Title: Hertz v. Times-World Corporation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 991282
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2000

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, Senior Justice 
 
HON. A. BURKE HERTZ, JUDGE DESIGNATE, 
JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF BEDFORD 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 991282  
April 21, 2000 
 
TIMES-WORLD CORPORATION, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 
James W. Updike, Jr., Judge 
 
HON. LESLIE L. MASON, JR.,  
JUDGE DESIGNATE, JUVENILE AND 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE COUNTY OF BRUNSWICK 
 
v. 
Record No. 992677 
 
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY 
Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 
 
I. 
 
In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether the 
writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to challenge 
juvenile and domestic relations district courts' rulings that 
closed preliminary hearings to the public. 
II. 
The Honorable A. Burke Hertz, Judge Designate, 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations  
District Court of the County of Bedford 
v. 
Times-World Corporation, et al. 
 
In November 1998, the Honorable A. Burke Hertz, Judge 
Designate of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 
Court of the County of Bedford, conducted a joint preliminary 
hearing in the cases styled Commonwealth v. Randy Dwayne Ross 
and Commonwealth v. Keirsten Damea Davis.  Ross, a juvenile, 
was charged with capital murder, and Davis, also a juvenile, 
was charged with first-degree murder.  Both juveniles were 
also charged with certain related felonies. 
 
Counsel for Ross, relying upon Code § 16.1-302*, requested 
that the juvenile and domestic relations district court 
exclude the public and news media from the consolidated 
preliminary hearing.  Counsel for Davis "joined" the motion.  
The Commonwealth's Attorney took no position on the closure 
motion.  Counsel for the defendants had not given notice to 
the public or news media that they intended to make a closure 
motion, and no evidence was presented to support the motion.  
Counsel for Ross told the juvenile and domestic relations 
                     
* Code § 16.1-302(C) states in relevant part: 
"The general public shall be excluded from all 
juvenile court hearings and only such persons 
admitted as the judge shall deem proper.  However, 
proceedings in cases involving an adult charged with 
a crime and hearings held on a petition or warrant 
alleging that a juvenile fourteen years of age or 
older committed an offense which would be a felony 
if committed by an adult shall be open.  Subject to 
the provisions of subsection D for good cause shown, 
the court may, sua sponte or on motion of the 
accused or the attorney for the Commonwealth close 
the proceedings.  If the proceedings are closed, the 
court shall state in writing its reasons and the 
 
2
district court that a preliminary hearing open to the public 
"would [a]ffect quite seriously . . . potential jury selection 
in this case."  Ross' counsel stated that a closed hearing was 
necessary because of the "violent nature" of the alleged 
crimes and the seriousness of the "potential punishment" that 
may be imposed upon his client.  Ross' counsel also stated 
that photographs of his client in "protective gear" may affect 
the "potential selection of the jury process." 
 
The juvenile and domestic relations district court 
granted the closure motion, stating: 
"Based on what counsel has represented based on 
Section 16.1-302, and the court is very sympathetic 
to the public interest that this matter has 
engendered, the public's right to know as much as 
possible about matters of this nature is most 
important, but this court believes that the rights 
of the defendant as expressed by counsel transcend 
the right of the public to know and therefore we 
will order at this time that the media be excluded 
and that the hearing be closed except to those 
subject to family members and relations and that 
sort of thing.  I do not want to inhibit these 
defendants' rights in any way when it comes time for 
jury selection, they could be harmed very seriously 
in many ways as counsel has expressed.  We do not 
want that to happen and in this court's opinion 
[that] transcends the rights of the public to be 
fully informed in this matter." 
 
 
After the juvenile and domestic relations district court 
made its ruling, Terry Scanlon, a newspaper reporter for the 
Lynchburg News & Advance, informed the court that he had 
                                                                
statement shall be made a part of the public 
 
3
forwarded a letter to court personnel requesting access to the 
hearing and that his request had not been denied.  The 
juvenile and domestic relations district court responded that 
it had not been involved in this communication and the court 
would not change its ruling. 
 
Shannon D. Harrington, a newspaper reporter for The 
Roanoke Times, identified himself to the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court and requested a continuance until 
counsel for his employer could appear to present "strong 
arguments" against closure.  The juvenile and domestic 
relations district court rejected Harrington's request, ruling 
that it would not delay the hearing.  During a recess, counsel 
for Harrington and The Roanoke Times contacted the juvenile 
and domestic relations district court by telephone and spoke 
with Judge Hertz.  Counsel requested an opportunity to present 
legal argument against closure, but the court refused the 
request.  Counsel did not, however, make a motion to intervene 
in the proceedings. 
 
The juvenile and domestic relations district court 
entered a closure order in each juvenile defendant's case 
record.  Each order stated that the preliminary hearing was 
closed to the public because of a "motion of defense counsel 
alleging jeopardy to client's right to a fair trial."  Neither 
                                                                
record." 
 
4
order recited any findings of fact by the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court. 
 
Times-World Corporation, which publishes The Roanoke 
Times, Virginia Newspapers, Inc., which publishes the 
Lynchburg News & Advance, and Richmond Newspapers, Inc., which 
publishes the Richmond Times-Dispatch, along with each 
newspaper's respective reporter who attended the preliminary 
hearing, filed a "joint petition for the writ of mandamus" in 
the Circuit Court of Bedford County.  These petitioners 
requested that the circuit court issue a writ of mandamus 
"compelling that [the juvenile and domestic relations district 
court's] ruling excluding the press be reversed and vacated as 
being violative of . . . Code § 16.1-302, the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 12, 
of the Virginia Constitution [, that the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court] be barred from excluding the press 
from any further proceedings in these matters; and [that] the 
transcript of the closed portion of the preliminary hearing be 
made public." 
 
The Attorney General, on behalf of Judge Hertz, responded 
to the petition for writ of mandamus and asserted, among other 
things, that the petitioners may not vindicate their purported 
statutory and constitutional rights with a writ of mandamus 
and that the petitioners were required to file a motion to 
 
5
intervene in the juvenile and domestic relations district 
court and assert whatever rights they might have in that 
forum.  The circuit court disagreed and entered an order 
issuing the writ of mandamus. 
 
The circuit court concluded that mandamus was an 
appropriate remedy and held, among other things, that the 
juvenile and domestic relations district court failed to 
comply with Code § 16.1-302(C).  The circuit court also held 
that the "appropriate interpretation and application of 
[Code §] 16.1-302(C), and application of the correct standard 
pursuant to that statute, constitute ministerial duties and 
not discretionary acts."  The circuit court's order required 
the filing of a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the 
public record of that court.  Judge Hertz appeals. 
III. 
The Honorable Leslie L. Mason, Jr.,  
Judge Designate, Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court of the County of Brunswick 
v. 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al. 
 
 
In May 1999, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 
Court of the County of Brunswick conducted a consolidated 
preliminary hearing in cases styled Commonwealth v. Mark 
Harvey and Commonwealth v. Michael Lee Knight.  Harvey was the 
chief of police of the Town of Alberta, and Knight is an 
electrician.  The defendants, both adults, had been charged 
 
6
with multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault and sodomy 
upon numerous juveniles.   
 
Before the hearing, Richmond Newspapers and its reporter, 
Jamie Ruff, filed a "motion for an open preliminary hearing."   
The Commonwealth's Attorney filed a motion for a closed 
hearing pursuant to Code § 18.2-67.8 which states: 
 
"In preliminary hearings for offenses charged 
under this article or under §§ 18.2-361, 18.2-366, 
18.2-370 or § 18.2-370.1, the court may, on its own 
motion or at the request of the Commonwealth, the 
complaining witness, the accused, or their counsel, 
exclude from the courtroom all persons except 
officers of the court and persons whose presence, in 
the judgment of the court, would be supportive of 
the complaining witness or the accused and would not 
impair the conduct of a fair hearing." 
 
 
The Commonwealth did not present any evidence in support 
of its motion.  The Commonwealth's Attorney argued that the 
victims of the sexual crimes are between the ages of nine and 
seventeen, and their identities have been closely guarded.  
Counsel for Richmond Newspapers and Ruff contended that the 
preliminary hearing should be open to the public.  The 
juvenile and domestic relations district court granted the 
motion to close the hearing.  That court concluded that some 
of the witnesses were as young as five years of age and that 
the court was required to consider the interests of these 
children.  
 
7
 
Richmond Newspapers and Ruff filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus against the Honorable Leslie L. Mason, Jr., Judge 
Designate, in the Circuit Court of Brunswick County.  The 
petitioners alleged that the juvenile and domestic relations 
district court violated their rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, 
Section 12, of the Constitution of Virginia.  The Attorney 
General, on behalf of Judge Mason, filed responsive pleadings 
in the circuit court, including a motion to dismiss on the 
basis that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy.   
 
The circuit court rejected the Attorney General's 
arguments and held that the juvenile and domestic relations 
district court violated the requirements of Code §§ 16.1-
302(C) and 18.2-67.8, the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and Art. I, Section 12, of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  The circuit court granted the writ of mandamus and 
entered a final order that directed the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court "not to close [its] courtroom without 
making and articulating the findings required by law so that a 
reviewing court can determine that the closure was proper," 
and required that transcripts of the preliminary hearing be 
filed with the court and made a part of the public records in 
Commonwealth v. Mark Harvey and Commonwealth v. Michael Lee 
Knight.  Judge Mason appeals. 
 
8
IV. 
 
Although the Attorney General, on behalf of Judges Hertz 
and Mason, raises a number of assignments of error, the 
dispositive issue in these appeals is whether the respective 
circuit courts erred in holding that mandamus was a proper 
remedy and in issuing the respective writs of mandamus.  The 
Attorney General argues that the circuit courts erred in 
issuing the writs of mandamus because mandamus is not a remedy 
that can be used to challenge a judge's decision granting a 
motion to close a preliminary hearing in a juvenile and 
domestic relations district court.  The newspapers and their 
reporters (collectively the newspapers) argue that the writ of 
mandamus is the appropriate remedy for challenging closure 
decisions. 
 
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be used to 
compel a public official to perform a duty that is purely 
ministerial and is imposed upon the official by law.  Earley 
v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999); 
Town of Front Royal v. Front Royal and Warren County 
Industrial Park Corp., 248 Va. 581, 584, 449 S.E.2d 794, 796 
(1994); Morrissette v. McGinniss, 246 Va. 378, 382, 436 S.E.2d 
433, 435 (1993); Gannon v. State Corp. Commission, 243 Va. 
480, 481-82, 416 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1992); Richlands Medical 
 
9
Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 384, 386, 337 S.E.2d 737, 739 
(1985). 
 
This Court has recognized that a writ of mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy and, for that reason, we have carefully 
scrutinized and imposed limitations upon the use of this 
remedy.  We have consistently stated the following principles 
that are equally pertinent here: 
 
" 'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary 
remedial process, which is not awarded as a matter 
of right but in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion.  Due to the drastic character of the 
writ, the law has placed safeguards around it.  
Consideration should be had for the urgency which 
prompts an exercise of the discretion, the interests 
of the public and third persons, the results which 
would follow upon a refusal of the writ, as well as 
the promotion of substantial justice.  In doubtful 
cases the writ will be denied, but where the right 
involved and the duty sought to be enforced are 
clear and certain and where there is no other 
available specific and adequate remedy the writ will 
issue.' " 
 
Gannon, 243 Va. at 482, 416 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Richmond-
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Davis, 200 Va. 147, 151-52, 104 
S.E.2d 813, 816 (1958)).  Accord Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 
277, 281, 448 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1994); Early Used Cars, Inc. v. 
Province, 218 Va. 605, 609, 239 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1977); Board 
of Supervisors v. Hylton Enterprises, Inc., 216 Va. 582, 584, 
221 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1976); Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
Potomac, R.R. v. Fugate, 206 Va. 159, 162, 142 S.E.2d 546, 548 
(1965). 
 
10
 
The requirement that a litigant who seeks the issuance of 
a writ of mandamus must have no adequate remedy at law is 
deeply imbedded in the jurisprudence of this Commonwealth.  
For example, we stated in Parker v. Anderson, 2 Patton & Heath 
38, 41 (Va. 1856), that "[a] writ of mandamus lies in 
consequence of the violation of some legal right or duty 
imposed by law, and for which no adequate remedy has been 
provided."  We restated this principle in Tyler v. Taylor, 70 
Va. (29 Gratt.) 765, 766-67 (1878): 
 
"The writ of mandamus, known in England as a 
high prerogative writ, is justly regarded in this 
country as one of the highest writs known to our 
system of jurisprudence; and it only issues when 
there is a clear and specific legal right to be 
enforced, or a duty which ought to be and can be 
performed, and where there is no other specific and 
adequate legal remedy.  The right which it is sought 
to protect must therefore be clearly established, 
and the writ is never granted in doubtful cases." 
 
Accord Milliner's Adm'r v. Harrison, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 422, 
426 (1879).  We repeated this elemental principle in Hall v. 
Stuart, 198 Va. 315, 324, 94 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1956): 
 
"One of the fundamental principles underlying 
the entire jurisdiction is that mandamus never lies 
where the party aggrieved has another adequate 
remedy at law, by action or otherwise . . . ." 
 
 
We applied this principle recently in Gannon v. State 
Corp. Commission, supra.  Stephen T. Gannon invoked this 
Court's original jurisdiction and sought a writ of mandamus to 
require the State Corporation Commission to produce certain 
 
11
documents that Gannon had requested pursuant to the Virginia 
Freedom of Information Act, Code § 2.1-340, et seq.  The 
Commission filed responsive pleadings, including a motion to 
dismiss the petition because Gannon failed to establish the 
"elements necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus."  
243 Va. at 481, 416 S.E.2d at 447.  The Rules of the State 
Corporation Commission permitted Gannon to pursue certain 
action before the Commission in order to obtain the documents 
that he had requested.  Therefore, we held that the writ of 
mandamus was not an appropriate remedy because Gannon had 
available to him a specific and adequate legal remedy.  243 
Va. at 482-83, 416 S.E.2d at 447-48. 
 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
574, 281 S.E.2d 915 (1981), we considered three consolidated 
appeals arising out of three criminal prosecutions from three 
different circuit courts.  In each case, the circuit court 
entered a closure order over the objection of newspapers or 
their reporters.  In each case, the newspapers, including 
Richmond Newspapers which is a party to these appeals, made 
petitions to intervene for the purpose of challenging the 
circuit court's closure order.  222 Va. at 579, 582, 583, 281 
S.E.2d at 917, 919, 920.  We recognized in Richmond Newspapers 
the right of a newspaper to intervene in a criminal proceeding 
for the sole purpose of challenging a circuit court's ruling 
 
12
which closed criminal proceedings.  Id. at 590, 281 S.E.2d at 
923-24.   
 
Applying well-established principles, we are compelled to 
conclude that the respective circuit courts erred by issuing 
the writs of mandamus.  In both cases, the newspapers had an 
adequate remedy at law to assert their purported statutory and 
constitutional claims.  The newspapers were entitled to 
intervene in the respective preliminary hearings for the 
limited purpose of asserting their objections to the juvenile 
and domestic relations district courts' rulings barring them 
from the courtrooms.  The juvenile and domestic relations 
district court judges would have been required to grant the 
motions to intervene and consider the newspapers' objections.  
See Richmond Newspapers, id.  Our review of the records 
reveals that the newspapers failed to make formal motions to 
intervene in the juvenile and domestic relations district 
courts' proceedings.   
 
Even though Richmond Newspapers asserted in its verified 
petition for writ of mandamus in the Mason case that "Richmond 
Newspapers and Jamie Ruff had intervened in the proceeding by 
filing a motion for an open preliminary hearing," the record 
before this Court does not show that these petitioners made a 
formal motion to intervene.  Moreover, had Richmond Newspapers 
made a formal motion to intervene, mandamus still would not 
 
13
lie because Richmond Newspapers would have been required to 
appeal any adverse order that may have been entered by the 
juvenile and domestic relations district court.  We have 
repeatedly held that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus 
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal.  Morrissette, 
246 Va. at 382, 436 S.E.2d at 435; Richlands Medical Ass'n, 
230 Va. at 387, 337 S.E.2d at 740. 
 
We will not, as requested by the newspapers, adopt the 
holdings in In re Worrell Enterprises, Inc., 14 Va. App. 671, 
419 S.E.2d 271 (1992), and In re Times-World Corp., 7 Va. App. 
317, 373 S.E.2d 474 (1988).  In those cases, the Court of 
Appeals, relying primarily upon federal court decisions, held 
that mandamus, rather than an appeal, is the appropriate 
remedy to challenge a closure order in a pending criminal 
proceeding.  These opinions by the Court of Appeals were 
wrongly decided and, as we have demonstrated, are inconsistent 
with principles firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that we 
have applied for over 150 years.  Thus, we decline to accept 
the expansive view of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus set 
forth in those opinions.   
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of the circuit 
courts, we will vacate the writs, and we will dismiss the 
petitions. 
Record No. 991282 — Judgment reversed, 
 
14
writ vacated, 
and petition dismissed. 
Record No. 992677 — Judgment reversed, 
writ vacated, 
and petition dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KINSER 
join, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The majority acknowledges, 
without specifically addressing “their purported statutory and 
constitutional claims,” the right of the news media to have 
access to preliminary hearings conducted in juvenile and 
domestic relations district courts and to challenge the 
closure of such hearings.  In my opinion, the majority fails 
to provide an “adequate” remedy for a denial of that right by 
requiring the news media to “intervene” in those hearings and 
then to appeal any adverse order that may have been entered by 
these courts.  I have no quarrel with the majority’s thorough 
recitation on the historical role of the writ of mandamus.  
However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that the 
writ of mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to correct a 
wrongful denial of the right of access in the circumstances 
presented in these appeals. 
Initially, it is to be stressed that we are concerned 
here with specific and limited proceedings in the juvenile 
courts.  It is neither asserted nor suggested that the news 
 
15
media, or the public, has any right of access to all 
proceedings in these courts which historically have not been 
open to the public.  However, with the enactment in 1996 of 
Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(6), 16.1-269.1(B), and 16.1-269.1(C),1 the 
General Assembly significantly altered the traditional role of 
the juvenile courts in this Commonwealth with regard to 
juveniles fourteen years of age or older charged with murder 
or other specified violent felonies.  As a result, the 
juvenile court conducts a “preliminary hearing” and limits its 
consideration to a determination of “probable cause” that the 
juvenile committed the charged offense.  Upon that 
determination, the charge is certified to the grand jury of 
the appropriate circuit court.  There, upon indictment by the 
grand jury, the juvenile is subject to trial as an adult.  
Manifestly under these statutory procedures, there is no 
material distinction between the preliminary hearing afforded 
to the juvenile and that applicable in the general district 
courts to adults similarly charged with violent felonies. 
In much the same way, Code § 16.1-241(I) grants the 
juvenile court the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases 
                     
1These statutes in combination provide that the 
preliminary hearing is mandatory when the offense charged is 
murder in violation of Code §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-32, or § 18.2-40, 
or aggravated malicious wounding in violation of § 18.2-51.2, 
and occurs at the Commonwealth’s option when the offenses 
charged are other specified violent felonies. 
 
16
involving the prosecution of an adult charged with any 
“offense against the person of a child,” and when the charged 
offense is a felony that jurisdiction is “limited to 
determining whether or not there is probable cause.”  Thus, 
this statute provides for a preliminary hearing with the same 
purpose and effect as the preliminary hearing applicable to 
certain juveniles outlined above.  Except for the fact that 
these hearings are conducted in the juvenile court, they are 
indistinguishable from preliminary hearings conducted in the 
general district courts for adults charged with other 
felonies. 
Therefore, the combined effect of all the above-
referenced statutory enactments requires the conclusion that 
these preliminary hearings in the juvenile courts are criminal 
proceedings.  It then only remains to be determined whether 
the fact that these preliminary hearings are held in the 
juvenile courts takes them outside the ambit of “criminal 
proceedings” for which there is a qualified constitutional 
right of news media access. 
Beyond question, there is a constitutional right of 
access of the public, and of the news media as the public’s 
representative, to criminal trials and proceedings held in 
adult courts.  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555 (1980); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 
 
17
464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 
457 U.S. 596 (1982).  Indeed, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)[hereinafter Press-Enterprise 
II], the United States Supreme Court held that there is a 
qualified First Amendment right of news media access to 
preliminary hearings.  In addition, with regard to pretrial 
suppression hearings, we have held that there is a qualified 
right of news media access guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 
of the Constitution of Virginia.  Richmond Newspapers v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 588, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1981). 
In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court held that the 
determination for whether there was a right of access involved 
a two-part inquiry: (1) “whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public” and 
(2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role 
in the functioning of the particular process in question”.  
478 U.S. at 8.  Applying this inquiry to the facts of the 
present cases, it is self-evident that the criminal nature of 
these proceedings, and not the nature of the forum, should 
determine the newspapers’ right of access. 
As noted above, proceedings in the juvenile courts in 
this Commonwealth historically have not been open to the 
public, and in most instances this continues to be so.  
However, with respect to the particular hearings at issue in 
 
18
the present appeals, the General Assembly has negated that 
historical tradition by providing in the 1996 amendment of 
Code § 16.1-302(C) that “proceedings [in the juvenile court] 
in cases involving an adult charged with a crime and hearings 
held on a petition or warrant alleging that a juvenile 
fourteen years of age or older committed an offense which 
would be a felony if committed by an adult shall be open.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, as in adult criminal proceedings, public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of these 
hearings despite the fact that they are held in the juvenile 
court.  Such access insures a fair hearing to the accused and 
promotes public confidence in the judicial process.  See 
Richmond Newspapers, 222 Va. at 585, 281 S.E.2d at 921.  
Consequently, with regard to the specific proceedings in the 
juvenile courts at issue here, I would find that the 
newspapers have a qualified right of access guaranteed both by 
the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and by Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
Examining the present cases in their proper context as 
criminal proceedings, it becomes clear that the juvenile 
courts gave insufficient consideration to the newspapers’ 
constitutional rights of access before closing the preliminary 
hearings.  In the Hertz appeal, in addition to certain related 
 
19
felonies, one juvenile was charged with capital murder and the 
other juvenile was charged with first-degree murder.  The 
applicable provisions of Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(6) and 16.1-
269.1(B) were invoked and preliminary hearings were 
instituted.  In the Mason appeal, two adults were charged with 
multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault and sodomy upon 
juveniles, invoking the provisions of Code § 16.1-241(I) and 
leading to preliminary hearings concerning those felony 
charges.  In each instance, the juvenile court judges closed 
the preliminary hearings despite the attempts of the 
newspapers to gain access to those hearings. 
The right of access of the news media to court 
proceedings is a hollow one without an effective remedy when 
that right is wrongfully denied.  The majority here does not 
reach the issue whether the juvenile courts properly closed 
the hearings in question as subsequently determined by the 
circuit courts in issuing writs of mandamus.  However, there 
can be no real dispute that such was the case.  Code § 16.1-
302(C) provides that “the court may, sua sponte or on motion 
of the accused or the attorney for the Commonwealth close the 
proceedings . . . [and] shall state in writing its reasons 
[for closing the proceedings] and the statement shall be made 
a part of the public record.” 
 
20
In the Hertz appeal, as recited in the majority opinion, 
the totally conclusory statements in the juvenile court’s 
order fall far short of compliance with the mandate of this 
statute and the circuit court properly so held.  In the Mason 
appeal, the juvenile court relied primarily upon Code § 18.2-
67.8 to exclude the news media from the hearing.  Again, 
however, the circuit court properly held that the juvenile 
court failed to articulate sufficient reasons for closure so 
that a reviewing court could determine whether that closure 
was proper.  It is in this context that I now turn to consider 
the remedy available to the news media to correct the wrongful 
denial of its right of access to these hearings in the 
juvenile courts. 
Relying primarily upon our decision in Richmond 
Newspapers, the majority concludes that the newspapers were 
required to file written or formal motions to intervene in the 
juvenile court proceedings in order to assert their 
constitutional rights of access and then to appeal the adverse 
rulings on those motions to the circuit courts.2  Richmond 
Newspapers, however, is not dispositive here.  In that case, 
                     
2I am unaware of, and the majority does not identify, any 
statutory provision for a formal or written motion to 
intervene in the juvenile court.  In any event, the record 
here is clear that the juvenile court judges were aware of the 
efforts of the newspapers to assert their rights of access to 
the proceedings. 
 
21
although one of the closure motions considered had also been 
challenged by a petition for a writ of mandamus, this Court 
concluded that it need not address that petition since the 
Court would reverse the denial of a petition to intervene also 
filed in the case, mooting the need for mandamus.  222 Va. at 
592 n.10, 281 S.E.2d at 925 n.10.  Clearly that case does not 
stand for the proposition that only intervention and appeal 
are available to the news media to assert and secure their 
qualified constitutional rights of access to criminal 
proceedings. 
Moreover, in my view, mandamus, rather than intervention 
and appeal, is a proper means to challenge the closure order 
in a pending criminal hearing.  The appeal of a closure order 
in a pending criminal hearing generally would not permit the 
issue to be timely addressed by the appellate court because of 
the typically short duration of such hearings and, thus, the 
issue would evade review.  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. at 563.  Additionally, such preliminary 
hearings are frequently the only public hearings conducted 
with regard to a particular offense because the accused 
subsequently enters a plea in the trial court.  Indeed, this 
was apparently the circumstance in the present cases.  
Undoubtedly these and similar reasons led the United States 
                                                                
 
 
22
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to conclude that 
“[m]andamus, not appeal, ‘is the preferred method of review 
for orders restricting press activity related to criminal 
proceedings.’”  Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 63 
(4th Cir. 1989)(quoting In re: Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 
383, 388 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
As noted by the majority, In re: Worrell Enterprises, 
Inc., 14 Va. App. 671, 419 S.E.2d 271 (1992) and In re: Times-
World Corp., 7 Va. App. 317, 373 S.E.2d 474 (1988), are 
premised upon these qualified constitutional rights of access 
of the news media and the federal court decisions establishing 
mandamus as an appropriate remedy to challenge closure orders 
in criminal cases.3  These cases were neither “wrongly decided” 
nor “inconsistent with principles firmly entrenched in our 
jurisprudence that we have applied for over 150 years.”  
Morrissette v. McGinniss, 246 Va. 378, 436 S.E.2d 433 (1993), 
and Richlands Medical Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 384, 337 
S.E.2d 737 (1985), cited by the majority for the proposition 
that mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal are 
civil cases and do not address the appropriateness of mandamus 
                     
3This is also the view in a plurality of other state 
jurisdictions.  See generally, Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, 
Standing of Media Representatives or Organizations to Seek 
Review Of, or to Intervene to Oppose, Order Closing Criminal 
Proceedings to Public, 74 A.L.R.4th 476 (1989). 
 
 
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in the context of a pending criminal trial.  In my view, we 
would do no violence to our jurisprudence by acknowledging 
that the extraordinary circumstances involved in pending 
criminal proceedings, where a balance is to be reached between 
the news media’s right of access and the concerns of the 
accused and the prosecution that give rise to requests for 
closed proceedings, are the proper subject for a petition for 
a writ of mandamus.  Rather, for the reasons stated above, we 
simply would be acknowledging that appeal is not an “adequate” 
remedy.  See Gannon v. State Corp. Commission, 243 Va. 480, 
482, 416 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1992)(noting that where the right 
involved and the duty sought to be enforced are clear and 
where there is no other available specific and adequate remedy 
the writ of mandamus is appropriate). 
For these reasons, and because I would further hold that 
the closure orders of the two juvenile courts did not comport 
with the requirements of Code § 16.1-302(C), nor were they 
narrowly tailored to serve any compelling governmental 
interest, I would affirm the judgments of both circuit courts. 
 
 
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