Title: State v. O'Rear
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99487
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2012

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 99,487 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
CLIFFORD D. O'REAR, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
Under circumstances where the evidence establishes that a defendant intentionally 
shot another with the purpose of disabling the other and there is no evidence that the 
battery was unintentional, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of reckless 
aggravated battery under K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(A).  
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision filed April 24, 2009. 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; THOMAS L. BOEDING, judge. Opinion filed February 17, 2012. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming in part and dismissing in part is reversed. Judgment of the 
district court is reversed.  
 
 
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant. 
 
 
Edmond D. Brancart, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
Per Curiam:  A jury convicted Clifford D. O'Rear of one count of reckless 
aggravated battery under K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(A). On direct appeal to the Court of 
2 
 
Appeals, O'Rear argued, among other things, that the trial evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction because the State failed to show that he acted recklessly in 
intentionally shooting the victim. The Court of Appeals rejected this and O'Rear's other 
claims and affirmed his conviction. This court granted O'Rear's petition for review and 
has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (petition for review) and K.S.A. 22-3602(e) 
(same). 
 
 
We reverse O'Rear's conviction, concluding the evidence established that O'Rear 
intentionally shot a gun at the center mass of the victim; thus, he intended the conduct of 
shooting and the result of causing injury. We reject the State's argument that this intent 
was mitigated because O'Rear mistook the facts and acted under the mistaken and 
unreasonable belief that he needed to defend himself or others; these facts do not change 
the intentional nature of O'Rear's action to shoot and disable the victim.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
The facts are generally undisputed. On the morning of June 26, 2006, 60-year-old 
Samuel L. Jackson walked to his bank intending to cash a check. It was a cool but sunny 
morning, so Jackson wore a black stocking cap and sunglasses. Jackson, who suffers 
from arthritis in his hip and an injured knee, walks with a cane. Jackson's bank was 
located on the second floor of an office building, and Jackson rode the escalator up to the 
bank.  
 
 
O'Rear, a security guard at the bank, noticed Jackson as he reached the top of the 
escalator. O'Rear focused on Jackson because of the stocking cap and sunglasses. O'Rear 
then noticed something in Jackson's hand, which O'Rear first thought was a pistol. O'Rear 
testified that the object was slightly behind Jackson's leg and slightly obscured by 
Jackson's trousers. Jackson had his hand up to his face, and O'Rear thought it looked like 
Jackson was trying to hide his face from the camera that was above O'Rear's head. As 
3 
 
O'Rear "looked at [the object] for another second," he noticed that it was much longer 
and thought that it was a shotgun.  
 
 
At that point, O'Rear "jumped out of the chair," drew his Glock pistol, and moved 
in a direction to keep Jackson from the door of the bank "in case we had a gun fight, 
which I thought we were gonna have." O'Rear said once, "drop the gun," and Jackson 
then turned toward him.  
 
 
Jackson testified that as he got to the top of the escalator, he noticed O'Rear get up, 
throw down a newspaper, and then draw his gun. O'Rear started moving to Jackson's left, 
and Jackson assumed that O'Rear saw something toward that direction. Jackson testified 
that his only concern when he got to the top of the escalator was to clear out of the way of 
whatever was going on. Jackson put his cane a step ahead of him to maintain his balance 
and took a step toward the bank lobby to get out of the way. At this point Jackson heard 
O'Rear say, "I said drop it," so Jackson turned his head and upper body to look at O'Rear 
to see what was going on. Jackson was still unsure whether O'Rear was talking to him.  
 
O'Rear mistook Jackson's actions of turning to look at him as Jackson's attempt to 
"bring[ ] the gun to bear on me." O'Rear fired a single shot at "center mass." The bullet 
struck Jackson beneath his armpit and lodged in the back of his rib cage. The bullet also 
punctured Jackson's lungs, causing them to collapse. The shot caused Jackson to fall back 
down the escalator; the escalator carried Jackson back to the upper level and "chewed" 
into the side of his body. At this point, O'Rear discovered that what he thought was a 
shotgun was actually Jackson's cane and, according to his testimony, O'Rear "lost it." 
Nonetheless, at trial, O'Rear testified that if put in the same situation again, he would take 
the same actions.  
 
The State charged O'Rear with reckless aggravated battery in violation of K.S.A. 
21-3414(a)(2)(A). At trial, after the close of the State's case, O'Rear moved to dismiss the 
4 
 
charge of reckless aggravated battery, arguing that it was an intentional shooting and the 
State made no showing of reckless conduct. The State argued that O'Rear's choice to 
shoot under these circumstances disregarded the risks of his actions and, therefore, was 
reckless. The trial court denied O'Rear's motion on the ground that it was the jury's role to 
determine the question of whether this was a reckless act.  
 
The jury convicted O'Rear of aggravated battery as charged. O'Rear filed a motion 
for new trial, first arguing there was insufficient evidence to convict him of reckless 
aggravated battery because the "State's evidence was insufficient to show a conscious 
disregard, as it only was able to show the jury that the victim was riding up an escalator, 
was shot, and that he has no idea why." O'Rear also argued that juror misconduct 
occurred when a juror admitted to considering evidence outside that presented at trial. 
The trial court denied O'Rear's motion. The court sentenced O'Rear to 34 months' 
imprisonment but granted him 36 months of probation followed by 24 months' 
postrelease supervision.   
 
O'Rear appealed. 
 
Court of Appeals' Decision 
 
O'Rear raised numerous issues on appeal:  sufficiency of the evidence, 
prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, failure to instruct on lesser included 
offenses, and a sentencing error. State v. O'Rear, No. 99,487, 2009 WL 1140249 (Kan. 
App. 2009) (unpublished opinion).  
 
The Court of Appeals first addressed O'Rear's claim that the State failed to 
produce any evidence at trial that he acted recklessly because O'Rear, himself, maintained 
that he acted intentionally when he shot Jackson. The panel pointed to the State's 
evidence that O'Rear overreacted and failed to positively identify whether Jackson 
5 
 
possessed a weapon before he shot Jackson. The panel also noted that O'Rear had 
nonlethal weapons that he did not use, only shouted one vague order from a concealed 
location, which was out of Jackson's line of sight, and ultimately placed himself in a 
position to shoot in the general direction of the bank lobby. The panel found this evidence 
to be sufficient to prove that O'Rear acted "'under circumstances that show a realization 
of the imminence of danger to the person of another and a conscious and unjustifiable 
disregard of that danger.'" O'Rear, 2009 WL 1140249, at *3 (quoting K.S.A. 21-3201[c]). 
 
The Court of Appeals panel also rejected O'Rear's arguments regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, jury instruction error, and sentencing issues. 
O'Rear, 2009 WL 1140249, at *4-8. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The first issue before this court, and the only one we reach, involves O'Rear's 
claim that the State failed to present any evidence of reckless conduct. O'Rear maintains 
the evidence establishes that he acted "purposefully and willfully" rather than "recklessly 
and unintentionally." According to O'Rear, "[t]he State provided no evidence that [he] did 
not intend to shoot Jackson." Rather, he asserts the undisputed evidence, including his 
own testimony, is that he intended to shoot his gun and he purposefully shot at Jackson's 
center mass in an effort to disable him and render him unable to exchange gunfire.  
 
Conversely, as sufficient evidence of reckless conduct, the State points to evidence 
that O'Rear shot Jackson before he confirmed that Jackson was carrying a shotgun. The 
State argues: 
 
"O'Rear's reckless act was not in pulling the trigger, but instead it was in deciding 
to shoot with too little information. . . . He was reckless in acting on an uninformed 
decision to shoot while knowing the consequences of shooting a person but disregarding 
6 
 
that risk and pulling the trigger anyway. He never intended to shoot an unarmed bank 
customer who posed no imminent threat, which is what he did."  
 
Standard of Review 
 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, 
the standard of review is whether after reviewing all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 
992, 1003, 236 P.3d 481 (2010). 
 
K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(A) 
 
Various severity levels of aggravated battery are set forth in K.S.A. 21-3414. 
Under the statute, the culpability of a defendant's actions is defined in two ways:  (1) by 
the defendant's mental state and (2) by the type of physical contact or the nature of the 
bodily harm that results. Regarding the first categorization based on mental state, some 
severity levels of aggravated battery are based on a defendant "intentionally causing" 
bodily harm or physical contact in one of several specified ways. See K.S.A. 21-
3414(a)(1)(A)-(C). Other severity levels of aggravated battery are defined in K.S.A. 21-
3414(a)(2)(B) as a defendant "recklessly causing" great bodily harm or bodily harm in 
certain specified ways. Under the provision with which O'Rear was charged, K.S.A. 21-
3414(a)(2)(A), the law prohibits "recklessly causing great bodily harm" or disfigurement.  
 
"Reckless conduct" means "conduct done under circumstances that show a 
realization of the imminence of danger to the person of another and a conscious and 
unjustifiable disregard of that danger. The terms 'gross negligence,' 'culpable negligence,' 
'wanton negligence' and 'wantonness' are included within the term 'recklessness' as used 
in this code." K.S.A. 21-3201(c).  
7 
 
Cases Applying Statute 
 
Applying these statutory provisions to the facts of this case, O'Rear argues his 
conduct of intentionally shooting a gun at a person's center mass with the intent to render 
that person unable to engage in a gunfight is the same as that of the defendants in several 
Kansas cases where the court has concluded shooting at a person is intentional, not 
reckless. Primarily, as before the Court of Appeals, O'Rear relies on State v. Berkstresser, 
No. 94,131, 2007 WL 518832 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), arguing the decision 
most closely resembles his case.  
 
In Berkstresser, the defendant and the victim, Todd Clark, were involved in a 
dispute. Clark testified that Ryan Berkstresser intentionally shot him. Berkstresser 
testified that Clark was choking him so Berkstresser fired two shots at the ground to 
frighten Clark and then aimed higher. A jury found Berkstresser guilty of intentional 
aggravated battery in violation of K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A).  
 
On appeal, Berkstresser contended the trial court erred in not instructing the jury 
on the lesser severity levels of aggravated battery. Berkstresser did not request these 
instructions at trial. The Court of Appeals found that the evidence did not support the 
giving of instructions on the two levels of reckless aggravated battery because under 
either Clark's or Berkstresser's version of events, Berkstresser intentionally fired the gun 
toward Clark. The Berkstresser court stated that "such conduct is intentional rather than 
reckless." Berkstresser, 2007 WL 518832, at *6.  
 
The Berkstresser court distinguished the facts of its case from those in State v. 
Ochoa, 20 Kan. App. 2d 1014, 1020-21, 895 P.2d 198 (1995) (great bodily harm), 
disapproved on other grounds by State v. Valentine, 260 Kan. 431, 435, 921 P.2d 770 
(1996), disapproved by State v. Brice, 276 Kan. 758, 80 P.3d 1113 (2003) (disapproving 
statement that through and through bullet wound is great bodily harm as a matter of law). 
8 
 
The Ochoa court determined that reckless battery instructions were warranted when the 
defendant testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone; he merely shot in the air to 
frighten others. These facts, the court concluded, could support a verdict that the 
defendant acted recklessly. Ochoa, 20 Kan. App. 2d at 1020-21.  
 
O'Rear maintains his actions were similar to those of Berkstresser and unlike those 
of Ochoa; he intended to shoot, rather than frighten, Jackson. Further, O'Rear relies on a 
statement in State v. Bradford, 27 Kan. App. 2d 597, 602, 3 P.3d 104 (2000), in which 
the court quoted from Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Wyo. 1999), to support its 
holding that self-defense is not available when a defendant is charged with reckless 
conduct. In the quotation, the Wyoming court stated "'[a] charge of recklessness involves 
an unintentional act.'" 
 
Discussing these cases, the Court of Appeals in this case first noted the quotation 
in Bradford was dicta and related to a different issue. The court then stated: 
 
"The State does not suggest that O'Rear's conduct was unintentional. The State 
claims that O'Rear was purposeful and willful when he shot Jackson; however, he 
consciously and unjustifiably disregarded that danger when he fired at an unarmed 
civilian who posed no threat. Thus, although O'Rear's conduct was intentional, his 
conduct was also reckless."  
 
On review, O'Rear cites additional authorities that he maintains stand for the 
proposition that when a gun is intentionally fired in the direction of the victim, the 
conduct is intentional only and cannot also be found to be reckless. Some cases arise 
where a defendant is charged with an intentional homicide and argues his actions were 
reckless. 
 
Specifically, O'Rear cites to State v. Bailey, 263 Kan. 685, 691, 952 P.2d 1289 
(1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 
9 
 
(2006), because of its statement that "a defendant's actions in pointing a gun at someone 
and pulling the trigger are intentional rather than reckless." Bailey is discussed in State v. 
Deal, 293 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2012), this day decided, along with decisions 
applying a similar analysis, including State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 931 P.2d 664 (1997) 
(shooting; premeditated first-degree murder defendant seeks second-degree reckless 
lesser included offense instruction) and State v. Pierce, 260 Kan. 859, 927 P.2d 929 
(1996) (shooting; premeditated first-degree murder defendant seeks second-degree 
reckless lesser included offense instruction); see also State v. Cavaness, 278 Kan. 469, 
101 P.3d 717 (2004) (citing to Bailey in context of a death resulting from a beating; 
premeditated first-degree murder defendant seeks second-degree reckless lesser included 
offense instruction); State v. Jones, 267 Kan. 627, 984 P.2d 132 (1999) (citing to Bailey 
in context of a manual strangulation; intentional second-degree murder defendant seeks 
second-degree reckless lesser included offense instruction).  
 
 
These cases all apply K.S.A. 21-3402, which provides:  "Murder in the second 
degree is the killing of a human being committed:  (a) Intentionally; or (b) unintentionally 
but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life." K.S.A. 21-3402 explicitly distinguishes between intentional and 
unintentional but reckless conduct, clearly focuses the intent element on the result, and is 
a specific intent crime. See Deal, 293 Kan. at ___. In this appeal, O'Rear argues that 
aggravated battery is a general intent crime. Consequently, these cases, which relate to a 
specific intent crime, are potentially distinguishable. We need not determine whether the 
distinction is real because under the facts of this case O'Rear admitted to having the 
specific intent to both shoot Jackson and to cause sufficient bodily harm that Jackson 
could not return fire. O'Rear acted intentionally.  
 
 
Consequently, we agree with O'Rear that Berkstresser, 2007 WL 518832, supports 
his argument. Also relevant are some additional cases cited by O'Rear that apply the 
aggravated battery instruction:  State v. Graham, No. 94,777, 2006 WL 2043219 (Kan. 
10 
 
App. 2006) (unpublished opinion); Tucker v. State, No. 89,661, 2004 WL 90056, at *5 
(Kan. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion); State v. Roberts, No. 91,322, 2004 WL 
2977478 (Kan. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion).  
 
In the earliest of these aggravated battery cases, Roberts, the victim testified that 
Roberts intentionally shot him, whereas Roberts' version was that during a struggle the 
gun accidentally went off. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in 
failing to instruct on reckless aggravated battery because the evidence showed either that 
Roberts intentionally shot the victim or the gun discharged accidentally; there was no 
evidence Roberts acted recklessly. Roberts, 2004 WL 2977478, at *1-2. In Tucker, the 
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that the trial court should have 
provided the jury an instruction on reckless aggravated battery as a lesser included 
offense because the only evidence at trial was the victim's testimony that the defendant 
intentionally shot her. Tucker, 2004 WL 90056, at *5. Likewise, in Graham, the Court of 
Appeals determined that an instruction on reckless aggravated battery was not warranted 
because the evidence showed only that the defendant intentionally stabbed the victim. 
The court stated there was no evidence to support a conviction for reckless aggravated 
battery; this was not an instance "where she waved the knife around injuring [the victim] 
by chance." Graham, 2006 WL 2043219, at *3. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the State argues that these cases do not foreclose a determination 
that the purposeful act of shooting can be reckless. As the State points out, none of these 
cases considered the possible mitigating circumstance of a defendant misunderstanding or 
misperceiving the circumstances that caused the defendant to form the decision to shoot 
another person.  
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Reckless Action 
 
The State, in making these arguments, focuses on other facts, specifically those 
facts that led O'Rear to conclude he was facing a potential assailant and needed to 
respond with gunfire rather than a lesser degree of force. In other words, the State 
suggests that intentional acts can be considered reckless when the intent to commit the act 
is formed from a mistaken understanding of facts that lead the actor to believe his or her 
action is justified. Under the facts of this case, if this argument was presented by a 
defendant, it would be an imperfect self-defense argument. In essence, the defendant 
would be arguing that he or she had an honest, but objectively unreasonable, belief that 
force was necessary. In a turn of the usual posture, here the State argues that O'Rear 
formed an honest belief that force was necessary and, because the jury rejected O'Rear's 
arguments regarding self-defense, that belief must be considered objectively 
unreasonable. Rather than presenting this theory as a defense, the State uses this theory to 
argue that intentional conduct morphed into reckless conduct.  
 
This argument does not withstand an examination of the historical and conceptual 
roots of the imperfect self-defense doctrine, which reveals that a mistaken belief 
regarding the existence of facts that justify an action does not negate intent. The 
application of imperfect self-defense in Kansas was explained in State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 
Kan. 329, 339, 184 P.3d 247 (2008), where this court stated:  
 
"Perfect self-defense is a concept based on justification or excuse and operates as 
a complete defense. It applies broadly to all crimes involving the use of force against 
another. See K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse) et seq. Imperfect self-defense, in contrast, is based 
not on justification, but on mitigation and, thus, operates only to reduce criminal 
culpability to a lesser crime. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide § 139. Imperfect self-defense is 
'not a true defense; it does not absolve a defendant of criminal liability. It is, rather, a 
lesser degree of the crime of homicide.' State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 326, 160 P.3d 457 
(2007)."  
12 
 
 
The Kirkpatrick court explained that the Kansas Legislature had codified 
imperfect self-defense in both the voluntary and involuntary manslaughter statutes. 
K.S.A. 21-3403(b) defines voluntary manslaughter to include the intentional killing of a 
human being committed upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances 
existed that justified deadly force. The involuntary manslaughter provision, K.S.A. 21-
3404(c), provides for an unintentional killing during the commission of a lawful act in an 
unlawful manner. For purposes of this case, it is noteworthy that neither is defined in 
terms of "recklessness."  
 
Furthermore, the Kirkpatrick court explained that imperfect self-defense is only 
available in homicide cases, explaining:   
 
"[I]mperfect self-defense exists only as a lesser degree of the crime of homicide. 
'"Outside of homicide law, the concept [of imperfect self-defense] doesn't exist. . . . With 
respect to all other crimes, the defendant is either guilty or not guilty. . . . There is no 'in 
between.'"' 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(i) (2d ed. 2003) (quoting, Bryant 
v. State, 83 Md. App. 237, 244-45, 574 A.2d 29 [1990]) (imperfect self-defense only 
applies to homicide crimes and their 'shadow forms' such as attempted murder; it does not 
apply to assault, battery, assault with intent to disable, or maiming); see also Jones v. 
State, 357 Md. 408, 422-23, 745 A.2d 396 (2000) (doctrine of imperfect self-defense 
applies only to criminal homicide and its shadow forms; it has no applicability to other 
assaultive crimes)." Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. at 339-40.  
 
Based on this authority, the Kirkpatrick court held "imperfect self-defense is not a 
defense to criminal discharge of a firearm." Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. at 340. 
 
The Maryland cases on which the Kirkpatrick court relied are instructive. The 
most extensive discussion of the rationale of these cases is found in Richmond v. State, 
330 Md. 223, 623 A.2d 630 (1993), abrogated by Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 311, 
333, 951 A.2d 832-35 (2008) (abrogation does not alter Richmond's discussion of basic 
13 
 
principles but changes their application in context of felony murder where underlying 
predicate felony supplies malice).  
 
The Richmond court, as we did in Kirkpatrick, explained that imperfect self-
defense is a mitigation defense. Mitigation defenses, the court explained, have 
historically applied only to homicides and shadow offenses. Richmond, 330 Md. at 233. 
To explain this development, the court quoted from LaFave & Scott, Handbook on 
Criminal Law § 76, p. 582 (1972), in which the authors discussed another mitigation 
defense, heat of passion, and answered the question of "'"[w]hy is it that there exists such 
a crime as voluntary manslaughter to aid one who kills when provoked into a passion, yet 
there is no crime like, say, voluntary theft or voluntary mayhem to aid others who, 
reasonably provoked into a passion, steal from or maim their tormentors?"'" Richmond, 
330 Md. at 231-32. The authors explained:  
 
"'The answer is historical. With most crimes other than murder the English court came to 
have discretion as to the punishment and so could take extenuating circumstances into 
account in the sentencing process; but with murder the penalty remained fixed at death, 
without the possibility of making any allowance for the extenuating fact that the victim 
provoked the defendant into a reasonable passion. "The rule of law that provocation may, 
within narrow bounds, reduce murder to manslaughter, represents an attempt by the 
courts to reconcile the preservation of the fixed penalty for murder with a limited 
concession to natural human weakness."'" Richmond, 330 Md. at 231-32.  
 
In addition, the Richmond court explained the distinction between mitigation of 
culpability and proof of intent, noting that the distinction had led other courts to reject 
imperfect self-defense for nonhomicide crimes. The court expanded that reasoning by 
stating:  
 
"The defense of absence of the requisite specific intent to commit a crime should 
not be confused with the principle of mitigation. A defendant may intend the exact result 
14 
 
he brings about, but be entitled to mitigation because of the circumstances that caused 
him to act. On the other hand, a defendant not entitled to mitigation may present as a 
defense evidence of an honestly held though objectively unreasonable belief that is 
inconsistent with the specific intent required to convict." Richmond, 330 Md. at 234. 
 
This distinction underscores the conclusion that O'Rear acted intentionally. Here, 
the State's argument and the Court of Appeals' analysis confuses the requisite intent to 
commit a crime with the principle of mitigation and applies the concept of imperfect self-
defense in a nonhomicide situation where it is not available.  
 
The only evidence presented at trial was that O'Rear intended to shoot Jackson in 
center mass; in other words, he intended to cause great bodily harm to Jackson. The 
reasons he intended to do so may have been born of misperception, but the intention 
remained. The mental state of recklessness is incompatible with a mental state where a 
person acts with knowledge, willfulness, or purposefulness, meaning a person cannot act 
both intentionally and recklessly with respect to the same act. State v. Shannon, 258 Kan. 
425, 429, 905 P.2d 649 (1995). Rather, an act is either intended or not intended; it cannot 
simultaneously be both. Consequently, guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other. 
 
 
Under the facts of this case, the State failed to establish that O'Rear committed 
reckless aggravated battery under K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(A) because it did not prove that 
O'Rear recklessly caused great bodily harm to Jackson with a deadly weapon. Rather, the 
only evidence was that O'Rear intentionally caused the injury so that Jackson could not 
engage in a gun battle.  
 
Reversed. 
 
 
LUCKERT, J., dissenting:  I disagree with the majority and would find that there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Clifford O'Rear recklessly 
caused great bodily harm to Samuel Jackson.  
15 
 
 
As the majority points out, the standard of review requires us to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1003, 236 P.3d 
481 (2010). Rather than do this, the majority has focused on facts that are contrary to the 
verdict and has justified doing so because those facts prove a different crime than the one 
charged.  
 
Under the twist from the usual that occurred in this case, it was in O'Rear's 
potential best interest to admit to intentional actions, rather than to try to make his actions 
seem reckless. Hence, it was to his benefit to admit that he purposefully fired at center 
mass. Yet other evidence suggests that O'Rear was not paying attention to what was 
happening around him and reacted hurriedly without assessing the situation. From this 
evidence a reasonable jury could conclude O'Rear did not intentionally cause great bodily 
harm to Jackson. Rather, the jury could conclude that O'Rear's conduct in firing the gun 
was as reckless as his assessment of the situation.  Yet, the majority accepts O'Rear's self-
serving statement as unassailable.  
 
As an appellate court we should filter the evidence that is contrary to the verdict 
and set it aside, meaning that in this case we should not consider the evidence of 
intentional conduct but should examine the record for evidence that supports the verdict 
of reckless conduct. In doing so, an appellate court should not expect the State to have 
disproved the elements of other crimes, such as an intentional crime when it had charged 
a reckless crime. Consequently, applying the sufficiency of evidence standard of review, 
I would not exonerate a defendant because the State proved a less culpable crime when 
evidence could also be viewed as supporting the more culpable offense.  
 
As one court explained in sustaining a verdict for reckless endangerment despite 
evidence that the defendant purposely harmed the victim, when a legislature describes the 
requisite mental state for a crime, it describes the 
16 
 
"minimum content for a finding of guilt in a particular degree, not the maximum content. 
It is always a defense to prove that one is less culpable than charged. It is not a defense to 
prove that one is more culpable than charged. One does not defend against a charge of 
second-degree murder by proving that one was really guilty of first-degree murder. To 
prove culpability at a given level, the State is not required to disprove greater culpability, 
although a casual scanning of definitional sentences might sometimes lead us to believe 
so. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"To be guilty of reckless endangerment, the defendant must be shown to have 
possessed nothing less than a reckless disregard of the consequences of his life-
threatening act. He may, however, be shown to have possessed a more blameworthy mens 
rea, such as an intent to maim, but that excess culpability will be simply surplusage as far 
as the reckless endangerment charge is concerned. It certainly does not operate to 
exculpate him of the reckless endangerment. 
 
 
"This type of linguistic problem is a recurring phenomenon in the criminal law. 
Although slack linguistic usage frequently describes a lesser degree of guilt in terms of 
the absence of a greater degree of guilt, the absence of the greater guilt is never an 
affirmative element that must be proved." Williams v. State, 100 Md. App. 468, 477, 641 
A.2d 990 (1994). 
 
For example, the court noted:  "Second-degree murder is frequently described as 
unpremeditated murder. It does not, however, require proof of nonpremeditation." 
Williams, 100 Md. App. at 477. Further explaining its reasoning by example, the 
Williams court stated: 
 
"How, one might ask, could a single manslaughter, for instance, be both 
involuntary and voluntary? Linguistically, it would seem that the two are mutually 
exclusive. If, indeed, a conviction for involuntary manslaughter required demonstrated 
proof that the killing was not voluntary, then findings that it was both involuntary and 
voluntary would, indeed, be inconsistent. Because, however, a finding of involuntary 
17 
 
manslaughter may imply nothing more than the non-proof of voluntariness, simultaneous 
findings of both involuntariness and voluntariness would require no more than the merger 
of the lesser mens rea into the greater. Cf. State v. Parker, 128 Ariz. 107, 624 P.2d 304 
(1980)." Williams, 100 Md. App. at 478.  
 
I agree with this reasoning and disagree with the majority's position of focusing on 
the evidence contrary to the jury verdict rather than applying the correct standard of 
review. Because I agree with the Court of Appeals' treatment of the other issues it 
considered, I would affirm the conviction. 
 
ROSEN, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.