Title: State v. Nieves
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP001623-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2017

2017 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1623-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Raymond L. Nieves, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 370 Wis. 2d 260, 881 N.W. 2d 358 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 19, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz and Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, with whom on the 
briefs were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Daniel P. 
Lennington, deputy solicitor general, and an oral argument by 
Daniel P. Lennington. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
John J. Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha, and an oral argument 
by John J. Grau. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP1623-CR 
 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF5111) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Raymond L. Nieves, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  The decision 
of the court of appeals is reversed and cause remanded to the 
court of appeals.    
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 vacating the judgment of conviction of 
Raymond Nieves (Nieves) and remanding for a new trial.  Nieves 
was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide, as a party 
to the crime and with the use of a dangerous weapon2 and 
                                                 
1 State v. Nieves, No. 2014AP1623-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016).   
2 See Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) (2009-10); § 939.50(3)(a); 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
2 
 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to the 
crime and with the use of a dangerous weapon.3  Nieves' argument 
on appeal is two-fold.  First, Nieves argues the circuit court 
erred when it denied his pretrial motion to sever his trial from 
the trial of his co-defendant, Johnny Maldonado (Maldonado).  
Nieves contends the circuit court's failure to sever the trials 
and 
the 
subsequent 
admission 
of 
Maldonado's 
inculpatory 
statements violated his rights under Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) (2009-10).4  
Second, Nieves contends that the circuit court erred in 
admitting 
the 
statement 
of 
"Boogie 
Man" 
because 
it 
was 
inadmissible hearsay.    
¶2 
We conclude that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) and its progeny limited the application of the Bruton 
doctrine to instances in which a co-defendant's statements are 
testimonial.  Therefore, Bruton is not violated by the admission 
of 
a 
non-testifying 
co-defendant's 
statements 
that 
are 
nontestimonial.  In the present case, Maldonado's statements 
were nontestimonial, and therefore Nieves' confrontation rights 
were not violated.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err 
in denying Nieves' motion to sever the trials.  
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 939.05; and § 939.63(1)(b). 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) (2009-10); § 939.50(3)(a); 
§ 939.32; § 939.05; and § 939.63(1)(b). 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
3 
 
¶3 
Moreover, even if Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) had been 
violated, we conclude that any error was harmless.  Likewise, 
the admission of the hearsay statement of "Boogie Man" during 
David's5 testimony was also harmless.  Each alleged error was 
inconsequential when viewed in light of the subsequent testimony 
of David, the surviving victim.  
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, reinstate Nieves' judgment of conviction, and remand to 
the court of appeals for consideration of Nieves' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.6  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On October 9, 2010, the State filed a criminal 
complaint charging Nieves and Maldonado with first-degree 
intentional homicide, as a party to the crime and with the use 
of a dangerous weapon, and attempted first-degree intentional 
homicide, as a party to the crime and with the use of a 
dangerous weapon.  The complaint alleged that Nieves and 
Maldonado were involved in a shooting that resulted in the death 
of Spencer Buckle (Buckle) as well as injuries to David.  
¶6 
The State sought to try Nieves and Maldonado jointly.  
Nieves filed a motion to sever the trials.  The State planned to 
present the testimony of Ramon Trinidad (Trinidad), a fellow 
                                                 
5 David is a pseudonym for the surviving victim.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 809.19(1)(g).  
6 Nieves' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was raised 
but not addressed by the court of appeals.  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
4 
 
inmate of both Nieves and Maldonado at the Milwaukee County 
Criminal Justice Facility.  The crux of Trinidad's testimony was 
statements made to him by Maldonado that inculpated Maldonado 
and, arguably, Nieves.  This testimony, Nieves maintained, would 
violate his rights under Bruton.  However, the State represented 
to the court that it could present the testimony in such a way 
that Trinidad's testimony would inculpate only Maldonado, not 
Nieves.  Accordingly, the circuit court denied Nieves' motion to 
sever the joint trial.   
¶7 
At trial, the State presented a number of witnesses 
that testified to Nieves' involvement in the homicide and 
attempted homicide.  One of these witnesses was the surviving 
victim, David.  
¶8 
David provided an extensive account of the crimes for 
which Nieves was charged.  Specifically, David testified to the 
following.  Nieves, Maldonado, Buckle, and an individual 
nicknamed "Fat Boy" were involved in a shooting in Waukegan, 
Illinois.  Each of these men was a member of the Maniac Latin 
Disciples gang, and the shooting was retaliatory and against a 
different gang, the Latin Kings.  Following the shooting in 
Waukegan, Nieves, Maldonado, Buckle, and David dropped off "Fat 
Boy" and then fled to Nieves' house in Kenosha, Wisconsin.  It 
was during this time that "Boogie Man" visited the home at which 
they were staying.  "Boogie Man" told David that Nieves and 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
5 
 
Maldonado were planning to kill him.7  While at Nieves' home in 
Kenosha, Nieves did not allow David to communicate with anyone. 
¶9 
David testified that Nieves and Maldonado took him and 
Buckle to an alley under the guise of moving to a new home in 
which they could hide.  The four men exited the car when they 
arrived at the new hiding place and began to walk into an alley.  
It was then that David testified he heard a gunshot and saw a 
light flash.  He saw Buckle fall to the ground.  David heard 
more gun shots and saw more flashes and threw himself to the 
ground in an effort to play dead.  From his position on the 
ground, David testified that he saw the tennis shoes Maldonado 
had been wearing move directly in front of him.  David then 
heard additional gunshots and felt a bullet pass through the 
hood of his sweatshirt.  The gunshots narrowly missed his head, 
but one of his hands was grazed.  Before David heard the 
gunshots, he had not seen any one else in the alley.    
¶10 Trinidad, the jailhouse informant, also testified at 
the trial.8  Specifically, he testified to conversations he had 
with both Nieves and Maldonado while they were in jail.  With 
respect to Nieves, Trinidad's testimony was brief.  Trinidad 
                                                 
7 Defense counsel objected to this testimony and argued it 
was inadmissible hearsay.  The objection was overruled.  This 
portion of David's testimony is provided more fully later in our 
opinion.  
8 Trinidad testified he received leniency in his own case in 
exchange for his testimony.  However, this exchange occurred 
after Trinidad brought the statements to law enforcement's 
attention.   
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
6 
 
testified that Nieves, in reference to David, had indicated 
"[h]e got his guy." 
¶11 However, the information conveyed to Trinidad by 
Maldonado was much more extensive.9  Trinidad testified that 
Maldonado indicated he had killed Buckle and tried to kill David 
in order to ensure that they did not speak to police regarding 
the homicide in Waukegan.10  At trial, Trinidad relayed several 
details of the crime, including where Nieves, Maldonado, and the 
others were staying before the homicide.  Finally, Trinidad 
testified that Maldonado told him:  "They brought them to a dark 
alley, if I'm not mistaken, and laid them on the ground.  And 
then when he shot, he shot through the hoody.  He thought he 
killed the victim, but it turned out to be that he played dead 
on him."   
¶12 The jury found Nieves guilty on both counts for which 
he was charged.  Nieves filed a postconviction motion and 
argued, in relevant part, that the circuit court erred in 
denying his motion to sever his trial from Maldonado's trial 
pursuant to Bruton, and that the circuit court erred in 
admitting the hearsay testimony of "Boogie Man."  On June 24, 
                                                 
9 If other prisoners were around, Maldonado spoke to 
Trinidad in Spanish to prevent them from understanding their 
conversations.  
10 When testifying as to what Maldonado had told him, 
Trinidad used the term "they" instead of referring to Nieves 
directly. 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
7 
 
2014, the circuit court entered an order denying Nieves' 
postconviction motion.  
¶13 Nieves appealed the judgment of conviction as well as 
the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion.  The 
court of appeals reversed, and in doing so, vacated Nieves' 
judgment of conviction.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court erred in failing to sever Nieves' trial from that 
of Maldonado, thereby leading to a violation of Nieves' rights 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) and Bruton.11 
¶14 We granted the State's petition for review, in part, 
to 
address 
the 
applicability 
of 
the 
Bruton 
doctrine 
to 
nontestimonial statements in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Crawford.  We now reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶15 We must determine whether Nieves' Confrontation Clause 
rights were violated by the circuit court's failure to sever 
Nieves' trial from that of Maldonado.  The decision on whether 
to sever a trial of two defendants is a discretionary matter for 
the circuit court.  State v. Shears, 68 Wis. 2d 217, 234, 229 
N.W.2d 103 (1975).  However, whether a defendant's Sixth 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals did not address the impact of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) on the Bruton doctrine as the State had not argued it.  
The State first raised the issue in a motion for reconsideration 
following the court of appeals' decision.   
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
8 
 
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the 
admission of evidence at a joint trial "is a question of 
constitutional law subject to independent review."  State v. 
Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶19, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256 (citing 
State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶7, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 
919). 
 
"We 
generally 
apply 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedents when interpreting" the Sixth Amendment and the 
analogous Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 
518 (2007). 
¶16 Moreover, we must also determine if the circuit court 
erred in admitting the statements of Ramon Trinidad or "Boogie 
Man."  "We review a circuit court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard."  
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698 (citing Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶81, 
235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659).   
¶17 "An erroneous exercise of discretion in admitting or 
excluding evidence does not necessarily lead to a new trial.  
[We] must conduct a harmless error analysis to determine whether 
the error 'affected the substantial rights of the party.'  If 
the error did not affect the substantial rights of the party, 
the error is considered harmless."  Id., ¶30; see also Wis. 
Stat. § 805.10.  "An error affects the substantial rights of a 
party if there is a reasonable probability of a different 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
9 
 
outcome."  State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶94, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 
N.W.2d 144.     
B.  The Bruton Doctrine 
¶18 "Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution guarantee a criminal 
defendant the right to confront witnesses who testify against 
the defendant at trial."  State v. Mattox, 373 Wis. 2d 122, ¶20; 
see also U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 7. 
¶19 In contrast, "[t]he privilege, or right, to remain 
silent afforded by the Fifth Amendment comes into play when a 
defendant is compelled to give testimony that is incriminating."  
State v. Sahs, 2013 WI 51, ¶97, 347 Wis. 2d 641, 832 N.W.2d 80 
(Roggensack, J., concurring) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 
U.S. 420, 426 (1984)).   
¶20 The right of confrontation and the right against self-
incrimination do not always co-exist gracefully.  A defendant 
tried jointly with a co-defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to 
confront a testimonial, out-of-court statement of a co-defendant 
who, in turn, has a Fifth Amendment right not to testify.  It is 
this tension that the Supreme Court sought to address in Bruton 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  See State v. Avery, 215 
Wis. 2d 45, 51, 571 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The Court [in 
Bruton] explained that although the defendant would have the 
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the codefendant, the 
exercise of that right would be impossible at a joint trial 
because the codefendant could not be compelled to testify.").  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
10 
 
¶21 In 
Bruton, 
the 
defendant, 
Bruton, 
and 
his 
co-
defendant, Evans, were tried jointly for armed postal robbery.  
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124.  Evans confessed to a postal inspector 
that Evans and Bruton had committed the crime for which they 
were charged.  Id.  "The postal inspector obtained the oral 
confession, and another in which Evans admitted he had an 
accomplice whom he would not name, in the course of two 
interrogations of Evans at the city jail in St. Louis, Missouri, 
where Evans was held in custody on state criminal charges."  Id.  
¶22 At trial, Evans' confession was introduced.  Id.  
However, Evans exercised his right not to testify at the trial.  
Id.  The trial court instructed the jury that Evans' confession 
could be considered evidence only against Evans; the jury was 
not to consider the confession as evidence against Bruton.  Id. 
at 124-25.  The trial court reasoned that the limiting 
instruction sufficiently protected Bruton's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
¶23 The 
Supreme 
Court 
rejected 
the 
trial 
court's 
supposition that a limiting instruction sufficiently alleviated 
any constitutional problem that resulted from admitting Evans' 
confession.  Id. at 137.  The Court said that an out-of-court 
statement made by a co-defendant that inculpates a defendant 
cannot be introduced at trial when the co-defendant does not 
take the stand.  Id. at 126; see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 
U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (reasoning "where two defendants are tried 
jointly, the pretrial confession of one cannot be admitted 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
11 
 
against the other unless the confessing defendant takes the 
stand").  The introduction of such statements, the Court held, 
violates the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.12 
Id. (holding, the "admission of Evans' confession in this joint 
trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured 
by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment."); see also 
id. at 137 ("Despite the concededly clear instructions to the 
jury 
to 
disregard 
Evans' 
inadmissible 
hearsay 
evidence 
inculpating petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we 
cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute 
for petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination.").  
¶24 The court of appeals in the present case concluded 
that the introduction of Maldonado's statements inculpating 
Nieves presented a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation 
under the Bruton doctrine.  However, since Bruton was decided, 
the Supreme Court has manifestly changed the framework under 
                                                 
12 The Supreme Court has since limited the Bruton doctrine 
in certain ways.  For example, in Richardson v. Marsh, the Court 
concluded that a redacted confession that did not reference a 
co-defendant fell outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 
481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 
185, 195 (1998) ("We concede that Richardson placed outside the 
scope of Bruton's rule those statements that incriminate 
inferentially."). 
In the present case, the State argues that Trinidad's 
testimony, on its face, does not directly inculpate Nieves.  
Therefore, the State contends, the testimony falls outside the 
scope of Bruton.  Because we conclude that a Bruton violation 
must involve a testimonial statement, and, as we explain below, 
the statement at issue in this case was nontestimonial, we need 
not address this issue.  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
12 
 
which we analyze the Confrontation Clause, which limits the 
application of the Clause to testimonial statements.  
C.  Crawford and Its Progeny 
¶25 The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
at the time Bruton was decided bears little resemblance to the 
Supreme Court's contemporary Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  
When Bruton was decided, the Supreme Court evaluated the 
Confrontation Clause under the analytical framework set forth in 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  The touchstone of the 
Confrontation Clause under Roberts was the nebulous notion of 
"reliability."  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 ("Reliability is an 
amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.").  Under 
Roberts, 
"an 
unavailable 
witness's 
out-of-court 
statement 
[could] be admitted so long as it has adequate indicia of 
reliability——i.e., 
falls 
within 
a 
'firmly 
rooted 
hearsay 
exception' 
or 
bears 
'particularized 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness.'"  Id. at 42 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).  
¶26 However, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court 
repudiated Roberts and fundamentally altered the way in which 
courts analyze the Confrontation Clause.  See Ohio v. Clark, 135 
S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to 
Crawford 
as 
a 
"categorical 
overruling" 
and 
a 
"thorough 
repudiation" of the Ohio v. Roberts line of Confrontation Clause 
cases).  The Supreme Court reasoned that "[l]eaving the 
regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence 
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
13 
 
the most flagrant inquisitorial practices."  Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 51.  Therefore, the Court in Crawford rejected the basic 
tenet of Roberts; reliability cannot be, and is not, the 
touchstone of the Confrontation Clause.  In so doing, the Court 
re-focused its analysis of the Confrontation Clause on the text 
of the Sixth Amendment.   
¶27 "The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides 
that, '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'"  
Id. at 42.  The Clause "applies to 'witnesses' against the 
accused——in other words, those who 'bear testimony.'"  Id. at 51 
(quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English 
Language 
(1828)). 
 
As 
such, 
the 
Court 
reasoned, 
"[t]he 
constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law 
right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute 
concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement."  Id.   
¶28 Accordingly, the Court in Crawford "held a defendant's 
right to confrontation is violated if the trial court receives 
into evidence out-of-court statements by someone who does not 
testify at the trial if those statements are 'testimonial' and 
the defendant has not had 'a prior opportunity' to cross-examine 
the out-of-court declarant."  Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶24; see also 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("Where testimonial evidence is at 
issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law 
required:  unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.").  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
14 
 
¶29 The Court in Crawford did not directly address the 
application of the Confrontation Clause to nontestimonial 
statements.  However, subsequent Supreme Court cases have seized 
on what Crawford insinuated; the Confrontation Clause applies 
only to testimonial statements.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 823 (2006).  It follows that the Confrontation Clause 
does not apply to nontestimonial statements.  Id.; see also 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359 (2011) (reasoning "the 
admissibility of a [non-testimonial] statement is the concern of 
state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation 
Clause"); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) ("Under 
Crawford, on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no 
application to [non-testimonial] statements . . . .").  
¶30 Consequently, as a threshold matter, a defendant 
cannot show that his or her rights under the Confrontation 
Clause were violated before first showing that the allegedly 
impermissible statements were testimonial.  
D.  Reconciling Bruton and Crawford 
¶31 Indisputably, Crawford engendered a seismic shift in 
how courts analyze the Confrontation Clause.  However, we must 
determine whether, as a result of this doctrinal shift, the 
Bruton doctrine was limited to cases in which a non-testifying 
co-defendant's statement was testimonial.  
¶32 Both 
Bruton 
and 
Crawford 
are, 
fundamentally, 
Confrontation Clause cases.  Crawford and its progeny illuminate 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause, 
whereas 
Bruton 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
15 
 
illustrates a specific type of Confrontation Clause violation. 
"[B]ecause Bruton is no more than a by-product of the 
Confrontation Clause, the Court's holdings in Davis and Crawford 
likewise limit Bruton to testimonial statements."  U.S. v. 
Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 128 (3d Cir. 2012).  And, as a result, 
"we are obliged to 'view Bruton through the lens of Crawford' 
and, in doing so, we consider 'whether the challenged statement 
is testimonial.'"  United States v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790, 816 
(10th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 
612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010)).  
¶33 We are not the first state to conclude that Crawford 
limited the application of the Bruton doctrine to testimonial 
statements.  For example, a majority of the justices of the 
Supreme Court of Washington13 reached the same conclusion in 
State v. Wilcoxon, 373 P.3d 224 (Wash. 2016).  The court 
reasoned that, after Crawford, "the scope of the confrontation 
right encompasses only testimonial statements.  Its protections 
                                                 
13 The decision we cite was that of a plurality of the 
court.  However, the concurring justice agreed with the 
plurality as to the issues relevant to our decision.  See State 
v. Wilcoxon, 373 P.3d 224, 231 (Wash. 2016) (Gonzalez, J., 
concurring) ("I agree with the lead opinion that Bruton and the 
confrontation 
clause 
did 
not 
apply 
to 
the 
out-of-court 
statements at issue before us.  A threshold question in 
determining when the confrontation clause applies is whether the 
out-of-court statement was procured by the government.  We 
should treat statements that were not procured by the government 
as presumptively nontestimonial.  Thus, their admissibility 
should 
be 
governed 
by 
the 
rules 
of 
evidence, 
not 
the 
confrontation clause.").  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
16 
 
simply do not apply to nontestimonial statements, whether in the 
context of a single defendant like in Crawford or codefendants 
like in Bruton."  Id. at 229.  Accordingly, the court held "that 
when 
an 
out-of-court 
statement 
made 
by 
a 
nontestifying 
codefendant is nontestimonial, Bruton is inapplicable because 
such statements are outside the scope of the confrontation 
clause."  Id.; see also Burnside v. State, 352 P.3d 627, 643 
(Nev. 
2015) 
(reasoning, 
"if 
the 
challenged 
out-of-court 
statement by a nontestifying codefendant is not testimonial, 
then Bruton has no application because the Confrontation Clause 
has no application."); Thomas v. United States, 978 A.2d 1211, 
1224–25 (D.C. 2009) (same); State v. Gurule, 303 P.3d 838, 848 
(N.M. 2013) (same).  
¶34 Our reasoning is also in accord with the majority of 
federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue.  These 
courts all followed the logic we employ in the present case:  
Crawford altered the scope of the Confrontation Clause, which, 
in turn, limited the application of the Bruton doctrine.  United 
States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 128 (3d Cir. 2012) ("Any 
protection provided by Bruton is therefore only afforded to the 
same extent as the Confrontation Clause, which requires that the 
challenged statement qualify as testimonial."); United States v. 
Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010) ("It is 
. . . necessary to view Bruton through the lens of Crawford and 
Davis."); United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) ("The appellants have no Bruton claim, however, because 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
17 
 
Franklin's concessions through counsel do not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause."); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 
326 
(6th 
Cir. 
2009) 
("Because 
it 
is 
premised 
on 
the 
Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation 
Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements."); 
United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 662 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial statements); Clark, 717 
F.3d at 816 (same).  
¶35 Therefore, 
the 
Bruton 
doctrine 
was 
limited 
by 
Crawford.  And, as a result, a defendant has a viable Bruton 
claim only insofar as the inculpatory statements at issue are 
testimonial under Crawford and its progeny.14    
E.  Confrontation Clause, Application 
1.  Definition of Testimonial 
¶36 We must analyze whether the statements at issue in the 
present case were testimonial.  If not, then the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply, and Nieves does not have a viable claim 
under Bruton.  We again look to Crawford and its progeny, this 
time to determine the scope of "testimonial."   
                                                 
14 For an extensive discussion of the effect Crawford had on 
Bruton see John M. Leventhal, Is Bruton on Life Support in the 
Aftermath of Crawford v. Washington?, 43 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 17 
(2015) ("Now that non-testimonial statements are no longer 
subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny, and post-Crawford 
decisions have not applied Bruton to non-testimonial statements, 
defendants must look to other avenues in an attempt to prevent a 
non-testifying co-defendant's incriminating statement made to a 
civilian from being admitted.").  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
18 
 
¶37 The Court in Crawford explained that testimony, at the 
time the Sixth Amendment was passed, was defined as "'[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact.'  [2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of 
the English Language (1828)].  An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that 
a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not."  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  "Statements taken by police officers 
in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even 
a narrow standard."  Id. at 52.  Despite this discussion, the 
Court in Crawford did not purport to provide a complete 
definition of "testimonial."  Id.  Subsequent cases, however, 
have provided further guidance as to the types of statements 
that fall within the contours of the Confrontation Clause.   
¶38 As with Crawford, the Supreme Court in Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) addressed the definition of 
testimonial in the context of a statement given to a law 
enforcement officer.  The Court adopted a "primary purpose" test 
for analyzing whether a statement is testimonial.  Davis, 547 
U.S. at 822.  "Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."  Id.  
Statements 
may 
be 
"testimonial 
when 
the 
circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
19 
 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution."  Id.  
¶39 Subsequently, 
in 
Michigan 
v. 
Bryant, 
the 
Court 
"reiterated [its] view in Davis that, when 'the primary purpose 
of an interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing emergency,' its 
purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not 
within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause.'"  Clark, 135 
S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358).  However, the 
Court clarified that "'the existence vel non of an ongoing 
emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.'  
Rather, the existence of an emergency is just one factor when 
determining the primary purpose of an interrogation."  Bryant, 
562 U.S. at 374.    
¶40 In its most recent Confrontation Clause case, Ohio v. 
Clark, the Supreme Court was "presented [with a] question [it 
had] repeatedly reserved:  whether statements to persons other 
than law enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation 
Clause."  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.  The Court acknowledged the 
applicability of the primary purpose test in such cases:  "In 
the end, the question is whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the 
conversation was to 'creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony.'"  Id. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 
358).  However, the Court cautioned that even though "statements 
to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could 
conceivably raise confrontation concerns . . . such statements 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
20 
 
are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law 
enforcement officers."  Id. at 2181.   
¶41 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Clark explained that 
the formality of the setting in which the statements were given 
is relevant to whether the statements were "made with the 
primary purpose of creating evidence for [the defendant's] 
prosecution." 
 
Id. 
at 
2176. 
 
"A 
'formal 
station-house 
interrogation,' like the questioning in Crawford, is more likely 
to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning 
is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining 
testimonial evidence against the accused."  Id. at 2180 (quoting 
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366); see also Jensen, 299 Wis. 2d 267, ¶33 
("In 
essence, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Julie's 
statements 
were 
informally made to her neighbor and her son's teacher and not 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to 
reasonably conclude they would be available at a later trial, 
and as such are nontestimonial.").  
¶42 Therefore, statements given in an informal setting are 
significantly less likely to be testimonial.  See United States 
v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding 
statements were nontestimonial because the defendant "did not 
make the statements to a police officer, during the course of an 
interrogation, or in a structured setting designed to elicit 
responses that intended to be used to prosecute him."); United 
States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 780 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Cook in 
no sense intended to bear testimony against Defendant Smalls; 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
21 
 
Cook in no manner sought to establish facts for use in a 
criminal investigation or prosecution.").  
¶43 The context in which a statement is made is also 
significant in determining whether a statement is testimonial.  
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.  And, "part of that context is the 
questioner's identity."  Id.  "Statements made to someone who is 
not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal 
behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than 
statements given to law enforcement officers."  Id.  
¶44 For this reason, statements to non-law enforcement 
individuals are unlikely to be testimonial, id., as are 
statements made unwittingly to non-law enforcement personnel 
acting as an informant for law enforcement.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 
825 ("statements made unwittingly to a Government informant" are 
"clearly nontestimonial"); see also United States v. Dale, 614 
F.3d 942, 956 (8th Cir. 2010) (statements made to an individual 
wearing a wire to record conversation for the police were not 
testimonial); United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 270 (4th 
Cir. 2008) ("Because [the declarant] plainly did not think he 
was giving any sort of testimony when making his statements to 
the victim during the recorded telephone calls, the admission of 
these two taped conversations into evidence did not violate [the 
defendant's] rights under the Confrontation Clause."); United 
States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A 
statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
22 
 
recorded 
by 
the 
government 
is 
not 
'testimonial' 
for 
Confrontation Clause purposes."). 
¶45 Therefore, 
under 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
analysis, 
statements between certain types of individuals are highly 
unlikely to be testimonial.  For example, the Supreme Court 
indicated that the statements in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 
87-89 (1970) (plurality opinion), were "clearly nontestimonial"   
because the "statements [were] from one prisoner to another."  
Davis, 547 U.S. at 825; see also United States v. Pelletier, 666 
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Although we have not previously had 
occasion to apply Davis to the situation presented here——
statements made by one inmate to another——we have little 
difficulty holding that such statements are not testimonial."); 
Smalls, 605 F.3d at 778 ("[Declarant's] recorded statement to 
CI, 
known 
to 
[declarant] 
only 
as 
a 
fellow 
inmate, 
is 
unquestionably nontestimonial.").  
2.  Maldonado's Statements 
¶46 In the present case, Maldonado made several statements 
to a fellow inmate, Trinidad, that implicated him and arguably 
Nieves in the crime for which they were charged.15  Trinidad 
testified that the conversation between him and Maldonado 
occurred while both were housed at the Milwaukee County Criminal 
Justice Facility.  
                                                 
15 We are assuming for purposes of this analysis that the 
testimony implicated Nieves under Bruton.  However, we reiterate 
that we are not deciding whether this would have been a Bruton 
violation if not for Crawford.  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
23 
 
¶47 Manifestly, these statements were not taken in what 
can be considered a formal setting.  The statements were made in 
a jail and were the product of the casual conversations of two 
inmates.  There is nothing to suggest that an objective observer 
would believe that these statements would later be used at 
trial. 
¶48 The context of the statements, including to whom the 
statements were made, also suggests that the statements are 
nontestimonial.  Maldonado was speaking to a fellow inmate; he 
was not conversing with a law enforcement officer or anyone that 
he would have reason to suspect would later use the testimony at 
a trial.  The statements at issue were the result of a 
conversation between two inmates——the type of statement that the 
Supreme Court and other courts have categorized as unequivocally 
nontestimonial.  
¶49 Notably, Maldonado's statements inculpated himself as 
well.  Trinidad testified that Maldonado spoke to him about his 
role in the homicide and the attempted homicide——not just the 
role of Nieves or other individuals.  An objective observer 
would, therefore, be unlikely to consider these statements to 
have been made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for 
trial.  See United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 289-90 
(7th Cir. 2014) ("Instead, we evaluate their conversation 
objectively. 
 
And 
from 
an 
objective 
perspective, 
[the] 
conversation looks like a casual, confidential discussion 
between co-conspirators.  Because the statements in question 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
24 
 
were not testimonial, their admission did not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause.").  After all, these conversations created 
evidence that could be, and ultimately was, used at trial 
against Maldonado.  See Smalls, 605 F.3d at 779 ("Cook did not 
make his statement to CI for the 'primary purpose' of 
establishing 
or 
proving 
facts 
relevant 
to 
a 
criminal 
prosecution" because "Cook would not have shared what he did had 
he known the Government was recording his statement or that his 
cellmate was a CI."). 
¶50 There is no indication these statements were made for 
the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
creating 
evidence 
for 
Nieves' 
prosecution.  Instead, Maldonado simply trusted the wrong 
person; he confided in a jailhouse informant.   
¶51 Consequently, we see no reason to depart from the 
Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Davis that the statements in 
Dutton 
were 
"clearly 
non-testimonial" 
because 
they 
were 
statements between inmates.  The statements in the present case 
display none of the formalistic characteristics that have come 
to define the contours of testimonial hearsay.  "Certainly, the 
statements in this case are nothing like the notorious use of ex 
parte examination in Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason, 
which  [the Supreme Court has] frequently identified as 'the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.'"  
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50). 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
25 
 
F.  Alleged Violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) 
¶52 Nieves argues that the circuit court violated Wis. 
Stat. § 971.12(3) by declining to sever his and Maldonado's 
trials and admitting the testimony of Trinidad.16  We need not 
examine whether our conclusion that Nieves' Confrontation Clause 
rights were not violated forecloses Nieves' argument under 
§ 971.12(3).17  Instead, even assuming that § 971.12(3) had been 
violated, we conclude that the putative error was harmless.  The 
overwhelming evidence the State presented at trial of Nieves' 
guilt leads us to conclude that he would have been found guilty 
of the crimes for which he was convicted even if the circuit 
court had excluded Trinidad's testimony.   
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.12(3) provides, in relevant part, a 
"district attorney shall advise the court prior to trial if the 
district attorney intends to use the statement of a codefendant 
which implicates another defendant in the crime charged.  
Thereupon, the judge shall grant a severance as to any such 
defendant."  Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3). 
17 Nothing in this opinion should be construed so as to cast 
doubt on our cases that hold Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) is a 
mechanism for enforcing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968), 
and 
therefore, 
does 
not 
"require[] 
severance 
of 
defendants in all instances in which law enforcement authorities 
possess a statement by a codefendant implicating another 
defendant.  We do not believe such an argument would be viable. 
The legislative committee note indicates that the statute is 
intended to provide a mechanism to insure compliance with 
Bruton.  As we have stated, compliance may be had with Bruton by 
effectively excising any reference implicating a codefendant and 
by instructing the jury as to the limited purpose for which the 
evidence is admitted.  If this is done, the statement no longer 
'implicates another defendant' and therefore does not fall 
within the prohibition of the statute."  Pohl v. State, 96 
Wis. 2d 290, 301, 291 N.W.2d 554 (1980) (quoting Cranmore v. 
State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 747, 271 N.W.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1978)).   
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
26 
 
¶53 The crux of the State's case was the testimony of the 
surviving victim, David, who testified at length as to the 
particulars of the crime and Nieves' involvement.  David's 
testimony was salient; it was detailed, direct evidence of 
Nieves' involvement in the crimes for which he was convicted.   
¶54 David explained the events leading up to the crimes at 
issue in this case.  Specifically, David described how he, 
Buckle, Maldonado, Nieves, and others were involved in a 
homicide that occurred in Waukegan, Illinois.  He testified: 
[State]: Okay.  South Park and Water.  So they come 
over, and do you or does anyone else in your 
presence explain what happened? 
[David]: To what happened when they shot at us? 
[State]: Yes 
[David]: Told Raymond Nieves what happened and he 
told us we had to go do what we had to do to 
get revenge.  
. . . . 
[State]: And 
after 
Raymond 
[Nieves] 
had 
this 
conversation with you guys, it's like, okay, 
we've got to get back, what happened next?  
[David]: We drove down to Woodard Park which is A 
Street.  
[State]: When you say 'we', who went? 
[David]: Raymond Nieves and Maldonado, Spencer, Fat 
Boy and me.  
. . . . 
[State]: And who got out of the car? 
[David]: Me, Fat Boy, Maldonado and Buckle. 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
27 
 
[State]: And does some shooting take place at these 
guys at the basketball court that you 
thought were Latin Kings? 
[David]: Yes. 
. . . . 
[David]: We ran back to the truck, me, Spencer, Fat 
Boy, and Maldonado.  
[State]: And where was Mr. Nieves? 
[David]: He was in the truck, driver's side.  He was 
the driver.  
David testified that he later discovered an individual had been 
killed in this shooting.  And, following the Waukegan homicide, 
David, Buckle, Nieves, and Maldonado traveled to Kenosha and hid 
at the home of one of Nieves' relatives.   
¶55 David revealed Nieves and Maldonado's fear that one of 
the participants in the Waukegan homicide would cooperate with 
police.  This testimony provided support for the State's theory 
of Nieves and Maldonado's motive as the State contended that 
this fear provided the impetus for the homicide and attempted 
homicide in this case.   
¶56 Importantly, David then explained the events on the 
day the crimes at issue in the present case were committed.  He 
began by relaying that Nieves and Maldonado all got into a 
vehicle purportedly to travel to a new place at which they could 
hide.   
[State]: Did there actually come a point in time you 
actually got into a vehicle with Schotee? 
[David]: Yes.  
[State]: And did anyone else go with you? 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
28 
 
[David]: Raymond 
Nieves, 
Johnny 
Maldonado, 
and 
Spencer Buckle. 
. . . . 
[State]: Okay. Did you stay in the car once the SUV 
stopped? 
[David]: No, we didn't stay in the car. 
[State]: What happened next? 
[David]: Raymond Nieves and Maldonado and Buckle and 
I got off the car. 
¶57 David then explained, in detail, the specifics of the 
crimes for which Nieves was eventually convicted.  David 
testified:  
[State]: What happens next.  You stop there, they're 
on the other side of the alley, what 
happens? 
[David]: I seen Maldonado goes up to, like, it looked 
like a garage to me.  It was, like, a 
garage.  I don't know if he's pretending to 
use a washroom or doing something.  But, I 
don't 
know, 
Raymond 
Nieves 
was, 
like, 
there's somebody running behind you all.  As 
we turning, I just see Spencer —— I hear a 
gunshot, I see a flash, and I see Spencer 
Buckle fall to the ground.  
[State]: And who are the only four people in the 
alley at that point in time? 
[David]: Raymond Nieves, Johnny Maldonado, Spencer 
Buckle and me.  
[State]: Did you see any person running down the 
alley when Nieves said this? 
[David]: No. 
[State]: How close to Mr. Buckle were you at that 
point in time when you say you heard 
gunshots? 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
29 
 
[David]: At arms reach. 
[State]: And where was Mr. Nieves? 
[David]: Right next to Buckle.   
[State]: And did you know where Mr. Maldonado was at 
that point in time? 
[David]: He ended up behind me.  It happened so fast.  
[State]: And as these shots were being —— going, 
fired, and you saw Mr. Buckle falling, what 
did you do? 
[David]: As I was turning to see, facing toward 
Nieves, I heard more shots and seen flashes 
coming my way.  So I threw myself on the 
ground as I was shot, like, when I really 
was not shot, I threw myself on the ground 
and played dead.  That's when I seen Johnny 
Maldonado's black tennis shoes come up.  
. . . . 
[State]: And what happened next? 
[David]: I felt like something pressed, like a gun 
pressed in the back of my head. 
[State]: And then what happened? 
[David]: I just heard shots being fired towards my 
head, and I could feel the wind of the 
bullets passing through my head and I felt 
the burn where I got grazed at from my left 
hand. 
[State]: So you were shot or felt something graze 
your left hand? 
[David]: Yes.  
[State]: And based upon the noise and sounds, you 
believed it to be what? 
[David]: Gunshots.  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
30 
 
¶58 David's testimony was powerful; it provided the jury 
with direct evidence of the crimes for which Nieves was 
convicted.  One of these crimes, of course, was the attempted 
homicide of David, who positively identified Nieves as one of 
the perpetrators. 
¶59 In contrast, the testimony of Trinidad was much more 
limited than that of David, and therefore, it did not provide 
evidence for any aspect of the crime that the jury did not 
otherwise hear in more detail from David.   
¶60 Accordingly, the circuit court's failure to exclude 
Trinidad's testimony did "not affect the substantial rights of" 
Nieves.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.18(1).  David, the surviving 
victim, explained both the events leading up to the homicide as 
well as the particulars of the crime.  David testified that 
Nieves brought Buckle and him into an alley, where they fatally 
shot Buckle and where they shot and wounded him.  As a result, 
the evidence against Nieves was such that he would have been 
convicted without the testimony of Trinidad.   
¶61 Finally, we note that the primary harm Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12(3) is designed to prevent is the harm that results from 
a violation of an individual's Confrontation Clause rights.18  
                                                 
18 We do not address cases that examine the potential 
prejudicial effect of a Confrontation Cause violation because we 
concluded that no such violation occurred in this case.  See, 
e.g., Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191 (1987) (reasoning 
"'devastating' practical effect was one of the factors that 
Bruton considered in assessing whether the Confrontation Clause 
might sometimes require departure from the general rule that 
jury instructions suffice to exclude improper testimony"); 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
31 
 
See generally Pohl v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 290, 301, 291 N.W.2d 554 
(1980).  However, as discussed above, Nieves' Confrontation 
Clause rights were not violated.    
G.  Admission of Hearsay 
¶62 At trial, David testified that a man named "Boogie 
Man" told him that Nieves and Maldonado were planning to kill 
him.  Specifically, in reference to "Boogie Man," David 
testified as follows:  
[State]: So what was said that made you concerned? 
[David]: He said that they were planning on killing 
me, that Raymond Nieves and Maldonado were 
planning on killing me. 
¶63 On appeal, the State concedes that the statement was 
improperly admitted; however, the State contends that it was 
harmless error to admit it.  We agree that the admission of the 
statement, while in error, was harmless as it did not affect the 
substantial rights of Nieves.  
¶64 The 
statement 
of 
"Boogie 
Man" 
preceded 
David's 
extensive and detailed account of the homicide and attempted 
homicide.  We need not rehash David's testimony at length.  It 
suffices to note that David testified that Nieves and Maldonado 
                                                                                                                                                             
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) ("We hold that the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting 
instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to 
eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to 
his or her existence.").  Therefore, the harm to which these 
cases refer is not relevant to our harmless error analysis.  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
32 
 
brought him and Buckle into an alley, where they fatally shot 
Buckle and where they wounded him.   
¶65 The single statement by "Boogie Man" to David that 
Nieves and Maldonado planned to kill him, when viewed in 
context, contributed little to David's testimony.  Any error 
that 
resulted 
from 
the 
admission 
of 
this 
statement 
was 
alleviated when David explained how Nieves and Maldonado fatally 
shot Buckle and attempted to fatally shoot him.  
¶66 As a result, the circuit court's decision to admit the 
testimony, while it may have been error, was harmless.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶67 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Crawford 
and its progeny limited the application of the Bruton doctrine 
to 
instances 
in 
which 
a 
co-defendant's 
statements 
are 
testimonial.  Therefore, Bruton is not violated by the admission 
of 
a 
non-testifying 
co-defendant's 
statements 
that 
are 
nontestimonial.  In the present case, Maldonado's statements 
were nontestimonial, and therefore Nieves' confrontation rights 
were not violated.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err 
in denying Nieves' motion to sever the trials.  
¶68 Moreover, even assuming that Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) 
had been violated, we conclude that any error was harmless.  
Likewise, the admission of the hearsay statement of "Boogie Man" 
during David's testimony was also harmless.  Each alleged error 
was inconsequential when viewed in light of the subsequent 
testimony of David, the surviving victim.  
No. 
2014AP1623-CR 
 
 
33 
 
¶69 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, reinstate Nieves' judgment of conviction, and remand to 
the court of appeals for consideration of Nieves' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the court of appeals.   
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶70 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In no uncertain 
terms, the legislature enacted a statute mandating that a judge 
"shall grant a severance" where statements of one defendant will 
implicate the other in the crime charged: 
 
The district attorney shall advise the court prior to 
trial if the district attorney intends to use the 
statement of a codefendant which implicates another 
defendant in the crime charged. Thereupon, the judge 
shall grant a severance as to any such defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 972.12(3) (emphasis added). 
¶71 This language is not confusing.  It does not suggest 
multiple meanings that could render it ambiguous.  Yet, the 
majority presents no analysis of the actual language of the 
statute, let alone an analysis that would lead to a conclusion 
that it is inapplicable. 
¶72 When faced with the question of whether a trial should 
be severed when a codefendant's inculpatory statement will be 
introduced, the court's analysis need go no further than Wis. 
Stat. § 971.12(3).  It plainly provides the answer:  yes, 
severance shall be granted. 
¶73 Instead, of applying the plain language of the 
statute, the majority embarks on a journey that takes us through 
unsettled territory, analyzing whether the United States Supreme 
Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), intended to 
limit Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  Resolution 
of this case does not require such a complex analytical 
exercise. 
¶74 This approach disregards the unambiguous language of 
the statute, violates a bedrock principle of review that should 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
guide appellate courts and fails to recognize the nuances in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
¶75 Honoring the language chosen by the legislature, I 
take an approach at odds with that of the majority.  Because I 
determine, based on the plain meaning of the text, that the 
circuit court erred in failing to sever the trials and that the 
error was not harmless, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶76 In State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, this court set 
forth a framework for statutory interpretation, which has since 
served to guide our analyses in cases involving statutory 
interpretation.  It instructs that "statutory interpretation 
'begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  Id., ¶45 
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 77, Wis. 2d 473, 613 
N.W.2d 591). 
¶77 The court provided strong justification for this rule.  
Focusing on the different roles of the judiciary and the 
legislature, it explained that the judiciary has a "solemn 
obligation . . . to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted 
by the legislature . . . ."  Id., ¶44.  Courts are to give 
deference to the policy choices made by the legislature, and 
deference 
"requires 
that 
statutory 
interpretation 
focus 
primarily on the language of the statute."  Id. 
¶78 As further justification for focusing on the plain 
language of the statute, Kalal explained that ultimately, "[i]t 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on 
the public."  Id., ¶46. 
¶79 Here, the language is unambiguous.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.12(3) mandates that a judge shall grant a severance where 
statements of one defendant will implicate the other in the 
crime charged: 
 
The district attorney shall advise the court 
prior to trial if the district attorney 
intends 
to 
use 
the 
statement 
of 
a 
codefendant 
which 
implicates 
another 
defendant in the crime charged. Thereupon, 
the judge shall grant a severance as to any 
such defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 972.12(3) (emphasis added). 
¶80 Despite the statute's clear answer to the question 
before us, the majority barely references it.  Indeed, its sole 
reference to Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3) is relegated to a footnote 
where it asserts that severance is not required where a 
codefendant's statement does not implicate a defendant——an 
assertion that is not at issue in this case and against which no 
one is arguing. Majority op., ¶52 n.17. 
¶81 Nowhere in the majority opinion is the actual language 
of the statute analyzed.  Instead, it bypasses a Kalal analysis 
entirely.  In so doing, the majority fails to give deference to 
the legislature as required.  
II 
¶82 Not only does the majority fail to defer to the plain 
language of the statute, it also violates a longstanding 
principle 
of 
appellate 
court 
practice 
by 
conducting 
an 
unnecessary constitutional analysis.  This court has repeatedly 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
stated that appellate courts should decide cases on the 
narrowest grounds possible.  Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 
2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("[A]n appellate 
court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds."); 
Ehlinger v. Hauser, 2010 WI 54, ¶66, 325 Wis. 2d 287, 785 
N.W.2d 328 ("Typically, an appellate court should decide cases 
on the narrowest possible grounds."); State v. Castillo, 213 
Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) (same). 
¶83 Thus, when a question presented can be answered by 
statute, we typically leave interpretation of federal and state 
constitutional provisions for another day.  See, e.g., State v. 
Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶5, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611 
("Because we affirm the circuit court's order on statutory 
grounds, we leave the interpretation of the federal and state 
constitutional provisions . . . for another case in which these 
issues are determinative."); HSBC Realty Credit Corp. v. City of 
Glendale (In re City of Glendale Cmty. Dev. Auth. Condemnation 
Award), 2007 WI 94, ¶14 n.7, 303 Wis. 2d 1, 735 N.W.2d 77 
("Because we decide this case on statutory grounds, we do not 
address 
the 
parties' 
arguments 
concerning . . . the 
constitutional right to interest on a condemnation award."); see 
also Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d at 492 ("a court will not reach 
constitutional issues where the resolution of other issues 
disposes of an appeal."). 
¶84 As discussed above, the question before us can be 
easily addressed by a plain language interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.12(3). 
 
Therefore, 
resorting 
to 
a 
complex 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
constitutional analysis is unnecessary.1  Yet, the majority 
disregards our well established practice of deciding issues 
narrowly.  Instead, it delves into an analysis of the impact 
that Crawford had on Bruton.  Such an exercise in constitutional 
analysis is not needed to resolve this case. 
III 
¶85 Not only is a constitutional analysis unnecessary, the 
one conducted by the majority is also unconvincing.  After 
asserting that Crawford shifted the focus of a Confrontation 
Clause away from reliability and onto the testimonial nature of 
statement, it concludes that because Bruton is a by-product of 
the Confrontation Clause, Crawford's holding necessarily limits 
Bruton to testimonial statements.  Majority op., ¶32.   
 
¶86 To support this conclusion, the majority quotes from 
the lead opinion in State v. Wilcoxon, 373 P.3d 224 (2016), 
which stated "the scope of the confrontation right encompasses 
only testimonial statements . . . whether in the context of a 
                                                 
1 Resorting 
to 
the 
constitutional 
analysis 
is 
also 
questionable because such an analysis likely has been forfeited 
here.  As the court of appeals observed, it appears that the 
State did not raise the Crawford issue before the circuit court 
and the State "explicitly acknowledged that it had forfeited its 
argument 
concerning 
Crawford 
by 
failing 
to 
raise 
it 
on 
appeal. . . ."  State v. Nieves, No. 2014AP1623-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶12 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016). 
 
After the State lost in the court of appeals, it raised the 
issue for the first time on a motion for reconsideration, which 
it also lost.  If the majority is going to now take up and run 
with the State's new Crawford issue, it should at least 
acknowledge and address Nieves' argument that this court, like 
the court of appeals, should consider the issue long since 
forfeited. 
 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
single defendant like in Crawford or codefendants like in 
Bruton."  Majority op., ¶33.  This analysis overlooks the 
complexities in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
¶87 More persuasive is the analysis presented in the 
dissent of State v. Wilcoxon, 373 P.3d 224 (2016) (Madsen, C.J., 
dissenting).  As Chief Justice Madsen observes, Bruton and 
Crawford address different concerns.  Id., ¶¶48, 54-55.  Where 
Crawford dealt with the initial admissibility of hearsay (and 
thus its discussion of reliability), Bruton dealt with the 
prejudice created by placing inadmissible hearsay before a jury.  
Id.  Crawford did not touch upon prejudice, indeed it did not 
even mention Bruton.  Id., ¶¶50, 53.  Thus, forcing Bruton 
through the lens of Crawford is a poor fit.  Id., ¶56. The 
majority's attempt to do so misses the nuance in the Supreme 
Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
IV 
¶88 Contrary to the majority, I conclude, as did the court 
of appeals, that Wis. Stat. § 917.12(3) decides the question 
before us.  When a prosecutor plans to use an inculpatory 
statement of a co-defendant, "the judge shall grant a severance 
as to any such defendant."  Wis. Stat. § 917.12(3) (emphasis 
added). 
¶89 The only issues remaining after reading this plain 
statutory language are whether the co-defendant's statements 
were inculpatory and, if so, whether the circuit court's failure 
to sever the trials constituted harmless error. 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶90 First, 
I 
consider 
whether 
the 
co-defendant's 
statements were inculpatory.  These statements were entered into 
the record through the testimony of a state's witness at the 
joint trial.  As they illustrate, on multiple occasion the 
witness used the pronoun "they" when describing the actions 
Maldonado took with Nieves: 
 
[State]:  And did [Mr. Maldonado], in fact, talk about 
how that happened and what Mr. Maldonado's involvement 
was with either of these two shorties? 
 
[Witness]:  They told them to come party or celebrate 
to Wisconsin. And they came to Kenosha, and then from 
Kenosha they came to Milwaukee. 
 
[State]:  By "they," you mean Mr. Maldonado and the 
shorties? 
 
[Witness]:  Yes. 
 
[State]:  And after leaving Kenosha, they were going 
to go to Milwaukee, and what happened once they got to 
Milwaukee according to Mr. Maldonado? 
 
[Witness]:  They brought them to a dark alley, if I'm 
not mistaken, and laid them on the ground.  And then 
when he shot, he shot through the hoody.  He thought 
he killed the victim, but it turned out to be that he 
played dead on him. 
 
(emphasis added).  Although the witness at times used the term 
"they" to describe the "two shorties," it is obvious that twice 
the word "they" was used to reference Maldonado and Nieves.  
When the witness stated "they told them" and "they brought 
them," it would be illogical to conclude that the "two shorties" 
were telling and bringing themselves. 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶91 The 
witness 
later 
referenced 
Nieves 
by 
name, 
reinforcing the implication that his prior testimony referred to 
both Nieves and Maldonado: 
[State]:  Did he talk about, when he spoke of the 
period of time they were in Kenosha, where they were 
at where he was at with the shorties in Kenosha? 
 
[Witness]:  I believe Mr. Nieves's mom's house or his 
baby mamma house. 
¶92 On cross-examination, the following exchange between 
the witness and Maldonado's attorney further emphasized that the 
"they" referred to both Nieves and the co-defendant: 
 
[Attorney]:  Okay.  You are testifying today that Mr. 
Maldonado told you that once they brought these other 
two guys from Waukegan, that they laid on the ground 
in the alley and then shot them; is that your 
testimony? 
 
[Witness]:  Yes. 
(Emphasis 
added). 
 
Given 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
witness's 
testimony, the most reasonable conclusion for the jury to reach 
was that Maldonado told the witness about how he and Nieves 
committed the crime.  Accordingly, I conclude that these out-of-
court statements by Maldonado implicated Nieves in the crime and 
must be considered inculpatory. 
¶93 Second, 
I 
consider 
whether 
admission 
of 
these 
inculpatory statements in violation of Wis. Stat. § 17.12(3) 
constituted harmless error.  Such a determination requires an 
inquiry into "whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  
State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶94, 363 Wis. 2d 376, 412, 864 
N.W.2d 827, 844 (quoting State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29, 355 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42).  The State bears the burden of 
proving the error was harmless.  State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, 
¶42, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397. 
 
¶94 Given the typically damning nature of a co-defendant's 
inculpatory confession, the State's burden is difficult to meet.  
As Bruton describes, such statements can be devastating.  391 
U.S. at 136; see also Cruz, 481 U.S. at 170 (referring to the 
"devastating practical effects" of a co-defendant's inculpatory 
statements).  Even when a jury is properly instructed to 
disregard such statements, it is unlikely such confessions will 
be ignored.  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129. 
¶95 The potency and prejudicial effect in a joint trial of 
a confession by a non-testifying co-defendant that is admissible 
against him but inadmissible and incriminating against the other 
defendant cannot be minimized.  Justice Frankfurter warned that 
the government gets the benefit of the inadmissible testimony 
influencing the jury "which, as a matter of law, they should not 
consider but which they cannot put out of their minds."  Delli 
Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting).  Contrary to the majority in Delli, Justice 
Frankfurter thought that the prejudice could not be cured by a 
limiting instruction.  Id. at 247. 
¶96 The prophylactic effect of a limiting instruction in 
similar situations was the focus of later cases.  In Richardson 
v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), the Court held that when a 
codefendant's confession is redacted to eliminate any reference 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
to the other defendant's existence, then a limiting instruction 
will suffice. 
¶97 Subsequently, the Court in Cruz v. New York, 481 
U.S. 186 (1987), determined that a limiting instruction was 
insufficient to cure the harm.  It held that where a 
nontestifying co-defendant's confession incriminating another 
defendant is not directly admissible against that defendant, 
then the risk of harm in a joint trial is too great "even if the 
jury 
is 
instructed 
not 
to 
consider 
it 
against 
the 
defendant . . . ."  Id. at 193. 
¶98 Here, we need not consider whether the harmful effect 
of this evidence can be sufficiently ameliorated by a limiting 
instruction, because no limiting instruction was given.  The 
jury was never told to disregard Maldonado's out-of-court 
statements implicating Nieves or told that those incriminating 
statements could not be used against Nieves.  Likewise, we need 
not analyze whether the redactions were sufficient, because 
there were no redactions. 
¶99 The State relies on the victim's testimony that Nieves 
and Maldonado brought him to an alley and shot him.  Yet, it is 
unclear how much weight the jury would have given it.  His story 
had changed several times during his interviews with police.  
Further, portions of his testimony were inconsistent, giving 
rise to the likelihood that Maldonado's corroborating statements 
added critical weight to the witness's testimony and contributed 
to Nieves' conviction. 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶100 Due to the nature of the testimony and the failure of 
the court to give a limiting curative instruction, I determine 
that the State fails to meet it burden because it cannot 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was 
harmless. 
¶101 In sum, I conclude that the question before us is 
answered by the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 917.12(3) that 
mandates severance.  Because the circuit court violated that 
statute and that error was not harmless, I would affirm the 
court of appeals decision. 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2014AP1623-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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