Title: Doughty v. Hammond
Citation: 341 S.W.2d 713
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1960

341 S.W.2d 713 (1960) J.H. DOUGHTY, et al., Complainants-Appellees, v. Thelma HAMMOND, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 9, 1960. *714 Ely &amp; Ely, Knoxville, for appellants. Hodges, Doughty &amp; Carson, Knoxville, for appellees. SWEPSTON, Justice. This suit involves the question of the validity of subsection 3 of Sec. 1 of Ch. 118, Public Acts of 1957, amending T.C.A. § 30-610, said subsection appearing in the Code Supplement as subsection 4. This amendment was enacted to meet the decision in First Federal Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n of Memphis, Tennessee v. Dearth, 198 Tenn. 304, 279 S.W.2d 503. Title 30 of the Code relates to and covers the broad subject of "Administration of Estates". Sec. 610 thereof originally appeared as it now appears in subsection 1 of the amendment so that subsections 2, 3 and 4 are added by the amendment and the same now reads as follows: The case is before us on a discretionary appeal by reason of the defendants' demurrer to the original bill having been overruled by the Chancellor. J.H. Doughty and K.D. Smith filed this suit against Thelma Hammond, et al., by reason of the following facts set out in the bill: Complainants sought a declaratory judgment and alternative relief. Defendants demurred on several grounds, all of which need not be stated because the assignments of error in behalf of defendant Hammond, et al., do not cover all of said grounds of demurrer. The three assignments of error are: Appellants assert in the brief that the first two assignments are practically the same. While generally in judicial sales the rule of caveat emptor applies, a sale for partition does not, however, fall in that classification. In Barksdale v. Keisling, 13 Tenn.App. 699, 703, referring to partition sales, the Court said: See also Gibson's Suits in Chancery, 4th Ed., Sec. 641, note 7, or 5th Ed., Sec. 687, note 7; see also 40 Am. Jur. (partition) Sec. 89, stating the general rule to be as above stated in the Court of Appeals case. Also T.C.A. § 16-110 provides as follows: It necessarily follows, therefore, from the foregoing authorities that the appellees must be deemed to have purchased from the heirs themselves and, if they are innocent purchasers for value as the bill alleges, they are entitled to the benefits provided by T.C.A. § 30-610, subsec. (4); and the rule of caveat emptor is not applicable. The first two assignments of error are accordingly overruled. Under subsec. (a) of the third assignment of error appellant asserts that the Act is unconstitutional because it denies defendant a property right without due process of law. Appellant had no property right in this land until August 6, 1958, the date of death of Repass, which was after the date of the enactment of Ch. 118, Public Acts of 1957. It is axiomatic that no one is heir to the living and since a will speaks as of the date of the death of the testator, a testator may make and revoke as many wills as he likes regardless of the expectations of hopeful prospective heirs or legatees or devisees. See Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed. pp. 749-750. Referring to subsec. (b) of the third assignment of error, since defendant Hammond had no interest or rights in this property at the time of the enactment of the statute in question, it can not be said that she was deprived of any property right therein. Moreover, with reference to both subsecs. (a) and (b), in Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 166, 299 S.W. 812, 815, 57 A.L.R. 601, it is said: In Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562, 62 S. Ct. 398, 401, 86 L. Ed. 452, the Court said: It seems logical, therefore, to say that when appellant did acquire a vested right under the will upon the death of the testator, she did so subject to reasonable regulations of the legislature as to the time within which she should publicly perfect that right in accordance with the statutes in regard to wills and administration. The point is well expressed in State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347, 350, as follows: In that case the statute barred probate of a will after a lapse of one year from the granting of letters of administration. A period of one year can not be said to be unreasonable, because it certainly tends to a proper and expeditious administration of a person's estate to be able to know whether there shall be an administrator, or an executor under some will. Mere reference to the index to our Tennessee Code discloses many statutes of limitations of one year and some for even a shorter period; interestingly enough somewhat in the present connection T.C.A. § 64-2604 contains a limitation of 90 days for registration of an instrument executed by a maker but not recorded prior to his death, so far as affects bona fide purchasers from the heir or devisee or legatee. Absent this statute, there is no statutory limitation on the time within which a will may be probated. T.C.A. § 30-113 does not apply to wills. Alsobrook v. Orr, 130 Tenn. 120, 169 S.W. 1165, Ann.Cas.1915B, 627; First Federal Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n. of Memphis, Tennessee v. Dearth, supra, 198 Tenn. 311, 279 S.W.2d 506. Finally, under subsec. (c) of the assignments of error it is said that the body of this amendatory act is broader than its caption and under subsec. (d) that the act contains more than one subject, both alleged to be in violation of Art. II, Sec. 17, which provides in part: "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title." Ch. 118, Public Acts of 1957, now under discussion, was reenacted by Ch. 1, Public Acts of 1957, as a part of the Tennessee Code Annotated and Ch. 1, Public Acts of 1959, reenacted the public laws as codified. Therefore, any question as *718 to the caption became moot. McClellan v. State, 199 Tenn. 60, 282 S.W.2d 631. The adoption of a code is a legislative act and not a mere revision of existing statutes and the general title is sufficient. State v. Runnels, 92 Tenn. 320, 21 S.W. 655; Brien v. Robinson, 102 Tenn. 157, 166, 167, 52 S.W. 802; Whitworth v. Hager, 124 Tenn. 355, 360, 140 S.W. 205. Regarding the insistence that T.C.A. § 30-610 as now codified contains more than one subject, for the general rule see 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, 184, Sec. 203, and 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 215c, p. 356. Both of these texts cite Chumbley v. People's Bank &amp; Trust Co., 166 Tenn. 35, 60 S.W.2d 164, 166, in which the Court said: It is insisted in behalf of appellants that since this is an amendment to Sec. 610 which before amendment related only to the sale of real property to pay debts, the amendment is not germane to the section amended. We believe that this is too narrow a construction because the Official Code is divided into Titles, 71 in number, and each Title attempts to cover the entire general subject embraced under said Title. This Title 30 relates to administration of estates. Surely, as heretofore indicated, it is important to the proper administration of estates to be able to determine whether the same will be done under letters testamentary or under letters of administration, because for example, if there is a will to be executed it may involve gifts to public charities and to individuals other than the heirs or next of kin, whereas in the absence of a will, the estate would have to be administered according to the statutes of descent and distribution. While it may be that this amendment might have been made under some other Title of the Code, it does not follow that it is not germane to the Title under which it is made. Accordingly, the decree below is affirmed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.