Title: STENBERG v BEATRICE FOODS CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13413
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 1978

No. 13413 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA PHILIP STENBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, BEATRICE FOODS, COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert Keller, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hash, Jellison and O'Brien, Kalispell, Montana Kenneth E. O'Brien argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Gary L. Graham argued and Candace C. Fetscher argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: January 19, 1977 M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. P l a i n t i f f appeals from a judgment entered i n the D i s t r i c t Court, Flathead County, favoring defendant Beatrice Foods C o . i n a products l i a b i l i t y case. P l a i n t i f f Philip Stenberg's l e f t arm was amputated below the elbow when h i s arm slipped i n t o the intake end of a grain auger (a mechanical, screw-type grain elevator) manufactured by the defendant Beatrice Foods Co. The action was t r i e d on two theories: (1) t h a t defendant was negligent i n not designing a shield f o r the intake end of the grain auger, and (2) t h a t defendant was l i a b l e under the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o place a shield on the intake end of the grain auger. A t the close of p l a i n t i f f ' s case the t r i a l court took the case away from the jury on the design negligence theory on the ground p l a i n t i f f was g u i l t y of contributory negligence a s a matter of law. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict f o r defendant on the s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y issue. P l a i n t i f f appeals from the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling and from the judgment i n favor of de- fendant. P l a i n t i f f presents many issues f o r review, but because we reverse and grant a new t r i a l we discuss only those issues t h a t a r e determinative of our ordering a new t r i a l and those which may be helpful on r e t r i a l . W e w i l l discuss the following issues : (1) Whether the t r i a l court erred i n granting a nonsuit on the negligence count of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint on the basis t h a t p l a i n t i f f was contributorily negligent a s a matter of law. I n t h i s regard, p l a i n t i f f a l s o alleges it was improper f o r the D i s t r i c t Court t o i n s t r u c t the jury t h a t he had taken the case away from it because he had found p l a i n t i f f t o be contributorily negligent a s a matter of la^. (2) Whether the jury must be instructed i n the l i t e r a l terminology of the Restatement of Torts 2d, §402A, t h a t recovery f o r s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s allowed only where the product is i n a "defective condition un- reasonably dangerous t o the user o r consumer ." I n t h i s context we a l s o discuss whether the term "de- fective condition" must be defined f o r the jury, whether the two definitions of "unreasonably dangerous1' a s given t o the jury were inconsistent, and whether the Restatement d e f i n i t i o n of "unreasonably dangerous1' should properly be given where the condition complained of is one t h a t i s open and obvious a s opposed t o one t h a t i s hidden o r l a t e n t . (3) Whether the jury was properly instructed on assump- t i o n of r i s k and whether such an instruction was j u s t i f i e d under the f a c t s . P l a i n t i f f Stenberg worked a s a grain truck driver f o r Grosswiler Dairy, Inc. from the f a l l of 1971 u n t i l August 31, 1972, the day of the injury. I n the course of h i s work he ob- served the procedures followed i n unloading grain trucks i n t o t h e grain auger and he had done it himself a few times. Normally, however, he did not unload h i s own truck. When he did unload a grain truck, he followed the procedures he had observed. His employer had never instructed him i n the proper method of unload- ing the grain. Grosswiler Dairy used the auger t o elevate the grain i n t o a bin. The unshielded intake end of the auger was placed i n a homemade box and grain was dumped from the trucks i n t o the box. The box was approximately four f e e t square and a foot and a half high. P l a i n t i f f was aware the auger was dangerous. He a l s o knew t h a t h i s employer owned a newer auger with a shield over t h e in- take end. On August 31, 1972, p l a i n t i f f was unloading h i s truck a t the grain auger. He was out of the truck, had placed h i s l e f t hand on the t a i l g a t e of the truck, and was i n the process of removing a 2 x 4 board from the t a i l g a t e with h i s r i g h t hand. I n order t o grasp the handle on the t a i l g a t e p l a i n t i f f had t o reach for- ward approximately two f e e t and leaned over the box i n doing so. While removing the board the t a i l g a t e suddenly slammed shut, he l o s t h i s balance and f e l l forward i n t o the moving grain auger. H i s l e f t arm was severed below the elbow. The intake end of the auger was not equipped with a s h i e l d , nor was it designed t o be equipped with a shield. Stenberg f i r s t contends t h a t the jury should have been allowed t o determine whether o r not he was contributorily negligent. The t e s t , of course, of p l a i n t i f f ' s contributory negligence is whether he acted a s an ordinarily prudent man. Even where the f a c t s a r e not disputed, the question i s one f o r the jury i f reasonable minds might draw d i f f e r e n t conclusions from the evi- dence. Dahlin v. Rice Trusk Lines, (1960), 137 Mont. 430, 352 P.2d 801; Stahl v. Farmers Union Company, (1965), 145 Mont. 106, 399 P.2d 763. I n ruling on defendant's motion f o r a directed verdict, the court r e l i e d e n t i r e l y on the testimony of the plain- t i f f and we conclude t h a t reasonable minds could d i f f e r a s t o whether he was g u i l t y of contributory negligence. Plaintiff t e s t i f i e d he was never instructed as t o how a truck should be unloaded, and on the few occasions he did unload h i s own truck he followed the same procedures he observed others follow. There was no evidence in the record as to any other standard of use. In taking the case away from the jury the t r i a l court concluded that he was doing so because plaintiff should have hung on t o the tailgate, and thus would not have slipped and l o s t h i s balance. The t r i a l court stated: "* * * This i s clearly from the P l a i n t i f f ' s standpoint, he was negligent and he knew the danger was there and there is no question every- body standing next t o something like t h a t appreciates, i f you are going t o get into it, you are i n trouble. And he didn't hang on. H e was negligent. * * *I1 (Emphasis added.) While the t r i a l court concluded that plaintiff had a duty t o "hang on", and was negligent i n not doing so, we cannot say as a matter of law that the reasonable minds of jurors would make that same determination. Clearly, the question was one for the jury. O n a related issue plaintiff complains when the court took the case away from the jury that a t the defendant's request the court told the jury he had taken the issue of design negli- gence from it, because he had found plaintiff t o be guilty of contributory negligence a s a matter of law. Plaintiff complains t h i s prejudiced his case on the remaining issue of s t r i c t l i a - b i l i t y . I n situations such a s t h i s , the t r i a l courts must be careful t o not give the wrong impression t o the jury. Here, since the court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and so informed the jury, the jury could well conclude the court did not think much of the p l a i n t i f f ' s entire case. This could affect the remainder of the t r i a l , as the jury could get the impression, however subtle, or however un- justified, that the court leaned i n defendant's favor. This i s particularly true where the case is a close one or where a ruling on one issue may well give the jury a feeling as t o how the court f e l t about the p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct. The distinctions between contributory negligence and assumption of r i s k have never been that clear t o the courts and the legal .profession, l e t alone a lay jury. While a jury need not be kept i n the dark that the t r i a l court has taken a cause of action away from it, nevertheless, the t r i a l judge must be extremely careful as to what he t e l l s the jury. Here, the judge could have told the jury that as a result of a ruling he had made on a question of law, the only remaining issue it was concerned with was that of the plain- t i f f ' s claim of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . H e also could have informed the jury that it was not t o be concerned why the court made t h i s ruling. See, for example, McBride, The A r t of Instructing the Jury, (1969), Sec. 4.12, page 141. After the jury returned with i t s verdict the court could then have explained i t s ruling t o it. The remaining two issues relate to the p l a i n t i f f ' s claim that the jury was not properly instructed on the questions relating t o i t s products l i a b i l i t y claim. Montana has adopted the rule of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y as s e t out i n the Restatement of Torts. Bcandenberger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., (1973), 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268. Most of the claimed errors r e l a t e directly t o an interpretation of the rule of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y s e t out i n 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, §402A, which provides: "(I) One who s e l l s any product i n a defective condition unreasonably dangerous t o the user or consumer or t o h i s property i s subject t o l i a - b i l i t y for physical harm thereby caused t o the - - ultimate user o r consumer, or t o h i s property, i f : "(a) the s e l l e r i s engaged i n the business of selling such a product, and. "(b) it is expected and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change i n the condition in which it i s sold. "(2) The rule stated i n Subsection (1) .applies although "(a) the s e l l e r has exercised a l l possible care i n the preparation and sale of h i s product, and "(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller." (Emphasis added.) W e emphasize that t h i s Court adopted the rule as s e t out i n the Restatement, but we did not and do not intend the restraints i n the comments to t h i s rule t o hamstring us i n developing and defining the rule of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . To the extent that the comments are helpful in our development of the law, w e s h a l l accept them; but w e w i l l reject them where w e believe a more appropriate explanation of the rule of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y can be provided. The plaintiff raises three issues concerning the key terminology for'recovery under the Restatement i n s t r i c t l i a - b i l i t y , namely, that for recovery the product must be i n a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." (~mphasis added.) (a) H e contends the court failed t o define the term "defective condition". (b) H e contends that i n adopting two definitions of "unreasonably dangerous" the court adopted inconsis- tent definitions. (c) He contends that one of the definitions of "unreasonably dangerous" as taken from a definition i n the Restatement, effectively precluded recovery under any situation where the condition complained of i s open and obvious rather than one which is hidden or latent. These issues are interconnected by the terminology of the Restatement it6el.f. - The issue as t o "defective condition" arose when p l a i n t i f f offered two instructions defining "defective condition" which the t r i a l court rejected. The defense offered no instructions defining t h i s term, and the court did not give any of i t s own. The result was that the jury was without guidance a s t o the meaning of "defective condition". Plaintiff contended a t t r i a l and asserts here that only "defective condition" should be defined, and that the words "unreasonably dangerous" should be eliminated from the proof required of a p l a i n t i f f . He r e l i e s on Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972), 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, which held that a plaintiff need only prove i n a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y case that the product was "defective". Cronin expressly eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff prove the product was "unreasonably dangerous". The basis of the decision was that the term "unreasonably dangerous" rings of negligence concepts and the policy of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y is t o avoid t h i s . However, we reject p l a i n t i f f ' s position that Montana should also eliminate the requirement of "unreasonably dangerous". The issue of defining "unreasonably dangerous" arose i n the context of Instruction No. 10 defining "unreasonably dan- gerous". It gave the jury two definitions of "unreasonably dangerous". It was agreed by the parties that the condition complained of (unshielded intake end of a grain auger) was open and obvious. Instruct ion No. 10 reads: he term 'unreasonably dangerous' as used else- where i n these instructions pertaining to the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y has a particular meaning applicable to t h i s legal doctrine. For l i a b i l i t y t o be imposed under t h i s doetrine, you must find that the product was unreasonably dangerous, by which is meant dangerous t o an ex- tent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it, with the ordinary knowledge common t o the community as t o the product's characteristics. "Another t e s t of ' unreasonably dangerous ' i s assuming that the defendant had knowledge of the condition of the product, would the defendant then have been acting unreasonably in placing it on the market?" The definition contained in the f i r s t paragraph of Instruction No. 10 is obviously inconsistent with the definition contained i n the second paragraph, The f i r s t views "unreasonably dangerous" from what the consumer could see a t the time of purchase or use. The second views "unreasonably dangerous" from what the manufacturer knew or should have known a t the time of manufacture. B y these definitions a jury could conclude under the f i r s t t e s t that the unshielded auger was not "unreason- ably dangerous" but under the second t e s t that it was "unreasonably dangerous". What then was the jury t o do? This instruction could only have confused the jury as t o what i s meant by the term "unreasonably dangerous", and it was improper. This also i s sufficient reason for reversal. The third issue concerning the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" i s connected with the Restatement definition of t h i s term. Plaintiff contends the practical effect of t h i s definition is t o provide a jury with a built-in reason t o conclude that an open and obvious condition i s not "unreasonably dangerous". H e argues that it effectively confines possible recovery t o a condition which may be l a tent o r hidden. One of the instruc- tions defining "unreasonably dangerous1' supra, was taken from Comment i., 2 Restatement of Torts Zd, $402A, which s t a t e s : 'I* * * The a r t i c l e sold must be dangerous t o an extent beyond t h a t which would be contemplated by t h e ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common t o the community a s t o i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . * * *" W e believe t h i s instruction may be adequate i n s i t u a t i o n s where the condition complained of i s l a t e n t , but it should not be given where the condition complained of is open and obvious. Most of $402A, 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, discusses s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n s i t u a t i o n s involving food, medicine, drugs and other s i t u a t i o n s where the danger is not an open and obvious one. Comment i. t o 8402A does not c i t e any example where t h a t danger may be one t h a t i s open and obvious. However, t h i s Court recently held there is no legitimate reason t o refuse recovery i n a s i t u a t i o n where the condition i s open and obvious. Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co., (1978), Mont . Y P.2d , 35 S t . Rep. 194. The problem with using the Restatement d e f i n i t i o n of "unreasonably dangerous1' is well i l l u s t r a t e d by what happened i n t h i s case. Defendant manufacturer consistently maintained it was not l i a b l e a s a matter of law because the unshielded intake end of the grain auger could be seen by an ordinary consumer o r user of the product, and therefore the danger could be contemplated. P l a i n t i f f did not dispute t h a t he saw the unshielded intake end of the grain auger, and he a l s o recognized it a s being dangerous. Surely, i f he could see the danger, he could contemplate the danger. Under the c o u r t ' s instruction therefore, it was a simple matter f o r the jury t o conclude t h a t the unshielded intake end of the grain auger was not unreasonably dangerous, because plaintiff saw it and could contemplate what he had seen. A t the close of a l l evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict precisely on those grounds, stating: "[Defendant] * * * moves the Court for a directed verdict or entry of judgment i n favor of the Defendant on the grounds and for the reasons that the elements of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y were not proved, particularly with regard t o the unreason- ably dangerous and defective condition which i s required under the s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y law i n Montana. ÿ he determination of unreasonably dangerous, it is f e l t that the Montana law with respect t o that involves a determination of whether the user contemplates a danger. In t h i s case a l l of the evidence has been that the danger i s open and obvious and the Plaintiff himself has t e s t i f i e d that he has appreciated the danger." Although the t r i a l court denied t h i s motion, defendant, l a t e r armed with an instruction which stated i n effect that an open and obvious danger is not "unreasonably dangerous" i f it can be contemplated by the user, was able t o make a more con- vincing argument to the jury. Under t h i s instruction it would be virtually impossible for an open and obvious condi- to be unreasonably dangerous. For a l l practical purposes recovery would be limited t o latent conditions. A s stated in Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co., supra, there are no policy reasons to refuse recovery i f the condition i s one that i s open and obvious. In the l a s t issue concerning jury instructions, p l a i n t i f f attacks the assumption of r i s k instruction given in t h i s case. Plaintiff offered no instructions on t h i s doctrine because he contended the doctrine did not apply t o the facts of t h i s case. Furthermore, even when defendant did offer such an instruction, which was the standard Montana Jury Instruction No. plaintiff made no specific objection t o it. Moreover, i n Brown we recently discussed i n d e t a i l the doctrine of assumption of r i s k as it applies to s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , and the decision there i s a sufficient guide for the r e t r i a l of t h i s cause. Plaintiff also contends the evidence was insufficient for the doctrine of assumption of r i s k t o apply. In t h i s regard w e note the jury in the instant case was not properly instructed on either of p l a i n t i f f ' s theories of l i a b i l i t y , and the e n t i r e cause must be tried again, under proper instructions. Under these circumstances, w e do not think the defendant should be precluded from presenting i t s evidence on the defense of assumption of risk. The t r i a l court can then make a determination of whether there i s sufficient evidence of assumption of r i s k t o present it t o a jury. W e reverse the judgment of the District Court. This cause is remanded for r e t r i a l with directions t o proceed i n accord with t h i s opinion. W e Concur: Chief Justice M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea's Special Concurring Comment t o Opinion: While we concluded herein t h a t i f the term "defective condition" i s given t o the jury it must somehow be defined, L believe t h a t it is not necessary t o present t h e issues t o the jury i n the precise terminology of the Restatement -- "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." The above wording has, I a m c e r t a i n , caused many problems of interpretation and undoubtedly has been the source of much confusion i n the minds of jurors. Because it is confusing and nondefinable, the term should not be given t o the jury unless it is absolutely e s s e n t i a l t o the meaning of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . I believe t h a t it i s not so e s s e n t i a l , and accordingly, the term "defective condition" can be effectively eliminated without taking any of the meaning away from the basic thrust of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . That basic t h r u s t i s t o protect the public, o r give them redress against manufacturers whose products f o r some reason a r e rendered unreasonably dangerous. The change i n the law by the adoption of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y and the f a i l u r e t o define "defective condition" o r "defect" was discussed by Professor Keeton i n 5 St. Mary's Law Journal, 30,33 "The change i n the substantive law a s regards the l i a b i l i t y of makers of products and other s e l l e r s i n the marketing chain has been from f a u l t t o defect. The p l a i n t i f f i s no longer required t o impugn the maker, but he i s required t o impugn the product. Simply s t a t e d , the product must be defective a s marketed, and it may be de- f e c t i v e a s marketed f o r one o r the other of a t l e a s t three reasons: (1) It may have been f a b r i - cated o r constructed defectively i n the sense t h a t the specific product was not a t the t i m e of s a l e by the maker o r other s e l l e r i n the condition t h a t the maker intended it t o be; o r (2) it may have been improperly designed; and (3) purchasers and those who are l i k e l y t o use the product may have been misinformed o r inadequately informed, e i t h e r about the r i s k s and the dangers involved i n the use of the product o r how t o avoid o r minimize the harmful- consequences from such r i s k s . I n so ; categories of defects a r e recognized, there has been no resolution of the ultimate question a s t o the meaning of defect." (Emphasis added.) The f i r s t question f o r determination is whether the p l a i n t i f f i s required t o prove t h a t the product was "defective" and a l s o t h a t it was "unreasonably dangerous". I f both a r e required then c l e a r l y the jury must understand the meaning of "defect" o r "defective". Otherwise a jury would be l e f t without meaningful guidelines concerning the key language o r core t e s t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . It is axiomatic t h a t where material elements of the law turn on key words o r terms, those words o r terms, a s well a s the elements, must be defined f o r t h e jury. F i r s t Nat. Bank of Portland v. Carroll, (1907), 35 Mont. 302, 314, 88 P. 1012 (holding t h a t an instruction on damages which included the words 11 "actual", remote" and "speculative" should have been defined f o r the jury); Rand v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., (1910), 40 Mont. 398, 410, 411, 107 P. 87 (holding t h a t "preponderance of the evidence" and "direct and proximate result" should have been de- fined f o r the jury). Likewise the term "defective condition" is a technical term, d i f f i c u l t t o understand, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the context of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , and should be defined f o r the jury i f the l i t e r a l terminology of the Restatement "defective condi- t i o n unreasonably dangerous" i s t o be given t o the jury. In the i n s t a n t case since the term "defective condition" was twice given t o the jury, it should have been defined. Analysis of the Restatement language leads m e t o conclude t h a t the e s s e n t i a l t h r u s t of the ~ e s t a t e m e n t ' s position on s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y can be retained without the courts and j u r i e s having t o wrestle with the meaning of "defective condi- tion" . Concerning "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" Professor Keeton s t a t e s i n 5 S t . Mary's Law Journal 30, "ik * It is unfortunate perhaps t h a t Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides t h a t a s a basis f o r recovery, it must be found t h a t the pro- duct was both 'defective' and 'unreason- ably dangerous' , when a s a matter of f a c t the term 'unreasonably dangerous' was meant only a s a d e f i n i t i o n of defect. The phrase was not intended a s s e t t i n g f o r t h two requirements but only one, the notion being t h a t t h e product was not defective f o r the purpose of s h i f t i n g losses due t o physically harmful events unless it I was unreasonably dangerous' . * * 9 ; " (Emphasis added. ) By t h i s explanation there i s only one requirement, r a t h e r than two, and I believe it t o be the most reasonable approach. For a detailed discussion concluding t h a t the term "unreasonably dangerous" i s the core of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y under the Restatement, see also: Tobias & Rossbach, A Framework f o r Analysis of Products L i a b i l i t y i n Montana, 38 Montana Law Review 221, Two comments t o 2 Restatement 2d, $402~4 a l s o lead m e t o believe the focal point is whether o r not the condition complained of i s "unreasonably dangerous". Comment g. provides i n relevant part: "The rule [of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y ] stated i n t h i s Section applies only where the product i s , a t the time it leaves the s e l l e r ' s hands, i n a con- dition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which w i l l be unreasonably dangerous t o him." (Emphasis added.) Comment j. provides i n pertinent part: "In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the s e l l e r may be required t o give directions o r warning, on the container, a s t o i t s use." (Emphasis added.) Each of these comments centers around the ultimate finding that the condition complained of must render the product unreasonably dangerous. Otherwise, there is no l i a b i l i t y . Here, the District Court directly injected the term "defective condition" into the ultimate resolution of the case by stating it as part of the issues t o be determined. Instruction No. 27 stated: "The issues t o be determined by you i n t h i s action are these: "First, was the auger i n a defective condition unreasonably dangerous? I f your answer t o t h i s question i s 'No', you w i l l riot consider the matter further, but w i l l return a verdict i n favor of the Defendant, and notify the b a i l i f f , who w i l l return you into Court. I f your answer t o t h i s question i s ',Yes1, you w i l l have a second issue t o determine, namely: was the defective condition unreasonably dangerous a proximate cause of any injury t o the P l a i n t i f f ? * * (Emphasis added.) It was not necessary t o s t a t e the issues i n t h i s fashion. Without taking any meaning from the focal point of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y under the Restatement, the jury could have been instructed on the issues a s follows: F i r s t , did the unshielded intake end of the grain auger render it unreasonably dangerous? I f your answer t o t h i s question is "yes", you w i l l have a second issue t o determine, namely: was the unshielded intake end of the grain auger the proximate cause of any injury t o the p l a i n t i f f ? The case was not complex i n terms of the condition complained of which rendered the grain auger unreasonably dangerous. I f there was more than one allegation of unreasonably dangerous condition, it would be a simple matter t o convert the above instruction t o one covering each of the allegations. A s stated e a r l i e r i n quoting Professor Keeton, supra, the issue under s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y is one of impugning the pro- duct rather than impugning the conduct of the manufacturer. Accordingly, the focal point is on the condition of the product a s it entered the stream of commerce. The v i t a l question is: Was it unreasonably dangerous? It is v i t a l l y important i n t h i s regard that the jury does not get bogged down i n wrestling with the nondefinable and unnecessary terminology of "defective condition" . / 1