Title: United States v. McGurn
Citation: 596 So. 2d 1038
Docket Number: 77390
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 1992

596 So. 2d 1038 (1992)
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,
v.
Kenneth R. McGURN, et ux., Appellees.
No. 77390.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 2, 1992.
Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Allen, David English Carmack and Kenneth W. Rosenberg, Attys., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Kenneth W. Sukhia, U.S. Atty. and R. Timothy Jansen, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tallahassee, for appellant.
Linda C. McGurn, Gainesville, for appellees.
OVERTON, Justice.
This cause is before this Court upon the following certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit:
McGurn v. Whiskey Creek, Inc., 924 F.2d 998, 999 (11th Cir.1991). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(6), Florida Constitution.
The issue in this case requires us to determine whether a security interest in a liquor license must be filed with both the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco of the State of Florida, in accordance with the provisions of section 561.65(4), Florida Statutes (1987), and with the Secretary of State under the provisions of the *1039 Uniform Commercial Code, chapter 679, Florida Statutes (1987). For the reasons set forth below, we find that filing with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco of the State of Florida is sufficient and that no duplicate filing under the Uniform Commercial Code is necessary.
The Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the facts are not in dispute, and its opinion articulates those facts and the issues for our determination as follows:
We note it is not in dispute that, in order to perfect a security interest in a liquor license, that interest must be recorded in the Division of Alcoholic Beverages in accordance with the provisions of section 561.65(4), Florida Statutes (1987). The issue in this case is whether a filing is also required under the Uniform Commercial Code, specifically, section 679.401, Florida Statutes (1987).
In In re Coed Shop, 435 F. Supp. 472 (N.D.Fla. 1977), that court held that a liquor license was a general intangible and, therefore, a Uniform Commercial Code filing was required to perfect a security interest in a liquor license. However, that case was decided before statutory provisions requiring a filing with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages was enacted. These provisions were enacted in 1981 and are now set forth in section 561.65(4)-(6), Florida Statutes (1987). The provisions include the steps to perfect a security interest in a license, how the lien is to be foreclosed, and a procedure for foreclosure sale, including the establishment of lien priorities. The statute reads as follows:
In re Seville Entertainment Complex, Inc., 79 B.R. 491 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1987), explained that the situation had changed since Coed Shop was decided. In Seville, the secured party had filed the necessary documents with the secretary of state under the Uniform Commercial Code to protect its security interest in an alcoholic beverage license. However, the secured party failed to file that security interest with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages in accordance with the provisions of section 561.65(4), Florida Statutes. The court in Seville noted that section 561.65(4), Florida Statutes, was clear and unambiguous, stating:
79 B.R.  at 492. The Internal Revenue Service argues that Seville requires a dual filing. We reject that argument because the question resolved by that court was whether filing was necessary with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages, not whether duplicate filing was essential to perfect a security interest.
We emphasize that a liquor license is not like other "general intangibles" because it is issued as a matter of privilege, not as a matter of right, by the government, and the government has total control of its use. Section 561.65(4)-(6) specifically provides that: (1) a filing with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages be made within ninety days of the date of creation of the lien; (2) it be filed with the Division on appropriate forms; (3) any foreclosure shall be in the circuit court in the county in which the beverage license is issued; and (4) the procedure for a foreclosure sale and the order of priority for the payment of the proceeds to lienholders, creditors, etc. This last provision gives priority to creditors who have paid taxes on goods sold to license holders.
In our view, it was not the legislature's intent to require a duplicate filing under the Uniform Commercial Code. If we were to so hold, it would require resolution of conflicts between the two statutes. We find this subsequent enactment of the legislature providing an express method to protect a security interest in a government-issued, regulated, and controlled liquor license was intended to provide the exclusive means of perfecting a lien on the license. Our holding in this regard is narrow, and we emphasize that it applies only to the liquor license itself.[1]
To hold that a duplicate filing is required, as sought by the Internal Revenue Service in this case, would not provide increased protection to creditors; it would merely require secured creditors to jump through another procedural hoop. We find no reason for such a procedural hoop, and such a construction would result in unnecessary confusion regarding the status of a secured lien and creditors' claims against a liquor license.
The certified question having been answered in the affirmative, we return the cause to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
[1]  This statute was never intended to apply to real estate, leases, goods, furniture, furnishings, equipment, good will, or other items that would be included as collateral for a security interest in a liquor business.