Title: Com. v. Pfaff
Citation: 384 A.2d 1179, 477 Pa. 461
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 1978

477 Pa. 461 (1978) 384 A.2d 1179 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Henry W. PFAFF, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued January 17, 1977. Decided March 23, 1978. *462 *463 John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals Div., Defender Ass'n, Jonathan Miller, Philadelphia, for appellant. F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., James A. Shellenberger, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. MANDERINO, Justice. Appellant, Henry Pfaff, was tried before a judge and a jury on charges of corrupting the morals of a minor, statutory rape, and forcible rape. On March 22, 1972, the jury found appellant not guilty of forcible rape and guilty of statutory rape and corrupting the morals of a minor. Following the denial of post-verdict motions, appellant was sentenced to two and one-half to seven years imprisonment for statutory rape, and sentence was suspended on the other conviction. No appeal was taken from this judgment of sentence. Appellant filed a PCHA petition six months later and, following a hearing, was granted the right to file an appeal as though timely filed. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa.Super. 153, 335 A.2d 751 (1975). We granted appellant's petition for allowance of appeal and this appeal followed. As summarized by the Superior Court, the allegations against appellant are as follows: Id. 233 Pa.Super. at 156-57, 335 A.2d at 752-753. Appellant raises several issues in support of his contention that the judgment of sentence should be reversed and a new trial granted. Because we believe one of these issues is meritorious and requires that appellant be granted a new trial, we need not now address the other issues raised. Appellant argues that a new trial should be granted because certain prejudicial comments were made by the district attorney during summation of the evidence to the jury. This issue is being raised for the first time before us and thus has been waived. Appellant contends, however, in his brief and supplemental brief presented to this Court, *466 that each of appellant's two prior counsel, as well as present counsel, have been ineffective either for failing to object to the prosecution's summation, or failing to raise that issue in post-verdict motions or before the Superior Court. We agree. Because present counsel for appellant raises not only the ineffectiveness of two prior counsel who represented appellant at trial and in post-verdict motions, but also his own ineffectiveness in representing appellant before the Superior Court, the issue is properly before us. As stated in Commonwealth v. Fox, 476 Pa. 475, 383 A.2d 199 (1978), reversal of the judgment of sentence and remand for new trial is the proper remedy where counsel alleges his or her own ineffectiveness and it is apparent from the record before us that counsel's stewardship of the case did not meet the standards required by this Court. When the ineffectiveness of counsel is apparent from the record it would be a waste of judicial time not to decide the underlying issue when presented to us. The issue which we must decide therefore is whether it is apparent from the record before us that appellant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel concerning the issue of the district attorney's summation to the jury. An accused has a constitutional right to the effective representation of counsel at trial. When trial counsel's actions, or failure to take action, cannot be said to have any reasonable basis designed to effectuate the accused's interest, this right has been denied. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). We have on many occasions taken the opportunity to specify the kinds of conduct which we deemed to be proper on the part of a prosecuting attorney. The prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer with the duty to seek justice, not just convictions. Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975); Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512, 295 A.2d 300 (1972). Our advocacy system demands that defense counsel diligently protect the accused from the prejudice that can be *467 caused by prosecutorial overreaching. It is defense counsel's duty to bring such remarks to the attention of the trial court by proper objection. Commonwealth v. Gilman, supra, Commonwealth v. Sampson, 454 Pa. 215, 311 A.2d 624 (1973); see also Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). Defense counsel's failure to so protect appellant's interest by allowing the prosecutor to make improper comments to the jury without objection cannot be said to have any reasonable basis designed to effectuate the accused's interests in securing a fair and impartial verdict from that jury. See Commonwealth v. Humphrey, 473 Pa. 533, 375 A.2d 717 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, supra. One convicted of crime also has a right to appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963); Commonwealth v. Herge, 436 Pa. 542, 260 A.2d 787 (1970), and has the right to effective representation of counsel when taking that appeal. We are unwilling to conclude that appellate counsel effectively represents one convicted of a crime when appellate counsel, either through inadvertence or otherwise, fails to raise arguably meritorious issues on that appeal. One purpose of the appellate process is to guarantee as much as possible that the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial is scrupulously honored. When appellate counsel fails to bring to the attention of the appellate courts facts which arguably indicate that trial counsel allowed the accused to be subjected to prejudicial prosecutorial conduct during trial, we are forced to conclude that appellate counsel's representation of the accused was also ineffective. Cf. Commonwealth v. Humphrey, supra. Because of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness, the accused is denied his right of appeal. The comments made by the assistant district attorney at trial, and now complained of, are as follows (emphasis throughout is ours). *470 In Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971) we vacated judgment of sentence and granted a new trial because of the following remark made by the prosecutor in the course of cross-examination of the defendant: Id. 445 Pa. at 286, 285 A.2d at 493. In Potter, supra, we said, The prosecutor, in branding appellant's testimony as a `malicious lie' exceeded the permissible bounds of cross-examination. Furthermore, he injected his highly prejudicial personal opinion of appellant's credibility into evidence, thereby clearly and improperly intruding upon the jury's exclusive function of evaluating the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470, 478 (3rd Cir. 1970); People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519, 229 N.E.2d 206 (1967); Commonwealth v. Maloney, 365 Pa. 1, 5, 73 A.2d 707, 709 (1950); People v. *471 Reese, 220 Cal. App. 2d 143, 33 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1963); People v. Hickman, 34 A.D.2d 831, 312 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1970)." Id. 445 Pa. at 286-287, 285 A.2d at 493. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Gilman, supra, 470 Pa. at 189, 368 A.2d at 258, The prosecutor here impermissibly expressed his personal belief as to appellant's guilt and credibility. Furthermore, he expressed his personal belief as to the credibility of the witnesses both for the defense and for the prosecution. In doing so he ". . . clearly and improperly intrud[ed] upon the jury's exclusive function of evaluating the credibility of witnesses." Commonwealth v. Gilman, supra, 470 Pa. at 191, 368 A.2d at 258-259, quoting from Commonwealth v. Potter, supra, 445 Pa. at 287, 285 A.2d at 493. We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to the remarks of the assistant district attorney during the closing summation to the jury could have had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests, that appellant's post-verdict motions counsel's failure to raise the issue of the effectiveness of appellant's trial counsel in post-verdict motions could have had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant's interests, and that appellant's appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of the effectiveness of post-verdict motions counsel and trial counsel before the Superior Court, could have had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant's interests. *472 Judgment of sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, J., concurred in the result. JONES, former C.J., did not participate in the decision of this case. POMEROY, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.