Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Jill Gilbert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP003561-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-3561-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jill S. Gilbert, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
Complainant-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jill Gilbert,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GILBERT 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 12, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
 
 
(opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Wilcox, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by 
Daniel W. Hildebrand and DeWitt, Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison 
and oral argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief 
by Thomas J. Basting, Sr. and Brennan, Steil, Basting & 
MacDougall, S.C., Janesville and oral argument by Thomas J. 
Basting, Sr. 
 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-3561-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jill S. Gilbert, Attorney at Law. 
Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility,  
 
 
Complainant-Respondent, 
 
v.  
Jill S. Gilbert,  
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney’s 
license 
suspended.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   Attorney Jill Gilbert appealed from the 
referee’s 
conclusions 
that 
she 
engaged 
in 
professional 
misconduct during her representation of a client over a six-
month period. That misconduct consisted of submitting bills to 
the 
client 
that 
contained 
misrepresentations 
and 
were 
fraudulent, misrepresenting her use of her client’s funds to 
purchase a television for herself, engaging in dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in videotaping what purported 
to be the client’s execution of an agreement, charging the 
client and paying herself excessive and unreasonable fees from 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
2 
the client’s funds, failing to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in handling the client’s checking account, failing to 
keep the client reasonably informed of the status of his 
financial affairs and explain them to the extent reasonably 
necessary for him to make informed decisions, and depositing 
funds she claimed as fees into her client trust account and 
subsequently withdrawing a portion of those funds knowing there 
was a dispute about her entitlement to them. Attorney Gilbert 
also appealed from the referee’s recommendation that her license 
to practice law be suspended for three years as discipline for 
that misconduct and that she be required to make restitution to 
the client, in the amount of $84,800, plus interest, for the 
excessive and unreasonable fees she charged and collected.  
¶2 
We determine that the referee’s conclusions in respect 
to Attorney Gilbert’s professional misconduct were properly 
drawn from the facts established in the disciplinary proceeding. 
We determine further that the egregiousness of that misconduct, 
in light of all the circumstances, warrants the suspension of 
Attorney Gilbert’s license to practice law for two years. For 
services rendered over a period of less than six months, she 
charged her client and paid herself $112,000 from his funds 
under her control -– more than one-third of the client’s total 
assets, excluding his residence. Moreover, she was repeatedly 
dishonest: her billing statements submitted to the client 
misrepresented services she had performed for him as well as the 
dates on which she performed them; she misrepresented her use of 
a cashier’s check drawn on the client’s funds to purchase a 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
3 
television for her family; after the client terminated her 
employment, she took client funds from her trust account to pay 
what she claimed were fees owing for services rendered, 
notwithstanding that she had been notified by the client’s 
successor attorney of a dispute over the services she claimed to 
have rendered and the amount of fees to which she was entitled.  
¶3 
In addition to the suspension, we order Attorney 
Gilbert to make restitution to her client in the amount 
determined by the referee to be the excessive fees she charged 
and collected. The referee based that determination on the 
expert testimony presented at a hearing held on the issue of 
restitution. Also, as the referee recommended, interest on the 
amount of restitution is to be paid at the legal rate from the 
date her representation of the client was terminated.  
¶4 
Attorney Gilbert was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in June 1992 and practices in Milwaukee. She 
previously had practiced law for several years in Illinois. She 
has not been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding.  
¶5 
The referee, Attorney Rose Marie Baron, made findings 
of fact based on testimony and documentary evidence presented at 
a lengthy disciplinary hearing concerning Attorney Gilbert’s 
representation of a client from March 4 to August 16, 1993. The 
client was a 63-year-old man who suffered from congestive heart 
disease and chronic depression, for which he had been receiving 
disability benefits. Following a heart attack in January 1993, 
the man was kept in a nursing home when he was unable to arrange 
for necessary home care. When his attorney no longer was willing 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
4 
to represent him, as he was a very demanding client, Attorney 
Gilbert agreed to take on the representation. At the time, the 
client had a stock portfolio valued at $254,000, a condominium 
unit where he resided valued at $95,000, and a wristwatch 
collection valued at up to $75,000.  
¶6 
On March 4, 1993, Attorney Gilbert met with the client 
at the nursing home and entered into a fee agreement by which 
she was to manage his financial affairs, determine his rights 
concerning hospitalization and nursing home care, and identify 
alternatives for payment of the medical and nursing home 
services he needed, for which she was to be paid at the rate of 
$125 per hour. Soon thereafter, however, when the client gave 
Attorney Gilbert his durable power of attorney and his power of 
attorney for health care, one copy of the durable power set 
forth a $95 hourly fee and another copy specified a $150 hourly 
fee. In any event, the check the client gave Attorney Gilbert 
April 15, 1993, for her services bore the notation “37 hours at 
$95.”  
¶7 
The client returned to his home March 24, 1993, and 
received home health care services -- skilled nursing for his 
medications, 
daily 
visits 
from 
a 
health 
aide, 
laundry, 
transportation, and cleaning services. When Attorney Gilbert had 
a nursing care evaluation done with a view toward the client’s 
being as independent as possible, the evaluator stated on April 
5, 1993, that he did not need a night-time companion and 
suggested occupational and physical therapy and home meal 
delivery. 
The 
evaluator’s 
recommendation 
for 
psychological 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
5 
testing to determine the client’s ability to make sound 
judgments for continued independent living was not followed.  
¶8 
Over the ensuing several months, the client was 
hospitalized three times: from April 23-30 for hypertensive 
cardiovascular disease with congestive heart failure; June 28-
July 7 for confusion and paranoia; from July 22-28 for fainting 
spells. During that time, Attorney Gilbert served as liaison 
with the client’s physician, caregivers, and case managers.  
¶9 
The handwritten records Attorney Gilbert kept of her 
time spent on the client’s representation from March 3 to 30, 
1993, reflected in two columns the time spent and services 
provided “in office” and “out of office,” but the typed 
statement of her services she gave the client and had him sign 
did not set forth the total of hours spent or the fee for those 
services. Attorney Gilbert produced no handwritten records of 
her time and charges in the client’s representation after March.  
¶10 Sometime after the client signed the March statement, 
Attorney Gilbert gave him a revised statement of those services, 
this time including the hours set forth in her handwritten notes 
under the column “out of office.” That revised statement, which 
the client signed July 1, 1993, showed a balance due of $16,200 
but did not set forth the total number of hours spent on his 
representation or the rate at which the fee was calculated. The 
referee noted that Attorney Gilbert could not have billed those 
services at the $125 hourly rate specified in the fee agreement, 
for if she had, the fee would have been $17,950.  
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
6 
¶11 The next three statements for Attorney Gilbert’s 
services, each of which, except the June 30 statement, she had 
the client sign, set forth the following totals:  
 
4/93: 
 
128.6 hours 
 
 
 
$16,075.00 
5/1 - 5/19: 
123.9 hours @ $125  
  
$15,487.50 
5/20 - 5/31: 
 41.7 hours @ $125 (less 
   unspecified $523 credit) 
 
 
 
$ 4,689.50 
 
6/1 - 6/15: 
 99.4 hours @ $125  
 
$12,425.00 
6/16 - 6/30: 
117.3 hours @ $125 (less $1200 
   credit for purchase that was returned) 
$13,462.50 
 
7/1 - 7/7: 
 57.1 hours @ $125  
 
$ 7,137.50 
7/8 - 7/31: 
136.3 hours @ $125  
 
$17,037.50 
¶12 After the client filed a grievance against Attorney 
Gilbert with the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 
(Board) August 16, 1993, terminated her representation, and 
retained another attorney, Attorney Gilbert’s final bill to the 
client, dated August 20, 1993, which he did not sign, set forth 
the following:  
8/1 - 8/17: Estimated fee per accounting  
$12,387.50 
Total actual hours 76.2 @ $125 
 
  
$ 9,525.00 
Balance due to client 
 
 
 
  
$ 2,862.50 
¶13 On May 23, 1993, Attorney Gilbert had written the 
client that she was concerned that at the rate he was paying for 
her services, his assets soon would be depleted. She proposed to 
limit her services to 35 hours per week for June and July and to 
30 hours per week for August and September. Her June 10, 1993 
letter to him summarizing deposits and withdrawals of his funds 
in her trust account showed a withdrawal for fees of $44,443 for 
April and May, even though her individual statements for the 
relevant period totaled only $36,252.  
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
7 
¶14 In early June 1993 Attorney Gilbert looked into the 
possibility of having her client enter the Community Options 
Program (COP), a state program providing assistance to persons 
needing care in order that they might remain in their home. In 
addition to an asset limit, there was a two-year waiting period 
to obtain COP benefits, and owing to recent legislation, the 
client would have to qualify for those benefits by October 1, 
1993.  
¶15 Attorney Gilbert discussed with the ethics advisor at 
the State Bar of Wisconsin ethical issues relating to a 
contemplated asset divestment plan to render her client eligible 
for COP. At the advisor’s suggestion, she consulted an attorney 
experienced in ethical issues and gave him details of a plan she 
had devised that included placing the client’s funds in her own 
account. When she met with that attorney June 28, 1993, he 
discussed with her the professional conduct rules concerning an 
attorney’s entering into a business transaction with a client.  
¶16 When told of the agreement she was contemplating by 
which she would provide her client legal services and health-
care-related case management services, the attorney advised 
Attorney Gilbert of the need to explain the matter fully to her 
client, give him available options, suggest he have independent 
counsel review any proposed agreement, ensure that her fees were 
reasonable, obtain her client’s written consent, and provide for 
a refund of fees in the event the client terminated her 
services. The attorney told her that if divestment of the 
client’s assets was intended, she should not deposit the 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
8 
client’s funds in her trust account. He also suggested that if 
the client were under a disability, she videotape the client’s 
execution of the agreement.  
¶17 That attorney also suggested that Attorney Gilbert 
arrive 
at 
a 
“blended” 
rate 
for 
her 
professional 
and 
nonprofessional services under the agreement, as charging a 
legal fee for personal services would not be reasonable. 
Attorney Gilbert stated that attorneys practicing in the area of 
elder law charged up to $165 per hour and that fees for non-
legal case management services ranged from $70 to $90 per hour. 
The attorney assisted Attorney Gilbert on several drafts of the 
agreement she was preparing but never saw the final copy she 
gave the client to sign.  
¶18 The case management agreement provided that the client 
give Attorney Gilbert $154,000 to be deposited into a joint bank 
account held by Attorney Gilbert and the client. It provided 
further that within 14 days of deposit Attorney Gilbert withdraw 
65 percent of the amount and place it in a segregated account 
for payment of the client’s care and retain 35 percent to pay 
estimated federal and state income tax obligations she expected 
to incur personally as a result of receiving the client’s funds. 
Under the agreement, Attorney Gilbert was to provide up to 30 
hours of services per week -– with a 24-hour per day 
availability –- for 24 months and be responsible for ensuring 
that the client’s 24-hour-a-day care needs were met. By its 
terms, the agreement would terminate when the client’s expenses 
exceeded the segregated and reserved funds.  
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
9 
¶19 The agreement provided that Attorney Gilbert’s total 
fee for lawyer and case management services would vary depending 
on the client’s date of eligibility for COP or for Medicaid 
benefits. If the agreement were terminated prior to September 
15, 1993, Attorney Gilbert would refund all funds in excess of 
what she would be entitled to for services rendered, at a rate 
of $125 per hour.  
¶20 On July 20, 1993, Attorney Gilbert videotaped what 
purported to be her explanation of the agreement to the client, 
his consent to its terms, and his execution of it. In fact, 
however, at the time the videotape was made during Attorney 
Gilbert’s meeting with the client at his home, the client 
already had signed the copies of the agreement she had given 
him. When the time came for the client to sign the agreement, 
Attorney Gilbert stopped the taping, and when it resumed she 
instructed the client to sign his name on a line that in fact 
already bore his signature. The referee described the videotape 
in her report as follows:  
 
[The client] is shown on the tape as a man who 
has obvious physical and cognitive problems  . . . . 
He has noticeable tremors, has a flat affect, responds 
slowly, and has periods of confusion. He is asked to 
review a complex document prepared by his attorney, 
indicate his understanding, and sign the agreement 
giving his attorney control of all his assets.  
 
 
 . . . The setting for this important procedure 
is in [the client’s] apartment and is conducted under 
extremely chaotic circumstances.  . . .  
 
 
 . . . Ms. 
Gilbert 
came 
to 
[the 
client’s] 
apartment accompanied by her two very young children 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
10
who are shown on the videotape running, screaming, 
vying for Ms. Gilbert’s attention, and interrupting 
her discussion with [the client]. The television set 
in the living room where the meeting is being 
conducted is tuned in resulting in a loud, distracting 
background noise and motion. [T]he housekeeper is 
seated in the room, and persists in prompting [the 
client] when he is unable to answer some of Ms. 
Gilbert’s questions.  
 
In addition to the cacophony, which in and of 
itself makes meaningful dialogue nearly impossible, 
Ms. Gilbert’s rapid speech when she addresses [the 
client] creates further difficulty. It is very hard 
for an ordinary viewer to follow as she races from 
topic to topic at an accelerated pace; for someone in 
[the 
client’s] 
condition 
and 
with 
his 
limited 
cognitive grasp, it can only be more of an ordeal. He 
looks dazed much of the time and rarely makes a 
declarative statement; Ms. Gilbert puts words in [his] 
mouth. He responds in a rote fashion, says “yes” when 
she asks him specific questions, but shows no real 
comprehension -– he reacts, but is not able by virtue 
of her manner of questioning him, to express his own 
understanding of the various topics raised. Because of 
the form of Ms. Gilbert’s questions, [the client] has 
no other way to respond but to say “yes” or nod his 
head in acquiescence.  
 
 . . . Most astounding was the revelation that 
[the client] had already signed several copies of the 
agreement prior to the videotaping. And what does Jill 
Gilbert do when she sees that this has occurred? Not 
what one would expect from an attorney whose intent is 
to memorialize the execution of a significant document 
to avoid any potential challenge of the client’s 
competence to enter into an agreement. She pages 
through the documents, sees that they are already 
signed, and then pretends that there is no problem. 
She then turns the camera off for an indeterminate 
time. When taping resumes, Ms. Gilbert is heard 
directing [the client] to sign his name “right above 
the line” and “fill in the date.”  
 
That the respondent continued to record this 
charade is unconscionable. That she would rely on the 
videotape to show that her client understood the many 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
11
complex provisions of the document, i.e., divestiture, 
tax, fees, termination, et al., is in reckless 
disregard of her responsibility to her client.  
¶21 Prior to the signing of the agreement, the client had 
authorized Attorney Gilbert to liquidate $37,000 of his stock 
brokerage account and place the proceeds in her client trust 
account for payment of his care and for her legal services. 
Attorney Gilbert liquidated $46,800 from that account and then 
transferred the account to another broker. Soon thereafter, she 
liquidated $90,000 from that account and transferred it to a 
newly created joint trust checking account in her and her 
client’s names. On July 19, 1993, one day before the case 
management agreement was to be executed, she transferred $74,380 
from the brokerage account to the joint account and nine days 
later withdrew approximately $110,000 from the joint account and 
placed it in her law office business account. On August 10, 
1993, she opened a trust account for the client’s funds and 
placed in it $24,000 from the joint trust account, representing 
that amount as payment of fees she already had earned. After 
being informed that the client filed a grievance with the Board, 
Attorney Gilbert withdrew $10,800 from the client trust account 
as fees for services she claimed she had rendered prior to the 
execution of the case management agreement.  
¶22 The referee also made findings in respect to Attorney 
Gilbert’s handling of her client’s affairs and personal needs. 
In early June 1993 she was told that the client’s large screen 
television was not working. After going to his residence and 
trying unsuccessfully to turn on the television using the remote 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
12
control, she obtained a $3000 cashier’s check written on her 
client’s funds payable to an appliance store and went shopping 
for a replacement television. When a salesman at the store 
suggested that the problem might be only the need for new 
batteries in the remote control, Attorney Gilbert bought new 
batteries, returned to the client’s home, and was able to 
operate the television with the remote control. She later 
returned to the store and used the $3000 cashier’s check to buy 
a large screen television for herself and her family.  
¶23 Attorney Gilbert entered in her client trust account 
check 
register 
an 
unidentified 
deposit 
of 
$3000 
and 
an 
unidentified 
withdrawal 
in 
the 
same 
amount, 
subsequently 
claiming that it constituted a $3000 credit to her client as 
partial payment of her legal fees connected to her use of the 
cashier’s check. The accounting she prepared for the client’s 
successor attorney after her services were terminated showed a 
$3000 “credit for unused money order” and a $3000 payment 
directly to her by an unidentified client check.  
¶24 In 
another 
matter, 
while 
Attorney 
Gilbert 
was 
representing the client and taking care of his financial 
affairs, she allowed his personal checking account to become 
overdrawn for a period of two months. The overdrawn status 
resulted from her having used the client’s debit card to make 
purchases for him believing that it was a credit card. Also, 
when going through the client’s files after Attorney Gilbert’s 
representation was terminated, the client’s successor attorney 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
13
found a Medicare check to the client postmarked May 1993 that 
had not been deposited into his account.  
¶25 On the basis of the foregoing facts, the referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Gilbert 
engaged 
in 
professional 
misconduct as follows.  
¶26 -- 
Engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation, 
prohibited 
by 
SCR 
20:8.4(c),1 
by 
the 
following:  
 
-- Her fraudulent billings and the misrepresentations 
in them for services she claimed to have rendered 
while her client was hospitalized and in respect to 
meetings with her client that did not occur.  
 
-- Misrepresenting the facts concerning her use of the 
$3000 cashier’s check drawn on client funds to 
purchase a television set for her own use.  
 
-- Offering to the Board during its investigation a 
videotape of what purported to be her client’s 
execution of the case management agreement, when 
the client already had signed the agreement -- a 
fact Attorney Gilbert attempted to conceal during 
the taping.  
¶27 -- Charged and collected excessive and unreasonable 
fees, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a)(1).2  
                     
1  SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
 . . .  
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation;  
2  SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part: Fees 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
14
¶28 -- Failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in managing her client’s financial affairs, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.3,3 by allowing his checkbook to become 
overdrawn and by failing to deposit a Medicare reimbursement 
check to his account.  
¶29 -- Failed to keep her client reasonably informed of 
the status of his financial situation and explain the provisions 
of the case management agreement in a manner that would permit 
him to make informed decisions regarding them, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.4(a) and (b).4  
¶30 -- Failed to keep her own funds separate from her 
client’s, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a),5 by transferring from a 
                                                                  
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include 
the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal service properly;   
3  SCR 20:1.3 provides: Diligence 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.   
4  SCR 20:1.4 provides: Communication 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information.  
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.   
5  At the time relevant here, SCR 20:1.15 provided, in 
pertinent part: Safekeeping property 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
15
joint account to her client trust account $24,000 that she 
characterized as fees earned prior to the execution of the case 
management agreement.  
¶31 -- Withdrew funds from her client trust account as 
fees while a dispute existed regarding her services, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.15(d).6  
¶32 The referee concluded that the Board was unable to 
establish 
by 
clear 
and 
satisfactory 
evidence 
four 
other 
allegations of professional misconduct: Attorney Gilbert’s using 
her client’s credit card to purchase items that were not for his 
benefit, liquidating some of her client’s stockholdings and 
                                                                  
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer’s own property, property of clients or third persons that 
is 
in 
the 
lawyer’s 
possession 
in 
connection 
with 
a 
representation. All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust 
accounts as provided in paragraph (c) maintained in a bank, 
trust company, credit union or savings and loan association 
authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin, which 
account shall be clearly designated as “Client’s Account” or 
“Trust Account” or words of similar import, and no funds 
belonging to the lawyer or law firm except funds reasonably 
sufficient to pay account service charges may be deposited in 
such an account.  . . .   
6  SCR 20:1.15 provides, in pertinent part: Safekeeping 
property 
 . . .  
(d) When, in the representation, a lawyer is in possession 
of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim 
interests, the property shall be treated by the lawyer as trust 
property until there is an accounting and severance of their 
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective 
interests, the portion in dispute shall continue to be treated 
as trust property until the dispute is resolved.   
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
16
depositing the proceeds into a joint account prior to the 
execution and in violation of the case management agreement, 
retaining the client’s funds to make a substantial estimated tax 
payment after she learned that the payment would not be 
required, and creating a conflict between her client’s interests 
and her own by setting up by the case management agreement for 
payment of the client’s health care and other needs as well as 
her fees. In respect to the first of those, while the testimony 
was unchallenged that Attorney Gilbert purchased a video 
cassette recorder, a dehumidifier, and cologne with her client’s 
credit card, there was contradictory evidence as to whether the 
client 
ever 
received 
the 
dehumidifier, 
despite 
Attorney 
Gilbert’s testimony that she delivered it to his residence. In 
respect to the cologne, the referee noted Attorney Gilbert’s 
contradictory statements to explain the appearance of the 
purchase on the credit card bill. While noting that Attorney 
Gilbert’s explanation to the client’s successor attorney about 
the purchase “leads to the conclusion that Ms. Gilbert has a 
penchant for deceitful behavior,” the referee concluded that 
there was no clear and convincing evidence to establish that she 
did not purchase the cologne for her client.  
¶33 Regarding the transfer of the client’s funds to the 
joint account prior to the execution of the case management 
agreement, the referee found that Attorney Gilbert was acting 
under a pre-existing power of attorney. As to the conflict of 
interest created by the case management agreement, the referee 
acknowledged that there might be an appearance of a conflict but 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
17
found that Attorney Gilbert had a reasonable belief that her 
representation would not be affected by the fact that her 
expenditure of the client’s funds for his health care and other 
needs would reduce the amount available for payment of her fees. 
Notwithstanding that reasonable belief, the referee questioned 
the 
client’s 
ability, 
based 
on 
his 
limited 
educational 
background, to comprehend the intricacies of the legal issues 
involved and the circumstances surrounding his execution of the 
agreement.  
¶34 As discipline for the professional misconduct she 
determined to have been established in this proceeding, the 
referee recommended that Attorney Gilbert’s license to practice 
law be suspended for three years, rejecting the Board’s position 
that license revocation is warranted. The referee explicitly 
based her recommendation on the egregious nature of Attorney 
Gilbert’s misconduct, particularly in light of the fact that her 
client was “a vulnerable elderly man with many health problems 
and limited mental ability,” Attorney Gilbert’s failure to 
express remorse for the way she handled her client’s assets, and 
the need to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system 
from any repetition of such misconduct by Attorney Gilbert or 
any other attorney. The referee’s recommendation took into 
account as mitigating factors that Attorney Gilbert has not 
previously been disciplined for professional misconduct, enjoys 
a reputation for good character, and cooperated with the Board 
in the disciplinary proceeding. At the same time, the referee 
considered as aggravating factors the absence of evidence that 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
18
Attorney Gilbert made a timely, good faith effort to make 
restitution or rectify the consequences of her misconduct, the 
presence of dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation 
throughout her dealings with the client, and the absence of any 
evidence of her rehabilitation or remorse for her conduct in 
representing that client.  
¶35 In addition to the license suspension, the referee 
recommended 
that 
Attorney 
Gilbert 
be 
required 
to 
make 
restitution to the client in the amount of $84,800 for the 
excessive and unreasonable fees she paid herself. On the basis 
of the testimony of the Board’s expert witness at a separate 
hearing held on the issue of restitution, the referee determined 
that a reasonable fee for Attorney Gilbert’s services as 
attorney, the social worker tasks she performed, her paralegal 
services, running errands for the client -- what the referee 
termed “fetching” services, and her bookkeeping services is 
$27,200. The referee recommended further that Attorney Gilbert 
be required to pay interest on the restitution at the legal rate 
from the date her fees were collected to a date to be determined 
by the court. In that respect, the referee observed that the 
client has been deprived of the use of his funds and Attorney 
Gilbert has had them at her disposal since August 1993.  
¶36 In this appeal, Attorney Gilbert contended that there 
was not clear and satisfactory evidence to support the referee’s 
conclusions that she engaged in professional misconduct in 
representing her client. We find no merit to that contention in 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
19
respect to any of the eight specific conclusions of professional 
misconduct the referee reached.  
¶37 First, contrary to Attorney Gilbert’s assertion that 
the 
referee’s 
conclusion 
in 
respect 
to 
her 
having 
made 
misrepresentations and rendered fraudulent billings for her 
services was based on only two instances, one involving the 
referee’s apparent misreading of a numeral set forth on one of 
the billing statements and the other in respect to her having 
had the client approve fee statements while he was hospitalized, 
the 
referee 
explicitly 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Gilbert 
made 
misrepresentations in her billings regarding meetings with the 
client that did not occur and that her billings contained 
duplicative entries. While the referee may have erred in 
deciphering one of Attorney Gilbert’s handwritten entries, there 
is ample evidence in the record to support the referee’s finding 
in respect to the misrepresentations in the billings submitted 
to the client. Moreover, the referee found not credible Attorney 
Gilbert’s testimony that errors contained in the revision of her 
billing for March-April 1993 to include a category of “out-of-
office” services had been made by a clerical person in her 
office whom she was unable to name. Also not credible to the 
referee was Attorney Gilbert’s testimony contradicting the 
documentary evidence that showed her client having signed a 
billing statement on a date he was hospitalized.  
¶38 Second, concerning her use of the $3000 cashier’s 
check to purchase a television for her family, Attorney Gilbert 
acknowledged 
that 
she 
did 
not 
immediately 
volunteer 
the 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
20
information during the Board’s investigation that she had used 
the check for that purpose. Her assertions that she eventually 
admitted to having done so and that by the end of the 
investigation the Board knew she had and that her failure to 
have made the admission timely was the result of emotional 
stress are insufficient to render improper the referee’s 
conclusion that she engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation in the matter. The record establishes that 
Attorney 
Gilbert 
made 
misrepresentations 
to 
the 
client’s 
successor attorney regarding her use of the cashier’s check, 
first asserting that she had purchased a large screen television 
for the client and then stating that the client probably signed 
for delivery of the television but she was unable to remember 
the matter.  
¶39 Even when she accounted for that check, Attorney 
Gilbert did so by labeling it an “unused money order,” when in 
fact it was a cashier’s check that she indeed used to purchase 
the 
television. 
The 
referee 
properly 
concluded 
that 
notwithstanding evidence of unidentified simultaneous $3000 
credit and debit entries in the checkbook register of her client 
trust account and a handwritten notation on a copy of the 
cashier’s check of a $3000 credit to the trust account, the 
client had no way of knowing what Attorney Gilbert was doing 
with his money. In that respect, the referee stated:  
 
Ms. Gilbert’s explanation of the way she handled the 
$3000 credit was so convoluted that investigators, 
trained lawyers, and members of the various committees 
who heard this matter prior to the final hearing, were 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
21
perplexed by the labyrinth which she had created. How 
then could [the client], with his limited mental 
ability, understand where his $3000 ended up? All he 
could do was rely upon Jill Gilbert’s professional 
knowledge and conduct. He did so to his detriment.  
¶40 Third, the referee properly concluded that Attorney 
Gilbert 
engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation by giving the Board the videotape that 
purported to show her client’s execution of the case management 
agreement. 
Attorney 
Gilbert 
contended 
that 
she 
made 
no 
representations to the Board or to its investigator concerning 
her purpose in delivering that videotape but merely offered it 
because she was required to disclose fully and fairly all facts 
to the Board during its investigation, and the videotape was 
information that was to be disclosed. That argument ignores the 
fact that the videotape itself was deceptive in that it 
purported to show the client’s execution of the agreement when 
in fact he had signed it prior to the videotaping, a fact 
Attorney Gilbert sought to prevent the videotape from showing. 
Regardless of Attorney Gilbert’s representations regarding it, 
the tape was not what it was intended and designed to be –- a 
memorialization of the client’s execution of the agreement 
following Attorney Gilbert’s explanation of its terms. Attorney 
Gilbert was aware of its deceptive content when she gave the 
Board the tape but did not inform the Board of it.  
¶41 Attorney Gilbert next argued that the referee erred 
when she failed to consider all of the factors listed in the 
rule of conduct, SCR 20:1.5(a),7 to be considered in determining 
                     
7  SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part: Fees  
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
22
the reasonableness of a lawyer’s fee. She contended that her 
“technical knowledge and professional insight” in developing a 
strategy to make her client eligible for government assistance 
to remain in his home, coupled with what she termed the “novel 
and complex” issues involved in his representation, rendered her 
fees reasonable. She further argued that the referee should have 
addressed the likelihood that her acceptance of the client’s 
representation would preclude her other employment, the fees 
customarily charged by persons practicing elder law in the 
Milwaukee area at the same time, the client’s insistence that 
she be available 24 hours per day, seven days per week, and the 
                                                                  
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include 
the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal service properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer 
or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
23
substantial financial gain her client would have realized if he 
had been found eligible for the assistance she was seeking to 
obtain for him.  
¶42 Notwithstanding the testimony of the Board’s expert 
that similar case management services were available in the 
Milwaukee area at a rate of $65 to $95 per hour and personal 
services at $10 per hour, it is Attorney Gilbert’s contention 
that the referee improperly concluded that billing her client 
$125 per hour for case management and personal services was 
excessive. She insisted that her client understood the nature of 
the services she was providing and the basis of the fee she was 
charging, as evidenced by the fact that he reviewed all of her 
bills before they were paid. She contended further that it was 
not unreasonable for her to charge lawyer rates for nonlawyer 
services, a contention supported by the testimony of her expert 
witnesses -- an attorney from Oklahoma experienced in elder law 
and a Wisconsin attorney experienced in lawyer ethics. In 
respect to the “fetching services” she performed for the client, 
Attorney Gilbert asserted that for the most part they were 
merely incidental to her performance of other services or in 
some cases were provided on an emergency basis.  
¶43 Regarding the fee she charged her client for the time 
spent consulting an ethics expert about the proposed case 
management agreement, Attorney Gilbert contended that she had 
done so to obtain advice on how to proceed with a specific   
agreement to benefit her client, not, as the referee concluded, 
to ascertain whether the terms of the agreement might constitute 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
24
professional impropriety on her own part. She did not address 
the fact that she did not have the client pay the fee of that 
expert but paid it from her own funds.  
¶44 The referee was presented with opposing views of the 
expert witnesses: the Board’s expert, an attorney with 20 years 
of elder law practice experience in Wisconsin, testified that 
Attorney Gilbert’s fees were unreasonable and grossly excessive; 
Attorney Gilbert’s expert, an Oklahoma attorney unfamiliar with 
the government assistance program Attorney Gilbert was pursuing 
for her client, testified that those fees were reasonable. 
Assessing that testimony, the referee gave more weight to that 
of the Board’s expert. In addition to his unfamiliarity with the 
government program that would have kept Attorney Gilbert’s 
client in his home, assuming he were eligible and following the 
two-year waiting period, Attorney Gilbert’s expert was unable to 
state whether Attorney Gilbert’s plan to qualify her client for 
that program was an appropriate one. It was for the referee to 
determine the amount of weight to give to the conflicting 
testimony of the experts, and Attorney Gilbert has not shown 
that the referee’s determination was erroneous.  
¶45 Concerning the charge to her client for the time she 
spent consulting with the ethics attorney, the referee properly 
concluded that the primary purpose of that consultation was not 
to obtain assistance in creating a plan that would render her 
client eligible for assistance but to ensure that her plan to 
have her client transfer all of his funds to her own account 
would not raise questions of her own ethical propriety. 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
25
Accordingly, while it was proper to use her own funds to pay for 
the advice of the ethics expert, it was improper to charge the 
client for the time she spent in consultation with him.  
¶46 Attorney 
Gilbert 
next 
argued 
that 
the 
referee 
improperly concluded that she failed to act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in managing her client’s affairs by 
allowing his checking account to become overdrawn and by failing 
to deposit a Medicare payment to his bank account. She asserted 
that 
the 
overdrawn 
status 
of 
the 
checking 
account 
was 
unintentional -- the result of her having used the client’s 
debit card to make purchases for him in the mistaken belief that 
it was a credit card. She claimed that the client suffered no 
harm by the error, for when she explained the situation to the 
bank, it refunded the charges for the overdrafts. As to the 
failure to deposit the Medicare check, while acknowledging that 
it was a mistake on her part, she insisted that it was an 
isolated instance and insufficient to support the referee’s 
conclusion that she failed to act promptly on her client’s 
behalf. There, too, she insisted that her failure to deposit the 
check did not result in any harm to the client, ignoring the 
fact that the client was deprived of the use of that money, as 
well as any interest it might have earned.  
¶47 The referee also properly concluded that Attorney 
Gilbert did not keep her client reasonably informed of the 
status of his financial situation and explain the provisions of 
the proposed case management agreement in such a way that he 
would be able to make informed decisions regarding the work she 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
26
was doing on his behalf. We find unpersuasive Attorney Gilbert’s 
arguments that the numerous billing statements she submitted to 
him for his “signature of approval” demonstrated that she had 
numerous discussions with him concerning his finances, that 
errors in one of her letters to him concerning deposits to and 
withdrawals from her trust account had no economic consequence 
to him or involved substantial sums of money, and that she had 
written her client a lengthy letter explaining the basis for the 
case management agreement, conferred with him about it, and left 
copies with him for his review prior to executing it. The 
referee found Attorney Gilbert’s system of financial management 
complex and confusing, such that even the referee and counsel 
for the parties had difficulty understanding the documents she 
prepared purporting to show how funds were allocated among and 
distributed from several accounts. The referee found further 
that the client, who was aged and confused, was not given 
comprehendible 
documentation 
regarding 
the 
status 
of 
his 
accounts. In respect to the case management agreement, the 
referee found on the basis of the videotape that Attorney 
Gilbert did not explain its complex provisions to her client but 
merely read or summarized them hurriedly and amid chaotic 
surroundings.  
¶48 Regarding her deposit into a client trust account 
$24,000 she claimed was fees she had earned prior to the 
execution of the case management agreement and her subsequent 
withdrawal of funds from that account as fees while a dispute 
existed regarding the services she had rendered to her client, 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
27
Attorney Gilbert argued that the referee’s conclusions that she 
thereby violated the trust account rules are contradictory. 
First, she claimed that the $24,000 had been fully earned but 
that she was uncertain of its status because her client’s 
illness delayed the execution of the case management agreement 
and her rate of compensation was not determined. Second, she 
contended that when she withdrew $10,800 from that account for 
fees she claimed to have earned prior to the execution of the 
agreement, no fee dispute existed. In the latter regard, she 
asserted that the grievance her client filed against her with 
the Board did not specify that it included a dispute over fees.  
¶49 Those arguments have no merit. The referee properly 
concluded that Attorney Gilbert commingled her own funds with 
those of her client when she deposited money she claimed to have 
earned for services already rendered into the account she 
maintained for the deposit of client funds and subsequently took 
almost half of that deposit in four separate withdrawals over 
the eight months following her client’s termination of her 
services, knowing there was a dispute concerning her handling of 
the client’s funds as well as the fees she had charged him for 
her services. The client’s successor attorney testified that 
Attorney Gilbert told her shortly after being terminated by her 
client that there was a dispute involving her handling of his 
funds.  
¶50 We turn now to the issue of restitution. Attorney 
Gilbert argued that restitution is not appropriate because the 
value of her services was the subject of substantial dispute and 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
28
because her former client can pursue his remedies elsewhere, 
presumably by filing an action in circuit court. We note here 
that at the close of the restitution phase of the disciplinary 
hearing, the referee urged the parties to come to an agreement 
on a reasonable fee for Attorney Gilbert’s services to the 
client, but they were unable to do so.  
¶51 Attorney Gilbert also asserted that the opinion of the 
Board’s expert witness, on which the referee relied for her 
recommendation, 
is 
an 
insufficient 
basis 
for 
ordering 
restitution. She contended that the expert’s opinions were based 
on unestablished assumptions as to the nature and quality of the 
work she performed for the client. Contrary to Attorney 
Gilbert’s assertion that the expert gave her opinion on the 
value of her services without having reviewed Attorney Gilbert’s 
fee statements, the record shows that the expert testified that 
she had reviewed those fee statements prior to her testimony at 
the misconduct stage of the disciplinary hearing and that she 
based her opinion regarding the value of Attorney Gilbert’s 
services on the breakdown of services Attorney Gilbert herself 
prepared in anticipation of the restitution phase of the 
proceeding.  
¶52 Attorney Gilbert argued that the $27,200 the referee 
determined was a reasonable fee for the work she did for her 
client is “grossly inadequate” to compensate her for the 
services 
she 
performed 
at 
the 
client’s 
request 
and 
is 
unsupported by any fair view of the evidence. Based on 
additional legal services that she contended the Board’s expert 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
29
should have included in arriving at her opinion and on the value 
of case management services to which the social worker she 
called testified, Attorney Gilbert asserted that she was 
entitled to $113,612 -– some $1600 more than she paid herself 
from the client’s funds.  
¶53 Attorney Gilbert also argued that, contrary to the 
referee’s recommendation, she should not be required to pay 
interest on any restitution that she might be required to pay. 
In that respect, she urged the court to adopt a test based on 
liquidated versus unliquidated damages and award interest only 
if damages resulting from an attorney’s misconduct were a fixed 
and determined amount, one the attorney could have given to the 
client 
immediately, 
thereby 
preventing 
any 
interest 
from 
accruing. Pursuant to that test, Attorney Gilbert contended, she 
should not be required to pay interest because the amount of any 
excessive 
fees 
had 
not 
been 
determined 
nor 
was 
readily 
determinable when the client terminated her representation.  
¶54 We find no merit to any of Attorney Gilbert’s 
contentions in respect to the issue of restitution and decline 
to adopt the interest test she proposed. The Board’s expert 
employed three methods to arrive at an opinion of what a 
reasonable fee would have been for the work Attorney Gilbert did 
for her client. Using those three methods, the expert opined 
that the value of Attorney Gilbert’s services was $7140, 
$27,200, and in the range of $2700 to $5000. The referee chose 
the method that produced the valuation of $27,200, and it has 
not been shown nor does it appear to be unreasonable. Moreover, 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
30
at the restitution hearing Attorney Gilbert offered no testimony 
of an elder law attorney regarding the reasonableness of her 
fees, although she had presented expert testimony at the earlier 
phase 
of 
the 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
in 
respect 
to 
the 
misconduct allegations. As to the other witnesses she produced, 
the ethics expert admitted having no experience in the practice 
of elder law, and the testimony of a medical social worker and 
of a certified public accountant was based on Attorney Gilbert’s 
billing 
statements, 
uncorroborated 
information, 
and 
misrepresentations Attorney Gilbert had made to them regarding 
the validity and reliability of her time records. It was proper, 
then, for the referee to rely on the unrefuted testimony of the 
Board’s expert witness.  
¶55 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
referee’s 
conclusions 
regarding Attorney Gilbert’s professional misconduct and the 
valuation of her services were properly drawn from the facts of 
record, we adopt those conclusions and the findings on which 
they are based. In most instances, the referee based those 
conclusions on her assessment of the credibility of the 
witnesses, consistently finding Attorney Gilbert’s testimony not 
to be credible in light of other testimony and documentary 
evidence. In other respects, those conclusions were based on the 
referee’s assessment of the relative weight of conflicting 
expert testimony, as to which the referee enunciated the bases 
on which she accepted the testimony of the Board’s expert and 
rejected that of Attorney Gilbert’s. While Attorney Gilbert 
correctly identified two instances in which the referee’s 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
31
factual findings were erroneous –- mistaking the numeral “6” for 
a “1” on one line of one billing statement and describing the 
assisted living arrangement in which the client most recently 
resided as government-assisted -- those errors are not of 
sufficient significance to render the referee’s conclusions 
improper.  
¶56 In determining the discipline to impose on Attorney 
Gilbert, we first consider the circumstances surrounding her 
misconduct. Here, over a period of less than six months 
representing a single client, Attorney Gilbert paid herself 
$112,000 for services she claimed to have provided during that 
time. Notwithstanding Attorney Gilbert’s assertions that her 
client was manipulative and had falsely represented to the 
investigator after filing a grievance against her that some of 
his signatures on the fee statements were not his and that he 
had not received several of the items she claimed to have 
purchased for him, the referee found the client to be “a 
vulnerable elderly man with many health problems and limited 
mental ability” who at times was confused. We also note the 
referee’s concern with Attorney Gilbert’s apparent lack of 
remorse for the harm she caused the client, despite her 
insistence that she had expressed remorse for what she termed 
“mistakes and errors of judgment.”  
¶57 In the disciplinary proceeding before the referee, the 
Board took the position that the egregious nature of Attorney 
Gilbert’s professional misconduct in respect to a physically and 
mentally frail client warranted the revocation of her license to 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
32
practice law. Rather than revocation, the referee recommended a 
three-year license suspension, which Attorney Gilbert contended 
is excessive. She asserted that the referee failed to give 
sufficient weight to several mitigating factors: her good 
character and reputation, the pro bono work she has performed, 
her cooperation in the Board’s investigation in this matter, the 
fact that she has not been disciplined in the past, and the fact 
that she sought ethical advice during the course of her 
representation of the client.  
¶58 Having 
considered 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
Attorney 
Gilbert’s 
professional 
misconduct, 
including 
the 
greatly excessive fees she was paying herself from her client’s 
funds, 
the 
rate 
at 
which 
she 
was 
charging 
him 
for 
nonprofessional services, the client’s vulnerability owing to 
his mental and physical condition, and Attorney Gilbert’s 
repeated resort to misleading statements and misrepresentations 
concerning what she had done for the client and with his funds, 
we 
determine 
that 
a 
two-year 
license 
suspension 
is 
the 
appropriate discipline to impose. That determination takes into 
account the mitigating factors of Attorney Gilbert’s good 
character and reputation and the fact that she has not been the 
subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding.  
¶59 By misstated and fraudulent billings, mismanagement of 
client funds under her control, mishandling of the client’s 
financial affairs, providing the Board with a videotape that 
itself was deceptive in what it purported to depict, and 
depositing into her client trust account funds she claimed she 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
33
was entitled to as fees and then withdrawing them after the 
client had terminated her services and filed a grievance against 
her, Attorney Gilbert has shown a willingness to place her 
financial interests above the welfare of a client and has 
established a pattern of deception to keep her professional 
misconduct from being discovered. The suspension we impose is 
intended not only to impress upon Attorney Gilbert the gravity 
of her professional misconduct but also to put other attorneys 
on notice of the degree of seriousness with which this court 
views conduct of this nature. The public, especially the 
elderly, the mentally impaired, and the vulnerable, need and 
deserve to be protected from those who would use their 
professional position to reward themselves unjustly at the 
expense of their clients.  
¶60 In addition to the suspension, we require Attorney 
Gilbert to make restitution to the client harmed by her 
misconduct as recommended by the referee, plus interest at the 
legal rate from the date on which her client terminated her 
representation. As the referee noted, the client has been 
deprived of the use of those funds, and Attorney Gilbert has had 
them at her disposal since August 1993.  
¶61 Finally, we address Attorney Gilbert’s objection to 
being required to pay in full the costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding. She urged the court to prorate those costs on the 
basis of the Board’s failure to establish by clear and 
satisfactory evidence four of the twelve counts of misconduct it 
had alleged in its complaint. As we have done in prior cases, we 
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
34
decline the invitation to reduce the costs to be assessed 
against an attorney in proportion to the number of misconduct 
allegations established. We also reject Attorney Gilbert’s 
argument that she should not be assessed the costs incurred for 
the evidentiary hearing on the restitution issue because she 
considered it the result of the Board’s untimely amendment of 
its pleadings to request restitution after discovery had been 
substantially completed. There is no merit to her assertion that 
the expenses incurred by the Board in dealing with the 
restitution issue greatly exceeded what it would have incurred 
had the issue of restitution been part of the original 
complaint. Attorney Gilbert’s additional objection regarding a 
witness fee she claimed was grossly excessive is also rejected.  
¶62 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Jill S. Gilbert to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 
years, effective August 16, 1999. 
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Jill S. Gilbert make restitution as set forth in 
this opinion.  
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Jill S. Gilbert pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility 
the costs 
of this 
proceeding, 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time 
specified and absent a showing to this court of her inability to 
pay the costs within that time, the license of Jill S. Gilbert 
to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until 
further order of the court.  
No. 
95-3561-D 
 
35
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jill S. Gilbert comply with 
the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
¶66 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate.  
95-3561-D.wab 
 
1 
¶67 WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J. 
(concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).   I agree with the majority opinion in all 
respects save one.  
¶68 The referee concluded that Attorney Gilbert engaged in 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation “by offering 
(the Board) a videotape” that purported to show her client’s 
execution of the case management agreement.  The referee’s 
characterization that Ms. Gilbert somehow intended to mislead 
the Board by giving them the tape ignores the fact that she was 
required to do so.  There is no indication in this record that 
had she not been required to do so, she would have provided it 
anyway.   
¶69 The majority recognizes this fact, but then asserts 
that the tape was not what it was intended and designed to be—a 
memorialization of the client’s execution of the agreement.  
That may or may not be, but those are not the facts this alleged 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) is based upon.  
¶70 The majority further justifies its approval by stating 
that in any event Ms. Gilbert did not inform the Board of its 
deceptive content.  It is so utterly clear from witnessing the 
tape that the client had already signed it that it can scarcely 
be said that she should have informed the Board of this fact.  
She should be under no obligation to inform the Board of the 
obvious.   
¶71 Accordingly, 
I 
would 
not 
adopt 
the 
referee’s 
conclusion with respect only to the above matter.   
95-3561-D.wab 
 
1