Title: George W. Garbutt v. Rosemary Lafarnara
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99-53
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 6, 2001

1. The district court certified the following question:
TO PRESERVE ERROR, IS A CONTEMPORANEOUS
OBJECTION REQUIRED FOR EACH INSTANCE OF IMPROPER
ARGUMENT OR CAN THE ISSUE BE PRESERVED BY A
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BEFORE THE CASE IS SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY?
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC99-53
____________
GEORGE W. GARBUTT,
Petitioner,
vs.
ROSEMARY LAFARNARA,
Respondent.
[September 6, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Garbutt v. LaFarnara, 754 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA
1999), in which we accepted review based on the certification by the district court
of a question of great public importance.1   We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
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§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We have recently addressed issues similar to those posed in the certified
question.  See Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 2000).  Therefore, we remand the cause to the district court for
reconsideration in light of our opinion in Murphy.  We decline to address other
collateral issues.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result only.
I do not believe that the certified question has been answered by Murphy v.
International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000).  Murphy
involved a case of unobjected-to closing argument at trial.  The Court in Murphy
concluded that in order for a civil litigant to seek relief in the appellate court, the
litigant must have "at least challenged such argument in the trial court by way of a
motion for new trial even if no objection was voiced during trial."  Id. at 1027. 
Thus, the standard we enunciated in Murphy was based on a lack of objection to
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the closing argument prior to the jury verdict.
In this case, although the defendant did not contemporaneously object to
each allegedly improper argument, the defendant did object to six comments
contemporaneously and to ten comments during a recess, and subsequently moved
for a mistrial based on cumulative error.  The trial court sustained some of the
objections and in its order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial found that
certain arguments directly impugned the integrity of defense counsel and accused
him of lying to the jury.
As Judge Blue observed in his concurring opinion below:
I write because I conclude Ms. LaFarnara's attorney . . . engaged in
improper closing argument, which should be a basis for a new trial. 
But for case law which appears to require a contemporaneous
objection to each instance of improper argument, I would find that the
issue was properly preserved by a motion for mistrial.
. . . .
I also agree the trial court properly analyzed the issue of
improper argument based on the case law from this court.  It is that
case law with which I disagree.  The trial court set forth fourteen
instances of improper argument in the order denying a new trial. 
Because there were no contemporaneous objections to these instances
of improper argument, the trial court tested each on the basis of
fundamental error.  Before the final argument concluded, and after the
instances of improper argument, Mr. Garbutt's counsel moved for
mistrial on the basis of improper argument.  I would like to hold that
this preserved the issue;  a finding of fundamental error was not
required;  the trial court should have granted a mistrial;  and it was
therefore error to deny a new trial.
. . . .
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In this case, Mr. Garbutt listed thirty-four alleged instances of
improper argument in the motion for new trial.  The trial court agreed
that in fourteen instances the argument by Ms. LaFarnara's counsel
was improper.  I conclude at least some of the remaining twenty were
improper or borderline.  Most trial lawyers would hesitate to interrupt
closing argument thirty-four times, which would seem to be required
under the present law.
In this case there was a motion for mistrial, based on the
improper argument, made before the conclusion of the final argument. 
I suggest this should preserve the error and that trial counsel should be
allowed to move for mistrial on the basis of cumulative improper
argument.  This places responsibility for proper argument on the
attorney making the argument. 
Garbutt v. LaFarnara, 754 So. 2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (Blue, J.,
concurring) (emphasis supplied).
The fact that a motion for mistrial was made prior to conclusion of the
closing argument is a significant difference from those cases where no objection is
made until an adverse verdict is returned.  Indeed, in Murphy, in discussing the
several policy concerns, we explained that the contemporaneous objection
requirement 
prevents counsel from engaging in "sandbagging" tactics, whereby
counsel may intentionally refrain from objecting to improper closing
argument, hoping to prevail despite such argument, and then seek relief
based on the unobjected-to argument in the event that the desired
outcome in the case is not achieved.  Relatedly, precluding relief absent a
contemporaneous objection accounts for the possibility that counsel may, as a
tactical decision, refrain from objecting to opposing counsel's improper argument
based on the belief that such improper argument actually hurts opposing counsel's
rapport with the jury.  Also, requiring a contemporaneous objection provides the
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trial judge, who is in the best position to evaluate the propriety and possible impact
of allegedly improper closing argument, with the optimal opportunity to stop such
argument when it is made.  Finally, requiring a contemporaneous objection helps
prevent confusion that can stem from appellate courts making "cold record"
decisions regarding improper closing argument. 
766 So. 2d at 1026 (citations omitted).
As the majority noted in Murphy, courts have taken varied approaches in
dealing with the preservation of closing argument claims and, in some cases, have
recognized that where a party moves for a mistrial prior to the close of the closing
argument the objection may be deemed preserved.  See Murphy, 766 So. 2d at
1025 (citing Johnson v. Emerson, 647 P.2d 806 (Idaho Ct. App.1982) (finding that
exception to improper closing argument is timely if made before case is submitted
to the jury); and Siler v. City of Kansas City, 505 P.2d 765, 766 (Kan. 1973)
(finding that improper closing argument was not available as basis for reversing
judgment where counsel for the party seeking relief did not object, request a
curative instruction, or move for a mistrial based on such improper argument)).
At the very least, this Court should explore whether the Murphy rule should
be varied when there is a motion for mistrial made prior to the conclusion of
closing argument.  Furthermore, we should clarify that the failure of the adverse
party to object contemporaneously to each closing argument is not fatal to appellate
review.  See Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1036 n.32, (Pariente, J. concurring specially in
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result only) ("[I]f the attorney has made objections to some of the closing argument
remarks, which have been overruled, the fact that all of the objectionable remarks
have not been preserved by subsequent objection does not preclude the appellate
court from reviewing the cumulative effect of the objected-to and unobjected-to
remarks.")
ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Great Public Importance
Second District - Case No. 2D97-04845 
(Pinellas County)
David B. Krouk of Piper, Esteva, Green, Karvonen & Lewis, St. Petersburg,
Florida,
for Petitioner
David J. Plante of Merkle & Magri, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent