based on this 
 
21
evidentiary support for the circuit court’s finding, we will not 
disturb that finding on appeal. 
V. 
We next consider Orndorff’s argument that the Court of 
Appeals erred in approving the circuit court’s denial of her 
motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence.  Such 
a motion is a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the 
circuit court and will be granted only under unusual 
circumstances after particular care and caution has been given 
to the evidence presented.  Commonwealth v. Tweed, 264 Va. 524, 
528, 570 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2002); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 
Va. 124, 149, 314 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1984); Fulcher v. Whitlow, 
208 Va. 34, 37, 155 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1967). 
A moving party’s burden of proof before the circuit court 
on a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence 
is well established.  The moving party must establish that such 
evidence 
(1) appears to have been discovered subsequent to the 
trial; (2) could not have been secured for use at the 
trial in the exercise of reasonable diligence by the 
movant; (3) is not merely cumulative, corroborative or 
collateral; and (4) is material, and such as should 
produce opposite results on the merits at another 
trial. 
 
Odum, 225 Va. at 130, 301 S.E.2d at 149. 
In the circuit court and on appeal, the Commonwealth has 
not disputed that Orndorff has met the first and third 
 
22
requirements set forth above.  The Commonwealth instead has 
asserted that Orndorff has failed to prove the second and fourth 
requirements of the Odum test, namely, those of “reasonable 
diligence” and “materiality.”  Because both the circuit court 
and the Court of Appeals confined their review of Orndorff’s new 
trial motion to these two requirements, we likewise limit our 
consideration to the same requirements. 
A. Reasonable Diligence 
Orndorff argues that the circuit court’s failure to award 
her a new trial denied her the constitutional right to present a 
defense.  She asserts that she exercised reasonable diligence 
before trial in securing the opinions of qualified medical 
expert witnesses to determine whether she had a mental condition 
that might support an insanity defense.  Orndorff contends that 
the circuit court and the Court of Appeals did not adequately 
consider the fact that these expert witnesses were unable to 
render a diagnosis of DID until the appearance of her “alter” 
personalities after the guilt phase of the trial.  Orndorff 
further maintains that the DID diagnosis was only one part of 
the after-discovered evidence, which also showed that at the 
time of the shooting one of her “alter” personalities committed 
the offense. 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that Orndorff failed 
to exercise reasonable diligence in considering the implications 
 
23
of the evidence already known to her before trial.  The 
Commonwealth contends that because this evidence, including the 
“911” conversation in which she asked for her “mommy,” showed 
that Orndorff had experienced dissociative episodes, her expert 
witnesses could have reached a diagnosis of DID before the trial 
began.  We disagree with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
We previously have discussed the scope of the reasonable 
diligence requirement as it pertains to a motion for a new trial 
based on after-discovered evidence.  In Mason v. Commonwealth, 
154 Va. 890, 894-95, 153 S.E. 684, 685 (1930), we stated that  
[w]hat is reasonable diligence depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case; the burden 
is on the mover to show to the court that he has 
exercised due or reasonable diligence to ascertain 
relevant facts before trial, and that such diligence 
did not reveal the existence of, nor show the 
probability of the existence of, the evidence now 
relied upon. 
 
We conclude that the same definition of reasonable 
diligence applies to a moving party’s duty to ascertain relevant 
expert opinions based on the facts of a case.  Thus, in the 
present case, it was insufficient for Orndorff merely to prove 
that she could not have discovered the evidence of her DID by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence.  She also was required to 
show that she actually attempted to secure such evidence in a 
diligent and timely manner but was prevented from obtaining the 
evidence for a particular reason.  See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 
 
24
209 Va. 602, 609, 166 S.E.2d 248, 253 (1969); Fulcher, 208 Va. 
at 38, 155 S.E.2d at 365. 
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 
Orndorff failed to exercise such reasonable diligence in 
obtaining psychiatric and psychological evidence for her 
defense.  Orndorff consulted Dr. Fiester, a forensic 
psychiatrist and authority on personality disorders, and Dr. van 
Gorp, a clinical psychologist, neuropsychologist, and an 
authority on malingering.  Both experts were asked to determine 
whether Orndorff had any psychiatric or psychological disorders 
that might be relevant to her defense. 
These medical experts performed a thorough analysis based 
on the available facts, including the “911” telephone 
conversation and their personal interviews and testing of 
Orndorff, and submitted their findings to Orndorff’s counsel.  
Dr. Fiester and Dr. van Gorp specifically concluded that 
although Orndorff had experienced dissociative episodes, she did 
not suffer from DID or any other mental disorder that could 
potentially support an insanity defense. 
According to these witnesses, Orndorff’s disorder was not 
fully revealed until after she manifested the personality of a 
12-year-old child following the jury verdict in the guilt phase 
of the trial.  When asked to explain why he had not identified 
this condition earlier, Dr. van Gorp testified that a diagnosis 
 
25
of DID “can only be made when [a patient’s] various alters, or 
separate personalities, emerge.”  Dr. Fiester likewise stated 
that DID can only be diagnosed when there is “the presence of a 
separate identity.” 
The Court of Appeals, however, held that Orndorff did not 
meet the reasonable diligence component of the Odum test because 
her experts could have discovered earlier the several symptoms 
of DID that they later identified.  We disagree with this 
holding because it improperly shifted the focus of the 
reasonable diligence inquiry by effectively assigning to 
Orndorff’s counsel the responsibility for reaching a different 
medical diagnosis. 
The reasonable diligence inquiry addresses the sufficiency 
of counsel’s actions, not the actions of medical professionals 
retained by counsel.  Thus, although counsel may be required 
under the facts of a given case to obtain additional or 
different expert opinions to satisfy counsel’s duty of due 
diligence, defense counsel’s efforts here were sufficient.  The 
particular areas of specialty held by Dr. Fiester and Dr. van 
Gorp directly involved the medical issues presented in this 
case, and they both conducted a thorough and well-reasoned 
analysis of those issues in their evaluations of Orndorff’s 
condition. 
 
26
While Dr. Dell and Dr. Lowenstein testified at the 
sentencing phase that Orndorff exhibited clear symptoms of DID 
before trial, their suggestion that the DID illness could have 
been diagnosed earlier did not shift that duty of evaluating the 
various symptoms from Orndorff’s medical experts to her counsel.  
Therefore, we conclude that when presented with Dr. Fiester’s 
and Dr. van Gorp’s opinions that Orndorff did not have a mental 
disorder that might support an insanity defense, Orndorff’s 
counsel reasonably relied on those opinions and were not 
required to seek the opinions of other experts.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Orndorff 
failed to meet the “reasonable diligence” requirement for a new 
trial based on after-discovered evidence. 
B. Materiality 
We next consider the Court of Appeals’ holding that 
Orndorff failed to satisfy the “materiality” requirement of the 
Odum test.  Orndorff contends that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in denying her motion for a new trial by relying on 
the failure of the jury to mitigate her punishment after hearing 
evidence of her mental illness in the sentencing phase of the 
trial.  Orndorff maintains that the correct standard for 
determining whether to grant a new trial is whether a new, 
unbiased jury would have accepted her evidence of an insanity 
defense. 
 
27
The Commonwealth replies that the circuit court and the 
Court of Appeals properly relied on the jury’s apparent 
rejection of the DID evidence at the sentencing phase in 
determining whether another jury would reach a different result 
on the merits at a new trial.  The Commonwealth also notes that 
it presented substantial testimony at the sentencing phase to 
counter Orndorff’s evidence, and that this evidence further 
supports the circuit court’s denial of the new trial motion.  We 
disagree with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
As stated above, under the “materiality” requirement of the 
Odum test, Orndorff was required to prove that the evidence in 
question was “material, and such as should produce opposite 
results on the merits at another trial.”  225 Va. at 130, 301 
S.E.2d at 149.  This established standard has also been 
expressed as requiring that the evidence be such that it “ought 
to produce opposite results on the merits” at another trial.  
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. at 608-09, 166 S.E.2d at 253 
(quoting Reiber v. James M. Duncan, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 206 Va. 
657, 663, 145 S.E.2d 157, 162 (1965)). 
When, as here, the evidence supporting the new trial motion 
is contradicted by evidence in opposition to the motion, the 
circuit court is not permitted to presume that the moving 
party’s evidence is true but is required to weigh all the 
evidence presented in determining whether the moving party has 
 
28
satisfied the materiality standard articulated in Odum.  See 
Fulcher, 208 Va. at 38, 155 S.E.2d at 365; Independent Cab Ass’n 
v. LaTouche, 197 Va. 367, 377-78, 89 S.E.2d 320, 327 (1955); 
Henry v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 281, 294, 77 S.E.2d 863, 871 
(1953); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 578, 586-87, 189 S.E. 
144, 148 (1937); Holmes v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 963, 969, 157 
S.E. 554, 556 (1931).  Thus, when a circuit court is presented 
with conflicting evidence in considering a motion for a new 
trial, the court’s role resembles that of a fact finder in 
determining whether the evidence is such that it should produce 
an opposite result on the merits at a new trial.  See Zimmerman, 
167 Va. at 587, 189 S.E. at 148; Holmes, 156 Va. at 969, 157 
S.E. at 556. 
In the present case, the circuit court did not weigh the 
conflicting evidence at issue but instead relied on the jury’s 
apparent rejection of the mitigation evidence presented during 
the sentencing phase.  We conclude that the circuit court’s 
reliance on the jury’s sentencing decision was error because the 
court substituted in place of its own judgment the reaction of a 
jury that had already resolved crucial credibility issues 
against Orndorff in the guilt phase of trial.  Under the Odum 
test, the circuit court was required to make its own 
determination whether a new jury that had not previously 
considered the evidence in the case should reach a different 
 
29
result on the merits at a new trial.  225 Va. at 130, 301 S.E.2d 
at 149. 
We further conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in 
approving the circuit court’s judgment on the same basis as that 
articulated by the circuit court.  Because the circuit court 
employed an improper legal standard in exercising its 
discretionary function, the standard of appellate review 
examining whether the court abused its discretion could not be 
applied.  See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 233, 559 
S.E.2d 652, 661 (2002).  Instead, the proper remedy for the 
circuit court’s error was to remand the case to that court for 
proper application of the Odum materiality test based on the 
conflicting evidence already offered regarding the new trial 
motion.  Thus, we now direct that this case be remanded to the 
circuit court so that the court may take this action to 
determine whether Orndorff, the moving party on the new trial 
motion, has met her burden of satisfying the Odum materiality 
requirement.2 
We decline the Commonwealth’s request that we also decide 
the question of law whether a defendant who suffers from DID and 
commits an act allegedly performed by one of the defendant’s 
                                                 
2 In light of our holding, we need not address Orndorff’s 
additional contention that the Court of Appeals construed her 
introduction of mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase as 
an implied waiver of her right to present that evidence to a new 
jury in a new trial. 
 
30
“alter” personalities may assert an insanity defense at a 
criminal trial on those charges.  Because the circuit court did 
not rule on this issue, we will not resolve it here, nor will we 
speculate whether the circuit court will be required to reach 
that issue in conducting its “materiality” analysis on remand. 
We emphasize, however, that the appellate courts of this 
Commonwealth have not yet decided this issue.  In addition, we 
note that our review of the decisions of other jurisdictions 
reveals an absence of any consensus regarding the recognition of 
a DID-based insanity defense.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1016 (10th Cir. 1993) (insanity 
defense should have been submitted to jury based on evidence 
that defendant’s “host” personality was not in control of 
“alter” personality and was not aware of “alter” personality’s 
control of defendant’s physical actions); Kirkland v. State, 304 
S.E.2d 561, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (criminal responsibility of 
defendant must be assessed according to defendant’s state of 
mind under personality acting at time crime committed); State v. 
Halcomb, 510 N.W.2d 344, 351 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) (defendant 
criminally responsible for actions because irrespective whether 
“alter” personality acted in commission of crimes, defendant 
alone committed those acts and there was no evidence that he met 
criteria for insanity defense); State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 
1071, 1075-76 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (criminal responsibility of 
 
31
defendant is determined based on whether defendant was aware of 
actions of “alter” personality controlling her behavior so as to 
render those actions product of her own volition); State v. 
Greene, 984 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Wash. 1999) (declining to adopt 
specific legal standard for assessing sanity of criminal 
defendant suffering from DID due to inadequacy of legal 
authority on subject and insufficiency of record before court); 
State v. Lockhart, 542 S.E.2d 443, 455 (W. Va. 2000) (refusing 
to adopt any specific test for admission of expert testimony in 
DID cases and holding that such testimony must be evaluated on 
case-by-case basis). 
VI. 
In conclusion, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
err in approving the circuit court’s determination that Orndorff 
was competent to stand trial in the sentencing phase of the 
proceedings.  We further hold, however, that the Court of 
Appeals erred in approving the part of the circuit court’s 
judgment holding that Orndorff failed to meet her burden of 
proving the “reasonable diligence” component of the Odum test.  
We also hold that the Court of Appeals erred in approving the 
part of the circuit court’s judgment that misapplied the 
“materiality” component of the Odum test.  For these reasons, we 
will affirm in part, and reverse in part, the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment.  We will remand the case to the Court of Appeals for 
 
32
further remand to the circuit court for application of the 
“materiality” component of the Odum test and any other 
proceedings as may be necessary in accordance with the 
principles expressed in this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
    and remanded.