Title: Falk v. Fannie Mae
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 197PA13
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

NO. COA13-81 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 6 August 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Rowan County 
No. 09 CRS 052604-06 
MICHAEL PAUL MILLER 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 May 2011 by 
Judge Joseph N. Crosswhite in Rowan County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Martin T. McCracken, for the State. 
 
William Trippe McKeny for defendant. 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge. 
 
Defendant Michael Paul Miller appeals from the judgment 
entered against him after he pled guilty to possession with 
intent to sell and/or deliver marijuana, maintaining a dwelling 
house for marijuana, and carrying a concealed gun.  On appeal, 
defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress the marijuana found in his hallway closet 
because: (1) the marijuana constituted fruit of the poisonous 
tree; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that it was in 
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plain view.  After careful review, we remand to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Background 
Defendant Michael Miller was indicted on 3 August 2009 on 
charges of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana; 
maintaining a dwelling house for keeping, storing, using and/or 
selling marijuana; and carrying a concealed handgun in his 
vehicle.  Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence 
seized during the search of his house.  The matter came on for 
hearing on 4 April 2011.  The evidence presented at the hearing 
tended 
to 
establish 
the 
following: 
On 
4 
May 
2011, 
at 
approximately 1:05 a.m., Officer Brian Hill (“Officer Hill”), a 
police officer with the Spencer Police Department, responded to 
a call that a burglar alarm was going off at 404 South Baldwin 
Avenue in Spencer, N.C.  After arriving at the house, Officer 
Hill was making his way around the house and found two large 
ziploc bags of what appeared to be marijuana sitting on concrete 
steps that led to a side door.  He took possession of the bags 
and placed them in his car.  Then, Officer Hill resumed his 
search of the outside of the home and noticed that a window at 
the back of the house was broken; he testified that “it appeared 
entry had been made.”  Believing that someone had entered the 
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home and that a suspect may still be inside, Officer Hill 
requested 
additional 
units 
assist 
him 
in 
searching 
the 
residence. 
 
Officer 
Hill 
contacted 
the 
Salisbury 
Police 
Department with his request and specifically requested a K-9 
unit respond.  Officer Jason Fox (“Officer Fox”), an officer 
with the East Spencer Police Department, arrived on scene with 
“Jack,” his canine.  Jack is trained not only to detect 
narcotics but also to search for suspects.  Shortly thereafter, 
Ms. Weant, defendant’s mother, showed up at the house.  After 
ascertaining that she had a key to defendant’s home, Officer 
Hill explained the situation to her, and Ms. Weant gave the 
officers permission to enter the home.   
After unlocking the front door, Officer Fox and Officer 
Hill announced that they were law enforcement and warned that 
they had a canine unit with them to deploy inside the home.  
After the announcements, Officer Fox released Jack into the 
premises.  Initially, Jack went into a bedroom on the right side 
of the house.  Officer Hill testified that when he and Officer 
Fox walked into the bedroom, a dresser drawer was open, and they 
could see a large quantity of brick marijuana laying in the top 
drawer.  In contrast, Officer Fox testified that after entering 
the bedroom, he noticed Jack was sitting and staring at the 
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dresser, indicating that it contained narcotics.  Officer Fox 
then opened the dresser drawer, found the marijuana, and showed 
the marijuana to Officer Hill.    
Since they still had not finished clearing the residence, 
Officer Fox redeployed Jack to check the rest of the house for a 
possible intruder.  Jack stopped in front of a closet door in 
the hallway of the home and began barking at the closet door.  
Officer Fox testified that, generally, barking indicates that 
Jack has located a suspect.  Based on their concern that someone 
was hiding in the closet, the officers opened the closet door 
and saw two large trash bags, partially opened, containing 
marijuana.  Officer Fox testified that he and Officer Hill did 
not have to manipulate the trash bags in order to see the 
marijuana; it was visible when they looked in the closet.  
However, Officer Fox did note that when they opened the closet 
door, Jack began sniffing the plastic bags, causing them to 
partially open up.  They did not do anything with the marijuana 
at that time but continued searching the rest of the residence 
for suspects.   
After clearing the house, Officer Hill contacted Sergeant 
Eric Ennis (“Sergeant Ennis”), his investigator, in order to 
obtain a search warrant.  At that point, defendant arrived on 
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the scene.  Officer Hill asked defendant whether there was 
anything in his vehicle that he needed to know about; defendant 
told Officer Hill he had a handgun under the front seat.  After 
Sergeant Ennis obtained his search warrant, he took possession 
of the bags of marijuana from the closet and the marijuana from 
the dresser.   
At the end of the hearing, the trial court concluded that 
the officers deviated from their search for suspects by opening 
the dresser drawer.  Accordingly, the trial court held that 
opening the drawer violated defendant’s constitutional rights, 
and it granted the motion to suppress with regard to the 
marijuana found in defendant’s dresser.  With regard to the 
marijuana in the closet, the trial court concluded that it was 
discovered when the officers had resumed their search for 
suspects and was in plain view, even though Officer Fox 
testified that the bag may have been closed until Jack stuck his 
nose in it.  Thus, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to 
suppress with regard to the marijuana found in the hallway 
closet.1   
                     
1 The trial court also denied defendant’s motion to suppress with 
regard to the gun in his car and the marijuana found on the back 
steps.  Specifically, the trial court concluded that defendant 
was not in custody when he voluntarily told the officer about 
the gun in his vehicle.  Moreover, the trial court held that the 
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After the motion to suppress was denied in part, defendant 
entered an Alford plea as to all charges.  The trial court 
sentenced defendant to a minimum of five months to a maximum of 
six months imprisonment for the charges of maintaining a 
dwelling for the keeping or selling of controlled substances and 
carrying a concealed handgun.  However, the trial court 
suspended his sentence and placed defendant on 24 months of 
supervised probation.  Defendant appealed.2  
Arguments 
First, defendant argues that, pursuant to the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress with regard to the marijuana in the closet 
after it found the officers violated his constitutional rights 
                                                                  
marijuana on the back steps was in plain view.  On appeal, 
defendant does not challenge the denial of his motion to 
suppress with regard to these two pieces of evidence.  Thus, 
these issues are deemed abandoned on appeal, N.C. R. App. P. 
28(b)(6) (2012), and we will not determine whether the trial 
court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress with 
regard to them. 
2 Prior to the current appeal, defendant unsuccessfully attempted 
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  In an 
unpublished case, this Court dismissed defendant’s appeal for 
failing to include the judgments entered upon his guilty plea in 
the record on appeal and for failing to indicate on his notice 
of appeal which final judgment he was appealing.  State v. 
Miller, __ N.C. App. __, 723 S.E.2d 584 (April 17, 2012) (COA11-
1177) (unpublished).  However, after the opinion was filed, 
defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari (P12-717) on 
22 August 2012 which was allowed to review the judgments entered 
against defendant on 23 May 2011. 
-7- 
 
 
by opening the dresser drawer.  In other words, defendant 
contends that once officers violated his constitutional rights 
by opening the dresser drawer, their subsequent discovery of the 
drugs in the closet is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  We disagree. 
“The governing premise of the Fourth Amendment is that a 
governmental 
search 
and 
seizure 
of 
private 
property 
unaccompanied by prior judicial approval in the form of a 
warrant is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within a 
well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement involving 
exigent circumstances.”  State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 135, 291 
S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982) (citations omitted).  To determine 
whether exigent circumstances existed such that an officer was 
authorized to conduct a warrantless search, the Court must look 
at the totality of the circumstances.  State v. Nowell, 144 N.C. 
App. 636, 643, 550 S.E.2d 807, 812 (2001), aff’d per curiam, 355 
N.C. 273, 559 S.E.2d 787 (2002). 
Based on the circumstances of the present case, the 
officers’ warrantless entries into defendant’s home did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because they were justified to 
enter based on exigent circumstances.  Prior to State v. Woods, 
136 N.C. App. 386, 391, 524 S.E.2d 363, 366 (2000), our Courts 
-8- 
 
 
had not considered whether “under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment law 
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant for the 
purpose of investigating a probable burglary.”  In Woods, we 
recognized the general consensus from other states and federal 
jurisdictions that “where an officer reasonably believes that a 
burglary is in progress or has been recently committed, a 
warrantless entry of a private residence to ascertain whether 
the intruder is within or there are people in need of assistance 
does not offend the Fourth Amendment.”  Id.  This Court 
concluded that the officers were justified in entering the 
defendant’s 
home 
without 
a 
warrant 
under 
the 
exigent 
circumstances doctrine because the security alarm was sounding, 
officers found a back door ajar, a window was broken, and 
officers had a reasonable belief that the intruders or a victim 
could be inside.  Id.   
Here, as in Woods, based on the exigent circumstances 
exception, the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s home 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Officers Hill and Fox had 
an objective reasonable belief that a burglary or breaking and 
entering was in process and that a suspect or suspects may still 
be in defendant’s home.  Officer Hill testified that the Spencer 
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Police Department had received a burglar alarm report concerning 
a suspected breaking and entering at defendant’s home.  Once he 
arrived and began his inspection, he noticed that a back window 
was broken such that a person could have entered defendant’s 
home.  Moreover, because all the doors remained locked, Officer 
Hill reasonably believed that the intruder could have still been 
in 
the 
home. 
 
Accordingly, 
probable 
cause 
and 
exigent 
circumstances existed which justified the warrantless entry into 
and subsequent search of defendant’s home. 
Even though the initial entry into defendant’s home was 
constitutional, we must determine whether the scope of their 
search inside the home was reasonable.  Woods, 136 N.C. App. at 
393, 524 S.E.2d at 367.  In Woods, this Court noted that “the 
ensuing search is reasonable under the circumstances only in so 
far as it furthers the stated purpose for entering.”  Id.  In 
other words, “the scope of a warrantless search must be strictly 
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the scope of the 
officers’ search was confined to places where an individual 
could hide, and the issue becomes whether the search of the 
closet furthers the purpose of the officers’ search: their 
belief that an intruder could still be in defendant’s house.   
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Based on the totality of the circumstances, the search of 
the hallway closet was justified.  Both Officer Hill and Fox 
testified that Jack indicated that someone may be hiding in the 
closet.  Moreover, Officer Hill testified that the closet was 
large enough for someone to hide in.  Thus, the closet could 
have contained an intruder, and their search of it clearly 
furthered their purpose for entering defendant’s home without a 
warrant.  Therefore, their discovery of the marijuana in the 
closet was the result of constitutional conduct.   
Defendant 
argues 
that 
since 
the 
officers 
acted 
unconstitutionally in discovering the marijuana in the dresser, 
as the trial court concluded, “there is no returning to legal 
conduct.”  Based on their unconstitutional conduct of opening 
the dresser drawer, defendant contends that the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine would require exclusion of the evidence 
found in the hallway closet.  We disagree. 
Our Supreme Court has noted that: 
The “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” 
a specific application of the exclusionary 
rule, 
provides 
that 
[w]hen 
evidence 
is 
obtained as the result of illegal police 
conduct, not only should that evidence be 
suppressed, but all evidence that is the 
“fruit” of that unlawful conduct should be 
suppressed. Only evidence discovered as a 
result 
of 
unconstitutional 
conduct 
constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree. 
-11- 
 
 
 
State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 58, 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Here, the 
evidence discovered as a result of that search was not “fruit of 
the poisonous tree” because it was found as a result of 
constitutional conduct. There is no support for defendant’s 
contention that Officers Hill and Fox could not have resumed 
their lawful search after discovering the drugs in the bedroom.  
Defendant’s argument is without merit.  
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
concluding that the marijuana in the closet was in plain view 
since Jack opened the bag with his nose.   Because the trial 
court failed to resolve the conflict in the evidence as to 
whether Jack opened the bag, we remand this matter back to the 
trial court. 
Our Court has noted that: 
One exception to the warrant requirement is 
the plain view doctrine, under which police 
may seize contraband or evidence if (1) the 
officer was in a place where he had a right 
to be when the evidence was discovered; (2) 
the evidence was discovered inadvertently; 
and (3) it was immediately apparent to the 
police that the items observed were evidence 
of a crime or contraband. 
 
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State v. Graves, 135 N.C. App. 216, 219, 519 S.E.2d 770, 772 
(1999) (citing State v. Mickey, 347 N.C. 508, 495 S.E.2d 669, 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 853, 142 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1998)).   
 
As discussed, due to exigent circumstances, Officers Hill 
and Fox were lawfully present in defendant’s house at the time 
the marijuana in the hallway was discovered, and they discovered 
the marijuana inadvertently while searching for suspects.  
However, it is unclear from the record whether the marijuana in 
the bag was actually in plain view given that Jack may have 
exposed the marijuana that otherwise would have remained hidden 
from Officer Hill’s and Fox’s view.   
 
This is a case of first impression in North Carolina.  A 
few federal courts have addressed the issue.  In United States 
v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that a dog sniff in the interior of an apartment that 
revealed contraband was constitutional even where the dog may 
have moved a dresser drawer in conducting its sniff that exposed 
the contraband to plain view, noting that other courts have held 
that “the instinctive acts of trained canines, such as trying to 
open a container containing narcotics, does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.”  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit adopted a 
similar reasoning in United States v. Lyons, 957 F.2d 615, 617 
-13- 
 
 
(8th Cir. 1992), holding that a “dog’s instinctive actions” such 
as tearing open a package containing narcotics does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
However, we decline to adopt the reasoning of the Sixth and 
Eighth circuits.  Here, there is a reasonable probability that 
the trash bag was opened as a result of Jack sniffing it.  Had 
Officer Hill or Fox manipulated or opened the trash bag in such 
a way that the marijuana, which was initially hidden from view, 
became exposed, the marijuana would not have been in plain view, 
and their action would constitute a search which must be 
justified under the Fourth Amendment.  See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 321, 324-25, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354 (1987) (holding that the 
police officer’s act of moving stereo equipment “did constitute 
a ‘search’ separate and apart from the search for the shooter, 
victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry 
into the apartment . . . . [and that] taking action, unrelated 
to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to 
view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did 
produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by 
the exigent circumstance that validated the entry”).  Jack was 
an instrumentality of the police, and his actions, regardless of 
whether they are instinctive or not, are no different than those 
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undertaken by an officer.  If he opened the bags and exposed the 
otherwise hidden marijuana, it would not be admissible under the 
plain view doctrine.3 
 
In concluding that a canine sniff that exposes hidden 
contraband would not be admissible under the plain view 
doctrine, we recognize that there was conflicting testimony 
presented at the hearing regarding whether the trash bag was 
partially open at the time the officers opened the closet door.  
While the trial court acknowledged that “Officer Fox [indicated] 
that the bag may have been closed until his K-9 stuck his nose 
in the bag[,]” and noted the conflicting testimony of Officer 
Fox regarding whether the trash bag was opened by Jack, it did 
not issue any definitive factual conclusion on this matter.  
Therefore, we must remand this matter to the trial court to 
resolve this conflict in the evidence.  As discussed above, if 
the trial court finds that the bag was already partially opened 
so that the marijuana could be seen by the officers, then the 
plain view doctrine would apply, and the marijuana in the 
hallway closet would be admissible.  In contrast, if the trial 
                     
3 We note that Jack’s alert on the bag may have provided the 
officers probable cause to obtain a search warrant to open the 
trash bag in the closet.  However, here, the officers did not do 
so prior to Jack allegedly opening the bag and exposing the 
marijuana.  
-15- 
 
 
court determines that the bag was opened by Jack in his attempt 
to sniff the bags’ contents, the marijuana would not have been 
in plain view of the officers, and the marijuana should have 
been suppressed.  Consequently, defendant would be entitled to a 
new trial. 
Conclusion 
 
Because exigent circumstances existed as to allow Officer 
Hill and Fox to search defendant’s house without a warrant and 
they resumed their constitutional search after opening the 
dresser, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not 
require exclusion of the marijuana in the hallway closet.  
However, because there is a conflict in the evidence regarding 
whether the marijuana in the closet was in plain view, we remand 
this matter back to the trial court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Judges GEER and McCULLOUGH concur.