Title: Robinson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 347, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRANDON ROBINSON, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 347, 2012 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr.I.D. No. 1009012821 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  April 17, 2013 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  May 10, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of May, 2013, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Brandon Robinson (“Robinson”), was 
indicted on charges of Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Murder in the 
First Degree, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”).1  Following a seven-day jury trial in 
the Superior Court, Robinson was convicted of Murder in the First Degree 
and one count of PFDCF.  The jury acquitted him of Attempted Murder and 
its related PFDCF charge.  The trial judge sentenced Robinson to life in 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 636, 531, and 1447A. 
2 
 
prison on the charge of Murder in the First Degree and eight years at Level 
V for the PFDCF charge.   
 
2) 
Robinson has raised one argument in this direct appeal.  He 
contends that the prosecutrix impermissibly vouched for its complainant 
witness.  We have concluded that argument is without merit.  Accordingly, 
Robinson’s convictions are affirmed. 
 
3) 
On September 14, 2010, at around 2 p.m., Jarren Glandton 
(“Glandton”) and Cameron Johnson (“Johnson”), were sitting with a group 
of people outside a mutual friend’s house when Robinson approached the 
group with two other young men.  Robinson and Glandton had been 
previously introduced in 2006 by “Amir,” a mutual friend.  They had seen 
each other numerous times around the neighborhood, but Glandton only 
knew Robinson as “Brandon” or “B.”  The other young men were familiar to 
Glandton.  After later viewing pictures on Facebook, Glandton was able to 
identify one of Robinson’s associates as “RC.”  The third young man 
remained unidentified.   
 
4) 
Robinson and Johnson stepped away from the group to discuss 
Robinson purchasing pills from Johnson.  The conversation lasted less than 
five minutes.  Then, Robinson, RC, and the third man left.  Later that same 
evening, around 9 p.m., Glandton and Johnson left their friend’s house and 
3 
 
walked to a convenience store on Second and VanBuren Streets to get 
something to eat.  The two friends then walked to the corner of Elm and 
VanBuren Streets, where Johnson met up with the third, unidentified young 
man whom they had seen earlier in the evening with Robinson and RC. 
5) 
While Glandton was on the phone with his cousin, he overheard 
Johnson talking to the young man about purchasing one pill, and he saw the 
young man hand Johnson a $5 bill.  As Johnson took the young man’s 
money, Robinson and RC approached.  Robinson stopped directly before 
Johnson, pulled a black and silver semi-automatic gun from his waistband, 
and shot Johnson from an arm’s length distance.  Glandton was also shot.  
As Glandton fell into the street, he watched Robinson, RC, and the other 
young man flee down Elm Street.  Glandton called 911. 
6) 
As emergency medical personnel arrived, a crowd gathered 
around Glandton and Johnson.  Glandton recognized Amir in the crowd, and 
shouted to him, “B did this, your peoples did this.”  Both Glandton and 
Johnson received emergency medical treatment at the scene and were 
transported to Christiana Hospital.  Glandton, who had been shot in the leg, 
required surgery and was unable to walk for seven months.  Johnson was 
pronounced dead in the emergency room. 
4 
 
7) 
At trial, Robinson did not raise the issue of improper vouching.  
Therefore, that issue must be reviewed on appeal for plain error.   
 
8) 
The plain error standard for prosecutorial misconduct was 
explained in Baker v. State.2  This Court will first review the record de novo 
to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct has in fact occurred.3  If the 
Court finds no error, the analysis ends.4  If the Court finds the prosecutor 
erred, the Court applies the Wainwright standard, under which, “plain error 
is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; 
which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which 
clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show 
manifest injustice.”5 
 
9) 
Glandton originally stated in a taped statement to the police that 
Robinson’s eyes were light brown or hazel.  At trial, Glandton conceded that 
Robinson’s eyes were dark brown and admitted his earlier statement was in 
error.  Defense counsel attempted to draw inferences from the inconsistency 
by questioning Glandton not only about when he realized his error, but 
where and with whom he was at that same time.  The cross-examination by 
defense counsel proceeded as follows: 
                                          
 
2 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139 (Del. 2006).   
3 Id. at 150. 
4 Id. 
5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citations omitted).   
5 
 
Defense Counsel (“DC”): You are sure that description is 
accurate? 
 
Jarren Glandton (“JG”): Not 100 percent, no. 
 
DC: How do you know if wasn’t 100 percent? 
 
JG: 
Because I listened to my statement, and as I thought 
about it and remember, seeing the picture in the paper 
and on the Delaware website, I know that one of the 
features I said about eye color was not correct. 
 
DC: Let me go through that with you.  When did you come to 
this realization, last week? 
 
JG: 
Yes. 
 
DC: Preparing for trial? 
 
JG: 
Right. 
 
DC: While meeting with the prosecutors? 
 
JG: 
Yes. 
 
 
10) 
The prosecutrix immediately requested a sidebar conference 
and objected to defense counsel’s line of questioning.  Defense counsel 
responded that his only purpose was to suggest the timing of Glandton’s 
realization – one week before trial – was “convenient.”  Notwithstanding 
that “timing” representation at sidebar, defense counsel again asked about 
not only when Glandton realized he was mistaken about Robinson’s eye 
color, but again where he was when he had that realization: 
6 
 
DC: Thank you.  So then was it at 7 o’clock this morning that 
you realized for the first time that you had been 
mistaken? 
 
JG: 
No, I just said that I realized last week when I listened to 
my statement that was wrong. 
 
DC: That was when you were in the Attorney General’s 
office? 
 
JG: 
Correct. 
 
 
11) 
On direct examination, the prosecutrix asked Glandton whether 
“[a]t any point during any of [the] meeting [with prosecutors]” he was told 
“what [he] should say when [he] w[as] here [testifying]?”  In response, 
Glandton testified that yes he did receive an instruction:  “Tell the truth.”   
 
12) 
Robinson contends this question and answer constituted 
improper vouching.  The State submits this question was asked in order to 
rebut any potential and improper inference that the prosecutors had in some 
way influenced Glandton to change his testimony.   
 
13) 
“Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies some 
personal superior knowledge . . . that the witness has testified truthfully.”6  
Prosecutors are prohibited from vouching for the credibility of a witness by 
stating or implying personal knowledge of the truth of the testimony, beyond 
                                          
 
6 White v. State, 816 A.2d 766, 779 (Del. 2003) (citation omitted).  See also Clayton v. 
State, 765 A.2d 940, 942 (Del. 2001) (“As a general rule, prosecutors may not express 
their personal opinions or beliefs about the credibility of witnesses or about the truth of 
testimony.”). 
7 
 
that which can be logically deduced from the witness’ trial testimony.7  The 
State argues that there was no vouching in Robinson’s case because, in 
questioning Glandton, the prosecutrix did not express a personal opinion 
regarding Glandton’s truthfulness.8  The State also notes that the prosecutrix 
did not “stat[e] or imply[] personal knowledge of the truth of [Glandton’s] 
testimony ‘beyond that logically inferred from the evidence presented at 
trial.’”9   
14) 
The record reflects the prosecutrix expressed no opinion on 
Glandton’s truthfulness.  She neither implied nor offered testimony that 
would imply she had some personal knowledge of Glandton’s truthfulness.10  
Glandton’s answer to the prosecutrix’s question recounted the instruction 
given to him to “tell the truth.”  It was a statement by Glandton himself.   
 
15) 
The question posed to Glandton was in direct rebuttal to the 
defense counsel’s inference that the State somehow induced Glandton’s 
realization that he incorrectly stated Robinson’s eye color during a police 
                                          
 
7 Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 530 (Del. 2001); Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 960 
(Del. 1988). 
8 C.f. Richardson v. State, 43 A.3d 906, 910-11 (Del. 2012) (finding plain error where a 
forensic interviewer expressed her personal opinion of the truthfulness of the victim). 
9 Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d at 530 (quoting Saunders v. State, 602 A.2d 623, 624 (Del. 
1984)). 
10 Compare Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 594-96 (Del. 2001) (experienced defense 
counsel called as a State’s witness improperly – albeit “subtl[y] and indirect[ly]” – 
vouched for the truthfulness of State’s witness because it was “implicit in [attorney’s] 
testimony that [attorney] believed his own admonitions to have been effective.”). 
8 
 
interview in order to shore up its case at trial. The question was not an 
attempt to “rehabilitate the witness” through personal prosecutorial opinion.  
Under the facts of this case, the question was a permissible method of 
rebutting any suggestion of impropriety.11  We hold that the record reflects 
no vouching.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgments 
of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
11 See Churchill v. State, 812 A.2d 224, 2002 WL 31780197, at *2 (Del. Nov. 20, 2002) 
(table) (use of rhetorical question to rebut claim of bias or prejudice not improper).