Title: Commonwealth v. Heywood
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12724
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12724 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LAWRENCE L. HEYWOOD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 9, 2019. - January 30, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,  
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Jury and Jurors.  Handicapped Persons.  
Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Empanelment of jury, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on October 21, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Debra A. DelVecchio, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Joseph Maggiacomo, III, for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Emily L. Levenson, of Maryland, & Richard M. Glassman for 
National Federation of the Blind & others. 
 
Jonathan M. Albano for Boston Bar Association. 
 
 
2 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Lawrence L. Heywood, was convicted 
of assault and battery causing serious bodily injury in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (b), in connection with an 
incident in which the defendant, without warning, punched the 
victim in the face.  He now appeals, claiming that it was error 
for a blind individual to serve on the jury.  The defendant 
further argues that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury. 
 
We transferred the defendant's appeal to this court on our 
own motion.  We discern no error with respect to the seating of 
the blind juror.  Additionally, we conclude that the 
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find 
that the defendant's action resulted in the victim suffering 
serious bodily injury.  We therefore affirm the defendant's 
conviction.1 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving some details for later discussion.  The 
defendant and the victim knew each other through an adult 
basketball team.  At a league event in May 2015, while the 
victim was talking to another individual, the defendant, without 
warning, punched the victim in the right cheek, just below his 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the National 
Federation of the Blind, National Federation of the Blind of 
Massachusetts, and Disability Law Center; as well as the amicus 
letter submitted by the Boston Bar Association. 
3 
 
eye.  As a result, the victim suffered a fractured orbital bone 
and cheekbone, and retinal bleeding.  He required surgery to 
repair the structure of his face, which involved inserting two 
titanium plates into his face to hold the bones in place.  To 
avoid "significant discomfort" in cold temperatures due to the 
titanium plates, the victim must apply warm compresses to his 
face.  As a result of either the assault or the subsequent 
surgery, the victim also suffered nerve damage to his cheek; 
consequently, he can "barely feel" the right side of his face. 
Discussion.  1.  Juror competency.  "A criminal defendant 
is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 447 (2019).  "Fundamental to the right 
of an 'impartial' jury is the requirement that jurors be 
competent and qualified" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Susi, 394 Mass. 784, 786 (1985).  "The failure to grant a 
defendant a fair hearing before an impartial jury violates even 
minimal standards of due process."  Id. 
Here, during the jury voir dire, juror no. 6 indicated to 
the judge that, although he was blind, his disability would not 
be an impediment to serving as a juror, and that he could access 
the evidence if a fellow juror described photographic evidence 
to him.  After determining that jury service would not otherwise 
4 
 
be a hardship, the judge empanelled juror no. 6 without 
objection. 
The defendant argues that his right to a fair and impartial 
jury was violated because the blind juror was unable to see the 
physical evidence, and had to have the documentary evidence read 
to him.  The defendant faults the judge for failing to strike 
the juror for cause, and faults his trial counsel for failing to 
object to the empanelment of the juror. 
As an initial matter, we note that the defendant failed to 
object contemporaneously to the seating of the juror who the 
defendant now claims was unqualified to serve.  Where a 
defendant has been denied an impartial jury, and the issue is 
properly preserved, the error is structural and requires 
reversal without a showing of actual prejudice.  See Williams, 
481 Mass. at 454; Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 
(2010).  However, "[w]here a defendant fails to challenge a 
juror for cause, the questions of the impartiality of that juror 
and the adequacy of voir dire are waived."  Commonwealth v. 
McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 842 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. Zakas, 
358 Mass. 265, 268 (1970).  Therefore, any error is reviewed for 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 118 (2013).  Here, there 
was no such risk, as the defendant's claim lacks merit. 
5 
 
"We afford a trial judge a large degree of discretion in 
the jury selection process."  Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 
Mass. 798, 803 (1995), and cases cited.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lopes, 440 Mass. 731, 736 (2004) ("The scope of voir dire rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial judge . . .").  This 
discretion extends to a judge's determination whether a juror is 
competent to serve.  See Susi, 394 Mass. at 787.  An abuse of 
discretion is a "clear error of judgment in weighing the factors 
relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014).  The judge did not abuse her discretion in finding 
juror no. 6 competent to serve despite the juror's blindness. 
During jury empanelment, the judge conducted an individual 
voir dire of juror no. 6 to evaluate the juror's ability to 
serve.  The juror responded affirmatively when the judge asked 
him if he would "feel comfortable" with having another juror 
describe the photographic evidence and, with regard to testimony 
from witnesses, whether he would be able to "follow along" 
without assistance.  The judge satisfied herself that the juror 
was competent and qualified to serve. 
This decision was entirely appropriate.  Because the 
identification of the perpetrator was not in question, the jury 
had to determine only whether the victim suffered serious bodily 
6 
 
injury.  As the injuries suffered by the victim were not visible 
at the time of trial, the ability to see the victim's face 
during his testimony was not essential to reaching a verdict.  
Similarly, because of the internal nature of the injuries and 
subsequent surgery, photographs of the victim's face taken close 
in time to the assault would not have assisted the jury in 
determining whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury as 
defined by G. L. c. 265, § 13A (c).  On the other hand, the 
juror had appropriate access to the testimony of the victim and 
the medical records, which were directly relevant to the 
question whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury.2  
Here, the medical records, rather than the photographs, provided 
the critical evidence upon which the jury could find serious 
bodily injury.  Because in this instance the photographic 
evidence would not have materially assisted the jury in 
                     
2 The defendant contends that the fact that jurors described 
photographic evidence and read documentary evidence to the juror 
who was impaired visually resulted in a verdict based on 
extraneous information.  We disagree.  "An extraneous matter is 
one that involves information not part of the evidence at 
trial . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 251 
(2001).  Here, the photographs and medical documents were 
admitted in evidence, and the victim described the photographs 
during his testimony.  A fellow juror's descriptions of the 
admitted evidence did not constitute extraneous evidence.  See 
id.  Although perhaps not ideal (see note 6, infra), the 
solution crafted with input from juror no. 6, and implemented 
without objection by the parties, provided satisfactory access 
to the evidence allowing the juror to participate effectively in 
deliberations. 
7 
 
determining serious bodily injury, seating juror no. 6 was well 
within the judge's discretion.  Contrast Susi, 394 Mass. at 786 
(empanelment of blind juror constituted reversible error where 
identification of perpetrator was contested, and ability to 
compare visually physical evidence was required). 
Further, the judge's voir dire inquiry to determine juror 
no. 6's competency to serve was mandated by G. L. c. 234A, § 3, 
which ensures that the right to participate in jury service is 
extended to all eligible citizens, including those with physical 
disabilities.  The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"All persons shall have equal opportunity to be considered 
for jury service.  All persons shall serve as jurors when 
selected and summoned for that purpose except as 
hereinafter provided.  No person shall be exempted or 
excluded from serving as a grand or trial juror because of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic 
status, or occupation.  Physically handicapped persons 
shall serve except where the court finds such service is 
not feasible.  The court shall strictly enforce the 
provisions in this section."  (Emphases added.) 
 
G. L. c. 234A, § 3. 
 
This statutory protection against discrimination in jury 
selection dovetails well with a defendant's right to a fair jury 
of his or her peers, an essential component of which is being 
able to select jurors from a fair and representative cross 
section of the community.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
86 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 478, cert. denied, 444 
8 
 
U.S. 881 (1979).  Because a cross section of the community 
necessarily includes, among others, citizens with disabilities,3 
the defendant's right to a fair jury trial and the protection 
against discrimination in jury selection work in tandem. 
General Laws c. 234A, § 3, creates a presumption of 
competency for all jurors, including those with disabilities, 
who then must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether service is "feasible."  See Susi, 394 Mass. at 788.  
Here, the judge's individual voir dire and subsequent seating of 
juror no. 6 followed the case-by-case determination specifically 
required by G. L. c. 234A, § 3.  See generally Adjartey v. 
Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 848-849 
(2019) (if litigant requests accommodation for disability and 
court determines litigant has disability, court shall provide 
reasonable accommodations determined on case-by-case basis). 
We note that such case-by-case determinations may also be 
required by Title II of the Federal Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA), which provides: 
"[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation 
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
                     
 
3 In 2016, approximately 11.7 percent of individuals living 
in the Commonwealth had a physical disability.  Massachusetts 
Rehabilitation Commission, Massachusetts & U.S. Disability Facts 
& Statistics:  2017, https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018 
/08/30/MRC-Disability-Fact-Sheet-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/H988-6FZK]. 
9 
 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity." 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132.  A "public entity" includes "any State or 
local government" and any department or agency thereof.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12131.  
Under Title II of the ADA and the regulations implementing 
it, public entities may be required to implement a variety of 
measures to prevent exclusion or discrimination on the basis of 
disability.  Such measures may include, among others, making 
reasonable modifications to policies and practices, removing 
architectural and communication barriers, and providing 
auxiliary aids and services.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12132; 28 
C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.130(b)(1)(i), 35.130(b)(7)(i), 35.160(b)(1) 
(2018).4 
 
Although at least one court has held that a court's "policy 
of categorical exclusion of all blind persons" from jury service 
violates the ADA, see Galloway v. Superior Court of D.C., 816 F. 
Supp. 12, 19 (D.D.C. 1993), we are not aware of any cases 
clarifying how Title II of the ADA and its implementing 
regulations apply to individualized determinations of juror 
                     
 
4 A public entity need not make a modification if it can 
demonstrate that the modification "would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the service, program, or activity."  28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2018). 
10 
 
competency.5  Without attempting to determine what specific 
procedures Title II of the ADA and its associated regulations 
require to determine the competency of a juror who is blind, we 
note that the judge here clearly complied with the ADA.  The 
judge conducted an individualized voir dire of juror no. 6 and 
determined that he was competent to serve.  Furthermore, the 
judge furnished, with the input and approval of juror no.6, 
auxiliary services allowing him to serve while another juror 
described the visual evidence.6  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) 
(2018) ("In determining what types of auxiliary aids and 
services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary 
                     
 
5 In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004), the United 
States Supreme Court held that Title II of the ADA applies to 
State courts with regard to ensuring that litigants with 
disabilities have equal access to judicial services.  In Lane, 
the Court held that the ADA requires State courts to take 
"reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers 
to accessibility," but that courts need not "employ any and all 
means to make judicial services accessible to persons with 
disabilities."  Id. at 531-532.  Unlike Lane, which involved a 
litigant who was "denied the benefits of the services" of a 
court, id. at 513, this case involves "participation in . . . 
[the] activities of a public entity," namely, the ability to 
participate as a juror in the adjudication of cases.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12132. 
 
6 Although the accommodation provided to juror no. 6 
satisfied the ADA, other accommodations for jurors who are blind 
or have a visual impairment may be preferable to having another 
juror describe visual evidence.  For instance, the ADA's 
implementing regulations list a variety of potential visual 
auxiliary aids and services, including qualified readers, 
Brailled materials and displays, and screen reader software.  
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2018). 
11 
 
consideration to the requests of individuals with 
disabilities").    There was no error. 
 
Furthermore, because there was no error, trial counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to object to the seating of juror 
no. 6.  See Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 327 (2015) 
(no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to 
properly admitted evidence).  See also Commonwealth v. Carroll, 
439 Mass. 547, 557 (2003) (failure to pursue futile tactic does 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth 
v. Vieux, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 527 (1996), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1245 (1997) (same). 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  General Laws c. 265, 
§ 13A (b) (i), provides for an enhanced penalty for conviction 
of an assault and battery that causes "serious bodily injury."  
Although the defendant disputes neither that he struck the 
victim nor that the victim was injured, he argues on appeal, as 
he did at trial, that there was insufficient evidence from which 
the jury could conclude that he caused serious bodily injury to 
the victim.7  The question, then, is whether, in viewing the 
                     
 
7 An unsigned motion for a required finding of not guilty 
based on an unspecified insufficiency of the evidence appears in 
the record but apparently was not argued.  At any rate, 
"[c]onvictions based on insufficient evidence 'are inherently 
serious enough to create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.'"  Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 294 n.2 
(2002), quoting Commonwealth v. McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 867-868 
(1986). 
12 
 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
jury could have found that the victim suffered serious bodily 
injury as a result of the assault and battery beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Bin, 480 Mass. 665, 674 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 
(1979). 
 
"Serious bodily injury" is defined under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13A, as "bodily injury that results in [1] a permanent 
disfigurement, [2] loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb 
or organ, or [3] a substantial risk of death."  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13A (c).  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 357 (2013) 
(statute sets forth "three distinct routes for establishing 
serious bodily injury").  Here, we conclude that the evidence 
was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
victim suffered a permanent disfigurement as well as the 
impairment of a bodily function. 
 
a.  Permanent disfigurement.  The statute does not define 
the phrase "permanent disfigurement."  "When a statute does not 
define its words we give them their usual and accepted meanings, 
as long as these meanings are consistent with the statutory 
purpose. . . .  We derive the words' usual and accepted meanings 
from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as 
their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  
13 
 
Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). 
 
"Permanent" is defined as "continuing or enduring (as in 
the same state, status, or place) without fundamental or marked 
change," synonymous with the words "lasting" or "stable."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1683 (1993).  
"Disfigurement" is "the state of being disfigured," that is, to 
be "ma[d]e less complete, perfect, or beautiful in appearance or 
character."  Id. at 649.  Hence, a permanent disfigurement is a 
significant and enduring injury that affects the appearance or 
the character of a person's bodily integrity.  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Jean-Pierre, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 163 (2005) 
(word "permanent" modifies only "disfigurement" in G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13A [c]). 
 
The defendant argues that a permanent disfigurement occurs 
only when there is a visible, significant, and permanent change 
in a person's outward appearance or, in the alternative, 
scarring.  We disagree.  Although the trier of fact certainly 
may consider visible evidence, the fact an injury can be or was 
concealed or repaired does not preclude a finding of permanent 
disfigurement.  See State v. Alvarez, 240 Or. App. 167, 171 
(2010) ("we decline to hold that an injury is not disfiguring 
merely because, by limiting his or her fashion or style options, 
the victim can conceal it").  See also Fisher v. Blankenship, 
14 
 
286 Mich. App. 54, 66-67 (2009) (injury need not be visible to 
be disfigurement). 
 
Here, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient for the jury to have found permanent disfigurement.  
The medical records and the victim's testimony detailed the 
number and extent of the fractures which compromised the 
integrity of the victim's face.  The computed tomography scan of 
the victim's face and jaw showed a "blowout" fracture of his 
right orbital socket, as well as fractures to his cheekbone and 
other facial bones.  The victim testified that there was a 
visible indentation in his face after the defendant's punch.  
The medical records indicate that surgery was required to 
correct and repair the anatomical structure of the victim's 
face.  The operative report noted that the fracture was mobile 
and required the surgeons to affix titanium plates to the bones 
in the victim's face to hold the bone structure together and to 
ensure that the bones remained stable.  Although the titanium 
plates conceal the visible evidence of the disfigurement, they 
are attached permanently to the bones in the victim's face.  
Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable and 
rational jury to have found a permanent disfigurement. 
 
b.  Impairment of a bodily function.  "Impairment of a 
bodily function" similarly is not defined in the statute; 
however, we previously interpreted the phrase to mean "a part or 
15 
 
system of the body [that] is significantly impeded in its 
ability to fulfil its role."  Scott, 464 Mass. at 359.  Unlike 
disfigurement, an impairment of a bodily function need not be 
permanent to constitute serious bodily injury.  Marinho, 464 
Mass. at 118. 
 
Here, according to the medical records and the victim's 
testimony at trial, the nerve damage in the victim's right cheek 
resulted in chronic numbness in that area of his face.  He 
described the lack of sensation as feeling like he had been 
given novocaine.  The inability of the affected nerves to 
communicate properly with the brain indicates an impairment of a 
bodily function, namely, the victim's peripheral nervous system.  
See Coronado v. State, 654 So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1995); Bright v. State, 986 So. 2d 1042, 1045, 1049 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1078 (Pa. 
Super. 2012).  We note that, based on the evidence presented, it 
was unclear whether the numbness that the victim experienced was 
a result of the physical assault (delayed onset), surgery, or a 
combination of the two.  However, "[t]he Commonwealth may 
establish causation in an assault and battery case by proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either directly 
caused or directly and substantially set in motion a chain of 
events that produced the serious injury in a natural and 
16 
 
continuous sequence" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Marinho, 464 Mass. at 119. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that in addition to permanent 
disfigurement, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury 
to find that the defendant caused impairment of a bodily 
function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.