Title: State v. Rich
Citation: 351 N.C. 386
Docket Number: 161PA99
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 161PA99
FILED: 7 APRIL 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
MATTHEW THOMAS RICH
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 132 N.C. App. 440,
512 S.E.2d 441 (1999), finding no error in two judgments for
second-degree murder entered by Albright, J., on 25 September
1997 in Superior Court, Guilford County.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 16 November 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery,
III, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
J. Donald Cowan and Shannon R. Joseph for defendant-
appellant.
LAKE, Justice.
Defendant was indicted on 6 January 1997 for two counts
of second-degree murder.  He was tried at the 15 September 1997
Criminal Session of Superior Court, Guilford County.  The jury
found defendant guilty of both charges.  On 25 September 1997,
the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of
132 to 168 months’ imprisonment.  Defendant gave notice of appeal
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals on 29 September 1997.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no error.  State
v. Rich, 132 N.C. App. 440, 512 S.E.2d 441 (1999).  For the
reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the Court of Appeals
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correctly determined that defendant received a fair trial, free
from prejudicial error.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The State’s evidence tended to show that on 29 November
1996, at approximately 10:15 p.m., while traveling on Horse Pen
Creek Road in Greensboro, North Carolina, defendant’s vehicle
collided head-on with another vehicle.  The passengers in the
other vehicle were Todd Allan Bush and James Brady Littrell.  The
accident occurred at a sharp curve in the road where the posted
speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour (mph).  The road
consisted of two lanes and was marked as a no-passing zone.  The
stretch of road leading up to the curve had a forty mph speed
limit.  Just prior to entering the curve in the road, defendant
had passed another motorist in a no-passing zone.  Defendant was
driving at a speed in excess of seventy mph when he entered the
curve, crossed into the left lane, and collided with Bush and
Littrell.  Both Bush and Littrell died as a result.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., Officer L.E. Farrington of
the Greensboro Police Department arrived at the scene of the
collision.  While investigating the accident, Officer Farrington
noticed a strong odor of alcohol on defendant.  A member of the
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) team who responded to the
accident, Karrina Crews, testified that she also detected a
strong odor of alcohol on defendant as she helped remove
defendant from his vehicle.  Other members of the EMS team
testified that defendant was verbally abusive and combative
toward assisting paramedics.  Thereafter, EMS transported
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defendant to Moses Cone Hospital, where Dr. Kai-Uwe Mazur treated
defendant.  While treating defendant, Dr. Mazur asked him a
series of questions, one of which was whether he drank alcohol. 
Defendant responded that he frequently consumed alcohol, and on
the night of the accident, he drank “several beers and several
shots.”  Dr. Mazur recorded this statement in defendant’s medical
record.
Officer Gerald Austin of the Greensboro Police
Department, who had also investigated the scene of the collision,
interviewed defendant at the hospital at approximately 11:35 p.m.
that night.  During this interview, Officer Austin detected a
strong odor of alcohol on defendant.  Officer Austin also noted
that defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, and that
defendant had difficulty focusing on him during the interview. 
Officer Austin concluded that defendant was impaired at the time
of the collision.  However, there is nothing in the record which
indicates that a blood alcohol test was ever administered to
defendant.
The State also introduced evidence that defendant had a
history of convictions for traffic violations:  driving seventy
mph in a thirty-five mph zone on 11 August 1995, driving seventy
mph in a fifty-five mph zone on 11 May 1994, reckless driving and
fleeing to elude arrest on 3 October 1991, driving seventy-six
mph in a forty-five mph zone on 6 September 1990, and driving
seventy-five mph in a forty-five mph zone on 3 October 1988.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in approving the trial court’s
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instruction that the jury needed to find only one of the
attitudinal components of malice to support a second-degree
murder conviction.  Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals’
affirmance of the trial court’s definition of malice conflicts
with this Court’s decision in State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559,
247 S.E.2d 905 (1978).  We disagree.
The trial court instructed the jury as to malice as
follows:
Now, members of the jury, our courts
have defined malice, and our courts have
declared that there are three kinds of malice
in our law of homicide.  One kind of malice
connotes a possible concept of express
hatred, ill will, or spite.  This is
sometimes called actual, express, or
particular malice.  Another kind of malice
arises when an act which is inherently
dangerous to human life is done so recklessly
and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly
without regard for human life and social duty
and deliberately bent on mischief.  And there
is, in addition, a third kind of malice which
is defined as nothing more than that
condition of mind which prompts a person to
take the life of another intentionally,
without just cause, excuse, or justification.
. . . .
Now, I further charge you, members of
the jury, with respect to the second kind of
malice that I have defined to you, that is,
malice which arises when an act which is
inherently dangerous to human life is done so
recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind
utterly without regard for human life and
social duty and deliberately bent on
mischief, I say I charge you that any act
evidencing wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of
consequences, and a mind regardless of social
duty and deliberately bent on mischief,
though there may be no intention to injure a
particular person, is sufficient to supply
the malice necessary for second-degree
murder.
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After beginning its deliberations, the jury requested additional
instructions from the trial court regarding “the nature of malice
of the second kind.”  The trial court responded to the jury’s
question as follows:
[Y]ou have asked me with regard to wickedness
of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences, a mind
regardless of social duty and deliberately
bent on mischief, as to whether all of these
must be present.  My answer to that is no. 
One of these, some of these, or all of these
may be proved and may be sufficient to supply
the malice necessary for second degree
murder.  That is a factual determination that
you, the jury, must make . . . .
Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court’s instruction to the jury that malice
may be present if only one of the six attitudinal circumstances
constituting malice is found to exist.  Defendant contends that
the Court of Appeals erred because the trial court’s definition
of malice conflicts with the language adopted by this Court in
Wilkerson.  The definition of malice set out in Wilkerson
originated from a dissent to State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185
S.E.2d 129 (1971).  Wilkerson, 295 N.C. at 578, 247 S.E.2d at
916.  In her dissenting opinion to Wrenn, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Sharp stated:
[Malice] comprehends not only particular
animosity “but also wickedness of
disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences, and a mind
regardless of social duty and deliberately
bent on mischief, though there may be no
intention to injure a particular person.”  21
A. & E. 133 (2nd Edition 1902).
. . . “[It] does not necessarily mean an
actual intent to take human life; it may be
inferential or implied, instead of positive,
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as when an act which imports danger to
another is done so recklessly or wantonly as
to manifest depravity of mind and disregard
of human life.”  State v. Trott, 190 N.C.
674, 679, 130 S.E. 627, 629 [(1925)] . . . . 
In such a situation[,] “the law regards the
circumstances of the act as so harmful that
the law punishes the act as though malice did
in fact exist.”  1 Wharton, Criminal Law and
Procedure § 245 (Anderson, 1957).
Wrenn, 279 N.C. at 686-87, 185 S.E.2d at 135 (Sharp, J.,
dissenting).  This Court later approved that definition of malice
in Wilkerson, 295 N.C. at 578, 247 S.E.2d at 916.
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s formulation of
malice conflicts with this Court’s definition set forth in
Wilkerson because the trial court did not require the jury to
find all six attitudinal circumstances of malice to exist in
order to find that defendant acted with malice.  Rather, the
trial court instructed the jury that only one of these
circumstances may be sufficient for malice to exist.  Defendant
contends that because the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury on malice, the trial court relieved the State of its burden
to prove all the essential elements of second-degree murder. 
This argument is without merit.
In State v. Leach, 340 N.C. 236, 456 S.E.2d 785 (1995),
this Court held that the elements listed by the trial court in a
jury instruction on premeditation and deliberation were examples
of circumstances that the jury could use to infer premeditation
and deliberation, and that the law did not require that each
circumstance be proven.  The trial court in Leach instructed the
jury on premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder as
follows:
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[Premeditation and deliberation] may be
proved by proof of a circumstance from which
they may be inferred such as a lack of
provocation by the [v]ictim; conduct of the
[d]efendant before, during and after the
killing; threats and declarations of the
defendant; use of grossly excessive force or
vicious circumstances of the killing or the
manner or means by which the killing was
done.
Id. at 241, 456 S.E.2d at 788.  In examining that jury
instruction, this Court explained:
The instruction in question informs a
jury that the circumstances given are only
illustrative; they are merely examples of
some circumstances which, if shown to exist,
permit premeditation and deliberation to be
inferred.  The instruction tells jurors that
they “may” find premeditation and
deliberation from certain circumstances,
“such as” the circumstances listed.
Id. at 241, 456 S.E.2d at 789.
Just as the phrases contained in the instructions for
premeditation and deliberation serve as examples from which a
jury could infer premeditation and deliberation, the attitudinal
circumstances given in the jury instruction for malice serve as
descriptive phrases.  These words or phrases are each descriptive
of the type or types of thought, attitude or condition of mind
sufficient to constitute malice.  Like premeditation and
deliberation, “depraved-heart” malice may be “infer[red] or
implied.”  Wilkerson, 295 N.C. at 578, 247 S.E.2d at 916.  The
descriptive phrases listed in the instructions for malice serve
to help define malice for the jury.  They do not constitute
“elements” of malice, which is itself an element of second-degree
murder, and thus the State need not prove each and every one of
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those attitudinal examples of malice in order for the jury to
infer the element of malice.
Defendant also argues that if this Court allows the six
traditional descriptive words and phrases defining malice to be
read in the disjunctive, then it is possible for a jury to
convict a defendant of second-degree murder based on a finding of
“recklessness of consequences.”  Defendant asserts that this
would effectively lower the culpability level required to convict
a defendant of second-degree murder since “recklessness of
consequences” is a level of culpability usually associated with
negligence.  We disagree.
The distinction between “recklessness” indicative of
murder and “recklessness” associated with manslaughter “is one of
degree rather than kind.”  United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d
945, 948 (4th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193, 83 L. Ed.
2d 973 (1985).  Additionally, this Court has stated:
“The charge of the court must be read as a
whole . . . , in the same connected way that
the judge is supposed to have intended it and
the jury to have considered it . . . .” 
State v. Wilson, 176 N.C. 751, [754-55,] 97
S.E. 496[, 497] (1918).  It will be construed
contextually, and isolated portions will not
be held prejudicial when the charge as [a]
whole is correct.  If the charge presents the
law fairly and clearly to the jury, the fact
that some expressions, standing alone, might
be considered erroneous will afford no ground
for reversal.
State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 214, 176 S.E.2d 765, 770 (1970)
(citations omitted).  After reviewing the trial court’s jury
instructions as a whole, we conclude that the trial court’s
instructions reflected terms which described the degree of
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recklessness sufficient for the jury to find the state of mind
which constitutes malice.  Because the trial court’s
instructions, in their entirety, conveyed the level of
recklessness required for second-degree murder, we cannot
conclude that the jury could have confused such a high degree of
recklessness with mere culpable negligence.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in approving the trial court’s
instruction to the jury on the meaning of the phrase
“deliberately bent on mischief.”  After receiving two identical
charges on the definition of malice, the jury asked the trial
court for a “legally-accepted paraphrase of ‘deliberately bent on
mischief.’”  In response to the jury’s question, the trial court
stated:
[The term deliberately bent on mischief]
connotes conduct as exhibits conscious
indifference to consequences wherein
probability of harm to another within the
circumference of such conduct is reasonably
apparent, though no harm to such other is
intended.  [It] [c]onnotes an entire absence
of care for the safety of others which
exhibits indifference to consequences.  It
connotes conduct where the actor, having
reason to believe his act may injure another,
does it, being indifferent to whether it
injures or not.  It indicates a realization
of the imminence of danger, and reckless
disregard, complete indifference and
unconcern for probable consequences.  It
connotes conduct where the actor is conscious
of his conduct, and conscious of his
knowledge of the existing conditions that
injury would probably result, and that, with
reckless indifference to consequences, the
actor consciously and intentionally did some
wrongful act to produce injurious result.
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Defendant argues that this instruction erroneously states the
meaning of “deliberately bent on mischief” because it fails to
convey the concepts of deliberateness and intention that are
intrinsic to the phrase.  In the decision below, the Court of
Appeals noted that “in this jurisdiction, it is well-settled
‘that a charge is to be construed as a whole and isolated
portions of a charge will not be held prejudicial where the
charge as a whole is correct and free from objection.’”  State v.
Rich, 132 N.C. App. at 447, 512 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting State v.
Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 324, 289 S.E.2d 335, 345 (1982)).  After
reviewing the jury instruction in its entirety, the Court of
Appeals found no error.  Id.  We agree.
“Second-degree murder is an unlawful killing with
malice, but without premeditation and deliberation.”  State v.
Brewer, 328 N.C. 515, 522, 402 S.E.2d 380, 385 (1991).  “Intent
to kill is not a necessary element of second-degree murder, but
there must be an intentional act sufficient to show malice.”  Id.
at 522, 402 S.E.2d at 385.  Accordingly, in the case sub judice,
it was necessary for the State to prove only that defendant had
the intent to perform the act of driving in such a reckless
manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely
result, thus evidencing depravity of mind.  The State was not
required to show that defendant had a conscious, direct purpose
to do specific harm or damage, or had a specific intent to kill.  
However, the State did show a pattern of such behavior by
eliciting testimony that defendant in this case drove his vehicle
at a high rate of speed while impaired, on the wrong side of the
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road, in a no-passing zone and in violation of right-of-way
rules.  This is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the
jury of malice necessary under second-degree murder.  Therefore,
after reviewing the trial court’s instructions, we conclude that
the jury was properly focused on defendant’s intention to perform
an act which reflected the level of intent that is associated
with a person being “deliberately bent on mischief.”
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s
instruction on “deliberately bent on mischief” blurred the
distinction between involuntary manslaughter and murder, and
would thus allow a jury to return a verdict of second-degree
murder when a defendant’s conduct amounted to no more than
culpable negligence.  We disagree.
As stated above, the difference between the type of
malice at issue in the case sub judice and culpable negligence is
the degree of recklessness that would support a finding of each. 
See Fleming, 739 F.2d 945.  “Standing alone, culpable negligence
supports the submission of involuntary manslaughter.”  Brewer,
328 N.C. at 523, 402 S.E.2d at 386.  But when that negligence is
accompanied by “an act which imports danger to another [and] is
done so recklessly or wantonly as to manifest depravity of mind
and disregard of human life,” then it is sufficient to support a
second-degree murder charge.  State v. Trott, 190 N.C. at 679,
130 S.E. at 629, quoted in Brewer, 328 N.C. at 523, 402 S.E.2d at
386.
After reviewing the trial court’s instructions to the
jury in their entirety, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s
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definition of “deliberately bent on mischief” blurred the
distinction between involuntary manslaughter and murder.  The
trial court never mentioned culpable negligence to the jury in
connection with its charge of second-degree murder.  Rather, the
court focused on the term “malice.”  The jury’s instructions
clearly required a finding of malice sufficient to support
second-degree murder if the jury concluded that defendant’s
actions were such as to be “inherently dangerous to human life
[and were] done so recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind
utterly without regard for human life and social duty and
deliberately bent on mischief.”  Because the trial court’s
instructions to the jury on the element of malice required for
second-degree murder were clear and correct, we cannot conclude
that the jury could have confused malice with culpable
negligence.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly approved
the trial court’s jury instructions, and this assignment of error
is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in approving the trial court’s
admission of the opinion of impairment by one of the
investigating officers.  Specifically, defendant argues that the
opinion testimony lacked a sufficient foundation and was not
rationally based on the observations of the witness.  We do not
agree.
At trial, Officer Gerald Austin testified that in his
opinion, “defendant was under the influence of an impairing
substance and unable and unfit to operate machinery or equipment
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of any type.”  During the cross-examination of Officer Austin,
the following colloquy ensued:
Q.  And you are then basing your opinion
on him lying on a gurney at Cone Hospital
concerning him being unable to drive an
automobile because he was intoxicated.  Is
that what you’re telling his Honor and the
members of this jury?
A.  No.  What I’m telling his Honor and
the members of this jury is based upon my
experience of having to deal with people that
I’ve arrested and charged with D.W.I.,
whether they be of sound mind and body or
whether they be injured.  That was the
opinion that I formed.
Q.  Well, in other words, you formed an
opinion, based on other arrests, that an hour
and 45 minutes to two hours after Mr. Rich
had an accident out there, that he was unable
to drive an automobile?
A.  Correct, sir.
Q.  And that was based on your smelling
a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath, is
that right?
A.  I believe my testimony was it was
moderate to strong, and, yes, that’s what
it’s based on.
Q.  Beg your pardon?
A.  My testimony was that it was
moderate to strong, and that is what my
opinion is based upon.
In addition to stating on cross-examination that his opinion that
defendant was impaired was based only upon the odor of alcohol,
Officer Austin also acknowledged that before he testified at
trial, he never discussed with the State his opinion that
defendant was impaired.  Officer Austin also failed to put any
notes in his report regarding his opinion that defendant was
impaired.  At trial, Officer Austin conceded that defendant’s
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bloodshot and watery eyes could have resulted from defendant’s
head injuries.  Finally, Officer Austin never saw defendant walk,
and there was no evidence that defendant’s speech was slurred.
In the decision below, the Court of Appeals determined
that Officer Austin was competent to express an opinion that
defendant was driving while impaired when he collided with the
victims’ vehicle.  State v. Rich, 132 N.C. App. at 449, 512
S.E.2d at 448.  The Court of Appeals reasoned:
Officer Austin’s opinion was based on his
experience as a law enforcement officer in
conjunction with his observations of the
circumstances surrounding the collision. 
Officer Austin testified that as he proceeded
to the scene, he noted the posted speed
limits, and when he arrived at the place
where the accident occurred, he observed the
position and condition of the vehicles
involved.  He stated that he also witnessed
defendant’s behavior at the scene and
described him as “giving E.M.S. quite a hard
time.”  When Officer Austin later interviewed
defendant at the hospital, he detected a
“moderate to strong” odor of alcohol about
defendant’s person.  He further noted that
defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery
and that defendant had difficulty focusing on
the officer during the interview.  Armed with
these facts, a police officer with more than
three years’ experience in the enforcement of
motor vehicle laws and who has been
personally involved in the investigations of
nearly 200 driving while impaired cases is
competent to express an opinion that
defendant was under the influence of alcohol
when he collided with the victims’ vehicle.
Id.  Based on the following reasons, we conclude that the Court
of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court properly admitted
Officer Austin’s testimony.
The rule concerning the admissibility of opinion
testimony by lay witnesses provides:
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If the witness is not testifying as an
expert, his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of his testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (1999).  Additionally, it is a well-
settled rule that a lay person may give his opinion as to whether
a person is intoxicated so long as that opinion is based on the
witness’s personal observation.  State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255,
258, 210 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1974).
Defendant argues that this Court has held that “an odor
[of alcohol], standing alone, is no evidence that [a driver] is
under the influence of an intoxicant.”  Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C.
179, 185, 176 S.E.2d 789, 793 (1970).  However, in that same
case, this Court also stated, “the ‘[f]act that a motorist has
been drinking, when considered in connection with faulty driving
. . . or other conduct indicating an impairment of physical or
mental faculties, is sufficient prima facie to show a violation
of [N.C.G.S. §] 20-138.’”  Id. at 185, 176 S.E.2d at 794 (quoting
State v. Hewitt, 263 N.C. 759, 764, 140 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1965)). 
In the case sub judice, Officer Austin observed the collision
scene and observed defendant at the hospital, and two witnesses
testified that they saw defendant’s car going seventy mph around
a curve just before the collision.  Additionally, other witnesses
testified as to defendant’s odor of alcohol.
We note that Officer Austin’s testimony was offered as
evidence which tended to show that defendant acted with malice,
not that defendant was impaired.  Based upon our review of the
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record in its entirety, we conclude that notwithstanding his
cross- examination testimony, Officer Austin based his opinion
not only on the odor of alcohol, but also on his investigation of
the accident and upon his experience enforcing traffic laws and
dealing with intoxicated drivers.  Moreover, it is the jury that 
determines how much weight should be afforded such opinion
evidence.  State v. Davis, 321 N.C. 52, 57-58, 361 S.E.2d 724,
727 (1987).  During cross-examination, defendant had the
opportunity to discredit Officer Austin’s testimony before the
jury.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals correctly determined that Officer Austin’s testimony was
competent and admissible evidence which was rationally based on
his perception of defendant and his observations at the scene of
the accident.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In his last assignment of error, defendant contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in approving the admission into
evidence of defendant’s prior traffic violations.  Defendant
asserts that prior driving-related convictions are irrelevant to
the issue of malice at the time of the collision, and that the
State introduced evidence of the prior convictions to show that
defendant acted in conformity with prior conduct.  We disagree.
Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake, entrapment or accident.
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N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999).  It is well settled that
this “list of permissible purposes for admission of ‘other
crimes’ evidence is not exclusive, and such evidence is
admissible as long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other
than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.”  State v.
Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 404, 501 S.E.2d 625, 641 (1998) (quoting
State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 284, 457 S.E.2d 841, 852-53, cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 994, 133 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1995)), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1180, 143 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1999).
In affirming the trial court’s admission of the prior
speeding convictions to show malice, the Court of Appeals noted
that it has previously and “repeatedly held that evidence of
prior convictions is admissible under Rule 404(b) to show the
malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction.” 
Rich, 132 N.C. App. at 450, 512 S.E.2d at 448; see also State v.
Grice, 131 N.C. App. 48, 505 S.E.2d 166 (1998), disc. rev.
denied, 350 N.C. 102, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1999).  The Court of
Appeals then stated:
[T]he State, in the present case, sought to
establish the malice element of second-degree
murder by showing that defendant committed an
act evidencing a total disregard for human
life--i.e., showing “wickedness of
disposition,” “recklessness of consequences”
or “a mind regardless of social duty and
deliberately bent on mischief.”  Evidence of
defendant’s prior traffic violations--driving
75 mph in a 45 mph zone, 76 mph in a 45 mph
zone, 70 mph in a 35 mph zone, and 70 mph in
a 55 mph zone--was relevant to establish
defendant’s “depraved heart” on the night he
struck the victims’ vehicle while rounding a
sharp curve at a speed at least 40 mph over
the posted limit. 
Rich, 132 N.C. App. at 450-51, 512 S.E.2d at 449.
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Defendant’s argument that the State introduced the
evidence of the prior speeding convictions to show that defendant
acted in conformity with prior conduct must fail.  The State was
not seeking to prove that defendant was speeding at the time of
the collision.  Rather, by introducing defendant’s prior speeding
convictions, the State offered additional evidence which tended
to show defendant’s “totally depraved mind” and “recklessness of
the consequences.”  Because the State offered the evidence to
show that defendant knew and acted with a total disregard of the
consequences, which is relevant to show malice, the provisions of
Rule 404(b) were not violated.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court
of Appeals correctly determined that defendant received a fair
trial, free from prejudicial error.  Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.