Title: WORTH JAMES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. Herring
Citation: 412 S.W.2d 838
Docket Number: 5-4135
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 1967

412 S.W.2d 838 (1967) WORTH JAMES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Jean HERRING, Appellee. No. 5-4135. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 13, 1967. Rehearing Denied April 17, 1967. *839 Smith, Williams, Friday &amp; Bowen, by Boyce R. Love, Little Rock, for appellant. Patten &amp; Brown, by Gerland P. Patten, Little Rock, for appellee. JONES, Justice. We are called on here to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial on motion of the appellee who had been awarded $2,500.00 in an action for personal injuries. Indeed we are called on to determine whether or not the trial court even had any discretion in the matter where the action is for injury to the person, but having concluded that the verdict should have been set aside and a new trial granted for error in instruction, the trial court's discretion becomes a minor issue. Mrs. Jean Herring filed suit in the Pulaski County Circuit Court against Worth James Construction Company alleging damages for personal injuries as a proximate result of the negligence of defendant's truck driver in driving defendant's truck into the rear of plaintiff's automobile as she slowed down to make a right hand turn from the highway. *840 The case was tried to a jury and a verdict was returned for plaintiff in the amount of $2,500.00. The verdict was set aside by the trial court and a new trial granted on motion of the plaintiff, for the reason that the verdict was contrary to the law, contrary to the evidence, contrary to the law and the evidence, and for the further reason that an instruction given by the court over the objection of the plaintiff, was error. The defendant has appealed and relies on one point: On November 23, 1964, the appellee and the appellant's driver were driving their respective vehicles the same direction on Rodney Parham Road in Pulaski County with appellant's truck behind appellee's automobile. Appellant's truck driver "speeded up" to cross a bridge before an oncoming automobile came onto the bridge and after observing appellee slowing down ahead of him in preparation to turn from the roadway, appellant's driver skidded the truck sixty-six feet in an effort to stop, but was unable to avoid striking appellee's automobile. Appellee experienced neck, head and shoulder pains immediately following the collision. She was nervous and upset and the following morning she was vomiting and went to the doctor who prescribed muscle relaxants and medication for pain and to induce rest. This condition persisted and about two and a half weeks later appellee developed a "lump" or choking sensation in her throat which was also associated with vomiting. She also began experiencing low back pain, as well as the continued pain in the shoulders, head and neck. The appellee in this case had injured her neck in an automobile accident in January 1961. She had injured her back trying to start a power lawn mower on July 19 or 20, 1964, and she had experienced a period of vomiting over a period of a week to ten days during November and December 1961. On December 27, 1964, appellee was operated on for hiatal hernia and on March 1, 1965, for herniated intervertebral disc in the lumbar area of the back. The medical evidence is to the effect that neither of these conditions was caused by the collision of November 23, 1964, but that the symptoms of both conditions were aggravated by the collision. In connection with appellee's operation for the hiatal hernia, an incision was made from beneath the left breast to the right side of the abdomen. An additional incision was made in the left side through which a tube was inserted into the stomach for drainage following the operation, and appellee was fed intravenously for a period of five days. About the second or third day following the operation, appellee noticed the loss of sensation in two fingers on her right hand. The evidence is uncontroverted that this symptom was attributable to an injury in the nature of a bruise to the ulna nerve and the severity of this condition continued to increase until by April 14, 1965, there was an 80 to 100 per cent loss of the function of the ulna nerve in appellee's right arm. Although there had been considerable improvement, the function of this nerve had not been completely restored at the time of trial, and this damage to the ulna nerve was an element of damage alleged by appellee in her amended complaint. Appellant answered that the injury to the ulna nerve Dr. Kenneth Jones and Dr. Jack Downs were the only doctors who had treated the *841 appellee and were the only doctors who testified at the trial. As to the ulna nerve injury, Dr. Jones testified that he didn't see appellee when she first developed the ulna nerve symptoms and that he didn't know how it came on, but that he couldn't explain it on the basis of a rear end collision; that it came on during the period of time appellee was in the hospital for hernia surgery and that it is reasonable to assume something happened during that period of time. That any patient who is confined to bed may encounter these complications from simply being in bed and pushing themselves about. As to the ulna nerve injury, Dr. Downs testified that several days, he didn't remember exactly how many days, Dr. Downs testified that it would be a fair assumption that the injury to the ulna nerve arose out of the surgery and treatment for the hiatal hernia, and on cross examination, Dr. Downs testified as follows: At the close of the evidence, including the above medical testimony, as appellee's requested instruction No. 9, the court gave A.M.I. instruction 501 on "proximate cause" as follows: And over appellee's objections, the trial court gave as appellant's instruction No. 4, A.M.I. instruction No. 503, as follows: The appellant first argues that as a matter of law the trial court had no discretion in setting the verdict aside and granting a new trial in this case, and in support of its argument, cite the following cases: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-1901 (Repl.1962) defines "new trial" and sets out eight grounds for a new trial, the fifth one being as follows: The next section, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-1902 (Repl.1962) is as follows: The Oklahoma, Indiana, Kansas and Nebraska statutes under which the cases cited by appellant were decided, contained the same provision as Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-1902 supra, and the Supreme Courts of those states interpreted this provision exactly as appellant argues that we should interpret it in this case. This provision in many of the state statutes was a carry over from the common law, and in Oklahoma, Indiana, Kansas and Nebraska, has been changed or repealed by later statutory enactment. (See also Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969, 88 A.L.R. 917). We are cited no case, and have found none, in which this court has followed or refused to follow the decisions of the Oklahoma, Indiana, Kansas and Nebraska Courts in their interpretation of this provision of their statutes, and because of the rule laid down in our own decisions, where other error appears in the record, we find it unnecessary to follow, or refuse to follow, the decisions from other states in this case. In a case such as this, however, where no other error appears in the record, we think our statute § 27-1902 might well be interpreted to mean that It does not follow that such interpretation should necessarily apply however, where the injury is susceptible of definite pecuniary measurement such as in loss of earnings and medical expense, and where the amount of the verdict may be based on *843 comparative negligence. Law v. Collins et ux., Ark., 411 S.W.2d 877. This court has held that a verdict for one dollar amounts to a denial of damages in an action for damages to the person where the proven pecuniary damage amounted to much more than that, and that such verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted. Dunbar v. Cowger, 68 Ark. 444, 59 S.W. 951; see Carroll v. Texarkana Gas &amp; Electric Co., 102 Ark. 137, 143 S.W. 586 (where, however, property as well as personal injury was involved). We have consistently held that it is not error to grant a new trial on the motion of a plaintiff who has been awarded damages for injury to the person where other reversible error appears in the record. In the recent case of Linxwiler v. El Dorado Sports Center, Inc., 233 Ark. 191, 343 S.W.2d 411, Billy Linxwiler received a gunshot wound through the negligent act of the defendant's employee. The appellant, Billy's father, sued to recover for the medical and hospital expenses incurred as a result of the wound and also for the injuries sustained by his son. There was a jury verdict for Billy's personal injuries in the amount of $1,400.00, but no award was given the father in his own right. Both parties appealed. The trial court had erred in its instruction pertaining to the duty by the owner of the premises to one who goes on the premises as a volunteer, and in that case this court said: In the case of Smith v. Arkansas Power &amp; Light Company, 191 Ark. 389, 86 S.W.2d 411, the appellant's automobile and appellee's street car collided causing injury to plaintiff's person. The jury returned a verdict for $5,000.00. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that error in the trial court resulted in damages grossly inadequate to compensate for his injuries. The trial court had committed error in failing to give a proper instruction, and this court in that case said: Later in the same case this court stated: See also McAdams v. Stevens, 240 Ark. 258, 399 S.W.2d 504. So, in the case at bar, we conclude that under the evidence in this case, the injury to appellee's ulna nerve was not an "intervening cause" as contemplated in A.M.I. instruction No. 503, and as given by the trial court as appellant's instruction No. 4 (see 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 111-113 and the numerous cases there cited). In the case of Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines, 233 N.C. 160, 63 S.E.2d 197, the North Carolina Court said: In the California case of Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 216 P.2d 119, the court said: In the Wisconsin case of Merlino v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 23 Wis.2d 571, 127 N.W.2d 741, we find this statement: In the case of Butler v. Arkansas Power &amp; Light Company, 186 Ark. 611, 54 S.W.2d 984, the plaintiff received injuries while alighting from appellee's street car. The complaint alleged that the street car started up prematurely, and negligence by the motorman for raising the car's step tripping her. This court speaking in regard to intervening cause said: As stated by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Kansas City, M. &amp; O. Ry. Co., et al. v. Allums, 133 Okl. 181, 271 P. 949: So, we conclude as in the Butler case, supra, that appellee's hiatal hernia either was or was not caused or aggravated to the point of hospitalization and surgery by appellant's negligence, and that the question of negligence in this respect cannot be determined by a consideration of the subsequent conduct of appellee in scooting around on her elbow or lying still in bed, or by having her arm extended for intravenous feeding *845 while undergoing or recovering from surgery for repair of the hernia. We are of the opinion that A.M.I. instruction 501 on "proximate cause" given by the trial court as appellee's instruction No. 9, thoroughly covered appellee's ulna nerve injury under the evidence in this case. For error in giving appellee's instruction No. 4, the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial is hereby affirmed. Affirmed.