Title: Commonwealth v. Palermo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12639
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2019

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SJC–12639 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JASON J. PALERMO. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 7, 2019. - July 11, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Threatening.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Evidence, Hearsay, Guilty 
plea, Criminal records, Threat.  Practice, Criminal, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Hearsay, Instructions to jury, 
Verdict. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Brockton Division of 
the District Court Department on December 5, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before Antoinette E. McLean Leoney, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Karl R.D. Suchecki (Jennifer M. Petersen also present) for 
the defendant. 
 
Christina L. Crowley, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case arises from a violent encounter among 
four men, one of whom had dated the other's sister.  In the 
2 
 
 
fight that ensued, the men threw punches, brandished knives, and 
made statements about one another's mothers.  The defendant was 
charged with one count of assault and battery and one count of 
threatening to commit a crime.  He subsequently was convicted of 
the lesser included offense of simple assault and threatening to 
commit a crime. 
 
The defendant argues, first, that the criminal docket of 
one of his friends, Charles,1 was admitted improperly as evidence 
against the defendant.  Second, the defendant contends that the 
jury were not instructed correctly as to which of several 
alleged incidents constituted the "threat to commit a crime" 
with which he had been charged, thus permitting the jury to 
return a verdict of "guilty" without reaching a unanimous 
consensus as to which facts supported that charge. 
 
We conclude that both claims constitute reversible error.  
Accordingly, the convictions must be vacated and the matter 
remanded for a new trial. 
 
Background.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following.  See 
Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 397 (2003). 
 
On a Saturday evening in November 2014, Russell drove to a 
gasoline station to pump gasoline into his truck.  He saw a Jeep 
                     
 
1 Because of the result we reach, we refer to the 
individuals involved by their first names. 
3 
 
 
Cherokee that he believed had followed him into the gasoline 
station.  The Jeep was being driven by Charles, and the 
defendant rode in the passenger's seat.  Russell previously had 
dated the defendant's sister, and there was ongoing animosity 
between the two men.2 
 
Russell backed his truck up to move closer to the Jeep and 
told Charles and the defendant to leave him alone;  they got out 
of the Jeep and began "hitting" and "punching" his truck.  
Russell locked the doors and drove away.  Charles and the 
defendant followed, this time with the defendant driving.  In an 
attempt to outrun the Jeep, Russell began speeding, but the Jeep 
also increased its speed, at times following as closely as six 
inches behind Russell's truck.3 
 
Russell stopped his truck in the driveway of his friend 
Daniel's house.  Daniel and his wife, Carrie, were sitting on 
the porch.  Charles and the defendant parked the Jeep directly 
behind Russell.  Russell locked the doors and remained in his 
                     
 
2 The defendant testified that, at the gasoline station, 
Russell made a shooting motion with his hand and proclaimed that 
he was going to "shoot" at the defendant's house.  Russell 
denied that the interaction occurred. 
 
 
3 The defendant testified that, at one point, Russell 
stopped his truck in the middle of the street and tossed a brick 
out of the driver's side window of his truck, striking the Jeep.  
Russell denied this occurrence.  He attributed damage to the 
Jeep to Daniel having thrown a brick at a later point in the 
encounter. 
4 
 
 
truck, while the defendant and Charles got out of the Jeep and 
approached the truck, the defendant on the driver's side and 
Charles on the passenger's side.  The two men began yelling at 
Russell and banging on the windows and doors. 
 
Russell and Daniel testified that Charles warned Daniel to 
stay on the porch, or Charles would stab him.  Carrie, however, 
recalled the defendant as the one who warned Daniel to "go back 
in the house" or the defendant would stab him.  Charles had a 
knife; the defendant did not. 
 
Russell testified that, at one point, Charles told him that 
Charles "was going to rape [his] mother and kill [his] father," 
and that "he went to jail for rape and he'll do it again."  
Carrie testified that it was the defendant who told Russell that 
"he was going to go to [Russell's] house and rape his mother in 
the ass."  The defendant recalled telling Russell something to 
the effect of, "[G]et out of the truck and fight me." 
 
At one point, Russell partially lowered the driver's side 
window, in an effort to communicate better with the defendant.  
The defendant placed his hand in the crack between the window 
and the frame, pushed the window down, reached into the truck, 
and grabbed Russell's hand, grasping a thumb that recently had 
been surgically reattached.  The defendant grazed Russell's head 
in an attempt to punch him. 
5 
 
 
 
Ultimately, Daniel came down from the porch and tackled the 
defendant.  The two rolled around on the ground and threw 
punches.  While this was going on, Carrie called the police, and 
Russell climbed out of the window of his truck.  Charles 
eventually pulled the defendant away from Daniel.  Charles and 
the defendant ran back to the Jeep and drove away.4  That Monday, 
the defendant went to the police station to file a report 
concerning his injuries and the damage to the vehicle. 
 
The defendant was charged with one count of assault and 
battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a), with respect to Russell, and 
one count of threatening to commit a crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2.  
He was not charged with assaulting Daniel, the man with whom he 
had fought in the bushes. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified on his own behalf.  On 
cross-examination, he maintained that, during the altercation in 
Daniel's driveway, he did not see Charles get out of the Jeep 
until Charles "got out of the car to help me up" from the 
ground.  "That was the only time I seen him out of the car."  
The defendant also testified that he did not see Charles take 
                     
 
4 Daniel threw a brick at the Jeep before it drove away.  
The defendant testified that Russell also shot an arrow at the 
windshield of the Jeep while the defendant and Charles were 
retreating.  Photographs of the damage to the Jeep were 
introduced at trial.  Although Russell acknowledged possessing 
the bow and arrow, he denied firing the weapon; he maintained 
that he had unstrung the bow after using it while hunting 
earlier in the day. 
6 
 
 
out a knife.  The prosecutor then sought to introduce a copy of 
the certified criminal docket in Charles's case, which reflected 
that Charles had pleaded guilty to assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon for an incident charged on the same day in 
November 2014 as the incident with which the defendant was 
charged.  The judge allowed the evidence to be introduced, over 
the defendant's objection. 
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser 
included offense of simple assault and the offense of 
threatening to commit a crime.  The defendant was sentenced to 
eighteen months of supervised probation on each charge, to run 
concurrently. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant raises two claims of 
error.  First, he argues that the certified docket sheet from 
Charles's case should not have been admitted.  Second, he argues 
that the jury should have been given a specific unanimity 
instruction with respect to the offense of threatening to commit 
a crime. 
 
1.  Introduction of certified criminal docket.  The 
defendant objected to the admission of the certified criminal 
docket sheet on the grounds that the evidence constituted 
hearsay, violated his right to confrontation, and was 
substantially more prejudicial than probative. 
7 
 
 
 
a.  Hearsay.  An out-of-court statement is considered 
hearsay, and ordinarily is not admissible, where it is offered 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.  See 
Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 452 (2011).  See also 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) (2019). 
 
The docket sheet in Charles's case reflected that he 
pleaded guilty to committing an assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon on the day of the altercation at issue here.  There is no 
question that the Commonwealth offered the statements for their 
truth.  The Commonwealth sought to use the plea as evidence that 
Charles had, in fact, possessed a dangerous weapon -- in 
particular, a knife -- on that day.  The docket sheet was to be 
used to challenge the defendant's credibility, as the defendant 
had testified that he had not seen Charles with a knife.  The 
judge allowed the introduction of the criminal docket for its 
truth, as a "public document, certified, as an exception to the 
hearsay rule."5  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(8) (2019). 
 
Regardless of whether the docket itself might have been 
admissible, the statements contained within it nonetheless 
constitute a second layer of inadmissible hearsay.  Charles's 
                     
 
5 Evidence introduced under this exception is admissible for 
the truth of the matter asserted.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803 
(2019).  The judge did not give any limiting instruction here 
that would have precluded the jury from considering the 
statements for their truth. 
8 
 
 
guilty plea is a statement independent of the docket within 
which it is memorialized.  See Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 
391, 394 (1980) (statements contained within reports may be 
inadmissible as "second level" hearsay).  "[E]vidence based on a 
chain of statements is admissible only if each out-of-court 
assertion falls within an exception to the hearsay rule" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 216 
(2014).  See United States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 28 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 975 (1997) ("hearsay statements by 
third persons . . . are not admissible under [Fed. R. Evid. 
803(8)] merely because they appear within public records").  
Without an exception for this second level of hearsay, the 
substance of Charles's plea should not have been admitted. 
 
Section 803(22) of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 
(2019) is instructive as to the admissibility in a criminal 
trial of a guilty plea.6  See Flood v. Southland Corp., 416 Mass. 
62, 70 (1993) (adopting principles of Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
803[22]).  Under § 803, a guilty plea may be admissible where it 
constitutes a prior judgment "against the defendant."  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 803(22)(D).  When offered by the Commonwealth in a 
criminal case, however, prior judgments against individuals 
                     
6 Neither the Commonwealth nor the judge invoked Mass. G. 
Evid. § 803(22) at trial, relying instead upon Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(8) to admit both the docket and the guilty plea contained 
therein. 
9 
 
 
other than the defendant are not admissible "for a purpose other 
than impeachment."  Id.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Powell, 40 
Mass. App. Ct. 430, 435-437 (1996) (joint venturer's guilty plea 
not admissible to prove armed robbery had transpired). 
 
The Commonwealth argues on appeal that it sought to use 
Charles's guilty plea not as substantive evidence but, rather, 
to impeach the defendant's credibility.  Had Charles testified, 
the Commonwealth might have been permitted to use Charles's 
guilty plea to impeach his credibility.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 609 (2019).  See also Commonwealth v. Supplee, 45 Mass. App. 
Ct. 265, 268 (1998) (prior conviction of witness appropriately 
may be used "to impeach the credibility of that witness" 
[emphasis in original]).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Roderick, 429 
Mass. 271, 274-275 (1999) (defendant's prior conviction was 
admissible to impeach credibility of defendant-witness).  We are 
aware of no case, however, in which we have permitted the prior 
judgment in a case where the defendant was someone other than 
the current defendant to be used to impeach the current 
defendant's credibility.  See Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 436 
("whereas proof of [third party's] guilty plea could be used to 
impeach [third party] as a witness, it could not be used as 
evidence against [defendant]").  Nor have we been given any 
reason to expand the exception today. 
10 
 
 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Charles's guilty plea does 
not fall under the prior judgments exception to the hearsay 
rule.  In the absence of any other exception, evidence of the 
guilty plea should not have been admitted.7 
 
Where, as here, the defendant objected, we review for 
prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 
624 (2017).  "An error is prejudicial if we cannot find with 
fair assurance that it did not substantially sway[] the verdict" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Id. 
 
As the Commonwealth consistently has acknowledged, the 
purpose of entering the criminal docket sheet was to challenge 
the defendant's credibility.  At bottom, the trial was a contest 
of credibility.  Whereas Russell claimed that the defendant 
forced down Russell's driver's side window, threw punches, and 
grabbed his thumb, the defendant testified that he never touched 
                     
 
7 As discussed infra, to conclude otherwise would run afoul 
of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  The drafters of the Federal rule appear to have 
reached the same conclusion.  See Flood v. Southland Corp., 416 
Mass. 62, 70 (1993) (our rule is "substantively identical to the 
Federal rule of the same number").  The Advisory Committee's 
Note to Fed. R. Evid. 803(22), 56 F.R.D. 183, 319 (1972), 
provides in relevant part, 
 
"the [prior judgments] exception [to the hearsay rule] does 
not include evidence of the conviction of a third person, 
offered against the accused in a criminal prosecution to 
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment of 
conviction.  A contrary position would seem clearly to 
violate the right of confrontation." 
11 
 
 
Russell and fought only with Daniel.  In weighing the 
conflicting testimony, the jury necessarily were required to 
evaluate the defendant's credibility.  The prosecutor argued in 
closing that the jury should rely on the docket sheet to decide 
whom to believe. 
 
The introduction of the criminal docket sheet also risked 
proving the defendant's guilt by association.  Whereas the 
defense strategy was to portray the defendant and Charles as the 
victims of the altercation, the fact that Charles confessed to 
committing a crime had the potential to invert that perception.  
Moreover, the official nature of the certified docket carried 
the weight of judicial authority; the document proclaimed the 
defendant's companion guilty in the eyes of the law.  There was 
risk that, "as soon as the [g]overnment produced the record," 
the jury would see the defendant, not as presumptively innocent, 
but, rather, as "presumptively or prima facie guilty," See Kirby 
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 56, 61 (1899) (reversal required 
where others' convictions were admitted against defendant).  The 
admission of Charles's plea, therefore, was prejudicial error. 
 
b.  Right to confrontation.  Under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him."  See Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 459 
12 
 
 
Mass. 775, 785, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 (2011).8  Where the 
Commonwealth seeks to introduce a declarant's testimonial 
statements as evidence against a defendant, the defendant is 
guaranteed the opportunity to test the declarant in the 
"crucible of cross-examination."  See Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 
In the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine, we have 
long held that the conviction of one individual may not be used 
during the prosecution of another to prove the facts underlying 
the conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Elisha, 3 Gray 460, 460-461 
(1855) (sellers' convictions of stealing property not admissible 
against buyer charged with receiving stolen goods where 
defendant had "no opportunity nor right to be heard" during 
seller's trial).  See also Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass. 
382, 398-399 (1997) (one person's guilty plea may not be used to 
prove guilt of another); Commonwealth v. Tilley, 327 Mass. 540, 
548 (1951) (art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
prohibits use of criminal conviction against another party to 
establish truth of any fact involved in conviction).9  "[I]t is 
                     
 
8 With respect to the hearsay rule, art. 12 is coextensive 
with the Sixth Amendment.  See Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 
Mass. 56, 57 n.1 (2006). 
 
 
9 This is distinct from a situation in which the 
Commonwealth attempts to prove, through a defendant's certified 
criminal docket, that the defendant previously has been 
convicted of a crime.  For example, where the fact finder must 
13 
 
 
an elementary principle of justice, that one [person] shall not 
be affected by another's act or omission, to which he is a 
stranger."  Elisha, supra at 461. 
 
In Kirby, 174 U.S. at 53-55, the United States Supreme 
Court reached the same result.  There, the defendant had been 
charged with receiving stolen postage stamps.  To prove that the 
stamps were stolen, the government entered the records of the 
convictions of the three men who stole them, two of whom had 
pleaded guilty and one of whom had been convicted at trial.  The 
Court concluded that the convictions were admitted in error, 
reasoning that "[the defendant] was not present when [two of the 
men] confessed their crime by pleas of guilty," nor when the 
third man "was proved to be guilty by witnesses"; the defendant 
"would not have been permitted to examine [the two men] upon 
their pleas of guilty, nor cross-examine the witnesses 
introduced against [the third man]"; and the defendant would not 
have been permitted to "introduce witnesses to prove that [the 
men] were not in fact guilty."  Id. at 54.  Accordingly, the 
defendant was deprived of the opportunity to confront the 
                     
determine whether a firearms offense is the defendant's third 
such offense, a docket demonstrating the fact of two prior 
offenses may be admissible, as it goes to show "the fact of 
conviction," as opposed to "the underlying evidentiary fact."  
See Commonwealth v. Weeks, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 2, 7 (2010). 
14 
 
 
witnesses against him; "he was confronted only with the record 
of another criminal prosecution."  Id. at 55.10,11 
 
In this case, Charles's guilty plea was used to establish 
that Charles possessed a knife.  Had the defendant been 
                     
 
10 As discussed, that the docket sheet itself possibly might 
have been admissible at trial does not imply the admissibility 
of the guilty plea contained therein.  "Business and public 
records are generally admissible absent confrontation not 
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, 
but because -- having been created for the administration of an 
entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact at trial -- they are not testimonial."  
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).  The 
same cannot be said, however, for the underlying guilty plea. 
 
 
11 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), the 
United States Supreme Court articulated that the Sixth Amendment 
applies to out-of-court statements that are "testimonial" in 
nature.  To determine whether a statement is testimonial, we 
look to "the primary purpose that a reasonable person would have 
ascribed to the statement, taking into account all of the 
surrounding circumstances."  See Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 
Mass. 575, 580 (2018), quoting Williams v. Illinois, 567 
U.S. 50, 84 (2012).  "[P]lea allocution[s]" constitute "plainly 
testimonial statements."  Crawford, supra at 64.  To the extent 
that a guilty plea conceptually can be divorced from the 
allocution, the Courts of Appeals for several Federal Circuits 
have determined explicitly that the guilty plea itself also is 
testimonial.  See, e.g., United States v. Head, 707 F.3d 1026, 
1031-1032 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 
219, 221–222 (2d Cir. 2004).  A guilty plea is "a form of prior 
in-court testimony," "formally given in court, under oath, and 
in response to questions by the court or the prosecutor."  See 
Head, supra at 1032; McClain, supra at 221.  The individual 
pleading guilty reasonably expects that his or her statement 
will be available to the government as evidence; it will 
constitute the basis for convicting and sentencing the 
declarant.  Where guilty pleas "are used as proof of facts 
underlying the crime charged," they trigger the protections of 
the confrontation clause.  See United States v. Causevic, 636 
F.3d 998, 1003–1004 (8th Cir. 2011).  See also State v. 
Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 18. 
15 
 
 
permitted to cross-examine Charles, he could have inquired as to 
why Charles had pleaded guilty, whether Charles had possessed a 
knife, or whether that knife would have been visible at the time 
of the altercation.  In the absence of such an opportunity, it 
was constitutional error to allow the introduction of evidence 
of Charles's guilty plea as proof of the facts underlying the 
conviction. 
 
Where, as here, an objection to constitutional error is 
preserved, we must vacate the defendant's convictions unless we 
are satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 394 (2008).  
For the reasons discussed, we cannot say that the admission of 
the criminal docket sheet was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.12 
 
2.  Jury instructions.  Through Carrie's testimony, the 
Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant made two 
statements, either of which could have constituted a threat to 
                     
 
12 Having determined that the evidence was admitted in 
error, we need not reach the question whether it also was 
substantially more prejudicial than probative.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 403 (2019).  See also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 
Mass. 491, 504 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) ("Admission of a guilty plea 
is of even less value because the plea is often the result of 
bargaining with the prosecutor and is not necessarily the 
equivalent of an admission of full guilt for the act alleged"); 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass. 382, 399 (1997) ("a plea of 
guilty by one person is not admissible to prove the guilt of 
another and may be highly prejudicial"). 
16 
 
 
commit a crime.  First, the defendant told Daniel, "Go back in 
the house, I'm going to stab you."  Second, the defendant told 
Russell "that he was going to go to [Russell's] house and rape 
his mother in the ass."  The defendant argues that, in light of 
the evidence presented, a specific unanimity instruction was 
required.  As he did not request such an instruction at trial, 
we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.13  
See Commonwealth v. Comtois, 399 Mass. 668, 676 (1987). 
 
"It is beyond dispute that the jury verdict in a criminal 
trial . . . must be unanimous."  Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 
Mass. 281, 284 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 
95, 111 (1995).  A specific unanimity instruction "indicates to 
the jury that they must be unanimous as to which specific act 
constitutes the offense charged."  Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 
Mass. 557, 566-567 (1987). 
 
Such an instruction is required when, "on a single charged 
offense, the prosecutor presents evidence of separate, discrete 
incidents, any one of which would suffice by itself to make out 
the crime charged."  Santos, 440 Mass. at 284-285.14  See, e.g., 
                     
 
13 But see Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 516 & 
n.11 (1995) (denial of requested specific unanimity instruction 
required reversal where "there [had] been no jury verdict within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment" [citation omitted]). 
 
 
14 Several Federal Courts of Appeals have required specific 
unanimity instructions where there exists a "genuine risk," 
United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1992), or 
17 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 514 (1995) (victim 
alleged eight instances of sexual assault).  In such a case, 
"the jury must all agree as to at least one, specific incident"; 
otherwise, "there is not unanimous agreement that [the 
defendant] has committed any crime."  Santos, supra at 285.  
"Absent a specific unanimity instruction, the jury might 
mistakenly believe that they could convict the defendant even if 
they disagreed as to which of the alleged criminal acts he [or 
she] had committed."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 135, 138 (2001). 
 
The jury "need not agree as to every detail" regarding 
"how" the crime was committed.  See Santos, 440 Mass. at 285, 
286 (jury need not agree "precisely which threat, or which 
application of force, caused the victim to part with her 
money").  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cyr, 433 Mass. 617, 620, 
623-624 (2001) (no instruction required as to whether murder was 
committed by stabbing or by fire); Commonwealth v. Thatch, 39 
Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905 (1995) (no instruction required as to 
which of several acts of penetration during single episode 
constituted rape).  The jury nonetheless must agree that the 
crime was committed.  Where there are "distinguishing 
                     
"genuine danger," United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 114–115 
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987), of jury 
confusion.  See Conefrey, 420 Mass. at 514 n.10, and cases 
cited. 
18 
 
 
differences between the successive events," there may be "reason 
to fear that the jury will pick and choose among the alleged 
incidents and convict the defendant while disagreeing as to 
which of them were committed."  See Santos, supra at 286. 
 
In this case, the jury were presented with two incidents 
that, although proximate in time, purportedly were committed 
against two separate victims.  In the first incident, Daniel was 
threatened with immediate harm to his person by means of a 
knife; in the second, Russell was threatened with future harm to 
his mother by means of sexual assault. 
 
On this record, there were reasons for the jury to question 
whether the defendant made either threat.  Both statements were 
overheard by Carrie, from the front porch of her house, some 
distance from the commotion.  As to the first statement, Daniel 
and Russell recalled that it was Charles, and not the defendant, 
who threatened to stab Daniel, and all three witness saw 
Charles, not the defendant, with a knife.  As to the second 
statement, Russell testified that it was Charles, and not the 
defendant, who threatened to rape Russell's mother. 
 
The defendant was charged only with one count of 
threatening to commit a crime; yet, in closing, the Commonwealth 
argued both that the defendant "threatened Daniel that he was 
going to stab him if he didn't go back in the house" and that 
19 
 
 
the defendant "threatened [Russell]'s mother in the heat of all 
of this exchange."  The judge also noted the confusion: 
The judge:  "The threat to commit a crime, who's the 
alleged victim there?" 
 
The prosecutor:  "Your Honor, the testimony wasn't as clear 
as, you know, it could have been in the sense that -- but 
[Carrie] explained that the threat was to [Daniel], saying 
that, if you don't go inside, I'll stab you, and then also 
to [Russell], that he was -- that he would rape his mother 
and that those were the two statements that would qualify 
as elements for the threats."15 
 
The judge gave no instruction or clarification on this issue, 
thereby permitting the jury to consider evidence of either 
threat.  As a result, the jurors reasonably could have reached 
disparate conclusions of fact.  Compare Conefrey, 420 Mass. at 
514 ("Some jurors may have convicted the defendant on the basis 
of one alleged incident, while others may have convicted him 
based upon any of the [others]").  In the circumstances of this 
case, the lack of clarity amounts to a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Because we are not satisfied that the 
verdict was unanimous, the conviction of threatening to commit a 
crime must be vacated. 
                     
 
15 According to the complaint, the defendant was charged 
with one count of threatening to commit a crime "to wit:  bodily 
harm with knife," in violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2.  At no 
point, however, were the jury made aware of this detail.  By 
contrast, the judge repeatedly identified Russell as the victim 
of the charged assault. 
20 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  Both verdicts are vacated and set aside, and 
the matter is remanded to the District Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.