Title: State v. Arthur
Citation: 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E.2d 291
Docket Number: 22924
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 14, 1988

296 S.C. 495 (1988) 374 S.E.2d 291 The STATE, Respondent v. Limmie ARTHUR, Appellant. 22924 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard March 9, 1988. Decided November 14, 1988. *496 I.S. Leevy Johnson, David I. Bruck, John H. Blume, and S.C. Office of Appellant Defense, Columbia, for appellant. Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock and Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Columbia, Sol. James O. Dunn and Asst. Sol. Debra Lynn Owens, Conway, for respondent. Heard March 9, 1988. Decided Nov. 14, 1988. CHANDLER, Justice: For the second time, Appellant Limmie Arthur appeals a death sentence imposed for the 1984 murder of "Cripple Jack" Miller. We reverse and remand for a new resentencing trial. In August 1985, Arthur was convicted by a jury of murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to death. We affirmed the convictions, but reversed the death sentence and remanded for resentencing. See State v. Arther[1] for a statement of the facts. At the commencement of his resentencing trial Arthur's attorneys informed the Court that the defense, with Arthur's full knowledge, "waived the Defendant's right to a jury and agreed to try this case before Your Honor alone...." The trial judge accepted the waiver, conducted a nonjury trial, then sentenced Arthur to death. Arthur appeals, now contending that he did not, within the meaning and scope of constitutional and statutory-mandated protections, knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a trial by jury. We agree. Although other issues are raised by this appeal, we address only whether Arthur's waiver of the right to be resentenced by a jury was made "knowingly and voluntarily." Trial by jury is a right guaranteed by the Constitutions of both South Carolina and the United States. Additionally, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (E)(2), entitled Arthur to have his punishment determined by a jury in Phase II of a bifurcated trial. The State concedes that waiver of a constitutional or statutory right requires a showing on the record that the defendant made the waiver knowingly and intelligently. See State v. Patterson[2] and State v. Reed.[3] The seminal and still landmark decision on this question is Patton v. United States,[4] in which the U.S. Supreme Court urges trial by jury for disposition of criminal cases: Both State and Federal jurisdictions uniformly uphold waiver of the right by an accused, so long as it is made knowingly and voluntarily. However, from a searching review *498 of case law it is clear that Courts vary widely as to the sufficiency of the waiver.[5] We hold that acceptance of a jury trial waiver must be based upon a written record clearly demonstrating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily. This can be accomplished only through a searching interrogation of the accused by the trial court itself. Here, the determination was made upon a patently insufficient inquiry. The following constitutes the entire colloquy between the Court and Arthur prior to sentencing: None of the three questions propounded to Arthur was of the nonleading character essential to a meaningful response. Moreover, they failed to inform Arthur of "the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right he was waiving." See Commonwealth v. Williams.[6] The necessity for a full and adequate record was heightened for a cogent reason recognized during the trial by the *499 Court itself, to wit, Arthur's mental retardation. The murder for which Arthur is charged occurred prior to enactment of the 1986 Omnibus Crime Bill. However, at a point in the bench trial, counsel informed the Court that Arthur "waives any objection... to the application of the 1986 Omnibus Crime Bill to him, and agrees that ... he would not be eligible for parole consideration until thirty years, were the court to impose a sentence of life..." The trial judge's reaction to this proffer was one of extreme caution. Based upon medical evidence already presented he, appropriately, responded: The colloquy which ensued with Arthur points up the propriety of the Court's conducting its own direct interrogation. Notwithstanding his statement that counsel had advised him in detail concerning the 1986 Act, it was obvious from his answers that Arthur failed to understand certain of its provisions. This simply underscores the peril inherent in the acceptance of waivers by criminal defendants. The peril is manifestly enhanced where the charge is death penalty murder, and the more so, when evidence of mental retardation is present. See Patton, supra. By conducting his own thorough examination, the trial judge made a conscious effort to ascertain Arthur's comprehension of a waiver regarding parole eligibility. He should have done no less in determining the voluntariness of the far more critical waiver of a jury trial.[7] Before accepting a proffered jury trial waiver in a criminal proceeding the trial Court must conduct its own direct and independent interrogation of the defendant. This insures that the waiver is, in fact, knowing and voluntary in protection of the defendant's rights. Moreover, it promotes judicial economy by foreclosing challenges to the validity of the waiver on appeal and in post-conviction relief proceedings. See United States v. Cochran.[8] Reversed and remanded for resentencing. GREGORY, C.J., HARWELL and FINNEY, JJ. and J.B. NESS, Acting Associate Justice, concur. [1] 290 S.C. 291, 350 S.E. (2d) 187 (1986). Although various spellings have been used, the correct spelling of Appellant's last name is "Arthur." [2] 278 S.C. 319, 322, 295 S.E. (2d) 264, 265 (1982). [3] 293 S.C. 515, 517, 362 S.E. (2d) 13, 14 (1987). [4] 281 U.S. 276, 312-13, 50 S. Ct. 253, 263, 74 L. Ed. 854, 870 (1930). [5] Compare United States v. Anderson, 704 F. (2d) 117 (3d Cir.1983); State v. Olivera, 53 Hawaii, 551, 497 P. (2d) 1360 (1972); Kennedy v. State, 271 Ind. 382, 393 N.E. (2d) 139 (1979) with United States v. Delgado, 635 F. (2d) 889 (7th Cir.1981); Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. (2d) 272, 267 N.W. (2d) 602 (1978). [6] 454 Pa. 368, 312 A. (2d) 597, 600 (1973). [7] This Court has held in the recent case of State v. Matthews, ___ S.C. ___, 373 S.E. (2d) 587 (1988), that the 1986 Omnibus Crime Act may not be applied retroactively. The Act is referred to here for the sole purpose of illustrating the trial court's recognition of Arthur's impaired mental faculties, a determination which it did not make as to the waiver of a jury trial. [8] 770 F. (2d) 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985).