Title: Kenneth Williams v. Charlie Johnson, Post Prison Transfer Board, and Larry Norris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 05-598
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2006

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. 05-598 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION KENNETH WILLIAMS Appellant v. CHARLIE JOHNSON, POST PRISON TRANSFER BOARD, AND LARRY NORRIS Appellees Opinion Delivered March 2, 2006 PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, CV 2004-967-4, HON. LEON N. JAMISON, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM Kenneth Williams, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction ("ADC"), filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Jefferson County Circuit Court. The circuit court denied the petition by order entered April 19, 2005. Williams now brings this appeal of that order. Appellant Williams is incarcerated following convictions on a number of drug related charges. The facts alleged in his petition are that he was placed in the boot camp program, and following his completion of that program, he was released on parole. He alleged that after 90 days on parole, he was picked up and returned to prison. He attached to his petition time computation cards from the ADC that he alleged indicate a change, at that time, on his eligibility date for parole as to one count on one charge, in that the eligibility date had been computed on 50% of the sentence and was changed to require 70% of the sentence to be served. The circuit court found in its order that parole eligibility is within the prerogative of the ADC, that appellant should have timely sought postconviction relief pursuant to a petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, and that appellant had no clear right to the subject matter of the petition. Appellant asserts error by the circuit court on two bases,1 as follows: (1) that the circuit court should have found he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing before he was returned to prison; (2) that the circuit court should have held that the ADC illegally altered his eligibility date for parole because he had entered his guilty plea in accord with a plea agreement that provided the 70% rule did not apply. We must agree with the circuit court's conclusion that appellant has not shown he was entitled to the relief sought. This court has said that declaratory relief lies where four requisite conditions are met, as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) it exists between parties with adverse interests; (3) those seeking relief have a legal interest in the controversy; (4) the issues involved are ripe for decision. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002). On appeal, the question as to whether there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue shall be reviewed de novo on the record of the trial court. Id. at 611, 80 S.W.3d at 336. The circuit court implicitly found that there was no justiciable issue by finding appellant had "no clear right to the subject matter," and we must agree. Appellant first argues that under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-705 (Repl. 2006), the ADC was required to provide a hearing before returning him to prison. However, as the State correctly notes, appellant has not provided any evidence that he was returned to prison because his parole was revoked due to a violation of the conditions of his parole, so as to invoke section 16-93-705. He has not alleged any violation occurred, and based upon his other allegations and the time computation cards he provides, it appears much more likely that the ADC required his return based upon a recalculation of his eligibility for parole, not due to an alleged violation of a condition of his parole. It is the appellant's burden to bring up a record sufficient to show that the trial court erred. Jones v. Flowers, ___Ark.___, ___S.W.3d___ (November 18, 2004); Dirickson v. State, 329 Ark. 572, 953 S.W.2d 55 (1997). As for appellant's general allegations of a violation of due process resulting from a return to prison without a hearing, appellant has not argued or shown that he had an expectation of parole arising under statute, or was otherwise entitled to be paroled, other than the arguments we address in his second point. Appellant argues that he was entitled to a hearing whether his release on parole was erroneous or not. The State argues that the court did not provide a ruling on this issue. We cannot agree; the circuit court's order addressed appellant's arguments with only a broad, general statement about his rights in the subject matter, but the arguments were addressed. Section 16-93-705 concerns only the right to a hearing in the case of a violation of the conditions of parole, and the cases appellant cites deal with violation of conditions of parole. In Morris v. State, 333 Ark. 466, 970 S.W.2d 210 (1998), we discussed that the ADC may recalculate a prisoner's parole eligibility, without a hearing, to correct an error. While a prisoner may be entitled to a hearing to revoke his parole, appellant has not provided citation to any authority for his assertion that a prisoner is entitled to a hearing when the ADC recalls the prisoner because he was incorrectly released, and in order to correct an error in calculation of his eligibility for parole. As already noted, appellant has provided no record as to why the ADC changed his eligibility date. In any case, we must dismiss his argument as it applies to this possibility, as we will not consider an argument that presents no citation to authority or convincing argument. Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238, 85 S.W.3d 893 (2002). Appellant next contends that the ADC did not have the right to change his eligibility date, in any case, because he alleged his plea agreement required parole eligibility after 50% of his sentence was served. Determining parole eligibility is the prerogative of the ADC. Morris, 333 Ark. at 468, 970 S.W.2d at 211. Appellant argues that the ADC changed the classification of the count on his card, but the record does not support that claim; the count was consistently listed as a class Y felony. Appellant's argument is essentially a collateral attack challenging his guilty plea and the judgment against him. Such a collateral attack is not a cognizable claim in a petition for declaratory judgment. See Johnson v. State, 340 Ark. 413, 12 S.W.3d 203 (2000) (per curiam). Extraordinary relief is not a substitute for an appeal. Dean v. Williams, 339 Ark. 439, 6 S.W.3d 89 (1999); Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988). Nor is declaratory judgment a substitute for postconviction relief through a petition under Rule 37.1. Appellant cannot now raise the terms of his plea agreement as a challenge to the ADC's recalculation of his parole eligibility. Declaratory judgment is not ordinarily granted where another adequate remedy is available. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 613-614, 80 S.W.3d at 337-338. Appellant's claim should have been raised in a timely petition under Rule 37.1. Because appellant has presented no justiciable issue, the circuit court did not err in denying appellant's petition for declaratory judgment. Affirmed. 1 While appellant lists two points on appeal in his brief, those points do not track the arguments in his brief. We consider the points as presented in his argument.