Title: In re Diaz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 108169
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2012

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 108,169 
 
In the Matter of MATTHEW M. DIAZ, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed November 21, 2012. Disbarment. 
 
Alexander M. Walczak, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the 
formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Jack Focht, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Matthew M. Diaz, 
respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Matthew M. Diaz, of Forest Hills, 
New York, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1995. 
 
 
On October 20, 2010, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on November 8, 2010. A hearing was 
held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on 
October 19, 2011, where the respondent was personally present and represented by 
counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.6(a) (2011 Kan. 
Ct. R. Annot. 480) (confidentiality) and 8.4(b) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 618) 
(commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer). 
 
2 
 
The panel made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, together 
with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
. . . . 
 
"22. 
In December, 1994, the Respondent received a commission from the 
United States Navy to serve as a judge advocate. The Respondent was admitted to the 
practice of law in the State of Kansas on April 28, 1995. [Footnote:  The Respondent's 
license to practice law in the State of Kansas has been temporarily suspended, due to his 
convictions, for more than three years.] 
 
"23. 
In July, 2004, the Respondent, a deputy staff judge advocate, was 
assigned to the Joint Task Force in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Respondent remained at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until January 15, 2005. 
 
"24. 
On June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Rasul v. Bush, 541 U.S. 466 (2004). In that case, the United State Supreme Court held 
that the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, entitled the Guantanamo Bay detainees 
to challenge the validity of their detention. [541 U.S.] at 483. The Respondent read Rasul 
on his way to Cuba. 
 
"25. 
On December 17, 2004, Barbara Olshansky, the Deputy Legal Director 
for the Center of Constitutional Rights sent a letter to the Honorable Gordon R. England, 
the Secretary of the Navy. The Respondent and his immediate supervisor, Lt. Colonel 
Randall Keys were sent copies of the letter. 
 
"26. 
In her letter, Ms. Olshansky stated: 
 
'As you know, the United States presently acknowledges 
detaining approximately 550 individuals at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base, Cuba. Approximately 63 of those individuals have filed habeas 
corpus petitions with the D.C. district court. We intend to take any legal 
3 
 
action necessary, including filing habeas petitions on behalf of the 
remaining detainees, in order to ensure that every detainee at 
Guantanamo has the opportunity to avail themselves of the decision in 
Rasul. 
 
'Accordingly, we are writing to request that you provide us with 
the names and other identifying information about each person held at 
Guantanamo who[se] identity has not yet been made known and who has 
not yet filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ("unidentified 
detainee" or "detainee").' 
 
"27. 
After Ms. Olshansky's letter was received, the Respondent understood 
that the government's response was to not release the requested information. 
 
"28. 
The Respondent had strong feelings about a prisoner's right to habeas 
corpus proceedings. When the Respondent was sixteen years old, his father, a nurse, was 
arrested and charged with 12 counts of murder for injecting patients with a lethal dose of 
Lidocaine. Later, the Respondent's father was convicted and sentenced to death. The 
Respondent's father's death sentence was not carried out because of a pending habeas 
corpus action. In fact, the Respondent's father's habeas corpus proceeding remained 
pending until he died in prison of natural causes in August, 2010. 
 
"29. 
For a period of three weeks, the Respondent contemplated what he could 
do to comply with the law and follow his orders. 
 
"30. 
During that time, the Respondent failed to seek or obtain guidance 
regarding his conflict between his ethical duties and military duties. Pursuant to § 13, 
Rule 1.13 of JAG Instruction 5803.1C, the Respondent could have sought and obtained 
guidance, but did not. Additionally, the Respondent failed to seek or obtain a formal 
ethics opinion pursuant to § 10(b) of JAG Instruction 5803.1C. The Respondent also 
failed to seek or obtain an informal ethics opinion pursuant to § 12(a) of JAG Instruction 
5803.1C. Further, at his court-martial, the Respondent testified that he could have gone to 
Lt. Col. Keys, General Hood, the Chief of Staff, the Inspector General, or a 
Congressperson regarding this issue. Moreover, at the hearing on this matter, the 
4 
 
Respondent testified that he could have gone to Admiral Gouder or Admiral Hudson for 
guidance. Finally, the Respondent testified that he could have contacted the Disciplinary 
Administrator for guidance. 
 
"31. 
From December 23, 2004, through January 4, 2005, Lt. Col. Keys was on 
Christmas leave and away from the office. 
 
"32. 
During the evening hours on January 2, 2005, the Respondent returned to 
the staff judge advocate office and printed a list of detainees from the Joint Defense 
Information Management System from the secret computer. The list that the Respondent 
printed contained each detainee's full name, their internment serial number, their country 
of origin, their country of citizenship, and other identifying information including 
ethnicity, source identification number, and information regarding the detention or 
interrogation team assigned to each detainee. The list contained classified information. 
 
"33. 
While contemplating what to do with the list, the Respondent maintained 
the list in a safe in the staff judge advocate's office. 
 
"34. 
The Respondent purchased a large Valentine's Day card. The Respondent 
cut the list into strips and placed the strips into the card. The Respondent did not sign the 
card. The only return address listed was 'GTMO.' On January 14, 2005, the Respondent 
sent the card to Ms. Olshansky. Ms. Olshansky did not have a security clearance and was 
not authorized by the government to access detainee information. 
 
"35. 
The Respondent knew that if he had the list in his belongings it would be 
found when he was leaving the island because his belongings were subject to search. 
 
"36. 
When Ms. Olshansky received the list, she believed that it might be a 
hoax or a practical joke. She immediately contacted the federal judge handling the 
detainee litigation. The judge requested that the list be secured from Ms. Olshansky. An 
agent came to Ms. Olshansky's office, secured the list, and provided it to the judge. The 
judge realized that it was an actual list of detainees and should not have been released to 
Ms. Olshansky in that fashion. Thereafter, an investigation ensued. 
 
5 
 
"37. 
On March 3, 2006, the Respondent was interrogated and fingerprinted. 
Additionally, at that time, the Respondent provided writing samples. 
 
"38. 
In August, 2006, the Respondent was charged in a three count complaint. 
The first charge alleged that the Respondent violated a lawful general regulation by 
wrongfully mailing classified secret information. The second charge alleged that the 
Respondent wrongfully and dishonorably transmitted classified documents to an 
unauthorized individual. The third charge alleged three different specifications, (1) that 
the Respondent made a print out of classified secret information with the intent to use the 
information to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, (2) 
that the Respondent knowingly and willfully communicated classified secret information 
relative to national defense to a person not entitled to receive the information that could 
be used to injure the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, and (3) that the 
Respondent knowingly removed materials containing classified information without 
authority and with the intention to retain such materials at an unauthorized location. 
 
"39. 
On May 17, 2007, a court-martial consisting of senior officers convicted 
the Respondent of the crime of [1] violating a lawful general regulation by wrongfully 
mailing classified secret information, [2] wrongfully and dishonorably transmitting 
classified documents to an unauthorized individual, [3] knowingly and willfully 
communicating classified secret information relative to national defense to a person not 
entitled to receive the information that could be used to injure the United States or to the 
advantage of a foreign nation, and [4] knowingly removing materials containing 
classified information without authority and with the intention to retain such materials at 
an unauthorized location. 
 
"40. 
The court-martial acquitted the Respondent of the most serious charge 
which was printing out the information with the specific intent to harm national security 
or to provide an advantage to a foreign government. 
 
"41. 
On May 18, 2007, the Respondent was dismissed from the Navy and 
sentenced to serve six months confinement. The Respondent served six months' 
confinement in 2007. 
 
6 
 
"42. 
On August 8, 2007, counsel for the Respondent reported the 
Respondent's convictions to the Disciplinary Administrator. 
 
"43. 
On August 31, 2007, the Respondent submitted a clemency request. 
After reviewing the matters submitted in clemency, the Convening Authority approved 
the sentence. 
 
"44. 
On September 17, 2007, Captain H.H. Dronberger wrote to the 
Disciplinary Administrator regarding the Respondent. In the letter, Captain Dronberger 
stated: 
 
'The Judge Advocate General permanently revoked Lieutenant 
Commander Diaz' certification under Article 27(b) of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 827(b), thereby disqualifying him from 
representing members of the Naval Service before any forum in the 
Department of the Navy. The Judge Advocate General also revoked 
Lieutenant Commander Diaz' authority to provide legal assistance and 
prohibited him from providing any other legal services or advice in any 
matter under the cognizance and supervision of the Judge Advocate 
General. 
 
'The Judge Advocate General found that Lieutenant Commander 
Diaz violated the "Rules of Professional Conduct of Attorneys Practicing 
Under the Cognizance and Supervision of the Judge Advocate General" 
by: 
 
a. committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on Lieutenant 
Commander Diaz' honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as an attorney in 
other respects, and 
 
b. revealing confidential information relating to representation of 
his client without his client's consent.' 
 
7 
 
"45. 
On February 19, 2009, the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of 
Criminal Appeals upheld the Respondent's convictions and sentence. In so doing, the 
Court stated: 
 
'The appellant's argument that taking action for arguably pure 
and good motives excused his knowing violation of the law is 
nonsensical and dangerous. The Government, quoting an opinion by 
Justice Stevens and when he was serving in the 7th Circuit, succinctly 
summarized the flaw in the appellant's logic. Justice Stevens observed 
that "[o]ne who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own 
hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to 
determine policy is superior to democratic decision making. . . . [a]n 
unselfish motive affords no assurance that a crime will produce the result 
its perpetrator intends.' 
 
"46. 
Thereafter, on July 15, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces considered the Respondent's appeal. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces affirmed the lower court, concluding that 'any error on the part of 
the military judge to assess and ultimately admit [the Respondent]'s proffer of motive 
evidence . . . was harmless.' 
 
 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
"47. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the decision of the Judge Advocate 
General, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202, the Hearing Panel concludes as a matter of law that 
the Respondent violated KRPC 1.6(a) and KRPC 8.4(b), as detailed below. 
 
"48. 
KRPC 1.6(a) provides: 
 
'A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation 
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).' 
 
8 
 
The Respondent revealed confidential client information without authorization. If the 
Respondent disagreed with the actions taken by his client, the Navy, then the Respondent 
was duty bound to so inform those with decision making power within the Navy. The 
Hearing Panel believes that the Respondent could not publicly announce his 
disagreement, or his reasons therefor, as such a public disavowment would harm the 
interests of his client. The actions taken by the Respondent to disclose the confidential 
information being protected by his client violated his fiduciary responsibility to that 
client. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent breached the trust 
of his client and violated KRPC 1.6(a). 
 
"49. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.' KRPC 8.4(b). In this case, the Respondent committed four crimes. The 
Respondent violated a lawful general regulation by wrongfully mailing classified secret 
information. The Respondent wrongfully and dishonorably transmitted classified 
documents to an unauthorized individual. The Respondent knowingly and willfully 
communicated classified secret information relative to national defense to a person not 
entitled to receive the information that could be used to injure the United States or to the 
advantage of a foreign nation. And, the Respondent knowingly removed materials 
containing classified information without authority and with the intention to retain such 
materials at an unauthorized location. The crimes which the Respondent was convicted of 
adversely reflect on the Respondent's trustworthiness. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel 
concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.4(b). 
 
 
"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
 
"STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 
 
"50. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
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"51. 
Duty Violated.  The Respondent violated his duty to the public to 
maintain his personal integrity. 
 
"52. 
Mental State.  The Respondent knowingly violated his duty. 
 
"53. 
Injury.  As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent 
caused potential serious injury to the public. 
 
"54. 
Aggravating or Mitigating Factors.  Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factor present: 
 
"55. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the Respondent to practice law in the state of Kansas in 1995. At the time 
of the misconduct, the Respondent has been practicing law for approximately 10 years. 
 
"56. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
"57. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record.  The Respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
"58. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions.  The Respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. 
Additionally, the Respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the violations. 
 
"59. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 
Reputation of the Attorney.  The Respondent enjoys the respect of his peers and generally 
10 
 
possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several affidavits received by 
the Hearing Panel. 
 
"60. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.22 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly reveals information relating to the 
representation of a client not otherwise lawfully 
permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes 
injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a 
necessary element of which includes intentional 
interference with the administration of justice, 
false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; . . .  
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in any other intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that serious adversely reflects 
on the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
 
'5.22 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an 
official or governmental position knowingly fails to 
follow proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal 
process.' 
 
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"RECOMMENDATION 
 
"61. 
The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that, based upon the 
Respondent's convictions, the conclusions of the Judge Advocate General, and the 
conclusions of the military courts, the Respondent be disbarred. Counsel for the 
Respondent argued that the Respondent has been disciplined enough and that no further 
discipline should be imposed. 
 
"62. 
The act of printing and sending classified and confidential information to 
an unauthorized person warrants significant discipline. The furtive nature of the 
Respondent's actions aggravate the malfeasance. Not only did the Respondent print the 
list which contained classified information from the secret computer, he also cut the list 
into pieces and placed the pieces into a Valentine's Day card so that the package appeared 
innocuous. Further, the Respondent's timing aggravates his conduct. The Respondent 
mailed the card the day before he left the island so as to reduce his chance of facing 
consequences for his actions. 
 
"63. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces also noted the 
Respondent's method of disclosure: 
 
'. . . [The Respondent] copied classified material and sent it to a person 
not authorized to receive it. The clandestine method of disclosure—by 
sending it through the postal system cut up in a Valentine's Day card—
suggests that [the Respondent] knew at the time his actions warranted 
concealment. His failure to adhere to presidential directives and 
departmental regulations, including those regarding classified 
information and for addressing differences of legal views within the 
Department, demonstrates that [the Respondent] was not legally 
permitted to disregard the classified nature of the protected information.' 
 
"64. 
Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, the 
conclusions of the Judge Advocate General, the conclusions of the military courts, and 
the Standards listed above, the Hearing Panel unanimously recommends that the 
Respondent be suspended for a period of three years. The Hearing Panel further 
12 
 
recommends that the suspension be made retroactive to the date of his temporary 
suspension. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel recommends that the Respondent be 
immediately reinstated to the practice of law. 
 
"6[5]. Costs are assessed against the Respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
hearing panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, the discipline to be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 
375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 334). Clear and 
convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of 
the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). When the court 
assesses the existence of clear and convincing evidence, it refrains from weighing 
conflicting evidence, assessing witness credibility, or redetermining questions of fact. See 
In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 699, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer, and adequate notice of both the hearing before the panel and the hearing 
before this court. He filed no exceptions to the panel's final hearing report. The panel's 
findings of fact are thus deemed admitted, and we adopt them. See Supreme Court Rule 
212(c), (d) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 352). 
 
The evidence before the hearing panel establishes the charged misconduct of the 
respondent by clear and convincing evidence and supports the panel's conclusions of law. 
We therefore also adopt the panel's conclusions. 
13 
 
 
The only remaining issue is the appropriate discipline to be imposed. We have 
held that "[t]he panel's recommendation is advisory only and shall not prevent the court 
from imposing a different discipline." In re Harding, 290 Kan. 81, 90, 223 P.3d 303 
(2010); Supreme Court Rule 212(f). At the hearing before this court, at which the 
respondent appeared, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the 
respondent be disbarred. The respondent requested that no discipline be imposed beyond 
that assessed by the military courts. As referenced above, the hearing panel recommended 
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 3 years and that the suspension 
be made retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. 
 
We begin our analysis by recognizing that in apparent support of respondent's 
position that the military courts have sufficiently disciplined him, he repeats an argument 
he made before those tribunals. Respondent essentially argues that while his actions were 
wrong his motive was virtuous. In short, he disclosed the information to protect the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees' habeas corpus rights declared in the United States Supreme 
Court opinion of Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 124 S. Ct. 2886, 159 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004). 
During the general court-martial proceedings, that tribunal excluded respondent's motive 
evidence showing his purported honorable intent in disclosing the classified information. 
As noted by the hearing panel, the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals affirmed, finding his motive argument "nonsensical and dangerous." United 
States v. Diaz, No. 200700970, 2009 WL 690614, at *5 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) 
(unpublished opinion). 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found that while the 
motive evidence might be relevant to respondent's charge of conduct unbecoming an 
officer, its exclusion was harmless error. It observed that supporting a harmlessness 
determination was respondent's knowledge that his "actions warranted concealment." 
United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, 137, 59 A.L.R. Fed.2d 701 (2010). An additional 
14 
 
consideration supporting a harmlessness determination was the "absence in Rasul of any 
indication the Supreme Court intended its ruling to supersede in some manner counsel's 
other legal and ethical obligations," including his obligation to adhere to presidential and 
naval directives regarding the handling of classified information. 69 M.J. at 137. 
 
According to the record before us, respondent was asked during his general court-
martial proceedings why he chose to disclose the classified information surreptitiously. 
He replied, "Selfish reasons, I was more concerned with self-preservation, I didn't want to 
get–make any waves and jeopardize my career." When asked why he did not share with 
his superior officers his concerns about the Navy's then-refusal to release the information 
to Ms. Olshansky, Diaz replied, "I was worried about the effect it would have on me. . . . 
I wasn't really to put—willing to put my neck on the line and jeopardize my career at the 
time. . . . [So], I did it anonymously." On this latter point, the hearing panel held that "[I]f 
the Respondent disagreed with the actions taken by his client, the Navy, then the 
Respondent was duty bound to so inform those with decision making power within the 
Navy." The panel did not cite a KRPC provision in support of its holding. But subsection 
(b) of KRPC 1.13 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 513), which sets out the rules for an attorney 
whose client is an organization, contains supportive language. It states: 
 
"If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person 
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a 
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the 
organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer 
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In 
determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of 
the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, 
the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, 
the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant 
considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the 
15 
 
organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to 
persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others: 
 
(1) 
asking for reconsideration of the matter; 
 
(2) 
advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for 
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and 
 
(3) 
referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral 
to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization 
as determined by applicable law." (Emphasis added.) 2011 Kan. 
Ct. R. Annot. 513-14. 
 
We continue our discipline analysis by referring to the ABA Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. As the hearing panel pointed out, suspension is generally 
appropriate when, as here, "a lawyer knowingly reveals information relating to the 
representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this 
disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client." ABA Standards, Section 4.22. 
And as the panel further pointed out, suspension is also generally appropriate when, as 
here, "a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly fails to follow proper 
procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of 
the legal process." ABA Standards, Section 5.22. But here, we have much more. 
 
Under ABA Standards, Section 5.11, disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
"(a)  a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft . . . .; or 
 
16 
 
 
"(b)  a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness 
to practice.'" 
 
Respondent's intentional actions—resulting in four felony convictions, 6 months' 
actual confinement, and dismissal from the naval service—undeniably qualify as serious 
criminal conduct under Section 5.11. And some of his criminal acts easily meet several of 
the specific "necessary element[s]" for disbarment, e.g., theft—of his country's classified 
information. 
 
As the hearing panel additionally noted in its quotation from the United States 
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals that reviewed respondent's general court-
martial, "'One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own hands thereby 
demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to determine policy is superior to 
democratic decision making.'" Diaz, 2009 WL 690614, at *5 (quoting United States v. 
Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 392 [7th Cir. 1971]). Accordingly, respondent's reviewing court 
later concluded that he "negatively impacted public trust in the fidelity of our military 
personnel but, more fundamentally, the appellant's conduct strikes directly at core 
democratic processes." (Emphasis added.) Diaz, 2009 WL 690614, at *6. We agree. 
 
On this general issue of harm, the hearing panel acknowledged that in determining 
the appropriate level of respondent's discipline, the ABA Standards call for considering 
as a factor "the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct." It correctly 
concluded that the respondent's misconduct "caused potential serious injury to the 
public." We independently observe that the particular information respondent disclosed 
about which detention or interrogation team was assigned to each detainee was labeled as 
classified. Diaz, 69 M.J at 133. That court concluded that if publicly disclosed, this and 
other information such as the detainee internment serial numbers and the source 
identification numbers also could "be used to the injury of the United States." 69 M.J. at 
17 
 
133. In addition to potential injury to the public and the United States, we also recognize 
the possibility of serious injury to particular persons. Simply put, the disclosure of the 
classified information about which team was assigned to each detainee could increase the 
chances of their individual members being publicly identified. Given the nature of their 
work, such identification could put them at personal risk by any Guantanamo Bay 
detainee's supporters around the world. 
 
Based upon the number and nature of respondent's violations and criminal 
convictions, the conclusions of the military courts, the decision of the Judge Advocate 
General permanently revoking respondent's certification as a lawyer in the naval service, 
respondent's admitted selfish reasons for the clandestine disclosure of classified 
information, and the standards listed above, we conclude disbarment is the appropriate 
sanction. A minority of this court would impose the lesser sanction of indefinite 
suspension. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that MATTHEW M. DIAZ be disbarred from the practice 
of law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with 
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 280). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 379). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas reports. 
 
BEIER, J., not participating. 
 
DAVID E. BRUNS, J., assigned.1 
18 
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Bruns, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed to 
hear case No. 108,169 vice Justice Beier pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court by K.S.A. 20-3002(c).