Title: State v. Richard W. Delaney
Citation: 2003 WI 9
Docket Number: 2001AP001051-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2003

2003 WI 9 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1051-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Richard W. Delaney,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APEALS 
Reported at:  251 Wis.2d 481, 640 N.W.2d 565 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 4, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
S. Michael Wilk   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Joseph R. Cincotta and Schweitzer & Cincotta LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Joseph R. Cincotta. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 9 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1051-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99-CF-1224) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard W. Delaney,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 4, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner Richard W. Delaney 
(Delaney) seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision, affirming his judgment of conviction and sentence for 
operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense.  Specifically, 
Delaney asks this court to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 939.62 
(1999-2000)1 was properly applied to his already enhanced OWI 
offense under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c), based on the existence 
of a past non-OWI offense, so as to enhance Delaney's penalty 
twice for count one of his judgment of conviction.  We answer in 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
2 
 
the affirmative, and conclude that a defendant convicted of  the 
crime of second-or subsequent-offense OWI, as Delaney has been, 
is subject to the penalty enhancements provided for in both 
§§ 346.65(2) and 939.62, so long as the application of each 
enhancer is based on a separate and distinct prior conviction or 
convictions. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The facts are undisputed.  On November 19, 1999, 
Officer Kenneth Clelland was attempting to locate a brown 
station wagon with a certain license plate that had been 
involved in a hit-and-run accident.  Dispatch identified the 
suspected driver as either Richard Delaney or Randy Delaney.  
Officer Clelland located the vehicle in front of Martin 
Delaney's residence.  Martin Delaney is the brother of Richard 
and Randy Delaney.  After finding Richard Delaney hiding in the 
house, Officer Clelland placed both Randy and Richard Delaney in 
custody.  During the investigation, Richard Delaney confessed 
that he had been the driver of the offending vehicle.  Officer 
Clelland then formally placed Richard Delaney (Delaney) under 
arrest and transported him to the police department.  
¶3 
Count 
One 
of the 
eight-count 
criminal 
complaint 
charged Richard with OWI pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a). 
The complaint also alleged that Richard had been previously 
convicted of OWI in July, 1992, and that his driving privileges 
had been previously revoked for failing to submit to a chemical 
test in July, 1990, making him a third-time offender pursuant to 
§ 346.65(2)(c). In addition, the complaint alleged that Richard 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
3 
 
had been previously convicted of attempted possession of THC 
with intent to deliver, a felony, in July, 1996, making him a 
repeat offender pursuant to § 939.62.  
¶4 
Delaney 
moved 
to 
suppress 
the 
pre-Miranda 
oral 
statements he made to Officer Clelland.  He also moved to 
dismiss the applicability of the habitual criminal penalty 
enhancer under Wis. Stats. § 939.62 from Count One of the 
complaint.  Delaney's motions were denied after an evidentiary 
hearing on January 14, 2000.2 
¶5 
On April 3, 2000, Delaney entered a no contest plea to 
OWI, 
third 
offense, 
as 
a 
repeater 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a), 346.65(2)(c), and 939.62.  He also 
pled no contest to two counts of causing injury while operating 
while intoxicated in violation of § 346.63(2)(a) 1.  
¶6 
The circuit court for Kenosha County, the Honorable S. 
Michael Wilk, presiding, imposed the following sentence: 
Count One [OWI, third offense]:  sentence withheld and 
six years probation to run concurrent with Count Three  
(R. 30:56). 
Count Three [Causing injury by motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicant as a repeater]:  14 
months prison stayed and six years probation to run 
                                                 
2 On appeal, Delaney argued that his pre-Miranda statement 
that he was the driver of the car involved in the accident was 
obtained during a custodial interrogation and should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. The court of appeals held that 
Delaney's statement was voluntary and was not the result of 
police questioning or custodial interrogation; therefore, the 
statement was admissible.  In his petition for review and briefs 
to this court, Delaney does not raise his Miranda issue.  As a 
result we will not revisit the issue. 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
4 
 
concurrent with Count One and consecutive to Count 
Five (R. 30:56). 
Count Five [Causing injury by motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicant as a repeater]:  
three years prison (R. 30:55, 30:56). 
If probation is revoked, a potential three years for 
the withheld sentence plus 14 months for the stayed 
sentence (R 30:56, 30:57).  
¶7 
Delaney filed motions for post-conviction relief on 
February 19, 2001, seeking to reverse the circuit court's ruling 
applying the penalty enhancer under Wis. Stat. § 939.62, and 
reserving the right to challenge the circuit court's denial of 
the motion to suppress his pre-Miranda statements on direct 
appeal.  After negotiation with the State, a stipulated sentence 
modification order was entered on March 28, 2001, disposing of 
Delaney's post-conviction motion challenging the circuit court's 
denial of the motion to suppress his pre-Miranda statements.3   
Delaney filed a notice of appeal on April 16, 2001. 
¶8 
On January 23, 2002, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court, finding the statutory language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.62 and 346.65(2)(c) unambiguous.  The court of appeals 
stated: 
Both statutes permit an enhanced penalty and the facts 
squarely support the implementation of both statutes.  
[Delaney's] present conviction qualifies him as a 
repeater pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) because 
the conviction is not for an escape or a failure to 
report.  And [Delaney's] prior felony conviction for 
                                                 
3 The circuit court denied the motion relating to the 
penalty enhancer on the basis that Richard's prior felony 
offense provided a separate factual basis for the application of 
the § 939.62 penalty enhancer. 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
5 
 
attempted possession of THC with intent to deliver 
further qualifies him as a repeater because the 
conviction is not a motor vehicle or juvenile offense.  
Therefore, [Delaney] was properly sentenced as a 
repeater under both statutes.  
State v. Delaney, No. 01-1051-CR, unpublished slip op. at ¶38 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2002).  
¶9 
Delaney petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on April 22, 2002.   
 
¶10 Delaney contends that his sentence was improperly 
enhanced by the circuit court's application of both the repeater 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(c) 
and 
939.62(1)(a).  
Delaney does acknowledge that he was properly subjected to the 
repeater provision of § 346.65(2)(c), based on his prior OWI 
conviction and his refusal to submit to a chemical test.  
Therefore, we must determine whether § 939.62 applies to 
Delaney's already enhanced OWI offense based on the existence of 
a past non-OWI offense.   
¶11 Delaney advances the following arguments in support of 
his 
contention 
that 
the 
general 
repeater 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62, may not be applied to an already enhanced 
sentence under § 346.65: (1) that the statutory language of 
§ 939.62, and our decision in State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 
94, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), illustrate that the legislature 
intended to exempt motor vehicle offenses from § 939.62, and (2) 
that the court of appeals decision in State v. Ray, 166 
Wis. 2d 855, 481 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1992), prohibits the 
application of the general repeater statute when a specific 
enhancer has already been utilized.   
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
6 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 Delaney's 
arguments 
require 
us 
to 
construe 
the 
language of Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65 and 939.62, raising questions 
of law, which we review independently.  Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 
94.  
¶13 The purpose of statutory construction is to determine 
and give effect to the legislative intent, which is ascertained 
by considering the language of the statute, and if necessary the 
scope, history, context, subject matter and object intended to 
be remedied or accomplished.  Ray, 166 Wis. 2d at 872.  When 
construing multiple statutes, we seek to harmonize them.  Id. at 
873. "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
conflicts between statutes are not favored and will be held not 
to exist if the statutes may otherwise be reasonably construed."  
Wyss v. Albee, 193 Wis. 2d 101, 110, 532 N.W.2d 444 (1995).   
¶14 We first look to the language of a statute and attempt 
to interpret it based on "the plain meaning of its terms."  
State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 248, 385 N.W.2d 145 
(1986).  Only when statutory language is ambiguous may we 
examine other construction aids such as legislative history, 
scope, context, and subject matter.  State v. Waalen, 130 
Wis. 2d 18, 24, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986). A statute is ambiguous if 
reasonable 
persons 
could 
disagree 
as 
to 
its 
meaning.   
Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d at 248. 
¶15 As 
noted 
above, 
if 
the 
statute 
is 
clear 
and 
unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statutory language to 
ascertain its meaning.  However, we may construe a clear and 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
7 
 
unambiguous statute "if a literal application would lead to an 
absurd or unreasonable result," Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Wisconsin v. La Follette, 106 Wis. 2d 162, 170, 316 N.W.2d 129 
(Ct. App. 1982).   
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
¶16 Delaney contends that the penalty enhancer under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 should not have been applied to the OWI 
count, since it was improperly used to further enhance his 
already 
enhanced 
penalty 
under 
the 
OWI 
provisions 
in 
§ 346.65(2)(c).  We disagree.  The circuit court and court of 
appeals did not err in applying the general penalty enhancer 
under § 939.62 to further enhance Delaney's already enhanced 
sentence under § 346.65(2)(c).  
¶17 
Delaney 
bases 
his 
argument 
upon 
language 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(3) that he contends seemingly excludes motor 
vehicle offenses from its scope.  However, a careful reading of 
the statute reveals that the plain language of § 939.62 does not 
exclude OWI offenses under § 346.63(1) from the scope of crimes 
to 
which 
the 
penalty 
enhancer 
applies. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 939.62(1) states:   
If the actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in 
sub. (2), and the present conviction is for any crime 
for which imprisonment may be imposed, except for an 
escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to report under s. 
946.425, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed 
by law for that crime may be increased as follows: 
(a) A maximum term of one year or less may be 
increased to not more than 3 years. 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
8 
 
(b) A maximum term of more than one year but not more 
than 10 years may be increased by not more than 2 
years if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors 
and by not more than 6 years if the prior conviction 
was for a felony. 
(c) A maximum term of more than 10 years may be 
increased by not more than 2 years if the prior 
convictions were for misdemeanors and by not more than 
10 years if the prior conviction was for a felony. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(3) states:  
In this section, "felony" and "misdemeanor" have the 
following meanings:  
(a) In case of crimes committed in this state, the 
terms do not include motor vehicle offenses under chs. 
341 to 349 and offenses handled through proceedings in 
the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 
48 and 938, but otherwise have meanings designated in 
s. 939.60.  
¶18 Contrary to Delaney's assertion that the exemption for 
motor vehicle offenses from the definition of "felony" and 
"misdemeanor" in Wis. Stat. § 939.62(3) bars the application of 
§ 939.62 to his already enhanced penalty, we hold that the plain 
language of the statute does not exclude OWI offenses under 
§ 346.63(1) from the scope of crimes to which the § 939.62 
penalty enhancer applies.4   
¶19 Applying the plain language of the statute, as we are 
obliged to do, we note it focuses on the defendant's present 
                                                 
4 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
correctly 
noted 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 "is not a stand-alone statute.  By its very 
terms, it must be linked to another statute creating a crime 
before it can be implemented."  State v. Delaney, No. 01-1051-
CR, unpublished slip op. at ¶35 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2002).   
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
9 
 
conviction. The statute applies where the defendant's present 
conviction is "for any crime for which imprisonment may be 
imposed, except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to 
report under s. 946.425."  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1).   
¶20 Wis. Stat. § 939.12 defines a crime as "conduct which 
is 
prohibited 
by 
state 
law 
and 
punishable 
by 
fine 
or 
imprisonment or both."  Under § 346.65(2)(c), a third offense 
OWI constitutes a crime, as the defendant is subject to a fine 
and a minimum jail sentence.  Thus, we conclude that the plain 
language of § 939.12 provides that motor vehicle offenses, for 
which a sentence of fine or imprisonment or both may be imposed, 
are "crimes" subject to § 939.62. 
¶21 However, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2), 
a 
defendant is only classified as a repeater if "the actor was 
convicted of a felony during the 5-year period immediately 
preceding the commission of the crime for which the actor 
presently is being sentenced, or if the actor was convicted of a 
misdemeanor 
on 
3 
separate 
occasions 
during 
that 
same 
period. . . . " Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  Delaney points to 
§ 939.62(3), which excludes motor vehicle offenses under chs. 
341 to 349 from the definitions of "felony" and "misdemeanor," 
in support of his contention that the legislature intended to 
create separate punishment mechanisms for general crimes and OWI 
offenses. 
¶22 We disagree.  The words "felony" and "misdemeanor" are 
only utilized in the discussion of prior convictions, not 
present convictions.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(3).  By contrast, the 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
10 
 
legislature referred to "any crime" in defining the present 
conviction under § 939.62(1).  The legislature specifically 
provided two exemptions to the phrase "any crime"; escape under 
§ 946.42 and failure to report under § 946.425.  Under the well-
established canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
expression of one thing excludes another), where the legislature 
specifically enumerates certain exceptions to a statute, we 
conclude, based on that rule, that the legislature intended to 
exclude any other exception.  State ex rel. Harris v. Larson, 64 
Wis. 2d 521, 527, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974). 
¶23 Applying the above canon to the case at hand, if the 
legislature intended to exempt present motor vehicle offenses 
from the definition of "any crime," it either would have 
clarified its intention by adding the "felony" and "misdemeanor" 
language to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1), rather than referring to 
"any crime," or it would have added a specific motor vehicle 
offense exemption to § 939.62(1).  However, the legislature has 
elected not to do so.  The legislature only barred the 
application of § 939.62 where the present conviction is for an 
escape or failure to report, and where the prior conviction 
relied on to trigger the enhancement statute is for a motor 
vehicle offense. 
¶24 Accordingly, we hold that the "any crime" language of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) unambiguously applies to a motor vehicle 
offense, such as the OWI offense here, which is a crime for 
which a sentence of both a fine and imprisonment must  be 
imposed.  The motor vehicle exemption in sub. (3) for prior 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
11 
 
convictions does not apply where the present motor vehicle 
conviction constitutes a "crime."5   
¶25 Therefore, because Delaney's present conviction for a 
third offense OWI is not an escape or failure to report and his 
prior drug conviction is a felony, and that felony occurred 
within the statutory time period, the repeater enhancement 
provision of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 was properly applied. 
¶26 Since we find that the statute is plain on its face, 
we need not look to extrinsic materials in interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62. See Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
86, ¶14, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893; State v. Waalen, 130 
Wis. 2d 18, 24, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).  Because Delaney cites two 
Wisconsin cases in support of his position, we feel it is 
necessary to address and analyze each case. 
                                                 
5 Delaney contends that applying Wis. Stat. § 939.62 to an 
already enhanced sentence contravenes the Wisconsin rule that 
"penal statutes are generally construed strictly to safeguard a 
defendant's rights."  State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 70, 291 
N.W.2d 809 (1980)(citation omitted).  However, the rule only 
applies where the statutory language is ambiguous.  Id.  We find 
§ 939.62 unambiguous and thus reject Delaney's argument.   
  Delaney also asserts that § 939.62 may not be applied 
because statutory rules of construction hold that a more 
specific provision governs the more general.  State v. Dairyland 
Power Coop., 52 Wis. 2d 45, 53, 187 N.W.2d 878 (1971).  Again, 
that rule only applies where the legislative intent cannot be 
discerned from the pertinent provisions and the two provisions 
irreconcilably conflict.  Dairyland Power, 52 Wis. 2d at 53.  As 
we stated earlier, we find both Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(c) and 
939.62 clear and unambiguous both in their own right, and in 
concert with each other.  Thus, we need not resort to the 
principle that the specific governs the general. 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 Delaney cites State v. Wideman, for support of his 
contention that the legislature intended to exclude OWI offenses 
from the penalty enhancement scope of Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  
Delaney is correct in that Wideman acknowledges that the 
legislature intended that § 346.65 generally operates in a 
different manner than other repeater statutes.  See Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d at 102.  However, Wideman is distinguishable from the 
case at bar, as Delaney himself acknowledges.  See Pet'r Br. at 
19.6   
¶28 In Wideman, we held that the proof requirements, 
necessary to make the  general repeater statute applicable, do 
not govern proof requirements for prior OWI convictions used to 
enhance 
an 
OWI 
conviction 
under 
 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2).  
Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 100.  Relying on the statutory language, 
we stated that § 939.62(3)(a) expressly excluded motor vehicle 
offenses from the definition of a repeater, so the burden of 
proof requirements for prior OWI convictions were not governed 
by that statutory provision.  Id.  Wideman reaffirms our 
statutory analysis that prior motor vehicle offenses are 
excluded from the definition of "felony" and "misdemeanor" in 
§ 939.62(3).  It also reaffirms our conclusion that § 939.62 is 
clear and unambiguous.   Regarding § 939.62, we stated in 
                                                 
6 The issue in Wideman was whether a prior conviction or 
prior convictions of OWI used to enhance the punishment of one 
convicted of OWI, as provided for in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2), 
must be proved in the same manner required by § 973.12 for prior 
convictions for purposes of § 939.62.  State v. Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996). 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
13 
 
Wideman that: "[w]e would be hard pressed to find a clearer 
expression of legislative intent."  Id. at 100.   
¶29 As noted before, Delaney's enhanced penalty under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 is based on his prior felony conviction for 
attempted possession of THC with intent to deliver.  Delaney's 
contention 
that 
Wideman 
supports 
his 
argument 
that 
the 
legislature intended to exclude OWI offenses from the penalty 
enhancement scope of § 939.62 would be correct if the prior 
conviction relied on for the purposes of § 939.62 was a motor 
vehicle offense.  However, attempted possession of THC with 
intent to deliver is clearly not a motor vehicle offense. Thus, 
we conclude that the plain language of § 939.62 does not 
prohibit its application to Delaney's present conviction for a 
third offense OWI. 
¶30 Next, Delaney contends that the court of appeals 
decision in State v. Ray, 166 Wis. 2d 855, 481 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. 
App. 1992), prohibits the double enhancement of penalties under 
both a specific penalty enhancer and the general enhancer in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Ray is distinguishable from the present 
case.  In Ray, the defendant's conviction was enhanced under 
§ 161.41(2) [now § 961.48] for violations of § 161.41(1x) [now 
§ 961.41] (conspiracy to deliver cocaine) and under the general 
repeater statute for the same prior conviction.  Ray, 166 
Wis. 2d at 871-72.  The court of appeals held that the circuit 
court may apply either the specific enhancer or the more general 
enhancer, but not both when the predicate offense is for the 
same conviction.  Id. at 873.   
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
14 
 
¶31 The court of appeals in Ray carefully limited its 
decision to the situation before it.  The factual situation in 
Ray is not the same as here.  Unlike the situation in Ray, where 
the State attempted to use one prior conviction to support two 
penalty enhancers, here the Wis. Stat. § 346.65 enhancer was 
based on Delaney's prior OWI conviction and refusal to submit to 
a chemical test.  The § 939.62 enhancer was based on Delaney's 
attempted possession of THC conviction; therefore, the decision 
in Ray is inapplicable here. 
¶32 Case law in other jurisdictions supports our analysis 
that when, as here, multiple penalty enhancers are predicated on 
separate and distinct prior offenses, imposition of multiple 
enhancers is permissible.  See Commonwealth v. Grimes, 698 
S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1985).  In that case, the defendant was 
convicted 
of 
second-offense 
drug 
trafficking, 
and 
as 
a 
persistent felony offender under a general repeater statute 
analogous to Wis. Stat. § 939.62. The Kentucky Supreme Court 
held: 
 
"[A] 
conviction 
of 
a 
second 
offense 
of 
[drug] 
trafficking . . . may be further enhanced by a persistent felony 
offender . . . charge pursuant to the general PFO [persistent 
felony offender] statute . . . where the PFO charge is grounded 
on a prior, unrelated conviction."  Grimes, 698 S.W.2d at 837. 
¶33 Applying the Grimes rule to a second or subsequent 
drunk driving offense enhanced under a general repeater statute, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Corman v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 
122 (Ky. 1995), sustained a conviction for fourth-offense OWI as 
a persistent felony offender (PFO) because there was a separate 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
15 
 
basis for each penalty enhancement.  In particular, the Corman 
court stated: 
The rule is now established that when a single prior 
felony is utilized to create an offense or enhance a 
punishment at the trial of the second crime, that same 
prior felony cannot be used at that trial to prosecute 
the defendant as a persistent felony offender.  If 
however, the prior felony used to underlie the PFO 
conviction is a separate prior felony from the one 
used to create the offense or enhance its punishment, 
the offense can be further enhanced under the PFO 
statute.   
Corman, 908 S.W.2d at 123 (citations omitted).   
¶34 Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme Court has reached a 
similar conclusion under a statutory scheme similar to that in 
Wisconsin.  Bown v. State, 475 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 1991).  In Bown, 
the defendant was charged with OWI, third offense, which 
enhanced his charge to class "D" felony, with a habitual 
offender enhancement for two previous burglary convictions.  475 
N.W.2d at 4.   Reversing the trial court, the Iowa Supreme Court 
found the OWI statute and the habitual offender statute 
unambiguously permitted the double enhancement in situations 
like Delaney's.  Id. at 7.  Noting the general trend in other 
jurisdictions toward permitting this type of double enhancement, 
the court found its construction reasonable given the public and 
legislative concerns regarding drunk driving.  Id. at 6.   
¶35 As 
Wideman, 
Ray, 
and 
the 
case 
law 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
indicate, 
applying 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 
to 
an 
already enhanced sentence under § 346.65(2)(c) does not lead to 
an "absurd or unreasonable result."  Coca-Cola Bottling, 106 
No. 
01-1051-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d at 170.   As a result, the unambiguous statutory 
language allows the application here of the penalty enhancement 
provisions of § 939.62 to further increase an already enhanced 
penalty under the specific penalty enhancer provisions of 
§ 346.65. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that a 
defendant convicted of the crime of second or subsequent offense 
OWI, as Delaney has been, is subject to the penalty enhancements 
provided for in both Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2) and 939.62, so long 
as the application of each enhancer is based on a separate and 
distinct prior conviction or convictions. 
¶37 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision, 
which affirmed Delaney's conviction and sentence for a third 
offense OWI.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  01-1051-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶38 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Rules of statutory interpretation are designed to help courts 
discern the intent of the legislature, not to serve as blinders.  
In this case, the majority opinion uses the plain language rule 
to shield its eyes from the legislative intent to exclude motor 
vehicle offenses from consideration both as a predicate offense 
and a present offense under the habitual offender statute.  
¶39 The majority opinion maintains that the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000) unambiguously excludes motor 
vehicle offenses from consideration as predicate offenses and 
just as clearly includes motor vehicle offenses when determining 
whether a present offense makes the perpetrator a habitual 
criminal. 
Specifically, 
the 
majority 
asserts 
that 
under 
§ 939.62, the word "crime" means all felonies and misdemeanors, 
but that the terms "felony" and "misdemeanor" mean only those 
crimes that are not motor vehicle offenses.  Thus, the "any 
crime" language of § 939.62(1) discussing present offenses that 
trigger the habitual offender statute "unambiguously" includes 
motor vehicle offenses.  
¶40 A rule of interpretation cannot, by itself, be 
dispositive in interpreting a statute because almost every rule 
can be countered by an opposing rule.7  Here, the majority 
opinion employs the plain language rule without acknowledging a 
counterpart.  Statutes plain on their face are not to be read so 
as to lead to an absurd result.  "A court will always reject an 
                                                 
7 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950). 
No.  01-1051-CR.ssa 
 
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unreasonable construction of a statute where a reasonable 
construction appears, and this is so notwithstanding that the 
statute is to be strictly construed."8  
¶41 According to the majority, a person convicted of 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant 
or other drug on five occasions who then commits a drug offense 
cannot be sentenced as a repeater because the predicate offenses 
were all for motor vehicle violations.   
¶42 In contrast, however, a person engaged in the same 
criminal offenses but in a slightly different order will be 
punished with a significantly higher sentence.  If the drug 
conviction occurred first, followed by five OWI convictions, the 
defendant could be sentenced as a repeater.  Similarly, if two 
OWI convictions were followed by the felony drug conviction and 
then three more OWI convictions, the defendant would again be 
considered a repeater.   
¶43 The 
more 
reasonable 
construction 
is 
to 
read 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 
(1999-2000) 
as 
excluding 
motor 
vehicle 
offenses from the entirety of the statute.  In this way, all 
persons convicted of the same types of crimes receive the same 
                                                 
8 Falkner v. N. States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 124, 248 
N.W.2d 885 (1977). 
No.  01-1051-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
enhanced 
punishment; 
the 
timing 
of 
the 
convictions 
is 
irrelevant.9 
¶44 Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with 
the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000).  The 
history of § 939.62 demonstrates that the legislature did not 
intend to distinguish between present offenses and predicate 
offenses when excluding motor vehicle offenses under the 
habitual 
criminality 
statute. 
 
Section 939.62 
began 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 359.12 (1949), and the plain language of § 359.12 
clearly excludes motor vehicle offenses from the operation of 
the entire statute.10   
                                                 
9 The majority opinion misses this point entirely.  The 
majority argues only that it is neither absurd nor unreasonable 
for the legislature to create a statutory scheme permitting the 
double enhancement of a sentence so long as each enhancer is 
based on a separate and distinct prior conviction.  Nowhere does 
it address the true absurdity resulting from its interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 939.62:  double enhancement is permitted when a 
person commits a drug offense and then an OWI but not when a 
person commits the same OWI and then the same drug offense. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 359.12 (1949) reads, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
Sentence of repeater: (1) Definitions.  As used in 
this 
section, 
unless 
context 
or 
subject 
matter 
otherwise requires:  
(a) "Repeater" means a person convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment, (except escapes under 
section 346.40 or 346.45(2)), who, within 5 years 
prior to commission thereof, had been convicted of a 
felony or on 3 separate occasions during such 5-year 
period had been convicted of misdemeanors by any 
criminal court or courts of this state or of the 
United States or of any other state or territory of 
the United States, which conviction or convictions 
remain of record and unreversed, whether pardoned 
therefore or not (except on grounds of innocence) and 
whether or not sentence on such conviction was stayed, 
No.  01-1051-CR.ssa 
 
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¶45 Under the 1949 version, subsection (1)(a) defines a 
repeater as someone convicted of "a crime punishable by 
imprisonment (except escapes under section 346.40 or 346.45(2))" 
who 
has 
either 
been 
convicted 
of 
a 
"felony" 
or 
three 
"misdemeanors" within the previous five years.  Subsection 
(1)(b) then defines "felony" and "misdemeanor."  The statute 
explains, "as to crimes committed in Wisconsin, 'felony' and 
'misdemeanor' have the same meaning given in [the Wisconsin 
statutes]."  For crimes committed outside of Wisconsin, a felony 
is a crime punishable by one year of imprisonment or more, and a 
misdemeanor is any other crime. 
¶46 Subsection (1)(b) then concludes by stating broadly 
that "motor vehicle offenses under ch. 85, fish and game law 
offenses in violation of ch. 23 or 29 or offenses against 
equivalent laws of other states are not to be considered crimes 
                                                                                                                                                             
suspended or withheld.  No time during which such 
person was in actual confinement serving a criminal 
sentence shall be included in such 5-year period.   
(b) As to crimes committed in Wisconsin, "felony" and 
"misdemeanor" 
have the 
meaning given 
in 
section 
353.31; otherwise "felony" is any crime under the laws 
of the United States or any other state or territory 
which carries a possible penalty of imprisonment for 
one year or more in a state prison or penitentiary or 
a federal penitentiary; and "misdemeanor" is any crime 
under the laws of the United States or any other state 
or territory which does not carry a possible penalty 
sufficient to constitute it a felony, and includes 
crimes punishable only by a fine.  Motor vehicle 
offenses under chapter 85, fish and game law offenses 
in violation of chapter 23 or 29 or offenses against 
equivalent laws of other states are not to be 
considered crimes for purposes of this section. 
No.  01-1051-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
for purposes of this section."11  Thus, reading (1)(b) back into 
(1)(a), the statute defines a repeater as a person convicted of 
a crime that is not a motor vehicle offense or fish and game law 
offense or escape.   
¶47 William Platz, the author of Wisconsin's criminal 
code, supports this reading.12  He commented at the time that one 
of the features of the habitual offender law as it read in 1949 
was to exclude "motor vehicle and fish-and-game laws" from "the 
operation of this statute."13   
 
¶48 
The parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 359.12 (1949) 
underwent only minor changes with the enactment of the 1955 
Code.  Most relevant to the case at hand, the legislative 
committee notes to Assembly Bill 100, enacting the criminal 
code, explain that "the only change" between the former 
subsection (1) and its counterparts in the current subsections 
(2) and (3) is that "under the new section fish and game law 
violations are considered crimes in calculating whether a person 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 359.12(1)(b)(1949) (emphasis added). 
12 William Platz was a Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General 
and the principal draftsman of the revised criminal code.  This 
court has consistently turned to his articles and comments on 
revisions to the criminal code as authoritative and persuasive 
evidence of the legislature's intent in drafting the criminal 
code.  See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d 802, 484 
N.W.2d 549 (1992); State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 
N.W.2d 145 (1986); State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 330 
N.W.2d 564 (1983); State ex rel. Gebarski v. Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, 80 Wis. 2d 489, 259 N.W.2d 531 (1977); State 
v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964). 
13 See William A. Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 236, 241. 
No.  01-1051-CR.ssa 
 
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is a repeater."14  The implication is that the status of motor 
vehicle offenses was to remain the same as it was in the 1949 
version——excluded from the operation of the statute.  
¶49 I conclude from the clear legislative history that the 
legislature did not intend to apply the penalty enhancement 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) (1999-2000) to further 
increase an already enhanced penalty for a motor vehicle offense 
under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c) (1999-2000).  
¶50 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.  
¶51 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Wis. Legis. Council, V Judiciary Committee Report on the 
Criminal Code, at 51 (1953). 
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