Title: Sutton v. Jordan's Furniture, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13382
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13382 
 
MATTHEW SUTTON1  vs.  JORDAN'S FURNITURE, INC. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 4, 2023. – March 28, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.2 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Labor, Wages, Overtime compensation, 
Minimum wage.  Minimum Wage.  Practice, Civil, Class 
action, Summary judgment, Attorney's fees, Costs, 
Retroactivity of judicial holding.  Statute, Construction.  
Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of statute.  
Retroactivity of Judicial Holding.  Damages, Attorney's 
fees. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 19, 2019. 
 
The case was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J., on 
motions for summary judgment; a motion to amend the judgment and 
for attorney's fees and costs was also heard by her; and a 
second amended judgment was entered by her. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
Brant Casavant (Hillary Schwab also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
Julie B. Brennan (Ariel D. Cudkowicz & Dawn Reddy Solowey 
also present) for the defendant. 
Joshua D. Nadreau, for Retailers Association of 
Massachusetts, was present but did not argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Michael J. Sheehan, P. Kevin Connelly, & Barrick Bollman, 
of Illinois, Robert J. Cordy, Andrew Liazos, Frank J. Bailey, 
& Selena Fitanides for Pioneer Public Interest Law Center. 
 
Raven Moeslinger for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association & others. 
 
Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, & Alexander 
Sugerman-Brozan, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney 
General. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The primary issue in this case is whether the 
commissions-based compensation scheme for sales employees of a 
retail employer, Jordan's Furniture, Inc. (Jordan's), complied 
with the overtime statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, and the Sunday 
pay statute, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50).3  We held in Sullivan v. 
Sleepy's LLC, 482 Mass. 227, 228 (2019) (Sleepy's), that 
(1) employers must make "separate and additional payments" to 
one hundred percent commission sales employees, to compensate 
the employees "for every hour [they] worked over forty hours or 
on Sunday"; and (2) "draws and commissions cannot be 
retroactively allocated" to meet these requirements "even if 
 
3 Portions of the record and the parties' briefs were 
impounded pursuant to a Superior Court order.  The impoundment 
is "lifted as to the information in the opinion, to the extent 
necessary in resolving the case."  Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 
474 Mass. 372, 373 n.1 (2016). 
3 
 
th[o]se draws and commissions equaled or exceeded the minimum 
wage for the employees' first forty hours of work and one and 
one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty 
hours or on Sunday." 
This class action lawsuit was brought in the Superior Court 
by a former Jordan's employee on behalf of all persons employed 
at one of Jordan's Massachusetts stores as sales employees 
between 2016 and 2019 and who worked more than forty hours in 
any work week or on any Sunday.  The plaintiff class alleged 
that Jordan's failed to comply with the requirements this court 
outlined in Sleepy's.  See Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 228-229.  On 
cross motions for summary judgment, the motion judge agreed and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class because 
Jordan's compensation plan "failed to remit separate and 
additional payments to its sales [employees] for overtime and 
Sundays," thereby violating the overtime and Sunday pay 
statutes.  Subsequently, after the plaintiff class sought 
statutory attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party, the 
same judge utilized the lodestar method to calculate the award 
of attorney's fees, discounted hours spent in settlement 
negotiations, and enhanced the lodestar figure by using a four 
times multiplier.4 
 
4 The lodestar method is a means of calculating attorney's 
fees that involves "multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
4 
 
Jordan's now appeals, maintaining that its compensation 
scheme complied with the overtime and Sunday pay statutes, that 
the judge erred in applying our decision in Sleepy's 
retroactively, and that there is no private right of action for 
violations of the Sunday pay statute.5  Both parties also appeal 
from aspects of the judge's calculation of attorney's fees. 
We conclude, as the motion judge did, that Jordan's 
compensation scheme violated G. L. c. 151, § 1A, and G. L. 
c. 136, § 6 (50).  Further, the judge did not err in applying 
our holding in Sleepy's to this case.  We also conclude that the 
Sunday pay statute is enforceable under the Wage Act's private 
right of action, G. L. c. 149, § 150. 
Regarding attorney's fees, we hold that the judge abused 
his discretion by relying exclusively on common fund cases to 
support the application of a four times lodestar multiplier and 
by categorically deducting time spent toward settlement 
negotiations. 
Accordingly, while we affirm the order on summary judgment, 
we vacate so much of the second amended judgment as awards 
attorney's fees to the plaintiff class, and remand this matter 
 
spent on the case times a reasonable hourly rate."  Fontaine v. 
Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324 (1993). 
 
5 Jordan's does not argue that there is no private right of 
action to enforce the overtime statute. 
 
5 
 
to the Superior Court for recalculation of the award of 
attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.6 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  Jordan's is a Massachusetts 
corporation that owns and operates retail furniture stores in 
Massachusetts and other States.  Matthew Sutton, the named 
plaintiff, is a former Jordan's sales employee.  He represents a 
class of employees who worked at Jordan's Massachusetts stores 
as "sale consultant[s]" or "sleep technician[s]" between June 
19, 2016, and August 1, 2019, and worked more than forty hours 
in any work week or on any Sunday.  Jordan's sales employees 
work at its retail stores and sell furniture and related 
products to customers.  As part of their regular work schedules, 
Jordan's sales employees often work on Sundays.  Some of 
Jordan's sales employees occasionally work more than forty hours 
per week.  All members of the plaintiff class worked either on a 
Sunday or over forty hours in at least one week between 2016 and 
2019. 
Jordan's compensated its sales employees on a one hundred 
percent commission basis.  Sales employees only earned 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
Jordan's by the Pioneer Public Interest Law Center; the 
Retailers Association of Massachusetts; and the Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association, Fair Employment Project, Inc., 
and Public Justice.  We also acknowledge the amicus brief 
submitted in support of the plaintiff class by the Attorney 
General. 
 
6 
 
commissions if they made sales.  Jordan's utilized a system of 
draws under its Sales Draw Plan (Draw Plan), which functioned 
like a loan or advance on the sales employees' future 
commissions because the draws were deducted, or "pa[id] back," 
from the sales employees' commissions once earned.  Employees 
received a draw that was at least equal to the minimum hourly 
wage for all time that they worked in one week, up to forty 
hours, plus one and one-half times the minimum wage for any time 
that they worked over forty hours in one week or for any time 
that they worked on Sundays. 
The Draw Plan included three primary types of draws:  (1) a 
base draw, (2) an overtime draw, and (3) a premium draw.  
Jordan's calculated the base draw by multiplying the number of 
hours the employee worked during the pay period by a base hourly 
rate, which was equivalent to the minimum wage rate at the time.  
The overtime draw was calculated by multiplying the hours an 
employee worked over forty hours in a given week by the base 
hourly rate and then applying a 1.5 overtime multiplier.  
Similarly, the premium draw was calculated by multiplying the 
hours a sales employee worked on Sunday by the base hourly rate, 
and then by a 1.5 "premium" multiplier.  All three categories of 
draws were "recoverable from future commissions." 
Jordan's only used future commissions to cover an 
employee's draw if the employee had a "negative draw balance" -- 
7 
 
which was created where commissions earned during a pay period 
were less than the total draw owed for the same period.  In 
those instances, the negative balance of the recoverable draw 
was carried forward to future weeks "and deducted from future 
Sales Earnings."  Sales earnings included commissions. 
b.  Hypotheticals.  Given the complexity of Jordan's pay 
scheme, we provide the following hypotheticals for clarity.  In 
these hypotheticals, we will use a base hourly rate of $10 and a 
1.5 premium multiplier for time worked on a Sunday.7 
The over-all effect of Jordan's compensation scheme was 
that a sales employee's gross pay for a particular week would be 
an amount equal to his or her total draw if the sales employee's 
commissions did not exceed the total draw for that week, 
although this would create a negative draw balance for 
subsequent weeks if the commissions were less than the total 
draw.  Conversely, in weeks where the sales employee's 
commissions exceeded his or her total draw, the sales employee's 
gross pay would be in an amount equal to his or her commissions 
minus the negative draw balance (if any), but would not be any 
lower than the amount of the employee's total draw. 
 
7 These hypotheticals only address Sunday premium pay; the 
overtime draw functioned the same as the Sunday premium draw. 
 
8 
 
i.  Example no. 1.  If a sales employee worked forty hours 
in a given week (week no. 1), which included ten hours on a 
Sunday, the employee's total draw would be $450, comprised of a 
$300 base draw (30 hours x $10 hourly rate) plus a $150 premium 
draw (10 hours x $10 hourly rate x 1.5 premium multiplier).  If 
this employee also earned $400 in commissions in week no. 1, 
then the employee's gross pay would be $450, with a $50 negative 
balance ($400 commissions - $450 total draw) carried over to the 
following week (week no. 2).  We will also assume that the 
hypothetical sales employee has no negative draw balance going 
into the first week (week no. 1) of the hypothetical. 
If during week no. 2, the sales employee worked thirty 
hours on days other than Sunday and earned $400 in commissions, 
the employee's gross pay would be $350 rather than $400 because 
the $50 negative balance from week no. 1 would be deducted from 
the employee's commissions. 
In total, the sales employee would receive $800 in gross 
pay over the two weeks ($450 from week no. 1 + $350 from week 
no. 2). 
ii.  Example no. 2.  If the sales employee worked forty 
hours in week no. 1 on days other than Sunday and earned $400 in 
commissions, the employee would receive $400 of gross pay.  In 
this scenario, the employee's commissions would be equal to the 
total draw and therefore there would not be any negative balance 
9 
 
carried over into week no. 2.  We will also assume that the 
sales employee has no negative draw balance going into the first 
week (week no. 1) of the hypothetical. 
If during week no. 2, the sales employee worked thirty 
hours on days other than Sunday and earned $400 in commissions, 
the employee's gross pay for week no. 2 would be $400. 
The sales employee would again receive $800 of gross pay 
over the two week period ($400 from week no. 1 + $400 from week 
no. 2). 
Notably, the sales employee in these two hypotheticals 
would earn the same gross pay over a two week period regardless 
of whether the employee worked on Sunday in week no. 1.  In 
short, under Jordan's Draw Plan, the premium Sunday rate has no 
impact on this sales employee's compensatory bottom line, at 
least when the employee's gross pay from the two weeks is 
combined.8 
 
c.  Procedural history.  In 2019, Sutton commenced a 
putative class action lawsuit against Jordan's on behalf of 
 
8 Although a sales employee's gross pay would increase if 
the employee earned higher commission while working on Sundays, 
this fact does not influence our analysis of whether Jordan's 
complied with the Sunday pay statute, as an employer's 
obligation to provide Sunday premium pay, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 136, § 6 (50), is distinct from and in addition to the 
employer's obligation to pay employees their earned commission.  
See G. L. c. 149, § 148. 
 
10 
 
himself and similarly situated sales employees to recover unpaid 
wages.  Sutton alleged in count one and count two of his 
complaint that Jordan's failed to pay its sales employees 
overtime and Sunday pay as required by G. L. c. 151, § 1A, and 
G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), respectively.  Sutton brought these 
claims under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150.  A 
judge later certified the following class of plaintiffs: 
"All individuals whom Jordan's Furniture, Inc. ha[d] 
employed in the positions of "sales consultant[s]" or 
"sleep technician[s]" at one or more of its retail stores 
located in Massachusetts, during the time period between 
June 19, 2016 and August 1, 2019 and who worked more than 
forty hours in any workweek or on any Sunday." 
 
 
The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment.  
Jordan's sought summary judgment on all counts.  The plaintiff 
class sought partial summary judgment as to Jordan's liability 
for failure to comply with the overtime and Sunday pay statutes, 
reserving the calculation of damages for trial.  The motion 
judge allowed the plaintiff class's motion for partial summary 
judgment, and accordingly entered summary judgment on the issue 
of liability in favor of the plaintiff class.9 
 
9 In count three of the complaint, Sutton alleged that 
Jordan's violated G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), by requiring employees 
to work on Sundays at a rate of less than one and one-half times 
the employee's hourly rate.  The motion judge entered summary 
judgment on this count in favor of Jordan's on the ground that 
it was redundant, but otherwise denied Jordan's motion for 
summary judgment as to the remaining counts.  Neither party has 
raised the dismissal of count three on appeal. 
 
11 
 
Thereafter, the parties came to an agreement regarding 
damages, which included all single and mandatory treble damages 
and prejudgment interest, both in gross and on a per member 
basis for all 247 members of the class, but which did not 
include attorney's fees.  The parties filed a joint motion to 
enter the proposed form of judgment that expressly reserved the 
parties' right to appeal.  The motion was allowed by the judge 
who had granted the plaintiff class summary judgment. 
The plaintiff class then filed a motion before the same 
judge to amend the judgment and a petition for fees and costs 
seeking statutory attorney's fees under G. L. c. 149, § 150, and 
G. L. c. 151, § 1B.10  Specifically, the plaintiff class sought 
$1,035,110 in attorney's fees plus $17,181.98 in costs.  The 
judge allowed the motion and petition in part.  Adopting the 
lodestar method, the judge first determined the reasonable hours 
spent on the case by counsel for the plaintiff class, and 
discounted the hours spent in settlement negotiations and 
mediation attempts.  The judge then calculated a base lodestar 
figure of $161,840 and enhanced the award by using a multiplier 
of four, rather than a multiplier of five as requested by the 
 
10 Pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, an employee who prevails 
in an action against his or her employer for certain Wage Act 
violations, including failure to pay "wages earned," G. L. 
c. 149, § 148, is entitled to the "costs of the litigation and 
reasonable attorneys' fees." 
 
12 
 
plaintiff class.11  An amended judgment entered awarding the 
plaintiff class $647,360 in attorney's fees plus $7,631.98 in 
costs, for a total award of $654,991.98. 
Because of an inadvertent error in calculating damages, the 
parties subsequently filed a motion to amend the judgment again, 
which was granted by the same judge.  Jordan's timely appealed 
from the Superior Court judge's finding of liability on summary 
judgment and from the award of attorney's fees.  The plaintiff 
class filed a cross appeal, seeking review only of the judge's 
ruling on the fee petition.  Specifically, the plaintiff class 
challenges the judge's decision to exclude time spent on 
settlement negotiations and mediation attempts from the total 
reasonable hours spent on the case.  After the cross appeals 
were entered in the Appeals Court, we allowed Jordan's petition 
for direct appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We review a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo."  
Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 330 
(2021).  "Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
 
11 In his endorsement on the plaintiff class's motion to 
amend the judgment and petition for fees and costs, the judge 
initially stated that he was applying a multiplier of 4.5 to the 
lodestar amount.  However, in his final calculation of 
attorney's fees, the judge applied a multiplier of four. 
13 
 
to judgment as a matter of law."  Id.  When both parties move 
for summary judgment, as the parties did here, "we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
summary judgment was entered."  Id.  See Miramar Park Ass'n v. 
Dennis, 480 Mass. 366, 377 (2018). 
b.  Relevant statutes.  We start our analysis with an 
examination of the statutory language of the overtime and Sunday 
pay statutes in effect at the relevant time.  The overtime 
statute, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, mandates that "employee[s] 
receive[] compensation for [their] employment in excess of forty 
hours at a rate not less than one and one half times [their] 
regular rate."  The Sunday pay statute, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), 
as amended through St. 2014, c. 182, required that employers 
"compensate all employees engaged in . . . work performed on 
Sunday[s] . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half times 
the employee's regular rate."12 
As mentioned at the outset of this opinion, we previously 
examined the application of the overtime and Sunday pay statutes 
 
12 The Sunday pay statute, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), was 
amended, effective January 1, 2019, decreasing the compensation 
rate to 1.4 times the employee's regular rate.  St. 2018, 
c. 121, §§ 5, 37.  The parties accounted for this rate change 
when determining damages.  General Laws c. 136, § 6 (50), was 
then legislatively abolished, effective January 1, 2023.  
St. 2018, c. 121, §§ 9, 36.  Given that the events at issue in 
this case occurred between 2016 and 2019, the Sunday pay statute 
was in effect for the relevant time period. 
14 
 
to one hundred percent commission employees in Sleepy's, 482 
Mass. at 228, which we summarize here.  In Sleepy's, the 
plaintiffs were sales employees who were "paid on a '[one 
hundred percent] commission' basis:  their wages took the form 
of a recoverable draw of $125 per day, and any sales commissions 
in excess of the draw."  Id. at 229.  Their total compensation 
"always equaled or exceeded the minimum wage times the number of 
hours they worked up to forty hours, plus one and one-half times 
the number of hours they worked over forty hours or on Sunday."  
Id.  Even so, we concluded that these employees were entitled to 
"separate and additional" payments for overtime and Sunday hours 
and that "employers may not retroactively reallocate and credit 
payments made to fulfill one set of wage obligations against 
separate and independent obligations."  Id. at 228-229, 233, 
239-240.  We reasoned that this outcome was necessary to fulfill 
the three purposes of the overtime and Sunday pay statutes, 
which are "[1] to reduce the number of hours of work, 
[2] encourage the employment of more persons, and [3] compensate 
employees for the burden of a long workweek" (citation omitted).  
Id. at 233-234, 239. 
 
c.  Compliance with overtime and Sunday pay requirements.  
Although Jordan's Draw Plan is different in some respects from 
the compensation scheme in Sleepy's, it suffers from the same 
fundamental flaws as the scheme in Sleepy's -- namely, once the 
15 
 
layers of complexity have been peeled back, it is clear that 
Jordan's plan fails to provide employees with "separate and 
additional" payments for overtime and Sunday hours.  Sleepy's, 
482 Mass. at 228.13 
 
Jordan's "tracked all regular, overtime, and Sunday hours, 
exactly calculated the regular and premium pay for those hours, 
and paid that amount to each sales employee."  Although these 
payments then appeared as separate line items on a sales 
employee's pay stub, they in fact were not separate from and in 
addition to the sales employee's commissions, because, as 
explained supra, negative draw balances were deducted from the 
employee's future commissions; thus, the draw payments that an 
employee received did not have an impact on the employee's gross 
pay over a broader time frame.  In our Sunday premium 
hypothetical above, while the sales employee would receive a 
higher gross pay in week no. 1 if he or she worked on a Sunday, 
the employee would nonetheless receive the same total 
compensation over a two week period as if the employee had not 
 
13 Jordan's also emphasizes that under its compensation 
scheme an employee would never be paid less than minimum wage 
plus all statutory premium pay.  This argument fails.  In 
Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 236, we noted that the mere fact that 
"the payments that the employees received always equaled or 
exceeded one and one-half times the minimum wage for all 
overtime hours worked [and all hours worked on Sundays]" did not 
alter our analysis.  This fact is likewise immaterial here. 
 
16 
 
worked on a Sunday during week no. 1, because the employee's 
commissions in week no. 2 would be reduced to offset the Sunday 
premium pay from week no. 1.14 
In this way, Jordan's Draw Plan is similar to the 
compensation scheme used by the defendant employer in Mullally 
v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 529-530 (2008).  In 
Mullally, the "employer used a payroll formula founded on a 
fluctuating 'base pay rate' that reflected the number of 
overtime hours an employee actually worked."  Sleepy's, 482 
Mass. at 234, citing Mullally, supra at 529.  "Nonetheless, the 
employee would receive 'approximately the same hourly wage 
regardless [of] whether [he or she] work[ed] overtime.'"  
Sleepy's, supra, quoting Mullally, supra at 532.  In Mullally, 
supra, we concluded that the employer's payroll formula violated 
the overtime statute because it "evade[ed] the economic 
disincentive to have an employee work more than forty hours a 
week."  Likewise, Jordan's compensation scheme also evades the 
purpose of the overtime and Sunday pay statutes because it does 
not incentivize Jordan's to have its sales employees work 
shorter weeks. 
 
14 In its briefing, Jordan's presents a hypothetical of its 
own to show that it provided higher compensation for overtime 
work.  It suffices to say that Jordan's ignores in its 
hypothetical that a negative balance would be carried over to 
the next week, thereby negating any higher compensation. 
 
17 
 
Jordan's contends that its compensation scheme was lawful 
because it never retroactively allocated commissions to overtime 
and Sunday pay, unlike the defendant employer in Sleepy's.  But, 
regardless of whether the allocation is retroactive, it is a 
violation of the Wage Act to "[]allocate and credit payments 
made to fulfill one set of wage obligations against separate and 
independent obligations."  Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 233.  The 
commissions owed to Jordan's sales employees were intended to 
fulfill wage obligations separate from the overtime and Sunday 
pay requirements, and thus it was impermissible for Jordan's to 
make deductions from its employees' commissions to cover its 
overtime and Sunday pay obligations. 
Simply put, a sales employee's commissions are one type of 
compensation, and overtime and Sunday pay are separate types of 
compensation that require employers to make additional payments 
to employees.  By attempting to allocate amounts owed to its 
sales employees in commissions toward their overtime and Sunday 
premium draws, Jordan's did not provide its sales employees with 
separate and additional overtime and Sunday pay, thereby 
violating the overtime and Sunday pay statutes.15 
 
15 Jordan's contends that it "merely applied the formula it 
had chosen for calculating the amount of an employee's 
commission[s]."  It is true that the Wage Act does not provide a 
specific means for calculating commissions.  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148.  However, an employer's formula cannot violate the Wage 
Act or be used to circumvent other obligations under the Wage 
18 
 
Jordan's alleges that two opinion letters from the former 
division of occupational safety (division), bearing the same 
language as the letters sent to the defendant employer in 
Sleepy's, and one opinion letter from the Attorney General's 
office indicate that its pay plan complied with the overtime and 
Sunday pay statutes.16  See Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 232 nn.13, 14.  
However, "[a]n opinion letter interpreting a statute or 
 
Act.  See id. ("No person shall by a special contract with an 
employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section 
or from [§ 150]"). 
 
16 With respect to the first letter from the division, 
Jordan's sought guidance from the division in 2003 as to whether 
"inside sales employee[s]" could be paid on a one hundred 
percent commission basis and, if so, whether such employees were 
owed overtime and Sunday pay, what form these payments could 
take, and how they should be calculated.  The division sent 
Jordan's an opinion letter in March 2003, which advised that 
inside sales employees can be paid on a one hundred percent 
commission basis, but that such employees are still owed 
overtime and may be owed Sunday pay.  The Attorney General's 
office also responded to Jordan's 2003 request for guidance with 
a letter, which expressly announced that "the following response 
is for informational purposes only and should not be construed 
as a legal opinion of the Attorney General."  More to the point, 
although the letter stated that inside sales employees can be 
paid on a one hundred percent commission basis, it did not 
address Jordan's questions relating to overtime and Sunday pay. 
 
Lastly, Jordan's sought guidance from the division again in 
2009 as to how an employee's overtime should be calculated if 
the employee occasionally "works random shift(s) . . . in a 
different role in which the employee earns a base hourly rate 
plus a commission."  In December 2009, the division sent 
Jordan's an opinion letter, which advised that "inside 
salespersons are subject to the state overtime law" and that an 
"employee's regular hourly rate must not be less than the 
minimum wage." 
 
19 
 
regulation 'does not have the binding force attributable to a 
full-blown regulation.'"  Id. at n.11, quoting Massachusetts 
Gen. Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 371 Mass. 705, 707 (1977).  
Additionally, no deference is given to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute if it is "contrary to plain language 
of the statute and its underlying purpose."  Sleepy's, supra, 
quoting Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 450 (2004).  
Therefore, to the extent that these nonbinding letters could be 
interpreted contrary to the rule announced in Sleepy's, they did 
not have the force of law. 
d.  Retroactive application of Sleepy's.  Jordan's argues 
that the motion judge erred in applying our decision in Sleepy's 
retroactively.  We disagree.  "Where a decision does not 
announce new common-law rules or rights but rather construes a 
statute, no analysis of retroactive or prospective effect is 
required because at issue is the meaning of the statute since 
its enactment."  McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. 257, 261 
(2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011).  In Sleepy's, we 
interpreted how the overtime and Sunday pay statutes apply to an 
employer's compensation scheme for one hundred percent 
commission employees.  Sleepy's, 482 Mass. at 228-229.  We 
therefore determined the meaning of these statutes "since 
[their] enactment."  McIntire, petitioner, supra.  Accordingly, 
20 
 
the judge properly applied our holding in Sleepy's to this case.  
See Sleepy's, supra. 
e.  Private right of action.  There is no express private 
right of action in the Sunday pay statute, G. L. c. 136, 
§ 6 (50), and the Sunday pay statute is not included in the list 
of statutory provisions that can be enforced under the Wage 
Act's private right of action, G. L. c. 149, § 150.  
Nonetheless, we conclude that the Sunday pay statute can be 
enforced under the Wage Act's private right of action through 
G. L. c. 149, § 148. 
Under the Wage Act: 
"An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of 
[§] 33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 152, 152A, 159C 
or 190 or [G. L. c. 151, § 19,] may . . . institute and 
prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for 
himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action 
for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for 
any lost wages and other benefits." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 150.  Included in the enumerated list of 
privately enforceable sections is § 148, which requires 
employers to timely pay their employees "wages earned."  Section 
148 states that "[e]very person having employees in his service 
shall pay weekly or biweekly each such employee the wages earned 
by him."  G. L. c. 149, § 148.  "When an employee has completed 
the labor, service, or performance required of him . . . he has 
'earned' his wage" (quotation and citations omitted).  Fernandes 
v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 124 n.6 (2014). 
21 
 
Section 148 applies to all wages earned, including those 
prescribed by statute.  See Drive–O–Rama, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 
63 Mass. App. Ct. 769, 769–770 (2005) (failure to pay time and 
one-half for work on legal holidays, as required by G. L. 
c. 136, § 13, violated Wage Act).  When an employee works on a 
Sunday, he or she earns Sunday pay pursuant to G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148; therefore, a Sunday pay violation is also a violation of 
§ 148 of the Wage Act.  In turn, an employee can bring an action 
to recover for Sunday pay violations under the Wage Act's 
private right of action.17 
 
Our decisions in Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC, 489 Mass. 
514 (2022); Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257 
(2020); and Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337 
(2008), do not foreclose this conclusion.  In Devaney, supra at 
515, 518-519, we held that the Wage Act's private right of 
action cannot be used to pursue a claim for failure to pay 
overtime arising solely under the Federal Fair Labor Standards 
 
17 Jordan's also argues that the purposes of the Sunday pay 
statute and the Wage Act, as evidenced through their respective 
legislative histories, indicate that the Sunday pay statute 
cannot be enforced under the Wage Act.  However, since the plain 
language of the Sunday pay statute and the Wage Act are clear 
and unambiguous as to whether Sunday pay constitutes "wages 
earned," we need not reach their legislative histories.  See 
Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019) ("Ordinarily, where 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent" [citation omitted]). 
 
22 
 
Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., because the "FLSA's 
comprehensive remedial scheme" preempts the Wage Act.  Here, 
preemption is not an issue because the Sunday pay statute is a 
State law and it does not contain its own remedial scheme.  See 
Devaney, supra at 522. 
 
In Donis, 485 Mass. at 265, we held that, since the 
Prevailing Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 26-27H, has its own 
private right of action, an employee could not recover for a 
violation of this act under the Wage Act's private right of 
action, because this "would . . . render the private right of 
action created by the Prevailing Wage Act utterly unnecessary, 
thereby violating the canon of statutory construction against 
superfluity."  Given that the Sunday pay statute does not 
contain its own private right of action, there is no risk of 
"superfluity" here.  Donis, supra.  Notably in Donis, we also 
said that: 
"[h]ad the Legislature intended for violations of the 
Prevailing Wage Act to be remedied under the Wage Act, 
. . . the Legislature simply could have omitted a private 
cause of action from the Prevailing Wage Act, thus implying 
that aggrieved employees would have to look elsewhere for a 
remedy, including under the Wage Act." 
 
Id.  Here, unlike in Donis, the Legislature "omitted a private 
cause of action" under G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), "thus implying" 
that employees can look to the private right of action under the 
23 
 
Wage Act to remedy violations of the Sunday pay statute.  Donis, 
supra. 
 
Lastly, in Salvas, 452 Mass. at 372-373, we held that the 
Wage Act's private right of action cannot be used to enforce 
mandatory unpaid meal breaks, pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 100, 
because this provision was not included in the enumerated list 
of provisions under G. L. c. 149, § 150.  Our decision in Salvas 
does not foreclose the Wage Act's private right of action from 
being used to enforce the Sunday pay statute because a Sunday 
pay violation also constitutes a violation of § 148, which is 
included in the enumerated list.  By contrast, the issue in 
Salvas, supra at 374-375, concerned whether the employer 
properly provided its employees with unpaid meal breaks, a 
benefit that may possess monetary value under a breach of 
contract claim despite not constituting actual wages. 
f.  Attorney's fees.  The plaintiff class was entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, 
because it prevailed at summary judgment in this matter.  The 
Superior Court calculated the attorney's fees owed to the 
plaintiff class using the lodestar method, and then enhanced the 
award by applying a four times multiplier.  See note 11, supra.  
Jordan's argues that the judge abused his discretion in applying 
the four times multiplier.  The plaintiff class also challenges 
the judge's calculation of attorney's fees, but on the grounds 
24 
 
that the judge erred in discounting the time that counsel for 
the plaintiff class spent in settlement negotiations.18 
We review a judge's award of attorney's fees for an abuse 
of discretion.  See LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 
Mass. 757, 772 (2016).  "The amount of a reasonable attorney's 
fee, awarded on the basis of statutory authority[] . . . is 
largely discretionary with the judge, who is in the best 
position to determine how much time was reasonably spent on a 
case, and the fair value of the attorney's services."  Fontaine 
v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324 (1993).  However, a judge's 
discretion in calibrating such an award is not limitless.  "We 
find abuse of discretion when we determine that a decision 
resulted from a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors 
relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and 
 
18 The plaintiff class also requests reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal.  The 
plaintiff class is statutorily entitled to appellate attorney's 
fees and costs, pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, insofar as the 
plaintiff class has prevailed on the issues raised on appeal by 
Jordan's.  See Reuter v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 476 n.8 (2022).  
Accordingly, the plaintiff class may, within fourteen days of 
the date of the rescript, file with the clerk of the court for 
the Commonwealth an application for fees and costs, together 
with any supporting material.  See Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 
10-11 (2004).  Thereafter, Jordan's shall have fourteen days 
within which to respond to the plaintiff class's application. 
 
25 
 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 768 
(2021). 
i.  Lodestar multiplier.  The lodestar method is generally 
used for calculating attorney's fees under fee-shifting 
statutes.  See LaChance, 475 Mass. at 772; Fontaine, 415 Mass. 
at 325.  See also Reuter v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 468 (2022) 
(lodestar method used in Wage Act case).  The lodestar method is 
"calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent 
on the case [by] a reasonable hourly rate."  Fontaine, supra at 
324.  "The judge may then adjust the lodestar calculation upward 
or downward in light of the results obtained."  LaChance, supra.  
"In limited circumstances, statutory fee awards may [also] be 
enhanced to compensate for the risk of nonpayment."  Fontaine, 
supra. 
Here, the motion judge calculated the attorney's fees by 
first determining what a reasonable hourly rate would be, using 
as a point of reference the "average rate in the community for 
similar work by attorneys with the same years' experience."  
Killeen v. Westban Hotel Venture, LP, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 791 
(2007).  The judge found that the actual hourly rates submitted 
by the plaintiff class were "within the range of acceptable 
fees" and thus utilized those hourly rates.  The judge then 
reviewed the hourly billing statements submitted by counsel for 
26 
 
the plaintiff class and discounted hours spent toward 
"mediation/settlement undertakings." 
After determining the base lodestar amount, the judge then 
considered the propriety of a multiplier.  Although the 
plaintiff class sought a multiplier of five, the judge concluded 
that, despite the "complexity and nuances related to [the] 
defendant's compensation methods," a multiplier of four was more 
appropriate because the parties agreed to the amount of the 
judgment "after dispositive motions were decided unlike those 
[cases] identified by [the] plaintiff[ class] in [its] brief."  
In doing so, the judge stated that he relied on certain 
unspecified "factors"19 and "follow[ed] the precedent identified 
in cases cited by [the] plaintiff[ class] where multipliers 
ranging up to 'four are frequently awarded in common fund cases 
where the loadstar method is applied.'"  See, e.g., In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 
341 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999).  We 
conclude that the judge abused his discretion by relying 
exclusively on common fund cases -- which involve policy 
 
19 The judge did not delineate the factors he referenced in 
his decision, but it is our understanding that these factors may 
have been listed in a footnote in a memorandum of law submitted 
by the plaintiff class in support of the petition for attorney's 
fees and costs.  This memorandum was not included in the record. 
 
27 
 
considerations different from fee-shifting cases such as this 
one -- in calculating the award of attorney's fees. 
Common fund cases are those in which "a litigant or a 
lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons 
other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee from the fund as a whole" (citation omitted).  In 
re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza 
Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 305 (1st Cir. 1995).  Thus, "the 
key distinction between common-fund and fee-shifting cases is 
whether the attorney's fees are paid by the client (as in 
common-fund cases) or by the other party (as in fee-shifting 
cases)."  In re The Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1079 (11th 
Cir. 2019). 
For the calculation of attorney's fees, while "the lodestar 
method is entrenched in the statutory fee-shifting context," the 
"percentage of the fund" (POF) method is utilized in common fund 
cases, whereby "the court shapes the counsel fee based on what 
it determines is a reasonable percentage of the fund recovered 
for those benefitted by the litigation."  In re Thirteen Appeals 
Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 
F.3d at 305.  After calculating attorney's fees via the POF 
method in common fund cases, courts generally also conduct a 
lodestar analysis and use the resulting lodestar value as a 
"cross-check" to determine if the attorney's fees are 
28 
 
reasonable.  In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 
742 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 889 (2001).  "[L]odestar 
cross-check calculation need not entail mathematical precision 
or bean-counting, and is not a full-blown lodestar inquiry" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  In re AT & T Corp., 455 
F.3d 160, 169 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Much ink has been spilled on the different purposes 
undergirding an award of attorney's fees in common fund cases 
and statutory fee-shifting cases.  See, e.g., Skelton v. General 
Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 810 (1989) ("Because there is a difference between 
statutory fee-shifting cases and common fund cases with respect, 
inter alia, to who bears the direct burden of compensating 
plaintiffs' attorneys, different policies may govern the two 
types of cases").  Among these differences, an award of 
attorney's fees in common fund cases is in part intended to 
prevent the unjust enrichment of class members who benefited 
from but did not contribute to the costs of the lawsuit, whereas 
the purposes of fee-shifting statutes, like the Wage Act, are to 
disincentivize unlawful conduct and incentivize attorneys "to 
provide representation in cases that otherwise would not be 
financially prudent for them."  Ferman v. Sturgis Cleaners, 
Inc., 481 Mass. 488, 492–493 (2019).  Given these differences, 
caution should be exercised in statutory fee-shifting cases to 
29 
 
ensure that excessive multipliers do not "inequitably burden 
defendants."  Skelton, supra at 253. 
Further, a fee-shifting statute "creates an exception to 
the 'American rule' that the prevailing litigant is ordinarily 
not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the 
loser" (quotation and citation omitted).  Brundle v. Wilmington 
Trust, N.A., 919 F.3d 763, 786 (4th Cir. 2019).  "In contrast, 
the common fund doctrine -- though often similarly described as 
an exception -- better accords with the American rule by holding 
the beneficiaries of a judgment or settlement responsible for 
compensating the counsel who obtained the judgment or settlement 
for them."  Id.  Accordingly, awards made pursuant to fee-
shifting statutes should generally utilize "more conservative" 
principles than those made pursuant to the common fund doctrine.  
Sack v. Sack, 328 Mass. 600, 605 (1952).  For this reason, in 
determining lodestar multipliers, we strongly caution judges 
against relying exclusively on common fund case law in a fee-
shifting case such as this one. 
Here, because the motion judge neither explicitly 
identified all the factors that he considered nor provided an 
explanation of the weight that he assigned to each factor, our 
appellate review is significantly impeded.  See Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (important for judges to 
"provide a concise but clear explanation of [their] reasons for 
30 
 
the fee award").  Still, a four times multiplier may have been 
excessive in this case given the judge's exclusive reliance on 
common fund cases, which do not utilize the more conservative 
approach that is required in fee-shifting cases.20 
We vacate the award of attorney's fees and remand the 
matter to the Superior Court for recalculation of the award.  On 
remand, if the judge seeks to enhance the base lodestar figure 
by a multiplier, he must set forth expressly the factors that he 
relies on and the weight he ascribes to those factors, without 
reliance solely on common fund cases where the lodestar figure 
was used as a cross check. 
ii.  Time spent on mediation and settlement negotiations.  
We now turn to the plaintiff class's argument that the judge 
erred in excluding hours spent in "mediation/settlement 
undertakings," which were unsuccessful, when making the lodestar 
calculation.  In support, the plaintiff cites Pérez-Sosa v. 
Garland, 22 F.4th 312, 323 (1st Cir. 2022), where the United 
 
20 Indeed, significantly lower multipliers have been applied 
in fee-shifting cases even where the facts arguably were more 
favorable.  For example, in Ridgeway v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 
269 F. Supp. 3d 975, 996-999 (N.D. Cal. 2017), the court applied 
a two times lodestar multiplier in a wage case brought under a 
fee-shifting statute where, among other considerations, the 
plaintiffs' counsel spent $1.7 million in out of pocket expenses 
on the case, the plaintiffs risked an unfavorable jury verdict 
but counsel secured a $60.8 million judgment after trial, and 
the defendant "vigorously defended" the case by raising 
"numerous novel, difficult, and complex issues" over the course 
of nearly nine years. 
31 
 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that it was 
error to "categorically exclud[e] time spent on settlement 
negotiations from the lodestar calculation."  In rejecting the 
"[s]peculative" notion that including such time in the lodestar 
calculation could frustrate settlement, the court reasoned: 
"We think it is unrealistic to assume that the marginal 
cost of counsel's work on settlement will scare off 
defendants in a substantial number of cases.  Litigants 
settle cases because doing so is cheaper and less risky 
than fighting tooth and nail to the bitter end.  The extra 
expense of compensating time reasonably spent in settlement 
negotiations scarcely alters this calculus.  Nor will 
attorneys be tempted to drag out talks unnecessarily 
because the court will later trim away time wasted as 
unreasonably expended." 
 
Id.  Thus, the court concluded that "time reasonably spent in 
pursuit of settlement is worthwhile and, therefore, generally 
fit for inclusion in a fee award."  Id. 
 
We find this reasoning to be persuasive and therefore 
conclude the same.  When calculating an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to the lodestar method, a judge cannot categorically 
discount all time spent in the pursuit of a possible settlement.  
Instead, a judge must determine whether -- and if so, to what 
extent -- that time was "reasonably spent" in pursuit of 
settlement.  Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324.  The mere fact that a 
case did not ultimately settle does not render time spent toward 
such a pursuit unreasonable. 
32 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the motion judge erred by 
categorically excluding time spent on settlement negotiations 
and mediation from the calculation of the base lodestar figure.  
On remand, to the extent that the judge discounts any such time, 
he must provide a clear explanation as to why it was spent 
unreasonably.  See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  So much of the second amended judgment as 
awarded attorney's fees is vacated, and the matter is remanded 
to the Superior Court for further proceedings to recalculate the 
award of attorney's fees in accordance with this opinion.21  In 
all other respects, the second amended judgment is affirmed. 
 
So ordered. 
 
21 We also conclude that the plaintiff class is entitled to 
reasonable appellate attorney's fees.  See note 18, supra.