Title: Tomlin v. McKenzie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 951427
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 1996

Present:  All the Justices 
 
J. WARREN TOMLIN, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v.  Record No. 951427                  April 19, 1996 
 
PATSYE D. McKENZIE, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
William H. Oast, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in 
sustaining a plea in bar asserting that a clinical social worker 
conducting court-referred family therapy was immune from 
liability for various claims of malpractice and defamation. 
 
J. Warren Tomlin, individually and as next friend for his 
minor daughter, Alexandria A. Tomlin, and his wife, Carolyn D. 
Hope-Tomlin (collectively Tomlin) filed a three-count motion for 
judgment against Patsye D. McKenzie (McKenzie), a licensed 
clinical social worker, and Family Marital Guidance Clinic, now 
F.M.G.C., P.C., a professional corporation in which McKenzie is 
the principal participant and sole shareholder.  The motion for 
judgment alleged that McKenzie provided family therapy to Mr. 
Tomlin, Alexandria and Darlene K. Giffin (Giffin), Mr. Tomlin's 
former wife and Alexandria's mother, pursuant to an order of 
referral by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of 
the City of Chesapeake arising out of divorce and custody 
proceedings.  The motion for judgment further alleged that in the 
course of providing that therapy, McKenzie intentionally and 
maliciously committed various acts amounting to malpractice and 
defamation. The motion for judgment sought compensatory damages 
of $11,000,000 and punitive damages of $350,000.   
 
The defendants filed a plea in bar seeking dismissal of the 
suit on the ground that McKenzie should be afforded immunity 
under common law and statutory theories.  McKenzie asserted that 
common law sovereign immunity protects her from civil suits for 
actions performed in her capacity as a court-appointed officer, 
"similar to a Commonwealth's attorney or judge."  McKenzie 
further asserted that pursuant to Code § 63.1-248.5 she is 
"absolutely immune for her participation in [the] judicial 
proceeding regarding Alexandria Tomlin."   
 
No evidence was taken at the subsequent hearing on the plea. 
 The trial court dismissed the motion for judgment "upon hearing 
argument of counsel and reviewing the papers filed herein, and 
for good cause shown."  We awarded Tomlin an appeal and, for the 
following reasons, we will reverse the judgment. 
 
Our resolution of the issue before us is guided by well 
established principles.  The defensive plea in bar shortens the 
litigation by reducing it to a distinct issue of fact which, if 
proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff's right of recovery.  The 
moving party carries the burden of proof on that issue of fact.  
See Campbell v. Johnson, 203 Va. 43, 47, 122 S.E.2d 907, 909 
(1961).  Where no evidence is taken in support of the plea, the 
trial court, and the appellate court upon review, must rely 
solely upon the pleadings in resolving the issue presented.  See 
Weichert Company of Va., Inc. v. First Commercial Bank, 246 Va. 
108, 109, 431 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1993).  When considering the 
pleadings, "the facts stated in the plaintiffs' motion for 
judgment [are] deemed true."  Glascock v. Laserna, 247 Va. 108, 
109, 439 S.E.2d 380, 380 (1994). 
 
Applying these principles, we initially address the immunity 
granted by Code § 63.1-248.5.  That Code section provides: 
 
Any person making a report pursuant to Code 
§ 63.1-248.3, a complaint pursuant to § 63.1-248.4, or 
who takes a child into custody pursuant to § 63.1-
248.9, or who participates in a judicial proceeding 
resulting therefrom shall be immune from any civil or 
criminal liability in connection therewith, unless it 
is proven that such person acted in bad faith or with 
malicious intention.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
Although the plea in bar specifically asserts that under 
this section "McKenzie is absolutely immune for her participation 
in [the] judicial proceeding regarding Alexandria," the plain 
language of the section refutes that assertion of absolute 
immunity.  In any event, on appeal McKenzie now asserts that this 
section is "irrelevant to the issue now before the Court" because 
her appointment was not controlled by the statutes referenced in 
this section.  We need not resolve that contention.  Even if we 
were to accept McKenzie's belated assertion that Code 
§ 63.1-248.5 is not applicable to her circumstances, we would 
nonetheless find that the allegations in the motion for judgment, 
accepted as true for purposes of resolving the plea in bar, would 
defeat McKenzie's other claims of immunity as well. 
 
The issue of fact, as expressed in her appellate brief, upon 
which McKenzie apparently relies as a bar to the suit is that 
"[a]ll of the acts of which Tomlin complains were performed by 
McKenzie in her capacity as an agent of the Court."  This 
reliance is misplaced for two reasons.  First, where sovereign 
immunity is claimed by an agent of the state, rather than by the 
state as an entity, it will not be extended to acts which 
constitute a wanton and intentional deviation from the duties the 
agent has been assigned to undertake.  See James v. Jane, 221 Va. 
43, 53, 267 S.E.2d 108, 113 (1980); see also Elder v. Holland, 
208 Va. 15, 19-20, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372-73 (1967).  Accordingly, 
accepting as true the allegations in the first two counts of the 
motion for judgment that McKenzie conspired with Giffin to 
violate court orders and to interfere with Mr. Tomlin's 
visitation with his child, and engaged in other intentional and 
wanton misconduct, we think the trial court erred in applying 
sovereign immunity on this state of the record. 
 
Second, and more importantly, the motion for judgment 
alleges acts of professional malpractice and defamation which, if 
accepted as true for purposes of the plea in bar and if 
ultimately proven at trial, are entirely inconsistent with the 
proper conduct of a family therapy practitioner.  Such conduct 
would be no less unacceptable, and perhaps even more egregious, 
if one were subjected to it under the compulsion of a 
court-ordered referral.  Conduct outside the scope of the 
employment is not protected by sovereign immunity.  See Messina 
v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 311, 321 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1984).  
Similarly, conduct outside the scope of a court-ordered referral 
has no valid claim to sovereign immunity. 
 
In short, because McKenzie argued her plea in bar without 
presenting evidence, the trial court was required to accept as 
true the allegations of the motion for judgment.  Those 
allegations concerned malicious, intentional tortious acts 
outside the scope of McKenzie's court-appointed role and, 
therefore, the trial court should have denied the plea in bar.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court's dismissal order 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Reversed and remanded.