Title: Hilton v. Central Division of the Housing Court Department
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12406
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2019

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SJC-12406 
 
CHRISTINE HILTON & others1  vs.  CENTRAL DIVISION OF THE HOUSING 
COURT DEPARTMENT.2 
 
 
April 10, 2019. 
 
 
Summary Process.  Housing Court.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
This case is one of three that we decide today involving 
self-represented litigants engaged in summary process 
proceedings in the Central Division of the Housing Court 
Department (Housing Court).  See Adjartey v. Central Div. of the 
Housing Court Dep't, 481 Mass.     (2019); Evans v. Federal Home 
Loan Mtge. Corp., 481 Mass.     (2019).  The complexities of 
summary process proceedings and the challenges that self-
represented litigants face in such proceedings are set forth in 
detail in our opinion in the Adjartey case and its Appendix.  
Although most of the petitioners in this case are also 
petitioners in the Adjartey case, and although the two cases 
have broad areas of overlap -- including arguments that the 
petitioners are being treated unfairly in the Housing Court on 
the basis of, among other things, their pro se status -- the 
specific complaints that the petitioners raise here are not 
addressed in the Adjartey case. 
                                                 
 
1 Ismail Abdelhamed, Ruth Adjartey, Vesta Ballou, Lori 
Cairns, Jackeline Cucufate, Marjorie Evans, Gerard Hughes, Maria 
Navedo, Paul Norris, and John Schumacher. 
 
 
2 The Worcester Division of the Housing Court Department, 
named as the respondent, is now part of the Central Division.  
See Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Housing Court Dep't, 481 
Mass.     ,     n.2 (2019).  The court is a nominal party only.  
See S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996).  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, the petitioners filed a petition in the 
county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, claiming that the 
Housing Court violated their substantive and procedural due 
process rights as well as various other constitutional rights, 
including their rights to free association and free speech.  The 
Housing Court opposed the petition, and the single justice 
denied it without a hearing.  Shortly thereafter, the 
petitioners filed several additional papers, including a motion 
for reconsideration and an amended G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, 
all of which the single justice denied.3 
 
 
Each of the petitioners is or was involved in an eviction 
action stemming from the foreclosure of his or her home.4  Each 
of them is also a member of the Worcester Anti-Foreclosure Team 
(WAFT), a "mutual aid organization" in which "[e]very member 
helps every other member" work through the various stages of 
summary process.  The petitioners have appeared pro se in the 
Housing Court, as they do here, and collectively assert that 
they have been subject to disparate treatment in the Housing 
Court on the basis of their pro se status and their membership 
in WAFT.5 
 
 
More specifically, they argue that at least one judge in 
the Housing Court has questioned the activities of WAFT and 
whether individual petitioners drafted their own motions and 
briefs or whether other WAFT members drafted the materials on 
their behalf (questioned, in other words, whether any of the 
self-represented litigants are improperly being represented by 
other individuals or are engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
                                                 
 
3 The original petition included three petitioners.  The 
amended petition (which was filed without leave of court) 
included all of the petitioners named here.  The general claims 
and issues raised in the two petitions are the same.  We 
acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by more than thirty 
individuals. 
 
 
4 It appears that at least some of the petitioners continue 
to reside in their homes. 
 
 
5 Although the petitioners also suggest they have been 
subject to disparate treatment on the basis of certain other 
factors, including indigency and disability, their G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, petition focuses largely on issues related to their pro se 
status and their membership in the Worcester Anti-Foreclosure 
Team. 
3 
 
 
 
law) and, in the petitioners' view, generally treated WAFT 
members differently from other parties in summary process 
proceedings.6  They assert that they sought various forms of 
relief in the Housing Court by, for example, moving for the 
judge's recusal or seeking a change of venue, but that their 
efforts were unsuccessful. 
 
 
The petitioners ask this court to transfer their cases to 
judges who will, in their view, treat them fairly.  They also 
ask the court, among other things, to issue "[a] preliminary 
injunction against all executions issued against members of the 
WAFT" and to order the Housing Court not "to seek criminal 
evidence [against] pro se litigants helping each other." 
 
 
The petitioners have not, however, met their burden "to 
demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of other remedies," as 
they must for purposes of G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See, e.g., Russell 
v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2001).7  Relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, is extraordinary and to be used sparingly.  See 
MacDougall v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 505, 510 (2006), citing 
Soja v. T.P. Sampson Co., 373 Mass. 630, 631 (1977).  A single 
justice may properly deny a request for this type of 
extraordinary relief, as the single justice in this case did, 
"where there are adequate and effective routes other than 
[G. L.] c. 211, § 3, by which the petitioning party may seek 
relief."  Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 
(1996).  We recognize the difficulties that these petitioners 
may face as they navigate the judicial system without attorneys, 
and the potential complexities of their individual proceedings, 
but this does not exempt them from the requirements of G. L. 
                                                 
 
6 Self-represented litigants facing eviction are, of course, 
free to work informally with one another and with other 
nonattorneys to help them understand how to navigate their way 
through summary process cases.  See Adjartey, 481 Mass. at     , 
citing Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 549 
n.8 (2018).  What they cannot do, however, is represent each 
other, see, e.g., Varney Enters., Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 
79, 82 (1988) ("A person appearing pro se does not represent 
another . . ."), or engage in the unauthorized practice of law, 
see Adjartey, supra; LAS Collection Mgt. v. Pagan, 447 Mass. 
847, 850-851 (2006). 
 
 
7 We note as well that the petitioners have failed to comply 
with S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996), which requires 
them to "name as respondents and make service upon all parties 
to the proceedings before the lower court." 
4 
 
 
 
c. 211, § 3.  See International Fid. Ins. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 
841, 847 (1983) (unrepresented litigants are bound by same 
procedural rules as represented litigants). 
 
 
For example, the denial of a request for a particular 
judge's recusal could have been adequately addressed in a direct 
appeal from an adverse final judgment.  See Haddad v. Gonzalez, 
410 Mass. 855, 860-862 (1991) (considering denial of plaintiff's 
motion for recusal on direct appeal of summary process action).  
See also Mani v. United Bank, 458 Mass. 1027, 1028 (2011) 
(petitioners "did not demonstrate why the judge's or the clerk's 
allegedly improper actions could not be adequately addressed in 
a regular appeal from the final judgment").  Similarly, the 
petitioners are free to raise issues of disparate treatment or 
denial of any particular rights in a direct appeal of their 
summary process cases.  Indeed, the petitioners generally aver 
that WAFT members "continue to appeal on an individual basis in 
their own cases" (although they do not specifically state 
whether any of the petitioners in this case are doing so or 
elaborate on their statement that "the majority" of WAFT members 
who have sought to appeal have "had their appeals rights 
blocked"). 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Central Division of the Housing Court Department. 
 
Brian Linehan for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
 
Marjorie Evans, pro se. 
 
Christine Hilton, pro se. 
 
John Schumacher, pro se. 
 
Annette Bent, pro se. 
 
Mychelyne Oliveira, pro se. 
 
Jean Atkinson, Edna Austell, Steven Bourassa, Samantha 
Farrar, Patricia Ferreira Bonilla, Kelly Johnson, Felix Kangaru, 
Heather Kozak, Cheryl LeBlanc, Phillippe LeBlanc, William Marks, 
Deb McCarthy, Keith McKenzie, Paulette McKenzie, Miranda Morgan, 
Joseph Nuzzolilo, Cynthia O'Gara, Susan Osborne, Brian Potter, 
Thomas Saxe, Al Solitro, Sherry Stanley, Myron Swanston, Stefani 
Tubert, Cynthia White, Nunciata Sullivan, Lila Ortiz, Carl 
Rellstab, Carey Souda, Patricia O'Dell, Linda Potter, Jasmine 
Alvarez, Chris Scott, & Tracey Tobin, pro se, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief.