Title: Kiribati Seafood Co., LLC v. Dechert LLP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12287
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2017

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SJC-12287 
 
KIRIBATI SEAFOOD COMPANY, LLC, & another1  vs.  DECHERT LLP. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2017. - October 11, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, 
& Cypher, JJ.2 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Malpractice, Negligence.  Negligence, Attorney 
at law, Proximate cause.  Proximate Cause.  Damages, 
Mitigation. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 1, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Megan C. Deluhery (John R. Neeleman, of Washington, also 
present) for Kiribati Seafood Company, LLC. 
 
Denis M. King (Richard M. Zielinski also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Olympic Packer, LLC. 
 
 
2 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
 
 
2 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue on appeal is whether, in a legal 
malpractice action, a court's error of law constitutes a 
superseding cause that bars recovery to the plaintiff client 
even where the defendant attorney was negligent for failing to 
prevent or mitigate the legal error.  The plaintiff, Kiribati 
Seafood Company, LLC (Kiribati), brought a legal malpractice 
claim against its former law firm, Dechert LLP (Dechert).  
Kiribati alleged that Dechert negligently failed to provide a 
French appellate court with the evidence the court deemed 
necessary for Kiribati to prevail on a claim, which resulted in 
the court's denial of the claim.  A judge of the Superior Court 
granted summary judgment to Dechert and denied partial summary 
judgment to Kiribati.  The judge determined that the French 
appellate court committed an error of law in requiring this 
evidence and that, even if Dechert were negligent in failing to 
provide the evidence to the court, Kiribati could not recover 
damages for Dechert's negligence because the court's legal error 
was a superseding cause of the adverse decision.  We conclude 
that an error of law under these circumstances is a concurrent, 
not a superseding, proximate cause and that the judge therefore 
erred in granting summary judgment to Dechert and denying 
partial summary judgment to Kiribati. 
 
Background.  Because this is an appeal from an allowance of 
summary judgment, we set forth the undisputed material facts.  
 
 
3 
Kiribati purchased a fishing vessel known as the Madee (ship), 
and chartered it to Olympic Packer, LLC, and Dojin Co., Ltd., 
for the purpose of fishing for tuna in the Pacific Ocean.3  After 
sustaining damage to its rudder, the ship was placed in a dry 
dock in the Autonomous Port of Papeete (port) in Tahiti to 
undergo repairs.  When the dry dock collapsed, the ship 
sustained damages so severe that it was deemed a "constructive 
total loss" by Kiribati's "port risk" insurer, Certain 
Underwriters of Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's).  Kiribati retained 
two attorneys in the Paris office of the law firm Coudert 
Brothers LLP (Coudert) to file a lawsuit for damages against the 
port in the Commercial Court of Papeete (commercial court).  
When these two attorneys left Coudert to join Dechert, Kiribati 
continued to retain them and transferred the representation to 
Dechert. 
 
Lloyd's paid Kiribati $1,763,803.71 on its insurance claim 
regarding the loss of the ship, which compensated Kiribati for 
some, but not all, of its losses.  As a result of its payment, 
Lloyd's had a right of subrogation to recover that amount from 
the port.  In April, 2004, Lloyd's and Kiribati entered into a 
written agreement jointly to prosecute Kiribati's litigation in 
                     
3 Kiribati Seafood Company, LLC, and Olympic Packer, LLC, 
are limited liability companies organized in the State of 
Washington.  Dechert LLP is a law firm organized as a limited 
liability partnership that is registered in Pennsylvania but has 
offices around the world, including in Boston. 
 
 
4 
the commercial court, where Kiribati sought to recover its 
losses that were not compensated by Lloyd's, and where Lloyd's 
sought to recover through subrogation the amount it paid to 
Kiribati.  As part of the agreement, Lloyd's agreed to pay half 
of the attorney's fees and costs associated with this 
litigation. 
The agreement between Kiribati and Lloyd's jointly to 
prosecute the suit against the port did not end Kiribati's 
financial disputes with Lloyd's.  Kiribati contended that it was 
paying substantially more than its fifty per cent share of the 
legal fees in the litigation and that Lloyd's was failing to pay 
its equal share.  Kiribati also claimed that Lloyd's had failed 
to pay it in full for the "sue and labor" and mitigation 
expenses it was entitled to under its policy.  To settle these 
and other disputes, in December, 2004, Kiribati and Lloyd's 
entered into a new agreement in which Kiribati released Lloyd's 
from all outstanding claims, including its claims for unpaid 
attorney's fees and "sue and labor" and mitigation expenses.  In 
return, Lloyd's assigned its subrogation claim to Kiribati. 
 
In January, 2008, the commercial court issued a judgment in 
favor of Kiribati and against the port.  As part of the 
judgment, the court found that the assignment of the subrogation 
claim was "signed abroad" by "two foreign registered entities" 
without any specific agreement that French law would apply, so 
 
 
5 
the validity of the assignment could not be determined under 
French law.  The court concluded that it was "valid" under 
"foreign law," and therefore awarded Kiribati the full amount of 
the subrogation claim assigned to it by Lloyd's -- approximately 
$1.76 million.  The port appealed from the decision to the Court 
of Appeals of Papeete (court of appeals). 
 
Tahitian courts are part of the French legal system.  A 
judgment by the commercial court may be appealed from as of 
right to the court of appeals, which will review the decision de 
novo and consider new evidence offered by the parties to 
supplement the record.  A decision by the court of appeals is 
appealable from as of right to the Cour de cassation in Paris, 
which is the French Supreme Court, but that court will review 
decisions only for errors of law. 
 
In its first appellate decision, issued in April, 2010, the 
court of appeals affirmed much of the judgment of the commercial 
court, but it deferred decision regarding its enforcement of the 
assignment of the subrogation claim.  It did not challenge the 
validity of the assignment under foreign law but noted that the 
"enforceability" of the assignment in a French court of law 
against a French defendant must be determined according to 
French law, which forbids "double compensation of the same 
damages."  Where the port claimed that Kiribati was seeking "a 
double compensation for the damages and accordingly an unjust 
 
 
6 
enrichment," the court of appeals decided to defer any decision 
regarding this claim for compensation to allow Kiribati to prove 
the amount paid in consideration for the assignment by showing 
the "actual price of the transfer." 
 
After the first appellate decision, a Dechert attorney, 
Xavier Nyssen, advised Dennis Moran, an attorney in another law 
firm who was acting essentially as Kiribati's general counsel, 
that he needed evidence of the consideration paid by Kiribati 
for the assignment to address the court of appeals's concern 
about double compensation.  Moran on two separate occasions 
provided various documents to Dechert, including (1) a 2004 
letter from Moran to Lloyd's counsel demanding payment of 
Lloyd's equal share of Coudert's legal fees, with attached 
payment records that demonstrated that Kiribati had paid far 
more of the attorney's fees than did Lloyd's despite the 
provision in the settlement agreement that payment of the fees 
be shared equally; (2) the December, 2004, agreement between 
Kiribati and Lloyd's that included a release by Kiribati of all 
further claims on its Lloyd's policy; (3) correspondence 
identifying the various claims against Lloyd's that Kiribati had 
released; and (4) an unsworn written statement by a Lloyd's 
representative that declared that "[t]he subrogation rights were 
assigned for valuable consideration, the amount of which is 
privileged." 
 
 
7 
 
In support of its brief, Dechert submitted to the court of 
appeals as evidence only the 2004 letter from Moran, without any 
of the supporting documentation regarding legal fees, and the 
unsworn written statement by the Lloyd's representative, without 
the policyholder's release or the correspondence identifying the 
released claims.  After the port in its response noted that 
Kiribati had provided no proof of having paid attorney's fees 
that Lloyd's was obligated to pay, another Kiribati attorney 
(who was not associated with Dechert) caused Nyssen again to be 
sent the documents that Moran had earlier provided and informed 
Nyssen that he needed to submit the attorney's fee payment 
records and the policyholder release in order to demonstrate the 
payment of consideration for the assignment.  Dechert did not 
further supplement the record by providing these documents to 
the court of appeals. 
 
In May, 2011, the court of appeals in its final decision 
reduced the amount of Kiribati's award by the amount of the 
assigned subrogated claim because Kiribati had failed to meet 
its burden to provide evidence of the "financial compensation" 
it paid for the assignment, explaining that "double recovery for 
the same damage must be avoided."  The court specifically noted 
that Kiribati had failed to provide any evidence that it had 
paid attorney's fees that Lloyd's was obligated to pay, or that 
it had released Lloyd's from legal claims that Kiribati 
 
 
8 
otherwise could have brought in a court of law. 
 
In June, 2011, Kiribati was in receivership, so Nyssen sent 
an electronic mail message to its receiver informing him that 
the court of appeals decision could be challenged before the 
Cour de cassation, but only as to errors of law.  Nyssen wrote, 
"As for Kiribati's subrogation interest acquired from . . . 
Lloyd's, there may be grounds to call into question its 
decision, although we would need the opinion of a lawyer 
registered with the Cour de cassation to take [a] position."  
Nyssen wrote that he "would not recommend challenging the 
decision" because of the cost and duration of the appeal, which 
he estimated at one to two years, and because an appeal by 
Kiribati may cause the defendants to challenge the entirety of 
the court of appeals ruling, which might result in a suspension 
of its enforcement.  The receiver later filed in the 
receivership action a motion for authorization to waive an 
appeal in the Tahiti litigation, attaching to his declaration a 
letter from an attorney for Kiribati stating that "Kiribati's 
shareholders will follow Dechert's advice and not appeal the 
Tahiti litigation outcome."  The court approved the receiver's 
request for authorization to waive the appeal. 
 
In July, 2013, Kiribati commenced this action in the 
Superior Court of Massachusetts against Dechert, alleging, among 
other claims, that Dechert was professionally negligent in its 
 
 
9 
prosecution of the assigned subrogation claim because it failed 
to present evidence the court of appeals had requested and that 
Dechert had in its possession, resulting in a loss to Kiribati 
of approximately $1.76 million.4  Dechert moved for summary 
judgment as to all of the remaining claims; Kiribati cross-moved 
for partial summary judgment on its legal malpractice claim. 
In support of their motions, both parties submitted 
affidavits from their respective chosen experts on issues of 
French law.  Dechert moved to strike the affidavit submitted by 
Kiribati's expert, claiming that it failed to show that his 
education, training, and experience qualifies him to provide 
expert testimony on any aspect of French law.  The motion judge 
granted the motion, finding that Kiribati's expert had "never 
practiced as a lawyer in France . . . and [did] not identif[y] 
any other education, training, experience, or familiarity in or 
with the topics he addresses in his expert reports."  Kiribati 
did not challenge the qualifications of Dechert's expert, a 
practicing French lawyer, and the judge credited portions of the 
affidavit he submitted in support of Dechert's motion regarding 
the content of French law. 
 
In granting Dechert's motion for summary judgment, the 
judge noted that the content of foreign law is a question of law 
to be decided by the court.  He determined that the court of 
                     
4 None of Kiribati's other claims is at issue on appeal. 
 
 
10 
appeals had committed judicial error under French law in 
disallowing recovery of the $1.76 million assigned subrogation 
claim for lack of proof that it was not an impermissible double 
recovery.  The judge also determined that, regardless of whether 
Dechert was negligent in its handling of the appeal and 
regardless of whether the court's error of law was foreseeable, 
Dechert could not be found liable because the error of law by 
the court of appeals underlying the resulting adverse ruling was 
"a superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation flowing 
from [Dechert's alleged negligence]" and "that relieves Dechert 
of any negligence in its representation of Kiribati before that 
court."5  Kiribati appealed, and we transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  Our review of a motion judge's decision on 
summary judgment is de novo, because we examine the same record 
and decide the same questions of law.  See Global NAPs, Inc. v. 
Awiszus, 457 Mass. 489, 499 n.16 (2010); Leavitt v. Mizner, 404 
Mass. 81, 88 (1989); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 
Mass. 1404 (2002). 
 
The central issue in this case is the relationship between 
                     
5 In a separate order, the judge granted Dechert's motion 
for costs as the prevailing party, and awarded $76,130.13 to 
compensate Dechert for the cost of obtaining deposition 
transcripts and "accurate English translations of key documents 
in [the] case" and for its attorney's travel to three 
depositions. 
 
 
11 
attorney malpractice and judicial error, more specifically, the 
circumstances under which an attorney should be relieved of 
liability for professional negligence where the attorney's 
negligent act or omission precedes judicial error. 
 
Attorneys who enter into attorney-client relationships owe 
their clients "an obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of 
care and skill in the performance of [their] legal duties."  
Global NAPs, Inc., 457 Mass. at 500, quoting Pongonis v. Saab, 
396 Mass. 1005, 1005 (1985).  "To prevail on a claim of 
negligence by an attorney, a client must demonstrate that the 
attorney failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
handling the matter for which the attorney was retained . . . ; 
that the client has incurred a loss; and that the attorney's 
negligence is the proximate cause of the loss . . . ."  Global 
NAPs, Inc., supra, quoting Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, 
Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111 (1985).  
"Expert testimony is generally necessary to establish that an 
attorney failed to meet the standard of care owed in the 
particular circumstances."  Global NAPs, Inc., supra, citing 
Pongonis, supra.  But "such testimony is not essential where 
'the claimed malpractice is so gross or obvious that laymen can 
rely on their common knowledge to recognize or infer 
negligence,' or where an attorney disobeys the lawful 
instructions of his client and a loss ensues for which the 
 
 
12 
attorney is responsible."  Global NAPs, Inc., supra, quoting 
Pongonis, supra. 
 
As to the element of proximate cause, a client must 
demonstrate that it "probably would have obtained a better 
result had the attorney exercised adequate skill and care."  
Global NAPs, Inc., 457 Mass. at 500, quoting Fishman v. Brooks, 
396 Mass. 643, 647 (1986).  Generally, the question of what the 
probable outcome would have been had the attorney acted 
reasonably is determined by a "trial within a trial," in which a 
new trier of fact decides both whether the attorney was 
negligent and what the outcome of the litigation would have been 
in the absence of negligence.  Fishman, supra.  The new trier of 
fact does not attempt subjectively to determine what the earlier 
trier of fact would have done; neither the judge nor the jurors 
at the earlier trial may testify at the new trial as to what 
they would have done under different circumstances.  See id. 
(jury evaluate consequences of attorney negligence objectively).  
Rather, the new trier of fact makes an independent determination 
as to what reasonably would have been the outcome of the earlier 
trial in the absence of negligence, based on the applicable law 
and the evidence presented at the new trial.  See 4 R.E. Mallen, 
Legal Malpractice § 33:8, at 677 (2017 ed.), citing Cecala v. 
Newman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1136 (D. Ariz. 2007) (trier of 
fact determines "what the result 'should have been'"); Justice 
 
 
13 
v. Carter, 972 F.2d 951, 956–957 (8th Cir. 1992); Phillips v. 
Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 418 (1986); Lombardo v. Huysentruyt, 91 
Cal. App. 4th 656, 670-671 (2001); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 
433, 441 (Utah 1996). 
 
Proximate cause in an attorney malpractice case is more 
complicated where the defendant attorney contends that the 
adverse outcome was the product of the court's legal error.  
Judges, being human, sometimes err as to the law.  
"Theoretically, it is always foreseeable that a judge might err 
in some manner; however, it is not typically foreseeable on what 
issues a judge will err and on what issues a judge will rule 
correctly."  Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 100 (Tex. 
2016).  Where an attorney makes a reasonable and correct 
argument of law and loses because of judicial error that was not 
foreseeable, the attorney cannot be found negligent for failing 
to prevent or mitigate that legal error.  See Correia v. Fagan, 
452 Mass. 120, 127 (2008) (liability for professional negligence 
dependent on showing loss was "reasonably foreseeable" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
But where the judicial error is foreseeable, such as where 
a judge or an appellate court has indicated an intention to rule 
in a manner that the attorney believes to be an error of law, 
then an attorney has an obligation to take reasonable and 
prudent steps to prevent or mitigate that error.  See Skinner v. 
 
 
14 
Stone, Raskin & Israel, 724 F.2d 264, 265-266 (2d Cir. 1983); 
Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 100.  Where the legal error will 
certainly doom the client's case, the attorney has few options 
but to provide additional argument or briefing in an attempt to 
demonstrate to the court the error of its foreseeable ruling of 
law.  But where the client can still prevail on the facts even 
if the court errs as to the law, the attorney is negligent where 
he or she fails to take reasonable steps to demonstrate to the 
court why the client still wins under the court's erroneous, but 
foreseeable, view of the law.  For instance, where a judge in a 
medical malpractice case has provided counsel with the 
instruction the judge intends to give to the jury regarding a 
physician's duty to obtain a patient's informed consent for a 
medical procedure, and where the physician's attorney fails to 
persuade the judge that the instruction is an error of law 
because it overstates a physician's duty, and where the 
physician has evidence in his or her possession that would prove 
that the physician complied with the duty erroneously described 
by the judge, the physician's attorney would be negligent if he 
or she failed to offer that evidence at trial.  Stated simply, 
where an attorney will foreseeably lose on the law but can still 
win on the facts, an attorney is negligent if he or she forgoes 
the opportunity to win on the facts.  See, e.g., Skinner, supra 
(summary judgment for attorneys reversed in legal malpractice 
 
 
15 
action where attorneys knew of impending judicial error and 
failed to take preemptive steps); Lombardo, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 
667-668 (client subjected to "unnecessary risk" where there was 
"abundant evidence" that attorney could have foreseen judicial 
error and failed to take "all reasonable steps" to mitigate 
impact); Temple Hoyne Buell Found. v. Holland & Hart, 851 P.2d 
192, 198–199 (Colo. App. 1992) (obligation to anticipate 
"reasonably foreseeable risks" includes taking reasonably 
objective steps to avoid impact of foreseeable legal error).6 
 
To be clear, this does not suggest that an attorney has an 
obligation under the duty of reasonable care to argue an error 
of law.  But where a court has indicated that it has a different 
view of the law from that of the attorney, and where the client 
can prevail on the facts even under that different view, an 
attorney is negligent if he or she forfeits that opportunity by 
failing to argue in the alternative. 
 
Dechert contends that, where a court rules against a client 
based on a foreseeable error of law, the client's attorney 
                     
 
6 The adage penned by Carl Sandburg, attributed to "a 
battered barrister," comes to mind:  "If the law is against you, 
talk about the evidence . . . .  If the evidence is against you, 
talk about the law . . . .  [A]nd . . . if the law and the 
evidence are both against you, then pound on the table and yell 
like hell."  C. Sandburg, The People, Yes, in The Complete Poems 
of Carl Sandburg 551 (1969).  We discourage attorneys from 
following the advice in the third sentence, but an attorney may 
be negligent if he or she fails to follow the advice in the 
first two sentences. 
 
 
16 
cannot be liable for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent 
or mitigate the consequences of that error by offering evidence 
that would enable the client to prevail even under the court's 
erroneous view of the law, because in such circumstances a 
court's legal error will always be the proximate cause of the 
adverse judicial decision.  It claims that, in the trial within 
a trial that occurs in a legal malpractice case, the new trier 
of fact must apply the correct law, and the judge's error of 
law, not the attorney's negligence, will always be revealed as 
the proximate cause of the adverse result.  In the context of 
this case, Dechert argues that a new, reasonable trier of fact, 
correctly applying French law, must conclude that Kiribati 
should have prevailed without proof of the consideration paid 
for the assignment, and therefore any negligence in failing to 
provide that proof cannot be the proximate cause of the lost 
$1.76 million. 
 
The fundamental flaw in this argument is that a plaintiff's 
loss need not have only one proximate cause; there can be 
multiple concurrent proximate causes.  See, e.g., Mullins v. 
Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 58, 62-63 (1983) (injury to 
rape victim caused both by assailant and by college's negligent 
security); Skinner, 724 F.2d at 266 ("there [can be] several 
proximate or efficient causes of an injury"); Stanfield, 494 
S.W.3d at 97 (same).  See also Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 
 
 
17 
1, 30 (2008) ("'substantial contributing factor' test is useful 
in cases in which damage has multiple causes").  Assuming for 
the sake of argument that the court of appeals truly made an 
error of law, a reasonable finder of fact would conclude that 
there were two independent proximate causes of Kiribati's loss:  
Dechert's negligence in failing to furnish the court with proof 
of the consideration paid for the assignment, and the court's 
error of law in concluding that the assigned subrogation claim 
was not enforceable under French law absent a demonstration that 
it would not result in "double compensation." 
 
 Nor is this flaw cured in the circumstances of this case 
by characterizing the judicial error as the superseding cause.  
A superseding cause in legal malpractice "(1) must have occurred 
after the original negligence; (2) cannot [be] the consequence 
of the attorney's negligence; (3) created a result that would 
not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and 
(4) was not reasonably foreseeable."  1 R.E. Mallen, Legal 
Malpractice § 8:25, at 1049 (2017 ed.).  Where the intervening 
cause meets all four criteria, the intervening cause is a new 
and independent cause that breaks the chain of causation, 
becoming a superseding cause that relieves the defendant of 
liability for the original negligence.  See Kent v. 
Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 321 (2002) (intervening event that 
is "superseding cause of the harm" breaks chain of factual 
 
 
18 
causation); Mullins, 389 Mass. at 62 (superseding cause severs 
chain of proximate causation); Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 97 
(superseding cause is new and independent cause that intervenes 
between original wrong and final injury and "thus destroys any 
causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the 
plaintiff's harm, precluding the plaintiff from establishing the 
defendant's negligence as a proximate cause").  But where the 
intervening cause (here, the court's alleged error of law) is 
reasonably foreseeable and the attorney could have taken 
reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the anticipated harm, 
the intervening cause is a "concurring cause" that leaves the 
causal link between the defendant's negligence and the 
plaintiff's harm unbroken.  See Mullins, supra at 62-63 
(criminal act of third party is not superseding cause that 
excuses negligent security precautions "if such act was, or 
should have been, foreseen"); Stanfield, supra at 100 ("if the 
judicial error alleged to have been a new and independent cause 
is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's alleged 
negligence, the error is a concurring cause as opposed to a new 
and independent, or superseding, cause").  Because an attorney's 
failure to prevent or mitigate an error of law can be negligent 
only where it is foreseeable that the court would commit the 
error, and because an intervening cause cannot be a superseding 
cause where the error was foreseeable, a judicial error cannot 
 
 
19 
be a superseding cause where an attorney is negligent for 
failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the 
judicial error or resulting harm. 
 
Therefore, in determining proximate cause in a legal 
malpractice action where there is an alleged error of law, the 
trier of fact in the "trial within a trial" must determine 
whether the court that foreseeably made the error of law would 
nonetheless have ruled in the client's favor had the attorney 
taken reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the error of law.  
The standard remains objective, not subjective; the trier of 
fact is not attempting to predict what the judge or judges who 
made the error of law would have done, but is making its own 
determination whether an attorney's reasonable efforts would 
probably have prevented or mitigated the error such that the 
client would have prevailed.  In the context of this case, where 
the court of appeals ruled against Kiribati because Dechert 
failed to submit the evidence it had been furnished that would 
have proved Kiribati's disproportionate payment of attorney's 
fees and its release of valuable claims against Lloyd's, 
Dechert's failure to provide the court with this evidence may be 
found to be the concurrent proximate cause of the court's 
adverse decision.  The judge therefore erred in ruling that 
Kiribati cannot prevail in proving the element of causation. 
 
Because the judge rested his allowance of Dechert's motion 
 
 
20 
for summary judgment on his finding of superseding causation, 
the judge did not reach the issue of negligence.  Inasmuch as 
our review is de novo and Kiribati moved for summary judgment on 
that issue, we do reach it.  Where it is undisputed that the 
court of appeals deferred its decision regarding the assigned 
subrogation claim to allow Kiribati to prove the amount paid in 
consideration for the assignment by showing the "actual price of 
the transfer," and where it was plainly foreseeable from its 
first appellate decision that it would not enforce the 
assignment without such proof, and where Dechert had the 
documentation in its possession that would have demonstrated 
that there was substantial consideration for the assignment, we 
conclude that Dechert's failure to furnish the court of appeals 
with the documentation was so plainly negligent that no expert 
testimony is needed to establish it.7  To prevail on its assigned 
subrogation claim, Kiribati needed the French court both to 
declare the assignment of the subrogation claim valid as a 
matter of law and to enforce it.  It was perfectly reasonable 
                     
 
7 We reach this conclusion regardless of whether French or 
Massachusetts law supplies the applicable standard of care.  
Both Dechert's expert, whose testimony the judge credited with 
respect to applicable principles of French law, and Kiribati's 
expert submitted affidavits in which they concluded that French 
lawyers have an obligation to act with reasonable diligence on 
behalf of their clients, a duty similar to that required under 
Massachusetts law.  See Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005, 1005 
(1985) ("An attorney owes his client an obligation to exercise a 
reasonable degree of care and skill . . ."). 
 
 
21 
for Dechert to argue that enforcement under French law follows 
inevitably from validity, and that it need not prove that 
Kiribati paid substantial consideration for the assignment.  But 
where Dechert possessed the documentation that would have 
enabled Kiribati to prevail on its assigned subrogation claim 
even if the court of appeals concluded that proof of 
consideration was needed to avoid "a double compensation for the 
damages and accordingly an unjust enrichment," it was plainly 
unreasonable for Dechert to fail to argue in the alternative and 
provide the court with this documentation.  Dechert may have 
believed that the court of appeals was wrong as a matter of law, 
but Dechert could have enabled Kiribati to win on its claim even 
if the court of appeals persisted in requiring what Dechert 
contended was an unnecessary factual showing to justify 
enforcement.  In short, Dechert may reasonably have believed 
that the question was solely one of law and not of fact, but 
where it had in its possession the evidence that would have 
enabled Kiribati to demonstrate that Kiribati would not be 
unjustly enriched if the court were to enforce the assignment, 
Dechert's failure to provide the court with that evidence was 
unreasonable. 
 
We have considered and rejected Dechert's contention that 
it was barred by a confidentiality provision in the second 
settlement agreement from providing the agreement to the court 
 
 
22 
of appeals without Lloyd's approval, which Lloyd's withheld.  We 
have examined the settlement agreement, which is a fully 
integrated agreement, and conclude that it contains no 
confidentiality provision that barred such disclosure to the 
court.  Rather, the agreement provides in paragraph twelve, 
"Underwriters shall execute the attached 'ASSIGNMENT OF 
SUBROGATION RIGHTS' that Kiribati may use to facilitate the 
transfer of interests in the Tahiti litigation without 
disclosing the full contents of this Agreement."  The fact that 
an assignment was attached to the agreement that did not 
disclose the full contents of the agreement cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as a confidentiality provision barring such 
disclosure.  Nor can paragraph seven of the settlement agreement 
reasonably be interpreted to bar disclosure of that agreement to 
the court of appeals.  The relevant part of that paragraph 
states, "The fact of this agreement shall not be admissible in 
the future for any purpose, except in an action to enforce this 
agreement or as necessary to implement its terms."  It was 
plainly necessary to disclose the "fact" of the agreement to the 
court of appeals "to implement its terms" where the failure to 
do so would foreseeably cause the court to decline to enforce 
the assignment of subrogation rights provided in that agreement.  
Moreover, it is undisputed that the settlement agreement had 
earlier been filed in a court proceeding in Seattle, Washington, 
 
 
23 
with Lloyd's knowledge. 
 
The scope of damages raises another issue that we address.  
A plaintiff in a negligence action has a duty to mitigate 
damages "that were avoidable by the use of reasonable 
precautions."  Burnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc., 387 Mass. 575, 
586 (1982).  Where a client suffers an adverse decision because 
of both an error of law and an attorney's negligence in failing 
to act reasonably to prevent or mitigate that error, the 
client's duty to mitigate damages might in some circumstances 
require appealing from that adverse decision to a higher court 
to correct the lower court's error of law.  In such cases, the 
loss to the client caused by the attorney's negligence would be 
only the attorney's fees and costs incurred in prosecuting an 
appeal that would not have been necessary had the attorney acted 
with reasonable care.  The defendant, however, bears the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
failed to fulfil the duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate 
damages.  See Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & 
Employees of Suffolk County, 465 Mass. 584, 592 (2013) (in 
wrongful discharge action, employer bears burden of proof on 
issue of mitigation of damages); American Mech. Corp. v. Union 
Mach. Co. of Lynn, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 103 (1985) ("[T]he 
burden of proving that losses could have been avoided by 
reasonable effort rests with the party in breach").  Here, where 
 
 
24 
Dechert recommended against an appeal to the Cour de cassation, 
Dechert cannot possibly meet its burden of proving that Kiribati 
acted unreasonably by failing to appeal from the court of 
appeals decision.  Therefore, the loss proximately caused by 
Dechert's negligence is the loss arising from the adverse ruling 
of the court of appeals on the assigned subrogation claim. 
 
As a result of this analysis, we need not decide whether 
the judge abused his discretion in striking the affidavit of 
Kiribati's expert on French law.  That expert affidavit is not 
necessary to find that Dechert was negligent where its 
negligence was "obvious," or to find that its negligence was a 
concurrent proximate cause of Kiribati's loss.  See Global NAPs, 
Inc., 457 Mass. at 500, quoting Pongonis, 396 Mass. at 1005.  
Nor is it necessary to decide whether the court of appeals was 
correct in its understanding of French law regarding the 
assignment of subrogation claims, because Kiribati prevails on 
its legal malpractice claim regardless of whether the court of 
appeals was in error.  And we need not determine whether an 
appeal to the Cour de cassation would have resulted in the 
mitigation of damages by the reversal of the court of appeals 
ruling, because Dechert cannot meet its burden of proving that 
Kiribati failed reasonably to mitigate damages by deciding not 
to appeal. 
 
Conclusion.  We reverse the judge's allowance of Dechert's 
 
 
25 
motion for summary judgment and his denial of Kiribati's motion 
for partial summary judgment on its legal malpractice claim, and 
remand the case to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.