Title: State of Florida v. Frederick Van Hubbard
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-116
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1999

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. 94,116
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
FREDERICK VAN HUBBARD,
Respondent.
[December 16, 1999]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Hubbard v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2247 (Fla. 1st
DCA Sept. 28, 1998), based upon certified conflict with Melvin v. State, 677 So. 2d
1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
For the reasons expressed below, we approve Hubbard in part and quash it in part,
approve Melvin under the reasoning expressed herein, and remand for proceedings
consistent herewith.
1  Specifically, that portion of the requested instruction read: "If, however, you find that
the fatal accident can be attributed in some way to any deviation or lack of care on the part of
Frederick Van Hubbard while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, this will suffice for you
to find him guilty of DUI manslaughter."  Hubbard, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2248 (emphasis
added).
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PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Respondent Frederick Van Hubbard (Hubbard) was convicted of DUI
manslaughter.  Hubbard claimed on appeal that the trial court erred in utilizing a
standard jury instruction adopted by this Court and not instructing the jury pursuant
to a special requested jury instruction containing a negligence element.1  The First
District agreed and reversed and remanded for a new trial.  The court began its
analysis by noting that the statute at issue, section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1995),
was amended in 1986 and construed by this Court three years later in Magaw v.
State, 537 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1989).  Hubbard, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2247.  While
emphasizing that Magaw interpreted the amended statute as containing an explicit
causation requirement, the court acknowledged that it "makes no mention of
negligence or deviation from a reasonable standard of care" by the operator of an
automobile. Hubbard, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2248.  Nevertheless, the First District
noted that a majority of Florida's district courts of appeal have interpreted Magaw as
reading a simple negligence element into the crime of DUI manslaughter.  Hubbard,
23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2248.  The court also recognized the Fourth District's
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contrary interpretation in Melvin, 677 So. 2d at 1318, that Magaw did not "requir[e]
that the standard instruction be broadened to specify lack of care as a distinct
element."
Turning to the case at hand, the First District detailed that over Hubbard's
objection the trial court used the standard jury instruction for DUI manslaughter
adopted by this Court in 1992.  See Hubbard, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2248 (citing
Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal Cases No. 92-1, 603 So. 2d 1175, 1195 (Fla.
1992)).  That instruction precisely mirrored the elements of DUI manslaughter
adopted in this Court's 1992 opinion, which contained an explicit causation
requirement but made no mention of negligence or deviation from a standard of care. 
The First District then noted that this Court recently adopted a revised DUI
manslaughter standard jury instruction, which again cited Magaw in support of the
causation element while remaining silent regarding negligence or deviation from a
standard of care.  Nevertheless, while acknowledging that sequence of events, the
court ultimately reversed the trial court's ruling and certified conflict with Melvin,
reasoning:
Of course, the fact that the Supreme Court has
adopted a standard jury instruction does not make that
instruction the substantive law of Florida. See Steele v.
State, 561 So.2d 638, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ("While
the standard jury instructions are intended to assist the trial
-4-
court in its responsibility to charge the jury on the
applicable law, the instructions are intended only as a
guide, and can in no wise relieve the trial court of its
responsibility to charge the jury correctly in each case.")
Nevertheless, we cannot completely ignore the fact that
twice, since the Magaw opinion, the Florida Supreme
Court has adopted standard jury instructions that do not
contain a negligence element. This may well be because,
despite the language in the Magaw opinion, the substantive
statute for DUI manslaughter does not contain any
reference to negligence. See § 316.193(3)(c)3, Fla. Stat.
(1995). In its brief in this case, the State urges that
"'causation' adequately covers the statutory topic, without
an explicit digression into 'negligence.'" The State's
position is not completely without logical force, given the
appellant's concession at oral argument, that, if negligence
must be part of the jury charge, the standard instruction
(adopted less than a week before this case was argued)
will never be legally sufficient in a DUI manslaughter case
where causation is contested. Nevertheless, we follow the
precedent of this court and others and hold that the trial
court erred by failing to give the Magaw instruction. In
hopes that the Supreme Court will soon resolve this
question that has arisen repeatedly in the nine years since
Magaw, we certify direct conflict with the Fourth District's
Melvin decision.
Hubbard, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2248.
The First District also found that the trial court improperly admitted evidence
that Hubbard's driving privileges had been suspended in the past.  Id.  During cross
examination of a Florida Highway Patrol investigator, Hubbard had elicited
testimony that he had a valid driver's license when the deadly accident occurred.  The
2  The Florida Legislature first addressed the issue of drinking and driving in 1915.  See
ch. 6882, Laws of Fla. (1915).  The crime of DUI manslaughter was added by amendment in
1923.  See ch. 9269, Laws of Fla. (1923).    
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State did not object to Hubbard's question.  After the State advised that it intended to
have the investigator testify that Hubbard's license had been previously suspended,
the trial court ruled, over objection, that Hubbard opened the door on cross-
examination to such a line of questioning.  Id.  The investigator testified accordingly
on redirect examination.  The First District concluded that the investigator's
testimony was inadmissible under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1995), "because
the danger of prejudice outweighed any probative value that could have been
attributed to the fact of prior license suspensions."  Id. at D2248-49. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS
This case implicates tort as well as criminal law principles, while also
involving the proper roles of the legislature and judiciary in establishing and defining
criminal offenses.  Although the issue presented concerns the standard jury
instruction for DUI manslaughter, it cannot be properly resolved without an
extensive examination of the DUI manslaughter statute first enacted in the early part
of this century2 and our periodic construction thereof.  A review of cases from other
jurisdictions is also instructive.
3  This crime has also been characterized as a "strict liability" or "reduced intent" offense. 
See State v. Smith, 638 So. 2d 509, 511-13 (Fla. 1994) (Kogan, J., concurring in result only).
4  The statute at issue provided, in pertinent part:
And if the death of any human being be caused by the operation of
a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, such person shall
be deemed guilty of manslaughter and, on conviction, be punished
as provided under existing law relating to manslaughter.
Ch. 9269, Laws of Fla. (1923).
-6-
DUI Manslaughter Statute
To place the current state of the law in context, we begin by reviewing the
evolution of the DUI manslaughter statute, our case law construing the statute, and
the recently adopted DUI manslaughter standard jury instruction.  Under our case
law for the last 75 years, simple negligence has been something of a subliminal or
presumed underlying element of DUI manslaughter.3  That is, the Legislature
determined "that it is criminal negligence for a person in an intoxicated condition to
attempt to drive an automobile upon the highways of this state and that if death
results to any person while so doing, such initial negligence will be imputed to the
act itself and the driver held guilty of manslaughter."  Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214,
218, 107 So. 360, 362 (1926) (emphasis added).4  Or, stated another way, "[t]he
provision of the statute with reference to the death of a person being 'caused' by the
operation of the car is the equivalent of stating that death resulted from his
5  The DUI manslaughter statute construed in Roddenberry contained the same wording as
the statutes previously construed by this Court in Cannon and Tootle v. State, 100 Fla. 1258, 130
So. 912 (1930).  See § 7749, Comp. Gen. Laws (1927).    
6  The statute construed in Tootle tracked the predecessor statute cited in Cannon word
for word.  See § 7749, Comp. Gen. Laws (1927).
7  One commentator lauded the DUI manslaughter statute construed in that line of cases as
"a valuable adjunct to legislation dealing with manslaughter because it substitutes the factual
question of whether the defendant was driving while intoxicated for the nebulous abstraction of
culpable negligence."  Walter T. Erickson, Legislative Note, Manslaughter by Automobile in
Florida, 4 U. Fla. L. Rev. 360, 369 (1951). 
-7-
misconduct which had its inception at the time he took control of the car and
proceeded to operate it while not in possession of his faculties."  Roddenberry v.
State, 152 Fla. 197, 202 11 So. 2d 582, 585 (1942).5
As to a negligence element, we explicitly stated that "there is no burden upon
the state to prove that at the time of the incident the defendant was negligent.  That
element is established if it be shown that he was not, at the time, in possession of his
faculties due to the voluntary use of intoxicants."  Id. at 201, 11 So. 2d at 585.  In a
similar vein, another opinion from that era defined DUI manslaughter as "the causing
of the death of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated." 
Tootle v. State, 100 Fla. 1248, 1250, 130 So. 912, 913 (1930).  Thus, in that case we
concluded that "[i]t was not necessary to allege culpable negligence of the defendant
in the operation of the motor vehicle, as that is not a specific element of the offense
defined by the particular statute."6  Tootle, 100 Fla. at 1251, 130 So. at 913.7
8  Section 860.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1977).  The statute provided:
(1) It is unlawful for any person, while in an intoxicated
condition or under the influence of intoxicating liquor, model glue,
as defined in s. 877.11, or any substance controlled under chapter
893 to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal
faculties, to drive or operate over the highways, streets, or
thoroughfares of Florida any automobile, truck, motorcycle, or
other vehicle.  Any person convicted of a violation of this section
shall be punished as provided in s. 316.193.
(2) If, however, damage to property or person of another,
other than damage resulting in death of any person, is done by said
intoxicated person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such
extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal faculties,
by reason of the operation of any of said vehicles mentioned herein,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable
as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and if the death of any
human being be caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by any
person while intoxicated, such person shall be deemed guilty of
manslaughter, and on conviction be punished as provided by
existing law relating to manslaughter.
-8-
More recently, we construed section 316.193's precursor statute8 in Baker v.
State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979).  There, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the DUI manslaughter statute on the basis that it did not require a
causal connection between the intoxication and the resulting fatality.  We initially
surveyed our case law and concluded that neither specific intent nor a causal
connection between the prohibited act of driving while intoxicated and the resulting
death were elements of DUI manslaughter.  Id. at 18.  From that point of departure,
we rejected Baker's substantive due process argument, reasoning that:
Statutes which impose strict criminal liability, although not
favored, are nonetheless constitutional, particularly when
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the conduct from which the liability flows involves
culpability or constitutes malum in se as opposed to malum
prohibitum.  Two classic examples of such legislation are
statutes which impose severe criminal sanctions where a
homicide occurs during the commission of a felony and
where one has intercourse with a female under a
prescribed statutory age.  In the case of felony murder,
there need be no showing of causation or active
participation by the defendant in the homicide so long as
he is proven to have been a participant in the felony out of
which the homicide occurred.  In the instance of statutory
rape it is no defense that the defendant actually believed
the female to be in excess of the prohibited age.  Regina v.
Prince, 13 Cox Crim.Cas. 138 (1875), early on settled the
validity of statutory rape legislation.  As recently as 1978
the United States Supreme Court conceded the
constitutional authority of the several states to enact felony
murder statutes.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602, 98
S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).
That the legislature intended section 860.01(2) to
have strict liability consequences is beyond peradventure. 
Cannon v. State was decided by this Court in 1926. 
Decisions of this Court and of the district courts of appeal
since that date have consistently held that negligence and
proximate causation are not elements of the crime
described in section 860.01(2).  The legislature's
reluctance to revisit the statute, in spite of ample
opportunity, leads to the conclusion that the judicial
construction of section 860.01(2) accurately reflects
legislative intent.
[Is] section 860.01(2) a rational response to a real
problem?  We must respond that (i) the problem of
drunken drivers operating motor vehicles on the highways
of this state is pernicious and real, and (ii) the response
embodied in section 860.01(2) can be justified on
deterrence grounds.  Both are supported by our recent
decision in Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla.1976),
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where, in the context of a civil action for punitive damages,
the statistics regarding fatalities resulting from accidents
where drinking was a contributing factor are recited, and
the public policy of punishment of drunk drivers as a
deterrent is recognized.
Although the majority of legal scholars adjure [sic]
strict criminal liability on the grounds that it is indefensible
to impose criminal sanctions in the absence of mens rea
and that such liability is not an effective deterrent, there are
those who make a respectable argument for the rationality
of strict criminal liability.  Furthermore, section 860.01(2)
is not the classic strict liability statute criticized by the
commentators.  Even in the parlance of the ALI Model
Penal Code, which is very critical of strict criminal
liability, the act of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated involves culpability.  We are not here dealing
with the type of statute which imposes strict criminal
liability for mere negligence or an act malum prohibitum. 
Given, then, that the operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated is a reckless (and therefore culpable) act,
is it rational for the legislature to impose criminal sanctions
for any death which occurs without regard to the tort law
concept of proximate causation between operation of the
automobile and the death?  If the legislature can reasonably
conclude that such a measure operates as a deterrent to
those who create a recognized and serious social problem,
then certainly it is.  Although, as noted, legal scholars have
questioned the efficacy of the deterrent effect of strict
liability statutes, an argument can be made that the
presence of strict liability sanctions for a particular activity
has the effect not only of inducing persons to engage in
that activity with greater caution, but may also have the
effect of keeping a relatively large class of persons from
engaging in the conduct at all.  This thesis cannot be
proved empirically, but neither can the position of the
opponents of strict criminal liability.  Consequently, it
cannot be asserted that the legislature has acted irrationally
9  In a very brief opinion, we again addressed the DUI manslaughter statute in 1986.  See
Armenia v. State, 497 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1986).  Under Baker, we found no requirement that the
State prove a causal relationship between the defendant's operation of his automobile or his
inability to avoid the accident because of his intoxication and the victim's resulting death. 
Armenia, 497 So. 2d at 639.  Justice Boyd again dissented, characterizing the disparate penalties
associated with DUI, vehicular homicide, and DUI manslaughter–all involving "substantially the
same conduct"–as "irrational, arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and therefore unconstitutional."  Id.
at 639-40 (Boyd, J., dissenting).     
-11-
in enacting section 860.01(2) where it is just as plausible
as not that it does have the desired deterrent effect.
Baker, 377 So. 2d at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).  On the basis of that reasoning, we
held that neither negligence nor proximate causation was an element of DUI
manslaughter.  Id. at 20.
Justice Boyd dissented, arguing that "[b]ecause of the lack of required causal
connection between the intoxication and the death, the [DUI] manslaughter statute
applies to conduct that is no more culpable than the conduct of one who drives while
intoxicated to the point at which his faculties are impaired."  Id. at 22 (Boyd, J.,
dissenting).  Consequently, Justice Boyd concluded that "[s]ince the conduct of one
who drives while intoxicated is of the same degree of culpability regardless of
whether such a collision and death occur, the provision for a possible maximum
sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment constitutes excessive punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."  Id.9      
 
10  Of note, the 1986 version of the statute construed in Magaw and the 1995 version at
issue in this case are precisely the same except for the passage in subsection (1)(a) which now
reads "when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired" versus the
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Ten years after issuing Baker, we again addressed the DUI manslaughter
statute in Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1989).  There, the issue presented
was whether the holding in Armenia was still valid in light of the 1986 legislative
amendments to section 316.193(3)(c).  After summarizing the holdings and reasoning
in Baker and Armenia, we began our analysis by comparing the wording of the pre-
and post-amendment statute and examining its legislative history to determine if a
causation requirement had been added.  Magaw, 537 So. 2d at 565-67.  In particular,
we quoted a staff analysis which stated "there now must be a 'causal connection'
between the operation of the vehicle by the offender and the resulting death" and that
the bill "insert[s] the element of causation into the definitions of DUI crimes."  Id. at
566-67.  We also found persuasive an excerpt from a floor debate on the proposed
amendment wherein one senator remarked that "[t]he new language does have the
word cause, and I think it's the intent of the drafters of the bill that causation be a
factor in a DUI manslaughter conviction."  Id. at 567.
Upon consideration of those factors, we concluded that the 1986 amendments
to section 316.193(3) introduced causation as an element of the crime of DUI
manslaughter.10  Id.  However, we attached several caveats to that conclusion:
former "his normal faculties."
11  See, e.g., Foster v. State, 603 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Kurtz v. State, 564
So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Jones v. State, 698 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
-13-
We caution . . . that the statute does not say that the
operator of the vehicle must be the sole cause of the fatal
accident.  Moreover, the state is not required to prove that
the operator's drinking caused the accident.  The statute
requires only that the operation of the vehicle should have
caused the accident. 
Id. Then, in what has been interpreted as reading a required simple negligence
element into the statute,11 we stated, "Therefore, any deviation or lack of care on the
part of a driver under the influence to which the fatal accident can be attributed will
suffice."  Id.
The revised DUI manslaughter standard jury instruction we recently adopted
mirrors the DUI manslaughter statute in all material respects.  See Standard Jury
Instructions in Criminal Cases (97-2), 723 So. 2d 123, 146-48 (Fla. 1998).  The
relevant portion of the instruction is as follows:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of DUI
Manslaughter, the State must prove the following three
elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.  (Defendant) drove or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
2.   While driving or while in actual physical control of
the vehicle, (defendant) 
 
a.   was under the influence of [alcoholic
12  The requested modification to part 2 of the standard DUI manslaughter jury instruction
read:
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beverages] [a chemical substance] [a
           
          controlled substance] to the extent that
[his] [her] normal faculties were impaired,
                            or
b.   had a blood or breath alcohol level of 0.08 or     
        higher.
                   3.  As a result, (defendant) caused or contributed to
  
the cause of the death of (victim).
   
Id. at 146-47.  The elements of the crime provided in the instruction track the precise
statutory language and, as the First District noted, the instruction "mentions neither
negligence nor deviation from a standard of care," Hubbard, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at
D2248, although the marginal note to the instruction cites Magaw as authority for the
causation element: "As a result, (defendant) caused or contributed to the cause of the
death of (victim)."   
Melvin
In Melvin, the defendant's van turned in front of the victim's oncoming vehicle,
causing a collision.  677 So. 2d at 1317.  The victim eventually died from injuries
sustained in the collision.  Evidence adduced at trial showed that Melvin was
intoxicated at the time of the accident.  Melvin requested a modified jury instruction
based on his interpretation of Magaw.12  The trial court denied the requested
2.  (Defendant), by reason of such operation, caused a collision by
deviation or lack of care, which was a cause of the death of
(victim).
Melvin, 677 So. 2d at 1318 (emphasis added).
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instruction.  Melvin was subsequently convicted of DUI manslaughter.  
The Fourth District affirmed the conviction on appeal, reasoning as follows:
Magaw has been interpreted as recognizing that for
DUI manslaughter, the state must prove that the defendant
was negligent and that this negligence was a contributing
cause of the death.  See Foster v. State, 603 So.2d 1312
(Fla. 1st DCA 1992), rev. denied, 613 So.2d 4 (Fla.1993); 
Parker v. State, 590 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev.
denied, 599 So.2d 1279 (Fla.1992).  In Murphy v. State,
578 So.2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), disapproved on other
grounds, State v. Chapman, 625 So.2d 838 (Fla.1993), we
recognized, distinguishing DUI manslaughter from
vehicular homicide, that DUI manslaughter "requires proof
of simple negligence while operating an automobile under
the influence of alcohol."  Id. at 411, citing Magaw.
We, nevertheless, find no error in the court's denial
of the requested instruction.  The standard jury instruction
for DUI manslaughter requires a finding that by reason of
operation of the vehicle, Melvin caused or contributed to
the victim's death.  Explicit in this instruction is a
determination by the jury of causation--Melvin had to
cause the death by reason of his operation of his vehicle. 
Although in Magaw the court elaborated on the meaning of
the term "caused," we do not construe that opinion as
requiring that the standard instruction be broadened to
specify lack of care as a distinct element.  For example,
based on the standard instruction, if the jury concluded that
someone else had caused the death, perhaps another driver,
13  The term "DUI manslaughter" is used for ease of reference and because that is the
statutory description of the crime in Florida.  However, equivalent crimes have different
descriptions in other states.  For example, the similar crime in Colorado is known as "vehicular
homicide." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I) (1999).
14  Indeed, the Colorado statute leaves no room for interpretation by explicitly stating that
"vehicular homicide . . . is a strict liability crime." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I) (1999).  
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Melvin would be found not guilty.  Similarly, if the death
was the result of factors beyond Melvin's control, he would
be not guilty.  Either of these scenarios, not involved here,
would preclude a finding of causation and result in a
defendant's acquittal as a defendant may be convicted only
on proof of causation.  We have considered Melvin's
argument in reliance on the First District's decision in
Foster, 603 So.2d at 1312.   However, in Foster, the court
did not hold the DUI manslaughter instruction to be per se
misleading, nor did it mandate the use of an alternative
instruction.
Melvin, 677 So. 2d at 318.
Other Jurisdictions
A split of authority exists on whether simple negligence is or should be an
element of DUI manslaughter.13  Several jurisdictions have found that simple
negligence is not an element of DUI manslaughter.  See, e.g., People v. Garner, 781
P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989);14 State v. Taylor, 463 So.2d 1274 (La. 1985); State v. Wong,
486 A.2d 262 (N.H. 1984); State v. Boag, 59 P.2d 396 (Or. 1936);  State v.
Caibaiosai, 363 N.W.2d 574 (Wis. 1985); Balsley v. State, 668 P.2d 1324 (Wyo.
1983), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1993). 
15  The Utah statute uses the phrase, "operat[es] the vehicle in a negligent manner."  Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1)(a) (1999).
16  The South Carolina statute's negligence element reads: "neglects any duty imposed by
law in the driving of the vehicle."  S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2945(A), (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998).  
17 Cal. Penal Code  § 191.5(a) (West 1999).
18 Cal. Penal Code § 192(c)(3)(West 1999).
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In contrast, Utah's "automobile homicide" statute requires simple negligence as an
element of the crime, see State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983),15 as does
South Carolina's "felony DUI" statute, see State v. Cribb, 426 S.E.2d 306 (S.C.
1992),16 and the corresponding Mississippi statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-
30(5) (1999) ("operates any motor vehicle . . . in a negligent manner").  California
has two DUI manslaughter statutes, with one requiring gross negligence17 and the
other only requiring simple negligence.18  Notably, in these jurisdictions the presence
or absence of explicit statutory language has determined whether negligence is an
element of DUI manslaughter.                   
In commenting on the public policy underlying "strict liability" crimes, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote that "[u]nder our laws, some acts performed with
no particular mental state and even without a particular result, are considered
sufficiently antisocial enough to qualify as a crime, [for example] . . . (sexual assault
using a dangerous weapon)."  Caibaiosai, 363 N.W.2d at 577.  On the discrete issue
19   The statute, titled "Homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm," criminalized the
actions of:
[Any person who] [c]auses the death of another by the operation or
handling of a vehicle, firearm or airgun and while under the
influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a
combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance[.]
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) (1983).
-18-
of drunk driving,19 the court explained:
The legislature has determined that combining the
operation of a motor vehicle with being in an intoxicated
state is conduct which is malum prohibitum and is
pervasively antisocial.  Since the conduct is considered
inherently evil, it conceptually cannot be divided into
portions which are bad and portions which are not bad. 
Section 346.63, Stats., entitled "Operating under the
influence of intoxicants" is violated by a person who, one,
operates a motor vehicle, and two, is at the time under the
influence of an intoxicant. The commission of the offense
does not require any erratic or negligent driving.  Because
driving under the influence of an intoxicant is malum
prohibitum it is impossible to separate the intoxication
from the driving or the driving from the intoxication.  The
result is the potentially lethal and illegal combination of
driving while intoxicated.
Section 940.09, Stats., requires that the prosecution
prove and the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt a causal
connection between the defendant's unlawful conduct,
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and the
victim's death.  The statute does not include as an element
of the crime a direct causal connection between the fact of
defendant's intoxication, conceptualized as an isolated act,
and the victim's death.  Under this statute there is an
inherently dangerous activity in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that driving while intoxicated may result in the
-19-
death of an individual.  The legislature has determined this
activity so inherently dangerous that proof of it need not
require causal connection between the defendant's
intoxication and the death.
. . . .
. . . So, when a person chooses to operate an
automobile while under the influence of intoxicants and
has done so deliberately knowing that society has through
its legislature established such combined activities as
dangerous and when such operation results in death, it may
be punished as a felony.
It is negligence per se to operate a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicants.  Experience has
established this conclusion and the legislature has accepted
it as a fact in sec. 346.63(1)(a), Stats., and has made such
combined activities a class D felony when the operation of
the vehicle results in death in sec. 940.09(1)(a).  The
substantial factor in the cause of the death is the cause in
fact of the operation of the vehicle while intoxicated. 
Section 940.09(1)(a) accepts that the conduct of operating
under the influence of intoxicants plus the consequences of
death will result in a felony charge.  The people of this
state through their legislature have determined in sec.
940.09(1)(a) that the operation of a motor vehicle by one
who is under the influence of intoxicants is a risk that will
not be tolerated.
Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added).  
Implicating another facet of this issue, the specter of the "faultless" drunk
driver outlined in Justice Boyd's Baker dissent appeared in a recent Rhode Island
case, although without the result feared by Justice Boyd.  See State v. Benoit, 650
A.2d 1230 (R.I. 1994).  In that case, the defendant was driving in an extremely
20  "When the death of any person other than the operator ensues as a proximate result of
an injury received by the operation of any vehicle, the operator of which is under the influence of
any intoxicating liquor . . . the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of driving under the
influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in death." R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2(a), (1983).
-20-
intoxicated state with his blood-alcohol content measuring .208, over twice the legal
limit.  Id. at 1231.  However, the evidence adduced at trial showed that it was the
victims' car that "left its lane of travel, crossed either a dividing line and/or median
strip, and made contact with the defendant's . . . truck . . . in the defendant's lane." 
Id.  Indeed, there was evidence that the intoxicated defendant tried to swerve and
avoid the victims' oncoming car.  Id. at 1234.  The ensuing accident seriously injured
the driver of the other car and killed the passenger.  The defendant was charged with
DUI manslaughter and DUI causing seriously bodily injury.  He moved to dismiss
both counts on the grounds that the State could not prove that his operation of his
automobile proximately caused the death and serious bodily injury of the victims. 
The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed both counts.  Id. at 1231.
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first determined that the DUI
manslaughter statute contained a proximate cause element.20  Id. at 1233.  From
there, the court found that in order for a valid conviction to be obtained, "the state
must produce sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant's manner
of operating his or her motor vehicle was a proximate cause of the victim's death and
-21-
the collision occurred while the defendant was legally intoxicated."  Id.  However,
the court noted that "this evidence need not necessarily show that the defendant's
manner of operating his or her motor vehicle was either reckless or criminally
negligent, as there is nothing in the statute to require this."  Id.  The court made clear
that the state did not have to prove that the defendant's intoxication was the
proximate cause of the death, but only that "the defendant's operation of his or her
motor vehicle was a proximate cause of the death in question occurring while the
defendant was legally intoxicated."  Id.   Under that reasoning, the court concluded
that "[t]here is scant evidence in the record other than his presence on the highway to
show that the defendant's manner of driving was the proximate cause of the death
and injury in question."  Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).  Consequently, the court
affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the charges.  Id.       
Statutory Interpretation
As a general proposition, the legislature has the prerogative to define or
redefine the elements of a crime.  See Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1996);
State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995); Chapman v. Lake, 112 Fla. 746, 151
So. 399 (1933).  While manslaughter was recognized as a common law crime in
England as early as the 1600s, see Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Substantive Criminal Law § 2.1 at 90 (1986), DUI manslaughter is strictly a creature
21  Section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1995), provides:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle:
(a) Without having a driver's license as required under s.
322.03; or
(b) While his or her driver's license or driving privilege is
canceled, suspended or revoked . . . and who by careless or
negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or
serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of
-22-
of statute.  See §316.193(3)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (1995).  Therefore, it is instructive to
examine the plain language of the statute.  
Section 316.193 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under
the influence . . . if such person is driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic
beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111,
or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when
affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are
impaired; or
(b) The person has a blood or breath alcohol level of
0.08 or higher.
. . . .
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes:
. . . .
3.  The death of any human being is guilty of DUI
manslaughter, a felony of the second degree . . . .
While the statute clearly has a causation element, it does not explicitly contain a
negligence element, in contrast to a related statute such as section 322.34(3),21 which
the third degree . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
-23-
does include such an element.  Thus, at least three principles of statutory
construction support a conclusion that simple negligence is not an element of DUI
manslaughter.  See Florida State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So. 2d 87, 88
(Fla. 1949) (observing that "[t]he legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
words and the rules of grammar, and the only way the court is advised of what the
legislature intends is by giving the [statutory language its] generally accepted
construction"); Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. M.B., 701 So. 2d
1155, 1160 (Fla. 1997) (finding no "consistency" requirement attached to child
victim hearsay exception, as opposed to statute defining nonhearsay, thus
"demonstrat[ing] that the legislature knew how to impose a 'consistency' requirement
if desired"); Federal Ins. Co. v. Southwest Fla. Retirement Ctr. Inc., 707 So. 2d
1119, 1122 (Fla. 1998) (concluding that absence of express language establishing
discovery rule for latent defects is "clear evidence that the legislature did not intend
to provide a discovery rule" in limitations statute).
Negligence
While a straightforward statutory interpretation eliminates the possibility of a
negligence element, a more practical consideration yields the same result.  As
22  According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 17,126
alcohol-related fatalities occurred in the United States during 1996, comprising 40.9% of the total
traffic fatalities for the year.  U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 1996 (visited May 24, 1999)
.  NHTSA statistics also show that
in 32% of all traffic fatalities in 1996, at least one driver or non-occupant (pedestrian) had a blood
alcohol concentration of .10 or greater.  Further, approximately 1.4 million drivers were arrested
in 1995 for driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.   In Florida, 944 alcohol-related
fatalities occurred in 1996, equaling over 33% of the total statewide traffic deaths for the year. 
Florida Highway Patrol, Crash Statistics (Statewide) (visited May 24, 1999)
.  The number of alcohol-related traffic crashes
in 1996–24,875–is a figure that has remained remarkably constant since these types of statistics
were last cited by this Court.  See Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 924 n.9 (Fla. 1976) (noting
that in 1974 alcohol was a contributing factor in 24,869 automobile accidents in Florida) (citing
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Traffic Accident Facts 3 (1975)).    
23  Defined as "an element of criminal responsibility; a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful
purpose; a criminal intent."  Black's Law Dictionary 985 (6th ed. 1990).
24  Section 782.07(1), Florida Statutes (1997) provides:
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable
negligence of another, without lawful justification according to the
provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing shall
-24-
implied in Caibaiosai, the legal concept of negligence is difficult to apply in a
situation where drugs or alcohol substantially affect a person's ability to drive,
maneuver, react, and make intelligent decisions.  While in most of these cases there
is no doubt that the driver's operation of the vehicle causes the accident that kills the
victim, that deadly (mis)operation is almost certainly a direct result of the driver's
intoxication.22  Consequently, the notion that the State would have to prove the
additional element of negligence appears to be an alien concept in this species of
unintended crime.  Just as mens rea23 is inapplicable in a normal manslaughter case,24
not be excusable homicide or murder . . . is manslaughter, a felony
of the second degree . . . .
25  Of course, those are the statutory elements of DUI manslaughter.  § 316.193(3), Fla.
Stat. (1995).
26  Put another way, negligence principles are based on how the proverbial reasonable
person would act in a particular situation, not how a reasonable intoxicated person would act in
that set of circumstances.  In other words, intoxication introduces a wholly different dynamic into
the calculus that simply is not present in the normal negligence analysis.  If taken to its logical
extreme, an argument could be made that a reasonable person would never drive while
intoxicated, so therefore an intoxicated driver is presumptively negligent.  However, as indicated,
we need not indulge in such analysis to resolve the issue before us.   
-25-
likewise negligence principles appear to have no utility in a DUI manslaughter
prosecution under the Florida statute.
More precisely, the fact that someone is intoxicated and drives a particular
vehicle which causes another person's death should be enough to satisfy the elements
of DUI manslaughter.25  Intuitively, someone who is intoxicated will not be able to
control his or her automobile in a safe manner and make quick decisions and execute
maneuvers that will avoid accidents.  See Ingram, 340 So. 2d at 924-25
(characterizing automobiles as dangerous instrumentalities whose "dangerous
propensities are heightened when operated by a person who is, by definition,
incapable of exercising vigilance and caution").  Therefore, negligence is simply the
wrong prism through which the intoxicated driver's actions should be viewed.  If the
person's normal faculties are impaired, that person will act accordingly and almost
certainly will have a greater chance of causing an accident.26  Thus, imposing an
27See  State v. Florida State Imp. Comm'n, 60 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1952); Pell v. State, 97
Fla. 650, 122 So. 110 (1929)). 
-26-
additional "simple negligence" element would appear to accomplish little.
Further, Benoit underscores the importance of the causation element:  the
defendant's operation of his or her automobile must cause the accident.  There, the
court determined that a undisputably drunk driver who, through no misoperation of
his own, was struck by another car resulting in the death of another person, cannot
be found guilty of DUI manslaughter because the operation of his vehicle did not
cause the victim's death.  Benoit, 650 A.2d at 1234.  The Fourth District recognized
that a defendant could not be convicted under such circumstances: "[I]f the jury
concluded that someone else had caused the death, perhaps another driver, Melvin
would be found not guilty."  Melvin, 677 So. 2d at 1318.  The court also concluded
that "if the death was the result of factors beyond Melvin's control, he would be not
guilty."  Id.   In so finding, the Fourth District applied the essential holding in Magaw
that the Legislature's 1986 amendments to the DUI manslaughter statute introduced
causation as an element of the crime.  537 So. 2d at 567.
In the final analysis, our language in Magaw regarding "deviation or lack of
care" was dicta,27 which does not change the import or correctness of the decision. 
See Continental Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1986) ("[D]icta
28  That we should feel compelled to do so is unsurprising in light of our over 60 years of
case law which unambiguously held that "neither negligence nor proximate causation is an
element" of DUI manslaughter.  Baker, 377 So. 2d at 20; Cannon; Tootle; Roddenberry.
-27-
is "at most persuasive and cannot function as ground-breaking precedent.").  Indeed,
it is really a matter of semantics because that language simply elaborated on and
emphasized the causation element,28 and was not intended to read another free-
standing element into the crime.  Certainly, there is no separate free-standing
negligence statutory element.  Hence, we conclude that Magaw has been
misinterpreted by several district courts as reading a separate and independent
negligence element into the crime of DUI manslaughter.  Because Magaw properly
focused on causation, we do not anticipate that "faultless" drunk drivers will be
snared under the standard DUI manslaughter jury instruction, even without the
"Magaw" simple negligence element required by the First, Second, and Fifth
Districts.  Accord Melvin; Benoit.  Contrary to the dissenting view, we do not feel
that the standard DUI manslaughter jury instruction as presently written creates
confusion for a jury as to the applicable law; the DUI manslaughter statute contains 
the element of causation and does not require proof of the separate and independent
element of "simple negligence," which is separate and apart from the causation
element.  See generally W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).  The legal concepts of causation and negligence
-28-
are not necessarily interchangeable, particularly under circumstances such as those
involved here.   Additionally, the causation element of the amended statute was
interpreted by this Court in Magaw as not requiring that the conduct of the operator
of a vehicle be the sole cause.  Thus, contrary to the dissenting view, Magaw did not
add an additional element of negligence to the statutory scheme but did define the
concept of causation.  Therefore, the standard jury instruction reflects this Court's
Magaw analysis.  Moreover, the 1986 amendments did not add the element of the
manner of operation, but included only a nexus between an accident and the
operation of a vehicle.
Finally, Hubbard made no request for a jury instruction as proposed by the
dissent as a first preferred option to include the phrase "manner of operation" in an
instruction and such is not in accordance with the existing statutory elements. 
Although the dissent carefully does not use the word "negligence", the additional
optional jury instruction proposed by the dissent would, in effect, require the State to
prove "negligence" as an additional free-standing element of DUI manslaughter, a
result with which we cannot agree. 
Scienter
As a final consideration, the concerns we voiced in Chicone v. State, 684 So.
2d 736 (Fla. 1996), do not appear present in the DUI manslaughter context.  There,
-29-
we held that the State was required to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed
illegal drugs even though the applicable statutes did not specifically include scienter
requirements.  Id. at 744.  In reaching that result, we reasoned that "if the legislature
had intended to make criminals out of people who were wholly ignorant of the
offending characteristics of items in their possession, and subject them to lengthy
prison terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect."  Id. at 743. 
Therefore, we found that "[s]ilence does not suggest that the legislature dispensed
with scienter here."  Id. at 744.  We also noted that interpreting the drug possession
statutes without a knowledge requirement would "criminalize a broad range of
apparently innocent conduct."  Id. at 743 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
Such a danger does not appear to exist where an intoxicated person enters and
drives an automobile and subsequently causes a fatal accident.  That is, it would
seem unreasonable to label driving while intoxicated as "apparently innocent
conduct" requiring a knowledge or at least an independent negligence element. 
Moreover, the fact that the crime of DUI manslaughter has been on the books for
over 75 years without ever containing such an element seems a fair indicator of the
29  We recognize that the Legislature accords disparate treatment to DUI and DUI
manslaughter, for example.  On the one hand, driving while drunk is a misdemeanor which
requires at least three convictions to earn a year's imprisonment.  § 316.193(2)(a)2c, Fla. Stat.
(1995).  It will only become a third-degree felony carrying a potential of five years' imprisonment
upon a fourth or subsequent conviction.  § 316.193(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995).  In contrast, a drunk
driver whose operation of his or her automobile causes the death of another is guilty of a second-
degree felony, carrying a potential fifteen-year prison term.  The Legislature clearly has made the
policy choice to impose more severe sanctions on the drunk driver who kills someone than on the
drunk driver who is fortuitously caught before possibly killing someone.  While that may seem a
bit unfair, it is hardly irrational.
30  We exercise our discretion to consider this issue although it is not within the scope of
the certified conflict.  See PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc., 690 So. 2d
1296, 1297 n.2 (Fla. 1997) (explaining that "[o]nce a court obtains jurisdiction, it has the
discretion to consider any issue affecting the case").
-30-
Legislature's intent.29
Prior Bad Acts Evidence
Although we disapprove the First District's treatment of the standard DUI
manslaughter jury instruction issue, we approve its disposition of the prior bad acts
evidence issue.30  The fact that Hubbard had his driving privileges suspended in the
past clearly was of slight probative value, which was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.  § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1995); see also Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (construing "unfair prejudice" as contained in
Federal Rule of Evidence  403 to mean "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis"); State v. Emmund, 698 So. 2d 1318, 1320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
(approving trial court's order prohibiting State from using "violent career criminal"
statutory terminology because of potential for "jury confusion and unfair prejudice,
31 Similarly, the evidence showing that Hubbard had a valid driver's license at the time of
the accident, elicited by defense counsel without objection by the State, was not relevant in this
case.  Upon objection, such evidence should not be admitted on retrial.
32  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
-31-
as well as the risk that the defendant's prior record will become a feature of the case.
. . . The focus of the case should remain on the facts that are actually in dispute."). 
Here, Hubbard's past driving record was of marginal, if any, relevance in establishing
the elements of DUI manslaughter.31  Accordingly, because we are unable to
conclude that the improper admission of this unfairly prejudicial evidence was
harmless,32 Hubbard is entitled to a new trial on this basis.
Summary
In conclusion, we hold that the DUI manslaughter standard jury instruction
should not be modified to include a negligence element.  We also find that the
improper admission of prior bad acts evidence was harmful error which necessitates
a new trial.  Accordingly, we approve that portion of the district court's decision that
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence was admitted.  We quash that portion that held that it was error to give the
standard jury instruction on DUI manslaughter.  We approve Melvin under the
reasoning expressed herein.
It is so ordered.
-32-
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring.
Although I agree with many of the concerns expressed by Justice Pariente, I
join in the majority opinion.  I write separately to note, however, that the standard
jury instruction does deviate from the statute, section 316.193, in a most significant
way.  As quoted in the majority opinion, section 316.193(3) provides:
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes:
. . . .
3.  The death of any human being is guilty of DUI
manslaughter, a felony of the second degree . . . .
(Emphasis added).  In contrast to this straightforward requirement of causation, the
standard jury instruction provides in element 3 that:
3.  As a result, (defendant) caused or contributed to the
cause of the death of (victim).
(Emphasis added).  Hence, the instruction modifies the straightforward causation
provision in the statute by adding the alternative "or contributed to the cause" even
though that language is not in the statute.  This appears to greatly expand the reach of
-33-
this penal statute.  
What has happened is that a civil tort concept has been added to an
unambiguous penal manslaughter statute.  I believe this is an error of law.  The
statute should not be altered by incorporating tort concepts into the criminal law
without express legislative direction.  By this wholesale incorporation of a tort
concept into the criminal law we raise more questions than we answer.  For example,
the broader tort instruction would apparently make someone who may be only one
percent at fault in causing an accident one hundred percent criminally liable under
the statute.  This same result would apparently obtain even if the alleged victim of
the crime was the driver of another vehicle and ninety-nine percent at fault for the
accident.  Of course, we should also note the irony of any incorporation of these tort
principles into the criminal law at a time when we know that these very outcomes
have been rejected by the Legislature under our prevailing tort law.  Hence, the
outcome of a civil lawsuit would be totally different than the outcome of a criminal
prosecution.
That the standard instruction is flawed is made especially clear by our recent
decision in Eversley v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S439 (Fla. Sept. 23, 1999), wherein
we explained:
Causation consists of two distinct subelements.  As
-34-
legal scholars have recognized, before a defendant can be
convicted of a crime that includes an element of causation,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant's conduct was (1) the "cause in fact" and (2) the
"legal cause" (often called "proximate cause") of the
relevant harm.  See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 390, 392
(2d ed. 1986).  See also United States v. Pitt-Des Moines,
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd, 168
F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 1999).
In order to establish that a defendant's conduct was
the "cause in fact" of a particular harm, the State usually
must demonstrate that "but for" the defendant's conduct,
the harm would not have occurred.  See LaFave & Scott,
supra, at 390, 392-94; Pitt-Des Moines, 970 F.Supp. at
1364; Hodges v. State, 661 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 3d DCA
1995) (quoting Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 350
(Fla. 3d DCA 1990).  A defendant can rebut this showing
by demonstrating that the harm would have occurred in any
event, regardless of the defendant's conduct.  See Pitt-Des
Moines, 970 F.Supp. at 1364.  In those rare circumstances
where "two causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the
harmful result, operate together to cause it," the "but for"
test becomes impossible to prove.  LaFave & Scott, supra,
at 394.  See also Hodges, 661 So. 2d at 110 n.3;
Velazquez, 561 So. 2d at 351.  In these circumstances, the
State may prove "cause-in-fact" causation by
demonstrating that the defendant's conduct was a
"substantial factor" in bringing about the harm.  See
LaFave & Scott at 394-95; Velazquez, 561 So. 2d at 351.  
In addition to establishing "cause-in-fact" causation,
the State must also demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was the "proximate cause" of the particular harm. 
Florida courts have considered two basic questions in
determining proximate cause: (1) whether the prohibited
result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scope of
any fair assessment of the danger created by the
-35-
defendant's conduct and (2) whether it would be otherwise
unjust, based on fairness and policy considerations, to hold
the defendant criminally responsible for the prohibited
result.  See Hodges, 661 So. 2d at 110; Velazquez, 561
So. 2d at 351.
Id. at S440.  The Hodges and Velazquez cases relied upon in Eversley also
demonstrate the  problem with the standard instruction.  Hodges and Velazquez point
out that "cause in fact" is different from proximate cause; even if a defendant
satisfies the "but for" test he cannot be held criminally liable if he is not the
proximate cause of the resulting injury.  See Hodges, 661 So. 2d at 110; Velazquez,
561 So. 2d at 351. 
With regard to vehicular homicide, the Third District in Velazquez noted:
     The "proximate cause" element of vehicular homicide in
Florida embraces more, however, than the aforesaid "but
for" causation-in-fact test as modified by the "substantial
factor" exception.  Even where a defendant's conduct is a
cause-in-fact of a prohibited result, as where a defendant's
reckless operation of a motor vehicle is a cause-in-fact of
the death of a human being, Florida and other courts
throughout the country have for good reason declined to
impose criminal liability (1) where the prohibited result of
the defendant's conduct is beyond the scope of any fair
assessment of the danger created by the defendant's
conduct or (b) [sic] where it would otherwise be unjust,
based on fairness and policy considerations, to hold the
defendant criminally responsible for the prohibited result. 
Id. at 351.  The import of the distinction between cause-in-fact and proximate cause
-36-
in this case is that the jury instructions would lead the jury to find the defendant
guilty even if the defendant's conduct was not the legal cause of the injury.  The jury
is simply told that it may find the defendant guilty if the defendant's conduct was a
contributing cause of the injury.  The jury instruction does not distinguish between
the "but for" and "substantial factor" test, and it does not specify that the conduct
must proximately cause the accident.
I believe the instructions should be limited to the plain language of the statute
or revised to conform to our holding in Eversley.
PARIENTE, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's reversal for a new trial based on the improper
admission of prior bad acts evidence.  As to the conflict issue, I would state
explicitly what the majority opinion acknowledges implicitly; that is, in order to be
convicted of DUI manslaughter, there must be something in the manner of operation
of the motor vehicle that causes the accident.  
The majority asserts that this dissent confuses the concepts of fault and legal
cause.  See Majority op. at 27-29.  However, before 1986, the DUI manslaughter
statute read in pertinent part,  "If the death of any human being is caused by the
operation of a motor vehicle by any person while so intoxicated, such person shall be
-37-
deemed guilty of manslaughter and on conviction shall be punished as provided by
existing law relating to manslaughter." § 316.1931, Fla. Stat. (1985) (quoted in
Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla. 1989)) (emphasis supplied).  As
mentioned in Magaw, the 1986 changes added the language that a person is guilty of
DUI manslaughter if the person "operates a vehicle" and "by reason of such
operation, causes . . . [t]he death of any human being."  § 316.193(3), Fla. Stat.
(Supp. 1986) (quoted in Magaw, 537 So. 2d at 566).  Thus, the 1986 amendments
did not simply add the element of causation, but they also added a requirement of
connexity between the accident and the manner of operation of the vehicle.
Although in Magaw the Court refers to "causation as an element" added by the
statutory amendment, it is clear from our opinion that we were also focusing on the
amended statutory language that adds the provision concerning the manner of
operation.  537 So. 2d at 567.  As Justice Grimes stated in Magaw:
We caution, however, that the statute does not say that the operator of
the vehicle must be the sole cause of the fatal accident.  Moreover, the
state is not required to prove that the operator's drinking caused the
accident.  The statute requires only that the operation of the vehicle
should have caused the accident.  Therefore, any deviation or lack of
care on the part of a driver under the influence to which the fatal
accident can be attributed will suffice.
Id. at 567 (emphasis supplied).  The majority does not disapprove of this statement,
which it labels as "dicta."  Majority op. at 27.  Instead, the majority explains that this
33I also share Justice Anstead's concerns expressed in his concurring opinion in this case as
to the variance between the jury instruction, which uses the terms "caused or contributed to
cause" based on Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1989), and the actual language of the
-38-
statement "is really a matter of semantics because that language simply elaborated on
and emphasized the causation element, and was not intended to read another
freestanding element into the crime."  Id. (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). 
Moreover, the majority contends that the standard DUI manslaughter jury
instruction, as presently written, does not create the possibility of confusing a jury as
to the applicable law.  See id.  I disagree.
As currently written, the relevant portion of the standard DUI manslaughter
jury instruction provides:  "As a result, (defendant) caused or contributed to the
cause of the death of (victim)."  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 103.  Under this prong of
the DUI manslaughter charge, what is the jury instruction referring to when it says
"As a result"?  As a result of the defendant's operation of the vehicle?  As a result of
the defendant's intoxication?  As a result of the defendant's intoxication and operation
of the vehicle?  Or, as a result of defendant's manner of operation of the vehicle? 
Based on these multiple possibilities, I do not feel as confident as the majority does
that an average juror would understand that implicit in this causation requirement is
the fact that the defendant's manner of operation caused or contributed to cause the
accident.33
statute, which only uses the term "causes."
-39-
Both the majority opinion and the Fourth District's opinion in Melvin v. State,
677 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), apparently agree that there must have been
something about the defendant's driving that caused the accident.  As the Fourth
District observed in Melvin: 
For example, based on the standard instruction, if the jury concluded
that someone else had caused the death, perhaps another driver, Melvin
would be found not guilty.  Similarly, if the death was the result of
factors beyond Melvin's control, he would be not guilty.  Either of these
scenarios, not involved here, would preclude a finding of causation and
result in a defendant's acquittal as a defendant may be convicted only on
proof of causation.
Id. at 1318.  In addition, the majority relies on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230 (R.I. 1994), which the majority claims
"underscores the importance of the causation element:  the defendant's operation of
his or her automobile must cause the accident."  Majority op. at 26.  In Benoit, the
court interpreted Rhode Island's DUI manslaughter statute, which provides in
pertinent part: 
When the death of any person other than the operator ensues as a
proximate result of an injury received by the operation of any vehicle,
the operator of which is under the influence of, any intoxicating liquor .
. . the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of "driving under
the influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in death".
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2(a) (1983) (emphasis supplied).  Interpreting this
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statutory language, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that in order to
sustain a conviction under Rhode Island's DUI manslaughter statute:
[T]he state must produce sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that
the defendant's manner of operating his or her motor vehicle was a
proximate cause of the victim's death and that the collision occurred
while the defendant was legally intoxicated.  We note that this evidence
need not necessarily show that the defendant's manner of operating his
or her vehicle was either reckless or criminally negligent, as there is
nothing in the statute to require this.
Benoit, 650 A.2d at 1233 (emphasis supplied).  According to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, even the states with the most lenient proximate cause requirements
still require that the prosecution show that the "defendant's manner of operating his
or her vehicle caused the injury or death."  Id. at 1232.  Similarly,  the State has this
burden under Florida's DUI manslaughter statute.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, I am not advocating that the jury
instructions contain an independent element of "simple negligence," separate and
apart from the causation element.  Rather, I do not find that the DUI manslaughter
jury instruction adequately informs jurors that they must find a causal connection
between the defendant's manner of operating his or her vehicle and the resulting
victim's death before finding the defendant guilty of the crime.  In my opinion, the
jury instruction as presently written thus creates the possibility of confusing the jury
as to the applicable law.  This is especially so because, unlike the standard civil jury
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instructions, the standard criminal jury instructions do not include an instruction
explaining legal cause.
I do not suggest that the jury be instructed that the State must prove that the
defendant's manner of operating his or her motor vehicle rose to the level of criminal
negligence or recklessness.  Instead, I suggest that the jury instructions adequately
inform jurors of the State's burden under the statute.  In order for the State to obtain a
valid conviction under the amended statute, the State must prove that the defendant's
manner of operating his or her motor vehicle was a legal cause of the victim's death
and that at the time of the operation of the vehicle, the defendant was legally
intoxicated.  Therefore, I would approve the First District's decision in Hubbard v.
State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2247 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 28, 1998), and adopt an
amended instruction to be applied prospectively that would include the following
additional underlined language:
1.
(Defendant) drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle.
2.
While driving or while in actual physical control of the vehicle,
(defendant)
a.  was under the influence of [alcoholic beverages] [a 
chemical substance] [a controlled substance] to the extent that
[his] [her] normal faculties were impaired,
or
b.  had a blood or breath alcohol level of 0.08 or higher.
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3.
As a result of defendant's manner of operation of [his] [her] vehicle
while under the influence of [alcoholic beverage] [a chemical substance]
[a controlled substance] defendant caused
or contributed to the cause of the death of (victim).
An additional option would also be to include the following:
The State is not required to prove that defendant's
intoxication was the cause of the accident, but only that
any deviation or lack of care on the part of defendant in the
operation of the motor vehicle was a legal cause of the
accident.
These additions to the jury instructions would be helpful to jurors, while at the same
time be consistent with this Court's decision in Magaw.
As Judge Webster observed in Foster v. State, 603 So. 2d 1312, 1315 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1992), "In criminal cases, the trial judge bears the responsibility of ensuring
that the jury is fully and correctly instructed as to the applicable law."  
While the majority may characterize Justice Grimes' statement in Magaw as "a
matter of semantics," majority op. at 27, in my opinion, an amendment to the jury
instructions would ensure that the jury was fully instructed on the applicable law and
minimize the possibility of juror confusion. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Direct
Conflict of Decisions
First District - Case No. 97-2666
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(Santa Rosa County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert R. Kimmel of Law Offices of Kimmel & Batson, Chartered, Pensacola, Florida,
for Respondent