Title: Walton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-448, SC17-1083
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-448 
____________ 
 
JASON DIRK WALTON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1083 
____________ 
 
JASON DIRK WALTON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[May 17, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal by Jason Walton from an order 
denying a motion to vacate sentences of death under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  Walton also petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus.  We 
 
 
- 2 - 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained 
below, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief and deny Walton’s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Walton was convicted and sentenced to death for the execution-style 
murders of three individuals that occurred during the commission of a robbery and 
burglary.  Walton v. Dugger (Walton IV), 634 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 1993).   
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the 
death sentences because the trial court failed to afford Walton an 
opportunity to confront two codefendants whose confessions and 
statements were presented during the penalty phase.  See [Walton v. 
State (Walton I), 481 So. 2d 1197,] 1198-1201 [(Fla. 1985)].  The trial 
court conducted a second penalty phase and the jury again 
recommended death on all three convictions.  See Walton v. State 
[(Walton II)], 547 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1989).[1]  The trial court again 
imposed the death penalty on all three convictions, and this Court 
affirmed those sentences on appeal.  See id. at 626.  The United States 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial judge found the following aggravating factors: 
(1) the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery 
and burglary; (2) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; (3) 
the murders were committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel fashion; (4) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, 
and premeditated manner; and (5) the murders were committed for the 
purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest.  The trial judge noted that the first 
two aggravating circumstances would be considered as one.  The trial 
judge found no mitigating factors and imposed the death sentence. 
Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 624. 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
Supreme Court denied certiorari review.  See Walton v. Florida 
[(Walton III)], 493 U.S. 1036 (1990). 
 
Walton filed his initial postconviction motion pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he alleged that 
trial counsel was ineffective.  See Walton [IV], 634 So. 2d [at] 1060-
61 . . . . After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  
See id.  Walton appealed that denial to this Court and petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  See id.  This Court initially relinquished 
jurisdiction to the trial court for resolution of a public records request 
by Walton.  See id. at 1062.  On remand, Walton amended his 
previously filed rule 3.850 motion to add claims based upon 
information discovered in the public records and newly adduced 
evidence.  See Walton v. State [(Walton V)], 847 So. 2d 438, 442-43 
(Fla. 2003).  One such claim was that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failure to adequately investigate and prepare for trial.  See id. at 442 
n.2.  The trial court again denied all of Walton’s claims.  See id. at 
443.  Walton appealed that denial to this Court and again petitioned 
this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  See id.  This Court affirmed 
the denial of Walton’s postconviction motion and denied habeas 
relief.  See id. at 460.  [This Court] also denied a subsequent petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Walton pursuant to Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  See Walton v. Crosby, 859 So. 2d 516 
(Fla. 2003). 
 
Walton thereafter filed a successive postconviction motion 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  See Walton v. 
State [(Walton VI)], 3 So. 3d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2009).  The trial court 
summarily denied relief.  See id. at 1002.  Walton appealed that denial 
to this Court, and this Court affirmed the order of the postconviction 
court.  See id. 
 
Walton v. State (Walton VII), 77 So. 3d 639, 640-41 (Fla. 2011).  In 2010, Walton 
filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.851.  
Id. at 641.  The postconviction court denied Walton’s motion.  See id. at 642.  This 
Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court.  Id. at 644.   
 
 
- 4 - 
On May 7, 2015, Walton filed a third successive postconviction motion 
asserting that he should either be resentenced to life or receive a new penalty phase 
due to the fact that his codefendant, Richard Cooper, was resentenced to life based 
on a cumulative review of the evidence.  On December 28, 2015, the 
postconviction court denied Walton’s motion.  On March 7, 2016, Walton filed a 
notice of appeal to this Court.  On September 16, 2016, this Court relinquished 
jurisdiction to allow for rehearing.  On October 4, 2016, the postconviction court 
granted rehearing.   
On June 20, 2016, Walton filed a fourth successive postconviction motion,2 
asserting that changes in Florida’s capital sentencing law are part of the cumulative 
review of newly discovered evidence.  On January 13, 2017, the postconviction 
court denied Walton’s motion.  This appeal follows. 
Additionally, on June 8, 2017, Walton filed a petition for habeas relief.  This 
Court stayed the proceedings on September 15, 2017, and then, on September 27, 
2017, issued an order for Walton to show cause why Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 
216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), does not control.  
 
                                          
 
 
2.  Walton’s fourth successive postconviction motion reasserted, in part, 
Walton’s third successive postconviction motion arguments in light of Hurst v. 
State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).   
 
 
- 5 - 
ANALYSIS 
We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief for the reasons 
discussed below.    
Walton’s Cumulative Analysis Claim 
Walton contends that a proper Swafford3/Hildwin4 cumulative analysis 
requires consideration of all changes in the law that might apply if a new trial were 
granted.  We find this claim to be meritless.  
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must meet two requirements.  First, the evidence must not 
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of 
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could 
not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly 
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 
521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the 
second prong of the Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the 
defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his 
culpability.”  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 
So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  If the defendant is seeking to vacate a 
sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered 
evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I). 
 
In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the 
postconviction court must “consider all newly discovered evidence 
which would be admissible” and must “evaluate the weight of both 
the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was 
introduced at the trial.”  Id. at 916.  This determination includes  
                                          
 
 
3.  Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2013). 
 
4.  Hildwin v. State, 141 So. 3d 1178 (Fla. 2014). 
 
 
- 6 - 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or 
whether it constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial 
court should also determine whether this evidence is 
cumulative to other evidence in the case.  The trial court 
should further consider the materiality and relevance of 
the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
 
Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted). 
 
When . . . the postconviction court rules on a newly discovered 
evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court “review[s] the 
trial court’s findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, 
and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence.”  
Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1100 (Fla. 2008).  In addition, “we 
review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.”  
Id. 
 
Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 767-68 (alteration in original) (quoting Marek v. State, 14 
So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009)).  
As to the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test, the 
postconviction court found that the resentencing of codefendant Cooper qualified 
as newly discovered evidence.  We conclude that the postconviction court’s 
finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Jones II, 709 So. 2d 
at 521 (“First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence ‘must have 
been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and 
it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use 
of diligence.’ ” (quoting Torres–Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 
(Fla. 1994))).   
 
 
- 7 - 
The second prong of the newly discovered evidence test requires that “the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial.”  Id. (citing Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 911, 915).  The 
postconviction court found that Walton failed to show that the resentencing of his 
codefendant, Cooper, to a life sentence would probably result in a life sentence for 
Walton on retrial.  Walton contends that the postconviction court erred because a 
proper cumulative analysis, as performed in Swafford and Hildwin, requires 
consideration of changes in the law.  Walton asserts that his newly discovered 
evidence, considered together with the changes to Florida’s capital sentencing law, 
i.e., Hurst, would probably result in him receiving a life sentence; thus he is 
entitled to resentencing.   
As an initial matter, this Court has consistently applied its decision in Asay 
v. State (Asay V), 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017), 
denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), as 
interpreted in Hurst, to defendants whose death sentences were final when the 
Supreme Court decided Ring.  See, e.g., Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217; Zack v. 
State, 228 So. 3d 41, 47-48 (Fla. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-8134 (U.S. 
Mar. 12, 2018); Marshall v. Jones, 226 So. 3d 211, 211 (Fla. 2017), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 17-7869 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018); Willacy v. Jones, No. SC16-497, 
2017 WL 1033679, at *1 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017); Lambrix v. State, 217 So. 3d 977, 
 
 
- 8 - 
988-89 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 312 (2017); Bogle v. State, 213 So. 3d 833, 
855 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 738 (2018); Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d 
399, 401 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 471 (2017).  Walton’s death sentences 
became final in 1990.  See Walton III, 493 U.S. 1036.  Therefore, Walton is among 
those defendants whose death sentences were final before Ring.  Thus it is clear 
that Hurst is not applicable to Walton.  
 
Turning to what may be considered within a cumulative analysis, this Court 
stated in Swafford:   
The Jones standard requires that, in considering the effect of the 
newly discovered evidence, we consider all of the admissible evidence 
that could be introduced at a new trial.  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521.  In 
determining the impact of the newly discovered evidence, the Court 
must conduct a cumulative analysis of all the evidence so that there is 
a “total picture” of the case and “all the circumstances of the case.”  
Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d 238, 247 (Fla. 1999) (quoting 
Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 775-76.  This Court did not consider any change in law 
within Swafford.  See generally id.  In Swafford, this Court reviewed an appeal 
from a postconviction court’s finding that newly discovered negative acid 
phosphatase5 (AP) results would not have probably produced an acquittal.  See id. 
at 766.  This Court disagreed, holding that the newly discovered AP evidence “so 
                                          
 
 
5.  Acid phosphatase is commonly found in seminal fluid.  See Swafford, 
125 So. 3d at 766. 
 
 
- 9 - 
significantly weakened the case against Swafford that it g[ave] rise to a reasonable 
doubt as to his culpability for the sexual battery.”  Id. at 768.  This Court then, in 
performing a cumulative analysis, held that the newly discovered evidence 
changed the entire character of the case and affected the admissibility of evidence 
that was originally presented to the jury.  Id. at 775-78.  In no part of this Court’s 
decision in Swafford was there a discussion or consideration of statutory or 
decisional changes in the law.  See id.  Although this Court stated that the newly 
discovered evidence test “focuses on the likely result that would occur during a 
new trial with all admissible evidence at the new trial being relevant to that 
analysis,” there is no mention of any changes in law that must be taken into 
account within a cumulative analysis.  See id. at 776.  Thus this Court did not hold 
in Swafford that a cumulative analysis requires consideration of changes in the law 
that might apply if a new trial were granted.  See generally id.   
Neither did this Court consider any changes in law while performing a 
cumulative analysis in Hildwin.  See generally 141 So. 3d 1178.  In Hildwin, this 
Court reviewed an appeal from a postconviction court’s denial of a motion based 
on newly discovered evidence that established that the DNA did not belong to the 
defendant.  See id. at 1183.  This Court held that the newly discovered evidence 
established that the DNA found on the victim’s underwear and on the washcloth at 
the crime scene belonged to another suspect, which supported the defendant’s story 
 
 
- 10 - 
that he saw the killer wipe his face with a “white rag.”  See id. at 1192.  This Court 
then held that the cumulative effect of the newly discovered evidence weakened 
the case against Hildwin to such an extent that it gave rise to a reasonable doubt as 
to his culpability.  See id. at 1193.  This Court did not discuss any change in law 
that was considered within the cumulative effect of the newly discovered evidence.  
See generally id.   
Thus in neither Swafford nor Hildwin did this Court hold that a cumulative 
analysis requires consideration of changes in the law that might apply if a new trial 
were granted.  See generally Swafford, 125 So. 3d 760; Hildwin, 141 So. 3d 1178.  
This Court applies the Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), standard to 
determine whether decisional changes in the law require retroactive application.  
See Coppola v. State, 938 So. 2d 507, 510-11 (Fla. 2006); see also State v. Glenn, 
558 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1990) (“[A]ny determination of whether a change in the law 
requires retroactive application should be decided upon traditional principles 
pertaining to changes in decisional law as set forth in Witt.” (citing McCuiston v. 
State, 534 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 1988))).  Viewing decisional changes in the law 
as newly discovered “facts” would erase the need for a retroactivity analysis 
pursuant to Witt.  See Coppola, 938 So. 2d at 510-11.  
Yet Walton contends that he satisfies the second prong of the newly 
discovered evidence standard because it is probable that a resentencing jury will 
 
 
- 11 - 
not unanimously return death recommendations, and thus, it is probable that life 
sentences will be imposed.  Clearly, Walton is attempting to circumvent this 
Court’s retroactivity holding in Asay V when he asserts that Hurst constitutes a 
newly discovered fact and is applicable through a cumulative analysis.  Thus we 
conclude that Walton’s attempt to shoehorn Hurst retroactivity through a newly 
discovered evidence claim is meritless.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
postconviction court properly denied Walton’s motion. 
Walton’s McCloud6 Claim 
In Walton’s third successive postconviction motion he asserted that he is 
entitled to a life sentence because his sentences of death are disproportionate to the 
life sentences imposed on all of his codefendants.   The postconviction court found 
that the life sentences of Walton’s two other codefendants, Terry Van Royal, Jr. 
and Jeffrey McCoy, were irrelevant with regard to proportionality because Van 
Royal was resentenced to life based on a legal error by the trial judge and McCoy 
received a life sentence as part of a negotiated plea.  Walton now contends that the 
postconviction court’s reasoning is contrary to McCloud.  However, McCloud is 
inapposite because Walton’s codefendants received lesser sentences due to purely 
legal reasons.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 623; see also Jeffries v. State, 222 So. 
                                          
 
 
6.  McCloud v. State, 208 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 2016). 
 
 
- 12 - 
3d 538, 547 (Fla. 2017) (“[W]e have historically refused to review the relative 
culpability of codefendants when a codefendant pleads guilty and receives a lesser 
sentence as a result.”); Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the 
life sentence of a codefendant was irrelevant because the basis for the codefendant 
receiving the life sentence was purely legal and had no connection to the nature or 
circumstances of the crime or to the defendant’s character or record).  Moreover, 
this Court previously directly addressed Walton’s culpability compared to Van 
Royal, finding that “Walton was indeed more culpable than Van Royal.”  Walton 
V, 847 So. 2d at 449.  
Walton’s Hurst Claims 
Walton also raises several Hurst claims,7 which we reject.  This Court has 
held that Hurst does not apply retroactively to capital defendants whose sentences 
were final before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring.  Asay 
V, 210 So. 3d at 7-14.  In Hitchcock, this Court affirmed its decision in Asay V, 
denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida, as interpreted in Hurst, to 
defendants whose death sentences were final when the United States Supreme 
Court decided Ring.  Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217; see also Zack, 228 So. 3d at 47-
                                          
 
 
7.  Walton claims that: (1) his death sentences violate the Eighth 
Amendment and the Florida Constitution; and (2) the retroactivity rulings in Asay 
V and Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016), violate the Eighth Amendment 
principles announced in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).   
 
 
- 13 - 
48; Marshall, 226 So. 3d at 211; Willacy, 2017 WL 1033679, at *1; Lambrix v. 
State, 227 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 312 (2017); Bogle, 213 
So. 3d at 855; Gaskin, 218 So. 3d at 401.  Walton is among those defendants 
whose death sentences became final before Ring. 
This Court has previously rejected Eighth Amendment Hurst claims.  See 
Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 513 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 441 (2017); 
Lambrix, 227 So. 3d at 113; Asay v. State (Asay VI), 224 So. 3d 695, 702-03 (Fla. 
2017); Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 216-17.  Walton disagrees with the retroactivity 
cutoff that this Court set in Asay V; however, that decision is final.8   
Walton’s Habeas Claim 
Walton’s petition sought relief pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hurst v. Florida, and our decision on remand in Hurst.  This Court stayed 
Walton’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock.  After this Court decided 
Hitchcock, Walton responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why 
Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.  After reviewing Walton’s 
response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we 
conclude that Walton is not entitled to relief.   Walton’s death sentences became 
final in 1990.  Walton III, 493 U.S. 1036.  Thus Hurst does not apply retroactively 
                                          
 
 
8.  The Supreme Court denied certiorari review on August 24, 2017.  See 
Asay v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 41, 41-42 (2017).    
 
 
- 14 - 
to Walton’s sentences of death.  See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217.  Accordingly, 
we deny Walton’s petition for habeas relief.  
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
Walton’s motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.  
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.  
PARIENTE and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. 
QUINCE, J., recused.   
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
W. Douglas Baird, Senior Judge – Case No. 521983CF000630XXXXNO 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Bryan E. Martinez, Staff 
Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Martin J. McClain of 
McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. 
Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent