Title: In Re Farson's Estate
Citation: 269 P.2d 600, 77 Ariz. 196
Docket Number: 5703
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 1954

77 Ariz. 196 (1954) 269 P.2d 600 In re FARSON'S ESTATE. MacPHERSON v. VALLEY NAT. BANK OF PHOENIX. No. 5703. Supreme Court of Arizona. April 13, 1954. Rehearing Denied May 25, 1954. *198 Manuel Avalos and Nolen L. McLean, Tucson, for appellant. Knapp, Boyle, Bilby &amp; Thompson, by T.K. Shoenhair, Tucson, for appellee. STANFORD, Justice. On March 29, 1950, appellant, John Frederick MacPherson, was appointed guardian of the person and estate of his mother, Pearl L. Farson, a mentally incompetent person. The estate was appraised at $322,125.75. In the course of the administration of this estate, appellant submitted two accountings which were approved in the routine manner. On October 31, 1951, he filed his third account and report which was heard December 6, 1951, and was not approved. December 31, 1951, the Probate Judge wrote the attorney for appellant, stating: January 28, 1952, appellant filed a third amended account and report. Hearing was had thereon, February 16, 1952. At the close of the testimony offered to explain and justify the expenditures in the account, the court found that there was no substantial change in this account and report from the original third account and report. Reiterating what he had said in his letter and explaining that therefore the amended account and report were unacceptable, the court entered the following orders: Third amended accounting, disapproved; appellant removed as guardian of the estate; appellee, bank, appointed guardian upon qualifying and posting proper bond; froze the estate checking account and ordered that outstanding checks not be honored; and, froze the personal safety deposit box of appellant. And, the lower court stated, as added grounds for these orders, the fact that appellant had been authorized only two months before the hearing to borrow $5,000 for the estate; that the court had received many calls and similar notices from nurses and persons employed by the estate and *200 who had not been paid for their services; and that the court could not ascertain why, in the light of the large expenditures incurred by appellant and the above authorized borrowing, such bills obviously contracted for the benefit of the ward had not been paid. According to the testimony at the hearing on the amended accounting, appellant was not at all surprised at his being removed. Appellant also testified that his personal safety deposit box contained many valuables which were part of the estate of the ward. On this appeal, appellant assigns the following as error: Appellant's removal as guardian of the estate; the appointment of appellee bank as general guardian of the estate; the freezing of the estate checking account and ordering that outstanding checks be not honored; and the freezing of appellant's personal safety deposit box. Regarding appellant's removal as guardian of the estate, appellant's reasoning in this case is essentially as follows: Numerous other states and California, from which state we have taken our probate and guardian statutes, hold that where the code sets out grounds for the removal of a guardian, the court can remove a guardian upon only those grounds set out in the code. The grounds for removal which the court used as a basis for discharge were clearly statutory, making it unnecessary for us to consider whether only statutory grounds may be the basis for removal of a guardian. Without restating the facts of this case, it is obvious that in the lower court's opinion, although appellant was not considered mentally incompetent or fraudulently mismanaging or misappropriating funds, appellant was considered from a business standpoint, mismanaging the affairs of the estate. Such grounds are clearly set forth in the statute, Section 42-140, A.C.A. 1939. Since his third account had been refused, and the reasons were given to him by the probate judge for such refusal, it became the duty of appellant to render an amended accounting for the reasonable and proper expenditures incurred out of this estate and his management thereof under the circumstances. Testimony as to the propriety of his expenses make up almost the entire transcript of testimony; in short, appellant was granted ample opportunity to justify his account. The removal of a guardian without written notice is proper where he has been in court and defended himself, In re Kenney's Appeal, 138 Kan. 29, 23 P.2d 597. By this failure to justify the account, by his mismanagement of the estate, and by his failure to amend his account so that it would show reasonable and proper expenditures under the circumstances, appellant, an officer of the court and subject to the control of the court in the discharge of his duties, was subject to be discharged forthwith. In re Guardianship of Chambers, 46 Okl. 139, 148 P. 148, 149. In such instance, a court may remove the guardian from his trust immediately, *201 and we do hold that such was properly done in this case. By way of explanation of the probate court power of removal, we quote from Reilly v. Clark, 2 Ariz. 299, 300, 15 P. 141, decided by the Territorial Court in 1887: It is the law of guardianships, anciently and well established, that at all times, the court must be guided by what is in the best interest of the ward. And, in order to protect the interests of the ward, as stated in In re Howard's Guardianship, 218 Cal. 607, 24 P.2d 486, 487: And, as the court held in the above case, we can see no abuse of discretion in this case. Regarding the appointment of the bank as general guardian of the estate upon appellant's removal, appellant contends that under Section 38-601, A.C.A. 1939, the court could appoint only a special guardian, not a general guardian, awaiting the time when upon proper notice and hearing it could determine whom it should appoint as general guardian. If the court committed error in appointing the bank ab initio as *202 general guardian, it still would not affect the propriety or impropriety of the removal of the appellant as general guardian. There was error under Section 38-601, supra, in appointing the bank as general guardian in that this statute clearly provides that a special guardian be appointed pending a proper appointment of a general guardian. However, since a special guardian's duties are merely to preserve the assets of an estate, and since the duties of the bank as general guardian accomplished the same result, no substantial error was committed by the failure to appoint the bank as special guardian under the circumstances herein. Finally, regarding the orders freezing the checking account and the appellant's personal safety deposit box, and ordering that the outstanding checks be not honored, since the removal of the appellant as guardian of this estate was proper and based upon the grounds of mismanaging the estate, freezing the checking account and ordering that outstanding checks be not honored were merely prudent moves for the court to make in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of these estates. And, as to freezing the personal safety deposit box of appellant, since the box contained valuables belonging to the estate, it was again proper for the court to place its protective hand over these valuables until the same could be sorted from those items belonging exclusively to appellant. Finding no abuse of discretion in the rendering of any of these orders considered in this paragraph, Judgment is affirmed. PHELPS, C.J., and LA PRADE, UDALL, and WINDES, JJ., concurring.