Title: Pitsenbarger v. Pitsenbarger
Citation: 382 N.W.2d 662
Docket Number: 10997
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 1986

382 N.W.2d 662 (1986) Jeffrey T. PITSENBARGER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Dana J. PITSENBARGER, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 10997. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 20, 1986. *663 Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson, Marcil &amp; McLean, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Ronald H. McLean. Stefanson, Landberg, Plambeck &amp; Geeslin, Moorhead, for defendant and appellee; argued by Randolph E. Stefanson. MESCHKE, Justice. Jeffrey J. Pitsenbarger appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court of Cass County following a hearing on motions to modify the custody and support provisions of an original divorce decree. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. Jeffrey and his wife, Dana J. Pitsenbarger, were divorced on December 10, 1982. Jeffrey and Dana have three daughters: Amy, age 12; Jenny, age 7; and Nancy, age 3. The original divorce decree, based upon a stipulated agreement by the parties, placed custody of the children with Dana and gave reasonable visitation rights to Jeffrey. The decree also provided for support payments to Dana with certain conditions. In May 1984, Jeffrey filed a motion requesting the district court to modify the original decree by placing custody of the three children with Jeffrey and providing reasonable visitation rights for Dana. Jeffrey also requested the district court to declare that Jeffrey's support obligation had terminated, because Dana ceased her educational studies for a registered nursing degree to pursue, instead, a degree in elementary education. Dana resisted Jeffrey's request to modify the original custody provision and filed a countermotion to modify the original decree to provide for increased child support payments and to extend the period of time that Dana would receive support payments from Jeffrey. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Jeffrey's request for a change of custody; interpreted the alimony provisions as providing support for Dana through June 1986 conditioned upon Dana being a student and remaining unmarried but not conditioned upon Dana pursuing a curriculum toward a registered nursing degree; and awarded Dana costs and attorney fees in an amount of $5,000 for the modification proceedings. Jeffrey's appeal raises three issues: Jeffrey's motion to modify custody was based primarily upon his assertion that Dana's mental health problems, involving recurrent episodes of major depression, have deteriorated since the divorce so as to warrant a change of custody to Jeffrey in the best interests of the children. Jeffrey also asserted that his remarriage would allow him to provide a more stable and loving environment for the children, and that Dana has been uncooperative regarding Jeffrey's visitation rights and has attempted to instill a negative attitude in the children toward Jeffrey. In addition, Jeffrey expressed concern that the children were experiencing some difficulties in school as a result of Dana's health problems. With regard to Dana's episodes of depression, her treating psychiatrists, Dr. David Sharbo and Dr. Joanne Hofstrand, *664 testified that Dana's illness is under control and that if she should have a recurrence of depression they have found effective treatment methods for her which can be provided on an out-patient basis. Both physicians also testified that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, they believe Dana will be able to continue to parent her children successfully. Dr. Hofstrand testified: A home study evaluation of Dana and the three children was conducted by the Village Family Service Center. That evaluation concluded: The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. In his written report to the court, the guardian ad litem recommended that custody of the three children remain with Dana. The trial court's consideration of a request to modify a custody award requires a determination of whether or not there has been a significant change of circumstances since the original custody award which warrants a change of custody in the best interest of the children. Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666 (N.D.1981). The burden of showing a change of circumstances requiring a change in custody is on the party seeking modification. Miller, supra. On appeal, the trial court's determination on a motion for change of custody will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. Olson v. Olson, 361 N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1985). [2] The trial court determined: Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, we conclude that these findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the court's decision to not modify the original custody award is not clearly erroneous. Jeffrey asserts that the trial court erred in construing the alimony provision of the original decree as requiring him to continue to pay support to Dana even though she has terminated her educational pursuit of a registered nursing degree. The alimony provision of the original decree provides as follows: The trial court construed this provision as requiring Jeffrey to make support payments for a period of 42 months providing that Dana continued to pursue an education even though she did not continue to pursue a curriculum to receive her registered nursing degree. Dana had terminated her pursuit of a registered nursing degree during March 1984 to pursue a course of study for a degree in elementary education. The support provision of the original divorce decree was based upon a contractual stipulation by the parties which is governed by the law of contracts. Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D.1984). The determination of whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide. Brown v. North Dakota State University, 372 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1985). We agree with Jeffrey that his support obligation was unambiguously conditioned upon Dana attending school to pursue a registered nursing degree. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the support provision, and we reverse that portion of the judgment.[1] *666 In her countermotion, Dana requested the court to extend Jeffrey's support obligations on the ground of changed circumstances. The trial court made no findings or conclusions with regard to that issue. In view of our reversal of the trial court's interpretation of the original support provision, we remand with instructions that the trial court make a determination on Dana's request for modification of the original support award on the basis of changed circumstances. Jeffrey also asserts that the trial court erred in awarding Dana attorney fees for the modification proceedings because, Jeffrey contends, there is no statutory or other authority for the court to make such an award. We disagree. Section 14-05-23, N.D.C.C., authorizes the court to award attorney fees "during any time in which an action for divorce is pending." Pursuant to Section 1-02-01, N.D.C.C., statutes "are to be construed liberally" with a view toward effecting their objects and "to promoting justice." This Court has previously concluded that attorney fees can be awarded in the discretion of the trial court, under Section 14-05-23, N.D.C.C., to a party in modification proceedings. Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478 (N.D.1978). We believe that Becker, supra, was a proper application of the law, and, accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding Dana attorney fees for the modification proceedings. Dana requested the trial court to award her attorney fees on appeal. The trial court postponed its ruling on that request pending a final decision by this Court on the merits of the appeal. Although this Court and the trial court have concurrent jurisdiction to award attorney fees on appeal, we have on numerous occasions expressed our preference that the initial determination be made by the trial court. E.g., Routledge v. Routledge, 377 N.W.2d 542 (N.D.1985). Accordingly, we remand this issue to the trial court for consideration of Dana's request for attorney fees on appeal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to proceed in accordance with this opinion. Pursuant to our authority under Rule 39(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, we order that costs for this appeal shall be taxed against Jeffrey. ERICKSTAD, C.J., GIERKE and VANDE WALLE, JJ., and PEDERSON, Surrogate Justice, concur. PEDERSON, Surrogate Justice, sitting in place of LEVINE, J., disqualified. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, concurring specially. I agree with opinion authored by Justice Meschke but feel compelled to express my concern about the manner in which issues relating to ambiguity appear to be first raised at the appellate level. It is not only this case but most suits involve contradictory versions of the meaning of words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs. Mostly the ambiguity relates to the background, and extrinsic evidence is offered without a clear-cut conclusion of law that there is an ambiguity. When the case is tried to the court, as this one was, a finding of fact as *667 to meaning is required, but is usually absent, as in this case. Even though lawyers are reluctant to do so, they would present a better argument on appeal if they would concede at the trial court level that their opponents interpretation is a possibly correct interpretation, by arguing that an ambiguity exists, introduce extrinsic evidence of their own interpretation, and get a finding of fact that would have the presumption of correctness on appeal under Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. [1] Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the support provision in the original decree was ambiguous as to whether Jeffrey's obligation was conditioned upon Dana's pursuit of a registered nursing degree, Dana's own testimony during the hearing on the modification requests demonstrates that she understood the provision to mean that Jeffrey's support obligation would terminate if she discontinued her pursuit of a registered nursing degree: "A. ... II knew of the statement in the decree that said that I must be in the nursing program, so I really tried to stick to it so as not to bebe caught off guard on that one. * * * * * * "Q. Are you receiving that alimony today? "A. No. "Q. Why not? "A. It was discontinued. "Q. By Jeff? "A. By Jeff. "Q. For what reason? Do you know? "A. I think I know. For thebecause it stated in the decree that I needed to be a nursing student at NDSU, in the nursing program there. If I was not, then I had no access to this alimony."