Title: State v. Rodriguez
Citation: 126 Ariz. 28, 612 P.2d 484
Docket Number: 4094
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 1980

126 Ariz. 28 (1980) 612 P.2d 484 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Richard RODRIGUEZ, Appellant. No. 4094. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. May 12, 1980. Rehearing Denied June 17, 1980. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., by William J. Schafer, III, Diane M. Ramsey and Crane *29 McClennen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. McCarthy &amp; Sandman by Cary Sandman, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. This is an appeal by defendant Richard Rodriguez from a verdict and judgment of guilt to the crimes of first degree murder, A.R.S. §§ 13-451, -452, -453;[1] four counts of assault with a deadly weapon, A.R.S. § 13-249(A) and (B), a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five calendar years, A.R.S. § 13-454(D), as to the murder conviction, and ten to twenty years on each count of assault, to run concurrently. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and -4035. We must answer three questions: The facts necessary for a disposition of this appeal are as follows. Defendant Richard Rodriguez was 17 years old when he moved from Santa Fe Springs, California, to live with his aunt and uncle in Green Valley, Arizona. While in California, Richard was under the supervision of the California Youth Authority. His California juvenile records show he was adjudicated a delinquent and spent several months in a juvenile detention center, as the result of an assault with a deadly weapon when he was fourteen years old. His juvenile record also contains other charges which were later dismissed. They include assault with intent to commit murder in August 1974, battery in September 1974, and assault with a deadly weapon in November 1975. On 4 April 1976, defendant drove with a neighbor from Green Valley to Nogales, Mexico, where he purchased some pills and alcohol. The neighbor testified that upon questioning by a United States customs agent at the border on the return trip, defendant became angry and later stated, "Somebody should blow that guy's head off." Late that evening, defendant drove to Tucson. He engaged a prostitute at the Manhattan Bar and went with her to the Arizona Hotel to obtain a room. The prostitute signed the registration because defendant was unable to do it himself. They paid the clerk and went upstairs to the room. When defendant did not have the twenty dollars for the prostitute's services, she went back downstairs. Defendant followed and attempted to get a refund for the $4.28 he had paid for the room. The clerk refused, and the manager came out to discuss the matter. An argument began which resulted in defendant firing a series of shots from a .22 caliber pistol, injuring the hotel clerk, the manager, and killing a resident of the hotel. Defendant then ran out the back door of the hotel and into a parking garage, where he shot at a policeman and an unmarked police car. He was finally shot in the leg by police and apprehended. Defendant had approximately .10 percent of alcohol as well as a significant amount of morphine in his blood at this time. He was also unable to recall the circumstances surrounding the offense. The three psychiatrists who examined defendant at the request of the defendant's attorney testified at defendant's hearing upon sentencing that defendant was substantially mentally impaired at the *30 time of the offense, and that he did not know the nature and consequences of his acts due to generalized, soft brain damage. Prior to trial, a motion in limine was filed to preclude introduction of any references to defendant's juvenile record. The court denied this motion, and the trial proceeded. No part of the juvenile record was ever introduced. At trial, sanity was an issue and the facts of the murder were not seriously contested. The State presented its evidence, calling fifteen witnesses over a three day period. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined all the State's witnesses. After the State rested its case, defense counsel announced that rather than present any evidence on behalf of the defendant, he would also rest his case. Defendant stated in court that he strongly opposed counsel's decision, and submitted a motion to have his attorney dismissed and a new attorney appointed. The court denied that motion. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and four counts of assault with a deadly weapon. After a mitigation hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to death for the murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to ten to twenty years on each count of assault, to run concurrently. At a resentencing pursuant to State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 924, 99 S. Ct. 1254, 59 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1979), the court found defendant's age to be a mitigating factor and reduced the death sentence for the murder conviction to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five calendar years. MOTION IN LIMINE Prior to trial, defendant moved in limine to preclude the State from introducing defendant's juvenile record from California. The court denied the motion stating: During the State's case, no mention was made of defendant's juvenile record. A motion "in limine" meaning "on or at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily," Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 896, West Publishing Company, 1951, is not provided for by name in either our criminal or civil rules of procedure. The motion appears to be frequently used, however, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered by the opposing party. It is apparent that in criminal cases, a "motion in limine" is nothing more than a motion to suppress specifically authorized by Rule 16, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. The trial court treated the motion as such and so will this court on appeal. In his motion, the defense counsel argued that A.R.S. § 8-207(C) precluded any references to defendant's juvenile record. That statute provides: In interpreting this statute, we have held that juvenile records are inadmissible as evidence in chief, State v. Fierro, 101 Ariz. 118, 416 P.2d 551 (1966), or as impeachment evidence, State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942), in a later criminal proceeding. See Rule 609(d), Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S., and comment following. See also State v. Councilman, 105 Ariz. 145, 460 P.2d 640 (1969); State v. Cano, 103 Ariz. 37, 436 P.2d 586 (1968). There are exceptions to this rule. For example, as noted by the statute, juvenile records may be introduced in presentence reports and be taken into consideration by the court in the imposition of sentence. State v. Fierro, supra. *31 A second exception in which courts have allowed juvenile records to be admitted as evidence is where their confidentiality conflicts with constitutional rights. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held that confidentiality of a witness' juvenile records must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, entitling the defendant to question the witness regarding his juvenile record. This exception is embodied in Rule 609(d) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S. A third exception occurs when the defendant himself waives their confidentiality by opening the door to his past. Once defendant presents favorable evidence regarding his juvenile history, courts have held that the State could rebut this with evidence of a juvenile record. State v. Ralls, 213 Kan. 249, 515 P.2d 1205 (1973); State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942). A defendant may not use the confidentiality of juvenile records statute for deception. Marinski, supra. Here defense counsel had suggested an insanity defense to the State and the court. Where insanity is an issue, all prior relevant conduct of the person's life is admissible into evidence. State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467, 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Hudgens, 102 Ariz. 1, 423 P.2d 90 (1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 873, 88 S. Ct. 162, 19 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1967); State v. Sexton, 4 Ariz. App. 41, 417 P.2d 554 (1966). Had defense counsel chosen to present evidence relating to defendant's sanity, he would have opened the door to defendant's past and waived the confidentiality of his juvenile records. The court was therefore correct in her denial of defendant's motion which would have been a blanket preclusion of defendant's juvenile record. As the court pointed out, her ruling did not admit the juvenile records, but merely denied their total preclusion until it became apparent as to the context in which they were to be offered. We find no error in her denial of defendant's motion in limine. Defendant claims, however, that the court's ruling had a chilling effect upon his constitutional right to put on an insanity defense, citing State v. Tuell, 112 Ariz. 340, 541 P.2d 1142 (1975). In Tuell, supra, we held that failure of the trial court to grant defendant a motion in limine as to subsequent bad acts was error. In that case, the State had contended that since the defendant did not choose to testify, the inadmissible evidence was not used to impeach him and therefore the issue was moot on appeal. In rejecting this argument, we pointed out that the admission of this improper evidence would have a chilling effect on defendant's exercise of his right to testify because "the admission of the evidence * * would have been so prejudicial as to completely destroy any possible probative value." Tuell, supra, 112 Ariz. at 345, 541 P.2d at 1147. While we agree with the defendant that his juvenile record would have been prejudicial and had a chilling effect upon the decision of the defendant to present evidence in his own behalf, the difference between Tuell, supra, and this case is that in this case the juvenile record was admissible *32 as to defendant's insanity defense. Under these circumstances, even though the possible admission of the defendant's juvenile record did have a chilling effect upon his decision to present testimony in defense, it was not error. Since the defense was insanity, the defendant was faced with the decision of presenting evidence and opening up evidence of his juvenile past, or not and keeping this damaging testimony out. It was a necessary decision which often must be made in criminal trials when considering whether to present further evidence. RIGHT TO A DEFENSE The defendant, when he learned that the defense would rest, filed a motion to dismiss counsel. In the motion, the defendant made it clear that he was not waiving counsel stating, "I'm asking the court to remove Robert Norgren; and be replaced by a new attorney." Defendant, thus, wanted to change attorneys in the middle of the trial. Also, defendant did not ask for the right to take the stand and testify which the court would have been required to grant. State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967). At the hearing on the motion, he stated: Nowhere in the motion or in defendant's statements in court did the defendant indicate who he wanted to call in his defense. Although the defendant did not specifically claim he was granted ineffective assistance of counsel,[2] the trust of his motion seems to be that his counsel was not competent. We do not agree with this contention. In general, the power to control trial strategy belongs to counsel. Townsend v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 774, 126 Cal. Rptr. 251, 543 P.2d 619 (1975); Herrera v. Wilson, 364 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1966). There are cogent reasons for this rule. In its lengthy discussion of this issue, the Alaska Supreme Court articulated several: The United States Supreme Court in considering whether counsel's waiver of constitutional rights would later bar defendant's habeas relief indicated that the defendant is bound by counsel's trial strategy except where the circumstances are exceptional. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S. Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1965). See State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated, regarding the "exceptional circumstances" test established in Henry, supra, in a case where counsel deliberately waived the right to object to the racial composition of the grand jury, that: In the instant case, it would appear that counsel did discuss this matter with the defendant and thought there was agreement on the proposed trial strategy. Although it is not clear exactly who defendant wanted to be called, it is clear he objected at the time to his counsel's decision to rest without calling any witnesses. The defendant did not insist on exercising his right to take the stand and testify in his own behalf. He did not indicate any witnesses he wished to call. There is no indication that counsel had not properly prepared his case. Indeed, it would appear that defendant's *35 counsel was well prepared and had considered all the options and had discussed them with the defendant. The only question we have here is whether the defendant's attorney, over the objection of defendant, as a trial strategy, could decide not to call any witnesses after the State had rested. We think he could. We find no error. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF While the conviction was on appeal, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief on 14 March 1978, and the appeal was stayed pending the determination of post-conviction relief. In addition to raising numerous issues concerning the sentence and the imposition of the death penalty, which we do not need to consider here, the petition raised the same issues that have been raised on this appeal. It is apparent that the petition was filed in aid of the appeal in the hopes that additional evidence could be obtained in support of the allegations made by defendant on appeal. A pre-hearing conference was held pursuant to Rule 32 at which time the trial court determined that "the record is sufficient for appellate review," and denied the motion for a Rule 32 hearing, and further denied the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. The defendant petitioned this court for review of the denial of post-conviction relief which petition was, pursuant to Rule 31.4(b)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., consolidated with the appeal. We have reviewed the petition for review of the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, and believe that the petition for review of the Rule 32 hearing should be denied. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur. [1] Title 13 citations in this opinion are to the Arizona Criminal Code as it existed prior to its extensive revision effective 1 October 1978. [2] The trial court initially interpreted defendant's objection to Mr. Norgren's decision not to present evidence as such a claim and rejected it.