Title: State v. Patty E. Jorgensen
Citation: 2003 WI 105
Docket Number: 2001AP002690-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2003

2003 WI 105 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2690-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Patty E. Jorgensen,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 1047, 650 N.W.2d 322 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 18, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven D. Ebert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Charles Bennett Vetzner, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 105 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2690-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CT 1250) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Patty E. Jorgensen,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of an unpublished 
court of appeals decision, State v. Jorgensen, No. 01-2690-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 27, 2002),1 in which the 
court of appeals affirmed a judgment of conviction and order 
denying a postconviction motion entered by the Dane County 
Circuit Court, Steven D. Ebert, Judge.  The defendant, Patty 
Jorgensen, contends that the court of appeals erred in affirming 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (1999-2000), this 
case was decided by one judge at the court of appeals, rather 
than a three judge panel.   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
2 
 
her conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, 
fourth offense, and the denial of her postconviction motion.  
She now seeks relief from this court on the ground that the 
sentencing guidelines established by the Fifth Judicial District 
for certain "operating while intoxicated" offenses under the 
authority of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a), are unconstitutional.  
Jorgensen claims the circuit court violated her rights to due 
process and equal protection of the laws by relying upon the 
local guidelines authorized by § 346.65(2m)(a).  She asserts the 
guidelines operate to increase disparity in sentencing based 
only on the geographic location of the offense.  Jorgensen 
further claims that the guidelines relied upon by the court 
exceed 
the 
authority 
granted 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
§ 346.65(2m)(a) and that the guidelines, on their face, are 
inapplicable to her. 
¶2 
We hold that the sentencing guidelines established by 
the 
Fifth 
Judicial 
District 
are 
authorized 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a).  We further conclude that under the 
plain language of § 346.65(2m)(a), the sentencing guidelines 
apply 
only 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b), 
not 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), under which Jorgensen was sentenced.  
However, 
because 
circuit 
courts 
have 
a 
great 
amount 
of 
sentencing discretion, we find that reference to the sentencing 
guidelines in a § 346.63(1)(a) case does not constitute error.  
That being the case, a defendant such as Jorgensen sentenced 
under § 346.63(1)(a) may potentially be sentenced by a court 
referring 
to 
the 
sentencing 
guidelines 
established 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
3 
 
for § 346.63(1)(b).  Therefore, we must address Jorgensen's 
argument that these guidelines are unconstitutional.  We agree 
with the court of appeals' conclusion that the sentencing 
guidelines are constitutional and, accordingly, we affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are 
not in dispute.  In the early morning hours of May 21, 1999, a 
witness found Jorgensen in her vehicle in a ditch near his home 
and summoned police.  Responding officers found Jorgensen asleep 
in the driver's seat of her vehicle.  Jorgensen failed field 
sobriety tests administered by the police, and she was arrested 
for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.  Subsequent blood 
testing showed that Jorgensen's blood alcohol content was .276. 
¶4 
Jorgensen 
was 
charged 
with 
violating 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b).2  She 
utilized her right to a jury trial.  She stipulated to many of 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle 
while: 
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a 
controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or 
any 
combination 
of 
an 
intoxicant, 
a 
controlled 
substance and a controlled substance analog, under the 
influence of any other drug to a degree which renders 
him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the 
combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug 
to a degree which renders him or her incapable of 
safely driving; or 
(b) 
The 
person 
has 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration. 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
4 
 
the facts and the only issue remaining for jury determination 
was whether or not Jorgensen was the person operating the 
vehicle.  At trial, Jorgensen claimed that another person was 
driving.   
¶5 
A jury found Jorgensen guilty of operating a vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and of operating a motor vehicle while 
having a prohibited blood alcohol concentration (PAC) in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b), either of which would 
constitute her fourth "operating under the influence" offense. 
¶6 
Section 
346.63(1)(c) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
provides that although a defendant may be charged and prosecuted 
for both OWI and PAC, violations of §§ 346.63(1)(a) and (b), 
respectively, a defendant may not be "convicted" and sentenced 
for both OWI and PAC if the charges arise out of the same 
incident or occurrence.  Rather, "[i]f the person is found 
guilty of both pars. (a) and (b) for acts arising out of the 
same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction 
for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting 
convictions 
under 
ss. 
343.30(1q) 
and 
343.305."  
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c).  Jorgensen's judgment of conviction 
was entered on the OWI count, § 346.63(1)(a).   
¶7 
The 
sentencing 
guidelines 
at 
issue, 
the 
"Fifth 
Judicial District OWI Sentencing Guidelines," were established 
by the Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial District under the 
authority 
granted 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a).3  For a fourth offense such as the 
one here, the guidelines are provided in a table format and 
include 
factors 
to 
consider 
and 
corresponding 
sentencing 
recommendations.  The horizontal headings on the table are:  
"BAC Levels," "Minimum Driving No Accident," and "Aggravated 
Driving Accident or Injury Bad Driving Record."  The specific 
guideline relevant to sentencing in this case provided that for 
a fourth offense, a defendant with a blood alcohol content level 
of .20 or above faces periods of incarceration with ranges of 60 
to 150 days and 90 days to one year, depending upon the court's 
determination of the specific circumstances surrounding the 
offense. 
¶8 
At 
sentencing 
on 
September 
7, 
2000, 
both 
the 
prosecutor and defense counsel made arguments based on these 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) provides: 
In imposing a sentence under sub. (2) for a 
violation of s. 346.63(1)(b) or (5) or a local 
ordinance in conformity therewith, the court shall 
review the record and consider the aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the matter.  If the level of the 
person's blood alcohol level is known, the court shall 
consider that level as a factor in sentencing.  The 
chief judge of each judicial administrative district 
shall 
adopt guidelines, 
under the 
chief 
judge's 
authority to adopt local rules under SCR 70.34, for 
the 
consideration 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors. 
(Emphasis added.)  We note that the defendant argues that the 
guidelines established by the Fifth Judicial District exceed the 
authority granted by this statute. 
 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
6 
 
sentencing guidelines.  Explicitly noting guideline factors, the 
State requested an eight- to nine-month sentence.  Defense 
counsel did not dispute application of the guidelines at the 
time. 
 
Rather, 
Jorgensen's 
counsel 
noted 
the 
guideline 
provisions and argued that a three-month sentence was more 
appropriate under the circumstances.  After hearing these 
arguments, 
the 
circuit 
court, 
explicitly 
referencing 
the 
sentencing guidelines, sentenced Jorgensen to seven months in 
jail. 
¶9 
Jorgensen filed a motion for postconviction relief on 
several grounds, including the issue now before this court, 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
relied 
upon 
local 
sentencing guidelines because § 346.65(2m)(a), the authorizing 
statute, is unconstitutional.  The circuit court denied the 
motion. 
¶10 Jorgensen 
appealed 
from 
both 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction and the order denying her motion for postconviction 
relief.  She again claimed that the sentencing guidelines relied 
upon by the circuit court were unconstitutional.4  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court, holding that the circuit 
court did not violate Jorgensen's due process and equal 
protection rights by using the local sentencing guidelines.  On 
October 21, 2002, this court accepted Jorgensen's petition for 
review.   
                                                 
4 Jorgensen also appealed the circuit court's ruling on the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, but that issue has 
not been raised as part of this appeal and is, therefore, not 
addressed. 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
7 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 The question before this court is whether the circuit 
court erred in using the Fifth Judicial District sentencing 
guidelines to sentence Jorgensen.  We review the circuit court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
sentencing 
Jorgensen. 
 
More 
specifically, we look at the legal bases for the circuit court's 
sentencing determination. 
¶12 Sentencing falls within the discretionary authority of 
the circuit court.  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971); State v. Eckola, 2001 WI App 295, ¶4, 249 
Wis. 2d 276, 638 N.W.2d 903.  This court has held that it "will 
not interfere with the circuit court's sentencing decision 
unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion."  
State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 418-19, 576 N.W.2d 912 
(1998); see also Eckola, 249 Wis. 2d 276, ¶4.  The circuit court 
erroneously 
exercises 
its 
discretion 
if 
the 
exercise 
of 
discretion is based on an error of law.  State v. Davis, 2001 WI 
136, ¶28, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 62; State v. Hutnik, 39 
Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 (1968). 
¶13 In 
reviewing 
the 
circuit 
court's 
sentencing 
determination 
in 
this 
case, 
we 
must 
also 
interpret 
the 
provisions of § 346.65(2m)(a).  Statutory interpretation is 
reviewed de novo.  Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 76, 
¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 36, 645 N.W.2d 880.  The first step in 
statutory interpretation is to look at language of the statute.  
Id., ¶16.   
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
8 
 
¶14 If we find that the sentencing guidelines established 
by the Fifth Judicial District do not exceed the authority 
granted by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a), the 
analysis must focus on the constitutionality of that statute.  
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which 
this court reviews de novo.  State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 
129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989); Employers Health Ins. Co. v. Tesmer, 
161 Wis. 2d 733, 737, 469 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1991).  Statutes 
are 
presumed 
constitutional, 
and 
the 
party 
bringing 
the 
constitutional challenge bears the burden of proving the statute 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d at 129 (internal citation omitted); Stanhope v. Brown 
County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 837, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979); State v. 
Hanson, 182 Wis. 2d 481, 485, 513 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Employers Health, 161 Wis. 2d at 737.  If there is no suspect 
classification or fundamental right involved, "'it is the 
court's obligation to locate or to construct, if possible, a 
rationale that might have influenced the legislature and that 
reasonably upholds the legislative determination.'" Tomczak v. 
Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 264, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) (internal 
citation omitted); McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 129 ("'If the court 
can conceive any facts on which the legislation could reasonably 
be based, it must hold the legislation constitutional.'") 
(quoting State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 
506, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)); see also Employers Health, 161 
Wis. 2d at 737-38 ("'If there is any reasonable basis upon which 
the legislation may constitutionally rest, the court must assume 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
9 
 
that the legislature had [that] fact in mind [when it passed the 
act].'") (internal citation omitted) (brackets in original). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 This case centers around the constitutionality of 
sentencing 
guidelines 
promulgated 
under 
the 
authority 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a). 
 
Jorgensen 
argues 
that 
these 
guidelines violate her state and federal constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection of the law because they 
increase sentencing disparity on the basis of the geographic 
location of the alleged offense.  Jorgensen also raises two 
related preliminary issues.  She argues that the guidelines 
established by the Fifth Judicial District exceed the authority 
granted 
through 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) 
and 
that 
the 
guidelines, on their face, are not applicable to her case.  We 
address these issues first.    Because we conclude that the 
guidelines were authorized under § 346.65(2m)(a), that reference 
to the guidelines was not error, and that there is a rational 
basis for the guidelines, we affirm the court of appeals' 
decision.  Finally, Jorgensen asserts that even if we find the 
sentencing guidelines constitutional, we should utilize our 
supervisory powers to abrogate use of the guidelines.  We 
decline to do so. 
A.  Statutory Authority 
¶16 Jorgensen 
argues 
that 
the 
sentencing 
guidelines 
established by the Fifth Judicial District exceed the authority 
granted by the legislature in § 346.65(2m)(a).  She argues that 
the legislature did not mandate creation of guidelines with 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
10 
 
recommendations of specific sentences or sentencing ranges.  She 
points to the language of § 346.65(2m)(a), which states, in 
pertinent 
part: 
 
"The 
chief 
judge 
of 
each 
judicial 
administrative district shall adopt guidelines . . . for the 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors."  Jorgensen 
suggests that the legislature did not intend for the districts 
to go beyond creating a list of appropriate aggravating and 
mitigating factors for consideration.  
¶17 The 
State, 
on 
the 
other 
hand, 
suggests 
that § 346.65(2m)(a) merely sets a minimum upon which the chief 
judges of various judicial districts have expounded by adding a 
link 
to 
an 
appropriate 
sentence. 
 
We 
agree 
with 
this 
perspective.  We see nothing in the language that prohibits the 
districts from linking the aggravating and mitigating factors 
with an appropriate sentence within the broader range of 
sentences 
allowed 
under § 346.65. 
 
Section 
346.65(2m)(a) 
mandates that chief judges set up guidelines based on their 
authority under SCR 70.34 (2000).  This rule provides that 
"[e]ach chief judge may adopt additional local rules not in 
conflict with the uniform judicial administrative rules."  SCR 
70.34.  The legislature authorized and required chief judges to 
set 
up 
guidelines 
for 
consideration 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating factors.  As far as we can discern, there is nothing 
to prevent the chief judges from taking an extra step to link 
these factors with appropriate sentence ranges.   
¶18 This court has found that "when the legislature has 
granted the sentencing court the authority to impose sentences 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
11 
 
within a certain range, the legislature has given the court 
discretion to determine where in that range a sentence should 
fall."  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 418, 565 N.W.2d 506 
(1997) (citation omitted).  That is essentially what the chief 
judges have done here.  They have created guidelines that match 
up 
appropriate 
sentences 
within 
the 
statutory 
ranges 
to 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  We do not find this 
inappropriate. 
B.  Applicability of the Guidelines 
¶19 The parties' briefs to this court raise the issue that 
Jorgensen was sentenced under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), not 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b).  It appears that this issue was not 
raised before either the circuit court or the court of appeals.  
Instead, the record indicates that all parties appeared to rely 
upon the applicability of the guidelines until the appeal to 
this court.  Jorgensen now attempts to use the argument to 
emphasize her point that application of these guidelines to her 
was inappropriate.  Arguably, she has waived any complaint about 
the application of the wrong statute to her case.  Nonetheless, 
we find it appropriate to discuss the issue because the State 
agrees that Jorgensen was sentenced under the wrong section of 
the statute and asserts that the error deprives Jorgensen of 
standing to argue the unconstitutionality of the guidelines.   
¶20 The State asserts that Jorgensen lacks standing to 
raise a constitutional challenge to the sentencing guidelines 
because the guidelines are inapplicable to the section under 
which she was sentenced.  The State acknowledges that the judge 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
12 
 
relied upon the guidelines, but suggests that only a person 
sentenced 
under 
the 
relevant 
section 
mentioned 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a)——Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)——has 
standing to make a constitutional challenge.  The State argues 
that Jorgensen could, at best, claim that the court's reliance 
upon the guidelines was an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶21 We do not agree with the State's argument on standing.  
In Mast v. Olsen, 89 Wis. 2d 12, 16, 278 N.W.2d 205 (1979), this 
court held:  "A party has standing to challenge a statute if 
that statute causes that party injury in fact and the party has 
a personal stake in the outcome of the action."  We find that if 
the circuit court relied upon the local sentencing guidelines, 
then Jorgensen has arguably been injured and assuredly has a 
personal 
stake 
in 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
guidelines 
are 
constitutional.   
¶22 One of the reasons for the rule of standing is that 
courts 
"should 
not 
adjudicate 
constitutional 
rights 
unnecessarily."  State v. Fisher, 211 Wis. 2d 665, 668 n.2, 565 
N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Mast, 89 Wis. 2d at 16).  In 
Schwittay v. Sheboygan Falls Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 WI App 
140, ¶16 n.3, 246 Wis. 2d 385, 630 N.W.2d 772, the court of 
appeals found that requiring standing also "assures that [the 
court does] not decide a constitutional issue unless it is 
essential to the determination of the case before [it]."  Here, 
the State has conceded that it was not necessarily inappropriate 
for the circuit court to refer to the sentencing guidelines.  
Circuit courts are allowed wide discretion in sentencing.  See 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
13 
 
State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 129, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990); 
Anderson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 361, 363, 251 N.W.2d 768 (1977); 
Eckola, 249 Wis. 2d 276, ¶4.  This court has found that the 
circuit courts are in the best position to consider the factors 
relevant to sentencing.  See Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 418.  We 
agree with the State that a circuit court's reference to the 
sentencing guidelines is not necessarily inappropriate, but we 
cannot agree that Jorgensen is deprived of standing on the 
constitutional 
issue 
because 
she 
was 
sentenced 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).   
¶23 Essentially, the issue of whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in this case may be 
determined by two considerations:  (1) whether the judge 
actually 
relied 
upon 
the 
local 
guidelines 
in 
sentencing 
Jorgensen; and (2) if the judge relied upon the guidelines, 
whether it was error for the judge to do so.  
¶24 The parties do not dispute the circuit court's 
reliance upon the sentencing guidelines.5  We find the record 
                                                 
5 Jorgensen argues, as she must, that the circuit court 
relied upon the guidelines.  If the circuit court did not rely 
upon the guidelines for sentencing, Jorgensen would clearly lack 
standing to make a constitutional claim, because there would be 
no injury.  See Mast v. Olsen, 89 Wis. 2d 12, 16, 278 N.W.2d 205 
(1979); Schwittay v. Sheboygan Falls Mutual Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
App 140, ¶16 n.3, 246 Wis. 2d 385, 630 N.W.2d 722.  The State 
argues that Jorgensen does not have standing, but on the basis 
that the circuit court sentenced Jorgensen under the wrong 
statute, not on the basis that the circuit court did not rely on 
the guidelines.   
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
14 
 
indicates that the circuit court did, in fact, rely, at least to 
some extent, upon the Fifth Judicial District guidelines in 
sentencing Jorgensen.  As noted, both parties made their 
sentencing arguments based on the guidelines.  The circuit court 
then followed suit, noting at the outset of its sentencing 
determination that "everybody apparently has the guidelines in 
front of them, so we all know what the Fifth Judicial District 
does consider as being an appropriate range of sentencing 
penalties for this type of an offense."  The court then went on 
to note that Jorgensen's blood alcohol level meant that the 
relevant section was the highest level in the guideline table.  
As noted by the circuit court in its postconviction order, 
however, it did consider other relevant factors in addition to 
the range of penalties set out by the guidelines, including 
blood alcohol level, prior convictions for operating under the 
influence, and the fact that there was an accident.  The circuit 
court indicated that its sentence was based upon the appropriate 
factors laid out by this court in McCleary:  the gravity of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and protection of the 
public.  See McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276; State v. Harris, 119 
Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984) (noting the McCleary 
"primary" factors and listing other additional factors). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Apparently, the parties disputed reliance at the court of 
appeals level, and the court of appeals did not make a 
determination regarding whether the circuit court relied upon 
the guidelines.  Rather, the court of appeals stated that it 
would assume the circuit court relied upon the guidelines in 
order to reach the constitutional issue.   
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
15 
 
¶25 Our second consideration is whether reliance upon the 
guidelines was inappropriate under the relevant statutes.  We 
have established that the circuit court relied, at least to some 
degree, upon the provisions of the guidelines.    Section 
346.65(2m)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes authorized the creation 
of sentencing guidelines for certain offenses.  That section 
provides, in its entirety:   
In imposing a sentence under sub. (2) for a 
violation of s. 346.63(1)(b) or (5) or a local 
ordinance in conformity therewith, the court shall 
review the record and consider the aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the matter.  If the level of the 
person's blood alcohol level is known, the court shall 
consider that level as a factor in sentencing.  The 
chief judge of each judicial administrative district 
shall 
adopt guidelines, 
under the 
chief 
judge's 
authority to adopt local rules under SCR 70.34, for 
the 
consideration 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) (emphasis added).  The plain language 
of the statute makes clear that the sentencing guidelines are 
only applicable to convictions under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) 
or Wis. Stat. § 346.63(5).   
¶26 The record here shows that Jorgensen was not sentenced 
under either § 346.63(1)(b) or Wis. Stat. § 346.64(5).  She was 
sentenced under § 346.63(1)(a).  Neither party has disputed that 
issue and, in fact, both relied upon it in making their 
arguments to this court.  It is true that Jorgensen was charged 
with 
and 
found 
guilty 
by 
a 
jury 
of 
violating 
both 
§§ 346.63(1)(a) and (1)(b).  Nevertheless, under the provisions 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c), Jorgensen could only be convicted 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
16 
 
and sentenced under one of these subsections.  The circuit court 
sentenced her under § 346.63(1)(a).   
¶27 Since the legislature specified that guidelines were 
to be established for use in sentencing under § 346.63(1)(b), 
not 
§ 346.63(1)(a), 
circuit 
courts 
should 
not 
apply 
the 
guidelines by rote to (1)(a) convictions.6  We agree that in 
exercising its broad discretion in the area of sentencing, a 
court may refer to the sentencing guidelines for PAC offenses in 
sentencing a defendant convicted of OWI.  These violations are 
similar and one cannot argue that the factors relevant to one 
offense are not a relevant consideration in sentencing for the 
other.  As this court has noted:  "Wisconsin has a strong public 
policy that the sentencing court be provided with all relevant 
information."  State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 592, 480 
N.W.2d 446 (1992).  Although this policy typically comes up in 
the context of information about the defendant, we believe it 
applies with equal force to relevant law.  Thus, it is not error 
for a circuit court to refer to the guidelines authorized 
under § 346.65(2m)(a) 
when 
sentencing 
a 
defendant 
under § 346.63(1)(a).  However, because the legislature has 
specifically delineated the offense to which the guidelines 
                                                 
6 In addition, we note that these are discretionary, not 
mandatory, guidelines.  State v. Smart, 2002 WI App 240, ¶15, 
257 Wis. 2d 713, 652 N.W.2d 429 ("The guidelines are not 
mandatory, and a court may disregard them if it so chooses.").  
Thus, 
even 
if 
sentencing 
a 
defendant 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b), 
a 
circuit 
court 
may 
decide 
to 
disregard the sentencing guidelines. 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
17 
 
apply, it is inappropriate for a circuit court to simply apply 
the 
guidelines 
as 
the 
sole 
basis 
for 
its 
sentence 
in 
a § 346.63(1)(a) case.7 
C.  Equal Protection and Due Process 
¶28 We have found that the sentencing guidelines do not 
exceed 
the 
authority 
granted 
by 
the 
legislature 
in § 346.65(2m)(a) and that a circuit court may refer to the 
guidelines 
as 
a 
relevant 
factor 
in 
sentencing 
under § 346.63(1)(a).  These findings leave us with the issue of 
whether § 346.65(2m)(a) 
itself 
violates 
Jorgensen's 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the 
                                                 
7 We note that this circuit court's error may not be unique.  
In the appendix to her brief to this court, Jorgensen included 
copies of the related sentencing guidelines from Eighth, Fourth, 
and Fifth Judicial Districts.  All of these guidelines are 
entitled "OWI Sentencing Guidelines."  This is somewhat of a 
misnomer 
that 
we 
suggest 
should 
be 
clarified.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63 deals with many "operating under the 
influence" offenses.  Violations of subsection (1)(a) of that 
statute are often referred to as "OWI" offenses.  Subsection 
(1)(b), as clarified in this case, refers to violations for 
operating a vehicle while having a prohibited blood alcohol 
concentration, sometimes known as "PAC" violations.  Titling the 
guidelines 
"OWI 
Sentencing 
Guidelines" 
suggests 
that 
the 
guidelines refer to all the offenses under § 346.63 and none of 
the guidelines appear to include an explanation that the 
guidelines only apply to Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(b) and (5).  
Courts could even interpret the guidelines to apply only to 
offenses 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)——so-called 
OWI 
offenses.  This opinion is intended to clarify that these 
interpretations are incorrect.  The guidelines only apply to 
sentencing 
for convictions 
under 
§§ 346.63(1)(b) 
and 
(5), 
although we acknowledge that a court may refer to the guidelines 
as 
a 
relevant 
factor 
in 
sentencing 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a). 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
18 
 
laws under both the state and federal constitutions.8  "This 
court has held the due process and equal protection clauses of 
the Wisconsin Constitution are the substantial equivalents of 
their respective clauses in the federal constitution."  McManus, 
152 Wis. 2d at 130; see also Joseph E.G. v. State, 2001 WI App 
29, ¶5 n.4, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137 (2000). 
¶29 Jorgensen 
argues 
that 
the 
sentencing 
guidelines 
violate her constitutional rights because the various judicial 
districts have different guidelines and thus, defendants may 
receive different sentences based on where the crime was 
committed.  Jorgensen asserts that the location of an offense 
within a particular district is not a legitimate sentencing 
factor.  Jorgensen asserts that the guidelines are not entitled 
to a presumption of constitutionality because § 346.65(2m)(a) 
did not authorize the type of guidelines promulgated by the 
Fifth Judicial District.  In contrast, the State argues that 
because there is a rational basis for the sentencing guidelines—
                                                 
8 Article XIV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part: 
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . . 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
19 
 
that being a reduction in sentencing disparity within judicial 
districts——the guidelines are constitutional.   
¶30 We agree with the analysis employed by the court of 
appeals in this case and in the case of State v. Smart, 2002 WI 
App 240, 257 Wis. 2d 713, 652 N.W.2d 429, a nearly identical 
case.  In both cases, the constitutionality of the guidelines 
was upheld. 
¶31 Jorgensen does not argue that there is any suspect 
class or fundamental right involved here and appears to agree, 
as she did at the court of appeals, that a rational basis test 
is appropriate.  See Jorgensen, No. 01-2690-CR, unpublished slip 
op. at ¶30.  The United States Supreme Court, in Chapman v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1991), supports such an 
interpretation of the claims here.  Chapman held that a 
fundamental right is not involved in this context and that a 
rational basis test is appropriate: 
They [the defendants] argue preliminarily that the 
right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a 
result of arbitrary sentences is fundamental, and 
therefore the statutory provision at issue may be 
upheld only if the Government has a compelling 
interest in the classification in question.  But we 
have never subjected the criminal process to this sort 
of truncated analysis, and we decline to do so now.  
Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the 
sense that the Government may not punish him unless 
and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with 
the relevant constitutional guarantees.  But a person 
who has been so convicted is eligible for, and the 
court may impose, whatever punishment is authorized by 
statute for his offense, so long as that penalty is 
not cruel and unusual, and so long as the penalty is 
not based on an arbitrary distinction that would 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
20 
 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
In this context,  . . . an argument based on equal 
protection essentially duplicates an argument based on 
due process. 
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 464-65 (emphasis in original) (internal 
citations omitted).  This view was adopted by the court of 
appeals in Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶5.   
¶32 As indicated by Chapman, the analyses of the due 
process claims and equal protection claims are largely the same.  
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 464-65.  The court of appeals has laid out 
the test for both.  In Joseph E.G., 240 Wis. 2d 481, ¶8, the 
court of appeals held: 
When considering an equal protection challenge that 
does 
not 
involve 
a 
suspect 
or 
quasi-suspect 
classification, "the fundamental determination to be 
made . . . is 
whether 
there 
is 
an 
arbitrary 
discrimination in the statute . . . , and thus whether 
there is a rational basis which justifies a difference 
in rights afforded."   
(internal citations omitted); see also McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 
130-31.  So long as a statute creating a classification is 
"rationally related to a valid legislative objective," it does 
not violate the constitutional right to equal protection.  Id.  
¶33 Similarly, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
held 
that 
substantive due process serves to "protect[] people from state 
conduct that 'shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with 
rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  Smart, 257 
Wis. 2d 713, ¶11 (quoting Joseph E.G., 240 Wis. 2d 481, ¶13).  
The court there found that unless a fundamental right is 
implicated, "a statute will generally survive a substantial due 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
21 
 
process challenge if it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest."  Id. (citing McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131).   
¶34 We disagree with Jorgensen's argument that the statute 
is not entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.  We have 
already found that the sentencing guidelines do not exceed the 
authority granted in § 346.65(2m)(a).  Thus, the issue becomes 
the constitutionality of the statute itself.  It has been well-
settled that statutes are presumed constitutional and a party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove the 
statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 837 ("We begin with the principle 
repeatedly stated by this court and the United States Supreme 
Court 
that 
all 
legislative 
acts 
are 
presumed 
constitutional . . . ."); see also Milwaukee Brewers Baseball 
Club v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 98-99, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986).  
Consequently, we will apply a presumption of constitutionality 
in 
our 
examination 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) 
and 
the 
guidelines promulgated thereunder.  
¶35 Jorgensen asserts, as did the defendant in Smart, that 
this court's decision in Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 
92, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141, and the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), 
support her argument that the guidelines are unconstitutional.  
Like the court of appeals in both this case and Smart, we 
disagree.   
¶36 In the Nankin case, this court held unconstitutional a 
tax statute that applied differently to residents in counties 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
22 
 
with larger populations.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶46.  As noted 
by the court of appeals in Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶9, the 
Nankin case is distinguishable.  Unlike the statute in Nankin, 
which merely created a disparity based on population where none 
existed before, the statute here is remedial and serves the 
purpose of reducing disparity.  See Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶9.  
¶37 The United States Supreme Court decision in Bush is 
also distinguishable, as noted by the court of appeals in Smart, 
257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶10.  In Bush, 531 U.S. at 110, the United 
States Supreme Court prevented a recount of presidential ballots 
on the basis that different standards would be used across the 
state.  Further, as the Smart court pointed out, the Supreme 
Court arguably applied a higher level of scrutiny since "the 
right to vote for president of the United States, once conferred 
by a state, is a fundamental right."  Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, 
¶10. 
¶38 Jorgensen 
argues 
that 
the 
guidelines 
increase 
disparity, but as noted by the court of appeals, she has 
provided no evidence of such an effect.  Instead, she asserts 
that the court of appeals in Smart concedes the point, with its 
acknowledgement that the statute "creates different classes of 
people" that might be subject to different standards.  See 
Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶6.  We disagree with this assertion.  
In fact, as this court has recognized:  "Equal protection does 
not deny a state the power to treat persons within its 
jurisdiction 
differently; 
rather 
the 
state 
retains 
broad 
discretion 
to 
create 
classifications 
so 
long 
as 
the 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
23 
 
classifications 
have 
a 
reasonable 
basis." 
 
McManus, 
152 
Wis. 2d at 131.   
¶39 We agree that having different guidelines in the 
various judicial districts may lead to some disparity.  It is 
not a perfect solution to the sentencing disparity problem.  
However, under a rational basis test, it need not be a perfect 
solution.  It must only be a step in the right direction.  As 
noted by the court of appeals in Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶7: 
Smart argues the guideline scheme does not bear a 
rational relationship to the objective of reducing 
disparity and actually increases it by allowing each 
judicial district to develop their own standards.  
While we agree the statute may not be the best way to 
reduce drunk driving sentencing disparity, a rational 
basis inquiry does not require perfection.  Our only 
question 
is 
whether 
the 
statute 
bears 
some 
relationship to advancing that goal.  It does.  By 
mandating the creation of guidelines within judicial 
districts, the statute attempts to reduce sentencing 
disparity within those districts.  While statewide 
guidelines would perhaps be more equitable, there is 
no requirement the legislature choose the wisest or 
most effective means of reducing disparity. 
In addition, this court has held:  "The fact a statutory 
classification results in some inequity . . . does not provide 
sufficient grounds for invalidating a legislative enactment."  
McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131. 
¶40 Jorgensen does not challenge sentencing guidelines as 
a whole.  As this court acknowledged in State v. Speer, 176 
Wis. 2d 1101, 1124, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993), sentencing guidelines 
that allow "the exercise of judicial discretion while reducing 
variance by providing guideline sentences for similar offenders 
who commit similar offenses," are valid.  (Citation omitted.)  
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
24 
 
We disagree with Jorgensen that the sentencing guidelines 
established under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) do not fit that 
mold.  We agree with the court of appeals' statement in Smart 
that 
statewide 
guidelines 
might 
be 
better, 
but 
that 
acknowledgement is not the equivalent of a determination that 
district-by-district guidelines increase disparity.  Smart, 257 
Wis. 2d 713, ¶7.  Rather, we are persuaded, as was the court of 
appeals in both Smart and this case, that the district-by-
district sentencing guidelines at issue here in fact operate to 
reduce disparity within the judicial administrative districts.  
See Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶9.  Such guidelines do not 
completely eliminate the evil of sentencing disparity, but as 
the court of appeals in this case pointed out, "[T]he proper 
comparison is between having no guidelines and having district-
by-district guidelines."  Jorgensen, No. 01-2690-CR, unpublished 
slip op. at ¶29.  That comparison makes clear that having some 
guidelines within districts are better than none at all.  As the 
State points out in its brief, Jorgensen here appears to argue 
for the position that district-by-district guidelines violate 
equal 
protection 
and 
due 
process, 
but 
a 
system 
without 
guidelines does not.  (Resp't Br. at 12)  Such a position is 
illogical and we reject it.  Instead, we accept that these 
guidelines 
fulfill 
the 
rational 
basis 
test 
by 
reducing 
sentencing disparity within judicial districts. 
¶41 Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination that the Fifth District Sentencing guidelines 
authorized by Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) are constitutional. 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
25 
 
D.  Supervisory Powers 
¶42 In a final argument, Jorgensen suggests that even if 
this court finds the guidelines constitutional——which we do——
this court should still invalidate the guidelines exercising its 
supervisory powers over the state courts.  We decline this 
invitation.  In finding these guidelines constitutional, we have 
determined that although such guidelines do not eliminate all 
disparity, they were authorized and set up for the purpose of, 
and succeed in eliminating some of the disparity that has 
existed within the state judicial districts.  As such, we will 
not impede the authority granted to chief judges of the circuit 
courts or the discretion of the circuit courts themselves in 
sentencing.   
¶43 This court has declared on previous occasions an 
unwillingness to intrude unnecessarily upon the discretion of 
circuit courts in the realm of sentencing.  See In re Felony 
Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 200-202, 353 N.W.2d 793 
(1984).  In Felony Sentencing, 120 Wis. 2d at 202-03, this court 
declined 
the 
legislature's 
request 
to 
promulgate 
felony 
sentencing guidelines.  Here, Jorgensen asks this court to 
overrule a scheme set up by the legislature and implemented by 
the various districts of the state, specifically here, the Fifth 
Judicial District.  We decline to do so for many of the same 
reasons discussed in Felony Sentencing.  Id.  We held in Felony 
Sentencing, 
120 
Wis. 2d at 
203, 
that 
"[i]t 
is 
for 
the 
legislature . . . to decide whether and to what extent the 
sentencing 
court's 
discretion 
should 
be 
limited." 
 
The 
No. 
01-2690-CR   
 
26 
 
legislature here has, via Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a), mandated 
districts to establish sentencing guidelines related to certain 
"operating under the influence" offenses.  The various districts 
have followed this mandate and established guidelines for 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors.  This court 
will not obstruct operation of this sentencing scheme. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals and find that the sentencing guidelines 
established by the Fifth Judicial District do not violate 
Jorgensen's equal protection or due process rights. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) is unconstitutional.  
The statute increases sentencing disparity for drunk driving 
offenses across the 10 judicial administrative districts of the 
state, and no rational basis exists for the legislature to treat 
offenders differently based upon the judicial district in which 
the 
offense 
was 
committed. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
legislature's 
delegation of authority to the chief judges of each judicial 
district to create OWI sentencing guidelines may violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
I 
¶46 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) 
directs 
the 
chief 
judge of "each judicial administrative district" to "adopt 
guidelines for the consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
factors" under the chief judge's authority to "adopt local rules 
under SCR 70.34."9  The legislature gives no direction that the 
guidelines be consistent across judicial districts or even that 
all judicial districts consider the same aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  
¶47 Thus, the statute, on its face, envisions a sentencing 
guidelines scheme that varies from judicial district to judicial 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) (emphasis added).  SCR 70.34 
provides: "The director of state courts shall develop uniform 
rules for trial court administration.  Each chief judge may 
adopt additional local rules not in conflict with the uniform 
judicial administrative rules."  No one argues that the 
guidelines are not local judicial administrative rules under 
70.34, but it seems arguable that they are not.   
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
district.  It creates a system in which sentences vary not 
because of any characteristic of the offender or the offense, 
but because of the geographic location in which the offense took 
place. As the court of appeals has noted, "the statute creates 
different classes of people.  It makes persons convicted of 
driving while under the influence in one judicial district 
subject to potentially different sentencing standards from those 
in other districts."10  
¶48 The 
majority 
opinion 
understates 
the 
sentencing 
disparity created by Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) when it admits 
that "having different guidelines in the various judicial 
districts may lead to some disparity."11  The disparity in 
sentences 
between 
judicial 
districts 
as 
a 
result 
of 
§ 346.65(2m)(a) is dramatic.12  In State v. Smart, 2002 WI App 
240, ¶4, 257 Wis. 2d 713, 652 N.W.2d 429, the court of appeals 
explained that the maximum sentence for a defendant's third 
offense OWI conviction ranged from 45 days to 120 days, 
depending on the judicial district.13   
                                                 
10 State v. Smart, 2002 WI App 240, ¶6, 257 Wis. 2d 713, 652 
N.W.2d 429. 
11 Majority op., ¶39. 
12 Indeed, it is arguable that the multiple guidelines 
create huge disparity where none existed before.  A Judicial 
Conference committee concluded in a 1983 report that there was 
no unjustified disparity in sentencing in Wisconsin courts.  
Matter of Implementation of Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 113 
Wis. 2d 689, 693, 335 N.W.2d 868 (1983). 
13 Smart, 257 Wis. 2d 713, ¶4: 
[T]he ninth district's jail time guideline for [the 
defendant's] offense is 120 days, except between 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶49 The 
range 
of possible sentences 
across judicial 
districts for a defendant convicted of fourth offense OWI, like 
the defendant in the present case, is no less startling.  One 
need only look at the guidelines created by the three districts 
I have attached hereto to see the disparity.  These guidelines 
were presented by and discussed by the parties in this case.   
¶50 In the Eighth Judicial District a person's fourth 
offense aggravated OWI conviction (with a blood alcohol level of 
.276 and resulting "accident") is subject to a flat 150-day 
sentence.14  The district guidelines provide no direction for a 
sentencing 
judge 
to 
consider 
additional 
aggravating 
or 
mitigating factors.  
¶51 In the Fourth Judicial District, a person's fourth 
offense aggravated OWI conviction (with a .276 blood alcohol 
level and resulting "accident") is subject to a flat sentence of 
105 days in jail, though the guidelines permit a court to 
consider as "mitigating factors" the defendant's ability to pay 
and conduct since the offense, the consequences to the defendant 
and victim, and whether there was cooperation by the defendant.   
¶52 In the Fifth Judicial District (where the defendant 
was convicted), according to guidelines, the same person faces a 
                                                                                                                                                             
January 2001 and August 2001, when it was ten months.  
Had he been convicted of the same crime in other 
judicial districts, [the defendant] would have likely 
received a much shorter jail term.  In the tenth 
district, the guideline is 110 days; in the eighth, 
seventy-five days; and in the fourth, forty-five days.   
14 The defendant would also face a $1654.00 fine and have 
his or her license revoked for 36 months. 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
possible sentence ranging from 90 days to one year.  Despite the 
guidelines proposing this wide range, the Fifth Judicial 
District guidelines give no directions to the circuit court in 
deciding where to place a given defendant within this broad 
range.   
¶53 The 
truth 
of 
the 
matter 
is 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) has, by design, created the potential 
for significant disparity in sentencing similarly situated 
offenders under similar circumstances who are similar threats to 
the public based solely upon geography, and the disparity from 
district to district and across the state has come to pass. 
II 
¶54 The majority opinion concludes that the legislature's 
decision to create disparate sentencing guidelines from judicial 
administrative district to judicial administrative district 
survives constitutional scrutiny by reframing the issue and 
focusing exclusively on the decreased disparity within each 
judicial district.  The majority opinion contends that the 
disparity 
created 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) 
is 
constitutional because a rational basis for the disparity among 
judicial districts can be conceived, namely that the guidelines 
adopted under § 346.65(2m)(a) operate to reduce sentencing 
disparity within judicial districts.15   
¶55 The purpose of the law at issue is to eliminate 
disparity in sentences.  The objective of decreasing disparity 
                                                 
15 Majority op., ¶40 ("we accept that these guidelines 
fulfill the rational basis test by reducing sentencing disparity 
within judicial districts"). 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
is to ensure to the extent possible that similarly situated 
offenders will be sentenced similarly.  Thus the imposition of a 
criminal sentence must be based on "the gravity of the offense, 
the character of the offender and the need for the protection of 
the public."16  "Sentencing disparities that are not justified by 
differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to 
offenders and to the public.  A sentence that is unjustifiably 
high compared to sentences for similarly situated offenders is 
clearly unfair to the offender; a sentence that is unjustifiably 
low is just as plainly unfair to the public."17 
¶56 Sentencing guidelines are "designed to allow the 
exercise of judicial discretion to consider the offense, the 
offender and the public while reducing variance by providing 
guideline sentences for similar offenders who commit similar 
offenses."18  Sentencing guidelines do not achieve this goal when 
offenders 
who 
commit 
similar 
offenses 
under 
similar 
circumstances and present similar dangers to the public are not 
sentenced similarly.  
¶57 The question in this case is whether there is a 
rational basis for establishing a sentencing guideline system 
that 
treats 
criminal 
offenders 
in 
one 
judicial 
district 
                                                 
16 State v. Ogden, 199 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 544 N.W.2d 574 
(1996) (citations omitted). 
17 United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 473 n.10 (1991) 
(citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 45-46 (1983); 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(98 Stat.) 3228-29.). 
18 State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1124, 501 N.W.2d 429 
(1993)  
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
different from similar offenders in a different judicial 
district. 
 
More 
specifically, 
the 
question 
is: 
How 
is 
authorizing different guidelines in each administrative district 
germane 
to 
the 
purpose 
of 
reducing 
disparity? 
 
"The 
classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the 
law."19  The majority opinion concludes that reducing disparity 
within the general geographical locus of the offense has a 
rational relation to reducing disparity in sentencing in the 
state even though sentencing disparity is increased within the 
state as a whole. 
¶58 The majority opinion's "rational basis" is, in fact, 
irrational.  It begs the question to conclude that the statute 
has a rational basis of reducing disparate sentencing in the 
State by reducing disparity within each judicial district.  The 
issue of disparate sentencing is not about disparate treatment 
of similar offenders within different parts of the state but 
about disparate treatment of similar offenders across the state.  
The majority opinion never explains why the judicial district 
classification 
is 
germane 
to 
the 
purpose 
of 
eliminating 
disparity in sentencing.20 
                                                 
19 Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶39, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141 (quoting Aicher v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶58, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849). 
20 I 
am 
also 
attaching 
a 
map 
showing 
the 
judicial 
administrative districts.  The map shows that while these 
districts 
might 
make 
sense 
for 
purposes 
of 
trial 
court 
administration they do not necessarily make sense for purposes 
of differences in OWI sentencing. 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶59 The geographical unit in which to determine disparity 
in sentencing for similar offenders is the state as a whole.  
The offenders have violated a state criminal statute describing 
an offense against the people of the State of Wisconsin, not an 
offense merely against the people of a particular county or 
administrative district. Yet the statute mandates a guideline 
system in which offenders who have similar characteristics are 
sentenced to the same state institutions but for different time 
periods, with the determinative issue not the characteristics of 
the offender and offense but geography (the administrative 
district in which the offense occurred).21 
¶60 Although the majority opinion dismisses Nankin v. 
Village 
of 
Shorewood, 
2001 
WI 
92, 
245 
Wis. 2d 86, 
630 
N.W.2d 141, without a meaningful explanation, I find Nankin 
persuasive.  In Nankin, the legislature provided different 
procedures for challenging property assessments depending on the 
population of the county in which the property was located, 
treating owners of property located in populous counties 
differently than owners of property located in other counties 
without a rational basis.  The Nankin court concluded that no 
rational basis existed for treating taxpayers differently on the 
                                                 
21 If the legislature or a statewide sentencing commission 
adopted different 
sentencing 
guidelines 
for 
each judicial 
district, it is hard to believe that this court would conclude 
that there is a rational basis for disparate sentencing across 
geographical lines.  Yet as a result of the majority opinion it 
seems to me that such a sentencing structure would now be valid.  
Clearly the constitutionality of the guidelines does not depend 
on whether the legislature promulgates the guidelines or 
delegates the authority to the chief judges of each judicial 
district. 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
basis of the population of the county in which their property 
was located.  No rational basis exists here either for treating 
offenders differently on the location of the county in a 
judicial administrative district.  
¶61 The majority opinion's "rational" basis analysis is 
not saved by the declaration that this guideline system is 
merely an imperfect solution that is a "step in the right 
direction."22  Decreases in disparity within a judicial district 
cannot save the increase in disparate sentences for fourth 
offense OWI offenders across the state.  A legislatively 
mandated program that fosters and creates disparate guidelines 
from one geographical area in the State to another cannot be 
viewed as a step in the right direction of eliminating disparity 
in sentencing in the State of Wisconsin.23  
¶62 The majority opinion's "rational" basis is also not 
saved by asserting that the sentencing scheme created under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) 
orders 
judicial 
districts 
to 
establish "permissive guidelines," not mandatory guidelines.  
The argument might be made that because the guidelines are 
permissive a circuit court must examine each offender and the 
circumstances of the offense in addition to the suggested 
guidelines and accordingly there is uniformity across the state.  
This reasoning rests on the premise that the guidelines are 
                                                 
22 Majority op., ¶39. 
23 The judges in a county or district might adopt countywide 
permissive guidelines.  This is different from legislatively 
mandated district guidelines. 
No.  01-2690-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
basically irrelevant or of little relevance because each circuit 
court must ultimately exercise its discretion free of the 
guidelines.   
¶63 If the majority opinion is resting on this reasoning, 
the majority's thinking squarely contradicts its own rational 
basis argument that the statute fosters the elimination of 
disparity within each district.  The majority opinion cannot 
argue that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) is constitutional because 
the guidelines decrease disparity within each judicial district 
if it also is arguing that the statute's constitutionality rests 
on the fact that each circuit court has no obligation to follow 
the guidelines and is free to impose whatever sentence it 
concludes fits the offender, offense, and public safety.   
¶64 Clearly the legislature (and the chief judges) intend 
circuit courts to adhere to the guidelines to the extent 
possible 
and 
want 
the guidelines 
to 
have 
an 
effect on 
sentencing.  Otherwise the guidelines are an exercise in 
futility.24 
 
Furthermore, 
our 
experience 
with 
guidelines 
demonstrates that they are very influential and that circuit 
courts ordinarily follow them or, at a minimum, use them as a 
starting point.  
                                                 
24 As this court explained: "The advisory committee could 
hardly expect the use of sentencing guidelines to reduce 
variance and dispel any perception of unequal treatment in 
sentencing if it did not intend that judges follow the 
guidelines and impose sentence within the guideline matrix 
ranges, 
except 
in 
cases 
where 
aggravating 
or 
mitigating 
circumstances dictate otherwise." Matter of Implementation of 
Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 113 Wis. 2d at 697.  
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¶65 The OWI sentencing guidelines in place in the various 
districts do not reflect a movement towards greater statewide 
sentencing uniformity for similarly situated offenders who 
commit similar offenses and are similarly dangerous to the 
public.  The guidelines reflect a movement towards greater 
sentencing disparity from district to district with differences 
in the guidelines based solely on geographical considerations.  
Because there is no rational basis for disparate sentences based 
upon the judicial district in which the offense occurred, I 
conclude that the statute is unconstitutional. 
III 
¶66 Finally, the majority opinion completely ignores the 
possibility that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) is unconstitutional 
because it violates the separation of powers doctrine.  Article 
VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution states that "the 
supreme court shall have superintending and administrative 
authority over all courts."    
¶67 Article VII, Section 3(1) makes it "incumbent on the 
legislature to exercise both deference and restraint when 
legislating 
in 
areas 
that 
impinge 
upon 
this 
[court's] 
authority."25 
 
The 
enactment 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) 
demonstrates both a lack of deference and a lack of restraint on 
behalf of the legislature and arguably impinges on our authority 
to supervise and administer the circuit courts and chief judges 
of the state.   
                                                 
25 State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 75-76, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982) (Coffey, J., concurring). 
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¶68 This conclusion becomes clear when the history of the 
adoption of sentencing guidelines is set forth.  In 1983, this 
court expressly refused to adopt an 18-month pilot program 
requiring circuit courts to use, according to their discretion, 
felony sentencing guidelines developed by the Advisory Committee 
for the Wisconsin Felony Sentencing Guidelines Project.26  A goal 
of the sentencing guidelines was to "remedy an unjustifiable 
disparity of sentences imposed by Wisconsin trial judges for 
like offenses,"27 but the court noted that the 1983 report of the 
advisory 
committee 
stated 
"that 
there 
is 
no 
unjustified 
disparity in sentencing in Wisconsin courts."28  The court 
concluded that an alleged public perception of sentencing 
disparity does not justify guidelines.  The court further 
concluded that it is for the legislature, not the court, to 
"decide whether [judicial discretion] should be more closely 
circumscribed."29   
¶69 One year later, the legislature enacted a statute 
giving this court the express authority to promulgate rules for 
sentencing guidelines to be used by Wisconsin courts.30  This 
court refused to act, however, and according to the statute the 
                                                 
26 Matter of Implementation of Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 
113 Wis. 2d at 690. 
27 Id. at 693. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 695. 
30 In 
the 
Matter 
of 
Jud. 
Admin. 
Felony 
Sentencing 
Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984). 
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authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines passed to a 
sentencing commission attached to the Wisconsin Department of 
Administration.  The court explained its refusal this time by 
stating that the existing sentencing system was accomplishing 
the goal of consistency and that it was for the legislative 
branch, not the judicial branch, to decide the extent to which 
sentencing discretion should be limited to accomplish the goal 
of consistency in criminal sentencing: 
The legislature considers it most appropriate that 
this court promulgate rules for sentencing guidelines 
because 
it 
sees 
a 
direct 
relation 
between 
the 
establishment of the guidelines and the exercise of 
judicial discretion.  We disagree; it is precisely 
because the determination of what constitutes an 
appropriate sentence in a particular case involves the 
exercise of judicial discretion that we decline to 
promulgate guidelines and thereby encroach on that 
discretion.31 
¶70 By 
enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a), 
the 
legislature circumvents this court's decision not to adopt 
sentencing guidelines.  The legislature requires circuit court 
judges (whom this court has appointed as chief judges of 
judicial districts) to do on a district-by-district level what 
this court has already refused to do on a statewide scale, 
because adopting sentencing guidelines is a legislative, not a 
judicial, function. 
¶71 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
                                                 
31 Id. at 203-04. 
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