Title: In Re Estate of Wood
Citation: 198 Kan. 313, 424 P.2d 528
Docket Number: 44,627
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1967

198 Kan. 313 (1967)
424 P.2d 528
In the Matter of the Estate of Franklin L. Wood, Deceased,
THOMAS A. VALENTINE, Appellant,
v.
TOM CUNNINGHAM, Administrator of the Estate of Franklin L. Wood, Appellee.
No. 44,627

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 4, 1967.
Jack N. Turner, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Robert J. O'Connor, of Wichita, argued the cause, and A.W. Hershberger, Richard Jones, William P. Thompson, H.E. Jones, Jerome E. Jones, Robert J. Roth, and William R. Smith, also of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FROMME, J.:
This appeal is from an order of the district court dismissing a petition for allowance of a demand against the estate of Franklin L. Wood, deceased, and arises out of the following facts.
Plaintiff Thomas A. Valentine was injured in an auto accident. He was nineteen years of age when the accident occurred.
Franklin L. Wood was driving the other car involved in this accident. Wood died and proceedings were filed in the probate *314 court to administer his estate. Tom Cunningham was appointed administrator for the estate.
The plaintiff filed a petition for allowance of demand in the probate court. This demand was based upon a tort claim for injuries received by plaintiff in the automobile accident. Plaintiff was born on December 8, 1942 and celebrated his twenty-first birthday on December 8, 1963.
The petition was properly certified to the district court. The administrator then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground the claim was barred by the statute of limitations K.S.A. 60-513 as extended by 60-515. The motion to dismiss was sustained by the district court and the petitioner perfected his appeal therefrom.
The following chronology of events is important to understand the one question involved in the appeal:
January 13, 1962, the car accident occurred;
December 8, 1963, the plaintiff became 21 years old;
January 27, 1964, Franklin L. Wood died;
December 14, 1964, plaintiff filed his claim;
The action for damages arising from this accident would be barred on January 13, 1964. [K.S.A. 60-513 (4)] However, plaintiff was a minor at the time of the accident and he would be entitled to bring the action any time before December 8, 1964. [K.S.A. 60-515 (a)] The prospective defendant died on January 27, 1964, and an administrator was appointed who published first notice to creditors on May 16, 1964. Plaintiff filed his claim in the probate court within the time specified by the nonclaim statute K.S.A. 59-2239 but it was filed six days after the time prescribed by K.S.A. 60-513 (4) as extended by K.S.A. 60-515 (a).
Therefore we have the question presented squarely for the first time of whether the nonclaim statute K.S.A. 59-2239 has the effect of enlarging the time in which a claim may be filed against a decedent's estate when the bar of the statute of limitation provided by K.S.A. 60-501, et seq. falls after the death of the tort-feasor but before the claim is filed against the estate of the decedent.
The following statutes are of primary concern to understand the question.
The above statutes will be referred to as general statutes of limitation and the following as the nonclaim statute.
The authorities are not in accord on the question of whether nonclaim statutes may be given effect to enlarge the period prescribed by general statutes of limitation, when a cause of action has accrued during the decedent's lifetime but death occurs before expiration of the limitation period. (See 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators § 925; 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 732 c.)
This court has held the time for bringing actions as limited by K.S.A. 60-501, et seq., may be reduced or limited by the provisions of K.S.A. 59-2239. In Gebers v. Marquart, 166 Kan. 604, 609, 203 P.2d 125, this court said:
In the final paragraph of Gebers v. Marquart, supra, the court said:
Article 5 of the code of civil procedure dealing with limitations of actions contains twenty-one separate sections relating to various types of claims and special groups of individuals such as those under legal disability. The first section of the article, K.S.A. 60-501, provides that the article shall govern the limitation of time for commencing civil actions, except where a different limitation is specifically provided by statute. This leads us to the question of whether the nonclaim statute, K.S.A. 59-2239, is a statute of limitations as contemplated in the above exception. We believe it is. The court in In re Estate of Kruse, 170 Kan. 429, 434, 226 P.2d 835 said:
Under the decisions of our court the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction of a petition for damage in tort against a decedent's estate arising out of an auto accident. (In re Estate of Meyer, 191 Kan. 408, 381 P.2d 546.)
*317 In Gebers v. Marquart, supra, this court said at page 608 of the opinion:
When a claim is barred under any general statute of limitation before the death of a person we have held that such claim cannot be recovered from his estate. (See Hammond v. Estate of Hammond, 150 Kan. 113, 91 P.2d 19; Riley v. Fallon, 179 Kan. 224, 294 P.2d 253; In re Estate of Forster, 178 Kan. 120, 283 P.2d 491.)
In In re Estate of Brasfield, 168 Kan. 376, 214 P.2d 305, our court compared the institution of proceedings leading up to filing a claim against an estate of a decedent to filing an action in the district court under the code of civil procedure, at page 385 of the opinion the court said:
In Rochester American Ins. Co. v. Cassell Truck Lines, 195 Kan. 51, 55, 402 P.2d 782, this court said:
In the light of the foregoing decisions it would appear that petitioner's tort claim was an existing right but undetermined at the death of the tort-feasor and the remedy prior to date of death was by civil action in the district court. When death intervened the remedy which petitioner had in the district court was cut off and the probate court then held exclusive original jurisdiction. If general statutes of limitation are not interrupted at date of death certain undesirable results will flow from circumstances which always exist during the period which follows death. Our probate code permits any interested person to file a petition for administration immediately after death. (K.S.A. 59-2221.) A creditor can file a petition and upon proper showing obtain the appointment of a special administrator pending appointment of an executor or administrator. (K.S.A. 59-710.) This may be accomplished a few days after death if sufficient necessity exists. However, the surviving spouse and next of kin are given preference in the administration of an estate. (K.S.A. 59-705.) If a creditor of the estate is required to initiate such proceedings because his claim is about to be barred he will have to usurp what is generally considered to be the personal prerogative of the family and do so at a time when the family is upset by the death of a loved one. Such a requirement will help neither the creditor nor the decedent's family.
Under the law as it existed in prior statutes thirty days had to elapse before a creditor could file or initiate the proceedings to obtain administration. The court in Robertson v. Tarry, 83 Kan. 716, 112 Pac. 603, held that the five year statute of limitations was tolled for a reasonable time of fifty days after death to allow a creditor time to apply for appointment and cite parties into court for a hearing. In Timmonds v. Messner, 109 Kan. 518, 200 Pac. 270, the court said a creditor could not extend the period of limitation by delay in taking appropriate action to secure the appointment of an administrator beyond a reasonable time. Although the statutory *319 reason for tolling the statutes of limitation in Robertson and in Timmonds no longer exists, the practical reason for the same would continue.
Many states such as Texas have special statutes which provide that the limitation provided in the civil code ceases to run for a period of 12 months after death unless an administrator is qualified during said period, so the maximum period of limitation is extended one additional year in case the debtor dies. We find no such provision in K.S.A. 60-501, et seq.
If our statutes of general limitation continue to run after date of death so as to bar a claim not yet filed against a decedent's estate we will be called upon to determine in each case the period of time, if any, the statute is tolled because of the claimant's inability to present the claim. The district court will be closed to him. Some time will necessarily elapse after the death and before he can prepare his claim for presentation in the probate court. Such an uncertainty in our law would not be desirable.
The legislature in Kansas has prescribed what should be contained in the notice to creditors. K.S.A. 59-2236 provides:
The right of a tort claimant is a demand which must be filed against the decedent's estate. The notice to creditors prescribed by statute advises the creditors and all others concerned to exhibit their demands within nine months from the date of the first published notice or they will be forever barred. To hold that a demand against a decedent must be filed in less than nine months in certain cases will make the creditors notice misleading and will add confusion to our probate law.
The statute relating to claims has undergone marked change since the advent of the probate code in 1939. Prior to that date the statute G.S. 1935, 22-702 read:
In the probate code (K.S.A. 59-2239) it was changed and the saving clause as to infants and others was deleted. A bar has been applied since that time to all demands or claims against a decedent which are not presented in the estate. No creditor shall have any claim against the property of the decedent unless an executor or administrator of his estate has been appointed within one year after the death of the decedent. If the appointment is obtained within the year the statute requires a claimant to file his claim within nine months after the date of the first published notice to creditors. When either of these requirements are not met a claim is forever laid to rest. (See Hoppas v. Bowman, 167 Kan. 761, 207 P.2d 950, and case annotations K.S.A. 59-2239.)
We have held that the time for bringing actions as limited by K.S.A. 60-501, et seq., may be reduced or limited by the provisions of K.S.A. 59-2239. It is consistent to further hold that K.S.A. 59-2239 becomes the controlling statute of limitations to be applied to all claims which exist at the date of death of a decedent. This may have the effect of enlarging the time in which a claim could have been filed under K.S.A. 60-501, et seq., but only in those cases when the claim is based upon a valid and subsisting right unbarred by the statute when death occurs. However, if a claimant has an existing claim at the date of the decedent's death, he must exhibit such claim within nine months from the date of the first published notice to creditors. If no administrator or executor is appointed within one year after the death of the decedent his claim will be barred at the end of the year.
Appellant's claim was a valid and subsisting right at the date of decedent's death. An administrator was appointed within one year after death. The claim was filed in the estate within nine months after the administrator first gave notice to creditors. The appellant's claim was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations which is K.S.A. 59-2239.
The order of the lower court dismissing the amended petition for the allowance of the demand is reversed.