Title: DuBoise v. DuBoise
Citation: 153 So. 2d 778
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 1963

153 So. 2d 778 (1963)
Jerry DuBOISE
v.
Inez DuBOISE
1 Div. 75.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 16, 1963.
Thos. F. Sweeney, Mobile, for appellant.
M. A. Marsal, Mobile, for appellee.
*779 PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal, with prayer in the alternative for mandamus, or other appropriate writ, if appeal does not lie, from an order or decree of the circuit court, in equity, whereby the court, ex mero motu undertook to amend a prior decree which the court had rendered almost two years earlier in a divorce suit.
The husband was respondent in the divorce suit and is now appellant and petitioner in the instant case.
In August, 1958, the wife, in her original bill of complaint, charged cruelty and prayed for divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony, for custody of a certain child of the parties, for the husband to be required to make periodic payments to the wife for support of the wife and said child, and for such further appropriate relief as she might be entitled to receive.
On October 21, 1958, the husband answered, denying the allegation of cruelty and setting out certain allegations as to his responsibility to support three other children of the parties and as to his income and physical condition.
On August 8, 1958, the wife filed also petition for support pendente lite and solicitor's fee. By order dated January 20, 1959, the court ordered the husband to pay $12.50 per week, pendente lite, pursuant to agreement of the parties.
On each of the dates, June 19, August 21, and September 14, 1959, respectively, the wife filed motion for rule nisi alleging that the husband was in arrears in making said payments. On September 14, 1959, the court ordered that the rule nisi be dismissed.
On January 7, 1960, the wife filed in open court an amendment to the bill as follows:
On January 7, 1960, the court heard testimony ore tenus and the cause was submitted on the pleadings and testimony so heard.
On January 14, 1960, was rendered the decree which the court later undertook to amend. The paragraphs of the decree are not numbered. We refer to the paragraphs according to the order of their appearance.
The first paragraph dissolved the bonds of matrimony; the second permitted remarriage after the statutory period; and the third awarded custody of children.
The fourth, fifth, and seventh paragraphs recite, respectively, as follows:
The sixth and eighth paragraphs order the husband to pay solicitor's fee and costs.
The transcript contains a motion filed February 29, 1960, by the husband, to reduce the $25.00 weekly payments, and an order dated August 19, 1960, denying his motion. There are other motions for rule nisi filed by the wife.
On July 28, 1960, the wife filed a paper moving "the Court to order the property owned jointly by the parties hereto to be sold" (Emphasis Supplied.) and that the proceeds "be divided equally."
On August 5, 1960, the court made an order which recites in pertinent part as follows:
On December 5, 1960, the court made an order as follows:
Then follows a description, by metes and bounds, of real property which probably lies in Mobile County, but the order does not clearly so state. This order of December 5, 1960, is the first time a description of real estate appears in the pleading or record proper.
Next appears a motion filed May 8, 1961, by the wife, to order the register to advertise and sell certain real property, in Mobile County, which is described as in the order of December 5, 1960.
The husband, on May 15, 1961, filed an answer to the motion wherein he sets out the fifth paragraph of the decree rendered January 14, 1960, and further:
On June 9, 1961, the cause was submitted for decree on the wife's motion for sale.
Next in the record appears the decree of January 3, 1962, of which the husband now complains. The decree recites as follows:
"ORDER AMENDING DECREE NUNC PRO TUNC AND APPOINTING COMMISSIONER TO SELL PROPERTY FOR DIVISION
"`It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court (sic) following property more particularly described as:
"It is also further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that the Honorable Sam B. St. John Be, and hereby is, appointed as commissioner to sell said property at private or public sale after due notice has been published as prescribed by law in a newspaper of general circulation in this County, and after said property has been sold by said commissioner, he shall make a report thereof and deposit the proceeds of said sale into the office of the Register as ordered by the Court."
*782 The decree of January 14, 1960, granted divorce, granted permission to remarry, awarded custody of children, awarded periodic payments of alimony for support of wife and child, determined the respective interests of the parties in their jointly owned property, ordered it partitioned, and ordered the husband to pay the fee for the wife's solicitor. Certainly that decree was a full determination of the equities of the case and was such a final decree as would support an appeal. The finality of the decree as regards an appeal is not affected by retention of power to modify by further orders to meet changed conditions. Rogers v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 259, 110 So. 140.
The decree of January 3, 1962, strikes out the provisions of the fifth paragraph of the earlier decree. Thus, as respects the interests of the parties in property, the later, amendatory decree is lacking in finality. We are of opinion that it will not support an appeal, but it will be reviewed on the application for mandamus.
From the entitlement of the decree of January 3, 1962, and the statements therein that the decree of January 14, 1960, "inadvertently" stated that the property was jointly owned and "should be amended nunc pro tunc," it appears that the trial court, in 1962, was undertaking to amend a supposed clerical error in the 1960 decree.
This court has said:
This court has consistently refused to allow amendment of a judgment after the term when there was nothing in the record to amend by. The court has said:
Armstrong v. Robertson &amp; Barnwell, 2 Ala. 164, 170.
See: Bondurant v. Thompson's Distributees, 15 Ala. 202; Metcalf v. Metcalf, 19 Ala. 319; Saltmarsh v. Bird, 19 Ala. 665; Hudson v. Hudson, 20 Ala. 364.
The court has said further:
In Sisson v. Leonard, 243 Ala. 546, 11 So. 2d 144, the court discussed at some length the principles governing amendment of decrees more than thirty days after rendition. Among other things the court said:
The wife contends that there is matter of record to amend by in the notes, or transcript of the notes, made by the court reporter at the hearing ore tenus on January 7, 1960.
According to the reporter's transcript, at the close of the hearing, the court stated, among other things:
Attached to the transcript of evidence is the certificate of the reporter to effect that the "foregoing pages 15 through 82 inclusive, comprise" a full and correct transcription of the testimony taken by the reporter on January 7, 1960, and further that the reporter has notified the attorneys of the filing of the transcript. The certificate is dated October 10, 1962.
We have not been able to find any showing as to when the transcript of evidence was filed in the office of the register. In fact, there is no showing that the transcript of evidence was ever filed in the office of the register, other than the certificate of the register that the foregoing transcript of 102 pages contains a full, etc., transcript "of the record and proceedings" in the cause. The register's certificate is dated October 11, 1962.
There is nothing to show that the writing, which purports to set out the oral pronouncement of the court made on January 7, 1960, was even in existence prior to October 10, 1962. It is this writing which the wife now insists constitutes matter of record by which the court, on January 3, 1962, was authorized to amend the decree which had been rendered January 14, 1960, two years and nine months, less four days, prior to the existence of the writing, and prior to the filing of the writing in the office of the register.
We are not to be understood as holding that the transcript of evidence made by the reporter constitutes "matter apparent on the record or entries of the court to amend by." § 567, Title 7, Code 1940. We do not think the reporter's notes constitute such matter. We are certain, however, that a writing made and filed so long after the decree was rendered is not contemporaneous with the decree and will not sustain the amendment here sought to be made. Moreover, the purported statement of the court, appearing in the transcript of evidence, does not support the amendment as we understand it.
The reporter's transcription and certificate, at the most, constitute an affidavit by a third person. In an earlier case, a party sought to support, by affidavits, a motion to amend a decree of the orphans' court. In affirming the trial court's refusal to allow the amendment, this court said:
In the case at bar, the record does not afford matter upon which to base the decree of January 3, 1962. We are of opinion that its rendition was not authorized as an amendment to correct a clerical error.
Argument is advanced that the decree of January 14, 1960, was interlocutory and not final so that the court, under its reserved power, had authority to modify the provisions relating to division of property.
We are not cited to any case which holds that a court can reserve power to amend a "property settlement," as distinguished from an allowance of alimony which is payable in installments for the support of the wife and children.
In Epps v. Epps, 218 Ala. 667, 120 So. 150, the court said:
The court answered the question in the affirmative and said:
In Sullivan v. Sullivan, 215 Ala. 627, 111 So. 911, where husband and wife made an agreement whereby the husband was to pay the wife $200 per month during her life, the court held that remarriage of the wife did not terminate her right to the monthly payments according to the agreement which had been approved by the decree. The court said:
In Constantine v. Constantine, 274 Ala. 374, 149 So. 2d 262, this court held that a provision in a divorce decree for periodic payments to wife for her support was not for a division of property, but was an allowance for support of the wife, and could be modified, on a showing of changed conditions, more than ten years after rendition of the divorce decree.
As reasoned in Epps v. Epps, supra, the power of the court to modify a provision for periodic support payments is derived from the continuous nature of such a provision. A property settlement is not continuous; it is a one time thing. We incline to the view that the rule permitting a court to modify a provision for periodic support payments does not apply to a provision for division of property, and that the power reserved in the instant decree is not a power to change the decision of the court which determined the equities of the parties in property, but is the reservation of power to make such orders as are necessary to give effect to that determination.
There is another consideration which requires a holding that the January 3, 1962, decree was not authorized.
Morgan v. Morgan, 211 Ala. 7, 8, 99 So. 185. See also: Whittle v. Whittle, 272 Ala. 32, 128 So. 2d 92.
Conceding arguendo, but not admitting, that a power to modify the property settlement could be and was reserved, we are nevertheless of opinion that the decree of January 3, 1962, was not authorized because the record does not show changed conditions.
As to what relief, if any, the wife might be entitled to have in appropriate proceedings, we express no opinion. We are of opinion that the decree of January 3, 1962, should be vacated.
Let the writ of mandamus issue as prayed for.
Appeal dismissed.
Writ awarded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON, MERRILL, COLEMAN, and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.
GOODWYN, J., dissents.
GOODWYN, Justice (dissenting).
The question in this case concerns the amendment on January 3, 1962, of part of a decree rendered on January 14, 1960, granting appellee (wife) a divorce from appellant and providing for the disposition of property. The property provision was the part amended.
As to the property, the original decree provided as follows:
The amendment struck from the decree the first of the above two paragraphs and substituted therefor a provision that certain described real property "be sold at public or private sale" and the proceeds therefrom paid into the office of the register "to be disposed of by the Court." There appears to be no question that there is no jointly owned property and that title to the property ordered sold is in the husband alone.
On January 31, 1962, appellant filed a motion to set aside the decree of January 3, 1962. This motion was overruled on May 15, 1962. Thereupon, appellant appealed from the decrees of January 3, 1962, and May 15, 1962, and also has filed here a petition for mandamus to set aside said decrees in event it should be held that they are not appealable.
My view is that the decrees appealed from will not support the appeal; that the appeal should be dismissed; that the trial court had jurisdiction to render the amendatory decree; and that the petition for mandamus should be denied.
Equity decrees may be so framed as to be partly final and partly interlocutory. Newton v. Ware, 271 Ala. 444, 450, 124 So. *787 2d 664; Ex parte Sparks, 254 Ala. 595, 597, 49 So. 2d 296; Wood v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 15, 22 So. 2d 331; Scholes v. Kibbe, 222 Ala. 587, 133 So. 286. In my opinion, the part of the decree of January 14, 1960, providing for disposition of property was interlocutory, as was also the decree amendatory thereof. A fortiori, the decree overruling the motion to set aside the amendatory decree was also interlocutory. "If there is a decree directing further proceedings under the direction of the court in order to make the final decree effective, such decree is interlocutory and remains within the control of the court because as to such decree and further proceedings thereunder the cause remains in fieri." Newton v. Ware, supra. Here, the trial court expressly retained jurisdiction "for the purpose of making such other or future orders or decrees as to the property settlement." Such interlocutory decrees are not appealable. They are reviewable on appeal from a final decree. As said in O'Rear v. O'Rear, 227 Ala. 403, 406, 150 So. 502:
From Moore v. Hawk, 270 Ala. 684, 686, 121 So. 2d 904, is the following apt statement:
In Ex parte Green, 221 Ala. 298, 300, 129 So. 72, it is said that "interlocutory judgments and decrees remain in fieri until final judgment is entered, and in the meantime the court may open, amend, or vacate them, as the facts justify (Pinkard v. Allen, 75 Ala. 73; Hurt v. Hurt, 157 Ala. 126, 137, 47 So. 260; Chancery Rule 82; 34 Corpus Juris, 216."
If the court was without jurisdiction to render the amendatory decree, such decree is void and mandamus is the appropriate remedy. Ex parte State, ex rel. Mitchell, 271 Ala. 203, 207, 123 So. 2d 209; Ex parte Sharp, 259 Ala. 652, 655, 68 So. 2d 545; Ex parte Myers, 246 Ala. 460, 461, 21 So. 2d 113; State ex rel. Davis v. Curtis, 210 Ala. 1, 4, 97 So. 291. It is my opinion, however, that the trial court had jurisdiction to render the amendatory decree, that said decree is not void, and that mandamus will not lie. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal and deny the petition for mandamus.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.