Title: Commonwealth v. Scesny
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11627
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2015

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SJC-11627 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALEX SCESNY. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 6, 2015. - July 14, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Rape.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Photograph, 
Relevancy and materiality, Identification, Third-party 
culprit.  Witness, Expert.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Confrontation of witnesses, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 12, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
 
Kenneth I. Seiger for the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In October of 1996 passersby discovered the 
body of a woman, Theresa Stone (victim), by the side of a road 
in Fitchburg.  Sixteen years later, in March of 2012, a 
Worcester County jury convicted the defendant, Alex Scesny, of 
2 
 
murder in the first degree and aggravated rape in connection 
with her death.1  Before us is the defendant's appeal from these 
convictions.  The defendant argues that (1) the evidence was 
insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial judge 
erred in admitting opinion testimony of a criminalist employed 
by the Commonwealth because the witness was not qualified to 
render the opinion stated; (3) the admission of an autopsy 
report prepared by a medical examiner who did not testify at 
trial, and of testimony of a substitute medical examiner, 
violated the defendant's constitutional right to confront 
witnesses; (4) it also was error to admit a witness's testimony, 
based on her examination of a photograph that itself should not 
have been admitted, that she recognized the defendant as one who 
had patronized a bar in which the victim was seen on the night 
of her death; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument was 
improper, impinging on the defendant's fundamental right to 
present a defense; and (6) the judge erred in declining to 
instruct the jury in accordance with the defendant's proposed 
instruction on third-party culprit evidence.  We conclude that 
the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of 
aggravated rape, and reverse his conviction of this crime.  We 
                     
 
1 The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree under all three theories:  deliberate premeditation, 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. 
 
3 
 
affirm the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree.2 
Background.  1.  Facts.  The defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, and therefore we summarize the 
facts the jury could have found in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 342 
(2010).  We reserve certain facts for later discussion in 
connection with other issues raised. 
 
On October 23, 1996, the victim and her daughter, Nashea 
Falcon,3 spent the day running errands together and returned in 
the afternoon to the apartment where they were living in 
Fitchburg.  At approximately 7 P.M. that evening, the victim 
left the apartment to buy some groceries for dinner.  Shortly 
thereafter, she visited the Brau-Hoff, a bar on Main Street in 
Fitchburg.  She arrived alone, stayed for about an hour or more, 
and talked to the bartender, Jessie Spencer.  The victim left 
the bar alone and subsequently returned to the apartment with 
groceries.  She told Nashea that she had received a ride home 
                     
 
2 The reversal of the defendant's conviction of aggravated 
rape means the jury's determination that the defendant was 
guilty of felony-murder in the first degree cannot stand.  
Because the jury also found the defendant guilty under the other 
two theories of murder, however, and because we discern no error 
affecting those findings, the defendant's conviction of first 
degree murder is affirmed. 
 
 
3 Nashea Falcon was formerly known as Nashea Stone.  By the 
time of the trial in 2012, she had married Efrain Falcon, her 
boy friend at the time of the victim's death in 1996.  We refer 
to her by her first name, Nashea, to avoid any confusion. 
4 
 
from a man in a black truck who was waiting for her outside, but 
that she did not want to go with him.  Sometime between 9:30 and 
10:30 P.M., the victim left the apartment again and told Nashea 
she was going to "Work-a-Day," a temporary employment agency.4  
That was the last time Nashea saw the victim alive. 
 
On October 25, 1996, responding to a telephone call 
regarding a body by the side of a road in Fitchburg, the police 
observed a white female lying on her left side with her face 
down on the ground, her pants and underwear pulled down to her 
knees, and her knees, thighs, buttocks, and lower abdominal area 
exposed.  There was a light coating of leaves over the body, and 
its lividity appeared consistent with the position in which it 
was found.  Police discovered what appeared to be a condom 
wrapper underneath or in the vicinity of the body.  The body was 
identified as the victim's through fingerprint analysis.  The 
cause of death was strangulation by ligature.  The autopsy 
revealed that two of the victim's teeth had been broken off, 
that she had blood in her mouth, and that there were injuries to 
her eyelids, nose, neck, left shoulder, right clavicular region, 
right arm, right metacarpal, and right thigh. 
 
During trial, the Commonwealth and the defendant stipulated 
                     
 
4 According to Nashea, the victim had worked as a prostitute 
in the past, and when the victim left the apartment at 
approximately 9:30 P.M. on October 23, 1996, it would not have 
surprised her (Nashea) if the victim was "going to make some 
money that night." 
5 
 
to the following: 
 
"After [the victim's] body was discovered on Kinsman 
Road on October 25, 1996, blood samples and vaginal and 
anal swabs were taken as evidence.  This material was sent 
to the Mass[achusetts] State Police crime [laboratory] for 
[deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)] testing.  These tests 
generated DNA profiles, which were made part of a DNA 
database.  In 2008, for reasons completely unrelated to the 
investigation of [the victim's] death, [the defendant's] 
DNA profile was entered into that system.  Sometime after 
that, a link was believed to be established between [the 
defendant's] DNA profile and biological evidence taken from 
[the victim].  At a later date, [the defendant] provided 
another DNA sample for further comparison purposes."5 
 
The rectal swab taken from the victim contained sperm cells, and 
the DNA profile generated from the sperm matched the DNA profile 
for the defendant.6  The probability of a randomly selected, 
unrelated individual having a DNA profile matching the major 
profile obtained from the rectal swab was one in 13.2 
quadrillion of the Caucasian population.7 
 
Upon examination of the victim's body, a number of small, 
red-brown stains were noted on the victim's exposed skin and 
                     
 
5 The trial judge read this stipulation to the jury during 
the trial. 
 
 
6 The rectal swab generated two deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
profiles, a sperm fraction and a nonsperm fraction.  The profile 
generated for the sperm fraction was a mixture of DNA, meaning 
that more than one person contributed DNA to that fraction.  The 
major profile for that fraction matched the DNA profile for the 
defendant.  The minor profile for the sperm fraction contained 
some cellular material "carr[ied] over" from the nonsperm 
fraction, and it was consistent with the victim's DNA. 
 
 
7 The defendant is Caucasian. 
 
6 
 
clothing.  A screening test for the presence of blood was 
performed on stains from the victim's lower pant leg and 
sneaker, as well as her right hip and right thigh-left knee 
area.  The stains tested positive indicating that blood may be 
present.  The stain on the thigh-knee area was submitted for 
further testing and a confirmatory test for human blood was also 
positive.8 
 
DNA profiles generated from the stains on the sneaker, hip, 
and thigh-knee area indicated a mixture of DNA from more than 
one source.  The defendant matched the major profile in the DNA 
mixture on the hip.  The probability of a randomly selected 
unrelated individual having a DNA profile matching this stain 
was approximately one in 1.366 billion of the Caucasian 
population.  The defendant also was included as a potential 
contributor to the DNA mixtures on the sneaker and thigh-knee 
area.  The probability of a randomly selected unrelated 
individual having contributed DNA to the mixture was 
approximately one in sixty-one of the Caucasian population for 
each of these two stains. 
 
Male-specific DNA testing also was performed on three areas 
of the victim's underwear.  In the first area, a partial male 
DNA profile was generated that matched the defendant's; the 
                     
 
8 The other stains were too small for confirmatory testing. 
 
7 
 
probability that a randomly selected individual would match the 
profile was one in two of the male population.  In the second 
area tested, a partial male DNA profile was generated that did 
not match the defendant's profile.  In the third area tested, no 
male DNA was found.  A screening test for the presence of blood 
on three red-brown stains found on the underwear was positive.9  
No seminal fluid was found to be present on the victim's 
underwear, which suggested that the victim had not pulled up her 
underwear and pants after the semen in her rectum had been 
deposited.10 
 
Some of the red-brown bloodstains11 on the victim's body and 
                     
 
9 A screening test for blood on a fourth red-brown stain on 
the underwear was negative. 
 
 
10 Debra McKillop, a criminalist who had been employed by 
the Commonwealth at the time of the victim's death, testified 
that if a liquid such as seminal fluid is deposited in an 
orifice, such as the vaginal, anal, or other cavity, it is a 
common occurrence, when cloth or other material is placed over 
the orifice, that liquid will be absorbed into the material; and 
that if the victim had pulled up her underwear and pants 
following deposit of semen or sperm in her rectum, some drainage 
or transference onto her underwear could be expected.  Doctor 
Henry Nields, a physician and the substitute medical examiner, 
however, testified that drainage of seminal fluid from the anal 
opening onto underwear after anal sex may or may not be present.  
The defendant challenges the admission of McKillop's opinion 
testimony on the ground that she was not professionally 
qualified to give it.  The defendant's argument is discussed 
infra. 
 
 
11 As suggested in the text, the evidence concerning the 
red-brown stains would permit the jury to find that they were 
bloodstains and, in particular, the defendant's bloodstains. 
 
8 
 
clothing appeared to have been deposited at an angle, suggesting 
that the blood causing the stains had hit the victim's body at 
an angle and that some type of action or force had been 
involved.  The stains on the victim's skin did not appear to be 
disturbed, meaning they had been deposited on the body and had 
dried in the condition in which the investigating police and 
criminalists found them.  The stains' appearance again suggested 
that the victim had not pulled up her pants after the stains 
were deposited.12 
 
Jessie Spencer worked as a bartender at the Brau-Hoff bar 
in Fitchburg on the night of October 23, 1996, the night of the 
victim's disappearance.  In 2008, police showed Spencer several 
photographs and asked her whether she recognized any of the 
persons depicted in them as customers of the bar.  She was shown 
a photograph of the defendant and was "pretty certain" she 
recognized him.  Over-all, four of the six photographs she was 
shown were of men she recognized from the bar. 
 
The defense conceded at trial that the defendant had had 
sexual intercourse with the victim, but argued that the 
                     
 
12 Testimony was presented indicating that if the stains had 
been wet when deposited on the victim, and the victim 
subsequently had pulled up her pants, some sort of interruption 
or disturbance of the stain would be expected.  If the stains on 
the victim's body had been dry and the victim then pulled up her 
pants, any friction or contact with the clothing could have 
dislodged the stain causing it to fall free from the skin. 
 
9 
 
intercourse was consensual.  He stressed that the stains on the 
victim's hip, knee, and sneaker contained a mixture of DNA from 
more than one person,13 and argued that any potential 
contribution by him to the DNA in the stains was not necessarily 
blood, but could have been some other bodily substance 
transferred onto the victim's body during their sexual 
encounter. 
 
The defendant also presented evidence at trial suggesting 
that two other men may have been responsible for the victim's 
death:  Everett Carlson and James Webber, who was the victim's 
former husband and father of Nashea.  Both men were excluded as 
sources of the sperm on the rectal swab taken from the victim, 
as well as the DNA mixture in the stains on the victim's sneaker 
and right thigh-left knee; the major male DNA profile in the 
stain on the victim's right hip also did not match either man.14  
Webber was excluded as a source of the partial male DNA profile 
generated from the stains on the first area tested from the 
victim's underwear, but Carlson was included, meaning his DNA 
profile matched the partial male DNA profile identified in that 
                     
 
13 The victim was included as a potential contributor to the 
DNA mixture on the sneaker; the DNA mixtures from the hip and 
knee yielded inconclusive results with respect to the victim. 
 
 
14 The minor profile yielded inconclusive or insufficient 
results for comparison. 
 
10 
 
area of the underwear.15  Both Webber and Carlson were excluded 
as sources of the male DNA detected in the second area tested 
from the victim's underwear.16 
 
2.  Procedural history.  In 2008, the defendant was 
indicted for the murder and aggravated rape of the victim.  As 
indicated, in March of 2012 a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder; 
he also was convicted of aggravated rape.  The defendant filed a 
timely appeal of his convictions, which we consider here. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
he was the perpetrator of the victim's murder and that he 
committed aggravated rape.  He does not dispute that the DNA 
from the rectal swab taken from the victim established that he 
had intercourse with her, but asserts there was no evidence to 
prove that the sexual interaction was not consensual.  He also 
contends that the additional forensic evidence was ambiguous, 
                     
15 The probability that a randomly selected individual would 
match the partial male profile identified was one in two of the 
male population; as previously indicated, the defendant's DNA 
was also included as a possible source. 
 
 
16 The defendant was excluded as a possible source of the 
male DNA detected in this area as well, indicating that a male 
other than the defendant, Carlson, or Webber contributed this 
stain. 
 
11 
 
inconclusive, speculative, and ultimately insufficient to prove 
that he murdered the victim;17 and that apart from this forensic 
evidence, the Commonwealth provided no evidence connecting him 
to the scene or to the murder.  To support this argument, he 
notes the evidence that the victim was a prostitute and 
therefore had consensual sex with men, and further that the 
autopsy report revealed the victim's external genitalia and anus 
were normal -- that is, without any sign of injury or trauma. 
With respect to the charge of murder, the defendant's claim 
fails.  The trial evidence considered in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth would allow the jury reasonably to 
find that the defendant had sex with the victim (as he 
conceded), at or near the time of her death; the red-brown 
stains on the victim's body and clothes were or certainly 
included the defendant's blood; the victim had not pulled up her 
underwear and pants after having anal intercourse with the 
defendant or after the defendant's blood was deposited on her 
                     
17 In particular, the defendant argues that DNA testing done 
on the stains from the victim's body and clothing did not 
identify the bodily source of the substance creating the stains, 
and thus his potential contribution to the DNA mixtures was not 
necessarily blood but could have been some other biological 
fluid -- e.g., saliva or semen -- transferred to the victim 
during intercourse.  He also points to the fact that the DNA 
found on the victim's underwear could have matched half of the 
male population, and that the DNA testing performed actually 
established that a fourth, unidentified man contributed sperm 
DNA to these underwear stains. 
 
12 
 
body; the victim died from strangulation by ligature; she also 
suffered significant injuries to her face as well as to her arm 
and thigh; and she could have encountered the defendant at the 
Brau-Hoff bar on the evening or night of October 23, 1996. 
 
Based on this evidence, the jury reasonably could infer 
that the defendant had sex with the victim and then strangled 
her.  See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 837-838 (2008) 
("Because death had occurred while [the victim] was lying on her 
back, and because no sperm cells were found on the crotch area 
of her panties, death probably occurred after intercourse and 
before [the victim] could pull up her clothes such that her 
panties would collect sperm cells draining from her body").  
This is a sequence of events that supports a determination that 
the defendant acted with deliberate premeditation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 431 Mass. 265, 269-270 (2000) 
("evidence of death by strangulation supported an inference that 
the victim's death was not instantaneous, but the result of 
pressure applied to her neck until she lost consciousness," 
which warranted finding that defendant "acted with malice and 
deliberate premeditation").  Moreover, the extent and severity 
of the victim's injuries permitted a finding of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 321, 324-
325 (2014) (evidence that victim was raped and strangled, with 
significant injuries to head, skull, and face, supported jury's 
13 
 
guilty verdict of murder in first degree under theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty [as well as other two theories of murder]).  
With respect to the murder charge, therefore, the Latimore test 
was met.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 
(1979) (considering evidence in light most favorable to 
Commonwealth, we ask whether "any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). 
 
We agree with the defendant, however, that the evidence 
presented was not sufficient to support his conviction of 
aggravated rape.  This court has established that "[t]he essence 
of the crime of rape, whether aggravated or unaggravated, is 
sexual intercourse with another compelled by force and against 
the victim's will or compelled by threat of bodily injury."  
Commonwealth v. McCourt, 438 Mass. 486, 494-495 (2003).  
"Absence of consent is an essential element of the crime of 
rape, whether aggravated or unaggravated."  Commonwealth v. 
Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 408 (2012).  Here, the evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably infer lack of consent was itself 
lacking.  Although the victim was found with her pants and 
underwear pulled down to her knees, the clothing was intact with 
no evidence of rips or tears.  Contrast, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Tavares, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 642 (1989), S.C., 57 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1111 (2003) (evidence was sufficient to support conviction 
14 
 
of aggravated rape where, inter alia, victim "woke up without 
her pants and her blouse and bra were torn").  In addition, the 
autopsy report established that the victim's external genitalia 
and anus were normal, and no injuries were noted in these areas.  
Contrast, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 435 Mass. 274, 278 
(2001) (evidence that victim's thighs were bruised and her 
vaginal opening had been injured, together with other evidence, 
was sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant 
had raped victim).  There also was evidence that the victim had 
worked as a prostitute in the past; further, the victim's 
daughter indicated that she would not be surprised if the victim 
was "going to make some money" the night she was murdered, and 
the victim's body was found about one-half mile to one mile from 
an area known to be a place that prostitutes frequented with 
their customers. 
 
The Commonwealth's case against the defendant was entirely 
circumstantial.  Although the victim ultimately suffered severe 
injuries that, the jury could infer, were inflicted in 
connection with her murder, there was no evidence favoring the 
inference that the defendant raped the victim before killing her 
over the inference that he had consensual sex with the victim 
and then killed her.  "When the evidence tends equally to 
sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them 
can be said to have been established by legitimate proof."  
15 
 
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 467 (2007), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200 (1965).  Accordingly, 
because the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding of 
lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's 
conviction of aggravated rape must be reversed, and the jury's 
finding that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of felony-murder must be set aside.18   
 
2.  Expert testimony.  The defendant argues that the trial 
judge abused his discretion in admitting the opinion testimony 
of Debra McKillop, a criminalist with the State police crime 
laboratory (crime lab) at the time the victim's killing was 
initially investigated in 1996.  At trial, the defendant 
objected to two portions of McKillop's testimony:  (1) that, 
based on her experience, she would have expected there to be 
some drainage located on the victim's underwear if the victim 
had pulled up her underwear following the deposit of semen in 
her rectum; and (2) that she would expect to see some 
                     
 
18 This conclusion follows from the fact that aggravated 
rape was the sole felony put before the jury as a possible 
predicate felony for felony-murder in the first degree.  The 
conclusion, however, does not affect the defendant's murder 
conviction because the jury also convicted the defendant on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction 
on these theories.  See Commonwealth v. Evans, 469 Mass. 834, 
842-843 (2014), and cases cited (where jury convicts defendant 
of murder in first degree under more than one theory, "evidence 
supporting either theory would suffice to affirm the verdict"). 
 
16 
 
interruption or disturbance of the stains on the victim's body, 
if the victim had pulled up her pants after the stains had been 
deposited.19  The defendant argues that McKillop's opinion 
testimony in these areas exceeded the scope of her 
qualifications and failed to meet the foundational requirements 
for expert testimony.  He further claims that because this 
testimony was a pivotal piece of the Commonwealth's case, its 
admission was highly prejudicial.20 
 
"A trial judge has wide discretion to qualify an expert 
witness and to decide whether the witness's testimony should be 
admitted."  Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 533 
(2001).  "The admission of expert testimony will be reversed 
only where it constitutes an abuse of discretion or other error 
of law."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 764 
(2009) (judge's decision to admit testimony "will not be upset 
on appeal if any reasonable basis appears for it" [citation 
                     
 
19 The defendant's trial counsel did not state the specific 
ground for his objections, but the defendant argues here that it 
was apparent from the context that the objection was to the lack 
of adequate foundation for McKillop's opinion testimony.  
Nothing in our resolution of this issue turns on the point, and 
we assume for argument that the defendant is correct. 
 
 
20 The Commonwealth argues that defense counsel raised only 
general objections to this testimony at trial and thus did not 
preserve the claim, so that the correct standard of review is 
whether the error, if any, created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Because we determine there was no error 
in admitting the contested testimony, we need not resolve the 
standard of review issue. 
 
17 
 
omitted]).  "In qualifying an expert witness, the question for 
judicial decision is whether the witness has sufficient skill, 
knowledge, and experience in the area of his training to aid a 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 406 Mass. 843, 852 (1990). 
 
McKillop testified at trial that she was employed at the 
crime lab from 1986 until her retirement in 2007.  After one 
year working as a criminalist in the toxicology unit, she 
transferred to the criminalistics section where her experience 
entailed going to crime scenes to collect evidence as well as 
working on evidence submitted to the crime lab.  The cases she 
worked on included fatal or nonfatal shootings, beatings, 
stabbings, and sexual assaults, and involved a variety of 
evidence including identification of body fluids, including 
blood, saliva, and semen, as well as collection of trace 
evidence, such as hair, fibers, paint, glass, and gunshot 
residue.  Later in her career McKillop was a supervisor in the 
criminalistics unit for approximately nine years, and supervised 
both the criminalistics and DNA units of the crime lab in the 
two years before she retired.  At the time she testified at 
trial in 2012, McKillop was the forensic manager of the crime 
laboratory of a county sheriff's office in California, where she 
was responsible for overseeing the crime scene response unit, 
the biology or DNA unit, the firearms unit, and the latent print 
unit.  She also has bachelor's degrees in chemistry and 
18 
 
environmental studies from the University of California in Santa 
Barbara. 
 
McKillop's challenged opinion testimony concerning what she 
would expect to see if the victim had pulled up her underwear 
and pants following intercourse and following the deposit of the 
red-brown stains on her body clearly was based on this extensive 
experience.21  The judge did not abuse his discretion in 
admitting this testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 
291, 297-299 (2004) (no abuse of discretion in permitting State 
police chemist employed at crime lab to testify to opinion 
concerning how long sperm may be found following ejaculation, 
based on training and experience);  Frangipane, 433 Mass. at 
533-535 (where social worker witness had extensive training, 
education, and experience interviewing and treating sexually 
abused children, judge had discretion to allow witness to opine 
concerning dissociation and recovered memory and fact that 
                     
 
21 McKillop was asked explicitly whether, "in [her] 
experience," she would expect to see some sort of drainage or 
transference of seminal fluid to the victim's underwear.  
McKillop responded that drainage is "a common occurrence" and 
stated, "in my experience, when examining cases in the 
laboratory, we will see a consistency of having a stain on the 
garment."  Similarly, McKillop was asked, "based on that same 
training and experience," whether the stains on the victim's 
body appeared to be disturbed, and it was evident from the 
context that McKillop's testimony on this topic was based on her 
prior work as a criminalist; the defendant is not correct that 
McKillop did, or was required to, base her opinions on an expert 
level of knowledge of anatomy or physiology. 
 
19 
 
victims of trauma may experience them; witness was not required 
to be medical doctor).  Compare id. at 535-536 (error to permit 
social worker witness to testify about how trauma victim stores, 
retrieves, or dissociates traumatic memory because opinions 
concerned physical functioning of brain; subject matter area was 
proper for medical doctor, not social worker).22 
 
There was no abuse of discretion or other error in the 
trial judge's decision to admit McKillop's testimony.23 
 
3.  Substitute medical examiner.  The medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy on the victim retired approximately twelve 
                     
 
22 In contrast to the substitute medical examiner who 
testified in this case regarding the anatomy of the rectum and 
the sphincter muscle, McKillop did not testify to the physical 
functioning of the body; her testimony was limited to opinions 
based on her prior observations and experience as a criminalist.  
To the extent that, as the defendant claims, the opinions of the 
substitute medical examiner and McKillop contradicted each 
other, such contradiction goes to the weight of the testimony, 
not its admissibility.  See Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 
299 (2004). 
 
 
23 It bears noting that in addition to McKillop, Beth 
Saucier Goodspeed, a chemist employed at the State police crime 
laboratory, testified at trial that if the victim had pulled up 
her pants following the deposit of semen or sperm in her, 
Goodspeed would have expected some drainage onto the victim's 
underwear.  It is also the case that the topic of semen draining 
out onto underwear has been addressed by State police 
criminalists in other cases.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 
470 Mass. 320, 323 (2014) (State police criminologist testified 
"if somebody is up walking around, . . . semen would be draining 
out of her and would be on the underwear if she were wearing 
it," and pattern of stains found on victim's skirt was 
"consistent with drainage if a person were laying [sic] 
horizontal[ly]"). 
 
20 
 
years before the defendant's trial took place.  A substitute 
medical examiner, Dr. Henry Nields, testified at trial regarding 
certain findings in the autopsy report:  that the victim's teeth 
were broken off; that there was blood in the victim's mouth; and 
that there were injuries to the victim's eyelids, nose, neck, 
shoulder, clavicular region, arm, and thigh.  He also testified 
to his opinion as to the cause of the victim's death.  The 
defendant did not object to any of Nields's testimony.  In 
addition, the autopsy report and photographs from the autopsy 
were introduced in evidence without objection.  The defendant 
now argues that admission of the autopsy report and the 
substitute medical examiner's testimony about the underlying 
findings in the report violated the defendant's constitutional 
right to confrontation.24  Because there was no objection to 
admission of the report or testimony at trial, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Emeny, 463 Mass. 138, 145 (2012). 
 
An autopsy report prepared by a medical examiner who is 
unable to testify constitutes "inadmissible hearsay whose 
admission violate[s] the defendant's right of confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution"; 
                     
 
24 The defendant correctly does not challenge the substitute 
medical examiner's opinion testimony as to the cause of the 
victim's death.  See Commonwealth v. Emeny, 463 Mass. 138, 145 
(2012). 
 
21 
 
and a substitute medical examiner is not permitted to testify 
about the underlying facts and findings of the report on direct 
examination.  Id. at 145, quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 
Mass. 590, 594 n.6 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 
470, 479 (2012).  Thus, neither the report nor Nields's 
testimony about the findings in the report should have been 
admitted. 
 
The defendant argues that the admission of this evidence 
created a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice 
because the Commonwealth relied on the evidence about the 
victim's injuries to prove that the defendant inflicted them and 
then bled on the victim.  The defendant claims this was critical 
evidence because there was no other evidence connecting the 
defendant to the injuries, and the over-all evidence of guilt 
was not so overwhelming as to nullify its effect.  We disagree 
for three reasons. 
 
First, the defendant used the evidence relating to the 
autopsy findings and Nields's testimony in particular to help 
build his defense.  Specifically, on cross-examination, the 
defendant elicited testimony from Nields about his observations 
that there were no visible injuries to the victim's genitals or 
anus.  The defendant then used this testimony to support his 
claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove the 
intercourse between the victim and defendant was consensual, and 
22 
 
defense counsel reiterated the point in his closing argument.  
See Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 482 (2010) ("There 
can be no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
where the defendant fails to object to the admission of 
testimonial hearsay and then relies on that erroneously admitted 
hearsay to challenge the prosecution's theory of the case").  
See also Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 395-396 (2008) 
(no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where 
autopsy findings were admitted without objection and defense 
expert "made use of and referenced those findings in his 
testimony"). 
 
Second, Nields's testimony about the findings in the 
autopsy report is cumulative of the injuries depicted in the 
properly admitted autopsy photographs,25 and of Nields's 
testimony regarding his review of these photographs.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 265-266, cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 813 (2011) (no error in admission of testimony based 
on autopsy photographs that constituted independently admissible 
evidence); McCowen, 458 Mass. at 481 n.17 ("Dr. Nields, using 
the photographs admitted in evidence, properly testified to the 
location and nature of the victim's injuries"). 
 
Third, the autopsy report and Nields's testimony about the 
                     
 
25 The photographs were admitted through a State police 
trooper who attended the autopsy. 
 
23 
 
victim's injuries did not relate to an issue contested at trial.  
The defendant challenged his identification as the perpetrator 
of the injuries, but did not dispute the nature of the injuries 
the victim suffered.  Rogers, supra at 266 (testimony by 
substitute medical examiner about length and depth of stab wound 
was not relevant to any contested issue when defense was lack of 
identification of defendant as stabber).26 
 
In sum, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice arose from the erroneous admission of the autopsy report 
and Nields's autopsy-related testimony.  The defendant's 
argument fails. 
 
4.  Evidence that the defendant patronized the Brau-Hoff 
bar.  Jessie Spencer testified at trial that she was "pretty 
certain" the defendant at some (undefined) point had been a 
patron of the bar, based on her examination of a photograph of 
the defendant the police had shown her in 2008.  The defendant 
argues that the testimony was irrelevant because Spencer was 
only "pretty certain" the defendant had been a customer at the 
bar, and there was no testimony about when.  The defendant 
                     
 
26 Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, the fact that the 
victim suffered certain injuries did not indicate that the 
defendant had inflicted them.  In terms of identifying the 
defendant as the person who caused the victim's injuries, the 
DNA evidence was the relevant evidence.  The autopsy report and 
Nields's testimony about the autopsy findings did not relate to 
DNA evidence. 
 
24 
 
alleges that the erroneous admission of this evidence resulted 
in the unwarranted inference by the jury that both the victim 
and defendant were present at the bar on the night of the 
homicide.  There was no error. 
 
"Evidence is relevant if it has a rational tendency to 
prove a material issue."  Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 
422, 436 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 
807 (1990).  To be relevant, "[e]vidence need not establish 
directly the proposition sought; it must only provide a link in 
the chain of proof."  Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 351 
(1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Tobin, 392 Mass. 604, 613 
(1984).  The trial judge has "substantial discretion in deciding 
whether evidence is relevant, and whether the prejudicial 
implications of such evidence outweigh its probative value."  
Commonwealth v. Pina, 430 Mass. 66, 78 (1999), quoting Tobin, 
supra.  A judge's determination will not be overturned unless 
palpable error is found.  Bresilla, supra. 
 
The testimony by Spencer that she was "pretty certain" the 
defendant had been a patron at the bar was relevant and properly 
admitted.  Although the information does not establish that the 
defendant was at the bar on the night the victim was murdered, 
it has a rational tendency to prove a link, however slight, 
between the defendant and victim, and makes the fact that the 
defendant encountered the victim on the night of her murder more 
25 
 
probable than it would be without the evidence.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 401 (2014).  The absence of any time frame for when the 
defendant was a patron of the bar certainly decreases the 
probative value of the testimony, but the defendant has failed 
to show that the evidence was "unduly" prejudicial, or more 
prejudicial than probative.  See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 
Mass. 135, 144 (2004).27 
 
5.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper in a number 
of respects:  the prosecutor unfairly disparaged the defendant's 
constitutional right to present a third-party culprit defense, 
misstated the law, engaged in improper vouching of evidence, and 
misstated the evidence.  The combined effect of the 
improprieties, he argues, requires reversal and a new trial. 
 
There is no question that the prosecutor's argument was 
flawed.  Before reaching the principal focus of his attack, the 
defendant's third-party culprit theory, the prosecutor told the 
jury: 
                     
 
27 The defendant also argues that introduction of his 
photograph in evidence following Jessie Spencer's testimony 
about it was prejudicial; he claims the photograph was similar 
to a mugshot, and conveyed to the jury that the defendant had a 
criminal history.  The defendant's trial counsel specifically 
disagreed with this assessment in declining the judge's offer to 
provide a limiting instruction.  An examination of the 
photograph, which is in the record, persuades us that the 
defendant's argument on this point is without merit.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 594 (2005). 
 
26 
 
"I'm privileged, and moreover proud to represent the 
citizens of the Commonwealth -- that's who I represent.  
This is not a case about the prosecutor against [the 
defendant].  This is a case about the citizens and [the 
defendant].  Sometimes, that's easy to forget; but you 
should know that the citizens of the Commonwealth, while 
defendants are cloaked in certain fundamental 
constitutional rights, and that's something we all embrace, 
the citizens of the Commonwealth are equally entitled to a 
fair trial.  I ask you to hold onto that fundamental 
principle as you listen, and deliberate later on." 
 
This argument is problematic in two respects.  First, the 
jurors, by definition, were themselves all "citizens of the 
Commonwealth," and the prosecutor's characterization of his role 
as representing the "citizens" ran the risk of suggesting that 
the prosecutor was representing the jurors-as-citizens against 
the defendant, and in that way misrepresenting or at least 
confusing the jurors' actual role as neutral fact finders 
charged with weighing all the evidence and determining whether 
the Commonwealth had proved the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Second and more fundamentally, the 
"Commonwealth" in a criminal case is not a shorthand way of 
referring to individual citizens, and is not just the name of 
the party on the other side of the "versus" from the defendant; 
the "Commonwealth" plays a different role, and so does its 
attorney.  Although the Commonwealth is entitled to a fair 
trial, and although the prosecutor has the responsibility to 
argue the Commonwealth's case forcefully, "[n]evertheless, the 
fact remains that the prosecuting attorney 'is the 
27 
 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of 
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'"  
Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 472 (1978), quoting 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  The 
prosecutor's characterization of his role in this case as 
representing "the citizens" of the Commonwealth against the 
defendant, and the prosecutor's emphasis on the rights of "the 
citizens," was at best inappropriate, and far better left 
unsaid. 
The majority of the prosecutor's argument was devoted to 
attacking the defendant's third-party culprit defense.  In his 
closing, particularly near its beginning, the prosecutor 
repeatedly sounded the theme that the defense was seeking to 
mislead, confuse, and "prejudice" the jury with the presentation 
of this defense by presenting information that "lack[ed] 
materiality and relevance" -- information that should not even 
be called "evidence" because it was so lacking in these 
qualities.28 
                     
 
28 For example, immediately after asking the jury to "hold 
onto" two fundamental "legal principles" -- namely, that the 
"citizens of the Commonwealth are equally entitled to a fair 
trial" and that "the Commonwealth does not have the burden of 
28 
 
                                                                  
proving that someone else did not commit the crime," the 
prosecutor argued: 
 
 
"It's important . . . [to keep these two principles in 
mind] because you've been exposed to information.  I will 
not honor it by calling it 'evidence,' because evidence is 
presumed to have relevance and materiality.  You've been 
exposed to information that has been advanced in an effort 
to do what real evidence is never supposed to do.  It's not 
supposed to invite speculation.  It's not supposed to 
divert your attention from the defendant who is on trial.  
It's not supposed to prejudice and confuse the fact finder 
-- that's you, the jury.  And yet, I say with a high level 
of confidence, on behalf of the citizens, that that is 
exactly what the effort has been here. 
 
 
"It's been regrettable that the Commonwealth must 
respond to information that lacks materiality and 
relevance; but given the course of this trial, the 
Commonwealth is compelled to do so. . . .  [W]hy do I say 
that this theory that's been advanced, this information 
that's been advanced, lacks materiality and relevance?  
It's because based on what you've heard . . . there is no 
link -- no link, no discernible link -- between James 
Webber and the murder of [the victim], or between Everett 
Carlson and the murder of [the victim].  Nothing you've 
heard or seen in this court room suggests that at all.  In 
that sense, the Commonwealth asks you to think of James 
Webber and Everett Carlson as a couple of bowls of 
spaghetti that have been hurled against the wall in the 
desperate hope that some of it sticks. 
 
 
". . . 
 
"What about the information you've heard about [Webber and 
Carlson] is not speculative, meant to divert your 
attention, and meant to confuse you? 
 
". . . 
 
"How can you not conclude . . . that this information is 
simply an invitation to you to speculate, to engage in rank 
speculation, or meant to divert your attention or to 
confuse you? 
 
". . . 
29 
 
 
"The opportunity to present third-party culprit evidence is 
of constitutional dimension, . . . because it is rooted in the 
right of criminal defendants to a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Scott, 470 Mass. at 327.  Pursuant to the trial judge's rulings, 
the defendant here was fully entitled to present evidence and 
argue his third-party culprit defense centered on James Webber 
and Everett Carlson.  Although the prosecutor was permitted to 
comment on the defense strategy and tactics, and was not beyond 
bounds in arguing that the strategy was intended to confuse, 
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 697 (2004), 
what may be permissible if stated once may become less so 
through constant repetition.  Although the prosecutor did not 
describe the third-party defense as a "sham," see Commonwealth 
v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013), and although he did not say 
that the defendant or his counsel were "intentionally 
misleading" the jury, see Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 436 Mass. 
671, 674 (2002), his repeated characterization of the defense 
evidence as irrelevant and immaterial "information," unworthy of 
                                                                  
 
"Do you get the impression . . . based on all of that 
inconsistent evidence, do you get the impression of what I 
suggested to you in the beginning -- the attempt to confuse 
you, and to confuse the issue?  This is stuff that should 
never have been heard by the jury.  It's irrelevant, and 
it's immaterial." 
 
30 
 
even being called "evidence"; his complaint that it was 
"unfortunate" the Commonwealth even had to respond to it; and 
his several rhetorical questions asking about the misleading and 
speculative nature of the third-party culprit defense (see note 
28, supra) came close.  These comments and questions both 
misstated the law -- the judge had specifically allowed the 
third-party evidence to be introduced as "evidence" -- and 
verged on suggesting that the entire third-party culprit defense 
was improper and should not have been presented.29 
 
"In determining whether an error in closing argument 
requires reversal, we consider whether defense counsel made a 
timely objection; whether the judge's instructions mitigated the 
error; whether the error was central to the issues at trial or 
concerned only collateral matters; whether the jury would be 
able to sort out any excessive claims or hyperbole; and whether 
the Commonwealth's case was so strong that the error would cause 
no prejudice."  Scott, 470 Mass. at 335, quoting Commonwealth v.  
                     
 
29 The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence (2015) contains a 
section setting out in comprehensive fashion the principles 
governing proper and improper opening statements and closing 
arguments, and provides citations to relevant decisions of this 
court and the Appeals Court on these subjects.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 1113 (2015).  Particularly in light of the availability 
of this resource, going forward, there should be even less 
excuse than at present for prosecutors as well as defense 
counsel to stray beyond the bounds of proper argument. 
 
31 
 
Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 732 (2005).30  Here, the first three 
factors weigh in the defendant's favor in whole or in part.  On 
the first, the defense counsel objected both during and after 
the Commonwealth's closing.31  As for the second factor, 
mitigation of the prosecutorial error by the judge's 
instruction, the judge overruled the defense counsel's objection 
                     
 
30 See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013): 
 
 
"When determining whether error in a prosecutor's 
closing argument requires reversal, we consider (1) whether 
the defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error 
was limited to collateral issues or went to the heart of 
the case; (3) what specific or general instructions the 
judge gave to the jury which may have mitigated the 
mistake; and (4) whether the error, in the circumstances, 
possibly made a difference in the jury's conclusion. . . .  
With respect to the fourth factor, we consider whether the 
jury, to whom we ascribe a certain level of sophistication, 
would be able to sort out a prosecutor's excessive claims; 
and we look to see if the Commonwealth's case was 
overwhelming" (citations and quotations omitted). 
 
 
31 The defendant's first objection followed the prosecutor's 
suggestion, quoted in note 28, supra, to the effect that the 
defense was seeking to confuse the jury with the third-party 
culprit evidence and that such evidence should not have been 
heard by the jury. 
 
 
The second objection by the defense, lodged at the end of 
the prosecutor's closing, was two-fold.  The defendant's trial 
counsel objected to the prosecutor's remarks suggesting the 
defense had "compromised" the Commonwealth's right to a fair 
trial by raising a third-party culprit defense.  Counsel also 
objected to the prosecutor's statements suggesting that the 
defense had presented evidence that the jury should not have 
heard.  He asked for curative instructions with respect to both 
sets of remarks by the prosecutor, a request the judge granted 
in part.  We discuss the judge's curative instruction in the 
text, infra. 
 
32 
 
during the closing but, thereafter, the judge did give one 
limiting instruction after the prosecutor completed his closing, 
in partial response to the defendant's objections.32  The 
instruction did help mitigate the prosecutor's improper 
misstatements belittling and mischaracterizing the evidence 
relied on by the defendant for his defense -- although it would 
have been appropriate, as the defendant had requested, to 
explain more directly the prosecutor's overreaching, and in 
particular to have addressed specifically the prosecutor's 
repeated assertions that the third-party culprit evidence was 
"irrelevant" and "immaterial."33  Finally, on the third factor, 
                     
 
32 The judge told the jury: 
 
"It was suggested to you that certain testimony given 
in this court should only be considered by you as 
'information,' and not as evidence in this trial.  I've 
told you before, and I'm going to instruct you [hereafter], 
that sworn testimony given in this case is evidence, and 
you shall consider as evidence. 
 
 
"You were also told that there was evidence that you 
never should have heard in this case, that you as the jury 
should not have heard in this case, and that it was 
irrelevant evidence.  I've told you before that I rule on 
the admissibility of evidence, and anything that you heard 
in this case, I have ruled on -- in consultation with 
counsel, many times.  I have ruled that the evidence that 
you heard is admissible; and that's the end of that story.  
You shall consider it as evidence." 
 
 
33 The judge declined to act on defense counsel's other 
request, that the judge explain to the jury that the defendant 
was entitled to raise a defense concerning the possibility of 
third-party culprits and his doing so could not be taken as 
interfering with the Commonwealth's right to a fair trial.  A 
33 
 
the argument errors of the prosecutor related in whole or in 
part to the third-party culprit defense, which was the heart of 
the defense. 
 
The final factor we consider concerns the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case:  does the strength eliminate the 
possibility of prejudice arising from the prosecutor's argument? 
The evidence leads us to conclude that the Commonwealth's 
evidence did so.  The DNA evidence unquestionably pointed to the 
defendant, and not Webber or Carlson (or anyone else), as the 
person responsible for the victim's death.  That is, there was 
no DNA evidence tying Webber to the victim, essentially none 
tying Carlson,34 extremely little linking an unidentified 
person,35 and the defendant was the sole source of the DNA 
located in the victim's rectum.  As indicated previously, the 
DNA evidence from the rectum by itself indicates only that the 
defendant had intercourse with the victim close to the time of 
                                                                  
curative instruction with this substantive message would have 
been appropriate. 
 
 
34 One of the stains on the victim's underwear could have 
come from half of all males, including Carlson (as well as the 
defendant).  The statistical probability that Carlson was the 
source of the DNA on the stain is so low that it is virtually 
meaningless. 
 
 
35 As explained previously, one of the areas of the victim's 
underwear that was tested led to generation of a partial male 
DNA profile that did not match the defendant, Webber, or 
Carlson.  No further evidence covering the possibility of 
another possible culprit beyond these three was offered. 
 
34 
 
her death, not that he killed her.  However, when this DNA 
evidence is combined with (1) the absence of drainage on the 
victim's underwear, suggesting the victim had not pulled up her 
pants and underwear after intercourse and before she was killed; 
(2) bloodstains -- or what were certainly most likely to be 
bloodstains -- on the victim's hip, knee, and sneaker, all of 
which were consistent with the defendant's DNA, and one of which 
would have matched only one in 1.366 billion randomly selected 
Caucasians;36 and (3) the fact that none of these fragile stains 
was smeared or disturbed in any way -- again suggesting the 
victim had not pulled up her pants and underwear -- the 
conclusion that the defendant killed the victim seems almost 
inescapable.37 
                     
36 The defendant argues that it is a misstatement of the 
evidence to refer to the red-brown stains found on the victim's 
hip, right thigh-left knee area, and sneaker as bloodstains, as 
the prosecutor did in his closing.  We disagree.  All three 
stains found on the victim screened positive for blood, and one 
of them was confirmed as blood by additional testing.  Moreover, 
as summarized here in the text, all three stains were consistent 
with the defendant's DNA, one of them overwhelmingly so.  The 
prosecutor's argument on the point was proper, and the evidence 
strongly supports the verdict. 
 
37 The defendant also contended the prosecutor "improperly 
vouched on the evidence" in his closing.  The defendant points 
to the prosecutor's comment, "I say with a high level of 
confidence, on behalf of the citizens" that the defense was 
seeking to divert the jury with the third-party culprit defense.  
See note 28, supra, where the prosecutor's comment is quoted in 
full.  As discussed in the text, we consider the prosecutor’s 
comment to have been improper, but vouching is not the issue.  
As the defendant points out, improper vouching occurs when the 
35 
 
 
In sum, there is no question the defendant had the right to 
advance a third-party culprit defense, and no question that the 
prosecutor's argument improperly sought to impugn that defense.  
But even considering the entire case through the lens supplied 
by G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we are persuaded that the DNA evidence 
pointing to the defendant as the person who killed the victim 
requires the conclusion that the defendant, in the end, was not 
prejudiced by the prosecutorial errors.38  A new trial is not 
warranted. 
 
6.  Jury instruction on third-party culprit evidence.  The 
defendant also argues that the judge committed reversible error 
by declining to give the defendant's proffered instruction on 
the third-party culprit defense.  There was no error. 
The judge instructed the jury: 
"The Commonwealth does not have the burden of proving 
that no one else may have committed the murder, nor does 
the defendant have to prove that another person committed 
                                                                  
prosecutor personally expresses a belief in the credibility of a 
witness.  See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 786 
(2011). 
 
 
38 It is also the case that most of the prosecutor's 
improper comments were made in the first part of his long 
closing.  (The prosecutor's closing lasted for approximately 
fifty minutes.)  Thereafter, the prosecutor principally focused 
his attention on the specifics of the trial evidence, and 
marshalled the evidence to refute the substance of the third-
party culprit defense.  This was an eminently permissible and 
appropriate approach and, given the length of the closing, may 
have blunted the impact of the earlier improper comments.  It is 
important to consider the prosecutor's argument as a whole.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 565 (2002). 
36 
 
the offense charged.  The Commonwealth does have the burden 
to prove the defendant's guilt by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
 
To date, this court has not held that where third-party 
culprit evidence is admitted, a judge is required to give an 
instruction on it, as long as the judge explains that "the 
Commonwealth's burden includes the obligation to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."  
Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 412 (2014).  The judge's 
instructions did this, and the quoted instruction at least 
specifically mentioned the type of evidence at issue.  Although 
giving the defendant's proposed instruction on third-party 
culprit evidence39 would have been appropriate -- especially in 
                     
39 The instruction requested by the defense stated in 
relevant part: 
 
 
"Although the defendant is under no obligation to 
prove his innocence, the defendant has raised the defense 
of other persons who you could find had motive, 
opportunity, or reason to have killed [the victim].  
Although such persons are not on trial, the defendant has 
brought forward some evidence which might indicate that a 
third party, not the defendant, committed the crime for 
which the defendant is charged.  The defendant must show 
some evidence which, if believed, tends to directly connect 
a third party to the crime.  The defendant offers the 
third-party culprit testimony not to prove the guilt of the 
third party, but for your consideration as to the guilt of 
the accused.  You must consider if this evidence raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.  Keep in 
mind, however, that the defendant is not required to prove 
another person committed the crime.  On the other hand, the 
Commonwealth does not have the burden of proving that no 
one else may have committed the offenses.  In the end, the 
burden remains with the Commonwealth to prove the 
37 
 
light of the prosecutor's closing argument -- the judge was not 
required to do so. 
7.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
evidence and the trial record thoroughly and carefully pursuant 
to our obligation under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude that 
the defendant's conviction of aggravated rape must be reversed, 
but find no basis for any additional relief. 
8.  Conclusion.  With respect to the charge of aggravated 
rape, the defendant's conviction is reversed, the jury's finding 
of guilt is set aside, and judgment shall enter for the 
defendant.  The defendant's conviction of murder in the first 
degree is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                  
defendant's guilt of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt."