Title: Stokes v. Harrison
Citation: 115 So. 2d 373, 238 La. 343
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 1959

115 So. 2d 373 (1959) 238 La. 343 Winston L. STOKES and Justiss-Mears Oil Co., Inc. v. Lester R. HARRISON and Beauregard Parish School Board. No. 44562. Supreme Court of Louisiana. November 9, 1959. *374 Peter S. Anderson, Dist. Atty., L. H. Coltharp, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., De Ridder, for defendant-relator. Kay &amp; Kay, De Ridder, for defendant-respondent. HAMLIN, Justice. In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction and control (Article VII, Section 11, Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA), we granted a writ of review from a judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit (109 So.2d 506), reversing the judgment of the Thirtieth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Beauregard. The principal issue presented for our determination in this concursus proceeding is whether or not the sale of land owned by a local school board is a sale of property by the State, which must set forth a reservation of the minerals on the property in conformity with the following provision of *375 Article IV, Section 2, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA: The stipulated facts of record recite that Beauregard Parish School Board acquired the property herein involved[1] from Davis Brothers Securities Company on April 30, 1919, and conveyed it to H. C. Craft on October 27, 1926; Calcasieu Building &amp; Loan Association acquired the property from Henry C. Craft by Sheriff's Deed on August 11, 1928, and conveyed it to Grady W. Grimes on May 11, 1929; Grady W. Grimes conveyed the property to the present owner, Lester R. Harrison, on February 5, 1944. In none of the deeds were the minerals excepted or mentioned. Lester R. Harrison executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease on the property on July 9, 1954 to Winston L. Stokes. On August 9, 1955, Beauregard Parish School Board likewise executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease on the property to Winston L. Stokes. The respective owners occupied the land during the years when they held title. Other than the recordation of the oil, gas, and mineral lease of August 9, 1955 from Beauregard Parish School Board to Winston L. Stokes, there was no adverse claim until the filing of the present proceeding. The stipulated facts recite: Plaintiffs instituted this concursus proceeding in January, 1957, alleging that a dispute existed between Lester R. Harrison and the Beauregard Parish School Board, which involved the ownership of the oil, gas, and other minerals lying in, on, or which may be produced from the instant property; they prayed, among other things, that the court declare to whom should be paid the funds deposited and to be deposited in the registry of the court. Beauregard Parish School Board contended that by operation of law pursuant to the provisions of Article IV, Section 2, Louisiana Constitution of 1921, supra, it was without authority to sell the instant property without a reservation of the minerals, and that the minerals had at all times since 1926 remained the property of the Beauregard Parish School Board and the State of Louisiana. Lester R. Harrison averred that by virtue of his and his predecessors' purchase of the property without any reservation of the minerals, he was the owner of all minerals and mineral rights therein. He also pleaded the prescription of ten and thirty years. *376 In scholarly reasons for judgment, the trial court recognized the State of Louisiana, through its agent, Beauregard Parish School Board, to be the true and lawful owner of all the minerals and mineral rights in the property. It rendered judgment awarding to Beauregard Parish School Board the funds deposited and to be deposited in the registry of the court. In reversing the judgment of the trial court and awarding the funds herein to Lester R. Harrison, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found that the provision, supra, of Section 2, Article IV, Louisiana Constitution of 1921, did not apply to school boards in cases of this kind. The controversy between Lester R. Harrison and Beauregard Parish School Board is before us for our full consideration. The present Constitution of Louisiana was adopted on June 18, 1921. Article XII provided for the Public Education of the State, and Section 1 thereof recited: Section 10 of Article XII stated: Following the mandate of the Constitution, the Legislature in 1922 enacted Act 100. Section 17 provided: Section 20 of Act 100 of 1922 stated, in part: Our jurisprudence has stated: A reading of the above enactments and jurisprudence conclusively shows that a parish school board is an agency of the State, a corporate body, a political corporation, the recipient from the Legislature of certain delegated powers, including power to sell or dispose of old sites and use the proceeds thereof toward procuring new ones. Henderson v. City of Shreveport, 160 La. 360, 107 So. 139; Andrews v. Claiborne Parish School Board, La.App., 189 *378 So. 355. Nowhere, however, do we find a parish school board called the "State." Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 is one of limitations. Therein (Sec. 2), the State is ordered to reserve the mineral rights on any and all property sold by it. The word "State" is not qualified or modified; therefore, we must seek to ascertain its meaning. Since the word "State" may include every instrumentality of the state or may be limited in its scope, Section 12 of Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 recites: In Section 13 of Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, it is further provided: The question posed herein is sui generis, and we believe: "In Construing a Constitution, resort may be had to the well-recognized rule of construction contained in the maxim `expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' and the expression of one thing in a Constitution may necessarily involve the exclusion of other things not expressed. * * *" 11 Am.Jur., Sec. 57, page 667, verbo, "Constitutional Law." See, Garrison v. City of Shreveport, 179 La. 605, 154 So. 622; State ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Grace, 187 La. 1028, 175 So. 656; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass'n, 235 La. 937, 106 So. 2d 316; City of Shreveport v. Price, 142 La. 936, 77 So. 883. In this respect, the learned Judge of the Court of Appeal in the instant case made the following statement, with which we agree: Act 100 of 1922 was in part carrying into effect the provisions, supra, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 providing for public education. In such close proximity to the adoption of the Constitution, it seems only reasonable to assume that the Legislature was aware of the limitations set forth in Article IV, Section 2, supra. We believe that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to include a State Agency (such as a school board) in said Section of said Article, and such intent is clearly evidenced by the failure of the Legislature to include the reservation of mineral rights when a school board sold or disposed of a piece of property under the authority of Act 100 of 1922. Defendant Beauregard Parish School Board argues vigorously that this proceeding is controlled by the cases of State ex rel. Board of Com'rs of Tensas Basin Levee District v. Grace, 161 La. 1039, 109 So. 830, and Board of Com'rs of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373. *380 We do not find that either of the above cited cases is apposite.[7] In the Tensas case, supra, we held that Section 2 of Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 did not repeal Act 103 of 1892, insofar as it related to the making of grants of land to the Tensas Basin Levee District. The following statement, on which the instant school board relies, was not necessary for the decision in that case: In the Caddo case, supra, we held that under LSA-Civil Code Articles 3521 and 3538 prescription ran against a State agency created by the Legislature for payment of royalties on land certified to the Levee District prior to the adoption of the 1921 Constitution. The following statement made in the opinion was not necessary for the decision of that case: We feel constrained to mention that in 1926 when the Beauregard Parish School Board sold the instant property to H. C. Craft in full and absolute ownership, neither purchaser nor vendor (an agency of the State) had any idea or even contemplated that the vendor would ever claim the minerals or mineral rights on the property. As reasonable men, it is fair to assume that the respective purchasers of the land would not have paid the prices they did had they known that there would be a future charge upon the land. We do not believe that it is fair and just to extend the constitutional limitation of *381 Section 2 of Article IV to a situation of the present nature. To do so would in effect be amending the Constitution of 1921 by writing into it something which was neither intended nor contemplated. We conclude that the title of H. C. Craft and his successors to the instant property was without limitation or restriction, insofar as the mineral rights were concerned. The sale of said land by Beauregard Parish School Board was not a sale of property by the State. In view of the above conclusion, we are not called upon to determine the questions of locus publicus and of prescription. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, is affirmed. [1] The property, located in the Parish of Beauregard, is described in plaintiffs' petition as follows: "Four &amp; 90/100 acres, being more particularly described as Acreage Tract Number 35 according to plat of survey by F. Shutts, C. E., dated June 20, 1914, being a subdivision of part of Section 24, Township 6 South, Range 11 West, * * *; said tract being bounded on the North by a street, South by Oklahoma Avenue, East by Kansas City Southern Railway and West by Acreage Tract 34, all of said survey." [2] This section presently reads in part as follows: "The Legislature shall provide for a public educational system of the State to consist of all public schools and all institutions of learning operated by State agencies and enact laws on all matters regarding the terms and qualifications for admission to the public schools. * * *" [3] This part of Section 10 of Article XII is presently in force and effect. [4] This part of Section 17 is now LSA-R.S. 17:51. [5] This part of Section 20 is found in LSA-R.S. 17:81. [6] "To provide that no member of Congress or person holding or exercising any office or position or employment of profit under the United States or under any foreign power shall be eligible to a member of the Legislature of Louisiana or shall hold orexercise any office or position or employment of profit under the State of Louisiana; to prohibit persons holding or exercise any office or position or employment of profit in one of the three departments of government of the State of Louisiana from holding or exercising any office, position or employment of profit in that department or in any other department or in any parish, municipality, or Board, Commission or subdivision of the State; to make certain exceptions and to provide punishment for the violation hereof." [7] Neither the trial judge nor the author of the opinion of the Court of Appeal thought that the cases were determinative of the issue herein involved.