Title: State v. Vondehn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S056371
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2010

FILED: July 1, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
HYATT ROBIN VONDEHN,
Respondent on Review.
(CC
C040956CR; CA A128800; SC S056371)
En banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
June 10, 2009.
Erin C. Lagesen, Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on
review.  With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Erika
L. Hadlock, Acting Solicitor General.
David J. Celuch,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
Linder, J., filed a
concurring opinion in which Balmer and Kistler, JJ., joined.
*Appeal from Washington
County Circuit Court, Thomas W. Kohl, Judge. 219 Or App 492, 184 P3d 567
(2008).
WALTERS, J.
This criminal case raises two
questions of first impression regarding the right against compelled
self-incrimination in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution(1)
and the consequences of the failure to give Miranda warnings to a person
who is in custody and subjected to custodial interrogation. 
The uncontested facts establish that the
police arrested defendant on a warrant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the
back seat of a patrol car.  A police  officer then asked defendant two
questions about a backpack that the officer had found in the car in which defendant
had been a passenger.  In response, defendant admitted that he owned the
backpack and that it contained marijuana.  The trial court suppressed those answers
because the police had failed to administer the required Miranda warnings. 
The trial court did not, however, suppress the marijuana, ruling that defendant's
answer to the next question that the officer asked -- whether they could search
the backpack -- was voluntary.  Relying on defendant's consent, the officer searched
the backpack, discovered marijuana, gave the required Miranda warnings,
and questioned defendant further.  The officer asked defendant where he got the
marijuana, how much marijuana there was, how much defendant had paid for it,
and whether he was a middleman.  Defendant responded to each of those
questions, but, after he admitted that he was a middleman, defendant declined
to provide further information and asked for an attorney.  The trial court
ruled that defendant's responses to the post-Miranda questions also were
voluntary and that they would be admitted.  
In a stipulated facts trial, the
court found defendant guilty of the crimes of delivery and possession of a
controlled substance.(2) 
Defendant appealed and claimed as error the denial of his pretrial motions to
suppress the marijuana and his post-Miranda statements. 
The Court of Appeals observed that Miranda
warnings are an essential part of the rights granted by Article I, section 12,
and that the exploitation analysis articulated by this court in State v.
Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005), provided the appropriate framework to
analyze the consequences of failing to give those warnings.  State v.
Vondehn¸ 219 Or App 492, 501-07,184 P3d 567 (2008).  In applying the Hall
analysis, the court concluded that, because the police had obtained both the
marijuana and the post-Miranda statements by exploiting defendant's pre-Miranda
statements, they must be suppressed.  Id. at 507-10.
More specifically, the court reasoned
that the police had learned that the backpack belonged to defendant only
through their pre-Miranda questioning and that "[d]efendant's
answers to [the officer's] questions gave [the officer] the information that he
needed to ask defendant for consent to search it."  Id. at 508. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals identified a "but-for relationship between
the unconstitutional questioning and defendant's consent to the search."  Id. 
The court then decided that the state had not demonstrated that the evidence
did not derive from the preceding illegality.   The state had not argued to the
trial court that the police inevitably would have discovered the evidence in
the absence of the Miranda violation, and the police had not obtained
the evidence independently of the Miranda violation.  The violation
provided the basis for the consent to search, and the consent led to the
evidence.  Moreover, there were no intervening circumstances that broke the
causal chain between the Miranda violation and defendant's consent.  Because
the Court of Appeals concluded that the police had obtained the marijuana by
exploiting the Miranda violation, it held that the trial court had erred
in denying defendant's motion to suppress.  Id. 
As to the post-Miranda
statements, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, "but for" the illegal
questioning and search of the backpack, the officer would not have had the
information on which he based his post-Miranda questions.  Id. at
509-10.  The record did not demonstrate that the police inevitably would have obtained
the later statements, nor did the record demonstrate that the police had obtained
them independently from the earlier violations.  Id. at 510.  The Court
of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in admitting both the
marijuana and the post-Miranda statements and reversed defendant's
convictions.  Id. at 509-10.
On review, the state acknowledges
that this court has held that, when a person is in custody, the police must
inform the person of his or her Miranda rights before subjecting
the person to custodial interrogation, and the failure to give the required warnings
necessitates the exclusion of all statements that the person makes in response
to the interrogation.  Applying that warning requirement and exclusionary rule
to the facts of this case, the state also acknowledges that defendant was in
custody and subjected to custodial interrogation when the police asked him whether
he was the owner of the backpack and whether the backpack contained marijuana.(3)
 Thus, the state concedes, the trial court properly excluded from evidence defendant's
responses to that interrogation -- that he owned the backpack and that it
contained marijuana.  
The state contests, however, the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the marijuana and the statements that defendant
made after the police administered Miranda warnings must also be
excluded.  With respect to the marijuana, the state first contends that,
although the text of Article I, section 12, precludes the admission of coerced
testimony, it does not extend similar protection to uncompelled physical
evidence.  Alternatively, the state contends that the rule that requires the
exclusion of statements made without the benefit of Miranda warnings is
a prophylactic rule that reaches beyond the requirements of the constitution
itself and that that rule should not be extended to preclude admission of
physical evidence.  The "mere failure," as the state puts it, to give
Miranda warnings does not constitute a constitutional violation and
therefore call for a Hall exploitation analysis.  With respect to
the post-Miranda statements, the state contends that the sole test of
their admissibility should be whether they were made voluntarily, an issue that
the Court of Appeals did not reach.   
 This case, as framed by the state's
arguments, requires that we address the effect of the failure to give Miranda
warnings in two distinct circumstances:  (1) when the police commence custodial
interrogation without giving required Miranda warnings and thereafter
obtain incriminating physical evidence; and (2) when, after conducting an initial,
unwarned custodial interrogation, the police give the required warnings and the
defendant makes further incriminating statements.  As to the first
circumstance, we hold that when the police conduct custodial interrogation
without obtaining a valid waiver of Article I, section 12, rights, they violate
Article I, section 12, and the derivative physical evidence that they obtain must
be suppressed.  As to the second circumstance, we hold that a trial court must exclude
defendant's warned post-Miranda statements unless the state establishes
that, considering the totality of the circumstances, when the police belatedly
administer Miranda warnings, they effectively and accurately informed the
defendant of his or her Article I, section 12, rights.  We affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals in part, reverse it in part, and remand this case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
I.  INTERROGATION
WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS     
The state begins its argument about the
admissibility of physical evidence obtained without the benefit of Miranda warnings
with the text of Article I, section 12: "[N]o person shall * * * be
compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself."  The
state argues that that text does not prohibit the admission of physical
evidence, even physical evidence that is a "fruit" of a defendant's
compelled testimony; it prohibits only compelling a person to "testify." 
The state also contends that the text of Article I, section 12, does not
prohibit the state from using a person's compelled statements to investigate a
crime and obtain evidence of the crime; it only creates a right not to have the
statements themselves introduced "in any * * * criminal proceeding." 
In support of those arguments, the state directs us to the comparatively
broader wording of other state constitutions and to cases discussing the
common-law privilege against self-incrimination as it was recognized at the
time that Article I, section 12, was adopted. 
This court first considered the text
of Article I, section 12, and its history in State v. Cram, 176 Or 577,
160 P2d 283 (1945).  The issue in that case was whether the testimony of a
physician as to the alcohol content of a sample of the defendant's blood, taken
from him while under arrest and in custody, violated the defendant's rights
under Article I, section 12.(4) 
Id. at 578-79.  The court noted that, with two exceptions, all state
constitutions contain provisions against "self-crimination."  Id.
at 579.  The wording of those provisions varies from prohibitions on "testifying"
and "furnishing evidence" to "being a witness," but the
court observed that the difference in phrasing had not been considered
important in construing their meaning.  Id. at 579-80.  The court also noted
that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination had generally been
held to be declaratory of the common-law privilege and that that privilege was
not limited to testimonial utterances, but extended to prevent the compelled
production of documents or chattels.  Id. at 581-82 (quoting 8 Wigmore
on Evidence § 2263).  The court also quoted Wigmore for the proposition that,
when physical evidence is obtained by means other than compulsion of the
defendant, it is admissible as long as admission does not depend on the
defendant being called upon to make "any act or utterance of his own." 
Id. at 582.  Finally, the court applied those principles to conclude
that the testimony of the physician about the blood sample did not violate the
defendant's Article I, section 12, rights.  Id. at 593.  The defendant
had not been compelled to establish the authenticity, identity, or origin of
the blood; those facts were proved by other witnesses.  Id.    
In State v. Soriano, 68 Or App
642, 646, 684 P2d 1220 (1984), aff'd and opinion adopted, 298 Or 392,
693 P2d 26 (1984), this court again examined the history of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination and again concluded that the differences in
various state constitutional provisions were inconsequential:  "The
constitutional language varies, but courts generally treat the basic principle
as the same in all the states."  68 Or App at 646.  The Soriano
court also agreed that the word "testify" is not a limit on the protections
that Article I, section 12, affords:  "We see no reason to construe the
Oregon Constitution to give protection from testifying but not from furnishing
evidence."  Id. at 646-47 n 4.
In Soriano, this court held
that the Oregon Constitution prohibits the state from requiring a witness to
relinquish the Article I, section 12, right against self-incrimination unless
it provides the witness with an alternative that affords the same protection as
the constitution.  Id. at 662.  The issue in Soriano was whether
Article I, section 12, permits the state to compel the testimony of a witness
in exchange for "use" or "derivative use" immunity without
also extending "transactional immunity."  Id. at 644.  Use and
derivative use immunity preclude the state from using compelled statements of a
witness and their direct or indirect fruits, such as physical evidence
discovered as a result of the statements, in a prosecution of that witness.  Id.
at 644 n 3.  Transactional immunity precludes the state from prosecuting the
witness for any offense to which the statements relate.  Id.  The court
acknowledged that, when a witness provides compelled statements, those
statements may influence a prosecution even if they are not offered in evidence
or used to obtain derivative evidence.  Id. at 663.  For example, the
statements may affect the discretionary decisions of a prosecutor to bring
charges or to accept a plea bargain.  Id.  The court held that the state
could not compel the statements of a witness without granting transactional
immunity because, without protecting the witness from all evidentiary and
nonevidentiary use of compelled statements, the state would not afford the
witness the same protection that the constitution confers -- the right to
remain silent.  Id. at 662.
Thus, this court has long interpreted
Article I, section 12, to impose no distinction between compelled statements
and physical evidence derived from such statements or between the use of
compelled statements to obtain evidence and as testimony at trial.  We reject
the state's argument that we should now impose those limitations on the reach
of Article I, section 12.  We turn to the state's alternative argument that, even
if Article I, section 12, requires that physical evidence derived from compelled
statements be excluded from evidence, the same is not true for physical
evidence derived from the "mere failure to provide Miranda warnings." 

For an understanding of that
argument, the state directs us to the reasoning of the plurality in United
States v. Patane, 542 US 630, 124 S Ct 2620, 159 L Ed 2d 667
(2004).  Although the state acknowledges that we need not defer to the United
States Supreme Court when we interpret the state constitutional right found in
Article I, section 12, see Soriano, 68 Or App at 645-46 (giving
reasons for independent interpretation of state constitutional right against
self-incrimination),(5)
the state finds the logic of the lead opinion in Patane persuasive, and we
would be remiss if we did not consider it.  That is particularly so because it
was the Supreme Court that first required, to effectuate the protections
afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the warnings
that this court later required to effectuate the protections afforded by
Article I, section 12, known to both courts by the name of the Supreme Court's
decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694
(1966).
In Patane, the police arrested
a defendant for violating a restraining order.  A detective attempted to inform
the defendant of his Miranda rights, but the defendant interrupted and
asserted that he knew his rights, and the officers did not attempt to complete
the warning.  The detective then asked the defendant about a gun.  The
defendant said that he did not want to discuss it because he did not want the
detective to take the gun away from him.  The detective persisted.  The
defendant told him that the gun was in a particular bedroom and gave the
detective permission to retrieve the gun.  
The government conceded that the
defendant's answers to the detective's questions were inadmissible under Miranda,
but argued that the failure to complete the Miranda warning did not
require suppression of the gun itself.  The plurality, consisting of Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, took the position that, although the admission of "actually
coerced statements" and physical evidence derived from such statements
violates the Fifth Amendment, "a mere failure to give Miranda
warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's constitutional rights * * *."(6) 
542 US at 641-44.  Thus, the plurality reasoned, there was no violation of the
Fifth Amendment to deter and no reason to apply the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471,
83 S Ct 407, 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).  Patane, 542 US at 641-42.  According
to the plurality, the Miranda rule is a prophylactic rule that sweeps
beyond the actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.  Id. at
639.  A court must presume that statements made without its protections are compelled,
but there is no need extend that rule to exclude physical evidence obtained as
a result of unwarned statements.  Id. at 639-43.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
concurred in the result.  They reasoned that Miranda was based in large
part on an effort to accommodate concerns about compelled testimony and other
objectives of the criminal justice system.  Given the important probative value
of reliable physical evidence, they could not justify exclusion based on "a
deterrence rationale sensitive to both law enforcement interests and a suspect's
rights during an in-custody interrogation."  Id. at 644-45.
To address the state's argument that,
in interpreting Article I, section 12, we should adopt the reasoning of the plurality
opinion in Patane, we must examine the nature and purpose of the Miranda
warnings that this court requires and the reasons that statements made
without the benefit of those warnings are excluded from evidence.  
In State v. Magee, 304 Or 261,
266, 744 P2d 250 (1987), this court stated that Article I, section 12, "furnishes
an independent basis" for requiring that police administer Miranda
warnings to suspects who are in custody.  The prior year, in State v. Smith,
301 Or 681, 725 P2d 894 (1986), the court had discussed the basis for the United
States Supreme Court's Miranda decision and whether similar warnings
were required by the Oregon Constitution.  Smith was a divided opinion
that resulted in the affirmance of defendant's conviction on the basis that the
defendant was not in custody when he made the unwarned statements.  When the
court then decided Magee, it did not reprise the arguments that it had considered
in Smith or state the rationale for its historic decision.
Since Magee, this court consistently
has held that the Oregon Constitution requires suppression of statements made
without the benefit of Miranda warnings.  See, e.g., State v.
Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 643-44, 136 P2d 22 (2006) (suppressing unwarned
statements made during custodial interrogation); State v. Smith, 310 Or
1, 7, 791 P3d 836 (1990) (so stating).  The full extent of the court's
discussion of the rationale for that rule has been to state that, when a suspect
is subjected to custodial interrogation, warnings are necessary "'because
of the inherent level of coercion that exists in such interrogations.'"  State
v. Scott, 343 Or 195, 200, 166 P3d 528 (2007) (quoting State v. Joslin,
332 Or 373, 380, 29 P3d 1112 (2001)); see also State v. Meade, 327 Or 335,
339, 963 P2d 656 (1998).  Further, in discussing the requirement that police advise
suspects subjected to custodial interrogation of the right to assistance of
counsel, the court has stated that that particular warning is required because "a
lawyer's presence at a custodial interrogation is one way to ensure the right
to be free from compelled self-incrimination."  Meade, 327 Or at
339.  A suspect must be informed if an identified lawyer has been retained or
appointed and is seeking to consult with the suspect.  Without that information,
the suspect cannot "be said knowingly to have waived his or her right
against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12."  Joslin,
332 Or at 383 (citing State v. Haynes, 288 Or 59, 70, 602 P2d 272 (1979)).
In State v. Simonsen, 319 Or
510, 512, 878 P2d 409 (1994), the court followed Haynes and held that the
police had violated the defendant's Article I, section 12, rights when they interrogated
him "without informing him of the fact that he had a court-appointed
lawyer or the fact that the lawyer had asked to consult with defendant before
further interrogation took place."  The court then stated that its
rationale for suppressing the statements that the defendant had made during
that interrogation was 
"'to preserve * * * rights to the same extent as if the
government's officers had stayed within the law. * * * In the context of a
criminal prosecution, the focus then is on protecting the individual's rights vis-a-vis
the government * * *.
"'This focus on individual protection under
the exclusionary rule, a rule that operates to vindicate a constitutional right
in the courts, supports the constitutional rule * * *.  [T]he constitutionally
significant fact is that the Oregon government seeks to use the evidence in an
Oregon criminal prosecution. Where that is true, the Oregon constitutional
protections apply.'"
Id. at 518-19 (quoting State v. Davis, 313 Or
246, 253-54, 834 P2d 1008 (1992)) (alterations in original; internal citations
omitted).  In the Davis case that the court in Simonsen quoted,
the court held that evidence obtained in violation of a suspect's rights to
be free of unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, section 9, of the
Oregon Constitution must be suppressed, and explained that, to give effect to constitutional
rights, the government cannot "obtain a criminal conviction through the
use of evidence obtained in violation of [those rights]."  Davis, 313
Or at 253.
Davis in turn relied on two
earlier cases -- State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 666 P2d 802 (1983), and State
v. Isom, 306 Or 587, 761 P2d 524 (1988).  In the former case, the court
noted that, although every rule of law is intended to deter contrary conduct
and is successful when it does so, deterrence does not constitute a
constitutional basis for the exclusion of evidence.  Davis, 295 Or at
234-35.  Instead, the court said, "'[i]n demanding a trial without such
evidence, the defendant invokes rights personal to himself.'"  Id.
at 235 (quoting State v. McMurphy, 291 Or 782, 785, 635 P2d 372 (1981). 
In the latter case, the court ordered suppression of statements made in
violation of Article I, section 12, because "the state may not prove, over
objection, any crime with unconstitutionally obtained evidence."  Isom,
306 Or at 595. 
Synthesizing the decisions that we
have reviewed, and applying our own constitutional analysis, we now set out the
basis for the requirement that police inform persons in custody and subjected
to custodial interrogation of the rights afforded by Article I, section 12, and
for excluding statements made without the benefit of those warnings.
Article I, section 12, affords a
constitutional right to remain silent.  That right is, however, subject to
waiver.  Because a custodial interrogation is inherently compelling, and to ensure
the validity of a waiver of the right against self-incrimination, article I,
section 12, requires that the police inform a person subjected to custodial
interrogation that he or she has a right to remain silent and to consult with
counsel and that any statements that the person makes may be used against the person
in a criminal prosecution.  Article I, section 12, requires those Miranda
warnings to ensure that a person's waiver is knowing as well as voluntary.  If the
police conduct a custodial interrogation without first obtaining a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the suspect's rights, then they violate the suspect's Article
I, section 12, rights.  To give effect to those constitutional rights, the
state is precluded from using, in a criminal prosecution, statements made in
response to the interrogation.
With that understanding, we return to
the state's alternative argument that we should adopt a rule that permits the
admission of physical evidence that the police obtain without the benefit of Miranda
warnings.  In making that argument, the state concedes that, if the constitutional
violation at issue results from "actual coercion," then all evidence,
including physical evidence, obtained as a result of the violation must be excluded
from evidence.  See Soriano, 68 Or App at 662-65 ("Prohibition
of the use of the fruits of illegal police activity in court is necessary to
vindicate the violated rights"); Patane, 542 US at 644
(acknowledging that Fifth Amendment requires that physical evidence derived
from actually coerced statements must be suppressed); United States v.
Hubbell, 530 US 27, 37-38, 120 S Ct 2037, 147 L Ed 2d 24 (2000) (holding
that Fifth Amendment requires that evidence derived from coerced statements
must be suppressed).  So, for example, if the police were to engage in
"actual coercion" to compel the answer to the question "where is
the gun located?," both the answer, "under the bed," and the gun
found in that location would be suppressed.  See State v. Miller, 300
Or 203, 709 P2d 225 (1985) (physical evidence derived from an unconstitutional
custodial interrogation must be suppressed unless admissible on some
independent ground).(7)
The state contends, however, that we
should reach a different conclusion when the violation of Article I, section
12, is a "mere failure to provide Miranda warnings" relying on
the reasons persuasive to the plurality in Patane:  that such a failure
does not violate a suspect's constitutional rights and that, given the
important value of reliable physical evidence, the Miranda rule should
not be extended to exclude it.  It is immediately obvious that the premise of
the state's argument does not hold here.  It is the Oregon Constitution that requires
Miranda warnings and it is the Oregon Constitution that is violated when
those warnings are not given.  When the police violate Article I, section 12, whether
that violation consists of "actual coercion" or the failure to give the
warnings necessary to a knowing and voluntary waiver, the state is precluded
from using evidence derived from that violation to obtain a criminal
conviction.  It follows ineluctably that, when the police violate Article I,
section 12, by failing to give required Miranda warnings, the state is
precluded from using physical evidence that is derived from that constitutional
violation to prosecute a defendant.(8)
It is now incumbent on us to apply
the principles that we have enunciated to the facts of this case.  As noted, defendant
was in custody, in the back seat of a patrol car and handcuffed, when the
police subjected him to custodial interrogation.  Defendant had the right to
remain silent and to advice of counsel, but the police conducted their custodial
interrogation without obtaining a valid waiver of those rights.  When they did
so, the police violated Article I, section 12.  That constitutional violation
requires suppression of both the answers that defendant gave in response to,
and the marijuana that the police identified and seized as a result of, that
interrogation.  
In response to the police officer's
first unwarned question, the officer learned that the backpack belonged to
defendant.  In response to the officer's second unwarned question, the officer
learned that there was marijuana in the backpack.  With that relevant
information, the officer then immediately requested consent to search the
backpack and seized the marijuana.  In this court, the state makes no argument that
the request for consent to search or the seizure of the marijuana derived from some
source other than defendant's answers to those unwarned questions, nor does the
state argue that, even without defendant's responses, the police inevitably
would have obtained the marijuana.  Thus, in this case, we conclude that the
marijuana derived from the violation of defendant's Article I, section 12,
rights, and the trial court erred in failing to exclude it from evidence.  We
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in that regard.
II.  BELATED MIRANDA
WARNINGS
The second question in this case is the
consequence that a violation of Article I, section 12, should have when the
police belatedly administer required Miranda warnings.  The state argues
that, after the police give the required warnings, a defendant's statements in
response to further interrogation are admissible as long as they are voluntary. 
Defendant argues that the constitutional violation that occurs when the police
fail to give the warnings when initially required necessitates exclusion of all
statements made as a result of the illegality and that that category includes statements
made after belated Miranda warnings, unless the state demonstrates,
under Hall, that, at the time the post-Miranda statements
were made, the taint of the illegality had been attenuated. 
Two Supreme Court cases illustrate
the range of factual circumstances that present that issue.  In Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 US 298, 105 S Ct 1285, 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985), the police
contacted a young suspect at his home to arrest him for burglary.  Before the
arrest, one officer spoke with the mother, while the other officer mentioned to
the suspect that he felt that the suspect had been involved in the burglary. 
The suspect admitted that he had.  The officers then placed the suspect under
arrest and took him to the police station where they administered Miranda
warnings and, when the suspect waived his rights, interrogated him.  The
defendant was charged with burglary and sought to suppress his post-Miranda
statements as the illegal "fruit" of the Miranda violation. 
The Court rejected defendant's argument. 
It ruled that the admissibility of any such statement turns "solely on
whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made."  Id. at 309.  In considering
whether the defendant's post-Miranda statements met those standards, the
Court discounted whatever psychological impact that his unwarned statements
could have had on his later waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights and found the warned
statements admissible because the connection between the defendant's prior
admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate was "speculative and
attenuated at best."  Id. at 312-14.
In 2004, the Supreme Court again
explored the issue of belated Miranda warnings in Missouri v. Seibert,
542 US 600, 124 S Ct 2601, 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004).  In that case, the officer
had made a "conscious decision" to withhold Miranda warnings. 
The officer conducted the interrogation in the station house, and the
interrogation was "systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological
skill."  Id. at 616.  The defendant made incriminating statements
in response to the interrogation.  Then, after a pause of only 15 to 20
minutes, the same officer, in the same place, recited the Miranda
warnings but did not advise the defendant that her prior statements could not
be used.  In fact, the officer referenced the defendant's earlier statements
and used them to convince her to repeat her earlier confesson.  Justice Souter
wrote for four members of the court and concluded that all of the defendant's
post-Miranda statements must be suppressed, not as the "fruit"
of a prior unlawful act, but because the state had not established that the
belated Miranda warnings were "effective."  Id. at 604
(plurality opinion).
The plurality explained its reasoning
as follows:  
"Just as 'no talismanic incantation [is] required to
satisfy [Miranda's] strictures,' California v. Prysock, 453 US
355, 359 [101 S Ct 2806, 69 L Ed 2d 696] (1981) (per curiam), it would
be absurd to think that mere recitation of the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda
in every conceivable circumstance. 'The inquiry is simply whether the warnings
reasonably "conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda."' 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 US 195, 203 [109 S Ct 2875, 106 L Ed 2d 166]
(1989) (quoting Prysock, supra, at 361).  The threshold issue
when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be
reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function 'effectively'
as Miranda requires.  Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect
that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that
juncture?  Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking
even if he had talked earlier?  For unless the warnings could place a suspect
who has just been interrogated in a position to make such an informed choice,
there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as
compliance with Miranda, or for treating the second stage of
interrogation as distinct from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment."
Id. at 611-12 (alterations in original; footnote
omitted).  
The Seibert plurality identified,
in the contrast between Elstad and Seibert, a "series
of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered
midstream could be effective enough to accomplish their object[.]"  Seibert,
542 US at 615.  Those facts include:  (1) the completeness and detail of
the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, (2) the
overlapping content of the two statements, (3) the timing and setting of the
first and the second rounds of interrogation, (4) the continuity of police
personnel, (5) the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the
second round as continuous with the first, and (6) whether the police cautioned
that the earlier unwarned statement could not be used in any subsequent
prosecution.  Id. at 615-16.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment, but his approach to the issue was different.  Justice Kennedy opined
that the question-first technique "creates too high a risk that
postwarning statements will be obtained when a suspect was deprived of knowledge
essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of abandoning them."  Id. at 621 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).  He concluded that the post-warning statements
should be excluded only when that technique is used deliberately.  Id.
at 622.  When the police purposely engage in a two-step interrogation, Justice
Kennedy opined, "postwarning statements that are related to the substance
of prewarning statements must be excluded absent specific, curative steps." 
Id. at 621.  Justice Kennedy explained that curative measures "should
be designed to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would
understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda
waiver[]" and could include, for example, a substantial break in time and
circumstances or an additional warning that the prior unwarned statements would
likely be inadmissible.  Id. at 622.   
Justice O'Connor, the author of Elstad,
penned the dissent for the four remaining members of the court.  She agreed
with the plurality that the test of admissibility should be an objective one
and not determined, as Justice Kennedy urged, by whether the police acted
intentionally:  
"A suspect who experienced exactly the same
interrogation as Seibert, save for a difference in the undivulged, subjective
intent of the interrogating officer when he failed to give Miranda
warnings, would not experience the interrogation any differently. Whether
intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to
the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of respondent's election to
abandon his rights." 
542 US at 624-25 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).  For Justice O'Connor, the correct issue was whether, under all the
circumstances, the post-warning statements were voluntary.  Id. at 628.
Because we analyze the issue under
the Oregon, and not the United States, Constitution, we are not bound by the Court's
decisions in either Elstad or Seibert.  Nevertheless, we
find the reasoning in those cases helpful because they focus, as we must, on the
source and purpose for the Miranda requirement and the exclusion of
evidence obtained when Miranda warnings are not given as required.  
As our prior discussion indicates, the
Oregon Constitution does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the
absence of Miranda warnings to deter illegal police conduct.  The Oregon
Constitution requires Miranda warnings to ensure that a waiver of the
rights conferred by Article I, section 12, is knowing as well as voluntary.  When
the police fail to give the required warnings, a suspect's responses to their
unwarned questions must be excluded from evidence.  When the police then
correct course and give the required warnings, the relevant inquiry must be whether
the belated warnings are effective and accomplish the purpose for which they are
intended.  The fact that the police initially violate a defendant's
constitutional rights by failing to give the warnings necessary to a valid
waiver does not preclude a defendant from later validly waiving those rights.  If
the state establishes that the police accurately and effectively, although
belatedly, gave the suspect the information necessary to a valid waiver of the
right against self incrimination, then, under the Oregon Constitution, a
suspect's subsequent voluntary statements will be admissible.(9) 
In arriving at that conclusion, we adopt the reasoning and the analysis of the Siebert
plurality as our own.
When the police give Miranda warnings
at the time that they are first required, the constitution does not demand that
the state establish that the warnings were effective.  The state need only
establish that the police recited the warnings completely and coherently.(10) 
The problem that Seibert demonstrates, however, is that when the police question
first and warn later, their exhibition and exercise of authority and violation
of the defendant's constitutional rights may communicate to a defendant, as the
Court believed they did in that case, that, before the defendant will be
released, he or she must answer the questions asked.  In that circumstance, the
police not only fail to provide the defendant with the information necessary to
a valid waiver -- that the defendant has a right to remain silent and to confer
with an attorney -- the police also convey a contrary message.  In that
situation, when the police later administer Miranda warnings, we cannot assume
that the mere recitation of Miranda warnings is sufficient to serve the intended
informative function.  
That being said, we note that Seibert
is at one end of the range of the factual circumstances that present the
issue that we address.  Elstad is at the other.  Not every instance in
which the police question first and warn later communicates a mixed message. 
Whether and to what extent police officers who fail to administer Miranda warnings
before beginning custodial interrogation obfuscate or contradict the
information that Miranda warnings are intended to convey and whether and
to what extent those officers later correct that misinformation are issues that
trial courts must confront and determine.  In doing so, courts should consider
all relevant circumstances, including those facts to which the plurality in Seibert
pointed -- the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the
first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the statements given
by the suspect, the timing and setting of the first and the second
interrogations sessions, the continuity of police personnel, the degree to
which the interrogator's questions treated the second round of interrogation as
continuous with the first, and whether the police cautioned that the earlier
unwarned statement could not be used in any subsequent prosecution.(11)
In this case, the Court of Appeals used
many, if not all, of those facts in its "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
or "exploitation," analysis.  The difference between that court's
analysis and our own is not in the facts considered but in the stick by which we
require that they be measured.  In our analysis, the test of the efficacy of
the belated warnings is an objective one.  A court considers the factual
circumstances to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of the information
that the police convey; a court does not use those circumstances to attempt to determine
the psychological effect that the particular police course of conduct had on
the particular defendant or whether the initial failure to warn caused the particular
defendant to make the post-Miranda statements.  
Although neither party in this case
advocates for the view articulated by Justice Kennedy in Seibert -- that
the admissibility of statements that a defendant makes after Miranda warnings
are belatedly given should be determined by whether the police intentionally
engaged in a two-step interrogation process -- we think it helpful to state explicitly
that we reject that approach.  Our focus is not on the subjective intent of the
police but on the objective message that the police actually convey by the
techniques that they use and the warnings that they give.  That does not mean,
however, that the deliberateness with which the police act is entirely
irrelevant.  In Isom, for instance, the defendant established that the
police had purposely disregarded his request for counsel, and this court did
not hesitate to hold that the statements that he made thereafter were obtained
in violation of Article I, section 12.  306 Or at 595.  If the police purposely
obscure the legal and practical significance of a belated Miranda
admonition, as they did in Seibert, it will not be difficult for a court
to determine under the objective test that we describe today that the police did
not accurately and effectively deliver the information necessary to a valid
waiver of Article I, section 12, rights.  
Finally, it remains for us to decide
whether the trial court in this case erred in admitting defendant's
post-Miranda statements.  To do so we must review the facts in more detail than
initially stated.  
This case arose from a routine
roadside stop of a car to investigate a traffic violation and possible driving
under the influence of intoxicants.  Defendant was a passenger in the car,
which a friend was driving.  Officer Stoneberg made the stop; a second officer,
Officer Espelien, arrived shortly afterward.  Stoneberg approached the driver's
side of the car and, as he did, smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana. 
Espelien approached the passenger's side and initially waited near the rear
corner of the car while Stoneberg talked to the driver.  Espelien, likewise,
smelled a very strong odor of fresh marijuana.  Both officers thought that the
smell was strongest towards the trunk area of the car.  Espelien approached
defendant (the passenger) to ask him for identification.  Defendant initially
lied about who he was but then gave Espelien the correct information.  Espelien
discovered an outstanding warrant for defendant.  Stoneberg therefore arrested
defendant, handcuffed him, and had him sit in the back of the patrol car while he
completed his investigation.  Stoneberg did not give Miranda warnings to
defendant at that point because he ordinarily does not conduct any kind of
investigation or ask questions of a person arrested on an outstanding warrant.
Stoneberg continued his investigation
of the driver.  He asked her if there were any illegal drugs or weapons in the
car.  She said no.  Stoneberg then asked her for, and the driver gave, consent
to search the car.  In the course of the search, Stoneberg opened the car
trunk, at which point the smell of fresh marijuana became even stronger.  The
only thing in the trunk was a backpack.  According to Stoneberg, the smell from
the backpack "is what really hit [him]" and, upon lifting it, he
could tell that the backpack was not empty.  At that point, given the smell and
the weight of the backpack, Stoneberg believed that there was a substantial
quantity of marijuana in it.  Stoneberg asked the driver if the backpack was
hers and if he could open it, and she told Stoneberg that it did not belong to
her.  He asked her who owned it, and she said she did not know.
Stoneberg then walked to the patrol
car with the backpack, opened the back door, and asked defendant if the
backpack belonged to him.  Defendant said yes.   Stoneberg asked defendant if
there was marijuana inside, and defendant said yes.   Stoneberg asked if he
could search the backpack, and defendant told Stoneberg he could.  Stoneberg
then searched the backpack while standing by the patrol car, in defendant's
presence, and found two folded-down grocery bags, each containing fresh
marijuana.  
After searching the backpack, Stoneberg
walked over to Espelien and consulted with him.  After about five minutes,
Stoneberg went back to the patrol car to ask defendant more questions about the
marijuana.  At that point, he gave defendant Miranda warnings.  He asked
defendant if he understood his rights, and defendant said he did.  Defendant
waived his rights and agreed to answer Stoneberg's questions.  Stoneberg asked
defendant several questions about the marijuana.  In particular, Stoneberg
asked defendant where he got the marijuana; defendant explained that he had
gotten it in Tualatin the day before.  Stoneberg asked how much marijuana was
in each bag; defendant told him that each bag contained about a quarter of a
pound of marijuana.  Stoneberg asked how much the marijuana cost; defendant said
that he had paid a total of $2200 for the marijuana.  Stoneberg asked defendant
if he was a middleman.  Defendant answered yes.  Eventually, Stoneberg told
defendant that he would like to know more about his middleman role.  In
response, defendant told Stoneberg that he wanted a lawyer.  Neither Stoneberg
nor Espelien asked defendant any further questions.  The post-Miranda questions
took place intermittently over a 15 to 20 minute time period.
Both officers described their contact
with defendant as conversational in tone.  Espelien further described
defendant, once defendant gave his correct identification to Espelien, as
seeming apologetic and even ashamed of the circumstances.  Defendant remained
"very cooperative" and willingly answered questions until, when
Stoneberg asked for more information about his role as a middleman, he invoked
his right to counsel.
We now consider all those facts to
determine whether the Miranda warnings, when given, accurately and effectively
conveyed the information necessary to a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right against self-incrimination.  We first observe that there was a marked
difference in the questioning before and after Stoneberg administered the Miranda
warnings.  The unwarned questions were routine in nature and consumed less
than a minute of time.(12) 
The second warned questions were significantly more detailed and probing.  This
was not a situation, like that in Seibert, in which the police conducted
extensive questioning and elicited significant detailed facts in the first
interrogation session and then repeated that questioning post-Miranda.  
Second, although Stoneberg posed the
second set of questions shortly after the first set, there was a break in the
questioning.  Given that the first set of questions consumed less than a
minute, the five minute break between questions, followed by the Miranda warning,
was an objective indication that the situation had changed and was governed by
new rules.  Again, this was not a circumstance, like that in Seibert, in
which both interrogation sessions were protracted and conducted at the police
station.  In such a circumstance, a short break between interrogation sessions
would not be of the same import.
Third, although Stoneberg did not
caution defendant that his earlier unwarned statements could not be used in any
subsequent proceeding, neither did he point out to defendant, as did the
officer in Seibert, that defendant had already made incriminating
disclosures that provided all of the information that Stoneberg needed.  And in
fact, at least some of the information that Stoneberg had obtained -- that the backpack
contained marijuana -- was obviously discernable from another source -- the odor
of the backpack itself.  When an officer does caution a defendant that the
unwarned statements that the defendant made may not be admissible, that caution
may militate (indeed, often will) in favor of finding that the officer's belated
Miranda warnings were effective, but such a caution is not necessary to that
result.
Fourth, although defendant was under
arrest and handcuffed when Stoneberg questioned him and was thus in inherently compelling
circumstances, he was not subjected to additional coercion.  The police
conducted their questioning in a conversational tone and it was of short
duration. 
The facts that we have outlined lead
us to conclude that the belated Miranda warnings that Stoneberg gave accurately
and effectively communicated that defendant had, from that time forth, a right
to remain silent.  We therefore agree with the trial court, although for
different reasons, that defendant's post-Miranda statements should have
been admitted.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
LINDER, J., concurring.
I write separately to explain my
reasons for concurring in the majority decision, both with respect to the
physical evidence that police obtained when defendant, before being given Miranda
warnings, consented to the search of his backpack and with respect to the
statements that defendant made after being given Miranda warnings.
In urging that the marijuana seized
from defendant's backpack should not be suppressed, the state has advanced an
ambitious argument seeking a per se rule that physical evidence is never
subject to exclusion under Article I, section 12, reasoning that the protection
against self-incrimination is directed to testimonial in-court evidence only. 
I concur in the majority's rejection of that per se rule.  As this court
has described it, our state-law based Miranda rule is "a judicial
means" to secure the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination, one
that this court has devised because it is appropriate for this court "to
specify the procedure by which [Article I, section 12's guarantee against
compelled testimony] is to be effectuated."  State v. Mains, 295 Or
640, 645, 669 P2d 1112 (1983).(1) 
Thus, the rule is constitutionally grounded, even if Miranda warnings
and waiver of them are procedures that the constitution does not itself
mandate.  When those procedural requirements are violated, we properly ask
whether any subsequently obtained evidence, physical or testimonial, is
sufficiently a product of that violation to require suppression along with any
statements made in direct response to unwarned custodial interrogation.  And
because the Miranda doctrine is a judicially devised procedural
protection, one this court has adopted as a matter of state law, it falls to
this court to determine whether and under what circumstances to exclude
evidence to serve the objectives of that procedural rule.  
The difficulty here is that the
state's argument on review stops with its invitation to adopt a per se
rule of no exclusion.  The state does not explore what test this court should
adopt to determine whether and when physical evidence obtained after a Miranda
violation should be subject to exclusion.  Because of that omission, I
concur in the result that the majority reaches.  I write separately, however,
to identify the limits of the majority's reasoning and to point out the work
that remains for future cases.
The majority announces a
"derives from" test to determine under what circumstances consent to
search, when that consent follows a Miranda violation, must be
suppressed.  ___ Or at ____ (slip op at 16).  The starting point of such a test
should be the underlying Miranda violation, because the nature and
extent of that violation necessarily bear on whether and to what extent other
evidence that police obtain is connected to that violation.
Here, the investigating officer asked
defendant a total of three questions without first giving Miranda warnings. 
The first question was whether defendant owned the backpack.  At trial, and
continuing through the layers of appeal, the state has conceded that the
officer was required to give defendant Miranda warnings and obtain a
waiver before asking that question.  For present purposes, I will assume that
concession is correct.(2)
The officer's second question was
whether there was marijuana in the backpack.  That question was,
quintessentially, interrogation.  Any reasonable officer asking if a container
has marijuana in it would know that the question could elicit an incriminating
response -- i.e., an inculpatory or an exculpatory response that the
prosecution might seek to use at trial.(3) 
To lawfully ask defendant -- who was under arrest -- that question, the
officer was required to advise defendant of his Miranda rights.  The
officer did not do so.
The officer's third question asked if
defendant would consent to a search of the backpack.  That was not
impermissible interrogation.  Asking for consent to search is a mere request
for permission.  The answer either gives permission or it does not; the
response is neither inculpatory or exculpatory (although, to be sure, the
results of the search can be).  With apparent unanimity, courts throughout the
country that have considered the question have held that asking for consent to
search is not interrogation within the meaning of the Miranda doctrine. 
See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 3 F3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir 1993), cert
den, 510 US 1061 (1994), (so observing; citing representative cases). 
Defendant has never contended to the contrary in this case.
Thus, at best for defendant, the Miranda
violation in this case consisted of two short questions, each of which
called for a one word (yes or no) response.  In analyzing whether the physical
evidence seized pursuant to defendant's consent was "derived" from
that violation, the majority concludes -- with only brief discussion -- that it
was.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 16-17).  It is unclear what test the majority's
"derived from" test entails.  The majority does not explain whether
the test turns on causation, or exploitation, or some other way in which an
initial illegality may be said to "taint" evidence that police gather
after that illegality.  Knowing the nature of the "derives from" test
that applies is important.  The majority appears to conclude that there is, in
fact, a "derived from" connection between the illegal questioning and
defendant's consent to search in this case, and therefore places the burden on
the state to disprove that connection.  ___ Or at ____ (slip op at 17).  At the
least, if the state is to have that burden, it must know what it must
disprove.  As important, at some point, both litigants and lower courts are
entitled to meaningful guidance as to the analysis that applies.  Compare
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 487-88, 83 S Ct 407, 9 L Ed 2d 441
(1963) ("but for" causation not enough to establish that consent to
search is the product of a prior illegality) with State v. Hall, 339 Or
7, 34-35, 115 P3d 908 (2005) (defendant need only show a "minimal causal
nexus" between consent to search and prior illegality).
The state's argument, as advanced in
this court, examines none of those issues, however.(4) 
Instead, as I have already noted, the state argues only that, as a per se matter,
physical evidence is never subject to suppression under Article I, section 12,
no matter how directly and immediately derivative of a Miranda violation. 
In this particular case, given the fact that the state has made no contrary
argument, I am prepared to conclude that, under the particular circumstances of
this case, the officer's request to search was part and parcel of the
impermissible unwarned questioning, at least enough to place the burden on the
state to point to the circumstances that either legally or factually break that
connection.  Because the state has not done so, I concur.  But it remains for
future cases to explore, in a way that we do not in this case, when evidence
obtained after a Miranda violation properly can be said to "derive
from" that violation. 
With respect to defendant's
subsequent, post-Miranda warning statements, the majority essentially
adopts the test articulated by the plurality decision in Missouri v. Seibert,
542 US 600, 124 S Ct 2601, 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004) (Souter, J.).  ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 22).  That test asks whether, viewed from the perspective of a
reasonable person, the Miranda warnings that police give after an
initial Miranda violation were effective for purposes of informing a
suspect of his rights and obtaining a knowing and voluntary waiver of those
rights.
I have no objection to that test.  I
see, ultimately, little or no difference in the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis used to analyze that issue and the totality of the
circumstances test that has long been in place to analyze the voluntariness of
a confession following prior illegal conduct by police.  See, e.g.,
State v. Wolfe, 295 Or 567, 572, 669 P2d 320 (1983) (drawing from totality
of circumstances test in Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 603-04, 95 S Ct
2254, 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975)).
What is important to emphasize,
however, is the distinctive context in which the Seibert plurality
fashioned that test.  The Seibert plurality identified that context in
the very first sentence of the opinion: the case involved what had become, at
least at the time, an increasingly popular "police protocol for custodial
interrogation that calls for giving no warnings of the rights to silence and
counsel until interrogation has produced a confession," after which
warnings are given and police then "lead[] the suspect to cover the same
ground a second time."  542 US at 604.  As the plurality noted, "the
reason that question-first [technique] is catching on is as obvious as its
manifest purpose, which is to get a confession the suspect would not make if he
understood his rights at the outset[.]"  Id. at 613.  The
plurality therefore, throughout its opinion, expressly tied its "effective
waiver" test to the question-first technique of interrogation -- e.g.,
a confession "so obtained" (id. at 611); one obtained through
the use of a "question first and warn later" protocol (id.);
and one in which Miranda warnings are "inserted in the midst of
coordinated and continuing interrogation" (id. at 613).  That
distinctive context also was what led the plurality to observe that belated Miranda
warnings might be unlikely to provide a defendant with the knowledge necessary
for a valid waiver, reasoning that it "would ordinarily be unrealistic to
treat two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning as
independent interrogations subject to independent evaluation simply because Miranda
warnings formally punctuate them in the middle."  Id. at 614.
The plurality in Seibert also
expressly contrasted the circumstances before it with those that had been
involved in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298, 105 S Ct 1285, 84 L Ed 2d 222
(1985), noting that the Court in Elstad had taken care to characterize
the officer's initial failure to give Miranda warnings in that case as
an "oversight."  Seibert, 542 US at 614.  The plurality
considered the facts in Seibert to be "[a]t the opposite
extreme" and by "any objective measure" to reveal a police
strategy adapted to undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda
warnings.  Id. at 616.  The plurality observed the "unwarned
interrogation was conducted in the station house, and the questioning was
systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill.  When the police
were finished there was little, if anything, of incriminating potential left
unsaid."  Id.  In addition, the circumstances of the questioning
did not change in any meaningful way between the initial round of questioning
and the later round.  And when police resumed their questioning and asked the
defendant to cover the same ground a second time, they "fostered" the
impression that the later round was a mere continuation of the first by
reminding the defendant of the confession that she had already given them.  Id.
As other courts have emphasized in
adopting the equivalent of the Seibert plurality's "effective
waiver" test, an examination of the totality of the circumstances for an
objective person's perception of those circumstances permits no
"bright-line rule."  State v. O'Neill, 193 NJ 148, 181, 936
A2d 438, 457 (2007).  But because the test focuses on the circumstances as they
would be objectively perceived, we should acknowledge that the danger of
rendering Miranda warnings a nullity is greatest at the Seibert
end of the factual spectrum.  Likewise, that danger is at its lowest ebb at the
Elstad end of the factual spectrum, where no question-first technique or
protocol objectively appears to have been at work, where the initial
questioning is minimal and the unwarned statements are more limited and less
detailed than later ones, and where, given what went before the warnings, there
is some substantial break in the circumstances.(5) 
The facts of this case readily bring it within the class of cases in which,
objectively, the circumstances of the initial Miranda violation are not
such that they rendered the belated Miranda warnings or defendant's
waiver of his Miranda rights ineffective.  The majority reaches the
correct conclusion in that regard.
For those reasons, I respectfully
concur.
Balmer, J. and Kistler, J. join in
this concurrence.
1. Article
I, section 12, provides, in part, that "no person shall * * * be compelled
in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself."
2. Defendant
was convicted under former ORS 475.992 (2003), renumbered as
ORS 475.840 (2005).
3. As
a result of the state's acknowledgement, we do not consider whether the two
questions that the police asked in this case constituted
"interrogation."  See State v. Scott, 343 Or 195, 203, 166 P3d
528 (2007) (defining "interrogation" as "conduct that the police
should know [is] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response"). 
When we refer to "custodial interrogation" elsewhere in this opinion,
we mean interrogation that meets the Scott definition.
4. The
defendant had not contested the act of obtaining the blood as an
unconstitutional search or seizure.  This case does not present that issue or
the issue discussed by the dissent in State v. Fish, 321 Or 48, 64-71,
893 P2d 1023 (1995) (Gillette, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
-- whether physical evidence concerning a person's identity, appearance, or
physical condition implicates Article I, section 12.
5. In
Soriano, the court noted that the common-law rule that no person is
bound to accuse himself first received constitutional status in Virginia in
1776 and that it was not added to the United States Constitution until 1791. 
68 Or App at 646.  The court explained that "[w]hen the United States
Supreme Court first acted it simply adopted one line of state decisions and
rejected another."  Id.
6. The
plurality acknowledged that the Court had held in Dickerson v. United States, 530 US 428, 444, 120 S Ct 2336, 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000), that Miranda  announced
a constitutional rule that could not be altered by Congress, Patane, 542
US at 636, but cited Chavez v. Martinez, 538 US 760, 772-89, 123
S Ct 1994, 155 L Ed 2d 984 (2003) (plurality opinion) for the proposition that
a failure to give those constitutionally required warnings does not violate the
constitution.  Patane, 542 US at 641.  One of the problems
with the plurality's approach is that Chavez was a case brought under 42
USC section 1983.  The plaintiff in that case had not been criminally
prosecuted and, therefore, no evidence, direct or derivative, had ever been
used against him.  However, we need not pick and choose here:  a plurality
opinion, particularly a plurality opinion addressing a federal constitutional
issue that is not before us, is not controlling, and it therefore stands only
for whatever persuasive power its logic carries.
7. In
Miller, the police found physical evidence when the defendant
handed them the keys to a hotel room.  Before the defendant did so, he had told
the police that he did not want to talk to them without a lawyer.  The police
had disregarded that statement and continued their questioning.  It was then
that the defendant handed over the keys.  The court found that the defendant
had asserted, and not waived, his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment.  Id.
at 224.
8. We
note that the result we reach is consistent with that of other state courts
that have decided the same issue under their state constitutions.  See, e.g.,
State v. Peterson, 181 Vt 436, 923 A2d 585 (2007) (physical evidence
obtained in violation of Miranda rights must be excluded at trial as
"fruit of poisonous tree"); Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass
213, 827 NE2d 198 (2005) (physical evidence derived from unwarned statements
presumptively excludable from evidence as "fruit" of improper failure
to provide such warnings); State v. Knapp, 285 Wis 2d 86, 700 NW2d 899
(2005) (physical evidence obtained as direct result of intentional Miranda
violation excluded as "fruit of poisonous tree").
9. Voluntariness
of course is always a requirement for admission of a defendant's incriminating
statements.  Even warned statements may be inadmissible if they are not
otherwise voluntary.  See State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572, 789 P2d 1352
(1990) (assessing voluntariness of statements made after warnings were
administered and defendant made "equivocal" remarks regarding request
to consult with attorney).
10.  We
acknowledge, of course, that a defendant is entitled to demonstrate (whether by
defendant's own testimony or otherwise) that the defendant's waiver was not
knowing.  So, for example, a defendant may demonstrate that he or she did not
understand the warnings due to cognitive or linguistic limitations.
11. We
note that other state courts applying their state constitutions also have used
multi-factor tests to determine the admissibility of post-Miranda statements. 
See State v. O'Neill, 193 NJ 148, 180-81, 936 A2d 438 (2007); People
v. Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-31, 833 NE2d 239 (2005); and State v.
Northern, 262 SW3d 741, 763-64 (Tenn 2008).
12. Given
the brevity of the initial three questions that Stoneberg asked, and the one
word answers that defendant gave in reply, the total amount of time involved
for all three questions would have been a matter of perhaps only 30 seconds or
less.  
1. I
accept that this court has adopted Miranda warnings as an independent
requirement under Article I, section 12.  The pedigree of that doctrine is,
however, uncertain.  In the one case in which the court attempted to decide,
consistently with our announced methodology for interpreting original
provisions of our constitution, whether a Miranda-type rule could be
divined from Article I, section 12, three members (of a six member court)
concluded that the answer was no, while three others believed the answer was
yes, but only two believed that the rule could extend to anything other than
formal custody or arrest.  See State v. Smith, 301 Or 681, 725 P2d 894
(1986).  Since then, without exploring the interpretative basis for an
independent state Miranda rule, this court has, for the most part,
assumed the existence of that rule.  See, e.g., State v. Magee,
304 Or 261, 744 P2d 250 (1987) (per curiam decision, with three members
concurring).  But see State v. Isom, 306 Or 587, 592, 761 P2d 524 (1988)
("majority of this court has not agreed whether Miranda-type
warnings are required under the Oregon Constitution"); State v. Kell,
303 Or 89, 734 P2d 334 (1987).  It may well be that, at some point, in deciding
novel questions about the scope or content of our state Miranda rule,
this court will have to engage in that interpretative exercise.  For present
purposes, however, it is unnecessary to do so.
2. It
is worth noting, however, that the issue is potentially a close one.  In many
circumstances, when police conducting a field investigation need to ascertain
the owner of property in order to ask for consent to search that property,
their inquiry may not qualify as "interrogation" that must be
preceded by Miranda warnings.  Here, the officer needed to determine who
owned the backpack to ask for consent to search it, among other reasons.  The
backpack could have belonged to the driver, even though she denied that it
did.  It could have belonged to defendant.  It could also have belonged to the
driver's parents, who owned the car, or to some other third party.  In such a
circumstance, attempting to determine the identity of the owner may potentially
qualify as the kind of routine questioning normally attendant to investigatory
activities, or even to custody and arrest, that does not trigger the
requirement of Miranda warnings.  See generally Wayne R. LaFave, 2
Criminal Procedure § 6.7(b) (3d ed 2007) (general investigatory
questions not ordinarily considered interrogation; citing representatives cases). 
In an appropriate case, that issue may merit closer attention than it has
received in this case.
3. "Interrogation,"
both for federal and state law purposes, is express questioning, as well as
words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody), that the police should know are reasonably likely to
produce an incriminating response, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. 
State v. Scott, 343 Or 195, 202, 166 P3d 528 (2007) (adopting test from Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 US 291, 301, 301 n 5, 100 S Ct 1682, 64 L Ed 297
(1980)).  
4. The
state also has not argued on review that the officers had probable cause to
believe that the backpack contained marijuana, based solely on the odor of
marijuana coming from it, and that they could therefore seize and search it
under the automobile exception.  See State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 149
P3d 1155 (2006) (discussing that exception to the warrant requirement).  The
prosecution relied on that theory in the trial court, and the trial court made
an explicit finding that the automobile was mobile at the time of the stop. 
Even though the trial court may have relied on that exception as an independent
and alternative ground for its ruling, the state did not raise the automobile
exception in the Court of Appeals.  The state therefore cannot (and, as noted,
does not) rely on that exception in this court.  See Tarwater v. Cupp,
304 Or 639, 644, 748 P2d 125 (1988) (on review in this court, party may not
argue alternative ground for affirmance of trial court if that argument was not
presented to Court of Appeals).
5. In
a case that falls on the Elstad end of the spectrum, Miranda warnings
themselves will often provide the needed substantial "break" in the
circumstances.   In a case that falls on the Seibert end of the
spectrum, Miranda warnings alone may rarely suffice.  In such a case,
among other possible attenuating circumstances, advice that the earlier
unwarned statements probably are not admissible against the defendant is a
significant intervening factor that will weigh heavily on the side of rendering
the subsequent warned statements admissible.