Title: Lovitt v. Warden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 012663
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2003

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
ROBIN MCKENNEL LOVITT 
 
v.  Record No. 012663   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          September 12, 2003 
WARDEN, SUSSEX I STATE PRISON 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
The petitioner, Robin M. Lovitt, was convicted by a jury of 
the capital murder of Clayton Dicks in the commission of 
robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-31, and of robbery, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58.  The circuit court sentenced Lovitt 
in accordance with the jury verdict to death for capital murder 
and to life imprisonment for robbery.  We affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment in Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 520, 
537 S.E.2d 866, 881 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001). 
 
Under Code § 8.01-654, Lovitt filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus against the warden of the Sussex I State Prison 
(the warden).  Lovitt alleged, among other things, that the 
destruction of certain trial exhibits after his convictions were 
affirmed by this Court violated his right of due process by 
preventing adequate review of his habeas corpus petition.  He 
also alleged that the prosecution suppressed exculpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.  
We entered an order directing that the Circuit Court of 
Arlington County (the circuit court) conduct an evidentiary 
hearing under Code § 8.01-654(C) concerning all issues raised in 
Lovitt's habeas corpus petition.  The circuit court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing (habeas hearing) pursuant to our order and 
submitted a written report stating its findings of fact and 
recommended conclusions of law.1  See Code § 8.01-654(C)(3). 
I. FACTS 
 
In Lovitt, we stated in detail the facts relating to the 
convictions and penalties imposed on Lovitt for the capital 
murder and robbery charges.  260 Va. at 502-08, 537 S.E.2d at 
870-73, 879.  We will recite those facts from our previous 
opinion that are relevant to the present habeas corpus 
proceedings: 
[I]n the early morning hours of November 18, 1998, 
Clayton Dicks was stabbed six times in the chest and 
back while working during the overnight shift at 
Champion Billiards Hall (the pool hall) in Arlington 
County. 
 
 
A few months before the killing, Lovitt worked as 
a cook at the pool hall on an evening shift that ended 
when Dicks arrived to begin the overnight shift.  Amy 
Hudon, the manager at the pool hall, testified that 
about two months before Dicks was killed, she had 
trouble opening a cash register drawer near a pool 
table and asked Lovitt to help her open the drawer.  
Lovitt opened it by "wedging" a pair of scissors into 
the drawer's latch.  About two months before the 
killing, Lovitt quit working at the pool hall. 
 
. . . . 
 
                     
 
1 The Honorable F. Bruce Bach conducted the evidentiary 
hearing and submitted the required report to this Court. 
 
2
 
[On November 18, 1998,] Dicks arrived at the pool 
hall between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m.  The other employees 
present when Dicks arrived had left the pool hall by 
3:00 a.m., leaving Dicks as the sole employee on the 
premises. . . . 
 
 
About 3:25 a.m., José N. Alvarado and Carlos 
Clavell entered the pool hall and saw two men arguing 
behind the bar.  Alvarado testified that one man was 
shorter than the other, and that the shorter man 
repeatedly shoved the taller man, who was wearing an 
apron.  Alvarado stated that he and Clavell watched as 
the shorter man stabbed the taller man six or seven 
times with a silver-colored weapon.  Alvarado saw 
blood on the taller man's apron and watched as the 
taller man fell to the floor behind the bar.  Clavell 
testified that he heard the taller man begging the 
shorter man to stop attacking him.  Both Alvarado and 
Clavell saw the assailant repeatedly kick the man who 
had fallen to the floor. 
 
 
Alvarado and Clavell immediately ran from the 
pool hall to a service station, where Alvarado 
telephoned the "911" emergency response number and 
reported what they had seen.  Although Alvarado could 
not identify Lovitt as Dicks's assailant at the 
preliminary hearing held in this case, Alvarado 
testified at trial that he was about "80% certain" 
that Lovitt was the assailant. 
 
 
When police and emergency medical personnel 
arrived at the pool hall in response to Alvarado's 
telephone call, they found Dicks lying on the floor 
behind the bar in a pool of blood.  Dicks was alive 
but was unable to speak and was taken by helicopter to 
a nearby hospital.  The multiple stab wounds prevented 
his heart from functioning, and he died while awaiting 
surgery. 
 
 
Dicks had been stabbed six times, five times in 
the chest and once in the back.  Four of these wounds 
were lethal.  Dicks also suffered two areas of 
internal hemorrhage on both sides of his head, as well 
as external abrasions on both shoulders and on his 
left knee. 
 
 
3
 
The police recovered from the pool hall a cash 
register that was lying on the floor near where Dicks 
was found.  The register was broken into pieces, the 
cash drawer had been removed from the register and was 
missing, and a torn piece of a ten-dollar bill was 
found nearby.  A pair of scissors with orange handles 
that was usually kept in a container on the bar was 
missing.  A police canine unit found an orange-handled 
pair of scissors bearing blood lying open in the woods 
about 15 yards behind the pool hall. 
 
 
Warren A. Grant, Lovitt's cousin, testified that 
Lovitt arrived at Grant's home in the early morning 
hours of November 18, 1998.  Grant lived about a 
quarter of a mile from the pool hall in a residential 
area located on the "other side" of the woods.  Grant 
stated that Lovitt knocked on his door sometime 
between 1:30 and 3:00 a.m.  Lovitt . . . entered the 
house carrying what looked like a large, square, gray 
metal box.  After Lovitt unsuccessfully tried to open 
the locked box, Grant eventually opened it by using a 
screwdriver to "pop" some of the screws securing the 
box.  Lovitt removed money from the opened cash 
register drawer and divided the cash between himself 
and Grant.  Lovitt left the cash register drawer with 
Grant and instructed him to "[g]et rid of [it]."  A 
few days later, Grant began cutting the cash drawer 
into pieces with tin snips and put them in a bag. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
On November 20, 1998, Arlington Detective Noel E. 
Hanrahan obtained pieces of the cash register drawer 
from Grant.  Four days later, Lovitt was arrested and 
charged with the present offenses. . . .  When Officer 
Stephen Ferrone collected Lovitt's clothing at the 
jail, Ferrone asked a detective whether he needed to 
seize Lovitt's jacket.  Ferrone testified that, upon 
hearing this question, Lovitt stated, "I wasn't 
wearing it when it happened." 
 
 
Julian J. Mason, Jr., a forensic scientist 
employed by the Virginia Division of Forensic Science, 
qualified as an expert witness on the subject of tool 
mark identification.  He testified that the cash 
register drawer Grant surrendered to the police had 
been removed from the broken cash register found on 
 
4
the floor of the pool hall.  Mason also stated that 
the pry marks on the cash register drawer were made by 
the scissors that were found in the woods behind the 
pool hall. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Carol Palmer, a forensic scientist employed by 
the Virginia Department of Forensic Science, qualified 
as an expert witness on DNA testing.  Palmer extracted 
human DNA from two places on the scissors, on a blade 
near the tip and on a blade near the finger loops.  
She also extracted blood from three small circular 
areas on the left front side of Lovitt's jacket, but 
the DNA tests were inconclusive and Palmer was unable 
to determine whether the blood on the jacket was 
human. . . . 
 
 
. . . The DNA extracted from the tip of the 
scissors displayed a DNA profile that matched the DNA 
profile of Dicks.  The profile derived from this 
sample did not match the DNA profiles of either Lovitt 
or Grant, thus eliminating both as contributors of 
this DNA.  Palmer stated that the chance of someone 
other than Dicks contributing the DNA sample on the 
tip of the scissors was 1 in more than 5.5 billion. 
 
 
The DNA extracted from the mid-section of the 
scissors also matched the DNA profile of Dicks.  
However, Palmer stated that this DNA evidence, unlike 
the DNA evidence from the tip of the scissors, did not 
exclude either Lovitt or Grant and, thus, was 
inconclusive as to them. 
 
 
After Lovitt's arrest, he was incarcerated in the 
Arlington County Jail in the same unit as Casel Lucas.  
Lovitt and Lucas developed a friendship during the two 
months that they lived together in this unit.  Lovitt 
first told Lucas that after leaving the bathroom at 
the pool hall on the night of the murder, Lovitt saw a 
Hispanic man stabbing Dicks.  Lovitt told Lucas that, 
at that time, Lovitt saw the cash register drawer, 
grabbed it, and ran from the pool hall. 
 
 
According to Lucas, Lovitt later stated that he 
knew Dicks and was aware that no one else would be in 
the pool hall late at night.  Lovitt further related 
 
5
that he waited in the bathroom until everyone left the 
pool hall before coming out of the bathroom to attempt 
to open the cash register drawer.  Dicks confronted 
Lovitt as he unsuccessfully attempted to open the cash 
drawer.  Lovitt told Lucas that he had to kill Dicks 
because Dicks had recognized him.  According to 
Lovitt, Dicks asked him, "[W]hy [are] you doing this?"  
Lovitt admitted to Lucas that he stabbed Dicks several 
times and took the cash register drawer to his 
cousin's house where he and his cousin split the money 
before leaving to buy some drugs.  Lovitt told Lucas 
that he discarded the murder weapon while en route to 
or from Grant's house, and that he changed his clothes 
at Grant's house because he had blood on his shirt and 
pants. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the 
Commonwealth presented evidence of Lovitt's criminal 
record.  In October 1975, when Lovitt was 11 years 
old, he was charged with assault and placed in 
protective supervision.  Also as a juvenile, in August 
1979, Lovitt was committed to the Beaumont Learning 
Center of the State Department of Corrections 
(Beaumont) based on adjudication of charges of 
breaking and entering and larceny.  While at Beaumont, 
Lovitt was disciplined for fighting, assault, and 
possessing contraband items.  After his release from 
Beaumont in 1980, Lovitt was convicted of grand 
larceny in 1981 and was sentenced to 12 months in 
jail. 
 
 
Between 1983 and 1985, Lovitt was convicted of 
petit larceny, grand larceny, breaking and entering, 
and distribution of marijuana.  In 1986, Lovitt was 
convicted of attempted robbery and was sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of from one to three years.  
After being released on parole in August 1987, 
Lovitt's parole was revoked in August 1988 based, in 
part, on additional arrests and his failure to pass 
certain drug tests.  Lovitt later was convicted of 
statutory burglary and grand larceny.  While 
incarcerated on these convictions and the parole 
violation, Lovitt was disciplined for damaging 
property and for fighting. 
 
 
6
 
In September 1990, Lovitt again was released on 
parole.  In early 1991, Lovitt was convicted of 
possession of cocaine, grand larceny, and burglary.  
While incarcerated on these charges, Lovitt was the 
subject of ten disciplinary actions for offenses 
including possession of contraband, disobeying direct 
orders, assault, possession of intoxicants, and 
manufacturing "shank handles."  After being released 
on parole in October 1996, Lovitt was convicted in 
1997 of possession of marijuana, petit larceny, 
unlawful entry, assault and battery, and destruction 
of property.  Lovitt was on parole at the time of the 
present offenses. 
 
 
In October 1998, Arlington County Police Officer 
Jerome A. Lee detained Lovitt in an apartment parking 
lot in Arlington.  Lovitt had parked his car behind 
the apartments, appeared to be very nervous, and 
consented to a search of his vehicle.  Lee found a 
long kitchen knife on the floor of the passenger area 
and a soda can used to smoke crack cocaine in the rear 
floor area of the vehicle. 
 
 
Lovitt presented testimony from his sister, 
[Lamanda] Jones, who testified that Lovitt was the 
oldest of 12 children and that he helped take care of 
his younger siblings, although not "gladly."  Lovitt 
also presented testimony from four deputies employed 
by the Arlington County Sheriff's Office, who stated 
that Lovitt had not presented any disciplinary 
problems while being held in jail on the present 
charges. 
 
Id. at 502-08, 537 S.E.2d at 870-73. 
 
In May 2001, about six months after we affirmed Lovitt's 
convictions, the circuit court entered an order authorizing 
destruction of the exhibits entered into evidence at Lovitt's 
trial.  Pursuant to the destruction order, all exhibits received 
in evidence at trial, with the exception of one chart, were 
destroyed.  On October 1, 2001, the United States Supreme Court 
 
7
denied Lovitt's petition for a writ of certiorari from this 
Court's judgment.  See Lovitt v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 815 (2001). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
When we consider a circuit court's findings of fact and 
recommended conclusions of law submitted pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-654(C), we defer to the court's factual findings and are 
bound by them unless they are plainly wrong or without 
evidentiary support.  Hedrick v. Warden, 264 Va. 486, 496, 570 
S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002).  However, the circuit court's 
recommended conclusions of law involve mixed questions of law 
and fact and are subject to our de novo review.  Id.
III.  HABEAS HEARING 
 
At the habeas hearing, Lovitt presented evidence regarding 
the destruction of the trial exhibits, the alleged Brady 
violations, and his counsel's alleged failure to provide 
effective assistance at trial. 
A.  DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
 
Testimony at the habeas hearing revealed that in April 
2001, Robert C. McCarthy, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of Arlington County, drafted an order authorizing the 
destruction of the exhibits received in evidence at Lovitt's 
trial.  McCarthy, who was responsible for evidence stored in the 
clerk's office, testified that he thought he was authorized to 
destroy the trial exhibits after receiving a mandate from this 
 
8
Court indicating that Lovitt's convictions were affirmed.  
McCarthy also stated that he decided to destroy the trial 
exhibits to create additional space in the clerk's office 
evidence room. 
 
McCarthy drafted the evidence destruction order without 
consulting anyone in the Commonwealth's Attorney's office, the 
Attorney General's office, or the Arlington County Police 
Department.  McCarthy also did not notify any of the circuit 
court judges, Lovitt's trial counsel, or his habeas counsel of 
the impending evidence destruction. 
 
McCarthy drafted the order before May 2, 2001, the date 
that Code §§ 19.2-270.4:1 and –327.1 became effective.  Code 
§ 19.2-270.4:1 provides, in relevant part: 
B.  In the case of a person sentenced to death, the 
court that entered the judgment shall, in all cases, 
order any human biological evidence or representative 
samples to be transferred by the governmental entity 
having custody to the Division of Forensic Science.  
The Division of Forensic Science shall store, 
preserve, and retain such evidence until the judgment 
is executed. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
E.  An action under this section or the performance of 
any attorney representing the petitioner under this 
section shall not form the basis for relief in any 
habeas corpus or appellate proceeding. 
 
 
With regard to such human biological evidence, Code § 19.2-
327.1 provides, in relevant part: 
 
9
A.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule 
of court, any person convicted of a felony may, by 
motion to the circuit court that entered the original 
conviction, apply for a new scientific investigation 
of any human biological evidence related to the case 
that resulted in the felony conviction . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
G.  An action under this section or the performance of 
any attorney representing the petitioner under this 
section shall not form the basis for relief in any 
habeas corpus proceeding or any other appeal. 
 
 
McCarthy took the destruction order prepared in Lovitt's 
case, along with between 15 and 20 other such orders, to the 
chambers of Judge Paul F. Sheridan.  McCarthy left the orders in 
Judge Sheridan's chambers for entry without providing him any 
information concerning the relevant cases.  Judge Sheridan, who 
did not conduct Lovitt's trial, entered the destruction orders 
on May 21, 2001, authorizing the destruction of all exhibits 
entered into evidence at Lovitt's trial.  These exhibits, with 
the exception of the one chart, were destroyed a few days later. 
 
Two deputy court clerks, Clifford P. Kleback and Gwendolyn 
Gilmore, testified that they spoke with McCarthy before he 
submitted the destruction orders to Judge Sheridan.  Both deputy 
clerks told McCarthy, who was their immediate supervisor, that 
he should not destroy the evidence in Lovitt's case because it 
was a "capital case" and Lovitt had not been executed.  Kleback, 
who was the clerk assigned to the courtroom during Lovitt's 
trial, stated that he told McCarthy that the case involved DNA 
 
10
evidence, and that he repeatedly advised McCarthy not to destroy 
the evidence. 
 
Both Kleback and Gilmore testified that McCarthy told them 
that the evidence could be destroyed because Lovitt's appeal had 
ended.  Kleback and Gilmore deferred to McCarthy's decision and, 
at that time, did not report these conversations to either the 
clerk of the circuit court or to anyone in the prosecutor's 
office. 
 
McCarthy testified that he did not recall speaking with 
Kleback and Gilmore before the evidence in Lovitt's case was 
destroyed.  McCarthy also stated that he did not review Lovitt's 
case file to determine whether Lovitt's appellate remedies were 
exhausted but instead relied on this Court's mandate affirming 
Lovitt's convictions.  According to McCarthy, when he drafted 
the destruction order, he may have known that Lovitt's case was 
a "capital murder case," but he was unaware that it was a "death 
penalty case."  He further testified that at the time the 
destruction order was entered, he was not aware of any change in 
the law concerning the preservation of human biological 
evidence. 
 
The circuit court found that there was no evidence that any 
official of the Commonwealth acted in bad faith or with the 
intent to destroy exculpatory evidence.  The court stated in its 
findings that "McCarthy believed he had the authority to destroy 
 
11
the trial exhibits once he received the mandate" from this 
Court.  The court also found that although Code § 19.2-270.4:1 
became effective 20 days before entry of the destruction order, 
McCarthy was unaware of the statute's provisions when the 
evidence was destroyed. 
B.  BRADY CLAIMS 
1.  DR. PIERRE-LOUIS 
 
Dr. Marie-Lydie Y. Pierre-Louis was the medical examiner 
who performed the autopsy on Clayton Dicks.  Among those present 
during the autopsy were Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney 
Margaret E. Lair-Eastman (Eastman), one of the prosecuting 
attorneys at Lovitt's trial, and Detective Stuart Chase of the 
Arlington County Police Department. 
 
During the autopsy, Dr. Pierre-Louis was shown two pairs of 
scissors recovered from a container next to the cash register 
near the location where Dicks' body was found.  Dr. Pierre-Louis 
was not shown the orange-handled pair of scissors found with 
blood on the blade tip (the bloody scissors), discovered in the 
woods behind the pool hall and admitted into evidence at 
Lovitt's trial. 
 
The autopsy report prepared by Dr. Pierre-Louis indicated 
that each of Dicks' six stab wounds displayed a blunt and a 
sharp edge.  The wounds ranged in depth between three and eight 
 
12
inches, and three of these wounds were between six and eight 
inches deep. 
 
The autopsy report further indicated that one of the pairs 
of scissors examined by Dr. Pierre-Louis had a total length of 
eight-and-one-half inches with blades that were three-and-one-
half inches long and one-half inch wide at the base.  The other 
pair of scissors she examined was six-and-one-half inches in 
length and had blades that were three inches long and one-half 
inch wide at the base. 
 
At the autopsy, Dr. Pierre-Louis told Eastman and Detective 
Chase that neither of the two pairs of scissors that she 
examined could have been the murder weapon because the length 
and width of their blades were not consistent with the nature 
and dimensions of Dicks' stab wounds.  Dr. Pierre-Louis also 
told Eastman and Chase that she would have to examine the bloody 
scissors before she could reach a conclusion whether those 
scissors were the source of Dicks' wounds. 
 
Dr. Pierre-Louis' opinion concerning the two pairs of 
scissors she examined was not included in the autopsy report.  
Neither Eastman nor anyone else in the prosecutor's office 
informed Lovitt's trial counsel of Dr. Pierre-Louis' opinion.  
During Lovitt's trial, Dr. Pierre-Louis was not asked to give 
her opinion concerning the two pairs of scissors that she had 
 
13
examined, nor was she asked to opine whether the bloody scissors 
admitted into evidence were consistent with Dicks' stab wounds. 
 
At the habeas hearing, Dr. Pierre-Louis testified that she 
is an "expert on the wounds on the body" and that part of her 
expertise includes determining "whether an object is consistent 
with a wound."  Dr. Pierre-Louis stated that each of Dicks' stab 
wounds had both a blunt and a sharp edge, indicating that a 
"single-edged blade" was used to cause those wounds. 
 
Dr. Pierre-Louis was shown a photograph of the bloody 
scissors found in the woods near the pool hall.  Using a 
measurement scale depicted in the photograph, she determined 
that one blade was three-and-one-half inches long from its tip 
to the base where the two blades are joined, and that this blade 
was one-half inch wide at the base.  She was unable to measure 
the other blade because of its position in the photograph. 
 
Dr. Pierre-Louis testified that the bloody scissors shown 
in the photograph were inconsistent with Dicks' wounds.  She 
stated that three of those wounds, which measured between six 
and eight inches in depth, were deeper than the length of the 
three-and-one-half inch blade.  She also stated that while the 
other three wounds, which ranged between three and five inches 
in depth, were "more or less" consistent with the length of the 
blade, the wounds were twice as wide as the width of the blade. 
 
14
 
Dr. Pierre-Louis further testified that if the blade had 
been completely inserted into Dicks' body, she would have 
expected to discover a "notch" from the other blade or a 
contusion from the scissors' handle in the immediate vicinity of 
the stab wounds.  However, she did not discover any evidence of 
such "marginal abrasions" near Dicks' wounds.  Dr. Pierre-Louis 
completely discounted "tissue compression" as an explanation for 
the discrepancy between the scissors' blade length and Dicks' 
wounds because of the lack of "marginal abrasions" in the wound 
areas.  She stated that the discovery of Dicks' blood on the 
scissors would not influence her opinion that those scissors are 
inconsistent with Dicks' wounds because she does not know how 
the blood was transferred to those scissors. 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Pierre-Louis testified that she 
never examined the bloody scissors depicted in the photograph 
and was unable to determine the thickness of the blades or 
whether their outside edges were sharp.  Contrary to her 
testimony on direct examination, she conceded that it was 
possible that a single blade of the scissors depicted in the 
photograph could have caused the three stab wounds that measured 
between three and five inches deep. 
 
Both Detective Chase and Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney 
Barbara Walker, one of the prosecuting attorneys at Lovitt's 
trial, testified that the bloody scissors were different in size 
 
15
from the two pairs of scissors presented to Dr. Pierre-Louis.  
Detective Chase also testified that he contacted Dr. Pierre-
Louis after the autopsy and informed her that the police had 
recovered a certain pair of scissors that he concluded was the 
murder weapon, which he described to her.  He stated that when 
he described the bloody scissors to Dr. Pierre-Louis, "she made 
some comment that, I guess I was wrong, or, I made a mistake." 
 
Eastman testified that when she told Dr. Pierre-Louis after 
the autopsy that Dicks' blood had been identified on the bloody 
pair of scissors, Dr. Pierre-Louis shrugged and responded, "oh 
well."  Eastman interpreted Dr. Pierre-Louis' response as a 
departure from her previous opinion and an abandonment of "any 
notion that scissors could not be the murder weapon." 
 
Eastman testified that Lovitt's counsel had a copy of the 
autopsy report and had access to the physical evidence in the 
case, including the bloody scissors.  She further testified that 
she did not consider Dr. Pierre-Louis' opinion concerning the 
two pairs of scissors to be exculpatory because neither pair was 
the murder weapon presented at trial. 
 
Denman Rucker, one of Lovitt's trial attorneys, testified 
at the habeas hearing that the trial evidence concerning the 
bloody scissors "actually worked to [his] benefit" during trial, 
and allowed him to assert that an unknown assailant had 
perpetrated the crimes, which was the "strongest argument" 
 
16
available for Lovitt's defense.  Rucker explained that this 
evidence also allowed him to avoid having the jury infer that 
Lovitt brought a deadly weapon with him to the pool hall. 
 
The circuit court made a factual finding that after DNA 
test results confirmed the presence of Dicks' blood on the 
bloody scissors, "Dr. Pierre-Louis indicated to the 
Commonwealth's attorneys that she had been wrong in her 
conclusion regarding the scissors."  The court also found that 
Lovitt's defense counsel had access to the bloody scissors, the 
autopsy report, and to Dr. Pierre-Louis prior to Lovitt's trial. 
 
Based on additional testimony by Denman Rucker, the circuit 
court also found that Rucker had recognized the differences in 
the blade lengths of the scissors listed in the autopsy report 
and the depth of Dicks' wounds and, as a result, had consulted 
with an expert at the Northern Virginia Forensic Laboratory.  
Rucker further testified that the expert informed him that a 
pair of scissors with a blade measuring between three-and-one-
half and four-and-one-half inches in length could inflict a 
wound up to seven inches deep during a "frenzied" and "violent" 
attack based on a victim's breathing and the compression of body 
tissue.  The court found that the expert informed Rucker that 
such scissors could have been the murder weapon. 
2. 
CASEL LUCAS 
a. 
LUCAS' PRIOR COOPERATION WITH AUTHORITIES 
 
17
 
Before Lucas testified at trial, Eastman and Walker 
provided Lovitt's defense counsel with a report detailing Lucas' 
extensive criminal record.  However, neither Eastman nor Walker 
disclosed to defense counsel that Lucas had provided information 
to various police departments in four previous criminal cases.  
The circuit court found that before the trial, the prosecutors 
in Lovitt's case were "unaware that Casel Lucas had provided 
information regarding any other case." 
 
The evidence at the habeas hearing showed that in 1998, 
Lucas testified in Alexandria against Steven Evans, who had been 
charged with robbery.  In exchange for his testimony, Lucas 
received a total recommended sentence of 20 years' imprisonment 
for various pending criminal charges, including robbery, 
abduction with the intent to defile, and attempted rape. 
 
Walker testified that although Lucas told her about his 
cooperation with the police in the Evans case, she did not tell 
either Rucker or Janell Wolfe, Lovitt's co-counsel at trial, 
about Lucas' role in that prosecution.  However, Walker stated 
that Lucas' sentence in the Evans case was included in his 
criminal record that the prosecution provided to defense counsel 
before Lucas testified. 
 
When Wolfe interviewed Lucas prior to his testifying, Lucas 
told her of his involvement in the Evans case.  However, Lucas 
did not inform Wolfe that he had cooperated with the police in 
 
18
any other cases.  Wolfe testified that had she received such 
information, she and Rucker would have used it to impeach Lucas' 
credibility at trial.  At Lovitt's trial, Rucker cross-examined 
Lucas concerning his cooperation with the police in the Evans 
case. 
 
In 1996, Lucas provided information to the police 
concerning a "jailhouse confession" made by Edward Young, who 
had been charged with rape in Arlington County.  Walker served 
as the prosecutor during the sentencing in the Young case and 
Wolfe served as Young's counsel.  However, neither Walker nor 
Wolfe was aware of Lucas' involvement in the Young case because 
the case did not proceed to trial and the defendant's plea 
agreement did not mention Lucas.  Lucas did not receive any 
benefit in exchange for the information that he provided in the 
Young case. 
 
In 1997, Lucas provided information to detectives in the 
District of Columbia concerning the "Starbucks triple homicide" 
case.  One of the detectives sent a letter to the judges of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria informing them of Lucas' 
cooperation in the Starbucks case.  There was no evidence that 
Lucas received any benefit resulting from his cooperation with 
the police in that case.  Further, prior to Lovitt's trial, the 
Arlington prosecutors did not have any information about 
Lovitt's cooperation in the Starbucks case. 
 
19
 
In 1998, Lucas provided Alexandria authorities with a 
statement detailing a defendant's "jailhouse confession" in the 
"Eddie Lee case."  Lucas did not receive any benefit as a result 
of his cooperation in that case, and the Arlington prosecutors 
were not aware of Lucas' involvement in the Lee case prior to 
Lovitt's trial. 
 
In June 1999, before Lovitt's trial, Lucas sent a letter to 
Judge Paul F. Sheridan of the Arlington County Circuit Court 
requesting reconsideration of one of his sentences.  In the 
letter, Lucas stated that he had cooperated with the police in 
previous matters but did not mention Lovitt's case.  The letter 
was sent directly to Judge Sheridan's chambers and a copy of the 
letter apparently was not placed in Lucas' file until after 
Lovitt's trial.  Lucas' request for reconsideration was denied.  
The prosecutors in Lovitt's case were not aware of Lucas' letter 
at the time of Lovitt's trial. 
b.  LUCAS' PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
 
At the habeas hearing, the court considered an affidavit 
handwritten by Lovitt's habeas counsel and signed by Lucas in 
September 2001.  The affidavit, which was prepared after 
Lovitt's trial, contained several statements that conflicted 
with Lucas' trial testimony.  For example, in the affidavit, 
Lucas stated that he initially informed the prosecutors that 
Lovitt had stated he used a gun to shoot Dicks, that Lovitt had 
 
20
discarded the weapon in a drain, and that Warren Grant had 
driven Lovitt from the pool hall to Grant's house.  These 
statements contradicted Lucas' trial testimony that Lovitt 
stated he used a knife or other object to stab Dicks, and that 
he discarded the weapon while walking from the pool hall to 
Grant's house. 
 
In the affidavit, Lucas also stated that he received a 
reduced sentence for his cooperation in the Young case, and that 
he learned about the details of Dicks' murder from "Crime 
Stoppers" and the Washington Post.  At habeas counsel's request, 
Lucas had "initialed" each paragraph of the affidavit. 
 
Lucas testified that the inconsistent statements contained 
in the affidavit were not accurate and that his testimony during 
Lovitt's trial was truthful.  Lucas stated that on the day he 
signed the affidavit, he was "confused" after answering "three 
hours' worth of questions" posed by Lovitt's habeas counsel.  
Lucas also stated that he did not feel "too good" that day 
because he had undergone a tooth extraction and was waiting to 
receive some medication. 
 
Lucas further testified that he did not thoroughly read the 
affidavit, but merely "glimpsed through it" and "glanced over 
it," not paying attention to its content.  He also testified 
that he was mistaken when he had stated that he received a 
sentence reduction in exchange for his cooperation in the Young 
 
21
case.  Additionally, Lucas stated that Lovitt was his sole 
source of information concerning the testimony he gave at 
Lovitt's trial. 
 
Eastman testified that Lucas' trial testimony was 
consistent with the statements he had made before Lovitt's 
trial.  She stated that Lucas' description of Lovitt's initial 
story was consistent with a statement that Lovitt had given to 
the police shortly after his arrest.  Included in Lovitt's 
initial story to Lucas were assertions that Lovitt was in the 
pool hall restroom during Dicks' murder, and that he took the 
cash register drawer after an allegedly unknown assailant had 
killed Dicks.2
 
The circuit court found that Lucas had "disavowed" the 
affidavit written by Lovitt's habeas counsel that had set forth 
the inconsistent statements Lucas allegedly had made before 
trial.  The court also found that Lucas did not make any 
statements before trial that were inconsistent with his trial 
testimony. 
C. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
                     
 
2 In that statement to the police, Lovitt claimed that when 
he discovered Dicks on the pool hall floor "gurgling blood" and 
"dying right there on the spot," he thought to himself, "I'm 
broke.  Might as well take [the cash register drawer] with me," 
and then he grabbed the drawer and left the premises.  Lovitt's 
statement to the police was not entered into evidence at 
Lovitt's trial. 
 
22
 
Two of Lovitt's stepsisters and a cousin testified at the 
habeas hearing about Lovitt's family background.  We will 
describe that testimony in detail in Part IV(C), infra, of our 
discussion which addresses the issue whether Lovitt received 
effective assistance of counsel at trial.  In that discussion, 
we will also describe the various jail, substance abuse, 
juvenile, and other records introduced into evidence at the 
habeas hearing. 
 
Rucker and Wolfe testified at the habeas hearing that they 
were concerned that if the jury was told about the criminal 
records and substance abuse of Lovitt's siblings and stepfather, 
the jury could conclude that Lovitt's family background 
increased his future danger to society.  Wolfe also stated that 
she asked Lamanda Jones to testify on Lovitt's behalf and spoke 
with her for between "45 minutes or an hour" before presenting 
her as a witness in the penalty phase proceeding.  Wolfe 
explained that Jones testified regarding "exactly what we wanted 
her to get on the stand and say," and that Jones' testimony 
"humanized" Lovitt by showing the jury that he had a family. 
 
With regard to the guilt phase of the trial, the circuit 
court found that defense counsel made a tactical decision not to 
pursue additional DNA testing of the bloody scissors and 
Lovitt's jacket, which allowed counsel to argue that an unknown 
assailant killed Dicks.  The court concluded that Rucker's 
 
23
investigation into the discrepancy between the length of the 
scissors and the depth of Dicks' stab wounds yielded information 
from an expert that scissors of the specified dimensions could 
have caused such wounds.  The court also found that Wolfe 
interviewed Lucas and obtained his criminal record prior to his 
testifying at Lovitt's trial. 
 
With regard to the penalty phase of the trial, the circuit 
court found that trial counsel adopted a strategy for the 
penalty phase that focused on efforts to "humanize" Lovitt and 
to show that he would not be dangerous in the penitentiary by 
emphasizing his good behavior while he was incarcerated awaiting 
trial.  The court also found that in preparation for trial, 
Rucker and Wolfe obtained "all of Lovitt's jail records from the 
Arlington County Detention Facility, all of his juvenile 
records, his records from the Beaumont juvenile facility, his 
medical records, and his pre-sentence report." 
 
The court further found that both Rucker and Wolfe were 
aware of the criminal history of Lovitt's family members from 
having represented some of his siblings in prior criminal 
proceedings, and from their "general reputation in the 
community" of having a "predilection for criminal activity."  
The court found that trial counsel made a strategic decision not 
to introduce evidence of Lovitt's family background, and that 
the social services records of Lovitt's siblings would not have 
 
24
assisted defense counsel in preparing for the penalty phase of 
the trial.  In addition, the court found that Lovitt had not 
given trial counsel any indication that he had been a victim of 
sexual or physical abuse by his stepfather. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A.  DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
 
Lovitt argues that McCarthy, an agent of the Commonwealth, 
procured the destruction of the trial exhibits in bad faith, and 
that the destruction of this evidence violated his right of due 
process by preventing meaningful review of his habeas corpus 
petition.  Lovitt also observes that under Code §§ 19.2-270.4 
and –270.4:1, trial evidence may not be destroyed until after 
all appellate remedies have been exhausted, and that DNA 
evidence in a death penalty case may not be destroyed until the 
final judgment is executed.  He asserts that the death penalty 
is "not a reliably appropriate punishment" under circumstances 
when material evidence has been destroyed and that, therefore, 
his sentence should be vacated.  We disagree with Lovitt's 
arguments. 
 
We first address Lovitt's due process claim.  He asserts 
that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has been 
deprived of an opportunity to seek new scientific testing of the 
DNA found on the bloody scissors and his jacket.  Lovitt asserts 
that this testing is necessary for him to seek a writ of actual 
 
25
innocence under Code §§ 19.2-327.2 through –327.6.3  However, he 
fails to present authority to support his claim that habeas 
corpus relief is the proper remedy for his inability to obtain 
this further testing.  He further acknowledges that the United 
States Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether due 
process rights may be asserted against the post-trial 
destruction of evidence. 
 
In the absence of such authority, Lovitt relies on Arizona 
v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), and California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479 (1984), in which the Supreme Court considered due 
process claims involving the pre-trial destruction of evidence.  
In Youngblood, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between the 
government's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence 
and the failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence.  
The Court explained that: 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of 
the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose 
to the defendant material exculpatory evidence.  But 
we think the Due Process Clause requires a different 
result when we deal with the failure of the State to 
preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be 
said than that it could have been subjected to tests, 
the results of which might have exonerated the 
defendant. . . .  We think that requiring a defendant 
                     
 
3 Lovitt also asserts that further DNA testing of these 
items is required in order to establish that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial.  However, based on our 
resolution of this aspect of his ineffective assistance claim, 
infra, we need not address the destruction of these items as 
they relate to the ineffective assistance claim. 
 
26
to show bad faith on the part of the police both 
limits the extent of the police's obligation to 
preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it 
to that class of cases where the interests of justice 
most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which 
the police themselves by their conduct indicate that 
the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant.  We therefore hold that unless a criminal 
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the 
police, failure to preserve potentially useful 
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process 
of law. 
 
488 U.S. at 57-58; see also Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; Thomas 
v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 18, 419 S.E.2d 606, 615-16 (1992). 
 
This constitutional standard of materiality, decided in the 
context of a state's pre-trial destruction of evidence, reflects 
the importance courts attach to the integrity of the trial 
process and to the ability of an accused to defend against 
criminal charges brought against him.  See Trombetta, 467 U.S. 
at 485.  Therefore, during the course of a criminal trial, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the 
government satisfy such prevailing concepts of fundamental 
fairness.  See id.
 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, however, the truth-seeking 
function of the trial process yields to a focus on the legality 
of a petitioner's detention and whether the petitioner presently 
is detained in violation of any constitutional rights.  See 
Virginia Parole Bd. v. Wilkins, 255 Va. 419, 420-21, 498 S.E.2d 
695, 696 (1998); McClenny v. Murray, 246 Va. 132, 134-35, 431 
 
27
S.E.2d 330, 331 (1993); Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92, 96-97, 97 
S.E.2d 745, 748-49 (1957).  This different focus raises the 
issue whether a due process right may be asserted in a habeas 
corpus proceeding to challenge the post-trial destruction of 
evidence when a petitioner's trial and direct appeal have 
concluded. 
 
We need not resolve this issue in the present case, 
however, because Lovitt fails to establish that he qualifies for 
relief under the Youngblood standard that he asks us to apply. 
Therefore, for purposes of this petition only, we will assume, 
without deciding, that a habeas petitioner may assert a due 
process claim regarding the post-trial destruction of evidence, 
and that the Youngblood standard governing pre-trial destruction 
of evidence also applies to a due process claim involving 
evidence destroyed post-trial. 
 
As provided above, under the Youngblood standard, a state's 
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 
constitute a denial of due process unless a defendant can show 
bad faith on the part of the state.  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; 
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Basden v. Lee, 290 F.3d 602, 615 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 980 (2002); Thomas, 244 Va. at 18, 419 S.E.2d at 615.  
The presence or absence of bad faith by the state depends on 
whether agents of the state had knowledge of the exculpatory 
 
28
value of the evidence when it was lost or destroyed.  
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*; Holdren v. Legursky, 16 F.3d 57, 
60 (4th Cir. 1994).  Thus, the possibility that evidence could 
have exculpated a defendant depending on future testing results 
is not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of 
materiality.  See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*. 
 
In the present case, the circuit court concluded that 
"[t]here [was] no evidence that any official of the Commonwealth 
acted in bad faith."  The court also found that "[t]here [was] 
no evidence to conclude that there was an intent by anyone in 
the Clerk's office to destroy exculpatory evidence."  The court 
further found that while Robert McCarthy's judgment was 
erroneous, he "wanted to remove the box of exhibits from the 
evidence room to make additional space," and he "believed he had 
the authority to destroy the trial exhibits once he received the 
mandate indicating that Lovitt's appeal to the Virginia Supreme 
Court had been denied." 
 
The circuit court's determination that there was an absence 
of bad faith was a finding of fact, not of law, because that 
finding rested on the knowledge of the Commonwealth's agents 
concerning the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it 
was destroyed.  See id.; Holdren, 16 F.3d at 60; Thomas, 244 Va. 
at 18, 419 S.E.2d at 615-16.  Such factual findings made by the 
circuit court are entitled to deference and are binding in this 
 
29
proceeding unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support them.  Hedrick, 264 Va. at 496, 570 S.E.2d at 847. 
 
The circuit court's findings concerning the absence of bad 
faith are supported by the evidence and are not plainly wrong.  
McCarthy's actions, and the failure of Kleback and Gilmore to 
report his intentions to another supervisor, do not establish 
that an agent of the Commonwealth had knowledge of any 
exculpatory value of the trial exhibits at the time they were 
destroyed.  See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*; Holdren, 16 F.3d 
at 60.  The mere fact that the exhibits included DNA evidence, 
and that Kleback may have related this information to McCarthy, 
does not establish that McCarthy was aware that an analysis of 
some of the DNA evidence had produced inconclusive results, or 
that such evidence may have been subject to further testing.  
Moreover, even if McCarthy had been aware of these 
considerations, such awareness would not have met the 
constitutional standard of materiality under Youngblood, because 
Lovitt can assert no more than the mere possibility that further 
testing could have exculpated him.  See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 
56 n.*. 
 
In addition, the circuit court found that at the time the 
evidence was destroyed, McCarthy was unaware that Code § 19.2-
270.4:1, enacted 20 days before the destruction order was 
entered, mandated the storage of human biological evidence 
 
30
received in the case of a person sentenced to death.  McCarthy's 
testimony adequately supports this finding. 
 
The circuit court made an additional factual finding that 
no employees of either the Commonwealth's Attorney or the 
Attorney General knew about the destruction of evidence until 
after the destruction occurred.  This finding is supported by 
the testimony of Margaret Eastman, Barbara Walker, and McCarthy.  
The record also shows that Judge Paul F. Sheridan, who entered 
the evidence destruction order, had not presided over Lovitt's 
trial.  Therefore, we hold that the record lacks any evidence 
that an agent of the Commonwealth acted in bad faith with regard 
to the destruction of the trial exhibits. 
 
We turn now to consider Lovitt's claim that he is entitled 
to habeas corpus relief because the destruction of the trial 
exhibits violated Code §§ 19.2-270.4 and –270.4:1.  Code § 19.2-
270.4(A) provides, in relevant part: 
Except as provided in § 19.2-270.4:1 and unless 
objection with sufficient cause is made, the trial 
court in any criminal case may order the donation or 
destruction of any or all exhibits received in 
evidence during the course of the trial (i) at any 
time after the expiration of the time for filing an 
appeal from the final judgment of the court if no 
appeal is taken or (ii) if an appeal is taken, at any 
time after exhaustion of all appellate remedies. 
 
 
In the case of a person sentenced to death, Code § 19.2-
270.4:1(B) requires the Commonwealth to store, preserve, and 
retain any human biological evidence, or representative samples 
 
31
thereof, until the judgment is executed.  This statute also 
provides that any noncompliance with the terms of the statute 
"shall not form the basis for relief in any habeas corpus or 
appellate proceeding."  Code § 19.2-270.4:1(E). 
 
In enacting Code §§ 19.2-270.4 and –270.4:1, the General 
Assembly provided for both the retention of trial evidence, 
including evidence containing DNA, and the ultimate disposal of 
such evidence when all appellate remedies have been exhausted 
and judgment has been executed.  Such procedures protect the 
efficacy of the appellate process, as well as the need to 
preserve evidence for use in the event of a retrial or other 
proceeding allowed by law.  However, in stating the procedural 
requirements relating to the retention of human biological 
evidence in Code § 19.2-270.4:1, the General Assembly also 
recognized that noncompliance with those procedures may occur 
and provided statutory language plainly excluding any such 
noncompliance as a basis for appellate or habeas corpus relief. 
 
Based on this unambiguous statutory proscription, we find 
no merit in Lovitt's contention that the Commonwealth's failure 
to comply with either statute's provisions relating to human 
biological evidence presented at his trial entitles him to 
habeas corpus relief.  Thus, we hold that Lovitt has failed to 
advance any valid basis for habeas corpus relief arising from 
the destruction of the trial exhibits in his case. 
 
32
B.  BRADY CLAIMS 
 
Lovitt argues that the Commonwealth failed to disclose 
certain exculpatory evidence before trial.  He contends that Dr. 
Pierre-Louis' comments at the autopsy concerning the scissors 
she examined were exculpatory, and that the Commonwealth's 
failure to disclose this information prejudiced him because 
these comments directly contradicted the Commonwealth's theory 
that Dicks was murdered with a pair of scissors.  Lovitt also 
argues that the Commonwealth was required to disclose evidence 
of Lucas' allegedly inconsistent prior statements and his 
cooperation with different law enforcement authorities, and 
asserts that such information could have been used to attack 
Lucas' credibility at trial.4
 
In response, the warden argues that Dr. Pierre-Louis' 
comments were not exculpatory because she did not examine the 
bloody scissors that were admitted at trial and those scissors 
were different in size from the two pairs of scissors she 
actually examined.  The warden also asserts that Casel Lucas did 
not make any prior inconsistent statements that should have been 
disclosed by the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth was not 
                     
 
4 We do not consider Lovitt's additional contention that the 
Commonwealth engaged in misconduct by arguing to the jury that 
the bloody scissors were the murder weapon when the Commonwealth 
knew of Dr. Pierre-Louis' comments concerning the other scissors 
examined during the autopsy.  Lovitt failed to make this 
allegation in his habeas petition.  See Code § 8.01-654(B)(2). 
 
33
required to disclose Lucas' cooperation in other criminal cases 
of which the Commonwealth was unaware at the time of Lovitt's 
trial. 
 
We review these claims under settled constitutional 
principles concerning the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.  
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held 
that a due process violation occurs when the prosecution 
suppresses evidence favorable to an accused that is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective whether the 
prosecution acted in good faith or bad faith.  Id. at 87; see 
also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995); Soering v. Deeds, 255 Va. 
457, 464, 499 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1998); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1994). 
 
Exculpatory evidence is material if there is a reasonable 
probability that the proceeding would have resulted in a 
different outcome had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433; 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Cherrix v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 302, 513 S.E.2d 642, 649, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999); Soering, 255 Va. at 464, 499 S.E.2d 
at 517; Bowman, 248 Va. at 133, 445 S.E.2d at 112.  A 
"reasonable probability" is one that is sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
 
34
434; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Soering, 255 Va. at 464, 499 
S.E.2d at 517; Bowman, 248 Va. at 133, 445 S.E.2d at 112.  At 
the heart of this inquiry is a determination whether the 
evidence favorable to the defendant could reasonably be 
considered as placing the entire case in such a different light 
that confidence in the verdict is undermined.  Strickler, 527 
U.S. at 290; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. 
 
The Brady disclosure requirements extend to information 
that can be used to impeach a witness' credibility.  Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 282 n.21; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Bramblett v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 276, 513 S.E.2d 400, 409, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 
456, 470 S.E.2d 114, 124, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996).  A 
prosecutor's suppression of impeachment evidence creates a due 
process violation only if the suppression deprives the defendant 
of a fair trial under the Brady standard of materiality.  
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678; see McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 
949 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 
This due process analysis requires consideration on an 
item-by-item basis whether the evidence at issue was 
exculpatory.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10; United States v. 
Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1997).  However, the 
determination whether undisclosed exculpatory evidence was 
material must be made by considering its cumulative effect.  
 
35
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10; Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 
302 (4th Cir. 2003); Ellis, 121 F.3d at 916. 
 
We first consider Dr. Pierre-Louis' comments made at the 
autopsy that the two pairs of scissors she was shown were not 
consistent with Dicks' wounds.  As stated above, both Detective 
Chase and Barbara Walker testified that these scissors were not 
the same size as the bloody scissors, which were the scissors 
introduced at trial.  In addition, after the bloody scissors 
were subjected to DNA testing, which showed that Dicks' blood 
was on the tip of the scissors, Dr. Pierre-Louis told Detective 
Chase that she had been wrong in her earlier conclusion 
regarding the pairs of scissors she examined. 
 
We conclude that Dr. Pierre-Louis' opinion concerning the 
scissors presented at the autopsy was not exculpatory evidence 
because that opinion related to scissors that were not 
introduced into evidence, were not the alleged murder weapon, 
and were not shown to be the same size as the alleged murder 
weapon.  Her initial opinion also was not exculpatory in light 
of the circuit court's factual finding, supported by the 
testimony of Detective Chase, that Dr. Pierre-Louis changed her 
opinion before trial.  Therefore, we hold that the prosecution 
was not required to provide the defense information concerning 
Dr. Pierre-Louis' initial opinion stated at the autopsy. 
 
36
 
Because Dr. Pierre-Louis' statement was not exculpatory, we 
are not required to consider the issue of the materiality of 
that evidence.  Nevertheless, we observe that the Commonwealth's 
failure to disclose this information could not have prejudiced 
Lovitt's defense because Dr. Pierre-Louis conceded at the 
evidentiary hearing in the present case that two of Dicks' fatal 
wounds, designated on the autopsy report as wounds #2 and #3, 
could have been caused by the bloody scissors.  This 
acknowledgement that the bloody scissors could have been the 
source of two of Dicks' fatal wounds completely negates Lovitt's 
claim that there is a reasonable probability that his trial 
would have resulted in a different outcome if Dr. Pierre-Louis' 
initial opinion had been provided to the defense. 
 
In addition, as the circuit court found, the evidence in 
the present case showed that trial counsel Denman Rucker 
investigated before trial whether the scissors like those 
presented at the autopsy could have caused Dicks' wounds.  Upon 
consultation with a forensic expert, Rucker was told that 
scissors of that approximate size could have caused Dicks' 
wounds.  Thus, Lovitt cannot show he was prejudiced by the 
Commonwealth's failure to inform him of Dr. Pierre-Louis' 
initial opinion, because he was aware of the issues involving 
scissors of that approximate size and investigated those issues 
as part of his defense in Lovitt's trial. 
 
37
 
We next consider the issue whether the Commonwealth failed 
to disclose material exculpatory evidence concerning Casel Lucas 
that could have been used to impeach his credibility at trial.  
Although the circuit court received evidence that Lucas had 
provided information to the police on several occasions, the 
evidence showed that on only one such occasion, the Evans 
prosecution in Alexandria, did Lucas receive any benefit from 
his cooperation with the police. 
 
When a person has provided information to governmental 
agents about the commission of a crime for which he received a 
benefit in the disposition of criminal charges against him, this 
fact may be used to impeach his credibility when he testifies as 
a witness for the prosecution.  See Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1215-
16 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lee, 867 F.2d 206, 207-08 
(4th Cir. 1989).  However, when a person does not receive a 
benefit from providing such information, and later testifies as 
a prosecution witness, the mere fact of his prior cooperation 
with the governmental agents does not constitute impeachment 
evidence subject to disclosure as exculpatory evidence.  See 
Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1290 (2003); Knox v. Johnson, 
224 F.3d 470, 482 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 975 
(2001). 
 
38
 
Applying these principles, the Commonwealth was required to 
provide Lovitt's trial counsel with information concerning 
Lucas' cooperation with the police in the Evans case.  Thus, 
when we consider below the effect of undisclosed exculpatory 
evidence to determine its materiality, see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
436 n.10, we must include in our analysis the Commonwealth's 
failure to disclose this information about Lucas.  However, 
because the record shows that Lucas did not receive a benefit 
for his cooperation in any of the other cases placed in issue by 
Lovitt, that cooperation did not constitute impeachment evidence 
subject to disclosure by the Commonwealth. 
 
Lovitt also argues that Lucas made inconsistent statements 
to the police about Lovitt's case that were subject to 
disclosure by the Commonwealth under the Brady rule as 
impeachment evidence.  In support of this allegation, Lovitt 
relies on the affidavit prepared by habeas counsel and signed by 
Lucas describing inconsistent statements made by Lucas to the 
police prior to Lovitt's trial.  Among those statements were 
comments relating to the type of murder weapon, the means by 
which Lovitt left the scene of Dicks' killing, and the source of 
Lucas' information concerning the murder. 
 
The circuit court found that Lucas did not make the 
inconsistent statements to the police detailed in the affidavit.  
This factual finding is supported by Lucas' testimony that he 
 
39
did not read the entire affidavit prepared by habeas counsel 
before signing it, and that he did not agree with its contents.  
The circuit court's factual finding also is supported by 
Margaret Eastman's testimony that Lucas' statements before trial 
were consistent with those Lovitt gave to the police when he was 
arrested.  Because the circuit court's finding is supported by 
the evidence, we conclude that Lovitt has not demonstrated that 
the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory evidence 
regarding statements Lucas made prior to trial. 
 
We conclude our Brady inquiry by examining the effect of 
the one item of exculpatory evidence that the Commonwealth 
failed to disclose to Lovitt's trial counsel, namely, the fact 
that Lucas had received a benefit for his cooperation with the 
police in the Evans case.  We conclude that the failure to 
disclose this evidence did not place Lovitt's trial in a posture 
that would undermine confidence in the verdict.  See Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 290; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.  Wolfe learned this 
information before trial when she interviewed Lucas, and Rucker 
cross-examined Lucas at trial about the benefit Lucas received 
in the Evans case from his cooperation with the police.  The 
jury also was informed that Lucas had been convicted of 13 
felonies and was able to include this information in its 
assessment of Lucas' credibility.  Thus, we hold that Lovitt's 
Brady claim is without merit. 
 
40
C.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
Lovitt argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance during both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of 
the trial.  With regard to the guilt phase, he challenges 
several decisions of his trial counsel, including their failure 
to have additional DNA tests performed on the bloody scissors 
and the jacket that he wore when he was arrested.  Among 
Lovitt's other contentions are that counsel failed to conduct a 
reasonable investigation of the alleged murder weapon, failed to 
conduct a thorough investigation of Casel Lucas, and failed to 
request a jury instruction on the credibility of "jailhouse 
informants." 
 
Lovitt also argues that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance at the penalty phase because they failed 
to conduct an adequate investigation into his background and 
family history.  He asserts that trial counsel were required to 
perform such an investigation to ensure that counsel had made an 
informed decision regarding whether to present extensive 
mitigation evidence to the jury.  Lovitt maintains that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to conduct an adequate 
investigation because evidence of his family background could 
 
41
have reasonably convinced the jury to fix a sentence of life 
imprisonment.5
 
In response, the warden argues that Lovitt's trial counsel 
provided effective assistance during both the guilt phase and 
the penalty phase of the trial.  With regard to the guilt phase, 
the warden contends that trial counsel's decisions were based on 
a careful strategy to emphasize the circumstantial nature of the 
evidence and the fact that the DNA evidence did not point to any 
single person as the perpetrator of the crime.  With regard to 
the penalty phase, the warden asserts that trial counsel were 
adequately familiar with Lovitt's record and family background, 
and that Lovitt has failed to demonstrate prejudice because 
evidence of his personal history would have supported a 
conclusion that he was a future danger to society. 
 
We consider Lovitt's claims under established principles of 
review.  A defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); see Roe 
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 (2000); United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984); Sheikh v. Buckingham Corr. 
                     
 
5Lovitt also argues on brief that his trial counsel were 
ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to object to the 
jury verdict form.  However, we do not consider this argument 
because Lovitt did not make this allegation in his petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus.  See Sheikh v. Buckingham Corr. Ctr., 
264 Va. 558, 565 n.1, 570 S.E.2d 785, 789 n.1 (2002). 
 
42
Ctr., 264 Va. 558, 564, 570 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2002).  Under this 
guarantee, a defendant is entitled to counsel who is reasonably 
competent and who gives advice that is within the range of 
competence required of attorneys in criminal cases.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. ___, ___, 123 
S.Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 
384 (1986); Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 609, 571 S.E.2d 135, 
138 (2002); Sheikh, 264 Va. at 564, 570 S.E.2d at 788.  The 
issue whether counsel provided a defendant effective assistance 
at trial presents a mixed question of law and fact.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 698; see Sheikh, 264 Va. at 564, 570 S.E.2d at 788. 
 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a petitioner must ordinarily satisfy both parts of the two-part 
test set forth in Strickland.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000).  The petitioner first must show that 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Bell v. Cone, 535 
U.S. 685, 695 (2002); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91; Friedline v. 
Commonwealth, 265 Va. 273, 277, 576 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2003).  In 
making this determination, the court considering the habeas 
corpus petition "must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
 
43
professional assistance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also 
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
185-86 (1986); Sheikh, 264 Va. at 564, 570 S.E.2d at 788. 
 
To show that counsel's conduct fell outside the range of 
reasonable professional assistance, a defendant must overcome 
the presumption that under the particular circumstances 
presented, the challenged actions may be considered sound trial 
strategy.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see Bell, 535 U.S. at 
698; Darden, 477 U.S. at 186.  However, "'strategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are reasonable' only to 
the extent that 'reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.'"  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 
S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91); see also 
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987). 
 
With respect to the investigation and presentation of 
mitigation evidence, the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins that 
"Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every 
conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely 
the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing.  Nor 
does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating 
evidence at sentencing in every case."  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
___, 123 S.Ct. at 2541. 
 
Rather, in deciding whether trial counsel exercised 
reasonable professional judgment with regard to the 
 
44
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a 
reviewing court must focus on whether the investigation 
resulting in counsel's decision not to introduce certain 
mitigation evidence was itself reasonable.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
___, 123 S.Ct. at 2536; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.  When 
making this assessment, "a court must consider not only the 
quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether 
the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to 
investigate further."  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 
2538. 
 
If counsel's performance is found to have been deficient 
under the first part of the Strickland test, to obtain relief 
the petitioner must also show that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see 
also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; Williams, 529 
U.S. at 390-91; Hedrick v. Warden, 264 Va. 486, 496-97, 570 
S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002). 
 
A reviewing court, however, is not required to determine 
whether "counsel's performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies. . . .  If it is easier to dispose of an 
 
45
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should 
be followed."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also Strickler 
v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 128, 452 S.E.2d 648, 652 (1995). 
 
The reviewing court must make its prejudice determination 
by considering the totality of evidence before the trier of 
fact.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 
381.  Further, when a prejudice determination concerns the 
failure to pursue the presentation of mitigation evidence, the 
reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the available 
mitigation evidence, both that adduced at trial and that 
presented at the habeas hearing which should have been presented 
at trial.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2543; 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98. 
 
We first consider Lovitt's arguments pertaining to trial 
counsel's strategy and actions during the guilt phase of his 
trial.  We find no merit in his contention that trial counsel 
were ineffective based on an alleged failure to conduct a 
reasonable investigation of the murder weapon.  The circuit 
court found that trial counsel investigated whether the bloody 
scissors could have caused Dicks' wounds.  The court's finding 
is supported by Rucker's testimony that he consulted a forensic 
expert at the Northern Virginia Forensic Laboratory, who opined 
that scissors of that approximate size could have caused the 
 
46
wounds due to tissue compression at the time the wounds were 
inflicted.  Based on this evidence, we conclude that counsel's 
investigation of the murder weapon was objectively reasonable.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91. 
 
Lovitt argues, nevertheless, that counsel were ineffective 
for failing to cross-examine the Commonwealth's witnesses 
concerning the "inconsistencies" between the stab wounds and the 
bloody scissors.  We disagree because the record establishes 
that Rucker's investigation revealed that the wounds were not 
inconsistent with scissors of that approximate size.  Therefore, 
Rucker had an objectively reasonable basis for failing to pursue 
this subject on cross-examination of the Commonwealth's 
witnesses.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Williams, 529 U.S. 
at 390-91. 
 
We also hold that trial counsel did not render ineffective 
assistance by failing to object to certain DNA evidence and by 
failing to request further testing of the bloody scissors and 
Lovitt's jacket.  Rucker testified that trial counsel 
purposefully adopted a strategy not to question the inconclusive 
DNA test results from the tests performed on these items.  
According to Rucker, this strategy permitted counsel to argue to 
the jury that the DNA tests failed to identify Lovitt as the 
 
47
perpetrator of the crime, and that the Commonwealth had failed 
to bear its burden of proof on this issue.  This strategy was 
objectively reasonable because it underscored the alleged 
deficiency in the Commonwealth's proof while avoiding the 
possibility that further testing of the scissors and jacket 
would yield results further implicating Lovitt in the murder.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91. 
 
Lovitt next argues that trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to request a continuance to investigate Lucas' 
background after counsel learned that Lucas would be testifying 
on behalf of the Commonwealth.  We find no merit in this 
contention because Wolfe interviewed Lucas before he testified 
and obtained information concerning his multiple felony 
convictions and his participation in the Evans prosecution for 
which he obtained the benefit of a plea bargain.  Given this 
extensive impeachment evidence obtained by Wolfe in her 
interview of Lucas, we conclude that trial counsel's 
investigation of Lucas constituted an objectively reasonable 
exercise of professional judgment, and that a continuance was 
not needed for further investigation.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687-88; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2535; 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91. 
 
48
 
Lovitt also argues that trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to request a jury instruction regarding the "credibility 
of jailhouse informants."  Citing a decision from another 
jurisdiction, Lovitt contends that he was entitled to an 
instruction stating that the testimony of an "informer" must be 
weighed with greater care than the testimony of an "ordinary" 
witness.  See Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2000).  Lovitt's contention is without merit because the law of 
this Commonwealth does not require a fact finder to give 
different consideration to the testimony of a government 
informant than to the testimony of other witnesses.  In 
addition, we observe that the jury at Lovitt's trial was 
properly instructed regarding its duty to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses.  Therefore, we conclude that 
Lovitt has failed to prove that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance during the guilt phase of the trial. 
 
We turn now to consider Lovitt's argument that trial 
counsel were ineffective in the penalty phase of the trial and 
that he suffered resulting prejudice.  His contentions primarily 
address trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate his 
family background, which he asserts contained evidence of drug 
and sexual abuse, and counsel's failure to present more 
extensive evidence of his personal history to the jury. 
 
49
 
Guided by Strickland, we directly consider the issue 
whether Lovitt suffered prejudice sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of his sentencing as a result of his 
counsel's failure to investigate and present certain mitigation 
evidence.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 
539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; Williams, 529 U.S. at 391.  
We focus our analysis on the Wiggins decision in which the 
Supreme Court, applying Strickland, recently invalidated a 
habeas petitioner's death sentence based on trial counsel's 
failure to investigate and present certain mitigation evidence 
to the jury at the petitioner's sentencing proceeding.  Wiggins, 
539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2541-44. 
 
In Wiggins, the petitioner was convicted of capital murder 
in a bifurcated proceeding.  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2532.  
During the penalty phase, trial counsel elected to present no 
mitigation evidence, instead seeking to prove that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that the defendant was the actual 
perpetrator of the murder rather than a lesser participant in 
the crime.  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2532-33.  Under Maryland 
law, this determination is made at the penalty phase of a 
capital murder trial, and a jury may impose the death penalty 
only if it determines that the defendant was the actual 
perpetrator of the offense.  See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-
202 (2002). 
 
50
 
Prior to adopting this approach, trial counsel had the 
defendant evaluated by a psychologist, who concluded that the 
defendant "had an IQ of 79, had difficulty coping with demanding 
situations, and exhibited features of a personality disorder."  
Wiggins, 539 U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2536.  However, the 
psychologist's report did not describe or address the 
defendant's extensive personal history.  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. 
at 2536.  Trial counsel also reviewed court and social services 
records, which referred to the defendant's "misery as a youth" 
and to the fact that he had spent most of his childhood in 
foster care.  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2536. 
 
At the habeas hearing in Wiggins, the petitioner presented 
evidence from a psychologist that petitioner "experienced severe 
privation and abuse in the first six years of his life while in 
the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother."  Id. at ___, 123 
S.Ct. at 2542.  Evidence from the psychologist further indicated 
that the petitioner "suffered physical torment, sexual 
molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in 
foster care."  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542.  In addition, the 
evidence showed that the petitioner was homeless for a period of 
time and had "diminished mental capacities."  Id. at ___, 123 
S.Ct. at 2542. 
 
The Supreme Court held that trial counsel's decision to 
limit their investigation of mitigation evidence was 
 
51
unreasonable, because the evidence counsel had seen in the 
social services records would have led a reasonably competent 
attorney to conduct a further investigation.  Id. at ___, 123 
S.Ct. at 2541-42.  The Court concluded that the petitioner was 
prejudiced by counsel's unprofessional errors of judgment 
because the mitigating evidence that counsel failed to discover 
and present was "powerful."  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court also observed that the 
petitioner's social history contained "little of the double edge 
we have found to justify limited investigations in other cases."  
Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542. 
 
Unlike the record in Wiggins, the record from Lovitt's 
trial shows that counsel presented some recent personal history 
as mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of the trial.  That 
evidence, provided by four sheriff's deputies working at the 
Arlington jail, showed that Lovitt had made a very good 
adjustment to his incarceration and had participated in Bible 
study, in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and in voluntary work 
programs. 
 
In addition, trial counsel presented some family history 
evidence through the testimony of Lamanda Jones, Lovitt's 
stepsister, who testified about the help that Lovitt had 
provided to his younger siblings in various aspects of their 
upbringing.  She stated that Lovitt helped take care of the 
 
52
other children because his stepfather was an alcoholic and 
"wasn't allowed around us most of the time."  According to 
Jones, Lovitt regularly fed the younger children and helped them 
get ready for school.  Jones also testified that, as an adult, 
Lovitt visited her children every weekend and that she trusted 
him to be with them. 
 
At the habeas hearing, the evidence of Lovitt's family and 
social history consisted of testimony from family members and 
various records from the courts, social services, and juvenile 
corrections.  Lovitt did not present testimony from a 
psychologist or a psychiatrist concerning his family history and 
any effect that such history may have had on his development. 
 
The testimony of Lovitt's family members at the habeas 
hearing consisted of mostly general statements concerning abuse 
directed toward Lovitt by his stepfather.  Sherry Taylor, 
Lovitt's cousin, testified that Lovitt's stepfather was "very 
abusive" toward Lovitt and the other children.  However, Taylor 
did not describe any abuse specifically directed at Lovitt, 
other than the fact that the stepfather "curs[ed] [Lovitt] out 
. . . all the time." 
 
Taylor also testified regarding Lovitt's good qualities, 
stating that he was very protective of his siblings, helpful, 
and "good with kids."  She further stated that all the children 
in the family loved him. 
 
53
 
Lamanda Jones testified that Lovitt's stepfather abused 
alcohol and drugs, and that she had observed him "beat" Lovitt 
with a telephone cord on a frequent basis.  Jones also stated 
that Lovitt's stepfather "molested" all the children, and that 
such abuse was a "regular occurrence."  However, Jones did not 
relate any particular type or instance of sexual abuse directed 
at Lovitt, and her only specific testimony regarding sexual 
abuse concerned some of the other children. 
 
Addressing Lovitt's good qualities, Jones stated that 
Lovitt tried to protect his younger siblings from their father's 
abuse.  She also indicated that Lovitt was a "father figure" to 
her during her childhood, and stated that he was "like [a] 
father" to her own children. 
 
Tonjala Carter, another stepsister, testified that Lovitt's 
stepfather abused alcohol and drugs and was very violent toward 
Lovitt.  However, her testimony concerning such violence was 
limited to a general description that the stepfather was "always 
hitting on him, always cursing at him," and was very "mean." 
 
Carter also related that Lovitt had good qualities as a 
brother and an uncle.  She stated that he often tried to protect 
the younger siblings from their father and was a "father figure" 
to them in several of the aspects of their daily life.  Carter 
also testified that Lovitt was "[v]ery good" with his nieces and 
nephews. 
 
54
 
The various records introduced at the habeas hearing were 
equivocal in some respects and could have been viewed by a jury 
as either evidence in aggravation or in mitigation of the 
offense.  For example, Lovitt's substance abuse and medical 
records showed that Lovitt had an antisocial personality 
disorder and "polysubstance" dependence.  The records stated 
that Lovitt began drinking alcohol, supplied by his stepfather, 
at the age of five, and began using marijuana at the age of 
eight. 
 
These records also showed that Lovitt abused many different 
types of drugs as an adult, including heroin, amphetamines, 
"acid," and phencyclidine.  The records described Lovitt as 
having a "serious problem with his anger" and having 
"[d]ifficulty in respecting others."  Also, in some of these 
records, Lovitt described his family as "growing up close" and 
stated that he "had everything he needed." 
 
In his juvenile court records, Lovitt's childhood home was 
described by a caseworker as being "very clean and nicely 
furnished," and his mother and stepfather were described as 
"strong individuals" who provided Lovitt with "a stable home 
life."  Lovitt's childhood home was further described by a 
caseworker "as being well-maintained and adequate for the 
family's needs."  In addition, a clinical assessment contained 
in the juvenile records stated that Lovitt did not relate any 
 
55
problems with his family and "reported no difficulties in the 
relationship with his stepfather."  However, other juvenile 
records showed that Lovitt described his stepfather as a "heavy 
drinker [who] would sometimes become abusive toward his wife and 
children." 
 
The juvenile records also contained references to Lovitt's 
lack of remorse for his behavior, lack of empathy for others, 
lack of respect for the law, and propensity to blame others for 
trouble that he instigated.  These records also described Lovitt 
as being "physically aggressive" and "manipulative," and as 
having assaulted other juveniles at the Beaumont Correctional 
Center. 
 
In determining prejudice, we "reweigh the evidence in 
aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 
evidence."  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; see 
also Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98.  The evidence in aggravation 
included the brutal nature of the attack on Dicks, and the fact 
that Lovitt murdered Dicks solely to eliminate any witness to 
the robbery.  Lovitt's prior record contained numerous felonies 
including attempted robbery, several burglaries and larcenies, 
and drug violations.  While incarcerated for some of these 
crimes, Lovitt was charged with many disciplinary violations, 
which included assault, manufacturing "shank handles," and 
 
56
possession of cocaine.  He was on parole at the time he murdered 
Dicks. 
 
The mitigation evidence concerning Lovitt's home life as a 
child is mixed, with some evidence from his juvenile records 
suggesting that the situation might not have been as difficult 
as the testimony at the habeas hearing indicated.  In addition, 
there is no evidence describing the nature or extent of sexual 
abuse allegedly inflicted on Lovitt by his stepfather.  Without 
such evidence, this Court would have to resort to speculation to 
consider any sexual abuse that Lovitt may have suffered. 
 
The evidence regarding Lovitt's stepfather's other actions 
toward him is somewhat general in nature.  Nevertheless, the 
evidence in mitigation at the habeas hearing contained 
information about Lovitt's stepfather having provided Lovitt 
alcohol at an early age and having hit him repeatedly with a 
telephone cord and cursing him. 
 
The evidence in mitigation also included descriptions of 
Lovitt helping to take care of his siblings to compensate for 
Lovitt's alcoholic stepfather's failure to assume this role.  
However, the jury was informed of this fact, although in less 
detail, when Lamanda Jones testified at the penalty phase 
proceeding.  There also was evidence in mitigation, which was 
not presented by trial counsel, that Lovitt helped protect his 
younger siblings from abuse by their father. 
 
57
 
The evidence concerning Lovitt's extensive drug abuse and 
antisocial personality disorder is evidence of a type that the 
Court in Wiggins termed "double edge."  See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542.  As such, this evidence could be viewed 
both in aggravation and in mitigation of the offense.  See 
Burger, 483 U.S. at 793-94; Darden, 477 U.S. at 186-87.  
Lovitt's juvenile and other records also are evidence reflecting 
a "double edge," and show that he began a cycle of crime and 
aggressive behavior at an early age and continued this pattern 
throughout his adult life, despite the many occasions he was 
offered assistance to resolve his problems. 
 
We also observe that there is no evidence in the record 
from a psychologist or a psychiatrist providing an evaluation of 
Lovitt's mental health.  Thus, there is no evidence directly 
addressing the effect Lovitt's family life may have had on his 
development.  The absence of such evidence represents a failure 
of proof regarding Lovitt's contention that he was prejudiced by 
trial counsel's failure to present extensive evidence of his 
family and social history at the penalty phase proceeding. 
 
In addition, there is no evidence in the record that Lovitt 
has a diminished mental capacity.  This aspect of the case 
represents a major distinction from the evidence presented in 
Wiggins, which showed that the petitioner exhibited "borderline 
retardation."  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2533. 
 
58
 
The evidence in Wiggins also showed that the petitioner had 
no prior convictions.  Id. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2543.  By 
contrast, as indicated above, Lovitt's prior record depicts a 
person who, in essence, was a "career criminal" unaffected by 
the many attempts to offer him rehabilitative services. 
 
Upon reviewing the evidence in aggravation and in 
mitigation of the offense presented at the penalty phase of the 
trial and at the habeas hearing, we conclude that Lovitt has 
failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's failure to investigate and present the available 
mitigation evidence.  Based on all the evidence before us, we 
hold that the record fails to show that, but for his trial 
counsel's stated failures, there is a reasonable probability 
that the result of the proceedings would have been different.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; Williams, 529 U.S. at 391.  In short, 
the record before us does not undermine confidence in the 
outcome of the proceedings.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; Williams, 
529 U.S. at 391. 
 
Our conclusion in this regard is not altered by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Williams.  There, the Court concluded that a 
defendant had suffered prejudice resulting from his counsel's 
failure to present substantial available mitigation evidence at 
 
59
the penalty phase of his capital murder trial.  Williams, 529 
U.S. at 396. 
 
The available mitigation evidence that was not presented in 
Williams showed that the petitioner had suffered extreme abuse 
and neglect in his early childhood years.  Id. at 395.  The 
evidence indicated that the petitioner's parents both had been 
imprisoned for criminally neglecting the petitioner, "that 
Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, 
[and] that he had been committed to the custody of the social 
services bureau for two years during his parents' incarceration 
(including one stint in an abusive foster home)."  Id.  In 
addition, the evidence available, but not presented, in Williams 
indicated that the petitioner was "'borderline mentally 
retarded' and did not advance beyond sixth grade in school."  
Id. at 396. 
 
In contrast, the record before us does not contain 
extensive evidence of abuse that Lovitt suffered as a child.  
Nor does the evidence suggest that he has a diminished mental 
capacity.  In fact, Lovitt obtained a high school equivalency 
diploma, commonly known as a G.E.D. degree, as an adult.  Thus, 
the evidence before us does not raise the same concerns that the 
Supreme Court in Williams held "might well have influenced the 
jury's appraisal of [the petitioner's] moral culpability."  Id. 
at 398. 
 
60
 
Finally, we observe that in reaching its conclusion in 
Williams that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of 
his counsel's errors, the Supreme Court also observed that trial 
counsel did not introduce evidence from certain witnesses who 
were not related to the petitioner and were available to 
testify.  Id. at 396.  The Court observed that a certified 
public accountant, who had visited Williams frequently as part 
of a prison ministry program, had been available to testify that 
Williams appeared to thrive in the structured environment of 
prison and had earned a carpentry degree while incarcerated.  
Id.  The Court also stated that certain prison officials would 
have testified that, in their opinion, Williams was not likely 
to act in a dangerous or violent manner while incarcerated.  Id.
 
At Lovitt's trial, however, the jury did hear testimony 
regarding his good adjustment to prison life while awaiting 
trial.  As we have already noted, four correctional officers 
testified to this effect at the penalty phase proceeding.  Thus, 
for all the above reasons, we conclude that the nature and 
amount of mitigation evidence that was proved to be available, 
but not presented, in Lovitt's case is materially different from 
the available mitigation evidence not presented in Williams. 
 
We also find no merit in Lovitt's claim that the judge at 
the habeas hearing improperly excluded certain affidavits by 
several of Lovitt's family members that Lovitt attempted to 
 
61
introduce into evidence.  Assuming, without deciding, that such 
affidavits are admissible subject to the trial court's 
discretion in an evidentiary hearing held under Code § 8.01-
654(C), we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to admit them into evidence.  The facts 
alleged in those affidavits were cumulative of the testimony of 
Taylor, Jones, and Carter. 
 
Lovitt also is incorrect in his assertion that the 
affidavits at issue would have been admissible in the penalty 
phase proceeding and, thus, should have been admitted into 
evidence on that basis at the habeas hearing.  Unlike some other 
jurisdictions, Virginia does not permit the admission of such 
hearsay evidence during penalty phase proceedings.  See Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(B). 
 
We do not consider in this habeas corpus proceeding 
Lovitt's claim that he is actually innocent.  This issue was 
resolved by the jury in his trial on the capital murder and 
robbery charges.  As stated above, we affirmed the judgment of 
the circuit court, and the United States Supreme Court denied 
Lovitt's petition for a writ of certiorari challenging those 
convictions.  We also observe that an assertion of actual 
innocence is outside the scope of habeas corpus review, which 
concerns only the legality of the petitioner's detention.  See 
Wilkins, 255 Va. at 420-21, 498 S.E.2d at 696; McClenny, 246 Va. 
 
62
at 134-35, 431 S.E.2d at 331; Smyth, 199 Va. at 96-97, 97 S.E.2d 
at 748. 
 
Finally, we have reviewed Lovitt's remaining allegations 
and conclude that they have no merit. 
 
For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
Petition dismissed.
 
63