Title: State v. Michael Scott Long
Citation: 2009 WI 36
Docket Number: 2007AP002307-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2009

2009 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2307-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael Scott Long, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 314 Wis. 2d 260, 757 N.W.2d 850 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 27, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix   
 
JUDGE: 
Edward F. Vlack   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Joseph L. Sommers and Sommers Law Office, Oregon, and oral 
argument by Joseph L. Sommers. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Anne 
C. Murphy, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 36
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2307-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF266) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Scott Long, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Michael Scott Long seeks 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming his conviction and sentence for second-degree sexual 
assault and false imprisonment.1  He asserts that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of either offense.  In 
addition, he contends that the circuit court erroneously 
                                                 
1 State v. Long, No. 2007AP2307-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008) (affirming judgments of the circuit 
court for St. Croix County, Edward F. Vlack, III, Judge.) 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
2 
 
concluded that he was a persistent repeater under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m) (2007-08).2   
¶2 
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a 
jury to find Long guilty of second-degree sexual assault and 
false imprisonment.  However, we also determine that the circuit 
court incorrectly applied Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m).  Under the 
plain language of the statute and the facts alleged in the 
complaint, Long is not a persistent repeater.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the convictions, vacate the sentence, and remand to the 
circuit court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶3 
On October 24, 2004, Michael S. Long entered the 
Country Inn in River Falls and had an encounter with the front 
desk attendant, Bobbie D.  According to the criminal complaint, 
Bobbie D. told the police that Long asked her to hug him so that 
she could feel his penis.  He then grabbed Bobbie D. from 
behind, hugging her three or four times.  She told the police 
that his penis touched her buttocks and inner thigh through 
their clothing.  Ultimately, Bobbie D. fled and Long departed.   
¶4 
Long was charged with one count of second-degree 
sexual assault contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) and one 
count of false imprisonment contrary to § 940.30.  For both 
counts, he was charged as a persistent repeater under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m)(b)1.  That subsection is commonly referred to as 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
3 
 
the Wisconsin "three strikes" statute, and it can subject a 
third-time offender to a mandatory term of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.   
¶5 
To count as a strike, a previous conviction must have 
been for a "serious felony."  The statute lists Wisconsin 
offenses that are considered to be serious felonies.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m)(a)2m.  Further, it provides that a "comparable" 
out-of-state conviction can be counted as a strike "only if the 
court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the violation 
relating to that conviction would constitute a [serious felony] 
if committed by an adult in this state."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.62(2m)(a)d., 939.62(2m)(d).   
¶6 
The complaint listed two Minnesota convictions as the 
basis for application of the persistent repeater statute: a 
December 18, 2003 conviction for first-degree burglary and a 
January 7, 2004 conviction for fourth-degree criminal sexual 
conduct.3  Long filed a motion to dismiss the persistent repeater 
enhancer.  The judge deferred consideration until after trial, 
reasoning that Long's status as a persistent repeater would only 
be relevant for sentencing purposes if Long was found guilty of 
second-degree sexual assault or false imprisonment.   
¶7 
At trial, Bobbie D. testified that she was working 
behind the desk at the Country Inn on the evening of October 24, 
                                                 
3  The complaint also listed an August 11, 2003 conviction 
for indecent exposure.  Since the filing of the complaint, the 
State has not argued that the 2003 indecent exposure conviction 
would constitute a serious felony in Wisconsin. 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
4 
 
2004.  Long entered the motel wearing white spandex shorts, a 
purple shirt, and a baseball cap.4  He told her that he was 
wearing spandex because he lost a bet, and he asked if it was 
revealing.  She testified that she thought he was joking, and 
when Long asked her to accompany him to the breakfast room, she 
went.   
¶8 
At that point, Long asked Bobbie D. to rate his penis 
on a scale from one to ten and asked her to come hug him so that 
she could tell him how his penis felt.  Bobbie D. testified that 
she "didn't know what to do" and that she "just stood there" 
because "she was too afraid to leave at that point."  She also 
testified, "I said no and I started to back away.  I just took 
one or two steps away.  I didn't leave the room but I backed 
away and I said no." 
¶9 
On cross-examination, however, Bobbie D. was uncertain 
about whether she affirmatively told Long he could not hug her.  
The following exchange occurred between Bobbie D. and the 
defense attorney:  
Q: And does the report indicate that Mr. Long asked 
you if you would mind if he hugged you? 
A: That's what it says. 
Q: And that your response was that you didn't say 
anything, is that correct? 
A. I said I wouldn't do it.  I'm not going to hug him. 
                                                 
4 Long did not testify, but he stipulated that he was the 
individual who approached Bobbie D. at the Country Inn on 
October 24, 2004.   
 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
5 
 
Q: Your testimony today is that you told Mr. Long that 
you would not hug him? 
A: When he asked if I would mind if he hugged me I 
don't remember, I guess I don't recall if I stood 
there or if I said no but he never asked if I would 
hug him.  
¶10 Bobbie D. testified that Long assaulted her: "He 
approached me and grabbed me and put his arms around me and 
hugged three to four different times."  She described the hug as 
"[v]ery forceful.  It was very tight."  She testified that his 
penis touched her buttocks and inner thigh through her clothes.  
"He just kept holding on very tight and both arms were around 
and it was just very tight and he didn't let go."  Bobbie D. 
further testified that she did not cry out or say anything 
because she was afraid, and she did not run away because he was 
holding her too tightly.  When he let go, she ran behind the 
desk and into a back room and called her supervisor.   
¶11 The 
jury 
was instructed on second-degree sexual 
assault and the lesser included crime of fourth-degree sexual 
assault,5 as well as on false imprisonment.  The jury returned 
guilty verdicts for both second-degree sexual assault and false 
imprisonment.   
¶12 Prior to sentencing, the circuit court issued a 
written memorandum decision and order concluding beyond a 
                                                 
5 Both second- and fourth-degree sexual assault require 
proof that the defendant had sexual contact with the victim and 
that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact.  Second-
degree sexual assault requires proof of one additional element——
that the sexual contact was by use or threat of force or 
violence.  Compare Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a) and 940.225(3m). 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
6 
 
reasonable doubt that two of Long's previous convictions were 
comparable to serious felonies in Wisconsin.  Thus, the court 
determined that Long would be sentenced to a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole under the persistent repeater 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(c). 
¶13 In 
reaching 
this 
conclusion, 
the 
circuit 
court 
examined Long's previous conviction for fourth-degree criminal 
sexual conduct in Washington County, Minnesota.  According to 
the criminal complaint, Long entered a tanning salon on March 
23, 2003, and had sexual contact with an employee without her 
consent.  There is no plea colloquy or judgment of conviction in 
the record.  However, according to a Minnesota sentencing order, 
it appears that Long pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal 
sexual conduct on January 7, 2004.  The circuit court in this 
case determined that this conviction was comparable to a 
Wisconsin conviction for second-degree sexual assault, and thus 
the conviction counted as one strike.  Long does not contest 
this ruling. 
¶14 The 
circuit court also examined Long's previous 
conviction 
for 
first-degree 
burglary 
in 
Hennepin 
County, 
Minnesota.  According to the criminal complaint, two women 
allowed Long to enter their apartment on March 26, 2003.  Once 
inside, Long asked the women to rate the size of his penis.  The 
women told Long to leave, and he did.  About one minute later he 
reentered the apartment without knocking, went into one of the 
bedrooms, and began to masturbate.  One of the women yelled at 
him to leave.  Long told her that she had a "nice butt" and 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
7 
 
asked to see it.  When she refused, Long pulled down her pants 
and grabbed her buttocks.   
¶15 Long was charged with first-degree burglary, fifth-
degree criminal sexual conduct, and indecent exposure.  There is 
no judgment of conviction or plea colloquy in the record.  
Nonetheless, according to a court document entitled "Terms and 
Conditions of Felony Sentence," it appears that Long pled guilty 
to the burglary charge on December 13, 2003.  There is nothing 
in the record indicating the disposition of the fifth-degree 
criminal sexual conduct charge or the indecent exposure charge.  
However, at oral argument the parties agreed that those charges 
had been dismissed. 
¶16 The circuit court also determined that the underlying 
conduct in the Hennepin County conviction "would constitute 
second-degree sexual assault under Wisconsin law."  The court 
thus concluded that the burglary conviction was a second strike, 
and that the persistent repeater enhancement would be applied to 
the sentence.   
¶17 On November 26, 2006, Long was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the second-
degree sexual assault conviction.  The court also sentenced him 
to a concurrent sentence of three years confinement and three 
years extended supervision on the false imprisonment conviction. 
¶18 Long appealed, arguing that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of second-degree sexual assault and 
false imprisonment.  He also challenged the application of the 
persistent repeater penalty enhancement, asserting that his 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
8 
 
Hennepin County burglary conviction was not comparable to a 
serious felony in Wisconsin.  The court of appeals issued a per 
curiam decision affirming the convictions and sentences. 
II 
¶19 This case requires us to review the sufficiency of 
evidence supporting a jury verdict.  When a defendant challenges 
a verdict based on sufficiency of the evidence, we give 
deference to the jury's determination and view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State.  State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 
80, ¶57, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203.  If more than one 
inference can be drawn from the evidence, we must adopt the 
inference that supports the conviction.  State v. Hamilton, 120 
Wis. 2d 532, 541, 356 N.W.2d 169 (1984).  We will not substitute 
our own judgment for that of the jury unless the evidence is so 
lacking in probative value and force that no reasonable jury 
could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant was guilty.  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 
507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).   
¶20 This case also requires us to interpret and apply the 
persistent repeater statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m).  Statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law which we 
review independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  State ex rel. Hipp v. 
Murray, 2008 WI 67, ¶20, 310 Wis. 2d 342, 750 N.W.2d 873.  We 
interpret statutory language in the context in which it is used, 
not in isolation but as part of a whole and in relation to the 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
9 
 
language of surrounding or closely related statutes.  State v. 
MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, ¶9, 310 Wis. 2d 550, 750 N.W.2d 910. 
III 
¶21 We address first the challenges Long makes to his 
Wisconsin convictions for second-degree sexual assault and false 
imprisonment.  Long argues that there was insufficient evidence 
for a reasonable jury to convict him of either offense.  
Specifically, he argues that there was insufficient evidence of 
use of force to sustain his conviction for second-degree sexual 
assault.  As to the false imprisonment conviction, he argues 
that there was insufficient evidence that he confined or 
restrained Bobbie D. and that there was insufficient evidence to 
show a lack of consent.  We address these arguments in turn.6 
A 
¶22 The jury was instructed that to find Long guilty of 
second-degree sexual assault, it must conclude that: (1) Long 
had sexual contact with Bobbie D.; (2) Bobbie D. did not consent 
to the sexual contact; and (3) the sexual contact was by use or 
threat of force or violence.  The instructions specified that 
the third element is satisfied if the "use or threats of force 
or violence compel the victim to submit.  The phrase by use of 
                                                 
6 Long also asserts that the rule of lenity should apply 
here.  Under the rule of lenity, we will construe a criminal 
statute in favor of the accused "[w]hen there is doubt as to the 
meaning of a criminal statute."  State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, 
¶66, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Because we do not doubt the meaning of the criminal 
statutes at issue, we do not apply the rule of lenity here.  
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
10 
 
force includes forcible sexual contact or force used as the 
means of making sexual contact."  Long does not argue that the 
jury instructions were erroneous. 
¶23 Instead, 
he 
argues 
that 
there 
was 
insufficient 
evidence of force because Bobbie D. testified that he hugged her 
and a hug is not equivalent to force.  He further argues that 
because Bobbie D. was not certain whether she told Long not to 
hug her, the jury was presented with insufficient evidence to 
conclude that Long forced her to submit to sexual contact.  In 
essence, Long argues that if Bobbie D. passively succumbed to 
the hug, the hug could not have been forceful or violent.7   
¶24 Long's arguments are not persuasive.  Under Wisconsin 
law, force has been used when the victim is compelled to submit.  
See State v. Bonds, 165 Wis. 2d 27, 32, 477 N.W.2d 265 (1991) 
(concluding that the force element of second-degree sexual 
assault was met when Bonds grabbed a woman's nipple and squeezed 
it).  In Bonds, the court said, "Force used at the time of 
contact can compel submission as effectively as force or threat 
                                                 
7 Although Long's argument might be construed as an attempt 
to argue that Bobbie D. consented to the sexual contact, we do 
not and cannot read it that way.  Sexual contact occurred when 
Long pressed his penis against Bobbie D's body.  Even if Bobbie 
D. affirmatively consented to the hug, that fact would not 
establish that she consented to the sexual contact.   
Further, Long has conceded that there was sufficient 
evidence to convict him of fourth-degree sexual assault, defined 
as sexual contact without consent.  Thus, Long has acknowledged 
that a jury could find that Bobbie D. did not consent to sexual 
contact.   
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
11 
 
occurring before contact.  Regardless of when the force is 
applied, the victim is forced to submit."  Id.  
¶25 Here, Bobbie D. testified that Long grabbed her, 
hugged her tightly and forcibly, and that she was too afraid to 
cry out.  From this testimony, the jury could have determined 
that Long forcibly held Bobbie D., compelling her to submit so 
that he could make sexual contact.  We conclude that a 
reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the sexual contact was by use or threat of force or 
violence. 
B 
¶26 Long also argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to convict him of false imprisonment.  The jury was instructed 
on the five elements of false imprisonment: (1) the defendant 
confined or restrained Bobbie D.; (2) he did so intentionally; 
(3) he did so without her consent; (4) the defendant had no 
lawful authority to restrain her; and (5) he knew that she did 
not consent and that he did not have lawful authority to 
restrain her.  The instruction further explained: 
If the defendant deprived Bobbi D. of freedom of 
movement or compelled her to remain where she did not 
wish to remain then Bobbie D. was confined or 
restrained.  
The 
use 
of 
physical 
force 
is 
not 
required.  One may be confined or restrained by acts 
or words or both.  A person is not confined or 
restrained if she knew that she could have avoided it 
by taking reasonable action.  A reasonable opportunity 
to escape does not change confinement or restraint 
that has occurred. 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 Long does not argue that the instruction misstates 
Wisconsin law.  Instead, he argues that Bobbie D.'s testimony 
was insufficient to establish that Long confined or restrained 
her.  He contends that it would be absurd to conclude that one 
can be confined by a hug.  Instead, he argues that confinement 
implies an action such as locking someone in a room or a car.  
Long further asserts that there was insufficient evidence that 
Bobbie D. did not consent to the hug.  
¶28 This court has previously explained that confinement 
is the "restraint by one person of the physical liberty of 
another."  Herbst v. Wuennenberg, 83 Wis. 2d 768, 774, 266 
N.W.2d 391 (1978).  Nothing in the statute or our case law 
limits confinement to situations where the defendant locks 
another person in some sort of structure, as Long suggests.   
¶29 In this case, Bobbie D. testified, "He just kept 
holding on very tight and both arms were around and it was just 
very tight and he didn't let go."  We conclude that, based on 
such testimony, a reasonable jury could have determined beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Long restrained Bobbie D.'s physical 
liberty.   
¶30 Long 
further argues that there was insufficient 
evidence that Bobbie D. did not consent to the confinement or 
restraint.  He points to her testimony during cross-examination, 
where Bobbie D. equivocated about whether she had affirmatively 
told Long that he could not hug her.  Long's argument misses the 
mark.  Even if Bobbie D. was silent and did not back away from 
Long, those facts would not establish her consent.   
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
13 
 
¶31 Although Wis. Stat. § 939.22(48) enumerates several 
definitions of "without consent," "consent in fact" is not 
specifically 
defined 
in 
that 
statute 
or 
in 
the 
false 
imprisonment statute.  Nonetheless, consent is defined in the 
sexual assault statute as "words or overt actions by a person 
who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely 
given agreement to have . . . sexual contact."  Wis. Stat. § 
940.225(4).  In the context of sexual assault, consent in fact 
requires an affirmative indication of willingness.  A failure to 
say no or to resist does not constitute consent in fact.   
¶32 In the context of false imprisonment, consent in fact 
is established by words or overt actions by a person who is 
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given 
agreement to be confined or restrained.  See id.  Long does not 
point to any words or actions by Bobbie D. that would indicate 
her freely given agreement to be confined or restrained.  Under 
these circumstances, we conclude that even if the jury did not 
believe that Bobbie D. said no, a reasonable jury could have 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not consent in 
fact to the restraint. 
IV 
¶33 Having determined that there was sufficient evidence 
to convict Long of second-degree sexual assault and false 
imprisonment, we turn next to his argument regarding the 
persistent repeater penalty enhancer.  Long asserts that the 
circuit court wrongly concluded that he was a persistent 
repeater.  He points to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(d), which 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
14 
 
provides that "comparable" out-of-state convictions can be 
counted as strikes "only if the court determines, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the violation relating to that conviction 
would constitute a [serious felony] if committed by an adult in 
this state."   
¶34 Long acknowledges that his previous conviction for 
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in Washington County, 
Minnesota would have constituted a serious felony in Wisconsin 
and thus constitutes one "strike."  However, he asserts that his 
second "strike," a Hennepin County, Minnesota conviction for 
first-degree burglary, is not comparable to a serious felony in 
Wisconsin.  He contends that the circuit court erred by 
concluding that, under the facts alleged in the Hennepin County 
complaint, Long would have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of second-degree sexual assault in Wisconsin.   
¶35 We need not address this argument because we determine 
that, based on the previous convictions that were listed in the 
complaint and the plain language of the persistent repeater 
statute, Long is not a persistent repeater.  The statute 
provides that an actor is a persistent repeater if: 
[1] The actor has been convicted of a serious felony 
on 2 or more separate occasions at any time preceding 
the serious felony for which he or she presently is 
being sentenced . . . and [2], of the 2 or more 
previous convictions, at least one conviction occurred 
before the date of violation of at least one of the 
other felonies for which the actor was previously 
convicted. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b)1 (emphasis added).   
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
15 
 
¶36 This 
subsection 
establishes 
two 
independent 
requirements that must be met before a defendant is deemed a 
persistent repeater.  The first clause requires that the two 
previous strikes occurred before the Wisconsin felony for which 
the defendant is presently being sentenced.  The second clause 
requires that the conviction date for the first strike preceded 
the violation date for the second strike.   
¶37 When asked at oral argument how this subsection should 
be construed, counsel for the State argued that it simply 
requires that at least one of the previous convictions preceded 
the present conviction.  This proposed interpretation does not 
comport with the plain meaning of the statute and principles of 
statutory interpretation.   
¶38 First, the State's interpretation is inconsistent with 
the text of the second clause, which provides that "of the 2 or 
more previous convictions, at least one conviction occurred 
before the date of violation of at least one of the other 
felonies for which the actor was previously convicted."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  This clause discusses the relationship 
between the two previous strikes, rather than the relationship 
between 
the 
previous 
strikes 
and 
the 
present 
Wisconsin 
conviction.  
¶39 Further, when construing statutes, meaning should be 
given to every word, clause, and sentence.  Hutson v. Wis. Pers. 
Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212.  A 
construction that would render part of the statute superfluous 
should be avoided.  If the second clause meant only that one of 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
16 
 
the previous convictions must have occurred before the present 
Wisconsin offense, as the State asserts, then the second clause 
would be entirely superfluous.  The first clause requires that 
both previous convictions occurred before the date of the 
present Wisconsin felony.   
¶40 Lest there be any doubt about the intent of the 
legislature in enacting this subsection, the legislative history 
confirms our analysis.  Before the legislature passed 1993 
Wisconsin Act 289, which codified the statutory language quoted 
above, the Legislative Reference Bureau provided the following 
analysis of the bill:   
This bill creates a persistent repeat serious felony 
offender category and persons who are persistent 
repeat serious felony offenders must be sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
To be subject to this persistent repeat serious felony 
offender status, a person must currently be sentenced 
for a serious felony and must have had convictions, or 
delinquency adjudications,8 on 2 or more separate 
occasions for serious felonies preceding the current 
serious felony violation.  In addition, of the prior 
convictions . . . , at least one of the  convictions 
. . . must have occurred before the date of at least 
one of the other serious felony violations . . . . 
This analysis clearly states that: (1) the conviction date for 
the first offense must have preceded the violation date for the 
second offense, and (2) the conviction date for the second 
offense must have preceded the violation date for the current 
Wisconsin offense.   
                                                 
8 A later amendment removed juvenile adjudications from the 
list of serious felonies that would subject an offender to the 
persistent repeater penalty enhancement.   
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
17 
 
¶41 Having determined that application of the persistent 
repeater statute requires a particular sequence of convictions, 
we turn to the convictions listed in Long's criminal complaint.  
They do not meet these requirements.  The violation date of the 
Washington County, Minnesota offense is March 23, 2003, and the 
conviction date for that offense is January 7, 2004.  The 
violation date for the Hennepin County, Minnesota offense is 
March 26, 2003, and the conviction date for that offense is 
December 18, 2003.  The conduct leading to his current Wisconsin 
convictions occurred on October 24, 2004, and he was convicted 
on November 30, 2006. 
¶42 Both of Long's prior convictions occurred before the 
date of violation of his present Wisconsin felonies, satisfying 
the statutory requirement that "[t]he actor has been convicted 
of a serious felony on 2 or more separate occasions at any time 
preceding the serious felony for which he . . . presently is 
being sentenced."  See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b)1.  However, 
the conviction date of the Hennepin County offense was not 
before the violation date of the Washington County offense.  
Likewise, the conviction date of the Washington County offense 
was not before the violation date of the Hennepin County 
offense.  Neither of Long's previous convictions occurred 
"before the date of violation of . . . the other felon[y] for 
which [Long] was previously convicted."  See id.  Therefore, the 
previous convictions listed in the criminal complaint do not 
satisfy the statutory requirements for sentencing under the 
persistent repeater statute.   
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
18 
 
¶43 Long did not advance this statutory interpretation 
argument at the circuit court or at the court of appeals.  
Normally, under such circumstances, we would conclude that an 
issue neither raised nor briefed is waived.  Long's sole 
recourse would be to file a motion for post-conviction relief, 
perhaps alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶44 Nonetheless, waiver is merely a rule of judicial 
administration.  State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, ¶31, 284 
Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884.  Waiver does not limit this court's 
authority to address unpreserved issues, particularly when doing 
so can clarify an issue of statewide importance.  Clean Wis., 
Inc. 
v. 
Pub. 
Serv. 
Comm'n, 
2005 
WI 
93, 
¶¶270-71, 
282 
Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768.  The proper interpretation of the 
persistent repeater statute is an issue of great importance in 
Wisconsin law.  In this case, the circuit court, the State, and 
the defense attorneys misinterpreted the persistent repeater 
statute, and the court mistakenly sentenced Long to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Under these 
circumstances, we decline to conclude that this argument is 
waived.   
¶45 We determine that the circuit court incorrectly 
interpreted and applied Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b).  Under the 
plain language of the statute and the facts alleged in the 
complaint, Long is not a persistent repeater.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the sentence and remand to the circuit court for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
19 
 
 
V 
¶46 On remand, this case may present several new and 
complex issues.  Although we briefly note these issues below, we 
need not and do not make any determinations about them today.   
¶47 First, it is conceivable that the State may wish to 
amend its complaint to substitute other prior convictions as the 
basis for the persistent repeater allegation.   
¶48 Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) provides in part: 
Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if 
convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. 
¶49 We have never specifically addressed whether it is 
permissible for the State to amend a criminal complaint after 
the conclusion of a jury trial.  We have, however, discussed 
when it is permissible for the State to amend a complaint after 
the defendant enters a guilty plea.  See, e.g., State v. Bonds, 
2006 WI 83, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133; State v. Gerard, 
189 Wis. 2d 505, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995); State v. Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 990 (1991). 
¶50 In Bonds, we stated that a post-plea amendment was 
permissible in that case because (1) the defendant had notice 
that he was being charged as a habitual criminal, and (2) the 
defendant was not prejudiced in making an intelligent plea as a 
result of the substitution of a different previous conviction as 
a factual basis for its repeater allegation.  292 Wis. 2d 344, 
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2007AP2307-CR   
 
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¶2.  These are factual determinations.  If, in this case, the 
State wishes to substitute different previous convictions as the 
factual basis for the persistent repeater allegation, the 
circuit court will have to determine whether it is permissible 
for the State to amend a criminal complaint after the conclusion 
of a jury trial.  If so, it will have to determine what test is 
appropriate for such a post-trial amendment.   
¶51 Second, if the State is permitted to amend its 
complaint, the circuit court will have to determine what 
documents are necessary to establish the fact of the prior 
convictions.  When an offender is sentenced as a persistent 
repeater, proof of a prior conviction directly affects a liberty 
interest, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is essential.  See 
id., ¶40.  The statutes provide that "[a]n official report of 
the F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the United States 
or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of 
any conviction or sentence therein reported."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).   
¶52 We have previously explained that: 
To be an official report under sec. 973.12(1), Stats., 
on which reliance may be placed, the report must 
contain relevant information regarding the issue of 
repeater status and must specifically include the date 
of conviction for the previous offense. . . .  The 
report in the present case did not contain such 
information and, therefore, could not be relied on for 
the penalty enhancement. 
State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 658, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984).  In 
Bonds, we concluded that an internet report generated by the 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
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Wisconsin Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) is 
insufficient to prove the fact of a previous conviction.  Bonds, 
292 Wis. 2d 344, ¶¶46, 49. 
¶53 There may be some circumstances when a judgment of 
conviction or similar document is entirely unnecessary to prove 
the fact of the prior conviction.  For instance, a defendant's 
admission can constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
State v. Zimmerman, 185 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 518 N.W.2d 303 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  Nonetheless, in such a circumstance, the admission 
must contain specific reference to the date of conviction and to 
any periods of incarceration.  Id.   
¶54 In this case, the State did not provide an official 
judgment of conviction for either of the previous offenses it 
charged in the complaint.  On remand, if the State is permitted 
to amend its complaint, the circuit court and State should 
ensure that the record is complete and that it allows the court 
to make the necessary determinations beyond a reasonable doubt.   
¶55 Finally, the circuit court will be required to grapple 
with the difficult task of determining the nature of any out-of-
state convictions.  The question of whether an out-of-state 
conviction is "comparable" to a serious felony in Wisconsin 
raises difficult constitutional issues.  We do not address these 
issues in any depth here because it is not necessary to do so in 
order to resolve this appeal.  However, courts applying a 
persistent 
repeater 
statute 
must 
be 
conscious 
of 
these 
constitutional complexities. 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
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¶56 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000), 
the Supreme Court declared that every fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum sentence must 
be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The sole exception to the rule is the fact of a prior 
conviction.  Id.   
¶57 However, when the court is required to compare an out-
of-state conviction to the Wisconsin criminal code, the court 
might be required to assess not only the fact of a prior 
conviction but also the facts and conduct underlying that 
conviction.  Whether a judge is permitted to make these 
assessments could implicate Apprendi.   
¶58 The United States Supreme Court has struggled to 
resolve a similar dilemma.  See Shepard v. United States, 544 
U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 
(1990).  In Shepard and Taylor, the Court was required to 
determine whether the defendants' prior state convictions were 
comparable to the "generic burglary" offenses as contemplated by 
the federal Armed Career Criminal Act.  The Court stated that a 
judge's inquiry into the nature of a previous offense "is 
limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a 
plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and 
defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed 
by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this 
information."  Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; see also State v. 
LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶52, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780 ("[A] 
trial court judge, rather than a jury, is allowed to determine 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
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the applicability of a defendant's prior conviction for sentence 
enhancement purposes, when the necessary information concerning 
the prior conviction can be readily determined from an existing 
judicial record.").   
¶59 The constitutional complexities are further heightened 
when the court must review a complaint charging multiple crimes, 
yet the defendant pleaded guilty to only one.  The court must 
determine the factual basis for the plea, and whether that 
factual basis would support a conviction for a serious felony in 
Wisconsin beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the United States 
Supreme Court cautioned in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, "the 
practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual 
approach are daunting." 
¶60 In sum, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
for a jury to find Long guilty of second-degree sexual assault 
and false imprisonment.  We further conclude that the circuit 
court incorrectly applied Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m).  Under the 
plain language of the statute and the facts alleged in the 
complaint, Long is not a persistent repeater.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the convictions, vacate the sentence, and remand to the 
circuit court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court for resentencing. 
No. 
2007AP2307-CR   
 
 
 
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