Title: State v. Rodriguez
Citation: 112 Ariz. 193, 540 P.2d 665
Docket Number: 3108-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 1975

112 Ariz. 193 (1975) 540 P.2d 665 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Joseph Rivera RODRIGUEZ, Appellant. No. 3108-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 25, 1975. N. Warner Lee, Former Atty. Gen., Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by Stanley L. Patchell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Anne Kappes, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. We accepted this petition for review for the limited purpose of determining the disposition on appeal of a guilty plea in which it does not appear that the trial court made a proper fact determination of the basis of the plea of guilty as required by Rule 17.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973, but in the extended record on appeal it does show a factual basis for the plea. The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On 20 February 1974, a complaint was sworn to in Glendale Precinct Justice *194 Court charging that defendant, appellant here, possessed a narcotic drug, heroin. On 27 February appellant signed a "waiver of preliminary hearing with plea agreement" form in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charge. On 5 March 1974, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Maricopa County charging him with possession of heroin and on 7 March he entered a plea of not guilty. On 20 March 1974 he entered his plea of guilty and was examined by the court. Appellant was sentenced to serve a term of not less than two nor more than five years in the Arizona State Prison. When, on 20 March 1974, appellant entered his plea of guilty the trial court made the following inquiry concerning the factual basis of the plea: Rule 17.3 reads as follows: The Court of Appeals in its decision and opinion held that this did not comply with Rule 17.3 and set aside the plea and directed the trial court to take a new plea. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this does not comply with the factual basis as required by Rule 17.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973. The record, however, indicates in the presentence report the following statement: Thus the extended record does establish that there was a factual basis for the plea even though the record made by the judge at the time the plea of guilty was entered is deficient in this regard. At the outset we feel it necessary to comment that much judicial time could be saved if the judge, the defense attorney, and the attorney for the State would make an effort to comply with the requirements of Rule 17.3, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree with the statement of Judge Stevens in this case: We would also add that it is the duty of the prosecutor, if he wishes to preserve the integrity of the guilty plea he has obtained, to call to the attention of the trial judge at the time the guilty plea is entered any omissions that the trial judge may have *195 made because of the trial court's failure to follow the checklist as set down in the Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973. An appeal of this kind, which could have been so easily avoided, is simply a waste of judicial manpower. Had the trial judge followed the rules and had the prosecution pointed out to the court his omissions when he failed to follow them, we would not have to be considering this matter on appeal. We have stated: Defense counsel, even though they may not have the prime responsibility for prosecuting the case to conclusion, are not relieved of the responsibility of assisting the trial court in complying with the rules in accepting a plea of guilty in a criminal matter. It brings the judicial system into disrespect for an attorney to stand idly by and watch the court commit error that will form the basis of an appeal at a later date when that error could have been avoided at the time of the plea of guilty. We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court in this regard: Because there is evidence in the record that reveals a factual basis for the plea, we believe that this case should be controlled by the doctrine of technical error as set down by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz. App. 251, 532 P.2d 193 (1975), in which the court stated: *196 Decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One, set aside; judgment of guilt of the trial court affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD, HAYS and HOLOHAN, JJ, concur. Note: Justice FRANK X. GORDON, Jr., did not participate in the determination of this matter and retired Justice LORNA E. LOCKWOOD sat in his stead.