Title: Charles Frederick Acker v. Barbara Drumm Acker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1925
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
_____________ 
No. SC02-1925 
_____________ 
CHARLES FREDERICK ACKER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BARBARA DRUMM ACKER, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 14, 2005] 
 
 
WELLS, J. 
We have for review the decision in Acker v. Acker, 821 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2002), which certified conflict with the decisions in Rogers v. Rogers, 746 
So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Paris v. Paris, 707 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1998); Ellis v. Ellis, 699 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 
79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); and Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1990).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the following 
reasons, we approve the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in the 
instant case and disapprove the decisions of the other district courts. 
FACTS 
 
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Petitioner Charles Acker (Mr. Acker) and respondent Barbara Acker (Mrs. 
Acker) were divorced after twenty-three years of marriage.  Mr. Acker was fifty-
three years old at the time of dissolution and a pilot for Delta Airlines, earning 
approximately $160,000 per year.  Mrs. Acker earned approximately $10,000 per 
year from part-time employment. 
At the time of dissolution in 1993, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement under which the parties’ substantial assets were distributed between 
them.  As part of his equitable distribution, Mr. Acker received his pension 
benefits from Delta Airlines.  Mrs. Acker received, among other things, the marital 
residence, Mr. Acker’s 401(k) plan, and other IRA accounts and stock plans.  Mrs. 
Acker was also awarded permanent alimony in the amount of $3000 per month.  
The settlement agreement provided that the alimony awarded to Mrs. Acker was 
not modifiable for any reason for the first three years but could be modified at the 
end of those three years.  The parties also agreed to revisit the alimony award in 
1999, when Mr. Acker reached Delta’s mandatory retirement age of sixty. 
In 1996, Delta offered an early retirement option, which Mr. Acker accepted.  
Under this retirement option, Mr. Acker’s pension benefits were substantially 
larger than the value of the pension at the time of dissolution.  At the time of 
dissolution, Mr. Acker’s pension was valued at approximately $487,000.  At the 
 
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time of retirement, Mr. Acker received a lump-sum payment of $1,066,378, plus 
$7803 per month. 
Mr. Acker turned sixty on March 1, 1999, at which time he ceased paying 
alimony to Mrs. Acker and moved for termination of his alimony obligation, 
arguing that because his monthly income had decreased from approximately 
$13,000 to approximately $7803, he no longer had the ability to pay alimony. 
The trial court denied Mr. Acker’s motion to terminate alimony, finding that 
the provision of the parties’ 1993 settlement agreement which stated that the issue 
of alimony would be “revisited” when Mr. Acker retired did not mean that alimony 
payments would automatically be terminated.  The trial court further rejected Mr. 
Acker’s argument that he took a risk by giving his wife his savings plans and 
keeping only his pension because the monthly value of his pension benefits could 
have decreased.  The trial court reasoned that Mr. Acker’s monthly benefits did not 
decrease but, rather, generated a one-million-dollar cash payoff, which had 
increased by $250,000.  The court therefore concluded that, taking into 
consideration the benefits received from Mr. Acker’s pension, Mr. Acker continues 
to have the ability to pay Mrs. Acker $3000 per month in permanent alimony, and 
Mrs. Acker continues to have the need for such payments.  Acker v. Acker, No. 
92-51581 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. order filed Sept. 21, 2000). 
 
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Mr. Acker appealed the trial court’s order to the Third District Court of 
Appeal, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law in considering his 
pension benefits as a source of funds with which to pay alimony because his 
pension had been treated as property and awarded to him in equitable distribution.  
He argued that to now consider the pension benefits in a determination of alimony 
would violate this Court’s decision in Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 
(Fla. 1986).  After a panel of the district court heard oral argument on this issue, 
the case was referred to the district court for en banc review.  The parties were 
thereafter directed to address whether the court should recede from two of its prior 
decisions that interpreted Diffenderfer. 
The Third District divided its opinion into two sections, the first discussing 
this Court’s decision in Diffenderfer.  The Third District noted that some of the 
difficulty in analyzing this issue resulted from a typographical error contained in 
the Westlaw and CD-Rom versions of the Diffenderfer decision.  The pertinent 
portions of the correct Diffenderfer opinion in the words of the Third District are 
as follows: 
In Diffenderfer, the Florida Supreme Court held “that a 
spouse’s entitlement to pension or retirement benefits must be 
considered a marital asset for purposes of equitably distributing 
marital property.”  491 So. 2d at 270.  The court also said that “such 
benefits may be considered as a source of payment of permanent 
periodic alimony.”  Id. at 267.  The court then said: 
 
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Obviously, however, injustice would result if the 
trial court were to consider the same asset in calculating 
both property distribution and support obligations.  If the 
wife, for example, has received through equitable 
distribution or lump sum alimony one-half of the 
husband’s retirement pension, her interest in his pension 
should not be considered as an asset reflecting his ability 
to pay. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Acker v. Acker, 821 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).  Thus, if one-half of 
the husband’s pension is given to the wife, that half is no longer available to the 
husband in calculating the husband’s ability to pay alimony.  The half which has 
been transferred to the wife, however, would reduce the wife’s need for alimony at 
such time as the parties were able to draw on the pension benefits.  Id. 
At the time Diffenderfer was released, the Westlaw and CD-Rom versions 
erroneously substituted the word “his” for “her” in the above-emphasized phrase.  
The incorrect decision therefore provided:  “If the wife, for example, has received 
through equitable distribution or lump sum alimony one-half of the husband’s 
retirement pension, his interest in his pension should not be considered as an asset 
reflecting his ability to pay.”  Id.  The Third District concluded that the incorrect 
version of Diffenderfer entirely changed the meaning of the opinion, causing all 
five district courts to erroneously conclude that “a pension could be treated as an 
asset for equitable distribution or as income available to determine a spouse’s 
ability to pay alimony, but not both.”  Id. at 1091 (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 746 
 
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So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).  The court reasoned that under the plain 
language of the correct version of Diffenderfer, a court is in fact permitted to 
consider a pension which has been equitably distributed to the payor in 
determining the payor’s ability to pay alimony.  In so holding, the court receded 
from its prior decisions in Hollinger v. Baur, 719 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), 
and Waldman v. Waldman, 520 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). 
The second portion of the Third District’s opinion went on to note, however, 
that the foregoing discussion of Diffenderfer is rendered academic because the 
Legislature subsequently enacted statutes which are now controlling on this issue.  
In 1988, the Legislature created the equitable distribution statute1 and amended the 
                                          
 
1.  Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (1993), provided in pertinent part: 
 
 
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the court 
shall set apart to each spouse that spouse’s nonmarital assets and 
liabilities, and in distributing the marital assets and liabilities between 
the parties, the court must begin with the premise that the distribution 
should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal 
distribution based on all relevant factors . . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(5) As used in this section: 
 
(a) “Marital assets and liabilities” include: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
4.  All vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued 
during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, 
deferred compensation, and insurance plans, and programs . . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(6) The date for determining marital assets and liabilities and 
the value of such assets and the amount of such liabilities is the 
earliest of the date the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, 
 
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alimony statute.2  The court concluded that the plain language of these statutes 
requires the court to consider the assets and liabilities that have been distributed to 
each party, which means that an equitably distributed pension is an asset to be 
considered on the issue of alimony.  Acker, 821 So. 2d at 1092.  Thus, the district 
court held that Mr. Acker’s pension was properly considered by the trial court in 
the instant case and certified conflict with Rogers v. Rogers, 746 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1999); Paris v. Paris, 707 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Ellis v. Ellis, 
                                                                                                                                        
such other date as may be expressly established by agreement, or the 
date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage, unless the 
trial judge determines another date is just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(8) The court may provide for equitable distribution of the 
marital assets and liabilities without regard to alimony for either party.  
After the determination of an equitable distribution of the marital 
assets and liabilities, the court shall consider whether a judgment for 
alimony shall be made. 
2.  Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (1993), provided in pertinent part: 
 
 
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may 
grant alimony to either party which alimony may be rehabilitative or 
permanent in nature.  In any award of alimony, the court may order 
periodic payments or payments in lump sum or both. . . . 
 
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, 
the court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but 
not limited to: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(d) The financial resources of each party, the nonmarital and the 
marital assets and liabilities distributed to each. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(g) All sources of income available to either party. 
 
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699 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1997); and Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 
ANALYSIS 
The issue presently before this Court is whether pension benefits equitably 
distributed to a party may be considered in determining the proper amount of 
alimony.  We agree with the Third District that pension benefits can be so 
considered. 
In this case, the parties appear to have contemplated that at the time of Mr. 
Acker’s retirement, the issue of the alimony paid to Mrs. Acker would be 
reexamined.  The 1993 settlement agreement specifically provided that “at the end 
of approximately six years, when the husband retires, no longer flies for Delta and 
is living off his pension, [the parties] agree to revisit the matter of the amount of 
alimony that he pays, thereafter.”  Acker v. Acker, No. 92-51581, agreement at 11 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. agreement filed Mar. 24, 1993).  Based upon the specific 
provision of the parties’ settlement agreement, we find no error in the trial court 
considering the income received from Mr. Acker’s pension in denying Mr. Acker’s 
petition to terminate his alimony payments.  By the agreement, the trial judge 
could have reduced the alimony payment if the evidence indicated that such 
reduction was then equitable.  But the trial judge did not make that decision, and 
 
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the decision made by the trial judge was within the trial judge’s proper discretion 
based upon the evidence. 
We reject Mr. Acker’s argument that the trial court’s decision is in conflict 
with a correct application of this Court’s decision in Diffenderfer.  Rather, we 
approve the Third District Court of Appeal’s opinion in respect to Diffenderfer and 
the court’s application of sections 61.075 and 61.08, Florida Statutes. 
In dissolution cases, the trial judge possesses the broad, discretionary 
authority to do equity between the parties.  Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 
1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980).  This discretionary authority is guided by the specific 
considerations provided by the Legislature.  We agree with the Third District that 
in sections 61.075 and 61.08, Florida Statutes, the Legislature provided the 
guidelines that courts are to follow in determining an equitable distribution of 
marital property and in determining whether to require a reasonable amount of 
alimony.  These statutory provisions expressly authorize the trial court to include 
an equitably distributed pension in a determination of alimony. 
We further agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s reading of 
Diffenderfer in Lauro v. Lauro, 757 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  In 
Lauro, the district court interpreted this Court’s statement in Diffenderfer with 
respect to pension plans that an “injustice would result if the trial court were to 
 
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consider the same asset in calculating both property distribution and support 
obligations,” 491 So. 2d at 267, as follows: 
What the supreme court meant, however, is explained by the next 
sentence, which is that the one-half of the husband’s pension 
distributed to the wife could not be “considered as an asset reflecting 
his ability to pay.”  In other words, the ability of the husband in 
Diffenderfer to pay alimony should be based on his financial situation 
after equitable distribution, not before.  Similarly, the needs of the 
wife in this case should be based on her financial situation after 
equitable distribution, not before.  That would include her income 
from the pension. 
Section 61.08(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), requires trial 
courts to consider, when fashioning awards of alimony, “all relevant 
economic factors, including but not limited to:  . . . the financial 
resources of each party, the non-marital and the marital assets and 
liabilities distributed to each.”  Section 61.08(2)(g) requires the court 
to consider “all sources of income available to either party.” 
Lauro, 757 So. 2d at 524-25. 
Accordingly, the portion of a pension which has been equitably distributed 
to a spouse cannot be considered in determining the other spouse’s ability to pay 
alimony because the other spouse obviously no longer has that portion of the 
marital asset.  Similarly, the needs of a spouse should be based on that spouse’s 
financial situation after, not before, equitable distribution.  We therefore approve 
the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in this case and disapprove 
Rogers, Paris, Ellis, Bain, and Gentile to the extent they conflict with this decision. 
We find that Mr. Acker’s argument that the trial court erred in awarding 
attorney fees to Mrs. Acker is not preserved for review. 
 
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It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
BELL, J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANTERO, J., concurs. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
BELL, J., concurring. 
 
The Ackers’ marital assets were equitably distributed when their marriage 
was dissolved.  Mr. Acker received his pension, and Ms. Acker received the 
remainder of the marital assets.  Ms. Acker also was awarded permanent, periodic 
alimony.  Mr. Acker has since retired, and, because he no longer draws a salary, he 
seeks to terminate his obligation to make alimony payments to Ms. Acker.  He 
argues that he no longer has the ability to make such payments.   
The issue in this case is whether the income Mr. Acker receives from his 
pension, which was awarded to him in the equitable distribution, may be 
considered by the court when determining Mr. Acker’s ability to pay alimony.  I 
agree with the majority that this income should be considered in determining Mr. 
Acker’s continued ability to pay alimony.  I recognize the concerns raised by the 
dissent, but I conclude that the majority’s holding is dictated by the statutes 
governing equitable distribution and alimony. 
I.  Pensions:  Equitable Distribution, Alimony, and the Statutory Scheme 
 
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The issue in this case is whether the income Mr. Acker receives from his 
pension, which was equitably distributed to him, may be considered by the court 
when determining Mr. Acker’s continued ability to pay alimony.  The resolution of 
this issue is controlled by Florida’s equitable-distribution and alimony statutes.  
See §§ 61.075, Fla. Stat. (2003) (equitable distribution); 61.08, Fla. Stat. (2003) 
(alimony).  The first thing these statutes make clear is that Mr. Acker’s pension 
was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of marriage.  
See § 61.075(5)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining “marital assets” to include “[a]ll 
vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in 
retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance 
plans and programs”); § 61.076(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (“All vested and nonvested 
benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension, 
profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and programs 
are marital assets subject to equitable distribution.”). 
It is simply not the case that Mr. Acker’s pension could either have been 
considered as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution or as a source of 
funds that would enable Mr. Acker to make alimony payments to Ms. Acker.  To 
treat the portion of Mr. Acker’s pension that accrued during the marriage simply as 
a source of funds from which Mr. Acker would be able to draw to make alimony 
payments to Ms. Acker would treat the pension as the nonmarital or separate 
 
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property of Mr. Acker.  The contrary conclusion, embraced by the dissent and 
adopted nearly uniformly by the case law, relies on a mistaken reading of our 
decision in Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986),3 and a failure 
to apply––regardless of what we might have held in Diffenderfer––the 
subsequently enacted statutes discussed above. 
In fact, the precise holding in Diffenderfer was that “a spouse's entitlement 
to pension or retirement benefits must be considered a marital asset for purposes of 
equitably distributing marital property.”  491 So. 2d at 270 (emphasis added).  We 
rejected the First District’s decision, which “held that the husband's entitlement to 
retirement benefits could not properly be considered marital property subject to 
equitable distribution, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of 
maintenance and support obligations.”  Id. at 265; see also id. at 266-67 (“We . . . 
join[ ] the vast majority of jurisdictions which have found it necessary to consider 
entitlement to [retirement] benefits in order to achieve an equitable distribution.”); 
                                          
 
3.  See Dissenting opinion at 27 (“In Diffenderfer, this Court clearly held 
that an asset which has been valued to include the value of future distributions, 
such as a pension plan, may be considered marital property for the purpose of 
equalizing and distributing assets for equitable distribution purposes or as an asset 
source for payment for alimony, but not both.”); see also, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 
746 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“In [Diffenderfer], the supreme court 
held that a pension could be treated as an asset for equitable distribution or as 
income available to determine a spouse's ability to pay alimony, but not both.”); 
Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820, 822-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[I]n 
[Diffenderfer], the supreme court held that a pension . . . may be considered as a 
source of marital property subject to equitable distribution or as a source of 
payment of alimony but not as both.”). 
 
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id. at 267 (“To the extent that [a pension right] result[s] from employment time 
[during the marriage], [it is a] contract right[ ] of value, received in lieu of higher 
compensation which would otherwise have enhanced either marital assets or the 
marital standard of living and, therefore, [is] marital property.") (quoting 
Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E. 2d 15, 20-21 (N.Y. 1984)). 
The widespread misreading of Diffenderfer is the result of the seemingly 
contradictory language we used in the decision.  For instance, in addition to our 
holding that “a spouse's entitlement to pension or retirement benefits must be 
considered a marital asset for purposes of equitably distributing marital property,” 
491 So. 2d at 270 (emphasis added), we also said that “such benefits may be 
considered as a source of payment of permanent periodic alimony.  The potential 
income may certainly bear on the employee spouse's ability to pay . . . .”  Id. at 267 
(emphasis added).  If we had stopped there it would have been clear that after the 
court distributed the pension plan (as it must in light of its status as marital 
property) to one party or the other, or a portion to one party and a portion to the 
other, it could then, in determining whether an award of alimony was appropriate, 
consider the pension benefits as a source of funds from which the pension-
receiving party’s ability to make alimony payments could be determined.  We went 
on to note, however, that it would be unjust “to consider the same asset in 
calculating both property distribution and support obligations.”  Id. at 267.  This is 
 
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the statement that has caused courts to conclude that a pension “may be considered 
marital property for the purpose of equalizing and distributing assets for equitable 
distribution purposes or as an asset source for payment for alimony, but not both.”  
Dissenting op. at 27.  But, as the majority and the district court explain, our 
“injustice” statement must be read in light of the sentence which followed it. 
After stating that it would be unjust “to consider the same asset in 
calculating both property distribution and support obligations,” we explained that 
“[i]f the wife, for example, has received through equitable distribution or lump 
sum alimony one-half of the husband's retirement pension, her interest in his 
pension should not be considered as an asset reflecting his ability to pay.”  
Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d at 267.  In this light, it is clear that our warning simply 
reflected the logical conclusion that once the pension (or a portion thereof) was 
distributed to one party, the pension (or that portion) should no longer be 
considered as an as asset reflecting the other party’s ability to pay alimony.  Were 
our warning about injustice to be read any other way, it would make the 
Diffenderfer decision internally contradictory.  It makes no sense to hold, on one 
hand, that pension benefits must be treated as marital property and equitably 
distributed as such, but, on the other hand, that such benefits may be treated either 
as marital property to be equitably distributed or as a source of funds from which 
the pensioner can make alimony payments. 
 
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In any event, the majority and the district court correctly note that 
Diffenderfer’s holding on this point is immaterial in light of the subsequently 
enacted equitable-distribution and alimony statutes.  Section 61.076(1) clearly 
provides that “[a]ll vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during 
the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, 
and insurance plans and programs are marital assets subject to equitable 
distribution.”  § 61.076(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).  There is no question then that the 
reading of Diffenderfer that would hold that pension benefits may be treated either 
as marital property subject to equitable distribution or as a source of funds for the 
payment of alimony, if indeed that was what Diffenderfer held, has clearly been 
legislatively altered:  pension benefits accrued during the marriage must be treated 
as marital property subject to equitable distribution. 
The question then becomes whether such benefits, after they are distributed 
and once they begin to produce a stream of income, can be considered as a source 
of funds reflecting the pension-receiving party’s ability to pay alimony.  This 
question is answered by section 61.08(2), which provides that “[i]n determining a 
proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court shall consider all relevant 
economic factors, including but not limited to . . . [t]he financial resources of each 
party, [including] . . . the marital assets . . . distributed to each[, and] . . . [a]ll 
 
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sources of income available to either party.”  § 61.08(2)(d), (g), Fla. Stat. (2003).4  
Because these statutes are clear, I agree with the majority that the income Mr. 
Acker is now receiving from his pension, the rights to which were equitably 
distributed to him, should be considered (along with all other relevant factors) by 
the court when determining Mr. Acker’s ability to pay alimony. 
II.  The “Double-Dipping” Argument 
 
I recognize the “double-dipping” concerns raised by the dissent, but I 
believe such concerns are more appropriately addressed to the Legislature.  The 
New Jersey Legislature, for example, amended its alimony statute to provide 
explicitly that “[w]hen a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for 
purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated 
thereafter by that share for purposes of determining alimony.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:34-23(b)(13) (West 2000); see also Innes v. Innes, 569 A.2d 770, 775 (N.J. 
1990) (“The plain language of the pertinent amendment provides that income from 
                                          
 
4.  The fact that this is a post-dissolution modification proceeding does not 
affect the application of section 61.08(2).  The party seeking to modify the alimony 
award, of course, must meet the prerequisites to modification articulated in Pimm 
v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).  In this case, that burden would fall on Mr. 
Acker.  But if the court finds that the prerequisites are met, the court must then 
determine to what extent the alimony award should be increased or decreased.  
This determination must be made in accordance with section 61.08(2).  Section 
61.14 itself provides no criteria on which to make such a determination except to 
provide that “the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires, with due 
regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties.”  § 
61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). 
 
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pension benefits that have been treated as an asset for equitable distribution 
purposes . . . is not to be considered in determining alimony.”).  Florida’s statutory 
scheme, however, contains no such provision.  Contrary to New Jersey, Florida’s 
statutory scheme expressly provides that among the relevant economic factors to 
be considered in fashioning an appropriate amount of alimony are “[t]he financial 
resources of each party, [including] . . . the marital assets . . . distributed to each,” § 
61.08(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added), and “[a]ll sources of income 
available to either party.”  § 61.08(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (2003). 
 
The statutory scheme adopted by the Florida Legislature and this Court’s 
decision today applying that scheme are not the result of “faulty reasoning and 
superficial logic,” dissenting op. at 24, nor has either “accomplish[ed] the total 
destruction of the foundation of the principles upon which the concept of equitable 
distribution of property has been based with regard to [pension assets].”  
Dissenting op. at 26.  Whether the benefits received from an equitably distributed 
pension should be considered in determining the pension-receiving party’s ability 
to pay alimony is a controversial issue on which there are varying perspectives; but 
there is certainly logical support for the position adopted by the Florida 
Legislature, and that position will not spell the “total destruction” of the “concept 
of equitable distribution.” 
 
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Part of the dissent’s concerns, I think, are based on a misconception of just 
what today’s decision (and the legislative scheme mandating it) will actually do.  
The dissent repeatedly refers to the Court’s decision as effecting a redistribution of 
the pension asset or a modification of the original property settlement.  See, e.g., 
Dissenting op. at 32-33 (“Former marital assets equitably distributed as property 
are not subject to redistribution a second time due to later values attributed to the 
asset used to equitably distribute property . . . . [S]pouses should not be entitled to 
a modification following the finalized equitable distribution as a result of the 
increase or decrease in value of an asset equitably distributed as property to the 
other former spouse. . . . Here, the majority essentially authorizes a second 
redistribution of the former husband’s pension plan––already distributed to him as 
property in the initial dissolution action with an equal value of assets distributed as 
property to the wife and subtracted from other marital assets––because the pension 
plan increased in value following the final dissolution.”).  Allowing a court to look 
to Mr. Acker’s pension benefits when determining his ability to pay alimony will 
in no way “redistribute” the rights to the pension plan.  Consider, for instance, if 
Mr. Acker also had a pension plan that had accrued entirely in the years after the 
parties’ marriage was dissolved.  Would allowing a court to look to the benefits 
received from that pension, in determining Mr. Acker’s ability to pay alimony, 
somehow transfer the rights to that pension to Ms. Acker? 
 
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The dissent asserts that Ms. Acker has no “alimony entitlement” to the assets 
previously equitably distributed to Mr. Acker.  Dissenting op. at 31.  Respectfully, 
the issue here is not whether one party has an entitlement to the other party’s 
assets; those claims were resolved in the equitable distribution.  The issue now, 
quite separately, is whether one party has a need for alimony and whether the other 
party has the ability to pay alimony.  See Moreno v. Moreno, 480 S.E.2d 792, 797 
(Va. Ct. App. 1997) (“[S]pousal support and equitable distribution of property are 
two distinct concepts.  The nonpensioned spouse is not claiming rights as a co-
owner in the distributed property, but is instead simply asserting that the pension 
should not be ignored when gauging the financial position of the two parties for 
purposes of awarding alimony.”) (quoting “Double Dipping,” 7  Equitable 
Distribution J. 73 (1990)).  As one commentator has noted: 
The receipt of pension benefits is always an important factor in 
determining whether alimony should be paid and how much either 
spouse should receive.  Any source of income is material to such a 
determination.  This is true whether the jurisdiction treats pensions as 
marital property and, indeed, was equally true in the now defunct 
common-law system that did not provide any marital property 
distribution at divorce. 
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, 
Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or 
Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1250, 1264 n.60 (1986); see also 2 
Homer H. Clark, Jr.,  The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 17.5, 
 
- 21 - 
at 259 (2d ed. 1987) (“The first step in reaching a judgment about [a party’s] 
ability to pay alimony is a determination of how much property and income he 
possesses.  If there has been a division of property in the divorce, the share of 
property awarded to him is of course to be considered.”). 
 
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
takes the position that “[s]pousal income from marital property allocated at 
dissolution between the spouses should not be considered.  To consider it invites 
double counting that will yield anomalous distinctions between equivalent cases.”  
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations, § 5.04, cmt. f (2002).  The Principles, however, adopt a loss-
based, rather than a need-based, approach to alimony.  See § 5.02 cmt. a.  This is 
an important distinction because, as the Reporter’s Notes recognize, the double-
counting concern is “unfounded” in a need-based alimony scheme: 
Under existing law, cases divide on the question of whether income 
from marital property should be considered available for alimony 
claims.  The issue typically arises when the court has divided a 
pension earned by Spouse A, and is then later asked to include Spouse 
A's share of the pension income in deciding whether A should make 
alimony payments to Spouse B. . . .  
Under prevailing law in which alimony is largely need-based, 
the double-dipping concern is unfounded.  The potential obligor's 
income from allocated marital property is appropriately considered 
because the potential obligee's income from that property is 
considered as well.  Typically, this is implicit:  All the resources of 
both of them are taken into account in evaluating the obligee's needs 
and the obligor's capacity to respond to those needs. 
 
- 22 - 
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations, § 5.04, reporter’s notes, cmt. f. 
 
In a need-based alimony scheme, such as Florida’s, the “double-counting” 
problem, properly understood, arises in only very limited circumstances.  As 
Professor Blumberg has noted, 
[e]rroneous “double-counting” only occurs where the actual division 
of the pension, or other marital asset, is postponed and will be made 
only if and when benefits are paid out.  Then each spouse is, properly 
speaking, an owner of a portion of those benefits and it would be 
incorrect to attribute the whole to either spouse for alimony 
determination purposes.  When, however, all marital property division 
is effected at divorce and one spouse is awarded the entire pension, it 
is not in any way improper to consider the pension benefits as entirely 
his income for purposes of alimony determination. 
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Intangible Assets: Recognition and Valuation, in 2 
Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, § 23.02[3][c], at 23-19 (1999).   
A number of courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the logic of 
Professor Blumberg’s position and similarly have rejected “double-dipping” 
arguments.  See In re Marriage of White, 237 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987); Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365, 375-76 n.26 (Conn. 1995) (“We reject 
the defendant's contention that to consider vested benefits for purposes of equitable 
distribution and also, as allocated, as a source of alimony constitutes impermissible 
‘double dipping.’ . . . Relying on the pension benefits allocated to the employee 
spouse under [the equitable distribution statute] as a source of alimony would be 
 
- 23 - 
improper only to the extent that any portion of the pension assigned to the 
nonemployee spouse was counted in determining the employee spouse's resources 
for purposes of alimony.”); Riley v. Riley, 571 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Ct. Spec. App. 
Maryland 1990) (“It is true, of course, that, in awarding and setting the terms of 
alimony, the court cannot properly consider as a resource of the payor spouse 
property or income that the spouse does not have.  Thus, if the court removes an 
asset or source of income from the payor spouse through a monetary award (or 
otherwise), it cannot premise an alimony award on the assumption that that asset or 
source of income is still available to the payor.  But we see no reason why it cannot 
base such an award on assets or sources of income that have not been taken from 
the payor and that do remain available.  That does not constitute double dipping . . 
. .”); Moreno, 480 S.E.2d at 799 (“[W]e hold that the income received by the 
husband from his share of the distribution of his pension is a fungible asset that 
may be considered as a resource when determining the amount of his spousal 
support obligation.”).   
Simply stated, despite the dissent’s criticism of so-called “double-dipping,” 
the cases and commentary discussed above make clear that Florida’s statutory 
scheme is not based on “faulty reasoning and superficial logic,” nor has it “total[ly] 
destr[oyed]” the “concept of equitable distribution.”  Whether or not the policy is 
 
- 24 - 
wise is a question left to the Legislature.  The majority has properly applied the 
statutory scheme, and I fully concur in its opinion. 
CANTERO, J., concurs. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., dissenting. 
The majority opinion, the specially concurring opinion, and that of the Third 
District below present a myopic view of the fundamental principles and issue 
addressed and resolved in Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986), 
almost two decades ago, and the principles which have naturally and correctly 
developed over that span of time.  Today, this Court with faulty reasoning and 
superficial logic, substantially and erroneously impacts and very seriously alters 
the stability of a multitude of contractual marital agreements and marital judgments 
entered in good faith based upon the uniformly recognized principles established in 
Diffenderfer and applied in its progeny over the past twenty years here and in the 
district courts of appeal. 
The fundamental issue is not simply the superficial and ever present issue of 
“need” or “ability to pay.”  The misstatement of the fundamental issue in dispute 
produces the incorrect result and a failure to understand or address that upon and 
after distribution, if the property initially distributed as and in the form of equitable 
distribution property is later taken back and given to the other party (double-
dipping) there has been no equitable distribution of assets at all.   
 
- 25 - 
After today, no asset or property distribution is final because the property or 
asset distribution can be altered upon a theory of “need” and “ability to pay.”  The 
law as stated in Diffenderfer and as interpreted by all Florida appellate decisions 
during the last two decades is contrary to the majority and concurring opinions and 
compels a contrary result.  It is most interesting that a subsequent decision of this 
Court following Diffenderfer and two decades of leading appellate decisions are 
now relegated to a category and conclusion that all appellate judges in Florida have 
simply repeatedly and uniformly engaged in a “mistaken reading” of the law. 
The decision today fails to accommodate those marital agreements entered 
into in good faith during the last twenty years based upon the law as stated by all 
Florida courts (which are now merely labeled a “mistaken reading”), and the final 
judgments predicated upon this “mistaken reading” of the law.  If this Court is 
determined to reject and reverse twenty years of Florida jurisprudence it certainly 
may do so, but it should do so prospectively and not use the guise of “mistaken 
reading” or interpretation to so drastically impact twenty years of existing 
agreements and judgments and thereby generate a basis for an unknown number of 
modifications.  To change the law is one thing, but to do so under a protective 
cloak of correcting two decades of “mistaken reading” is far different. 
Initially, the Third District fell victim to incorrectly elevating an apparent 
single typographical error in one sentence into a total transformation of an entire 
 
- 26 - 
fundamental body of law upon which material economic decisions in marital 
disputes have been predicated for years.  The lower court next improperly blended 
its fundamental error with inapplicable statutory provisions to justify an erroneous 
result which further misdirected Florida law in a very substantial manner.  This 
Court falls victim to and even magnifies the same errors by not only adopting the 
incorrect decision below, but also proceeding to interpret a marital agreement 
entered into under the then existing law as though Diffenderfer and its progeny 
never existed at the time the parties entered into the contract in 1993.  This Court 
applies this new, different, and previously nonexistent erroneous interpretation of 
Diffenderfer to negate the 1993 marital agreement which was clearly drafted based 
on the principles discussed in Diffenderfer.  The Court today accomplishes the 
total destruction of the foundation of the principles upon which the concept of 
equitable distribution of property has been based with regard to the type of asset 
which generates the disputed issue here. 
In my view, the issue before the Court, namely whether a party's remaining 
asset which has been previously specifically valued and utilized as a property asset 
for the purpose of shifting and the equalization of property by equitable 
distribution may again be utilized as a fund to be taken as alimony, in a later post-
dissolution proceeding, is controlled by this Court's almost two-decade old 
precedent of Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986), and our 
 
- 27 - 
subsequent decision in Pastore v. Pastore, 497 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1986).  In 
Diffenderfer, this Court clearly held that an asset which has been valued to include 
the value of future distributions for property distribution, such as a pension plan, 
may be considered marital property for the purpose of equalizing and distributing 
assets for equitable distribution of property purposes or as an asset source for 
payment for alimony, but not both.  See Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d at 267.  
Diffenderfer has remained the controlling law on this question for almost twenty 
years, has been consistently applied correctly by this Court and all district courts of 
appeal that have ever considered the issue until now, and, in my view, has not been 
superseded by subsequent legislation.  The majority has simply elected to ignore 
this long-standing body of law, the equitable foundation of equitable distribution of 
property and instead mandated an inequitable and unconscionable result.  
Therefore, I must dissent. 
Mr. Acker, the former husband, properly argues that the trial court's decision 
to consider the income he receives from his pension in determining his alimony 
payments conflicts with this Court's holding in Diffenderfer.  The majority rejects 
Mr. Acker's argument with an absence of sound logic.  Moreover, the majority 
expressly approves the Third District's erroneous treatment of Diffenderfer in its 
opinion in Acker v. Acker, 821 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).  See majority op. 
at 10.  All seem to also ignore that within months of Diffenderfer, this Court again 
 
- 28 - 
addressed the controlling issue in Pastore.  Referring to and quoting from 
Diffenderfer, this Court, in Pastore, again recognized and stated the general 
principle that: 
in most cases . . . it may be preferable to deal with pension rights as a 
marital asset rather than merely a source of support obligations . . . . 
Pastore, 467 So. 2d at 637 (quoting Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d at 268) (emphasis 
supplied).  Following this Court's decisions in Diffenderfer and Pastore, the 
Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts all correctly interpreted Diffenderfer and held 
that an asset may not be counted twice, both during the equitable distribution of 
marital property as property and again as income for alimony purposes.  See 
Rogers v. Rogers, 746 So. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Paris v. Paris, 
707 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Ellis v. Ellis, 699 So. 2d 280, 283 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1997); Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Gentile v. 
Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820, 822-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).  In Acker, the Third District 
has mistakenly attempted to explain the decisions of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth 
Districts by suggesting that the original Westlaw and CD-Rom versions of the 
Diffenderfer opinion contained a typographical error, and, therefore, speculating 
that the decisions rendered by the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts were all a 
direct result of reliance upon the typographical error in Diffenderfer without any 
basis whatsoever for such faulty conclusion.  See Acker, 821 So. 2d at 1090-91.  
The Acker court below held, without explanation, that based upon the authoritative 
 
- 29 - 
version of Diffenderfer, "a court is allowed to consider a pension which has been 
equitably distributed to the payor in determining the payor's ability to pay 
alimony."  Id. at 1091.  The majority here simply regurgitates the Third District's 
erroneous view of the application of Diffenderfer. 
The Third District's explanation for the decisions of the Second, Fourth, and 
Fifth Districts which interpreted Diffenderfer is, however, clearly misdirected.  A 
review of Rogers, Paris, Ellis, Bain, and Gentile reveals that there is absolutely no 
indication whatsoever that any of those courts relied upon the asserted 
typographical error in Diffenderfer first published by Westlaw and on CD-Rom.  In 
fact, of those five decisions, three did not quote directly from Diffenderfer at all, 
see Rogers, 746 So. 2d at 1179; Paris, 707 So. 2d at 890; Gentile, 565 So. 2d at 
822-23, while two quoted from the correct, authoritative version, see Ellis, 699 So. 
2d at 283; Bain, 687 So. 2d at 81.  The Third District here has attempted to create 
confusion in Diffenderfer where none exists.  In Diffenderfer, this Court clearly 
held that "injustice would result if the trial court were to consider the same asset in 
calculating both property distribution and support obligations."  Diffenderfer, 491 
So. 2d at 267.  The subsequent decisions of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts 
all properly interpreted the clear mandate of Diffenderfer, which the majority now 
rejects even though the citizens of Florida, their counsel, and Florida courts have 
relied thereon for almost twenty years. 
 
- 30 - 
Moreover, the Third District, in Acker, asserted that its discussion of 
Diffenderfer was merely "academic" because the Legislature subsequently enacted 
sections 61.075(8) and 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes in 1988, which effectively 
superseded this Court's Diffenderfer holding.  See Acker, 821 So. 2d at 1091-92.  
The majority here approves the Third District's application of sections 61.075(8) 
and 61.08(2).  See majority op. at 10.  However, as recognized by Judge Gersten in 
his dissent in Acker below, with which I totally agree, Florida's equitable 
distribution statute (section 61.075) and alimony statute (section 61.08) do not at 
all conflict with this Court's Diffenderfer holding.  See Acker, 821 So. 2d at 1094-
95 (Gersten, J., dissenting).  Judge Gersten noted in his dissent that 
"[c]onsiderations in the initial dissolution proceedings are distinct from those 
raised in a post-dissolution scenario."  Id. at 1095.  While sections 61.075 and 
61.08 pertain to initial dissolution proceedings, here we are faced with a post-
dissolution action.  Sections 61.075 and 61.08 are not controlling here and the 
generalizations contained therein do not even attempt to address the specific true 
issue with which we are confronted in this case.  The statutory provisions do not 
address the issue of the distribution of assets, including the value of a stream of 
future payments, as property to fund and accomplish equitable distribution and 
then later in subsequent proceedings utilization of the same asset again as one from 
which to distribute a flow of continuing payments to a party who has already 
 
- 31 - 
received the value of such payments in the prior property distribution allocations.  
The fundamental dynamics and rights change after the classification and 
distribution of an asset as property and a division based on such classification. 
In the initial proceeding, the assets were equalized and distributed with the 
former husband receiving his pension plan with its future distributions valued as an 
asset in the equitable distribution of property while the wife received other 
valuable assets to offset and place the total assets of each party in an equalized 
position.  To now take that property asset previously classified as and subject to 
property distribution for valuation purposes for alimony payments violates the 
fundamental principles of equitable property distribution and fairness and 
constitutes a clear "double-dipping" of assets—a result this Court sought to avoid 
in Diffenderfer.  Certainly, when the specific asset was originally assigned as 
property with value to Mr. Acker, the value recognized and received enhancement 
because it would eventually produce a future stream of income, and it was valued 
accordingly as a total property.  Similarly, the former wife was assigned the marital 
residence asset, and additional other assets valued and equalized accordingly of 
significantly higher value than if the stream of payments had not been included in 
the value as property for the husband.  The former wife has no additional alimony 
entitlement to the current value of the former husband's asset distributed and 
valued as property, just as the former husband has no entitlement to the current 
 
- 32 - 
value of the assets distributed as property to the wife.  The majority's holding 
encourages a dissipation of assets previously used for property distribution and 
permits a second redistribution of an asset already distributed as property in the 
initial process. 
In an initial dissolution proceeding, a court begins the equitable distribution 
of property with the "premise that the distribution should be equal."  § 61.075(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2003).  Upon the distribution of assets as property in the final dissolution 
proceeding, the parties become independent of each other, and are entitled to the 
use of their equitably distributed property assets distributed for that purpose 
without interference from their former spouse.  If one spouse dissipates the value 
of a distributed asset or a spouse's distributed property asset does not 
proportionately increase, that spouse is not entitled to a subsequent redistribution 
of the property following the initial finalized equitable property distribution.  
Former marital assets equitably distributed as property are not subject to 
redistribution a second time due to later values attributed to the asset used to 
equitably distribute property.  Similarly, principles of fundamental fairness support 
the notion that spouses should not be entitled to a modification following the 
finalized equitable distribution as a result of the increase or decrease in value of an 
asset equitably distributed as property to the other former spouse.  The majority 
here ignores this principle.  Here, the majority essentially authorizes a second 
 
- 33 - 
redistribution of the former husband's pension plan—already distributed to him as 
property in the initial dissolution action with an equal value of assets distributed as 
property to the wife and subtracted from other marital assets—because the pension 
plan increased in value following the final dissolution. 
Reference is made to decisions and statutes from other jurisdictions which 
are invoked to allegedly support the majority position.  Interestingly, a review of 
such material actually undermines the majority view.  First, reference to legislation 
in New Jersey and Innes v. Innes, 569 A.2d 770 (N.J. 1990), simply reveals that 
the substance of the applicable statutory provision there is exactly the law of 
Florida as established and announced some twenty years ago in Diffenderfer and 
uniformly applied by all district courts of appeal which has not been legislatively 
altered in Florida.  Second, Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365 (Conn. 1995), does 
not support the majority and outlines methods of addressing pension matters in 
domestic litigation.  Importantly, the Krafick court recognized and outlined the 
“present value” or “offset” method of distributing such assets as property, which is 
recognized in Florida in Diffenderfer, as opposed to a continuing revenue source 
for alimony payments.  The Krafick court also noted an important difference 
between distributions in the form of property and those of continuing payments 
when it stated: 
It must be kept in mind, however, that awards of property and of 
alimony are different in quality and consequence for the recipient.  
 
- 34 - 
Periodic alimony, unlike a property award, is subject to modification 
on a number of grounds.   
Id. at 374 n.25 (emphasis supplied).  The Connecticut court concluded the “offset” 
discussion by recognizing: 
 
The offset method has the advantage of effecting a “clean 
break” between the parties.  See Kikkert v. Kikkert.  (“Although 
fixing present value under such circumstances may be difficult and 
inexact, nevertheless immediate final resolution of the method of 
distribution is to be encouraged, preferably by voluntary agreement 
whenever possible.  Long term and deferred sharing of financial 
interests are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, 
circumstances which our courts traditionally strive to avoid to the 
greatest extent possible.”).  It also avoids extended supervision and 
enforcement by the courts. 
Id. at 374 (citations omitted). 
 
For two decades, this Court and the district courts of appeal have recognized 
that the majority's result here is inequitable.  An injustice is occurring here as the 
former husband's pension plan is being distributed twice—first in the initial 
distribution as property (with the wife receiving a larger offset share of property) 
and now in a subsequent post-dissolution proceeding concerning income or 
alimony.  I would continue to adhere to this Court's precedent in Diffenderfer and 
Pastore and that from other district courts of appeal, and hold that the former 
husband's pension plan, distributed to him as part of the initial equitable 
distribution of property, may not now, in a post-dissolution proceeding, be 
considered as a source for the payment of alimony to be redistributed to the former 
 
- 35 - 
wife.  Under these circumstances, the wife has previously received the full offset 
value of the asset in the form of additional property assets at the time the marriage 
was dissolved. 
In Diffenderfer, the Court recognized the difference and the use of asset 
distribution as property rather than the designation of an asset as a source for 
continuing payments as a method "by which the marriage could be truly ended 
rather than prolonged through financial dependence ad infinitum."  Diffenderfer, 
491 So. 2d at 266 (quoting Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 456 So. 2d 1214, 1219 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984)).  It also recognized the use of assigning a pension plan as an 
asset in a "scheme of property distribution" rather than extending the connection of 
the parties by considering a stream of payments as income to connect the parties 
forever.  Id. at 267 (emphasis supplied).  The Diffenderfer court recognized that 
alternatively a pension asset may be considered as a source of periodic alimony; 
the court immediately noted, however, that  
[o]bviously, . . . injustice would result if the trial court were to 
consider the same asset in calculating both property distribution and 
support obligations.   
Id.  If the pension asset had not been distributed as property and considered 
here only as a source of proceeds, and had the wife not received additional 
or enhanced property as the corresponding property “offset,” I would agree 
with the majority. 
 
- 36 - 
 
I respectfully dissent and agree with the well-reasoned view expressed 
by Judge Gersten below.  The majority today has, however, created a 
principle of law in domestic litigation that an asset distributed as property is 
subject to redistribution post-judgment upon a “need” and “ability to pay” 
analysis notwithstanding its character, valuation and distribution as property 
in the initial distribution, a principle previously contrary to a well-developed 
body of Florida law.  The asset here was valued, characterized and 
distributed as property in the original proceeding rendering it separate 
property which is now subject to redistribution. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
 District - Case No. 3D00-3096 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Jerome J. Kavulich of Ruso and Kavulich, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Nancy A. Hass, Hallandale, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent