Title: State v. Keister
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP001618-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2019

2019 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1618-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael A. Keister, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 18, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Iowa 
 
JUDGE: 
William Andrew Sharp 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general. With 
whom on the briefs is Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Tiffany M. Winter.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Jeremy C. Perri, assistant state public defender. There was an 
oral argument by Jeremy C. Perri. 
 
 
2019 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP1618-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2015CF193) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael A. Keister, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed; 
circuit court order vacated.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The court of appeals dismissed this 
appeal as moot.  We reverse that order and address the Iowa 
County 
Circuit 
Court's 
decision 
declaring 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 165.95(1)(a) and (3)(c) (2015-16)1 unconstitutional as applied 
to Michael Keister.  We granted the State's petition for review 
asking us to consider:  (1) whether an individual has a 
fundamental liberty interest in continued participation in a 
treatment court funded by § 165.95; and (2) whether § 165.95 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
2 
 
must define expulsion procedures for treatment courts in order 
to survive a procedural due process challenge.  Keister, 
however, now concedes both issues and agrees with the State that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
declaring 
the 
statute 
unconstitutional.  We vacate the order of the circuit court.2  
¶2 
The facts relevant to this appeal are summarized as 
follows.  In November 2015, Keister overdosed on heroin while on 
extended supervision in two Sauk County felony cases.  Later 
that month, Keister voluntarily applied for admission to the 
Iowa County Drug Treatment Court program.  Keister was charged 
with possession of heroin and drug paraphernalia in Iowa County 
in December 2015 as a result of his heroin overdose.  In August 
2016, Keister picked up new charges in Sauk County.3  Based on 
the new Sauk County charges, the State moved to expel Keister 
from the Iowa County Drug Treatment Court program pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 165.95(3)(c).  Keister advised that he would 
challenge the expulsion on constitutional grounds. 
¶3 
In January 2017, with the expulsion hearing still 
pending, Keister pled no contest to possession of heroin in Iowa 
County.4  The State agreed to make the following conditional 
                                                 
2 The Honorable William Andrew Sharp of Iowa County 
presided. 
3 Keister 
was 
charged 
with 
substantial 
battery, 
strangulation/suffocation, and felony bail jumping. 
4 In exchange, the State dismissed the drug paraphernalia 
charge. 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
3 
 
sentencing recommendations:  (1) if Keister was not expelled 
from the Iowa County Drug Treatment Court program, the State 
would recommend two years of probation, conditioned upon 
participation in and completion of the program; (2) if Keister 
was expelled from the Iowa County Drug Treatment Court program, 
the State would recommend four months in jail.  A sentencing 
date was set off into the future.  
¶4 
In February 2017, Keister filed a motion challenging 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. §§ 165.95(1)(a) and (3)(c).  
Keister asserted that the statute violated his substantive and 
procedural due process rights because it required mandatory 
expulsion of a "violent offender" from drug treatment court with 
no requirement that the allegations be proven and no meaningful 
opportunity to be heard prior to expulsion.  The circuit court 
issued a declaratory judgment in July 2017, ruling that 
§§ 165.95(1)(a) and (3)(c) violated Keister's substantive and 
procedural due process rights.5  The circuit court held that 
Keister faced potential deprivation of his liberty as a result 
of §§ 165.95(1)(a) and (3)(c) and that there was no compelling 
state interest to justify infringing on Keister's fundamental 
liberty interest.  The circuit court further held that the 
filing of the Sauk County criminal complaint alleging that 
Keister was a violent offender was the only process provided by 
                                                 
5 The circuit court also granted Keister's motion to dismiss 
the State's motion to expel Keister from drug treatment court.   
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
4 
 
§ 165.95 and that therefore the statute deprived Keister of his 
liberty without any procedural due process.  
¶5 
The State appealed the circuit court's decision.  
Two months later, the new charges filed against Keister in Sauk 
County were dismissed.  Keister did not have an offense pending 
and thus no longer met the definition of "violent offender" for 
purposes of the motion to expel.  Keister was, however, revoked 
from his extended supervision and sentenced to prison.  Keister 
was 
eventually 
placed 
on 
probation 
for 
three 
years 
for 
possession of heroin in Iowa County, with the condition that he 
successfully complete the Iowa County Drug Treatment Court 
program.  
¶6 
We first note that although this case is moot with 
respect to Keister, we accepted this petition because the issues 
involved are likely to arise again and this court could 
alleviate uncertainty.  See State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶7, 268 
Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349.6  
                                                 
6 We acknowledge that reviewing courts generally decline to 
decide moot issues but may do so under certain circumstances. 
State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶7, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 
349.  However, this court has held that it may decide an 
otherwise moot issue if it:   
(1) [I]s of great public importance; (2) occurs so 
frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to 
guide circuit courts; (3) is likely to arise again and 
a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; 
or (4) will likely be repeated, but evades appellate 
review because the appellate review process cannot be 
completed or even undertaken in time to have a 
practical effect on the parties.   
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
5 
 
¶7 
Wisconsin Stat. § 165.95(2) provides, in relevant 
part, that the Wisconsin Department of Justice shall make grants 
to counties and tribes "to enable them to establish and operate 
programs . . . that provide alternatives to prosecution and 
incarceration for criminal offenders who abuse alcohol or other 
drugs."  The statute further sets forth rules and guidelines for 
programs receiving grant funds.  Section 165.95(3)(c) requires 
that programs created pursuant to the grant program establish 
criteria for a person's participation, including criteria that 
specifies 
that 
a 
"violent 
offender" 
is 
not 
eligible 
to 
participate in the program.  Section 165.95(1)(a) defines a 
"violent offender" as a person who "has been charged with or 
convicted of an offense in a pending case and, during the course 
of the offense, the person carried, possessed, or used a 
dangerous weapon, the person used force against another person, 
or a person died or suffered serious bodily harm."7   
¶8 
Substantive and procedural due process rights emanate 
from the Fourteenth Amendment.  Penterman v. Wisconsin Elec. 
Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 473, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997); see also 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.  To succeed on a substantive due 
process claim, a party must demonstrate that he or she has been 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id.  This appeal satisfies (3). 
7 This 
subsection 
was 
renumbered 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 165.95(1)(bg)1. due to 2017 Wis. Act 351.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 165.95(1)(b), which provides an alternative definition of 
"violent offender," renumbered to § 165.95(1)(bg)2., does not 
apply. 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
6 
 
deprived 
of 
a 
liberty 
or 
property 
interest 
that 
is 
constitutionally protected.  Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 480; see 
also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  
Fundamental liberty interests are interests "so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental."  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 
(1987). 
Where 
there 
is 
no 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest 
implicated, the legislative enactment must be sustained "unless 
it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to 
a legitimate government interest."  State v. McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). 
¶9 
The circuit court held that because Keister could be 
sentenced to jail for possession of heroin if he were to be 
expelled from the Iowa County Drug Treatment Program, Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.95 implicated a fundamental liberty interest.  Keister now 
concedes and the State agrees that § 165.95 does not create a 
fundamental liberty interest.  We concur that § 165.95 which 
helps fund, but does not create, drug treatment programs, is not 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people so as 
to create a fundamental liberty interest.  It is therefore 
sufficient that § 165.95 be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.  Section 165.95(3)(b) provides that the 
grant program is designed to "promote public safety, reduce 
prison 
and 
jail 
populations, 
reduce 
prosecution 
and 
incarceration costs, reduce recidivism, and improve the welfare 
of participants' families by meeting the comprehensive needs of 
participants."  We conclude that the State has a rational basis 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
7 
 
to exclude violent offenders from drug treatment programs 
because they may have additional treatment and supervision needs 
and may also have their progress in the treatment court program 
hampered by the possibility of incarceration in a pending case. 
¶10 The circuit court further concluded that because Wis. 
Stat. § 165.95 does not provide procedures for expulsion from 
drug treatment programs for persons labeled "violent offenders," 
the statute violated Keister's procedural due process rights.  
To prove a procedural due process violation, a party must show 
"a deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected 
interest in 'life, liberty or property' without due process of 
law."  Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶53, 235 Wis. 2d 
610, 612 N.W.2d 59 (quoted source omitted). 
¶11 The parties concede that because Wis. Stat. § 165.95 
is a funding statute, it need not set forth procedures for 
expulsion 
in 
order 
to 
survive 
a 
procedural 
due 
process 
challenge.  We agree.  Section 165.95 gives discretion to the 
individual counties to define rules and procedures for their 
treatment programs, including expulsion procedures.  We decline 
to address the procedures used by Iowa County regarding 
expulsion from the Iowa County Drug Treatment Court program 
because those procedures are not in the record and Keister 
himself was never subject to those procedures.8  We decline to 
                                                 
8 Keister was ultimately not deprived of a liberty or 
property interest as he was given the opportunity to continue 
his participation in the Iowa County Drug Treatment Court 
program. 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
8 
 
exercise our superintending authority here, as suggested by 
Keister, because the "necessities of justice" do not require it.  
Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 225, 556 N.W.2d 721 
(1996).     
¶12 We agree with the parties' concessions and conclude 
that Keister does not have a fundamental liberty interest in 
continued participation in a treatment court funded by Wis. 
Stat. § 165.95 and that as a funding statute, § 165.95 need not 
provide expulsion procedures to survive a procedural due process 
challenge.  Accordingly, we summarily reverse the circuit 
court's declaratory judgment order. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed; circuit court order vacated.  
 
No. 
2017AP1618-CR   
 
 
 
1