Title: Thomas v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 152, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WAYNE THOMAS,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 152, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN95-11-1520-1521
§                   IN95-10-0219
§                   IN96-02-0376-0377
§                   IN96-05-0447
Submitted: March 26, 2001
  Decided:   May 17, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 17th day of May 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal,
the record below and the Superior Court’s March 26, 2001 report following
remand, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Wayne Thomas, filed an appeal from
an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the appeal.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
1Specifically, Thomas claims that the public defender who represented him at the
time his guilty plea was entered had a conflict because he also represented Pierre Carter,
Thomas’ co-defendant in one of the cases encompassed by the plea agreement.
2Murphy v. State, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993).  Thomas also argued
in his postconviction motion in the Superior Court that his confession was coerced and that
his counsel failed to advise him of the direct and indirect consequences of his guilty plea.
-2-
(2)
In this appeal, Thomas claims that:  (a) he was provided
ineffective assistance of counsel, first, because of the Superior Court’s failure
to remove his counsel due to a conflict1 and, second, because his counsel
failed to present his psychological problems as a defense; and (b) the Superior
Court abused its discretion in denying his postconviction motion without
holding an evidentiary hearing.  To the extent Thomas has not argued other
grounds to support his appeal that were previously raised, those grounds are
deemed waived and will not be addressed by this Court.2
(3)
On March 14, 1997, Thomas pleaded guilty to Robbery in the
First Degree, Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree, two counts of
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of
Cocaine and Assault in the Second Degree.  He was sentenced to a total of 15
years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 8 years for 3 years at
Level IV Home Confinement, in turn to be suspended after 6 months for 5
3See Thomas v. State, Del. Supr.,  No. 152, 2000, Steele, J. (ORDER) Order at
¶¶ 9-10 (citing  Lewis v. State, Del. Supr., 757 A.2d 709, 714-15, 717-18 (2000)).
-3-
years and 6 months at Level III, followed by 1 year of Level I probation.
Thomas did not file a direct appeal from his convictions or sentences.
(4)
On remand, this Court directed the Superior Court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether at the time of Thomas’ guilty plea
Thomas’ attorney represented conflicting interests, whether an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his performance and, if a conflict existed,
whether Thomas waived his right to conflict-free representation in accordance
with the appropriate legal standards.3  In its March 26, 2001 report, the
Superior Court determined that there was no active representation of
conflicting interests by Thomas’ public defender at the time of Thomas’ guilty
plea because he no longer represented Pierre Carter; Thomas’ attorney’s
performance was in no way affected by an actual conflict of interest; and,
after having been advised by his attorney of the potential conflict should the
charges involving Thomas and Pierre Carter be scheduled for trial, Thomas
waived his right to independent effective assistance of counsel in that matter.
(5)
We have reviewed in detail the Superior Court’s March 26, 2001
report following remand, the transcript of the Superior Court’s evidentiary
4We again emphasize that the pitfalls of multiple representation exist not only at the
trial stage, but at the plea negotiation stage as well.  Id. at 718 (citing Commentary to ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: Defense Function, Conflicts of Interest, § 4-3.5 (3d ed.
1993).  
5Id. at 715.
6Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
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hearing and the transcript of the plea colloquy.  We conclude that, contrary
to the finding of the Superior Court, the record reflects that, at the time of
Thomas’ guilty plea, Thomas’ attorney also represented Thomas’ co-defendant
Pierre Carter in a matter that was encompassed by the plea agreement.4  We
also conclude that the record supports the Superior Court’s finding that
Thomas was advised of the representation and knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived any conflict.5    
(6)
There is no merit to Thomas’ claim that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance.  In order to prevail on this claim, Thomas must show
that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different.6  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was
7Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
8Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h).
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professionally reasonable.”7  While the record supports Thomas’ allegation
that, at the time of his guilty plea, his attorney represented a co-defendant in
a matter encompassed by the plea agreement, there is no evidence that any
errors on the part of Thomas’ counsel resulted in prejudice to him.
(7)
Thomas’ final claim is that the Superior Court abused its
discretion in denying his postconviction motion without holding an evidentiary
hearing.  The decision whether a postconviction motion merits an evidentiary
hearing lies within the discretion of the Superior Court.8  Because this matter
was remanded to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim is now moot.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice