Title: In re Leuenberger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50178
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2004

FILED:  July 15, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
JAMES E. LEUENBERGER,
Accused.
(OSB 98-59; SC S50178)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted January 12, 2004.
Terrance L. McCauley, Estacada, argued the cause and filed
the brief for the accused.
Richard A. Weill, Bar Counsel, Troutdale, argued the cause
for the Oregon State Bar.  Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel, Lake Oswego, filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is reprimanded.
*Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar alleged that lawyer James E. Leuenberger (the accused)
had violated Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 7-102(A)(1) (knowingly taking action that served merely
to harass or maliciously injure another) (two counts); DR 7-102(A)(2) (knowingly advancing legally unwarranted claim or
defense) (three counts); DR 7-106(C)(7) (intentionally violating
established procedural rule) (two counts); DR 7-110(B)(2) and (3)
(communicating with judge as to merits of cause, without promptly
delivering copy of written communication to opposing counsel or
providing adequate notice of oral communication to opposing
counsel) (two counts); DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct
prejudicial to administration of justice) (two counts); and DR 5-101(A)(1) (continuing employment, except with client's consent
after full disclosure, when lawyer's own interests reasonably may
affect exercise of professional judgment).  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board determined that the accused had violated the
rules as charged, with the exception of two counts of DR 7-102(A)(2) and one count of DR 7-106(C)(7).  The trial panel
imposed a 90-day suspension.  
The accused has petitioned this court for review under
ORS 9.536(1) and BR 10.3, challenging the trial panel's violation
determinations and its selected sanction.  We review de
novo, ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6.  The Bar bears the burden of
establishing the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing
evidence.  BR 5.2.  "'Clear and convincing evidence' means
evidence establishing that the truth of the facts asserted is
highly probable." In re Cohen, 316 Or 657, 659, 853 P2d
286 (1993).  
As explained below, we conclude after reviewing the
record that, with the exception of DR 5-101(A)(1), the Bar has
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
violated the disciplinary rules at issue.  We further conclude
that, respecting the accused's violation of DR 5-101(A)(1), a
public reprimand is the appropriate sanction.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
All the alleged misconduct at issue here arose from the
accused's representation of the Kerbers, who were the defendants
in a foreclosure action.  In July 1996, Taylor, a creditor of the
Kerbers, obtained a judgment of foreclosure against them that
involved their residence.  In December 1997, the trial court
entered a supplemental judgment against Mrs. Kerber for attorney
fees that Taylor had incurred.  The supplemental judgment did not
contain a separate money judgment, which was required before
Taylor could obtain a writ of execution.  Mrs. Kerber appealed
from that supplemental judgment.  While the supplemental judgment
was pending on appeal, Taylor's lawyer, Kosydar, submitted an
amended supplemental judgment to the trial court that named both
Mrs. and Mr. Kerber as judgment debtors and that contained a
separate money judgment.
When the accused received a copy of Kosydar's proposed
amended supplemental judgment, he concluded that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to enter it, because the original
supplemental judgment was pending on appeal.  He filed no
objection, however, and the trial court entered the amended
supplemental judgment on June 13, 1997.  The court then entered a
writ of execution, pursuant to the amended supplemental judgment,
and a sheriff's sale was scheduled for July 30, 1997.  
When the trial court entered the amended supplemental
judgment, and for several weeks thereafter, the accused
repeatedly advised the Kerbers to challenge that judgment.  The
Kerbers, however, resisted, because they were trying to refinance
a loan on their residence to pay off Taylor and they were fearful
that further litigation would increase Kosydar's attorney fees.  
On either Friday, July 25, 1997, or Monday, July 28,
1997, Mr. Kerber called the accused in either the late afternoon
or early evening and instructed him to challenge the amended
supplemental judgment. (1)  The accused told Mr. Kerber that he
would prepare the motion very early on July 29, 1997, and then
would submit it later that morning at the court's regular time
for hearing ex parte matters.  The accused did not
telephone Kosydar or otherwise notify her that he intended to
present the motion.
On the morning of July 29, 1997, the accused drafted an
ex parte motion to vacate the amended supplemental
judgment upon the ground that the trial court had lacked
jurisdiction to enter it.  The phrase "ex parte" appeared
in the caption of the motion, in compliance with the Uniform
Trial Court Rules. (2)  Immediately after completing the
motion, the accused transmitted it by facsimile to Kosydar's
office and then left for court.  Kosydar's law firm received the
motion at 8:55 a.m., and Kosydar personally received it at 9:30
a.m.  The facsimile did not state whether the accused intended to
appear personally in court to present the motion.
Sometime after 8:00 a.m. that same morning, the accused
went to see the judge who was assigned to hear ex parte
matters for the day.  The accused handed his motion to the judge
and, as he describes it, "kept [his] mouth shut."  After reading
the motion and concluding that it would be contested, the judge
told the accused that the matter must be set for a hearing.  The
accused scheduled a hearing for the following morning.  At that
hearing, Kosydar told the court by telephonic appearance that she
had postponed the sheriff's sale, and the court decided to
reschedule the hearing in regular course.  A new hearing on the
accused's motion to vacate the amended supplemental judgment was
rescheduled to August 14, 1997.
Meanwhile, the Kerbers continued trying to refinance a
loan on their residence so that they could pay off Taylor.  The
accused conferred with the Kerbers' lender, who maintained that,
before title insurance could be issued, the lender needed the
exact dollar figure necessary to satisfy Taylor's judgments in
writing (hereafter "final payoff figure" or "payoff figure"). 
The accused asked Kosydar for that figure, but she did not
provide it.  Consequently, on July 30, 1997, the accused filed a
motion requesting, under former ORS 18.410 (1995), (3)
repealed by Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 576, section 580,
that the trial court enter an order setting out a final payoff
figure.  The accused filed that motion after conferring with a
title insurance lawyer who regularly invoked that statute in
similar situations.
On August 14, 1997, the trial court held a hearing,
over which Judge Nachtigal presided.  The hearing concerned the
accused's July 29, 1997, ex parte motion to vacate the
amended supplemental judgment; his July 30, 1997, motion for an
order under former ORS 18.410 (1995); a motion for
sanctions against the Kerbers and the accused that Kosydar had
filed relating to the accused's July 29, 1997, ex parte
motion; and a request for attorney fees that Kosydar had filed. 
Judge Nachtigal first ruled against the accused on his motion to
vacate the amended supplemental judgment, stating her
understanding that the trial court had authority to make the
types of corrections contained in the amended supplemental
judgment.  
Judge Nachtigal next addressed the accused's July 30,
1997, motion for a court-ordered final payoff figure under
former ORS 18.410 (1995).  As to any ruling on that
motion, the record contains conflicting statements on Judge
Nachtigal's part.  For example, Judge Nachtigal first suggested
that the Kerbers might not have been permitted to invoke
former ORS 18.410 (1995), because they had not yet sought
to obtain a satisfaction of Taylor's judgments against
them. (4)  However, Judge Nachtigal then told the accused that
it would not "take a rocket scientist to figure out" the final
payoff figure using the judgments entered in the case.  Finally,
Judge Nachtigal told both parties that she could not calculate a
payoff figure until any additional attorney fee issues had been
resolved, stating to the accused, "I don't think you have a
[former] ORS 18.410 [(1995)] problem at all yet.  You may,
but you don't have it." (5)
Judge Nachtigal then addressed Kosydar's motion for
sanctions respecting the accused's ex parte motion to
vacate the amended supplemental judgment.  Judge Nachtigal and
the accused engaged in the following colloquy:
"[THE ACCUSED]:  Your Honor, my notice to opposing
counsel is of record.  I've got the fax transmittal. 
She [was] there.  It was before the hearing. * * *
"THE COURT:   How long before the hearing?
"[THE ACCUSED]:  About a half an hour.
"THE COURT:   Half an hour before the hearing?  Do
you think that's adequate notice?"
"[THE ACCUSED]:  * * * Your Honor, I was doing my
best to get --
"THE COURT:  Whatever gave you the idea that you
could come in and do that ex parte in the first place?
"[THE ACCUSED]:  I was given to -- by a
desperation --
"THE COURT:  Desperation doesn't cause us to do
things that there's no legal basis to do.  What gave
you the right to go in, ex parte, and try to set aside
a judgment with a half an hour notice when you know the
other side's represented?
"* * * * *
"* * * I mean where -- where in any of the rules
does it say you can do that?
"[THE ACCUSED]: I didn't know it was forbidden.
"THE COURT:  I'm going to take that as a[n] answer
under pressure.  That's an affront to the Court. * * *
Nobody is going to do anything ex parte on a valid
judgment on a case like this.  Nobody.  A half an hour
notice on that kind of a matter is, I believe,
unethical, at a minimum.  It is not reasonable notice. 
You can't even get an ex parte.
"This file is full of at the last minute your
client[s] doing everything in their power to stop the
judgment that's been entered.  At some point[,] it
simply has to stop. * * *
"This is an appropriate case for sanctions.  There
never should have been an effort to try to set it aside
ex parte."
Judge Nachtigal later entered a monetary judgment awarding sanctions against both the Kerbers and the accused under
ORCP 17 D. (6)  The judgment stated that the accused had
presented his July 29, 1997, ex parte motion to vacate the
amended supplemental judgment "for an improper purpose,
specifically[,] to delay and hinder [the] scheduled foreclosure
sale."  The sheriff's sale was rescheduled to August 25, 1997.
On August 19, 1997, the accused wrote to Judge
Nachtigal, requesting that she issue an order granting the
Kerbers' earlier motion under former ORS 18.410 (1995) to
obtain a final payoff figure.  The accused wrote:
"It is critical that you make the necessary findings to
complete the order and that you sign the order.  Until
you file the order, no title company will calculate and
determine the amount of money due Mr. Taylor under his
judgments in light of Mr. Taylor's refusal to provide
reasonable payoff figures.
"Once you file the order, Mr. Kerber can and will
obtain the necessary refinancing to pay off the
judgments in the amounts you determine."
"Time is of the essence.  The sheriff's sale is
now scheduled for Monday, August 25, 1997[,] at 10:00
a.m."
The accused thereafter transmitted a letter by facsimile to
Kosydar asking that she supply a final payoff figure before 5:00
p.m. on Friday, August 22, 1997, the last business day before the
scheduled sheriff's sale.  Neither Judge Nachtigal nor Kosydar
responded to the accused's letters.
At 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 22, 1997, having heard
from neither Judge Nachtigal nor Kosydar, the accused drafted an
ex parte motion to stay the sheriff's sale pending entry
of an order granting his earlier motion under former ORS
18.410 (1995).  He transmitted a copy of his ex parte
motion to Kosydar by facsimile at 5:14 p.m. that same day.  As
with his first ex parte motion, the phrase "ex
parte" appeared in the caption; however, the facsimile to
Kosydar did not state whether the accused intended to appear
personally in court to present the motion.
At 8:45 a.m. on Monday, August 25, 1997, the accused
went to the chambers of Judge Alexander, who was assigned to hear
ex parte matters for the day.  The accused handed Judge
Alexander his motion and told him that Judge Nachtigal had made a
ruling on the case.  Judge Alexander asked if Judge Nachtigal
should hear the motion, and the accused responded affirmatively. 
Judge Alexander called Judge Nachtigal's chambers, but Judge
Nachtigal was not available.  Judge Alexander then read the
motion and granted the stay; however, he did not rule on the
merits.
Kosydar thereafter moved to set aside the stay that
Judge Alexander had granted and also moved for additional
sanctions against the Kerbers and the accused.  Judge Nachtigal
held a hearing on those motions on October 1, 1997.  At that
hearing, the accused repeated his assertion that, under
former ORS 18.410 (1995), the court must issue an order
setting out a final payoff figure; however, Judge Nachtigal
denied his motion, stating that she was "not required to do the
math."  As to Kosydar's motion for sanctions, Judge Nachtigal
stated:
"Well, when I heard that a stay had been issued
under almost identical facts to the previous stay that
had been issued that I sanctioned you for, I was
speechless.  I'm not very often speechless.  I
absolutely couldn't believe that as an officer of the
court you did exactly what I had told you not to do. 
That you did precisely what I had sanctioned you for
before.  I was dumbfounded that you would do that.
"* * * * *
"I don't know how much plainer I could have made
it at the last hearing that I found your behavior of
faxing after hours for a[n] ex parte hearing the very
next morning, knowing that there was an objection,
knowing that there was no way that the attorney would
get the fax or be able to respond, and knowing that the
other side vehemently objected to your position --. 
And on top of it there was no basis for your stay,
none.  I was amazed to say the least.
"I am going to sanction you. * * *"
Judge Nachtigal later entered a second monetary
judgment awarding sanctions against the Kerbers and the accused. 
That judgment stated that the accused's August 25, 1997, ex
parte motion had been presented "for an improper purpose,
including to delay foreclosure." (7)
The Kerbers' residence subsequently was sold; however,
the sale proceeds were insufficient to pay all Taylor's judgments
against the Kerbers.  The interest rate on the Kerber's principal
balance to Taylor was 13.89 percent; by contrast, the interest
rate on the post-judgment interest on that balance, as well as on
a cost judgment, two attorney fee judgments, and the two sanction
judgments, was nine percent.
The accused filed a motion to determine which of
Taylor's judgments had been satisfied as a result of the
foreclosure, including a request that the sanction judgments, for
which he was jointly liable with the Kerbers, be paid in full. 
Before the hearing on that motion, Kosydar suggested to the
accused by letter that his motion presented a conflict of
interest because he would benefit financially if the sanction
judgments -- the only judgments for which he also was liable --
were satisfied before the principal judgment, whereas the Kerbers
would benefit financially if the principal judgment -- the
judgment with the highest interest rate -- was satisfied before
the sanction judgments.  The accused disagreed that a conflict of
interest existed.  In his view, Taylor could not collect against
the Kerbers on the principal judgment, because he had exhausted
his security in the Kerbers' residence through the foreclosure.
After receiving Kosydar's letter, the accused
transmitted it by facsimile to the Kerbers and discussed it with
them.  The accused told the Kerbers, as he had numerous times
over the course of the litigation, that, in his view, Taylor
could not collect on the principal judgment and, therefore, that
the higher interest rate on that judgment was immaterial.  He
further told the Kerbers that, if the court denied his request
respecting satisfaction of the sanction judgments, then he
personally would pay those judgments.  The Kerbers agreed with
that course of action. 
In May 1998, Judge Nachtigal held a hearing on the
accused's motion regarding application of the sale proceeds. 
Judge Nachtigal raised the issue of a conflict of interest, and
the accused responded that, in his view, no conflict existed. 
Judge Nachtigal then denied the accused's request respecting
satisfaction of the sanction judgments, and the accused
ultimately paid those judgments in their entirety.
B. Bar's Complaint and Trial Panel Proceeding
In March 2002, the Bar filed an Amended Formal
Complaint against the accused, alleging that he had violated DR
7-102(A)(1) and (2), DR 7-106(C)(7), DR 7-110(B)(2) and (3), and
DR 1-102(A)(4), both when he had presented his first ex
parte motion seeking to vacate the amended supplemental
judgment and when he had presented his second ex parte
motion seeking to delay the sheriff's sale pending entry of an
order under former ORS 18.410 (1995).  The Bar's amended
complaint further alleged that the accused had violated DR 5-101(A)(1) and DR 7-102(A)(2) when he requested satisfaction of
the sanction judgments without complying with the requirements
respecting full disclosure of a conflict of interest.
The trial panel held a hearing later in 2002.  The Bar
introduced a transcript of the accused's deposition from May 2001
and several exhibits, largely consisting of transcripts and court
orders from the proceedings before Judge Nachtigal; however, the
Bar introduced no witness testimony.  The accused introduced the
testimony of three witnesses and also testified at length in his
own behalf.  Five months after the completion of the hearing, the
trial panel issued an opinion that determined that the accused
had committed all the alleged violations respecting his second
ex parte motion and had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(1), and DR 7-110(B) respecting his first ex parte
motion.  The trial panel further determined that the accused had
violated DR 5-101(A)(1), respecting his request to satisfy the
sanction judgments. (8)  Finally, the trial panel imposed a 90-day suspension.
On review, the accused argues that his conduct in
representing the Kerbers did not violate any disciplinary rules;
alternatively, he asks this court to impose only a public
reprimand.  The Bar, in turn, argues that this court should reach
the same conclusions as the trial panel respecting both the
alleged violations and the appropriate sanction. (9)
II.  ALLEGED DISCIPLINARY RULE VIOLATIONS
A. DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2) DR 7-102(A) provides, in part:
"In the lawyer's representation of a client or in
representing the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall
not:
"(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a
defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf
of the lawyer's client when the lawyer knows or when it
is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another.
"(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law except that the lawyer
may advance such claim or defense if it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
As noted above, the trial panel concluded that the accused had
violated DR 7-102(A)(1) when he had presented both his ex
parte motions because those motions had served the sole
purpose of harassing Taylor.  The trial panel further concluded
that the accused had violated DR 7-102(A)(2) when he had
presented his second ex parte motion because Judge
Nachtigal already had denied his first ex parte motion,
which effectively had sought to delay the sheriff's sale.  Before
the trial panel and again on review, the accused argues that he
violated neither DR 7-102(A)(1) nor (2) because his ex
parte motions did not "serve merely to harass" Taylor and
because his second ex parte motion was warranted under
existing law.  The Bar, by contrast, argues that the trial
panel's analysis was correct.
We begin with the Bar's allegations under DR 7-102(A)(1).  As noted above, that rule prohibits a lawyer, among
other things, from taking action in a client's behalf when the
lawyer knows or when it is obvious "that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." 
(Emphasis added.)  This court has clarified that, in using the
word "merely," that rule prohibits conduct aimed solely toward
harassing or maliciously injuring another, rather than conduct
aimed toward serving some legitimate purpose that happens to
harass or injure another. See In re Hockett, 303 Or
150, 160, 734 P2d 877 (1987) (accused lawyer did not violate DR
7-102(A)(1), because, although lawyer's conduct in fact harassed
and injured his clients' creditors, "that was not his sole aim");
In re Hopp, 291 Or 697, 700, 634 P2d 238 (1981) (accused
lawyer violated DR 7-102(A)(1) when he admittedly had "no other
purpose" than to harass opposing counsel).
Because this court's inquiry under DR 7-102(A)(1) can
involve the question whether the accused lawyer advanced a
legally unwarranted claim or defense, thereby implicating conduct
that DR 7-102(A)(2) prohibits, we take this opportunity to
clarify the interplay between those inquiries.  Simply stated,
this court's inquiry under DR 7-102(A)(1) -- unlike an inquiry
under DR 7-102(A)(2) -- generally focuses upon the accused
lawyer's motivation in taking a particular action, rather than
upon the legitimacy of the legal position asserted.  For example,
if the Bar proves by clear and convincing evidence that an
accused lawyer sought merely to harass or maliciously
injure another in advancing a legal position, then the Bar has
proved a violation of DR 7-102(A)(1), regardless of the
legitimacy of the legal basis for the lawyer's action. See
In re White, 311 Or 573, 578, 815 P2d 1257 (1991) (accused
lawyer violated DR 7-102(A)(1) when he admittedly filed numerous
actions in client's behalf to cause particular defendant "as much
grief and expense  * * * as was humanly possible"; not all such
actions legally unwarranted).  However, if the Bar proves by
clear and convincing evidence that no legitimate legal
basis for the action in question existed, then that fact would
provide evidence that the lawyer's sole motivation had been to
harass or maliciously injure another (rather than to pursue a
legitimate legal position). See id. at 579-81
(court's conclusion that accused lawyer knowingly had filed
legally unwarranted claims provided basis for conclusion that
lawyer had filed those particular claims merely to harass
another); In re Glass, 309 Or 218, 223-24, 784 P2d 1094
(1990) (accused lawyer who engaged in prohibited
misrepresentation to advance client's interests might not have
violated DR 7-102(A)(1) if he had engaged in permissible action
intended to serve legitimate purpose). 
We turn to the question whether the accused presented
his first ex parte motion (seeking to vacate the amended
supplemental judgment for lack of jurisdiction) merely to harass
Taylor.  In doing so, we first emphasize that the Bar does not
argue in support of its DR 7-102(A)(1) allegation -- let alone
attempt to prove -- that the accused had no legal basis to argue
that the trial court had been without jurisdiction to enter the
amended supplemental judgment.  Because the Bar neither has made
that argument nor has presented any evidence in that regard, we
do not consider the legal legitimacy of the accused's first ex
parte motion in our determination whether he presented that
motion merely to harass Taylor.
Turning to the contents of the record, the accused
testified at his deposition that his sole purpose in presenting
his first ex parte motion, which, if successful, would
have stopped the foreclosure process, was to obtain time for the
Kerbers to complete refinancing.  Nothing in the record
contradicts that testimony; indeed, the accused's additional
uncontroverted testimony that the Kerbers had resisted
challenging the amended supplemental judgment while they sought
refinancing and then had acquiesced shortly before the scheduled
sale supports the accused's contention that his purpose in
presenting his first ex parte motion was to obtain
additional time for the Kerbers to satisfy the judgments, not to
harass Taylor.  Consequently, as in Hockett, 303 Or at
160, although the accused's motion doubtlessly caused significant
inconvenience to Taylor, the Bar has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the motion "serve[d] merely to harass"
Taylor within the prohibition set out in DR 7-102(A)(1).
Compare White, 311 Or at 578 (accused lawyer
violated DR 7-102(A)(1) when he purposefully acted to cause
another person significant grief and expense).
We turn to the Bar's allegation under DR 7-102(A)(1)
involving the accused's second ex parte motion (seeking to
delay the sheriff's sale pending entry of an order under
former ORS 18.410 (1995)).  As with the accused's first
ex parte motion, we first emphasize that the Bar does not
argue, to support its allegation under DR 7-102(A)(1), that the
accused had no legal basis to file his second ex parte
motion.  In any event, we conclude below -- in connection with
the Bar's allegation under DR 7-102(A)(2) -- that the Bar has not
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused's second
ex parte motion was unwarranted under existing law.  We
proceed, then, to determine whether any evidence in the record
demonstrates that the accused presented his second ex
parte motion merely to harass Taylor.
As with the accused's first ex parte motion, the
record demonstrates that the accused presented his second ex
parte motion hoping to delay the sheriff's sale for the
purpose of obtaining time for the Kerbers to refinance, not to
harass Taylor.  Indeed, the accused presented his second ex
parte motion to obtain that objective only after repeated
efforts to obtain a final payoff figure from both Judge Nachtigal
and Kosydar had failed.  In light of that evidence, the Bar has
not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
presented his second ex parte motion merely to harass
Taylor in violation of DR 7-102(A)(1).
For purposes of clarification, we briefly discuss the
trial panel's contrary conclusions under DR 7-102(A)(1),
respecting both the accused's ex parte motions.  As to
those alleged violations, the trial panel wrote:
"The Accused filed two ex parte motions with the
purpose of delaying the court[-]ordered sheriff's sale. 
In response to [Judge Nachtigal's] question at the time
the Accused was ordered to appear for his first
sanction hearing, the Accused stated that he filed the
ex parte motion because his clients were 'desperate' to
save their house from the sheriff's sale.  The
Accused's course of conduct served the sole purpose of
harassing the judgment creditor."
The trial panel's opinion misses the mark in two
respects.  First, the trial panel in part relied upon the
accused's statement at the August 14, 1997, hearing that he had
been "given to -- by a desperation" in presenting his first ex
parte motion to conclude that he had acted in violation of DR
7-102(A)(1).  However, that statement on the accused's part did
not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he had
presented his first ex parte motion merely to harass
Taylor.  At the hearing before Judge Nachtigal and at his
deposition in this proceeding, the accused elaborated that the
Kerbers had been desperate to prevent their residence from being
sold, which is consistent with and supported by the
uncontroverted evidence that the Kerbers had sought to secure
refinancing until the late hours before the scheduled sale.  The
fact that his clients had been desperate to prevent the sale does
not justify the trial panel's conclusion that the accused had
acted merely to harass Taylor when he sought to protect his
clients' interests.
Second, the trial panel appears to have equated the
accused's motivation in delaying the sheriff's sale with the
prohibited purpose of merely harassing Taylor.  As we have
explained, however, the record demonstrates that, as to both his
ex parte motions, the accused had legitimate motivations
for seeking to delay the sheriff's sale -- that is, to obtain
time for the Kerbers to complete refinancing (and, specifically
as to the second ex parte motion, to obtain a final payoff
figure after earlier attempts to do so had failed).  Because the
Bar has not proved that the accused presented his ex parte
motions "merely to harass" Taylor, it has failed to prove that
the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(1). (10)
We turn to the Bar's allegation that, in presenting his
second ex parte motion, the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2), which prohibits "[k]nowingly advanc[ing] a claim or
defense that is unwarranted under existing law." (11)  We first
clarify the contents of the record and the specifics of the Bar's
argument, as important background to the discussion that follows.
For purposes of our analysis here, the following
aspects of the record are significant.  First, in response to the
accused's first ex parte motion (to vacate the
amended supplemental judgment), Judge Nachtigal told the accused
that he had had no legal basis to file that motion ex
parte and with eleventh-hour notice to Kosydar, and that his
clients must stop their efforts to delay the sheriff's sale. 
Second, in response to the accused's July 30, 1997, motion under
former ORS 18.410 (1995), the record is unclear as to the
precise basis for Judge Nachtigal's refusal to provide a final
payoff figure, and it also is unclear as to whether Judge
Nachtigal in fact made any ruling on the motion at all.  Finally,
in response to the accused's second ex parte motion, Judge
Nachtigal sanctioned the accused for presenting that motion ex
parte shortly after she had sanctioned him for similar
conduct respecting his first ex parte motion, which had
involved a wholly different legal issue.  That is, Judge
Nachtigal sanctioned the accused for again presenting a motion
ex parte to delay the impending sheriff's sale with
eleventh-hour notice to Kosydar.  Nothing in the record suggests
that, as to the accused's second ex parte motion, Judge
Nachtigal sanctioned the accused for continuing to press the
legal merits of his argument under former ORS 18.410
(1995) after she purportedly already had ruled against him on the
merits of that argument.  (Indeed, as discussed above, it is
unclear whether she had ruled on the merits of his July 30, 1997,
motion at all.)
We turn to the Bar's argument under DR 7-102(A)(2)
respecting the accused's second ex parte motion, although
we begin by clarifying that which the Bar does not argue. 
First, the Bar does not argue that the accused improperly invoked
the statutory procedure set out in former ORS 18.410
(1995) for obtaining a final payoff figure in his second ex
parte motion.  That is, in arguing that the accused
"[k]nowingly advance[d] a claim or defense * * * unwarranted
under existing law," the Bar does not argue that former
ORS 18.410 (1995) provided no legitimate legal basis for the
accused's second ex parte motion (for example, that the
Kerbers had not satisfied a requirement for invoking that
statute).  After reviewing the statute, we similarly conclude,
without further discussion, that it provided the accused with a
colorable legal basis for his continued requests for a court-ordered payoff figure, including the request set out in his
second ex parte motion.  We further note as significant
that the accused clearly thought that his second ex parte
motion properly invoked that statute.  In short, as to the legal
basis underlying the accused's second ex parte motion, the
Bar has not proved that the accused "[k]nowingly advance[d] a
claim or defense * * * unwarranted under existing law." See
generally In re Dugger, 334 Or 602, 611, 54 P3d 595
(2002) (because accused lawyer acted in conformance with
particular statute, he did not advance claim unwarranted under
existing law in violation of DR 7-102(A)(2)).
The Bar also does not argue that, in filing his second
ex parte motion, the accused improperly continued to press
his argument under former 18.410 (1995) after Judge
Nachtigal already had ruled on the merits by denying his July 30,
1997, motion.  That is, in arguing that the accused "[k]nowingly
advance[d] a claim or defense * * * unwarranted under existing
law" under DR 7-102(A)(2), the Bar does not argue that the
accused improperly pursued a legal argument that the trial court
already had rejected on the merits.  Further, as explained above,
the record is unclear in any event as to (1) whether Judge
Nachtigal in fact ruled against the accused on the merits of his
July 30, 1997, motion under former 18.410 (1995); or (2)
whether she merely declined to provide a final payoff figure.
We turn, then, to the argument under DR 7-102(A)(2)
that the Bar does make, which is that the accused
"[k]nowingly advance[d] a claim or defense * * * unwarranted
under existing law" because he presented his second ex
parte motion on an ex parte basis eight days after
Judge Nachtigal had sanctioned him for presenting a similar,
eleventh-hour ex parte motion.  Specifically, the Bar
argues that, after Judge Nachtigal had sanctioned the accused for
presenting a motion ex parte with the improper purpose of
delaying the sheriff's sale (as she had characterized his first
ex parte motion), he was not permitted to present another
motion to delay the sheriff's sale on an ex parte basis. 
The trial panel agreed with that contention.
The Bar essentially challenges the ultimate objective
of the accused's second ex parte motion (i.e.,
delay of the sheriff's sale), as well as the form in which the
accused presented that motion (i.e., ex parte). 
However, as discussed above, the Bar does not challenge the legal
underpinnings of that motion -- specifically, the procedure set
out under former ORS 18.410 (1995).  That is, the Bar's
complaint under DR 7-102(A)(2) respecting the accused's second
ex parte motion is that the accused presented that
motion ex parte hoping to delay the sheriff's sale, not
that the motion itself was legally unwarranted or that the
accused improperly presented it because Judge Nachtigal already
had ruled on the merits.  The Bar's particular argument
respecting the objective of the accused's motion and its ex
parte nature is more appropriately addressed to other
allegations that it has made against the accused, most notably,
its allegations under DR 1-102(A)(4) (prejudice to administration
of justice). See In re Magar, 335 Or 306, 313-14,
66 P3d 1014 (2003) (tenor of Bar's argument respecting accused
lawyer's repeated efforts to undo property transfer more
appropriately addressed to harassment claim under DR 7-102(A)(1)
than to "legally unwarranted" claim under DR 7-102(A)(2)).  We
conclude that the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2) when he
presented his second ex parte motion. 
B. DR 7-106(C)(7)
DR 7-106(C) provides, in part:
"In appearing in the lawyer's professional
capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
"* * * * *
"(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any
established rule of procedure or of evidence."
The Bar's amended complaint alleged that the accused violated DR 7-106(C)(7) when he presented both his ex parte motions;
the trial panel concluded that the accused had violated that rule
respecting his second ex parte motion.  On review, the Bar
specifically contends, as the trial panel concluded, that the
accused intentionally violated ORCP 17 C, which provides that, by
signing or submitting a motion, a lawyer certifies that that
motion "is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay," ORCP 17 C(2), and that
the legal position set out in the motion is "warranted by
existing law," ORCP 17 C(3).  In challenging the trial panel's
determination respecting his second ex parte motion, the
accused argues, first, that the Bar's complaint was insufficient
to notify him as to the "established rule of procedure," DR 7-106(C)(7), that he was alleged to have violated.  Alternatively,
the accused argues that he did not act intentionally.  For the
reasons set out below, we agree with the accused's first
contention, and we therefore dismiss the Bar's allegation under
DR 7-106(C)(7).
As relevant here, the Bar's amended complaint set out
the following allegations.  In its first cause of complaint,
which pertained to the accused's first ex parte motion,
the Bar alleged that (1) the trial court had found that the
accused had presented that motion for the purpose of delay and
hindering the sheriff's sale; (2) the court had sanctioned the
accused; and (3) the accused intentionally had violated an
established rule of procedure.  In its second cause of complaint,
which pertained to the accused's second ex parte motion,
the Bar realleged the foregoing allegations and further alleged
that (1) the trial court had found that the accused intentionally
had appeared ex parte and presented a motion for an
improper purpose that was not warranted by existing law; (2) the
court again had sanctioned the accused; and (3) the "aforesaid
conduct" had violated DR 7-106(C)(7), among numerous other rules. 
The Bar's complaint did not include any reference to any
particular procedural rule that the accused's conduct allegedly
had violated.
In his brief before the trial panel and again in his
written closing argument, the accused noted that the Bar's
amended complaint had been silent as to which rule he allegedly
had violated, and he asserted that no written rule had prohibited
him from presenting his second motion on an ex parte
basis.  The accused further asserted that "[d]ue process requires
that [he] be advised of precisely which rule or procedure he is
accused of intentionally violating."  The accused repeats that
due process argument on review, asserting, correctly, that "[t]he
first specification of such a rule came in the Trial Panel
Decision: ORCP * * * 17."
We need not address the accused's constitutional due
process argument, because we conclude that the Bar's complaint
was insufficient under the Bar's own rules of procedure.
See Leo v. Keisling, 327 Or 556, 562, 964 P2d 1023
(1998) (court ordinarily does not decide constitutional issues if
adequate subconstitutional basis exists for decision).  BR 4.1(c)
provides, in part:
"A formal complaint shall * * * set forth
succinctly the acts or omissions of the accused,
including the specific statutes or disciplinary rules
violated, so as to enable the accused to know the
nature of the charge or charges against the accused.   
* * *"
The wording of that rule imposes a duty upon the Bar to "set
forth succinctly the acts or omissions of the accused" lawyer
that gave rise to an alleged disciplinary rule violation.  In the
context of an allegation under DR 7-106(C)(7), that duty
encompasses the obligation to allege with specificity the
"established rule of procedure or of evidence" that, in the Bar's
view, the accused lawyer intentionally or habitually violated. 
Such an obligation ensures that the particular allegation
"enable[s] the accused [lawyer] to know the nature of the charge
or charges against [him or her]," as BR 4.1(c) requires.
Here, the Bar's amended complaint set out the
disciplinary rule at issue, DR 7-106(C)(7); however, it did not
specify which procedural rule provided the basis for the alleged
DR 7-106(C)(7) violation.  Moreover, we can glean nothing from
the lengthy, collective description of the accused's conduct in
the complaint that clearly identifies which particular rule was
at issue.  Indeed, in answering the complaint and in defending
himself before the trial panel, the accused apparently thought
that the Bar's allegation under DR 7-106(C)(7) pertained to ex
parte motion practice; by contrast, the trial panel
ultimately concluded that the accused intentionally had violated
ORCP 17 C(3). (12)  In sum, we conclude that, respecting the
alleged violation of DR 7-106(C)(7) relating to the accused's
second ex parte motion, the Bar's amended complaint did
not "set forth succinctly the acts or omissions of the accused,"
as BR 4.1(c) requires. Compare In re Spencer, 335
Or 71, 79-80, 58 P3d 228 (2002) (Bar's complaint satisfied BR
4.1(c), because contested wording was not necessary to prove
violation of disciplinary rule at issue).  We therefore dismiss
that allegation.
C. DR 7-110(B)(1)-(4)
DR 7-110(B) provides, in part:
"In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not
communicate, or cause another to communicate, as to the
merits of the cause with a judge or an official before
whom the proceeding is pending except:
"(1) In the course of official proceedings in the
cause.
"(2) In writing if the lawyer promptly delivers a
copy of the writing to opposing counsel * * *.
"(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing
counsel * * *.
"(4) As otherwise authorized by law or by Judicial
Rule 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct."
In its amended complaint, the Bar alleged that the accused had 
violated DR 7-110(B)(2) and (3) when he had presented both his
ex parte motions.  Similarly, the Bar argues on review
that the accused failed to give Kosydar either "prompt[]" or
"adequate" notice when he notified her by facsimile at the
eleventh hour.  The trial panel appears to have agreed with the
Bar. (13)  As to DR 7-110(B)(2), the accused argues that he
satisfied the "prompt[] deliver[y]" requirement of that rule when
he transmitted copies of his ex parte motions to Kosydar
by facsimile immediately upon completing them.  As to DR 7-110(B)(3), the accused argues that that rule is inapplicable to
his ex parte motions because those motions constituted
written -- not oral -- communications with the trial
court. (14)
We begin with DR 7-110(B)(2), which provides that a
lawyer may communicate in writing as to the merits of the cause
to the judge before whom the proceeding is pending, "if the
lawyer promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing
counsel."  (Emphasis added.)  Viewed more narrowly, the rule
requires "prompt[] deliver[y]" of "the writing" (emphasis
added) to opposing counsel.  Here, the record establishes that
the accused transmitted to Kosydar by facsimile copies of both
his ex parte motions -- the writings at issue that
constituted communications with the trial court as to the merits
of the cause -- immediately upon completing them.  He therefore
satisfied the "prompt[] deliver[y]" requirement set out in DR 7-110(B)(2).
The Bar argues that the accused's eleventh-hour
facsimile transmissions to Kosydar violated DR 7-110(B)(2)
because they contravened the purpose of DR 7-110(B), which is "to
prevent the effect or the appearance of granting undue advantage
to one party." In re Smith, 295 Or 755, 759, 670 P2d 1018
(1983) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).  The Bar
is correct that the accused's eleventh-hour transmissions of his
ex parte motions to Kosydar (i.e., his "deliver[y]"
of the written communications at issue) likely contravened that
general purpose.  However, contrary to the Bar's assertion, the
wording of DR 7-110(B)(2) does not require prompt notice
of a written communication on the merits with a judge; rather, it
requires prompt delivery of a written communication of
that type.  At bottom, the Bar essentially complains of an aspect
of the accused's conduct that DR 7-110(B)(2) does not
prohibit. (15)
We turn to DR 7-110(B)(3), which requires "adequate
notice" to opposing counsel of an oral communication with a judge
as to the merits of a cause.  The Bar contended at oral argument
before this court that, although the accused technically had
submitted both his ex parte motions in written form, those
motions properly should be viewed as oral communications because
they had not consisted of the type of communication that a lawyer
ordinarily would submit in writing and deliver to a judge via
messenger, to be acted upon in due course.  Rather, the Bar
argues, the accused purposely crafted his emergency motions in
writing, so as to avoid the "adequate notice" requirement of DR
7-110(B)(3), but then submitted them personally to the trial
court for immediate action. (16)  In the Bar's view, the
accused cannot rely upon the form of his motions to circumvent
the disciplinary rules, and, to avoid that result, this court
should treat the accused's written ex parte motions as if
they had been oral motions.  
As with the alleged violations of DR 7-110(B)(2), the
Bar's argument respecting DR 7-110(B)(3) misses the mark. 
Although we agree that a lawyer purposefully should not seek to
circumvent the disciplinary rules, and although we further agree
that the accused's eleventh-hour facsimile transmissions
respecting both his ex parte motions were insufficient to
provide meaningful notice to Kosydar, we cannot disregard the
fact that the accused submitted his ex parte
communications to the court as to the merits of the cause in
writing, not orally.  That form of communication falls within the
"prompt[] deliver[y]" requirement of DR 7-110(B)(2) -- which the
accused satisfied by immediately transmitting his motions by
facsimile to Kosydar upon completing them -- not the "adequate
notice" requirement of DR 7-110(B)(3). 
We acknowledge that this proceeding presents an unusual
factual scenario in that, notwithstanding the accused's eleventh-hour notice to Kosydar of both his ex parte motions, the
form of those motions effectively assisted the accused in
avoiding violations of either DR 7-110(B)(2) or (3).  We further
note that, in the context of the facts at issue here, we
generally view the accused's conduct as unprofessional, because
the accused crafted his ex parte motions so as to conform
with DR 7-110(B)(2) while avoiding the reach of DR 7-110(B)(3)
and because his actions effectively denied Kosydar the
opportunity to prepare any meaningful response.  Nevertheless, to
constitute unethical conduct, the accused's actions must
have contravened the wording of the disciplinary rules at issue,
and, as discussed, the Bar has not proved that the accused's
actions did so.
D. DR 1-102(A)(4)
DR 1-102(A) provides, in part:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"(4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice."
The Bar alleged, and the trial panel agreed, that, in presenting
both his ex parte motions, the accused engaged in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The accused
responds that his conduct was within the bounds of permissible
representation and that the "administration of justice" included
the Kerbers' "rights to pay the judgments by refinancing their
home, to know the certain judgment amounts necessary for
satisfaction, and to have all such judgments entered by a court
exercising lawful jurisdiction."
This court's first inquiry when evaluating an
allegation under DR 1-102(A)(4) is to determine whether the
accused lawyer "engaged in 'conduct,' by doing something that the
lawyer should not have done or by failing to do something that
the lawyer was supposed to do." In re Gustafson, 327 Or
636, 643, 968 P2d 367 (1998).  As explained below, we conclude
that the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the accused engaged in prohibited conduct under DR 1-102(A)(4);
we therefore need not proceed to any other inquiries under that
rule.
The specific conduct at issue here is the accused's
conduct in presenting both his ex parte motions.  In its
brief, the Bar argues that it was impermissible for the accused
to present both the motions ex parte; however, the overall
tenor of the Bar's argument encompasses the accused's conduct in
providing eleventh-hour notice to Kosydar.  We address each
aspect of the accused's ex parte motions below.
As to the ex parte nature of the accused's
motions, we conclude that the Bar has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused engaged in prohibited
conduct under DR 1-102(A)(4).  In our view, Judge Nachtigal might
have been correct in assessing that the accused's motions were
not of the type that, ordinarily, a lawyer should present ex
parte -- particularly when, as here, the accused knew that
opposing counsel would object.  However, the Bar has pointed to
no source of law or any other applicable authority that
specifically prohibited the accused from presenting his motions
ex parte; instead, the Bar argues that the accused "had no
basis to believe that either motion was appropriate to bring
ex parte" and relies in part upon Judge Nachtigal's
statements to the accused in that regard.  The problem with the
Bar's argument -- and it is insurmountable -- is that it is
merely that:  an argument.  Arguing that the accused was
not permitted to present his motions ex parte does not
make it so, and it certainly is insufficient to prove that "the
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable," which is the
Bar's burden. Cohen, 316 Or at 659.  In short, the Bar has
not proved by clear and convincing evidence that, in presenting
his motions on an ex parte basis, the accused "engaged in
'conduct,' by doing something that [he] should not have done." 
Gustafson, 327 Or at 643. (17) 
As to the accused's conduct in providing eleventh-hour
notice of his ex parte motions to Kosydar, we similarly
conclude that the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused engaged in prohibited conduct under DR
1-102(A)(4).  Again, the Bar has not pointed to any source of law
or other applicable authority that prohibited the accused from
notifying Kosydar of his written motions when he did.  Further,
as to the accused's second ex parte motion, the record
demonstrates that the accused appeared to have had no other
available option to protect his clients' interests, in light of
the lack of response from Judge Nachtigal and Kosydar respecting
his repeated requests for a final payoff figure.  As with the
accused's decision to present both his motions ex parte,
the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused "[did] something that [he] should not have done,"
Gustafson, 327 Or at 643, when he provided eleventh-hour
notice of his motions to Kosydar.
Because we conclude that the Bar has not proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused engaged in
prohibited conduct under DR 1-102(A)(4), we further conclude that
the Bar has not proved any violation of that rule.
E. DR 5-101(A)(1)
DR 5-101(A) provides, in part:
"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure,
"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests. 
* * *"
DR 10-101(B) provides, in part:
"(1) 'Full disclosure' means an explanation
sufficient to apprise the recipient, of the potential
adverse impact on the recipient of the matter to which
the recipient is asked to consent.
"(2) As used in DR 5-101 * * *, 'full disclosure'
shall also include a recommendation that the recipient
seek independent legal advice to determine if consent
should be given and shall be contemporaneously
confirmed in writing."
The Bar contends, and the trial panel agreed, that the accused
violated DR 5-101(A)(1) when he requested that the trial court
satisfy the sanction judgments from the sale proceeds --
judgments for which he was jointly liable and that were accruing
interest at a lower interest rate than the principal judgment
against the Kerbers.  The accused responds that no conflict of
interest existed because Taylor could not have pursued any
deficiency on the principal judgment against the Kerbers as a
matter of law.  Alternatively, the accused contends that he fully
disclosed any conflict of interest to the Kerbers and obtained
their consent to request satisfaction of the sanction judgments.
We disagree with the accused that DR 5-101(A)(1) does
not, in light of his legal theory respecting any deficiency
judgment, reach the conduct at issue here.  As the wording of the
rule makes clear, DR 5-101(A)(1) reaches circumstances in which a
lawyer's professional judgment "reasonably may be
affected" (emphasis added) by the lawyer's own interests, as
well as situations in which the lawyer's judgment will be
affected.  See In re Knappenberger, 336 Or 15, 27-28, 90 P3d 614 (2004) (wording of rule that exercise of
professional judgment "reasonably may be affected" by lawyer's
personal or financial interests "expresses a lesser degree of
certainty and sweeps more broadly" than "will be * * * affected"
wording); In re Lawrence, 332 Or 502, 506, 512, 31 P3d
1078 (2001) (accused lawyer violated DR 5-101(A)(1) by not fully
disclosing potential conflict of interest in avoiding
acknowledged malpractice liability).  Here, the accused had a
financial interest in having the sanction judgments satisfied,
while the Kerbers had a financial interest in having the
principal judgment satisfied.  Even if the accused ultimately had
been correct that Taylor could not have pursued any deficiency
judgment on the principal against the Kerbers, the Kerbers were
entitled to have the opportunity to seek advice in that regard
from independent counsel -- counsel whose personal financial
interests were not reasonably implicated in a decision to pursue
satisfaction of the sanction judgments.
We turn to the disclosure requirements of DR 5-101(A)(1), more specifically, DR 10-101(B)(2).  In that
connection, we acknowledge that the accused had numerous
discussions with the Kerbers regarding his conclusion that Taylor
could not seek a deficiency judgment and that he notified the
Kerbers orally and in writing of Kosydar's concern regarding a
conflict of interest.  We further acknowledge that the Kerbers
acquiesced in the accused's plan to request satisfaction of the
sanction judgments and that, as the accused and the Kerbers
agreed, the accused ultimately paid those judgments in full.  
Nonetheless, it is apparent from the record that the
accused did not advise the Kerbers to seek the advice of
independent counsel respecting his conflict of interest and, it
follows, did not confirm such advice in writing, as DR 10-101(B)(2) requires.  As this court noted in Lawrence, 332
Or at 512, that requirement "may [not] be dispensed with so
casually."  In light of the accused's failure to comply with DR
10-101(B)(2), we conclude that his conduct violated DR 5-101(A)(1). See id. at 512 (accused lawyer who
failed to comply with DR 10-101(B)(2) violated DR 5-101(A),
notwithstanding lawyer's other actions to protect client's
interest, including securing outside counsel on particular issue
that gave rise to conflict of interest). (18)
III. SANCTION
Having found that the accused violated a disciplinary
rule, we turn to the issue of the appropriate sanction, following
our well-established methodology.  We first refer to the American
Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), to make a
preliminary determination of the appropriate sanction, by
considering the duty or duties that the accused violated, his
mental state at the time of his misconduct, and the injury that
his misconduct caused.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then consider the
existence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and
consider this court's relevant case law. See In re
Kluge, 335 Or 326, 348, 66 P3d 492 (2003) (setting out
methodology).
A. Preliminary Analysis
In failing to comply with the disciplinary rules
respecting full disclosure of a conflict of interest, the accused
violated his duty owed to his clients, the Kerbers.  ABA Standard
4.3.  We conclude that the accused knowingly engaged in that
misconduct. See ABA Standards at 7 (defining
"knowledge" as "the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result"). 
Further, the accused caused potential injury to the Kerbers by
denying them the opportunity to seek independent advice regarding
satisfaction of the sanction judgments. See id.
(defining "potential injury" as harm that is reasonably
foreseeable at time of misconduct and that, but for some
intervening event, probably would have resulted from misconduct).
Considering the duties violated, the accused's mental
state, and the harm caused, the ABA Standards suggest that a
suspension would be the appropriate sanction here. See ABA
Standard 4.32 (suspension generally appropriate when lawyer knows
of conflict of interest and does not fully disclose possible
effect of conflict and causes potential injury to client).
B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
We conclude that one aggravating factor applies, that
is, that the accused had substantial experience in the practice
of law at the time of his misconduct. (19)  ABA Standard
9.22(i).  We further conclude that two mitigating factors apply. 
First, the accused has no prior disciplinary record.  ABA
Standard 9.32(a).  Second, this case involves the factor of
significant delay, with the accused's misconduct having occurred
in 1998.  ABA Standard 9.32(j) (amended 1992). See also
In re Unrein, 323 Or 285, 288, 917 P2d 1022 (1996)
(applying that mitigating factor in light of four-year delay in
proceeding; factor "especially significant" because, during
period of delay, no further complaints filed against accused
lawyer); (20) compare In re Devers, 328 Or 230,
244 n 7, 974 P2d 191 (1999) (declining to apply that mitigating
factor when accused lawyer shared responsibility for delay). 
Consistently with Unrein, 323 Or at 288, we give
heightened significance to the delay in the proceedings against
the accused.  See also Lawrence, 332 Or at 515
(similarly characterizing long delay in proceeding as "important"
mitigating factor, when accused lawyer's disciplinary record was
"unblemished" since engaging in the misconduct at issue).
On balance, the mitigating factors outweigh the single
aggravating factor here.  That, in turn, suggests that a public
reprimand, rather than a suspension, might be appropriate.
C. Case Law
This court's decision in Lawrence, 332 Or 502,
confirms that a public reprimand, rather than a suspension, is
the appropriate sanction here.  The accused lawyer in
Lawrence, among other misconduct, had failed to comply
with the full disclosure requirements of DR 5-101(A)(1).  There,
a trial court had entered a default judgment against the lawyer's
client in a dissolution action, after the lawyer had missed a
filing deadline.  The lawyer arranged for other counsel to
represent the client on the default matter; however, the lawyer
continued to represent the client on child support and visitation
matters, "without making full written disclosure to [the client]
of the possibility that his own interests in avoiding a[n]
[acknowledged] malpractice claim might affect his professional
judgment." Id. at 506.
This court concluded that the accused lawyer had
violated DR 5-101(A). Id. at 512.  As to the appropriate
sanction for that particular violation, the court accepted the
parties' agreement that a public reprimand was appropriate.
Id. at 513.  The court ultimately imposed a 60-day
suspension for the lawyer's collective misconduct. Id. at
517.
D. Appropriate Sanction
Having considered the applicable ABA Standards, the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, and this court's
case law, we conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate
sanction here. 
The accused is reprimanded.
1. At the trial panel hearing in July 2002, the accused testified that Mr. Kerber had called
him on "Friday" at about 4:30 p.m, which would have been July 25, 1997.  However, at his
deposition in May 2001, the accused stated that Mr. Kerber had called him about 12 hours before
he ultimately presented his motion on the morning of July 29, 1997.
The accused also testified before the trial panel in 2002 that July 29, 1997, had
been a Monday; however, July 29, 1997, in fact had been a Tuesday.  The Bar has not noted that
disparity, and, in any event, it is immaterial to our analysis of the disciplinary rules at issue here.
2. UTCR 5.060(2) provides, in part, that "[a] motion for an ex parte order must
contain the term 'ex parte' in the caption * * *."
3. Former ORS 18.410 (1995) provided, in part:
"(1) This section establishes a procedure to obtain a satisfaction for a
judgment for the payment of money when any person, against whom exists a
judgment for the payment of money * * *, is unable to obtain a satisfaction from a
judgment creditor for any reason.  * * *
"* * * * *
"(2) A person described in subsection (1) of this section may request the
court which gave the judgment  * * * to determine the amount necessary to satisfy
the judgment at a specific time in the future.  To make such request, the person
must do all of the following:
"(a) File a motion with the court * * *
"* * * * *
"(4) Not less than seven days after notice of hearing given to the person
filing the motion and to the parties served with the motion, the court shall hear
and determine the issues between the parties in a summary fashion without a jury. 
All the following apply to the court proceeding:
"(a) The court shall give the parties a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence relevant to any factual issues in dispute as shown by the affidavits.
"(b) If the court, based on the record and sufficient evidence, is satisfied
that the person making the request is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an
order stating all the following:
"(A) * * * [I]f the judgment has not been satisfied in full, the specific
amount that will satisfy the judgment on a date or within a period of time
specified in the order.
"(B) The party or parties to whom the money is owed."
4. Before Judge Nachtigal, Kosydar had argued that the statutory wording that a judgment
debtor be "unable to obtain a satisfaction from a judgment creditor," former ORS
18.410(1) (1995), required a judgment debtor to make payment on the judgment before the
debtor could invoke the statute (which, apparently, the Kerbers had not done).  As discussed later
in this opinion, the Bar has not made a similar statutory argument in this proceeding.
5. Judge Nachtigal said nothing further to the accused at the August 14, 1997, hearing,
respecting his July 30, 1997, motion for a court-ordered final payoff figure, although she and the
parties ultimately agreed upon a method of calculating the amount due at that point in time, not
including Kosydar's pending attorney fee request.  The record contains no additional written
communication from Judge Nachtigal to the accused regarding his motion for a court-ordered
final payoff figure.
6. ORCP 17 D(1) provides that a court may impose sanctions against a person or a party
who is found to have made a false certification under ORCP 17 C.  ORCP 17 C, in turn, provides
that, in submitting a motion, a lawyer certifies that the motion "is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay," ORCP 17 C(2), and that the
legal position set out in the motion is "warranted by existing law," ORCP 17 C(3).
7. The accused appealed both sanction judgments to the Court of Appeals, and that court
affirmed both judgments. Taylor v. Kerber, 171 Or App 301, 15 P3d 93 (2000).  The
Court of Appeals concluded that, as to both the accused's ex parte motions, evidence in
the record before it supported Judge Nachtigal's factual findings that the accused had acted with
an "improper purpose" under ORCP 17 C(2). Id. at 309-10.  The court further concluded
that Judge Nachtigal had not abused her discretion in imposing sanctions. Id.
8. The trial panel's opinion does not mention the Bar's additional allegation that the accused
violated DR 7-102(A)(2) (prohibiting knowingly advancing claim unwarranted under existing
law) when he requested satisfaction of the sanction judgments. 
9. At the outset of its brief, the Bar generally argues that this court should conclude that the
accused violated all the disciplinary rules at issue in its amended complaint respecting the
accused's two ex parte motions (as well as those respecting any purported conflict of
interest).  However, in each section of its brief pertaining to each individual disciplinary rule, the
Bar argues only that this court should reach the same conclusions as the trial panel; it offers no
additional argument supporting its initial allegations under DR 7-102(A)(2) and DR 7-106(C)(7) 
-- relating to the accused's first ex parte motion -- as to which the trial panel concluded
that no violations occurred.  Given that lack of argument on the Bar's part, we do not address
those additional allegations in this opinion.
10. As noted earlier, ___ Or at ___ n 7 (slip op at 12 n 7), the Court of Appeals in
Taylor, 171 Or App at 309-10, determined that evidence in the record before it
had supported Judge Nachtigal's findings that, in presenting both his ex parte motions,
the accused had acted with an "improper purpose" under ORCP 17 C(2), specifically, to delay
unnecessarily the sheriff's sale.  The trial panel appears to have relied upon
Taylor, at least in part, in concluding that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(1).  
Our analysis in this proceeding, however, differs in three significant respects from
the Court of Appeals decision in Taylor:  (1) different records are subject to judicial
review; (2) different rules (with different elements) are at issue; and (3) different burdens of
proof apply to the legal issues involved.  When viewed in its entirety, the record before us in this
proceeding does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the accused presented his
ex parte motions merely to harass Taylor.
11. As noted earlier, ___ Or at ___ n 9, ___ (slip op at 16 n 9, 19), the Bar does not
argue on review that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2) in presenting his first ex
parte motion; rather, respecting that rule, the Bar focuses only upon his second ex
parte motion.
12. As noted above, the Bar's amended complaint generally alleged, among many other
things, that the trial court had found that the accused had presented his second ex parte
motion with an "improper purpose" and that the motion had not been "warranted by existing
law."  Although the Bar's use of those terms could have pointed the accused to ORCP 17 C(2)
and (3), those terms equally could have been understood as referring to conduct that DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2) proscribe.  
13. The trial panel wrote:
"* * * DR 7-110(B)(2) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
The Accused chose a course of conduct which permitted him to communicate as
to the merits of his cause with a judge before whom the proceeding was pending
with inadequate notice to the opposing party's counsel.  The court agreed
with the opposing party's counsel that the notice was inadequate."
(Emphasis added.)  As can be seen, the trial panel opinion cited DR 7-110(B)(2) (but did
not cite DR 7-110(B)(3)); however, it quoted from DR 7-110(B)(3) in its reasoning, in
referring to "inadequate notice" (but did not quote from DR 7-110(B)(2), regarding "prompt[]
deliver[y]").
14. We note that this court's decision in In re Bell, 294 Or 202, 655 P2d 569 (1982),
presented a factual scenario involving DR 7-110(B) similar to the facts at issue here. See
id. at 205-08 (accused lawyer prepared decree that he intended to leave for judge's
signature, without notifying opposing counsel when he knew that counsel would object; lawyer
unexpectedly encountered judge at courthouse, which led to discussion of proposed decree and
judge's signature).  However, because that case involved only the issue of the appropriate
sanction, the court did not address in any detail the particular requirements of (or differences
between) DR 7-110(B)(2) and (3).  Further, because that case -- unlike the facts involved in this
proceeding -- involved no notice to opposing counsel, the lawyer's conduct undoubtedly
fell within at least some of the prohibitions set out in DR 7-110(B).
15. Stated another way, the Bar relies upon the general purpose of DR 7-110(B), rather than
the specific wording of DR 7-110(B)(2), to argue that the accused violated DR 7-110(B)(2). 
However, that proposition stands in contrast to the standard that this court applies to accused
lawyers. See generally In re Lawrence, 332 Or 502, 512, 31 P3d 1078 (2001)
(notwithstanding accused lawyer's argument that he complied with "spirit" of rules regarding full
disclosure of conflict of interest, his conduct needed to conform with wording of rules).
16. The record supports the Bar's contention that, by crafting his motions in writing, the
accused sought to avoid the "adequate notice" requirement.
17. We note that the Bar does cite Judicial Rule (JR) 2-102, which clarifies when a
judge -- not a lawyer -- is permitted to communicate ex parte with a lawyer in an
adversary proceeding. See JR 2-102(B) (judge shall not communicate with lawyer about
any matter in adversary proceeding outside course of proceeding, except with parties' consent or
as authorized by law or permitted by judicial rule); JR 2-102(C) (judge may, in certain
circumstances, communicate regarding scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies not
dealing with substantive matters or merits).  However, the accused's actions in
communicating with the court ex parte are subject to the requirements of DR 7-110(B),
which permits certain lawyer-initiated communications in addition to those that JR 2-102 permits
for judges. See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 32-33) (setting out DR 7-110(B), including DR
7-110(B)(4), which encompasses permissible judicial ex parte communications under
Judicial Rule 2).  We already have concluded that the accused's conduct did not run afoul of DR
7-110(B)(2) or (3), as the Bar alleged in its amended complaint.
18. The Bar also charged the accused with violating DR 7-102(A)(2) (knowingly advancing
legally unwarranted claim or defense) when he requested satisfaction of the sanction judgments
against him and the Kerbers.  As noted earlier, the trial panel's opinion did not mention that
allegation, and the Bar likewise does not mention it on review.
The Bar has presented no evidence that, in requesting satisfaction of the sanction
judgments or in asserting that Taylor could not have collected any deficiency on the principal
judgment, the accused advanced any claim or defense unwarranted under existing law.  We
therefore conclude that the Bar has not proved that particular allegation under DR 7-102(A)(2).
19. The accused was admitted to the Bar in 1989.
20. Nothing in the record suggests that the accused is alleged to have committed any further
disciplinary rule violations since committing the misconduct at issue or that the accused
contributed in any way to the delay in the proceedings.