Title: MATTER OF ADOPTION OF SMIGAJ
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13466
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 1977

No. 13466 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 I N THE MATTER O F THE ADOPTION O F JAMIE L Y N N SMIGAJ, a minor. Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Leaphart Law Firm, Helena, Montana W. William Leaphart argued, Helena, Montana Victor H. F a l l , Helena, Montana James M. D r i s c o l l appeared, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Russell LaVigne argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: January 2 0 , 1977 D e c i d e d E B 7 1977 F i l e d : FEB 7 W Q A M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. A s t e p f a t h e r of a seven year o l d female c h i l d a p p e a l s from a n o r d e r dismissing h i s p e t i t i o n f o r adoption e n t e r e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lewis and Clark County, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, d i s t r i c t judge, s i t t i n g without a jury. The c a s e comes t o u s on t h e b a s i s of an agreed statement of f a c t i n l i e u of a record on appeal pursuant t o Rule 9 ( d ) , M.R.App.Civ.P. The agreed f a c t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e c h i l d , J a m i e Lynn Smigaj, was adopted when she was one year o l d by James E. Smigaj and Alberta Smigaj, husband and wife. Subsequently James Smigaj became t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d and a s a consequence t h e r e o f , Jamie Lynn r e c e i v e s monthly S o c i a l S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s of $154. O n February 16, 1973, James E. Smigaj and Alberta Smigaj w e r e divorced. Custody of J a m i e Lynn was awarded t o Alberta w i t h reasonable r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n granted t o James Smigaj. The judge, upon considering James1 d i s a b i l i t y , d i d n o t o r d e r him t o pay c h i l d support. O n September 3 , 1974, Alberta married Douglas J. Rushford and ever s i n c e they have been husband and w i f e , r e s i d i n g t o g e t h e r w i t h J a m i e Lynn. O n A p r i l 20, 1976, Rushford p e t i t i o n e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r permission t o adopt Jamie Lynn without t h e consent of t h e c h i l d ' s p r i o r adoptive f a t h e r , James Smigaj. O n June 24, 1976, a hearing was held i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a t which t i m e James Smigaj appeared w i t h counsel b u t d i d n o t t e s t i f y . Alberta t e s t i f i e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t f o r more than one year p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption by Rushford, James Smigaj had n o t v i s i t e d with o r seen Jamie Lynn nor had Jamie Lynn received any letters, p o s t c a r d s , p r e s e n t s , c l o t h i n g o r money from James Smigaj. A t t h e conclusion of t h e testimony i n support of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption, Judge Bennett dismissed t h e c a s e f o r t h e reason t h a t Rushford had f a i l e d t o prove t h a t James Smigaj was a b l e t o f i n a n c i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e support of Jamie Lynn a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, and t h u s t h e adoption could n o t proceed without t h e consent of James Smigaj. Two i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review: (1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n n o t considering t h e c h i l d ' s welfare t h e paramount c o n s i d e r a t i o n ? (2) Is s e c t i o n 61-205(1) ( f ) l i m i t e d t o " f i n a n c i a l support"? The f i r s t i s s u e has previously been decided by t h i s Court adversely t o a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . I n re Adoption of Biery (1974), 164 Mont. 353, 359, 522 P.2d 1377. S t a t u t o r y consent requirements i n adoption c a s e s must f i r s t be m e t a f t e r which t h e w e l f a r e of t h e c h i l d becomes paramount. A s s t a t e d i n Biery: "While t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d a r e of utmost concern i n both custody and adoption cases w e have r e q u i r e d strict compliance w i t h s e c t i o n 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, because of t h e harshness of permanently terminating p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . " Thus i n adoption c a s e s t h e i n i t i a l threshhold requirement is s t a t u t o r y compliance. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t i n dismiss- i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption on f i n d i n g t h a t s t a t u t o r y consent requirements had n o t been m e t . D i r e c t i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e second i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h e t e r m "support" contained i n s e c t i o n 61-205(1) ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, does n o t r e f e r e x c l u s i v e l y t o f i n a n c i a l support b u t i n c l u d e s moral support, psychological support, s p i r i t u a l support and s o f o r t h . Rushford urges t h a t "support" i n c l u d e s t h e p a r e n t a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o express l o v e and concern f o r t h e c h i l d and t o g i v e t h e c h i l d s o c i a l and r e l i g i o u s guidance as set f o r t h i n Appli- c a t i o n of Conley v. Walden (1975), 166 Mont. 369, 533 P.2d 955. I n t h i s regard Rushford relies on A l b e r t a ' s testimony t h a t James Smigaj d i d n o t v i s i t Jamie and d i d n o t send her any letters, post cards, presents, c l o t h i n g o r money. Section 61-205(1)(f) s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s consent t o t h e adoption is n o t required: " i f it i s proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t - s a i d f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e , has not contributed t o t h e support of s a i d c h i l d during a period of one (1) year before t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption * * *." (Emphasis added.) Although w e have not been r e f e r r e d t o any c a s e s p e c i f i c - a l l y construing t h e meaning of t h e term "support" i n s e c t i o n 6 1 - 2 0 5 ( 1 ) ( f ) , we have no d i f f i c u l t y i n construing t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e context of t h e consent s t a t u t e a s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e " f i n a n c i a l support" t h a t a parent owes a c h i l d . Rushford's p e t i t i o n f o r adoption a l l e g e d t h a t James Smigaj, " * * * although f i n a n c i a l l y capable, has not contributed t o t h e support of s a i d c h i l d * * *". The p a r t i e s b r i e f e d t h e question of f i n - a n c i a l support. The p a r t i e s themselves i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s t a t u t e t o mean " f i n a n c i a l support". The l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t is c l e a r from t h e language used i n t h e context of t h e s t a t u t e and w e a r e not permitted t o apply e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of construction t o expand Mont . t h e d e f i n i t i o n . Keller v. Smith, (1976), , 553 P.2d 1002, 33 St-Rep. 828; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. (1968), 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . It appears t h a t Rushford i s a c t u a l l y attempting t o argue t h a t James Smigaj has abandoned Jamie Lynn and t h e r e f o r e h i s consent i s not required under s e c t i o n 61-205(1)(d), R.C.M. 1947. I f such i s t h e case, t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption should be d r a f t e d on t h i s b a s i s and a hearing held thereon t o determine whether t h e f a c t s bring t h e p e t i t i o n within t h i s s t a t u t e . The d e c i s i o n herein i s without p r e j u d i c e t o r e f i l i n g t h e p e t i t i o n on t h i s b a s i s . The order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t dismissing t h e p e t i t i o n is affirmed. J u s t i c e We concur: ~,- -. Justices 6 '