Title: Thomas N. Tomczak and Mary Ann Tomczak by John Louis Castellani v. Pete L. Bailey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP002733
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2733 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
John Louis Castellani, Trustee of the bankrupt 
estate of Thomas N. Tomczak and Mary Ann 
Tomczak, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Pete L. Bailey and American Surveying Company, 
Inc., 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Randolph L. Rafalski and Interline Surveying 
Services, Inc., 
 
Defendants, 
Mildred B. Wohlfard, 
 
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Equitable/Stefaniak Realty, 
 
Third Party Defendant. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
206 Wis. 2d 404, 557 N.W.2d 840 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 22, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 7, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis Flynn 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Steinmetz, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Geske, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Crooks, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Bradley, J., joins in dissent. 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Stephen L. Fox and Schmidt & Rupke, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Stephen L. Fox. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
Robert H. Bichler, Brenda J. Stugelmeyer and Hostak, Henzl & 
Bichler, S.C., Racine and oral argument by Robert H. Bichler. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by John A. Kassner and 
Wendel & Center, Madison for the Wisconsin Builders Assocation. 
 
No.  95-2733 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2733 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Louis Castellani, Trustee of the  
bankrupt estate of Thomas N. Tomczak and  
Mary Ann Tomczak,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Pete L. Bailey and American Surveying  
Company, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Randolph L. Rafalski and Interline  
Surveying Services, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Mildred B. Wohlfard,  
 
          Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Equitable/Stefaniak Realty,  
 
          Third Party Defendant.  
FILED 
 
May 22, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  95-2733 
 
2 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Tomczak v. Bailey, 206 Wis. 2d 
404, 557 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1996), which affirmed an order of 
the Circuit Court for Racine County, Dennis J. Flynn, Judge.  
The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion of the 
defendants, Pete L. Bailey (Bailey) and American Surveying 
Company (American), seeking dismissal because the plaintiffs, 
Thomas N. Tomczak and Mary Ann Tomczak (the Tomczaks), brought 
their action after the six-year limitation period set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.37 (1993-94)1 had expired.  The circuit court 
held that the "discovery rule," as adopted by this court in 
Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 
578 (1983), applied to the Tomczaks' cause of action so as to 
render it timely. 
¶2 
There are three issues before us on review: (1) 
whether the Hansen discovery rule applies to the time limitation 
for commencement of an action against a land surveyor under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.37; 
(2) 
whether 
§ 893.37 
violates 
the 
equal 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all future references to Wis. 
Stats. are to the 1993-94 version of the statutes. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.37 provides: 
893.37  Survey. No action may be brought against an 
engineer or any land surveyor to recover damages for 
negligence, errors or omission in the making of any 
survey nor for contribution or indemnity related to 
such negligence, errors or omissions more than 6 years 
after the completion of a survey. 
No.  95-2733 
 
3 
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
constitutions; and (3) whether placement of surveyor's stakes in 
the ground constitutes a continuing tort, such that the six-year 
limitation period may be tolled following completion of a 
survey.2  We hold that the Hansen discovery rule does not apply 
to the time limitation for commencement of an action under 
§ 893.37, that § 893.37 satisfies the equal protection commands 
of the state and federal constitutions, and that the limitation 
period was not tolled following completion of the survey.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On August 25, 
1988, Bailey, a land surveyor employed by American, surveyed and 
                     
2 The circuit court rejected the Tomczaks' continuing tort 
allegations, but did not rule upon the equal protection 
challenge to the surveyor statute pending compliance with the 
uniform declaratory judgments act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11).  
This statute requires that the attorney general be notified and 
presented with the opportunity to appear on behalf of the state 
if a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional.  The court of 
appeals directed the Tomczaks to comply with § 806.04(11), but 
reached neither the constitutional challenge to the surveyor 
statute, nor the continuing tort argument in its decision.  
Because we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, our 
consideration of these issues is appropriate. 
Although the attorney general declined to appear, we note 
that the Tomczaks did notify the attorney general of both the 
court of appeals proceedings, as well as the proceedings before 
this court.  Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the 
Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement 
during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of 
Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was 
cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney 
general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings."  
In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444, 302 N.W.2d 414 
(1981). 
No.  95-2733 
 
4 
staked the boundaries of lots 96 and 97, located in the 
unrecorded plat of the Elm Island subdivision in Waterford, 
Wisconsin.  The surveyor's certificate indicated that the survey 
was "made for the present owners of the property, and also those 
who purchase . . . within one (1) year" from the date of the 
survey. 
¶4 
Around that time, the Tomczaks negotiated with the 
defendant Mildred B. Wohlfard and her real estate agent for the 
purchase of the two lots.  During these negotiations, the 
Tomczaks became aware of the survey markers placed on the 
property by Bailey, and were provided with a copy of Bailey's 
survey.  On October 21, 1988, the Tomczaks purchased the lots. 
¶5 
In 1989, the Tomczaks began making improvements to the 
property.  In doing so, their builder hired a different survey 
company, Inman Survey and Associates, Inc. (now defendant 
Interline Surveying Services, Inc.), to confirm the boundaries 
of the property.  This surveyor relied on the stakes placed by 
Bailey in confirming that the boundaries of lots 96 and 97 
existed as marked.  The builder then completed construction of a 
home and deck on the property consistent with the Bailey and 
Inman/Interline surveys. 
¶6 
In June 1994, Charles and Kim Andersen (the Andersens) 
purchased the land adjacent to the Tomczaks' property.  In 
conjunction with this purchase, the Andersens had their property 
surveyed to confirm its boundaries.  Their survey indicated that 
the Tomczaks' house, deck, patio and pier extended onto the 
Andersens' property.  According to this new survey, the 
No.  95-2733 
 
5 
boundaries of lots 96 and 97 as marked by Bailey were actually 
the boundaries of lots 97 and 98 of the unrecorded plat of Elm 
Island. 
¶7 
As a result, the Andersens commenced an action for 
trespass and encroachment against the Tomczaks.  On May 24, 
1995, the Tomczaks in turn instituted this negligence action 
against Bailey and American seeking attorney's fees and other 
damages incurred in defending the Andersens' lawsuit.  Bailey 
and American moved for summary judgment arguing that the 
Tomczaks' claim was time barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.37.  The 
Tomczaks opposed the motion by invoking the discovery rule of 
Hansen.  That is, the Tomczaks asserted that the six-year 
limitation period did not begin to run at least until they 
became aware of their encroachment on the Andersens' property in 
June 1994. 
¶8 
The circuit court denied Bailey and American's motion 
for summary judgment, holding that the discovery rule applied to 
the time limitation set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.37.  The court 
of appeals agreed, stating: "Because the language of § 893.37, 
Stats., contains no rule of discovery, we conclude that it falls 
under the Hansen discovery rule."  Tomczak, 206 Wis. 2d at 416. 
 The court of appeals therefore affirmed the circuit court's 
non-final order denying Bailey and American's motion for summary 
judgment, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  
Bailey and American appeal from the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. 
No.  95-2733 
 
6 
¶9 
We first consider whether the Hansen discovery rule 
applies to the limitation period governing lawsuits against 
surveyors.  The application of a statute to a particular set of 
facts is a question of law which this court reviews without 
deference to the conclusions of the circuit court or the court 
of appeals.  See State v. Ahrling, 191 Wis. 2d 398, 403, 528 
N.W.2d 431 (1995).  Therefore, we review the court of appeals' 
decision de novo. 
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.37 is a statute of repose.  It 
provides that a cause of action must be commenced within a 
specified amount of time after the defendant's action which 
allegedly led to injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff has 
discovered the injury or wrongdoing.  In this case, the statute 
bars suit against a surveyor brought more than six years after 
the survey was completed. 
¶11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.37 
is 
not 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations, which bars an action not commenced within a 
specified amount of time after the cause of action "accrues."  
Nevertheless, the Tomczaks ask this court to apply the Hansen 
discovery rule to § 893.37, so that its six-year limitation 
period began to run, at the earliest, in June 1994 when the 
Tomczaks became aware of their encroachment on the Andersens' 
property.  Not only does such reasoning run contrary to the 
No.  95-2733 
 
7 
plain language of § 893.37, but it also misreads our decision in 
Hansen.3 
¶12 In Hansen, we were faced with a certified question of 
law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
 
The 
following 
question 
was 
certified 
for 
our 
determination: "When does the cause of action accrue within the 
meaning of the Wisconsin statute of limitations for personal 
injury actions . . . when the injury to the plaintiff was caused 
by a disease which may have been contracted as a result of 
protracted exposure to a foreign substance?"  113 Wis. 2d at 
551-52 (emphasis added).  The case involved a woman (Hansen) who 
was allegedly injured by use of a Dalkon Shield intrauterine 
device.  Hansen first discovered abnormal medical symptoms 
approximately four years after the device had been inserted into 
her uterus by medical personnel, and later discovered that she 
had pelvic inflammatory disease.  The disease left her fallopian 
tubes blocked, rendering her sterile.  See id. at 552-53. 
¶13 The applicable statute of limitations for Hansen's 
lawsuit provided that an action to recover damages for injuries 
sustained must be brought within three years "after the cause of 
action has accrued."  Id. at 554.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.14, 
893.205(1) (1977).  Thus, we were left to decide when the cause 
of action accrued for the purposes of Hansen's action because 
                     
3 For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and 
its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97, 
562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
194 Wis. 2d 302, 312-16, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995). 
No.  95-2733 
 
8 
the legislature had not spoken on the issue.  See Hansen, 113 
Wis. 2d at 556-57, 559-60.  Acknowledging the "harsh results" 
that often stem from using the date of injury as the benchmark 
for accrual of claims, we stated: 
 
In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness, 
we adopt the discovery rule for all tort actions other 
than those already governed by a legislatively created 
discovery rule.  Such tort claims shall accrue on the 
date the injury is discovered or with reasonable 
diligence 
should 
be 
discovered, 
whichever 
occurs 
first.  All cases holding that tort claims accrue at 
the time of the negligent act or injury are hereby 
overruled. 
Id. at 556, 560. 
¶14 Of principal importance to our decision in Hansen was 
the legislature's silence on the issue of when such a cause of 
action would accrue.  In the present situation, the legislature 
has explicitly barred suits against surveyors that are not 
brought within six years from the date that the survey was 
completed.  In effect, the legislature has already determined 
when the claim "accrues": the date the survey is completed, not 
the date that the injury is discovered. 
¶15 We are unwilling to change the legislature's decision 
on time limitation periods such as that provided by the 
surveyor's statute.  "[W]isconsin courts have traditionally held 
that statutes of limitation are policy considerations within the 
province of the legislature."  Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 
580, 531 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).  In 
short, the decision to close the courthouse doors on litigants 
No.  95-2733 
 
9 
with stale claims is a pure question of policy that is better 
left to the legislative branch of government. 
¶16 The Tomczaks argue, however, that the legislature has 
not "grappled" with the inequities inherent with a limitation 
period 
that 
commences 
before 
the 
injury 
is 
discovered.  
According to the Tomczaks, justice dictates that a time 
limitation period not begin to run on tort claims without 
discovery, unless the legislature has clearly illustrated, 
either through legislative history or by the language of the 
statute itself, that it has weighed the unfairness that such a 
result would produce against other policy considerations. 
¶17 Consistent 
with 
this 
argument 
is 
the 
Tomczaks' 
contention that the discovery rule was not recognized at the 
time that Wis. Stat. § 893.37 was amended in 1979 to its current 
form.  Because it was not a recognized principle in this state 
prior to our decision in Hansen, the Tomczaks argue that we can 
presume that the discovery rule was not considered by the 
legislature.  We address these arguments in turn. 
¶18 We conclude that in adopting Wis. Stat. § 893.37, the 
legislature did consider the inequity of a time limitation 
period that commences prior to discovery, and yet determined 
that claims against surveyors will be barred six years after the 
survey has been completed, regardless of when the injury is 
discovered.  Although the plain language of § 893.37 is 
sufficient 
to 
support 
our 
conclusion, 
we 
note 
that 
the 
legislative history to which the Tomczaks refer serves to affirm 
our conclusion. 
No.  95-2733 
 
10
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.37 was originally enacted as 
Wis. Stat. § 59.665 (1969), by 1969 Assembly Bill 533.  See 
Chapter 499, Laws of 1969, § 15.  The only relevant difference 
between the current surveyor's statute and its predecessor was 
the earlier version's four-year limitation period for commencing 
an action, instead of the current six-year period.  Ten years 
after the statute was first enacted, 1979 Assembly Bill 326 
renumbered § 59.665 (1969) to § 893.36 and amended it to read as 
it currently stands.  See Chapter 323, Laws of 1979, § 3.4  The 
Judicial Council Committee's Note that is attached to the 
amended version of the statute explains that "[t]he 4-year 
statute of limitation time period . . . has been increased to 6 
years as it is felt the prior time period was too short as the 
consequences of an erroneous survey are sometimes not readily 
apparent."  Wis. Stat. § 893.37 (1979-80). 
¶20 Had we not been satisfied that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.37 illustrates the legislature's intent to bar 
claims against surveyors regardless of when the injury is 
discovered, the Committee Note clearly reveals the legislature's 
consideration, and rejection, of discovery principles.  In this 
case, the legislature recognized the problems inherent in a 
four-year statute of repose relating to surveyor negligence, 
and, to remedy the situation, chose to grant injured parties 
another two years to commence litigation. 
                     
4 That same year, it was then renumbered to its current 
location at Wis. Stat. § 893.37 by 1979 Senate Bill 621.  See 
Chapter 355, Laws of 1979, § 228.  
No.  95-2733 
 
11
¶21 This alone would seem to be enough to reject the 
Tomczaks' argument that the discovery rule was a principle 
unrecognized in the law prior to our decision in Hansen.  
However, we also point out that at least five sections of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 893 (1979-80) included discovery provisions prior to 
our decision in Hansen,5 proving that the legislature was aware 
of discovery principles when it adopted Wis. Stat. § 893.37. 
¶22 The Tomczaks contend, and the court of appeals held, 
that the discovery rule should apply because Wis. Stat. § 893.37 
does not contain a legislatively created discovery rule or 
"recite discovery principles or contain discovery language," as 
required in order to be exempt from our holding in Hansen.  See 
Tomczak, 206 Wis. 2d at 415.  We disagree. 
¶23 Although we adopted the discovery rule for all tort 
actions other than those "already governed by a legislatively 
created discovery rule," Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560, we did not 
require that all statutory time periods for initiating an action 
be based upon the injured party's discovery of his or her 
injury.  Indeed, our statement that "[a]ll cases holding that 
tort claims accrue at the time of the negligent act or injury 
are hereby overruled," id. (emphasis added), makes clear that we 
overruled all judicial determinations that a cause of action 
accrues at the time of the negligent act or injury, not all 
                     
5 See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55 (medical malpractice), 893.60 
(forfeiture actions), 893.87 
(fraud 
actions involving the 
state), 893.89 (injury resulting from improvements to real 
property), 893.93 (fraud actions) (1979-80).  
No.  95-2733 
 
12
legislative declarations that set the time of injury as the 
accrual date.  The latter suggestion would require this court to 
rewrite Wis. Stat. § 893.37 and other statutes of repose like 
it—a 
course 
of 
action 
that 
is 
neither 
appropriate 
nor 
constitutionally sound. 
¶24 Moreover, 
by 
referencing 
previously 
existing 
"legislatively created discovery rules" in Hansen, we merely 
recognized the legislature's adoption of a limited discovery 
rule for medical malpractice actions.  See Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 556-57; Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1979-80).6  Although § 893.55 is 
a statute of repose, it also employs a restricted, one-year 
discovery 
rule 
in 
limiting 
actions 
against 
health 
care 
providers. 
¶25 Thus, as we have said, Hansen's "exemption" of tort 
actions already governed by a legislatively created discovery 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1979-80) provided in part: 
893.55  Limitation of actions; medical malpractice.  
(1) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an action 
to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
 
(a)  Three years from the date of the injury, or 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission. . . . 
 
The statute contains virtually the same language today.  
See Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1995-96). 
No.  95-2733 
 
13
rule was not intended to necessitate a discovery rule for every 
tort action.  It is more appropriately interpreted as our 
recognition of the legislature's power to attach very limited 
discovery rules to statutes of repose.  Where the legislature 
has done so, we indicated that this court will not override that 
decision in order to apply its own discovery rule.  Our decision 
today clarifies that the legislature may not only adopt limited 
discovery rules such as that set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55, 
but may also choose to employ no discovery rule at all. 
¶26 In concluding that the Hansen discovery rule applies 
to the Tomczaks' cause of action under Wis. Stat. § 893.37, the 
court of appeals decided that H.A. Freitag & Son, Inc. v. Bush, 
152 Wis. 2d 33, 447 N.W.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1989), and not Skrupky 
v. Elbert, 189 Wis. 2d 31, 526 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1994), or 
Esser Distrib. Co. v. Steidl, 145 Wis. 2d 160, 426 N.W.2d 62 
(Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 149 Wis. 2d 64, 437 N.W.2d 884 (1989), 
"represents the correct law because it correctly interprets 
Hansen."  Tomczak, 206 Wis. 2d at 415.  We disagree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion of law.  To explain why, we examine 
more closely these prior decisions by the courts of appeals. 
¶27 The court of appeals acknowledged that Freitag, Esser 
and Skrupky all involved statutes of repose by which the 
limitation periods began to run as of the date of the 
defendant's conduct.  See Tomczak, 206 Wis. 2d at 410-13; see 
also Skrupky, 189 Wis. 2d at 54; Freitag, 152 Wis. 2d at 36; 
Esser, 145 Wis. 2d at 164.  Of the three decisions, however, 
only Freitag applied the Hansen discovery rule to a statute of 
No.  95-2733 
 
14
repose.  See Tomczak, 206 Wis. 2d at 411; Freitag, 152 Wis. 2d 
at 37.  Therefore, a brief look at Freitag is warranted to 
determine whether the Hansen discovery rule can appropriately be 
applied to a statute of repose. 
¶28 In Freitag, the applicable limitations period as set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.51(1) (1987-88) provided that: 
 
[A]n action to recover damages for the wrongful 
taking, conversion or detention of personal property 
shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of 
action accrues or be barred.  The cause of action 
accrues at the time the wrongful taking or conversion 
occurs, or the wrongful detention begins. 
(emphasis added).7 
¶29 Despite the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.51 that 
defines when the cause of action shall accrue, the court of 
appeals held that the Hansen discovery rule would apply.  See 
Freitag, 152 Wis. 2d at 37.  In doing so, the Freitag court 
interpreted Hansen to require use of the discovery rule in "all 
causes of action, except causes of action that have a statute of 
limitations that contains its own rule of discovery."  Id.  
Therefore, the court of appeals stated: 
 
Because the statute of limitations for conversion or 
theft contains no rule of discovery, but by its plain 
language would act to bar a claim before the party 
owning the claim was aware of its existence, we find 
the judicially created discovery rule found in Hansen 
applicable to this case. 
Id.8 
                     
7 This statute contains identical language today.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 893.51(1) (1995-96).  
No.  95-2733 
 
15
¶30 Once again, our decision in Hansen did not require 
that all time limitation periods be based upon the discovery 
rule.  Such reasoning is tantamount to declaring that all 
legislative decisions regarding time limitation periods are void 
unless the legislature agrees with this court's assessment of 
what constitutes good public policy.  This we decline to do.  We 
hold that the judicially-created Hansen discovery rule cannot be 
applied to a statute of repose. 
¶31 Because the Freitag court misunderstood our decision 
in Hansen, and incorrectly applied the discovery rule to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.51, that decision is hereby overruled. 
II. 
¶32 We next consider whether Wis. Stat. § 893.37 violates 
the equal protection clauses of the United States or Wisconsin 
constitutions.  The constitutionality of a statute presents a 
question of law which this court considers utilizing a de novo 
standard of review.  See State v. Akins, 198 Wis. 2d 495, 502, 
                                                                  
8 The court of appeals reached this conclusion despite the 
Judicial Council Committee's Note that is attached to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.51 (1987-88): 
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section 
is based on previous s. 893.19(6), without change in 
substance, but with some expansion of language to make 
clear that accrual of the cause of action is not 
delayed until the person bringing the action learns of 
the wrongful taking or detention. . . . 
 
Although the plain language of § 893.51 is sufficient to 
determine the intent of the legislature, this note indicates 
clearly that the legislature rejected discovery principles in 
amending the conversion statute.  
No.  95-2733 
 
16
544 N.W.2d 392 (1996).  We conclude that § 893.37 satisfies the 
demands of both the state and federal equal protection clauses 
because a rational basis exists to treat land surveyors 
differently than other potentially liable parties such as the 
property owners.  Accordingly, we hold that § 893.37 is 
constitutionally valid and applies in the present case to bar 
the Tomczaks' cause of action against Bailey and American. 
A. 
¶33 To attack a statute on grounds that it denies equal 
protection of the law, a party must show that the statute 
unconstitutionally treats members of similarly situated classes 
differently.  See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 318, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995).  Upon review of such challenges, there is a 
strong 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality 
for 
legislative 
enactments, and every presumption favoring validity of the law 
must be indulged.  See id. at 301 (citation omitted).  Moreover, 
a party challenging a statute has the burden of proving the law 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id. (citation 
omitted). 
¶34 Before proceeding to the constitutional analysis, we 
must first clarify the level of judicial scrutiny that the 
surveyor statute deserves.  This court applies the same 
interpretation to the state Equal Protection Clause as that 
given to the equivalent federal provision.  See Post, 197 
Wis. 2d at 317 n.21 (citation omitted).  Compare Wis. Const. art 
I, § 1 with U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No.  95-2733 
 
17
¶35 "Equal protection 
requires 
strict 
scrutiny 
of a 
legislative 
classification 
only 
when 
the 
classification 
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental 
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect 
class."  State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992) (citation omitted).  Otherwise, the appropriate analysis 
is 
to 
determine 
"whether 
the 
legislative 
classification 
rationally furthers a purpose identified by the legislature."  
Id. 
¶36 The Tomczaks argue that the surveyor statute is 
subject to the "strict scrutiny test" because it implicates a 
fundamental right of access to the courts.  Bailey and American, 
on the other hand, contend that the "rational basis test" 
applies because the case involves economic decisions and claims, 
and does not involve a fundamental right or a "suspect" 
classification.  We conclude that the rational basis test 
applies to Wis. Stat. § 893.37. 
¶37  The Tomczaks' argument regarding access to the courts 
is based entirely upon Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.9  See Resp. Brief 
at 36-38.  This section of the constitution "does not . . . 
create any legal rights, but rather, guarantees access to the 
courts to enforce existing rights."  Vandervelden v. Victoria, 
177 Wis. 2d 243, 252, 502 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis 
                     
9 Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in 
relevant part: 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character . . . . 
No.  95-2733 
 
18
in original).  Moreover, we have explicitly held that the rights 
guaranteed by art. I, § 9 are not "fundamental," as that term is 
used in the context of equal protection analyses.  See Doering 
v. WEA Ins. Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 130-31, 532 N.W.2d 432 
(1995).  Therefore, we are not persuaded that this case 
implicates a fundamental right, and we proceed to analyze the 
surveyor statute under the rational basis test. 
B. 
¶38 We pause first to note that the Tomczaks raise Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9 more than once in their brief.  See Resp. 
Brief at 12, 21, 29.  In addition, counsel for the Tomczaks 
referred to art. I, § 9 several times during oral argument in 
this case.  Although we reiterate that constitutional points 
merely raised but not argued will not be reviewed, see In re 
Paternity of James A.O., 182 Wis. 2d 166, 173 n.2, 513 N.W.2d 
410 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted), we will assume for the 
sake of argument that the Tomczaks intended to formally assert 
that the surveyor's statute violates art. I, § 9 because it may 
bar a litigant's right to sue before it arises. 
¶39 Despite our interpretation of the Tomczaks' arguments, 
we do not find a violation of art. I, § 9 in this case.  The 
Tomczaks concede that they became aware of their encroachment on 
the Andersens' property in June 1994: 
 
6) From the time we purchased the property and at 
least until the time that the Andersens first raised a 
question about a boundary discrepancy in June 1994, we 
believed our home was centered on the lots we 
purchased and [sic] as depicted in the Inman survey 
and the American survey and we were unaware that there 
No.  95-2733 
 
19
was any discrepancy or question regarding the boundary 
line. 
Record on Appeal, 17:2 (Aff. of Thomas N. Tomczak, July 24, 
1995) (emphasis added).  In addition, counsel for the Tomczaks 
reiterated at oral argument that it is "undisputed fact" that 
the Tomczaks learned of their encroachment on the Andersens' 
property in June 1994.  Therefore, we need not be concerned with 
a possible violation of art. I, § 9 in this case because we 
conclude that the Tomczaks' right to sue arose well before the 
six-year limitation period expired on August 25, 1994.10 
C. 
¶40 Great 
deference 
is 
afforded 
to 
legislative 
classifications under the rational basis test.  See Annala, 168 
Wis. 2d at 468.  Where, as here, a suspect classification is not 
alleged, and fundamental constitutional rights are not at stake, 
the 
statute 
"'must 
be 
sustained 
unless 
it 
is 
'patently 
arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate 
government interest.'"  State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 
447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
                     
10 The dissent discerns a possible contradiction between 
this opinion and the multiple opinions in Estate of Makos v. 
Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 
662 (1997) (Geske, J., not participating), because two justices 
concluded that the statute of repose in that case violated Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9.  See Dissent at 1-2.  We disagree. 
In Makos, the plaintiff's cause of action for medical 
malpractice was barred before she discovered her injury.  See 
Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 45.  As we have stated, we need not be 
concerned with a potential violation of art. I, § 9 in this case 
because the Tomczaks learned of their "injury" well before the 
period of repose had expired.  Therefore, Makos is inapposite. 
No.  95-2733 
 
20
677, 683 (1973)).  Under these situations, "it is the court's 
obligation to locate or to construct, if possible, a rationale 
that might have influenced the legislature and that reasonably 
upholds the legislative determination."  Sambs v. City of 
Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980). 
¶41 As we noted in Sambs, "[t]he rationale which the court 
locates or constructs is not likely to be indisputable.  But it 
is not our task to determine the wisdom of the rationale or the 
legislation."  Id.  In particular, limitation periods are a 
subject 
over 
which 
we 
have 
traditionally 
afforded 
the 
legislature significant control.  See Ortman v. Jensen & 
Johnson, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 508, 522, 225 N.W.2d 635 (1975).  
Classifications made within such statutes will not be overturned 
if there are "some conceivable facts" which might be thought to 
justify the disparity in treatment.  Id.  Therefore, the issue 
is whether a rational basis exists for treating surveyors 
differently from the owners of the property in question. 
¶42 The Tomczaks assert that there is no rational basis 
for the disparity in treatment afforded by Wis. Stat. § 893.37. 
 They contend that the surveyor's statute is analogous to the 
statutes that were held to violate the equal protection clauses 
of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions in Funk v. 
Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 
(1989), and Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 
382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).  Accordingly, we will address these 
cases in some detail. 
No.  95-2733 
 
21
¶43 Kallas and Funk are related insofar as they addressed 
different versions of the same statute.  See Funk, 148 Wis. 2d 
at 62-63.  In both cases, we held that the statutes of repose 
limiting the time for an action against persons performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or 
construction 
of 
improvements 
to 
real 
property 
(builder's 
statutes) violated the equal protection clauses of the United 
States and Wisconsin constitutions.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.155 
(1965);11 893.89 (1985-86).12  Because we employed substantially 
                     
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.155 (1965) provided: 
893.155  Within 6 years.  No action to recover damages 
for any injury to property, or for an injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of 
an improvement to real property, nor any action for 
contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on 
account of such injury, shall be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of such 
improvement to real property, more than 6 years after 
the performance or furnishing of such services and 
construction.  This limitation shall not apply to any 
person in actual possession and control as owner, 
tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time 
the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement 
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for 
which it is proposed to bring an action.  
 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89 (1985-86) provided: 
893.89  Action for injury resulting from improvements 
to real property.  No action to recover damages for 
any injury to property, or for an injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of 
an improvement to real property, nor any action for 
contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on 
account of such injury, shall be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the design, land 
No.  95-2733 
 
22
the same reasoning in both cases to conclude that the builder's 
statutes violated the equal protection clauses, see Funk, 148 
Wis. 2d at 64, we examine the more in-depth reasoning of Funk 
alone to address the Tomczaks' analogy. 
¶44 The principal reason for holding that the builder's 
statutes violated the equal protection clauses was that "owners 
or occupants of land are . . . in the non-protected class."  Id. 
at 66-67.  In other words, the builder's statutes terminated 
liability of those involved in the planning, design and 
construction of improvements to real estate (the "protected 
class") after six years, but did not terminate liability of 
those who would subsequently own or occupy the property (the 
"unprotected class").  The Tomczaks raise essentially the same 
argument in this case: Wis. Stat. § 893.37 violates the equal 
protection 
clauses 
because 
it 
arbitrarily 
cuts 
off 
the 
surveyor's liability after six years, but perpetuates the 
liability of the landowner after six years and beyond. 
¶45 The Funk court went on to examine, and subsequently 
reject, the justifications put forth by the legislature in 
                                                                  
surveying, 
planning, 
supervision 
of 
construction, 
materials or construction of such improvement to real 
property, more than 6 years after the substantial 
completion of construction.  If the injury or defect 
occurs or is discovered more than 5 years but less 
than 6 years after the substantial completion of 
construction, the time for bringing the action shall 
be extended 6 months. 
 
See Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 
66-67, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989) for a discussion of the differences 
between the two statutes. 
No.  95-2733 
 
23
adopting Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (1985-86).  Specifically, the 
legislature 
found 
that 
subsequent 
to 
the 
completion 
of 
construction, persons involved in the planning, design and 
construction of improvements to real estate lack control over 
the property, and other intervening causes which might lead to 
deterioration of the improvements.  See Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 65. 
 Furthermore, the legislature cited the public interest in 
limiting long-term liability in tort litigation relating to 
building construction.  See id. 
¶46 The Funk court rejected these justifications because 
control was irrelevant to the statute's purpose in avoiding 
long-term liability.  First, the court noted that "[l]iability 
is not terminated when it is shifted to another class whose 
ability to compensate for injuries is questionable."  Funk, 148 
Wis. 2d at 74.  More importantly, the court concluded that 
"builders in no event would be liable for injuries resulting 
from negligent maintenance of those in control of the building." 
 Id.  Therefore, the Funk court found that landowner "control" 
did not provide a rational basis for the differential treatment 
afforded to landowners. 
¶47 As it relates to surveyors, however, we are satisfied 
that 
the 
legislature's 
interest 
in 
eliminating 
long-term 
liability 
is 
a 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
disparity 
in 
No.  95-2733 
 
24
surveyor/landowner treatment.13  Therefore, we decline to follow 
the reasoning of the Funk court in this case. 
¶48 In adopting Wis. Stat. § 893.37, as with any statute 
of repose, the legislature was faced with the difficult choice 
of terminating liability—in this case, either the liability of 
the surveyor or the landowner.  The legislature was precluded 
from terminating the liability of both classes because in that 
case, a neighboring landowner in the Andersens' position would 
be completely without redress for the encroachment on their 
property.  Moreover, such a result would alter the well-
established guidelines set forth by the adverse possession 
statutes.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.24-893.32 (1995-96).  Instead 
of the seven-, ten- or twenty-year periods that characterize the 
current adverse possession statutes, see id., the legislature 
would have reduced, sub silentio, the time required to adversely 
possess property in this state to the six-year period afforded 
by 
§ 893.37, 
without 
including 
some 
of 
the 
important 
prerequisites of successful adverse possession claims.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 893.25(2)(a) (1995-96) (requiring actual 
continued occupation of the property). 
¶49 Thus, rather than risk an inadvertent change to 
adverse possession law, the legislature elected to terminate the 
                     
13 As the dissent aptly points out, the builder's statute in 
Funk specifically included "land surveying" in the "protected 
class."  See Dissent at 4.  However, the Funk court did not 
consider the rationale of limiting long-term liability as it 
applies to surveyors.  Thus, we are satisfied that Funk did not 
address the issue that is currently before this court. 
No.  95-2733 
 
25
surveyor's liability alone.  We therefore agree with the Funk 
court that not all long-term liability ends when a statute of 
repose such as Wis. Stat. § 893.37 is enacted.  The landowner 
may be liable for years after the six-year period of repose 
expires.  With adverse possession as a remedy, however, there is 
some finality for the landowner's liability.14  In other words, 
adverse 
possession 
provides 
inherent 
protection 
for 
the 
landowner who may be sued for reliance on an erroneous survey. 
                     
14 We acknowledge that adverse possession was not an option 
for the Tomczaks in this case, since the Andersens commenced 
their lawsuit against the Tomczaks less than 7 years—the minimum 
time required in Wisconsin for a successful adverse possession 
claim—after 
the 
Tomczaks' 
initial 
encroachment 
on 
their 
property. 
We also acknowledge that adverse possession will not 
protect, for various reasons, all landowners who are in the 
Tomczaks' position.  However, it is neither our function, nor 
our duty as the judiciary to question the wisdom of this 
legislation.  As we have said, "[j]udicial response to a 
challenged legislative classification requires only that the 
reviewing 
court 
locate 
some 
reasonable 
basis 
for 
the 
classification made.  The public policy involved is for the 
legislature, not the courts, to determine."  Omernik v. State, 
64 Wis. 2d 6, 19, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974). 
Put simply, the legislature's basis for distinguishing 
between two similarly situated classes need not be perfect, but 
merely rational.  Yet the dissent deems it newsworthy to remind 
us that "adverse possession laws do not protect all property 
owners from long-term liability."  Dissent at 3.  The dissent 
forgets our limited purpose in this matter: it is not our duty 
to ensure that all parties are properly protected from long-term 
liability, but only to ensure that some rational basis exists 
for the legislature's decision to treat members of similarly 
situated classes differently.  The legislature has met this 
burden here. 
No.  95-2733 
 
26
¶50 On the other hand, without the finality that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.37 
affords, 
a 
surveyor's 
liability 
would 
be 
perpetual.  The legislature was no doubt aware that real estate 
transactions today could rely upon surveys that date to the 
early 20th century.  As a result, there is a distinct 
possibility that a surveyor could be held liable to a remote and 
unforseeable purchaser thirty, forty, or even fifty years after 
completion of the original survey.  In our assessment, this 
legislation is amply justified by the legislature's implicit 
conclusion 
that no 
duty 
so 
broad, 
and no 
liability so 
immeasurable should be imposed upon any party to a commercial 
transaction such as that involved here. 
¶51 In fact, the problems posed by long-term surveyor 
liability may be particularly egregious.  The technology of land 
surveying in this country has changed dramatically over the past 
50 to 100 years, such that surveys performed today will likely 
be much more accurate than those performed in the past.  As a 
recent treatise on the subject has noted: 
 
In less than a single generation, the surveyor has 
progressed from having to trace and measure each and 
every foot of a traverse line to measuring long, and 
heretofore inaccessible, distances with accuracies 
never before attained, in a matter of minutes, through 
the use of electronic distance measuring equipment.  
Presently, equipment is being used that determines 
positional 
accuracies 
of 
corners 
in 
latitude, 
longitude and elevation to within one inch.  Although 
high costs now prohibit the general use of such 
equipment, it is forseeable that within a decade or 
less the practicing land surveyor will employ them in 
his every day work. 
No.  95-2733 
 
27
Walter G. Robillard & Lane J. Bouman, Clark on Surveying and 
Boundaries § 31.09, at 1044 (6th ed., Michie Co. 1992).15 
¶52 The 
legislature 
would 
clearly 
want 
to 
avoid 
a 
situation where surveyors are compelled to defend their actions 
several decades after completion of their original surveys—
surveys that were performed according to the accepted standards 
of the time, but which have recently proven to be inaccurate 
through the use of modern surveying techniques. 
¶53 The Tomczaks contend that any problem of long-term 
liability is avoided because surveyors generally provide a 
certification that limits the parties who may rely on the 
survey's 
representations. 
 
For example, American's 
survey 
indicates: "This survey is made for the present owners of the 
property, and also those who purchase, mortgage or guarantee the 
title thereof within one (1) year from this date thereof."  We 
disagree with the Tomczaks' argument. 
¶54 Regardless of the certification's potential effect on 
a surveyor's future liability, this "limitation" does little to 
address the long-term surveyor liability created by a "present" 
property owner who holds the land in question for many years 
without selling it.  In this scenario, the landowner who has the 
survey performed may own the property for 30 years before he or 
she is sued by a neighbor for encroachment.  Without a statute 
                     
15 For a discussion of current surveying technology and its 
history, see Walter G. Robillard & Lane J. Bouman, Clark on 
Surveying and Boundaries §§ 31.01-.09 (6th ed., Michie Co. 
1992). 
No.  95-2733 
 
28
of repose such as Wis. Stat. § 893.37, the surveyor would remain 
liable. 
¶55 In light of the important policy concern of statutes 
of 
repose 
and 
statutes 
of 
limitations 
to 
ensure 
prompt 
litigation of claims and to protect defendants from fraudulent 
or stale claims brought after memories have faded or evidence 
has been lost, see Korkow v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 
117 Wis. 2d 187, 198-99, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (citation 
omitted), the legislature reasonably chose to terminate the 
surveyor's otherwise infinite liability after six years.  Where 
the surveyor could remain vulnerable to erroneous survey 
liability for undefined periods of time, the landowner's 
obligation 
to 
neighboring 
property 
owners 
imports 
the 
protections of adverse possession to lessen the likelihood of 
long-term accountability.16  Therefore, we hold that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.37 satisfies the equal protection commands of the state 
and federal constitutions. 
¶56 In so holding, we also note that the classification 
imposed by Wis. Stat. § 893.37 satisfies the five criteria set 
forth in Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 423, 198 N.W.2d 
                     
16 We note that the adverse possession statutes allow for 
the "tacking" together of periods of possession by adverse 
possessors in privity with one another.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.25(1), 893.26(1), 893.27(1) (1995-96).  Therefore, no 
single landowner is necessarily required to possess the disputed 
property for the full time periods set forth in those statutes 
to maintain a successful adverse possession claim. 
No.  95-2733 
 
29
667 (1972) (citations omitted).  These criteria provide that in 
order to sustain legislation against an equal protection attack: 
 
(1) 
All 
classification[s] 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law. 
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing 
circumstances only.  [The following sentence was added 
to No. 3 by State ex rel. Risch v. Trustees: 'It must 
not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the 
numbers included within a class.'] 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof. 
. . . 
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be 
so far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation. 
Id. 
¶57 As 
we 
have 
indicated, 
there 
is 
a 
substantial 
distinction between surveyors and landowners in that the latter 
class is afforded the protections of adverse possession to 
lessen 
the 
likelihood 
of 
long-term 
liability. 
 
This 
classification 
serves 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.37's 
purpose 
of 
eliminating long-term, undefined liability, does not preclude 
addition to the numbers included within the surveyor class, and 
applies equally to each member of that class.  Finally, the 
potential for virtually perpetual erroneous survey liability 
suggests 
the 
propriety 
of, 
and 
perhaps 
the 
need 
for, 
substantially different legislation that eliminates such an 
undesirable result. 
III. 
No.  95-2733 
 
30
¶58 Finally, the Tomczaks assert that their claim is 
timely because American's placement and maintenance of permanent 
survey stakes, together with its certification of accurate 
boundaries to purchasers for one year, constitutes a continuing 
tort.  According to the Tomczaks, these two actions entitle 
outside parties to rely upon the "continuing statement" of the 
correct boundaries for the one-year period so that the six-year 
limitation period in Wis. Stat. § 893.37 is tolled until the 
one-year period set forth in the surveyor's certification has 
expired.  Our resolution of this issue depends solely on the 
application of law to undisputed facts.  Therefore, we are 
presented with a question of law which we review de novo.  See 
Town of DePere v. City of DePere, 184 Wis. 2d 278, 282, 516 
N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶59 We find this argument to be without merit.  The 
Tomczaks rely upon one case for their assertion that where a 
continuing tort exists, the limitations period does not commence 
until the last event in the continuum occurs.  See Tamminen v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 109 Wis. 2d 536, 559, 327 N.W.2d 55 
(1982).  In Tamminen we held that: 
 
[w]here there is a continuum of negligent medical care 
related 
to 
a 
single 
condition 
occasioned 
by 
negligence, there is but one cause of action; and if 
any act of negligence within that continuum falls 
within the period during which suit may be brought, 
the plaintiff is not obliged to split his cause of 
action but may bring suit for the consequences of the 
entire course of conduct. 
Id. at 556.  
No.  95-2733 
 
31
¶60 In this case, we have little trouble concluding that 
American's placement of survey stakes in the ground following 
completion of the survey is but a single act.  When property is 
staked, no continuum or series of events transpires.  The mere 
fact that the monument remains in the ground does not somehow 
transform that single act into a series of continuing events 
such that the limitations period can be tolled. 
¶61 In fact, no series of separate negligent acts are 
alleged in this case.  The Tomczaks appear to acknowledge that 
American committed only one "act" when it placed surveyor stakes 
in the ground.  Instead, their continuing tort or "continuing 
misrepresentation" argument depends heavily on the surveyor's 
certification as to the accuracy of the staked boundaries for 
one year.  As long as the certification period remained in 
effect, 
the 
Tomczaks 
contend 
that 
American 
continuously 
misrepresented the boundaries of their property. 
¶62 Reliance on the certification is dubious because Wis. 
Stat. § 893.37 is clear and unambiguous in its command that 
"[n]o action may be brought . . . more than 6 years after the 
completion of a survey." (emphasis added).  In essence, the 
Tomczaks ask this court to find that the survey was not 
completed until the "certification period" expired.  Such an 
interpretation of the surveyor's statute would do an injustice 
to any plain reading of its language.  The survey was completed 
when Bailey signed and dated it in August 1988.  Therefore, the 
six-year limitation period began to run from that date, 
rendering the Tomczaks' 1995 filing untimely. 
No.  95-2733 
 
32
IV. 
¶63 Because the court of appeals erred in concluding that 
the discovery rule applied to the Tomczaks' cause of action, we 
reverse that decision.  We further hold that the Tomczaks have 
failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.37 is unconstitutional, and conclude that its six-year 
limitation period was tolled neither by Bailey's certification 
in the survey nor by American's placement of survey stakes in 
the ground. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
95-2733.dws 
 
1 
¶64 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.    (Concurring).    I agree 
with the majority and with Justice Crooks' discussion of Estate 
of Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 
564 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  I write separately to respond to part of 
the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion.  The Chief Justice 
argues that the majority holding "that the judicially-created 
Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose" 
is inconsistent with the plurality opinion in Makos, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 564 (Steinmetz, J., plurality opinion).  Dissent at 1.  I 
disagree. 
¶65 In Makos, the plurality opinion concluded that, as 
applied to the facts of that case, the statute of repose in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) violated Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 where it 
"closed the doors of the courtroom" before the plaintiff 
discovered or could have discovered the alleged negligence of 
the doctor who misdiagnosed her condition.  See Makos, 211 
Wis. 2d at 49, 54 (Steinmetz, J.).  The issue whether the Hansen 
discovery rule applies to statutes of repose was not addressed 
in Makos.  In this case, the Tomczaks concede that they 
discovered their encroachment on the Andersens' property prior 
to the running of the time limit in Wis. Stat. § 893.37.  Thus, 
unlike in Makos, the statute of repose in this case did not bar 
the Tomczaks' claim before they discovered their injury.  As 
applied to the facts here presented, the statute of repose, 
therefore, is not unconstitutional under art. I, § 9.  See 
Majority op. at 18-19.  In its application of art. I, § 9, the 
95-2733.dws 
 
2 
holding in this case is not inconsistent with the plurality 
opinion in Makos. 
¶66 The Chief Justice confuses the judicially created 
Hansen discovery rule with the application of art. I, § 9.  In 
nature and application, the two concepts are entirely different. 
 In Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 
(1993), this court concluded that where a statute of limitations 
does not set the time at which a plaintiff's claim "accrues," 
the court retains the authority to do so.  See id. at 560.  The 
court then held that "[i]n the interest of justice and 
fundamental fairness, we adopt the discovery rule for all tort 
actions other than those already governed by a legislatively 
created discovery rule." Id. (emphasis added).  Simply stated, 
the Hansen discovery rule sets the time that a cause of action 
accrues under a statute of limitations, unless the statute 
already expressly provides the time of accrual.  Since by 
definition a statute of repose cuts off a right of action 
regardless of the time of accrual, see Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 51 
n.8 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1411 (6th ed. 1990)), the 
Hansen discovery rule cannot apply to a statute of repose. 
¶67 Article I, § 9, on the other hand, guarantees that 
every person shall be afforded a remedy for wrongs committed 
against his or her "person, property or character."   "This 
court has long held that the 'certain remedy' clause of this 
provision, while not guaranteeing to litigants the exact remedy 
they desire, entitles Wisconsin residents 'to their day in 
court.'"  Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 52 (Steinmetz, J.)(quoting 
95-2733.dws 
 
3 
Metzger v. Department of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 129, 150 
N.W.2d 431 (1967)).  In contrast to the Hansen discovery rule, 
which in effect sets the time at which tort statutes of 
limitations begin to run,17 art. I § 9, as applied here and in 
Makos, bars the application of a statute of repose only when 
that statute has closed the courtroom doors before a plaintiff 
discovered or could have discovered his or her injury. 
¶68 Although application of art. I, § 9 in cases such as 
Makos and this case is driven by determining whether the 
plaintiff discovered his or her injury before the running of the 
statute of repose, the practical effect of applying art. I, § 9 
is far different from that of the Hansen discovery rule.  The 
fundamental distinction in the application of these two legal 
concepts is simple to illustrate.   
¶69 If the court were to apply the Hansen discovery rule 
to the statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.37, every plaintiff 
bringing a claim against a surveyor would have six years from 
the day he or she discovers his or her injury, rather than from 
the day the survey was completed, to file an action against the 
surveyor.  As explained by the majority, the court in effect 
would be rewriting the statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.37 
as a statute of limitations and then setting in all cases the 
day of discovery as the time of accrual.  Under the Hansen 
                     
17 Under the Hansen discovery rule, a statute of limitations 
can never violate art. I, §9 because the statute will not begin 
to run until a plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, his or her injury.  
95-2733.dws 
 
4 
discovery rule, the Tomczaks would not be barred from bringing 
their claim because they filed their action within six years 
after they discovered their injury.  Since the Hansen discovery 
rule does not apply, however, the Tomczaks' claim is barred by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.37 because they filed their claim "more than 6 
years after the completion of the survey."  Wis. Stat. § 893.37. 
  
¶70 In contrast, application of the guarantees in art. I, 
§ 9 to a statute of repose turns on the facts of a particular 
case and does not affect that statute of repose as applied in 
other cases.  For example, although the statute of repose in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1) was found unconstitutional as applied to 
the facts in Makos, that statute continues to bar actions 
commenced outside its five-year time period where the plaintiffs 
discover their injuries prior to the running of the statute.  In 
this case, the guarantees of art. I, § 9 will not save the 
Tomczaks' claim because, unlike the plaintiff in Makos, they 
discovered their injury prior to the running of the statute of 
repose.  At the time of discovery, the courtroom doors had not 
been closed to the Tomczaks.  Section 893.37, therefore, did not 
deny the Tomczaks their day in court. 
¶71 The holding of the court in this case is not 
inconsistent with the plurality opinion in Makos. 
95-2733.jpg 
 
1 
¶72 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Concurring).  I join the majority 
opinion.  I agree with the majority that it need not reach the 
Article I, sec. 9 issue raised in Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin 
Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997), 
based on the facts of this case.  Majority op. at 19-20.  I 
write 
merely 
to 
address 
the 
comments 
of 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent and the response of Justice Crooks' 
concurrence regarding Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶73 Curiously, both writers address the effect today's 
majority opinion has on the multiple opinions comprising Makos. 
Their discussion of Makos is curious, and academic, because none 
of the four separate opinions in that case has precedential 
value. 
¶74 In a unanimous opinion released less than two weeks 
after the Makos decision, this court said that none of the Makos 
opinions have precedential value.  See Doe v. Archdiocese, 211 
Wis. 2d 312, 334-35 n.11, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997); see also, Ives 
v. Coopertools, 208 Wis. 2d 55, 559 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (per 
curiam), "our division on reasoning simply means that the 
analyses of the two concurrences have no precedential value," 
citing State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 199 Wis. 2d 714, 719, 
546 N.W.2d 140 (1996) (per curiam), and State v. Elam, 195 
Wis. 2d 683, 685, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (per curiam), "a 
majority of the participating judges must have agreed on a 
particular point for it to be considered the opinion of the 
court." 
95-2733.jpg 
 
2 
¶75 The Art. I, sec. 9 portion of the dissent is academic 
because it contends that the majority opinion overrules the 
mandate in Makos, sub silentio.  Overruling the mandate of Makos 
is not possible.  "A judicial decision is said to be overruled 
when a later decision, rendered by the same court or by a 
superior court in the same system, expresses a judgment upon the 
same question of law directly opposite to that which was before 
given, thereby depriving the earlier opinion of all authority as 
a precedent."  Black's Law Dictionary 1105 (6th Ed. 1990).  
Neither the mandate of Makos, which reversed the court of 
appeals and remanded for trial, nor the multiple non-majority 
opinions by the justices participating in that case can be 
"overruled" because they never possessed authority as precedent. 
¶76 The 
reasoning of 
Justice 
Crooks' 
concurrence is 
likewise academic when it criticizes the majority's statement 
about the discovery rule as "contrary to the lead opinion and a 
concurring opinion in Makos."  A majority opinion is not bound 
to comply with non-precedential opinions.  Justice Crooks is 
free to advocate adoption of the rationale he alone proposed in 
his Makos concurrence, as Chief Justice Abrahamson is free to 
advocate the position she joined in the Makos dissent, but the 
majority should not be faulted for failing to adopt that 
rationale when the facts do not even raise Art. I, sec. 9 as an 
issue. 
No. 95-2733.npc 
 
1 
 
¶77 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Concurring).    Although I 
concur with the mandate, I write separately to address the 
majority's discussion of the discovery rule adopted by this 
court in Hansen v. A. H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 
N.W.2d 578 (1983).  While I recognize that the Hansen discovery 
rule is relevant to the issue presented, I conclude that the 
extensive analysis by the majority is unnecessary, since the 
majority acknowledges that "the Tomczaks learned of their 
'injury' well before the period of repose expires."  Majority 
op. at 19 n.10.  The majority also fails to recognize and 
consider the lead opinion and a concurring opinion in Estate of 
Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 
N.W.2d 662 (1997).  
¶78 Writing separately in Makos, I concluded that the 
statute of repose as applied in that case violated Article I, 
Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Specifically, I 
concluded that the statute of repose at issue deprived that 
plaintiff of "the right to a remedy in violation of Article I, 
Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution," id. at 60, because the 
plaintiff "could not have discovered the injury until after the 
statute of repose had run." Id. at 59.  In reaching that 
conclusion, I urged that: 
 
courts should consider the following three principles, 
along with the nature of the cause of action, in 
determining whether an individual has been denied the 
right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9 through 
the 
legislature's 
modification, 
reduction, 
or 
elimination of a right to bring a cause of action:  
No. 95-2733.npc 
 
2 
(1) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or 
eliminated 
a 
post-constitutional 
cause 
of 
action 
created by the legislature itself; (2) whether the 
legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a common 
law or pre-constitutional statutory cause of action 
and 
provided 
a 
reasonable 
alternative; 
and 
(3) 
whether, 
if 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
provide 
a 
reasonable alternative, it has established that an 
overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of 
such right exists, and that no reasonable alternative 
exists. 
Id. at 67.  Applying this test to the facts in Makos, I 
concluded 
that 
there 
are 
circumstances 
under 
which 
the 
legislature cannot eliminate a plaintiff's right to bring a 
cause of action pursuant to a statute of repose without 
violating Wis. Const. art. I, § 9. 
¶79   The Hansen discovery rule and Wis. Const. art I, § 9 
are not equivalent legal theories, but are both related to the 
right to bring a claim.  In tort actions where the legislature 
has not expressly created a discovery rule, the Hansen discovery 
rule sets forth the date that a plaintiff discovers, or should 
have discovered, his/her injury as the date of the accrual of a 
claim.  Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides 
"[e]very 
person 
is 
entitled 
to 
a 
certain 
remedy . . . for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in 
his person, property or character."  The theories are distinct; 
however, the Hansen discovery rule, and Wis. Const. art I, § 9 
in the context of a statute of repose, both address the 
plaintiff's discovery of his/her injury and ultimately may 
provide a plaintiff with the right to bring a claim. 
No. 95-2733.npc 
 
3 
¶80 The majority's statement that the Hansen discovery 
rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose fails to recognize 
that under the Wisconsin Constitution a statute of repose may 
not bar a claim where the plaintiff had no opportunity to 
discover the injury.  As a practical matter, a Wis. Const. art 
I, § 9 argument may necessarily be raised in an instance where a 
plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the expiration of 
statute of repose because the plaintiff had no opportunity to 
discover his/her injury.  At least two Justices of this court 
concluded that Wis. Const. art I, § 9 provides a remedy in such 
an instance.  See Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 44 (Steinmetz, J.), 211 
Wis. 2d at 60 (Crooks, J., concurring).  
¶81 I also write separately to address Justice Geske's 
concurrence, which states that Makos has no precedential value. 
 I disagree.  I recognize that this court has previously stated 
that "a majority [of judges] must have agreed on a particular 
point for it to be considered the opinion of the court."  State 
v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984).  However, 
I submit that the appropriate rationale for interpreting a 
plurality opinion is that adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
¶82 In Marks, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a 
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Sixth 
Circuit had determined that a relevant United States Supreme 
Court case "never became the law" because the standard set forth 
in that case "never commanded the assent of any more than three 
No. 95-2733.npc 
 
4 
Justices at any one time."  Id. at 192.  The Supreme Court 
rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning: 
 
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
[a majority of] Justices, 'the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .'  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 
n.15 [] (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, JJ.).   
Id. at 193.  Since its holding in Marks, the United States 
Supreme Court has re-affirmed the principle of law that the 
narrowest grounds of a plurality opinion constitute the opinion 
of the Court.  See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988) (rejecting the argument 
that a plurality opinion is "not good law" and restating the 
holding of Marks).   
 
¶83 The lead and concurring opinions in Makos concededly 
encompassed distinct rationales, making a determination of the 
"narrowest grounds" arguably complex.  However, this does not 
negate the fact that Makos is of precedential value.  In Nichols 
v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994), the Supreme Court 
again revisited the "narrowest grounds" holding of Marks and 
applied it to the Court's fragmented decision in Baldasar v. 
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).  The Supreme Court recognized 
that several lower courts had "decided that there is no lowest 
common denominator or 'narrowest grounds' that represents the 
Court's holding [in Baldasar]."  Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745.  
Still other courts had reached differing conclusions regarding 
No. 95-2733.npc 
 
5 
which Justice's opinion in Baldasar set forth the opinion of the 
Court.  See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745.  Rather than ignore 
Baldasar by concluding it has no precedential value, the Supreme 
Court restated its holding in Marks and concluded that a 
confusing plurality opinion should be reexamined and clarified 
by the Court, not disregarded.  See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746. 
 
¶84 Because the plurality opinion in Makos is unnecessary 
to the majority opinion given the facts in the present case, I 
decline to examine Makos beyond reasserting the discussion of 
Wis. Const. art I, § 9 and advocating for the application of the 
three-part test discussed above.  I do, however, urge this court 
to recognize that a plurality opinion of this court is in no way 
devoid of any precedential value.  Cf. Marks 430 U.S. at 193; 
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46. 
¶85 In sum, I conclude that the lengthy discussion of the 
Hansen discovery rule is unnecessary given the facts presented 
in this case.  Moreover, I strongly disagree with the majority's 
holding that the "Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied to a 
statute of repose" due to the majority's failure to address Wis. 
Const. art I, § 9.  I also urge this court to consider in future 
cases, where applicable, the adoption of the three-part test 
suggested in Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 67.  Finally, I assert that 
the opinion of this court in Makos is of precedential value, and 
that its legal authority should be determined in accord with the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Marks. 
 
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
No. 95-2733.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶87 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (Dissenting).   I 
write because the majority opinion's discussion of the Hansen 
discovery rule is internally inconsistent and the holding is 
irreconcilable with the court's prior cases relating to the 
application of the discovery rule, statutes of repose and Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9, which provides that "every person is 
entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or 
wrongs which he may receive."  Furthermore, I conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.37 violates the equal protection clauses of the 
Wisconsin and federal Constitutions. 
I 
¶88 The majority opinion states that in adopting a statute 
of repose "the legislature may . . . choose to employ no 
discovery rule at all."  Majority op. at 13.  It further states 
its holding as follows:  "We hold that the judicially-created 
Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose." 
 Majority op. at 15.  I conclude that the majority opinion sub 
silentio overrules the mandate in Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin 
Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  
¶89 Contrary to the majority opinion's position, the 
holding in this case is, in my opinion, inconsistent with 
Justice 
Steinmetz's 
lead 
opinion 
and 
Justice 
Crooks's 
concurrence in Makos.  These justices concluded that the statute 
of repose, which did not take into account the date of discovery 
of the injury, violates art. I, § 9.  See Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 
44 (Steinmetz, J.), 211 Wis. 2d at 60 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
No. 95-2733.ssa 
 
2 
¶90 The holding in this case is, in my opinion, consistent 
with Justice Bradley's dissent in Makos, which I joined.  The 
dissent in Makos upheld the legislature's power to enact a 
statute of repose without regard to the date of discovery of the 
injury. 
¶91 The legal and factual scenarios in Makos and this case 
are virtually identical. 
¶92 Makos involved Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), a statute of 
repose requiring medical malpractice actions to be commenced 
within one year from the date the injury was discovered but not 
later than five years from the date of the act or omission.  In 
this case the statute of repose provides that no action for 
negligence, errors or omission in the making of any survey may 
be brought against an engineer or a land surveyor more than six 
years after completion of the survey.  
¶93 In Makos the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice 
action against her physician after the statute of repose had 
run.  In this case the plaintiffs filed a negligence action 
against their land surveyor after the statute of repose had run. 
  
¶94 Despite 
the 
nearly 
identical 
factual 
and 
legal 
scenarios, the end results of the two cases are significantly 
different.  In Makos this court remanded the cause for trial, 
thereby allowing the plaintiff to pursue the medical malpractice 
action.  In this case the court bars the plaintiffs' negligence 
action as untimely, thereby closing the courtroom doors to the 
plaintiffs without giving them a day in court. 
No. 95-2733.ssa 
 
3 
¶95 In my view had the majority's reasoning in this case 
been applied to Makos, the estate of Makos should have been 
barred, by a 4-2 vote, from pursuing the medical malpractice 
action.  The majority opinion should acknowledge that it is 
adopting 
the 
dissenting 
position 
in 
Makos 
regarding 
the 
discovery rule, statutes of repose and art. I, § 9.  
II 
¶96 I also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.37 violates the 
equal 
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
federal 
Constitutions. 
¶97 The issue presented is whether the classification in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.37 is reasonably related to a legitimate state 
purpose.  If there is no reasonable relationship between the 
legislative classification and the legislative purpose, then 
§ 893.37 violates the equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin 
and federal Constitutions. 
¶98 What is the rational basis for the distinction between 
land surveyors and property owners?  The majority opinion 
attempts to salvage Wis. Stat. § 893.37 from an equal protection 
challenge by stating that "there is a substantial distinction 
between surveyors and landowners in that the latter class is 
afforded the protections of adverse possession to lessen the 
likelihood of long-term liability."  Majority op. at 29.   
¶99 The 
fundamental 
flaw 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
analysis is that the adverse possession laws do not protect all 
property owners from long-term liability.  Under Wisconsin law 
there are several prerequisites for adverse possession, and a 
No. 95-2733.ssa 
 
4 
landowner may not be able to meet them.  In this case the 
Tomczaks are liable to the abutting property owners but cannot 
seek contribution or indemnification from the land surveyor who 
caused the damage. 
¶100 Furthermore, the majority opinion contravenes Funk v. 
Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 
(1989), in which this court struck down a statute of repose that 
distinguished property owners, occupants, and tenants from 
builders, material suppliers, and land surveyors.  The statute 
of repose immunized the latter group from liability upon 
negligence 
actions 
not 
brought 
within 
six 
years 
after 
substantial completion of construction.  This court held that 
the statute violates equal protection and specifically rejected 
the legislature's justification for the statutethat owners, 
occupants, and tenants have post-construction control over the 
premises while builders, material suppliers, and land surveyors 
do not.  See id. at 77, 74. 
¶101 I see no basis for distinguishing the statute of 
repose in Funk from the statute at issue here.  
¶102 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶103 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this dissent. 
 
No. 95-2733.ssa 
 
1