Title: Barter Foundation v. Widener
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 022409
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
THE BARTER FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022409 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
January 16, 2004 
GORDON L. WIDENER, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
Charles B. Flannagan, II, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider the rights of owners of land 
with respect to an adjoining undeveloped parcel that was 
dedicated for use as a public street in 1944, but which has 
never been formally accepted by the governing public authority. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 22, 1940, Investors Service Corporation conveyed 
to Benson S. Alleman a 50-acre tract in the Town of Abingdon 
(the Town) that formerly had been a portion of the land owned 
by, and containing the buildings of, Stonewall Jackson College.1  
Alleman subdivided two sections of that property by separate 
plats in May and June of 1943 respectively.  These platted 
subdivisions were designated as “White Addition No. 1” and 
“White Addition No. 2.”  The certificates filed with the plats 
when both were recorded in the land records of Washington County 
                     
1 Although the property was deeded to Alleman, both Alleman 
and his wife executed the subsequent subdivision certifications 
and conveyances related to this property.  We will refer to both 
parties as “Alleman” hereafter. 
provide that they “shall operate to create a public easement or 
right of passage over said portion of the premises platted, as 
is on this plat set apart for streets, or other public use.”2
On May 25, 1944, Alleman recorded a plat and certificate 
showing the subdivision of the remaining section of the 
property, designating this subdivision as the “College Building 
Tract.”  The plat depicted seventy lots numbered consistent with 
the scheme used to identify the lots depicted on the White 
Addition No. 1 and No. 2 subdivision plats.  The plat also 
depicted a large unnumbered lot containing four former college 
buildings.  As did the certificates for the first two platted 
subdivisions, the certificate accompanying the College Building 
Tract subdivision plat stated that it “shall operate to create a 
public easement or right of passage over said portion of the 
premises platted, as is on this plat set apart for streets, or 
other public use.” 
The College Building Tract subdivision plat depicts Court 
Street, an existing public street on the western edge of the 
property, and a portion of “White Avenue,” a proposed street 
that appears on the White Addition No. 1 subdivision plat and 
                                                                  
 
2 The two plats depict existing public streets that were not 
part of the property Alleman acquired in 1940 as well as 
proposed streets that were the subject of the “public easement 
 
2
which is today known as “White Street.”  In addition, the plat 
depicts three other streets, two of them being forty feet wide 
and the other twenty-five feet wide.  One of the forty foot wide 
streets connects with White Avenue and runs north between lot 
120 and lots 20 to 24, and then east between the lot containing 
the college buildings and lots 120 to 137.  This street, 
currently known as “Barter Drive,” has been accepted by the Town 
and has been widened to forty-five feet as the result of a 
subsequent dedication.  Barter Drive has been partially paved 
and opened to public use.  The end of Barter Drive is maintained 
by The Barter Foundation, Inc. and is used as a parking area. 
The other forty foot wide street depicted on the College 
Building Tract subdivision plat runs south from the eastern end 
of Barter Drive between lot 137 and lot 99 to an intersection 
with White Avenue.  As with Barter Drive, a subsequent 
dedication of an additional five feet to the right-of-way 
increased the width of the street to forty-five feet.  However, 
this street has not been paved or otherwise opened to public use 
and remains in a more or less natural state, being covered with 
grass and trees. 
The twenty-five foot wide street depicted on the College 
Building Tract subdivision plat, which is the property at issue 
                                                                  
or right of passage” granted in the certificates accompanying 
 
3
in this appeal, runs north from the intersection of the two 
forty foot wide streets along the eastern boundary of the lot 
containing the four college buildings, terminating at the 
southern boundary of lot 139 as shown on the White Addition No. 
2 subdivision plat.  This proposed street has never been 
accepted formally by the Town.  With the exception of the 
creation of a “Shakespearean Garden” maintained by a garden club 
at one point along its route, the street has remained 
undeveloped and in a more or less natural state to the present 
day. 
On May 25, 1944, the same day that the College Building 
Tract subdivision plat was recorded, Alleman conveyed to S. H. 
Rivers the lot containing the four college buildings.  The metes 
and bounds description of the lot in the deed and the depiction 
of the lot on an incorporated plat establish that the conveyance 
did not include the area designated as the twenty-five foot wide 
street.3
On October 17, 1945, Rivers conveyed a portion of his 
property to E. A. Hines.  As described in the deed and depicted 
                                                                  
the plats. 
3 See the attached copy of an excerpt from a 1944 plat that 
was incorporated in the Alleman/Rivers deed.  We have altered 
this plat to highlight the disputed street and to generally 
identify the various locations of the properties of the parties 
with respect to that street and other streets referenced in 
 
4
on an incorporated plat, the southeast corner of the property 
acquired by Hines was located at the intersection of Barter 
Drive and the twenty-five foot wide street.  The deed also 
references the plat incorporated in the Alleman/Rivers deed, 
stating that “[i]t is understood between the parties hereto that 
the streets as shown on said plat . . . have been dedicated for 
the purpose of and are public streets for the use of the owners 
of said lots described on said plat . . . and the public 
generally.”  Subsequent conveyances of this property make 
reference to the twenty-five foot wide street and contain 
language similar to that in the Rivers/Hines deed indicating 
that it has been dedicated as a public street. 
Through this chain of title, The Barter Foundation, Inc. 
ultimately became the owner of the property containing the four 
college buildings formerly owned by Alleman and lying west of 
the twenty-five foot street.  Mary Dudley Porterfield and Gordon 
L. Widener are the owners of the properties lying east of the 
twenty-five foot wide street.4  It is undisputed that the 
                                                                  
various deeds and plats.  It is intended only as a general 
schematic depiction. 
4 Widener’s son, Christopher D. Widener, daughter, Karen W. 
Koontz, and son-in-law, Thomas F. Koontz, also have an interest 
in his property and were named as parties to the suit from which 
this appeal arises and are parties to this appeal.  However, 
“Widener was treated by the parties for the purposes of this 
litigation as the equitable owner of [their] property.”  
 
5
properties lying east of the twenty-five foot wide street were 
not part of the property acquired by Alleman in 1940, and none 
of these properties are landlocked such that they would require 
use of the twenty-five foot wide street for ingress and egress. 
A plat prepared for Widener of his property in January 1996 
shows the street in question as “(25’ STREET UNDEVELOPED)” along 
his property’s western edge.  This plat also indicates that the 
two forty foot wide streets have been widened to forty-five feet 
as the result of a “5’ DEDICATION OF STREET TO TOWN OF 
ABINGDON.” 
On June 7, 1999, Widener received a letter from Graham M. 
Newman, Abingdon Town Manager, confirming an earlier 
conversation between Widener and Newman concerning Widener’s 
desire “to make the [twenty-five foot wide street] right-of-way 
useable to access [his] property.”  Newman indicated that the 
Town had no objection to Widener’s request to “mow the right-of-
way, remove some trees and stumps (clearing and grubbing) and 
[undertake] minor leveling of the grade . . . as long as it is 
done reasonably, without creating a nuisance.”  Newman further 
stated, however, that “the right of way in question has not been 
                                                                  
Accordingly, for convenience, we will refer to these parties 
collectively as “Widener.” 
 
 
6
opened by the Town to public use and has not been accepted by 
the Town for maintenance purposes.” 
On November 10, 1999, The Barter Foundation, Inc. and Mary 
Dudley Porterfield (collectively, Barter) filed an amended bill 
of complaint against Widener and the Town seeking a 
determination that the dedication of the proposed twenty-five 
foot wide street has been abrogated through lack of use by the 
public, and that as a result “Barter is the owner of the real 
property free and clear of the proposed easement.”  Barter 
further sought a permanent injunction prohibiting Widener from 
“entering or damaging” the property.5
Widener filed an answer to the bill of complaint asserting 
essentially that Barter could not claim ownership of the 
disputed property because it was estopped to do so by language 
in the deeds in its chain of title acknowledging the dedication 
of the property as a public right-of-way.  Widener further 
asserted that the Town owned the disputed property because it 
                     
5 Alternately, Barter asserted that Widener could not 
undertake the proposed clearing of the twenty-five foot wide 
street because such action was contrary to certain provisions of 
the Code of the Town of Abingdon regarding the opening of 
previously unopened rights-of-way.  This assertion does not 
impinge upon our resolution of this appeal and, accordingly, we 
express no opinion thereon. 
 
 
7
had accepted the dedication of all the proposed streets depicted 
on the College Building Tract subdivision plat.6
On August 29, 2001, following an extended period of 
discovery, the chancellor conducted an ore tenus hearing at 
which evidence in accord with the above-recited facts was 
received from a land surveyor, Town officials, the parties, and 
other witnesses.  In addition, the chancellor heard evidence 
concerning use of the twenty-five foot wide street by the public 
over the last sixty years.  Specifically, Widener testified that 
his father-in-law “used to use it to go to work” in the 1960s.  
Widener’s wife testified that in her youth she and other 
children would walk to school over the street and that 
automobiles sometimes would drive over it. 
In a final decree dated July 16, 2002, the chancellor found 
that the Alleman plats “were a dedication to the public of all 
the streets shown thereon.”  Based upon the evidence and a view 
taken of the property, the chancellor further found that 
“although . . . Barter Drive and the street extending from 
Barter Drive to White Street have been accepted by the Town of 
Abingdon, the Town has not accepted the dedication of the 
                     
6 The Town did not file an answer, although counsel for the 
Town participated in the subsequent proceedings.  Counsel stated 
that “[t]he Town does not favor one party over the other in this 
action.”  The Town is also a party to this appeal, but did not 
file a brief. 
 
8
subject 25 foot [wide] street.”  However, in part based on the 
wording of the certificate filed with the College Building Tract 
subdivision plat, the chancellor also found that “a public right 
of way or easement . . . exists separately and independently 
from whether the Town has accepted the dedication” and, thus, 
“the Wideners and . . . other members of the public have and own 
a right of way or easement to travel across and use the said 25 
foot [wide] street as a public way.”  Accordingly, the 
chancellor decreed that Barter did not “own the fee simple title 
to the 25 foot [wide] street . . . set out in the Alleman plat,” 
decreed that Barter’s requested injunctive relief was “without 
merit,” and dismissed Barter’s bill of complaint “with 
prejudice.” 
We awarded Barter this appeal and also accepted an 
assignment of cross-error raised by Widener. 
DISCUSSION 
For its part, Barter contends that the chancellor erred in 
finding that there can be a right-of-way or easement over the 
twenty-five foot wide street in favor of the public in the 
absence of an acceptance of the dedication of that right-of-way 
by the Town.  Barter further contends that the chancellor erred 
in failing to find that the dedication of the street in question 
has been abandoned and, as a result, that Barter has become the 
fee simple owner of the property.  Widener, by assignment of 
 
9
cross-error, contends that the chancellor erred in not finding 
that the Town had accepted dedication of the twenty-five foot 
wide street by implication.  We will consider the assignment of 
cross-error first, because a determination that there has been 
an acceptance of the dedication by implication would moot the 
remaining issues of the appeal. 
The parties do not challenge the chancellor’s finding that 
Alleman’s 1944 recorded plat and certificate for the subdivision 
of the College Building Tract constituted a dedication to the 
public of all the streets depicted thereon.  The record is 
unclear, however, whether the chancellor considered that 
dedication to be in compliance with the statutory scheme 
applicable to such dedications in 1944 or whether the chancellor 
considered the dedication to be governed by common law.  For 
purposes of our resolution of the issue raised by Widener upon 
cross-error, the distinction is not critical.  Fundamental and 
long established principles regarding land conveyances under the 
then applicable statutory scheme or the common law make this 
clear. 
Because a definite and certain grantee was required in 
order to take land by conveyance or grant at common law, a 
landowner could not effectively convey or grant an interest in 
his land to the general public as grantee.  However, in order to 
facilitate the creation of public streets and other public areas 
 
10
for the benefit of the general public, the doctrine of 
dedication evolved and recognized the rights acquired by the 
public by estopping the dedicator from disputing those rights.  
Payne v. Godwin, 147 Va. 1019, 1024-25, 133 S.E. 481, 482-83 
(1926).  We have explained in numerous cases that: 
“Dedication, at common law, was a grant to the public, 
by a landowner, of a limited right of use[] in his 
land.  No writing or other special form of conveyance 
was required; unequivocal evidence of an intention to 
dedicate was sufficient.  Until the public accepted 
the dedication, it was a mere offer to dedicate.” 
 
Brown v. Moore, 255 Va. 523, 529, 500 S.E.2d 797, 800 (1998) 
(quoting McNew v. McCoy, 251 Va. 297, 299, 467 S.E.2d 477, 478 
(1996)).  We have further explained that: 
Prior to acceptance, the offer to dedicate imposed no 
responsibilities upon the public and was subject to 
unilateral withdrawal at any time by the landowner.  
Acceptance could be formal and express, as by the 
enactment of a resolution by the appropriate governing 
body, or by implication arising from an exercise of 
dominion by the governing authority or from long 
continued public use[] of requisite character. 
 
Brown v. Tazewell County Water & Sewerage Auth., 226 Va. 125, 
129-30, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983). 
 
In Brown, we recounted the legislative history of a series 
of laws enacted since 1887 relating to dedications of streets 
and other public areas within platted, recorded subdivisions.  
We noted that under the statutory scheme applicable in 1944 the 
acknowledgement and recording of a properly approved subdivision 
plat operated “to create a public easement or right of passage 
 
11
over streets shown on the plat.”  Id. at 130, 306 S.E.2d at 891; 
see also Code (1942) § 5219 (providing that the acknowledgement 
and recording of a plat complying with Code (1942) § 5217 is 
equivalent to a deed in fee simple).  However, we stressed that 
“although such ‘dedication by map’ was irrevocable by the 
dedicator, the rights of the public were merely inchoate, and 
that the dedication was not complete until accepted by competent 
public authority.”7  Id. at 130, 306 S.E.2d at 891. 
In view of these principles, the critical question to our 
resolution of the issue raised by Widener’s cross error is 
whether the evidence established that the Town has manifested an 
intent to accept the dedication of the property at issue as a 
public street.  Whether there has been a sufficient 
manifestation of such intent is a mixed question of law and 
fact.  When reviewing the judgment of a chancellor upon such an 
issue, we review the application of the law de novo, while 
giving deference to the chancellor’s factual findings.  See  
Caplan v. Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 225, 563 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2002). 
The record supports the chancellor’s finding that the Town 
has not formally accepted Alleman’s dedication of the twenty-
five foot wide street depicted in the College Building Tract 
                     
7 The current statutory scheme for the recordation of plats 
dedicating land for public streets is contained in Code § 15.2-
2265. 
 
12
subdivision plat and referenced in the certification.  Widener, 
relying on Ocean Island Inn v. City of Virginia Beach, 216 Va. 
474, 479, 220 S.E.2d 247, 252 (1975), contends that the Town 
should be deemed to have accepted the dedication of that street 
because the chancellor found that the Town had accepted the two 
forty foot wide streets, thus manifesting an intent to accept 
all the streets depicted on the plat. 
The doctrine of implied acceptance of a dedication of 
property for public use provides that: 
where a governing body has accepted part of the 
streets appearing on a recorded plat and no “intention 
to limit the acceptance” is shown, such partial 
acceptance constitutes acceptance of all of the 
streets, provided the part accepted is sufficiently 
substantial to evince an intent to accept the 
comprehensive scheme of public use[] reflected in the 
plat. 
 
Id. (quoting Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 
435, 101 S.E. 326, 330 (1919) and Village of Lee v. Harris, 69 
N.E. 230, 232 (Ill. 1903)). 
However, in Ocean Island Inn, and in other cases where we 
have considered whether there was an acceptance by implication 
of an offer of dedication, the evidence was not merely that the 
governing authority had accepted some of the property offered 
for dedication, but rather that there had been “an ‘exercise of 
jurisdiction and dominion’ by the governing authority” over the 
property dedicated to the public, such as the paving of streets 
 
13
or installation and maintenance of public utilities.  Id. at 
477, 220 S.E.2d at 250 (quoting Staunton v. The Augusta 
Corporation, 169 Va. 424, 436, 193 S.E. 695, 699 (1937)); see 
also, Greenco Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach, 214 Va. 201, 208-
09, 198 S.E.2d 496, 501-02 (1973); City of Richmond v. Gallego 
Mills Co., 102 Va. 165, 171, 45 S.E. 877, 879 (1903).  We are of 
opinion that the evidence in the present case does not rise to 
the level necessary to find an acceptance by the Town of the 
dedication of the twenty-five foot wide street by implication. 
The evidence showed that of the three streets dedicated to 
public use on the 1944 plat of the College Building Tract, only 
Barter Drive has actually been opened to public use, and the 
Town maintains only a portion of that street.  Barter has not 
challenged the chancellor’s finding that the dedication of the 
other forty foot wide street has been accepted by the Town, and, 
for purposes of this appeal, we accept that finding.  However, 
the evidence further showed that this street has never been 
paved or otherwise opened to public use, and this property 
remains in a more or less natural state.  By contrast, there was 
express testimony from Town officials that the Town had not 
accepted dedication of the twenty-five foot wide street.  Under 
these facts, placing the burden of maintenance and liability of 
ownership on the Town by finding an acceptance of the dedication 
of the twenty-five foot wide street by implication is not 
 
14
warranted.  Accordingly, we hold that the chancellor correctly 
ruled that the Town has not accepted the dedication in the 1944 
College Building Tract subdivision plat of this street. 
We then must consider Barter’s assignments of error.  
Initially, Barter asserts that the chancellor erred in finding 
that the dedication of the twenty-five foot wide street depicted 
on the 1944 College Building Tract subdivision plat created a 
right-of-way to travel across and use that property as a public 
way in favor of the general public even in the absence of the 
acceptance of that dedication by the Town.  We disagree. 
Barter’s assertion fails to distinguish between a right of 
passage over a platted street which inures to the benefit of the 
general public and a platted street which becomes a public 
street or highway upon acceptance by the governing body of the 
jurisdiction in which the platted street is located.  This 
distinction is significant.  As we have explained above, whether 
at common law or by the then applicable statutory scheme, a 
street dedicated by plat to public use did not impose the duty 
of maintenance or potential liability upon the governing body 
until that dedication was accepted by the governing body.  
Nevertheless, the general public could accept the dedication by 
use of the right of passage granted by the dedicator.  It was in 
this context, that we stated in Payne that dedication by plat of 
a street “is an inchoate right vested in the public, and the 
 
15
street . . . does not become a highway until established or 
accepted by competent authority.”  Payne, 147 Va. at 1026, 133 
S.E. at 483. 
There can be no question, and the parties do not dispute, 
that Alleman intended to dedicate the property in question as 
well as the other areas depicted as streets on the 1944 College 
Building Tract subdivision plat to be used for public streets.  
In addition, the fact that Alleman did not convey the property 
comprising the streets when he sold the adjoining property shows 
that he intended, and undoubtedly presumed, the Town would 
accept the dedication of that property and use it as streets 
open to public use.  Because the Town did not do so with regard 
to the twenty-five foot wide street, that property never became 
a public highway for which the Town assumed the duty to 
maintain.  Nevertheless, the general public had the right to use 
the property for passage in accord with the expressed intent of 
Alleman’s certificate and plat.  The record reflects such use by 
the public, although it was infrequent. 
We next consider Barter’s contention that the chancellor 
erred in failing to find that the dedication of the street in 
question has been abandoned.  The essence of Barter’s position 
is that, because the Town has not accepted the 1944 dedication 
of this street and the general public has not used the right-of-
way for an extended period of time, the dedication should be 
 
16
deemed abandoned through nonuse even without a court proceeding 
to confirm that abandonment has occurred.8
The abandonment of an offer to dedicate property to public 
use may be proven in the same manner as the abandonment of an 
easement.  See Magee v. Omansky, 187 Va. 422, 430-31, 46 S.E.2d 
443, 448 (1948).  “The party claiming abandonment of an easement 
. . . has the burden to establish such abandonment by clear and 
unequivocal evidence.  Nonuse of an easement coupled with acts 
which evidence an intent to abandon . . . constitutes 
abandonment . . . .  However, mere nonuse will not suffice to 
establish an abandonment.”  Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 296, 302, 
541 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2001) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
                     
8 Relying on our holding that when such an abandonment is 
found and “the dedicator does not reserve or dispose of the fee 
in the street, it vests in the purchasers of the abutting lots,” 
Payne, 147 Va. at 1025, 133 S.E. at 483, Barter further contends 
that, because it is the only adjoining landowner in privity of 
title with Alleman, the chancellor should have found that Barter 
is vested with fee simple title to the property of the proposed 
twenty-five foot wide street.  Because of the view we take that 
Barter failed to carry its burden to establish that the 
dedication has been abandoned, we need not address the 
applicability, if any, of this proposition articulated in Payne 
to the determination of the fee title of this property had 
abandonment of the dedication been established.  Moreover, 
because we are unable to determine from the record whether the 
1944 plat complied with the then applicable statutory scheme for 
dedication of streets, we are unable to determine the fee title 
of the disputed property in this proceeding, and it is 
unnecessary that we do so. 
 
17
While the Town has not accepted the dedication of the 
twenty-five foot wide street, either by formal resolution or by 
implication, it does not necessarily follow that the Town has 
abandoned the offer of dedication of that property.  To the 
contrary, the evidence showed that the Town was aware of the 
offer of dedication and, although it had “not been accepted by 
the Town for maintenance purposes,” nonetheless considered the 
property to be an “unopened right[]of way . . . useable to 
access” the adjoining property.  Indeed, it exercised a degree 
of dominion and control over the property by requiring its 
permission for Widener to clear the right-of-way for his use.  
In other words, the Town recognized both the public’s present 
right of passage over the twenty-five foot wide street under the 
language of the certification filed with the 1944 College 
Building Tract subdivision plat and the Town’s inchoate right to 
open the right-of-way at some future date by assuming a duty to 
maintain the property as a public street.  We hold that this 
evidence is sufficient to establish that the Town has not 
abandoned the offer of dedication. 
Additionally, we do not find that the evidence in this case 
would support a finding that the public’s right of passage has 
been abandoned.  Although the evidence in this record of actual 
use by the general public of the disputed street over many years 
is slight, “mere nonuse will not suffice to establish an 
 
18
abandonment.”  Id.  The chancellor viewed the property and we 
can assume that no substantial changes or uses of the property 
inconsistent with a right of passage were revealed by the view. 
The record also shows that every deed relating to the 
adjoining property expressly mentions the existence of the 
right-of-way for public use, thereby confirming the original 
grant of that right by the 1944 College Building Tract 
subdivision plat and certification.  Similarly, every plat in 
the record depicting the environs shows the property as a public 
right-of-way.  Thus, the evidence does not support a finding of 
“acts which evidence an intent to abandon,” Hudson, 261 Va. at 
302, 541 S.E.2d at 560, but to the contrary show a continuing 
recognition of the existence of the public’s right-of-way.  We 
hold that under these circumstances, Barter, which had the 
burden to do so, failed to show by clear and unequivocal 
evidence an abandonment of the public’s right to use the 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor’s decree 
reflecting the findings that although the Town has not accepted 
dedication of the twenty-five foot wide street, neither has that 
dedication been abandoned and, thus, Barter has not acquired fee 
simple ownership of the property, and the Wideners and the 
 
19
general public have a right-of-way or easement to use that 
property as a public way. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
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