Title: Mullendore v. Mercy Hospital Ardmore
Citation: 2019 OK 11
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2019

Mullendore v. Mercy Hospital Ardmore Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Petitioner Emilee Mullendore was employed as a certified nursing assistant (CNA) with Mercy Hospital in Ardmore, Oklahoma. While working during her assigned hospital shift, Petitioner entered the fifth floor nutrition room and assembled 8 separate one pound bags of ice for the patients. She then turned to open the door out of the nutrition room, took a step into the doorway and "I felt my right foot slip out to the right and then the top part of my leg and my knee turned in to the left." Petitioner immediately fell onto the floor and was unable to walk on her leg. Petitioner had worked over six hours of her shift without difficulty before her accident. At the time, Petitioner was twenty-one years old. Mullendore was evaluated in the emergency room within a few hours after the accident complaining of "right knee pain - says she just stepped and fell." Petitioner filed a claim to the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Commission seeking the recovery of medical care for the injury and requested the reservation of the issue of whether she was entitled to recover temporary total disability benefits. Petitioner claimed she sustained a compensable injury to her right knee as a result of an unexplained fall that arose out of her performing employment related services for the hospital. Respondent-hospital denied the claim contending the injury was not work-related but was idiopathic in nature, arising out of a condition that was personal to Petitioner. Both parties retained a physician expert who conducted an exam, reviewed medical records and issued a written report. Neither expert testified at the hearing; the ALJ was provided their respective written reports. Petitioner sought review of the Workers' Compensation Commission's Order en banc, which upheld the administrative law judge's Order Denying Compensability finding that Petitioner's injury to her right leg/knee was idiopathic in origin and noncompensable under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Commission en banc. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held Petitioner's knee injury was indeed a "compensable injury" within the meaning of the Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. 85 A O.S. Supp. 2018 section 2 (9)(a). Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . MULLENDORE v. MERCY HOSPITAL ARDMORE 2019 OK 11 Case Number: 113560 Decided: 03/12/2019 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. EMILEE ANNE MULLENDORE, Petitioner, v. MERCY HOSPITAL ARDMORE, SELF INSURED, and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III ¶0 Petitioner/Employee sought review of the Workers' Compensation Commission's Order en banc, which upheld the administrative law judge's Order Denying Compensability finding that Employee's injury to her right leg/knee was idiopathic in origin and was noncompensable under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. lt was undisputed by all parties that the 21 year old Employee: (1) had never suffered any prior injury to her knee; (2) had never sought prior medical treatment for her knee; and (3) she was "in the course of her employment" at the time of her injury. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Commission en banc. We hold that Employee's knee injury is a "compensable injury" within the meaning of the Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. 85 A O.S. Supp. 2018 § 2 (9)(a). COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION EN BANC REVERSED; ORDER OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE REVERSED. Bob Burke, 308 NW 13th, Suite 200B, Oklahoma City, OK 73103 and John R. Colbert, P.O. BOX 1421, Ardmore, OK 73402, for Petitioner, and Janet Dech, 401 NW 63rd Street, Suite 600, Oklahoma City, OK 73116, for Respondent. OPINION EDMONDSON, J.: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶1 Emilee Ann Mullendore (Petitioner) was employed as a certified nursing assistant (CNA) with Mercy Hospital in Ardmore, Oklahoma during the time relevant to this matter. One of Petitioner's duties as a CNA included providing ice and water to her assigned patients. On March 22, 2014, while working during her assigned hospital shift, Petitioner entered the fifth floor nutrition room and assembled 8 separate one pound bags of ice for the patients. She then turned to open the door out of the nutrition room, took a step into the doorway and "I felt my right foot slip out to the right and then the top part of my leg and my knee turned in to the left." 1 Petitioner immediately fell onto the floor and was unable to walk on her leg. Petitioner had worked over six hours of her shift without difficulty before her accident. At the time, Petitioner was twenty-one (21) years old. ¶2 Ms. Mullendore was evaluated in the emergency room within a few hours after the accident complaining of "right knee pain - says she just stepped and fell." 2 The physician documented she had limited range of motion to the right knee with tenderness noted at the medial and lateral joint lines.3 The x-ray of her knee showed no acute or structural abnormalities of the right knee, specifically noting "no fracture or dislocation."4 The emergency room physician diagnosed her with "right knee injury, initial encounter." 5 Petitioner testified that before this fall, she had (1) no previous injuries to the right knee and (2) she had no complaints regarding the right knee and had never sought medical treatment for this knee. All evidence before this Court reflects that Petitioner had no prior injuries to this knee and that she had never previously sought medical treatment for her right knee. The physician experts for Petitioner as well as Respondent both acknowledge Petitioner had no prior history of an injury to this right knee. ¶3 A few days after the injury, Petitioner was evaluated in the Mercy Occupational Medicine Clinic. She had pain and swelling in the knee with a diagnosis of right knee derangement. On April 1, 2014 a MRI study of the right knee was conducted with a conclusion that Petitioner had a "linear tear of the hyaline articular cartilage of the medial patellar facet which measures 0.4 cm." 6 This MRI study goes further in finding that Petitioner's "quadriceps and patellar tendons, medial and lateral collateral ligaments, ACL and PCL are normal. Normal medial and lateral menisci." 7 Based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the treating medical provider diagnosed Petitioner with "right knee derangement". 8 Thus, the right knee x-ray reflected no fracture or dislocation, and the MRI reflected that all structures of the knee were normal, except for the tear in the hyaline articular cartilage and the small effusion. Respondent was then given a referral for an evaluation with an orthopedic surgeon. ¶4 Petitioner filed a claim before the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Commission seeking the recovery of medical care for the injury and requested the reservation of the issue of whether she was entitled to recover temporary total disability benefits. Petitioner claimed she sustained a compensable injury on March 22, 2014 to her right knee as a result of an unexplained fall that arose out of her performing employment related services for the hospital. Respondent denied the claim contending the injury was not work-related but was idiopathic in nature, arising out of a condition that was personal to the Petitioner. Both parties retained a physician expert who conducted an exam, reviewed medical records and issued a written report. Neither expert testified at the hearing; the ALJ was provided their respective written reports. ¶5 Petitioner's physician expert noted that there was no evidence of prior work related or non-work related injuries to Petitioner's right knee. He noted that the MRI revealed a small joint effusion and a horizontally oriented linear tear of the hyaline cartilage of the medial patella facet. There was no abnormality in the cartilage of the lateral patellar facet. This expert also specifically noted that the MRI study of the knee revealed that the "quadriceps and patellar tendons, medial and collateral ligaments, ACL and PCL were all noted to be normal." The medial and lateral menisci were also normal. 9 Petitioner's expert opined that Ms. Mullendore's slip on the floor on March 22, 2014 is the "major cause of the injury and need for treatment to her right leg/knee." 10 This expert also expressed the opinion that Petitioner was in need of further medical treatment and recommended that "she be referred to a board-certified orthopedic specialist for further evaluation, a course of physical therapy and possible injections." 11 Petitioner's expert then concluded that "based upon the history provided by Ms. Mullendore, review of medical records, my examination as well as my experience and training, it is my opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the major cause of the injury arose out of and is the direct result of the employee's work-related accident sustained on March 22, 2014, while employed by the above employer." 12 ¶6 The physician expert for Mercy Hospital Ardmore ("Respondent") acknowledged in his report that Ms. Mullendore had no history of a prior injury to her right knee. He also discussed the MRI reflected a linear tear of the hyaline cartilage of the patellar facet of the right knee. Even though the record reflects that prior to March 22, 2014 Ms. Mullendore had (1) no prior injury to the right knee, (2) no prior complaints relating to the right knee, and (3) never sought medical treatment related to the right knee, Respondent's expert rendered the opinion that Petitioner had the following diagnoses related to her accident of March 22, 2014: No indication of work-related injury. The following diagnosis is unrelated, pre-existent or subsequent to her accident of 03/22/14: Patellofemoral13 dysplasia14 with acute subluxation15 and relocation of the right knee, an idiopathic condition leading to an idiopathic fall. No injury occurring from the fall. All complaints related to the pre-existing patellofemoral condition.16 Idiopathic means something that arises spontaneously or from an obscure or unknown cause or something peculiar to the individual. 17 Respondent's expert discusses in his report that Ms. Mullendore's explanation of what happened "sounds like a patellar dislocation." 18 He attributes the tear of the right knee hyaline cartilage to "the idiopathic subluxation relocation of her kneecap, a pre-existing condition leading to an idiopathic fall."19 Using common language, it is his opinion that Ms. Mullendore had an unexplained movement or partial dislocation of her right knee which was a "pre-existing" condition that led to in his opinion an "idiopathic" fall while she was at work. ¶7 Respondent's expert offers a discussion and the following opinions: Ms. Mullendore stated that her knee went into a valgus posture and then corrected itself and after that she fell. She gives a history that sounds like a patellar dislocation and she has fairly passive patellar motion, especially medially, but without any specific apprehension. Her MRI shows what the radiologist refers to as a tear of the hyalin [sic] cartilage, which is related to the idiopathic subluxation relocation of her kneecap, a pre-existing condition. She did not experience any injury at work. There was nothing about work that made her fall. She did not trip on any object. She did not say that her foot slipped on something on the floor or give any other such history. It is my opinion that Ms. Mullendore simply has a patellofemoral malalignment, and in adulthood this often leads to episodes of subluxation of the patella. The MRI findings are consistent with this condition and she should seek private orthopedic care for the treatment of this condition. It is my opinion that there is nothing about this episode that was a work-related injury. 20 He stated the MRI findings are consistent with "this condition", i.e., the patellofemoral malalignment which leads to episodes of subluxation in adulthood. However, the complete MRI report has no such finding; the entire findings are as follows: FINDINGS: Small joint effusion with estimated volume of 5 ml.There is a horizontally oriented linear tear of the hyaline cartilage of the medial patella facet. This measures 0.4 cm. The hyaline cartilage of the lateral patellar facet is normal. The quadriceps and patellar tendons, medial and lateral collateral ligaments, ACL and PCL. Normal medial and lateral menisci. Normal bone marrow signal. No bone contusion or fracture. CONCLUSION: THERE IS A LINEAR TEAR OF THE HYALINE ARTICULAR CARTILAGE OF THE MEDIAL PATELLAR FACET WHICH MEASURES 0.4 cm. 21 The report of the x-rays taken of Ms. Mullendore's knee on the date of this injury state: FINDINGS: The osseous structures are intact. No fracture or dislocation. No joint effusion. 22 (emphasis added). Neither the x-ray or the MRI report include a finding or discussion relating to patellofemoral malalignment, or dislocation. ¶8 Respondent's expert finally concludes: A. No permanent partial impairment to the right knee from work-related accident of 03/22/14, while an employee of Mercy Memorial Hospital; B. The patient sustained an idiopathic subluxation relocation of the right knee for which she may wish to seek private medical care.23 ¶9 Petitioner's claim for benefits went to hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who concluded that "Claimant has failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that she suffered a compensable injury to her RIGHT LEG (KNEE) on March 22, 2014 within the meaning of 85A O.S., § 2 (9) (a) of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act while employed by the Respondent." 24 In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on the following findings: (1) Dr. John's findings with respect to causation that the cause of the episode to her right knee was due to a pre-existing condition, the patellofemoral dysplasia causing "subluxation and relocation of the right knee causing an idiopathic fall and not a work-related injury, (2) there was no evidence presented establishing any slip or trip obstacles in the Claimant's path, (3) Claimant's history of the fall on the date of injury was that her "knee gave out on her", and (4) Claimants history of the fall was that "she was walking out of the nutritional room when the bottom of my right knee went to the right and the top of my right knee went to the left and I felt a popping and crunching sensation that turned into sharp excruciating pain."25 ¶10 Ms. Mullendore filed a Request for Review before the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Order issued by the ALJ was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Commission En Banc. Ms. Mullendore then filed a Petition for Review; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Order of the Workers' Compensation Commission En Banc. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11 The law in effect at the time of the injury controls both the award of benefits and the appellate standard of review. Vasquez v. Dillards, Inc., 2016 Ok 89, 381 P.3d 768; Brown v. Claims Mgmt. Res. Inc., 2017 OK 13, ¶ 9, 391 P.3d 111, 115. Appellate review of the judgment in this matter is set forth at 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 78 which provides in pertinent part: C. The judgment, decision or award of the Commission shall be final and conclusive on all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties unless an action is commenced in the Supreme Court of this state to review the judgment, decision or award made by an admininstrative law judge shall be stayed until all appeal rights have been waived or exhausted. The Supreme Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the judgment or award only if it was: 1. In violation of constitutional provisions; 2. In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission; 3. Made on unlawful procedure; 4. Affected by other error of law; 5. Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence; 6. Arbitrary or capricious; 7. Procured by fraud; or 8. Missing findings of fact on issues essential to the decision. ¶12 Mullendore alleges both legal error concerning statutory interpretation and constitutional claims. The issues of a statute's constitutional validity and of its construction are questions of law subject to de novo review. Brown, 2017 OK 13, ¶ 10, 391 P.3d at 115. Under this standard on appeal, we assume plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to reexamine the lower tribunal's legal rulings. Id.; see also Lee v. Bueno, 2016 OK 97, ¶ 6, 381 P.3d 736. ¶13 The interpretation and application of the statutes at issue in this matter, also implicates 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 78(c)(5). We previously noted that the language of this provision is similar to that used by this Court concerning its review of factual matters in other administrative proceedings. Brown, 2017 OK 13, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d at 115. Accordingly, with respect to issues of fact, the Commission's order will be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence in support of the facts upon which it is based and is otherwise free of error. Id. ¶14 Petitioner also urges as error that the COCA has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this Court in Pauls Valley Travel Center v. Boucher, 2005 OK 30, 112 P.3d 1175 . ANALYSIS ¶15 The Administrative Workers' Compensation Act defines compensable injury as follows: a. "Compensable injury" means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body, or prosthetic appliances, including eyeglasses, contact lenses, or hearing aids, caused solely as the result of either an accident, cumulative trauma or occupational disease arising out of the course and scope of employment. An "accident" means an event involving factors external to the employee that: (1) was unintended, unanticipated, unforeseen, unplanned and unexpected, (2) occurred at a specifically identifiable time and place, (3) occurred by chance or from unknown causes, and (4) was independent of sickness, mental incapacity, bodily infirmity or any other cause. 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 2(9)(a), (emphasis added). ¶16 The Commission affirmed the ALJ's order that Mullendore failed to establish she suffered a "compensable injury" by a preponderance of the evidence. In arriving at this decision, the ALJ relied almost exclusively on the findings of the Respondent's expert that Mullendore had a pre-existing condition, a patellofemoral malalignment, that created an instability then causing her to fall and injuring her knee while at work. These findings will be affirmed only if the record contains substantial evidence in support of such facts. Brown, 2017 OK 13, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d at 115. ¶17 We next examine the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support these findings. As defined in the AWCA, Mullendore sustained a "compensable injury" if she can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she suffered damage to her physical body, (2) caused solely as the result of an accident, cumulative trauma or occupational disease, and (3) arising out of the course and scope of employment. 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 2(9)(a). The record contains undisputed evidence that Mullendore suffered pain, swelling and a visible cartilage tear on the MRI study, which is clearly "damage to her physical body". The ALJ made a specific finding in her Order that "whether the injury was 'in the course of employment' was not disputed."26 Thus, Mullendore clearly met this factor. ¶18 With respect to the requirements of "compensable injury" in §2 (9) (a), the only factor in dispute is whether Mullendore's injury was solely the result of an accident. 27 "Accident" is specifically defined in § 2 (9)(a) as an event that (1) was unintended, unanticipated, unforeseen, unplanned and unexpected, (2) occurred at a specifically identifiable place, (3) occurred by chance or from unknown causes and (4) was independent of sickness, mental capacity or bodily infirmity or any other cause. We next consider whether Mullendore met her burden in establishing that her injury fits the definition of "accident" under § 2(9)(a). ¶19 Respondent's expert disputed that Mullendore's injury was "solely" caused by accident, asserting that her injury was the result of a pre-existing condition that caused her knee to become unstable and cause injury. He concluded that "the patient sustained an idiopathic subluxation relocation of the right knee"28 and this was due to a previously unknown condition of patellofemoral malalignment. We take note that no other treating physician, MRI study or X-ray study has found that Mullendore had this "previously unknown" condition, ie. patellofemoral malalignment. As earlier discussed, "idiopathic" means something that arises spontaneously or from an obscure or unknown cause or something peculiar to the individual.29 The very definition of "accident" in § 2(9)(a) is that an event occurs that was unplanned, unforeseen and from unknown causes. Thus, even Respondent's expert identifying Mullendore's knee injury as arising from unknown causes is consistent with the definition of "accident" as part of the definition of "compensable injury." 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 2(9)(a). Mullendore's injury occurred as she stepped out of the nutrition room at the hospital while performing her CNA duties, which meets the requirement of § 2(9)(a) as occurring at a "specifically identifiable time and place." ¶20 The final requirement of "accident" as set forth in § 2(9)(a), is that the event is "independent of sickness, mental incapacity, bodily infirmity, or any other cause." The only factor raised by Respondent that relates in any way to this final requirement is whether Mullendore was suffering from some type of "bodily infirmity" at the time of her fall on March 22, 2014. Respondent urged on appeal that "as with numerous other idiopathic injuries, there is a known cause- a previously unidentified pre-existing condition."30 This previously unidentified pre-existing condition as stated by Respondent's expert is a patellofemoral malalignment that in adulthood "often leads to episodes of subluxation of the patella."31 Although Respondent's expert stated in his report that this conclusion is consistent with the MRI findings, the actual findings in the MRI report offer no substantiation for this diagnosis. Respondent's argument is that Ms. Mullendore had a pre-existing condition that was unknown to her, that caused an instability in her knee and the subsequent fall causing the cartilage tear. This argument lacks credibility. ¶21 The record evidence before us reflects: (1) Mullendore had never had any complaint or problem with her right knee prior to this incident, (2) Mullendore had no prior injury to the right knee, (3) Mullendore had never sought medical treatment for the right knee prior to her fall on March 22, 2014, (4) the initial treating physician in the ER diagnosed her with a right knee injury, (5) the X-ray taken on March 22, 2014 notes there is no dislocation in the right knee, (6) the same X-ray makes no mention of a patellofemoral malalignment, (7) the MRI study reflects a tear to the hyaline cartilage, but specifically notes all other tendons, ligaments and cartilage in the right knee as normal, (8) the MRI study does not note any patellofemoral malalignment of her right knee, or any evidence of any pre-existing condition, (9) Mullendore had immediate swelling and pain following her fall. We hold that the evidence before this Court does not contain "substantial evidence" to support the Commission's order affirming the ALJ's findings that Mullendore "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered a compensable injury to her RIGHT LEG (KNEE) within the meaning of 85A O.S. § 2 (9)(a) of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act while employed by the Respondent." In fact, we hold that this conclusion is against the clear weight of the evidence before us. The Commission's order will be affirmed only if the record contains substantial evidence in support of the facts, woefully absent in the record before us. Brown, 2017 OK 13, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d at 115. We further hold that there is a preponderance of evidence that Mullendore suffered a "compensable injury" within the meaning of § 2 (9)(a) as set forth in the AWCA. Respondent's arguments disputing Mullendore suffered a compensable injury are not credible. ¶22 In 2011 under the former Workers' Compensation Code, the legislature enacted 85 O.S. 2011 § 308 which specifically excluded "an injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes" from the definition of "compensable injury." When the AWCA was enacted in 2013 this language was omitted by the Legislature from the definition of "compensable injury." Before 2011 we had a long line of cases addressing the issue of whether a worker could recover for injuries that were related in part to a known pre-existing condition of the employee/claimant. ¶23 In one of the more recent of those cases, Pauls Valley Travel Center v. Boucher, 2005 OK 30, 112 P.3d 1175 , Boucher was walking a straight path, was not carrying anything, encountered no obstacles, did not slip or exert undue physical effort, and did not fall, but her knee simply "gave way" while walking to the cash register. It was established she had a pre-existing known injury to that right knee. We were faced with the question of whether claimant's injury arose out of her employment. We found that Boucher's knee "did not give way spontaneously, rather, an untoward step precipitated the harm that ensued". Id. ¶ 14, 112 P.3d at 1182. We also noted that "even if employer did establish Boucher's proneness to injure herself because of a pre-existing defect, it does not follow as a matter of law, that her on-the-job injury stems solely from idiopathic harm that is not compensable." Id. ¶24 Further, we have recognized that the term accidental injury is not to be given a narrow or restricted meaning but rather is to be liberally construed. Choctaw County v. Bateman, 1952 OK 387, 252 P.2d 465 ; also see, H.J. Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 1964 OK 242, 397 P.2d 637 (internal injury produced by work-connected strain or exertion is accidental in character). ¶25 In Halliburton Services v. Alexander, 1976 OK 16, 547 P.2d 958 , we held that "compensation benefits are not limited to perfectly healthy workmen" citing Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Standridge, 1970 OK 49, 467 P.2d 461 . In Halliburton, the security guard employee sought to recover benefits for a fall he sustained when he was descending stairs as part of his routine work. It was undisputed that the employee had a pre-existing arthritic condition and that he had suffered a prior injury causing weakness of the back. The fall resulted solely from the sudden onset of back pain causing his left leg to give way and causing the fall leading to injury. As in the instant matter, the employer urged that the injuries arose from risks personal to the employee, idiopathic injuries, and thus were not accidental injuries arising out of employment. We rejected this argument and we found: Injury occurred within course of employment at a place claimant was expected to be while performing duties he was required to fulfill. Injury resulting from the fall was contributed to by the necessity to ascend and descend stairways, which was a factor peculiar to the employment. Where accidental injury results from a risk factor peculiar to the task performed it arises out of the employment, although the fall had its origin in idiopathy of the employee. Id. at ¶ 10, 547 P.2d 961(emphasis added). There is no credible evidence before this Court that Mullendore had a pre-existing injury so there is nothing before us to resolve in this respect. ¶26 Petitioner raised both legal and constitutional claims regarding the denial of her claim for workers' compensation benefits. This Court has long recognized that where relief is available on alternative non-constitutional grounds, we avoid reaching a determination on constitutional issues. Brown, 2017 OK 13, ¶ 26, 391 P.3d 119.32 ¶27 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated. The opinion of the Workers' Compensation Commission is reversed. The opinion of the Administrative Law Judge is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION REVERSED; ORDER OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE REVERSED; CAUSE REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT GURICH, C.J., EDMONDSON, COLBERT, REIF, and COMBS, JJ, concur; KAUGER, J., concurs in part; dissents in part; WYRICK, V.C.J., (by separate writing) WINCHESTER, and DARBY, JJ., dissent. FOOT