Title: Reed v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091803
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., 
and Koontz, S.J.* 
 
CHARLES E. REED, III 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 091803 
March 4, 2011 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY 
Charles S. Sharp, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
properly denied a motion to vacate the convictions in a criminal 
case on the ground that the judgment was void ab initio because 
the foreman of the grand jury did not sign the indictments under 
which the defendant was subsequently tried, convicted, and 
sentenced. 
BACKGROUND 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On October 4, 2004, 
the grand jury of the Circuit Court of Stafford County was 
presented with eight written charges against Charles Edward Reed, 
III arising from the robbery and murder of Robert Douglas Lee.  
Each was styled as a “Grand Jury Indictment” or as a “Direct Grand 
Jury Indictment,” and it is not disputed that each charge was made 
                     
* Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
 
with requisite specificity to inform Reed of the nature and 
character of the accusations against him.  Each of the indictments 
had a check mark in the space provided indicating that the grand 
jury had found it to be “A True Bill.”  However, none of the 
indictments were signed by the foreman of the grand jury in the 
space provided for the foreman’s signature. 
On the same day that the grand jury considered the 
indictments against Reed, the Commonwealth requested that the 
trial court issue a capias for Reed’s arrest.1  The order directing 
that the capias be issued recited that Reed “was this day indicted 
for eight (8) felonies,” listed each offense by description and 
Code section, and further stated that “[i]t appear[ed] to the 
Court that [these] direct indictments were handed down by the 
Grand Jury this day.”  Reed’s court appointed attorney was present 
at the hearing at which the capias was issued.  The record does 
not reflect that Reed’s counsel raised any objection concerning 
the form of the indictments described in the capias. 
Reed, with his counsel present, was subsequently arraigned in 
the trial court on November 1, 2004 and entered pleas of not 
                     
1 There were ultimately three separate proceedings in the 
Circuit Court of Stafford County relating to Reed’s convictions 
under these indictments – the original trial, a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus to review the convictions, and the motion to 
vacate the convictions.  For clarity, we will refer to these 
proceedings respectively as occurring in the “trial court,” the 
“habeas court,” and the “circuit court.”  
 
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guilty to all the charges against him.  Again, Reed’s counsel did 
not raise any objection to the form of the indictments on which 
Reed was being arraigned. 
A jury trial was held on April 20, 2005.  At the outset of 
the trial, Reed entered guilty pleas to three of the charges that 
were not directly related to the robbery and murder of Lee, and 
which would have permitted the Commonwealth to prove at trial that 
Reed had a prior felony record and was in possession of illegal 
drugs.  The trial proceeded on the remaining five charges, and the 
jury convicted Reed on all five.  Following preparation of a pre-
sentence report, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on 
June 16, 2005.  By an order dated June 19, 2005, the court 
sentenced Reed to life imprisonment for the murder of Lee, thirty-
eight years imprisonment on the remaining charges, and fines 
totaling $200,000.  The record again reflects that no objection 
was raised to the form of the indictments under which Reed had 
been tried during either the trial or the sentencing hearing. 
Reed filed a petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals, 
which refused Reed’s appeal in a per curiam order.  Reed v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1535-05-4 (March 7, 2006).  The order 
refusing Reed’s appeal reflects that Reed did not raise the issue 
of the validity of the indictments under which he had been tried 
in his petition for appeal.  Id.  Thereafter, a three-judge panel 
of the Court refused Reed’s appeal for the reasons stated in the 
 
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per curiam order.  Reed v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1535-05-4 
(June 9, 2006).  Reed’s further appeal to this Court was also 
refused.  Reed v. Commonwealth, Record No. 061375 (November 27, 
2006).  Reed’s convictions became final on March 19, 2007, when 
the Supreme Court of the United States refused Reed’s petition for 
a writ of certiorari.  Reed v. Virginia, 549 U.S. 1290 (2007). 
Reed then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
habeas court.  Among the claims made therein, Reed alleged that 
his trial counsel had been ineffective in that “he did not verify 
the authenticity of the indictments, which were not signed by the 
grand jury foreman.”  In a separate claim, Reed further contended 
that his counsel should have “assert[ed] the prosecution was void” 
because of the defect in the indictments.   In an order dated 
February 27, 2008, the habeas court dismissed Reed’s petition, 
finding that the failure of the jury foreman to sign the 
indictments was only a “technical omission[]” and “not a fatal 
defect.”  The court further opined that if counsel had objected to 
the absence of the foreman’s signature on the indictments, “the 
[trial] court would have addressed the issue, but the indictments 
would not have been found void.”  The court further found that 
Reed “was arraigned on the charges, knew the crimes he was charged 
with, and was not hindered in any way in preparing his defense.”  
Thus, the court concluded that Reed’s counsel could not “be found 
 
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ineffective for not attacking the indictments because he had no 
viable grounds for doing so.” 
Reed noted an appeal from the judgment of the habeas court to 
this Court.  The Clerk of this Court received the record of the 
habeas proceeding on March 24, 2008.  On July 31, 2008, the Clerk 
returned the habeas record to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Stafford County “[b]ecause no petition for appeal has been filed 
and the time allowed by law within which to do so has expired.” 
On July 23, 2009, Reed filed a motion in the circuit court to 
vacate his convictions on the ground that the indictments under 
which he had been tried were defective, contending that the failure 
of the jury foreman to sign the indictments rendered them a 
nullity.  Reed contended that because a judgment based upon a 
nullity was void ab initio, it could be attacked in any court at 
any time, directly or collaterally. 
In response to Reed’s motion, and without requiring an answer 
from the Commonwealth, the circuit court entered an order dated 
August 5, 2009 denying the motion.  The court concluded that 
endorsement of the indictment by the grand jury foreman was not a 
substantive part of the indictment.  The court further found that 
as “the indictment[s] herein [were] returned in open court . . . 
the signature of the foreman [was] unnecessary.”  We awarded Reed 
this appeal. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
As was noted during oral argument of this appeal, Reed did 
not assign error to the circuit court’s factual finding that the 
indictments at issue were “returned in open court.”  Accordingly, 
the issues presented in this appeal are limited to the questions 
of law as to whether the documents under which Reed was tried were 
in fact “indictments” and, even if they were, whether they were 
nonetheless so defective as to have deprived Reed of his due 
process right to a fair trial.  We review these issues de novo.  
Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 224, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ 
(2011). 
Reed first contends that the documents under which he was 
tried were not “indictments” because they were not signed by the 
foreman of the grand jury as required by this Court’s Rule 
3A:6(d).  Reed notes that in a civil context, this Court has 
repeatedly held that a pleading that is not signed by the person 
with proper authority to do so is a nullity.  See Aguilera v. 
Christian, 280 Va. 486, 489, 699 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2010); Shipe v. 
Hunter, 280 Va. 480, 484-85, 699 S.E.2d 519, 521-22 (2010); Kone 
v. Wilson, 272 Va. 59, 62-63, 630 S.E.2d 744, 745-46 (2006); Nerri 
v. Adu-Gyamfi, 270 Va. 28, 31, 613 S.E.2d 429, 430 (2005); 
Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283, 568 
S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002).  Reed contends that the same rationale 
should apply to indictments.  He maintains that since the only 
 
6
person authorized to sign an indictment is the grand jury foreman, 
the indictments in this case are nullities and not indictments at 
all. 
Citing Johnston Memorial Hospital v. Bazemore, 277 Va. 308, 
314, 672 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2009), Reed asserts that “[i]f an action 
is a nullity, regardless of the reason it is such, then no legal 
proceeding is pending” and the purported action is of “no legal 
effect.”  Thus, he contends that the convictions and sentences 
imposed upon him are void because the “indictments” against him 
were nullities and there was no other valid charging instrument 
under which he could have been tried.  See Code § 19.2-217 (“no 
person shall be put upon trial for any felony, unless an 
indictment or presentment shall have first been found or made by a 
grand jury in a court of competent jurisdiction”). 
The Commonwealth responds that the failure of the grand jury 
foreman to sign the indictments was a defect in form only.  See 
Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 345 (1984) (foreman’s duty to 
sign indictment is “a formality,” and the absence of his signature 
“is a mere technical irregularity that is not necessarily fatal to 
the indictment”); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 164 
(1895) (although “advisable” that indictment be endorsed by 
foreman, absence of signature is defect in form rather than in 
substantive charge).  Accordingly, the Commonwealth contends that 
when the indictments were returned by the grand jury in open court, 
 
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as the circuit court found was done in this case, this defect in 
form was cured, and the indictments became valid instruments under 
which to try Reed.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
This Court has previously held that “[a] written charge 
preferred by the [Commonwealth’s] attorney to the grand jury, is 
not, when handed to them, an indictment, nor does it become so 
till sanctioned by them, which sanction is indicated by the . . . 
endorsement” of the foreman that the charge is a true bill.  Price 
v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 846, 860 (1872).  Accordingly, 
there can be no doubt that a written charge reciting events that 
constitute a criminal offense, citing the statute or ordinance 
that defines that offense, alleging that a particular person 
committed the offense so described, and indicating that a grand 
jury has found probable cause to support this charge such that the 
accusation is “a true bill,” but which has not been signed by the 
foreman of the grand jury that has made this finding, is defective 
on its face.  If this were all that the record showed in a 
particular case about the written charge under which a defendant 
is tried and convicted, then it is not an “indictment,” and cannot 
serve as the basis for the criminal prosecution of the accused.  
However, as this Court went on to explain in Price, we do not view 
the written charge in isolation from other aspects of the grand 
jury’s proceedings. 
 
8
In Price, the record in the appeal of a conviction upon a 
charge of horse theft contained a document stating the nature of 
the charge, but which was neither signed by the grand jury foreman 
nor endorsed by him as a true bill.  Id. at 861-62.  It was 
presumed that the document in the record was a copy prepared by 
the clerk from the original and that the clerk must have omitted 
the true bill endorsement and fact of the foreman’s signature, 
believing that these elements of the indictment were no part of 
the charge against Price.  Id. at 862.  However, this Court held 
that whether the foreman “in fact endorsed . . . the indictment or 
not” was “an immaterial question, as the indictment was presented 
by the grand jury in open court as a true bill, and the finding 
was entered of record.”  Id.  Thus, this Court concluded that it 
was the receipt of the charging instrument from the grand jury in 
open court, and not any precise form of that document, that was 
the essential requirement for a written charge to become an 
“indictment.” 
In White v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 824, 828 (1878), 
applying Price, this Court further explained that “it is not 
necessary that a bill, in order to be made a good indictment, 
should have on it an endorsement by the grand jury, or its 
foreman, that it is a true bill.  It is sufficient that the bill 
was actually found to be a true bill by the grand jury; that such 
finding was announced in court by the clerk on the return, and 
 
9
with the acquiescence, of the grand jury, and entered of record.”  
Thus, this Court concluded that the fact that there is “no 
endorsement on the indictment of any finding by the [grand] jury 
would not have made the [subsequent] judgment [founded on that 
indictment] erroneous” if the indictment was presented in open 
court.  Id. at 829 (emphasis omitted). 
The principles set out in these cases, deriving from cases 
even more ancient and extending back to the English common law 
upon which our grand jury system is founded, have been applied in 
many subsequent cases.  See, e.g. Hall v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 
554, 561, 130 S.E. 416, 418 (1925); Crump v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 
833, 835, 23 S.E. 760, 760 (1895); Simmons v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 
156, 159, 15 S.E. 386, 387 (1892).  Price, White, and their 
progeny illustrate the general rule that where the record of a 
criminal conviction contains a document with a written charge, 
whether the original or a copy thereof, that has been presented to 
a grand jury and found by it to be a true bill, the prosecution 
for the offense described in the document will not be void because 
of any error in the form of the indictment so long as the record 
shows that the document was returned in open court by the grand 
jury in the normal course of its proceedings. 
Simmons is particularly instructive of this rule.  In that 
case, the record contained a written charge against Simmons for 
murder “which was endorsed ‘a true bill,’ and signed by the 
 
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foreman of the grand jury.”  Simmons, 89 Va. at 156, 15 S.E. at 
387.  The record further showed that when Simmons was arrested, he 
was arraigned upon a charge of murder, and subsequently was tried 
and convicted on that charge, all of which was reflected in the 
order book by the clerk.  Id. at 156-57, 15 S.E. at 387.  However, 
the record did not show whether the written charge that had been 
endorsed a true bill and signed by the foreman also had been 
“delivered in court by the grand jury, and its finding recorded.”  
Id. at 157, 15 S.E. at 387.  Accordingly, this Court held:  
This omission is a fatal defect.  No man can be tried 
for a felony in the courts of this [C]ommonwealth except 
upon an indictment of a grand jury; and the indictment, 
to be valid, must be presented in open court, and the 
fact recorded.  Until this is done the accused is not 
indicted. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
In other words, even where a written charge materially in the 
form required by Code § 19.2-220 has been considered by a grand 
jury, endorsed as a true bill, and signed by the foreman, it only 
becomes a valid indictment when it is “presented in open court, 
and the fact recorded.”  Likewise, if the written charge is merely 
defective in form rather than substance, it nonetheless becomes a 
valid indictment for purposes of having the accused brought before 
the court to be tried on the charge when it is returned in open 
court by the grand jury and that occurrence is recorded in the 
record. 
 
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Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in 
ruling that Reed was tried under valid indictments.  Although the 
written charges did not contain the signature of the grand jury 
foreman, they had been “returned in open court” by the grand jury 
as true bills and, thus, became valid indictments permitting the 
trial court to order the arrest of Reed and bring him to trial on 
those indictments. 
Reed next contends that even if the indictments were otherwise 
valid instruments for bringing him to trial, they nonetheless were 
fatally defective under Code § 19.2-227, which provides that a 
judgment in a criminal case may be set aside where the indictment 
under which the defendant was tried is “so defective as to be in 
violation of the Constitution.”  The indictments in this case were 
constitutionally infirm, Reed contends, because Code § 19.2-226 
provides for ten express defects in an indictment that will not 
result in the indictment being vitiated, and the absence of the 
foreman’s signature from the indictment is not among them.  Relying 
on the maxim expressio unis est exclusio alterius, Reed contends 
that as the General Assembly did not include the absence of the 
foreman’s signature on the indictment as a non-fatal defect in Code 
§ 19.2-226, we must conclude that an indictment that lacks the 
signature of the only person authorized to attest to its validity 
is “so defective as to be in violation of the Constitution” under 
Code § 19.2-227.  We disagree. 
 
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The purpose of Code § 19.2-226 and its predecessor statutes 
is to “dispens[e] with the necessity of formal allegations in an 
indictment” when the defect complained of is only in form.  Lazier 
v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 708, 711 (1853).  The 
enumerated defects that will not render an indictment ineffective 
under the statute are not, however, as Reed contends, exclusive 
and complete.  Id.  Moreover, Code § 19.2-226 is addressed to 
efforts to quash or have an indictment deemed invalid, while Code 
§ 19.2-227 applies to efforts to having a judgment “arrested or 
reversed upon any exception or objection made after a verdict.”  
In other words, the former statute is addressed to direct attacks 
on an indictment before, or perhaps during, trial, while the 
latter is addressed to collateral attacks after the court or jury 
has returned a verdict of conviction under the indictment.  As 
Code § 19.2-227 makes clear, once a verdict has been entered on an 
indictment, it will be set aside only if the indictment is “so 
defective as to be in violation of the Constitution.” 
The function of an indictment is to give an accused notice of 
the nature and character of the accusations against him so that he 
can prepare an adequate defense.  See, e.g., Rawls v. Commonwealth, 
272 Va. 334, 346, 634 S.E.2d 697, 702 (2006); Wilder v. 
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1976).  In 
order for an indictment to be “so defective as to be in violation 
of the Constitution” so that a final judgment in a criminal case 
 
13
will be declared void, the defect must have deprived the defendant 
of the ability to defend against the charge, thus depriving him of 
due process as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
See, e.g., Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2004).  But, 
“where there is enough on the face of the [indictment] to charge 
the defendant with the commission of an offense known to the law” 
the indictment will be sufficient to sustain the judgment rendered.  
Council v. Smyth, 201 Va. 135, 139, 109 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1959); cf. 
Code § 19.2-221 (providing for short form indictments for murder 
and manslaughter and that “any form of . . . indictment . . . which 
informs the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him shall be good”). 
Reed does not contend that the absence of the foreman’s 
signature from the indictments somehow prevented him from 
understanding the nature and character of the charges against him 
or that this deficiency in form interfered with his ability to 
defend against those charges.  To the contrary, the record from the 
trial court amply demonstrates that Reed was fully apprised of the 
charges against him, made a strategic decision to plead guilty to 
certain of the charges so that the jury would not be made aware 
that he was a convicted felon and in possession of drugs at the 
time of the murder, and mounted a vigorous defense to the charges 
on which he elected to go to trial. 
 
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Thus, we conclude that the absence of the foreman’s signature 
from an indictment, although not specified in Code § 19.2-226 as 
an insubstantial defect in form, is nonetheless a defect in form 
only and does not render the indictment “so defective as to be in 
violation of the Constitution” under Code § 19.2-227.  Accordingly, 
we hold that Reed may not assert this defect in the form of the 
indictments under which he was tried and convicted as a basis for 
vacating those convictions.2 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court denying Reed’s motion to vacate his convictions and 
sentences. 
Affirmed. 
                     
2 Because of our resolution of this appeal on the two issues 
addressed above, we need not address the Commonwealth’s assertions 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
 
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