Title: MARVIN v HARGRAVE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-083
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 1980

No. 79-83 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 NEWTON MARVIN, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . C. LEO HARGRAVE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead. Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana Daniel Johns argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana Kenneth O'Brien argued, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: September 12, 1980 ~ecided: @@T 2 2 1980 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered by the Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Flathead County D i s t r i c t Court, following a nonjury t r i a l , awarding p l a i n t i f f Newton Marvin t h e sum of $3,736.24 pursuant t o a land clearance c o n t r a c t . Defendant C. Leo Hargrave and h i s wife entered i n t o a w r i t t e n land c l e a r i n g agreement with Bruce K i s e r on August 16, 1974, f o r t h e purpose of converting approximately 100 acres of timberland i n t o a d d i t i o n a l farmland. According t o t h e agreement, K i s e r was t o c u t " a l l - timber, except aspen, and c l e a r stumps and brush and p i l e same i n a s c l e a r a manner a s p o s s i b l e i n r e t u r n f o r a l l timber r i g h t s . " The c o n t r a c t continued: "Large stumps w i l l be t r i e d , and i f they c a n ' t be moved they may be l e f t . Timber w i l l be c u t t o t h e brow of t h e slopes f o r s h e l t e r b e l t , a l s o s h e l t e r from A.M.C. Road. A l l s l a s h d i s p o s a l money w i l l go t o Bruce f o r c l e a r i n g Harrding logging job--also s l a s h from t h i s job." Kiser began c l e a r i n g t h e land, b u t had c l e a r e d only a small p o r t i o n of the 100 a c r e s when, with t h e consent of Leo Hargrave on November 2, 1974, he assigned h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t r a c t t o Newton Marvin. A t t h e t i m e of the assign- ment, Hargrave explained t o Marvin t h a t t h e land w a s being c l e a r e d s o t h a t it would be s u i t a b l e f o r farming. For ap- proximately two years, Marvin performed t h e c o n t r a c t a s re- quired, removing t h e timber and receiving t h e money from i t s sale. Marvin ceased work i n November 1977. By t h i s t i m e Marvin had c l e a r e d t h e property s o a s t o comply with t h e t e r m s of a S t a t e F i r e Hazard Reduction Agreement which had been executed f o r t h e acreage by Hargrave with t h e Montana S t a t e Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) i n accordance with t h e s e c t i o n 76-13-408, MCA. The requirements of t h i s agreement having been m e t , DNRC in- formed Hargrave t h a t t h e remaining s l a s h d i s p o s a l d e p o s i t being held under t h e agreement was no longer necessary and could be r e t r i e v e d . I n accordance with t h e assigned c o n t r a c t , an i n i t i a l s l a s h d e p o s i t , r e l e a s e d e a r l i e r by DNRC, was paid t o Marvin by Hargrave. The payment was made during t h e two-year period Marvin worked on t h e land. The last s l a s h d e p o s i t of $3,616.24 was returned i n March 1978. However, i n s t e a d of paying t h i s sum t o Marvin, Hargrave r e t a i n e d t h e money s i n c e he believed t h a t Marvin had n o t f u l l y performed under t h e c o n t r a c t . I n an attempt t o secure t h e monies contained i n t h e s l a s h d e p o s i t , Marvin f i l e d a claim and n o t i c e of a mechanic's l i e n on March 10, 1978. Marvin then f i l e d s u i t on June 22, 1978, a l l e g i n g t h a t Hargrave had f a i l e d t o pay him t h e s l a s h d i s p o s a l d e p o s i t i n consideration f o r s e r v i c e s performed i n c l e a r i n g t h e land. Marvin asked f o r $3,840.04 i n damages, p l u s a t t o r n e y f e e s , and t h a t t h e property involved be s o l d and t h e proceeds applied t o t h e judgment i n accordance with t h e l i e n . Hargrave counterclaimed a l l e g i n g t h a t because of Marvin's f a i l u r e t o properly perform t h e c o n t r a c t he l o s t t h e use of t h e 100 a c r e s as farmland f o r a period of t h r e e y z a r s and unless Marvin proceeds t o properly complete t h e performance due, he w i l l l o s e f u t u r e use of t h e land. Hargrave s t a t e d h i s damages were a s y e t undetermined. During t r i a l Hargrave sought t o introduce evidence showing c e r t a i n expenditures he had made i n completing t h e work a l l e g e d l y l e f t undone by ~ a r v i n . Marvin objected on t h e ground t h a t t h e evidence was incompetent, i r r e l e v a n t and immaterial t o any i s s u e i n t h e cause and t h a t it was beyond t h e scope of any contention t h a t Hargrave had s e t f o r t h i n t h e case. The t r i a l c o u r t provisionally allowed t h e evi- dence t o be introduced s u b j e c t t o Marvin's r i g h t t o renew h i s o b j e c t i o n a t t h e completion of a l l testimony. A t t h e conclusion of t h e t r i a l , Marvin by w r i t t e n motion renewed h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e evidence. The t r i a l c o u r t granted t h e motion on t h e ground t h a t t h e claimed expenses w e r e o u t s i d e t h e scope of t h e pleadings and t h e p r e t r i a l order and t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t testi- mony a t t r i a l t h a t a claim o r b i l l f o r s a i d expenses was ever presented t o Marvin. Judgment i n favor of Marvin f o r $3,736.24 was entered on September 17, 1979. The judgment was based on t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t Hargrave had wrongfully converted t h e s l a s h d i s p o s a l monies. Following e n t r y of judgment, Hargrave moved t h e c o u r t , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o amend t h e findings; f o r judgment f o r t h e defendant; f o r a new t r i a l ; and f o r l e a v e t o amend t h e counterclaim so a s t o conform with t h e o f f e r e d evidence per- t a i n i n g t o t h e expenditures made i n completing t h e c l e a r i n g of h i s land. Defendant's motions w e r e denied, and amended f i n d i n g s w e r e f i l e d on October 9, 1979, again finding t h a t Hargrave's a c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d conversion. The c o u r t then ordered t h a t each p a r t y have o f f s e t t i n g judgments a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r f o r $1,000 i n a t t o r n e y f e e s . Hargrave was allowed a t t o r n e y f e e s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 71-3-124, MCA, because Marvin had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h h i s mechanic's l i e n . H a r - grave appeals. On appeal defendant r a i s e s t h e following i s s u e s : 1. id t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court err i n s t r i k i n g a l l evidence p e r t a i n i n g t o monies expended o r about t o be expended by de- fendant f o r c l e a r i n g h i s land? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r by n o t permitting amend- ment of t h e counterclaim s o a s t o m e e t t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e evidence p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e expenditures was beyond t h e scope of t h e pleadings? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by awarding a t t o r n e y f e e s t o p l a i n t i f f ? A s t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , w e note t h a t p l a i n t i f f brought t h i s s u i t a l l e g i n g t h a t , although he had performed i n ac- cordance with t h e land c l e a r i n g c o n t r a c t , defendant refused t o r e l e a s e t o p l a i n t i f f c e r t a i n s l a s h d i s p o s a l monies due and owing a s consideration. Defendant i n response denied t h a t p l a i n t i f f had f u l l y performed under t h e c o n t r a c t and alleged, by way of a counterclaim, t h a t because of t h i s f a i l u r e , defendant l o s t t h e use of h i s land as farmland f o r a period of a t l e a s t t h r e e years. The general r u l e i s t h a t where a person by h i s c o n t r a c t charges himself with an o b l i g a t i o n , p o s s i b l e and lawful, t o be performed, he must perform i n accordance with t h e con- tract t e r m s . Smith v. Zepp (1977), 173 Mont. 358, 567 P.2d 923; Brown v. F i r s t Federal Savings and Loan Association of Great F a l l s (1969), 154 Mont. 79, 460 P.2d 97; 17A C.J.S. Contracts, 8459 a t 594. I t has a l s o been s t a t e d t h a t a v a l i d defense t o an a c t i o n on a c o n t r a c t arises when t h e obliga- t i o n t o perform t h e a c t a l l e g e d l y required was dependent on some o t h e r a c t i v i t y which t h e other p a r t y w a s t o do, b u t f a i l e d t o so perform (i.e., performance of a condition is precedent t o t h e r i g h t of payment) . See White v. Hulls, e t a l . (1921), 59 Mont. 98, 195 P. 850; 17A C.J.S. Contracts, 5452 a t 566. I n t h i s instance defendant, i n h i s answer t o the com- p l a i n t , denied t h a t p l a i n t i f f f u l l y performed under t h e i r contract. Defendant then alleged a t t r i a l t h a t because of p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e he was relieved of any contractual duty t o r e l e a s e the s l a s h disposal money t o p l a i n t i f f as payment f o r services. With t h i s being t h e case, defendant was e n t i t l e d t o present evidence i n support of h i s position. The i s s u e now becomes whether t h e r e j e c t e d evidence supports defendant's p o s i t i o n a s s t a t e d above. The offered evidence d e a l s with expenditures made by defendant i n h i r i n g o t h e r s t o complete t h e work allegedly l e f t undone by p l a i n t i f f . Certainly, when a defendant i s required t o expend money t o h i r e o t h e r s t o work i n c l e a r i n g land, which a p l a i n t i f f under c o n t r a c t was t o clear as " c l e a r a s possible," t h i s gives r i s e t o an inference t h a t p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o f u l l y perform under h i s contract. Such i s t h e case here, and thus, the t r i a l c o u r t should have allowed defendant t o present evidence of t h e expenditures t o support h i s d e n i a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g a t i o n t h a t he (plain- t i f f ) f u l l y performed and w a s e n t i t l e d t o the s l a s h disposal money. It should be noted t h a t t h i s Court does not f i n d t h a t defendant's p o s i t i o n a s t o nonperformance under the given c o n t r a c t i s determinative i n t h i s case. W e merely conclude t h a t defendant should have been permitted t o introduce t h e offered evidence i n support of t h a t defense. Nor do w e f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o admit t h e evidence c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Defendant a t t r i a l was a b l e t o introduce evidence showing t h e condition of t h e land a f t e r p l a i n t i f f f i n i s h e d h i s work, a s w e l l a s evidence t h a t he hired o t h e r s t o f i n i s h work allegedly l e f t undone by p l a i n t i f f . Defen- d a n t was only denied t h e introduction of evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h e expenses he incurred i n h i r i n g the outside p a r t i e s . Consequently, i n l i g h t of t h e evidence presented i n support of defendant's position, the f a c t t h a t he w a s unable t o introduce evidence a s t o h i s expenses d i d n o t so prejudice defendant's case t h a t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t would have been reached had t h e evidence been allowed i n . I n regard t o defendant's contention t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n n o t permitting him t o amend h i s counterclaim, w e acknowledge t h a t even absent the amendment the offered evidence arguably should have been allowed t o show damages a s t o defendant's claim t h a t he l o s t the use of h i s land as farmland. However, because t h i s evidence i s n o t of t h e nature t h a t t o exclude it r e s u l t s i n a d i f f e r e n t outcome and because t h e t r i a l c o u r t found f o r p l a i n t i f f , thereby r e j e c t - i n g defendant's a l l e g a t i o n of nonperformance as well a s h i s counterclaim, w e need n o t consider t h i s i s s u e f u r t h e r than t o f i n d t h e r e was no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. A s t o the f i n a l i s s u e on appeal, defendant merely a s s e r t s t h a t because p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t f u l l y perform pursu- a n t t o t h e i r contract, he was not e n t i t l e d t o p r e v a i l i n t h i s action, and thus, i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o attorney fees. A s already s t a t e d , defendant was a b l e t o present evidence i n support of h i s defense of nonperformance and w a s n o t preju- diced a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t l e v e l i n t h i s regard. Having then concluded t h e r e w a s no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a t t r i a l , and plain- t i f f having prevailed on a conversion claim, w e cannot f i n d t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n awarding him attorney fees. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s , ' - hereby affirmed. W e concur: %.A J 4 % 4 Chief J u s t i c e Q ' a e US tices .h