Title: Ex Parte Monk
Citation: 557 So. 2d 832
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 1989

557 So. 2d 832 (1989)
Ex parte Samuel H. MONK II, Circuit Judge, Seventh Judicial Circuit.
(In re Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Joseph D. Hubbard, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Seventh Judicial Circuit. (In re State of Alabama v. David Michael Carden. State of Alabama v. Preston Andrew Ansley.))
88-1445.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 17, 1989.
*833 Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Ed Carnes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner. Joseph D. Hubbard, Asst. Dist. Atty., Seventh Judicial Circuit, Anniston, for respondent.
Bryan E. Morgan, Executive Director, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama Dist. Attys. Ass'n.
PER CURIAM.
Samuel H. Monk II, Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Alabama, entered two identical discovery orders in the pending capital cases of State of Alabama v. David Michael Carden and State of Alabama v. Preston Andrew Ansley on April 10, 1989, which resulted in this proceeding. On April 17, 1989, Chief Assistant District Attorney Joseph D. Hubbard, filed a motion to vacate the discovery order in each case. On May 18, 1989, Judge Monk held a joint hearing on the motions to vacate, which he denied by order on May 19, 1989.
Hubbard filed his petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals on June 14, 1989. 553 So. 2d 145. On July 11, 1989, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition for writ of mandamus, with the following order:
Judge Monk filed an application for rehearing, which was denied on July 26, 1989.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in issuing the following discovery order in a capital case:
As previously noted, Judge Monk held a hearing on Hubbard's motion to vacate this order. Hubbard stated during this hearing:
Although Hubbard conceded that in the proper circumstances Judge Monk had the authority to order discovery from the State over and beyond that required in A.R.Crim. P.Temp. 18, he argued that if such an order were entered in a capital case by any circuit judge in the state, that judge's order would entitle any other capital defendant in the state to a similar order. He further objected to the order because it required turning over material in the possession of any investigative agency though not in the possession of the district attorney's office itself. Hubbard did, however, concede that Judge Monk had the authority to order additional discovery from the State over and beyond that required in A.R.Crim.P. Temp. 18 if there was an adequate reason for doing so. He questioned only whether the capital nature of a case constituted an adequate reason for so ordering:
After hearing arguments both from the district attorney and counsel for both defendants, Judge Monk explained his rationale behind the order as follows:
Judge Monk went on to explain that it was his opinion that the court had the power and authority to enter the order that he entered. He assured the district attorney that he intended for safeguards to exist to prevent the State from having to disclose confidential or work product materials. He stated as follows:
On May 19, 1989, Judge Monk entered identical orders in the two capital cases, denying the motion to vacate the additional discovery orders. His order stated in pertinent part:
We note at the outset that both parties agree that a circuit judge has the discretionary authority to order additional discovery from the prosecution in "certain situations." Those situations Hubbard characterized as "the situation where Your Honor felt like the individual case and the certain circumstances involved in that case because of some unusual situation demanded that the State give to the defense teams further discovery."
The order granting the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals also recognized the authority of circuit judges to grant additional discovery. That order requires Judge Monk "to comply with the requirements of A.R.Crim.P. Temp. 18 or base his decision for complete and total discovery on the particular circumstances and specific facts of this case."
Thus, the question before us here is whether capital cases by their very nature are sufficiently different from other cases to justify the exercise of judicial authority to order discovery from the prosecution as broad as that contained in Judge Monk's order of April 10, 1989. We hold that capital cases are sufficiently different by their very nature, and that the discovery order of April 10, 1989, in these two capital cases was within the discretionary authority of the trial court.
The capital case is "sufficiently different" from other cases, because there is no other criminal case in which the crime is murder and the possible punishment is death or life imprisonment without parole. See: § 13A-5-39 et seq. Justice Brennan explained how the Justices of the United States Supreme Court view capital cases, as follows: "When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to give a doubtfully condemned man another chance." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2751, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972). The hovering death penalty is the special circumstance *837 justifying broader discovery in capital cases.
In addition, because of the nature of the penalty in a capital case, the sentencing process becomes of utmost importance. For this reason our Alabama statutes provide in a capital case for a "separate sentence hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole or to death." § 13A-5-45. At this hearing, under existing constitutional and statutory law, a convicted capital defendant has the right to introduce and have considered at the sentence hearing, by way of mitigation, evidence that reflects upon his life, his character, and the circumstances of the crime. § 13A-5-45; § 13A-5-51; § 13A-5-52. See, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982).
In a capital case the definition of "favorable evidence" expands at the sentencing stage to far beyond what it is at any stage of any other type of criminal proceeding. The Alabama statute provides:
Code 1975, § 13A-5-45.
This statutory mandate that a defendant shall be allowed to offer evidence of mitigating circumstances is another reason why broad discovery must be allowed. The prosecutor cannot screen files for potential mitigating evidence to disclose to the defense counsel because, "[w]hat one person may view as mitigating, another may not." Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S. Ct. 3591, 82 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1984).
The Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), established that a prosecutor has a constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant. This duty extends to evidence favorable on the issue of sentencing as well as on the issue of guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
It is clear from the record that the additional discovery order entered by Judge Monk was for the purpose of reducing the likelihood of post-conviction litigation and reversals on Brady grounds and on the basis of advice and a recommendation of the capital litigation division of the Alabama attorney general's office. Many Alabama capital cases have been reversed in state and federal collateral proceedings for Brady problems.[1]
The order issued by Judge Monk is an attempt to prevent these two Alabama capital cases from being set aside on Brady grounds. It includes safeguards for the prosecutor. The order provides:
Therefore, the file is not in danger of being turned over to defense counsel in an indiscriminate manner. The trial judge has provided both a safeguard as to the turning over of the evidence and due process to the defendant, who has a right to discover exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor may have.
For the above stated reasons the Court of Criminal Appeals should have denied the writ of mandamus.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent.
[1]  See: Dobart v. Johnson, No. 84-0495-C (S.D. Ala. June 23, 1986); Ex parte Raines, 429 So. 2d 1111 (Ala.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S. Ct. 1804, 76 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1983); Raines v. Smith, No. 83-P-1080-S, 1983 WL 3310 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 3, 1983); Ex parte Womack, 541 So. 2d 47 (Ala.1988); Ex parte Geeslin, 505 So. 2d 1246 (Ala.1986); Ex parte Kimberly, 463 So. 2d 1109 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Watkins, 509 So. 2d 1064 (Ala.1984); Kircheis v. Long, 425 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.Ala.1976), affirmed, 564 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977). See also: the dissent in Ex parte Bradley, 494 So. 2d 772 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 923, 107 S. Ct. 1385, 94 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1987). See further: cases in which Brady questions were raised, Ex parte Firth, 493 So. 2d 405 (Ala.1986); Ex parte Kennedy, 472 So. 2d 1106 (Ala.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975, 106 S. Ct. 340, 88 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1985); Ex parte Duncan, 456 So. 2d 362 (Ala.1984).