Title: Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, Charles Edward Rainwater, Jean Rainwater Loggins, and Rainwater Marital Trust v. Lenn Rainwater
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190951
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2021

REL: June 30, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190951
____________________
Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, Charles Edward
Rainwater, Jean Rainwater Loggins, and Rainwater Marital
Trust
v.
Lenn Rainwater
____________________
1190952
____________________
Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust, Charles Edward
Rainwater, Jean Rainwater Loggins
v.
Lenn Rainwater
Appeals from St. Clair Circuit Court
(CV-18-900281)
MITCHELL, Justice.
These appeals spring from a legal dispute between four siblings
about the management of trusts set up by their parents.  The siblings --
Lenn Rainwater ("Lenn"), Charles Edward Rainwater ("Charles"), Jean
Rainwater Loggins, and Mary Rainwater Breazeale -- executed a
settlement agreement resolving their dispute, but, in appeal no. 1190952,
we are asked to consider whether that agreement should be declared void. 
Lenn has also sought to garnish trust assets that she says are hers; in
appeal no. 1190951, we are asked to decide whether those garnishment
proceedings should be quashed.  But we ultimately do not reach either of
those issues because both appeals are due to be dismissed -- appeal no.
1190952 was filed too late and appeal no. 1190951 was filed too soon.
Facts and Procedural History
Lem Rainwater ("Lem") and Jean Rainwater ("Jean") had four
children -- Lenn, Charles, Loggins, and Breazeale.  In 1995, Lem and Jean
2
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set up the Lem Harris Rainwater Family Trust ("the Family Trust").  The
terms of the Family Trust provided that when one of them died, the trust
assets would be split so that the deceased parent's assets would go into
the Rainwater Bypass Trust and the remaining assets would go into the
Rainwater Marital Trust ("the Marital Trust").1  Jean died in 2007; Lenn
alleges that it is not clear how and if her parents' assets in the Family
Trust were actually divided into the two other trusts at that time.
In January 2009, Lem executed a document purporting to restate the
terms of the Marital Trust.  Among other things, this restatement
provided that each of the siblings would receive certain real property upon
his death.  Notably, Lenn was to receive all rights to Victorian Village, a
shopping center in Sylacauga. Lem restated the Marital Trust on two
more occasions, in November 2011 and in April 2013.
1A bypass trust is a tax-savings entity "into which just enough of a
decedent's estate passes, so that the estate can take advantage of the
unified credit against federal estate taxes."  Black's Law Dictionary 1818
(11th ed. 2019).  A bypass trust allows trust beneficiaries, usually the
settlors' children, to obtain the property of the first spouse to die, although
the surviving spouse is given a life interest in that property.  Id.  "Upon
the last spouse's death, all the trust property passes to the trust
beneficiaries outside the estate-tax regime."  Id.
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1190951, 1190952
After Lem's death in 2015, the siblings, who serve as cotrustees of
each of the trusts, disagreed about the effects of certain provisions in the
trust documents.  Lenn specifically questioned the validity of certain
changes made by Lem when he restated the terms of the Marital Trust in
April 2013, as well as the fact that rents paid by tenants at Victorian
Village were being collected and treated as trust assets instead of being
remitted to her.  In November 2018, Lenn sued her siblings and the
Family Trust in the St. Clair Circuit Court seeking a judgment declaring
their rights under the trust documents and determining the ownership
interests of the siblings in certain trust assets. 
The trial court ordered the siblings to mediate their dispute.  It
initially appeared that the mediation was successful because, on
November 21, 2019, all four siblings executed a settlement agreement.
That agreement stated that its terms were to remain confidential, but it
generally provided that, "[w]ithin 30 days," a cash payment and all rights
to Victorian Village would be transferred to Lenn.  It also required the
parties to execute releases waiving any claims they had against each
other.  
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For reasons that are not entirely clear, the parties did not satisfy
their respective obligations within the 30-day period set out in the
settlement agreement.  Charles, Loggins, and Breazeale then moved the
trial court to declare the settlement agreement void because, they alleged,
Lenn had violated its confidentiality provision and refused to execute the
required releases.  On February 12, 2020, the trial court entered an order
holding that the settlement agreement was due to be enforced and
directing the parties, within the next 30 days, "to perform each and every
act and to execute any and all documents necessary or expedient to
evidence and consummate the mediation settlement agreement as
heretofore agreed by the parties." 
On March 12, 2020, Lenn filed notice stating that she had executed
all the documents required by the settlement agreement and alleging that
Charles and Loggins were refusing to do the same.  That same day,
Charles and Loggins -- who had dismissed their previous legal counsel and
retained attorney Jerry M. Blevins to represent them -- filed a motion
stating that they understood the trial court's February 12 order "to be a
final order subject to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.," and asking the trial court
5
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to alter, amend, or vacate that order in accordance with Rule 59. 
Breazeale -- still represented by the same counsel who had represented all
three defendant siblings and the Family Trust during the mediation --
filed a response stating that she was no longer challenging the settlement
agreement and that she had executed all the documents the agreement
required.  
On April 20, 2020, the trial court denied Charles and Loggins's
motion and again ordered the parties to perform their obligations under
the settlement agreement.  Two days later, Blevins filed a notice of
appearance purporting to represent the Family Trust.  Lenn and
Breazeale then filed separate responses denying that he represented the
Family Trust; Breazeale further alleged that her attorneys already
represented the Family Trust and that their representation had never
been terminated.  
On May 6, 2020, Blevins filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial
court's February 12 order directing the parties to comply with the
settlement agreement; that notice listed the Family Trust as an appellant
along with Charles and Loggins.  The next day, Blevins filed a motion
6
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with the trial court asserting that it had lost jurisdiction to conduct
further proceedings in the case -- including the authority to rule on
whether he properly represented the Family Trust -- because of the
pending appeal.  At a hearing conducted later that day to clarify its
jurisdiction, the trial court identified another jurisdictional issue --
whether its February 12 order directing the parties to comply with the
settlement agreement was a final judgment that could support an appeal. 
In a written order, the trial court concluded that it was.  But, the
court explained, even if the order was instead an interlocutory order
granting injunctive relief, it was still appealable.  See Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala.
R. App. P. (authorizing the appeal of "any interlocutory order granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an injunction").  The court
further concluded that, based on the pending appeal, it no longer had
jurisdiction to decide which attorneys were representing the Family Trust.
Two weeks later, Lenn served a process of garnishment on Regions
Bank.  Consistent with the discussion at the May 7 hearing, Lenn alleged
that a final judgment had been entered in her favor on February 12, and
that Regions Bank was holding assets in an account belonging to the
7
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Marital Trust that she was entitled to recover to satisfy that judgment. 
Regions Bank filed an answer stating that it would hold the sum claimed
by Lenn "until the court orders release or payment or until [the] funds are
remitted per statute."  Blevins -- purporting to represent the Marital
Trust as well as Charles, Loggins, and the Family Trust -- then moved the
trial court to quash the garnishment proceedings.  The trial court denied
that motion, and Blevins filed another notice of appeal, listing Charles,
Loggins, the Family Trust, and the Marital Trust as appellants and
seeking appellate review of that order.2
Appeal no. 1190952
Before considering the issue that Charles, Loggins, and the Family
Trust raise in this appeal -- whether the trial court's February 12 order
enforcing the settlement agreement should be reversed because of Lenn's
alleged breach of that agreement -- we must address whether we have
2Whether Blevins is properly representing the Family Trust and the
Marital Trust is an issue that has not been decided by the trial court.  We
express no opinion on that issue, but, because Blevins purported to file the
notices of appeal on behalf of those entities, we treat them as appellants
in this opinion.
8
1190951, 1190952
jurisdiction to do so.  See Nettles v. Rumberger, Kirk, & Caldwell, P.C.,
276 So. 3d 663, 666 (Ala. 2018) (explaining that jurisdictional matters are
of such importance that an appellate court may take notice of them even
when they have not been raised by the parties).  A review of the
procedural history of the case reveals that we lack jurisdiction.
At the hearing to consider whether Blevins was properly
representing the Family Trust, the trial court discussed whether its
February 12 order was a final judgment.  The court ultimately held that
it was but concluded that the order was appealable in any event based on
this Court's decision in Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. Price-Williams, 40 So.
3d 683 (Ala. 2009) .  In that case, a plaintiff who had been assaulted at a
fraternity party settled his lawsuit with a national fraternity and its local
chapter, but there was later disagreement about whether that settlement
encompassed his claims against the individuals who had assaulted him. 
40 So. 3d at 687.  The trial court in that case granted the plaintiff's motion
to enforce the settlement agreement in accordance with his interpretation,
directing him "to execute a release compliant with the court's findings and
order[ing] the chapter to 'tender the settlement proceeds to [the plaintiff's]
9
1190951, 1190952
counsel.' " Id. at 689.  The chapter did not comply with the trial court's
order and instead filed an appeal three days later.  Id.
The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal as being from a nonfinal
judgment.  In addressing that motion, this Court discussed the nature of
the order being appealed and agreed that it was an interlocutory order
granting injunctive relief as opposed to a final judgment.  Id. at 690
("Because the ... order commands the chapter to take action, we conclude
that it is injunctive in nature.").  But, the Court explained, an appeal can
be taken from an interlocutory order granting an injunction.  See Rule
4(a)(1)(A) (authorizing a party to file a notice of appeal "within 14 days (2
weeks) of the date of the entry of ... any interlocutory order granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an injunction").  The Court
therefore denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the chapter's appeal --
which had been filed just three days after the entry of the order enforcing
the settlement agreement -- and proceeded to consider the merits of the
case.  Kappa Sigma, 40 So. 3d at 689.
Based on Kappa Sigma, it is clear that the trial court in this case
erred to the extent it held that its February 12 order was a final
10
1190951, 1190952
judgment.  That order was injunctive in nature -- because it commanded
the parties to take specific action -- but it was not a final judgment.3  See
Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So. 2d 333, 335 (Ala. 2001) ("An injunction is
defined as '[a] court order commanding or preventing an action.'  Black's
Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999).").  The trial court nevertheless
correctly noted that the February 12 order was appealable under Rule
4(a)(1)(A).  Under that rule, any such appeal must be filed "within 14 days
(2 weeks) of the date of the entry of the order or judgment appealed from." 
Here, the order granting injunctive relief was entered on February 12, but
no notice of appeal was filed until May 6, well outside the 14-day period
allowed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A).4  Because the notice of appeal was untimely,
3This is not to imply that an injunctive order can never constitute a
final judgment.  For example, in Consolidated Electrical Contractors &
Engineers, Inc. v. Center Stage/Country Crossing Project, LLC, 175 So. 3d
642, 649 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), the Court of Civil Appeals properly held
that a trial court's order dissolving an injunction was a final judgment
subject to the general 42-day time period for filing an appeal.  But, unlike
the case now before us, the complaint that initiated that action sought
only injunctive relief and did not assert any underlying claims.  Thus, that
court explained, the injunctive order "adjudicated the only claim asserted
in the action."  Id. 
4We recognize that Charles and Loggins purported to file a Rule 59
postjudgment motion challenging the trial court's February 12 order on
11
1190951, 1190952
we must dismiss the appeal.  Beatty v. Carmichael, 293 So. 3d 874, 877
(Ala. 2019); see also Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. ("An appeal shall be
dismissed if the notice of appeal was not timely filed to invoke the
jurisdiction of the appellate court.").
Appeal no. 1190951
Charles, Loggins, the Family Trust, and the Marital Trust argue in
this appeal that the garnishment proceedings should have been quashed. 
We must first address our jurisdiction to consider their argument. 
Nettles, 276 So. 3d at 666. 
March 12.  Under Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., a postjudgment motion
filed under Rule 59 will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.   But one
cannot properly file a Rule 59 "postjudgment" motion directed to an
interlocutory order that is not a final "judgment."  See Momar, Inc. v.
Schneider, 823 So. 2d 701, 706 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (holding that a
purported Rule 59 motion did not operate to extend the time for taking an
appeal under Rule 4(a)(1)(A)).  This Court does not appear to have
previously addressed this issue, but we agree with the substance of the
Court of Civil Appeals' holding in Momar.  It would be inconsistent with
our caselaw emphasizing the necessity of a timely filed notice of appeal to
permit a party to resurrect a right to appeal by filing a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate two weeks after the period for filing an appeal had
already expired.
12
1190951, 1190952
With regard to garnishment proceedings, § 6-6-464, Ala. Code 1975,
provides that "[a]n appeal lies to the supreme court or the court of civil
appeals, as the case may be, at the instance of the plaintiff, the defendant,
the garnishee, or the contestant, or claimant."  The caselaw interpreting
§ 6-6-464 makes clear, however, that such an appeal will lie only when
there has been a final judgment.  In Miller Construction, LLC v. DB
Electric, [Ms. 2190467, Jan. 15, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021),
the Court of Civil Appeals considered an appeal with a factual and
procedural history substantially similar to this appeal and concluded that
the appeal was premature.  In that case, the garnishers commenced
garnishment proceedings against the defendants, which then moved the
trial court to quash those proceedings.  The trial court denied the motion
to quash but did not take any other action.  After the defendants filed
their notice of appeal challenging the trial court's denial of their motion
to quash, the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed their appeal, explaining
that "[t]he order denying the motion to quash ... addressed only the
disposition of that motion but did not direct the garnishee ... to disburse
any funds to [the garnishers].  Thus, the ... order denying the motion to
13
1190951, 1190952
quash is not a final judgment and is not capable of supporting this
appeal."  Id.  See also Robbins v. State ex rel. Priddy, 109 So. 3d 1128,
1132 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (explaining that an order denying a motion to
quash garnishment proceedings that does not otherwise adjudicate the
rights of the parties is not a final judgment capable of supporting an
appeal).
Like in Miller Construction, the trial court here denied a motion to
quash garnishment proceedings, but it did not decide what should be done
with the funds that were the subject of the garnishment.  The garnishee
Regions Bank has stated that it will hold the funds Lenn seeks to garnish
"until the court orders release or payment," and it appears from the record
before us that the trial court has yet to order either release or payment. 
Until such time as the trial court directs Regions Bank to take one of
those actions, there is not a final judgment that will support an appeal. 
Miller Construction, ___ So. 3d at ___, Robbins, 109 So. 3d at 1132. 
Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.
14
1190951, 1190952
Conclusion
The trial court's February 12 order directing the parties to comply
with the terms of the settlement agreement was an interlocutory order
that was injunctive in nature.  That order was appealable under Rule
4(a)(1)(A), but any such appeal had to be filed within 14 days of the order's
entry.  Charles, Loggins, and the Family Trust filed their notice of appeal
almost three months after the February 12 order was entered -- which
means appeal no. 1190952 must be dismissed as untimely.
Conversely, the notice of appeal filed by Charles, Loggins, the
Family Trust, and the Marital Trust in appeal no. 1190951 was filed too
soon -- no final judgment has been entered in the garnishment
proceedings.  Because the trial court's order denying their motion to quash
was not a final judgment, appeal no. 1190951 must be dismissed as
premature.
1190951 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and
Stewart, JJ., concur.
1190952 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
15
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Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Mendheim, J., concurs specially.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
16
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MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring specially in appeal no. 1190952).
In appeal no. 1190952, it appears to me that the main opinion
correctly applies the analysis in Kappa Sigma Fraternity v.
Price-Williams, 40 So. 3d 683 (Ala. 2009), pertaining to the settlement
order, and no party has asked us to overrule Kappa Sigma.5  However, I
write specially to inquire about what it is the trial court would need to do
in order to render its February 12, 2020, order a final judgment.  The trial
court specifically stated that the settlement is enforceable.   The Kappa
Sigma Court's only basis for determining after the fact that the settlement
order in that case was an "injunction" was that the "order commanded
[one settlement party] to take specific action -- to pay the settlement
proceeds to [the other settlement party] by March 9, 2009."  40 So. 3d at
690.  But if that is the only required characteristic of an injunction, then
many trial-court orders could be considered "injunctions" after the fact
5In Bates v. Stewart, 99 So. 3d 837, 851 (Ala. 2012), this Court
explained:  "Because the trial court's order in Kappa Sigma commanded
the parties to take specific action, this Court held that it had jurisdiction
to consider the appeal, even though the order appealed from was not a
final judgment."  (Emphasis added.)
17
1190951, 1190952
because trial courts routinely "order" parties to do or not do things, but we
ordinarily do not view those orders as injunctions.  As Justice Murdock
observed in his special writing in Kappa Sigma, if "such an order is
properly viewed as an injunction, the order could be procured only upon
proof of the four elements necessary for such equitable relief." Kappa
Sigma, 40 So. 3d at 696 (Murdock, J., concurring in the rationale in part
and concurring in the result).  Specifically, a permanent injunction
requires four elements: 
" '[A] plaintiff must demonstrate [1] success on the merits, [2] a
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not
granted, [3] that the threatened injury to the plaintiff
outweighs the harm the injunction may cause the defendant,
and [4] that granting the injunction will not disserve the public
interest.' "
Classroomdirect.com, LLC v. Draphix, LLC, 992 So. 2d 692, 702 (Ala.
2008) (quoting TFT, Inc. v. Warning Sys., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1238, 1242 (Ala.
1999)).  But the reality is that in both Kappa Sigma and in this case the
18
1190951, 1190952
elements of a permanent injunction were not satisfied; indeed, they were
not even contemplated by the parties or by the trial court.6
In a case in which this Court carefully explained why an order a
circuit court had entered based on an arbitration panel's decision was a
final judgment, the Court stated that the order was
"one that adjudicates the rights and responsibilities of the
parties.  Accordingly, it is enforceable as a final judgment.  In
essence, it is a final judgment that requires certain acts of both
parties.  As such, it contemplates further enforcement, and
6I also note that the February 12, 2020, order, in stating that "the
Mediation Settlement Agreement is due to be enforced" and ordering the
parties "to perform each and every act and to execute any and all
documents necessary or expedient to evidence and consummate the
mediation settlement agreement as heretofore agreed by the parties,"
relied upon the terms of the settlement agreement without incorporating
that document into the order.  However, Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
requires that "[e]very order granting an injunction shall set forth the
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained ...."  (Emphasis added.) 
Cf. Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2012) (Pryor, J., concurring) (reasoning that, because a district court
"did not intend to issue an injunction when it entered the order enforcing
the settlement agreement because the district court neither stated that it
was issuing an injunction nor complied with Rule 65(d)," Fed. R. Civ. P.,
the "order enforcing the settlement agreement is not an order of specific
performance that is appealable as an injunction ....").
19
1190951, 1190952
perhaps interpretative acts, by the circuit court. This,
however, does not make it a nonfinal judgment.5
"_________________________
"5'A final judgment is an order "that conclusively
determines the issues before the court and ascertains and
declares the rights of the parties involved."  Bean v. Craig, 557
So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. 1990).'  Lunceford v. Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 244, 246 (Ala. 1994).  The determination
whether a judgment is final does not depend on the title of the
order; 'rather, the test of a judgment's finality is whether it
sufficiently ascertains and declares the rights of the parties.'
Ex parte DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 571 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1990) (emphasis added) (citing McCulloch v. Roberts, 290
Ala. 303, 276 So. 2d 425 (1973)).  In McCulloch, the Court
explained as follows:
" 'In Ex parte Elyton Land Co., 104 Ala. 88,
91, 15 So. 939 (1893), this court held that:
" ' "...  The test of the finality of a
decree to support an appeal is not
whether the cause remains in fieri, in
some respects, in the court of chancery,
awaiting further proceedings necessary
to entitle the parties to the full measure
of the rights it has been declared they
have; but whether the decree which has
been rendered, ascertains and declares
these rights -- if these are ascertained
and adjudged, the decree is final, and
will support an appeal...." '
"290 Ala. at 305, 276 So. 2d at 426 (emphasis added)."
20
1190951, 1190952
Southeast Constr., L.L.C. v. WAR Constr., Inc., 110 So. 3d 371, 376-77
(Ala. 2012) (first emphasis added).  See also Helms v. Helms' Kennels,
Inc., 646 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994) (noting that "a trial court does have
residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to
enforce or interpret a final judgment").  
It seems to me that the issue presented in Kappa Sigma and in
appeal no. 1190952 is one of enforcement, not finality of a judgment, and
I do not believe that an order that does nothing more than approve a
settlement and require the parties to fulfill it should be viewed as an
interlocutory order, much less an "injunction." Cf. Saber v.
FinanceAmerica Credit Corp., 843 F.2d 697, 702 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining
that "[a] settlement agreement is a contract, and an order enforcing a
contract is ordinarily described as an order for specific performance. 
'Unlike an injunction, which can be employed procedurally to preserve
rights pending the outcome of the substantive litigation, the remedy of
specific performance is, generally speaking, dispositive of the substantive
rights of the parties.' United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483, 486
(3d Cir. 1969).  The fact that a specific date for compliance is attached to
21
1190951, 1190952
an order for specific performance of the settlement agreement does not by
itself transform the enforcement order into a mandatory injunction.");
United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of Nat'l Ass'n
of Realtors, 590 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding "no persuasive
authority" for "treating an order approving a settlement as an
injunction").  In sum, it seems to me that the main opinion correctly
applies Kappa Sigma as binding precedent in this case, but I question the
logic of the holding in that case.
22
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting in appeal no. 1190952).
I dissent from the main opinion as to appeal no. 1190952 and concur
with Justice Shaw's special writing except as to note 7.
23
1190951, 1190952
SHAW, Justice (dissenting in appeal no. 1190952).  
I believe that appeal no. 1190952 was timely; therefore, I
respectfully dissent to dismissing that appeal. 
The 14-day period of Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P., for filing a
notice of appeal, by its terms, applies to only interlocutory injunctions: "In
appeals from the following orders or judgments, the notice of appeal shall
be filed within 14 days (two weeks) of the date of the entry of the order or
judgment appealed from: (A) any interlocutory order granting ... an
injunction ...."  (Emphasis added.)  However, when an injunction is a final
judgment and not interlocutory, the 42-day period provided in Rule 4(a)(1)
instead applies.  Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. ECO Pres. Servs., L.L.C., 788
So. 2d 121, 125-26 (Ala. 2000) ("[T]he 14-day limit prescribed by Rule
4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P., applies only to interlocutory orders granting an
injunction .... [T]he injunction order is not an 'interlocutory order' and is
appealable without regard to the provisions of Rule 4(a)(1)(A). We
conclude that the 42-day limit, rather than the 14-day limit, applies ...."). 
See also Consolidated Elec. Contractors & Eng'rs, Inc. v. Center
Stage/Country Crossing Project, LLC, 175 So. 3d 642, 649 (Ala. Civ. App.
24
1190951, 1190952
2015) (holding that an order dissolving an injunction "was a final,
appealable judgment" from which a party had 42 days to appeal).  
The February 12, 2020, order at issue in appeal no. 1190952 resolved
a challenge to a settlement agreement and enforced the agreement
against the parties.  Under the authority of Kappa Sigma Fraternity v.
Price-Williams, 40 So. 3d 683 (Ala. 2009), the order is in the nature of an
injunction.  The settlement agreement itself resolved all claims by all
parties in the underlying action.  Often, parties that settle an action will
have the trial court enter the settlement agreement as a judgment, and
it appears that the February 12, 2020, order, in substance, does so. 
Because there was nothing more for the trial court to do in this action to
resolve the claims of the parties, the injunction was final, and the 42-day
period of Rule 4(a)(1), and not the 14-day period of Rule 4(a)(1)(A), applies
to the judgment.  Bekken v. Greystone Residential Ass'n, 227 So. 3d 1201,
1213 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (holding that an injunction that "did not
require further action by the trial court" was "a final judgment issuing a
permanent injunction rather than ... an interlocutory order issuing a
25
1190951, 1190952
preliminary injunction," and thus the 42-day period under Rule 4(a)(1)
applied).  
The Court in Kappa Sigma, supra, applied Rule 4(a)(1)(A) to the
appeal in that case, but there was no precise holding on whether the
injunction in that case was interlocutory because it was irrelevant: the
Court's decision addressed whether an order enforcing a settlement was
considered an injunction, and the appeal from it, filed within three days,
was timely under either Rule 4(a)(1) or (a)(1)(A).  In any event, Kappa
Sigma did not hold that all injunction rulings, interlocutory or not, were
controlled by Rule 4(a)(1)(A), which would have been contrary to the
language of the rule.  
This Court, on its own motion, must recognize the lack of appellate
jurisdiction.  McElroy v. McElroy, 254 So. 3d 872, 875 (Ala. 2017) ("[T]he
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and it is the duty
of an appellate court to notice the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction
ex mero motu.").7  The timely Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter,
7This Court's decision in Nettles v. Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell,
P.C., 276 So. 3d 663 (Ala. 2018), erroneously applied this rule to provide
26
1190951, 1190952
amend, or vacate the February 12, 2020, order filed in this case suspended
the time to file the notice of appeal.  See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.  The
notice was ultimately filed within 42 days of the trial court's timely denial
of that motion; therefore, I believe that appeal no. 1190952 is timely, and
I respectfully dissent to its dismissal. 
Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur.     
that this Court could, on its own motion, overrule unchallenged caselaw
and hold that appellate jurisdiction existed.  See Nettles, 276 So. 3d at
672-73 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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