Title: State Ex Rel. Krupke v. Witkowski
Citation: 256 N.W.2d 216
Docket Number: 2-59212
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 1977

256 N.W.2d 216 (1977) STATE of Iowa ex rel. Donna R. KRUPKE, Appellant, v. Rich WITKOWSKI, Appellee. No. 2-59212. Supreme Court of Iowa. July 29, 1977. Rehearing Denied August 29, 1977. *218 Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Lorna L. Williams, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Zigmund Chwirka, County Atty., and John Samore, Asst. County Atty., for appellant. William W. Gates, Sioux City, for appellee. Heard by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ. MOORE, Chief Justice. Plaintiff appeals trial court ruling dismissing paternity action initiated under chapter 675, 1975 Code more than two years after the birth of the child. We affirm. Plaintiff alleged she was the mother and defendant was the father of an illegitimate child born August 19, 1972. In her prayer she sought an adjudication defendant was the child's father and in addition an order requiring defendant to pay hospital and medical bills incurred and child support. No facts were alleged attempting to circumvent the limitations of section 675.33. The complaint was filed November 19, 1975 and notice was served on defendant the same day. Thus it is undisputed plaintiff's action to establish paternity was filed more than two years after the birth of the child. Defendant, by way of motion to dismiss, raised as a defense the limitation contained in chapter 675 which provides: Plaintiff filed a resistance to this motion alleging that section 675.33, if applied to bar her action, would effect an unconstitutional denial of equal protection and due process rights of both complainant and her daughter, Heather. Subsequently plaintiff amended the petition to eliminate all claims for support. Trial court sustained the motion and dismissed the petition on the ground that our decision in Jensen v. Voshell, Iowa, 193 N.W.2d 86, 59 A.L.R.3d 678 mandated such result. This appeal followed. I. Before addressing the merits of appellant's contentions we briefly consider the propriety of raising the statute of limitations defense by way of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 104(b), Rules of Civil Procedure. Ordinarily the bar of limitations clearly falls within the category of an affirmative defense which must be specially asserted in a separate division of the responsive pleading. Rule 101, R.C.P.; Ehlinger v. Ehlinger, 253 Iowa 187, 192, 193, 111 N.W.2d 656, 659; Smith v. Middle States Co., 228 Iowa 686, 696, 293 N.W. 59, 64. However, where it is obvious from the uncontroverted facts appearing on the face of the challenged petition that the claim for relief may be barred when the action was commenced, the defense of limitations may properly be raised by motion to dismiss. Pride v. Peterson, Iowa, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554. Of course our determination whether plaintiff's petition presents a situation which affords defendant the option of raising this defense by motion to dismiss must be based solely on matters alleged in the petition. Riediger v. Marrland Development Corp., Iowa, 253 N.W.2d 915, 916; Ke-Wash Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company, Iowa, 177 N.W.2d 5, 9. II. In her first assignment of error appellant urges us to reconsider our holding in Jensen v. Voshell, supra, that section 675.33 bars her action in light of subsequent legislative action relating to paternity proceedings and enforcement of child support orders. In Jensen we were presented with an identical situation under chapter 675. There, as here, plaintiff failed to timely file her petition within the two-year limitation of section 675.33. In rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to escape the clear language of that section we stated at page 89, 193 N.W.2d: Plaintiff contends that the meaning of chapter 675 has been clarified by the legislature since the Jensen decision was rendered through enactment of The Child Support Recovery Act, 66 G.A. (1975 Session), chapter 151, now codified at chapter 252B, 1977 Code. Section 5 of that Act provides, inter alia, that the child support recovery unit established by the Act shall provide the following services: Plaintiff argues this statutory language manifests a legislative intent that the legislature intended chapter 675 to provide for two causes of actionone to establish paternity, the other to enforce the obligation. We disagree. In construing these statutes we must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Spilman v. Board of Directors of Davis Cty., Iowa, 253 N.W.2d 593, 596; Doe v. Ray, Iowa, 251 N.W.2d 496, 500; Iowa Dept. of Rev. v. Iowa Merit Employ. Com'n., Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 610, 614. In making this determination, since the statutes under consideration relate to the same subject matter, we must consider them in light of their common purpose and intent. Thus the concept of pari materia comes into play. Spilman v. Board of Directors of Davis Cty., supra, 253 N.W.2d at page 596, and cases cited therein; Catholic Char. of Arch. of Dubuque v. Zalesky, Iowa, 232 N.W.2d 539, 544. We believe when the two statutes are properly read together in light of the foregoing principles the Jensen rationale becomes even more persuasive. Chapter 252B establishes no new theories of child support recovery but merely creates a vehicle to establish paternity under chapter 675 and enforce existing court orders for support previously entered in chapters 252A, 598, 675 proceedings. Plaintiff's argument seeking to circumvent section 675.33 is without merit. Also see Annot., Statute of Limitations in Illegitimacy or Bastardy Proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685, particularly section 3, pages 698-702; 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 60, pages 155-156. III. Appellant next contends the application of section 675.33 denies equal protection and due process rights of both mother and child by imposing on them a time limitation not imposed on persons asserting paternal support obligations under different statutes. This contention is first raised here as it was not pleaded or decided in the lower court. However, because plaintiff's resistance *220 to the motion to dismiss made reference thereto, appeal counsel urges us to consider the constitutionality of section 675.33. Because of its importance in future litigation, we choose to consider and decide the constitutional issues. See In the Interest of Hochmuth, Iowa, 251 N.W.2d 484, 488. Our task is made difficult as appellant cites only Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 and appellee has not filed a reply brief. Our research leads us to observe that most of the legal disabilities which affect illegitimates have been removed to a substantial extent by recent mandate of the United States Supreme Court. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436 (right to share in wrongful death recoveries); Glona v. American Guar. &amp; L. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 88 S. Ct. 1515, 20 L. Ed. 2d 441 (same as above); Willis v. Prudential Insurance Co., 405 U.S. 318, 92 S. Ct. 1257, 31 L. Ed. 2d 273 (right to share in insurance policies); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (putative father's right to notice and custody); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (right to share in Workmen's Compensation awards); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 93 S. Ct. 1700, 36 L. Ed. 2d 543 (right to share in wholly state supported welfare program); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 94 S. Ct. 2496, 41 L. Ed. 2d 363 (right to share in social security disability benefits). However, see, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 97 S. Ct. 1473, 52 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1977) where the Supreme Court upheld an immigration statute which had the effect of excluding the relationship of illegitimate child and natural father (as opposed to natural mother) from special preference immigration status accorded to "child" or "parent" of U.S. citizen or resident. In this opinion the court stated: "* * *. Congress obviously has determined that preferential status is not warranted for illegitimate children and their natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 763, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977). In any event, it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770, 92 S. Ct. 2576, 2585, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1972)." 430 U.S. at 799, 97 S. Ct. at 1481, 1482, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 60, 61. A thorough analysis of cases dealing with the rights and status of illegitimate children is collected in two outstanding annotations. See Annot., Illegitimate ChildrenRights and Status, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1228; Annot., Discrimination on Basis of Illegitimacy as Denial of Constitutional Rights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613. Recent developments have clarified the mode of analysis applicable to a case of this nature. In Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1976) the Court considered and rejected an argument that classifications based on illegitimacy are "suspect" so that any state justifications for difference in treatment must survive "strict scrutiny." The court concluded such classifications are "in this realm of less than strict scrutiny," although such scrutiny "is not a toothless one." Thus the burden remains upon those challenging the statute to show it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 505-510, 96 S. Ct. at 2762, 2764, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 661-664. Applying this analysis the court upheld a provision of the Social Security Act against equal protection challenge that conditions the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for surviving child's insurance benefits upon a showing the deceased wage earner was the claimant child's parent and, at the time of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his support. In April of this year the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois probate statute which allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers but provided legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from *221 both their mothers and their fathers. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 763, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977). While declining to directly overrule Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S. Ct. 1017, 28 L. Ed. 2d 288, wherein a Louisiana statute which differentiated on the basis of the character of the child's illegitimacy was upheld against equal protection challenge, the court's analysis clearly called into question the analysis used there. The court severely criticized the "most perfunctory analysis" utilized by the Illinois supreme court to sustain the state statute against constitutional attack and stated at 430 U.S. 769, 97 S. Ct. at 1464, 1465, 52 L.Ed.2d at 38-39: The Court's decision turned on a determination that unlike the statutory scheme in Lucas, the Illinois Act was not "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" but operated to totally effect a statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772, 97 S. Ct. at 1466, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 40-41. With this background we now consider the case of Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56, which appellant contends entitles her to reversal. In Gomez, the Supreme Court held a Texas statutory scheme which granted legitimate children a judicially enforceable right to support from their fathers but denied that right to illegitimate children as violative of Equal Protection, stating: "* * *. We therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother. * * *." 409 U.S. at 538, 93 S. Ct. at 875, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 60. While recognizing the problems of proof in the paternity context the court held these problems do not justify an absolute barrier to paternal support of illegitimates. Section 675.33 does not justify such a barrier; it provides the method of proof and time limitation for proving paternity. IV. Recently in Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976) the Illinois supreme court was faced with a challenge strikingly similar to the one brought here. There the plaintiffs also challenged a two-year limitation period on due process and equal protection grounds. In a well-reasoned opinion the court rejected these arguments as follows: We agree with the rationale of the Cessna case for it recognizes that until the proof of parentage is proved the putative father has no fixed legal obligation to support the child. Of course, once such relationship is proved the support obligation attaches. We believe this is all Gomez requires; nothing in that opinion in any way indicates the legislature may not enact limitation statutes to prevent litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. See also In re People in Interest of L. B., 179 Colo. 11, 19, 498 P.2d 1157, 1161, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 976, 93 S. Ct. 1497, 36 L. Ed. 2d 173. Neither do we believe the recent pronouncements in Trimble v. Gordon, supra, limit our conclusions in this regard. In a footnote to that opinion the court states: We believe the Iowa statute is clearly so drafted. We further note the statute is "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" as it provides for three specific exceptions to an absolute bar to establishing paternity within the two-year time period. V. Our opinion today is but another recognition that statutes of limitations go to matters of remedy and not to destruction of fundamental rights. Wolder v. Rahm, Iowa, 249 N.W.2d 630; Bruce v. Wookey, 261 Iowa 231, 154 N.W.2d 93 (probate claims barred); Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 232 (title claim barred where no compliance section 614.24); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions, section 27, page 611; 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 2, pages 905-907; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 560, pages 510-512. The Supreme Court many years ago in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 1635 aptly summarized the law in this regard as follows: In view of the foregoing we hold under these circumstances the defense of limitations is available by a motion to dismiss. Trial court was correct in sustaining defendant's motion. AFFIRMED.