Title: OÂ’Connell v. Stockton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S135160
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2007

1
Filed 7/26/07  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
KENDRA O’CONNELL, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S135160 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 CV044400 
CITY OF STOCKTON et al., 
) 
 
) 
San Joaquin County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CV019275 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Our state Constitution allows cities and counties to enact and enforce local 
ordinances so long as they are “not in conflict” with the state’s “general laws.”  
(Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.)  Any conflicting ordinance is preempted by state law 
and thus void.   
 
At issue here is a city ordinance allowing forfeiture to the city of any 
vehicle used to commit certain acts made criminal by state law.  The Court of 
Appeal held that state law preempts the city ordinance.  We agree.   
I. 
 
Plaintiff Kendra O’Connell filed this taxpayer action (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 526a) against the City of Stockton and its city attorney (City) challenging the 
constitutionality of a City ordinance labeled “Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance 
Vehicles.”  Plaintiff sought to enjoin the City’s enforcement of the ordinance.  The 
trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint, allowing plaintiff  
 
 
 
2
leave to amend her complaint.  When plaintiff did not do so, the trial court 
dismissed the lawsuit.   
 
On plaintiff’s appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that the 
forfeiture ordinance violated procedural due process because it failed to provide 
for a reasonably prompt postseizure probable cause hearing on the City’s right to 
hold a vehicle pending its forfeiture.  The Court of Appeal also held that the 
forfeiture ordinance was preempted by specific state law provisions governing 
vehicle forfeiture.  This conclusion conflicted with Horton v. City of Oakland 
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580, in which a different Court of Appeal held that a 
vehicle forfeiture ordinance enacted by the City of Oakland, and similar to the one 
at issue here, was not preempted by state law.  We granted review to resolve the 
conflict.1   
II. 
 
Part XXV of Chapter 5 of the Stockton Municipal Code is entitled “Seizure 
and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles.”  The term “forfeiture,” as used here, means 
that the government assumes title to property used to further some illegal purpose.  
(See United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321; Bennis v. Michigan (1996) 
                                              
1  
In granting review in this case, we asked the parties to brief these three 
issues:  “(1)  Does California state law preempt provisions of the City of Stockton 
Municipal Code pertaining to ‘Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles’?  (2)  
Do the Stockton municipal code provisions allowing the commencement of 
vehicle forfeiture proceedings ‘as soon as practicable but in any case within one 
year’ satisfy the state and federal constitutional requirements of procedural due 
process?  (3)  Do the municipal code provisions allocating proceeds of vehicle 
forfeitures to the offices of the San Joaquin County District Attorney and the 
Stockton City Attorney violate state or federal constitutional guarantees of 
substantive or procedural due process?”  Because we conclude here that state law 
preempts the provisions of the Stockton Municipal Code pertaining to seizure and 
forfeiture of nuisance vehicles, thus invalidating those provisions and rendering 
them unenforceable, we need not address the remaining two issues.   
 
 
3
516 U.S. 442; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974) 416 U.S. 663, 
682.)   
 
The ordinance at issue provides for the forfeiture of “[a]ny vehicle used to 
solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire any controlled 
substance,” with “[a]ll right, title, and interest” thereafter vesting in the City.  
(Stockton Mun. Code, §§ 5-1000 & 5-1002, italics added.)  A vehicle so used may 
be seized by a peace officer (1) with a court order; (2) incident to an arrest or a 
search conducted with a search warrant; or (3) with probable cause to believe the 
vehicle was used in the specified crimes.  (Id., § 5-1003.)  Within one year of 
police seizure of a vehicle, either the Stockton City Attorney or the San Joaquin 
County District Attorney “shall file a petition for forfeiture with the Superior 
Court of San Joaquin County.”  (Id., § 5-1006, subds. (a) & (b).)  The prosecuting 
agency must then give notice of the intended forfeiture proceedings to interested 
parties, advising them of their rights to file claims with the San Joaquin County 
Superior Court challenging the forfeiture.  (Id., § 5-1006, subd. (c).)   
 
A trial of the vehicle forfeiture can be before either a court or a jury.  The 
City has “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence” that the 
vehicle was used for one of the prohibited purposes set out in the ordinance.  
(Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-1006, subd. (f).)  Forfeited vehicles are to be sold; the 
proceeds are used first to pay any “bona fide or innocent purchaser, conditional 
sales vendor, mortgagee or lien holder” of the vehicle, when such payment is 
ordered by the prosecuting agency.  (Id., § 5-1008, subd. (a).)  After paying the 
costs of publishing the notice of the forfeiture action and of storing, repairing and 
selling the vehicle (id., § 5-1008, subd. (b)), remaining funds are distributed in 
proportionate shares to the involved prosecuting and law enforcement agencies.  
(Id., § 5-1008, subd. (c).)   
 
 
4
 
We now turn to the principles governing state law preemption of local 
ordinances.   
III. 
 
We have in the past articulated the following principles on state law 
preemption of local ordinances.  “Under article XI, section 7 of the California 
Constitution, ‘[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, 
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general 
[state] laws.’  [¶]  ‘If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is 
preempted by such law and is void.’  [Citations.]  [¶]  ‘A conflict exists if the local 
legislation “ ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general 
law, either expressly or by legislative implication.  [Citations.]  ’ ” ’ ”  (Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 (Sherwin-Williams), 
italics added; see also American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland 
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239, 1251 (American Financial).)  We explain the italicized 
terms below. 
 
A local ordinance duplicates state law when it is “coextensive” with state 
law.  (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, citing In re Portnoy 
(1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 240 [as “finding ‘duplication’ where local legislation 
purported to impose the same criminal prohibition that general law imposed”].)   
 
A local ordinance contradicts state law when it is inimical to or cannot be 
reconciled with state law.  (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, citing Ex 
Parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 641-648 [as finding “ ‘contradiction’ ” in a 
local ordinance that set the maximum speed limit for vehicles below that set by 
state law].)   
 
A local ordinance enters a field fully occupied by state law in either of two 
situations -- when the Legislature “expressly manifest[s]” its intent to occupy the 
legal area or when the Legislature “impliedly” occupies the field.  (Sherwin-
 
 
5
Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898; see also 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law 
(10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law, § 986, p. 551 [“[W]here the Legislature has 
manifested an intention, expressly or by implication, wholly to occupy the field 
. . . municipal power [to regulate in that area] is lost.”].)   
 
When the Legislature has not expressly stated its intent to occupy an area of 
law, we look to whether it has impliedly done so.  This occurs in three situations:  
when “ ‘(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general 
law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; 
(2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such 
terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further 
or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by 
general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local 
ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to 
the’ locality.”  (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.)   
 
With respect to the implied occupation of an area of law by the 
Legislature’s full and complete coverage of it, this court recently had this to say:  
“ ‘Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject 
matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local 
regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole 
purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.’ ”  (American Financial, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 1252, quoting Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 712.)  We 
went on to say:  “ ‘State regulation of a subject may be so complete and detailed as 
to indicate an intent to preclude local regulation.’ ”  (American Financial, supra, 
at p. 1252.)  We thereafter observed:  “ ‘Whenever the Legislature has seen fit to 
adopt a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, the entire control 
over whatever phases of the subject are covered by state legislation ceases as far as 
local legislation is concerned.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1253, quoting In re Lane (1962) 58 
 
 
6
Cal.2d 99, 102.)  When a local ordinance is identical to a state statute, it is clear 
that “ ‘the field sought to be covered by the ordinance has already been 
occupied’ ” by state law.  (American Financial, supra, at p. 1253.)   
 
“[W]hen local government regulates in an area over which it traditionally 
has exercised control, such as the location of particular land uses, California courts 
will presume, absent a clear indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature, 
that such regulation is not preempted by state statute.”  (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. 
County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.)   
 
With these principles in mind, we consider below whether state law 
preempts the City’s vehicle forfeiture ordinance.    
IV. 
 
As we noted earlier, the City’s ordinance permits the forfeiture of any 
vehicle used to “to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire 
any controlled substance.”  (Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-1000, italics added.)  We 
turn first to the latter aspect.  The Court of Appeal concluded that this part of the 
ordinance was preempted by certain provisions of the California Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11000 et seq.) 
authorizing forfeiture of vehicles used in specified serious drug crimes.  We too 
look to the UCSA as the source of state law preemption of this part of the City’s 
forfeiture ordinance.  But unlike the Court of Appeal, we do not rely solely on the 
UCSA’s vehicle forfeiture provisions; instead, we consider the UCSA as a whole, 
a comprehensive scheme defining and setting the penalties for crimes involving 
controlled substances.  This requires an analysis of various UCSA provisions 
pertinent here.  It makes for tedious reading, but it is central to a resolution of the 
preemption issue presented.   
 
As defined in the UCSA, controlled substances include every “drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor” listed in one of five schedules set out in Health 
 
 
7
and Safety Code sections 11054 through 11058.  The schedules include all 
commonly known controlled substances, such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and 
methamphetamine, as well as many others less familiar.  The UCSA not only 
regulates the lawful use and distribution of controlled substances (see Health & 
Saf. Code, §§ 11100, 11210-11211), but it also defines as criminal offenses the 
unlawful possession and distribution of specified controlled substances (see Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11350-11361). 
 
In addition, the UCSA sets forth the penalties for criminal violations of its 
provisions.  For example, unlawful possession of “not more than 28.5 grams of 
marijuana” is a misdemeanor offense carrying a maximum fine of $100 and no jail 
time.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b).)  For more serious possessory drug 
crimes and those involving manufacture, sale, or possession for sale, the UCSA 
prescribes felony penalties.  (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, subd. (a) 
[providing that certain specified possessory drug crimes “shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison”], 11351.5 [punishment for the sale of cocaine 
base is “imprisonment . . . for . . . three, four, or five years”], 11352, subd. (a) 
[providing state prison terms of three, four, or five years for transporting, 
importing into California, selling, furnishing, administering, or giving away 
certain controlled substances.].)   
 
In Health and Safety Code section 11470, the Legislature specifies the 
following as subject to forfeiture:  Controlled substances “manufactured, 
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this division” (id., subd. (a)); the 
raw materials, products and equipment used, or intended to be used, to 
manufacture, compound, process, deliver, import or export controlled substances 
in violation of the UCSA (id., subd. (b)); items used as containers for the property 
described in subdivisions (a) and (b) (id., subd. (c)); “[a]ll books, records, and 
research products and materials, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data 
 
 
8
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this division” (id., subd. (d)); 
moneys, negotiable instruments, securities and other valuable items furnished or 
intended to be furnished in illicit exchanges of specified controlled substances as 
well as all proceeds traceable to such exchanges (id., subd. (f)); and the real 
property of persons convicted of specified drug crimes involving such property, 
except for real property “used as a family residence or for other lawful purposes, 
or which is owned by two or more persons, one of whom had no knowledge of its 
unlawful use” (id., subd. (g)). 
 
Subdivision (e) of Health and Safety Code section 11470 governs 
forfeitures involving boats, airplanes, and vehicles.  It makes the following subject 
to forfeiture:  “The interest of any registered owner of a boat, airplane, or any 
vehicle [other than certain vehicles used for agricultural purposes] which has been 
used as an instrument to facilitate the manufacture of, or possession for sale or 
sale of” specified amounts of certain controlled substances including 14.25 grams 
or more of heroin or cocaine base, or a substance containing 14.25 grams or more 
of heroin or cocaine base, or 28.5 grams or more of all Schedule I controlled 
substances except marijuana, peyote, or psilocybin, or 10 pounds or more of 
marijuana, peyote, or psilocybin, or methamphetamine in any amount.  (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 11470, subd. (e), italics added.)  Health and Safety Code section 
11488.4, subdivision (i)(1), states that forfeiture of airplanes, boats, and vehicles 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property to be forfeited was 
used for one of the specified drug offenses.  Thus, as relevant here, under the 
UCSA a vehicle can be forfeited to a government entity only upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the vehicle was “used as an instrument to facilitate the 
manufacture of, or possession for sale or sale” of specified amounts of certain 
controlled substances.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11470, subd. (e).)   
 
 
9
 
In Health and Safety Code section 11469, the Legislature has established 
“guidelines” that local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies should follow 
in enforcing the state law provisions regarding the seizure and forfeiture of 
property used to commit drug crimes in California.  It points out, among other 
things, that “[l]aw enforcement is the principal objective of forfeiture,” and that 
“[p]otential revenue [to be derived from property forfeiture] must not be allowed 
to jeopardize the effective investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses.”  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11469, subd. (a).)  And it reminds prosecutors that they 
should “[w]henever appropriate . . . seek criminal sanctions as to the underlying 
criminal acts which give rise to the forfeiture action.”  (Id., subd. (c).)   
 
Recognizing that forfeiture can sometimes lead to harsh results, the 
Legislature included this cautionary language in subdivision (j) of Health and 
Safety Code section 11469:  “Although civil forfeiture is intended to be remedial 
by removing the tools and profits from those engaged in the illicit drug trade, it 
can have harsh effects on property owners in some circumstances.  Therefore, law 
enforcement shall seek to protect the interests of innocent property owners, 
guarantee adequate notice and due process to property owners, and ensure that 
forfeiture serves the remedial purpose of the law.”   
 
We summarize:  State law, through the UCSA (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11000 et seq.), defines controlled substances, regulates their use, and sets 
penalties for their unlawful possession and distribution.  Among the available 
penalties is vehicle forfeiture but, as pointed out earlier, only upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the vehicle’s use to facilitate certain serious drug crimes 
(manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of methamphetamine, or of heroin or 
cocaine base, marijuana, peyote, or psilocybin and other Schedule I controlled 
substances in specified amounts).  By way of contrast, the City’s ordinance allows 
the harsh penalty of vehicle forfeiture upon proof merely by a preponderance of 
 
 
10
evidence of a vehicle’s use simply “to attempt to acquire” any amount of any 
controlled substance (for instance, less than 28.5 grams of marijuana, a low-grade 
misdemeanor warranting only a $100 fine and no jail time and not subject to 
vehicle forfeiture under the UCSA).   
 
The comprehensive nature of the UCSA in defining drug crimes and 
specifying penalties (including forfeiture) is so thorough and detailed as to 
manifest the Legislature’s intent to preclude local regulation.  The UCSA 
accordingly occupies the field of penalizing crimes involving controlled 
substances, thus impliedly preempting the City’s forfeiture ordinance to the extent 
it calls for the forfeiture of vehicles used “to acquire or attempt to acquire” 
(Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-1000) controlled substances regulated under the UCSA.  
(See American Financial,  supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1252; Tolman v. Underhill, 
supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 712.)   
 
Relevant to this conclusion is our decision in In re Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d 
99.  That case involved a statewide statutory scheme that, we held, fully occupied 
an area of regulation, thereby preempting a municipal ordinance covering the same 
legal area.  The statewide statutory scheme consisted of comprehensive criminal 
proscriptions against specified sexual conduct, and the local law was a Los 
Angeles City ordinance criminalizing sexual intercourse between persons not 
married to each other.  Although the state statutory scheme included laws 
prohibiting prostitution, pimping and pandering, bigamy, acts against public 
decency, rape, and various sex crimes against children, it did not include any 
offense for “simple fornication or adultery.”  (In re Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at 
p. 104.)  This court reasoned that the exclusion of fornication or adultery from the 
comprehensive state law scheme showed the Legislature’s intent that “such 
conduct sh[ould] not be criminal.”  (Ibid.)   
 
 
11
 
Here too the Legislature’s comprehensive enactment of penalties for crimes 
involving controlled substances, but exclusion from that scheme of any provision 
for vehicle forfeiture for simple possessory drug offenses, manifests a clear intent 
to reserve that severe penalty for very serious drug crimes involving the 
manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of specified amounts of certain controlled 
substances.   
 
We now consider the Court of Appeal’s decision in Horton v. City of 
Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, which involved an ordinance similar to the 
one at issue here, but which reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Court of 
Appeal in this case.  Horton held that the UCSA’s forfeiture provisions did not 
preempt Oakland’s ordinance allowing forfeiture of vehicles used to acquire or 
attempt to acquire controlled substances.  It reasoned that the ordinance covered 
an area of law “untouched by statewide legislation” because the UCSA’s forfeiture 
provisions, which apply only to persons possessing for sale or selling illicit drugs, 
were “silent with regard to vehicles used by drug buyers.”  (Horton v. City of 
Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 586, italics added.)  In focusing solely on the 
UCSA’s forfeiture provisions, Horton failed to consider the UCSA’s 
comprehensive scheme of drug crime penalties, which include forfeiture of 
various items of property, including vehicles, when used in specified serious drug 
offenses.  Thus, Horton never addressed whether the UCSA as a whole constitutes 
a comprehensive scheme that fully occupies the field of penalizing crimes 
involving controlled substances.  Because of our conclusion in this case that the 
UCSA’s comprehensive regulation of drug offenses as a whole impliedly preempts 
the City’s ordinance allowing forfeiture of vehicles used in acquiring controlled 
substances, we need not resolve whether the UCSA’s forfeiture provisions alone 
 
 
12
establish implied state preemption, the question entertained by the Courts of 
Appeal in this case and in Horton.2   
 
We now turn to the other aspect of the City’s forfeiture ordinance, allowing 
for the forfeiture of any vehicle used to solicit prostitution.  The Court of Appeal 
below held that the Legislature had expressly preempted that field through the 
interplay of two Vehicle Code provisions:  Vehicle Code section 21 (precluding 
local regulation in areas covered by the Vehicle Code absent express legislative 
authorization) and Vehicle Code section 22659.5, subdivision (a) (setting up a 
five-year pilot program for local entities to declare vehicles used in specified 
prostitution-related offenses public nuisances).  The Court of Appeal was correct, 
as we explain below.   
 
Vehicle Code section 21 states:  “Except as otherwise expressly provided, 
the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout the State and in 
all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or 
enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly 
authorized herein.”  (Italics added.)  Thus, under section 21, local regulation of 
any “matter[]” covered by this state’s Vehicle Code is prohibited unless the 
Legislature has expressly allowed local regulation in that field.  (See Rumford v. 
City of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 545, 550; Save the Sunset Strip Coalition v. City 
of West Hollywood (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177-1178.)   
                                              
2  
The dissent, relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Horton, asserts 
there is no conflict between the City’s ordinance and the UCSA because the 
former covers drug buyers while the latter is silent on that topic.  Not so.  As 
comprehensive statewide legislation that broadly addresses the problems arising 
from illicit drugs, the UCSA, through its generally applicable laws against 
possession or attempted possession of all controlled substances, imposes criminal 
penalties on those who, in the words of the City’s forfeiture ordinance, “acquire or 
attempt to acquire any controlled substance.”  
 
 
13
 
The matter that is covered by the Vehicle Code and that is pertinent here is 
the authority of local government entities to declare a vehicle used in soliciting 
prostitution to be a public nuisance.  That topic is addressed in the Vehicle Code 
by subdivision (a) of section 22659.5.  That provision allows a city or a county to 
“adopt an ordinance establishing a five-year pilot program that implements 
procedures for declaring any motor vehicle a public nuisance” when used in the 
commission of specified criminal conduct, including acts covered in Penal Code 
section 647, subdivision (b), which prohibits engaging in acts of prostitution as 
well as soliciting or agreeing to engage in such acts.  (Veh. Code, § 22659.5, subd. 
(a), italics added.)    
 
Subdivision (b) of Vehicle Code section 22659.5 permits local ordinances 
adopted under the statutory scheme to “include procedures to enjoin and abate the 
declared [vehicular] nuisance by ordering the defendant not to use the vehicle 
again,” and it allows for the forcible removal of vehicles.  Under subdivision (c) of 
section 22659.5, any action taken to abate a public nuisance is limited to those 
“specified in subdivision (b),” that is, an injunction against or abatement of a 
declared nuisance or the removal of a nuisance vehicle.  Section 22659.5 contains 
no language, however, that would allow a local entity such as the City here to 
seize and forfeit a vehicle that, through its use in soliciting prostitution, has 
created a public nuisance.   
 
We summarize:  Vehicle Code section 21 precludes local regulation of 
“matters covered” by the Vehicle Code, absent express legislative authorization.  
The use of vehicles in soliciting prostitution is a matter that the Vehicle Code 
covers in section 22659.5, which establishes a five-year pilot program under 
which cities and counties may treat as a public nuisance any vehicle used in 
soliciting prostitution, but that pilot program does not allow for forfeiture of the 
vehicle.  There being no express legislative authorization for any other form of 
 
 
14
local regulation of the matter covered by Vehicle Code section 22659.5, Vehicle 
Code section 21 precludes an ordinance like the City’s, which seeks to regulate 
vehicle use in soliciting prostitution by requiring forfeiture of the vehicle.  Under 
Vehicle Code section 21, therefore, the City’s ordinance is expressly preempted by 
state law.   
 
In addressing a similar ordinance adopted by the City of Oakland, the Court 
of Appeal in Horton v. City of Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, reached a 
contrary conclusion.  First, asking whether Vehicle Code section 22659. 5 had 
impliedly preempted the Oakland ordinance allowing forfeiture of any vehicle 
used to solicit prostitution, Horton concluded it had not, because Oakland had not 
adopted the five-year pilot program authorized by that statute.  (Horton, supra, 82 
Cal.App.4th at p. 589.)  Horton then considered whether there was express 
preemption under Vehicle Code section 21.  As we have seen, absent express 
legislative authorization of local regulation in a legal area, Vehicle Code section 
21 prohibits such regulation pertaining to any “matters” covered by the Vehicle 
Code.  And section 22659.5 of the Vehicle Code specifically covers abatement of 
public nuisance vehicles used to solicit prostitution, the same subject of the 
Oakland ordinance at issue in Horton.  But Horton reasoned that because Vehicle 
Code section 22659.5 allowed local entities to abate as a public nuisance any 
vehicle used to solicit prostitution only if the local entity participated in “an 
optional and limited pilot program” authorized by section 22659.5, that state 
statute, according to Horton, did not cover the same subject as the Oakland 
ordinance, which was not based on the pilot program.  (Horton, supra, 82 
Cal.App.4th at p. 591.)  We disagree.  
 
Vehicle Code section 22659.5, and the vehicle forfeiture ordinances in this 
case and in Horton v. City of Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, both address 
the same subject:  abatement of a public nuisance created by vehicles used in 
 
 
15
soliciting prostitution.  As the Court of Appeal here  noted, the purpose of the state 
Legislature’s enactment of section 22659.5 was to ascertain through a five-year 
pilot program “ ‘whether declaring motor vehicles a public nuisance when used in 
the commission of acts of prostitution would have a substantial effect upon the 
reduction of prostitution in neighborhoods, thereby serving the local business 
owners and citizens of our urban communities.’ ”  (Quoting Stats. 1993, ch. 485, 
§ 1, pp. 2595-2596.)  Because the Vehicle Code addresses the same subject -- 
nuisance abatement of vehicles used to solicit prostitution -- as the City’s 
ordinance at issue, and the state Legislature has in no other statute provided for 
local regulation in this area, the City’s ordinance is preempted by state law.3 
 
We also reject the City’s characterization of Vehicle Code section 22659.5 
as a “special statute” that cannot support a claim of preemption, because such 
claims must be “founded upon a ‘conflict with general laws’ ” (Baldwin v. County 
of Tehama (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 166, 177, italics added).  Vehicle Code section 
22659.5 allows, but does not require, a city or a county to adopt an ordinance 
declaring vehicles used in specified sex offenses to be a public nuisance in accord 
with the terms of the statute.  But this statute is, contrary to the City’s contention, 
a general rather than a special law because it applies generally throughout the 
state; it is not limited to certain listed cities and counties.  Thus, Vehicle Code 
section 22659 cannot be characterized as special legislation.  (See Cal. Const., art. 
IV, § 16 [authorizing the enactment of statutes applicable to particular cities or 
counties]; White v. State of California (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 298, 305 
[Legislature must have rational basis for singling out a city or county to be 
“ ‘affected by [a special] statute’ ”]; Baldwin, supra, at p. 177 [uncodified 
                                              
3   
To the extent it is contrary to our conclusions here, we disapprove Horton 
v. City of Oakland, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580.  
 
 
16
enactments granting limited powers over groundwaters to “specifically identified 
special districts” described as “special acts”].)  
 
We now turn to the City’s arguments made in overall support of its vehicle 
forfeiture ordinance.  According to the City, the ordinance does not conflict with 
any state law, and therefore a necessary precondition to state preemption is 
lacking.  We disagree.  As discussed earlier, the ordinance conflicts with state law 
because anyone using a vehicle “to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or 
attempt to acquire any controlled substance” -- conduct exclusively within the 
purview of state law – is subject to penalties in excess of those prescribed by the 
Legislature.   
 
The City also argues that because it operates under a charter rather than 
under the general laws governing California cities and therefore meets the 
requirement of Government Code section 34101 for a “chartered city,” our state 
Constitution allows it to adopt and enforce ordinances in conflict with state law so 
long as the subject matter constitutes a “municipal affair[]” rather than a 
“statewide concern.”  (See Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5; Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 389, 399.)  The City asserts that its vehicle forfeiture ordinance deals with 
a municipal affair, namely, abating the nuisance caused by vehicular traffic 
associated with the “illicit commercial activity” of obtaining drugs or soliciting 
prostitution within the City’s boundaries.  We are not persuaded, as explained 
below.   
 
The illicit commercial activities — prostitution and trafficking in controlled 
substances — that are the focus of the City’s vehicle forfeiture ordinance are 
matters of statewide concern that our Legislature has comprehensively addressed 
through various provisions of this state’s Penal and Vehicle Codes, leaving no 
room for further regulation at the local level.  One of the lesser harms associated 
with these crimes is the traffic congestion that may result when vehicles are used 
 
 
17
to solicit acts of prostitution or to buy or sell drugs illegally on city streets.  
Although traffic congestion is a local problem that cities ordinarily are authorized 
to address, they may not do so by means of an ordinance that, by allowing 
forfeiture of a vehicle used to commit a specific state law violation, impinges on 
an area fully occupied or exclusively covered by state law.4  
 
 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
                                              
4   
Because the determination to preclude or to allow local regulation in a field 
addressed by state law resides exclusively with the state Legislature, that body 
can, of course, expressly authorize local entities to enact ordinances such as the 
one in this case that we conclude is preempted under existing law. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.   
 
The ordinance at issue is a practical and responsible attempt by the City of 
Stockton (Stockton) to address problems it, and many other cities face on a daily 
basis.  The ordinance speaks to a narrow, pressing and quite real local concern.  
Street commerce in drugs and sex forces innocent people to share their 
neighborhoods with pimps, prostitutes, and drug dealers who use their streets as a 
bazaar for illegal transactions.   
 
Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides, “[a] county or 
city may make and enforce within it limits all local, police, sanitary, and other 
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”  Article XI, section 
5 of the California Constitution, commonly referred to as the “home rule” 
doctrine, “reserves to charter cities the right to adopt and enforce ordinances that 
conflict with general state laws, provided the subject of the regulation is a 
‘municipal affair’ rather than one of ‘statewide concern.’  [Citation.]”  (Horton v. 
City of Oakland (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580, 584-585 (Horton).)  “[W]hen local 
government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised 
control, . . . California courts will presume, absent a clear indication of preemptive 
intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not preempted by state statute.”  
(Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.) 
 
 
2
 
In deciding whether a local ordinance enacted by a charter city, like 
Stockton, is valid, we apply the following analysis:  “ ‘First, a court must 
determine whether there is a genuine conflict between a state statute and a 
municipal ordinance.  [Citations.]  Only after concluding there is an actual conflict 
should a court proceed with the second question; i.e., does the local legislation 
impact a municipal or statewide concern?’  [Citation.]  Courts should avoid 
making unnecessary choices between competing claims of municipal and state 
governments ‘by carefully insuring that the purported conflict is in fact a genuine 
one, unresolvable short of choosing between one enactment and the other.’  
[Citation.]  In other words, the preemption question begins with an inquiry into the 
existence of a conflict.  If there is no conflict, the home rule doctrine is not 
brought into play.”  (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 585.)   
 
The majority relies on the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
(UCSA) (Health & Saf. Code, §11000 et seq.) in reaching its conclusion that 
Stockton’s ordinance is preempted because of a conflict.  It views the UCSA as so 
comprehensive in nature “as to manifest the Legislature’s intent to preclude local 
regulation.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  The majority’s reasoning, if accepted, 
requires preemption on an all-encompassing basis. 
 
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the overall structure of the 
UCSA “manifests a clear intent” to limit the penalty of vehicle forfeiture to “very 
serious drug crimes involving the manufacture, sale, or possession for sale of” 
drugs.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  The Legislature has authorized a state prison 
sentence of up to three years for the simple possession of even a small amount of 
certain drugs.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350; Pen. Code, § 18.)  It is difficult to 
conclude that the Legislature intended to deprive a person of freedom for simple 
possession, but intended to protect an automobile from forfeiture in only very 
serious cases of drug manufacture and sale. 
 
 
3
 
Certainly the Legislature has not said that was its intent and no legislative 
history1 has been cited to support that conclusion.  Unlike the majority, I do not 
discern a conflict between the UCSA and Stockton’s ordinance. 
 
In fact, “the [UCSA] is silent with regard to vehicles used by drug buyers.”  
(Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 586, fn. omitted.)  Stockton has included 
these vehicles in its nuisance abatement program in an attempt to alleviate the 
concerns of its residents.  Thus, rather than creating a conflict, Stockton’s 
ordinance covers an area undisturbed by the UCSA. 
 
Also, Stockton’s ordinance does not conflict with provisions of the Vehicle 
Code.  The majority relies on Vehicle Code section 21, which states, “Except as 
otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and 
uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no 
local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this 
code unless expressly authorized herein.”  The majority next refers to Vehicle 
                                              
1  
In Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at page 588, the court rejected an 
argument that it should “retroactively infer . . . preemptive intent from recent 
legislative activity” based on the Legislature’s passage of Assembly Bill No. 662 
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.)  That bill amended Health and Saf. Code section 11469 et 
seq. “to include forfeitures under the criminal profiteering statute.  The bill also 
declared the Legislature’s intent that forfeiture law be exclusive of any local 
ordinance or regulation, declaring the subject a matter of statewide concern.”  
(Horton, at p. 588.)  The Governor vetoed Assembly Bill No. 662 explaining, “ 
‘[i]t is not appropriate for the State to take away the tools from Oakland, 
Sacramento, and other cities considering the adoption of similar ordinances 
without a more careful analysis of the amount of discretion which should be left to 
cities to craft their own remedies in response to local conditions.’ ”  (Horton, at p. 
588.)  The court concluded, “Thus the bill’s statement that ‘[t]he provisions of this 
section are a clarification and declaration of existing law’ is far from definitive.  A 
‘clear indication’ is one which needs no further elucidation.  The Legislature’s 
perceived need to ‘clarify’ demonstrates that the statute as drafted fails to provide 
the clear indication required to preempt by implication.”  (Ibid.)   
 
 
4
Code section 22659.5, which authorizes a city to “adopt an ordinance establishing 
a five-year pilot program that implements procedures for declaring any motor 
vehicle a public nuisance” used in soliciting prostitution.  (See maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 12, italics omitted.)  The majority concludes that because Vehicle Code section 
22659.5 covers nuisance abatement of vehicles used in soliciting prostitution and 
“does not allow for forfeiture of the vehicle,” Stockton’s ordinance is preempted 
under the provisions of Vehicle Code section 21.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) 
 
I disagree.  The provisions of Vehicle Code section 22659.5 merely 
authorize “an optional and limited pilot program.”  (Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 591.)  Vehicle Code section 22659.5 “does not preclude local governments 
from enacting other provisions if they decide not to adopt the proffered pilot 
program.”  (Horton, at p. 589.)  Like the Oakland ordinance in Horton, Stockton’s 
ordinance “was not enacted pursuant to section 22659.5, [therefore] it is not 
constrained by the procedural requirements of that statute.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  
Thus, Stockton’s ordinance does not conflict with state law.  The ordinance does 
not interfere with the operation of state law as it is not “inimical” to its provisions 
in the relevant sense, and it “does not prohibit what the statute commands or 
command what it prohibits.” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 
4 Cal.4th 893, 902.)   
 
 
This court has counseled that we should carefully ensure “that the 
purported conflict is in fact a genuine one, unresolvable short of choosing between 
one enactment and the other.”  (California Fed. Savings and Loan Assn. v. City of 
Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 17.)  Contrary to the majority, I would hold that 
there is no conflict between state law and Stockton’s ordinance.   
 
In addition, assuming there is a conflict with state law, because Stockton is 
a charter city, it argues that its ordinance addresses a municipal affair:  nuisance 
abatement.  Stockton urges that the ordinance’s forfeiture provisions are necessary 
 
 
5
to reduce the urban blight and traffic caused by prostitution and drug dealing.  The 
majority summarily rejects this argument holding that although traffic congestion 
is a harm associated with these crimes, illicit commercial activities such as 
prostitution and drug trafficking are matters of statewide concern.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 16.)   
 
The majority quotes our opinion in Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of 
Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1139, for the rule that when a local government 
regulates an area which it traditionally exercised control, courts will presume that 
the regulation is not preempted by state statute, absent the Legislature’s clear 
intention to preempt.  (Id. at p. 1149; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  The majority 
fails to follow this rule.  It cannot be said that when the Legislature enacted the 
UCSA and Vehicle Code, it intended to invalidate local nuisance ordinances 
targeting the urban blight created by drug trafficking and prostitution.   
 
The majority also relies on American Financial Services Assn. v. City of 
Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239 (American Financial), where we concluded that a 
statutory scheme that regulated predatory lending practices preempted an Oakland 
ordinance that purported to regulate predatory lending practices in the Oakland 
home mortgage market.  In that case, we found it significant that “the Legislature 
was not suddenly entering an area previously governed by municipalities,” but 
instead was addressing a subject matter that historically has been regulated “at the 
state, not the municipal, level.”  (Id. at p. 1255.) 
 
Here, by contrast, Stockton passed an ordinance aimed at nuisance 
abatement, a traditionally local police power.2  (People v. Johnson (1954) 129 
                                              
2  
The majority relies on In re Lane (1962) 58 Cal.2d 99, in support of its 
conclusion that the UCSA thoroughly “occupies the field of penalizing crimes 
involving controlled substances.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  Lane is 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
6
Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [“[a] city has the power to pass general police regulations to 
prevent nuisances”]; see also The City of Oakland v. Williams (1940) 15 Cal.2d 
542, 549 [cities “possess the necessary police power, both under constitutional 
grant and under their respective charters, to abate nuisances”].)  In acknowledging 
what constitutes a “nuisance,” the Civil Code defines the term broadly as 
including “[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the 
illegal sale of controlled substances,” or anything that is “indecent or offensive . . . 
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,” or anything 
that “unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any 
. . . public park, square, street, or highway . . . .”  (Civ. Code, § 3479, italics added; 
see also Civ. Code, § 3480 [“[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same 
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of 
persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon 
individuals may be unequal”].)  Therefore, the traditionally local nature of 
nuisance regulation distinguishes this case from the situation presented in 
American Financial, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1239. 
 
The majority does not address the compelling problem of urban blight for 
the poor and elderly, which is immediate, significant, and certainly a local 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
distinguishable.  It involved a statewide statutory scheme providing 
comprehensive criminal proscriptions against specified sexual conduct.  Lane held 
void, a local ordinance that appears quaint nearly 50 years later, which purported 
to criminalize sexual intercourse between unmarried persons.   
 
This case involves a completely different situation.  Here, Stockton’s 
ordinance attempts to address the problems caused by drug dealing and 
prostitution, activities the city understandably views as public nuisances.  (Civ. 
Code, §§ 3479, 3480, 3491.)  
 
 
 
7
concern.  The aged homeowner who must shut herself inside while drug 
transactions are conducted in her front yard, and the parents who must walk their 
children to school while commercial sex acts are performed in cars parked at the 
curb pay a heavy and very local price.  Not all Californians confront these 
problems, but those who do have a pressing and localized need for protection.   
 
It should not be the case that local governments require the permission of 
the state to protect their own citizens from nuisances that profoundly affect their 
quality of life and the quiet enjoyment of their own property.   
 
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
                                              
3  
I believe the distinctions drawn in Horton, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 580, are 
sound and should be adopted.  Horton specifically left open the due process 
question raised by ordinances that impose a reduced burden of proof and the 
authorization of a one-year time frame before requiring notice and providing an 
opportunity for challenging the forfeiture.  These procedural provisions are worthy 
of careful scrutiny. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion O’Connell v. City of Stockton 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 128 Cal.App.4th 831 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S135160 
Date Filed: July 26, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Joaquin 
Judge: Elizabeth Humphreys 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mark T. Clausen for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers, Meredith N. Landy, Dale M. Edmondson, Joshua D. Baker and Michel Amaral for 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern 
California, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties and California Attorneys for 
Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Joseph M. Quinn; Richard E. Nosky, Jr., City Attorney, and Lori 
S. Whittaker, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles) and Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, 
for The League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark T. Clausen 
18 E. Fulton Road 
Santa Rosa, CA  94117 
(415) 221-1817 
 
Joseph M. Quinn 
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson 
575 Market Street, Suite 2600 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 421-3711