Title: McBride v. Bennett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131301
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2014

1 
 
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
CAROLYN McBRIDE, AS 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
DONNELL EARL WORSLEY, DECEASED 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131301 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 31, 2014 
 
JOEY GAYLAN BENNETT, JR., 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN EMPLOYEE 
OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Jerrauld C. Jones, Judge 
 
 
Carolyn McBride (“McBride”), the administrator for the 
estate of Donnell Worsley (“Worsley”), appeals the trial court’s 
judgment that sovereign immunity bars her wrongful death action 
against Joey Gaylan Bennett, Jr. (“Bennett”) and Derek Michael 
Folston (“Folston”). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On July 25, 2010, Bennett and Folston were on-duty police 
officers working for the City of Norfolk.  At around 1:00 a.m., 
Folston received a call to transport a prisoner.  Shortly 
thereafter, Bennett was dispatched to a domestic disturbance 
call in the Tidewater Gardens area of Norfolk.  Folston 
overheard the dispatcher assign Bennett to investigate the 
domestic disturbance call and decided to provide backup for 
Bennett rather than respond to the transport call.  Folston 
later explained that he decided to go because he was near 
Officer Bennett’s location while the unit actually assigned to 
 
2 
backup Bennett was “across the city,” and the police department 
required a backup unit for domestic disturbance calls. 
 
In assigning Bennett to investigate the domestic 
disturbance call, the dispatcher did not assign a response code.  
According to Norfolk Police Department General Order OPR-710 
(“OPR-710”), “[w]hen no specified response code is assigned to 
the message, response Code 3 will be used.”  OPR-710 also 
dictates that, on calls designated Code 3, “[e]mergency lights 
and/or siren will not be used.  All posted signs and traffic 
laws will be observed.”  In addition to delineating Response 
Codes, OPR-710 also establishes when a police officer is 
authorized to engage in “emergency vehicle operation.”1 
 
In responding to the call, both officers began to drive 
across the Campostella Bridge.  While Bennett did not know how 
fast he was traveling, Folston admitted to exceeding the speed 
limit after being passed by Bennett and to falling in line 
behind him as they drove up the bridge.  At no point did either 
officer activate his emergency lights or sirens. 
 
After cresting the crown of the bridge, Bennett began 
slowing down.  At that point, Bennett saw Worsley riding on his 
bicycle, swerving, in the middle of the left lane, which was the 
same lane in which Bennett was driving.  Upon seeing Worsley, 
                     
 
1 The operation of emergency equipment and driving in excess 
of the speed limit are considered aspects of “emergency vehicle 
operation.” 
 
3 
Bennett came to a quick stop.  Worsley subsequently swerved his 
bicycle into the right lane, where he was then hit by Folston, 
who had maneuvered into that lane to avoid hitting Bennett's 
vehicle.  Tragically, Worsley died as a result of injuries 
sustained when he was struck by Folston’s vehicle. 
 
McBride, as Administrator of Worsley’s estate, filed a 
simple negligence2 claim against Bennett and Folston, 
individually and as employees of the City of Norfolk, seeking 
damages for Worsley’s wrongful death as a result of their 
misconduct.  Bennett and Folston filed special pleas in bar on 
the grounds of sovereign immunity.  After hearing testimony from 
Bennett and Folston at an ore tenus hearing, the trial court 
sustained the special pleas in bar.  The trial court held that 
Bennett and Folston were entitled to sovereign immunity because 
they had exercised discretion in determining whether and how to 
respond to the dispatch. 
 
McBride appeals. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
The issue of whether a municipal employee is entitled to 
sovereign immunity is a question of law that we review de novo.  
City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 633, 604 S.E.2d 
420, 426 (2004).  Although we review the trial court’s decision 
                     
 
2 McBride initially filed a gross negligence claim but later 
amended her complaint, withdrawing the gross negligence claim 
and proceeding on a claim of simple negligence. 
 
4 
de novo, we also recognize that, when evidence is presented “on 
[a] plea ore tenus, the circuit court’s factual findings are 
accorded the weight of a jury finding and will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary 
support.”  Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566, 577, 692 S.E.2d 
226, 233 (2010). 
 
Where a municipal employee is charged with simple 
negligence, this Court has established a four factor test for 
determining whether sovereign immunity applies.  James v. Jane, 
221 Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980).  These factors are: 
(1) the nature of the function performed by the employee; (2) 
the extent of the state’s interest and involvement in the 
function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by 
the state over the employee; and (4) whether the act complained 
of involved the use of judgment and discretion.  Id.  In the 
present case, only the fourth factor is at issue. 
 
Recognizing that “[v]irtually every act performed by a 
person involves the exercise of some discretion,” James, 221 Va. 
at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869, this Court has explained that there 
are additional considerations involved in assessing the use of 
judgment and discretion in driving situations.  With regard to 
the fourth factor, this Court has explained that “[t]he defense 
of sovereign immunity applies only to acts of judgment and 
discretion which are necessary to the performance of the 
 
5 
governmental function itself.”  Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143, 
145, 400 S.E.2d 190, 191 (1991).  In situations involving the 
exercise of judgment and discretion by government employees 
while driving, we look to whether the means of effectuating the 
applicable government function involves “ordinary driving in 
routine traffic” versus driving that requires a “degree of 
judgment and discretion beyond ordinary driving situations in 
routine traffic.”  Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 268 Va. 384, 390-
91, 601 S.E.2d 591, 595 (2004).  Sovereign immunity attaches in 
the latter situation, but not in the former.  Id.; Colby v. 
Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 129, 400 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1991). 
 
In further refining the analysis applied in determining the 
types of driving to which sovereign immunity attaches, this 
Court has acknowledged that “[u]nlike the driver in routine 
traffic, [a government employee in an emergency situation] must 
make difficult judgments about the best means of effectuating 
the governmental purpose by embracing special risks.”  Colby, 
241 Va. at 129-30, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  When embracing special 
risks, government employees are necessarily called upon to make 
“split-second decisions balancing grave personal risks, public 
safety concerns, and the need to achieve the governmental 
objective.”  Id.  Such split-second decisions may lead to 
negligent acts, which can result in death or serious injury, as 
the present case demonstrates.  At the same time, the failure to 
 
6 
make such split-second decisions could similarly result in death 
or serious injury, and one of the purposes served by sovereign 
immunity is to “eliminate[] public inconvenience and danger that 
might spring from officials being fearful to act.”  Messina v. 
Burden, 228 Va. 301, 308, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984).  
Therefore, our jurisprudence is clear that, in the context of 
driving a vehicle, whether the act in question involves the 
requisite exercise of discretion such that sovereign immunity 
applies depends on whether that act embraces “special risks” in 
order to effectuate a governmental purpose. 
 
Applying this standard, we have recognized that sovereign 
immunity applies to an officer engaged in vehicular pursuit, 
Colby, 241 Va. at 130, 400 S.E.2d at 187, or a firefighter 
responding to a car fire, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. 
Catlett Volunteer Fire Co., 241 Va. 402, 413-14, 404 S.E.2d 216, 
222 (1991), but does not apply to a deputy serving judicial 
process, Heider, 241 Va. at 144-45, 400 S.E.2d at 190-91, or a 
firefighter engaged in “ordinary driving in routine traffic” 
while responding to a nonemergency, “public service call,” 
Friday-Spivey, 268 Va. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 594.  In each case, 
the application of sovereign immunity turned on whether a 
government employee exercised judgment and discretion in 
determining what actions to take, whether the actions taken were 
 
7 
necessary to effectuate a governmental purpose and whether those 
actions inherently required them to embrace “special risks.” 
 
In cases like the present one, the proper application of 
sovereign immunity should not be based upon a court second-
guessing a split-second decision made by a government employee 
effectuating a governmental function by embracing special risks.  
If that were the case, sovereign immunity would be rendered 
meaningless.  Rather, the proper application of sovereign 
immunity requires a court to make an objective determination as 
to whether the decision made and the actions taken pursuant 
thereto were necessary to the performance of a governmental 
function and embraced special risks.  In other words, the 
application of sovereign immunity in a case involving the 
operation of a motor vehicle by a government employee is an 
objective determination considered in light of all the 
circumstances including the government employee’s assessment3 of 
                     
 
3 While not dispositive, a government employee’s assessment 
is still relevant to the application of sovereign immunity.  The 
government employee’s assessment of the situation provides 
valuable context relating to what governmental function was 
being effectuated (e.g., an officer on routine patrol versus 
responding to a crime in progress) and whether the actions taken 
were “necessary to the performance of the governmental function 
itself.”  Heider, 241 Va. at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 191.  Context 
also addresses the question of whether the government employees 
were exercising judgment and discretion in deciding how best to 
discharge their duties. 
 
Indeed, we have recognized that one cannot meaningfully 
divorce the reason why a government employee responded to a 
particular situation from how the government employee responded.  
 
8 
the situation.  Nonetheless, the test is objective in nature.  
The driver’s evaluation of the situation must be objectively 
reasonable to permit the application of sovereign immunity. 
 
In the present case, Bennett and Folston determined that it 
was necessary for them to respond to the domestic disturbance 
call in an emergency manner and proceeded to do so.  In so 
doing, Bennett and Folston exercised their judgment and 
discretion.  See Colby, 241 Va. at 130, 400 S.E.2d at 187 
(recognizing that “[t]he exercise of discretion is involved even 
in the initial decision to undertake [a particular course of 
action]”).  Furthermore, determining the proper response to a 
criminal act (e.g., a domestic disturbance) and implementing 
that response clearly involve the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in the performance of a governmental function.  
Similarly, the operation of their vehicles in an emergency 
manner involved speeds in excess of the speed limit and, thus, 
went beyond “ordinary driving in routine traffic.”  Friday-
                                                                  
See Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 676-77, 727 S.E.2d 634, 646 
(2012) (analyzing a government employee’s assessment of the 
situation to explain why the employee’s actions (or lack 
thereof) demonstrated an exercise of judgment and discretion).  
Thus, a government employee’s assessment of the situation is a 
relevant consideration.  However, that consideration must 
necessarily be tempered by an objective examination of the 
circumstances.  See Friday-Spivey, 268 Va. at 390-91, 601 S.E.2d 
at 595 (determining that the facts of the case did not support 
the defendant’s classification of the situation as an 
“emergency”). 
 
 
9 
Spivey, 268 Va. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 594.  Therefore, in 
exercising their judgment and discretion about the best means of 
effectuating a governmental function by embracing the requisite 
special risks, Bennett and Folston triggered the application of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
McBride further takes issue with the fact that the officers 
had no specific knowledge about the particular call because the 
domestic disturbance call was not initially declared to be an 
emergency by the dispatcher.  McBride asserts that sovereign 
immunity cannot apply because, under those circumstances, 
Bennett and Folston had no authority to engage in emergency 
vehicle operation under OPR-710.  While the existence of such a 
policy may be relevant to any internal disciplinary actions that 
Bennett and Folston may face, it is not dispositive of the 
present issue.  Rather, OPR-710 merely demonstrates that the 
City of Norfolk Police Department has exercised administrative 
control and supervision over the officers.  See Colby, 241 Va. 
at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187. 
 
In Colby, this Court held that policies or guidelines like 
OPR-701 “do not, and cannot, eliminate the requirement that a 
police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and 
potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt, 
original, and crucial decisions in a highly stressful 
situation.”  Id.  This holding implicitly acknowledges the fact 
 
10 
that no policy can account for every situation a police officer 
may face.  Indeed, at least one court has recognized that there 
may be situations where the strict application of such policies 
may not be the most prudent course of action.  See Muse v. 
Schleiden, 349 F.Supp.2d 990, 997-98 (E.D. Va. 2004).  Rather, 
such decisions are best left to the judgment and discretion of 
the officer.  Id.  It is this exercise of judgment and 
discretion, even in violation of policy, that allows for the 
invocation of sovereign immunity.4 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
In National Railroad Passenger Corp., we concluded that 
sovereign immunity attached because we could not “logically 
distinguish the act of crossing a railroad track without 
stopping in order to extinguish a fire from running a red light 
in order to apprehend a traffic offender.”  241 Va. at 413, 404 
S.E.2d at 222.  Similarly, we cannot logically distinguish the 
act of speeding to respond to a domestic disturbance call.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
                     
 
4 We further observe that each police department in the 
Commonwealth likely has different policies or guidelines.  A 
standard for determining sovereign immunity that relied heavily 
on such policies or guidelines would result in an inconsistent 
application of this doctrine: the acts of an officer in one 
jurisdiction might be covered by sovereign immunity, while the 
same acts of another officer in the exact same situation but in 
a different jurisdiction would not. 
11 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, 
concurring. 
 
As reflected by the various views expressed in this case 
and in Anders v. Kidd, Record No. 131891 (this day decided), the 
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity over the years 
to ever-changing circumstances has produced less than clear 
guidelines for the resolution of future cases.  The majority's 
resolution of the case before us adds to the complexity that 
permeates the law of sovereign immunity by adding a new factor, 
whether "the government employee's assessment of the situation" 
in deciding "how" to respond is objectively reasonable.  Our 
precedent does not support second-guessing "how" an individual 
seeking the protection of sovereign immunity responded in a 
particular situation, even if judged by an objective standard.  
Instead, we have made an objective determination by asking 
whether effectuating the governmental purpose of the 
individual's employer required the exercise of discretion and 
judgment.  Applying that analysis in this case, I conclude that 
the circuit court correctly held that the defendants, Joey 
Gaylan Bennett, Jr. and Derek Michael Folston, were protected by 
sovereign immunity.  Thus, I respectfully concur. 
To determine whether an individual working for an immune 
governmental entity is entitled to the protection of sovereign 
immunity, we apply a four-part test first enunciated in James v. 
 
12 
Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980).  See Messina 
v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 313, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663 (1984).  The 
four factors are: "(1) the nature of the function the employee 
performs; (2) the extent of the government's interest and 
involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and 
direction exercised over the employee by the government; and (4) 
whether the act in question involved the exercise of discretion 
and judgment."  Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 129, 400 S.E.2d 
184, 186-87 (1991); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hylton, 
260 Va. 56, 63, 530 S.E.2d 421, 424 (2000); Stanfield v. 
Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 342, 429 S.E.2d 11, 12 (1993). 
In the present case, only the fourth prong of the test is 
at issue.  Since we enunciated this test, we have addressed the 
fourth prong, whether a particular act involved the exercise of 
discretion and judgment, in a multitude of factual scenarios.  
See, e.g., Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 677, 727 S.E.2d 634, 
646 (2012) (holding that a high school vice principal's response 
(or lack thereof) to a student's report about an impending fight 
"involved the exercise of judgment and discretion" because he 
had to decide whether to respond, when to respond, and how to 
respond);1 Gargiulo v. Ohar, 239 Va. 209, 215, 387 S.E.2d 787, 
                     
 
1 In Burns, we did not examine whether the vice-principal's 
decision about "how" to respond was objectively reasonable.  We 
only recognized that he necessarily had to exercise discretion 
and judgment in deciding whether, when, and how to respond. 
 
13 
791 (1990) (concluding that in performing duties as a fellow in 
a research project, a physician exercised discretion and 
judgment in diagnosing and treating participating patients); 
Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 83, 372 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1988) 
(holding that "a teacher's supervision and control of a physical 
education class . . . clearly involves, at least in part, the 
exercise of judgment and discretion by the teacher"); Messina, 
228 Va. at 313, 321 S.E.2d at 664 (granting sovereign immunity 
to a chief of the operations division of a county public works 
department because his supervisory activities "clearly involved 
judgment and discretion"). 
In situations involving the operation of a motor vehicle by 
an employee of an immune governmental entity, we have 
recognized, however, that every person driving a vehicle "must 
make myriad decisions" and thus have held that "in ordinary 
driving situations the duty of due care is a ministerial 
obligation."  Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143, 145, 400 S.E.2d 
190, 191 (1991).  In deciding whether the operation of a vehicle 
in a particular situation was ministerial or discretionary, we 
repeatedly have focused on whether the "operation of [the] 
vehicle involved special risks arising from the governmental 
activity and the exercise of judgment or discretion about the 
proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose of the 
defendant's employer."  Stanfield, 245 Va. at 344, 429 S.E.2d at 
 
14 
13-14; see also Colby, 241 Va. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187 (asking 
whether a police officer in vehicular pursuit of a fleeing 
lawbreaker had to make "difficult judgments about the best means 
of effectuating the governmental purpose by embracing special 
risks").  We have differentiated between drivers in situations 
necessarily requiring "discretionary, split-second decisions 
balancing grave personal risks, public safety concerns, and the 
need to achieve the governmental objective," Colby, 241 Va. at 
129-30, 400 S.E.2d at 187, and drivers involved in "the simple 
operation of a vehicle in routine traffic."  Smith v. Settle, 
254 Va. 348, 353 n.7, 492 S.E.2d 427, 430 n.7 (1997).  While the 
former is deemed conduct involving the exercise of discretion 
and judgment and thus protected by sovereign immunity against 
charges of simple negligence, the latter is not. 
For example, in Colby, a law enforcement officer was 
pursuing a motorist who had violated a traffic law.  241 Va. at 
127, 400 S.E.2d at 185-86.  During the pursuit, the officer 
proceeded to cross an intersection against a red traffic light, 
colliding with another vehicle.  Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 186.  
Affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining the officer's 
plea in bar based on sovereign immunity, we concluded that "a 
police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and 
potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt, 
original, and crucial decisions in a highly stressful 
 
15 
situation."  Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  Although his 
municipal employer exercised "administrative control and 
supervision over [the officer's] activities through the 
promulgation of guidelines governing actions taken in response 
to emergency situations," we determined that those guidelines 
could not eliminate the need for the officer to make 
discretionary decisions during the course of vehicular pursuit.  
Id.  Thus, we held that, "unlike the driver in routine traffic," 
the police officer was cloaked with the protection of sovereign 
immunity.  Id. 
Similarly, in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Catlett 
Volunteer Fire Co., 241 Va. 402, 404 S.E.2d 216 (1991), we 
addressed whether a volunteer fireman was immune from liability 
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity for an accident that 
occurred while the fireman was driving a fire truck to the site 
of a fire.  Id. at 405, 404 S.E.2d at 217.  The fireman 
proceeded through a railroad crossing without stopping, and a 
train struck the fire truck.  Id.  The railroad company asserted 
that the fireman was not entitled to the defense of sovereign 
immunity because his act of crossing the railroad tracks without 
first stopping "was a ministerial act, not a discretionary act 
to which sovereign immunity attaches."  Id. at 413, 404 S.E.2d 
at 222.  Disagreeing, we concluded that, like the police officer 
in Colby, the fireman was exercising discretion and judgment 
 
16 
about the best means of effectuating the governmental purpose 
and in doing so was embracing special risks.  Id.  See also 
Smith, 254 Va. at 353 n.7, 492 S.E.2d at 430 n.7 (holding that 
an ambulance driver traveling to a location where he could 
establish radio contact with his other squad members to 
determine whether he was needed at the scene of an emergency was 
not engaged in "the simple operation of a vehicle in routine 
traffic" because the trip "involved the exercise of discretion 
and judgment required by a person performing a governmental 
function in operating a vehicle in response to an emergency"). 
We again applied the same analysis in Stanfield, which did 
not involve an emergency situation.  There, the defendant-driver 
was operating a city truck and spreading salt during a snowstorm 
when his truck collided with another vehicle.  245 Va. at 340, 
429 S.E.2d at 11.  In concluding that the driver was entitled to 
the protection of sovereign immunity, we stated that "the 
conduct of driving and spreading salt combined [is] an integral 
part of the governmental function of rendering the city streets 
safe for public travel" and that "the operation of this vehicle 
involved special risks arising from the governmental activity 
and the exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper 
means of effectuating the governmental purpose."  Id. at 344, 
429 S.E.2d at 13-14.  We explained that if the "accident had 
happened as defendant was driving his truck en route to the area 
 
17 
he was assigned to plow and salt, or if it occurred when he was 
returning to his . . . headquarters after completing his 
function of plowing and salting, he would have been engaged in 
'the simple operation' of the truck 'in routine traffic,' a 
ministerial act."  Id. at 344, 429 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Heider, 
241 Va. at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 191 and Colby, 241 Va. at 129, 400 
S.E.2d at 187).  Compare Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 595, 197 
S.E. 527, 529 (1938) (holding that driving a school bus while 
not transporting children did not involve judgment or discretion 
but was purely ministerial) and Heider, 241 Va. at 145, 400 
S.E.2d at 191 (holding that a police officer who was involved in 
an accident while operating his vehicle after serving judicial 
process was not exercising "judgment and discretion about the 
proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose of" his 
employer but was engaged in "the simple operation of an 
automobile [that] did not involve special risks arising from the 
governmental activity") with Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 36, 
540 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2001) (holding that a school bus driver's 
act of transporting children did involve the exercise of 
judgment and discretion). 
In none of these cases did the Court look at "how" the 
defendant chose to respond and decide whether the response was 
objectively reasonable.  For example, in Stanfield, we did not 
ask whether the defendant's decision, as he was spreading salt 
 
18 
on a city street, to attempt to stop at a stop sign located at 
an intersection was objectively reasonable.  245 Va. at 342, 429 
S.E.2d at 12.  Instead, the driver was exercising the requisite 
discretion and judgment because, to effectuate the governmental 
purpose, he had to decide not only "whether a particular street 
needed to be salted, plowed, or a combination of both" but also 
whether to spread salt on the entire street and how much salt to 
spread.  Id.  Thus, we concluded that "[t]he operation of the 
truck in snow and ice to effectuate a governmental purpose 
clearly involved, at least in part, the exercise of judgment and 
discretion by the driver."  Id. at 343, 429 S.E.2d at 13.  See 
also Smith, 254 Va. at 353 n.7, 492 S.E.2d at 430 n.7; National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 241 Va. at 413, 404 S.E.2d at 222; Colby, 
241 Va. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187. 
 
Obviously, the facts and circumstances in each case are 
relevant to understanding the precise governmental function at 
issue and whether effectuating that function requires the 
exercise of discretion and judgment.  But, we have not looked 
past that point and examined "how" the driver chose to respond.  
Instead, we simply asked whether an employee of an immune 
governmental entity, while driving an automobile, was engaged in 
routine driving or driving that involved the exercise of 
judgment and discretion. 
 
19 
 
If it is necessary for the government employee to 
demonstrate on an objective basis that the actions taken were 
reasonable, this new factor introduced by the majority 
essentially deprives the doctrine of sovereign immunity of its 
purpose: it will only provide government employees with immunity 
from negligence claims if they were not negligent in responding 
to the circumstances they faced.2  See Litchford v. Hancock, 232 
Va. 496, 499, 352 S.E.2d. 335, 337 (1987) (stating that the 
driver of a vehicle is negligent if the driver fails "to use 
ordinary care to observe other vehicles on the highway, to see 
what a reasonable person would have seen, and to react as a 
reasonable person would have reacted under the circumstances to 
avoid a collision"); Smith v. Lamar, 212 Va. 820, 823, 188 
S.E.2d 72, 74 (1972) (holding that "reasonable care" or 
"ordinary care" is that "degree of care which an ordinary 
                     
2 Sovereign immunity protects a defendant working for an 
immune governmental entity against only claims for simple 
negligence.  See Green v. Ingram, 269 Va. 281, 290, 608 S.E.2d 
917, 922 (2005); National R.R. Passenger Corp., 241 Va. at 414, 
404 S.E.2d at 222.  Thus, when "a defendant's actions are 
clothed with sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must establish 
gross negligence in order to prevail."  Colby, 241 Va. at 130, 
400 S.E.2d at 187.  In exercising judgment and discretion to 
effectuate a governmental purpose, if a defendant does so in 
such a manner that shows "indifference to others as constitutes 
an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of 
the safety of [another], that is, such a degree of negligence as 
should shock fair minded men although something less than 
willful recklessness," the defendant is liable for gross 
negligence.  Laster v. Tatum, 206 Va. 804, 807, 146 S.E.2d 231, 
233 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Green, 269 
Va. at 290-91, 608 S.E.2d at 922. 
 
20 
prudent person would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances to avoid injury to another").  Also, if a 
government employee has successfully demonstrated that the 
actions taken were objectively reasonable, I question whether 
that employee could ever then be liable for gross negligence. 
 
At a minimum, if this new factor is appropriate, the 
majority should acknowledge its departure from our precedent and 
explain why it is necessary.  Moreover, in the case before us, 
the majority does not apply this new factor.  The majority never 
decides whether the decisions by Bennett and Folston to drive 
their vehicles in excess of the speed limit without lights and 
sirens were objectively reasonable.  Instead, the majority 
concludes, by utilizing the approach supported by our precedent, 
that "determining the proper response to a criminal act (i.e., a 
domestic disturbance) and implementing that response clearly 
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion in the 
performance of a governmental function." 
Nevertheless, I conclude, like the majority, that the 
circuit court did not err in sustaining the special pleas in bar 
based on sovereign immunity filed by Bennett and Folston.  As 
police officers, they were effectuating the governmental 
function of responding to a domestic disturbance call.  Like the 
police officer in Colby and the driver spreading salt in 
Stanfield, the operation of their respective vehicles entailed 
 
21 
"special risks arising from the governmental activity and the 
exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper means of 
effectuating the governmental purpose."  Stanfield, 245 Va. at 
344, 429 S.E.2d at 14.  For that reason, they are entitled to 
the protection of sovereign immunity.  Whether their decisions 
about "how" to respond were objectively reasonable, even though 
the dispatch assigned no response code to the call, is not 
determinative. 
I recognize, however, that this Court utilized a different 
approach in Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 268 Va. 384, 601 S.E.2d 
591 (2004).  There, a fire truck collided with a motor vehicle 
after the fire truck driver failed to yield the right-of-way.  
Id. at 386, 601 S.E.2d at 592.  The fire technician was 
responding to a "Priority 2" dispatch regarding an infant locked 
in a vehicle.  Id. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 592.  Under that 
protocol, the technician "was required to proceed without 
activating warning devices, i.e., 'no lights and no sirens,' and 
to obey all statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles."  
Id. 
In reversing the trial court's judgment holding that this 
driver was protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the 
Court relied on both the protocol and the technician's 
testimony, admitting "that, based on what he knew at the time, 
'there was no danger' involved in the call to which they were 
 
22 
responding and he understood that 'when [he] got a [Priority 2] 
call, [he was] to respond in a nonemergency manner and conform 
to all the traffic regulations.'"  Id. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 
594.  When asked whether "there [was] any difference in the way 
you respond to a call for a cat in a tree versus an infant 
locked in a car, according to [the] regulations," he responded, 
"[my] regulations, no."  Id. 
The Court's reliance on the fire department operating 
procedures and the fire technician's testimony admitting that he 
knew there was no danger involved in the call represented a 
departure from our precedent applying the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  We specifically had rejected the use of guidelines 
and operating procedures in Colby and National Railroad 
Passenger Corp.  And, in determining whether the operation of a 
vehicle involved the exercise of discretion and judgment, the 
Court had not previously examined a driver's subjective 
assessment about the nature of the specific situation at issue 
and how to respond in deciding whether the driver was protected 
by sovereign immunity.  In my view, the approach followed in our 
cases before Friday-Spivey should be applied in the case before 
us, and to the extent that Friday-Spivey suggests that the 
application of sovereign immunity turns on such subjective 
assessments or internal policies and operating procedures, it 
should be overruled. 
 
23 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur and would affirm 
the circuit court's judgment. 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting. 
 
Because a public employee who flagrantly violates a direct 
order is acting outside the limits of his or her permissible 
judgment and discretion, I dissent. 
Facts 
 
Donnell Worsley spent much of the last day of his life at 
his mother's house with family.  In the early evening, he 
attended the birthday party of a family friend.  He returned to 
his mother's house and then rode his bike home.  The night was 
clear.  The roads were dry and well-lit. 
 
Worsley never made it home.  As he pedaled his bike on the 
Campostella Bridge, two police cruisers were approaching at high 
speed behind him. 
 
Officer Bennett had received a call for a "disorderly 
trespasser or disturbance or something of that nature" in the 
Tidewater Gardens community.  Officer Folston had previously 
received a call from dispatch to transport a prisoner.  He 
disregarded that call without permission when he overheard 
Officer Bennett take the call for the "disturbance." 
 
The cruiser was "full throttle," "pedal down to the floor" 
as Folston drove up the bridge.  Coming down, the officers began 
 
24 
to slow slightly, because they were going too fast to make an 
upcoming turn.  Suddenly, Bennett hit his brakes and came to a 
complete stop as he encountered Worsley.  Folston swerved to 
avoid rear-ending Bennett's cruiser.  As he did, he struck 
Worsley.  The impact threw Worsley onto the windshield, which 
shattered.  Folston's cruiser dragged the crumpled bicycle more 
than 200 feet. 
 
The officers were not using their sirens or emergency 
lights.  There is evidence that the cruisers reached speeds 
between eighty and eighty-eight miles per hour. 
 
Bennett and Folston were each indicted on one charge of 
involuntary manslaughter and two charges of reckless driving.  
In Bennett's case, the involuntary manslaughter charge and one 
of the two charges of reckless driving were nolle prossed.  The 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk convicted Bennett of the 
remaining reckless driving charge.  Folston entered an Alford 
Plea to one of the reckless driving charges, and the remaining 
charges were nolle prossed. 
 
Discussion 
 
The majority concludes that sovereign immunity attached to 
the officers’ actions while responding to the uncategorized 
disturbance call, despite the clear and express order issued by 
the Norfolk Chief of Police to treat such calls as nonemergency 
responses while observing "[a]ll posted signs and traffic laws."  
Because they violated an express order that dictated the limits 
of their permitted judgment and discretion in the performance of 
 
25 
this government function, our precedent dictates that they 
cannot hide behind the shield of sovereign immunity. 
1. 
Norfolk Police Department General Order OPR-710 
 
The majority opinion fails to give due regard to Norfolk 
Police Department General Order OPR-710 (“General Order”).  As 
the Court has explained: "Whether the act performed involves the 
use of judgment and discretion is a consideration, but it is not 
always determinative. . . . Of equal importance is the degree of 
control and direction exercised by the [governmental body] over 
the employee whose negligence is involved."  James v. Jane, 221 
Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980) (emphasis added).  The 
General Order exercises clear control and direction for the 
emergency operation of police vehicles, which constrains 
officers' otherwise-permitted judgment and discretion.  Bennett 
and Folston flagrantly disregarded this order and, therefore, 
were acting outside the limits of their authority.  They 
exercised no permissible "judgment and discretion" in 
unilaterally choosing to speed recklessly without sirens or 
emergency lights. 
The structure of the General Order makes it clear that 
there are four situations in which “emergency vehicle operation” 
is authorized.  If one of those four situations applies, then 
police officers may assess ten factors to determine the 
appropriate response to the emergency situation. 
 
26 
The relevant sections of the General Order (I, II, and V) 
are printed in their entirety below: 
I. 
Policy 
 
 
Sworn personnel will operate police vehicles 
in 
emergency 
situations 
in 
the 
safest 
possible 
manner, 
consistent 
with 
law 
enforcement 
responsibilities, 
and 
in 
accordance with the procedures contained in 
this order. 
 
II. Emergency Operation of Police Vehicles 
 
 
In 
undertaking 
any 
emergency 
vehicle 
operation, 
officers 
must 
balance 
the 
seriousness 
of 
the 
situation 
and 
the 
importance of the law enforcement objective 
involved against the hazards to the safety of 
citizens and police personnel involved. 
 
A. Emergency vehicle operation is authorized 
during the following: 
 
1.  When the immediate presence of the 
police is required in order to protect 
a person from possible death or serious 
injury. 
 
2.  When the telecommunicator dispatches a 
message with a response Code 1 or 2. 
 
3.  When 
directly 
authorized 
by 
a 
supervisor. 
 
4.  When engaged in a vehicular pursuit. 
 
B. Officers are expected to exercise good 
judgment 
as 
to 
the 
necessity 
and 
justification for operating their vehicles 
under emergency conditions.  Factors and 
conditions to be assessed by officers prior 
to and during the emergency operation of 
the police vehicle include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
 
 
27 
1.  Nature and seriousness of offense or 
call 
2.  Weather conditions 
3.  Road surface conditions 
4.  Traffic conditions 
5.  Time of day 
6.  Knowledge of area 
7.  Ability to control vehicle 
8.  Type of vehicles involved 
9.  Availability of assisting units 
10. Geographic 
location 
– 
school, 
residential, business, etc. 
 
. . . . 
 
V. 
Response Codes 
 
A. 
Code 
1- 
With 
due 
regard 
for 
safety, 
emergency lights and siren must be used at 
all times when operating a vehicle in 
excess of the speed limit, or contrary to 
other traffic regulations, regardless of 
the time of day or the location.  Speed 
limits will not be exceeded by more than 15 
mph, except during pursuits. 
 
B. 
Code 
2- 
With 
due 
regard 
for 
safety, 
emergency lights must be used at all times 
and siren used as necessary.  Police units 
will come to a full stop at each red light, 
then proceed through the intersection only 
if it is possible to do so without danger 
to pedestrians or vehicles.  All other 
traffic controls will be approached with 
extreme caution.  Speed limits will not be 
exceeded by more than 5 mph. 
 
C. 
Code 3- Emergency lights and/or siren will 
not be used.  All posted signs and traffic 
laws will be observed.  When no specified 
response code is assigned to the message, 
response Code 3 will be used. 
 
Pursuant to the plain language of subsection (II)(A) of the 
General Order, an officer is authorized to engage in “emergency 
 
28 
vehicle operation” in only four scenarios: (1) when his or her 
immediate presence is required to protect a person from possible 
death or serious injury; (2) when the dispatch has a response 
Code 1 or 2; (3) when directly authorized by a supervisor; or 
(4) when engaged in a vehicular pursuit.  Only if one of these 
four scenarios applies does the officer then have authority to 
exercise independent judgment and discretion to disregard 
traffic laws.  To guide officers in the exercise of this 
judgment and discretion, subsection (II)(B) provides a list of 
ten factors for consideration.  But these factors do not come 
into play unless the officer is first authorized to engage in 
“emergency vehicle operation” pursuant to one of the four prongs 
of subsection (II)(A). 
In this case, the domestic disturbance call from the 
dispatcher was not assigned a code, and therefore it was 
required to be treated as Code 3.  It did not involve vehicular 
pursuit.  The officers were not authorized by their supervisors 
to treat it as an emergency situation. 
Thus, the only possible basis for engaging in “emergency 
vehicle operation” under the policy was if “the immediate 
presence of the police [wa]s required in order to protect a 
person from possible death or serious injury.”  The majority 
opinion makes no attempt to argue that scenario applies.  
Indeed, the majority makes the conclusory assertion that 
 
29 
"Bennett and Folston determined that it was necessary for them 
to respond to the domestic disturbance call in an emergency 
manner."  However, there are no facts in the record to support 
that conclusion.  To the contrary, the dispatcher, who was aware 
of the facts, decided not to code the response.  That was a 
factual determination that the officers' "immediate presence" 
was not required to prevent death or serious injury. 
The majority concludes that Folston's unilateral and 
unauthorized decision to back up Bennett (even though the 
dispatcher had already assigned back up), coupled with their 
collective, unauthorized decision to speed recklessly to the 
call without sirens or lights--again, unauthorized--was enough 
to trigger sovereign immunity.  I disagree.1 
Whether a dispatch falls within one of the General Order’s 
authorizations for “emergency vehicle operation” is an objective 
                     
1 In fact, the officers did not comply with the General 
Order's mandates for Code 1 or Code 2 emergency operation 
either.  In other words, Bennett and Folston did not respond in 
any sort of authorized manner; they just drove fast.  As the 
accident report indicates, the speed limit in the area was 30 
mph, and Folston surmised that he was probably driving 45-50 mph 
at the time of the crash (despite having the "pedal down to the 
floor" going up the bridge), while Bennett indicated that he 
reached speeds around 60 mph.  Code 1 operation requires that 
"[s]peed limits will not be exceeded by more than 15 mph, except 
during pursuits."  Under Code 1, "emergency lights and siren 
must be used at all times when operating a vehicle in excess of 
the speed limit . . . regardless of the time of day or the 
location."  Under Code 2, which requires use of lights and 
requires intermittent use of sirens, "[s]peed limits will not be 
exceeded by more than 5 mph." 
 
30 
determination that must be based on the specific facts about 
that particular dispatch known by the officer at the time of 
response.  Generalized knowledge regarding the character of the 
area or the type of call cannot suffice.  Otherwise, an officer 
could overrule a dispatcher’s assigned response code and treat 
the call as an emergency based on nothing more than after-the-
fact, self-serving conjecture.  Such a result would effectively 
nullify the Norfolk Police Department’s established system of 
response codes and nullify the direct order of the Norfolk Chief 
of Police. 
2. 
Friday-Spivey v. Collier Controls this Case 
These facts place this case squarely within the rule of 
Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 268 Va. 384, 601 S.E.2d 591 (2004), 
which the Court decided a mere decade ago.  It remains binding 
authority in the Commonwealth; it has not been overruled or 
limited.  Therein, the Court drew a clear line between driving 
in emergency conditions that embraces "special risks" and 
"ordinary driving situations," derived from the Fairfax County 
Fire and Rescue Department Standard Operating Procedures. 
In Friday-Spivey, we refused to grant sovereign immunity to 
a fire truck driver who collided with a motorist while 
responding to a "Priority 2" call indicating that an infant was 
locked in a parked car. Id. at 390-91, 601 S.E.2d at 594-95.  
Under the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department Standard 
 
31 
Operating Procedures, the driver was "required" to proceed 
without emergency equipment and "to obey all statutes governing 
the operation of motor vehicles."  Id. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 
592.  Similar to the facts in this case, the driver was not 
using his emergency lights or siren, but failed to yield the 
right of way to another vehicle.  Id. at 386-87, 601 S.E. at 
592-93.  He testified that he had exercised his discretion to 
determine the “quickest route possible” because he “just [did 
not] know what to expect when [he got] there.”  Id. at 387, 601 
S.E.2d at 593.  The Court held that, “[d]espite a natural 
inclination to classify the report of a child in a locked car as 
an ‘emergency,’” he was not required to “exercise . . . 
discretion beyond that required for ordinary driving in routine 
traffic situations.”  Id. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 594.  Thus, the 
driver was performing a ministerial function to which sovereign 
immunity did not apply. Id. at 391, 601 S.E.2d at 595. 
The majority makes no attempt to distinguish the facts of 
Friday-Spivey from the facts of this case.  Moreover, there is 
little effort to address the officers' disobedience of the 
General Order.  Rather, the majority sidesteps the officers' 
unjustified insubordination with a quote from Colby v. Boyden, 
241 Va. 125, 129, 400 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1991): "[T]hose 
guidelines do not, and cannot, eliminate the requirement that a 
police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and 
 
32 
potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt, 
original, and crucial decisions."  However, this ignores a 
significant factual distinction.  In Colby, there were known, 
objective facts of an emergency situation.  Colby applied 
immunity to a police officer who had observed a traffic 
infraction committed in his presence, after which the 
perpetrator fled at a high rate of speed, and who initiated 
vehicular pursuit.  Id. at 127, 130, 400 S.E.2d at 185-187.  In 
fact, in the present case vehicular pursuit is one of the four 
prongs in the General Order that would have permitted the 
officers to exercise such judgment and discretion.  As discussed 
in more detail below, and like the driver in Friday-Spivey, 
Bennett and Folston could point to no specific facts of a 
defined emergency situation.  They had no knowledge that would 
permit judgment and discretion to speed recklessly without 
emergency lights or sirens.2 
Nothing about the call indicated that the immediate 
presence of the officers was needed to protect anyone from 
“possible death or serious injury.”  In fact, when Bennett was 
                     
2 Further, unlike the General Order, which requires Norfolk 
police officers to treat calls with no specific response code as 
Code 3 nonemergency calls, Virginia Beach Police Department 
General Order 8.01, addressed in Colby, expressly authorized 
officers to judge the response required according to the 
information available to the officer at the time. City of 
Virginia Beach Police Department, General Order 8.01, at 5, 
Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 129, 400 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1991). 
 
33 
questioned by his supervisors shortly after the accident, he 
stated that “[t]here was no like excuse or reason for [speeding 
to get to the scene].”  And at the hearing before the circuit 
court, Bennett agreed that his decision was "not based on any 
exigent emergency circumstance." 
Similarly, Folston, who was not even assigned to respond to 
the call, acknowledged that there was only "an unidentified 
problem" and that "[t]here may or may not be a danger."  Like 
the driver in Friday-Spivey who "just [did not] know what to 
expect when [he got] there,” Folston posited that this "unknown" 
presented an exigent circumstance.  Yet the officers could have 
addressed that exigent circumstance without speeding recklessly 
through the city and endangering the lives of innocent 
civilians.  For example, they could have learned about the 
specific facts of the call--or even verified the code--by 
accessing the computer in the vehicle.  Unlike in Colby, based 
on the specific information available to the officers at the 
time of the response, there was no emergency involved in the 
call to which they were responding.  Consequently, the General 
Order mandated that the officers respond to the call in a 
nonemergency manner.3 
                     
3 This is distinguishable from Muse v. Schleiden, 349 
F.Supp.2d 990 (E.D. Va. 2004), in which the court held that 
sovereign immunity applied to an officer responding to a 
domestic violence call.  In Muse, the responding officer had 
 
34 
Although the majority opinion cites Friday-Spivey five 
times, it utterly fails to meaningfully address the importance 
that we attached to the departmental policy governing emergency 
vehicle operation in that case.  See 268 Va. at 391, 601 S.E.2d 
at 595 ("[Defendant] was in routine traffic under a mandate 'to 
respond in a nonemergency manner and conform to all the traffic 
regulations.'") (emphasis added).  Make no mistake, the majority 
opinion vitiates the rule of Friday-Spivey and leaves it with 
little to no vitality.  In effect, it is overruled sub silentio. 
The majority opinion establishes a lamentable precedent by 
casting adrift the determination of "judgment and discretion" 
from its firm moorings within authority granted by well-reasoned 
departmental guidance such as the General Order.  There are 
three reasons to give such guidance due deference. 
First, a speeding emergency vehicle is a dangerous weapon, 
capable of killing innocent civilians, as occurred in this 
tragic case.  Departmental policies limit that danger: in this 
instance by requiring activation of sirens and emergency lights 
to warn unsuspecting motorists and bicyclists when speeding up 
                                                                  
specific information regarding the circumstances of the call.  
The dispatch reflected that the caller’s daughter had struck him 
in the face, was standing next to him at the time of the call, 
and was “out of control.” Id. at 992.  From those facts, the 
officer reasonably determined that an assault was in progress 
and that he needed to get to the call as quickly as possible.  
Id. at 996. 
 
35 
to fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit and prohibiting 
speeds in excess of that, except during pursuit. 
Second, such policies--particularly when expressed as 
commands such as the General Order--limit the authority, and 
therefore the permitted judgment and discretion, of public 
employees for good purpose.  They are intended to prevent free-
lancing, and ensure respect for the chain of command.  In this 
instance, a superior officer could have authorized emergency 
operation, but no such request was made. 
Third, though courts may desire a single statewide standard 
that neatly categorizes "judgment and discretion" in all 
instances, proper judicial respect for local policies reflects 
due consideration of the Commonwealth's diversity.  Judgment and 
discretion on the crowded city streets of Norfolk or the 
sprawling highway network of Fairfax County will necessarily 
involve different factors than on the less-traveled rural roads 
of Lee County.  Departmental orders and policies reflect the 
unique traffic conditions that are likely to be faced in each 
locality.  The Chief of Police in the City of Norfolk is better 
able to provide useful guidance to officers than a court one 
hundred miles away.  And when that guidance is flagrantly 
violated, no court should provide a shield of immunity from 
civil consequences. 
 
36 
3. 
An Objective Determination Regarding the Application of 
Sovereign Immunity 
 
I agree with the majority's proposition that "the proper 
application of sovereign immunity requires a court to make an 
objective determination as to whether the decision made and the 
actions taken pursuant thereto were necessary to the performance 
of a governmental function and embraced special risks."  
However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Bennett 
and Folston possessed or exercised sufficient judgment and 
discretion to trigger application of sovereign immunity.  Their 
Chief of Police had already issued an order that required a 
nonemergency response, thereby significantly limiting such 
judgment and discretion. 
Moreover, I disagree that their decision was "necessary." 
The Norfolk Chief of Police had already made the "necessary 
decision" that controlled how officers must respond.  The only 
decision Bennett and Folston had to make was whether to act 
within their authority and abide by the General Order or whether 
to engage in insubordination.  They chose to ignore the order, 
and Donnell Worsley's tragic and preventable death was the 
result. 
According to the majority's logic: 
[T]he operation of their vehicles in an emergency 
manner involved speeds in excess of the speed limit 
and, thus, went beyond "ordinary driving in routine 
traffic." . . .  Therefore, in exercising their 
 
37 
judgment and discretion about the best means of 
effectuating a governmental function by embracing 
the requisite special risks, Bennett and Folston 
triggered the application of sovereign immunity. 
 
This reasoning is circular.  Bennett and Folston treated a Code 
3, nonemergency situation as an emergency, without authorization 
from their superiors or justification based on specific, 
objective facts known to them but not their supervisor.  They 
unjustifiably drove their vehicles at excessive, reckless speeds 
without sirens or emergency lights. Thus, they created the 
"special risks" that triggered the application of sovereign 
immunity.  This reasoning permits government employees to assume 
an emergency into existence and respond in a manner that poses 
"special risks" to themselves and the public while hiding behind 
the shield of civil immunity. 
Officers who obey the orders of their superiors and are 
engaged in the dangerous and potentially deadly job of 
responding to emergency situations must make prompt and crucial 
decisions in the midst of highly stressful conditions.  “Such 
situations involve necessarily discretionary, split-second 
decisions balancing grave personal risks, public safety 
concerns, and the need to achieve the governmental objective.”  
Colby, 241 Va. at 129-30, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  That principle is 
sacrosanct.  However, the Norfolk Police Department, through the 
General Order, also requires its officers to make and execute 
 
38 
certain decisions according to clear direction.  The General 
Order represents the chain-of-command within the police 
department. It provides an objective means for evaluating 
official action.  In other words, denying immunity under these 
circumstances is consistent with internal expectations and 
standards.  This is not a question of courts second guessing 
legitimate official actions.  Here, the rules were established 
beforehand. 
As Colby recognizes, there are scenarios where exigent 
circumstances can authorize an officer to exercise a level of 
refined discretion that exceeds the language of a policy.  Id. 
at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.  However, raising the shield of 
sovereign immunity must require a basis in fact, rather than 
generalization, speculation, or post hoc rationalization.  See 
id.  The absence of specific facts triggering the need for 
"prompt, original, and crucial decisions" distinguishes this 
case from Colby, because the "original" decisions dictating the 
manner of response under these circumstances had already been 
made by Bennett's and Folston's superiors. 
Conclusion 
Officers Bennett and Folston were under a sworn duty to act 
within the authority conferred by their badges.  That authority 
was expressed clearly in the General Order.  That order 
expressed the policy of their chain of command regarding the 
 
39 
judgment and discretion they were authorized to exercise while 
driving.  They flagrantly breached their sworn duty when they 
disregarded the General Order.  They acted far outside their 
authority.  They ignored their chain of command. 
Friday-Spivey is the law of the Commonwealth.  It governs 
the facts of this case.  It dictates reversal and remand to the 
trial court for a full trial on the merits. 
 
I dissent.