Title: People v. Patterson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82711
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2000

Docket No. 82711-Agenda 1-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								AARON PATTERSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	 
	 JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Aaron Patterson, appeals from the trial court's
dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Because defendant was
sentenced to death for the underlying murder conviction, he
appeals directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
BACKGROUND
Procedural Background
	A jury in the circuit court of Cook County convicted
defendant of the murders of Vincent and Rafaela Sanchez.
Subsequently, the jury found that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude a sentence of death, and the trial court
sentenced defendant to death. Defendant appealed, and we
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. People v.
Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 (1992). The Supreme Court denied
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Patterson v. Illinois,
510 U.S. 879, 126 L. Ed. 2d 175, 114 S. Ct. 219 (1993).
	Thereafter, defendant filed a timely post-conviction petition.
The State moved to dismiss the petition, and the trial court granted
the State's motion. Defendant now appeals, arguing first that he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney
failed to (a) discover and present additional evidence to support
defendant's claim that his confession was coerced; (b) discover
and present evidence to support defendant's motion to reopen his
motion to suppress; (c) present evidence at trial that defendant's
confession was coerced; (d) present, during the post-trial
proceedings, new evidence relating to defendant's allegations of
torture; (e) supplement the record on direct appeal or seek a
remand; (f) interview witnesses who could have provided
exculpatory testimony; (g) cross-examine witnesses properly; (h)
seek to remove for cause the judge who presided over the pretrial
proceedings; (i) argue that the trial court did not ask the proper
questions during voir dire; (j) object to the use of residential
burglary as an eligibility and aggravating factor; and (k) object to
the trial court's praise of the jury. In addition, defendant argues
that (1) new evidence demonstrates that the trial court erred in
denying defendant's motion to suppress statements; (2) the State
knowingly used perjured testimony; (3) he was denied his right to
a fair trial when a police officer volunteered that defendant had
taken a polygraph; and (4) the State violated its duties under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963),
by failing to tender the results of fingerprint examinations.


Pretrial Proceedings


	In May 1986, defendant and Eric Caine were indicted for the
Sanchez murders. Their case originally was assigned to Judge
James Bailey. Defendant sought a substitution of judge. Rather
than randomly assigning a new judge, Judge Bailey assigned the
case to Judge Arthur Cieslik. Defendant moved to vacate the
assignment to Judge Cieslik, and that motion was denied.
Subsequently, defendant sought leave to file a writ of mandamus
ordering that the case be assigned randomly. This court denied
defendant's motion.
	Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements
that he had made while in police custody. After a hearing, the trial
court denied that motion. Defendant's attorney then filed a
renewed motion to suppress statements or to reopen the evidence.
The crux of defendant's argument in his motions was that, to
obtain defendant's confession, the police officers struck him,
attempted to suffocate him, and threatened him with a gun. The
trial court, Judge John Morrissey(1) presiding, denied that motion.
Thereafter, defendant and Caine were simultaneously tried before
separate juries.
Defendant's Trial
	The evidence at defendant's trial established that, on April 19,
1986, Chicago police officers discovered the victims' badly
decomposed bodies in the Sanchez home. The police were called
when Wayne Washington, a teenager who routinely performed odd
jobs for Vincent, discovered that the Sanchezes' door was open
and that there was blood on the floor. Washington told the police
that he had seen Caine and DeEdward White across from the
Sanchez house.
	The police took White into custody to question him about the
Sanchez murders. Subsequently, Marva Hall, White's 16-year-old
cousin, told the police that defendant had offered to sell her a
chain saw and a shotgun. Defendant had claimed that he obtained
the items from two elderly Mexicans that he had stabbed to death.
Under cross-examination, Hall admitted that she had told a
defense investigator that defendant had not told her that he had
committed the murders. She explained, however, that she told the
investigator this only because she was scared of defendant.
	Several days after Hall spoke with the police, defendant was
arrested on an unrelated charge. Detective James Pienta testified
that, when he learned that defendant had been arrested, he
questioned him about the Sanchez murders. Defendant told Pienta
that Caine had approached defendant and said that he needed guns.
Defendant and Caine knew that the Sanchezes had guns. They
reached the house by traveling down the Illinois Central railroad
tracks. Once at the house, defendant waited in the garage while
Caine entered the house. Shortly thereafter, Caine came running
out with a shotgun in a duffle bag, and the two fled.
	When Pienta asked defendant to elaborate, defendant added
that he had entered the Sanchez house and "came up like-up like
a straight up Ninja" and "shanked" the "old man" because he was
taking too much time to get the "good stuff." Rafaela began
screaming so defendant "shanked" her too. Thereafter, defendant
repeated the same story to Pienta and Assistant State's Attorney
Kip Owen. At this time, defendant also stated that he had thrown
the knife away on the railroad tracks. Although the police searched
the railroad tracks for the knife, they never discovered it.
	Former Assistant State's Attorney Peter Troy testified that
defendant told him that Caine, Michael Arbuckle, "Cochise,"
"Rambo," and defendant went on a "mission" to the Sanchez
home to retrieve guns and drugs. The remainder of defendant's
statement to Troy was consistent with his original statement to
Pienta. Troy reduced this statement to writing, but defendant
refused to sign it.
	An assistant medical examiner testified that both victims died
of stab wounds and that both had defense wounds. An expert in
fingerprint identification testified that both a palmprint and a
fingerprint recovered from the scene belonged to Vincent. A
second fingerprint, recovered from a tape recorder, did not belong
to Vincent, Rafaela, Wayne Washington, Willie Washington,
Arbuckle, Caine, or defendant.
	Detective William Marley testified for defendant that, after
hearing defendant's statement, Owen wanted the police to perform
additional investigation before he would authorize the filing
charges against defendant. Carlton Ford testified that he, Steve
Weathersby, and defendant were driving around in late April 1986,
trying to sell a saw Weathersby owned. Ford testified that they saw
Hall that day and asked her if she knew anyone who would want
the saw. Ford also testified that there were no guns in the car.
Defendant's former girlfriend testified that she was with defendant
on the night of April 17, the night that the State contends that the
Sanchezes were murdered.
Post-Conviction Proceedings
	This court affirmed defendant's sentence and conviction on
direct appeal. Defendant then filed a post-conviction petition,
relying largely on evidence that numerous other people had made
allegations similar to defendant's about police brutality at Area 2.
In particular, defendant relied on a report from the police
department's office of professional standards (OPS). This report
found that the abuse of prisoners at Area 2 was systemic. After
allowing defendant to amend his petition, the trial court granted
the State's motion to dismiss. In dismissing the petition, the trial
court stated that "any nexus between Area 2 Chicago Police
Department Headquarters' alleged systemic torture of people and
Aaron Patterson is highly tenuous at best." Defendant
subsequently appealed.


ANALYSIS


Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	Defendant first raises several arguments as to how he was
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. To support a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege facts
demonstrating that his attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068-69 (1984). A defendant must satisfy both prongs
of the Strickland test; thus the failure to satisfy either prong
precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v.
Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 332 (1998). Because the trial court
dismissed defendant's petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing, we review that dismissal de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998).


Failure to Discover and Present Evidence to Support
Defendant's Claim of Torture


	Defendant, who was represented by several different attorneys
before his trial, asserts that each of these attorneys, along with his
trial counsel and his post-trial counsel, was ineffective for failing
to properly discover and present evidence that (1) Area 2
Lieutenant Jon Burge, who defendant alleges participated in
torturing him, has a documented pattern of leading and
participating in similar acts of torture; (2) Burge and the detectives
who served under him had contemporaneously beaten and abused
other suspects and witnesses in defendant's case; and (3)
defendant suffered psychological injury from the torture.
Defendant also contends that his direct appeal counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the ineffectiveness claim with
respect to his pretrial and trial counsel.
	Defendant asserts that Luther Hicks, who represented
defendant on his motion to suppress, was aware both of the details
of defendant's torture allegations and that a red-haired officer
along with Detectives Pienta, Marley, Daniel McWeeny, and
Raymond Madigan were involved.
	Defendant alleges that Hicks should have discovered that the
red-haired officer was Burge. Further, Hicks should have
discovered that his supervisor was representing Andrew Wilson
and that Wilson had raised similar torture allegations against
Burge. Moreover, defendant contends that Hicks should have
questioned other assistant public defenders to determine if their
cases involved similar torture allegations at Area 2. Defendant
concludes that, had Hicks properly conducted this investigation,
he would have discovered almost 50 other victims of torture at
Area 2.
	Further, defendant asserts that Hicks should have discovered
that Burge had actively participated in a "systemic policy and
practice of torture" while at Area 2 and was involved in at least 50
incidents while he was there. Moreover, he claims that Hicks
should have discovered that Pienta had been involved in prior acts
of beating while working with Burge. After the other officers had
finished, McWeeney would often act as the "good cop" who
would help the prisoner if he would cooperate.
	The problem with defendant's argument is that much of the
information relating to other allegations of torture would simply
not have been discoverable by Hicks at the time of the suppression
hearing in 1987. At approximately the same time that defendant's
case was proceeding, defendant's current attorney, G. Flint Taylor,
Jr., was representing Wilson in a federal suit against the City of
Chicago, Burge, and other officers. Notwithstanding the fact that
Taylor had available to him the full panoply of the civil discovery
process, he did not discover the vast majority of the information
upon which defendant now relies until February 1989, two years
after Hicks filed defendant's motion to suppress. Moreover, Taylor
discovered the information relating to the other allegations of
torture only because he was assisted by an anonymous police
department informant.
	Additionally, beyond interviewing anyone who had ever been
a prisoner at Area 2, we can conceive of no manner in which
Hicks reasonably could have obtained this information. At the
time, the OPS had no reports indicating that several other people
had been tortured. Defendant has identified no other available
source that could provide this information.
	After reviewing defendant's allegations and considering the
facts that were known when Hicks filed the motion to suppress, we
will not find Hicks ineffective for failing to discover information
that only an informant could provide. Because defense counsel
would not have discovered this information, defendant was not
prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate.
	Defendant also alleges that Hicks should have investigated
other contemporaneous allegations of torture from Caine,
Arbuckle, and Illya Rowland. To support his claim with respect to
Caine, defendant attaches Caine's original and amended motions
to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of
his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency,
that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in
the stomach, and that he was intoxicated when he gave his
statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the
officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct
similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence
indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or
that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis
upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to
defendant's claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312
(1994) (holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was
inadmissible, in part, because it was not similar to the allegations
made by defendant).
	Rowland's affidavit alleges that the officers told him to
implicate defendant, but it does not assert that the officers
mistreated him. Arbuckle, in his affidavit, states that an Area 2
lieutenant (whom he later identified as Burge) threatened him. He
does not allege, however, that Burge or any other officer used
physical coercion. His allegations are limited to asserting that the
officers verbally threatened him. Because these allegations are
quite different from defendant's, we are unable to conclude that
they are relevant to defendant's claim. See Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d  at
312.
	After reviewing the evidence submitted by defendant, we are
unable to conclude that defendant has demonstrated that, had
Hicks interviewed these witnesses, a reasonable probability exists
that the result of the suppression hearing would have been
different.
	As for defendant's claim about evidence of a psychological
injury, defendant has not explained why Hicks would request a
psychiatric examination of defendant. Defendant has not alleged
that he told Hicks that the torture caused him psychological
damage. Moreover, defendant has not alleged that any of his
actions would have placed Hicks on notice that defendant had
suffered a psychological injury. Without some evidence that would
indicate to Hicks that defendant had suffered a psychological
injury, we are unable to conclude that Hicks acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner when he failed to secure a
psychiatric examination of defendant.
	Defendant also alleges that Hicks was ineffective in his
presentation of hearsay evidence during defendant's motion to
suppress. At the motion, Hicks sought to introduce etchings made
by defendant in the interrogation room after he had been
interrogated. Photographs that Hicks sought to introduce revealed
the following etchings on the bench in the interrogation room:
			"I lied about murders police threatened me with
violence slapped and suffocated me with plastic-no
phone-no dad signed false statement to murders (Tonto)
Aaron."
			"Sign false statements to murder, Tonto on statements
is code word Aaron."
Additionally, the photographs revealed the phrase "Aaron lied"
etched in the door of the room.
	During the motion to suppress, Hicks argued that the etchings
were admissible under various exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
trial court rejected Hicks' argument. On appeal, defense counsel
argued that the statements were admissible (1) as spontaneous
declarations, (2) as prior consistent statements, and (3) under the
doctrines of curative admissibility or completeness. This court
rejected each of those claims. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 452-54.
	Defendant now claims that his trial and appellate attorneys
were ineffective because they advanced the wrong arguments.
Defendant explains that the etchings were admissible at the motion
to suppress not because they fell within an exception to the
hearsay rule but because hearsay is admissible at pretrial hearings
in which the trial court is determining the admissibility of
evidence.
	The appellate court has recognized that hearsay evidence is
admissible during a motion to suppress, even though it is not
admissible at trial. People v. Lesure, 271 Ill. App. 3d 679, 680
(1995). Moreover, federal law supports defendant's argument.
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides, in relevant part,
"Preliminary questions concerning *** the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court ***. In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges." (Emphasis added.) Fed. R. Evid.
104(a). The Supreme Court has explained that no automatic rule
precludes the admission of hearsay when a trial court is
determining the admissibility of evidence. United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 252, 94 S. Ct. 988,
995 (1974); see also United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th
Cir. 1975) (holding that "it is clear that hearsay evidence is
admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress").
	After reviewing the cases cited by defendant, we agree with
defendant that they support his contention that hearsay evidence
is admissible during a hearing on a motion to suppress. That,
however, is not sufficient to grant defendant relief on his claim.
Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, had this evidence been presented, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. Given the context of
defendant's claim, that means that he must demonstrate that a
reasonable probability exists that, had his appellate attorney
argued on appeal that Hicks was ineffective, this court would have
agreed. To do so, this court would have had to reach the
conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that, had the
etchings been introduced as admissible hearsay, the trial court
would have concluded that defendant's confession should have
been suppressed. With this conclusion, we cannot agree.
	When Hicks presented the pictures of the etchings during the
motion to suppress, the trial court, in addition to excluding them
from evidence as hearsay, specifically found that it did not believe
that defendant had established that the etchings in the pictures
were in the same condition as the etchings were when defendant
allegedly made them. Moreover, the trial court twice stated that it
believed that the etchings were not relevant to the motion to
suppress.
	As noted by the Court in Matlock, although hearsay may be
admissible during motions to suppress, the trial court is entitled to
"give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel."
Matlock, 415 U.S.  at 175, 39 L. Ed. 2d  at 252, 94 S. Ct.  at 995.
Here, we know exactly how much weight the trial court would
have given it, had the court considered it: none. While this
conclusion is by no means binding on any subsequent trier of fact,
it is sufficient to allow us to conclude that, even if Hicks had
argued that the etchings were admissible hearsay, no reasonable
probability exists that defendant's confession would have been
suppressed.
Failure to Investigate, Present, and Preserve Evidence During
the Motion to Suppress Statements or Reopen the Motion to
Suppress
	Defendant next contends that when Brian Dosch, the attorney
who succeeded Hicks, sought to reopen the motion to suppress, he
erred because he failed to (1) inform the court that the red-haired
officer was Burge and that Burge supervised and participated in
the policy and practice of torture at Area 2; (2) inform the court of
the similarities between defendant's allegations of torture and
Wilson's allegations; (3) document the other claims of torture by
filing the "proffer"(2) prepared by Wilson's civil attorneys; and (4)
subpoena Burge's record from the OPS. Defendant also alleges
that Dale Coventry, Dosch's supervisor, failed to inform Dosch
both of the similarity between defendant's allegations of torture
and the allegations raised by Wilson, Melvin Jones, and of the
actions of Burge, Pienta, and McWeeny.
Allegations Relating to Coventry
	With respect to the allegations relating to Coventry, defendant
has cited no rule of law, and we are aware of none, that holds that
the defendant's attorney's supervisor owes a constitutional duty to
the defendant. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that
Coventry owed defendant a constitutional obligation, we must
agree that the trial court properly dismissed the claims with respect
to Coventry.
Defendant's Identification of Burge as the Red-Haired Officer
	As to the claims involving Dosch, defendant does not explain
how Dosch's identification of Burge as the red-haired officer
would have affected either the trial court's ruling on the motion or
this court's decision on appeal. Notably, on direct appeal, this
court held that, although the red-haired officer was a material
witness, it was within the trial court's discretion not to require that
the officer be called. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 450. Defendant has
failed to explain why a reasonable probability exists that, had
either this court or the trial court known the identity of the red-haired officer, either court would have ruled differently.
Accordingly, this claim must fail.
Similarities Between Defendant's Allegations and Wilson's
Allegations
	Next, defendant claims that counsel erred by failing to inform
the court of the similarities between defendant's and Wilson's
torture allegations. Counsel could be ineffective for failing to
introduce this evidence only if it would have been admissible at
defendant's motion to suppress. Evidence is admissible if it is
relevant to an issue in dispute and if its prejudicial effect does not
substantially outweigh its probative value. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (1991). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency
to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d  at 487-88. Probability
is tested in the light of logic, experience, and accepted assumption
as to human behavior. Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill. 2d 125, 128
(1966).
	In past cases, this court has declined to find evidence of prior
police brutality to be relevant when the defendant offered only
generalized allegations of coercive activity at Area 2 (People v.
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 150-51 (1995)) and when the allegations
of brutality were not similar and occurred three years before the
case at bar (Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d at 312).
	The appellate court has found evidence of prior brutality
admissible when the allegations were similar and involved the
same officers, the incidents occurred only 13 months apart, and
both the prior allegations and the allegations in the case before the
court contained evidence of injury consistent with police brutality.
People v. Banks, 192 Ill. App. 3d 986, 994 (1989). The appellate
court also has found evidence of prior allegations of brutality
admissible where the defendant could present evidence that "the
police officers who questioned him systematically tortured other
suspects to obtain confessions at or near the time he was
questioned." People v. Cannon, 293 Ill. App. 3d 634, 640 (1997).
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
has found evidence of prior allegations of brutality admissible
when it involves the same officer, involves similar methods of
torture, and occurs at or near the time of the current allegation.
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1993).
	Here, the State contends that the evidence of prior allegations
of torture is inadmissible because defendant has failed to
demonstrate that he suffered physical injuries consistent with his
allegations of torture. Although we believe that this is a relevant
consideration, we do not believe that the absence of physical
injury, standing alone, precludes evidence of prior acts of brutality
from being admissible. See Cannon, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 642.
	Here, defendant testified at his suppression hearing that, when
he was being transported to Area 2, he was in a car with Marley,
Pedersen, Pienta, and James Hill, a friend of defendant. During
this trip, Pienta reached across defendant and slapped Hill across
the face. After doing this, Pienta turned to defendant and stated
that, if he had been the officer who had found defendant,
defendant would now be dead. Later, when the officers were
interrogating defendant at the police station, Pienta said to the
other officers in the room, "I don't know about the rest of you, but
I am tired of listening to this bullshit, I am about ready to kick his
ass."
	Pienta then left the room and returned with four other officers.
Pienta was carrying a manila folder and a gray plastic item, later
identified as a typewriter cover. Thereafter, Pienta handcuffed
defendant's hands behind his back. Another officer turned off the
lights, and Pienta slapped defendant across the chest and placed
his hands around defendant's neck. Pedersen then grabbed the
typewriter cover and placed it over defendant's face. Defendant
testified that he could not breathe when the typewriter cover was
over his face. Also, when the typewriter cover was over his face,
the other officers hit him in the chest.
	After approximately one minute, the officers removed the
typewriter cover and turned the lights back on. Defendant then
requested to speak to an attorney. Pienta replied, "No, you are not
getting an m.f. attorney." The officers then asked defendant if he
was ready to cooperate. He told them that he had said all that he
was going to say. The officers again turned the lights off and
placed the typewriter cover over defendant's face. After
approximately one to two minutes, the officers removed the
typewriter cover and turned the lights on.
	Subsequently, defendant requested something to drink, and an
officer gave him a plastic cup containing a brown liquid. The
officer told defendant that the cup contained bourbon. The officers
then told him that he was to tell an assistant State's Attorney that
he killed the victims. The officers left him alone for approximately
one hour. During that time, defendant used a paper clip to scratch
a statement into the bench on which he was sitting. An assistant
State's Attorney then arrived with a red-haired officer, later
identified as Burge. After Burge left, pursuant to defendant's
request, defendant told the assistant State's Attorney that he
wanted an attorney and that he had nothing to say. Thereafter, the
assistant State's Attorney left. Burge then entered the room and sat
across from defendant.
	After taking a seat, Burge told defendant, "You are fucking
up." Defendant did not respond, and Burge said, "We told you if
you didn't do it-if you didn't do what we told you to do that you
was going to get something worse than what you had earlier. And
what you had earlier will be a snap compared to what you will
get." Burge then placed his revolver on the table and asked,
"[Y]ou are going to cooperate now, right?" Defendant's only reply
was to request an attorney. Burge then said, "[Y]ou know, that we
[sic] just doing our job and this is nothing new to you, you know,
the way we go about doing things around here, you know. If you
decide to tell us that, it is your word against our word. And who
are they going to believe you or us." Burge then holstered his
revolver and left the room.
	After that, Troy entered the room and told defendant that he
was going to write a statement that defendant was to sign.
Defendant said that he would sign the statement if Troy allowed
him to make a phone call. Troy agreed. Defendant called an
attorney and his grandmother. Troy took him to the interview
room and asked defendant to sign the statement. After defendant
refused to sign the statement, Troy left.
	McWeeny then entered the room and told defendant that he
was trying to help defendant and that defendant should cooperate
because "they could do something serious" to defendant if he
failed to cooperate. When defendant continued to refuse to sign the
statement, the officers had defendant shower and they placed him
in a cell.
	The allegations made by Wilson are similar in some respects
to those made by defendant. Wilson has testified that he was
punched, kicked, and smothered with a plastic bag. He has also
claimed that he was electrically shocked and forced against a hot
radiator. Additionally, Wilson has testified that Burge placed a
revolver in Wilson's mouth when Burge was alone in the room
with Wilson. Although both defendant and Wilson alleged that
numerous officers were involved, the only officers that both
included in their allegations were Burge and Pienta.
	We first note that defendant's allegations and Wilson's
allegations are not closely related in time. Wilson was arrested in
February 1982. Defendant was arrested in April 1986. Thus, more
than four years passed between the two occurrences. We
recognize, however, that both defendant and Wilson alleged that
they had been punched, kicked, and suffocated with a plastic bag.
Moreover, Burge, while alone with each of them, used a revolver
as a threat.
	Notwithstanding these similarities, we do not believe that a
reasonable probability exists that, had defense counsel informed
the trial court of these similarities, the trial court would have found
this evidence admissible or that we would have reversed this
decision on appeal. As noted earlier, the Wilson incident occurred
more than four years before the incident involving defendant.
Additionally, at the time of defendant's trial, Wilson believed that
he was tortured not because officers at Area 2 routinely tortured
all suspects, but rather because the officers routinely tortured those
accused of killing police officers. See Wilson, 6 F.3d  at 1236.
	Because the information available at the time indicated that
Wilson was mistreated for a reason wholly unrelated to
defendant's case, and because the evidence identified only a single
incident of misconduct removed in time from defendant's, we
believe that the evidence is too attenuated to be relevant.
Accordingly defendant's attorney was not ineffective for failing to
inform the court of the similarities between defendant's and
Wilson's torture allegations.
Failure to Introduce Plaintiff's Proffer
	Defendant next contends that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to document the other allegations of torture by introducing
the proffer prepared by Wilson's civil attorneys. The proffer is a
12-page document detailing various allegations of torture by Burge
and his associates during the years 1972 through 1984. In his
affidavit, Dosch admits that he had the proffer before he sought to
reopen defendant's motion to suppress.
	After examining the proffer, we do not believe that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to provide it to the trial court.
The proffer is a summary of evidence prepared by Wilson's civil
attorneys for Wilson's civil trials. We have previously recognized
that documents prepared in anticipation of litigation "generally
lack the earmarks of trustworthiness and reliability." People v.
Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 73 (1990); see also 725 ILCS 5/115-5(c)(2)
(West 1998). The plaintiff's proffer is nothing more than 12 pages
of unreliable hearsay. Consequently, we are unable to conclude
that, even if this proffer had been presented to the trial court, a
reasonable probability exists that the court would have either
reopened the hearing or suppressed defendant's statements.
Failure to Subpoena Burge's OPS Records
	Defendant next contends that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to subpoena Burge's OPS records. Defendant, however,
never explains what information was contained within Burge's
OPS records that would have assisted him in convincing the trial
court to reopen the hearing on the motion to suppress or to grant
defendant's motion. Without this information, we have no basis to
conclude that a reasonable probability exists that, had defense
counsel subpoenaed the records, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.


Failure to Introduce at Trial Evidence That Defendant's
Confession Was Coerced


	Defendant next contends that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to introduce evidence that his confession was coerced.
Defendant contends that this error was particularly damaging
because, during opening statements, defense counsel promised to
present evidence that defendant's statement was coerced.
	Defendant could have raised this issue on direct appeal.
Because he failed to do so, the issue is waived. See People v.
Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). Defendant also argues,
however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise this issue on direct appeal. Consequently, we will review the
underlying claim. See People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999).
	Dosch's affidavit reveals that he chose not to have defendant
testify that his confession was coerced or to present other evidence
to corroborate defendant's torture allegations because he believed
that reversible error had occurred earlier during the trial when one
of the State's witnesses, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), commented on
defendant's post-arrest silence. Unfortunately for defendant, this
court did not agree with counsel's assessment of the Doyle
violation. Although this court agreed that a Doyle violation had
occurred, the court held that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 467-68.
	We recognize that a mistake as to the law can be a basis for
finding that an attorney was ineffective. See People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 18 (1986) (holding that an attorney was ineffective for
failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense because he did
not understand the elements). Here, however, counsel's error lies
not in believing that the State had committed reversible error, but
rather in deciding that, because of the error, he should not present
the defense that he had promised to present.
	Significantly, neither the State nor Dosch has ever explained
what about the Doyle violation would have made defendant's
testimony less credible than it would have been had the Doyle
violation not occurred. Because the Doyle violation did not
undermine, in any manner, defendant's defense, we fail to
understand what about this Doyle violation would lead a
reasonable attorney to conclude that he need not present the
defense that he has already promised the jury that he will present.
We also fail to see what strategy would lead Dosch to conclude
that it would be best to pin defendant's chance for success on the
possibility of a reversal and remandment for a new trial rather than
attempting to obtain an acquittal. Consequently, we believe that
defendant has pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that
counsel's decision not to present this defense fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
	We now decide whether this failure to present a defense
prejudiced defendant. As noted above, to demonstrate prejudice,
a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068-69. Notably, this standard does not require a
defendant to demonstrate that counsel's conduct more likely than
not altered the outcome in the case. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 693, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 697, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. Instead, a reasonable
probability "is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	The evidence identifying defendant as the perpetrator
consisted of (1) the oft-changing testimony of a teenager whose
cousin had been a suspect in the crime; and (2) the testimony from
the police officers and assistant State's Attorneys concerning
defendant's confession.
	The promised defense would have consisted of defendant's
testimony consistent with the testimony he provided at the motion
to suppress. In his brief, defendant also contends that he could
have introduced other evidence corroborating this testimony. The
State raises numerous objections to this other testimony. Without
deciding the effect of the other testimony, we believe that
defendant has pleaded sufficient facts to undermine confidence in
the jury's verdict.
	The evidence against defendant consisted essentially of the
testimony of police officers and assistant State's Attorneys stating
that defendant had confessed. During opening statements,
defendant's attorney told the jury that they would hear evidence
that defendant confessed only because the police beat him up and
tried to suffocate him with a plastic bag. Notwithstanding this
promise, defense counsel chose to present no such evidence.
Although we are unable to conclude that, absent this failure, the
result of the proceeding would have been different, we have no
need to reach such a conclusion. See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. We need only determine
that a reasonable probability exists that, had the evidence been
present, the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068-69. We are, of
course, unable to divine the course the jury would have taken if it
had heard this evidence, but we believe that, under the factual
circumstances of this case, the evidence is of such import that our
confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined.
	In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that we are
determining only that defendant has pleaded sufficient facts to
enable him to obtain an evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the
trial court may conclude that defendant had demonstrated that his
attorney was ineffective. On the other hand, the trial court may
determine that the attorney had a previously undisclosed but
objectively reasonable basis for failing to present defendant's
testimony or that defendant's testimony is not so compelling as to
undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. That, however, is a
question to be answered in the trial court.


Failure of Post-Trial Counsel to Present Newly Discovered
Evidence of Torture Allegations


	Following defendant's conviction, Dosch sought to continue
the date for filing a post-trial motion until after the trial transcripts
were completed. The trial court denied the motion, and Dosch
failed to file a post-judgment motion. Subsequently, this court
remanded the action for the filing of a post-trial motion.
Thereafter, in an arrangement with the office of the State
Appellate Defender, Joan Kubalanza, an attorney with Foley &amp;
Lardner who normally handled commercial litigation, assumed
primary responsibility for handling defendant's post-trial motion
and appeal.
	Defendant now contends that, before Kubalanza filed her
motion, she knew that (1) Burge was the red-haired officer; (2) a
federal jury had found a policy and practice of torture and abuse
by Area 2 detectives; and (3) the City of Chicago had held public
hearings at which acts of torture and abuse by Burge had been
detailed. Defendant also claims that Kubalanza had access to (1)
trial counsel's file containing Wilson's proffer and information
concerning Caine and Arbuckle, who could corroborate
defendant's testimony; (2) an article from the Chicago Reader
documenting torture by Burge and other Area 2 detectives; and (3)
an OPS report finding that physical and psychological abuse was
systemic and methodical in Area 2 from 1973 through 1986.
Defendant asserts that, if Kubalanza had introduced this new
evidence, the trial court would have granted defendant's motion
for a new trial.
	For new evidence to be sufficient to grant a defendant a new
trial, the evidence (1) must be of such a conclusive character that
it will probably change the result on retrial; (2) must be material
but not merely cumulative; and (3) must have been discovered
since trial and be of such character that the defendant in the
exercise of due diligence could not have discovered it earlier.
People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 134 (1984). Because
defendant's claim is based upon a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, he must demonstrate that Kubalanza's failure to
introduce this evidence fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for counsel's error, a reasonable
probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068-69.
	Turning to the facts that defendant contends Kubalanza
should have introduced, we can easily discard some of them. The
fact that Burge was the red-haired officer and the facts contained
within trial counsel's file were facts that were not "new." Not only
could they have reasonably been discovered earlier, they were. The
article from the Chicago Reader is simply a newspaper article, and
as such is essentially a collection of hearsay statements. Defendant
fails to explain why this hearsay would have been admissible for
any purpose. With respect to the hearings, defendant does not
explain what information was revealed at those hearings that
would have required the trial court to order a new trial.
	Turning to the OPS report, we note that defendant concedes
that the report was not public at the time Kubalanza filed
defendant's post-trial motion. Defendant contends, however, that
the report could have been obtained by subpoena. Defendant,
however, never explains why Kubalanza should have known that
the OPS report existed. Without some explanation of why
Kubalanza should have known that the OPS report existed, we will
not find that Kubalanza's actions fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Kubalanza could not reasonably have been
expected to engage in a fishing expedition by serving subpoenas
on the Chicago police department. This is particularly true given
that, just before defendant's trial, Dosch had subpoenaed records
from the OPS and the trial court found that the records that OPS
delivered were not relevant to the litigation.
	That leaves only the fact that a federal jury had found that
Area 2 detectives had a policy and practice of torture and abuse.
The evidence defendant relies on here is from the first Wilson civil
trial. In that case, the jury found that Wilson's civil rights were
violated. However, the jury also exonerated all of the individual
officers, including Burge. Moreover, the finding with respect to
the policy and practice of abuse was a finding that "the City of
Chicago had a de facto policy authorizing its police officers
physically to abuse persons suspected of having killed or injured
a police officer." (Emphasis added.) Wilson, 6 F.3d  at 1236.
	After examining this evidence, we are unable to conclude that
a reasonable probability exists that, had Kubalanza presented this
in defendant's post-trial motion, the trial court would have
concluded that the evidence was of such a character that it would
likely change the result on retrial. First, the jury verdict implicated
no officer at all, let alone any officer identified by defendant.
Second, the jury's finding, and Wilson's theory of the case, was
that Area 2 detectives tortured defendants that they believed had
killed or injured police officers. Here, the victims were not police
officers. Thus, any probative value that the jury's verdict in the
Wilson case might have is weakened to the point of irrelevancy.
Consequently, we are unable to conclude that Kubalanza rendered
the ineffective assistance of counsel when she prepared and
presented defendant's post-trial motion.


Failure of Appellate Counsel to Supplement the Record on
Direct Appeal or Seek a Remand


	Defendant next contends that Kubalanza was ineffective when
she represented him on appeal. Specifically, he alleges that, by the
time she filed his appellate brief, she (1) had obtained the OPS
report finding a systemic pattern and practice of torture at Area 2;
(2) had obtained an OPS report finding that Burge had tortured
Wilson and recommending that Burge be fired; and (3) knew that
the police board was holding public hearings at which Shadeed
Mumin, Wilson, and Melvin Jones testified about acts of torture
that "closely paralleled" the acts described by defendant.
Defendant contends that Kubalanza should have either sought to
supplement the record with this information or sought a remand to
the trial court for a hearing on these issues.
	Supreme Court Rule 329 (134 Ill. 2d R. 329) permits a party
to amend the record on appeal to correct "[m]aterial omissions,"
"inaccuracies," or "improper authentication." Rule 329 is not a
vehicle through which a party may supplement a record with
evidence that was not presented in the lower court. People v.
Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 94 (1988). Because the evidence defendant
now relies upon was not presented in the lower court, no
reasonable probability exists that, had a motion to supplement
been made, that it would have been granted.
	Turning to defendant's assertion that Kubalanza should have
filed a motion for remand, we are unable to conclude that
Kubalanza's failure to file such a motion fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Although such a motion is not
necessarily improper, defendant has not identified a single statute,
court rule, or case that authorizes such a motion. Because of this,
we are unable to conclude that Kubalanza's failure to file the
motion was objectively unreasonable.
	 
Failure to Interview Other Witnesses
	Defendant next contends that his trial attorneys were
ineffective for failing to interview and present witnesses that were
identified in the police and medical examiner's reports. These
witnesses included Ophelia Loy, Willie Washington, Mack Ray,
and Rowland.
	The State contends that, because the issue could have been
raised on direct appeal, defendant has waived his claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Loy. See Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d  at 428. Although this is true, defendant argues that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on
direct appeal. Consequently, we will review the underlying claim.
See West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435.
	Defendant contends that Loy's testimony would have
impeached the reliability of the unsigned statement admitted
against him. Loy, the victims' neighbor, reportedly saw one of the
victims raking grass on April 18, 1986, at 3 p.m. In defendant's
statement, however, he states that he had killed the victims during
the early morning hours of April 18.
	The State asserts that defense counsel did not have Loy testify
as a matter of trial strategy because her testimony would have
directly contradicted defendant's theory as to the victims' time of
death. After reviewing the evidence, we agree with the State's
assessment. During trial, defense counsel sought to establish that
the victims had died before the time mentioned in defendant's
confession. Loy, however, would have testified that the victims
died after the time indicated in defendant's confession. Because
Loy's testimony would have directly contradicted defendant's
theory relating to the time of death, we believe that counsel's
decision not to call Loy was a matter of trial strategy and did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
	Defendant next asserts that his attorneys should have
interviewed Willie Washington because he was a suspect in the
Sanchez murders, he was identified in police reports as the person
who killed the Sanchezes, and his brother Wayne knew the victims
and discovered the bodies. Defendant contends that, if counsel had
interviewed Washington, he would have learned that Washington
lived near the victims and that the victims would open the door for
him.
	Defendant also contends that defense counsel should have
interviewed Ray, who was reported in a police report to have told
the police that Willie Washington had recruited him to rob the
Sanchezes. According to Ray's affidavit, if defense counsel had
interviewed him, counsel would have learned that Ray, along with
Willie and Wayne Washington, stole merchandise to sell to the
Sanchezes. On several occasions, the Washington brothers asked
Ray if he wanted to help them rob the Sanchezes. Ray declined
each time.
	Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective for
failing to interview Rowland. Defendant asserts that counsel
should have interviewed Rowland because police reports indicate
that defendant was at Rowland's house just before the murders.
Moreover, Rowland told Madigan that Ray had told him that
Willie Washington had tried to recruit Ray to rob the Sanchezes
and that defendant was with his girlfriend at the time of the
murders.
	The State first argues that defendant has waived his right to
challenge counsel's failure to interview and present the testimony
of Washington, Ray, and Rowland. We must disagree. The
evidentiary basis of the claims relating to these witnesses
necessarily rests upon evidence that was de hors the direct appeal
record. See People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 372 (1996).
Here, Ray and Rowland have provided affidavits as to what their
testimony would have been and one of defendant's attorneys who
interviewed Washington in prison has filed an affidavit revealing
what Washington told him during the interview.
	After examining the affidavits, we are unable to conclude that
defendant has demonstrated that, had he introduced this testimony,
a reasonable probability exists that he would have been found not
guilty. Ray, an admitted drug user who was in custody on a
burglary charge, would have been able to testify only that the
Washingtons had asked him if he wanted to rob the Sanchezes.
Ray had no information that either or both Washington brothers
actually had committed the crime, and he was unable to identify
with any specificity the time when they suggested robbing the
Sanchezes. Rowland's testimony is nothing more than hearsay that
repeats Ray's vague testimony. Finally, the information provided
by Washington adds nothing of substance. After reviewing these
affidavits, we are unable to conclude that, had counsel interviewed
these witnesses and presented this evidence, a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been
different.
Failure to Cross-Examine Witnesses Properly
	Defendant next asserts that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to cross-examine Hall properly. In particular, he asserts that
counsel failed to perfect impeachment relating to (1) where Hall
saw the shotgun defendant tried to sell her; and (2) what day
defendant tried to sell her the shotgun.
	The crux of defendant's argument concerns counsel's failure
to impeach Hall with her testimony before the grand jury.
Defendant, however, did not attach Hall's grand jury testimony to
his post-conviction petition. Without this evidence attached to his
petition, defendant's claim must fail. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West
1998); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 414 (1999).
	The other issues defendant raises all involve a failure to cross-examine or perfect impeachment with respect to certain police
reports. Defendant does not assert that these records were de hors
the record on direct appeal. Consequently, we find these issues
waived. See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 428; Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at
372.
Failure to Seek Removal of Judge Cieslik for Cause
	Defendant asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to seek removal of Judge Cieslik for cause and that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on
appeal.
	Defendant's action was originally assigned to Judge Bailey.
Defendant's attorney, Thomas Bomba, sought a substitution as a
matter of right (see 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 1998)). When that
motion was granted, Judge Bailey, rather than sending the case to
the office of the chief judge for random reassignment, assigned the
case to Judge Cieslik. Bomba moved to vacate the case
assignment, and Judge Cieslik denied that motion. Subsequently,
defendant sought leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus or
a supervisory order with this court. This court denied defendant's
motion.
	Defendant could have raised this issue on direct appeal.
Because he failed to do so, the issue is waived. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 428. Defendant argues, however, that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
Consequently, we will review the underlying claim. See West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435.
	A defendant who seeks a substitution of judge for cause (see
725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (West 1998)) bears the burden of
establishing actual prejudice. People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 178
(1979). To meet this burden, the defendant must establish
"animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust towards this defendant."
Vance, 76 Ill. 2d  at 181.
	Defendant contends that Judge Cieslik demonstrated his
prejudice when he (1) ruled against the motion to vacate the case
assignment to Judge Cieslik filed by Bomba; (2) criticized
defendant's attitude; (3) criticized defendant's objections to Neil
Spector, who had been appointed to represent defendant; (4)
referred to Hicks, in a different case, as "Smiley" and to another
assistant public defender as "Laughing Boy"; (5) had a reputation
for racial and sexual intolerance and had previously been censured
for offensive comments to a female attorney; (6) made derogatory
comments to both defendant and Hicks during the motion to
suppress; and (7) stated, during defendant's testimony during the
motion to suppress, that he was not getting the facts from
defendant.
	The facts that Judge Cieslik ruled against defendant's motion
to vacate the case assignment and that he told Bomba that the
motion was baseless are not reasons to grant a motion for
substitution for cause. See Vance, 76 Ill. 2d  at 178 (holding that
the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis
for finding the judge prejudiced); see also Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474, 490, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157
(1994) (explaining that "judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion").
	The comments criticizing defendant's attitude and defendant's
objections to Spector similarly do not demonstrate an animosity,
hostility, ill will, or distrust toward defendant. The first
complained-of criticism occurred during the following colloquy.
			"THE COURT: Any other matters that can be handled
a this particular time?
			A DEFENDANT:(3) Did they catch the guy who did the
double murder yet?
			THE COURT: I don't know anything about it sir. I
really have no idea who they caught or anything. I have
enough problems with the people that are before me, and
I don't want to get involved with some other people's
problems.
			I not only have problems with the individuals, but
certain other situations that you need not concern yourself.
			The only problem I have, gentlemen, is that you all get
a fair trial and you get fair consideration by this court, do
you understand that?
			A DEFENDANT: I understand, I'm just wondering is
anybody earning their money around here besides sitting
on your duffs.
			THE COURT: How do you mean that?
			A DEFENDANT: You got me up here for a double
murder I didn't even do.
			THE COURT: Look, I know nothing about what's
happening in here. An attitude like that will do nothing
for you."
	Defendant also complains of Judge Cieslik's comments
during a later proceeding in which defendant said, with respect to
Spector, "He's not representing me, your Honor, I don't want
him." The trial judge responded,
			"When did you think that you could tell me-just a
minute. You listen to me. I listened to what you had to
say. You are not going to tell me who's going to represent
you. Do you understand that? I am not running a
courtroom where the defendants are telling me what they
are going to do. There is no law that requires me to listen
to you to tell me what I have to do. Do you understand
that? I don't tell you what you have to do. You are
required to do certain things as required by rules of court
and rules of statute or the Supreme Court. But there is
[sic] no rules that I know of where a defendant can come
out there and tell me that a particular individual is not
representing him. You can indicate that you are not
satisfied with him, and it is for me to make that decision."
	After reviewing the statements in their context, we are unable
to conclude that they demonstrate animosity, hostility, ill will, or
distrust toward defendant. Instead, they demonstrate nothing more
than judicial expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction and
annoyance that are within the bounds of what judges, as imperfect
people, sometimes display, and such statements do not provide a
basis for finding that Judge Cieslik was prejudiced against
defendant. See Liteky, 510 U.S.  at 555-56, 127 L. Ed. 2d  at 491,
114 S. Ct.  at 1157; see also People v. Blanck, 263 Ill. App. 3d 224,
232-33 (1994) (holding that an isolated comment made during a
"momentary lapse of judicial composure" does not demonstrate
the prejudice necessary to obtain a motion for substitution for
cause).
	Although we recognize the concern raised by Judge Cieslik's
statements in another case involving Hicks and another African-American assistant public defender, we do not believe that these
statements are sufficient to demonstrate a prejudice against
defendant. To begin with, the comments at issue were not directed
at defendant. Granted, they were directed toward one of
defendant's attorneys, but our test looks to whether the trial court
is prejudiced against the defendant. See Vance, 76 Ill. 2d  at 181.
Although situations may arise in which comments directed toward
a defendant's attorney can demonstrate animosity, hostility, ill
will, or distrust toward the defendant, we do not believe that this
single comment in another proceeding is sufficient to meet this
standard. Moreover, the mere fact that Judge Cieslik allegedly had
a reputation for racial and sexual intolerance is an insufficient
basis upon which to grant a motion for substitution for cause. "To
conclude that a judge is disqualified because of prejudice is not, of
course, a judgment to be lightly made." Vance, 76 Ill. 2d  at 179.
Because of this, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice,
not just the possibility of prejudice. People v. Hooper, 133 Ill. 2d 469, 513 (1989).
	Finally, the comments directed toward defendant and his
attorney during the motion to suppress do not demonstrate
animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward defendant.
Defendant alleges that Judge Cieslik admonished him 11 times
during defendant's testimony to answer yes or no. Although the
judge did, at times, instruct defendant to answer yes or no, he did
so only where there was confusion over the question asked or
when an objection had been raised. With respect to the statement
in which Judge Cieslik stated, "I know what the facts are. But that
is not the facts [sic] I am getting from this witness," it appears that
the judge's comment arose, not as a criticism of defendant, but
rather from confusion over the contents of defendant's testimony.
	After reviewing the portions of the record cited by defendant,
we are unable to conclude that, had a motion for substitution for
cause been filed, a reasonable probability exists that it would have
been granted.


Failure to Argue That the Trial Court Asked Improper
Witherspoon Questions


	Defendant contends that, despite repeated objections from
Dosch, the trial court failed to ask proper Witherspoon questions.
Defendant now asserts that his counsel on direct appeal was
ineffective for failing to raise this issue.
	We note that the State begins its argument by asserting that
this claim is waived because it "should have been fully addressed
on direct appeal." With all due respect to the State, this is precisely
defendant's argument.
	Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), precludes the trial court from excluding for cause
jurors who merely express general objections to the death penalty
or conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. For a
juror to be excluded for cause because of his views on the death
penalty, the juror's views must "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath." Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980).
	The crux of defendant's argument is that the trial court failed
to inquire of those jurors dismissed for cause whether they could
set aside their objections to the death penalty and follow the law
and impose the death penalty if the circumstances warranted it.
After reviewing the relevant portions of the record, we believe that
the trial court's voir dire with respect to this issue did not violate
Witherspoon.
	At the beginning of voir dire, the trial court instructed the
venire:
			"Keeping in mind what I told you about your duty to
follow the law and what I just told you about now, is there
anyone in the array who unmistakably would
automatically vote against the imposition of the death
penalty without regard to any evidenced that might be
developed at trial of the case ***." (Emphasis added.)
Nine prospective jurors raised their hands. Ultimately only three
of those were excused because of their views on the death penalty.
The trial court asked each of these prospective jurors several
questions about their views on the death penalty and their ability
to impose it. Further the court ended each inquiry with the
question "Is there no situation regardless of how brutal or how
heinous where you could vote for capital punishment?" One
prospective juror answered, "No, no situation." A second
prospective juror answered. "No, I couldn't." And the third
prospective juror answered, "No."
	Given the trial court's admonition regarding the jurors' duty
to follow the law and these prospective jurors' unequivocal
statements that they could never vote to impose the death penalty,
the trial court was not required to conduct a further examination.
Consequently, had appellate counsel raised this issue on direct
review, no reasonable probability exists that this court would have
found a Witherspoon violation.


Failure to Object to the Use of Residential Burglary as an
Eligibility and Aggravating Factor


	Defendant next contends that his counsel was ineffective
during the sentencing hearing because counsel failed to object to
the State's use of residential burglary during the eligibility phase
as an aggravating factor rendering defendant eligible for the death
penalty. When defendant was sentenced, residential burglary was
not one of the enumerated felonies making a defendant eligible for
a death sentence. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c)
(now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West
1998)). Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective in
not objecting to the use of the residential burglary conviction as an
aggravating factor during the aggravation/mitigation phase.
Finally, defendant asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this issue on appeal.
	We can easily reject defendant's assertion with respect to the
use of residential burglary as an aggravating factor during the
eligibility phase. At the conclusion of the eligibility phase, the jury
returned two verdicts: one found defendant eligible for the death
penalty based on multiple murders (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
par. 9-1(b)(3) (now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1998))), the other
found defendant eligible for the death penalty because the murders
occurred during a home invasion or residential burglary (see Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c) (now codified, as
amended, at 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West 1998))). Defendant
raises no challenge to the jury's finding with respect to his
eligibility for the death penalty based upon multiple murders. The
law is well established that, where a defendant is found eligible for
the death penalty based upon two or more aggravating factors, the
fact that one of those factors may later be found improper does not
affect the separate valid aggravating factor. People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (1998). Because the eligibility factor based upon
multiple murders remains valid, even if appellate counsel had
raised this issue on direct appeal, no reasonable probability exists
that this court would have found that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different if trial counsel had objected
to this use of the residential burglary conviction.
	Turning to the other facet of defendant's argument, we see no
ineffectiveness in not objecting to the State's use of defendant's
conviction of residential burglary as an aggravating factor during
the aggravation-mitigation stage. Because evidence of a
defendant's prior crimes is admissible, as an aggravating factor
(People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 41-42 (1995)), no reasonable
probability exists that, had appellate counsel raised this issue on
direct appeal, this court would have found that trial counsel was
ineffective.
Failure to Object to the Trial Court's Praise of the Jury
	Defendant next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object and move for a mistrial after the trial court praised
the jury following the jury's finding defendant guilty. Defendant
also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise this issue on direct appeal.
	After the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty, the
trial court, responding to an earlier request of the jury, told the
jurors that they could begin hearing evidence for defendant's
sentencing hearing the next day. Before dismissing the jurors, the
court stated, "I think you have certainly done a great job. You've
been very diligent and we will see you tomorrow."
	A trial court has the duty to refrain from conveying improper
impressions to the jury. People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1996).
For such comments to be reversible error, the defendant must
demonstrate that the comments constituted a material factor in the
jury's decision. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 38-39.
	Here, we do not believe that the trial court's comment was
intended as a praise of the jury's guilty verdict. The context of the
statement reveals that the trial court was expressing its gratitude
to the jury for deliberating for several hours and for performing its
job. Given this context, and the substantial amount of aggravating
evidence presented during the sentencing hearing, even if appellate
counsel had raised this issue on appeal, no reasonable probability
exists that this court would have found trial counsel ineffective for
failing to object or seek a mistrial.
New Evidence Supporting Defendant's Claim That He Was
Tortured
	Defendant next asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to present new evidence to support his claim that his
confession was the result of torture. Defendant's new evidence
falls into four categories: (1) the OPS report finding that
"psychological techniques and planned torture" were "systemic"
and "methodical" in Area 2 and that Burge actively participated in
and supervised this torture; (2) appellate court decisions holding
that Burge tortured Wilson and that Burge was properly fired for
his role in torturing Wilson; (3) the discovery of 60 additional acts
of torture from Area 2; and (4) the conclusion, by an expert on the
psychological effects of torture, that defendant was tortured.
	On direct review, this court addressed the voluntariness of
defendant's confession and held that the trial court did not err in
finding defendant's confession voluntary. See Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 445-47. Consequently, defendant's claim is barred by res
judicata. See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 449. We have recognized,
however, that, in the interests of fundamental fairness, the doctrine
of res judicata can be relaxed if the defendant presents substantial
new evidence. See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 449; People v. Madej,
177 Ill. 2d 116, 132 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 91 (1999).
	For new evidence to be sufficient to warrant a new trial, it
must be of such conclusive character that it will probably change
the result upon retrial. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 449; see also Molstad,
101 Ill. 2d  at 134. Furthermore, the evidence must be material and
not merely cumulative, and " 'it must have been discovered since
the trial and be of such character that it could not have been
discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence.' "
Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d  at 134, quoting People v. Baker, 16 Ill. 2d 364, 374 (1959).
	We will first address the "newness" of defendant's new
evidence. The OPS report clearly qualifies as new evidence, as it
did not exist until after defendant's trial. The same rationale
applies to the appellate court opinions upon which defendant
relies.
	The same rationale, however, does not apply to all of the 60
other cases involving torture at Area 2. The record clearly
establishes that defendant's counsel obtained a copy of the
plaintiff's proffer before counsel sought to reopen defendant's
motion to suppress. Thus, it would appear that any torture claims
that were detailed in plaintiff's proffer should not be considered
new evidence. We do not believe such a simplistic approach to be
appropriate, however. Many of the claims detailed in the plaintiff's
proffer are remote in time from defendant's claims. The amount of
time separating the incidents is a relevant consideration when
determining admissibility. See Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d  at 312; Banks,
192 Ill. App. 3d at 994; see also Wilson, 6 F.3d  at 1238. Even
incidents that are remote in time can become relevant, however, if
the party presenting the evidence can present evidence of other
incidents that occurred in the interim. Thus, a single incident years
removed has little relevance. However, a series of incidents
spanning several years can be relevant to establishing a claim of
a pattern and practice of torture. Consequently, we believe that the
claims detailed in the proffer should be considered new evidence,
but only if defendant can establish the later discovery of other
torture allegations linking defendant's claims to those contained
in the proffer.
	With respect to the report of defendant's expert on the
psychological effects of torture, this is clearly an examination that,
in the exercise of due diligence, could have been completed before
defendant's trial. Significantly, the expert's conclusions do not rest
on any evidence that was not available before defendant's trial.
Consequently, we are unable to conclude that the expert's opinion
constitutes new evidence.
	We now examine the new evidence to determine its
materiality and whether it is of such a substantial character that it
would probably change the result on retrial.
	The first item is the OPS report. The OPS report is actually
two reports. The first, the Goldston report, concerns the "history
of allegations of misconduct by area two personnel." The second,
the Sanders report, is an "analysis of the Wilson case." The
Goldston report answered two specific questions: (1) "Is there
evidence that personnel assigned to Area 2 are guilty as regards the
practice of systemic abuse of individuals in their custody?" and (2)
"If such systemic abuse did occur, is there evidence that Area 2
command personnel were aware of such abuse and condoned the
same?"
	With respect to the first question, the Goldston report
concludes that "abuse did occur and that it was systemic." The
report also explains that the abuse "was not limited to the usual
beating, but went into such esoteric areas as psychological
techniques and planned torture." With respect to the second
question, the report concludes that "[p]articular command
members were aware of the systemic abuse and perpetuated it
either by actively participating in same or failing to take any action
to bring it to an end."
	The data supporting the Goldston report identify 13 other
incidents of the use of a plastic bag or a typewriter cover to
suffocate the victims and 11 incidents in which a firearm was used
to threaten or strike the victim. Of the incidents in which specific
police officers were identified, Burge was identified in 51% of the
cases. He was also alleged to have had some contact with at least
two of the other cases as well.
	The Sanders report finds, inter alia, that Burge actively
participated in the "mistreatment" of Wilson, burned Wilson with
a radiator, repeatedly shocked him, and "engaged Andrew Wilson
in several unjustified physical altercations during which Mr.
Wilson was handcuffed and incapable of providing any
resistance."
	Defendant also relies upon two appellate court opinions, one
federal and one state. The federal opinion holds that a rational jury
could have found from the "frequency of the abuse, the number of
officers involved in the torture of Wilson, and the number of
complaints from the black community" that the superintendent of
police knew that officers in Area 2 were "prone to beat up
suspected cop killers." Wilson, 6 F.3d  at 1240. Additionally, the
court held that evidence of similar acts of torture were relevant to
the question of whether the officers tortured Wilson. Wilson, 6 F.3d  at 1238.
	The state opinion is an unpublished appellate court decision
in which the court affirmed the decision to fire Burge and to
suspend two other officers for their roles in torturing Wilson.
O'Hara v. Police Board, Nos. 1-94-0999, 1-94-2462, 1-94-2475
cons. (1995) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
In particular, defendant explains that the circuit court had held that
the police board did not err in hearing evidence from Jones and
Mumin relating to the abuse they suffered while arrestees at Area
2. He then notes that the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision.
	The final new evidence that defendant relies upon are the
numerous other allegations of torture that defendant's attorney has
discovered. Defendant asserts that his counsel has discovered 60
cases of torture and abuse that Burge either participated in or
supervised. He explains that Burge directly participated in 27 of
these cases. Of these 27, 11 involved suffocation by plastic bag or
typewriter cover, 6 involved threats with a gun, and 23 involved
beatings. Of the cases supervised by Burge, 14 involved
suffocation, 2 involved threats with a gun, and 29 involved
beatings. Pienta was identified in five cases. Three of those
involved suffocation and three involved beatings. Eight cases
involved McWeeney, who was usually identified as an officer who
appeared to take a statement from the victim after the torture had
been completed. Finally, four cases implicated Madigan and three
implicated Pedersen.
	The State does not directly challenge the accuracy of
defendant's information. Instead, the State argues that, because
defendant did not suffer a physical injury, evidence of other
allegations of beatings is inadmissible. Indeed, the State boldly
asserts that "[t]his court has consistently required a showing of
physical injury in order to admit evidence of other allegations of
police brutality." The State supports this statement by citing to
eight different decisions. A review of these decisions, however,
reveals that they do not support the State's assertion.
	Two of the cases relied upon by the State do not even address
the admissibility of other allegations of police brutality. Instead,
they confine their analysis to the question of whether the defendant
demonstrated that he suffered injury at the hands of the police and
what effect that has. See People v. Woods, 184 Ill. 2d 130 (1998);
People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29 (1987). In three cases, this court
rejected the other evidence because it consisted of only
generalized allegations of coercive activity. See Orange, 168 Ill.
2d at 150-51; People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 464 (1995);
People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 245 (1993). One case involved a
defendant who asserted that the police had injured him, but the
evidence offered by the defendant did not support his assertions.
Because the defendant's facts did not support his own claims, the
other allegations of brutality were irrelevant. See People v.
Maxwell, 173 Ill. 2d 102, 120-21 (1996).
	That leaves, as the State's final two cases upon which it relies,
this court's decisions in the direct and post-conviction appeals of
Madison Hobley. Neither of these cases, however, supports the
State's position. In Hobley's direct appeal, the defendant relied
upon Banks and asserted that evidence of prior allegations of
police brutality should be admissible. This court rejected his
claim, not because he failed to demonstrate a physical injury, but
because the evidence in the defendant's case shared none of the
characteristics of the evidence in Banks that made it
admissible-only one of which was that the defendant suffered a
physical injury. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d  at 312. Moreover, when this
court addressed the defendant's claim again in his post-conviction
appeal, this court emphasized that the defendant's new evidence
of other allegations of torture would not change the result on
retrial because the defendant's consistent assertion has been that
he did not confess; thus, evidence that his confession was coerced
was irrelevant. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 448-50.
	Moreover, despite its assertions in its brief that this other
evidence is irrelevant, the State's actions reveal that the State finds
evidence of the other torture allegations highly relevant. After the
briefs were filed, the State filed a motion seeking to stay the
proceedings. The basis of the State's motion was that the circuit
court was holding a hearing after the remand in Cannon, 293 Ill.
App. 3d 634, and that this hearing would "address and resolve the
issues relating to allegations of police torture in Area 2 which are
identical to those raised in the present appeal." The State then
explained that "[t]he resolution of the issues in the Cannon
hearing will have a direct impact on the issues raised in this case."
Finally, the State asked this court to stay these proceedings
because "petitioner's claims are directly affected by the
proceedings in the Cannon case." Given the admissions contained
in the State's motion, the State's insistence that the other evidence
is irrelevant is dubious at best.
	In sum, as we earlier explained, the fact that the defendant has
suffered a physical injury is only one of many factors to consider
when determining whether evidence of prior allegations of police
brutality are admissible. The question of relevancy is a
determination to be made by the trial court after a consideration of,
inter alia, the defendant's allegations of torture and their similarity
to the prior allegations.
	After reviewing the new evidence relied upon by defendant,
we believe that it is material and that, as pleaded, would likely
change the result upon retrial. In particular, we note that defendant
has consistently claimed that he was tortured. In fact, he made this
claim during his first court appearance. Moreover, defendant's
claims are now and have always been strikingly similar to other
claims involving the use of a typewriter cover to simulate
suffocation. Additionally, defendant describes the use of a gun as
a threat and beatings that do not leave physical evidence. Further,
the officers that defendant alleges were involved in his case are
officers that are identified in other allegations of torture. Finally,
defendant's allegations are consistent with the OPS findings that
torture, as alleged by defendant, was systemic and methodical at
Area 2 under the command of Burge.
	Thus, we believe that defendant has presented sufficient
evidence at the pleading stage to entitle him to a hearing. At this
hearing, the trial court can evaluate defendant's testimony in light
of the OPS report and the relevant prior allegations of torture.
Such a hearing will allow the trial court to determine whether (1)
any of the officers who interrogated defendant may have
participated in systemic and methodical interrogation abuse
present at Area 2 and (2) those officers' credibility at the
suppression hearing might have been impeached as a result.
Consequently, we remand this action to the trial court for a hearing
to consider defendant's new evidence relating to other allegations
of police misconduct at Area 2.
Knowing Use of Marva Hall's "Perjured" Testimony
	Defendant next claims that the State violated his state and
federal constitutional rights by using Hall's testimony, which the
State knew was false. Defendant did not include this issue in his
original or amended post-conviction petition. Consequently it is
waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1998); People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 258 (1995).


Pienta's Volunteered Statement that Defendant Had Taken a
Polygraph


	Defendant next asserts that Pienta's volunteered statement
that defendant had taken a polygraph violated defendant's due
process rights to a fair trial. Defendant asserts that Kubalanza was
ineffective for failing to raise this issue. After reviewing the
record, we agree with the State that defendant failed to raise this
issue in his original or amended post-conviction petition.
Admittedly, defendant's amended post-conviction petition alleges
that this trial counsel was ineffective for failing to respond
adequately to Pienta's volunteered statement. On appeal, however,
defendant does not argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for
his response to Pienta's statement. Rather, he argues that Pienta's
statement, by itself, denied defendant of due process. This is a
different claim and one that was not raised in defendant's original
or amended post-conviction petition. Consequently, it is waived.
725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1998).
State's Failure to Tender the Results of Fingerprint
Comparisons
	Defendant's final claim is that the State violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963),
by failing to tender to either trial or post-conviction counsel the
results of fingerprint comparisons of a fingerprint taken from a
cassette recorder found on the victims' porch.
	Once again, defendant did not include this claim in his
original or amended post-conviction petition. Consequently, the
claim is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1998).
Motion to Remand
	Before oral argument was held, defendant filed a motion to
remand this cause to the trial court for a suppression hearing at
which "all relevant evidence of torture and injury can be
presented." We ordered that motion taken with the case.
	After reviewing the record, we conclude that the proper
remedy is not to grant defendant a new suppression hearing, but
rather to grant defendant a hearing on the claim in his post-conviction petition. Consequently, we deny defendant's motion.
CONCLUSION
	We reverse the trial court's judgment in part and remand this
action to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's
claims that (1) his attorney was ineffective for failing to present
evidence at trial that defendant's confession was involuntary; and
(2) substantial new evidence supports defendant's claim that his
confession was the result of police brutality. The trial court's
judgment is affirmed with respect to defendant's other claims.


	JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:


	I agree with the majority that defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence at trial that defendant's
confession was coerced, and on his claim that new evidence
demonstrates that his confession was the product of torture at the
hands of police. I write separately however because I believe
defendant is also entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim
that his counsel was ineffective for failing, during the hearing on
the motion to suppress defendant's confession, to make arguments
which would have resulted in the admission of additional evidence
in support of defendant's claims of torture by police.


FACTS


	On April 19, 1986, Vincent Sanchez and Rafaela Sanchez
were found stabbed to death in their home in Chicago. The bodies
were discovered after Wayne Washington, a 13-year-old youth
who routinely performed odd jobs for the couple, alerted neighbors
that the rear door of the Sanchez home was open and that the
kitchen floor was bloody. Neighbors subsequently called police.
After the police officers discovered the bodies, they questioned
Washington. He told police that he had seen Eric Caine and
"DeEdward" "across from" the Sanchez residence. Police later
located DeEdward and brought him to the police station for
Washington to identify.
	Shortly thereafter, DeEdward's 16-year-old cousin, Marva
Hall, came forward claiming to have information about the
murders. At the time she spoke to police, Hall believed that
DeEdward had been arrested for the murders and was still in jail.
In her statement, Hall claimed that defendant had told her that he,
and not Hall's cousin who had also been questioned in connection
with the murders, had killed the Sanchezes.
	Several days later, defendant was arrested by police on an
unrelated matter and was taken to the fourth district police station
in Chicago. Shortly thereafter, Detective James Pienta, who was
investigating the Sanchez murders, learned that defendant had
been taken into custody. Pienta then went to the fourth district
police station and transported defendant to Area Two Violent
Crimes headquarters, where defendant was questioned by two
officers.
	According to police, defendant initially denied knowledge of
the Sanchez murders. Subsequently however, defendant told police
officers that he, along with another man, had killed the Sanchezes
during the course of a robbery. The police reduced defendant's
confession to writing, although defendant refused to sign it.
	Defendant acknowledges that he told police that he had
committed the Sanchez murders. However, defendant contends
that he did so only after he was tortured by police officers during
his interrogation. Before his trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress his confession on the ground that it was involuntary. At
the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant testified that he
was tortured for an extended period of time by a red-haired officer
(later identified as Jon Burge), by Detective Pienta, and by others.
According to defendant, the torture included repeated beatings,
threats at gunpoint, and suffocation using a gray plastic typewriter
cover. In support of his claims, defendant attempted to introduce
photographs which allegedly depicted an interior view of the
interview room where defendant was questioned. According to a
defense offer of proof, the photographs would have shown certain
messages which defendant had etched, using a paper clip, into a
bench in the interview room when he was left alone after giving
his confession. These photographs, which were subsequently
introduced at sentencing, showed the following writings on the
bench of the interview room:
				"I lied about murders police threatened me with
violence slapped and suffocated me with plastic-no
phone-no dad signed false statement to murders (Tonto)
Aaron."
			"Sign false statements to murder, Tonto on statements
is code word Aaron."
The phrase "Aaron lied" also appears etched on the door to the
room.
	Defendant argued that these etched statements, made close in
time to his confession, strongly supported his claims that his
confession had been coerced by means of police torture. The trial
court refused to consider defendant's written statements, however,
ruling that they were inadmissible hearsay. This court affirmed the
trial court's ruling on defendant's direct appeal. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 451-54. In reaching our holding, this court considered and
rejected defendant's arguments that the etchings were admissible
either under the spontaneous declaration or prior consistent
statement exceptions to the hearsay rule. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at
452-53. This court likewise rejected defendant's arguments that
the statements were admissible under the curative admissibility
and completeness doctrines. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 453-54.(4)
DISCUSSION
	In his post-conviction petition, defendant contends that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for the admission
of the etchings on the grounds that hearsay is admissible at
motions to suppress and other pretrial hearings. Defendant argues
that this position was amply supported by existing law at the time
of the suppression hearing, citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250-52, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993-95
(1974); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 93 L. Ed. 1879,
69 S. Ct. 1602 (1949); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557
(7th Cir. 1975); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), 1101(d)(1); People v. Jones,
75 Ill. App. 2d 332, 337-38 (1966); People v. Fugate, 77 Ill. App.
3d 103, 105 (1979); and People v. Lesure, 271 Ill. App. 3d 679,
680, 683 (1995). Defendant also contends that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to argue that the etchings were admissible to
rebut the State's evidence that defendant did not complain of
injury or protest his treatment to the paramedic, the assistant
State's Attorneys, or the detectives. Defendant maintains that, had
his counsel made these arguments, the results of the suppression
hearing would have been different. 
	In today's opinion, the majority correctly holds that the
etchings would have been admissible, even if they were hearsay,
in the context of a motion to suppress. The majority refuses to
grant defendant an evidentiary hearing on his claim, however, on
the ground that defendant has failed to establish a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been admitted, the results of the
suppression hearing would have been different. The majority states
that the trial court refused to admit the etchings not only because
the judge believed them to be hearsay, but also because the judge
found that defendant could not establish that the photographs
accurately depicted the etchings as they were when the defendant
made them, and because the etchings were not relevant to the
motion to suppress. The majority holds that these findings indicate
that the judge would have given no weight to the etchings even if
the photographs had been admitted and, therefore, the result of the
suppression hearing would have been the same.
	The majority is incorrect. First, the majority misreads the
record when it states that the trial judge found that the etchings
were not relevant to the motion to suppress. A careful reading of
the hearing transcript indicates that it was the testimony of the
photographer, not the photographs of the etchings themselves,
which the judge found to be irrelevant. That finding, however, was
premised upon the judge's belief that the photographs of the
etchings were inadmissible as hearsay. In that light, the judge's
ruling makes perfect sense. If the photographs are indeed
inadmissible hearsay, then the testimony by the photographer
concerning how, when, and where the photographs were taken
would indeed be irrelevant. However, because this court has now
recognized that the photographs of the etchings were admissible
even if hearsay, the judge's findings concerning the relevance of
the photographer's testimony is shown to be error. Moreover, even
if the majority's reading of the record were correct and the judge
had found that photographs of the etchings were themselves
irrelevant to defendant's contention that he was tortured by police,
such a finding would be clearly erroneous.
	The majority further states that "the trial court *** specifically
found that it did not believe that defendant had established that the
etchings in the pictures were in the same condition as the etchings
were when defendant allegedly made them." Slip op. at 10. Indeed,
after reiterating its erroneous position that the photographs were
inadmissible as hearsay, the court made the following comments:
		"I believe another important aspect that is very disturbing
is the point of time where the etchings originated when in
fact the investigator went and viewed these etchings.
Certainly it would be rather difficult, if not impossible,
but it would be difficult for the defense to show that these
etchings are exactly as they were on the date indicated
herein. There is a point of time, there is a certain
possibility of any possible changes that could have been
made, which we would have no knowledge of but which
would have transpired on this theory ***."
According to the majority, these statements demonstrate that the
trial court would have given no weight to the photographs even if
they had been admitted.
	The majority reads too much into the trial court's comments.
Although the trial court raised the possibility the etchings had been
tampered with and expressed skepticism concerning the ability of
the defense to establish that the etchings had not been altered from
their original form before they were photographed, the court
stopped well short of finding that etchings had been tampered with
or that the photographs were inaccurate. In any event, the trial
court's initial erroneous rulings that the photographs were
inadmissible hearsay and that the testimony of the photographer
was irrelevant deprived the defense of any meaningful opportunity
to establish the accuracy and authenticity of the photographs.
Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, I do not believe
that this court can confidently state that the trial court would have
given no weight to photographs which appear to show messages
written by defendant immediately after he was allegedly tortured
by police. On the contrary, these etchings, if authentic, would be
highly probative of the veracity of defendant's claims of torture.
Accordingly, I would hold that the allegations of defendant's
petition, taken as true, establish a reasonable probability that
defendant's confession would have been suppressed if defense
counsel had made the proper legal arguments for the admission of
the photographs. Defendant is therefore entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on this claim.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority's holding
granting defendant evidentiary hearings on the two claims
identified in the majority's opinion. I dissent, however, from the
majority's refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing on defendant's
additional claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at the hearing on his motion to suppress his confession.
1.      1The record does not reveal why defendant's case was transferred to
Judge Morrissey.

2.      2The proffer was a document summarizing other claims of torture by
people interrogated at Area 2.

3.      3Although defendant ascribes these statements to himself, the record
does not reveal whether defendant or a codefendant was the speaker.
For purposes of this appeal, we will accept defendant's representation
that he was the speaker.

4.     4At this stage, defendant makes no argument concerning the
correctness of this court's ruling on direct appeal, and as such, that issue
is not properly before the court at this time.