Title: PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS TODD KRUEGER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117375
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 117375  
THOMAS TODD KRUEGER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
Defendant was charged with and convicted by a jury of one  
count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct1 and one count  
of attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct.2
 He  
1MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (penetration of a victim under 
thirteen).  
2MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual contact with a victim under 
thirteen).  
appeals, claiming that he was deprived of his constitutional3  
and statutory4 right to be present at trial when the trial  
judge removed him from the courtroom while the complainant  
testified.  
We conclude that under MCL 768.3 a defendant has a right  
to be physically present at trial.  The trial judge's decision  
to remove this defendant from the courtroom while taking  
testimony from the complainant constituted error requiring  
reversal.  
I. Facts and Proceedings  
The complainant was five years of age at the time of  
trial and initially named someone other than defendant as  
having committed the sexually abusive acts in question.  
Eventually she accused the defendant, her father,5 of the  
sexual abuse.  He denied the charges. 
At defendant's  
preliminary examination, it became clear that the complainant  
likely would be unable to testify in court at trial.  Her  
preliminary 
examination 
testimony 
was 
obtained 
on 
videotape 
in  
closed chambers with only the judge, a social worker, and the  
attorneys present. Defendant was bound over for trial.  
3US Const, Am VI ; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.  
4MCL 768.3.  
5Defendant and the child's mother were divorced shortly 
before the child was born.  
2  
At trial, the judge entertained the prosecution's  
pretrial motion to use the statutory procedures of MCL  
600.2163a6 to allow the child to testify outside the  
defendant's presence. Over defendant's objection, the judge  
instead removed defendant from the courtroom and allowed the  
child to testify in his absence.  The courtroom was closed to  
everyone but the jury, a social worker, the attorneys, a law  
enforcement officer, and the court's staff.  
Defendant was allowed to watch the child's testimony on  
closed circuit television and to confer with counsel during  
the single recess that was called. To assist with this, the  
defendant was permitted to take notes with a pencil and paper.  
The judge explained defendant's absence from the courtroom to  
the jury in the following instruction:  
I have made a decision, ladies and gentlemen, 
that the defendant will not be present in the 
courtroom during the testimony.  However, we have 
made arrangements so that he can view the testimony 
from another room. Okay?  
The complainant told the jury of one incident where defendant  
encouraged her to kiss his privates and of a second where he  
6MCL 600.2163a offers the judge several options for 
protecting an underage witness in court, including clearing 
the court of all people not necessary to the proceedings; 
positioning the defendant so that the defendant is located far 
from the witness stand, and allowing a witness' testimony to 
be videotaped.  
3  
penetrated her digitally. The Court of Appeals affirmed the  
conviction in an unpublished opinion.  
II. The Statutory Violation  
This 
case 
involves 
a 
question 
of 
statutory  
interpretation, which we review de novo. People v Webb, 458  
Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998).  We are asked whether the  
trial court violated defendant's right under MCL 768.3 to be  
present at his own trial. MCL 768.3 provides:  
No person indicted for a felony shall be tried 
unless personally present during the trial . . . .  
The statute has its origin in the Revised Statutes of 1846,  
ch 165, § 9.7
 We have had few occasions to review this  
statute previously, and those came in cases where we concluded  
that the defendants had waived their right to be present. No  
such waiver is presented here.  Therefore, we must consider  
whether the statutory term "personally present" mandates that  
a defendant be physically present at trial.  
We apply the ordinary meaning of "personally" and  
"present."8 The primary meaning of "personally" is "in person;  
7See also 1857 CL 6076; 1871 CL 7955; How Stat 9568; 1897 
CL 11951; 1915 CL 15824; 1929 CL 17296; 1948 CL 768.3.  
8As these are not technical terms or words of art, we 
comply with the directive of the Legislature, given at MCL 
8.3a, that: "All words and phrases shall be construed and 
understood according to the common and approved usage of the 
language . . . ."  See Horace v Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756;  
575 NW2d 762 (1998).  
4  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
directly." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1995).  
The relevant meaning of "present" is "being with one or others  
in the specified or understood place."  Id. 
Given these  
definitions, there can be no doubt that when a defendant is  
physically removed from the courtroom during trial, he is not  
personally present as required by MCL 768.3.  Under the facts  
of this case, the statute was violated.9  
III. The Extent of the Error  
There was a statutory error in this case that was  
preserved by objection.  It must be evaluated under the  
standard for preserved, nonconstitutional error announced in  
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  
Under Lukity, the error is presumed not to be a ground for  
reversal unless it affirmatively appears that, more probably  
9We are not suggesting that a defendant's statutory right 
to be personally present under MCL 768.3 is absolute.  Rather, 
the facts of this case do not present a situation where the 
statutory right can be abrogated. 
We recognize, also, that 
a defendant's constitutional right to be present at trial is 
not absolute. Diaz v United States, 223 US 442; 32 S Ct 250;  
56 L Ed 500 (1912).  For example, a defendant can lose his 
Confrontation Clause right to be present in the courtroom 
under the Sixth Amendment where he continues disruptive 
behavior after being warned to refrain.  Illinois v Allen, 397 
US 337; 90 S Ct 1057; 25 L Ed 2d 353 (1970).  See also People  
v Staffney, 187 Mich App 660; 468 NW2d 238 (1991). However, 
the facts that would lead to a defendant's removal under Allen  
are not applicable here. 
There is no allegation that 
defendant's behavior presented an obstacle to the trial 
judge's ability to conduct the trial.  Thus, we do not address 
whether constitutional exceptions like that in Allen are  
applicable to the right conferred by MCL 768.3.  
5  
 
than not, it was outcome determinative. As was explained in  
People v Elston,10 "[a]n error is deemed to have been 'outcome  
determinative' if it undermined the reliability of the  
verdict." That determination requires that we "focus on the  
nature of the error in light of the weight and strength of the  
untainted evidence." Id. at 766.  
The evidence of defendant's guilt presented a close  
question.   There were no third-party eyewitnesses, no medical  
findings, and no confession. The complainant initially named  
someone other than defendant as the person who had sexually  
abused her. Under the circumstances, if there were an error  
closely linked with the complainant's believability, it had a  
high probability of influencing the verdict.  The trial judge  
instructed the jury that he had decided to remove defendant  
from the courtroom.  While the instruction made clear that  
defendant's absence was not voluntary, the court did not  
attempt to explain why the decision had been made or to allay  
jury speculation about it.  
Not only do these facts suggest that the proofs were not  
overwhelming in this case, they illustrate that an effective  
cross-examination 
of the complainant was vital to the defense.  
Yet, in violation of his statutory right, defendant was  
removed from the courtroom.  Although he was permitted to view  
10462 Mich 751, 766; 614 NW2d 595 (2000).  
6  
the proceedings through closed-circuit television, he was  
effectively unable to convey urgent lines of inquiry to his  
lawyer.11  Defendant was provided with paper and pencil with  
which to take notes and had the opportunity to consult with  
his attorney only during a break in the complainant's  
testimony. Additionally, he was deprived of the ability to  
make the subtle statement by his presence and demeanor in  
court that he was innocent of the charges made by his  
daughter.  
On the basis of the foregoing facts, we conclude that it  
is more probable than not that the statutory error was outcome  
determinative.  Therefore, we find that the error requires  
reversal.  
IV. Conclusion  
Under the facts of this case, we hold that defendant  
should not have been removed from the courtroom while the  
complainant testified.  It is more probable than not that the  
error was outcome determinative because the complainant's  
11Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed a 
procedure that similarly separated a defendant from his 
counsel in Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836; 110 S Ct 3157; 111 L 
Ed 2d 666 (1990), that Court was not faced with the same right 
to counsel issue presented here.  In Craig, the witness 
testified in a video deposition outside the defendant's 
presence.  However, he remained in constant electronic 
communication with his counsel.  Thus urgent questions and 
objections could be made as if both were in the same room. 
Id. at 841-842.  
7  
 
 
 
 
testimony was pivotal and the jury was left to speculate  
adversely to defendant about his absence.  We find it  
unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue raised.  
Defendant's conviction is vacated and the case is remanded for  
retrial.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.  
8