Title: In re A.G.D.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 258A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 258A19  
Filed 1 May 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.G.D. and A.N.D. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 6 March 
2019 by Judge Robert J. Crumpton in District Court, Ashe County.  This matter was 
calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 25 March 2020 but determined on 
the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee mother. 
 
Edward Eldred for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
Respondent-father Aaron D. appeals from orders1 entered by the trial court 
terminating his parental rights in his minor children A.G.D. and A.N.D. on the 
grounds of willful abandonment.2  After careful consideration of respondent-father’s 
challenge to the trial court’s termination orders in light of the record and the 
                                            
1 The trial court entered separate, although essentially identical, orders terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights in each of his two children.  For ease of comprehension, 
we will treat these separate orders as a single document throughout the remainder of this 
opinion. 
2 We will refer to A.G.D. and A.N.D. throughout the remainder of this opinion as 
“Amy” and “Andy,” respectively, with these names being pseudonyms that we use for ease of 
reading and to protect the privacy of the juveniles. 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s termination orders should be 
affirmed. 
Petitioner Amber D. and respondent-father were married in April 2008, with 
Amy having been born to the parents in 2008 and with Andy having been born to the 
parents in 2011.  The parties separated in March 2013 after Amy revealed that 
respondent-father had committed repeated sexual assaults against her.  Along with 
a number of other individuals, respondent-father was subsequently charged with 
having committed multiple criminal acts of sexual abuse in the state and federal 
courts, including crimes involving child pornography.  On 27 May 2014, an order was 
entered granting the mother sole legal and physical custody of the children, with 
respondent-father being ordered to have no contact with them in the absence of a 
further order of the court.3  A judgment granting an absolute divorce between the 
parents was entered in July 2014. 
On 26 June 2018, the mother filed petitions seeking to have respondent-
father’s parental rights in the children terminated on the grounds that he had 
willfully failed to pay any portion of the cost of the children’s care and that he had 
willfully abandoned the children.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4), (7) (2019).  After a 
                                            
3 The custody and visitation order in question, which the trial court incorporated by 
reference into the termination order, found as a fact that respondent-father was “currently 
incarcerated in [the] Ashe County Jail” and was “under a [c]ourt [o]rder not to have any 
contact with [Amy]” or “with a child under 18” and ordered that respondent-father “shall have 
no contact with the [children] absent future [o]rders of this Court.” 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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hearing held on 25 February 2019, the trial court entered orders terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights in both children on 6 March 2019,4 with this 
decision resting upon determinations that respondent-father had willfully abandoned 
Amy and Andy and that the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights in the 
children would be in their best interests.  Respondent-father noted appeals to this 
Court from the trial court’s termination orders. 
In seeking to persuade us to grant relief from the trial court’s termination 
orders, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by determining that his 
parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the grounds of willful 
abandonment in light of the fact that he had been “prohibited . . . from having any 
contact with his children.”  According to respondent-father, “it was not within [his] 
power to display his love and affection for his children because he was court-ordered 
not to contact them.”  In respondent-father’s view, the trial court’s reliance upon his 
failure to seek relief from the earlier custody and visitation order was misplaced given 
that the record contained no evidence tending to show that he had the ability to make 
such a filing or that there had been “any change of circumstances warranting the 
filing of” such a motion, citing Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 
250, 253 (2003) (stating that a party is only entitled to seek to have a prior custody 
                                            
4 The trial court did not find that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children 
were subject to termination on the grounds of a willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of 
the cost of the children’s care. 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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order modified in the event that “there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the child”), with it 
“beg[ging] belief” that respondent-father “could have filed a custody motion every six 
months for four years.”  As a result, since respondent-father “was court-ordered not 
to contact [his children] and could only have shown them filial affection by disobeying 
a court’s order,” respondent-father contends that the trial court’s termination orders 
should be reversed.5 
“We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.’ ”  In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 
49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 
(1984)).  A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights in his or her children 
based upon a determination that “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile 
for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or 
motion . . . .”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).6  In order to find that a parent’s parental 
rights are subject to termination based upon willful abandonment, the trial court 
must make findings of fact that show that the parent had a “purposeful, deliberative 
and manifest willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all 
                                            
5 The mother did not file a brief in defense of the trial court’s orders with this Court. 
6 As a result of the fact that the termination petitions were filed on 26 June 2018, the 
relevant six-month period for purposes of this case runs from 26 December 2017 until 26 June 
2018. 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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parental claims to [the child],” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 79, 833 S.E.2d 768, 774 
(2019) (quoting In re D.M.O., 250 N.C. App. 570, 573, 794 S.E.2d 858, 861–62 (2016)), 
with a parent having abandoned his or her child for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(7) in the event that he “withholds his presence, his love, his care, the 
opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully neglects to lend support and 
maintenance . . . .”  Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962). 
We further note that “[o]ur precedents are quite clear—and remain in full 
force—that ‘[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a 
termination of parental rights decision.’ ”  In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153, 804 S.E.2d 
513, 517 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 
10, 618 S.E.2d 241, 247 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006)).  
Although “a parent’s options for showing affection while incarcerated are greatly 
limited, a parent will not be excused from showing interest in [the] child’s welfare by 
whatever means available.”  In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19–20, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 
(2019) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 621, 810 S.E.2d 375, 378 (2018)).  As 
a result, our decisions concerning the termination of the parental rights of 
incarcerated persons require that courts recognize the limitations for showing love, 
affection, and parental concern under which such individuals labor while 
simultaneously requiring them to do what they can to exhibit the required level of 
concern for their children.  In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 283, 837 S.E.2d 861, 867–68 
(2020) (stating that “the extent to which a parent’s incarceration or violation of the 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-6- 
terms and conditions of probation support a finding of neglect depends upon an 
analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances, including the length of the parent’s 
incarceration”). 
In the course of determining that respondent-father’s parental rights in the 
children were subject to termination on the grounds of willful abandonment, the trial 
court found as a fact that: 
5. [Respondent-father] was not present, but represented 
by Adam E. Anderson, Esq.  [Respondent-father’s] 
Attorney informed the Court that he met with 
[respondent-father], but was unable to ascertain his 
wishes as to whether he wished to contest this action 
or not.  [Respondent-father] also indicated he did not 
want to be present due to wanting to focus his efforts 
on “trial preparation” for his upcoming criminal 
matters.  [Respondent-father’s] Attorney also reached 
out to [respondent-father’s] Federal Attorney, Anthony 
Martinez, who spoke with [respondent-father] and 
indicated that he was also unable to ascertain whether 
[respondent-father] wished to contest this matter.  
[Respondent-father’s] Attorney made a motion to 
continue this matter, which was denied.  This matter 
was filed on June 26, 2018 and was noticed on well in 
advance of the trial date. 
 
. . . . 
10. Respondent[-father] has not participated in the care of 
the [children] in the last six (6) months and has not had 
any meaningful interaction with the [children] since 
March 8, 2013. 
 
. . . . 
 
12. Respondent[-father] has pending criminal charges for 
child related sex offenses which have prevented and 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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prevent him from being a meaningful part of the 
[children’s] live[s]. 
 
13. [Amy] was four (4) years old when she disclosed that 
she was the victim of a sexual assault by her father.  
Upon disclosure, [the mother] made [respondent-
father] leave the home and reported these allegations 
to the Ashe County Sheriff’s Department, who started 
an investigation.  [Respondent-father] was charged 
with fourteen (14) counts of sexual assault in state 
court and eight (8) charges in Federal Court.  [The 
mother] did not know the exact names of the charges 
but did testify that they related to these allegations 
and other sexual acts including child pornography. 
 
14.  The Federal investigation also led to [respondent-
father] being charged along with others for sexual acts 
including child pornography. . . .  
 
15. During the time these acts were committed, [Amy] was 
two to four (2–4) years old.  Her brother, [Andy], was a 
newborn and nonverbal at the time. 
 
. . . . 
18. 
 [Respondent-father] has not seen or spoken to the 
children since March 8, 2013.  About eighteen (18) 
months after this date, he contacted the [mother] 
requesting to see the children, but this is the only 
attempt he has made to contact the children. 
 
. . . . 
22. 
 . . . .  [The children] have no bond with [respondent-
father.  Amy] refers to [respondent-father] as “Aaron”, 
not “dad”. 
 
. . . . 
24. 
 The [mother] was granted sole legal and physical 
custody of the children in 2014.  [Respondent-father] 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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was not allowed further visitation “absent further 
orders of the Court.”  [Respondent-father] has taken no 
action to file anything with the Court seeking visitation 
with the children. 
 
25. 
 [Respondent-father] has not made any attempt to 
contact or see the [children] for the six (6) months next 
preceding the filing of this action and has not had any 
meaningful interaction with the [children] since March 
of 2013. 
 
26. 
 [Respondent-father] has willfully abandoned the 
juvenile[s] for at least six (6) months immediately 
preceding the filing of this action.  The actions of 
[respondent-father] manifest a willful determination to 
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental 
claims regarding the minor children.  This was done 
with purpose and deliberation. 
 
27. 
 [Respondent-father’s] attorney argued that the actions 
of [respondent-father] were not willful due to his 
incarceration.  The Court’s findings of willfulness are 
not based on incarceration alone.  Despite his 
incarceration, [respondent-father] is not excused from 
showing an interest in his children’s welfare.  The 
Court has considered other actions that could have 
been taken by the [respondent-father].  He could have 
filed a motion for contact or visitation with the Court 
in the custody action. 
 
28. 
 [Respondent-father] has at all times been able to 
ascertain the whereabouts of the [children.]  [The 
mother] testified that [respondent-father’s] Federal 
Attorney came to her home a few months ago to ask 
questions regarding [respondent-father’s] criminal 
case. 
 
Although these findings of fact are, admittedly, rather sparse, we believe that they 
do suffice to support the trial court’s conclusion that respondent-father’s parental 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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rights in the children were subject to termination for abandonment pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 
In its termination orders, the trial court found7 as a fact that respondent-
father’s trial counsel “met with [respondent-father]” and “was unable to ascertain his 
wishes as to whether he wished to contest this action or not.”  In addition, the trial 
court found that respondent-father’s trial counsel had “reached out” to the attorney 
responsible for representing respondent-father in connection with his pending federal 
criminal cases, who “was also unable to ascertain whether [respondent-father] wished 
to contest this matter.”  The trial court further found that Amy “was four (4) years 
old when she disclosed that she was the victim of a sexual assault by” respondent-
father,8 who “was charged with fourteen (14) counts of sexual assault in state court 
and eight (8) charges in [f]ederal court.”  The trial court found that the mother “was 
granted sole legal and physical custody of the” children by means of an order entered 
in the District Court, Ashe County, with respondent-father not being “allowed further 
visitation ‘absent further orders of the Court’ ”  The trial court also found that 
respondent-father “has not participated in the care of the [children] in the past six (6) 
months,” “has not had any meaningful interaction with the [children] since March 8, 
                                            
7 Respondent-father has not challenged any of the trial court’s findings of fact as 
lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, rendering the trial court’s findings binding upon us 
for purposes of appellate review. 
8 The mother testified at the termination hearing that respondent-father had 
admitted the truth of Amy’s accusation. 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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2013,” “has taken no action to file anything with the Court seeking visitation with 
the children,” and “has not made any attempt to contact or see the [children] for the 
six (6) months next preceding the filing of this action and has not had any meaningful 
interaction with the [children] since March of 2013.”  The trial court found that, 
approximately eighteen months after March 8, 2013, respondent-father had 
“contacted [petitioner-mother] requesting to see the children,” with this having been 
“the only attempt he has made to” do so.  In response to respondent-father’s 
contention that “the actions of [respondent-father] were not willful due to his 
incarceration,” the trial court found that, “[d]espite his incarceration, [respondent-
father] is not excused from showing an interest in his children’s welfare,” that “[t]he 
Court ha[d] considered other actions that could have been taken by” respondent-
father, and that respondent-father “could have filed a motion for contact or visitation 
with the Court in the custody action.”  Finally, the trial court found that respondent-
father “ha[d] at all times been able to ascertain the whereabouts of the [children]” 
and that the attorney that represented respondent-father in his federal criminal 
cases “came to [petitioner-mother’s] home a few months ago to ask questions 
regarding [respondent-father’s] criminal case.”  Based upon these findings of fact, the 
trial court concluded that respondent-father’s actions and inactions “manifest a 
willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims 
regarding the” children and that “[t]his was done with purpose and deliberation.” 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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A careful review of the termination orders reveals that the trial court did not 
conclude that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were subject to 
termination on the grounds of abandonment solely because he had failed to make 
direct contact with them in violation of the custody and visitation order.  On the 
contrary, the trial court specifically noted that respondent-father was “not excused 
from showing an interest in his children’s welfare” because of his incarceration and 
found as a fact that, among other things, the only attempt that respondent-father had 
made to contact the children had occurred when he communicated with petitioner-
mother about eighteen months after his last “meaningful” contact with them.  In 
other words, the trial court found that respondent-father had, with one exception, 
done nothing to maintain contact with the mother, with whom the children lived and 
who would know how they were doing,9 making this case similar to In re C.B.C., 373 
N.C. at 23, 832 S.E.2d at 697 (noting, in describing the reasons that the trial court 
had not erred by finding that a parent’s parental rights in a child were subject to 
termination for abandonment, that the trial court had found that the parent “did not 
contact [the child’s custodians] to inquire into [the child’s] well-being”), and In re 
B.S.O., 234 N.C. App. 706, 711, 760 S.E.2d 59, 64 (2014) (upholding the trial court’s 
                                            
9 Admittedly, petitioner-mother testified that, at the time that respondent-father 
contacted her, she “hung up” on him and that, subsequently, “the state put a ban and didn’t 
let him call me.”  As a result, once again, respondent-father was the author of his own 
misfortune given that he “demanded” to be allowed to see the children.  Moreover, nothing in 
the mother’s testimony suggests that respondent-father was in any way prohibited from 
communicating with the mother by mail or through intermediaries. 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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determination that a parent had abandoned his children on the grounds that the trial 
court’s findings showed that, “during the relevant six-month period, respondent-
father ‘made no effort’ to remain in contact with his children or their caretakers and 
neither provided nor offered anything toward their support”), and distinguishable 
from In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. at 621, 810 S.E.2d at 379 (holding that the trial 
court had erred by finding that an incarcerated parent’s parental rights in his child 
were subject to termination for abandonment based, in part, on the fact that “the trial 
court’s findings . . . do not address, in light of his incarceration, what other efforts 
[the parent] could have been expected to make to contact [the other parent] and the 
juvenile”). 
Although the custody and visitation order that was entered at petitioner-
mother’s request did preclude respondent-father from having direct contact with the 
children, it did not place any other limitation upon his ability to interact with or show 
love, affection, and parental concern for the children.10  The trial court’s findings of 
                                            
10 In spite of the fact that respondent-father has contended in his brief before this 
Court that he would have been unable to make a showing of “changed circumstances” 
sufficient to support a request for modification of the existing custody and visitation order, 
respondent-father points to nothing in the relevant order that prohibited him from 
attempting to obtain permission from the mother to have contact with the children or from 
requesting the mother or others to relay his best wishes to them.  Aside from the fact that 
this argument seems inconsistent with our recent decision in In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 394, 
831 S.E.2d at 53, in which we declined to accept a parent’s contention that he had failed to 
seek modification of a temporary custody order because “he ‘wasn’t in a place in [his] life to—
to really be a father or parent,’ ” respondent-father’s exclusive focus upon an attempt to 
handicap his own likelihood of successfully obtaining a change in the existing custody and 
visitation order is inconsistent with our insistence that incarcerated parents do what they 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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fact reflect that respondent-father had the legal right and practical ability to contact 
the mother directly or through intermediaries for the purpose of inquiring about the 
children’s welfare and asking that she convey his best wishes to them, with nothing 
in the custody and visitation order serving to prohibit him from doing so.  Similarly, 
nothing in the custody and visitation order prohibited respondent-father from using 
other persons as a vehicle for the indirect communication of his love, affection, and 
parental concern for the children.  In spite of the fact that respondent-father had the 
ability to make such inquiries or to request others to do so, the trial court’s findings 
of fact reflect that respondent-father did not ever make contact with petitioner-
mother to ask permission to have contact with the children or to otherwise express 
any love, affection, or parental concern for them during the six-month period 
prescribed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and that respondent-father would not even 
clearly tell his trial counsel whether he opposed the allowance of the termination 
petitions.  As a result, we have no difficulty in determining that the trial court’s 
findings do, wholly aside from their references to respondent-father’s failure to seek 
a modification of the custody and visitation order, support a conclusion that 
respondent-father completely withheld his love, affection, and parental concern for 
the children, rendering his parental rights in them subject to termination for 
abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and rendering this case easily 
                                            
can in order to show love and affection for their children and the trial court’s depiction of 
defendant’s failure to do anything to this effect at all. 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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distinguishable from decisions such as In re K.C., 247 N.C. App. 84, 87–88, 805 S.E.2d 
299, 301–02 (2016) (holding that the trial court’s findings of fact failed to support the 
termination of the mother’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect by abandonment 
despite her failure to visit with the child for the last year prior to the termination 
hearing given that the father, based upon the advice of a therapist, refused to grant 
the mother’s request for a visit, the fact that the mother had had sporadic visits with 
the child prior to being denied access to the child, and the fact that the mother had 
paid court-ordered child support), and In re T.C.B., 166 N.C. App. 482, 485–87, 602 
S.E.2d 17, 19–20 (2004) (holding that the trial court’s findings of fact failed to support 
the termination of the father’s parental rights in his child on the grounds of 
abandonment despite the fact that he had not visited with the child for four years 
prior to the termination hearing and had not sent the child any letters, cards, or gifts 
during that period given the fact that the mother had denied his request to visit the 
child during that period, the fact that he had visited with the child on an earlier date, 
the fact that the attorney representing the father in connection with charges that he 
had sexually abused his child (that were later dismissed) advised him to refrain from 
attempting to visit the child during the pendency of the criminal charges, the fact 
that the father refused to accept an agreement pursuant to which the pending charges 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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would be dismissed in return for his relinquishment of his parental rights, and the 
fact that the father regularly paid child support).11 
In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, respondent-father argues, 
in essence, that the order prohibiting him from having contact with the children stood 
as an absolute barrier to his ability to show love, affection, and parental concern for 
them and that this fact should preclude a finding of abandonment for purposes of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).  Respondent-father appears to take the position that, in the 
absence of a reasonable belief that he had a chance of prevailing in an action seeking 
to have the existing custody or visitation arrangements modified, he could not be 
found to have willfully abandoned the children despite having done absolutely 
nothing to express any interest in their welfare.  However, as we have already 
demonstrated, the trial court did not find that respondent-father’s parental rights in 
the children were subject to termination for abandonment solely because he failed to 
make direct contact with the children at a time when he was incarcerated and 
prohibited from doing so by the custody and visitation order.  Instead, the trial court’s 
findings of fact reflect that respondent-father failed to do anything whatsoever to 
express love, affection, and parental concern for the children during the relevant six-
month period, making this case completely different from In re K.N., 373 N.C. at 284, 
                                            
11 The conduct of the father in T.C.B. stands in stark contrast to that of respondent-
father, who, as described in the trial court’s findings, would not even take a position 
concerning whether he did or did not oppose the termination of his parental rights in the 
children. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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837 S.E.2d at 868, in which we held that the trial court’s findings were “insufficient 
to support [its] ultimate determination that respondent’s parental rights were subject 
to termination on the basis of neglect.”  Thus, respondent-father’s argument fails to 
take the entirety of the trial court’s findings of fact into consideration or to come to 
grips with the ultimate problem created by the fact that the trial court’s findings 
reflect a total failure on his part to take any action whatsoever to indicate that he 
had any interest in preserving his parental connection with the children. 
A decision to overturn the trial court’s termination orders in this case would 
also run afoul of our decisions concerning the manner in which termination of 
parental rights cases involving incarcerated individuals should be decided.  As we 
have already noted, the fact of incarceration is neither a sword nor a shield for 
purposes of a termination of parental rights proceeding.  Although the fact that he 
was incarcerated and subject to an order prohibiting him from directly contacting the 
children created obvious obstacles to respondent-father’s ability to show love, 
affection, and parental concern for the children, it did not render such a showing 
completely impossible.  In spite of the fact that other options for showing love, 
affection, and parental concern for the children remained open to him, the trial court’s 
findings show that respondent-father remained inactive.  For that reason, the effect 
of a decision to overturn the trial court’s termination orders would be to allow 
respondent-father to use his incarceration and the provisions of the custody and 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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visitation order as a shield against a finding of abandonment contrary to the 
consistent decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals. 
A decision to overturn the trial court’s termination orders would also preclude 
a trial court from determining that a parent who has been accused of sexually abusing 
one of his children and incarcerated for a lengthy period of time prior to trial had 
abandoned his children solely because the parent’s spouse and representatives of the 
State took action to protect the family from any risk that the incarcerated parent 
would inflict further harm upon the members of the family.  A decision to reach the 
result that respondent-father contends to be appropriate in this case would raise 
serious questions about the extent, if any, to which an incarcerated individual subject 
to limitations upon his ability to contact a child that he had allegedly abused could 
ever be found to have abandoned his or her children for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(7) regardless of that parent’s failure to do what he or she could have done to 
show love, affection, and parental concern for his or her children.  Such a result seems 
inconsistent with the intent of the General Assembly and the precedents of this Court 
or the Court of Appeals.  As a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the 
trial court’s termination orders should be affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
This case is yet another example of bad facts making bad law. The majority’s 
decision undermines parental rights and expands the definition of abandonment 
because to do otherwise, in the majority’s view, would “raise serious questions about 
the extent, if any, to which an incarcerated individual subject to limitations upon his 
ability to contact a child that he had allegedly abused could ever be found to have 
abandoned his or her children for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) regardless of 
that parent’s failure to do what he or she could have done to show love, affection, and 
parental concern for his or her children.” Stated more simply, the majority would like 
to make sure that a parent’s rights to a child can be terminated if the parent abuses 
the child, even if the parent is incarcerated. While I certainly agree with that 
objective, the General Assembly has already addressed it. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) (2019) (allowing for the termination of parental rights if a parent has 
abused the child). It is therefore unnecessary, as the majority does today, to expand 
the definition of willful abandonment to include a factual situation as limited as the 
one before us in this case. I would remand this case to the trial court for additional 
findings. 
As the majority acknowledges, the trial court’s order shows that the judgment 
terminating respondent’s parental rights was based on findings that respondent did 
not have any contact with the children since 2013, that he did not attempt to contact 
or see them in the six months preceding the termination petition, and that he did not 
IN RE A.G.D. 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-2- 
file a motion in the civil custody case to modify the no-contact provisions of the 2014 
custody order.1 None of these findings support the conclusion that respondent 
willfully abandoned his children. 
First, respondent’s mere lack of contact does not demonstrate that he had a 
purposeful, deliberative, and manifest willful determination to forego all parental 
duties and relinquish all parental claims to Amy and Andy, because he was prohibited 
by court order from contacting the children. Cf. In re T.C.B., 166 N.C. App. 482, 486–
87, 602 S.E.2d 17, 19–20 (2004) (holding that a trial court’s conclusion of willful 
abandonment was not supported by its findings regarding lack of visits, because a 
protection plan between DSS and the mother prohibited visitation with the 
respondent-father, and because the respondent-father’s attorney instructed him not 
to have any contact with the child); In re K.C., 247 N.C. App. 84, 88, 805 S.E.2d 299, 
301–02 (2016) (holding that a trial court’s conclusion of neglect by abandonment was 
not supported by its findings regarding lack of visits, because the petitioner-father 
denied the respondent-mother’s request for visitation “on the grounds that the child’s 
therapist determined that visits should be suspended indefinitely”). Willful 
abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) requires willful abdication of parental 
responsibility, which simply does not occur if a parent does not contact his children 
                                            
1 The majority separately claims that the trial court based its conclusions, in part, on 
respondent’s failure to maintain contact with the children’s mother. The trial court’s order 
contains no statement to that effect. 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
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in compliance with a court order. Cf. Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 
597, 608 (1962) (defining abandonment “as wilful neglect and refusal to perform the 
natural and legal obligations of parental care and support”); id. at 502, 126 S.E.2d at 
608 (“Abandonment requires a wilful intent to escape parental responsibility and 
conduct in effectuation of such intent.”). Respondent’s mere lack of contact thus does 
not support the trial court’s conclusion on the ground of willful abandonment. 
Second, the fact that respondent did not file a motion seeking to modify the no-
contact provisions of the civil custody order similarly does not demonstrate that he 
willfully abandoned his children. Filing a motion to modify custody or visitation is 
evidence that a parent does not have a willful determination to forego all parental 
duties and relinquish all parental claims to a child. See, e.g., In re D.T.L., 219 N.C. 
App. 219, 222, 722 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2012) (“Having been prohibited by court order 
from contacting either petitioner or the juveniles, respondent’s filing of a civil custody 
action clearly establishes that he desired to maintain custody of the juveniles and 
cannot support a conclusion that he had a willful determination to forego all parental 
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the juveniles.”). However, the trial court’s 
findings do not indicate that respondent could have successfully modified the civil 
custody order with such a motion. Actual modification of custody or visitation 
requires a parent to show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare 
of the child. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 473, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003) (“It 
is well established in this jurisdiction that a trial court may order a modification of 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
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an existing child custody order between two natural parents if the party moving for 
modification shows that a ‘substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare 
of the child’ warrants a change in custody.” (quoting Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 
619, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899 (1998))); Charett v. Charett, 42 N.C. App. 189, 193, 256 
S.E.2d 238, 241 (1979) (applicable here because “[c]ustody and visitation are two 
facets of the same issue.”). Given his continued incarceration on pending charges that 
included child pornography and sexual offenses against Amy, respondent could not 
show the required substantial change in circumstances necessary to modify the civil 
custody order. Respondent’s failure to file a meritless motion in the civil custody case 
thus does not support the trial court’s conclusion that he willfully abandoned his 
children. 
To be sure, there may be other facts the petitioner could establish and the trial 
court could find that would support a conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned 
his children or that another ground for termination of his parental rights exists in 
this case. But our ruling today should be based solely on the facts that have been 
found by the trial court in its order terminating respondent’s parental rights on the 
ground of willful abandonment. See In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 
(2019) (“We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 ‘to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 
111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984))). 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
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The majority makes two additional mistakes on its path to affirming the trial 
court. First, the trial court’s findings concerning respondent’s attorneys being “unable 
to ascertain” whether respondent wished to contest the termination somehow become 
support for the conclusion that respondent manifested a willful determination to 
forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to his children. However 
accurate the attorneys’ statements may have been, those statements are not 
competent evidence of abandonment. Second, the majority essentially flips the 
burden of proof by reasoning that a lack of evidence in the record justifies a finding 
of abandonment because the father was “not excused from showing an interest in his 
children’s welfare.” This second point must be addressed in detail. 
It remains true that the fact of a parent’s incarceration neither requires a court 
to terminate the incarcerated parent’s rights nor prevents a court from doing so. See 
In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153, 804 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2017) (“Our precedents are 
quite clear—and remain in full force—that ‘[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither 
a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision.’ ” (alteration in 
original) (quoting In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 10, 618 S.E.2d 241, 247 (2005))). 
Indeed, this Court recently held that there were sufficient facts to support a finding 
of abandonment where the order barring the incarcerated father from having any 
contact with the minor child was merely a temporary custody order, and where there 
was evidence in the record that the father had the capacity to seek modification of 
the custody order and failed to do so because he felt he was not able to be a father to 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
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his child.  See In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 394, 831 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019) (“A temporary 
custody order is by definition provisional, and the order at issue here expressly 
contemplated the possibility that the no-contact provision would be modified in a 
future order.”); see also In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 19–23, 832 S.E.2d at 695–97 (holding 
that abandonment was established despite the fact that respondent had been 
incarcerated for approximately three of the relevant six months before the filing of 
the petition because respondent made no attempt to contact the child while not 
incarcerated and there was no court order barring him from doing so). 
In this case, however, the record is silent as to whether the respondent could 
successfully modify the court orders that prevented him from having any contact 
whatsoever with his children. Thus, we are confronted with a situation similar to the 
situation in In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 837 S.E.2d 861 (2020). In that case, we held that 
respondent’s incarceration, by itself, cannot serve as clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence of neglect. Instead, the 
extent to which a parent’s incarceration or violation of the 
terms and conditions of probation support a finding of 
neglect depends upon an analysis of the relevant facts and 
circumstances, including the length of the parent’s 
incarceration. The trial court’s findings do not contain any 
such analysis. 
 
Id. at 283, 837 S.E.2d at 867–68. Likewise, the bare bones order in this case does not 
provide sufficient facts to support the conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned 
his children. The trial court’s findings do little more than establish that at the time 
of the hearing respondent was in jail awaiting trial, under a court order not to contact 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
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his children. There are therefore few facts upon which to distinguish this case from 
In re K.N. 
Accordingly, the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the 
ground of willful abandonment exists to terminate respondent’s parental rights.  
Willful abandonment was the only basis upon which the trial court terminated 
respondent’s parental rights to the minor children, and I would therefore vacate the 
trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.