Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Marvin E. Marks
Citation: 2003 WI 114
Docket Number: 2001AP002284-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2003

2003 WI 114 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2284-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Marvin E. Marks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
Complainant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Marvin E. Marks,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MARKS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
        
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 23, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross respondent there were 
briefs by Daniel W. Hildebrand and DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross appellant there were 
briefs by Richard P. Mozinski and Radosevich, Mozinski, Cashman 
& Olson, LLP, Manitowoc, and oral argument by Richard P. 
Mozinski. 
 
2003 WI 114 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2284-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Marvin E. Marks, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Marvin E. Marks,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Marvin E. Marks appeals from 
the recommendation of the referee that his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin be suspended for 60 days for having asserted he 
maintained a lien on settlement proceeds in violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c).1 The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) cross-appeals 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
2 
 
from the referee's decision to dismiss two claims that were 
filed against Attorney Marks under the Michigan Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
¶2 
We determine that a 60-day suspension is appropriate 
discipline under the facts of this case.  We further conclude 
that the referee erred by dismissing the Michigan disciplinary 
counts.  However, we are of the opinion that remanding this 
matter would not serve the interests of judicial efficiency.  
The OLR has indicated that its recommendation with respect to 
discipline would not change, even if violations of the Michigan 
rules of disciplinary conduct were established, and there has 
already been substantial delay in the prosecution of this 
matter.   
¶3 
Attorney Marks was admitted to practice in Wisconsin 
in 1983.  He is also a member of the Michigan State Bar.  
Approximately 75 percent of his practice is based in Michigan 
and he maintains his office in Michigan. 
¶4 
In 1992 Marks was issued a private reprimand for 
violating SCR 20:3.1(a)(1), for commencing an action that was 
unwarranted under existing law.  In June 1994 he received a 
public reprimand for violating SCR 20:3.4(c), because he failed 
to pay a $10,000 judgment entered against him in connection with 
filing the aforementioned frivolous action.  In July 1999, while 
this 
matter 
was 
pending, 
Marks 
received 
another 
private 
reprimand for conduct constituting a conflict of interest in 
violation of SCR 20:1.7(b) and SCR 20:1.9(a). 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
The facts of this matter are largely undisputed. On 
October 18, 1996, Donald Koivisto (Mr. Koivisto) retained Marks 
to represent him in a personal injury action.  Mr. Koivisto's 
wife had just been killed in an automobile accident in Iron 
County, Wisconsin.  His daughter and granddaughter were injured 
in the accident.  The driver of the other vehicle was a Michigan 
resident. 
¶6 
Mr. Koivisto signed a Percentage Fee Agreement (Fee 
Agreement) that provided for a contingency fee of 25 percent of 
the amount recovered unless the matter went to trial, in which 
case the fee would be 33 and 1/3 percent.  Marks explained the 
fee 
options 
and 
Mr. 
Koivisto 
elected 
a 
contingency 
fee 
arrangement rather than an hourly fee.  On October 24, 1996, Mr. 
Koivisto's daughter signed a similar Fee Agreement on behalf of 
her minor daughter.  Paragraph 5 of both Fee Agreements provided 
as follows: 
If for any reason, the Attorney-Client relationship 
was to be terminated prior to settlement, compromise, 
or judgment, etc., without good cause on client's 
behalf, the client hereby agrees to pay attorney for 
the value of legal services received by the client for 
attorney on an hourly rate schedule of $100.00 per 
hour plus expenses.  Said fee will be immediately due 
and payable. 
¶7 
It is undisputed that Marks diligently pursued his 
clients' cases from October 18 through October 25.  He drafted 
letters, contacted insurers, contacted the district attorney's 
office and the sheriff's department, met with his clients, and 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
4 
 
began to prepare pleadings.  Mr. Koivisto acknowledges that 
Marks was diligently pursuing the matter.  
¶8 
However, on October 25, 1996, Mr. Koivisto contacted 
Attorney Michael Fauerbach and asked Fauerbach to represent him 
instead.  Mr. Koivisto signed a Fee Agreement with Fauerbach, 
providing for a contingency fee of 30 percent.  With Fauerbach 
present, Mr. Koivisto then called Marks to tell him he was 
transferring the case to Fauerbach.   
¶9 
A series of phone calls ensued.  Marks asked why Mr. 
Koivisto was transferring the case and Mr. Koivisto explained 
that Fauerbach's law firm had more lawyers and an investigator. 
Fauerbach denies that he solicited the case or that he advised 
Mr. Koivisto how to respond to Marks' questions.   
¶10 The same day Marks wrote to Fauerbach, via facsimile, 
expressing surprise at the transfer of the case and stating that 
he did not think Fauerbach's law firm could move the case along 
more quickly.   
¶11 The next day Marks wrote directly to Mr. Koivisto, 
expressing surprise, outlining the work he had performed to 
date, and stating that he hoped to continue working with Mr. 
Koivisto.  He also retained Attorney Roy Polich to represent him 
because he believed Fauerbach had improperly and intentionally 
interfered with the Fee Agreement between Mr. Koivisto and 
himself. 
¶12 On October 28 Fauerbach responded to Marks via 
facsimile.  Fauerbach denied soliciting the case and denied 
making negative comments about Marks or Marks' law firm.  He 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
5 
 
asked Marks to send him the Koivisto file, as well as an 
itemized statement of the time spent on it.   
¶13 The same day Attorney Polich wrote to Fauerbach on 
Marks' behalf, stating that Marks believed Fauerbach had acted 
unethically 
and 
had 
intentionally 
interfered 
with 
Marks' 
contract with Mr. Koivisto.   
¶14 Fauerbach responded to Attorney Polich denying the 
allegations and attaching an affidavit executed by Mr. Koivisto 
that averred that the Fauerbach firm had not provided him with 
the reasons he thought Fauerbach's firm would do a better job on 
the case.  That same day Mr. Koivisto's daughter terminated 
Marks' representation and transferred her daughter's matter to 
Fauerbach.  She signed a contingency Fee Agreement with 
Fauerbach on or about November 1, 1996.  
¶15 On October 31, 1996, Marks submitted an invoice to Mr. 
Koivisto for $1812.24, detailing the work performed on the 
matter and stating that the bill was due November 15, 1996.  The 
same day, Matt Zielke, of Frankenmuth Insurance, wrote to Marks 
explaining 
that 
he 
understood 
that 
Fauerbach 
was 
now 
representing the Koivistos.  Zielke asked Marks to advise him, 
in writing, if Marks maintained a lien on any settlement of the 
Koivisto claims.   
¶16 On November 6, 1996, Carol Coursey of American 
National Property & Casualty Company wrote to Marks stating that 
she understood that Fauerbach was now representing the Koivistos 
and asking for a letter of withdrawal so she could review it to 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
6 
 
determine whether Marks had any liens on the settlement of the 
Koivisto claims. 
¶17 About this time Fauerbach wrote to Marks requesting 
Mr. Koivisto's file "for the fourth time" and advising Marks 
that he was now representing Mr. Koivisto's daughter.  This was 
the 
first 
written 
notice 
Fauerbach 
sent 
regarding 
this 
representation.  Mr. Koivisto's daughter testified she did not 
contact Marks personally to tell him she was transferring the 
case to Fauerbach.  In the same letter, Fauerbach advised Marks 
that Mr. Koivisto had consulted Fauerbach about Marks' invoice, 
and stated that it was difficult to render advice with respect 
to the bill without having seen the materials generated in the 
file. 
¶18 On November 6, 1996, Marks advised Fauerbach that he 
required signed releases from Mr. Koivisto and his daughter 
before 
he 
would 
release 
the 
files, 
as 
they 
contained 
confidential client information.  He also indicated that he had 
not been advised how his lien for his attorney fees would be 
protected.   
¶19 The same day Fauerbach sent Marks a facsimile, 
requesting that Marks deliver the Koivisto files to Fauerbach's 
office in Ironwood, Wisconsin. He suggested that Marks would be 
paid from the proceeds of the case and confirmed that he had 
told Mr. Koivisto he would reduce his 30 percent contingency fee 
by the amount of Marks' charges. 
¶20 On November 11 Fauerbach sent, via facsimile, the 
signed releases, stating that "[b]efore any final decision is 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
7 
 
made regarding your fees we would like to see the file materials 
that have been generated."  Marks interpreted this letter as 
questioning his fees and thus as contrary to the Fee Agreement, 
which required immediate payment.  
¶21 The same day Marks wrote to Fauerbach, indicating that 
he had sent the Koivisto files.  He also stated that he would be 
suing the Fauerbach firm for interference with contract.  
Fauerbach subsequently acknowledged receipt of the files. 
¶22 On November 14 Marks wrote letters to the two 
insurance adjusters, Zielke and Coursey, stating that his office 
"maintains a lien on each of your files out of the settlement of 
the claims in the amount of 25%."  The letter enclosed copies of 
the Fee Agreements signed by the Koivistos.   
¶23 On November 19 Fauerbach advised Marks that Mr. 
Koivisto would pay the $1812.24 legal bill, provided Marks 
agreed to sign a release with respect to the Koivisto matters, 
and agreed to drop any claimed "lien" related to these matters.  
Marks refused to sign the release, later explaining that the Fee 
Agreement did not require Marks to sign any release to be 
entitled to payment of his legal fees. 
¶24 On November 21 Marks wrote to Coursey, advising her 
that his office maintained a lien on the proceeds of 25 percent 
of any recovery in the Koivisto matters.  As of that date his 
bill for legal services had not been paid. 
¶25 On December 2 Fauerbach filed a motion in Iron County 
Circuit Court in Wisconsin for an order determining that Marks 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
8 
 
was not entitled to any legal fees other than those set forth in 
the previously submitted invoice (the "Wisconsin action").   
¶26 On December 11 Marks filed suit against Fauerbach, the 
Koivistos, and the insurers in Gogebic County Circuit Court, 
Michigan, alleging interference with contract and asserting a 
"charging lien" (the "Michigan action"). 
¶27 On December 12 there was a court hearing in the 
Wisconsin action.  The trial court concluded that Marks was 
entitled to recover his fees in the amount of $1812.24.  The 
court therefore directed Marks to endorse two settlement checks 
that had been received from the insurers, each in the amount of 
$1000.  Marks endorsed the checks on December 18 as follows: 
"Signed as Per Court Order of 12/12/96, with exception."   
¶28 On December 20 Marks sent a second invoice to Mr. 
Koivisto, billing him for an additional $420.37 in legal fees 
and stating that these additional fees were due December 31.  
The total amount of the legal fees claimed by Marks now totaled 
$2232.61. 
¶29 On January 6, 1997, Marks received a check in the 
amount of $1812.24 from the Iron County Registrar as payment for 
his legal fees.  The funds were derived from the two settlement 
checks that Marks had endorsed at the court's direction.  Marks 
returned the check indicating he believed accepting it would 
constitute a release of his claims against Fauerbach. 
¶30 On March 26 the insurance adjuster, Zielke, wrote to 
Fauerbach, advising him that Frankenmuth Insurance would settle 
the Koivisto claims for its policy limit of $100,000, in 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
9 
 
exchange for a release.  Because Marks had refused to accept the 
check for his legal fees, Fauerbach obtained a court order 
directing Marks to endorse the anticipated settlement check if 
his name was identified as a payee.   
¶31 On April 21 Fauerbach contacted Zielke and told him 
that the settlement check should be issued without Marks' name 
on it.  Zielke responded that if he were to issue the settlement 
check without Marks' name on it, he would require an unlimited 
indemnification from Fauerbach.  Fauerbach was unwilling to 
offer unlimited indemnification and told Zielke to simply issue 
the settlement check with Marks' name on it. 
¶32 Upon receipt of the settlement check, Fauerbach asked 
Marks to endorse it.  Marks refused.   
¶33 Meanwhile, on April 8 Marks filed a brief in the 
Michigan action, opposing Fauerbach's motion to dismiss the 
Michigan claim and arguing that he was legally entitled to 
maintain a lien on the Koivisto settlement.   
¶34 On April 28 Marks amended his complaint in the 
Michigan action to add a slander claim against Fauerbach.  He 
did not amend that portion of the complaint that stated that his 
legal fees had not been paid.   
¶35 On June 9 Marks' lawyer advised the Koivistos that 
Marks would settle the lien claim and endorse the settlement 
check, provided that only the Koivistos (and not Fauerbach) 
received 
the 
settlement 
monies. 
 
Mr. 
Koivisto 
expressed 
frustration that he had been forced to pay approximately $1200 
in legal fees in connection with defending against the Michigan 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
10 
 
action.  Marks agreed to reduce his legal bill of $2232.61 by 
$1200, to reflect the fees paid by Mr. Koivisto in connection 
with the Michigan action.  Marks also agreed to dismiss the 
insurers and the Koivistos from the Michigan action, and further 
agreed to limit his claim against Fauerbach to $25,000. 
¶36 This settlement agreement was formalized and signed on 
June 20, 1997.  On July 11 the Michigan court signed the related 
order and Marks endorsed the $100,000 settlement check without 
further delay.   
¶37 On July 18 Fauerbach sent a check for $75,000 to Mr. 
Koivisto.  Fauerbach also directed the Iron County Wisconsin 
Registrar to return the $1812 check (previously refused by 
Marks) to Mr. Koivisto.   
¶38 In January 1998 the parties stipulated to dismissal of 
all claims in the Michigan action, including Marks' appeal from 
an order granting summary judgment against him.  The Fauerbach 
firm received the $25,000 fee, previously held in an escrow 
account. 
¶39 On October 9, 1998, Mr. Koivisto and Fauerbach filed a 
grievance with OLR against Marks.  Nearly three years later, on 
August 29, 2001, the OLR filed a complaint against Marks 
alleging three counts:  
(1) Marks violated SCR 20:8.4(c), or, in the 
alternative, Michigan Rule of Professional 
Conduct 
(MRPC) 
8.4(b) 
by 
issuing 
correspondence to two insurers in November 
1996, claiming a lien on 25% of the proceeds 
of the wrongful death and personal injury 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
11 
 
claims 
asserted 
by 
the 
Koivisto 
family 
(Count 1);  
(2) Marks 
violated 
MRPC 
3.1 
by 
filing 
a 
complaint and amended complaint in Michigan 
Circuit Court asserting a breach of contract 
claim after the Koivistos terminated Marks' 
representation (Count 2);  
(3) Marks violated MRPC 8.4(b) by filing an 
amended complaint alleging in the Michigan 
lawsuit that Donald had not paid Marks' 
billing statement when the amount had been 
tendered (Count 3).   
¶40 Marks answered, denying the charges.  He subsequently 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds it alleged 
violations 
of 
Michigan 
disciplinary 
rules 
or, 
in 
the 
alternative, sought a stay of the proceedings to permit the OLR 
to refer the matter to the Michigan disciplinary authority.   
The OLR opposed the motion.   
¶41 Following briefing and oral argument the referee 
granted Marks' motion to dismiss the complaint as to Count 1 
(the Michigan alternative), Count 2, and Count 3, each of which 
alleged 
violations 
of 
the 
Michigan 
disciplinary 
rules.  
Subsequently, Marks filed a motion in limine to suppress 
evidence that he violated the Michigan rules.  The referee 
granted the motion but permitted the OLR to introduce evidence 
that Marks alleged the existence of a "charging lien" in the 
Michigan action. 
¶42 The 
trial 
on 
the 
remaining 
count, 
the 
alleged 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), occurred on June 3, 2002.  The 
referee issued a report and recommendation on June 27, 2002, 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
12 
 
concluding that Marks violated SCR 20:8.4(c), and recommending a 
60-day suspension.  Both parties now appeal. 
¶43 The parties agree that the referee's findings of fact 
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous and that the 
referee's conclusions of law are to be reviewed de novo.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 342 
N.W.2d 406 (1984). 
¶44 The first issue presented for review is whether Marks 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by notifying two insurance companies that 
he maintained a lien on the proceeds for 25 percent of his 
former client's recovery in a personal injury wrongful death 
claim. 
¶45 First, the referee was required to decide whether 
Michigan or Wisconsin rules should apply to this claim, as it 
was pled by OLR in the alternative.  The referee determined that 
the predominant effect of Marks' alleged misconduct occurred in 
Wisconsin because it affected the Koivistos, who are Wisconsin 
residents.  The referee thus concluded that Wisconsin law 
applied to this claim.  Neither party appears to dispute that 
the Wisconsin disciplinary rule was properly applied to this 
count. 
¶46 Turning to the substantive question presented, the 
referee made certain findings of fact, then made the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. 
The 
Koivistos 
had 
the 
right 
to 
discharge 
respondent as their attorney in connection with 
their wrongful death and personal injury claims; 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
13 
 
2. 
Respondent's lien claim was wrongful because the 
fee agreement was not in existence in November 
1996 when he wrote the two insurance companies 
involved nor was it in existence in December 1996 
or April 1997 when he asserted his lien claims in 
the Michigan action.  McBride v. Wausau Insurance 
Companies, 176 Wis. 2d 382, 500 N.W.2d 387 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
3. 
Respondent's 
insistence 
on 
claiming 
a 
lien 
impaired Attorney Fauerbach's representation of 
the Koivistos and delayed payment of the proceeds 
he ultimately recovered for the Koivistos; 
4. 
Respondent was guilty of misrepresentation in 
stating he held a lien against the two insurance 
companies involved in this matter in his letters 
to them on November 14, 1996 and November 21, 
1996. 
5. 
Respondent violated SCR 8.4(c) by engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation when he wrote letters to the 
two insurance companies in November 1996 stating 
that he held a lien against them and the 
Koivistos 
on 
any 
settlement 
proceeds 
the 
Koivistos might receive in settlement of their 
claims. 
¶47 Marks 
disputes the 
referee's conclusion that he 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when he wrote the two insurers to advise 
them that he maintained a 25 percent lien on the proceeds of the 
Koivisto settlements.  Essentially, Marks contends that he may 
have been wrong about having such a lien, but that he did not 
intentionally deceive anyone because he believed he was legally 
justified in asserting the lien claims.   
¶48 We cannot agree.  The circumstances of this case 
support the referee's conclusion that Marks violated SCR 
20:8.4(c) when he wrote letters to the two insurance companies 
in November 1996 stating that he held a lien against any 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
14 
 
proceeds the Koivistos might receive in settlement of their 
claims.  
¶49 At argument the question was raised whether the 
findings of fact made by the referee support the conclusion that 
Marks' 
engaged 
in 
misrepresentation 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4(c).  Counsel for Marks correctly asserts that this court 
will not make a finding that the referee could have made but did 
not.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood, 122 
Wis. 2d 610, 363 N.W.2d 220 (1985); see also Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 342 N.W.2d 406 
(1984) (court will not conduct de novo review of record or 
independently make factual findings).   
¶50 Our review would be simpler had the referee made more 
explicit findings to support his conclusion that Marks' conduct 
constituted misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  
However, it is unnecessary to either plead or prove the tort of 
misrepresentation in order to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that an attorney has violated a rule of professional 
conduct, proscribing attorney conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 388 N.W.2d 176 
(1986).  
¶51 We conclude that the referee's findings do support the 
conclusion that Marks' conduct constituted misrepresentation in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  The referee found that the 
Koivistos executed the Fee Agreement, that they opted to 
terminate Marks' representation, that Marks submitted an invoice 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
15 
 
for the legal fees and expenses incurred during the period of 
his representation, and that subsequently, Marks represented to 
two insurance companies that he maintained a 25 percent lien on 
any settlement ultimately obtained by the Koivistos.  Marks did 
not release that lien claim until more than a year later, in 
June 1997.  The circumstances as reflected in the referee's 
findings establish that Marks' conduct rose to the level of 
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶52 While Marks may have legitimately maintained a claim 
for the legal services he rendered before the date of his 
termination, he nonetheless represented to the insurers that he 
was entitled to fully 25 percent of any recovery ultimately 
obtained by the Koivistos.  Such a representation is simply 
contrary to the express terms of the Fee Agreement.  Paragraph 
One of the Fee Agreement provided that the Koivistos would pay 
Marks 
"25 
percent 
of 
the 
total 
value 
of 
the 
property 
(settlement, compromise, or judgment) recovered for the client 
by the Attorney."  Paragraphs Two and Three described various 
costs and expenses for which the client would be responsible.  
Paragraph Four provided that the client would "render to the 
attorney, an attorney's lien on the proceeds of any settlement, 
. . . ." 
¶53 However, an entirely separate provision of the Fee 
Agreement sets forth the procedure for compensating Attorney 
Marks 
in 
the 
event 
the 
lawyer-client 
relationship 
was 
terminated.  Paragraph Five provides: 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
16 
 
If for any reason, the Attorney-Client relationship 
was to be terminated prior to settlement, compromise 
or judgment, etc., without good cause on client's 
behalf, the client hereby agrees to pay attorney for 
the value of legal services received by the client for 
attorney on an hourly rate schedule of $100.00 per 
hour plus expenses.  Said fee will be immediately due 
and payable. 
¶54 This is the provision applicable to Marks' claim for 
legal 
fees. 
 
As 
the 
OLR 
correctly 
asserts: 
"Marks 
knew . . . when he wrote his letters of November 14, 1996 and 
November 21, 1996 . . . that any fee due him by the Koivistos 
was not to be calculated on a contingency fee basis."2   
¶55 We thus agree with the referee's conclusion that 
Marks' letters to the insurers stating that he "maintains a lien 
on each of your files out of the settlement of the claims in the 
                                                 
2 The referee cited McBride v. Wausau Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 
382, 500 N.W.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1993) in support of his conclusion 
of law that the claim was wrongful.  Marks asserts that the 
referee's reliance on McBride is misplaced.  We agree that 
McBride is distinguishable.  In McBride the court held that an 
attorney who was discharged by her client prior to obtaining a 
settlement was not entitled to recover any portion of the legal 
fees pursuant to the contingency agreement because she provided 
such substandard legal services that she effectively breached 
the fee agreement with her former client.  By contrast, there is 
no dispute that Marks pursued the Koivisto cases diligently 
during the brief period of his representation, and that he was 
entitled to recover the fees and costs incurred during that 
representation.  However, the fact that McBride is inapposite 
does not alter the referee's conclusion that Marks engaged in 
misrepresentation when he wrote the letters to the insurers 
representing he was entitled to a 25 percent lien on the 
Koivisto settlement proceeds. 
 
 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
17 
 
amount of 25%" constituted misrepresentation in violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c). 
¶56 Next, 
Marks 
asserts 
that 
the 
60-day 
suspension 
recommended by the referee is excessive.  He suggests that a 
public reprimand is more appropriate discipline for a violation 
of SCR 20:8.4(c) based on the facts set forth herein.   
¶57 Marks has been reprimanded on three prior occasions.  
Further, as the referee found, Marks' actions delayed Mr. 
Koivisto's receipt of the settlement.  We are not persuaded that 
this finding is clearly erroneous.  We agree with the referee 
that a 60-day suspension of Marks' license to practice law is 
appropriate discipline under the circumstances of this case.   
¶58 We turn to the issue presented by the OLR on cross-
appeal: namely, whether the referee erred in dismissing two 
counts from the disciplinary complaint that alleged violations 
of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct.   
¶59 The OLR alleged that Marks violated MRPC 3.1 and MRPC 
8.4(b).  These counts relate to the lawsuit Marks filed in 
Michigan against the Koivistos, Attorney Fauerbach and the 
insurers. 
¶60 This cross-appeal presents a choice of law question 
and requires the court to interpret SCR 20:8.5, which provides:  
 
SCR 20:8.5.  Disciplinary authority; choice 
of law. 
 
(a) Disciplinary 
Authority. 
A 
lawyer 
admitted to the bar of this state is subject 
to the disciplinary authority of this state 
regardless of where the lawyer's conduct 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
18 
 
occurs. A lawyer allowed by a court of this 
state 
to 
appear 
and 
participate 
in 
a 
proceeding in that court is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this state for 
conduct that occurs in connection with that 
proceeding. For the same conduct, a lawyer 
may be subject to the disciplinary authority 
of both this state and another jurisdiction 
where the lawyer is admitted to the bar or 
allowed to appear in a court proceeding. 
 
(b) Choice of Law. In the exercise of 
the disciplinary authority of this state, 
the rules of professional conduct to be 
applied shall be as follows: 
 
(1) for conduct in connection with a 
proceeding in a court before which a lawyer 
has been authorized to appear, either by 
admission to the bar in the jurisdiction or 
by the court specifically for purposes of 
that proceeding, the rules to be applied 
shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in 
which the court sits, unless the rules of 
the court provide otherwise. 
 
(2) for any other conduct, 
 
(i) if the lawyer is admitted to the 
bar of only this state, the rules to be 
applied shall be the rules of this state. 
 
(ii) if the lawyer is admitted to the 
bars of this state and another jurisdiction, 
the rules to be applied shall be the rules 
of the admitting jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer principally practices, except that if 
particular 
conduct 
clearly 
has 
its 
predominant effect in another jurisdiction 
in which the lawyer is admitted to the bar, 
the rules of that jurisdiction shall be 
applied to that conduct. 
¶61 After briefing and oral argument the referee granted 
Marks' motion to dismiss these two counts and subsequently 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
19 
 
granted a motion in limine, precluding the OLR from introducing 
evidence about the alleged Michigan rule violations at trial. 
¶62 The referee expressed concern about the basis for the 
OLR's authority to enforce the disciplinary rules of another 
jurisdiction, as well as concern about possible inconsistencies 
between the laws and rules of Wisconsin and other states.  
Ultimately, the referee reasoned that the predominant effect of 
Marks' alleged misconduct occurred in Wisconsin because it 
affected the Koivistos, who are Wisconsin residents.  The 
referee thus dismissed the Michigan counts, observing: "[t]he 
Comment to SCR 20:8.5 makes it clear that in a choice of law 
situation 'any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject 
to only one set of rules of professional conduct.'"  
¶63 On appeal the OLR contends that the referee erred and 
that, under the facts presented, SCR 20:8.5 authorizes the OLR 
to apply Michigan disciplinary rules.  This is an issue of first 
impression. 
¶64 There is no dispute that because Marks is a member of 
the Wisconsin bar he is subject to the disciplinary authority of 
this state regardless where his alleged misconduct occurred.  
Marks, who is also a member of the Michigan bar, allegedly filed 
and litigated a frivolous lawsuit in the Michigan courts.  This 
constituted "conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court 
before which a lawyer has been authorized to appear. . . . " SCR 
20:8.5(a)(1).  As such, SCR 20:8.5(a)(1) provides that "the 
rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in 
which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
20 
 
otherwise."  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, we agree with the 
OLR that it was authorized to proceed under the Michigan 
disciplinary rules.  
¶65 We find support for our conclusion in the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.  
ABA Model Rule 8.5 is identical to SCR 20:8.5. See Ronald D. 
Rotunda, Professional Responsibility: A Student's Guide (2001 
ed.) at 731-32.  Referring to ABA Model Rule 8.5(b), Professor 
Rotunda states: 
The goal of [Rule 8.5] is to insure that any 
particular conduct of a lawyer should be subject to 
only one set of rules.  Both jurisdictions may impose 
discipline, but they should both be using the same set 
of rules against which they measure the conduct.  
Disciplinary 
authorities 
should 
avoid 
proceeding 
against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent 
rules. 
 
The 
choice 
of 
law 
issue 
is: 
 
which 
jurisdiction's 
ethics 
should 
apply 
to 
a 
lawyer 
admitted in more than one jurisdiction? 
Id. at 735.  In an example assuming misconduct by a lawyer 
admitted in state A but committed before a court in state B, 
Professor Rotunda concludes: "Under the Model Rules, if that 
lawyer then violates the rules of the court in state B, state A 
should apply the ethics rules of state B, which are the rules 
applicable to that case."  Id. (emphasis added).   
¶66 We thus hold that SCR 20:8.5 authorizes the OLR to 
proceed with a complaint alleging violations of the Michigan 
Rules of Professional Conduct for alleged misconduct that 
occurred in a proceeding before a court in the state of 
Michigan. 
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
21 
 
¶67 Marks, however, suggests that the better practice 
would be for the OLR to refer this matter to the Michigan 
disciplinary authorities.  He notes that if the Michigan Supreme 
Court disciplined Marks, this court could then impose reciprocal 
discipline under SCR 22.22.  He contends this would be a more 
efficient procedure, because Wisconsin disciplinary authorities 
would not be required to construe the rules and possibly the 
substantive law of another state. 
¶68 Even if we agree that may be the better practice, SCR 
20:8.5 does authorize the OLR to proceed with a complaint 
alleging violations of the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct for alleged misconduct that occurred in a proceeding 
before a court in the State of Michigan.  Therefore, the referee 
erred by dismissing counts two and three of the OLR complaint. 
¶69 However, we are of the opinion that remanding this 
matter would not advance judicial efficiency.  The OLR has 
indicated that its recommendation with respect to discipline 
would not change, even if violations of the Michigan Rules of 
Disciplinary Conduct were established, and there has already 
been substantial delay in the prosecution of this matter.3 
¶70 Finally, we accept the referee's recommendation that 
Attorney Marks be required to pay the costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
                                                 
3 Consistent with that determination we decline to stay this 
matter pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.63, nor will we require the 
OLR 
to 
refer 
the 
matter 
to 
the 
Michigan 
disciplinary 
authorities.   
No. 
01-2284-D   
 
22 
 
¶71 Upon the foregoing reasons, 
¶72 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Marvin E. Marks to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective August 20, 2003.   
¶73 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Marvin E. Marks comply with 
the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
¶74 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Marvin E. Marks shall pay to the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Attorney Marvin E. Marks to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of the court. 
¶75 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. and JON P. WILCOX, J., did not 
participate. 
No.  01-2284.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶76 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This case raises 
disturbing issues about attorney discipline proceedings in 
Wisconsin.  For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶77 The court approves a referee's recommended discipline 
of Attorney Marvin E. Marks under Wisconsin SCR 20:8.4(c), for 
engaging in conduct that involved misrepresentation.  The 
referee's Conclusions of Law state: 
 
2. 
Respondent's lien claim was wrongful because 
the fee agreement [he had with the Koivisto family] 
was not in existence in November 1996 when he wrote 
the two insurance companies involved nor was it in 
existence in December 1996 or April 1997 when he 
asserted his lien claims in the Michigan [legal] 
action.  McBride v. Wausau Insurance Companies, 176 
Wis. 2d 382, 500 N.W.2d 387 Ct. App. 1993). 
 
. . . .  
 
4. 
Respondent was guilty of misrepresentation 
in stating he held a lien against the two insurance 
companies involved in this matter in his letters to 
them on November 14, 1996 and November 21, 1996. 
 
5. 
Respondent violated SCR 8.4(c) by engaging 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceipt [sic] 
or misrepresentation when he wrote letters to the two 
insurance companies in November 1996 stating that he 
held a lien against them and the Koivistos on any 
settlement proceeds the Koivistos might receive in 
settlement of their claims. 
 
¶78 First, the court acknowledges that the McBride case 
does not support the referee's legal conclusion.  Per curiam 
op., ¶54, n.2.   
¶79 Second, and more important, the referee made no 
factual finding that Attorney Marks knew or should have known 
No.  01-2284.dtp 
2 
 
that he was not justified in asserting a lien claim on November 
14 and November 21, 1996.   
¶80 The court's per curiam opinion, ¶47, summarizes the 
situation: "Essentially, Marks contends that he may have been 
wrong 
about 
having 
such 
a 
lien, 
but 
that 
he 
did 
not 
intentionally deceive anyone because he believed he was legally 
justified in asserting the lien claims."  The per curiam never 
responds to this contention by asserting that Attorney Marks 
knew or should have known that he did not have a lien.  It 
dances around this predicament in ¶51.   
¶81 The court's treatment of the problem leads to one of 
two unpalatable results: either this court has engaged in 
implicit fact-finding, contrary to our own statements and 
precedent, or we have concluded that it is not necessary for an 
attorney to know or have reason to know that something he 
represents is not correct, in order for us to find the attorney 
guilty of misrepresentation. 
 
¶82 Attorney Marks' purported "misrepresentation" needs to 
be put in context.  There is no dispute that Donald Koivisto 
entered into a Contingent Fee Agreement with Attorney Marks in 
connection with Mrs. Koivisto's untimely and wrongful death.  
That agreement was signed on October 22, 1996.  Koivisto's 
daughter, Nikki, entered into a similar agreement on October 24, 
1996.  Both agreements contained the following paragraph: 
 
5. 
If 
for 
any 
reason, 
the 
Attorney-Client 
relationship was to be terminated prior to settlement, 
compromise, or judgment, etc., without good cause on 
client's behalf, the client hereby agrees to pay 
attorney for the value of legal services received by 
the client for attorney on an hourly rate schedule of 
No.  01-2284.dtp 
3 
 
$100.00 per hour plus expenses.  Said fee will be 
immediately due and payable. 
 
¶83 The 
referee 
based 
his 
conclusion 
about 
Marks' 
misrepresentation on the premise that "the fee agreement was not 
in existence in November 1996 when he wrote the two insurance 
companies."  There is no dispute, however, that the hourly rate 
billed on October 31, 1996, had not been paid on November 14, 
1996, when Marks wrote the first letter.  On November 11 the 
Koivistos' new attorney had proposed paying Attorney Marks 
"after settlement of the Anna Koivisto wrongful death case."  
¶84 The new attorney also indicated that before any final 
decision regarding payment of Marks' fees would be made, the 
attorney wished to see the file materials that had been 
generated by Marks.  In other words, the attorney who acquired 
the Koivisto case from Marks reserved the right to delay payment 
of Marks' legal fees and to evaluate Marks' legal work before 
Marks was paid.  These conditions were not part of the two 
Contingent Fee Agreements, and when Marks was not paid by 
November 15, he reasonably concluded that the agreements had 
been breached. 
 
¶85 Rightly or wrongly, Marks thought the Koivistos' new 
attorney had tampered with his contract.  He retained a lawyer 
to represent him in the matter.  On November 11 Marks advised 
the Koivistos' new attorney that he would sue the attorney's 
firm for interference with contract.  All this preceded the 
November 14 letter. 
 
¶86 Prior to the November 21 letter, the new attorney 
advised Marks that Koivisto would pay Marks' legal bill if Marks 
agreed to sign a release and drop any claimed lien.  The per 
No.  01-2284.dtp 
4 
 
curiam opinion does not explain what effect this release would 
have had on Marks' tampering claim.  Ultimately, Marks filed 
suit in Michigan alleging an interference with contract and 
claiming a "charging lien."  
 
¶87 The sum of all this is that Attorney Marks could have 
believed that he had a lien when he wrote letters to the two 
insurance companies.  Even now in this appeal, Marks' attorney 
maintains that Marks had a legitimate basis for claiming such a 
lien.  
¶88 The 
per 
curiam 
opinion 
does 
not 
decimate 
this 
argument, nor does it assert that Marks knew or should have 
known that he did not have a lien at the time of the November 
letters, the critical period for this case.  Consequently, I do 
not understand what rule of law on misrepresentation comes out 
of this case. 
¶89 Over time Marks became obsessed with pursuing a lost 
cause.  He went too far.  I would have no problem issuing a 
public reprimand on an appropriate charge.  But Marks' license 
to practice law is suspended for two months for conduct 
involving misrepresentation in November 1996, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c), which is a charge that was not satisfactorily 
proved.   
¶90 Beyond the suspension, this court imposes costs of 
$22,178.69.  These costs are disproportionate to the seriousness 
of the offense.  In part, they reflect OLR's obsession to appeal 
an issue that it lost before the referee.  The issue of costs in 
attorney 
discipline 
cases 
requires 
prompt 
attention, 
for 
excessive costs will deter some attorneys from adequately 
No.  01-2284.dtp 
5 
 
defending themselves and may prevent others from ever returning 
to the practice of law. 
No.  01-2284.dtp 
 
 
1