Title: Grandison v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 061296
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2007

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
 
TONY DONNELL GRANDISON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 061296   SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
June 8, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether a police officer 
violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures when the officer removed a folded one-
dollar bill from the defendant's pocket and unfolded it to 
reveal drugs. 
I 
 
After a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Petersburg, Tony Donnell Grandison was convicted of possession 
of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.  During the trial, 
Grandison moved to suppress the evidence.  The trial court 
denied the motion, finding that the cocaine had been legally 
seized under the "plain view doctrine."  Thereafter, the trial 
court sentenced Grandison to imprisonment for ten years, with 
eight years suspended. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.  
Grandison v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 314, 630 S.E.2d 358 
(2006).  We awarded Grandison this appeal. 
 
2
II 
 
On November 25, 2003, about 4:56 a.m., Officer Matthew P. 
Gilstrap of the Petersburg City Police Department was called to 
assist another officer in a traffic stop of a vehicle that had 
been reported stolen.  The vehicle was stopped in a "high crime 
area" of downtown Petersburg that was known for drug activity. 
 
Officer Gilstrap approached the passenger side of the 
vehicle and directed Grandison, the front seat passenger, to 
step out of the vehicle.  When Grandison exited the vehicle, 
Officer Gilstrap immediately handcuffed Grandison because the 
officer was concerned for his own safety considering the time 
and circumstances of the detention.  Officer Gilstrap then 
conducted a pat-down search of Grandison's outer clothing for 
weapons. 
 
During the pat-down search, Officer Gilstrap felt a hard 
object in the front watch pocket of Grandison's jeans.  The 
object was a cigarette lighter. When the officer looked down at 
the lighter, he observed a piece of drinking straw and a folded 
one-dollar bill protruding from the pocket.∗  The dollar bill was 
protruding halfway out of the pocket and was folded in what 
Officer Gilstrap recognized as an "apothecary fold."  The 
officer testified that, when he saw the bill's apothecary fold, 
                     
 
∗ The lighter and straw were not produced as evidence at 
trial. 
 
3
he immediately recognized it as a way of packaging cocaine. 
Thereupon, Officer Gilstrap pulled the folded bill out of 
Grandison's pocket and opened it.  Inside the bill, the officer 
discovered a substance that, from a subsequent laboratory 
analysis, proved to be cocaine. 
 
Officer Gilstrap was familiar with the packaging and 
storage of drugs from his training and experience as a police 
officer.  Consequently, the trial court qualified him as an 
expert in the packaging of drugs.  Officer Gilstrap stated that 
an apothecary fold is a method commonly used to conceal and 
carry contraband.  He explained that an apothecary fold results 
when a dollar bill "is folded three times lengthwise with the 
material, whatever it is that you're trying to hide on the 
inside, and then the two ends are folded over toward the 
middle." 
III 
 
In Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 149, 400 S.E.2d 
191, 193 (1991), we said the following: 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States provides in part that "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated."  This inestimable 
right of personal security belongs to all citizens, 
whether they are in the comfort of their homes or on 
the streets of our cities. 
 
4
The Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), 
recognized that, in certain circumstances, a police officer may 
conduct a limited search of a subject who has been detained but 
not arrested.  When a detention is not an arrest based upon 
probable cause, the right of a police officer to search a 
subject is limited to a search of the subject's outer clothing 
"to discover weapons which might be used to assault [the 
officer]."  Id. at 30. 
An officer who conducts a Terry pat-down search is 
justified in removing an item from a subject's pocket if the 
officer reasonably believes that the object might be a weapon.  
Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 213, 308 S.E.2d 106, 112 
(1983).  Additionally, the removal of an item from a subject's 
pocket is also justified if the officer can identify the object 
as suspicious under the "plain feel" variation of the plain view 
doctrine.  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993); 
see Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 574, 570 S.E.2d 836, 
839 (2002).  However, an item may not be retrieved under the 
plain view doctrine unless it is "immediately apparent" to the 
officer that the item is evidence of a crime.  Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); Murphy, 264 Va. at 574, 570 
S.E.2d at 839. 
 
An accused's claim that evidence was seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution presents 
 
5
a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on 
appeal.  Murphy, 264 Va. at 573, 570 S.E.2d at 838; see Ornelas 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 699 (1996).  The accused 
has the burden of showing that the denial of his suppression 
motion, when the evidence is considered in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, is reversible error.  McCain v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001). 
IV 
 
We find the facts in the present case to be strikingly 
similar to those in Harris.  In Harris, a police officer seized 
and searched a film canister discovered on a subject's person 
during a pat-down search for weapons.  241 Va. at 148, 400 
S.E.2d at 192.  The officer justified opening the canister based 
upon his personal experience on "plain clothes assignments" and 
"making arrests," which led him to conclude that the canister 
contained drugs.  Id. at 154, 400 S.E.2d at 196.  In concluding 
that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the 
canister contained contraband, we said,  
It is true that [the officer] knew from his personal 
experience of working "plain clothes assignments" and 
"making arrests" that certain people kept their 
narcotics and drugs in film canisters and "things of 
that nature."  However, law-abiding citizens, on a 
daily basis, also use film canisters to store film, 
which is a legitimate use. 
Id. 
 
6
 
We also find the facts in the present case somewhat 
analogous to those in Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 620 
S.E.2d 760 (2005).  In Brown, the police found a subject who was 
sleeping in a car in an alley in a high-crime area.  The subject 
had a hand-rolled cigarette in his possession.  The arresting 
officer, based upon his experience with hand-rolled cigarettes, 
concluded that the cigarette contained narcotics.  Id. at 417, 
620 S.E.2d at 761.  We held that the officer did not have 
probable cause to arrest the subject, stating: 
[F]or the last 25 years, [we have] consistently 
declined to find that probable cause can be 
established solely on the observation of material 
which can be used for legitimate purposes, even though 
the experience of an officer indicates that such 
material is often used for illegitimate purposes.  To 
support a finding of probable cause, such observations 
must be combined with some other circumstance 
indicating criminal activity.  
Id. at 420-21, 620 S.E.2d at 763. 
 
In the present case, Grandison had legal currency in his 
possession when Officer Gilstrap made a Terry pat-down search 
for weapons.  At that time, all that the officer saw was about 
one-half of a folded dollar bill protruding from Grandison's 
watch pocket.  As with the canister in Harris and the hand-
rolled cigarette in Brown, the folded dollar bill was legal 
material with a legitimate purpose, even though Officer 
Gilstrap, based on his experience, knew that dollar bills folded 
in a similar manner are often used as containers for drugs.  No 
 
7
other circumstances indicated criminal activity.  Consistent 
with our holdings in Harris and Brown, we conclude that, in the 
present case, Officer Gilstrap did not have probable cause to 
retrieve the dollar bill from Grandison's possession. 
V 
 
We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in refusing 
to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful 
seizure and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
trial court's judgment.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the 
Court of Appeals with directions to remand the case to the trial 
court for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and JUSTICE LEMONS join, 
dissenting. 
 
The majority opinion relies upon two prior decisions of 
this Court, Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191 
(1991) and Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 620 S.E.2d 760 
(2005), to conclude Officer Gilstrap did not have probable cause 
to seize Grandison’s dollar bill containing cocaine because “the 
folded dollar bill was legal material with a legitimate 
purpose.”  Thus, the majority concludes the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming Grandison’s conviction for possession of 
cocaine.  In my view, neither Harris nor Brown is applicable to 
 
8
the case at bar, and the police officer’s search did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Accordingly, I would affirm Grandison’s 
conviction. 
Neither Harris nor Brown involved the distinctive 
circumstance before us: the manipulation of an otherwise 
“legitimate” object in such a way as to indicate illegitimate 
usage and thus provide probable cause to the arresting officer 
who views such a manipulated object in plain view.  For purposes 
of appeal, it is important to note that there is no issue the 
dollar bill was found in plain view and was manipulated into an 
“apothecary fold.”  Grandison did not assign error to those 
findings by the circuit court, and consequently those facts are 
the law of the case.  Trustees of Asbury United Methodist Church 
v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 144, 154, 452 S.E.2d 847, 852 
(1995) (where appellant “did not object or assign error to [the 
circuit court’s] ruling, it . . . become[s] the law of the 
case”).  
Grandison’s dollar bill shaped in the unique apothecary 
fold indicating drug packaging is dissimilar from the ordinary 
film canister in Harris or the hand-rolled cigarette in Brown.  
Neither the film canister nor the cigarette reflected an 
intentional manipulation of an otherwise legitimate object into 
an item that a trained police officer could identify as 
 
9
contraband on the basis of the manipulation.  This is a critical 
distinction that renders the majority’s reliance on Brown and 
Harris inapplicable, particularly in view of other precedent 
more directly on point. 
The United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 
730 (1983), upheld a conviction for heroin possession when 
police, conducting a routine driver’s license checkpoint stop, 
observed the defendant holding an opaque party balloon, knotted 
one-half inch from the tip, between the two middle fingers of 
his hand.  Id. at 733.  In upholding the conviction, the Supreme 
Court considered testimony of the police officer that “balloons 
tied in the manner of the one [in this case] were frequently 
used to carry narcotics.”  Id. at 743.  The Supreme Court ruled 
“the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes 
as to its contents – particularly to the trained eye of the 
officer.”  Id. at 743.  The balloon at issue in Texas was an 
otherwise legitimate object which any citizen could possess.  
However, because of the manipulation for an illegitimate use, 
there was sufficient basis to form probable cause. 
 
The Court of Appeals in Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 
313, 437 S.E.2d 235 (1993), similarly considered the 
reasonableness of a search by a police officer who viewed the 
defendant’s folded plastic shopping bag in plain view in the 
back seat of a stopped vehicle.  Id. at 315, 437 S.E.2d at 236.  
 
10
The officer testified based on his experience in retail security 
that the manner in which the shopping bag was folded indicated 
the bag had been intentionally lined with foil to prevent anti-
theft devices in stores from detecting tags on clothing.  Id.  
In affirming the defendant’s conviction for receiving stolen 
property, the Court of Appeals concluded:  
[a]lthough . . . the shopping bag in this case was of 
the sort that law-abiding citizens put to legitimate 
use on a daily basis, Officer Craig testified that the 
manner in which the bag was folded led him to suspect, 
based on his training and experience, that it was 
lined with aluminum foil for use as a shoplifting aid. 
Id. at 320, 437 S.E.2d at 239. 
 
Arnold relied in part on the Court of Appeals’ earlier 
decision in Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 497, 404 S.E.2d 
919 (1991), which upheld the conviction of a defendant for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession 
of cocaine with intent to distribute, when the defendant was 
observed in a vehicle at a toll booth with a “one-and-a-half to 
two inch” cut straw on the seat between his legs.  Id. at 498-
99, 404 S.E.2d at 920.  The arresting officer knew that cut 
straws often corresponded with cocaine usage, and the court 
considered how the straw had been intentionally cut and 
concluded that “[t]he uniqueness of the straw’s size 
distinguishes it from straws one would usually encounter for 
legitimate purposes.”  Id. at 502, 404 S.E.2d at 922.  This 
 
11
Court granted an appeal in Carson on several issues, including 
the validity of the seizure of the straw, and we affirmed that 
court’s ruling on the issue by expressly adopting “the reasons 
articulated in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.”  Carson v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 293, 294, 421 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1992). 
 
Texas, Arnold and Carson all support the premise in a 
Fourth Amendment context that an ordinarily lawful or legitimate 
object, discovered in plain view during an otherwise lawful 
seizure like a Terry stop, can be the basis of probable cause 
where the object has been manipulated in a way so as to reflect 
an illegitimate purpose.  That factual predicate was simply 
absent in Harris and Brown, as there was no evidence the 
otherwise legitimate objects of a film canister and a cigarette 
had been manipulated in any way.  Thus, the film canister and 
cigarette could not form the basis of probable cause.  In 
contrast, like the items in Texas, Arnold and Carson, 
Grandison’s dollar bill, creased in an apothecary fold and found 
in plain view, was a proper basis for probable cause to search 
by virtue of the manipulation of an otherwise lawful object for 
an illegitimate purpose. 
In affirming Grandison’s conviction, the Court of Appeals 
effectively synthesized these cases and applied them to the 
facts of this case: 
 
12
It is clear that the determinative, 
distinguishing factor in each of these cases was the 
observed nature of the item seized by the police.  
Although often used for illegitimate purposes, the 
items seized in Harris and Brown v. Commonwealth – the 
film canister and hand-rolled cigarette, respectively 
– were “facially innocent vessel[s] of a type employed 
by law-abiding citizens, on a daily basis, for 
legitimate uses.”  [Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. 
App. 206, 209, 409 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1991)].  Because 
there was nothing in those cases that made it 
immediately apparent to the officer that the items 
observed in plain view were being used illegitimately, 
probable cause did not exist to believe they contained 
contraband.  Conversely, the items seized and searched 
in Carson and Arnold were items legitimately used by 
law-abiding citizens on a daily basis that had been 
noticeably manipulated in a manner that was consistent 
with illegitimate usage.  The size of the cut-off 
straw in Carson led the officer, based on his 
experience and training, to suspect it was used for 
snorting cocaine.  The shopping bag in Arnold was 
folded in a manner that led the officer, based on his 
experience, to suspect it had been lined with aluminum 
foil for shoplifting purposes.  Because the items had 
been manipulated in a way that made it immediately 
apparent to the officers that they may contain 
contraband, the officers had probable cause to seize 
and search them. 
Here, like the cut-off straw in Carson and the 
foil-lined shopping bag in Arnold, the dollar bill 
seized and searched by Officer Gilstrap was an item 
legitimately used by law-abiding citizens on a daily 
basis that had been manipulated in a manner consistent 
with illegitimate usage.  Qualified as an expert in 
drug packaging, Officer Gilstrap indicated at trial 
that the distinctive manner in which the dollar bill 
he saw protruding from appellant's watch pocket had 
been folded led him to immediately suspect, based on 
his training and experience, that it contained 
contraband.  The bill, he explained, was manipulated 
into an “apothecary fold,” which involves a series of 
systematic folds and is a common method for concealing 
and carrying contraband.  Thus, the unique manner in 
which the bill was manipulated “distinguishes it from 
[bills] one would usually encounter for legitimate 
 
13
purposes.”  Carson, 12 Va. App. at 502, 404 S.E.2d at 
922.  Hence, unlike the film canister in Harris and 
the hand-rolled cigarette in Brown v. Commonwealth, 
the distinctively folded dollar bill Officer Gilstrap 
observed protruding from appellant's watch pocket was 
not a “facially innocent vessel of a type employed by 
law-abiding citizens, on a daily basis, for legitimate  
uses.”  Ruffin, 13 Va. App. at 209, 409 S.E.2d at 179. 
Grandison v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 314, 322-23, 630 S.E.2d 
358, 362-63 (2006). 
I find the Court of Appeals’ analysis correct and 
persuasive.  In my view, the circuit court did not err when it 
refused to suppress the evidence obtained from the police 
officer’s search of Grandison, and the Court of Appeals did not 
err when it affirmed Grandison’s conviction.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals.