Title: In re Kluge
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S49334
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2003

Filed: April 10, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of 
DAVID R. KLUGE,
Accused.
(OSB 98-23; SC S49334)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Submitted on the record November 7, 2002.
	David R. Kluge, Portland, filed the briefs for himself.
	Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, filed
the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for two
years, with that period of suspension to run consecutively to the
period of suspension imposed upon the accused in In re Kluge, 332
Or 251, 27 P3d 102 (2001).
	*Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
		PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that David R. Kluge (the accused)
violated Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice); DR 1-103(C) (noncooperation with
disciplinary investigation); DR 5-101(A) (conflict of interest
with lawyer's self-interest); DR 5-102(C) (lawyer as witness
other than in behalf of own client); DR 7-110(B) (contact with
officials in adversary proceeding); and ORS 9.460(2) (lawyer
shall employ only truthful means and not mislead court).  A trial
panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had
committed the alleged violations and "recommended" (1) that he be
suspended from the practice of law for five years, with that
suspension period to run consecutively to the accused's present
three-year suspension.  See In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 27 P3d 102
(2001) (Kluge I) (suspending accused for three years, effective
60 days from June 28, 2001). 
		Our review is automatic, ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.1, and de
novo, ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The Bar has the burden of
establishing the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing
evidence.  BR 5.2.  Clear and convincing evidence establishes
that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.  In re
Cohen, 316 Or 657, 659, 853 P2d 286 (1993).  Because the accused
did not appear for oral argument in this court and the Bar waived
oral argument, we have considered this matter on the record
before the trial panel and on the briefs filed with this court.  
		On review, the accused argues that this court should
invalidate the decision of the trial panel and dismiss all the
charges against him upon the grounds that the Disciplinary Board
denied him a fair disciplinary proceeding and that the Bar has
failed to establish the alleged violations by clear and
convincing evidence.  The Bar responds that this court should
uphold the decision of the trial panel and, at a minimum, impose
its stated sanction.
		For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the
Disciplinary Board afforded the accused a fair disciplinary
proceeding.  We also conclude that the accused is guilty of each
of the alleged violations and that, for those violations, the
appropriate sanction is a two-year suspension from the practice
of law.  That period of suspension is to run consecutively to the
accused's present three-year suspension.

I. FACTS
We find that the Bar has established the following
facts by clear and convincing evidence. (2)  The accused was
admitted to the Bar in 1978.  In 1995, the accused worked both as
the general manager and as legal counsel for "Tel-Ad," a group of
several corporate entities. (3)  As Tel-Ad's general manager, the
accused directly supervised an employee named Fischer.  Because
Fischer is deaf, Tel-Ad occasionally had provided him with a sign
language interpreter for work-related matters. 
In March 1995, Tel-Ad decided that it no longer would
pay for Fischer's interpreter service.  Shortly after the accused
informed Fischer of that decision, Fischer's employment at Tel-Ad
ended.  
Subsequently, Fischer filed an action against Tel-Ad in
federal district court, alleging that Tel-Ad had violated state
and federal employment discrimination laws by discontinuing his
interpreter service and by wrongfully terminating his employment. 
In support of his wrongful termination claim, Fischer alleged
that the accused had threatened to fire him if he pursued an
employment discrimination claim against Tel-Ad.  Fischer also
alleged that, after he had informed the accused that he planned
to pursue a discrimination claim, Tel-Ad had terminated his
employment.
The accused represented Tel-Ad in the Fischer
employment discrimination litigation.  In July 1996, Fischer's
lawyer notified the accused that she planned to call him as a
witness. Fischer's lawyer also
objected to the accused's representation of Tel-Ad during a
subsequent case conference before United States Magistrate Judge
Jelderks.  Judge Jelderks, however, declined to consider the
issue until after he had ruled upon a summary judgment motion
that Tel-Ad had filed in the case.  Shortly thereafter, Judge
Jelderks granted Tel-Ad's summary judgment motion and dismissed
the complaint, both for lack of jurisdiction over the federal law
claims and because he declined supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims.
Fischer then filed an action in Multnomah County
Circuit Court, reasserting his state law claims.  In January
1997, Fischer also filed a motion in that court to disqualify the
accused from representing Tel-Ad in the matter upon the ground
his representation violated DR 5-102(A) and (C).  Judge Johnson
heard oral argument on that motion, but postponed her ruling,
because she determined that, in light of the exceptions contained
in the rules, it was not yet apparent whether the accused's
representation of Tel-Ad was prohibited.
In April 1997, Judge Pro Tem Fisher heard oral argument
on a summary judgment motion that Tel-Ad had filed in the Fischer
state court litigation.  At the conclusion of that oral argument,
Judge Fisher sua sponte raised her concern that, because the
dispute involved him directly, the accused had a conflict of
interest in representing Tel-Ad in that litigation.  Because of
that concern, Judge Fisher recommended that Fischer's lawyer
renew the motion to disqualify the accused to Judge Johnson. 
Judge Fisher also denied Tel-Ad's summary judgment motion. 	
The accused subsequently filed a second summary
judgment motion in Tel-Ad's behalf.  The day after he filed that
motion, the accused presented a motion ex parte to Judge Pro Tem
Overgaard to disqualify Judge Fisher from hearing his summary
judgment motion upon the ground that Judge Fisher was biased
against him.  The accused did not notify Judge Fisher or opposing
counsel of his motion to disqualify Judge Fisher.  The accused
also did not inform Judge Overgaard that Judge Fisher already had
ruled upon a substantive matter in the litigation.  Judge
Overgaard granted the accused's motion.
A month after the accused had obtained the order
disqualifying Judge Fisher, Fischer's lawyer learned of that
order and filed a motion to set it aside.  In June 1997, Judge
Johnson set aside the order disqualifying Judge Fisher and
entered an order disqualifying the accused from further
representing Tel-Ad in the case.  At no point before his
disqualification did the accused inform Tel-Ad that he had, or
potentially could have, a conflict of interest in the Fischer
case. 
In December 1997, after receiving a complaint from
Judge Fisher, the Bar contacted the accused by letter to
investigate his conduct in the Fischer litigation.  The accused
timely answered that letter, and, shortly thereafter, the Bar
referred the matter to the Washington/Yamhill County Local
Professional Responsibility Committee (LPRC).  In February 1998,
the accused met in person and cooperated with the investigating
lawyer from the LPRC.  In May 1998, the investigating lawyer
again contacted the accused, but the accused refused a second
interview and filed ethics complaints against the investigating
lawyer and two other lawyers from the LPRC. (4)


The LPRC reassigned the investigation, and, in January
1999, the new investigating lawyer requested to interview the
accused about the Fischer matter.  The accused refused that
interview and informed the investigating lawyer that he believed
that the investigation was closed.  In response, the
investigating lawyer informed the accused by letter that the
investigation was still active and, again, requested an
interview.  The accused did not respond to that letter and filed
ethics complaints against the new investigating lawyer and other
lawyers involved in the matter. (5)
In January 2000, the Bar filed a formal complaint
against the accused for his conduct in the Fischer litigation. 
After extensive prehearing motions and discovery, the trial panel
held a two-day disciplinary hearing that started in April 2001
and finished in October of that year.  In February 2002, the
trial panel issued its decision.  As noted, the trial panel
concluded that the accused had committed each of the alleged
violations and suspended the accused from the practice of law for
five years.

II. THE ACCUSED'S CLAIMS
Before turning to the charges against the accused, we
address the accused's argument that the Disciplinary Board denied
him a fair disciplinary proceeding.  The accused first contends
that this court must invalidate the trial panel's decision
because the assigned regional chairperson erroneously denied the
accused's peremptory challenge to the trial panel chairperson
under BR 2.4(g). (6)  As explained below, because we determine that
the accused waived that peremptory challenge, we reject the
accused's argument.
In March 2000, after the assigned regional chairperson
notified the accused and the Bar of the trial panel appointment,
the accused timely submitted to her 27 six-page letters, in which
he asserted various challenges for cause against each of the
selected trial panel members.  Except for the first paragraph of
each of those letters, which the accused altered to reflect his
different challenges for cause, all 27 letters appeared
identical.  One letter, however, differed from the others by a
single sentence inserted in the middle of that letter.  In that
sentence, the accused asserted that, if his challenges for cause
against the trial panel chairperson were denied, then he
exercised his peremptory challenge against the trial panel
chairperson.
In May 2000, the assigned regional chairperson denied
all the accused's challenges to the selected trial panel members. 
Shortly thereafter, the accused filed motions with the state
chairperson to disqualify both the assigned regional chairperson
and the entire trial panel upon the grounds that the regional
chairperson was biased against him and that she erroneously had
denied his challenges to the selected trial panel members.  The
accused, however, did not assert in either of those motions that
the assigned regional chairperson had denied a peremptory
challenge to the trial panel chairperson. (7)

From June 2000 until the conclusion of the disciplinary
hearing in October 2002, the accused submitted and received
rulings upon numerous motions to the trial panel chairperson. 
Before the disciplinary hearing, the accused also personally
appeared before the trial panel chairperson at a hearing
respecting a discovery matter.  Not until the second day of the
disciplinary hearing in October 2002, however, did the accused
argue specifically that the assigned regional chairperson
erroneously had denied a peremptory challenge to the trial panel
chairperson. (8)
Based upon the foregoing discussion of the record, we
conclude that the accused waived his peremptory challenge to the
trial panel chairperson.  This court previously has explained
that "a motion that is never called to the attention of the court
is presumed to have been waived by the party."  Harju v.
Anderson, 111 Or 414, 417-18, 225 P 1100 (1924).  That rule
applies equally in the context of a disciplinary proceeding. 
Here, although the accused submitted his peremptory challenge in
writing within seven days of the notification of the appointment
of the trial panel, as BR 2.4(g) requires, the accused inserted
that challenge into the middle of 162 pages of correspondence to
the assigned regional chairperson.  After the assigned regional
chairperson denied all his challenges, the accused then waited
until the second day of the disciplinary hearing, at which time
the trial panel chairperson already had presided over the
disciplinary proceeding for more than two years, before he argued
specifically that the regional chairperson erroneously had denied
a peremptory challenge.  The accused may not wait until after the
trial panel chairperson has ruled upon motions, and the
disciplinary hearing is near conclusion, and then argue that the
regional chairperson erroneously denied a peremptory challenge to
the trial panel chairperson.  Such conduct is inconsistent with
the accused's initial assertion of a peremptory challenge to the
trial panel chairperson and constitutes a waiver of that
challenge.  We therefore conclude that the denial of the
accused's peremptory challenge does not require this court to
invalidate the trial panel's decision.
The accused next contends that the Disciplinary Board
denied him a fair disciplinary hearing because the trial panel
chairperson displayed bias against him throughout the proceeding. 
We have reviewed the entire record of the disciplinary
proceeding, including the prehearing motions, and find no
evidence of bias.  Therefore, we also reject the accused's
argument that this court must invalidate the trial panel decision
because of bias against him.	  
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
		Having concluded that the Disciplinary Board did not
deny the accused a fair disciplinary hearing, we turn to the
merits of the charges against the accused.
A.	First Cause of Complaint
		The first cause of complaint alleges that the accused
violated DR 5-101(A) and DR 5-102(C) by representing Tel-Ad in
the Fischer employment discrimination litigation when that
dispute was based, in part, upon the accused's actions as
Fischer's supervisor at Tel-Ad. 
	1.	DR 5-101(A) 
		DR 5-101(A) provides, in part:
		"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client after full disclosure, * * * a lawyer shall not accept 	or continue employment if the exercise of the lawyer's 	professional judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client 	will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own financial, business, property, or personal 		interests."
DR 10-101(B)(1) and (2) define "full disclosure" in the context
of DR 5-101(A) as:
	"[A]n explanation sufficient to apprise the recipient of the potential adverse impact on the recipient, of
the matter to which the recipient is asked to consent 
* * * [including] a recommendation that the recipient seek independent legal advice to determine if consent should be given and shall be contemporaneously 	confirmed in writing."
As this court previously has explained, the disciplinary rules
governing conflicts of interest are based upon the concern that,
when a lawyer undertakes the representation of a client with
interests differing from the interests of the lawyer or the
lawyer's other clients, the lawyer's judgment might become
impaired or the lawyer's loyalty might become divided.  See In re
O'Neal, 297 Or 258, 264, 683 P2d 1352 (1984) (discussing ethical
principles underlying disciplinary rules respecting conflicts of
interest).  To establish a violation of DR 5-101(A), the Bar need
not prove that the lawyer's judgment actually was impaired, but,
instead, must show only that the lawyer had an interest that
reasonably might have affected the lawyer's professional
judgment.  In re Wolf, 312 Or 655, 661, 826 P2d 628 (1992).
Although a lawyer never may represent multiple clients who have
actually conflicting interests, In re Johnson, 300 Or 52, 58-59,
707 P2d 573 (1985), under DR 5-101(A), a lawyer may represent a
client even when the lawyer's interests may or will affect the
lawyer's professional judgment, so long as the lawyer has
obtained the consent of the client after making full disclosure
under DR 10-101(B)(1) and (2). 
		By representing Tel-Ad in a matter that involved him
directly, we find that the accused created the risk of impaired
judgment and divided loyalty that implicates DR 5-101(A). 
Because Fischer's claim against Tel-Ad rested in large part upon
allegations of wrongdoing by the accused in Tel-Ad's behalf, that
claim placed the legality of the accused's own actions directly
at issue.  As an alleged wrongdoer in the action, the accused had
a strong interest in defending the propriety of his conduct to
protect his professional reputation.  Additionally, although, as
the accused emphasizes, Fischer did not name the accused in his
action against Tel-Ad, the accused nevertheless also had a
personal and financial interest in avoiding any personal
liability to Fischer for his actions as Fischer's supervisor. 
See ORS 659A.030(1)(g) ("It is an unlawful employment practice * * * [f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee, to
aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts
forbidden in this chapter or to attempt to do so.").  
		Although we do not determine whether the accused's
interests had an actual effect upon his representation of Tel-Ad,
we conclude that those interests reasonably might have affected
his professional judgment.  Because the accused had a stake in
defending the propriety of his actions, the accused's ability to
provide detached advice to Tel-Ad about the potential merits of
Fischer's claims or about Tel-Ad's potential defenses reasonably
might have been impaired.  In addition, the accused's interests
also reasonably might have compromised his ability to advise Tel-Ad about litigation strategy in the case, including the possible
benefit to Tel-Ad in separating itself from the accused.

Although he insists that Tel-Ad consented to his
representation, the accused does not dispute that he did not make
full disclosure to Tel-Ad under DR 10-101(B)(1) and (2), as DR 5-101(A) requires.  See In re Altstatt, 321 Or 324, 330, 897 P2d
1164 (1995) (requirements of full disclosure set out in DR 10-101(B)(1) and (2) must be followed for valid consent); see also
In re Brandt/Griffin, 331 Or 113, 137, 10 P3d 906 (2000)
(explaining requirements of full disclosure under DR 10-101(B)). 
Because we determine that the accused was required to and did not
obtain the consent of Tel-Ad after making full disclosure under
DR 10-101(B)(1) and (2), we conclude that the Bar has established
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 5-101(A) as alleged in the first cause of complaint. 
	2.	DR 5-102(C)

		We turn to the second allegation in the first cause of
complaint, that is, that the accused violated DR 5-102(C) when he
represented Tel-Ad in the Fischer dispute.  DR 5-102(C) provides,
in part:
		"If, after undertaking employment in contemplated
or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious
that the lawyer * * * may be called as a witness other
than on behalf of the lawyer's client, the lawyer may continue the representation until it is apparent that the lawyer's * * * testimony is or may be prejudicial to the lawyer's client."
		The prohibition against a lawyer acting as counsel in a
case in which the lawyer also will be called as a witness is a
basic rule of legal ethics.  In re Kinsey, 294 Or 544, 568 n 12,
660 P2d 660 (1983).  To prevent parties from abusing that rule as
a means to disqualify or force the withdrawal of opposing
counsel, DR 5-102(C) mandates the withdrawal of a lawyer who will
be called as a witness by opposing counsel only when it is
apparent that the lawyer's testimony will be actually or
potentially prejudicial to the lawyer's client.  See ABA
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct at 365 (4th ed
1999) (disqualification motions subject to potential abuse as
litigation tactic).  Once it is apparent that the lawyer's
testimony will be actually or potentially prejudicial to the
lawyer's client, however, DR 5-102(C) does not permit the lawyer
to continue the representation by obtaining the consent of the
client after full disclosure.		
		We determine that, from the outset of the case, the
accused learned and it was obvious that he would be called as a
witness in Fischer's case against Tel-Ad.  As Fischer's direct
supervisor, the accused represented Tel-Ad in negotiating
Fischer's employment terms and played a central role in the
events leading to Fischer's action against Tel-Ad.  In his
complaint against Tel-Ad, Fischer confirmed that the accused
likely would be a material witness in the case because he alleged
specific acts of wrongdoing by the accused in Tel-Ad's behalf to
support his claim.  Fischer's lawyer also repeatedly notified the
accused that the accused would be called as a witness, and she introduced 
the accused's written notes and recorded teletypewriter (TTY)  conversation between Fischer and the accused as 
evidence in the case.  
		We also determine that, from the outset of the case, it
was apparent that the accused's testimony in Fischer's behalf
would have been at least potentially prejudicial to Tel-Ad.  As a
principal actor in the events underlying Fischer's claim against
Tel-Ad, the accused would have been called to testify as to the
decision to terminate Fischer's interpreter service and the
circumstances under which Fischer's employment at Tel-Ad ended. 
The facts surrounding those events were both disputed and
material to Fischer's claim.  Further, because Fischer alleged
specific acts of wrongdoing by the accused in Tel-Ad's behalf,
and because the accused consistently has maintained that Tel-Ad
approved of his actions, it is likely that the accused's
testimony would have been adverse to Tel-Ad.  
		Nevertheless, the accused contends that he could not
have violated DR 5-102(C) because he never perceived his
testimony as potentially prejudicial to Tel-Ad, and, according to
the accused, DR 5-102(C) requires a showing that it was apparent
to the lawyer that the lawyer's testimony might be prejudicial --in other words, that the accused lawyer acted with a knowing
mental state.  We disagree.
		As this court noted in Kluge I, on its face, DR 5-102(C) contains no explicit requirement of a particular mental
state.  332 Or at 262 n 4.  This court's case law also has not
addressed whether the showing of a particular mental state is
necessary to establish a violation of DR 5-102(C).  In
considering that question here, however, we are mindful that the
inherent conflict of a lawyer simultaneously acting as an
advocate for and as a witness against a client exists regardless
of whether the lawyer actually perceives or unreasonably
disregards that circumstance.  In light of that fact, we conclude
that, to establish that it was "apparent" that the lawyer's
testimony might be prejudicial under DR 5-102(C), the Bar need
show only that a reasonable person would have recognized that
fact without difficulty.  Thus, although the accused's mental
state is relevant in assessing the appropriate sanction for his
misconduct, In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 64-65, 36 P3d 468 (2001), it
is immaterial to our determination whether the accused violated
DR 5-102(C).  
 		The accused also argues that, until his
disqualification, he was entitled to rely upon Judge Johnson's
initial determination that his representation did not violate DR
5-102(C).  Again, we disagree.  Even assuming that Judge Johnson
fully understood the accused's role in the Fischer case, the
accused may not rely as a matter of defense upon Judge Johnson's
determination that his representation of Tel-Ad did not violate
DR 5-102(C).  See Kidney Association of Oregon v. Fergusen, 315
Or 135, 143, 843 P2d 442 (1992) (lower courts do not have
jurisdiction to determine or sanction disciplinary rule
violations);  cf. In re Ainsworth, 289 Or 479, 490, 614 P2d 1127
(1980) (favorable advice by Bar's general counsel is not defense
to disciplinary violations).  Accordingly, we conclude that the
Bar has established by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused violated DR 5-102(C) as alleged in the first cause of
complaint.  
B.	Second Cause of Complaint
The second cause of complaint alleges that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by obtaining an order to disqualify Judge
Fisher without notifying Judge Fisher or opposing counsel, and
without informing Judge Overgaard that Judge Fisher already had
ruled against him upon a matter in the case. (9)  DR 1-102(A)(3)
provides:
		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to * * * [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 	deceit or misrepresentation[.]"
Although the Bar's complaint does not specify which of the four
theories embodied in DR 1-102(A)(3) that it relies upon in this
proceeding, the Bar argued only the theories of dishonesty and
misrepresentation in its brief before this court.  Accordingly,
we consider the Bar's allegation that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) only under those theories.  See In re Davenport, 334 Or
298, 307-08 n 8, 49 P3d 91 (2002) (better practice for Bar to
identify theory or theories under DR 1-102(A)(3) and confining
analysis to theory argued before this court).
		Under DR 1-102(A)(3), dishonesty is conduct evidencing
a disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud, as well as a lack of
trustworthiness or integrity.  In re Claussen, 331 Or 252, 260,
14 P3d 586 (2000).  A misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3) is
either an affirmative misstatement or an omission that is
knowing, false, and material.  Kluge I, 332 Or at 255.  A
misrepresentation is material if it concerns "information that
would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making process."  Id.  An accused lawyer makes a knowing
misrepresentation when the accused has the material information
in mind and is conscious of its materiality.  In re Gustafson,
327 Or 636, 648, 968 P2d 367 (1998).
		The Bar first argues that, in presenting his judicial
disqualification motion to Judge Overgaard, the accused made a
material misrepresentation, both by omission and affirmatively,
as to the timeliness of his motion.  The accused denies that he
misrepresented any facts and contends that his nondisclosure of
Judge Fisher's previous ruling was neither material nor knowing. 
ORS 14.210 to ORS 14.275 govern motions to disqualify a
judge.  ORS 14.210 and ORS 14.250 provide causes for judicial
disqualification, and ORS 14.260 (10) and ORS 14.270 (11) set out the
procedure for change of judge in a circuit court.  Under ORS
1.645(4), judges pro tem appointed to the circuit court are
expressly subject to the causes for judicial disqualification
provided in ORS 14.210 and ORS 14.250.
		Because Fischer filed his action in Multnomah County,
ORS 14.270 dictated the proper time and manner for a motion to
disqualify a judge in that case.  See ORS 14.260(4) (ORS 14.270
applies in judicial districts with populations of 100,000 or
more).  Under ORS 14.270, the accused's judicial disqualification
motion was untimely, because the accused presented that motion
weeks after Judge Fisher had ruled upon his first summary
judgment motion.  See ORS 14.270 (judicial disqualification
motion must be at time of case assignment to judge and may not be
made after judge has ruled upon a motion).  Because we presume
that Judge Overgaard would not have granted the accused's motion
had she known that fact, and Judge Overgaard so testified, there
is no doubt that the timeliness of the accused's motion was a
material fact.  Further, if the accused knew that his motion was
untimely, he clearly had a duty to disclose that fact to Judge
Overgaard.  The issue here, then, is whether the accused knew
that his motion was untimely when he filed it.
In his disqualification motion, the accused
specifically cited ORS 14.250 and ORS 14.260.  Because he
complied with the pleading requirements set out in ORS 14.260,
the accused also appears to have read that provision.  In light
of the trial panel's finding that the accused was not credible,
we are unconvinced by the accused's protestations that he did not
disclose Judge Fisher's previous ruling because he had
interpreted ORS 14.260(3) to bar only a motion to disqualify a
judge, and not a motion to disqualify a judge pro tem, if that
judge already had ruled upon a matter in the case.  Further,
because Fischer's lawyer testified at the disciplinary hearing
that the accused's second summary judgment motion was almost
identical to the summary judgment motion that Judge Fisher
previously had denied, we also agree with the trial panel's
conclusion that the accused did not disclose Judge Fisher's
previous ruling because he sought to circumvent that adverse
ruling. (12) Based upon those facts, we are persuaded that it was
highly probable that the accused had grasped the import of the
fact that Judge Fisher had ruled upon a matter in the case weeks
before he presented his disqualification motion and that he
failed to disclose that fact because he knew that it might affect
Judge Overgaard's ruling.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Bar
has established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
made a misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) as
alleged in the second cause of complaint. (13)
		The Bar also charges that the accused was dishonest in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) when he failed to notify either
opposing counsel or Judge Fisher of his disqualification motion
because, according to the Bar, the accused knowingly elected not
to make those disclosures to ensure that his motion would go
unopposed.  The accused responds that ORCP 9 A did not require
him to notify either opposing counsel or Judge Fisher of that
motion because a judicial disqualification motion is a motion
that may be heard ex parte.
		Under ORCP 9 A, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
these rules, * * * every written motion other than one which may
be heard ex parte * * * shall be served upon each of the
parties."  In a judicial disqualification motion, the parties
include both the other parties to the case and the judge being
moved against in the motion.  See ORS 14.260(1) (judge moved
against in judicial disqualification motion permitted to
challenge that motion).  Although, as the accused contends, a
judicial disqualification motion may be presented without the
presence of either of those parties, such a motion is not exempt
from the general rule set out in ORCP 9 A that copies of written
motions must be served upon each of the parties.  Eadie, 333 Or
at 59.   
The question here, however, is not whether the accused
should have served his motion upon opposing counsel and Judge
Fisher, but, instead, is whether, in failing to do so, the
accused acted dishonestly.  In other motions that he filed in the
Fischer litigation, the accused complied with the requirements of
ORCP 9 A by serving those motions upon opposing counsel.  In
addition, as noted above, the accused specifically cited ORS
14.260 in his disqualification motion, which provides that a
judge moved against in a judicial disqualification motion may
challenge such a motion.  ORS 14.260(1).  Based upon those facts,
we conclude that the accused was familiar with the requirements
of ORCP 9 A and that the accused knowingly elected to disregard
those requirements when he failed to serve his motion upon either
opposing counsel and Judge Fisher. (14)  Because we find that such
conduct evidences a lack of integrity, we conclude that the Bar
has established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
acted dishonestly in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) as alleged in
the second cause of complaint.
C.	Third Cause of Complaint
		The third cause of complaint alleges that the accused
violated DR 7-110(B) when he failed to notify opposing counsel or
Judge Fisher of his judicial disqualification motion.  DR 7-110(B) provides:
		"In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another to communicate, as to the
merits of the cause with a judge or an official before whom the proceeding is pending except:
		"(1) In the course of official proceedings in the 	cause.
		"(2) In writing if the lawyer promptly delivers a
copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the adverse party is not represented by a lawyer.
		"(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the adverse party is
not represented by a lawyer.
		"(4) As otherwise authorized by law or by Judicial
	Rule 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct."
		As this court previously has explained, the purpose of
DR 7-110(B) is to avoid the appearance or the effect of granting
one party an undue advantage.  In re Dugger, 334 Or 602, 621, 54
P3d 595 (2002).
		As noted above, ORCP 9 A required the accused to serve
his judicial disqualification motion upon both opposing counsel
and Judge Fisher.  Although it was not related to the underlying
substantive claim, that motion nevertheless was on the merits in
Fischer's action against Tel-Ad.  See Eadie, 333 Or at 59 (motion
to disqualify judge is motion "on the merits").  In addition,
because Judge Fisher had the right to challenge the accused's
disqualification motion under ORS 14.260(1), that motion also was
on the merits as to her in the judicial disqualification
proceeding.  We conclude that the Bar has established by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 7-110(B) as
alleged in the third cause of complaint.
D.	Fourth Cause of Complaint
		The fourth cause of complaint alleges that the
accused's conduct in obtaining Judge Fisher's disqualification
order also violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  DR 1-102(A)(4) prohibits a
lawyer from engaging in "conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]"  
		To establish a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), the Bar
must show that (1) the accused lawyer's action or inaction was
improper; (2) the accused lawyer's conduct occurred during the
course of a judicial proceeding or a proceeding with the
trappings of a judicial proceeding; and (3) the accused lawyer's
conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect upon the
administration of justice.  In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-48, 801
P2d 818 (1990).  The administration of justice includes both the
procedural functioning of the proceeding and the substantive
interests of parties to the proceeding.  Id. at 747.  Prejudice
may arise from several acts that cause some harm or a single act
that causes substantial harm to the administration of justice. 
Id. at 748. 
		The Bar contends that, by failing to disclose that his
disqualification motion was untimely and by failing to notify
opposing counsel or Judge Fisher of that motion, the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) because he imposed an unnecessary burden
upon both the court system and opposing counsel.  The accused
responds, based upon his arguments set out above, that he did not
violate DR 1-102(A)(4) because his actions were proper.   
		As explained above, here, the accused knew that his
disqualification motion was untimely and that he was required to
serve notice of that motion upon opposing counsel and Judge
Fisher.  Because the accused failed to disclose the untimeliness
of his motion and to serve such notice, the accused improperly
obtained an order disqualifying Judge Fisher.  Opposing counsel
did not learn of that order until she appeared at oral argument
for the accused's second summary judgment motion a month later. 
Opposing counsel then had to prepare a motion to set aside that
order, and Judge Johnson was required to conduct a hearing
regarding the order.  The accused's conduct prejudiced the
procedural functioning of the judicial system by imposing a
substantial burden upon both opposing counsel and Judge Johnson
to undo the accused's actions.  See In re Gresham, 318 Or 162,
166, 864 P2d 360 (1993) (unnecessary burden upon court
prejudicial to administration of justice).  In addition, because
a judge must be able to rely upon the candor and integrity of a
lawyer presenting a matter ex parte, the accused's misconduct
also prejudiced the procedural functioning of the judicial system
by undermining that trust.  See In re Greene, 290 Or 291, 297-98,
620 P2d 1379 (1980) (judges must be able to rely upon integrity
of lawyer presenting matter ex parte).  We conclude that the Bar
has established by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) as alleged in the
fourth cause of complaint.
E.  Fifth Cause of Complaint
The fifth cause of complaint alleges that the accused's
conduct during the Bar's investigation violated DR 1-103(C). 
That rule provides:
"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary 	  	investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to 	  	inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a 	tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or 	act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the 	   	exercise of any applicable right or privilege."
The Bar charges that the accused refused to cooperate
with the disciplinary investigation and that he further
obstructed that investigation by making unfounded accusations
against the investigating LPRC members.  The accused contends
that he responded fully to all reasonable inquiries from the
investigators and that, after his contact with the first
investigating LPRC member, the Bar failed to provide him with
official or clear notice that the investigation was still active. 
The accused also alleges that the Bar was not authorized to
conduct the investigation because it failed to obtain extensions
of time to complete the investigation as required under BR
2.5(f)(2). (15)  To that allegation, the Bar responds that the
accused has not demonstrated that he was substantially prejudiced
by any delay in the investigation.
Although the accused initially responded to and
cooperated with the first investigating lawyer from the LPRC, he
then refused all subsequent requests for interviews from both
lawyers investigating the matter.  In addition, contrary to the
accused's contention that the Bar did not inform him of the
status of the investigation, the second investigating lawyer
clearly notified the accused that the investigation was active
after the accused advised him of that concern.  Despite that
clear notification, however, the accused's only response to the
investigation was to file ethics complaints against the lawyers
involved in the matter.  It is clear from those facts that the
accused failed to respond to the Bar's reasonable requests.
In addition, we reject the accused's argument that the
Bar was not authorized to conduct the investigation because the
Bar failed to obtain necessary extensions of time.  As this court
noted in Griffith, 304 Or at 590, under BR 11.1, the Bar's
failure to meet any time requirement that the rules of procedure
imposes will be grounds for dismissal of a charge only if the
accused demonstrates that such delay prejudiced him.  We agree
with the Bar that the accused has failed to make such a showing
in this case.  Thus, we conclude that the accused violated DR 1-103(C) as alleged in the fifth cause of complaint.
IV. SANCTION
		In sum, we have concluded that the accused violated DR
5-101(A), DR 5-102(C), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-110(B), DR 1-102(A)(4), and DR 1-103(C).  We now turn to the question of the
appropriate sanction for those violations.  
		In determining the appropriate sanction for violations
of the disciplinary rules, this court first refers to the
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  Using the ABA
Standards, we make a preliminary determination of the appropriate
sanction by considering the duty violated by the accused, the
accused's mental state, and the injury caused by the accused's
misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then consider the existence of
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may justify
either an increase or a reduction in the degree of sanction to be
imposed.  ABA Standards 9.2; 9.3.  Finally, we evaluate the
appropriate sanction in light of this court's case law.  See
Eadie, 333 Or at 64-65 (describing court's methodology for
determining appropriate sanction in lawyer discipline cases). 
A.	Preliminary Determination	
	1.	The Accused's Violations of DR 5-101(A) and DR 5-102(C)
		The accused violated his duty to his client, Tel-Ad,
when he continued his representation despite a conflict of
interest and when he knew that he would be called as a witness in
the Fischer litigation.  ABA Standard 4.0.  Because we find that
the accused was alerted repeatedly to the conflict and to the
fact that his testimony would have been at least potentially
prejudicial to Tel-Ad, we conclude that the accused's conduct was
knowing.  See ABA Standards at 7 (lawyer's mental state is
knowing when lawyer acts with conscious awareness of nature of
conduct, but without conscious objective).  We also conclude
that, by continuing his representation under such circumstances,
the accused caused at least potential harm to Tel-Ad.  In re
Devers, 328 Or 230, 242, 974 P2d 191 (1999) (potential injury
sufficient, because disciplinary process serves to protect
public).  Absent other factors, the ABA Standards provide that a
suspension is the appropriate sanction for such violations in
those circumstances.  ABA Standard 4.32.
	2.	The Accused's Violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4), and
		7-110(B)
		The accused violated his duty to the public and the
legal system when he engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty
and misrepresentation and that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  ABA Standards 5.1; 6.1.  The accused
also violated his duty to the legal system when he improperly
communicated ex parte with the court in presenting his judicial
disqualification motion.  ABA Standard 6.3. 
		The accused lawyer's mental state is intentional when
that lawyer acts with "the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result."  ABA Standards at 7.  The Bar
argues that, in misrepresenting the timeliness of his judicial
disqualification motion and in failing to notify opposing counsel
and Judge Fisher of that motion, the accused acted intentionally
to ensure that Judge Overgaard would grant his motion.  We agree
and conclude that the accused's violations of those disciplinary
rules were intentional.  See Davenport, 334 Or at 319 n 17
(determination that accused acted "knowingly" for purposes of
particular rule violation does not preclude conclusion that
accused acted intentionally for purposes of sanction analysis). 
We also conclude, as discussed earlier, that the accused's
intentional violations of the disciplinary rules caused actual
harm to the legal system and to the legal profession.  Under the
ABA Standards, the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct under DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4), and DR 7-110(B), is
disbarment.  ABA Standards 5.11; 6.11.
	3.	The Accused's Violation of DR 1-103(C)
		When the accused did not respond to reasonable requests
during the disciplinary investigation, the accused violated his
duty owed as a professional.  ABA Standard 7.0.  In addition,
because the disciplinary process serves to protect the public,
the accused also violated his duty to the public by engaging in
such conduct.  ABA Standard 5.0 ; see also In re Glass, 308 Or
297, 305, 779 P2d 612 (1989) (disciplinary process serves to
protect public).  
		In the disciplinary investigation, the Bar made
multiple efforts to contact the accused and clearly informed the
accused that the investigation was active.  As we noted
previously, the accused responded to those efforts only by filing
multiple ethics complaints against the lawyers who were involved
in the investigation, all of which were subsequently investigated
and dismissed.  Based upon those facts, we conclude that the
accused intentionally acted to frustrate the disciplinary
process.  ABA Standards at 7.  Because the disciplinary
investigation was unnecessarily extended as a result, we also
determine that the accused caused actual injury to the Bar and to
the public.  The appropriate sanction for such misconduct under
the ABA Standards is a suspension.  ABA Standard 7.2.
B.	Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
		In this proceeding, several aggravating factors apply.
Based upon his history of prior disciplinary offenses and the
multiple offenses at issue in this proceeding, the accused has
demonstrated a pattern of misconduct.  ABA Standards 9.22(c),
(d).  The accused also has refused to acknowledge the
wrongfulness of his conduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(g).  In addition,
because the accused was admitted to the Bar in 1978, the accused
has substantial experience in the practice of law.  ABA Standard
9.22(i).  
		Further, the accused's prior disciplinary offenses also
act as an aggravating factor in this proceeding.  ABA Standard
9.22(a); see also In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149
(1997) (disciplinary violations adjudicated prior to the
imposition of sanction in current case act as aggravating
factor).  In determining the weight of prior disciplinary
offenses as an aggravating factor, this court considers: (1) the
relative seriousness of the prior offenses and resulting
sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offenses to the offense
at issue in the current case; (3) the number of prior offenses;
(4) the relative recency of the prior offenses; and (5)
particularly, whether the accused lawyer had been sanctioned for
the prior offenses before engaging in the offenses at issue in
the current case.  Id.; see also In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 227,
13 P3d 994 (2000) (timing of current offense in relation to prior
offense particularly important factor).  
		In this case, the accused's prior disciplinary offenses
occurred recently and involved some of the same violations that
we have concluded that the accused violated in this proceeding.
See Kluge I, 332 Or at 253 (concluding that accused violated DR
1-102(A)(3) and DR 5-102(C), among other violations).  The
accused's prior disciplinary offenses also were of a sufficiently
serious nature that this court considered disbarment and
concluded that a three-year suspension from the practice of law
was warranted.  Id. at 265.  However, the fact that the accused
was not sanctioned for those offenses before committing the
offenses at issue in this proceeding diminishes the weight that
we place upon the accused's prior offenses as a aggravating
factor.  See Huffman, 331 Or at 228 (fact that accused lawyer
sanctioned for prior misconduct after he committed misconduct at
issue in current proceeding diminishes weight of prior offense as
aggravating factor).     
		No mitigating factors apply in this proceeding. 
Although delay in the disciplinary proceeding can operate as a
mitigating factor, that factor does not apply here, because the
accused himself substantially contributed to that delay.  ABA
Standard 9.32(j); see also Jones, 326 Or at 201 (delay in
disciplinary proceeding can act as mitigating factor when lawyer
did not contribute to delay).  In addition, although the accused
has stressed that his client has not complained about his
representation, the absence of complaint from the client is not a
mitigating factor.  See ABA Standard 9.4(f) (failure of injured
client to complain is neither aggravating nor mitigating factor).
C.	Oregon Case Law
		Our preliminary determination under the ABA Standards
suggests that a suspension or disbarment may be the appropriate
sanction for the accused's misconduct.  We now consider the
appropriate sanction in light of this court's case law. 
		Depending upon the individual facts and circumstances,
this court has imposed a range of sanctions in cases involving
misconduct similar to the accused's misconduct here.  In cases
resulting in lesser sanctions, the court often has considered the
presence of significant mitigating factors, particularly
cooperation with the disciplinary process.  For example, in In re
Morris, 326 Or 493, 953 P2d 387 (1998), this court suspended the
accused lawyer for 120 days for knowingly representing clients
with conflicting interests, for making a knowing
misrepresentation by filing a false document, and for knowingly
engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice.  In that case, however, the court emphasized that the
mitigating factors, including the accused lawyer's good
reputation and her cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceeding, significantly outweighed the applicable aggravating
factors.  Id. at 505.  Similarly, in In re Claussen, 322 Or 466,
909 P2d 862 (1996), this court imposed a one-year suspension when
the accused lawyer intentionally had represented clients with
conflicting interests, had made intentional misrepresentations to
bankruptcy court, and had engaged in intentional conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  As in Morris, the
court considered several mitigating factors, including
cooperation with the disciplinary proceeding, in determining the
appropriate sanction for the accused lawyer's misconduct.  Id. at
486.
		In cases in which the aggravating factors significantly
outweighed any mitigating factors, this court has imposed
significantly more serious sanctions for similar misconduct.  For
example, in Kluge I, 332 Or 251, this court concluded that a
three-year suspension was warranted when the accused made
intentional misrepresentations about his status as a public
notary and about his engagement in the private practice of law,
intentionally failed to withdraw from representing his client
after it was apparent that his testimony would be prejudicial to
his client, and intentionally practiced law without professional
liability insurance.  In determining the appropriate sanction,
the court stressed that the multiple aggravating factors
significantly outweighed the one mitigating factor (no prior
disciplinary record).  Id. at 264.  Similarly, in Eadie, 333 Or
42, this court suspended the accused lawyer for three years for a
negligent ex parte communication with a judge, for intentional
misrepresentations to the court and the opposing party, and for
intentional conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice, in addition to other violations.  In that case, the
court determined that several aggravating factors applied, but
that the accused lawyer's cooperation with the disciplinary
proceeding acted as the sole mitigating factor.  Id. at 69-70. 
Finally, in Huffman, 331 Or 209, this court concluded that a two-year suspension was warranted when the accused lawyer
intentionally misrepresented his ability to pay appellate filing
fees and intentionally failed to cooperate with the disciplinary
investigation.  In that case, this court determined that no
mitigating factors, but numerous aggravating factors applied,
including a prior disciplinary record.  Id. at 227-28.  However,
because the accused lawyer had not been sanctioned for his
earlier misconduct prior to committing the misconduct at issue in
that case, the court gave that aggravating factor only "some, but
not substantial, weight * * * [.]"  Id. at 228.  See also In re
Wyllie, 327 Or 175, 957 P2d 1222 (1998) (two-year suspension for
intentional misrepresentation regarding compliance with
continuing legal education requirements and intentional
frustration of disciplinary process, with no mitigating factors
and multiple aggravating factors, but diminishing weight given to
prior disciplinary record as aggravating factor because accused
lawyer had not been sanctioned for prior misconduct at time of
misconduct at issue in that case).
In light of the serious nature of the additional
disciplinary violations at issue in Kluge I and Eadie, the
accused's misconduct in this case is less serious than the
misconduct involved in those cases.  However, the accused's
misconduct is substantially more serious than the misconduct
at issue in Morris and Claussen, due to the accused's
intentional failure to cooperate with the disciplinary
proceeding, the presence of multiple aggravating factors,
and the lack of any mitigating factors.  On balance,
although the accused here also is guilty of knowing
violations of the disciplinary rules involving conflicts of
interest, we find the facts and circumstances of this case
to be most analogous to Huffman and Wyllie.  As in those
cases, the accused's violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-103(C) were intentional and caused actual injury to the
legal system, the legal profession, and the public. 
Further, also as in Huffman and Wyllie, we have determined
that no mitigating factors, but multiple aggravating
factors, apply.  However, as the court did in those cases,
we also place only some weight on the accused's prior
disciplinary record as an aggravating factor, because the
accused was not sanctioned for those prior violations until
after he had committed the violations at issue here. 
Considering that case law, along with the ABA Standards, we
conclude that the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law for two
years, to run consecutively to the accused's present
suspension.  
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law
for two years, with that period of suspension to run
consecutively to the period of suspension imposed upon the
accused in In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 27 P3d 102 (2001).



1.  	In this context, the trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board is the equivalent of a trial court and, as such, makes
decisions, rather than recommendations.  In re Griffith, 304 Or
575, 577 n 1, 748 P2d 86 (1987).

2. 	The trial panel deemed a number of the following facts
to be admitted by the accused as the result of a discovery
sanction under BR 4.5(e), in which the trial panel chairperson
deemed each of the Bar's requests for admissions to be admitted
by the accused.  On review, the accused argues that the
chairperson erred in imposing that discovery sanction and points
to that sanction as evidence of the chairperson's bias against
him.  We have reviewed that sanction and find no evidence of
bias.  In addition, because we find that the Bar proved the truth
of the facts set out in each request for admission by clear and
convincing evidence, we decline to address whether the trial
panel chairperson erred in imposing that discovery sanction. 

3. 	Both the Bar and the accused refer to the accused's
employer as "Tel-Ad."  For convenience, we also refer to the
accused's employer as "Tel-Ad."

4. 	The Bar later processed and dismissed the accused's
ethics complaints against those lawyers under BR 2.5(i)(1).
5. 	The Bar also later processed and dismissed the
accused's ethics complaints against those lawyers under BR
2.5(i)(1).

6. 	BR 2.4(g) provides, in part:
		"The Bar and an accused * * * shall be entitled to
	one peremptory challenge and an unlimited number of 	challenges for cause as may arise under the Code of 	Judicial Conduct or these rules.  Any such challenge 	shall be filed in writing within seven days of written 	notice of an appointment of a trial panel with the 	regional chairperson for disciplinary proceedings and 	the state chairperson for contested admission and 	reinstatement proceedings or for cases involving 		challenges to a regional chairperson.  Challenges for 	cause shall state the reason for the challenge.  The 	regional chairperson or the state chairperson, as the 	case may be, shall notify Disciplinary Counsel, Bar 	Counsel and the accused or applicant in writing of all rulings on challenges." 

7. 	In September 2000, the accused also sent a letter to
the state chairperson in which he asked the state chairperson to
disqualify the trial panel chairperson.  In that letter, however,
the accused again did not argue specifically that the assigned
regional chairperson erroneously had denied a peremptory
challenge to the trial panel chairperson.
8. 	The trial panel chairperson did not permit the accused
to make that argument at the disciplinary hearing, ruling that it
was untimely.  The accused also argued specifically that the
assigned regional chairperson erroneously had denied a peremptory
challenge to the trial panel chairperson in a motion to
disqualify the trial panel that he filed after the conclusion of
the disciplinary hearing, but the trial panel chairperson did not
rule upon that motion.

9. 	The second cause of complaint also alleges that the
accused violated ORS 9.460(2), which provides that a lawyer shall
"[e]mploy, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
the attorney, such means only as are consistent with truth, and
never seek to mislead the court or jury by any artifice or false
statement of law or fact[.]"  Because we conclude that, for the
reasons set out in the text below, the accused's conduct violated
DR 1-102(A)(3), and a decision respecting the accused's conduct
also as to ORS 9.460(2) would not alter the nature or extent of
the sanction in this proceeding, we decline to address that
charge.  See In re Davenport, 334 Or 298, 313, 49 P3d 91 (2002)
(declining to address charge of ORS 9.460(2), because finding as
to that charge would not alter nature or extent of sanction).

10. 	ORS 14.260 provides, in part:
		"(2) The affidavit [supporting a motion for change
of judge] shall be filed with such motion at any time prior to final determination of such cause, matter or proceedings in uncontested cases, and in contested cases before or within five days after such cause, matter or proceeding is at issue upon a question of
fact or within 10 days after the assignment,
appointment and qualification or election and
assumption of office of another judge to preside over
such cause, matter or proceeding.
		"(3) No motion to disqualify a judge shall be made
after the judge has ruled upon any petition, demurrer or motion other than a motion to extend time in the
cause, matter or proceeding.  No motion to disqualify a
judge or a judge pro tem, assigned by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court to serve in a county other than
the county in which the judge or judge pro tem resides
shall be filed more than five days after the party or
attorney appearing in the cause receives notice of the
assignment.
		"(4) In judicial districts having a population of 	100,000 or more, the affidavit and motion for change of
	judge shall be made at the time and manner prescribed 	in ORS 14.270."

11. 	ORS 14.270 provides, in part:
		"An affidavit and motion for change of judge to
hear the motions and demurrers or to try the case shall
be made at the time of the assignment of the case to a
judge for trial or for hearing upon a motion or
demurrer.  Oral notice of the intention to file the
motion and affidavit shall be sufficient compliance
with this section providing that the motion and	affidavit are filed not later than the close of the
next judicial day.  No motion to disqualify a judge to
whom a case has been assigned for trial shall be made
after the judge has ruled upon any petition, demurrer
or motion other than a motion to extend time in the
cause, matter or proceeding * * *[.]"

12. 	The trial panel concluded that the accused's
misrepresentation as to the timeliness of his motion was knowing
because it found that the accused "was probably familiar" with
the rule that a motion to disqualify a judge may not be brought
after that judge already has ruled upon a motion in the case.  As
noted previously, in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Bar
has the burden of establishing the alleged misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence, that is, evidence establishing that the
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.  __ Or __ (slip
op at 1-2).  Because we conclude that the trial panel's finding
as to the accused's knowing mental state does not satisfy that
standard, we place no weight upon that finding in our
determination that the accused's misrepresentation was knowing.
13. 	As noted, the Bar also argues that the accused
affirmatively misrepresented the timeliness of his
disqualification motion because, according to the Bar, he implied
in that motion that any hearing before Judge Fisher was yet to
take place.  The accused's motion stated, in part:
		"Defendants hereby move the court under ORS 14.250
	and 14.260 for an order recusing Judge pro tem Ann 	Fisher from hearing defendants' Motion for Summary 	Judgment on the grounds that defendants' counsel 		believes that neither he nor defendants can have a fair
	and impartial hearing before her." 
(Emphasis added).
		Although, as explained in the text above, we conclude
that the accused made a material misrepresentation by omission,
we disagree with the Bar that the accused also made an
affirmative misrepresentation in that motion.  By referring to
his future summary judgment motion hearing, we find that the
accused affirmatively represented only that the hearing as to
that motion was yet to take place.

14. 	The trial panel concluded that the accused's conduct in
failing to serve opposing counsel and Judge Fisher of his
disqualification motion violated DR 1-102(A)(3) because it found
that the accused "knew or should have known" that he was required
to provide such notice.  Because we conclude that the trial
panel's finding as to the accused's knowledge of the notice
requirements of ORCP 9 A does not satisfy the standard of clear
and convincing evidence, we again place no weight upon that
finding in our determination that the accused knew and
disregarded the notice requirements of ORCP 9 A.

15. 	BR 2.5(f)(2) provides:
		"The SPRB may grant to an LPRC additional time to
investigate a complaint if a request for additional time with the reasons therefor is submitted by the chairperson of the LPRC to Disciplinary Counsel for presentation to the SPRB.  Disciplinary Counsel shall notify the attorney and the complainant in writing of
the action taken by the SPRB on any such request."