Title: Friends University v. WR Grace & Co.
Citation: 227 Kan. 559, 608 P.2d 936
Docket Number: 50,468
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 1980

227 Kan. 559 (1980)
608 P.2d 936
FRIENDS UNIVERSITY, a Not for Profit Corporation, Appellant,
v.
W.R. GRACE &amp; CO., GAF CORPORATION; THE PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE CO., and COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE CO., Appellees.
No. 50,468

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 5, 1980.
Kenneth P. Stewart, of Boyer, Donaldson &amp; Stewart, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Martin R. Ufford, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
H.E. Jones, of Hershberger, Patterson, Jones &amp; Roth, of Wichita, argued the cause, and J. Michael Kennalley, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellee, W.R. Grace &amp; Co.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is an action brought by Friends University against the manufacturers of certain roofing materials used in the construction of the university's new library building. The roof leaked and Friends alleges the defendants are liable therefor on theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty. The two defendant insurance companies are successive sureties on defendant GAF Corporation's bond. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the ground the claims were barred by the relevant statutes of limitations. Friends appeals from that judgment.
The library roof was completed in September, 1969. The general contractor for the building was the Johnson Construction Company, with the roofing subcontractor being the Buckley Roofing Company. Neither company is party to this action. The alleged defects are in the "built-up" roof, as opposed to the structural roof. The roof first leaked in 1970 or 1971 and continued to leak during virtually every rain occurring thereafter. Friends was particularly concerned with the leaks, inasmuch as the water presented a serious risk to the library contents. Complaints were initially made to the roofing company, but ultimately *560 the manufacturers, W.R. Grace &amp; Co., and GAF Corporation, were also involved. The roofing company made the first repairs in 1970. On October 18, 1974, the president of Friends wrote the following letter to the architect, the general contractor, the roofing company, and GAF:
"Gentlemen:
The defendants participated in various conferences and inspections of the roof, but each consistently denied liability for the problem. In April of 1975 an independent expert was retained, *561 who pinpointed the cause of the problem as being the failure of the W.R. Grace Zonolite Dyzone Board to bond to the substructure, and who was of the opinion that the structure would require complete reroofing. A like problem had occurred in other structures, and in 1971 W.R. Grace had developed a special Zonolite nail which apparently resolved the bonding difficulty. The special nail must be used at the time of initial roofing or reroofing and is not suitable for partial repairs of existing roofs. The action herein was commenced on March 29, 1977, and sought recovery on theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty  causes of actions with two and three-year statutes of limitations (K.S.A. 60-512 and 60-513). The two defendant manufacturers filed motions for summary judgment based on the relevant statutes of limitations. The district court sustained the motions, determining:
Friends appeals from the entry of the summary judgments. Preliminarily, we note that whereas the appeal was taken from the summary judgment entered as to all three theories, the appellant's brief is devoted wholly to the negligence claim. Defendant-appellees correctly point out that this constitutes a waiver or abandonment of claims of error relative to the other theories. Steele v. Harrison, 220 Kan. 422, 552 P.2d 957 (1976). However, by virtue of the result we reach herein the outcome of the appeal is not altered by the waiver of the claims of error relative to the other theories.
Friends contends the statute of limitations did not commence to run until April, 1975, when the expert's report disclosed the substantial injury plaintiff had suffered. The position of Friends is that only upon receipt of such report was the severity of the problem revealed  only then did Friends ascertain the roof had wholly failed and would have to be redone in its entirety. Friends seeks to extend the two-year statute of limitations by application of K.S.A. 60-513(b), which provides:
Friends relies heavily on Hecht v. First National Bank &amp; Trust Co., 208 Kan. 84, 490 P.2d 649 (1971), which was a medical malpractice action arising from radiation therapy administered to treat Hodgkin's disease. In Hecht, at 91-93, this court stated:
....
....
The Hecht case is readily distinguishable on the facts. Radiation therapy, whether or not properly done, frequently produces substantial injury to the body, which generally heals in time. A lay person cannot readily ascertain whether or not negligent treatment has been administered. Further, with a living entity, healing can occur which remedies the problem in whole or in part. The new roof was obviously defective in some respect when leaking occurred. These defendants did not advise the plaintiff that the roof would heal itself or take any action to lull plaintiff into believing the problem was less severe than it appeared. Friends' letter of October 18, 1974, above recited, clearly shows that Friends was aware of its serious problem at least as early as August, 1972.
Miller v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 204 Kan. 184, 460 P.2d 535 (1969), also cited by Friends, again involves the question of *563 when the injury done to the plaintiff's body was reasonably ascertainable, and is easily distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. From 1970 forward, Friends was complaining about the roof and demanding that the roof problems be remedied. Friends frequently urged the defendants and the roofing company to stop arguing among themselves about whose fault it was and repair the roof. The fact Friends had not determined the exact scientific cause of the leaking did not toll the running of the statute. Fully cognizant that a severe problem existed, Friends elected to seek nonjudicial resolution of the controversy. Simply stated, Friends lost its right to a judicial determination of the dispute by its own delay and inactivity.
A rather analogous factual situation is presented in Cooksey v. Jones, 184 Kan. 300, 336 P.2d 422 (1959), involving refrigeration equipment in a cold storage plant. In the summer of 1953 plaintiffs were aware the equipment was not cooling properly. In February of 1957 plaintiffs brought an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation. This court stated at p. 303:
Friends next contends the conduct of the defendant manufacturers tolled the running of the statute of limitations. The specific conduct relied upon in support of this contention is the suggestion of defendants that an independent expert be hired to report on the roof and the offer of W.R. Grace to help pay the expert's fee. These acts were the result of Friends' October 18, 1974, letter. In support of this contention, Friends cites Safeway Stores v. Wilson, 190 Kan. 7, 12, 372 P.2d 551 (1962), where this court approved the following from Rex v. Warner, 183 Kan. 763, 771, 332 P.2d 572 (1958):
The defendants herein at all times denied liability and there is no showing that their acts, individually or collectively, amounted to an affirmative inducement to Friends to delay bringing the action.
Finally, Friends contends the failure of W.R. Grace to disclose the crawling of other roofs and the development of the Zonolite nail constituted fraudulent concealment which tolled the statute of limitations. Friends argues the company knew the roof was a total failure and should have disclosed said information. This doctrine is discussed in 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions § 148, pp. 719-721, as follows:
*565 In the case before us a new roof on a new building was leaking. The cause had to be defective design, materials, workmanship, or some combination thereof. At any time Friends could easily have obtained an expert opinion on the precise cause or causes for the leaking roof.
We must conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants W.R. Grace &amp; Co., and GAF Corporation on the ground the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment is affirmed.