Title: State v. Clark
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94959
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC94959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
ADRIANO RAPHAEL CLARK, SR., 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WEBSTER COUNTY 
The Honorable Donald C. Cheever, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 28, 2016 
 
 
Adriano Clark appeals his conviction of the class C felony of possession of a 
controlled substance.  Section 195.020.1  Following a bench trial, Mr. Clark was found 
guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison as a prior and persistent offender.  On appeal, 
Mr. Clark contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  The state 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Clark, with knowledge of the presence 
and nature of the substance, had possession of two closed pouches containing 
methamphetamine.  Accordingly, this Court reverses the trial court’s judgment and 
remands the case to the circuit court with instructions to discharge Mr. Clark. 
 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2011, unless otherwise indicated.  
2 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
On February 6, 2013, Officer Jeffrey Ford responded to a 911 hang-up call from a 
residence in Marshfield.  The call had been reported as an assault in progress.  Upon his 
arrival at the residence, Officer Ford made contact with A.D., who appeared to have been 
assaulted.  When Officer Ford asked her if anyone else was present in the residence, A.D. 
motioned with her head toward the rear of the house.  Sergeant Richard Neal arrived at 
the residence shortly thereafter.  
During the investigation of the residence, Officer Ford found Adriano Clark sitting 
on the side of a bed in the residence’s small east bedroom, which also appeared to be the 
residence’s main living area.  Officer Ford and Sergeant Neal observed large men’s 
tennis shoes next to the bed.  A cell phone and a closed black velvet pouch were on a 
nightstand that was right next to Mr. Clark.  The top of the nightstand was cluttered with 
numerous other items, including a desk lamp, two television remote controls, a coaster, a 
mouse pad, a used ashtray, a bottle of medication, and a glass filled with pens and other 
items.  A larger closed brown pouch was hanging on the wall near photographs of A.D. 
and Mr. Clark.  The contents of the two pouches were not visible to the officers, and they 
did not observe any drugs in plain sight. 
As the officers entered the bedroom, Mr. Clark stood up and moved toward the 
foot of the bed.  Officer Ford handcuffed and arrested Mr. Clark and then searched him.2  
The officers did not find any drugs on him.  He was carrying $560, consisting of five 
                                              
2 The record does not reveal why Mr. Clark was arrested. 
3 
 
$100 bills and three $20 bills.  Before being removed from the residence, Mr. Clark 
requested his belongings from the west bedroom of the residence.  He stated that all the 
belongings in the west bedroom were his.  According to Officer Ford, the officers later 
found “numerous clothes, a toolbox, [and] things of that nature” in the west bedroom.   
After Mr. Clark was placed in a patrol car, A.D. gave the officers written consent 
to search the residence, which she said was her residence.  She said Mr. Clark was her 
boyfriend.  Detective Joseph Taylor, who obtained A.D.’s consent for the search, testified 
that A.D was holding a cell phone when he spoke to her.   
During their search of the east bedroom, the officers opened the two pouches and 
found plastic bags with crystalline substances that appeared to be methamphetamine, 
scales, and numerous items of drug paraphernalia.  The state highway patrol crime 
laboratory later confirmed that the crystalline substances were methamphetamine.  Police 
did not find Mr. Clark’s wallet, any identification with Mr. Clark’s name on it, or any 
other items identified as his property in the east bedroom.   
Mr. Clark was subsequently charged with the class C felony of possession of a 
controlled substance, punishable as a class A felony due to his status as a prior and 
persistent offender.  Following a bench trial, the trial court found him guilty as a prior 
and persistent offender and sentenced him to ten years in prison.  Mr. Clark appeals, 
contending there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
had knowledge and control over the drugs in the pouches.  This Court granted transfer 
after opinion by the court of appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.    
 
4 
 
Standard of Review 
 
“To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a 
conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh 
the evidence but rather accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with 
all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignore[s] all contrary evidence and 
inferences.”  State v. Ess, 453 S.W.3d 196, 206 (Mo. banc 2015) (internal quotations 
omitted).  This Court, however, “may not supply missing evidence, or give the [state] the 
benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.”  State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 
181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001) (internal quotations omitted).  Evidence is sufficient to support 
a conviction when “there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable [fact-finder] 
might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Coleman, 
463 S.W.3d 353, 354 (Mo. banc 2015); see also Musacchio v. United States., 136 S. Ct. 
709, 715 (2016).  
Insufficient Evidence to Support the Conviction 
Mr. Clark contends that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
possessed the methamphetamine found in the pouches in the residence’s east bedroom.  
Mr. Clark asserts that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knew 
about the drugs” or “that he exercised control over them” because the “drugs were found 
in closed pouches and there was no further evidence presented connecting Mr. Clark to 
the drugs.”   
5 
 
Section 195.020 makes it “unlawful for any person to possess or have under his 
control a controlled substance.”  “[P]ossessed” or “possessing a controlled substance” is 
defined by the legislature as: 
[A] person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, 
has actual or constructive possession of the substance.  A person has actual 
possession if he has the substance on his person or within easy reach and 
convenient control.  A person who, although not in actual possession, has 
the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control 
over the substance either directly or through another person or persons is in 
constructive possession of it.  Possession may also be sole or joint.  If one 
person alone has possession of a substance possession is sole.  If two or 
more persons share possession of a substance, possession is joint. 
 
Section 195.010(34) (emphasis added).  “When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is 
to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.”  Stiers 
v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. banc 2016).  By the plain language of the 
statute, a person must have knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance to 
have actual or constructive possession.  Section 195.010(34).  In accordance with this 
statutory definition, this Court has long held that possession itself requires a defendant to 
have “conscious and intentional possession of the [controlled] substance, either actual or 
constructive[.]”. State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. banc 2016) (internal 
quotations omitted).  “Possession without knowledge of such possession is not possession 
in the legal sense of the word.  Knowledge of the existence of the object is essential to 
physical control thereof with the intent to exercise such control and such knowledge must 
6 
 
necessarily precede the intent to exercise or the exercise of such control.”  State v. Burns, 
457 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Mo. 1970) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).3 
                                              
3 The interpretation of section 195.010 in the concurring opinion conflicts with the 
language of the statute and more than 45 years of decisions from this Court.  Section 
195.010 reads: “[A] person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a 
substance, has actual or constructive possession of the substance.”  (Emphasis added).  
The requirement of “knowledge” precedes and modifies the element of possession.  As 
written in the statute, “knowledge” informs the element of “actual or constructive 
possession.”  This statutory language and its structure have been recognized by this Court 
in its prior jurisprudence, which holds that the element “actual possession” requires 
conscious knowledge and intentional possession of the controlled substance.  See Zetina-
Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 807; Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 146; Withrow, 8 S.W.3d at 80; Purlee, 
839 S.W.2d at 587; see also Burns, 457 S.W.2d at 724 (interpreting section 195.020).     
 
The concurring opinion, in fact, favorably cites the holding in Zetina-Torres for 
the proposition that “to prove possession of a controlled substance, the state must show 
[1] conscious and intentional possession of the substance, either actual or constructive, 
and [2] awareness of the presence and nature of the substance.”  (Emphasis added).  
Accordingly, as stated by the concurring opinion, the element “possession” requires 
“conscious and intentional possession of the substance,” regardless of whether the 
possession is actual possession or constructive possession.  Yet, in direct contradiction of 
the law it purports to rely on, the concurring opinion states that “a person can possess a 
substance without being ‘conscious’ of its ‘existence’ or ‘nature.’”  Based on this 
misstatement of law, the concurring opinion erroneously draws the conclusion that       
Mr. Clark “possessed” the contents of the pouches, i.e. the methamphetamine, even 
though, as the concurring opinion agrees, the evidence was not sufficient to establish he 
was conscious that the pouches contained methamphetamine.  Because the analysis and 
conclusions drawn by the concurring opinion are diametrically opposed to the holding in 
Zetina-Torres, the concurring opinion would require Zetina-Torres to be overruled, 
despite being handed down by this Court on March 1, 2016. 
 
 Moreover, the interpretation of section 195.202 urged by the concurring opinion 
would lead to the absurd and unjust result that a person with no connection or intention to 
possess a controlled substance would be legally guilty of actual possession.  Under the 
concurring opinion’s analysis of section 195.010, if Jane Doe sits next to John Doe and 
puts her purse between them with a clear plastic baggie of methamphetamine visible on 
the top of the contents of her purse, which John sees and recognizes as 
methamphetamine, John would be guilty of the crime of possession of a controlled 
substance because he would have: (1) actual possession of the controlled substance 
because it was within his easy reach and convenient control, and (2) knowledge of the 
presence and nature of the methamphetamine.  This Court’s prior interpretation of the 
 
7 
 
A person has actual possession of a controlled substance if the person, “with the 
knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance,” has the substance either “on his 
person or within easy reach and convenient control.”  Section 195.010(34).   Here, the 
officers did not find any drugs on Mr. Clark when they patted him down following his 
arrest.  Moreover, because the drugs were concealed in closed pouches, mere proximity 
to the drugs does not create a reasonable inference that Mr. Clark had knowledge of the 
presence and nature of the methamphetamine in the pouches.  See Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 
184; see also State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Mo. banc 1999) (finding a defendant did 
not have actual possession of methamphetamine found in a bedroom when the police had 
observed the defendant exiting the bedroom).  The statutory definition of “possessing a 
controlled substance” requires knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance as a 
condition precedent to a person’s actual or constructive possession of the controlled 
substance.  Section 195.010(34).  Plainly stated, a person cannot control a substance if he 
                                                                                                                                                  
statute to hold that “actual possession” requires conscious knowledge and intentional 
possession of the controlled substance avoids this absurd result.  See McCollum v. Dir. of 
Revenue, 906 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Mo. banc 1995) (a statute “should be interpreted to avoid 
absurd results”).   
 
Additionally, the legislature has amended section 195.010 several times since this 
interpretation of “actual possession” by the Court, but the legislature has not amended 
either the language or structure of this definition.  Specifically, the definition of 
possessing a controlled substance was first included in section 195.010 in 1989.  Section 
195.010 has since been reenacted in 1998, 2001, and 2011, with no change in the 
language of the definition of possessing a controlled substance.  This definition will also 
not be modified when the new criminal code becomes effective on January 1, 2017.  2014 
Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 491.  Accordingly, “where a court of last resort construes a statute, 
and that statute is afterwards re-enacted, or continued in force, without any change in its 
terms, it is presumed that the legislature adopted the construction given to it by the 
court.”  State v. Grubb, 120 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Mo. banc 2003).   
 
8 
 
or she is not conscious of its existence.  Accordingly, Mr. Clark did not have “actual 
possession” of the two pouches.   
“Absent proof of actual possession, constructive possession may be shown when 
other facts buttress an inference of defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the 
controlled substance.”  State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. banc 1992).  The state, 
therefore, had the burden to prove that Mr. Clark constructively possessed the 
methamphetamine found in the closed pouches.      
To have constructive possession of a controlled substance, a person must have 
both “knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance” and “the power and the 
intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly 
or through another person or persons[.]”  Section 195.010(34).  Proof of constructive 
possession requires: 
[A]t a minimum, evidence that the defendant had access to and control over 
the premises where the [controlled substances] were found.  Exclusive 
possession of the premises containing the [controlled substances] raises an 
inference of possession and control.  When the accused shares control over 
the premises, as here, further evidence is needed to connect [the defendant] 
to the [controlled substances].  The mere fact that a defendant is present on 
the premises where the [controlled substances were found] does not by 
itself make a submissible case.  Moreover, proximity to the contraband 
alone fails to prove ownership.  There must be some incriminating evidence 
implying that the defendant knew of the presence of the [controlled 
substances], and that the [controlled substances] were under his control.4 
                                              
4 In Withrow, the state claimed that the defendant was guilty of taking a substantial step 
toward the manufacture of methamphetamine because he had possession of a bedroom  
and its locked closet, which contained a glass jar with a substance that was “indicative of 
the primary stage of methamphetamine production.”  8 S.W.3d at 77.  The Court found 
that proof of “actual or constructive possession of the materials being used to 
manufacture the controlled substance” would be sufficient to convict.  Id. at 80.  As in 
 
9 
 
 
Withrow, 8 S.W.3d at 80 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. 
Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. banc 2012); Glover v. State, 225 S.W.3d 425, 428 
(Mo. banc 2007).  In other words, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant 
who does not have exclusive control over the premises has constructive possession of a 
controlled substance, the state must present additional facts that “buttress the inference of 
the defendant’s requisite mental state.”  Withrow, 8 S.W.3d at 80.   
Here, Mr. Clark did not have exclusive control over the residence or the east 
bedroom.  A.D. was present at the residence when the police arrived.  She told Detective 
Taylor that it was her residence and that Mr. Clark was her boyfriend.5  The officers 
found Mr. Clark’s clothes, a toolbox and other personal items in the west bedroom of the 
residence.  Because the premises were shared, the state was required to present additional 
“incriminating evidence” to support the inference that Mr. Clark had knowledge and 
control over the methamphetamine in the two closed pouches in the east bedroom – 
additional facts that would “buttress the inference of the defendant’s requisite mental 
state.”  Id.   
                                                                                                                                                  
this case, this Court in Withrow based its analysis of “constructive possession” on section 
195.010’s definition of “possessing a controlled substance” and prior case law related to a 
defendant’s possession of a controlled substance.  Id. at 80-81.   
5 The relationship of Mr. Clark as A.D.’s boyfriend does not give rise to an inference that 
he had control over the drugs.  Even “the status of husband and wife between the persons 
found on the shared premises amidst the contraband” does not give rise to an inference of 
joint control.  State v. Bowyer, 693 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Mo. App. 1985).  “The more 
correct analysis sees no distinction between spouses and other cotenants of premises but 
directs inquiry only to whether or not the accused was in a position to exercise control 
over the drugs found on the premises.”  State v. Lowe, 574 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo. App. 
1978).     
10 
 
The state presented the following evidence in its attempt to link Mr. Clark to the 
drugs found in the two closed pouches in the east bedroom: (1) Mr. Clark was sitting on 
the side of the bed in the east bedroom next to the nightstand in close proximity to the 
two  pouches containing the methamphetamine; (2) a large pair of men’s tennis shoes was 
by the side of the bed where he was seated; (3) a cell phone was on the nightstand near 
Mr. Clark; and (4) Mr. Clark had $560 on his person, consisting of five $100 bills and 
three $20 bills. 
The state asserts that Mr. Clark’s proximity to the pouches where the drugs were 
found, along with the above additional incriminating evidence, was sufficient to prove 
that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine.  Although Mr. Clark was found 
sitting on the bed near the two closed pouches that contained the drugs, neither “[t]he 
mere fact that a defendant is present on the premises” nor a defendant’s “proximity to the 
contraband alone” proves constructive possession.  Id.   
Withrow, a case with facts similar to those presented here, provides guidance on 
this point.  In that case, while the police had a suspected drug house under surveillance 
for a two-day period, the police observed approximately 30 persons coming and going 
from the house.  They observed the defendant’s car parked in front of a house at least 
twice.  Id. at 77.  The defendant entered and exited the house five or six times during this 
period of time.  Id.  When officers searched the house, the officers found the defendant 
leaving a bedroom that “emitted a solvent-like odor, commonly associated with the 
production of methamphetamine.” Id.  This bedroom contained weapons and numerous 
items used to manufacture methamphetamine, including ingredients and a milky 
11 
 
substance that was the primary stage of methamphetamine production in a locked closet.  
Id.  A letter addressed to the defendant at a different address was found in another room 
in the house that also contained drug paraphernalia.  Id.  This Court held that “[e]ven 
viewed in a deferential light[,] . . . [n]othing beyond being present in the room truly 
connect[ed] the defendant to the manufacturing apparatus” and that the defendant’s 
presence in the room that contained drugs did not support an inference of constructive 
possession.  Id. at 81.  
Likewise, in this case, because Mr. Clark had shared access to the east bedroom, 
his presence in the east bedroom and his proximity to the closed pouches do not support a 
reasonable inference that he had knowledge and control over the drugs found in the 
pouches.  See id. at 80.  The state asserts, however, that the totality of the evidence 
presented, including the presence of men’s shoes and a cell phone near the drugs and    
Mr. Clark’s possession of $560, were sufficient to prove that he constructively possessed 
the methamphetamine.   
The state is correct that the “presence of a defendant’s personal belongings in 
close proximity to the drugs may support an inference that he possessed the drugs.” 
Glover, 225 S.W.3d at 428.  But, in this case, such evidence was not sufficient.  Detective 
Taylor testified that he believed the cell phone on the night stand near the pouches was 
Mr. Clark’s because he thought A.D. was holding a cell phone when he spoke to her.     
On this evidence, the officer was merely speculating that the cell phone belonged 
to Mr. Clark.  Speculative inferences, however, may not be used to support a verdict.  
Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 184.  For example, in a similar case, an open manicure case that 
12 
 
contained a small baggie of methamphetamine could not be inferred to belong to a 
woman who shared her bedroom with her ex-husband when “the [s]tate neither presented 
any evidence showing to whom the manicure case belonged nor identified any 
characteristics of the manicure case indicating whether it belonged to a man or a 
woman.”  State v. Tomes, 329 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 2010).  The defendant’s 
sharing of the bedroom and dresser where the drugs were found was not alone sufficient 
to prove that she constructively possessed the methamphetamine.  Id. at 404.  As in 
Tomes, the state did not present evidence that supports a reasonable inference that the cell 
phone found near the methamphetamine belonged to Mr. Clark.  See id. at 403-04.  
Accordingly, this Court cannot give the state the benefit of the speculative inference that 
the cell phone belonged to Mr. Clark.  See Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 184.   
Likewise, even if it were reasonable to infer that the men’s shoes, which were 
found near Mr. Clark and in close proximity to the two closed pouches containing the 
methamphetamine, belonged to Mr. Clark, a single pair of his shoes found near him as he 
was sitting on the bed was insufficient to infer the drugs were his.  As discussed above, 
Mr. Clark’s mere presence in proximity to illegal drugs does not in itself establish his 
knowledge or control over the closed pouches containing the methamphetamine.  
Withrow, 8 S.W.3d at 80.  The fact that his shoes were near him does not establish his 
knowledge or control over the drugs.   
The cases in which the proximity or commingling of a defendant’s personal 
belongings supported an inference of the defendant’s awareness and control of the drugs 
have very different facts.  In State v. Cline, 808 S.W.2d 822, 823-24 (Mo. banc 1991), 
13 
 
methamphetamine was found in a dresser in a bedroom shared by the defendant and his 
girlfriend. The dresser contained only men’s clothing, and the defendant was the only 
male living in the household.  Id.  This evidence was sufficient to support an inference 
that the defendant had “exclusive control over” the dresser where the methamphetamine 
was found.  Id.  In Stover, a defendant’s newly purchased watch was found in a gift bag 
next to a suitcase containing a large amount of PCP in the trunk of a rental car shared 
with another passenger.  388 S.W.3d at 144-45, 148.  This Court held that, because the 
defendant was the named customer on the rental agreement as well as the driver of the 
vehicle, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant “had easy access to the 
trunk where the drugs were found,” and the proximity of his watch to the drugs 
“support[ed] the inference that [the defendant] had knowledge and control of the drugs.”  
Id. at 148.   
 
Additionally, an inference of a defendant’s knowledge and control of illegal drugs 
or drug paraphernalia was also supported when: (1) a defendant’s duffel bag was next to 
two bags of raw marijuana, Purlee, 839 S.W.2d at 588; (2) a defendant’s birth certificate 
found with methamphetamine locked in a safe under a desk in attic, State v. Richardson, 
296 S.W.3d 21, 25 (Mo. App. 2009); and (3) a defendant’s wallet, driver’s license, and 
handgun and only male hygiene items and clothing were found in the master bedroom 
and adjoining bathroom in a residence shared with two women and drugs were found in 
the bathroom, State v. Bacon, 156 S.W.3d 372, 378-79 (Mo. App. 2005).  Unlike in these 
cases, a single pair of Mr. Clark’s shoes next to where he was sitting in proximity to the 
two closed pouches containing drugs was not sufficient to support the inference that     
14 
 
Mr. Clark was either aware of or in control of the illegal drugs found in the two closed 
pouches.   
The state further asserts that Mr. Clark’s contemporaneous possession of $560, 
along with the other evidence, created an inference that he had knowledge and control 
over the methamphetamine.  The state cites State v. Jackson, 419 S.W.3d 850, 856-57 
(Mo. App. 2013), as support for its contention that the money found on Mr. Clark is 
incriminating evidence that would support a reasonable inference that he had knowledge 
and control of the drugs.  In Jackson, the court of appeals held that “[t]he presence of 
large sums of money held in small denominations may be consistent with drug dealing,” 
which may in turn be used to infer the defendant’s constructive possession of illegal 
drugs found in a residence.  Id.  at 856.   
Here, Mr. Clark was in possession of a large sum of money, but that money was 
not held in small denominations.  Instead, he possessed five $100 bills and three $20 
bills, denominations that are not indicative of drug dealing.  Because Mr. Clark’s 
possession of $560 in five $100 bills and three $20 bills does not indicate that he was 
dealing drugs, it likewise does not support an inference that he had knowledge or control 
over the methamphetamine found in the pouches.  See Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 184.   
The totality of the facts presented by the state, and the reasonable inferences 
drawn from these facts, fail to show that Mr. Clark had constructive possession over the 
methamphetamine concealed in the closed pouches.  Accordingly, no rational trier of fact 
could have found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements 
of possession of a controlled substance.  See Withrow,  8 S.W.3d at 81. 
15 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The trial court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Clark, with knowledge of the presence and nature of the 
substance, had possession of the methamphetamine found in the two pouches in the east 
bedroom.  Although the state presented evidence that Mr. Clark had joint access to his 
girlfriend’s residence and its east bedroom where he was found, with his shoes, in close 
proximity to concealed methamphetamine, this evidence was insufficient to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he knew of the presence and nature of the drugs and the drugs 
were under his control as necessary to prove either actual or constructive possession of 
the drugs.  Evidence of a cell phone on the nightstand and Mr. Clark’s possession of $560 
was not “additional incriminating evidence” necessary to create an inference that          
Mr. Clark had knowledge and control over the illegal drugs.  Accordingly, this Court 
reverses the trial court’s judgment and remands the case to the circuit court with 
instructions to discharge Mr. Clark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
Stith, Draper and Teitelman, JJ., concur; 
Wilson, J., concurs in result in separate  
opinion filed; Fischer and Russell, JJ., 
concur in opinion of Wilson, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC94959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
ADRIANO RAPHAEL CLARK, SR., 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN THE RESULT 
 
 
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but not its reasoning.  The 
evidence in this case was sufficient to prove that Mr. Clark had actual possession of the 
two pouches and their contents, but it was not sufficient to prove that he had “knowledge 
of the presence and nature” of those contents, i.e., that he knew the pouches contained the 
controlled substance methamphetamine.  Accordingly, I would reverse Clark’s conviction 
on that basis. 
 
Section 195.010(34) provides that a person is in possession of a controlled 
substance if that person, “with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, 
has actual or constructive possession of the substance.”  As a result, to “prove possession 
of a controlled substance, the state must show [1] conscious and intentional possession of 
the substance, either actual or constructive, and [2] awareness of the presence and nature 
2 
 
of the substance.”  State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting 
State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 146–47 (Mo. banc 2012)).   
The verdict director approved by this Court for the crime of possession of a 
controlled substance reflects the same two statutory elements of possession and 
knowledge:  
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
 
First, that (on) (on or about) [date], in the (City) (County of) of 
_____________, State of Missouri, the defendant possessed [name 
of the controlled substance], and 
 
Second, that the defendant (knew) (or) (was aware) of its presence 
and nature, 
 
Then you will find the defendant guilty of possessing a controlled 
substance. 
 
MAI-CR 3d 325.02 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 
As a result, it is clear that the statutory language, this Court’s precedents, and the 
jury instruction quoted above uniformly require proof of two separate and distinct 
elements for the crime of possession of a controlled substance:  (1) possession of a 
substance and (2) “knowledge of the presence and nature” of that substance.  Despite this 
uniformity, the majority opinion blurs this distinction by calling the latter a “condition 
precedent” to the former.1  Such confusion is not new.  See, e.g., Zetina-Torres, 482 
                                              
1   The flaw in the majority opinion’s reasoning is encapsulated perfectly in the following:  
“Plainly stated, a person cannot control a substance if he or she is not conscious of its existence.”  
Slip Op. at 7.  Because a person can possess a substance without being “conscious” of its 
“existence” or its “nature,” section 195.010(34) does not make such possession a crime unless 
the state also proves that the defendant actually knew (or, in the language of the majority 
opinion, was “conscious”) that the substance possessed was present and that it was a 
3 
 
S.W.3d at 807 (“Absent proof of actual possession, constructive possession may be 
shown when other facts buttress an inference of defendant’s knowledge of the presence 
of the controlled substance.”) (quoting State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. banc 
1992)).  The majority opinion also adds to this confusion by repeated reference to State v. 
Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Mo. banc 1999), which inserts into the analysis the unrelated 
concept of “ownership.” 
The question in this case is not whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that 
Clark physically possessed the pouches and their contents.  It was.  Instead, the question 
is whether the same evidence establishing Clark’s possession of the pouches and their 
contents (i.e., evidence that the pouches were within his easy reach and control) also was 
sufficient to prove Clark actually knew of the presence and nature of the contents of those 
pouches, i.e., that he actually knew they contained methamphetamine.  It was not, and 
Clark’s conviction should be reversed on that basis.   
The majority opinion seemingly agrees with this conclusion, Slip Op. at 7 
(“because the drugs were concealed in closed pouches, mere proximity to the drugs does 
not create a reasonable inference that Mr. Clark had knowledge of the presence and 
nature of the methamphetamine in the pouches”), but holds that this constitutes a failure 
to prove the element of possession.  In other words, the majority opinion holds that the 
evidence was not sufficient to prove that Clark possessed the two pouches and their 
contents – which were found next to the bed on which he was sitting when the officers 
                                                                                                                                                  
controlled substance.  As a result, the principle stated in the majority opinion, i.e., that “a person 
cannot control a substance if he or she is not conscious of its existence,” merely restates (in part) 
the element of knowledge as defined in section 195.010(34).  
4 
 
arrived – even though section 195.010(34) provides that the element of possession may 
be proved by evidence that the substance was on the defendant’s “person” or “within easy 
reach and convenient control” of the defendant.  Because the evidence was sufficient for 
a reasonable factfinder to believe that these pouches and their contents were within 
Clark’s “easy reach and convenient control,”2 the majority opinion’s conclusion that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove the element of possession is incorrect. 
Two illustrations may be helpful.  Imagine that the pouches had been clear plastic 
bags or, more to the point, suppose the outside of the pouches had been emblazoned with 
the words: “Methamphetamine Inside!”  With the addition of such evidence, the majority 
opinion surely would hold that the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.  But 
this hypothetical new evidence has no logical relevance to the element of whether Clark 
possessed the pouches and their contents.  Instead, its only relevance is to the element of 
knowledge, i.e., whether Clark had “knowledge of the presence and nature” of the 
contents of the pouches.  Because the addition of this hypothetical evidence surely would 
change the outcome of the majority opinion, it proves that the deficiency of the evidence 
actually presented in this case is that it fails to prove knowledge, not possession. 
On the other hand, imagine that the evidence of possession was strengthened by 
evidence that the pouches were lying on the bed six inches from where Clark was sitting 
                                              
2   Possession of the pouches in this case necessarily proves possession of their contents because 
the evidence shows both were within Clark’s “easy reach and convenient control.”  As discussed 
below, however, even though this evidence reasonably supports the inference Clark knew of the 
presence and nature of the pouches, this evidence is not – without more – sufficient to prove 
Clark actually knew both that there was a substance inside the pouches and that this substance 
was methamphetamine. 
5 
 
when the officers first saw him (rather than lying on, or hanging above, a table “a few 
feet” away).  If the evidence actually presented in this case was insufficient to prove the 
element of possession, as the majority opinion holds, then the addition of this 
hypothetical evidence surely would cure that deficiency.  If the majority opinion agreed, 
then its holding would stand only for the modest proposition that the statutory definition 
of actual possession being “within easy reach and convenient control” of the defendant is 
met by distances of less than one foot but not by distances of “a few feet.”  However, 
nothing in the majority opinion suggests that this hypothetical evidence would change its 
result because the analysis in the majority opinion is not based upon any physical 
limitations on the statutory phrase “within easy reach and control.”  As above, therefore, 
this hypothetical illustrates that the result reached in the majority opinion is driven by the 
lack of evidence on the element of knowledge, not the element of possession.3 
                                              
3   Similarly, the discussion of “joint possession” in the majority opinion sheds no light on 
whether the evidence actually presented in this case was sufficient to prove the element of 
possession.  This is because section 195.010(34) makes it clear that guilt may be proved either 
through sole or joint possession.  Instead, the significance of “joint possession” is whether 
evidence that proves the element of possession also is sufficient to prove the element of 
knowledge.  When the evidence of possession is that the substance was not found on the 
defendant’s person but within the easy reach and convenient control of the defendant and 
another person (i.e., joint possession), then the inference needed for the element of knowledge is 
weakened and may not be reasonable without some additional evidence from which such 
knowledge may be inferred.  This is the hypothetical offered in the majority opinion.  There, the 
evidence is sufficient for a factfinder to believe John was in actual possession of a purse because 
it was sitting next to him within his easy reach (assuming Jane did not have the purse locked or 
otherwise secured from John in a way that would preclude finding the purse was within John’s 
“easy reach and convenient control”).  But then the majority opinion’s hypothetical adds the sort 
of evidence that was wholly lacking in the trial of this case, i.e., evidence that John had actual 
knowledge of the presence and nature of a controlled substance in the purse.  As a result, if John 
were to be charged with possession of a controlled substance under such circumstances, the 
evidence posited in the majority opinion makes a submissible case on both the possession and 
knowledge elements.  It is not clear why the majority opinion finds this absurd, especially given 
6 
 
To be sure, the two elements of this crime (i.e., possession and knowledge) are 
related.  Evidence that is sufficient to prove the element of possession also may – in some 
cases – be sufficient to support the inference needed for the second element, i.e., that the 
defendant had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance possessed.  But this 
will not be true in every case.  For example, evidence that the defendant was arrested 
with a controlled substance in his hand or pocket will be sufficient to prove the element 
of possession and – without more – normally will be sufficient to support the inference 
that the defendant knew of the presence and nature of the controlled substance he 
possessed.   
But possession need not be so intimate.  Under section 195.010(34), the element of 
possession may be proved – as it was in this case – by evidence that the substance was 
“within easy reach and convenient control” of the defendant, even though it was not on 
the defendant’s “person.”  In such cases, however, additional evidence may be needed 
before the finder of fact will be allowed to infer the knowledge element, i.e., that the 
defendant knew the nature and presence of the substance possessed.  This will be so  
                                                                                                                                                  
that this Court affirmed the conviction in Zetina-Torres on far less evidence.  But the heavy 
reliance on Withrow throughout the majority opinion suggests that it tacitly assumes what 
Withrow expressly (though mistakenly) stated, i.e., that the possession element is equivalent to 
“ownership.”  Nothing in the plain language of section 195.010(34) supports that view. 
By the same token, the discussion of “constructive possession” in the majority opinion 
also adds nothing to the analysis of whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of 
possession.  When the substance is not found on the defendant’s person or within his easy reach 
and convenient control, the evidence still can be sufficient to prove the element of possession if 
it shows that the defendant had “the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion 
or control over the substance” located somewhere else.  § 195.010(34).  But, as discussed below, 
evidence showing a substance was constructively possessed may not be sufficient – without 
more – to support the inference required by the knowledge element. 
7 
 
where – as here – the circumstances establishing the defendant’s actual possession of a 
substance simply do not reasonably support the inference that the defendant knew of the 
presence and nature of the controlled substance he possessed.   
Finally, even when the defendant does not have actual possession of the substance, 
evidence can be sufficient to prove “constructive possession” of a substance if it shows 
that the defendant had “the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion 
or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons[.]”  § 
195.010(34).  In those cases, however, evidence sufficient to establish the element of 
constructive possession likely will not be sufficient to support the inference required by 
the second element, i.e., that the defendant knew of the presence and nature of the 
substance.  This is so because, when the element of possession is proved by facts 
showing constructive possession, the defendant’s relationship to the substance possessed 
is far more attenuated than when there is proof of actual possession (i.e., when a 
substance is found on the defendant’s person or within his easy reach and convenient 
control).  Without more, such evidence may well be insufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that the defendant knew of the presence and nature of the controlled substance 
he constructively possessed. 
Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove Clark possessed the pouches and their 
contents because they were within his easy reach and convenient control when the 
officers first observed him in the bedroom.  This same evidence was not sufficient to 
support the inference required by the knowledge element, however, because it provides 
no reasonable basis from which to infer that Clark actually knew both that there was 
8 
 
something in those pouches and that the “something” was methamphetamine.  
Accordingly, I would reverse Clark’s conviction on that basis.4 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
_____________________________ 
 
 Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
                                              
4   The state does not argue that the evidence was sufficient to establish possession in this way, 
but this likely is the result of prior decisions that vacillate between distinguishing the elements of 
possession and knowledge and conflating them as done here.  In any event, sufficiency of the 
evidence is a question of law, and the state cannot establish points of law by omission, 
agreement, or confession of error.  See, e.g., State v. Hardin, 429 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo. banc 
2014) (“The State conceded this point in its brief.  Nevertheless, parties cannot stipulate to legal 
issues, and this Court is not bound by the Attorney General's confession of error.”); State v. 
Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 199 (Mo. banc 1980) (“stipulations of litigants cannot be invoked to 
bind or circumscribe a court in its determination of questions of law”).