Title: State v. George Smith
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002894-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 1996

No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2894-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
George Smith, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
JUN 14, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.    Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The issue presented in this case is 
whether a defendant, as part of a plea agreement with the State, 
can enter an Alford
1 plea to a crime which was legally impossible 
for the defendant to have committed.  We hold that in order to 
accept an Alford plea, even in the context of a plea agreement, a 
                     
       
1  Alford pleas are named after the defendant in the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
case 
which 
first 
upheld 
their 
constitutionality.  See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970).  An Alford plea "is a guilty plea in which the defendant 
pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not 
admitting having committed the crime."  State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 856, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).   
   
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
2 
court must find that there is strong proof of guilt as to each 
element of the crime to which the defendant is pleading.  Since it 
was legally impossible in this case for the defendant to have 
committed the crime to which he entered an Alford plea, the trial 
court could not have found strong proof of guilt that the crime 
was committed.   
 
The facts leading to this review of the court of appeals 
decision are not in dispute.  While on parole, the defendant was 
charged with second-degree sexual assault pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a).
2  Specifically, it was alleged that on December 
7, 1993, the defendant, through use of or threat of force, had 
sexual contact with a 16-year-old female without her consent.  The 
defendant waived his preliminary hearing and entered an Alford 
plea on February 22, 1994, to the amended charge of child 
enticement, Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1),
3 in Milwaukee County Circuit 
                     
     
2  Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) provides as follows:   
 
 
(2) Second degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of 
the following is guilty of a Class C felony: 
 
(a)  Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
another person without consent of that person by use or 
threat of force or violence. 
     
3  Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1) provides as follows:   
 
 
948.07 Child enticement.  Whoever, with intent to commit 
any of the following acts, causes or attempts to cause 
any child who has not attained the age of 18 years to go 
into any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is 
guilty of a Class C felony: 
 
(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the 
child in violation of s. 948.02. 
 
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
3 
Court before the Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner.  The defendant 
entered this plea as part of a plea agreement with the State.  In 
return, the State agreed to recommend that the defendant's prison 
sentence run concurrently with the sentence he would receive as a 
result of his parole revocation.  The court accepted the State's 
recommendation and on March 2, 1994, the defendant was sentenced 
to ten years in prison. 
 
On July 29, 1994, the defendant moved to withdraw his Alford 
plea, alleging that there was no factual basis to support the 
charge since child enticement requires the victim to be less than 
16 years of age.  The trial court denied the defendant's motion to 
withdraw.  The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, 
reluctantly affirmed, deeming itself bound by the decision in 
State v. Harrell, 182 Wis. 2d 408, 513 N.W.2d 676 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 Under Harrell, a defendant can enter a no contest or guilty plea 
to any crime which is reasonably related to a more serious crime 
for which a factual basis exists, even if a "true greater- and 
lesser-included offense relationship does not exist" between the 
two offenses.  Id. at 419.  The court of appeals concluded that 
since the crime of child enticement was reasonably related to the 
original offense of sexual assault, the trial court did not commit 
error in not allowing the plea to be withdrawn.   
(..continued) 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) provides:  "Whoever has sexual contact 
or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony."   
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
4 
 
Withdrawal of a plea following sentencing is not allowed 
unless it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.  See State 
v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 558-59, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).  
Historically, one type of manifest injustice is the failure of the 
trial court to establish a sufficient factual basis that the 
defendant committed the offense to which he or she pleads.  See 
White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 488, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978).  When 
the plea entered is an Alford plea, the factual basis is deemed 
sufficient only if there is strong proof of guilt that the 
defendant committed the crime to which the defendant pleads.  See 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); State v. 
Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 857-58, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995);  State v. 
Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657, 663, 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981).  
However, in the context of a negotiated guilty plea, this court 
has held that a court "need not go to the same length to determine 
whether the facts would sustain the charge as it would where there 
is no negotiated plea."  See Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 
423-24, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975).  The determination of the existence 
of a sufficient factual basis lies within the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be overturned unless it is clearly 
erroneous.  See Broadie, 68 Wis. 2d at 423.   
 
Before accepting a guilty plea or a plea of no contest, the 
trial court must ascertain "that the defendant in fact committed 
the crime charged."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b).
4  Although Alford 
                     
     
4  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) provides as follows:   
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
5 
pleas are 
not mentioned 
in 
the 
statute, 
this 
court has 
specifically made the procedural safeguards of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
applicable to such pleas.  Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 856, 860.  
Subsection (1)(b) requires a court to establish a sufficient 
factual basis that the defendant committed the crime to which he 
or she is pleading.  See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 262, 
389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).
5  In an Alford plea, a trial court is 
required to find a sufficient factual basis, i.e., strong evidence 
of guilt, in order to conclude that the defendant committed the 
crime to which he or she is entering the plea.  In Johnson, the 
court of appeals stated:   
The prosecutor's recital of the evidence in this case 
indicates that the state could prove all of the elements 
of the crimes charged, and is sufficient to negate 
defendant's protestation of innocence, which was solely 
based upon defense counsel's statement that defendant 
'has constantly and always denied any involvement to me 
in the [. . . incident].'  (emphasis added.)   
 
(..continued) 
 
 
971.08 Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal 
thereof. (1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty 
or no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
 
(a)  Address the defendant personally and determine that 
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the 
nature of the charge and the potential punishment if 
convicted. 
 
(b)  Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
     
5 This inquiry is also mandated by the United States Supreme 
Court.  See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
6 
Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 665.  If there is no evidence as to one of 
the elements of the crime, the defendant's Alford plea cannot be 
accepted and the factual basis requirement cannot be met.   
 
Alford pleas are treated differently from guilty pleas in 
regard to the factual basis requirement because Alford pleas allow 
a defendant to be convicted of a crime even though the defendant 
continues to assert his innocence.  In Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 
663, the court of appeals recognized the difficulty posed by an 
Alford plea in relation to the factual basis requirement and held 
that when an Alford plea was entered, the factual basis 
requirement could only be fulfilled if there was a showing of 
"strong proof of guilt" by the state that the defendant committed 
the crime to which he or she pled.  In Garcia, we specifically 
approved the reasoning in Johnson and cited the following 
language: 
'We conclude that in Wisconsin a trial court can accept an 
Alford plea of guilty without violating the factual 
basis rule of Ernst v. State where, despite the 
defendant's protestations of innocence, the trial court 
determines that the prosecutor's summary of the evidence 
the state would offer at trial is strong proof of 
guilt.' 
Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857-58.  The requirement of a higher level 
of proof in Alford pleas is necessitated by the fact that the 
evidence has to be strong enough to overcome a defendant's 
"protestations" of innocence.  Although strong proof of guilt is 
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Spears, 147 
Wis. 2d 429, 435, 433 N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1988), it is clearly 
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
7 
greater than what is needed to meet the factual basis requirement 
under a guilty plea.  
 
Thus the court of appeals' conclusions that a defendant may 
enter a plea to a reasonably related crime if there is proof of 
the more serious charge (Harrell), and that the circuit court need 
not go to the same lengths in reviewing the facts to sustain a 
negotiated plea as a nonnegotiated plea (Broadie and Harrell), are 
not applicable to this Alford plea case.  Harrell involved a no 
contest plea and Broadie involved a guilty plea.   This case, 
instead, involves an Alford plea, and therefore is controlled by 
Garcia's requirement of strong proof of guilt.  In an Alford plea, 
the  court must be satisfied that there is strong evidence of 
guilt despite the defendant's protestations of innocence.   
 
The application of the factual basis requirement and Garcia 
to the case before us is a simple matter.  The factual basis 
requirement demands that a sufficient factual basis exists as to 
each element of the crime to support the conclusion that the 
defendant committed the crime to which he or she entered the 
Alford plea.  Since the defendant in this case entered an Alford 
plea, the factual basis requirement is only satisfied if there is 
strong proof of guilt as to each element of the crime.  The trial 
court, however, could not have found such proof in this case.  The 
defendant entered an Alford plea to the charge of child 
enticement.  In order to accept this plea, the trial court would 
have had to find that there was strong proof that the victim was 
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
8 
under the age of 16.  It is undisputed, however, that the victim 
was in fact 16 years old. 
 
Since the factual basis requirement was not met, and in fact 
could not have been met in this case, the trial court should have 
allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea in order to prevent a 
manifest injustice.  Its decision not to do so was clearly 
erroneous. 
   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.   
 
No. 94-2894-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2894-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
George Smith, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis.2d 646, 539 N.W.2d 336 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 14, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
JEFFREY A. WAGNER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a 
brief and oral argument by Donna L. Hintze, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas 
J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general.