Title: O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101000
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2012

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,000 
 
SUE O'BRIEN, individually and on behalf  
of a class of similarly situated individuals, 
Appellants/Cross-appellees, 
 
v. 
 
LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS, INC., 
Appellee/Cross-appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Cases interpreting federal antitrust statutes may be persuasive authority for any 
state court interpreting its antitrust laws, but such authority is not binding upon any court 
in Kansas interpreting Kansas antitrust statutes.  
 
2. 
 
Vertical price-fixing involves participants at different rungs of the distribution 
ladder, e.g., a wholesaler and a retailer. Horizontal price-fixing involves participants who 
are at the same rung of the distribution ladder, e.g., two or more retailers.  
 
3. 
 
Under the plain language of K.S.A. 50-101, there are several optional theories 
under which a Kansas restraint of trade plaintiff may proceed. Under the most forgiving 
of those theories, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a trust "for . . . the . . . purpose[] 
. . . [t]o fix any standard or figure, whereby . . . price to the public shall be, in any 
manner, controlled or established." K.S.A. 50-101 Fourth. As defined in K.S.A. 50-101, 
to establish the existence of a trust, a plaintiff need only show a "combination of capital, 
2 
 
skill, or acts, by two or more persons." A plaintiff need not show a relationship rising to 
the level of an agreement. Furthermore, it is enough to demonstrate that the combination 
is for the purpose to fix prices; a plaintiff does not have to show that the combination 
actually succeeds in increasing prices. The phrase "for the purpose" contemplates a 
subjective standard, one that requires examination of the intent behind a defendant's 
behavior. 
 
4. 
 
Under the plain language of K.S.A. 50-112, there are alternate theories under 
which a Kansas restraint of trade plaintiff may proceed:  A plaintiff may prove the 
existence of an arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination between persons 
designed to advance, reduce, or control price, or one that tends to advance, reduce, or 
control price. Mere arrangements between persons are within the scope of the statute; a 
plaintiff does not have to show a relationship rising to the level of an agreement. In 
addition, it is enough to show that the arrangement is designed to or tends to control 
prices; a plaintiff does not have to show that the arrangement actually succeeds in 
increasing prices. Like "for the purpose" in K.S.A. 50-101, the phrase "designed to" 
contemplates a subjective standard. On the other hand, "tend to" contemplates an 
objective standard, one that requires examination of the defendant's behavior to discern 
whether it would reasonably be expected to produce a particular result, regardless of the 
defendant's intention. 
 
5. 
 
The concept of "antitrust injury" from federal antitrust jurisprudence essentially 
equates to the Kansas concept of causation. 
 
6.  
 
In this case, the named plaintiff and class have come forward with enough 
evidence that the defendant's pricing policy and written applications and agreements were 
3 
 
for the purpose of fixing prices or designed to control prices, that they tended to control 
prices, and that the named plaintiff and class members were injured or damaged to 
survive defendant's summary judgment motion.  
 
7. 
 
The "rule of reason" of federal antitrust jurisprudence does not apply to lawsuits 
under the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act. K.S.A. 50-101, K.S.A. 50-102, and K.S.A. 50-
112 forbid all vertical and horizontal price-fixing by two or more persons or between 
persons. Contrary holdings in Okerberg v. Crable, 185 Kan. 211, 341 P.2d 966 (1959), 
and Heckard v. Park, 164 Kan. 216, 188 P.2d 926 (1948)—decided during the period 
when the Kansas Fair Trade Act, R.S. 1937, 50-301 et seq., was in effect—are overruled. 
 
8.  
 
The Kansas Restraint of Trade Act does not differentiate between vertical and 
horizontal price-fixing or outline a particular approach to a dual-distribution situation. In 
this case, named plaintiff and the class have alleged both vertical and horizontal price-
fixing, and they are free to pursue the alternative theories as long as they are supported by 
the evidence.  
 
9. 
 
The 3-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-512(2) controls both full 
consideration and treble damages claims under the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act.  
 
10.  
 
K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112 do not demand that a defendant in a price-fixing 
case have had an explicit written agreement with the other person with whom the 
defendant engages in the unlawful behavior. However, more than unilateral behavior by 
the defendant is required. In this case, named plaintiff and the class have marshaled 
4 
 
sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment with respect to purchases made at stores 
other than those subject to explicit applications and agreements.  
 
11.  
 
An appellate court reviews a district judge's decision to certify a class action under 
K.S.A. 60-223 to ensure that the judge has applied and rigorously analyzed the 
requirements of the statute. In this case, the district judge's findings of fact and legal 
conclusions are inadequate to support meaningful appellate review of the predominance 
factor for certification. A pending motion for decertification will be ripe for decision on 
remand to the district court, and the judge and the parties will have another opportunity to 
make and preserve a record sufficient for any eventual appellate review.    
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; WILLIAM SIOUX WOOLLEY, RICHARD T. BALLINGER, and 
JEFFREY E. GOERING, judges. Opinion filed May 4, 2012. Reversed and remanded.   
 
Robert W. Coykendall, of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chartered, of Wichita, argued 
the cause, and Will B. Wohlford and John W. Johnson, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for 
appellants/cross-appellees.   
 
James M. Armstrong, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Timothy B. 
Mustaine and Jeffrey A. Jordan, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for appellee/cross-
appellant.   
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, Clay Britton, assistant solicitor general, and 
Lynette Bakker, assistant attorney general, were on the brief for amicus curiae State of Kansas.  
 
Rex A. Sharp, of Gunderson, Sharp & Walke L.L.P., of Prairie Village, was on the brief for 
amicus curiae Quin Jackson.  
 
5 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
BEIER, J.:  This appeal and cross-appeal concern a dispute over retail pricing 
practices by a fashion accessories company. 
 
 
Named plaintiff Sue O'Brien and a class of similarly situated consumers (O'Brien) 
sued the maker of Brighton handbags, other accessories, and luggage, defendant Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. (Brighton), alleging violations of the Kansas Restraint of 
Trade Act (KRTA), K.S.A. 50-101 et seq. We understand O'Brien to contend that 
Brighton's practices as a wholesale supplier and retailer constituted illegal price-fixing in 
violation of K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112, entitling her and other class members to 
recovery under K.S.A. 50-108, K.S.A. 50-115, K.S.A. 50-147, and K.S.A. 50-161.  
 
 
Brighton moved for summary judgment in the district court. In the alternative, it 
sought partial summary judgment and moved to decertify the class. District Judge Jeffrey 
E. Goering granted Brighton's motion for summary judgment, granted its motion for 
partial summary judgment in part, and did not reach the issue of decertification.  
 
 
O'Brien appealed, and Brighton cross-appealed. We transferred this matter from 
our Court of Appeals on O'Brien's unopposed motion. We reverse and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with the rulings below. 
 
ISSUES 
 
We have reformulated and reorganized the questions presented by the parties for 
ease and flow of analysis. The six questions are: 
 
(1) 
Did the district judge correctly interpret the KRTA on the issue of "antitrust 
injury"? 
6 
 
 
(2) 
Did the district judge err in relying on a "rule of reason" to evaluate 
whether there has been a violation of the KRTA? 
 
(3) 
Does this case involve a claim for horizontal price-fixing as well as vertical 
price-fixing, and, if so, was  summary judgment on that claim properly 
granted by the district judge? 
 
(4) 
Did the district judge identify the correct statute of limitations applicable to 
a treble damages claim and to a full consideration claim under the KRTA? 
 
(5) 
Did the district judge correctly determine that an explicit written agreement 
with each retailer was not a necessary prerequisite to liability under the 
KRTA?  
 
(6) 
Did the district judge properly evaluate predominance when granting class  
 
 
certification? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Before we set forth the pertinent factual and procedural background, a brief review 
of basic principles governing the relationship between Kansas and federal antitrust law 
and the types of price-fixing that can occur is in order. 
 
 
Although there are federal antitrust statutes, e.g., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006) et seq., and a large body of interpreting caselaw, antitrust law has traditionally 
been the province of the states. McShares, Inc. v. Barry, 266 Kan. 479, 488-89, 970 P.2d 
1005, cert. denied 526 U.S. 1158 (1998) (citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 
U.S. 93, 109 S. Ct. 166, 104 L. Ed. 2d 86 [1989]). In addition, we have noted in the past 
7 
 
that federal antitrust law is intended to supplement the remedies available under Kansas 
law, not to replace Kansas antitrust provisions. 266 Kan. at 488-89.   
 
Kansas' antitrust law under the KRTA, originally enacted in 1897, remains largely 
undeveloped; very few cases have reached this court. See Bergstrom v. Noah, 266 Kan. 
829, 843, 974 P.2d 520 (1999). We have observed generally that the KRTA is broad in 
scope but that the bulk of its provisions have not been meaningfully interpreted by 
Kansas courts. 266 Kan. at 843.   
 
While the KRTA and federal antitrust statutes share some similarities, they are 
not, in fact, the same. 266 Kan. at 844. Thus, "[w]hile . . . cases [interpreting federal 
antitrust statutes] may be persuasive authority for any state court interpreting its antitrust 
laws, such authority is not binding upon any court in Kansas interpreting Kansas antitrust 
laws." 266 Kan. at 845. 
 
In relation to price-fixing practices specifically, this court concluded more than 50 
years ago that it "may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the legislature as to whether 
price fixing is good or bad for the economic life of the state." Quality Oil Co. v. du Pont 
& Co., 182 Kan. 488, 495, 322 P.2d 731 (1958). It is the role of the legislature, not this 
court, to set antitrust policy. 
 
This case concerns allegations that defendant engaged in price-fixing. Price-fixing 
may be either "vertical" or "horizontal." Vertical price-fixing involves participants at 
different rungs of the distribution ladder, e.g., a wholesaler and a retailer. Horizontal 
price-fixing involves participants who are at the same rung of the distribution ladder, e.g., 
two or more retailers. See Black's Law Dictionary 1227-28 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
8 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The bulk of the following facts are taken from District Judge Goering's findings of 
uncontroverted fact. Neither party challenges these facts on this appeal, making them 
conclusive for our purposes. See McShares, Inc., 266 Kan. at 480. 
 
Brighton's Business 
 
 
Brighton is a designer, manufacturer, and retailer of fashion accessories and 
luggage. It primarily markets its accessories to independent retailers, but it also maintains 
retail stores of its own called "Brighton Collectibles." The first Brighton Collectibles 
store opened in 1999, and there are now more than 100 stores nationwide. A substantial 
portion of Brighton's profits come from its own retail stores.  
 
Brighton's Pricing Practices 
 
Since April 1997, Brighton has provided its retailers with copies of its suggested 
pricing and promotional policy. Brighton's policy calls for retailers to sell Brighton 
products at "keystone," which is an amount equal to twice wholesale plus a small amount 
that varies by product. Under the policy, retailers may discount out-of-season products 
and products that are not selling well that the retailer will not reorder. Brighton ships its 
products to its retailers with tags displaying the manufacturer's suggested retail price 
(MSRP). For at least 1 year, Brighton required its retailers to initial and sign an 
acknowledgement that a violation of its pricing policy was grounds for dismissal.  
 
According to Jerry Kohl, Brighton's owner and president, Brighton's pricing policy 
was not adopted to thwart competition from other manufacturers of similar products. 
When asked if he had thought about how the pricing policy affected the profitability of 
retail sales of the Brighton line, Kohl responded that he had not thought about it. Further, 
9 
 
Laura Young, Brighton's second-in-command, said that prices were set without regard to 
retailers' profits. Brighton admits that its pricing policy was not created in response to any 
problem with retailers failing to provide desired service to customers. It has made certain 
of its decisions about its pricing policies after consulting with its retailers, such as when 
"birthday club" discounting was approved. 
 
Many retailers of Brighton products have advertised discounts of Brighton 
products, but it is unclear which, if any, of these advertisements violated Brighton's 
pricing policy. Young stated in her affidavit:  
 
 
"Since the promulgation of the universal retail price policy, Brighton has never 
undertaken any systematic, comprehensive effort aimed at determining whether its 
retailers are following that policy. But Brighton from time to time has acquired 
information from various sources (e.g., consumers, other retailers, advertisements, and 
Brighton's sales force), to the effect that some Brighton retailers are or might be violating 
the suggested retail price policy, and Brighton has occasionally enforced that policy 
against retailers in states other than Kansas by refusing to deal with retailers believed to 
have intentionally violated Brighton's policy."   
 
Kohl also testified in his deposition that Brighton sometimes becomes aware of 
retailers selling products at prices other than the MSRP. Kohl further testified that 
Brighton keeps reports documenting customer inquiries, including those about Brighton's 
pricing policies. Kohl testified: 
 
 
"Q: . . . And one of the things you do with the reports is keeping [sic] track of 
whether or not the particular retailer is complying with the pricing policy of [Brighton]? 
 
"A: Well, that's a big stretch. I surely wouldn't call it that. We keep comments 
regardless of what they might be, everything from talk to Joe about a handbag was 
damaged. So we keep comments that people give us. 
 
"Q: Those comments include whether or not the retail customer of [Brighton]'s is 
discounting or is not following the pricing policy; is that a fair statement? 
10 
 
 
"A: Well, again, I wouldn't put it the way you did. You know, there are times 
when there's comments about pricing policies, but to say they include them implies that 
it's a regular situation. And the answer is no, it isn't. 
 
"Q: Well, if a retailer was abiding by the pricing policy, there wouldn't be any 
need to put information like that in an inquiry report. 
 
"A: That's correct. 
 
"Q: And your point is most of the retailers comply with the retail pricing policies 
of [Brighton]? 
 
"A: As far as I know, yes. 
 
"Q: And those who don't, when you find out about it, are terminated, correct? 
 
"A" "Those who don't and who are aware of our pricing policy and is [sic] 
willfully disregarding our pricing policy, yes, they are terminated or I should say put on 
hold until we make a decision on what we're going to do."   
 
In the past, Brighton has rejected at least one promotion for violating its retail 
price maintenance policy. When rejecting the promotion, a proposed shoe trade-in, 
Young stated in an email: 
 
". . . . Did someone tell you it was ok to do this? 
"The reason I ask is this will spread like cancer . . . one person does it . . . sells more 
shoes than normal. And they and you tell more people and before you know it the world 
will be holding their own shoe trade in. 
"It cannot be an individual store authorize [sic] event. We have a very clear SRP 
(Suggested Retail Pricing Policy) and this would be in violation of it. . . . 
"SO, please no matter what/who said its ok, it's not."   
 
Young also expressed the following in another email: 
 
"[W]hen one store begins to lure customers in with an incentive for purchasing . . . the 
next store thinks they need to 'one up' the competition, and then the third customer needs 
to 'two up them both' and so on . . . and after a while it's out of control. What happens is 
the customers then get confused on if they need to wait for the best offer to purchase 
Brighton.  
11 
 
 
"Our Suggested Retail Pricing and Promotional Policy basically was designed to create 
an environment for the consumer to shop with confidence that they were being treated 
fairly. We have always wanted consumers to be able to feel that wherever Brighton is 
sold—authorized dealers—they can buy now! And not worry if they're getting the 'best 
deal.'" 
 
One of O'Brien's experts was Gregory T. Gundlach, Professor of Marketing and 
Senior Fellow at the American Antitrust Institute. He asserted in his prepared report that 
there was no evidence that a cartel existed among Brighton's retailers in Kansas or 
elsewhere and that there was no evidence that Brighton's pricing policy was instituted by 
Brighton at the request of its retailers. Gundlach also concluded, however, that Brighton 
engaged in vertical price-fixing and in horizontal price-fixing. Gundlach further 
concluded that Brighton's price-fixing necessarily raised the price at which consumers 
may purchase its products. In addition, Gundlach concluded that Brighton's price-fixing 
limited price competition between retailers and that, as a result of the suppression of 
competition, consumers were denied potential savings. 
 
Gundlach also opined that the higher prices faced by consumers were not offset by 
benefits to competition or to consumers, stating that no facts supported various theories 
advanced by Brighton's experts to support a pro-competitive explanation of the 
company's price-fixing. According to him, the more compelling scenario was that 
Brighton's price-fixing shielded its own stores and those of its retailers from competition 
by more efficient forms of retailing to the detriment of consumers. 
 
 
Christopher Charles Pflaum, Ph.D., an economist specializing in business and 
financial economics and the other expert for the plaintiff class, testified about class 
certification and the measure of damages.  
 
 
12 
 
Brighton's Heart Store and Luggage Applications 
 
Since 1998, Brighton has offered a "Heart Store" program to retailers, which 
offers incentives for retailers to expand their business with Brighton. In exchange for 
these incentives, Heart Stores are expected to maintain certain levels of Brighton 
inventory, to display Brighton products in a dedicated section of the store, and to service 
Brighton products regardless of where they were purchased.   
 
A retailer becomes a Heart Store by signing an application, which is then approved 
by Brighton. Less than 5 percent of Brighton's retailers are Heart Stores.  
 
Applications for Heart Store status must be submitted each calendar year. The 
Heart Store applications for the years 2001 and 2002 included language that the applicant 
would maintain minimum inventory, showcase Brighton products in dedicated spaces, 
"[s]ell Brighton products for the suggested price every day, 365 days a year," and "close 
out markdown styles you do not plan to reorder." The Heart Store applications for 2003 
and later do not include that language, but they do include a statement that "Brighton 
reserves the right to withdraw Heart Store benefits from any store that does not represent 
Brighton in a positive and quality manner."  
 
To sell Brighton luggage, a separate agreement must be signed by the retailer. As 
with the Heart Stores, a retailer must apply to become a Brighton luggage retailer. 
Luggage retailers must maintain a certain inventory of products. About 5 percent of 
Brighton retailers sell Brighton luggage. 
 
The application to sell Brighton luggage for calendar year 2003 included language 
that the applicant agreed to display a certain number of pieces and agreed to "sell the 
luggage at the suggested retail price." The luggage applications for prior and subsequent 
years did not include such language.   
13 
 
 
Brighton never made any express or explicit promise to enforce its retail pricing 
policy against other Brighton retailers as an incentive for a retailer to become a Heart 
Store or luggage store.   
 
Brighton in Kansas 
 
In the relevant time period for this lawsuit, after April 12, 2001, Brighton has sold 
to more than 100 independent retailers in Kansas. Most of Brighton's retailers in the state 
are small boutiques or specialty stores, but Brighton also sells to certain department 
stores and specialty chains. The independent retailers typically carry products from both 
Brighton and other brands. There is only one Brighton Collectibles store in Kansas; it 
opened in December 2006.   
 
O'Brien, the class representative, testified that she owns numerous other brands of 
accessories and that she made purchases of these accessories in both department stores 
and specialty stores. O'Brien testified that she shops in all different types of retail 
establishments.   
 
Several of Brighton's Kansas retailers have sworn that they generally sell at the 
MSRP and do not discount unless an item is out of season or selling poorly. Further, the 
retailers swore that this is true for both Brighton and non-Brighton products.   
 
 
Ten Brighton retailers in Kansas who submitted affidavits in this case have sworn 
that they generally price products at keystone. These retailers also swore that their pricing 
of Brighton products would have been the same in the absence of Brighton's pricing 
policy. Four Kansas Brighton retailers have stated in affidavits that they voluntarily 
follow Brighton's pricing policies and that they had no agreement with Brighton to sell 
Brighton products at the suggested retail price.   
14 
 
 
Since adopting its pricing policy, Brighton has not determined that any Kansas 
retailer violated the policy and has not refused to deal with or taken other adverse action 
against any Kansas retailer for an actual or suspected violation. However, Brighton did 
follow up on a report that one of its Kansas retailers may have been discounting. It 
concluded that the reported discounting had not occurred.   
 
 
Six independent retailers in Kansas submitted Heart Store applications for the 
years 2001 and 2002, and Brighton accepted the six as Heart Stores for those years. Three 
Kansas Heart Stores, as well as three other Brighton Kansas retailers, submitted luggage 
applications for 2003 and were accepted as luggage stores for that year.   
 
The Accessories Market 
 
Products of a quality and price similar to Brighton's are sold in department stores, 
specialty chains, and over the Internet. According to figures arrived at by using 
Accessories magazine, an industry trade publication relied on by the experts on both 
sides, the value of retail sales of Brighton's products in 2005 was approximately $357 
million. Accessories magazine reports that the total amount of retail sales in the 
accessories industry in 2005 was $30.2 billion. Based on these figures, Brighton's sales 
accounted for less than 2 percent of total sales in the accessories market in 2005. 
Accessories magazine also reported that 2005 retail sales of accessories in specialty 
boutiques totaled $4.1 billion. If all of Brighton's sales had occurred in specialty 
boutiques, which was not the case, Brighton's retail sales would constitute 6.2 percent of 
the sales in specialty boutiques in 2005. From 2001 to 2004, Brighton's estimated sales as 
a percentage of retail sales were in the 1 percent to 2 percent range; and Brighton's 
estimated sales as a percentage of specialty boutique sales were in the 5 percent to 7 
percent range.   
 
15 
 
Gundlach drew conclusions about the relevant market and Brighton's market 
dominance. He defined the relevant market for this case as women's accessories 
distributed through specialty boutique dealers. He further defined boutique retailers as 
those who generally are independent and provide an intimate experience for shoppers. 
Gundlach recognized that Brighton seeks to focus its retail distribution on small, 
independent specialty retailers or boutique retailers. He also determined that the specific 
characteristics of consumers who shop often in boutique retail outlets are important to 
understanding whether products generally distributed through boutique retailers compete 
with products not distributed through boutique retailers. Gundlach concluded that these 
characteristics are important in defining the market in this case. In addition to his analysis 
of the relevant market, Gundlach also concluded that Brighton was the dominant vendor 
in women's accessories distributed through specialty boutique retailers. He stated that 
Brighton's dominant power was derived from its extensive retail distribution network, its 
broad product lines, and its differentiated product.  
 
This Lawsuit 
 
The class in this case consists of named plaintiff O'Brien and "[a]ll persons who, 
in the period from January 1, 1997, . . . to the date of trial, have purchased any Brighton 
product from any Brighton retailer." 
 
In the petition that launched this litigation, an earlier named plaintiff alleged that 
Brighton engaged in pricing practices prohibited by K.S.A. 50-101, K.S.A. 50-102, and 
K.S.A. 50-112. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that "[t]he arrangements made between 
[Brighton] and its retailer dealers are made with the purpose of controlling the price of 
Brighton goods to the customer, and are prohibited trust arrangements outlawed in 
Kansas."   
 
16 
 
Plaintiff further alleged that plaintiff and the class were entitled to damages 
pursuant to K.S.A. 50-108, K.S.A. 50-137, and K.S.A. 50-161, including full 
consideration damages, treble damages, and attorneys fees and costs. We note that the 
statutory citations on damages appear to be in error in two respects. First, K.S.A. 50-115 
is omitted, even though it is the support for the full consideration claim. Second, K.S.A. 
50-137 does not apply, as it deals exclusively with unlawful restraints by grain dealers. It 
is obvious that the citation was intended to be K.S.A. 50-147 instead. Neither of these 
errors appears to have confused the parties, so we will address the class damages claims 
on this appeal as though the petition's citation errors did not occur. 
 
The district judge held that O'Brien's claims that Brighton's resale price 
maintenance (RPM) agreements and RPM policy violate the KRTA were to be evaluated 
under a "rule of reason" framework. The district judge cited both K.S.A. 50-101 and 
K.S.A. 50-112 in this portion of his summary judgment decision, but he failed to address 
the statutory language in either statute or any potential differences between the two 
provisions. Although the district judge ruled that genuine issues of material fact remained 
on whether Brighton's RPM policy or agreements were unreasonable, the district judge 
also ruled that O'Brien would be unable to prove antitrust injury. The judge therefore 
granted Brighton's summary judgment motion. 
 
Judge Goering also determined that O'Brien did not make out a claim of horizontal 
price-fixing. District Judge William Sioux Woolley held that O'Brien's claim for treble 
damages was subject to a 1-year statute of limitations, while O'Brien's full consideration 
claim was subject to a 3-year statute of limitations. Judge Goering did not reach 
Brighton's motion to decertify the class. 
 
 
 
On this appeal by O'Brien and cross-appeal by Brighton, in addition to the parties' 
briefs, we have received and reviewed amici briefs from the State of Kansas and from 
17 
 
Quin Jackson, a plaintiff in a separate Kansas antitrust class action. Brighton submitted 
briefs responding to the amici briefs, which we have also considered. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Three standards of appellate review are influential in this case. 
 
 
First is our familiar standard for summary judgment: 
 
 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is 
sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come 
forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude 
summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive 
issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable 
minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment 
must be denied. [Citations omitted.]" Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 
289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009).    
 
We have also emphasized that "'"[s]ummary judgment should not be used to prevent the 
necessary examination of conflicting testimony and credibility in the crucible of a trial."' 
[Citations omitted.]" Esquivel v. Watters, 286 Kan. 292, 296, 183 P.3d 847 (2008).  
 
The second relevant standard of review affects interpretation of statutes, such as 
the KRTA. Statutory interpretation raises a question of law over which this court has 
unlimited review. State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). The most 
fundamental rule is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be 
ascertained. 290 Kan. at 47. An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative 
18 
 
intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary 
meanings. State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914, 219 P.3d 481 (2009). 
 
 
"When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we must give effect to its express 
language, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. We will not 
speculate on the legislative intent and will not read the statute to add something not 
readily found in it. If the statute's language is clear, there is no need to resort to statutory 
construction. [Citations omitted.]" Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 284 Kan. 547, 
554, 161 P.3d 695 (2007). 
 
Only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court employ 
canons of construction, legislative history, or other background considerations to divine 
the legislature's intent and construe the statute accordingly. State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 
793, 796, 217 P.3d 15 (2009). 
 
 
Our third relevant standard of review applies to questions about class action 
certification: 
 
 
"'Trial judges are afforded substantial discretion in determining whether a class 
should be certified.' [Citation omitted.] . . . "'[T]he amount and degree of judicial 
discretion will vary depending on the character of the question presented for 
determination."' [Citations omitted.] . . . In general, when a discretionary decision is made 
within the legal standards and takes the proper factors into account in the proper way, the 
[trial court's] decision is protected even if not wise. [Citation omitted.] . . . However, 
'abuse is found when the trial court has gone outside the framework of legal standards or 
statutory limitations, or when it fails to properly consider the factors on that issue given 
by the higher courts to guide the discretionary determination.' [Citations omitted.]" 
Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, Inc., 277 Kan. 776, 779, 89 P.3d 908 (2004).  
 
"While the trial court has substantial discretion in determining whether a class should be 
certified, the provisions of K.S.A . . . 60-223 must be applied and rigorously analyzed." 
19 
 
277 Kan. at 780. In conducting its analysis, the trial court "should consider evidence 
when submitted by the parties and make those factual determinations necessary to a 
determination of whether the prerequisites for a class action are met." 277 Kan. at 783. 
"[T]he presence of individual questions, while tending to diminish the weight of class 
facts, does not necessarily defeat a prima facie showing the class prerequisites are 
satisfied, [citation omitted,] or mean that there has been an abuse of discretion in 
certifying the class. [Citation omitted.]" 277 Kan. at 793.  
 
KRTA Provisions 
 
 
K.S.A. 50-101, one of the KRTA sections setting out elements of O'Brien's cause 
of action, provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
"A trust is a combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two or more persons, for 
either, any or all of the following purposes: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
 
"Second. To increase or reduce the price of merchandise, produce or 
commodities, or to control the cost or rates of insurance.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Fourth. To fix any standard or figure, whereby such person's price to the public 
shall be, in any manner, controlled or established, any article or commodity of 
merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, use or consumption in this state.  
 
 
"Fifth. To make or enter into, or execute or carry out, any contract, obligation or 
agreement of any kind or description by which such person shall:  (a) Bind or have to 
bind themselves not to sell, manufacture, dispose of or transport any article or 
commodity, or article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a 
common standard figure;  
20 
 
 
 
(b) agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or 
transportation at a fixed or graded figure;  
 
 
(c) in any manner establish or settle the price of any article or commodity or 
transportation between them or themselves and others to preclude a free and unrestricted 
competition among themselves or others in transportation, sale or manufacture of any 
such article or commodity; or  
 
 
(d) agree to pool, combine or unite any interest they may have in connection with 
the manufacture, sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that such 
person's price in any manner is affected. Any such combinations are hereby declared to 
be against public policy, unlawful and void."  
 
 
K.S.A. 50-102 denies "[a]ll persons within this state" the right to form "or be in 
any manner interested, either directly or indirectly, as principal, agent, representative, 
consignee or otherwise," in any trust as defined in K.S.A. 50-101. 
 
 
K.S.A. 50-112, the KRTA section setting out elements of what appears to be 
O'Brien's alternative statutory cause of action, provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
"All arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between 
persons made with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition in the 
importation, transportation or sale of articles imported into this state, or in the product, 
manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or product of domestic raw material, 
. . . , and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations between 
persons, designed or which tend to advance, reduce or control the price or the cost to the 
producer or to the consumer of any such products or articles, . . ., are hereby declared to 
be against public policy, unlawful and void."  
 
 
K.S.A. 50-108 provides for a private right of action against those who violate 
K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-102: 
21 
 
 
"[A]ny person that may be damaged by any such agreement, trusts or combinations 
described in K.S.A. 50-101 and 50-102, and amendments thereto, may sue for and 
recover in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, of any person operating such 
trust or combination, such damages sustained, together with reasonable attorney fees."  
 
 
K.S.A. 50-115 does likewise but applies to K.S.A. 50-112: 
 
"[A]ny person injured or damaged by any such arrangement, contract, agreement, trust or 
combination, described in K.S.A. 50-112 and 50-113, and amendments thereto, may sue 
for and recover in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, of any person, the full 
consideration or sum paid by such person for any goods, wares, merchandise and articles 
included in or advanced or controlled in price by such combination . . . ."   
 
 
K.S.A. 50-147 speaks to the cumulative nature of rights and remedies under the 
KRTA: 
 
 
"The rights and remedies given by this act shall be construed as cumulative of all 
other laws in force in this state, and shall not affect, change or repeal any other remedies 
or rights now existing in this state for the enforcement, payment or collection of fines, 
penalties and forfeitures."  
 
 
K.S.A. 50-161 defines certain terms, again authorizes a private right of action, and 
discusses remedies: 
 
 
"(a) As used in this section, the term 'person' means any individual, corporation, 
partnership, firm, company or other association of persons . . . . 
 
 
"(b) . . . [A]ny person who may be damaged or injured by any agreement, 
monopoly, trust, conspiracy or combination which is declared unlawful by any of the acts 
contained in chapter 50 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, relating to unlawful acts, 
agreements, monopolies, trusts, conspiracies or combinations in restraint of trade, shall 
22 
 
have a cause of action against any person causing such damage or injury. Such action 
may be brought by any person who is injured in such person's business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this act, regardless of whether such 
injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant. The plaintiff in any action 
commenced hereunder in the district court of the county wherein such plaintiff resides, or 
the district court of the county of the defendant's principal place of business, may sue for 
and recover treble the damages sustained. In addition, any person who is threatened with 
injury or additional injury by reason of any person's violation of such acts may 
commence an action in such district court to enjoin any such violation, and any damages 
suffered may be sued for and recovered in the same action in addition to injunctive relief 
. . . .  
 
 
"(c) . . . The remedies provided herein shall be alternative and in addition to any 
other remedies now provided by law."  
 
Antitrust Injury 
 
In this case, the district judge concluded that O'Brien was vulnerable to summary 
judgment in favor of Brighton because "[p]laintiff has to have some concrete evidence 
that she personally paid higher prices for Brighton products as a result of Defendant's 
RPM Policy" and, viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to 
O'Brien, "[p]laintiff has not demonstrated that she paid higher prices for the Defendant's 
products than she would have paid absent Defendant's RPM policy." Thus, in the district 
judge's view, O'Brien was unable to prove "antitrust injury." 
 
The concept of antitrust injury invoked in the district court comes from federal 
antitrust jurisprudence. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 489, 97 S. Ct. 690, 50 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1977) ("Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, 
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that 
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by 
23 
 
the violation."). Essentially, it equates to the Kansas concept of causation, or the 
"require[ment] that a plaintiff's theory of damages . . . correspond to an economic effect 
that the statute or case law rule invoked as the basis for liability aims to prevent." See 
Davis, Standing on Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 
Antitrust L.J. 697, 698 (2003). 
 
 
Under the plain language of K.S.A. 50-101, there are several optional theories 
under which a KRTA plaintiff may proceed. Under the most forgiving of those theories, a 
plaintiff must prove the existence of a trust "for . . . the . . . purpose[]"  [t]o fix any 
standard or figure, whereby . . .  price to the public shall be, in any manner, controlled or 
established." K.S.A. 50-101 Fourth. As defined in K.S.A. 50-101, to establish the 
existence of a trust, a plaintiff need only show a "combination of capital, skill, or acts, by 
two or more persons." A plaintiff need not show a relationship rising to the level of an 
agreement. Furthermore, it is enough to demonstrate that the combination is "for the . . . 
purpose[] . . . [t]o fix prices; a plaintiff does not have to show that the combination 
actually succeeds in increasing prices. "For the purpose" contemplates a subjective 
standard, one that requires examination of the intent behind a defendant's behavior. 
 
Under the plain language of K.S.A. 50-112, there are alternate theories under 
which a KRTA plaintiff may proceed:  A plaintiff may prove the existence of an 
arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination "designed to" advance, reduce, or 
control price, or one that "tend[s] to" advance, reduce, or control price. Mere 
arrangements between persons are within the scope of the statute; again, a plaintiff does 
not have to show a relationship rising to the level of an agreement. In addition, it is 
enough to show that the arrangement is "designed to" or "tends to" control prices; again, 
a plaintiff does not have to show that the arrangement actually succeeds in increasing 
prices. Like "for the purpose" in K.S.A. 50-101, the phrase "designed to" contemplates a 
subjective standard. On the other hand, "tend to" contemplates an objective standard, one 
that requires examination of the defendant's behavior to discern whether it would 
24 
 
reasonably be expected to produce a particular result, regardless of the defendant's 
intention.     
 
In addition, under the plain language of K.S.A. 50-108, K.S.A. 50-115, and K.S.A. 
50-161, a plaintiff must show that the plaintiff was injured or damaged by the defendant's 
forbidden behavior. 
 
The language in Brighton's pricing policy and written Heart Store and luggage 
store applications and agreements is probative on whether Brighton's pricing policy and 
pricing agreements were for the purpose of fixing prices or designed to control prices and 
on whether they tended to control prices.   
 
Brighton's 1997 "Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotional Policy" sets the 
"Suggested Brighton Retail Pricing" for each Brighton product. Although limited 
discounting is permitted by the policy for items that will not sell and that the retailer will 
not reorder, the policy explicitly states that Brighton "stand[s] firm on [its] Suggested 
Retail Prices" and that "[e]xceptions are not favored, should not be assumed, and will be 
granted only in extraordinary circumstances as determined independently by Brighton." 
The policy also states that "[c]onsumers are confused by the ever popular sale, sale, sale, 
etc.," i.e., discounting by retailers, and that one purpose of the policy is to seek to 
reassure customers that prices are always "consistent." Pricing policies promulgated for 
subsequent years are nearly identical.  
 
The language of Brighton's pricing policy certainly is subject to an inference that it 
was for the purpose of fixing prices and was designed to and tended to control the  prices 
of Brighton's goods. While some discounting is allowed under the policy, it is permitted 
only under terms set by Brighton. Moreover, discounting is intended to be the exception 
rather than the rule, and discounting approval must be granted in advance by Brighton. 
Ensuring that prices are the same each day and at each store where Brighton goods are 
25 
 
sold is a part of Brighton's business strategy to build consumer confidence by letting the 
customers know that they do not need to hunt for deals. 
 
Further, for the relevant years of 2001 and 2002, Brighton's Heart Store 
applications included an explicit agreement between Brighton and its retailers that 
retailers agree to "[s]ell Brighton products for the suggested price every day, 365 days a 
year." The Heart Store agreements also allowed retailers to close out styles they would 
not reorder, but advertising of such closeouts was not permitted. No other discounting 
appears to have been permissible under the Heart Store agreements. 
 
The 2003 luggage application is similar. It required the same agreement by 
retailers to sell at the price suggested by Brighton, stating that applicants "also agree that 
you will sell the luggage at the suggested retail price." The luggage agreement did not 
appear to allow for any discounting.   
 
Both Heart Store and luggage store applications required applicants' signatures. 
 
The Heart Store and luggage applications explicitly required retailers who wished 
to qualify for Heart Store or luggage store status to sell Brighton products at the same 
amount each and every day. The language of the agreements gives an even stronger 
indication that they were "for . . . the . . . purpose[] . . .[t]o fix any standard or figure, 
whereby . . . price to the public shall be, in any manner, controlled or established," 
"designed to . . . control the price or the cost . . . to the consumer of any such products or 
articles," and would "tend to advance, reduce or control the price or the cost to the . . . 
consumer" by explicitly limiting discounting.   
 
Evidence of Brighton's enforcement practices also is relevant to Brighton's 
subjective intention, intention logically necessary if the plaintiff's theory is that 
Brighton's arrangements were "for . . . the . . . purpose[]" or "designed to" fix prices. 
26 
 
O'Brien came forward with probative evidence of Brighton's enforcement of its pricing 
policy. 
 
Although Brighton insisted that it has "never undertaken any systematic, 
comprehensive effort aimed at determining whether its retailers are following th[e] 
[suggested retail price] policy," it does maintain a file titled "Pending Pricing Issues," in 
which it keeps complaints from retailers and customers, as well as advertisements 
offering discounts of Brighton products. In addition, it maintained a specific file on a 
particular Kansas retailer. It contains one entry stating that Brighton received a tip on the 
retailer's discounting and a later entry stating that, after a Brighton representative visited 
the store, it determined that no discounting was occurring. Also, logs produced by 
Brighton show a notation that one of Brighton's Kansas retailers reported another for 
discounting; the log also shows that a Brighton representative would be notified of the 
report.   
 
In addition to tracking potential violations, Brighton's management actively 
discouraged departures from Brighton's pricing policy and pricing agreements. On this 
point, Young emphatically rejected a retailer's proposed promotional event, reminding 
the retailer of the pricing policy and stating that the rejected promotion was to be avoided 
because it would "spread like cancer." Kohl said that Brighton would rather retailers not 
pursue such promotions because "the other retailers in the area feel they have to compete 
and before long [it's] chaos." Kohl also said that "[t]hose who don't [follow the pricing 
policies] and who are aware of our pricing policy . . . are terminated."   
 
The above-described evidence of Brighton's enforcement practices is 
circumstantial support for O'Brien's assertion that Brighton's written pricing policy and 
written pricing agreements were "for. . . the . . . purpose[]" or "designed to" at least 
control, if not advance, the prices at which defendant's products were sold to consumers 
27 
 
and that they "tend[ed] to" do the same. If controlling prices was not at least part of 
Brighton's intent, then enforcement would be unnecessary.   
 
It is true that Brighton attempted to counter O'Brien's evidence on purpose or 
design and tendency with testimony from certain Kansas retailers who would charge the 
same price for Brighton products regardless of Brighton's pricing policy. But such 
evidence makes summary judgment less appropriate, not more. It translates to the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact on a dispositive issue—here, one of the 
essential components of O'Brien's cause of action. 
 
To avoid summary judgment, however, O'Brien must also come forward with 
evidence that the class has been injured or damaged by Brighton's pricing combination or 
arrangement. See K.S.A. 50-108 ("damaged"); K.S.A. 50-115 ("injured or damaged"); 
K.S.A. 50-161 ("damaged or injured").    
 
The district judge followed Brighton's lead and established a "concrete evidence" 
standard for injury, requiring O'Brien to prove actual Brighton consumer purchases at 
prices higher than they would have been absent Brighton's unlawful pricing practices. 
Again, the district judge based his decision on federal law. 
 
 
The district judge cited federal antitrust cases for the proposition that market 
studies are the proper bases for determining whether prices have been higher because of a 
defendant's alleged violation of the antitrust laws. See American Seed Co., Inc. v. 
Monsanto Co., 238 F.R.D. 394, 400 (D. Del. 2006); Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., 210 
F.R.D. 136, 144 (D. N.J. 2002); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation, 905 F. 
Supp. 1457, 1462 (D. Kan. 1995). The federal cases strongly favor this approach, 
although they appear to stop short of stating that a market study is the only way to 
demonstrate a difference in prices. See, e.g., In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust 
Litigation, 905 F. Supp. at 1462 ("In order for plaintiffs to make a submissible case on 
28 
 
damages, they must provide evidence which would allow the jury to compare actual 
prices during the conspiracy period with reasonably estimated prices that would have 
prevailed during that same period, absent the conspiracy."); Proving Antitrust Damages: 
Legal and Economic Issues, Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, pp. 31-
39 (1996). 
 
 
Brighton argued, in particular, for use of what is known as a "benchmark analysis" 
under federal law, positing that this was the only way O'Brien could show cognizable 
injury. Under this approach, O'Brien would have needed:  (1) to conduct a benchmark 
analysis comparing the actual retail prices of Brighton products before and after Brighton 
allegedly crossed the line between a lawful pricing policy and unlawful pricing 
agreements, (2) to compare the prices of Brighton accessories against the prices of similar 
accessories from manufacturers who did not impose price restraints, or (3) to collect 
affidavits from Kansas retailers who were prevented from discounting. In Brighton's 
view, the methodology and opinion of Gundlach, based on academic theory and 
economic literature rather than an empirical analysis of the Kansas market, was not a 
suitable substitute. In addition, O'Brien's other expert, Pflaum, was inadequate because he 
was "asked to simply assume the fact of injury" in order to calculate damages. This same 
expert admitted that, absent defendant's conduct, "there could be [the] possibility" that 
prices would increase and some class members might have paid more, and it was not his 
testimony that every Brighton retailer would lower prices. Brighton also relied upon its 
affidavits from certain Brighton retailers in Kansas who swore that their pricing practices 
would be the same absent Brighton's policy.   
 
 
O'Brien argued to this court that the language of Brighton's written pricing policy, 
its written pricing agreements, and its enforcement practices—plus the testimony of 
Gundlach—created a genuine issue of material fact on injury and thus precluded 
summary judgment. Gundlach opined that Brighton's practices fixed the prices of 
Brighton's products, which severely limited discounting, and he observed that retailers 
29 
 
who willfully failed to comply with the pricing arrangement were terminated or their 
shipments put on hold. He further concluded that, as a result, Brighton's price-fixing 
limited price competition by retailers selling Brighton goods. Gundlach based his 
conclusions on information from Brighton regarding its practices, a survey of 
"authoritative opinion" on the effects of vertical price-fixing in general, and "empirical 
evidence" of the impact of price-fixing documented by other scholars, studies that were 
not specific to Brighton.   
 
 
Brighton's demand that O'Brien come forward with proof of injury or damage in 
the form of a benchmark analysis sets too high a bar. It over-interprets federal law, 
which, at best, is persuasive rather than controlling. It also is contrary to this court's usual 
posture of hospitality to circumstantial evidence. See Dieker v. Case Corp., 276 Kan. 
141, 160, 73 P.3d 133 (2003) (circumstantial evidence can serve as proof of the elements 
of a theory of liability even though other reasonable theories are not excluded by such 
evidence). Neither the KRTA nor our limited caselaw interpreting it, see, e.g., Bergstrom 
v. Noah, 266 Kan. 829, 974 P.2d 520 (1999); United Artists Corp. v. Mills, 135 Kan. 655, 
11 P.2d 1025 (1932); Mills v. Ordnance Co., 113 Kan. 479, 215 P. 314 (1923); requires 
this particular form of "concrete evidence" to avoid summary judgment on antitrust 
injury. O'Brien has directed the court's attention to adequate circumstantial evidence that 
consumers actually paid prices for Brighton goods inflated by its pricing combinations or 
arrangements with retailers, and the district judge erred in ruling otherwise. Summary 
judgment in favor of Brighton based on the nonexistence of "antitrust injury" as a matter 
of law must be reversed.  
 
"Rule of Reason" Violation Standard  
 
 
Brighton's next line of defense—raised as a contingent issue in the appeal of the 
plaintiff class—is its insistence that only price-fixing that violates a "rule of reason" can 
subject it to liability under the KRTA. In essence, Brighton argues that the district judge's 
30 
 
decision to grant it summary judgment can be upheld as right for the wrong reason. See, 
e.g., State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1025, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012). We must therefore 
reach the merits of this issue.  
 
 
As with the issue of antitrust injury, Brighton references federal law, in particular, 
the United States Supreme Court's employment of "rule of reason" analysis in an earlier 
case involving at least some of the same pricing practices at issue here, Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 168 L. Ed. 2d 623 
(2007).  
 
 
In Leegin, a case brought under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., by PSKS, 
Inc., operator of Kay's Kloset, a Texas women's apparel store, the Court stated that the 
goal of the required federal rule of reason is to distinguish between "restraints with 
anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating 
competition that are in the consumer's best interest." 551 U.S. at 886. 
 
 
The district judge in this case followed Brighton half as far as it would have had 
him go. He accepted Brighton's argument that reasonableness or a rule of reason sets the 
standard for violation of the KRTA, invoking language in two Kansas restraint-of-trade 
cases:  Heckard v. Park, 164 Kan. 216, 223-24, 188 P.2d 926 (1948) ("The real question 
is never whether there is any restraint of trade but always whether the restraint is 
reasonable in view of all the facts and circumstances and whether it is inimical to the 
public welfare."), and Okerberg v. Crable, 185 Kan. 211, 217, 341 P.2d 966 (1959) 
(quoting same language from Heckard). But he stopped short of granting summary 
judgment on this issue to Brighton because he believed there were genuine issues of 
material fact on whether Brighton's pricing policies could pass muster under a 
reasonableness standard. Brighton challenges this part of the district judge's ruling on its 
cross-appeal—arguing that O'Brien cannot show that it had market power within a 
properly defined market or that its pricing practices had anticompetitive effects. We need 
31 
 
reach these cross-appeal issues only if we first agree with the district judge's decision that 
reasonableness sets the standard for when price-fixing violates the KRTA.  
 
 
Neither K.S.A. 50-101 nor K.S.A. 50-112 mentions reasonableness or a rule of 
reason. Rather, K.S.A. 50-101(d) provides that "[a]ny such combinations are hereby 
declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void," (emphasis added) and K.S.A. 
50-102 denies "the right to form or to be in any manner interested, either directly or 
indirectly, as principal, agent, representative, consignee or otherwise, in any trust as 
defined in K.S.A. 50-101. K.S.A. 50-112 provides that "[a]ll arrangements, contracts, 
agreements, trusts or combinations between persons, designed or which tend to advance, 
reduce or control the price or the cost to the producer or to the consumer of any such 
products or articles . . . are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and 
void." (Emphasis added.)  
 
This clear statutory language draws a bright line. The question is therefore 
whether Heckard and Okerberg or federal antitrust rulings invoking a rule of reason 
compel its erosion.    
 
 
We address the federal antitrust rulings first and briefly:  We conclude that they 
compel nothing. O'Brien is correct in arguing that federal precedents interpreting, 
construing, and applying federal statutes have little or no precedential weight when the 
task is interpretation and application of a clear and dissimilar Kansas statute. See 
Bergstrom, 266 Kan. at 845 (Kansas courts not bound by federal approach in interpreting 
antitrust laws); see also State v. Sellers, 292 Kan. 117, 128, 253 P.3d 20 (2011) (court 
will give effect to plain language of unambiguous statute); State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 
911, 914, 219 P.3d 481 (2009) (court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent 
through statutory language enacted, giving common words ordinary meanings); Graham 
v. Dokter Trucking Group, 284 Kan. 547, 554, 161 P.3d 695 (2007) ("If the statute's 
language is clear, there is no need to resort to statutory construction."). Brighton's 
32 
 
scholarly exegesis on the holdings and reasoning of federal cases, though impressive, is 
inapposite.  
 
 
Pronouncements in our Kansas precedents are another matter. Although stare 
decisis is not an "inexorable command," see Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 
777, 787, 189 P.3d 508 (2008) (doctrine of stare decisis does not compel perpetuation of 
incorrect analysis of the law); see also Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co., 289 Kan. 
605, 610, 214 P.3d 676 (2009) (citing Coleman v. Swift-Eckrich, 281 Kan. 381, 388, 130 
P.3d 111 [2006] ["This court is not inexorably bound by precedent; it will reject rules that 
were originally erroneous or are no longer sound."]), we do not lightly overrule this 
court's prior cases. See Rhoten v. Dickson, 290 Kan. 92, 112, 223 P.3d 786 (2010) (court 
of last resort will follow rule of law established in earlier cases unless clearly convinced 
rule was originally erroneous, no longer sound because of changing conditions, more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent). Thus it is necessary for us to 
conduct a careful examination of the development of the antitrust violation standard in 
Kansas to discern whether any reasonableness gloss that has been read into the KRTA is 
first, sound, and, second, applicable to the vertical or horizontal price-fixing claims here. 
 
 
The first case to address vertical price-fixing in our state was 1923's Mills v. 
Ordnance Co., 113 Kan. 479. In that case, this court considered a contract for the 
purchase of tractors that required the purchaser to maintain the seller's list prices when 
reselling the tractors to consumers. This qualified as a vertical price-fixing agreement, 
although the opinion did not use that description. At the time, the governing provision 
was Section 6409 of the General Statutes of 1915, the legislative ancestor of today's 
K.S.A. 50-101. Section 6409 provided in part:   
 
 
"A trust is a combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two or more persons, firms, 
corporations, or associations of persons, or either two or more of them, for either, any or 
all of the following purposes:  
33 
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
"Fifth, To make or enter into, or execute or carry out, any contract, obligation or 
agreement of any kind or description by which they shall bind or have to bind themselves 
not to sell, manufacture, dispose of or transport any article or commodity, or article of 
trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure; or 
by which they shall agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or 
transportation at a fixed or graded figure; or by which they shall in any manner establish 
or settle the price of any article or commodity or transportation between them or 
themselves and others to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves 
or others in transportation, sale or manufacture of any such article or commodity; or by 
which they shall agree to pool, combine or unite any interest they may have in connection 
with the manufacture, sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its 
price may in any manner be affected. And any such combinations are hereby declared to 
be against public policy, unlawful and void." (L. 1897, ch. 265, sec. 1.) 
 
 
This court held that the tractors purchase contract violated Section 6409 and was 
therefore unenforceable:  
 
"[The parties] tried to have the contract apply to a restricted territory and apparently 
attempted to give to the plaintiff the exclusive right to sell tractors in that territory. In 
doing so, the parties fixed the price at which the tractors should be sold by the plaintiff 
after they had been purchased from the defendant. They could not make such a contract 
because it violated the law of this state." Mills, 113 Kan. at 481.   
 
Nine years later, this court decided United Artists Corp. v. Mills, 135 Kan. 655, 
another vertical price-fixing case. By that time, the Revised Statutes of 1923 had replaced 
the General Statutes of 1915, see State, ex rel., v. Davis, Governor, 116 Kan. 663, 229 P. 
757 (1924); and R.S. 1923, 50-101, the predecessor to today's K.S.A. 50-101, precisely 
mirrored Section 6409, as quoted above.  
 
34 
 
This court examined a contract between a photoplay distributor and exhibitor, 
which included a provision requiring the exhibitor to charge a minimum admission fee to 
customers, and concluded that the provision "plainly . . . violate[d] the inhibition against 
price[-]fixing contained in . . . R.S. 50-101." United Artists Corp., 135 Kan. at 656. 
 
In 1936, this court again refused to enforce a contract that included a vertical 
price-fixing agreement, this time concerning ice, in Joslin v. Steffen Ice & Ice Cream Co., 
143 Kan. 409, 54 P.2d 941 (1936). Again, we relied on R.S. 1923, 50-101, as well as R.S. 
1923, 50-112, which provided that 
 
"all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or 
corporations made with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition in the 
importation, transportation or sale of articles imported into this state, or in the product, 
manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or product of domestic raw material, 
or for the loan or use of money, or to fix attorneys' or doctors' fees, and all arrangements, 
contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations between persons or corporations, designed 
or which tend to advance, reduce or control the price or the cost to the producer or to the 
consumer of any such products or articles, or to control the cost or rate of insurance, or 
which tend to advance or control the rate of interest for the loan or use of money to the 
borrower, or any other services, are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful 
and void." (L. 1889, ch. 257, sec. 1.) 
 
We concluded:  "A manufacturer of ice may fix the price at which he may sell his 
product, but the law will not permit him and his buyer to agree as to the price the latter 
will charge when he in turn sells that product to third parties." 143 Kan. at 411. The 
vertical price-fixing arrangement in the ice contract was "in plain violation" of the 
statutes. 143 Kan. at 411-12 (citing Mills, 143 Kan. at 481).   
 
The following year, the legislature enacted the Kansas Fair Trade Act (KFTA), 
R.S. 1937, 50-310 et seq. See Quality Oil Co. v. du Pont & Co., 182 Kan. 489, 493, 322 
35 
 
P.2d 731 (1958) (citing to KFTA in L. 1937, ch. 165, secs. 1-10). It specifically permitted 
contracts controlling resale prices, G.S. 1949, 50-302, and explicitly authorized private 
suits to punish deviation from them. G.S. 1949, 50-306. Such suits could be brought 
against not only a reseller who was party to the newly legal price-fixing contract, but also 
against a third-party retailer who had never agreed to the price control. G.S. 1949, 50-
306; see Quality Oil, 182 Kan. at 493-94 (discussing KFTA provisions). 
 
In 1958, this court struck down the third-party provision as "statutory price[-] 
fixing by compulsion," in conflict with the Kansas Constitution. Quality Oil, 182 Kan. at 
495-96. This court stated: 
 
"[W]e conclude the nonsigner clause of the Fair Trade Act is an unconstitutional attempt 
to delegate legislative power to private persons in violation of Art. 2, § 1 of the Kansas 
Constitution. The statute, beyond permitting voluntary contracts or agreements between a 
trade-mark owner and a retailer to fix a minimum resale price binding upon the signing 
retailer, gives legislative sanction to the trade-mark owner to fix minimum resale prices 
binding upon nonsigners.  
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
". . . The legislature is powerless to clothe a private person with power to fix 
minimum resale prices, binding upon all who acquire and sell his trade-mark commodity 
with whom he has no direct contractual relation. An attempt to confer such power is an 
attempt to delegate legislature power, which is futile." 182 Kan. at 495-96.  
 
The legislature repealed the KFTA in 1963. This repeal, in theory, returned 
Kansas to the simple, per se rule developed by Mills, United Artists, and Joslin: Vertical 
price-fixing arrangements again were always impermissible in Kansas. None of the pre-
KFTA cases or the statutory provisions they applied had imposed a threshold judicial 
evaluation of the reasonableness of the subject contract's trade restraint before a violation 
preventing enforcement could be recognized.  
 
36 
 
If anything about that simple, per se rule changed between 1937 and 1963, that is, 
while the KFTA was in effect, it had to have changed because of Heckard and Okerberg, 
the only two relevant cases decided during the period.   
 
In 1948's Heckard, Bessie B. Heckard and singer Lucile Jeannie Park entered into 
a vocal training contract. Under the contract, Park agreed to certain restrictive covenants, 
including:  "[n]ot to employ or accept tutelage from any musical instructor without 
plaintiff's written consent"; "[t]o engage plaintiff's services as defendant's exclusive 
manager and agent"; and "[t]o pay plaintiff 10% of all, if any, professional earnings equal 
or exceeding $100.00 per week which defendant might obtain during, but only during, the 
next seven years following the execution of the written agreement." 164 Kan. at 221. 
Heckard sued Park for an accounting and for specific performance of the written contract 
under G.S. 1935, 50-101 and G.S. 1935, 50-112, which were identical in all relevant 
respects to today's K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112. There was no allegation that the 
contract contained any vertical price-fixing provisions.  
 
This court held in favor of Heckard and said that "[t]he real question is never 
whether there is any restraint of trade but always whether the restraint is reasonable in 
view of all the facts and circumstances and whether it is inimical to the public welfare." 
164 Kan. at 223-24. Because the court viewed the contract as reasonable under all of the 
circumstances, it could be enforced despite the covenants. 164 Kan. at 224 (citing Mills v. 
Cleveland, 87 Kan. 549, 125 P. 58 [1912] [contract "limiting the right of a physician to 
practice a specialty and limiting his right to sell or disclose certain formulas used in such 
practice" upheld as valid because "reasonable[] under all the circumstances"]; Kent Oil 
Co. v. Waddill, 127 Kan. 704, 274 P. 1113 [1929] [contract limiting former employee 
"not to engage in that kind of work [for which employee was employed] for himself or 
any other person within the city for a period of two years after the termination of the 
employment" upheld as reasonable; order granting temporary restraining order to enforce 
the contract affirmed]; Berkey v. Smith, 138 Kan. 792, 796, 28 P.2d 763 [1934] [contract 
37 
 
in which apprentice "promise[d] not to enter into competition with undertaker within 
radius of ten miles in consideration of undertaker's instructing apprentice in art of 
embalming and funeral directing" upheld as reasonable; injunction affirmed]; Southwest 
Kan. Oil & G. Co. v. Argus P. L. Co., 141 Kan. 287, 39 P.2d 906 [1935] [reasoning that 
"[a] bargain in restraint of trade is illegal, not if there is restraint, but if the restraint be 
unreasonable" and upholding "[c]ontract whereby producers agreed to sell, at fixed price, 
and distributor to buy, all gas produced from producers' well up to requirements of 
distributor"]). 
 
In 1959's Okerberg, this court upheld contracts regulating milk routes against an 
antitrust challenge under G.S. 1949, 50-101 and G.S. 1949, 50-112. 185 Kan. at 219. The 
contracts set territories, required approval from a committee of the milk producers for 
route changes, required haulers to serve all producers within their territories who sold to a 
specific creamery, protected haulers against encroachment on their routes, and provided 
for sale or transfer of tank hauling rights. 185 Kan. at 218-19. Vertical price-fixing was 
not in issue.  
 
We quoted Heckard with approval, treating reasonableness as a threshold inquiry 
when an antitrust violation was alleged, and examined "'fundamental elements of 
common fairness in view of the facts and circumstances of the parties.'" 185 Kan. at 217 
(quoting Heckard, 164 Kan. at 224). As with the vocal training contract in Heckard, 
because this court viewed the Okerberg milk route contracts as reasonable, they also were 
enforceable. The contracts' limiting effect on the parties' market behavior did not make 
them illegal under the ostensibly governing statutes. 185 Kan. at 219.   
 
Careful examination of Heckard and Okerberg demonstrates that the 
"reasonableness" rubric they instituted had and has nothing to do with evaluation of an 
alleged price-fixing arrangement. This is also true of the cases upon which Heckard, and, 
in turn Okerberg, relied. The restraints of trade at issue—for example, covenants not to 
38 
 
compete and a requirements contract—are factually and legally distinct from the vertical 
and horizontal price-fixing alleged in this case under K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112.   
 
There is another, more basic reason not to apply the reasonableness rubric of 
Heckard and Okerberg to this price-fixing case:  Under the pattern for interpretation of 
statutes that this court has now firmly established, we are loathe to read unwritten 
elements into otherwise clear legislative language. See State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 
223 P.3d 780 (2010) ("'The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through 
the language of the statutory scheme it enacted.'"). We take the legislature at its word, 
unless there is ambiguity, because the legislature, unlike the judiciary, is one of the 
branches of government charged with development of public policy on behalf of the 
electorate and because our deference to clear statutory language leads to long-term 
predictability and stability in Kansas law. See Quality Oil, 182 Kan. at 495 (decision on 
whether K.S.A. 50-112 reflects sound economic policy not the court's to make). This 
means that, if the Heckard and Okerberg contracts were to come before us now, it is all 
but certain we would not append a requirement that an antitrust plaintiff demonstrate the 
unreasonableness of a defendant's trade restraint to show a statutory violation, because 
the clear language of the governing statutes does not require it. See K.S.A. 50-101 
("[a]ny such combinations are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and 
void.") (Emphasis added.); K.S.A. 50-112 ("[a]ll arrangements, contracts, agreements, 
trusts or combinations between persons, designed or which tend to advance, reduce or 
control the price or the cost to the producer or to the consumer of any such products or 
articles . . . are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void.") 
(Emphasis added.). If the legislature had wanted to make such a showing part of an 
antitrust action, it certainly was capable of doing so. In the absence of the policy message 
such a legislative addition would send, we have no confidence in the soundness of the 
Heckard language—"The real question is never whether there is any restraint of trade, 
but always whether the restraint is reasonable in view of all the facts and circumstances 
and whether it is inimical to the public welfare"—at the time it was written and today. 
39 
 
 
As K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112 now read, the proper approach is not to 
determine "whether the restraint is reasonable in view of all of the facts and 
circumstances," or to attempt to distinguish between restraints with anticompetitive effect 
and restraints that stimulate competition. Cf. Heckard, 164 Kan. at 223-24; Leegin, 551 
U.S. at 886. The clear statutory language of K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112 leaves no 
room for such an approach. The simple, per se rule of Mills, United Artists, and Joslin 
survives. The reasonableness rubric of Heckard and Okerberg is overruled. 
 
Because we decide that reasonableness does not set the antitrust violation standard 
in Kansas, we need not reach Brighton's cross-appeal arguments that O'Brien's claims are 
blocked by the rule of reason. 
 
Horizontal Price-fixing  
 
 
O'Brien has also contended that Brighton's ownership of stores that sell Brighton 
products qualifies it as a competitor to the retailers with which it entered into pricing 
agreements; this, in turn, would support a claim for horizontal price-fixing. Brighton has 
one retail store in Kansas and more than 100 such stores nationwide. Brighton has 
countered that its status as a dual-distributor, i.e., both a wholesale supplier and a retailer 
of its own products, does not support a horizontal price-fixing claim because dual-
distribution systems are treated as vertical arrangements under federal law.  
 
 
On appeal, Brighton has asserted that O'Brien raised any challenge to the district 
judge's rejection of any horizontal price-fixing claim too late to preserve it for our review. 
Our review of the record and briefs in this matter indicates otherwise, and we therefore 
consider the merits of the challenge.  
 
40 
 
 
The district judge concluded in a one-paragraph footnote to his Memorandum 
Decision on summary judgment that "the claims made do not involve horizontal price-
fixing." He reasoned that the Heart Store agreements at issue were between Brighton as 
the wholesale supplier of Brighton products and its retailers, and that the RPM policy set 
forth the relationship between Brighton as the wholesale supplier of Brighton products 
and its retailers. In other words, both had vertical rather than horizontal structure and 
impact.  
 
We have not previously evaluated a dual distribution price-fixing case. The 
governing KRTA provisions, K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112, neither differentiate 
between vertical and horizontal price-fixing nor outline a particular approach to a dual-
distribution situation. Rather, as fully discussed above, they forbid all price-fixing 
combinations or arrangements, regardless of the applicable label. Were this case in 
federal court, flawless labeling would have more bite, because horizontal price-fixing is 
still subject to a per se prohibition while vertical price-fixing—held to include dual-
distribution situations by every circuit to examine the question—is analyzed under the 
rule of reason. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893 (vertical price-fixing subject to rule of reason 
analysis); AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 2006) (dual-
distribution treated like vertical price-fixing); EEC v. Toshiba America Consumer 
Products, Inc., 129 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & 
Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); Illinois Corporate Travel v. 
American Airlines, 889 F.2d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); International Logistics 
Group v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 906 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. 
Eden Services, 823 F.2d 1215, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. 
Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); compare Red Diamond 
Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004-1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); 
Glacier Optical, Inc. v. Optique du Monde, 1995 WL 21565 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished 
opinion) (same).    
 
41 
 
Because this state court case arises under the KRTA rather than federal law, the 
rule of reason does not apply. To the extent O'Brien's horizontal price-fixing claim rests 
on conduct identical to that supporting her vertical price-fixing claim, horizontal price-
fixing is an alternative theory of liability. Proof of an alternative theory does not entitle a 
plaintiff to additional damages, but it gives a factfinder another way to get to judgment in 
the plaintiff's favor. O'Brien, like any civil plaintiff, could pursue an alternative theory of 
liability if it is supported by evidence. The district judge erred in ruling that the class 
"claims do not involve horizontal price-fixing." They do. Because the district judge did 
not, evidently, reach the next question of whether O'Brien has come forward with enough 
evidence to avoid summary judgment on horizontal price-fixing, we do not reach it 
either.  
 
Statute of Limitations on Full Consideration and Treble Damages Claims 
 
 
For persons injured or damaged by price-fixing prohibited under K.S.A. 50-101 
and K.S.A. 50-112, recovery of damages sustained, full consideration damages, and 
treble damages are permitted. See K.S.A. 50-108 (applying to K.S.A. 50-101; "such 
damages sustained"); K.S.A. 50-115 (applying to K.S.A. 50-112; "full consideration or 
sum paid"); K.S.A. 50-161(b) (applying to all of KRTA; "treble the damages sustained," 
"any damages suffered"); see also K.S.A. 50-147 ("The rights and remedies given by this 
act shall be construed as cumulative of all other laws in force in this state, and shall not 
affect, change or repeal any other remedies or rights now existing in this state for the 
enforcement, payment or collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures."). The parties 
disagree on the applicable statute of limitations and the attendant downward pressure it 
may exert on any eventual full consideration or treble damages award. We now address 
the merits of this disagreement.   
 
O'Brien argues in favor of application of the 3-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 
60-512(2). It provides that "[a]n action upon a liability created by a statute other than a 
42 
 
penalty or forfeiture" must be brought in 3 years. O'Brien argues that both the full 
consideration and the treble damages provisions are civil remedies, not penalties, 
designed to encourage consumers to exercise their rights under the KRTA.  
 
Brighton advocates for application of the 1-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 
60-514(c), which governs "[a]n action upon statutory penalty or forfeiture." Brighton 
argues that both the full consideration and treble damages provisions are statutory 
penalties because they award more than actual damages and are cumulative with actual 
damages.  
 
 
We also note as an initial matter that amicus Quin Jackson, in addition to 
supporting O'Brien's argument for application of the 3-year statute of limitations, states 
that the discovery rule of K.S.A. 60-510 applies and that "fraudulent concealment and 
other tolling issues may be raised as well." Neither of the parties has ever made an issue 
of either the discovery rule or any tolling doctrine, and we therefore do not address their 
merit or lack of merit. See State ex rel. Six v. Kansas Lottery, 286 Kan. 557, 561, 186 
P.3d 183 (2008) (court will not address arguments raised only by nonparty amici curiae). 
 
District Judge Woolley split the baby. He ruled that the full consideration claim 
under K.S.A. 50-115 was not a claim for a penalty and was, therefore, subject to the 3-
year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-512(2). He also ruled that the treble damages 
claim under K.S.A. 50-161 was a claim for a penalty and was, therefore, governed by the 
1-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-514(c).    
 
The KRTA explicitly established a cause of action for individuals to sue and 
recover general "damages" as well as specific types of damages. See K.S.A. 50-102; 
K.S.A. 50-108; K.S.A. 50-115; K.S.A. 50-161. It thus creates not only a new procedure 
for relief, but also new substantive rights. See Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 255 Kan. 
990, 997, 881 P.2d 567 (1994); see also Four B Corp. v. Daicel Chemical Industries, 
43 
 
Ltd., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1155-56 (D. Kan. 2003) (concluding plaintiff's antitrust 
claims under Kansas law arise out of antitrust statute). In addition, we note that the 
remedies for persons under the KRTA are separate and distinct from the civil penalties 
the attorney general is empowered to seek. See K.S.A. 50-103(a)(5); see also K.S.A. 50-
160(a) ("The commission of any act or practice declared to be a violation of the Kansas 
restraint of trade act shall render the violator liable to the state for the payment of a civil 
penalty in a sum set by the court of not less than $100 nor more than $5,000 for each day 
such violation shall have occurred."); K.S.A. 50-160(b) ("Any person who willfully 
violates the terms of any court order issued pursuant to the Kansas restraint of trade act 
shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per violation, in addition to 
other penalties that may be imposed by the court . . . . [T]he district court issuing an order 
shall retain jurisdiction, and in such cases, the attorney general may petition for recovery 
of civil penalties.").  
 
In the words of K.S.A. 60-512(2), an action based on the KRTA is "upon a 
liability created by statute." See Alexander v. Certified Master Builders Corp., 268 Kan. 
812, 821, 1 P.3d 899 (2000) (quoting Wright, 255 Kan. at 997) (liability "'created by 
statute'" when "'liability for resultant damages would not arise but for the statute'"). 
Likewise, an action based on the KRTA qualifies for the one-word description of K.S.A. 
60-514(c):  It is "statutory." The rest of the relevant language from the two statutes of 
limitation requires construction. See Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 
Kan. 446, 450, 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (when legislative intent not clear from statutory 
language court moves to applying canons of construction or legislative history). Although 
an action seeking a "penalty or forfeiture" is plainly excluded by K.S.A. 60-512(2) and 
plainly included by K.S.A. 60-514(c), "penalty or forfeiture" is not clearly defined. And 
we have not previously construed "penalty or forfeiture" as applied to either full 
consideration damages or treble damages under the KRTA. In the only one of our cases 
in which the KRTA statute of limitations was in issue, we did not decide the question 
44 
 
because the plaintiff's action would have been barred by either limitations provision 
under consideration. McCue v. Franklin, 156 Kan. 1, 131 P.2d 704 (1942).  
 
Judge Carlos Murguia of the federal District of Kansas did reach the issue of the 
statute of limitations applicable to the KRTA treble damages remedy in Four B Corp., 
253 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56, deciding the 3-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-512(2) 
applied. Judge Murguia cited this court's decision in Alexander, 268 Kan. at 820, in 
support of the proposition that "[a] claim which arises from a statute does not 
automatically constitute a 'penalty' or 'forfeiture' so as to trigger a one-year statute of 
limitations period, even if a plaintiff is entitled to recover more than his actual damages." 
Four B Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-55. The question of which statute of limitations 
should apply to KRTA full consideration damages was not before the court in Four B 
Corp.   
 
In an action brought under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA), we 
stated that "in many instances where a statute gives accumulative damages to the party 
grieved, it is not a penal action." Alexander, 268 Kan. at 824 (citing Huntington v. Attrill, 
146 U.S. 657, 667-69, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 [1892]). We observed that under the 
KCPA a consumer had the option to seek either damages or a civil penalty, not both. 268 
Kan. at 823. But we said that the key question was whether a statutory provision was 
more remedial or punitive in nature. 268 Kan. at 823.  
 
In Alexander, we examined the KCPA statutory scheme and concluded that "the 
KCPA provides a private remedy to consumers in the hope that they will enforce the 
KCPA as 'private attorneys general,'" and that consumer suits allowed individuals to gain 
"reimbursement for the private wrong done." 268 Kan. at 822, 824. We ultimately 
determined that both an action seeking a civil penalty and one seeking actual damages 
should be subject to the 3-year statute of limitations because treating the two differently 
would frustrate the intent of the statute to create an effective remedy for Kansas 
45 
 
consumers. 268 Kan. at 823-24. We said that a 1-year statute of limitations would be 
appropriate "if the legislature had provided for a separate penalty in addition to a damage 
recovery." 268 Kan. at 824.   
 
As Brighton has noted, both the full consideration damages and treble damages 
recoverable under the KRTA would exceed actual damages, and it makes sense to subject 
both provisions to the same statute of limitations analysis. See 268 Kan. at 824 (under 
KCPA, applying "two different statutes of limitation would force the consumer to file 
within 1 year, or find his or her options for recovery reduced to merely actual damages"). 
But, otherwise, we regard O'Brien's statute of limitations argument as generally more 
consistent with our reasoning in Alexander.  
 
The 3-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-512(2) gives a greater incentive to 
consumers to exercise their statutory rights by bringing private actions under the KRTA. 
Like the KCPA, the KRTA enables individuals to gain "reimbursement for the private 
wrong done." See 268 Kan. at 824. Also like the KCPA, the KRTA's provisions allowing 
private suits permit consumers to act as "'private attorneys general'" to enforce the 
provisions of the statute and prevent further wrongdoing. See 268 Kan. at 822. We also 
are persuaded that both full consideration damages and treble damages under the KRTA 
are "more remedial in nature than punitive." See 268 Kan. at 823. They are chiefly, if 
handsomely, designed to compensate an individual who has been injured by a trade 
restraint, while the Attorney General is explicitly empowered to seek civil penalties to 
punish a violation on behalf of the rest of the citizens of the state. K.S.A. 50-103(a)(5); 
K.S.A. 50-160. 
 
We therefore hold that neither O'Brien's claim for full consideration damages nor 
her claim for treble damages qualifies as an action for a statutory penalty or forfeiture. 
They are both subject to the 3-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-512(2). This 
holding compels us to affirm the district judge's partial summary judgment ruling on the 
46 
 
question of full consideration damages and to reverse his summary judgment ruling on 
the question of treble damages. 
 
Necessity of Explicit Written Agreement 
 
 
Brighton argues on its cross-appeal that it was entitled to partial summary 
judgment against O'Brien on any purchases made at Kansas retailers that were not Heart 
Stores in 2001or 2002 and/or luggage stores in 2003, that is, for any purchases made at 
all but nine Kansas stores during the specified years. Brighton asserts that the KRTA, like 
federal law, demands that a plaintiff alleging vertical price-fixing come forward with 
proof of "agreement and concerted action" between each specific retailer and Brighton. In 
its view, the evidence O'Brien has gathered cannot possibly demonstrate that there was 
the necessary meeting of the minds between Brighton and the overwhelming majority of 
Kansas retailers subject only to Brighton's pricing policy and not designated a Heart Store 
nor authorized to sell luggage.   
 
 
O'Brien responds that the written agreements between Brighton and nine of its 
Kansas retailers were merely the clearest evidence of a larger, unwritten price-fixing 
arrangement between Brighton and all of its Kansas retailers. She urges us to consider all 
of her evidence and the reasonable inferences a jury may be permitted to draw from it in 
context, arguing there is plenty in the record to enable her to escape summary judgment 
on the issue of whether Brighton acted unilaterally or in unlawful conjunction with its 
Kansas retailers. 
 
 
Judge Goering denied partial summary judgment to Brighton on this issue. He 
determined that "[t]he KRTA requires concerted action by two or more persons or entities 
to fix prices," without citation to a specific KRTA provision. The district judge reasoned 
that O'Brien established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the scope of 
any arrangement or agreement. He noted, in particular, evidence of Brighton's 
47 
 
enforcement practices and the dispute between the parties over the purpose of Brighton's 
RPM policy. 
 
 
As we observed above, K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112 prohibit more than 
"agreements" to fix prices. But even a "combination" under K.S.A. 50-101 must be "by 
two or more persons" and an "arrangement" under K.S.A. 50-112 must be "between 
persons." Both requirements demand something more than merely a unilateral pricing 
policy adopted by a wholesale supplier in the position of Brighton.  
 
 
Because K.S.A. 50-112 and § 1 of the Sherman Act share the "between persons" 
language, and the language of K.S.A. 50-101 is equivalent, we look to interpreting United 
States Supreme Court precedent for assistance in understanding what, short of an express 
agreement, qualifies as more than merely unilateral behavior. Has O'Brien mustered 
enough evidence to avoid summary judgment on those purchases made at Brighton 
retailers who were not parties to Heart Store or luggage store applications or agreements? 
 
 
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763, 768, 104 S. Ct. 
1464, 79 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1984), the Court ruled that, under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a 
price-fixing case must include "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of 
independent action by the manufacturer and distributor." "[T]here must be direct or 
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 
had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful 
objective," and neither communication between a manufacturer and its retailers nor the 
existence of complaints about discounting would be enough alone for a plaintiff in a 
price-fixing action to sustain its burden of proof. 465 U.S. at 768. The Court 
acknowledged that evidence of complaints about discounting can be probative; however, 
there must be additional evidence of unlawful conduct. 465 U.S. at 764. 
 
48 
 
 
In this case, Brighton emphasizes evidence from several retailers who said that 
they independently decided to charge the suggested price for Brighton products. It 
reminds us that Brighton's officers testified that Brighton had not actually terminated any 
Kansas retailer for a pricing policy violation and that Brighton had not made explicit 
promises to Heart Stores or luggage stores that it would enforce its pricing policy against 
other retailers.   
 
 
But the record contains ample conflicting evidence in support of O'Brien's claim 
that an unlawful pricing arrangement existed between Brighton and Kansas retailers 
beyond the nine Heart Stores and/or luggage sellers.  
 
 
Brighton's pricing policy was distributed to all retailers. And for at least 1 year, 
Brighton required all of them to initial an acknowledgment stating that violation of the 
policy was grounds for dismissal. Brighton's owner testified that the company "require[d] 
everybody to charge the same price." Unauthorized promotions were not allowed because 
they would "spread like cancer." Brighton maintained a "Pending Pricing Issues" file, and 
it conducted investigations into at least two Kansas retailers suspected of discounting. 
One of those investigations was launched when one retailer who was not a Heart Store or 
luggage seller reported another in the same category.  
 
 
All of this evidence provides relevant context for the written agreements Brighton 
entered into with Heart Stores and luggage sellers and at least circumstantially supports a 
reasonable inference of more than a unilateral policy or action by Brighton.    
 
 
This evidence also is reminiscent of that before the United States Supreme Court 
in Monsanto Co. In that case, a manager testified that the company advised distributors 
who were discounting that they were in danger of receiving less than their desired amount 
of company product. A company representative contacted a distributor's parent company, 
which then told the subsidiary distributor to comply with the pricing plan. The Court 
49 
 
recognized such evidence as "relevant and persuasive as to a meeting of minds." 465 U.S. 
at 765. In addition, one distributor sent a newsletter to his customers, in which he 
discussed the company's efforts to "'get [t]he "marketplace in order"'" and emphasized the 
company's efforts to maintain minimum prices. 465 U.S. at 765-66.  
 
 
The Court ultimately stated in Monsanto Co. that it was reasonable to conclude 
that the termination of a noncomplying distributor was pursuant to a pricing agreement 
rather than unilateral pricing policy because it was "necessary for competing distributors 
contemplating compliance with suggested prices to know that those who do not comply 
will be terminated." 465 U.S. at 767. The Court decided that the plaintiff had marshaled 
enough evidence to raise a jury issue. 465 U.S. at 768.  
 
 
We reach a similar conclusion here. There is more than enough evidence in the 
record before us to hold that the district judge was correct in denying Brighton partial 
summary judgment on the issue of whether there was an unlawful combination "by two 
or more persons" under K.S.A. 50-101 or an arrangement "between persons" under 
K.S.A. 50-112 with an effect on the prices paid for purchases at retailers other than Heart 
Stores and luggage sellers. This is not a case in which the plaintiff can show only a 
unilateral pricing policy or action. A genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, and 
weighing of evidence by this court or by the district judge reviewing a summary 
judgment motion would be improper. See Underhill v. Thompson, 37 Kan. App. 2d 870, 
878, 158 P.3d 987, rev. denied 285 Kan. 1177 (2007). 
 
Certification of the Plaintiff Class 
 
The last issue raised in Brighton's cross-appeal concerns class certification. We 
address its status to provide guidance to the district court on remand. 
 
50 
 
Class actions are governed by K.S.A. 60-223, which was modeled after and has 
traditionally been interpreted like Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23. Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, 
Inc., 277 Kan. 776, 778, 89 P.3d 908 (2004) (Dragon I). The class in this case is 
composed of named plaintiff O'Brien and "[a]ll persons who . . . from January 1, 1997, 
. . . to the date of trial, have purchased any Brighton product from any Brighton retailer."   
 
At the time this case was filed, K.S.A. 60-223(b)(3), the subsection of the statute 
that is relevant here, stated that a class should be certified if 
 
"the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) The interest of members of 
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action." 
 
District Judge Richard T. Ballinger ordered certification of the class, Brighton 
filed an interlocutory appeal challenging that certification. The appeal was denied by the 
Court of Appeals without explanation. Brighton also moved to decertify the class in the 
district court, but, given Judge Goering's summary judgment ruling in favor of Brighton 
on antitrust injury, the judge never ruled on the motion to decertify.   
 
On its cross-appeal, Brighton challenges only Judge Ballinger's analysis of K.S.A. 
60-223(b)(3), the predominance requirement. It seeks a ruling from us that the district 
judge abused his discretion in certifying the class. 
 
51 
 
Brighton makes two arguments:  (1) O'Brien and the class lack a method of 
common proof for showing injury, i.e., payment of a price higher than the price that 
would have been paid absent an unlawful restraint; and (2) O'Brien and the class lack a 
common method of proof for showing each Kansas retailer entered into an illegal 
arrangement with Brighton.   
 
In response to Brighton's first point, O'Brien asserts that there is common proof 
that every purchase was made at a fixed price in a distorted market. In response to 
Brighton's second point, O'Brien asserts that there is common proof of Brighton's written 
agreements, its pricing policy, and its monitoring and enforcement activities—all of 
which, taken together, establish the extent of the arrangement. 
 
Under Dragon I, we do not judge "'the propriety of a class certification by 
hindsight'" but rather to ensure that the district judge applied and "'rigorous[ly] 
analy[zed]'" the requirements of K.S.A. 60-223 in its decision to certify the class. 277 
Kan. at 780; see also Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Group, Inc., 293 Kan. 285, 
292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011). If a district judge evaluates the proper factors, his or her 
decision will be granted deference on appeal.  See 277 Kan. at 779.    
 
Here, the district judge incorporated the transcript of the oral argument on the 
motion for class certification into his decision in this case. During the oral argument, the 
judge stated that he had reviewed all of the documents filed by the parties, and he 
concluded that "the requirements of 223(a)(1) through 4 are clearly met" because 
"[t]here's no factual issue. The legal issues are really common, whether or not there is one 
person or there are a thousand people who have bought belts from [Brighton]." 
Specifically regarding the factors to be considered on predominance, the judge said: 
 
"The interest of the members, the extent and nature of the litigation controversy, the 
desirable concentration in the litigation, certainly the judicial economy comes into play in 
52 
 
there, too, but of course that's not determinative, and the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of the class action, those are all considerations and 
clearly tend to show that a class action is appropriate in this case."   
 
 
In his journal entry, the judge repeated that he had  
 
"considered and carefully examined the evidence in relation to:  
 
 
"(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions;  
 
 
"(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by or against members of the class;  
 
 
"(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims 
in the particular forum; [and]  
 
 
"(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class 
action." 
 
But, as at oral argument, the judge did not make factual findings or explain how he had 
considered or applied the statutory factors to arrive at his legal conclusions. He said 
merely that he had reached its ultimate conclusions regarding predominance "in light of 
the evidence." 
 
 
After the district judge's certification ruling, we handed down our decision in 
Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, 282 Kan. 349, 144 P.3d 1279 (2006) (Dragon II.). In that 
case, we determined that K.S.A. 60-252(a) and Supreme Court Rule 165 (2011 Kan. Ct. 
R. Annot. 246)—which require that a district court judge "find, and either orally or in 
writing state, the controlling facts and the judge's conclusions of law thereon" and "state 
the controlling facts required by K.S.A. 60-252, and the legal principles controlling the 
decision"—apply to a district judge's class certification decision. 282 Kan. at 356. 
53 
 
Generally litigants and their counsel bear the responsibility of objecting to inadequate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law  
 
"to give the trial court the opportunity to correct them, and in the absence of an objection, 
omissions in findings will not be considered on appeal. [Citation omitted.] Where no 
objection is made, this court will presume the trial court found all facts necessary to 
support its judgment. However, this court may still consider a remand if the lack of 
specific findings precludes meaningful review. [Citation omitted.]" Dragon II, 282 Kan. 
at 356.   
 
 
In this case, it does not appear that Brighton objected specifically to inadequate 
findings and conclusions on certification, but it did attempt to pursue a timely 
interlocutory appeal. When the Court of Appeals rebuffed that effort, Brighton filed a 
motion to decertify the class. And it included the predominance issue in its prophylactic 
cross-appeal. 
 
 
Because Brighton made a consistent effort to keep its challenge to certification 
alive, both in the district court and before this court, and because the district judge's 
insufficient factual findings and legal conclusions preclude meaningful appellate review 
of class certification at this procedural juncture, we merely observe that Brighton's 
motion to decertify the class remains pending. It will, on remand, be ripe for decision. 
When that motion is heard and decided, the parties and the district judge will have the 
opportunity to ensure creation of a record adequate to support any future appropriate 
appellate review.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
After a thorough review of the record and the parties' extensive arguments on this 
appeal and cross-appeal, we hold that the district judge erred in his demand for proof of a 
"concrete injury" in this price-fixing case under K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112. This 
54 
 
holding requires reversal of the district judge's summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Brighton, and this case must be remanded to district court. 
 
Brighton also was not entitled to summary judgment under a "rule of reason," 
which is not applied in a price-fixing action brought under K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-
112 of the KRTA.   
 
The district judge erred in ruling that the claims of the plaintiff class do not 
involve horizontal price-fixing. The named plaintiff and class have made an alternative 
allegation of unlawful horizontal restraint. 
 
We affirm in part and reverse in part on the district judge's statute of limitations 
rulings. The limitations provision applicable to the class claims for both full 
consideration damages and treble damages is the 3-year statute of K.S.A. 60-512(2). 
 
We hold that the district judge correctly determined that a genuine issue of 
material fact remained for trial on the issue of whether there was an unlawful 
combination or arrangement under K.S.A. 50-101 and K.S.A. 50-112 between Brighton 
and its retailers who had no express agreements as Heart Stores or luggage sellers. 
 
And, finally, the insufficiency of the district judge's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on class certification preclude meaningful appellate review of the 
predominance issue raised in Brighton's cross-appeal. On remand, Brighton's motion to 
decertify the class will be ripe for decision under the guidance of this court's opinions in 
Dragon I, 277 Kan. at 778-93, and Dragon II, 282 Kan. at 360-64.  
 
Reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
 
55 
 
MALONE, J., assigned.1  
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by 
K.S.A. 20-3002(c), Judge Thomas E. Malone, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was 
appointed to hear case No. 101,000 to fill the vacancy on the court created by the 
retirement of Chief Justice McFarland.