Title: Mitchell v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 195, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HAREEM D. MITCHELL, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 195, 2013 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§ 
§  Cr. ID 1203014788A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: February 14, 2014 
   Decided: March 21, 2014 
   Revised: April 8, 2014 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
O R D E R 
 
This 8th day of April 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-below/appellant, Hareem D. Mitchell, appeals 
from his criminal convictions in the Superior Court of Kent County.  
Mitchell’s appeal rests on several alleged violations during the investigation, 
pre-trial, and trial phases of his case.  We find no merit to Mitchell’s appeal.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record shows that a grand jury indicted Mitchell on one 
count of Attempted First Degree Murder, two counts of First Degree 
2 
 
Robbery, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of 
a Felony, four counts of First Degree Reckless Endangering, one count of 
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, one count of 
Resisting Arrest, one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
Prohibited, and one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person 
Prohibited.  Initially, a public defender represented Mitchell.  On October 
26, 2012, the trial judge granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, and 
Mitchell proceeded to trial pro se.1  After a six-day trial, a jury found 
Mitchell guilty of the ten charges that the State presented.2  The trial judge 
sentenced Mitchell to 89 years of imprisonment. 
 
(3) 
The crimes in this case occurred on March 17, 2012.  A masked 
man with a firearm entered Dot Discount in Dover.  The man approached a 
customer, Robert Williams, from behind, placed a hand around Williams’ 
neck, and thrust the firearm into his back.  The man then approached the 
store clerk, Keandra Thompson, and demanded money.  Thompson 
complied and placed the store’s money into a black plastic bag.  The man 
then ordered Thompson to lie face down on the ground, and left with the 
                                                 
1 The transcript of the hearing on Mitchell’s motion to proceed pro se reflects that 
Mitchell’s waiver of his right to counsel and his assertion of his right to represent himself 
was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 
2 The trial judge severed the person prohibited counts from the other charges, and the 
State dismissed the charges of reckless endangerment. 
3 
proceeds of his robbery.  Once the man left, Thompson reported this incident 
to the police.  Williams also reported this incident to the police. 
 
(4) 
Corporal Michael Wisniewski of the Dover Police Department 
responded to the police radio dispatch regarding the Dot Discount robbery.  
The dispatch informed that the robber “was fleeing on foot northbound . . . 
wearing all black clothing,” and was possibly armed.  Wisniewski headed 
toward Dot Discount in an unmarked black Ford Crown Victoria.  He 
spotted a person in flight matching the description of the robber on South 
Governor’s Avenue.  The suspect, upon seeing Wisniewski, dove into a 
nearby bush.  Wisniewski ordered the suspect to crawl slowly from the bush, 
but the suspect did not comply.   
 
(5) 
With his firearm drawn, Wisniewski approached the suspect.  
Wisniewski testified that the suspect then fired four shots in his direction.  
Wisniewski fired five shots at the suspect in response.  Wisniewski then 
realized that his gun malfunctioned, and he retreated for cover to correct the 
malfunction.   
 
(6) 
The suspect ultimately threw down the bag of money and his 
firearm.  Officers approached the suspect and instructed him to place his 
hands behind his back.  The suspect refused to place his hands behind him.  
4 
 
The suspect continued to resist while the officers arrested him.  Wisniewski 
identified Hareem D. Mitchell as the man officers arrested. 
 
(7) 
Near the place of Mitchell’s arrest, police recovered a .38 
revolver with four spent shells inside the cylinder, $730 in loose bills, 
$1,300.50 and two checks in a black plastic bag, and a bandana.  Police also 
recovered a black cap and an additional $120 in Mitchell’s sweatshirt.  
Finally, police recovered the five spent .40 caliber shells from Wisniewski’s 
gun. 
 
(8) 
In May 2012, the prosecutor sought to indict Mitchell on 
fourteen counts related to the March 17 events.  The grand jury indicted 
Mitchell on all fourteen counts.  Count 1 alleged that Mitchell attempted 
First Degree Murder “by shooting the victim [officer Wisniewski] several 
times. . . .” 
 
(9) 
Mitchell initially had the benefit of a public defender to assist 
him in the preparation of his defense.  In October 2012, Mitchell fired his 
public defender, citing that he and his public defender had fundamental 
differences in their pursuit of Mitchell’s defense.  Mitchell conducted the 
rest of his case pro se. 
5 
 
(10) As the case proceeded to trial, Mitchell attempted to obtain 
several items from the Dover Police Department.  Mitchell sought and was 
denied the following: 
a. 
Officers’ disciplinary records; 
b. 
Gunshot residue and DNA testing of the revolver found at the 
crime scene; 
c. 
Fingerprint testing of fingerprints recovered from Dot Discount; 
d. 
Operational manuals for the recording system in police cars; 
e. 
Bullets that struck residences near the crime scene on South 
Governor’s Avenue; 
f. 
Pennies, gum, and pens near crime scene Marker #12; 
g. 
Names of people that witnessed Mitchell’s arrest; and 
h. 
An independent ballistics expert to examine the crime scene 
and any ballistic evidence recovered from the scene. 
 
(11) At trial, the prosecutor’s evidence included Wisniewski’s, 
Williams’, and Thompson’s testimony, surveillance tapes from Dot 
Discount, surveillance tapes from the Election Commissioner’s office on 
South Governor’s Avenue, and the physical evidence recovered from the 
crime scene.  At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, Mitchell moved for a 
6 
 
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had not established every 
element of the offenses charged.  The trial judge denied that motion. 
 
(12) Mitchell’s defense theory was that the police and prosecution 
fabricated his involvement in the entire scenario.  Accordingly, Mitchell’s 
defense largely attempted to undermine the credibility of the prosecutor’s 
witnesses. 
 
(13) At the close of evidence, the jury convicted Mitchell on the ten 
counts that the prosecutor presented at trial.  The trial judge sentenced 
Mitchell to 89 years of imprisonment for his crimes.  Mitchell timely 
appealed.  Because we find no merit to his contentions, we affirm his 
conviction. 
 
(14) Mitchell first argues that the trial judge abused his discretion 
when he allowed the State to amend its indictment on Attempted First 
Degree Murder.  The indictment initially alleged that Mitchell attempted 
first degree murder “by shooting the victim several times.”  The State’s 
amendment alleged that Mitchell attempted first degree murder “by shooting 
at the victim.”  After reviewing Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(e), the trial 
judge granted the State’s motion to amend the indictment.  The judge 
determined that the amendment “does not substantially affect the rights of 
the defendant.”  Nor did he find that the amendment created a distinct 
7 
criminal charge.  Rather, he determined that the State’s amendment helped 
Mitchell, because it “clarifies exactly what [Mitchell] is charged with.” 
 
(15) Rule 7(e) allows the State to amend its indictment any time 
before a verdict if:  (1) the amended indictment does not charge the 
defendant with committing any new or different crime, and (2) the amended 
indictment does not prejudice any of the defendant’s substantial rights.3  In 
other words, if the indictment adds or changes the crime charged, or if the 
amendment prejudices the defendant, then the State may not amend its 
indictment.  An amendment is not permitted if it changes an essential 
element of the charged offense.4  Nor is an amendment permitted if it 
prevents the defendant “from pursuing his initial defense strategy.”5  
Conversely, mere changes in the form of an indictment are permissible.6 
 
(16) A conviction for Attempted First Degree Murder required the 
State to prove (1) Mitchell’s intent to kill Wisniewski, and (2) that to further 
his intent, Mitchell took a substantial step to complete the murder.7  Whether 
                                                 
3 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 7(e). 
4 See O’Neil v. State, 691 A.2d 50, 55 (Del. 1997). 
5 Id. 
6 Id.; see also State v. Blendt, 120 A.2d 321, 323 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956) (permitting State 
to amend date of offense charged, where “obvious clerical error” did not affect 
defendant’s ability to prepare trial defense). 
7 See Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 881 (Del. 2001). 
8 
 
Mitchell struck Wisniewski with a bullet is not dispositive on either element.  
The State could sustain an indictment for attempted murder under either 
theory:  striking, but not killing, with a bullet; or firing, but not striking with, 
a bullet.  Accordingly, the amended indictment did not change the crime 
charged in the indictment: attempted murder.  Nor did the amendment 
change Mitchell’s defense strategy in any way.  The trial judge, therefore, 
did not abuse his discretion in permitting the State to amend its indictment 
on Count 1 to allege that Mitchell committed attempted first degree murder 
“by shooting at the victim several times.” 
 
(17) Mitchell next argues that the trial judge erred when he denied 
Mitchell’s request for the disciplinary files of any officer involved in his 
arrest.  Mitchell first sought the records under a subpoena duces tecum, 
which the trial judge quashed.  Mitchell then sought to compel production of 
the records for an in camera review to determine their admissibility for 
impeachment purposes.  Both requests were denied.  For each request, the 
trial judge found that Mitchell did not lay a sufficient factual foundation for 
the relevance of the documents. 
 
(18) Under Snowden v. State, a court must conduct an in camera 
review of a state employee’s personnel file where the requesting party 
establishes “some factual predicate which makes it reasonably likely that the 
9 
file will bear . . . fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a 
desperate grasping at a straw.”8  In Snowden, we ordered the Superior Court 
to conduct an in camera review of an officer’s disciplinary file for 
exculpatory material where the officer was terminated from duty shortly 
after the defendant’s arrest.   
 
(19) Here, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to 
review in camera the officers’ disciplinary files.  Mitchell offered no basis 
for seeking production of the disciplinary records.  He sought to peruse the 
records in hopes of finding impeachment material.  But this kind of general 
fishing expedition is exactly what Snowden prohibits.  Absent a factual 
predicate to suggest the relevance of those documents, the trial judge was 
not required to conduct an in camera review. 
 
(20) Next, Mitchell argues that the State committed Brady violations 
by failing to produce certain evidence.  Mitchell requested, but did not 
receive, the following evidence:  (1) DNA, fingerprint, and gunshot residue 
testing results from the crime scene; (2) operational manuals for the in-dash 
camera system in the police patrol car; (3) bullets that struck nearby 
residences; (4) pennies, gum, and pens from the crime scene; (5) the names 
                                                 
8 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1023-24 (Del. 1996). 
10 
 
of unidentified eyewitnesses to Mitchell’s arrest; and (6) logs of police radio 
calls. 
 
(21)  “There are three components of a Brady violation:  (1) 
evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either 
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the State; and 
(3) its suppression prejudices the defendant.”9 Brady prejudice requires “a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.’”10 
 
(22) Mitchell’s Brady argument is meritless.  First, the State never 
performed the gunshot residue testing that Mitchell sought, because the 
residue would not remain affixed to Mitchell’s hooded sweatshirt.  Second, 
the State determined that the DNA and fingerprint test results were useless 
(a point that Mitchell could have argued to the jury), and thus did not require 
production.  Third, the video recorder operational manual was not relevant 
because the State provided Mitchell with the only dashboard video-recording 
of the incident.  Fourth, a detective determined that removing the bullets 
                                                 
9 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 324 (Del. 2013) (quotations omitted). 
10 Id. at 325 (quotations omitted). 
11 
might cause structural damage to the home.  Fifth, the miscellaneous items 
near Marker #12 play no apparent role in Mitchell’s defense.  Sixth, Mitchell 
fails to identify the significance of the unnamed eyewitnesses.  And seventh, 
any police radio logs would not have altered the course of trial, because the 
State admitted into trial evidence an audio tape of the police dispatches.  In 
sum, Mitchell’s failure to obtain the evidence he sought does not undermine 
our confidence in the trial’s outcome. 
 
(23) In a related vein, Mitchell argues that the trial judge 
erroneously rejected his request for a “missing evidence” or Lolly11 
instruction.  This argument lacks merit.  A prerequisite for relief under Lolly 
is that the requested material must be subject to disclosure under Brady or 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 16.12  As discussed above, the material 
Mitchell sought did not trigger a duty under Brady.  Nor was the information 
subject to disclosure under Rule 16.  That rule requires production of 
evidence that is either material to a defendant’s trial preparation or intended 
to be used in the state’s case-in-chief. 13  None of the evidence above meets 
                                                 
11 Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992). 
12 McCrey v. State, 2008 WL 187947, at *2 (Del. Jan. 3, 2008). 
13 See DEL. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 16. 
12 
 
those requirements.  We therefore affirm the trial judge’s denial of 
Mitchell’s request for a missing evidence instruction. 
 
(24) Next, Mitchell argues that the trial judge erroneously denied his 
request for state money to procure an independent ballistics expert.  Mitchell 
claims that an independent ballistics expert would validate his claim that the 
police fabricated the case against him.  Specifically, Mitchell wanted to 
obtain an independent expert analysis of the following:  (1) where 
Wisniewski was located when he fired at Mitchell; and (2) bullet holes from 
the residence at 814 South Governor’s Avenue.  Both the trial judge and the 
Office of the Public Defender denied Mitchell’s request for a ballistics 
expert. 
 
(25) Due process requires the State to furnish the “basic tools of an 
adequate defense” to an indigent criminal defendant.14  We will not upset a 
trial judge’s decision denying investigative services unless (1) an 
investigator is essential to defense preparation, and (2) substantial prejudice 
results from the investigator’s absence.15 
 
(26) The trial judge correctly denied Mitchell’s request for a 
ballistics expert.  On both Mitchell’s points, we find that a ballistics expert 
                                                 
14 Dennis v. State, 1993 WL 169136, at *4 (Del. Apr. 26, 1993). 
15 Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1017 (Del. 1985). 
13 
was not essential to his trial preparation, nor did the absence of a ballistics 
expert prejudice his defense in any way.  First, the jury was presented with 
surveillance tapes and Wisniewski’s testimony regarding Wisniewski’s 
location when he returned fire.  Mitchell did not attempt to contradict this 
evidence.  Moreover, Mitchell was able to argue any inconsistencies in this 
evidence to the jury.  Second, the jury heard testimony from a Governor’s 
Avenue resident and saw photographs of the bullet holes.  That evidence 
suggested that the bullet holes were from Mitchell’s gun.  Again, Mitchell 
did not attempt to contradict this evidence.  We fail to see how a ballistics 
expert was “essential” to Mitchell’s defense when he failed to offer any 
objection to the State’s evidence. 
 
(27) Next, Mitchell argues that the trial judge erred when he 
prevented Mitchell from asking Wisniewski on cross-examination whether 
he had an attorney present during his internal affairs post-shooting interview.  
The internal affairs (“IA”) interview is an investigation that occurs when an 
officer discharges his weapon.  Mitchell suggested that Wisniewski made 
several statements before the interview was recorded.  Mitchell theorized 
that the attorney coached Wisniewski through any later recorded statements, 
and that provided a basis for an attack on Wisniewski’s credibility.  The trial 
judge determined that Mitchell’s questioning was not relevant unless 
14 
 
Mitchell had some reason to think that the attorney assisted Wisniewski 
during the interview.  Aside from bare speculation, Mitchell could provide 
no basis to suspect that the attorney assisted Wisniewski in crafting his 
answers.  Accordingly, the trial judge foreclosed that line of questioning as 
irrelevant. 
 
(28) The definition of relevance is well-established.  Relevant 
evidence tends to make the existence or non-existence of a consequential 
fact more or less probable than it would be absent that evidence.16  Mitchell 
provided no evidence to suggest that Wisniewski was coached before or 
during the IA interview.  Thus, the issue of coaching was not a 
“consequential fact.”  The trial judge properly foreclosed Mitchell’s 
proposed cross-examination because it would have gone to a non-issue in the 
case. 
 
(29) Mitchell argues for the first time on appeal that alleged 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct tainted his trial.  He asserts two 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct:  (1) that the prosecutor misstated the 
events in a surveillance video, and (2) that the prosecutor coached the victim 
                                                 
16 Del. R. Evid. 401. 
15 
and State witness Mr. Williams.  Because Mitchell did not raise these 
objections at trial, we review his claims for plain error only.17   
 
(30) When reviewing alleged prosecutorial misconduct under a plain 
error standard, this Court follows a three-step analysis.18  We begin by 
asking whether any prosecutorial misconduct occurred.19  If we find no 
prosecutorial misconduct, our analysis ends there.  If we do find 
prosecutorial misconduct, however, we then determine whether the 
misconduct clearly and plainly undermines confidence in the trial process.20  
If we answer in the negative, we then determine whether the misconduct 
included repetitive errors that cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial 
process.21 
 
(31) A prosecutor’s duty is to seek justice on behalf of “all the 
people, including the defendant who [is] being tried.”22  In his pursuit of that 
end, a prosecutor may craft arguments based on evidence admitted at trial 
                                                 
17 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8. 
18 See generally Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 149-51 (Del. 2006) (laying out the 
framework for plain error review of prosecutorial misconduct). 
19 Id. at 150. 
20 See Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
21 See Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 733 (Del. 2002). 
22 Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 1960). 
16 
 
and the reasonable inferences that flow from that evidence, but a prosecutor 
cannot misrepresent trial evidence.23  Likewise, a prosecutor may not use 
false testimony to obtain a conviction.24  But, we will not reverse a 
conviction based on a defendant’s unsupported allegation that a prosecutor 
induced a witness to change his story.25  Defense counsel may highlight any 
inconsistencies during cross-examination.  Without more, however, an 
inconsistent statement does not rise to the level of impermissible witness 
coaching. 
 
(32) Our analysis begins and ends at step one because we find no 
prosecutorial misconduct.  First, we conclude that the prosecutor’s initial 
narration was an innocent mistake that does not rise to the level of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The prosecutor incorrectly narrated the events 
from the Governor’s Avenue surveillance tapes when he represented that 
Wisniewski fired some shots from behind his police vehicle.  Later, the 
prosecutor corrected this account by representing that Wisniewski fired all 
of his shots from in front of his police vehicle.  Wisniewski’s trial testimony 
confirms the latter account.  Importantly, the prosecutor corrected his 
                                                 
23 See Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 659 (Del. 2002). 
24 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
25 See Foreman v. State, 2012 WL 2857752, at *3 (Del. July 11, 2012). 
17 
misstatement before trial.  Second, we conclude that any differences in 
Williams’ trial testimony and his initial report to the police are matters of 
credibility and recollection and do not establish witness coaching.  Williams’ 
trial testimony described Mitchell concealing his revolver in a bandana 
during the Dot Discount robbery.  His initial police report did not mention a 
bandana.  Mitchell had an opportunity to expose this inconsistency at trial.  
Mitchell presented no evidence, however, that the differences arose from 
anything other than the foibles of human memory.   
 
(33) Next, Mitchell argues that the trial judge erred when he denied 
Mitchell’s motion for judgment of acquittal.  At the close of the State’s case, 
Mitchell moved for judgment of acquittal.  He asserted that the State’s 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction because (1) the State had 
not conducted DNA or gunshot residue (“GSR”) testing that would have 
provided Mitchell with exculpatory evidence; and (2) the State did not prove 
that Mitchell ever possessed the firearm found at the crime scene.   
 
(34) The trial judge rejected these assertions and denied the motion.  
Regarding the lack of DNA and GSR testing, the trial judge reasoned that 
Mitchell’s best-case-scenario, if the State had performed these tests, would 
be that they showed no connection between Mitchell and the crimes.  
Because the State did not perform these tests, Mitchell already had his best-
18 
 
case-scenario: no DNA or GSR evidence connecting him to the crime.  
Accordingly, the trial judge found no prejudice from the absence of these 
tests.  The trial judge noted, however, that Mitchell could argue the lack of 
testing to the jury. 
 
(35) Regarding Mitchell’s possession of the revolver, the trial judge 
found sufficient evidence for the jury to infer Mitchell’s possession.  
Namely, the State presented two eyewitnesses’ testimony and the close 
proximity of the gun to the place of Mitchell’s arrest.  On these grounds, the 
trial judge denied Mitchell’s motion. 
 
(36) We agree with the trial judge’s ruling.  We review Mitchell’s 
claim de novo and determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant 
guilty of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.26  In our review, we 
do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.27   
 
(37) We hold that the trial judge correctly concluded that the 
absence of DNA and GSR evidence did not require acquittal.  This evidence 
was not dispositive of the State’s case.  The State was able to establish the 
elements of the charged crimes without the DNA and GSR tests.  For 
                                                 
26 Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 1998). 
27 Id. 
19 
example, two eyewitnesses placed Mitchell at Dot Discount, and two 
eyewitnesses testified that Mitchell fired the gun.  Furthermore, the trial 
judge correctly concluded that the State provided sufficient evidence that 
Mitchell possessed the gun.  Two eyewitnesses testified that Mitchell held 
the gun.  That evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  It was for the jury to decide whether these eyewitnesses were 
credible.28 
 
(38) Mitchell also raises a third basis in support of his motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the attempted first degree murder charge.  He 
argues that the State failed to establish every element of the crime of 
attempted first degree murder.  Specifically, he claims that the State could 
not prevail in its prosecution unless it established that Mitchell planned to 
kill Wisniewski.  Moreover, he argues, the State never established whether 
Mitchell fired his gun in a trajectory that would constitute a “substantial 
step” towards murdering Wisniewski. 
 
(39) We reject Mitchell’s claims and affirm his conviction for 
attempted first degree murder.  First, assuming, without deciding, that the 
State had to show that Mitchell planned to kill Wisniewski, the State met its 
                                                 
28 See Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
20 
 
burden with evidence that Mitchell fired his gun four times at Wisniewski.29  
Second, Wisniewski’s testimony that the bullet “sizzle[d] and swoosh[ed]” 
past his head suffices to establish a “substantial step” in killing Wisniewski. 
 
(40) After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we are 
convinced that all Mitchell’s claims fail.  His conviction is affirmed in its 
entirety. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice  
                                                 
29 See Chattin v. State, 2011 WL 987752 at *2 (Del. Mar. 21, 2011).