Title: Coseboom v. Marshall's Trust
Citation: 326 P.2d 368, 64 N.M. 170
Docket Number: 6341
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 1958

326 P.2d 368 (1958) 64 N.M. 170 Sally COSEBOOM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret S. MARSHALL'S TRUST; Margaret Meyer, also known as M. Meyer, Individually and as Trustee of the Defendant, Margaret S. Mashall Trust; Schuyler B. Marshall III, individually, and as Trustee of athe DEfendant, Margaret S. Marshall Trust; and F.P. Schuster, individually and as Trustee of the Defendant, Margaret S. Marshall Trust, Defendants-Appellees. No. 6341. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 4, 1958. Shipley &amp; Seller, Alamogordo, for appellant. J.D. Weir, Las Cruces, L.J. Maveety, Las Cruces, Schuyler B. Marshall, El Paso, Tex., for appellees. SHILLINGLAW, Justice. The plaintiff in this case filed a complaint which read in part: In an "Answer to request for admission of facts", the plaintiff said, as follows: The defendant, Margaret Meyer, individually, and as trustee filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and alleged as grounds therefor: Subsequently, on the 10th day of June, 1957, the lower court entered its order sustaining the motion to dismiss concluding that the cause of action was within and barred by the statute of frauds. Whereupon it dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff thereupon appealed to this Court and the foregoing constitutes the entire record before us upon which we rely in basing our decision, the allegations of the complaint being admitted by the defendant by virtue of his motion to dismiss. 1, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 350. Although other parties are named as defendants in the complaint the only defendant before the court below and this Court is the appellee, Margaret Meyer, also known as M. Meyer individually and as trustee of the Margaret Marshall Trust. We determine the only question before this Court to be: is the plaintiff's action within and barred by the statute of frauds? The lower court held in the affirmative. We do not agree with that conclusion. We have in this case a situation where from the pleadings the facts are admitted that the appellee, following oral negotiations with plaintiff's agent, gave a check for $1,000 and went into possession of the premises and then stopped payment on the check. In arriving at a decision in this case we must determine whether the appellant had the right to recover on a check delivered as part of the consideration of a parol contract and only so far as the right of recovery on the check is affected by the statute of frauds. *371 The English Statute of Frauds (29 Charles II, c. 3) in force in New Mexico, as part of the common law, provides: Childers v. Talbott, 4 N.M.Gild. 336, 16 P. 275, and Section 21-3-3, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. It is interesting to note that in Osborne v. Osborne, 24 N.M. 96, 172 P. 1039, this Court held that a vendee under an oral contract for the purchase of real estate, having paid the purchase price and being in possession, was permitted to prosecute a suit for specific performance, this Court holding that under the facts in that case the action was not within the statute of frauds. In the instant case the vendor is suing on a check, payment on which had been stopped, given in part payment of the purchase price. This is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction but the better reasoning and the great majority of cases hold that an action such as this is not within the statute of frauds and, therefore, the appellee's motion to dismiss should have been rejected by the trial court. In Garbarino v. Union Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n, 107 Colo. 140, 109 P.2d 638, 132 A.L.R. 1480, the plaintiff brought suit on a check drawn by the defendant to the plaintiff's order and upon which the defendant had stopped payment. The check was in the sum of $1,000 and constituted a down payment on certain real estate which the parties had orally contracted to transfer. Among the defenses pleaded to the suit was the statute of frauds. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in holding that a suit on the check could be maintained. We think the facts in the Garbarino case, supra, are practically identical with the facts in this case and that the holding of the Colorado court follows the better reasoning of the majority of the cases. The question is annotated in 32 A.L.R. 1486 and the general rule will be found at 49 Am.Jur. 845. The order of the lower court sustaining the motion to dismiss is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., McGHEE and COMPTON, JJ., and DAVID W. CARMODY, D.J., concur.