Title: Levan v. Independence Mall, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH LEVAN,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 121, 2007 
 
Claimant Below-  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
INDEPENDENCE MALL, INC. 
§ 
C.A. No.: 06A-05-006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Employer Below-  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 5, 2007 
   Decided:  December 5, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Edward B. Carter and Lawrance Spiller Kimmel (argued), Esquires, of Kimmel, 
Carter, Roman & Peltz, P.A., Bear, Delaware, for Appellant. 
David R. Batman, Esquire, of Heckler & Frabizzio, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellee. 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 2
 
Appellant Joseph LeVan was injured in a work-related accident in 1989 
while employed by Appellee Independence Mall (“Employer”).  A check issued by 
the Employer’s insurance carrier to pay medical expenses was mailed on February 
3, 2000.  The medical provider deposited the check on February 11, 2000.  LeVan 
filed a petition for additional compensation with the Industrial Accident Board on 
February 9, 2005.  The Board held that his petition was barred by the five-year 
statute of limitations.1  The Superior Court affirmed that ultimate ruling but 
employed an analysis based upon the date of mailing plus three business days.  
LeVan argues in this appeal that the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
claimant or his medical provider actually receives the last payment.  He also argues 
that the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, that the Superior 
Court applied its own construction of the statute incorrectly, and erred when it 
upheld the ultimate ruling of the Board that his petition is barred.   
 
Under 19 Del. C. § 2361(b), “[w]here payments of compensation have been 
made in any case under an agreement approved by the Board or by an award of the 
Board, no statute of limitations shall take effect until the expiration of 5 years from 
the time of the making of the last payment for which a proper receipt has been filed 
with the Department.”  We hold that a payment is “made” when a check is mailed 
                                          
 
1 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). 
 3
to the employee-claimant or a medical provider, conditioned upon the check being 
negotiable and ultimately received.  This gives effect to the legislative intent in this 
context and affords the most predictable and unambiguous date to determine when 
a payment is “made” for purposes of the statute of limitations.   It is also consistent 
with the triggering date of mailing used in other wage and workers’ compensation 
contexts.  Because LeVan’s petition was filed more than five years after the 
mailing of the last payment, his petition is barred by the statute of limitations.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
I. 
 
In October 1989, LeVan was injured in a work-related accident.  As a result, 
LeVan received workers’ compensation benefits.  The last payment of indemnity 
(lost wage) benefits was in 1994, but his Employer approved payment of medical 
bills through August 11, 1999.  LeVan received further medical treatment in 
August 1999 and submitted that bill for payment. 
 
On February 3, 2000, the Employer’s insurance carrier issued and mailed the 
last medical benefits check to LeVan’s medical provider, Orthopaedic Specialists, 
in the amount of $228.00.  This check represented the last payment made by the 
Employer relating to LeVan’s compensable injury.   
 
The date the check was received was much less clear.  The office manager 
for Orthopaedic Specialists testified that the check was deposited on February 11 
 4
and was posted to their ledger on February 18.  No witness from the medical 
provider’s offices was able to state when the check was actually received.  
Generally, it was not uncommon at the medical provider’s offices for some period 
of time to elapse between the receipt and deposit of a check. 
 
On February 8, 2005, LeVan faxed his Petition to Determine Additional 
Compensation Due to the Board during regular business hours.2  This occurred 
more than five years after the last check was mailed, but within five years of the 
date the check was deposited.  After the petition was filed, the Employer raised the 
statute of limitations defense. 
 
The Board held a hearing and agreed with the Employer that the claim was 
time barred.  It found that no witness was able to establish the exact date the check 
was received.  It also found that the check was issued and mailed on the same day, 
February 3, 2000, and there was no fraud or deceit in the mailing of the check.  To 
avoid uncertainties that arise from triggering the statute of limitations upon receipt, 
the Board interpreted § 2361(b) as beginning to run upon the date of the issuance 
of the check.  Because there was no dispute that the check was issued on February 
3, 2000 and the petition was not filed until February 9, 2005, the Board concluded 
                                          
 
2 The fax from LeVan is time stamped 3:35 p.m., February 8.  The Board’s time-stamp on the 
petition is 4:18, February 9.  The time of day (a.m. or p.m.) is unreadable. 
 5
that the statute of limitations had expired.  It therefore dismissed LeVan’s petition 
as time barred.  
 
LeVan appealed to the Superior Court.  The Superior Court agreed that the 
statute of limitations had expired, but under a different rationale.  The court found 
that the “time of the making of the last payment” under § 2361(b) is the actual date 
of receipt of the payment, unless the recipient has acted in bad faith.  Further, 
because of the uncertainty here, the Superior Court determined that in the absence 
of proof of the actual date of receipt of the payment, the date of receipt would be 
deemed the date of the mailing of the payment, plus three business days.  After 
finding that there was no conclusive testimony on the date of receipt, the Superior 
Court deemed the receipt date to be three business days after February 3, 2000, 
which would have been Tuesday, February 8, 2000.3  The Superior Court then 
decided that the petition was barred because it was filed on February 9, 2005.  This 
appeal followed. 
II. 
 
When reviewing an appeal from the Board, “the only role of the appellate 
court is to determine whether the decision of the Board is supported by substantial 
                                          
 
3 In the written order, the Superior Court appears to have miscalculated the dates by writing that 
the date of the receipt would have been Tuesday, February 7, but corrected this error by writing 
“Tuesday is February 8, 2000—still 1 day off” in its order.   
 6
evidence and is free from legal error.”4  It is well-established that the appellate 
court does not sit as the trier of fact, rehear the case, reweigh the evidence, make 
credibility determinations, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.5  
Questions of law, such as the construction of the workers’ compensation statute, 
are reviewed de novo.6  Likewise, whether a complaint is barred by a statute of 
limitations is a question of law that we review de novo.7  Particularly, “[i]t is the 
well recognized duty of a court to construe statutes of limitation so as to establish 
just and reasonable guidelines for different classes of cases in light of the general 
policy of repose.”8 
A. 
 
Section 2361(b) of Title 19 provides: 
Where payments of compensation have been made in any case under 
an agreement approved by the Board or by an award of the Board, no 
statute of limitations shall take effect until the expiration of five years 
                                          
 
4 Std. Distrib., Inc.  v. Hall, 897 A.2d 155, 157 (Del. 2006).  See also Anchor Motor Freight v. 
Ciabattoni, 716 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1998) (“The Board’s factual findings will be upheld if they 
are supported by substantial evidence, which means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”) (citation omitted). 
5 Hall, 897 A.2d at 157; Gen. Motor Corp. v. Kane, 2006 WL 1650807, at *2 (Del. Supr.). 
6 Page v. Hercules, 637 A.2d 29, 32 (Del. 1994) (“The construction of our workers’ 
compensation law, 19 Del. C. sections 2301, et seq., . . . is a question of law this Court reviews 
de novo.”). 
7 Parker v. Gadow, 893 A.2d 964, 966 (Del. 2006). 
8 Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 662 (Del. 1987).  See also Leatherbury v. Greenspun, -- A.2d --, 
2007 WL 4216850, at *5 (Del. Nov. 30, 2007) (“Delaware courts have consistently held that 
strict construction is particularly important when construing statutes of limitation where ‘the 
General Assembly has evinced its intent to bar claims filed after the stated time.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 7
from the time of the making of the last payment for which a proper 
receipt has been filed with the Department.9 
 
We have previously emphasized that this statute “unambiguously provides that no 
statute of limitation shall take effect until five years from the last payment of 
benefits.”10  We have also stated that the limitations period begins “to run on the 
date that the last medical payment was made.”11  More recently, courts have placed 
“primary importance on the date of the last payment, and to de-emphasize the 
significance of the filing of a receipt.”12  The question of what date determines 
when a payment is “made” for purposes of the statute of limitations is a matter of 
first impression in Delaware.   
 
“The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to 
legislative intent.”13  An unambiguous statute precludes the need for judicial 
interpretation, and “the plain meaning of the statutory language controls.”14  An 
                                          
 
9 19 Del. C. § 2361(b) (emphasis added). 
10 McDougall, 877 A.2d at 975. 
11 Starun v. All Am. Eng’g Co., 350 A.2d 765, 768 (Del. 1975). 
12 Lawhorn v. New Castle County, 2006 WL 1174009, at *3 (Del. Super.), aff’d, 913 A.2d 570 
(Del.) (Table). 
13 Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1999).  See generally Carper v. New Castle 
County Bd. of Ed., 432 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Del. 1981) (“The synopsis of the [legislative bill is] a 
proper source from which to glean legislative intent.”); Leatherbury, -- A.2d --, 2007 WL 
4216850, at *3-4 (stating that “the preamble of [an act]” and “the synopsis accompanying the 
amendment” are “instructive” in determining the General Assembly’s intent). 
14 Eliason, 733 A.2d at 946.  See also Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 
A.2d 892, 900 (1994) (“Undefined words in a statute must be given their ordinary, common 
meaning.  Additionally, words in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if there is a 
 8
ambiguous statute should be construed “in a way that will promote its apparent 
purpose and harmonize it with other statutes” within the statutory scheme.15  A 
statute is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or 
interpretations” or “if a literal reading of the statute would lead to an unreasonable 
or absurd result not contemplated by the legislature.”16   
1. 
 
We begin our analysis with the language of the statute itself.  Section 
2361(b) of Title 19 provides that the statute of limitations runs from “the time of 
the making of the last payment.”  In both legal and non-legal definitions, “to 
make” means “to cause (something) to exist.”17  The legal definition of a “maker” 
refers to “a person who signs a promissory note.”18  In choosing to start the statute 
of limitations upon the “time of the making of the last payment,” without any 
further clarification or definition of the term, the Legislature’s use of the word 
“making” is given its ordinary meaning.  In this case, the “making” of the last 
payment would be when the maker of the check caused it to exist.   
                                                                                                                                        
reasonable construction which will give them meaning, and courts must ascribe a purpose to the 
use of statutory language, if reasonably possible.”) (internal citations omitted). 
15 Eliason, 733 A.2d at 946. 
16 Newtown Vill. Serv. Corp. v. Newtown Rd. Dev. Co., 772 A.2d 172, 175 (Del. 2001). 
17 WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 661 (2001) (defining “make” as “to cause to exist 
or happen; create”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 967 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “make” as “to 
cause (something) to exist”). 
18 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 967. 
 9
 
Because the legislature also conditioned the statute on the “time of the 
making of the last payment” and not solely its “making,” we must also determine 
when a payment is made.  The date on which a payment is “made” arguably could 
occur when a check is issued, sent, received, deposited, or honored.  These various 
possibilities require us to make a choice that best effectuates the intent of the 
Legislature.  Because the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that any amount 
due under the Act may be collected as wages are collected,19 the statutory scheme 
for the payment of wages is relevant to our determination.20   
2. 
 
The Delaware Wage Payment and Collection Act21 provides for payment to 
be made, among other ways, by mail: “If an employee is for any reason not present 
on the regular payday, payment shall be made either by mail if requested by the 
employee or at the next regular workday that the employee is present or by the 
credit to the bank account designated by the employee.”22  In other words, in 
certain circumstances, payment is made when the check is mailed.  
                                          
 
19 19 Del. C. § 2357. 
20 Although the Uniform Commercial Code addresses when a check is “paid” (see 6 Del. C. § 3-
602), we find the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Wage Payment and 
Collection Act to be more relevant to the issue before us.   
21 19 Del. C. §§ 1101-1115. 
22 19 Del. C. § 1102(c). 
 10
The analogy of a civil action to collect benefits also demonstrates that the 
date of receipt is not controlling.  Civil actions filed under 19 Del. C. § 2357 “to 
collect unpaid workers’ compensation awards have become known as ‘Huffman’ 
claims,”23 named after Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Son, Inc.24  We have 
previously held that the applicable statute of limitations for Huffman claims is 
subject to 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).25  Further, we have held that “the focus of the 
Huffman award must be on the employer’s failure to pay once the thirty day default 
period has expired after proper demand.”26  Huffman claim cases demonstrate that 
“the event that begins the thirty day statutory period for payments” (i.e., when 
Huffman triggers) is the date the Huffman demand letter is mailed “because it 
put[s] the employer on clear notice . . . .”27  If the date that a Huffman demand 
letter is mailed is sufficient to trigger that statutory period to pay benefits, then the 
date the payment is mailed should also be sufficient to trigger the statute of 
limitations for any petition for additional compensation.  
                                          
 
23 McDougall, 877 A.2d at 971. 
24 432 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1981). 
25 McDougall, 877 A.2d at 974-75.  See also Holden v. Gaico, Inc., 736 A.2d 202, 203 (Del. 
1999) (“[W]e hold that if a default is made by the employer for thirty days after demand in the 
payment of any amount due under the Workers’ Compensation statute, the amount due may be 
recovered in the same manner as claims made pursuant to the Wage Payment and Collection 
Act.”). 
26 Acro Extrusion Corp. v. Cunningham, 810 A.2d 345, 348 (Del. 2002) (concluding that the 
“event that begins the thirty day statutory period for payment[] was the September 21, 1998 letter 
because it put the employer on clear notice that [the employee] was appealing only the denial of 
partial disability payments”). 
27 Id. 
 11
B. 
LeVan argues that the “time of the making of the last payment” should be 
the date of receipt.  In making this argument, he relies heavily on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case of Romaine v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bryn 
Mawr Chateau Nursing Home) and cases cited therein,28 which held that the statute 
of limitations period runs from the date of receipt of the check.29  The Romaine 
court explained that “payment is conditionally made when the [claimant] accepts 
payment by a check from the [employer].  If the check is honored, the condition is 
removed and the payment relates back to the date of [receipt].”30  The court then 
held that the claimant bears the burden of proving the date of receipt.31   
We choose not to follow the rationale used in Romaine for two reasons.  The 
first is the intent of our General Assembly under our worker’s compensation and 
wage payment statutory scheme that a payment can be “made” by mailing.  The 
second reason is that “it is appropriate [to] follow a bright line such as the ‘date of 
mailing’ rule so that all parties can operate with some predictability.”32  
                                          
 
28 901 A.2d 477 (Pa. 2006). 
29 The applicable statute in Romaine provides: “no notice of compensation payable, agreement or 
award shall be reviewed, or modified or reinstated, unless a petition is filed with the department 
within three years after the date of the most recent payment of compensation made prior to the 
filing of such petition.”  Id. at 485. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 486-87. 
32 Am. Intern. Group v. Carriere, 2 P.3d 1222, 1224-25 (Alaska 2000). 
 12
Predictability is better achieved when the payment obligation of an employer or 
insurer is “conditionally satisfied when the check is mailed, but the check must be 
negotiable and must ultimately be received.”33 
In this case, the Board found that the check was mailed on February 3, 2000.  
It also determined that there was no evidence of fraud or deceit in mailing the 
check, and it was ultimately received and honored.  LeVan’s petition for additional 
compensation was filed on February 8, 2005, more than five years after the mailing 
of the last payment.  That finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.  Accordingly, the Board did not err in dismissing LeVan’s petition as 
untimely and barred by the statute of limitations, 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). 
III. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
                                          
 
33 Id. at 1225.