Title: Ex Parte Cobb
Citation: 781 So. 2d 208
Docket Number: 1991230
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 2000

781 So. 2d 208 (2000)
Ex parte Shelton COBB and Amy Cobb.
(Re Shelton Cobb and Amy Cobb v. Serra Toyota, Inc.)
1991230.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 29, 2000.
*209 S. Andrew Scharfenberg and Timothy A. Palmer of Ogletree, Deakin, Nash, Smoak &amp; Stewart, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioners.
Cecil H. Macoy, Jr., and Michael L. Jackson of Wallace, Jordan, Ratliff &amp; Brandt, L.L.C., Birmingham, for respondent.
COOK, Justice.
Shelton Cobb and Amy Cobb, the plaintiffs in an action pending in the Jefferson Circuit Court, petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order compelling them to submit their claims to arbitration.
The Cobbs leased an automobile from Serra Toyota, Inc., on March 26, 1999. According to the Cobbs, in response to a specific question they say they were asked while they were signing the lease documents, Serra's agent told them that all aspects of the lease transaction had been approved. The Cobbs took possession of the car and left the dealership. Some time later, when the Cobbs brought the car to Serra for a repair, they were told that Serra had voided the lease transaction because their financing request had not been approved. The Cobbs were not allowed to leave with the new car, and Serra returned their old car to them.
The Cobbs sued Serra, stating a detinue claim; alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent suppression, deceit, and conversion; and asking for compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, costs, and "such other relief to which [they] may be entitled." In response, Serra moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the action and compel arbitration. Serra relied on an arbitration clause in the Lease Agreement; that clause provided, in part, as follows:
In support of its motion, Serra submitted the affidavit of its secretary/treasurer, Marty Brill, who stated that the Retail Buyer's Order signed by the Cobbs contained a sentence reading: "VEHICLE IS BEING DELIVERED SUBJECT TO FINANCIAL APPROVAL." (Brill stated that that sentence was written in bold print.) Brill also stated that the Cobbs' request for financing was denied.
The Cobbs amended their complaint to add a request for the additional relief of "possession of the vehicle at issue or its alternate value."
After conducting a hearing on Serra's motion, the trial court ordered arbitration and placed the case on its "administrative *210 docket." The Cobbs filed this mandamus petition.
In Ex parte Payne, 741 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1999), this Court was faced with facts substantially similar to those presented by the Cobbs' petition. In that case, Payne's application for financing for the purchase of a new car was not approved. Although Payne resisted the dealership's efforts to regain possession of the car, the dealership obtained a writ of seizure, which was executed by the sheriff's department. Payne moved for a hearing on the writ of seizure, filed an answer to the dealership's detinue action, and filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, fraud, and deceit.
In Payne, as here, the trial court granted the dealership's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision in the "Retail Purchase Order" executed by the parties. Payne sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the order compelling arbitration of her counterclaims against the dealership. We granted the petition, holding, in pertinent part:
Ex parte Payne, 741 So. 2d  at 402-04.
Here, the Retail Buyer's Order signed by Serra and the Cobbs provided, in large, boldface type, that the car was being delivered to the Cobbs "SUBJECT TO FINANCIAL APPROVAL." This condition precedentobtaining "financial approval" did not occur, and the record before this Court shows that, after the Cobbs' financing request was rejected, Serra did not view the Lease Agreement as a binding contract. Attached to the Cobbs' mandamus petition is a copy of the Lease Agreement containing the arbitration provision Serra seeks to enforce. Written across the first page of the Lease Agreement and across the first page of the Retail Buyer's Order are the words "VOID" and "TURNED DOWN."
Because neither the Lease Agreement nor the Retail Buyer's Order is a binding contract, Serra cannot enforce the arbitration provision it relies on. The Cobbs have demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief they seek. Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682 (Ala.1989). Therefore, we grant the Cobbs' petition for a writ of mandamus and we direct the trial court to vacate its order compelling the Cobbs to arbitrate their claims against Serra.[1]
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
[1]  Because neither the Lease Agreement nor the Retail Buyer's Order is a binding contract, it necessarily follows that the Cobbs may not proceed upon any claims sounding in contract that would be based upon these documents.