Title: In re Skagen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52940
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2006

FILED: December 21, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
CHRISTOPHER KNUTE SKAGEN,
Accused.
(OSB 03-64; SC S52940)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 11, 2006.
Christopher Knute Skagen, Portland, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for himself.
Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. 
With her on the brief was Roscoe C. Nelson, II.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.**
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for one
year, commencing 60 days from the filing of this decision.
** Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating the following
Disciplinary Rules (DR) of the Oregon Code of Professional
Responsibility: (1)  DR 9-101(A) (requiring lawyer to maintain
client funds in trust account and to identify account with phrase
"Lawyer Trust Account"); DR 9-101(C)(3) (requiring lawyer to
maintain complete records of client funds in possession of lawyer
and to render appropriate accounts to client regarding funds); DR
9-101(D)(1) (requiring lawyer trust account to be interest-
bearing); DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation); DR 2-106(A) (prohibiting illegal or
clearly excessive fee); DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct
prejudicial to administration of justice); and DR 1-103(C)
(requiring lawyer who is subject of disciplinary investigation to
cooperate and respond fully and truthfully to inquiries and
requests of disciplinary counsel).  The Bar charged those
violations in four causes of complaint, based on the accused's
conduct in four different situations:  (1) the accused's handling
of and accounting for funds held in his lawyer trust account on
behalf of a client, Anderson; (2) the fee that the accused
charged Anderson and a bill that he submitted to her; (3) the
accused's actions in establishing and maintaining his lawyer
trust account; and (4) the accused's conduct during the Bar's
investigation of the complaint against him and during the
subsequent disciplinary proceeding.
After a four-day hearing, a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had violated all
the rules as charged, except DR 2-106(A) and one of the two
alleged violations of DR 9-101(A).  The trial panel suspended the
accused from the practice of law for three years and imposed an
additional two-year probationary term upon his reinstatement. 
Pursuant to ORS 9.536(1) and Bar Rules of Procedure (BR) 10.1 and
10.3, the accused sought review of the trial panel's decision in
this court.
We review a decision of the trial panel de novo.  ORS
9.536(2); BR 10.6.  The Bar must establish misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence, which "means evidence establishing that
the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."  In re
Cohen, 316 Or 657, 659, 853 P2d 286 (1993).  For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the Bar has proved some of, but not all,
the violations charged, and we suspend the accused from the
practice of law for one year.
I.  FINDINGS OF FACT
We find the following facts by clear and convincing
evidence.  The accused was admitted to practice in Oregon in
1991.  At different times since his admission, the accused 
maintained offices at locations in Portland, Gresham, and
McMinnville.  The accused moved to New Zealand in May 2003. (2)
A. Lawyer Trust Account
On February 25, 2000, the accused opened a trust
account with US Bank in Gresham.  The accused advised the bank
that he wanted to open an interest-bearing lawyer trust account,
and the bank labeled the account "CHRISTOPHER SKAGEN BENEF,
CLIENT LTAB ACCOUNT, CHRISTOPHER SKAGEN ATTORNEY AT LAW TSTEE." 
The bank's internal code "LTAB" denoted that the account was a
lawyer trust account; however, the account name, the accused's
checks, and the accused's monthly statements all failed to
include the designation "Lawyer Trust Account."  Pursuant to DR
9-101(D)(2)(c), the interest on lawyer trust accounts is to be
paid to the Oregon Law Foundation (OLF).  Due to a bank error, no
interest was earned on the account or paid to the OLF until May 
2004.
Between February 2000 and April 2004, the accused never
reconciled his monthly statements and, therefore, never verified
whether the bank was in compliance with his original instructions
to set up an interest-bearing account with the name "Lawyer Trust
Account."  Moreover, when asked at his deposition whether he had
maintained a trust account ledger for all client funds kept in
his lawyer trust account, the accused reported that he had kept
track of his clients' account balances in his head.  When asked
whether that approach complied with the relevant disciplinary
rule, the accused replied:  "I don't know.  I don't think it
complies entirely. * * * I haven't thought about that."  Finally,
the accused stated that he had deposited personal funds in his
lawyer trust account on a "handful of occasions."  
In November 2001, the accused made out three checks to
himself in the amounts of $450, $250, and $50, drawing down the
balance in his lawyer trust account to $46.13. (3)  That amount
was insufficient to cover funds belonging to the accused's
clients, including Anderson, that should have been in the
account. 
B. Anderson Matter
On November 27, 2000, Anderson retained the accused to
represent her in the dissolution of her marriage.  Anderson and
the accused executed a written fee agreement, which required
Anderson to pay a "nonrefundable lump sum, earned when paid fee"
of $1,500.  The agreement provided that the accused would credit
his first ten hours of work to that fee and that additional time
would be charged at $150 per hour and billed monthly.  The
agreement also provided that Anderson would be responsible for
"all costs, including expert witness fees, filing fees, subpoena
fees etc." and that the accused would send her "pleadings,
documents, correspondence, and other information throughout the
case."  Anderson gave the accused a check for $1,500.  The
accused did not deposit that check into his lawyer trust account;
instead, he deposited it into his business account. 
Additionally, the accused advised Anderson that the filing fee in
her case would be $300 and asked Anderson to give him a separate
check for that amount.  Anderson gave the accused a second check
in the amount of $300, which he deposited into his lawyer trust
account.  On November 28, 2000, the accused filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage in Yamhill County Circuit Court and drew
a check against his lawyer trust account in the amount of $225 to
pay the filing fee.
Subsequently, the accused performed legal services for
Anderson in the dissolution matter.  During his representation of
Anderson, the accused did not keep regular time records of
services that he performed for her, did not provide monthly
billings as provided in the fee agreement, and never prepared any
billing statements or other accountings concerning her funds in
the trust account.
On September 20, 2001, Anderson wrote a letter to the
accused in which she expressed her dissatisfaction with his
representation and terminated his services.  In that letter,
Anderson requested an itemized statement detailing the services
rendered to her by the accused, a copy of her file, and a refund
of the unearned portion of the $1,500 retainer.  In response to
that letter, on September 25, 2001, the accused prepared a
billing statement concerning Anderson's dissolution matter.  In
that billing statement, the accused represented that he had
devoted 18.9 hours to Anderson's dissolution matter between
November 27, 2000, and September 14, 2001, and that, after the
$1,500 retainer was deducted from the total amount due, Anderson
owed an outstanding balance of $1,335.  Because the items in that
billing are central to certain of the Bar's allegations, we
discuss a few of them in further detail.
The accused billed Anderson 3.3 hours on November 28,
2000, for preparing and filing the petition for dissolution and
other related documents.  Additionally, he billed 1.8 hours on
November 30, 2000, to "Finalize Initial Dissolution Documents." 
On that date, the accused filed an amended petition that was
identical to the original petition filed on November 28, except
that the amended petition included the date of the Andersons'
marriage and husband's Social Security Number -- information that
the accused had omitted from the original petition.
The accused billed Anderson for a "Telephone call to
[husband] re inheritance" on January 10, 2001, and for a
"Conference with [husband] re Uniform Affidavit" on April 13,
2001.  At his deposition, the accused stated that he could not
recall having any conversations with husband.  The accused
further testified that the January billing entry must have been
wrong, because the telephone call must have been to either
husband's lawyer (Bierly) or Anderson, and that the April billing
entry incorrectly referred to husband instead of some other
person.  Nothing in the record, other than the billing statement
itself, indicates that the accused had any communication with
Anderson, Bierly, or any other person connected to Anderson's
case on either of those dates.  Indeed, the testimony of several
witnesses, including the accused, contradicted those time
entries. (4)
The accused also billed Anderson for a conference with
husband's attorney's office on July 12, 2001.  That billing entry
states: "JO: Telephone conference with Bierly office re filing
pleadings; receive letter from Bierly's office re out of Town
until 7/23/01."  The Bar asserts that that entry was for time
spent on Anderson's case by the accused's legal assistant, whose
initials were "JO."  Bierly testified that his office had contact
with the accused's assistant on July 12, 2001, but not with the
accused.  The accused testified that he recalled doing work on
Anderson's case on that date and that he thought that the entry
actually reflected time that he had spent on the case.  He
further testified that, if the entry reflected his assistant's
time, he had not intended to bill for that time because the fee
agreement did not permit him to do so.  The accused also stated
that, if his assistant had performed work on Anderson's case on
that date, then he likely had, as well.  
Following the termination of his services on September
20, 2001, the accused did not return to Anderson the remaining
$75 of the $300 that she had advanced for filing fees.  Neither
did he provide an accounting of those funds.  As noted above, by
November 2001, the accused had drawn down the balance in his
trust account to $46.13.  More than a year later, after the Bar
began its investigation, the accused, on October 10, 2002,
deposited $75 into his trust account to cover the funds belonging
to Anderson.
C. Bar Investigation
On April 29, 2002, Anderson complained to the Bar about
the accused's performance in handling her dissolution matter.  In
that complaint, Anderson stated that, after she had compared her
own records of her communications with the accused to the
itemized billing statement that he had sent her, she believed
that many of the dates corresponding to the billing entries had
been "fabricated."  Among other things, Anderson also complained
specifically about the accused's failure to notify her of the
scheduled trial date and generally of his failure to attend to
several aspects of her case.  As a result of her experience with
the accused, Anderson stated that she was forced to find another
lawyer to represent her in the dissolution matter and that she
was "frightened" to do so because she was "afraid that all
attorneys acted in such manner with their clients."
In response to Anderson's complaint, on April 30, 2002,
the Bar's disciplinary counsel wrote to the accused informing him
of its investigation and requesting that he provide his account
of the matter along with a copy of his billing statements, time
records, and correspondence concerning his representation of
Anderson.  On June 10, 2002, the accused responded that, because
he had moved his office and home in February and March of that
year, he was unable to locate Anderson's file and suggested that
the Bar obtain copies of as much of the file as possible from
Anderson to help expedite his further response.  The accused also
disputed any contention that his fee was excessive and stated
that, because Anderson still owed him $1,335, he was holding a
"disputed" amount of $75 in trust.  Subsequently, the Bar sent
another letter to the accused on July 12, 2002, requesting
responses to a number of additional inquiries, including whether
he had billed Anderson monthly for his time, what records he had
used to prepare the itemized billing statement dated September
25, 2001, and why that billing statement did not account for the
funds that Anderson had advanced to cover the filing fees in her
case.  Additionally, the Bar requested that the accused provide a
copy of his lawyer trust account statements from November 2000 to
the present.
The accused responded to those requests in a letter
dated August 8, 2002.  The accused stated that he had not billed
Anderson monthly for his services because the fee agreement had
required that he do so only after his services had exceeded ten
hours (5) and because he "did not have time to do the billing
for fees."  With respect to the preparation of Anderson's billing
statement, the accused stated that his assistant had prepared the
billing based on his notes, which indicated the dates, the work
performed, and the amount of time spent to perform that work. 
The accused admitted that he had not provided an accounting of
Anderson's $300 filing-fee advance in the billing statement and
that his failure to do so was an "error."  Finally, in response
to the Bar's request for copies of his lawyer trust account
statements, the accused provided the following explanation for
why he could not comply with that request:
"The main reason is based on my clients['] rights to
privacy.  I assert my clients['] attorney/client
privilege.  I previously provided records relating to
[Anderson.]  Your request is outside the scope of this
investigation and the breadth of the request spills
over into my other clients['] rights to privacy.  Trust
accounting for my clients is not an issue in this
matter.  Whatever my clients have held in my trust
account is a client secret and not subject to
disclosure. * * * I am sorry, but I cannot give you
what you request[.] * * * All bar proceedings are
public record.  My clients have a constitutional right
to privacy."
On September 3, 2002, the Bar renewed its request for a
copy of the accused's lawyer trust account statements.  The Bar
informed the accused that its investigation included his handling
of Anderson's funds and that his lawyer trust account should have
maintained a $75 balance of funds belonging to Anderson from
November 2000 to the present.  The accused provided copies of
some of his monthly statements in response to that request on
October 10, 2002.  The accused reported that the statements for
several months were missing and that he had requested copies of
those statements from the bank and would forward them to the Bar
immediately upon receipt.  One of the missing monthly statements
was that for November 2001.  As noted previously, that statement
would have shown that the accused wrote checks to himself in
November 2001 for a total of $750, drawing the balance in the
account down to $46.15.  At that time, the account should have
held at least the extra $75 that Anderson had paid in excess of
the actual filing fee for the dissolution proceeding.  In a
letter to the accused dated May 6, 2003, the Bar stated that it
had not received copies of those missing statements and again
requested that the accused submit them no later than May 16,
2003.
On May 19, 2003, disciplinary counsel had a telephone
conversation with the accused's lawyer, who reported that the
accused was no longer located in Oregon and that he had closed
his practice and moved to New Zealand on or about May 5, 2003. 
In a follow-up letter to that conversation, the Bar requested
that the accused provide current contact information and again
requested that he provide the missing bank statements.  The Bar
suggested that the accused make immediate arrangements with the
bank to have the records forwarded to the Bar.  On June 5, 2003,
the accused responded with a letter indicating that the requested
bank statements were enclosed.  The Bar immediately wrote back,
stating that several bank statements still had not been
forwarded, including the November 2001 statement.  Finally, on
June 19, 2003 -- more than 11 months after the Bar's initial
request -- the accused provided the remaining bank statements to
the Bar.
The Bar filed a formal complaint against the accused on
September 10, 2003.  In response, the accused filed a motion to
require the complaint to comply with BR 4.1(c), (6) arguing
that it "fail[ed] to connect alleged facts with alleged
violations in a manner that clearly state[d] which pleaded
allegations violate[d] which Disciplinary Rules."  Subsequent to
filing its complaint, the Bar made several requests that the
accused provide dates for his deposition.  Due to the accused's
failure to cooperate with those requests, the Bar filed a Motion
to Compel Deposition on December 1, 2003.  
In an order dated December 9, 2003, the trial panel
addressed those issues and a number of others presented by both
parties.  First, the trial panel granted the accused's motion to
require the complaint to comply with BR 4.1(c) and ordered the
Bar to file an amended complaint. (7)  Additionally, the trial
panel granted the Bar's motion to compel the accused's deposition
and ordered the accused to make himself available for a telephone
deposition between February 1 and March 30, 2004.  Finally, the
trial panel sustained the accused's objection to the Bar's
request for discovery of all client files other than Anderson's.
On March 26, 2004, the Bar deposed the accused by
telephone.  During that deposition, the accused repeatedly
objected and refused to answer questions posed by the Bar on
various grounds, including lawyer-client privilege, client
secrets, work product, and harassment.  The following illustrates
the types of questions asked and objections made:
"Q.  After Ms. Anderson terminated the attorney-client relationship in September 2001 until the Bar
asked you about Ms. Anderson's cost advance, did you
review your trust account records?
"A.  I'm going to object to that question on the
basis it asks for information about other clients, and
that information is privileged, that information is
secret.  And it goes way beyond the scope of this
proceeding as limited by the trial panel chairperson.
"Q.  When do you contend that you determined or
discovered that you had not maintained Ms. Anderson's
funds in your lawyer trust account?
"A.  I'm going to object to that question on the
basis of work product.
"Q.  Are you going to answer the question?
"A.  No, I'm not going to answer it.
"Q.  What caused you to review the issue?
"A.  Which issue?
"Q.  Whether or not you had Ms. Anderson's funds
maintained in your lawyer trust account, the issue that
we've been questioning?
"A.  I'm going to object to that question again on
the basis of privilege and work product.
"Q.  When did you make the review?
"A.  The review of what?
"Q.  The records.
"A.  Which records?
"Q.  Did you review any records to determine
whether or not Ms. Anderson's funds had been disbursed
from your trust account?
"A.  Again I'm going to object to that particular
question on the basis of work product.  I won't answer
it.
"Q.  Any other objections?
"A.  Work product.  Privileged.  You're asking
some pretty general questions, but it appears to be
specific with regards to Ms. Anderson.  I'll just
simplify it and state that there's probably some
correspondence with you which reflects -- from me which
reflects a point at which that matter was answered and
responded to.  And -- just leave it at that.
"Q. * * * [W]ould you please answer the question?
"A.  It also goes beyond the scope of these
proceedings as well.  But it is work product and it is
privileged whatever I might have discovered and when I
discovered it with regard to these proceedings.
"Q.  So you're refusing to answer the question?
"A.  Yes, I am.  Again you're just perpetuating
the questions.  This is unnecessary information, you
don't need to know it.  You're just using it to harass
and prolong the proceedings.
"Q.  When you determined that Ms. Anderson's funds
had not been maintained in your lawyer trust account,
what did you do?
"A.  That assumes a fact not in evidence.  And
you're asking me two questions.
"Q.  When you determined that Ms. Anderson's funds
had not been maintained in your lawyer trust account,
what did you do?
"A.  That[] assumes a fact that is not in
evidence."
As the result of several similar exchanges between the accused
and disciplinary counsel throughout the deposition, the Bar filed
a Motion to Compel Accused's Response to Deposition Questions on
April 30, 2004.  In that motion, the Bar argued that the
accused's objections at his deposition were unjustified, were not
supported by law, and served only to obstruct and delay the Bar's
discovery.  As a result, the Bar contended, the accused
unnecessarily had increased the time and expense associated with
the proceeding.
Also in April 2004, the Bar served the accused with a
Request for Production of Documents related to the accused's
treatment of the funds that Anderson had delivered to him. 
Additionally, the Bar requested documents related to the
accused's maintenance of his lawyer trust account, including
whether he specifically identified the account by use of the
phrase "Lawyer Trust Account," whether the account was an
interest-bearing account, and whether any interest earnings had
been paid to the OLF.  Finally, the Bar requested documents
related to the accused's representation of Anderson, including
time records and Anderson's client file.  The accused refused to
comply with those requests.  As a result, the Bar filed a Motion
to Compel Production of Documents on May 6, 2004, in which it
requested that the trial panel compel the accused to produce the
documents.  In that motion, the Bar argued that the accused's
failure to comply with its requests violated BR 4.5(b), (8)
ORCP 36 (providing general provisions governing discovery), and
ORCP 43 (governing production of documents).
On June 9, 2004, the trial panel ruled on the Bar's
motions.  After reviewing the accused's deposition, the trial
panel concluded that the Bar's questions properly had related to
Anderson's case in particular or to the accused's maintenance of
his lawyer trust account in general.  The trial panel further
concluded that the Bar's questions were reasonable under DR 1-103(C) (requiring lawyer subject to disciplinary proceeding to
respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from investigating
tribunal) and had not violated the trial panel's order of
December 9, 2003.  Additionally, the trial panel concluded that
the documents that the Bar had requested were not protected by
any privilege and did not qualify as work product.  Consequently,
the trial panel ordered the accused to submit to another
deposition, "to fully and truthfully respond to all reasonable
inquiries," and "to provide those documents to which he has
access," including Anderson's client file and those records
reflecting his receipt, deposit, and withdrawal of Anderson's
funds.  Because the accused did not comply with the trial panel's
order to produce the latter documents, the Bar issued a subpoena
to US Bank in October 2004 to obtain the bank's documents related
to his lawyer trust account. (9)
The Bar deposed the accused again on November 11, 2004. 
At that deposition, the accused admitted that, at some point
prior to his first deposition in March 2004, he had made a
conscious decision to not send to the Bar a deposit slip
reflecting a return of Anderson's $75 to his lawyer trust account
-- a document that the Bar had requested and the trial panel had
ordered him to produce.  The accused did not provide that deposit
slip to the Bar until November 29, 2004, the first day of the
hearing in this proceeding.
D. Trial Panel Disposition
The trial panel held the accused's hearing on November
29 and 30, 2004, and January 5 and 6, 2005, and filed an opinion
on August 1, 2005.  As discussed below, the trial panel found
that the Bar had established by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused violated the following disciplinary rules:  DR
9-101(A); DR 9-101(C)(3); DR 1-102(A)(3); DR 9-101(D)(1); DR 1-102(A)(4); and DR 1-103(C).  The trial panel also found, however,
that the Bar had not established by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused had charged Anderson an illegal or clearly
excessive fee in violation of  DR 2-106(A) or that he had failed 
specifically to identify his lawyer trust account by use of the
phrase "Lawyer Trust Account," in violation of DR 9-101(A).  As
noted above, the trial panel suspended the accused from the
practice of law for three years and imposed a two-year
probationary term upon his reinstatement, with conditions related
to obtaining professional office management assistance and
establishing appropriate procedures regarding time records and
bank accounts.
The accused seeks review of the trial panel's decision,
raising eight assignments of error.  In the discussion that
follows, we first consider the assignments of error related to
the trial panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law, in the
context of the four causes of complaint that the Bar alleged. 
Next, we consider the accused's due process arguments, and,
finally, we consider his challenges to the trial panel's sanction
and to the trial panel's refusal to sanction the Bar for alleged
discovery violations.  For its part, the Bar asserts on review
that the trial panel erred in concluding that it had not proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 2-106(A) and one of the two alleged violations of DR 9-101(A).
II.  ALLEGATIONS
A. First Cause of Complaint:  DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(C)(3)
In its first cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that
the accused (1) failed to maintain client funds in a trust
account, in violation of DR 9-101(A); (10) and (2) failed to
maintain complete records of and render appropriate accounts for
client funds in his possession, in violation of DR 9-101(C)(3). (11)
The trial panel found that the Bar had established by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated DR 9-101(A) because the balance in his trust account had reached
$46.13 in November 2001.  The trial panel also found that the Bar
had established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated DR 9-101(C)(3) because he never gave Anderson a
written accounting of the funds held in trust for costs
associated with her case.
1. DR 9-101(A)
The accused first argues that the trial panel erred in
finding that he had violated DR 9-101(A) because his failure to maintain Anderson's $75 in his trust account was nothing more
than "negligence," and "negligence is not a disciplinary matter." 
The accused points to the following statement in In re Gygi, 273
Or 443, 450-51, 541 P2d 1392 (1975), to support that proposition: 
"Although negligence may be a sufficient basis for civil
liability under Rule 10b-5 in a federal securities suit, we are
not prepared to hold that isolated instances of ordinary negligence are alone sufficient to warrant disciplinary action."
The accused's reliance on Gygi is misplaced.  Gygi was a case in which this court refused to give preclusive effect to a
federal trial court's ruling in a securities action that the
accused lawyer had been negligent, because that civil proceeding
required proof of the accused lawyer's negligence by only a
preponderance of the evidence, whereas the subsequent
disciplinary proceeding required the Bar to prove the accused
lawyer's unethical negligent conduct by clear and convincing
evidence.  Nevertheless, Gygi is often cited, as it is here, for
the proposition that an isolated instance of ordinary negligence
alone is insufficient to warrant disciplinary action.  As this
court has stated before, however, Gygi does not support such a
broad rule:
"The accused contends this court has held that
isolated instances of negligence are not grounds for
discipline.  That is too broad a statement.  In [Gygi],
we held an attorney's negligence in preparing a
corporate annual report was not sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action.  However, we contrasted In re
Marvin G. Hollingsworth, 272 Or 319, 536 P2d 1244
(1975), in which we held that negligence in making
court appearances and disbursing funds did warrant
discipline.
"A breach of the Code is a subject of disciplinary
action if done negligently and if the breach is apt to
cause the harm the Code sought to prevent."
In re McCaffrey, 275 Or 23, 28, 549 P2d 666 (1976).
In further support of his position, the accused relies
on In re Starr, 326 Or 328, 952 P2d 1017 (1998), where this court
stated in a footnote that it "never has held that DR 9-101(A) is
a strict liability offense."  Id. at 337 n 3.  The Bar responds
by pointing to In re Phelps, 306 Or 508, 760 P2d 1331 (1988),
where this court stated, "Failing to maintain funds in a trust
account does not require intent[.]" Id. at 513.  The Bar argues
that Phelps held that proving that a lawyer failed to maintain
funds in a lawyer trust account does not require proof of any
particular mental state.  As we shall explain, however, this case
does not present circumstances requiring us to consider the
merits of that argument by the Bar.
Here, following the termination of his services on
September 20, 2001, the accused did not account for or disburse
to Anderson the remaining $75 of the $300 that she had advanced
for filing fees.  Rather, two months after that termination, he
made out three checks from the trust account to himself in the
amounts of $450, $250, and $50, drawing down the balance to
$46.13.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we find that
the accused was negligent in handling his lawyer trust account. 
The record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to
support the claim that the accused "knowingly" withdrew trust
account funds that belonged to Anderson, and, indeed, the accused
may not have been aware that the balance in his trust account was
below $75 in November 2001.  However, it is undisputed that the
accused never reconciled his monthly bank statements, and, when
asked whether he had prepared a trust account ledger to keep
track of his clients' funds, he responded that he kept track of
those funds in his head.  Defendant was negligent in failing to
maintain records from which he would have known the amount of
money in his trust account and in writing checks to himself that
caused the balance in that account to fall below the level
required to maintain the funds that belonged to Anderson.  In
sum, the accused negligently failed to comply with DR 9-101(A),
and the rule is satisfied by proof of that kind.    
The accused raises an alternative argument, which he
claims justifies his actions with respect to Anderson's funds in
the trust account.  He contends that he was not required to
return the balance of Anderson's cost advance upon termination
because that amount was disputed, in light of the remaining
$1,335 that he asserts Anderson owed to him.  DR 9-101(A)(2),
however, prohibits the withdrawal of disputed funds from a lawyer
trust account "until the dispute is finally resolved."  Here, the
accused withdrew a portion of Anderson's funds from his lawyer
trust account even though she disputed the amount.  Thus, he also
failed to adhere to the rule's requirement with respect to
disputed funds.  
Finally, the accused asserts that his conduct did not
violate DR 9-101(A) because he later replaced the money, the
amount involved was "de minimis," and the money "was not of
concern to the client."  We reject those contentions without
discussion.
We find that the Bar has proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused failed to maintain client funds in his
lawyer trust account, in violation of DR 9-101(A).
2. DR 9-101(C)(3)
The accused argues that the trial panel erred in
finding that he had failed to maintain appropriate trust account
records or to provide Anderson with an accounting in violation of
DR 9-101(C)(3) because (1) there were records of his dealings
with Anderson; (2) he accounted for the $75 as part of the
investigation; and (3) that rule does not specify that an
accounting is to be made at a particular time.  The accused
further contends that the rule does not require an accounting
until the client requests one.  Thus, according to the accused,
because his correspondence with Anderson does not reveal a
specific request on her part for an accounting, he was not
required to provide one.
First, the facts discussed above prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused failed to maintain "complete
records" of Anderson's $300 filing-fee advance, as required by DR
9-101(C)(3).  Moreover, the accused admitted that he kept track
of his clients' account balances in his head.  That conduct is
insufficient to comply with the rule.  Second, with respect to
the accused's contention that the accounting requirement
contained in DR 9-101(C)(3) is dependent upon a request for an
accounting from the client, this court previously has rejected
that argument.  See In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 290-91, 936 P2d 975
(1997) (concluding that text of DR 9-101(C)(3) makes clear that
requirement that lawyer render all "appropriate" accounts is not
preconditioned on client first asking for an accounting).  In any
event, Anderson's letter terminating her lawyer-client
relationship with the accused, in which she requested an itemized
statement detailing the services rendered to her by the accused
and the return of any unused portion of the initial fee,
constituted a request for an accounting of all funds provided to
the accused.
The accused nevertheless argues that DR 9-101(C)(3)
does not specify that a lawyer must make an accounting at a
particular time.  The facts of this case do not make that
argument available to the accused.  As this court put the matter
in Gildea:  "Whatever efficacy it might have in other
circumstances, that argument cannot aid the accused here, because
the rule clearly requires an accounting at some time, and the
accused never made one."  325 Or at 291 n 10 (emphasis in
original).  Although the accused eventually sent Anderson a bill
that detailed the services that he had provided to her, that bill
did not provide an accounting of Anderson's funds in the
accused's lawyer trust account.
We hold that the Bar has proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused failed to maintain complete records of
and render appropriate accounts for client funds in his
possession, in violation of DR 9-101(C)(3).
B. Second Cause of Complaint:  DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 2-106(A)
In its second cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that
the accused (1) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and
misrepresentation, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3); (12) and (2)
charged an illegal or clearly excessive fee, in violation of DR
2-106(A). (13)
The trial panel determined that the accused made
misrepresentations in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) in the billing
statement that he prepared and sent to Anderson.  The trial panel
reached that conclusion based on a number of errors in the
billing statement, some of which we describe below.  The trial
panel found that the accused had not performed some of the
services identified in the bill that he had sent to Anderson, but
also that the accused had performed other services for Anderson
that were not identified in the bill.  The trial panel stated:
"[The accused] prepared the billing knowing that
he could not substantiate or verify all time charged. 
The trial panel finds that the [a]ccused acted
recklessly in preparing his billing.  There were
misrepresentations in the billing that a reasonable
person would know did not accurately reflect the work
actually performed on Anderson's behalf.  This lack of
attention to detail, and failure to insure that
documents related to the case were accurately prepared
is similar to the lack of attention to detail that the
[a]ccused has given to his monthly lawyer trust account
statements * * *."
The trial panel rejected the Bar's charge that the
accused had violated DR 2-106(A), which prohibits charging an
excessive fee.  The trial panel found that "time charged on
January 10, 2001, April 13, 2001, and July 1[2], 2001, was not
performed for the client" and therefore was excessive, but
nevertheless concluded that the total fee charged was not
excessive, because, as noted, the accused also performed work
that was not reflected in the bill.
1. DR 1-102(A)(3)
The accused argues that the trial panel erred in
finding that he violated DR 1-102(A)(3) because his conduct
constituted nothing more than "unintentional errors" in the
billing.  Therefore, the accused argues, the alleged
misrepresentation and dishonesty were not committed knowingly,
which is a prerequisite for a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).  The
Bar responds that the accused "knowingly" and "intentionally"
engaged in misrepresentation and dishonesty by billing for
services that he did not perform or that did not occur and by
inflating the time for services rendered (or taking excessive
time to perform those services).
Evaluating an allegation of affirmative
misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3) involves a two-part
inquiry:  (1) whether the accused lawyer knew that the lawyer's
statement was a misrepresentation -- i.e., the misrepresentation
must have been committed knowingly; and (2) whether the lawyer
knew that it was material.  In re Claussen, 331 Or 252, 261, 14
P3d 586 (2000).  A material misrepresentation involves
information that, if the decision-maker had known of it, would or
could have influenced the decision-making process significantly. 
Id.  
The Bar also may prove a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) by
demonstrating that the accused lawyer engaged in "conduct
involving dishonesty."  In contrast to what is required to prove
an affirmative misrepresentation, the Bar may prove dishonest
conduct without proving that the accused knowingly made
affirmative false statements.  See In re Carpenter, 337 Or 226,
233-34, 95 P3d 203 (2004) (describing differences in evidence
required to prove "misrepresentation" and "dishonesty" under DR
1-102(A)(3)).  Dishonest conduct is "conduct that indicates a
disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud; untrustworthiness; or a
lack of integrity."  Carpenter, 337 Or at 234 (quoting In re
Dugger, 334 Or 602, 609, 54 P3d 595 (2002)).  Although proving
that a lawyer acted dishonestly does not require evidence that
the lawyer intended to deceive, it does require a mental state of
knowledge -- that is, that the accused lawyer knew that his
conduct was culpable in some respect.  See Carpenter, 337 Or at
235 ("[D]ishonesty requires a mental state of knowledge or
intent." (Emphasis in original.)).
We note first that the trial panel did not find that
the errors in the accused's billing had been knowing or
intentional.  Rather, the trial panel concluded that the accused
had acted "recklessly" and that he had prepared a bill knowing
that he could not substantiate or verify all of the entries on
the bill with contemporaneous records.  When a lawyer prepares a
bill that is inaccurate in one or more respects, as the accused
admits the bill prepared for Anderson was, that conduct may
breach a contract between the lawyer and the client or it may
provide a basis for the client's refusal to pay disputed charges
on the bill.  However, unless the Bar proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused lawyer knowingly or
intentionally prepared a bill that contained material
misrepresentations or was the product of the lawyer's dishonest
conduct, the lawyer has not violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
We now turn to the specifics of the bill at issue here.
As noted above, after Anderson requested a bill, the accused
directed his assistant to prepare a bill based on the available
documentation, which she did.  The Bar identifies three aspects
of the bill that it asserts constitute misrepresentation or
dishonesty:  billing for services that were not performed;
billing for services for which the accused was not authorized to
charge; and inflated or excessive time for certain activities.
As noted previously, the billing statement includes
entries for a telephone conference between the accused and
husband on January 10, 2001, and another conference between the
accused and husband on April 13, 2001.  It is undisputed that the
accused did not confer with husband on either of those dates. 
The accused admits that those entries contained errors, but
asserts that the conferences to which they referred actually
occurred and were conferences either with husband's lawyer or
with Anderson and may have occurred on other dates.  
Having reviewed the record, we find that the Bar has
not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
knew, at the time that he sent the bill, that those entries were
incorrect.  Neither has the Bar demonstrated that those entries
did not reflect conferences that the accused actually had with
husband's lawyer or with Anderson, albeit on different days than
indicated in the bill.  In other words, on this record, the
accused's explanation of the errors in the bill is plausible. 
That conclusion is supported by the trial panel's determination
that the accused acted "recklessly" and not intentionally or
knowingly with respect to the errors in the bill and the trial
panel's factual finding that the accused performed work on
Anderson's dissolution that was not reflected in the time entries
in the bill.  Moreover, for a misrepresentation to violate DR 1-102(A)(3), it must be material.  An entry on a bill that
accurately reflects work performed for a client, but misstates
the name of a person the accused lawyer talked to or the
particular day the work was performed, ordinarily will not be
material. (14)
The Bar also argues that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by billing Anderson for certain work that accused's
assistant performed and billing for that work at the same rate
that the accused billed for his own time.  The Bar asserts that
the fee agreement did not permit the accused to bill for his
secretary's time.  We agree with the Bar's assertion:  The fee
agreement is silent as to whether the accused could charge
Anderson for work that his assistant performed on Anderson's
behalf.  In the absence of such an agreement, the accused was not
entitled to bill for that activity.  The accused testified,
however, that he understood that the fee agreement did not permit
him to bill for his assistant's time and that he did not intend
to do so.  He states that the entry, which we have quoted
previously, does not necessarily indicate that he was billing for
her time and that he billed only for his own time.  He further
testified that he had worked on Anderson's case on that date.  
While the accused's explanations leave room for doubt
and the trial panel was plainly correct in concluding that the
accused "acted recklessly" in preparing his billings, we cannot
say that the record in this case shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused knowingly made a material
misrepresentation when he included the July 12, 2001, entry in
the bill.  The Bar has not proved a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3)
in that respect.
Finally, the Bar asserts that the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(3) with respect to a billing entry for November 30,
2000.  The accused billed 3.3 hours on November 28, 2000, for
preparing Anderson's dissolution petition and related documents,
which he filed on that day.  He then billed 1.8 hours on November
30 for filing an amended petition, which was identical to the
November 28 petition except that it included husband's Social
Security Number and the date of the marriage, which had been
omitted from the earlier petition.  The record also indicates
that other papers were prepared and filed with the court on
November 30, including a motion for a temporary restraining
order, but those documents were not mentioned in the accused's
billing entry for that date.  The accused was unable to recall
what work he had performed for Anderson on November 30.  
The trial panel agreed with the Bar that the accused
had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) with respect to the November 30
billing entry.  The trial panel stated that the accused was not
entitled to bill Anderson for time spent correcting the accused's
own mistakes. 
We disagree.  Again, the Bar and the trial panel appear
to have confused what may be a contract dispute between the
accused and Anderson with the stricter standards for proving
misrepresentation or dishonest conduct.  Whether the accused
could charge Anderson for correcting the omissions in the initial
petition -- even assuming that those omissions demonstrated some
error on the accused's part -- is a matter of the agreement
between the accused and Anderson.  But the mere fact that he
billed her for preparing and filing an amended petition that
included required information not included in the initial
petition does not demonstrate any misrepresentation; neither does
it constitute dishonest conduct.  Similarly, the record does not
contain clear and convincing evidence that the accused's billing
of 1.8 hours for work performed on November 30, 2000, was a
material, false statement or constituted dishonest conduct.
We hold that the Bar has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused knowingly engaged in conduct
involving misrepresentation of dishonesty, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).
2. DR 2-106(A)
As noted, the trial panel concluded that the accused
had not violated DR 2-106(A) because the total fee that he had
charged to Anderson had not been excessive, even if individual
billing entries may have been excessive.  The Bar argues that the
trial panel's statement of the legal standard is incorrect and
that the accused charged an excessive fee in violation of the
rule because he billed for work that he did not do, billed for
his assistant's work when the fee agreement did not permit that,
and billed for "inflated or excessive time."
We agree with the Bar that the trial panel misstated
the appropriate legal standard.  This court has held that a
particular charge in a bill may be excessive and in violation of
DR 2-106(A), even if the fee as a whole is reasonable.  See In re
Paulson, 335 Or 436, 440-41, 71 P3d 60 (2003) (concluding that
accused lawyer who charged fee that client had no obligation to
pay had charged excessive fee even though excessive charge
appeared within bill containing other reasonable charges). 
However, we disagree with the Bar that the record here proves by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused charged an
excessive fee.  We turn to the specific charges at issue.
The Bar argues that the charges for the conferences on
January 10, 2001, and April 13, 2001, were "clearly excessive"
because those conferences did not take place on those days or
with the individual identified in the billing entries.  As
discussed above, the evidence in the record supports the
accused's position that those entries were simple mistakes and
that around those specific dates the accused did, in fact, have
conferences with husband's lawyer (although not with husband, as
the entries indicated) or with Anderson.  Those charges are not
"clearly excessive" within the meaning of DR 2-106(A).  The Bar
also argues that the accused violated the rule in charging
Anderson for certain services rendered by the accused's
assistant.  We reject that argument for the reasons previously
given.
Finally, the Bar argues that the accused "inflated" his
time for certain work, specifically, the 1.8 hours that he spent
on November 30, 2000, preparing the amended dissolution petition. 
As discussed above, however, the trial panel found that the
accused had prepared other documents on behalf of Anderson that
day that he did not identify in the bill.  In Paulson, this court
stated, "The test for whether a fee is clearly excessive is
whether, 'after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.'"  335 Or at 440
(quoting DR 2-106(B)).  The evidence here falls short of that
standard.  The accused did not violate DR 2-106(A).
C. Third Cause of Complaint:  DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(D)(1)
In its third cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that
the accused (1) failed specifically to identify his lawyer trust
account by use of the phrase "Lawyer Trust Account," in violation
of DR 9-101(A); (15) and (2) failed to maintain an interest-bearing lawyer trust account, in violation of DR 9-101(D)(1). (16)
The trial panel found that the Bar had not established
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated DR
9-101(A) because the accused had made an effort to properly label
his account as a "Lawyer Trust Account."  The trial panel found,
however, that the Bar had established by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused had violated DR 9-101(D)(1) because he
never reconciled his monthly statements and, therefore, never
verified whether the bank was in compliance with his original
instructions to set up an interest-bearing account.
The accused argues that the trial panel erred in
finding that he had violated DR 9-101(D)(1) because he had
instructed the bank to set up his lawyer trust account in
compliance with the rule and he had been unaware that the bank,
due to its own error, had not done so.  
As discussed above with respect to the accused's
failure to maintain client funds in a trust account in violation
of DR 9-101(A), DR 9-101(D)(1) does not specify a particular
mental state that the Bar must prove to establish a violation of
that rule.  Accordingly, a violation can be proved if the lawyer
failed to comply with the requirements of the rule and did so
either intentionally, knowingly, or negligently.  
DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(D)(1) require lawyers to
ensure that any client funds be deposited and maintained in a
trust account that bears interest and that is specifically
identified by use of the phrase "Lawyer Trust Account."  As
demonstrated by his instructions to the bank in setting up his
lawyer trust account, the accused was aware of that obligation. 
Nevertheless, between February 2000 and April 2004, his lawyer
trust account did not comply with those rules.  
The accused is correct that the bank committed the
initial errors in failing to establish the account as an
interest-bearing account and in failing to designate the account
properly as a "Lawyer Trust Account" on checks and monthly
statements.  Here, however, the accused's lawyer trust account
failed to comply with DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(D)(1) from
February 2000 through April 2004.  The accused received a bank
statement for the lawyer trust account each month within that
time frame and made deposits and withdrawals from the account.  A
reasonable lawyer would have reviewed those monthly statements
and checks and would have noticed that the trust account was not
an interest-bearing account and was not properly identified as a
"Lawyer Trust Account."  The accused was negligent in failing,
for more than four years, to bring his lawyer trust account into
compliance with the rules.  
We hold that the Bar has proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused violated both DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(D)(1).
D. Fourth Cause of Complaint:  DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C)
In its fourth cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that,
based on the accused's conduct during the Bar's investigation and
this proceeding, the accused (1) engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4); (17) and (2) failed to cooperate and respond fully
and truthfully to the inquiries and requests of disciplinary
counsel, in violation of DR 1-103(C). (18)
The trial panel found that the Bar had established by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C) because the accused had lacked any
justification to withhold discovery once the trial panel had
ordered him to do so and because he "unreasonably and without
valid cause" refused to cooperate with numerous discovery
requests from disciplinary counsel.
As an initial matter, we set forth the rules of
procedure governing discovery in lawyer disciplinary proceedings. 
The Bar Rules of Procedure provide that "[r]equests for
admission, requests for production of documents, and depositions
may be utilized in disciplinary proceedings" and that the manner
of discovery concerning those items "shall conform as nearly as
practicable to the procedure set forth in the Oregon Rules of
Civil Procedure."  BR 4.5(b).  Three rules of civil procedure are
pertinent here:  ORCP 36, which establishes the scope of
discovery generally; ORCP 43, (19) which governs the production
of documents; and ORCP 39, which sets out the procedures for
taking depositions.  ORCP 36 B(1) provides:
"For all forms of discovery, parties may inquire
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things, and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 
It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
The accused argues that the Bar's requests for the production of
documents and the Bar's questions to him during deposition sought
documents and information that were privileged or otherwise
protected from disclosure and that his failure to produce the
requested documents and to answer the relevant questions
therefore was permissible.
1. DR 1-103(C)
With respect to DR 1-103(C), the accused argues that
the trial panel erred in finding that he had violated that rule
because, in every alleged instance of misconduct, he had been
exercising an "applicable right or privilege."  For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that the accused's objections were not
justified by any applicable right or privilege.
As discussed above, the Bar's discovery requests and
deposition questions related to the accused's lawyer trust
account and his representation of Anderson.  During this
proceeding, the accused objected to those requests multiple times
-- in response to deposition questions, in written responses to
discovery requests, and in multiple letters to the Bar and the
trial panel -- on various grounds, including lawyer-client
privilege, client secrets, work product, and harassment.  
We observe first that the rules for the conduct of
lawyer disciplinary proceedings and the Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure permit a person from whom discovery is sought to object
to the discovery request if the information requested is
privileged.  See e.g., ORCP 36 B(1) (scope of discovery does not
include "privileged" matter); ORCP 39 D(3)(c) (deponent may
object and decline to answer question "to preserve a privilege");
ORCP 43 B (party receiving request to produce documents may
object to production).  When such objections are made, the rules
provide procedures by which the party objecting can obtain a
ruling on the objections or a party seeking discovery can obtain
an order compelling discovery.  See BR 4.5(c) (trial panel
chairperson to rule on discovery disputes in lawyer disciplinary
proceedings); ORCP 46 A (trial court may enter order compelling
discovery).  Thus, an accused lawyer, like a party to a civil
action, does not necessarily engage in improper conduct or
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice simply by
objecting to the production of documents or by refusing to answer
questions at a deposition based on a claim of privilege.  The
accused lawyer is permitted to make an objection and force the
Bar to seek a motion to compel or similar order from the trial
panel.
Here, however, the Bar argues that the accused did not
simply make use of applicable procedures, but rather that his
objections to the Bar's discovery requests were frivolous and
were made solely to delay and obstruct the disciplinary
proceeding.  The Bar points to multiple letters, filings, and
emails that document the accused's repeated refusal to provide
possible deposition dates, to produce documents, and to respond
to requests for admissions.  The Bar also asserts that the
accused's substantive objections to certain discovery requests --
primarily on the grounds of lawyer-client privilege and work
product -- were frivolous.
We agree with the Bar.  As to the accused's responses
to the Bar's discovery requests generally, the record amply
demonstrates that the accused violated DR 1-103(C) by failing to
"respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from and comply with
reasonable requests of" the Bar and the trial panel.  
We also conclude that the accused's lawyer-client and
work product objections to the Bar's discovery requests were
frivolous.  First, the Bar's document requests did not request
the production of privileged documents, but rather requested that
the accused identify any documents that he asserted were
privileged and the basis for the privilege.  The accused never
articulated any basis for the asserted privilege.  He never
explained why the lawyer trust account records that the Bar
sought constituted confidential communications "in furtherance of
the rendition of professional legal services," such that the
records might be subject to the lawyer-client privilege protected
by OEC 503.  
More significantly, the accused's objections ignore the
fact that the Bar proceeding was based on Anderson's complaint. 
The lawyer-client privilege is a privilege of the client, not the
lawyer.  It would defy logic to permit the accused to assert his
client's privilege as a basis for withholding information needed
for the Bar to prosecute a complaint that the client initiated. 
Here, given the nature of Anderson's complaint and the rules that
the Bar charged the accused with violating, there was no doubt
that the documents requested were necessary to investigate and
prosecute the violations charged.
 The accused's position also ignores OEC 503(4)(c),
which provides an exception to the lawyer-client privilege for "a
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the
lawyer to the client * * * ."  Thus, even if the lawyer trust
account records might be considered "communications" subject to
the lawyer-client privilege, that privilege did not apply to the
disciplinary proceeding growing directly out of Anderson's
complaint about the accused's conduct.
We conclude that the Bar has proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused repeatedly and intentionally
violated DR 1-103(C).
2. DR 1-102(A)(4)
This court has held that, to prove a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), the Bar must demonstrate that (1) the lawyer engaged
in "conduct," that is, the lawyer did something that he or she
should not have done or failed to do something that the lawyer
should have done; (2) the conduct occurred during the
"administration of justice," that is, during the course of a
judicial proceeding or another proceeding that was analogous to a
judicial proceeding; and (3) the lawyer's conduct resulted in
"prejudice," either to the functioning of the proceeding or to a
party's substantive interests in the proceeding.  See In re
Coggins, 338 Or 480, 486, 111 P3d 1119 (2005) (so holding); see
also In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-48, 801 P2d 818 (1990) (setting
forth test).  The Bar asserts that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by, among other things, failing to comply with a
June 9, 2004, order of the trial panel directing him to produce
certain documents.  The accused argues that the trial panel erred
in finding that the first and third elements of that test were
met here.
With respect to the first element, the accused contends
that he did not fail to do something that he should have done,
because the trial panel's June 9, 2004, discovery order was "not
entirely clear" and "did not specify" exactly what records the
Bar sought to discover.  The accused is wrong.  The Bar clearly
articulated in its Request for Production of Documents (and its
later motion to compel) that it sought discovery of those
documents related to the accused's maintenance of his lawyer
trust account and his representation of Anderson.  In granting
the Bar's motion, the trial panel expressly identified which of
the Bar's requests it was ordering the accused to comply with. 
As noted above, the accused refused to comply with that order,
and none of the various grounds that he asserted to justify his
repeated objections was supported under applicable law. 
Consequently, the accused failed to do something that he should
have done.
With respect to the third element, the accused argues
that any alleged misconduct was not prejudicial to the
administration of justice but, rather, was the product of a
"contentious" and vigorous defense.
To conclude that a lawyer's conduct was prejudicial to
the administration of justice under DR 1-102(A)(4), we must find
that the lawyer engaged either in repeated acts causing some harm
to the administration of justice or a single act that caused
substantial harm to the administration of justice.  Haws, 310 Or
at 748.  Here, the accused delayed his compliance with the Bar's
request for copies of his lawyer trust account statements for
more than eleven months.  Additionally, his improper objections
at his first deposition prejudiced the Bar's ability to prosecute
this case expeditiously and resulted in the added time and
expense of a subsequent deposition.  Furthermore, due to the
accused's intentional refusal to respond fully and truthfully
about his failure to prepare and maintain lawyer trust account
records, the Bar was burdened with the added expense of
subpoenaing records from US Bank pertaining to the accused's
account.  Finally, the accused admitted at his second deposition
that, at some point during the Bar's investigation, he had made a
conscious decision not to provide the Bar with the deposit slip
reflecting a return of Anderson's $75 to his lawyer trust
account.  The accused's repeated actions resulted in prejudice to
the conduct of this proceeding and to the interests of the Bar
and the public.  See In re Boothe, 303 Or 643, 654, 740 P2d 785
(1987) (issues in bar disciplinary proceedings directly and
significantly affect members of Bar and general public).  His
conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
We conclude that the Bar has proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused intentionally violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
E. Accused's Due Process Contentions
Throughout this proceeding, the accused has contended
that the failure of the pleadings to provide him with notice of
the charges and facts supporting them denied him a full
opportunity to defend himself and, therefore, violated his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  Other than a series of conclusory
statements, however, the accused does not provide any argument to
support the alleged due process violations.  As stated above, in
response to his motion to require the initial complaint to comply
with BR 4.1(c), the trial panel ordered the Bar to file an
amended complaint.  The Bar did so and, as discussed above, the
allegations in the amended complaint related to a specific client
and to specific financial and accounting issues in connection
with the accused's representation of that client.  Consequently,
any due process concern that might have arisen from the somewhat
general nature of the Bar's initial complaint -- and we do not
suggest that such a concern would be justified -- was cured early
in this proceeding.  The Bar's amended complaint provided the
accused with the notice that was due to him under BR 4.1(c) and
the Due Process Clause.  The accused's due process rights were
not violated in this proceeding.
F. Sanctions Against the Bar
In his final assignment of error, the accused argues
that the trial panel erred in not sanctioning the Bar for its
"egregious" discovery violations.  Assuming (without deciding)
that such an assignment of error is even permissible in cases
like this, the accused's assignment here is not well-taken.  The
record demonstrates that the Bar complied with the trial panel's
orders and with the rules of procedure throughout this
proceeding.  The trial panel did not err in refusing to sanction
the Bar.
III.  SANCTION
Having concluded that the accused violated DR 9-101(A),
DR 9-101(C)(3), DR 9-101(D)(1), DR 1-102(A)(4), and DR 1-103(C),
we now must determine the appropriate sanction. 
In determining the appropriate sanction, we recognize
that the purpose of a sanction is not to penalize the accused,
but rather to protect the public and the integrity of the legal
profession.  In re Glass, 308 Or 297, 304, 779 P2d 612 (1989). 
Consistently with this court's well-established methodology, we
examine the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and Oregon
case law.  In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 223, 13 P3d 994 (2000).  We
first determine preliminarily the appropriate sanction by
considering (1) the duty violated; (2) the accused's mental
state; and (3) the actual or potential injury that the misconduct
caused.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then examine any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances to determine whether we should adjust
the preliminary sanction, and, finally, we review our prior case
law for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction. 
Huffman, 331 Or at 223.
A. Duty Violated
Under the ABA Standards, the accused's conduct as
described above violated the following duties.  First, in
violating DR 9-101(A), DR 9-101(C)(3), and DR 9-101(D)(1), the
accused mishandled his lawyer trust account and his client's
funds, thereby failing in his duty to preserve client property. 
ABA Standard 4.1.  Second, in violating DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C), the accused failed in his duty owed as a professional to
cooperate fully and truthfully with a disciplinary investigation,
ABA Standard 7.0, and in his duty owed to the legal system to
comply with his obligations under the disciplinary rules, ABA
Standard 6.2.  Additionally, because the disciplinary process
serves to protect the public, the accused also violated his duty
to the public by engaging in such conduct.  ABA Standard 5.0; see
In re Kluge, 335 Or 326, 349, 66 P3d 492 (2003) (so stating).
B. Mental State
The ABA Standards recognize three mental states: 
intentional, knowing, and negligent.  A lawyer acts intentionally
by acting with the conscious objective or purpose of
accomplishing a particular result.  A lawyer acts knowingly by
being consciously aware of the nature or attendant circumstances
of the conduct, but not having a conscious objective to
accomplish a particular result.  A lawyer acts negligently by
failing to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or
that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation.  ABA Standards at 7.
Based on the discussion above, we find that the accused
acted negligently with respect to his lawyer trust account and
intentionally with respect to his conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice and his failure to respond fully and
truthfully during the disciplinary process.
C. Actual and Potential Injury
Under the ABA Standards, the injuries caused by a
lawyer's professional misconduct may be either actual or
potential.  See In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280
(1992) ("[A]n injury need not be actual, but only potential, in
order to support the imposition of a sanction.").  "Injury" is
actual harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the
profession which is caused by a lawyer's misconduct.  ABA
Standards at 7.  "Potential injury" is harm that was reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct but that
ultimately did not occur.  Id.
Here, the accused's negligent misconduct with respect
to his lawyer trust account, at a minimum, caused potential
injury to Anderson, because the accused failed to maintain
Anderson's funds in that account.  The accused's intentional
refusal to cooperate fully and truthfully with the Bar's
disciplinary investigation caused actual injury to the Bar,
because it unnecessarily extended the proceedings and resulted in
the added expense of a subsequent deposition.  Additionally, we
conclude that the accused's unjustified disruption of the orderly
operation of the disciplinary process also caused actual injury
to the public.  See Kluge, 335 Or at 350 (so stating under
similar circumstances).
D. Preliminary Sanction Under ABA Standards
The ABA Standards suggest that a reprimand is an
appropriate sanction for the accused's negligent misconduct
concerning his lawyer trust account and client funds.  ABA
Standard 4.13.  With respect to the accused's refusal to
cooperate fully and truthfully during the disciplinary
investigation, the ABA Standards suggest that a suspension is an
appropriate sanction for that misconduct.  ABA Standard 6.22; ABA
Standard 7.2.  We now consider the applicable aggravating and
mitigating factors that might affect our determination of the
appropriate sanction.
E. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
"[A]ggravating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.21.  The Bar first argues that
the aggravating factor of prior disciplinary offenses, ABA
Standard 9.22(a), is present here because the accused had
accepted a letter of admonition in May 2002, in which the State
Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB) concluded that he had
violated DR 2-110(A)(2) (requiring lawyer to deliver to client
property to which client is entitled) and DR 2-106(A)
(prohibiting excessive fee).  At its discretion, the SPRB may
issue a letter of admonition to a lawyer against whom a complaint
has been filed with the Bar, upon a determination that probable
cause exists to believe that misconduct has occurred.  BR
2.6(c)(1).  The letter is issued in lieu of referring the
complaint either to a Local Professional Responsibility Committee
(LPRC) for investigation or to the Bar for filing a formal
complaint, provided that the lawyer "accepts" the admonition. 
Id.
The allegedly improper conduct involved in the letter
of admonition related to the accused's alleged failure to return
the unearned part of a retainer to a client and charging an
excessive fee.  We decline to consider the letter of admonition
as an aggravating factor here, as the client complaint that led
to the letter of admonition was not made until January 2002 and
the letter of admonition itself was not issued until May 2002. 
The similar conduct of the accused in this proceeding predated
the letter of admonition and the client complaint that led to the
letter.
Second, the Bar asserts, and we agree, that the
accused's long delay in producing the lawyer trust account
statement for November 2001 and the deposit slip reflecting that
he had redeposited Anderson's $75 -- both of which tended to
prove the allegations against him -- constituted "bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding."  ABA Standard
9.22(e).  Indeed, the trial panel concluded -- and the record
demonstrates -- that the accused knowingly made false statements
to the trial panel during the proceeding, including representing
that he did not have certain lawyer trust account records, when,
in fact, he did have the records and later offered them as
evidence at the proceeding.  The accused's repeated refusal to
cooperate with the Bar in other aspects of its investigation and
formal proceedings further supports our finding of this
aggravating factor.  Finally, the accused's misconduct in this
case involves multiple offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(d).  We find
no mitigating factors.
F. Oregon Case Law
Our preliminary analysis under the ABA Standards
suggests that a reprimand may be an appropriate sanction for
certain of the accused's violations, while a suspension may be
appropriate for other violations.  Considering the accused's
misconduct as a whole, some period of suspension is appropriate. 
We now consider this court's case law, focusing on the violations
of DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C), for which this court often
imposes a suspension.
In In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 36 P3d 468 (2001), the
accused lawyer committed multiple ethical violations involving
four different client matters, including conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice and intentional misrepresentations. 
After finding several aggravating factors, but only one
mitigating factor (cooperation with Bar during initial
investigation), and actual or potential injury to more than one
client, this court imposed a three-year suspension.  Id. at 72. 
In other cases, this court has imposed two-year suspensions when
it found that a lawyer had failed to respond truthfully and fully
in disciplinary proceedings in addition to other serious
misconduct.  See In re Gallagher, 332 Or 173, 190, 26 P3d 131
(2001) (accused repeatedly lied to Bar and LPRC in violation of
both DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-103(C)); Huffman, 331 Or at 229
(accused made misrepresentations in motions filed with court in
violation of both DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-103(C)); In re Staar,
324 Or 283, 292, 924 P2d 308 (1996) (accused failed to cooperate
with Bar, engaged in misrepresentation, and knowingly made false
statements of fact under oath resulting in prejudice to
administration of justice).
Here, the accused's misconduct was less egregious than
that involved in Eadie.  In this case, the accused's ethical
violations -- albeit several -- involved only one client.  We
also view the accused's misconduct here as less egregious than
the misconduct in the other cases just described, where this
court imposed two-year suspensions.  Although the accused's
obstructionist tactics during the disciplinary proceeding were
ongoing and serious, we have concluded that the Bar did not prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused made knowing
misrepresentations to Anderson.
In In re Eakin, 334 Or 238, 259, 48 P3d 147 (2002),
this court suspended a lawyer for 60 days for mistakenly removing
a client's money from the lawyer trust account, failing to
maintain adequate lawyer trust account records, and failing to
return property to the client.  In contrast to this case,
however, the accused's conduct in Eakin was mitigated by her
cooperation with the Bar.  334 Or at 258.  Here, the accused
failed to cooperate with the Bar -- indeed, he did so repeatedly,
in violation of DR 9-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(c).  
In our view, this case falls somewhere between Eadie
and similar cases -- where suspensions of two or three years were
imposed for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
and failure to cooperate with the Bar, as well as
misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3) -- and Eakin. Here, the
accused's violation of DR 1-103(C) pervaded the disciplinary
proceeding.  Because the public protection provided by the entire
disciplinary process is undermined when a lawyer accused of
violating another disciplinary rule violates DR 1-103(C) by
failing to cooperate in the investigatory process, we emphasize
the seriousness with which this court views that failure.  See
Glass, 308 Or at 305 (stating that court does not view violation
of DR 1-103(C) "lightly" because public will lack confidence in
disciplinary process unless DR 1-103(C) is enforced).  "Indeed,
the disciplinary system likely would break down if the mandatory
cooperation rule set forth in DR 1-103(C) were not in place,
given the lack of incentive for a lawyer to cooperate with a Bar
investigation if that lawyer had the option of not cooperating." 
In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 222-23, 923 P2d 1219 (1996).
Considering together the ABA Standards, the applicable
aggravating factors, and this court's case law, we conclude that
the appropriate sanction for the accused's misconduct is a
suspension from the practice of law for one year. (20)
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
one year, commencing 60 days from the effective date of this
decision.
1. The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became effective
January 1, 2005.  Because the conduct at issue here occurred
before that date, the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility
applies.
2. The record does not disclose when the accused returned to
Oregon from New Zealand.  However, it is undisputed that, as of
the date that this case was argued and submitted, the accused was
an active member of the Bar and maintained an office in Portland.
3. The accused experienced financial difficulties in 2001 and
2002 and filed a bankruptcy petition in February 2002.
4. Both Anderson and Bierly testified at the hearing that they
had had no communication with the accused on January 10, 2001. 
Bierly also testified that, according to his time records, he had
met with husband on April 13, 2001, but had had no communication
with the accused on that date.
5. According to the itemized billing statement that the
accused prepared in September 2001, he had completed the first
ten hours of work on Anderson's case by January 2, 2001 -- more
than eight months prior to Anderson's termination of the
accused's services.
6. BR 4.1(c) provides:
"A formal complaint shall be signed by
Disciplinary Counsel, or his or her designee, and shall
set forth succinctly the acts or omissions of the
accused, including the specific statutes or
disciplinary rules violated, so as to enable the
accused to know the nature of the charge or charges
against the accused.  When more than one act or
transaction is relied upon, the allegations shall be
separately stated and numbered.  The formal complaint
need not be verified." 
7. The accused made several subsequent challenges to the
Bar's amended complaints, but the trial panel denied them
all.
8. BR 4.5(b) provides, in part:
"(1) Requests for admission, requests
for production of documents, and depositions
may be utilized in disciplinary proceedings.
"* * * * *
"(4) The manner of making requests for
the production of documents shall conform as
nearly as practicable to the procedure set
forth in the Oregon Rules of Civil
Procedure."
9. At the Bar's expense, the bank produced copies of
records related to the accused's lawyer trust account,
including cancelled checks and deposit slips for the period
of October 2000 to April 2002, and monthly statements for
the period of February 2000 to September 2004.
10. DR 9-101(A) provides, in part:
"All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law
firm, including advances for costs and expenses and
escrow and other funds held by a lawyer or law firm for
another in the course of work as lawyers, shall be
deposited and maintained in one or more identifiable
trust accounts in the state in which the law office is
situated."
11. DR 9-101(C) provides, in part:
"A lawyer shall:
"* * * * *
"(3) Maintain complete records of all funds,
securities and other properties of a client coming into
the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate
accounts to the lawyer's client regarding them.  Every
lawyer engaged in the private practice of law shall
maintain and preserve for a period of at least five
years after final disposition of the underlying matter,
the records of the accounts, including checkbooks,
canceled checks, check stubs, vouchers, ledgers,
journals, closing statements, accountings or other
statements of disbursements rendered to clients or
equivalent records clearly and expressly reflecting the
date, amount, source and explanation for all receipts,
withdrawals, deliveries and disbursements of funds or
other property of a client."
12. DR 1-102(A) provides, in part:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]"
13. DR 2-106 provides, in part:
"(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive
fee.
"(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.  Factors to
be considered as guides in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
"(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly."
14. The Bar identifies a number of other entries on the
bill as misrepresentations.  Many of those appear to be
errors that resulted from the accused's assistant's efforts
to reconstruct the bill from a variety of contemporaneous
notes and documents.  For example, the bill contains an
entry dated February 20, 2001, for receiving and reviewing a
letter from husband's lawyer that was dated February 20,
2001, and apparently sent by regular mail on that date. 
Although the Bar is probably correct that the letter was
actually received and reviewed after February 20, 2001,
nothing in the record suggests that the accused did not, in
fact, receive and review the letter or that the accused
knowingly misrepresented a material fact or acted
dishonestly when he sent the bill that his assistant had
prepared and containing that error.
15. DR 9-101(A) provides, in part:  "Trust accounts shall
be specifically identified by use of the phrase 'Lawyer
Trust Account.'"
16. DR 9-101(D)(1) provides:  "Each lawyer trust account
shall be an interest bearing trust account in a financial
institution selected by the lawyer or law firm in the
exercise of reasonable care."
17. DR 1-102(A) provides, in part:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"(4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]"
18. DR 1-103(C) provides:
"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."
19. ORCP 43 A provides, in part:
"Any party may serve on any other party a request: 
(1) to produce and permit the party making the request,
or someone acting on behalf of the party making the
request, to inspect and copy, any designated documents
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations
from which information can be obtained, and translated,
if necessary, by the respondent through detection
devices into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and
copy, test, or sample any tangible things which
constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule
36 B and which are in the possession, custody, or
control of the party upon whom the request is
served[.]"
20. As noted, the trial panel ordered that the accused be
suspended for three years and that, upon reinstatement, he
be subject to certain terms of probation.  This court
recently stated that it did not favor probation.  See In re
Obert, 336 Or 640, 656, 89 P3d 1173 (2004) ("[W]e do not
favor probationary terms unless they are the result of a
stipulation.  When a lawyer's misconduct is sufficiently
serious to warrant a lengthy probationary period, the
uncertainties of the monitoring process lead us to prefer,
when appropriate, imposition of a sanction involving a
concrete period of suspension.")  Moreover, the probationary
period here would have commenced after reinstatement, and we
question whether the Bar would be able adequately to monitor
the accused's compliance with the terms of probation
following his possible reinstatement after a three-year
suspension.  In our view, the burden placed on the accused
to demonstrate the requisite good moral character and
general fitness to practice law, should he apply for
reinstatement under BR 8.1(a)(iv) following the suspension
imposed here, adequately will protect the public and the
integrity of the profession.