Title: T-Mobile West LLC v. City & County of San Francisco
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S238001
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S238001 
 
First Appellate District, Division Five 
A144252 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
CGC-11-510703 
 
 
April 4, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO 
S238001 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
By ordinance the City and County of San Francisco (the 
City) requires wireless telephone service companies to obtain 
permits to install and maintain lines and equipment in public 
rights-of-way.  Some permits will not issue unless the 
application conforms to the City’s established aesthetic 
guidelines.  Plaintiffs assert a facial challenge urging that 
(1) the ordinance is preempted by state law and (2) even if not 
preempted, the ordinance violates a state statute.  The trial 
court and the Court of Appeal rejected both arguments.  We do 
likewise.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs are telecommunications companies.  They 
install and operate wireless equipment throughout the City, 
including on utility poles located along public roads and 
highways.1  In January 2011, the City adopted ordinance No. 
                                        
1  
The plaintiffs named in the operative complaint were T-
Mobile West Corporation, NextG Networks of California, Inc., 
and ExteNet Systems (California) LLC.  T-Mobile West 
Corporation has also appeared in this litigation as T-Mobile 
West LLC.  NextG Networks of California, Inc. has also 
appeared as Crown Castle NG West LLC and Crown Castle NG 
West Inc.  (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San 
Francisco (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 334, 340, fn. 3 (T-Mobile West).)  
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
12-11 (the Ordinance),2 which requires “any Person seeking to 
construct, install, or maintain a Personal Wireless Service 
Facility in the Public Rights-of-Way to obtain” a permit.  (S.F. 
Pub. Works Code, art. 25, § 1500, subd. (a).)  In adopting the 
Ordinance, the board of supervisors noted that the City “is 
widely recognized to be one of the world’s most beautiful cities,” 
which is vital to its tourist industry and an important reason 
that residents and businesses locate there.  Due to growing 
demand, requests from the wireless industry to place equipment 
on utility poles had increased.  The board opined that the City 
needed to regulate the placement of this equipment to prevent 
installation in ways or locations “that will diminish the City’s 
beauty.”  The board acknowledged that telephone corporations 
have a right, under state law, “to use the public rights-of-way to 
install and maintain ‘telephone lines’ and related facilities 
required to provide telephone service.”  But it asserted that local 
governments may “enact laws that limit the intrusive effect of 
these lines and facilities.”   
The Ordinance specifies areas designated for heightened 
aesthetic review.  (See S.F. Pub. Works Code, art. 25, § 1502.)  
These include historic districts and areas that have “ ‘good’ ” or 
“ ‘excellent’ ” views or are adjacent to parks or open spaces.  
                                        
Not all plaintiffs install and operate the same equipment, but 
there is no dispute that they are all “ ‘telephone corporation[s],’ ” 
as that term is defined by Public Utilities Code section 234, nor 
that all of the equipment in question fits within the definition of 
“ ‘telephone line’ ” in Public Utilities Code section 233.  All 
unspecified statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code.   
2  
The Ordinance was codified as article 25 of the San 
Francisco Public Works Code.   
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
(Ibid.)  The Ordinance establishes various standards of aesthetic 
compatibility for wireless equipment.  In historic districts, for 
example, installation may only be approved if the City’s 
planning department determines that it would not “significantly 
degrade the aesthetic attributes that were the basis for the 
special designation” of the building or district.  (S.F. Pub. Works 
Code, art. 25, § 1502; see also id., §§ 1508, 1509, 1510.)  In “view” 
districts, proposed installation may not “significantly impair” 
the protected views.3  (S.F. Pub. Works Code, art. 25, § 1502.)   
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.  The 
operative complaint alleged five causes of action, only one of 
which is at issue.4  It alleges the Ordinance and implementing 
regulations are preempted by section 7901 and violate section 
7901.1.  Under section 7901, “telephone corporations may 
construct . . . telephone lines along and upon any public road or 
highway, along or across any of the waters or lands within this 
State, and may erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments for 
supporting the insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures of 
their lines, in such manner and at such points as not to 
incommode the public use of the road or highway or interrupt 
                                        
3  
The Court of Appeal discussed other provisions of a 
previous enactment of the Ordinance that are not in issue here.  
(T-Mobile West, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 340-341.)  We review 
the current version of the Ordinance.  (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 306, fn. 6.) 
4  
Plaintiffs’ first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action 
are not before us. The first cause of action was resolved in 
plaintiffs’ favor by summary adjudication.  The second was 
dismissed by plaintiffs before trial.  The fourth was resolved in 
City’s favor by summary adjudication.  And the fifth was 
resolved in plaintiffs’ favor after trial.   
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
the navigation of the waters.”5  According to plaintiffs, section 
7901 preempted the Ordinance to the extent it allowed the City 
to condition permit approval on aesthetic considerations.   
Section 7901.1 sets out the Legislature’s intent, 
“consistent with Section 7901, that municipalities shall have the 
right to exercise reasonable control as to the time, place, and 
manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are accessed.”  
(§ 7901.1, subd. (a).)  But section 7901.1 also provides that, to be 
considered reasonable, the control exercised “shall, at a 
minimum, be applied to all entities in an equivalent manner.”  
(§ 7901.1, subd. (b).)  Plaintiffs alleged the Ordinance violated 
subdivision (b) of section 7901.1 by treating wireless providers 
differently from other telephone corporations.  
The trial court ruled that section 7901 did not preempt the 
challenged portions of the Ordinance and rejected plaintiffs’ 
claim that it violated section 7901.1.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed.  (T-Mobile West, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 339, 359.)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Section 7901 Does Not Preempt the Ordinance  
 
1.  Preemption Principles 
Under the California Constitution, cities and counties 
“may make and enforce within [their] limits all local, police, 
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict 
with general laws.”  (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.)  General laws are 
those that apply statewide and deal with matters of statewide 
                                        
5  
This case does not involve the construction or installation 
of lines or equipment across state waters.  Thus, we limit our 
discussion to lines installed along public roads and highways, 
which we refer to collectively as public roads.   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
concern.  (Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 29 Cal.2d 661, 
665.)  The “inherent local police power includes broad authority 
to determine, for purposes of the public health, safety, and 
welfare, the appropriate uses of land within a local jurisdiction’s 
borders.”  (City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & 
Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 738 (City of 
Riverside); see also Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa 
Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1151 (Big Creek Lumber).)  The 
local police power generally includes the authority to establish 
aesthetic conditions for land use.  (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City 
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 886; Disney v. City of Concord (2011) 194 
Cal.App.4th 1410, 1416.)   
“[L]ocal legislation that conflicts with state law is void.”  
(City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 743, citing Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897.)  A 
conflict exists when the local legislation “ ‘ “ ‘duplicates, 
contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, 
either expressly or by legislative implication.’ ” ’ ”  (Sherwin-
Williams, at p. 897.)  Local legislation duplicates general law if 
both enactments are coextensive.  (Ibid., citing In re Portnoy 
(1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 240.)  Local legislation is contradictory 
when it is inimical to general law.  (Sherwin-Williams, at p. 898, 
citing Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 641-648.)  State law 
fully occupies a field “when the Legislature ‘expressly 
manifest[s]’ its intent to occupy the legal area or when the 
Legislature ‘impliedly’ occupies the field.”  (O’Connell v. City of 
Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061, 1068 (O’Connell), citing 
Sherwin-Williams, at p. 898.)   
The party claiming preemption has the burden of proof.  
(Big Creek Lumber, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1149.)  “[W]hen local 
government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
exercised control, such as the location of particular land uses, 
California courts will presume” the regulation is not preempted 
unless there is a clear indication of preemptive intent.  (Ibid., 
citing IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 81, 93.)  Ruling on a facial challenge to a local ordinance, 
the court considers the text of the measure itself, not its 
application to any particular circumstances or individual.  (San 
Francisco Apartment Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco 
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 463, 487, citing Pieri v. City and County of 
San Francisco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 886, 894, which in turn 
cites Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.)6   
 
2.  Analysis 
Section 7901 provides that telephone corporations may 
construct lines and erect equipment along public roads in ways 
and locations that do not “incommode the public use of the road.”  
We review the statute’s language to determine the scope of the 
rights it grants to telephone corporations and whether, by 
                                        
6  
There is some uncertainty regarding the standard for 
facial constitutional challenges to statutes and local ordinances.  
(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of 
Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218.)  Some cases have held 
that legislation is invalid if it conflicts in the generality or great 
majority of cases.  (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
1110, 1126.)  Others have articulated a stricter standard, 
holding that legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and 
fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.  (Ibid.; 
see also Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)  
We need not settle on a precise formulation of the applicable 
standard because, as explained below, we find no inherent 
conflict between the Ordinance and section 7901.  Thus, 
plaintiffs’ claim fails under any articulated standard.   
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
granting those rights, the Legislature intended to preempt local 
regulation based on aesthetic considerations.  These questions 
of law are subject to de novo review.  (Bruns v. E-Commerce 
Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724; Farm Raised Salmon 
Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10.)   
The parties agree that section 7901 grants telephone 
corporations 
a 
statewide 
franchise 
to 
engage 
in 
the 
telecommunications business.7  (See Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Visalia (1906) 149 Cal. 744, 750 (Visalia).)  Thus, a local 
government cannot insist that a telephone corporation obtain a 
local franchise to operate within its jurisdiction.  (See Visalia, 
at p. 751; see also Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S. F. 
(1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771 (Pacific Telephone I).)  The parties also 
agree that the franchise rights conferred are limited by the 
prohibition against incommoding the public use of roads, and 
that local governments have authority to prevent those impacts. 
Plaintiffs argue section 7901 grants them more than the 
mere right to operate.  In their view, section 7901 grants them 
the right to construct lines and erect equipment along public 
roads so long as they do not obstruct the path of travel.  The 
necessary corollary to this right is that local governments 
cannot prevent the construction of lines and equipment unless 
the installation of the facilities will obstruct the path of travel.  
Plaintiffs urge that the Legislature enacted section 7901 to 
promote technological advancement and ensure a functioning, 
statewide telecommunications system.  In light of those 
                                        
7  
In this context, a franchise is a “government-conferred 
right or privilege to engage in specific business or to exercise 
corporate powers.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 772, col. 
2.)   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
objectives, they contend that their right to construct telephone 
lines must be construed broadly, and local authority limited to 
preventing roadway obstructions. 
Preliminarily, plaintiffs’ argument appears to rest on the 
premise that the City only has the power to regulate telephone 
line construction based on aesthetic considerations if section 
7901’s incommode clause can be read to accommodate that 
power.  That premise is flawed.  As mentioned, the City has 
inherent local police power to determine the appropriate uses of 
land within its jurisdiction.  That power includes the authority 
to establish aesthetic conditions for land use.  Under our 
preemption cases, the question is not whether the incommode 
clause can be read to permit the City’s exercise of power under 
the Ordinance.  Rather, it is whether section 7901 divests the 
City of that power.   
We also disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that section 
7901’s incommode clause limits their right to construct lines 
only if the installed lines and equipment would obstruct the path 
of travel.  Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the incommode 
clause need not be read so narrowly.  As the Court of Appeal 
noted, the word “ ‘incommode’ ” means “ ‘to give inconvenience 
or distress to:  disturb.’ ”  (T-Mobile West, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 351, citing Merriam-Webster Online Dict., available at 
 [as 
of April 3, 2019].)8  The Court of Appeal also quoted the 
definition of “incommode” from the 1828 version of Webster’s 
Dictionary.  Under that definition, “incommode” means “ ‘[t]o 
                                        
8  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket number, and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
38324.htm>.   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
give inconvenience to; to give trouble to; to disturb or molest in 
the quiet enjoyment of something, or in the facility of 
acquisition.’ ”  (T-Mobile West, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 351, 
citing 
Webster’s 
Dict. 
1828—online 
ed., 
available 
at 
<http://www.webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/incommod
e> [as of April 3, 2019].)  For our purposes, it is sufficient to state 
that the meaning of incommode has not changed meaningfully 
since section 7901’s enactment.9  Obstructing the path of travel 
is one way that telephone lines could disturb or give 
inconvenience to public road use.  But travel is not the sole use 
of public roads; other uses may be incommoded beyond the 
obstruction of travel.  (T-Mobile West, at pp. 355-356.)  For 
example, lines or equipment might generate noise, cause 
negative health consequences, or create safety concerns.  All 
these impacts could disturb public road use, or disturb its quiet 
enjoyment.   
Plaintiffs assert the case law supports their statutory 
construction.  For example, City of Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. 
Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 284 (Petaluma) stated that the “franchise 
tendered by [section 7901] . . . [is] superior to and free from any 
grant made by a subordinate legislative body.”  (Id. at p. 287; 
see also Pacific Telephone I, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 770; County 
of Inyo v. Hess (1921) 53 Cal.App. 415, 425 (County of Inyo).)  
                                        
9  
The predecessor of section 7901, Civil Code section 536, 
was first enacted in 1872 as part of the original Civil Code.  
(Anderson v. Time Warner Telecom of California (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 411, 419, citing Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co. v. 
Pasadena (1911) 161 Cal. 265, 273.)  Civil Code section 536 
contained the “incommode” language, as did its predecessor, 
which was adopted as part of the Statutes of California in 1850.  
(Stats. 1850, ch. 128, § 150, p. 369.)   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
Similarly, Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 44 
Cal.2d 272 (City of Los Angeles), held that the “authority to 
grant a franchise to engage in the telephone business resides in 
the state, and the city is without power to require a telephone 
company to obtain such a franchise unless the right to do so has 
been delegated to it by the state.”  (Id. at pp. 279-280.)   
But these cases do not go as far as plaintiffs suggest.  Each 
addressed the question whether a telephone corporation can be 
required to obtain a local franchise to operate.  (See Pacific 
Telephone I, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 767; Petaluma, supra, 44 
Cal.2d at p. 285; City of Los Angeles, supra, 44 Cal. 2d at p. 276; 
County of Inyo, supra, 53 Cal.App. at p. 425.)  None considered 
the distinct question whether a local government can condition 
permit approval on aesthetic or other considerations that arise 
under the local police power.  A permit is, of course, different 
from a franchise.  The distinction may be best understood by 
considering the effect of the denial of either.  The denial of a 
franchise would completely bar a telephone corporation from 
operating within a city.  The denial of a permit, on the other 
hand, would simply prevent construction of lines in the proposed 
manner at the proposed location.   
A few published decisions have tangentially addressed the 
scope of the inherent local police power to regulate the manner 
and location of telephone line installations.  Those cases cut 
against plaintiffs’ proposed construction.   
In Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco 
(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 133 (Pacific Telephone II), the City 
argued it could require a telephone corporation to obtain a local 
franchise to operate within its jurisdiction because the power to 
grant franchises fell within its police power.  (Id. at p. 152.)  The 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
court rejected the City’s argument, reasoning that the phrase 
“ ‘police power’ has two meanings, ‘a comprehensive one 
embracing in substance the whole field of state authority and 
the other a narrower one including only state power to deal with 
the health, safety and morals of the people.’ ”  (Ibid.)   “Where a 
corporation has a state franchise to use a city’s streets, the city 
derives its rights to regulate the particular location and manner 
of installation of the franchise holder’s facilities from the 
narrower sense of the police power.  Thus, because of the state 
concern in communications, the state has retained to itself the 
broader police power of granting franchises, leaving to the 
municipalities the narrower police power of controlling location 
and manner of installation.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
This court, too, has distinguished the power to grant 
franchises from the power to regulate the location and manner 
of installation by permit.  In Visalia, supra, 149 Cal. 744, the 
city adopted an ordinance that (i) authorized a telephone 
company to erect telegraph poles and wires on city streets, (ii) 
approved the location of poles and wires then in use, (iii) 
prohibited poles and wires from interfering with travel on city 
streets, and (iv) required all poles to be of a uniform height.  (Id. 
at pp. 747-748.)  The city asserted its ordinance operated to 
grant the company a “ ‘franchise,’ ” and then attempted to assess 
a tax on the franchise.  (Id. at p. 745.)  The company challenged 
the assessment.  It argued that, because the ordinance did not 
create a franchise, the tax assessment was invalid.  (Id. at pp. 
745-746.)  We concluded the ordinance did not create a local 
franchise.  (Id. at p. 750.)  By virtue of its state franchise, “the 
appellant had the right, of which the city could not deprive it, to 
construct and operate its lines along the streets of the city.”  
(Ibid.)  “[N]evertheless it could not maintain its poles and wires 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
in such a manner as to unreasonably obstruct and interfere with 
ordinary travel; and the city had the authority, under its police 
power, to so regulate the manner of plaintiff’s placing and 
maintaining its poles and wires as to prevent unreasonable 
obstruction of travel.”  (Id. at pp. 750-751, italics added.)  “[T]he 
ordinance in question was not intended to be anything more . . . 
than the exercise of this authority to regulate.”  (Id. at p. 751)10   
Plaintiffs argue the italicized language above shows that 
local regulatory authority is limited to preventing travel 
obstructions.  But the quoted language is merely descriptive, not 
prescriptive.  Visalia involved an ordinance that specifically 
prohibited interference with travel on city streets, and the court 
was simply describing the ordinance before it, not establishing 
the bounds of local government regulatory authority.  Moreover, 
the Visalia court did not question the propriety of the 
ordinance’s requirement that all poles be a uniform height, nor 
suggest that requirement was related to preventing obstructions 
to travel.  Thus, Visalia does not support the conclusion that 
section 7901 was meant to restrict local government power in 
the manner plaintiffs suggest.  The “right of telephone 
corporations to construct telephone lines in public rights-of-way 
is not absolute.”  (City of Huntington Beach v. Public Utilities 
Com. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 566, 590 (City of Huntington 
Beach).)  Instead, it is a “ ‘limited right to use the highways . . . 
only to the extent necessary for the furnishing of services to the 
                                        
10  
Visalia interpreted a predecessor statute, Civil Code 
section 536, which was repealed in 1951 and reenacted as 
section 7901.  (Stats. 1951, ch. 764, pp. 2025, 2194, 2258 
[reenacting Civ. Code, former § 536 as Pub. Util. Code, § 7901].) 
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
public.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting County of L. A. v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co. 
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 378, 387; see also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Redevelopment Agency (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 957, 963.)11   
Having delineated the right granted by section 7901, we 
now turn to its preemptive sweep.  Because the location and 
manner of line installation are areas over which local 
governments traditionally exercise control (Visalia, supra, 149 
Cal. at pp. 750-751), we presume the ordinance is not preempted 
absent a clear indication of preemptive intent.  (Big Creek 
Lumber, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1149.)  Plaintiffs put forth a 
number of preemption theories.  They argue the Ordinance is 
contradictory to section 7901.  At oral argument, they asserted  
the Legislature occupied the field  with section 7901, the terms 
of which indicate that a paramount state concern will not 
tolerate additional local action.  And in their briefs, many of 
plaintiffs’ arguments were focused on what has been labeled, in 
the federal context, as obstacle preemption.   
“The ‘contradictory and inimical’ form of preemption does 
not apply unless the ordinance directly requires what the state 
                                        
11  
The Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue twice, coming 
to a different conclusion each time.  In Sprint PCS Assets v. City 
of Palos Verdes Estates (9th Cir. 2009) 583 F.3d 716, the Ninth 
Circuit found no conflict between section 7901 and a local 
ordinance 
conditioning 
permit 
approval 
on 
aesthetic 
considerations.  (Palos Verdes Estates, at pp. 721-723.)  In an 
unpublished decision issued three years earlier, the Ninth 
Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion.  (Sprint PCS v. La 
Cañada Flintridge (9th Cir. 2006) 182 Fed.Appx. 688, 689.)  Due 
to its unpublished status, the La Cañada Flintridge decision 
carries no precedential value.  (T-Mobile West, supra, 3 
Cal.App.5th at p. 355, citing Bowen v. Ziasun Technologies, Inc. 
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 777, 787, fn. 6.)   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
statute forbids or prohibits what the state enactment demands.”  
(City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 743, citing Big Creek 
Lumber, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1161.)  “[N]o inimical conflict 
will be found where it is reasonably possible to comply with both 
the state and local laws.”  (City of Riverside, at p. 743.)  As noted, 
section 7901 grants telephone corporations the right to install 
lines on public roads without obtaining a local franchise.  The 
Ordinance does not require plaintiffs to obtain a local franchise 
to operate within the City.  Nor does it allow certain companies 
to use public roads while excluding others.  Any wireless 
provider may construct telephone lines on the City’s public 
roads so long as it obtains a permit, which may sometimes be 
conditioned on aesthetic approval.  Because section 7901 says 
nothing about the aesthetics or appearance of telephone lines, 
the Ordinance is not inimical to the statute.   
The argument that the Legislature occupied the field by 
implication likewise fails.  Field preemption generally exists 
where the Legislature has comprehensively regulated in an 
area, leaving no room for additional local action.  (See, e.g., 
American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 
Cal.4th 1239, 1252-1257;  O’Connell, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1061, 
1068-1074.)  Unlike the statutory schemes addressed in 
American Financial and O’Connell, section 7901 does not 
comprehensively regulate telephone line installation or provide 
a general regulatory scheme.  On the contrary, section 7901 
consists of a single sentence.  Moreover, although the granting 
of telephone franchises has been deemed a matter of statewide 
concern (Pacific Telephone I, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 774; Pacific 
Telephone II, supra, 197 Cal.App.2d at p. 152), the power to 
regulate the location and manner of line installation is generally 
a matter left to local regulation.  The City is not attempting to 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
regulate in an area over which the state has traditionally 
exercised control.  Instead, this is an area of regulation in which 
there are “ ‘significant local interest[s] to be served that may 
differ from one locality to another.’ ”  (Big Creek Lumber, supra, 
38 Cal.4th at p. 1149.)   
City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th 729, is instructive.  
There, the question was whether state statutes designed to 
enhance patient and caregiver access to medical marijuana 
preempted a local zoning law banning dispensaries within a 
city’s limits.  (Id. at pp. 737, 739-740.)  An early enactment had 
declared 
that 
physicians 
could 
not 
be 
punished 
for 
recommending medical marijuana and that state statutes 
prohibiting possession and cultivation of marijuana would not 
apply to patients or caregivers.  (Id. at p. 744.)  A subsequent 
enactment established a program for issuing medical marijuana 
identification cards and provided that a cardholder could not be 
arrested for possession or cultivation in permitted amounts.  (Id. 
at p. 745.)  We concluded that the “narrow reach of these 
statutes” (ibid.) showed they did not “expressly or impliedly 
preempt [the city’s] zoning provisions” (id. at p. 752).   
Preemption was not implied because the Legislature had 
not tried “to fully occupy the field of medical marijuana 
regulation as a matter of statewide concern, or to partially 
occupy this field under circumstances indicating that further 
local regulation will not be tolerated.”  (City of Riverside, supra, 
56 Cal.4th at p. 755.)  While state statutes took “limited steps 
toward recognizing marijuana as a medicine,” they described 
“no comprehensive scheme or system for authorizing, 
controlling, or regulating the processing and distribution of 
marijuana for medical purposes, such that no room remains for 
local action.”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, there were significant local 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
interests that could vary by jurisdiction, giving rise to a 
presumption against preemption.  (Ibid.)   
Similarly, here, the Legislature has not adopted a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.  Instead, it has taken the 
limited step of guaranteeing that telephone corporations need 
not secure a local franchise to operate in the state or to construct 
local lines and equipment.  Moreover, the statute leaves room 
for additional local action and there are significant local 
interests relating to road use that may vary by jurisdiction.     
Finally, plaintiffs’ briefing raises arguments that sound in 
the theory of obstacle preemption.  Under that theory, a local 
law would be displaced if it hinders the accomplishment of the 
purposes behind a state law.  This court has never said explicitly 
whether state preemption principles are coextensive with the 
developed federal conception of obstacle preemption.  (See, e.g., 
Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 853, 867-868; cf. City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
pp. 763-765 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  But assuming for the sake of 
argument that the theory applies, we conclude there is no 
obstacle preemption here.   
The gist of plaintiffs’ argument is that section 7901’s 
purpose is to encourage technological advancement in the state’s 
telecommunications networks and that, because enforcement of 
the Ordinance could hinder that purpose, the Ordinance is 
preempted.  But no legislation pursues its objectives at all costs.  
(Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp. (1990) 496 U.S. 633, 
646-647.)  Moreover, the Legislature made clear that the goal of 
technological advancement is not paramount to all others by 
including the incommode clause in section 7901, thereby leaving 
room for local regulation of telephone line installation.   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
Finally, we think it appropriate to consider the Public 
Utilities Commission’s (PUC) understanding of the statutory 
scheme.  In recognition of its expertise, we have consistently 
accorded deference to the PUC’s views concerning utilities 
regulation.  The PUC’s “interpretation of the Public Utility Code 
‘should not be disturbed unless it fails to bear a reasonable 
relation to statutory purposes and language.’ ”  (Southern 
California Edison Co. v. Peevey (2003) 31 Cal.4th 781, 796, 
quoting Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1968) 68 
Cal.2d 406, 410-411.)  Here, the PUC has made determinations 
about the scope of permissible regulation that are on point.   
The 
state 
Constitution 
vests 
principal 
regulatory 
authority over utilities with the PUC, but carves out an ongoing 
area of municipal control.  (Cal. Const., art. XII, § 8.)  A company 
seeking to build under section 7901 must approach the PUC and 
obtain a certificate of public necessity.  (§ 1001; see City of 
Huntington Beach, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 585.)  The 
certificate is not alone sufficient; a utility will still be subject to 
local control in carrying out the construction.  Municipalities 
may surrender to the PUC regulation of a utility’s relations with 
its customers (§ 2901), but they are forbidden from yielding to 
the PUC their police powers to protect the public from the 
adverse impacts of utilities operations (§ 2902).   
Consistent with these statutes, the PUC’s default policy is 
one of deference to municipalities in matters concerning the 
design and location of wireless facilities.  In a 1996 opinion 
adopting the general order governing wireless facility 
construction, the PUC states the general order “recognize[s] 
that primary authority regarding cell siting issues should 
continue to be deferred to local authorities. . . . The [PUC’s] role 
continues to be that of the agency of last resort, intervening only 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
when a utility contends that local actions impede statewide 
goals . . . .”  (Re Siting and Environmental Review of Cellular 
Mobile Radiotelephone Utility Facilities (1996) 66 Cal.P.U.C.2d 
257, 260; see also Re Competition for Local Exchange Service 
(1998) 82 Cal.P.U.C.2d 510, 544.)12  The order itself 
“acknowledges that local citizens and local government are often 
in a better position than the [PUC] to measure local impact and 
to identify alternative sites.  Accordingly, the [PUC] will 
generally defer to local governments to regulate the location and 
design of cell sites . . . .”  (PUC, General order No. 159-A (1996) 
p. 
3 
(General 
Order 
159A), 
available 
at 
 
[as 
of April 3, 2019].)   
The exception to this default policy is telling:  the PUC 
reserves the right to preempt local decisions about specific sites 
“when there is a clear conflict with the [PUC’s] goals and/or 
statewide interests.”  (General Order 159A, supra, at p. 3.)  In 
other words, generally the PUC will not object to municipalities 
dictating alternate locations based on local impacts,13 but it will 
step in if statewide goals such as “high quality, reliable and 
widespread cellular services to state residents” are threatened.  
                                        
12  
In its 1996 opinion adopting general order No. 159-A, the 
PUC left implicit the portions of the statutory scheme it was 
applying.  In its 1998 opinion, the PUC clarified the respective 
regulatory spheres in response to arguments based on sections 
2902, 7901, 7901.1 and the constitutional provisions allocating 
authority to cities and the PUC.  (See Re Competition for Local 
Exchange Service, supra, 82 Cal.P.U.C.2d at pp. 543–544.) 
13  
Among the PUC’s express priorities regarding wireless 
facility construction is that “the public health, safety, welfare, 
and zoning concerns of local government are addressed.”  
(General Order 159A, supra, at p. 3.) 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
(General Order 159A, at p. 3.)  Contrary to plaintiffs’ view of the 
respective spheres of state and local authority, the PUC’s 
approach does not restrict municipalities to judging only 
whether a requested permit would impede traffic.  Instead, the 
PUC accords local governments the full scope of their ordinary 
police powers unless the exercise of those powers would 
undermine state policies. 
Plaintiffs argue our construction of section 7901, and a 
decision upholding the City’s authority to enforce the 
Ordinance, will “hinder the roll-out of advanced services needed 
to upgrade networks [and] promote universal broadband” and 
will “stymie the deployment of 5G networks, leaving California 
unable to meet the growing need for wireless capacity created 
by the proliferation of . . . connected devices.”  This argument is 
premised on a hypothetical future harm that is not cognizable 
in a facial challenge.  (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 
29 Cal.3d 168, 180; see also Arcadia Unified School Dist. v. State 
Dept. of Education (1992) 2 Cal.4th 251, 267.)   
In sum, neither the plain language of section 7901 nor the 
manner in which it has been interpreted by courts and the PUC 
supports plaintiffs’ argument that the Legislature intended to 
preempt local regulation based on aesthetic considerations.  The 
statute and the ordinance can operate in harmony.  Section 7901 
ensures that telephone companies are not required to obtain a 
local franchise, while the Ordinance ensures that lines and 
equipment will not unreasonably incommode public road use.14   
                                        
14  
We dispose here only of plaintiffs’ facial challenge and 
express no opinion as to the Ordinance’s application.  We note, 
however, 
that 
plaintiffs 
seeking 
to 
challenge 
specific 
 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
B.  The Ordinance Does Not Violate Section 7901.1 
Plaintiffs next contend that, even if not preempted, the 
Ordinance violates section 7901.1 by singling out wireless 
telephone corporations for regulation.  Section 7901.1 provides 
in 
relevant 
part 
that, 
consistent 
with 
section 
7901, 
municipalities may “exercise reasonable control as to the time, 
place, and manner” in which roads are “accessed,” and that the 
control must “be applied to all entities in an equivalent manner.”  
(§ 7901, subds. (a), (b), italics added.)   
Before trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts.  
First, that the City requires all utility and telephone 
corporations, both wireless and non-wireless, to obtain 
temporary occupancy permits to “access” public rights-of-way 
during the initial construction and installation of equipment 
facilities.  These permits are not subject to aesthetic review.  
Second, that the City requires only wireless telephone 
corporations to obtain site-specific permits, conditioned on 
aesthetic approval, for the ongoing occupation and maintenance 
                                        
applications have both state and federal remedies.  Under state 
law, a utility could seek an order from the PUC preempting a 
city’s decision.  (General Order 159A, supra, at p. 6.)  Thus, cities 
are prohibited from using their powers to frustrate the larger 
intent of section 7901.  (Pacific Telephone II, supra, 197 
Cal.App.2d at p. 146.)  Under federal law, Congress generally 
has left in place local authority over “the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service 
facilities” (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)), but it has carved out several 
exceptions.  Among these, a city may not unduly delay decisions 
(47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)) and may not adopt regulations so 
onerous as to “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
provision of wireless services” (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)).  If 
a city does so, a wireless company may sue.  (Sprint PCS Assets 
v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, supra, 583 F.3d at p. 725.)   
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
of equipment facilities in public rights-of-way.  The trial court 
and the Court of Appeal held that section 7901.1 only applies to 
temporary access to public rights-of-way, during initial 
construction and installation.  Because the parties had 
stipulated that the City treats all companies equally in that 
respect, the lower courts found no violation of section 7901.1.   
Plaintiffs argue the plain language of section 7901.1 does 
not limit its application to temporary access to public rights-of-
way.  Rather, the introductory phrase, “consistent with section 
7901,” demonstrates that section 7901.1 applies to both short- 
and long-term access.  Plaintiffs also suggest that the legislative 
history of section 7901.1 supports their position, and that the 
lower courts’ interpretation of section 7901.1 “results in an 
incoherent approach to municipal authority.”   
Plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive.  Section 7901.1 
allows cities to control the time, place, and manner in which 
roads are “accessed.”  (§ 7901.1, subd. (a).)  As the competing 
arguments demonstrate, the “plain meaning of the word 
‘accessed’ is ambiguous.”  (T-Mobile West, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 358.)  It could refer only to short-term access, during the 
initial installation and construction of a telephone equipment 
facility.  But it could also refer to the longer term occupation of 
public rights-of-way with telephone equipment.  (Ibid.)  Though 
it would be odd for a statute authorizing local control over 
permanent occupations to specifically allow for control over the 
“time” of such occupations, the statute’s plain language does not 
render plaintiffs’ construction totally implausible.   
However, the legislative history shows that section 7901.1 
only deals with temporary access to public rights-of-way.  “This 
bill is intended to bolster the cities[’] abilities with regard to 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
construction management . . . .”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 621 (1995–
1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1995, p. 3, italics added.)  
Before section 7901.1’s enactment, telephone companies had 
been taking the “extreme” position, based on their statewide 
franchises, that “cities [had] absolutely no ability to control 
construction.”  (Assem. Com. on Utilities and Commerce, Rep. 
on Sen. Bill No. 621 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 7, 
1995, p. 2.)  Section 7901.1 was enacted to “send a message to 
telephone corporations that cities have authority to manage 
their 
construction, 
without 
jeopardizing 
the 
telephone 
[corporations’] statewide franchise.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 
Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 621 
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1995, p. 3.)  Under 
section 7901.1, cities would be able to “plan maintenance 
programs, protect public safety, minimize public inconvenience, 
and ensure adherence to sound construction practices.”  (Assem. 
Com. on Utilities and Commerce, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 621 
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 7, 1995, p. 2.)  
To accept plaintiffs’ construction of section 7901.1, we 
would have to ignore this legislative history.  (T-Mobile West, 
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.)  Contrary to plaintiffs’ 
argument, construing section 7901.1 in this manner does not 
render the scheme incoherent.  It is eminently reasonable that 
a local government may:  (1) control the time, place, and manner 
of temporary access to public roads during construction of 
equipment facilities; and (2) regulate other, longer term impacts 
that might incommode public road use under section 7901.  
Thus, we hold that section 7901.1 only applies to temporary 
access during construction and installation of telephone lines 
T-MOBILE WEST LLC v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
and equipment.  Because the City treats all entities similarly in 
that regard, there is no section 7901.1 violation.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur:   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 3 Cal.App.5th 334 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S238001 
Date Filed: April 4, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: James J. McBride 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Wiley Rein, Joshua S. Turner, Matthew J. Gardner, Megan L. Brown, Meredith G. Singer; Davis Wright 
Tremaine, Martin L. Fineman, T. Scott Thompson and Daniel P. Reing for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Janet Galeria; Jenner & Block, Scott B. Wilkens, Matthew S. Hellman, Adam G. Unikowsky, Erica L. Ross 
and Leonard R. Powell for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the California 
Chamber of Commerce, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the Bay Area Council and the Silicon 
Valley Leadership Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Mayer Brown, Hans J. Germann, Donald M. Falk and Samantha Booth for Pacific Bell Telephone 
Company and AT&T Mobility, LLC, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Crowell & Moring, Emily T. Kuwahara and Colin Proksel for American Consumer Institute Center for 
Citizen Research as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Wilkinson Barker Knauer, Christine M. Crowe and Craig E. Gilmore for CTIA-The Wireless Association 
and the Wireless Infrastructure Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Yvonne R. Meré, Chief of Complex and Affirmative Litigation, Christine 
Van Aken, Chief of Appellate Litigation, William K. Sanders, Erin B. Bernstein and Jeremy M. Goldman, 
Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Rutan & Tucker, Jeffrey T. Melching and Ajit Singh Thind for League of California Cities, California State 
Association of Counties, International Municipal Lawyers Association and the States of California and 
Nevada Chapter of the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joshua S. Turner 
Wiley Rein 
1776 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20006 
(202) 719-7000 
 
Jeremy M. Goldman 
Deputy City Attorney 
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 234 
San Francisco, CA  94102-4682 
(415) 554-6762