Title: Ferguson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-1987
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-1987 
____________ 
 
JOHN ERROL FERGUSON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 8, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John Errol Ferguson, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit 
court’s order denying his second successive motion for postconviction relief filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and appeals the order 
denying his motion for competency determination.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the circuit court’s 
order denying relief and order denying Ferguson’s motion for competency 
determination. 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Ferguson was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder and two counts 
of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  We affirmed the 
judgment on direct appeal, but remanded for resentencing for proper consideration 
of mitigating circumstances under section 921.141(6)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes 
(1977), because the trial judge improperly used a sanity-type analysis to reject 
these circumstances.  Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639, 645 (Fla. 1982).  Ferguson 
was separately convicted of another two counts of first-degree murder, one count 
of involuntary sexual battery, one count of robbery, one count of attempted 
robbery, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal 
offense, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and 
sentenced to death.  Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631, 633, 638 (Fla. 1982).  We 
affirmed the judgment and remanded for resentencing for reconsideration of 
mitigating circumstances.  Id. at 638.   
 
The trial court resentenced Ferguson for both cases and again sentenced 
Ferguson to death, which we affirmed on direct appeal.  Ferguson v. State, 474 So. 
2d 208, 210 (Fla. 1985).  Ferguson then filed a petition for writ of quo warranto 
and a petition for writ of prohibition.  This Court denied both.  Ferguson v. 
Martinez, 515 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1987) (petition for writ of quo warranto denied) 
(table); Ferguson v. Synder, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1989) (petition for writ of 
 
 
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prohibition denied) (table).  Thereafter, this Court affirmed the postconviction 
court’s denial of Ferguson’s initial motion for postconviction relief.  Ferguson v. 
State, 593 So. 2d 508, 513 (Fla. 1992).  Later, we denied Ferguson’s petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 59 (Fla. 1993).  
Ferguson filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, which the circuit 
court denied.  We affirmed the circuit court’s denial.  Ferguson v. State, 789 So. 2d 
306, 315 (Fla. 2001).  Ferguson also sought habeas corpus relief in the federal 
courts.  See Ferguson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 580 F.3d 1183 (Fla. 11th Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, Ferguson v. McNeil, 130 S. Ct. 3360 (2010). 
 
Ferguson filed the instant motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851 after Governor Rick Scott signed his death warrant on September 
5, 2012, with execution set for October 16, 2012.  He raised four claims.1  
                                          
 
 
1.  The claims Ferguson raised below are the same as raised here: 
1.  Florida’s execution protocol and the recent amendment thereto are invalid 
because they unconstitutionally delegate power from the Florida Legislature to the 
Florida Department of Corrections. 
2.  Florida’s death warrant selection process is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
3.  Ferguson was unconstitutionally denied an opportunity to participate in his 
clemency investigation and proceedings. 
4.  Executing an inmate after keeping him on death row for thirty-four years 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
 
 
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Additionally, he filed a motion for determination of competency.  The circuit court 
denied relief on all postconviction claims and denied the motion for determination 
of competency.  Ferguson appeals the denial of both motions.   He argues that: (A) 
Florida’s execution protocol violates the separation of powers provision of the 
Florida Constitution; (B) he was unconstitutionally denied an opportunity to 
participate in his clemency investigation and proceedings; (C) the postconviction 
court erred in ruling that Florida’s death warrant selection process, as applied to 
Ferguson, did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (D) his 
punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments; and (E) the circuit court erred by summarily denying his motion for 
determination of competency after expressly finding that “Mr. Ferguson 
undoubtedly suffers from mental illness.”  For the reasons set forth below, we now 
affirm the circuit court’s orders denying postconviction relief and denying 
Ferguson’s request for a competency determination.  
ANALYSIS 
 
Ferguson’s postconviction claims are governed by rule 3.851.  Whenever a 
movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual determination, the 
circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing.  Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. 
Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 n.2 (Fla. 2000); see also Reynolds 
v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S593 (Fla. Sept. 27, 2012); Walker v. State, 88 So. 3d 
 
 
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128, 135 (Fla. 2012).  However, “ ‘claims may be summarily denied when they are 
legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or are positively 
refuted by the record.’ ”  Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 868 (Fla. 2007)).  Additionally, rule 3.851(d) 
provides time limitations.  Specifically, the rule provides:  
 
(1) Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence 
of death shall be filed by the prisoner within 1 year after the judgment 
and sentence become final. For the purposes of this rule, a judgment is 
final:  
 
(A) on the expiration of the time permitted to file in the United 
States Supreme Court a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review 
of the Supreme Court of Florida decision affirming a judgment and 
sentence of death (90 days after the opinion becomes final); or 
 
(B) on the disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the 
United States Supreme Court, if filed. 
Fla. R. Crim P. 3.851(d)(1).  “Because a postconviction court’s decision whether to 
grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written 
materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, 
subject to de novo review.”  Marek, 8 So. 3d at 1127 (citing State v. Coney, 845 
So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003)). 
Separation of Powers 
 
In his first claim on appeal, Ferguson argues that section 922.07, Florida 
Statutes (2006), constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of powers by the Florida 
Legislature to the executive branch because there are insufficient guidelines 
provided in the statute.  The circuit court found the claim time-barred.  The circuit 
 
 
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court found that the claim became ripe on June 1, 2010, the same day the United 
States Supreme Court denied Ferguson’s petition for writ of certiorari.  On the 
merits, the circuit court found that it was bound by this Court’s rulings in Power v. 
State, 992 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2008); Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1142-43 
(Fla. 2006); and Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000), all of which 
rejected the claim that Florida’s lethal injection statute violates the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine.  Relating to Ferguson’s claim that the “last minute” changes to 
the protocol are constitutionally dubious, the circuit court found the claim timely 
raised, but found that the changes do not constitute a violation of separation of 
powers.  In dicta, the circuit court noted that the chemical in question, vecuronium 
bromide, has been a component of the lethal injection protocol in Oklahoma since 
2003.2  Based on our reasoning stated below, we find that the circuit court properly 
denied this claim. 
 
The circuit court rejected Ferguson’s claim of unconstitutional delegation as 
untimely filed, stating that the issue became ripe on June 1, 2010—when 
                                          
 
 
2.  In Malicoat v. State, 137 P.3d 1234 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006), the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed a claim that the Oklahoma lethal 
injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  137 P.3d at 1235.  The court denied Malicoat’s request to 
stay his execution.  Id.  Like Florida, Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol is 
established by statute but the specific method is determined by the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections.  Id. at 1236.  The Oklahoma court found that Malicoat 
failed “to show that this protocol is facially unconstitutional.”  Id.   
 
 
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Ferguson’s judgment became final after the federal court denied habeas relief and 
the United States Supreme Court denied Ferguson’s petition for writ of certiorari.  
The State asserts that this claim was ripe for review at any time because the statute 
has not changed.  Ferguson argues that the claim is not ripe until a death warrant is 
signed because otherwise a prisoner cannot be certain under which protocol he is to 
be executed.  Because we find that Ferguson has not based his claim on facts that 
occurred during a recent execution, we agree with the circuit court that this claim 
was untimely filed.  See, e.g., Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 321 (Fla. 2007) 
(finding that Schwab’s lethal injection protocol claim was not procedurally barred 
because he relied on the execution of Angel Diaz, “a claim that did not exist when 
lethal injection was first authorized.”).  Because the claim was untimely, we 
decline to address the merits.    
Clemency Proceedings 
 
In his second claim, Ferguson alleges that his clemency proceeding did not 
comport with basic due process requirements because he was only afforded an 
incomplete proceeding in which he was incapable of participating.  The circuit 
court found this claim time-barred and rejected Ferguson’s argument that the claim 
was not ripe until his death warrant was signed.  The court noted that had the claim 
not been time-barred, Ferguson “may have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
for the limited purpose of determining whether [Ferguson] received a ‘full 
 
 
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clemency hearing’ within the meaning of [Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11 (Fla. 
2010)] and Marek . . . .”  Based on our reasoning below, we find that the circuit 
court properly denied this claim.   
 
Relating to timeliness, the trial court ruled that 
The Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied on June 1, 
2010.  Pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B), the Defendant 
should have raised this claim by June 1, 2011.  The Defendant argues 
that clemency is only ripe and/or relevant “close to the time a death 
warrant is signed,” when the “snapshot” of the inmate is current and 
with a significant history on death row to evaluate.  To that end, this 
Court notes that in describing clemency as a “fail-safe” the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that it is a last resort after “judicial 
process has been exhausted.”  Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 192 
(2009) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993)).  In 
this case, Mr. Ferguson had spent over thirty (30) years on death row 
at the time his appellate remedies had been exhausted.  At that time 
this claim regarding clemency should have been raised. 
We agree.  Claims raised pursuant to rule 3.851 must meet either the timeliness 
requirements provided in section (d)(1) or the exceptions provided in section 
(d)(2).  Ferguson has failed to do either.  Accordingly, we find that the circuit court 
properly denied this claim.  
Warrant Selection Process 
 
In his third argument, Ferguson argues that, as applied, Florida’s death 
warrant selection process is unconstitutional.  The circuit court found that 
Ferguson’s claims relating to the arbitrariness and lack of safeguards in the warrant 
selection process have been argued and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court.  
 
 
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The circuit court found Ferguson’s claim that the State plays an improper role in 
the process without merit and insufficiently pleaded.  Likewise, the circuit court 
found without merit Ferguson’s claim that the infrequency of execution renders it 
unconstitutional.  Lastly, the circuit court denied Ferguson’s claim that the 
Governor’s discretion is “unfettered power” to determine the length of pre-
execution incarceration and is unconstitutional.  Because we have previously 
rejected similar claims, we find that the circuit court properly denied Ferguson’s 
present claim.  See, e.g., Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 779-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1904 (2012); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 551-52 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1 (2011). 
Length of Time on Death Row 
 
In his fourth issue on appeal, Ferguson alleges that his punishment is 
unconstitutional because he has been incarcerated on death row for over three 
decades.  After acknowledging that Ferguson “has not filed frivolous or successive 
claims,” the circuit court denied this claim stating that no federal or state court 
“ ‘has accepted the argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment, especially where both parties bear responsibility for the 
long delay.’ ” (quoting Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007)).  Because 
we have repeatedly rejected this claim for sentences of similar length, we find that 
the circuit court did not err by denying Ferguson’s claim.  See Valle, 70 So. 3d 530 
 
 
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(rejecting a claim that thirty-three years on death row constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008) (rejecting a 
claim that twenty-three years on death row constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.); Gore, 91 So. 3d at 780-81 (rejecting claim that twenty-eight years on 
death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 
380, 388-89 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim that twenty-five years on death row 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 916 
(Fla. 2002) (rejecting claim that twenty-three years on death row constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment (citing Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998))); 
Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 805 (Fla. 2001) (holding as without merit a cruel 
and unusual punishment claim of a death row inmate under sentence of death since 
1977). 
Determination of Competency 
 
In his final issue on appeal, Ferguson alleges that the circuit court 
improperly denied Ferguson’s 3.851(g) Motion for Determination of Competency.  
The State asserts that Ferguson is competent and that no evidence in the record 
supports his assertion that he is currently suffering from any mental illness.  The 
circuit court found “Mr. Ferguson undoubtedly suffers from mental illness which is 
documented from the time prior to the murders committed in the above-referenced 
cases.”  The court then found that it was possible “that the Defense would have 
 
 
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been able to demonstrate a need for Mr. Ferguson’s competent input on exactly 
what his clemency process has involved.”  However, because the court denied that 
claim as untimely, the court found that Ferguson could not meet his burden under 
rule 3.851(g).  Because we find that each of the claims above was properly denied, 
we find that the circuit court did not err in denying Ferguson’s motion for 
competency determination.  
  
In Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1997), this Court adopted 
Justice Overton’s concurring view in Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 
1984) (Overton, J., specially concurring), and stated that “a trial court must hold a 
competency hearing in a postconviction proceeding only after a capital defendant 
shows there are specific factual matters at issue that require the defendant to 
competently consult with counsel.”  Carter, 706 So. 2d at 875 (citing Jackson, 452 
So. 2d at 537).  Rule 3.851(g) was promulgated to adopt the ruling expressed in 
Carter.  See Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 794 So. 2d 
457, 458 (Fla. 2000) (adopting new subdivision 3.851(d) Incompetence to Proceed 
in Capital Collateral Proceedings) (renumbered to subdivision 3.851(g) in 
Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993 & 
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050, 797 So. 2d 1213, 1221, 1231 (Fla. 
2001)).  The circuit court correctly noted that, pursuant to this Court’s discussion 
in Carter and to rule 3.851(g), a competency evaluation is not necessary if “all 
 
 
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collateral relief issues . . . involve only matters of record and claims that do not 
require the prisoner’s input . . . .”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(g)(1).  Such claims “shall 
proceed in collateral proceedings notwithstanding the prisoner’s incompetency.”  
Id.  Accordingly, because we find that each of Ferguson’s claims was untimely and 
that the circuit court properly denied them, we also find that the circuit court 
properly denied Ferguson’s motion for competency determination.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying 
Ferguson’s second successive motion for postconviction relief and order denying 
Ferguson’s motion for competency hearing.   
 
It is so ordered.  
 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,  
Nushin G. Sayfie, Judge - Case Nos. F77-25650 & F78-05428 
 
Benjamin J.O. Lewis of Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, New York, E. Barrett 
Prettyman, Jr., Christopher T. Handman, and Hrishikesh Hari of Logan Lovells US 
LLP, Washington,  District of Columbia, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Scott Andrew Browne 
and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee