Title: Vickers v. State
Citation: 547 So. 2d 1191
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1989

547 So. 2d 1191 (1989)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re James Calvin VICKERS
v.
STATE).
87-1436.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 17, 1989.
*1192 Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
John T. Kirk, Montgomery, for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a person stopped for speeding who runs away from the officer before the ticket is prepared and the violator signs it cannot be guilty of third degree escape. We reverse and remand.
James Calvin Vickers was convicted of escape in the third degree. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction. The full facts are fully reported in the opinion below Vickers v. State, 547 So. 2d 1189 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). Briefly, the facts relevant to our decision are as follows: The defendant was stopped for speeding. As he sat in the officer's car, he was given a field test for intoxication. When he failed it, and the officer informed him that he had to go to the station, the defendant opened the car door and ran away. The officer caught him and, after a tussle, subdued him. The officer had not completed his preparation of the speeding ticket when the defendant ran away, and the defendant had not signed the ticket agreeing to appear in court on the speeding charge. Ala.Code 1975, § 32-l-4(a).
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the defendant "was under arrest only for speeding when he ran from the car... he was not properly in custody," and that he could not be convicted of escape in the third degree.
Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-10-33(a), defines escape in the third degree: "A person commits the offense of escape in the third degree if he escapes or attempts to escape from custody." Section 13A-10-30(b)(1) defines custody as "A restraint or detention by a public servant pursuant to a lawful arrest..." The court below cited Morton v. State, 452 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (Ala. Crim.App. 1984) for the proposition that "the police have no authority to take a motorist into custody and then require him to go to the local [stationhouse] when that motorist had committed a misdemeanor traffic violation but is willing to sign the summons to court." (Emphasis added.) The Court of Criminal Appeals has apparently reasoned that an arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation does not involve any kind of custody or detention until the ticket is prepared. We do not agree.
Section 13A-10-30(b)(1) specifically defines "custody" as a restraint or detention pursuant to a lawful arrest. The defendant here admitted that he was speeding and that the arrest for speeding was lawful. Section 32-1-4 provides a method for a person under arrest to be released if he agrees to appear in court to stand trial for the traffic violation. That statute provides:
This language was what the Court of Criminal Appeals was interpreting in Morton, and that court was correct in that case in saying that the police have no authority to take a motorist into custody and then require him to go to the local stationhouse when he is willing to sign the ticket indicating his willingness to go to court at the appointed time. However, that ruling does not mean that the police could not take the motorist into custody briefly for the traffic violation for the time necessary to write up the ticket and secure his bond to appear in court to answer the charge. In fact, Morton says:
452 So. 2d  at 1364.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held in another case that "[a]n individual is in custody even though he is lawfully physically restrained for the briefest period of time." Sanders v. State, 512 So. 2d 809, 811 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). The defendant in this case was in "custody" because he had not signed the ticket agreeing to appear in court, and the officer was not under a duty to release him.
It is obvious that the Legislature, by authorizing an arresting officer to release a traffic violator upon his own recognizance, intended to provide a convenient means for a person who is in custody to obtain his release from custody. It is a common sense method that allows selected offenders to go free, if they sign their own recognizance. Section 32-l-4(b) provides the method for handling the more serious violators.
The violator here was in lawful custody and was not eligible for release from custody because he had not executed a "sufficient written bond, approved by the arresting officer, to appear [in court to answer to the charge]"; therefore, we agree with the State's argument, and we hold that an arresting officer has authority to arrest a violator for a traffic offense and, upon doing so, is under a statutory duty to release the violator only if the violator signs "a bond approved by the arresting officer," agreeing to appear in court; thus, if one runs away before he signs the bond, he can be guilty of escape in the third degree.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.