Title: Poteat v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 145, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRAHEEM POTEAT, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 145, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0107011363 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 5, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 14, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of August 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Braheem Poteat, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s March 11, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In April 2003, Poteat was found guilty by a Superior Court jury 
of Trafficking in Cocaine, Resisting Arrest, and Possession of Cocaine.  On 
the trafficking conviction, he was sentenced to three years at Level V and, 
on the resisting arrest conviction, he was sentenced to one year at Level V, 
suspended for one year at Level III.2  This Court affirmed Poteat’s 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.3 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Poteat claims that a) his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the cocaine; b) 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to have 
him appear at trial in civilian, rather than prison, clothing; and c) the 
Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte suppress the 
cocaine evidence.   
 
(4) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Poteat was not separately sentenced on the possession conviction. 
3 Poteat v. State, 842 A.2d 647 (Del. 2003). 
 
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the proceedings would have been different.4  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”5  The 
defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.6 
 
(5) 
Poteat’s first claim is that his attorney improperly failed to 
move to suppress the cocaine.  The record reflects that police officers were 
on routine patrol when they noticed Poteat and two other men standing on 
the street corner.  One of the officers previously had warned Poteat not to 
loiter in the area and issued him a ticket.  As the officers approached, Poteat 
attempted to flag down a passing car without success.  During a pat-down 
for weapons, Poteat placed a cup he was holding on the curb.  As one of the 
men sat down on the curb, he knocked the cup over, and several bags of 
crack cocaine spilled out.  Poteat attempted to flee but was subdued by the 
police and placed under arrest.  Under these circumstances, it was reasonable 
for Poteat’s counsel to conclude that a motion to suppress would not be 
successful because Poteat’s behavior led to a reasonable suspicion on the 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
5 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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part of the police that he might have a weapon7 and the cocaine 
unintentionally ended up in plain view on a public street.8  We, therefore, 
conclude that Poteat’s first claim is without merit.   
 
(6) 
  Poteat’s second claim is that his counsel failed to object to his 
wearing a prison uniform during the trial.  The United States Supreme Court 
has ruled that a State may not compel a criminal defendant to appear at trial 
wearing prison clothing.9  Without the element of compulsion, there is no 
constitutional violation.10  The record in this case does not reflect that Poteat 
was compelled to appear at trial in prison clothing.  Moreover, the jury 
found Poteat not guilty of one of the charges against him and found him 
guilty of a lesser-included charge.  Under these circumstances, there is no 
evidence of prejudice.  We, therefore, conclude that Poteat’s second claim is 
without merit.  
 
(7) 
Poteat’s third claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it failed to sua sponte suppress the cocaine evidence.  
Because Poteat did not raise that issue in his direct appeal, he is foreclosed 
from doing so in this postconviction proceeding unless he can demonstrate 
cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of 
                                                 
7 Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1262-63 (Del. 2001). 
8 Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 358 (Del. 1998). 
9 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
10 Id. at 512. 
 
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his rights.11  Poteat has failed to demonstrate either cause for relief or 
prejudice from a violation of his rights.  Moreover, he has failed to 
demonstrate a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, 
integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.12  We, therefore, conclude that Poteat’s third claim is also 
without merit.  
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that Poteat’s 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3). 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).