Title: Woodbury v. CH2M Hill, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48592
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2003

Filed: January 24, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

E. MAX WOODBURY II,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
CH2M HILL, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 9706-04494; CA A103037; SC S48592)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 5, 2002.
	James S. Coon, of Swanson, Thomas &amp; Coon, Portland, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland.
	M. Elizabeth Duncan, of Greene &amp; Markley PC, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review. 
	Robert K. Udziela, Portland, filed briefs on behalf of amici
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association, Oregon AFL-CIO, and
Oregon State Building Trades Council.
	James E. Mountain, Jr., and Linda J. Kessel, Eugene, filed a
brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of America, Associated Oregon
Industries, Inc., and American Council of Engineering Companies
of Oregon.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	*On appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Michael Marcus, Judge. 173 Or App 171, 21 P3d 153 (2001).
	**Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		In this civil action, plaintiff sought recovery for
personal injuries suffered in a fall from a construction
platform.  Although plaintiff worked for a subcontractor, he
filed the action against the general contractor, CH2M Hill, Inc.
(defendant), alleging liability under the Employer Liability Law
(ELL), ORS 654.305 to 654.336, (1) and common-law negligence.  At
trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on both theories
of liability.  Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment on both claims.  Woodbury v. CH2M Hill,
Inc., 173 Or App 171, 21 P3d 153 (2001).  We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
		The Court of Appeals described the relevant (2) evidence
as follows:
	"Reynolds Metal Company (Reynolds) hired defendant to
conduct an environmental remediation investigation at a
Reynolds plant in Troutdale, Oregon.  Defendant, in
turn, hired several subcontractors to perform certain
work at the site.  Stratus Corporation (Stratus) was
one of those subcontractors.
		"Stratus was owned and operated by Scott Flaherty. 
It had no full-time employees and fulfilled its own
employment needs by hiring temporary employees.  One
such 'temporary' employee was plaintiff, who had worked
exclusively for Stratus for over a year when he was
hired to work on the Reynolds job.
		"* * * * *
		"Defendant hired Stratus, among other things, to
construct a 'vehicle decontamination pad' at the
Reynolds site.  This required Stratus to install a
means of processing liquid waste from the
decontamination pad.  Defendant told Stratus to install
a water pipe from the pad to a clarifier tank to
accomplish the task.  Defendant further told Stratus
where to locate the pipe and what kind of materials to
use.  All of the Stratus work was performed by Flaherty
and plaintiff.
		"Most of the pipe was installed underground.  In
order to reach the clarifier tank, however, the last
few feet of pipe had to be installed over a sunken
stairway and corridor that ran approximately ten feet
below ground level.  Flaherty discussed with Griffin,
one of defendant's employees, how to suspend the pipe
over the stairway and corridor.  They decided to
construct a platform made of four-by-four and
two-by-four boards and plywood.  Later, Griffin
recalled that the idea to construct the platform was
Flaherty's.  Flaherty could not remember how the
decision was arrived at.  Both agreed, however, that,
once they decided to build the platform, the details of
how to construct it were left to Flaherty.  Plaintiff
and Flaherty then built the platform without input from
or oversight by any of defendant's employees.
		"When the remediation work was complete, Stratus
was required to dismantle the platform supporting the
pipe to the clarifier tank.  Because Flaherty was
occupied with other work, plaintiff attempted to
dismantle the platform by himself.  No employee of
defendant's assisted.  Nor did any employee of
defendant's provide instructions, offer advice, or
provide oversight.  While dismantling the platform,
plaintiff wore no fall-protection harness.  In the
course of attempting to move one of the boards from the
platform, he lost his balance and was seriously injured
when he fell onto the subsurface corridor."
173 Or App at 173-75.
		As noted, plaintiff filed an action against defendant
alleging two claims.  Under the ELL claim, plaintiff asserted
that defendant had failed to install guardrails on the platform
and to train plaintiff how to avoid the hazards of working in
areas where there was a danger of falling.  Under the common-law
negligence claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent
for failing to provide proper training and supervision for the
disassembly of the platform.
		At trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict on
both claims.  The trial court denied the motion and submitted the
case to the jury.  The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on
both claims and awarded economic and non-economic damages.
		The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that
plaintiff could not recover under either the ELL or negligence
theories.  The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no
evidence that defendant had assumed any obligation to control or 
had exercised actual control over the method by which Stratus
accomplished the work.  173 Or App at 179.  That conclusion was
sufficient, in the Court of Appeals' view, to defeat both
claims. (3) 
		This court reviews the denial of a motion for directed
verdict for any evidence to support the verdict in plaintiff's
favor.  See Bolt v. Influence, Inc., 333 Or 572, 577-78, 43 P3d
425 (2002) (describing standard).  This court cannot set aside a
jury's verdict unless there was no evidence from which the jury
could have found the facts necessary to establish the elements of
plaintiff's cause of action.  See Or Const, Art VII (Amended), §
3 ("no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there
is no evidence to support the verdict").  Instead of weighing the
evidence, this court must consider the evidence and inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiff.  Brown v.
J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 297 Or 695, 705-06,688 P2d 811 (1984).  
Because the jury weighed the evidence, judged the credibility of
the witnesses, and resolved all conflicts in the evidence, this
court may rely on any fact that finds support in the record.  Id.
at 705-06.
		We begin with the ELL claim.  The ELL imposes a
heightened statutory standard of care on a person or entity who
either is in charge of, or responsible for, any work involving
risk or danger.  Specifically, ORS 654.305 provides:
		"Generally, all owners, contractors or
subcontractors and other persons having charge of, or
responsibility for, any work involving a risk or danger
to the employees or the public shall use every device,
care and precaution that is practicable to use for the
protection and safety of life and limb, limited only by
the necessity for preserving the efficiency of the
structure, machine or other apparatus or device, and
without regard to the additional cost of suitable
material or safety appliance and devices."
		ELL liability can be imposed on a person or entity who
(1) is engaged with the plaintiff's direct employer in a "common
enterprise" (4); (2) retains the right to control the manner or
method in which the risk-producing activity was performed; or (3) 
actually controls the manner or method in which the risk
producing activity is performed.  See Wilson v. Portland General
Electric, 252 Or 385, 391-92, 448 P2d 562 (1968) (so stating).
  		The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had
failed to prove that defendant retained the right to control the
manner or method in which the risk-producing activity was
performed.  173 Or App at 182.  That conclusion was based on the
terms of the contract between defendant and Stratus.  Id.  In
reaching it, the Court of Appeals held that under ORS 654.305,
the scope of the work involving a risk or danger to the employees
was solely the act of disassembling the platform.  As we explain
below, we need not reexamine the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that the contract did not support a finding of a right to
control, because our analysis rests on different grounds.
		The Court of Appeals also concluded that plaintiff
failed to prove that defendant had exercised actual control over
plaintiff's work.  Id. at 182.  As discussed below, we conclude
that the Court of Appeals erred in that holding, because it
defined the work involving risk or danger too narrowly. (5)
		The phrase "any work involving a risk or danger to the
employees" presents the interpretive issue in this case.  ORS
654.305.  To determine the meaning of that statutory phrase "any
work involving a risk or danger to the employees," we use the
interpretive template that this court formulated in PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Under
that framework, words of common usage are given their "plain,
natural, and ordinary meaning."  Id. at 611.  If, after our
analysis at the first level, the intent is clear from the text
and context, further analysis is unnecessary.  Id.  
		The words "any work" are inclusive, suggesting that the
reference is to the tasks in which the employee was engaged.  The
phrase "involving a risk or danger" modifies "any work."  Thus,
identifying the relevant scope of the work for purposes of the
ELL requires an initial determination of whether the work
involved a risk or danger to the employees or the public.  "Risk"
and "danger" are both words of common usage.  Webster's Third
Int'l Dictionary 573 (unabridged ed 1993) indicates that "risk"
and "danger" are synonyms for each other, as well as for "peril,"
"jeopardy," and "hazard."  Webster's first modern definition of
"danger" is "the state of being exposed to harm: liability to
injury, pain or loss: PERIL, RISK."  Id.  Similarly, Webster's
defines "risk" as "the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage,
or destruction: CONTINGENCY, DANGER, PERIL, THREAT."  Id. at
1961.  Thus, as used in ORS 654.305, "risk" or "danger" refers to
conditions of the work that create the possibility that a worker
will suffer harm.
		In this instance, the Court of Appeals described the
work involving a risk or danger as moving the boards to
facilitate disassembly of the platform.  173 Or App at 181.  That
description, however, is neither complete nor accurate.  While
moving the boards, plaintiff was working at a dangerous height
over a concrete surface.  That height created a constant risk of
harm to the employees working on that section of the pipeline. 
During that part of the project, the risk was reduced by building
a platform on which plaintiff could stand while installing that
section of the pipeline.  The work included both the assembly and
disassembly of the platform.  The height of the work posed a risk
of injury to the employees while the platform was assembled,
while it was used to complete the project, and while it was
disassembled.  The risk of falling, then, was the most obvious
potential and foreseeable danger during the installation of that
section of the pipeline.  We conclude that, under these facts,
the "work involving a risk or danger" included requiring
plaintiff to work at height during the assembly, use, and
disassembly of the platform.
		Plaintiff argues that, once the scope of the dangerous
work is understood properly, evidence of defendant's actual
control of that work is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict
on the ELL claim.  In that regard, the record contains the
following evidence.  
		Flaherty, Stratus' principal and plaintiff's
supervisor, expected and received detailed instructions from
defendant's personnel during the work at the site.  In
particular, Flaherty relied on defendant's safety coordinator,
who was at the job site every day, for guidance on both physical
and chemical hazards present in that industrial setting.  In
addition to the requirement that Stratus construct a
decontamination pad, a representative of defendant, Griffin,
instructed Flaherty to install the 2-inch pipeline for
contaminated water that would run to the clarifier tank. 
Defendant provided Flaherty with detailed instructions as to how
the pipeline should be constructed.  Most significantly, because
the pipeline had to travel over the underground concrete corridor
and stairwell that was 10 feet deep, some provision had to be
made to facilitate work on the pipeline at that height.  Flaherty
and Griffin discussed the options.  They considered the use of
ladders or a fixed platform.  Because ladders would not be stable
on the kind of ground that was present on either side of the
corridor, Flaherty and Griffin jointly decided to use a fixed
wooden platform consisting of boards and plywood sheets.  Griffin
advised Flaherty that he should "build [the platform] sturdy
enough" and "long enough to stay in the opening so it doesn't
shift one way or the other."
		In light of those facts, there was evidence from which
the jury reasonably could conclude that defendant exercised
actual control both over the decision to use a wooden platform
and over the choice of how that platform was constructed.  In
particular, the jury could have concluded that the platform was
constructed without fall protection that might have protected
plaintiff from injury.  We conclude that there is evidence in the
record to support a jury finding that defendant exercised actual
control over the manner or method in which the risk-producing
activity (working at height) was performed and, therefore,
defendant was liable under the ELL.  Under Article VII (Amended),
section 3, we are required to sustain the jury's verdict on
plaintiff's ELL claim.
		The Court of Appeals also reversed the jury's verdict
on plaintiff's negligence claim.  As with plaintiff's ELL claim,
under Article VII (Amended), section 3, this court cannot set
aside a jury's verdict unless there is no evidence from which the
jury could have found the facts necessary to establish the
elements of plaintiff's cause of action. 
		Defendant's motion for directed verdict against
plaintiff's negligence claim was based on the assertion that
plaintiff had not offered any evidence that defendant's
negligence had caused plaintiff's injuries.  Plaintiff's
complaint includes several specifications of negligence,
essentially alleging that defendant failed to provide proper
training and supervision for the disassembly of the platform.  As
previously noted, there is evidence permitting the jury to find
that defendant exercised actual control over safety aspects of
the project and, in particular, exercised actual control over
that part of the project that required plaintiff to work at a
dangerous height.  There is also evidence that defendant failed
to provide plaintiff and its own supervising employees with any
fall protection training or supervision.
		A jury reasonably could find that defendant's failure
to provide training and supervision in connection with the
assembly, use, and disassembly of the platform was a substantial
factor in causing plaintiff's fall from the platform.  That is
sufficient to support the jury's verdict on plaintiff's
negligence claim, and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
otherwise.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.



1. 	We refer to the statutory scheme as the Employer
Liability Law, because that is how the Oregon Revised Statutes
identify the enactment.  We note, however, that the Court of
Appeals refers to the same statutory scheme as the Employer
Liability Act.

2. 	We use "relevant" because, as we discuss below, our
view of the pertinent factual inquiry is slightly different than
that of the Court of Appeals.

3. 	The Court of Appeals noted that, in light of the
disposition, it did not reach a number of other assignments of
error.  Id. at 184.  Those assignments of error primarily concern
evidentiary matters and damages.

4. 	The parties agree that defendant and Stratus were not
engaged in a common enterprise.

5. 	The Court of Appeals explained that, under one of its
recent ELL cases, George v. Myers, 169 Or App 472, 10 P3d 265
(2000), the risk must be construed narrowly:
	"[P]laintiff's broad reading of the 'risk-producing
activity' cannot be reconciled with our decision in
George * * *.  In George, we held that what
precipitated the accident was the plaintiff's attempt
to move boards to another location to permit him to
complete the framing of the third story of the house
where he had been working.  Thus, the risk-producing
activity was the discrete activity of moving the
boards, not more generally of framing the house.  So
also in this case, what precipitated plaintiff's
accident was his attempt to move boards to facilitate
the disassembly of the platform.  It was not more
generally the construction of the platform or the 'work
over the stairwell.'"
Woodbury, 173 Or App at 181 (citation omitted).