Title: QHG of Enterprise, Inc., d/b/a Medical Center Enterprise v. Pertuit
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1181072
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2020

Rel: September 25, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1181072
____________________
QHG of Enterprise, Inc., d/b/a Medical Center Enterprise
v.
Amy Pertuit
Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court
(CV-15-900156)
BRYAN, Justice.
QHG of Enterprise, Inc., d/b/a Medical Center Enterprise
("QHG"), appeals from a judgment of the Coffee Circuit Court
("the trial court") awarding Amy Pertuit ("Amy") $5,000 in
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compensatory damages and $295,000 in punitive damages.1  We
reverse the judgment and render a judgment for QHG.
Background
Leif Pertuit ("Leif") was married to Deanna Mortensen;
one child, Logan, was born of their marriage.  Leif and
Mortensen were divorced in 2007.  At some point, Mortensen was
awarded sole physical custody of Logan, and Leif was awarded
visitation.
Leif later married Amy, a nurse.  At the time of their
marriage, Leif and Amy resided in Mobile, and Mortensen
resided in Enterprise.  Eventually, tensions arose between
Leif and Mortensen regarding the issue of visitation.  In
March 2014, Mortensen began sending text messages to Leif
accusing Amy of being addicted to drugs.
Around that time, Mortensen visited the attorney who had
represented her in matters relating to her divorce from Leif
("Mortensen's attorney").  Mortensen expressed concern that
Logan was in danger as a result of the visitation arrangement
1QHG also named Leif Pertuit as an appellee in its notice
of appeal.  However, as explained in more detail infra, QHG
prevailed on Leif's claims in the trial court, and Leif did
not appeal from the trial court's judgment.  Therefore, Leif
is not a party to this appeal.
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and asked her attorney to assist with obtaining a modification
of Leif's visitation.  Mortensen's attorney explained: "We
can't just go on your belief. ...  You can file a petition,
but it will not be granted ...." 
In April 2014, Mortensen telephoned or sent a text
message to Dr. Kathlyn Diefenderfer, a physician whom QHG
employed as a hospitalist at Medical Center Enterprise, a
hospital operated by QHG (hereinafter referred to at times as
"the hospital").  Mortensen had been Dr. Diefenderfer's
patient when Dr. Diefenderfer worked in her own clinic, and
Dr. Diefenderfer's son played sports with Logan.  Mortensen
went to see Dr. Diefenderfer at the hospital.  Hysterical and
crying, Mortensen informed Dr. Diefenderfer that Logan was
scheduled to ride in an automobile with Amy from Enterprise to
Mobile for Leif's visitation and expressed concern regarding
Amy's ability to drive, given her belief that Amy was using
drugs and had lost her nursing license.
Dr. Diefenderfer then used a hospital computer to access
the Alabama Prescription Drug Monitoring Program ("PDMP"), a
database 
that 
contains 
information 
regarding 
drug
prescriptions.  See § 20-2-212, Ala. Code 1975 ("The [Alabama
3
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Department of Public Health] may establish, create, and
maintain a controlled substances prescription database
program.").2  After reviewing information pertaining to Amy's
drug prescriptions, Dr. Diefenderfer told Mortensen: "All I
can tell you is I would not put my son in the car." 
Later in April 2014, Mortensen visited her attorney,
again distraught.  Mortensen informed her attorney that her
suspicions about Amy's drug use had been confirmed. 
Mortensen's attorney said: "You cannot allege that unless you
have proof. ...  Where's the proof?"  Mortensen indicated that
Dr. Diefenderfer had acquired the necessary proof.
2Section 20-2-210, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"The Alabama Legislature hereby finds that the
diversion, 
abuse, 
and 
misuse 
of 
prescription
medications classified as controlled substances
under the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act
constitutes a serious threat to the health and
welfare of the citizens of the State of Alabama. 
The Legislature further finds that establishment of
a controlled substances prescription database to
monitor the prescribing and dispensing of controlled
substances will materially assist state regulators
and practitioners authorized to prescribe and
dispense controlled substances in the prevention of
diversion, 
abuse, 
and 
misuse 
of 
controlled
substances prescription medication through the
provision of education and information, early
intervention, and prevention of diversion, and
investigation and enforcement of existing laws
governing the use of controlled substances."
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At the time, Mortensen's attorney was also representing
Dr. Diefenderfer in a different legal matter, and the two were
neighbors.  Mortensen's attorney telephoned Dr. Diefenderfer,
who was at home.  Dr. Diefenderfer told Mortensen's attorney
that no child should be around Amy because of her methadone
and opiate use.  At some point, Mortensen's attorney asked Dr.
Diefenderfer whether she had written documentation supporting
her statements, and Dr. Diefenderfer said: "Yes, I have a
printout."  Mortensen's attorney asked whether a subpoena
would be required to obtain the documentation, and Dr.
Diefenderfer again responded in the affirmative.
Based 
on 
his 
telephone 
conversation 
with 
Dr.
Diefenderfer, Mortensen's attorney 
drafted 
and 
filed 
that 
same
day a petition seeking a modification of Leif's visitation
with Logan, so as to prevent Logan from being left in Amy's
care.  Among other things, the petition alleged:
"[Amy] has lost her nursing license after reprimand,
counseling[,] and[,] finally[,] a revocation of her
license due to what is believed as prescription drug
and substance abuse.  Records and other evidence
show that [Leif and Amy] ha[ve] purchased up to 138
pills a month of [m]ethadone, Lortabs and other
narcotics for over a year.  These numbers are far in
excess of medically recommended dosages.  [Amy] is
also 
making 
purchases 
at 
four 
different
pharmaceutical establishments in the Mobile area and
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with three different doctors."
Amy later received a copy of the modification petition on
Leif's behalf.  According to Amy, the material allegations set
out in the petition included multiple inaccuracies, and she
was convinced that her private health information had been
obtained in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 
Amy testified that her nursing license had never been
suspended or revoked, that she had never been reprimanded or
terminated by an employer for drug use, that she had never
failed a drug test requested by an employer, that she had
never been arrested for drug possession, that she had never
taken methadone and Lortab together, that she had never taken
138 pills in one month, that she had never "shopped around"
for doctors or pharmacies, and that her doctor had never
raised a concern that Amy was addicted to opioids.  Amy noted
that she had been prescribed medication to help manage pain
resulting from fusion surgery to repair multiple spinal
fractures in her neck that had been caused by a significant
motor-vehicle 
collision. 
 
Amy 
attributed 
one 
large
prescription for 138 doses of methadone in November 2013 to
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the fact that her doctor was leaving town for Christmas at
that time.
At some point after the modification petition was filed,
Mortensen's attorney met Dr. Diefenderfer at her home and
delivered what he purported to be a subpoena directing Dr.
Diefenderfer to produce: "Records which indicate that Logan
... may by in imminent danger if in the physical custody of
Amy ...."  In reality, the purported subpoena had never been
filed in the court in which the modification petition was
pending; neither the court presiding over that action nor
opposing counsel was aware of the purported subpoena.  See
Rule 45, Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing the procedure for seeking
the issuance of a subpoena).  At some point after Mortensen's
attorney 
presented the 
purported 
subpoena 
to 
Dr. 
Diefenderfer,
Dr. Diefenderfer gave him a report generated by Dr.
Diefenderfer from the PDMP and printed at her home that
reflected Amy's name and listed prescriptions for methadone
and Lortab.  
The total number of times Dr. Diefenderfer accessed the
PDMP to obtain medical information concerning Amy is unclear. 
It is undisputed that she did so more than once.  However, Dr.
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Diefenderfer testified that such access occurred only once at
the hospital -- on the day that Mortensen sought her
assistance regarding Logan's scheduled visitation with Leif.
At the hearing on Mortensen's modification petition, Amy
testified, in the presence of Leif and Leif's mother,
regarding the allegations raised by Mortensen in 
her 
petition. 
The court presiding over that action denied the modification
petition, ordering Leif's visitation to resume as previously
ordered.
As a result of the events described above, Amy submitted
a report to the Enterprise Police Department, a complaint to
the United States Department of Health and Human Services, a
complaint to the Alabama Bar Association, and a complaint to
the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners.  Indictments were
presented by the grand jury of Coffee County against Mortensen
and Dr. Diefenderfer, charging each with violating § 
20-2-216,
Ala. Code 1975.3  The indictments were later recalled upon
3Section 20-2-216 provides: 
"Any 
person 
who 
intentionally 
makes 
an
unauthorized disclosure of information contained in
the controlled substances prescription database
shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.  Any
person 
or 
entity 
who 
intentionally 
obtains
unauthorized access to or who alters or destroys
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Mortensen's and Dr. Diefenderfer's entering into pretrial-
diversion agreements with the district attorney's office.  
The
Alabama Board of Medical Examiners sent Dr. Diefenderfer a
letter of concern.
On October 24, 2014, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"),
sent a letter to "[t]he [o]ffice" of Dr. Diefenderfer,
explaining that OCR had received a complaint regarding Dr.
Diefenderfer's access of the PDMP in April 2014.  The letter
was sent to the address of Dr. Diefenderfer's previous
employer, Enterprise Medical Clinic.  The letter stated that
Dr. Diefenderfer's actions "could reflect a violation" of
specified federal regulations.  Among other things, the 
letter
stated: 
"OCR has determined to resolve this matter through
the provision of technical assistance to the Office. 
To that end, OCR has enclosed [certain] material[s]
....  It is our expectation that you will review
these materials closely and share them with your
staff as part of the [HIPAA] training you provide to
your workforce.  It is also our expectation that you
will assess and determine whether there may have
been an incident of noncompliance as alleged by the
complainant in this matter, and, if so, to take the
information contained in the controlled substances
prescription database shall be guilty of a Class C
felony."
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steps necessary to ensure such noncompliance does
not occur in the future."
Four days later, QHG received, via a courier from Dr.
Diefenderfer's previous employer, a copy of the letter sent by
OCR.  
Richard Ellis was QHG's chief executive officer ("CEO")
at the time, and Kathy McCurdy was the compliance and privacy
officer for Medical Center Enterprise.  As the compliance and
privacy 
officer, 
McCurdy 
was 
responsible 
for 
investigating the
complaint against Dr. Diefenderfer.  McCurdy was also
Mortensen's aunt.  Ellis and McCurdy met with Dr. Diefenderfer
and discussed the 
importance of patient privacy and compliance
with the requirements of HIPAA and explained QHG's commitment
to safeguarding patient privacy.  Dr. Diefenderfer agreed
regarding the importance of HIPAA and patient privacy.  Dr.
Diefenderfer was not reprimanded, suspended, or fired by QHG. 
Evidence was also presented indicating that Dr. Diefenderfer
believed that the hospital "backed her up a hundred percent."
In September 2015, Leif and Amy (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the Pertuits") commenced this action.  As
amended, the Pertuits' complaint named as defendants Dr.
Diefenderfer, Mortensen, Mortensen's attorney, and QHG.  The
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Pertuits 
asserted 
counts 
alleging 
"negligence 
and 
wantonness";
"violation of the right of privacy"; "tort of outrage
(intentional 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress)"; 
and
"conspiracy" against Dr. Diefenderfer, Mortensen, Mortensen's
attorney, and QHG.  Leif also asserted a claim for "loss of
consortium."
The Pertuits alleged that Dr. Diefenderfer was acting
within the line and scope of her employment with QHG during
all times relevant to the actions made the basis of the
foregoing claims.  The Pertuits asserted separate counts
against QHG for "respondeat superior/ratification" and
"negligent 
and 
wanton 
training, 
supervision[,] 
and 
retention." 
The Pertuits sought compensatory and punitive damages for 
each
of their claims.
At some point after the Pertuits filed their complaint,
QHG terminated its employment relationships with hospitalists
working at Medical Center Enterprise.  Specifically, QHG
entered into a contract with a management company called
Schumacher Group, which, in turn, employed the hospitalists
working at Medical Center Enterprise.  According to Amy, from
that point, hospitalists working at Medical Center Enterprise
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became independent contractors with regard to QHG.  Amy's
brief, at 14.
During the course of this litigation, in 2016, Dr.
Diefenderfer prepared a report ("the 2016 report"), in which
Dr. Diefenderfer referenced Amy's use of medications and 
other
factors leading to Dr. Diefenderfer's conclusion that "Amy
exhibits the behaviors of a patient with antisocial
personality disorder, defined as a person who[se] ways of
thinking, perceiving situations[,] and relation to others are
dysfunctional and destructive."  Among other things, Dr.
Diefenderfer's report 
suggested 
that 
Amy's 
"long[-]term use 
of
Methadone ha[d] ... contributed to her psychological and
emotional disorder resulting in a frivolous law suit."  Dr.
Diefenderfer gave a copy of the report to Mortensen because,
at the time, Dr. Diefenderfer felt that she and Mortensen
"were partners in this."  According to Dr. Diefenderfer's
testimony, when she created the 2016 report, she was employed
by Schumacher Group -- not by QHG.  QHG did not learn of the
report until later.
In September 2016, QHG filed a summary-judgment motion. 
The trial court entered an order granting QHG's motion,
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concluding, in pertinent part: "Because [QHG] cannot be held
liable for the alleged intentional acts of [Dr.] Diefenderfer
committed outside the scope of her employment, [QHG] is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  The Pertuits
filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its order,
asserting that discovery had not yet been completed.  The
trial court granted the Pertuits' motion and set aside its
previous order granting QHG's summary-judgment motion. 
The Pertuits reached settlements with Dr. Diefenderfer,
Mortensen, and Mortensen's attorney.  The terms of Dr.
Diefenderfer's 
settlement 
agreement 
with 
the 
Pertuits
specified that the agreement did not constitute an admission
of liability on Dr. Diefenderfer's part.  Dr. Diefenderfer,
Mortensen, and Mortensen's attorney were eventually dismissed
from the action.  
A jury trial was conducted over the course of several
days on the Pertuits' claims against QHG.  QHG filed a written
motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of the
Pertuits' case.  The trial court denied QHG's motion.  At the
close of all the evidence, QHG's attorney orally moved for a
judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court heard
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arguments from counsel regarding the motion.  The trial court
denied QHG's motion.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of QHG on all claims
asserted against it by Leif.  The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Amy on her claims against QHG, awarding her $5,000 in
compensatory damages and $295,000 in punitive damages.  QHG
filed a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law,
pursuant to Rule 50(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and a separate motion
requesting a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur.4 
The trial court entered orders denying QHG's motions.  The
trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in favor
of Amy and on the jury's verdict in favor of QHG regarding
Leif's claims.  QHG appealed.5
4In New Addition Club, Inc. v. Vaughn, 903 So. 2d 68, 72
(Ala. 2004), this Court held "that if a party moves for a
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new
trial before the court has entered a judgment, the motion
shall be treated as having been filed after the entry of the
judgment and on the day thereof."
5During the pendency of this appeal, this Court remanded
this cause to the trial court for the disposition of certain
matters.  On September 10, 2020, QHG filed a supplemental
brief pursuant to Rule 28A, Ala. R. App. P., asserting
additional argument in support of its position that the trial
court erred by failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law
in QHG's favor.  Amy filed a motion to strike QHG's
supplemental brief.  As explained infra, we have concluded
that QHG was entitled to a judgment as matter of law based on
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Analysis
QHG raises 10 arguments on appeal.  One of QHG's
arguments is that this action represents an attempt by Amy to
assert a private right of action to enforce the provisions of
HIPAA, which, QHG contends, she lacks authority to do.  See
Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006). In
response, Amy argues that her claims were not brought to
enforce the provisions of HIPAA; she says they are "common law
tort claims that incorporate QHG's privacy policies, employee
contract, and HIPAA into each element where appropriate." 
Amy's brief, at 29.  Amy asserts, however, that "this is a
case of first impression for Alabama."  Amy's brief, at 30. 
In support of her argument that we should recognize her
claims, Amy points to Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), a decision of the Indiana Court of
Appeals that, Amy says, recognized claims similar to those she
brought against QHG.  Amy's brief, at 30-31.6 
the arguments asserted in QHG's initial briefs.  Therefore, we
do not consider the additional arguments asserted in QHG's
supplemental brief, and Amy's motion to strike QHG's
supplemental brief is denied as moot.
6Neither party has raised any issue concerning federal
preemption and HIPAA on appeal.  Therefore, we express no
opinion regarding preemption in this case.
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QHG also argues that it was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law under well settled principles of law.  For the
reasons explained below, we agree.  Therefore, we decline
Amy's invitation to tread new ground in the field of Alabama
tort law based on the facts of this case, and we expressly
reach no holding in this case concerning the general viability
of tort claims that, as a matter of Alabama law, seek to
incorporate the privacy provisions of HIPAA.  We need not
decide that question at this time because, even assuming that
such claims are generally cognizable under Alabama law,
insufficient evidence was presented to satisfy the essential
components of the theories of liability relied upon by Amy
against QHG.7
"In American National Fire Insurance Co. v.
Hughes, 624 So. 2d 1362 (Ala. 1993), this Court set
out the standard that applies to the appellate
review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for a
[judgment as a matter of law]:
"'The standard of review applicable to
7At trial, Amy presented the testimony of an expert
witness, Donna Grindle, who, among other things, opined that
QHG had violated the provisions of HIPAA in various ways.  We
express no opinion regarding Grindle's conclusions in that
regard.  As noted, our decision in this appeal is based only
on Amy's failure to present sufficient evidence to support
essential components of the state-law theories of liability
she asserted against QHG and does not address federal law. 
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a ruling on a motion for JNOV [now referred
to as a renewed motion for a judgment as a
matter of law] is identical to the standard
used by the trial court in granting or
denying a motion for directed verdict [now
referred to as a motion for a judgment as
a matter of law].  Thus, in reviewing the
trial court's ruling on the motion, we
review the evidence in a light most
favorable 
to 
the 
nonmovant, 
and 
we
determine whether the party with the burden
of proof has produced sufficient evidence
to require a jury determination.'
"624 So. 2d at 1366 (citations omitted).  Further,
in Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Trzcinski, 682 So. 2d 17
(Ala. 1996), this Court held:
"'The motion for a J.N.O.V. [now
referred to as a renewed motion for a
judgment as a matter of law] is a
procedural device used to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's verdict.  See, Rule 50(b), [Ala.] R.
Civ. P.; Luker v. City of Brantley, 520 So.
2d 517 (Ala. 1987).  Ordinarily, the denial
of a directed verdict [now referred to as
a judgment as a matter of law] or a
J.N.O.V. is proper where the nonmoving
party has produced substantial evidence to
support 
each 
element 
of 
his 
claim. 
However, if punitive damages are at issue
in a motion for a directed verdict or a
J.N.O.V., then the "clear and convincing"
standard applies.  Senn v. Alabama Gas
Corp., 619 So. 2d 1320 (Ala. 1993).'
"682 
So. 
2d 
at 
19 
(footnote 
omitted). 
'[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise
of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'  West v.
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Founders Life Assurance Co., 547 So. 2d 870, 871
(Ala. 1989).  See § 12–21–12(d), Ala. Code 1975."
Cheshire v. Putman, 54 So. 3d 336, 340 (Ala. 2010).
As noted, the bases for QHG's liability asserted in the
Pertuits' 
complaint, 
as 
amended, 
were 
"respondeat
superior/ratification" and "negligent and wanton training,
supervision[,] and retention."  Each theory of liability is
predicated on the notion that Dr. Diefenderfer's actions in
this case were wrongful and that QHG is consequently
responsible for Dr. Diefenderfer's wrongful conduct.8  As also
noted, Amy entered into a settlement agreement with Dr.
Diefenderfer that included no admission of liability on the
part of Dr. Diefenderfer. 
As with our assumption stated above regarding the general
availability of state-law tort claims that incorporate the
privacy provisions of HIPAA, for the purposes of this opinion
we assume, without deciding, that Alabama law provides a
remedy in tort against a defendant who commits the actions Dr.
8On appeal, Amy states: "Claims against [QHG] are for
Invasion of Privacy, Outrage, Respondeat Superior, and
Negligent 
and 
[W]anton[] 
Training, 
Supervision 
and 
[R]etention
...."  Amy's brief, at 29.  It is clear from her brief,
however, that Amy's first two "claims" are still predicated on
QHG's 
conduct 
concerning, 
and 
relationship 
to, 
Dr.
Diefenderfer.  Amy's brief, at 35-39.
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Diefenderfer committed in this case.  We make this assumption
because, by virtue of the settlement between Amy and Dr.
Diefenderfer, the primary issue presented by this appeal is
not whether Dr. Diefenderfer is liable to Amy for her actions
but, rather, whether QHG is liable to Amy as a consequence of
Dr. Diefenderfer's actions. 
QHG argues that Amy failed to present substantial
evidence indicating that QHG was liable for 
Dr. 
Diefenderfer's
actions 
under 
either 
a 
theory 
of 
"respondeat
superior/ratification" or "negligent and wanton training,
supervision[,] and retention."  We address each in turn.
I.  Respondeat Superior
QHG argues that Amy failed to present substantial
evidence indicating that Dr. Diefenderfer was acting within
the scope of her employment with QHG when she committed the
conduct forming the basis of Amy's claims or that Dr.
Diefenderfer's conduct furthered QHG's business interests. 
QHG cites, among other authority, Solmica of Gulf Coast, Inc.
v. Braggs, 285 Ala. 396, 232 So. 2d 642 (1970), for the
standard used to determine whether an employee's conduct fell
within the line and scope of his or her employment.  In
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Braggs, we stated:
"'The test is the service in which the employee is
engaged.  City of Bessemer v. Barnett[, 212 Ala.
202, 102 So. 23 (1924)].  The rule which has been
approved for determining whether certain conduct of
an employee is within the line and scope of his
employment is substantially that if an employee is
engaged to perform a certain service, whatever he
does to that end, or in furtherance of the
employment, is deemed by law to be an act done
within the scope of the employment.  Railway Express
Agency v. Burns, 225 Ala. 557, 52 So. 2d 177
[(1950)]; Rochester-Hall Drug Co. v. Bowden, 218
Ala. 242, 118 So. 674 [(1928)].'"
285 Ala. at 401, 232 So. 2d at 642 (quoting Nelson v. Johnson,
264 Ala. 422, 427, 88 So. 2d 358, 361 (1956)); see also
Synergies3 Tec Servs., LLC v. Corvo, [Ms. 1170765, August 21,
2020] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2020).
QHG employed Dr. Diefenderfer as a hospitalist.  Ellis,
QHG's CEO during the relevant times, testified as follows
during his deposition:9
"In general terms, a hospitalist is a physician
who manages the inpatient care for a variety of
patients while they're -- while they have inpatient
status in the hospital.  So typically they do not
have an outside clinic and all they do is see
patients in the hospital.  A clinic physician so to
speak or an outpatient physician might refer a
patient for admission and the hospitalist would
provide their care, coordinate consultants such as
a cardiologist or a pulmonologist or a neurologist
9A video of Ellis's deposition was played at trial.
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and sort of be the captain of the ship so to speak
for that care of the patient."
Ellis testified that Dr. Diefenderfer's access of Amy's
private medical information via the PDMP did not relate in any
way to Dr. Diefenderfer's employment as a hospitalist.
Dr. Diefenderfer testified as follows during examination
by QHG's attorney at trial:
"Q. Was this something that you did in your duties
as a hospitalist?
"A. Absolutely not.
"Q. This is a mistake that didn't involve the
hospital?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. No, sir --
"A. No, sir.
"Q. It didn't involve the hospital?
"A. Not at all in my opinion." 
Dr. Diefenderfer testified that she was not acting within
the line and scope of her employment with QHG when she
accessed Amy's personal medical information while at her house
because her actions in that regard did not relate to caring
for a patient.  Dr. Diefenderfer also testified that the PDMP
is maintained by the Alabama Department of Public Health, that
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only "[p]hysicians and people that can prescribe narcotics"
can access the PDMP, and that she had to use her physician-
license number to log into the PDMP.
McCurdy, the compliance and privacy officer for Medical
Center Enterprise, testified that the hospital itself had no
access to the PDMP and that only physicians were able to
access it.10  McCurdy further testified that, according to
hospital policy, whenever a hospital employee accesses the
private health information of friends or family, or even the
employee's own information, the employee is not acting as an
employee of the hospital and that the hospital is required to
have 
written 
authorization 
for 
the 
release 
of 
such
information.11  It is undisputed that Amy was not a patient of
10See § 20-2-214, Ala. Code 1975 (defining the persons and
entities that are authorized to access the PDMP, which does
not include health-care facilities).
11McCurdy's testimony concerning the hospital's policies
is relevant to 
the 
question whether Dr. Diefenderfer's actions
fell within the scope of her employment as a matter of law. 
However, the fact that an employee violated his or her
employer's company policies is not, taken alone, dispositive
of such an inquiry.  See Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Tarver,
492 So. 2d 297, 305 (Ala. 1986)("A corporation or employer
will be liable for the torts of its employee committed while
acting in the line and scope of his employment even though the
corporation or employer did not authorize or ratify such acts
and even if it expressly forbade them."), and Williams v.
Hughes Moving & Storage Co., 578 So. 2d 1281, 1283 (Ala.
22
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the 
hospital 
and 
that 
she 
did 
not 
consent 
to 
Dr.
Diefenderfer's access of her personal medical information via
the PDMP and subsequent disclosure of that information to
Mortensen and Mortensen's attorney.
The foregoing evidence indicates that Dr. Diefenderfer's
actions in accessing and disclosing Amy's personal medical
information stored on the PDMP were not within the scope of
Dr. 
Diefenderfer's 
employment 
with 
QHG 
because 
Dr.
Diefenderfer's conduct in that regard was unrelated to the
purpose for which QHG employed her, namely, to treat the
hospital's patients.  See Braggs, 285 Ala. at 401, 232 So. 2d
at 642.
On appeal, Amy points to several items that she contends
amounted 
to substantial 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
Dr.
Diefenderfer was acting within the scope of her employment
when she accessed and disclosed Amy's personal medical
information.  First, she implies that Mortensen was "a long-
time patient" of the hospital.  Amy's brief, at 25.  However,
the testimony Amy cites in support of that assertion included
1991)("The mere fact that [the employee] was acting against
company policy is not ... conclusive as to the question of
[the employee]'s status at the time of the accident.").
23
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no such evidence and was primarily Dr. Diefenderfer's account
of what transpired when Mortensen came to her with concerns
about Amy's alleged drug use.  At another point during the
trial, Dr. Diefenderfer testified: "[Mortensen] was a patient
of mine in my clinic for probably about seven years." 
(Emphasis added.)12  Thus, no evidence was presented at trial
indicating that Mortensen was a patient of the hospital.
Regardless, even assuming that Mortensen had been a
patient of the hospital at some point, it is undisputed that
the reason for Mortensen's April 2014 visit to the hospital
was not to obtain medical treatment from the hospital's
employees but, 
rather, 
to 
obtain 
Dr. 
Diefenderfer's assistance
or advice regarding Logan's scheduled visitation with Leif. 
12During the charge conference at the close of trial, the
parties' attorneys argued about whether any evidence had been
presented at trial indicating that Mortensen had ever been a
patient of the hospital.  Eventually, Amy's attorneys pointed
to a portion of Dr. Diefenderfer's deposition, in which she
testified that the hospital had a file regarding certain "lab
work" pertaining to Mortensen.  However, Dr. Diefenderfer's
deposition was not admitted as evidence at trial, because the
Pertuits called Dr. Diefenderfer as a witness to offer live
testimony during the presentation of the their case.  See
Mobile Infirmary v. Eberlein, 270 Ala. 360, 370, 119 So. 2d 8,
17-18 (1960)(noting that oral testimony is preferred over
deposition testimony); Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of
Rule 32, Ala. R. Civ. P. (noting that Eberlein was still
applicable).
24
1181072
On appeal, Amy contends that a jury question was presented
regarding whether Dr. Diefenderfer's actions –- both at the
hospital and elsewhere -- were within the scope of her
employment with QHG because, she says: "Doctors are
professionals.  They do not stop being doctors when they leave
their place of work."  Amy's brief, at 26.  Amy also points to
Dr. Diefenderfer's testimony indicating that she believed she
had an ethical obligation to help Mortensen.
One case QHG cites in response is Hendley v. Springhill
Memorial Hospital, 575 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 1990).  In Hendley,
this Court held that, as a matter of law, an employee13 of a
hospital was acting outside the scope of his employment when
he allegedly performed an unauthorized vaginal examination on
one of the hospital's patients.  575 So. 3d at 551.  Citing 
Avco Corp. v. Richardson, 285 Ala. 538, 234 So. 2d 556 (1970),
the Hendley Court articulated the applicable rule as follows: 
"[I]n cases where a servant's deviation from the
master's business is slight and not unusual, a court
may determine, as a matter of law, that the servant
was still executing the master's business.  On the
other hand, with a very 'marked and unusual'
deviation, the court may determine that the servant
is not on his master's business at all.  Cases
13The Hendley Court assumed for the purposes of that case
that an employment relationship existed.  575 So. 2d at 550.
25
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falling between these two extremes must be regarded
as involving a question of fact to be left to the
jury."
575 So. 2d at 550 (emphasis added); see also Corvo, ____ So.
3d at ____ (holding that a circuit court erred by failing to
enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor of employers
after reasoning: "Theft and conversion are a 'marked and
unusual deviation' from the business of Synergies3 and 
DIRECTV
for which Castro and McLaughlin were in Corvo's house --
installing equipment for DIRECTV's satellite television
service.  Furthermore, there was no evidence indicating that
the theft or conversion was done for Synergies3's or DIRECTV's
benefit or in furtherance of their interests."); Conner v.
Magic City Trucking Serv., Inc., 592 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Ala.
1992)(affirming a "directed verdict" in favor of an employer
after determining that an employee's decision to chase the
plaintiff while holding a snake was a "marked and unusual"
deviation 
from 
the 
employer's business 
and, 
therefore, 
outside
the scope of employment); Sakas v. Capital Concepts Corp., 565
So. 2d 237, 238 (Ala. 1990)(affirming a summary judgment in
favor of the owner of an apartment complex after determining
that an apartment manager's decision to break into the
26
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plaintiff's apartment, remove some of her clothes, and beat
her with a hammer constituted a "marked and unusual deviation"
from the employer's business); and Prosser v. Glass, 481 So.
2d 365, 368 (Ala. 1985)("[The alleged employee] was employed
as a mechanic to assist in the experimentation and development
of [a] swirlplate. ... [H]is repair of Glass's truck, which
did not have a swirlplate, would not reasonably further the
purpose of developing the [swirlplate], which was 
the 
business
at hand.  Therefore, [the alleged employee's] deviation from
the scope of his master's business was marked and unusual, and
thus outside the scope of employment.  The summary judgment
for [the alleged employer] is affirmed.").
In this case, no evidence was presented indicating that
QHG employed Dr. Diefenderfer to assist or advise third
parties in making a determination regarding whether they
should 
permit 
their 
children 
to 
attend 
court-ordered
visitation with a former spouse or to seek a modification of
a former spouse's court-ordered visitation.  Therefore, Dr.
Diefenderfer's decision 
to 
collect 
and 
disclose 
Amy's 
personal
medical 
information 
in 
furtherance 
of 
those 
pursuits
constituted a "marked an unusual deviation" from QHG's
27
1181072
business, undertaken by Dr. Diefenderfer for personal reasons
that were outside the scope of her employment by QHG.  See
AVCO Corp., 285 Ala. at 542, 234 So. 2d at 560.  Thus, the
evidence presented did not amount to "'evidence of such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment [could] reasonably infer the existence of
the fact sought to be proved,'" Cheshire, 54 So. 3d at 340
(quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co., 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989)), i.e., that Dr. Diefenderfer was engaged in
her employment by QHG or furthering the hospital's business
interests when she accessed and disclosed Amy's personal
medical information in 2014.  See Braggs, 285 Ala. at 401, 232
So. 2d at 642.  Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying
QHG's motion for a judgment as a matter of law on Amy's claims
asserting liability on a theory of respondeat superior.
II. Ratification
Both QHG and Amy cite East Alabama Behavioral Medicine,
P.C. v. Chancey, 883 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 2003), in their
respective appellate briefs.  In Chancey, we stated the
following concerning ratification:
"In addition to vicarious liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can
28
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also be held liable for the unlawful acts of its
employee if the employer ratifies those acts.  Potts
v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala.
1992).  An employer ratifies an act when 1) it
expressly adopts the employee's behavior or 2) it
implicitly approves the behavior.  Potts, 604 So. 2d
at 400.  Furthermore, '[a]n employer's failure to
stop the tortious conduct after it learns of the
conduct will support an inference that the employer
tolerated the conduct.'  Id.  Acquiescence or
ratification requires full knowledge or means of
knowledge of all material facts.  American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Powell, 235 Ala. 236, 245, 178
So. 21, 29 (1937); Van Heuvel v. Roberts, 221 Ala.
83, 87, 127 So. 506, 509 (1930).  An employer cannot
be said to have ratified an employee's conduct when
the employer, upon learning of an employee's
conduct, which was not in the scope of the
employee's 
employment, 
gives 
instructions 
calculated
to prevent a recurrence.  Joyner [v. AAA Cooper
Transp.,] 477 So. 2d [364] at 365 [(Ala. 1985)]
(after an employee's homosexual advances to another
employee were reported to the employer, the employer
conducted 
an 
investigation 
and 
informed 
the
offending employee that if another complaint of this
nature came to the employer's attention the
offending employee would be laid off and a
full-scale investigation conducted)."
883 So. 2d at 169-70 (emphasis added).
In 
Chancey, 
a 
patient 
sought 
treatment 
from 
a
psychologist for depression, anxiety, and panic attacks. 
After a therapy session, the patient and the psychologist
expressed romantic feelings for one another over drinks at a
restaurant.  A few days later, they terminated the
psychologist-patient relationship.
29
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A few days after the psychologist-patient relationship
was terminated, the psychologist's employer, East Alabama
Behavioral Medicine, P.C. ("East Alabama"), learned of the
patient's infatuation with the psychologist.  East Alabama's
administrators confronted the psychologist, and, among other
things, instructed her to end all contact with the patient. 
Evidence was also presented indicating that East Alabama's
administrators had instructed the psychologist to alter the
patient's medical records, so as to make it appear as if the
patient had expressed his feelings for the 
psychologist during
a therapy session and that the psychologist had instructed the
patient 
regarding 
the 
limits 
of 
their 
therapeutic
relationship.
About three weeks later, the psychologist and the patient
became sexually involved.  The patient's wife asked him to
leave the marital home.  The psychologist thereafter resigned
her position at East Alabama.  After the affair ended, East
Alabama rehired the psychologist, on the condition that she
undergo a psychiatric evaluation and any necessary treatment. 
The psychologist was also restricted to treating only female
patients.
30
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The patient and his wife sued the psychologist and East
Alabama, alleging, in pertinent part, "negligent or wanton
counseling; negligent or wanton 'abandonment'; and negligence
or wantonness per se."  Chancey, 883 So. 2d at 166.  The
patient and his wife settled their claims against the
psychologist, and a jury trial was conducted on their claims
against East Alabama.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the patient and his wife, awarding them each $1 in
compensatory damages and $495,000 in punitive damages.  East
Alabama appealed.
On appeal, the patient and his wife argued, in pertinent
part, that East Alabama had ratified the psychologist's
conduct by ordering that the patient's medical records be
altered and by failing to terminate the psychologist's
employment.  This Court held that the trial court had erred by
failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor of
East Alabama, and we reversed the trial court's judgment and
rendered a judgment in favor of East Alabama.  In so doing, we
reasoned:
"While the falsification of medical records is
inexcusable, it cannot serve as evidence that East
Alabama ratified [the psychologist]'s subsequent
conduct, 
which 
was 
taken 
contrary 
to 
the
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instructions given [the psychologist] by East
Alabama.  When East Alabama allegedly instructed
[the 
psychologist] 
to 
change 
[the 
patient's]
records, all [East Alabama's administrators] knew
was that [the patient] and [the psychologist] had
met for drinks and that [the psychologist] had
terminated or was in the process of terminating the
psychologist-patient relationship between her and
[the patient].  It is undisputed that when [East
Alabama] learned of [the psychologist]'s social
relationship with [the patient], they instructed her
to end both the professional relationship and the
social relationship.  East Alabama had no knowledge
at the time the records were falsified that [the
psychologist] and [the patient] would thereafter
have sexual relations, that [the patient]'s wife
would thereafter ask him to leave their home, and
that [the psychologist] would leave her husband as
a result of her affair with [the patient]. 
Ratification requires full knowledge of the facts. 
American Nat'l [Bank & Trust Co. v. Powell], 235
Ala. [236] at 245, 178 So. [21] at 29 [(1937)]; Van
Heuvel [v. Roberts], 221 Ala. [83] at 87, 127 So.
[506] at 509 [(1930)].  The [patient and his wife]
offered no evidence indicating that East Alabama
failed to stop the subsequent tortious conduct of
[the 
psychologist] 
after 
it 
learned 
of 
the
infatuation.  To the contrary, [East Alabama's
administrators] instructed [the psychologist] to end
the relationship.  Likewise, no ratification was
shown in Joyner [v. AAA Cooper Transportation, 477
So. 2d 364 (Ala. 1985),] when the employer warned
the employee against repeating the conduct made the
basis of the action.  477 So. 2d at 365.  In Joyner,
the record reflected that no subsequent misdeed
occurred, while here, the subsequent misdeeds were
contrary to East Alabama's express instructions."
Chancey, 883 So. 2d at 170 (some emphasis added).
On appeal, Amy argues that Dr. Diefenderfer's creation of
32
1181072
the 2016 report that relied, at least in part, on information
regarding Amy's personal medical information that Dr.
Diefenderfer had learned during her 2014 access of the PDMP is
evidence that QHG's response to Dr. Diefenderfer's actions in
2014 amounted to ratification.  As we explained in Chancey,
"[r]atification requires full knowledge of the facts." 
Chancey, 883 So. 2d at 170.  
Of course, QHG could not have known in 2014 that Dr.
Diefenderfer would create the 2016 report.  Indeed, no
evidence was presented indicating that QHG was even aware of
Dr. Diefenderfer's conduct in 2014 until it received notice of
a complaint from OCR in October 2014, because QHG lacked the
ability to restrict Dr. Diefenderfer's access to the PDMP in
that Dr. Diefenderfer's access was derived from her licensure
as a physician; QHG itself possessed no authority to access
the PDMP.  Therefore, it is clear that knowledge of the 2016
report cannot be imputed to QHG with regard to its response to
Dr. Diefenderfer's conduct in 2014.  See Chancey, 883 So. 2d
at 170.
Regarding QHG's response to Dr. Diefenderfer's 2014
conduct, 
the 
evidence 
presented 
indicated 
that 
QHG
33
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representatives, specifically Ellis and McCurdy, met with Dr.
Diefenderfer after learning of her access and disclosure in
2014 of Amy's personal medical information and discussed the
importance of patient privacy and compliance with the
requirements of HIPAA and explained QHG's commitment to
safeguarding patient privacy.  Dr. Diefenderfer agreed with
QHG regarding the importance of HIPAA and patient privacy.  
We note the evidence presented demonstrating that McCurdy
was Mortensen's aunt and the evidence presented indicating
that Dr. Diefenderfer believed the hospital "backed her up a
hundred percent."  However, we cannot ignore the fact that,
notwithstanding McCurdy's relationship to Mortensen and
whatever personal beliefs Dr. Diefenderfer harbored regarding
the propriety of her conduct after meeting with Ellis and
McCurdy, no evidence was presented indicating that Dr.
Diefenderfer thereafter used the hospital's resources to
access 
and 
disclose 
personal 
medical 
information pertaining 
to
third parties who were not patients of the hospital after her
meeting with Ellis and McCurdy.  An employer cannot be said to
have ratified an employee's conduct when, after instruction by
the employer, the employee's conduct stops.  See Chancey, 883
34
1181072
So. 2d at 170. 
With regard to the 2016 report, Dr. Diefenderfer
testified that she did not again access the PDMP when creating
the 2016 report.  As noted above, Dr. Diefenderfer testified
that, when she printed Amy's personal medical information from
the PDMP in 2014, she did so at home.  Thus, there is no
indication that Dr. Diefenderfer used the hospital's computer
or other resources in creating the 2016 report at all, much
less with QHG's "implicit[] approv[al]."  See Chancey, 883 So.
2d at 170.  
Moreover, there is no indication that QHG participated
in, consented to, or condoned Dr. Diefenderfer's creation of
the 2016 report or that the 2016 report had any relation to
her employment with QHG.  Dr. Diefenderfer's testimony
indicated that she created the 2016 report because she felt
that it would assist her and Mortensen with the Pertuits'
litigation against them.  Indeed, Dr. Diefenderfer testified
that, when she created the 2016 report, she was no longer
employed by QHG but was instead employed by Schumacher Group.14 
14We note that, on appeal, Amy appears to concede that QHG
"reliev[ed] itself of any future liabilities with respect to
hospitalists" working at Medical Center Enterprise once the
change involving Schumacher Group was implemented.  Amy's
35
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Furthermore, even assuming that Dr. Diefenderfer created
the 2016 report while she was still employed by QHG, it is
undisputed that QHG became aware of the 2016 report only after
the fact.  As already stated, "[r]atification requires full
knowledge of the facts."  Chancey, 883 So. 2d at 170. 
Therefore, there is no basis upon which one could reasonably
infer that QHG "implicitly approve[d]" Dr. Diefenderfer's
creation of the 2016 report when it had no knowledge of its
existence until well after its creation.  Chancey, 883 So. 2d
at 170.  
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence
presented did not amount to "evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment [could] reasonably infer," West, 547 So. 2d at 871,
that QHG ratified Dr. Diefenderfer's conduct.  See Chancey,
883 So. 2d at 170-71.  Therefore, the trial court erred by
denying QHG's motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the
issue of ratification.  See Chancey, 883 So. 2d at 173.
III. 
Negligent 
and 
Wanton 
Training, 
Supervision, and 
Retention
On appeal, Amy cites no authority discussing her 
brief, at 14.
36
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"negligent and wanton training, supervision[,] and retention"
claim as a theory of liability under Alabama law.  Among other
authority, QHG cites Armstrong Business Services, Inc. v.
AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 2001), for the standard
used in evaluating claims of negligent supervision.15  In
Armstrong, we explained:
"A claim of negligent supervision is stated as
follows:
"'"In the master and servant relationship,
the master is held responsible for his
servant's incompetency when notice or
knowledge, either actual or presumed, of
such unfitness has been brought to him. 
Liability 
depends 
upon 
its 
being
established by affirmative proof that such
incompetency was actually known by the
master or that, had he exercised due and
proper diligence, he would have learned
that which would charge him in the law with
such knowledge.  It is incumbent on the
party charging negligence to show it by
proper evidence.  This may be done by
showing specific acts of incompetency and
bringing them home to the knowledge of the
master, or by showing them to be of such
nature, character, and frequency that the
15A plurality of this Court has indicated that there is no
distinction under Alabama law between claims of negligent
supervision and claims of negligent training.  See Corvo, ____
So. 3d at ___; and Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938
So. 2d 933, 940 (Ala. 2006).  As noted, Amy cites no authority
concerning her claim of "negligent and wanton training,
supervision[,] and retention."  Therefore, we need not
consider whether such a distinction exists in this case.
37
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master, in the exercise of due care, must
have had them brought to his notice.  While
such specific acts of alleged incompetency
cannot be shown to prove that the servant
was negligent in doing or omitting to do
the act complained of, it is proper, when
repeated 
acts 
of 
carelessness 
and
incompetency of a certain character are
shown on the part of the servant to leave
it to the jury whether they would have come
to his knowledge, had he exercised ordinary
care."'
"Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So. 2d 999, 1003
(Ala. 1993)(quoting Lane v. Central Bank of Alabama,
N.A., 425 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Ala. 1983)(quoting
Thompson v. Havard, 285 Ala. 718, 725, 235 So. 2d
853 (1970))).  'Wanton supervision' requires that
the 
employer 
wantonly 
disregard 
its 
agent's
incompetence ...."
817 So. 2d at 682 (emphasis added).  "Like a claim of
respondeat superior, liability under a theory of negligent
supervision is based on 
the employment relationship."  Hammock
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 So. 3d 939, 942 (Ala.
2008)(holding that a "respondeat superior claim" and a
"negligent-supervision-and-training claim" 
were 
"intertwined"
for the purposes of a Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
certification analysis).
In this case, no evidence was presented indicating that
QHG had reason to believe that Dr. Diefenderfer would access
the PDMP to obtain the personal medical information of someone
38
1181072
who was not one of the hospital's patients before she did so
with regard to Amy in 2014.  Moreover, although Dr.
Diefenderfer's conduct in 2014 was outside the scope of her
employment with QHG, upon QHG's discovery of her conduct, it
provided instruction regarding the importance of patient
privacy and compliance with the requirements of HIPAA and
explained to 
Dr. 
Diefenderfer 
QHG's 
commitment 
to 
safeguarding
patient privacy.  The evidence presented indicated that QHG
had 
no 
knowledge 
of 
any 
further 
instances 
of 
Dr.
Diefenderfer's access to or disclosure of a third party's
personal medical information until after she created the 2016
report.  At that time, however, Dr. Diefenderfer was no longer
an employee of QHG.  Moreover, as already explained above,
there was no indication that Dr. Diefenderfer's creation of
the 2016 report was related to her previous employment with
QHG.16
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence
presented did not amount to "evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
16At trial, Dr. Diefenderfer testified that she left her
position at Medical Center Enterprise in September 2018 to
work in a different hospital.
39
1181072
judgment [could] reasonably infer," West, 547 So. 2d at 871,
that QHG negligently supervised Dr. Diefenderfer.  See
Armstrong, 817 So. 2d at 682.  Therefore, the trial court
erred by denying QHG's motion for a judgment as a matter of
law regarding Amy's claim of "negligent and wanton training,
supervision[,] and retention."
Conclusion
We express no opinion regarding the general viability, as
a matter of Alabama law, of tort claims that seek to
incorporate the privacy provisions of HIPAA.  Even assuming
that such tort claims are generally cognizable under Alabama
law, however, the trial court nevertheless erred by denying
QHG's motion for a judgment as a matter of law with respect to
Amy's asserted theories of respondeat superior; ratification;
and negligent and wanton training, supervision, and retention
because there was not substantial evidence indicating that QHG
was liable to Amy as a consequence of Dr. Diefenderfer's
conduct under any of those theories.  Because we resolve this
appeal on the foregoing grounds, we pretermit consideration of
the remaining arguments raised by QHG on appeal.  Therefore,
we reverse the trial court's judgment awarding Amy $5,000 in
40
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compensatory damages and $295,000 in punitive damages and
render a judgment in favor of QHG.
MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim,
and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., recuses himself.
41