Title: Mercycare Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance
Citation: 2010 WI 87
Docket Number: 2008AP002937
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2010

2010 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2937 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mercycare Insurance Company and Mercycare HMO, 
Inc., 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
James E. Welker   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant the cause was argued by Bruce 
A. Olsen, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the petitioners-respondents there was a brief by 
Matthew J. Duchemin, William J. Toman, and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Matthew J. Duchemin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew C. Cook and the 
Wisconsin Civil Justice Council, Inc., Madison, and James A. 
Friedman and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Civil Justice Council, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 87
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2937  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV32 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MercyCare Insurance Company and MercyCare HMO, 
Inc., 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from judgment of the circuit court for Rock County, 
James E. Welker, Judge.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.1  The certification states: "We 
certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine 
whether Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) permits an insurer to exclude 
maternity coverage for an insured acting as a surrogate mother.  
The answer to this question is determined, in part, by what 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
2 
 
level 
of 
deference, 
if 
any, 
should 
be 
accorded 
the 
Commissioner's decision."   
¶2 
The 
Commissioner 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.895(7) does not permit an insurer to exclude generally 
covered maternity services for surrogate mothers.  Thus, the 
Commissioner determined that MercyCare's 2002 Contract was 
ambiguous, and MercyCare's attempt to exclude generally covered 
maternity 
services 
for 
surrogate 
mothers 
under 
its 
2002  
Contract 
contravened 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.895(7).  For the same reason, he determined that the 2005 
Contract contravened Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).  Finally, the 
Commissioner also disapproved the 2005 Contract under Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.20(2)(a)1., determining that it is misleading because the 
benefits are too restricted to serve the purposes for which the 
policy is sold.  On review, the circuit court accorded no 
deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.895(7) and reversed the Commissioner's legal conclusions.2   
¶3 
Applying due weight deference, we conclude that an 
insurer may not make routine maternity services that are 
generally covered under the policy unavailable to a specific 
subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the 
insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to 
achieve pregnancy.  Accordingly, we determine that MercyCare's 
application of the 2002 Contract to exclude from coverage all 
                                                 
2 Judgment of the circuit court for Rock County, James E. 
Welker, Judge. 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
3 
 
maternity services for surrogate mothers contravenes Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.895(7).     
¶4 
We also conclude that the Commissioner appropriately 
disapproved the surrogacy provision in MercyCare's 2005 Contract 
because it is contrary to Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).  In addition, 
the definition of "surrogate mother" set forth in the 2005 
Contract is misleading because the benefits are too restricted 
to 
serve 
the 
purposes 
for 
which 
the 
policy 
is 
sold.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court.  
I 
¶5 
MercyCare Insurance Company and MercyCare HMO, Inc. 
(collectively "MercyCare") are insurance companies authorized to 
do business in Wisconsin and subject to the jurisdiction and 
control of the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance.  In 2002, 
MercyCare offered a group disability insurance policy that 
provided maternity coverage for eligible persons covered under 
the policies.    
¶6 
J.M. and C.S. were eligible persons insured by 
MercyCare under MercyCare's 2002 Certificate of Coverage ("the 
2002 Contract").3   C.S. was insured as a dependent, and J.M. was 
insured as an employee.       
¶7 
While insured under the 2002 Contract, J.M. and C.S. 
each agreed to act as a gestational carrier by carrying a child 
for other parents.  The children carried by J.M. and C.S. are 
not genetically related to J.M. or C.S. respectively.    
                                                 
3 Form MCHMOAUG2002 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Both women received health care services in connection 
with their pregnancies.  J.M. received medical care including 
laboratory tests, ultrasounds, maternity care, physician visits, 
inpatient hospital care, anesthesia and delivery.  The total 
costs incurred amounted to $16,774.63.  C.S. received comparable 
pre- and post-partum medical services, with costs totaling 
$18,510.84.    
¶9 
During the course of their pregnancies, MercyCare 
denied coverage for the maternity services received by both J.M. 
and C.S.  It notified J.M. that benefits for lab work were being 
denied because the contract did not cover "surrogate mother 
services."4  Subsequently, MercyCare informed J.M. by letter: 
MercyCare is unable to authorize coverage for all 
services related to this pregnancy.  Services provided 
from 5-10-04 through 1-7-05 are not eligible for 
reproductive services benefits or pregnancy benefits.  
Any benefits paid for the services will be recouped. 
C.S. was similarly denied coverage based on the 2002 Contract's 
identification of "surrogate mother services" as a "non-covered 
service" under the Contract's "Pregnancy Benefits coverage."5     
                                                 
4 The letter stated in part: "MercyCare Insurance Company 
has received a request for you to receive coverage for the 
following service: obstetrical testing at Meriter Perinatal 
Clinic for twin pregnancy from surrogate mother services.  It 
has been determined that this service is not a covered benefit.  
Your denial was based on your Certificate of Coverage: under 
REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES; NON-COVERED SERVICES: Surrogate mother 
services.  Therefore, MercyCare Insurance Company is unable to 
authorize coverage for services related to surrogate mother 
services."  
5 MercyCare informed C.S.: "Your denial was based on: Your 
HMO Certificate of Coverage under Pregnancy Benefits, non 
covered services: surrogate mother services are not covered."  
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
5 
 
¶10 The 2002 Contract provides that "surrogate mother 
services" are a "non-covered service" in two separate places——
under the section titled "Pregnancy Benefits" and under the 
section titled "Reproductive Services."  However, the term 
"surrogate mother services" is not defined anywhere within the 
2002 Contract.6     
¶11 The "Pregnancy Benefits" section provides as follows: 
Covered Services: 
Treatment of pregnancy is covered for an employee, an 
employee's covered dependent spouse, or an employee's 
covered dependent child. 
Pregnancy benefits include coverage for inpatient 
hospital care and pre- and post-natal care received 
from a participating provider. 
. . . .  
Non-Covered Services: 
• 
Surrogate mother services. 
• 
Elective abortions. 
• 
Maternity services received out of the service area 
in the last 30 days of pregnancy without prior 
authorization from the Plan except in an emergency.  
Prior authorization is based on medical necessity. 
                                                 
6 The Certificate of Coverage for the 2002 Contract had been 
approved by the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI) 
prior 
to 
its 
use. 
 
During 
the 
proceedings 
before 
the 
Commissioner, an OCI insurance examiner explained that when she 
approved the 2002 Contract, she believed the provision excluding 
"surrogate mother services" was intended to exclude the expenses 
incurred by an insured to pay for a third person to act as a 
surrogate or gestational carrier and carry a child on behalf of 
that insured.      
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
6 
 
• 
Amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling (CVS) 
solely for sex determination. 
In addition, the "Reproductive Services" section of the 2002 
Contract lists various covered services and provides that 
"surrogate mother services" are a "non-covered service."7    
¶12 After 
denying 
coverage 
for 
J.M. 
and 
C.S.'s 
pregnancies, MercyCare sought to recoup the money it had already 
paid for claims related to the pregnancies.  Ultimately, the 
services provided to both women were paid in full by third 
parties.   
                                                 
7 The following "reproductive services" are "non-covered 
services" under the 2002 Contract: 
• 
Any other artificial means to achieve pregnancy, 
consultations for, or any procedures in connection 
with, but not limited to in vitro fertilization, 
gamete intra fallopian transfer (GIFT), embryo 
transplant, or any other assistive reproductive 
technique. 
• 
Reversal 
of 
voluntarily 
induced 
sterilization 
procedures. 
• 
Donor sperm. 
• 
Charges for donor, laboratory or biological fees 
directly related to the insemination procedure. 
• 
Revision of scarring caused by implantable birth 
control devices. 
• 
Surrogate mother services. 
• 
Elective abortions. 
• 
 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
7 
 
¶13 C.S. filed a complaint with the Office of the 
Commissioner of Insurance.  Her complaint triggered the agency's 
review of MercyCare's denial of coverage to the two women.  
During this review, MercyCare filed its newest group disability 
policy insurance form ("the 2005 Contract")8 with OCI for 
approval.9   
¶14 In many respects, the 2005 Contract is identical to 
the 2002 Contract.  However, the 2005 Contract revises the 
language of the surrogate mother services exclusion and provides 
a definition for the term "surrogate mother."   
¶15 Rather 
than 
simply 
excluding 
"surrogate 
mother 
services," the 2005 Contract provides that the following is a 
"Non-Covered Service": "Treatment, services or supplies for a 
surrogate mother or any pregnancy resulting from your service as 
a surrogate mother."  Additionally, the 2005 Contract provides 
the following definition of the term "surrogate mother": 
Surrogate mother means a woman who, through in vitro 
fertilization or any other means of fertilization, 
gives birth to a child which she may or may not have a 
genetic relationship to, or an individual who provides 
a uterus for the gestation of a fertilized ovum 
obtained from a donor when the child will be parented 
by someone other than the woman who gives birth.   
                                                 
8 Form no. MCPlusRCPPOAug2005.     
9 Wis. Stat. § 631.20 states that with certain exceptions, 
"No form [] may be used unless it has been filed with and 
approved by the commissioner and unless the insurer certifies 
that the form complies with chs. 600 to 655 and rules 
promulgated under chs. 600 to 655. . . ."  
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
8 
 
¶16 OCI disapproved the 2005 Contract by letter dated 
January 11, 2006.  The letter explained that the exclusion for 
"[t]reatment, services or supplies for a surrogate mother or any 
pregnancy resulting from your service as a surrogate mother," 
must be deleted because "[a] policy that provides maternity 
coverage may not limit the coverage based on method of 
conception, as such a limitation is unfairly restrictive and 
discriminatory."10  MercyCare requested a hearing. 
¶17 On February 15, 2006, OCI issued a Notice of Hearing 
alleging that MercyCare violated Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) when it 
denied coverage for J.M. and C.S.'s pregnancies under the 2002 
Contract.  The notice further alleged that the disapproval of 
the 2005 Contract was appropriate because the policy exclusions 
violated 
the 
mandated 
maternity 
benefits 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.895(7) and were misleading under Wis. Stat. § 631.20.  The 
case ultimately went before the Commissioner of Insurance.  The 
parties agreed to submit the case on the basis of briefs, a 
stipulation of facts, and other stipulated documentation.     
¶18 The Commissioner issued a final decision on December 
8, 2006.  It concluded that: (1) under the mandate of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
10 Under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a), the commissioner may 
disapprove a form upon a finding that "it is inequitable, 
unfairly 
discriminatory, 
misleading, 
deceptive, 
obscure 
or 
encourages misrepresentation," including cases where the form 
"[i]s misleading because its benefits are too restricted to 
achieve the purposes for which the policy is sold" and cases 
where the form "violates a statute or rule promulgated by the 
commissioner, or is otherwise contrary to law."   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
9 
 
§ 632.895(7),11 MercyCare may not exclude maternity coverage of 
otherwise covered persons based on their status as surrogate 
mothers; (2) even if the surrogacy services could be properly 
excluded, the language of the 2002 Contract is ambiguous; (3) 
OCI appropriately disapproved MercyCare's 2005 Contract because 
the surrogate mother exclusion is contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.895(7) and the 2005 Contract is misleading because its 
benefits are too restricted to achieve the purposes for which 
the policy is sold.    
¶19 The decision first addressed whether MercyCare was 
permitted under Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) to exclude maternity 
coverage on the basis that the insured was acting as a surrogate 
mother.  The Commissioner explained that the issue required the 
application of "exclusions or limitations" to a set of facts 
unanticipated by the legislature at the time the statute was 
passed.  According to the Commissioner's interpretation, "the 
legislative history indicates that the statute's purpose is one 
of inclusiveness" and therefore, the statute ensures that if the 
policy provides maternity coverage, all covered persons must be 
treated equally.  "[T]he answer to whether MercyCare's exclusion 
is permissible requires a determination of whether MercyCare is 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) provides as follows: 
Every group disability insurance policy which provides 
maternity coverage shall provide maternity coverage 
for all persons covered under the policy.  Coverage 
required under this subsection may not be subject to 
exclusions or limitations which are not applied to 
other maternity coverage under the policy. 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
10 
 
attempting to exclude the provision of a group of services or 
the exclusion of a group of insureds." 
¶20 The Commissioner concluded that under the statute, an 
insurer may deny coverage of certain specific procedures, such 
as in vitro fertilization, to all people covered under the 
policy.  However, an insurer may not deny coverage for all 
maternity services to some insureds covered under the policy 
based on their reasons for becoming pregnant.  Therefore, the 
insurer may not deny coverage of generally covered maternity 
services 
because 
the 
insured 
is 
a 
surrogate 
mother.  
Additionally, the Commissioner concluded that the surrogacy 
exclusion in the 2002 Contract is ambiguous and that OCI's 
disapproval of the 2005 Contract was appropriate under Wis. 
Stat. § 631.20.  
¶21 MercyCare filed a petition for judicial review in the 
Rock County Circuit Court.  The circuit court accorded no 
deference to the Insurance Commissioner's legal conclusions 
because 
the 
Commissioner 
had 
not 
previously 
interpreted 
§ 632.895(7) and because it determined that the Commissioner had 
no particular expertise that would assist it in determining the 
applicability of the statute.  Rather, it stated that the case 
was one of "first impression."   
¶22 The circuit court determined that "the Commissioner of 
Insurance exceeded its statutory authority in disapproving the 
certificate of insurance," and it ordered the Commissioner to 
approve the 2005 Contract.  In reaching this decision, it  
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§  632.895(7) 
"clearly 
and 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
11 
 
unambiguously" permitted MercyCare to exclude maternity coverage 
for otherwise covered persons who were serving as surrogate 
mothers.  It determined that the statute required only that "any 
exclusions or limitations must be applied uniformly to all 
covered persons," and that "the exclusion for surrogate parents 
is 
an 
exclusion 
which 
applies 
uniformly 
to 
all 
covered 
persons."12       
¶23 The Commissioner appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the appeal to this court.  It explained that its 
answer to the question of the proper interpretation of the 
statute would be determined, in part, by the level of deference 
that should be accorded the Commissioner's decision.  Although 
OCI 
had 
never 
before 
interpreted 
the 
specific 
statutory 
subsection at issue, the court implied that OCI had experience 
interpreting other mandatory coverage provisions.  The court 
stated that "guidance is [] needed on this topic because it is 
not apparent from the case law to date what level of deference 
should be given to an agency's decision when the issue is 
particularly 
within 
the 
agency's 
area 
of 
expertise 
and 
specialized knowledge, but the agency is construing a specific 
statute for the first time."    
¶24 The court of appeals commented that "[a] number of 
cases 
suggest 
that 
a 
question 
is 
not 
one 
of 
first 
impression . . . simply because an agency is addressing a new 
                                                 
12 The circuit court also stated that it was unnecessary to 
address the other issues raised by the parties.   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
12 
 
fact situation for the first time.  We question whether the 
approach should be any different when an agency is addressing 
particular statutory language for the first time."        
II 
¶25 On appeal, we review the decision of the Commissioner 
of Insurance rather than the decision of the circuit court.  The 
parties dispute, and the court of appeals was uncertain of, the 
applicable standard of review.  We address this question first.   
¶26 We are asked to interpret Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) and 
apply it to the exclusions at issue in this case.  We are also 
asked to interpret MercyCare's 2002 and 2005 Contracts, which 
are policies of insurance.  Interpretation and application of 
statutes and insurance policies are questions of law.  Volvo 
Trucks N. Am. v. Wausau Truck Ctr., 2010 WI 15, ¶11, 323 
Wis. 2d 294, 779 N.W.2d 423; Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom 
Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, ¶18, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448.  
This court decides questions of law independently, but benefits 
from the analyses rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, 
¶16, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67. 
¶27 Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, 
a court is never bound by an agency's interpretation of a 
statute.  Hutson v. State Personnel Com'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶31, 263 
Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212.  Nevertheless, a court will under 
certain circumstances give deference to an agency's statutory 
interpretation.  Id.; Racine Harley-Davidson v. State, 2006 WI 
86, ¶11, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
13 
 
¶28 In Racine Harley-Davidson, we clarified the three 
levels of deference to be accorded to an agency's interpretation 
of a statute: no deference, due weight deference, and great 
weight deference.  292 Wis. 2d 548, ¶¶12-20.  These three levels 
take into account the comparative institutional qualifications 
and capabilities of the court and the administrative agency.  
Id., ¶¶13-14. 
¶29 A reviewing court accords an agency's statutory 
interpretation no deference when the issue is one of first 
impression, when the agency has no experience or expertise in 
deciding the legal issue presented, or when the agency's 
position on the issue has been so inconsistent as to provide no 
real guidance.  Id., ¶19.  When no deference to the agency 
decision 
is 
warranted, 
the 
court 
interprets 
the 
statute 
independently and adopts the interpretation that it deems most 
reasonable.  Id.    
¶30 A reviewing court accords due weight deference when 
the agency has some experience in an area but has not developed 
the expertise that places it in a better position than the court 
to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute.  
Id., ¶18.  When applying due weight deference, the court 
sustains an agency's interpretation if it is not contrary to the 
clear meaning of the statute——unless the court determines that a 
more reasonable interpretation exists.  Id.  
¶31 Finally, 
a reviewing court accords great weight 
deference when each of four requirements are met: (1) the agency 
is charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
14 
 
statute; (2) the agency's interpretation is one of long 
standing; (3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in forming its interpretation; and (4) the agency's 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the 
application of the statute.  Id., ¶16.  When applying great 
weight deference, the court will sustain an agency's reasonable 
statutory interpretation even if the court concludes that 
another interpretation is equally or more reasonable.  Id., ¶17.  
The court will reverse the agency's interpretation if it is 
unreasonable——if it directly contravenes the statute or the 
state or federal constitutions, if it is contrary to the 
legislative intent, history, or purpose of the statute, or if it 
is without a rational basis.  Id. 
¶32 Whichever level of deference is granted, the reviewing 
court does not abdicate its own authority and responsibility to 
interpret the statute.  Id., ¶14; Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶31.  
In assessing the agency's interpretation, the court must itself 
interpret 
the 
statute 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
agency's 
interpretation is reasonable.  Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 
Wis. 2d 549, ¶15.  It is only under the great weight deference 
standard that the agency's specialization and expertise is so 
extensive that the court views the agency's interpretation as 
the one to adopt even if it is not the most reasonable one.  
¶33 Here, the focus of our inquiry in determining whether 
there is great weight deference is whether the Commissioner's 
interpretation is one of "long standing."  OCI has extensive 
experience 
interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 632.895 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
15 
 
generally,13 but no experience interpreting the requirements of 
sub. (7), the specific statutory language upon which this case 
turns.  The court of appeals inquired about the appropriate 
level of deference when the issue is particularly within the 
agency's area of expertise and specialized knowledge, but the 
agency is construing specific statutory language for the first 
time.     
¶34 Wisconsin courts have previously accorded great weight 
deference to an agency's application of a familiar statute to a 
novel set of facts.  See, e.g., Town of Russell Volunteer Fire 
Dept. v. LIRC, 223 Wis. 2d 723, 733, 589 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 
1998).   Yet, applying statutory language to a novel set of 
facts is not the same as interpreting particular statutory 
language for the first time.     
¶35 It 
cannot 
be 
said 
that 
the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation of this specific subsection is one of "long 
standing."  In this case, the Commissioner, like this court, is 
interpreting the requirements of sub. (7) for the first time.  
Under these circumstances, it would make little sense to defer 
to the Commissioner's statutory interpretation even if the court 
concludes that an equally reasonable or a more reasonable 
interpretation exists.  We conclude that a reviewing court 
should 
not 
give 
great 
weight 
deference 
to 
an 
agency's 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Com'r, 
151 Wis. 2d 411, 413-15, 444 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1989). 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
16 
 
interpretation of a statute when the agency is interpreting 
particular statutory language for the first time.14   
¶36 Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the 
Commissioner has been charged by the legislature with the 
administration of the mandatory coverage statutes and has the 
responsibility of ensuring that the insurance policies issued in 
Wisconsin comply with statutory regulations.  Due to this 
legislative mandate, OCI addresses an untold number of insurance 
policies each year.   As a result, OCI has developed experience, 
institutional qualifications, and specialized knowledge in the 
area of mandatory coverage, generally.  Thus, it also makes 
                                                 
14 MercyCare brings to our attention several decisions of 
the court of appeals which could be read to state that an 
agency's experience in administering a "particular statutory 
scheme" is sufficient for affording the agency great weight 
deference.  See, e.g., Barron Elec. Co-op v. Pub. Serv. Com'm 
Wis., 212 Wis. 2d 752, 764, 569 N.W.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1997); Town 
of Russell Volunteer Fire Dept. v. LIRC, 223 Wis. 2d 723, 733, 
589 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1998).  Our conclusion clarifies that 
great weight deference is not warranted merely because an agency 
has been charged with administering a particular statutory 
scheme when the agency has not interpreted the specific 
statutory language at issue. 
We are not persuaded that our conclusion is inconsistent 
with the court of appeals' decisions cited by MercyCare.  In 
Barron, for instance, the commission had interpreted and applied 
the provisions of the statute to similar disputes, and on at 
least one occasion, the commission had interpreted the exact 
statutory language that was at issue in the case.  212 Wis. 2d 
at 766.  Further, in Town of Russell, the Labor and Industry 
Review Commission had vast experience determining whether an 
employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time 
of 
an 
accident 
and 
was 
therefore 
entitled 
to 
worker's 
compensation benefits.     
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
17 
 
little sense to accord no deference at all to the Commissioner's 
interpretation of the statutory language at issue here.   
¶37 We conclude that due weight deference may be warranted 
when an agency has specialized experience with the issues 
regulated by the statute, but has not yet interpreted the 
specific statutory language at issue.  See, e.g., Wis. Dep't 
Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶51, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 
N.W.2d 95.  We acknowledge that in most situations, applying due 
weight deference will lead to the same result as would applying 
no deference at all.  "Under both due weight deference and no 
deference, the reviewing court may adopt, without regard for the 
agency's interpretation, what it views as the most reasonable 
interpretation of the statute."  Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 
Wis. 2d 549, ¶20.   
¶38 Applying the above principles here, we observe that 
the Commissioner has been charged by the legislature with 
approving group disability insurance forms, and the Commissioner 
may disapprove a form upon concluding that it violates a statute 
or is otherwise contrary to law.  Wis. Stat. §§ 631.20(1); 
631.20(2). 
 
The 
Commissioner 
has 
substantial 
experience 
interpreting mandatory coverage provisions.  Nevertheless, the 
Office of the Commissioner of Insurance has never specifically 
interpreted the language of sub. (7), which addresses maternity 
coverage, and it therefore has not developed the expertise that 
places it in a better position than the court to make judgments 
regarding the interpretation of this statute.  We conclude that 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
18 
 
due weight deference is warranted,15 and we will sustain the 
Commissioner's statutory interpretation if it is not contrary to 
the clear meaning of the statute and no more reasonable 
interpretation exists.  We turn now to the statute.      
III 
¶39 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 632.71-632.899 
regulate 
group 
disability insurance contracts.  Section 632.895(7) sets forth 
specific requirements for maternity coverage.  We are asked to 
determine whether MercyCare's 2002 Contract, which excludes 
"surrogate mother services," contravenes the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).   
                                                 
15  The concurrence's determination about deference misses 
the mark.  It confuses an inconsistency in the interpretation of 
ambiguous 
policy 
language 
with 
an 
inconsistency 
in 
the 
interpretation of the statute.  See concurrence, ¶¶86, 94-95.   
The OCI insurance examiner who approved the 2002 Contract 
testified about her reasons for approving the exclusion for 
"surrogate mother services."  She interpreted the exclusion as 
addressing the expenses incurred by an insured to pay for an 
uninsured third party to carry a child on that insured's behalf.  
See supra, ¶10, n.6. 
When the Commissioner reviewed the 2005 contract as a part 
of this litigation, he did not conclude, as the concurrence 
contends, 
"that the 2002 contract violated § 632.895(7)."  
Concurrence, ¶94.  Rather, he determined that the undefined term 
"surrogate mother services" in that contract was ambiguous and 
that it was MercyCare's application of the ambiguous term that 
violated the statute.   
Although 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
that 
OCI 
has 
not 
consistently interpreted the language of MercyCare's 2002 
contract, there is no evidence of inconsistency in OCI's 
interpretation of the statute.  Thus, there is no basis for the 
de novo review undertaken by the concurrence.   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
19 
 
¶40 We begin our examination of the statute by setting 
forth the relevant statutory and legislative history.  Next, we 
turn to the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute to 
determine whether it is reasonable.  Finally, we examine other 
interpretations to determine whether they are more reasonable 
than the interpretation advanced by the Commissioner. 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. Ch. 632 contains provisions applying 
to specific types of insurance contracts.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 632.895 sets forth various mandatory coverages in group 
disability insurance policies.  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.895(7), 
which regulates maternity coverage, provides as follows: 
Every group disability insurance policy which provides 
maternity coverage shall provide maternity coverage 
for all persons covered under the policy.  Coverage 
required under this subsection may not be subject to 
exclusions or limitations which are not applied to 
other maternity coverage under the policy.16 
¶42 The parties and the Commissioner agree that the first 
sentence of the statute prohibits an insurer from selectively 
offering maternity coverage to some insureds but not to others.  
Rather, the first sentence requires an insurer that decides to 
offer maternity coverage to anyone under the policy to offer 
that coverage to all persons under the policy.  The parties 
agree that the mandate of the first sentence is very broad.      
                                                 
16 The surrounding subsections regulate other aspects of 
group disability insurance coverage including home care, skilled 
nursing care, kidney disease treatment, coverage of newborn 
infants, coverage of grandchildren, equipment and supplies for 
treatment of diabetes, coverage for mammograms, drugs for 
treatment of HIV infection, and lead poisoning screening.  
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
20 
 
¶43 The parties' dispute centers around the meaning of the 
second sentence: "Coverage required under this subsection may 
not be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not 
applied to other maternity coverage under the policy."  From 
that sentence, it is clear that an insurer may exclude or limit 
some aspects of maternity coverage.  However, no maternity 
coverage may "be subject to exclusions or limitations which are 
not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy." 
¶44 Whether this sentence permits the exclusion of all 
maternity services to a subgroup of insureds based on the fact 
that the insured is serving as a surrogate mother is not readily 
apparent from the text.  As the Commissioner opined, it is 
likely that the current understanding of surrogacy was not a 
factual situation contemplated by the legislature when it passed 
the relevant statutory language in 1981 and 1985.17  Indeed, 
                                                 
17 The 
gravamen 
of 
the 
concurrence's 
statutory 
interpretation is illusory.  It relies on a void in the 
legislative 
debate. 
 
The 
concurrence 
asserts 
that 
the 
legislature's 
failure 
to 
discuss 
the 
"complicated 
social 
question" of surrogacy when enacting Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) is 
an indication that the legislature did not intend the statute to 
be 
applied 
to 
women 
acting 
as 
gestational 
carriers.  
Concurrence, ¶102.   
Failure to discuss an issue cannot be regarded as a 
positive indication of what the legislature intended.  It is far 
more likely that the legislature did not discuss surrogacy and 
gestational carriers because those issues were not contemplated 
by the legislature when the statute was enacted in 1981 and 
amended in 1985. 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
21 
 
cases from the early 1980s demonstrate that the term "surrogate 
mother" was used at that time to refer to a woman who was a 
caregiver for another woman's child.18    
¶45 Subsection (7) was originally added to the mandatory 
coverage statute in 1981.  It extended maternity coverage to 
dependent children only: 
                                                                                                                                                             
It was not until the 1988 case, In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 
(N.J. 1988), that the political tale of surrogacy attracted 
media attention and "left its mark on American law."  Elizabeth 
S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 109, 109 (Summer 2009).  In Baby M, the birth 
mother entered into a contract to conceive and bear a child that 
would be raised by another couple.  The child was conceived 
through artificial insemination using the birth mother's ovum 
and the intended father's sperm.  "It was through the lens of 
Baby M that this innovative use of reproductive technology was 
first scrutinized as an issue of social, political, and legal 
interest."  Id. 
Courts are routinely required to interpret the meaning of 
statutory 
language 
and 
apply 
it 
to 
"complicated 
social 
questions" involving technology that was not contemplated when a 
statute was enacted.  See, e.g., Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. 
Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶4, ___ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (discussing 
how the public records law should be applied to email, a 
technology not contemplated when the legislature enacted the 
law).  The question is, and should be, how the words of a 
statute apply to a new factual situation.  If the legislature 
disagrees with our interpretation, it is free to debate the 
issue and pass legislation amending the statute. 
18 See Estate of Hoier v. Knapp, No. 81-1341, slip op. at 2 
(Wis. Ct.  App., Apr. 27, 1982) ("[T]he decedent was and would 
have continued to be a surrogate mother to her minor brothers 
and sister because of the mother's illness and subsequent 
death"); K.S.R. v. A.L.R., No. 81-1292, slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., 
June 18, 1982).  Portions of the Wisconsin statutes also reflect 
this understanding of the term "surrogate."  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 115.792(1)(a)2 ("For a child who is a ward of the state, 
a judge overseeing the child's care may appoint a surrogate for 
the child's parents . . . .").   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
22 
 
Every group disability policy which provides coverage 
of dependent children and maternity coverage for any 
individual 
shall 
provide 
maternity 
coverage 
for 
dependent children.  Coverage required under this 
subsection may not be subject to exclusions or 
limitations which are not applied to other maternity 
coverage under the policy.  
The Legislative Reference Bureau explained that "[m]aternity 
coverage for dependent children may not be subject to exclusions 
or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage 
under the policy."   
¶46 The scope of sub. (7) was broadened by 1985 Wisconsin 
Act 56, the Abortion Prevention and Family Responsibility Act of 
1985.  This act was drafted by the Legislative Council Special 
Committee on Pregnancy Options.  Among other instructions, the 
committee had been specifically directed to "make available 
health insurance coverage for childbirth in all instances."  
Wisconsin Legislative Council Report No. 16 to the 1985 
Legislature, Legislation on Pregnancy Options, Oct. 7, 1985, at 
5.   
¶47 1985 Wisconsin Act 56 amended the first sentence to 
read: "Every group disability insurance policy which provides 
maternity coverage shall provide maternity coverage for all 
persons covered under the policy."  Thus, the act expanded the 
reach of sub. (7) from dependent children to "all persons 
covered under the policy."  The act did not amend the second 
sentence of sub. (7).  Thus, maternity coverage for "all persons 
covered under the policy" could not "be subject to exclusions or 
limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage 
under the policy."   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
23 
 
¶48 In a memo to the Joint Committee on Finance, the 
Director of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau explained that under 
the 
previous 
enactment, 
"[m]aternity 
coverage 
[was] 
not 
specifically 
required 
for 
persons 
other 
than 
dependent 
children."  However, the 1985 changes "would require that, if 
maternity coverage is provided under the policy, all persons who 
are generally covered under the policy must receive maternity 
coverage."  The fiscal note accompanying the act explained that 
the amendments required "every group disability insurance policy 
which provides maternity coverage to any individual to provide 
the same level to all persons covered under the policy."   
¶49 In 
interpreting 
the 
statute, 
the 
Commissioner 
recognized that the second sentence of sub. (7) permits some 
exclusions and limitations.  However, he also recognized that 
the exclusion written by MercyCare attempts to exclude coverage 
of generally covered maternity services available to other 
insureds on the sole basis that an insured is a surrogate 
mother.  The question was whether an exclusion of generally 
covered maternity services to those insureds acting as surrogate 
mothers contravenes the statute.   
¶50 The Commissioner quoted the definition of "exclusion" 
from a Wisconsin case that was contemporary to the drafting of 
the statute: "An exclusion, in insurance parlance, serves the 
purpose of taking out persons or events otherwise included 
within the defined scope of coverage."  Bortz v. Merrimac Mut. 
Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 2d 865, 871, 286 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1979).  
Although an exclusion typically takes out "persons or events," 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
24 
 
the Commissioner determined that the first sentence of sub. (7) 
prohibits the "taking out of persons who receive maternity 
coverage."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶51 Thus, the Commissioner concluded that although an 
insurer may exclude or limit "certain services" as long as it 
does so uniformly, the insurer "may not discriminate against a 
subgroup of insureds."  Accordingly, an insurer may make 
specific procedures——such as in vitro fertilization, elective 
abortion, and amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling solely 
for sex determination——non-covered benefits under the policy.  
The insurer may exclude these procedures for all insureds.  
However, the Commissioner concluded that it could not exclude 
services that are generally covered under the policy——such as 
inpatient hospital care and pre- and post-natal care——for a 
specific subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely 
on the insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method 
used to achieve pregnancy.   
¶52 MercyCare 
asserts 
that 
the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable because it 
conflicts with the language of sub. (7), which permits some 
exclusions.  Therefore, MercyCare contends that the unambiguous 
statutory language permits it to exclude not only specific 
services, but specific subgroups of insureds as well.     
¶53 The meaning of the statute and its application to the 
type of exclusion presented here are not readily apparent from 
the statutory text.  Therefore, applying the standard for due 
weight deference, we cannot conclude that the Commissioner's 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
25 
 
interpretation is contrary to the clear meaning of the statute.  
See, supra, ¶38.   
¶54 Further, 
the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation 
is 
reasonable because it reconciles the broad mandate of the first 
sentence, which requires that coverage be granted to all members 
of a group, and the second sentence, which allows exclusions 
under certain circumstances.  The Commissioner's interpretation 
is also consistent with the legislative history, which explains 
that "every group disability insurance policy" must "provide the 
same level to all persons covered under the policy."    
¶55 Giving due weight deference to the Commissioner's 
interpretation, we will nevertheless decline to adopt the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation 
if 
there 
is 
another, 
more 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  MercyCare asserts 
that "the statute was enacted to end discrimination based on the 
insured's status as a member, spouse or child, not to end all 
discrimination."   It advances that the second sentence requires 
only that any exclusion in its policy be applied uniformly.  
MercyCare contends that this interpretation of the statute is 
more reasonable.     
¶56 The crux of MercyCare's argument is that "the statute 
allows an exclusion to take out a person otherwise included, as 
long as under the same circumstances all persons otherwise 
included would also be taken out."  Thus, it asserts, the 
statute "allows coverage to be excluded for an insured who 
chooses to become a surrogate mother as long as the exclusion 
applies equally and uniformly to all insureds who chose to 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
26 
 
become surrogate mothers, i.e. a group member, a group member's 
spouse, or a group member's dependent child." 
¶57 MercyCare's 
interpretation 
suffers 
from 
some 
infirmities.  Initially, we observe that it does not find direct 
support in the text of the statute.  The statute does not state 
that it permits an exclusion that discriminates among subgroups 
as long as it applies uniformly to group members, spouses, and 
dependent children.  Rather, it states that the coverage for 
"all persons covered under the policy . . . may not be subject 
to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other 
maternity coverage under the policy." 
¶58 A second problem with MercyCare's interpretation is 
that it would produce unreasonable results.  Taken to its 
logical conclusion, MercyCare's interpretation would permit an 
insurer to discriminate against any number of subgroups of 
insureds, as long as the discrimination was "uniform."  For 
example, at oral argument, MercyCare suggested that it would be 
permitted to exclude an insured's fourth pregnancy——or even a 
second pregnancy——as long as that exclusion was applied to all 
policies uniformly.19  Such a result would undercut the broad 
mandate of the first sentence and is not reasonable. 
                                                 
19 At oral argument, the following exchange occurred between 
the court and counsel for MercyCare: 
Q: Under that second sentence, could MercyCare say we 
are providing coverage for pregnancies one through 
three, but any of you women who get pregnant with 
number four, you're on your own?  . . .  
A: Yes, I think they could. 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
27 
 
¶59 The concurrence also offers an interpretation of the 
statute.  It concludes that Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) permits an 
insurer to exclude maternity coverage for "gestational carrier 
services."  Concurrence, ¶83.  It explains that it reaches this 
conclusion because maternity care for a gestational carrier is a 
"contract expense" that inures to the benefit of a third party.  
Id., ¶100.        
¶60 There 
are 
three problems with the concurrence's 
interpretation.  First, the concepts of gestational carriers and 
contract expenses are not found in the language of the statute.  
The concurrence carves out an exception that is not supported by 
the statute's text.   
¶61 Second, although the concurrence's analysis is based 
on the existence of a contract, it relies on a definition of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q: Why? 
A: Because that exclusion would apply uniformly to 
every single person under the policy.  Any dependent, 
any spouse, or any covered employee would know going 
in that if they got pregnant a fourth time, that 
coverage would be excluded.  
Later, counsel was asked to clarify MercyCare's position on 
uniformity: 
Q: If you say that the second sentence authorizes 
exclusions and the test is uniformity, it could really 
be the second child. . . . Could it say to unmarried 
mothers?  
A: I don't think it could say for unmarried mothers, 
well, I don't think there's anything necessarily in 
the language of this statute that provides it but I do 
believe it would run afoul of [other discrimination 
laws].  
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
28 
 
"gestational carrier" that makes no reference to the existence 
of a contract.  The concurrence explains that a gestational 
carrier is a woman who "receives a transfer of an embryo created 
by ovum and sperm" and who has no genetic relationship with the 
baby she carries.  Id., ¶83 n.2.  Nothing in the definition of 
"gestational carriers" restricts the term's use to a contract 
situation where the gestational carrier intends that the baby 
will be raised by other parents.  See id.   
¶62 Third, the concurrence's interpretation, based on a 
contract analysis, raises more questions than it answers.  It is 
not entirely clear how its interpretation of the statute would 
be applied.  What is clear, however, is that the existence of 
contract expenses——the rationale adopted by the concurrence——
does not appear to yield a predictable result.   
¶63 Imagine, for instance, a situation where an insured is 
impregnated via embryo transfer and shares no genetic material 
with the child she carries.  Could the insurer exclude maternity 
coverage for that insured, even if there was no contract and the 
insured became pregnant with the express purpose of parenting 
the child?  Under the concurrence's interpretation, the answer 
would appear to be yes——the insured is a gestational carrier and 
can be excluded.    
¶64 Alternatively, imagine the fact situation in In re 
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), the case that raised national 
awareness 
of 
the 
social 
and 
legal 
issues 
involved 
with 
surrogacy.  See supra, ¶44 n.17.  There, the birth mother 
supplied the ovum and carried the baby to term, but her purpose 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
29 
 
in becoming pregnant was to fulfill a contract with third 
parties who intended to raise the baby.  Could an insurer have 
excluded coverage for the delivery of Baby M?  Under the 
concurrence's interpretation, the answer appears to be no.  
Despite the existence of a contract, Baby M's birth mother was 
not a gestational carrier because she was genetically related to 
the child she carried. 
¶65 The 
questions 
raised 
by 
the 
concurrence's 
interpretation are endless.  Is the basis of the concurrence's 
rationale really the existence of a contract, or is it status as 
a gestational carrier, intent to parent, or all three?  How 
would 
the 
concurrence's 
interpretation 
affect 
independent 
adoptions, where there is often a contract providing that the 
adoptive parents will pay for the birth mother's maternity 
expenses?  See Audra Behne, Balancing the Adoption Triangle, 15 
In Pub. Interest 49, 79 (1996-1997) ("[U]sually the adoptive 
parents pay the birth mother's maternity expenses and legal 
fees.").  Who would pay for the maternity coverage if the 
parties contested the rights and obligations of parentage after 
the child was born?  What would happen if a gestational 
surrogate decided mid-pregnancy to parent the child, or if the 
intended parents decided to divorce and refused to accept the 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
30 
 
child?  What would happen if a court concluded that the 
surrogacy contract was unenforceable?20   
¶66 The concurrence's interpretation writes language into 
the statute, relies on a definition of gestational carrier that 
is not consistent with the contract-based rationale it advances, 
and would lead to unpredictable results.  Therefore, it is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.   
¶67 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation is reasonable and is not contrary to the clear 
meaning of the statute, we determine that the interpretations 
advanced 
by 
MercyCare 
and 
the 
concurrence 
are 
not 
more 
reasonable than the interpretation advanced by the Commissioner.  
Further, no more reasonable interpretation exists.  Thus, we 
affirm 
the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.895(7).   
¶68 We conclude that the statute permits an insurer to 
exclude or limit certain services and procedures, as long as the 
exclusion or limitation applies to all policies.  However, an 
insurer may not make routine maternity services that are 
generally covered under the policy unavailable to a specific 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 69.14(1)(h) provides that when a child 
is born to a surrogate mother, the child's birth certificate 
shall 
list 
information 
about 
the 
surrogate 
mother, 
and 
information about the father shall be omitted.  If a court 
determines parental rights, a new birth certificate will be 
issued.  The statutes do not distinguish between traditional 
surrogacy arrangements and gestational surrogacy arrangements.  
Neither the statutes nor our case law provides specific guidance 
about how a determination of parental rights would be made under 
these circumstances.   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
31 
 
subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the 
insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to 
achieve pregnancy.  Accordingly, MercyCare's attempt to exclude 
surrogate 
mothers 
from 
coverage 
under 
its 
2002 
Contract 
contravenes Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7), and MercyCare wrongfully 
denied maternity coverage to J.M. and C.S.   
IV 
¶69 Having determined that the statute does not permit 
MercyCare to exclude maternity services on the basis of an 
insured's role as a surrogate mother, it follows that the 
Commissioner appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision 
in the 2005 Contract as contrary to § 632.895(7).  The 
Commissioner also offered an additional reason for disapproving 
the 
provision——that 
it 
is 
misleading 
because 
it 
is 
too 
restricted to achieve the purposes for which the policy is sold.  
This reason also supports our conclusion that the Commissioner 
appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision in the 2005 
Contract.   
¶70 Under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(1), MercyCare was required 
to file its 2005 Contract with the Commissioner for approval.  
Section 631.20(2) provides that the Commissioner may disapprove 
a form if it makes one of several findings.  Disapproval is 
authorized if the Commissioner finds that the form "violates a 
statute or a rule promulgated by the commissioner, or is 
otherwise 
contrary 
to 
law." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 631.20(2)(d).  
Disapproval is also authorized if the Commissioner finds: 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
32 
 
That 
it 
is 
inequitable, 
unfairly 
discriminatory, 
misleading, 
deceptive, 
obscure 
or 
encourages 
misrepresentation, including cases where the form: 
1. 
Is 
misleading 
because 
its 
benefits 
are 
too 
restricted to serve the purposes for which the policy 
is sold.   
Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a). 
¶71 The 2005 Contract excludes "[t]reatment, services, or 
supplies for a surrogate mother or any pregnancy resulting from 
your service as a surrogate mother."  Unlike the 2002 Contract, 
it defines the term "surrogate mother" as follows: 
Surrogate mother means a woman who, through in vitro 
fertilization or any other means of fertilization, 
gives birth to a child which she may or may not have a 
genetic relationship to, or an individual who provides 
a uterus for the gestation of a fertilized ovum 
obtained from a donor when the child will be parented 
by someone other than the woman who gives birth.   
¶72 The Commissioner concluded that this definition was 
misleading because its benefits are too restricted to achieve 
the purposes for which the policy was sold.  Although MercyCare 
asserted the definition was meant to encompass expenses incurred 
by women who profited by carrying a child for another parent to 
raise, the Commissioner concluded that there is nothing in the 
2005 definition of surrogate mother that limits the exclusion to 
those situations.  Rather, aside from being contrary to the 
statutory mandate, MercyCare's definition was overly broad and 
would have the unintended effect of excluding coverage for some 
insureds that MercyCare may not have intended to exclude.  As a 
result, MercyCare would have "broad discretion in applying its 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
33 
 
exclusion to any number of women based solely on how or why they 
are pregnant."   
¶73 MercyCare now asserts that the Commissioner erred in 
disapproving the 2005 Contract because an OCI insurance examiner 
testified at deposition that if the exclusion did not contravene 
the statute, she otherwise did not have "any objection to the 
definition of surrogate mother in the 2005 certificate."  
MercyCare explains that the Commissioner ignored this testimony, 
and his decision is therefore not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record.  However, the interpretation of a 
definition in an insurance policy is a question of law.  Thus, 
neither the Commissioner nor this court is bound by the legal 
conclusion of any witness. 
¶74 MercyCare's definition of "surrogate mother" appears 
to encompass two different types of insureds: (1) an insured who 
through in vitro or any other means of fertilization gives birth 
to a child, regardless of whether she has a genetic relationship 
with that child; and (2) an insured who provides a uterus for 
the gestation of a fertilized ovum obtained from a donor when 
the child will be parented by someone other than the insured.   
¶75 The first category appears to exclude all pregnancies.  
It would exclude insureds who do or do not have a genetic 
relationship 
to 
the 
children 
they 
give 
birth 
to 
when 
fertilization occurs "by any means."  The Commissioner is 
correct 
that 
even 
if 
an 
exclusion 
for 
surrogacy 
were 
permissible, the definition of "surrogate mother" is misleading 
under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a).  With such a broad exclusion, 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
34 
 
the policy's benefits are too restricted to achieve the purposes 
for which the policy is sold. 
¶76 MercyCare acknowledges that the definition suffers 
from a drafting error, and it asserts that a comma should be 
inserted between "donor" and "when the child will be parented by 
someone other than the woman who gives birth."21  Thus, MercyCare 
contends, the phrase "when the child will be parented by someone 
other than the woman who gives birth" would modify both 
categories of insureds.   
¶77 At oral argument, counsel for MercyCare explained that 
if a comma is added to the definition, "[t]he person who would 
be excluded would be the insured employee, spouse, or dependent 
who actually becomes pregnant, regardless of how that person 
became pregnant, [] if the pregnancy was for the purpose of 
giving that child to some other non-covered [parent]."  Counsel 
further explained that its definition rested upon the intention 
of the insured at the moment the insured became pregnant:    
Q: [W]hat does the phrase "any other means of 
fertilization" mean? 
A: I don't know. 
Q: Seems fairly broad, doesn't it? 
                                                 
21 Once edited, the definition would read: "Surrogate mother 
means a woman who, through in vitro fertilization or any other 
means of fertilization, gives birth to a child which she may or 
may not have a genetic relationship to, or an individual who 
provides a uterus for the gestation of a fertilized ovum 
obtained from a donor, when the child will be parented by 
someone other than the woman who gives birth."  (Emphasis 
added.)   
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
35 
 
A: Yes, it is broad.   
Q: So, if you become pregnant, isn't that what it 
says, regardless of how——  
A: It does. 
Q: ——and whether it is genetic or not? 
A: Right.  And that covers traditional surrogacy 
versus gestational surrogacy, basically bringing us 
back to the point, which is whether the person is 
intending to be the parent, or providing the child to 
the intended parent. 
Q: And it has to be at the time of the fertilization? 
A: The time of the pregnancy, which I would interpret 
as the time of the fertilization. 
Q So, if I at the moment I become pregnant, plan on 
keeping the baby, but at some time during the 
pregnancy, decide to give it up for adoption or 
otherwise, I would be covered. 
A: I believe you would.   
¶78 Even with the addition of a comma to correct the error 
in draftsmanship, we conclude that MercyCare's definition of 
"surrogate mother" is overly broad.  Nothing in the text of the 
definition limits the exclusion to situations where the insured 
knows "at the moment of fertilization" that the child will be 
parented by someone else.  Rather, it appears that MercyCare 
could invoke the exclusion and deny coverage in any situation 
"when the child will be parented by someone other than the woman 
who gives birth"——regardless of when that decision was made.    
¶79 Further, even if the definition did turn on an 
insured's intention at "the moment of fertilization," the 
exclusion could be applied to an insured who knows that in the 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
36 
 
event of an unplanned pregnancy, she would carry the child to 
term and then put the child up for adoption.  Nothing in the 
definition of "surrogate mother" limits the exclusion to a 
commercial relationship where an insured agrees to carry a child 
for a third party, expecting to be compensated for that service. 
¶80 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
Commissioner 
appropriately 
disapproved the surrogacy provision in the 2005 Contract under 
Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a)1.  In addition to contravening Wis.  
Stat. § 632.895(7), MercyCare's definition of "surrogate mother" 
is misleading because it is too restricted to serve the purposes 
for which the policy is sold. 
V 
¶81 In sum, applying due weight deference, we conclude 
that an insurer may not make routine maternity services that are 
generally covered under the policy unavailable to a specific 
subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the 
insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to 
achieve pregnancy.  Accordingly, we determine that MercyCare's 
application of the 2002 Contract to exclude from coverage all 
maternity services for surrogate mothers contravenes Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.895(7).     
¶82 We also conclude that the Commissioner appropriately 
disapproved the surrogacy provision in MercyCare's 2005 Contract 
because it is contrary to Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).  In addition, 
the definition of "surrogate mother" set forth in the 2005 
Contract is misleading because the benefits are too restricted 
No. 
2008AP2937   
 
37 
 
to 
serve 
the 
purposes 
for 
which 
the 
policy 
is 
sold.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed.   
 
 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶83 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I agree 
with the majority opinion's conclusion that the 2002 MercyCare1 
policy did not exclude healthcare services for the pregnancies 
and deliveries of the gestational carriers, J.M. and C.S.2  I 
also 
agree 
that 
the 
2005 
MercyCare 
policy 
was 
properly 
disapproved 
by 
the 
Commissioner 
of 
Insurance. 
 
I 
write 
separately, 
in 
concurrence, 
because 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
Commissioner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) is 
subject to de novo review, not to due weight deference, and 
because I conclude that § 632.895(7) permits MercyCare to 
exclude coverage for gestational carrier services, even though 
the 2002 MercyCare policy did not do so.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶84 The facts from which this appeal arises are not 
complex.  Two insureds, J.M. and C.S., acted as gestational 
carriers.  Both delivered infants pursuant to arrangements with 
                                                 
1 MercyCare Insurance Company and MercyCare HMO, Inc. are 
insurance companies licensed to do business in Wisconsin.  As a 
convenience, I will refer to the insurers as MercyCare. 
2 Both 
J.M. 
and 
C.S. 
are 
"gestational 
carriers."  
Gestational carrier was defined by the Commissioner of Insurance 
as "a woman who receives a transfer of an embryo created by an 
ovum and sperm from either the intended parents or a donor(s).  
A gestational carrier shares no genetic material with the child 
with which she is impregnated."  Office of the Commissioner of 
Insurance 
Final 
Decision 
39 
(Dec. 8, 
2006) 
[hereinafter 
Commissioner's decision].  Because both J.M. and C.S. are 
gestational carriers and because surrogate mother is a broader 
term 
subject 
to 
various 
interpretations, 
but 
includes 
gestational carriers, I employ the term gestational carrier 
throughout this opinion.  
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
2 
 
unnamed persons not parties to this litigation.  MercyCare 
refused to pay for J.M.'s and C.S.'s prenatal, delivery and 
postnatal care, asserting that the 2002 healthcare policy under 
which both were insureds did not cover healthcare services for 
their pregnancies and deliveries.   
¶85 J.M.'s and C.S.'s bills for the healthcare services 
provided to them were paid by persons other than the insureds.  
Nevertheless, C.S. complained to the Office of the Commissioner 
of Insurance that MercyCare refused to pay for the healthcare 
services relating to her pregnancy and delivery.  C.S.'s 
complaint brought MercyCare's nonpayment to the attention of the 
Commissioner of Insurance.3   
¶86 The Commissioner re-examined the 2002 policy, which 
his office had previously approved, and determined that the 
policy violated Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7)'s mandatory coverage of 
maternity services.4  The Commissioner also concluded that 
"[e]ven if the surrogacy services could be properly excluded, 
the 2002 contract is unenforceable because the language is 
ambiguous."5  The Commissioner did not approve the 2005 contract 
because he found that it was too complex, which he concluded 
could mislead the public.6   
                                                 
3 Id. at 31.   
4 Id. at 39.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 43. 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
3 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶87 On appeal, we review the decision of the Commissioner 
of Insurance, not that of the circuit court.  See Nat'l 
Motorists Ass'n v. Office of the Comm'r of Ins., 2002 WI App 
308, ¶10, 259 Wis. 2d 240, 655 N.W.2d 179.   
¶88 This appeal requires construction of the MercyCare 
healthcare policies.  We construe an insurance contract as a 
question of law.  Peterson v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 2003 
WI App 166, ¶11, 265 Wis. 2d 768, 669 N.W.2d 151.  We do so 
independently, without deference to the agency's interpretation.  
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 
WI 86, ¶114, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184 (Roggensack, J. 
concurring, citing Wisconsin End-User Gas Ass'n v. PSC, 218 
Wis. 2d 558, 565, 581 N.W.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
¶89 The Commissioner's decision turns in part on his 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7), which 
we also review as questions of law.  Buettner v. DH&FS, 2003 WI 
App 90, ¶6, 264 Wis. 2d 700, 663 N.W.2d 282.  We may apply one 
of three levels of deference to an agency's interpretation and 
application of a statute:  (1) no deference, often referred to a 
de novo review; (2) due weight deference, where we affirm an 
agency's statutory interpretation and application if it is 
reasonable and another interpretation is not more reasonable; 
and (3) great weight deference, where we affirm an agency's 
interpretation and application if it is reasonable, even when we 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
4 
 
conclude that another interpretation is more reasonable.  UFE 
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284-87, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).   
¶90 In order to employ due weight or great weight 
deference 
to 
an 
agency's 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application, the agency must have met certain experiential 
benchmarks.7  Due weight deference requires the agency to have 
been charged by the legislature with administering the statute 
at issue and the agency must have had some experience in 
interpreting that statute in a consistent fashion.  Id. at 286-
87.   
¶91 Great weight deference requires that:  (1) the agency 
has been charged by the legislature with administering the 
statute; (2) the agency has long standing experience in 
administering the statute; (3) the agency has used its expertise 
and specialized knowledge in forming its interpretation of the 
statute; and (4) the agency's interpretation must provide more 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute 
than would a court's decision.  Id. at 284.   
                                                 
7 Although both present as questions of law and are often 
intertwined, a difference process is employed in the repetitive 
application of a statute to varying fact-sets than is employed 
in the initial statutory interpretation.  Patience Drake 
Roggensack, Elected to Decide:  Is the Decision-Avoidance 
Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of 
Last Resort, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541, 550-52 (Spring 2006) 
(explaining that giving deference to agency decisions on 
questions of law was first suggested in regard to an agency's 
application of a statute to a particular fact-set and later, 
without 
further 
explanation, 
encompassed 
statutory 
interpretation as well). 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶92 In the case now before us, the majority opinion gives 
due weight deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).8  I would grant the Commissioner's 
statutory interpretation no deference.   
¶93 Usually, 
it 
does 
not 
matter 
to 
the 
ultimate 
interpretation of a statute whether this court applies due 
weight deference or a de novo review because in both cases we 
interpret the statute.  County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶19, 
315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.  However, we have set 
parameters that an agency must satisfy in order to be accorded 
due weight deference.  UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 286-87.  When an 
agency 
has 
not 
satisfied 
the 
parameters 
for 
due 
weight 
deference, we should acknowledge that by the level of deference 
we employ.    
¶94 The 
Commissioner's 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) present on the following 
undisputed facts.  First, the Office of the Commissioner of 
Insurance is charged by the legislature with administering 
§ 632.895(7).  Second, the Office of the Commissioner of 
Insurance approved the 2002 MercyCare policy, under which J.M. 
and C.S. were insured, before it was used as an insuring 
vehicle, thereby concluding that the 2002 policy complied with 
§ 632.895(7).  Third, the current version of § 632.895(7) was in 
effect when the Commissioner's office initially approved the 
2002 contract.  Fourth, in resolving C.S.'s complaint, the 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶38. 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
6 
 
Commissioner concluded that the same 2002 contract that it had 
approved under § 632.895(7) violated  § 632.895(7).  
¶95 The Commissioner has met the first parameter for due 
weight deference in that his office has been charged by the 
legislature 
with 
administering 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.895(7).  
However, the Office of the Commissioner has demonstrated no 
experience interpreting the statute in a consistent fashion 
based on the same facts, i.e., the 2002 MercyCare insurance 
policy.  Stated otherwise, the Office of the Commissioner of 
Insurance has once approved the 2002 MercyCare policy as being 
in compliance with the statutes and has once concluded that the 
same policy violated the statutes.  Therefore, the agency has 
not satisfied the second parameter this court has established 
for due weight deference.  Accordingly, I give no deference to 
the 
Commissioner's 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
§ 632.895(7).   
B.  Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) 
¶96 Statutory interpretation begins with the language 
chosen by the legislature.  State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶21, 
311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769.  If the meaning of the statute 
is plain on its face we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Id. 
(citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  "However, if 
a statute is 'capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses[,]' then the statute is 
ambiguous, and we may consult extrinsic sources to discern its 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
7 
 
meaning."  Grunke, 311 Wis. 2d 439, ¶22 (quoting Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶47-48, 50).   
¶97 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.895(7), provides: 
MATERNITY 
COVERAGE. 
 
Every 
group 
disability 
insurance policy which provides maternity coverage 
shall provide maternity coverage for all persons 
covered under the policy.  Coverage required under 
this subsection may not be subject to exclusions or 
limitations which are not applied to other maternity 
coverage under the policy.   
"Maternity coverage" is not defined in ch. 632.  The varying 
circumstances under which a request for healthcare relating to 
pregnancy may arise also are not addressed in ch. 632.  As a 
consequence, "maternity coverage" may have different meanings to 
different reasonably well informed people.   
¶98 For example, must "maternity coverage" be defined as 
prenatal, delivery and postnatal services for all women who 
become pregnant?  Or, are the healthcare services that are 
necessitated by the contract of a gestational carrier not 
included within the meaning of "maternity coverage" because they 
are more accurately characterized as the contract expenses of a 
woman who agreed to carry a child to which she has contributed 
no genetic material and to which she claims no rights of 
parentage?9  Stated otherwise, while the healthcare expenses J.M. 
                                                 
9 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of 
Commodification, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109 (Summer 2009) 
(discussing the social policy concerns of the various forms of 
surrogacy, including gestational carriers); see also Anna L. 
Benjamin, 
The 
Implications 
of 
Using 
the 
Medical 
Expense 
Deduction of I.R.C. § 213 to Subsidize Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1117 (April 2004) (questioning 
whether the expenses of creating a child through expensive 
assisted reproduction should qualify as a medical expense 
deduction within the meaning of I.R.C. § 213). 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
8 
 
and C.S. incurred were related to their giving birth, they were 
not expenses incurred to become mothers.  Rather, they were the 
contract expenses they incurred in fulfilling their agreements 
with third parties.   
¶99 A 
construction 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.895(7) 
that 
concludes that the cost of the healthcare services J.M. and C.S. 
received were contract expenses is consistent with the facts of 
this case.  It is uncontested that as gestational carriers both 
women contributed no genetic material to the fetuses they 
carried and that the healthcare bills of J.M. ($16,774.64) and 
C.S. ($18,510.84) have been paid by third parties.  Therefore, 
any payment by MercyCare for the costs of these gestational 
carrier services will not inure to the benefit of the insureds, 
but rather, to the benefit of persons who are not insured by 
MercyCare.   
¶100 Because reasonably well informed persons could come to 
the conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) requires that 
healthcare services must be provided to all pregnant women who 
are also insureds or to the conclusion that it does not apply to 
gestational carrier services, which are contract expenses, the 
statute is ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶47-48.  
Accordingly, in attempting to discern its meaning, I consult 
extrinsic sources.  Id. at 50. 
¶101 The 
legislative 
history 
underlying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.895(7) gives no indication that the legislature considered 
insureds who acted as gestational carriers when it mandated 
coverage for "maternity services."  Subsection (7) was amended 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
9 
 
to its current language by 1985 Wisconsin Act 56, § 33.  It 
began as Assembly Bill 510.  The Legislative Reference Bureau's 
note provides that the amendment to subsection (7) has the 
effect of requiring "the same maternity coverage for a dependent 
spouse of a male employee as for a female employee."  Another 
note explains: 
Current law requires every group disability insurance 
policy which provides both coverage of dependent 
children 
and 
maternity coverage to also provide 
maternity coverage for dependent children. . . .  
This subsection requires every group disability 
insurance policy which provides maternity coverage to 
any individual to provide the same level of maternity 
coverage to all persons covered under the policy. 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff note of September 23, 1985.  
Therefore, if a person who was not a policyholder, a spouse of a 
policyholder or the dependant child of a policyholder, but 
nevertheless was an insured, became pregnant, maternity coverage 
is required.   
¶102 The legislature could require coverage for gestational 
carrier services.  However, if coverage for gestational  carrier 
services were considered by the legislature, because it is such 
a complicated social question, there surely would have been some 
indication of such a discussion.10  But, there is not.  
Accordingly, I conclude that although the pregnancy of a 
gestational carrier who carries a child under a contract with a 
                                                 
10 See generally Scott, supra note 9 (discussing the various 
types of surrogacy, including gestational carriers, and how 
these types of pregnancies may relate to current parentage and 
abortion concepts).   
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
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third party could be mandated, there is no indication that the 
legislature did so in Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).   
C.  MercyCare Policies 
1.  2002 policy 
¶103 The 2002 MercyCare policy provides in relevant part: 
PREGNANCY BENEFITS 
. . .  
Non-Covered Services: 
• Surrogate mother services. 
• Elective abortions. 
• Maternity services received out of the service 
area in the last 30 days of pregnancy without 
prior authorization from the Plan except in an 
emergency.  Prior authorization is based on 
medical necessity. 
• Amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling (CVS) 
solely for sex determination. 
¶104 MercyCare 
relies on the term, "Surrogate mother 
services," for its exclusion of coverage for J.M.'s and C.S.'s 
prenatal, delivery and postnatal care.  Surrogate mother 
services is not defined in the 2002 policy.  That term could 
encompass a variety of healthcare services, some of which are 
not at issue in this case.   
¶105 For example, surrogate mother services could include 
the extensive hormone therapy that is required prior to 
implantation of zygotes11 in order to permit a gestational 
                                                 
11 When fertilization of the egg is accomplished in vitro, 
the resulting combination of the egg and the sperm with which a 
woman is impregnated is the zygote.   
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
11 
 
carrier to carry a child to which she has provided no genetic 
material.  Or, it could refer to similar treatment for a 
surrogate who has provided the ovum for the zygote with which 
she will be impregnated.  It could also be read to cover the 
usual prenatal, delivery and postnatal care after the pregnancy 
has begun for a pregnant woman who carries a child under any 
type of surrogacy.  Or it could encompass more than one of those 
circumstances, or perhaps some circumstance that I have not 
mentioned.  
¶106 Based on this lack of precision in defining surrogate 
mother services, I conclude that the 2002 policy is ambiguous.  
The Commissioner also concluded that the 2002 MercyCare policy 
is ambiguous because it does not adequately define surrogate 
mother services.12   
¶107 An ambiguous insurance policy, with undefined terms, 
is construed as it would be understood by a reasonable insured.  
Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶13, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 750 N.W.2d 
817.  Policy language that relates to coverage and is ambiguous 
is construed in favor of the insured, as affording coverage.  
Id.   
¶108 Because MercyCare did not define surrogate mother 
services as healthcare services provided to a woman who 
contracted to carry a child to which she contributes no genetic 
material and to whom she asserts no rights of parentage, I 
construe the policy against MercyCare and conclude that the 
                                                 
12 Commissioner's decision at 42. 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
12 
 
costs of the healthcare provided to J.M. and C.S. must be born 
by MercyCare.   
2.  2005 policy13 
¶109 The 2005 MercyCare policy provides in relevant part: 
PREGNANCY BENEFITS 
. . .  
Non-Covered Services: 
• Treatment, services or supplies for a surrogate 
mother or any pregnancy resulting from your 
service as a surrogate mother. 
. . .  
SURROGATE MOTHER 
Surrogate mother means a woman who, through in 
vitro 
fertilization 
or 
any 
other 
means 
of 
fertilization, gives birth to a child which she may or 
may not have a genetic relationship to, or an 
individual who provides a uterus for the gestation of 
a fertilized ovum obtained from a donor when the child 
will be parented by someone other than the woman who[] 
gives birth.   
¶110 As if in recognition of the ambiguity in its 2002 
policy, while C.S.'s complaint was pending in the Office of the 
Commissioner of Insurance, MercyCare submitted the 2005 policy 
for consideration.  The 2005 policy defines surrogate mother, as 
set out above.   
                                                 
13 Neither J.M. nor C.S. claim coverage under the 2005 
policy.  Therefore, even though the Commissioner has held that 
the 2005 policy is not in compliance with Wis. Stat. § 631.20, 
his 
decision 
does 
not affect payment to J.M. and C.S.  
Furthermore, since the 2005 policy has not been approved by the 
Commissioner, it cannot have been used as an insuring vehicle or 
have affected any other insureds.   
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
13 
 
¶111 The Commissioner denied approval of the 2005 policy 
based on his authority under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a)3.14  The 
Commissioner explained: 
While MercyCare has argued that it is only trying 
to limit its coverage to provide personal health 
insurance 
and 
"not 
cover 
expenses 
incurred 
in 
activities from which the insured profits or expenses 
are incurred on behalf of persons not covered under 
the policy.". . .  [T]here is nothing in the 2005 
Contract's definition of surrogate mother that limits 
coverage to those situations.  Rather, as OCI argues, 
the definition "permits MercyCare broad discretion in 
applying its exclusion to any number of women based 
solely on how and why they are pregnant," and further 
has the "unintended effect of restricting coverage to 
some insureds they may or may not intend to exclude."  
The fact that the policy drafter does not understand 
the implications of the language in its own policy 
supports a finding the language is unnecessarily 
verbose or complex.    
¶112 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 631.20(2)(a)3. 
permits 
the 
Commissioner to disapprove a proposed insurance policy upon a 
"finding" that the policy is "unnecessarily verbose or complex 
in language."  I agree with the finding of the Commissioner.  
The definition that MercyCare employs in the 2005 policy does 
not accomplish the purposes MercyCare says it hoped to achieve 
and could easily mislead a reasonable insured. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶113 In conclusion, I agree with the majority opinion that 
the 2002 MercyCare policy did not exclude gestational carrier 
services for the pregnancies and deliveries of J.M. and C.S.  I 
also 
agree 
that 
the 
2005 
MercyCare 
policy 
was 
properly 
disapproved 
by 
the 
Commissioner 
of 
Insurance. 
 
I 
write 
                                                 
14 Commissioner's decision at 43.   
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
14 
 
separately, 
in 
concurrence, 
because 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
Commissioner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) is 
subject to de novo review, not to due weight deference, and 
because I conclude that § 632.895(7) permits MercyCare to 
exclude coverage for gestational carrier services, even though 
the 2002 MercyCare policy did not do so.   
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2937.pdr 
 
 
 
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