Title: Fowler v. Missouri Sheriffs' Retirement System
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC98484
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2021

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
DAVEN FOWLER, ET AL., 
) 
          ) 
Appellants/Cross-Respondents, 
) 
        ) 
v. 
       )  
No.  SC98484 
         ) 
MISSOURI SHERIFFS' RETIREMENT      
) 
SYSTEM, 
           ) 
 ) 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Kevin D. Harrell, Judge 
Daven Fowler and Jerry Keller appeal the circuit court's dismissal of their lawsuit 
against the Missouri Sheriffs' Retirement System ("MSRS").  MSRS cross-appeals.  
Because the municipal court clerks are not necessary and indispensable parties, and the 
statute authorizing the $3 surcharge, § 57.955,1 violates article I, § 14 of the Missouri 
Constitution, the circuit court's judgment is vacated and remanded. 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise provided. 
Opinion issued June 1, 2021
2 
 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
The General Assembly enacted § 57.955 in 1983.  At enactment, the statute 
provided in pertinent part:  
After the effective date of the establishment of the system, in addition to all 
other legal costs in each civil suit, action, case and all other proceedings of a 
civil nature filed in each circuit court and the divisions[2] thereof, except the 
juvenile divisions, in a county there shall be assessed and collected in the 
same manner as other civil court costs are collected a sum of three dollars 
and in all criminal cases a sum of two dollars, but no such costs shall be 
assessed when the costs are to be paid by the state for indigent defendants.  
The clerk, or other official responsible for collecting court costs in civil and 
criminal cases, shall collect such amounts and shall remit them monthly to 
the board for deposit in the sheriffs' retirement fund. 
 
§ 57.955.1, RSMo Supp. 1983.  From its enactment until 1997, the statute did not require 
municipal courts to collect either the $3 or the $2 surcharge.3   
 In 1997, the General Assembly amended the statute to its current version, which 
provides: 
There shall be assessed and collected a surcharge of three dollars in all civil 
actions filed in the courts of this state and in all criminal cases including 
violation of any county ordinance or any violation of criminal or traffic laws 
of this state, including infractions, but no such surcharge shall be assessed 
when the costs are waived or are to be paid by the state, county or 
municipality or when a criminal proceeding or the defendant has been 
dismissed by the court. For purposes of this section, the term "county 
ordinance" shall not include any ordinance of the city of St. Louis. The clerk 
responsible for collecting court costs in civil and criminal cases, shall collect 
and disburse such amounts as provided by sections 488.010 to 488.020. Such 
funds shall be payable to the sheriffs' retirement fund. Moneys credited to the 
sheriffs' retirement fund shall be used only for the purposes provided for in 
sections 57.949 to 57.997 and for no other purpose. 
                                              
2 Municipal courts, as they are commonly called, are divisions of the circuit court.  State v. Severe, 
307 S.W.3d 640, 643 n.6 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Mo. Const. art. V, §§ 23, 27).    
3 The General Assembly amended the statute in 1984 to exclude municipal courts from collecting 
the surcharges.  See § 57.955.1, RSMo Supp. 1984.   
3 
 
 
§ 57.955.1 (emphasis in statute).  The municipal court clerks ("the clerks") assess and 
collect the surcharge and then remit collected surcharges to the Missouri Sheriffs' 
Retirement Fund ("the Fund").  The Fund pays its benefits to retired elected county sheriffs 
and their spouses, but only if the elected sheriff served in that capacity for at least eight 
years. 
 
In May 2017, Daven Fowler and Jerry Keller received speeding tickets in Kansas 
City.  Both men hired the same attorney and resolved their cases by pleading guilty and 
paying court costs totaling $223.50 to the Kansas City municipal court.  Three dollars of 
the total costs was the surcharge authorized by § 57.955.  Neither Fowler nor Keller knew 
they were paying the $3 surcharge.  After discussions with their attorney, Fowler and Keller 
believed the surcharge was unconstitutional, and both men agreed to become class 
representatives for all Kansas City municipal court litigants who had paid the surcharge.   
 
Fowler and Keller, on behalf of a putative class, sued MSRS in the Jackson County 
circuit court.  As germane to this case, the petition alleged one count of unjust enrichment 
and asserted the surcharge violated article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution.  The case 
proceeded to a bench trial.  After the close of all the evidence, the circuit court dismissed 
this case,4 concluding Fowler and Keller had failed to join the clerks responsible for 
assessing, collecting, and remitting the surcharge as necessary and indispensable parties.  
                                              
4 The circuit court rejected MSRS' arguments that the plaintiffs did not have standing, waived their 
constitutional challenge by failing to raise it with the municipal court, waived their unjust 
enrichment claim under the "voluntary payment doctrine," and that MSRS' reception of surcharge 
funds was nothing more than passive acquiescence.   
4 
 
Despite this conclusion, the circuit court addressed the constitutional challenge and 
concluded § 57.955 did not violate article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution. 
 
Fowler and Keller appealed, and MSRS cross-appealed.  This Court has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal because Fowler and Keller challenge the 
constitutional validity of § 57.955.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 3; Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. 
State, 601 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Mo. banc 2020).   
Analysis 
I. 
MSRS' Threshold Arguments 
MSRS raises several arguments, which, if accepted, would prevent this Court from 
reaching the merits.  Namely, MSRS argues: (1) Fowler and Keller do not have standing; 
(2) Fowler and Keller waived their constitutional claim by failing to raise it with the 
municipal court; (3) the "voluntary payment doctrine" bars Fowler and Keller's unjust 
enrichment claim; and (4) Fowler and Keller's unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of 
law because MSRS' reception of funds was nothing more than "passive acquiescence."  All 
of these arguments fail.   
A. 
Fowler and Keller Have Standing 
 
MSRS argues Fowler and Keller do not have standing because their attorney 
originally paid the court costs (including the surcharge) on their behalf.  "This Court 
reviews the issue of standing de novo."  Mo. Coal. for Env't v. State, 579 S.W.3d 924, 926 
(Mo. banc 2019).  "Standing. . . requires a petitioner to demonstrate a personal stake in the 
5 
 
outcome of the litigation, meaning a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and 
subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief."  Id.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
It was established that Fowler and Keller's attorney originally paid their respective 
court costs to the municipal court.  However, both Fowler and Keller testified they 
reimbursed their attorney for the court costs.5  It is of no consequence that the attorney 
originally paid the court costs.  Fowler and Keller reimbursed their attorney and, therefore, 
have a pecuniary interest.  Their petition seeks a refund or reimbursement of the surcharge.  
Fowler and Keller have standing.   
B. 
Fowler and Keller Did Not Waive Their Constitutional Claim 
 
MSRS argues Fowler and Keller waived their constitutional claim because they 
failed to raise the same with the municipal court.  Fowler and Keller do not dispute they 
failed to present their constitutional challenge to the municipal court, but disagree they 
waived the claim.  Because the parties do not dispute the facts related to the issue of waiver, 
it is a question of law this Court reviews de novo.  Hay v. Bankers' Life Co., 231 S.W. 
1035, 1037 (Mo. App. 1921) ("[W]aiver is generally a question of fact . . . yet where the 
facts and circumstances relating to the subject are admitted or clearly established, waiver 
becomes a question of law."); see also Malam v. State, Dep't of Corr., 492 S.W.3d 926, 
928 (Mo. banc 2016) ("Questions of law are reviewed de novo.").   
                                              
5 Keller paid the attorney back directly while Fowler's mother originally reimbursed the attorney.  
Fowler testified he paid his mother back for the reimbursement.   
6 
 
Generally, to properly raise and preserve a constitutional challenge, a party must:  
(1) raise the constitutional question at the first available opportunity; 
(2) designate specifically the constitutional provision claimed to have 
been violated, such as by explicit reference to the article and section or 
by quotation of the provision itself; (3) state the facts showing the 
violation; and (4) preserve the constitutional question throughout for 
appellate review. 
  
United C.O.D. v. State, 150 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Mo. banc 2004).  However, this Court has 
recognized an exception to the general rule as it pertains to municipal courts, that is, "failure 
to raise constitutional questions in municipal court is not considered a waiver of the same."  
State ex rel. Kansas City v. Meyers, 513 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Mo. banc 1974); City of 
Ferguson v. Nelson, 438 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Mo. 1969).  Because Fowler and Keller were 
not required to present their constitutional challenge to the municipal court, and because 
they have otherwise sufficiently raised and preserved the issue, they did not waive their 
claim that § 57.955 violates article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution. 
C.  
MSRS' Remaining Arguments Not Preserved 
MSRS' remaining point relied on provides: "THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN 
REJECTING 
[MSRS'] 
VOLUNTARY 
PAYMENT 
AND 
PASSIVE 
ACQUIESCENCE DEFENSES."  This point relied on fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d) 
in that it fails to concisely state the legal reasons for MSRS' claims of error and fails to 
explain how those legal reasons, in the context of the case at hand, support MSRS' stated 
claims of error.  Rule 84.04(d)(1)(B)-(C).  Furthermore, the point relied on is multifarious 
in violation of Rule 84.04 because it groups together multiple, independent claims.   
7 
 
Macke v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. banc 2019).  Because Rule 84.04's 
requirements are mandatory, MSRS' noncompliant point relied on fails to preserve either 
argument for this Court's review.  Id.; see also Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Mo. 
banc 2005). 
II. 
Municipal Court Clerks Are Not Necessary Parties 
Turning to the merits of Fowler and Keller's appeal, they first argue the circuit court 
erred in dismissing their petition for failing to include the clerks as necessary and 
indispensable parties.  "This Court applies de novo review to a judgment dismissing a 
petition."  Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 180, 182 (Mo. banc 2014).   
Rule 52.04 governs whether a person is a necessary and indispensable party.  More 
precisely, Rule 52.04(a) governs whether a party is "necessary."  It provides: 
A person shall be joined in the action if: (1) in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may: (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of the claimed interest. If the person has not been joined, the court shall order 
that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but 
refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant. 
 
"If either prong of Rule 52.04(a) has been satisfied, courts have traditionally labeled such 
party 'necessary.'"  State ex rel. Woodco, Inc. v. Phillips, 603 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Mo. banc 
2020).   
8 
 
MSRS argues, in conclusory fashion, that the clerks must be necessary and 
indispensable parties because they are the party responsible for assessing, collecting, and 
remitting the surcharge; therefore, a court could not grant complete relief without them.6  
The only relief sought by Fowler and Keller is restitution or repayment of the $3 surcharge.  
If the plaintiffs prevail on their unjust enrichment claim, they are entitled to restitution from 
MSRS as the party that retained the benefit of their surcharge payment.  Polk Tp., Sullivan 
Cnty. v. Spencer, 259 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. 1953); see also Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 (2011) ("A person who is unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.").  MSRS does not argue it is 
incapable of providing restitution directly to Fowler and Keller if their unjust enrichment 
claim is successful, nor does it explain how the clerks are necessary to ensuring restitution 
is paid.  Because complete relief can be accorded among the named parties, the clerks are 
not necessary parties under Rule 52.04(a)(1).  Nor are the clerks necessary parties under 
Rule 52.04(a)(2). 
As Rule 52.04(a)(2)'s plain language makes clear, the clerks themselves must claim 
an interest in the subject matter of this lawsuit to be a necessary party.  Rule 52.04(a)(2); 
see also Aversman v. Danner, 616 S.W.2d 117, 123 (Mo. App. 1981) (holding natural 
                                              
6 MSRS argued the clerks are necessary and indispensable parties because, as the state officials 
required to enforce § 57.955, the clerks would have an "interest that would be affected by a court's 
declaration."  See Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Att'y Gen. of the State of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 617, 621 
(Mo. banc 1997) (emphasis added).  Of course, this line of thinking applies only to a declaratory 
judgment action.  Because Fowler and Keller seek restitution through an unjust enrichment 
theory—and at no point seek a declaration § 57.955 is unconstitutional—the clerks are not 
necessary and indispensable parties for that reason.  
9 
 
mother and her present husband were not required to be joined as necessary and 
indispensable parties because they claimed no interest in the underlying wrongful death 
lawsuit).  At no point in this litigation have the clerks claimed an interest in this lawsuit, 
and none of the parties suggest they have claimed such an interest at any time.  Because 
the clerks do not satisfy either prong of Rule 52.04(a), they are not necessary parties and 
this Court need not address whether they are indispensable parties.  State ex rel. Twenty-
Second Jud. Cir. v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. banc 1992). 
III. 
Section 57.955 Violates Article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution 
Fowler and Keller argue § 57.955's $3 surcharge violates article I, § 14 of the 
Missouri Constitution.  "This Court reviews the constitutional validity of a statute de novo." 
Donaldson v. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 615 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Mo. 
banc 2020).  "A statute is presumed constitutional and will not be found unconstitutional 
unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitution."  Priorities USA v. State, 591 
S.W.3d 448, 452 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution provides "[t]hat the courts of justice shall 
be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property 
or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."  
This Court has recognized, "Art. I, § 14 embodies the principle found in Chapter 40 of the 
Magna Carta that 'To no one will We sell, to no one will We deny or delay, right or justice.'"  
Harrison v. Monroe Cnty., 716 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo. banc 1986).  For a statute imposing 
10 
 
a court cost to withstand an article I, § 14 challenge to its validity, this Court has held the 
statute must be "reasonably related to the expense of the administration of justice."  Id.   
 
Harrison is directly on point.  In Harrison, the plaintiff alleged Senate Bill 601 
violated article I, § 14.  Id. at 264 & n.1.  SB 601 provided for additional compensation to 
county officials (including county sheriffs) if those officials attended a certain training 
program.  Id. at 264-65.  To fund the additional compensation, SB 601 authorized the 
assessment of a $4 surcharge in criminal and civil proceedings.  Id. at 265.  As in this case, 
the clerk of court collected the $4 surcharge and paid any amount to the county treasurer, 
who then transmitted the funds to the state treasurer for deposit into the "County Officers 
Compensation Fund."  Id.  The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, and the plaintiff 
appealed to this Court.  Id.  
 
In addressing SB 601's constitutional validity, this Court reasoned: 
S.B. 601 civil court costs bear no reasonable relationship to the expenses of 
the administration of justice; S.B. 601 civil court costs are collected to 
enhance the compensation of officials of the executive department of county 
government. We, therefore, hold that the fees imposed in civil cases by S.B. 
601 are unreasonable impediments to access to justice in violation of art. I, 
§ 14. 
 
Id. at 267.  Harrison laid down a bright-line rule that court costs used to enhance 
compensation paid to executive officials are not "reasonably related to the expense of the 
administration of justice" and, therefore, violate article I, § 14.  Like SB 601, § 57.955 
requires the collection of a court cost used to enhance the compensation of executive 
department officials—retired county sheriffs.  Applying Harrison's bright-line rule, 
11 
 
§ 57.955 is not "reasonably related to the expense of the administration of justice" and 
therefore, violates article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution.   
Conclusion 
 
 
Because the circuit court erred in determining that the clerks were necessary parties 
and that § 57.955 did not violate article I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court 
vacates the circuit court's judgment.  This case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
_______________________ 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
 
 
Draper, C.J., Wilson, Russell,  
Powell and Breckenridge, JJ., concur.