Title: BROTHERS v TOWN OF VIRGINIA CITY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13283
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 1976

No. 13283 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 197 6 BILL BROTHERS, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - TOWN OF VIRGINIA cIm, VIRGINIA CITY MONTANA, and W A L T E R EVERLY, Defendants and Appellants, T O W N O F VIRGINIA CITY, VIRGINIA CITY M O N T A N A , Third Party P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, STANFORD 0. DUGDALE, Third Party Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Chester Lloyd Jones argued, County Attorney, Virginia City, Montana For Respondents: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana R. D . Corette argued and John Larson argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: October 22, 1976 Decided:DEC 2 8 i97b Filed : JEh; 2 : J76 M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a f i n a l judgment following a jury verdict rendered i n favor of plaintiff B i l l Brothers i n the d i s t r i c t court, Madison County. O n July 21, 1972, B i l l Brothers Construction entered into a contract with the Town of Virginia City, Montana, whereby the contractor agreed t o construct a sanitary sewer system and lagoon for the contract price of $139,681.50. Virginia City subsequently requested changes i n the sewer system which reduced the contract price t o $138,629.20. These changes were approved by the contractor and Virginia City's supervising engineer. The contractor commenced performance of the contract i n accordance with a "notice t o proceed" and continued t o perform under the contract except during those periods when inclement weather caused the suspension of work. The contractor received periodic payments under the contract as the construction progressed u n t i l September 5, 1973, when the contractor gave notce performance of the contract was complete. In the d i s t r i c t court the contractor contended the following sums remained due, owing and unpaid under the original contract or subsequent contracts: Count One - $17,195.15, together with interest, as the - - f i n a l payment due under the original construction contract. Count T w o - $3,829.55, together with interest, as payment for work requested and authorized by Virginia City i n the repair of wash-out conditions caused by a ruptured water line. Count Three - $468.60, together with interest, as payment P for part performance on a contract for extra work performed in connection with the lagoon. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the district court granted plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on Count Two, ruling that defendant was indebted to plaintiff but leaving the amount of indebtedness to the jury, The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiff and in the sums prayed for by the plaintiff with the exception of Count Three for which the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $400. Defendant presents five issues for review: 1. Whether the district court erred in granting plaintiff's motion in limine which restricted defendant from questioning I plaintiff regarding litigation between plaintiff and defendant's supervising engineer? 2. Whether the district court erred in not granting defendant's motion for directed verdict on Counts One and Three? 3. Whether the district court erred in not granting defendant's motion for a new trial on Counts One, Two and Three? 4. Whether the district court erred in not granting defend- ant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count Three? 5. Whether the district court erred in giving Instruction No. 1 0 and refusing to give defendant's proposed instructions No. 2, 10 and 11? Defendant's first allegation of error concerns the district court's granting of plaintiff's motion in limine, Defendant con- tends that evidence of pending litigation between plaintiff and defendant's engineer was relevant and material i n proving the bad f a i t h of the engineer and thus wrongly withheld from the jury. Defendant concludes that plaintiff would not have recovered had defendant been allowed t o establish the engineer's bad f a i t h i n issuing extensions of time for performance and i n h i s determination that the contract had been completed. W e believe defendant has incorrectly interpreted the law of Montana regarding the effect of decisions of a supervising engineer. Clifton, Applegate & Toole v. Big Lake Drain District No. 1, 82 Mont. 312, 327, 330, 267 P. 207, correctly s t a t e s the Montana rule : "The law appears t o be definitely settled that 'the decision, estimate, or c e r t i f i c a t e of an archi- t e c t , engineer, or superintendent, i n approving or dis- approving the work as a performance of a contract, or i n passing on questions relating thereto, is, i n the absence of fraud, bad f a i t h , or mistake, conclusive and binding on the parties, where the contract, either i n express terms provides that it s h a l l be f i n a l and con- clusive, or i n plain language shows that it was the intention of the parties that the person to whom the question i s submitted should be the a r b i t e r thereof.' "An honest mistake i n measurement o r i n judgment i s not a ground for impeachment of the engineer's estimates. it i s not sufficient t o say that the engineer came t o a conclusion of fact erroneously. Although the court might have made,a different estimate, it may not substitute i t s judgment for that of the engineer." See: Polley's Lumber Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 751; United Pacific Insurance Co. v. County of Flathead, 499 F.2d 1235. Absent a showing of fraud, the decisions of the supervising engineer are binding upon the contracting parties. W e f a i l t o perceive how the introduction of evidence regarding l i t i g a t i o n between plaintiff and the supervising engineer would establish such fraud. The issue t o be resolved was whether or not plaintiff could recover from defendant under a construction contract. Evidence of pending claims and counterclaims'between p l a i n t i f f and defendant's supervising engineer were not material i n resolving such a question of law and fact. This Court reviewed the applicability of the motion i n limine i n Wallin v. Kenyon Estate, 164 Mont. 160, 164, 519 P.2d "Authority for the granting of a motion i n limine r e s t s i n the inherent power of the court to admit or exclude evidence and t o take such precautions as a r e necessary to afford a f a i r t r i a l for a l l parties. * * * "The decision of the d i s t r i c t court i n excluding questions a t t r i a l of the proponent's alleged practice of law was conducive t o the prevention of irrelevant, immaterial arid prejudicial evidence being heard by the jury. The pur- pose, and effect, of the court's granting the motion i n limine was t o prevent that which occurred i n the case of I n the Matter of the Estate of Powers, 163 Mont. 67, 515 P.2d 368, where many diverse issues were allowed * * t o divert the t r i a l court from the single issue * * *'." The advantages of the motion i n limine are many. It speeds, simplifies and purifies the process of obtaining just verdicts by excluding prejudicial evidence which lacks probative value. The motion i n limine allows the judge and jury t o concentrate on the main dispute by isolating the jury from prejudicial inferences and c o l l a t e r a l issues. See: 20 Am Jur Trials p. 441. W e hold the d i s t r i c t court properly exercised i t s discre- tion when it granted p l a i n t i f f ' s motion i n limine. I n i t s second allegation of error defendant contends the d i s t r i c t court erred i n not granting defendant's motion for directed verdict on Counts One and Three. The law is clear i n Montana . that a party asserting error i n the d i s t r i c t court's denial of motion for directed verdict has the burden of showing that error was committed. Fuchs v. Huether, 154 Mont. 11, 459 P.2d 689. When reviewing an order denying motion for directed verdict only evidence of the non-moving party w i l l be considered and such evidence w i l l be considered i n the l i g h t most favorable t o that party. Mueller v. Svejkovsky, 153 Mont. 416, 458 P.2d 265. The reviewing court must concede as true a l l of p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence and give plaintiff the bene- f i t of a l l legitimate inferences. Gerard v. Sanner, 110 Mont. 71, 103 P.2d 314. The evidence must be reviewed from the standpoint most favorable t o p l a i n t i f f and every fact which the evidence tends t o prove must be deemed proved. Leybold v. Fox Butte Theater Corp., 103 Mont. 232, 62 P.2d 223. I f the record should contain substantial evidence sustaining the jury finding then the t r i a l court's action i n denying the motion for directed verdict and submitting the cause t o the jury, and the jury verdict i t s e l f , must be sustained. In r e Dillenburg's Estate, 136 Mont. 542, 349 P.2d 573. W e find the d i s t r i c t court properly concluded that p l a i n t i f f introduced substantial evidence sustaining the jury's finding. The d i s t r i c t court correctly denied defendant's motion for directed verdict on Counts One and Three. Defendant's third allegation of error concerns the d i s t r i c t court's denial of defendant's motion for a new t r i a l on Counts One, T w o and Three. The d i s t r i c t court has broad discretion t o grant or deny motions for new t r i a l and i t s rulings w i l l not be disturbed on review i n the absence of a clear showing of manifest abuse of discretion. Gunderson v. Brewster, 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589. Where there is substantial evidence t o support the verdict the d i s t r i c t court's refusal t o grant a new t r i a l w i l l not be disturbed. State Highway Commission v. Roth, 159 Mont. 268, 496 P.2d 1136. Even where the evidence i s i n conflict, the judgment w i l l not . be disturbed on appeal when substantial evidence appears i n the record t o support the judgment. This rule is particularly appli- cable when the d i s t r i c t court has passed upon the sufficiency of the evidence on motion for new t r i a l and has upheld i t s suffi- ciency. Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 460 P.2d 90. W e find substantial evidence i n the record t o support the jury verdict and find no abuse of discretion or error i n denial of the motions f o r new t r i a l . Defendant's fourth allegation of error concerns the d i s t r i c t court's refusal t o grant defendant's motion f o r judgment, not- withstanding the verdict on Count Three. A s i n the case of a motion for directed verdict, the Court reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must view the evidence i n the light most favorable t o the party against whom the motion i s made. The moving party admits the truth of adverse evidence and every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the adverse evidence. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only where it appears from the evidence, viewed i n the light most favorable to the non-moving party, that there i s no substantial evidence t o support the verdict. Hauter v. Zogarts, 120 Cal.Rptr.681, 534 P.2d 377. Clearly, p l a i n t i f f introduced substantial evidence which would support the jury's verdict on Count Three. W e find no error i n the d i s t r i c t court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendant's fifth allegation of error is that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury and in refusing to give several of defendant's proposed instructions. When determining whether jury instructions were properly given or refused the reviewing court considers the instructions in their entirety. Furthermore, the instructions are read in connection with other instructions given and they are cohsidered in light of the evidence adduced. Fox v. Fifth West, Inc., 153 Mont. 95, 454 P. 2d 612. Where the instructions to the jury in their entirety state the law applicable to the case, a party cannot claim reversible error as to the giving or denying of certain instruc- tions. Franck v. Hudson, 140 Mont. 480, 373 P.2d 951. Upon reviewing the jury instructions given by the district court, we find no reversible error. The judgment of the district court We Concur: 1 n. L.C. Gulbrandson, District dge, sitting for Justice Wesley