Title: The Florida Bar re: Norwood Sherman Wilner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC2022-1055
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2024

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-1055 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR RE: NORWOOD SHERMAN WILNER. 
 
March 14, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that 
Norwood Sherman Wilner be reinstated to the practice of law from 
his 91-day suspension.1  The Bar challenges the referee’s 
recommendation, arguing that Wilner failed to establish 
rehabilitation under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.10(f)(3) 
because he did not strictly comply with rule 3-6.1 as directed by 
this Court’s disciplinary order.  The Bar claims Wilner was not 
actively supervised as required by rule 3-6.1(f) in his post-
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.; see also 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10 (Reinstatement and Readmission 
Procedures). 
 
- 2 - 
suspension employment at a law firm.  We agree and deny Wilner’s 
petition for reinstatement.2 
BACKGROUND 
In March 2022, the Court suspended Wilner for 91 days for 
filing more than three thousand Engle-progeny claims3 without 
investigating or informing himself as to the facts of each case and 
for knowingly misrepresenting the viability of the claims to the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.  Fla. 
Bar v. Wilner, No. SC2021-0373 (Fla. Mar. 3, 2022) (approving 
uncontested referee’s report).4  The disciplinary order directed 
Wilner to fully comply with rule 3-6.1.  Id. 
 
 
2.  The Bar also argues that reinstatement of Wilner is 
precluded because Wilner sent a misleading closeout letter to his 
client that downplayed the nature of the misconduct on which his 
suspension was based.  Because we conclude that Wilner’s failure 
to comply with rule 3-6.1(f) requires denial of his reinstatement, we 
need not address the Bar’s request regarding the closeout letter. 
 
3.  See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1277 (Fla. 
2006) (directing that a class action group of smokers and their 
survivors be decertified and permitting class members to file 
individualized claims with the Court’s findings receiving res judicata 
effect within one year of the mandate). 
 
 
4.  Wilner was found guilty of violating Rules Regulating The 
Florida Bar 4-1.1 (Competence), 4-1.3 (Diligence), 4-1.4 
(Communication), 4-3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions),  
 
- 3 - 
After his suspension, Wilner sold his Jacksonville-based law 
firm to Howard Acosta, an experienced lawyer in St. Petersburg 
whom Wilner has known since the early 1980s.  Acosta paid $100 
for the firm, and Wilner, if reinstated, can buy back the firm under 
the terms of the purchase agreement for $200.  Aside from 
renaming the firm Jax Litigation Group (JLG), Acosta made no 
tangible changes to the firm after purchasing it.  He characterized 
his role to the referee as being “kind of a silent owner,” and he 
explained that the only real purpose behind the firm’s change in 
ownership was to put his name on the letterhead, though his name 
does not actually appear there, nor does it appear on the firm’s 
website or in its telephone directory.  Wilner explained to the referee 
that Acosta’s name did not appear in any of these places because 
his role “was not to engage in case litigation in Jacksonville.” 
Wilner remained employed with the firm after its sale to 
Acosta.  He had no specific job title at the firm, and he came into 
the office only a few times a week for a couple hours to discuss 
 
4-3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), and 4-8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall 
not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation . . . .”). 
 
- 4 - 
general strategy—not specific cases—with the firm’s lawyers, all of 
whom Wilner supervised before his suspension.  Acosta was the 
lawyer responsible for supervising Wilner’s work at JLG, and Acosta 
was the only lawyer at the firm eligible to supervise Wilner.5  His 
supervisory role at the firm, however, was limited to speaking with 
Wilner and the firm’s office manager on the phone every week or 
two.  Acosta explained to the referee that in his practice it is rare for 
clients to come to the office, and “I think it’s the same with his firm, 
or my firm now.”  Wilner testified that he did not do much work for 
the firm, leaving little for Acosta to supervise.  In describing his 
conversations with Acosta, Wilner stated: 
Well, he knows me for many years, and he knows, you 
know, what I contribute and understands, as we’ve 
talked since the last spring, since the beginning of this, 
my role is to advise and consult.  And so he understands 
that.  And we talk about that same group of subjects. 
 
After his suspension ended, Wilner filed a petition for 
reinstatement with the Court.  The petition was referred to a 
referee, who held a hearing and submitted a very brief report 
 
 
5.  A suspended or disbarred lawyer is prohibited under rule 
3-6.1(b) from being employed or supervised by a lawyer whom the 
suspended or disbarred lawyer employed or supervised before the 
date of the suspension or disbarment order. 
 
- 5 - 
recommending that Wilner be reinstated to the practice of law.6  
She found that: “Although [Wilner’s] compliance with the 
disciplinary order was not perfect, I believe it is sufficient to 
recommend reinstatement.”   
The Bar seeks review of the referee’s recommendation. 
ANALYSIS 
“In a reinstatement proceeding, the party seeking review of the 
referee’s recommendation has the burden to demonstrate that the 
report is erroneous, unlawful, or unjustified.”  Fla. Bar re Dunagan, 
775 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fla. Bar re Grusmark, 662 
So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1995)).  A referee’s findings of fact will “be 
upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.”  
Id.  “With regard to the referee’s legal conclusions and 
recommendations, the Court’s scope of review is wider because we 
 
 
6.  The referee’s report contains no factual findings about 
Wilner’s post-suspension conduct.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar  
3-7.10(h) (“[T]he referee will make and file . . . a report that includes 
the findings of fact and a recommendation . . . .”).  However, in his 
answer brief, Wilner, with some minor exceptions, “accept[ed] the 
Bar’s statement of the case and facts,” which details Wilner’s post-
suspension conduct. 
 
- 6 - 
have the ultimate responsibility to enter the appropriate judgment.”  
Id. (quoting Grusmark, 662 So. 2d at 1236). 
 
As part of his petition for reinstatement, Wilner was required 
to produce clear and convincing evidence of his rehabilitation.  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(3).  In order to make such a showing, 
he was, at a minimum, required to satisfy each applicable element 
of rehabilitation listed in rule 3-7.10(f)(3).  One of the listed 
elements is “strict compliance with the specific conditions of any 
disciplinary . . . or other order.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar  
3-7.10(f)(3)(A).  
The Bar argues that Wilner failed to establish rehabilitation 
because he did not strictly comply with the disciplinary order’s 
directive to fully comply with rule 3-6.1.  Rule 3-6.1 authorizes legal 
service providers to employ suspended or disbarred lawyers and 
places certain restrictions on their employment, such as having no 
client contact and not handling client funds or property.  See R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-6.1(d).  One of the restrictions is that a 
disbarred or suspended lawyer 
must be supervised by a member of The Florida Bar in 
good standing and eligible to practice law in Florida who 
is employed full-time by the entity that employs the 
 
- 7 - 
individual subject to this rule and is actively engaged in 
the supervision of the individual subject to this rule in all 
aspects of the individual’s employment. 
 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-6.1(f).  A suspended or disbarred lawyer 
and an employing legal services provider are both responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the rule.  See id. 
The Bar claims that Wilner was not supervised in accordance 
with rule 3-6.1(f) while employed at JLG.  It contends that his 
occasional telephone conversations with Acosta are far from the 
active supervision that is required by rule 3-6.1(f).  Wilner, however, 
maintains that his occasional telephone conversations with Acosta 
satisfy rule 3-6.1(f), as they were commensurate with how little 
work he actually did for JLG. 
It is clear from our review of the record that, regardless of the 
amount of work he either did or did not do for JLG, Wilner was not 
actively supervised in all aspects of his employment with the firm.  
His supervisor, Acosta, lived across the state in St. Petersburg and 
was not actively involved in any of JLG’s cases or Wilner’s work at 
the firm.  He did not oversee any of Wilner’s so-called strategy talks 
with the firm’s other lawyers, and the only oversight he exercised 
over Wilner was through unstructured telephone conversations 
 
- 8 - 
every week or two.  Acosta simply had no meaningful way to 
consistently ensure that Wilner fully complied with the restrictions 
on his employment in rule 3-6.1 other than Wilner’s own personal 
assurances.  This is exactly the type of scenario rule 3-6.1(f) is 
intended to guard against, as those subject to its restrictions have 
in many instances already demonstrated an unwillingness to abide 
by the profession’s rules and ethical standards.  See R. Regulating 
Fla. Bar 3-6.1(a) (identifying persons subject to the rule).  
Accordingly, we find that Wilner failed to demonstrate strict 
compliance with our disciplinary order, and that as a result, he has 
failed to establish rehabilitation under rule 3-7.10(f)(3).  The Bar 
has satisfied its burden in this case, and we find that the referee’s 
recommendation to reinstate Wilner to the practice of law is 
unjustified. 
CONCLUSION 
The referee’s recommendation is disapproved, and Norwood 
Sherman Wilner’s petition for reinstatement is denied.   
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
 
- 9 - 
Norwood Sherman Wilner, in the amount of $2,281.46, for which 
sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered. 
 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Richard A. Greenberg of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Shaneé L. Hinson, Bar Counsel, The Florida 
Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The 
Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent