Title: Underwood v. Bunger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 53S01-1703-MI-126
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2017

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Arend J. Abel 
Cohen & Malad, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
THOMAS BUNGER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
KENNETH K. KINNEY 
Scott D. Pankow 
Indianapolis, Indiana
_________________________________________________________________________________  
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 53S01-1703-MI-126 
 
CHERYL L. UNDERWOOD, 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff),  
 
V. 
 
THOMAS BUNGER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE  
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE  
OF KENNETH K. KINNEY; JUDITH M. FULFORD;  
AND SHEREE DEMMING, 
 
Appellees (Defendants).  
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court, No. 53C01-1504-MI-657 
The Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 53A01-1509-MI-1305 
_________________________________ 
 
March 6, 2017 
Slaughter, Justice. 
Indiana has a longstanding legal presumption, recognized by statute and at common law, 
that spouses owning real property hold their interests as tenants by the entirety. This presumption, 
which is rebuttable upon a showing the parties intended another form of ownership, applies even 
if the couple owns the property with one or more additional parties. We hold this presumption is 
rebutted on the record before us. The deed conveying the property specifies that the three grantees, 
two of whom are married, shall take the property “all as Tenants-in-Common”. We reverse and 
remand with instructions. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 06 2017, 12:42 pm
 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
On July 25, 2002, the owner of real property located near the Indiana University campus 
in Bloomington (Property) executed a warranty deed (Deed) to three grantees: Cheryl Underwood, 
Kenneth Kinney, and Judith Fulford. Kinney (Husband), now deceased, and Fulford (Wife) were 
married when the Property was conveyed and remained married at Husband’s death. The Deed’s 
granting clause provides as follows: 
MERRILL DAVIS KISSICK, of legal age (“Grantor”), of MONROE 
County, Indiana, CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to CHERYL L. UNDERWOOD, 
of legal age, and KENNETH KINNEY AND JUDITH M. FULFORD, husband and 
wife, all as Tenants-in-Common (“Grantee”), of MONROE County, Indiana, for 
and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is acknowledged, the following described real 
estate in MONROE County, Indiana: [Legal Description Omitted] 
A dozen years later, in a separate case in June 2014, the Monroe Circuit Court entered a 
six-figure damages judgment against Husband and Underwood, and in favor of Sheree Demming, 
Underwood’s former employer. The judgment for Demming was affirmed on appeal, Bunger v. 
Demming, 40 N.E.3d 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. The Demming Judgment became a 
lien on the Property. Husband subsequently died in November 2014; his estate is represented here 
by Thomas Bunger, the personal representative. 
In April 2015, Underwood filed this action, asking the court to partition and sell the 
Property and distribute the proceeds. Underwood argues that she, Husband, and Wife all owned 
the Property as tenants in common and says she no longer wants to own the Property in common 
with Wife and Husband’s Estate. Bunger, on behalf of the Estate, moved to dismiss Underwood’s 
petition under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing her claim fails because it presupposes the Estate has 
an interest in the Property. Demming moved for summary judgment, likewise arguing the Estate 
has no interest in the Property, and that she has a valid, enforceable lien against Underwood’s 
interest. 
The trial court agreed with the Estate and Demming and granted their respective motions. 
The court found the Deed to be “clear and unambiguous” in creating “an estate by the entireties as 
to the interest of” Husband and Wife. It also found the marital unit—and then Wife herself (after 
 
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Husband died)—was a tenant in common with Underwood. Based on these findings, the court held 
that the judgment lien created by the Demming Judgment did not attach to the share of the real 
estate now owned by Wife because the judgment was entered against only Husband. Thus, the 
court concluded that Demming’s lien applied against Underwood’s one-half interest in the 
Property but not Wife’s interest. The court entered a partial final judgment under Trial Rule 54(B), 
from which Underwood appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Underwood v. Bunger, 52 N.E.3d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), 
reh’g denied. It, too, rejected Underwood’s argument, concluding that “the deed’s phrase ‘all as 
Tenants-in-Common’ must be balanced against the identification of Kinney and Fulford as 
husband and wife and does not clearly overcome the presumption in favor of tenancies by the 
entirety.” Id. at 833 (citations omitted). Based on this determination, the Court held that Husband’s 
interest in the Property passed directly to Wife upon his death and not to his Estate. Underwood 
sought transfer, which we now grant and reverse. 
Standard of Review 
The interpretation of a written instrument, including a deed, is generally a question of law 
we review de novo. Corn v. Corn, 24 N.E.3d 987, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. See also 
Brown v. Penn Cent. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. 1987). In construing a deed, we read it as 
a whole, determining “the parties’ intent by the unambiguous language they used, presuming they 
intended each part to have meaning.” Girl Scouts of So. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc., 988 
N.E.2d 250, 256 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted). 
Discussion and Decision 
We consider, first, whether the Deed is sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption 
that Husband and Wife held their interests in the Property by the entireties. We hold that it is. In 
addition, we address whether Underwood’s petition in the trial court contains a fatal judicial 
admission that estops her from challenging the trial court’s adverse judgment. We conclude it 
does not. 
 
 
 
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I. 
The Deed’s unambiguous statement that the three grantees, including Husband and 
Wife, hold their interests in the Property “all as Tenants-in-Common” overcomes the 
legal presumption favoring a tenancy by the entirety. 
Under established Indiana law, a conveyance of real property to spouses presumptively 
creates an estate by the entireties. The presumption can be overcome if the instrument of 
conveyance reflects an intention to create some other form of concurrent ownership. Over the 
years, this common-law rule has been re-enacted by statute on several occasions, including most 
recently in 2002. This latest statute, which applies here, likewise presumes that spouses hold 
interests in realty as tenants by the entirety. The only noteworthy change to the current statute is 
that it relaxes the showing required to overcome the legal presumption of an entireties estate. We 
conclude the Deed’s granting clause defeats the presumption by expressing an intention to create 
a tenancy in common among all three grantees—Underwood, Husband, and Wife. 
A. 
At common law, a conveyance of real property to spouses created an estate by 
the entireties. 
Three forms of concurrent ownership of real property have survived from English common 
law to the present: tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy by the entirety. United States 
v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002) (citing 1 G. Thompson, Real Property § 4.06(g) (D. Thomas 
ed. 1994)). See also Powell v. Estate of Powell, 14 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). At common 
law, when real property was conveyed to a husband and wife, their interest in the property was as 
tenants by the entirety, Hadlock v. Gray, 104 Ind. 596, 598, 4 N.E. 167, 168 (1886), and not as 
joint tenants or tenants in common, Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391, 410 (1871). 
A tenancy by the entirety exists only between spouses and is premised on the legal fiction 
that husband and wife are a single entity. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Union Bank & Trust 
Co., 380 N.E.2d 1279, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). Once an entireties estate has vested, each spousal 
tenant “becomes seized of the entire estate, but neither is seized of any divisible part thereof”. 
Kilgore v. Templer, 188 Ind. 675, 682, 125 N.E. 457, 459 (1919). Thus, an entireties estate cannot 
be severed by the unilateral action of one of the tenants. Neither spouse has a separable interest in 
property held by such a tenancy, so a conveyance by just one tenant is insufficient to pass legal 
title. Pension Fund of Disciples of Christ v. Gulley, 226 Ind. 415, 419, 81 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1948). 
An essential trait of this tenancy is that it “devolves upon the surviving spouse the ownership of 
the property in real estate, free and clear of the individual indebtedness of the other spouse.” 
 
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Whitlock v. Public Service Co. of Ind., 159 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ind. 1959). When one spouse dies, 
the survivor, “being already seized of the whole, can acquire no new or additional interest” due to 
the survivorship. Kilgore, 188 Ind. at 682, 125 N.E. at 459. Rather, the survivor “holds the entire 
estate, not by virtue of any right which he acquires as survivor, but by virtue of the original grant.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
B. 
The legal presumption that spouses hold real property as tenants by the 
entirety can be overcome if the parties express or intend a different form of 
estate. 
The common-law presumption in favor of an entireties estate for spouses is the default rule. 
But the rule can be defeated by “conditions, limitations, and stipulations in the deed conveying the 
property” showing the grantor intended to convey a different form of ownership. Hadlock, 4 N.E. 
at 168. “Husband and wife, notwithstanding tenancies by entirety exist as they did under the 
common law, may take and hold lands for life, in joint tenancy or in common, if appropriate 
language be expressed in the deed or will creating it[.]” Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 187, 
34 N.E. 999, 1002 (1893). We have held the presumption defeated when the deed presented 
sufficient conditions or limitations, such as a conveyance of land “to Daniel S. Wiggins and Laura 
Belle Wiggins in joint tenancy”. Id. (emphasis added). See also Wilken v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 3, 
41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (defeating presumption when deed granted land to “Samuel Gordon and 
Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy, their heirs and assigns, forever”) (emphasis added); 
Hadlock, 4 N.E. at 168-69 (creating life estate where conveyance made clear that each spouse’s 
share would be devised to his or her heirs upon death of last-surviving spouse). 
C. 
By statute, Indiana adopted the common-law presumption favoring a tenancy 
by the entirety. 
The common law prevails in Indiana unless modified or abrogated by statute. New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Finkelstein, 212 Ind. 155, 159, 8 N.E.2d 598, 599 (1937). Cf. McIntosh v. Melroe 
Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 977 (Ind. 2000) (“This Court has long recognized the ability of the General 
Assembly to modify or abrogate the common law.”) (citations omitted). Our legislature has never 
repealed the common-law rule governing conveyances of real property to married persons. In 
1807—nine years before statehood—Indiana, while still a Territory, first codified the legal 
presumption that spouses take and hold real property as tenants by the entirety. Thornburg, 135 
Ind. at 183, 34 N.E. at 1000. Since becoming a state, Indiana has reinforced this presumption in a 
 
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series of legislative enactments occurring over many years. See, e.g., 1852 Revised Statutes of 
Indiana 233, §§ 7, 8; 1894 Ind. Acts Ann. 163, §§ 3341, 3342; 1914 Ind. Acts Ann. 509-10, 
§§ 3953, 3954; 1943 Ind. Acts 667-68. The legal presumption thus remains intact because “[o]ur 
statute [did] not change[] the common law rule as to the estate created by grants of real estate to 
husband and wife, but, on the contrary … expressly recognized it.” Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424, 
428 (1866). See also Arnold v. Arnold, 30 Ind. 305, 306 (1868). 
During the 1850 constitutional convention, delegates considered the property rights of 
husband and wife but “wisely left the whole question to the legislature.” Chandler, 37 Ind. at 409-
10. The 1851-52 legislature did modify the common law in some respects. For example, it adopted 
the presumption that a joint deed to two or more (unmarried) persons would create a tenancy in 
common and not a joint tenancy, unless the intention to create a joint tenancy were either 
“expressly declared” in the instrument of conveyance or “manifestly” appeared from its tenor. Id. 
at 410. But the legislature did not abolish estates by the entireties between spouses.  
[W]hen the legislature provided that husband and wife should not be tenants in 
common, but by entireties, the intention was to guard and protect the rights of the 
wife by depriving the husband of the power to alien or encumber the same without 
her consent and concurrence, or to charge the same with his debts, or to exercise 
sole control, or to enjoy exclusive possession thereof. 
Id. at 414. 
D. 
The 2002 statute relaxed the showing required to overcome the presumption. 
In the modern era, our legislature in 1993 reaffirmed the common-law presumption but 
said the presumption would be defeated if the written instrument “expressed” a contrary intention 
or made its intention “manifestly” clear: the “contract shall not be construed as creating a tenancy 
in common unless it shall be expressed therein or shall manifestly appear from the tenor of the 
instrument that it was intended to create a tenancy in common.” Ind. Code § 32-4-2-1 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
In 2002, the legislature again reaffirmed the common-law presumption but reduced the 
showing required to overcome it by removing the word “manifestly”:  
 
 
 
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Sec. 1. 
*          *          * 
(d) If:  
(1) a contract [to purchase or lease real estate] expressly creates a tenancy 
in common; or  
(2) it appears from the tenor of a contract [to purchase or lease real estate] 
that the contract was intended to create a tenancy in common;  
the contract shall be construed to create a tenancy in common. 
I.C. § 32-17-3-1(d) (Supp. 2002) (added by Pub. L. No. 2-2002, §2). The 2002 statute applies to 
written contracts where a husband and wife either buy real estate or lease real estate with an option 
to buy. I.C. § 32-17-3-1(a). The statute provides that a written instrument conveying real property 
to a married couple generally creates an estate by the entireties. Id. § 32-17-3-1(b). But the statute’s 
general rule is subject to an exception. The instrument will be construed to create not an estate by 
the entireties but a tenancy in common if it does so “expressly” or if it “appears from the tenor” of 
the instrument that was the parties’ intention. Id. § 32-17-3-1(d). The legislature’s omission of the 
word “manifestly” from the statute indicates a weakening of the showing needed to defeat the 
presumption.  
The 2002 version of the statute—the current version—had been in effect for 25 days when 
the Grantor in this case issued the Deed on July 25, 2002. Thus, we analyze the Deed under the 
current statute. 
E. 
The Deed’s granting clause rebuts the presumption favoring a tenancy by the 
entirety between Husband and Wife. 
In applying the current statute, we are mindful of the common-law principles it subsumes, 
including the significant case authority dating to the 19th century that interpret and apply these 
principles. But we also heed the statute’s evolution and its noteworthy revision in 2002 to provide 
that the parties’ intention to create a different form of tenancy no longer need “manifestly” appear 
in the instrument of conveyance. These considerations require that we continue to honor the age-
old presumption favoring a tenancy by the entirety between spouses. But in giving a fair reading 
to the whole instrument, we will find the presumption is rebutted if its terms reasonably reflect the 
parties’ intention to establish a different form of tenancy—a standard we find satisfied here. 
 
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Recall that the Deed’s granting clause provides in pertinent part: “[Grantor] CONVEYS 
AND WARRANTS to CHERYL L. UNDERWOOD, of legal age, and KENNETH KINNEY 
AND JUDITH M. FULFORD, husband and wife, all as Tenants-in-Common[.]” 
We consider two aspects of the granting clause that bear on the issue of what interests in 
the Property the Grantor conveyed to the three grantees: the phrase “husband and wife”, on the 
one hand, and the phrase “all as Tenants-in-Common”, on the other. We conclude that the phrase 
“all as Tenants-in-Common” establishes the parties’ intention to create a tenancy in common 
among all three grantees, and that the phrase “husband and wife” does not compel a tenancy by 
the entirety. 
The Grantor’s inclusion of “all” in the phrase “all as Tenants-in-Common” shows that he 
did not view Husband and Wife as one entity whose unitary estate in the Property was by the 
entireties. Were that his intention, the Deed would have described two sets of grantees—
Underwood and Husband/Wife—and said they were acquiring their interests “both as Tenants-in-
Common”. We hold that the phrase actually used—“all as Tenants-in-Common”— refers to more 
than two such tenants and denotes that “all” three grantees take and hold as tenants in common. 
This phrase creates at least the appearance that the parties intended a form of ownership other than 
a tenancy by the entirety between Husband and Wife under Section 32-17-3-1(d)(2). And, on this 
record, the phrase expressly creates a tenancy in common between them as contemplated by 
Section 1(d)(1). Either way, the Deed defeats the legal presumption. 
Against this conclusion, the Estate argues that the phrase “KENNETH KINNEY AND 
JUDITH M. FULFORD, husband and wife” shows the Grantor’s intention to create a tenancy by 
the entirety between Kinney and Fulford or, at a minimum, shows the Deed is insufficient to rebut 
the legal presumption favoring such a tenancy. But the phrase “husband and wife” does not 
necessarily reflect the Grantor’s intention to create a tenancy by the entirety. Established case 
authority holds that a “husband and wife, though not thus described in a deed of conveyance of 
real estate executed to them, take under such deed as tenants by the entireties.” Hulett v. Inlow, 57 
Ind. 412, 414 (1877) (citing Chandler, 37 Ind. at 394). In other words, husbands and wives enjoy 
the legal presumption favoring tenancies by the entirety, regardless of whether the deed describes 
them as married. Under this view, the phrase is descriptive and provides little or no insight into 
 
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the Grantor’s intent. Thus, we disagree that the phrase “husband and wife” prevents the deed from 
defeating the legal presumption. 
We conclude the Deed rebuts the presumption favoring a tenancy by the entirety between 
spouses and reasonably reflects the parties’ intention that all three grantees take and hold their 
interests in the Property as tenants in common—meaning that Husband’s interest passed to his 
Estate upon his death. 
II. 
Underwood did not make a fatal judicial admission in her trial-court petition. 
We also consider whether Underwood’s “Petition to Compel Partition of Real Estate” 
contains a judicial admission fatal to her case. The argument is that Paragraph 3 of her petition, 
quoted below, essentially concedes the spousal interests are held by the entireties, given her 
allegation that she had an “undivided one-half interest” in the Property, and that so, too, did 
Husband and Wife: 
Throughout the period of time from July 25, 2002, to the date of the filing of this 
Petition, it has been understood and reflected on tax returns that Cheryl L. 
Underwood took title to an undivided one-half interest in the subject real estate and 
that this was a business partnership wherein Kenneth Kinney [Husband] and Judith 
M. Fulford [Wife] owned the remaining undivided one-half interest in the real 
estate with the two one-half interests being owned by Tenants-in-Common.  
Statements in a party’s pleadings “may be taken as true as against the party without further 
controversy or proof.” Lutz v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 848 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ind. 2006) (internal 
citations omitted). “Unless a pleading is withdrawn or superseded, any admission contained in the 
pleading is conclusive as to that party.” Id. 
We hold that Underwood did not make a fatal pleading admission by characterizing the 
grantees’ interests in the Property as “undivided one-half interest[s]”. An undivided interest is 
merely “[a]n interest held under the same title by two or more persons, whether their rights are 
equal or unequal in value or quantity.” Black’s Law Dictionary 935 (10th ed. 2014). A property 
interest held with other parties as tenants in common is an undivided interest. “It is the general rule 
that the possession of one tenant in common is the possession of all, and for the common benefit 
of all[.]” King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20, 24, 35 N.E. 509, 511 (1893). Underwood’s pleading 
does not admit to any form of ownership, but merely specifies the proportions in which the three 
 
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grantees (before Husband’s death) originally held their respective interests in the Property: 
Underwood, one half; Husband and Wife, together, one half. These ownership proportions are not 
inconsistent with the written conveyance providing that all three conveyed interests were held in 
common. 
Conclusion 
The Deed overcomes the statutory and common-law presumption in favor of a tenancy by 
the entirety between spouses by specifying that the three grantees own the property “all as Tenants-
in-Common”. We reverse the trial court’s contrary judgment and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, JJ., concur.