Title: Christopher Waters v. Kenneth Pertzborn
Citation: 2001 WI 62
Docket Number: 1999AP001702
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2001

2001 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1702 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Christopher Waters, by his Guardian ad Litem, 
Ardell W. Skow, Richard Waters and Connie 
Waters,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Kenneth Pertzborn, Diane Pertzborn and State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants, 
Nicholas Haus, Paula Haus, Al Haus and MSI 
Insurance Co.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 14, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 1, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Barron 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward R. Brunner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross respondents 
there were briefs by Ardell W. Skow, Martha H. Heidt and Doar, 
Drill & Skow, S.C., Baldwin, and oral argument by Matthew 
Biegert. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross appellants 
there were briefs by Kay Nord Hunt, James R. Johnson, Brent R. 
 
2 
Johnson and  Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., Hudson, and 
oral argument by Kay Nord Hunt. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Joe Thrasher and Thrasher, Doyle, Pelish & Franti, Ltd., Rice 
Lake. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michele M. 
Ford and Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by George 
Burnett and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green 
Bay, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2001 WI 62 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1702 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Christopher Waters, by his Guardian ad  
Litem, Ardell W. Skow, Richard Waters and  
Connie Waters,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth Pertzborn, Diane Pertzborn and  
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants, 
 
Nicholas Haus, Paula Haus, Al Haus and  
MSI Insurance Co.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Barron County, 
Edward R. Brunner, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed in part, 
affirmed in part, and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This negligence action is 
before us on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1999-2000).  Christopher Waters and 
his parents, Richard and Connie Waters (plaintiffs), appeal from 
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
2 
the circuit court's order bifurcating the issues of liability 
and damages for trial before different juries.1  Defendants, 
Kenneth and Diane Pertzborn (Pertzborns) and their insurer, also 
cross-appeal the circuit court's order denying summary judgment 
on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed as 
to 
the 
applicability 
of 
the 
social 
guest 
exception 
to 
recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d) (1995-96).2 
¶2 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
certification 
specifically 
requests that we "determine whether the circuit court properly 
ordered trials on liability and damages before separate juries." 
 We conclude that the circuit court is barred by statute from 
ordering separate trials before different juries on the issues 
of liability and damages arising from the same claim.  We 
therefore reverse the circuit court's order bifurcating the 
trial.  We also conclude that there exist genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether the social guest exception to 
recreational immunity applied 
when 
Christopher 
Waters was 
injured.  We thus affirm the circuit court's order denying the 
motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, we remand the cause 
for further proceedings.  
                     
1  The appeal and cross-appeal before us are from orders 
entered in the Circuit Court for Barron County, Judge Edward R. 
Brunner presiding.   
Richard and Connie Waters are represented by separate 
counsel, but join in the arguments submitted on behalf of 
Christopher Waters for purposes of this appeal and cross-appeal. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
3 
¶3 
This case arises from a sledding accident that 
occurred in Rice Lake on November 24, 1996.  The facts 
surrounding the accident are revealed in the depositions and 
affidavits that were submitted in support of and in response to 
the motion for summary judgment.   
¶4 
On the day of the accident, Christopher Waters, who 
was then ten years old, had been playing with 11-year-old 
Kathleen Pertzborn at the Waters' home.  At some point that 
afternoon, the two children left to go to the Pertzborn home.  
In his deposition testimony, Christopher explained that the two 
left his home upon Kathleen's prompting.  He testified that 
Kathleen brought him over to her house, telling him "let's go 
over to my house or something."  Christopher took his snowboard 
and sled to the Pertzborns.  It is undisputed that neither of 
Kathleen's parents invited Christopher to their home that day.   
¶5 
The children began sledding down a hill in the 
Pertzborns' front yard.  At the base of the hill, the Pertzborn 
property abuts Hilltop Drive.  Before long, Kathleen's mother, 
Diane Pertzborn, became aware that the children intended to sled 
down the hill in the front of the home.  She admonished the 
children that they were not to sled down the hill without anyone 
watching for cars, and instructed the children to go sled at a 
local schoolyard.  Nonetheless, the children set about making a 
path in the recently fallen snow and took turns sledding down 
the hill and watching for cars.   
¶6 
A short while later Diane Pertzborn learned that the 
children were still in the yard and called Kathleen in for 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
4 
supper.  Christopher stayed outside at the Pertzborns, waiting 
for Kathleen to finish eating.  He testified that the children 
planned to go sledding at the local school after Kathleen's 
meal.  Diane Pertzborn was unaware that Christopher was waiting 
outside.  She testified that Kathleen told her that Christopher 
was going home to tend to his pet dogs and would be coming back 
later.  Christopher denies that he told Kathleen that he 
intended to go home to tend to his dogs.  Diane Pertzborn was 
aware that Kathleen and Christopher had plans to sled at the 
local school when Kathleen finished her meal.   
¶7 
After waiting for a while, Christopher became bored 
and decided to sled down the hill by himself.  When Christopher 
reached the base of the hill and the edge of the Pertzborn 
property, he continued moving forward into Hilltop Drive.  In 
the road, Christopher and his sled intersected the path of a 
vehicle driven by Nicholas Haus, a teenage neighbor.  The 
vehicle struck Christopher and dragged him 74 feet before coming 
to a stop.  Consequently, Christopher suffered severe and 
permanent injuries. 
¶8 
The 
plaintiffs 
brought 
this 
action 
against 
the 
Pertzborns, Nicholas Haus and his parents, and both families' 
insurers (collectively, the "defendants").  In their complaint, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the Pertzborns and the Hauses were 
negligent and that their negligence was the proximate cause of 
Christopher's injuries and his parents' loss of society and 
companionship.  
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
5 
¶9 
After filing an amended answer asserting recreational 
immunity under § 895.52(2)(b) as an affirmative defense, the 
Pertzborns moved for summary judgment on that basis.  The 
Pertzborns argued that because Christopher was engaged in a 
recreational activity (i.e., sledding) on their property at the 
time he was injured, they were entitled to recreational 
immunity.  They also asserted that the social guest exception of 
§ 895.52(6)(d) did not apply because neither of them, as the 
owners of the property, expressly and individually invited 
Christopher to their home to sled.  The plaintiffs countered by 
arguing that because Christopher was not injured on the 
Pertzborns' property, but was injured in the street, the 
Pertzborns were not entitled to immunity under § 895.52(2)(b).  
They also argued that the social guest exception to immunity 
provided by § 895.52(6)(d) applied because Christopher had been 
expressly 
and 
individually 
invited 
to 
the 
Pertzborns 
by 
Kathleen.   
¶10 The circuit court denied summary judgment.  The court 
determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether the social guest exception applied and that the 
plaintiffs were thus entitled to proceed under that exception to 
immunity.  However, the court further concluded that, in the 
absence of such a statutory exception, the Pertzborns would be 
entitled to recreational immunity.  The court explained that 
although Christopher was not injured on the Pertzborn property, 
immunity would attach because the continuous act of sledding 
began on the Pertzborn property. 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
6 
 
¶11 Following the denial of summary judgment, the parties 
prepared for trial.  The Pertzborns filed a motion to bifurcate 
the issues at trial, seeking separate trials on the questions of 
liability and damages.  The plaintiffs objected, contesting the 
circuit court's authority to bifurcate.  At a motion hearing, 
during which the Hauses stated their support for the motion to 
bifurcate, the circuit court granted the Pertzborns' motion.  
The court, explaining that it was swayed by the time and expense 
that might be saved by bifurcation and the potential that 
bifurcation would facilitate settlement, noted the experimental 
nature of its decision: 
 
So I think it could save parties, plaintiffs and 
defendants money by attempting this, particularly if 
it —— after the liability issue is tried, it results 
in a settlement, and I think maybe it's worth the 
effort at least to experiment with it to see if this 
would be a way to get this case on track and resolved 
sooner for both sides.   
When making its ruling, the court made clear that the trials 
would be conducted before different juries.   
¶12 The plaintiffs sought leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal challenging the bifurcation.  The court of appeals 
granted leave to appeal noting the importance of the issue to 
the administration of justice.  The Pertzborns then cross-
appealed the circuit court's denial of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
¶13 The court of appeals certified this case for our 
review.  It did so specifically so that we could address the 
circuit court's order to try the issues of liability and damages 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
7 
before separate juries.  While we also review the circuit 
court's denial of summary judgment on the basis that there were 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the social guest 
exception to recreational immunity applied, we first address the 
certified issue.  
I 
¶14 The plaintiffs challenge the circuit court's order to 
bifurcate the issues of liability and damages on both statutory 
and constitutional grounds.  They argue that the circuit court's 
order is not authorized, and indeed is prohibited by, the 
Wisconsin rules of civil procedure.  The plaintiffs also allege 
that the order violates their rights to a trial by jury and a 
verdict agreed upon by five-sixths of the jury as guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  We begin by 
addressing the statutory challenge.  When a case may be resolved 
on non-constitutional grounds, we need not reach constitutional 
questions.  Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 612, 
407 N.W.2d 873 (1987).  We thus turn to the issue of whether a 
circuit court may, consistent with the Wisconsin Statutes, order 
separate trials before different juries on the issues of 
liability and damages arising from the same claim of negligence.3  
 
¶15 The parties' debate with respect to the statutory 
validity of the circuit court's order bifurcating the trial 
                     
3 Our holding in this case responds only to the situation 
presented to us by the facts of this case: the bifurcation of 
issues for trial before different juries as ordered by the 
circuit court.  We are not asked to decide the validity of 
separate trials before the same jury.   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
8 
centers on various statutory provisions promulgated under this 
court's rule-making authority.  See Wis. Stat. § 751.12.  The 
plaintiffs contend that bifurcation is not authorized by Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 805.05(2) and is prohibited by Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 805.09(2).  The defendants maintain that under Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 906.11(1), as interpreted by the court of appeals in 
Zawistowski v. Kissinger, 160 Wis. 2d 292, 466 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. 
App. 1991), the circuit court has the authority to bifurcate 
issues for trial.4   
 
¶16 As with the interpretation of a statute enacted by the 
legislature, interpretation of a statute promulgated under this 
court's rule-making authority presents us with a question of law 
that we review independently of the determination of the circuit 
court.  Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 
187, 194, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997).  The goal of statutory 
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 
the enacting body.  Id.  
¶17 We conclude that there are two statutory impediments 
to the circuit court's order for separate trials on the issues 
of liability and damages before different juries.   First, a 
review of the history of § 805.05(2) reveals that the omission 
of a provision that would allow for the bifurcation of separate 
issues was deliberate and was intended to disallow such 
bifurcation. 
 
Second, 
§ 805.09(2) 
effectively 
bars 
the 
                     
4 "Defendants" here refers to the Hauses, Pertzborns, and 
their insurers, who are all respondents to the plaintiffs' 
appeal on the matter of bifurcation.   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
9 
bifurcation of issues before different juries, because that 
statute requires that the same five-sixths of the jury must 
agree on all the questions before a valid verdict can be 
entered. 
¶18 We begin with the impediment to bifurcation posed by 
§ 805.05(2).  Section 805.05(2) is the rule of civil procedure 
that authorizes the circuit court to conduct separate trials 
under certain circumstances:  
 
    (2) Separate Trials.  The court, in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducive to expedition or economy, or 
pursuant to s. 803.04(2)(b), may order a separate 
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or 3rd 
party claim, or of any number of claims, always 
preserving inviolate the right of trial in the mode to 
which the parties are entitled. 
 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 805.05(2). 
¶19 On its face § 805.05(2) does not authorize the 
bifurcation of issues.  While this alone is not necessarily 
indicative of an intent to disallow bifurcation, the drafting 
history of that subsection reveals that the omission of language 
providing 
for 
separate 
trials 
on 
individual 
issues 
was 
deliberate and was intended to disallow the bifurcation of 
issues.  We note at the outset of our discussion that we do not 
often come upon extrinsic materials that so clearly and 
concisely provide insight into the intent of a body enacting a 
statute as those that guide our determination in this case.   
 
¶20 Section 805.05 was created as part of the 1976 
revision of the rules of civil procedure.  The proposed changes 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
10
to the statutes were drafted by a committee of the Judicial 
Council and submitted to this court for adoption.5  The 
commentary 
of 
the 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee 
accompanying 
§ 805.05, as proposed to the court, explains that while 
§ 805.05(2) is patterned on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, 
it does not provide for bifurcation of issues, as does its 
federal counterpart: 
 
This section is based in large part on Federal Rule 
42.   
Unlike Federal Rule 42, sub. (2) does not permit 
bifurcation of issues, but only separate trial of 
discrete claims.   
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 805.05(2) (1977).6  The records of the Judicial Council reveal 
                     
5 Under Wis. Stat. § 751.12, this court is granted the 
authority to promulgate rules regulating pleading, practice and 
proceedings in the courts of this state.  The Judicial Council 
is the body charged with acting in "an advisory capacity to 
assist the court in performing its duties under [§ 751.12]."  
§ 751.12. 
We may look to Judicial Council materials in determining 
the meaning of a statute promulgated under our rule-making 
authority.  See State v. Lee, 197 Wis. 2d 959, 964 n.3, 542 
N.W.2d 143 (1996). 
6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) reads as follows: 
(b) Separate Trials.  The court, in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, 
may order a separate trial on any claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, 
always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury 
as 
declared 
by 
the 
Seventh 
Amendment 
to 
the 
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United 
States.   
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (emphasis added). 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
11
that language allowing for separate trials on issues was 
proposed but rejected by the Judicial Council Civil Rules 
Committee.7   
¶21 Moreover, the intent of the drafters to disallow 
affirmatively 
bifurcation 
of 
issues 
is 
found 
in 
the 
correspondence of the Judicial Council Committee members.  In an 
August 1974 letter, the Chairman of the Judicial Council 
                                                                  
Secondary 
sources 
discussing 
the 
contrast 
between 
§ 805.05(2) and Federal Rule 42 have explained the practical 
effect of this in a negligence action:   
Unlike Federal Rule 42, subsection (2) does not permit 
separate trials for separate issues (for example, in a 
negligence action, separate trials on the issue of 
liability and the issue of damages), but rather, 
separate trials for discrete claims. 
 
Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Chapters 805-807, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 680 (1976); see also 3A 
Jay E. Grenig & Walter L. Harvey, Wisconsin Practice: Civil 
Procedure § 505.3 (1994).   
7 The first proposed draft of § 805.05(2) prepared by the 
Judicial Council Rules Revision Committee followed the approach 
of Federal Rule 42 and allowed separate trials for "any separate 
issue or of any number of claims, or issues."  Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 805.07 (Rule 42), Judicial Council Civil Rules Revision 
Committee, December 1972.  In January 1973, the Committee, by a 
5-2 vote, struck all language allowing separate trials for 
issues.  Minutes of January 19 & 20, 1973 Meeting of the 
Judicial Council Civil Rules Revision Committee at 3.  Section 
805.05(2) as it appears in the second proposed draft is 
substantially the rule that was adopted by this court.  Compare 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 805.07 (Rule 42), Judicial Council Civil 
Rules 
Revision 
Committee, 
February 
1973 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.05(2).   
The records of the Judicial Council Committee are on file 
with the Wisconsin State Law Library.   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
12
explained the Committee's intent in drafting § 805.05(2) to an 
inquiring member of the state judiciary: 
 
The rule has been intentionally written to provide 
that only claims can be bifurcated and that issues 
cannot be bifurcated.  An exception to that is the 
bifurcation of an issue of insurance coverage under 
803.04(2)(b).8   
 
¶22 Most indicative of an intent to disallow bifurcation 
of issues are the materials presented to this court prior to its 
adoption of § 805.05(2).  In 1974, the Judicial Council 
submitted its proposed version of § 805.05(2) to the court.  The 
court then conducted public hearings and accepted input from 
interested parties.  Included in the feedback received by the 
court were calls for the inclusion of a provision in § 805.05(2) 
that would allow for the bifurcation of issues.9   
                     
8 Letter from Reuben W. Peterson, Chairman, Judicial 
Council, to the Honorable Michael T. Sullivan, Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County (April 16, 1974) (on file with Wisconsin State 
Law Library). 
9 For example, the Executive Committee of the Milwaukee 
County Board of Judges submitted, on several occasions, its 
recommendation that bifurcation of issues be allowed under 
§ 805.05(2)(b).  See Letter from the Honorable Michael T. 
Sullivan, Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, to Honorable 
Horace W. Wilkie, Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court (Jan. 
23, 1975); Letter from the Honorable Michael J. Barron, Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, to the Justices of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court (Apr. 26, 1974).  Another organization objecting 
to the proposed § 805.05(2) and pursuing a provision that would 
allow for bifurcation of issues was the Milwaukee Junior Bar 
Association.  See Letter from Heiner Giese, Member, Executive 
Board, Milwaukee Junior Bar Association, to Justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court 3 (Oct. 21, 1974).  Numerous objections 
and recommendations were also made by individual law firms and 
members of the bar.  See, e.g., Letter from John E. Schapekahm, 
Kasdorf, Henderson, Dall, Lewis & Swietlik, to Justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court 7 (Oct. 31, 1974).   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
13
¶23 In response to the objections to proposed § 805.05(2), 
the Judicial Council submitted a memorandum to the court 
reiterating its position with regard to the bifurcation of 
issues.  The Council explained that it deliberately drafted a 
rule that did not allow for bifurcation of issues:   
 
805.05(2) This permits bifurcation of claims but does 
not permit bifurcation of issues, except for insurance 
coverage issues.  The Committee did not accept the 
suggestion that issues could also be bifurcated.   
Drafting Committee's Memorandum Brief in Response to Objections, 
at 5 (August 1974) (on file with Wisconsin State Law Library).   
¶24 After receiving the objections and the response of the 
Judicial Council, this court subsequently adopted § 805.05(2) as 
proposed by the Judicial Council.  See Supreme Court Order, 67 
Wis. 2d 
585, 
691-93 
(1975). 
 
The 
documented 
history 
of 
§ 805.02(2) thus demonstrates that the Judicial Council drafted, 
and this court adopted, § 805.05(2) specifically intending that 
issues were not to be bifurcated.  Given this clear evidence of 
an intent to disallow bifurcation we conclude that the circuit 
court's order to bifurcate the trial of separate issues before 
different juries contravenes § 805.05(2).   
¶25 In addition to § 805.05(2), our conclusion that the 
circuit court's order to bifurcate was invalid is reinforced by 
§ 805.09(2).  That provision, which establishes the requisite 
elements of a valid jury verdict, states as follows: 
 
                                                                  
 
The cited materials are on file with the Office of the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court.   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
14
    (2)  Verdict.  A verdict agreed to by five-sixths 
of the jurors shall be the verdict of the jury.  If 
more than one question must be answered to arrive at a 
verdict on the same claim, the same five-sixths of the 
jurors must agree on all the questions. 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 805.09(2).   
¶26 In prior cases we have explained that § 805.09(2) 
codifies the constitutional guarantee of a five-sixths jury 
verdict of Article I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Giese 
v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 401, 331 N.W.2d 585 
(1983).10  While the first sentence of the statute codifies the 
constitutional 
protection, 
the 
second 
sentence 
provides 
protection more explicit than the constitutional guarantee.11  
The second sentence of § 809.05(2) requires the same five-sixths 
                     
10 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law. Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. 
 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 5. 
11 The language requiring that the same five-sixths of the 
jury agree on all the questions necessary to sustain a claim was 
created by the legislature in 1951.  Chapter 36, Laws of 1951; 
see Wis. Stat. § 270.25(1) (1973).  Identical language was 
adopted by this court when it promulgated § 805.09(2).  See 
Supreme Court Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 700 (1975); see also 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 805.11 (Rule 48), Judicial Council Civil 
Rules Revision Committee, February 1973 ("Sub. (2) is virtually 
identical to s. 270.25(1).").   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
15
of a jury to agree to all questions necessary to sustain a claim 
in order for a jury's verdict to be valid.  We have explained 
that this language requires a "claim-by-claim" review of a 
verdict.  Id.  Thus, when we subject a verdict to scrutiny, we 
examine each question necessary to sustain a claim to insure 
that the same five-sixths of the jury agrees on all the issues 
necessary to sustain that claim.  Id.    
¶27 We believe that the circuit court's order to bifurcate 
the issues of liability and damages and to try them before 
different juries cannot be reconciled with the requirements of 
the § 805.09(2) five-sixths verdict protection.  In the context 
of a negligence claim, in order for a jury to render a valid 
verdict under the plain language of § 805.09(2), the same five-
sixths of the jury must agree on all questions necessary to 
sustain that claim of negligence.  Because the requirement that 
the same five-sixths of the jury must agree on all questions 
cannot be met where the questions are answered by an entirely 
different jury panel, we conclude that the circuit court's order 
in this case is invalid.  
 
¶28 In light of the statutory provisions and statutory 
history that we believe wholly undermine the validity of the 
circuit court's order to bifurcate, we only briefly address 
several arguments raised by the defendants in support of their 
position.   
 
¶29 In advancing their statutory argument, the defendants 
rely to a large degree on the court of appeals decision in 
Zawistowski, 160 Wis. 2d 292.  In Zawistowski, the court of 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
16
appeals approved of a circuit court's order to bifurcate issues 
in a defamation trial.  After examining numerous statutory 
provisions, 
including 
§ 805.05(2), 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded that § 906.11(1) provided the circuit court with the 
"inherent discretion to bifurcate issues for reasons of judicial 
economy."  Id. at 300.12 
 
¶30 In Zawistowski, the court of appeals concluded that 
while § 805.05(2) does not authorize bifurcating individual 
issues of trial, "neither does it prohibit the trial court from 
taking such an action."  Id. at 299.  This conclusion cannot 
stand in light of the statements of intent to disallow 
bifurcation revealed in the statutory history of § 805.05(2) 
presented above.  While it is unclear from the Zawistowski 
decision whether the circuit court contemplated trials before 
the same or different juries, to the extent that opinion is 
inconsistent with today's decision, it is overruled. 
¶31 Moreover, while we agree that the evidentiary rule 
§ 906.11(1) provides the circuit court with broad discretion in 
its control over the presentation of evidence at trial, that 
                     
12 Section 906.11, entitled "Mode and order of interrogation 
and presentation," states in pertinent part: 
 (1)  Control by judge.  The judge shall exercise 
reasonable 
control 
over 
the 
mode 
and 
order 
of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as 
to 
(a) 
make 
the 
interrogation 
and 
presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (b) 
avoid needless consumption of time, and (c) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 906.11(1).   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
17
discretion is not unfettered.  It must give way where the 
exercise of discretion runs afoul of other statutory provisions 
that are not discretionary.  In the context of bifurcation of 
issues for trial before different juries, § 805.05(2) and 
§ 805.09(2) limit that discretion.13    
¶32 The defendants also present an argument addressing the 
powers of this court and the court of appeals to remand cases 
upon reversal for the retrial of discrete issues rather than 
directing that the entire case be retried.  The defendants 
essentially assert that the bifurcation of issues by the circuit 
court is indistinguishable from the retrial of isolated issues 
on remand and that we cannot invalidate one practice without 
calling into question the other.14  We disagree.   
                     
13  The defendants also argue that under the rule of 
legislative acquiescence, we should consider the legislature to 
have acceded to the court of appeals interpretation of § 906.11 
and § 805.05(2) in Zawistowski v. Kissinger, 160 Wis. 2d 292, 
466 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1991), through its silence.  The 
doctrine of legislative acquiescence is a means of ascertaining 
the intent of the legislature.  See State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 
628, 641, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993).  The defendants' argument 
ignores that the statutes at issue in this case and in 
Zawistowski originated with this court and not with the 
legislature.  Although we share the power to regulate pleading, 
practice, and procedure with the legislature under § 751.12, the 
fact that the statutes at issue were promulgated by this court 
minimizes the legislative acquiescence argument.   
14  In their briefs, the Pertzborns raise this argument in 
response to the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge.  However, 
the argument they raise is equally applicable and worthy of 
discussion in the statutory context, primarily with reference to 
§ 805.09(2).   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
18
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.09 grants the appellate courts 
of this state the power to remand issues for a new trial.  It 
specifically provides that an appellate court may "reverse, 
affirm or modify [a] judgment or order as to any or all of the 
parties; [and] may order a new trial."  Wis. Stat. § 808.09.  
Over a century ago we explained that "[t]he power to affirm, 
reverse, or modify a judgment in part, and order a new trial, 
necessarily confers the power upon this court to order a new 
trial as to the part of the judgment reversed."  Braunsdorf v. 
Fellner, 76 Wis. 1, 18, 45 N.W. 97 (1890).  This remains true 
today.  Thus, contrary to the defendants' assertions, remand for 
partial retrial by an appellate court and bifurcation by a 
circuit 
court 
are 
distinguishable. 
 
One 
is 
specifically 
authorized by statute, whereas the other is prohibited.   
¶34 Finally, we note defendants have raised numerous 
policy arguments advancing the merits of bifurcated trials on 
separate issues.  Because we have concluded that the question of 
bifurcation raised in this case is addressed by § 805.05(2) and 
§ 805.09(2), we will not entertain these policy arguments to 
reach a result contrary to that required by the statutes.  To do 
so on appeal would be an inappropriate exercise of our rule-
making power.  See Rupp v. Travelers Indem. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 16, 
23, 115 N.W.2d 612 (1962).  This court makes changes to pleading 
and practice rules through the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.12.  Id. 
¶35 In sum, the court of appeals has asked us to 
"determine whether the circuit court properly ordered trials on 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
19
liability and damages before separate juries."  In answering the 
certification, we conclude that bifurcating the issues of 
liability and damages for separate trials before different 
juries cannot be reconciled with the rules of civil procedure.  
Because there is an intent to disallow bifurcation of separate 
issues underlying § 805.05(2) and because it is impossible for 
different juries trying bifurcated issues of liability and 
damages to render a valid verdict under § 805.09(2), we conclude 
that the circuit court's order to bifurcate is invalid.  Having 
concluded that § 805.05(2) and § 805.09(2) are determinative of 
this appeal, we need not address the plaintiffs' constitutional 
challenge.15  
II 
¶36 We next turn to the issues raised on the Pertzborns' 
cross-appeal.  The questions posed by the cross-appeal relate to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
denial 
of 
summary 
judgment 
and 
the 
interpretation and application of the recreational immunity 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52.   
¶37 We review a grant or denial of summary judgment 
independently of the determination rendered by the circuit 
court, applying the same methodology used by the circuit court. 
 Robinson v. City of West Allis, 2000 WI 126, ¶26, 239 Wis. 2d 
595, 619 N.W.2d 692.  A motion for summary judgment shall be 
                     
15 Additionally, because we can decide this issue as a 
matter of statutory law, we need not address certain arguments 
raised 
by 
the 
defendants 
in 
which 
they 
advance 
extra-
jurisdictional case law to establish a common law authority to 
bifurcate issues for trial.   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
20
granted when the pleadings and supporting papers reveal no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law, subject to our independent review.  
State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536.   
¶38 In challenging the circuit court's denial of summary 
judgment, the Pertzborns claim that the social guest exception 
to recreational immunity provided by § 895.52(6)(d) does not 
apply and that they are entitled to recreational immunity under 
§ 895.52(2)(b)16 for any damages arising from Christopher's 
accident.  We agree with the circuit court that under the facts 
of this case it is improper to grant summary judgment to the 
Pertzborns.  The summary judgment materials present genuine 
                     
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) states: 
 
(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner 
and no officer, employe or agent of an owner is liable 
for the death of, any injury to, or any death or 
injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational 
activity on the owner's property or for any death or 
injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b). 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
21
issues of material fact as to whether the § 895.52(6)(d) social 
guest exception to recreational immunity applies.17 
¶39 Under 
§ 895.52(2)(b), 
the 
precondition 
for 
recreational immunity is that the injury be to or caused by a 
person 
engaging 
in 
recreational 
activity 
on 
the 
owner's 
property.  Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 
634, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996).  Christopher was injured while he 
was engaging in a recreational activity.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(g) (including sledding as a recreational activity). 
 However, 
recreational 
immunity is 
subject 
to 
statutorily 
enumerated exceptions, including the social guest exception of 
§ 895.52(6)(d). 
¶40 Under the social guest exception, invited social 
guests, unlike permitted entrants, may proceed against a 
landowner under certain circumstances when they are injured 
while engaged in a recreational activity.  See Ervin v. City of 
Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 475, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) (drawing 
distinction between 
permitted 
entrants 
and 
invited 
social 
guests). 
 
The 
social 
guest 
exception 
is 
established 
by 
§ 895.52(6)(d) and exists where there is an express and 
individual invitation made to the injured party by the private 
                     
17  The circuit court denied the Pertzborns' motion for 
summary judgment, concluding there exist genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the applicability of the social guest 
exception to recreational immunity.  We affirm the order denying 
summary judgment on that basis.  Accordingly, we need not 
address whether the Pertzborns are entitled to recreational 
immunity notwithstanding the social guest exception.   
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
22
property "owner" for the specific occasion during which the 
injury occurs: 
 
(6) LIABILITY; PRIVATE PROPERTY. Subsection (2) 
does not limit the liability of a private property 
owner or of an employe or agent of a private property 
owner whose property is used for a recreational 
activity if any of the following conditions exist: 
. . . .  
(d) The death or injury occurs on property owned 
by a private property owner to a social guest who has 
been expressly and individually invited by the private 
property owner for the specific occasion during which 
the death or injury occurs, if the death or injury 
occurs on any of the following: 
. . . .  
  
2. Residential property. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d).  The term "owner" as it is used in 
the provision includes a person that "owns, leases, or occupies 
the property."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1. 
¶41 The Pertzborns contest the applicability of the social 
guest exception on several grounds.  First, they maintain that 
Kathleen Pertzborn was without the legal authority to extend an 
invitation that would trigger the social guest exception.  
Second, the Pertzborns argue that there was no express and 
individual invitation to trigger the exception.  Third, they 
also contend that even if such invitation existed, it had 
expired by the time Christopher was injured and Kathleen had 
gone inside for supper.  
¶42 We turn first to Kathleen's authority to extend an 
invitation under § 895.52(6)(d).  While the Pertzborns make much 
of the fact that neither Diane nor Kenneth Pertzborn invited 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
23
Christopher to their home to sled, that fact is not controlling. 
 The only alleged invitation to be found in the summary judgment 
materials arose from Kathleen.  The Pertzborns maintain that 
Kathleen had no authority to invite Christopher and trigger the 
social guest exception because she was merely eleven years old. 
 Their position is not supported by the statute.  The statute 
requires only that an "owner" of the property invite the injured 
party.  An "owner" under § 895.52(1)(d)1 includes an "occupant." 
 The statute contains no age limitation, and we will not read 
one into the statute.   
¶43 The Pertzborns additionally direct us to court of 
appeals precedent that defines an "occupant" as one who "has 
actual possession of the property."  Doane v. Helenville Mut. 
Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 351, 575 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 They maintain that Kathleen does not satisfy this requirement. 
 The proffered definition of "occupant" was created to define 
the outer limits of the term in cases where the term's 
applicability was not necessarily apparent given the nature of 
the property.  See id. at 348 (ice fishing shanty on lake); Hall 
v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 487, 431 N.W.2d 696 
(Ct. App. 1988) (fairgrounds).  We believe that in the context 
of residential property the ordinary meaning of the term 
"occupant" encompasses one who resides on the property in 
question.  It is not disputed that Kathleen is a resident of the 
Pertzborn home.  She is therefore an occupant and is capable of 
extending 
an 
invitation 
that 
triggers 
the 
social 
guest 
exception. 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
24
¶44 The second challenge to the applicability of the 
social guest exception centers on whether there was an express 
and individual invitation extended to Christopher.  We believe 
that Christopher's testimony regarding Kathleen's statements and 
conduct is sufficient to establish a question of fact as to 
whether Christopher was "expressly and individually invited" to 
the Pertzborns.  Christopher's testimony establishes that the 
children went to the Pertzborns at Kathleen's behest.  He 
testified that Kathleen wanted to go to the Pertzborns from the 
Waters and that she "brought" Christopher to her house, saying 
"let's go over to my house or something."  On summary judgment 
we are required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the non-moving party.  Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., 
Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶56, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142. 
¶45 The Pertzborns also argue that the social guest 
exception does not apply because if there was an invitation it 
was not one to sled at the Pertzborns.  The Pertzborns' argument 
in this regard is not supported by the statutory language.  
Section § 895.52(6)(d) requires only that the injured party be 
"expressly and individually invited by the private property 
owner for the specific occasion during which the death or injury 
occurs." 
¶46 The third challenge to the applicability of the social 
guest exception focuses on whether the invitation had expired by 
the time Christopher was injured.  Under § 895.52(6)(d), for the 
social guest exception to apply the injured person must have 
been invited "for the specific occasion during which the death 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
25
or injury occurs."  It is implicit in this provision that an 
invitation does not create an open-ended exception to immunity 
unlimited by time or circumstance.  Rather, the invitation, and 
therefore the exception, may cease.  The Pertzborns contend that 
the specific occasion for which Christopher was invited onto 
their property ended when Kathleen went in for supper and that 
Christopher unilaterally decided to linger on the property.   
¶47 Again, we conclude that the summary judgment materials 
present a disputed issue of fact.  Christopher testified that he 
was waiting on the property because he and Kathleen were to go 
to the schoolyard to sled following supper.  A reasonable 
inference 
to 
draw 
from 
this 
testimony 
is 
that 
Kathleen 
understood he was waiting for her outside.  While Diane 
Pertzborn testified that Kathleen told her that Christopher had 
gone home to tend the dogs, Christopher's testimony to the 
contrary creates a factual dispute on that matter.  Thus, while 
Diane Pertzborn was unaware that Christopher remained on the 
property, there is an issue of fact as to whether the specific 
occasion 
of 
Kathleen's 
invitation 
included 
the 
time 
and 
circumstances of Christopher's injury, and therefore summary 
judgment is inappropriate. 
¶48 Finally, we briefly address an argument raised in 
passing by the Pertzborns in their reply brief.  The Pertzborns 
argue that the social guest exception does not apply because the 
injury did not occur on the Pertzborn property.  Section 
895.52(6)(d) provides an exception to immunity when the "death 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
26
or injury occurs on the property owned by a private property 
owner."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d).   
¶49 While we acknowledge that Christopher was not on the 
Pertzborn property when he was injured, we conclude that 
rendering the social guest exception inapplicable on this basis 
in this case would be an absurd and unreasonable result.  See 
DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 370, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985) 
("We must interpret a statute in such a way as to avoid an 
absurd or unreasonable result.").  Christopher was injured while 
engaged in the continuous act of sledding that began on the 
Pertzborn property.  It was the act of sledding down the 
Pertzborns' hill that thrust Christopher a few feet beyond the 
Pertzborn property.  It is this continuous act, which began on 
the Pertzborn property and which propelled Christopher a few 
feet from that property, that compels our conclusion that 
§ 895.52(6)(d) must be construed to allow for the extension of 
his social guest status to the injuries suffered by Christopher 
in Hilltop Drive. 
¶50 Under 
the 
Pertzborns' 
reading 
of 
the 
statute, 
Christopher's social guest status would fall away simply because 
the force and speed generated when Christopher sledded down the 
Pertzborns' hill propelled him a few feet over their property 
line.  Were we to accept this mechanistic reading of the 
statute, we would have to nuance the trajectory of Christopher's 
downhill descent in a manner that would ignore the laws of 
physics. 
 
Rather 
than 
subject 
the 
statute 
to 
such 
an 
unreasonable construction, we conclude that under the facts 
No. 
99-1702 
 
 
27
presented to us in this case the plaintiffs may proceed under 
the social guest exception to recreational immunity provided by 
§ 895.52(6)(d).   
III 
¶51 In sum, our answer to the certified issue is that the 
circuit court is precluded by statute from ordering separate 
trials before different juries on the issues of liability and 
damages arising from the same claim.  We also conclude that 
because there are numerous disputed issues of material fact as 
to 
whether 
the 
§ 895.52(6)(d) 
social 
guest 
exception 
to 
recreational immunity applies, the circuit court appropriately 
denied summary judgment.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit 
court's bifurcation order, affirm the order denying the motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
and 
remand 
the 
cause 
for 
further 
proceedings. 
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit court are reversed 
in part, affirmed in part, and the cause is remanded for further 
proceedings.   
 
 
99-1702.ssa 
 
1 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
join Part I of this opinion relating to the bifurcation of the 
issues of liability and damages.  As to Part II, I agree that 
the plain meaning of the statute leads to an absurd result in 
this case.  Statutory interpretation is necessary.  In contrast, 
a plain meaning of the statute does not lead to an absurd result 
in Urban v. Grasser, 2001 WI 63, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___. 
¶53 This 
case 
once 
again 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
recreational immunity statute needs legislative attention.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 13.83(1)(c)1 and 13.93(2)(d) (1999-2000). 
 
99-1702.ssa 
 
1