Title: John Gillen v. City of Neenah
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002470
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2470 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
John Gillen, Ann Gillen, William Dunwiddie, 
Friends of Our Neenah Parks and Clean Water 
Action Council of Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc.,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
City of Neenah, Minergy Corporation and P.H. 
Glatfelter Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Hawley 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Geske and Bradley, J.J., join 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs 
by William P. O'Connor, Rhea A. Myers and Jennifer S. McGinnity 
and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., Madison and oral 
argument by William P. O’Connor. 
 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, City of Neenah 
and Minergy Corporation, there was a brief by James G. Gunz, city 
attorney, Neenah; Arthur J. Harrington, Winston A. Ostrow, 
Michael B. Apfeld, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee and James  
G. Schweitzer, Joseph R. Cincotta and Schweitzer and Cincotta, 
LLP, Milwaukee and oral argument by Michael B. Apfeld. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, P.H. Glatfelter 
Company there was a brief by Mark A. Thimke and Foley & Lardner, 
Milwaukee and David G. Mandelbaum, Harry R. Weiss and Ballard, 
Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, PA and oral argument by 
David G. Mandelbaum. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by John S. Greene, 
assistant attorney general with whom on the brief was James E. 
Doyle, attorney general, for the State of Wisconsin. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Curt F. Pawlisch 
and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison for The Wisconsin 
Alliance of Cities. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Curtis A. 
Witynski, counsel, Madison for the League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities. 
 
 
No. 96-2470 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2470 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Gillen, Ann Gillen, William  
Dunwiddie, Friends of Our Neenah Parks  
and Clean Water Action Council of  
Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Neenah, Minergy Corporation and  
P.H. Glatfelter Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Robert A. Hawley, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, 
John and Ann Gillen, William Dunwiddie, Friends of Our Neenah 
Parks and Clean Water Action Council of Northeastern Wisconsin, 
Inc., from a judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County, 
Robert A. Hawley, Judge, granting motions to dismiss and motions 
for summary judgment for the defendants, City of Neenah, Minergy 
Corporation and P.H. Glatfelter Company.  The circuit court 
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint (as amended) with prejudice 
on several grounds, including that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing, failed to exhaust administrative remedies and sought 
No. 96-2470 
 
2 
to assert rights in a derivative action that were not properly 
asserted in their pleadings.1 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the following issue to 
the court:  "Whether the public trust doctrine enables a citizen 
to directly sue a private party whom the citizen believes was 
inadequately regulated by the Department of Natural Resources?" 
¶3 
We hold that the plaintiffs may bring suit under Wis. 
Stat. § 30.294 (1993-94) against the defendants to abate a 
public nuisance.2  For the reasons set forth, we reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court dismissing the complaint and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
I 
¶4 
The dispute in this case concerns portions of Little 
Lake Butte des Morts in Winnebago County.  In chapter 52, Laws 
of 1951, the legislature granted right, title and interest into 
certain submerged land near the south shore of Little Lake Butte 
des Morts (referred to as the Legislative Lakebed Grant) to the 
City of Neenah "for a public purpose."3 
¶5 
Beginning in 1951 and continuing through at least 
1975, fill material consisting of sludge generated by the 
                     
1 The circuit court examined the complaint (as amended) and 
the stipulation of facts. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise indicated.  
3 The title to chapter 52, Laws of 1951, states that the 
grant of the submerged land to the city is "for a public 
purpose." The deed to the city repeats the title of the act but 
does not otherwise limit the use of the submerged land.  
No. 96-2470 
 
3 
primary wastewater treatment system of Bergstrom Paper Company, 
the predecessor to P.H. Glatfelter Company, was placed in the 
Grant Area (that is, the area discussed in the Legislative 
Lakebed Grant).  In addition, in 1951, 1974, and 1984 the City 
leased a certain portion of the Grant Area to the Bergstrom and 
Glatfelter Companies for construction and operation of a 
wastewater treatment plant and for vehicular parking.  The 
Department of Natural Resources (the DNR), or its predecessor 
agency, had some knowledge of the development of the Bergstrom 
and Glatfelter Companies' facilities and was involved in 
reviewing and approving the wastewater treatment plant and paper 
sludge combustor. 
¶6 
In 1995 Minergy Corporation sought a lease from the 
City 
to 
construct 
and 
operate 
a 
commercial 
facility 
on 
approximately five acres of the Grant Area other than the area 
leased to the Bergstrom and Glatfelter Companies.  The proposed 
Minergy facility would process paper sludge generated by paper 
mills in the Fox Valley area into a glass aggregate product. 
¶7 
In December 1995 the DNR, the City, Glatfelter Company 
and Minergy Corporation signed a stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement, which provided the following: 
(1) The DNR asserted that both the proposed Minergy 
facility and the existing operations of Glatfelter Company are 
impermissible public trust uses and violate the Legislative 
Lakebed Grant, relevant portions of Chapter 30 including Wis. 
Stat. § 30.03 and the public trust doctrine as developed under 
Wisconsin law. 
No. 96-2470 
 
4 
(2) Regardless of the foregoing, based on the historical 
development of the Grant Area, to which the DNR failed to 
object, and based on the DNR's enforcement discretion, the DNR 
agreed that it would not pursue enforcement action under its 
authority relating to the public trust laws and that it would 
not seek equitable relief, including removal of existing 
facilities and activities, during the term of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
(3) The City, Minergy Corporation and Glatfelter Company 
agreed that applicable regulatory permits under chapters 30, 144 
and 147 would be obtained for any activities in the Grant Area 
and that any violations of the Settlement Agreement could be 
treated as violations of chapter 30 and enforced in accordance 
with the provisions of chapters 23, 30 and 227. 
(4) The DNR concluded that the legislative grant is a 
lakebed grant; the City of Neenah, Minergy Corporation, and 
Glatfelter Company disagreed with the DNR's characterization of 
the legislative grant as a lakebed grant. 
¶8 
After executing the Settlement Agreement, the City and 
Minergy Corporation entered into a lease, running through May 
2050, that authorized Minergy Corporation to construct and 
operate the proposed facility. 
¶9 
The City conducted public meetings relating to the 
proposed lease with Minergy Corporation and received both 
support for and opposition to the proposal.  Plaintiff Dunwiddie 
objected to the Minergy facility and requested that the lease be 
voided. 
No. 96-2470 
 
5 
¶10 Nevertheless, the Minergy facility was approved by the 
City Common Council, the City Plan Commission, the City Board of 
Appeals, the City Finance Committee, and the City Park and 
Recreation Committee.   
¶11 In April 1996 the DNR issued the Final Air Pollution 
Control Construction Permit (air permit) for the Minergy 
facility and prepared an Environmental Analysis and Decision on 
the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement.  The DNR also 
provided notice of its approval of the air permit to several 
individuals who had requested copies of the final decision, 
including plaintiffs William Dunwiddie and John Gillen.  
¶12 On or about May 8, 1996, a representative of plaintiff 
Friends of Our Neenah Parks applied to the City for a permit to 
hold a "Minergy Protest March" on May 18, 1996, over the Grant 
Area.  As a part of that request, the representative of Friends 
of Our Neenah Parks asked for permission to use a boat ramp to 
launch a canoe.  The request was denied by Glatfelter Company. 
¶13 On May 21, 1996, the plaintiffs initiated suit in 
circuit court as individuals "and in the name of the State of 
Wisconsin."  The complaint (as amended) challenges the legality 
of the Minergy lease and the actions of Glatfelter Company.  
More specifically, the complaint asserts the following seven 
theories 
or 
claims 
supporting 
the 
plaintiffs' 
ultimate 
conclusion that the defendants' actions are unlawful: (1) the 
Minergy lease is for a private purpose and violates the public 
trust doctrine established by Wis. const., art. IX, § 1; (2) the 
Minergy and Glatfelter leases constitute state action depriving 
No. 96-2470 
 
6 
the plaintiffs of their interest in the use of the area in issue 
in violation of Wis. const., art. XI, § 3a; the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) the lease 
(the complaint does not specify which lease) deprives the 
plaintiffs of their interest in land held in trust by the state 
without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the Minergy 
lease constitutes a private nuisance; (5) the defendants' 
actions constitute a trespass; (6) the construction of the 
Minergy facility and Glatfelter Company's causing gravel to be 
dumped on Grant Area lands constitute public nuisances under 
Wis. Stat. § 30.294 on the ground that no DNR permits were 
obtained, as required by Wis. Stat. § 30.12; and (7) the Minergy 
lease constitutes an alienation of the public interest and 
violates Wis. const., art. XI, § 3. 
¶14 The plaintiffs' prayer for relief requests that the 
circuit court declare that the Minergy lease is null and void; 
that the lease constitutes a private nuisance, a public nuisance 
and a trespass; and that the circuit court grant a permanent 
injunction against the construction of the Minergy facility.4  
The plaintiffs did not file a notice of claim against the City. 
                     
4 A week before oral argument in this court, Minergy 
Corporation filed supplemental affidavits on the issue of 
mootness.  Minergy Corporation argued that the appeal was moot 
because Minergy Corporation had already completed construction 
of the facility, had commenced startup of the facility, had 
operated the facility on natural gas and was scheduled to begin 
receiving paper sludge for processing on January 5, 1998, the 
day before oral argument in this court. 
No. 96-2470 
 
7 
¶15 Glatfelter Company filed a motion to dismiss; the City 
and Minergy Corporation filed consolidated motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment.  The circuit court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' 
claims 
with 
prejudice, 
reasoning 
that 
the 
plaintiffs' proper remedy was to challenge the Settlement 
Agreement through the administrative review process established 
in chapter 227 of the statutes.  
¶16 After the circuit court's ruling on the motion to 
dismiss, Minergy Corporation proceeded with construction of the 
facility.5 
¶17 This court accepted the case on certification from the 
court of appeals and heard oral argument on January 6, 1998.  In 
a letter to the parties dated January 23, 1998, the court asked 
the parties to consider alternative dispute resolution.  In a 
                                                                  
The plaintiffs responded that the appeal was not moot 
because Minergy Corporation made the business decision to 
proceed with construction of the facility in spite of the risks, 
including the DNR's position that construction on the Grant Area 
would be illegal.   
At oral argument the plaintiffs conceded that their request 
for a grant of a permanent injunction against the construction 
of the Minergy facility is moot, but they persisted in their 
position that the Minergy lease violates the public trust 
doctrine. 
5 The plaintiffs did not seek a stay in circuit court. All 
the parties agree that under the Wisconsin statutes the 
plaintiffs may have been required to provide substantial 
security in order to seek a stay.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 806.08(3), 
813.06.  The plaintiffs argue that as individual citizens, they 
did not have the financial ability to post security against the 
construction of the multi-million dollar Minergy facility. 
No. 96-2470 
 
8 
letter to the court dated March 3, 1998, the parties requested 
that the court proceed to a decision in the case. 
II 
¶18 The first issue we must address is whether the 
plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim against the City 
bars the plaintiffs' action against the City.  The City and 
Minergy Corporation argue that the plaintiffs' failure to comply 
with the notice of claim requirement set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) bars the plaintiffs' claims against the City.6   
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) prohibits a claimant 
from bringing an action against a governmental body or its 
officers or employees for acts done in their official capacity 
unless a notice of claim is first presented and the claim is 
disallowed.7 See City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Board, 
217 Wis. 2d 616, 575 N.W.2d 712, 714 (1998).   
                     
6 The plaintiffs concede that no notice of claim was filed 
against the City.  They argue that the City had actual notice of 
their claim because at a January 1996 public meeting, plaintiff 
William Dunwiddie objected to the Minergy facility and asked 
that the lease be voided.  In attendance at that meeting were 
the City Mayor, City Attorney and two Minergy representatives.  
Actual notice may satisfy the notice of injury provisions 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a), Kellner v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 
183, 196, 539 N.W.2d 685 (1995), but does not satisfy the notice 
of claims provisions of § 893.80(1)(b).  See Futsch v. St. Croix 
Central School District, 183 Wis. 2d 336, 343, 515 N.W.2d 328 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) provides:  
[N]o action may be brought or maintained against any 
 . . . governmental 
subdivision . . . unless 
 . . . [a] 
claim 
containing 
the 
address 
of 
the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
No. 96-2470 
 
9 
¶20 This court has held that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) 
"applies to all causes of action, not just those in tort and not 
just those for money damages."  DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994); City of Racine, 575 
N.W.2d at 714. 
¶21 The United States Supreme Court has refused to permit 
application of the Wisconsin notice of claims statute to a 42 
U.S.C. 
§ 1983 
action 
brought 
in 
Wisconsin 
state 
courts, 
reasoning that the notice of claims statute interferes with 
federal civil rights policy.  See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 
(1988).  The Felder Court stated that "enforcement of the 
notice-of-claim statute in § 1983 actions brought in state court 
so interferes with and frustrates the substantive right Congress 
created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must yield to the 
federal interest."  Id. at 151.  The Felder Court concluded as 
follows: 
 
[Wisconsin] may not alter the outcome of federal 
claims it chooses to entertain in its courts by 
demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules 
that are inapplicable when such claims are brought in 
federal court . . . .  [A] state court may not decline 
to hear an otherwise properly presented federal claim 
because that claim would be barred under a state law 
requiring timely filing of notice.  State courts 
simply are not free to vindicate the substantive 
interests underlying a state rule of decision at the 
expense of the federal right.   
                                                                  
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person 
who performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for 
the defendant . . . sub-division . . . and the claim 
is disallowed.  
 
No. 96-2470 
 
10
Id. at 152. 
¶22 Under the Felder case, the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims 
are not barred by the plaintiffs' failure to comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  The question then becomes whether the 
plaintiffs' claims, other than the § 1983 claims, are barred by 
the failure to file a notice of claim. 
¶23 An examination of the complaint (as amended) reveals 
that the § 1983 claims and the state claims are closely related.8 
 The plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are based on the same factual 
allegations giving rise to the state claims, and the § 1983 
claims are premised on violations of the state public trust 
doctrine.  Therefore, the crux of this case is the state public 
trust doctrine, which recognizes that the state holds beds of 
navigable waters in trust for all Wisconsin citizens.  See 
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 501, 53 N.W.2d 514 
(1952).  The origins of the public trust doctrine date back at 
                     
8 The complaint alleges two different claims under both 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Const.  First, 
the complaint alleges that the City's execution of the lease 
with Minergy Corporation constitutes a state action depriving 
the plaintiffs of their interest in the use of the area held in 
trust by the state for the public's benefit, in violation of 
Wis. const., art. XI, § 3a; the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  This claim states that the 
City violated the plaintiffs' property rights under the takings 
clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
Second, the complaint alleges that the City's lease with 
Minergy Corporation deprives the plaintiffs of their interest in 
land held in trust by the state for the benefit of the State's 
citizens without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment and § 1983.  This claim states that the City violated 
the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. 
No. 96-2470 
 
11
least to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Wis. const., art. 
IX, § 1.9 
¶24 Although the public trust doctrine was originally 
designed to protect commercial navigation, the doctrine has been 
expanded to safeguard the public's use of navigable waters for 
enjoyment of natural scenic beauty, as well as for recreational 
and nonpecuniary purposes.  See State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 
91, 104, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987); Muench, 261 Wis. at 492.  The 
legislature has the primary authority to administer the public 
trust and has the power of regulation to effectuate the purposes 
of the public trust.10   
¶25 The public trust doctrine allows a person to sue on 
behalf of, and in the name of, the State "for the purpose of 
vindicating the public trust."  State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 
                     
9 Wisconsin Const., art. IX, s. 1 provides: 
 
Jurisdiction on rivers and lakes; navigable waters.  
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all 
rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways 
and 
forever 
free, 
as 
well 
as 
to 
the 
inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the 
United States, without any tax, impost or duty 
therefor. 
 
10 For other cases discussing the public trust doctrine, 
see, e.g., State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492 
(1983); Ashwaubenon v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 38, 48-
49, 125 N.W.2d 647 (1963). 
No. 96-2470 
 
12
13, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).  It is through the public trust 
doctrine that the plaintiffs bring their suit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.294. 
¶26 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 30.294 
provides 
that: 
"Every 
violation of this chapter is declared to be a public nuisance 
and may be prohibited by injunction and may be abated by legal 
action brought by any person."  The plaintiffs requested the 
equitable remedy of a permanent injunction in their complaint in 
this case.  While they are no longer seeking that remedyone 
specifically allowed by Wis. Stat. § 30.294the fact that 
enforcement of the public trust doctrine can be achieved by 
injunction 
is 
significant 
to 
our 
determination 
of 
the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).   
¶27 Injunctive relief is usually requested simultaneously 
with, or soon after, commencing an action by a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction.    
A 
permanent 
injunction 
"is 
designed 
to 
prevent 
injury . . . and . . . may 
issue 
merely 
upon 
proof 
of 
a 
sufficient threat of future irreparable injury."  Pure Milk 
Prod. Coop. v. National Farmers Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 802, 280 
N.W.2d 691 (1979).  Because the goal in the issuance of a 
permanent injunction is to prevent injury, "it is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to wait until some injury has been done."  Id. 
  
¶28 It is with the nature of the public trust doctrine and 
the preventative goals of injunctive relief in mind that we 
consider the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) to the 
No. 96-2470 
 
13
claim under Wis. Stat. § 30.294 in this case.  As stated, 
§ 893.80(1)(b) prevents a plaintiff from bringing a cause of 
action against a governmental body unless the plaintiff provides 
to the governmental body a notice of claim.  The purpose of 
§ 893.80(1)(b) is "to provide the governmental subdivision an 
opportunity to compromise and settle a claim without costly and 
time-consuming litigation."  City of Racine, 575 N.W.2d at 714. 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.294 expressly allows a plaintiff 
to seek immediate injunctive relief to prevent injury.  The 
enforcement procedures provided in § 30.294, are inconsistent 
with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), which requires a plaintiff to 
provide a governmental body with a notice of claim, and to wait 
120 days or until the claim is disallowed before filing an 
action.  Therefore, the general application of § 893.80(1)(b) in 
this 
case 
frustrates 
the 
plaintiffs' 
specific 
right 
to 
injunctive relief under § 30.294.   
¶30 Where general and specific statutory provisions are in 
conflict, the specific provisions take precedence.  See State ex 
rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 596, 547 
N.W.2d 587 (1996).  Therefore, the specific procedures set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 30.294 "take precedence over the general notice 
provisions of § 893.80." Id.  Thus, the plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) in this case does not bar 
their state claims brought in accord with § 30.294. 
¶31 Our 
analysis 
of 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) in this case is consistent with this court's 
decision in Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d 585.  In Auchinleck, we 
No. 96-2470 
 
14
created an exception to the application of § 893.80(1)(b) in 
regard to open meetings and open records laws because of the 
specific enforcement provisions of the statutes involved.  See 
id. at 596.  Under the open records law at issue in Auchinleck, 
a requester may immediately bring a mandamus action seeking 
release of records if a municipality withholds or delays access 
to a record.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.37.  In addition, under the 
open meetings law, a complainant had to first file a complaint 
with the district attorney.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(1).  If the 
district attorney failed to bring an enforcement action within 
20 days, the complainant could immediately file suit against the 
municipality, seeking declaratory or other appropriate relief.  
See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(4).  Notwithstanding these provisions of 
the open records and opening meetings laws, however, the 
municipality in Auchinleck argued that the notice of claim 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) 
required 
that 
a 
complainant wait 120 days after filing a notice of claim, or 
until the municipality disallowed the claim, to file suit 
against the municipality.  
 ¶32 Faced 
with 
these 
somewhat 
inconsistent 
statutory 
provisions, we had to ascertain the legislature’s intent in 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  See Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d 
at 594.  Having determined that the legislative intent of the 
open records and open meetings laws conflicted with the intent 
of § 893.80(1)(b), we followed the cardinal rule of statutory 
interpretation that a specific statute takes precedence over a 
general statute.  See id. at 595-96.  In Auchinleck, therefore, 
No. 96-2470 
 
15
we held that the specific enforcement procedures of the open 
meetings and open records laws took precedence over the general 
notice requirements of § 893.80(1).  See id. at 595-96.   
¶33 The 
concurring opinion states that 
this court's 
position regarding the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) 
is "unpredictable." Concurring op. at 12.  As part of its 
argument, the concurrence asserts that this court has not 
previously decided "whether noncompliance with the notice of 
claim statute would deprive the court of the power to proceed." 
 Id. at 11.  Citing Wis. Stat. § 893.82 as an analogy, the 
concurrence suggests that failure to give notice in accord with 
§ 893.80(1)(b) may be jurisidictional and, therefore, "may not 
be waived by the defendant's failure to plead noncompliance as 
an affirmative defense."  Id. at 12.  We disagree. 
¶34 The concurring opinion correctly states that in Figgs 
v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984), 
this court concluded that the notice of claim filed pursuant to 
§ 893.80(1)(b) in that case was sufficient.  However, this court 
did recognize that the court of appeals in Figgs had determined 
that the notice of claim was defective.  Accordingly, this court 
 found it necessary to determine whether noncompliance with 
§ 893.80(1)(b) is an issue that may be waived by a defendant, or 
whether compliance with § 893.80(1)(b) involves an issue of the 
court's jurisdiction or power to proceed which may not be 
wavied.  See id. at 50-51.   
 
[W]e point out that this court has stated that these 
statutory conditions or conditions precedent [in Wis. 
No. 96-2470 
 
16
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b)] have nothing to do with subject 
matter jurisdiction of a circuit court.  Lees v. ILHR 
Department, 49 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 182 N.W.2d 245 
(1971); Galloway v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 414, 419, 145 
N.W.2d 761, 147 N.W.2d 542 (1966).  They deal only 
with the appropriate conditions set by the legislature 
as a prerequisite for commencing or maintaining an 
action.  Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on 
the circuit courts by the constitution.  In the Matter 
of the Guardianship of Ebarhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 
550, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).  Whether or not a proper 
claim 
has 
been 
filed, 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
jurisdiction of the subject matter. 
Id. at 51-52 n.6.11    
¶35 The concurring opinion also argues that our reliance 
on the immediate enforcement remedy of injunctive relief in Wis. 
Stat. § 30.294 is misplaced because the injunction in this case 
was not filed against the City, the injunction sought in the 
complaint was a permanent rather than a preliminary injunction, 
and the plaintiffs waited approximately 165 days from the date 
the City of Neenah and Mineargy entered into the lease before 
filing their claim.  None of these asserted distinctions alter 
our analysis. 
                     
11 The concurrence would likely argue that because the 
jurisdictional issue was not dispositive in this court's 
decision in Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 357 
N.W.2d 548 (1984), this statement is dicta.  However, this court 
has previously stated that "when a court of last resort 
intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question 
germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, 
such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court 
which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision."  
Chase v. Ameircan Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 
(1922).  See also State v. Taylor, 205 Wis. 2d 664, 670, 556 
N.W.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 
No. 96-2470 
 
17
¶36 We conclude that there is an exception to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) where the plaintiffs' claims are brought pursuant 
to the public trust doctrine under Wis. Stat. § 30.294, which 
provides injunctive relief as a specific enforcement remedy.  It 
is irrelevant that the requested injunction in this case was not 
against the City of Neenah.  Against whom the injunctive relief 
is sought is not a significant factor.  Rather, our conclusion 
rests upon the fact that the plaintiffs brought this action in 
the name of the State to stop a violation of the public trust 
doctrine, and that injunctive relief is a specific enforcement 
remedy available under § 30.294.    
¶37 Similarly, it is irrelevant that the plaintiffs here 
did not request a preliminary injunction.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 30.294 provides for enforcement through an injunction.  The 
statutory language is not limited to enforcement only through a 
permanent injunction, and a request for a permanent injunction 
in a complaint may often be accompanied by a request for a 
preliminary injunction. 
¶38 Finally, the record in this case shows that the reason 
the plaintiffs did not immediately file an action against the 
City of Neenah and Minergy is because they attempted to resolve 
the issue through other means.  The City of Neenah and Minergy 
entered into the lease on December 6, 1995. Soon after, the 
plaintiffs  requested a public meeting to voice objection to the 
lease, and a public meeting was held on January 23, 1996.  See 
Record on appeal 16:2.  Additional public meetings were held, 
and the City received further written and oral commentary 
No. 96-2470 
 
18
opposing the lease.  It was not until April 22, 1996, that the 
DNR made its decision that an Environmental Impact Statement was 
not required.  See id. at 16:110.  On April 30, 1996, the DNR 
issued the Final Air Pollution Control Construction Permit for 
Minergy to construct and operate the glass aggregate plant. See 
id. at 16:3.  Less than one month later, on May 22, 1996, the 
plaintiffs filed their Summons and Complaint in this case.  
Thus, the concurring opinion's conclusion that "the plaintiffs 
clearly had sufficient time to comply with the notice of claim 
statute" is unfounded.  See Concurring op. at 5. 
¶39 Based upon the nature of the plaintiffs' claims 
brought in the name of the State to vindicate the public trust; 
the fact that the plainitffs' complaint could under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.294 and, in fact, did request injunctive relief; and the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), we conclude that the 
unique circumstances of this case provide an exception to the 
notice of claim requirements.12  As such, the plaintiffs failure 
                     
12 We do not understand the concurring opinion's conclusion 
to the effect that our holding is premised upon "no governing 
rule or principle."  Concurring op. at 2.  As set forth in the 
above discussion, our decision concluding that there is a narrow 
exception to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), for claims filed under 
Wis. Stat. § 30.294, is premised upon the unique nature of a 
claim brought to enforce the public trust doctrine in the name 
of the State, combined with the fact that § 30.294 provides 
injunctive relief as a specific enforcement remedy.  Even if 
this court may find it necessary to recognize other exceptions 
to the requirements of § 893.80(1)(b) in the future, we should 
not undertake a re-write of the statute as the concurring 
opinion suggests.  See Concurring op. at 8.  We decline the 
invitation 
to 
take 
on 
a 
policy-making 
function 
more 
appropriately left to the legislature.  See Gaertner v. Holcka, 
No. 96-2726, unpublished slip op. (S. Ct. June 26, 1998). 
No. 96-2470 
 
19
to comply with § 893.80(1)(b) in this case does not bar their 
claims brought in accord with § 30.294. 
III 
¶40 We next determine whether the public trust doctrine 
enables a citizen to directly sue a private party whom the 
citizen believes was inadequately regulated by the DNR.  This 
question 
is a question 
of 
law that 
this 
court decides 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court, 
benefiting 
from 
its 
analysis.  See Northbridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 
918, 923, 471 N.W.2d 179 (1991).   
¶41 On appellate review of a motion to dismiss the 
complaint, we treat as true the facts presented in the complaint 
(as amended) and the stipulation of facts, as well as all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts.13  We 
construe all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.  
See id. at 923-24. 
¶42 As stated, the public trust doctrine "establishes 
standing for the state, or any person suing in the name of the 
state for the purpose of vindicating the public trust, to assert 
a cause of action recognized by the existing law of Wisconsin." 
  Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 13.  Therefore, we look to the statutes 
enacted pursuant to the public trust doctrine to determine 
whether the plaintiffs may bring this suit. 
                     
13 The parties agree that the circuit court treated the case 
as a motion to dismiss based on the complaint (as amended) and 
the stipulation of facts, not as a motion for summary judgment.  
No. 96-2470 
 
20
¶43 Wisconsin Stats. ch. 30, enacted pursuant to the 
public trust doctrine, governs navigable waters and navigation 
in Wisconsin.  The plaintiffs assert that Wis. Stat. § 30.294 
gives them standing to bring an action against the defendants.  
Section 30.294 provides that "every violation of this chapter 
[30] is declared to be a public nuisance and may be prohibited 
by injunction and may be abated by legal action brought by any 
person" (emphasis added).  Thus § 30.294 expressly contemplates 
citizen suits irrespective of the DNR'S actions or enforcement 
decisions. 
¶44 The 
plaintiffs 
allege 
that 
the 
defendants 
have 
violated Wis. Stat. § 30.12, which is "a codification of the 
common law restriction against encroachments on publicly held 
lakebeds."  Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 102 (citing Hixon v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 616, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966)).14  In 
§ 30.12 the legislature declared that it is unlawful to place 
any structure on a bed of a navigable water unless a permit has 
been granted by the DNR or the structure is authorized by 
statute.15  The plaintiffs allege that Minergy Corporation did 
not obtain the permits from the DNR. 
                     
14 See also Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 467; Sterlingworth 
Condominium Ass'n v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 723, 556 N.W.2d 791 
(Ct. App. 1996); Cassidy v. DNR, 132 Wis. 2d 153, 158, 390 
N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1986). 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.12(1) states: 
(1) GENERAL PROHIBITION.  Except as provided under 
sub. (4), unless a permit has been granted by the 
department pursuant to statute or the legislature has 
No. 96-2470 
 
21
¶45 The City and Minergy Corporation raise two defenses to 
the plaintiffs' public nuisance claim under Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12 
and 30.294.  First, the City and Minergy Corporation argue that 
the DNR's decision to forego public trust claims in accordance 
with Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4)(a) defeats the plaintiffs' public 
nuisance claim under § 30.294.  Second, the City and Minergy 
Corporation argue that § 30.12(1), the provision the plaintiffs 
claim was violated, does not apply in this case because the 
Grant Area is not a bed of navigable water.16  
¶46 The City and Minergy Corporation first argue that the 
legislature has delegated to the DNR the exclusive authority to 
decide when a public trust violation has occurred and that after 
the DNR decides to allow a project to proceed, as it did in this 
case, all persons are barred from challenging the disputed 
project under Wis. Stat. § 30.294. 
¶47 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 30.03(4)(a) 
sets 
forth 
the 
procedures for the DNR to follow when it learns of a possible 
violation of the statutes relating to navigable waters or a 
possible infringement of the public rights relating to navigable 
                                                                  
otherwise 
authorized 
structures 
or 
deposits 
in 
navigable waters, it is unlawful: 
 
(a) To deposit any material or to place any structure 
upon the bed of any navigable water where no 
bulkhead line has been established; or 
(b) To deposit any material or to place any structure 
upon the bed of any navigable water beyond a 
lawfully established bulkhead line.  
(c)  
16 Glatfelter Company joins the City and Minergy Corporation 
in this defense. 
No. 96-2470 
 
22
waters.17  According to the City and Minergy Corporation, the 
DNR, by entering into the Settlement Agreement with the 
defendants, 
decided 
to 
forego 
the 
public 
trust 
claims.  
Therefore, the City and Minergy Corporation argue, whatever 
right the plaintiffs may have had to challenge the Minergy 
facility was forfeited when the DNR entered into the Settlement 
Agreement.  The City and Minergy Corporation assert that the 
plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a public nuisance claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 30.294; their only recourse is to challenge 
the DNR's actions under the administrative review process 
established in Wis. Stat. ch. 227. 
¶48 The City and Minergy Corporation are, in essence, 
asking this court to amend Wis. Stat. § 30.294 by grafting onto 
the statute an exception.  The statute then would read as 
follows:  "Every violation of this chapter  . . .  may be abated 
by legal action brought by any person except where the DNR has 
decided not to seek enforcement action itself for the violation" 
(underscored portion reflects the language grafted onto the 
statute by the City and Minergy Corporation). 
                     
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.03(4)(a) provides in pertinent part: 
If the department learns of a possible violation of 
the statutes relating to navigable waters, and the 
department determines that the public interest may not 
be adequately served by imposition of a penalty or 
forfeiture, the department may proceed as provided in 
this paragraph, either in lieu of or in addition to 
any other relief provided by law.  The department may 
order a hearing under ch. 227 concerning the possible 
violation or infringement . . .  
No. 96-2470 
 
23
¶49 We agree with the amicus brief of the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice that the position advanced by the City and 
Minergy Corporation has no basis in statutory language or 
legislative history. 
¶50 The text of Wis. Stat. § 30.294 expressly states that 
a violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 "may be abated by legal action 
brought by any person."  We can discern nothing in chapter 30 to 
allow us to read an exception into § 30.294 that would disallow 
the plaintiffs' suit in this case. 
¶51 In addition, the legislative history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.294 contravenes the argument advanced by the City and 
Minergy Corporation that the creation of the DNR implicitly 
limits the application of 
§ 30.294 
in this 
case. 
 The 
legislature authorized citizens to bring actions to abate 
unauthorized structures in public waters both before and after 
the creation of the DNR in 1967.18  
¶52 As far back as 1917, the legislature provided that 
public nuisances may be enjoined and abated by citizen suits.  
See § 25, ch. 474, Laws of 1917.  A more recent precursor to 
Wis. Stat. § 30.294 provided that "every obstruction constructed 
or maintained in or over any navigable waters of this state in 
violation of this chapter is declared to be a public nuisance, 
and the construction thereof may be enjoined and the maintenance 
thereof may be abated by action at the suit of the state or any 
                     
18 The DNR was created in 1967.  Section 3, ch. 327, Laws of 
1967. 
No. 96-2470 
 
24
citizen thereof" (emphasis added).  Section 30.15(4), ch. 441, 
Laws of 1959.  The 1959 legislature thus expressly recognized 
the citizen's right to enjoin and abate public nuisances as 
separate and independent from the state's right to enjoin and 
abate public nuisances.  The legislature enacted the present 
form of § 30.294 in 1987, 1987 Wis. Act. 374, § 78, 20 years 
after the creation of the DNR. 
¶53 Neither the text nor the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 30.294 indicates that a citizen's right to abate public 
nuisances is contingent on the DNR's actions or enforcement 
decisions or is circumscribed by the procedures set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 30.03(4)(a). Thus we conclude that the DNR's decision 
stated in the Settlement Agreement to forego enforcement of the 
public trust claims does not defeat the plaintiffs' public 
nuisance claim under Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  
¶54 The second defense raised by the defendants to the 
plaintiffs' Wis. Stat. ch. 30 public nuisance claim is that Wis. 
Stat. § 30.12(1) does not apply to the Minergy facility or the 
actions of the Glatfelter Company because the area in issue was 
never lakebed and the waters were not navigable.   
¶55 The brief of the City and Minergy Corporation points 
out that the issue of the navigability of the water in the area 
involved in this case and the effects of accretions or passage 
of time on public trust characteristics of the area are in 
dispute in this case and must be adjudicated.  See also 
Settlement Agreement discussed at pp. 3-4 above.  The brief of 
No. 96-2470 
 
25
the City and Minergy Corporation comments on the dispute as 
follows:  
 
Although [the plaintiffs'] lawsuit presupposes that 
the area in question was once "lakebed," this has not 
been adjudicated and is not free from dispute.  It 
remains to be shown whether and to what extent the 
area (which was never covered by more than a few 
inches of water even at the time of filling) was 
navigable at the time of the Northwest Ordinance, 
before the Fox River was dammed.  Even if it was, it 
remains to be determined whether the accretions/or 
passage of time destroyed its purported "public trust" 
characteristics.  And, despite the name, there is a 
legitimate argument that Little Lake Butte des Morts 
is a river (in which case the riparian rights of 
landowners may be materially greater).   
Brief for the City and Minergy Corporation at 3 n.1.  
¶56 This defense raises, as the defendants concede, an 
issue that must be adjudicated.  It cannot be determined on a 
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.  The 
complaint asserts that the Grant Area involves a bed of 
navigable water and that portions of Little Lake Butte des Morts 
are navigable waters.  We accept these assertions as true for 
purposes of determining whether the plaintiffs' complaint (as 
amended) allows them to directly sue the defendants under Wis. 
Stat. § 30.294. 
¶57 For the reasons we have set forth previously, we hold 
that the plaintiffs may bring suit under Wis. Stat. § 30.294 
against the defendants to abate a public nuisance.   
¶58 The 
plaintiffs' 
numerous 
claims 
appear 
to 
be 
interconnected and involve, in one form or another, the 
plaintiffs' assertion that the Minergy lease and Glatfelter 
No. 96-2470 
 
26
Company's conduct are violations of the public trust doctrine.  
Without a developed factual record in this case, we do not 
address further the plaintiffs' various claims for relief.  We 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause 
to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
1 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (Concurring).   
Although I agree that the plaintiffs' failure to file a notice 
of claim with the City of Neenah pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) (1993-94)19 does not bar the plaintiffs' action 
against the City, I cannot join Part II of the per curiam 
opinion for several reasons. 
¶60 First and fundamentally, the holding of the per curiam 
opinion is not applicable to the facts of this case.  The per 
curiam opinion holds that because the plaintiffs' complaint 
sought injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 30.294, no notice of 
claim need be filed with the City.  In this case, however, the 
plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief against the City; they 
sought a permanent injunction only against Minergy Corporation, 
a private corporation.  Therefore, the holding of the per curiam 
opinion does not apply to this case. 
¶61 Although claiming to adhere to DNR v. City of 
Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994), the per curiam 
opinion essentially overrules the Waukesha case by holding that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) does not apply to claims for permanent 
injunctive relief brought under Wis. Stat. § 30.294.  The bench 
and bar would be better served if the per curiam opinion would 
acknowledge forthrightly the effect of its holding, namely 
making § 893.80(1)(b) inapplicable to claims for injunctive 
relief against governmental bodies. 
                     
19 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
2 
¶62 Second, if the Waukesha case is not overruled, I would 
hold that the plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim does 
not require dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against the 
City.  The plaintiffs have asserted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for 
relief against the City.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) is not 
applicable to the § 1983 claims.  See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 
131 (1988). 
¶63 Third, I can discern no governing rule or principle in 
the court's creation of various exceptions to the notice of 
claim requirement.  I believe our decisions regarding Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) leave attorneys and circuit courts uncertain 
about when a notice of claim must be filed, calling into 
question the status of cases that are pending in or already 
decided by the courts. 
I 
¶64 The 
per 
curiam 
opinion 
holds 
that 
because 
the 
plaintiffs sought an injunction under Wis. Stat. § 30.294 
against Minergy Corporation, they need not file a notice of 
claim with the City.20  The underlying rationale for this holding 
is that a request for an injunction under § 30.294 requires 
immediate court action and there is not enough time to file a 
notice of claim and wait the prescribed 120 days for the City to 
disallow the claim.  See per curiam op. at 12.  
                     
20 The per curiam opinion reasons that "the fact that 
enforcement of the public trust doctrine can be achieved by 
injunction 
is 
significant 
to 
our 
determination 
of 
the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b)."  Per curiam op. at 
12. 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
3 
¶65 The 
holding 
of 
the 
per 
curiam 
opinion 
is 
not 
applicable to the facts of this case.  The plaintiffs in this 
case did not seek an injunction against the City.  They sought 
an injunction against another defendant to the action, Minergy 
Corporation, to halt Minergy Corporation's construction of a 
glass aggregate plant.  The fact that the plaintiffs sought 
injunctive relief against a defendant other than the City does 
not excuse the plaintiffs from filing a notice of claim with the 
City. 
¶66 In addition, the rationale of the per curiam opinion 
does not fit the facts of this case and directly contradicts the 
Waukesha case.  The per curiam opinion reasons that because Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.294 
expressly 
allows 
the 
plaintiffs 
to 
seek 
"immediate" injunctive relief to prevent injury, the general 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), frustrates the plaintiffs' 
specific right to "immediate" injunctive relief under § 30.294. 
 Per curiam op. at 13.  
¶67 The per curiam opinion relies on State ex rel. 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 587 
(1996), which held that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) does not apply 
to the open records law.  The open records law requires that the 
record custodian fill or deny a request for a record "as soon as 
practicable and without delay."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4).  As 
Auchinleck and the per curiam opinion make clear, time is of the 
essence in the open records law, which sets forth a detailed 
procedure to govern both the requester in obtaining a record and 
the custodian of the record in granting or denying the request. 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
4 
 The focus of the open records law is to facilitate speedy 
access to records. 
¶68 Unlike the open records law, Wis. Stat. § 30.294 does 
not set forth a procedure for injunctive relief or a specific 
enforcement mechanism.  Section 30.294 merely provides that 
violations of chapter 30 "may be prohibited by injunction and 
may be abated by legal action."  Although the per curiam opinion 
asserts that § 30.294 provides a specific enforcement mechanism, 
the statute in fact does not.  Injunctions brought under 
§ 30.294, like injunctions generally, are governed by ch. 813, 
which sets forth mechanisms for injunctive relief. 
¶69 Even 
if 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 30.294 
were 
silent 
about 
injunctive relief, a claimant could still seek an injunction to 
abate a public nuisance.  A statute need not specify that 
injunctive relief is available for a claimant to seek an 
injunction.  See State v. Seigel, 163 Wis. 2d 871, 892, 472 
N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1991).  "Wisconsin courts may enjoin public 
nuisances pursuant to their vested equitable powers."  Seigel, 
163 Wis. 2d at 892-93; see also State v. Weller, 109 Wis. 2d 
665, 675, 327 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1983).  Thus contrary to the 
per curiam opinion's assertion, § 30.294 provides no specific 
enforcement mechanism. 
¶70 Furthermore, the per curiam opinion repeatedly equates 
injunctive relief with immediacy.  According to the per curiam 
opinion, in all actions seeking an injunction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.294, time is of the essence, and an injunction therefore is 
inconsistent with the notice of claim and the 120-day waiting 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
5 
period contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  See per curiam 
op. at 12. 
¶71 The per curiam opinion obfuscates the differences 
between a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction.  A 
preliminary injunction is a pretrial remedy that is granted to 
preserve the status quo and to prevent harm while an action is 
pending.  A permanent injunction is granted upon a final 
decision in the case, which may come many months or years after 
an action is brought. 
¶72 Waukesha made clear that unless preliminary injunctive 
relief is requested, a notice of claim must be filed with the 
defendant city.  The Waukesha court held that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) 
applies 
to 
an 
action 
against 
a 
city 
for 
injunctive relief.  The Waukesha court reasoned that because no 
preliminary injunctive relief was requested in that case, the 
claimant 
had 
sufficient 
time 
to 
comply 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b).  See Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 193 n.10.  
¶73 In this case the plaintiffs did not seek a preliminary 
injunction.  Moreover, the plaintiffs waited nearly six months 
(about 165 days) after the lease was signed by the City and 
Minergy Corporation before bringing an action against the City 
and the other defendants.21  The lease authorized Minergy 
Corporation to construct and operate a glass aggregate plant.  
The plaintiffs thus were on notice that construction of the 
                     
21 The City of Neenah and Minergy Corporation entered into 
the lease on December 6, 1995.  The plaintiffs did not file 
their action until May 22, 1996.  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
6 
proposed Minergy facility had been authorized by the City.  The 
plaintiffs had plenty of time to seek a preliminary injunction. 
 Having waited nearly six months to bring their action, the 
plaintiffs clearly had sufficient time to comply with the notice 
of claim statute.  If the per curiam opinion were adhering to 
Waukesha as it purports to do, it would have to conclude that 
the plaintiffs in this case had adequate time to file a notice 
of claim and to wait 120 days for the City to disallow the 
claim.  
¶74 According to the per curiam opinion, the plaintiffs 
who sought an injunction in this case against a private 
corporation for allegedly violating navigable waters law need 
not have filed a notice of claim with the City.  By contrast, 
the claimant in Waukesha (the state Department of Natural 
Resources) that sought an injunction against the city of 
Waukesha for allegedly violating drinking water standards was 
required to file a notice of claim.  The per curiam opinion 
provides no basis for this distinction. 
¶75 Two additional problems are raised in the per curiam 
opinion.  The per curiam opinion errs in its rationale that "the 
specific procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 30.294 'take 
precedence over the general notice provisions of § 893.80.'"  
Per curiam op. at 13.  The per curiam opinion misapplies this 
rule of statutory construction.  The rule that the specific 
statute controls applies only where both statutes relate to the 
same subject matter.  See Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 65 
Wis. 2d 153, 161, 222 N.W.2d 156 (1974); Frostman v. State Farm 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
7 
Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Wis. 2d 138, 144, 491 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 
1992).  The per curiam opinion does not explain why these two 
statutes relate to the same subject matter or why § 30.294 is 
the more specific statute.  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 893.80 has 
been interpreted as directing that when a claim against a 
governmental body is based on another statute, the notice 
provisions of § 893.80(1) nevertheless apply.  See Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d at 192-93.22  
¶76 Finally, the per curiam opinion errs in relying on the 
fact that the plaintiffs' suit was brought in the name of the 
State.  The plaintiffs in this case alleged in their complaint 
that they were bringing suit as individuals and in the name of 
the State.  The plaintiffs' right to sue under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.294 is not contingent on their bringing suit in the name of 
the State.  Section 30.294 expressly states, "Every violation of 
this chapter . . . may be abated by legal action brought by any 
person."  Section 30.294 makes no reference to the State and in 
no way limits suits to those brought by individuals in the name 
of the State. 
                     
22 The Waukesha court concluded that Wis. Stat. §  893.80(5) 
"only directs that when a claim is based on another statute, the 
damage limitations of sec. 893.80(3) do not apply.  Section 
893.80(5) does not say that the notice provisions of sec. 
893.80(1) do not apply."  Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 192-93. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(5) provides in pertinent part:  
"When rights or remedies are provided by any other statute 
against any political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency or any officer, official, agent or employe thereof for 
injury, damage or death, such statute shall apply and the 
limitations in sub. (3) shall be inapplicable."  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
8 
¶77 In addition, the per curiam opinion's reasoning defies 
this court's precedent.  The Waukesha court held that the 
Department of Natural Resources, the state regulatory agency 
entrusted with enforcing state environmental laws, was not 
exempt from the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  The 
Waukesha court explained, "Our holding today, that the state 
must comply with sec. 893.80(1), applies to all actions that are 
covered by the statutenot just DNR enforcement proceedings."  
Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 196.  Under the per curiam opinion's 
reasoning 
the 
State 
is 
not 
exempt 
from 
complying 
with 
§ 893.80(1)(b) but citizens suing in the name of the State are. 
¶78 In short, the holding and rationale of the per curiam 
opinion do not apply to the facts of this case, and directly 
contradict Waukesha.  The plaintiffs brought an injunction 
against Minergy Corporation, not the City.  The plaintiffs 
sought a permanent injunction, not a preliminary injunction, and 
thus had adequate time to file a notice of claim.  Therefore, 
the plaintiffs were required under Waukesha to comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b). 
¶79 The per curiam opinion carves out an exception to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) that is not supported by either the facts 
or the law.  The per curiam opinion asserts that the exception 
is confined to "the unique circumstances of this case."  Per 
curiam op. at 15.  The circumstances of seeking an injunction 
under Wis. Stat. § 30.294, however, are not unique.  Several 
statutes, as well as the common law, expressly recognize the 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
9 
right of a person to seek an injunction, including one to abate 
a public nuisance.23  
¶80 The per curiam opinion opens the door for many 
claimants to argue for an exemption from the provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  Under the per curiam opinion, a claimant 
need only insert a request for injunctive relief in a complaint 
to be exempt from the notice of claim provision.  According to 
the per curiam opinion, a claimant need not even pursue or win 
on the request for injunctive relief. 
¶81 The per curiam opinion's holding in effect overrules 
Waukesha, significantly undercuts City of Racine v. Waste 
Facility Siting Bd., 216 Wis. 2d 616, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998),24 
and returns the case law to pre-Waukesha decisions that required 
a notice of claim in suits for money damages, but not for 
injunctive relief. 
¶82 If the per curiam opinion forthrightly held that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) does not apply to injunctive relief, I 
would join the opinion.  Excluding injunctions from the 
application of § 893.80(1)(b) comports with the purpose and 
operation of the statute. 
II 
                     
23 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 823.01; 157.70(8)(a); and 
66.032(7)(b); see also Wis. Stat. ch. 813 (governing injunctions 
generally). 
24 The court in City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Bd., 
216 Wis. 2d 616, 622, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998), relied heavily on 
Waukesha.  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
10
¶83 If I were to adhere to Waukesha, I would hold that the 
plaintiffs' action against the City should not be dismissed.  
The plaintiffs have asserted § 1983 claims that are based on the 
same factual allegations giving rise to the state law claims and 
that are premised on violations of the state public trust 
doctrine.  See per curiam op. at 10.  Dismissing the plaintiffs' 
§ 1983 claims for failure to file a notice of claim would be 
contrary to the principles articulated in Felder, 487 U.S. 131. 
¶84 In Felder the United States Supreme Court stated that 
"enforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in § 1983 actions 
brought in state court so interferes with and frustrates the 
substantive right Congress created that, under the Supremacy 
Clause, it must yield to the federal interest."  Felder, 487 
U.S. at 151. 
III 
¶85 Since the court held in the 1994 Waukesha decision 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) "applies in all actions, not just 
in tort actions," Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 183, 202,25 this court 
has decided three other cases in which a claimant's failure to 
comply 
with 
the 
notice 
of 
claim 
requirement 
has 
been 
                     
25 The Waukesha court stated that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) 
explicitly exempts only two causes of action from the notice of 
claim requirement:  medical malpractice actions and actions for 
the negligent inspection of property.  See Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 
at 190 n.7. 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
11
challenged.26  In Racine, 216 Wis. 2d at 630, the court strictly 
adhered to Waukesha.  The Racine court stated that it had "no 
alternative 
under 
[§ 893.80(1)(b)] 
and 
case 
law" 
but 
to 
stringently apply § 893.80(1)(b) to all actions as "our hands 
are tied by the plain language of § 893.80(1)(b)."  Racine, 216 
Wis. 2d at 628-29.   
¶86 However, in two cases, including this case, the court 
carved out exceptions to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) and the "all 
actions" language of Waukesha.27 
¶87 What is the collective result of these four decisions? 
In short, "all actions" means all actions except when the court 
says otherwise.  I cannot discern what governing principle or 
rule guides the court in recognizing exceptions to the notice of 
claim statute, and the per curiam opinion offers no guidance for 
identifying other potential exceptions to the statute. 
¶88 The importance of clarifying when a notice of claim 
must be filed under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) cannot be 
overstated.  Many cases in Wisconsin courts involve lawsuits in 
which governmental bodies or their officers, agents or employees 
are defendants.  Between September 1997 and June 1998, the 
defendants in about one fourth of the cases decided by this 
court were governmental bodies or their officers, agents or 
                     
26 See State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 
Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996); City of Racine v. Waste 
Facility Siting Bd., 216 Wis. 2d 616, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998); and 
the present case, Gillen v. City of Neenah, No. 96-2470, op. at 
__ (S. Ct. July __, 1998). 
27 See Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d at 597; Gillen, op. at __.  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
12
employees.  In some of these cases a notice of claim was filed.28 
 In other cases, according to the complaint, no notice of claim 
was apparently filed.29 
¶89 The court of appeals has held that a claimant's 
failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) deprives a 
court of the power to proceed.  See Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 
116 Wis. 2d 281, 286-87, 342 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd 
on other grounds, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984).30  In 
reviewing the court of appeals decision in Figgs, this court 
concluded that the notice of claim filed was sufficient and thus 
did not reach the question of whether noncompliance with the 
notice of claim statute would deprive the court of the power to 
proceed.  See Figgs, 121 Wis. 2d at 51.  This court stated, "If 
the court of appeals erred in respect to the sufficiency of the 
claim, as we conclude it did, we need not, for the purpose of 
deciding this case, explore whether an insufficient notice would 
deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction and render 
futile any assertions by a plaintiff of estoppel or laches."  
Figgs, 121 Wis. 2d at 51.   
                     
28 See, e.g., Morris v. Juneau County, No. 96-2507, op. at 
__ (S. Ct. June 30, 1998); Vivid v. Fiedler, No. 96-1900, op. at 
__ (S. Ct. July __, 1998). 
29 See, e.g., Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 559, 
575 N.W.2d 691 (1998); Sullivan v. Waukesha County, 1998 WL 
286449, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (1998). 
30 This court has not yet determined the status of an issue 
decided in a published court of appeals opinion when the court 
of appeals decision is subsequently reversed or affirmed by this 
court on other grounds.  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
13
¶90 The per curiam opinion errs in two respects.  First, 
it errs when it states that this court in Figgs reached and 
decided the question whether noncompliance with the notice of 
claims statute deprives a circuit court of the power to proceed. 
 See per curiam op. at 15-16.  The Figgs court did not decide 
this issue. 
¶91 Second, the per curiam misunderstands the language it 
quotes from a footnote in Figgs.  See per curiam op. at 15-16.  
The Figgs footnote merely explains the difference between 
subject matter jurisdiction and a circuit court's lack of power 
to proceed when a party has failed to comply with statutory 
requirements.  According to Figgs, a circuit court always has 
subject matter jurisdiction but may not have the competence, 
that is, the power to proceed, if the statutory requirements are 
not met.  See e.g., Sallie T. v. Milwaukee County Dep't of 
Health & Soc. Serv., No. 96-3147, op. at __ (S. Ct. June 24, 
1998) (parties' failure to extend a dispositional order resulted 
in the circuit court, which had subject matter jurisdiction, 
losing the power to afford relief to the parties).31 
                     
31 In recent years this court has used the term "competence" 
or "power to proceed" instead of the phrase "subject matter 
jurisdiction."  See Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 700, 
705-06 n.1, 495 N.W.2d 660 (1993); In Interest of B.J.N. and 
H.M.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 654 n.15, 656-58, 469 N.W.2d 845 
(1991); Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 51-52 n.6, 
357 N.W.2d 548 (1984); Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 
313 N.W.2d 790 (1982); In Interest of L.M.C., 146 Wis. 2d 377, 
390-92, 430 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1988).  
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
14
¶92 Several past cases have construed compliance with the 
precursor statutes to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) to be a 
condition precedent to the commencement32 or maintenance33 of an 
action, and have treated failure to file a notice of claim as 
fatal.34  The past cases are not readily reconcilable on this 
issue. 
¶93 In cases involving Wis. Stat. § 893.82, the notice of 
claim statute applicable to suits against the state or state 
employees, courts have concluded that failure to give notice is 
                                                                  
The critical focus, however, is not on the terminology used 
to describe a court's power to proceed, but on the effect of 
noncompliance with a statutory requirement on the court's power 
to proceed.  See Miller Brewing Co., 173 Wis. 2d at 706 n.1; 
B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 656-57; L.M.C., 146 Wis. 2d at 390-92. 
32 See, e.g., Foreway Express, Inc. v. Hilbert, 32 Wis. 2d 
371, 372, 145 N.W.2d 668 (1966); Seifert v. School Dist., 235 
Wis. 489, 497, 292 N.W. 286 (1940); Maynard v. DeVries, 224 Wis. 
224, 228, 272 N.W. 27 (1937).  
33 See, e.g., Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 2d 119, 
128, 168 N.W.2d 107 (1969).  
34 See Sambs v. Nowak, 47 Wis. 2d 158, 167, 177 N.W.2d 144 
(1970)(refusing to apply the estoppel doctrine to bar a 
governmental body from asserting defense of noncompliance with 
the notice of claim statute).  But see Fritsch v. St. Croix 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 183 Wis. 2d 336, 344, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 
1994)(applying equitable estoppel to bar a governmental body 
from using noncompliance with the notice of claim statute as a 
defense). 
No. 96-2470.ssa 
 
15
jurisdictional and may not be waived by the defendant's failure 
to plead noncompliance as an affirmative defense.35 
¶94 It is regrettable that the per curiam opinion has not 
taken the opportunity today to articulate the court's governing 
principle or rule in applying Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  The 
court's 
unpredictable 
application 
of 
§ 893.80(1)(b) 
leaves 
attorneys and courts guessing about when a notice of claim must 
be filed and calls into question the status of cases now pending 
or already decided by the courts. 
¶95 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
¶96 I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske 
and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
                     
35 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 Wis. 2d 720, 726, 348 
N.W.2d 554 (1984); Oney v. Schrauth, 197 Wis. 2d 891, 904, 541 
N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1995); J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State 
Bldg. Comm'n, 114 Wis. 2d 69, 83, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 
1983). 
Although Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), the municipal notice of 
claim statute, and Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3), the state notice of 
claim 
statute, 
have 
similar 
purposes, 
the 
statutes 
have 
significant differences.  See Lewis v. Sullivan, 188 Wis. 2d 
157, 169, 524 N.W.2d 630 (1994)(the notice provision of 
§ 893.82(3) does not apply to injunctive and declaratory 
relief).