Title: Watkins v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 239, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ADAM WATKINS, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 239, 2010 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
ID No. 0906014912 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  May 18, 2011 
  Decided:  June 28, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, of the Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, of the Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Barbara Santana was robbed at gunpoint as she attempted to withdraw cash 
from an automatic teller machine.  Video surveillance at the bank captured the 
events.  Police used that surveillance footage to create an “attempt to identify” 
flyer, which included the operative facts of the crime and two photographs of the 
perpetrator in the act.  After two law enforcement officers identified Defendant-
Below/Appellant, Adam Watkins, as the perpetrator in the flyer, Watkins was 
charged by indictment with robbery first degree and possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”).  At a jury trial that followed, defense 
counsel proffered evidence of a different bank robbery that recently had occurred 
across the street from the bank where Santana was robbed.  Defense counsel called 
the man who had pled guilty to that crime as a witness at Watkins’ trial in an 
attempt to create a reasonable doubt that Watkins had robbed Santana.  But, the 
trial judge concluded that the evidence of the nearby robbery was “too attenuated” 
and excluded defense counsel’s proffer.  The jury ultimately found Watkins guilty 
of robbery first degree and PFDCF.  On appeal, Watkins argues that the trial judge 
abused his discretion by precluding Watkins’ proffer of exculpatory evidence to 
establish a reasonable doubt that someone else may have committed the crime 
charged.  After carefully reviewing the proffered evidence, we reverse Watkins’ 
convictions and remand the matter for a new trial consistent with this Opinion. 
 
3
PNC Robbery 
One Friday night approximately two years ago, Barbara Santana visited a 
PNC Bank not far from where she lived.  As Santana walked towards the automatic 
teller machine (“ATM”), she observed a man who was holding a gun and 
approaching her.  Santana recalled that the man was wearing a cap, sunglasses, a 
dark shirt, and jeans.  The man grabbed Santana and instructed her to withdraw 
five hundred dollars from the ATM.  Santana complied, and when the ATM 
dispensed the cash, the man took the cash and fled into a nearby neighborhood. 
Investigation 
The following Monday, Detective Corey Godek of the Delaware State Police 
was directed to investigate the PNC Robbery.  Two days later, a PNC Bank 
manager sent Godek an email, which included three still photographs of the 
perpetrator in the act.  Godek used two of those photographs to create an “attempt 
to identify” flyer (the “Flyer”), which also included the relevant facts of the crime.  
Godek circulated the Flyer through Delaware’s law enforcement information 
sharing system.  Godek also caused the Flyer to be posted to an internet version of 
a local newspaper.  Two law enforcement officers identified the defendant, 
Watkins, as the man in the Flyer’s photographs.  Less than one week after Santana 
was robbed, police arrested Watkins for the crime.  Police then executed a search 
warrant at Watkins’ apartment, which was located approximately two miles from 
 
4
the PNC Bank.  Police recovered two black caps and several pairs of sunglasses, 
but those items were not otherwise connected to the PNC Robbery.  Police did not 
recover a gun or ammunition. 
Procedural History 
Thereafter, Watkins was charged by indictment with robbery first degree and 
PFDCF.  The matter proceeded to a jury trial.  Defense counsel employed a single 
strategy: misidentification.  In defense counsel’s opening statement, he explained: 
And I’m going to tell each and every one of you without any 
doubt, when [the prosecutor] stands up and says the State rests, 
you’re going to look over there and say, you know what?  He 
probably did it, because it does look like him.  Your job as 
jurors is to restrain from, okay, game’s over, halftime, and say, 
let’s wait to see what happens in the second half.  And I 
guarantee you, I guarantee you, there’s going to be something 
that happens in the second half that you go, whoa, look at that.  
Internally, a head-snapper, and the moment that you have that 
head-snapper, you’re going to have in your head there’s a 
reasonable doubt here.  Was it really him?  Mark me on it.  He 
gets a call at the end of the endeavor and say, remember when 
[defense counsel] told you about the head-snapper, well, I said 
it.  See if I can deliver. 
The prosecutor then presented the State’s case.  Detective Godek testified 
about his investigation and the creation of the Flyer.  Santana testified about the 
PNC Robbery itself.  The prosecutor then called the two law enforcement officers 
that had identified Watkins as the man in the Flyer’s photographs.  Daniel Daly, an 
investigator for the Attorney General’s Office, testified that he had known Watkins 
since he was approximately ten or eleven years old.  Daly described Watkins as “a 
 
5
family friend.”  But, Daly testified that he only saw Watkins “maybe once a year or 
so in the last few years.”  Nevertheless, Daly testified that when he observed the 
Flyer, he “immediately” said, “I know who that is.”  Daly attributed his certainty to 
Watkins’ profile: “It’s the profile.  That’s Adam’s profile.” 
Detective Nicholas Terranova of the Delaware State Police also testified.  
Terranova explained that he attended the same elementary school as Watkins and 
that he “continually saw different members of the family from then on throughout 
[his] . . . adulthood.”  On direct examination, Terranova testified: “I’m 100-perecnt 
sure that’s Adam Watkins.  When you look at the picture, it looks like a 
Watkins. . . .  [W]hen I saw the picture . . . , just the jaw line, then I knew that was 
Adam Watkins.” 
The next day, defense counsel attempted to call his first witness, Joseph 
Blevins.  Blevins recently had pled guilty to a robbery at Artisans’ Bank (the 
“Artisans’ Robbery”), which is located across the street from the PNC Bank where 
Santana was robbed.  Blevins committed the Artisans’ Robbery six weeks before 
the PNC Robbery occurred.  Like the perpetrator in the PNC Robbery, Blevins fled 
into the nearby neighborhood.  But, unlike the perpetrator in the PNC Robbery, 
Blevins used a threatening note (not a gun) and robbed the bank itself (not a 
customer).  Also, Blevins committed the Artisans’ Robbery during the day, 
whereas the PNC Robbery occurred at night. 
 
6
The trial judge first asked a threshold question: 
The Court: 
. . . If Blevins testifies, is he going to take 
the Fifth Amendment on this, or is he 
going to admit it, or is he going to deny 
being involved in the crime here? 
Defense Counsel: 
I would expect him not to admit that he’s 
involved in the crime here. 
Blevins was then brought into the courtroom, and the trial judge observed him.  
The trial judge and Blevins engaged in the following exchange: 
The Court: 
. . . [D]o you have any idea why you’re 
here, by the way? 
Blevins:  
 
No. 
The Court:  
 
Don’t worry about it. . . . 
The trial judge then compared the details of the two robberies as follows: 
. . . Again, the physical resemblance is a subjective thing.  
Some might say there’s a similarity and some might disagree.  
One might say that one’s jaw is different and the nose is 
different and so on; otherwise, there’s a six-week separation.  
It’s a different bank, [albeit] across the street.  It’s a different 
time of day as between night and day.  The robbery at 
Artisan[s]’[] was through a threatening note, and the robbery at 
the ATM was verbal.  No sunglasses in the Artisan[s]’[] 
robbery.  I think this is too attenuated. 
After further argument, the trial judge concluded: 
. . . Having pressed the issue, I do not think that the jawline of 
Mr. Blevins is the same as the jawline of the person in the 
[surveillance] photograph; but I did not make that part of my 
findings, because I do not want to make it appear that I’m 
judging the admissibility of this evidence based on my 
subjective impressions of Blevins versus that photograph.  So, 
 
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I’m allowing for the possibility that the jury might actually see 
it differently than I did. 
* 
* 
* 
. . . [I]f there’s a guilty verdict, you have leave within ten days 
longer, if you show cause, to supplement the record with 
whatever photographs you care to as to Mr. Blevins’ 
appearance . . . . 
Thereafter, Watkins testified.  Watkins recalled that he became aware of the 
Flyer after Terranova spoke to Watkins’ brother about it.  Watkins explained that 
he viewed the Flyer and reacted: “To me, yes, it looked like me.  That’s what put 
me in shock immediately.”  But, Watkins testified that he did not commit the PNC 
Robbery.  Watkins also testified that he was with a friend at the time that the PNC 
Robbery occurred.  That friend also testified, but was unable to confirm Watkins’ 
story. 
The jury ultimately found Watkins guilty of robbery first degree and 
PFDCF.  Thereafter, the trial judge sentenced Watkins.  For the robbery first 
degree conviction, the trial judge sentenced Watkins to fifteen years imprisonment 
at Level V, suspended after three years for decreasing levels of supervision.  For 
the PFDCF conviction, the trial judge sentenced Watkins to an additional three 
years imprisonment at Level V.  This appeal followed. 
Discussion 
Watkins contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in “precluding 
[his] proffer of exculpatory evidence to establish a reasonable doubt that someone 
 
8
else may have committed the crime for which [he] was charged.”  Specifically, 
Watkins argues that the trial judge erred in “imposing a stringent standard of 
admissibility under [Delaware Rule of Evidence] 404(b), in effect requiring a 
‘signature crime’ similarity between the two offenses in order to permit admission 
of the other crime evidence.”  We review the trial judge’s ruling to exclude the 
Artisans’ Robbery evidence for abuse of discretion.1 
Relevant Evidence 
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible at trial.2  Delaware Rule of 
Evidence 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  We 
have explained that the definition of relevance encompasses materiality and 
probative value.3  Evidence is material if the fact it is offered to prove is “of 
consequence” to the action.4  Evidence has probative value if it “advances the 
probability” that the fact is as the party offering the evidence asserts it to be.5 
Watkins’ only defense at trial was misidentification.  Consequently, the 
“central issue” or “ultimate fact” necessarily became the identity of the 
                                          
 
1 Purnell v. State, 979 A.2d 1102, 1106 (Del. 2009) (citing Foster v. State, 961 A.2d 526, 529 
(Del. 2008)). 
2 Stickel v. State, 975 A.2d 780, 782 (Del. 2009) (citing D.R.E. 402). 
3 Id. (citing Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1060 (Del. 1994)). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
 
9
perpetrator.6  Whether Daly and Terranova were mistaken was the material issue in 
this case.  The Artisans’ Robbery evidence had the potential to bolster Watkins’ 
misidentification defense and was thereby “of consequence” to the trial.  Given 
that the Artisans’ Robbery evidence was material, the question then becomes 
whether the evidence had probative value. 
The details of the Artisans’ Robbery differed from the PNC Robbery in 
many minor respects: the Artisans’ Robbery occurred during the day, whereas the 
PNC Robbery occurred at night; the Artisans’ Robbery involved the use of a 
threatening note, whereas the PNC Robbery was effected through the threat of a 
firearm; and the perpetrator in the Artisans’ Robbery targeted a bank teller inside 
the bank, whereas the perpetrator in the PNC Robbery targeted a customer outside 
of the bank at the ATM.  Nevertheless, the Artisans’ Robbery and the PNC 
Robbery were unusually similar in other respects: the banks were located across 
the street from one another; the perpetrators fled into the same area; and the 
perpetrators were both white males and had similar builds.  Given these 
similarities, we conclude that the Artisans’ Robbery advanced the probability that 
someone other than Watkins had committed the PNC Robbery.  Given that we 
                                          
 
6 See Kiser v. State, 769 A.2d 736, 740 (Del. 2001). 
 
10
conclude that the Artisans’ Robbery evidence was material and had probative 
value, it was thereby relevant and admissible unless otherwise barred.7 
Probative Value Not Substantially Outweighed by Prejudicial Effect 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 402 relevantly provides: “All relevant evidence 
is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other 
rules applicable in the courts of this State.”  Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 
provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
We have explained that where a defendant invokes the defense of 
misidentification, “relevant misidentification evidence is highly probative of a 
material issue in the case.” 8   Consequently, we must identify the potential 
prejudicial effect of admitting the Artisans’ Robbery evidence and determine 
whether that prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value of the 
Artisans’ Robbery evidence.  
There was at least one potentially prejudicial effect if Blevins took the 
witness stand: Blevins may have invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to 
                                          
 
7 See id. at 741 (“It is sufficient if the evidence establishes that the fact sought to be proven, here 
the claim of misidentification, is more probable when supported by the proffered evidence that it 
would be without it.”) (citing 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 185 (5th ed. 1999)). 
8 Id. 
 
11
incriminate himself, which could have misled the jury.  We encountered that same 
legal issue in Kiser v. State.9  There, the defendant’s sole defense at his trial for 
drug charges was mistaken identity.10  Specifically, the defendant attempted to 
establish that law enforcement officials often mistook him for one of his cousins or 
brothers on at least three occasions during the preceding ten years. 11   To 
demonstrate that fact, the defendant attempted to call the following witnesses: his 
mother, a Superior Court bailiff, and his brother.12  The trial judge did not allow 
any of those witnesses to testify.13 
We reversed the trial judge’s rulings.  We concluded that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in excluding the testimony of the defendant’s mother and the 
bailiff because their testimony would have been relevant to the defendant’s claim 
of misidentification, and because the probative value of the evidence would not 
have been substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 14  We were also 
troubled because the trial judge applied an incorrect standard -- whether the 
probative value of the evidence was “outweighed by the danger of confusing the 
                                          
 
9 769 A.2d 736 (Del. 2001) 
10 Id. at 738–39. 
11 Id. at 738. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 739. 
14 Id. at 740–42. 
 
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jury and the issues” -- rather than the standard that the probative value be 
“substantially outweighed” by the dangers cited.15 
We also examined the proffer of the defendant’s brother, who indicated that 
he intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself if 
asked any questions regarding the crimes for which the defendant was charged.16  
We explained that the brother’s appearance and identification could lead the jury to 
infer that the brother was the perpetrator, but that his refusal to answer any 
questions other than his name and relationship to the defendant “would have 
precluded the State from effectively cross-examining him to dispel [that] 
inference . . . .”17  We concluded that the trial judge did not err in determining that 
the State would be unduly prejudiced if the defendant’s brother was permitted to 
testify, given that two photographs of the defendant’s brother were in evidence and 
available to the jury.18  We also noted that an acceptable procedure on remand 
would be for the defendant’s brother to be identified in court as an exhibit.19 
The facts here are different from the facts of Kiser.  The trial judge asked 
defense counsel if Blevins would invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to 
                                          
 
15 Id.; D.R.E. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”). 
16 Kiser, 769 A.2d at 742. 
17 Id. at 743. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 743 n.4. 
 
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incriminate himself if permitted to take the witness stand.  Defense counsel 
responded: “I would expect him not to admit that he’s involved in the crime here.”  
When Blevins was present in the courtroom, the trial judge did not ask Blevins if 
he planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment right.  The record before us does not 
reflect that Blevins would have done so. 
Even if Blevins definitively had asserted that he would take the witness 
stand and invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself, the 
Artisans’ Robbery evidence could have been admitted in two other ways, which 
would have limited any prejudicial effect.  In Kiser, we identified those options.  
First, the trial judge could have allowed defense counsel to present the jury with 
the facts of the Artisans’ Robbery and photographs of Blevins.20  Second, the trial 
judge could have allowed defense counsel to present the jury with the facts of the 
Artisans’ Robbery and then have Blevins identified in court as an exhibit to avoid 
the concern that Blevins might invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to 
incriminate himself.21  If the trial judge had employed either of those methods, the 
probative value of the relevant Artisans’ Robbery evidence would not have been 
substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the issues or misleading 
the jury.  Accordingly, the evidence was admissible. 
                                          
 
20 See id. at 743. 
21 See id. at 743 n.4. 
 
14
As in Kiser, “[t]he claim of misidentification did not present a peripheral 
issue in this case -- it was the core of the defense.”22  The exclusion of the 
Artisans’ Robbery evidence deprived Watkins of the opportunity to pursue his sole 
defense.  Because the trial judge erred in excluding that critical evidence, we must 
grant Watkins a new trial. 
Conclusion 
The judgments of the Superior Court are REVERSED and the matter is 
REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this Opinion. 
                                          
 
22 See id. at 743.