Title: Bridgeman v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: s
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2015

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11764 
 
KEVIN BRIDGEMAN & others1  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE SUFFOLK 
DISTRICT & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2015. - May 18, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of 
government agents, Judicial review, Sentence, Delay in 
commencement of prosecution.  Due Process of Law, Plea, 
Sentence, Delay in commencement of prosecution, 
Intervention in civil action.  Committee for Public Counsel 
Services.  Attorney at Law, Attorney as witness.  Practice, 
Criminal, Plea, Postconviction relief, New trial, Sentence, 
Delay in commencement of prosecution, Conduct of government 
agents, Cross-examination by prosecutor.  Evidence, Guilty 
plea, Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of evidence, 
Cross-examination.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence 
of inferior courts.  Practice, Civil, Intervention. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 9, 2014. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
                     
 
1 Yasir Creach and Miguel Cuevas; Committee for Public 
Counsel Services (CPCS), intervener. 
 
 
2 District Attorney for the Essex District.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we refer to the district attorneys for the Suffolk 
and Essex Districts as "the Commonwealth." 
2 
 
 
 
 
Matthew R. Segal (Daniel N. Marx with him) for the 
petitioners. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Nancy J. Caplan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with 
him) for the intervener. 
 
Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
Quentin Weld, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Essex District. 
 
Jean-Jacques Cabou, of Arizona; Joanna Perini-Abbott, of 
Oregon; & Daniel Gelb & Elizabeth A. Lunt, for National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Richard Marshall, of New York, & Aaron M. Katz, C. Thomas 
Brown, Mark Vaughn, & Barbara J. Dougan, for Families Against 
Mandatory Minimums & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The present case is the latest in a series of 
cases concerning the egregious misconduct of Annie Dookhan, a 
chemist who was employed in the forensic drug laboratory of the 
William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug lab) 
from 2003 until 2012.3  Kevin Bridgeman, Yasir Creach, and Miguel 
Cuevas (collectively, the petitioners) are three individuals who 
pleaded guilty to various drug offenses in cases where Dookhan 
signed the certificates of drug analysis (drug certificates) on 
the line labeled "Assistant Analyst."  On January 9, 2014, prior 
to this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 
(2014), the petitioners filed a petition in the county court 
                     
 
3 The details of Annie Dookhan's misconduct in the forensic 
drug laboratory of the William A. Hinton State Laboratory 
Institute (Hinton drug lab) have been well documented and, 
therefore, will not be repeated in the present case.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 338-342 (2014). 
3 
 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking the court for two forms of 
relief.  First, they asked for the establishment of a rule 
whereby defendants who have been convicted of drug offenses, and 
who successfully obtain new trials based on Dookhan's 
misconduct, cannot thereafter be charged with or convicted of 
more serious offenses than those of which the defendants 
originally were convicted, or be given longer sentences than 
originally were imposed.  Second, the petitioners requested an 
order requiring those district attorneys who prosecuted so-
called "Dookhan defendants"4 to (1) notify all such defendants 
within ninety days whether the Commonwealth intends to 
reprosecute them;5 (2) vacate the convictions in those cases 
where the defendants are not so notified; and (3) conclude any 
reprosecutions within six months.  On May 27, 2014, following 
the release of our decision in Scott, supra,6 the Committee for 
                     
 
4 We use the term "Dookhan defendants" to refer generally to 
those individuals who were convicted of drug offenses and in 
whose cases Dookhan signed the certificate of drug analysis 
(drug certificate) on the line labeled "Assistant Analyst."  
These cases all arose in Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Essex, 
Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties, except for 
one case that arose in Worcester County. 
 
 
5 As noted by the single justice, the petitioners appear to 
propose notification to all Dookhan defendants, irrespective of 
whether they have sought and obtained postconviction relief. 
 
 
6 Relying on Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 
(1st Cir. 2006), this court articulated in Scott, 467 Mass. at 
346-358, a two-prong framework for analyzing a defendant's 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
4 
 
Public Counsel Services (CPCS) filed a motion to intervene under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974), to join the 
petitioners' requests for relief and to seek additional relief 
for all Dookhan defendants.7  The Commonwealth opposed both the 
petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and the 
motion to intervene.  After several hearings, a single justice 
                                                                  
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), in a case involving the 
misconduct of Dookhan at the Hinton drug lab.  Under the first 
prong of the analysis, a defendant must show egregious 
misconduct by the government that preceded the entry of the 
defendant's guilty plea and that occurred in the defendant's 
case.  Scott, supra at 347-354.  We recognized that, given the 
breadth and duration of Dookhan's malfeasance, it might be 
impossible for a defendant to show the required nexus between 
government misconduct and the defendant's own case.  Id. at 351-
352.  Consequently, we established a special evidentiary rule 
whereby a defendant seeking to vacate a guilty plea under rule 
30 (b) as a result of the revelation of Dookhan's misconduct, 
and proffering a drug certificate from the defendant's case 
signed by Dookhan on the line labeled "Assistant Analyst," would 
be entitled to "a conclusive presumption that egregious 
government misconduct occurred in the defendant's case."  Id. at 
352.  Application of this conclusive presumption in a particular 
case meant that a defendant's evidentiary burden to establish 
each element of the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework 
was satisfied.  Id. at 353-354.  The defendant then had the 
burden under the second prong of the analysis of particularizing 
Dookhan's misconduct to his or her decision to tender a guilty 
plea.  Id. at 354.  That is to say, the defendant had to 
"demonstrate a reasonable probability that he [or she] would not 
have pleaded guilty had he [or she] known of Dookhan's 
misconduct."  Id. at 355.  A successful showing on this second 
prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework would warrant an order 
granting the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
 
7 CPCS does not represent any of the petitioners.  It seeks 
intervention to assert and protect the interests of numerous 
other Dookhan defendants for whom it inevitably will be called 
on to provide (or already is providing) representation. 
5 
 
on October 21, 2014, reserved and reported the entire case to 
the full court. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we now conclude that (1) a 
defendant who has been granted a new trial based on Dookhan's 
misconduct at the Hinton drug lab cannot be charged with a more 
serious offense than that of which he or she initially was 
convicted under the terms of a plea agreement and, if convicted 
again, cannot be given a more severe sentence than that which 
originally was imposed; (2) the motion to intervene filed by 
CPCS is allowed; (3) a so-called "global remedy" will not be 
implemented at this time; (4) a lawyer who represented a Dookhan 
defendant at the plea stage of criminal proceedings is not 
barred by the advocate-witness rule from subsequently 
representing that defendant and testifying at an evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea; (5) 
the scope of cross-examination of a Dookhan defendant at a 
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the 
broad discretion of the motion judge; and (6) the testimony of a 
Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is only admissible at a subsequent trial for impeachment 
purposes if the defendant chooses to testify.8 
                     
 
8 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums and others, and by the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
6 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Kevin Bridgeman.  On April 8, 2005, 
members of the Boston police department's drug control unit were 
conducting an undercover operation in the theater district.  
Officer Greg T. Walsh approached Bridgeman and purchased two 
rocks of what appeared to be "crack" cocaine for forty dollars 
in controlled "buy" money.  Officers then attempted to arrest 
Bridgeman, whereupon he resisted and struck one of the officers 
with a closed fist.  When Bridgeman was searched after his 
arrest, officers found twenty-two plastic bags containing what 
appeared to be crack cocaine and the forty dollars in buy money. 
 
On June 2, 2005, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted 
Bridgeman on charges of possession of a class B controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, as a second or 
subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b) (count one); 
distribution of a class B controlled substance (cocaine), as a 
second or subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b) (count 
three); violation of the controlled substances laws in proximity 
to a school, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J (counts two and four); assault 
and battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D (count 
five); and resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B (count six).  
The Commonwealth produced drug certificates signed by Dookhan on 
the line labeled "Assistant Analyst," stating that the 
substances at issue contained cocaine as defined in G. L. 
c. 94C, § 31.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bridgeman pleaded 
7 
 
guilty on October 4, 2005, to counts one (first offense), three 
(first offense), five, and six.  The Commonwealth's motion to 
dismiss the second or subsequent offense portions of the 
indictments and the school zone charges was granted.9 
 
On July 26, 2007, members of the Boston police department's 
drug control unit were conducting an undercover operation around 
Boston Common.  An undercover officer approached Bridgeman, 
engaged him in conversation, walked with him to the Public 
Garden, and then purchased two plastic bags containing what 
appeared to be crack cocaine for forty dollars in buy money.  
Bridgeman was arrested, and when he was searched, officers 
found, among other items, ten additional bags containing what 
appeared to be crack cocaine and the forty dollars in buy money. 
 
On September 24, 2007, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted 
Bridgeman on charges of possession of a class B controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, as a subsequent 
offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b) (count one); violation of the 
controlled substances laws in proximity to a park, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32J (count two); and distribution of a class B controlled 
substance (cocaine), as a subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, 
                     
 
9 With respect to the charge of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute, Bridgeman was sentenced to State prison 
for two to three years.  With respect to the charges of 
distribution of cocaine, assault and battery on a police 
officer, and resisting arrest, Bridgeman was sentenced to three 
years' probation, to commence on and after his sentence for 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 
8 
 
§ 32A (b) (count three).  The Commonwealth again produced drug 
certificates signed by Dookhan on the line labeled "Assistant 
Analyst," stating that the substances at issue contained cocaine 
as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 31.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Bridgeman pleaded guilty on April 17, 2008, to counts one and 
three.10  The Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the park zone 
charge was granted.  Bridgeman has completed service of his 
sentences, but has not yet filed a motion for postconviction 
relief.11 
                     
 
10 With respect to the charges of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute, subsequent offense, and distribution of 
cocaine, subsequent offense, Bridgeman was sentenced to 
concurrent terms of from three to five years in State prison, to 
be served concurrently with the sentence he already was serving 
on his 2005 conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 
 
 
11 In an affidavit dated December 30, 2013, filed in 
connection with the petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
Bridgeman stated that, at the time he pleaded guilty to the 
various drug charges, he was unaware of Dookhan's misconduct.  
He further stated that, had he known about Dookhan's misconduct, 
it was reasonably probable that he would have sought dismissal 
of the indictments, would have tried to negotiate a different 
plea agreement with the Commonwealth, or would have gone to 
trial.  In an affidavit dated December 19, 2013, Bridgeman's 
trial counsel with respect to the 2007 charges stated that, at 
the time he advised his client to plead guilty, he was not aware 
of Dookhan's misconduct.  If he had been aware of such 
misconduct prior to Bridgeman's pleas, he would have sought 
dismissal of the indictments, and he would have advised 
Bridgeman to either negotiate for a better plea offer or 
consider proceeding to trial.  In an affidavit dated January 4, 
2014, Bridgeman's trial counsel with respect to the 2005 charges 
made similar representations. 
9 
 
 
b.  Yasir Creach.  On January 7, 2005, members of the 
Boston police department's drug control unit were conducting 
surveillance in the Chinatown section of Boston.  They observed 
Creach engaging in a brief conversation with another man before 
the two entered an alley marked with a "no trespassing" sign.  
The officers followed the men into the alley and saw Creach 
smoking from a glass tube that had been modified into a crack 
pipe.  The officers recovered one rock of what appeared to be 
crack cocaine from the pipe, and Creach was placed under arrest.  
Three days later, a criminal complaint issued from the Central 
Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department charging 
Creach with trespassing, G. L. c. 266, § 120 (count one); and 
possession of a class B controlled substance (cocaine), G. L. 
c. 94C, § 34.  The Commonwealth produced a drug certificate 
signed by Dookhan on the line labeled "Assistant Analyst," 
stating that the substance at issue contained cocaine as defined 
in G. L. c. 94C, § 31.  Creach pleaded guilty on April 20, 2005, 
to both charges.12  He has completed service of his sentences, 
but has not yet filed a motion for postconviction relief.13 
                     
 
12 According to the Commonwealth, Creach was sentenced to 
concurrent terms of incarceration totaling one year in a house 
of correction. 
 
 
13 In an affidavit dated December 30, 2013, filed in 
connection with the petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
Creach stated that, at the time he pleaded guilty to the drug 
charge, he was unaware of Dookhan's misconduct.  He further 
10 
 
 
c.  Miguel Cuevas.  On January 5, 2007, members of the 
Salem police department were conducting an undercover operation 
in the "Point" neighborhood of Salem.  An undercover officer 
contacted Cuevas by cellular telephone, the two met, and Cuevas 
sold the officer a "twist" of what the officer believed to be 
cocaine for forty dollars in buy money.  Three days later, 
undercover officers again contacted Cuevas by cellular telephone 
and arranged to purchase more cocaine.  Cuevas directed the 
officers to meet him at the corner of Bridge and Rice Streets.  
Once there, the officers picked up Cuevas from the side of the 
road and drove him to the vicinity of a residence on Palmer 
Street.  Cuevas got out of the vehicle, disappeared from sight 
for a few minutes, and then returned with another twist of what 
the officers believed to be cocaine.  On January 10, undercover 
officers once more contacted Cuevas by cellular telephone and 
arranged to purchase cocaine and heroin.  The officers picked up 
Cuevas at the corner of Bridge and Rice Streets and again drove 
him to Palmer Street.  Cuevas got out of the vehicle, briefly 
                                                                  
stated that, had he known about Dookhan's misconduct, it was 
reasonably probable that he would have tried to negotiate a 
different plea agreement with the Commonwealth, or would have 
gone to trial.  In an affidavit dated December, 2013, Creach's 
trial counsel stated that, at the time she advised her client to 
plead guilty, she was not aware of Dookhan's misconduct.  If she 
had been aware of such misconduct prior to Creach's pleas, she 
would have discussed with him the options of attempting to 
secure a more favorable plea agreement with the Commonwealth or 
proceeding to trial. 
11 
 
entered Theo's Market, and then returned to the vehicle where he 
sold the officers what appeared to be cocaine and heroin for 
ninety dollars in buy money. 
 
On October 5, 2007, an Essex County grand jury indicted 
Cuevas on charges of distribution of a class B substance 
(cocaine), as a second or subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (d) (counts one, two, and three); and distribution of a 
class A substance (heroin), as a second or subsequent offense, 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b) (count four).  The Commonwealth produced 
drug certificates signed by Dookhan on the line labeled 
"Assistant Analyst," stating that the substances at issue 
contained, respectively, cocaine and heroin as defined in G. L. 
c. 94C, § 31.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Cuevas pleaded 
guilty on January 30, 2009, to all four counts.14  The 
Commonwealth did not pursue the second or subsequent offense 
portions of the indictments.  Cuevas has completed service of 
his sentences.15  On October 18, 2012, Cuevas filed a motion to 
                     
 
14 Cuevas was sentenced to concurrent terms of between four 
and one-half years and five years in State prison. 
 
 
15 In an affidavit dated December 31, 2013, filed in 
connection with the petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
Cuevas stated that, at the time he pleaded guilty to the various 
drug charges, he was not aware of Dookhan's misconduct.  He 
further stated that, had he known about Dookhan's misconduct, it 
was reasonably probable that he would have sought dismissal of 
the indictments, would have tried to negotiate a different plea 
agreement with the Commonwealth, or would have gone to trial.  
In an affidavit dated December 30, 2013, Cuevas's trial counsel 
12 
 
withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), based on Dookhan's 
misconduct at the Hinton drug lab.  That motion remains pending. 
 
2.  Exposure to harsher punishment.  The petitioners 
contend that our decision in Scott has given rise to a 
substantial fear among Dookhan defendants that by challenging 
their drug convictions, they will subject themselves to harsher 
punishment than was imposed when they pleaded guilty.16  For 
example, they continue, a successful motion for a new trial 
could result in the reinstatement of previously dismissed 
charges that carry mandatory minimum sentences.17  In the 
                                                                  
stated that, at the time he advised his client to plead guilty, 
he was not aware of Dookhan's misconduct.  If he had been aware 
of such misconduct prior to Cuevas's pleas, he would have sought 
dismissal of the indictments, and he would have advised Cuevas 
to either negotiate for a better plea offer or consider 
proceeding to trial. 
 
 
16 In their petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, the 
petitioners do not distinguish between defendants who pleaded 
guilty and those who were convicted after a trial.  Our decision 
today only addresses those cases that were resolved on the basis 
of guilty pleas. 
 
 
17 The petitioners point to the case of Angel Rodriguez as a 
cautionary tale.  See Commonwealth vs. Rodriguez, Superior Ct., 
ESCR2007-00875 (Essex County).  Rodriguez was indicted on a 
charge of trafficking in cocaine (one hundred grams or more), 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (1).  He pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge of trafficking in cocaine (twenty-eight to one hundred 
grams), G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2), and was sentenced to State 
prison for from five to seven years.  After the revelation of 
Dookhan's misconduct, Rodriguez filed a motion to vacate his 
guilty plea pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).  A judge in 
the Superior Court allowed the motion.  The Commonwealth then 
13 
 
petitioners' view, the magnitude of Dookhan's misconduct has 
placed enormous pressure on the Commonwealth to limit their 
postconviction relief.  They assert that the Commonwealth has an 
aversion to the duplicative expenditure of scarce prosecutorial 
resources, that the judicial system has a bias against retrying 
issues that already have been decided, and that the Commonwealth 
has a desire to preserve convictions.  Consequently, the 
petitioners argue that their fear of receiving a harsher 
punishment has chilled the exercise of their postconviction 
rights.  Given these considerations, the petitioners contend 
that this court should conclude that defendants who plead guilty 
to drug offenses and subsequently are granted new trials based 
on Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton drug lab cannot (1) be 
charged with more serious offenses than those of which they 
initially were convicted; and (2) if convicted again, cannot be 
given sentences longer than those that originally were imposed. 
 
Preliminarily, before reaching the merits of the 
petitioners' arguments, we must resolve a procedural matter.  
The Commonwealth asserts that the petitioners' claims are not 
ripe for review because the harm the petitioners have alleged -- 
harsher sentences following new trials -- is hypothetical.  The 
                                                                  
charged Rodriguez with trafficking in one hundred grams or more 
of cocaine, a jury convicted him of that charge, and he was 
sentenced to from eight years to eight years and one day in 
State prison.  The case of Angel Rodriguez suggests that 
petitioners' fear is not baseless or unwarranted. 
14 
 
Commonwealth correctly points out that, among the petitioners, 
only Cuevas has sought postconviction relief by filing a motion 
to withdraw his guilty pleas based on Dookhan's misconduct, and 
according to the record, the motion remains pending.  In the 
Commonwealth's view, the harm alleged by the petitioners is 
speculative until such time as the petitioners are granted new 
trials, the Commonwealth charges the petitioners with more 
serious offenses, and, if convicted, the petitioners actually 
receive harsher punishments.  Until those events unfold, the 
Commonwealth continues, the petitioners' claims are not ripe for 
review. 
 
Generally speaking, "this court will not review [a] matter 
until the entire case is ripe for review due to the burdensome 
nature of 'piecemeal appellate review.'"  Campana v. Directors 
of the Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 399 Mass. 492, 499 n.16 (1987).  
However, given the significance of this case in light of the 
thousands of defendants who have been affected by Dookhan's 
misconduct and now are considering whether to pursue 
postconviction relief, coupled with the impact our decision will 
have on the timely administration of justice in all Hinton drug 
lab cases, we conclude that it is appropriate to review the 
petitioners' claims now in accordance with our broad powers of 
superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 657 n.5 
15 
 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  We agree with the single 
justice that in the unique circumstances of this case, the 
interests of justice dictate immediate resolution of the 
petitioners' claims.  Moreover, we have said that where, as 
here, "the single justice has, in [her] discretion, reserved and 
reported the case to the full court, we grant full appellate 
review of the issues reported."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 14-15 (2010). 
 
We turn to the merits of the petitioners' arguments.  Since 
the revelation of Dookhan's egregious misconduct at the Hinton 
drug lab -- a lapse of widespread magnitude in the criminal 
justice system -- we have found it necessary to exercise our 
general superintendence power to ameliorate its damaging 
effects.  In the early stages of the crisis, this court reviewed 
and resolved the legality of plea colloquies conducted by 
special magistrates appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
Superior Court Department of the Trial Court to preside over 
criminal proceedings in cases relating to the Hinton drug lab.  
See Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 65-66, 88-89 (2013).  
Then, in Scott, we articulated a workable approach by which 
judges should evaluate and decide individual motions to withdraw 
guilty pleas brought by defendants affected by Dookhan's 
misconduct.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 352.  See also note 6, 
supra.  Now, with this approach in place, it is incumbent on the 
16 
 
court to address uncertainties regarding the legal implications 
of a defendant's decision to challenge his or her ostensibly 
tainted drug conviction, and the propriety of returning the 
parties to the positions they occupied before entering into a 
plea agreement.  These matters are ones of systemic concern that 
this court shall resolve through the exercise of its general 
superintendence powers under G. L. c. 211, § 3, so as to ensure 
that a fear of more punitive consequences, as expressed by the 
petitioners, does not render their right to seek postconviction 
relief a flawed option.  See Charles, supra at 88-89. 
 
It is well established that "[r]emedies for prosecutorial 
misconduct should be tailored to the injury suffered and should 
not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests."  
Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 199 (1985).  See 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 290-292 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 439-440 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 209-210, cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 860 (1983).  "[P]rosecutorial misconduct requires that 
the rights of defendants be balanced against the necessity for 
preserving society's interest in the administration of justice."  
Cronk, supra.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 352.  In the ordinary 
course, "when a defendant withdraws his [guilty] plea after 
sentencing, he may receive a harsher sentence than was 
originally imposed."  Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 481, 
17 
 
486 (1982).  See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 178 
(2014) (judge vacated defendant's plea of guilty and reinstated 
portion of indictment charging defendant with trafficking in 
cocaine, which had been dismissed under terms of plea 
agreement); Commonwealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 502-505 
(1971) (allowance of defendant's motion to withdraw plea of 
guilty to murder in second degree subjected defendant to trial 
on charge of murder in first degree with attendant penalties).  
However, a defendant who files a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea as a consequence of Dookhan's misconduct is not doing so in 
the context of an ordinary criminal case in which the original 
charges brought by the Commonwealth, and their attendant 
sentences, simply can be reinstated as if the plea bargain had 
never occurred. 
 
A return to the status quo ante would mean ignoring the 
egregious misconduct of Dookhan and disregarding its impact on 
criminal defendants whose drug samples she analyzed.  This 
course of action would present a defendant with two options.  A 
defendant could choose not to file a motion for postconviction 
relief and accept the fact that his or her convictions may have 
been tainted by Dookhan's misconduct.  Alternatively, a 
defendant could choose to file a motion to withdraw his or her 
guilty plea and, if allowed, accept the fact that he or she may 
be subject to a harsher punishment than was imposed when he or 
18 
 
she pleaded guilty.  Either way, defendants wrongly would bear 
the burden of a systemic lapse that, in the circumstances of the 
Hinton drug lab, we have said is entirely attributable to the 
government, even though there is no indication that prosecutors 
had actual knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct during their 
prosecutions of the Dookhan defendants.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 
347-352.  Were it not for Dookhan's actions, defendants would 
not be in the position of having to seek postconviction relief 
from her malfeasance in the first instance.  Moreover, it cannot 
be overlooked that many Dookhan defendants already have served 
the sentences to which they and the Commonwealth agreed.  A 
return to the status quo ante simply is not a legally tenable 
solution, given that "[w]e must account for the due process 
rights of defendants . . . [and] the integrity of the criminal 
justice system."  Scott, supra at 352.  The proper solution is 
one that takes into consideration the interests of the Dookhan 
defendants and the Commonwealth, recognizing that "in the wake 
of government misconduct that has cast a shadow over the entire 
criminal justice system, it is most appropriate that the benefit 
of our remedy inure to defendants."  Id.  See Lavallee v. 
Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 246 
(2004). 
 
A plea bargain often has been compared to an enforceable 
contract.  See Commonwealth v. Tirrell, 382 Mass. 502, 512 
19 
 
(1981); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 610, 611 (2004).  
"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part 
of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled."  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  
See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) 
("the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance 
must be met by prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining").  We 
have said that "when the prosecutor enters into plea bargain 
agreements, 'the court will see that due regard is paid to them, 
and that the public faith which has been pledged by him is duly 
kept.'"  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 394 Mass. 25, 28 (1985), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Benton, 356 Mass. 447, 448 (1969).  See 
Cruz, supra at 612; Doe v. District Attorney for the Plymouth 
Dist., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 673 (1991).  See also Reporters' 
Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1491-1492 (LexisNexis 2014-
2015). 
 
Here, before the revelation of Dookhan's misconduct, the 
petitioners and the Commonwealth entered into plea agreements 
that both parties considered to be mutually advantageous and 
fair.  The petitioners agreed to waive various constitutional 
rights associated with proceeding to trial, and to relieve the 
Commonwealth of its burden of proving the petitioners' guilt 
20 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 447 Mass. 
625, 628 (2006) (guilty plea constitutes waiver of three 
constitutional rights:  right to jury trial, right to confront 
one's accusers, and privilege against self-incrimination).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 468 (2015) ("In a 
criminal case, due process requires that the Commonwealth prove 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").  In exchange, 
the Commonwealth agreed to reduce the charges against the 
petitioners,18 and, consequently, the sentences that would be 
imposed by a judge.  Any subsequent motions to withdraw those 
guilty pleas must be viewed as an inevitable result of the 
disclosure of Dookhan's misconduct.  That being the case, the 
Commonwealth cannot simply reprosecute the petitioners as if the 
plea agreements had never existed, thereby giving the 
Commonwealth a second bite at the proverbial apple in its 
efforts to convict the petitioners.  Instead, the Commonwealth 
must be held to the terms of its plea agreements.19 
                     
 
18 It does not appear from the record that the charges 
against Creach actually were reduced as a consequence of his 
plea agreement with the Commonwealth.  That said, the writing on 
the tender of plea form is virtually unreadable. 
 
 
19 In those cases where Dookhan defendants have completed 
service of their sentences, the Commonwealth has obtained the 
full benefit of its plea agreements.  If, following a Dookhan 
defendant's successful withdrawal of a guilty plea, the 
Commonwealth could reinstate previously dismissed charges that 
carry mandatory minimum sentences and reprosecute a defendant on 
all of the charges, the Commonwealth ultimately could benefit 
21 
 
 
Therefore, we hold that in cases in which a defendant seeks 
to withdraw a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) as a 
result of the revelation of Dookhan's misconduct, and where the 
motion is allowed, the defendant cannot (1) be charged with a 
more serious offense than that of which he or she initially was 
convicted under the terms of a plea agreement; and (2) if 
convicted again, cannot be given a more severe sentence than 
that which originally was imposed.  In essence, a defendant's 
sentence is capped at what it was under the plea agreement.  See 
Ferrara v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 108, 111 (D. Mass. 
2005), aff'd, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006) (when determining 
proper remedy for government misconduct, "[t]he court's goal is 
to fashion a remedy that will, as much as possible, place [the 
defendant] in the position that he would have been in if the 
government had not violated his constitutional right to [d]ue 
[p]rocess").  Our holding will enable the Commonwealth to 
reprosecute defendants as appropriate, such as where there is 
sufficient untainted evidence for the Commonwealth to satisfy 
its burden of proving the charged crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  At the same time, our holding also will safeguard the 
integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that 
                                                                  
from Dookhan's misconduct.  Successful reprosecution of a 
defendant could result in the imposition of a longer sentence.  
Even if the Commonwealth's reprosecution were not successful, 
such a defendant already would have served the agreed-upon 
sentence under the previous plea agreement. 
22 
 
defendants may challenge convictions of drug crimes based on 
tainted evidence. 
 
3.  Undue delay in postconviction relief.  The petitioners 
assert that the Commonwealth has violated their due process 
rights by unduly delaying the provision of postconviction relief 
to Dookhan defendants.  They point out that, among other lapses, 
there is no comprehensive list of docket numbers identifying all 
of the cases in which Dookhan served as either the primary or 
secondary chemist,20 and that lawyers have not yet been appointed 
for approximately 30,000 individuals.  In the petitioners' view, 
these delays have been prejudicial because the Dookhan 
defendants must contend with the ongoing uncertainties over and 
the collateral consequences of their purportedly tainted 
convictions.  The petitioners propose that we order the 
following relief:  (1) the Commonwealth should be given ninety 
days to notify individual defendants, or their counsel, whether 
                     
 
20 The petitioners acknowledge that in September, 2014, the 
district attorneys for the Suffolk and Essex Districts provided 
CPCS with docket numbers for the cases from Suffolk and Essex 
Counties, respectively, in which Dookhan analyzed the drug 
samples as either the primary or secondary chemist.  We are 
aware that since the oral argument in this case, the district 
attorneys for the Bristol and Norfolk Districts also have 
provided to CPCS docket numbers for such cases in their 
respective counties.  Other district attorneys, including those 
for the Cape and Islands, Middlesex, and Plymouth Districts, 
have not done so. 
 
23 
 
it intends to reprosecute their cases;21 (2) defendants who do 
not receive such notification within ninety days will be 
entitled to have their convictions vacated with prejudice; and 
(3) if timely notice is provided, the Commonwealth will have six 
months to bring the cases to trial or to conclude them with 
guilty pleas. 
 
With regard to the matter of undue delay, "[t]he guaranty 
of a speedy trial set forth in the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution (and art. 11 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights) is not read as applying to the appellate 
process."  Commonwealth v. Lee, 394 Mass. 209, 220 (1985), 
quoting Williams, petitioner, 378 Mass. 623, 625 (1979).  
However, this court has said that "deliberate blocking of 
appellate rights or inordinate and prejudicial delay without a 
defendant's consent, may rise to the level of constitutional 
error."  Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268, 279-280 (1975).  
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 400 Mass. 676, 684 (1987).  "The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be 
heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), quoting Armstrong 
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).  See Paquette v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 131 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1150 (2004).  We recognize that an inordinate delay in resolving 
                     
 
21 See note 5, supra. 
24 
 
the Hinton drug lab cases may result in a loss of liberty if an 
incarcerated defendant's conviction is overturned, and "may 
entail anxiety, forfeiture of opportunity, and damage to 
reputation, among other conceivable injuries."  Williams, 
petitioner, supra at 626.  At the same time, our response to 
Dookhan's misconduct necessarily requires consideration of not 
only "the due process rights of defendants," but also "the 
integrity of the criminal justice system, the efficient 
administration of justice in responding to such potentially 
broad-ranging misconduct, and the myriad public interests at 
stake."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 352. 
 
Given the unprecedented circumstances surrounding the 
debacle at the Hinton drug lab, and the substantial efforts that 
are being made to deal with the impact of Dookhan's misconduct 
on affected defendants, we conclude that, at this juncture, any 
delays in the provision of postconviction relief do not "rise to 
the level of constitutional error."  Swenson, 368 Mass. at 280.  
Our decisions in Scott, see note 6, supra, and Charles22 have 
                     
 
22 In Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (2013), this 
court concluded that, "[i]n exceptional circumstances, a judge 
of the Superior Court [has] the authority to allow a defendant's 
motion to stay the execution of his sentence, then being served, 
pending disposition of the defendant's motion for a new trial."  
Id. at 79.  We further concluded that special magistrates have 
the authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 47, 378 Mass. 923 (1979), 
to conduct guilty plea colloquies with defendants in special 
drug lab sessions, and to report their findings concerning such 
issues as the voluntariness of the proposed plea and the factual 
25 
 
provided Dookhan defendants and the Commonwealth with meaningful 
solutions for addressing concerns that have arisen as defendants 
attempt to challenge their drug convictions.  In particular, the 
special evidentiary rule that we created in Scott is designed to 
enable a defendant "to establish the requisite nexus between 
egregious government wrongdoing and the defendant's [own] case" 
and to "relieve the trial courts of the administrative burden of 
making duplicative and time-consuming findings in potentially 
thousands of new trial motions regarding the nature and extent 
of Dookhan's wrongdoing."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 353.  Affidavits 
from assistant district attorneys in the Bristol, Essex, 
Middlesex, Norfolk, and Suffolk Districts regarding the progress 
of motions for new trials or motions to withdraw guilty pleas 
filed by Dookhan defendants suggest that they are being resolved 
at a steady pace.23 
 
That said, we recognize that there has been some delay in 
providing Dookhan defendants with postconviction relief given 
                                                                  
basis for the plea to a presiding justice of the Superior Court.  
See id. at 66, 85-87, 89-91. 
 
23 These affidavits are included in the Commonwealth's 
supplemental appendix, which is not a part of the record in this 
case.  The Commonwealth has not filed a motion to supplement the 
record.  At the same time, the petitioners have not filed a 
motion to strike the Commonwealth's supplemental appendix.  On 
October 7, 2014, CPCS filed its own motion to supplement the 
record pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e), as amended, 378 Mass. 
932 (1979).  See note 27, infra.  In light of our decision to 
allow the motion filed by CPCS, see id., and in the interest of 
fairness, we shall consider the Commonwealth's supplemental 
appendix to be a part of the record in this case. 
26 
 
their reluctance to file motions to withdraw their guilty pleas 
because of fears that they will be reprosecuted on more serious 
charges and will face harsher punishments than resulted from 
their plea agreements.  Here, for example, neither Bridgeman nor 
Creach has filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  Our 
decision today should alleviate those fears and remove a 
significant impediment to further proceedings pertaining to 
their convictions. 
 
We also realize that efforts to provide postconviction 
relief to Dookhan defendants have been hampered by the inability 
of CPCS to ascertain which cases may have been tainted by 
Dookhan's misconduct.  The ability of CPCS to identify clients 
and to assign them attorneys who will represent their interests 
in postconviction proceedings is crucial to the administration 
of justice in the Hinton drug lab cases.24  During earlier 
proceedings in this case in the county court, the Commonwealth 
commendably provided the single justice and CPCS with the docket 
numbers (and other relevant identifying information) of the 
Suffolk County and Essex County cases in which Dookhan analyzed 
the drug samples as either the primary or secondary chemist.  
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), 426 Mass. 1397 (1998) ("The 
prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure 
                     
 
24 We focus here on CPCS, but recognize that not all Dookhan 
defendants were represented by CPCS attorneys. 
27 
 
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense . . .").  While recognizing that only the 
district attorneys for the Suffolk and Essex Districts currently 
are parties to this case, we encourage the district attorneys 
for the districts in other counties in which Dookhan analyzed 
drug samples as either the primary or secondary chemist to 
assist the single justice in obtaining docket numbers (and other 
relevant identifying information) for those cases.  See note 20, 
supra. 
 
4.  Motion to intervene by CPCS.  We begin with some 
pertinent background.  On March 12, 2013, CPCS filed a motion to 
intervene in earlier litigation arising as a consequence of 
Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton drug lab.  See Commonwealth 
vs. Charles, No. SJ-2013-0066, S.C., Commonwealth v. Charles, 
466 Mass. 63 (2013).  Among other reasons for its motion, CPCS 
sought to "preserve its clients' due process rights to the just 
and timely resolution of the many thousands of previously-
adjudicated cases tainted by the systemic malfeasance and 
incompetence at the Hinton Drug Lab" and to "advocate for 
remedies that [would] restore the integrity of the criminal 
justice system."  A single justice denied the motion, without 
prejudice to renewal, concluding that it was premature in light 
of the ongoing investigations of the Hinton drug lab by Attorney 
28 
 
David Meier and by the office of the Inspector General.  The 
single justice stated that CPCS would have an opportunity to 
renew its motion "at an appropriate time."  In the view of CPCS, 
now is the appropriate time for intervention on the side of the 
petitioners. 
 
On May 27, 2014, CPCS filed its motion to intervene in the 
present case pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a).25  CPCS agrees 
with and supports the positions taken by the petitioners.  It 
contends that tens of thousands of defendants who pleaded guilty 
to various drug offenses without any knowledge of Dookhan's 
misconduct require the assistance of counsel to secure relief 
from the violation of their due process rights, and CPCS 
inevitably will be called on to provide (or already is 
providing) representation.  Beyond the issues raised by the 
petitioners, CPCS asserts that its ability to assign counsel for 
Dookhan defendants has been hindered by the position taken by 
prosecutors in at least one county that a lawyer who represented 
a defendant at the plea stage of criminal proceedings may not 
thereafter represent and testify on behalf of that defendant at 
a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea without 
                     
 
25 As acknowledged by CPCS, its motion to intervene does not 
delve into our jurisprudence on intervention.  Nonetheless, CPCS 
has incorporated by reference the legal arguments that it made 
in its prior motion to intervene, filed on March 12, 2013, and 
that earlier motion has been included in the record of the 
present case. 
 
29 
 
violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7 (a), 426 Mass. 1396 (1998) 
(advocate-witness rule).26  In the view of CPCS, such "dual role 
representation" should be permitted.  CPCS also asserts that 
Dookhan defendants are concerned about pursing postconviction 
relief because special magistrates, at hearings on motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas, have permitted wide-ranging cross-
examination of defendants regarding their factual guilt.27  CPCS 
                     
 
26 Rule 3.7 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 426 Mass. 1396 (1998), provides, in pertinent part, 
that "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which 
the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where 
. . . disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client." 
 
 
27 With respect to this issue, on October 7, 2014, CPCS 
filed a motion to supplement the record pursuant to Mass. R. A. 
P. 8 (e).  It seeks to include in the record the transcript of a 
hearing before a special magistrate and other papers from 
Commonwealth vs. Cruz, Superior Ct., SUCR2009-10595 (Suffolk 
County).  CPCS asserts that these papers are relevant to the 
question of the permissible scope of cross-examination when a 
Dookhan defendant testifies in support of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea.  Defense attorneys have taken the position that 
cross-examination on the facts of the case should be limited to 
the defendant's understanding of the nature and extent of the 
prosecution's evidence.  Prosecutors have argued that the "full 
context" of a defendant's plea decision under Scott, 467 Mass. 
at 357, opens the door to an inquiry encompassing the 
defendant's factual guilt.  According to CPCS, rulings by 
special magistrates on this issue have varied widely.  For 
example, in the Cruz case, supra, the special magistrate 
permitted the prosecutor, over objection, to cross-examine the 
defendant about his culpability for two drug offenses -- what he 
had done, said, and known regarding the alleged contraband in 
question -- and to ask the defendant whether he had pleaded 
guilty because, in fact, he was guilty.  In the view of CPCS, 
the inclusion of these papers in the record will assist this 
court in deciding whether the testimony of a Dookhan defendant 
at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea can be used 
30 
 
takes the position that the testimony of a Dookhan defendant at 
such a hearing should be deemed inadmissible in any subsequent 
reprosecution of the defendant, except for perjury.28  The 
Commonwealth opposes CPCS's motion to intervene on the grounds 
that the interests of CPCS are adequately represented by the 
petitioners, CPCS has not shown that it has other interests that 
would be impaired by the disposition of the petition for relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and CPCS seeks relief beyond the scope 
of the petition. 
 
Rule 24 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 
Mass. 769 (1974), provides: 
 
"(a) Intervention of Right.  Upon timely application 
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:  (1) 
when a statute of the Commonwealth confers an unconditional 
right to intervene or (2) when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action and [the applicant] is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede [the applicant's] ability 
                                                                  
in a subsequent reprosecution of the defendant.  The 
Commonwealth has not filed an objection to CPCS's motion to 
supplement the record, and the single justice included the 
motion as part of her reservation and report to the full court.  
Because the transcript and other papers from the Cruz case 
provide helpful background information on this issue, we allow 
the motion to supplement the record. 
 
 
28 CPCS has raised several additional issues in its motion 
to intervene.  However, in a letter to the single justice dated 
September 26, 2014, CPCS limited the issues that it wanted 
reserved and reported to the full court to those that we have 
mentioned. 
 
31 
 
to protect that interest, unless [such] interest is 
adequately represented by existing parties."29 
 
Judges have "broad discretion in deciding whether to permit 
intervention."  Cruz Mgt. Co. v. Thomas, 417 Mass. 782, 785 
(1994).  See Corcoran v. Wigglesworth Mach. Co., 389 Mass. 1002, 
1003 (1983). 
 
Intervention should be allowed as of right when "(1) the 
applicant claims an interest in the subject of the action, and 
(2) [the applicant] is situated so that [its] ability to protect 
this interest may be impaired as a practical matter by the 
disposition of the action, and (3) [the applicant's] interest is 
not adequately represented by the existing parties."30  
Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. School Comm. of 
Chelsea, 409 Mass. 203, 205 (1991) (Massachusetts Fed'n of 
Teachers).  Given that rule 24 (a) (2) "does not articulate 
explicit criteria for determining the sufficiency of the 
asserted interest," appellate courts "have agreed that a 
'flexible, rather than rigid approach is indicated,' and that 
                     
 
29 CPCS has not identified the subsection of Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 24 (a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974), on which it bases its motion.  
In the absence of an apparent statutory right to intervene, we 
shall assume that CPCS is relying on rule 24 (a) (2). 
 
 
30 Given that CPCS filed an earlier motion to intervene that 
was denied as premature, we need not consider the threshold 
question whether the present motion is timely.  See Corcoran v. 
Wigglesworth Mach. Co., 389 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1983); Bolden v. 
O'Connor Café of Worcester, Inc., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 61 
(2000). 
32 
 
'the requirement should be viewed as a prerequisite rather than 
relied upon as a determinative criterion for intervention.'"  
Bolden v. O'Connor Café of Worcester, Inc., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 
56, 62 (2000), quoting Cosby v. Department of Social Servs., 32 
Mass. App. Ct. 392, 395-396 (1992).  The United States Supreme 
Court has stated that the interest in the litigation must be 
"significantly protectable," Donaldson v. United States, 400 
U.S. 517, 531 (1971), and it "must be sufficiently direct and 
immediate to justify the intervention."  Bolden, supra.  See 
Johnson Turf & Golf Mgt., Inc. v. Beverly, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 
386, 390 (2004).  An interest that is "remote" or "contingent" 
or "tangential" or "collateral" will not suffice.  Bolden, 
supra.  "In the end, however, there is 'no convenient rule of 
thumb' which we can employ [in deciding whether the interest 
prerequisite has been satisfied], . . . and we are thrown back 
upon the need for a practical, case-specific, fact-intensive 
analysis."  Id., quoting Mayflower Dev. Corp. v. Dennis, 11 
Mass. App. Ct. 630, 635 (1981). 
 
We add that "the 'interest' requirement should be viewed 
more leniently in cases that, as here, implicate questions of 
public interest" and the potential impairment of such interest.  
Johnson Turf & Golf Mgt., Inc., supra.  See, e.g., Cruz Mgt. 
Co., 417 Mass. at 786 (Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
[MHFA] allowed to intervene in case raising "significant 
33 
 
question of how damages should be calculated in an action for a 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability brought by a 
tenant who [was] the beneficiary of rent subsidies" paid by MHFA 
because, as administrator of so-called "Section 8" program, MHFA 
was proper party to raise concerns about impact of litigation on 
that program); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. 
Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 468-469, 479 n.13, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
868 (1994) (Attorney General allowed to intervene in name of 
Commonwealth to represent public interest in civil rights action 
involving access to facilities providing abortion counselling or 
services); Cosby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. at 396-397 (labor union 
allowed to intervene as of right in litigation between several 
members and employer where union had strong interest in 
balancing conflicting policies underlying seniority provisions 
and affirmative action requirements of collective bargaining 
agreement, in preserving integrity of grievance process, and in 
ensuring ability to protect interests of all union members). 
 
An applicant for intervention as of right has the burden of 
showing that representation of its interests by an existing 
party will be inadequate.  See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, 
409 Mass. at 206; Attorney Gen. v. Brockton Agric. Soc'y, 390 
Mass. 431, 434 (1983).  "The question whether the prospective 
intervener is adequately represented necessarily turns to a 
comparison of the interests asserted by the applicant and the 
34 
 
existing party."  Mayflower Dev. Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 
636.  See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, supra ("There is no 
single standard for determining when an applicant has carried 
his burden because the circumstances of the case determine the 
weight of that burden").  If the interest of the prospective 
intervener "is identical to that of one of the present parties, 
or if there is a party charged by law with representing his 
interest, then a compelling showing should be required to 
demonstrate why this representation is not adequate."  Mayflower 
Dev. Corp., supra at 637, quoting 7A C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1909, at 524 (1972) (Wright & 
Miller).  See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. 
Attorney Gen., 424 Mass. 586, 599 (1997); Massachusetts Fed'n of 
Teachers, supra at 206-207; Attorney Gen. v. Brockton Agric. 
Soc'y, supra.  If the prospective intervener's interest "is 
similar to, but not identical with that of one of the parties, a 
discriminating judgment is required on the circumstances of the 
particular case, but [the applicant] ordinarily should be 
allowed to intervene unless it is clear that the [existing] 
party will provide adequate representation for the [applicant]."  
Mayflower Dev. Corp., supra, quoting Wright & Miller, supra.  
See Cosby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. at 397-398. 
 
We conclude that CPCS's motion to intervene should be 
allowed.  CPCS is an entity established by statute to "plan, 
35 
 
oversee, and coordinate the delivery of criminal and certain 
noncriminal legal services" to indigent defendants.31  G. L. 
c. 211D, § 1.  It has a substantial and immediate interest in 
these proceedings given its current and future responsibility 
for providing representation to thousands of indigent Dookhan 
defendants who want to pursue postconviction relief from their 
drug convictions.  It cannot be overstated that CPCS has been 
and will be asked to expend significant resources to handle 
countless numbers of these cases.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth that there is some overlap in the matters raised by 
                     
 
31 Pursuant to G. L. c. 211D, § 5, CPCS is required to 
"establish, supervise and maintain a system for the appointment 
or assignment of counsel at any stage of a proceeding, either 
criminal or noncriminal in nature, provided, however, that the 
laws of the commonwealth or the rules of the supreme judicial 
court require that a person in such proceeding be represented by 
counsel; and, provided further, that such person is unable to 
obtain counsel by reason of his indigency."  The Commonwealth 
asserts that G. L. c. 211D does not authorize CPCS to intervene 
on behalf of a broad class of unnamed defendants whom it may or 
may not represent.  Plainly, not all Dookhan defendants will be 
represented by CPCS in the event they seek postconviction 
relief.  Nonetheless, the claims that have been raised in these 
proceedings are fundamental to the mission and responsibilities 
of CPCS, and will impact defendants beyond those currently 
identified as clients of CPCS.  See, e.g., Edwards, petitioner, 
464 Mass. 454, 455, 458 (2013) (CPCS allowed to intervene in 
case deciding whether, in determining reasonable compensation to 
be paid expert retained by indigent petitioner seeking release 
from commitment as sexually dangerous person, judge is bound by 
hourly rate set by CPCS); Adoption of Meaghan, 461 Mass. 1006, 
1006 (2012) (CPCS allowed to intervene to seek ruling whether 
father and child entitled to appointed counsel in case initiated 
by private parties involving termination of parental rights).  
For these reasons, the fact that CPCS has moved to intervene on 
behalf of a broad class of unnamed individuals is not a bar to 
the allowance of its motion. 
36 
 
CPCS and the petitioners, especially with regard to the issue of 
exposure to harsher punishment.  However, the interests of CPCS 
go well beyond those articulated by the petitioners. 
 
CPCS is in the position of having to provide representation 
to Dookhan defendants in eight counties, and, as such, it has a 
compelling interest in advocating for uniform practices and 
solutions that will ensure consistent treatment for all of those 
defendants, irrespective of their individual jurisdictions.  
Limiting our review in this case to the specific concerns raised 
by the petitioners will hamper the timely ability of CPCS to 
address wider problems that inevitably have arisen as Dookhan 
defendants consider whether to pursue postconviction relief.  
The interests of CPCS are not and cannot be adequately 
represented by the petitioners.  At the same time, contrary to 
the Commonwealth's assertion, CPCS is not attempting improperly 
to interject in these proceedings matters that are independent 
from or wholly unrelated to the relief sought by the 
petitioners.  Contrast Coggins v. New England Patriots Football 
Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 539 (1986); Rothberg v. 
Schmiedeskamp, 334 Mass. 172, 178 (1956).  The additional issues 
raised by CPCS are directly connected to its ability to provide 
representation for Dookhan defendants and to its assessment of 
the benefits of pursing postconviction relief for those 
individuals.  At this juncture, it is appropriate that CPCS, 
37 
 
which will be shouldering much of the burden for attempting to 
resolve the Hinton drug lab cases, be permitted to intervene in 
the present case. 
 
5.  Global remedy.  CPCS contends that, in accordance with 
our broad powers of superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
this court should implement a "global remedy" to resolve, once 
and for all, the tens of thousands of cases affected by 
Dookhan's egregious misconduct at the Hinton drug lab.  In the 
view of CPCS, the time and expense of proceeding on a case-by-
case basis has become untenable.  Therefore, it proposes a two-
part solution.  First, CPCS asserts that this court should 
vacate the convictions of all Dookhan defendants.  Second, it 
continues, this court should dismiss all such cases with 
prejudice or, in the alternative, give the Commonwealth a 
limited opportunity to reprosecute individual cases in which 
there is sufficient untainted evidence to prove the drug charges 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Those cases that are not 
reprosecuted within one year, CPCS asserts, should be dismissed 
with prejudice in accordance with the speedy trial rule, Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (D), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996). 
 
We decline to implement a global remedy at this time.  As 
we have said, our decisions in Scott and Charles have provided 
Dookhan defendants and the Commonwealth with meaningful 
solutions for addressing concerns that have arisen as these 
38 
 
defendants attempt to challenge their drug convictions.  Our 
decision today will go a long way in resolving additional 
concerns that have surfaced and in moving these cases forward 
towards resolution.  We stated in Scott, 467 Mass. at 352, that 
when fashioning a workable approach for handling these cases, we 
must "account for the due process rights of defendants, the 
integrity of the criminal justice system, the efficient 
administration of justice in responding to such potentially 
broad-ranging misconduct, and the myriad public interests at 
stake."  We also noted that while "[i]t certainly is true that 
we cannot expect defendants to bear the burden of a systemic 
lapse, . . . we also cannot allow the misconduct of one person 
to dictate an abrupt retreat from the fundamentals of our 
criminal justice system."  Id. at 354 n.11, and cases cited.  In 
our view, the implementation of a "one size fits all" approach 
is not presently a workable solution. 
 
6.  Advocate-witness rule.  CPCS asserts that, by 
necessity, the vast majority of its assignments of counsel to 
Dookhan defendants for the pursuit of postconviction relief have 
been to the same attorneys who handled the defendants' guilty 
pleas.  However, according to CPCS, prosecutors in at least one 
county have objected to this dual role representation, arguing 
that it is prohibited by Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7 (a).  CPCS 
contends that, given the urgent need for timely resolution of 
39 
 
innumerable Hinton drug lab cases, rule 3.7 (a) should not 
disqualify a lawyer who represented a Dookhan defendant at the 
plea stage of criminal proceedings from subsequently 
representing that defendant and testifying at an evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  We 
agree. 
 
Rule 3.7 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct states, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer shall not act 
as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where . . . disqualification of the 
lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client" (emphasis 
added).  In Smaland Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 214, 
219-226 (2012) (Smaland), this court discussed the purposes and 
scope of attorney disqualification under rule 3.7 (a).  We 
stated that "[t]he primary purpose of the rule is 'to prevent 
the jury as fact finder from becoming confused by the 
combination of the roles of attorney and witness.'"  Id. at 220, 
quoting Steinert v. Steinert, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 287, 291 (2008).  
See comment [2] to rule 3.7 ("A witness is required to testify 
on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is 
expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others.  It 
may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness 
should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof").  In 
addition, rule 3.7 (a) obviates the possibility that a lawyer 
40 
 
"will appear to vouch for his own credibility," Culebras Enters. 
Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1988); mitigates 
the perception that "the testifying lawyer may well be 
distorting the truth for the sake of his client," id.; and 
"relieves the opposing counsel of the difficult task of cross-
examining his lawyer-adversary."  Smaland, 461 Mass. at 220.  
See Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 786-787 (1979); Serody v. 
Serody, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 413-414 (1985).  Weighing against 
these benefits is the substantial countervailing fact that rule 
3.7 (a) "carries with it the severe consequence of stripping a 
party of chosen counsel."  Smaland, supra.  See Commonwealth v. 
Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 853 & n.15 (2008) (criminal defendant 
generally enjoys right to be represented by counsel of own 
choosing). 
 
Significantly, we pointed out in Smaland, 461 Mass. at 225, 
that rule 3.7 (a), by its plain language, prohibits a lawyer 
from acting as both an advocate and a necessary witness "at 
trial."  There, the court analyzed the prohibitions of rule 3.7 
(a) in the context of a lawyer-witness's pretrial representation 
of his clients and concluded that "an attorney considered to be 
a necessary witness may participate in pretrial proceedings, 
though it would be particularly prudent first to secure client 
consent after consultation."  Smaland, supra at 226.  We 
determined that such a reading of rule 3.7 (a) "adheres to its 
41 
 
text and fulfils its underlying purposes."  Id.  Concerns about 
potential jury confusion, cross-examination of a lawyer-
adversary, and the appearance of impropriety "are absent or, at 
least, greatly reduced, when the lawyer-witness does not act as 
trial counsel, even if he performs behind-the-scenes work for 
the client in the same case."  Id., quoting Culebras Enters. 
Corp., 846 F.2d at 100. 
 
Relying on the plain language of rule 3.7 (a), and 
considering the context in which dual role representation has 
arisen vis-à-vis the Hinton drug lab cases, we conclude that the 
rule does not bar such representation.  The request by CPCS to 
proceed with dual role representation does not involve plea 
counsel acting as both an advocate and a necessary witness "at 
trial."  To the contrary, plea counsel will be acting in those 
capacities during a motion proceeding before a judge.  There 
will be no jury that might become "confused by the combination 
of the roles of attorney and witness."  Steinert, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 291.  To the extent that plea counsel may be in the 
position of having to comment on his or her own credibility, the 
judge is amply able to make the necessary credibility 
determinations without being swayed by any improper 
considerations.  Apart from the defendant, plea counsel is 
likely the only individual who can attest to the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant's decision to plead guilty, and such 
42 
 
testimony is critical to the judge's decision whether to allow a 
motion to vacate a guilty plea.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 354-355 
("the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that 
he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Dookhan's 
misconduct").  At the time of plea negotiations, neither the 
defendant nor plea counsel could have imagined the events that 
later would unfold at the Hinton drug lab, or entertained the 
thought that plea counsel would be called as a witness at a 
subsequent proceeding.  See comment [4] to rule 3.7 ("It is 
relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that 
the lawyer would probably be a witness").  Given the numbers of 
Dookhan defendants and of attorneys able to represent them, 
having plea counsel continue their representation of former 
clients is a sensible approach for resolving these cases in a 
timely and efficient manner.  Plea counsel already will be 
familiar with a defendant's case and can expeditiously work 
toward bringing it to a conclusion. 
 
We recognized in Smaland, 461 Mass. at 227 n.20, that 
"combining the roles of advocate and witness may create a 
conflict of interest [as] governed by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, 426 
Mass. 1373 (1998) (conflict of interest), or Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.9, 426 Mass. 1342 (1998) (prior representation)."  See comment 
[1] and [5] to rule 3.7.  The Commonwealth asserts that dual 
role representation presents a conflict of interest because the 
43 
 
Commonwealth likely will elicit information from counsel that is 
harmful to a defendant, particularly an admission that, apart 
from the drug certificate, the evidence against the defendant 
was strong.  See Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 Mass. 16, 21 
(1986) ("A genuine conflict of interest arises whenever trial 
counsel is called upon to give testimony adverse to his 
client").  Determining the existence of a conflict of interest 
is "primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved," 
comment [5] to rule 3.7, and is a matter for discussion with the 
client.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (b) (2).  A defendant may 
consent to dual role representation notwithstanding a conflict 
of interest.  See id; comment [5] to rule 1.7.  See also 
Perkins, 450 Mass. at 853.  We conclude that Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.7 (a) does not bar dual role representation of a Dookhan 
defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, 
although "it would be particularly prudent first to secure 
client consent after consultation."32  Smaland, 461 Mass. at 226.  
Ultimately, as acknowledged by CPCS, the decision whether to 
                     
 
32 We add that, in light of our conclusion, dual role 
representation at a Dookhan defendant's hearing on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea also does not run afoul of Rule 12 of the 
Rules of the Superior Court 1017 (LexisNexis 2014-2015), which 
states:  "No attorney shall be permitted to take part in the 
conduct of a trial in which he has been or intends to be a 
witness for his client, except by special leave of the court" 
(emphasis added). 
44 
 
continue with plea counsel or request the appointment of a new 
attorney should remain in the hands of the defendant. 
 
7.  Scope of testimony by Dookhan defendants.  Finally, 
CPCS raises two related claims pertaining to the testimony of a 
Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea.  First, CPCS contends that cross-examination of a 
defendant should not be permitted to delve into the defendant's 
guilt or innocence of the underlying crime, unless the defendant 
asserts a claim of actual innocence.  As we understand its 
argument, CPCS does not seek to preclude cross-examination 
regarding the alleged facts of a given case, acknowledging that 
the Commonwealth should be free to question the defendant about 
his or her assessment of the nature and strength of the evidence 
against the defendant.  However, CPCS wants to prevent the 
Commonwealth from turning the defendant's request for 
postconviction relief into what CPCS views as a game of 
"gotcha," where the Commonwealth's strategy is to ask the 
defendant about his or her guilt (and presumably elicit a 
response that he or she is not guilty) and then argue that the 
defendant is a liar because the defendant's testimony at the 
motion hearing contradicts his or her testimony from the plea 
colloquy.  CPCS asserts that allowing the Commonwealth to pursue 
this line of cross-examination is unfair and prejudicial.  
Therefore, it continues, this court should limit the scope of 
45 
 
cross-examination to questions concerning the defendant's 
knowledge about the Commonwealth's evidence at the time he or 
she pleaded guilty.  We decline to adopt CPCS's proposed 
evidentiary rule. 
 
As CPCS correctly points out, a Dookhan defendant at a 
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "must demonstrate 
a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty 
had he known of Dookhan's misconduct."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 355.  
"Ultimately, a defendant's decision to tender a guilty plea is a 
unique, individualized decision, and the relevant factors and 
their relative weight will differ from one case to the next."  
Id. at 356.  We have emphasized that "the full context of the 
defendant's decision to enter a plea agreement will dictate the 
assessment of his claim that knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct 
would have influenced [his] decision to plead guilty."  Id. at 
357.  A judge's determination whether a defendant has made the 
necessary showing will be based on "the totality of the 
circumstances."  Id. at 358. 
 
It is well established that the scope and extent of cross-
examination is left to a judge's broad discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 Mass. 440, 447 (2013); Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 431 Mass. 535, 538 (2000).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 192 (1990), S.C., 430 Mass. 348 (1999), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Underwood, 358 Mass. 506, 513 (1970) 
46 
 
(judge determines extent to which "the accuracy, veracity, and 
credibility of a witness may be tested" on cross-examination).  
Consequently, whether the Commonwealth should be allowed to 
cross-examine a defendant on his or her guilt or innocence of 
the underlying crime is a matter for the motion judge to decide.  
If permitted, the judge can assess the Commonwealth's arguments 
about the defendant's truthfulness in the context of defense 
counsel's countervailing arguments about the essential reasons 
for the defendant's guilty plea.  Judges are aware that, on 
occasion, defendants have an incentive to plead guilty for 
reasons other than actual guilt, including to avoid the 
imposition of mandatory minimum sentences in the event they are 
found guilty after trial.  See Commonwealth v. Nikas, 431 Mass. 
453, 455 (2000), and cases cited. 
 
Second, and dovetailing with the issue just discussed, CPCS 
contends that the testimony of a Dookhan defendant at a hearing 
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea should not be admissible 
at a subsequent trial on the defendant's guilt.  In the view of 
CPCS, the Commonwealth cannot put a defendant in the position of 
having to surrender the privilege against self-incrimination in 
order to secure the allowance of the motion, and then turn 
around and use the defendant's testimony from the motion hearing 
against the defendant at trial.  If such testimony is admissible 
at trial, CPCS continues, defendants will be deterred from 
47 
 
seeking postconviction relief in the first place.  CPCS argues 
that, in light of Dookhan's egregious misconduct, this result 
would be inherently unfair.33 
 
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court considered the issue whether a 
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing regarding his 
standing to allege a violation of his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution could be admitted 
against him at trial on the question of his guilt or innocence.  
See id. at 382, 389-390.  Given that the defendant would be 
obliged either to give up a valid Fourth Amendment claim, or 
effectively waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court found it "intolerable that one 
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to 
assert another."  Id. at 394.  Accordingly, the Court held that 
"when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress 
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not 
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of 
guilt unless he makes no objection."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 637 (1997) (recognizing rule articulated 
in Simmons). 
                     
 
33 The Commonwealth asserts that this issue is not ripe for 
review because the harm alleged by CPCS is hypothetical.  For 
the reasons already articulated, we conclude that it is 
appropriate to consider CPCS's claim now in accordance with our 
broad powers of superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
48 
 
 
Here, although the rights asserted by a Dookhan defendant 
are somewhat different from those in Simmons, we reach a similar 
conclusion.  A defendant has a "constitutional due process right 
to a fair trial."  Commonwealth v. Henderson, 411 Mass. 309, 310 
(1991).  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 352.  See also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).  For a Dookhan defendant, 
the ability to exercise the right to a fair trial is contingent, 
in the first instance, on the allowance of a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea.  However, the allowance of such a motion may 
depend in significant measure on the defendant's willingness to 
sacrifice the privilege against self-incrimination to enable the 
motion judge to assess the full context of the defendant's 
decision to plead guilty.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 357.  
Alternatively, a Dookhan defendant can sacrifice the right to a 
fair trial by asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination at the hearing, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that his or her motion to withdraw a guilty plea will 
be denied.  Having to make this choice places the defendant in 
an untenable position.  On the one hand, the defendant is 
compelled to be a witness against himself or herself in order to 
obtain relief from egregious government misconduct that may well 
have tainted his or her conviction.  On the other hand, the 
defendant is deterred from pursuing his or her postconviction 
rights under Scott by not seeking to withdraw the guilty plea, 
49 
 
thereby perpetuating the injustice arising from Dookhan's 
misconduct.  The relief afforded by the allowance of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea would be illusory if the Commonwealth 
then could turn around and use the defendant's testimony against 
him or her at trial.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
testimony of a Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is only admissible at a subsequent trial 
for impeachment purposes if the defendant chooses to testify.34  
See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. at 637, and cases cited 
(rule articulated in Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, "has not been 
applied to exclude the use of prior inconsistent statements for 
impeachment purposes"). 
 
8.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that (1) a defendant who has been granted a new trial based on 
Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton drug lab cannot be charged 
with a more serious offense than that of which he or she 
initially was convicted under the terms of a plea agreement and, 
if convicted again, cannot be given a more severe sentence than 
that which originally was imposed; (2) the motion to intervene 
filed by CPCS is allowed; (3) a so-called "global remedy" will 
not be implemented at this time; (4) a lawyer who represented a 
Dookhan defendant at the plea stage of criminal proceedings is 
                     
 
34 In accordance with Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (f), as appearing 
in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004), statements made by a Dookhan defendant 
at a plea colloquy are not admissible at a subsequent trial. 
50 
 
not barred by the advocate-witness rule from subsequently 
representing that defendant and testifying at an evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea; (5) 
the scope of cross-examination of a Dookhan defendant at a 
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the 
broad discretion of the motion judge; and (6) the testimony of a 
Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is only admissible at a subsequent trial for impeachment 
purposes if the defendant chooses to testify.  The case is 
remanded to the single justice for further proceedings, 
consistent with this opinion, as appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.