Title: Williams v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 48S05-1507-CR-424
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2015

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
 
David W. Stone IV 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Anderson, Indiana 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Eric P. Babbs 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________  
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 48S05-1507-CR-424 
 
WENZEL WILLIAMS, 
 
Appellant (Defendant),  
 
V. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff).  
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court No. 4, No. 48C04-1402-FB-192 
The Honorable David A. Happe, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 48A05-1407-CR-321 
_________________________________ 
 
October 26, 2015 
 
Rush, Chief Justice. 
Indiana Evidence Rule 704(a) generally allows witness opinion testimony to “embrace” an 
ultimate issue—but as a matter of constitutional right, only a jury may resolve an ultimate issue. 
And Evidence Rule 704(b) explicitly prohibits, in criminal cases, witness opinions concerning the 
ultimate issue of guilt.  
In Defendant’s trial for drug dealing, the detective who observed a controlled buy testified, 
“there’s zero doubt in my mind that that was a transaction for cocaine.” This opinion did not merely 
“embrace” an ultimate issue by implying Defendant’s guilt. It was rather an outright opinion of 
Oct 26 2015, 2:15 pm
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guilt—rendering it inadmissible under Evidence Rule 704(b) and violative of the jury’s right to 
determine the law and facts in criminal cases. The trial court therefore should have excluded that 
testimony. But because that error was harmless, we affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History  
 
In April 2013, Madison Country Drug Task Force officers and a confidential informant 
(“CI”) set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine from Defendant Wenzel Williams—at the time, 
known to them only by his street name “Bear.” On April 11, Detective Keith Gaskill, acting under-
cover, checked the CI for drugs, and after confirming that he had none, he drove the CI to meet 
Williams to complete the buy, while Detectives Jake Brooks and Clifford Cole recorded video from 
approximately thirty feet away. The three officers watched as the CI (wearing a body recording 
device or “wire”) left the car, approached Williams, and made a hand-to-hand exchange. The CI and 
Williams returned to Gaskill’s undercover vehicle where Williams asked for a ride to a nearby 
residence. After they dropped off Williams, the CI gave Gaskill the recording equipment and 0.98 
grams of crack cocaine.  
Soon after, the Task Force arranged a second controlled buy between the CI and Williams. 
Detective Gaskill dropped off the CI (again wearing a wire) at Williams’s home, and after the CI 
retrieved Williams from inside, Gaskill drove the two men to a nearby barbershop to get the drugs. 
Detective Cole and Detective Leanne Dwiggins conducted surveillance from a short distance away. 
Gaskill and the CI stayed in the car and watched Williams walk to the barbershop. Williams came 
back a few minutes later, got in the backseat, and handed the CI a baggie. Detective Gaskill then 
drove Williams home. After Williams left, the CI again handed Gaskill the baggie containing 1.30 
grams of crack cocaine and the recording equipment.  
The State charged Williams with two B-felony counts of dealing in cocaine. Ind. Code § 35-
48-4-1(a)(1)(C) (2013). Evidence at trial included audio of a phone call setting up the two buys; 
audio-video recordings of the buys themselves; testimony from the CI; and testimony from 
Detectives Brooks, Cole, Dwiggins, and Gaskill. Over the defense’s objection, Detective Gaskill 
testified:  
STATE: 
You gave the confidential informant money when he got out of the 
vehicle. Any doubt in your mind that a drug transaction took place 
in front of you? 
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GASKILL: 
On buy number one (1) on April 11th? 
STATE: 
Yes, sir.  
GASKILL: 
No. Having conducted over two hundred and fifty of these types of 
investigations, there’s zero doubt in my mind that that was a 
transaction for cocaine. 
The jury found Williams guilty on both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to two sixteen-
year terms, served concurrently, with five suspended to probation. Williams appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision. Williams v. State, 29 N.E.3d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2015), vacated. In relevant part, the Court of Appeals held that Detective Gaskill’s opinion 
testimony on witnessing a drug transaction led only to an inference of guilt, and was not an opinion 
of guilt itself in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b). Id. at 150.  
We granted transfer and now hold that Detective Gaskill’s statement was an opinion of 
Williams’s guilt that violated Rule 704(b), but its admission was harmless error. On all other 
issues, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).  
Standard of Review 
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion resulting in prejudicial error. Car-
penter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. 2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling 
is either clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or when 
the court misinterprets the law. Id. at 703. To determine whether an error prejudiced a defendant, 
“we assess the probable impact the evidence had upon the jury in light of all of the other evidence 
that was properly presented.” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014). If the conviction is 
properly supported by other independent evidence of guilt, the error is harmless. Id.  
Discussion 
I. 
Forbidden Guilt Testimony Under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) Includes Opinion Testi-
mony That the Defendant Was Dealing in Cocaine.  
Our evidence rules allow witnesses to testify to their opinion of the facts and circumstances 
if the opinion is “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; and (b) helpful to a clear under-
standing of the witness’s testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.” Ind. Evidence Rule 
701. Such an opinion is admissible even if “it embraces an ultimate issue.” Evid. R. 704(a).  
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But Evidence Rule 704(b) draws a bright-line exception: “Witnesses may not testify to opin-
ions concerning . . . guilt[] or innocence in a criminal case.” Ind. Evidence Rule 704(b). The jury, 
not the witness, is responsible for deciding the ultimate issues in a trial, and opinion testimony con-
cerning guilt “invades the province of the jury in determining what weight to place on a witness’ 
testimony.” Blanchard v. State, 802 N.E.2d 14, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Head v. State, 519 
N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988)). In other words, such testimony usurps the jury’s “right to determine 
the law and the facts,” Ind. Const. art. I, § 19, and is therefore inadmissible.  
Taken together, those principles establish that even in criminal cases, opinion testimony may 
include “evidence that leads to an [incriminating] inference, even if no witness could state [an] 
opinion with respect to that inference.” Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 
(second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 13 Robert L. Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice 
Series § 704.201 at 589 (3d ed. 2007)). But an opinion must stop short of the question of guilt—
because under Rule 704(b) and our constitution, that is one “ultimate issue” that the jury alone 
must resolve.  
Here, Detective Gaskill’s testimony that he saw a “transaction for cocaine” overstepped that 
line. His opinion did not just merely imply guilt by addressing some of the elements of Williams’s 
dealing charges. Rather, his testimony extended to the ultimate issue of guilt on one of those charges 
by stating, not merely implying, that Williams’s conduct satisfied every element of the dealing 
offense. Those elements include (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) delivering, (3) cocaine. I.C. § 35-
48-4-1(a). In the context of Detective Gaskill’s entire testimony, “transaction” necessarily refers to 
delivery by exchanging one thing for another, and the phrase “for cocaine” necessarily refers to 
Williams’s knowledge or intent that cocaine was the subject of that exchange. The testimony 
establishes both the prohibited act and the mens rea, leaving nothing for the jury to decide. In sum, 
the phrase “transaction for cocaine” in this record simply parrots the underlying offense, thereby 
establishing guilt. 
Nor is Detective Gaskill’s testimony admissible because it is cloaked as an objective state-
ment of fact instead of a more general statement of guilt. Paraphrasing all elements of an offense 
resolves the ultimate issue of guilt just as much as saying, “I know the Defendant did it.” We have 
found error in admitting officer statements like, “I thought it was you,” Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 
213, 217 (Ind. 1999), “you were there and we know it, and you know it,” Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 
5 
 
675, 686 (Ind. 2009), or even as subtle as, “Something stinks . . . I think you was looking out for 
Boogie,” Lampkins v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ind. 2002). Cf. Walker v. State, 988 N.E.2d 
341, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (finding error for admission of “if I thought that this indi-
vidual didn’t do nothing, I would be in this court saying this man is innocent”). Detective Gaskill’s 
factual assertion that a “transaction for cocaine” occurred is equally inadmissible—it declares an 
ultimate opinion of Defendant’s guilt, which Rule 704(b) leaves for the jury alone to decide.  
The State argues that excluding Detective Gaskill’s testimony would require overruling pre-
cedent allowing officers to testify to other facts like defendants’ intoxication or identity. But such 
cases are distinguishable because an opinion of intoxication or identity does not reach every element 
of the offense. An opinion on those issues may imply guilt, see Steinberg, 941 N.E.2d at 526, but 
does not embrace the ultimate question of guilt, because the State still must prove the other elements 
in order for the jury to find guilt.  
In Robles v. State, for example, the Court of Appeals allowed opinion testimony from three 
Sheriff’s deputies that the defendant, charged with OWI, was intoxicated following his arrest. 705 
N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). The deputies’ testimony did not fully resolve the OWI charge 
because the State still had to prove the defendant had been operating a vehicle while he was 
inebriated. See id. Likewise, in Goodson v. State, the Court of Appeals held that two officers could 
identify the defendant from a videotape depicting a cocaine purchase—even though that 
identification certainly led to the strong inference that the defendant was guilty of drug dealing. 747 
N.E.2d 1181, 1183–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Again, identifying the defendant on video 
in Goodson did not fully resolve the drug-dealing charge, but only one element of it. In sum, neither 
inebriation nor identity in these cases established guilt of the crimes, without proof of the 
remaining elements.  
By contrast, Detective Gaskill’s statement that “there’s zero doubt in my mind that that 
was a transaction for cocaine” crossed the line into declaring Williams’s guilt. In the context of 
this drug-dealing offense, Detective Gaskill’s testimony, unlike testimony of intoxication and iden-
tity, does not just describe or imply some elements of the offense, but all of them—including mens 
rea. Detective Gaskill could (and indeed did) imply guilt by explaining to the jury the process of 
controlled buys and utilizing confidential informants; his experience handling narcotics; and how 
narcotics are weighed and tested. He could also testify to the validity and authenticity of the audio 
6 
 
and video recordings produced during both transactions. And he could testify to all of the particular 
actions of the Defendant: that on the first buy, he handed the CI money; the CI completed a hand-
to-hand exchange with Williams; and the CI returned to the vehicle with crack cocaine. All of 
these statements would have been admissible, even though they may quite strongly “lead[] to an 
inference” of dealing in cocaine. Steinberg, 941 N.E.2d at 526. But Detective Gaskill was not 
permitted to expressly state the ultimate legal conclusion that Williams performed a “transaction 
for cocaine.” At that point, his testimony no longer merely implied guilt, but declared it just as 
conclusively as if he had stated, “there’s zero doubt in my mind that he is guilty of dealing cocaine”—
a statement that would clearly violate Rule 704(b). Since his testimony that a “transaction for 
cocaine” occurred effectively resolved the ultimate issue of guilt as to the first buy, the trial court 
abused its discretion by admitting this statement. 
II. 
Admitting the Guilt Opinion Testimony Was Harmless Error. 
While the admission of Detective Gaskill’s statement was improper, Williams must also 
show that the error was prejudicial to his substantial rights. Blount, 22 N.E.3d at 564. In evaluating 
whether erroneously admitted evidence was prejudicial, we assess its “probable impact . . . upon 
the jury in light of all of the other evidence that was properly presented. If we are satisfied the con-
viction is supported by independent evidence of guilt[,] . . . the error is harmless.” Id. Put another 
way, “we judge whether the jury’s verdict was substantially swayed. If the error had substantial 
influence, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand,” Lafayette v. State, 917 
N.E.2d 660, 666–67 (Ind. 2009) (citation omitted).  
Williams argues the inadmissible opinion testimony not only prejudiced him as to his con-
viction for the first drug buy, but also substantially affected the jury’s verdict on the second buy. We 
disagree and hold that Williams’s rights were not prejudiced by the erroneous evidentiary admission. 
Instead, there was substantial, independent evidence of guilt to support both convictions, and we are 
satisfied that the jury’s verdict was not “substantially swayed” by Detective Gaskill’s statement.  
In Blount, we found a detective’s impermissible statements did not contribute to the jury’s 
verdict because of other independent evidence of guilt. 22 N.E.3d at 568. There, the detective 
testified about an out-of-court conversation with two witnesses who identified the defendant as the 
shooter. Id. at 567. We held the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony, but that such 
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error was harmless. Id. at 569. We reached that conclusion by focusing on the other evidence pro-
vided to the jury supporting the defendant’s conviction, including two 911 calls, other witnesses’ 
testimony including a second officer at the scene, certain factual admissions by the defendant, and 
other testimony from the detective himself. Id. at 568–69.  
Just like the jury in Blount, the jury in this case heard ample evidence to independently 
convict Williams. The jury listened to a phone conversation between Williams and the CI regarding 
the first buy in which Williams said, “I just been selling out the sh** real quick” and that he would 
sell the CI two grams of crack cocaine for $80. The jury also watched a video recording showing 
Williams and the CI complete a hand-to-hand exchange, followed by Williams asking for a ride 
home. The CI testified at trial, “[Williams] handed me the . . . eight-ball of cocaine, and then he 
needed a ride back,” and the CI identified and pointed to Williams in the courtroom as the man he 
bought crack cocaine from. Detective Brooks’ testimony also identified Williams from two still 
photographs taken from surveillance of the first buy. Finally, Detective Gaskill’s testimony 
corroborated these events, stating that he witnessed a “hand exchange” between the CI and 
Williams and that the CI handed over the cocaine and the recording equipment shortly after 
Williams exited the vehicle.  
For the second buy, the jury listened to an audio recording and watched a video recording 
showing the CI and Williams complete a hand-to-hand exchange inside the undercover vehicle. 
Detective Cole testified that he watched Williams walk to the front of a barbershop where he “had 
contact with another male subject out front, they both went inside the barbershop, wasn’t very long 
at all, a minute or two (2), came back out, got back into the backseat of Detective Gaskill’s 
vehicle.” Further, the CI testified that once Williams got back into the vehicle, Williams “handed 
[him] the package . . . [t]he cocaine.” And during the audio recording of the transaction, the jury 
heard Williams state, after handing the package to the CI, “[t]hat’s some barbershop action . . . [I]t 
ain’t got a speck of baking soda in that sh**. . . . That sh** right there is good. I don’t think you 
can get better than this.” Detective Gaskill’s testimony once again corroborated these events, and 
he stated that he watched Williams hand a baggie of cocaine to the CI “[l]ike a foot, foot and a 
half in front my face.” 
Audio and video evidence from both buys, independent and consistent testimony from 
three detectives and a CI, and Williams’s own incriminating statements sufficiently show that 
8 
 
erroneously admitting Detective Gaskill’s statement was harmless with regards to both convic-
tions. Reversal is not required.  
Conclusion 
 
Detective Gaskill’s testimony that he witnessed the Defendant “conduct a transaction for 
cocaine” improperly resolved the ultimate issue of Defendant’s guilt of one drug dealing charge 
and was therefore inadmissible under Evidence Rule 704(b). But because it was harmless in light 
of the overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.  
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.