Title: Anthony Merlino v. Borough of Midland Park
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-108-00
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2002

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVecchia, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this opinion, the Court determines whether the plaintiff, Anthony Merlino, achieved tenure as the Code Official of the Borough of Midland Park when he served a second four-year term after a ten-day break in service. On May 24, 1990, Merlino was appointed to a four-year term as construction official, building sub-code official, and building inspector. Merlino's term began on June 4, 1990, and was to expire on June 3, 1994. As the term neared its conclusion, Merlino appeared at a public meeting of the Borough of Midland Park's governing body ( governing body ) and expressed his desire to be reappointed. At the meeting, one member of the governing body expressed specific complaints about Merlino's performance. Appointment to a second four-year term would result in Merlino achieving tenure in the position, and a majority of the members were not convinced that Merlino's performance was such that he should receive tenure. Because there was no other candidate for the job, and because appointment to a second four-year term without tenure would provide an opportunity to assess improvements in Merlino's performance, the governing body proposed a compromise. The governing body decided to give Merlino a second chance by giving him a new appointment without tenure. The plan, which was a take-it-or-leave-it situation, provided that Merlino would resign effective June 3, 1994, the day his term of office expired, and he would be appointed to a new term to commence ten days later, on June 13, 1994. Merlino acknowledged at trial his understanding at that time that his resignation would cause him not to be afforded tenure. Merlino acknowledged that he could have rejected the plan and awaited the results of the vote on his reinstatement, but instead consented to the terms. Merlino did not ask for more time to think about the plan or to seek advice. Merlino insisted the governing body vote on the resolution in order to guarantee that he would receive four more years as a code official before he signed the letter of resignation. After the governing body passed a resolution explaining that a vacancy would occur in the position and that Merlino would be appointed to that vacancy effective June 13, 1994, Merlino signed the letter of resignation, effective June 3, 1994. Merlino began his new term and worked for the next four years. Prior to the expiration of the term, Merlino requested a third appointment. On May 28, 1998, the governing body met to discuss Merlino's reappointment. Merlino was present at the meeting. After the members discussed complaints regarding Merlino's performance, the members unanimously determined not to reappoint him. Merlino received written notice of the decision in a letter dated May 28, 1998. Merlino responded with a letter contending that he had achieved tenure and demanding either reinstatement or a hearing. Thereafter, Merlino filed suit. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ruled in favor of the governing body and dismissed Merlino's complaint, with prejudice. The trial court found that the governing body's plan was unmistakable in its intent to deprive Merlino of tenure at that time, and that Merlino received a valuable appointment in exchange for his agreement. The trial court found that there was no undue pressure on Merlino, and that he was not in an unfair bargaining position. Finally, the trial court found that the governing body's actions were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, nor did they violate the law. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Merlino's claims for breach of contract and punitive damages, but reversed the trial court's finding that Merlino did not have tenure. The Appellate Division held that if the Legislature establishes a specific term or condition of employment with no room for discretion, negotiation is fully preempted. The court found also that the parties' contract could not trump the plain terms of N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b) that confer tenure on a Code official when there is an appointment to a second consecutive term or the commencement of a fifth consecutive year of service. The court found both of these requirements met, and remanded for a determination of whether Merlino was entitled to attorney's fees. HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The factual prerequisites for tenure were not satisfied because Merlino was not appointed to a second consecutive term. 1. The right to tenure is created and governed entirely by statute, and statutory terms and conditions of employment take precedence over any side agreement in contravention of the statute. Tenure attaches only on compliance with the precise conditions articulated in the relevant legislative enactment. Compliance must be absolute, and deviations from the statutory methodology can affect entitlement to tenure. (Pp. 8-10). 2. The second clause of N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b) states that code officials shall, upon appointment to a second consecutive term, be granted tenure. The term consecutive means without an interval or break. The second, separate four-year term to which Merlino was appointed fails to satisfy the precise criteria for the acquisition of tenure under this clause because it was not consecutive to his former four-year term. The next clause of this statute, which provides that the official shall be granted tenure on or after the commencement of a fifth consecutive year of service, including years of service in an equivalent job title held prior to the adoption of the State Uniform Construction Code, is not a holdover route to tenure, but rather a limited grandfather clause. It is not applicable to this case. (Pp. 10 to 14). 3. Spiewak v. Rutherford Bd. of Education, 90 N.J. 63 (1982), does not provide relief here. In Spiewak, the teachers had fully satisfied the statutory standard for tenure under the relevant statute and, therefore, side agreements renouncing their statutory rights did not govern tenure. (Pp. 14 to 16). 4. A negotiated break in service is not facially contrary to N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b). The decision to reappoint or to create a vacancy in an office is vested entirely in the governing body. Merlino's break in service does not violate any public policy of the State, nor does it undermine the purposes underlying the Uniform Construction Code Act, of which N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b) is a part. The statute ensures that the tenure in office of code officials is not influenced by local politics, but its intent is not to confer job protection on all code officials, otherwise tenure would attach upon initial appointment. (Pp. 16 to 18). 5. Here, by mutual consent, the parties agreed to a separate, second four-year term of office for Merlino, thereby effecting his appointment as construction official without acquisition of tenure. Nothing within the four corners of the statute precludes that action. Because Merlino did not achieve tenure, the Court does not address the counsel fee issue. (Pp. 18-20). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. Justice Long, dissenting, in which JUSTICES STEIN and ZAZZALI join, is of the view that Merlino met the statutory standard for tenure and that the ten-day interval between his terms of service did not render the terms non-consecutive under the statute. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES STEIN AND ZAZZALI join. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOROUGH OF MIDLAND PARK, MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF MIDLAND PARK, MICHELLE F. DUGAN, BOROUGH ADMINISTRATOR, DAVID HEEREMA, CONSTRUCTION OFFICIAL, BUILDING SUB-CODE OFFICIAL and BUILDING INSPECTOR, Defendants-Appellants, and JOHN DOE II THROUGH X (fictitious persons), Defendants. Argued November 26, 2001 -- Decided March 27, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 338 N.J. Super. 436 (2001). Thomas B. Hanrahan and Robert T. Regan argued the cause for appellants (Hanrahan and Robertelli and Mr. Regan, attorneys). Paul A. Massaro argued the cause for respondent. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the governing body and dismissed Merlino's complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. The court found that: The governing body suggested this plan, it gave the plaintiff the primary relief that he wanted, that was reappointment. If his primary relief was tenure then shame on plaintiff for having that hidden agenda. But the governing body's plan was unmistakable in what it would do; it would deprive, it's [sic] intent was to deprive the plaintiff of obtaining tenure at that time. But he received a valuable appointment in exchange therefore, he was given the second chance . . . . I do not find that Mr. Merlino's will was overborne, that undue or unfair pressure was brought to bear. This was in some respects a settlement of a risk, the risk being that the governing body would vote in the absence of the plan and vote not to reappoint. Plaintiff obtained a certainty; he was aware he was obtaining the certainty, he obtained what he set out to obtain that night, there was no coercion, there was no duress, there was no obligation on the part of the municipality to advise him that if you want more time you may have it, that you may consult with an attorney. . . . . . . . [P]laintiff was not in a materially unfair bargaining position, because although it's true that the governing body makes the decision[,] the plaintiff could have at any time said I do not go along with the plan and let's see where the votes fall. [It may] have turned out the way Mr. Merlino wanted plus, the plus being he would have been reappointed without a break in service and he would have had tenure. But nobody could have known that . . . . I conclude . . . that the plan in the abstract and as implemented was neither intra vires nor ultra vires, that Mr. Merlino therefore did not have tenure in May and June 1998, and the discretionary decision of the governing body not to reappoint him was not arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable, was not violative of either the State Uniform Construction Code Act, its regulations, state common law, federal common law, federal statutory law[,] or any constitutional provision nor any organic natural law. Merlino appealed. In a published opinion, Merlino v. Borough of Midland Park, 338 N.J. Super. 436 (2001), the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Merlino's claims for breach of contract and punitive damages, reasoning that no contract of continuing employment had been established and no factual case for punitive damages was offered under state or federal law. Id. at 441. However, the panel reversed the trial court's finding that Merlino did not have tenure. Ibid. Relying on Spiewak v. Rutherford Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 63, 76 (1982), the Appellate Division held that if the Legislature establishes a specific term or condition of employment with no room for discretion, negotiation is fully preempted. Merlino, supra, 338 N.J. Super. at 439. Further, the court stated that the parties' contract could not trump the plain terms of N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b) that confer tenure on a Code official so long as two conditions are met: (1) appointment to a second consecutive term; or (2) commencement of a fifth consecutive year of service. Id. at 440. The Appellate Division found that Merlino's employment history satisfied both statutory requirements. Id. at 440-41. Finally, the Appellate Division characterized the mechanism employed by the governing body as having the potential of entirely frustrating the manifest legislative design in enacting N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b) by forestalling the conferral of tenure indefinitely. Id. at 441. The court remanded the matter for a determination of whether Merlino was entitled to attorney's fees and dismissed, as moot, a challenge to an evidential ruling that barred the testimony of a Department of Community Affairs official. Ibid. The governing body filed a petition for certification limited to two issues: whether Merlino achieved tenure and whether he is entitled to counsel fees. We granted certification. 169 N.J. 606 (2001). ANTHONY MERLINO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOROUGH OF MIDLAND PARK, MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF MIDLAND PARK, MICHELLE F. DUGAN, BOROUGH ADMINISTRATOR, DAVID HEEREMA, CONSTRUCTION OFFICIAL, BUILDING SUB-CODE OFFICIAL and BUILDING INSPECTOR, Defendants-Appellants, and JOHN DOE II THROUGH X (fictitious persons), Defendants. LONG, J., dissenting, I agree with my colleagues that Merlino's sole route to tenure was an appointment to a second consecutive term. I also agree that Cutler v. Borough of Westwood, 295 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 143 (1997), correctly interpreted the fifth consecutive year language of the statute as a limited grandfather clause with no relevance in these circumstances. Where I part company from the majority is in connection with the meaning of the word consecutive. I recognize that the common import of the word is without an interval or break. However, that notion is more complex than the majority believes. What constitutes an interval or break that would make two members of a series non-consecutive depends on the purpose underlying the requirement. Thus, for example, a law might bar a public official from serving two consecutive terms. In those circumstances, and in light of the purposes underlying term limits, no reasonable person would suggest that a ten-day break in service would render a second term served by the same individual non-consecutive. That is the kind of analysis that is absent from the majority opinion in this case, which holds essentially that any hiatus meets the break or interval standard and renders two terms of office non-consecutive for tenure purposes regardless of the break's length or purpose. In my view, that is a gross oversimplification of what is the proper analysis: whether in enacting the tenure provisions of the UCCA, the legislature intended a scheme like that crafted by the governing body to pass muster. To answer that question, the UCCA requires scrutiny. The purpose underlying that statute is the creation of a cadre of highly professional construction code officials not subject to political influence in the performance of their mandated duties under applicable federal, state, county, and municipal statutes, codes, regulations, and ordinances. DeStefano v. Washington Tp., 220 N.J. Super. 273, 278 (Law Div. 1987). That goal is directly related both to the initial four-year term and the tenure provision. The four-year term insulates a code official from political pressure for a temporal period and allows the governing body that period to assess the official's performance. The grant of tenure insulates a code official from any future political pressure and provides continuity and experience in code enforcement. To be sure, the governing body is free to deny reappointment to an unsatisfactory employee. Such action advances the goals of professionalism by removing inadequate code officials. However, once an employee is found to have acquitted himself well enough to be reappointed to a second consecutive term, legislative tenure advances the goals of the UCCA by providing job security, thus ensuring that high quality, experienced persons will remain as code officials. That is why N.J.S.A. 27D-126(b) is cast in mandatory and not permissive terms: A construction official . . . shall, upon appointment to a second consecutive term . . . be granted tenure. (Emphasis added). Clearly, the Legislature did not intend that a governing body could evade statutory tenure simply by imposing a gap of a few days between regular four-year terms. Such a reading of the consecutive language of the act would completely undermine the Legislature's intent to insulate construction officials from the winds of political change. Moreover, it would effectively permit the indefinite employment of a code official without the protection of tenure ever attaching. There is nothing in the majority's opinion to prevent a governing body from placing minuscule gaps between all its reappointments, thereby effectively abolishing tenure. Given the majority's bright-line rule that such gaps are permissible and prevent tenure from attaching, its prediction that its holding will create no incentive to circumvent tenure because a governing body would not choose a route that could result in litigation rings hollow. After this opinion, there is nothing left to litigate. In my view, Merlino met the statutory standard for tenure. Hence, Spiewak v. Rutherford Board of Education, 90 N.J. 63, 76 (1982), with its holding that side agreements cannot vitiate statutory tenure terms, is applicable. Further, I note that nothing in such a ruling would violate Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333 (1998). That case held that an employee who has not been reappointed and confirmed by the last day of his first term must vacate the office. Id. at 353. Merlino, indeed, was reappointed prior to the last day of his first full term, which ended on June 3, 1994. The fact that his reappointment was to be effective ten days later was of no consequence to tenure. In addition, with respect to the majority's public policy argument, a mechanism already exists that provides governing bodies with the flexibility necessary to address the concerns raised in the opinion. N.J.A.C. 5:23-4.4(a)(6)See footnote 11 provides a procedure for a temporary appointment of a code official that may be extended or renewed with the approval of the Department of Community Affairs. Such a temporary appointment, after the expiration of an official's first four-year term, would neither grant him tenure nor constitute a gap or interruption that would obviate tenure if he was thereafter appointed to a second consecutive term. That methodology is available to deal with the employee who improves or deteriorates near the end of his first term and requires a further period of observation. That scheme has the advantage of providing for oversight by the Department of Community Affairs, the agency charged with the ultimate responsibility for code enforcement. There is simply no provision in our law for deliberately imposing gaps or interruptions between full four-year terms for the purpose of avoiding tenure. As Judge Kestin, writing for the Appellate Division, correctly stated: The mechanism that was employed has the potential of entirely frustrating the manifest legislative design in enacting N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b). If the statutory tenure grant could so easily be evaded, any municipality could forestall the conferral of tenure indefinitely simply by employing the same mechanism every four years. Without denigrating the trial court's finding that no duress occurred here, we observe simply that any official faced with the choice given to plaintiff at the end of his term would be hard pressed to refuse the offer and opt for the relinquishment of office over the guarantee of continued employment for an ensuing four-year term. If, by the unfettered judgment of those making the decision, plaintiff had not earned reappointment to his second term, it was incumbent upon the decision-makers so to declare. There were no impediments to the denial of a second term. By choosing, instead, to grant plaintiff a second term, even in a good faith effort to defer the tenure issue, the mayor and council came squarely within the terms of the statute and, by operation of law, conferred tenure upon the plaintiff. Any subsequent effort to remove him needed to conform with statutory requirements: for just cause after a fair and impartial hearing. Justices Stein and Zazzali join in this dissent. NO. A-108 ANTHONY MERLINO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOROUGH OF MIDLAND PARK, MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF MIDLAND PARK, MICHELLE F. DUGAN, BOROUGH ADMINISTRATOR, DAVID HEEREMA, CONSTRUCTION OFFICIAL, BUILDING SUB-CODE OFFICIAL and BUILDING INSPECTOR, Defendants-Appellants, DECIDED March 27, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz Acting appointments: A municipality shall appoint an acting construction official or subcode official any time the absence of such official would impede orderly administration of the Uniform Construction Code and other duties mandated by the municipality. Acting appointments shall be accomplished by any mechanism acceptable to the municipality; providing, however, that a written record shall be kept. Notice to the Department shall be provided within seven days any time an appointment is made for more than 30 days. Acting appointments may not be made for longer than 60 days, nor may they be extended or renewed beyond 60 days unless specific authority to do so is granted in writing by the Department.