Title: People v. Hughes
Citation: 2015 IL 117242
Docket Number: 117242
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2015

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Hughes, 2015 IL 117242 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
CAVINAUGH HUGHES, Appellee. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
117242 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
December 17, 2015 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. John 
P. Kirby, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
 
Judgment 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
Cause remanded. 
 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, 
State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz and 
Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the 
People. 
 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, 
Deputy Defender, and Deborah K. Pugh, Assistant Appellate 
Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, 
for appellee. 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity of 
this document 
Date: 2016.01.22 
10:27:26 -06'00'
 
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Justices 
CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 
with opinion. 
Justices Freeman, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and 
opinion. 
Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justices 
Thomas and Kilbride. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant Cavinaugh Hughes was convicted in a bench trial of first-degree murder in the 
2005 shooting deaths of Elijah Coleman and Joshua Stanley. Coleman was a 68-year-old man 
shot multiple times at his Chicago home in a botched robbery on November 18, 2005; Stanley 
was defendant’s alleged coconspirator, gunned down in an alley the next day. Defendant’s own 
statements in taped police interrogation were admitted as evidence against him at trial. 
¶ 2 
 
Relevant to this appeal, defendant sought suppression of those statements. He argued they 
were involuntary due to police questioning him off-camera and without Miranda rights and 
due to physical coercion from handcuffs kept on him an excessively long time. The circuit 
court of Cook County denied that motion. Defendant brought it up again in his posttrial 
motion, which was also denied. 
¶ 3 
 
The appellate court concluded the confession should have been suppressed due to doubts it 
was voluntary. The appellate court reached this conclusion based on defendant’s age, 
educational level, sleep and food deprivation, prior substance abuse, deceptive conduct by 
police, length of interrogation, a coercive atmosphere, lack of experience with the criminal 
justice system, and use of marijuana while in police custody. The appellate court reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 2013 IL App (1st) 110237. It also corrected defendant’s mittimus in 
the event he should be convicted again. Id. This court granted the State’s petition for leave to 
appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). 
 
¶ 4 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 5 
 
Elijah Coleman was shot multiple times, as he opened his front door, in a home invasion 
robbery attempt. He suffered gunshot wounds to his left thigh and knee and a gunshot wound 
in his right ear, and he died in the entryway to his home. The trial court heard evidence that 
Coleman was targeted due to a rumor he had won the lottery. Coleman’s grandnephew 
attended school with Joshua Stanley, who embarked on a plan to rob Coleman. Stanley, 16, 
was gunned down in an alley the night after Coleman’s killing. He suffered gunshot wounds to 
his left abdomen, left shoulder, left arm, right thigh, and right lower leg and was pronounced 
dead at a hospital. Parked nearby was a 2001 Impala belonging to Jetun Coburn, who was at 
that time the girlfriend of Dorian Skyles, then aged 32. That Impala had altered temporary 
plates on it, with the registration address (but not the owner name) of those plates being 
defendant’s. 
 
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¶ 6 
 
Coburn had reported the Impala as stolen, but Chicago police detectives questioned her, 
and her responses led police to question Skyles. Police also questioned Cordell Matthews, aged 
17, and the statements of Skyles and Matthews led police to seek the arrest of defendant. 
¶ 7 
 
Defendant, meanwhile, had left the state for Michigan and would not be brought into 
custody for another 11 months. On October 26, 2006, two detectives traveled to Kalamazoo 
County, Michigan, in a rental car to bring defendant back to Chicago for interrogation. 
Because they were traveling in a rental car, they kept defendant handcuffed behind his back for 
the ride back from Michigan. One of the detectives estimated that ride to take about an hour. 
¶ 8 
 
Detectives placed defendant in an interrogation room with an electronic recording device 
already activated. He implored them to remove the handcuffs and expressed relief when 
detectives removed them. Detectives Patrick Ford and Robert Brannigan began interrogating 
defendant around 3:30 p.m. Questioning continued on and off over the course of several hours, 
with defendant repeatedly denying having pulled the trigger in either death.1 Around 12:21 
a.m., defendant admitted to throwing the weapon used to kill Stanley in the river, but he still 
maintained Skyles had been the one to kill both Stanley and Coleman. Around 1 a.m., 
defendant admitted to having shot Stanley, after detectives recounted that defendant had 
changed the plates on the Impala, ended up with the gun, and told Matthews he had shot 
Stanley. Detectives additionally told defendant that people looking out their windows had seen 
a suspect that resembled defendant and not Skyles, a claim that was not supported by any 
evidence brought out at trial. 
¶ 9 
 
Defendant agreed to sit for a polygraph examination to be taken in the morning. Detectives 
instead returned for him around 2:30 a.m. From about 3:30 to 4 a.m., defendant answered 
polygraph detective Tina Figueroa-Mitchell’s questions, repeatedly denying that he had a gun 
in Coleman’s house. Around 4:30 a.m., Figueroa-Mitchell returned to tell defendant he had 
repeatedly lied about having a gun in Coleman’s house. She emphasized it was important for 
defendant to show remorse. Shortly before 5 a.m., defendant stated he and his coconspirators 
had expected a younger man to come to the door with a gun, and the plan had been for 
defendant to shoot that man twice in the legs. Defendant stated Stanley was in front of him and 
that defendant fired twice at Coleman’s legs without seeing that he was an older man. 
Figueroa-Mitchell then brought in the other two detectives, and defendant told them that he 
shot Coleman in the legs. 
¶ 10 
 
Defendant later filed a motion to suppress all statements he made to police subsequent to 
his arrest. The motion asserted that prior to interrogation, defendant was not advised of his 
right to remain silent, “informed that anything he might say or do could be used against him in 
court,” informed of his right to counsel, informed he had a right to have a lawyer present 
during the interrogation, or informed that he would be provided with representation in the 
event he was indigent. It also stated that “due to the physical, physiological, mental, 
educational, psychological state, capacity and condition of the defendant, he was incapable and 
unable to appreciate and understand the full meaning of his Miranda rights and any statements 
w[e]re therefore not the free and rational choice of the accused and was not made voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently in violation of the 5th and 4th Amendments to the Constitution of 
                                                 
 
1The appellate court decision contains an extensive description of the interrogation. See 2013 IL 
App (1st) 110237, ¶¶ 16-34. 
 
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the United States.” The motion stated “the statements sought to be suppressed were obtained as 
a result of interrogation which continued after the defendant had elected to remain silent and/or 
had elected to consult with an attorney prior to further questioning in violation of the 5th and 
14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” The motion further stated “the 
statements sought to be suppressed were obtained as a result of psychological and mental 
coercion illegally directed against the defendant and that such statements were, therefore, 
involuntary in light of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.” It then 
made an identical assertion, but with regard to physical coercion. The motion then repeated, 
word for word, the statement about psychological and mental coercion. It then stated “the 
statement[s] sought to be suppressed were obtained as the product of and as the result of 
confronting the accused with certain evidence which had been obtained in violation of the 
defendant’s 4th amendment[ ] protection against illegal search and seizure,” and “as the 
produc[t] of and as the direct and proximate result o[f] confronting the accused with the certain 
material misrepresentations in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.” Finally, the motion stated that all “communications, confessions, statements, 
admissions, or tests executed by the defendant were elicited in violation of his constitutional 
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution of the State of Illinois” and requested a pretrial suppression hearing “to determine 
if the nature of such statements were voluntary.” 
¶ 11 
 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress on July 20, 2009, defendant’s trial counsel first 
presented two lines of argument: that the detectives cuffed defendant too uncomfortably for the 
ride down from Michigan, and that detectives questioned him on the drive down, without 
having informed him of his Miranda rights and without video recording. Defendant’s trial 
counsel acknowledged the breadth of the motion to suppress, stating “those are the grounds on 
which we will be proceeding because we have filed a general motion. I just want to give notice 
to counsel those are the grounds we will be proceeding on.” Apparently in response to 
discussion that took place off the record, counsel asked one of the assistant State’s Attorneys, 
“Is that what you are asking, Miss Gonzalez?” Gonzalez responded in the affirmative. 
¶ 12 
 
The State then called Detective Patrick Ford, who recounted how he took custody of 
defendant. Ford stated he read defendant his Miranda rights from his Fraternal Order of Police 
book upon taking him into custody. Ford testified that defendant indicated he understood his 
rights and that he wanted to make a statement, but Ford told him it would have to wait until 
they arrived back at the Area Two station. Ford indicated he had no conversations with 
defendant about the murders, aside from the ones video recorded at Area Two. On 
cross-examination, Ford testified that he read defendant his Miranda rights at both the jail in 
Michigan and at Area Two on video, to avoid any mistakes about whether he had read them to 
defendant. Ford also acknowledged that he had refused defendant’s requests to be cuffed in a 
different way, as being cuffed behind his back was uncomfortable for defendant, a large man. 
Defendant’s trial counsel also posed brief questions about the detectives’ persistence in asking 
questions of defendant after he gave exculpatory answers. 
¶ 13 
 
The State then called Detective Figueroa-Mitchell. On direct examination, she testified that 
defendant had been read his Miranda rights before the polygraph examination, had consented 
to the test with a written form, and had no off-camera conversations with her. Asked by the 
State if she had any difficulty in communicating with defendant, she replied that he “answered 
in an appropriate and timely manner” and that he had never complained about the way he was 
 
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treated by other police personnel. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked questions 
about whether the detectives would have been able to observe Figueroa-Mitchell’s questioning 
of defendant, and whether this would have been obvious to defendant. Defense counsel then 
asked about the purpose of the test and what Figueroa-Mitchell told the detectives afterward. 
Figueroa-Mitchell responded that she aimed to find out the truth, and that she had told the 
detectives defendant did not pass. 
¶ 14 
 
The DVDs of defendant’s interrogation were entered into evidence, and the parties 
stipulated to the content of the transcripts of defendant’s interrogation. The State called no 
further witnesses, and defendant rested. In closing arguments on the motion, defense counsel 
argued that Detective Ford lacked credibility in explaining that he had read defendant his 
Miranda rights in Michigan and that detectives admitted handcuffing defendant in a way that 
caused him discomfort and pain. Defense counsel concluded by arguing the lack of reliable 
evidence that defendant received his Miranda warnings or that all statements were on video. 
“For that reason, the reasons that we have given, we would ask that you grant our motion to 
suppress statement.” On rebuttal, defense counsel made reference to the length of the 
interrogation to bolster the argument that the court should infer that detectives interrogated 
defendant on the drive from Michigan: “As you can see it is numerous DVDs where the 
questioning continues and continues until they get the statement they want. I think it is not 
credible to believe they would wait an hour and a half when they have him, and apparently for 
whatever reasons he is talking.” 
¶ 15 
 
Ten days later, the court ruled that defendant’s confessions would not be suppressed. The 
court summarized the testimony heard and noted the allegations of physical and mental 
coercion. “The only grounds—possible grounds would be the handcuffing behind the back.” 
The court acknowledged that defendant had said they were tight, but concluded they had no 
coercive effect on defendant. The court concluded: “But in reading the transcript and looking 
at the video, on the first page of the transcript and the video, when they brought him into the 
station into the interview room, what the defendant said is—in this Court’s opinion is 
extremely important. He said—he asked to take the cuffs off, please, the cuffs. All right. Turn 
around. The defendant said, I can’t see. I can’t wait to get them off. Hold still. Can I get some 
water? You’re just glad to get them off. And his answer was—and this is the defendant upon 
getting his handcuffs off—it’s all good.” The court noted that the detectives had made the trip 
in about an hour and a half and concluded there was no evidence of physical coercion. Further, 
the court noted both detectives had testified credibly that they had read defendant the Miranda 
warning. The motion to suppress was denied, and defendant did not renew any challenge to the 
admission of his confessions until his posttrial motion. 
¶ 16 
 
At trial, Dorian Skyles testified pursuant to a plea agreement. Skyles had previously faced 
a first-degree murder charge. In exchange for his testimony, he pled guilty to home invasion 
and conspiracy to commit murder, receiving 17-year and 7-year sentences, to run concurrently. 
Skyles testified that he gave defendant a gun to carry out the robbery but that he was not 
involved in carrying it out. Instead, he and Jetun Coburn parked down the street, without the 
robbery’s direct participants being aware. Skyles testified that he heard shots fired, and 
defendant and the others fled from the house shortly after. Skyles also testified that he and 
defendant had discussed that Stanley would need to be killed, as they believed police would be 
able to track the robbery plot back to Stanley. Skyles denied that Jetun Coburn was involved in 
that conversation. He testified that he had dropped Stanley off for defendant to pick up in 
 
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Coburn’s Impala and that defendant later called him saying he had lost the keys to the Impala. 
He acknowledged that he had initially lied to police and that he was a three-time felon who was 
selling drugs for his occupation at that time. 
¶ 17 
 
Cordell Matthews testified he had been invited by defendant to participate in the robbery 
with defendant, Skyles, and Stanley, but Matthews declined. He further testified that defendant 
called him the next day and said Stanley had shot Coleman and that Stanley and defendant had 
been armed. Matthews denied remembering whether defendant had told him that he had fired a 
gun and was impeached with his grand jury testimony from November 23, 2005. Matthews 
then admitted he had told the grand jury that defendant said Stanley had called out that 
Coleman had a gun when Coleman opened the door and that defendant then shot Coleman 
twice in the leg. Matthews also testified he went to Skyles’s and Coburn’s home in East 
Chicago, Indiana, with defendant, Stanley, and others. He denied remembering defendant and 
Skyles leaving the main room there but was impeached with his grand jury testimony in which 
he stated he heard them in the back room, discussing a plan to kill Stanley. Matthews’ grand 
jury testimony also indicated Skyles had given defendant a gun for that purpose. Matthews 
testified he rode back to defendant’s house with defendant in Coburn’s Impala. He testified he 
did not remember defendant doing anything with the license plates but was impeached with his 
grand jury testimony in which he stated defendant put his temporary plates on the Impala and 
drove away. 
¶ 18 
 
Matthews testified he could not remember if, later that night, defendant had been driving 
Matthews around in defendant’s own car and stopped on a bridge. He was then impeached with 
his own grand jury testimony, in which he stated defendant had stopped the car on the bridge 
from Indiana, gotten out of the car, and thrown a gun wrapped in a black shirt into the river. 
Asked why he was giving different answers now from his grand jury testimony, Matthews 
asserted he was “drunk and intoxicated” when he made those statements. He had been in police 
custody for approximately two days at that point; the State later brought forward an assistant 
State’s Attorney who testified that Matthews did not exhibit any signs of intoxication and had 
given a coherent and detailed statement on a complex case. On cross-examination, Matthews 
also acknowledged he was scared to be in police custody and had given many inconsistent 
versions of events. 
¶ 19 
 
Some of defendant’s statements were brought into evidence through the testimony of 
Detective Ford, who laid the foundation for them. Defendant sought to have all of the DVDs 
introduced if any portion of them were to be introduced. The court admitted the conversations 
offered by the State, noting that defendant could bring in background through testimony as 
needed. Defense counsel cross-examined Ford about the discomfort caused by bringing 
defendant down from Michigan in handcuffs, given that he was a teenager weighing about 300 
pounds. Defense counsel cross-examined Ford about whether defendant had been able to get 
any sleep amid extensive questioning. Defense counsel cross-examined Ford about whether 
detectives had deceived defendant by saying they had DNA evidence linking him to the crimes 
and that there were witnesses. Ford acknowledged they had. Defense counsel also 
cross-examined Ford on whether defendant might have been so deferential to the police 
questioning him that he might not have been telling the truth when he admitted guilt. 
Defendant did not object at that time to the admission of the DVDs on the basis that his 
confessions were involuntary. 
 
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¶ 20 
 
Aside from defendant’s own statements, the major points of evidence implicating him in 
Stanley’s death were the testimony of Skyles, the grand jury testimony of Matthews, the 
presence of defendant’s DNA on a hat in the Impala, and the Impala’s temporary plates 
registered to his residence, which Matthews had testified to seeing defendant place on the car. 
The weapon used to kill Stanley was never found, but unrebutted evidence at trial indicated the 
same gun was used to shoot both Stanley and Coleman. The State emphasized these points in 
its closing arguments, along with defendant’s flight to Michigan the day after Stanley’s 
murder. The State’s closing argument did not discuss the voluntariness of defendant’s 
statement. 
¶ 21 
 
Defendant’s closing argument considered Skyles to be the mastermind of the Coleman 
robbery and Stanley murder, describing how the witnesses in the case should be viewed as 
untruthful. Moving on to defendant’s confession, defense counsel brought up that defendant 
was only a teenager when he made those statements, that he had been in discomfort from the 
handcuffs, and that the court should look very carefully at the defendant’s “age, his 
intelligence, his background, his experience, his mental capacity, his education, his physical 
condition,” along with the duration of questioning. Defense counsel also argued detectives 
deceived defendant, that defendant was emotionally fragile from learning his grandfather had 
died recently, and that defendant was afraid of Dorian Skyles. These concerns should prompt 
the court to consider his confessions unreliable, defense counsel argued. “Under those 
conditions, Judge, I would suggest to you that his confession is not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. *** Judge, there are other cases that courts recognized where people confess not 
because of coercion or by the police, but they confess voluntarily to facts that simply aren’t 
true, facts that simply couldn’t be true when you learn more physical evidence.” (Emphasis 
added.) Defense counsel repeatedly questioned the reliability of these statements and 
repeatedly suggested they were voluntary. 
“And we understand that even if they are voluntary, even if there’s been a pre-trial 
hearing and there’s been a ruling, there’s been no constitutional violations, they still 
can be unreliable. And we don’t leave it up to the trier of fact to decide if a confession 
alone is enough. We have a rule that says it is not because we recognize that. The Court 
in Smith2 said—the United States Supreme Court said though a statement may not be 
quote, involuntarily, unquote within the meaning of the exclusionary rule, its reliability 
may be suspect if it is extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police 
investigation, whose words may reflect the strain and confusion attending this 
predicament rather than a clear reflection of his past. *** Judge, I would submit to you 
that that is what we have here, a false confession voluntarily made because of the age of 
Mr. Hughes, because of his condition, because of the duration of the questioning, 
because of his fear of Dorian Skyles and because of his emotional state because of the 
loss of his grandfather, who he clearly loves from that portion of the tape.” (Emphasis 
added.)  
The remainder of defendant’s closing argument focused on why the court should not find the 
other witnesses credible, why the physical evidence was unconvincing, and why the court 
should be concerned about the statements Detective Ford made. The State’s rebuttal argument 
                                                 
 
2Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954). 
 
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focused on the sufficiency of the evidence even if the court did not find defendant’s confession 
to be reliable. 
¶ 22 
 
The court found defendant guilty of both murders. The court recited the various pieces of 
evidence on which it relied, including the testimony of Skyles and grand jury testimony of 
Matthews. In its finding of fact, it specifically found defendant had not been coerced, and that 
his words were “a clear reflection of the past. He was not making anything up.” The court also 
found other indicia of reliability: “in regards to his age, intelligence, his background and 
experience, his education, the duration of the conversations and any abuse, there was no abuse. 
As the State has mentioned the Defendant was 19 years old at the time, he was intelligent, he 
was able to explain in regards to the event that occurred on those two nights exactly what 
happened, how things progressed from one stage to the other.” The trial court’s ruling 
contained no discussion of voluntariness. 
¶ 23 
 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion contained a number of general claims, 
asserting the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the finding was 
against the weight of evidence, the defendant was denied due process of law and equal 
protection of the laws, and the defendant did not receive a fair trial. It included approximately 
twenty more detailed claims, e.g., “The Court erred in allowing Dorian Skyles to testify, over 
objection, that Joshua Stanley said he knew a guy who won $1.2 million on lottery and he 
wanted to rob him, and that he learned this information from the guy’s nephew, Angelo” and 
“The Court erred in sustaining an objection to questioning of Detective Ford as to whether 
Cavinaugh Hughes expressed his relief to the detective when the detective removed his 
handcuffs.” The motion also stated that “[t]he Court erred in denying defendant’s Motion to 
Suppress statement,” with no further discussion on voluntariness or the reason behind that 
claim. 
¶ 24 
 
At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel acknowledged the court had presided over 
the case recently and opted not to “go into great detail.” Defense counsel asked the court to 
grant the motion for “each and every allegation in the motion,” but particularly for the 
credibility problems of the State’s witnesses. 
“Additional evidence in this case, Judge, was the statements Mr. Hughes made to the 
detective in the police station here in Chicago, and I’d ask your Honor to reconsider 
your ruling based on the fact that Mr. Hughes appears on the tapes that your Honor saw 
to be attempting to please the detective, and cooperate with him, and give him the 
answers that he wants. *** There were misstatements by the detective to induce him to 
give the statement, and based on the caliber of the civilian witnesses, all of whom had 
reasons to fear that they would be charged themselves, including Jetun Coleman [sic] 
who actually asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege so she would not have to testify 
because of her fear of being involved in this, and based on the fact that Mr. Hughes was 
a very young person, just a teenager, and being pressured and held all night during the 
time he was giving the statements, we would ask you to consider—reconsider your 
findings of guilty as to the two first degree murder charges. In addition, Judge, we 
would ask in the alternative that you grant him a new trial based on the trial error.” 
No additional indication was given on the record as to which trial error was referenced, but 
Coburn’s fifth amendment privilege was among the written claims in the motion for a new 
trial. The State’s argument focused on the strength of evidence presented and argued the court 
 
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had been correct to recognize Coburn’s privilege. The trial court denied the motion for a new 
trial. 
¶ 25 
 
Before the appellate court, defendant argued that his confession to shooting Coleman was 
involuntary and should have been suppressed. Specifically, he argued he was 19 years old and 
had only a ninth-grade education, having gotten Cs and Ds in school. He’d had little to no sleep 
when he made his statement. The State provided no evidence about when Hughes had last slept 
before being arrested in Michigan, and he could not have slept on the way down from 
Michigan due to his discomfort. The videos indicated he did not sleep for any significant 
amount of time in the interrogation room at Area Two, and he fell asleep in the polygraph 
examiner’s chair while she was out of the room. Further, he was susceptible to suggestion as he 
was suffering from severe emotional distress due to the death of his grandfather, with whom he 
was close. On the tape, defendant began speaking aloud to his grandfather while detectives 
were out of the interrogation room. Defendant was additionally the victim of deceptive and 
coercive police conduct, when Detective Ford falsely indicated there were numerous 
eyewitnesses against defendant and that the shots to Coleman’s legs had been the fatal ones. 
Likewise, Detective Figueroa-Mitchell indicated she would testify about who passed a 
polygraph, and that court needed to know Hughes was sorry. Defendant also argued he was 
susceptible to suggestion due to his substance abuse, using marijuana five to six times a day 
and drinking four to five glasses of cognac twice a week. Finally, defendant pointed toward his 
minimal prior contact with the criminal justice system and the relentless nature of the 
questioning. The error of admitting his confession, defendant argued, was not harmless 
because the evidence was closely balanced, given the credibility problems of Skyles and 
Matthews. Defendant did not present any argument about his confession to shooting Stanley or 
whether the evidence in that case was closely balanced. 
¶ 26 
 
The State first argued defendant “should be estopped from raising this claim based upon 
his affirmative waiver of this issue where he did not present these reasons at his motion to 
suppress in the trial court.” The State further argued that a reviewing court may not consider 
trial evidence to reverse a trial court’s decision denying a motion to suppress, relying on 
People v. La Bostrie, 14 Ill. 2d 617, 620-21 (1958), and People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 128 
(1999) (“By not asking the court to reconsider its ruling on the motion to suppress when that 
evidence was introduced at trial, defendant has waived his right to argue it on appeal.”). The 
State countered defendant’s specific contentions on voluntariness point for point and 
additionally argued the evidence was not closely balanced. 
¶ 27 
 
The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, agreed with defendant. First, the appellate 
court held the admission of defendant’s confession was not forfeited, insofar as he raised the 
issue of voluntariness in a motion in limine and a posttrial motion. 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, 
¶ 42. While he raised some additional theories on appeal, the appellate court found he had 
raised the issue under sufficiently similar theories, citing People v. Hyland, 2012 IL App (1st) 
110966, ¶¶ 27-28. The appellate court concluded the trial court “had every opportunity to 
meaningfully review and rule on the same essential claim raised on appeal, namely, 
involuntariness.” 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 46. The court further found that, even if it had 
been forfeited, the admission of defendant’s confession could be reviewed under first-prong 
plain error, insofar as it was a clear and obvious error among otherwise balanced evidence. The 
appellate court reversed, finding defendant’s confession involuntary due to a confluence of 
issues: his age and educational level (id. ¶¶ 56-57), being handcuffed on the ride from 
 
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Michigan (id. ¶ 58), his sleep deprivation and the length of interrogation (id. ¶¶ 59-60), food 
deprivation (id. ¶ 60), his prior substance abuse (id. ¶ 62), and police deception and deceptive 
use of polygraph results in particular (id. ¶¶ 72-78). The appellate majority was additionally 
troubled by the unbriefed and unargued issue of defendant’s apparent use of cannabis while in 
police custody and shortly before his polygraph examination, while officers were out of the 
interrogation room. Id. ¶ 71. The appellate court concluded it was not clear that defendant’s 
grief over his grandfather’s death hampered the voluntariness of his statements. Id. ¶ 61. The 
appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial on both the Coleman and Stanley 
murders, with the confessions suppressed. 
¶ 28 
 
The dissenting justice concluded these points were forfeited and rebutted point for point. 
The dissenting justice noted defendant filed a “boilerplate motion to suppress” urging “every 
ground imaginable as a basis to suppress.” Id. ¶ 91 (Mason, J., dissenting). The dissenting 
justice concluded defendant did not raise the “same essential claim” on appeal and must be 
deemed to have forfeited those arguments. Id. ¶ 94. The dissenting justice concluded the 
majority had, by reviewing the interrogation and confessions de novo, wandered into fact 
finding, “a function incompatible with any recognized standard of review.” Id. ¶ 97. The 
dissent took issue with the appellate majority’s raising and deciding the unbriefed issue of 
defendant’s marijuana use in custody and specifically contested the majority’s interpretation of 
the video. Id. ¶¶ 99-115. 
¶ 29 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
¶ 30 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 31 
 
It is “axiomatic” that a conviction based, “in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession, 
regardless of its truth or falsity,” violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 n.33 (1966). “The test of voluntariness is whether the individual 
made his confession freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement of any kind, or 
whether the individual’s will was overborne at the time of the confession.” People v. Morgan, 
197 Ill. 2d 404, 437 (2001). Courts weighing the voluntariness of a confession consider the 
“totality of the circumstances,” including the defendant’s “age, intelligence, background, 
experience, education, mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning,” 
along with the duration and legality of the detention. People v. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, 
¶ 30. Courts also consider whether there was any physical or mental abuse, including if police 
made threats or promises to a defendant. Id. No single factor is dispositive. Id. The State has 
the burden of establishing the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession by a preponderance 
of the evidence. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 501 (1996). 
¶ 32 
 
The trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be disturbed only if they are 
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 29. We review the 
trial court’s ultimate finding on voluntariness de novo. Id. 
¶ 33 
 
This case additionally concerns arguments of waiver and forfeiture. The State contends 
defendant affirmatively waived those arguments raised on appeal that were not raised before 
the trial court. Citing People v. McAdrian, the State argues that parties have the right to address 
the arguments made by their opponents and to rely on intentional waiver when arguments are 
deliberately not made. People v. McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254 (1972). The State additionally 
analogizes to the invited error rule, wherein a party cannot complain of error that it brought 
 
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about or participated in. People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227-28 (2001). The State 
additionally points toward our decision in People v. White, for the proposition that a court of 
review should decline to answer a question for which no adequate record has been developed 
due to a party’s chosen strategy. People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 143. 
¶ 34 
 
Defendant argues that the grounds defense counsel argued at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress were additional grounds, such that all of the original written grounds were never 
withdrawn. Defendant further points out that it was the State that introduced the entirety of the 
interrogation videos. Defendant additionally argues that a defendant need not argue identical 
grounds for suppression at trial and on appeal, pointing to Hyland, 2012 IL App 110966, ¶ 27. 
¶ 35 
 
Beyond the threshold issue of claim preservation, the State additionally argues the 
appellate court exceeded the scope of review in reversing defendant’s conviction for the 
Stanley murder when defendant presented no evidence and in considering the issue of 
defendant’s putative in-custody marijuana consumption sua sponte. Finally the State argues 
admission of defendant’s confession was proper. 
¶ 36 
 
Defendant asks that if this court should conclude the appellate court exceeded the scope of 
review in reversing the Stanley murder conviction that it nonetheless affirm reversal of the 
Coleman conviction. In the alternative, defendant asks this court to remand for a new hearing 
on voluntariness, if we do not affirm the appellate court outright. Defendant additionally 
renews his appellate grounds for finding the confession involuntary. 
¶ 37 
 
We believe the State has the better view on the threshold question of claim preservation. 
The question is closely related to the doctrines of forfeiture and waiver. We should 
acknowledge that these two terms have been used interchangeably at times, particularly in the 
criminal context, despite representing distinct doctrines. “As this court has noted, there is a 
difference between waiver and forfeiture. While waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a 
known right, forfeiture is the failure to timely comply with procedural requirements. 
[Citations.] These characterizations apply equally to criminal and civil matters. Thus, while 
Sullivan [v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100 (2004),] spoke in terms of waiver, a party’s 
failure to raise an issue in its petition for leave to appeal may equally be deemed a forfeiture of 
that issue.” Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, 320 n.2 (2008). Whether 
we were to consider this question under waiver or forfeiture, a drastic change in arguments can 
prompt the same problems on appeal. 
¶ 38 
 
In People v. Caballero, this court noted the lack of judicial economy in raising forfeited 
issues. “Failure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court the opportunity to grant a new 
trial, if warranted. This casts a needless burden of preparing and processing appeals upon 
appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution, and upon the court of review.” People v. 
Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31 (1984). The Caballero court noted the posttrial motion needed to 
limit consideration to errors considered significant, lest the appeal become open-ended. 
“Appellate counsel may comb the record for every semblance of error and raise issues on 
appeal whether or not trial counsel considered them of any importance. In this case, for 
instance, 18 issues have been raised on appeal, some of which were obviously considered 
insignificant by trial counsel.” Id. at 32. This court has also previously noted how new factual 
theories on appeal deprive the formerly prevailing party of the opportunity to present evidence 
on that point. McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d at 254 (“The failure to urge a particular theory before the 
trial court will often cause the opposing party to refrain from presenting available pertinent 
 
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rebuttal evidence on such theory, which evidence could have a positive bearing on the 
disposition of the case in both the trial and reviewing courts.”). 
¶ 39 
 
This court has more recently recognized that a defendant’s affirmative waiver of the right 
to challenge the admission of lineup evidence could skew the record on appeal. 
 
“However, the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the lineup, and those 
leading up to it, are less clearly developed. Because defense counsel never moved to 
suppress the lineup identifications on grounds defendant now asserts, there was no 
suppression hearing; hence the State may not have adduced all available evidence 
bearing upon defendant’s current constitutional contentions. Thus, we do not have a 
record equitably compiled for the purpose of addressing the attachment issue defendant 
actually raised in his petition for leave to appeal and in his opening brief, nor for the 
issue we might have to address in the event we were to find the right to counsel had 
attached at the time of the lineup. Neither side presented arguments applicable thereto. 
In sum, we are not confident that all of the evidence that could have been brought to 
bear on these issues was in fact adduced.” White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 143. 
The White court declined to hear that issue, in part because of the lack of a “record equitably 
compiled for the purpose.” Id. 
¶ 40 
 
We find that all of these concerns motivating the doctrines of forfeiture and waiver apply 
with equal vigor here. Despite defendant’s arguments that he is making the same claims, his 
reasons for suppression in the trial and appellate courts, while not factually hostile to one 
another, are almost wholly distinct from one another. At the suppression hearing, defense 
counsel acknowledged the very broadly worded motion, then stated “I just want to give notice 
to counsel those are the grounds we will be proceeding on.” Defense counsel proceeded to 
present argument about defendant’s handcuffs being too tight on the ride down from Michigan 
and whether the court might infer that detectives interviewed him without having given 
defendant the Miranda warning. Contrary to defendant’s current argument that these were 
additional grounds for suppression, they fit entirely within the motion’s claims of interrogation 
without the benefit of Miranda warnings and physical and psychological coercion being 
directed at defendant. 
¶ 41 
 
Further, defense counsel presented no evidence and produced no argument as to sleep 
deprivation, food deprivation, the defendant’s education, his age, his grief at the loss of his 
grandfather, his lack of exposure to the criminal justice system, or his abuse of drugs and 
alcohol. There was minimal cross-examination about police deception, but little substantial 
argument. All of this information was available to defendant at the time of the suppression 
hearing, either through his own personal knowledge or his review of the interrogation video. 
Notably, defense counsel relied on the video interrogation in the suppression hearing solely for 
an event that occurred within minutes of its start. The State had the responsibility to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant’s confession was voluntary. Defendant 
thereafter did not utilize the video in the hearing on the motion to suppress, and it must be 
presumed this was defendant’s tactical choice. 
¶ 42 
 
When the State later sought to introduce video of defendant’s confession in its case in 
chief, defendant did not renew any objection to it on the basis it was involuntary. Instead, 
counsel’s objection focused on incompleteness, as the State introduced only individual 
conversations and not the entire course of interrogation. At closing argument, defense counsel 
 
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pointed to a variety of factors about the defendant and the interrogation that should make the 
confession suspect, but only as to the reliability of that confession. Even where a confession 
has been determined to be voluntary, a defendant might still attack it as unreliable. See, e.g., 
People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 465 (1992) (holding that polygraph evidence should have 
been admitted for the purpose of determining the credibility and reliability of the confession 
where it had been ruled voluntary). Counsel conceded the confession was voluntary, 
repeatedly suggesting it was a “false confession voluntarily made.” 
¶ 43 
 
Defendant never renewed the call for suppression of the confession until the posttrial 
motion. The motion for a new trial did assert that “[t]he Court erred in denying defendant’s 
Motion to Suppress statement,” but the written motion provided no further detail or argument 
on that point. The oral argument on the posttrial motion was, likewise, not sufficient to give the 
trial court any indication the intended focus was voluntariness. The oral argument stated a 
variety of the factors counsel had previously argued as to the unreliability of defendant’s 
confession and asked the court to “reconsider your findings of guilty as to the two first degree 
murder charges.” Nothing in the oral argument on the motion distinguished this as a 
voluntariness argument, rather than a renewal of counsel’s closing argument as to reliability. 
The oral argument on the motion concluded by asking the court to “grant him a new trial based 
on the trial error.” Nothing in the oral argument indicated whether “the trial error” was a 
particular one of the twenty specific trial errors claimed, one of the generic claims of error, or 
that “[t]he Court erred in denying defendant’s Motion to Suppress statement.” 
¶ 44 
 
Throughout the suppression hearing, the admission of the confession at trial, the closing 
argument, and the posttrial motion argument, nothing in the record indicates the trial court was 
given the opportunity to consider the bulk of these arguments that defendant’s confession was 
involuntary. Likewise, the State was never given the opportunity to present evidence or 
argument that defendant’s confession was voluntary even as against these challenges. To the 
extent defense counsel germinated the seeds of these arguments, they were against the 
confession’s reliability. The State was never provided notice these arguments would attack the 
admissibility of the confession, such that the State never had an opportunity to rebut them. 
¶ 45 
 
Defendant has argued that he need not state identical grounds for contesting the issue of 
voluntariness, citing Hyland, 2012 IL App (1st) 110966, ¶ 27. Hyland relied on our holding in 
People v. Mohr that a defendant’s posttrial argument that the State had inadequately supported 
a jury instruction on provocation and initial objection that the State did not back up its claim of 
provocation with evidence were “close enough” to preserve the issue for review. People v. 
Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 64-65 (2008). In Hyland, the appellate court concluded a defendant’s 
motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause to arrest him was sufficiently similar to his 
posttrial motion about the investigative alert lacking probable cause. Hyland, 2012 IL App 
(1st) 110966, ¶¶ 26-27. We need not pass on whether Hyland was an appropriate application of 
Mohr, because defendant’s contentions regarding voluntariness at trial and on appeal were 
almost entirely distinct. We conclude defendant did not adequately preserve these claims. 
¶ 46 
 
Because defendant failed to produce an adequate record for the appellate court to review 
voluntariness under these new theories, the appellate court ought not to have decided these 
factual issues anew. The dissenting justice below quite aptly pointed out the difficulty of 
discerning the appellate majority’s standard of review; this was because the appellate majority 
was deciding new issues of fact for the first time on appeal. Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, 
 
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¶ 117 (Mason, J., dissenting) (concluding “the majority engages in a detailed factual analysis 
of the contents of the videotape as if an evidentiary hearing addressing these issues had been 
conducted in the trial court, which, of course, it was not. Therefore, it is unclear under what 
standard the majority is reaching the conclusions it finds warrant reversal.” (Emphasis in 
original.)). By declining or failing to raise these claims below, defendant deprived the State of 
the opportunity to challenge them with evidence of its own, he deprived the trial court of the 
opportunity to decide the issue on those bases, and he deprived the appellate court of an 
adequate record to make these determinations. To consider such claims preserved would also 
multiply litigation by motivating parties to address at trial all conceivable arguments that might 
later be made and by forcing the trial court to consider not only the arguments made by 
counsel, but all arguments counsel might have made. 
¶ 47 
 
Having concluded defendant did not adequately preserve these distinct claims for appeal, 
we find the trial court did not err in its conclusion that keeping handcuffs on defendant for the 
ride from Michigan and the possibility of interrogation without Miranda warnings did not 
render defendant’s confession involuntary. The trial court found, as a factual matter, that 
Detective Ford credibly testified he had read defendant the Miranda warning both before and 
after the ride from Michigan. The trial court likewise found defendant had not been physically 
or psychologically coerced by the presence of handcuffs on him. Though the decision to take a 
rental car to pick up an out-of-state murder suspect may be questionable—given that officer 
safety will then require handcuffing the suspect for the duration of the ride home—we likewise 
do not find that it alone was sufficient to render defendant’s confession involuntary. We have 
concluded the trial court did not err in declining to suppress defendant’s confession to Elijah 
Coleman’s murder. This conclusion applies a fortiori to the earlier confession to shooting 
Joshua Stanley, which the appellate court suppressed despite defendant having presented no 
argument on it there. 
¶ 48 
 
Neither party has argued the appellate court’s correction of defendant’s mittimus, and we 
leave that portion of the appellate decision undisturbed. Accordingly, we affirm the correction 
of the mittimus and reverse the appellate court as to the suppression of defendant’s confession. 
The decision of the circuit court is otherwise affirmed. 
 
¶ 49 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 50 
 
While defendant adequately preserved the broad issue of voluntariness of his confession, 
his arguments on appeal are almost entirely distinct from his arguments before the trial court. 
The drastic shift in factual theories deprived the State of the opportunity to present evidence on 
them. A court of review could not be confident in the adequacy of this record to address those 
arguments. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed as to suppression and affirmed as to 
mittimus. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for issuance of a corrected mittimus giving 
defendant credit for his custody starting October 26, 2006, until sentencing. 
 
¶ 51 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
¶ 52 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 53 
 
Cause remanded. 
 
 
 
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¶ 54 
 
JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring: 
¶ 55 
 
I agree with the majority that the judgment of the appellate court must be reversed. I 
disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis, which omits some necessary steps. I therefore 
specially concur. 
 
¶ 56 
 
 
 
 
The Majority Does Not Address the Jurisdictional Issue 
 
 
 
 
Which This Court Ordered the Parties to Brief 
¶ 57 
 
Defendant was arrested for the murders of two people, Elijah Coleman and Joshua Stanley. 
After questioning by police officers, defendant admitted shooting Stanley. Later, after a 
polygraph test and further questioning, defendant gave a second confession in which he 
admitted shooting Coleman. 
¶ 58 
 
Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Cook County in two separate indictments. In 
case No. 06-CR-26159, defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of Coleman, home 
invasion and attempted armed robbery. In case No. 06-CR-26160, defendant was charged with 
the first-degree murder of Stanley. The State filed a motion to join the cases for trial, which 
was granted by the circuit court. 
¶ 59 
 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress both of his confessions. That motion was 
denied. A bench trial followed. At trial, the state produced evidence which tended to show that 
defendant shot and killed Coleman during a home invasion and that, the next day, defendant 
shot and killed Stanley, who was an accomplice, to prevent him from talking about the murder 
of Coleman. 
¶ 60 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, defendant was convicted of all charges. He was sentenced to 
two terms of natural life imprisonment: one term for the murder of Coleman and one term for 
the murder of Stanley. 
¶ 61 
 
On appeal, defendant did not challenge the circuit court’s order denying his motion to 
suppress his confession that he shot Stanley (2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 1), and the appellate 
court did not discuss that confession. 3  However, the appellate court concluded that 
defendant’s confession that he shot Coleman was involuntary (id. ¶¶ 80-81) and, therefore, the 
circuit court erred in admitting that confession into evidence. The appellate court reversed 
defendant’s conviction for the murder of Coleman4 and remanded for a new trial. We granted 
the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 
                                                 
 
3The majority states that the appellate court ordered the suppression of defendant’s confession that 
he shot Stanley. Supra ¶ 47. This is incorrect. The appellate court never addressed the admissibility of 
defendant’s first confession and never ordered its suppression. In fact, the appellate court expressly 
stated that “[Defendant] killed Stanley.” 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 82. 
 
4The appellate court’s disposition of the Stanley case, No. 06-CR-26160, is unclear. On the one 
hand, the judgment of the appellate court was simply to “reverse and remand for a new trial.” 2013 IL 
App (1st) 110237, ¶ 83. Without further elaboration, this would suggest that the appellate court 
intended to reverse both of defendant’s convictions. On the other hand, the appellate court never 
suppressed, or even discussed, defendant’s confession that he shot Stanley and, as noted previously, the 
court stated that “[Defendant] killed Stanley.” Id. ¶ 82. This makes it difficult to conclude that the 
appellate court meant to reverse defendant’s conviction for murdering Stanley but, instead, may have 
intended only to reverse the Coleman conviction. In any event, because this court holds that both of 
defendant’s convictions must be affirmed, it is not necessary to explore this further. 
 
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¶ 62 
 
After initial briefing was completed in this court, and before oral argument, this court 
ordered the parties to provide additional briefing on an issue affecting the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court. The caption at the top of the notice of appeal to the appellate court contained 
the case No. 06-CR-26160, the number for the Stanley case. The notice of appeal thereby 
vested the appellate court with jurisdiction over the judgment of conviction rendered against 
defendant for the murder of Stanley. However, the caption to the notice of appeal did not 
contain the number for the Coleman case, No. 06-CR-26159. 
¶ 63 
 
In the appellate court, defendant’s appellant counsel sought, and the appellate court 
granted, an order amending the notice of appeal to add the number of the Coleman case. 
However, the request to amend the notice of appeal was filed some 15 months after the notice 
was filed, well beyond the time for amending a notice of appeal permitted under our rules. See 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b), (c), (d) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014); R. 303(b)(5) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). This court’s 
order to the parties for additional briefing directed them to address whether the notice of appeal 
was sufficient to vest the appellate court with jurisdiction over both cases. 
¶ 64 
 
Oddly, the majority says nothing about this issue. This is clearly error. If an issue is of such 
importance to the proceedings that the parties must be ordered to submit additional briefing, 
then surely it is a matter that must be addressed by this court. This is particularly true here since 
the issue is one of jurisdiction and determining whether the appellate court had jurisdiction is a 
necessary first step to our reviewing the merits of the appellate court’s decision. 
¶ 65 
 
I would address the jurisdictional issue. I would hold that the notice of appeal was 
sufficient to vest the appellate court with jurisdiction over the judgments of conviction in both 
cases. 
¶ 66 
 
The purpose of a notice of appeal is to inform the party prevailing in the circuit court that 
the unsuccessful party seeks review of the judgment. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 
(2008). The notice is to be construed liberally. Id. The notice of appeal “ ‘should be considered 
as a whole and will be deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court when it 
fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising 
the successful litigant of the nature of the appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘Where the deficiency in notice is 
one of form, rather than substance, and the appellee is not prejudiced, the failure to comply 
strictly with the form of notice is not fatal.’ [Citation.]” Id. at 105. 
¶ 67 
 
Here, while the caption to the notice of appeal did not contain the number of the Coleman 
case, the body of the notice stated that defendant was appealing “OFFENSES: FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER.” The body of the appeal further indicated that defendant received two 
sentences of life imprisonment (“LIFE IMPRISONMENT (2)”) for those first-degree murder 
convictions. Thus, not only were the cases tried jointly at the State’s request, but the body of 
the notice of appeal explicitly provided that defendant was appealing multiple offenses of 
first-degree murder, thereby necessarily encompassing both cases, and the notice stated that 
defendant was appealing the convictions resulting in his two life sentences. Subsequent 
proceedings in the appellate court also made it clear that defendant was appealing the Coleman 
case. Moreover, the State, in its additional briefing in this court, has acknowledged that it 
understood defendant to be appealing both cases and that it was not prejudiced in any way by 
the omission of the Coleman case number in the caption of the notice of appeal. Under these 
circumstances, I would find the notice of appeal sufficient. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 144 Ill. 
App. 3d 184, 185 (1986) (jurisdiction found where pro se notice of appeal contained the wrong 
 
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case number but the body of the notice referred to the correct case). Accordingly, I would hold 
that the appellate court had jurisdiction over both cases, and, therefore, we may address the 
merits of the appellate court’s decision. 
 
¶ 68 
 
 
 
 
The Majority Does Not Address Defendant’s 
 
 
 
 
Plain Error Argument 
¶ 69 
 
The appellate court held that defendant’s confession that he shot Coleman was involuntary 
based upon defendant’s character, which included his age, education and experience with the 
criminal justice system, defendant’s physical condition, in that he was “visibly spent” and 
“drug-addled” at the time of the confession, and police “trickery.” 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, 
¶ 80. Before this court, the State points out that the only arguments offered by defendant in 
support of his motion to suppress were that, during transport from a Michigan jail to a jail in 
Chicago, the police (1) improperly questioned him without the benefit of an electronic 
recording; (2) failed to read him his Miranda rights; and (3) handcuffed him in an 
uncomfortable manner. The State further notes that at trial, defendant did not renew his claim 
of involuntariness. Instead, defendant argued only that his confession was unreliable. 
Therefore, according to the State, defendant abandoned any claim that his confession was 
involuntary on the grounds relied upon by the appellate court and the court erred in ordering 
that the confession be suppressed. 
¶ 70 
 
Defendant, in response, contends that his claims were properly preserved. In the 
alternative, defendant maintains that, even if they were not, the admission of his confession 
that he shot Coleman was plain error. Therefore, defendant contends, the appellate court was 
correct to find his confession involuntary. 
¶ 71 
 
The majority holds that defendant “did not adequately preserve” his claims that the 
Coleman confession was involuntary on the grounds relied upon by the appellate court. Supra 
¶ 45. However, the majority never addresses defendant’s alternative argument, i.e., that even if 
those claims were not adequately preserved, there was, nevertheless, plain error. This is a 
critical omission. The appellate court’s judgment can only be reversed if defendant’s plain 
error argument is incorrect. If defendant is, in fact, correct, and there is plain error, then the 
judgment of the appellate court reversing defendant’s conviction for the murder of Coleman 
must be affirmed. It is necessary, therefore, to address defendant’s plain error argument. 
¶ 72 
 
I would reject defendant’s contention that the admission of his confession to shooting 
Coleman was plain error. Justice Mason, writing in dissent in the appellate court, persuasively 
explained why there was no error in the admission of defendant’s confession and, therefore, no 
plain error. I would adopt the reasoning of Justice Mason’s dissent in toto and incorporate it 
herein. 
¶ 73 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I specially concur. 
¶ 74 
 
JUSTICES THOMAS and KILBRIDE join in this special concurrence.