Title: State of Alabama v. Dian Burnett Lupo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050224
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2007

REL:10/12/2007 State v. Lupo
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1050224
____________________
State of Alabama
v.
Diane Burnett Lupo
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-02-5201)
SMITH, Justice.
The State of Alabama, by and through the Alabama State
Board of Registration for Interior Design ("the Board"),
appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
declaring 
the 
Alabama 
Interior 
Design 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act,
1050224
2
Act No. 2001-660, Ala. Acts 2001 ("the Act"), codified at §
34-15B-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, unconstitutional.  We
affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History
On August 28, 2002, the Board sued Diane Burnett Lupo in
the Jefferson Circuit Court.  The complaint alleged that the
Board had found Lupo in violation of the Act for practicing
"interior design" without registering with the Board.  The
complaint further alleged that the Board had fined Lupo $1,500
and sought a judgment requiring Lupo to pay the fine plus $235
in costs and an injunction prohibiting Lupo from practicing
interior design unless she complies with the requirements of
the Act.
Lupo's answer denied the material allegations of the
complaint and asserted that the Act is unconstitutional
because, she argued, it is overly broad and deprives her of
her liberty interest in violation of due process.
Following a nonjury trial and the submission of briefs,
the trial court issued an order holding that the Act was
"overly broad, unreasonable, and vague" and that it therefore
violated 
the 
due-process 
provisions 
of 
the 
Alabama
1050224
The trial court later issued an order enjoining 
the Board
1
from enforcing the Act.
3
Constitution.   The Board filed a motion to alter, amend, or
1
vacate the judgment and also moved for a stay of the judgment.
The parties consented to extend the time period under Rule
59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., for the trial court to rule on the
Board's postjudgment motion.  The trial court eventually
denied the postjudgment motion within the time period
stipulated by the parties, and the Board filed a timely notice
of appeal.
Standard of Review
"'Our 
review 
of 
constitutional 
challenges 
to
legislative enactments is de novo.'  Richards v.
Izzi, 
819 
So. 
2d 
25, 
29 
n.3 
(Ala. 
2001).
Additionally, acts of the legislature are presumed
constitutional.  State v. Alabama Mun. Ins. Corp.,
730 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1998).  See also Dobbs v.
Shelby County Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So. 2d
425, 
428 
(Ala. 
1999) 
('In 
reviewing 
the
constitutionality of a legislative act, this Court
will sustain the act "'unless it is clear beyond
reasonable doubt that it is violative of the
fundamental law.'"'  White v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
558 So. 2d 373, 383 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Alabama
State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18
So. 2d 810, 815 (1944))).  We approach the question
of the constitutionality of a legislative act
'"'with every presumption and intendment in favor of
its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike
down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the
government.'"'  Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762 So. 2d
1050224
Section 5 of Act No. 82-497 created the "Alabama State
2
Board of Registration for Interior Designers," and §§ 2 and 3
4
828, 831 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Moore v. Mobile
Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991),
quoting in turn McAdory, 246 Ala. at 9, 18 So. 2d at
815).
"Moreover, in order to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality, ... the party asserting the
unconstitutionality of the Act ... bears the burden
'to show that [the Act] is not constitutional.'
Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of
Montgomery v. Talley, 291 Ala. 307, 310, 280 So. 2d
553, 556 (1973).  See also Thorn v. Jefferson
County, 375 So. 2d 780, 787 (Ala. 1979) ('It is the
law, of course, that a party attacking a statute has
the 
burden 
of 
overcoming 
the 
presumption 
of
constitutionality....')."
State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Ala.
2006).
Discussion
In 1982, the legislature enacted Act No. 82-497, Ala.
Acts 1982, which was codified at §§ 34-15A-1 to -7, Ala. Code
1975).  Act No. 82-497 was a "title" act--it regulated the use
of the title "interior designer" but did not regulate the
practice of "interior design."  Thus, the 1982 Act restricted
the use of the title "interior designer" to those individuals
who had complied with the registration provisions of the 1982
Act,  but it did not limit who could engage in the practice of
2
1050224
required an individual to register with that board before
using the title "interior designer."
Section 
1(d) 
of 
the 
1982 
Act 
provided: 
"Nothing 
contained
3
herein shall preclude any person from performing, or offering
to perform, [interior-design services], provided that such
person shall not be permitted to use or be identified by the
title 'interior designer.'"
Section 1(d) of the 1982 Act defined "interior design"
4
as 
"the performance of, or offering to perform,
services hereinafter described, for a fee or other
compensation, 
to 
another 
person, 
or 
to 
a
partnership, corporation, or other legal entity, in
connection with the design, utilization, furnishing
or fabrication of elements in interior spaces in
buildings, homes, and related structures.  Such
services include, but shall not be limited to, the
following:  programming the functional requirements
for interior spaces; preparing analysis of user
needs; planning interior spaces; preparing designs,
drawings and specifications for selection, use,
5
interior design.  
3
The evidence before the trial court showed that Lupo had
been an "interior decorator" for more than 22 years.  The
services she provided to clients consisted of advice in
selecting paint colors, accessories, fabrics, and furniture
for 
homes 
and 
businesses. 
Many 
of the services Lupo provided
as an interior decorator also could have been classified as
"interior design" under the definition of that term in the
1982 Act.   Even so, because the 1982 Act was a "title" act,
4
1050224
location, color, and finishes of interior materials,
equipment, 
furnishings 
and 
furniture; 
and
administering 
contracts 
for 
fabrication, 
procurement
or installation in connection with such designs,
drawings and specifications."  
Section 20, Act No. 2001-660, Ala. Acts 2001. 
5
Section 6 of the Act states the following requirements
6
for obtaining a certificate of registration from the Board: 
"(b)(1) The board may issue a certificate of
registration authorizing an individual to engage in
the practice of interior design and use the title of
interior designer in the State of Alabama, only if:
"a. The applicant is determined by the board to
be of good moral character.
6
Lupo was able to offer those services so long as she did not
use the title "interior designer." 
However, when the legislature enacted the Act, it
repealed the 1982 Act.   Although similar in some ways to the
5
1982 Act, the Act differs from its predecessor in one
significant manner: it restricts the practice of interior
design to those individuals who have been issued a certificate
of registration by the Board.  In particular, § 8(c) of the
Act states that an individual who practices interior design
without having a certificate of registration from the Board is
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.   See also § 3(2) to (5), Act
6
1050224
"b. The applicant has successfully passed the
National Council for Interior Design Qualification
(NCIDQ) examination, or an equivalent examination,
accepted and approved by the board, based on the
standards set by the NCIDQ.
"c. The applicant is a graduate of a Foundation
for Interior Design Education Research (FIDER)
accredited interior design program or its equivalent
based on contents standards set by FIDER.
"(2) Each applicant shall have a combined
minimum record of passing 48 semester or 60 quarter
hours of board approved interior design education
and practical experience under the guidance of a
person holding a valid certificate of registration,
or any individual approved by the board to total a
minimum of six years.
"(3) The board shall approve the equivalent
interior design educational programs based on
content standards set by FIDER and standards set by
the NCIDQ or subsequent and equal accrediting and
testing agencies."
7
No. 2001-660, Ala. Acts 2001 (defining the terms "certificate
of registration," "interior designer," "practice of interior
design," and "practicing interior design").
In January 2002, Lupo appeared before the Board to
respond to charges that she was not complying with the Act.
The Board alleged that Lupo was using the title "interior
designer" and was practicing interior design without a
certificate of registration.  After a hearing, the Board
1050224
8
determined the Lupo had violated the Act, assessed a fine of
$1,500 and costs of $235, and ordered her to cease from
practicing interior design without having a certificate of
registration from the Board.  To enforce its order, the Board
then filed the present action in the Jefferson Circuit Court.
In her defense to the action, Lupo asserted--and the trial
court held--that the Act is unconstitutional.
As authority for her assertion that the Act is
unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and unreasonable, Lupo
cites Ross Neely Express, Inc. v. Alabama Department of
Environmental Management, 437 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1983), a
decision the trial court cited in its order finding the Act
unconstitutional.  The defendant in Ross Neely Express
operated a truck terminal in Montgomery County.  To reach the
terminal, the defendant's trucks had to travel along an
unpaved access road.  The Alabama Air Pollution Control
Commission claimed that by creating dust as they traveled
along the access road Ross Neely's trucks were violating
certain rules and regulations of the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management ("ADEM").  437 So. 2d at 83-84.
This Court held that the ADEM rules and regulations the
1050224
9
defendant was charged with violating were unconstitutional.
437 So. 2d at 85-86.  The ADEM provisions at issue stated:
"'4.2.1 
No 
person 
shall 
cause, 
suffer, 
allow, 
or
permit ... a road to be used ... without taking
reasonable precautions to prevent particulate matter
from becoming airborne. Such reasonable precautions
shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
"'....
"'(b) Application of asphalt, oil, water, or
suitable chemicals on dirt roads, materials stock
piles, and other surfaces which create airborne dust
problems;
"'....
"'4.2.2 Visible Emissions Restrictions Beyond
Lot Line.  No person shall cause or permit the
discharge of visible fugitive dust emissions beyond
the lot line of the property on which the emissions
originate.'"
437 So. 2d at 83.
This Court stated:
"The right to due process is guaranteed to the
citizens of Alabama under the Alabama Constitution
of 1901, Article 1, Sections 6 and 13.  This
constitutional right to due process applies in civil
actions as well as criminal proceedings.  Pike v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 263 Ala.
59, 81 So. 2d 254 (1955).  The courts have found
that this right is violated when a statute or
regulation 
is 
unduly 
vague, 
unreasonable, 
or
overbroad.  In Kahalley v. State, 254 Ala. 482, 48
So. 2d 794 (1950), this court found a criminal
misdemeanor statute to be unconstitutionally vague.
There the court stated:
1050224
10
"'[L]egislation may run afoul of the due
process clause because of a failure to set
up any sufficient guidance to those who
would be law-abiding, or to advise a
defendant of the nature and cause of an
accusation he is called on to answer, or to
guide 
the courts in the law's enforcement.'
"In reviewing a regulation of a county Board of
Health, this court held that the central issue was
reasonableness.  Baldwin County Board of Health v.
Baldwin County Electric Membership Corporation, 355
So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978).  In City of Russellville v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1980),
this court said:
"'The validity of a police power
regulation 
... 
primarily 
depends 
on
whether, 
under 
all 
the 
existing
circumstances, 
the 
regulation 
is
reasonable, and whether it is really
designed to accomplish a purpose properly
falling within the scope of the police
power.  Crabtree v. City of Birmingham, 292
Ala. 684, 299 So. 2d 282 (1974) ....
Otherwise expressed, the police power may
not be employed to prevent evils of a
remote or highly problematical character.
Nor may its exercise be justified when the
restraint imposed upon the exercise of a
private right is disproportionate to the
amount of evil that will be corrected.
Bolin v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 96 So. 2d
582, conformed to in 39 Ala. App. 161, 96
So. 2d 592 (1957).'
"Statutes 
and 
regulations 
are 
void 
for
overbreadth if their object is achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.  See Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S. Ct. 391, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444
(1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
1050224
11
87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967).
"In applying the above cited principles to the
regulations challenged in the case before us, we
find that both 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are constitutionally
defective.  Regulation 4.2.1 requires that [Ross
Neely Express ('RNE')] not allow its road to be used
without taking 'reasonable' precautions to prevent
particulate matter from becoming airborne, and lists
certain precautions which shall be included.  While
'reasonableness' has been upheld as a legal standard
in some cases, the fact remains that the regulation
before 
us 
is 
so 
vague 
that 
men 
of 
common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.  See Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct.
126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).  How often should RNE
have taken 'reasonable' precautions?  Must it take
all of the suggested precautions, as well as others?
If the precautions taken fail to eliminate airborne
particulate matter completely, has RNE failed to
take reasonable precautions per se?
"The stipulated facts show that RNE used 50 to
60 truckloads of slag in the construction of the
road in 1974. Since that time, on at least four
occasions, slag and chert had been added to the road
surface.  On three occasions oil was applied to the
surface.  (We note that this was one of the
suggested 'reasonable precautions' contained in the
regulation itself.)  But in 1981, ADEM alleged that
RNE was in violation of § 4.2.1 because dust had
been observed rising from the road, and the trial
court agreed.  This appears to be a classic example
of a case where men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to the requirements of the
regulation.  See Connally v. General Construction
Co., supra.
"Regulation 
4.2.2 
is 
unconstitutionally
restrictive.  Visible fugitive dust emissions may
not be permitted to float beyond the lot line of the
1050224
12
property on which the emissions originate. ... Such
a regulation is clearly overbroad, encompassing
every situation in which visible fugitive dust
emissions move across a lot line, without regard to
damage, injury, or inconvenience caused, reasonable
attempts at control, etc.  This invades the area of
protected freedom, severely restricting the use of
property, 
and 
creates 
a 
situation 
where
discriminatory enforcement is almost inevitable.
"We 
find 
both 
of 
the 
regulations 
under
consideration to be unreasonable.  ADEM argues that
they are a proper exercise of the police power of
the State of Alabama, going to the protection of
health, 
public 
convenience, 
public 
welfare,
protection of property, and the maintenance of good
order.  See James v. Todd, 267 Ala. 495, 103 So. 2d
19 (1958); Alosi v. Jones, 234 Ala. 391, 174 So. 774
(1937).  While the above matters are clearly subject
to the police power, and while the control of air
pollution is greatly to be desired, we find that the
restraint imposed by the two regulations before us,
as written, imposes a restraint upon the use of
private property that is disproportionate to the
amount of evil that will be corrected.  Thus, they
fail the test of constitutionality under City of
Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., supra."
437 So. 2d at 84-86.
In response to Lupo's argument that, under the principles
stated in Ross Neely Express, the Act is unconstitutionally
overbroad, vague, 
and 
unreasonable, the 
Board 
argues that 
Lupo
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Act is
unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, or unreasonable.  We
disagree.  
1050224
13
Lupo has sufficiently demonstrated that the Act--
particularly in its definition of the "practice of interior
design"--restricts her ability to provide interior-decorating
services.  When asked at trial to explain the services she
provided as an interior decorator, Lupo testified:
"I go into someone's house and I pick out their
paint colors, their art, flooring, as in carpet,
telling them if they need to have their hardwoods
redone or maybe, you know, linoleum come up and tile
go down. ... [I]t's strictly the surfaces of the
interiors of [a client's] house.  I work with
contractors and architects to draw up that.  I don't
do drawings. ... I am strictly doing surfaces as far
as paint colors, accessories, fabrics, furniture,
things like that."
Those 
activities--giving 
advice to clients 
as 
to 
paint 
colors,
art, 
flooring, 
accessories, 
fabrics, 
and 
furniture--are 
within
the definition of the "practice of interior design" in § 3(4)
of the Act.  That section defines the "practice of interior
design" as:
"The performance of, or offering to perform,
services for a fee or other compensation, directly
or 
indirectly, 
to 
another 
person, 
or 
to 
a
partnership, corporation, or other legal entity, in
connection with the design, utilization, furnishing,
or fabrication of elements in interior spaces in
buildings, homes, and related structures. These
services include, but are not limited to, the
following: Programming the functional requirements
for interior spaces; planning interior spaces;
preparing analyses of user needs for interior
1050224
14
spaces; 
preparing 
designs, 
drawings, 
and
specifications for selection, use, location, color,
and 
finishes 
of 
interior 
walls, 
materials,
equipment, furnishings, furniture, and personal
property; administering contracts for fabrication,
procurement, or installation in connection with
reflected 
ceiling 
plans, 
space 
utilization,
furnishings, or the fabrication of nonstructural
elements within and surrounding interior spaces of
buildings."
However, certain activities are exempt from the definition of
the practice of interior design in § 3(4)d of the Act
(codified at § 
34-15B-3(4)b.4). 
 Lupo 
emphasizes the 
following
exemption (which the parties refer to as the "retail-sale
exemption"):
"4. The performance of services pursuant to
selling, selecting, or assisting in selecting
personal property or fixtures, such as, but not
limited to, furnishings, decorative accessories,
furniture, paint, 
wall coverings, window treatments,
floor coverings, surface mounted lighting, or
decorative materials, pursuant to a retail sale;
installing or coordinating installation as part of
the 
prospective 
retail 
sale; 
or 
providing
computer-aided or other drawings for the purpose of
retail sales, provided those drawings are for
placements or materials lists.  Provided, however,
an individual, partnership, or corporation shall not
use the title designations set forth in Section
34-15B-8 nor receive a certificate of registration
without 
successful 
completion 
of 
the 
NCIDQ
examination and/or a sealed level examination, as
applicable, and as approved by the board. Services
performed shall be subject to all fire, safety,
1050224
On April 18, 2006, the Governor approved Act No. 2006-
7
518, Ala. Acts 2006.  Section 2 of Act No. 2006-518 "expressly
preserved, until October 1, 2007," those parts of Act No.
2001-660 codified at §§ 34-15B-1 to 34-15B-18, Ala. Code 1975.
However, § 2 of Act 2006-518 amended § 34-15B-3(4)b.4, Ala.
Code 1975 (§ 3(4)d of the Act), to read as follows: 
"The performance of consultation or services
pursuant to selling, selecting or assisting in
selecting personal property or fixtures, such as,
but 
not 
limited 
to, 
furnishings, 
decorative
accessories, furniture, paint, wall coverings,
window treatments, floor coverings, surface mounted
lighting, or decorative materials, pursuant to a
consultation 
or 
retail 
sale; 
installing 
or
coordinating installation as part of the prospective
retail 
sale 
or 
consultation; 
or 
providing
computer-aided or other drawings for the purpose of
retail sales or consultations, provided those
drawings are for placements or material lists.
Nothing herein shall prohibit any person from
charging a fee for such services whether or not a
consultation 
or 
retail 
sale 
is 
consummated.
Provided, however, an individual, partnership, or
corporation shall not use the title designations set
forth in Section 34-15B-8 nor receive a certificate
of registration without successful completion of the
NCIDQ examination and/or a sealed level examination,
as applicable, and as approved by the board.
Services performed shall be subject to all fire,
safety, building and construction codes."
(Emphasis added to indicate changes made by Act No. 2006-518.)
Act No. 2001-660 was the legislation under which the
Board charged Lupo; Act No. 2006-518 did not take effect until
after the trial court had issued its order declaring Act No.
2001-660 unconstitutional.  Consequently, we do not consider
Act No. 2006-518 in our review of Act No. 2001-660, and we
15
building, and construction codes."7
1050224
express no opinion regarding the effect of Act No. 2006-518.
16
At trial, the chairperson of the Board, Courtney Oglesby,
testified that the definition of the "practice of interior
design" included such things as selecting paint colors or
pillows for a sofa.  According to Oglesby, an individual such
as Lupo could not offer advice to clients regarding the
selection of paint colors or "throw pillows" unless she was
registered with the Board in accordance with the Act or
offered the services "pursuant to a retail sale" under the
retail-sale exemption.
The Board, however, argues that "[t]he language of the
Act does not compel such a broad reading" and that the
definition of the practice of interior design "does not
contemplate mere recommendations of paint colors and throw
pillows, but more comprehensive services involving analyzing,
planning, drawing, and preparing specifications for interior
spaces."  (Board's brief, pp. 16-17.)  The Board also argues
that this Court should read the definition of the practice of
interior design in the Act "as narrowly as its language
permits, if necessary to avoid invalidity."  (Board's brief,
p. 19.)  The Board relies on the following principle of
1050224
17
statutory construction: 
"Where the validity of a statute is assailed and
there are two possible interpretations, by one of
which the statute would be unconstitutional and by
the other would be valid, the courts should adopt
the construction which would uphold it.  11 Am. Jur.
p. 725.  Or, as otherwise stated, it is the duty of
the courts to adopt the construction of a statute to
bring it into harmony with the constitution, if its
language will permit. This principle has been often
recognized by our own Court. It was well stated by
the Supreme Court of the United States in National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 621, 81 L. Ed.
893, 108 A.L.R. 1352 [(1937)], in the following
language:
"'The cardinal principle of statutory
construction is to save and not to destroy.
We have repeatedly held that as between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by
one of which it would be unconstitutional
and by the other valid, our plain duty is
to adopt that which will save the act.
Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is
the same.'"
Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 10, 18
So. 2d 810, 815 (1944) (citations omitted).  
The Board does not, however, show how McAdory applies to
the Act.  The Board cites the definition of the practice of
interior design in the Act, states the rule from McAdory, and
urges this Court to read the definition narrowly, but the
Board does not explain how the plain language of the Act may
1050224
18
be read so narrowly.
In Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 132 (Ala. 2005),
this Court noted:  
"In any case involving statutory construction,
our inquiry begins with the language of the statute,
and if the meaning of the statutory language is
plain, our analysis ends there.  Ex parte Moore, 880
So. 2d 1131, 1140 (Ala. 2003) ('"'The cardinal rule
of statutory interpretation is to determine and give
effect to the intent of the legislature as
manifested in the language of the statute.'"')
(quoting Ex parte Weaver, 871 So. 2d 820, 823 (Ala.
2003), quoting in turn Ex parte State Dep't of
Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala.1996)).  This
Court in DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas,
Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275-76 (Ala. 1998), explained:
"'In determining the meaning of a
statute, this Court looks to the plain
meaning of the words as written by the
legislature. As we have said:
"'"'Words used in a statute must
be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language
is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says. If the
language 
of 
the 
statute 
is
unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction
and the clearly expressed intent
of the legislature must be given
effect.'"'
"729 So. 2d at 275-76 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998),
additional citations omitted).  See also 729 So. 2d
1050224
19
at 276 (explaining that the separation-of-powers
doctrine requires a court to use the plain-meaning
rule in construing a statute and that 'only if there
is no rational way to interpret the words as stated
will [a court] look beyond those words to determine
legislative intent')."
In the present case, the definition of the "practice of
interior design" plainly includes, as the chairperson of the
Board acknowledged, things such as offering advice to a client
regarding the selection of paint colors and sofa pillows, as
well as the other services Lupo testified she offers as an
interior decorator.  Section 3(4) of the Act (§ 34-15B-3(4))
provides:  "These [interior-design] services include, but are
not limited to, the following: ... preparing designs,
drawings, and specifications for selection, use, location,
color, and finishes of interior walls, materials, equipment,
furnishings, furniture, and personal property ...."  The
retail-sale exemption in § 3(4)d of the Act (§ 34-15B-3(4)b.4)
makes it even clearer, because it excludes from the definition
of the practice of interior design "[t]he performance of
services pursuant to ... selecting, or assisting in selecting
personal property or fixtures, such as, but not limited to,
furnishings, decorative accessories, furniture, paint, wall
coverings, 
window 
treatments, 
floor 
coverings, 
surface 
mounted
1050224
This section of the Act was amended effective April 18,
8
2006.  See supra note 7.
20
lighting, 
or 
decorative 
materials" 
so 
long 
as 
those 
activities
are "pursuant to a retail sale."8
If the selection of "decorative accessories" or "paint"
were not included in the "practice of interior design," there
would be no need to exempt those activities under the retail-
sale exemption.  Consequently, we reject the Board's "narrow"
reading of the definition, because the Board's reading would
render portions of the retail-sale exemption superfluous.  Ex
parte D.B., [Ms. 1060077, June 15, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___
(Ala. 2007) ("'"'A statute should be construed so that effect
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative 
or 
superfluous, void 
or 
insignificant, 
and 
so 
that
one section will not destroy another unless the provision is
the result of obvious mistake or error.'"'  Ex parte Wilson,
854 So. 2d 1106, 1110 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte Welch, 519
So. 2d 517, 519 (Ala. 1987), quoting in turn 2A Norman J.
Singer, 
Sutherland 
Statutes 
and 
Statutory 
Construction 
§ 
46.06
(4th ed. 1984)).").
The issue, therefore, is whether the Act is overbroad or
1050224
21
unreasonable in its regulation of those activities when they
are not related to a retail sale.  In Scott & Scott, Inc. v.
City of Mountain Brook, 844 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 2002), this Court
examined the concepts of overbreadth and unreasonableness:
"'"An overbreadth challenge is based
on the statute's 'possible direct and
indirect burdens on speech.'"  United
States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th
Cir. 
1999) 
(quoting 
American 
Booksellers 
v.
Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1499-500 (11th Cir.
1990)).  The overbreadth doctrine "permits
the facial invalidation of laws that
inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
rights 
if 
the 
impermissible 
applications 
of
the law are substantial when judged in
relation 
to 
the 
statute's 
plainly
legitimate sweep."  City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 119 S. Ct. 1849,
144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999) (quoting Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15, 93 S.
Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973)).  The
doctrine "'protects the public from the
chilling effect such a statute has on
protected speech; the court will strike
down the statute even though in the case
before the court the governmental entity
enforced the statute against those engaged
in unprotected activities.'"  Acheson, 195
F.3d at 650 (quoting Nationalist Movement
v. City of Cumming, 934 F.2d 1482, 1485
(11th 
Cir. 
1991) 
(Tjoflat, 
J.,
dissenting)).'
"[Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n,] 802
So. 2d [207,] 213 [(Ala. 2001)].  However, in Friday
v. Ethanol Corporation, 539 So. 2d 208 (Ala. 1988),
this Court recognized a broader application of the
overbreadth doctrine by stating, in pertinent part:
1050224
22
"'The doctrine of overbreadth recognizes
that a state legislature may have a
legitimate and substantial interest in
regulating particular behavior, but "that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly 
stifle 
fundamental 
personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."  Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252, 5 L. Ed. 2d
231 (1960) [quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 88 S. Ct. 391, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444
(1967)].  Historically, the overbreadth
doctrine has been used by the federal
courts to prevent a chilling effect on
First Amendment freedoms.  Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 844, 852 (1970).  The overbreadth
doctrine does not apply to commercial
speech under the Federal Constitution.
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.
Ct. 1186, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982).
However, 
the 
overbreadth 
doctrine 
under 
the
Alabama Constitution has been applied in
due process cases not involving First
Amendment freedoms.  See Ross Neely
Express, Inc. v. Alabama Department of
Environmental Management, 437 So. 2d 82
(Ala. 1983).'
"539 So. 2d at 215.  In Ross Neely Express, Inc. v.
Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 437
So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1983), this Court stated:
"'Statutes and regulations are void
for overbreadth 
if 
their 
object is achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. ...'
"437 So. 2d at 85.
1050224
23
"'This Court has also recognized that the
right to due process under the Alabama
Constitution is violated when a statute,
regulation, 
or 
ordinance 
imposes
restrictions that are unnecessary and
unreasonable upon the pursuit of useful
activities in that they do not bear some
substantial relation to the public health,
safety, or morals, or to the general
welfare, the public convenience, or to the
general prosperity.'
"Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So. 2d at 216 (citing
Ross Neely Express, Inc., 437 So. 2d at 84-86; City
of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d
525, 527-28 (Ala. 1980); Leary v. Adams, 226 Ala.
472, 474, 147 So. 391 (1933); Baldwin County Bd. of
Health v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 355
So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978)).
"'"The concept of the public welfare is broad
and inclusive.  The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary."'  Members of City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 104 S.
Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984) (quoting Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27
(1954)).  If an ordinance is '"fairly debatable, a
court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the 
municipal 
government 
body 
acting 
in 
a
legislative capacity."'  City of Russellville v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d at 526 (quoting
City of Birmingham v. Norris, 374 So. 2d 854, 856
(Ala. 1979))."
 
844 So. 2d at 593-95.
In the present case, § 2 of the Act (§ 34-15B-2) includes
the following statement of legislative findings:  
"The Legislature finds and declares that interior
1050224
24
design is a learned profession, involving issues
such as indoor pollution, fire safety, space
planning, 
and 
requirements 
of 
special 
needs
citizens.  For this is a matter of public interest,
safety 
protection, 
and 
concern 
that 
persons
practicing interior design merit and receive the
confidence of the public and that only qualified
persons be permitted to practice interior design in
the State of Alabama.  This act shall be liberally
construed to carry out these purposes."
The Board contends that the Act is merely a licensing statute
that "protects the public by enabling the public to rely on
licensure as proof of qualifications."  (Board's reply brief,
p. 2.)  We disagree.
At the trial in the circuit court, the chairperson of the
Board denied that the State had any interest in regulating
advice regarding things such as selecting throw pillows on the
sofa of a private individual's residence; she testified that
"[t]he State doesn't have any interest in the color of your
living room walls.  The State is trying to determine the
difference in a professional and nonprofessional."  In its
materials to this Court, the Board does not assert that the
State has a legitimate interest in regulating "the color of
... living room walls" or the number or type of throw pillows
on a sofa in an individual's residence.  The Board suggests,
however, that the Act is necessary to ensure that a person who
1050224
25
makes recommendations regarding materials to be installed in
a residence or business is "qualified" to select materials
that comply with regulations such as fire codes or with laws
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
However, the existence of the retail-sale exemption
negates the Board's assertion that the qualifications for
interior designers included in the Act are necessary to ensure
that individuals engaged in the practice of interior design
recommend materials that comply with applicable laws and
regulations.  Under the retail-sale exemption in § 3(4)d (§
34-15-3(4)b.4), an individual not registered with the Board
may offer advice about the selection of a number of materials
--"furnishings, 
decorative 
accessories, 
furniture, 
paint, 
wall
coverings, 
window 
treatments, 
floor 
coverings, 
surface 
mounted
lighting, or decorative materials"--to be installed in houses
or places of business, if that advice is given "pursuant to a
retail 
sale." 
  
Additionally, 
the 
retail-sale 
exemption 
states
that the design "[s]ervices performed shall be subject to all
fire, safety, building, and construction codes."  Id.
(emphasis added).  Thus, the retail-sale exemption permits
nonregistered individuals to make--if done "pursuant to a
1050224
26
retail sale"--a recommendation of those materials that would
comply with applicable laws and codes.  If the position of the
Board is correct, we do not understand how acting "pursuant to
a retail sale" qualifies a nonregistered individual to make
such 
a 
recommendation. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
Board's 
justification
of the Act is not reasonable.  
We 
conclude, 
therefore, 
that 
the 
Act 
"'imposes
restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the
pursuit of useful activities'" and that those restrictions
"'do not bear some substantial relation to the public health,
safety, or morals, or to the general welfare, the public
convenience, or to the general prosperity.'" Scott & Scott,
844 So. 2d at 594 (quoting Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So. 2d
at 216).  Consequently, the Act violates Art. 1, §§ 6 and 13,
Ala. Const. of 1901.
The Board argues that this Court should sever any
provision of the Act it finds unconstitutional rather than
declaring the entire act unconstitutional. 
"If a portion of a legislative enactment is
determined to be unconstitutional but the remainder
is found to be enforceable without it, a court may
strike the offending portion and leave the remainder
intact and in force.  Courts will strive to uphold
acts of the legislature.  The inclusion of a
1050224
27
severability clause is a clear statement of
legislative intent to that effect, but the absence
of such a clause does not necessarily indicate the
lack of such an intent or require a holding of
inseverability."
City of Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So. 2d 1312, 1315 (Ala.
1987).  See also § 1-1-16, Ala. Code 1975.
The Act includes a severability provision.  § 18, Act No.
2001-660, Ala. Acts 2001 ("The provisions of this act are
severable. If any part of this act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, that declaration shall not affect the part
which remains.").  However, the unconstitutional provision in
the Act is its overbroad and unreasonable definition of the
"practice of interior design," which is "so intertwined with
the remaining portions" of the Act that the Act would be
meaningless without it.  State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735
So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Ala. 1999) ("Under these well-established
principles, 
the 
judiciary's 
severability 
power 
extends 
only 
to
those cases in which the invalid portions are '"not so
intertwined with the remaining portions that such remaining
portions are rendered meaningless by the extirpation."'
Hamilton v. Autauga County, 289 Ala. 419, 426, 268 So. 2d 30,
36 (1972) (quoting Allen v. Walker County, 281 Ala. 156, 162,
1050224
28
199 So. 2d 854, 860 (1967)).  If they are so intertwined, it
must '"be assumed that the legislature would not have passed
the enactment thus rendered meaningless."'  Id.  In such a
case, the entire act must fall.   2 [Norman J.] Singer,
[Sutherland 
Statutory 
Construction], 
§ 
44.04, 
at 
502 
[(5th 
ed.
1992)].").  Consequently, the objectionable portion cannot be
severed, and the Act in its entirety is unconstitutional.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court declaring Act No. 2001-
660, Ala. Acts 2001, unconstitutional is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., concurs specially.
1050224
29
PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the majority opinion that the Alabama
Interior Design Consumer Protection Act, Act No. 2001-660,
Ala. Acts 2001 ("the Act"), is unconstitutional.
I write to express concern over the State's invocation of
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955): 
"The day is gone when this Court uses the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down 
state 
laws, 
regulatory 
of 
business 
and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought." 
The citizens of Alabama expect this Court to decide cases
based 
on 
the 
timeless 
meaning 
of 
the 
United 
States
Constitution and the Alabama Constitution of 1901, not merely
on the basis that "[t]he day is gone" for a certain school of
jurisprudence.  Our oath of office as Justices requires this.
However, I assure the State that this Court did not declare
the Act unconstitutional because the Justices think its
provisions are "unwise, improvident, or out of harmony" with
their own school of thought.  This Court declared the Act
unconstitutional because it violates Art. 1, §§ 6 and 13,
Alabama Constitution of 1901.
1050224
30
In 1901, when the Alabama Constitution was drafted and
ratified, economic liberties such as the liberty of contract,
the right to enforce a contract, the right to own and to use
property, and the right to enter into and to practice the
common occupations  were highly valued.  United States Supreme
Court cases such as Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)
(concerning the right of a Louisiana shipper to insure his
shipment with an out-of-state insurer not licensed to do
business in Louisiana), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (concerning the right of a bakery and bakery employees
to contract to work more hours than allowed by New York law),
upheld economic rights under the concept of the liberty of
contract as guaranteed in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Although it is fashionable to speak of the "demise of the
Lochner era," and although later cases such as Williamson,
supra, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), give less protection to economic liberties and more
deference to such state interests as health and safety, the
Court has never denied that the liberty of contract is a
constitutionally protected right.
1050224
Letter from R.A. Moseley, Jr., to Governor Thomas G.
9
Jones (August 14, 1893); letter from Governor Thomas G. Jones
to R.A. Moseley, Jr. (August 16, 1893) (cited and quoted in
John Eidsmoe, Warrior, Statesman, Jurist for the South: The
Life, Legacy and Law of Thomas Goode Jones 168-69 (Sprinkle
Publications 2003)).  For a general understanding of the
convictions of the framers of the Constitution of 1901
concerning economic liberties, see Eidsmoe at 173-88.
31
The Alabama Constitution of 1901 was in the process of
being drafted and ratified during the Allgeyer-Lochner era.
Thomas Goode Jones, one of the primary drafters of that
constitution, served as governor from 1890 to 1894.  During
that time an economic crisis led to a proposal to issue a
moratorium on mortgage foreclosures.  Governor Jones opposed
that proposal, both because he thought it was unconstitutional
and because he thought it was economically unwise.   The
9
framers of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 protected economic
liberties and other liberties in the Due Process Clause of
Art. I, § 6 ("[He] shall not ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, except by due process of law"), using language
similar to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  But they also
protected economic liberties by adopting Art. I, § 1 ("That
all men are equally free and independent; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
1050224
The term "liberty of contract" generally refers to the
10
right to enter into a contract; the term "impairing the
obligations of contracts" involves the state's preventing the
enforcement of contracts already made.
32
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."),
§ 13 ("That all courts shall be open; and that every person,
for any injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person, and
reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and
right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
or delay."), § 22 ("That no ... law, impairing the obligations
of contracts ... shall be passed by the legislature ...."),10
§ 23 ("private property shall not be taken for, or applied to
public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor;
nor shall private property be taken for private use, or for
the use of corporations, other than municipal, without the
consent of the owner," thereby providing protection that goes
beyond those found in the "takings" clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution), § 35 ("That this
sole object and only legitimate end of government is to
protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property, and when the government assumes other functions it
is usurpation and oppression."), and § 36 ("That this
enumeration of certain rights shall not impair or deny others
1050224
33
retained 
by 
the 
people; 
and, 
to 
guard 
against 
any
encroachments on the rights herein retained, we declare that
everything in this Declaration of Rights is excepted out of
the general powers of government, and shall forever remain
inviolate.").  Concerning § 35, this Court stated in Churchill
v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama in Birmingham,
409 So. 2d 1382, 1389 (Ala. 1982): 
"The prohibition of § 35 is not to be taken lightly.
The 'compelling need' criterion for governmental
involvement in profit-making ventures mandates that
each challenged activity undergo careful scrutiny on
a case by case basis to avoid the constitutional
'usurpation and oppression' admonition."
These provisions lead me to conclude that the framers of
the Alabama Constitution of 1901 valued economic liberties as
highly as did the United States Supreme Court Justices who
decided Allgeyer and Lochner and that they intended to
enshrine in the Alabama Constitution strong protections for
economic liberties.  As can be seen from the provisions quoted
above, the safeguards for economic liberties the framers
placed in the Alabama Constitution of 1901 are much more
extensive than those in the United States Constitution.
This Court has continued to recognize the value of
economic liberties.  In City of Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala. 622,
1050224
34
173 So. 266 (1937), this Court invalidated a city ordinance
prohibiting persons from charging lesser fees than the
ordinance specified for certain personal services, in that
case barber services and laundry services.  The Court in Rouse
acknowledged that in Franklin v. State ex rel. Alabama State
Milk Control Board, 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295 (1936), it had
upheld regulation of the milk industry, but it distinguished
that case because, it reasoned, the milk industry was
"affected 'with a public interest.'" Rouse, 233 Ala. at 625,
173 So. at 268.  The Court stated:
"Personal service can not become affected 'with
public interest' unless the service rendered is
official in character, or is rendered in connection
with a business 'affected with public interest' or
'devoted to a public purpose.'"
233 Ala. at 625, 173 So. at 268.
Rouse recognized both the liberty of contract and the
right to engage in an occupation:
"In Meyer v. State of Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390
(1923)], the Supreme Court of the United States,
treating what is embraced in the term 'liberty' as
guaranteed by the Constitution, observed: 'While
this court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has
received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated.  Without doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to
1050224
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has held that "[t]he
11
right to engage in the profession of dentistry is a property
right, and that right may be abrogated only by compliance with
due process of law." Delevan v. Board of Dental Exam'rs of
Alabama, 620 So. 2d 13, 16 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); see also
Board of Dental Exam'rs of Alabama v. Townsley, 668 So. 2d 4,
5 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).  I recognize that the state may have
a greater interest in regulating a profession than in
regulating other occupations.
35
engage in any of the common occupations of life,[
]
11
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.' 262 U.S. 390, at page 399, 43 S.Ct.
625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446."
Rouse, 233 Ala. at 624, 73 So. at 268 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Summers v. Adams Motor Co., 34 Ala. App.
319, 39 So. 2d 300 (1949), the Court of Appeals upheld a
liquidated-damages provision of a contract for the sale of an
automobile.  Summers, the purchaser, had agreed not to resell
the car within six months without first offering to resell it
to Adams Motor Company for its reasonable market value.  The
court stated:
"Before the contract was executed the Motor
Company was not obligated to sell or deliver the
automobile that was sold to Mrs. Summers except on
terms agreeable to the dealer.  Neither was Mrs.
Summers obligated to purchase that automobile from
the Motor Company except on terms agreeable to her.
It would be an unwarranted interference with their
1050224
36
liberty of contract for this court to say that they
could not enter into the agreement that was entered
into ...." 
34 Ala. App. at 323, 39 So. 2d at 303.
In Juneman Electric, Inc. v. Cross, 414 So. 2d 108, 112
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982), the Court of Civil Appeals stated: "The
police power of the state enters into every contract, but the
exercise of that power must be for an end which is in fact
public, and the means must be reasonably adapted to the end to
be achieved." 
In Alabama Power Co. v. The Citizens of Alabama, 740 So.
2d 371 (Ala. 1999), this Court recognized that the United
States Supreme Court has backed away from the strong emphasis
on economic rights found in Lochner and other earlier cases.
Justice See, writing for the Court, observed:
"While this Court has not engaged in a campaign
to strike down economic legislation, it has applied
some of the less activist substantive-due-process
formulations previously employed by the Supreme
Court of the United States.  For example, in
Franklin v. State ex rel. Alabama State Milk Control
Bd., 232 Ala. 637, 642-44, 169 So. 295, 299-300
(1936), this Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's
pre-Lochner 
'affected-with-the-public-interest' 
test
in upholding a statute regulating the production of
milk. (Citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto)
113, 130, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876) (holding that a state
law regulating rates charged by grain elevators did
not violate the elevator operators' substantive-due-
1050224
The briefs of both parties discuss the differences
12
between interior "design" and interior "decoration."  In this
writing I will use the term "interior design" without defining
the differences between these terms or deciding which term
best describes Lupo's work.
37
process rights because the statute was 'affected
with the public interest' and, thus, within the
police power of the state)).  In [Alabama State
Federation of Labor v.] McAdory, 246 Ala. [1] at 12,
18 So. 2d [810] at 818 [(1944)], this Court quoted
the Supreme Court's post-Lochner means-end relation
test in upholding certain provisions of a labor
statute. (Citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
525, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934) (stating that
legislation did not impinge on substantive-due-
process rights as long as it was not 'unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious' and 'the means selected
[had] a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained'))."
740 So. 2d at 380.  While acknowledging that economic
liberties are not protected as vigorously as they were during
the Lochner era, this Court nonetheless recognized that
economic liberties still enjoy protection.
The State's argument that certification of interior
designers
 is necessary to ensure that designers are competent
12
to choose safe products for use in interior design fails for
two reasons: (1) federal and state commissions already exist
to ensure that unsafe materials are not available for use in
homes or businesses; and (2) there is no state requirement
that homeowners or businesses retain any interior decorator or
1050224
Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227
13
(E.D.N.Y. 1993), implied that decoration of one's home is a
means of expression.  Hornell argued that the name of the
alcoholic beverage it was marketing -- "The Original Crazy
Horse Malt Liquor" -- was entitled to constitutional
protection as freedom of expression above that ordinarily
afforded commercial speech.  The court "explicitly reject[ed]
plaintiff's argument that use of the Crazy Horse name is
actually the personal expression of Don Vultaggio, the
Chairman and co-owner of Hornell Brewing, and therefore is
entitled to the utmost constitutional protection.  Plaintiff
cannot seriously liken Vultaggio's freedom of expression in
decorating his home in Southwestern style to the use of the
name Crazy Horse on a 
nationally 
marketed 
alcoholic beverage."
819 F. Supp. at 1233 n. 7.  See also Commonwealth v. Bricker,
542 Pa. 234, 666 A.2d 257 (1995), in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that Bricker's display of a flag in her
home was constitutionally protected expression.  The court
stated: "[S]ome might argue that there are few forms of self-
expression as personal and important as the manner in which we
38
designer to decorate their homes or offices.  If the public
interest is not threatened by allowing homeowners and
businesspersons to design their own houses and offices, it is
difficult to understand how that interest is threatened by
allowing them to retain interior designers who are not
certified.
Not only are Lupo's rights to contract and to engage in
her chosen occupation at stake in this case, but also the
rights of the people of Alabama to contract with her.  If a
homeowner or businessperson wants to express himself by
decorating his home or his office in a certain way,
 and if
13
1050224
decorate our homes. ... [T]he government must satisfy
constitutional scrutiny before it can tell the citizens of
this Commonwealth what pictures they may hang on their walls
or what symbols they may display in the sanctity of their
homes." Bricker, 542 Pa. at 242, 666 A.2d at 261.
39
that person believes Lupo can best provide the design that he
desires, the State should not  tell that person that he may
not contract with Lupo merely because Lupo lacks state
certification or an academic degree.  Nor should this Court
embrace the paternalistic notion that the average citizen is
incapable of choosing a competent interior designer without
the State's help.  The economic liberty of contract remains a
protected right in  Alabama, especially in a field like
interior design that involves expressive activity.
Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion.  I write
separately only to emphasize that the rights infringed by the
Act, which the majority declares unconstitutional, are even
more extensive than stated in the majority opinion.