Title: Moore v. Warren
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 942157
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DAVID E. MOORE, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC. 
 
v.   Record No. 942157 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                   November 3, 1995 
WILLIAM R. WARREN 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a person performing 
the work of a charity as a volunteer is entitled to the 
protection of the charitable immunity doctrine. 
 
William R. Warren was driving Mary A. Moore to a medical 
facility for routine medical care when the vehicle was involved 
in a collision with another vehicle.  Moore was injured in the 
accident.  Moore later died from natural causes unrelated to 
the accident.   
 
David E. Moore, administrator of her estate, filed a 
motion for judgment against Warren alleging that he negligently 
operated the vehicle and that his negligence proximately caused 
Moore's injuries.  Warren filed a plea of charitable immunity 
asserting that, at the time of the accident, he was driving a 
car owned by the American Red Cross and that he was serving as 
an unpaid volunteer for the Red Cross.  Under these 
circumstances, Warren asserted, he was "cloaked with the 
immunity of the charity."  The trial court sustained Warren's 
plea.  We awarded Moore an appeal and will affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
 
This is a case of first impression in this Commonwealth.  
The doctrine of charitable immunity adopted in Virginia 
 
 
 
 
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precludes a charity's beneficiaries from recovering damages 
from the charity for the negligent acts of its servants or 
agents if due care was exercised in the hiring and retention of 
those agents and servants.  Straley v. Urbanna Chamber of 
Commerce, 243 Va. 32, 35, 413 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1992).  Moore's 
primary argument is simply that cloaking Warren with charitable 
immunity would encourage charitable activities at the expense 
of compensating an injured victim.  We struck this balance in 
favor of charitable institutions when the doctrine of 
charitable immunity was adopted and applied in Virginia years 
ago.  Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 
602, 107 S.E. 785, 790 (1921).  In making this choice, the 
Court expressed the belief that it is in the public interest to 
encourage charitable institutions in their "good work."  Id.  
Resolution of this case, therefore, must be consistent with 
that choice.  
 
Like any organization, a charity performs its work only 
through the actions of its servants and agents.  Without a 
charity's agents and servants, such as the volunteer here, no 
service could be provided to beneficiaries.  Denying these 
servants and agents the charity's immunity for their acts 
effectively would deny the charity immunity for its acts.  If 
the charity's servants and agents are not under the umbrella of 
immunity given the institution itself and they are exposed to 
negligence actions by the charity's beneficiaries, the "good 
 
 
 
 
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work" of the charity will be adversely impacted.  That result 
is inconsistent with the Commonwealth's policy underlying the 
doctrine of charitable immunity. 
 
Moore, nevertheless, suggests that, as a case of first 
impression, actions taken in other jurisdictions are 
instructive and provide persuasive authority for his position. 
However, we are aware of only one case which directly 
considered the immunity of a charity's volunteer, Wood v. 
Abell, 300 A.2d 665 (Md. 1973).  
 
Wood is not persuasive here because the holding relied on 
a trust fund theory of charitable immunity.  Id. at 679.  That 
theory bases the charitable immunity doctrine on the rationale 
that the funds of the charity should not be subject to 
dissipation by negligence suits against the charity.  Because 
charitable funds would not be affected by the personal 
liability of a charity's volunteer, the Supreme Court of 
Maryland held that the rationale for the doctrine in Maryland 
did not support applying the immunity to the charity's 
volunteer.  Id.
 
The trust fund doctrine, however, was considered and 
specifically rejected as the rationale for adopting charitable 
immunity in Virginia.  Instead, public policy considerations 
are the rationale for charitable immunity in this jurisdiction. 
 Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 107, 81 S.E. 
13, 15 (1914).  Because the status of charitable immunity and 
 
 
 
 
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the theories upon which it is based vary greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we do not find cases from other 
jurisdictions instructive or persuasive here.  See generally 
Note, The Quality of Mercy:  "Charitable Torts" and Their 
Continuing Immunity, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1382, 1392-93 & n.71 
(1987); Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of 
Nongovernmental Charities -- Modern Status, 25 A.L.R. 4th 517 
(1983 & Supp. 1995). 
 
In resolving the issue before us, we also reject Moore's 
contention that including volunteers within a charity's cloak 
of immunity is an expansion of the doctrine and that we have 
previously stated such a task should be left to the 
legislature.  First, our previous statements regarding 
preference for legislative rather than judicial action in this 
area have been limited to actions which would "abolish or 
relax" the doctrine.  Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 
703, 709, 133 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1963); Hill v. Leigh Memorial 
Hosp., Inc., 204 Va. 501, 504, 132 S.E.2d 411, 414-15 (1963); 
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 889, 108 S.E.2d 
388, 396 (1959).  In Oakes, the Court enunciated its rationale 
for avoiding judicial restriction or abrogation of the 
doctrine: 
 
If it be considered desirable to abolish such 
immunity, it would be more appropriate for the 
General Assembly to act, for the effect would be to 
 
 
 
 
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operate prospectively.  Abandonment of the rule by 
judicial decision would be retroactive and give life 
to tort claims not barred by the statute of 
limitations at the time of rendition of this opinion. 
200 Va. at 889, 108 S.E.2d at 396. 
Thus, this Court's stated preference for legislative action is 
limited in scope and is based on a need to avoid the 
potentially detrimental results that would flow from judicial 
abrogation or limitation of the doctrine. 
 
More importantly, our resolution of the present issue is 
not an expansion of the charitable immunity doctrine but 
involves only another instance of defining its contours.  See, 
e.g., Weston's Adm'x, 131 Va. at 610, 105 S.E. at 792 (one who 
pays for services of a charity can be a beneficiary of the 
charity); Hill, 204 Va. 501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963) (charity is 
not liable for corporate negligence other than negligent hiring 
and retention of its servants); Straley, 243 Va. at 37, 413 
S.E.2d at 50-51 and Thrasher v. Winand, 239 Va. 338, 341, 389 
S.E.2d 699, 701 (1990) (member of community only generally 
served by a charity is not beneficiary). 
 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that under the 
doctrine of charitable immunity, a volunteer of a charity is 
immune from liability to the charity's beneficiaries for 
negligence while the volunteer was engaged in the charity's 
 
 
 
 
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work.
*  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HASSELL, dissenting. 
 
Contrary to its assertion, the majority has certainly 
expanded the doctrine of charitable immunity.  We have not 
heretofore held that a volunteer of a charitable organization 
is immune from tort liability.  Indeed, I am unaware of any 
other court in the United States which has granted such tort 
immunity to a volunteer of a charitable organization.   
 
We have consistently held that if the bar of charitable 
immunity is to be either expanded or abolished, the General 
Assembly should do so, and not this Court, which is the branch 
of government least suited to make public policy decisions.  
For example, we stated in Hospital Association v. Hayes, 204 
Va. 703, 709, 133 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1963): 
 
 
The defendant urges us to broaden the immunity 
extended to a charitable institution.  We have 
heretofore said that the wisdom of exempting a 
charitable institution from liability in tort even to 
its beneficiaries was not entirely free from doubt; 
but we felt that it would be more appropriate for the 
General Assembly of Virginia to abolish or relax the 
rule than for this Court to undertake to do so.  Hill 
v. Memorial Hospital, Inc., [204 Va. 501, 506, 132 
                     
     
*We decline to adopt Moore's suggestion that the test 
applied to sovereign immunity cases for determining employee 
immunity be employed in charitable immunity cases.  While the 
doctrines may appear to be similar, their jurisprudence and 
statutory development are different.  We see no reason to 
transport standards developed in the context of sovereign 
immunity to charitable immunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
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S.E.2d 411, 414-15 (1963)]; Memorial Hospital v. 
Oakes, Adm'x, [200 Va. 878, 889, 108 S.E.2d 388, 396 
(1959)].  We decline to accept defendant's request. 
 
Even a cursory review of the majority's opinion reveals that 
the majority's decision to expand the bar of charitable 
immunity is based solely upon public policy considerations 
rather than legal precedent.  I would reverse the judgment of 
the trial court and remand this case for a trial on the merits.