Title: Rhea v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.
Citation: 176 Kan. 674, 272 P.2d 741
Docket Number: 39,506
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 1954

176 Kan. 674 (1954)
272 P.2d 741
JOE L. RHEA, Appellee,
v.
KANSAS CITY POWER &amp; LIGHT COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.
No. 39,506

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 6, 1954.
Basil W. Kelsey, of Ottawa, argued the cause, and Irvin Fane and Arthur J. Doyle, both of Kansas City, Missouri, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Keith Martin, of Mission, and Harry C. Clark, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause and were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
The only question in this workmen's compensation case concerns the formula used by the commissioner in computing the award, and which was upheld and adopted by the trial court.
Material portions of the findings and award, and which tell the story and show the question involved, are as follow:
...............
Pertinent provisions of the applicable statute (G.S. 1951 Supp. 44-510) read:
...............
...............
...............
Rule 51-7-9, of the regulations of the workmen's compensation commissioner filed in the office of the revisor of statutes pursuant to G.S. 1949, 77-406, reads:
Counsel for appellant company state the question to be:
and contend the award should have been computed in the following manner:
Appellant concedes, however, that this court has held adversely to its contentions in Hering v. San Ore Construction Co., 130 Kan. 70, *678 285 Pac. 592, and Gallagher v. Menges &amp; Mange Const. Co., 146 Kan. 506, 72 P.2d 79, and that the rule laid down in those decisions was followed in the instant case, but contends the rule there announced has not been followed in later decisions, and has in fact been impliedly overruled, and in support thereof reliance is had upon Chamberlain v. Bowersock Mills &amp; Power Co., 150 Kan. 934, 96 P.2d 684, 129 A.L.R. 654; Amos v. J.E. Trigg Drilling Co., 153 Kan. 617, 113 P.2d 107; Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 149 P.2d 632; Richards v. J-M Service Corp., 164 Kan. 316, 188 P.2d 939; Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 200 P.2d 271; Miller v. Massman Construction Co., 169 Kan. 499, 219 P.2d 429, and Meredith v. Shawver Graham, Inc., 171 Kan. 513, 233 P.2d 750.
In the Hering case, supra, the workman was temporarily totally disabled as the result of a foot injury for a period of 41 weeks and 4 days, and was thereafter permanently partially disabled to the extent of a one-third loss of use of the foot. It was held that (3) (c) (21), supra, which in substance provides that when a workman is entitled to compensation for a specific injury under the schedule no additional compensation shall be allowed for temporary or permanent disability, did not preclude recovery for both temporary and permanent loss of use of a scheduled member as both results were included in the schedule, and the workman was allowed compensation for the total loss of use of his foot for 41 weeks and 4 days, and for one-third the loss of the use of the foot for the remaining 83 weeks and 3 days of the 125 weeks' period provided for by the schedule.
In the Gallagher case, supra, the injury was to a finger. There was a temporary total loss of use for 15 weeks, followed by a fifty percent permanent partial loss of use. It was contended that a temporary total loss of use, followed by permanent partial loss of use, was not compensable as a scheduled injury. This court, following the holding in the Hering case, supra, held otherwise, and ruled that the proper method of computing the award was to deduct the 15 weeks of temporary total loss of use from the maximum 37 weeks fixed by the schedule, and to allow fifty percent disability for the remaining 22 weeks  the same method that was followed in the instant case.
Appellant's contention that subsequent decisions discard the rule announced in the Hering and Gallagher cases, supra, is not sustained by a reference to the facts and holdings in such later cases. We *679 consider it unnecessary to review the facts of each, which are clearly distinguishable from those in the Hering and Gallagher cases and the case at bar.
The method of computation here used does not amount to "pyramiding of compensation," as inferentially suggested by appellant. Temporary total loss of use of a foot is a scheduled injury, as is also the permanent partial loss of its use. It was entirely proper to make an award for each of such injuries, and the total award was computed correctly. The judgment is therefore affirmed.