Title: Jefferson v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 040254
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2005

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
PAUL D. JEFFERSON 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
 
v.  Record No. 040254           January 14, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal in a criminal matter, the question is 
whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in affirming a 
circuit court's judgment that revoked a suspended sentence 
when the sentencing order was entered at the revocation 
hearing nunc pro tunc as of the date of the original 
sentencing hearing.  Finding no error, we will affirm the 
Court of Appeals' judgment. 
 
The pertinent facts are undisputed.  On January 5, 1999, 
defendant Paul D. Jefferson was convicted during a bench trial 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Colonial Heights of grand 
larceny.  At trial, defendant pled guilty to the charge, and 
the court determined the evidence was sufficient to find him 
guilty.  The court withheld sentencing pending receipt of a 
presentence report. 
 
On March 18, 1999, the court considered the presentence 
report and orally pronounced from the bench a sentence of 
incarceration for a term of 20 years, with 19 years, six 
months suspended upon certain conditions, including supervised 
 
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probation.  Although a written order memorializing that action 
was prepared, it was not signed or entered by the court at the 
time. 
 
Apparently, defendant served time in prison and commenced 
his supervised probation.  In February 2002, his probation 
officer notified the Colonial Heights Commonwealth's Attorney 
that defendant recently had been convicted in the Circuit 
Court of Dinwiddie County of obtaining money by false 
pretenses.  This notice resulted in the revocation proceeding 
from which this appeal arises. 
 
On September 5, 2002, a revocation hearing was conducted 
by the same judge who presided over defendant's criminal 
trial.  During the hearing, the judge realized he had not 
signed the draft of the sentencing order that was lodged in 
the court file.  Then, as suggested by the prosecutor, the 
court signed and entered the order nunc pro tunc March 18, 
1999. 
 
During the revocation hearing, defendant's attorney did 
not dispute that the nunc pro tunc order accurately set forth 
the proceedings as they occurred at the sentencing hearing on 
March 18, 1999.  Rather, counsel argued that it was improper 
to revoke probation for violation of a sentencing order that 
had not been entered at the time of the misconduct giving rise 
to the revocation proceeding. 
 
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The court overruled defendant's objection after offering 
defendant a continuance, which was declined.  The hearing 
proceeded, and the court revoked the probation, resuspended 
some of the sentence, and imposed one year for the defendant 
to serve.  From that judgment, the defendant appealed. 
 
Upon review, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's judgment in an unpublished 
memorandum opinion.  Jefferson v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2301-02-2 (January 13, 2004).  We awarded defendant this 
appeal. 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends he erroneously "was 
found in violation of a sentencing order never signed or 
entered" before the date of the revocation hearing.  He 
asserts that the terms of his suspended sentence had not been 
set at the time of the alleged misconduct, and that his 
suspended sentence was revoked "through a process that 
circumvented the necessary issuance of a written sentencing 
order." 
 
Also, defendant now argues that "there is inadequate 
proof in the record to establish the sentencing and terms of 
the sentence."  "Thus," he says, "there is inadequate proof 
that the sentencing order was properly entered nunc pro tunc." 
 
We disagree with defendant's contentions.  Initially, 
defendant will not now be heard to attack the correctness of 
 
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the nunc pro tunc sentencing order and to argue that it did 
not accurately set forth the proceedings as they occurred at 
the sentencing hearing on March 18, 1999.  He is procedurally 
barred from making the argument on appeal because it was not 
asserted in the circuit court.  Rule 5:25; Rule 5A:18. 
 
There being no cognizable dispute about the substantive 
accuracy of the nunc pro tunc order, the only question 
remaining is whether probation may be revoked based upon the 
provisions of such an order.  We answer that query in the 
affirmative. 
 
Preliminarily, we focus on the events of the sentencing 
hearing of March 18, 1999.  The rendition of a judgment must 
be distinguished from its entry on the court records.  The 
rendition of a judgment duly pronounced is the judicial act of 
the court, and the entry or recording of the instrument 
memorializing the judgment "does not constitute an integral 
part of, and should not be confused with, the judgment 
itself."  Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 617, 139 S.E.2d 114, 
117 (1964).  The absence of the judge's signature "does not 
invalidate the judgment rendered."  Id. at 617-18, 139 S.E.2d 
at 118.  Therefore, contrary to defendant's implicit 
contention, the judgment of conviction sentencing the 
defendant, pronounced on March 18, 1999, was a valid judicial 
act without the judge's signature on the draft order. 
 
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Parenthetically, we point out that the Rollins principle 
does not affect the rule that:  "A court speaks only through 
its orders."  Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 
S.E.2d 770, 773 (1964).  Accord Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 
148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996).  The foregoing statement deals 
with evidence of judicial action, that is, a declaration of 
historical fact.  The statement, however, does not purport to 
govern the substantive validity of the judicial act.  In the 
present case, the evidence of the written order entered at the 
September 5, 2002 revocation hearing (the court speaking 
through its order) shows substantively that the valid judicial 
act of sentencing was performed at the March 18, 1999 hearing. 
 
Next, we focus on the events during the revocation 
hearing of September 5, 2002.  A court has power to make an 
entry nunc pro tunc, in the exercise of its discretion, to 
correct the court's records so that they speak the truth.  
Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 293, 94 S.E.2d 245, 248 
(1956).  Accord Netzer v. Reynolds, 231 Va. 444, 449, 345 
S.E.2d 291, 294 (1986); Harris v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 205, 
209, 279 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1981); Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 
638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1979).  See Code § 8.01-428(B) 
(clerical mistakes and errors arising from oversight may be 
corrected in all judgments by the court at any time upon 
certain conditions). 
 
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In making such an entry, the court's power is restricted 
to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action that 
actually has been taken. "[T]he amendment or nunc pro tunc 
entry should not be made to supply an error of the court or to 
show what the court should have done as distinguished from 
what actually occurred."  Council, 198 Va. at 292, 94 S.E.2d 
at 248. 
 
In this case, because there is no issue that the record 
entry speaks the truth about what transpired at the sentencing 
hearing, the circuit court did not err in its action during 
the revocation hearing in entering the order nunc pro tunc and 
in making it the basis for revoking the defendant's suspended 
sentence. 
 
Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will 
be 
Affirmed.