Title: Coleman v. State
Citation: 224 N.E.2d 47, 248 Ind. 137
Docket Number: 30,938
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 1967

248 Ind. 137 (1967)
224 N.E.2d 47
COLEMAN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,938.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 13, 1967.
Don. R. Money, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Donald R. Ewers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
MOTE, J.
This is an appeal from Appellant's conviction in Division 2 of the Marion County Criminal Court upon indictment charging Appellant with the crime of first degree burglary. Omitting the formal parts, the indictment reads as follows:
The Appellant waived a jury trial. He was found to be guilty and was sentenced by the court, under the provisions of the Statute under the Acts of the Indiana General Assembly 1941, ch. 148, § 4, p. 447, Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. (1956 Repl.) § 10-701 (a), as follows:
It will be noted from the indictment that Appellant was charged with breaking and entering a dwelling house "with the intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit: unlawfully and feloniously to have carnal knowledge of Margaret Conour, a woman, forcibly and against her will, she, the said Margaret Conour then and there not being the wife of the said Eugene Coleman."
We have searched the briefs in vain in an attempt to discover testimony or evidence to sustain the charge in the indictment referred to above that the Appellant had any intent whatsoever "unlawfully and feloniously to have carnal knowledge of Margaret Conour, a woman, forcibly and against her will."
From the record before us, we have no question but what Appellant did enter the dwelling house as charged; however, when he was entering, or promptly thereafter, having mashed some tomatoes on the windowsill, he met Miss Conour, the prosecuting witness, and exclaimed that he was looking for *139 "Bob Samson" and was in the wrong place and attempted to escape from said apartment through the front door.
We find no substantial evidence that Appellant attacked Miss Conour for any purpose whatever and particularly for the purpose and with the intention of rape. On the other hand, we think it clearly appears that Appellant, when discovered either coming into or after entering the premises of Miss Conour, was exerting reasonable efforts to leave the place through a door, but he was restrained from so doing by Miss Conour.
It is our considered opinion that there has been a complete lack on the part of the State of Indiana to prove the indictment; as a consequence, the judgment rendered is hereby reversed.
NOTE.  Reported in 224 N.E.2d 47.