Title: Michelle Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance
Citation: 2008 WI 52
Docket Number: 2005AP002796
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2008

2008 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2796 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Michelle Richards, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Badger Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
 
David Schrimpf, 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Tomakia Pratchet, 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 255 
Reported at: 297 Wis. 2d 699, 727 N.W.2d 69 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, JR., JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by 
James 
J. 
Murphy, 
Keith 
R. 
Stachowiak 
and 
Murphy 
& 
Prachthauser, 
Milwaukee, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Keith 
R. 
Stachowiak. 
 
For the defendant-third-party plaintiff-appellant there was 
a brief by Eric S. Darling and Schmidt, Darling & Erwin, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Eric S. Darling. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ralph A. Weber, Beth 
Ermatinger Hanan and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Ralph A. Weber, on behalf of Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Joshua P. Dau and Godfrey & Kahn S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance and the Property Casualty Insurers 
Association of America, and oral argument by James A. Friedman. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2796 
(L.C. No.  2004CV392) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michelle Richards, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Badger Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
David Schrimpf, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Tomakia Pratchet, 
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We are asked to review 
a decision of the court of appeals that reversed the circuit 
court's decision,1 which concluded that the stipulated facts of 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Patricia D. McMahon of Milwaukee County 
presiding. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
2 
 
this case present a "common scheme or plan" that invokes joint 
and several liability under Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) (2005-06).2  
We affirm the court of appeals.   
¶2 
We conclude as follows:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
is the legislative codification of the concerted action theory 
of liability; (2) the damages in this case resulted from the 
consumption of beer to the point of intoxication and the 
subsequent decision to drive while intoxicated; and (3) although 
Robert Zimmerlee, David Schrimpf, and Tomakia Pratchet acted "in 
accordance with a common scheme or plan" to procure beer, they 
did not so act in consuming beer to the point of intoxication 
and in the subsequent act of driving while intoxicated, and, 
therefore, David Schrimpf is not jointly and severally liable 
under 
§ 895.045(2) 
for 
the 
death 
of 
Chris 
Richards.  
Accordingly, Badger Mutual Insurance Company is relieved from 
making any further payment to Michelle Richards.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
An ill-conceived idea between teenagers to "get some 
beer" one evening culminated in tragedy the next morning when an 
intoxicated Robert Zimmerlee, 19, failed to stop for a stop sign 
and smashed into the driver's side of Christopher Richards' 
vehicle, killing him instantly.  Chris' wife, Michelle Richards 
(Richards), sought to recover damages.  She initially pursued a 
negligence claim against Zimmerlee and his insurer.  The parties 
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
3 
 
settled on a Pierringer3 basis for $1,312,500,4 and Zimmerlee is 
therefore not a party to this appeal.  After Richards received 
the settlement, she then brought a wrongful death action against 
David Schrimpf, 19, who was the passenger in Zimmerlee's car, 
and 
Schrimpf's 
insurer, 
Badger 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Company, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.04.  Richards alleged that Schrimpf 
illegally procured beer and that Zimmerlee's consumption of the 
beer resulted in Christopher Richards' wrongful death.  Schrimpf 
joined Tomakia Pratchet, who purchased the beer for Zimmerlee 
and Schrimpf, in the litigation.   
¶4 
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case.  
Events leading to the accident unfolded the prior evening, when 
Schrimpf and Zimmerlee decided to "go get some beer."  Schrimpf 
was employed at a West Allis restaurant, and he said that one of 
his co-workers, Pratchet, would be able to purchase the beer for 
them because she was of-age. 
¶5 
Zimmerlee and Schrimpf drove together to Schrimpf's 
employer, where Pratchet was working that evening.  Schrimpf 
entered and spoke with Pratchet about her purchasing beer for 
him and Zimmerlee.  Pratchet agreed.  Schrimpf also spoke with 
another co-worker, Jennifer Spencer, who invited Schrimpf to a 
party at her home that evening.   
                                                 
3 Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 
(1963). 
4 The parties stipulated that Richards' total damages equal 
$1,785,714.29. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
4 
 
¶6 
From the restaurant, Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet 
traveled together to a nearby grocer, where Pratchet purchased 
an 18-pack of beer for Zimmerlee and Schrimpf with money 
Zimmerlee provided.  The two dropped Pratchet off at a bus stop 
and Zimmerlee and Schrimpf went their separate ways for several 
hours, with the beer remaining in Zimmerlee's car. 
¶7 
Later 
that 
evening, 
Schrimpf 
and 
Zimmerlee 
reconnected, and with 18-pack in tow, arrived at Spencer's party 
between 12 midnight and 1:00 a.m.  While Schrimpf drank "some" 
of the beer, Zimmerlee consumed "maybe half" of the 18 beers. 
¶8 
At approximately 7:30 a.m., the duo left Spencer's 
party.  Schrimpf sat in the passenger seat, and Zimmerlee took 
the wheel of his car.  They proceeded only half a block before 
colliding with Chris Richards' vehicle.   
¶9 
Two days before trial was set to commence, the parties 
entered into a settlement agreement.  By the terms of that 
settlement agreement, the jury trial was waived and the parties 
agreed to allow the circuit judge to decide the question of 
whether Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance 
with a common scheme or plan that caused damage to Chris and 
Michelle Richards.  The circuit court answered that question in 
the affirmative and held the parties jointly and severally 
liable for Richards' damages.   
¶10 There is no dispute that Zimmerlee was negligent in 
the operation of his vehicle and that his negligence was a cause 
of the accident and death of Chris Richards.  There is also no 
dispute that the beer was a substantial factor in causing the 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
5 
 
accident and the death.  Both Schrimpf and Pratchet were 
"providers" of alcoholic beverages to Zimmerlee, as defined by 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) and were therefore negligent under Wis. 
Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)1.   
¶11 The parties also agreed to the apportionment of causal 
negligence among them:  Zimmerlee at 72 percent; Schrimpf at 14 
percent; and Pratchet at 14 percent.  The parties stipulated to 
Richards' damages and that Schrimpf's and Pratchet's combined 
causal negligence resulted in $500,000 of the total damages, or 
$250,000 each.  Accordingly, the parties agreed that Richards 
was to be paid $250,000, as Schrimpf's share of the total 
damages, regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit.  If the 
final court decision in this case concluded that the parties did 
not act in accordance with a common scheme or plan that resulted 
in Richards' damages, Richards would not receive the 14 percent 
of the damages that remained unpaid.  If, however, it was 
concluded that the parties did act in accordance with such 
common scheme or plan that caused Richards' damages, then 
Schrimpf and Pratchet would be jointly and severally liable to 
Richards and, therefore, Schrimpf, and thereby Badger Mutual, 
would be required to pay Richards an additional $250,000 to 
cover the remainder of the damages.   
¶12 What the parties dispute is whether the foregoing 
stipulated facts give rise to joint and several liability under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).  The parties contest whether Zimmerlee, 
Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
6 
 
or plan that resulted in Richards' damages, as those terms are 
used in § 895.045(2). 
¶13 The court of appeals concluded that the parties were 
not jointly and severally liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
for Richards' damages.  It held that, although the parties "had 
an agreement to purchase alcohol," that agreement did not 
include Zimmerlee's driving while intoxicated, which resulted in 
the damages.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 255, 
¶27, 297 Wis. 2d 699, 727 N.W.2d 69.  Richards petitioned for 
review, which we granted.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶14 The outcome of this case hinges on the interpretation 
and application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).  The interpretation 
and application of a statute are questions of law that we review 
independently, "but benefiting from the analyses of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court."  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 
N.W.2d 110.  
B. 
The Parties' Positions 
¶15 Both parties posit that Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) is 
unambiguous; however, they offer differing interpretations and 
applications of it under the facts before us.  Before turning to 
a discussion of the language of the statute, it is instructive 
to recount briefly the parties' respective arguments. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
7 
 
 
1. 
Richards' position 
¶16 Richards argues that the parties agree that Zimmerlee, 
Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan to purchase beer.  She also asserts that the parties 
agree that "as a result of drinking the beer bought for 
[Zimmerlee] pursuant to his and Schrimpf's joint scheme and 
plan, Zimmerlee killed Mr. Richards by the intoxicated use of 
his vehicle."  Further, Richards asserts that the parties have 
stipulated that the beer was a substantial factor in the cause 
of Chris Richards' death.  Richards refers to Judge Fine's 
dissent as a succinct presentation of her argument:  The 
stipulated facts require the conclusion that Chris Richards 
"would not have been killed by Zimmerlee if Zimmerlee had not 
been drunk as a result of drinking alcohol [bought] for him by 
Pratchet." 
 
Richards, 
297 
Wis. 2d 
699, 
¶34 
(Fine, 
J., 
dissenting).  Richards contends that those facts evidence a 
common scheme or plan that falls within Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2), 
resulting 
in 
joint 
and 
several 
liability 
for 
all 
three 
defendants.   
¶17 Furthermore, Richards argues that cannons of statutory 
interpretation preclude this court's consideration of the title 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(2), 
"Concerted 
action," 
when 
interpreting the statute.  Richards argues that, because the 
statute is plain on its face, it is improper for the court to 
consider extrinsic sources to facilitate its interpretation, and 
because Wisconsin law provides that titles of statutes are not 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
8 
 
part of the statute, the title to § 895.045(2) is an extrinsic 
source.  The import of Richards' argument in this regard is 
twofold:  (1) we have not adopted the concerted action theory of 
liability, as embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, 
even though it is incorporated into Wisconsin Jury Instruction 
1740 that attends § 895.045(2).  Therefore, the so-called, but 
misnamed, "concerted action cases" that predate § 895.045(2) 
provide no guidance in interpreting the statute; and (2) the 
enactment of § 895.045(2) did not alter the law in Wisconsin 
that causal negligence is predicated on whether an act or 
omission is a substantial factor in causing harm.  Here, it was 
stipulated that the beer was a substantial factor in causing the 
accident that killed Chris Richards. 
2. 
Badger Mutual's position   
¶18 In response, Badger Mutual argues that, while Richards 
correctly asserts that the statute is unambiguous, Richards 
nevertheless misapprehends the statute's meaning.  First, Badger 
Mutual contends that "Concerted action" is the title for the 
theory of liability described in Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2), as 
shown by the discussions in Wisconsin cases.  Badger argues that 
because the concerted action theory of liability embodied in 
§ 895.045(2) is the concerted action referred to in Wisconsin 
case law, subsection (2) requires that all parties have equal 
causal negligence.  Consequently, because the parties stipulated 
to apportionment of causal negligence among Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, 
and 
Pratchet, 
their 
liability 
to 
Richards 
falls 
within 
subsection (1), not within subsection (2) of § 895.045.   
No. 2005AP2796   
 
9 
 
¶19 Second, 
Badger 
Mutual 
acknowledges 
that 
while 
Schrimpf's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the 
accident, it did not also constitute concerted action, as is 
required before it falls within Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).  Badger 
Mutual contends that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 and 
the common law in regard to concerted action support its 
position.  Badger Mutual contends that the common scheme or plan 
to purchase beer did not damage Chris Richards.  It was the 
reckless driving while intoxicated that resulted in damage to 
Chris Richards.  However, the reckless driving was not part of a 
common scheme or plan in which Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet 
participated. 
 
Accordingly, 
it 
concludes 
that 
Schrimpf's 
liability 
to 
Richards 
falls 
within 
the 
parameters 
of 
§ 895.045(1), not those of subsection (2).   
C. 
Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
1. 
General principles 
¶20 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  We assume that the meaning of a statute is 
expressed in the words the legislature chose.  Id., ¶44.  The 
context in which the operative language appears is important too 
because a statute's meaning may be affected by the context in 
which the words chosen by the legislature are used.  Id., ¶46.  
If our focus on the statute's language yields a plain, clear 
meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
10 
 
according to its plain terms.  Id.  If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, it is unnecessary to consult extrinsic sources to 
facilitate interpretation.  Id. 
¶21 However, if a statute is "capable of being understood 
by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses[,]" 
then the statute is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  When a statute is 
ambiguous, 
we 
may 
resort 
to 
extrinsic 
sources, 
such 
as 
legislative 
history, 
to 
assist 
our 
understanding 
of 
the 
statute's meaning.  Id., ¶48. 
2. 
Statutory history 
¶22 A review of statutory history is part of a plain 
meaning analysis.  Id., ¶69.  Statutory history encompasses the 
previously enacted and repealed provisions of a statute.  By 
analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course 
of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning 
of a statute.  Id.  Therefore, statutory history is part of the 
context in which we interpret the words used in a statute.  
Accordingly, we examine the statutory history that underlies the 
current version of Wis. Stat. § 895.045.   
¶23 The early common law rule of contributory negligence 
that existed prior to 1931, when the predecessor to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) 
was 
enacted, 
required 
that 
any 
contributory 
negligence of a plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery.  
Brewster v. Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 346, 247 N.W. 449 (1933).  
Also at common law, joint and several liability was the rule, 
such that when multiple tortfeasors caused injury to a plaintiff 
who was not contributorily negligent, the plaintiff could 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
11 
 
recover his or her entire damages from any tortfeasor.  Group 
Health Coop. of Eau Claire v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co., 164 
Wis. 2d 632, 634-35, 476 N.W.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1991).   
¶24 In 
1931, 
the 
legislature 
established 
statutory 
comparative negligence.5  This change in the law permitted a 
plaintiff who was contributorily negligent to recover damages if 
his or her negligence was less than the negligence of the person 
from whom recovery was sought.  Lupie v. Hartzheim, 54 Wis. 2d 
415, 416, 195 N.W.2d 461 (1972).  However, the adoption of 
comparative negligence did not change the common law rule of 
joint and several liability for the tortfeasors.  Walker v. 
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 535, 252 N.W. 721 
(1934).   
¶25 In 1971, the legislature renumbered the comparative 
negligence statute to Wis. Stat. § 895.045.  It continued to 
permit a plaintiff who was not more negligent than the defendant 
from whom recovery was sought to recover damages, reduced by the 
amount of the plaintiff's negligence.6  Once again, this change 
did not affect the common law rule of joint and several 
liability.  Group Health, 164 Wis. 2d at 637.  Therefore, in 
suits involving multiple tortfeasors, a comparison of the 
negligence of the plaintiff with that of any tortfeasor 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1931); ch. 242, Laws of 1931.  
6 Wis. Stat. § 895.045 (1971); ch. 47, Laws of 1971. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
12 
 
continued to be made and the full amount of damages7 could be 
recovered from any tortfeasor who was more negligent than the 
plaintiff, even though a second tortfeasor may have been more 
negligent than the tortfeasor from whom recovery was sought.  
Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, ¶10, 244 
Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842.     
¶26 The current version of Wis. Stat. § 895.045 was 
created by 1995 Wis. Act 17.  That Act amended comparative 
negligence in subsection (1) and created subsection (2).  In 
subsection (1), the legislature chose to significantly change 
the law of joint and several liability by limiting the 
circumstances under which joint and several liability could be 
applied.  Id.  The relevant portion of § 895.045(1) provides: 
Comparative negligence.  . . .  The negligence of 
the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the 
negligence of each person found to be causally 
negligent.  The liability of each person found to be 
causally 
negligent 
whose 
percentage 
of 
causal 
negligence is less than 51% is limited to the 
percentage of the total causal negligence attributed 
to that person.  A person found to be causally 
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% 
or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the 
damages allowed.   
Under 
revised 
subsection 
(1), 
a 
contributorily 
negligent 
plaintiff is precluded from recovering more of his or her 
damages 
from 
a 
tortfeasor 
than 
the 
tortfeasor's 
causal 
                                                 
7 The amount due the plaintiff was always first reduced by 
the percentage of plaintiff's negligence.  See Matthies v. 
Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, ¶10, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 
N.W.2d 842. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
13 
 
negligence bears to the total causal negligence.  Id.  For those 
tortfeasors, the common law rule of joint and several liability 
is abrogated.  See id.  Only when a tortfeasor is at least 51 
percent causally negligent will the tortfeasor be jointly and 
severally liable for all damages attributed to all tortfeasors 
in the comparisons made under subsection (1).  Therefore, in 
many cases involving joint tortfeasors and a contributorily 
negligent plaintiff, there no longer is joint and several 
liability.  
¶27 In 
amending 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045 
in 
1995, 
the 
legislature also created subsection (2).  This subsection 
retains the common law rule of joint and several liability in 
the circumstances described in the statute.  Subsection (2) 
provides: 
Concerted action.  Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 
or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan, those parties are jointly and severally 
liable for all damages resulting from that action, 
except as provided in s. 895.043(5).8 
Subsection (2), which the legislature chose to title "Concerted 
action," retains the common law rule of joint and several 
liability, if "that action" is taken in accordance with a common 
scheme 
or 
plan 
resulting 
in 
damages. 
 
However, 
while 
demonstrating a legislative choice to significantly reduce the 
occasions where joint and several liability may be awarded, the 
statutory history underlying § 895.045 does not resolve the 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.043(5) provides:  "The rule of joint 
and several liability does not apply to punitive damages." 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
14 
 
meaning of the terms, "common scheme or plan" and "that action" 
"resulting" in damages that are before us in this review.  Nor 
does it shed light on the title of subsection (2), "Concerted 
action."  However, it does inform us that the legislature meant 
to proscribe the occasions for imposition of joint and several 
liability.9   
3. 
Ambiguity 
¶28 Richards urges us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
such that it applies to persons engaged in a common scheme or 
plan to accomplish a result that in combination with other acts 
ultimately causes harm.  Richards asserts that common law 
concerted action is not what the legislature meant to describe 
in subsection (2).  Badger Mutual contends that the action that 
causes the harm must be undertaken to facilitate the common 
scheme or plan10 and that subsection (2) does embody common law 
concerted action.  These competing interpretations of the terms 
                                                 
9 The amicus brief of Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers 
cites Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, 244 
Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833, as support for its assertion that 
the 1995 amendments to Wis. Stat. § 895.045 did not intend to 
change the common law rule of joint and several liability.  
Reliance on Fuchsgruber for that proposition is misplaced.  
Fuchsgruber explained that a claim for strict products liability 
is not a negligence action under the common law; and therefore, 
because § 895.045(1) involves negligence, it has no application 
to claims of strict products liability.  Id., ¶¶1–3.  
10 Badger Mutual's position is similar to that of the court 
of appeals, which concluded that Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) applies 
to persons engaged in "'a common scheme or plan to accomplish 
the result that injures the plaintiff . . . .'"  Richards v. 
Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 255, ¶25, 297 Wis. 2d 699, 727 
N.W.2d 69 (emphasis in original). 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
15 
 
and 
the 
title 
of 
§ 895.045(2) 
are 
both 
reasonable 
interpretations.  They indicate that the statute is "capable of 
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or 
more senses" and is therefore ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶47.  
¶29 When confronted with an ambiguous statute, we may 
resort to extrinsic sources to help uncover the statute's 
meaning.  Id., ¶48.  The legislative history now available that 
relates to the creation of subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045 is sparse.  However, the Legislative Reference Bureau 
Analysis of an earlier version of the 1995 changes in § 895.045 
that were eventually enacted states:   
This bill modifies the comparative negligence 
system in several ways.  The bill requires that the 
negligence of the plaintiff be measured separately 
against each of the joint tort-feasors.  Under this 
bill, a joint tort-feasor's liability is limited to 
the 
percentage 
of 
the 
total 
causal 
negligence 
attributed to that party.   
 
The bill specifies that the changes in the rule 
of joint and several liability do not apply to parties 
whose concerted action results in damages . . . 
Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 17, Analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau of 1995 S.B. 11, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.  The LRB's analysis supports our conclusion that 
the 1995 changes to § 895.045 were meant to significantly change 
the common law rule of joint and several liability that had 
applied to negligence actions in the past.  However, the 
legislative history provides limited guidance with respect to 
the statutory terms in subsection (2) that we must interpret.  
No. 2005AP2796   
 
16 
 
¶30 The title is not part of a statute according to Wis. 
Stat. § 990.001(6); however, it may be used to assist in 
understanding a statute's meaning.  Brennan v. Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 112 Wis. 2d 38, 41, 331 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 
1983).  We note that the title to Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) is 
"Concerted action."  Concerted action is a theory of liability 
that comes from the common law, as do key words the legislature 
chose to use in subsection (2), such as "common scheme or plan."  
Accordingly, we review Wisconsin's common law and the learned 
treatises cited therein for guidance in interpreting the title 
and terms of subsection (2).  See, e.g., Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 
WI 25, ¶¶15, 16, 19, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 (explaining 
that the words used by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) 
derive in large part from the common law; and therefore, a 
review 
of 
the 
common 
law 
is 
helpful 
to 
statutory 
interpretation).   
4. 
Wisconsin appellate decisions 
¶31 Four published appellate opinions offer potential 
guidance on the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).  Danks v. 
Stock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 
N.W.2d 846; Bruttig v. Olsen, 154 Wis. 2d 270, 453 N.W.2d 153 
(Ct. App. 1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 
N.W.2d 37 (1984); and Ogle v. Avina, 33 Wis. 2d 125, 146 N.W.2d 
422 (1966). 
¶32 Danks provides only the briefest interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).  There, liability for a personal injury 
was at issue.  Danks was injured while assisting his supervisor 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
17 
 
load a truss onto a truck belonging to the manufacturer of the 
truss, Stock Building Supply.  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶1.  
Stock Building Supply had given specific written instructions 
that the truss was not to be lifted in the manner used at the 
time of the accident.  Id., ¶6.  When the truss failed due to 
the improper lift, it fell and Danks was injured.  Id., ¶13.   
¶33 Danks had several theories under which he attempted to 
impose liability on Stock Building Supply.  One of those 
theories 
was 
concerted 
action 
liability, 
in 
which 
Danks 
contended that the lifting of the truss was undertaken in 
accordance with a common scheme or plan pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(2).  Id., ¶38.  The court of appeals decision 
concluding that Stock Building Supply was not liable turned on 
the lack of an affirmative act of negligence by Stock Building 
Supply.  Id., ¶22.   
¶34 However, Danks does interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
as pertaining only to tortfeasors who take concerted action.  
Id., ¶39.  Danks does not discuss the meanings of "Concerted 
action" or "common scheme or plan," but it does note that those 
who act "in concert" will come within the parameters of 
subsection (2): 
Subsection (2) simply modifies subsection (1) of the 
statute to provide that all defendants who are legally 
responsible for causing a plaintiff's damages, and who 
acted in concert in so doing, are jointly and 
severally 
liable 
for 
the 
plaintiff's 
damages, 
irrespective 
of 
whether 
a 
given 
defendant's 
apportioned causal negligence is less than 51%.    
No. 2005AP2796   
 
18 
 
Id.  Danks continues to conclude that "§ 895.045(2) plays no 
role to determine whether a given defendant may be held liable."  
Id., ¶40 (emphasis in original).  Rather, a defendant must be 
liable before subsection (2) may be applied.  Id.  Stated 
otherwise, Danks determined that subsection (2) does not create 
a claim for relief, but instead applies only when a defendant is 
already liable for damages under the substantive law.  That is, 
he or she is causally negligent to a greater extent than the 
plaintiff; and in addition, he or she participated in concerted 
action that resulted in the plaintiff's damages.  Id., ¶¶39-40.  
¶35 Collins precedes Danks and the 1995 revisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045.  There we discussed concerted action as a 
theory of liability and relied on the explanation of that theory 
by Professor Prosser.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 184.  In it we 
explained that: 
The concerted action theory of liability rests 
upon the principle that "those who, in pursuance of a 
common plan or design to commit a tortious act, 
actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation 
or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the 
wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their 
benefit, are equally liable with him.  Express 
agreement is not necessary, and all that is required 
is that there be a tacit understanding." 
Id. (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 46, at 
292 (4th ed. 1971)).  However, we declined to apply the 
concerted action theory when the plaintiff, who sought damages 
from former manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) 
that caused an aggressive form of cervical cancer, could not 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
19 
 
identify the specific manufacturer of the DES that was taken by 
her mother.  Id. at 186.   
¶36 Collins explained that the concerted action theory 
required an agreement among the parties.  Id. at 185.  The 
allegation of Collins was that the "defendants failed to 
adequately test [DES] or to give sufficient warning[s] of its 
dangers."  Id.  We noted that there had been "a substantial 
amount of parallel action by the defendants in producing and 
marketing DES" but that activity did not "rise to the level of 
'acting in concert.'"  Id.  We so concluded because there was no 
agreement that the testing and warnings would be inadequate, and 
it was that type of "agreement" that would have been required to 
show concerted action caused the plaintiff's harm.  Id.  
¶37 Collins is helpful to our analysis.  For example, the 
specificity of the subject matter of the common plan in Collins 
that we concluded was necessary to support the concerted action 
theory of liability is important to our consideration of the 
specificity of the subject matter of the common plan at issue in 
the case before us.  That is, the action that harmed Collins 
must have been that which was undertaken to further the drug 
companies' agreement.  Id.  In addition, Collins equated 
"concerted action," the title of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) with 
"pursuance of a common plan," terms employed in the text of 
subsection (2).  Id. at 184.   
¶38 Bruttig also tackled the topic of concerted action.  
There the plaintiff, Brian Bruttig who was a minor, and two 
friends, also minors, engaged in a game of "snowmobile tag."  
No. 2005AP2796   
 
20 
 
Brian was injured and recovery was denied because his liability 
was greater than that of either of the other two tortfeasors.  
Bruttig, 154 Wis. 2d at 273.  On appeal, Brian argued that he 
and the two defendants were equally negligent "because the tag 
game created a situation of mutual stimulation where the 
negligence of each participant [was] entirely interrelated with 
that of the others and therefore each should be charged with the 
causal negligence of the other."  Id. at 280.  The court of 
appeals recognized the argument as the theory of concerted 
action liability in which "the jury would not be permitted to 
apportion damages."  Id. (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law 
of Torts § 46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971)).   
¶39 The court of appeals noted that the concerted action 
theory of liability has never been "explicitly adopted" in 
Wisconsin.  Id. at 280.  It also noted that Brian had not raised 
this theory of liability in the circuit court.  Therefore, it 
rejected his argument to apply it on appeal.   Id. at 281.   
¶40 Bruttig's discussion is helpful, as it reviews Brian's 
claim that the three boys "acted in concert," which terms are 
similar to the title of subsection (2):  "Concerted action."  
Bruttig acknowledges that the theory that Brian is proffering is 
"a separate theory of liability, that of 'concerted action.'"  
Id. at 280.  This is significant because Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
requires proof of a separate theory of liability for one who may 
already be a tortfeasor under subsection (1), in order to accord 
joint and several liability.  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶39.  That 
is, subsection (2) requires a plaintiff to prove that the 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
21 
 
tortfeasor acted "in accordance with a common scheme or plan" 
and also that the common scheme or plan the tortfeasor acted in 
accordance with resulted in damages.  Id.  Subsection (2) is not 
applicable in every case where joint tortfeasors are present. 
¶41 Our review of Wisconsin case law that touches on the 
concerted action theory of liability concludes with Ogle.  In 
Ogle, we held that both negligent participants in a "drag race" 
were equally liable for a fatal collision resulting from their 
negligence, even though only one of the tortfeasors struck a 
third automobile causing injury.  Ogle, 33 Wis. 2d at 135.  
¶42 In Ogle, two cars were racing at a high rate of speed 
in the same direction down a highway, when the lead car collided 
with the plaintiff's car.  Id. at 128-30.  In holding both 
defendants equally liable for the collision without specifically 
referencing "concerted action," we applied the principles of 
concerted action:  
We think when there is an understanding to reach 
a common destination and in doing so illegal speed is 
used and the cars are driven so closely together as to 
be practically in tandem, or to constitute a unit, 
that we have a situation of mutual stimulation where 
the negligence of each participant is so related to 
the negligence of the other participants that the 
participants should each be chargeable with the causal 
negligence of the other as to speed and their 
percentage of causal negligence should be equal. 
Id. at 135.  The mutual agreement to use excessive speed to 
reach an agreed upon destination formed the basis for the 
tortfeasors' concerted action.  Id.  
No. 2005AP2796   
 
22 
 
¶43 This court went on to explain in Ogle that the usual 
rule of apportioning causal negligence between tortfeasors whose 
negligence combined or concurred in causing injury does not 
apply with "mutual fault" for the injury that occurred.  Id.  
Rather, the tortfeasors in Ogle each assumed the fault of the 
other and causal negligence was apportioned equally between 
them.  Id.  Badger Mutual argues that the concept of equal fault 
for tortfeasors in concerted actions is significant to the case 
before us because the parties have agreed to apportioned causal 
negligence.  Richards maintains it has no relevancy. 
5. 
Learned treatises 
¶44 Because discussions of the concerted action theory of 
liability in Professor Prosser's The Law of Torts, as well as 
those provided by The Restatement (Second) of Torts, are so 
prominent in the cases that discuss the concerted action theory 
of liability, we review those learned treatises as well, before 
interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).  Prosser's 
explanation of the historic context of the concerted action 
theory of liability is helpful.  It provides: 
The original meaning . . . was that of vicarious 
liability for concerted action.  All persons who acted 
in concert to commit a trespass, in pursuance of a 
common design, were held liable for the entire result.  
In such a case there was a common purpose, with mutual 
aid in carrying it out; in short, there was a joint 
enterprise, so that "all coming to do an unlawful act, 
and of one party, the act of one is the act of all of 
the same party being present."  Each was therefore 
liable for the entire damage done . . . .  [S]ince 
each was liable for all, the jury would not be 
permitted to apportion the damages. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
23 
 
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 46, at 
322-23 (5th ed. 1984) (quoted citations omitted).  This historic 
framework for concerted action is helpful to our understanding 
of the mutuality of agreement that is necessary in order to have 
a common scheme or plan under the concerted action theory of 
liability, as well as to understanding the statutory terms used 
to express the concerted action theory of liability.   
¶45 Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is 
also helpful.  It provides:   
Persons Acting in Concert 
For harm resulting to a third person from the 
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to 
liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the 
other or pursuant to a common design with him, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or 
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in 
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, 
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to 
the third person. 
Comment on Clause (a):  Parties are acting in 
concert when they act in accordance with an agreement 
to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to 
accomplish a particular result.  The agreement need 
not be expressed in words and may be implied and 
understood to exist from the conduct itself.  Whenever 
two or more persons commit tortious acts in concert, 
each becomes subject to liability for the acts of the 
others, as well as for his own acts.  The theory of 
the early common law was that there was a mutual 
agency of each to act for the others, which made all 
liable for the tortious acts of any one.  
No. 2005AP2796   
 
24 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, at 315-16 (1979).  The 
Comment to Clause (a) is particularly helpful in its description 
of mutual agency and that it was mutual agency that made all the 
actors liable for one another's tortious acts. 
¶46 From our review of Wisconsin cases and learned 
treatises, wherein principles of concerted action are discussed, 
terms similar to those in Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) are employed 
and the concerted action theory of liability is explained, we 
conclude that § 895.045(2) is the codification of the concerted 
action theory of liability.  The statute is consistent with the 
concerted action theory as explained by Wisconsin courts11 and in 
learned treatises such as Prosser's The Law of Torts and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876.  Our decision in this 
                                                 
11 The understanding of concerted action liability as 
explained by Wisconsin appellate courts is consistent with the 
discussions by New York appellate courts.  For example, 
Blakeslee v. Wadsworth, 37 A.D.3d 1021 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007), 
bases the concerted action theory as applied in New York on 
Professor Prosser's articulation of it, as was quoted by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Collins.  The New York courts explain 
that in order to establish concerted action liability, "there 
must have been an explicit or implicit agreement" on the part of 
all alleged wrongdoers.  Blakeslee, 37 A.D.3d at 1023 (emphasis 
in original).  Moreover, it is "'essential that each defendant 
charged with acting in concert [has] acted tortiously and that 
one of the defendants committed an act in pursuance of the 
agreement which constitutes a tort.'"  Canavan v. Galuski, 2 
A.D.3d 1039, 1041 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (quoting Rastelli v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 591 N.E.2d 222, 224 (N.Y. 1992)).  Mere 
"'[p]arallel 
activity, 
without 
more, 
is 
insufficient 
to 
establish 
the 
agreement 
element 
necessary 
to 
maintain 
a 
concerted action claim.'"  Id. (quoting Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (N.Y. 1989)).  
No. 2005AP2796   
 
25 
 
regard is supported by those who considered this question when 
drafting the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1740.12     
¶47 Our conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) is the 
codification of the concerted action theory of liability does 
not change Wisconsin law in regard to whether the actions of a 
tortfeasor were a substantial factor in causing harm sustained 
by another.  This is so because in order to fit within the 
parameters of § 895.045(2), a tortfeasor must already be 
causally negligent under substantive law.  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 
348, ¶39.  One is causally negligent when his or her conduct is 
a substantial factor in causing injury to another.  Johnson v. 
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 97 Wis. 2d 521, 561, 294 N.W.2d 501 
(Ct. App. 1980).  Accordingly, under our interpretation of 
§ 895.045(2), a person who is causally negligent with regard to 
a recovering plaintiff will have proportionate liability under 
§ 895.045(1), unless something more is proved about that 
tortfeasor's conduct that will bring it within the purview of 
subsection (2).  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶39.   
6. 
Application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2)   
¶48 There are two possible scenarios under the stipulated 
facts and the arguments made by Richards wherein she seeks to 
hold Schrimpf jointly and severally liable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(2) for her damages:  (1) Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1740 quotes § 876 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts as well as the "Comment to Clause 
(a)" of that section.  Moreover, the instruction quotes Collins 
v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984) in its 
description of concerted action. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
26 
 
Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan to 
procure beer and that action resulted in her damages; or (2) 
Zimmerlee and Schrimpf acted in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan to drink to intoxication and then drive and that action 
resulted in her damages.  Although Richards interweaves these 
two scenarios, we will examine them independently.   
¶49 Concerted action liability is a separate theory of 
liability that does not apply to all who are proved to be 
causally negligent.  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶40; see Bruttig, 
154 Wis. 2d at 280; W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts § 46, at 322-23 (5th ed. 1984).  Something more 
than causal negligence is required before the actions of a 
tortfeasor will come within the parameters of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(2).  Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶40.  Concerted action 
must be proved.  
¶50 There 
are 
three factual predicates necessary to 
proving concerted action:  First, there must be an explicit or 
tacit agreement among the parties to act in accordance with a 
mutually agreed upon scheme or plan.  See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 
at 185.  Parallel action, without more, is insufficient to show 
a common scheme or plan.  Id.  Second, there must be mutual acts 
committed in furtherance of that common scheme or plan that are 
tortious acts.  See Ogle, 33 Wis. 2d at 135.  Third, the 
tortious acts that are undertaken to accomplish the common 
scheme or plan must be the acts that result in damages.  See 
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 184-85.   
No. 2005AP2796   
 
27 
 
¶51 In regard to the actions of Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and 
Pratchet, it is undisputed that they agreed to purchase beer.  
When Schrimpf asked Pratchet to purchase beer and Zimmerlee 
drove her to the grocery and gave her the money that she used to 
purchase the beer, they acted "in accordance with a common 
scheme or plan."  Their procurement of beer was tortious.  Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 125.035(4)(b); 
125.07(1). 
 
However, 
after 
that 
purchase, Pratchet had nothing further to do with the beer.  She 
took a bus to an unnamed location.  Zimmerlee and Schrimpf 
became parallel actors.  Zimmerlee and Schrimpf separated, with 
Zimmerlee keeping the beer in his car.  The scheme or plan that 
was common to these three defendants had been completed.  
Richards had suffered no damages because of actions taken to 
further that common plan.  Something more was required.  
Therefore, the purchase of beer is insufficient to show 
concerted action, and to cause Schrimpf's conduct to fall within 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).   
¶52 In regard to concluding that there was concerted 
action between Zimmerlee and Schrimpf resulting in Zimmerlee's 
drinking until intoxicated and then driving, certainly, the 
consumption of the beer to the point of intoxication and 
Zimmerlee's driving while intoxicated resulted in Richards' 
damages.  Moreover, the drinking by Zimmerlee and Schrimpf was 
tortious because they were both under age.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.07(4)(b).  However, there is nothing in the record to show 
that their drinking was not merely parallel conduct and that 
Zimmerlee and Schrimpf did not have a common scheme or plan to 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
28 
 
drink until intoxicated and then to drive.  Accordingly, 
Schrimpf's conduct does not bring him within the parameters of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2).13  
¶53 In addition, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, 
Zimmerlee was 72 percent causally negligent in the death of 
Chris Richards; Schrimpf was 14 percent causally negligent, and 
Pratchet was 14 percent causally negligent.  The apportioned 
negligence here reflects Schrimpf's and Pratchet's respective 
several liability.  However, with a concerted action theory of 
liability, each party assumes the causal negligence of the other 
so that all are equally liable.  See Ogle, 33 Wis. 2d at 135.  
Therefore, the parties' stipulation to differing percentages of 
causal negligence further supports our conclusion that Richards' 
injury was not the result of concerted action.  
¶54 In sum, we reach the following conclusions:  (1) 
Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a 
common scheme or plan to procure alcohol, but since the action 
undertaken to accomplish that common scheme or plan was not the 
act that resulted in Richards' damages, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
                                                 
13 Schrimpf's involvement with Zimmerlee after the parties 
purchased the beer resembles the involvement of the defendants 
in Blakeslee.  There, the drivers of two vehicles alternately 
changed lanes on a highway, and the rear driver crashed after 
dipping his tires onto the right-hand shoulder of the highway.  
Blakeslee, 37 A.D.3d at 1022.  The court held that there was 
insufficient proof to hold the drivers jointly and severally 
liable under a concerted action theory of liability because the 
record did not demonstrate that the drivers had an express or 
implied agreement to engage in a "passing contest."  Id. at 
1022-23. 
No. 2005AP2796   
 
29 
 
is inapplicable and therefore Schrimpf is not jointly and 
severally liable; and (2) the action that did result in 
Richards' 
damages 
was 
Zimmerlee's 
drinking 
until 
he 
was 
intoxicated 
and 
his 
subsequent 
decision 
to 
drive 
while 
intoxicated, but since this action was not taken in accordance 
with a common scheme or plan, § 895.045(2) is again inapplicable 
and therefore Schrimpf is not jointly and severally liable in 
that context as well.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 We conclude as follows:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
is the legislative codification of the concerted action theory 
of liability; (2) the damages in this case resulted from the 
consumption of beer to the point of intoxication and the 
subsequent decision to drive while intoxicated; and (3) although 
Robert Zimmerlee, David Schrimpf, and Tomakia Pratchet acted "in 
accordance with a common scheme or plan" to procure beer, they 
did not so act in consuming beer to the point of intoxication 
and in the subsequent act of driving while intoxicated, and, 
therefore, David Schrimpf is not jointly and severally liable 
under 
§ 895.045(2) 
for 
the 
death 
of 
Chris 
Richards.  
Accordingly, Badger Mutual Insurance Company is relieved from 
making any further payment to Michelle Richards.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The issue 
presented is whether the defendants Schrimpf and Pratchet are 
jointly and severally liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) for 
their combined 28 percent causal negligence for the plaintiff's 
injury.  These two engaged in a common scheme or plan to procure 
alcohol for an underage drinker (Zimmerlee, the driver-defendant 
with 72 percent causal negligence) who became intoxicated and 
caused damage to an innocent third party (the plaintiff) by the 
intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.  In other words, the issue 
is whether Schrimpf is liable to the plaintiff not only for the 
damages attributed to his causal negligence but also for the 
damages attributed to Pratchet's causal negligence.   
¶57 I agree with Judge Fine's short, simple and cogent 
dissent in the court of appeals.  Judge Fine wrote that Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045(2) is plain and unambiguous and should be 
applied according to its text; it should be applied as enacted 
by the legislature, not as rewritten by the court.   
 
¶58 I agree with Judge Fine that the court of appeals' 
majority 
opinion 
"overly 
complicated 
a 
simple 
matter 
by 
attempting to read the tea leaves of cases and concepts that are 
not on point . . . ."1  This same criticism applies to the 
majority opinion by this court, which largely adopts the 
reasoning of the majority opinion in the court of appeals.   
¶59 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) is that 
parties acting in accordance with a common scheme or plan are 
                                                 
1 Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 255, ¶35, 
297 Wis. 2d 699, 727 N.W.2d 69 (Fine, J., dissenting). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
2 
 
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for all the 
damages resulting to the plaintiff from that common scheme or 
plan.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(2) provides in full as follows: 
(2) Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 
or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan, those parties are jointly and severally 
liable for all damages resulting from that action, 
except as provided in s. 895.043(5). 
¶60 The parties, the circuit court, and the majority 
opinion2 agree that Schrimpf and Pratchet acted in accordance 
with a common scheme or plan to procure alcohol beverages for 
the underage driver in the present case.  Furthermore, the 
parties, the circuit court, and the majority opinion3 agree that 
Schrimpf and Pratchet's procurement of the alcohol was tortious.  
Schrimpf and Pratchet stipulated that each was a "provider" of 
alcohol beverages to the underage driver for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 125.035(4), that is, that they each "procure[d] alcohol 
beverages for . . . an underage person in violation of s. 
125.07(1)(a)."4   
                                                 
2 See majority op., ¶51. 
3 See majority op., ¶10. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035(4)(a) provides in full as 
follows: 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"provider" 
means 
a 
person, 
including 
a licensee or permittee, who procures 
alcohol beverages for or sells, dispenses or gives 
away alcohol beverages to an underage person in 
violation of s. 125.07(1)(a). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶61 The parties, the circuit court, and the majority 
opinion5 also agree that Schrimpf and Pratchet's procurement of 
the alcohol caused damages to the plaintiff.  Schrimpf and 
Pratchet stipulated that each was "causally negligent" with 
respect to the plaintiff's damages.  Schrimpf and Pratchet 
stipulated that their combined negligence caused 28 percent of 
the total damages suffered by the plaintiff.6   
¶62 Under these circumstances, the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045(2) permits only one result: It provides that 
Schrimpf and Pratchet shall be jointly and severally liable for 
"all" damages resulting from their common scheme or plan to 
procure alcohol for the underage driver.  No one disputes that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Schrimpf and Pratchet's act of procurement was proscribed 
by Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)1., providing that "[n]o person may 
procure for, sell, dispense or give away any alcohol beverages 
to any underage person not accompanied by his or her parent, 
guardian or spouse who has attained the legal drinking age." 
When a person is a "provider" for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.035(4)(a), such person is not immune to civil liability 
arising out of the person's act of procuring alcohol beverages.  
See Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), (4)(b). 
5 See majority op., ¶11.   
6 The parties stipulated that the plaintiff's total damages 
were $1,785,714.29. The parties further stipulated that the 
underage driver-defendant's share of the causal negligence was 
72 percent, Schrimpf's share was 14 percent, and Pratchet's 
share was 14 percent. 
 
The plaintiff has settled all claims against the driver, 
recovering $1,285,714.29 and satisfying 72 percent of the 
plaintiff's damages.  The plaintiff has recovered $250,000 (that 
is, 14 percent of her total damages) from Schrimpf.  The 
plaintiff seeks in the current action to recover $250,000 from 
Schrimpf 
for 
the 
remaining 
14 
percent 
causal 
negligence 
attributable to Pratchet. 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
4 
 
28 percent of the plaintiff's damages resulted from Schrimpf and 
Pratchet's procurement of alcohol for the underage driver.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(2) thus requires, about as clearly as 
any statute could, that Schrimpf and Pratchet be jointly and 
severally liable for 28 percent of the plaintiff's total 
damages.     
¶63 The majority opinion errs, as Judge Fine stated, in 
concluding that the question whether a common scheme or plan has 
resulted in damages for purposes of joint and several liability 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) is different from the question 
whether a common scheme or plan has resulted in damages for 
purposes of tort liability to the plaintiff.  In other words, 
the majority opinion has concluded that Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
changes the Wisconsin law on causation.7  Nothing in the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) states that the legislature is altering 
or modifying the substantial factor test of causation, as the 
majority opinions opine.     
 
¶64 The end!  No more need be said.   
¶65 I write more, however, because in addition to ignoring 
the text of the statute, the majority opinion rests, as Judge 
Fine recognizes, on "concepts that are not on point."  The 
majority opinion errs by listening to the siren song of 
                                                 
7 Compare majority op., ¶11 (conceding that Schrimpf and 
Pratchet's negligent act of procuring alcohol for the underage 
driver resulted in 28 percent of damages to the plaintiff for 
purposes of liability to the plaintiff) with majority op., ¶54 
(concluding that Schrimpf and Pratchet's procurement of alcohol 
for the underage driver did not result in damages to the 
plaintiff for purposes of § 895.045(2)).  
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
5 
 
concerted action.  The majority opinion errs by applying the 
common law doctrine of "concerted action" in a context in which 
it does not apply.  The concept of concerted action in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 and in the cases (upon which 
the majority opinion relies) is not on point in interpreting and 
applying Wis. Stat. § 895.045. 
¶66 Concerted action in the Restatement and in the cases 
is a substantive rule of tort liability to determine which of 
multiple actors are causally negligent and liable to an injured 
plaintiff.  Concerted action under the Restatement and in these 
cases relates to a theory of liability.8 
                                                 
8 Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) is 
a specific application of the rule stated in § 875 of the 
Restatement, which provides as follows: 
Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is 
a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the 
injured party is subject to liability to the injured 
party for the entire harm. 
Comment c explains that § 875 is consistent with the rules 
of causation in negligence; any one of a number of persons whose 
tortious conduct is a substantial factor in causing harm is 
liable for the harm in the absence of a superseding cause. 
Section 876 of the Restatement provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious 
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if 
he . . . does a tortious act in concert with the other 
or pursuant to a common design with him . . . . 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
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¶67 The majority opinion lifts the doctrine of concerted 
action and applies it in a different legal context, namely in 
the allocation of damages among those tortfeasors already found 
at fault.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(2) does not determine 
fault; 
it 
apportions 
damages 
after 
liability 
has 
been 
determined. 
¶68 The majority opinion compounds its mistake of applying 
the substantive doctrine of concerted action by treating the 
doctrine as one departing from Wisconsin's law of causation.  
According to the majority opinion, joint and several liability 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) applies only to tortfeasors who 
act in accordance with a common scheme or plan that is the 
direct and particular cause of the plaintiff's damages, rather 
than merely a cause of the plaintiff's damages.  The majority 
opinion requires that damages be the direct and particular 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
Wisconsin 
cases 
upon 
which 
the 
majority 
relies 
similarly treat the common law doctrine of "concerted action" as 
a rule to determine causal negligence.  See Bruttig v. Olsen, 
154 Wis. 2d 270, 280, 453 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating 
that concerted action is "a separate theory of liability"); 
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 185, 342 N.W.2d 37 
(1984) ("The concerted action theory typically is applied to 
situations in which . . . a particular defendant is already 
identified as causing the plaintiff's harm, and the plaintiff 
desires to extend liability to those acting in league with that 
defendant.") (citation omitted); Ogle v. Avina, 33 Wis. 2d 125, 
133-35, 146 N.W.2d 422 (1966) (participant in a drag race 
causally negligent even though plaintiff's injuries were caused 
most directly by another participant in the race). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
7 
 
result of the common scheme or plan for purposes of § 895.045, 
rather than merely a result of the common scheme or plan.9       
¶69 The majority opinion declares that for purposes of 
joint and several liability under § 895.045(2) the common scheme 
to procure the alcohol beverage in the instant case did not 
result in the plaintiff's damages, notwithstanding the parties' 
stipulation that the procurement of alcohol was a cause of 
damages to the plaintiff and that the providers were liable for 
their causal negligence.  The majority opinion concludes that 
for purposes of joint and several liability under § 895.045(2), 
the only cause of the plaintiff's damages was the underage 
drinker's consumption of alcohol to the point of intoxication 
and subsequent decision to drive while intoxicated.  
¶70 The majority opinion's reasoning is explained in a 
simple way in the third-party brief of the Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America.  
The brief urges that the words "that action" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(2) mean that joint and several liability is applicable 
only in those cases where the damages result solely from the 
tortfeasors who act in accordance with a common scheme or plan.  
Applying this interpretation to the present case, the Alliance's 
                                                 
9 "The test of cause in Wisconsin is whether the defendant's 
negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury.  It 
need not be the sole factor or the primary factor, only a 
'substantial factor.'  The phrase 'substantial factor' denotes 
that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the 
harm as to lead the trier of fact, as a reasonable person, to 
regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense.  
There may be several substantial factors contributing to the 
same result."  Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 
617-18, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980) (internal citations omitted). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
8 
 
brief concludes that "[i]n this case, the concerted action, or 
'that action,' was buying beer, but the harm resulted from drunk 
driving——conduct different from 'that action.'"10 
¶71 I do not know on what basis the majority opinion 
determines that the common-law doctrine of concerted action (or 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2), which the majority opinion concludes is 
a codification of the common-law doctrine) applies only when 
damages result solely from acts that the tortfeasors undertake 
in accordance with a common scheme or plan.  The majority 
opinion fails 
to 
cite any authority in support of its 
determination that for purposes of § 895.045(2), the plaintiff 
suffered no damages because of the defendants' common scheme or 
plan to procure alcohol.11  Even assuming that the majority 
opinion is correct to apply the substantive doctrine of 
concerted action to the present case, it does not appear that 
this doctrine distinguishes between "a" cause and "the" cause in 
the manner that the majority opinion does.  The majority opinion 
cites no case or treatise dealing with a situation similar to 
the present case, in which the defendants' common scheme or plan 
caused some but not all of the plaintiff's damages.  
¶72 In contrast to the majority opinion, I conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045 uses the concept of defendant tortfeasors 
acting in accordance with a common scheme or plan to allocate 
damages among the multiple tortfeasors already found to be at 
                                                 
10 Non-party 
Brief 
of 
Wisconsin 
Insurance 
Alliance 
& 
Property Casualty Insurance Association of America at 5. 
11 See majority op., ¶51.   
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
9 
 
fault, not to determine (as § 876 of the Restatement does) 
whether each actor is liable to the plaintiff under a theory of 
liability.  The multiple tortfeasors in the present case have 
been identified as contributing to a single injury and the 
responsibility of each is based upon the causal fault.  In other 
words, tort liability has already been decided when § 895.045 is 
applied.  I conclude that under § 895.045, Schrimpf is liable 
for damages attributed to Pratchet's causal negligence. 
¶73 Several factors support the position I espouse.   
¶74 First, the text of Wis. Stat. § 895.045 supports my 
view of "concerted action."  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(1) 
modifies the common-law rule of joint and several liability.  
The common-law rule regarding joint and several liability 
allowed a plaintiff (who was not negligent) to recover the total 
judgment against any defendant who was liable——regardless of how 
much fault was attributable to that tortfeasor.  Section 
895.045(1) limits the plaintiff's recovery from a tortfeasor 
whose causal negligence is less than 51 percent to the 
percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that 
person.  Ordinarily, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) would preclude the 
plaintiff from recovering Pratchet's 14 percent share of 
liability from Schrimpf.   
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(2), however, provides an 
exception to the statutory modification of joint and several 
liability.  Subsection (2) provides that if 2 or more parties 
act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, those parties 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
10 
 
are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from 
that action.   
¶76 The phrase "concerted action" does not appear in the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 895.045.  The phrase is in the title to 
§ 895.045(2).  The phrase "concerted action" in the title to 
§ 895.045(2) 
is 
obviously 
a 
shorthand 
for 
the 
lengthier 
statutory language "act in accordance with a common scheme or 
plan."12  The concept of concerted action can play a role in 
§ 895.045.  The substantive law of concerted action may be used 
to 
interpret 
whether 
the 
defendant 
tortfeasors 
acted 
in 
accordance with a common scheme or plan under § 895.045(2).13    
¶77 Section 895.045(1) and (2) provide as follows: 
(1) Comparative negligence. Contributory negligence 
does not bar recovery in an action by any person or 
the person's legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, if that negligence was not greater 
than the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished 
in 
the 
proportion 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
negligence attributed to the person recovering. The 
negligence 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
shall 
be 
measured 
separately against the negligence of each person found 
to be causally negligent. The liability of each person 
found to be causally negligent whose percentage of 
causal negligence is less than 51% is limited to the 
percentage of the total causal negligence attributed 
to that person. A person found to be causally 
                                                 
12 Several states apparently have adopted the concept of 
"concerted action" as an exception to the modification of joint 
and several liability.  Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability 
Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint 
and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U. 
C. Davis L. Rev. 1141, 1168 (1987-88).  See, e.g., Idaho Code 
Ann. § 6-803 (2004); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02 (2006). 
13 See Hurt v. Freeland, 589 N.W.2d 551, 557 (N.D. 1999). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
11 
 
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% 
or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the 
damages allowed. 
(2) Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 
or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan, those parties are jointly and severally 
liable for all damages resulting from that action, 
except as provided in s. 895.043(5). 
¶78 As I see it, Wis. Stat. § 895.045 directs that each of 
the multiple actors who has acted in accordance with a common 
scheme or plan and whose causal negligence has been apportioned 
at less than 51 percent is liable to the plaintiff not only for 
his or her own share of causal negligence but also for the share 
of causal negligence of another defendant with whom he acted in 
concert.  Rather than decide the substantive tort liability of 
multiple 
actors, 
§ 895.045 
apportions 
damages 
after 
the 
liability 
of 
the 
multiple 
tortfeasors 
has 
already 
been 
determined.  Section 895.045 does not change causal negligence. 
¶79 Second, the court of appeals in Danks v. Stock 
Building Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, ¶39, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 
N.W.2d 846, is in accord with my interpretation, correctly 
describing Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) as follows: 
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(1) sets forth Wisconsin's 
law of comparative negligence, specifying when a 
negligent plaintiff may recover from a negligent 
defendant.  It also spells out Wisconsin law regarding 
joint 
and 
several 
liability 
among 
defendants, 
specifying when a given defendant may become liable 
for all damages assessed against multiple tortfeasors.  
Thus § 895.045(2) applies only after a judge or jury 
has determined, under applicable substantive law, that 
more than one tortfeasor is liable in some measure to 
the 
plaintiff. 
 
Subsection 
(2) 
simply 
modifies 
subsection (1) of the statute to provide that all 
defendants who are legally responsible for causing a 
plaintiff's damages, and who acted in concert in so 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
12 
 
doing, are jointly and severally liable for the 
plaintiff's damages, irrespective of whether a given 
defendant's apportioned causal negligence is less than 
51%. 
 
¶80 Third, 
other 
states 
have 
similarly 
interpreted 
"concerted action" in joint and several liability statutes.  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court, for example, held that its joint and 
several 
liability 
statute 
with 
a 
special 
provision 
for 
"concerted action" "does not create an independent basis of 
liability, rather it deals with the allocation of damages among 
those already at fault."14 
¶81 Fourth, my interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
comports 
with 
Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
the 
Law 
of 
Torts: 
Apportionment of Liability § 15 (2000), which does not replace 
Restatement (Second) § 876, but is an addition thereto.  Section 
                                                 
14 Hurt v. Freeland, 589 N.W.2d 551, 557 (N.D. 1999). 
North 
Dakota 
has 
a 
statute 
similar 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(2).  The North Dakota statute provides in part (and 
provided at the time of the Hurt decision): 
When two or more parties found to have contributed to 
the injury, the liability of each party is several 
only, and is not joint, and each party is liable only 
for 
the 
amount 
of 
damages 
attributable 
to 
the 
percentage of fault of that party, except that any 
persons who act in concert in committing a tortious 
act or aid or encourage the act, or ratifies or adopts 
the act for their benefit, are jointly liable for all 
damages attributable to their combined percentage of 
fault. Under this section, fault includes negligence, 
malpractice, absolute liability, dram shop liability, 
failure 
to 
warn, 
reckless 
or 
willful 
conduct, 
assumption of risk, misuse of product, failure to 
avoid injury, and product liability, including product 
liability involving negligence or strict liability or 
breach of warranty for product defect. 
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02 (2006) (emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
13 
 
15 provides for apportionment of liability when persons act in 
concert as follows: 
When persons are liable because they acted in concert, 
all persons are jointly and severally liable for the 
share of comparative responsibility assigned to each 
person engaged in concerted activity. 
¶82 Comment 
a 
explains 
that 
§ 15 
applies 
when 
the 
"governing law determines that concerted activity took place and 
that the tortious acts of one or more of the participants in the 
concerted activity was a legal cause of the plaintiff's 
indivisible injury."15  The comment further explains that "[t]he 
joint and several liability of those engaged in concerted 
activity is for the total comparative responsibility assigned to 
all who engage in the concerted activity."16  The Reporters' Note 
to § 15 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability interprets Wis. Stat. § 895.045 as retaining "full 
joint and several liability for concerted actors."17 According to 
the comment, the American Law Institute does not take a position 
on "whether a concerted-action tortfeasor is also jointly and 
severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility 
assigned to an independent tortfeasor who is also liable for the 
same indivisible injury."18       
                                                 
15 Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability § 15, cmt. a at 129 (2000). 
16 Id. 
17 Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability § 15, reporters' note at 131 (2000). 
18 Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability § 15 at 129 (2000). 
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶83 Fifth, my interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) 
also comports with Reilly v. Anderson, 727 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 
2006), in which the Iowa Supreme Court had to decide whether the 
theory 
of 
concerted 
action 
is 
compatible 
with 
statutory 
comparative fault principles.19  The Iowa court explained, 727 
N.W.2d at 109, that where an independent party (such as the 
underage drunken driver in the present case) had been assigned 
55 percent fault and concerted actors #1 and #2 (here Schrimpf 
and Pratchet) had been assigned fault of 35 percent and 10 
percent respectively, the concerted actors would at least be 
jointly and severally liable for 45 percent of plaintiff's 
damages.  The Iowa court did not decide whether the concerted 
actors would be jointly and severally liable for the entire 
fault 
assigned 
to 
all 
defendants 
in 
the 
fact 
situation 
described.     
¶84 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶85 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.  
 
                                                 
19 The 
Iowa 
statute 
provided 
that 
joint 
and 
several 
liability 
attaches 
only 
to 
those 
persons, 
excluding 
the 
plaintiff, who are found 50 percent or more at fault.  The 
statute was silent about concerted action.    
No.  2005AP2796.ssa 
 
1