Title: Town of Madison v. County of Dane
Citation: 2008 WI 83
Docket Number: 2006AP002554
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2008

2008 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2554 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Town of Madison, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
County of Dane, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 177 
Reported at: 304 Wis. 2d 402, 737 N.W.2d 16 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 17, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ZIEGLER, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Marcia MacKenzie, 
corporation counsel, and Gary Rehfeldt, 
assistant corporation counsel, Madison, and oral argument by 
Gary Rehfeldt. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by John M. 
Gerlach and Larowe, Gerlach & Roy, LLP, Madison, and oral 
argument by John M. Gerlach. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Kristen D. DeCato, and Stadler, Centofanti & Phillips, S.C., 
Mequon, on behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2554  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1484) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Town of Madison, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
County of Dane, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
JUL 9, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals opinion1 affirming a judgment of the 
Dane County circuit court, Judge David T. Flanagan, III, 
presiding.  The County of Dane (County) challenges a judgment 
ordering the County to pay the Town of Madison (Town) $75,000 
toward the cost of constructing a bridge, along with costs and 
fees. 
                                                 
1 Town of Madison v. County of Dane, 2007 WI App 177, 304 
Wis. 2d 402, 737 N.W.2d 16. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The dispute in this case began when the County 
rejected the Town's Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2001-02)2 "bridge aid" 
petition 
as 
not 
meeting 
the 
statutory 
criteria 
for 
reimbursement.  The Town filed a complaint with the Dane County 
Circuit Court, and the County's answer included the affirmative 
defense that the bridge was not "on a highway maintainable by 
the town" as required by § 81.38.  
¶3 
In a summary judgment decision and order, the circuit 
court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the County 
was responsible for paying one-half the cost of the bridge and 
ordering the County to pay $75,000 plus costs and fees.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court decision. 
¶4 
We conclude that the bridge at issue in this case was 
not a "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 because the bridge aid petition 
did not request funding to help connect the bridge to a highway 
maintainable by the Town or for the frontage road extension 
project in its entirety, because there was no existing highway 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2005, Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1), entitled 
"Town bridges or culverts:  construction and repair; county 
aid," was revised and renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 82.08(1).  As 
we will explain, the revisions made by the session law amending 
the statute, 2003 Wis. Act 214, did not substantially alter the 
statute in ways affecting our decision.  However, as the lower 
courts and parties in this case have, we apply the earlier 
version 
of 
the 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 81.38 
(2001-02), 
corresponding with the date when the Town first approved the 
bridge at issue and included it in its 2003 budget.  All 
subsequent references to § 82.08 are to the 2005-06 version, and 
all subsequent references to § 81.38 are to the 2001-02 version 
unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
3 
 
extending to the planned bridge site at the time of the Town's 
petition, and because the bridge was still not connected to a 
highway upon completion.  Section 81.38 requires funding for 
only those bridges built on highways in existence at the time of 
a bridge's construction.  As such, the County appropriately 
denied the Town's § 81.38 "bridge aid" petition.  We therefore 
reverse. 
I 
¶5 
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute.  
The most pertinent facts relate to the Town's June 10, 2004, 
Dane County Bridge Aid Program petition for financial assistance 
in building a bridge ("the bridge").3  In its petition and 
                                                 
3 The 
petition 
also 
included 
requests 
for 
financial 
assistance for two culvert projects.  Unlike the funds requested 
for the bridge, the culvert funds requested were approved and 
included in Dane County's 2005 budget.  The culvert funding is 
therefore not at issue on appeal. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
4 
 
accompanying letter, the Town requested $75,0004 for a new 
railroad overpass bridge that, the letter explained, "will be 
constructed as part of the South Madison EDA Project, which 
includes the construction of an extension of the W. Beltline 
Highway frontage road along with many other components."   
¶6 
The formal petition requesting bridge aid did not 
describe the bridge itself as being on or connected to a 
highway, but described the bridge as located 1500 feet west of 
the nearest intersecting road.  Architectural plans submitted 
along with the petition detail the design of the bridge but do 
not describe the bridge as being connected to any existing or 
future highways.  However, the plans do describe the location of 
the bridge as "East Badger Road over Union Pacific Railroad."  
                                                 
4 The estimated cost of construction was $300,000.  The Town 
received a grant for $150,000 and sought reimbursement for one-
half of the remaining $150,000 cost.  The other half was 
obtained through a grant from the U.S. Department of Commerce's 
Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of the 
United States Department of Commerce authorized to effectuate 
the provisions of the Public Works and Economic Development Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3226 (2004), and the Act's purpose of enabling 
localities and citizens to participate more fully in American 
prosperity by increasing economic growth through improved and 
expanded public infrastructure.  See Afton Alps, Inc. v. United 
States, 392 F. Supp. 543, 545-46 (D. Minn. 1974); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3121(a)(3)(A)-(4).  The EDA provides eligible recipients, 
including 
"local 
governments 
engaged 
in 
economic 
or 
infrastructure development activities," with a grant of 50 
percent of the cost as the Federal share of any project carried 
out under this program.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3122(4)(A)(iv); 
3144(a)(1). 
 
Thus, 
the 
EDA 
also 
requires 
that 
eligible 
recipients provide half of the cost to match the funds granted 
by the federal government.  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
5 
 
¶7 
Photographs and maps included in the record further 
clarify that the roadways the Town's project sought to connect, 
consisting of a segmented portion of East Badger Road5 on the 
east and Ski Lane on the west, would not in fact be connected 
through the bridge's construction.  Rather, to the east of the 
tracks that the bridge would traverse was a 200-foot gap between 
the railroad tracks and an East Badger Road cul-de-sac, and to 
the west there was a much wider gap of land, including a quarter 
mile of unpaved right-of-way and embankment between the bridge 
and Ski Lane.  The bridge, as proposed, was 100 feet long, thus 
traversing less than half the distance between the railroad 
tracks and the nearest road to the east and leaving even more of 
an area between the tracks and the road on the west.  Thus, the 
plan was to a build a bridge before any highway was built to 
which the bridge would be directly connected.  
¶8 
In a letter dated September 9, 2004, the County denied 
the Town's request to include funding for the bridge in the 
County's budget, stating that the bridge did not qualify for the 
bridge aid program.  The Town subsequently served the County 
with a notice of claim and claim, and an amended notice and 
accompanying claim, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)-(b).  
The amended notice formally recited the Town's June 10, 2004, 
"request for Dane County to pay one-half of the Town's cost of 
                                                 
5  East Badger Road is alternately referred to as the West 
Beltline or South Beltline frontage road by the parties; it is 
the frontage road running nearly parallel and to the south of 
Madison's Beltline Highway between the Rimrock Road and Park 
Street exits.  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
6 
 
constructing the railroad overpass bridge which is part of the 
Town of Madison EDA project" and described the bridge as 
"located on the frontage road west of 323 West Beltline 
Highway."  
¶9 
Despite the County's bridge aid denial, the Town began 
construction of the bridge in January 2005, and construction was 
completed 
in 
March 
2005.  After the bridge was built, 
construction began that connected the roadway to the bridge on 
both sides.  The extension of the roadway connecting it with the 
bridge was completed in August 2005, and the new road was 
dedicated in October 2005.  
¶10 On May 6, 2005——after the bridge was built but before 
it was connected to the frontage road——the Town filed suit 
against the County seeking damages of $75,000, plus attorney's 
fees and costs.  Although its answer admitted the facts alleged 
by the Town,6 the County also included in its answer a request 
that the circuit court dismiss the action on the basis of two 
affirmative defenses.  
¶11 The first affirmative defense raised by the County, 
which is the central issue upon review, was its assertion that 
"[i]nsofar as the section of highway has not been constructed, 
it is not yet maintainable, and since the plaintiff's new 
                                                 
6 Notably, the County admitted the Town's allegation that 
the overpass bridge at issue "is located on the frontage road 
west of 323 West Beltline Hwy., Town of Madison, Wisconsin," 
although such admission should be viewed in light of its 
affirmative defenses described above and the other arguments we 
will proceed to address.  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
7 
 
construction of the bridge is not 'on a highway maintainable by 
the town' as required by Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2003), the bridge 
does not qualify for aid."  The County's second affirmative 
defense was an assertion that the Town failed to state a cause 
of action upon which relief may be granted.  The circuit court 
does not appear to have addressed the County's dismissal 
request.   
¶12 On April 27, 2006, the Town filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court granted the Town's summary judgment 
motion.  
The 
court concluded that it is illogical and 
inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 81.38's purpose of having 
counties absorb half the cost of bridge construction and repair 
to interpret "on a highway" to apply only to existing highways 
because "new bridges are often constructed where no highway 
existed previously."  The court ruled that "recovery under Wis. 
Stats. § 81.38 is not precluded by the fact that a maintainable 
highway is not yet in existence," and ordered the County to pay 
$75,000 plus costs and fees.   
¶13 On appeal by the County, the court of appeals 
described 
the 
proposed bridge as "connect[ing] previously 
unconnected portions of existing highways,"7 and affirmed the 
                                                 
7 As the preceding description of uncontested facts sets 
forth, this is an inaccurate description of the bridge, which 
did not connect the roads; the roads remained unconnected after 
the bridge was completed, as they were separated from the bridge 
by right of way or other non-highway land.  The roads were not 
connected until the road construction extending the roads was 
completed several months after the bridge's construction. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
8 
 
judgment, concluding that Wis. Stat. § 81.38 "includes aid for 
bridge construction where there is no preexisting highway if the 
completed bridge is 'on a highway maintainable by the town.'"  
Town of Madison v. County of Dane, 2007 WI App 177, ¶¶1, 17, 22, 
304 Wis. 2d 402, 737 N.W.2d 16.  
¶14 The County sought review by this court, and on 
September 13, 2007, review was granted. 
II 
¶15 The standard for reviewing summary judgment decisions 
is set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)(2005-06), which provides 
that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  We review 
summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standards 
as a circuit court.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 
304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  
¶16 In this case, neither party argues that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact.  As such, we solely decide 
whether the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
The question of law in this case is one of statutory 
interpretation.  The outcome of the case depends on the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 81.38's language requiring a county to levy a 
tax to fund a bridge's construction or repair if it is "on a 
highway maintainable by the town."  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
9 
 
¶17 When we interpret a statute, we begin with the text of 
the statute, and "[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations omitted).  Statutory language is generally given its 
common, ordinary and accepted meaning.  Id.  "We often consult a 
recognized dictionary to determine the common, accepted meaning 
of a word.  However, when construing a word or phrase that is a 
legal term of art, we give the word or phrase its accepted legal 
meaning."  City of Milwaukee v. Washington, 2007 WI 104, ¶32, 
304 Wis. 2d 98, 735 N.W.2d 111 (citations omitted).  Further, we 
examine statutory language "in the context in which it is used; 
not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  If a statutory provision is ambiguous, 
i.e., "if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning," UFE 
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 283, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) 
(citation omitted), we examine extrinsic sources, such as 
legislative history, to ascertain the legislative intent.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶43. 
¶18 In 
addition 
to 
these 
well-established 
statutory 
construction principles, we observe that nearly a century ago, 
in interpreting a predecessor version of the bridge aid statute, 
this 
court held that the statute is subject to strict 
construction.  State ex rel. Hamburg v. Bd. of Supervisors, 145 
Wis. 191, 192-93, 130 N.W. 104 (1911).  Specifically, this court 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
10 
 
held that the extent of a county's power to levy taxes for the 
construction of a town's bridge "must be regarded as measured by 
the precise terms of the law.  No equitable considerations will 
warrant the court coercing the county to go further than the 
written specifications prescribed by the legislature."  Id. at 
193. 
III 
¶19 The bridges of Dane County, like bridges in all 
Wisconsin counties, may receive county funding under Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38 for construction or repairs when the criteria of that 
statute are met.  Section 81.38 provides in relevant part: 
(1) When any town has voted to construct or 
repair any . . . bridge on a highway maintainable by 
the town, and has provided for such portion of the 
cost of such construction or repair as is required by 
this section, the town board shall file a petition 
with the county board setting forth said facts and the 
location of the . . . bridge; and the county board, 
except as herein provided, shall thereupon appropriate 
such sum as will, with the money provided by the town, 
be 
sufficient 
to 
defray 
the 
expense 
of 
constructing . . . [the] bridge . . . . 
(2) . . . The town and county shall each pay one-
half of the cost of construction or repair above 
$1,500. . . .   
Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1)-(2).  Under § 81.38, after a town votes to 
construct a bridge and has raised half the cost of the bridge, 
it can petition the county for "bridge aid" for the remainder of 
the bridge's cost.  Id.; see also Town of Grand Chute v. 
Outagamie County, 2004 WI App 35, ¶2, 269 Wis. 2d 657, 676 
N.W.2d 540.  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
11 
 
¶20 The dispute in this case pertains to the phrase "on a 
highway maintainable by the town" contained within Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38(1), describing bridges funded under the statute.  The 
County frames its dispute with the Town and with the lower court 
decisions by focusing on the word "highway," a word that is 
defined elsewhere in the Wisconsin Statutes, but not within ch. 
81. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 340.01(22) 
and 
990.01(12)(2005-
06)(defining "highway" as "all public ways and thoroughfares 
and . . . bridges upon the same").  See also Morris v. Juneau 
County, 219 Wis. 2d 543, 559-62, 579 N.W.2d 690 (1998)(applying 
§ 340.01(22) in a case involving a different section of ch. 81).  
The County observes that § 340.01(22) contains an explanation 
that the definition of "highway" "includes the entire width 
between the boundary lines of every way open to the use of 
public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular 
travel."  The County concludes that under this description, a 
non-existing highway does not meet the legal definition of 
"highway" because if it does not exist, it cannot be open to the 
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.8  
¶21 The 
Town 
does 
not 
dispute 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 340.01(22) and 990.01(12) contain applicable definitions of 
                                                 
8 Dissenting from the court of appeals decision in this 
case, Judge Dykman similarly stated, "the plain meaning of that 
statute is that a chasm is not a highway, and certainly not a 
highway maintainable by the Town."  Town of Madison, 304 Wis. 2d 
402, ¶23 (Dykman, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
12 
 
"highway."9  The Town agrees that in Morris, this court held that 
the § 340.01(22) definition was applicable to a ch. 81 case.  
However, the Town contends, the agreed upon statutory definition 
does not resolve the issue of whether a highway must be pre-
existing, and Wis. Stat. § 81.38 does not require that the 
"highway maintainable by the town" exist prior to the bridge's 
construction.  
¶22 As such, what the parties disagree about is not the 
literal meaning of "on a highway maintainable by the town" but 
whether there are any temporal restrictions modifying that 
phrase.  The parties disagree about when a bridge must be "on a 
highway maintainable by the town" in order to qualify for bridge 
aid, and the related question of when that maintainable highway 
must exist in relation to the bridge.  
¶23 Specifically, the County argues that in order to 
qualify for bridge aid, the bridge must be on an existing 
highway maintainable by the town.  Because the bridge in 
question was not on a highway maintainable by the Town when it 
                                                 
9 Nor do the parties dispute the meaning of "on," although 
an interesting discrepancy about the meaning of "on" arose in 
the oral arguments of two attorneys arguing against the town:  
Assistant Corporate Counsel Gary Rehfeldt, arguing on behalf of 
Dane County, and Attorney Andrew Phillips, arguing on behalf of 
amicus curiae Wisconsin Counties Association (WCA).  In an 
argument from which the County quickly distanced itself, 
Attorney Phillips argued that "any time you're bridging an 
expanse that is not part of a town road," the bridge would not 
qualify for bridge aid.  We reject this interpretation as 
absurd.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, 
¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The general concept of 
bridges is that they bridge such expanses. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
13 
 
was constructed, and a highway adjoining the future bridge's 
site did not yet exist at the time of the Town's bridge aid 
petition, there was a "temporal disconnect" that precluded 
bridge aid in this case.  
¶24 The Town responds that the County's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.38 as precluding bridge aid where there is no 
pre-existing highway is in direct conflict with the statute's 
plain language, which requires funding as long as the bridge, 
"upon completion, is on a highway maintainable by the Town."  At 
oral argument, the Town offered a new variation of the "upon 
completion" argument.  While not burning its bridges by waiving 
its briefed "upon completion" argument, the Town at oral 
argument appeared to argue in the alternative that § 81.38 
requires funding as long as the overall project contemplates an 
eventual connection of the bridge to a highway at some point 
down the road after the bridge's construction.10 
¶25 While disagreeing about the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38, the parties do not dispute that the frontage road to 
which the bridge was eventually connected was a highway 
maintained by the Town.  However, it is also undisputed that, 
upon completion, the bridge was not on that highway.  Rather, 
                                                 
10 In other words, the Town described the bridge as 
essentially serving as a bridge to the future, part of a broader 
economic development plan that would continue beyond the 
construction of the bridge.  The County, in contrast, has dubbed 
the bridge as a "bridge to nowhere," because when it was 
finished being built, it was connected to unpaved land, not to 
the type of highway required for county funding under Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38.  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
14 
 
the bridge was completed in March 2005, but the extension of the 
frontage road connecting to the bridge did not occur until 
August 2005.  Thus, under even the Town's "upon completion" 
interpretation of § 81.38, the bridge did not qualify for 
funding under the statute, because it was not "upon completion" 
on a highway maintainable by the Town.11   
¶26 However, to address the Town's apparent alternative 
argument that as long as a bridge will eventually be connected 
to a highway, it should be funded, we will proceed to address 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 81.38's "on a highway maintainable 
by the town" language.  For the reasons given below, we conclude 
that § 81.38 requires funding for only those bridges built on 
highways in existence at the time of a bridge's construction. 
¶27 Turning first to the text of Wis. Stat. § 81.38, we 
observe that while the statutory language allows for the 
construction or repair of a "bridge on a highway maintainable by 
the town," making it clear that the bridge does not have to be 
preexisting for the town to request funding, it is unclear 
whether the "highway maintainable" must be preexisting where the 
bridge is to be constructed, or whether the bridge could be 
                                                 
11 The dissent portrays our opinion as "reach[ing] this 
conclusion because West Beltline Highway frontage road and Ski 
Lane were not a contiguous highway when the bridge was 
constructed."  Dissenting op., ¶55.  Our construction is not 
merely based on whether the two separate and distinct roads were 
contiguous, but rather, on the fact that these two separate and 
distinct roads were connected neither to the bridge nor to each 
other.  Thus, the newly constructed bridge was not built "on a 
highway."  Indeed, upon completion, the newly constructed bridge 
did not "bridge" the two noncontiguous highways.  
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
15 
 
built before the "highway maintainable" exists under the 
statute.   
¶28 Either interpretation is reasonable, and we therefore 
treat Wis. Stat. § 81.38 as ambiguous.  UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 
283.  In this case, such ambiguity can be resolved by reference 
to the statutory history underlying the statute, read in 
conjunction 
with 
both 
§ 81.38 
and 
surrounding 
statutory 
language.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46-48.   
¶29 Chapter 81 of the 2001-02 Wisconsin Statutes, of which 
Wis. Stat. § 81.38 is a part, is entitled "Town Highways."  The 
majority of the surrounding statutory provisions in the chapter 
focus on highways.  Consequently, the context of § 81.38 would 
suggest that the bridge aid statute is better understood as a 
subset of a chapter addressing the construction, maintenance, 
and repair of town highways. 
¶30 Going back to the earlier incarnations of the bridge 
aid statute, we observe that in the nineteenth century, the 1858 
version of the statute described funding being appropriate for 
"necessary" bridges12 and was modified in 1866 to clarify that 
such necessity is related to the bridge's location on a primary 
road.  Specifically, the 1866 language provided that taxes may 
                                                 
12 Under 
the 
1858 
statute, 
county 
supervisors 
were 
statutorily authorized to levy taxes to defray the costs of 
building 
or 
repairing 
bridges 
"[w]henever 
it 
shall 
appear . . . any one of the towns in such county would be 
immeasurably burthened by erecting or repairing any necessary 
bridge or bridges in said town."  Wis. Stat. ch. 19, § 115 
(1858).   
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
16 
 
be levied "for erecting or repairing any necessary bridge or 
bridges upon the principally traveled thoroughfares in said 
town," with the caveat that even if the road was not the 
principally traveled thoroughfare13 for a particular town, the 
county could still appropriate bridge aid if the bridge was 
necessary for the use and convenience of adjoining towns.14  Wis. 
Stat. ch. 19, § 115 (1866)(emphasis added).   
¶31 In 1879 the statute, renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 1319, 
was amended to make funding mandatory rather than discretionary.  
§ 1, ch. 126, Laws of 1879.  The amended statute also used the 
word "highway" for the first time, providing that whenever the 
cost to a town exceeded a certain property tax threshold  
for the purpose of erecting or repairing any bridge or 
bridges upon the principally traveled highway of such 
town; or when it shall be made to appear that a bridge 
in any town is necessary for the use and convenience 
of the adjoining towns, rather than the town in which 
it shall be situated, it shall cause such sum to be 
levied upon the taxable property of the county as will 
be sufficient to defray the expense of erecting or 
repairing the same. . . .  
Id.  Although the "highway" language was removed in 1885,15 
Wisconsin courts continued to recognize that counties could 
refuse funding for bridges on the grounds "that the bridge or 
                                                 
13 As opposed to a "road less traveled."  
14 The 1866 statute, as well as later versions, also 
contained limitations on bridge aid based on the initial cost of 
a project in proportion to a town's taxable property; such 
statutory language and related amendments are not pertinent to 
our analysis. 
15 See § 1, ch. 187, Laws of 1885. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
17 
 
bridges are not upon public highways, or are bridges which the 
town has no authority to build or repair."  State ex rel. Town 
of Star Prairie v. Bd. of Supervisors, 83 Wis. 340, 347, 53 N.W. 
698 (1892). 
¶32 The first time the language "on a highway maintainable 
by the town" appeared in Wisconsin's bridge aid statutes was in 
1923, when the statute was rewritten to describe bridge aid as 
applying to the construction or repair of "any bridge on a 
highway maintainable by the town" when the town has paid its 
statutorily required share.  § 87.01, ch. 108, Laws of 1923 
(emphasis added).  Since 1923, when the "highway" language 
reappeared, more explicitly narrowing the scope of the statute, 
bridge aid funding has continued to be expressly limited to 
funding for a bridge "on a highway maintainable by the town."  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 81.38, 82.08.  See also Town of Grand Chute, 
269 Wis. 2d 657, ¶2, ¶13 n.5.  Although a 2003 Act changed the 
phrase "highway maintainable" to "highway maintained," this 
amendment did not change the substantive meaning of the statute, 
as the court of appeals in this case correctly recognized: 
Section 81.38(1) referred to a "highway maintainable 
by the town"; section 82.08(1)(2005-06) refers to a 
"highway maintained by the town" (emphasis added).  
This revision was part of broader revisions to both 
§ 81.38 and to the town highway statutes in general.  
See generally 2003 Wis. Act 214. . . .  A prefatory 
note to the Act that amended and renumbered the town 
highway 
statutes 
states 
that, 
if 
an 
individual 
section's 
explanatory note "does not indicate a 
substantive change, none is intended."  2003 Wis. Act 
214, Joint Legislative Council Prefatory Note 4.  The 
note then goes on to state:  "If a question arises 
about the effect of any modification made by this 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
18 
 
bill, the special committee intends that the revisions 
in this bill be construed to have the same effect as 
the prior statute."  Id.  The individual explanatory 
note 
accompanying 
the 
section 
that 
revised 
and 
renumbered § 81.38(1) attributes no significance to 
the change from "maintainable" to "maintained."  See 
2003 Wis. Act 214, § 141, note.  
Town of Madison, 304 Wis. 2d 402, ¶17 n. 4.  Thus, as the court 
of 
appeals 
has 
noted, 
the 
legislature's 
prefatory 
note 
explaining the change from "maintainable" to "maintained," 
confirms the legislature's understanding that this is how the 
statute has been interpreted all along.  
¶33 Other than Town of Grand Chute, there are no published 
cases addressing Wis. Stat. § 81.38.  Town of Grand Chute has 
limited utility for our analysis because it primarily addresses 
the meaning of "costs" in the statute; it does not address the 
meaning of the statute's "on a highway" language.16  Prior to 
                                                 
16 Furthermore, Town of Grand Chute's description of the 
general cost-sharing purpose of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 is somewhat 
incomplete.  The court described that purpose as "to have 
counties absorb half the cost of constructing or repairing 
bridges," and explained that § 81.38(2) "essentially obligates 
the county to pay for one-half the cost of constructing or 
repairing the town's bridge."  Town of Grand Chute v. Outagamie 
County, 2004 WI App 35, ¶¶2, 18, 269 Wis. 2d 657, 676 N.W.2d 
540.  We clarify here that counties do not literally pay for the 
bridges, but rather they impose tax levies to fund the bridges.  
Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1).  More importantly for our analysis, the 
plain text of the statute does not clearly require counties to 
impose tax levies to fund every bridge a town constructs, but 
rather, only those bridges built on highways maintainable by 
towns.   
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
19 
 
Town of Grand Chute, no other Wisconsin decision contained a 
substantial analysis of either § 81.38's language or the 
comparable language in predecessor statutes describing bridges 
eligible for county funding as being on highways maintainable by 
towns.17  
¶34 Even though this is a case of first impression in a 
number of respects, we are not without guidance, however.  It is 
clear from the emphasis on the necessary role of highways in 
Wis. Stat. § 81.38 and its predecessor statutes, and from the 
surrounding text of chapter 81 focusing on highway maintenance 
and funding, that the purpose of § 81.38 is not just cost 
sharing and cooperation between counties and towns in general, 
but rather, cost sharing in the specific context of bridges 
built upon maintainable highways.  Much of the statutory history 
also indicates that the highways to which bridges must be 
connected in order to qualify for funding have historically been 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent misses this point in its discussion of Town of 
Grand Chute, which it describes as setting forth a broader cost-
sharing legislative purpose that our opinion today somehow 
contravenes.  See dissenting op., ¶¶61-63.  The dissent's 
understanding of the legislature's purpose is flawed, however, 
as the dissent fails to recognize that counties have no 
obligation to assist with bridge construction where § 81.38(2) 
does not apply, and that § 81.38(2) applies to require funding 
only for those bridges built on highways maintainable by towns, 
not to all bridge construction without qualification. 
17 However, as we have described, this court interpreted the 
1892 version of the statute, which was devoid of highway or 
thoroughfare language, as nonetheless precluding a county's 
denial of funding for bridges on the basis that the bridges "are 
not upon public highways."  State ex rel. Town of Star Prairie 
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 83 Wis. 340, 347, 53 N.W. 698 (1892). 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
20 
 
required to be highways that are essential to travel in the 
county, or are "well traveled" thoroughfares at the time of the 
bridge aid application.  
¶35 This highway-focused purpose underlying Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38 helps provide a predictable and certain basis for county 
determinations whether or not to fund town bridges.  Whereas, 
under the Town's approach, counties might be required to fund 
bridges even if their eventual connection to highways will not 
transpire 
for 
years, 
or 
may 
not 
ever 
occur, 
a 
strict 
interpretation limiting funding requirements to bridges built 
upon existing highways provides the clearer guidance required 
for ensuring predictability and certainty in future cases.  
Reading the language "on a highway maintainable by the town" 
literally is in accord with our reading of Wisconsin's bridge 
aid statutes.  See Hamburg, 145 Wis. at 192-93.  The Town offers 
no specific parameters as to how far in the future or how 
definite such future connections might take place, and points to 
no authority offering guidance on this point.18   
                                                 
18 The dissent attempts to bridge the gap for the Town by 
claiming that "[m]any similar phrases in other sections of the 
statutes" also employ prepositional phrases similar to "on a 
highway maintainable by the town" to identify bridges in terms 
of their relationships to highways that they are a part of "or 
will become" a part of.  Dissent, ¶57.  However, while naming 
eight other statutes that mention bridges, the dissent fails to 
cite a single statute that merges the present and future tenses 
in the manner the dissent urges, indicating that a bridge's 
identity may be determined by a future condition that does not 
yet exist, defining things in terms of what may be, not in terms 
of what is. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
21 
 
¶36 In its brief to this court, the County asks the most 
pertinent question in this case:  "if there is no preexisting 
highway[,] how can a completed bridge be on a 'highway 
maintainable by a town?'"  Answering its own rhetorical 
question, 
the 
County 
continues, 
"[t]here 
is 
a 
temporal 
disconnect occurring here; a highway can't be 'maintainable' 
until it is constructed."  We agree with the County's analysis.  
In order for a bridge to be constructed or repaired on a highway 
"maintainable by the town" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38(1), we conclude that the bridge must be constructed or 
repaired on an existing highway. 
¶37 Having concluded that the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38(1) limits county bridge aid requirements to bridges on 
existing highways maintainable by towns, we conclude that the 
bridge in this case did not meet that statutory criteria for 
funding.  The parties do not dispute that in this case, when the 
Town's bridge aid petition was submitted, there was no highway 
maintainable by the Town already in existence that extended to 
the spot where the bridge would be built.  In addition, the 
parties do not dispute that the bridge was not "on a highway 
maintainable by the town" when its construction was complete.  
Rather, even the Town concedes that the bridge was only 100 feet 
long, thus leaving a gap of over 100 feet between the railroad 
tracks and the nearest road to the east and leaving even more of 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
22 
 
an area between the tracks and the road on the west upon its 
completion.19  
¶38 In a key concession at oral argument, the Town even 
acknowledged that it could have applied for funding to help fill 
that gap, thereby connecting the bridge to the road, but it 
failed to do so, leaving the gap between the bridge and highway 
                                                 
19 As previously noted, the court of appeals inaccurately 
described 
the 
proposed bridge as "connect[ing] previously 
unconnected portions of existing highways."  See supra, ¶13 & n. 
7.  We note here that the circuit court's description of the 
Town's proposal as a proposal "to use an existing state right-
of-way to connect the two dead ends," and its description of 
that connection as "requir[ing] the construction of a railroad 
overpass bridge that would span both the railroad line and the 
right-of-way," are clearly erroneous for the same reason.  The 
record establishes, and the parties agree, that the bridge 
itself would not traverse the entirety of the right-of-way, but 
would only cross a length of 100 feet across the railroad 
tracks, leaving a large section of unpaved right-of-way intact 
to the west until a highway was later extended across that land.  
Further, at oral argument, when the attorney for the Town was 
asked whether the right-of-way area to the west of the railroad 
was a highway maintainable by the Town, he conceded it was not, 
because it was vacant land without pavement at the time of the 
bridge's construction.   
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
23 
 
unaddressed by the bridge aid petition.20  In other words, the 
Town failed to request funding in its petition that would bridge 
the gap between the bridge and the highway, and that would, with 
reference to the highway, ensure that funding was allocated to 
help "take it to the bridge."21   
¶39 The only description of the bridge's relationship to a 
road in the Town's petition was the description of the bridge as 
located 1,500 feet west of the nearest intersecting road.  
Although the letter accompanying the petition described the 
bridge construction as part of a broader plan to extend the 
frontage road, and the architectural plans submitted along with 
the petition described the bridge location in relation to the 
frontage road, there is no language in the petition explicitly 
describing the bridge as being built on or connecting to that 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 81.38(2) provides in relevant part that 
"[i]n determining the cost of construction or repair of any 
culvert or bridge, the cost of constructing or repairing any 
approach not exceeding 100 feet in length shall be included."  
At 
oral 
argument, 
the 
Town's 
attorney 
acknowledged 
this 
statutory provision, explaining that "the statute also talks 
about that, you can even apply for, which the Town did not, 100 
feet of entrance portion to the bridge, on the road," but that 
in this case "theoretically, if what is covered, how close we 
are to this bridge, is 200 feet less 100 feet. . . ."  Here, the 
Town seems to be arguing that its failure to request any funding 
to extend the road to the bridge was due to the fact that 
funding beyond the first 100 feet would not be granted.   
However, there is no question that the Town could have made a 
petition for funding to connect the road to the bridge, subject 
to the legislative limitation of cost-sharing at the 100-foot 
mark. 
21 See Charles Donelan, James Brown: 1933-2006, 21 Santa 
Barbara Indep. 52, Jan. 11, 2007, at 15. 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
24 
 
road.  It may be the case that it was the Town's intent to 
connect the bridge to the highway eventually, but Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38 does not set forth funding for future connections of a 
funded bridge to a highway after the bridge is built.  
¶40 Thus, with (1) the petition describing funding for the 
bridge alone, not for the entire frontage road extension 
project; (2) the petition not requesting funding to connect the 
bridge to a highway, although the Town concedes it could have 
requested such funding; and (3) the bridge in fact not being 
connected to a highway maintainable by the Town upon the 
bridge's completion, it is clear that the Town's bridge falls 
outside the scope of Wis. Stat. § 81.38's requirements.  
¶41 The Town has conceded that its petition for bridge aid 
was for funding for the bridge alone, and did not include a 
request for funding to help connect the bridge to a highway 
maintainable by the Town.  Furthermore, no such highway extended 
to the bridge site either prior to the bridge's construction or 
at the time of the bridge's completion.  Thus, under the Town's 
own interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 as requiring funding 
for a bridge that is on a highway maintainable by the Town "upon 
completion," the bridge did not qualify for funding. 
IV 
¶42 We conclude that the bridge at issue in this case was 
not a "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 because the bridge aid petition 
did not request funding to help connect the bridge to a highway 
maintainable by the town or for the frontage road extension 
No. 
2006AP2554   
 
25 
 
project in its entirety, because there was no existing highway 
extending to the planned bridge site at the time of the Town's 
petition, and because the bridge was still not connected to a 
highway maintainable by the Town upon completion.  Section 81.38 
requires funding for only those bridges built on highways in 
existence at the time of a bridge's construction.  As such, the 
County appropriately denied funding for the bridge under 
§ 81.38.  We therefore reverse. 
¶43 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2006AP2554.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion applies Wis. Stat. § 81.38 (2001-02) according 
to its literal text, a well-accepted approach to statutory 
interpretation.  The Town of Madison did not literally "vote[] 
to construct . . . [a] bridge on a highway maintainable by the 
[T]own."  The Town of Madison instead voted to construct a 
bridge near a highway maintainable by the Town and then to 
connect the bridge to the highway.  The Town of Madison 
therefore loses; it did not comply with the text of the statute.   
¶45 I suggest that the chief of the legislative reference 
bureau 
consider 
reporting 
this 
decision 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.08(1) (2005-06) to the law revision committee.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 13.83(1); 13.92(2)(j).     
¶46 I join in the court's mandate but write separately for 
the reasons set forth. 
 
 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶47 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   I agree 
with the lead opinion that this case turns on the interpretation 
of the statutory phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by 
the town," found in Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1),1 now Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.08(1).2  However, the lead opinion concludes that a highway 
must be constructed before the bridge is constructed in order 
for the bridge to come within the identified statutory phrase 
from § 81.38(1).3   
¶48 In 
my 
view, 
the 
phrase, 
"bridge 
on 
a 
highway 
maintainable by the town," identifies a type of bridge by 
describing the relationship of the bridge to the highway of 
which it is, or will become, a part.  The type of bridge that is 
"on a highway maintainable by the town" is distinguished from 
many other types of bridges referenced in the statutes that also 
are located on highways, but which highways are maintained by 
governmental entities other than a town, such as the state or 
another municipality.  The phrase, "bridge on a highway 
maintainable by the town," has nothing to do with whether the 
bridge 
is 
constructed 
before 
or 
after 
the 
highway 
is 
constructed.  Rather, if the bridge is of the type identified in 
Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1), the town may apply to the county of which 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2005, Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) was 
revised and renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 82.08(1).  I agree with 
the lead opinion's assertion that there was no change to 
§ 81.38(1) that affects the questions presented in this review.  
See lead op., ¶2 n.2. 
2 Id., ¶4. 
3 Id. 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
2 
 
the 
town 
is 
a part for assistance in constructing and 
maintaining such a bridge.  If the county has not opted out of 
§ 81.38(2), the county must pay its statutory share of the costs 
incurred.4  Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals, and I dissent from the lead opinion.5  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶49 The facts relating to this controversy are not in 
dispute.  The Town of Madison applied to Dane County for 
statutory assistance in constructing a bridge to span a railway 
corridor and connect two town highways, the West Beltline 
Highway frontage road and Ski Lane.6  Prior to applying for aid 
from the County, the Town had obtained federal assistance for a 
portion of the cost of constructing the bridge.  The County 
denied the Town's petition for funding.7  Thereafter, the Town 
constructed the bridge; connected a town highway to either side 
                                                 
4 Dane County has not opted out of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2).  
5 The lead opinion, coupled with the concurrence's vote to 
reverse the court of appeals, decides the outcome in this 
dispute between the Town of Madison and Dane County.  The lead 
opinion has no precedential value because the concurrence does 
not 
join 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
statutory 
interpretation.  
Accordingly, there are three justices who agree with the lead 
opinion's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 81.38(1), 
three 
justices 
who 
agree 
with 
the 
dissent's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 81.38(1) and one justice who does not say how she thinks 
§ 81.38 should be interpreted.   
6 On June 10, 2004, the Town petitioned the County for a 
contribution to the cost of bridge construction. 
7 On September 9, 2004, the County sent a letter refusing to 
contribute to the cost of the bridge's construction. 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
3 
 
of the bridge;8 and sued the County to collect the financial 
assistance that the Town believed was due under Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38(2).9 
¶50 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
Town, concluding that the County was required to pay a portion 
of the bridge's construction, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) 
and (2).  The County appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
¶51 We independently review whether summary judgment was 
properly granted, employing the same procedure as the circuit 
court employed.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 
¶15, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  Statutory interpretation 
and application are at the heart of the summary judgment 
decision in this case.  They, too, present questions of law for 
our independent review; however, we benefit from the reasoning 
of the court of appeals and the circuit court.  Marder v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 
252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
                                                 
8 The construction of the bridge was completed in March 
2005, and the connection of the highway to both sides of the 
bridge was completed in August 2005. 
9 The statutory obligation for payment by a county is now 
found at Wis. Stat. § 82.08(3). 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
4 
 
B. 
Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) 
 
¶52 In order to determine whether the County has a 
statutory obligation to contribute to the Town's cost of bridge 
construction, we must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1). 
1. 
General principles 
¶53 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Plain meaning may be ascertained 
not only from the words employed in the statute, but also from 
statutory context.  Id., ¶46.  We do not interpret statutory 
language in isolation, but rather, as that language appears in 
relation to surrounding or related statutes, and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Id.  We also presume that 
the legislature meant an interpretation that will advance the 
objective of the statute.  GTE N. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
Wis., 176 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993). 
¶54 If a statute is "capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses[,]" then 
the statute is ambiguous, and we may consult extrinsic sources 
to discern its meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶47-48, 50.  
However, a statute is not ambiguous simply because two litigants 
disagree about its meaning.  Id., ¶47.   
¶55 The lead opinion concludes that the Town is not due a 
contribution from the County for the Town's construction of the 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
5 
 
bridge because this bridge does not fall within the phrase, 
"bridge on a highway maintainable by the town."10  The lead 
opinion reaches this conclusion because West Beltline Highway 
frontage road and Ski Lane were not a contiguous highway when 
the bridge was constructed.11  In so concluding, the lead opinion 
interprets the statutory phrase contrary to the context in which 
it and similar phrases are used throughout the statutes when 
identifying other types of bridges in Wisconsin.  It also 
interprets the phrase contrary to the cost-sharing purpose of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1).  
2. 
Contextual assessment 
¶56 The statutory phrase on which our determination rests 
is:  "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 81.38(1) provided in relevant part: 
When any town has voted to construct or repair any 
culvert or bridge on a highway maintainable by the 
town, and has provided for such portion of the cost of 
such construction or repair as is required by this 
section, the town board shall file a petition with the 
county board setting forth said facts and the location 
of the culvert or bridge; and the county board . . . 
shall thereupon appropriate such sum as will, with the 
money provided by the town, be sufficient to defray 
the expense of constructing or repairing such culvert 
or bridge . . . . 
The statutory phrase, "on a highway maintainable by the town," 
modifies the word, "bridge," in § 81.38(1).  This prepositional 
phrase identifies a particular type of bridge by describing the 
location of the bridge.   
                                                 
10 Lead op., ¶4. 
11 Id. 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶57 Many similar phrases in other sections of the statutes 
identify other types of bridges, also through the use of a 
prepositional phrase that describes the location of the bridge 
in relation to which entity is responsible for maintaining the 
highway of which the bridge is, or will become, a part.  For 
example, "a bridge which is not on the state trunk highway 
system or on marked routes of the state trunk highway system 
designated as connecting highways" are the phrases employed to 
define a "local bridge" in Wis. Stat. § 84.18(2)(d) (2005-06).  
A bridge "not on the state trunk highway system" is the phrase 
employed in Wis. Stat. § 84.10 (2005-06) to address the 
maintenance and operation of one specific type of bridge that is 
not located on state trunk highways.  In addition, "every 
highway bridge on a city, village, or town boundary shall be 
repaired and maintained by any adjoining municipality in which 
the bridge is located" is the phrase used in Wis. Stat. § 82.23 
(2005-06) to identify municipal line bridges.  Further, "a 
bridge on a highway in this state which crosses waterways, other 
topographical barriers, other highways or railroads" is the 
identifying phrase in Wis. Stat. § 84.17(1)(b) (2005-06) that 
describes the type of bridge for which certain inspections are 
required by a particular entity.12  None of the statutes 
                                                 
12 There are other statutes, too numerous to mention, that 
identify 
other 
types 
of 
bridges 
and 
address 
inspection, 
maintenance or construction.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 83.15 
(2005-06) (county aid for state line bridges); Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.12 (2005-06) (interstate bridges); Wis. Stat. § 84.14 
(2005-06) (bridge construction); Wis. Stat. § 84.15(1) (2005-06) 
(maintenance of intrastate bridges). 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
7 
 
condition the identification of the type of bridge described on 
whether the bridge was constructed before or after the highway 
that establishes the location of the bridge; yet, all of the 
statutes 
share 
similar 
syntax 
in 
that 
they 
employ 
a 
prepositional phrase to identify a type of bridge by its 
relationship to the highway of which it is, or will become, a 
part. 
¶58 In Village of Bloomer v. Town of Bloomer, 128 Wis. 
297, 107 N.W. 974 (1906), we discussed a type of bridge for 
which expenses were to be shared between a village and a town.  
There, the Village determined that it was necessary to repair 
and then build a new bridge on a town road that was bisected by 
a navigable creek as the road ran through the Village.  Id. at 
300-01.  Accordingly, the bridge was of a type that was 
identified in "ch. 284, Laws of 1899" that created a cost-
sharing relationship between a village and a town for that type 
of bridge.  Id. at 302.  The Village presented a claim for 
$2,022.74 to the Town for the construction of the bridge, and 
the Town disallowed it.  Id. at 301.  
¶59 The Town did not argue that the bridge was not of the 
type described in the statute, but rather, it challenged the 
statute 
that 
apportioned 
payment 
for 
the 
bridge 
on 
constitutional grounds.  Id. at 304.   We concluded that 
requiring cost-sharing between municipalities was within the 
legislature's power, and we noted that "[t]he law relating to 
county aid to towns for bridge purposes has been often 
approved."  Id. at 305.  We also noted that the legislative 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
8 
 
directive under challenge "no more violates the constitutional 
provision 
referred 
to 
than 
the 
law 
providing 
for 
joint 
maintenance of bridges on town-line roads."  Id. at 310.   
¶60 Throughout Village of Bloomer, we reasoned by analogy 
to other types of bridges, all of which were identified by the 
locations of bridges in relationship to the highways on which 
they had been or would be constructed.  That reasoning is 
directly applicable here where the plain meaning of the 
statutory words employed in Wis. Stat. § 81.38 identify the type 
of bridge that is subject to cost-sharing between a town and a 
county as one that is "on a highway maintainable by the town."  
There is no dispute that West Beltline Highway frontage road and 
Ski Lane were highways maintainable by the Town when the Town 
petitioned the County to contribute to the cost of constructing 
the bridge. 
3. 
Statutory purpose 
¶61 We also interpret the words chosen by the legislature 
in light of the purpose for which the statute was enacted.  GTE, 
176 Wis. 2d at 566.  Wisconsin Stat. § 81.38(2) and the purpose 
for which it was enacted were discussed in Town of Grand Chute 
v. Outagamie County, 2004 WI App 35, 269 Wis. 2d 657, 676 N.W.2d 
540.  There, the question presented was whether Outagamie County 
was "liable for one-half the costs of repairing a bridge in the 
Town of Grand Chute."  Id., ¶1.  The actual cost of repair 
exceeded the amount that the Town requested in its initial 
petition for aid, and the County argued that it was not liable 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
9 
 
for any costs incurred after the petition for aid was approved 
by the County.  Id.   
¶62 The court of appeals reasoned that when a town votes 
to repair or to construct a bridge and petitions the county of 
which the town is a part for aid, if the town has raised funds 
sufficient to meet the town's statutory obligation in that 
regard, the county is obligated "to pay for one-half the cost of 
constructing or repairing the town's bridge."  Id., ¶2.  As the 
court of appeals examined the concerns of the parties before it, 
the court noted that Wis. Stat. § 81.38 is a "cost-sharing 
scheme" in which both county and town participate.  Id., ¶3.  In 
concluding that Outagamie County must pay the Town of Grand 
Chute, the court of appeals observed the purpose of § 81.38 as 
follows:  "Most importantly, however, we conclude that the goal 
of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 is to have counties absorb half the cost 
of constructing or repairing bridges."  Id., ¶18.   
¶63 The 
lead 
opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38 contravenes the legislative purpose of cost-sharing that 
underlies § 81.38 because it permits the County to avoid its 
statutory 
obligation 
to 
contribute 
to 
the 
Town 
for 
the 
construction of the bridge.  Id., ¶3.  Statutory interpretation 
that contravenes the legislative purpose underlying the statute 
is not favored.  GTE, 176 Wis. 2d at 566; Brown v. Thomas, 127 
Wis. 2d 318, 323, 379 N.W.2d 868 (Ct. App. 1985).  The lead 
opinion identifies no reason, nor could this writer identify a 
reason, why the legislature would establish a cost-sharing 
scheme for bridge construction and maintenance when the highway 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
10 
 
is constructed first, but then nullify the same cost-sharing 
when the bridge is constructed first.   
¶64 And query, now that the bridge has been constructed 
and has joined Ski Lane and the West Beltline Highway frontage 
road, under the lead opinion's reasoning, has Dane County no 
statutory obligation to assist the Town in maintaining the 
bridge?  Surely the lead opinion would not question that the 
County does have a statutory maintenance obligation for this 
bridge.   
¶65 Whether the bridge is constructed first or whether the 
highway is constructed first, in either case, the bridge becomes 
part of a contiguous highway within the Town and the County.  
The plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature 
requires Dane County to contribute its statutory share of the 
cost the Town of Madison incurred in constructing the bridge 
that connected West Beltline Highway frontage road to Ski Lane, 
thereby creating a contiguous highway, which highway continues 
to be maintainable by the Town. 
No.  2006AP2554.pdr 
 
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C. 
The Lead Opinion's Secondary Rationale 
¶66 As a secondary rational, the lead opinion concludes 
that, in addition to the bridge not being connected physically 
to an existing highway from the moment of its construction, the 
Town's petition was properly denied because the Town did not 
request funding to extend the highway to the bridge.13  The lead 
opinion's rationale for this conclusion escapes me.   
¶67 Is the lead opinion really saying that if the Town had 
asked for more money than it did, its request for bridge funding 
would have been granted?  That appears to be the case because 
the lead opinion faults the Town for not applying for funding to 
extend the highway to the constructed bridge.14  However, the 
Town's counsel acted prudently by not seeking such funding.  I 
note that the gap between where the bridge was to be constructed 
and the then existing highway was 200 feet.15  The statute 
provides for cost-sharing for only a 100-foot highway extension.  
Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2).  Accordingly, the Town recognized that it 
was statutorily ineligible to receive funding to extend the 
highway all the way to the bridge.16  
                                                 
13 Lead op., ¶¶38 & n.20, 40. 
14 Id. 
15 Id., ¶7. 
16 Nevertheless, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
suggests 
otherwise, 
eschewing cogent reasoning for opportunities to make fey 
references to James Brown by stating that the "Town failed to 
request funding in its petition that would bridge the gap 
between the bridge and the highway, and . . . ensure that 
funding was allocated to help 'take it to the bridge.'"  Id., 
¶38 (emphasis added). 
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¶68 It is telling that the lead opinion characterizes the 
funding for the highway extension as funding to "help" connect 
the bridge to a highway maintainable by the Town.17  With a 200-
foot gap between the bridge and the highway, County funding 
would not have caused the highway to reach all the way to where 
the bridge was to be built.  The lead opinion's suggestion would 
leave the Town with a 100-foot gap between the yet-to-be-
constructed bridge and the highway.18  The lead opinion's 
reasoning 
in 
this 
regard 
underscores 
that, 
despite 
its 
protestations to the contrary, it considers the word "on" within 
Wis. Stat. § 81.38 to be dispositive of this case.  That is, 
under the lead opinion's interpretation of § 81.38, the bridge 
must be constructed after the highway is complete so the bridge 
can physically touch the highway immediately upon the bridge's 
construction.  The lead opinion's statutory interpretation 
defeats the cost-sharing mandate of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) and 
therefore it cannot be the correct interpretation of the 
statute. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶69 The phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the 
town," 
identifies 
a 
type 
of 
bridge 
by 
describing 
the 
relationship of the bridge to the highway of which it is, or 
will become, a part.  The type of bridge that is "on a highway 
maintainable by the town" is distinguished from many other types 
of bridges referenced in the statutes that also are located on 
                                                 
17 Id., ¶¶4, 38, 41-42. 
18 Id., ¶¶38 & n.20, 40. 
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highways, but which highways are maintained by governmental 
entities other than a town, such as the state or another 
municipality.  The phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by 
the town," has nothing to do with whether the bridge was 
constructed before or after the highway was constructed.  
Rather, if the bridge is of the type identified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 81.38(1), the town may apply to the county of which the town 
is a part for assistance in maintaining or constructing such a 
bridge.  If the county has not opted out of § 81.38(2), the 
county must pay its statutory share of the costs incurred.   
¶70 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals, and I dissent from the lead opinion.  
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this dissent. 
 
 
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