Title: Oregon v. Davis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S058641
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 2011

Filed:  September 22, 2011. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Petitioner on Review, 
v. 
 
TERRY DEAN DAVIS, 
Respondent on Review. 
 
(CC 02C45953, CA A134216, SC S058641) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted March 7, 2011. 
 
 
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for 
petitioner on review.  Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the briefs.  With 
him on the briefs were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, 
Solicitor General. 
 
 
George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. 
 
 
WALTERS, J. 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part.  The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
 
 
 
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Susan M. Tripp, Judge. 235 Or App 
327, 230 P3d 987 (2010). 
1 
 
 
WALTERS, J. 
1 
 
 
In this criminal case, the state argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
2 
reversing one of the trial court's rulings excluding certain evidence.  Defendant, in 
3 
response, challenges two of the trial court's other evidentiary rulings excluding evidence, 
4 
which the Court of Appeals had affirmed.1  Defendant was charged with murder and 
5 
manslaughter based on allegations that he shook the victim, his 15-month-old daughter, 
6 
and inflicted fatal abdominal and brain injuries on the night that she died.  Defendant 
7 
contended that the victim's autopsy revealed that the victim had been injured at least 
8 
several days before the night of her death and that nothing that he intentionally did to the 
9 
victim on that evening caused the catastrophic brain hemorrhage that killed her.  As 
10 
relevant to this case, defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the victim had been 
11 
subjected to physical abuse throughout her short life; that a friend of the victim's mother 
12 
saw the victim four days before her death and concluded that the victim looked like the 
13 
friend's own daughter, who had suffered a brain injury as a baby; and that that friend 
14 
relayed that conclusion to the victim's mother.  In each instance, the trial court excluded 
15 
the evidence.  Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of 
16 
manslaughter. 
17 
 
 
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals and that court 
18 
                                              
 
1 
Under ORAP 9.10(1), a party filing a response to a petition for review may 
include a contingent request for review of any question properly before the Court of 
Appeals.    
2 
reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding 
1 
testimony that, four days before the child's death, a friend told the victim's mother that the 
2 
victim resembled the friend's child, who had suffered a brain injury.  State v. Davis, 235 
3 
Or App 327, 230 P3d 987 (2010).  However, the Court of Appeals affirmed without 
4 
discussion the trial court's rulings as to the evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse 
5 
and the statement of the mother's friend that, four days before she died, the victim 
6 
resembled the friend's own child, who had suffered a brain injury.  Id.  We granted the 
7 
state's petition for review and, for the reasons that follow, now affirm in part and reverse 
8 
in part the decision of the Court of Appeals,  
9 
 
 
Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed.  Defendant's 
10 
daughter, the victim in this case, was 15 months old when she died on June 30, 2002.  
11 
The victim lived with her mother, Ecklund, and several of Ecklund's other children.  
12 
Ecklund and defendant were not married and lived apart.  The victim stayed with 
13 
defendant overnight at his home from time to time.   
14 
 
 
The Court of Appeals described the events of the days preceding the child's 
15 
death as follows: 
16 
 
"Ecklund, the victim, and Ecklund's other children vacationed in 
17 
Mexico and California in the middle of June 2002.  During the trip, the 
18 
victim fell off a motel bed.  Ecklund told police later that she 'couldn't get 
19 
there fast enough' and that the victim hit the 'top of her head' in the fall.  
20 
Ecklund testified, however, that the victim exhibited no signs of distress 
21 
after the fall. 
22 
 
"Shortly after the family's return to Oregon, on June 24, the victim 
23 
had an overnight visit with defendant.  She returned to Ecklund's care the 
24 
following day.  On June 25, Ecklund noticed that the victim was not feeling 
25 
well; she was vomiting and her eyes were 'glassy.'  Ecklund asked her 
26 
3 
friend Payne, a registered nurse, to stop by and examine the victim.[2]  
1 
Payne did so and noticed that the victim was unresponsive.  The trial court 
2 
excluded as hearsay Payne's testimony that she had told Ecklund that the 
3 
victim's condition looked just like that of Payne's daughter when she had 
4 
suffered a traumatic brain injury years before.  Payne tested the victim for 
5 
dehydration by pinching the victim's skin and noticed that the victim's eyes 
6 
were glassy and somewhat 'rolled up' in her head; Payne recommended that 
7 
Ecklund have the victim examined by a doctor.  During her testimony at 
8 
trial, Ecklund did not recall Payne's visit or recommendation. 
9 
 
"Ecklund took the victim to Santiam Hospital a few hours after 
10 
Payne's examination.  There, the victim was evaluated, treated for 
11 
dehydration and a viral infection, and given intravenous fluids.  Her 
12 
symptoms resolved, and the victim returned home the next morning. 
13 
 
"Defendant testified that, on June 29, around 7:00 p.m., he picked up 
14 
the victim for an overnight visit.  The victim was fussing and crying when 
15 
defendant arrived, but showed no other signs of illness or injury.  Once they 
16 
arrived at defendant's home, defendant gave the victim a bath and changed 
17 
her diaper.  He then began doing some household chores while the victim, 
18 
another child of defendant, and defendant's small dog played together in the 
19 
garage.  When defendant returned to the garage, he found the victim lying 
20 
on her side on the floor.  Defendant testified that the other child told him 
21 
that the small dog had knocked over the victim.  Defendant picked up the 
22 
victim, but decided that she seemed unhurt. 
23 
 
"Later that evening, defendant ordered a pizza, which was delivered 
24 
after 10:00 p.m.  The victim was uninterested in the pizza, but ate a few 
25 
pieces of pineapple.  The victim spat up or vomited, and defendant testified 
26 
that he noticed that the victim had a blank affect and had become limp.  He 
27 
called Ecklund at 10:58 p.m. to tell her that something was wrong with the 
28 
victim and asked Ecklund to come to his house to help.  A few minutes 
29 
later, when Ecklund arrived, she found the victim limp and unresponsive 
30 
and told defendant to call 9-1-1.  Defendant made the call and told the 
31 
dispatcher that the victim had recently eaten pineapple and spat up and that 
32 
he was concerned about a possible allergic reaction. 
33 
 
"Paramedics arrived at defendant's home around 11:00 p.m.  They 
34 
                                              
 
2 
Ecklund testified that she did not recall calling Payne, Payne coming over 
to her home to look at the victim, or anything Payne may have said to her that day. 
4 
found the victim lying on the floor with defendant, Ecklund, and 
1 
defendant's other child nearby.  Defendant told the paramedics that the 
2 
victim had not suffered any trauma, but had been sitting on the couch and 
3 
went suddenly limp.  The paramedics found the victim unresponsive but 
4 
breathing, with a body temperature of 92.7 degrees.  The paramedics also 
5 
noticed a small bruise on her forehead and some bruising on her abdomen.  
6 
The paramedics testified that Ecklund did not tell them about the victim's 
7 
visit to Santiam Hospital several days previously.  The paramedics decided 
8 
to transport the victim to Salem Hospital after determining that she rated 
9 
extremely low on a scale measuring brain functioning." 
10 
Davis, 235 Or App at 330-31. 
11 
 
 
Defendant and Ecklund followed the ambulance in a car to Salem Hospital.  
12 
At Salem Hospital, doctors questioned Ecklund and defendant.  Defendant told the 
13 
emergency room physician that the child had not suffered any trauma or injury that 
14 
evening, and had not experienced any vomiting or other illness.  Ecklund did not mention 
15 
her discussion with Payne, the victim's visit to the hospital four days earlier, or the 
16 
victim's treatment for dehydration.  Testing revealed that the victim had a subdural 
17 
hematoma3 and needed surgery to relieve the resulting pressure on the brain.  Because 
18 
Salem Hospital does not have pediatric neurosurgeons on staff, the treating physicians 
19 
decided to transport the victim to Oregon Health Sciences University Hospital (OHSU) in 
20 
Portland.  At OHSU, doctors performed surgery to relieve the pressure on the victim's 
21 
brain.  Subsequent testing showed that the victim's brain was no longer functioning, and 
22 
she was taken off life support on June 30, 2002. 
23 
                                              
 
3  
A subdural hematoma is bleeding under the dura, the membrane that 
encases the brain. 
5 
 
 
A medical examiner performed an autopsy the next day.  The autopsy 
1 
revealed, among other things, that the victim had about a quart and a half of blood in her 
2 
abdomen, which was due to tear in the mesentery, the lining of the abdominal cavity that 
3 
connects to parts of the small intestine.  In addition, the victim's brain was swollen, the 
4 
subdural hematoma on the right side of the victim's head had been removed by the 
5 
surgeons who had tried to save her, and the victim had retinal hemorrhaging and bleeding 
6 
at the base of the optic nerve.  The medical examiner later testified that the retinal 
7 
hemorrhage and brain injury were caused by acceleration and deceleration of the victim's 
8 
head, which would have been caused either by violent shaking, a violent shake followed 
9 
by a slam, or a single slam.  The medical examiner also stated that the injuries were 
10 
"acute" and had to have occurred within 24 to 36 hours of the victim's death; according to 
11 
him, the microscopic evidence was not consistent with an older abdominal injury.  
12 
Finally, he concluded that the cause of the victim's death was homicide. 
13 
 
 
In addition to those findings related to the cause of death, the autopsy and a 
14 
radiology test revealed that the victim had suffered other injuries in the weeks and 
15 
months before her death.  Among other things, the victim had healing fractures to three 
16 
ribs and a healing fracture on the femur, as well as possible old fractures on her tibia and 
17 
fibula.   
18 
 
 
Defendant was initially charged in 2002 with various crimes arising out of 
19 
the victim's death, including murder by abuse and manslaughter.  To support the murder-
20 
by-abuse charge, the state relied on, among other things, the healing leg and rib fractures 
21 
and an expert's opinion that the victim had suffered child abuse.  The case went to trial in 
22 
6 
2003.  At that trial, the victim's entire medical history was admitted into evidence.  The 
1 
jury found defendant guilty of manslaughter but could not reach a decision on the 
2 
remaining charges, including murder by abuse.  After that trial ended, the trial court 
3 
declared a mistrial due to juror misconduct in that case.  Defendant was reindicted in 
4 
2005; the state dropped the murder by abuse charge.  Instead, at the criminal trial at issue 
5 
here, the state's theory of the case was that the victim died on June 30, 2002, due to head 
6 
and abdominal injuries that defendant intentionally inflicted on the victim on a particular 
7 
date -- on or between June 29 and 30, 2002. 
8 
 
 
At a pretrial hearing about a year before the second trial, the trial court 
9 
informed the parties that it intended to try a narrow case, given the new charges, and 
10 
stated that defendant had agreed that, at that point, he did not intend to offer evidence of 
11 
the victim's prior physical abuse unless he could establish that that physical abuse was 
12 
directly related to the cause of the victim's death.  However, at a pre-trial hearing closer 
13 
to the trial date, defendant told the trial court that he intended to argue that evidence of 
14 
the victim's prior physical abuse was relevant for a different purpose.  Defendant reported 
15 
that his experts had reached the conclusion that the fatal abdominal and brain injuries had 
16 
been inflicted not on June 29 or 30 but at least several days before the victim's death, and 
17 
that the victim died on June 30 as a result of a rebleed of the earlier injuries.  Defendant 
18 
told the trial court that, in reaching that conclusion, the experts had reviewed and relied 
19 
on the victim's medical record, including the autopsy and radiologist's reports showing 
20 
healing rib and leg fractures, demonstrating that the victim had been subjected to physical 
21 
abuse throughout her life.  Evidence of that abuse, defendant contended, was admissible 
22 
7 
to explain the basis for the experts' conclusions.   
1 
 
 
The state objected, arguing that the parties had agreed not to delve into the 
2 
details of the victim's prior physical abuse, and that the defense experts could testify 
3 
about their conclusions as to when the injuries that caused the victim's death occurred 
4 
without talking about all the details that they had relied on to reach them.  Further, 
5 
although the state agreed that the victim had been abused, the state argued that, because it 
6 
was not clear when the victim was abused or who had abused her, evidence of the prior 
7 
abuse would be confusing and misleading to the jury and would distract the jury from the 
8 
real issues in the case -- what injury caused the victim's death and when it happened.   
9 
 
 
The trial court excluded the evidence of the prior physical abuse.  The trial 
10 
court first explained that that evidence was not relevant because the defense could not tie 
11 
the prior abuse, including the healing fractures, to the abdominal and brain injuries that 
12 
caused the victim's death.  Further, the court explained, even if evidence of prior physical 
13 
abuse were relevant, it would be inadmissible under OEC 403,4 because the probative 
14 
value of the prior abuse was outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues for the 
15 
jury.  The court also concluded that the evidence of the abuse was inadmissible under 
16 
                                              
 
4  
OEC 403 provides: 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
8 
OEC 404(3),5 because there was no indication of who had inflicted the prior injuries or 
1 
whether the prior injuries were the result of an improper act.  And, even if there were, the 
2 
court stated, the evidence would not be admissible to show that the person who inflicted 
3 
the injuries that led to the victim's death acted in conformity with his or her prior conduct, 
4 
and there was no suggestion that defendant was offering the evidence for any of the 
5 
permissible reasons under OEC 404(3):  to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
6 
plan, knowledge, identity, or lack of mistake or accident.  Finally, the court ruled that 
7 
none of the evidence of prior injuries was admissible to support the opinions of either the 
8 
state's or defendant's experts, unless the experts could tie a particular past injury to the 
9 
cause of the victim's death: 
10 
"They are not going to say that this was a battered child, and that's not 
11 
going to come up in their diagnosis, they're not going to talk about that in 
12 
their testimony, they're not going to talk about other injuries unless they can 
13 
tie them to the death."6 
14 
 
 
During the trial, various state witnesses testified that the victim appeared 
15 
                                              
 
5 
OEC 404(3) provides:  
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident."  
 
6  
The court also ruled that evidence of any particular hospital visit or medial 
contact may be admissible to the extent that the defense could "tie it to your rebleed 
theory or * * * to your abdominal injury theory."  At trial, defendant did not attempt to 
show that the victim died as a direct result of any of the particular injuries evidenced in 
the victim's medical records. 
9 
normal during the day before defendant picked her up from her mother's home -- that she 
1 
ate and drank normally, and that she did not seem to be in any pain.  The state presented 
2 
the testimony of the doctors who treated the victim, the medical examiner, and other 
3 
experts who viewed the victim's records, to the effect that the abdominal and brain 
4 
injuries that the victim suffered were not accidental and that it would have taken severe 
5 
blunt force trauma to inflict them.7  Those witnesses also testified that the abdominal 
6 
injury would have been quite painful, the victim would not have been able to eat 
7 
afterward, and that the head injury would have produced immediate and obvious 
8 
symptoms -- the victim would have lost coordination and she would not have been able to 
9 
eat or swallow.  Those facts led the medical examiner to conclude that the abdominal 
10 
injury occurred after the victim ate pieces of pineapple on the pizza that was delivered 
11 
after 10:00 pm on June 29 and that the head injury occurred at some time thereafter.8 
12 
 
 
As noted, defendant's theory of the case was that the victim's injuries were 
13 
intentionally inflicted, but that the injuries occurred at least several days before the 
14 
evening of her death.  Defendant's experts testified that the abdominal injury showed 
15 
microscopic signs of healing that would not have been evident unless the injury were at 
16 
                                              
 
7  
The medical examiner testified that it was possible that the abdominal 
injury occurred accidentally, from, for example, falling off a bed or couch onto a 
protruding toy.  
 
8  
The radiologist at Salem Hospital agreed that there had been a recent brain 
injury, but he also testified that there might have been an additional, existing subdural 
hematoma, which could have been up to three weeks old. 
10 
least several days old.  Moreover, those experts testified that CT scans and x-rays showed 
1 
evidence of an older trauma to the dura around the brain and that photos taken at the 
2 
autopsy revealed that clotting had begun to occur there.  In that regard, one expert 
3 
testified that the brain injury was at least five days old.  Defense witnesses opined that the 
4 
abdominal injury worsened over time, with the mesentery rupturing and the bleeding 
5 
consequently accelerating, causing coagulopathy, or an inability of the body to clot 
6 
properly.  That, in turn, caused the existing subdural hematoma to rebleed, leading, 
7 
ultimately, to the victim's death. 
8 
 
 
Defendant's experts testified that the child could have appeared normal after 
9 
suffering the earlier abdominal injury and the brain injury, including eating, drinking, and 
10 
eliminating normally.  In addition, witnesses stated that the abdominal injury might not 
11 
have caused constant pain, after the initial blow, because the mesentery tear was in the 
12 
back of the abdomen, and, if the mesentery had ruptured on the night of the victim's 
13 
death, the victim would have experienced unquenchable thirst, which would have driven 
14 
her to eat the pineapple from the pizza.  Finally, one of defendant's witnesses testified 
15 
that the early symptoms of a deteriorating abdominal trauma were exactly the same as the 
16 
symptoms with which the victim presented at Santiam Hospital four days earlier, on June 
17 
25, leading that expert to conclude that the victim already had the abdominal injury at 
18 
that time. 
19 
 
 
Defendant also attempted to offer testimony by Ecklund's friend, Payne, 
20 
that, on June 25, Payne thought that the victim looked like her own daughter, who had 
21 
suffered a brain injury when she was a child, when she had pressure on the brain or was 
22 
11 
dehydrated, and that Payne had relayed that belief to Ecklund.  Defendant made an offer 
1 
of proof that Payne would have testified that she had known Ecklund for about 10 years 
2 
and that, on June 25, Ecklund called her over to her house to look at the victim, who was 
3 
not well.  In the offer of proof, Payne testified that, on that afternoon, the victim was 
4 
lying on a cushion on the floor, lethargic.  She described the victim as looking off to one 
5 
side, her eyes rolled back to the right and bulging and her pupils enlarged.  Payne 
6 
testified that she thought that the victim resembled her own daughter when she was the 
7 
victim's age, when her daughter was suffering from swelling in the brain or was 
8 
dehydrated.  Payne explained that her daughter, at three months of age, had suffered a 
9 
traumatic brain injury as a result of a car accident and had been hospitalized many times 
10 
and had undergone many brain surgeries.  Payne acknowledged that she could not tell 
11 
whether her daughter was suffering from brain swelling or dehydration when her child's 
12 
eyes were bulging, rolled back, and non-reactive, but she recognized that those symptoms 
13 
were triggered by one of the two conditions.  In addition, Payne testified that she told 
14 
Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her daughter when she was that age, and she 
15 
recommended that Ecklund take the victim to the hospital to be examined.  Finally, Payne 
16 
testified that Ecklund knew that her daughter had been in a car accident as an infant and 
17 
had suffered a serious brain injury.   
18 
 
 
The trial court ruled that Payne could testify that she came to Ecklund's 
19 
house as a family friend at around 4:00 in the afternoon, could describe how the victim 
20 
looked when Payne saw her that afternoon, and could testify that she told Ecklund that 
21 
she thought that the victim might be dehydrated.  However, the court excluded the 
22 
12 
remainder of Payne's proffered testimony.  In particular, the court ruled that Payne's 
1 
statements to Ecklund that the victim reminded her or her daughter were hearsay, and, to 
2 
the extent that that testimony might have been admissible nonetheless to show its effect 
3 
on the listener, the court found that it was unclear what Ecklund might have understood 
4 
Payne to mean.  In addition, the court ruled that any testimony regarding Payne's 
5 
daughter was irrelevant.  Finally, it rejected defendant's argument that Payne's statement 
6 
that the victim looked like her daughter when her daughter's brain was swelling was 
7 
admissible as lay opinion testimony under OEC 701, which permits opinion testimony by 
8 
lay witnesses if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and is helpful to the 
9 
determination of a fact in issue.9  In that regard, the court ruled,  
10 
"I think that there is far too much possibility for the fact that it really was 
11 
speculation or conjecture or -- and she was not certain.  And, for that 
12 
reason, I am not going to allow it in."   
13 
 
 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rejected without discussion defendant's 
14 
challenges to the trial court's rulings respecting the victim's prior injuries and hospital 
15 
                                              
 
9 
OEC 701 provides:   
 
"If the witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness 
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or 
inferences which are: 
 
"(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and 
 
"(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of testimony of the witness or 
the determination of a fact in issue." 
  
13 
visits and Payne's lay opinion that the victim looked like she may have been suffering 
1 
from a brain injury on June 25.  State v. Davis, 235 Or App at 334.  The court, however, 
2 
reversed the trial court's ruling excluding Payne's testimony that she told Ecklund on June 
3 
25 that the victim reminded her of her daughter.  In evaluating that issue, the Court of 
4 
Appeals began by observing that, although the trial court excluded that testimony as 
5 
hearsay, it was not hearsay, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
6 
asserted, viz., that the victim reminded Payne of her daughter.  Id. at 335.  Rather, it was 
7 
offered to show that Payne told Ecklund, in effect, that the victim looked like she was 
8 
suffering from a brain injury and that Ecklund did not report that concern to hospital staff 
9 
at Santiam Hospital later that day, or to the paramedics who were called to defendant's 
10 
house on June 29, or to any of the doctors at Salem Hospital or OHSU who treated the 
11 
victim on the night of her death.  Defendant had argued that the victim's injuries occurred 
12 
several days before June 29, when the victim was not in his care, and that Ecklund knew 
13 
something about those injuries and had hidden that information from care providers.  
14 
Defendant argued that Payne's testimony supported that contention.   
15 
 
 
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant.  The court stated: 
16 
 
"Payne's testimony about Ecklund's knowledge of the victim's 
17 
potential brain injury was relevant under OEC 401.  That fact had a 
18 
tendency to make more probable the existence of deliberate nondisclosures 
19 
by Ecklund of that condition to treatment providers.  Those deliberate 
20 
nondisclosures, in turn, were of consequence to the defense theory that the 
21 
victim's injuries had been previously incurred.  Thus, the proffered 
22 
evidence assists in establishing the relevance of other evidence, namely, the 
23 
testimony of the paramedics and emergency room doctors who said that 
24 
Ecklund never told them about the possibility of an earlier brain injury.  
25 
That evidence supports the inference that Ecklund was hiding her 
26 
knowledge about the victim's prior injuries.  The evidence is relevant, and 
27 
14 
the court erred in ruling that it should be excluded." 
1 
Id. at 336.   
2 
 
 
The Court of Appeals noted that the exclusion of relevant evidence does not 
3 
require reversal if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict, that is, if the 
4 
error is harmless.  Id.  The court then characterized the proper inquiry for evaluating 
5 
harmlessness as follows:  "where there is convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt in 
6 
the record as a whole, and little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict, 
7 
then the error is harmless."  Id.  Applying that standard to the facts of the case, the court 
8 
concluded that the error was not harmless:   
9 
"The record, in short, did not contain evidence of guilt that was so 
10 
substantial and convincing that evidentiary error could be presumed to be 
11 
harmless.  Instead, the jury was required to discern whether the state's 
12 
evidence concerning the timing of the victim's injuries constituted proof 
13 
beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, in light of the contradictory 
14 
scientific explanation offered by defendant's experts.  Any evidence of prior 
15 
injury to the victim's brain might have tipped the balance in defendant's 
16 
favor.  The evidence that Ecklund hid information suggesting an earlier 
17 
injury was significant." 
18 
Id. at 337.   
19 
 
 
The state seeks review of that decision, arguing that evidence of Payne's 
20 
statement to Ecklund on June 25 and Ecklund's reaction to that statement were not 
21 
offered for their truth -- that is, that the victim, in fact, had a brain injury on June 25, 
22 
2002 -- and, therefore, were not relevant to the crucial factual question before the jury, 
23 
viz., whether the victim's brain injury was inflicted on June 29, 2002.  In addition, the 
24 
state contends that Court of Appeals misapplied the standard for harmless error; properly 
25 
considered, the state contends, the excluded evidence in this case was unlikely to have 
26 
15 
affected the verdict, and any error, therefore, was harmless.   
1 
 
 
Defendant counters that the Court of Appeals was correct to reverse the 
2 
trial court's ruling on that point.  Additionally, defendant repeats his argument that the 
3 
trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's past injuries and evidence of 
4 
Payne's lay opinion that the victim looked on June 25 as if she were suffering from a 
5 
brain injury. 
6 
 
 
All of the parties' arguments in this court require a determination of 
7 
whether each piece of evidence was relevant.  As this court often has stated, the relevance 
8 
standard for admissibility is a low bar.  State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427, 245 P3d 
9 
113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307, 83 P3d 304 (2004).  Under OEC 401,  
10 
"'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
11 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
12 
action more or less probably than it would be without the evidence." 
13 
That means that evidence is relevant "so long as it increases or decreases, even slightly, 
14 
the probability of the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
15 
action."  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 238, 986 P2d 5 (1999).  And, as the court recently 
16 
stated in Salas-Juarez, "the inference that the proponent of the evidence wishes to be 
17 
drawn from the evidence need not be the necessary, or even the most probable, one."  349 
18 
Or at 428.  Our review of the trial court's decision to exclude evidence on relevance 
19 
grounds is for errors of law.  Sparks, 336 Or at 307-08. 
20 
Evidence Concerning Payne's Observation of the Victim 
21 
 
 
We turn first to the trial court's rulings concerning Payne's testimony.  
22 
Because the two issues are related, we consider the state's argument that the Court of 
23 
16 
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's exclusion of Payne's testimony concerning 
1 
what she told Ecklund on June 25, 2002, together with defendant's argument that the 
2 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's exclusion of Payne's lay opinion 
3 
testimony. 
4 
 
 
It is helpful to our analysis to set out the relevant part of Payne's testimony 
5 
from defendant's offer of proof.  In response to defendant's question about what Payne 
6 
saw when she first arrived at Ecklund's home on June 25, Payne responded,  
7 
"[Payne:]  Well, the thing that I observed was [the victim] was laying on 
8 
the floor on the pallet, down sort of in front of the couch, sort of back by a 
9 
coffee table, and [Ecklund] was there and she was down there by her, and 
10 
one of [Ecklunds's] friends, I do believe her name was Kelly, was there.  
11 
And [the victim] I remember laying there on her back.  And as a mother of 
12 
somebody that's had a child that's had 15 brain surgeries, my instant 
13 
thought by looking at her is, Oh, my gosh, there's [Payne's daughter] when 
14 
she was young, when she had pressure on the brain or else she was 
15 
dehydrated. 
16 
"* * * * * 
17 
"She was laying there on her back with her arms sort of up and she looked 
18 
lucid [sic]. She was looking off to one side, and her eyes were sort of rolled 
19 
up to the right and they were sort of bulgy and the pupils were dilated -- 
20 
excuse me, they were enlarged." 
21 
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant then asked Payne to explain her daughter's injury, to put 
22 
her observations of the victim in context.  Payne answered,  
23 
"[Payne:]  When [Payne's daughter] was three months old, I had a car 
24 
wreck which caused a skull fracture.  She has a shunt.  Her first surgery 
25 
was done probably within the first two weeks of her skull fracture, and 
26 
before that her signs were her eyes would roll up and go up, and all I could 
27 
see was mainly a lot of the white part.  But after her first brain surgery, we 
28 
ran into problems with dehydration as she was still with the bottle and she 
29 
didn't talk * * *.  She had multiple hospitalizations for dehydration.  * * * 
30 
[O]ne minute she would look just fine and then the next minute she was just 
31 
17 
lucid [sic].  * * * And of course, as [Payne's daughter] got older, it was 
1 
easier for me to pick up the signs of her not feeling well. 
2 
"[Defense Counsel:]  Okay.  What would those signs be? 
3 
"[Payne:]  Some of the signs would be her eyes being bulgy and not 
4 
reacting, the size of her pupils not being equal, the way that she would just 
5 
lay around. 
6 
"* * * * * 
7 
"[Defense Counsel:]  And in your taking care of your daughter * * * over 
8 
that period of time, did you come to understand that those very signs and 
9 
symptom were triggered by either brain swelling or problems that needed to 
10 
be relieved? 
11 
"[Payne:]  Well, over time -- it's hard to tell because with having a shunt, if 
12 
you're dehydrated, the shunt is going to collapse and it's going to stick to 
13 
the side of the brain, and so there's no fluid in there for the shunt to go 
14 
across.  And you think of dehydration * * *.  
15 
 
"So for me to say to look at [the victim] and say she was dehydrated 
16 
versus a head injury, I could not do that because it was hard for me to 
17 
distinguish the two because she -- my daughter always had multiple things 
18 
going on." 
19 
Later in the offer of proof, Payne also testified that she told Ecklund that the victim's 
20 
condition that day reminded her of her daughter.  The trial court attempted to clarify 
21 
what, exactly, Payne had said to Ecklund: 
22 
"THE COURT: What I heard you say, and I -- and so I want to make sure 
23 
that I understand what you're saying, is that you told her that it reminds you 
24 
of [Payne's daughter]. 
25 
"[PAYNE]:  Correct. 
26 
"THE COURT:  Did you say anything more than that?  Did she -- when 
27 
you said it reminds you of [Payne's daughter], would she know what that 
28 
meant? 
29 
"[PAYNE]:  Yes." 
30 
On redirect examination, defendant's lawyer asked Payne to elaborate on the foregoing.  
31 
18 
Defense counsel asked Payne whether she had shared her daughter's history with 
1 
Ecklund, including the facts that Payne's daughter had been in a motor vehicle accident, 
2 
that she had suffered a brain injury, and that she had been hospitalized many times.  
3 
Payne answered in the affirmative, and added that Ecklund knew that her daughter had 
4 
impaired intellectual and motor functioning.  Payne concluded,   
5 
"[Payne:] I think she -- I assumed as when I said that, she reminded me of 
6 
[Payne's daughter], as when [Payne's daughter] was in the state of being 
7 
really sick." 
8 
 
 
As noted, with respect to Payne's testimony that she told Ecklund that the 
9 
victim reminded her of her own daughter, the trial court erroneously first ruled that that 
10 
statement was hearsay.  The court then added that, even if defendant were offering the 
11 
statement for its effect on Ecklund,  
12 
"it's speculative as to what that could have meant to her.  And so that, I 
13 
think, causes * * * the Court the concern about whether or not I should let it 
14 
in at all, the fact that -- that Ms. Ecklund may or may not have known what 
15 
that really meant.  The witness' statement was that -- [']I assume that she 
16 
understood I meant she was really sick.[']  'Really sick' isn’t what I think 
17 
the defense is trying to get it in for." 
18 
The trial court also ruled that, "[i]f that testimony is out," then Payne's testimony 
19 
concerning her daughter also was inadmissible, because it was not relevant to any issue 
20 
before the jury.  In addition, the court ruled that Payne's testimony that the victim looked 
21 
like she may have been suffering from a brain injury was inadmissible as lay opinion 
22 
under OEC 701, because Payne was not certain about her opinion that the victim might 
23 
have been suffering from a brain injury.  At the same time, the trial court permitted Payne 
24 
to testify that she believed that the victim may have been suffering from dehydration.  
25 
19 
The court also permitted Payne to testify about her observations of the victim's condition 
1 
when Payne arrived at Ecklund's home on June 25.  
2 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling concerning Payne's 
3 
statement to Ecklund, but affirmed the ruling on Payne's lay opinion.  Davis, 235 Or App 
4 
at 337. 
5 
 
 
The state argues that the Court of Appeals' decision respecting Payne's 
6 
statements to Ecklund is incorrect because it relies on several attenuated and cumbersome 
7 
inferential steps that lack a factual predicate.  The state argues that, at best, one could 
8 
infer from Payne's statement to Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter 
9 
that Ecklund believed that, on June 25, the victim showed symptoms of brain injury.  
10 
However, the state contends, that inference does not support the further inference that, on 
11 
June 25, the victim in fact had a brain injury.  And, in any event, the fact that Ecklund 
12 
believed that the victim showed symptoms of brain injury on June 25 was not relevant, 
13 
because it would not have helped to establish that any June 25 injury played a role in the 
14 
victim's death. 
15 
 
 
The state asserts that the indictment charged defendant with causing the 
16 
victim's death on or between June 29, 2002, and June 30, 2002, and, therefore, the 
17 
dispositive issue for the jury was whether the symptoms that the victim displayed on June 
18 
29 and 30 necessarily reflected fatal injuries that must have been inflicted on June 29 or 
19 
30, when the victim was in defendant's care.  According to the state, at most, the 
20 
excluded statement could have established what Ecklund was told about the victim's 
21 
symptoms on June 25 and what Ecklund believed about those symptoms on that date; it 
22 
20 
would not have assisted the jury in deciding, as a medical matter, whether any June 25 
1 
injury contributed to the victim's death.   
2 
 
 
Although the trial court concluded that it was not clear what Payne's 
3 
statement to Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter would have meant 
4 
to Ecklund, the Court of Appeals paraphrased Payne's statement as "testimony about 
5 
Ecklund's knowledge of the victim's potential brain injury."  Davis, 235 Or App at 336.  
6 
As is evident from our description of the state's argument to this court, the state appears 
7 
to accept that paraphrase as accurate.  We agree.  It is clear from Payne's testimony that 
8 
she and Ecklund had known each other for a long time, that Payne had told Ecklund 
9 
about her daughter's medical history, and that anyone talking to Payne's daughter would 
10 
recognize her intellectual and motor limitations.  We think it is reasonable to infer from 
11 
those facts that Ecklund would have understood that, when Payne said that the victim 
12 
reminded her or her own daughter, she meant that the victim looked like someone with a 
13 
brain injury.   
14 
 
 
However, we also agree with the state that evidence that Ecklund was told, 
15 
on June 25, that her child looked like someone with a brain injury was not relevant to the 
16 
jury's determination whether defendant inflicted fatal injuries on June 29 or 30 or 
17 
whether, rather, on June 25, the victim already was suffering from the injuries that caused 
18 
her death a few days later.  Assuming, arguendo, that, based on Payne's statement to her 
19 
on June 25, Ecklund had reason to fear, or even believed, that the victim was suffering 
20 
from a brain injury that day, we do not think that Ecklund's knowledge of that possibility 
21 
is relevant to the jury's determination whether the child, in fact, was then suffering from 
22 
21 
the injuries that ultimately killed her.  It is undisputed that Ecklund took the victim to the 
1 
hospital that day, and that, over the course of several hours, the victim was fully 
2 
examined and subjected to testing to determine what was wrong with her.  Ecklund's 
3 
"deliberate withholding" of her fear (or belief) on that day does not make it more likely 
4 
that the victim actually was then suffering from a brain injury.  Even under the low 
5 
threshold for relevance, Ecklund's belief in the possibility of a brain injury on June 25 
6 
does not, even slightly, either increase the probability that the defense rebleed theory was 
7 
the correct one, or decrease the probability that the fatal injuries occurred on June 29 or 
8 
30, while the victim was in defendant's care. 
9 
 
 
The doctors who examined the victim on June 25 concluded that she was 
10 
dehydrated.  They treated her for that condition and the victim appeared to respond 
11 
favorably to that treatment.  Once Ecklund was informed of that medical diagnosis of her 
12 
daughter's condition, Ecklund had no further reason to report Payne's observations to 
13 
trained paramedics or emergency room doctors.  It follows that nothing at all can be 
14 
inferred from Ecklund's failure to relay Payne's statement to those who examined the 
15 
victim on June 29.  
16 
 
 
For those reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding 
17 
Payne's statement that she told Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter. 
18 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding to the contrary. 
19 
 
 
We turn to the related issue:  whether the trial court erred in excluding the 
20 
remainder of Payne's testimony, in which she explained her daughter's condition and 
21 
stated that the victim looked like her daughter when she was the victim's age and when 
22 
22 
she was suffering from her brain injury or was dehydrated.  Defendant argues that that 
1 
testimony is admissible as lay opinion under OEC 701 and that the trial court erred in 
2 
excluding it.  For convenience, we set out that rule again here:  
3 
 
"If the witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness 
4 
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or 
5 
inferences which are: 
6 
 
"(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and 
7 
 
"(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of testimony of the witness or 
8 
the determination of a fact in issue." 
  
9 
 
 
OEC 701 provides a "liberal standard for the admissibility of lay opinion" 
10 
and permits a "shorthand" description of what the witness perceived, which is, in reality, 
11 
an opinion.  State v. Lerch, 296 Or 377, 383, 677 P2d 678 (1984).  As Justice Unis 
12 
explained in his concurring opinion in State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 340, 845 P2d 904 
13 
(1993), the requirement in subsection (1) that lay opinion must be "rationally based on 
14 
the perception of the witness" has two limitations.  The first comes from OEC 602:  the 
15 
witness must have personal knowledge of the facts from which the opinion or inference is 
16 
derived.10 The second is that  
17 
                                              
 
10  
OEC 602 provides: 
"Subject to the provisions of [OEC 703] [dealing with expert opinion 
testimony], a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter.  Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but 
need not, consist of the testimony of the witness." 
OEC 703 provides an exception to that rule for expert testimony, which does not need to 
be based on personal knowledge.  That rule provides: 
 
23 
"there must be a rational connection between the opinion or inference and 
1 
the perceived factual basis from which it derives.  The rational connection 
2 
requirement means only that the opinion or inference advanced by the 
3 
witness is one which a normal person could form on the basis of observed 
4 
facts." 
5 
Id.  Subsection (2) provides that, to be admissible, lay opinion must be "helpful" to the 
6 
jury.  As this court stated in State v. Wright, 323 Or 8, 17, 913 P2d 321 (1996), "[t]he 
7 
concept of 'helpfulness' in OEC 701 subsumes a relevancy analysis."  That is, as OEC 
8 
701 itself provides, lay opinion evidence is helpful only if it is relevant either to "clear 
9 
understanding of testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue."   
10 
 
 
As the court explained in Lerch,  
11 
"[a]n essential difference between opinion testimony by a lay witness and 
12 
an expert witness is that the lay witness is restricted to his personal 
13 
perceptions while an expert witness may also testify from facts made 
14 
known to him at or before the hearing." 
15 
296 Or at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 
 
 
Lay opinion is commonly admissible on a variety of topics.  For example, 
17 
the Commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code officially approves lay opinion on the 
18 
following subjects:  (1) the speed of an automobile, (2) the identity of a person, (3) the 
19 
appearance of another person, (4) the sound of footsteps, (5) footprints, (6) distance, (7) 
20 
uncomplicated illness or injury, and (8) apparent age.  1981 Conference Committee 
21 
                                              
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." 
24 
Commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code.  In addition, Oregon case law recognizes that 
1 
"lay witnesses are capable of offering an opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated."  
2 
State v. Wright, 315 Or 124, 132, 843 P2d 436 (1992).  See also State v. Clark, 286 Or 
3 
33, 38-40, 593 P2d 123 (1979) (lay testimony that a defendant lacked signs of 
4 
intoxication admissible to impeach result of chemical breath test even absent any 
5 
foundation laid by expert testimony).  Further, a lay witness may give an opinion that a 
6 
stain on the floor was fecal matter.  Lerch, 296 Or at 384. 
7 
 
 
A lay witness and an expert may testify as to the same subject matter: 
8 
 
"'The testimony of the chemist who has analyzed blood, and that of 
9 
the observer who has merely recognized it by the use of the senses belong 
10 
to the same legal grade of evidence, and though the one may be entitled to 
11 
greater weight than the other with the jury, the exclusion of either is not 
12 
sustainable.'" 
13 
Id., (quoting  Clifford S. Fishman, 2 Jones on Evidence, § 14:4, 591-592 (6th ed 1972)).  
14 
In fact, if the requirements of OEC 701 are met, lay opinion on subjects well outside the 
15 
purview of most people is admissible.  For example, in Lerch, a witness who had served 
16 
in an infantry unit with the United States Army for 13 months during the Korean conflict 
17 
was allowed to testify that he recognized the smell of decomposing human flesh in a 
18 
dumpster, notwithstanding that that smell would be a "rare experience to the average 
19 
person," because the witness's opinion was "rationally based on his perception in that he 
20 
had previously experienced and recognized" that smell.  Id. at 387, 388. 
21 
 
 
Applying those standards, we conclude that Payne's testimony that the 
22 
victim looked like her own daughter when her daughter "had pressure on the brain or else 
23 
she was dehydrated," as well as the background information about her daughter's 
24 
25 
condition, which explained the basis for her opinion testimony about the victim, satisfied 
1 
the requirements of OEC 701.  
2 
 
 
At the outset, it is important to observe that defendant's offer of proof did 
3 
not include testimony by Payne that, in her opinion, the victim actually was suffering 
4 
from a brain injury on June 25.  Only an expert could make that medical diagnosis.11  
5 
Rather, in the offer of proof, Payne was asked to describe what she saw when she arrived 
6 
at Ecklund's home.  In addition to describing the victim's physical appearance, Payne 
7 
testified that her immediate thought was that the victim looked like her daughter when 
8 
she was young and "had pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated."  Thus, Payne 
9 
did not testify from the perspective of a physician who has diagnosed a patient, but from 
10 
the perspective of an observer describing a person's appearance by associating it with a 
11 
medical condition, much as a witness may describe a person's behavior and appearance 
12 
by saying that the person looks intoxicated.   
13 
 
 
Although a person without Payne's prior experiences may not have been 
14 
able to describe the victim's appearance in those terms, Payne was able to do so because, 
15 
                                              
 
11 
As this court stated in Ritter v. Sivils, 206 Or 410, 413, 293 P2d 211 (1956), 
"[i]f the issue turns upon some fact beyond the ken of laymen, expert testimony must be 
produced."  In the same vein, in Uris v. Compensation Department, 247 Or 420, 424, 427 
P2d 753 (1967), this court quoted with approval the following, from Spivey v. Atteberry, 
205 Okla 493, 494, 238 P2d 814 (1951): 
"[W]here injuries complained of are of such character as to require skilled 
and professional persons to determine the cause and extent thereof, the 
question is one of science and must necessarily be determined by testimony 
of skilled, professional persons." 
26 
like someone who has seen blood or smelled decomposing human flesh, she often had 
1 
observed the appearance of her child when she displayed the effects of pressure on the 
2 
brain or dehydration.  Payne's opinion that the victim resembled her daughter when her 
3 
daughter was suffering from one of those two conditions was rationally based on her 
4 
perceptions, in that she had a lifetime of previous experience with her own child suffering 
5 
those conditions. 
6 
 
 
Payne's testimony also was "helpful to a clear understanding of testimony 
7 
of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue."  Payne's testimony was consistent 
8 
with and helpful to corroborate the testimony of defendant's expert witnesses, based on 
9 
their examination of the physical evidence, that the victim's brain and abdominal injuries 
10 
occurred at least several days before she died.  The state's experts testified that the fatal 
11 
injuries had to have been inflicted on the night of her death.12  Payne's testimony that, on 
12 
June 25, the victim resembled her child when her child displayed the effects of a brain 
13 
injury or was dehydrated was relevant.  It increased the probability, even if only slightly, 
14 
that the defense experts were correct and the state's experts incorrect. 
15 
 
 
The state argues that, given that Payne was allowed to testify as to her 
16 
observations of the victim's condition on June 25, the excluded evidence would not have 
17 
made it any more probable that the victim had a brain injury on June 25.  However, we 
18 
                                              
 
12  
However, as noted, one of the state's experts, the radiologist at Salem 
Hospital, testified that the victim also had a preexisting brain injury, which might have 
been inflicted as long as three weeks before her death. 
27 
think that Payne's opinion that, on that date, the victim resembled her own child when her 
1 
child was suffering from pressure on the brain (or dehydration) is qualitatively different 
2 
from a description of the victim's symptoms, in much the same way that a witness's 
3 
opinion that a person looks intoxicated is qualitatively different from the simple 
4 
observation that a person is disheveled or flushed or glassy-eyed.  In both cases, the 
5 
shorthand reference conveys a picture to the jury that is more complete than a mere list of 
6 
physical characteristics.  Payne's opinion, on June 25, that the victim resembled her child 
7 
when she was suffering from a brain injury made it more probable that the victim did, in 
8 
fact, have a brain injury on June 25.  And, if the victim already was suffering from a 
9 
brain injury on June 25, that fact, in turn, made it more probable that the victim died as a 
10 
result of an injury inflicted on or before that date and not on June 29 or 30, as the state 
11 
alleged. 
12 
 
 
In excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, the trial court did not evaluate 
13 
that testimony in light of the requirements of OEC 701.  That is, the court did not 
14 
consider whether that testimony was rationally based on Payne's perception or whether 
15 
she had personal knowledge of the facts on which she based her opinion.13  Rather, the 
16 
court excluded that testimony because "it really was speculative or conjecture or -- and 
17 
                                              
 
13  
In fact, as discussed above, the trial court's only ruling concerning evidence 
relating to Payne's experience with her daughter was that, in light of the court's ruling that 
Payne's statement to Ecklund that the victim resembled her daughter was inadmissible 
because the court believed it was unclear what that statement would have meant to 
Ecklund, testimony about Payne's daughter was inadmissible because it was not relevant 
to any issue before the jury.   
28 
she was not certain." 
1 
 
 
We agree that Oregon's lay opinion rule precludes opinions based on 
2 
conjecture or speculation, because opinions based on speculation or conjecture generally 
3 
are not based on the perception of the witness or on the witness's personal knowledge.  
4 
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 701.03[3], Art VII-572 (5th ed 2007) (so 
5 
stating); see also Brown v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 248 Or 110, 122, 431 P2d 817 
6 
(1967) (under pre-OEC law, guesses or conjecture not admissible testimony and would 
7 
not suffice as substantial evidence of a fact).  However, OEC 701 does not require 
8 
certainty, as long as it is clear that the witness's opinion is based on personal knowledge 
9 
and not guesswork.  Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 701.03[3] at 573.   
10 
 
 
Payne's opinion that the victim looked like her child when she "had 
11 
pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated" was not based on "speculation or 
12 
conjecture."  It was based on Payne's personal knowledge of her own daughter's 
13 
appearance when suffering from one of those two conditions.  Payne was offering her lay 
14 
opinion concerning the victim's appearance as a mother of a brain-injured child; she did 
15 
not purport to be an expert or to diagnose the victim's condition.  Payne's opinion was 
16 
rationally drawn from her perceptions, even though those perceptions were, as she herself 
17 
acknowledged, susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation.  As this court stated 
18 
in Salas-Juarez, 340 Or at 428, "the inference that the proponent of the evidence wishes 
19 
to be drawn from the evidence need not be the necessary or even the most probable one."  
20 
Similarly, the inference that the victim was suffering from a brain injury on June 25 was 
21 
not the only inference that could be drawn from Payne's observations of the victim's 
22 
29 
condition.  The jury could have inferred that the victim was suffering from dehydration 
1 
instead.  However, Payne's complete observations were, nonetheless, helpful to the jury, 
2 
insofar as they increased the probability, even if slightly, that defendant's experts were 
3 
correct that, on June 25, 2002, the victim already had suffered the brain injury that 
4 
eventually killed her. 
5 
 
 
As is evident from the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
6 
ruling that Payne's inability or unwillingness to state unequivocally that the victim looked 
7 
like she was suffering only from a brain injury showed that she was simply guessing or 
8 
speculating about the victim's condition.  Because that was the sole reason that the trial 
9 
court gave for excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, and because Payne's opinion was 
10 
relevant, rationally based on her perceptions, and helpful to the jury, we conclude that the 
11 
trial court erred in excluding Payne's lay opinion in which she stated that the victim 
12 
resembled her daughter when she was experiencing brain swelling.14  The trial court also 
13 
erred in excluding Payne's testimony explaining her daughter's injury and resultant 
14 
condition, because that testimony was essential to the jury's understanding of Payne's 
15 
qualifications to offer her lay opinion. 
16 
 
 
It is axiomatic that not every evidentiary error requires reversal.  Under 
17 
                                              
 
14 
The trial court did not weigh the probative value of Payne's lay opinion 
testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from its admission, under OEC 
403, and we express no opinion about the proper result of any such weighing on retrial in 
this case. 
30 
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution,15 error is "harmless" and 
1 
does not require reversal whenever the court is of the opinion "that the judgment of the 
2 
court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case."  See State v. 
3 
Willis, 348 Or 566, 571, 236 P3d 714 (2010) (so defining harmlessness).  Before we turn 
4 
to an analysis of the prejudicial effect of the trial court's error in excluding Payne's lay 
5 
opinion testimony, however, we consider the state's criticism of the Court of Appeals' 
6 
harmless error analysis. 
7 
 
 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals cited this court's opinion in State v. 
8 
Walton, 311 Or 223, 809 P2d 81 (1991), as the standard for evaluating harmless error. 
9 
Davis, 235 Or App at 336.  In Walton, this court stated that error is harmless if (1) there is 
10 
convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt in the record as a whole, and (2) there is 
11 
little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the verdict.  311 Or at 231.  However, as 
12 
the state points out, this court's case law has evolved since Walton was decided.  In State 
13 
v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 30, 77 P3d 1111 (2003), this court clarified that it had eliminated the 
14 
first of those two criteria as an independent consideration in the harmless error analysis.  
15 
                                              
 
15 
Article VII (Amended), section 3, provides, in part: 
"In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $750, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can 
affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict * * * If the 
supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus 
submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should 
have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, 
notwithstanding any error committed during the trial[.]" 
31 
In State v. Hansen, 304 Or 169, 743 P2d 157 (1987), this court acknowledged that OEC 
1 
103(1)16 and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution permit 
2 
consideration of those two factors in determining whether a trial court's evidentiary error 
3 
warrants reversal, but held that there was no justification for analyzing those two criteria 
4 
separately, because the applicable constitutional and statutory standards are fully 
5 
expressed in the second criterion.  304 Or at 180.  As the court in Hansen went on to 
6 
state,  
7 
"[w]hether there was substantial and convincing evidence of guilt is not the 
8 
issue; the issue is whether the error was likely to have affected the result.  
9 
Of course, the less substantial the evidence of guilt, the more likely it is that 
10 
an error affected the result, but that is an additional reason not to bifurcate 
11 
the standard so as to require two independent inquiries."   
12 
Id.  The court in Davis noted that, in Walton and in another case decided after Hansen, 
13 
State v. Parker, 317 Or 225, 233, 855 P2d 636 (1993), this court repeated the erroneous 
14 
bifurcated test for affirmance despite error.  Nonetheless, the Davis court emphasized that  
15 
"Oregon's constitutional test for affirmance despite error consists of a single 
16 
inquiry:  Is there little likelihood that the particular error affected the 
17 
verdict?  The correct focus of the inquiry regarding affirmance despite error 
18 
is on the possible influence of the error on the verdict rendered, not whether 
19 
this court, sitting as fact-finder, would regard the evidence of guilt as 
20 
substantial and compelling. 
21 
 
"In determining whether the error affected the verdict, it is necessary 
22 
that we review the record.  However, in so doing, we do not determine, as a 
23 
                                              
 
16  
OEC 103(1) provides: 
"Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.  Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected[.]" 
32 
fact-finder, whether the defendant is guilty.  That inquiry would invite this 
1 
court to engage improperly in weighing the evidence and, essentially, 
2 
retrying the case, while disregarding the error committed at trial, to 
3 
determine whether the defendant is guilty.  Rather, when we review the 
4 
record, we do so in light of the error at issue.  We ask whether there was 
5 
little likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict.  We recognize that, 
6 
if the particular issue to which the error pertains has no relationship to the 
7 
jury's determination of its verdict, then there is little likelihood that the 
8 
error affected the verdict.  However, that is not a finding about how the 
9 
court views the weight of the evidence of the defendant's guilt.  It is a legal 
10 
conclusion about the likely effect of the error on the verdict." 
11 
336 Or at 32.   
12 
 
 
With the correct standard in mind, we conclude that the trial court's error in 
13 
excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony was not harmless.  As discussed above, in 
14 
evaluating whether to affirm despite evidentiary error, "we review the record * * * in 
15 
light of the error at issue.  We ask whether there was little likelihood that the error 
16 
affected the jury's verdict."  Davis, 336 Or at 32.  In so doing, we consider the nature and 
17 
the context of the error.  Id. at 32-33.   
18 
 
 
In this case, the trial court erred in excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, 
19 
which defendant offered to support his theory that the injuries that killed his daughter 
20 
occurred several days before she died, and that nothing that defendant intentionally did to 
21 
the victim on June 29 or 30 caused her death.  Evidence that Payne thought that the 
22 
victim looked like her daughter when she was suffering from a brain injury (or 
23 
dehydration) on June 25 supported, but was not duplicative of, defendant's experts' 
24 
testimony that the victim already was suffering from a brain injury at least several days 
25 
before she died. 
26 
 
 
The effect of the error was prejudicial.  As noted, Payne's testimony in the 
27 
33 
offer of proof was that the victim looked like her daughter when she was suffering either 
1 
from a brain injury or from dehydration on June 25.  The trial court's ruling, under which 
2 
Payne was allowed to testify only that she thought that the victim "looked dehydrated," 
3 
rendered her testimony misleading, and it effectively undermined defendant's case and 
4 
put the state in a better position than it otherwise would have been.  That is so because 
5 
the jury had heard that, on the evening of June 25, doctors at Santiam Hospital diagnosed 
6 
the victim with dehydration.  Testimony that the victim looked dehydrated on June 25 
7 
reinforced the innocuous dehydration explanation for her symptoms that day.  The 
8 
stricken lay opinion, on the other hand, would have provided the jury with additional 
9 
evidence to support a finding that the victim already was suffering from a brain injury on 
10 
June 25, as defendant's experts contended.  In that circumstance, we cannot say that there 
11 
is little likelihood that that error affected the verdict.  Therefore, we reverse the ruling of 
12 
the trial court excluding Payne's lay opinion and the decision of the Court of Appeals 
13 
affirming that ruling. 
14 
Evidence of the Victim's Prior Injuries 
15 
 
 
We turn to defendant's argument that the Court of Appeals erred in 
16 
affirming the trial court's ruling excluding evidence that the victim earlier had been 
17 
subjected to physical abuse.  As discussed above, defendant initially was charged with, 
18 
among other things, murder by abuse.  During defendant's first trial, the state introduced 
19 
evidence that the victim had been physically abused as well as evidence of her prior 
20 
injuries.  Before the second trial, the court stated that, given the fact that defendant no 
21 
longer was being charged with murder by abuse, it intended to try a narrower case and 
22 
34 
was not inclined to permit the introduction of evidence of the victim's prior abuse or 
1 
injuries, except to the extent that they related to the cause of her death.  Defendant 
2 
responded, however, that, in addition to other purposes, he intended to offer evidence of 
3 
the victim's prior abuse and injuries to explain the basis for his experts' opinions that the 
4 
victim died from injuries that were inflicted at least several days before June 29, 2002.  
5 
He argued that his experts had reviewed the victim's medical records, including the 
6 
autopsy report and tests showing healing broken bones, and determined that the victim 
7 
had been subjected to chronic child abuse.  Defendant explained that the experts would 
8 
testify that that determination supported their conclusions that the victim's fatal injuries 
9 
were inflicted in the period before June 29.   
10 
 
 
The trial court excluded that evidence, giving multiple alternative reasons 
11 
for its ruling.  First, the trial court ruled that the evidence was irrelevant to defendant's 
12 
theory that the victim's preexisting abdominal injuries worsened on the night of her death, 
13 
causing her preexisting subdural hematoma to rebleed.  Second, the trial court ruled that 
14 
the probative value of the evidence of prior injuries was outweighed by the danger of jury 
15 
confusion.  Third, the trial court ruled that the evidence was not admissible under OEC 
16 
404(3), which provides: 
17 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
18 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
19 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
20 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
21 
absence of mistake or accident." 
22 
In that latter connection, the court stated that the prior injuries could not be tied to any 
23 
particular person, and even if they could have been, they would not be admissible 
24 
35 
because the defense had not shown that they were being offered for any admissible 
1 
purpose under OEC 404(3).  Finally, the court ruled that neither the defense's nor the 
2 
state's experts were permitted to allude to the fact that the victim had been abused or that 
3 
their diagnoses relied on the victim's previous injuries, except to the extent that they 
4 
could tie the prior injuries to the medical cause of the victim's death. 
5 
 
 
As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling without 
6 
discussion.  Defendant asks this court to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision in that 
7 
regard.  Defendant contends that he did not offer evidence of the victim's prior injuries as 
8 
prior bad acts to prove anyone's character under OEC 404(3), nor did he contend that 
9 
anyone was acting in conformity with his or her character in inflicting the victim's fatal 
10 
injuries.  Rather, he argues, the evidence is relevant because it tends to show that the 
11 
victim had suffered repeated abuse, either negligently or intentionally, that the abuse 
12 
began long before the victim died, and that that abuse may have included abdominal and 
13 
head injuries that were inflicted prior to June 29 but that eventually resulted in the 
14 
victim's death on June 30.  According to defendant, his experts based their conclusions 
15 
that the victim's fatal injuries occurred at least several days before the date of her death, 
16 
in part, on the fact that the victim had been subjected to child abuse in the past.  
17 
Defendant argued that his experts were entitled to explain that they reached that 
18 
conclusion from their review of the victim's medical records and the autopsy and tests 
19 
showing healing rib and leg fractures. 
20 
 
 
We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence 
21 
of the victim's prior physical abuse as a basis for the expert's testimony.  Defendant did 
22 
36 
not offer that evidence to establish any particular person's conduct or character; he 
1 
offered it for another, permissible, purpose -- to establish the basis for his experts' 
2 
conclusions that the victim suffered the injuries that resulted in her death before June 29.  
3 
See OEC 703, 705 (expert may testify to reasons for opinion and facts on which opinion 
4 
is based).  It is true that defendant's experts did not tie any particular prior abuse, 
5 
medically, to defendant's theory that, on the night she died, the victim suffered an 
6 
exacerbation of her abdominal injury and/or a rebleed of a preexisting subdural 
7 
hematoma.  However, defendant did explain to the trial court that his experts concluded 
8 
that the fact that the victim repeatedly had been harmed in the past was one of the bases 
9 
for their opinions that the victim had suffered a brain and abdominal injury at least 
10 
several days before she died.  That is, evidence that the victim had suffered frequent 
11 
serious injuries during the course of her life supported the experts' view that she also had 
12 
suffered serious injuries the week or so before her death.  That, in turn, made it more 
13 
probable that, in the week before her death, the victim incurred the injuries that, in the 
14 
defense experts' view, ultimately killed her. 
15 
 
 
The state argues, on the contrary, that evidence of the victim's past injuries 
16 
was not relevant, because evidence that someone committed earlier child abuse is not 
17 
evidence that defendant did not commit the fatal injuries on June 29.  The state contends 
18 
that there is no logical inferential connection between those two propositions.  We think 
19 
that the state's argument misses the point.  As we have discussed, defendant's experts 
20 
testified that the autopsy revealed that the victim died from injuries to her abdomen and 
21 
brain that were inflicted at least several days before her death.  The experts would have 
22 
37 
testified that the fact that the victim also suffered other repeated physical injuries before 
1 
June 29 supported those conclusions.  The experts were entitled to explain the bases for 
2 
their opinions and were not barred from doing so by OEC 404(3).17 
3 
 
 
As noted, the trial court also concluded that, even if the evidence were 
4 
relevant, it should be excluded under OEC 403, because its probative value was 
5 
outweighed by the risk of jury confusion.  Although the trial court did not explain its 
6 
ruling, the state argues that assessing who, if anyone, caused the prior injuries would 
7 
have been confusing and pointless.  We agree that evidence of who caused the prior 
8 
injuries potentially would be confusing to the jury, and, more importantly, under the 
9 
particular circumstances presented in this case, it would not be relevant to any issue of 
10 
consequence to the jury's determination.  Because the state elected to charge defendant 
11 
with intentional acts committed on or between June 29 or 30, it was not important who, if 
12 
anyone, injured to the victim before those dates.18  As the state acknowledges in its brief 
13 
                                              
 
17 
If, on retrial, defendant again proffers and the trial court admits evidence 
that the victim was subject to prior physical abuse to support the conclusions of his 
experts, we recognize that the state may seek to use that evidence.  We take no position 
on whether such use would or would not be permitted under the applicable rules of 
evidence. 
 
18 
Although the state generally is not required to prove the specific date that a 
crime is committed, see, e.g., State v. Yielding, 238 Or 419, 423, 395 P2d 172 (1964) (so 
holding), in this case, the date of the crime became a material element of the offense 
when the prosecutor elected to amend the indictment to charge the defendant with 
knowingly inflicting the fatal injuries on or between June 29 and 30, 2002, and the trial 
court instructed the jury that, to prove defendant guilty of murder and or manslaughter, 
the state was required to prove that "the act occurred on or between June 29th, 2002, and 
June 30th, 2002." 
38 
to this court, if the fatal injuries were inflicted before June 29, even if they were inflicted 
1 
by defendant, defendant could not be convicted of the charged offenses.  The jury 
2 
therefore had no need to determine who, if anyone, was responsible for injuries inflicted 
3 
before June 29. 
4 
 
 
That argument also misses the point, however.  Defendant's experts testified 
5 
that the victim died from injuries inflicted before June 29 and that those injuries (and not 
6 
what occurred on June 29) were the precipitating cause of the victim's death.  To support 
7 
their testimony, defendant's experts were entitled to testify that they based their opinions, 
8 
in part, on the fact that the child had been the victim of ongoing abuse throughout her 
9 
life, as evidenced by her medical records and prior injuries.  The experts' reasoning and 
10 
the evidence on which they relied was not only relevant, it was necessary to aid the jury 
11 
to evaluate their conclusions.  The trial court erred in precluding the experts from 
12 
testifying to the bases for their opinions. 
13 
 
 
Like the error in excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, the trial court's 
14 
error was not harmless.  The expert's conclusions went "directly to the heart of 
15 
defendant's factual theory of the case."  Davis, 336 Or at 34.  The trial court's erroneous 
16 
exclusion of the evidence that the experts used to reach their conclusions could have 
17 
affected the jury's determination of whether to believe the experts and whether there was 
18 
reasonable doubt that defendant fatally injured the victim on June 29 or 30, 2002.  On this 
19 
record, we cannot say that there was little likelihood that the evidence of the victim's 
20 
prior injuries affected the jury's verdict.   
21 
 
 
Because we conclude that that error was not harmless, we reverse the ruling 
22 
39 
of the trial court excluding evidence of the victim's prior injuries, and we reverse the 
1 
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that ruling.   
2 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in 
3 
part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 
4 
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
5