Title: Jefferson County v. Mosley
Citation: 226 So. 2d 652
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 1969

226 So. 2d 652 (1969)
JEFFERSON COUNTY
v.
M. C. MOSLEY et al.
6 Div. 491.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 21, 1969.
Rehearing Denied October 2, 1969.
John P. Carlton, Bishop &amp; Carlton, Birmingham, for appellant.
Jones, Propst &amp; Topazi, Birmingham, for appellees.
*653 LAWSON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Jefferson County following the filing by the plaintiff, Jefferson County, of its "Substituted Petition for Declaratory Judgment" and the filing of an "Answer to Substituted Petition for Declaratory Judgment" by M. C. Mosley, a single man; Earnie A. Peoples and wife, Edna M. Peoples; and George R. Self and wife, Margarette Self, which the defendants separately and severally prayed "be taken as a cross bill." Plaintiff made no response to the so-called "cross bill."
The ultimate question for decision is whether Jefferson County has a right-of-way over certain lands included in the description in separate warranty deeds executed by the defendant M. C. Mosley to the Peoples and to the Selfs.
The land described in the two aforementioned deeds is in the SW¼ of the SW¼ of Section 9, Township 17, Range 1 West, which will be referred to hereinafter as the government subdivision involved.
The cause was tried by the court without a jury. No oral testimony was adduced. In so far as the record before us discloses, the cause was submitted to the trial court on a "Stipulation of Facts" and, of course, on the pleadings.
On October 18, 1945, Lester L. Dillard by warranty deed conveyed to Jefferson County a "right-of-way for public purposes" across lands situated in the government subdivision involved. The right of way is described as being eighty feet in width or forty feet on each side of a center line of a proposed road which is described by metes and bounds.
In September, 1949, the "Old Alton-Weems Road" where it traversed the government subdivision involved was widened, paved and otherwise improved. The pavement was twenty feet wide and the shoulders on each side of the road were widened to a distance of five feet, making the said road thirty feet wide after the improvements were made. In Paragraph 4 of the "Substituted Petition for Declaratory Judgment" it is alleged that "said road was built over and occupied a substantial portion of the right-of-way acquired by Jefferson County, Alabama, under deed from Lester L. Dillard executed and delivered on October 18, 1945." Defendants'"Answer to Substituted Petition for Declaratory Judgment" admits all of the allegations of Paragraph 4 of that Petition.
Prior to the making of the improvements in September, 1949, the part of the "Old Alton-Weems Road" here involved had a gravel surface. Its width prior to September, 1949, is not shown and the exact amount of the eighty-foot right-of-way used in widening the "Old Alton-Weems Road" does not appear. Subsequent to 1949 the "Old Alton-Weems Road" was straightened, further widened and improved where it traversed the right-of-way conveyed by Dillard to Jefferson County in 1945, but such work was done subsequent to all transactions involved in this case.
On December 20, 1951, Lester L. Dillard and wife conveyed by warranty deed certain real property in the government subdivision involved to M. C. Mosley. The description in the deed includes the right-of-way conveyed by Lester L. Dillard to Jefferson County under the deed of October 18, 1945. The deed from Dillard to Mosley contains the following exception: "The property hereinabove described and conveyed is conveyed subject to all public roads, or easements and rights of way thereover." The "Old Alton-Weems Road" existed as a public road and was maintained by Jefferson County for more than twenty-five years prior to the date on which Dillard executed the deed to Mosley.
Paragraph 4 of the "Substituted Petition for Declaratory Judgment," which is concerned with the improvement of the Alton-Weems Road in September, 1949, concludes as follows: "Plaintiff further avers that on December 20, 1951, the date of the *654 deed from Lester L. Dillard and wife, Betty Lawson Dillard, to M. C. Mosley, said road was situated and maintained as set out above and in such manner as to be plainly visible." As before indicated, the averments of said Paragraph 4 were admitted in the defendants'"Answer to Substituted Petition for Declaratory Judgment."
The right-of-way deed from Lester L. Dillard to Jefferson County under date of October 18, 1945, was not recorded in the office of the Judge of Probate of Jefferson County until April 2, 1952, which was subsequent to the execution of the deed from Lester L. Dillard to M. C. Mosley. The last-mentioned deed was recorded in the office of the Judge of Probate of Jefferson County on January 14, 1952.
On May 26, 1952, M. C. Mosley conveyed by warranty deed certain real property in the government subdivision involved to Earnie A. Peoples and Edna M. Peoples. The description in the deed includes a part of the right-of-way conveyed by Lester L. Dillard to Jefferson County under the deed of October 18, 1945. It was recorded in the office of the Judge of Probate of Jefferson County on July 7, 1952. The deed from Mosley to the Peoples contains the following exception: "The property hereinabove described and is conveyed subject to all public roads, easements, and right-of-ways thereover."
By warranty deed dated June 26, 1953, and corrected in so far as the description is concerned by warranty deed dated December 27, 1958, M. C. Mosley conveyed to George R. Self and wife, Margarette Self, certain real property in the government subdivision involved. The description of said real property (as corrected) includes a part of the right-of-way conveyed by Lester L. Dillard to Jefferson County under the deed of October 18, 1945. The deed from Mosley to the Selfs dated June 26, 1953, was recorded in the office of the Judge of Probate of Jefferson County on June 26, 1953, and the deed correcting the description was recorded in that office on December 29, 1958. These deeds do not contain any exceptions as to public roads, easements or rights-of-way.
The trial court rendered a judgment which in pertinent parts reads:
From that judgment Jefferson County has appealed to this court.
In brief filed here on behalf of appellant, Jefferson County, it is said:
The last sentence quoted above is inaccurate if the words "in addition to actual notice of the right-of-way" contained in that sentence were used to convey the impression that the Selfs had actual notice of the right-of-way because of the exceptions in their deeds as to public roads, easements and rights-of-way. As we have pointed out above, the deeds from Mosley to the Selfs contained no such exceptions. As we view this case, the absence of such exceptions in the deeds from Mosley to the Selfs is of no consequence.
We will first consider the assertion of appellant to the effect that since its right-of-way deed was recorded prior to the time Mosley executed the deeds to the Peoples and to the Selfs, they had constructive notice of the rights of appellant by virtue of the provisions of § 102, Title 47, Code 1940, and hence the Peoples and the Selfs were not innocent purchasers for value without notice. Section 102, Title 47, supra, reads:
If appellant is correct in that assertion, a judgment by this court reversing the judgment of the trial court would necessarily follow and we would not be called upon to consider the question as to whether Mosley was an innocent purchaser for value without notice of appellant's rights under the 1945 deed to it from Dillard. But we cannot agree with appellant's contention here under consideration.
Our case of Fenno v. Sayre, 3 Ala. 458, and that of Tennessee Coal, Iron &amp; R. Co. v. Gardner, 131 Ala. 599, 32 So. 622, appear to hold to the contrary. The Peoples and Selfs claim title from Mosley and from him alone. In the case last cited above it was said: "The record of a deed from any other person than the grantor from whom title is claimed will not operate to give constructive notice to a subsequent grantee."
In American Law of Property, Vol. IV, § 17.21, the rule is stated thusly:
See Hawley v. McCabe, 117 Conn. 558, 169 A. 192.
We hold, therefore, that the recordation of the 1945 deed from Dillard to Jefferson County, after the recordation of the deed from Dillard to Mosley, did not by virtue of the provisions of § 102, Title 47, Code 1940, operate as notice to the Peoples and to the Selfs of the contents of the 1945 deed from Dillard to Jefferson County.
If Mosley was an innocent purchaser for value without notice of his grantor's right-of-way deed to Jefferson County, the title which he conveyed to the Peoples and to the Selfs would pass to them unaffected even by any notice which they themselves *656 might have had. Reeder v. Cox, 218 Ala. 182, 118 So. 338; Barron v. Hughes, 202 Ala. 207, 80 So. 29; Whitfield v. Riddle, 78 Ala. 99; Gulf, C. &amp; S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 5 Tex.Civ.App. 496, 23 S.W. 142.
In Vol. 3, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., § 754a, it is said:
The exception to that rule is that such a title cannot be conveyed, free from prior equities, back to a former owner who was charged with notice.
So the question is presented as to whether the record before us shows that Mosley was an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the appellant's [Jefferson County's] rights under the deed executed to Jefferson County in 1945 by Dillard.
As far as the record discloses, Mosley at the time he secured his deed from Dillard did not have actual knowledge of the deed executed by Dillard to Jefferson County in 1945. He was not charged with the constructive notice provided by § 102, Title 47, Code 1940, because Jefferson County did not record its deed until after Mosley secured his deed and after it was recorded.
But it is well settled in this state that whatever is sufficient to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which the inquiry would have led; that when a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant with it; that one who has knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the existence of an unrecorded deed is not a purchaser without notice within the protection of the registry statutes. Wittmeir v. Leonard, 219 Ala. 314, 122 So. 330; Gamble v. Black Warrior Coal Co., 172 Ala. 669, 55 So. 190; Cole v. Birmingham Union R. Co., 143 Ala. 427, 39 So. 403; Pepper v. George, 51 Ala. 190; Alexander v. Fountain, 195 Ala. 3, 70 So. 669; Blocker v. Boyd, 242 Ala. 345, 6 So. 2d 19; Walden v. Walden, 268 Ala. 145, 105 So. 2d 105.
It has been said that it is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule as to what facts will in every case be sufficient to charge a party with notice or put him on inquiry. Veitch v. Woodward Iron Co., 200 Ala. 358, 76 So. 124.
In Wittmeir v. Leonard, supra, we said:
Cases from other states hereafter cited are authority for the proposition that a person is charged with notice of the contents of the instrument by which he takes title and of all the facts which would be disclosed with a reasonably diligent search. Floyd County Board of Education v. Johnson (Ct. of App. of Ky.), 260 S.W.2d 217; Adams v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d 457; Eakers v. Clopton, 199 Okl. 99, 184 P.2d 247, 173 A.L.R. 309; McDonald v. *657 Welborn, 220 S.C. 10, 66 S.E.2d 327; Tuggle v. Cooke (Ct. of Civ.App. of Tex.), 277 S.W.2d 729; State v. Jewell, 250 Wis. 165, 26 N.W.2d 825, 28 N.W.2d 314.
In State v. Jewell, supra, it appears that one Esther Lindgren conveyed certain land to Burnett County on April 29, 1931, for the purpose of permitting the State Highway Commission to relocate a portion of State Trunk Highway No. 87 in Burnett County. That conveyance was not recorded. On March 9, 1944, Esther Lindgren conveyed to Henry A. Jewell a parcel of land which included the property previously conveyed to Burnett County. In the deed to Jewell, after the granting clause and description of the property, there appeared the following recital: "Subject to the right of way of Highway No. 87 on the east side of the parcel above described." At the time the deed to Jewell was executed State Trunk Highway No. 87 had been improved and in use for many years.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin among other things said as follows:
In the Jewell case, supra, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which was in favor of the State, with certain modifications not here pertinent. On rehearing the Wisconsin Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court without modifications. State v. Jewell, 250 Wis. 165, 26 N.W.2d 825, 28 N.W.2d 314.
In Ocean Shore Railroad Company v. Spring Valley Water Company et al., 218 Cal. 86, 21 P.2d 588, the railroad company owned a right-of-way which was conveyed to it in 1909, but the instrument of conveyance was not recorded. Not later than the *658 early part of 1921, the railroad company discontinued operation of the railroad over the right-of-way and removed its tracks and equipment except for a trestle which was visible to the naked eye. In March of 1922, a golf club entered into a contract for the purchase of the land. The golf club thereupon entered into possession and improved the property after paying $10,000 on account of the purchase price. Unlike the case at bar, the contract of purchase contained no reference to plaintiff's right-of-way and the deed conveying the right-of-way was not recorded until approximately one month after the defendant golf club had executed such contract and paid a portion of the purchase price. The Supreme Court of California said, in part:
In McLaren et al. v. American Telephone &amp; Telegraph Co. of New Jersey, 1 N.J.Super. 600, 63 A.2d 922, it was said:
It is difficult to understand how Mosley could have read the deed and not have seen the exception clause. Whether he saw it or not, he is presumed to have knowledge of it and the consequences are the same in either case. State v. Jewell, supra.
So far as the record discloses, Mosley made no effort to ascertain whether, in fact, there were any public roads, easements or rights-of-way across the land described in the deed from Dillard to him prior to the present controversy. After the controversy arose, apparently he had no trouble in ascertaining such information, as is evidenced by the map or drawing which is in the record.
*659 It seems to us that a reasonably prudent man who obtained a deed containing an exception such as was included in the deed from Dillard to Mosley would have made inquiry from his grantor as to why such an exception was included. If such an inquiry had been made, Mosley would no doubt have been advised of the right-of-way deed executed by Dillard to Jefferson County in 1945.
The defendants in their answer admitted that the improvements made on the old Alton-Weems Road in 1949 were "built over and occupied a substantial portion of the right-of-way acquired by Jefferson County, Alabama, under deed from Lester L. Dillard executed and delivered on October 18, 1945." The defendants in their answer further admitted that at the time Dillard executed the deed to Mosley "said road was situated and maintained as set out above and in such a manner as to be plainly visible."
The existence of this road at the time Mosley secured his deed from Dillard was open and notorious and its presence was such notice as to put Mosley on inquiry and the notice was not confined to that part of the right-of-way used as a road or highway, but extended to the lands described in the deed from Dillard to Jefferson County.
The established rules of law may operate harshly in this case, but they are well established and we have no alternative but to apply the law as it is.
In conclusion, we hold that Mosley was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Jefferson County's easement. His title was subject to that easement. He could convey to the Peoples and to the Selfs no better title than he possessed.
We have referred to one of the appellees as "Mosley," which is the spelling used most frequently in the record, although his name is spelled "Moseley" in some places in the record, and that is perhaps the correct spelling of his name.
It follows that the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.