Title: State v. Patrick C. Carter
Citation: 2010 WI 77
Docket Number: 2006AP001811-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2010

2010 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1811-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Patrick C. Carter, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 255 
Reported at: 306 Wis. 2d 450, 743 N.W.2d 700 
(Ct. App.2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2008 & October 21, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mel Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1811-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF4139) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick C. Carter, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
as modified affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This case addresses the 
award of sentence credit for the time a criminal defendant 
spends in jail while awaiting trial and sentencing.  The 
statutory provision at issue here is mandatory and the language 
at issue in this case amounts to one simple sentence:  "A 
convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of 
his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
When adopted, this provision was meant to provide "a 
simpler, more equitable system . . . ."1  Today's decision brings 
to a close the tortured saga of this case.  Perhaps it will 
enable  circuit courts to calculate and award sentence credit in 
a simpler and more equitable manner.  We first heard oral 
argument in this case on September 12, 2008, in tandem with 
State v. Johnson (Elandis Johnson), 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 
767 N.W.2d 207.  In that case, we reached a unanimous result, 
holding that the defendant in that case was not entitled to the 
sentence credit he sought.  It appeared that the goal of 
simplicity might be served.   
¶3 
Today, we take another step forward to help clarify 
sentence credit in a case involving concurrent sentences.   
¶4 
This case, in which the bottom line is whether or not 
a criminal defendant should be awarded 302 or 305 days of 
sentence credit, has now been before this court in some form for 
over 800 days.  In the lifespan of this appeal, the State has 
three times abandoned and reformulated its legal position.  The 
defendant has offered more than one proposal for sentence 
credit.   
¶5 
In the most recent foray in this court, the parties 
filed a joint brief, in which the State joined the defendant, 
agreeing that he was entitled to 305 days of sentence credit.  
Neither party requested a second oral argument, and apparently 
                                                 
1 State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 392, 362 N.W.2d 162, 
(Ct. App. 1984). 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
3 
 
neither desired it.  This court nevertheless compelled the 
lawyers to appear, which they did.  That was on September 22, 
2009.  Another eight months have passed.  The court now issues a 
decision in which five opinions (totaling more than 100 typed 
pages) are offered with four justices joining this opinion 
(Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, 
Justice N. Patrick Crooks, and Justice Michael J. Gableman) 
agreeing on the interpretation of the statutes and case law and 
the bottom line, that is, just how many days of sentence credit 
should be awarded to the defendant in this case.   
¶6 
Circuit courts deal with sentence credit every day.  
The statute proposes a simple test.  The four justices who join 
this opinion hope we have provided greater clarity in awarding 
sentence credit in a case involving concurrent sentences. 
I 
¶7 
This is a review of a published decision of the court 
of appeals2 reversing the order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Mel Flanagan, Judge, denying sentence credit 
to defendant Patrick Carter on his sentence in Wisconsin for 
time spent in pre-sentencing custody in Illinois. 
¶8 
The court of appeals disagreed with the circuit court 
and gave the defendant credit on his Wisconsin sentence for time 
spent in Illinois custody.  The court of appeals remanded the 
                                                 
2 State v. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, 306 Wis. 2d 450, 743 
N.W.2d 700. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
4 
 
matter to the circuit court to grant the defendant 324 days of 
sentence credit. 
¶9 
On review, we modify the decision of the court of 
appeals and grant the defendant a total of 305 days of credit, 
and as modified, affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
¶10 The instant case presents a question of interpreting 
and 
applying 
the 
sentence 
credit 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1) (2007-08)3 to a particular factual circumstance.  
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to a felony in Wisconsin, 
first degree recklessly endangering safety, in violation of Wis.  
Stat. § 941.30(1).  The sentence for this crime was imposed to 
run concurrently with a sentence previously imposed in Illinois 
for an unrelated armed robbery.  Prior to his guilty plea, 
conviction, and sentencing on the Wisconsin crime, the defendant 
was in presentence custody in Illinois from the time of his 
arrest in Illinois (December 13, 2003) until his sentencing on 
the Illinois charge (October 19, 2004).4 
¶11 The defendant seeks credit for this presentence time, 
claiming this custody was in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed in Wisconsin as well as 
being in connection with the robbery charge in Illinois.  A 
defendant seeking sentence credit in Wisconsin has the burden of 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 After 
sentencing 
in 
Illinois, 
the 
defendant 
was 
incarcerated in Illinois on his Illinois charges. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
5 
 
demonstrating both "custody" and its connection with the course 
of conduct for which the Wisconsin sentence was imposed.5 
¶12 Interpretation of a statute and application of a 
statute, here Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), to undisputed facts 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
which 
this 
court 
determines 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from the analyses of both courts.6 
¶13 Because the defendant had not been surrendered to 
Wisconsin during the presentence custody in Illinois, the 
circuit court denied the defendant's motion requesting 324 days 
of sentence credit for his presentence custody.  The circuit 
court awarded the defendant credit for 97 days, calculated from 
May 26, 2005, when he was arrested for extradition to Wisconsin, 
to August 30, 2005, when he was sentenced on the Wisconsin 
charge.7 
                                                 
5 State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
6 State v. Johnson (Marcus Johnson), 2007 WI 107, ¶27, 304 
Wis. 2d 318, 332, 735 N.W.2d 505; State ex rel. Pharm v. Bartow, 
2007 WI 13, ¶13, 298 Wis. 2d 702, 713, 727 N.W.2d 1. 
7 The court of appeals rejected credit for this time period, 
reasoning that the defendant was in custody solely on the basis 
of serving a sentence on the Illinois charge, not in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed in 
Wisconsin.  The defendant does not now seek, and is not entitled 
to, sentence credit for this 97 days.  He was serving his 
sentence for the Illinois crime.  This time was not served in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed in Wisconsin.  See State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 
369 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1985) (no credit for service of 
sentence on a separate crime).  The only period at issue in this 
case is the time before the defendant's sentencing in Illinois 
on October 19, 2004, on the Illinois offense. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
6 
 
¶14 In contrast, the court of appeals held that the 
defendant was entitled to 324 days of sentence credit for his 
presentence confinement in Illinois from the date he was 
arrested in Illinois until the date he was sentenced on the 
Illinois charge; this time spent in Illinois custody was in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed in Wisconsin. 
¶15 This court granted the State's petition for review. 
After hearing oral argument on September 12, 2008, we determined 
that the record in this case was "insufficiently developed to 
demonstrate whether all or some of the defendant's jail time in 
Illinois was 'in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed' in Wisconsin."  Order of September 17, 
2008.  The cause was remanded to the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County "to receive the documents relating to the Illinois 
presentence proceedings and for a hearing to determine the 
ground or grounds on which the defendant was held in an Illinois 
jail from December 14, 2003, to November 2, 2004." 
¶16 The circuit court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. 
McMahon, Judge, received 15 exhibits into the record, an 
affidavit of an Investigator with the Office of the Public 
Defender, and the parties' proposed findings of fact.  The 
circuit court issued findings of fact on June 17, 2009.  We 
heard oral argument for a second time on October 21, 2009. 
¶17 For the reasons set forth, we grant the defendant 305 
days of sentence credit on the Wisconsin sentence.  We conclude, 
as do the parties, that under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) the 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
7 
 
defendant's presentence custody in Illinois was in connection 
with the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in 
Wisconsin for 305 days.  He was in custody in connection with 
the Wisconsin charge for which he was sentenced from the date of 
his arrest in Illinois on December 13, 2003, until he was 
sentenced on an Illinois conviction on October 19, 2004, 
excluding six days between December 15 and December 21.  During 
those six days the defendant was serving a sentence on an 
Illinois charge and was not held in custody in connection with 
the course of conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin. 
¶18 The decision of the court of appeals is therefore 
modified and as modified affirmed.  The cause is remanded to the 
circuit court for entry of judgment consistent with this 
opinion. 
II 
¶19 The facts are not disputed by the parties, although 
the facts on which we now decide this case differ somewhat from 
the facts that were presented prior to our remand of the case to 
the circuit court.8    
                                                 
8 In the previous proceedings in this case, both parties and 
the courts below relied substantially on an investigation report 
prepared by the Office of the State Public Defender.  This 
report, originally attached to the defendant's postconviction 
motion, was apparently based on a telephone call with an 
investigator at the extradition unit of the Chicago Police 
Department.  Other parts of the record indicate that the 
extradition unit was connected with the Office of the Cook 
County Sheriff. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
8 
 
¶20 We adopt the findings of fact made by the Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge, in 
compliance with our remand of this case to the circuit court.  
The parties do not dispute these findings.  Findings of fact 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.17(2).  The circuit court's findings of fact in the 
present case are not clearly erroneous; they are supported by 
the 15 exhibits in the record.9   
                                                                                                                                                             
Several of the circuit court's findings of fact following 
our remand differ from those stated in this earlier report.  For 
instance, the earlier report stated only that the defendant was 
"booked in the Cook County Jail" on December 14, 2003.  The 
finding of fact, supported by the Chicago Arrest Report, an 
exhibit in the record, shows that the defendant was arrested on 
December 13, 2003.  The Investigation Report stated that the 
defendant was sentenced on the Illinois armed robbery charges on 
November 2, 2004, while according to the findings of fact, 
supported by the exhibits, the Illinois sentencing date was 
actually October 19, 2004.   
The Investigation Report also states that the defendant was 
"charged" with the Wisconsin fugitive warrant on December 16, 
2003.  This date is not included in the current findings of fact 
and is uncorroborated by any document now in the record.  At 
oral argument it was clarified that this gap exists at least in 
part because the Illinois authorities have been unable to locate 
and provide the extradition file.   
Given the discrepancies in what we do now know, we now rely 
on the circuit court's findings of fact instead of the 
Investigation Report.  The circuit court found that the 
defendant was arrested on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin 
warrant on December 13, 2003. 
9 For a discussion of the "documentary evidence exception" 
to the clearly erroneous standard of review, see Phelps v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 2009 WI 74, ¶¶37-38 (majority op.), ¶¶71-74 
(Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
9 
 
¶21 The circuit court's final finding of fact states as 
follows:  "From December 13, 2003, until November 2, 2004, 
defendant was in custody in Illinois.  From December 15, 2003, 
to December 21, 2003, defendant was serving his sentence in Cook 
County Case No. TZ241194.  The balance of the time from December 
13, 2003, until October 19, 2004, defendant was held in custody 
resulting in part from the Wisconsin warrant issued in this 
case." 
¶22 Following the Circuit Court's proceedings on remand, 
the State and the defendant filed a joint response in lieu of 
submitting letter briefs to this court.  They stated that they 
have no objections to the Milwaukee County circuit court's 
findings of fact.  The parties agreed: (1) that the defendant 
was arrested in Illinois on December  13, 2003, on the basis of 
an 
outstanding 
Wisconsin 
felony 
warrant 
for 
first-degree 
recklessly endangering safety (the offense resulting in the 
conviction in this case) and an Illinois probation violation 
warrant; and (2) that the defendant's custody from December 13, 
2003, until October 19, 2004, resulted in part from the 
outstanding felony warrant issued for the defendant by the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court. 
¶23 We shall further discuss the circuit court's findings 
of fact below when we apply Wis. Stat. § 973.155 to the relevant 
facts. 
¶24 The facts of the case and the calculation of 305 days 
of sentence credit in Wisconsin are perhaps more easily 
understood when summarized as in the following chart:  
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 The 305-day sentence credit on the Wisconsin sentence 
which the parties have calculated and which this court accepts 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
11 
 
as correct is calculated as follows: 
 
Dec. 13-15, 2003:    3 days in Illinois custody. 
 
Dec. 22-31, 2003:   10 days in Illinois custody. 
 
Jan. 1-31, 2004:    31 days in Illinois custody. 
 
Feb. 1-29, 2004:    29 days in Illinois custody. 
 
March 1-31, 2004:   31 days in Illinois custody. 
 
April 1-30, 2004:   30 days in Illinois custody.  
 
May 1-31, 2004:     31 days in Illinois custody. 
 
June 1-30, 2004:    30 days in Illinois custody. 
 
July 1-31, 2004:    31 days in Illinois custody. 
 
Aug. 1-31, 2004:    31 days in Illinois custody. 
 
Sept. 1-30, 2004:   30 days in Illinois custody.  
 
Oct. 1-18, 2004:    18 days in Illinois custody.  
         TOTAL:   305 days in Illinois presentence custody. 
III 
¶26 We 
turn 
now 
to 
describe 
the 
several 
judicial 
proceedings in the present case, culminating in a second oral 
argument before this court and the present decision. 
¶27 The sentence credit statute at issue here, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), provides for sentence credit for "all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for 
which sentence was imposed."  Days spent in custody include 
those days spent in custody while the offender is awaiting 
trial, is being tried, and is awaiting imposition of sentence.  
The statute provides: 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
12 
 
(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit toward 
the service of his or her sentence for all days spent 
in custody in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed. As used in this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, 
without limitation by enumeration, confinement related 
to an offense for which the offender is ultimately 
sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of 
the same course of conduct, which occurs: 
1. While the offender is awaiting trial;   
2. While the offender is being tried; and   
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial.     
¶28 The 
defendant's 
Wisconsin 
postconviction 
motion 
originally sought 324 days of sentence credit against the 
Wisconsin charge for the days he spent in custody in Illinois.10  
¶29 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction 
motion, 
erroneously 
concluding 
that 
"[a] 
defendant is not in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which the sentence is imposed until his custody is 
surrendered to that jurisdiction." 
                                                 
10 The calculation of 324 days differed in two ways from our 
holding today.  First, it was based on the belief that the 
defendant had not been sentenced on the Illinois armed robbery 
charges until November 2, 2004.  As explained in note 8, supra, 
the actual sentence date was October 19, 2004.  Thus 13 days of 
presentence custodyare eliminated from the total.  Second, it 
was based on credit for six days (December 15-21, 2003) that the 
record now shows the defendant served on his Illinois operating 
under the influence sentence.  These six days are also excluded 
from the calculation of Wisconsin sentence credit because the 
defendant was not in presentence custody in connection with the 
Wisconsin charge but was actually serving a sentence on an 
Illinois charge.  Correcting for these two differences reduces 
the calculation to 305 days of sentence credit, as the parties 
now agree. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
13 
 
¶30 The defendant appealed to the court of appeals.  On 
appeal, the State did not dispute that the defendant was in 
custody in Illinois from December 14, 2003, until he was 
sentenced for the Illinois crime because of both the Illinois 
charges and the Wisconsin felony warrant.11  The dispute was 
whether the defendant's custody in Illinois was properly 
understood as being "in connection with" the conduct for which 
he was sentenced in Wisconsin for purposes of § 973.155(1)(a).12   
¶31 The State argued at the court of appeals that a 
defendant should not be entitled to sentence credit unless the 
presentence custody in Illinois had been exclusively the result 
of the Wisconsin charges.  In support of its position, the State 
pointed to the Special Material in Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A, 
stating that a defendant is entitled to sentence credit if 
detained in jail in another jurisdiction "when that detention 
results exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer."13   
¶32 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
explicitly 
rejected 
this 
argument, concluding that no case law supported an "exclusivity" 
requirement and that the case law was "inconsistent with" the 
Special Materials.   
                                                 
11 Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶9. 
12 Id. 
13 As the court of appeals explained, "[t]he special 
material is prepared by the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee 
and 'is a comprehensive study of the sentence credit statute 
with guidelines for its implementation in the trial court.'  
State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983)."  
Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶7, n.6.    
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
14 
 
¶33 The court of appeals carefully analyzed State v. 
Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. 
Nyborg, 122 Wis. 2d 765, 768, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985); 
and State v. Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 
1991), cited by the Special Materials, and concluded that these 
three cases were not applicable to the present case.  The first 
two cases involved an intrastate "detainer," that is, a request 
by a district attorney to a sheriff of another county that the 
sheriff continue to detain an accused person for resolution of 
the requesting county's charges, even if the jurisdiction in 
which the accused is detained resolves its own charges and would 
otherwise release the person on whom the detainer has been 
placed.  The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does 
not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any 
custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted 
elsewhere.14  The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl 
case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to 
the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences.15 
¶34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of 
these three cases supports the proposition that a person 
detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in 
connection with" a Wisconsin charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
unless the person is in custody exclusively pursuant to a 
                                                 
14 Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶18. 
15 Id., ¶¶19, 22. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
15 
 
Wisconsin warrant.16  The court of appeals declined the State's 
suggestion 
to 
adopt 
an 
exclusivity 
requirement 
on 
the 
"persuasive authority" of the Special Materials.17  We agree with 
the court of appeals' analysis of these cases. 
¶35 The court of appeals also addressed State v. Ward, 153 
Wis. 2d 743, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989), on which the 
defendant relied, and our then-recent decision in State v. 
Johnson (Marcus Johnson), 2007 WI 107, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 
N.W.2d 505.18   
¶36 In Ward, 153 Wis. 2d at 746, the court of appeals 
concluded, consistent with the conclusion of the Wisconsin Civil 
Jury Instruction Committee,19 that "[w]hen concurrent sentences 
are imposed at the same time or for offenses arising from the 
same course of conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a 
total number of days and is to be credited against each sentence 
imposed."  
¶37 In its decision in the present case, the court of 
appeals concluded that "the [Marcus] Johnson court did not 
intend to overrule Ward" and that "the principle applied in 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶13. 
17 Id., ¶23.   
18 The 2007 Marcus Johnson case was decided after the 
initial briefing in the present case at the court of appeals, 
and the court of appeals asked for and received supplemental 
briefing from the parties on the question whether the 2007 
Marcus Johnson decision applies to the present case.  Carter, 
2007 WI App 255, ¶28. 
19 Wis JI——Criminal SM-34A. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
16 
 
Ward . . . applies in this case——that when a defendant is in 
custody, presentence, on two separate charges and the sentences 
are concurrent, the defendant is entitled to sentence credit 
against each sentence."20  Furthermore, the Marcus Johnson case 
reinforced the State v. Beets decision, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 369 
N.W.2d 382 (1985), which held that "unless the acts for which 
the first and second sentences are imposed are truly related or 
identical, the sentencing on one charge severs the connection 
between the custody and the pending charges."  Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d at 383.  In other words, once a defendant is actually 
serving the sentence on a charge, the defendant is not entitled 
to credit for presentence custody toward sentences on unrelated 
charges, although trial may be pending on the separate charges 
at the time the defendant is serving the first sentence.  
Neither the State nor the defendant argues for credit in the 
present case for the days when the defendant was serving an 
Illinois sentence. 
¶38 The court of appeals also concluded in the present 
case that there was no reason supporting the State's argument 
that sentence credit is not awarded when concurrent sentences 
are not imposed at the same time.21  Finally, the court of 
appeals concluded that the same rules for sentence credit 
                                                 
20 Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶¶28-30. 
21 Id., ¶30. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
17 
 
applied whether the presentence custody was in Wisconsin or in 
another state.22       
¶39 The court of appeals therefore awarded the 324 days of 
sentence credit that the defendant sought on the basis of the 
factual record presented at that time.  
¶40 On review in this court, the State abandoned its 
reliance on the Special Materials and took the position that 
"the Court of Appeals correctly rejected Wis. JI——Criminal SM-
34A" because the court of appeals had "correctly analyzed the 
case law" cited in SM-34A.23  We agree with the State's decision 
to abandon its exclusivity argument for the persuasive reasons 
set forth by the court of appeals.  
¶41 Moving away from the exclusivity argument in this 
court, the State's initial brief asserted that the court of 
appeals had erred in its application of State v. Ward and that 
sentence credit should not be granted on concurrent sentences 
when those concurrent sentences were imposed at different times, 
as happened in the instant case.24     
¶42 The State took the position in its initial brief that 
although the Wisconsin sentence runs concurrent with the 
Illinois sentence, "[t]he only way Carter would be entitled to 
sentence credit on his Wisconsin sentence for the days he 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 7-8. 
24 The Illinois court imposed sentence on October 19, 2004.  
The Wisconsin court accepted defendant's guilty plea and imposed 
a concurrent sentence on August 30, 2005. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
18 
 
claims, is if he could demonstrate that he had not received 
credit for the same pretrial confinement on his Illinois 
sentence."25  We now know that the defendant received sentence 
credit for 305 days on his Illinois sentence.26  
¶43 The defendant argued in this court that the State had 
waived this argument about the timing of the imposition of the 
sentences by not raising it at the circuit court or the court of 
appeals.  He further argued that the logic behind the State's 
new position was flawed and that when a defendant is in custody 
in connection with the course of conduct underlying two or more 
cases, and sentences for those cases are imposed concurrently, 
the sentence credit should be applied to both sentences.27     
¶44 At our first oral argument it became clear that 
because sentence credit turned on whether the defendant was in 
custody in Illinois "in connection with" the Wisconsin charge, 
the record did not adequately establish the facts of the 
defendant's arrest and custody in Illinois.  We therefore 
remanded the cause to the circuit court "to receive the 
documents relating to the Illinois presentence proceedings and 
                                                 
25 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 23. 
26 Findings of Fact No. 10.   
27 The defendant pointed to the equal protection concepts 
underlying Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and argued that for concurrent 
sentences, "dual credit 'is necessary to insure that the 
defendant who was unable to post bail is not incarcerated any 
longer than a comparable individual who could post bail.'"  
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 27 (citing Richard White, 
Sentence Credit: More Than Just Math, Wis. Lawyer, Oct. 1991, at 
26, 29). 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
19 
 
for a hearing to determine the ground or grounds on which the 
defendant was held in an Illinois jail from December 14, 2003, 
to November 2, 2004." 
¶45 On remand, defense counsel procured several additional 
documents.  The parties agreed to the submission of fifteen 
documents as exhibits at the circuit court, which made its 
findings of fact on the basis of those exhibits.     
¶46 In the parties' joint response to this court after the 
remand, the parties agreed that our decision in State v. Johnson 
(Elandis Johnson), 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207,28 
was controlling in the present case.  According to the parties, 
the unanimous Elandis Johnson decision held that "sentence 
credit is awarded based on whether custody is 'in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed' 
without regard to the timing of the imposition of any concurrent 
sentences," and that "this holding forecloses the state's 
position that the timing of the imposition of concurrent 
sentences imposed at different times affects the sentence credit 
award."29   
¶47 Neither party requested additional oral argument. 
Nevertheless, we heard extended oral argument for a second time 
on October 21, 2009. 
                                                 
28 The 2009 Elandis Johnson case was argued on the same day 
this court first heard argument in the instant case, September 
12, 2008. 
29 Joint Response at 2-3 (citing Elandis Johnson, 318 
Wis. 2d 21, ¶3). 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
20 
 
¶48 At oral argument, the State emphasized that its prior 
argument 
about 
the 
need 
for 
simultaneous 
imposition 
of 
concurrent 
sentences 
"has 
been 
removed, 
or 
undercut, 
or 
completely done away with . . . by Elandis Johnson.  Because in 
my view the teaching of that case is that we do not look at the 
timing of the imposition of the sentence, with the one exception 
of 
consecutive 
sentences. . . . [W]e 
look 
at 
whether 
the 
sentence for which credit is claimed is factually connected with 
the conduct."  
¶49 We 
agree 
with 
the 
State's 
and 
defendant's 
interpretation of the Elandis Johnson case and its application 
to the present case. 
IV 
¶50 Although the parties agree about how Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
and 
the 
existing 
case 
law 
apply 
to 
the 
undisputed facts in the present case, we are not bound by the 
parties' interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a 
party's concession of law.30  This court, not the parties, 
decides questions of law.   
¶51 The provisions of the sentence credit law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1), are mandatory.  A sentencing court must give 
credit accorded by statute because "a person [may] not serve 
more time than that for which he is sentenced."31  
                                                 
30 Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 
(1997). 
31 State v. Ward, 153 Wis. 2d 743, 745, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 
N.W.2d 382 (1985)).  
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
21 
 
¶52 Admittedly, the circuit court's findings of fact and 
the record now before us lack some particulars.  Still, any 
relevant weaknesses are either bridged by reasonable inference 
from the undisputed facts or are not material.  The facts as 
established by the circuit court and the record are sufficient 
to apply the established principle of law. 
¶53 The established principle of law is that a convicted 
person 
is 
entitled 
to 
credit, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1), toward his Wisconsin sentence for all days spent 
in custody outside the state if the custody was in whole or in 
part "in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence [in Wisconsin] was imposed." 
¶54 Our unanimous synthesis of the case law in the Elandis 
Johnson decision, 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207, 
authored by Justice Prosser, controls the present case.  In that 
case the question was whether the statute "requires a court to 
apply the same sentence credit to each concurrent sentence given 
to an offender at the same sentencing hearing, regardless of 
whether the offender's days spent in presentence custody were 
'in connection with the course of conduct for which [each] 
sentence was imposed.'"32  We answered that question in the 
negative.  There, Elandis Johnson received his three concurrent 
sentences at the same hearing, but they arose from separate 
cases.33  The cases arose from separate courses of conduct, and 
                                                 
32 Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶2. 
33 Id., ¶24. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
22 
 
each period of custody for which the defendant sought sentence 
credit was "tied directly to only one case."34   
¶55 The defendant in Elandis Johnson argued that Ward, 153 
Wis. 2d 743, on which the defendant in this case also relies, 
controlled his case.35  Our Elandis Johnson opinion therefore 
gave Ward a "close examination."36  We observed that in Ward the 
defendant was "in custody in connection with both [three 
marijuana charges] and [two separate cocaine charges] from his 
arrest until he was sentenced in each of the two cases."37  We 
clarified that the court of appeals' apparent reliance on Wis 
JI——Criminal SM-34A had been "unfortunate" and "not totally 
accurate."  Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶59, 61.   
¶56 We analyzed Ward in Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 
¶¶65-66, as follows:  
Ward demonstrates that when a defendant spends time in 
presentence 
custody 
and 
the 
reason 
for 
that 
presentence custody is "in connection with the course 
of conduct for which sentence was imposed," then the 
time spent in presentence custody must be credited 
against the ultimate sentence imposed. 
 
. . . . 
[I]n order for time in presentence custody to be 
credited to the sentence imposed, there must be a 
factual connection between the presentence custody and 
the sentence. 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Id., ¶25. 
36 Id., ¶51. 
37 Id., ¶53. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
23 
 
In other words, in Elandis Johnson we rejected the defendant's 
reliance on a procedural connection between multiple concurrent 
sentences by emphasizing that it is the factual connection 
between custody and the conduct for which sentence is imposed 
that is controlling.38 
                                                 
38 In contrast to this straightforward approach, Justice 
Prosser spins a long, winding tale about the sentence credit 
statute.  Where the tale leads, and what lesson is to be 
learned, is difficult to fathom. 
Among other detours, Justice Prosser takes up issues never 
raised or argued in this case's long history, including the 
definition of custody.  See Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶153-
168.  The dissent cites as "highly relevant" numerous federal 
cases 
never 
previously 
cited 
in 
any 
Wisconsin 
decision 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  See Justice Prosser's 
dissent, ¶¶138-140 & n.4.  Justice Prosser first veers toward 
the position that the defendant should receive credit only for 
custody that was solely or exclusively "in connection with" the 
underlying offense.  See Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶129, 139-
140 & n.4, 146-147 & n.5.  Persuaded by the court of appeals' 
decision, the State abandoned the "exclusivity" argument; the 
Wisconsin statute provides no textual basis for "solely" or 
"exclusively"; and an exclusivity requirement departs from our 
established case law.  Tellingly, while cases from a number of 
other states dating back to 1973 have expressly stated that the 
sentence credit rule in those states is only for custody 
"solely" in connection with the relevant charge, see Justice 
Prosser's dissent, ¶147 & n.5, none of today's several writings 
has 
cited 
any 
Wisconsin 
case 
to 
have 
adopted 
that 
interpretation. 
 
The 
dissent 
eventually 
backs 
off 
from 
contemplating 
exclusivity 
to 
suggest 
various 
murky 
and 
difficult-to-administer 
tests 
that 
might 
apply 
in 
this 
situation:  Whether the defendant "was held . . . primarily on 
the 
charge 
from 
Wisconsin," 
¶129; 
whether 
later 
charges 
"supersede" or "overwhelm" an established factual connection 
between custody and the underlying course of conduct, ¶201; 
whether the custody was "grounded almost entirely" in Illinois 
procedures, ¶234; or "how large a factor" one charge or warrant 
played in the arrest and subsequent custody, ¶231.   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
24 
 
¶57 Thus we must determine in the instant case whether a 
"factual connection" exists between the defendant's presentence 
Illinois custody (from December 13, 2003, to October 19, 2004) 
and the Wisconsin sentence imposed.39  We now examine the facts 
in greater detail. 
                                                                                                                                                             
So at the end of the dissent's twisting tale, it is 
difficult to discern what result Justice Prosser would favor 
except to disagree with the result set forth herein.  What 
lessons circuit courts might glean from the dissent's take on 
the established law remain a mystery. 
39 Justice Roggensack attempts to shift the focus away from 
the factual connection the court emphasized in Elandis Johnson 
to "necessary legal process," a phrase not used in the statute 
or in our previous decisions.  See Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶93.  According to Justice Roggensack, the 
defendant's Illinois custody was not "in connection with" the 
criminal conduct in Wisconsin until the time an Illinois 
fugitive (or prerequisition) warrant was issued.  Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶100, 103.  Reliance on State 
v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975), see Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶¶100-103, 
is 
misplaced.  
Hughes did not involve sentence credit or the sentence credit 
statute.  
Furthermore, in Hughes, as in the instant case, the person 
was in custody in the asylum state on the basis of information 
that the person was wanted on a felony charge in another state.   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
25 
 
¶58 On July 23, 2003, a criminal complaint was filed 
against the defendant Patrick Carter in Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court.  The defendant, a resident of Chicago, Illinois, was 
charged with first degree recklessly endangering safety, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1).  The complaint alleged that 
while visiting Milwaukee on June 20, 2003, the defendant fired 
shots that wounded Phillip Jordan, who died from his injuries. 
¶59 On the same date and together with the complaint, the 
court 
issued 
a 
"Felony 
Warrant 
(and 
Authorization 
for 
Extradition)" authorizing the defendant's arrest. 
¶60 The felony warrant follows the prescribed form and 
requirements of a warrant authorized by Wis. Stat. § 968.04.  
The 
Wisconsin 
felony 
warrant 
was 
addressed 
"to 
any 
law 
enforcement 
officer" 
and 
authorized 
extradition 
from 
any 
location in the United States.40 
                                                                                                                                                             
The defendant in the instant case was taken into custody by 
valid police authority, on December 13, 2003, when Chicago 
police arrested the defendant and reported that the arrest was 
based on the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant.  See supra 
¶¶54-55.  Justice Roggensack's logic would appear to deny 
sentence credit for days in confinement prior to a court 
appearance in every case where arrest is made prior to the 
asylum state's issuance of a fugitive warrant.  This position 
cannot be squared with the clear authorization for such 
"warrantless" arrests in the asylum state (Illinois), provided 
in 
the 
extradition 
statutes. 
 
See 
infra, 
¶61; 
Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶102.  As a practical matter, 
Justice Roggensack is denying the defendant sentence credit here 
for the time from when he was arrested, 12:45 p.m. on Saturday, 
December 13, 2003, until he was brought to an Illinois court on 
Monday, December 15, 2003.   
40 The Wisconsin "Felony Warrant (and Authorization for 
Extradition)" is in the record as Exhibit No. 1.   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
26 
 
¶61 The Wisconsin warrant does have a legal effect outside 
the state of Wisconsin.  Law enforcement officers in Illinois 
(the state other than the state that issued the warrant) are 
authorized to lawfully arrest a person on the basis of an out-
of-state 
warrant.41 
 Section 14 of the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act,42 adopted in "the overwhelming majority of the 
states,"43 including both Wisconsin and Illinois, authorizes 
police in the "asylum state" (here Illinois) to lawfully arrest 
an accused felon "without a warrant upon reasonable information 
that the accused stands charged in the courts of a[nother] 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Wisconsin statute provides that such warrants "shall be 
directed to all law enforcement officers of the state.  A 
warrant may be served anywhere in the state."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.04(4). 
41 For an example of a Wisconsin police officer's making an 
arrest of a person found in Wisconsin on the basis of an 
outstanding 
Nebraska 
warrant, 
see 
State 
v. 
Hoffman, 
163 
Wis. 2d 752, 755, 472 N.W.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Even if it were arguable, and it is not, that the 
defendant's arrest and custody in Illinois on the basis of the 
Wisconsin felony warrant were not lawful, the defendant was 
factually in custody on December 13, 2003, in connection with 
the course of conduct in Wisconsin. 
42 See 11 U.L.A. Appendix I (2003).  The relevant provisions 
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act remain the statutory law 
of both Wisconsin and Illinois, even though "the Uniform 
Criminal Extradition Act (as last revised in 1936) was withdrawn 
from recommendation for enactment by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1982 due to it being 
superseded by the Uniform Extradition and Rendition Act (1980)."  
Id. at 289. 
43 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.4(c) 
(2007). 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
27 
 
state."  Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14 
(2009).44  In the instant case, the Wisconsin warrant provided 
reasonable information for Illinois law enforcement officers to 
know that the defendant was charged with a felony in Wisconsin.45   
¶62 According to the circuit court's findings of fact, "On 
December 13, 2003, defendant was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, 
on a probation violation warrant from Illinois and on the 
                                                 
44 This provision in its entirety, as codified in Wisconsin 
at Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14) reads: 
(14) Arrest without a warrant. The arrest of a person 
may be lawfully made also by an officer or a private 
citizen without a warrant upon reasonable information 
that the accused stands charged in the courts of 
another state with a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; but when 
so arrested the accused must be taken before a judge 
with all practicable speed and complaint must be made 
against the accused under oath setting forth the 
ground for the arrest as in sub. (13); and thereafter 
the accused's answer shall be heard as if the accused 
had been arrested on a warrant. 
Authority for the arrest is confirmed by 725 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/107-2(1)(b): 
(1) A peace officer may arrest a person when: 
 
. . . . 
(b) He has reasonable grounds to believe that a 
warrant for the person's arrest has been issued in 
this State or in another jurisdiction[.] 
45 Under the Uniform Act, the governor of each state has a 
duty "to have arrested and delivered up to the Executive 
Authority of any other state . . . any person charged in that 
State with treason, felony, or other crime . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.03(2); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/2. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
28 
 
Wisconsin warrant."46  This finding is not clearly erroneous.  It 
is supported by the "Chicago Police Department Arrest Report."  
The arrest report lists the Wisconsin warrant as the first basis 
for the arrest.  Furthermore, the Illinois arrest report also 
identifies the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant with the 
designation "Warrant No. W064549547."  The same number is 
written on the face of the Wisconsin felony warrant and 
authorization for extradition, next to the "Authorization for 
Extradition" on the original Wisconsin felony warrant. 
¶63 Thus on the face of the Illinois arrest report a 
factual connection exists between the defendant's arrest and 
resulting presentence custody in Illinois and the Wisconsin 
conduct for which the Wisconsin felony warrant was outstanding 
and for which sentence was later imposed.47  We need not 
speculate beyond the record about what motivations the Chicago 
Police may or may not have had for the defendant's arrest.48  The 
                                                 
46 Finding of Fact No. 2. 
47 As stated in note 8 above, an earlier investigator's 
report asserts that the defendant was not "charged" with the 
Wisconsin Fugitive Warrant until December 16, 2003.  Nothing in 
the record supports this date.  Moreover, even if supported, the 
date is now immaterial, since the fact of the defendant's lawful 
arrest on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant 
establishes the factual connection between custody beginning on 
the arrest date and the conduct that provided the underlying 
cause for that arrest. 
48 At oral argument there was speculation that the defendant 
was arrested because he had been under investigation for a June 
9, 2002 Illinois armed robbery and that the Wisconsin warrant 
merely provided a convenient basis to the Chicago police for his 
arrest to complete the armed robbery investigation:  
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Prosser: "My theory is that on the 13th of 
December, somehow the Chicago Police went out to find 
[the defendant].  They had an Illinois warrant, and 
they probably had a Wisconsin warrant as well, and he 
was a suspect in a robbery." 
Defense Counsel: "While I believe that is speculation, 
I've speculated exactly the same way. . . .  
. . . . 
Justice Prosser:  Well that's my speculation here.  
What we'd hoped is that you would clarify this so we 
wouldn't have to speculate . . .  
Defense Counsel:  Well, my position would be this: 
When an arresting officer tells me that he arrested 
someone based on two warrants, we take him at his 
word.  I therefore believe it is not speculation 
that's what he arrested him on . . . . 
Justice Prosser persists in his "speculation."  See Justice 
Prosser's dissent, passim and ¶¶125-126 & nn.1-2, ¶193.  This 
court does not resolve cases on the basis of speculation, 
confabulation, or "theories" about what may or may not have 
occurred.  We resolve this case on the basis of the record 
before us and the circuit court's findings of fact based on that 
record.   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
30 
 
circuit court found: "On December 13, 2003, defendant was 
arrested . . . on the Wisconsin warrant."  Finding of Fact No. 
2. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, the circuit court found as a fact that Carter was 
arrested on the basis of the Wisconsin warrant, not for the 
armed robbery.  Finding of Fact No. 2.  Further, the record 
contains a Chicago Police Department "Supplementary Report" 
regarding the armed robbery investigation.  The report was 
completed by the detective who investigated the armed robbery.  
The report plainly states that sometime after the arrest of 
Saturday, December 13, 2003, the detective "learned that 
OFFENDER/CARTER was arrested 13 DEC 03 on an unrelated charge 
and was in custody at Cook County Jail."  The detective 
investigating the armed robbery made no mention of Carter's 
court appearance on Monday, December 15, 2003.  After learning 
that Carter was in custody, he interviewed Carter and conducted 
a physical lineup for identification in the armed robbery 
investigation.  These events took place on December 19, 2003, 
six days after the arrest.  Carter was then arrested for the 
armed robbery.  He was scheduled for an additional court 
appearance.  See Exhibit 14.  Rather than Justice Prosser's 
personal "speculation" that police were aware of the armed 
robbery on December 13 and 15, we instead rely on the 
contemporaneous report of the detective who investigated that 
crime, which in our view provides a considerably more convincing 
account of "what actually happened in Carter's case."  See 
Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶213.  
Justice Ziegler and looks askance at certain of the circuit 
court's findings of fact, or ignores documents in the record 
that are inconvenient to her view of the case.  Yet no justice 
has identified any one of the circuit court's findings of fact 
as being clearly erroneous.  For instance, Justice Ziegler's 
dissent, ¶¶259, 250, suggests that Chicago Police merely 
"possess[ed] knowledge" of the outstanding Wisconsin warrant and 
that there is "no proof that he was arrested . . . on the 
Wisconsin charge."  The Chicago arrest report, which is in the 
record, specifically identifies the Wisconsin felony warrant as 
a basis for arrest and resolves any doubts or speculation along 
these lines. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
31 
 
¶64 On December 15, 2003, while still in Illinois custody, 
the defendant appeared in Cook County Court.49  This appearance 
conforms to the requirements of the Uniform Act. 
¶65 Under the Uniform Act, when the accused is arrested as 
a result of an out-of-state warrant, "the accused must be taken 
before a judge with all practicable speed," at which point a 
complaint is entered on the basis of the criminal charge from 
the foreign state and "thereafter his answer shall be heard as 
if he had been arrested on a warrant."  Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14); 
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14. 
¶66 At this court appearance, the Uniform Act requires the 
judge in the asylum state (here Illinois) to commit the accused 
fugitive to jail "by a warrant reciting the accusation" if "it 
appears that the person held is the person charged with having 
committed the crime alleged and . . . that he has fled from 
justice."  Wis. Stat. § 976.03(15); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15.  
This commitment period is for 30 days, to "enable the arrest of 
the accused to be made under a warrant of the governor," but it 
can be extended for an additional 60 days.50  Thus the defendant 
could have been kept in Illinois custody for at least 90 days on 
the basis of the Wisconsin felony warrant without any further 
action or authority. 
¶67 At the December 15, 2003 hearing, the defendant 
refused to waive formal extradition.  Under Illinois practice he 
                                                 
49 Finding of Fact No. 6. 
50 Wis. Stat. § 976.03(17); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/17. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
32 
 
could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local 
(Illinois) charge and that local charge had to be resolved 
before he could be sent back to Wisconsin.51   
¶68 On the same date, December 15, 2003, the Chicago 
Police Department Extradition Unit sent a teletype message to 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department, 
giving 
notice 
that 
the 
defendant was in custody in Cook County and had refused to waive 
                                                 
51 Finding of Fact No 6.  See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/19.  
See also Affidavit of Mary E. Taylor.  Ms. Taylor, an 
investigator with the Office of the State Public Defender, 
Milwaukee Appellate Office, spoke by telephone with Shani Sun, 
supervisor of the Extradition Unit of the Chicago Police 
Department.  Officer Sun verified "that resolution of a local 
charge had to occur before a defendant could waive extradition 
and be sent to another state to face charges."  This was also 
verified by Deborah White, Chief Director-Felony Division of the 
Cook County Public Defender's Office.   
To support this point, defense counsel also submitted into 
evidence (Exhibit No. 10) a certified transcript from a 
September 24, 2004 hearing in another case (State v. Townsend, 
No. 01-CF-005345, Circuit Court, Branch 30, Milwaukee County).  
In that proceeding, Investigator Wayne Layer of the Cook County 
Sheriff's Department Extradition Unit described in some detail 
the normal extradition procedures followed in Cook County.  He 
specified 
that 
a 
defendant 
"couldn't 
agree 
to 
the 
extradition . . . because he had a local charge, and we had to 
finish that local charge before we send him back to Wisconsin."  
Exhibit 10 at 13.  At oral argument, counsel for the State said, 
"I think all the states have this exception where they won't 
surrender somebody to a demanding state until the felony, if 
there is one, in their state is resolved."  
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
33 
 
formal extradition, and requesting that Wisconsin authorities 
proceed with an application for a governor's warrant.52  
¶69 Also on December 15, 2003, the defendant's supervision 
on the prior Illinois drunk driving charge was revoked, and he 
was sentenced to serve (and did serve) in the Cook County Jail 
from December 15 to December 21, 2003, on that revocation 
charge.53  
¶70 On December 19, 2003, while serving his Illinois OWI 
charge, the defendant was arrested on two Illinois armed robbery 
charges.54   
¶71 A Wisconsin governor's warrant for Extradition was 
signed on February 6, 2004,55 but on March 5, 2004, the Chicago 
Police Department sent another teletype to the Milwaukee Police 
Department advising that the governor's warrant had not been 
received.  This teletype notified the Milwaukee police that the 
90-day deadline was approaching, beyond which "the fugitive 
                                                 
52 Exhibit 9.  The Uniform Act also creates the procedures 
for the issuance of a "governor's warrant" to accomplish the 
extradition of a fugitive charged in one state but arrested and 
detained in another.  See Wis. Stat. § 976.03(3)-(8).  The 
procedure of sending such a teletype to notify Wisconsin 
authorities of defendant's custody and pending charges in 
Illinois and to begin proceedings on a governor's warrant 
followed normal practice in Cook County, according to the prior 
testimony of Investigator Layer submitted by defense counsel.  
See supra note 51. 
53 Finding of Fact No. 5. 
54 Finding of Fact No. 7. 
55 Finding of Fact No. 8; Exhibit No. 15. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
34 
 
charge must be dismissed."56  Although the investigator's report 
on which prior proceedings relied showed that the defendant was 
served with the Wisconsin governor's warrant on March 11, 2004, 
the present record does not document the date on which this 
service actually occurred.  We do know, however, that Illinois 
was aware on March 5 that the charge "must be dismissed" if the 
governor's application for a warrant were not received and 
served before the deadline.57 The hold based on the Wisconsin 
charges was not, in fact, released until October 20, 2004.58  
Illinois therefore treated the extradition hold as valid until 
that date.  The reasonable inference from the record is that the 
governor's application for a warrant was received within the 90-
day time limit.59 
¶72 On October 19, 2004, the defendant was sentenced to 
two concurrent sentences of 14 years on two counts of armed 
                                                 
56 Exhibit 11.  The 90-day period of detention authorized by 
Sections 15 and 17 of the Uniform Act beginning on December 15, 
2003 would have expired on March 14, 2004. 
57 Exhibit 11. 
58 Finding of Fact No. 11. 
59 On this point at oral argument, counsel for the state 
stated, "On my reading of the record, he was held on fugitive 
Illinois warrant until the Illinois governor's warrant issued.  
Now if that was beyond 90 days, I'm not sure how they 
accomplished that.  But I do know it happens.  I've seen cases—
other cases in which it takes more than 90 days for the 
extradition process to go through." 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
35 
 
robbery in Cook County (Case No. 04CR0055701).60  The Illinois 
court credited defendant for 305 days of presentence custody.61   
¶73 As noted, the hold on the defendant based on the 
Wisconsin charges was released the following day, on October 20, 
2004.62  The record is silent about why, after the governor's 
warrant issued, the extradition case was dismissed, and the 
defendant was transferred to the Illinois prison system.  At 
oral argument, counsel for the State said: "For some reason——
again, I haven't a clue what goes on down in Illinois——but for 
some 
reason 
after 
the 
disposition 
of 
his 
Illinois 
sentence . . . he went into the Illinois prison system.  So he 
actually came back here . . . under the Uniform Detainers Act."  
This procedure is also in keeping with what the record reflects 
to be normal practice in Illinois: once defendant is convicted 
and sentenced on an Illinois charge, he or she is incarcerated 
by the Illinois Department of Corrections and the governor's 
warrant is dismissed.63 
                                                 
60 Finding of Fact No. 10. 
61 Id. 
62 Finding of Fact No. 11. 
63 Exhibit 10 at 23-24.  This point is clarified in the 
transcript of testimony from Investigator Layer, see supra note 
51. 
Q:  So a known procedure if the prisoner gets a local 
prison sentence, the governor's warrant goes back to 
the Chief Judge of the Criminal Division, and it gets 
dismissed? 
A:  That's correct. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
36 
 
¶74 On June 6, 2005, while still serving the Illinois 
prison sentence for armed robbery, the defendant was conveyed to 
Milwaukee County.64  The State's initial brief in this court 
surmised that the defendant was returned to Wisconsin pursuant 
to the Uniform Agreement on Detainers, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(4).65  
On remand, a document executed by the Milwaukee County Deputy 
District Attorney to the warden of an Illinois corrections 
institution states that the defendant was transferred to 
Milwaukee County pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers for trial.66  
                                                 
64 Finding of Fact No. 12. 
65 Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 
3-4, n.2. 
66 For 
a 
discussion 
of 
the 
interstate 
agreement 
on 
detainers, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 18.4(c) (2007) (footnotes omitted).  Professor LaFave writes: 
[T]he necessity for extradition often can be avoided 
by proceeding 
under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, a Compact which has been adopted by the 
federal government and virtually all the states. The 
IAD provides that a prisoner "serving a term of 
imprisonment" (which excludes a pretrial detainee, a 
person serving a misdemeanor sentence in the county 
jail, and perhaps a person still in a facility for 
temporary custody, but includes a person serving a 
prison term who has other charges pending in the 
incarcerating jurisdiction) against whom a detainer 
has been filed must be promptly notified of that fact 
and of his right to demand trial, and if he demands 
trial 
then 
trial 
must 
be 
had 
within 
180 
days 
thereafter; the request is a waiver of extradition by 
the prisoner, and the state by adopting the Compact 
has agreed to surrender the prisoner under such 
circumstances . . . . 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
37 
 
¶75 On August 30, 2005, the defendant entered a plea of 
guilty to the Wisconsin charge of first degree reckless 
endangering safety and was sentenced to seven years and six 
months 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
five 
years 
extended 
supervision.  The Wisconsin sentence was imposed to run 
concurrently with any other sentence and the sentencing court 
stated that the Wisconsin sentence could be served either in 
Wisconsin or in Illinois.67    
¶76 From the records available, the procedures set forth 
in the Uniform Act appear to have been followed.  The defendant 
was arrested by Chicago Police officers on December 13, 2003, on 
the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
The record in this case is consistent with the procedure 
for extradition under a detainer.  When the defendant made an 
initial appearance in Wisconsin on June 1, 2005, defense counsel 
made note that a detainer was filed and that trial must begin on 
or before September 22, 2005.  Subsequently, on June 8, 2005, 
defense counsel notified the court that the case had been 
negotiated and a guilty plea was anticipated.  The defendant 
entered a guilty plea on August 30, 2005. 
67 Finding of Fact No. 13.  See also Transcript of 
Plea/Sentencing Hearing, Aug. 30, 2005, at 37-38 ("And the court 
is going to enter a concurrent sentence, and that would be for a 
initial confinement of 7.5 years and a extended supervision of 
five years, concurrent to your current sentence.  It may be 
served in Illinois, and you may serve this in an institution 
there rather than here.  You may also do the extended 
supervision there, if they're willing to take that on.  I don't 
know that they will.  If not, it would have to come back here.  
I think for the [victim's] family's purposes, it probably would 
be better if you never entered this state again, and perhaps for 
the state as well, but it's gonna be their determination in 
Illinois whether they'll take that or not."). 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
38 
 
provided the arresting officers with "reasonable information" 
that the defendant was charged with a felony in Wisconsin.  
¶77 The defendant appeared in court in Illinois on 
December 15, 2003, and at that time the Chicago Police 
Department notified the Milwaukee Police Department that the 
defendant was in custody and requested that the formal request 
of a "governor's warrant" be initiated.  The defendant was 
thereafter in Illinois custody under the Uniform Act, as well as 
under Illinois law, awaiting trial for an Illinois offense.   
¶78 Thus, on the face of the Illinois arrest report and 
the documents in the record, a factual connection exists between 
the 
defendant's 
presentence 
custody 
in 
Illinois 
and 
the 
Wisconsin sentence imposed.  The circuit court's finding of fact 
that the defendant was arrested and taken into custody in 
Illinois on the basis of the outstanding Wisconsin felony 
warrant on December 13, 2003 is not clearly erroneous, and we 
decline to set it aside. 
¶79 The circuit court's finding No. 14 is that the 
defendant's presentence custody in Illinois from December 13, 
2003 until October 19, 200468 was "custody resulting in part from 
the Wisconsin warrant issued in this case."  This finding is not 
clearly erroneous.  Thus the warrant, the arrest, and the 
                                                 
68 The six days when the defendant was serving a separate 
sentence on unrelated Illinois charges are excluded from the 
calculation of sentence credit. 
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
39 
 
presentence custody were in connection with the course of 
conduct for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin.69   
                                                 
69 In dissent, Justice Ziegler argues, in essence, that the 
record inadequately demonstrates that presentence custody in 
Illinois was "in connection with" the conduct for which the 
defendant was sentenced.  Indeed, she is considerably more 
zealous in her skepticism of defendant's claims and evidence 
than was the State. 
No one argues this is the best of records, but we review 
the circuit court's fact-finding for clear error and find none.  
Justice Ziegler does not specify what clear error she thinks 
occurred.  She appears to object to the absence of Illinois 
court records for Carter's appearance of December 15, 2003 and 
protests 
reliance 
on 
law 
enforcement 
teletypes 
regarding 
Carter's extradition proceedings. 
Is Justice Ziegler suggesting a per se rule that the 
circuit courts may only base factual findings on official court 
records?  "Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the 
relevance and admissibility of proffered evidence."  State v. 
Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d 316, 319, 477 N.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1991).  
Here, the teletypes and documentation of Carter's custody in 
Illinois were accepted as evidentiary exhibits without objection 
from the State, which does not dispute either their accuracy or 
their implications. 
The critical facts are not disputed.  Chicago police not 
only "possess[ed] knowledge" of defendant's Wisconsin felony 
warrant, see Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶259, but arrested him 
on the basis of that warrant.  The defendant appeared in an 
Illinois 
court 
and 
Illinois 
officials 
began 
extradition 
proceedings the same day.  Even if there were a procedural 
shortcoming 
in 
the 
extradition 
procedures, 
the 
defendant 
remained in custody and the hold based on the Wisconsin conduct 
and felony warrant was not released until October 20, 2004.  The 
dissent's supposition that procedures may not have been properly 
followed does not persuade us to deny credit for days when 
defendant was actually in custody in connection with the conduct 
for which he was sentenced in Wisconsin.  See Justice Ziegler's 
dissent, ¶¶252-254.   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
40 
 
¶80 At the second oral argument, counsel for both the 
State and the defendant stated that they have independently 
reviewed the circuit court's findings of fact and each came to 
the conclusion that the defendant was entitled to 305 days of 
sentence credit.  Having thoroughly examined the record and 
applied our law interpreting § 973.155(1)(a), we have reached 
the same conclusion. 
¶81 For the reasons set forth, we modify the decision of 
the court of appeals and grant the defendant 305 days of 
sentence credit on the Wisconsin sentence and, as modified, 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
¶82 We conclude, as do the parties, that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1) the defendant's custody in Illinois for 305 days 
was in connection with the course of conduct for which he was 
sentenced in Wisconsin.  He was in custody in connection with 
the Wisconsin charge for which he was sentenced from the date of 
his arrest on December 13, 2003, until he was sentenced on an 
Illinois conviction on October 19, 2004, excluding six days 
between December 15 and December 21.  During those six days the 
defendant was serving a sentence on an Illinois charge and was 
not held in custody in connection with the course of conduct for 
which he was sentenced in Wisconsin. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Carter's return to Wisconsin under a detainer, see Justice 
Ziegler's dissent, ¶257, is not relevant because no sentence 
credit is given for time after October 19, 2004, when Carter was 
sentenced in Illinois. 
As to Justice Ziegler's concern about setting bail or bond, 
Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶258, the exact problem is unclear.   
No. 
2006AP1811-CR   
 
41 
 
¶83 The decision of the court of appeals is modified and 
as modified affirmed.  The cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and as modified affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶84 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion.  I write separately to emphasize the narrow 
and limited extent of our review in this case.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.17(2), "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous."  In this case, the circuit court has made 
specific findings of fact, and therefore it is our duty to defer 
to those findings "unless they are unsupported by the record."  
Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 223 Wis. 2d 417, 426, 588 
N.W.2d 26 (1999).  Even if the evidence permits a different 
finding, an appellate court is to affirm the circuit court's 
findings of fact "as long as the evidence would permit a 
reasonable person to make the finding."  Sellers v. Sellers, 201 
Wis. 2d 578, 586, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶85 The circuit court found (and the parties agree) that 
Carter's arrest and confinement in Illinois were based in part 
on the outstanding Wisconsin felony warrant for first degree 
recklessly endangering safety.  Specifically, the circuit court 
found that Carter "was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, on a 
probation violation warrant from Illinois and on the Wisconsin 
warrant" and that he "was held in custody resulting in part from 
the Wisconsin warrant issued in this case" from "December 13, 
2003, until October 19, 2004," excepting a six-day period while 
he "was serving his sentence" for the Illinois probation charge.1 
¶86 The circuit court conducted a thorough and diligent 
review of the evidence and reached a reasonable conclusion for 
which support exists within the record.  It reached its 
                                                 
1 Findings of Fact 2, 14. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
conclusions in part based on inferences, as is proper and as was 
necessary under the circumstances.  Reasonable minds may differ 
as to the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from such 
inferences; 
however, 
the 
existence 
of 
other 
reasonable 
interpretations does not make the findings of the circuit court 
clearly erroneous. 
¶87 Because of our obligation to defer to the circuit 
court's findings of fact, I agree with the majority and the 
parties that Carter is entitled to 305 days of sentencing 
credit.2  See majority op., ¶¶76-82. 
 
                                                 
2 I agree, however, with Justice Ziegler that the decision 
in this case addresses a very narrow set of facts and should not 
be seen as disturbing or modifying the principles established in 
our prior cases.  Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶239. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶88 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring/dissenting).   
I concur in that part of the majority opinion that concludes 
that Patrick Carter is due 302 days of sentence credit for the 
period between the date on which he finished his Illinois 
Driving Under the Influence (DUI) sentence, December 21, 2003, 
and the commencement of his Illinois armed robbery sentence, 
October 19, 2004.1  However, because no legal process caused 
Carter's custody in Illinois to be "in connection with" the 
Wisconsin crime2 until:  (1) Illinois issued a fugitive warrant 
for Carter's arrest, based on the Illinois fugitive complaint, 
and (2) Carter had completed his Illinois DUI sentence, I 
dissent from the majority opinion's grant of sentence credit 
prior to December 21, 2003.  
I. BACKGROUND 
¶89 On August 30, 2005, Carter was convicted of recklessly 
endangering safety, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1).  He 
seeks a redetermination of the sentence credit he is due in 
connection with that conviction based on time he alleges to have 
been in custody in Illinois in connection with that crime.  The 
majority opinion grants him 305 days of sentence credit.3  I 
would grant him 302 days of credit.  The difference may seem 
small, but the reason for the difference is important. 
¶90 Carter was arrested in Illinois on December 13, 2003.  
That arrest was based on an Illinois probation violation warrant 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶17. 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a). 
3 Majority op., ¶9. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
for a DUI conviction, dated September 3, 2002.  It appears that 
the Illinois authorities were also aware of the Wisconsin felony 
warrant,4 dated July 23, 2003.  First, Carter was brought before 
an Illinois judicial officer on the Wisconsin felony warrant on 
December 15, 2003.5  Carter refused to waive extradition to 
Wisconsin on that date.6  
¶91 On December 16, 2003, pursuant to Illinois' enactment 
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,7 Illinois issued a 
fugitive complaint and a fugitive arrest warrant against Carter.8  
My dispute with the majority opinion is that it gives Carter 
sentence credit for December 13, 2003 through December 15, 2003, 
when he was not subject to legal process that caused his 
Illinois custody to be in connection with the alleged commission 
                                                 
4 Throughout this opinion I use the terms "felony warrant" 
and "fugitive warrant."  As used herein, a "felony warrant" is a 
warrant issued by a jurisdiction that seeks the arrest of an 
individual for the alleged commission of a felony in that 
jurisdiction.  A "fugitive warrant" is a warrant issued by an 
asylum state pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.  
See State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975). 
Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding 
state is the state that is seeking the return of a defendant 
from another state.  Id. at 670.  The asylum state is the state 
where the defendant is physically present.  Id. 
5 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition 
Unit, teletype of 12/15/03.  
6 Id.   
7 Illinois has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 
as 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/1 et seq. 
8 July 5, 2006, Order of the Honorable Mel Flanagan; see 
also Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, 
teletype of 12/15/03. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
of a Wisconsin crime for which he received a sentence concurrent 
with the sentence for the Illinois conviction.   
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶92 In order to determine the appropriate amount of 
sentence credit to which Carter is entitled, I interpret and 
apply Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and portions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.03, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.9  Statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law.  State 
v. Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶27, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505.  
We independently interpret and apply statutes, while benefitting 
from 
the 
discussions 
in 
preceding 
judicial 
opinions.  
Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 
N.W.2d 641. 
B.  Necessary Legal Process 
¶93 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
establishes 
when 
sentence credit for presentencing incarceration is due.  It 
provides:  "A convicted offender shall be given credit toward 
the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody 
in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed." 
¶94 The application of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) requires 
that I determine whether Carter was "in custody" and also 
whether all the days of custody were "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  See Johnson, 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 
effective July 1, 1970. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶31 (citing  State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 
391, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing approvingly of 
Gavigan's 
holding 
that 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
requires 
two 
determinations:  whether the defendant was "in custody" and 
whether the custody was "in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed"). 
¶95 Carter was arrested and taken "in custody" in Illinois 
on December 13, 2003.  Accordingly, the first determination of 
whether Carter was "in custody" under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 
has been met.   
¶96 Our next task is to determine whether all the days 
Carter spent in custody were "in connection with" the subsequent 
Wisconsin conviction for reckless endangering, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 941.30(1).  We must make this decision based on Carter's 
proof of legal process that held him in Illinois in connection 
with the Wisconsin charge of reckless endangerment.  See State 
v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 25-26, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 
1984).  As the dissent of Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler 
correctly points out, Carter has the burden of proof in this 
regard.10  See State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 
N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that "[t]he law places 
the burden for demonstrating both custody and its 'connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed,' 
§ 973.155(1)(a), Stats., on the defendant. . . ."). 
                                                 
10 Ziegler, 
J., 
dissenting, 
¶244 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 
1995)).   
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶97 Carter's December 13, 2003 arrest was based on an 
Illinois probation violation warrant that resulted from a DUI 
conviction.  That Illinois warrant was issued September 3, 2002.  
It appears that the Illinois authorities were aware of a 
Wisconsin felony warrant because they took Carter before a 
magistrate on December 15, 2003, on which date he refused to 
waive formal extradition proceedings.11 
¶98 On December 15, 2003, Carter also was committed to the 
Cook County Department of Corrections to begin his sentence on 
the Illinois DUI conviction.12  Carter's service of his DUI 
sentence 
precluded 
sentence credit from December 15, 2003 
through December 21, 2003, when that sentence concluded.  See 
State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) 
(affirming that "an offender was not entitled to sentence credit 
for the time spent in custody awaiting sentence on a robbery 
charge 
when 
he 
was 
simultaneously 
in 
custody 
serving 
a 
misdemeanor sentence for fleeing the scene of a crime"). 
¶99 On December 16, 2003, in preparation for formal 
extradition to Wisconsin, it appears that Illinois issued a 
fugitive complaint and an Illinois fugitive warrant,13 based on 
the outstanding Wisconsin charges.  See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
                                                 
11 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition 
Unit, teletype of 12/15/03. 
12 See Cook County, Illinois Clerk of Circuit Court Order of 
Sentence and Commitment, Dec. 15, 2003. 
13 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition 
Unit, teletype of 12/15/03. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
225/13.14  The function of the fugitive warrant was to arrest 
Carter in Illinois in order to hold him lawfully in custody in 
Illinois for extradition to Wisconsin.  See State ex rel. Wells 
v. Hanley, 250 Wis. 374, 375, 27 N.W.2d 373 (1947) ("The 
function of the fugitive warrant under which the relator is 
detained is to provide for his arrest and detention pending the 
institution and conduct of an extradition proceeding."); see 
also Illinois v. Martin, 567 N.E.2d 1097, 1098-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991). 
¶100 In State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 229 N.W.2d 655 
(1975), we examined the procedure for issuing a fugitive 
complaint and a fugitive warrant under the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act and the effect of instituting that legal 
process.  I relate such procedures here because they are 
illustrative of when a defendant's custody becomes custody in 
connection with the Wisconsin crime for which a concurrent 
sentence was imposed. 
¶101 In Hughes, the Beloit Police Department received a 
teletype message from Batesville, Mississippi, informing them of 
Mississippi warrants for the arrest of Hughes for assaulting a 
police officer.  Id. at 664.  Pursuant to that teletype, Hughes 
was arrested by the Beloit police.  Id.   
¶102 The Mississippi warrants and affidavits in support of 
those warrants arrived in Beloit shortly thereafter, whereupon 
they were sent to the district attorney's office for the 
                                                 
14 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/13 is part of Illinois' Uniform 
Criminal Extradition Act.  725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/13 of the 
Illinois Code parallels Wis. Stat. § 976.03(13).  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
preparation of a fugitive complaint.  Id. at 665.  An arrest of 
a person wanted in another state may be made with or without a 
warrant, Wis. Stat. § 976.03(13), (14).  Id. at 668-69.  In 
either case, a fugitive complaint is required to be issued.  Id. 
at 669.  Thereafter, a judge must satisfy himself that the 
person upon whom the fugitive complaint is served is the person 
charged with the commission of a crime in the demanding state 
and that the person has fled the demanding state.  Id.  If the 
judge is so satisfied, he then issues a "prerequisition" or 
"fugitive" warrant, for the arrest and confinement of the 
defendant, pending the issuance of the governor's requisition 
warrant.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 976.03(15).   
¶103 It is only after the fugitive complaint and the 
prerequisition or fugitive warrant have been issued and served 
upon the defendant that the defendant is held in custody by the 
asylum state for the charges pending in the demanding state.  
Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669.   
¶104 The issuance of the fugitive complaint and fugitive 
warrant by Illinois held Carter for extradition to Wisconsin for 
30 days.15  725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15.  Illinois notified 
Wisconsin of the legal process it had in place and requested 
that Governor Doyle sign and present an extradition warrant to 
Illinois.16  When the Wisconsin extradition warrant did not 
                                                 
15 This initial period could be extended for an additional 
60 days.  725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/17; Wis. Stat. § 976.03(17).   
16 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition 
Unit, teletype of 12/15/03. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
arrive in 30 days, Illinois extended the period of detention for 
60 additional days and it notified Wisconsin that the Illinois 
detention would end March 14, 2004, if Illinois had not received 
the governor's extradition warrant before that date.17   
¶105 Governor Doyle signed the extradition warrant on 
February 6, 2004, and it was served on Carter on March 11, 2004.   
¶106 Carter was convicted of the Illinois armed robbery 
charge and he was sentenced for it on October 19, 2004.  The 
Wisconsin governor's warrant was vacated on October 20, 2004.  
At the commencement of Carter's Illinois sentence for armed 
robbery, he was no longer being held in Illinois in connection 
with Wisconsin charges on which he was later convicted and for 
which he received a concurrent sentence.  See Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 
at 380.  Carter was later returned to Wisconsin pursuant to a 
detainer agreement with Illinois.18  No sentence credit accrues 
for the time spent on detainer.  State v. Nyborg, 122 Wis. 2d 
765, 768, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Demars, 119 
Wis. 2d at 26).  After Carter's Wisconsin conviction, he was 
returned to Illinois to complete his Illinois sentence for armed 
robbery. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶107 I concur in that part of the majority opinion that 
concludes that Carter is due 302 days of sentence credit for the 
                                                 
17 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition 
Unit, teletype of 03/05/04. 
18 See Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, 
Division of Corrections, Prosecutor's Report on Disposition of 
Charges, Sept. 8, 2005. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
period between the date on which he finished his Illinois DUI 
sentence, December 21, 2003, and the commencement of his 
Illinois armed robbery sentence, October 19, 2004.  However, 
because no legal process caused Carter's custody in Illinois to 
be "in connection with" the Wisconsin crime until:  (1) Illinois 
issued a fugitive warrant for Carter's arrest, based on the 
Illinois fugitive complaint, and (2) Carter had completed his 
Illinois DUI sentence, I dissent from the majority opinion's 
grant of sentence credit prior to December 21, 2003. 
 
 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶108 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The facts often 
determine the law.  My first purpose in this dissent is to set 
out the facts as clearly and completely as an inadequate record 
permits.  My second purpose is to apply the law to these facts. 
I 
¶109 On December 13, 2003, the defendant, Patrick C. 
Carter, was arrested in Chicago.  He was taken into custody on a 
probation violation arrest warrant that was issued by a Cook 
County judge on September 3, 2002.  He also was arrested on a 
July 23, 2003, felony warrant issued in Wisconsin.   
¶110 These grounds for arrest will be discussed in turn. 
¶111 Patrick Carter was convicted of driving under the 
influence (DUI) in Cook County, Illinois, on June 10, 2002.  He 
was released after being placed under 18 months of supervision.  
The court enumerated several conditions of release.  Carter was 
ordered to report to a social services agency and to complete a 
"Comprehensive Correctional Intervention Assessment and fully 
comply with the Comprehensive Correctional Intervention Plan."  
In addition, Carter was to (a) pay all fines, costs, and 
assessments ordered by the court before his supervision expired; 
(b) not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction; and 
(c) refrain from possessing any firearm or any other dangerous 
weapon. 
¶112 On September 3, 2002, a Cook County judge signed a 
warrant for Carter's arrest because he had violated his 
supervision.  The warrant fixed bail at $5,000.  Carter was 
picked up on this warrant on December 13, 2003.  He was carrying 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
a handgun.  Possession of a firearm violated another condition 
of Carter's supervision. 
¶113 The day before Carter's DUI conviction in 2002, he 
participated in the armed robbery of a liquor store on Devon 
Avenue in Chicago.  He and another man entered the store and 
demanded money.  Carter's partner was carrying a handgun and 
used it to strike the male proprietor in the head.  Carter 
himself chased the female proprietor to the back of the store, 
demanded money, and struck her in the face with his fist.  The 
two men escaped with money taken from the cash register.   
¶114 A Chicago police report of the incident indicated that 
the male victim had seen the two perpetrators in the store 
before.  A later police report indicated that Carter and Eric T. 
Minor were identified in a photo lineup on June 16, 2002.  Minor 
was the subject of Chicago Police Department Investigative Alert 
#299908348 concerning the liquor store robbery.  The record does 
not 
show 
whether 
Carter 
was 
the 
subject 
of 
a 
similar 
Investigative Alert, but that is likely because Carter was a 
convicted felon who had been identified by two witnesses as the 
other man who robbed the store.  
¶115 An Investigative Alert is not an arrest warrant, but 
its issuance means that police have reasonable grounds to stop a 
suspect and detain him for a reasonable time to question him 
about a crime.  Illinois law provides that a peace officer may 
arrest a person when the officer "has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person . . . has committed an offense."  725 
ILCS 5/107-2(c).  Chicago police had reasonable grounds to 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
arrest Carter for robbery based on his identification by two 
people in a photo lineup seven days after the crime.  
¶116 On June 19, 2003, Patrick Carter was living in 
Wisconsin.  On that evening, about midnight, after a friend was 
beaten up, Carter went out with a borrowed handgun and opened 
fire at people on the porch of a house on North 1st Street.  The 
house was linked to people who had assailed his friend.  One of 
Carter's gunshots hit Phillip Jordan, Jr., in the head.  Jordan, 
21, was taken to a hospital and later died.  
¶117 After 
the 
shooting, Carter returned to Chicago.  
There, he was arrested about six months later on December 13.  
In the meantime, the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office 
had charged Carter with recklessly endangering safety, first 
degree, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1).  The criminal 
complaint quotes Carter as telling a witness that he just "aired 
those [_____ ______] out," but it fails to mention that Phillip 
Jordan died from the shooting.   
II 
¶118 The day after he was arrested in Chicago, Carter was 
transferred to the Cook County Jail.  He appeared in court on 
the Wisconsin warrant on December 15.  The record does not 
indicate whether the court set bail or denied bail.   
¶119 In another court on December 15, Carter's supervision 
on the DUI was revoked and he was sentenced to 30 days in the 
Cook County Department of Corrections, with sentence credit of 
three days.  His sentence on the DUI was completed on December 
21——much less than 30 days.  Consequently, Carter was in custody 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
on the DUI from December 13 to December 21, 2003, a total of 
nine days. 
¶120 In response to this court's order last term requesting 
additional facts, Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Patricia D. 
McMahon made several findings based on documents provided to 
her.  These findings included the following: 
 
6. 
On December 15, 2003, defendant appeared in 
Cook County Court and refused to waive extradition.  
Defendant could not agree to extradition because he 
had a pending local charge and that local charge had 
to be resolved before he could be sent back to 
Wisconsin. 
 
7. 
On December 19, 2003, defendant was arrested 
on a charge of armed robbery, based on an incident 
which had occurred on June 9, 2002. 
 
¶121 Some of these findings require comment.  Judge 
McMahon's finding that Carter "refused to waive extradition" is 
not based on any official court document.  It is based on a 
December 
15 
teletype 
from 
the 
Chicago 
Police 
Department 
Extradition Unit to the Milwaukee Police Department advising 
that "Your fugitive in our custody. . . .  Appeared our ct this 
date & refused to waive formal extradition."  
 
¶122 Judge 
McMahon 
relied 
on 
a 
September 
24, 
2004, 
transcript from an unrelated case, State v. Jeffrey Townsend, 
#01-CF-005345, Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, to explain 
Carter's refusal to waive extradition.  In the Townsend 
transcript, a Cook County Sheriff's Department Extradition Unit 
officer was asked: "So how is it you knew he was not going to 
agree to extradition?"  Answer: "Well, I knew that he couldn't 
agree to the extradition part because he had a local charge, and 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
we had to finish that local charge before we send him back to 
Wisconsin."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶123 This testimony is the source of Judge McMahon's 
statement that "Defendant could not agree to extradition because 
he had a pending local charge and that local charge had to be 
resolved before he could be sent back to Wisconsin."  The 
wording of the teletype about Carter is quite similar to the 
teletype described in the Townsend case testimony:  
This is a teletype that we send automatically to the 
jurisdiction that wants the wanted subject that we 
have in custody.  This is telling the Milwaukee Police 
Department . . . that 
the 
above 
subject, 
Jeffrey 
Townsend, is in our custody, is fighting extradition 
back to your state of Wisconsin, and we also advise 
his next court date.   
Given 
the 
explanation 
of 
the 
Townsend 
teletype 
in 
that 
testimony, there is no hard evidence that Carter actually 
"refused" extradition.   
¶124 Judge McMahon's statement also does not specify what 
"local charge" the court is alluding to.  The charge could be 
the DUI on which Carter would be serving time after revocation.  
On the other hand, the charge could be the robbery charges that 
were imminent.  In either event, the court's finding is very 
important to the resolution of this case.  It is not relevant 
whether Carter waived extradition or refused extradition: he was 
not going anywhere until Illinois "finish[ed] that local 
charge." 
 
¶125 According to Chicago police documents, Patrick Carter 
was identified in a photo array on June 16, 2002, as a 
participant in the June 9, 2002, robbery.  It is a little hard 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
to believe that Chicago police knew about Carter's probation 
violation arrest warrant and the Wisconsin arrest warrant but 
were not aware that Carter had been identified by two people as 
a participant in an armed robbery, when they took him into 
custody on December 13, 2003.1   
¶126 The Townsend transcript explains that authorities 
check on local charges before they take a prisoner to court on 
an out-of-state warrant, inasmuch as local charges will have 
priority.  This could explain why several days after Carter's 
arrest, robbery investigators arranged for a "Writ and physical 
lineup including Carter" to be held on December 19, 2003.  On 
that day, they picked Carter up at 9:15 a.m. at the jail and 
transported him to "Area 3" for the lineup.  They gave him 
Miranda warnings at 9:25 a.m.  Carter gave an oral statement and 
then a written statement, and he was identified by both victims 
as one of the June 9, 2002, robbers.2  
                                                 
1 The record contains an Investigation Report from Mary E. 
Taylor, dated 6-13-06, to Assistant State Public Defender 
Richard D. Martin.  The report recounts Taylor's telephone 
conversation, 6-13-06, with Wayne Layer, an investigator with 
the Cook County [Sheriff's] Department Extradition Unit.  The 
report reads in part: "12/14/03——Defendant booked in the Cook 
County Jail; Hold placed on defendant re: Robbery, DUI, and 
Extradition Cases."  (Emphasis added.)  
2 If 
the 
Chicago 
Police 
Department 
maintained 
an 
Investigative Alert on Patrick Carter concerning the June 9, 
2002, robbery, as they did on Eric Minor, Chicago officers may 
have decided not to arrest him for the robbery on December 13 so 
that they did not have to bring him before a judge on that 
charge.  Police had other grounds on which to hold him.  The 
delay gave police the opportunity to question Carter, obtain 
inculpatory statements from him, and arrange for a lineup before 
Carter was entitled to counsel on the robbery. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
 
¶127 Judge McMahon found that Carter was arrested on 
December 19, 2003, on a charge of armed robbery.  On that date, 
Carter was still in jail serving his DUI sentence.   
 
¶128 The record does not indicate when Carter made his 
initial appearance in Cook County court on the robbery charges.  
The next day, December 20, 2003, was a Saturday.  Carter may not 
have appeared in court that Saturday or the next day, but a 
lengthy delay would have been inappropriate.  At his initial 
appearance, Carter would have been entitled to bail.  Under 
Illinois law, a defendant must post "a sum of money equal to 10% 
of the bail" to be eligible for release.  725 ILCS 5/110-7.  
 
¶129 Notwithstanding his two inculpatory statements to 
police, Carter fought the robbery charges for many months.  He 
remained in custody until October 19, 2004, when he entered a 
guilty plea and was sentenced on two robbery counts concurrently 
to 14 years in prison.  Carter has not established that before 
this sentencing he was held exclusively or even primarily on the 
charge from Wisconsin.  
III 
¶130 The issue presented in this case is how much sentence 
credit, if any, Patrick Carter is entitled to on his Wisconsin 
conviction for reckless endangerment, first degree, for the time 
he spent in the Cook County Jail or other Illinois custody, from 
December 13, 2003, when he was arrested, through October 19, 
2004, when he was convicted and sentenced on the liquor store 
robbery.  This requires the court to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, which reads in part: 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
 
Sentence credit.  (1)(a)  A convicted offender 
shall be given credit toward the service of his or her 
sentence for all days spent in custody in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed.  As used in this subsection, "actual days 
spent in custody" includes, without limitation by 
enumeration, confinement related to an offense for 
which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any 
other sentence arising out of the same course of 
conduct, which occurs: 
 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial; 
 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and 
 
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
 
(b) The categories in par. (a) . . . include 
custody of the convicted offender which is in whole or 
in 
part 
the 
result 
of 
a 
probation, 
extended 
supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113(8m), 
302.114(8m), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2) placed upon the 
person for the same course of conduct as that 
resulting in the new conviction. 
¶131 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1) should be interpreted the 
same as other statutes by looking first at the language of the 
statute.  "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citation omitted). 
¶132 The sentence credit statute carries a heavy burden 
because it must be applied in an "almost endless variety" of 
factual circumstances.  State v. Elandis Johnson, 2009 WI 57, 
¶23, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207.  As a result, courts have 
often determined that the statute is ambiguous as to specific 
facts, 
see 
State 
v. 
Marcus 
Johnson, 
2007 
WI 
107, 
304 
Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505; State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155; State v. Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465, 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
595 
N.W.2d 443 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999); 
State 
v. 
Gavigan, 
122 
Wis. 2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984); and they have 
looked beyond the text to extrinsic sources.  
¶133 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 was part of 1977 Senate Bill 
159, which became Chapter 353, Laws of 1977.  The language in 
§ 973.155(1)(a) has been the same since it became law in May 
1978. 
¶134 The language in § 973.155(1)(a) was derived from 18 
U.S.C. § 3568 (1977), which read in part: 
 
The 
sentence of imprisonment of any person 
convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the 
date 
on 
which 
such 
person 
is 
received 
at 
the 
penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such 
sentence.  The Attorney General shall give any such 
person credit toward service of his sentence for any 
days spent in custody in connection with the offense 
or acts for which sentence was imposed.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶135 One of the early cases interpreting § 973.155 was 
Gavigan, in which the court noted: 
 
Section 973.155, Stats., was created by ch. 353, 
Laws of 1977.  This section established an entitlement 
to sentence credit that was broader than prior case 
law and was intended to extend credit for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed. . . .  Our 
supreme court recommended to the legislature that a 
simpler, more equitable system be enacted based on the 
federal system.  Within a short time, sec. 973.155 was 
enacted and it is similar to the federal statute. 
Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d at 392 (footnotes omitted).  State v. 
Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 91-93, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988), has a 
more extensive discussion of the history of § 973.155(1) and 18 
U.S.C. § 3568.  Boettcher noted that the state statute had its 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
genesis in the federal statute and employs controlling words 
that are identical in meaning.  Id. at 95. 
 
¶136 These cases establish the link between § 973.155 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3568.  Both the Gavigan court and the Boettcher 
court utilized federal cases interpreting the federal statute as 
they made their own decisions.  "Federal court cases dealing 
with similar facts and construing a similar statute have reached 
the same result."  Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d at 394 (footnote 
omitted).  The federal statute is "persuasive authority in 
interpreting the Wisconsin statute."  Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 
92. 
 
¶137 In State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 
(1985), this court also cited federal cases "interpreting the 
analogous federal statute, 18 U.S.C., sec. 3568," for guidance 
in interpreting Wisconsin's sentence credit statute.  Id. at 
380-81. 
 
¶138 Although 18 U.S.C. § 3568 was repealed and recreated 
in revised form in 1984,3 federal cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. 
                                                 
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which reads in part: 
(b) Credit for prior custody.——A defendant shall 
be given credit toward the service of a term of 
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official 
detention prior to the date the sentence commences—— 
(1) as a result of the offense for which 
the sentence was imposed; or 
(2) as a result of any other charge for 
which 
the 
defendant was arrested after the 
commission of the offense for which the sentence 
was imposed; 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
§ 3568 are highly relevant because the former statute was not 
only "analogous" but also the acknowledged source of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1), and the Wisconsin statutory provision at issue has 
not changed. 
 
¶139 When they interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3568, federal courts 
consistently denied credit on federal sentences for time spent 
in state custody, with one notable exception.  In Anglin v. 
Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974), the court stated: 
The only situation where credit has been given 
for the serving of time for a different offense is 
where a state prisoner has been denied release on bail 
solely because of an outstanding federal detainer 
lodged against him.  In that case courts have held 
that he is in custody "in connection with" the federal 
offense and entitled to credit against his federal 
sentence for time spent in state custody under those 
circumstances. 
Id. at 1169 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Anglin was 
the established law in the Seventh Circuit at the time Wisconsin 
adopted Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) in 1978. 
 
¶140 The interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3568 was summed up 
several years later in Boniface v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 1434 (9th 
Cir. 1988), where the court said: 
 
A prisoner in state custody who cannot secure his 
release on bail because of a federal detainer is 
entitled to credit against his federal sentence for 
the time he would otherwise be out free on bail.  See 
18 
U.S.C.A. 
§ 3568 
(West 
1985) 
(repealed 
1984, 
effective Nov. 1, 1986).  To secure this credit, 
                                                                                                                                                             
that has not been credited against another sentence.  
(Emphasis added.) 
The last clause of (b) puts into statutory language the 
longstanding disapproval of dual credit in federal courts. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
however, the prisoner must establish not only that the 
federal detainer was the sole reason for the denial of 
bail, but also that the state did not credit his state 
sentence for that time. 
Id. at 1436 (citations omitted).4 
                                                 
4  
See also: 
1. 
Shaw v. Smith, 680 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1982): 
In sum, the Attorney General is ordinarily not 
required to give credit toward a federal sentence for 
time spent by a prisoner serving a sentence imposed by 
another jurisdiction for an unrelated offense. 
 
Case law has, however, established one general 
exception to this basic rule.  Time spent in state 
custody, even if for an unrelated offense, must be 
credited toward time served on a federal sentence "if 
the continued state confinement was exclusively the 
product of such action by federal law-enforcement 
officials as to justify treating the state jail as the 
practical equivalent of a federal one."  Ballard v. 
Blackwell, 449 F.2d 868, 869 (5th Cir. 1971).  "If, 
for example, a state defendant is denied bail solely 
because of a federal detainer issued against him, the 
time spent in state custody awaiting trial must be 
credited to his federal sentence."  United States v. 
Shillingford, 586 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). 
 
 
2. 
United States v. Blankenship, 733 F.2d 433 (6th 
Cir. 1984): 
 
However, the evolved legal precedent also teaches 
that the credit against the federal sentence attaches 
only when the federal detainer is the exclusive reason 
for the prisoner's failure to obtain his release on 
bail. 
 . . .  
Since 
appellant's 
failure 
to 
obtain 
release on bond was not caused by the federal 
detainer, he is not entitled to a credit against his 
federal sentence. 
Id. at 434 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶141 As noted, the legislature adopted § 973.155(1) in the 
1977 
session. 
 
Thereafter, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Criminal 
Jury 
Instructions Committee drafted special materials to suggest 
standards for the proper determination of sentence credit under 
the new statute.  Wis. JI——Criminal, Part III, SM-34A.  In 1982 
the Committee attempted to define the phrase "in custody."  It 
drew upon the definition of "custody" in Wis. Stat. § 946.42 
(1981) and then gave examples: 
 
The following situations would be within this 
definition of custody: 
 
1. 
detention in the county jail before bail is 
set or thereafter; 
 
2. 
detention 
in 
the 
county 
jail 
during 
nonworking hours as a condition of bail release or 
probation; 
 
3. 
commitment 
for 
the 
determination 
of 
competency 
to 
stand 
trial 
under 
§ 971.14(2) 
or 
commitment as not competent to stand trial under 
§ 971.14(5); 
 
4. 
detention in jail in another state when that 
detention is in connection with a course of conduct 
for which sentence is imposed in Wisconsin. 
Wis. JI——Criminal SM-34A at 6 (1982) (emphasis added).    
¶142 The Committee's out-of-state example was ambiguous.  
Three months before the Committee issued special materials on 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), Attorney General Bronson C. La Follette 
released an opinion on sentence credit for revoked probationers 
and parolees.  71 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 102 (1982) (OAG 29-82).  
La Follette described a situation "where a parolee is picked up 
in the foreign jurisdiction on a parole violation warrant issued 
in Wisconsin but, prior to being returned to this state, is 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
charged in the foreign jurisdiction with a new criminal 
violation."  Id. at 105. 
The intervening period between arrest on a parole 
violation warrant and the issuance of charges by the 
foreign jurisdiction would be the result of the 
Wisconsin revocation proceeding, and thus subject to 
the credit provisions . . . .  Similarly, the period 
of custody between the completion of the parolee's 
custodial period in the foreign jurisdiction and the 
time he is picked up by Wisconsin authorities to be 
returned to this state would be credited. 
Id. at 105-06.  The period after the "issuance of charges" and 
"the completion of the parolee's custodial period in the foreign 
jurisdiction" would not lead to sentence credit.  La Follette's 
opinion was consistent with federal court rulings.   
¶143 By 1986 the committee had reconsidered the wording of 
its out-of-state example because it was too broad.  It changed 
the special materials to read: 
 
4. 
detention in jail in another state when that 
detention results exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant 
or detainer. 
Wis. JI——Criminal SM-34A at 7 (1986). 
¶144 The 1986 special materials then gave an additional 
example: 
 
Not included within the definition of "custody" 
for 
sentence 
credit 
purposes 
are 
the 
following 
situations: 
 
. . . .  
 
4. 
detention in another state based on an 
offense committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin 
warrant or detainer has also been filed. 
Id. at 8. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶145 These two examples were in complete conformity with 
the federal interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3568 and the Attorney 
General's opinion.  The Committee explained its examples as 
follows: 
 
4. 
Credit should be granted when, for example, 
a Wisconsin parolee is arrested in Illinois solely 
because of a Wisconsin warrant.  Credit should not be 
granted when a Wisconsin parolee, already in custody 
on Illinois charges, has a Wisconsin hold or warrant 
filed against him.  This is consistent with the 
conclusion that filing a detainer against one already 
in custody in Wisconsin does not result in "custody" 
under § 973.155 on the charge which is the subject of 
the detainer. 
Comment to Wis. JI——Criminal SM-34A at 23 (1986).  The Committee 
cited two Wisconsin cases: State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 348 
N.W.2d 708 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984), 
and 
State 
v. 
Nyborg, 
122 
Wis. 2d 765, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985). 
 
¶146 The 1988 version of the special materials contained 
the exact same examples and explanation.  The 1991 version is 
the same except that the committee added State v. Rohl, 160 
Wis. 2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991), as additional 
support for its examples. 
 
¶147 The 1995 version of the special materials includes the 
same examples and explanation as the 1991 version, and the 1995 
version is the latest to be issued on this point.  In short, 
detention in another state based on an offense committed in that 
state, even if a Wisconsin warrant or detainer has also been 
filed, has been excluded from the interpretation of "custody" 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
for sentence credit purposes since the early 1980s.5  Rohl's 
facts vindicated the committee's second sentence. 
IV 
¶148 In an opinion filed November 1, 2007, the court of 
appeals 
repudiated 
the 
examples 
set 
out 
in 
the 
special 
materials.  State v. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, 306 Wis. 2d 450, 
743 N.W.2d 700.  The court rejected "the State's argument that, 
because [Carter] was not exclusively in custody on the Wisconsin 
charge, he was not entitled to sentence credit for the time he 
was in custody in Illinois."  Id., ¶2.  The court added: 
                                                 
5 The 
sentence 
credit rule explained in the special 
materials is not only the federal rule but also the rule in most 
states.  "[T]he overwhelming majority of states allow for the 
granting of credit for time served in presentence confinement 
while awaiting extradition when the sole reason for the foreign 
incarceration is the offense for which the defendant is 
ultimately convicted and sentenced."  Nieto v. State, 70 P.3d 
747, 748 (Nev. 2003) (emphasis added); see also Kronz v. State, 
462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985) (allowing trial courts discretion to 
grant credit "when the defendant was incarcerated in another 
state solely because of the Florida offense for which he or she 
is being sentenced"); Jennings v. Hunt, 272 So. 2d 333, 334 (La. 
1973) (authorizing sentence credit "where the out-of-state 
detention results solely from the sentencing state's detainer on 
a fugitive complaint"); State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 
(Minn. 1984) (applying credit "to time spent in jail in another 
state solely in connection with the offense of sentencing while 
awaiting extradition"); State v. Duran, 960 A.2d 697, 707 (N.H. 
2008) (granting credit where "sole reason" for confinement was 
in-state warrant); Commonwealth v. Bortner, 326 A.2d 622, 623 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (holding that the defendant should be 
given credit "if he was detained in Ohio solely by reason of the 
Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of the separate Ohio 
charges"); State v. Coe, 554 A.2d 656, 659 (Vt. 1988) (relying 
on state and federal precedent to conclude that a defendant 
"bears the burden of establishing that the charge on which 
sentence is imposed was the sole basis of the custody at 
issue"). 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
 
We conclude that Carter is entitled to sentence 
credit for the days from December 14, 2003, when he 
was taken into custody in Illinois based on the charge 
in this case, until November 2, 2004, when he was 
sentenced on the Illinois charge. 
Id., ¶31.  According to the court of appeals, Carter was 
entitled to 324 days of sentence credit. Id. 
¶149 In retrospect, the court of appeals was presented with 
incorrect facts.  It also misconstrued the law.  Some of the 
factual errors are revealed in the majority's opinion.  The 
legal deficiencies are largely adopted in the majority opinion.  
Thus, although the correct rule to decide this case is stated in 
the special materials, the majority opinion, which changes the 
rule, requires a comprehensive response. 
V 
 
¶150 Determining sentence credit is one of the most common 
duties of a circuit court.  This duty requires the circuit court 
to answer two questions.  First, was the defendant "in custody" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)?  Second, was all 
or part of the "custody" for which sentence credit is sought "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed"?  Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶27 (citations 
omitted). 
¶151 Sometimes the amount of sentence credit turns on the 
interpretation of the words "in custody."  Other times it turns 
on the interpretation of the "in connection with" clause.  On 
occasion, the court's determination requires interpretation of 
both factors. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
A. 
"In Custody" 
¶152 Almost from the beginning, Wisconsin courts have 
wrestled with the meaning of "in custody."  In a lay sense, a 
person who is confined to a county jail in Wisconsin or another 
state is in custody.  But confinement may not equal "custody" or 
qualify the person for sentence credit under the statute. 
¶153 The special materials explain that "in custody" is not 
defined for purposes of § 973.155.  The materials suggest that 
"the definition of 'custody' used for purposes of the criminal 
escape statute, § 946.42, may be applicable to the sentence 
credit issue: If any part of the offender's status would be 
considered 'custody' for purposes of the escape statute, credit 
is due."  Wis. JI——Criminal, Part III, SM-34A, at 5.  This 
court, in State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 340 N.W.2d 511 
(1983), used this standard and applauded the committee's work. 
¶154 One implication of the committee's analysis is plain: 
A person confined to an Illinois jail is not "in custody" within 
the meaning of § 946.42 because Wisconsin may not prosecute an 
escape 
from 
an 
Illinois 
jail 
or 
any 
other 
out-of-state 
institution. 
¶155 In State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 349 N.W.2d 708 
(Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals employed a different 
explanation of custody in a case involving a "detainer."  The 
detainer was issued by Winnebago County against a person being 
held in Fond du Lac County.  Demars was jailed on February 9, 
1983, in Fond du Lac County solely on Fond du Lac County crimes.  
Id. at 21.  On the same date, a probation hold was placed 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
19 
 
against him for absconding from probation.  Id.  A preliminary 
revocation hearing was held on March 10.  Id.  The following 
day, a fact-finder found probable cause for revocation and 
ordered that Demars be held in custody pending a final hearing 
on probation revocation.  Id.  All this happened in Fond du Lac 
County. 
¶156 In the meantime, on February 22, 1983, the Winnebago 
County District Attorney filed unrelated criminal charges 
against Demars for Winnebago County crimes.  Id.  On February 
25, the Winnebago County Sheriff's Department filed a "detainer" 
with Fond du Lac County, requesting that Fond du Lac County 
detain Demars if he should post bond and if his probation hold 
should be lifted.  Id.  Winnebago County subsequently made 
arrangements to bring Demars to Winnebago County, and Demars 
made his initial appearance there on May 2, 1983.  Id.  The 
Winnebago County court imposed $400 in cash bail, set a 
preliminary examination for May 18, and permitted Demars to be 
returned at once to Fond du Lac County.  Id. at 21-22.  When he 
was brought to Winnebago County a second time on May 18, Demars 
pled guilty and was sentenced to 33 months in prison. 
¶157 The issue on appeal was whether Demars was entitled to 
sentence credit on the Winnebago County crimes for the period 
from February 25, when the Winnebago County detainer was filed, 
until May 18, the day Demars was sentenced——a total of 83 days.  
Id. at 22.  The court of appeals said no, but it did award 
Demars credit for 17 days——May 2 through May 18——on his 
Winnebago County sentence.  Id. at 20-21. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
20 
 
¶158 Public Defender Glenn Cushing argued on appeal that 
the issue was "whether the defendant's custody in the Fond du 
Lac County jail was 'in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed' in Winnebago County."  He 
contended that Demars' status changed when Winnebago County 
filed the detainer, inasmuch as Demars was no longer in custody 
in Fond du Lac solely on Fond du Lac County charges, as 
Winnebago County had lodged a formal "hold" request that would 
take effect if Demars posted bond and if his probation hold was 
lifted. 
¶159 The court of appeals did not rely on the escape 
statute to decide the case.  It used Black's Law Dictionary, 
which defined "custody," in part, as "the detainer of a man's 
person by virtue of lawful process or authority."  Demars, 119 
Wis. 2d at 23 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 
1979)).  The court said: 
 
A close analysis of all the cases cited by Demars 
shows the presence of a legal event, process or 
authority which occasioned, at least in part, the 
custody of the defendant relative to the charge for 
which he was ultimately sentenced.  We conclude that 
"custody" as used in sec. 973.155, Stats., must 
necessarily result from the occurrence of a legal 
event, process, or authority which occasions, or is 
related to, confinement on the charge for which the 
defendant is ultimately sentenced. 
Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 25-26. 
¶160 The court explained: 
Examples of lawful process or authority resulting in 
custody in a criminal case include arrest with or 
without a warrant, arrest upon a capias or bench 
warrant, unsatisfied bail requirements resulting in 
confinement, 
sentence 
to 
confinement, 
temporary 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
21 
 
detention pursuant to sec. 968.24, Stats., probation 
or parole holds, and periods of confinement imposed as 
a condition of probation. 
Id. at 23. 
¶161 A "detainer," the court said, did not meet this 
standard.  "The term 'detainer' carries no custodial mandate in 
our jurisprudence."  Id. at 24.  Consequently, the court held, 
Demars was not in custody, within the meaning of the statute, 
until he was brought to Winnebago County and the court set bail.  
This constituted the "legal event" that changed his status in 
Fond du Lac County.  Id. at 26. 
¶162 The Demars analysis is very useful in establishing a 
second prerequisite of "custody."  Carter's arrest in Chicago on 
a Wisconsin felony warrant was clearly the occurrence of a legal 
event, but it did not make Carter subject to prosecution under 
§ 946.42 or any other Wisconsin statute for an escape from the 
Cook County Jail.  Demars teaches that "custody" may depend on 
the existence of two elements: (1) a legal event, process, or 
authority that occasions, at least in part; (2) a status that 
subjects a person to an escape charge under a Wisconsin statute 
for leaving that status. 
¶163 That "custody" requires both elements was made clear 
in 
State 
v. 
Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 
N.W.2d 536.  Magnuson was subject to eight criminal charges.  He 
was unable to post bond.  Id., ¶2.  The court modified his bail 
to a $10,000 signature bond on each count, plus multiple other 
conditions of release, including a nightly curfew that confined 
him to the residence of his pastor between specified hours.  
Id., ¶4.  "This home detention as a condition of bond was not 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
22 
 
pursuant to an order from the sheriff or the Department of 
Corrections under Wis. Stat. § 302.425 (1997-98)."  Id., ¶5.  
The defendant was required to wear an electronic bracelet to 
ensure his presence in the pastor's home during curfew hours.  
Id., ¶6. 
¶164 After pleading no contest to three counts, the 
defendant sought sentence credit for the six months he resided 
with his pastor as a condition of his bond.  Id., ¶8.  This 
court upheld the circuit court's denial of sentence credit.  The 
court made the following statements: 
[N]umerous cases have interpreted the sentence credit 
statute and concluded that the plain meaning of 
custody 
under 
the 
statute 
corresponds 
to 
the 
definition of custody contained in the escape statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 946.42. 
 
. . . .  
[W]e determine that for sentence credit purposes an 
offender's status constitutes custody whenever the 
offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving 
that status. 
 
In establishing this definition, we modify the 
approach set forth in Gilbert in that we do not limit 
the inquiry to the definition of custody contained 
only in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a).  Instead, we 
acknowledge the importance of reading statutes in pari 
materia . . . and 
include 
for 
reference 
other 
statutory provisions in which the legislature has 
classified 
certain 
situations 
as 
restrictive 
and 
custodial 
by 
attaching 
escape 
charges 
for 
an 
unauthorized departure from those situations. 
 
. . . .  
In sum, we determine that for purposes of sentence 
credit 
an 
offender's 
status 
constitutes 
custody 
whenever the offender is subject to an escape charge 
for leaving that status. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
23 
 
Id., ¶¶13, 25, 26, 31 (emphasis added). 
 
¶165 It must be noted that the defendant in Magnuson was 
subjected 
to 
multiple court-ordered conditions of release 
occasioning his status, so that he met the standard set out in 
the Demars case.  He did not get sentence credit, however, 
because he was not subject to an escape charge under any 
provision of Wisconsin law. 
¶166 Patrick Carter was not "in custody" within the meaning 
of § 973.155 when he was confined in the Cook County Jail 
because he was not subject to an escape charge under any 
provision of Wisconsin law.6  Holding that Carter's Chicago 
confinement fits within the terms of § 973.155(1) would rewrite 
more than three decades of interpretation and eliminate any 
jurisdictional or geographic limitation to statutory "custody." 
¶167 This analysis immediately raises the question whether 
a person held in Illinois solely on a Wisconsin warrant would be 
entitled to sentence credit on a Wisconsin sentence related to 
the warrant.  The answer is yes.  The reason sentence credit 
would be required is explained in Ballard v. Blackwell, 449 F.2d 
868, 869 (5th Cir. 1971): 
 
In 
interpreting 
§ 3568 
we 
are 
definitely 
committed to the position that time spent in State 
custody must be credited toward time served on a 
Federal sentence if the continued State confinement 
was exclusively the product of such action by Federal 
law-enforcement officials as to justify treating the 
State jail as the practical equivalent of a Federal 
one.  Davis v. Attorney General, [425 F.2d 238 (5th 
Cir. 1970)]; United States v. Morgan, [425 F.2d 1388 
(5th Cir. 1970)].  If the Federal detainer alone 
                                                 
6 Cf. Herman v. Brewer, 193 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 1972). 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
24 
 
prevented Ballard's release from State confinement, 
credit must be given.  Or, to state it affirmatively, 
if absent the Federal detainer and under available 
state procedures Ballard could have been released from 
the contemporary State confinement, credit must be 
given. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶168 Credit must be given in this hypothetical circumstance 
for a constitutional reason, not a statutory reason.  See Klimas 
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977); State ex rel. 
Solie v. Schmidt, 73 Wis. 2d 76, 242 N.W.2d 244 (1976); Kubart 
v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 94, 233 N.W.2d 404 (1975).  The law must 
"ensure that a person not serve more time than he is sentenced."  
Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶23 (citation omitted).  Carter cannot 
rely on a constitutional argument because he was legitimately 
confined in Illinois for Illinois offenses that were unrelated 
to his offense in Wisconsin.  He is seeking dual credit. 
B. 
"In Connection With" 
 
¶169 Determining that a defendant was "in custody" within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) does not settle the issue 
of sentence credit.  The court also must determine whether all 
or part of the custody for which sentence credit is sought was 
"in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed." 
 
¶170 There are numerous cases in which a defendant's 
request for sentence credit was denied on grounds that his 
custody was not "in connection with the course of conduct for 
which sentence was imposed."  See, e.g., Elandis Johnson, 318 
Wis. 2d 21; 
Marcus 
Johnson, 
304 
Wis. 2d 318; 
Floyd, 
232 
Wis. 2d 767; Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372; Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465; 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
25 
 
State v. Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 
1997); State v. Morrick, 147 Wis. 2d 185, 432 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
 
¶171 The Elandis Johnson case establishes that: 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155 imposes no requirement that 
credit applied toward one sentence also be applied 
toward a second sentence if the basis for applying the 
same credit to both sentences is merely that the 
sentences are concurrent and are imposed at the same 
time.  The fact that sentences are concurrent and are 
imposed at the same time does not alter the statutory 
mandate that credit toward service of a sentence be 
based on custody that is "in connection with" the 
course of conduct giving rise to that sentence: i.e., 
custody factually connected with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed. 
Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶3, 76. 
¶172 The Elandis Johnson case pounds the necessity of a 
factual connection between custody and "the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed."  Floyd emphasizes not only that 
a 
factual 
connection 
is 
necessary 
"for 
sentence 
credit . . . [but also that] a procedural or other tangential 
connection will not suffice."  Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶17 
(emphasis added). 
¶173 Three cases illustrate some of the principles at play 
in the "in connection with" clause.  These cases all present 
some factual "connection" or relationship between "custody" on 
Crime A and sentence on Crime B, but not all lead to sentence 
credit. 
¶174 At one end of the "in connection with" spectrum is 
Beets.  Beets was on probation for two drug crimes when he was 
arrested on a burglary charge.  Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 374.  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
26 
 
Shortly afterward he was also in custody on a probation hold 
because of the alleged violation of his probation by virtue of 
the burglary.  Id. at 374.  About one month later, Beets' 
probation was revoked and later he was sentenced on the two drug 
crimes.  Id. at 375.  Beets was given credit on the drug 
sentence for his days in custody from his arrest on the burglary 
to his sentencing on the drug crimes.  Id. 
¶175 About six months later, Beets pled guilty to the 
burglary and was sentenced to a prison term that was to run 
concurrent with the previously imposed sentence on his drug 
crimes.  Id.  He was granted sentence credit on the burglary 
sentence for the period from his arrest to the date he began his 
prison sentence on the drug crimes.  Id.  But Beets wanted more 
and filed a post-conviction motion asking for credit for the 
period subsequent to his sentencing on the drug crimes up to his 
sentencing on the burglary.  Id. 
¶176 The circuit court denied his request.  Id. at 376.  
This determination was affirmed by the court of appeals and this 
court.  Id.  Beets contended that his sentence on the burglary 
was "related" to all custody with respect to the drug crimes, 
inasmuch as his burglary arrest had triggered the revocation of 
his probation and his ultimate sentence on the drug crimes.  Id. 
at 377. 
¶177 This court disagreed.  It concluded that "the sentence 
on the drug charges was not related or connected to the burglary 
course of conduct."  Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 378. 
[A]ny days spent in confinement after the revocation 
of probation and the imposition of sentence arise out 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
27 
 
of, and are connected not with the burglary, but the 
unrelated 
conduct 
which 
resulted 
in 
the 
drug 
convictions more than a year earlier.  Thus, the 
offenses are not connected. 
Id. 
¶178 The 
court 
had 
to 
concede 
"a 
temporal 
connection . . . because 
it 
was 
the 
burglary 
arrest 
that 
triggered the probation hold on Beets."  Id.  But, it said, "any 
connection which might have existed between custody for the drug 
offenses and the burglary was severed when the custody resulting 
from the probation hold was converted into a revocation and 
sentence."  Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 
¶179 All confinement in the Beets case qualified as 
"custody" under Floyd principles and under Demars principles.  
But any "connection" between the drug crimes and the burglary 
was "severed" by Beets' sentence on the drug crimes. 
¶180 At the other end of the "in connection with" spectrum 
is State v. Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d 578, 593 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 
1999).  Thompson involved the revocation of a juvenile's 
aftercare supervision (or juvenile "parole") as a result of new 
offenses committed after the defendant's 18th birthday.  Id. at 
580.  Thompson was arrested for operating a vehicle without the 
owner's consent, fleeing from an officer, and possession of 
marijuana.  Id.  At the time of these offenses, he was released 
on juvenile aftercare from confinement as a delinquent for 
multiple previous offenses.  Id.  Following his arrest, Thompson 
made his initial appearance, the court set bail, a "hold" for 
violation of aftercare supervision was placed on Thompson, and 
he remained in adult custody.  Id. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
28 
 
¶181 About a month later, Thompson's juvenile aftercare was 
revoked as a result of the new offenses.  Id.  Two months later, 
he pled to the adult criminal charges.  Id.  About three months 
later, he was sentenced on those charges.  Id.  Over the five-
month period between revocation of juvenile aftercare and 
sentencing on the adult offenses, Thompson spent time in both a 
county jail and a juvenile correctional facility.  Id. at 580-
81.  He was given credit for his time in county jail but not for 
his time at Ethan Allen.  Id. at 581. 
¶182 The denial of credit for the juvenile institution 
confinement was reversed by the court of appeals, which 
distinguished the situation in Thompson from the situation in 
Beets.  Id. at 583-84.  The court said, among several points, 
that revocation of aftercare was not a sentence; the duration of 
Thompson's juvenile custody was indefinite; the duration of 
juvenile custody was not shortened by credit for time spent in 
adult custody; and confinement in a secured juvenile facility 
was designed as treatment, not punishment.  Id. at 584 n.2.  
Revocation 
of 
aftercare, 
the 
court 
said, 
represents 
a 
determination that new offenses require continuing treatment in 
a 
secured 
correctional 
facility. 
 
"Thompson's 
continuing 
confinement in the juvenile system was clearly and intimately 
related to the pending charge."  Id.  It constituted custody in 
the juvenile system, waiting for adult court disposition.  Id.  
¶183 In sum, the juvenile system custody after revocation 
was "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence 
was imposed," and it required sentence credit. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
29 
 
¶184 The case of Marcus Johnson falls between Thompson and 
Beets.  In June 2001 Marcus Johnson was committed to a secured 
juvenile institution after being found delinquent on multiple 
grounds.  Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶11.  His supervision 
was extended for a second year on May 20, 2002.  Id.  In June 
2002 Johnson battered a fellow inmate and was charged for that 
offense in adult court.  Id., ¶12.  He was released back to the 
juvenile institution on a signature bond.  Id., ¶13.  The felony 
battery case was tried on February 27, 2003, and Johnson was 
convicted.  Id., ¶15.  On May 6, 2003, the juvenile court 
extended Johnson's juvenile supervision for a third year.  Id., 
¶16.  He was not sentenced on the felony battery in adult court 
until February 2004.  Id., ¶21.  The issue before this court was 
whether Johnson was entitled to 608 days of sentence credit on 
his battery sentence for all custody between the time of his 
arrest on the battery charge and his sentence on that charge.  
Id., ¶32.  Almost all confinement during this time period was in 
the juvenile institution.   
¶185 The 
Marcus 
Johnson 
court 
reached 
the 
following 
conclusions: (1) Johnson's initial confinement in a secured 
juvenile institution was completely unrelated to the felony 
battery.  Id., ¶9.  Moreover, the extension of his supervision 
for an additional year on May 20, 2002, was unrelated to the 
felony battery because the battery had not yet occurred.  Id.  
(2) The extension of Johnson's supervision for a third year on 
May 6, 2003, was related to the felony battery because the 
juvenile court did factor the battery into its decision to 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
30 
 
extend supervision.  Id.  (3) However, the circuit court made a 
reasonable determination that there was an "extremely high 
probability" that Johnson's supervision would have been extended 
regardless of the June 2002 battery.  Id., ¶23. 
¶186 This court said: "The issue . . . is how large a 
factor did the June 2002 battery have to play in the decision to 
extend Johnson's juvenile supervision in 2003 for Johnson's 
juvenile custody to be 'in connection with' the June 2002 
battery."  Id., ¶67. 
¶187 The court noted that the phrase "in connection with" 
was "subject to both a narrow and broad interpretation.  Id., 
¶68.  "Beets suggests that a narrower interpretation of the 
statute is appropriate." Id., ¶69.  Then the court added: "We 
stated that, from the time Beets began serving his sentence on 
the drug charges, it became irrelevant that he was also awaiting 
trial on the burglary charge."  Id. 
¶188 The court quoted and approved the following language 
from Beets: 
[T]hat any connection which might have existed between 
custody for the drug offenses and the burglary was 
severed when the custody resulting from the probation 
hold was converted into a revocation and sentence.   
From that time on, Beets was in prison serving an 
imposed and unchallenged sentence; and whether he was 
also awaiting trial on the burglary charge was 
irrelevant 
. . . . 
because [Beets'] freedom from confinement——his right 
to be at liberty——was not in any way related to the 
viability of the burglary charge.  His ability to make 
bail on the burglary charge became immaterial.  Even 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
31 
 
had the burglary charge been dismissed, he would still 
have been in confinement.  Thus, there is no logical 
reason why credit should be given on the burglary 
charge for his service of sentence on a separate 
crime. 
Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶44, 69 (quoting Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d at 379) (citation omitted). 
 
¶189 The Marcus Johnson court went on to say: 
The underlying purpose of the sentence credit statute 
is to afford fairness by ensuring "that a person not 
serve more time than that for which he is sentenced."  
A narrow interpretation of the phrase "in connection 
with" furthers this purpose.  If Johnson would have 
been in custody even if the June 2002 battery had 
never occurred, he is not being treated unfairly by 
not receiving sentence credit for that time. 
 
. . . .  
We . . . affirm the circuit court's finding that 
Johnson would have been in custody even if the June 
2002 battery had not occurred.  This finding is not 
clearly erroneous.  It is amply supported by the 
record. . . .  
Johnson's 
time 
spent 
in 
juvenile 
custody was not in connection with the June 2002 
battery, and he is not entitled to sentence credit 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 for the entire 608 days he 
spent in custody after his arrest awaiting adult 
sentencing. 
Id., ¶¶70, 76 (emphasis added). 
 
¶190 All of Marcus Johnson's custody, like Beets' custody, 
satisfied the requirements set forth in Floyd and Demars.  But 
part of his custody had no connection to his battery offense, 
while another part was deemed irrelevant because he would have 
been in custody "even if the June 2002 battery had never 
occurred."  Id., ¶70. 
 
¶191 This analysis is a second way of evaluating Carter's 
confinement in Chicago.   
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
32 
 
 
¶192 Judge McMahon found that Carter was arrested in 
Chicago on December 13, 2003, "on a probation violation warrant 
from Illinois and on the Wisconsin warrant."  Accepting this as 
fact, it is undisputed that the Illinois warrant set bail at 
$5,000.  Existence of a Wisconsin warrant firmed up the 
preexisting Illinois warrant because it indicated an additional 
violation of the conditions of Carter's release. 
 
¶193 Carter appeared before an Illinois judge on December 
15 on the Wisconsin warrant.  The record does not tell us 
whether bail was set or denied.  According to the record, 
however, the standard practice in Chicago is for law enforcement 
authorities 
to 
check 
on 
local 
charges 
before 
taking 
an 
extradition case before a judge.  It is inconceivable that law 
enforcement authorities did not know anything about the robbery 
at the time they took Carter before a judge.  Carter's own 
evidence says they knew.  See ¶18 n.1, supra.  It cannot be 
disputed that authorities knew about the probation violation 
warrant, the $5,000 bond on that warrant, and Carter's need to 
satisfy his local obligations for violating supervision before 
being shipped off to Wisconsin. 
 
¶194 When Carter's probation was revoked on December 15 and 
he was sentenced to 30 days in jail, less three days of sentence 
credit, 
his 
sentence 
severed 
any 
connection 
between 
his 
confinement and the Wisconsin warrant. 
 
¶195 Before Carter's confinement in the jail could be 
"reconnected" to the Wisconsin warrant, he was arrested on the 
robbery.  He eventually appeared in court on the robbery.  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
33 
 
Logic, experience, and common sense tell us that the court set 
conditions of release that Carter could not meet.  It was 
Carter's burden to establish otherwise.  
 
¶196 Carter might have chosen to fight extradition by not 
posting bond in the robbery case, or he might not have been able 
to post bond, but Judge McMahon found as a fact that "Defendant 
could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local 
charge and that local charge had to be resolved before he could 
be sent back to Wisconsin."7  This court is bound by that finding 
because it is not clearly erroneous.  
 
¶197 In addition, Carter would have been arrested even if 
there had been no Wisconsin warrant. 
 
¶198 Carter was on a $5,000 bond for an Illinois offense 
before he appeared in court on the Wisconsin warrant. 
 
¶199 Carter's sentence on the DUI severed any connection 
between his confinement and the Wisconsin warrant. 
 
¶200 Carter was charged with armed robbery before his DUI 
sentence expired. 
                                                 
7 On August 30, 2005, Patrick Carter entered a guilty plea 
on the reckless endangerment charge.  In a colloquy with 
Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Mel Flanagan and others, Carter 
was asked how he had handled extradition.  There is some 
ambiguity in the record about whether Judge Flanagan was 
speaking of extradition in 2003 before Carter's Illinois 
conviction or extradition in 2005 when Carter was in prison.  
The State said, "I think he pretty much waived extradition; is 
that correct?"  Carter answered, "No, I had another case."  
Carter's defense attorney then interjected: "He [Carter] says 
they wouldn't let 'em, because he had another case, he was——you 
were incarcerated."  Carter replied, "Right."  This discussion 
makes more sense with reference to 2003 than 2005.  Carter did 
not have "another case" in 2005.  He was already in prison 
because of his 2004 conviction. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
34 
 
 
¶201 If Carter was denied bail on the Wisconsin warrant, 
the denial served the acknowledged interests of Illinois at 
least as much as the interests of Wisconsin.  The robbery charge 
and the unknown conditions of release on the robbery superseded 
and overwhelmed the effect of the Wisconsin warrant.  Even if 
bail had been set on the Wisconsin charge and had been posted, 
it would not have mattered.  Carter's waiver or refusal to waive 
extradition was irrelevant because Illinois would not have 
permitted Carter to leave Illinois under any circumstances until 
the charges against him had been resolved.  As a result, he 
received 305 days of credit for his presentence confinement 
against his Illinois robbery sentence. 
 
¶202 In any event, Carter deliberately delayed his return 
to Wisconsin by fighting the robbery charge from December 19 to 
October 19——ten months.  This squares with Judge McMahon's 
findings. 
 
¶203 Carter cannot satisfy the requirement that his days of 
confinement in the Cook County Jail were "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed" if this court 
follows the principles stated in Beets and Marcus Johnson. 
VI 
 
¶204 Carter's case is the embodiment of the hypothetical 
example set out in the special materials: 
 
4. 
detention in another state based on an 
offense committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin 
warrant or detainer has also been filed. 
¶205 The example denying sentence credit is the flip side 
of the example requiring sentence credit: 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
35 
 
 
4. 
detention in jail in another state when that 
detention results exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant 
or detainer.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶206 As 
noted 
above, 
the 
Criminal 
Jury 
Instructions 
Committee provided the following explanation for its examples of 
out-of-state confinement: 
 
4. 
[1] Credit should be granted when, for 
example, a Wisconsin parolee is arrested in Illinois 
solely because of a Wisconsin warrant. [2] Credit 
should not be granted when a Wisconsin parolee, 
already 
in 
custody 
on 
Illinois 
charges, 
has 
a 
Wisconsin hold or warrant filed against him.  [3] This 
is consistent with the conclusion that filing a 
detainer against one already in custody in Wisconsin 
does not result in "custody" under § 973.155 on the 
charge which is the subject of the detainer. 
¶207 The court of appeals asserted that the Demars and 
Nyborg cases do not support "the proposition that a person 
detained in jail in another state is not 'in custody in 
connection with' under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 unless the person is 
in custody exclusively pursuant to a Wisconsin warrant."  
Carter, 306 Wis. 2d 450, ¶13.  The court of appeals went on: 
 
Section IIIA(4) read together with the footnote 
references to Demars and Nyborg suggests that the 
detainer in those cases did not trigger sentence 
credit because the defendants were already in custody.  
However, that is not correct.  As we explained in 
Demars, 
a 
"detainer" . . . simply 
notifies 
the 
jurisdiction in which the defendant is confined that 
'his [or her] custody [is] desired elsewhere.'"  We 
specifically distinguished between a detainer and a 
warrant for an arrest (and other lawful means of 
arrest). . . .  [T]here is nothing in either Demars or 
Nyborg that supports the proposition that, if a 
defendant in custody in another state both because of 
an arrest under the law of the state and under a 
Wisconsin warrant, the defendant is not "in custody" 
under the Wisconsin warrant for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
36 
 
Id., ¶18. 
 
¶208 The third sentence of the committee's comment is 
factually correct.  The committee did not overstate its reliance 
on the two cases when it said that Demars and Nyborg were 
"consistent with" the statement that "credit should not be 
granted when a Wisconsin parolee, already in custody on Illinois 
charges, has a Wisconsin hold or warrant filed against him."  
See ¶209, supra. 
 
¶209 The committee is clearly correct with respect to 
detainers based on the facts of Demars.  The committee also is 
correct with respect to the mere existence of an arrest warrant.  
State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. Ap. 
1995), is helpful in making this point.  The court in Villalobos 
said: 
 
Distinguishing Demars, Villalobos argues that 
here an arrest warrant with cash bail and complaint 
had been issued.  We disagree that the difference in 
the form of the legal process changes the result.  The 
teaching of Demars is that the mere existence of legal 
process does not, in and of itself, trigger custody.  
Demars offered some examples of custody which would 
qualify for sentence credit.  Id. at 23.  In a 
situation involving an arrest warrant, Demars did not 
say that the mere existence of the warrant was 
sufficient.  Rather, Demars said that an arrest was 
necessary.  See id.  Thus, Demars requires that the 
process 
be 
accompanied 
by 
some 
legal 
event 
or 
occurrence 
which 
"occasions, 
or 
is 
related 
to, 
confinement" on the charge referenced in the process.  
Id. at 26. 
 
Villalobos argues that he has shown this linkage 
because the Racine County jail records listing the 
various reasons for his custody include a reference to 
the Kenosha County charge in this case.  We disagree 
that this kind of entry in a jail log demonstrates an 
"occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority" 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
37 
 
within the meaning of Demars.  See id.  Like the 
detainer in Demars, all this entry connotes is Racine 
County's 
awareness 
that 
Kenosha 
County 
had 
an 
outstanding warrant for Villalobos's custody. 
Id. at 147-48 (citation omitted). 
¶210 The record in the present case indicates that Carter 
was arrested simultaneously on two warrants, including the 
arrest warrant from Wisconsin.  This makes the case closer in 
theory than a case in which an arrest warrant is issued for a 
person who is already in custody, either in another Wisconsin 
county or in another state. 
¶211 In Wisconsin, when a court in one county issues an 
arrest warrant for a person who is in custody in another county, 
the person is not re-arrested and brought before a judge in the 
county where he is confined.  Rather, the arrest warrant serves 
the same purpose as a detainer.  The county issuing the arrest 
warrant does not acquire "custody" of the person until it issues 
a writ and brings the person before its court. 
¶212 In this case involving an out-of-state arrest on two 
different warrants, the felony arrest warrant from Wisconsin, 
the Illinois fugitive warrant, and the subsequent demand for 
requisition from the governor of Wisconsin were all functionally 
equivalent to a detainer——a notice to the Cook County Jail that 
Carter's presence was desired in Wisconsin.  Strong language is 
used in the governor's requisition demand, but Wisconsin had no 
way to enforce that demand as long as Illinois had legitimate 
local matters pending.  Illinois would not permit Carter to 
waive extradition until Illinois resolved its local charge.  The 
situation would have been completely different if the Wisconsin 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
38 
 
arrest warrant and subsequent documents had been the exclusive 
reason for holding Carter. 
¶213 This court must look beyond the technicalities of 
various legal instruments to understand what actually happened 
in Carter's case.  If Wisconsin were required to give Carter and 
similarly situated persons sentence credit in situations where 
this state is powerless to bring those persons to Wisconsin and 
powerless even to speed up the process in a sister state, the 
state could be stripped of the ability to effectively enforce 
its own criminal laws.  Courts must not reward a person with 
dual credit for committing crimes in Wisconsin and then fleeing 
to a jurisdiction where the person is already wanted for other 
crimes or where the person may commit new crimes. 
¶214 The court of appeals also dismissed the Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee's reliance on Rohl.  The court said: 
Rohl does not support the proposition that a defendant 
is not in custody in connection with a Wisconsin 
charge for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 if 
detained in another state "based on an offense 
committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin warrant 
or detainer has been filed."  WIS JI——CRIMINAL SM-34A 
at p.6. The reason sentence credit was denied in Rohl 
was that the California and the Wisconsin post-parole 
revocation sentences were not concurrent; the reason 
was not that confinement in California did not result 
"exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer."  
Wis. JI——Criminal SM-34A at p.5. 
Carter, 306 Wis. 2d 450, ¶22. 
¶215 In Rohl, the defendant was released on parole in 
Wisconsin after serving time on two offenses including a 
homicide.  Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d at 327.  He was permitted to go to 
California where his parole was to be supervised.  Id. at 328.  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
39 
 
Before the transfer of parole had been accomplished, Rohl was 
arrested and jailed in California on new crimes.  This happened 
on November 24, 1986.  Id.  The Wisconsin Division of 
Corrections issued a parole violation warrant against Rohl on 
November 26, 1986.  Id. 
¶216 Rohl was convicted of the California offenses on 
September 15, 1987, and sentenced on January 28, 1988.  Id. at 
328.  He was granted 431 days of sentence credit on his four-
year California prison sentence: namely, the period between his 
November 24, 1986, arrest and his January 28, 1988, sentence.  
Id. 
¶217 Upon completion of his sentence in California, Rohl 
was returned to Wisconsin where a hearing examiner revoked his 
parole 
and 
effectively 
imposed 
a 
three-year 
sentence 
by 
determining that Rohl should forfeit three years of accumulated 
good time on his previous sentence.  Rohl demanded "sentence" 
credit for all time spent in custody in California.  Id. 
¶218 The decision of the hearing examiner granted "custody 
credit" from April 20, 1989, when Rohl was placed "in custody 
solely as a result of his Wisconsin detainer," until he was 
received at the Wisconsin institution.  The examiner said that 
the time Rohl served in California after his arrest until April 
20, 1989, "will not be granted as custody credit as he was not 
being held solely as a result of the Wisconsin detainer."  The 
circuit court affirmed this determination, stating that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155 has been "interpreted to be a mirror image of 
the federal statute and we find a reluctance in courts to grant 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
40 
 
a dual credit in these situations where an individual's in-
custody status may reasonably and arguably be attributed to two 
separate and distinct crimes." 
¶219 The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that 
"Rohl's credit request constitutes impermissible double credit 
against two non-concurrent sentences."  Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d at 
327.  The court said: "So-called 'dual credit'——where an 
offender can receive credit for a single episode of jail time 
toward two (or more) sentences——will be granted only for 
sentences which are concurrent."  Id. at 330.  In fact, this 
statement neither asserts nor implies that dual credit must be 
afforded on all concurrent sentences. 
¶220 In reaching its decision, the Rohl court did not 
criticize the hearing examiner or the circuit court, nor did it 
say that a concurrent sentence must result in dual credit.  It 
approvingly cited Boettcher, where the court noted that the 
"federal courts are firm and unanimous that there shall be no 
dual credit for the same presentence time served."  Boettcher, 
144 Wis. 2d at 95.  Boettcher also indicates that § 973.155 
gives courts "power to give dual credit in appropriate cases," 
id. at 99-100, namely, "when a new sentence is imposed to run 
concurrently with a revoked probation."  Id. at 100 n.4.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(b). 
¶221 A careful review of Rohl shows that it was not misread 
by the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee.  Rohl's reference 
to concurrent sentences has been taken too far. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
41 
 
¶222 One case that generated confusion about sentence 
credit 
and 
concurrent 
sentences 
was 
State 
v. 
Ward, 
153 
Wis. 2d 743, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989).  In Ward, the 
circuit court sentenced the defendant to indeterminate terms of 
three years incarceration on each of three drug convictions.  
The court made the three sentences concurrent with each other 
but gave the defendant 233 days of sentence credit on only one 
of the three sentences.  The court of appeals reversed, saying: 
Applying pre-sentence credit against only one of the 
concurrent three-year terms defeats the concurrent 
nature of the sentence because the first term is 
reduced to two years and 132 days, while the remaining 
two 
terms 
stand 
at 
three 
full 
years. 
Thus, 
implementation of the concurrent sentences imposed by 
the trial court requires that the 233-day credit be 
applied against each of the concurrent three-year 
terms. 
Id. at 745 (footnote omitted). 
¶223 Subsequent 
court 
decisions 
interpreted 
the 
Ward 
language 
as 
requiring 
identical 
sentence 
credit 
on 
all 
concurrent sentences imposed at the same time.  This principle 
was shattered in State v. Elandis Johnson, 2008 WI App 34, 307 
Wis. 2d 735, 746 N.W.2d 581, aff'd 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 2, 
767 N.W.2d 207, where the court of appeals showed that Ward's 
presentence custody was exactly the same in all three drug 
cases, which required that the same sentence credit be given in 
all three cases. 
¶224 When 
this 
court 
reviewed 
Elandis 
Johnson, 
it 
unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' clarification of 
Ward.  It also drew on supportive language in the special 
materials, see Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶63 (explaining 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
42 
 
that there will be situations when the periods of time for which 
credit is due on unrelated concurrent sentences will not line up 
with each other) (citing Wis. JI——Criminal SM-34A, at 12).  The 
resulting principles of law are quoted in Elandis Johnson, 318 
Wis. 2d 2, ¶66. 
¶225 In sum, the court of appeals in this case was misled 
about the facts.  It was not informed about and did not examine 
federal law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3568.  It did not fully 
appreciate the bases for the examples in the special materials.  
It misread Marcus Johnson, and it did not have the benefit of 
the two Elandis Johnson decisions, explaining Ward and the 
relationship between sentence credit and concurrent sentences.   
VII 
¶226 The majority opinion attempts to straighten out the 
factual discrepancies between Judge McMahon's findings and the 
facts set out by the court of appeals.  However, there is no way 
to sugarcoat the failure of the parties to submit the complete 
facts to Judge McMahon.  The parties did not advise the circuit 
court about what conditions of release, if any, were set by 
Illinois courts on the Wisconsin warrant nor on the Illinois 
robbery.  This serious failure was disrespectful to the court 
because it has deprived us of critical information that we 
requested. 
¶227 With respect to the law, the majority opinion relies 
on the incorrect analysis of the court of appeals and a mistaken 
interpretation of the Elandis Johnson case to award Carter 305 
days of credit on his Wisconsin sentence for virtually all of 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
43 
 
his presentence confinement in Illinois.  Under the majority's 
mistaken interpretation of Elandis Johnson, it appears that 
Carter would be eligible for 305 days of sentence credit even if 
his 
Wisconsin 
sentence 
were 
consecutive 
to 
his 
Illinois 
sentence.   At the same time, the opinion denies Carter any 
credit for the "actual days in custody" in Wisconsin awaiting a 
trial on the Wisconsin charge. 
¶228 This dissent has previously addressed the court of 
appeals' legal analysis, but the Elandis Johnson case requires 
separate comment. 
¶229 The Elandis Johnson case stands, in part, for the 
proposition that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) does not provide 
sentence credit for time in custody that is not related, or is 
only procedurally related, to the matter for which sentence was 
imposed.  Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶45.  That is why 
Johnson lost.  He could not show a factual connection between 
"the four days of presentence custody in 2004 and the course of 
conduct for which the sentences in the 2005 case were imposed."  
Nor could he show "a factual connection between the 50 days of 
presentence custody in 2005 and the course of conduct for which 
the sentence in the first 2004 case was imposed."  Id., ¶49.  
Thus, Johnson moved to a legal argument that when a defendant 
receives concurrent sentences on different offenses and those 
sentences are imposed at the same time, the defendant is 
entitled 
to 
the 
same 
sentence 
credit 
on 
all 
concurrent 
sentences, irrespective of whether he was in custody in 
connection with the course of conduct for which a particular 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
44 
 
sentence was imposed.  The court unanimously rejected that 
contention. 
¶230 In applying Wis. Stat. § 973.155 to the facts in 
Elandis Johnson, this court repeatedly emphasized that sentence 
credit must be based on "custody" that is factually connected to 
the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.  A factual 
connection is a prerequisite.  The court did not say, however, 
that once a defendant shows some factual connection between 
confinement and the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed, he automatically earns sentence credit. 
¶231 A defendant must establish, first, that he was "in 
custody" within the meaning of the statute, satisfying the tests 
in both Floyd and Demars.  He then must show that the "custody" 
for which he claims credit is not only factually related, but 
also is not "precluded," or "severed," or made irrelevant by 
other facts or legal process.  Here, we should ask how large a 
factor the Wisconsin warrant was in the decision to arrest 
Patrick Carter and keep him in custody from December 13, 2003, 
to October 19, 2004. 
¶232 The majority is correct in recognizing that Carter is 
not entitled to sentence credit in Wisconsin for the time he 
spent in custody in Illinois on his sentence for DUI.  He was 
sentenced to 30 days.  He served only nine days, which included 
three days of credit, including the day his probation was 
revoked.  He was on $5,000 bail until he was revoked.  Carter is 
not entitled to credit for any of those nine days on his 
Wisconsin sentence. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
45 
 
¶233 The majority is also correct that Carter is not 
entitled to credit for any confinement in Illinois after his 
October 19, 2004, sentence on the Chicago robbery.  This is 
standard analysis under Beets. 
¶234 What the majority fails to appreciate is that Carter's 
confinement in the Cook County Jail between December 19, 2003, 
and October 19, 2004, is grounded almost entirely upon Illinois' 
insistence that he be present for his trial on the robbery.  
Carter had committed a serious, violent crime in Chicago.  He 
was already a convicted felon who had once "beat[en]" a homicide 
charge in Cook County.  He had violated the conditions of 
supervision on his DUI and been on the lamb for more than a year 
before he was picked up.  When he was arrested, he was carrying 
a gun.  Yes, Wisconsin wanted him, but Wisconsin would have to 
wait until Illinois "finish[ed] that local charge."  According 
to Judge McMahon, Carter "could not agree to extradition because 
he had a pending local charge and that local charge had to be 
resolved before he could be sent back to Wisconsin."  
¶235 Carter failed to establish that his detention in 
Illinois resulted exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or 
detainer.  Had he provided such evidence, he would have been 
entitled to credit for every day of such confinement.  In fact, 
Carter's own evidence——the Townsend transcript, the affidavits 
of his own investigator, and his own statements in court——
establish that Illinois would not have permitted Carter to leave 
Illinois because of the pending robbery charge.  Thus, he is 
entitled 
to 
zero 
credit 
in 
Wisconsin 
for 
his 
Illinois 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.dtp 
 
46 
 
confinement.  The Wisconsin paperwork played virtually no part 
in Carter's continuing 10-month confinement. 
¶236 In 2005 Carter was brought to Wisconsin for trial on 
the Wisconsin charge.  At that time, he was unquestionably in 
Wisconsin "custody."  He was awaiting trial on the Wisconsin 
charge for which he was sentenced.  Carter was entitled to 
credit for all his presentence confinement in Wisconsin because 
he would not have been in a Wisconsin jail awaiting trial except 
for the Wisconsin charge.  This credit would comply with the 
statute and in no way affect his sentence in Illinois. 
¶237 The majority opinion is legally mistaken in many ways, 
but it is also problematic because it is likely to inspire 
countless motions for additional sentence credit based upon the 
new principles of law announced in the opinion. 
¶238 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶239 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
dissent from the majority opinion, which awards the defendant 
305 days of sentence credit on a Wisconsin sentence for time 
spent in Illinois custody on an Illinois criminal charge.  I 
fear that the majority opinion confuses sentence credit and 
misplaces the burden of proof that properly lies with the 
defendant.  In addition, the majority asserts that its sentence 
credit 
analysis 
applies 
only 
with 
respect 
to 
concurrent 
sentences, see majority op., ¶6 ("hop[ing] [the majority] ha[s] 
provided greater clarity in awarding sentence credit in a case 
involving concurrent sentences"), but then fails to explain how 
or why its analysis would not apply to consecutive sentences.  
While the majority proclaims that it clarifies the law, it 
actually muddles the sentence credit issues with which trial 
courts are routinely confronted.  Apparently the majority cabins 
its analysis to the unique facts of this case.  The majority's 
lack of analysis with respect to sentence credit due for related 
verses unrelated charges and concurrent verses consecutive 
sentences is telling.  The majority opinion must be intended to 
apply only to a future case where a defendant is in custody out 
of state on charges in both that state and Wisconsin, and a 
Wisconsin court later pronounces a concurrent sentence to one 
imposed in the other state, and the exact same credit is due in 
each.  These facts are unique indeed. 
¶240 On July 23, 2003, the defendant was charged with 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 941.30(1).  On that same date, a felony warrant and 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
authorization for extradition was executed in Wisconsin for the 
defendant on the above charge.  On December 13, 2003, the 
defendant was arrested in Chicago, Illinois.  The arrest report 
lists both the Wisconsin warrant and an outstanding Illinois 
warrant for probation violation.  The defendant remained in 
Illinois custody until June 1, 2005, when he was conveyed to 
Milwaukee County pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers.  On August 30, 2005, the defendant pled guilty to 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety and was sentenced to 
twelve-and-a-half years of imprisonment, comprised of seven-and-
a-half years in initial confinement and five years on extended 
supervision——imposed concurrently with the defendant's existing 
sentence in Illinois.  The circuit court granted the defendant's 
request for 91 days credit, which the State and defense attorney 
stipulated to as it comprised the period between his initial 
appearance in Milwaukee County (June 1, 2005) and his sentencing 
in Milwaukee County (August 30, 2005). 
¶241 Ten months later, on June 29, 2006, the defendant 
filed a post-conviction motion in Milwaukee County seeking 324 
days of sentence credit representing the time he spent in 
Illinois custody between the date of his arrest in Illinois and 
the date of his sentencing on the Illinois charge.  The circuit 
court denied the defendant's motion for 324 days of sentence 
credit; however, the circuit court granted the defendant an 
additional credit of six days for a total of 97 days of sentence 
credit.  This adjusted amount included the period between the 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
defendant's arrest in connection with the Wisconsin charge (May 
26, 2005) and his sentencing on that charge (August 30, 2005). 
¶242 As the utterly deficient record in this case makes 
clear, the most appropriate time to determine sentence credit is 
at the sentencing itself.  Four-and-a-half years later, the 
majority finds itself drawing assumptions from next to no 
records detailing the defendant's custody in Illinois.  I 
decline to join the majority's award of 305 days of sentence 
credit to a defendant who failed to present any Illinois court 
records proving that he was "in custody" in Illinois "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed" in Wisconsin.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  For 
that reason, I respectfully dissent.  
¶243 The defendant now seeks credit for time spent in 
presentence custody in Illinois from the day of his arrest in 
Illinois (December 13, 2003) until his sentencing on the 
Illinois charge (October 19, 2004).  The defendant claims that 
this presentence custody was both "in connection with the course 
of conduct for which sentence was imposed" in Wisconsin, Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), as well as in connection with the robbery 
charge in Illinois.  However, merely because the defendant was 
initially brought to court in connection with a Wisconsin 
charge, if that indeed happened in this case, does not mean that 
he deserves credit for time spent in Illinois custody absent 
proof that he was held in custody on the Wisconsin charge.  The 
record is devoid of any proof that the defendant was held in 
Illinois on cash bail or otherwise because of the Wisconsin 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
charge.  The defendant fails to provide official court records 
which would prove that Illinois filed a fugitive complaint or 
held an extradition proceeding based upon the Wisconsin warrant.  
At best, it seems that the defendant was ultimately returned on 
a detainer, for which it is clear that no sentence credit is 
due.  
¶244 I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) provides for sentence credit "for all days spent 
in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed."  Despite the majority sidestepping the 
issue, the statute indeed requires that the defendant be "in 
custody" "in connection with" the Wisconsin charge.  See id.; 
State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶27, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 
N.W.2d 207 
(explaining 
that 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
requires 
two 
determinations: whether the defendant was in custody and whether 
the custody was in connection with the course of conduct for 
which sentence was imposed).  The "in connection with" language 
has a nexus with the "in custody" language, which tethers the 
defendant's in-custody status to a specific charge.  See 
Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶32-33.  For example, in State v. 
Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 498-99, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 
1997), the court of appeals declined to grant the defendant 44 
days of sentence credit against his sexual assault sentence for 
time spent in presentence custody resulting from a bail jumping 
charge, despite the bail jumping charge arising out of a 
violation of the defendant's personal recognizance bond on the 
sexual assault charge.  The court of appeals explained:  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
[B]ecause Beiersdorf posted a personal recognizance 
bond on the felony sexual assault charge and remained 
on that bond until his sentencing, and because he was 
in custody on cash bail only on the subsequent bail 
jumping and sexual intercourse charges, the forty-four 
days in custody, under § 973.155(1)(a), Stats., was 
'custody' only 'in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed' and stayed on 
the bail jumping. 
Id.  In other words, there was no factual connection between the 
presentence custody and the sentence imposed on the sexual 
assault charge, "despite the obvious procedural connection 
between the bail jumping charge and the original sexual assault 
charge: i.e., without the sexual assault charge there would have 
been no personal recognizance bond, and thus, no bail jumping."  
Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶35 (citing approvingly the court of 
appeals' analysis in Beiersdorf).  I fear that the majority 
today has blurred the clear distinction that has heretofore 
existed as to when sentence credit is due and when it is not.  
The "in custody in connection with" language of § 973.155(1)(a) 
has never been interpreted to require only that law enforcement 
have knowledge of an outstanding warrant.  In this case, 
sentence credit for being in custody on an Illinois charge 
should not be awarded to the defendant who has shown merely that 
a police report suggests that law enforcement knew about an 
outstanding Wisconsin warrant at the time he was initially 
arrested in Illinois.  The burden of proving both the "in 
custody" status and its connection with the course of conduct 
for which the Wisconsin sentence was imposed rests with the 
defendant.  State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995).  Here, the defendant has failed to 
meet his burden. 
¶245 In State v. Villalobos, the court of appeals held that 
Villalobos was not entitled to sentence credit because he failed 
to meet his burden of demonstrating that the custody for which 
he sought credit was in connection with the charge he was 
sentenced on.  Id.  At the time of his arrest in Racine County 
for possession of a controlled substance, Villalobos was the 
subject of an outstanding Kenosha County warrant and complaint 
for a charge of injury by conduct regardless of life.  Id. at 
145.  Following his sentence on the Racine County drug matter, 
Villalobos was transferred to Kenosha County, where he was 
eventually convicted as a habitual criminal of recklessly 
endangering safety and sentenced to 40 months in prison.  Id.  
Villalobos claimed that he was entitled to sentence credit for 
the days he spent in presentence custody in Racine County.1  Id. 
at 146.  The court of appeals disagreed.  Id. at 148.   
¶246 Quoting State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 349 
N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984), the Villalobos court ruled that "the 
                                                 
1 Following Villalobos's conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, the Racine County Circuit Court placed him 
on probation for 18 months and ordered him to serve 30 days in 
jail as a condition of probation.  State v. Villalobos, 196 
Wis. 2d 141, 144, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995).  Villalobos 
was credited with 53 days of presentence custody.  Id.  Because 
the credit of 53 days was in excess of the 30 days imposed as a 
condition of probation, Villalobos did not have to serve any 
further time on the drug matter.  Id.  It was those remaining 23 
days of "excess" Racine County presentence custody for which 
Villalobos sought credit against the Kenosha County sentence.  
Id. at 146. 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
custody for which credit is sought 'must . . . result from the 
occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority which 
occasions, or is related to, confinement on the charge for which 
the defendant is ultimately sentenced.'"  196 Wis. 2d at 146.  
The court of appeals rejected Villalobos's argument that under 
the Demars test, his Racine County custody was sufficiently 
related to or "in connection with" the Kenosha County arrest 
warrant and complaint.  Id. at 146-48.   
¶247 As the Villalobos court explained, in Demars, the 
defendant sought credit against a Winnebago County sentence for 
time spent in presentence custody served in Fond du Lac County 
relating to a Fond du Lac probation revocation proceeding.  Id. 
at 146-47 (citing Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 21).  The Winnebago 
County Sheriff's Department filed a detainer with Fond du Lac 
County, requesting that Fond du Lac County detain Demars should 
he post bond and have his probation hold lifted.  Demars, 119 
Wis. 2d at 21.  The court of appeals held that Demars was not 
entitled to sentence credit against the Winnebago County 
sentence because the detainer did not occasion Demars' custody 
on the Winnebago County charge for which he was sentenced: 
The 
communication 
by 
the 
Winnebago 
county 
authorities to the Fond du Lac county authorities did 
not occasion the custody of Demars on the Winnebago 
county charges in any sense.  Demars was not arrested 
based upon the communication, nor, based on the record 
before [the court of appeals], was bail set or any 
bail information conveyed.   
Id. at 26.   
¶248 According to the Villalobos court, "[t]he teaching of 
Demars is that the mere existence of legal process does not, in 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
and of itself, trigger custody."  196 Wis. 2d at 147.  The 
process must "be accompanied by some legal event or occurrence 
which 'occasions, or is related to, confinement' on the charge 
referenced in the process."  Id. (quoting Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 
26).  Accordingly, the mere existence of an arrest warrant, like 
in Villalobos's case, is not sufficient to trigger custody.  Id.   
¶249 Villalobos argued that the Racine County jail records 
demonstrated the necessary link under the Demars test, as a 
reference to the Kenosha County charge was included in a list of 
the various reasons for his custody.  Id.  The court of appeals 
rejected his argument that the jail log entry demonstrated an 
"'occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority' within the 
meaning of Demars."  Id. at 147-48 (quoting Demars, 119 
Wis. 2d at 26).  "Like the detainer in Demars, all this entry 
connote[d] [was] Racine County's awareness that Kenosha County 
had an outstanding warrant for Villalobos's custody."  Id. at 
148.  The court of appeals noted that the record was silent as 
to the reason for Villalobos's arrest in Racine County.  Id.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals denied Villalobos sentence 
credit for time spent in presentence custody in Racine County, 
concluding that "[w]hat is lacking is sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that Villalobos's initial arrest was based on the 
Kenosha County warrant or that the warrant was ever executed 
against Villalobos during his Racine County custody."  Id. 
¶250 In this case, the defendant has introduced no proof 
that he was arrested and held in custody in Illinois on the 
Wisconsin charge of first-degree recklessly endangering safety.  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
Simply stated, this far after the fact, the record is woefully 
inadequate with respect to what credit should be due the 
defendant.  The majority awards the defendant sentence credit 
based on pure speculation.  As was the case in Villalobos, the 
record lacks any sufficient evidence demonstrating that the 
Wisconsin warrant was ever even executed against the defendant 
during his Illinois custody.  See id.  While the arrest report 
documenting the defendant's arrest in Chicago, Illinois may list 
both an Illinois probation violation warrant and a Wisconsin 
warrant, the fact that the Wisconsin warrant was listed in the 
arrest report does not alone sufficiently demonstrate that the 
defendant was subsequently held in custody in Illinois on the 
Wisconsin charge.  There are no court records to indicate that 
bail was set for the defendant's Wisconsin case in Illinois or 
that he was in custody on the Wisconsin charge.  Instead, it is 
apparent that the defendant was held in Illinois to answer to an 
Illinois criminal charge. 
¶251 Even assuming that the defendant was arrested in 
Illinois on the Wisconsin warrant, the record is void of any 
court records proving that Illinois filed a fugitive complaint 
or held an extradition proceeding.  The record fails to contain 
any court documents or entries which would evidence that any 
case was filed or extradition proceeding held on the Wisconsin 
charge such that the defendant would be entitled to credit for 
being "in custody in connection with" the Wisconsin charge.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).   
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
¶252 The holding of a defendant for extradition is not 
without certain requirements and protections.  The Extradition 
Clause of the United States Constitution governs interstate 
extradition and provides that any person accused of committing 
an offense in one state, who flees to another state, must be 
returned to the state where the crime was committed upon request 
of that state's executive authority.  U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, 
cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2006); see also Black's Law Dictionary 
605 (7th ed. 1999).  Section 14 of the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 599 (2003), codified in Wisconsin at 
Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14) and in Illinois at 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
225/14 (2009),2 "permit[s] the police in one state, upon 
reasonable information that a person had committed a felony in 
another state, to arrest that person without a warrant when 
found in the asylum state."  State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 
668, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975).  That arrest is "known as a 
prerequisition arrest and is for the purpose of holding the 
defendant until a governor's requisition warrant can be issued 
upon 
the 
demanding 
state's 
initiation 
of 
extradition 
proceedings."  Id.  Regardless of whether the arrest is made 
with a fugitive warrant, Wis. Stat. § 976.03(13); 725 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 225/13, or without a fugitive warrant, § 976.03(14); 725 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14, a judge in the asylum state must issue 
                                                 
2 The cited statutory provisions in Wisconsin and Illinois, 
which 
codify 
the 
Uniform 
Criminal 
Extradition 
Act, 
are 
substantively identical.  All references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2007-08 version, and all references to the 
Illinois Statutes are to the 2009 version.  
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
a fugitive complaint, stating the grounds for the alleged 
fugitive's arrest.  See Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669.  In this 
case, the record does not contain any such complaint, official 
documentation, or court case file entries. 
¶253 Following the arrest and the issuance of the fugitive 
complaint, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 976.03(15) and 725 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 225/15, a judge in the asylum state must determine 
whether the appearing defendant is the person charged with 
committing the crime in the demanding state and whether the 
defendant is a fugitive from justice.  See Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 
669.  If so, the judge must then issue a prerequisition warrant 
for the defendant's confinement pending the issuance of the 
governor's warrant from the demanding state.  § 976.03(15); 725 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15; Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669.  Pending the 
governor's warrant, the defendant may be committed to county 
jail in the asylum state for a period not to exceed 30 days.  
§ 976.03(15); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15.  The defendant may be 
released on bail by bond, so long as the defendant was not 
charged with a crime punishable in the demanding state by death 
or life imprisonment.  § 976.03(16); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
225/16.  If the governor's warrant is still not received, 
commitment or bail may be extended up to 60 days.  § 976.03(17); 
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/17.  Again, in this case, no such 
prerequisition warrant or extradition case file entries exist in 
the record before us.   
¶254 In fact, we are not presented with any Illinois court 
records which would prove that the extradition proceeding, 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
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mandated by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and codified at 
Wis. Stat. § 976.03 and 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225, actually took 
place in this case.  See State ex rel. Ehlers v. Endicott, 188 
Wis. 2d 57, 63, 523 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The aim of 
interstate extradition is to [] provide a summary and mandatory 
proceeding."  (citing Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288 
(1978))).  The majority concludes that based upon "the records 
available, the procedures set forth in the Uniform Act appear to 
have been followed."  Majority op., ¶76.  However, the mandates 
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act demand more than a mere 
"appearance" of being followed.  See Doran, 439 U.S. at 288 
("Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and 
mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. 
IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution."). 
¶255 The evidence that the majority so heavily relies on to 
conclude that an extradition proceeding took place consists of 
two non-authenticated teletype messages sent from the Chicago 
Police Department Extradition Unit to the Milwaukee Police 
Department.  The first message, sent on December 15, 2003, 
purportedly gives notice that the defendant "appeared our ct 
this date & refused to waive formal extradition" and requested 
that the Milwaukee Police Department "plz proceed with [its] 
governors warrant application."  The second message, sent March 
5, 2004, purportedly advised that the "governors warrant has not 
yet been received" and that the "fugitive charge must be 
dismissed" if the warrant is not received within the 90-day 
period of commitment authorized by sections 16 and 17 of the 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
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Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.  It is apparently these 
teletype messages alone that the circuit court relied upon and 
the majority now uses to find that the defendant in fact 
appeared in Cook County Court on December 15, 2003, for an 
extradition proceeding and was thereafter held in custody in 
connection with the Wisconsin charge for almost a year.  
¶256 We do have in the record a governor's warrant that 
Governor Jim Doyle apparently signed on February 6, 2004, to 
extradite the defendant back to Wisconsin.  However, we do not 
know where the document came from or whether it was ever 
received in Illinois.  The majority concedes as much.  Despite 
recognizing that "the present record does not document the date" 
on which service of the warrant actually occurred, if at all, 
the majority nevertheless makes the extraordinary assumption 
that the warrant was received by Illinois within the 90-day 
period of commitment because (a) evident by the second teletype 
message, Illinois was aware on March 5, 2003, that the Wisconsin 
charge "must be dismissed" if the governor's warrant is not 
received within the 90-day period of commitment, and (b) 
Illinois held the defendant based on the Wisconsin charge until 
October 20, 2004, well after the 90-day period would have 
expired.  Majority op., ¶71.  The bare record before us simply 
does not support such an incredible leap of logic.  Even the 
majority 
cannot 
explain 
why 
Illinois 
would 
dismiss 
the 
extradition case and release the defendant on October 20, 2004, 
if in fact the governor's warrant had been received.  See id., 
¶73 ("The record is silent about why, after the governor's 
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warrant issued, the extradition case was dismissed, and the 
defendant was transferred to the Illinois prison system.").  
Based upon the majority's assumptive logic, it is just as 
conceivable that Illinois never actually received the governor's 
warrant and instead held the defendant on the Illinois charge 
until he was sentenced on that charge on October 19, 2004.  
Again, based upon the assumptions that the record forces the 
court to make, how can the majority conclude that the defendant 
met his burden of proof? 
¶257 In any event, at oral argument, the parties agreed 
that the defendant was transferred to Milwaukee County on June 
1, 2005, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 976.05, 976.06.  The Act "establishes 
procedures that require cooperation between the 'receiving 
state' that is requesting the person in custody, and the 
'sending state' that currently has custody of the accused."  
State v. Townsend, 2006 WI App 177, ¶10, 295 Wis. 2d 844, 722 
N.W.2d 753.  "A 'detainer' is not executed against a person, 
nor, standing alone, can it legally authorize custody."  Demars, 
119 Wis. 2d at 24.  Because sentence credit requires the 
defendant be "in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct 
for 
which 
sentence 
was 
imposed," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), no sentence credit results from a detainer.  
When then does the majority conclude that the defendant ceased 
to be held "in custody" on the Wisconsin charge and instead was 
held on a "detainer" for which no credit is due? 
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¶258 The confusion caused by the majority opinion may not 
be limited to interstate situations.  Sentence credit issues 
arise on a daily basis in trial courts all across Wisconsin.  
Some sentence credit issues can be difficult, but prior to 
today, it seemed clear that in order to be awarded sentence 
credit, the defendant needed to be "in custody in connection 
with" the case for which the defendant was being sentenced.  The 
majority opinion confuses the fact that a defendant may receive 
credit for time spent in custody before bond or bail is set by 
the 
court, 
but 
once 
set, 
additional 
sentence 
credit 
is 
determined from that point forward based on whether the 
defendant was required to stay in custody on bail in connection 
with the case for which the defendant is being sentenced.  For 
example, it is not atypical for a defendant to be brought to 
court, in custody, on two or more charges for which bond or bail 
will be set in two or more cases.  Bail or bond is set 
separately for each case.  A cash bail may be set on one case, 
and a personal recognizance bond may be set in the other 
case(s).  Assuming the defendant cannot post cash bail and 
therefore remains in custody in that case, sentence credit from 
that point forward is due in that case.  However, at sentencing 
in the case for which the defendant received a personal 
recognizance bond, and therefore is not in custody, the 
defendant is not due sentence credit for the time spent in 
custody on the cash bail case, even though he or she was 
initially arrested and brought into court on both cases.  
Likewise, in this case, even if the defendant was initially 
No.  2006AP1811-CR.akz 
 
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brought to court in connection with a Wisconsin charge along 
with the Illinois charge, that does not mean that the defendant 
deserves sentence credit against the Wisconsin sentence for time 
spent in Illinois custody absent proof that he was held in 
Illinois custody on that Wisconsin charge. 
¶259 In conclusion, the defendant has failed to prove that 
he is entitled to sentence credit on the Wisconsin charge for 
time spent in Illinois custody.  He failed to meet his burden of 
proving that he was "in custody" "in connection with the course 
of conduct" for which the Wisconsin sentence was imposed.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d at 148.  
Merely because the defendant may have been arrested in Illinois 
with law enforcement possessing knowledge that he had an 
outstanding Wisconsin warrant does not automatically translate 
into dual sentence credit in Illinois and Wisconsin for nearly a 
year of time spent in Illinois custody, especially given the 
lack of proof that he was held in Illinois custody on the 
Wisconsin charge.  The utterly deficient record is devoid of any 
proof that the defendant was held in Illinois on cash bail 
stemming from the Wisconsin charge.  There are also no court 
records before us which prove that Illinois filed a fugitive 
complaint or held an extradition proceeding based upon the 
Wisconsin warrant.  At best, it seems that the defendant was 
ultimately returned to Wisconsin on a detainer, for which no 
sentence credit is due.   
¶260 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
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