Title: State v. Liles
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121459
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2021

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 121,459 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KORA L. LILES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A court follows a two-step analysis to address a prosecutorial error claim. First, it 
decides whether an error occurred. For the first step, if the claim relates to something the 
prosecutor said, the court looks at the statement complained about to decide if it falls 
outside the wide latitude afforded the prosecutor in conducting the State's case and 
attempting to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend a defendant's fair trial 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant can establish the first prong by 
demonstrating the prosecutor misstated the law or argued factual assertions with no 
evidentiary foundation. If the court finds error, it takes the second step and considers 
prejudice to determine whether that error was harmless. 
 
2. 
A court considers jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they properly 
and fairly state the applicable law and whether it is reasonable to conclude they could 
have misled the jury. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3. 
A district court is not legally required to instruct a jury to view with caution the 
testimony of a noninformant witness who is testifying in exchange for benefits from the 
State. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; DAVID B. DEBENHAM, judge. Opinion filed July 16, 2021. 
Affirmed. 
 
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Capital Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellant.  
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney 
general, was with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Kora L. Liles appeals her convictions and sentences stemming from 
three murders at her Topeka home. She argues:  (1) the prosecutor misstated the law by 
telling the jury to use the same caution in considering her testimony as her accomplices 
who testified for the prosecution; (2) the district court erred by refusing to instruct the 
jury to view the accomplices' testimony with caution because they were receiving 
benefits from the State; (3) the cumulative effect of these two alleged errors on her fair 
trial rights requires reversal; and (4) the State breached an unwritten, postconviction 
agreement to make a favorable sentencing recommendation if she testified in the trial of 
other participants in the crimes. We reject each challenge and affirm.  
 
We hold the prosecutor's argument on Liles' credibility stayed within permissible 
bounds, and that the court properly refused to modify the accomplice jury instruction. 
These rulings make a cumulative error analysis inappropriate. As to sentencing, we hold 
3 
 
 
 
Liles failed to make an adequate record concerning the alleged agreement to allow 
meaningful review. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Luke Davis, Nicole Fisher, and Matthew Leavitt were murdered the night of 
March 11-12, 2017, at Liles' house. The controverted chain of events alleged and the trial 
evidence establishing her crimes of conviction are largely irrelevant to the issues now 
raised on appeal. It is enough to know the victims died following hours of confrontation 
and violence. Davis eventually died after being strangled with an electric fan cord used as 
a ligature. Fisher was suffocated to death with a plastic bag placed over her head. And 
Leavitt died from strangulation when his neck was held between his killer's legs during a 
struggle. There was evidence Liles had accused Leavitt of a sexual impropriety toward 
her in the weeks preceding the murders. 
 
The State charged Liles, her then-boyfriend Joseph Lowry, her ex-husband Brian 
Flowers, and Joseph Krahn with the murders and related crimes. The State also charged 
Shane Mays and Richard Folsom, who both reached cooperation agreements for their 
testimony. 
 
A grand jury indicted Liles on 11 charges:  three counts of felony murder with two 
alternative underlying felonies, i.e., aggravated kidnapping or aggravated assault; three 
counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; three counts of aggravated 
kidnapping; one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute; and one 
count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia. A jury convicted her on all counts. 
 
The district court imposed three hard 25 sentences for the felony-murder 
convictions, a 226-month sentence for one of the aggravated kidnapping convictions, 
4 
 
 
 
165-month sentences for each of the remaining aggravated kidnapping convictions, three 
13-month sentences for the aggravated assault convictions, and a 98-month sentence for 
the possession conviction. The court ran all these sentences consecutive. The court also 
imposed a concurrent one-year sentence for the paraphernalia conviction. This is Liles' 
direct appeal. Jurisdiction is proper. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3), (4). 
 
PROSECUTORIAL ERROR 
 
Liles argues the prosecutor misstated the law during closing arguments by telling 
the jury a cautionary instruction given with respect to accomplice testimony applied to 
Liles' testimony as well. We reject this because the prosecutor did not make the legal 
assertion Liles claims. The prosecutor made a permissible statement about credibility. 
 
Additional facts 
 
The district court gave the jury an instruction about accomplice testimony because 
Mays and Folsom testified. Instruction 8 stated:  "An accomplice witness is one who 
testifies that he was involved in the commission of a crime with which the defendant is 
charged. You should consider with caution the testimony of an accomplice." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued the jurors "most importantly 
. . . should consider with caution, the testimony of an accomplice." He explained an 
accomplice might seek to obtain immunity or a lighter sentence by trying to shift blame 
to someone else, or might simply wish to drag someone else down for malice. He pointed 
out Mays negotiated a plea bargain for lesser charges in exchange for his testimony. On 
rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed this, telling the jury, 
 
5 
 
 
 
"Now, I want to go on to Instruction Number 8, because this is where we talk about the 
credibility of the witnesses. [Defense counsel] talked about this, and he says the law 
requires you, or somewhat suggested the law requires you to disbelieve the testimony of 
an accomplice. That's not what the instruction says. It says you should consider with 
caution the testimony of an accomplice. And that makes sense, because somebody who's 
perhaps getting a benefit for their testimony . . . you might want to consider with caution. 
That's sensible." 
 
The prosecutor then made the following comment Liles now challenges:  
 
"That also applies to Ms. Liles, because she has a bias in her testimony. She has 
a bias to mislead you, to make you think things are true that are not true, so that you will 
think that there's a reasonable doubt as to her guilt, because in essence, in broad strokes, 
what is it that Ms. Liles is saying here today? What is her account of what happened? I 
was in this house, and all these other people started to do the things, and I had nothing to 
do with it. . . . 
 
"That testimony, if you look at all the other evidence in the case, is simply not 
believable, and it is nowhere near believable and credible when [you] compare it to the 
testimony of [sic] the prior statement of Shane Mays. This is true for a number of 
reasons." (Emphasis added.) 
 
The prosecutor argued Liles' testimony was internally inconsistent, giving 
examples. He asserted there was no explanation for the night's events other than Liles 
being upset with Leavitt. He argued Liles admitted her involvement but consistently 
minimized her participation. He pointed out Liles claimed to be scared of Lowry, but he 
was the one who told her to establish an alibi, which she tried to do by leaving and being 
seen elsewhere. And the prosecutor pointed out that while Liles claimed the others 
threatened her children, she never went to look for or take care of them. He argued the 
most reasonable explanation for all this was that Liles was the "boss" and the others were 
6 
 
 
 
doing her "dirty work." He also argued Mays' testimony was more believable because he 
was "putting his own neck in the noose" by admitting his intent to kill Fisher. 
 
Standard of review 
 
A court follows a two-step analysis to address a prosecutorial error claim. First, it 
decides whether an error occurred. For this first step, if the claim relates to something the 
prosecutor said, the court looks at the statement complained about to decide if it falls 
outside the wide latitude afforded the prosecutor in conducting the State's case and 
attempting to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's fair 
trial rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. A defendant can establish the first prong by 
demonstrating the prosecutor misstated the law or argued factual assertions with no 
evidentiary foundation. If the court finds error, it takes the second step and considers 
prejudice to determine whether that error was harmless. State v. Vonachen, 312 Kan. 451, 
467, 476 P.3d 774 (2020). 
 
Discussion 
 
Prosecutors may point out inconsistencies in a defendant's statements and argue 
the evidence reflecting poorly on the defendant's credibility. But in doing so, they may 
not accuse a defendant of lying. State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387, 1402, 430 P.3d 11 
(2018). Here, the prosecutor's argument was consistent with this limitation by pointing 
out potential bias affecting Liles' testimony and making an evidence-based argument as 
to why other testimony reflected poorly on her credibility. The prosecutor noted Liles 
stood to benefit from skewed testimony because it increased her acquittal chances. And 
he detailed why other evidence undermined Liles' testimony that she was merely an 
innocent bystander. 
 
7 
 
 
 
Liles concedes prosecutors may argue witness bias. But she claims the prosecutor 
in this instance linked the accomplice instruction directly to her testimony. This, she 
argues, would be an error of law. The State contends Liles mischaracterizes the 
prosecutor's comments. We agree with the State. Rather than tying the accomplice 
instruction to Liles, the prosecutor simply argued the same underlying reasons for that 
instruction about self-serving accomplices applied to Liles' testimony as the defendant. 
 
Liles contends a misstatement occurred because the prosecutor violated a 
"'constitutional limit on a court's ability to comment on a defendant's credibility in a jury 
instruction,'" which she argues must be done in a "neutral or balanced" manner without 
"'singl[ing] out the defendant as not to be believed.'" She relies on State v. Land, 14 Kan. 
App. 2d 515, 794 P.2d 668 (1990). There, the Court of Appeals held it was error for the 
trial court to give an accomplice testimony instruction, like the one given in Liles' case, 
when the defendant was the only crime participant testifying. See 14 Kan. App. 2d at 519 
("The instruction in this case referred to accomplice testimony. But, Land was testifying 
both as an accomplice and as a defendant."). That is not what happened in Liles' case. 
 
Land is distinguishable mainly because Liles does not challenge an instruction 
from the court. And even if the prosecutor's argument were construed as saying the 
instruction legally applied to Liles, Land remains distinguishable because Mays and 
Folsom also testified. In other words, if the instruction applied to Liles, it applied equally 
to Mays and Folsom, so it was neutral and did not "single out the defendant as not to be 
believed." 14 Kan. App. 2d at 518. The prosecutor only asserted Liles' testimony should 
be considered on equal footing with the testimony from Mays and Folsom. See Louie v. 
United States, 426 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting it was appropriate to instruct a 
jury that it may consider any interest the defendant has in the case's outcome, including 
the defendant's "hopes and his fears and what he has to gain or lose as a result of your 
verdict"). 
8 
 
 
 
 
Granted, a prosecutor commits error by misstating the law. State v. Watson, 313 
Kan. 170, 179, 484 P.3d 877 (2021). But this prosecutor's comment was not error. It did 
not suggest Liles' testimony was unbelievable just because she was the defendant 
exercising her right to testify. And after pointing out Liles' interest in the outcome, the 
prosecutor made an evidence-based argument as to why the jury should credit the 
testimony from Mays and Folsom over hers. 
 
THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION CLAIM 
 
Liles argues the district court erred by refusing to modify Instruction No. 8 to 
make explicit reference about witnesses who testify for the State in exchange for benefits. 
Again, we disagree. This issue is controlled by the court's decision in State v. Dean, 310 
Kan. 848, 856, 450 P.3d 819 (2019), which Liles fails to demonstrate was wrongly 
decided. 
 
Additional facts 
 
During his direct testimony, Mays acknowledged reaching an agreement with the 
State and was providing testimony in exchange for consideration in his case. On cross-
examination, Mays agreed he faced a lesser sentence for his cooperation. He would plead 
guilty to reduced charges:  attempted second-degree murder in Fisher's death and 
aggravated battery of Leavitt. 
  
Folsom testified he did not have a formal agreement with prosecutors but assumed 
he would not face murder charges. He said he was testifying because it was the right 
thing to do. On cross-examination, Folsom agreed he was providing testimony in the 
multiple cases related to the murders and negotiating with the State. 
9 
 
 
 
 
At the jury instruction conference, Liles requested the instruction about informant 
testimony, which would have told the jury to consider with caution the testimony of an 
informant who in exchange for benefits acted as an aid for the State in obtaining 
evidence, if the testimony was not supported by other evidence. The State objected, 
arguing there was no informant who acted on the State's behalf to obtain evidence and 
noting other evidence supported Mays' and Folsom's testimony. Defense counsel 
countered by observing they received benefits in exchange for their testimony. The court 
refused to give the informant instruction. 
 
Defense counsel then asked:  "[C]an we add to the testimony, accomplice, [sic] 
that in exchange for his testimony he is getting benefits[?]" The court rejected that too, 
ruling:  "I think that's something you get to argue on the credibility of any witness." 
 
Standard of review 
 
When analyzing instruction issues, an appellate court follows a three-step process: 
 
"'(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e., whether 
there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) 
considering the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) 
assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed 
harmless.'  
 
"Whether a party has preserved a jury instruction issue affects the reversibility 
inquiry. At the second step, we consider whether the instruction was legally and factually 
appropriate. Appellate courts use unlimited review to determine whether an instruction 
was legally appropriate. To be factually appropriate, there must be sufficient evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, to support the 
instruction. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Levy, 313 Kan. 232, 241, 485 P.3d 605 (2021). 
10 
 
 
 
 
A court considers jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they properly 
and fairly state the applicable law and whether it is reasonable to conclude they could 
have misled the jury. In re Care and Treatment of Quillen, 312 Kan. 841, 849, 481 P.3d 
791 (2021). 
 
Discussion 
 
Liles properly preserved this issue for appellate review because she requested the 
instruction modification during trial. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 267, 485 P.3d 
622 (2021) (defendant preserved challenge to omission of instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter by requesting the instruction at trial). The next inquiry is whether her 
requested modification was legally and factually appropriate. We previously have 
addressed this specific issue. See Dean, 310 Kan. at 856 ("A district court is not legally 
required to instruct the jury to view with caution the testimony of a noninformant witness 
who is, nonetheless, testifying in exchange for benefits from the State."). Dean's holding 
is equally applicable here.   
 
In Dean, the defendant's gang associate testified in hopes of obtaining a reduced 
sentence in another case. The defendant argued the district court should have given the 
same instruction Liles requested here—the testimony of one who obtains evidence in 
exchange for benefits should be considered with caution—but modified for a cooperating 
witness. Dean, 310 Kan. at 855, upheld a long line of cases holding that a cautionary 
instruction is appropriate only when prisoner-witnesses are acting as agents of the State 
when they obtain the information about which they later testify. See State v. Ashley, 306 
Kan. 642, 647-48, 396 P.3d 92 (2017). 
 
11 
 
 
 
The paid informant cautionary instruction "complies with the constitutional 
prohibition against using the testimony of a witness who acts on behalf of the State in 
eliciting evidence from the defendant in exchange for receiving benefits from the State." 
State v. Saenz, 271 Kan. 339, 348, 22 P.3d 151 (2001). But the informant instruction only 
applies when witnesses are acting as agents of the State when they obtain the information 
about which they testify. Ashley, 306 Kan. at 647-48. 
 
Liles appears to concede the district court properly declined to give the informant 
cautionary instruction, but then argues Dean was wrongly decided. She contends that if 
an instruction is factually appropriate and "fairly and accurately states the applicable 
law," it simply must be given. In her view, this leaves no room for a distinction between 
required and permissible instructions. This argument finds some support in State v. 
Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 162, 283 P.3d 202 (2012), that "[i]f an instruction is legally 
appropriate and factually supported, a district court errs in refusing to grant a party's 
request to give the instruction." 
 
But Plummer is distinguishable because the instruction at issue was for a lesser 
included offense of the charged crime. See 295 Kan. at 160. And lesser included offense 
instructions are required by statute under certain circumstances. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
22-3414(3) ("In cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a 
conviction of some lesser included crime . . . the judge shall instruct the jury as to the 
crime charged and any such lesser included crime."). So when a district court fails to give 
an otherwise appropriate lesser included offense instruction, the instructions as a whole 
necessarily would not accurately state the law because they would not comply with the 
statutory command. See 295 Kan. at 161-62. There is no statutory directive regarding an 
informant instruction. 
 
12 
 
 
 
Liles' focus on the requested modification in isolation also is inconsistent with 
both the scope of this court's review and the law surrounding the instruction. A reviewing 
court considers the instructions as a whole "'to determine whether they properly and fairly 
state the applicable law or whether it is reasonable to conclude that they could have 
misled the jury.'" Quillen, 313 Kan. at 849; see State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 271, 323 
P.3d 829 (2014). Context matters. For example, this court has said "'a failure to provide 
the jury with the cautionary accomplice witness instruction . . . is not error when the 
defendant's guilt is plain or when the jury is cautioned about the weight to be accorded 
testimonial evidence in other instructions.'" (Emphasis added.) Todd, 299 Kan. at 271.   
 
Similarly, in Dean, this court suggested the jury could not have been misled, even 
though the instructions given did not include the testifying-for-a-benefit cautionary 
language. The court reasoned, 
 
"At trial, [the witness] admitted that he was testifying in hopes of getting a reduced 
sentence in his federal case; defense counsel cross-examined [the witness] on this point; 
and defense counsel hammered [the witness'] bias in closing argument. Thus, the jury 
was well aware of [the witness'] benefit and well-equipped to weigh his credibility 
without a specific cautionary instruction." Dean, 310 Kan. at 856. 
 
Both Mays and Folsom admitted they anticipated reduced charges in exchange for 
their testimony, and defense counsel addressed that potential bias in closing argument. As 
in Dean, the jury in Liles' case knew about the witness' benefits and was capable of 
weighing their credibility without a more explicit caution in the instructions addressing 
that possibility. 
 
We adhere to Dean and apply it here. We hold the district court did not err by 
refusing the requested instruction modification under these facts. 
13 
 
 
 
 
NO CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Anticipating success on both of the previous claims, Liles raises a cumulative 
error argument based on their combined adverse impact on her right to a fair trial. But 
since neither issue has merit, there can be no cumulative error. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 
378, 412, 486 P.3d 551 (2021). 
 
THE SENTENCING AGREEMENT CLAIM 
 
Liles' final claim is that the State breached an unwritten, postconviction agreement 
to exchange a favorable sentencing recommendation for her testimony in her 
accomplices' cases. She asks us to vacate her sentences and remand the case "for a 
resentencing hearing, in front of a different judge, at which the State must make a lesser 
sentencing recommendation." The State argues Liles failed to raise this issue in the 
district court; that it is impossible to determine if a breach occurred because there is no 
record of an agreement; and that the record in any event demonstrates Liles did not fulfill 
her part of any alleged bargain. We agree with the State that the record is inadequate to 
permit meaningful appellate review. We also note Liles provides no authority to 
demonstrate a viable basis for resentencing. 
 
Additional facts 
 
At a hearing after Liles' convictions, defense counsel requested sentencing be 
continued because Liles had agreed to cooperate with the State and testify in two other 
cases. He asked that sentencing wait until that testimony. The State agreed.  
 
When the sentencing hearing occurred, the State acknowledged Liles had 
expressed interest in cooperating after her convictions in exchange for some favorable 
14 
 
 
 
consideration or mitigation of her sentence. The State noted she testified in Lowry's trial 
but characterized that testimony as self-serving and minimizing, comparing it to how she 
testified at her own trial. The prosecutor said he talked to jurors after the Lowry trial and 
they did not believe Liles. The prosecutor speculated Lowry's trial would have had the 
same outcome without Liles' testimony. And because of that, he said, Liles did not 
cooperate in a meaningful way, so he asked the court to impose the maximum sentences 
for her convictions. 
 
Defense counsel responded that it was 
 
"a bit disappointing that the Defendant did cooperate with the State and she testified as to 
what she testified in the trial, and the State had no inclination she was gonna testify any 
differently. But be that as it may, she did cooperate, judge, and she testified that [sic] she 
told the State that she would do. 
 
"The—I have no idea what the jurors believed or didn't believe, and I have no 
reason not to believe what [the Prosecutor] said, but her agreement with the State was to 
cooperate and testify, and she did, and she was prepared to do that if needed be in Mr. 
Flowers' case." 
 
Defense counsel requested concurrent sentences for the murders and standard 
sentences on the remaining crimes. He argued Liles' lifestyle and associations led to the 
crimes and that Liles was paying for her poor choices. He said there was no plan to the 
killings, but Liles understood her responsibility for her participation. 
 
Neither the State nor Liles described with any particularity the terms of any 
agreement between them. 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Liles refers us to the standard of review applicable for plea agreement breaches. 
Under that standard, 
 
"'[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 
promise must be fulfilled.' If the State fails to fulfill a promise it made in a plea 
agreement, the defendant is denied due process. This is true even if the record indicates 
that the district court's sentencing decision was not influenced by the State's actions at 
sentencing. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Urista, 296 Kan. 576, 583, 293 P.3d 738 (2013) 
(quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 
[1971]). 
 
If the State fails to perform its portion of a plea agreement and a defendant timely 
objects, the "breach will constitute harmless error only if a court can say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the State's promise had little, if any, influence on the defendant's 
decision to enter into the plea agreement." Urista, 296 Kan. at 594-95. And when the plea 
is given in exchange for a favorable sentencing recommendation, the remedy for a breach 
"is to vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing before a different 
district court judge with directions that the State comply with the provisions of plea 
agreement at sentencing." 296 Kan. at 595. 
 
But Liles did not enter into a plea agreement. Any understanding with prosecutors 
occurred after the jury convicted her. And Liles simply asserts—without citation to any 
authority or elaboration—that "[w]hile this issue is more correctly described as a 'breach 
of sentencing agreement,' it is legally indistinguishable from a breach of plea agreement 
for purposes of this Court's review." 
 
16 
 
 
 
Several problems present themselves, but the most obvious is the failure to make 
an adequate record about the terms of this claimed postconviction agreement. See State v. 
McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 997-98, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (holding assertion of error not 
preserved and record inadequate to address the issue, even if it could be reached). "It is 
'the well-established rule that an appellant has the burden to designate a record sufficient 
to establish the claimed error. Without an adequate record, an appellant's claim of alleged 
error fails.'" Vonachen, 312 Kan. at 460. We further note that, 
 
"A failure to support an argument with pertinent authority or to show why the argument 
is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority is akin 
to failing to brief the issue. Therefore, an argument that is not supported with pertinent 
authority is deemed waived and abandoned." State v. Tague, 296 Kan. 993, 1001, 298 
P.3d 273 (2013). 
 
See also Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(1)(5) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 36) ("An 
appellant's brief must contain . . . [t]he arguments and authorities relied on."). 
 
Claims of a plea agreement breach differ significantly from what is alleged here. 
Liles had already been convicted of the crimes when any agreement was reached. And 
she had already waived her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination that 
could have been bargained away under the agreement when she voluntarily testified in 
her own defense. See State v. Belone, 51 Kan. App. 2d 179, 186, 343 P.3d 128 (2015) 
(citing State v. Simmons, 78 Kan. 852, 853, 98 P. 277 [1908]). 
 
The requirement for prosecutors to follow through on their plea agreement 
commitments arises from the desirability of resolving cases by plea bargain and the 
attendant requirement for "fairness in securing [such] agreement." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 
261. We are aware of no appellate case addressing a claim that the State violated a 
sentencing recommendation agreement reached postconviction in exchange for the 
17 
 
 
 
defendant's testimony, and Liles cites none. Worse yet, the terms of any such alleged 
agreement do not appear in the record. Even in her appellate brief, she only vaguely 
claims the State agreed to "make some sort of beneficial sentencing recommendation in 
exchange for that testimony." 
 
We hold the failure to develop the record makes this question inappropriate for 
appellate review.  
 
Affirmed.