Title: Pavlick v. Pavlick
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 962474
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
1 Hassell, Keenan, 
and Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
SHARI G. PAVLICK, ADM'X, ETC.  
                                          OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 962474 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO  
                             September 12, 1997 
THOMAS MATTHEW PAVLICK, JR. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 
 
John M. Folkes, Judge 
 
 
The question for decision in this appeal is whether the 
doctrine of intra-family immunity bars recovery of damages for 
the death of an unemancipated child as a result of a parent's 
negligent or intentional act.  The question stems from a motion 
for judgment filed by Shari G. Pavlick, Administratrix of the 
Estate of Justin Robert Pavlick, deceased, against the defendant, 
Thomas Matthew Pavlick, Jr., seeking damages for the wrongful 
death of the deceased, the infant son of Shari Pavlick and the 
defendant. 
 
The defendant filed a plea to the motion for judgment 
asserting that he was "immune from suit under the doctrine of 
intra-family immunity."  The trial court sustained the plea and 
dismissed the plaintiff's motion for judgment.  We awarded the 
plaintiff an appeal. 
 
Justin was born June 24, 1994.  He died August 18, 1994, 
when less than two months old, allegedly from injuries sustained 
while in the care and custody of the defendant.  In her two-count 
motion for judgment, the plaintiff alleged that Justin died as a 
                     
    
1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on July 1, 1997. 
result of the defendant's negligence or, alternatively, that the 
death resulted from the defendant's intentional act.
2
 
In sustaining the plea of immunity, the trial judge noted 
that there is no Virginia precedent "supporting a denial of the 
plea."  The plaintiff responds on appeal with a request that we 
abrogate the rule of intra-family immunity completely or, 
alternatively, that we recognize an exception to the rule 
allowing recovery for the death of a child resulting from the 
intentional act of a parent. 
 
Citing numerous out-of-state cases, the plaintiff says that 
"[c]ourts in the majority of states which have considered the 
matter in recent years have found that the doctrine of intra-
family immunity can not be justified and have abolished parental 
tort immunity."
3  In abolishing parental immunity, the plaintiff 
states, courts have rejected the several factors that prompted 
adoption of intra-family immunity in the first place, viz., "(1) 
the wish for domestic peace and tranquility; (2) the desire to 
                     
     
2The defendant states on brief that he has been convicted of 
second-degree murder as a result of Justin's death and is serving 
time in the penitentiary. 
     
3Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. 
Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 
648 (Cal. 1971); Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971);  Anderson v. 
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Silesky v. Kelman, 161 
N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1968); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 
1991);  Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966); France v. 
A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970); Guess v. Gulf 
Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981);  Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 
N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 
1967);  Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984); Winn v. 
Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 
(Pa. 1971); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963). 
allow the parent to discipline and control the child; (3) the 
wish not to allow family resources to be depleted; [and] (4) the 
wish to avoid possible fraud or collusion."  Quoting Kirchner v. 
Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984), the plaintiff asserts that 
"these rationalizations [are] outdated, highly questionable and 
unpersuasive."  Id. at 276. 
 
With respect to injuries caused by the intentional acts of a 
parent, the plaintiff says that "[v]irtually every reported case 
that has considered [the issue] has held that the bar of intra-
family immunity should not apply to such [acts]."
4  In so 
holding, the plaintiff states, courts "have recognized that to 
permit a child to maintain a suit against a parent [for injuries] 
resulting from an intentional or willful tort is no more 
disruptive to the family peace and tranquility than depriving the 
child of the right to bring such a suit." 
 
The defendant argues, on the other hand, that "[t]he 
doctrine of intra-family/parental immunity is alive and well in 
Virginia."  There are no cases in Virginia, the defendant states, 
"which allow suit by a deceased unemancipated child's estate 
against [a] living parent [for the parent's allegedly negligent 
                     
     
4Brunner v. Hutchinson Div., Lear-Siegler, Inc., 770 F.Supp. 
517 (D.S.D. 1991); Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264 (Ala. 1989); 
Attwood v. Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982); Emery v. Emery, 
289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 
1385 (Colo. 1990); Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct.App. 
1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956); Barnes v. 
Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992); Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 
(Md. 1951); Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992); Cowgill v. 
Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. 
Util., 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 
418 (W.Va. 1991). 
or intentional acts,] given the instant circumstances."  The 
defendant asserts that while there are several exceptions to the 
doctrine in Virginia, none is applicable here. 
 
The considerations prompting the initial adoption of intra-
family immunity are still viable, the defendant maintains, 
especially when, as here, the family includes another child of 
the parents' marriage.  The defendant submits that "[t]o allow 
one child's cause of action to take assets of the family required 
to support the entire family unit is certainly cause for 
disharmony in the family unit, even where the parent responsible 
for the egregious conduct is no longer an integral part of that 
unit." 
 
Quoting from Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891),
5 
the defendant maintains that "[t]he state, through its criminal 
laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence 
and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to 
demand."  Id. at 887.  This is sufficient reason, the defendant 
submits, to forbid a minor child from asserting a civil claim to 
redress personal injuries suffered at the hands of a parent.  
Other courts have followed this rationale, the defendant states, 
"and to this date the majority of states have not completely 
abrogated the [intra-family immunity] Rule."
6  
                     
     
5In the official Mississippi reporter, 68 Miss. 703, the 
case is styled Hewlett v. George. 
     
6In Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906, 912 (Miss. 1992), 
Hewellette was overruled but only with respect to injuries 
suffered by a child in an automobile accident resulting from the 
negligence of a parent. 
 
Finally, the defendant asserts that there is a strong public 
policy in Virginia against the complete abrogation of the rule.  
Accordingly, the defendant concludes, we should refrain from 
abrogating the rule in the interest of maintaining "parental 
discipline and control and family harmony."  
 
This Court first considered the doctrine of intra-family 
immunity in Norfolk Southern R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 
S.E. 841 (1934).  There, Gretakis's infant daughter was injured 
as the result of the concurring negligence of her father and a 
railroad company.  The daughter recovered judgment against the 
railroad company, and the latter sought contribution from the 
father, who demurred on the ground that "an infant daughter 
cannot sue her parent and there can be no contribution."  Id. at 
599, 174 S.E. at 842.  The trial court sustained the demurrer.  
We affirmed, stating that "[a]ccording to the great weight of 
authority an unemancipated minor child cannot sue his or her 
parent to recover for personal injuries resulting from an 
ordinary act of negligence."  Id. at 600, 174 S.E. at 842. 
 
We soon recognized an exception to the intra-family immunity 
rule.  In Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939), a 
father owned and operated a bus company as a common carrier, and 
his daughter was injured while a passenger on one of his buses.  
She recovered a judgment against him for her injuries, and he 
sought reversal in this Court on the ground that the daughter, 
"being an unemancipated minor, could not recover against her 
father."  Id. at 15, 4 S.E.2d at 344.  We affirmed, holding that 
the doctrine of intra-family immunity did not bar the daughter's 
recovery because "the action was brought against the father, in 
his vocational capacity, as a common carrier, not against the 
father for the violation of a moral or parental obligation, in 
the exercise of his parental authority."  Id. at 27, 4 S.E.2d at 
349. 
 
We next considered the intra-family immunity rule in 
Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953), 
involving an action brought by an infant against her father for 
injuries allegedly resulting from his gross negligence.  We noted 
that "[i]t is well settled . . . that an emancipated infant may 
maintain a tort action against a parent."  Id. at 580, 74 S.E.2d 
at 173.  We held, however, that because the infant in Brumfield 
was unemancipated, she was precluded from maintaining the action 
against her father under the rule announced in Gretakis, supra.  
We said in Brumfield it made no difference in that gross 
negligence was alleged as the basis for recovery.  194 Va. at 
583, 74 S.E.2d at 174. 
 
Later, in Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 
(1971), this Court abrogated the intra-family immunity rule with 
respect to "an action by [a] child against [a] parent to recover 
for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident."  Id. at 186, 
183 S.E.2d at 194.  The rationale for our decision was that 
"[t]he very high incidence of liability insurance covering 
Virginia-based motor vehicles . . . has made our rule of parental 
immunity anachronistic when applied to automobile accident 
litigation [and] the rule can be no longer supported as generally 
calculated to promote the peace and tranquility of the home and 
the advantageous disposal of the parents' exchequer."  Id. at 
185, 183 S.E.2d at 194. 
 
Finally, in Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 
(1972), we considered the question whether an unemancipated child 
could maintain an action for the simple negligence of her father 
in failing to provide a safe place for her to play in the yard of 
the family home.  We answered the question in the negative 
because the injury was not "sustained in [a] motor vehicle 
accident[]" and "the alleged negligence was incident to the 
parental relationship of the father with his unemancipated child, 
and not to a business or vocational relationship."  Id. at 179, 
191 S.E.2d at 225. 
 
This examination of our prior decisions on the rule of 
intra-family immunity establishes two propositions.  First, the 
rule is "alive and well in Virginia," as the defendant maintains, 
at least to the extent it still bars recovery by an unemancipated 
child against a parent for negligence in a non-automobile or non-
business related situation.  See Gretakis, Brumfield, and Wright. 
 Second, as the plaintiff observes on brief, "[n]o Virginia case 
has ever held that the bar of intra-family immunity applies to 
intentional, wilful, or malicious torts." 
 
This brings us to the question whether we should abrogate 
the rule of intra-family immunity completely, as the plaintiff 
requests, refuse to alter the rule in any way, as the defendant 
urges, or recognize an exception to the rule to allow recovery 
for injuries to an unemancipated child resulting from the 
intentional act of a parent, as the plaintiff asks alternatively. 
 
In order to abrogate the rule completely, we would be 
required to overrule Gretakis, Brumfield, and Wright.  Yet, those 
decisions were accepted as correct when made, they have been 
relied upon since by the bench, the bar, and the public, and 
nothing has occurred, such as the advent of "[t]he very high 
incidence of liability insurance covering Virginia-based motor 
vehicles," noted in Smith, 212 Va. at 185, 183 S.E.2d at 194, to 
make the rule "anachronistic" when applied to non-automobile, 
non-business litigation.  Id.
 
Furthermore, we are not satisfied that the considerations 
which prompted the adoption of the intra-family immunity rule in 
the first place have become "outdated, highly questionable and 
unpersuasive"
7 in all instances.  When applied in negligence 
cases similar to Gretakis, Brumfield, and Wright, the rule may 
still work to maintain peace and tranquility within the family 
unit.   
 
The "doctrine of stare decisis is more than a mere cliche" 
in Virginia; it "plays a significant role in the orderly 
administration of justice by assuring consistent, predictable, 
and balanced application of legal principles."  Selected Risks 
Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987).  
Giving the doctrine full effect, we decline to overrule Gretakis, 
Brumfield, and Wright, and we deny the plaintiff's request to 
abrogate the rule of intra-family immunity completely. 
 
We are not inclined, however, to respond favorably to the 
                     
     
7Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 276 (Ohio 1984). 
defendant's urging that we refuse to alter the rule in any way.  
Rather, we think the proper course is to recognize an exception 
to the rule of intra-family immunity when, as alleged here, a 
child's death results from the intentional act of a parent. 
 
As noted supra, no Virginia case has ever applied the rule 
of intra-family immunity to an intentional tort committed by a 
parent against a child.  Therefore, to recognize an exception 
with respect to an intentional tort by a parent resulting in the 
death of a child would neither disturb established precedent nor 
offend principles of stare decisis. 
 
Furthermore, such an exception would be supported by logic 
and common sense.  The factors which prompted adoption of intra-
family immunity in the first place are totally irrelevant when 
considered in the context of the death of a child caused by the 
intentional act of a parent.  Indeed, such an act defeats the 
very purpose of the immunity rule.  Paraphrasing the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of Oregon in Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 
(Or. 1950), it is absurd to talk about maintaining the peace and 
tranquility of the home when it has already been disrupted by 
such a monstrous crime as the murder of a child by a parent.  Id. 
at 450.  Or, paraphrasing the opinion of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951), there can be 
no basis for the contention that a suit against a father for the 
murder of his child would be contrary to public policy, for the 
simple reason that there is no home at all in which discipline 
and tranquility are to be preserved.  Id. at 926.   
 
Finally, we do not overlook the defendant's argument based 
upon Hewellette v. George, supra, that "[t]he state, through its 
criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental 
violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard 
to demand."  However, while enforcement of the criminal laws may 
serve the public interest in protecting children from parental 
violence, such enforcement does not serve to redress the loss 
suffered by the survivors of a child whose death results from the 
intentional act of a parent.  They have the right to demand more. 
 Furthermore, to allow recovery against the parent here may also 
serve as a deterrent against similar conduct by other parents. 
 
For these reasons, we refuse to abrogate the rule of intra-
family immunity completely.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
trial court's judgment to the extent it sustained the plea of 
intra-family immunity with respect to the defendant's alleged 
negligence.  However, we will reverse the judgment to the extent 
it failed to recognize an exception to the rule of intra-family 
immunity that would have allowed recovery against the defendant 
for the death of his unemancipated child as a result of his 
allegedly intentional act, and we will remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this 
opinion. 
 
Affirmed in part,
                                                reversed in part,
                                                and remanded.