Title: Harvey v. Ridgeway
Citation: 450 S.W.2d 281
Docket Number: 5-5223
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 1970

450 S.W.2d 281 (1970) Robert HARVEY, Appellant, v. Lyda T. RIDGEWAY, Appellee. No. 5-5223. Supreme Court of Arkansas. February 9, 1970. Rehearing Denied March 16, 1970. *282 J. E. Lightle, Jr., Searcy, for appellant. Hodges, Hodges &amp; Hodges, Newport, for appellee. JONES, Justice. The appellant, the Honorable Robert Harvey, is the duly elected state Senator for the Seventeenth Senatorial District of Arkansas, having been elected to that office in 1966 for a four year term. In 1968, and during the term for which he was elected to the Senate, Senator Harvey was also elected to serve as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the state of Arkansas. He was seated as a delegate by a unanimous vote of the Convention on May 27, 1969. This taxpayer's suit was brought by the appellee pursuant to Art. 16, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution, which permits taxpayer's suits to prevent illegal exactions. The appellee alleges that under Art. 5, § 10 of the Arkansas Constitution Senator Harvey is ineligible to serve as delegate to the Constitutional Convention and the appellee seeks to enjoin Senator Harvey from holding both offices. Upon the foregoing facts, as stipulated, the chancellor found Senator Harvey ineligible to hold the office of state Senator and at the same time serve as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Senator Harvey has appealed and designates the points upon which he relies as follows: This matter having reached this court a few days before the Constitutional Convention was to enter upon its final thirty day session, we entered a per curiam opinion of January 10, 1970, reversing the chancellor and holding that Senator Harvey is eligible to serve as delegate to the Convention. We now set out our reasons for so holding. As a delegate to the Convention Senator Harvey would be entitled to receive per diem and travel expenses as provided in Act 42 of the first extraordinary session of the legislature for 1968, and the courts do have jurisdiction to determine the issues raised by this case. We so held in Starnes v. Sadler, 237 Ark. 325, 372 S.W.2d 585. See also Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in dealing with a similar problem, said: We now come to the real issue of whether a member of the Arkansas State Legislature can legally serve as a delegate to a constitutional convention under Art. 5, § 10 of the present Constitution, which reads as follows: There is no question that Robert Harvey is a Senator and there is no question that he had been elected a delegate to the Constitutional Convention during the term for which he was elected Senator; so the actual question, is whether the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention is a "civil office under this State," within the meaning and prohibition as contemplated by the Constitution. Legal precedent does not furnish a sound and clear answer to the precise question presented here, because there have been relatively few constitutional conventions, and therefore, few legal precedents concerning the qualifications of delegates to constitutional conventions. Both J. A. Jameson and R. S. Hoar in their respective books on Constitutional Conventions, point out that conventions for the purpose of drafting constitutions, are American institutions of recent origin. Jameson and Hoar differ as to the official status of a delegate to a constitutional convention. A provision of the Illinois Constitution provided that judges of certain courts should not be eligible to any other office, or public trust, of profit, during the term for which they were elected or for one year thereafter. A delegate to the Illinois Constitutional Convention had been a judge *284 of a court within one year prior to his election to the Convention and his competitor contested his election on this ground. The judge contended that the words of the Constitution referred to the distribution of powers by the Constitution to the three regular branches of government, and that the Convention belonged to neither branch. The difference of opinion between Jameson and Hoar is only important here in illustrating the two opposing philosophies leading to opposite conclusions as stated by Hoar on pages 185-186 of his book, as follows: Hoar then continues: Hoar then continues, quoting from the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, as follows: In the Nebraska case of Baker v. Moorhead, 103 Neb. 811, 174 N.W. 430, a legislative act provided for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention at a special election. The Constitution provided that all officers (except certain ones named) should be elected at the general election. In holding the act constitutional, the Supreme Court said: In 1915 the Constitution of Louisiana contained a provision as follows: "No person shall hold or exercise, at the same time, more than one office of trust or profit, except that of justice of the peace or notary public." In the case of State v. Doyle, 138 La. 350, 70 So. 322, four defendants were convicted of stealing cattle and on appeal they contended that the trial court erred in overruling their motion to quash the jury panel because one of the jury commissioners, who helped select the panel, was a member of the state Constitutional Convention of 1913, and therefore an "outsider" in helping to draw the talesman jury list. In sustaining the trial court, the Louisiana Supreme Court said: In the Oklahoma case of Frantz v. Autry, 18 Okl. 561, 91 P. 193, an action was instituted to enjoin the governor and president of the Constitutional Convention from issuing and publishing a proclamation submitting certain items to the electorate in a proposed constitution for Oklahoma. In that case the Oklahoma Supreme Court set out the contention and its decision as follows: The Kentucky case of Chenault v. Carter, 332 S.W.2d 623, had to do with the calling of a special election to take the sense of the people of Kentucky on the question of holding a constitutional convention, and although that case did not involve the qualifications of delegates to the convention, the court said: In Board of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel County v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, a declaratory judgment action was instituted for a determination of the correct answer to whether a delegate to a proposed constitutional convention would be a holder of office within the meaning of declaration of rights provisions, and certain other sections, of the Constitution of Maryland then in force. The circuit court held that such delegate would not be the holder of an office within the Constitutional provisions and in affirming the circuit court on appeal, the Supreme Court said: Returning now to the case at bar, we do not consider Senator Harvey's qualifications to serve as state Senator as being an issue in this case. We are of the opinion that when Senator Harvey was elected as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, he was not appointed or elected to any civil office under this State, within the meaning and prohibition of Art. 5, § 10, supra. We are of the opinion that the phrase "any civil office under this State" refers to an office created by civil law within one of the only three branches of government provided for under the present Constitution of this state. The people of Arkansas saw fit to set up and limit the powers of government to three separate departments, but they did not see fit to trust either department with the power to change the Constitution. Article 4, § 1 of the Constitution provides: Unlike the constitutions of some of the states, the present Constitution of Arkansas does not provide a method for obtaining a new constitution, and we may reasonably assume that the people intended it that way. Article 2, § 1 of the Constitution explains *288 why the Constitution is silent as to the method of changing it, and it does so in majestic words of tremendous import and meaning, as follows: We are unable to conceive of any person being appointed or elected to "any civil office under this State" unless such civil office would be under one of the three divisions of the powers of the government of the State of Arkansas as specifically divided and limited in Art. 4, § 1, supra. We are of the opinion that Senator Harvey's position as delegate to the Constitutional Convention is not derived from the Constitution at all. It is derived directly from that power "inherent in the people" as simply announced in Art. 2, § 1, of the state Constitution, supra, and in the manner the people thought proper as expressed in Act 42 of the Acts of the General Assembly for 1969. This act did not create a "civil office under this State," as referred to in Art. 5, § 10. Act 42 was simply "an Act setting up the procedure to be followed in calling a Constitutional Convention * * *" and was so stated in its preamble by the legislature. Delegate is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: We are of the view that the appellant has not been appointed or elected to a civil office under this State (other than that of state Senator). He has been selected as a delegate, or agent, of the people of his district for the purpose of acting in their stead in the exercise of their inherent power in working out the substance, form and content of a constitution to be submitted to all the people of Arkansas for their approval or rejection. It is obvious that Art. 5, § 10 of the present Constitution was designed and intended as a protection against the possible conflicts in interests a member of the legislature might have as an elected official with the power, influence and authority to create positions and offices, and the interest he might have as a private citizen who would desire to hold such civil office by appointment or election. The people impose considerable confidence in their legislative Representatives and Senators. Legislators bear the full responsibility of enacting laws in the carrying out of the functions of the legislative branch of the government as delegated by the people under the Constitution. Representatives and Senators cannot delegate their legislative powers and dutiesthey cannot even refer a legislative act to a vote of the people. That power is reserved by the people in the form of referendum. The legislature is, of course, given the full authority to repeal any law it is authorized to enact, but the people of Arkansas risk their constitutional changes in the hands of no one. They have retained their inherent power when it comes to changing their constitution, and have reserved the right and power to make such changes in such manner as they think proper. The people of Arkansas have thought it proper to call a Constitutional Convention composed of delegates they have selected to represent them in preparing such constitutional changes as they, the people, may desire to consider. Even if the position of delegate to a Constitutional Convention were a "civil office under this State," we are unable to see where such conflict could arise between a member of the legislature and a delegate to a constitutional convention, as Art. 5, § 10 is designed to prevent. *289 We conclude that a delegate to a constitutional convention is not a "civil office under this State" within the meaning and prohibition expressed in Art. 5, § 10 of the Constitution of 1874, and we so hold. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause dismissed. FOGLEMAN, J., disqualified and not participating. HARRIS, C. J., GEORGE ROSE SMITH, J., and RICHARD H. WOOTTON, Special Justice, dissent. RICHARD H. WOOTTON, Special Justice (dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that a delegate to the Constitutional Convention is not a "civil office under this State" within the meaning and prohibition expressed in Article 5, Section 10, of the Constitution of 1874. To the contrary, I believe the better reasoning is that a Constitutional Convention delegate elected pursuant to Act 42 holds a civil office under this State within the Constitutional prohibition. The Arkansas Constitution makes no specific reference to constitutional conventions. However, even in the absence of such a reference it is generally recognized and accepted that the legislature has the power to call a Constitutional Convention. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Const.Law, Section 30. That right not being denied to the General Assembly by the Arkansas Constitution of 1874, it must be held to exist. Webb v. State, 176 Ark. 722, 3 S.W.2d 1000. Both the legislature and the convention must act under the Constitution of 1874. The legislature cannot create a body with powers or authority beyond the Constitution; it cannot create a super-body with powers or rights beyond the very Constitution that created those powers and rights. A Constitutional Convention, once assembled, may propose for popular approval any form of Constitution it may desire, subject only to superior law such as the United States Constitution. The form and mechanics of arriving at the end result, however, are procedural matters that must be conducted within the framework of our present Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to permit the legislature to amend the present Constitution. That it cannot do. The legislature in passing Acts 3 and 42, and the electorate in approving the call for a Constitutional Convention and choosing delegates thereto, did not purport to and did not in fact amend the Constitution of 1874. Act 42 was unquestionably enacted pursuant to the authority granted by the Constitution of 1874. For instance, it had to have an enacting clause and had to be approved by a majority of each house, all as required by Constitutional mandate. It clearly was an act of the State. Being creatures of the State and of the Constitution of 1874, Acts 3 and 42, and the Constitutional Convention called thereunder, could not rise higher than the Constitution of 1874 nor possess authority beyond its provisions. Hence Article 5, Section 10, with its prohibition against legislators' being appointed or elected to any civil office under the State, was part of the overlying Constitutional blanket. If, therefore, a Constitutional delegate holds a civil office, a member of the General Assembly is ineligible to serve as a delegate. A Constitutional delegate must be either an officer or an employee. An employee holds his position by reason of a contractual relationship. A public officer exercises some of the State's sovereign power, has statutory duties rather than contractual ones, and receives his position by appointment or election. The concept includes such ideas as a definite term, payment for services, and important duties. See Maddox and Coffman v. State, 220 Ark. 762, 249 S.W.2d 972; Lucas v. Futrall, 84 Ark. 540, 106 S.W. 667; and Vincenheller v. Reagan, 69 Ark. 460, 64 S.W. 278. Clearly a delegate to the Constitutional Convention is not an employee. On the *290 contrary, he is elected, has a definite term (even though relatively short), must perform the statutory duties provided by an act, and is exercising some of the State's sovereign power in helping to draft a Constitution to affect all the citizens of Arkansas. The General Assembly chose its language carefully and correctly in Section 2 of Act 42 when it referred to "the office" of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. In a substantially similar case, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a legislator was not eligible to serve as a delegate to a Constitutional Convention. Fyfe v. Mosher, 149 Mich. 349, 112 N.W. 725. Said the court: I cannot agree with the contrary view taken in Board of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel County v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, and similar cases cited in the majority opinion. The purpose of Article 5, Section 10, is, of course, to prevent any conflict between the legislator's public duty and his personal interest. This opinion should not be read to imply in the slightest degree that the Appellant would place his own interest above that of the public; but that possibility would exist, now and in the future, if legislators were permitted to serve as delegates. Our Constitution seeks to prevent that possibility, and it is the duty of the Court to uphold the Constitution. I would agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that this Court does have jurisdiction to determine the issues raised by this case. For the reasons cited above, I would enjoin the Appellant from serving as a delegate to the Arkansas Constitutional Convention. HARRIS, C. J., and GEORGE ROSE SMITH, J., join in this dissent.