Title: In re Koliha
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45209
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2000

Filed:  July 21, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct ofLeANNE L. KOLIHA,
	Accused.
(OSB 96-169; SC S45209)

	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Submitted on the record April 14, 2000.
	Martha M. Hicks, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, for the Oregon State Bar.
	No appearance contra.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year, commencing 60 days from the date of the
filing of this decision.
		PER CURIAM				
		The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged the accused by
formal complaint with violating ORS 9.160 (engaging in the
unlawful practice of law), (1) Code of Professional Responsibility
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), (2) DR 1-102(A)(4)
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice), (3) DR 3-101(B) (engaging in the unlawful practice of
law), (4) and DR 1-103(C) (failing to cooperate during disciplinary
investigation). (5)  The accused was served personally with a copy
of the complaint and notice to answer.  She failed to file an
answer or to make any appearance throughout these proceedings. (6)
		A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board entered an
order finding the accused in default.  Bar Rule of Procedure (BR)
5.8(a). (7)  Thereafter, the trial panel deemed the allegations in
the formal complaint to be true and held a hearing solely on the
issue of sanction.  The trial panel suspended the accused from
the practice of law for one year.
		ORS 9.536(2) requires this court to review the trial
panel's decision.  See also BR 10.1 (same).  We review de novo. 
ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The accused did not file a brief or make
any appearance in this court.  We granted the Bar's motion to
submit the matter on the record without oral argument.  ORAP
11.25(3)(b).  For purposes of review, because the accused
defaulted, we deem the allegations contained in the Bar's
complaint to be true.  In re Crist, 327 Or 609, 612, 965 P2d 1023
(1998).
		The Bar's formal complaint against the accused alleged,
in part:
"3.
	"On or about July 6, 1993, the Accused was
suspended from the practice of law in the State of
Oregon and was, at all relevant times herein, not an
active member of the Oregon State Bar.
"4.
	"Prior to June, 1995, the Accused undertook to
represent Allen Mackey (hereinafter referred to as
"Mackey") in a conservatorship/guardianship proceeding
pending in Grant County, Oregon.  During this
representation, the Accused rendered legal advice to
Mackey.
"5.
	"On or about June 6, 1995, the Accused drafted a
Petition to Block Accounts on her pleading paper for
Mackey's signature.  On or about June 6, 1995, the
Accused corresponded with opposing counsel on Mackey's
behalf and filed the Petition to Block Accounts with
the Oregon Circuit Court in Grant County.
"6.
	"On October 17, 1995, the Accused appeared on
Mackey's behalf at a telephone hearing in Case No. 94-11324PR, Circuit Court, State of Oregon, County of
Grant.  In so appearing the Accused held herself out to
the court as an active member of the Oregon State Bar
and eligible to practice law in this state when she was
not.
	"* * * * *
"10.
	"On June 7, 1996, the Oregon State Bar received a
complaint concerning the Accused's conduct.  On June
14, 1996 and July 26, 1996, the Disciplinary Counsel's
Office forwarded a copy of the complaint to the Accused
and requested her response to it.  The Accused
responded on September 13, 1996.
"11.
	"On September 20, 1996, October 4, 1996, and
October 18, 1996, the Disciplinary Counsel's Office
requested the Accused's response to specific questions
with regard to her conduct.  The Accused made no
response.
"12.
	"On June 25, 1997 and July 29, 1997, a member of
the Baker/Grant [C]ounty Local Professional
Responsibility Committee (LPRC) contacted the Accused
by mail and by telephone and requested her response to
the complaint.  The Accused made no response.
"13.
	"While the subject of a disciplinary
investigation, the Accused failed to cooperate with the
Disciplinary Counsel's Office and with LPRC which are
empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of
lawyers."	
		On the basis of the Bar's formal complaint and the
accused's default, we agree with the trial panel that the accused
violated ORS 9.160, DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), and (as
corrected) DR 3-101(B), by representing a client in an Oregon
circuit court proceeding while not an active member of the Oregon
State Bar.  We also agree with the trial panel that the accused
violated DR 1-103(C), by failing to cooperate with the Bar's
inquiries regarding her misconduct. 
		We next determine the appropriate sanction.  This court
refers to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) for
guidance in determining the appropriate sanction.  In re Howser,
329 Or 404, 412, 987 P2d 496 (1999).  Under the ABA Standards,
the court uses three factors to make an initial determination of
the appropriate sanction:  (1) the duty violated; (2) the
accused's mental state; and (3) the actual or potential injury
caused by the accused's misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0.  The court
then considers any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
are present to determine whether that initial determination
should be adjusted.  In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 241, 974 P2d 191
(1999); ABA Standard 3.0.  Finally, the court also considers the
conduct of the accused in light of prior case law.  In re
Huffman, 328 Or 567, 588, 983 P2d 534 (1999). 
		We first consider the duties that the accused violated. 
By practicing law during a period of suspension, the accused
violated her duty to the public and as a professional to refrain
from the unauthorized practice of law.  ABA Standards 5.0 and
7.0.  She also violated her duty to the court by failing to
disclose that she was suspended from the practice of law.  ABA
Standard 6.0.  Finally, she violated her duty as a professional
by failing to respond to inquiries from both the Disciplinary
Counsel's Office and the Local Professional Responsibility
Committee (LPRC).  ABA Standard 7.0. 
		We turn next to the mental state of the accused.  The
ABA Standards provide that a lawyer acts with "intent" if he or
she has a "conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result."  ABA Standards at 17.  A lawyer acts with
"knowledge" if he or she has a "conscious awareness of the nature
or attendant circumstances of the conduct," but does not have a
"conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  Id.
		The accused is presumed to know that the law requires a
person who practices law in Oregon to be an active member of the
Oregon State Bar.  Devers, 328 Or at 241.  In this matter, the
accused's representation of Mackey took place more than two years
after she had been suspended from the practice of law in Oregon
for failure to pay her Bar dues.  We conclude, from those facts,
that the accused acted intentionally, i.e., that she acted with a
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result,
by holding herself out as eligible to practice law when she was
not eligible to do so and by failing to disclose to the court
that she was suspended from the practice of law.  See id. at 241-42 (lawyer acted intentionally when he engaged in unauthorized
practice of law).  
		For the following reasons, we also conclude that the
accused knowingly failed to cooperate with the Bar's
investigation.  The record indicates that the accused signed a
return receipt for a letter from the Bar notifying her of the
allegations and requesting a response from her to those
allegations. (8)  Additionally, the record also shows that the Bar
personally served the accused with a copy of the complaint and
that the accused returned the notice to answer with a signed Form
B resignation form attached.  Based on those facts, we conclude
that the accused acted "knowingly" when she failed to respond to
the Bar's inquiries, that is, with a "conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant circumstances of her conduct, but without a
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  See In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 221-22, 923 P2d 1219
(1996) (finding same mental state in similar circumstances). 
		As to the injury caused by the accused's misconduct, we
note that "injury" includes actual or potential harm to a client,
the public, the legal system, or the legal profession.  ABA
Standards at 6-7.  Although the Bar does not allege that the
accused's client suffered actual harm as a result of her unlawful
practice of law, the Bar correctly asserts that the unauthorized
practice of law inherently carries with it the potential to
injure the legal system.  See In re Whipple, 320 Or 476, 488, 886
P2d 7 (1994) (so stating).  We also agree that the accused's
failure to cooperate with the Bar's investigation caused actual
harm to both the legal profession and the public, because it
delayed the investigation and, consequently, the resolution of
the complaint against her.  See Miles, 324 Or at 222 (so
concluding in similar circumstances).
		The accused's misconduct implicates several ABA
Standards.  ABA Standard 5.11 provides, in part:
	"Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
	"* * * * * 
	"(b) a lawyer engages in * * * intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice."
ABA Standard 6.12 provides:
	"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows that false statements or documents are being
submitted to the court or that material information is
improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial
action, and causes injury or potential injury to a
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or
potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding."
ABA Standard 7.1 provides:
	"Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a
duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a
benefit for the lawyer or another, and caused serious
or potentially serious injury to a client, the public,
or the legal system.
ABA Standard 7.2 provides:
	"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a
duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system."
		Based on the foregoing, we make an initial
determination that either disbarment or a suspension would be
appropriate in this case.  We now consider the applicable
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that might affect our
determination of the appropriate sanction.
		We find only one aggravating factor:  The accused's
misconduct involved multiple offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(d). 
The sole mitigating factor is that the accused has no prior
disciplinary record.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).  
		The remaining consideration is this court's case law. 
Although we find no cases directly on point, the following are
instructive.  In Devers, 320 Or at 245, this court disbarred a
lawyer, who had a disciplinary record, for continuing to practice
law after he had been suspended.  Similarly, the court disbarred
the lawyer in In re Jones, 312 Or 611, 825 P2d 1365 (1992), who
also had a previous disciplinary record, for, among other things,
practicing law while suspended and failing to respond to the
Bar's inquiries.  Unlike the lawyers in Devers and Jones,
however, the accused does not have a prior disciplinary record. 
Her unauthorized practice occurred while she was suspended for
failure to pay her Bar dues, not for a previous disciplinary
violation.  Additionally, because the conduct in Devers and in
Jones was more egregious than the accused's conduct here, we do
not think that a similar sanction is appropriate in this case. 
		The Bar suggests, and the trial panel concluded, that a
one-year suspension is appropriate here.  The Bar directs our
attention to In re Jones, 308 Or 306, 779 P2d 1016 (1989), in
which the court suspended the accused lawyer for six months for
violating DR 1-102(A)(1) (knowingly assisting another to violate
disciplinary rules), DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice) and DR 3-101(A) (aiding nonlawyer in
unlawful practice of law).  The Bar acknowledges that the
misconduct in Jones differs from the misconduct in this case but
argues that Jones is instructive because it demonstrates that a
six-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for the accused's
unlawful practice of law.  However, because the accused engaged
in additional misconduct -- failure to cooperate with the Bar's
disciplinary investigation -- the Bar recommends a one-year
suspension.  See, e.g., Miles, 324 Or at 224 (120-day suspension
appropriate when lawyer failed to respond to inquiries posed by
Bar and LPRC in disciplinary investigation).
		Drawing together the factors of the duty violated, the
mental state of the accused, the injury caused, and the
aggravating and mitigating factors, in addition to our
consideration of this court's prior case law, we conclude that a
one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct -- engaging in the unauthorized practice of law while
suspended for failure to pay her Bar dues, engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty and misrepresentation, engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failure to
cooperate with the Bar's investigation of that misconduct. (9) 
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year, commencing 60 days from the date of the
filing of this decision.

1. 	ORS 9.160 provides:
	"Except for the right reserved to litigants by ORS
9.320 to prosecute or defend a cause in person, no
person shall practice law or represent that person as
qualified to practice law unless that person is an
active member of the Oregon State Bar."

2. 	DR 1-102(A)(3) provides, in part:
	"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
	"* * * * *
	"Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation[.]"

3. 	DR 1-102(A)(4) provides, in part:
	"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
	"* * * * *
	"Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]"

4. 	DR 3-101(B) provides:
"A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction
where to do so would be in violation of regulations of
the profession in that jurisdiction."
		The Bar pleaded, and the trial court found, that the
accused violated DR 3-101(A), which prohibits aiding a nonlawyer
in the unlawful practice of law.  The reference to that
Disciplinary Rule appears to have been a typographical error. 
There are no facts alleged in the complaint that would support a
violation of DR 3-101(A).  Moreover, in its memorandum to the
trial panel concerning sanctions, the Bar distinguished the
misconduct of the accused -- practicing law while suspended --
from the misconduct in In re Jones, 308 Or 306, 779 P2d 1016
(1989) (lawyer allowed nonlawyer to practice law using his name). 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Bar intended to
plead that the accused violated DR 3-101(B).  We proceed
accordingly.

5. 	DR 1-103(C) provides:
	"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."

6. 	Instead of filing an answer to the formal complaint,
the accused returned the notice to answer and executed the sample
Form B resignation attached to it.  The Bar submitted the
accused's resignation to this court for consideration.  Bar Rule
of Procedure (BR) 9.2.  We declined to accept the accused's
resignation, because it did not comply with BR 12.7. 

7. 	BR 5.8(a) provides, in part:
	"If an accused lawyer fails to resign or file an
answer to a formal complaint within the time allowed by
these rules, or if an accused lawyer fails to appear at
a hearing set pursuant to BR 2.4(h), the trial panel
may enter an order in the record finding the accused in
default under this rule.  The trial panel may
thereafter deem the allegations in the formal complaint
to be true.  The trial panel shall thereafter proceed
to render its written opinion based on the formal
complaint, or at the discretion of the trial panel,
after considering evidence or legal authority limited
to the issue of sanction. * * *"

8. 	The record also suggests that the accused responded to
the complaint in a letter dated September 13, 1996.  The Bar did
not include the accused's letter as part of the record in this
proceeding.  In a subsequent letter, the Bar acknowledged the
accused's response and requested additional information.  The
accused, however, did not respond to that, or any other,
additional inquiry by the Bar or the LPRC.

9. 	If the accused desires to be reinstated as an active
member of the Bar, then she must submit a formal application. 
See BR 8.1(a)(iv) and (viii) (formal application required for
reinstatement of member of Bar who has been suspended for
misconduct for period of more than six months and/or for member
of Bar who has been suspended for failure to pay membership fees
and has remained in that status more than five years).