Title: Pugh v. State
Citation: 584 So. 2d 781
Docket Number: 89-KA-1011
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 1991

584 So. 2d 781 (1991) Ivory Lee PUGH v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 89-KA-1011. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 7, 1991. *782 Sam N. Fonda, Lott Franklin Fonda &amp; Flanagan, Greenwood, for appellant. Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., W. Glenn Watts, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ. McRAE, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Leflore County, wherein Ivory Lee Pugh was tried and convicted of the crime of burglary and sentenced to serve a term of ten (10) years in custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as an habitual offender. We reverse and remand. The grand jury indicted appellant (hereinafter "Pugh") in March, 1989, and charged him as follows: Pugh's trial convened on July 6, 1989, and the jury returned a guilty verdict the same day. The following day the court sentenced Pugh to serve ten years as an habitual offender. Because we reverse and remand on procedural grounds, a lengthy rendition of the facts is unnecessary. It is sufficient to note only that the facts involve Maude Crosby, her daughter Cynthia and Wesley Brown, all of whom reside at 2014 Maybelline in Greenwood, Mississippi. Gregory Crosby, Maude's older son, resides on Roosevelt Street in Greenwood. Pugh allegedly burglarized 2014 Maybelline on January 15, 1989, while Cynthia and Gregory were in the house. Pugh first argues that the Court erred in allowing the State to impeach him on cross-examination, with evidence of two prior burglary convictions, without first conducting an on-the-record determination that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of such evidence. Recognizing that the Miss.Rules of Evidence apply in both criminal and civil cases, Miss. R.Evid. 609(a) is the applicable rule, which provides as follows: Id. The Comment to 609(a) states the following: Miss.R.Evid. 609 comment (emphasis added). The following testimony is pertinent to this issue and came out during Pugh's cross-examination: In Peterson v. State, 518 So. 2d 632 (Miss. 1987) this Court faced a Rule 609 interpretation. The grand jury indicted and the court tried Peterson for the sale of more than an ounce of marijuana. Peterson, 518 So. 2d at 634. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Peterson if he had any felony convictions and, over objection, he admitted to a prior conviction for possession of marijuana. Id. On appeal the defense cited U.S. v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.1979) as support for the proposition that the trial judge had to make an on-the-record determination of the probativeness of the prior conviction. Peterson, 518 So. 2d at 635. This Court held that "Rule 609(a)(1) requires the trial judge to make an on-the-record determination that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect before admitting any evidence of a prior conviction." Id. at 636. Since this was the first interpretation, this Court listed the following factors to use as an analysis in the trial court: In McInnis v. State, 527 So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1988) this Court again addressed Miss. R.Evid. 609(a). The grand jury indicted McInnis on robbery charges and the trial jury subsequently found him guilty as charged. McInnis, 527 So. 2d at 85. At issue on appeal was the prosecution's use, for impeachment purposes, of a prior arson conviction. Id. The prosecution offered the arson conviction at the end of McInnis' direct testimony, and the following discussion took place at the bench: Id. at 85-86. McInnis argued that the trial court, before ruling on the admissibility of the conviction, erred in failing to (1) inquire into the nature and circumstances of the previous conviction; and (2) apply the Peterson balancing test. Id. at 87. This Court reasoned that under Rule 609(a)(1) the prosecution has the burden to show the prior *785 conviction's probative value, and after this prima facie showing, the trial court should apply the balancing test. Id. at 88. This Court then held that the prosecution's argument that arson was a violent crime failed to establish the prior conviction as probative on the credibility issue. Id. More recently, in McGee v. State, 569 So. 2d 1191 (Miss. 1990) this Court reiterated its Rule 609(a) ruling as follows: McGee, 569 So. 2d at 1195 (citations omitted). Under Peterson, McInnis, and McGee the State in the case sub judice had the burden to show prima facie the probative value of Pugh's prior burglary convictions. The State argues that Pugh opened the door on this issue by stating on direct examination "I wouldn't break in a house with the lights on and stuff" and by stating on cross-examination that he would not break into a house at all. The State contends that his statements make his prior burglary convictions highly relevant as to his credibility. Arguably, the State may have met its prima facie burden. Where a defendant in effect testifies that he would not engage in a crime for which he had already been convicted, then the conviction may become relevant as a specific rebuttal as opposed to the defendant's credibility generally. We will not permit perjury to go unchallenged, but the Peterson factors have to be weighed before presentment to a jury. See generally Miss.R.Evid. 403 and 609. The second hurdle under Peterson, McInnis, and McGee was clearly not met in the case sub judice. That is, the trial judge failed to utilize the Peterson factors in determining the admissibility of the prior convictions. Because Pugh's credibility is central to his defense, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. See McGee, 569 So. 2d at 1197 (although in the past the balancing test has been applied on appeal we remand). Next Pugh argues that even though defense counsel failed to offer a limiting instruction, the Court should have instructed the jury sua sponte on the limited purpose of such evidence. The State cites Simmons v. State, 358 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Miss. 1978) and Murphy v. State, 336 So. 2d 213, 216-17 (Miss. 1976) for the proposition that the trial judge does not have an affirmative duty to give the jury a limited instruction. Both Simmons and Murphy pre-date the effective date of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and are not persuasive authority on this issue. Appropriate authority includes U.S. v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978) which involved a drug prosecution where the state impeached the defendant with two *786 prior drug convictions. Diaz, 585 F.2d at 117. Neither the government nor the defense offered a limiting instruction and the sole issue presented on appeal was whether the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to sua sponte give an instruction. Id. The Fifth Circuit held as follows: This Court in Peterson v. State, 518 So. 2d 632 (Miss. 1987) cited Diaz and suggested that "the better practice is that a limiting instruction be granted by the trial judge sua sponte when proper request is not made by counsel." Peterson, 518 So. 2d at 638. See also Simpson v. State, 553 So. 2d 37, 39 (Miss. 1989) (citing Peterson with approval). The State argues that in Peterson the defendant was asked about his previous felonies on cross-examination without ever having opened this up by his own statements on direct, as occurred in the case sub judice. Although factually Peterson is distinguishable, the fact remains that the defendant's credibility is at issue here and under Peterson and Diaz the jury should have been instructed that Pugh's prior convictions were only to be considered for the purpose of attacking his credibility. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in results only. PITTMAN, J., not participating.