Title: STATE v SPIELMANN CHRISTENSEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12480
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 29, 1973

I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, No. 12479 JOHN MICHAEL SPIELMANN, Defendant and Appellant. ............................................ STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, No. 12480 LOUIS T O N Y CHRISTENSEN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley , Judge presiding. Counsel of R.ecord: For Appellants : Smith, Smith and Sewell, Helena, Montana Robert J. Sewell argued, Helena, Montana Anderson and Dasinger, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 3 . C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Thomas A . Olson, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Donald E. White, Special Deputy County Attorney, argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: October 2, 1973 Decided : ~ V Z 9 l g n M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal i s brought by defendants John Michael Spielmann and Louis Tony Christensen, from t h e i r j o i n t t r i a l i n the dis- t r i c t court of Gallatin County. Spielmann was convicted of one count of robbery and Christensen of two counts of robbery and of f i r s t degree burglary. On November 9, 1972, Spielmann, Christensen and Douglas Green, aged 15, were a r r e s t e d together. Green plead g u i l t y t o charges against him and was committed t o the Pine H i l l s Juvenile f a c i l i t y . Green t e s t i f i e d a s a prosecution witness a t the t r i a l of Spielmann and Christensen. From the t r i a l record these f a c t s appear: Sometime between 10:00 p.m. the night of October 31, 1972, and 2:39 a.m. the morning of November 1, 1972, Christensen and Green burglarized the medical o f f i c e of D r . Edward L. King i n Ifanhatten, Montana, taking various types of drugs, some syringes and other medical equipment. O n November 2, 1972, Christensen and Green, a t gun point, robbed the Medical A r t s Pharmacy i n Bozeman, Montana, taking a l l the codeine, morphine and demerol. The pharmacist i n charge, D. G. Dunham, was able t o generally describe the two persons and t h e i r clothing. He s t a t e d t h a t both had nylon stockings over t h e i r faces. On November 8, 1972, Spielmann, Christensen and Green again burglarized D r . King's o f f i c e sometime between 5:45 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., t h i s time taking a black medical bag and various drugs. O n November 9, 1972, a t about 9:45 a.m., Spielmann and Green, a t gun point, again robbed the Medical Arts Pharmacy wearing nylon stockings over t h e i r faces. M r . Dunham was on duty and recognized Green from the previous robbery. Some r e d l i n , dexedrine and demerol were taken i n the robbery. While the robbery was i n progress a customer, Mrs. Aileen Zacher, entered the pharmacy and .. observed the two men who ran from the pharmacy to a waiting car driven by Christensen. At this time a Mrs. AnnaClousing, with her mother and son, were driving south on Willson Avenue and observed what they described as a black-over-white 1964 or 1965 Buick leaving the scene of the crime. After police were notified of the robbery, roadblocks were set up around Bozeman. Instructions were given to look for a Buick with a black top and white body, about a 1964 or 1965 model, and two occupants, one of whom wore a pencil-line mustache, appeared to be in his forties and wore a khaki coat. The other occupant was described as a younger, taller man with rather long hair, wearing a khaki colored coat with a fur collar. Two Montana highway patrolmen, John Flynn and Kerry Keyser, participated in the search setting a roadblock on U.S. Highway 191 at its intersection with Cottonwood Road. At approximately 11:OO a.m. they were notified to discontinue the roadblock. While proceeding back toward Bozeman on U.S. 191, they noticed a black-over-white 1967 Buick traveling the opposite direction. The patrolmen turned and came up behind the Buick, which stopped before the patrol car lights or siren were turned on. The driver of the Buick, Christensen, who was in his forties and had a black pencil-line mustache, got out as the two patrolmen were walking up on either side. Both patrolmen looked into the Buick and observed Green sitting in the front seat on the passenger side and Spielmann sitting in the back seat. They also observed a khaki jacket with a fur collar on the left side of the rear seat. Patrolman Keyser asked Christensen to come back to the patrol car with him. Flynn remained at the other car talking to the other two men. Patrolman Keyser contacted Bozeman law enforcement officers concerning the stopped vehicle and remained seated in the patrol car with Christensen, questioning Christensen about the absence of license plates on his car. Christensen was also asked if there was a gun in the Buick and he replied there was a gun on the front seat under some books. Patrolman Flynn walked back to the patrol car from the Buick and asked Christensen if he could look into the trunk. Christensen said yes, and yelled t o Green to push the button that opened the trunk. Green pushed the re- lease button opening the trunk and i n i t Flynn saw another khaki type jacket. It appears Flynn closed the trunk once, and then again asked Christensen i f he could look i n the trunk. Green again opened the trunk a t christensen's request, and t h i s time Flynn took a black medical bag from the trunk. Officers from the Bozeman c i t y police and from the Gallatin County s h e r i f f ' s office arrived on the scene i n response t o the radio notification from Keyser. Spielmann, Christensen and Green were placed under a r r e s t and advised of t h e i r rights. O n November 10, 1972, M r . Harold Cain telephoned the Gallatin County s h e r i f f ' s office and informed them that a bag containing drugs had been found a t h i s wrecking yard the previous day by a customer, M r . David Keith. Gerald Mell, a pharmicist who had been employed a t the Medical A r t s Pharmacy, t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l concerning these drugs and identified them a s having come from the Medical A r t s Pharmacy based upon inventory markings on t h e containers and the fact the types of drugs corresponded with the types missing a f t e r the robbery. Green t e s t i f i e d that Spielmann, a t Christensen's request, had tossed the bag of drugs out of the car window before the three were apprehended. Spielmann and Christensen retained separate counsel. Both f i l e d identical p r e t r i a l motions t o suppress the evidence seized i n the November 9 searches of the Buick automobile, and a joint hearing was had. Defendants were tried together without objection by defendants or their respective counsel. O n appeal defendants bring three issues of error: (1) Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying defendants' motions t o suppress evidence obtained i n the November 9 searches of the Buick automobile? (2) Whether prejudicial error resulted from the consolidation of the cases for t r i a l ? ( 3 ) Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying motions t o dismiss on the b a s i s of i n s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence t o corroborate the testimony of the accomplice? Issue 1. Certain f a c t s appear undisputed. The November 9 searches of the automobile by the patrolmen were not pursuant t o a warrant 7 ' lncident t o a r r e s t and exceeded the scope of the 11 plain view doctrine" a s t o most of the evidence seized. The consent t o search was given prior t o t h e defendants being placed under a r r e s t and informed of t h e i r r i g h t s . However, the f a c t t h a t search was conducted on an automobile traveling on a public highway, pursuant t9 descriptive informa- t i o n known t o the law enforcement o f f i c e r s conducting the search, 11 brings i n t o issue the probable cause exception" developed i n Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L ed 543; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L ed 2d 538; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L ed 2d 419, 426, 428; Coolidge v. N e w Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564; and various other United States Supreme Court cases which d i f f e r e n t i a t e between automobiles and nonmovable premises. The r a t i o n a l e upon which t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a - t i o n i s predicated i s s t a t e d i n Chambers: 11 I n terms of the circumstances justifying a warrantless search, the Court has long distinguished between an automobile and a home o r o f f i c e , I n Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S C t 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925), the i s s u e was the admissibility i n evidence of contraband liquor seized i n a warrantless search of a c a r on the highway. After surveying the law from the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment onward, the Court held t h a t automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant i n circumstances t h a t would not j u s t i f y the search without a warrant of a house o r an o f f i c e , provided t h a t there i s probable cause t o believe t h a t the c a r contains a r t i c l e s t h a t the o f f i c e r s a r e e n t i t l e d t o seize. The Court expressed i t s holding a s follows: 11 1 W e have made a somewhat extended reference t o these s t a t u t e s t o show t h a t the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been c o n s t h e d , practi-. c a l l y since the beginning of the Government, a s recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a s t o r e , dwelling house or other s t r u c t u r e i n respect of which a proper o f f i c i a l warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon o r automobile, f o r contraband goods, where it i s not practicable t o secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the l o c a l i t y or j u r i s d i c t i o n i n which the warrant must be sought. " ' ~ a v i n g thus established t h a t contraband goods concealed and i l l e g a l l y transported i n an automobile o r other vehicle may be searched f o r with- out a warrant, we come now t o consider under what circumstances such search may be made. Jc Jc [Tlhose lawfully within the country, e n t i t l e d t o use the public highways, have a r i g h t t o f r e e passage with- out interruption o r search unless there i s known t o a competent o f f i c i a l authorized t o search, probable cause f o r believing t h a t t h e i r vehicles a r e carrying contraband o r i l l e g a l merchandise. Jc * he he measure of l e g a l i t y of such a seizure is, therefore, t h a t the seizing o f f i c e r s h a l l have reasonable o r probable cause f o r believing t h a t the automobile which he stops and seizes has con- traband liquor therein which i s being i l l e g a l l y transported.' * * * "The Court a l s o noted t h a t the search of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly d i f f e r e n t from t h a t justifying the search incident t o an a r r e s t : he r i g h t t o search and the v a l i d i t y of the seizure a r e not dependent on the r i g h t t o a r r e s t , They a r e dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing o f f i c e r has f o r b e l i e f t h a t the contents of t h e automobile offend against the law.' I I Arguably, because of the preference f o r a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of the c a r should be permitted u n t i l a search warrant I i s obtained; arguably, only the l e s s e r ' intrusion i s permissible u n t i l the magistrate authorizes the 'greater.' But which i s the 'greater' and which the I l e s s e r ' intrusion i s i t s e l f a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circum- stances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a c a r before presenting the probable cause issue t o a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause t o search, e i t h e r course i s reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . I I The determination made by the t r i a l court before entering i t s order denying defendants' motions t o suppress and the deter- mination t h i s Court must make is: Did the patrolmen conducting the search of the automobile have probable cause t o believe it was carrying contraband o r stolen property from the robbery of the Medical A r t s Pharmacy a short time p r i o r t o the search' A general d e f i n i t i o n of probable cause i s s t a t e d i n United States v. Thompson, 420 F.2d 536, 539 (3rd C i r , ) : I I One need not have evidence which would j u s t i f y a conviction; probable cause e x i s t s i f the f a c t s and circumstances known t o the o f f i c e r would warrant a prudent man i n believing t h a t the offense has been o r i s being committed. On the other hand, probable cause means more than a bare suspicion, the l i n e between mere suspicion and probable cause 'must be drawn by an a c t of judgment formed i n the l i g h t of the p a r t i - cular s i t u a t i o n and with account taken of a l l the circumstances. 1 I1 The b a s i s of the probable cause existing i n Chambers was a description of a car and occupants furnished by the victim of a service s t a t i o n robbery and two teenage observers. Officers were seeking a blue compact s t a t i o n wagon carrying four men, one of whom was wearing a green sweater and one of whom was wearing a trench coat. I n the i n s t a n t case, o f f i c e r s had in- formation which was a s p a r t i c u l a r and r e l i a b l e ; which matched the defendants, t h e i r clothing, and t h e i r automobile a s closely a s t h a t i n Chambers. - Accordingly, the t r i a l court was correct i n denying defendants' motions t o suppress evidence obtained i n the i n i t i a l searches. Issue 2. Whether prejudicial e r r o r resulted from consoli- dation of the cases f o r t r i a l ? Both Spielmann and Christensen re- tained and were represented by separate paid counsel. Neither defendants nor t h e i r respective counsel objected t o consolidation prior t o o r during t r i a l . Neither of defendants1 t r i a l counsel participated i n t h i s appeal. The case precedent c i t e d by defendants i n support of t h i s issue involves instances of f a i l u r e of the t r i a l court t o appoint separate counsel or denial of a request t o allow separate t r i a l s . I n l i g h t of the undisputed f a c t s t h a t both Spielmann and Christensen were represented a t t r i a l by competent counsel of t h e i r own choice and t h a t a t no t i m e p r i o r t o appeal was t h i s objection raised, we find t h e t r i a l court did not e r r i n con- ducting a j o i n t t r i a l . It often happens t h a t a j o i n t t r i a l with two participating attorneys can be an advantageous t a c t i c or strategy. Hindsight has great advantage over foresight, i n t h a t it i s always 20-20. After electing a p a r t i c u l a r course of strategy, a defendant cannot assign a s e r r o r on appeal the f a c t t h a t h i s defense was unsuccessful, predicated on the supposition t h a t another alterna- t i v e would have been successful. State v. Meidinger, Mont . , 502 P.2d 58, 29 St.Rep. 861; Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L ed 2d 408. Issue 3. Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying motions t o dismiss on the b a s i s of i n s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence t o corroborate the testimony of the accomplice? This issue is pre- dicated on section 94-7220, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: I I A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he i s corroborated by other evidence, which i n i t s e l f , and without the a i d of the testimony of the accomplice, tends t o connect the defendant with t h e commission of the offense; and the corroboration i s not s u f f i c i e n t , i f it merely shows t h e commission of the offense, o r the circum- stances thereof. " Whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony tending t o connect a defendant with the commission of the offense charged i s a determination of law which must be made by the t r i a l court. S t a t e v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777; S t a t e Y. Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 237, 462 P.2d 186. Here, we find s u f f i c i e n t corroborating evidence i n the record from s t a t e ' s witnesses t o warrant submission of t h i s case t o the jury: M r . D.G. Dunham; Mrs. Anna Clousing and her son David; Mrs. Aileen Zacher, who saw the defendants and t h e i r c a r during the commission of a robbery; D r . Edward King; M r . Gerald Mell; M r . Harold Cain; Patrolmen Flynn and Kyser; and M r . David Keith. The requirement and application of section 94-7220, R.C.M. 1947, was explained i n Dess: "* + < * Appellant suggests t h a t the evidence, inde- pendent of the testimony of an accomplice, must prove him g u i l t y beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not the law i n Montana, however. Though there must be some independent evidence connecting the defendant t o the crime, it need not be s u f f i c i e n t alone t o sustain a conviction. The jury can consider the testimony of the accomplice and give the testimony whatever weight they desire. I n S t a t e v. Donges, 126 Mont. 341, 251 P.2d 254 (1952), the Court s t a t e d a t page 347, 251 P.2d a t page 257: 11 I The evidence which corroborated Bungard could be furnished by the defendants. It could be circumstantial. It need not extend t o every f a c t t o which Bungard t e s t i f i e d and need not be s u f f i - c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a conviction or e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case of g u i l t ; it being s u f f i c i e n t i f it tends t o connect defendants with the commission of the crime. Whether i t tends t o do so i s a question of law, while i t s weight--its efficacy t o f o r t i f y the testimony of Bungard and render h i s story t r u s t - worthy--is a matter f o r the consideration of the jury. State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265. III From our examination of the record, we find no prejudicial error. The jury was properly instructed; there was amply sub- s t a n t i a l credible evidence properly before it upon which t o base i t s verdict of guilty. The judgment of conviction i s a f firmed,: , f ' J u s t i c e , " /' Chief J u s t i c e d Justices U -;r3-d--dr-L--'-i ---- * - - - > - I . - - - d - Hon. Edward T. Dussault, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison.