Title: Fultz v. Delhaize America, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 080782
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2009

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DORIS KNIGHT FULTZ 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 080782 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
     June 4, 2009 
DELHAIZE AMERICA, INC., 
D/B/A FOOD LION, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Cheryl V. Higgins, Judge 
 
 
Doris Knight Fultz, a customer at a Food Lion grocery 
store, injured herself when she tripped over a metal bar 
attached to the floor and extending along the side and to the 
front of an automated teller machine (“ATM”) located inside 
the grocery store.  The sole issue we consider in this appeal 
is whether Fultz was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law.  Specifically, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in determining that the issue whether Fultz was 
reasonably distracted before injuring herself on an open and 
obvious hazard was appropriate for summary judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Pursuant to Rule 3:20, we examine the facts as presented 
in the pleadings, the orders made at a pretrial conference, 
and the party admissions.  After completing her shopping at 
the Food Lion grocery store located on the 4000 block of 
Franklin Road in Roanoke on August 7, 2004, Fultz walked 
directly to the ATM located in the front vestibule area of the 
store.  The ATM had been installed and maintained by 
Nationwide Money Services, Inc.  Actual dimensions of the ATM 
and the bars were not included in the record.  However, 
Fultz’s answers to interrogatories and three photographs of 
the ATM and bars filed as exhibits illustrate the overall 
appearance, color, shape, and general placement of the ATM and 
the bars.  The interrogatory answers and photographic exhibits 
depict two bars, each approximately twice the length of the 
ATM, bolted to the floor on either side of the machine.  Less 
than four inches of space exists between the bars and the ATM.  
The bars extend into the walkway from either side of the ATM 
three feet in front of the machine.  The bars are bolted to 
the floor by four metal struts attached to each bar.  The bars 
sit approximately five inches off of the floor.  The bars 
appear to be wrought of a dark smooth metal and to be more 
than two, but less than five inches in diameter.  The 
photographs depict off-white or beige floor tiles beneath the 
ATM and the bars. 
 
In order to use the ATM, an individual would first have 
to step over one of the bars if approaching the ATM from the 
side, or walk directly between the bars if approaching from 
the front of the machine.  The placement of the bars forced a 
user of the ATM like Fultz, to stand between both bars while 
using the machine.   
 
2
 
Fultz’s three-year old grandson accompanied her when she 
approached the ATM.  While using the ATM, Fultz’s grandson 
suddenly moved away from her.  Fultz turned, moved toward her 
grandson, and tripped over one of the metal bars.  The impact 
from the fall fractured three bones in Fultz’s right elbow.   
 
Fultz thereafter filed in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Albemarle an amended complaint against Delhaize America, 
Inc., the parent company of Food Lion, Inc., Food Lion, LLC, 
and Nationwide Money Services, Inc. (collectively, “the 
defendants”), seeking damages for her injuries from her fall.∗  
Ultimately, the circuit court held that the bars protruding 
from the sides of the ATM represented an open and obvious 
hazard, and that Fultz was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law when she tripped over one of those bars and 
injured herself.  Accordingly, the circuit court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  We awarded Fultz 
this appeal. 
                     
∗ The record does not reflect which of the defendants 
installed the metal bars and under what circumstances this was 
done.  Based upon a review of the photographic exhibits, 
however, it is a reasonable inference that the bars were 
installed to protect the ATM from being damaged by grocery 
carts stored next to it.  In the procedural posture of the 
case, and for purposes of resolving this appeal, we will 
merely assume that the defendants acted jointly.  
Additionally, we note that venue is not an issue in this case. 
 
 
3
DISCUSSION 
 
Under well-settled principles, we review the record 
applying the same standard a trial court must adopt in 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, accepting as true 
those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, unless the inferences are forced, strained, 
or contrary to reason.  Dickerson v. Fatehi, 253 Va. 324, 327, 
484 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1997); Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 
139-40, 427 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1993).  In this context, we have 
repeatedly held that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, 
available only when there are no material facts genuinely in 
dispute.  Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 269 Va. 609, 
618, 611 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2005); Smith v. Smith, 254 Va. 99, 
103, 487 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1997); Slone v. General Motors 
Corp., 249 Va. 520, 522, 457 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1995).  Thus, if 
the evidence is conflicting on a material point or if 
reasonable persons may draw different conclusions from the 
evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.  See Jenkins v. 
Pyles, 269 Va. 383, 388, 611 S.E.2d 404, 407 (2005)(applying 
this principle to motion to set aside jury verdict). 
 
Furthermore, we have previously observed that we are 
increasingly confronted with appeals of cases in which a trial 
court incorrectly has short-circuited litigation pretrial and 
has decided the dispute without permitting the parties to 
 
4
reach a trial on the merits.  Renner v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 
352, 429 S.E.2d 218, 219 (1993); see also CaterCorp, Inc. v. 
Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 24, 431 S.E.2d 277, 279 
(1993).  This is another such case. 
 
It is well-established that Virginia law requires 
storeowners to maintain reasonably safe facilities for their 
invitees’ visits.  As we explained long ago, a storeowner is 
not an insurer of the invitee’s safety on the premises, but 
must use ordinary care to render them reasonably safe for the 
invitee's visit.  Knight v. Moore, 179 Va. 139, 145, 18 S.E.2d 
266, 269 (1942)(citing cases).  Further, while a storeowner 
“must give notice or warning of an unsafe condition which is 
known to him and is unknown to the invitee, such notice is not 
required where the dangerous condition is open and obvious, 
and is patent to a reasonable person exercising ordinary care 
for his own safety.”  Id. at 146, 18 S.E.2d at 269 (citing 
Eastern Shore of Va. Agric. Ass’n v. LeCato, 151 Va. 614, 619-
20, 144 S.E. 713, 714 (1928)).  In addition, an invitee also 
“has the right to assume that the premises are reasonably safe 
for his visit,” and “[i]n the absence of knowledge or warning 
of danger, . . . is not required to be on the lookout for it.”  
Id. at 146, 18 S.E.2d at 270 (citing cases). 
 
For purposes of our resolution of this appeal, we will 
assume, without deciding, that the protruding metal bars 
 
5
constituted an open and obvious dangerous condition on the 
premises.  We note, however, that “[w]hen the defect is of 
such a character that reasonable and prudent [persons] may 
reasonably differ as to whether an accident could or should 
have been reasonably anticipated from its existence or not, 
then the case is generally one for the jury.”  City of Roanoke 
v. Sutherland, 159 Va. 749, 758, 167 S.E. 243, 246 (1933).  
Thus, assuming the metal bars constituted an open and obvious 
dangerous condition, the focus of this appeal is whether the 
facts as presented in the pleadings and the party admissions 
support the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants on the ground that Fultz was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. 
 
In Moses v. Southwestern Va. Transit Management Co., 273 
Va. 672, 643 S.E.2d 156 (2007), we recently reviewed the well-
established principles of law that define contributory 
negligence and its determination.  As pertinent here, we 
recounted that “[c]ontributory negligence is an affirmative 
defense that must be proved according to an objective standard 
whether the plaintiff failed to act as a reasonable person 
would have acted for his or her own safety under the 
circumstances.  The essential concept of contributory 
negligence is carelessness.  The issue whether a plaintiff is 
guilty of contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of 
 
6
fact to be decided by the fact finder.  The issue becomes one 
of law for the circuit court to decide only when reasonable 
minds could not differ about what conclusion could be drawn 
from the evidence.”  Id. at 678, 643 S.E.2d at 159-60 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 
When, as here, the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence arises from the plaintiff’s injury by an open and 
obvious dangerous condition, the plaintiff has the burden to 
show conditions outside herself which prevented her seeing the 
dangerous condition or which would excuse her failure to 
observe it.  Southern Floors & Acoustics, Inc. v. Max-Yeboah, 
267 Va. 682, 686, 594 S.E.2d 908, 910-11 (2004)(jury issue 
presented when plaintiff tripped over stack of tiles after 
contractor’s employees yelled and pointed).  In other words, 
when the plaintiff was distracted and suffered injuries from 
an open and obvious defect, a jury issue as to the plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence can be created.  However, “‘more is 
needed than a simple allegation of a distraction to create a 
jury issue.  It [is] necessary for [the] plaintiff to 
establish that [her] excuse for inattention was reasonable, 
i.e., that the distraction was unexpected and substantial.’ ”  
Id. at 686, 594 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting citing West v. City of 
Portsmouth, 217 Va. 734, 737, 232 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1977)). 
 
7
 
In West, a pedestrian injured himself after walking into 
a water meter box on a public sidewalk.  West argued that 
customers entering and exiting an adjacent bakery had 
distracted him.  Id. at 737, 232 S.E.2d at 765.  He contended 
that this evidence was sufficient to establish a condition and 
a distraction “outside of himself” which prevented him from 
seeing the defect in the sidewalk.  Id.  According to West, a 
question of fact for the jury was presented as to whether he 
exercised ordinary care under the circumstances.  We rejected 
this contention, reasoning that “[a] careful review of the 
evidence compels the conclusion that [West] was simply not 
observant and neglected to see what was . . . open and 
obvious, and what, by maintaining a lookout commensurate with 
the circumstances then existing, he should have seen.”  Id. at 
739, 232 S.E.2d at 767. 
 
Nonetheless, we have specifically declined to hold that, 
as a matter of law, a pedestrian’s failure to look down while 
stepping forward necessarily constitutes contributory 
negligence in every case.  Little Creek Inv. Corp. v. Hubbard, 
249 Va. 258, 261, 455 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1995)(citing City of 
Suffolk v. Hewitt, 226 Va. 20, 28, 307 S.E.2d 444, 448 
(1983)).  Furthermore, as we stated in Little Creek, “the 
circumstances of each case must be considered to determine 
whether a pedestrian who failed to look nevertheless produced 
 
8
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the pedestrian 
exercised reasonable care for his or her safety under the 
circumstances. If such evidence is produced, a jury question 
is presented.”  249 Va. at 261, 455 S.E.2d at 246.  See also 
Miracle Mart, Inc. v. Webb, 205 Va. 449, 452, 137 S.E.2d 887, 
890 (1964) (invitee injured by slipping on wet floor of a 
store not barred from recovery by contributory negligence 
where a store employee had distracted her). 
 
In the present case, Fultz did not trip on the metal bars 
while walking from one point to another as she approached the 
ATM.  The thrust of her allegations is that once she arrived 
at the ATM, she was distracted from the hazard the metal bars 
presented both by her use of the ATM and the sudden movement 
of her grandson.  It is a matter of common knowledge and 
experience that manipulating the user interface of an ATM 
requires a degree of concentration, that young children 
frequently accompany adults while shopping at grocery stores, 
and that such children frequently require the attending adults 
to respond to the children’s sudden and unexpected movements.  
Whether the occurrence of such circumstances would excuse 
inattentiveness to an open and obvious dangerous condition, 
such as the protruding metal bars here, would depend upon the 
circumstances of the particular case. 
 
9
 
We are of opinion that reasonable minds could differ as 
to whether under the circumstances of this case, Fultz acted 
as a reasonable person would have acted for her own safety.  
Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred in determining that 
Fultz was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, the circuit court erred in granting 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
10