Title: State v. Warrick D. Floyd
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP002062-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2000

2000 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Warrick D. Floyd,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 22, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Beloit 
 
JUDGE: 
Edwin C. Dahlberg 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the Defendant-Appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by David D. Leeper, Madison. 
 
 
For the Plaintiff-Respondent the cause was argued 
by Lara M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 14 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2062-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
 
   IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Warrick D. Floyd,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, 
Edwin C. Dahlberg, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1997-98).1  The defendant, Warrick D. 
Floyd, asserts that he is entitled to sentence credit for the 
time he spent in confinement on an armed robbery charge that was 
dismissed and read in for purposes of sentencing.  Because we 
determine that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) requires sentence credit 
                     
1 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
FEB 22, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
2 
for confinement on charges that are dismissed and read in at 
sentencing, we reverse and remand for a recalculation of Floyd’s 
sentence credit. 
¶2 
The facts are undisputed.  On February 5, 1997, Floyd 
was charged with recklessly endangering safety while armed with 
a dangerous weapon, carrying a concealed weapon, fourth-degree 
sexual assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass.   He 
was 
released 
on 
a 
$3,500 
personal 
recognizance 
bond.  
Subsequently, the State filed a four-count information including 
all of the charges with the exception of the sexual assault 
charge.  Floyd’s recognizance bond was not modified until it was 
revoked upon his guilty plea to the reckless endangerment charge 
on September 19, 1997. 
¶3 
While free on bond, Floyd was arrested on April 15, 
1997 for armed robbery.  The court set a $15,000 cash bond for 
his release on the armed robbery charge.  Unable to post bond, 
Floyd remained in custody from April 15, 1997 until November 18, 
1997, the date of the sentencing hearing. 
¶4 
As part of a plea agreement, the State agreed to 
dismiss the armed robbery charge and file a lesser charge of 
                                                                  
The defendant appeals an order of the Circuit Court for 
Rock County, Edwin C. Dahlberg, Judge, denying his post-
conviction motions. 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
3 
felony bail jumping.2  On September 19, 1997, Floyd pled guilty 
to both the original reckless endangerment charge and the felony 
bail jumping charge with the understanding that all remaining 
charges, including the armed robbery charge, would be dismissed 
and read in at sentencing.  The circuit court then ordered a 
pre-sentence report. 
¶5 
The description of the armed robbery charge contained 
in the report was both lengthy and detailed.  An equal amount of 
discussion was devoted to the read-in armed robbery charge as to 
the reckless endangerment charge.  The victim impact statement 
in the report also related the serious consequences of Floyd’s 
armed 
robbery 
charge, 
describing 
the 
victim’s 
various 
psychological and financial problems.   
¶6 
On November 18, 1997, all of the dismissed charges, 
including the armed robbery charge, were read in at the 
sentencing hearing.  On the reckless endangerment charge, Floyd 
received the maximum sentence of five years.3   The circuit court 
                     
2  The bail jumping charge stemmed from Floyd’s testimony 
that he had used illegal drugs in violation of his personal 
recognizance bond in the reckless endangerment case. 
3 The maximum term of imprisonment for second degree 
reckless endangerment is two years.  Wis. Stat. § 941.30(2); 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(e).  Floyd also received a penalty 
enhancement for having committed the offense with a dangerous 
weapon.  For a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of two 
years or less, the penalty enhancement may not exceed three 
years.  Wis. Stat.  § 939.63(4).  Thus, Floyd received the 
maximum sentence permitted.  
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
4 
withheld sentencing on the bail jumping charge and placed Floyd 
on five years probation, consecutive to the sentence of five 
years imprisonment.    
¶7 
Upon an inquiry by the court as to the appropriate 
sentence credit on the reckless endangerment charge, Floyd’s 
attorney requested 217 days of credit for the time Floyd spent 
in custody from the date of his arrest on armed robbery to the 
date of sentencing.  Challenging that calculation, the State 
suggested Floyd was entitled to only 61 days of credit for the 
period between his plea to reckless endangerment on September 19 
and the sentencing on November 18.  In response, Floyd’s 
attorney altered his position and agreed with the State’s 
computation of sentence credit.  The court then ordered that 61 
days of credit be applied towards the sentence for reckless 
endangerment. 
¶8 
Subsequently, Floyd filed a post-conviction motion 
seeking to remedy the inadequate award of sentence credit.4  He 
alleged that under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) he was entitled to an 
additional 157 days of credit for the period he remained in 
custody from April 15, 1997, the date of his arrest on the 
                     
4 Floyd also filed an amended post-conviction motion that 
added a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Since we 
resolve this case on a statutory basis for sentence credit, we 
need not address Floyd’s post-conviction arguments as to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
5 
charge of armed robbery, to September 19, 1997, the date of his 
guilty plea.  Since the armed robbery charge was read in and 
considered by the court at sentencing, Floyd claimed that he was 
entitled to the days spent in custody on that charge. 
¶9 
The State moved to dismiss the post-conviction motion 
on the basis that Floyd’s custody on the armed robbery charge 
was not connected to the conduct for which the sentence was 
imposed in the reckless endangerment case.  The circuit court 
granted the State’s motion and denied Floyd additional sentence 
credit, observing that he was not entitled to credit “for any 
time he spent on the armed robbery charge unless and until he is 
convicted of that charge.” 
¶10 Floyd filed a notice of appeal, renewing his post-
conviction arguments and supplementing his statutory sentence 
credit argument with a constitutional claim that the denial of 
sentence credit based on his indigency constituted a violation 
of equal protection.  The court of appeals subsequently 
presented for certification the following question on the issue 
of sentence credit:  
[W]hether a dismissed charge that is read in for the 
purpose of sentencing on another conviction is “in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence 
was imposed,” or constitutes “an offense for which the 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
6 
offender is ultimately sentenced” within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1).5  
¶11 Our inquiry, as set forth in the certified question, 
begins with an examination of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), the 
statutory basis of Floyd’s claim.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that we decide independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court or court of 
appeals.  Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 
54, 596 N.W.2d 456 (1999).   
¶12 The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the 
intent of the legislature in enacting the statutory provision.  
Our first step in the interpretation of a statute focuses on its 
plain language.  State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 377, 340 
N.W.2d 511 (1983).  If the plain language proves ambiguous, we 
look beyond the language to examine the scope, history, context, 
and purpose of the statute.  State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 
Wis. 2d 516, 538, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998).  A statute is ambiguous 
if reasonable, well-informed persons may differ as to its 
meaning.  State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 48, 
559 N.W.2d 900 (1997).   
                     
5 The court of appeals also certified the question of   
whether it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to deny 
sentence credit due to indigency pending the dismissal of a 
charge that was read in for sentencing purposes.   Because our 
examination of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 resolves the present case, 
we do not address the second certified question.  State v. 
Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997).  
 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
7 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 governs sentence credit and 
states in pertinent part: 
 
(1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed.  As used in 
this 
subsection, “actual 
days spent in 
custody” 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial; 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and 
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
Since 
neither 
Floyd 
nor 
the 
State 
dispute 
that 
Floyd's 
confinement constitutes “custody” under the statute, the two 
critical phrases for the purposes of our analysis are: “in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed” and “related to an offense for which the offender is 
ultimately sentenced.”6 
¶14 Floyd sets forth two principal arguments in support of 
his claim that he is entitled to credit under Wis. Stat. 
                     
6  During oral argument, both parties suggested that the 
second sentence of Wis. § 973.155(1), which defines days spent 
in custody as “confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced,” is not pertinent in our 
analysis of whether Floyd is entitled to sentence credit.  
However, the court of appeals takes a different view of the 
phrase and observes that the ambiguity as to read-in charges 
stems from this critical language.  We agree. Floyd has also 
asserted the relevance of this language throughout his briefs 
submitted before this court and has rested one of his principal 
statutory arguments on the phrase. 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
8 
§ 973.155(1).  First, he maintains that under the plain meaning 
of the first phrase, “in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed,” he should receive sentence 
credit for the period spent in custody on the armed robbery 
charge.  He asserts that it was connected to the reckless 
endangerment charge by virtue of being dismissed and read in at 
sentencing in exchange for a plea to reckless endangerment.  
Since the dismissal and subsequent read-in of the armed robbery 
charge are procedurally “connected” to the “course of conduct” 
for which the sentence was imposed, Floyd contends that such a 
link represents yet another type of significant connection that 
meets the requirement for sentence credit.   
¶15 However, the proposition that a procedural connection 
may satisfy the statutory requirement has already been rejected 
by a court addressing a similar scenario.  In State v. 
Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997), the 
defendant was charged with bail jumping for violating the 
conditions of his personal recognizance bond on a sexual assault 
charge.  Unable to post cash bail in his bail jumping case, the 
defendant remained in custody for 44 days.    
¶16 The defendant subsequently pled guilty to both sexual 
assault and bail jumping and received a sentence of ten years 
imprisonment for sexual assault.  His sentence of five years 
imprisonment for bail jumping was stayed in favor of probation. 
 He then sought sentence credit towards the sexual assault 
sentence for the 44 days spent in custody in his bail jumping 
case.  The defendant asserted that these 44 days were “in 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
9 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed,” because they resulted from his violation of the 
conditions of the bond on the sexual assault charge.   
¶17 The court dismissed the defendant’s interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), reasoning that although a defendant’s 
custody may have some partial connection to another crime, “that 
does not mean that the custody, for credit purposes, is related 
to ‘the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.’”  Id. 
at 498.  Beiersdorf underscores that a factual connection 
fulfills the statutory requirement for sentence credit, and that 
a procedural or other tangential connection will not suffice.    
¶18 Floyd’s next argument addresses the second statutory 
phrase set forth in the certified question: “[related to] an 
offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced.”  He 
contends that because the trial court took the read-in armed 
robbery charge into account when sentencing him for reckless 
endangerment, his confinement on the armed robbery charge was 
related to an offense for which he was ultimately sentenced.  
This statutory phrase of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) appears to 
be 
ambiguous 
and 
is 
subject 
to 
differing 
reasonable 
interpretations. 
¶19 A narrow construction of the statute would allow 
credit only on the charge for which the offender is convicted.  
A broader construction would include credit for a read-in 
offense upon which the sentence ultimately might be based.  The 
former construction focuses on the basis of the conviction, and 
the latter focuses on the basis of the sentencing.  
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
10
¶20 Since Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) is ambiguous in this 
respect, we look beyond the language to examine the statute’s 
history and purpose in order to discern the legislative intent. 
 Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d at 538.  Wisconsin’s sentence 
credit statute has its roots in the constitutional principle of 
equal protection and was an immediate response to this court’s 
call for action in Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 
285 (1977).   
¶21 The 
Klimas 
court, 
addressing 
equal 
protection 
concerns, urged the legislature to provide sentence credit for 
custody based on an indigent defendant’s inability to post bail. 
 Id. at 250.  Although the holding in Klimas was limited to 
requiring sentence credit in the case of the defendants treated 
disparately due to their financial status, the court also 
encouraged the adoption of a broader rule based on the existing 
federal law.  Id. at 251.  
¶22 The legislature responded by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, which expanded sentence credit beyond the scope of 
Klimas.  The statute was fashioned in large part on both the 
federal sentence credit statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3568, and the Model 
Penal Code.  State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 91-92, 423 
N.W.2d 533 (1988).  Underlying the adoption of Wis. Stat.       
 § 973.155 was the intent to bring the law of Wisconsin into 
conformity with the broad federal statute, which provided for 
sentence credit for any pre-sentence confinement period, whether 
arising from a financial inability to post bail, unwillingness 
to grant release on bail, or for the purpose of examination.   
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
11
Id.  See also Legislative Council Notes to 1977 Senate Bill 159, 
sec. 9. 
¶23 In State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 
382 (1985), this court noted the broad statutory base of the 
sentence credit statute which exceeded the restricted scope of 
the common law.  The court further recognized the remedial 
purpose underlying the conscious effort to provide sentence 
credit in a wide range of situations, observing that the statute 
was  “designed to afford fairness” and ensure “that a person not 
serve more time than he is sentenced.”  Id.   
¶24 With the history and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
in mind, we next examine the nature of read-in charges to 
determine whether the inclusion of these charges comports with 
the legislative scheme of the statute.  Wisconsin’s read-in 
procedure was set forth in Austin v. State: 
 
Under our read-in procedure, the defendant does not 
plead to any charges and therefore is not sentenced on 
any of the read-in charges but such admitted uncharged 
offenses are considered in sentencing him on the 
charged offense. 
49 Wis. 2d 727, 732, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).  Although Austin 
addressed the validity of negotiated agreements not to prosecute 
in exchange for a read-in of defendant’s uncharged offenses, its 
description of read-in charges is nevertheless significant to 
our analysis.   
¶25 Read-ins constitute admissions by the defendant to 
those charges.  Id.; State v. Cleaves, 181 Wis. 2d 73, 78-79, 
510 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1993).  The sentencing court considers 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
12
read-ins as part of a defendant’s conduct in determining the 
appropriate sentence, and the state is prohibited from future 
prosecution of these charges.  Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 
157, 174 N.W.2d 521 (1970); State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 
740, 753, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 1990).  
¶26 An offender does not run the risk of consecutive or 
concurrent sentences based on read-in charges and, in that 
respect, is not formally sentenced on these charges.  Austin, 49 
Wis. 2d at 727.   However, there is exposure to the risk of a 
lengthier sentence as a result of consideration by the court of 
read-in charges.  Id.    
¶27 By their very nature, read-ins stand apart from other 
charges that may be considered by a sentencing court.  The 
implication is that more weight is placed on the admitted 
charges than on unproven or acquitted offenses.  Szarkowitz, 157 
Wis. 2d at 753-54.  See also Annotation, Court’s Right, in 
Imposing Sentence, to Hear Evidence of, or to Consider, Other 
Offenses Committed by Defendant, 96 A.L.R. 2d 768, 787 sec. 7(a) 
(1964).  
¶28 In examining whether Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) provides 
sentence credit for confinement on read-in charges, we are 
guided by the discussion in State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 
740, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 1990). The Szarkowitz court was 
asked to interpret an ambiguity in the restitution statute and 
determine whether the language providing that a defendant pay 
restitution “to any victim of the crime” included victims of 
read-in offenses.  Id. at 751.   
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
13
¶29 Recognizing the remedial purpose of the restitution 
statute, as well as the distinct character of read-in charges, 
the court adopted an expansive reading of the language to 
include read-in offenses rather than restricting the statute’s 
application exclusively to convictions.  Id. at 755-56.  The 
court did not, however, extend the scope of the statute to other 
offenses unrelated to the crimes of conviction or read-in 
crimes.  Id. at 756.  The legislature subsequently amended the 
restitution statute consistent with the Szarkowitz rationale.  
See Wis. Stat. § 973.20. 
¶30 The State argues that an expansive interpretation of 
the sentence credit statute will release the floodgates and 
result in sentence credit for a myriad of dismissed and other 
charges that also may be considered or mentioned at sentencing. 
 Because we limit the reach of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) to 
charges that are dismissed and read in at sentencing, we neither 
share the State’s ominous prediction nor envision a deluge of 
unwarranted claims for sentence credit.   
¶31 In limiting the statute’s scope, we recognize the 
important 
distinction between 
read-ins 
and 
other charges, 
including pending charges, acquittals or dismissals.  The unique 
nature of read-in charges and this state’s read-in procedure, 
viewed in the context of the legislative history and purpose of 
the sentence credit statute, lead us to conclude the legislature 
intended that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) provide sentence credit 
for these charges.  Applying the rule of lenity, we also 
construe this ambiguous statute strictly in favor of Floyd.  
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
14
State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 417, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983); 
State v. Frey, 178 Wis. 2d 729, 745, 505 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 
1993).    
¶32 In summary, we determine that pre-trial confinement on 
a dismissed charge that is read in at sentencing relates to “an 
offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced.”   
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), Floyd is entitled to 
sentence credit for the time spent in confinement from the date 
of his arrest on armed robbery to the date of sentencing.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court with 
directions to recalculate Floyd’s sentence credit. 
By the Court.-The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 
98-2062-CR 
 
 
1