Title: State Of Florida v. Kathy Jo Cable
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-1684
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1684 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KATHY JO CABLE,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 9, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Cable v. State, 18 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), 
regarding a violation of Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute.  In its decision the 
district court ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of 
great public importance: 
IN VIEW OF THE ABROGATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE 
VIOLATIONS, SHOULD THE JUDICIAL REMEDY OF 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE BE APPLIED FOR VIOLATIONS 
OF FLORIDA‟S STATUTORY KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE 
PROVISIONS. 
 
Id. at 39-40.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
 
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This certified question asks whether the recent United States Supreme Court 
decision in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), requires the Court to recede 
from its 1964 opinion in Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964), in which 
this Court held that a violation of Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute vitiated the 
ensuing arrest and required the suppression of the evidence obtained in connection 
with the arrest.  We conclude that because the remedy of exclusion in Benefield 
was based on a violation of Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute, and not the 
Fourth Amendment, Hudson does not mandate that we recede from Benefield.  
Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Second District. 
FACTS 
On May 15, 2007, at 6:37 a.m., Polk County Sheriff‟s Office Deputy 
Richard Lawrence was checking vehicle license tags in the parking lot of the Lake 
Wales Inn.  Deputy Lawrence was in uniform and was in a marked Sheriff‟s Office 
vehicle.  Deputy Lawrence recognized a vehicle that he had seen at a drug house 
the day prior and ran the license tag number.  He found that it was registered to 
respondent Kathy Jo Cable.  Upon running a check on Cable, Deputy Lawrence 
discovered that Cable had an outstanding Polk County arrest warrant for failure to 
appear on a charge of possession of methamphetamine.  Deputy Lawrence 
contacted the motel manager and learned that Cable and her husband were staying 
at the motel.   
 
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After returning to his vehicle, Deputy Lawrence observed R.E., later 
identified as Cable‟s sixteen-year-old son, exit the motel room.  Deputy Lawrence 
initiated contact with R.E. and directed R.E. to go back to the motel room and “get 
his mother up” because Deputy Lawrence needed to speak with her.  Deputy 
Lawrence did not inform R.E. about the outstanding warrant because he believed 
this information might prompt Cable to attempt a “back door” escape.  After 
Deputy Lawrence waited approximately fifteen minutes, neither Cable nor R.E. 
came outside, so Deputy Lawrence knocked on the door of Cable‟s motel room.  
Since there was no answer, Deputy Lawrence knocked again and announced 
“Sheriff‟s Office” and “come to the door.”  Deputy Lawrence did not announce his 
purpose for being there—that he had a warrant for Cable‟s arrest.  
Deputy Lawrence received no answer after announcing his authority and 
requesting that the occupants come to the door.  After waiting a few minutes with 
still no response, Deputy Lawrence opened the unlocked door and entered the 
motel room.  Inside, he found Cable, who was unresponsive on the bed, her 
husband, R.E., and two other boys.  Deputy Lawrence woke Cable, notified her 
that he had a warrant for her arrest, and placed her in custody.  A search of Cable‟s 
person incident to the arrest revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. 
 
Cable was charged by information with trafficking in methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  She filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
 
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against her on the ground that the warrant for her arrest was illegally executed in 
violation of section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2005)—Florida‟s statute requiring 
police to announce their authority and purpose before entering a building to arrest 
an individual.  Specifically, she argued that Deputy Lawrence knocked and 
announced his presence and authority, but failed to announce his purpose before 
entering the motel room in which she was staying—a fact conceded by the State in 
this case.  The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing.  The trial 
court concluded in pertinent part: 
 
Defendant contends that the Deputy Sheriff failed to announce 
his purpose for being there when knocking on the door, and therefore, 
the entry and arrest were unlawful.  The Court disagrees.   
 
Pursuant to V.P.S. v. State, 816 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2002), arrest warrants carry with them the limited authority to enter a 
dwelling when there is reason to believe that the person is within.  
Florida also recognizes a “substantial compliance” standard for arrest 
statutes.  Conti v. State, 540 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).  In 
accordance with these standards, and in light of all of the attendant 
facts and circumstances, the Court holds that there was, at a minimum, 
substantial compliance on the part of the officer and lawful authority 
to enter the room to arrest the Defendant.   
 
Furthermore, in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), a 
case in which it was undisputed that the knock and announce statute 
was violated, the United States Supreme Court held that, “exclusion 
[of the evidence] may not be premised on the mere fact that a 
constitutional violation was a „but-for‟ cause of obtaining evidence.”   
Id. at 2164.   
 
Subsequently, Cable entered into a negotiated nolo contendere plea to the 
trafficking charge in exchange for a mandatory minimum sentence of three years in 
prison, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.  The State 
 
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nolle prossed the paraphernalia charge.  Cable was then sentenced pursuant to the 
plea agreement, and she appealed to the Second District.   
 
The Second District reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying 
Cable‟s motion to suppress.  Cable, 18 So. 3d at 38-39.  The district court reasoned 
that “by failing to announce his purpose before entering the motel room, the officer 
acted in violation of section 901.19(1).”  Id. at 38.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Second District relied on Benefield but noted that the facts in Benefield regarding 
statutory violations by police were extreme.  The district court then explained that 
it had considered less extreme circumstances in Urquhart v. State, 211 So. 2d 79 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1968): 
Relying on Benefield, we held that an officer failed to comply with 
the provisions of the statute when he “did not announce his purpose 
and he did not wait until he was refused admittance before pushing 
open the door.”  Urquhart, 211 So. 2d at 83.  We also held that the 
officer‟s failure to announce his purpose made “the subsequent arrest 
and incidental search invalid and any evidence seized as a result 
thereof . . . inadmissible.”  Id.   
 
Cable, 18 So. 3d at 38-39.  The Second District found the facts in Cable to be 
indistinguishable from those in Urquhart.  Id. at 39.  The Second District also 
recognized that the “issue in the instant case, however, is not—as it was in 
Hudson—whether the evidence is subject to suppression under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Instead, the issue is whether suppression of the evidence is a remedy 
that must be applied for the violation of the statutory knock-and-announce 
 
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provision.”  Id.  The Second District recognized, however, that the reasoning of 
Hudson “calls into question the appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule 
for violations of Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute.”  Id.  Thus, it certified the 
question of great public importance as to whether the remedy of exclusion of 
evidence is required as a result of a violation of the knock-and-announce statute. 
More recently, the Third District Court of Appeal relied on Hudson to 
conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to statutory knock-and-
announce violations.  See State v. Brown, 36 So. 3d 770, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).  
In Brown, the defendant argued that section 901.19(1), the knock-and-announce 
statute, supported the trial court‟s suppression of inculpatory evidence against him.  
Id. at 771, 773.  The Third District rejected the defendant‟s knock-and-announce 
argument, but noted: 
[W]e believe that reversal is required even if we are wrong on the 
knock and announce point.  This is so because of the holding of 
Hudson that even established violations of the principle do not 
implicate the exclusionary rule so as to suppress pertinent evidence.  
We follow Hudson both because we are persuaded by its reasoning on 
the point and because we are required to do so by Article 1, section 
12, of the Florida Constitution.   
 
Id. at 775 (footnotes omitted).  The Third District noted that Cable was contrary to 
its reasoning.  Id. 
ANALYSIS 
 
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To answer the certified question, we first discuss Florida‟s knock-and-
announce statute and the case law interpreting it.  We then discuss the Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Hudson and why it does not control.  We next discuss whether 
we should recede from Benefield and conclude that we should not.  Thus, we 
answer the certified question in the affirmative.  Finally, we discuss the application 
of Benefield to the facts of this case. 
Florida’s Knock-and-Announce Statute and the Exclusionary Rule 
 
Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005),1 provides:   
If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has 
announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest 
either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony 
without a warrant, the officer may use all necessary and reasonable 
force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested 
is or is reasonably believed to be.[2] 
 
A separate statute, section 933.09, Fla. Stat. (2005), parallels this language for 
search warrants: 
                                          
 
 
1.  The 2010 version of section 901.19 remains the same as the 2005 version. 
 
2.  At the time of the Benefield decision, the language of section 901.19(1) 
provided: 
An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or 
when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, 
may break open a door or window of any building in which the person 
to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused 
admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose. 
160 So. 2d at 708.   
 
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The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a 
house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the 
warrant, if after due notice of the officer‟s authority and purpose he or 
she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein.  
 
In Benefield, this Court held that noncompliance with the statutory knock-
and-announce requirement vitiated the ensuing arrest and required suppression of 
the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest—absent any of the recognized 
exigencies justifying noncompliance.  160 So. 2d at 710.  There, the Court noted 
that “the officers totally ignored every requirement of the law.”  Id. at 709.  “They 
barged into petitioner‟s home without knocking or giving any notice whatever of 
their presence; they did not have a search warrant or warrant to arrest anyone; they 
ransacked petitioner‟s home without the least semblance of any showing of 
authority.”  Id.  The Court explained: 
It is true that the act is ambiguous and poorly drawn, but a 
reasonable interpretation of it runs like this: When an officer is 
authorized to make an arrest in any building, he should first approach 
the entrance to the building.  He should then knock on the door and 
announce his name and authority, sheriff, deputy sheriff, policeman or 
other legal authority and what his purpose is in being there.  If he is 
admitted and has a warrant, he may proceed to serve it.  He is not 
authorized to be there to make an arrest unless he has a warrant or is 
authorized to arrest for a felony without a warrant.  If he is refused 
admission and is armed with a warrant or has authority to arrest for a 
felony without a warrant, he may then break open a door or window to 
gain admission to the building and make the arrest.  If the building 
happens to be one‟s home, these requirements should be strictly 
observed. 
 
Id.  The Court then concluded: 
 
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As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 
901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable 
cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an 
unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any 
building, including a private home, except (1) where the person within 
already knows of the officer‟s authority and purpose; (2) where the 
officers are justified in the belief that the persons within are in 
imminent peril of bodily harm; (3) if the officer‟s peril would have 
been increased had he demanded entrance and stated the purpose, or 
(4) where those within made aware of the presence of someone 
outside are then engaged in activities which justify the officers in the 
belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted. . . . 
. . . Under the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that 
§ 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was violated and that its 
violation is not excused by any of the exceptions discussed herein and 
for this reason the fruits of the search being the product of an unlawful 
arrest and a search incident thereto, should have been excluded by the 
trial court upon proper motion. 
 
Id. at 710-11.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that “[s]ection 901.19, 
Florida Statutes, . . . appears to represent a codification of the English common law 
which recognized the fundamental sanctity of one‟s home yet nevertheless 
provides that an arresting office „may break open doors, if the party refused upon 
demand to open them.‟ ”  Id. at 710 (citing 1 Hale‟s Pleas of the Crown 583 
(1763)).  As the Court explained: 
Entering one‟s home without legal authority and neglect to give 
the occupants notice have been condemned by the law and the 
common custom of this country and England from time immemorial.  
It was condemned by the yearbooks of Edward IV, before the 
discovery of this country by Columbus. . . .   
This sentiment has moulded our concept of the home as one‟s 
castle as well as the law to protect it.  The law forbids the law 
enforcement officers of the state or the United States to enter before 
knocking at the door, giving his name and the purpose of his call.  
 
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There is nothing more terrifying to the occupants than to be suddenly 
confronted in the privacy of their home by a police officer decorated 
with guns and the insignia of his office.  This is why the law protects 
its entrance so rigidly.   
 
Id. at 709.   
 
Since Benefield, the district courts of appeal have applied the exclusionary 
rule to violations of the knock-and-announce statutes.  See Guerrie v. State, 691 
So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Here, because the officers failed to 
announce their purpose as required by [section 901.19(1)], the evidence must be 
suppressed.”); Kistner v. State, 379 So. 2d 128, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) 
(reversing trial court‟s denial of a motion to suppress where sheriff failed to 
comply with knock-and-announce statute—section 933.09 (citing Benefield)); 
Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (concluding that trial court 
erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of an arrest effectuated in 
violation of section 901.19(1) (citing Benefield)).  However, all of these decisions 
predated Hudson, which changed the analysis regarding exclusion of evidence for 
violation of constitutional knock-and-announce requirements. 
The United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Hudson v. Michigan 
 
In Hudson v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce rule requires 
the exclusion of all evidence found in the search.  547 U.S. at 588.  In Hudson, 
“[w]hen the police arrived to execute the warrant, they announced their presence, 
 
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but waited only a short time—perhaps „three to five seconds,‟. . .—before turning 
the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson‟s home.”  Id.  The 
defendant moved to suppress all of the inculpatory evidence against him, arguing 
that the police officers‟ premature entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  Id.  
After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain relief in the state courts, Hudson 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  Id. at 588-89.  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and denied relief, concluding that the exclusionary rule is 
not an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment knock-and-
announce requirement.   
 
In reaching this conclusion in Hudson, the Supreme Court noted that the 
knock-and-announce requirement is a well-established principle with deep roots in 
our English common law heritage.  Id. at 589.  The Supreme Court also explained 
that it concluded in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), that the knock-and-
announce rule is also a command of the Fourth Amendment—in essence, the 
common law knock-and-announce rule is part of the reasonableness inquiry under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589; see also Wilson, 514 U.S. at 
930.  The Supreme Court highlighted the distinction between the question of 
whether evidence should be excluded in a particular case and the question of 
whether law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce 
requirement: 
 
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“In Whiteley [v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 
(1971)], the Court treated identification of a Fourth Amendment 
violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to 
evidence secured incident to that violation.  Subsequent case law has 
rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule.”  (Citation 
omitted.)  We had said as much in [United States v.] Leon[, 468 U.S. 
897, 906 (1984)], a decade earlier, when we explained that “[w]hether 
the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case 
. . . is „an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were 
violated by police conduct.‟ ” 
In other words, exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact 
that a constitutional violation was a “but-for” cause of obtaining 
evidence.  Our cases show that but-for causality is only a necessary, 
not a sufficient, condition for suppression.  In this case, of course, the 
constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for 
cause of obtaining the evidence.  Whether that preliminary misstep 
had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they 
had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the 
house.  But even if the illegal entry here could be characterized as a 
but-for cause of discovering what was inside, we have “never held 
that evidence is „fruit of the poisonous tree‟ simply because „it would 
not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.‟ ” 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984). 
 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591-92.  The Supreme Court also explained the interests 
protected by the knock-and-announce requirement: 
One of those interests is the protection of human life and limb, 
because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed 
self-defense by the surprised resident.  Another interest is the 
protection of property.  Breaking a house (as the old cases typically 
put it) absent an announcement would penalize someone who did not 
know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed 
that he would obey it.  The knock-and-announce rule gives individuals 
the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of 
property occasioned by a forcible entry.  And thirdly, the knock-and-
announce rule protects those elements of privacy and dignity that can 
be destroyed by a sudden entrance.  It gives residents the opportunity 
 
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to prepare themselves for the entry of the police.  The brief interlude 
between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the 
opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.  
In other words, it assures the opportunity to collect oneself before 
answering the door. 
What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, 
however, is one‟s interest in preventing the government from seeing 
or taking evidence described in a warrant.  Since the interests that 
were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the 
evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. 
 
Id. at 594 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  However, the United 
States Supreme Court did not address whether states were free to enact their own 
knock-and-announce statutes that mandate exclusion of evidence as a remedy for 
violation of the statute or enact other remedies for violations, such as monetary 
damages.  
Why Hudson Does Not Control 
 
We conclude that Hudson does not control the question of whether the 
exclusionary rule applies to statutory knock-and-announce violations in Florida 
because we deem the distinction between common law remedies and constitutional 
remedies stressed in Cable a meaningful one.  As explained by the Second District 
in Cable: 
The issue in the instant case, however, is not—as it was in 
Hudson—whether the evidence is subject to suppression under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the issue is whether suppression of the 
evidence is a remedy that must be applied for the violation of the 
statutory knock-and-announce provision.  The Florida case law 
recognizes the common law and constitutional background for the 
knock-and-announce statute.  See Benefield, 160 So. 2d at 710 
 
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(stating that section 901.19 “appears to represent a codification of the 
English common law which recognized the fundamental sanctity of 
one‟s home”); State v. Loeffler, 410 So. 2d 589, 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1982) (stating that the purpose of the knock-and-announce statute 
“parallels that of the constitutional guarantees against search and 
seizure”).  But the case law does not support the conclusion that the 
statute has no force independent of the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Under the Florida case law, it is by no means clear that 
the exclusionary rule has been applied to violations of the knock-and-
announce statute only because Fourth Amendment knock-and-
announce violations were subject to the exclusionary rule.  Indeed, 
Benefield applied the exclusionary rule for violations of the knock-
and-announce statute long before the United States Supreme Court 
decided in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), that the common 
law knock-and-announce rule was also a “ „command of the Fourth 
Amendment.‟ ”  Id. at 931 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 337 (1985)).   
 
Cable, 18 So. 3d at 39.   
 
Under Hudson, it is clear that the exclusionary rule does not apply to Fourth 
Amendment knock-and-announce violations.  However, Hudson is not 
automatically dispositive of the question of whether the exclusionary rule may be 
applied for violations of Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute because, as 
explained in State v. Slaney, 653 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995):  
[T]he states are privileged under their state law to adopt higher, but 
not lower, standards for police conduct than those required by the 
Fourth Amendment.  Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) 
(state constitutional provision on search and seizure); Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (state statute).  In Florida, these higher 
standards may not, as a matter of state law, be imposed under the state 
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (1982 amendments); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 
2d 988 (Fla. 1988), but may be imposed by other provisions of Florida 
law, including a state statute. 
 
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(Emphasis added.)  As a matter of state law, a state may provide a remedy for 
violations of state knock-and-announce statutes, and nothing in Hudson prohibits it 
from doing so.  Benefield was based on state law grounds and not the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 
 
Whether We Should Recede from Benefield 
In urging us to recede from Benefield, the State relies on three grounds: (1) 
the Supreme Court‟s opinion in Hudson; (2) the adoption of an amendment to our 
state constitution requiring this Court to interpret our constitutional amendment 
against unreasonable search and seizures in conformity with the United States 
Constitution; and (3) our opinion in Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2008), 
regarding our approach to remedying statutory violations committed by law 
enforcement officers.  In North Florida Women‟s Health & Counseling Services, 
Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 637 (Fla. 2003), we explained when circumstances 
require that we recede from precedent: 
Before overruling a prior decision of this Court, we 
traditionally have asked several questions, including the following.  
(1) Has the prior decision proved unworkable due to reliance on an 
impractical legal “fiction”?  (2) Can the rule of law announced in the 
decision be reversed without serious injustice to those who have relied 
on it and without serious disruption in the stability of the law?  And 
(3) have the factual premises underlying the decision changed so 
drastically as to leave the decision‟s central holding utterly without 
legal justification?   
 
 
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See also Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1077 (Fla. 2009) (same).  We conclude 
that none of the developments relied on by the State are sufficient to overcome the 
presumption in favor of adhering to our precedent.   
Hudson 
 
The State contends first that Hudson requires us to recede from Benefield.  
We disagree because we find Benefield distinguishable.  In Benefield, we 
determined that a violation of the state‟s knock-and-announce statute, not a 
constitutional violation, mandated the remedy of exclusion.  We conclude that 
because Hudson does not address the remedy for state-created statutory violations, 
Hudson does not require us to recede from Benefield.  
Constitutional Amendment  
 
 
The State also argues that a 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution 
requires us to recede from Benefield after Hudson.  Article I, section 12, of the 
Florida Constitution, which was amended in 1982 and effective January 3, 1983, 
provides in pertinent part:  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . shall not 
be violated. . . .  This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court.”  This Court held in Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 
1988), that following the 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution, 
 
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we are bound to follow the interpretations of the United States 
Supreme Court with relation to the fourth amendment, and provide no 
greater protection than those interpretations.  Indeed, an exclusionary 
rule that was once constitutionally mandated in Florida can now be 
eliminated by judicial decision of the United States Supreme Court.  
However, we conclude that this amendment is inapplicable to the instant case 
because, as explained above, Hudson is not automatically dispositive of the 
question of whether the exclusionary rule may be applied for violations of 
Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute because it involved a Fourth Amendment 
knock-and-announce violation—not one based on a state statute.  
Jenkins v. State 
The State finally argues that our precedent in Jenkins v. State changed the 
way we analyze the remedy of exclusion of evidence for statutory violations.  We 
disagree.  In Jenkins, this Court considered, among other things, whether the 
exclusionary rule was a remedy for a violation of Florida‟s strip search statute.  
978 So. 2d at 129.  The Court noted that “the plain language of [the statute] does 
not expressly provide for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for a violation of the 
statute.”  Id. at 130.  However, the Court also noted that the statute made explicit 
reference to civil and injunctive remedies, and “[s]ince the Legislature chose to 
reference these remedies in the statute, we must assume that the Legislature 
intended to exclude all other remedies.  Therefore, it would be inappropriate for 
this Court to read a judicially created remedy into the statute.”  Id. at 130 n.14.   
 
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In reaching this conclusion, this Court noted that it has held that the 
exclusionary rule applies to certain statutes that are silent as to a remedy for their 
violation.  Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 814 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2002) (exclusionary 
rule applies to willful violation of statute governing confidentiality of patient 
medical records); Benefield, 160 So. 2d 706).  The Court then noted, without 
deciding, that Hudson may impact this Court‟s decision in Benefield.  See id.   
We conclude that Jenkins is distinguishable from this case.  The strip-search 
statute at issue in Jenkins explicitly provided civil and injunctive remedies—thus 
indicating that the Legislature intended to omit an exclusionary remedy, as 
reasoned by the Court in Jenkins.  The knock-and-announce statutes in Florida do 
not explicitly provide for any remedies.  The State argues that a person harmed by 
a violation of the knock-and-announce statute may seek civil damages for a 
violation.  However, without a basis in the statute for civil remedies, and because 
of the difficulties faced by a defendant seeking to recover money damages for a 
statutory violation against the police, we are concerned that the important values 
represented by the knock-and-announce statute, which is based on common law 
origins, would be undermined if the exclusionary rule did not apply to its violation.  
The fact that Benefield has been the law since 1964 and the fact that the 
statute has not been amended by the Legislature to prohibit the remedy of 
exclusion are further considerations in favor of not receding from Benefield.  As 
 
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we have observed, “[l]ong-term legislative inaction after a court construes a statute 
amounts to legislative acceptance or approval of that judicial construction.”  
Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (Fla. 2001).  
This Case 
In this case, although the Deputy Lawrence acted pursuant to a valid arrest 
warrant, he never announced his purpose before entering the motel room.  This is 
not simply a technical omission.  A citizen‟s obligation to respond to a request to 
allow a law enforcement officer into his or her home depends on the purpose of the 
law enforcement officer‟s request.  While a citizen has every right to refuse entry 
to an officer who may be merely seeking information or conducting an 
investigation, the citizen has no right to refuse entry by an officer whose purpose in 
seeking entry is to execute an arrest warrant or search warrant.  Before law 
enforcement officials may properly enter a private building to effect an arrest and 
“use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property,” § 
901.19(1), Fla. Stat., they are required to announce their purpose.  Accordingly, 
because in this case the State concedes that the deputy never announced his 
purpose, the Second District properly applied our precedent to suppress the 
evidence seized as a result of the unlawful entry.   
CONCLUSION 
 
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For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question of great public 
importance in the affirmative and approve the Second District‟s decision in Cable.  
We disapprove of the Third District‟s alternative holding in Brown, which relied 
on Hudson and the 1982 constitutional amendment to conclude that the 
exclusionary remedy no longer existed for statutory knock-and-announce 
violations.  We remand to the Second District for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs. 
CANADY, C.J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting, 
 
 
By adding an exclusionary rule to remedy a violation of Florida‟s knock-
and-announce statutory requirement, the majority improperly applies a remedy that 
is not present in the statute and that is contrary to both the United States and 
Florida Constitutions.   
 
The majority acknowledges that, under both the United States and Florida 
Constitutions, the exclusionary rule does not apply to knock-and-announce 
violations.  See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.   
 
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Further, Florida‟s knock-and-announce statute at issue does not contain an 
exclusionary rule.  See § 901.19, Fla. Stat. (2005).  This is not surprising because 
the statute is patterned after English common law, which had no exclusionary rule.  
See 8 John Henry Whitmore, A Treatise on the Ango-American System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2183 (3d ed. 1940) (“[I]t has long been 
established that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the 
means through which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence.” (citing to 
English precedent dating back to 1723) (emphasis omitted)).  
 
Accordingly, without this additional remedy added by the Court in Benefield 
v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964), the plain language of section 901.19 would be 
consistent with the United States and Florida Constitutions, and English common 
law.  Therefore, for the same reasoning followed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Hudson, I would recede from Benefield.   
Because the majority‟s decision is premised on common law principles, the 
Florida Legislature may choose to eliminate the majority‟s exclusionary rule for 
knock-and-announce violations. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
LABARGA, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-5267 
 
 
(Polk County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent