Title: Westlake Properties v. Westlake Pointe Ass'n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060518
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WESTLAKE PROPERTIES, INC., ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 060518 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
January 12, 2007 
WESTLAKE POINTE PROPERTY 
 OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
William N. Alexander II, Judge 
 
This appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court 
confirming a jury verdict in favor of a property owners’ 
association against the corporate developer and the corporate 
contractor for construction of a townhome community.  The 
property owners’ association maintained that as a result of 
negligence in development and construction, the septic system 
serving the community was damaged when massive soil erosion 
occurred on the community property.  The sufficiency of the 
evidence to support this negligence claim is not at issue in 
this appeal.  The principal issues we consider are whether the 
property owners’ association had standing to bring the action on 
its own behalf and, if so, whether the individual property 
owners were nonetheless necessary parties to the action.  We 
also consider whether an improper attempt to impeach a witness 
was adequately cured by a cautionary instruction to the jury and 
whether the jury was correctly instructed on the issue of 
proximate causation and the proper measure of damages. 
 
 
2
BACKGROUND 
Westlake Pointe is a townhome community located on Smith 
Mountain Lake in Franklin County.  Westlake Properties, Inc. 
began development of Westlake Pointe in 1998.1  In an original 
declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions recorded 
among the land records of Franklin County on May 1, 1998, 
Westlake Properties stated its intention, among other things, to 
establish “Limited Common Easements . . . which shall be 
easements to locate, maintain, repair, operate and replace sewer 
lines, septic systems and drainfields on the common area 
designated for drainfield use and within any sewer line, septic 
system or drainfields designated upon land adjoining the 
property.”  In that declaration, Westlake Properties further 
stated that it had “incorporated under the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, as a non-profit corporation, Westlake 
Pointe Property Owners Association, Inc.” (“the Association”).  
The express purpose for creating the Association was to delegate 
                     
1Realty Services, Inc. served as general contractor for the 
development of Westlake Pointe and is also a party to this 
appeal.  Realty Services is wholly owned by Wayne Yeatts, one of 
the principals of Westlake Properties, Inc.  Yeatts acknowledged 
that in the development and construction of Westlake Pointe, the 
two entities worked in concert and essentially functioned as 
one.  For convenience, hereinafter we will refer to the 
appellants jointly as “Westlake Properties.” 
 
 
3
to it “the powers of maintaining and administering the Community 
facilities” including the septic system. 
The declaration also provided that “[t]he Developer will be 
the initial owner of the sewage disposal system . . . and also 
of the permit issued by the state health commissioner for the 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the septic tank and 
drainfield sewage disposal system.”  The declaration further 
provided that “[t]he permit and ownership of the sewage disposal 
system including the drainfield or Limited Common Easements and 
the Common Areas upon which said easements are located . . . and 
[the Developer’s] responsibilities [to maintain and repair the 
system] will be transferred to the Association” upon substantial 
completion of the development or sale of seventy-five percent of 
the townhomes. 
Westlake Pointe was subsequently developed to consist of 
forty-six separately owned townhomes in eight buildings.  As 
originally designed, the septic system included eleven septic 
tanks and pump stations to service all the townhomes in the 
development.  Individual sewer lines connected each townhome to 
one of the eleven septic tanks.  Most of these septic tanks and 
the other fixtures of the septic system were installed in a 
slope, which was located behind four of the buildings and 
between them and the waterline of the lake.  Effluent from the 
 
 
4
septic tanks was pumped to a drainfield located several hundred 
yards from the development.  The drainfield was part of the 
common property that ultimately was deeded to the Association.  
Most of the fixtures of the septic system were located on lots 
that abutted and included portions of the slope which ultimately 
was deeded to the individual owners of the townhomes. 
In addition to the construction and installation of the 
septic system, the engineering design specifications of the 
Westlake Pointe development plans called for the soil of the 
slope, where the principal fixtures of the septic system would 
be located, to be filled, compacted, and graded in a specific 
manner to prevent excessive erosion and runoff.  Westlake 
Properties does not contest that it deviated significantly from 
these specifications for covering the septic system with the 
specified fill dirt and compacting and grading the slope.  The 
evidence showed that Westlake Properties negligently failed to 
use the proper quality of fill material, did not adequately 
compact the fill material used, and did not contour the slope to 
the recommended grade. 
After Westlake Pointe was fully developed, Westlake 
Properties turned control of the Association over to the 
property owners on May 2, 2003.  With the transfer of control, 
as provided by the declaration, the Association became the 
 
 
5
record owner of the common areas of the community, including the 
fixtures that made up the infrastructure of the common portions 
of the septic system, as well as the permit issued by the state 
health commissioner for its operation. 
The Association’s articles of incorporation expressly 
require it “to manage and [e]nsure the maintenance, repair, 
replacement and operation of the septic systems.”  The 
Association is required further to maintain the septic system 
“in compliance with the applicable state and local laws, 
ordinances, and regulations.”  To that end, the Association is 
authorized to make assessments on the property owners to pay for 
the maintenance and repair of the septic system.  Under the 
provisions of a recorded dedication of easements pertaining to 
Westlake Pointe, the individual property owners are required to 
maintain the sewer lines that connect their townhomes to the 
common fixtures of the septic system, and the Association has an 
easement to come onto the property of an individual property 
owner to repair or maintain the fixtures of the septic system. 
Prior to the transfer of control to the Association and 
with it the obligation to maintain and repair the septic system, 
the property owners had reported to Westlake Properties numerous 
problems with the slope where the common fixtures of the septic 
system were located.  Specifically, there had been multiple 
 
 
6
instances of soil erosion, known as “washouts,” as well as 
resulting structural damage to various fixtures of the septic 
system.  Westlake Properties took remedial efforts to repair the 
damage and rectify the situation, but problems with soil erosion 
along the entire slope persisted. 
From August 9 to August 10, 2003, heavy rain in the Smith 
Mountain Lake area resulted in a catastrophic failure of the 
Westlake Pointe septic system.  Due to excessive erosion in the 
slope, the septic tanks and pump stations that served a number 
of the townhomes were completely exposed and damaged in place or 
were dislodged entirely from their proper placement in the 
system so that they were no longer capable of functioning.  The 
erosion rapidly spread along the slope behind other buildings.  
As a result of the exposure and damage to the septic tanks and 
pump stations, the entire community was inundated by the smell 
of the raw sewage. 
The Franklin County Health Department investigated the 
damage to the Westlake Pointe septic system and directed the 
Association to “come up with a plan of action . . . to keep the 
sewage system operational and keep sewage off the ground and out 
of [Smith Mountain Lake].”  The Association was given fourteen 
days to hire an engineer and report back to the Department.  
According to the Department, the order was directed to the 
 
 
7
Association as the party “legally responsible” for the 
maintenance and repair of the septic system. 
The Association obtained estimates from several engineers 
for making repairs to the septic system and ultimately hired ACS 
Design LLC to devise a plan to address the erosion of the slope 
that was the origin of the problem with the system.  ACS Design, 
along with the general contractor hired to perform the 
anticipated repair work and a consulting geotechnical 
engineering firm, determined that the septic system would need 
to be entirely redesigned.  This would require the relocation of 
most of the septic system’s infrastructure, removal of the 
existing fixtures of the system, and construction of a retaining 
wall to prevent future erosion. 
According to Dan Early, the ACS Design engineer who 
designed the plan for the new septic system, the decision not to 
attempt to restore the system in accord with the original 
development plan was reached because the erosion of the slope 
made it “impossible to develop a repair [plan] that was 
specified on the original design.”  Early further stated that to 
repair the system so that it would be as originally designed 
could not have been achieved within the same budget and time 
frame that would be required to install the newly designed 
system. 
 
 
8
After the plan to replace the septic system was approved by 
the health department, the Association voted to assess each 
homeowner $13,050 to cover the cost of the construction.  The 
Association further determined, and advised the individual 
property owners, that it would seek to recover the cost of 
repairing the septic system from Westlake Properties.  According 
to Philip H. Martin, an officer of the Association, it was 
“assumed that any recovery [from Westlake Properties] would be 
redistributed to the record members of the Association” at the 
time the special assessment was made.  However, Martin further 
stated that “[n]o official decision has been made on that 
issue.” 
On June 17, 2004, the Association filed a motion for 
judgment against Westlake Properties seeking $750,000 in damages 
under theories of negligence, breach of an implied warranty, 
breach of contract, and indemnity.2  Westlake Properties 
responded to the motion for judgment by filing a plea in bar.  
As relevant to this appeal, Westlake Properties contended that 
“the Association lacks standing to bring this action” because 
the septic system “is not owned by the Association but is owned 
                     
2The motion for judgment was filed in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Roanoke.  Before any material proceedings occurred, 
however, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court of 
Franklin County. 
 
 
9
instead by the individual property owners who are not parties to 
this action.”  In a responding brief, the Association contended 
that it had standing to bring the action because it had a legal 
obligation to maintain the septic system. 
In an order dated August 15, 2005, the trial court denied 
Westlake Properties’ plea in bar, finding that the Association 
had standing to bring the action.  The trial court further 
ruled, however, that the Association “cannot proceed as a 
representative of the individual property owners.” 
Following entry of the trial court’s order denying the plea 
in bar, Westlake Properties filed a motion for reconsideration 
alleging that during a deposition, Martin had conceded that the 
Association was acting in a representative capacity for the 
property owners.  Westlake Properties alleged that this 
concession established both that the Association had no legal 
claim against Westlake Properties and that, even if it did, the 
property owners were nonetheless necessary parties to the 
action.  While conceding that the property owners might 
ultimately benefit from any recovery from Westlake Properties, 
the Association maintained that it sought to recover damages 
incurred by the Association and, thus, it was neither acting in 
a representative capacity for the property owners, nor were they 
necessary parties to the action. 
 
 
10
In an order dated September 28, 2005, the trial court 
denied Westlake Properties’ motion for reconsideration of the 
standing issue and further ruled that the property owners were 
not necessary parties to the action.  In that order, the trial 
court adopted by reference the findings of fact and rationale 
for its ruling as stated in the hearing on the motion for 
reconsideration: 
I still did not see how the homeowners’ association is 
proceeding in a representational capacity.  They are 
doing exactly what they are required to do. 
 
 
It is not the individual [property owner’s] 
damage, even though [the Association] might end up 
distributing any money collected to the homeowners. 
 
 
The [property owners] are not the people damaged.  
The damage has been done to the [A]ssociation because 
they are the ones required by the articles and by the 
way the corporation has been set up to maintain, to 
replace, to repair the damage, if any, and the whole 
system. 
 
 . . . . 
 
It doesn’t make the [property owners] necessary 
parties because the . . . [A]ssociation still will not 
be coming in and testifying about individual losses.  
It is not [the property owners’] loss.  It is the 
[A]ssociation’s loss, and I don’t think the homeowners 
are necessary parties in this. 
 
 
The necessary party is the [A]ssociation. 
 
By leave of the trial court, the Association filed an 
amended motion for judgment on November 23, 2005; however, the 
amended motion for judgment did not differ materially from the 
 
 
11
original motion for judgment.  Westlake Properties filed a plea 
in bar to the amended motion for judgment in which it restated 
its assertions that the Association lacked standing to bring the 
action and was acting in a representative capacity for the 
property owners, who, Westlake Properties again contended, were 
necessary parties to the prosecution of the action against it.  
The trial court did not rule on the plea in bar to the amended 
motion for judgment until the conclusion of the trial, at which 
time it was summarily overruled. 
In a jury trial beginning December 8, 2005 and continuing 
for five days, the trial court received evidence in accord with 
the above-recited facts.3  Because the issues raised in this 
appeal relate to actions of the trial court that arose during 
distinct incidents of the proceedings, we will recite additional 
relevant evidence and the nature of the proceedings pertinent to 
those issues within our discussion.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the jury found that Westlake Properties was negligent in 
                     
3Immediately prior to trial, upon motion of Westlake 
Properties to require an election of remedies, the trial court 
directed that the trial would be bifurcated, with the jury first 
determining the negligence claim, and that the trial would 
proceed to the contract, warranty, and indemnity claims only “if 
necessary.”  The Association objected to the trial court 
requiring it to elect its remedy and to the bifurcation of the 
trial, but has not assigned cross-error to those rulings.  
Accordingly, we will express no opinion thereon. 
 
 
 
12
its construction of the septic system and awarded the 
Association $641,788.43.  The parties agree that this amount is 
the precise cost of removing the damaged original system, 
constructing the replacement septic system, and regrading the 
slope.  In a final order dated January 12, 2006, the trial court 
confirmed the jury’s verdict and award of damages, overruling 
Westlake Properties’ motion to set aside that verdict as 
contrary to the law and the evidence. 
DISCUSSION 
This Court awarded Westlake Properties an appeal limited to 
the following assignments of error: 
1. The trial court properly ruled before trial 
that the Association could not proceed in a 
representational capacity but erred thereafter by 
permitting the Association to proceed in a 
representational capacity to recover damages for 
nonparty property owners.  
 
2. The trial court erred by ruling that the 
Association otherwise had standing.  
 
[3]. The trial court erred by concluding that 
individual property owners were not necessary parties.  
 
[4]. Where the Association called Westlake 
Properties’ president to the stand for the purpose of 
informing the jury that the president had been 
convicted of a felony, the trial court erred by 
denying defendants’ motions for mistrial on that and 
other grounds.  
 
[5]. The trial court improperly instructed the 
jury concerning liability and damages[:]  (a) Where 
the Association told the jury in opening statement 
that the jury would address the question of whether 
 
 
13
the slope failure was caused by the August 2003 storm 
and offered evidence accordingly, the trial court 
erred by taking that question away from the jury and 
by ruling that defendants could not argue that the 
slope failure was caused by excessive rainfall and the 
August 2003 storm[; and] (b) The trial court also 
improperly instructed the jury concerning the measure 
of damages. 
 
Standing and Necessary Parties 
Westlake Properties initially contends that the trial 
court’s pre-trial ruling that the Association could not act in a 
representative capacity for the individual property owners 
constitutes a factual finding that the Association was, in fact, 
attempting to act in that capacity.  Westlake Properties further 
contends that subsequent events at trial show that, despite the 
trial court’s order, the Association continued to act as the de 
facto representative of the property owners, rather than 
pursuing any claim of its own.   
In support of these contentions, Westlake Properties notes 
that in his opening statement, counsel for the Association 
referred to the trial as an opportunity to “bring out into the 
light . . . the situation through which Westlake Pointe Property 
Owners Association and its members, [t]he folks who are here – 
many of whom are here out in the audience today, . . . lived the 
last few years.”  The Association’s counsel later stated, 
referring to the property owners, that “the folks . . . living 
here at the lake [in] this development . . . are complaining 
 
 
14
about the fact that they had to lay out of their [own] pocket[s] 
$641,000 of their own money.” 
After the opening statements were made and outside the 
presence of the jury, Westlake Properties contended that counsel 
for the Association had, by making reference to the property 
owners in his opening statement, conceded both that the 
Association lacked standing to proceed on its own and that the 
property owners were necessary parties to the case.  The trial 
court, while rejecting these contentions, nonetheless admonished 
counsel for the Association that “you are representing the . . . 
Association; you’re not representing the individual homeowners 
. . . .  Keep the record clear.” 
Contrary to the interpretation made by Westlake Properties, 
nothing in the trial court’s August 15, 2005 order suggests that 
it made a factual finding that the Association had been 
attempting to proceed jointly or solely as a representative of 
the individual property owners.  Rather, the trial court was 
clear in its ruling that the Association had independent 
standing to maintain the action in its own name, that this was 
the only basis upon which the Association could present its case 
to the jury, and that the Association could not “proceed as a 
representative of the individual property owners.”  These 
findings were emphasized in the trial court’s summation, 
 
 
15
subsequently incorporated into its September 28, 2005 order, at 
the conclusion of the hearing on Westlake Properties’ motion to 
reconsider. 
The isolated comments made by counsel for the Association 
during opening statements, when viewed out of context, might 
well imply representation of the individual property owners.  
These comments do not, however, constitute an “admission” that 
the Association was acting in a representative capacity for the 
individual property owners.  Rather, we are of opinion that 
these comments were merely references to the property owners 
collectively as the members of the Association; references that 
were at worst irrelevant and certainly far short of an admission 
or an assertion of representative capacity by the Association in 
this suit. 
We recognize that although opening statements are not 
evidence, the introduction of irrelevant or prejudicial issues 
by counsel during opening statements can be grounds for a 
mistrial.  See, e.g., Forsberg v. Harris, 238 Va. 442, 445, 384 
S.E.2d 90, 91-92 (1989)(counsel’s mentioning that defendant was 
employed in the insurance industry was grounds for setting aside 
verdict).  Here, the full context of counsel’s opening statement 
made clear to the jury that the issue before it would be whether 
and to what extent the Association was damaged by Westlake 
 
 
16
Properties’ negligence.  The evidence subsequently presented at 
trial was limited to that claim for damages.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the Association was not acting in a representative 
capacity for the individual property owners with respect to any 
individual damages they may have suffered as a result of 
Westlake Properties’ negligence.4 
We turn now to Westlake Properties’ principal contention 
that even if the Association was not acting in a representative 
capacity for the individual property owners, the trial court 
erred in ruling that the Association had independent standing to 
proceed against Westlake Properties for the damage to the septic 
system.  In this regard, Westlake Properties reasons that 
although it conveyed to the Association the common areas of the 
development, the real property comprising the slope where the 
erosion occurred and where the majority of the common fixtures 
of the original septic system were located was deeded to 
                     
4Our analysis is not altered by the likelihood that the 
Association has an agreement, or at least an informal 
understanding, that any recovery from the litigation would be 
distributed to the individual property owners.  Such a 
distribution would be entirely in keeping with the nature and 
purpose of the Association under the circumstances of this case.  
The Association is not intended to be a for profit enterprise.  
To the extent that fees and assessments paid by the members 
exceed the expenses incurred by the Association and a reasonable 
reserve, it is not improper for excess funds, however acquired, 
to be returned pro rata to the membership. 
 
 
 
17
individual property owners whose townhomes abut the slope.  
Westlake Properties further reasons that the Association’s 
obligation to maintain the septic system is secondary to that of 
the individual property owners, who are required by the recorded 
documents to “maintain[], repair or replace[] . . . the sewage 
lines within [each] lot [owned] by the [individual] lot 
owner[s].”  Accordingly, Westlake Properties concludes that the 
Association could not establish damages independent from the 
damages incurred by the individual property owners on their 
lots.  We disagree. 
A party has standing if it can “show an immediate, 
pecuniary, and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a 
remote or indirect interest.”  Harbor Cruises, Inc. v. State 
Corp. Comm., 219 Va. 675, 676, 250 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1979) (per 
curiam).  “The concept of standing concerns itself with the 
characteristics of the person or entity who files suit.  The 
point of standing is to ensure that the person who asserts a 
position has a substantial legal right to do so and that his 
rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.  In 
asking whether a person has standing, we ask, in essence, 
whether he has a sufficient interest in the subject matter of 
the case so that the parties will be actual adversaries and the 
issues will be fully and faithfully developed.”  Cupp v. Board 
 
 
18
of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 
407, 411 (1984)(internal citation omitted); see also Grisso v. 
Nolen, 262 Va. 688, 693, 554 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2001); Goldman v. 
Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371, 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001). 
It is clear, as Westlake Properties contends, that the 
Association did not own the real property, that is the slope, 
where the majority of the common fixtures that made up the 
original septic system were located.  On this record, it is also 
beyond dispute that the Association owned, and was the party 
legally responsible for the maintenance and repair of, the 
fixtures of the septic system that served the entire 
development.  Westlake Properties’ assertion that the individual 
property owners had the primary responsibility to maintain the 
septic system as a whole is simply contrary to clear and 
unambiguous express provisions of the pertinent recorded 
documents which require the individual property owners to 
maintain their individual sewer lines between their townhomes 
and the common septic system, but places responsibility for 
maintenance and repair of the common fixtures of the system 
exclusively with the Association. 
It also cannot be disputed that in order to function as 
designed, the original septic system was required to be placed 
in ground that had been properly graded and compacted to avoid 
 
 
19
excessive erosion.  Thus, even though the Association did not 
own the real property, the damage caused to the septic system by 
the erosion of the slope injured the Association and it had “an 
immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest” in recovering 
for that damage.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did 
not err in ruling that the Association had standing to bring 
this action against Westlake Properties. 
We turn now to Westlake Properties’ contention that the 
individual property owners were necessary parties in this suit. 
Westlake Properties asserts that “the interests of individual 
property owners were so ‘bound up’ with the interest of the 
Association that the presence of the property owners . . . was a 
necessity,” and their absence as parties deprived the trial 
court of the power to render complete justice.  Westlake 
Properties maintains that this is so, in part, because a portion 
of the damages sought by the Association included the regrading 
of the slope and installation of a retaining wall.  It further 
maintains that there is the possibility that individual property 
owners might have claims against Westlake Properties for damages 
unrelated to the septic system and, thus, that it may be 
subjected to further litigation.  Accordingly, Westlake 
Properties contends that even if the Association had standing to 
proceed in the matter, the trial court erred in failing to find 
 
 
20
that the individual property owners were nevertheless necessary 
parties to the action.  Again, we disagree. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that fixtures comprising 
a septic system are installed below the surface of the soil.  It 
follows then that the process of repairing or replacing a 
damaged septic system necessarily requires invasion of the soil 
and the subsequent restoration of the real property where the 
damaged and replaced fixtures of the system were located and 
where the new fixtures are installed.  In this case, the 
Association was given easements over the lots of the individual 
property owners so that it could satisfy its duty to maintain 
and repair the sewer system.  As the owner of the dominant 
estate, the Association had the duty to maintain those easements 
in a manner consistent with the use allowed.  Here that duty 
required the restoration of the disturbed real property in which 
the sewer system was located.  See Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead 
Civic Ass'n, 253 Va. 264, 273, 483 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1997); 
Pettus v. Keeling, 232 Va. 483, 490, 352 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1987).  
Thus, to the extent that the Association’s damages include 
repairs and improvements to real property owned by individual 
property owners, those damages were nonetheless direct damages 
incurred by the Association as a result of its obligation to 
maintain and repair the septic system. 
 
 
21
A necessary party is one who has an interest in the subject 
matter of the litigation that is likely to be defeated or 
diminished by the litigation.  Raney v. Four Thirty Seven Land 
Co., 233 Va. 513, 519, 357 S.E.2d 733, 736 (1987).  While the 
individual property owners may have had, and may still have, 
claims against Westlake Properties for other damage suffered as 
a result of its negligence, the repair of the damaged slope was 
a natural consequence of the Association’s duty to maintain the 
septic system and the easements in which the fixtures of the 
system were located.  By seeking recovery only for the direct 
damages it incurred, the Association’s action against Westlake 
Properties neither implicated nor imperiled any claim by an 
individual property owner for damages not related to the 
replacement of the damaged septic system.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court did not err in ruling that none of the 
individual property owners were necessary parties to the action 
filed by the Association. 
Impeachment of an Adverse Witness 
During its case-in-chief, the Association called Coy 
Cooper, president of Westlake Properties, as an adverse witness.  
At the outset of Cooper’s testimony, the Association’s 
co-counsel asked, “Now, Mr. Cooper, in this case in front of the 
jury we’re trying to get some of the truth out here, and one of 
 
 
22
the truths that’s in this case is [that] you’ve been convicted 
of a felony, correct?”  Counsel for Westlake Properties 
immediately objected to the question, and the witness did not 
answer the question.  The trial judge retired to chambers with 
counsel for both parties.  The conference in chambers was not 
recorded.  Thereafter, Cooper completed his direct testimony and 
the proceeding was continued with the understanding that the 
issue would be considered further. 
On the next day of the trial, Westlake Properties expanded 
its objection to the attempt to impeach Cooper to include a 
motion for mistrial.  The Association agreed to withdraw the 
question, but contended that a cautionary instruction to the 
jury would be sufficient to cure any harm the question may have 
caused.  Westlake Properties contended that a mistrial was the 
only proper course as “cautionary instructions are of little 
efficacy and in fact may highlight the thing that we are all 
trying to minimize.”  Over Westlake Properties’ objection, the 
trial court denied the motion for mistrial and instructed the 
jury that the “question was an improper question, it should not 
have been asked, and I am telling you now to just disregard the 
fact that that question was asked and do not consider it in any 
way.” 
 
 
23
During oral argument of this appeal, the Association’s 
appellate counsel acknowledged that the question posed to Cooper 
was improper and attributed that error to the fault of an 
inexperienced associate counsel who had not adequately 
researched the issue.  Even accepting this explanation, it 
appears from the record that the question was posed to impeach 
Cooper in a manner calculated to have the most dramatic effect 
on the proceedings and with no identifiable purpose other than 
to impugn the character of the witness.  We condemn in the 
strongest possible terms the use of such tactics, even if they 
result from the inexperience of counsel rather than the 
purposeful disregard of procedural rules.  The issue remains, 
however, whether the trial court properly denied the motion for 
a mistrial. 
“The decision whether to grant a motion for a 
mistrial is a matter submitted to the trial court's 
sound discretion.”  Lowe v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 268, 
272, 601 S.E.2d 628, 630 (2004) (citation omitted).  
Generally, “absent a manifest probability of prejudice 
to an adverse party, a new trial is not required when 
a court sustains an objection to an improper remark or 
question by counsel and thereafter instructs the jury 
to disregard the remark or question.”  Id. at 272, 601 
S.E.2d at 630.  However, “when the prejudicial effect 
of an improper remark or question is overwhelming, 
such that it cannot be cured by a cautionary 
instruction,” a trial court must grant a new trial, if 
requested.  Id. at 273, 601 S.E.2d at 631.  In 
determining whether [the remark or question] is so 
inherently prejudicial that a cautionary instruction 
cannot cure the prejudice, several factors must be 
considered.  Those factors include “the relevance and 
 
 
24
content of the improper reference, . . . whether the 
reference was deliberate or inadvertent[, and] the 
probable effect of the improper reference.”  Id. at 
273, 601 S.E.2d at 631. 
 
Castle v. Lester, 272 Va. 591, 610-11, 636 S.E.2d 342, 353 
(2006). 
Westlake Properties notes that in Smith v. Lohr, 204 Va. 
331, 336-37, 130 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1963), this Court held that a 
trial court erred in overruling a motion for mistrial when a 
party was called as an adverse witness for the sole purpose of 
impeaching him through evidence of a prior felony conviction.  
Our decision in Smith can be distinguished on the ground that 
here the trial court did not permit the impeachment question to 
be answered and instructed the jury to disregard the question 
and not to speculate on the answer that might have been given.  
Moreover, the verdict ultimately rendered by the jury does not 
suggest that it was influenced by this isolated incident, as 
that verdict is wholly in accord with the relevant evidence.  
Cooper did not materially deny the negligence of Westlake 
Properties and Wayne Yeatts, vice-president of that corporation, 
virtually conceded that negligence during his testimony that no 
compaction tests were made of the soil used to fill around the 
septic tanks and no effort was made to ensure that the final 
contour of the slope was achieved as specified by the engineers.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court, under the particular 
 
 
25
circumstances of this case, did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Westlake Properties’ motion for mistrial and instead 
exercising its discretion to issue a curative instruction to the 
jury.5 
Jury Instruction Issues 
The principal point of contention between the parties was 
whether the erosion of the slope and the attendant damage to the 
septic system had been caused by the alleged negligence in the 
construction of the septic system or was the result of unusually 
heavy rain during the period preceding the significant erosion 
in August 2003.   
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the Association 
sought to preclude Westlake Properties from arguing that the 
damage was solely caused by the unusually heavy rain as an act 
of nature otherwise known as a force majeure defense.  Relying 
upon Cooper v. Horn, 248 Va. 417, 448 S.E.2d 403 (1994), the 
Association contended that in order to be entitled to assert 
such a defense, Westlake Properties was required to show that no 
human agency was a contributing factor in the damage incurred, 
                     
5Westlake Properties’ assignment of error also asserts that 
the trial court erred in denying its motion for mistrial on 
“other grounds.”  We will not address such a general and 
unspecific assertion of error.  See Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 
285, 290-91, 455 S.E.2d 18, 21-22 (1995). 
 
 
 
26
and that the heavy rain “ ‘was the sole proximate cause of the 
injury.’ ”  Id. at 425, 448 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Southern Ry. 
v. Neal, 146 Va. 229, 239, 135 S.E. 703, 706 (1926)) (emphasis 
added).  The trial court sustained the Association’s motion, 
with Westlake Properties noting its objection. 
Relevant to this issue, the Association offered and was 
granted the following jury instruction: 
 
If you find that the defendants or either of them 
are negligent and the negligence of either or both of 
them was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss, 
then you shall find your verdict for the plaintiff 
regardless of the rain. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Westlake Properties objected to this instruction, 
contending that “it would be possible for the jury to find from 
[the] evidence that neither [of the] defendants were negligent 
and that the cause of the slope failure was, in fact, [an] 
extreme storm, the rain.”  Westlake Properties proffered a 
general instruction on superseding cause, which the trial court 
refused.  Westlake Properties did not proffer a specific 
instruction on a force majeure defense. 
On appeal, Westlake Properties maintains that the trial 
court erred in granting the Association’s jury instruction 
because it removed from the jury the determination of causation 
by requiring the jury not to consider whether the rain was a 
 
 
27
proximate cause of the failure of the slope.  Thus, according to 
Westlake Properties, the jury was left essentially to conclude 
that the failure of the slope must have been caused by Westlake 
Properties’ negligence. 
“There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.”  
Molchon v. Tyler, 262 Va. 175, 182, 546 S.E.2d 691, 696 (2001); 
Panousos v. Allen, 245 Va. 60, 65, 425 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1993).  
While it is self–evident that the rain must have been a 
proximate cause of the erosion of the slope, the record evidence 
would not have supported a defense by Westlake Properties that 
the rain was the sole proximate cause of the failure of the 
slope. 
By precluding the jury from considering the factor of the 
rain, the trial court did not, as Westlake Properties suggests, 
direct the jury to find that Westlake Properties was negligent 
and that its negligence caused the failure of the slope.  
Rather, the instruction properly focused the jury on the 
question of whether Westlake Properties was negligent and if so, 
whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the erosion of 
the slope and the ensuing damage to the septic system.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
granting the instruction in question. 
 
 
28
Lastly, we turn to the measure of damages issue raised by 
Westlake Properties.  The trial court granted the Association’s 
instruction defining the measure of damages as “the reasonable 
cost of repairing the property plus the necessary and reasonable 
expenses shown by the evidence to have been incurred by the 
[Association] as a result of the damage to the property.”  
Westlake Properties objected to this instruction, contending 
that the correct measure of damages was the cost to repair and 
restore “the septic system substantially in accordance with the 
plans and specifications under which the septic system was 
originally constructed” as required by the language of the 
recorded documents, rather than the cost of the septic system 
designed and installed by the contractor and engineers hired by 
the Association after the original system failed. 
On appeal, Westlake Properties maintains that the 
replacement septic system was of superior quality to the system 
that was originally designed and that the damages for its 
negligence should have been limited to the cost of restoring the 
system to its original design.  Westlake Properties’ assertion 
is unavailing for the simple reason that the uncontested 
evidence was that the cost for restoring the septic system as 
originally designed would have exceeded the cost of constructing 
the new system. 
 
 
29
“The measure of damages in a negligence action is that 
amount necessary to compensate the injured party for the damages 
proximately caused by the tortious conduct.”  Lochaven Co. v. 
Master Pools by Schertle, Inc., 233 Va. 537, 541, 357 S.E.2d 
534, 537 (1987).  In Lochaven Co., the damage award on a tort 
claim was held inadequate because property damage elements shown 
to have been proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct were 
not compensated in the award.  Id. at 543, 357 S.E.2d at 538.  
Regarding a claim on a breach of contract theory, a cost measure 
of damages was not appropriate because the benefit to be derived 
from the complete removal and replacement of an improperly 
constructed swimming pool was grossly disproportionate to the 
cost of doing so.  Id.  The evidence in this case, by contrast, 
showed that the removal of the original septic system, its 
replacement with the newly designed system, and the necessary 
repair of the slope was the most cost-effective and beneficial 
method of remedying the damages caused by Westlake Properties’ 
negligence.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s 
instruction on the measure of damages was the correct statement 
of the law under the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that there is no error in the 
trial court’s judgment confirming the jury’s verdict.  
 
 
30
Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the Association will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed.