Title: Whitley v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992394
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARY L. WHITLEY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF JOSEPH H. JENKINS, DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 992394   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          November 3, 2000 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
V. Thomas Forehand, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment entered in a wrongful death 
action, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds of collateral 
estoppel and sovereign immunity. 
 
In March 1993, Mary L. Whitley, administrator of the estate 
of Joseph H. Jenkins, filed a motion for judgment against 
certain medical personnel (the individual defendants) at St. 
Brides Correctional Center (St. Brides) and against the 
Commonwealth.  St. Brides is part of the Virginia Department of 
Corrections and is operated and maintained by the Commonwealth.  
Whitley alleged that the "gross negligence" and "deliberate 
indifference" of the individual defendants, acting within the 
scope of their employment, caused Jenkins's death while he was 
incarcerated at St. Brides.  Whitley further alleged that the 
Commonwealth also was liable for Jenkins's death under the 
Virginia Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), Code §§ 8.01-195.1 
through –195.9, which imposes limited liability on the 
Commonwealth for "personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while 
acting within the scope of his employment under circumstances 
where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant for such . . . injury or death."  Code 
§ 8.01-195.3. 
 
According to the motion for judgment, Jenkins was a 
mentally impaired person with an epileptic condition who 
required constant medication to prevent the onset of seizures.  
Jenkins was incarcerated in St. Brides from March 1988 until 
April 1991, when he died as a result of a seizure.  The motion 
for judgment alleged that the individual defendants were grossly 
negligent in allowing Jenkins's medication levels to fall below 
the therapeutic minimum amounts appropriate for his condition, 
by failing to prescribe sufficient medication and to supervise 
Jenkins's receipt of the medication. 
 
On the same date Whitley filed the circuit court action, 
she filed another action against the individual defendants in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia (federal district court), alleging claims under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and a wrongful death claim under 
Va. Code § 8.01-50.  After dismissing the wrongful death claim 
and the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the 
 
2
federal district court granted summary judgment for the 
individual defendants on the claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  Whitley v. Lewis (Whitley I), No. 2:93cv268 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 6, 1993); Whitley v. Lewis (Whitley II), No. 2:93cv268 
(E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1994).  The federal district court ruled that 
Whitley failed to prove that the individual defendants acted 
with "deliberate indifference" to Jenkins's serious medical 
needs.  Whitley II, at 8.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's 
judgment.  Whitley v. McWaters, No. 94-1452 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 
1995). 
 
In granting the individual defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the federal district court made the following factual 
determinations: 
 
 
[T]he court concludes that the facts in the instant 
case could not lead a reasonable jury to conclude that any 
of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to 
Jenkin[s's] medical condition.  With regard to Dr. Ibarra, 
the record shows that he took active measures to monitor 
Jenkin[s's] condition.  Dr. Ibarra monitored regular blood 
samples taken from Jenkins, counseled him about the 
importance of taking his medication and altered his regimen 
so as to make it easier for Jenkins to follow.  While 
Jenkins suffered several seizures and showed low levels of 
medication in his blood, Dr. Ibarra considered Jenkin[s's] 
condition to have been stable.  [Footnote omitted.]  Dr. 
Ibarra further concluded that Jenkins had the mental 
capacity to continue following his daily regimen.  Given 
Jenkin[s's] frequent visits for medical treatment, and his 
medication ingestion ratio (over an 85% average during his 
three years at St. Brides), such a conclusion does not 
appear to have been the product of deliberate indifference.  
While the plaintiff may disagree with Dr. Ibarra's 
 
3
assessment and treatment of Jenkins, such disagreement does 
not support a finding of deliberate indifference.  [Case 
citations omitted.] 
 
 
With regard to the defendant nurses, the record fails 
to support the plaintiff's assertions that they acted with 
deliberate indifference to Jenkin[s's] condition.  The 
nurses['] primary contact with Jenkins occurred when they 
assisted Dr. Ibarra (and other physicians) in treating 
Jenkins and when they administered his medication at the 
pill window.  Given the nurses['] limited contact with 
Jenkins, and their agreement with Dr. Ibarra that he was 
capable of following his seizure-preventing regimen, the 
plaintiff has failed to come forward with enough evidence 
to establish a triable issue of deliberate indifference on 
their part. 
 
Whitley II, at 8-9.  In affirming the federal district court's 
judgment, the United States Court of Appeals reached similar 
conclusions and held that the decedent "received adequate 
medical care."  Whitley v. McWaters, No. 94-1452, slip op. at 3. 
 
In March 1994, Whitley obtained a nonsuit in the original 
state court action and refiled the same action the following 
day.  In response, the individual defendants and the 
Commonwealth filed pleas of sovereign immunity, collateral 
estoppel, and res judicata, and moved for summary judgment on 
those grounds. 
 
In a letter opinion, the trial court determined that the 
motion for summary judgment should be granted.  The trial court 
held that the motion for judgment stated a claim of ordinary 
negligence, and concluded that since the federal district court 
did not address whether the facts alleged constituted ordinary 
negligence, Whitley was not precluded by collateral estoppel 
 
4
from raising an ordinary negligence claim in her motion for 
judgment.  The trial court ultimately concluded that the 
ordinary negligence claims against both the individual 
defendants and the Commonwealth were barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
The trial court also held "that any claim asserted by 
plaintiff for gross negligence . . . is barred under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel."  According to the trial court, 
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the dismissal of the 
federal action precluded Whitley from alleging gross negligence 
in the state court action.  The trial court entered final 
judgment dismissing the motion for judgment against the 
individual defendants and the Commonwealth. 
 
On appeal, Whitley first argues that her motion for 
judgment encompasses claims of both gross negligence and 
ordinary negligence.  She asserts that the trial court erred in 
holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred her from 
asserting a gross negligence claim against the individual 
defendants.  Whitley contends that the issue in the federal 
action was whether the individual defendants were guilty of 
"deliberate indifference" to Jenkins's serious medical needs 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than of gross negligence.  She 
argues that in order for collateral estoppel to bar the present 
action against the individual defendants, the federal district 
 
5
court must have adjudicated the "precise same issue" presented 
in her motion for judgment. 
 
Although we agree with Whitley that her motion for judgment 
states a claim of gross negligence, we find no merit in the 
balance of her argument because she has misconstrued the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel.  The fact that "reckless 
indifference," as pled in support of the claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and "gross negligence" are distinct causes of action 
does not affect application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.  Unlike the doctrine of res judicata, the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel does not turn upon the issue whether a cause 
of action in a prior proceeding is the same as a cause of action 
brought in a later proceeding.  See Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 
667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 920-21 (1974). 
 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the same 
parties to a prior proceeding from litigating in a later 
proceeding any issue of fact that actually was litigated and was 
essential to the final judgment in the first proceeding.  Glasco 
v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64, 452 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1995); Bates v. 
Devers, 214 Va. at 671, 202 S.E.2d at 921.  This doctrine 
applies even when the later proceeding asserts a different claim 
for relief.  Glasco, 249 Va. at 64, 452 S.E.2d at 855; Pickeral 
v. Federal Land Bank, 177 Va. 743, 750-51, 15 S.E.2d 82, 85 
(1941).  However, before the doctrine of collateral estoppel may 
 
6
be applied, four requirements must be met: (1) the parties to 
the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the factual issue 
sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the 
prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential 
to the judgment rendered in the prior proceeding; and (4) the 
prior proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment 
against the party to whom the doctrine is sought to be applied.  
Glasco, 249 Va. at 64, 452 S.E.2d at 855; Bates, 214 Va. at 671, 
202 S.E.2d at 921. 
 
In the present case, we conclude that all four of these 
requirements have been met with regard to Whitley's gross 
negligence claim against the individual defendants.  First, the 
plaintiff and the individual defendants were parties to both 
actions. 
 
Second, we conclude that the factual issues underlying 
Whitley's state court claim of gross negligence, regarding the 
medical care that the individual defendants provided to Jenkins, 
were actually litigated in the federal action.  A claim of gross 
negligence, which involves the "absence of slight diligence, or 
the want of even scant care," will not lie if the defendant 
exercised some degree of care with regard to the plaintiff.  
Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 133, 400 S.E.2d 184, 189 (1991) 
(quoting Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 393, 362 
S.E.2d 688, 691 (1987)). 
 
7
 
The federal district court's resolution of the factual 
issues regarding the care the defendants gave Jenkins included 
the court's findings that Dr. Ibarra actively monitored 
Jenkins's condition by reviewing his blood samples, counseling 
him regarding the importance of taking his medication, and 
assessing his capability of following a daily medication 
regimen.  The federal district court further found that Jenkins 
received frequent medical treatment and achieved a "medication 
ingestion ratio" of over 85% during his incarceration at St. 
Brides. 
 
With regard to the defendant nurses, the federal district 
court found that the defendant nurses assisted Dr. Ibarra and 
other staff physicians in their treatment of Jenkins, monitored 
Jenkins's medication, and concurred in Dr. Ibarra's assessment 
that Jenkins was capable of following his prescribed medication 
regimen.  Thus, the federal district court's findings show that 
the defendants exercised at least some degree of care toward 
Jenkins. 
 
Third, we conclude that these issues of fact regarding the 
medical care rendered by Dr. Ibarra and the defendant nurses 
were essential to the federal district court's judgment.  In 
order to award summary judgment for the individual defendants on 
Jenkins's "reckless indifference" claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
the federal district court had to find that the individual 
 
8
defendants' actions were not so grossly incompetent or 
inadequate as to shock the conscience or be intolerable to 
fundamental fairness.  See Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544 
(11th Cir. 1995); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 
1990); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).  
In this case, the factual findings concerning the medical care 
rendered by the individual defendants were essential to the 
federal district court's determination that Whitley "ha[d] 
failed to bring forth sufficient evidence that could shock the 
conscience of a reasonable jury and lead to a finding of 
deliberate indifference."  Whitley v. Lewis, No. 2:93cv268, at 
9. 
 
Fourth, we conclude that the federal district court's order 
awarding summary judgment for the individual defendants on 
Whitley's § 1983 claim became a valid, final judgment against 
Whitley, the party against whom the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is being applied in the present case.  Thus, we hold 
that the trial court did not err in ruling that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel barred Whitley's claim of gross negligence 
against the individual defendants. 
 
The trial court also held that Whitley's claim of gross 
negligence against the Commonwealth was barred by the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel.  In reaching this result, the trial 
court erroneously concluded that the parties to the state and 
 
9
federal actions were the same.  Although the individual 
defendants were parties to the federal action, the Commonwealth 
was not.  Thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not 
apply directly to bar Whitley's gross negligence action against 
the Commonwealth.  See Glasco, 249 Va. at 64, 452 S.E.2d at 855; 
Bates, 214 Va. at 671, 202 S.E.2d at 921.  However, the result 
that the trial court reached, holding that the present gross 
negligence claim was barred against the Commonwealth, is correct 
for the reason that collateral estoppel barred the claim based 
on the Commonwealth's privity with its defendant employees.*  See 
Kesler v. Fentress, 223 Va. 14, 16-17, 286 S.E.2d 156, 157 
(1982); Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 813, 284 S.E.2d 828, 832 
(1981). 
 
The Commonwealth acts only through its employees or through 
its agencies.  See Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 407, 200 
S.E.2d 569, 571 (1973); Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 227, 22 
S.E.2d 9, 11 (1942).  Any liability of the Commonwealth under 
the Tort Claims Act rests solely on a "negligent or wrongful act 
or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of his 
employment under circumstances where the Commonwealth . . ., if 
a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such 
                     
 
*In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion whether 
the Commonwealth has waived its common law immunity for gross 
negligence claims under the Tort Claims Act.  The trial court 
 
10
damage, loss, injury, or death."  Code § 8.01-195.3.  Thus, if 
factual findings binding on a plaintiff through collateral 
estoppel preclude, as a matter of law, a holding of gross 
negligence against an employee of the Commonwealth, such a 
holding is also precluded as a matter of law against the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Here, under the factual findings of the federal district 
court, the medical care provided to Jenkins by the individual 
defendants is, as a matter of law, insufficient to support a 
claim of gross negligence against them.  Because of the 
Commonwealth's identity of interest with its employees' actions 
in this case, the medical care provided to Jenkins by the 
individual employees also is insufficient as a matter of law to 
support a claim of gross negligence against the Commonwealth.  
Accordingly, since the trial court reached the correct result 
for the wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and 
affirm that result.  Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 
S.E.2d 246, 253 (2000); Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256 
Va. 294, 303, 505 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1998). 
 
Whitley next argues that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity in favor of the 
individual defendants, and in "concluding without evidence or 
                                                                  
did not rule on this issue and, in view of our holding above, we 
need not address the issue here. 
 
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trial that the actions of the defendant Ibarra and other 
individual medical defendants were not ministerial in nature."  
However, since Whitley offers no argument in support of this 
assignment of error with regard to Dr. Ibarra, we do not 
consider that portion of the assignment of error.  See Rule 
5:27; Atkisson v. Wexford Assocs., 254 Va. 449, 454 n.*, 493 
S.E.2d 524, 527 n.* (1997); Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 
364, 370, 402 S.E.2d 218, 222, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 
(1991).  With regard to the defendant nurses, Whitley argues 
that the trial court erred in concluding that the medical 
treatment rendered by the nurses consisted of discretionary, not 
ministerial, acts.  Whitley asserts that the nurses made "errors 
in transcription" that were ministerial in nature and, thus, 
that these acts were excluded from protection under the defense 
of sovereign immunity. 
 
In response, the defendant nurses contend that they 
established their entitlement to the protection of sovereign 
immunity under the four-part test articulated in James v. Jane, 
221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980).  They argue that Whitley 
incorrectly characterizes their actions as ministerial and state 
that they were continually required to make multiple, 
professional judgments in their evaluation, treatment, and care 
of all inmates.  The nurses assert that, among these judgments, 
 
12
they were required to determine whether Jenkins's condition 
required further evaluation by Dr. Ibarra. 
 
In deciding this issue, we first observe that the 
Commonwealth and the defendant nurses have not assigned cross-
error to the trial court's holding that Whitley's motion for 
judgment states a cause of action in ordinary negligence.  
Therefore, that holding has become the law of this case and is 
not before us in this appeal.  See Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. 
Pierce Arrow, L.L.C., 258 Va. 524, 527-28, 521 S.E.2d 761, 763 
(1999); Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 578, 318 S.E.2d 292, 297 
(1984); Twin Lakes Mfg. Co. v. Coffey, 222 Va. 467, 474, 281 
S.E.2d 864, 867 (1981). 
 
When an employee of the Commonwealth is charged with 
ordinary negligence and then claims the immunity of the state, 
four factors must be considered in determining whether the 
employee is entitled to sovereign immunity for those alleged 
acts of ordinary negligence.  Those factors are: (1) the 
function that the employee was performing at the time of the 
alleged negligence; (2) the extent of the state's interest and 
involvement in that function; (3) the degree of control and 
direction exercised by the state over the employee; and (4) 
whether the act performed involved the use of judgment and 
discretion.  Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 85, 431 S.E.2d 642, 644 
(1993); James v. Jane, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869. 
 
13
 
Whitley's assignment of error is limited to the trial 
court's determination that the defendant nurses' acts were 
discretionary, rather than ministerial, in nature.  Her argument 
rests entirely on the principle that a plea of sovereign 
immunity will not be sustained unless the acts at issue involve 
judgment and discretion necessary to the performance of a 
governmental function.  Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143, 145, 400 
S.E.2d 190, 191 (1991). 
 
In reviewing Whitley's claim, we are guided by established 
principles.  A plea of sovereign immunity is a defensive plea 
presenting distinct issues of fact which, if proved, create a 
bar to the plaintiff's right of recovery.  Tomlin v. McKenzie, 
251 Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996).  As the moving 
party, the defendants bear the burden of proving those issues of 
fact.  Id.  Generally, when no evidence is presented on the 
plea, the trial court, and the appellate court on review, must 
rely solely on the pleadings in resolving the issues presented.  
Id.; see also Weichert Co. v. First Commercial Bank, 246 Va. 
108, 109, 431 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1993).  Here, however, the trial 
court also was entitled to consider the factual findings of the 
federal district court, which were binding on Whitley under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
 
In reviewing the record on the defendants' plea of 
sovereign immunity, we consider as true the facts alleged in 
 
14
Whitley's motion for judgment and bill of particulars.  See 
Tomlin, 251 Va. at 480, 468 S.E.2d at 884, Glascock v. Laserna, 
247 Va. 108, 109, 439 S.E.2d 380, 380 (1994).  Whitley alleged 
in her motion for judgment that the defendant nurses allowed 
Jenkins's medication levels to fall below the "required 
therapeutic minimums."  Whitley alleged in her bill of 
particulars that the nurses, among other things, "transcribed 
from the chart the wrong dosage for Delantin and Phenobarbital," 
"failed to compare and verify the dosage for Jenkins['s] seizure 
medications," and "prepared incorrect renewal prescriptions for 
Jenkins."  Whitley also alleged in her bill of particulars that 
the nurses "misconstrued and misapplied" the physicians orders 
"concerning the administration of Jenkins['s] seizure 
medications," "failed to monitor" the medical records, and 
"failed to schedule Jenkins to see Dr. Ibarra" for periodic 
review of his seizure medications. 
 
The federal district court found that the defendant nurses' 
"primary contact with Jenkins occurred when they assisted Dr. 
Ibarra (and other physicians) in treating Jenkins and when they 
administered his medication at the pill window."  The federal 
district court also found that the nurses agreed "with Dr. 
Ibarra that [Jenkins] was capable of following his seizure-
preventing regimen." 
 
15
 
Although the nurses' acts described in this record have 
some ministerial components, the acts themselves are 
discretionary in nature and require the exercise of judgment 
when considered in the context of the treatment rendered.  The 
nursing activities described in Whitley's pleadings and the 
federal district court's findings of fact involve the provision 
of health care to an inmate, in conjunction with physicians' 
orders, that required the nurses to administer, monitor, and 
assess the effects of medication prescribed for treatment of a 
serious medical condition.  Thus, the record supports the trial 
court's conclusion that the nurses' acts at issue required them 
to exercise their judgment and discretion.  Since Whitley does 
not argue that the trial court otherwise misapplied the four-
part test of James v. Jane, we will uphold the trial court's 
ruling sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity in favor of the 
individual defendants. 
 
Whitley also argues that the trial court erred in entering 
summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on the claim of 
ordinary negligence based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
She notes that the trial court did not address in its opinion 
letter the issue of the Commonwealth's liability under the Tort 
Claims Act for its employees' acts of ordinary negligence.  
Whitley contends that the plain language of the Act waives the 
 
16
Commonwealth's immunity for acts of ordinary negligence 
committed by employees within the scope of their employment. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court 
properly entered summary judgment on its behalf.  The 
Commonwealth does not contest its limited liability under the 
Tort Claims Act for injury or death caused by its employees' 
acts or omissions constituting ordinary negligence while the 
employees were acting within the scope of their employment.  
Instead, the Commonwealth asserts that Whitley's ordinary 
negligence claim is excluded by either of two exceptions to the 
Tort Claims Act.  First, the Commonwealth contends that this 
claim is subject to the exception set forth in Code § 8.01-
195.3(4), which precludes any claim "based upon an act or 
omission of an officer, agent or employee of any agency of 
government in the execution of a lawful order of any court."  In 
support of its position, the Commonwealth cites Baumgardner v. 
Southwestern Virginia Mental Health Institute, 247 Va. 486, 442 
S.E.2d 400 (1994).  We find no merit in the Commonwealth's 
argument. 
 
The order on which the Commonwealth relies is the judgment 
order convicting Jenkins and committing him to the custody of 
the Department of Corrections to serve the sentence imposed on 
him.  Thus, under the Commonwealth's argument, any inmate 
committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections would 
 
17
be excluded as a matter of law from bringing any claim against 
the Commonwealth otherwise authorized by the Tort Claims Act, 
simply because a court lawfully has ordered that the inmate be 
incarcerated.  We conclude that the language of Code § 8.01-
195.3(4) does not provide such a sweeping exemption to the Tort 
Claims Act. 
 
Instead, this statutory exception addresses the type of 
court order at issue in Baumgardner, in which the decedent was 
admitted to Southwestern Virginia Mental Health Institute 
(Southwestern) pursuant to a Civil Mental Temporary Detention 
Order (detention order) for a maximum period of 48 hours for 
emergency medical evaluation and treatment.  247 Va. at 488, 442 
S.E.2d at 401.  The administrator of the decedent's estate 
alleged in his motion for judgment that employees of 
Southwestern, which was controlled and maintained by the 
Commonwealth, were negligent in failing to provide adequate 
emergency and non-emergency medical care to the decedent, who 
died from a cardiac arrhythmia.  Id. at 487-88, 442 S.E.2d at 
400-01. 
 
We held that the administrator's negligence claim was 
barred by Code § 8.01-195.3(4), because the allegedly negligent 
acts all occurred within the 48-hour period while Southwestern 
and its employees lawfully were engaged in executing the terms 
of the detention order.  247 Va. at 489-90, 442 S.E.2d at 402.  
 
18
Unlike the facts presented in Baumgardner, the facts of the 
present case do not involve employees who were implementing the 
directives of a court order to provide medical evaluation and 
care at the time of the alleged acts of medical negligence.  
Instead, the individual defendants at St. Brides were providing 
medical care to Jenkins because he was an inmate of that 
facility.  Thus, the acts complained of did not occur "in the 
execution of a lawful order of any court," within the meaning of 
Code § 8.01-195.3(4). 
 
Next, the Commonwealth contends that Whitley's ordinary 
negligence claim is precluded by Code § 8.01-195.3(7).  That 
provision excludes from coverage under the Tort Claims Act 
"[a]ny claim by an inmate of a state correctional facility," in 
which the claimant has not filed an affidavit verifying that "he 
has exhausted his remedies under the adult institutional inmate 
grievance procedures promulgated by the Department of 
Corrections."  Id.  We disagree with the Commonwealth's 
argument. 
 
The plain language of Code § 8.01-195.3(7) applies to a 
"claim by an inmate of a state correctional facility."  Whitley, 
who is asserting a wrongful death action based on the 
Commonwealth's liability under the Tort Claims Act, is not an 
inmate of a state correctional facility.  Further, nothing in 
the statutory language indicates that a claim filed by an 
 
19
administrator of the estate of a deceased inmate is subject to 
the affidavit requirement of this exception.  Thus, we hold that 
the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof in support 
of its plea of sovereign immunity, and that the trial court 
erred in sustaining the plea and in dismissing the claim of 
ordinary negligence against the Commonwealth. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part, and reverse in 
part, the trial court's judgment and remand for trial the claim 
of ordinary negligence brought against the Commonwealth under 
the Tort Claims Act. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
 
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