Title: Wendy M. Day v. Allstate Indemnity Company
Citation: 2011 WI 24
Docket Number: 2008AP002929
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 2011

2011 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2929 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wendy M. Day , individually and as Personal 
Representative  
of the deceased, Emma Day, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Allstate Indemnity Company, 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Clinton Day, 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 72 
325 Wis. 2d 370, 784 N.W. 2d 694 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 29, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 06, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward F. Vlack, III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, PROSSER, and GABLEMAN, JJ., dissent  
(Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Martha H. Heidt, Bye, Goff & Rohde, Ltd., River Falls, 
with whom on the brief was C.M. Bye and Brian F. Laule. 
For the defendant-third-party-plaintiff-appellant the cause 
was argued by John M. Swietlik, Jr., Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, 
S.C., Milwaukee with whom on the brief was Michael D. Aiken and 
Michael J. Cerjak. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 24
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP2929 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV380) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wendy M. Day, individually and as Personal 
Representative of the deceased, Emma Day, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Allstate Indemnity Company, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Clinton Day, 
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Wendy M. Day seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit 
court's denial of Allstate Indemnity Company's motion for 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
2 
 
summary judgment.1  The parties dispute whether Wendy's claim for 
wrongful death is covered under the terms of a homeowner's 
policy Allstate issued to Clinton and Holly Day.  Allstate 
argues that the language of the family exclusion precludes 
coverage for Wendy's claim because a benefit of coverage would 
accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person. 
¶2 
The court of appeals concluded that Clinton, who is an 
insured person, would benefit from the coverage by virtue of his 
entitlement to half of any recovery Wendy received.  It 
determined that the exclusion applied, and it directed the 
circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of Allstate.    
¶3 
We determine that the court of appeals erred when it 
directed the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Allstate.  The court of appeals' assertion that Clinton would 
have a legal right to collect a portion of the wrongful death 
award fails to distinguish the right to pursue a claim under the 
wrongful death statute from the ownership of a wrongful death 
recovery when the parties are divorced.   
¶4 
Based upon an examination of the language of the 
policy, the canons of insurance policy construction, and our 
case law, we conclude that Allstate has failed to meet its 
burden to demonstrate that the family exclusion unambiguously 
precludes coverage.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the 
                                                 
1 See Day v. Allstate, 2010 WI App 72, 325 Wis. 2d 370, 784 
N.W.2d 694, reversing a nonfinal order of the Circuit Court for 
St. Croix County, Edward F. Vlack III, Judge.  
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
3 
 
court of appeals directing the entry of summary judgment and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.    
I 
¶5 
This insurance coverage dispute arises out of several 
claims advanced in the wake of the events of November 27, 2006.  
On that evening, eight-year-old Emma Day drowned while taking a 
bath at the home of her father, Clinton Day, and her stepmother, 
Holly Day.        
¶6 
The plaintiff in this action is Emma's mother and 
Clinton's former wife, Wendy Day.  Wendy and Clinton divorced in 
2004.  They shared joint custody and placement of Emma prior to 
her death.  Emma and her two sisters, Hannah Day and Desirae 
Sarver, were scheduled to spend the night of November 27 at 
Clinton and Holly's home.  
¶7 
According to the allegations in the complaint, Emma 
had epilepsy and suffered from frequent seizures.  On the day of 
her death, she had two seizures and was excused early from 
school.  Holly picked Emma up from school.  Later that evening, 
Holly prepared a bath for Emma.  The complaint alleges that 
Holly left Emma unattended in the bathtub with the bathroom door 
closed, and that Emma drowned as a result of having a seizure in 
the bathtub.          
¶8 
Wendy filed suit against Holly, alleging negligence.  
The complaint named Wendy as a plaintiff in three different 
capacities: "Individually"; "as Personal Representative of the 
Deceased"; and "on behalf of her Minor Children," Desirae and 
Hannah.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
4 
 
¶9 
The complaint demanded the pecuniary loss and injury 
Wendy suffered as a result of Emma's death, an amount sufficient 
to compensate Wendy for the loss of her daughter's society and 
companionship, and relief for "the wrongful death of Emma Day."  
On behalf of Emma, the deceased, it demanded the damages for 
Emma’s pre-death pain and suffering.   Finally, on behalf of 
Desirae and Hannah, the complaint demanded compensation for 
their severe emotional distress as well as an amount sufficient 
to compensate the girls for the loss of Emma's society and 
companionship.2 
¶10 Holly tendered her defense to Allstate, which had 
issued a homeowner's policy listing Clinton and Holly as the 
named insureds.3  The policy, which includes coverage for family 
liability, provides in relevant part: "Subject to the terms, 
conditions and limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay 
damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay 
because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an 
occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by this 
part of the policy."  It provides further: "If an insured person 
                                                 
2 Wendy later amended her complaint and demanded additional 
damages, including medical expenses, funeral expenses, and 
burial expenses.      
3 During oral argument in this court, Allstate's attorney 
acknowledged that the policy's limit of liability was $300,000, 
which is $200,000 short of the damage cap for wrongful death.  
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
5 
 
is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with 
counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are groundless, 
false or fraudulent."   
¶11 The policy's grant of coverage is subject to various 
exclusions, including the following family exclusion: "We do not 
cover bodily injury to an insured person . . . whenever any 
benefit of this coverage would accrue directly or indirectly to 
an insured person."           
¶12 Allstate hired counsel to defend Holly, subject to its 
reservation of its right to deny coverage based on the family 
exclusion.  The reservation of rights letter explained: "[t]he 
Allstate policy contains an exclusion that provides that the 
policy does not cover bodily injury to an insured person.  Some 
or all of the damages claimed in the complaint relate to bodily 
injury sustained by an insured person.  Allstate does not 
believe that Holly Day is entitled to coverage for such 
damages."    
¶13 Allstate then moved to intervene as a party plaintiff 
"so that its obligation to provide insurance coverage to the 
defendant, Holly Day, relative to some or all of the claims set 
forth in the Complaint, can be determined."  It also moved for 
an 
order 
bifurcating 
insurance 
coverage 
issues 
from 
the 
underlying issues of liability and damages.  Finally, Allstate 
filed a cross-complaint seeking judgment declaring that Allstate 
has no duty to defend or indemnify Holly in connection with some 
or all of the claims set forth in the complaint.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
6 
 
¶14 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Allstate's 
motion 
to 
intervene.  The court ordered bifurcation of the case so that 
the insurance coverage issues would be decided first, and stayed 
discovery on the merits pending final determination on coverage.    
¶15 Allstate 
then 
filed 
a 
third-party 
complaint, 
requesting that Clinton Day be joined as an interested party.  
It later explained that "Clinton Day was joined by Allstate 
simply because, as one of Emma Day's parents, he owns a portion 
of the wrongful death cause of action brought by Wendy Day, and 
is therefore a necessary party in Allstate's declaratory 
judgment action.  Clinton Day also paid for half of the funeral 
and related expenses, and would therefore own part of Emma's 
survivorship action."     
¶16 Several months later, the parties filed a series of 
stipulations with the court.  First, they stipulated to Holly's 
dismissal.  Wendy expressed her intention to proceed exclusively 
against Allstate's liability policy.4  The parties further 
stipulated to the dismissal of the claims made on behalf of 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin's direct action statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.24, 
permits 
a 
plaintiff 
to 
bring 
suit 
directly 
against 
a 
tortfeasor's 
insurer 
without 
bringing 
suit 
against 
the 
tortfeasor: 
Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to 
others for negligence makes the insurer liable, up to 
the amounts stated in the bond or policy, to the 
persons entitled to recover against the insured for 
the death of any person or for injury to persons or 
property, irrespective of whether the liability is 
presently established or is contingent and to become 
fixed or certain by final judgment against the 
insured. 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
7 
 
Desirae and Hannah.  Finally, Wendy represented and stipulated 
that she was pursuing no claim against Clinton in connection 
with the action.   
¶17 Based 
on 
the 
parties' 
stipulations, 
the 
court 
dismissed Holly, and it also dismissed with prejudice the claims 
of Desirae and Hannah.  In addition, the court ordered: "No 
claim shall be pursued against Clinton Day, now or in the 
future, in connection with this action."  Finally, the court 
ordered that the complaint be amended to name Allstate as a 
defendant.  As a result of the court order, the only remaining 
claims were the survival action5 advanced on behalf of Emma's 
estate and Wendy's claim for wrongful death.    
¶18 Allstate moved for summary judgment.  With regard to 
the survival claim, it argued that "[t]he Allstate policy 
provides no coverage for the claims brought by Wendy Day as Emma 
Day's personal representative because they are based on Emma's 
bodily injury, the recovery for which would directly benefit the 
estate of the insured, Emma Day."  It argued further that 
because there was no coverage for the survival claim, there was 
                                                 
5 The parties and the court of appeals refer to this action 
as a "survivorship action."  Wisconsin case law and practice 
guides more frequently refer to this type of claim as a 
"survival action."  See, e.g., Estate of Merrill v. Jerrick, 231 
Wis. 2d 546, ¶5, 605 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999); 9 Callaghan's 
Wisconsin Pleading & Practice § 82:2 (4th ed. 2005); 2 The Law 
of Damages in Wisconsin § 16.10 (5th ed. 2010).  For the sake of 
clarity and consistency, we use the term "survival action" 
throughout this opinion. 
 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
8 
 
likewise no coverage for the wrongful death claim.  In response 
to Allstate's brief, Wendy filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment. 
¶19 After hearing arguments, the circuit court issued a 
written decision.  Addressing the survival claim, the circuit 
court assumed for the sake of argument that Emma was an insured 
under Clinton and Holly's policy.  Nevertheless, it concluded 
that there was coverage under the policy for a claim brought by 
Emma's personal representative that would benefit her estate: 
"While bodily injury in the policy includes death, the direct or 
indirect benefit must accrue to an 'insured person.'  [The 
policy] does not say to an insured person or their estate."  The 
court construed ambiguity against the insurer and concluded that 
"the phrase 'insured person' does not include an insured 
person's estate."   
¶20 Addressing Wendy's wrongful death claim, the court 
found that "Wendy Day is clearly not an insured under Clinton 
Day's insurance policy with Allstate."  It explained that it was 
required to interpret the phrase "accrue directly or indirectly 
to an insured person."  Relying on this court's discussion of 
that phrase in Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 
539 N.W.2d 883 (1995), the circuit court determined: "This court 
cannot, as a matter of law, find that any moneys that Wendy Day 
may receive would 'be funneled through' directly or indirectly" 
to Hannah or Desirae.  (Emphasis in original.)  The court 
concluded that coverage existed under the policy, and it granted 
Wendy's motion for summary judgment.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
9 
 
¶21 The court of appeals granted Allstate's petition for 
leave to appeal the non-final order, and it reversed the circuit 
court.  It began by acknowledging that "resolution of this 
coverage dispute requires that we determine to whom the benefits 
of Wendy's wrongful death and [survival] claims would accrue."  
Day v. Allstate, 2010 WI App 72, ¶9, 325 Wis. 2d 370, 784 
N.W.2d 694.  The court reasoned that both claims were excluded 
from coverage because Clinton, an insured, was entitled to half 
of any recovery on either claim.  Id., ¶16.    
¶22 Regarding the survival claim, the court reasoned that 
Clinton and Wendy would share equally any assets belonging to 
Emma's estate under the laws governing intestate succession.  
Id., ¶13.  Consequently, it determined, "one-half of any 
[survival] damages Wendy recovers will pass through Emma's 
estate to Clinton.  If Allstate must indemnify Holly for these 
losses, Clinton——an insured person——would benefit from the 
coverage."  Id.    
¶23 The court of appeals also determined that there was no 
coverage for Wendy's wrongful death claim.   Citing Bruflat v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 69, ¶18, 233 
Wis. 2d 523, 608 N.W.2d 371, the court of appeals asserted that 
"any amount recovered shall belong and be paid to Clinton and 
Wendy."  Day, 325 Wis. 2d 370, ¶11.  Therefore, it concluded 
that Clinton would benefit from coverage because he would have a 
"legal right to collect a portion of the wrongful death award."  
Id.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
10 
 
¶24 Wendy filed a petition with this court seeking review 
of the court of appeals' determination that there is no coverage 
for her wrongful death claim.  She did not seek review of the 
court of appeals' determination regarding the survival claim, 
and accordingly, that issue is not before this court.    
II 
¶25 In this case, we are required to construe the terms of 
an insurance policy to determine whether Allstate may deny 
coverage for Wendy's wrongful death claim.  An insurance policy 
is a contract for insurance.  Construction of an insurance 
policy is a question of law, which we review independently of 
the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶12, 264 
Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.   
¶26 When determining whether an insurance policy provides 
coverage, we examine the facts of the claim and the language of 
the policy to determine whether the policy's insuring agreement 
makes an initial grant of coverage.  Estate of Sustache v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 
N.W.2d 845.  If the claim triggers the initial grant of 
coverage, 
we 
determine 
next 
whether 
any 
of 
the 
various 
exclusions preclude coverage for the claim.  Id., ¶23.  The 
insured bears the burden of showing an initial grant of 
coverage, and if that burden is met the burden shifts to the 
insurer to show that an exclusion nevertheless precludes 
coverage.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2010 WI App 157, 
¶8, 330 Wis. 2d 263, 793 N.W.2d 111. 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
11 
 
¶27 The court's goal is to determine and carry out the 
intentions of the parties as expressed by the language of the 
insurance policy.  Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶12.   An insurance 
policy is to be construed, whenever possible, "so as to give a 
reasonable meaning to each provision of the contract, and [] 
courts must avoid a construction which renders portions of a 
contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage."  1325 
North Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, ¶56, 293 
Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 822.  
¶28 We interpret policy terms not in isolation, but rather 
in the context of the policy as a whole.  Badger Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, ¶61, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223.  We 
give undefined words and phrases their common and ordinary 
meaning.  Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶17.  If words or phrases 
are susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, they 
are ambiguous.  Id., ¶13.  "[B]ecause the insurer is in a 
position to write its insurance contracts with the exact 
language it chooses——so long as the language conforms to 
statutory and administrative law——ambiguity in that language is 
construed in favor of an insured seeking coverage."  Froedtert 
Mem'l Lutheran Hosp. v. Nat'l States Ins., 2009 WI 33, ¶43, 317 
Wis. 2d 54, 765 N.W.2d 251. 
¶29 A basic canon of construction in Wisconsin is that 
exclusions in an insurance policy are narrowly construed against 
the insurer.  Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 152.  A court will 
enforce exclusions that are clear from the face of the policy.  
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
12 
 
Id.  However, if the effect of an exclusion is ambiguous or 
uncertain, it will be construed in favor of coverage.  Id.   
III 
¶30 Because the parties focus many of their arguments on 
public policy, we begin our discussion by briefly clarifying the 
role that public policy plays in a discussion about insurance 
coverage.  Next, we turn to examining the policy language to 
determine whether the family exclusion in this policy of 
insurance unambiguously precludes coverage.   
¶31 If an insurance policy provision is contrary to clear 
public policy, a court may conclude that it is unenforceable.6  
On several occasions, this court has addressed public policy 
arguments regarding the enforceability of family exclusions.  In 
both Shannon v. Shannon and in Whirlpool, it was argued that the 
family member exclusion, which excluded coverage under the facts 
of each case, was "contrary to public policy."  Shannon v. 
Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 455, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989); Whirlpool, 
197 Wis. 2d at 147.   
¶32 In those cases, we concluded that the exclusions were 
not contrary to public policy because they serve the legitimate 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Mau v. North Dakota Ins. Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 
134, ¶34, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45 (concluding that an 
occupancy requirement in an underinsured motorist policy was 
unenforceable because it excluded coverage for a named insured 
in 
violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(b)2.a. (1995-96)).  
Courts will determine that a policy provision is contrary to 
public policy 
only 
in cases that are free from doubt.  
Continental Ins. Co. v. Daily Express, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 581, 
589, 229 N.W.2d 617 (1975).  
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
13 
 
purpose of "exempt[ing] the insurer from liability to those 
persons to whom the insured, on account of close family ties, 
would be apt to be partial in case of injury."  Shannon, 150 
Wis. 2d at 456.  We further determined that an insurer need not 
prove actual collusion between the plaintiff and the insured as 
a prerequisite to enforcing a family exclusion: "[S]uch clauses 
are not contrary to public policy, even though there may be no 
collusion in this particular case."  Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 
151-52.    
¶33 Seizing upon our discussion in Shannon and Whirlpool, 
the parties focus many of their arguments on notions of public 
policy and the purpose underlying family exclusions.  Wendy 
argues that there is little likelihood of collusion here given 
the probable antagonism between Clinton's former and current 
wives.  The amicus brief filed by the Wisconsin Association for 
Justice takes the public policy discussion one step further.  It 
argues that even if concerns about collusion would support 
denying coverage, there may be other public policies that should 
be considered, including the public policy against denying 
coverage in cases involving domestic abuse.  Allstate contends 
that these facts present a likelihood of collusion, and 
accordingly, it implies that it is appropriate to deny coverage.     
¶34 By advancing these arguments, the parties put the cart 
in front of the horse.  Generally, family exclusions are 
enforceable because they protect the insurer from a class of 
plaintiffs to whom the insured defendant may be partial——but it 
does not follow that the family exclusion protects an insurer 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
14 
 
from all plaintiffs to whom the defendant insured may be 
partial.7   
¶35 Whether the family exclusion precludes coverage for 
Wendy's 
wrongful 
death 
claim 
is 
a 
question 
of 
contract 
interpretation.  The purpose underlying a family exclusion does 
not control our determination of whether the language of the 
family exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for a claim.  
The answer to that question depends upon the language of the 
insurance policy.     
IV 
¶36 We turn next to interpreting the relevant policy 
language.  It is clear that Wendy's claim for wrongful death 
falls within the policy's initial grant of coverage.  The policy 
provides 
that, 
"[s]ubject 
to 
the 
terms, 
conditions 
and 
limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an 
insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of 
bodily injury . . . arising from an occurrence to which this 
policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy."  If 
Wendy prevails, Holly, who is an insured, will be legally 
obligated to pay damages because of Emma's bodily injury.    
¶37 The question, then, is whether the language of the 
family exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for the claim.  
The family exclusion provides: "We do not cover bodily injury to 
                                                 
7 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 148, 539 
N.W.2d 883 (1995) (recognizing that whether a claim is excluded 
under "the specific language of the family exclusion clause" is 
a separate question from whether such exclusions are "contrary 
to public policy").    
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
15 
 
an insured person . . . whenever any benefit of this coverage 
would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person."   
¶38 In this context, the word "whenever" serves the role 
of a conjunction and indicates that two conditions must be met 
for the exclusion to apply.  The exclusion's language precludes 
coverage if: (1) the coverage sought is for bodily injury to an 
insured person; and (2) any benefit of coverage would accrue 
directly or indirectly to an insured person.8     
¶39 Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
focus our examination on whether "any benefit" of coverage 
"would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person."9  The 
                                                 
8 At some points throughout its argument, Allstate appears 
to abandon any language-based interpretation of the policy.  
Instead, it briefly suggests that because there is no coverage 
for Emma's estate's claims, there is likewise no coverage for 
Wendy's wrongful death claim: "If there is no coverage for Emma 
Day's bodily injury under Allstate's policy, it follows there 
can be no coverage for Wendy Day's wrongful death claim, which 
is dependent on and stems from that bodily injury."      
This argument is inconsistent with the language of the 
policy.  The language of the exclusion precludes coverage when 
(1) the coverage sought is for bodily injury to an insured 
person and (2) any benefit of coverage would accrue directly or 
indirectly to an insured person.  Allstate's argument that the 
sole consideration should be whether there is injury to an 
insured fails to account for the second condition, that is, 
whether any benefit would accrue to an insured.       
9 There is no dispute that Emma is an insured person, and 
that Wendy's wrongful death claim arises out of Emma's bodily 
injury.  The parties do not brief or argue whether claims that 
arise out of bodily injury to an insured fit within the 
exclusion's first condition.  Accordingly, we do not determine 
whether the first condition is met, and like the parties, we 
focus our examination on the exclusion's second condition.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
16 
 
parties agree that Clinton, Holly, Hannah, and Desirae are all 
insureds.10    
¶40 We are mindful that the only claim now being pursued, 
and therefore the only claim we need address in this opinion, is 
Wendy's wrongful death claim.  It is undisputed that Wendy is 
not an insured under Allstate's policy.  Nevertheless, we agree 
with Allstate that "[t]he fact that Wendy Day is not an insured 
person under the policy will not save her wrongful death claim 
against Allstate if a benefit would accrue to an insured 
person[.]"  The language of the policy requires us to determine 
whether 
a 
benefit 
of 
coverage 
would 
accrue 
directly 
or 
indirectly to an insured person.   
¶41 We examine first what is meant by the term "benefit," 
as it is used in the family exclusion.  Next, we turn to 
examining whether any benefit of coverage would accrue directly 
or indirectly to any insured. 
A 
¶42 Although the meaning of the exclusion turns on a 
definition of the term "benefit," the policy does not define 
that term.  We are left, then, to attempt to discern its 
meaning.  Our inquiry about the meaning of "benefit" is aided by 
this 
court's 
examination 
of 
the 
identical 
family 
member 
exclusion in Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d 144.   
                                                 
10 Emma was likewise an insured under the policy.  Under the 
circumstances here, we need not determine whether her estate 
would be considered an "insured."  The court of appeals 
determined that there is no coverage for the estate's survival 
claim, and Wendy does not seek review of that determination.      
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
17 
 
¶43 The relevant facts from the Whirlpool case are 
important but not complex.  Three-year-old Jaclyn Ziebert was 
injured by a meat grinder that had been manufactured by 
Whirlpool.  Id. at 147.  Jaclyn's parents filed suit against 
Whirlpool and another defendant, seeking damages for Jaclyn's 
injuries.  Id. at 147-48.  In a separate action, Whirlpool filed 
a contribution claim against Jaclyn's mother.  Id. at 148.  It 
alleged that Jaclyn's mother's negligent supervision contributed 
to Jaclyn's injuries.  Id.  Jaclyn's mother tendered the defense 
of Whirlpool's contribution claim to her homeowner's insurer, 
which contested coverage.  Jaclyn's action for negligence 
against Whirlpool was stayed pending resolution of the coverage 
dispute in the contribution claim.11         
¶44 To understand the reasoning adopted by the Whirlpool 
court, 
it 
is 
essential 
to 
understand 
the 
nature 
of 
a 
contribution claim.  A contribution claim may arise when more 
than one tortfeasor is legally responsible for an injury.  If 
one of the tortfeasors has paid more than its proportionate 
share of the damages, it may seek contribution from the other 
tortfeasors.  "Contribution distributes the loss by requiring 
each person to pay his proportionate share of the damages on a 
comparative fault basis."  Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 99 
Wis. 2d 179, 196, 299 N.W.2d 234 (1980).   
                                                 
11  Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d 144, Appendix of Petitioner at 
111, available at the Wisconsin Law Library.    
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
18 
 
¶45 By bringing the contribution action against Jaclyn's 
mother, Whirlpool was alleging that Jaclyn's mother, an insured, 
was obligated to pay her proportionate share of the damages 
Whirlpool owed to Jaclyn, also an insured, for her bodily 
injury.  See Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 155 ("The liability being 
asserted in Whirlpool's contribution claim against [Jaclyn's 
mother] is based on the claim for damages suffered by Jaclyn 
Ziebert.  That liability is identical whether there is a direct 
claim against [Jaclyn's mother] by her daughter or whether the 
claim is indirectly asserted through a contribution claim by 
Whirlpool.").   
¶46 The language of the family exclusion in Whirlpool was 
identical to the language in this policy, and we had occasion to 
explore the circumstances under which a "benefit" would accrue 
to an insured.  This court determined that the language "is 
unambiguous and clearly contemplates contribution claims."  Id. 
at 153.  It explained that a benefit would accrue indirectly to 
Jaclyn because "the money Whirlpool receives [as a result of the 
contribution claim] will, in all practical respects, be funneled 
through to Jaclyn," who was injured and also an insured under 
the policy.  Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). The court 
commented: "To say that Jaclyn Ziebert is not receiving a 
benefit because her recovery comes from a contribution claim 
rather than a direct claim for personal injuries is the ultimate 
tribute to form over substance.  Such a conclusion defies both 
logic and common sense."  Id. at 155 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
19 
 
¶47 In Whirlpool, the court applied the term "benefit" to 
reference money recovery, that is, the proceeds of insurance 
coverage.  It concluded that when the insurance proceeds end up 
in the pocket of the insured, a benefit has accrued to the 
insured, regardless of whether those proceeds are paid directly 
by the insurer or funneled indirectly through a third party: "An 
indirect benefit would incur to Jaclyn if Whirlpool won its 
contribution claim since the money Whirlpool receives will, in 
all practical respects, be funneled through to Jaclyn.  Jaclyn 
would receive, in the plainest sense of the word, an indirect 
benefit." 
 
Id. 
at 
153-54. 
 
The 
court 
continued: 
"The 
direct/indirect 
benefit 
language 
was 
obviously 
meant 
to 
differentiate between two possible types of benefits and to 
clarify the policy language to ensure that contribution claims 
were included in the scope of the clause."12  Id. at 154.    
                                                 
12 Like the exclusion at issue in this case, the key phrase 
in the Whirlpool exclusion was "whenever any benefit of this 
coverage would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured 
person."  The plain language of the exclusion does not set forth 
two different types of benefits.  Rather, it sets forth two 
different ways in which benefits may accrue to an insured.   
We recognize that at times, the Whirlpool court used the 
shorthand "direct and indirect benefits" when discussing the 
language of the exclusion.  Nevertheless, the "benefits" 
contemplated by the court——whether direct or indirect——were the 
proceeds of the insurance policy.  The distinction made by the 
court was the means by which this benefit would accrue to the 
insured rather than what constitutes a benefit.  See Whirlpool, 
197 Wis. 2d at 153 ("A 'direct' benefit [] would accrue to 
Jaclyn Ziebert by way of a direct claim against Sharon Ziebert 
and Allstate. . . . An indirect benefit would incur to Jaclyn if 
Whirlpool won its contribution claim since the money Whirlpool 
receives will, in all practical respects, be funneled through to 
Jaclyn.").        
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
20 
 
¶48 Allstate argues for a more expansive interpretation of 
the term "benefit."  Citing Red Arrow Products Co., Inc. v. 
Employers Insurance of Wausau, 2000 WI App 36, ¶17, 233 
Wis. 2d 114, 
607 
N.W.2d 294, 
Allstate 
asserts 
that 
"the 
principal benefits provided under an insurance policy are 
indemnification and defense."  It contends that "the family 
exclusion will apply if any benefit under the policy——including 
[not only] (1) the proceeds of coverage, [but also] (2) the 
right to indemnification under the policy, or (3) the right to a 
defense under the contract's obligation to defend the insured——
would accrue to an insured person."  (Emphasis in original.)   
¶49 Because Holly would be benefited by her contractual 
right to receive defense and indemnification, Allstate argues 
that 
a 
"benefit 
of 
coverage" 
"would 
accrue 
directly 
or 
indirectly to [Holly,] an insured person."  Therefore, Allstate 
concludes, the family exclusion applies.   
¶50 Certainly, an insured is benefitted by receiving 
defense 
and 
indemnification 
from 
an 
insurer. 
 
However, 
Allstate's 
expansive interpretation of the undefined term 
"benefit" to include an insured's contractual right to defense 
and indemnification is inconsistent with how that term is used 
in the very next exclusion in the policy.   
¶51 In 
addition 
to 
the 
family 
exclusion, 
the 
term 
"benefits" appears in the exclusion immediately following.  That 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
dissent's 
reliance 
on 
"two 
types 
of 
benefits" 
misconstrues both Whirlpool and the language of the policy.  See 
dissent, ¶99.       
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
21 
 
exclusion precludes coverage if the bodily injury occurred to a 
person eligible to receive certain benefits, including workers' 
compensation benefits: 
We do not cover bodily injury to any person eligible 
to receive benefits required to be provided or 
voluntarily provided by an insured person under any 
workers' compensation, non-occupational disability or 
occupational disease law.  
¶52 Again, the policy does not define what is meant by the 
term "benefits."  Nevertheless, we are unaware of any workers' 
compensation benefits that do not involve the payment of money.  
It appears that this exclusion is referring to money——that is, 
monetary 
benefits 
that 
are 
paid 
pursuant 
to 
a 
workers' 
compensation policy.13  It does not make sense to suggest that 
the term "benefits" as used in this exclusion is a reference to 
the contractual right to receive a defense or the contractual 
right of indemnification.   
¶53 Thus, Allstate's interpretation of the term "benefit" 
in the family exclusion is not consistent with the meaning of 
the 
term 
"benefits" 
used 
in 
the 
exclusion 
that 
appears 
                                                 
13 See, 
e.g., 
total 
disability 
benefits 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.43(1)); 
partial 
disability 
benefits 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.43(2)); 
temporary 
disability 
benefits 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.43(5)); death benefit (Wis. Stat. § 102.46); compensation 
for burial expenses (Wis. Stat. § 102.50).  
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
22 
 
immediately below it.14  Allstate's expansive interpretation of 
the term "benefit" would violate the canon of construction that 
policy terms should be interpreted not in isolation, but rather 
in the context of the policy as a whole.  Schmitz, 255 
Wis. 2d 61, ¶61; see also Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London 
Market, 2010 WI 52, ¶¶67-69, 325 Wis. 2d 176, 784 N.W.2d 579. 
   
¶54 Additionally, 
interpreting 
the 
term 
"benefit" 
to 
include the contractual right to defense and indemnification in 
addition to the recovery of insurance proceeds would violate a 
second canon of construction.  It would render an entire phrase 
in the family exclusion meaningless.   
¶55 As discussed above, the language of the exclusion 
precludes coverage if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the 
coverage sought is for bodily injury to an insured person; and 
(2) any benefit of coverage would accrue directly or indirectly 
to an insured person.  Yet, in every case where there is an 
initial grant of coverage under this policy, the right to 
defense and indemnification would always accrue to an insured.  
Accordingly, under Allstate's interpretation, the exclusion's 
second condition would always be satisfied.  The language of 
                                                 
14 The term "benefit" also appears in a section setting 
forth various conditions to the policy's coverage for accidental 
loss to dwellings, other structures, and personal property.  One 
condition of this first-party coverage, titled "No Benefit to 
Bailee," provides: "This insurance will not benefit any person 
or organization who may be caring for or handling your property 
for a fee."  Again, the term is undefined and does not appear to 
unambiguously include an insured's contractual right to defense 
and indemnification. 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
23 
 
Allstate's family exclusion would mean nothing different from an 
exclusion with the single condition: "We do not cover bodily 
injury to an insured person."      
¶56 If Allstate had intended to exclude coverage in all 
cases where the coverage sought was for bodily injury to an 
insured person, it should have said so.  An established canon of 
construction provides that language in an insurance policy will 
be construed "so as to give a reasonable meaning to each 
provision of the contract."  1325 North Van Buren, 293 Wis. 2d 
410, ¶56.  Because it would "render[] portions of a contract 
meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage," id., it is not 
reasonable to interpret the word "benefit" in the family 
exclusion as a reference to defense and indemnification.15       
¶57 We conclude that Allstate has failed to meet its 
burden 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
policy 
term 
"benefit" 
                                                 
15 We recognize that a recent decision of the New York 
appellate division, Cragg v. Allstate Indem. Corp., 74 A.D.3d 
90, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), adopted reasoning similar to the 
reasoning advanced by Allstate.  The Cragg court did not discuss 
any defense that would be received by an insured, but it did 
consider the insured's contractual right to indemnification for 
a money judgment: "[I]ndemnification by Allstate on behalf of 
decedent's mother would result in the receipt by the mother, an 
insured, of the benefits of the policy in the form of the 
satisfaction of the money judgment obtained against her for the 
death of her daughter, also an insured."  
We do not find the New York decision to be persuasive for 
several reasons.  Most importantly, its interpretation of this 
language contravenes our canons of construction, as discussed 
above.  Additionally, the New York Court of Appeals has granted 
leave to appeal the Cragg decision, leaving uncertain the status 
of this lower court decision relied on by Allstate.  15 N.Y.3d 
705 (Sept. 2, 2010). 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
24 
 
unambiguously includes the contractual right to receive a 
defense or the contractual right to indemnification.  The term 
is undefined in the policy.  Allstate's expansive definition is 
inconsistent with Wisconsin case law interpreting identical 
policy language.  It is likewise inconsistent with how the term 
is used in the context of another policy provision.  Finally, it 
would render policy language meaningless surplusage.        
B 
¶58 Having 
determined 
that 
Allstate 
has 
failed 
to 
demonstrate that the term "benefit" unambiguously includes the 
right to a defense and the right to indemnification, we turn to 
examining whether any insurance proceeds will accrue directly or 
indirectly to an insured person as a result of Allstate's 
coverage of Wendy's claim.  Allstate advances several arguments 
in support of its position.    
¶59 Most formidably, Allstate contends that because half 
of the wrongful death claim belongs to Clinton, any insurance 
proceeds Wendy recovers for Emma's wrongful death "must be split 
between Wendy Day and Clinton Day."  Similarly, the court of 
appeals concluded that Clinton "benefits from coverage by virtue 
of his legal right to collect a portion of the wrongful death 
award."   Day, 325 Wis. 2d 370, ¶11.  Citing Bruflat, 233 
Wis. 2d 523, ¶18, the court of appeals asserted that any 
wrongful death recovery "shall belong and be paid" to both 
Clinton and Wendy. 
¶60 We construe these arguments as an assertion that 
insurance proceeds would accrue directly to Clinton by virtue of 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
25 
 
Wendy's wrongful death recovery.  To evaluate this assertion, it 
is necessary to review the nature of wrongful death actions 
under Wisconsin law.     
¶61 Some causes of action survive the death of the person 
who is entitled to bring them.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.01 
codifies this common law principle.  A "survival action" is 
brought to recover damages suffered by the decedent prior to 
death.  Weiss v. Regent Properties, Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 233, 
346 N.W.2d 766 (1984); see also Schilling v. Chicago, N. Shore & 
Milwaukee R.R. Co., 245 Wis. 173, 177, 13 N.W.2d 594 (1944) 
(pre-death conscious pain and suffering).  With a survival 
action, both the cause of action and the recovery belong to the 
estate. 
¶62 An action for wrongful death is separate and distinct 
from a survival action.  Weiss, 118 Wis. 2d at 233; see also 
Truesdill v. Roach, 11 Wis. 2d 492, 496-97, 105 N.W.2d 871 
(1960).  "It has been held many times that the wrongful-death 
statute creates a new cause of action, . . . and such cause of 
action is distinct from any cause of action that the deceased 
might have had if he had survived."  Id.  Importantly, wrongful 
death beneficiaries seek recovery not for the injury suffered by 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
26 
 
the deceased, but rather "for the loss sustained to the 
beneficiaries because of the death."16  Id. 
¶63 In contrast to a survival action, which belongs to the 
estate, "[t]he action for wrongful death does not belong to the 
estate of the deceased or become an asset thereof."  Nichols v. 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 496, 109 
N.W.2d 131 (1961); Weiss, 118 Wis. 2d at 230-31.  Instead, the 
right to bring an action for wrongful death belongs to certain 
relatives of the decedent, who are designated by statute.     
¶64 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(1) "provides that a wrongful 
death action may be brought by the person to whom the amount 
recovered belongs, and § 895.04(2) instructs that the person to 
whom it belongs is the relative (or relatives) next in order 
under § 852.01."17  Lamers v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 
App 165, ¶15, 314 Wis. 2d 731, 761 N.W.2d 38.  In this case, the 
right to bring an action for wrongful death belongs to the class 
                                                 
16 A wrongful death action compensates the beneficiaries 
"for the pecuniary benefits which they would have derived from 
the earning power of the decedent had he or she lived" and "the 
loss 
of 
the 
relational 
interest 
existing 
between 
the 
beneficiaries and the decedent."  Weiss v. Regent Properties, 
Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 346 N.W.2d 766 (1984).  The loss of 
the deceased's society and companionship is an "element of 
damages recoverable in the cause of action for wrongful death."  
Nichols v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 
109 N.W.2d 131 (1961). 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) provides in part: "If there 
are no such surviving minor children, the amount recovered shall 
belong and be paid to the spouse or domestic partner of the 
deceased; if no spouse or domestic partner survives, to the 
deceased's lineal heirs as determined by s. 852.01; if no lineal 
heirs survive, to the deceased's brothers and sisters." 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
27 
 
of beneficiaries consisting of Emma's lineal heirs, Wendy and 
Clinton.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(3) requires that the claims 
of both Wendy and Clinton be consolidated for the action to 
proceed.18   
¶65 Based on the fact that Wendy and Clinton are members 
of the same class of beneficiaries, Allstate argues that Clinton 
will benefit directly from coverage for Wendy's wrongful death 
claim.  This argument relies on the assumption that because 
Clinton has a right to make a claim under the wrongful death 
statute and because his claim must be consolidated with Wendy's 
claim for wrongful death, Clinton will have an entitlement to a 
portion of any insurance proceeds Wendy recovers.  Allstate's 
assumption is not supported by our case law.   
¶66 This court has explained that "[t]he right to sue and 
recover damages under the wrongful death statute must be 
distinguished from the ownership and allocation of the recovery 
itself."  Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 
Wis. 2d 549, 561, 
514 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (emphasis added).  
Although all members of a class (here, both Wendy and Clinton) 
share the right to bring a wrongful death action, they do not 
necessarily share joint ownership of the recovery.  Rather than 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 895.04(3) 
provides: 
"If 
separate 
actions are brought for the same wrongful death, they shall be 
consolidated on motion of any party.  Unless such consolidation 
is so effected that a single judgment may be entered protecting 
all defendants and so that satisfaction of such judgment shall 
extinguish all liability for the wrongful death, no action shall 
be 
permitted 
to 
proceed 
except 
that 
of 
the 
personal 
representative."  
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
28 
 
requiring joint ownership or an equal division of any wrongful 
death recovery, each wrongful death beneficiary's recovery may 
be an individualized amount that is based on a beneficiary's 
actual loss.  Keithley v. Keithley, 95 Wis. 2d 136, 289 
N.W.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1980).  
¶67 In Keithley, the divorced parents of a deceased minor 
accepted a settlement of their wrongful death claim, but they 
could not agree on a division of the proceeds.  Id. at 137.  The 
circuit court considered each parent's loss to be a question of 
fact, and it submitted the questions to the jury.  The jury 
awarded the entire settlement to the mother.  On appeal, the 
father argued that he was entitled to half of the wrongful death 
damages as a matter of law.    
¶68 The Keithley court determined that "wrongful death 
damages do not become a part of the decedent's estate, to be 
divided simply on the basis of a biological relationship," and 
that the wrongful death statute does not require an equal 
division between parents.  Id. at 138.  It determined that the 
rules 
of 
intestate 
succession 
were 
irrelevant 
to 
the 
proportioning of wrongful death damages.  Rather, "[w]rongful 
death damages are not automatically recoverable; the survivors 
must prove their loss."  Id.     
¶69 In Chang, the wrongful death beneficiaries were the 
married parents of a deceased child.  The specific issue was 
whether the father's negligence, which had contributed to the 
child's death, diminished the mother's ability to recover her 
own damages for the child's wrongful death.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
29 
 
¶70 Like the Keithley court, this court rejected the 
argument that "there must be an automatic, equal division of 
damages or recovery among the class members."  Chang, 182 
Wis. 2d 
at 
562. 
 
It 
clarified 
that 
"[d]amages 
may 
be 
stipulated . . . or damages may be awarded jointly to a class of 
beneficiaries if so requested and agreed, but since recovery is 
for actual damages, every individual beneficiary has the right 
to prove and collect upon his or her individual loss[.]"  Id. at 
557. 
¶71 We explained that under the statute, a wrongful death 
beneficiary's 
recovery 
is 
not 
affected 
by 
any 
other 
beneficiary's inability to recover damages:  
There are no provisions in the statute for reducing a 
non-negligent beneficiary's recovery.  Nor are there 
any provisions for reducing the award of the class of 
beneficiaries because of the negligence of one of its 
members.  Nor will we impute the negligence of the 
father to the mother in these circumstances.   
Id. at 563-64. 
¶72 As both Keithley and Chang made clear, the wrongful 
death statute does not provide that all members of a class 
always have a legal right to collect a portion of any wrongful 
death recovery.  Rather, each beneficiary's recovery for 
wrongful death may be independent from the recovery of any other 
beneficiary.  This premise is made more evident in situations 
where 
the 
wrongful 
death 
beneficiaries 
are 
divorced.  
Wisconsin's pattern jury instructions advise circuit courts that 
when "the parents are separated or divorced, it may be advisable 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
30 
 
to submit separate questions for each parent."  Wis. JI-Civil 
1895 cmt.       
¶73 Accordingly, any language from Bruflat suggesting that 
a wrongful death recovery must be distributed to all wrongful 
death 
beneficiaries 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
this 
court's 
pronouncement in Chang, and it is withdrawn.19  See Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) ("The supreme court 
is the only state court with the power to overrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a previous supreme court case.").      
¶74 Further, the court of appeals in this case erred by 
concluding that Clinton would have a "legal right to collect a 
portion of the wrongful death award."  Day, 325 Wis. 2d 370, 
¶11.  The court of appeals' assertion fails to distinguish 
ownership of wrongful death recovery from the right to pursue a 
                                                 
19 In addition to its inconsistency with Keithley and Chang, 
it appears that the Bruflat court's brief discussion of the 
wrongful 
death 
statute 
was 
based 
on 
an 
error 
of 
law.  
Specifically, the court of appeals failed to recognize the 
distinction between survival damages for the deceased's injuries 
(which belong to the deceased's estate) and wrongful death 
damages for the beneficiaries' own losses (which belong to the 
beneficiaries). 
In that case, Simon Bruflat was killed in an automobile 
accident, and his estate filed a claim for uninsured motorist 
(UM) coverage. Bruflat v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 
WI App 69, ¶¶2, 4, 233 Wis. 2d 523, 608 N.W.2d 371.  Although 
the court of appeals characterized the UM proceeds as a 
"wrongful death award," id., ¶1, this characterization was 
inconsistent with other portions of the court of appeals' 
opinion.  For example, the court asserted that the recovery was 
for Simon's own injuries, not for his parents' losses.  It 
further explained: "Prudential's UM coverage seeks to reimburse 
the victim.  In the present case, Simon is the victim, not [his 
parents]."  Id., ¶20.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
31 
 
claim under the wrongful death statute.  See Chang, 182 
Wis. 2d at 561; see also Wis. JI-Civil 1895 cmt.   
¶75 When examined in this light, it is apparent that under 
the facts of this case, no insurance proceeds will accrue to 
Clinton by virtue of Allstate's coverage of Wendy's wrongful 
death claim.  Regardless of whether Wendy pursues a wrongful 
death claim and whether Allstate provides coverage, Clinton has 
a right to bring a claim for Emma's wrongful death.  Yet, a 
judgment in favor of Wendy does not entitle Clinton to any 
ownership of her recovery.  If he remains a party to this 
action, Clinton will have to prove his own loss.  It goes almost 
without saying that if the fact-finder awards Clinton any 
damages, Allstate will have no contractual obligation to 
indemnify those losses under the family exclusion.20   
                                                 
20 The dissent misconstrues this opinion when it contends 
that Clinton's decision not to actively pursue wrongful death 
damages is "the touchstone upon which the majority relies."  
Dissent, ¶105; see also id., ¶108.  Rather, the "touchstone" of 
our analysis is that Clinton and Wendy have separate recoveries 
under the wrongful death statute, and that Allstate can provide 
coverage for the wrongful death damages sought by Wendy without 
providing coverage for any wrongful death damages awarded to 
Clinton. 
The dissent likewise misconstrues other aspects of this 
opinion.  It asserts: "According to the majority, [the dismissal 
of the claims originally advanced by Hannah and Desirae] results 
in coverage for" Wendy's wrongful death claim.  Id., ¶102.  
Contrary to this assertion, we do not conclude that coverage for 
Wendy's claim is contingent upon the dismissal of her daughters' 
claims.   
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
32 
 
¶76 Allstate advances several additional arguments that 
benefit will accrue directly or indirectly to an insured.  It 
contends that Wendy "would undoubtedly utilize at least some of 
the proceeds of this lawsuit to benefit her children," Hannah 
and Desirae, who are both insureds.  It further asserts that 
"[a]ny money that Wendy Day[] recovers from Allstate will ease 
Clinton Day's financial burden of providing Hannah Day and 
Desirae Sarver with their desired material resources."  
¶77 Under the facts here, no benefit would directly accrue 
to Hannah, Desirae, or Clinton.  Neither Hannah and Desirae nor 
Clinton would have any entitlement to the insurance proceeds.  
The 
distribution 
of 
insurance 
proceeds 
to 
Wendy 
is 
not 
equivalent to the distribution of insurance proceeds to her 
daughters or to her former husband.   
¶78 During oral argument, the attorney for Allstate 
explained his argument that a benefit would indirectly accrue to 
an insured as follows: 
I think first of all, to the extent that Clinton Day 
and Wendy Day have joint custody of the children and 
Wendy Day would obtain a financial recovery, I think 
that there is a potential benefit to the children.  
She has more money, she's got more money to spend on 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent mistakenly assumes that the exclusion of 
coverage for any one claim advanced in a lawsuit will lead to 
the exclusion of coverage for all other claims advanced in the 
same 
lawsuit. 
 
The 
dissent's 
assumption 
is 
unsupported.  
Regardless of whether Clinton, Hannah, and Desirae pursue claims 
for 
which 
there 
is 
no 
coverage 
under 
the 
policy, 
the 
determination of whether there is coverage for Wendy's claim is 
made by comparing Wendy's claim against the language of the 
policy.         
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
33 
 
providing things like clothing and food and shelter 
and school supplies and things of that nature.  I 
think that Clinton Day could even indirectly benefit 
insofar as perhaps his load for caring for these 
children could be decreased by virtue of the fact that 
she has a financial recovery in this case.         
The attorneys and the court speculated that as a result of 
Wendy's recovery, Hannah and Desirae might be able to go on an 
extra vacation, ride in a new car, or supersize their meals.   
¶79 When pressed by members of the court, Allstate's 
attorney appeared to acknowledge that this argument was based 
not on the language of the exclusion, but rather upon the 
purpose underlying the exclusion and notions of public policy.  
He explained: "You have to go back to the public policy that 
underlies the family member exclusion."  He further emphasized: 
"I would say [] that it is the public policy behind the 
exclusion, the potential for collusion."  As discussed above, 
the purpose underlying an exclusion does not control our 
determination of whether the language of the family exclusion 
unambiguously precludes coverage for a claim.  See supra, ¶35.     
¶80 In 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
benefit 
would 
accrue 
indirectly to an insured, it is helpful to compare the alleged 
benefits that Allstate identifies with the benefit identified in 
Whirlpool that would accrue indirectly to Jaclyn Ziebert.  In 
Whirlpool, 
the 
court 
found 
that 
a 
benefit 
would 
accrue 
indirectly to an insured because, due to the nature of a 
contribution claim, "in all practical respects, the money 
[recovered in the action] will be funneled through to" the 
insured under the policy.  Unlike in Whirlpool, this case does 
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
34 
 
not involve a contribution claim.  In this case, there is no 
reason to suggest that any insurance proceeds that Wendy 
recovers would be in any way funneled through Wendy's accounts 
and on to an insured.21  Allstate's assumptions about how Wendy 
would 
spend 
the 
insurance 
proceeds 
are 
based 
only 
on 
speculation.   
¶81 Further, stretching the policy term "benefit" to 
encompass the possibility that Wendy might buy her daughters 
supersized meals or take them on a vacation would appear have no 
stopping point.  Rather, it seems that the same argument could 
be made any time that there was an injury to an insured person.  
As stated above, if Allstate had intended to exclude coverage in 
all cases where there was bodily injury to an insured person, it 
should have said so.  See supra, ¶56.   
¶82 We conclude that Allstate has failed to meet its 
burden to demonstrate that a benefit of coverage would accrue 
directly or indirectly to an insured.  To the extent that the 
terms of the policy lack clarity, the ambiguity in an insurance 
contract is construed in favor of coverage.22  
                                                 
21 Allstate also argues that "the benefit to Clinton Day as 
a result of the survivorship claim triggers the application of 
the family exclusion to preclude coverage for Emma Day's bodily 
injuries."  We do not understand Allstate's argument.  Wendy's 
claim for wrongful death action is a separate cause of action 
from the estate's survival claim, and the estate's survival 
claim has been dismissed.    
22 Having determined that the policy language does not 
unambiguously preclude coverage for Wendy's wrongful death 
claim, we need not address Wendy's argument that the exclusion 
is unenforceable under these facts.        
No. 
2008AP2929   
 
35 
 
¶83 In sum, we determine that the court of appeals erred 
when it directed the circuit court to grant summary judgment in 
favor of Allstate.  The court of appeals' assertion that Clinton 
would have a legal right to collect a portion of the wrongful 
death award fails to distinguish the right to pursue a claim 
under the wrongful death statute from the ownership of a 
wrongful death recovery when the parties are divorced.   
¶84 Based upon an examination of the language of the 
policy, the canons of insurance policy construction, and our 
case law, we conclude that Allstate has failed to meet its 
burden to demonstrate that the family exclusion unambiguously 
precludes coverage.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals directing the entry of summary judgment and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.  
    
  
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶85 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  Today, 
in the face of undoubtedly sympathetic facts, the majority 
avoids a straight-forward application of the unambiguous family 
exclusion provision and dispenses with the precedent set forth 
in Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 539 N.W.2d 883 
(1995).  In the process, the majority authors a recipe for 
collusion, inviting insureds to manipulate intra-family claims 
so as to obtain liability coverage where it otherwise would be 
excluded. 
¶86 While I have tremendous sympathy for the Day family, 
this court cannot rewrite an unambiguous family exclusion 
provision in order to cover a risk that Allstate did not 
contemplate and for which it did not receive a premium.  See 
Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶19, 
311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I. ANALYSIS 
¶87 This court has expressly recognized the validity of 
family exclusion provisions in homeowner's insurance policies.  
See Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 149-50; Shannon v. Shannon, 150 
Wis. 2d 434, 455-56, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989).  In particular, this 
court has concluded that family exclusion provisions serve the 
legitimate purpose of protecting insurers from exposure to 
liability to those persons to whom an insured, because of close 
family ties, would likely be partial in case of injury.  
Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 149; Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d at 456.  In 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
2 
 
such cases, the mere possibility of family member collusion 
warrants the exclusion of coverage.  Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 
150-52. 
¶88 With that policy in mind, I turn to the case now 
before this court. 
¶89 To determine whether Wendy Day's claim for wrongful 
death is covered by the homeowner's insurance policy issued to 
Holly Day, I begin with the language of the policy.  The 
policy's initial grant of coverage provides, in relevant part, 
that "[s]ubject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this 
policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person 
becomes 
legally 
obligated 
to 
pay 
because 
of 
bodily 
injury . . . arising from an occurrence to which this policy 
applies, and is covered by this part of the policy."   
¶90 In turn, the policy defines "insured person(s)" as 
"you and, if a resident of your household: a) any relative; and 
b) any dependent person in your care."  Clinton and Holly Day 
are named insureds under the policy.  In addition, the parties 
do not dispute that Emma Day and the two surviving children of 
Clinton and Wendy Day (Hannah Day and Desirae Sarver) qualify as 
"insured persons." 
¶91 The policy also defines "bodily injury."  In relevant 
part, "'[b]odily injury'——means physical harm to the body, 
including sickness or disease, and resulting death . . . ."  
Again, the parties do not dispute that Emma Day's death 
constitutes "bodily injury" for purposes of this policy. 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
3 
 
¶92 Accordingly, it is clear that Wendy Day's claim for 
Emma Day's wrongful death falls within the policy's initial 
grant of coverage: if Wendy Day prevails on her claim, then 
Holly Day, as a named insured, will be "legally obligated to pay 
because of [Emma Day's] bodily injury." 
¶93 However, that initial grant of coverage is subject to 
a family exclusion provision.  The provision provides, in 
relevant part: "We do not cover bodily injury to an insured 
person . . . whenever any benefit of this coverage would accrue 
directly or indirectly to an insured person."  In other words, 
in this case, "[Allstate] do[es] not cover bodily injury to 
[Emma Day] . . . whenever any benefit of this coverage would 
accrue directly or indirectly to [Clinton Day, Holly Day, Emma 
Day, Hannah Day, or Desirae Sarver]." 
¶94 Significantly, in Whirlpool, this court concluded that 
the language of the identical family exclusion provision was 
clear and unambiguous.  197 Wis. 2d at 153, 155-56.  Without 
explanation, the majority appears to arrive at the opposite 
conclusion of the Whirlpool court, namely, that the family 
exclusion provision is ambiguous.  See majority op., ¶82 ("To 
the extent that the terms of the policy lack clarity, the 
ambiguity in an insurance contract is construed in favor of 
coverage.").  Moreover, in Whirlpool, the clear and unambiguous 
family exclusion provision appeared in a homeowner's insurance 
policy issued by Allstate, the same insurer that issued Clinton 
and Holly Day's policy.  See id. at 148.  In the more than 15 
years since Whirlpool has been decided, Allstate should have 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
4 
 
been able to rely on this court's conclusion that the identical 
family exclusion provision is clear and unambiguous.  Instead, 
today, the majority concludes that "Allstate has failed to meet 
its 
burden 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
family 
exclusion 
unambiguously precludes coverage."  Majority op., ¶¶4, 84. 
¶95 Because the Whirlpool court construed and applied the 
identical family exclusion provision, I look to the Whirlpool 
decision for guidance in applying the family exclusion provision 
to the facts now before us.   
¶96 In Whirlpool, this court held that the identical 
family exclusion provision was "clear and unambiguous and 
clearly encompasse[d]" a third party contribution claim brought 
against an insured.  197 Wis. 2d at 155-56.  In that case, 
three-year-old Jaclyn Ziebert injured her hand in a meat grinder 
manufactured by Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool).  Id. at 147.  
Jaclyn and her parents, Kenneth and Sharon Ziebert, filed an 
action against Whirlpool and the supplier of the meat grinder to 
recover 
damages 
for 
Jaclyn's 
injuries. 
 
Id. 
at 
147-48.  
Whirlpool then filed a separate contribution claim against 
Sharon Ziebert and her homeowner's liability insurer, Allstate, 
alleging that Sharon's negligent supervision contributed to 
Jaclyn's injuries.  Id. at 148. 
¶97 Allstate 
moved 
for 
summary 
judgment 
in 
the 
contribution action, arguing that the family exclusion provision 
in 
Sharon 
Ziebert's homeowner's insurance policy excluded 
coverage for Whirlpool's contribution claim.  Id.  The circuit 
court denied Allstate's motion, but the court of appeals 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
5 
 
reversed.  Id.  This court affirmed the decision of the court of 
appeals, concluding that the family exclusion provision "even 
when construed narrowly, is unambiguous and clearly contemplates 
contribution claims."  Id. at 153. 
¶98 The Whirlpool court aptly noted that the key phrase of 
the family exclusion provision is "'whenever any benefit of this 
coverage would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured 
person.'"  Id.  Explaining that a court should interpret an 
insurance contract to give meaning to each word, the court 
concluded that "[t]he direct/indirect benefit language was 
obviously meant to differentiate between two possible types of 
benefits": "direct" benefits and "indirect" benefits.  Id. at 
154 (emphasis added).1   
¶99 In direct contradiction to Whirlpool, the majority 
conflates the analysis, interpreting the term "benefit" to mean 
only one type of benefit: insurance proceeds.  See majority op., 
¶58 ("[W]e turn to examining whether any insurance proceeds will 
accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person as a result 
of Allstate's coverage of Wendy's claim.").  Interpreting the 
term "benefit" to mean only insurance proceeds contradicts the 
clear language of the family exclusion provision, which provides 
that Allstate "do[es] not cover bodily injury to an insured 
person . . . whenever any benefit of this coverage would accrue 
directly or indirectly to an insured person."  (Emphasis added.)  
                                                 
1 The majority acknowledges this language in Whirlpool but 
quickly dismisses it, explaining that the Whirlpool court did 
not mean what it said.  Majority op., ¶47 n.12.  If the majority 
is going to overrule Whirlpool, then it should simply say so. 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
6 
 
A proper reading of Whirlpool reveals that insurance proceeds 
are construed as a "direct" benefit of coverage, which is just 
the first of two types of benefits included within the family 
exclusion provision.  The second type of benefit, an "indirect" 
benefit, is not so narrow.  I examine the two types of benefits 
in turn. 
A. "Direct" Benefits 
¶100 First, the Whirlpool court construed "direct" benefit 
to mean the insurance proceeds that would accrue to an insured 
person by way of a direct claim against another insured person.  
Applying the ordinary dictionary meaning of "direct,"2 the court 
determined that "[a] 'direct' benefit . . . would accrue to 
Jaclyn Ziebert by way of a 'direct' claim against Sharon Ziebert 
and Allstate."  Id. at 153.  Stated differently, if Jaclyn 
Ziebert would have brought a negligence claim against her 
mother, there is no question that the family exclusion provision 
would have barred coverage: assuming Jaclyn's claim prevailed, a 
"direct" benefit——that is, the insurance proceeds——would accrue 
to Jaclyn, an insured person.  See id. 
¶101 Likewise, in this case, if an insured person (Clinton 
Day, Emma Day, Hannah Day, or Desirae Sarver) brings a direct 
claim against Holly Day, there is no question that the family 
                                                 
2 See Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶22, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 
750 N.W.2d 817 (explaining that when a term is not defined in an 
insurance policy, this court gives the term its common and 
ordinary meaning by consulting dictionary definitions).  But see 
majority op., ¶¶42, 52-54 (recognizing that the policy does not 
define the term "benefit" but nevertheless neglecting to 
consider the term's common and ordinary meaning). 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
7 
 
exclusion provision bars coverage: if the claim prevails, a 
"direct" benefit in the form of insurance proceeds would accrue 
to the insured person. 
¶102 Hannah Day, Desirae Sarver, and Clinton Day have all, 
at some point in the litigation, asserted direct claims against 
Holly Day for Emma Day's death.  For the reason just stated, 
those claims are clearly subject to the family exclusion 
provision.  However, as this lawsuit has progressed, certain 
claims and parties have successively dropped out, leaving only 
Wendy Day's claim for wrongful death asserted directly against 
Allstate.  According to the majority, this results in coverage 
for Emma Day's death——coverage that otherwise would clearly be 
excluded if claims were made by other members of the same 
family.  Hence, the majority instructs a family how best to 
plead in order to obtain coverage and avoid application of an 
unambiguous family exclusion provision.  
¶103 At one time, both Hannah Day and Desirae Sarver were 
named plaintiffs in the complaint against Holly Day.  Majority 
op., ¶¶8-9.  However, the parties later stipulated to the 
dismissal of Hannah Day and Desirae Sarver's claims.  Id., ¶16.  
Indeed, if their claims had remained and prevailed, then the 
family 
exclusion 
provision 
clearly 
would 
have 
precluded 
coverage.  
¶104 Clinton 
Day 
was 
not 
a 
named 
plaintiff 
in 
the 
complaint; as a practical matter, Clinton probably did not wish 
to assert a claim against his wife.  Nevertheless, as the 
majority acknowledges, Wendy Day's claim for wrongful death 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
8 
 
could not proceed without Clinton Day bringing a claim for 
wrongful death.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.04(3); majority op., ¶64.  
Hence, Wendy Day's claim for wrongful death was able to proceed 
only by virtue of Clinton Day asserting a claim for wrongful 
death against his wife——a claim that is clearly subject to the 
family exclusion provision.   
¶105 The 
majority 
sidesteps 
any 
significant 
analysis 
regarding Clinton Day's claim and instead concludes that his 
right to sue and recover damages for his daughter's wrongful 
death does not mean that he is entitled to a portion of Wendy 
Day's recovery.  See majority op., ¶¶65, 75.  Relying on Chang 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 
514 N.W.2d 399 (1994), the majority reasons that although 
Clinton Day and Wendy Day are members of the same class of 
beneficiaries and thus "share the right to bring a wrongful 
death action, they do not necessarily share joint ownership of 
the 
recovery"; 
rather, 
each 
beneficiary's 
recovery 
is 
independent, and each beneficiary must prove his or her own 
loss.  Majority op., ¶66.  According to the parties, in this 
case, Clinton Day is not actively pursuing his portion of the 
recovery for his daughter's wrongful death.  Apparently, this is 
the touchstone upon which the majority relies.  
¶106 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however, Chang 
is not so limited.  While the Chang court concluded that the 
wrongful death statute does not "dictate[e] an automatic, equal 
division of damage awards or recovery among class members," 182 
Wis. 2d at 562 (emphasis added), the court also made clear that 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
9 
 
the fact-finder is not precluded from presuming equal damages 
"if no individualized findings of damages are requested or given 
for the members of a class," id. at 562.3  See also id. at 573-74 
                                                 
3 The holding in Chang cannot be divorced from its context.  
In that case, only one of two parents brought a wrongful death 
claim for the loss of the couple's child.  Chang v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 558, 514 N.W.2d 399 
(1994).  The other parent's recovery was barred by virtue of the 
undisputed fact that his negligence was the sole cause of the 
child's death.  Id. at 563.  The court concluded that the 
wrongful death statute does not "dictat[e] an automatic, equal 
division of damage awards or recovery" among the members of the 
class of beneficiaries, id. at 562, which meant that the non-
negligent parent's recovery was not automatically cut in half.  
Rather, as the sole claimant, she had the right to prove and 
collect upon her individual loss up to the statutory maximum.  
Id. at 557; see also Smith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 192 
Wis. 2d 322, 335-36, 531 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In Chang, there was only one wrongful death claimant and 
hence no need to allocate the recovery.  Nevertheless, the court 
went on to discuss the method of allocating damages among two or 
more wrongful death claimants.  See Chang, 182 Wis. 2d at 581-82 
(Steinmetz, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for 
needlessly addressing the issue of the allocation of damages 
when, in that case, only one party claimed damages).  The court 
concluded:  
[I]f there are no specific damage findings for 
individual members of the class, or if the damages are 
awarded jointly to a given class, damages may be 
presumed to be equal.  Each beneficiary would thus 
receive an equal proportion of the amount available, 
up to the statutory maximum. . . .   
[In contrast,] [w]hen there is a specific finding 
of different damages for the individual members of the 
class, the members of the class should recover in 
proportion to the damages each has proven.   
Id. at 573-74. 
This latter discussion in Chang is what most pertains to 
the case at bar.  Here, unlike in Chang, there are two wrongful 
death claimants: Wendy Day and Clinton Day. 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
10 
 
("[I]f there are no specific damage findings for individual 
members of the class, or if the damages are awarded jointly to a 
given 
class, 
damages 
may 
be 
presumed 
to 
be 
equal.").  
Accordingly, Chang suggests that, here, even if Clinton Day 
elects not to personally participate in the litigation and prove 
his own loss for his daughter's wrongful death, nothing would 
preclude the fact-finder from presuming that his damages are 
equal to Wendy Day's damages.  If such is the case, Clinton 
Day's claim for wrongful death would prevail, and a "direct" 
benefit in the form of insurance proceeds would accrue to 
Clinton Day, an insured person. 
¶107 More to the point, however, once Clinton Day joined 
the lawsuit, he had every incentive not to pursue his own 
interests in a recovery for his daughter's wrongful death.  As 
previously mentioned, Wendy Day's claim for wrongful death was 
able to proceed only by virtue of Clinton Day asserting a claim 
for wrongful death——a claim originally asserted against Holly 
Day, Clinton's wife.  Subsequent to Clinton Day joining the 
suit, however, Wendy Day "expressed her intention to proceed 
exclusively against Allstate's liability policy," and Holly Day 
was dismissed from the lawsuit.  Majority op., ¶16.  Because 
Holly Day was dismissed from the lawsuit, Clinton Day was able 
to avoid asserting a claim against his wife personally and was 
able to avoid placing their marital property at risk in the 
lawsuit.  See Wis. Stat. § 766.31(1)-(3) (providing that all 
spousal property is, or is presumed to be, marital property and 
that, generally, each spouse has a present undivided one-half 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
11 
 
interest in the marital property); Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2)(cm) 
(providing that "[a]n obligation incurred by a spouse during 
marriage, resulting from a tort committed by the spouse during 
marriage, may be satisfied . . . from that spouse's interest in 
marital property").   
¶108 Tracing the majority's logic, if the pleadings are 
manipulated such that only Wendy Day remains a legal party, then 
coverage inures to Wendy Day even though (a) Clinton Day is 
clearly necessary to the litigation; (b) Clinton Day's claim is 
clearly excluded; and (c) Clinton Day's own assets are at stake 
if insurance coverage does not apply.  According to the 
majority, even though Clinton Day is a party, so long as he 
promises not to seek money damages, coverage for Wendy Day's 
claim is not precluded. 
¶109 It is this potential for intra-family collusion that 
strikes at the heart of the family exclusion provision.  In no 
way do I mean to suggest that the Days have intentionally 
manipulated their claims so as to ensure coverage for Emma Day's 
death.  To the contrary, I have every reason to believe that the 
Days are upstanding people who have suffered a terrible family 
tragedy.  However, it is the mere potential for intra-family 
collusion that warrants the exclusion of coverage for an 
insured's bodily injury.  This is the precise rationale 
underlying Whirlpool, precedent that we are required to follow.  
See Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 151 ("It must be noted that our 
decision does not imply any wrongdoing on the part of the 
Zieberts.  In fact, the possibility of collusion in this case 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
12 
 
seems quite low, if not nil.  However, although this court never 
ignores the circumstances of a particular case, there are times 
when we must look beyond the immediate facts to principles of 
public policy and the broader ramifications that our decisions 
have on the people of this state as a whole." (Internal footnote 
omitted.)).  
B. "Indirect" Benefits 
¶110 After 
construing 
"direct" 
benefit 
to 
mean 
the 
insurance proceeds that would accrue to an insured person by way 
of a direct claim against another insured person, the Whirlpool 
court turned to "indirect" benefits.  Applying the ordinary 
dictionary meaning of "indirect," the court construed "indirect" 
benefit to include the money that would incur to an insured 
person by virtue of a third party's successful claim against 
another insured person.  Id. at 153-54.  Specifically, the court 
concluded that "[a]n indirect benefit would incur to Jaclyn if 
Whirlpool won its contribution claim since the money Whirlpool 
receives will, in all practical respects, be funneled through to 
Jaclyn.  Jaclyn would receive, in the plainest sense of the 
word, an indirect benefit."  Id.  In other words, the court 
concluded that if (a) Whirlpool's claim against Sharon Ziebert 
and 
Allstate 
prevailed, 
meaning 
Whirlpool 
recovered 
the 
insurance proceeds paid by Allstate for Sharon Ziebert's 
negligence, then (b) Jaclyn would receive an indirect benefit by 
virtue of Whirlpool having more money to meet Jaclyn's judgment.  
Indeed, assuming Whirlpool lacked the financial resources to 
meet Jaclyn's judgment, Whirlpool's contribution claim against 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
13 
 
Sharon Ziebert and Allstate would be Jaclyn's only source of 
funds.  Id. at 150.  Thus, as far as the Whirlpool court was 
concerned, Whirlpool's contribution claim against Sharon Ziebert 
and Allstate could have had the same practical effect as Jaclyn 
asserting a direct claim against her mother and Allstate. 
¶111 Applying that same logic to the case now before this 
court, I conclude that an "indirect" benefit would accrue to 
Hannah Day and Desirae Sarver by virtue of Wendy Day's 
successful claim against Allstate.  That is, Wendy Day's claim 
against Allstate could have the same practical effect as her 
daughters 
asserting 
direct 
claims 
against 
Allstate——direct 
claims that, as discussed previously, would clearly be subject 
to the family exclusion provision.  If Wendy Day prevails on her 
claim for wrongful death, then the money she receives "will, in 
all practical respects, be funneled through" to her daughters.4  
Id. at 153-54.  To be fair, I cannot know for certain whether 
Wendy Day will spend the actual monies recovered in this lawsuit 
on her daughters.  See majority op., ¶80.  However, it was pure 
speculation on which the Whirlpool court based its conclusion 
that Jaclyn would incur an indirect benefit if Whirlpool 
prevailed on its contribution claim.  197 Wis. 2d at 153-54.  
                                                 
4 Instead of meaningfully addressing Allstate's argument 
that an indirect benefit would accrue to Hannah Day and Desirae 
Sarver by virtue of their mother's successful claim against 
Allstate, see majority op., ¶78, the majority engages in the 
classic 
straw 
man 
fallacy——setting 
up 
and 
attacking 
an 
exaggerated version of Allstate's argument, see id., ¶81 
("[S]tretching the policy term 'benefit' to encompass the 
possibility that Wendy might buy her daughters supersized meals 
or take them on a vacation would appear [to] have no stopping 
point."). 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
14 
 
The court never could have known whether Whirlpool was going to 
utilize the actual monies recovered in its contribution claim to 
help satisfy Jaclyn's judgment against Whirlpool.  In fact, the 
court assumed for the sake of argument that, but for Whirlpool's 
successful contribution claim, Whirlpool lacked the financial 
resources to meet Jaclyn's judgment.  Id. at 150.  The logic of 
Whirlpool must apply here.  We can assume that Hannah Day and 
Desirae Sarver would receive an indirect benefit by virtue of 
their mother having more money, regardless of the actual manner 
in which she allocates her recovery. 
¶112 In summary, I conclude that this case is governed by a 
straight-forward application of the unambiguous family exclusion 
provision.  Specifically, I conclude that the family exclusion 
provision unambiguously precludes coverage for Emma Day's death 
because 
a 
benefit 
of 
coverage 
would 
accrue 
directly 
or 
indirectly to one or more insured persons, namely, Clinton Day, 
Hannah Day, and Desirae Sarver.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID. T. 
PROSSER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent. 
 
No.  2008AP2929.akz 
 
 
 
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