Title: State v. X.S.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000419
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2022

2022 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP419 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the interest of X. S., a person under the age 
of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
X. S., 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 323, 964 N.W.2d 553 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Brittany C. Grayson    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ. joined.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Christopher P. August, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Christopher P. August.  
  
For the petitioner-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 49 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP419   
(L.C. No. 
2020JV663) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the interest of X. S., a person under the 
age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
X. S., 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ. joined.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. X.S., 
No. 2021AP419, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 20, 
2021), reversing the decision of the Milwaukee County circuit 
No. 2021AP419 
 
4 
 
court1 to deny a petition filed by the State to waive a juvenile, 
X.S., into adult court for criminal proceedings.  The court of 
appeals remanded the case to the circuit court to conduct a new 
waiver hearing.  
¶2 
A mass shooting occurred at the Mayfair Mall, located 
outside of Milwaukee.  X.S., armed with a concealed handgun, 
entered 
the 
mall 
with 
a 
friend, 
became 
involved 
in 
a 
confrontation with another group of four individuals, and opened 
fire.  In the process, X.S. shot and hospitalized eight people.  
The victims included the friend of X.S., three individuals in 
the other group, and four bystanders who happened to be at the 
mall that day.  X.S. fled the scene with the help of his family.  
Subsequently, he was apprehended by police.  He was charged with 
eight counts of first-degree reckless injury with use of a 
dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§  940.23(1)(a) and 
939.63(1)(b) (2019-20),2 and one count of illegal possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a person under 18 years of age, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.60(2)(a).  The State sought to have X.S. waived 
into adult court instead of remaining in juvenile court.  The 
circuit court denied that request for waiver.  The court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the 
case for a new waiver hearing. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Brittany C. Grayson presided.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2021AP419 
 
5 
 
¶3 
We affirm the court of appeals' decision to reverse 
the circuit court and remand the case.  However, we conclude 
that a new waiver hearing is unnecessary.  We conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying 
the State's waiver petition.  There exists no reasonable basis 
for denying the State's waiver petition.  Therefore, we remand 
the case to the circuit court with instructions to grant the 
State's waiver petition. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Over the course of several months in 2020, X.S. 
engaged in serious and escalating criminal behaviors, despite 
juvenile court interventions and court-ordered conditions.  X.S. 
had been previously deemed to be delinquent.3  He had a 
concerning history while in the juvenile justice system, and the 
amount of resources and the remaining potential time available 
to assist X.S. in the juvenile system was limited.  The 
                                                 
3 Juvenile 
delinquency 
is 
an 
alternative 
to 
criminal 
proceedings.  Juvenile courts retain exclusive jurisdiction 
"over any juvenile 10 years of age or older who is alleged to be 
delinquent." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.12(1). 
 
In 
Wisconsin, 
a 
"'juvenile' . . . means a person who is less than 18 years of 
age," but "for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person 
who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal law 
or any civil law or municipal ordinance, 'juvenile' does not 
include a person who has attained 17 years of age."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.02(10m).  "A juvenile adjudged delinquent may be subject 
to, inter alia, placement in a juvenile correctional facility or 
juvenile portion of a county jail, forfeiture, suspension of 
driving 
privileges, 
counseling, 
supervision, 
electronic 
monitoring, restitution, supervised work or community service, 
or drug testing."  State v. Sanders, 2018 WI 51, ¶6, 381 
Wis. 2d 522, 912 N.W.2d 16.  
No. 2021AP419 
 
6 
 
following facts were established through X.S.'s juvenile case 
records and through undisputed testimony at X.S.'s waiver 
hearing.  As for all pretrial waiver determinations, these facts 
are used only to determine whether waiver into adult court is 
warranted, not to decide whether X.S. is guilty of a criminal 
offense.  Under the American system of law, "[a] person when 
first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of 
innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 
(1993).  By reciting and relying upon the following facts, we do 
not establish X.S.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor do we 
impose any form of criminal liability on X.S.   
¶5 
In April 2020, X.S. and two of his friends, including 
E.G., were in a car together and were involved in a drug deal.  
An individual purchasing drugs from the car shot into the car 
and hit X.S.  X.S. was taken to a nearby hospital and was 
treated for several days.  X.S. was 15 years old at the time of 
the shooting.  
¶6 
In July 2020, three months after X.S. was shot, X.S., 
E.G., and another individual were driving in a car when they 
were pulled over by police in St. Francis.  X.S. exited the 
vehicle and ran from the police, resulting in a foot chase with 
police.  Police soon apprehended X.S. but recognized that X.S. 
had discarded a backpack during his flight.  After a K-9 unit 
was called to the scene, police found the backpack X.S. 
concealed and discovered 133 grams of marijuana packaged for 
No. 2021AP419 
 
7 
 
distribution.  Both X.S. and E.G. possessed drug trafficking 
tools, cash, and a scale. 
¶7 
The State charged X.S. with possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana and obstructing an officer.  The charges 
were brought in juvenile court, and the State did not petition 
to waive into adult court.  X.S. and the State entered into a 
plea agreement whereby the State dismissed and read in the 
possession with intent to distribute charge.  X.S. was convicted 
of obstructing an officer.  The juvenile disposition order, 
entered in August 2021, directed that X.S. participate in nine 
months of court-ordered supervision, participate in the Running 
Rebels Intensive Monitoring Program ("Running Rebels"),4 complete 
a Global Appraisal of Individual Needs ("GAIN") assessment,5 
attend 
school 
daily, 
refrain 
from 
association 
with 
or 
participation in activities that could be deemed criminal, 
refrain from consuming alcohol and drugs, follow household 
rules, and meet as scheduled with X.S.'s assigned Human Service 
Worker ("HSW").   
¶8 
Despite the resources and services devoted to X.S. in 
the juvenile justice system, X.S. did not comply with the 
conditions included in his juvenile disposition order.  On 
initial intake into the juvenile system, X.S. refused to 
                                                 
4 Running Rebels Intensive Monitoring Program provides 
support, oversight, and mentoring to delinquent juveniles.    
5 A GAIN assessment tests the extent of an individual's drug 
and alcohol use.  The assessment allows the juvenile justice 
system to best structure its treatment and services to the needs 
of a delinquent juvenile.   
No. 2021AP419 
 
8 
 
cooperate with an HSW and provide information necessary to begin 
his transition into supervision.  After X.S.'s attorney and 
parents were contacted, the information was provided.  Around 
the time when school was scheduled to begin for X.S., his HSW 
received a text message from X.S. offering to sell her 
marijuana.6   
¶9 
The beginning of school in mid-August 2020 did not 
improve the situation for X.S.  Despite being ordered to do so 
and despite repeated check-ins from X.S's HSW and school social 
workers, X.S. did not attend class for the first several weeks 
of school.  In mid-September, several weeks after the juvenile 
disposition order was entered, Running Rebels contacted the HSW 
to inform her that X.S. had not enrolled, received an 
assessment, or participated in orientation with Running Rebels.  
This was despite specific court-ordered directions and despite 
Running Rebels staff contacting X.S.  Several weeks later, in 
early October, Running Rebels informed the HSW that X.S. had yet 
to complete orientation and begin the Running Rebels program.  
The HSW eventually got in contact with X.S. (after much effort) 
through his mother, notified him of Running Rebels' repeated 
attempts to contact him, and informed X.S. that his refusal to 
register for Running Rebels would result in him being subject to 
                                                 
6 The text message stated, "Out here all day with some gas.  
LMK." Based on the HSW's training and experience, the HSW 
provided uncontested testimony that this was an offer to sell 
marijuana.  
No. 2021AP419 
 
9 
 
a 24-hour electronic monitoring system.  The same day X.S. 
completed his Running Rebels orientation. 
¶10  Between early October and late November 2020, X.S. 
continued to violate the juvenile disposition order.  In mid-
October, Running Rebels informed the HSW that X.S. was non-
compliant, did not contact Running Rebels when he left his 
house, and was not participating in check-in calls.  In mid-
November, Running Rebels reported that X.S. had been compliant 
recently and was available for face-to-face contact.  However, 
by late-November, X.S. was again not communicating with Running 
Rebels in violation of conditions.  On numerous occasions, the 
HSW attempted to contact X.S. as part of his court-ordered 
supervision plan, and he did not answer or respond.  The HSW 
attained X.S.'s school records, which showed that X.S. had not 
attended a single day of school since the start of the school 
year; X.S. was failing every class.  After the incidents at 
issue in this case, X.S. admitted that he used marijuana during 
his time under court-ordered supervision.  Further, X.S. was 
court ordered in August 2020 to complete a GAIN assessment.  In 
mid-October, X.S. was given a specific referral to complete his 
GAIN assessment, but by the date of the shooting at issue in 
this case, the assessment had not been completed.   
¶11 An initial screening indicated X.S. was at high risk 
of recidivism,7 but screening also found that he did not have 
                                                 
7 The court system utilized the Youth Assessment and 
Screening Instrument ("YASI") to determine X.S.'s risk of 
recidivism. 
No. 2021AP419 
 
10 
 
substantial mental health needs.8  The HSW asked X.S. and his 
family on numerous occasions if they needed any assistance, if 
any help could be provided for X.S.'s school, and if they had 
any issues complying with court-ordered conditions.  X.S. and 
his family repeatedly said no.   
¶12 On Friday, November 20, 2020, three months after X.S. 
entered the juvenile system, he participated in the Mayfair Mall 
mass shooting.  One witness described how a group of four 
individuals, three male and one female, were shopping at the 
Mayfair Mall.  Another male approached this group "screaming" 
and was accompanied by another male associate.  Video evidence 
confirmed that the first male was E.G. and the second male was 
X.S.  The witness described E.G. and X.S. as "looking for 
someone," not shopping.  When E.G. approached the group of four, 
X.S. reached for his waistband where the witness could observe a 
concealed handgun.  E.G. punched a member of the group of four, 
and X.S. drew the handgun.  X.S. pointed the gun at the group, 
who were now moving toward E.G., and X.S. opened fire.  The 
person who E.G. hit fell to the ground immediately; E.G. and 
another member of the group of four then fell to the ground.   
¶13 The witness observed that X.S. was targeting the group 
of four.  One of the members of the group attempted to flee, and 
the witness observed X.S. turn and shoot at that member as the 
member attempted to flee.  The witness stated that there were 
volleys of shots, separated by time.  X.S. unloaded around 10 
                                                 
8 The screening was conducted by Wraparound Services.  
No. 2021AP419 
 
11 
 
rounds, paused, and then continued shooting.  The witness's 
account was corroborated by video evidence and the statements of 
other witnesses.  One other witness, for instance, described 
E.G. punching a member of the group of four and X.S. taking a 
"shooter's stance" and firing a gun.   
¶14 Almost immediately after the shooting began, local 
police received emergency calls.  The first officers arrived 
within one minute of reports of an active shooter.  By the time 
police arrived, X.S. had already fled the scene.  The police 
discovered that eight people in the mall had been shot, 
requiring immediate medical care.  All eight were taken to the 
hospital for treatment.  It was later determined that three of 
the eight were members of the group of four, and one was E.G.  
The other four victims were bystanders who happened to be at the 
mall that day; they had no association or interaction with X.S.  
Fortuitously, none of the victims died of their injuries.  
¶15 Video evidence demonstrated that X.S. fled the mall 
and was picked up by a car, later determined to be an Uber 
called by X.S.'s father.  X.S. was dropped off at his home.  
Text messages revealed that X.S.'s family coordinated to help 
X.S. flee out of state, board a flight, and hide from 
authorities with a family member in Florida.  However, that plan 
did not succeed.  Police arrested X.S. a few days after the 
shooting traveling in a car and carrying the handgun used in the 
shooting.  Forensic investigators recovered the shell casings 
and bullet fragments at the mall, and they were traced to the 
No. 2021AP419 
 
12 
 
handgun X.S. possessed and used.  At the time of the shooting, 
X.S. was 15-1/2 years old.  
¶16 After X.S. was detained, the State filed an amended 
petition for juvenile delinquency, charging X.S. with eight 
counts of first-degree reckless injury with use of a dangerous 
weapon and one count of illegal possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a person under 18 years of age.  The petition described in 
detail the corroborated witness testimony of the shooting and 
the video evidence depicting X.S.'s involvement and flight from 
the scene.  The day after the charges were filed, the State 
filed a petition to waive X.S. into adult court to face criminal 
prosecution.  The State explained that X.S. was adjudicated 
delinquent in August 2020 and X.S. had failed to comply with 
court-ordered conditions, and reasoned that, given X.S.'s 
documented failures with the juvenile system, "the adult system 
is better able to provide appropriate accountability and address 
his long-term rehabilitative needs."  
¶17 After a short period of discovery and psychological 
evaluations of X.S., the circuit court held a combined sanctions 
hearing for X.S.'s August 2020 case and a waiver hearing for the 
November 2020 case.  The defense did not contest the prosecutive 
merit in the State's delinquency and waiver petitions. 
¶18 At the hearing, X.S.'s HSW testified and described in 
detail his treatment progression and lack of compliance with the 
juvenile system.  The testimony corresponded to X.S.'s past 
behavior and treatment history recounted above.  See, supra, 
¶¶5-11.  Nonetheless, the HSW recommended that X.S. remain in 
No. 2021AP419 
 
13 
 
the juvenile system and concluded that the juvenile system can 
provide effective treatment and services.   
¶19 X.S. 
called 
Dr. 
David 
Thompson 
as 
a 
witness.  
Dr. Thompson was a clinical psychologist hired by X.S. to 
conduct a psychological evaluation of X.S. for the waiver 
hearing.  Dr. Thompson stated that he reviewed the delinquency 
petition, as well as the August 2020 juvenile disposition order.  
However, he did not consider X.S.'s record while on juvenile 
supervision, police reports of the mall shootings, and video 
evidence of X.S.'s actions while at the mall, specifically 
X.S.'s pause in shooting and his taking aim at a fleeing victim.  
Dr. Thompson was also unaware that X.S.'s family conspired to 
move X.S. out of state and escape arrest.  Dr. Thompson 
explained in his written report that he relied on statements 
from X.S.'s mother to conclude that X.S. was "compliant" and had 
"completed" the Running Rebels program.  Dr. Thompson concluded 
that, because X.S. had "strong social support" and a "positive 
attitude toward intervention and authority," X.S. was a low risk 
to reengage in violent behavior with treatment.  
¶20 Dr. Thompson explained that X.S. reported to him 
emotional distress as a result of the April 2020 shooting where 
X.S. was shot.  X.S. told Dr. Thompson that since that date, he 
had experienced serious episodes of paranoia, depression, and 
anxiety.  X.S. provided Dr. Thompson a description of the mall 
shooting.  According to Dr. Thompson, X.S. stated the four other 
individuals at the mall had previously threatened X.S.  X.S. and 
E.G. were not looking for the group, but simply ran into them.  
No. 2021AP419 
 
14 
 
E.G. approached the group and punched one member, and X.S. felt 
threatened.  Under this account, X.S. pulled out a gun, closed 
his eyes, and fired until the magazine was empty.  Based on all 
this information, Dr. Thompson believed X.S. was experiencing 
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), and his 
needs with proper treatment could be "more than adequately 
addressed 
within . . . twelve 
months" 
within 
the 
juvenile 
system.  X.S. offered no testimony, affidavits, or other 
evidence to support this account of events.   
¶21 At the hearing, the State noted that most juveniles, 
even the most violent, spend only about six to nine months in 
correctional placements before they are released into the 
community under supervision.  X.S. did not contest this 
description of the probable length of confinement.  It was also 
uncontested that the most serious action that could be taken if 
X.S. proceeded as a juvenile was confinement in a correctional 
facility, which would at most last until X.S. turned 18 years 
old.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.355(4)(b), 938.34(4m).  Given X.S.'s 
birthdate and the circuit court's scheduling, any juvenile 
disposition order could only have been entered several months 
after X.S. turned 16 years old, leaving by statute less than two 
years as the maximum confinement period.  Id.  
¶22 After receiving evidence, the circuit court denied the 
State's petition for waiver, concluding that the State had not 
met its burden to waive X.S. into adult court.  The State filed 
a petition with the court of appeals for leave to appeal the 
circuit court's waiver decision as a nonfinal order.   
No. 2021AP419 
 
15 
 
¶23 The court of appeals granted the State's petition for 
leave to appeal.  In July 2021, the court of appeals reversed 
the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case to the 
circuit court to conduct another waiver hearing.  State v. X.S., 
No. 2021AP419, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 30.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the circuit court inappropriately relied 
on 
unverified 
hearsay, 
recounted 
through 
Dr. 
Thompson's 
testimony of X.S.'s account of the mall shootings.  Id., ¶18.  
Further, the circuit court improperly considered statements that 
contradicted the State's delinquency petition.  Id., ¶¶19-21.  
According to the court of appeals, the circuit court also failed 
to provide adequate explanation or analysis on the seriousness 
of the offenses, protection of the public, the time remaining in 
the juvenile system, and X.S.'s familial support, specifically 
X.S.'s family's assistance with his escape from police after the 
shooting.  Id., ¶¶22-29.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Id., 
¶30. 
¶24 X.S. petitioned this court for review, and we granted 
the petition in October 2021. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 governs waiver of juvenile 
court jurisdiction.  "The decision to waive juvenile court 
jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 938.18 is committed to the sound 
discretion of the juvenile court."  State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 
52, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192.  "We will reverse the 
No. 2021AP419 
 
16 
 
juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction only if the 
court erroneously exercised its discretion."  Id.  We explained 
the 
process 
for 
reviewing 
discretionary 
juvenile 
waiver 
decisions in J.A.L. v.  State: 
 
An appellate court first looks to the record to see 
whether 
that 
discretion 
was 
in 
fact 
exercised. 
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971).  
Assuming discretion was exercised, the 
appellate court will look for reasons to sustain the 
trial court's discretionary decision.  Loomans v. 
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 158 
N.W.2d 318, 320 (1968).  An appellate court will 
reverse a juvenile court's waiver determination if and 
only if the record does not reflect a reasonable basis 
for the determination or a statement of the relevant 
facts or reasons motivating the determination is not 
carefully delineated in the record.  State v. C.W., 
142 Wis. 2d 763, 766–67, 419 N.W.2d 327 (1987). 
 
162 Wis. 2d 940, 961, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991). 
 
III.   ANALYSIS 
¶26 We will first discuss the procedure for waiving 
juveniles into adult court.  We will then turn to the State's 
waiver petition in this case.  Reviewing the record and circuit 
court findings, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
denied the State's petition. 
 
A.  Juvenile Court Waiver Proceedings 
¶27 There are two steps in the process to waive juvenile 
court jurisdiction.  First, "[t]he court shall determine whether 
the matter has prosecutive merit."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(a).  
We have equated a determination of prosecutive merit in this 
context with "a determination of probable cause at a preliminary 
No. 2021AP419 
 
17 
 
examination."  P.A.K. v. State, 119 Wis. 2d 871, 884, 350 
N.W.2d 677 (1984) (citing T.R.B. v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 179, 192, 
325 N.W.2d 329 (1982)).   
¶28 Once prosecutive merit has been found, the juvenile 
court advances to the second stage of the proceedings.  At the 
second stage, the juvenile court must determine whether to waive 
jurisdiction.   
 
[T]he court shall base its decision whether to waive 
jurisdiction on the following criteria: 
 
(a)  The personality of the juvenile, including 
whether 
the 
juvenile 
has 
a 
mental 
illness 
or 
developmental disability, the juvenile's physical and 
mental maturity, and the juvenile's pattern of living, 
prior treatment history, and apparent potential for 
responding to future treatment. 
 
(am)  The prior record of the juvenile, including 
whether 
the 
court 
has 
previously 
waived 
its 
jurisdiction over the juvenile, whether the juvenile 
has been previously convicted following a waiver of 
the court's jurisdiction or has been previously found 
delinquent, whether such conviction or delinquency 
involved the infliction of serious bodily injury, the 
juvenile's motives and attitudes, and the juvenile's 
prior offenses. 
 
(b)  The type and seriousness of the offense, 
including whether it was against persons or property 
and the extent to which it was committed in a violent, 
aggressive, premeditated or willful manner. 
 
(c)  The adequacy and suitability of facilities, 
services and procedures available for treatment of the 
juvenile and protection of the public within the 
juvenile justice system, and, where applicable, the 
mental health system and the suitability of the 
juvenile 
for 
placement 
in 
the 
serious 
juvenile 
offender program under s. 938.538 or the adult 
intensive sanctions program under s. 301.048. 
 
No. 2021AP419 
 
18 
 
(d)  The desirability of trial and disposition of 
the entire offense in one court if the juvenile was 
allegedly associated in the offense with persons who 
will be charged with a crime in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5).  
¶29 Under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6), the juvenile court 
shall state its finding with respect to the criteria 
on the record. . . . [I]f the court determines on the 
record that there is clear and convincing evidence 
that it is contrary to the best interests of the 
juvenile or of the public to hear the case, the court 
shall 
enter 
an 
order 
waiving 
jurisdiction 
and 
referring the matter to the district attorney for 
appropriate proceedings in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction.  
§ 938.18(6).  
¶30 At juvenile waiver hearings, "common law and statutory 
rules of evidence are not binding."  Wis. Stat. § 938.299(4)(b).  
"Hearsay evidence may be admitted if it has demonstrable 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id.  
¶31 As we explained in State v. Kleser in the analogous 
reverse-waiver context, the time for the juvenile to contest the 
factual basis for the offenses charged is when the court makes 
its probable cause determination.9  2010 WI 88, ¶¶56-66, 328 
Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.  Once prosecutive merit in a 
juvenile waiver case has been found, the juvenile cannot then 
contest or contradict the findings that the offenses charged 
                                                 
9 Reverse waiver is a procedure by which juveniles "subject 
to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the adult criminal 
court" may obtain a "transfer [of] jurisdiction [from adult 
court] to juvenile court."  State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶¶1, 3, 
328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144 (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 938.183(1), 
970.032(1) and (2) (2005-06)).   
No. 2021AP419 
 
19 
 
were committed at the second stage of the proceedings.  Id., ¶66 
("We see no basis for contradicting that finding after the 
preliminary examination except at trial.").  A waiver hearing is 
not an opportunity to conduct a "minitrial" on the merits of the 
case.  Id., ¶69.  However, a juvenile has latitude to present 
supplementary 
evidence 
in 
order 
to 
allow 
the 
court 
to 
effectively analyze the statutory criteria under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18(5), recognizing that violations of the law "[have] 
already been established."  Id., ¶84.   
 
B.  The State's Petition To Waive X.S. Into Adult Court. 
¶32 The circuit court's decision to deny the State's 
waiver petition was not reasonably supported by the facts and 
record.  Tyler T., 341 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 (explaining that "[a] 
juvenile court erroneously exercises its discretion . . . if it 
renders a decision not reasonably supported by the facts of 
record").  We defer to a circuit court's exercise of discretion.  
However, in this case, reversal of the circuit court's decision 
is warranted.  
¶33 Under J.A.L., we first look to "the record to see 
whether that discretion was in fact exercised."   162 Wis. 2d at 
961.  The exercise of discretion incorporates a process of 
reasoning and proper explanation.  State v. Salas Gayton, 2016 
WI 58, ¶19, 370 Wis. 2d 264, 882 N.W.2d 459 ("An exercise of 
discretion contemplates a process of reasoning.  This process 
must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably 
derived by inference from the record and a conclusion based on a 
No. 2021AP419 
 
20 
 
logical 
rationale 
founded 
upon 
proper 
legal 
standards." 
(quotations and citations omitted)); McCleary v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d at 277, 282 (holding that a circuit court that did not 
provide adequate reasoning or explanation for a discretionary 
decision "fail[ed] to exercise discretion," and explaining that 
"[d]iscretion is not synonymous with decision-making"); State v. 
Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶¶16-17, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41 
(reasoning that a discretionary decision that was supported by 
minimal 
and 
inadequate 
explanation 
by 
a 
circuit 
court 
"reflect[ed] decision making" but not "a process of reasoning 
based on a logical rationale," as is required for a proper 
exercise of discretion (citations and quotations omitted)).  The 
circuit court here concluded that waiver into adult court was 
not justified and provided a statement on the record in support 
of that conclusion.  However, the circuit court's findings were 
unclear, and reading the circuit court's transcript as a whole, 
it is difficult to infer how the circuit court applied the facts 
of this case to the statutory criteria provided under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18(5).10  Nonetheless, we will assume, without deciding, 
that the circuit court provided sufficient reasoning and 
explanation to constitute an exercise of discretion. 
                                                 
10 The circuit court in this case discussed much of the 
record at the waiver hearing and cited the statutory criteria.  
In addition, the circuit court repeatedly stated in general 
terms that it had heard evidence from different perspectives.  
However, it is not clear from the circuit court transcript how 
the circuit court interpreted and applied the facts in this case 
to the statutory factors provided under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5).  
No. 2021AP419 
 
21 
 
¶34 Under J.A.L., "[a]ssuming discretion was exercised," 
we next "look for reasons to sustain the trial court's 
discretionary decision."  162 Wis. 2d at 961.  There are several 
facts that may support the circuit court's decision to deny 
waiver into adult court in this case.   
¶35 First, 
at 
the 
Mayfair 
Mall, 
X.S. 
shot 
three 
individuals in the other group with whom X.S. was engaged in a 
confrontation, as well as four bystanders.  However, in the 
process, he also shot his own friend, E.G.  Second, after X.S. 
engaged in the shootings, he contacted his family to assist him 
in his escape and had an Uber called to drive him away from the 
mall.  X.S. and his family formulated a plan to flee the state 
after the shootings took place, and X.S. was apprehended by 
police a few days after the shootings.  From the available 
record, X.S. does not appear to have created a well-developed 
escape plan prior to the mall shootings.  Third, X.S. was 
diagnosed with PTSD as a result of being shot in April 2020, and 
the State did not challenge the validity of that diagnosis.  
X.S. could in the future receive treatment for any remaining 
mental health issues he has.  Proper treatment could improve the 
possibility that X.S. will comply with court-ordered conditions 
and decline opportunities to engage in future criminal behavior.  
Fourth, many of the events that lay at the heart of the record 
in this case occurred when both X.S. and E.G. were acting 
together.  X.S. was shot in April 2020 when he was at a drug 
deal with E.G.; X.S. was arrested in July 2020 for possessing 
with intent to distribute marijuana and obstructing an officer 
No. 2021AP419 
 
22 
 
while he was with E.G.; and X.S. participated in the shooting at 
the Mayfair Mall after E.G. and X.S. confronted the other group 
of four individuals.  It is possible X.S.'s past behavior could 
be attributed in part to his associations with E.G.  Fifth, 
between when X.S. entered the juvenile system in July 2020 and 
when he committed the shootings at issue in November 2020, he 
was in the juvenile system for around four months.  Although 
X.S.'s record in the juvenile system was marked by non-
compliance with court-ordered conditions, there was not a long 
history by which a court could judge the adequacy of the 
juvenile system for X.S.   
¶36 Under J.A.L. we "will reverse a juvenile court's 
waiver determination if and only if the record does not reflect 
a reasonable basis for the determination or a statement of the 
relevant facts or reasons motivating the determination is not 
carefully delineated in the record."  162 Wis. 2d at 961.  We 
conclude that the record does not reflect a reasonable basis for 
denying the State's waiver petition.   
¶37 The circuit court determined there was prosecutive 
merit, which X.S. did not contest.  Therefore, it is taken as 
established for purposes of analyzing the State's waiver 
petition that X.S. on November 20, 2020, engaged in eight acts 
of first-degree reckless injury with use of a dangerous weapon, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23(1)(a) and 939.63(1)(b).  
See Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶84.  For purposes of a waiver 
analysis, it is taken as established that X.S. on eight 
different occasions "recklessly cause[d] great bodily harm to 
No. 2021AP419 
 
23 
 
another human being under circumstances which show utter 
disregard for human life."  § 940.23(1)(a).  In addition, it is 
taken as established that X.S. illegally possessed a dangerous 
weapon on that date, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.60(2)(a).11  
1.  The Type and Seriousness of the Offenses. 
¶38  The offenses X.S. is charged with demonstrate that he 
engaged in reckless conduct while showing an utter disregard for 
human life.  X.S. was willing and able to carry an illegal 
weapon, use it, and thereby risk the lives of eight people.  
¶39  Supplemental facts in the record, used "to put the 
offense[s] in context," only highlight the dangerousness and 
reckless nature of X.S.'s actions.  Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶84.  
According to witness testimony, X.S. and E.G. entered a public 
mall on the Friday afternoon before Thanksgiving.  E.G., with 
X.S., then confronted the group of four other individuals, 
consisting of three males and one female, who were shopping.  
E.G. assaulted one of the members of the other group.  X.S. drew 
a concealed handgun and opened fire on the group.  X.S. unloaded 
around ten rounds, hitting E.G. and at least two of the members 
of the other group.  After firing, X.S. then paused, saw one of 
the members of the other group attempting to flee, turned his 
attention to this other individual, and he opened fire at that 
                                                 
11 As we emphasized previously, at trial the State must 
prove these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt to establish 
X.S.'s guilt.  See supra, ¶4.  When reviewing the juvenile 
waiver decision at issue in this case, we do not establish 
X.S.'s guilt, nor do we attach any form of criminal liability to 
X.S.  
No. 2021AP419 
 
24 
 
individual.  There was no evidence or indication that anyone at 
the mall posed a danger to X.S., used or possessed a weapon, or 
threatened X.S. with serious danger.  This sequence of events 
was corroborated by multiple witnesses and video evidence.  
¶40 Local police were asked to respond to an active 
shooter.  They arrived in less than one minute after the first 
emergency calls were made.  They identified and addressed the 
wounded, and one officer, Dexter Schleis, searched the mall for 
the shooter.  The police did not discover X.S.  Although he did 
not have a well-developed escape plan, X.S. chose not to 
surrender to authorities.  Instead, he fled the scene and 
attempted to escape out of state.  This resulted in a police 
search for an at-large mass shooting suspect.  X.S. was 
eventually apprehended a few days later in possession of the 
weapon used in the shootings.   
¶41 As a result of X.S.'s actions, eight individuals 
received serious bodily injury with gunshot wounds.  One victim 
was his own friend, E.G.  Three of the victims were from the 
other group, and four were completely unassociated bystanders.  
After the shooting, the victims were transported immediately to 
a hospital where they received emergency care.  As the circuit 
court accurately found, "it's a miracle that there were . . . no 
deaths."  
¶42 The record highlights how X.S. carried an illegal 
handgun, entered a public location populated by bystanders and 
innocents, and opened fire.  X.S. targeted at least four members 
of the other group, and in fact paused, turned, and shot at one 
No. 2021AP419 
 
25 
 
member attempting to flee.  At least four of the victims were 
shot indiscriminately and without any association with X.S.   In 
addition, X.S. put his own, young life in serious jeopardy; as 
the circuit court correctly found, it is "miracle" X.S. was not 
shot or killed by a private citizen or police during the 
incidents at issue.   
¶43 With the offenses and record in mind, consideration of 
the "type and seriousness of the offense[s]" overwhelmingly 
support waiver into adult court.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(b).  
There are very few acts that are more deleterious and harmful, 
to 
individuals 
and 
society 
at 
large, 
than 
a 
mass 
and 
indiscriminate shooting at a place of public accommodation.  
Further, witnesses and video evidence confirmed that X.S. paused 
while he was shooting, turned toward a fleeing member of the 
group, and fired several rounds at that member.  The facts, as 
shown by the delinquency petition and the record, demonstrate 
that X.S. acted in a "violent," "aggressive," and "willful 
manner" when he unloaded his handgun at the Mayfair Mall on 
November 20, 2020.  Id.   
¶44 X.S. did not submit into evidence an alternative 
account of the events the day of the shooting.  At the waiver 
hearing, Dr. Thompson stated that X.S. told him that the other 
group of four at the mall had threatened X.S. in the past, X.S. 
and E.G. were not looking for the group at the mall, and X.S. 
simply closed his eyes and unloaded the full magazine of a 
handgun he carried into the mall.  Putting aside the fact that 
closing one's eyes and firing indiscriminately in a public mall 
No. 2021AP419 
 
26 
 
is extraordinarily serious, the waiver hearing transcript 
indicates that the circuit court never relied on the hearsay 
story provided by Dr. Thompson for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.01(3) ("Hearsay is a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.").   
¶45 Although out-of-court statements can be relied upon to 
form expert opinions, State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶28, 253 
Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919, and hearsay is admissible at waiver 
hearings, 
to 
be 
admitted 
hearsay 
statements 
must 
have 
"demonstrable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."  
Wis. Stat. § 938.299(4)(b).  The circuit court did not make any 
findings 
that 
the 
story 
had 
"demonstrable 
circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness" sufficient to warrant admission 
as hearsay statements under § 938.299(4)(b).  The circuit court 
did cite the story as one used by Dr. Thompson to formulate his 
opinion, but that does not on its own constitute reliance by the 
court on the truth of the matters asserted.  See Williams, 253 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶28.  On appeal, X.S. did not argue that the hearsay 
statements recounted by Dr. Thompson should be admitted for the 
truth of the matter asserted.  To the contrary, X.S. repeatedly 
argued that the circuit court did not rely on those statements 
for their truth and, therefore, no hearsay concern is warranted.  
Therefore, while reviewing the record to determine whether there 
was a reasonable basis for the circuit court's decision, we do 
not accept the hearsay story recounted by Dr. Thompson for the 
No. 2021AP419 
 
27 
 
truth of the matter asserted.  J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 961.  The 
"type and seriousness of the offense[s]" overwhelmingly support 
waiver into adult court.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(b).  
2.  The Adequacy and Suitability of Juvenile Disposition. 
¶46 In addition to the seriousness of the offenses, under 
the established record, the "adequacy and suitability" of 
juvenile disposition heavily favors waiver into adult court.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(c).  X.S. received an uncontested 
diagnosis of PTSD, for which he could receive treatment.   In 
addition, X.S. may have been influenced by peer pressure from 
E.G.  Nonetheless, it was well documented and undisputed that 
X.S. struggled mightily while in the juvenile system after he 
was caught possessing with the intent to distribute marijuana 
and obstructing an officer in July 2020.  X.S. was given access 
to programs and resources to help him conform to a socially 
productive way of life and to avoid a life of crime.  Not only 
did X.S. fail to take advantage of these benefits, his 
antisocial and criminal behavior escalated. 
¶47 By court order in August 2020, X.S. was directed to 
participate in the Running Rebels, complete a GAIN assessment, 
attend 
school 
daily, 
refrain 
from 
association 
with 
or 
participation in activities that could be deemed criminal, 
refrain from consuming alcohol and drugs, follow household 
rules, and meet as scheduled with X.S.'s assigned HSW.  X.S. 
performed poorly or outright failed to comply with almost all 
these conditions.   
No. 2021AP419 
 
28 
 
¶48 X.S. initially refused to participate in an intake 
interview, which was corrected only after his attorney and 
parents were made aware of possible consequences of non-
compliance.  Soon after entering the juvenile system, his HSW 
stated that X.S. texted the HSW an advertisement to purchase 
marijuana from him.  The HSW testified that on numerous 
occasions, she attempted to contact X.S. in line with his 
juvenile supervision plan, and he did not answer or respond.  By 
early October, X.S. had not enrolled, received an assessment, 
nor participated in orientation with Running Rebels as directed, 
despite repeated contacts from the HSW and Running Rebels' 
representatives.  X.S. registered for Running Rebels only after 
the HSW threatened court sanctions.  Even then, X.S. was only 
sporadically compliant with the Running Rebels program.  For 
many weeks, he did not contact Running Rebels when he left his 
house, nor did he participate in check-in calls.  Despite 
repeated contacts and offers of assistance from the HSW and 
school social workers, X.S. did not attend a single day of 
school from August 2020 to the date of shooting.  X.S. was 
failing in every class in which he was enrolled.  After the 
shootings, X.S. admitted to using drugs while on juvenile 
supervision, and by the date of the shootings, X.S. had not 
completed a GAIN assessment.  As shown by the facts of the 
instant case, X.S. continued to associate himself with E.G. and 
engaged in criminal behavior while on supervision. 
¶49 X.S.'s actions and history demonstrated that he was 
deeply unresponsive to the juvenile system while he was a 
No. 2021AP419 
 
29 
 
participant.  Juvenile resources did not seem to improve X.S.'s 
situation, and this period under juvenile supervision culminated 
in a mass shooting.  Although the HSW stated that X.S. could be 
adequately 
treated 
in 
the 
juvenile 
system, 
offering 
a 
correctional placement, the record and the HSW's own testimony 
conclusively contradicted the notion that X.S. was receptive to 
juvenile services and treatment.12  The State contended that, in 
all likelihood, X.S. would at most spend six to nine months in 
confinement if given a correctional placement.  This was 
undisputed before the circuit court and on appeal.  By statute, 
the maximum length X.S. could spend at a correctional placement 
was up to his 18th birthday, which was less than two years.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 938.355(4)(b), 938.34(4m).  Given X.S.'s criminal 
actions at issue in this case, and his demonstrated responses to 
juvenile interventions in the past, the amount of confinement 
under consideration in this case is woefully inadequate to 
address X.S.'s serious needs and his risk to the public. 
¶50 X.S.'s hired expert Dr. Thompson testified in favor of 
adjudicating X.S. as a juvenile.  However, the contradictions 
with the record and the information Dr. Thompson did not 
consider placed his opinion in serious doubt.  Dr. Thompson did 
not consider X.S.'s record while on juvenile supervision, police 
reports of the mall shootings, and video evidence of X.S.'s 
                                                 
12 The HSW described in detail X.S.'s past history and 
failures in complying with court-ordered conditions.  See, 
supra, ¶¶5-11.  In addition, the HSW had access to a court-
ordered YASI risk assessment that concluded X.S. was at high 
risk of reoffending. 
No. 2021AP419 
 
30 
 
actions while at the mall, specifically pausing while shooting 
and taking aim at a fleeing victim.  Dr. Thompson reasoned, 
relying on self-reported statements from X.S.'s mother, that 
X.S. was "compliant" and had "completed" the Running Rebels 
program.  That is undeniably false.  In addition, Dr. Thompson 
explained that X.S. had "strong social support" and a "positive 
attitude toward intervention and authority."  This too is 
completely at odds with the full record, which Dr. Thompson 
admittedly did not consider.  Dr. Thompson himself stated on 
cross-examination that if he had considered the fact that X.S.'s 
family conspired to help X.S. flee from the police, that would 
present a "problem" for his favorable findings with regard to 
X.S.'s social support.  From an incomplete picture of the facts 
and a series of faulty assumptions, Dr. Thompson opined that 
X.S.'s 
needs 
could 
be 
"more 
than 
adequately 
addressed 
within . . . twelve months" within the juvenile system.  This 
opinion does not alter the analysis that the "adequacy and 
suitability" of juvenile disposition strongly favored waiver.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(c).   
3.  The Personality of the Juvenile. 
¶51 The "personality of the juvenile" also strongly 
supports waiver.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(a).  X.S. received a 
diagnosis of PTSD and may have been influenced by negative peer 
pressure.  He nonetheless engaged in a mall shooting where he 
carelessly gunned down eight people.  X.S. concealed an illegal 
handgun and, targeted, paused, and shot at a group of people 
with whom he had gotten into a confrontation without provocation 
No. 2021AP419 
 
31 
 
or any serious threat.  After the shooting, he worked with his 
parents and family to devise an escape plan.  All these acts 
were committed while X.S. was already in the juvenile system.  
Prior to entering the juvenile system, X.S. dealt drugs and 
obstructed police.  Despite the access to the benefits of 
juvenile disposition, X.S. performed abysmally.  In his time on 
juvenile supervision, X.S. violated almost every court-ordered 
condition with which he was obliged to comply, and he committed 
at least eight serious felonies and one misdemeanor.  Through 
Running Rebels, GAIN assessment, school social workers and 
teachers, and access to a HSW and an overseeing juvenile court, 
X.S. was given the opportunity to receive support, obtain any 
needed help, and put his life on a path to becoming a productive 
member of society.  X.S. was completely unreceptive to these 
resources.  Given the evidence currently available, his "pattern 
of living, prior treatment history, and apparent potential for 
responding to future treatment" heavily weighed in favor of 
waiver.  Id. 
4.  The Prior Record of the Juvenile. 
¶52 As thoroughly explained above, X.S.'s "prior record" 
supports waiver into adult court.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(am).  
X.S. was not previously waived into adult court, and before he 
committed a mass shooting, his prior record did not include acts 
of violence.  Further, X.S.'s motives and attitudes may have 
been influenced by his association with E.G.  However, at the 
waiver hearing, it was undisputed that in April 2020, he was in 
a drug deal with two of his friends and was shot.  In July 2020, 
No. 2021AP419 
 
32 
 
he was arrested for distribution of marijuana and obstructing an 
officer, and he was brought into the juvenile system.  He 
pleaded guilty to the obstruction charge.  The marijuana 
distribution charge was dismissed but read in.  In August 2020, 
X.S. was court ordered to comply with conditions of supervision, 
to participate in a number of services, and to attend school.  
During 
his 
time 
in 
the 
juvenile 
system, 
X.S.'s 
record 
demonstrates that he engaged in criminal behavior and violated 
his conditions of supervision in numerous ways.  According to 
X.S.'s records and testimony at the waiver hearing, X.S. still 
used drugs, his text to his HSW indicated that he continued to 
deal drugs, he refused to attend any classes at school, and he 
was largely non-responsive to professionals at Running Rebels 
and the juvenile system which sought to give him help and 
support.  After all this, he participated in a mass shooting and 
attempted to flee the state, while still on supervision.  X.S.'s 
escalated criminal activity and non-compliance with court orders 
and programming in the juvenile justice system is nothing short 
of frightening.   His "prior record" demonstrates that juvenile 
court is inadequate to address X.S.'s behaviors, needs, and 
predispositions, and that adult adjudication can best ensure the 
protection of the public and the safe reintroduction of X.S. 
into society.13  Id.  
                                                 
13 Because X.S. was not "associated in the offense with 
persons who will be charged with a crime in the court of 
criminal 
jurisdiction," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.18(5)(d) 
is 
not 
applicable. 
No. 2021AP419 
 
33 
 
¶53 Appellate courts defer to the discretionary decisions 
of circuit court judges, who are in the best position to observe 
the facts and apply the law.  Tyler T., 341 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  But 
while a circuit court's discretion is broad, it is "not 
unlimited."  Salas Gayton, 370 Wis. 2d 264, ¶24; Hartung v. 
Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66-69, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981) ("[T]he 
exercise of discretion is not the equivalent of unfettered 
decision-making.").  It has been long established that circuit 
courts must exercise their discretion within the bounds of 
reasonable decision-making.  Tyler T., 341 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  We 
cannot search the record to find reasons to overturn circuit 
courts' discretionary decisions.  Id. ("In reviewing the 
juvenile court's discretionary decision to waive jurisdiction, 
we look for reasons to sustain the court's decision.").  
However, we cannot stand by while discretionary decisions 
falling outside the bounds of reasonable action are executed and 
enforced in this state.  See J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 961 ("An 
appellate 
court 
will 
reverse 
a 
juvenile 
court's 
waiver 
determination if . . . the record does not reflect a reasonable 
basis for the determination.").  As an appellate court, to sit 
back and allow the implementation of wholly unjustified orders 
would be as great a misuse of our judicial role as would be the 
overriding of discretionary decisions simply due to a lack of 
comfort, or mere disagreement with those decisions.  See Casper 
v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 81, ¶30, 336 Wis. 2d 267, 800 
N.W.2d 880 (explaining that when reviewing a circuit court's 
exercise of discretion "we do not look to whether this court 
No. 2021AP419 
 
34 
 
would or would not have granted relief but rather whether the 
circuit court [erroneously exercised] its discretion").  
¶54 We have a duty as appellate courts to review lower 
court decision making, just as lower courts have an obligation 
to reasonably exercise their discretion.  If lower courts 
erroneously 
exercise 
their 
discretion, 
we 
have 
the 
responsibility to intervene.  See, e.g., Miller v. Hanover Ins. 
Co., 2010 WI 75, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493 (reasoning 
that a circuit court's discretionary decision to deny a motion 
for relief from default judgment because it was "not reasonable 
in light of the extraordinary circumstances present," despite 
the fact that the defendant was already a named and noticed 
party in the lawsuit, the defendant received several notices of 
the action, including to the defendant's registered agent, and 
the defendant's attorney of record told the plaintiff in a 
letter he represented the defendant as to an unrelated issue); 
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶¶46-73, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698 (holding that a plaintiff had set an adequate 
foundation for expert testimony, the expert was professionally 
competent to testify in the area, and the expert testimony met a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, despite circuit court 
findings with factual citations to the contrary); Hartung, 102 
Wis. 2d at 66-69 (concluding that a circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by awarding alimony and child support 
at 27 percent of the payor's income and limiting alimony for 18 
months, even recognizing that there is an interest in ensuring 
self-sufficiency, that it was unrealistic for the payor to 
No. 2021AP419 
 
35 
 
afford payments without the recipient beginning some form of 
work, and that the payor and recipient signed a divorce 
agreement in consideration for the stated alimony); McCleary, 49 
Wis. 2d at 278-86 (holding that a nine-year sentence for forging 
a $50 check was an erroneous exercise of discretion by relying 
in part on the defendant's testimony and the weaknesses of a 
professional report favoring the sentence, despite the fact that 
the circuit court believed the defendant's explanation was not 
credible and that the defendant thought he was above the law and 
lacked a sense of responsibility).  
¶55 The facts of this case are extreme, and the circuit 
court's decision is distinctly out of the ordinary:  it is 
erroneous.  Considering the criteria enumerated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18(5), the record reasonably supports only the conclusion 
that there is "clear and convincing evidence that it is contrary 
to the best interests of the juvenile [and] the public to hear 
the case" in juvenile court.  § 938.18(6); Tyler T., 341 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶24. 
 
While 
we 
are 
hesitant 
to 
overturn 
a 
discretionary decision of a circuit court, the circuit court's 
No. 2021AP419 
 
36 
 
decision below to deny the State's waiver petition cannot be 
upheld.14   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶56 We affirm the court of appeals' decision to reverse 
the circuit court and remand the case.  However, we conclude 
that a new waiver hearing is unnecessary.  We conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying 
the State's waiver petition.  There exists no reasonable basis 
for denying the State's waiver petition.  Therefore, we remand 
the case to the circuit court with instructions to grant the 
State's waiver petition. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and affirmed and, as modified, the cause remanded to 
the circuit court. 
                                                 
14 After the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
X.S. filed a motion for reconsideration.  The court of appeals 
denied 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
without 
providing 
reasoning.  Before this court, X.S. argues that the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the 
motion for reconsideration without providing explanation.  Even 
if we assume without deciding that the court of appeals 
erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to give adequate 
reasoning, we will not reverse the court of appeals' decision.  
As a matter of law, the court of appeals' decision was correct 
on the merits.  See Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 
Wis. 2d 6, 20, 531 N.W.2d 597 (1995) ("While the basis for an 
exercise of discretion should be set forth in the record, it 
will be upheld if the appellate court can find facts of record 
which would support the [lower] court's decision.").  The 
circuit court's denial of waiver in this case was erroneous and 
must be reversed.    
No. 2021AP419 
 
37 
 
 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
1 
 
¶57 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring). The 
circuit court below determined that waiver into adult court was 
not warranted.  As the majority opinion correctly concludes, 
there was no reasonable basis for the circuit court to deny the 
State's waiver petition in this case.  Majority op., ¶56; see 
also J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 961, 471 N.W.2d 493 
(1991).  Therefore, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion, and the circuit court's decision to deny waiver must 
be reversed.  I write separately because there is a second 
reason why the circuit court's decision must be reversed:  the 
circuit court failed to provide sufficient reasoning to support 
its decision.   
¶58 A circuit court erroneously exercises it discretion 
when "if it fails to carefully delineate the relevant facts or 
reasons motivating its decision."1  State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 
52, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192; McCleary v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971) ("[T]he failure to 
exercise discretion (discretion that is apparent from the 
                                                 
1 "Regardless of the extent of the trial court's reasoning, 
a reviewing court will uphold a discretionary decision if there 
are facts in the record which would support the trial court's 
decision had it fully exercised its discretion."  State v. 
Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶29, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174 
(quotations omitted); accord McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 
282, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  We cannot reverse a valid juvenile 
waiver decision simply due to the circuit court's failure to 
articulate reasoning without providing the opportunity for a 
rehearing.  See Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 16 Wis. 2d 284, 286, 114 
N.W.2d 438 (1962) (explaining that appellate courts "remand to 
the trial court to exercise discretion" when "there [is] room in 
the facts which did not confine the court to one result").   
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
2 
 
record) when discretion is required, constitutes an [erroneous 
exercise] of discretion.").  
¶59 The statute governing juvenile waivers into adult 
court 
adds 
support 
and 
clarification 
to 
this 
standard.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(4)(b) states that circuit courts "shall 
base [their] decision[s] whether to waive jurisdiction on the 
[five] criteria" specified in § 938.18(5).  Section 938.18(5) 
reiterates this requirement:  "If prosecutive merit is found, 
the court shall base its decision whether to waive jurisdiction 
on the [five] criteria."  Finally, § 938.18(6) explains that, 
"[a]fter considering the criteria under sub. (5), the court 
shall state its finding with respect to the criteria on the 
record."  The plain text of § 938.18 indicates that circuit 
courts must consider, address, and analyze each of the five 
criteria used in juvenile waiver proceedings before making a 
waiver determination.  § 938.18(5).  Of course, the weight and 
importance of some criteria may differ depending on the case.  
"The juvenile court has discretion as to the weight it affords 
each of the criteria."  J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 960.  There may 
be some cases, for instance, in which the seriousness of the 
offense alone justifies wavier into adult court.  See B.B. v. 
State, 166 Wis. 2d 202, 209, 479 N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(affirming as a reasonable exercise of discretion a circuit 
court decision to waive a juvenile charged with five counts of 
first-degree intentional homicide into adult court when all 
criteria favored retaining jurisdiction, except the seriousness 
of the offense).  Nonetheless, no matter how the circuit court 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
3 
 
decides the criteria are best weighed, it must still evaluate 
each of the five statutory criteria and state its findings on 
the record.  Tyler T., 341 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24; § 938.18(4)(b), (5), 
(6).   
¶60 While the circuit court in this case discussed much of 
the record at the waiver hearing and cited the statutory 
criteria, it failed to perform that final, invaluable step of 
proper judicial reasoning:  analyzing and applying the facts to 
the relevant criteria.  The circuit court stated in broad and 
generalized terms that it had received evidence on different 
topics.  It stated, "we have talked and I heard a lot of 
testimony about school and how schooling was a major issue"; "we 
all 
know 
that 
connection 
between 
education 
and 
risk 
of 
offending"; "[the HSW] did talk about . . . [her] frequent 
contact with [X.S.], trying to identify how she could help him"; 
a YASI risk assessment finding X.S. a high risk to reoffend 
"really highlighted . . . history, school, and family"; "[w]e 
heard from Dr. Thompson" who "went through his assessment."   
¶61 The circuit court then turned to the statutory 
criteria.  It stated, "we talked about some of [X.S.'s] 
personality traits" and his "family life"; "[w]e also talked 
about 
his 
age 
and 
maturity 
level"; 
"[X.S.'s] 
continued 
association with [E.G.] . . . came out when we discussed the 
nature of this offense that we're discussing"; "we can talk 
about [maturity] in a number of ways"; "[p]attern of living, so 
we talked about that."  For prior history, the circuit court 
stated 
"we 
talked 
and 
I 
heard . . . [X.S] 
has 
been 
on 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
4 
 
supervision"; "[X.S.] didn't comply with Running Rebels or his 
GAIN assessment"; and X.S.'s prior delinquency "came in with two 
charges" and "we talked in detail about that prior case."  For 
the seriousness of the offense, the circuit court stated that 
"we spent a lot of time on this criteria"; "the allegations are 
incredibly serious"; and the record "shed[s] some light on our 
discussion about whether the act was premeditated."  For the 
adequacy of the juvenile system, the circuit court stated "we 
have . . . a history of really declining and not engaging in 
several 
treatment 
options"; 
"legal 
history, 
school, 
and 
family . . . are the risk factors we're talking about"; and "I 
didn't hear any testimony on a timeline that [X.S.] would need 
for treatment."   
¶62  Finally, the circuit court explained that "much of the 
conversation focused on the nature of the offense . . . and the 
adequacy of the system."  It stated that it has "no information 
to . . . find that the juvenile system is inadequate" and "[w]e 
handle serious cases all the time in juvenile court."  The 
circuit court appeared to conclude that the "adequacy and 
suitability" of juvenile facilities weighed against waiver; the 
circuit court explained that the seriousness of the offense 
"does not bar" juvenile proceedings.   
¶63 The lack of analysis provided in the circuit court's 
transcript is striking.  The circuit court repeatedly stated in 
general terms that it and the parties, i.e., "we," heard 
evidence from different perspectives.  The transcript leaves the 
reader anxiously awaiting how the circuit court will weigh those 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
5 
 
facts and apply them to the statutory criteria.  Alas, the 
reader is ultimately left disappointed, learning only after the 
fact that the circuit court had "already discussed" those 
issues, unbeknownst to any reasonable observer.  Contrary to the 
circuit court's statements, it never actually provided analysis.  
It never individualized the statutory criteria to the facts of 
this case, and it never fully articulated how it came to its 
decision.   
¶64 The circuit court reiterated the substantial body of 
evidence that favored waiver, including X.S.'s abysmal treatment 
history, his prior conduct, the serious issues with X.S.'s 
family support, and the extreme and violent nature of his 
crimes.  None of these facts, at the center of a proper waiver 
analysis in this case, were weighed or properly balanced against 
any offsetting considerations.  They were simply cited, along 
with the statutory criteria.  The circuit court then declared 
they "were discussed."  Similarly, the circuit court cited the 
HSW's and Dr. Thompson's opinions in opposition to waiver.  But 
the court never fully explained how much, if any, weight it was 
giving to those opinions and whether and to what extent the 
opinions were credible, given the information relied upon by the 
HSW and Dr. Thompson in the formation of their opinions.  The 
circuit court did not compare the HSW's final opinion to the 
body of evidence the circuit court cited and the HSW herself 
produced, which included a YASI risk assessment indicating a 
high likelihood of recidivism, serial violations of the prior 
juvenile disposition order, minimal respect for court-ordered 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
6 
 
conditions, and little receptiveness to outreach and treatment.  
The circuit court did not discuss the shocking discrepancy 
between the established record and Dr. Thompson's findings that 
X.S. was compliant with court orders, had a positive attitude 
toward state authority, and had a strong network to support law-
abiding behaviors.     
¶65 From reading the circuit court transcript, we cannot 
readily determine whether the circuit court believed "[t]he 
personality of the juvenile," "[t]he prior record of the 
juvenile," or the "type and seriousness of the offense" weighed 
in favor or against waiver.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(a), (am), 
(b).  And if we cannot, we seriously doubt others, especially 
the lay public, can.  While the circuit court appeared to 
conclude that the "adequacy and suitability" of the juvenile 
system did not support waiver, that is only one criteria.  
§ 938.18(5)(c).  The circuit court provided no material analysis 
as to how that one criteria compared, interacted, and countered 
considerations of other factors.  No substantive discussion was 
provided as to how all the factors, considered and weighed 
together as a whole, supported denial of the State's waiver 
petition.   
¶66 More is required to ensure a proper exercise of 
discretion.  See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d at 268-70 
(describing how a sentencing court read from evidence, concluded 
it agreed with the evidence without further analysis or 
explanation, and provided cursory findings on the seriousness of 
the offense and the defendant's motives; reasoning that the 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
7 
 
Wisconsin Supreme Court could not infer whether the sentencing 
court had applied the applicable sentencing factors, thus 
resulting in an erroneous exercise of discretion); Hartung v. 
Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 67, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981) (explaining in 
the context of circuit court rationale for a alimony and child 
support order that "[i]t is not enough that the relevant factors 
upon which discretion could have been based may be found 
obscurely in the record"); State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶¶16-
17, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41 (explaining that the circuit 
court indicated it "[took] into consideration" evidence and 
"mentioned a number of the sentencing factors," which reflected 
"decision-making" but not a "process of reasoning based on a 
logical rationale," in an erroneous exercise of discretion 
(quotations omitted)).  
¶67 Circuit courts have the responsibility to "carefully 
delineate the relevant facts [and] reasons motivating its 
decision."  Tyler T., 341 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  They are statutorily 
obligated to "state [their] finding[s] with respect to the 
criteria on the record."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6).  This ensures 
clear and well reasoned decisions for the benefit of the public, 
appellate 
courts, 
and 
the 
individuals 
subject 
to 
waiver 
proceedings.  Here, the circuit court failed to provide adequate 
reasoning for its decision, and that was an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.   
¶68 As the majority opinion correctly concludes, there was 
no reasonable basis for the circuit court to deny the State's 
waiver petition in this case.  Majority op., ¶56; see also 
No.  2021AP419.akz 
 
8 
 
J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 961.  However, there is a second reason 
why the circuit court's decision must be reversed: the circuit 
court failed to provide adequate reasoning as required under the 
law.   
¶69 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
1 
 
¶71 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  In the face of a 
deeply disturbing crime, the State sought to waive a juvenile 
offender out of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and into 
adult court.  The circuit court denied the State's request.  
Although another judge might have reasonably reached a different 
conclusion on the same set of facts, this decision was within 
the discretion the law affords to circuit court judges.  The 
majority, however, displaces the circuit court's discretion with 
its own, even as it pays lip service to the deferential standard 
of review we are duty-bound to apply.  After reviewing cold 
transcripts of testimony the circuit court heard firsthand, the 
majority concludes it knows better and grants the State's waiver 
petition——a remedy even the State didn't think to ask for.  The 
majority errs. 
¶72 The majority's essential misstep is that it brushes 
aside the circuit court's decision and conducts the analysis 
afresh——both in finding its own facts and deciding the issue 
without the proper deference to the circuit court.  To be sure, 
the circuit court's analysis left something to be desired in 
both content and clarity.  But that should not doom its 
determination.  Read reasonably and in context, the transcript 
reveals that the circuit court examined the relevant facts, 
applied the proper standard of law, and rationally connected the 
facts to the law.  See Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 2002 
WI 28, ¶19, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788.  Given this standard 
of review, the law instructs that the ultimate judgment call is 
the circuit court's to make, even for decisions we dislike.  The 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
2 
 
majority acknowledges this rule, and then promptly ignores it.  
Because the law entrusts these judgment calls to locally elected 
circuit court judges, and not to us, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶73 This case began when the State filed a delinquency 
petition against Xander (a pseudonym), alleging eight counts of 
first-degree reckless injury with the use of a dangerous weapon 
and a single count of possession of a dangerous weapon.  The 
charges stemmed from a shooting that occurred at Mayfair Mall in 
Wauwatosa; eight people were senselessly injured.  Xander, the 
alleged shooter, was 15 at the time. 
¶74 The day after the delinquency petition was filed, the 
State petitioned for waiver of jurisdiction into adult court.  
At the waiver hearing, the State presented only one witness, an 
employee of the Milwaukee County Division of Youth and Family 
Services (DYFS) who recommended against waiving Xander into 
adult court.  Xander called his own expert witness, Dr. 
Thompson, who, like the State's witness, testified against 
waiver.  He opined that Xander could be effectively treated in 
the juvenile system.  No witness called by either the State or 
Xander testified in favor of the waiver petition.  After hearing 
testimony from both witnesses and argument from the attorneys, 
the circuit court denied the State's petition for waiver, 
providing 
a 
lengthy 
explanation 
from 
the 
bench 
for 
its 
reasoning. 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
3 
 
¶75 The State sought leave to appeal the waiver denial, 
which the court of appeals granted.  The court of appeals 
reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a new waiver 
hearing.  State v. X.S., No. 2021AP419, unpublished slip op. 
(July 20, 2021).  Xander moved for reconsideration, which the 
court of appeals summarily denied.1  We granted Xander's petition 
for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶76 This case centers on the relevant legal standards for 
waiver of a juvenile into adult court under Wis. Stat. § 938.18.  
Under the system the legislature has designed, not all criminal 
conduct is treated the same.  In particular, the legislature 
established a justice system for juveniles aiming to "impose 
accountability 
for 
violations 
of 
law 
and 
equip 
juvenile 
offenders 
with 
competencies 
to 
live 
responsibly 
and 
productively."  Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2); see also State v. 
Toliver, 2014 WI 85, ¶26, 356 Wis. 2d 642, 851 N.W.2d 251.  
Juvenile courts have "exclusive jurisdiction . . . over any 
juvenile 10 years of age or older who is alleged to be 
delinquent."  Wis. Stat. § 938.12(1).  Rather than impose 
criminal penalties, juvenile courts may impose a variety of 
dispositions on juveniles to protect the public and hold 
                                                 
1 Xander and the State both argue this summary denial was 
erroneous.  The court of appeals did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion; nothing in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.24(2) 
requires the court of appeals to explain its rationale for 
denying a party's reconsideration motion.  See also State v. 
Jendusa, 2021 WI 24, ¶21, 396 Wis. 2d 34, 955 N.W.2d 777. 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
4 
 
offenders accountable.  Compare Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01, 973.03, 
973.09 (criminal penalties) with Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (juvenile 
dispositions); Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2) (purposes of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 938).  They also work with service providers, such as DYFS 
to provide treatment and care that will redirect juveniles away 
from further delinquent behavior.  § 938.01(2).  However, a 
court may waive jurisdiction over a juvenile and transfer 
jurisdiction to adult criminal court via statutory procedures 
outlined in § 938.18. 
¶77 Waiver under Wis. Stat. § 938.18 is a discretionary 
decision, reviewed under the highly deferential erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 52, 
¶24, 
341 
Wis. 2d 1, 
814 
N.W.2d 192. 
 
"A 
juvenile 
court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it fails to carefully 
delineate the relevant facts or reasons motivating its decision 
or if it renders a decision not reasonably supported by the 
facts of record."  Id.  On review, appellate courts affirm the 
wavier determination if the record reflects "a reasonable basis 
for the determination or a statement of the relevant facts or 
reasons motivating the determination."  J.A.L. v. State, 162 
Wis. 2d 940, 961, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991).  Unless they are 
clearly in error, we accept the circuit court's findings of 
fact.  State v. Van Linn, 2022 WI 16, ¶10, 401 Wis. 2d 1, 971 
N.W.2d 478.  And while circuit courts are given the authority to 
make reasonable decisions based on the facts and law, a decision 
based on a misapplication of the law must be reversed.  State v. 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
5 
 
Patrick 
G.B., 
2001 
WI App 85, 
¶12, 
242 
Wis. 2d 550, 
627 
N.W.2d 898. 
A.  Waiver Hearings Under Wis. Stat. § 938.18 
¶78 A petition waiving jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
may be filed if the "juvenile is alleged to have violated any 
state criminal law on or after the juvenile's 15th birthday." 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(1)(c).   This petition "may be filed by the 
district attorney or the juvenile or may be initiated by the 
court," and it "shall contain a brief statement of the facts 
supporting the request for waiver."  § 938.18(2).  The petition 
"shall be accompanied by or filed after the filing of a petition 
alleging delinquency and shall be filed prior to the plea 
hearing"——subject to certain exceptions.  Id. 
¶79 The waiver hearing that follows is a two-step process.  
First, the court must determine "whether the matter has 
prosecutive merit."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(a).  While not 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 938.18, this court previously noted 
"that the determination of 'prosecutive merit' is analogous to 
the determination of probable cause in a criminal proceeding and 
that a finding of prosecutive merit must be based on a showing 
that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the juvenile has 
committed the violation of state criminal law charged."  T.R.B. 
v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 179, 187, 325 N.W.2d 329 (1982). 
¶80 Once prosecutive merit is established, the circuit 
court proceeds to decide, in its discretion, whether it should 
waive jurisdiction.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(a).  This decision 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
6 
 
must be based on five criteria articulated in § 938.18(5), all 
of which are explored in depth below.  After consideration of 
§ 938.18(5)'s criteria, 
the court shall state its finding with respect to the 
criteria on the record, and, if the court determines 
on the record that there is clear and convincing 
evidence that it is contrary to the best interests of 
the juvenile or of the public to hear the case, the 
court shall enter an order waiving jurisdiction and 
referring the matter to the district attorney for 
appropriate proceedings in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction. 
§ 938.18(6).  Thus, a circuit court's duty is to state its 
findings on the record.  Then it must determine whether the 
State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that waiver is appropriate because it is in the best interests 
of the juvenile or the public. 
B.  The Circuit Court's Discretionary Decision 
¶81 Here, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
there 
was 
prosecutive merit, which Xander did not contest.  The dispute 
therefore 
centers 
entirely 
on 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
permissibly exercised its discretion when it denied the State's 
petition to waive Xander into adult court. 
¶82 The circuit court heard a full day's worth of 
testimony, and several hours of argument, before announcing its 
decision on waiver.  Only two witnesses testified:  Xander 
called Dr. Thompson, his expert, and the State presented a DYFS 
employee.  Both testified in support of the juvenile court 
retaining jurisdiction.  To reiterate, the circuit court's 
choice to deny waiver was based on testimony from two witnesses 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
7 
 
who testified against waiver and zero witnesses who recommended 
waiver. 
¶83 The court began its decision with a high-level 
overview of the testimony and identified the correct legal 
standards:  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5), (6).  It then worked through 
the criteria one by one and discussed the pertinent testimony 
for each. 
¶84 The circuit court started by reading the first 
criterion under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(a):  "The personality of 
the juvenile, including whether the juvenile has a mental 
illness or developmental disability, the juvenile's physical and 
mental maturity, and the juvenile's pattern of living, prior 
treatment history, and apparent potential for responding to 
future treatment."  It then summarized the testimony and 
argument it had heard with respect to this factor over the 
course of two days.  Specifically, it noted Dr. Thompson's 
diagnosis of Xander; that Xander's mental and physical maturity 
seemed consistent with his age; Xander's home life and his 
association with another individual allegedly present at the 
shooting and involved in his first juvenile adjudication; and 
Xander's past treatment history, noting that Xander was under 
supervision when the allegations at issue in the present 
petition surfaced.  Finally, the court indicated that it 
received differing opinions on Xander's potential for responding 
to future treatment——a subject it also addressed at the end of 
its decision.  In identifying the relevant and uncontested 
testimony pertinent to this criterion, the only reasonable 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
8 
 
reading of the transcript is that the circuit court did exactly 
as the statute requires:  "state its finding with respect to the 
criteria on the record."  § 938.18(6). 
¶85 The circuit court next looked to the second criterion: 
The prior record of the juvenile, including whether 
the court has previously waived its jurisdiction over 
the juvenile, whether the juvenile has been previously 
convicted 
following 
a 
waiver 
of 
the 
court's 
jurisdiction or has been previously found delinquent, 
whether such conviction or delinquency involved the 
infliction of serious bodily injury, the juvenile's 
motives and attitudes, and the juvenile's prior 
offenses. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(am).  The circuit court noted Xander's 
prior juvenile delinquency and that Xander had no prior adult 
convictions.  It stated that the prior delinquency did not 
involve the infliction of serious bodily injury.  Again, this 
cannot help but be understood as factual findings regarding 
Xander's prior record. 
¶86 The third criterion requires consideration of the 
"type and seriousness of the offense, including whether it was 
against persons or property and the extent to which it was 
committed in a violent, aggressive, premeditated or willful 
manner."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(b).  The circuit court 
unequivocally addressed this head on.  It explained that 
"there's no dispute that this was an incredibly dangerous, 
serious, series of events.  These allegations are incredibly 
serious."  The court largely adopted the district attorney's 
summation of the allegations made previously in the hearing, 
adding that some information, particularly regarding Xander's 
mental state, might be speculative.  Notably, the circuit court 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
9 
 
acknowledged that these alleged events occurred in a public 
place where more people could have died or been injured——once 
more 
underscoring 
the 
serious 
nature 
of 
these 
offenses.  
Finally, the circuit court mentioned that both the State and the 
defense discussed the seemingly impulsive nature of the alleged 
crime.  A review of the transcript thus reveals that the circuit 
court took care to incorporate the frightening details of the 
charges against Xander into its consideration; it did not ignore 
or minimize the seriousness of the allegations. 
¶87 The circuit court then turned to the fourth criterion: 
The adequacy and suitability of facilities, services 
and procedures available for treatment of the juvenile 
and protection of the public within the juvenile 
justice system, and, where applicable, the mental 
health system and the suitability of the juvenile for 
placement in the serious juvenile offender program 
under s. 938.538 or the adult intensive sanctions 
program under s. 301.048. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(c).  When analyzing this criterion, the 
circuit court identified what evidence it had heard, and what it 
had not.  The circuit court took note that because of Xander's 
age, he could be placed at Lincoln Hills, the juvenile 
correction facility, for only "six to nine months."  The court 
acknowledged the State's view that a six-to-nine month window 
was too short to address Xander's risk factors.  But the circuit 
court did not adopt that view.  Instead, it concluded that 
because there was no evidence in the record regarding how long 
Xander might need for treatment, it could not find that the time 
remaining was insufficient.  The circuit court's approach is 
consistent with the legal requirement that it is the State's 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
10 
 
burden to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.  See 
§ 939.18(4)(b), (6).  The circuit court also acknowledged this 
was not Xander's first delinquency, but it explained that the 
juvenile system could address and work to change Xander's 
behavior and school attendance.  All told, the circuit court 
made a series of factual findings regarding the fourth criterion 
based on the testimony it heard. 
¶88 Finally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
addressed 
the 
fifth 
criterion:  "The desirability of trial and disposition of the 
entire offense in one court if the juvenile was allegedly 
associated in the offense with persons who will be charged with 
a crime in the court of criminal jurisdiction."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18(5)(d).  The circuit court correctly stated this 
criterion was not applicable. 
¶89 After finishing this review and identification of 
relevant evidence for each of the five criteria under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18(5), the circuit court turned to the main question 
before it, supplementing its determination with additional 
references to the evidence it had heard.  We quote this portion 
of its decision in full: 
But a major part of our focus is on this -- this 
nature of this offense and the time that we have left 
in the juvenile system. 
You know, I've said this before as well, this Court 
relies on – I'm not the one that gets to do the 
assessments.  I'm not the one that gets to do the 
treatment plan.  I'm not the one that gets to -- I'm 
not the expert.  I'm not a psychologist. 
I rely on the experts in the fields to tell me what 
information is appropriate in order to both keep our 
youth safe and rehabilitate them and to some -- and to 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
11 
 
an extent keep the public safe, right?  And they know 
that usually the State is the person saying that they 
represent the public and community safety but that's a 
part of my job too, as well.  So that's what I rely 
on.  I'm relying on the information provided by DYFS 
at least to give me some context on what was going on 
at the time of this offense.  I'm considering the fact 
that when we talk about the adequacy of this system I 
have no information to opine or find that the juvenile 
system is inadequate to meet [Xander's] needs.  I 
don't have information that -- I would -- I would have 
to accept the State's argument that jurisdiction until 
he is 18 is inadequate, but again I don't have 
information that supports that -- that assertion. 
I'd have to find that without any sort of expert 
testimony or psychologist saying, "Hey, based on these 
treatment needs and this plan this is not going to 
work".  I don't have that.  We handle serious cases 
all the time in juvenile court.  So the offense being 
serious, this offense, because this is an individual 
assessment, does not bar or indicate that this Court 
that this system would be inadequate on its face. 
I've been given a diagnosis with a treatment plan.  
That is not uncommon for treatment plans that we give 
other youth, in other cases, who are similarly 
situated.  I don't have information that would lead me 
to find -- that could support a finding that this 
system is inadequate, particularly given that there 
are a number of treatment options and secure settings 
that have not been utilized. 
And aside from that, I know, that there -- based on 
the evidence based tool that we use to assess risk 
factors and protective factors.  That there are 
factors within [Xander's] risk -- I should say or 
within his assessment -- that can be addressed.  I 
have no information that would lead me to find that 
DYFS and the juvenile system as a whole cannot address 
these risk factors, cannot address the treatment needs 
that were identified, and cannot do those things while 
both keeping [Xander] safe and the public safe. 
Back to that standard that I mentioned before, the 
Court would be required to find that the State has 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is 
contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of 
the public to hear the case.  I don't find that it's 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
12 
 
contrary to [Xander's] best interests, based on the 
information that I just provided, regarding the risk 
factors, the potential treatment, and the services 
that are available to him in the juvenile justice 
system. 
I don't have information that would support a finding 
that the remainder of the time that this Court would 
have left is insufficient.  I'm not finding that it 
would be in the public's -- that it would be contrary 
of the public's best interest either. 
We do have an ability to both keep the public safe and 
keep [Xander] in a structured setting, which I think 
it's apparent is what he needs, based on what I've 
heard from the prior -- how his supervision was going 
on his underlying case on his older pending case, 
while this was occurring.  And for those reasons I am 
going to deny the State's petition for waiver. 
¶90 To 
summarize 
the 
foregoing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
reiterated several of its key findings on the various criteria 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5).  The court expressed its reliance 
on 
the 
information 
provided 
by 
the 
two 
witnesses 
when 
considering if the juvenile system was adequate to address 
Xander's needs——emphasizing that the record did not support the 
State's assertion that jurisdiction until Xander is eighteen was 
inadequate.  It noted that the juvenile court had the ability to 
handle serious cases.  And the circuit court stated its 
conclusion that the juvenile system could address Xander's 
treatment needs while keeping the public and Xander safe.  The 
circuit court then centered on the proper legal framework:  the 
State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
retaining jurisdiction in juvenile court is contrary to Xander's 
and the public's best interest.  The State did not do so, the 
court held, once more citing the treatment and services 
available to Xander in the juvenile justice system, and its 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
13 
 
conclusion that the State had not proven this was contrary to 
the public's best interests. 
¶91 The 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
in 
this 
case 
was 
reasonable and within its broad discretion.  It identified the 
correct legal standard, Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5), (6), and noted 
the relevant facts with respect to each of the criteria under 
§ 938.18(5).  Then, the court rationally applied the facts to 
the law to reach its decision——explaining its conclusion that 
retaining jurisdiction was in the best interest of Xander and 
the public.  Could the circuit court have more clearly 
articulated its factual findings and legal conclusions?  Sure.  
However, when we review discretionary decisions, we do not 
require a perfectly polished transcript or magic words.  Rather 
we "look for reasons to sustain the trial court's discretionary 
decision," reversing "if and only if the record does not reflect 
a reasonable basis for the determination or a statement of the 
relevant facts or reasons motivating the determination is not 
carefully delineated in the record."  J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 
961.  That simply is not the case here.2 
                                                 
2 The State also argues that the circuit court committed a 
legal error by introducing and relying on inadmissible hearsay 
testimony from Dr. Thompson.  The State forfeited this argument.  
The State never objected to the introduction of this testimony 
before the circuit court and in fact elicited this testimony 
from Dr. Thompson during cross-examination.  It cannot now seek 
to invalidate the circuit court's decision on waiver based on 
testimony it elicited and did not object to. 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
14 
 
C.  The Majority 
¶92 The majority opinion takes a different tack.  It 
oversteps its role as an appellate court and supplants the 
circuit court's discretionary decision-making authority with its 
own.  It conducts what amounts to a de novo review, concluding 
waiver into adult court is required.  See Majority op., ¶¶32-55.  
The majority analyzes the relevant criteria under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18(5), not by referencing the circuit court's factual 
findings and legal conclusions, but by evaluating the record 
anew——effectively sitting in the place of the circuit court.  
This is wholly inappropriate in light of our scope of review in 
these cases. 
¶93 The majority also argues that because the "facts of 
this case are extreme," that lends credence to its conclusion 
that the circuit court acted in error.  Majority op., ¶55.  Yes, 
the facts of this case are extreme.  Eight people suffered 
dangerous gunshot injuries resulting from the actions for which 
Xander was charged.  But facts——extreme or not——do not change 
the legal standard that we are called to apply as an appellate 
court.  The majority's reasoning seems to be that any juvenile 
committing a serious crime should be waived into adult court.  
This is contrary to legislature's policy choice reflected in the 
juvenile justice code; it is not what Wis. Stat. § 938.18 
requires or allows.  Here, the circuit court acknowledged the 
severity of Xander's actions, along with the other relevant 
criteria it must consider under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5) and (6).  
Because this is precisely the type of discretionary decision 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
15 
 
entrusted to locally elected circuit court judges who hear these 
matters day-in and day-out, we cannot now reverse such a 
decision simply because we feel strongly that the court should 
have concluded otherwise. 
¶94 Finally, the majority errs by declining to order a new 
waiver hearing upon the finding of error.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 
56.  The State did not ask for such relief; it asked us to 
remand for a new waiver hearing.  Additionally, as already 
explained, a decision to waive jurisdiction of a juvenile court 
requires 
a 
court 
to 
make 
factual 
findings 
and 
legal 
determinations under Wis. Stat. § 938.18.  Appellate courts are 
not equipped or authorized in the ordinary course to make 
factual findings.  Douglas L. v. Arika B., 2015 WI App 80, ¶18, 
365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 357.  And we are ill-suited to make 
credibility determinations regarding the testimony the circuit 
court witnessed in its courtroom.  Given the majority's 
conclusions, the better course would be to award the State the 
relief it asked for and remand for a new waiver hearing. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶95 All told, the majority confronts a discretionary 
decision it thinks was wrong, and burns through the law in an 
effort to override it.  Applying the proper standard of review 
as we must, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying the State's petition for waiver.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
No.  2021AP419.bh 
 
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¶96 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent.