Title: State v. Murrell
Citation: 362 N.C. 375
Docket Number: 484A06
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 2008

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA  v. JEREMY DUSHANE MURRELL
No. 484A06 
FILED: 27 AUGUST 2008
1.
Confessions and Incriminating Statements--waiver of rights after appointment of
counsel--knowing and voluntary--knowledge of indigent services rules not required
                                           
The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by concluding that
defendant’s waiver of his rights was knowing and voluntary and that his statement to
investigators was admissible.  Counsel had been appointed but defendant waived his rights and
elected not to have counsel present when making his statement to investigators after initiating
contact.  Whether defendant was advised of the provisions of IDS (indigent services) rules about
the appointment of counsel in capital cases is immaterial to a determination under Miranda.
2.
Jury–voir dire–prosecutor’s remarks–definition of mitigating
circumstance–shorthand summary
The prosecutor’s remarks during voir dire in a first-degree murder prosecution that “A
mitigating circumstance, if you choose to believe it, could make this crime more deserving of life
imprisonment,” were substantially correct shorthand summaries of the definition of mitigating
circumstances and thus were not grossly improper.
3.
Jury--selection--ability to impose death penalty
There was no plain error in a first-degree murder prosecution where the prosecutor was
allowed to ask whether prospective jurors had the “intestinal fortitude” to vote for a death
sentence.  The question was not posed in a way that might affect the jurors’ impartiality, and it is
evident that the intent was to elicit answers which would have provided grounds for a challenge
for cause.  
4.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s closing argument--mitigating circumstances
There was no plain error in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant contended
that the prosecutor misrepresented the law regarding mitigating circumstances by suggesting that
mitigating evidence would have to lessen the severity of the crime.  The remarks were at least
substantially correct, and cannot then be said to be grossly improper.
5.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s closing argument--witness not called
The court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by overruling
defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding a witness whom the State
did not call.  Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice because the only aspect of the witness’s
testimony possibly suggested by the State’s argument was the assessment that defendant was not
schizophrenic, with which defendant’s own expert agreed.
6.
Sentencing--prosecutor’s closing argument--ability to vote for death penalty
There was no gross impropriety in a first-degree murder prosecution in the trial court not
intervening ex mero motu in the prosecutor’s arguments about having the inner strength to carry
out justice and having the intestinal fortitude to vote for the death penalty.
7.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s argument--use of mitigating evidence
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by
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overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecution’s alleged argument that the jury should
consider mitigation evidence in support of an aggravating circumstance.  In context, the
argument was that defendant’s childhood temper tantrums should not be significant factors in the
consideration of defendant’s mitigating evidence.
8.
Sentencing--capital--prosecution’s closing argument--contention for State’s position
rather than personal opinion
There was no gross impropriety in a first-degree murder prosecution where the
prosecutors argued that they wanted the jury to return a recommendation of death.  They were
advocating the State’s position rather than expressing a personal opinion.
9.
Sentencing--capital--mitigating circumstances--definition
There was no error, plain or otherwise, in the court’s definition of mitigating
circumstances in the sentencing phase of a first-degree murder prosecution.
10.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--questions to jurors about
sympathy for defendant--no objection
There was no ineffective assistance of counsel in a first-degree murder prosecution where
defendant contended that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to questions
concerning prospective jurors’ sympathy for defendant because of his age.  It would have been
reasonable for trial counsel to interpret the questions as permissible inquiries into potential bias,
and counsel sufficiently advocated the age of defendant as a mitigator.
11.
Sentencing–capital–aggravating circumstances–pecuniary gain–causal
connection–instructions
The trial court’s instructions on the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in a capital
sentencing proceeding sufficiently informed the jury regarding the circumstances which would
support a finding of some causal connection between the murder and the pecuniary gain at the
time the killing occurred when the court instructed that the pecuniary gain must have been
“[obtained] as compensation for committing [the murder]” or “[intended or expected] as a result
of the death of the victim.” 
12.
Criminal Law--motion for appropriate relief--issues adequately raised
Under these particular circumstances, a defendant adequately raised on appeal each of the
grounds underlying a motion for appropriate relief.  Defendant filed his brief after filing his
motion for appropriate relief and incorporated by reference into the brief each of the grounds for
relief from the motion, and was evidently acting upon a good faith misunderstanding of the law.
13.
Criminal Law--perjured testimony--prior convictions--not knowingly allowed
There was no error, and no prejudice even assuming error, where the defendant in a first-
degree murder prosecution alleged that a witness was allowed to perjure himself concerning
prior convictions, current charges, and discussions with a district attorney’s office.  The
testimony about pending charges was true at that time, and defendant presented no evidence to
support the assertion that the prosecution knowingly and intentionally allowed false testimony.
14.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--cross-examination of State’s
witness
A first-degree murder defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel in the
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cross-examination of a State’s witness.
15.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--conflict of interest
A first-degree murder defendant received effective assistance of counsel where one of his
attorneys had represented a State’s witness previously, but the transcript revealed that the
attorney did not remember the witness or her representation of him, nor did she discuss
defendant’s case with the witness. Defendant did not object at trial, or show that the potential
conflict affected his lawyer’s performance.
16.
Criminal Law--inconsistent statements by State’s witness--not the knowing
presentation of false testimony
False testimony was not permitted from a witness for the prosecution where the witness 
made inconsistent statements.  Issues of fact are of the jury to resolve.
17.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--cross-examination and request
for instructions
A first-degree murder defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel in the
cross examination of a State’s witness and in the lack of a request for an instruction on
accomplice testimony.  Counsel’s performance met the constitutionally required objective
standard of reasonableness, and evidence of being an accessory after the fact does not subject the
witness’s testimony to rules regarding accomplice testimony.
18.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s closing argument--not prejudicial
A first-degree murder defendant could not show that the failure to sustain his objection to
the prosecutor’s closing argument was prejudicial, even evening assuming the argument was
improper.  The argument concerned defendant ignoring the ringing of the victim’s cell phone
after the crime as the victim’s family tried to find him; the challenged remarks were made to
show the family’s love of the victim.
19.
Criminal Law--keeping facts from jury--corrected on cross-examination--not
prejudicial
There was no prejudice in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant argued that
the prosecution had tried to keep from the jury the victim’s attempt to buy marijuana.  The jury
heard the evidence through cross-examination of a detective.
20.
Criminal Law--questions assuming facts not in evidence--objections sustained--not
prejudicial
There was no prejudice in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant asserted
that the prosecution had asked questions assuming facts not in evidence, but defendant’s
objections had been sustained.
21.
Sentencing--death penalty--not disproportionate
A death sentence was not disproportionate where the evidence supported the aggravating
circumstances, there was no indication that the verdict was rendered under the influence of
passion or any other arbitrary factor, and the sentence was proportionate in light of the defendant
and the crime.
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Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a
judgment imposing a sentence of death entered on 17 February 2006
by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Superior Court, Forsyth County,
following a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree
murder.  On 26 March 2007, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s
motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of
additional judgments.  On 21 September 2007, defendant filed a
motion for appropriate relief with the Supreme Court.  Heard in
the Supreme Court 6 May 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Amy C. Kunstling, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-
Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender; and Paul M. Green for
defendant-appellant.
BRADY, Justice.
Late in the evening on 21 August 2003, defendant approached
Lawrence Matthew Harding, who was seated in his own vehicle in a
parking lot adjacent to his place of employment.  Defendant
fatally shot Harding twice in the head and neck with a firearm
and, after transporting him to Durham in the vehicle, placed his
body inside the trunk and took from him a watch and approximately
$130.00.  Three days later, defendant abandoned the vehicle--
along with Harding’s body--near a bus station in Richmond,
Virginia.  The victim was not discovered until 29 August 2003,
more than one week after the murder.  Defendant was apprehended
and subsequently convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon and was sentenced
to death for the murder.  We find no error in defendant’s
convictions or sentences and deny defendant’s contemporaneously
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filed Motion for Appropriate Relief.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 6 July 2004, the Grand Jury of Forsyth County returned
true bills of indictment charging defendant with first-degree
kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree
murder of Lawrence Matthew Harding.  Defendant was tried
capitally and, on 10 February 2006, was found guilty by a jury on
all charges.  With respect to the jury’s verdict on the murder
charge, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on
the basis of both the theory of malice, premeditation, and
deliberation and under the felony murder rule.
On 17 February 2006, following the statutorily required
sentencing hearing, the jury returned a binding recommendation
that defendant be sentenced to death for the first-degree murder
conviction, and judgment was entered accordingly by the trial
court.  Defendant was also sentenced within the presumptive range
for the robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree
kidnapping convictions.
Defendant now appeals his first-degree murder conviction and
sentence of death as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) and
has asserted several assignments of error in a Motion for
Appropriate Relief filed on 21 September 2007, during the
pendency of his appeal.  Defendant also moved to bypass the Court
of Appeals in appealing his non-capital judgments, and this Court
allowed the defendant’s motion on 26 March 2007.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE
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The State’s evidence presented during the guilt phase of
defendant’s trial tended to show the following:  That late in the
evening on 21 August 2003, the victim, Matthew Harding, completed
his regular food preparation shift at the restaurant where he was
employed, South by Southwest in Winston-Salem.  He received a
paycheck for $331.00, left the restaurant, and entered his red
Mitsubishi Lancer automobile, which was parked in an adjacent
lot.  He was last observed by a fellow employee in the same
parking lot at approximately 10:30 p.m., seated in his stationary
vehicle with the interior light turned on and the stereo playing
at a high volume.
A missing person report was filed with the Winston-Salem
City Police Department on 22 August 2003 after the victim did not
report for his scheduled shift at work and his father and
stepmother were unable to contact him.  Officer W.E. Kelsey, who
took the report from the victim’s parents, canvassed the
restaurant’s parking lot for evidence later the same day and
retrieved a shell casing.  On 29 August 2003, a red Mitsubishi
Lancer with a North Carolina license plate number matching that
of the victim’s vehicle was discovered on Altamont Street in
Richmond, Virginia, by the Richmond City Police Department.
The vehicle was seized and subsequently towed to the
Virginia Medical Examiner’s Office, where skeletal remains later
identified as the victim’s were discovered in the trunk. 
Investigators also recovered two projectile fragments from the
floor of the rear passenger area of the vehicle and detected the
presence of metal particles around a hole in the front passenger
seat.  An autopsy of the victim’s remains conducted on 30 August
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2003 revealed that he had suffered two gunshot wounds to the head
and neck areas.  The head wound would have been immediately
incapacitating and fatal, whereas the wound traced from under the
left side of his chin down through the soft tissue of his neck
and into his spine might have been survivable but would have been
painful and likely caused some paralysis; however, the autopsy
did not reveal the order in which these wounds were inflicted.
One additional projectile was recovered during the autopsy. 
A ballistics expert tendered without objection from defendant
testified that this projectile was consistent with a “caliber
.380 auto full metal jacketed bullet” and that the shell casing
retrieved by Officer Kelsey from the South by Southwest parking
lot in Winston-Salem was a fired Winchester caliber .380 auto
cartridge case.
The State also presented the testimonies of several
acquaintances of defendant.  Mangus Daniels, at whose apartment
defendant resided during the summer of 2003, testified that
before the night of 21 August 2003, defendant had occasionally
mentioned the possibility of robbing someone to obtain money. 
Daniels further testified that on 21 August 2003 he received a
telephone call from defendant, who indicated that he had robbed
someone.  After a few days, defendant returned to Daniels’
apartment, at which point defendant described having forced
someone into a trunk at gunpoint and taken the vehicle to
Virginia.  Defendant further described the victim as “a white
guy” and stated that he left him in good health, although
defendant had shot into the trunk of the vehicle to keep the
victim from making too much noise.  In October 2003, prompted by
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1 “Chop shop” is defined as “a place where stolen
automobiles are stripped of salable parts.”  Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 202 (10th ed. 1993) [hereinafter Merriam-
Webster’s].
a Winston-Salem newspaper account of a body discovered in
Virginia, Daniels first confronted defendant during a telephone
conversation and then initiated contact with Crime Stoppers, the
victim’s family, and law enforcement concerning the murder.
Defendant also related to his girlfriend, Stacy Whitson,
before 21 August 2003 that he wanted to rob someone for money. 
Defendant lived temporarily at Whitson’s residence from 17 August
2003 until he was ultimately apprehended by law enforcement in
October 2003.  One day during October 2003, while at Whitson’s
residence, defendant returned a telephone call in response to a
message he had received from Daniels.  After speaking with
Daniels, he said to Whitson, “I didn’t want to get that phone
call.”  Defendant then borrowed a vehicle belonging to Whitson’s
roommate in order to obtain a newspaper.  Whitson later witnessed
defendant balling up a newspaper and discarding it in the trash. 
Defendant also asked Whitson whether investigators could detect
fingerprints on clothing.
Another of defendant’s acquaintances, Bennie Cameron,
testified that he was aware defendant possessed a firearm
sometime before 21 August 2003 and that defendant had stated his
intention to rob someone, put the individual in the trunk of his
or her own vehicle, and take the vehicle to Durham.  Defendant
also indicated to Cameron that he knew of a “chop shop” in
Durham.1  In August 2003, defendant visited Cameron’s apartment
and indicated he had robbed someone and put the individual in the
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trunk.  Defendant further indicated that he had obtained
approximately $130.00 from the victim, whom he had transported to
Virginia.
At about 11:00 p.m. on 21 August 2003, Alonzo Dingle, a
friend of defendant who resided in Durham at the time, left work
and returned to his apartment.  Dingle heard a knock on the door
as he was showering, and when he opened the door he observed
defendant standing outside, smiling and wearing no shirt. 
According to testimony from Dingle, defendant requested his
assistance in placing a dead body in the trunk of a vehicle. 
Defendant made several similar requests as he and Dingle spent
some time inside the apartment, but Dingle did not believe
defendant was serious.
Eventually, defendant convinced Dingle to follow him to the
parking lot outside his apartment, where Dingle observed a white
male inside a Mitsubishi Lancer with his head positioned on the
floor of the front passenger area, one leg across the driver’s
seat and the other between the two front seats extending into the
rear of the vehicle.  Dingle testified that he observed no blood
at this time and that he thought defendant and the other man were
playing a joke on him.
Defendant subsequently drove the vehicle to a nearby
neighborhood, with the victim’s body situated in the same manner
and Dingle seated in the rear.  Defendant parked the vehicle on
the street, moved around to the front passenger side, opened the
door, and dragged the body out of the vehicle.  At this point,
Dingle observed the man’s face was covered with blood and that he
was not moving.  Dingle then refused defendant’s request for
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assistance and watched as defendant placed the body inside the
trunk of the vehicle.  When Dingle asked defendant what had
happened, defendant explained that he needed to eat.
Additionally, the State introduced into evidence a recorded
statement defendant made to law enforcement on 28 October 2003. 
Defendant’s account of the events surrounding the victim’s death
on 21 August 2003 was as follows:  He knew the victim, although
not by name, from a previous encounter during which the victim
had purchased marijuana from defendant.  Sometime after 9:00 p.m.
on 21 August 2003, while defendant was standing near an
intersection in Winston-Salem, he was approached by the victim,
who wished to again purchase marijuana, but defendant shook his
head “no” to communicate that he did not have any marijuana at
the time.
Defendant next saw the victim sometime later in the evening
seated in his vehicle in a parking lot near a hotel and listening
to music.  By this time, defendant had obtained about an ounce of
marijuana and was carrying in his right pants pocket a .380
caliber handgun, which he had borrowed from Dingle.  Without
speaking, defendant entered the vehicle through the front
passenger side door to initiate the sale of marijuana to the
victim in exchange for cash, in similar fashion as the two had
done previously.  A struggle ensued, apparently initiated by the
victim attempting to “snatch” the marijuana, during which
defendant “panicked” and removed the handgun from his pocket with
his right hand.  The victim subsequently pulled at defendant’s
right hand, which caused the handgun to discharge once into the
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2 Before making a recorded statement, defendant provided law
enforcement an inconsistent account of events in which he stated
that a third, unidentified individual shot the victim in the face
while defendant and the victim were both seated in the vehicle
engaged in the drug transaction.
victim’s face or head.2
Defendant repositioned the victim from the driver’s seat to
the front passenger seat of the vehicle, so that the victim was
upside down with his head positioned near the floorboard. 
Defendant departed the scene operating the victim’s vehicle,
eventually merged onto Interstate 40, and drove east.  He
considered taking the victim to a hospital but, as he continued
driving, the victim said to him, “Finish me off.”  As defendant
described:  “A few seconds later, he said, ‘Please,’ and he said,
‘Please’ again.  And, he said, that’s, that’s when he got, got to
me personally and that’s when the . . . So, that’s when it, cause
he twitched and I shot him.”  After this second shot was fired,
it appeared to defendant the victim was dead, and he noticed no
further movement or other signs of life from the body.
According to defendant, he arrived at Dingle’s apartment in
Durham between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on 21 August 2003, with the
victim’s body situated in the same manner as before.  When
defendant explained to Dingle what had happened and requested his
assistance, Dingle retrieved a pair of gloves and a hat.  After
some discussion, the two men decided to dispose of the body
somewhere in Durham and traveled around town in the vehicle for
thirty minutes to an hour with defendant operating the vehicle,
the victim’s body in the front passenger seat, and Dingle seated
in the rear behind defendant.  Ultimately, they decided to stop
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the vehicle and place the body inside the trunk, and Dingle
assisted defendant in doing so.
After defendant and Dingle returned to the Durham apartment
in the same vehicle, defendant showered and followed Dingle’s
advice to dispose of his own clothes and the victim’s cellular
phone, placing these items in trash bags and discarding them in
the garbage dumpster outside of Dingle’s apartment.  Dingle also
advised defendant to dispose of the vehicle, along with the
victim’s body, in some location outside of the state.
Defendant departed Dingle’s apartment and returned to the
vehicle with the handgun, the victim’s watch, and approximately
$115.00 or $120.00 he had taken from the victim’s wallet.  He
traveled north on an unspecified route until he reached Richmond,
Virginia, in the early morning hours of 22 August 2003, at which
point he decided he would dispose of the remaining evidence in
that city.  During the next three days, defendant drove the
vehicle around the Richmond area and as far north as Washington,
D.C., while the victim’s body remained in the trunk.  Defendant
placed several calls from his cellular phone--to Whitson,
Daniels, and his father--and at one point attended a screening of
a horror film at an unspecified public movie theater.  On 24
August 2003, defendant abandoned the vehicle, along with the
body, in a secluded area near a bus station in Richmond.  He
discarded the keys to the vehicle, sold the .380 caliber handgun
for $90.00, and used the proceeds to purchase a bus ticket to
return to Winston-Salem.  Once he arrived in Winston-Salem,
defendant returned to Daniels’ residence in a taxi.
Defendant did not introduce evidence during the guilt phase
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of his trial.
II. PENALTY PROCEEDING EVIDENCE
The State introduced as victim impact evidence the testimony
of Judy Harding, the victim’s stepmother, who described how much
he was missed by his family.
Defendant introduced as mitigating evidence the testimonies
of defendant’s family members, including his father and sister,
detailing how defendant was adversely affected during childhood
by his mother’s paranoid schizophrenia and the mental problems
his father suffered as a result of a head injury.
Claudia Reeves Coleman, Ph.D., a licensed clinical
psychologist with a practice in Raleigh, was tendered by
defendant without objection as an expert in forensic psychology. 
Dr. Coleman testified that she diagnosed defendant as having
suffered from a mood disorder since childhood; that defendant was
thus prone to panic and anxiety attacks, depression, and poor
impulse control; and that he was at a higher than normal risk for
developing a schizophrenic disorder as a consequence of his
family’s mental health history.  Dr. Coleman’s opinion was that,
at the time of the murder, defendant was suffering from a
significant mood disorder which impaired his capacity to conform
his conduct to the law.
The jury found as aggravating circumstances that the murder
was committed for pecuniary gain, that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the murder was committed while
defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery with a
dangerous weapon, and that the murder was committed while
defendant was engaged in the commission of first-degree
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kidnapping.  One or more jurors found the statutory mitigating
circumstances that defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity and that the murder was committed while
defendant was under a mental or emotional disturbance.  Several
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were also found to exist by
one or more jurors.
The jury unanimously found the mitigating circumstances
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and
further found that the aggravating circumstances were
sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death
penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstances. 
Accordingly, the jury entered its binding recommendation that
defendant be sentenced to death for the murder conviction.
ANALYSIS
I. PRETRIAL ISSUES
[1] Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s 30 January
2006 order denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. 
Defendant moved before trial to suppress an inculpatory statement
he made to law enforcement on 28 October 2003, following his
arrest on 24 October 2003, on the basis that he did not knowingly
and voluntarily waive his right to counsel before making this
statement.
At the conclusion of the hearing on defendant’s motion to
suppress, the trial court made, inter alia, the following
findings of fact:  On 24 October 2003, defendant was questioned
by police investigators for approximately three hours at the
Winston-Salem City Police Department.  Immediately after this
interview, during which defendant “did not make any admissions of
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any type . . . in any way,” defendant was arrested for first-
degree kidnapping and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Matthew
Harding, but was not charged with murder.  Detective D.L. Elmes
subsequently transported defendant to the Forsyth County jail and
gave defendant his business card in case defendant wished to
speak with him or “wanted to get anything off his chest.”
At approximately 8:00 a.m. on 28 October 2003, defendant
initiated contact with investigators by placing a telephone call
from the county jail to the number listed on Detective Elmes’
business card and leaving a voice mail message requesting to meet
with him.  When the investigators arrived at the jail, they
advised defendant of his Miranda rights.  Defendant stated that
he understood these rights and wanted to answer questions,
indicated that he was aware he had already been appointed
counsel, and responded that he did not wish to have an attorney
present during questioning but instead chose to waive the
appearance of his appointed counsel.  Before making his
statement, defendant told the investigators, “I want y’all to
help me.”
Based upon its findings of fact, the trial court concluded
that defendant’s statement to investigators “was made freely,
voluntarily, and understandingly and . . . without promise of
hope or reward . . . and without force or pressure.”  The court
determined that the statement was admissible as a result.
Although defendant assigned error to the trial court’s
findings of fact, he has failed to make any argument on appeal
that these findings were unsupported by competent evidence. 
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3 We note that Part 2 of the IDS rules “places with [IDS]
the responsibility for appointing and compensating counsel in
capital cases.”  Indigent Def. Servs. Rules, Part 2, reprinted in
2008 Ann. R. N.C. 973 (emphasis added).
Thus, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact, and our
review on appeal is limited to a determination of whether these
findings support the lower court’s conclusions of law.  See State
v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 62-63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999) (citing
State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 438, 446 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1994)),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245 (2000).
Defendant asserts that his waiver of the right to have an
attorney present during questioning was not knowing and voluntary
because he “could not possibly waive a right that he did not know
existed.”  However, defendant does not contend that investigators
did not apprise him of his right to have an attorney present. 
Rather, he argues that certain steps should have been taken to
notify the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services
(IDS) that defendant might potentially become a capital
defendant.  See N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-498.1 to -498.8 (2007) (“Indigent
Defense Services Act”); Indigent Def. Servs. Rules, Subpart 2A
(“Appointment and Compensation of Trial Counsel in Capital
Cases”), reprinted in 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 974-79.3  Yet the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v.
Arizona expressly dispels any notion that the failure of
investigators to obtain counsel for a defendant constitutes a
violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination:
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that
each police station must have a ‘station house lawyer’
present at all times to advise prisoners.  It does
-17-
mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a
person they must make known to him that he is entitled
to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer
will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.
384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (emphasis added).  Whether defendant was
advised of the provisions of the IDS rules pertaining to the
appointment of counsel in capital cases is immaterial to a
determination under Miranda of whether defendant was informed
“that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him.”  Id. at 473; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422
(1986) (“Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect
and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the
capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional
right.”).
In this regard, the instant case is easily distinguishable
from State v. Steptoe, in which the defendant clearly
communicated his desire to have a lawyer and to speak with an
attorney, and only after the investigators “discouraged the
appointment of counsel” did the defendant issue a statement.  296
N.C. 711, 716-17, 252 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (1979).  Here, in
contrast, defendant had already been appointed counsel but waived
his Miranda rights and elected not to have counsel present when
making his statement to investigators after initiating contact
with them.  The trial court did not err in concluding that
defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary and that his
statement to investigators on 28 October 2003 was thus
admissible.  Defendant’s assignments of error related to this
issue are overruled.
II. JURY SELECTION ISSUES
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A. Prosecutor’s Characterization of “Mitigating Circumstances”
[2] Defendant contends that the trial court erred during
jury selection by permitting the prosecutor, over defendant’s
objection, to misrepresent the law with regard to mitigating
circumstances.  Our trial courts have traditionally been afforded
broad discretion to rule upon the manner and extent of jury voir
dire, and this Court will not disturb such a ruling on appeal
absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. Polke, 361 N.C. 65,
68-69, 638 S.E.2d 189, 191 (2006) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 70, 169 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2007).
Before trial, defendant filed a written motion “To Prohibit
the DA from Improperly Defining a Mitigating Circumstance.”  At a
pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion on 12 January 2006, the
trial court reserved its ruling on the motion, instructing both
sides to “follow the statute” and to note an objection in the
event opposing counsel made “any improper statement of the law.”
During the State’s jury voir dire questioning on 30 January
2006, the prosecutor stated without objection:  “A mitigating
circumstance, if you cho[o]se to believe it, could make this
crime more deserving of life imprisonment.”  However, defense
counsel did object to two similar remarks made by the prosecutor
later in the proceeding, and these objections were sustained.
On the morning of 31 January 2006, defendant filed a written
motion to prohibit the prosecutor from “incorrectly defining
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  The trial court held
a brief hearing on defendant’s motion and again declined to enter
a ruling, but noted defendant’s continuing objection “to [the
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prosecutor’s] questions.”
As in State v. Frye, the prosecutor’s remarks during voir
dire “were shorthand summaries of the definition[] of . . .
mitigating circumstances” and “were substantially correct, even
if slightly slanted toward the State’s perspective.”  See 341
N.C. 470, 491, 461 S.E.2d 664, 674 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1123 (1996).  Thus, the trial court’s rulings upon defendant’s
motions and objections were not “manifestly unsupported by reason
or so arbitrary that they could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.”  Polke, 361 N.C. at 69, 638 S.E.2d at 191
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Defendant’s
assignment of error is overruled.
B. The Prosecutor’s Use of the Phrase “Intestinal Fortitude”
[3] Defendant also challenges on appeal a question asked
individually of prospective jurors by the prosecutor at jury
selection:  Whether the individual possessed the “intestinal
fortitude” to vote for a sentence of death.  Defendant initially
noted his objection to the prosecutor’s use of this phrase and
was overruled, but thereafter failed to preserve this assignment
of error for appellate review with further timely objection. 
Alternatively, defendant has asserted plain error.
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, we find no
error related to this issue, plain or otherwise.  Defendant
attempts to distinguish this Court’s previous decision in State
v. Oliver.  309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983).  In Oliver, this
Court found no error in the prosecutor’s use of the words
“backbone” and “intestinal fortitude,” respectively, when
questioning two prospective jurors “who equivocated on imposition
-20-
of the death penalty” for the specific purpose of determining,
“in light of their equivocation, whether they could comply with
the law.”  Id. at 355, 307 S.E.2d at 323.  The Court held that
the defendants had failed to demonstrate prejudice since “these
comments could be viewed as favorable, rather than unfavorable to
defendants’ position as they tended to encourage jurors who
equivocated on imposition of the death penalty to serve.”  Id.
As stated in Oliver, we review prosecutorial remarks in
light of both the context in which they were made and “the
overall factual circumstances to which they referred.”  Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In this case,
no less than in Oliver, the prosecutor’s questions “were made not
to badger or intimidate these [prospective jurors], but rather to
determine . . . whether they could comply with the law.”  Id.  It
is evident from the transcript of jury selection proceedings that
the prosecutor intended this question of “intestinal fortitude”
to elicit from prospective jurors answers which would have
provided grounds for a challenge for cause.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1212(8), (9) (2007).  In fact, the phrase “intestinal fortitude”
was simply substituted when defendant’s objection to the word
“courage” was sustained.
Moreover, this Court has previously found no abuse of
discretion or prejudicial error with respect to similar inquiries
which have implicated a prospective juror’s metaphorical
physiological capacity to recommend a sentence of death when
called upon to do so by law.  See, e.g., State v. Flippen, 349
N.C. 264, 275, 506 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1998) (questions concerning
“courage” of prospective jurors), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1135
-21-
(1999); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 130, 400 S.E.2d 712, 729
(1991) (questions concerning whether prospective jurors were
“strong enough”); State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 252, 311 S.E.2d
256, 261 (question concerning “backbone” of an equivocating
prospective juror), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984). 
Similarly, the prosecutor’s question in the instant case was not
posed to prospective jurors in a way that might affect their
impartiality, and the trial court therefore committed no
prejudicial error in overruling defendant’s objection.
Defendant also argues, without citing any authority, that
his trial counsel were ineffective to the extent they failed to
note a timely objection to the prosecutor’s questions.  As we
have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to
defendant’s argument and have found this argument to be without
merit, we need not reach any ineffective assistance of counsel
claims related to this issue as they have been rendered moot.
Accordingly, defendant’s related assignments of error are
overruled.
III. PENALTY PROCEEDING ISSUES
A. Prosecution’s Closing Argument
[4] Defendant raises several issues by assignment of error
and argument in his brief concerning the prosecution’s closing
argument at the penalty proceeding on 16 February 2006.
Defendant first contends that the prosecution misrepresented
the law with regard to mitigating circumstances.  The prosecutor
suggested more than once during closing argument that mitigating
evidence would have to “lessen the severity of this crime.” 
-22-
4 In his brief, defendant describes other instances in which
the prosecutor made reference to Dr. Kramer, both during jury
selection and during the penalty proceeding, and discusses at
length the facts surrounding the prosecutor’s decision not to
call Dr. Kramer as a witness.  However, defendant has not
preserved any of these matters for appellate review either
However, defense counsel failed to object to any of these remarks
at trial.  Thus, we review the remarks for whether they “were so
grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to
intervene ex mero motu.”  State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 358, 572
S.E.2d 108, 135 (2002) (citing State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451,
509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999)),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003).
As with defendant’s similar assignment of error concerning
prosecutorial remarks made during jury selection, we find that
the prosecutor’s remarks at closing argument “were shorthand
summaries of the definition[] of . . . mitigating circumstances”
and “were substantially correct, even if slightly slanted toward
the State’s perspective.”  Frye, 341 N.C. at 491, 461 S.E.2d at
674.  Because these remarks were at least “substantially
correct,” it does not stand to reason that they were in any way
“grossly improper.”  Id.  These assignments of error are
overruled.
[5] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to the following portion of the
prosecution’s closing argument:
You also saw Dr. [Steve] Kramer sitting in the
front row, somebody on the State’s witness list. 
Defense may make -- make a comment about why didn’t the
State call Dr. Kramer?  Well, what is the net effect of
zero?  Zero.  The cumulative effect of zero is zero. 
You want more testimony to tell you that this defendant
is not schizophrenic?4
-23-
through assignment of error or by “specifically and distinctly”
contending plain error.  Thus, our consideration is limited to
the objected-to portion of the prosecution’s closing argument
quoted above.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c).
We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial
court’s decision to overrule defendant’s timely objection.  State
v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 606, 652 S.E.2d 216, 229 (2007)
(citing State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106
(2002)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. Ed. 2d
377 (2008).  Under this standard, we apply a two-part analysis: 
“‘[T]his Court first determines if the remarks were improper . .
. .  Next, we determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude
that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have
been excluded by the trial court.’”  Id. at 606-07, 652 S.E.2d at
229 (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106
(alterations in original)).
Defendant asserts that the jury was erroneously permitted to
infer from the prosecutor’s line of argument that Dr. Kramer’s
testimony would have been favorable to the State had he been
called as a witness and qualified as a mental health expert. 
However, the only aspect of Dr. Kramer’s potential testimony that
was even conceivably suggested by the State’s closing argument
was an assessment, with which defendant’s own mental health
expert witness concurred, that defendant was not schizophrenic. 
Even assuming, arguendo, the impropriety of the prosecutor’s
reference to Dr. Kramer, defendant has failed to demonstrate
prejudice.
Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by overruling defendant’s objection to these remarks. 
-24-
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
[6] Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s
failure to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecution’s
closing argument when the prosecutor implored jurors to “find the
inner strength to carry out justice.”  Since defendant failed to
object to the prosecutor’s remarks, we must determine whether
these remarks were “‘so grossly improper that the trial court
erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.’”  State v. Walters,
357 N.C. 68, 101, 588 S.E.2d 344, 364 (quoting Barden, 356 N.C.
at 358, 572 S.E.2d at 135), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971 (2003).
Defendant provides no authority or legal analysis to
demonstrate that the language “find the inner strength to carry
out justice” was in any way grossly improper.  Defendant argues
instead that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s questions
during jury selection concerning jurors’ “intestinal fortitude”
to vote for the death penalty and the prosecutor’s repeated
remarks at closing argument imploring jurors to “find the inner
strength to carry out justice” was sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a new sentencing hearing.  Relatedly, defendant asserts
that the prosecutor’s question during jury selection concerning
whether prospective jurors possessed the “intestinal fortitude”
to vote for the death penalty was recalled in the minds of the
jurors at closing argument when the prosecutor stated, “We asked
you in jury selection if you were strong enough to do this.”
As set forth above, we can discern no prejudicial error in
the trial court’s decision to allow the prosecutor’s inquiry into
the “intestinal fortitude” of prospective jurors to vote for a
-25-
sentence of death.  Absent any further analysis from defendant
specifically addressing the prosecutor’s remarks at closing
argument, we are unable to hold that these remarks rose to the
level of gross impropriety.  Moreover, defendant has not carried
his burden under the Strickland test with regard to the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims he sets forth related to
this issue.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (requiring a defendant to show both that trial counsel’s
performance was “deficient” and that the defendant was prejudiced
as a result).  Accordingly, defendant’s assignments of error are
overruled.
[7] Defendant contends that the following portion of the
prosecution’s closing argument prompted the jury to consider
defendant’s evidence in mitigation as evidence in support of an
aggravating circumstance instead:
Consider whether [defendant] has shown signs in
his childhood of emotional disturbance as evidenced by
prolonged crying spells or periods of staring at
nothing or unwillingness to engage with other children
or inability to tolerate being touched.  He had temper
tantrums when he was a toddler.  He had a bad temper. 
He would throw fits when he didn’t get what he wanted,
I believe, was the testimony.  Perhaps his personality
for murder was already formed.
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this
argument.  Thus, we determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion and therefore, whether its ruling “could not have been
the result of a reasoned decision.”  Peterson, 361 N.C. at 606,
652 S.E.2d at 229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106).
Specifically, defendant characterizes the statement,
“Perhaps his personality for murder was already formed,” as an
-26-
invitation to jurors to vote for a sentence of death because of
the mitigating evidence he presented at the penalty proceeding. 
However, it is well established that “‘statements contained in
closing arguments to the jury are not to be placed in isolation
or taken out of context on appeal.’”  See State v. Thompson, 359
N.C. 77, 110, 604 S.E.2d 850, 873 (2004) (quoting State v. Green,
336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046
(1994)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830 (2005).  The prosecutor’s
line of argument from which the challenged remarks have been
extracted can be traced back for seven pages of transcript and
continues on for approximately eleven pages--for a total of
eighteen transcript pages.  This line of argument served the
prosecutor’s purpose of calling into question the weight jurors
ought to assign to each individual item of defendant’s mitigating
evidence.  At one point, the prosecutor stated to the jury that
defendant would “hurl grapes around the courtroom” in the form of
mitigating circumstances “[a]nd even though there are 41 of them,
when you put 41 grapes on a scale with four watermelons, we know
that it’s not going to weigh more than four watermelons.”
Viewed in this context, it is readily apparent that the
prosecutor was not in any way suggesting defendant had formed a
“personality for murder” as a toddler, but rather was using a
skeptical tone to advocate the opposite conclusion:  That, in the
prosecutor’s view, defendant’s early temper tantrums should not
be significant factors in jurors’ consideration of defendant’s
mitigating evidence.
For this reason, we hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in overruling defendant’s objection to this
-27-
argument; therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.
[8] Finally, defendant contends that prosecutors expressed
their personal desires, opinions, or beliefs during closing
argument when advocating that the jury return a binding
recommendation of death and that these remarks were grossly
improper.  Specifically, defendant assigns error to the
following:
[T]here are going to be four questions.  I want you to
answer yes, yes to every one of them, and then I want
you to write -- I want your foreperson to write on that
last line death, because I want you to do justice, I
want you to give a punishment that is appropriate for
the crime.
Additionally, the prosecution encouraged the jury to “answer
those questions yes, yes, yes, and yes.  The recommendation in
this case is death.”
Because defendant did not object when these remarks were
made, we review them for whether they were “‘so grossly improper
that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero
motu.’”  Walters, 357 N.C. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting
Barden, 356 N.C. at 358, 572 S.E.2d at 135).  Defendant cites
this Court’s decision in Jones to support his assertion that the
prosecutor’s argument was grossly improper.  See 355 N.C. at 135,
558 S.E.2d at 108 (stating that closing argument must be “devoid
of counsel’s personal opinion”); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1230(a)
(2007) (stating that during closing argument to the jury “an
attorney may not . . . express his personal belief as to the
truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant”); N.C. St. B. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(e), 2008
Ann. R. N.C. 759, 848-49 (stating that “[a] lawyer shall not . .
-28-
. in trial . . . state a personal opinion as to the justness of
the cause”).
In Jones, this Court vacated the defendant’s death sentence
and awarded a new sentencing hearing after holding that the trial
court “abused its discretion by affording the prosecution undue
latitude in its closing arguments at sentencing.”  355 N.C. at
135, 558 S.E.2d at 109.  Two distinct sets of remarks were found
by the Court in Jones to exceed the bounds of permissible
argument.  First, the prosecutor had been permitted, over the
defendant’s objection, to state the following:
[PROSECUTOR]:  Thank you, judge.  The United States of
America, a great country, indeed around the world for
its freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of privacy in
your own home.  But with those freedoms comes
individual responsibility that every citizen of this
country must realize; that to have these freedoms, one
is responsible for their own conduct; one is
responsible for their own behavior.
A year ago the Columbine shootings; five years ago
Oklahoma City bombings.  When this nation faces such
tragedy--
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
[PROSECUTOR]:  --the laws of this country come in to
bring order to that tragedy, to speak to that tragedy. 
Here we are addressing a tragedy of a man’s life.  The
tragedy not of this defendant, the tragedy of [the
victim] . . . .
Id. at 132 n.2, 558 S.E.2d at 107 n.2.  Second, the trial court
did not intervene ex mero motu to prevent the prosecutor from
describing the defendant as a “quitter,” a “loser,” “worthless,”
“as mean as they come,” and “lower than the dirt on a snake’s
belly.”  Id. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107.
In sharp contrast with Jones, the case at bar presents this
-29-
Court with a closing argument well within the “wide latitude” of
what is permissible, as the prosecutor merely sought to fulfill
the well-recognized “duty to advocate zealously that the facts in
evidence warrant imposition of the death penalty.”  Williams, 350
N.C. at 25, 510 S.E.2d at 642 (citing State v. Conner, 345 N.C.
319, 334, 480 S.E.2d 626, 633, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876
(1997)).  Thus, the prosecutor was advocating the State’s
position as to the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment
form rather than expressing a personal opinion or desire that
defendant be sentenced to death.  Defendant’s argument is without
merit, and consequently, his related assignments of error are
overruled.
B. Trial Court’s Instructions on Mitigating Circumstances
[9] Defendant contends that the trial court gave an
incorrect definition of mitigating circumstances in its final
charge to the jury at the close of the penalty proceeding.  He
challenges the following portion of the trial court’s final
charge to the jury at the conclusion of the penalty proceeding,
although no timely objection was raised at the charge conference
or made contemporaneously with the instructions:
A mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of facts
which do not -- which do not constitute a justification
or excuse for a killing or reduce it to a lesser degree
of crime than first degree murder, but which may be
considered as extenuating or reducing the moral
culpability of the killing or as making it less
deserving of the extreme punishment than other first
degree murders.
Our law identifies several possible mitigating
circumstances; however, in considering issue two, it is
your duty -- it would be your duty to consider as a
mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant’s
character or record or any circumstances of this murder
that the defendant contends is a basis for a sentence
-30-
less than death and to consider any other circumstances
arising from the evidence which you deem to have
mitigating value.
Because defendant did not object to the trial court’s jury
instructions, this assignment of error was not preserved for
appellate review.  See State v. Hardy, 353 N.C. 122, 131, 540
S.E.2d 334, 342 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840 (2001).  
Alternatively, defendant asserts plain error; however, this
Court has repeatedly upheld virtually identical instructions. 
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 32-34, 510 S.E.2d 626,
647, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880 (1999); State v. Harden, 344 N.C.
542, 564, 476 S.E.2d 658, 669-70 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1147 (1997); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 52-53, 446 S.E.2d 252,
280-81 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134 (1995), superseded by
statute on other grounds, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, as recognized in
State v. Price, 337 N.C. 756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994).  Thus, there
was no error in the trial court’s instructions, plain or
otherwise.  Accordingly, defendant’s assignment of error is
overruled.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Concerning (f)(7)
Mitigator (“the age of the defendant at the time of the crime”)
[10] Although the trial court properly submitted and
instructed the jury on the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance,
defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel did not object to a number of questions asked by
the prosecution and the trial court during jury selection
concerning prospective jurors’ “sympathy” for defendant on
account of his age.  Further, defendant contends that these
questions were prejudicial because they prevented the jury from
-31-
considering the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, defendant’s age
at the time of the murder, in its sentencing deliberations.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (2007).
Among other questions cited by defendant, the prosecutor
asked prospective jurors whether they would “be sympathetic to
this defendant because of his age”; whether they agreed “that the
law must apply the same to everyone regardless of their age, sex,
and race”; and whether they agreed that “a decision based upon
somebody’s age, race, or sex would be unlawful.”  At one point
during the State’s jury voir dire questioning, the trial court
interjected and asked prospective jurors whether they understood
that “deciding this case based on a person’s age, race, religion,
or sex” would be “morally wrong” in addition to being “unlawful.” 
The prosecutor thereafter characterized “basing [a] decision on
sex, age, or race” as both “unlawful” and “immoral” when
questioning prospective jurors.
This Court has long recognized the two components of a
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as set forth in Strickland v. Washington.  State v.
Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 623, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007) (citations
omitted); State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 690, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30
(2005) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073 (2006). 
First, defendant must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s
performance was “deficient,” such that the errors committed were
“so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland,
-32-
466 U.S. at 687.  Second, defendant is required to show prejudice
resulting from trial counsel’s “deficient performance,” which
“requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.”  Id.  “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted
from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable.”  Id.
This Court has previously held that a prosecutor may
“‘inquir[e] into the sympathies of prospective jurors in the
exercise of [the State’s] right to secure an unbiased jury.’” 
See State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 170-71, 513 S.E.2d 296, 308,
(quoting State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 15, 372 S.E.2d 12, 19
(1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433 (1990)),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 973 (1999).  Defendant contends that the
questions asked of prospective jurors by the State and the trial
court in the present case were not permissible inquiries into the
bias of prospective jurors.  Instead, in effect defendant argues
that these were “hypothetical questions involving the existence
of a mitigating circumstance” and thus, impermissible because
they were “designed to elicit in advance what the juror’s
decision will be under a certain state of the evidence or upon a
given state of facts.”  See id. at 170, 513 S.E.2d at 307
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
It is far from clear that the questions asked by the
prosecutor and the trial court were directed toward the (f)(7)
mitigating circumstance of defendant’s age rather than toward any
bias which may have affected prospective jurors during the guilt
-33-
phase of the trial because of defendant’s age.  Regardless, we
are not persuaded that the performance of defendant’s trial
counsel “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as
is required to show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  Indeed, as defendant
acknowledges, his trial counsel made repeated references to
defendant’s youth throughout the penalty proceeding and stated
the following in closing argument:
The defendant’s age at the time of the crime was a
mitigating factor.  He was twenty-four.  He had not
finished college.  The State wants you to believe he
had apartments and lived with women, but what was he
doing?  He was living in somebody’s dorm room.  He had
lived with various people that kicked him out.  And I
would contend that that’s not evidence that he had
established some home and was living through life as a
mature person.  And I think you can consider his age. 
That is a statutory mitigating factor.  He was young.
Moreover, as the trial court submitted the (f)(7) mitigating
circumstance and did not err in its instructions to the jury on
this mitigator, there is nothing in the trial transcript and
record to support a conclusion that defendant’s trial counsel did
not act reasonably to ensure the jury fully considered
defendant’s age as a mitigator in its sentencing deliberations.
Because it would have been reasonable for trial counsel to
interpret the questions asked of prospective jurors concerning
defendant’s age as permissible inquiries into potential bias, and
because counsel sufficiently advocated during the penalty
proceeding that the jury find the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance,
we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated the first
component of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim--that
counsel’s performance was deficient.  Consequently, defendant’s
-34-
claim is without merit, and his related assignments of error are
overruled.
D. Trial Court’s Instructions on (e)(6) Aggravator (that “[t]he
capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain”)
[11] Defendant asserts plain error and a violation of his
rights to due process in the following instruction given by the
trial court concerning the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance--
whether the murder “was committed for pecuniary gain”:
A murder is committed for pecuniary gain if the
defendant, when he commits it, has obtained or intends
or expects to obtain money or some other thing, in this
case the victim’s automobile, which can be valued in
money, either as compensation for committing it or as a
result of the death of the victim.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that when the defendant killed the victim, the
defendant took or intended to take the victim’s
automobile, then you would find this aggravating
circumstance and would so indicate by having your
foreperson write yes in the space after this
aggravating circumstance on the issues and
recommendation form.
(Emphasis added.)  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (2007).  The
jury subsequently found the (e)(6) aggravator to exist.
Defendant contends that the italicized portion of the above
instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving that the
murder was committed for the purpose of pecuniary gain and of
thereby showing that “the taking was [not] a mere act of
opportunism committed after a murder was perpetrated for another
reason.”  See State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 54, 591 S.E.2d 521,
530 (2004).  However, this Court has rejected several previous
challenges to virtually identical instructions.  See Barden, 356
N.C. at 383, 572 S.E.2d at 149-50 (citing, inter alia, State v.
Davis, 353 N.C. 1, 35-37, 539 S.E.2d 243, 266-67 (2000), cert.
-35-
5 Defense counsel did object to the submission of the (e)(6)
aggravating circumstance to the jury, but not to the precise
wording of the trial court’s jury instruction.
denied, 534 U.S. 839 (2001)).  In the instant case, as was true
in the cases cited above, the trial court sufficiently informed
the jury regarding the circumstances which would support a
finding of “some causal connection between the murder and the
pecuniary gain at the time the killing occur[red],” Maske, 358
N.C. at 54, 591 S.E.2d at 530 (citations omitted), with its
instructions that the pecuniary gain must have been “[obtained]
as compensation for committing [the murder]” or “[intended or
expected] as a result of the death of the victim.”
Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate any error in these
instructions, much less plain error.  Defendant’s assignment of
error is overruled, as it is without merit.  
Alternatively, defendant claims his trial counsel was
ineffective, depriving defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel, by
failing to note a timely objection to the trial court’s
instructions on the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance.5  Since we
have found no error in the challenged instructions, defendant has
not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s performance “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness,” and his claim is
without merit as a result.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
Thus, defendant’s assignment of error is overruled.
IV. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF
[12] On 21 September 2007, defendant filed with this Court a
Motion for Appropriate Relief from his sentence of death pursuant
-36-
to Article 89 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  See N.C.G.S. §§
15A-1415, -1418 (2007).  Through this motion, defendant assigns
error to (1) the allegedly false testimony of State’s witness
Bennie Cameron; (2) the allegedly false testimony of State’s
witness Alonzo Dingle; and (3) the prosecutors’ closing remarks,
trial strategy, and direct examination pertaining to victim
impact evidence.  Moreover, defendant effectively contends that
each assignment of error resulted in an invalid sentence as a
matter of law and in his prayer for relief asks us to vacate his
sentence of death or, in the alternative, remand the case to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on these claims.  See id.
§ 15A-1415(b)(8).  This Court allowed oral argument on
defendant’s motion contemporaneously with argument concerning his
direct appeal, and we have determined that the merits of this
motion can be decided based upon the materials before us.  See
id. § 15A-1418(b).
We note at the outset that a capital defendant’s Motion for
Appropriate Relief filed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1418 would
ordinarily be subject to denial on statutory procedural grounds
if “[u]pon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to
adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present
motion but did not do so.”  Id. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (2007).  The
fact that each of defendant’s three stated grounds for relief are
based upon assignments of error contained in the record on
appeal, and therefore, could have been presented by argument in
defendant’s brief, demonstrates that defendant “was in a position
to adequately raise the ground[s] or issue[s] underlying the
present motion” on direct appeal.  Id.  In State v. Price, this
-37-
Court applied section 15A-1419(a)(3) to a defendant’s Motion for
Appropriate Relief filed during the pendency of his direct
appeal, stating:
Motions for appropriate relief generally allow
defendants to raise arguments that could not have been
raised in an original appeal, such as claims based on
newly discovered evidence and claims based on rights
arising by reason of later constitutional decisions
announcing new principles or changes in the law.  We
agree with the State that statutes governing motions
for appropriate relief were not intended to circumvent
the orderly briefing of arguments on appeal.  Motions
for appropriate relief may not be used to add to an
appeal new arguments which could have been raised in
the briefs originally filed.  Both of the arguments now
raised by defendant in the motion for appropriate
relief could have been raised in his original appeal. 
Therefore, defendant’s motion for appropriate relief is
subject to being dismissed.
331 N.C. 620, 630, 418 S.E.2d 169, 174 (1992) (internal citation
omitted), sentence vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 1043
(1993).
In Price, this Court exercised its discretion to reach the
merits of the defendant’s claims notwithstanding the
applicability of section 15A-1419(a)(3).  See 331 N.C. at 630,
418 S.E.2d at 174-75.  In fact, the version of N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1419(b) which was applicable when Price was decided expressly
provided for such an exercise of discretion “in the interest of
justice and for good cause shown.”  See Act of June 21, 1996, ch.
719, sec. 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 1996) 389, 391. 
However, the General Assembly has since amended section 15A-
1419(b), which currently provides:
   (b) The court shall deny the motion under any of the
circumstances specified in this section, unless the
defendant can demonstrate:
(1)  Good cause for excusing the grounds for
denial listed in subsection (a) of this
section and can demonstrate actual prejudice
-38-
resulting from the defendant’s claim; or
(2)  That failure to consider the defendant’s
claim will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 (2007) (emphasis added) (as amended by ch.
719, sec. 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 1996) at 391-92). 
Thus, our state’s appellate courts may excuse the grounds for
denial set forth in section 15A-1419(a) only if a defendant can
demonstrate (1) “good cause” resulting in “actual prejudice,” as
defined by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(c), (d), or (2) that a
“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” as defined by N.C.G.S. §
15A-1419(e), would otherwise result.
Because defendant filed his brief after filing his Motion
for Appropriate Relief and incorporates by reference in his brief
each of the three stated grounds for relief set forth in his
motion, and because defendant was evidently acting upon a good
faith misunderstanding of the law, we hold that defendant, under
these particular circumstances, did adequately raise on appeal
each of the grounds underlying the motion in his brief.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3).  After careful review of defendant’s
several arguments, we find they are all meritless.  Accordingly,
we overrule defendant’s related assignments of error and deny his
Motion for Appropriate Relief.
A. State’s Witness Bennie Cameron
[13] Defendant first contends that the prosecution allowed
State’s witness Bennie Cameron to perjure himself concerning his
prior convictions, current charges, and discussions with the
Durham County District Attorney’s office.  Defendant also alleges
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect
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to the impeachment of Cameron on cross-examination, that
defendant’s right to effective assistance of conflict-free
counsel was violated, and that defendant was sentenced to death
upon materially false and unreliable information in violation of
his state and federal constitutional rights.  Defendant’s
arguments are without merit.
[I]t is established that a conviction obtained
through use of false evidence, known to be such by
representatives of the State, must fall under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  The same result obtains when the
State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows
it to go uncorrected when it appears.  Further, with
regard to the knowing use of perjured testimony, the
Supreme Court has established a standard of materiality
under which the knowing use of perjured testimony requires a convictio
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury.  Thus, [w]hen a defendant
shows that testimony was in fact false, material, and knowingly
and intentionally used by the State to obtain his conviction, he
is entitled to a new trial.
State v. Williams, 341 N.C. 1, 16, 459 S.E.2d 208, 217 (1995)
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128 (1996).
Defendant asserts that Bennie Cameron testified falsely
concerning “pending charges in Durham.”  At trial, defense
counsel questioned Cameron concerning charges filed against
“Kevin Jermaine McAdoo,” which defendant contends has been
identified by fingerprint comparison as an alias of Cameron. 
Defense counsel asked Cameron if he had any pending charges in
Durham.  He responded that he did not.  This statement was in
fact true, even assuming that Cameron and McAdoo are the same
person, since the supporting documentation provided by defendant
and the testimony at trial show that the charges against McAdoo
were dismissed with leave for failure to appear.  Although the
-40-
charges were subject to reinstatement, they were not pending at
the time of the challenged testimony.
Even assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was false,
defendant has presented no supporting evidence for his assertion
that the prosecution “knowingly and intentionally” allowed
Cameron to testify falsely concerning these matters.  Moreover,
even had sufficient evidence been provided by affidavit or other
supporting documentation to demonstrate such knowledge by the
prosecutors, Cameron’s testimony on this peripheral issue
concerning charges dismissed in another district attorney’s
jurisdiction was simply not material.  See State v. Abraham, 338
N.C. 315, 353, 451 S.E.2d 131, 151 (1994) (holding that counsel
is not allowed to cross-examine witnesses on pending charges). 
Unlike State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 163-64, 484 S.E.2d 377,
378 (1997), in which the State’s witness faced pending charges
within the same jurisdiction in which he testified, any charges
pending against Cameron were being handled in a different
jurisdiction, and defendant provides no supporting documentation
of any discussion between the two district attorneys’ offices to
demonstrate that Cameron’s testimony was biased in this respect. 
Moreover, this case is unlike Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974), in which the trial court had refused to allow defense
counsel to question a witness as to his probationary status when
the witness was afraid he might be charged with the crime for
which the defendant was on trial.  Id. at 312-14.  In the instant
case, there is no indication that Cameron feared being charged
with the victim’s murder.  Thus, Cameron’s allegedly false
testimony was clearly not material to defendant’s trial.
-41-
[14] Defendant also argues that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel during the cross-examination of Cameron. 
We disagree.  Defense counsel’s performance at trial was far from
deficient.  Counsel not only confronted Cameron about his
numerous prior convictions, but also questioned him concerning
the charges under his alleged alias and any conversations with
the district attorney regarding the disposition of the alleged
charges against him.  Defense counsel’s cross-examination of
Cameron spanned twenty-nine pages of transcript and we cannot say
that her performance in impeaching Cameron was deficient.  Thus,
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
[15] Defendant argues that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because it was revealed during defense
counsel Lisa Costner’s cross-examination of Cameron that she had
represented him on a previous charge that resulted in a
conviction.  However, the transcript also reveals that Costner
did not recall Cameron or her representation of him, nor did she
discuss defendant’s case with Cameron.  Defendant did not object
at trial to this potential conflict of interest and has failed to
show that this asserted conflict of interest “‘adversely affected
his lawyer’s performance.’”  State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 39-40,
463 S.E.2d 738, 757 (1995) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 348 (1980)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197 (1996).  As noted
above, Costner sufficiently cross-examined Cameron and adequately
raised issues concerning his credibility.  Thus, defendant’s
arguments relating to Cameron’s testimony lack merit, and his
related assignments of error are overruled.
-42-
B. State’s Witness Alonzo Dingle
[16] Defendant next contends that the prosecution was
permitted to present false testimony from State’s witness Alonzo
Dingle concerning whether he observed blood on defendant’s person
when defendant first arrived at Dingle’s apartment on the night
of the murder.  According to Detective Elmes’ report of his
unrecorded interview with Dingle, Dingle told investigators that
he had observed blood on defendant’s person at this point in
time, whereas in Dingle’s recorded interview he indicated that
this was not the case and he had not observed any blood until
defendant later removed the body from the passenger side of the
vehicle.  Although Dingle’s statements are inconsistent, it
cannot be said that the prosecution knowingly submitted false
testimony for the jury’s consideration based solely on the fact
that the prosecutors submitted evidence which may have conflicted
with Dingle’s prior statements.  As this Court has stated,
“[T]here is a difference between the knowing presentation of
false testimony and knowing that testimony conflicts in some
manner.  It is for the jury to decide issues of fact when
conflicting information is elicited by either party.”  State v.
Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 305, 626 S.E.2d 271, 279 (citation omitted),
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 164, 166 L. Ed. 2d 116
(2006).
[17] Moreover, defendant’s assertion that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to
properly cross-examine Dingle concerning his statement and failed
to request a jury instruction on accomplice testimony must fail. 
At trial, defense counsel questioned Dingle concerning his
-43-
recollection of the events in a manner designed to raise a
suspicion in jurors’ minds that Dingle’s account was fictional. 
Counsel further impeached Dingle with his conflicting accounts of
these events.  Thus, counsel’s performance met the
constitutionally required “objective standard of reasonableness.” 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  Additionally, even had
counsel requested a jury instruction on accomplice testimony, it
would not have been a proper instruction.  There was no evidence
that Dingle was an accessory before the fact, and “[e]vidence
that a witness was an accessory after the fact does not subject
[the witness’s] testimony to rules relating to accomplice
testimony.”  State v. Cabey, 307 N.C. 496, 501, 299 S.E.2d 194,
197 (1983).  Moreover, as defendant was not entitled to such an
instruction, the failure of the trial court to give the
instruction could not constitute plain error.  Accordingly,
defendant’s assignment of error related to Dingle’s testimony is
overruled.
C. Prosecutors’ Closing Argument Remarks, Trial Strategy, and
Direct Examination Pertaining to Victim Impact Evidence
[18] Finally, defendant has raised several assignments of
error pertaining to victim impact evidence presented by the State
during the penalty proceeding.  Defendant first challenges the
prosecutor’s remarks during penalty proceeding closing argument
that the victim’s family placed numerous telephone calls to his
cellular phone following his death.  The prosecutor argued:
MR. O’NEILL:  And what did Alonzo Dingle tell you?
. . .  I heard the phone, some phone kept ringing, kept
ringing, kept ringing, kept ringing.  That was
Matthew’s family trying to find their kid --
-44-
MS. COSTNER:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
MR. O’NEILL:  -- trying to find their baby.
Defendant argues that this was patently false, as discovery
records show that all of the calls placed to the victim’s
cellular phone were not made by concerned family members, but by
friends.  “This Court has articulated a two-part analysis for
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in such
cases. ‘[T]his Court first determines if the remarks were
improper . . . .  Next, we determine if the remarks were of such
a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus
should have been excluded by the trial court.’”  Peterson, 361
N.C. at 606-07, 652 S.E.2d at 229 (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at
131, 558 S.E.2d at 106 (alterations in original)).  Even
assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper,
defendant cannot show that the trial court’s failure to sustain
his objection was prejudicial.  The challenged remarks were
obviously made for the purpose of showing the love the victim’s
family felt toward him.  Moreover, considering (1) the evidence
detailed above as to the impact of the victim’s death on his
family, (2) the fact someone was concerned of his whereabouts as
indicated by the ringing of his cellular phone, and (3) the trial
court’s instruction to the jury that “if your recollection of the
evidence differs from that of the Court or of the district
attorneys, you are to rely solely upon your recollection of the
evidence in your deliberations,” defendant cannot demonstrate
prejudice.
[19] Additionally, defendant asserts that the prosecution
-45-
tried to “keep the victim’s attempt to purchase marijuana from
the jury by eliciting incomplete information from Detective Rowe”
and by arguing to the jury that defense counsel’s exploration of
the issue was an attempt to “smear the victim.”  However, the
jury was allowed to hear the relevant evidence through defense
counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Rowe, in which Detective
Rowe stated affirmatively that he had information that “the
victim was trying to purchase drugs at the time that he was
shot.”  Thus, even had the prosecutor attempted to “conceal” this
evidence, it came before the jury and defendant cannot show
prejudice.
[20] Finally, defendant asserts that the prosecutor posed
questions assuming facts not in evidence by asking witnesses
about medication used by the victim’s father.  The prosecution
asked both the victim’s stepmother and his grandmother whether
his father was taking medication and, if so, why.  On both
occasions, the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection
to the question of why the victim’s father was taking medication. 
“This Court has held that where the trial court sustains
defendant’s objection, he has no grounds to except, and there is
no prejudice.”  State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 341, 561 S.E.2d
245, 259 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006 (2002). 
Thus, defendant’s argument is without merit.  Defendant’s related
assignments of error are overruled, and his Motion for
Appropriate Relief is denied.
V. PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s instruction to
the jury on the (f)(2) mitigating circumstance, contending it was
-46-
plainly erroneous for the trial court to state that being “under
the influence of mental or emotional disturbance,” see N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(2) (2007), is similar to acting “in the heat of
passion upon adequate provocation.”  This Court has previously
upheld the language used by the trial court.  See State v.
Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 218-20, 474 S.E.2d 375, 385-87 (1996). 
Although defendant bases his challenge of these instructions on
apparently novel grounds, his bare contention that the trial
court’s characterization is unfounded does not compel us to
overrule our previous holding that the trial court’s instruction
“clearly did not prevent the jury from considering any evidence
tending to support this mitigating circumstance.”  Id. at 219-20,
474 S.E.2d at 386-87.  Accordingly, we overrule defendant’s
assignment of error as without merit.
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s instructions
to the jury on the (f)(2) (“mental or emotional disturbance”) and
(f)(6) (impaired capacity) mitigating circumstances were plainly
erroneous and violated his state and federal constitutional
rights because these instructions limited the evidence the jury
could consider in support of these circumstances.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(2), (f)(6) (2007).  We have reviewed defendant’s
argument and decline to overrule this Court’s previous holding
that this argument is without merit.  See State v. Carroll, 356
N.C. 526, 552, 573 S.E.2d 899, 915-16 (2002), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 949 (2003).
Additionally, defendant argues the following:  (1) the
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance
-47-
is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the trial court
erred in instructing the jury to answer “yes” for Issue Three of
the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form even if the
jury found that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances were
of equal weight; (3) the trial court erred in instructing jurors
that, in considering Issues Three and Four of the Issues and
Recommendation as to Punishment form, they “may” consider the
mitigating circumstances found in response to Issue Two; (4) the
trial court erred in instructing jurors that they could ignore
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances if they deemed the evidence
to have no mitigating value; and (5) the death penalty is
inherently cruel and unusual, and North Carolina’s capital
sentencing procedure is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
After reviewing defendant’s several arguments, we decline to
overrule this Court’s numerous holdings that these contentions
are all meritless.  State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 136-42, 623
S.E.2d 11, 28-32 (2005), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
130, 166 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2006).
VI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
[21] Having determined that defendant’s trial and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we must
further determine:  “(1) whether the record supports the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon which the
sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was
entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the facts of the crime and the defendant.” 
-48-
State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 24, 653 S.E.2d 126, 141 (2007)
(citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (2005)).
The jury found four aggravating circumstances:  (1) the
murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (2) the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was
committed while defendant was engaged in robbery with a dangerous
weapon; and (4) the murder was committed while defendant was
engaged in first-degree kidnapping.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(5), (e)(6), (e)(9) (2007).  We find the record supports
each of these aggravating circumstances.
First, the testimony of Bennie Cameron supported the jury’s
finding that defendant committed the murder for pecuniary gain--
namely, the victim’s vehicle--since defendant stated to Cameron
before 21 August 2003 that he would rob someone, put the
individual in the trunk of his or her own vehicle, and take the
vehicle to Durham, where defendant knew of a “chop shop,”
referring to “a place where stolen automobiles are stripped of
salable parts.”  Merriam-Webster’s at 202.
Additionally, the State offered (1) considerable testimony
from those who associated with defendant before the murder that
defendant apparently intended to rob someone for money; (2)
defendant’s statements to Mangus Daniels afterward that he had
robbed someone at gunpoint; and (3) defendant’s statement to
investigators that he had taken money from the victim.  Thus, the
record supports the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance as to robbery
with a dangerous weapon to obtain the victim’s money.  See
N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (2007).
Defendant’s statements to investigators, in conjunction with
-49-
what he related to several acquaintances, tended to prove that
the victim--while he remained alive--was unlawfully transported
in his own vehicle without his consent and for the purpose of
robbery or the infliction of serious bodily harm.  This finding
would support the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance as to first-
degree kidnapping.  See id. § 14-39 (2007) (providing that “the
offense is kidnapping in the first degree” if the victim was “not
released by the defendant in a safe place” or was “seriously
injured”).
Finally, defendant’s statement to investigators tended to
show that defendant, although he considered taking the victim to
a hospital after the initial discharge of the handgun, fired a
second, fatal shot at the helpless victim as he lay upside down
on the front passenger side of the vehicle and after he begged
defendant to put him out of his misery.  This evidence, in turn,
supports the jury’s finding of the (e)(9) aggravating
circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel.
We find no indication in the record that the sentence of
death recommended by the jury was imposed “under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.”  See id. §
15A-2000(d)(2); Raines, 362 N.C. at 25, 653 S.E.2d at 141.  “In
such circumstances we will not disturb the jurors’ weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  Raines, 362 N.C. at
25, 653 S.E.2d at 141.
Lastly, we determine whether defendant’s sentence is
proportionate, considering both the individual defendant and the
crime for which he was convicted.  See id.  “Ultimately,
-50-
proportionality review rests upon the experienced judgments of
the members of the Court.”  Goss, 361 N.C. at 629, 651 S.E.2d at
879 (citing State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 425, 628 S.E.2d 735,
752, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 505, 166 L. Ed. 2d 378
(2006)).  “In its determination, the Court must compare
defendant’s case with all similar cases in this jurisdiction,
though we are not bound to cite each of these.”  See id. at 629,
651 S.E.2d at 879 (citing State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 477-
78, 648 S.E.2d 788, 812 (2007), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S.
Ct. 1888, 170 L. Ed. 2d 760 (2008)).
This Court has previously found a sentence of death
disproportionate in only eight cases.  State v. Kemmerlin, 356
N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318,
372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d
653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C.
647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 (1997), and by
State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v.
Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311
N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C.
674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26,
305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
Only in Stokes and Bondurant did the juries find the
aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.  However,
[i]n Stokes, the defendant was seventeen years old
and the only one of four assailants to receive the
death penalty.  In Bondurant, the defendant showed
immediate remorse for his actions and even directed the
victim's transport to the hospital, hoping to see the
-51-
victim live.
Cummings, 361 N.C. at 478, 648 S.E.2d at 812 (citations omitted). 
In contrast, in the case now before us, defendant was twenty-four
years old at the time of the murder and was also the sole
assailant.  Moreover, although defendant stated to investigators
that he killed the victim only because the victim repeatedly
pleaded with him to do so, none of defendant’s subsequent actions
following the victim’s death demonstrated any remorse.  In fact,
defendant took considerable steps to conceal his involvement in
the murder--including abandoning the body in a remote location
outside of the state.
Accordingly, after careful consideration, we find the
sentence of death proportionate in light of this defendant and
the crime for which he was convicted.
CONCLUSION
All remaining assignments of error presented by defendant
but not set forth in his brief or argued on appeal are deemed
abandoned.  N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also Goss, 361 N.C. at
630, 651 S.E.2d at 879 (citations omitted).  We conclude that
defendant received a fair trial and sentencing proceeding, that
his convictions and sentence were free of error, and that the
sentence of death is not disproportionate to the crime for which
he was convicted.  As detailed above, we also deny defendant’s
Motion for Appropriate Relief.
NO ERROR; MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF DENIED.