Title: State v. Ellis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120046
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2020

1 
 
 
 
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,046 
 
STATE OF KANSAS 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
SHELBIE ELLIS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
A law enforcement officer who has available objective, specific, and articulable 
facts creating a suspicion that an individual needs help or is in peril may stop and 
investigate the situation. 
 
2. 
 
If an individual has been stopped subsequent to a legitimate suspicion that she or 
he needs aid, the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance.  
 
3. 
Once the officer is assured that an individual is not in peril or is no longer in need 
of assistance, any actions beyond that constitute a seizure, implicating the protections 
provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
A law enforcement officer's mere request for identification or identifying 
information generally will not constitute a seizure. 
 
5. 
The nature of a police-citizen encounter can change, and what may begin as a 
consensual encounter can transform into an investigative detention if the police conduct 
changes. 
 
6. 
Police may not lawfully extend a welfare check by running a warrant check on an 
individual who is the subject of the check unless some other circumstances support 
prolonging the check and converting it into a detention. 
 
7. 
Under the attenuation doctrine, the poisonous taint of an unlawful search or 
seizure may dissipate when the connection between unlawful police conduct and 
challenged evidence becomes attenuated. 
 
8. 
The State bears the burden of establishing sufficient attenuation to purge the taint 
of an illegal search or seizure and avoid application of the exclusionary rule.  
 
9. 
To demonstrate that the taint of an illegal seizure has dissipated, the government 
must prove, from the totality of the circumstances, a sufficient attenuation or break in the 
3 
 
 
 
causal connection between the illegal detention and the discovery of incriminating 
evidence. 
 
10. 
The development of probable cause to arrest an individual, after a police officer's 
discovery of evidence of a crime when the officer has illegally detained an individual, 
does not attenuate the taint of an illegal seizure and allow admission of evidence obtained 
in a later search.  
 
11. 
Probable cause flowing directly from an unlawful seizure does not break the 
causal connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and a search and is therefore 
not an intervening circumstance. 
 
12. 
Once a law enforcement officer has legal grounds to conduct an investigatory 
detention, the officer is free to check an individual for outstanding warrants as part of the 
investigation. If a warrant is discovered, then an arrest may follow and evidence 
consequent to the arrest is admissible. 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 57 Kan. App. 2d 477, 453 P.3d 882 (2019). 
Appeal from Lyon District Court; W. LEE FOWLER, judge. Opinion filed August 7, 2020. Judgment of the 
Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded to the district court with directions.  
 
Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
4 
 
 
 
Laura L. Miser, assistant county attorney, and Marc Goodman, county attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Shelbie Ellis appeals from the denial of her motion to suppress 
evidence relating to possessing drugs and from her subsequent conviction. The Court of 
Appeals reversed, and this court granted the State's petition for review. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On the afternoon of January 20, 2018, an employee of a Casey's General 
Store in Emporia called in a police report that a woman had been in a store 
restroom stall for about 45 minutes and had been seen at one point on her hands 
and knees. Police officers Eric Law and William Kent were dispatched to the store 
for a welfare check, with Kent arriving at the scene first. The employee told Kent 
that the woman had told her she was "fine."  
 
According to Officer Kent's affidavit, he went to the restroom door, 
knocked, and announced, "Police department." He told the woman the business 
staff was concerned about her being in the restroom for so long and had asked the 
police to check on her. According to Kent, the woman replied "she was feeling 
well and asked if she needed to come out." Kent asked her to step out so he "could 
see if she was ok." She told him "she had stomach issues due to her eating 
something."   
 
5 
 
 
 
Kent asked to see her driver's license, and he identified her as Shelbie Ellis. 
He held onto her license and placed a call to dispatch asking them to run the 
license information for possible outstanding warrants. Ellis told Kent that she and 
a friend were on their way to Michigan from Stafford, Kansas.  She said that her 
friend was waiting in the car for her.  
 
Kent directed her to step outside the store to see whether the friend was still 
around, and at about this time Officer Law arrived at the scene. Ellis walked 
around to the south of the building and then said the friend must have left, 
probably trying to find characters for a mobile Pokémon game. Kent then directed 
Ellis to call the friend to come get her. While this was going on, Kent received a 
report from the police dispatcher that Ellis had a possible outstanding warrant 
from Rice County, Kansas, for a probation violation.  
 
As Ellis was attempting to call her friend, Kent observed her hands shaking. 
He asked her if she had been using drugs that day. She said that she had not but 
she was aware her hands were shaking. Kent then asked her if he could search her 
bag for drugs. She replied, "Please don't." He followed up by asking what she had 
been doing in the restroom. She replied, "I would never use drugs in a public 
restroom, but I do have drugs in my purse. I have meth and a pipe in my purse."  
 
After Ellis finally contacted the driver and asked him to come back for her, 
based on a confirmation of the warrant report from the dispatcher, Kent placed her 
in handcuffs and read her her Miranda rights. He escorted Ellis to the back of his 
patrol car and then searched her wallet, where he found a clear plastic baggie 
containing a crystalline substance. In her makeup bag, he found a glass pipe 
wrapped inside two stockings. He then transported her to the county jail, where 
6 
 
 
 
she was confined on the outstanding warrant and the pending drug charges. A field 
kit gave a positive test for methamphetamine for the crystalline substance and 
residue in the glass pipe.  
 
On January 22, 2018, the State filed a complaint charging Ellis with one 
count of possession of methamphetamine and one count of possessing drug 
paraphernalia. Through counsel, Ellis filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the 
seizure and subsequent search exceeded the scope of the encounter. The State filed 
a response, arguing that the attenuation doctrine set out in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 
___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016), legitimized the seizure. 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion to 
suppress. The court also denied a motion to reconsider. Ellis elected to go to a trial 
before the bench, where she again objected to the introduction of the drug 
evidence. The court found her guilty of both counts. On August 15, 2018, the court 
sentenced her to a standard term of 13 months of incarceration with 12 months of 
postrelease supervision for the methamphetamine charge and a concurrent term of 
6 months for the paraphernalia charge. The court then placed her on probation for 
a period of 18 months. She took a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals.  
 
The panel of the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, holding that the 
investigatory detention exceeded the scope of the welfare check and the evidence 
obtained as a result should have been suppressed. State v. Ellis, 57 Kan. App. 2d 
477, 489-90, 453 P.3d 882 (2019). This court granted the State's petition for 
review and noted Ellis' response. 
 
7 
 
 
 
The State urges this court to decide that the Court of Appeals either ignored 
or misunderstood the attenuation doctrine, which states that, following a legitimate 
seizure, the discovery of a valid arrest warrant legitimizes further detention and 
consequent searches. For the reasons set out below, we disagree with the position 
that the State advocates. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
When a party appeals a ruling based on the attenuation doctrine, the 
appellate court considers questions of fact that it reviews to determine whether the 
facts are supported by substantial competent evidence. The appellate court then 
reviews the district court's ultimate legal conclusion de novo. State v. Christian, 
310 Kan. 229, 235, 445 P.3d 183 (2019); see State v. Hanke, 307 Kan. 823, 827, 
415 P.3d 966 (2018) (general standard of review for reviewing district court 
decision on motion to suppress). 
 
We will initially address whether Officer Kent lawfully engaged with Ellis 
and requested her identification and will conclude that he did. We will then 
address whether Kent lawfully detained Ellis and will conclude that he did not. 
Finally, we will address whether the attenuation doctrine mitigates the unlawful 
detention and will conclude that it does not. We will conclude that the Court of 
Appeals correctly held that the evidence used against Ellis should have been 
suppressed.  
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:  "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Section 15 of 
8 
 
 
 
the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights contains similar language and provides "the 
same protection from unlawful government searches and seizures as the Fourth 
Amendment." See State v. Neighbors, 299 Kan. 234, 239, 328 P.3d 1081 (2014). 
 
This court first recognized the concept of a public safety stop in State v. Vistuba, 
251 Kan. 821, 840 P.2d 511 (1992), disapproved in part on other grounds by State v. 
Field, 252 Kan. 657, 847 P.2d 1280 (1993). In that case, the officer testified that she 
observed erratic driving and was concerned that the driver might be impaired, but the 
officer specifically stated that she suspected no criminal activity from her observations. 
The Supreme Court determined the stop was lawful and held:  "[A] civil or criminal 
infraction is not always essential to justify a vehicle stop. Safety reasons alone may 
justify the stop, if the safety reasons are based on specific and articulable facts." 251 
Kan. at 824. 
 
In State v. Gonzalez, 36 Kan. App. 2d 446, 456, 141 P.3d 501 (2006), the Court of 
Appeals adopted a three-part test to determine the legality of a public safety stop. First, as 
long as there are objective, specific, and articulable facts from which an experienced law 
enforcement officer would suspect that a citizen needs help or is in peril, the officer has 
the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen needs aid, the officer may take 
appropriate action to render assistance. Third, once the officer is assured that the citizen 
is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance, any actions beyond that constitute a 
seizure, implicating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. This court has 
never adopted the Gonzalez test, but, in State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 662-64, 215 P.3d 
601 (2009), we discussed the test without expressly applying, adopting, or rejecting it.  
We deem the Gonzalez test appropriate in analyzing the legality of the search in the 
present case.  
 
9 
 
 
 
While not a vehicle stop, Kent's contact with Ellis was justified by safety reasons 
based on specific and articulable facts. The testimony was uncontroverted that Kent 
initiated his contact with Ellis in response to a store employee's concerns for Ellis' health 
or safety. Ellis had spent an unusually long time in the restroom and had been observed 
on her hands and knees on the floor. When he arrived, Kent inquired whether she was all 
right, consistent with an investigation into her wellbeing. Ellis replied that she was 
feeling generally well but was dealing with some digestive issues. This interaction was 
lawful. 
 
Kent did not stop with the welfare inquiry; he proceeded to ask Ellis for 
identification. This was also lawful. This court has held that a law enforcement officer's 
mere request for identification or identifying information generally will not constitute a 
seizure. See State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 888, 190 P.3d 234 (2008). Kent viewed 
Ellis' license and determined that she was who she purported to be and was not a minor or 
using false identification. At this time, the welfare check had been completed. The 
officer's actions up to this point were lawful.  
 
The nature of a police-citizen encounter can change, however, and what may begin 
as a welfare check can transform into an investigative detention if the police conduct 
changes. See, e.g., Pollman, 286 Kan. at 888-89 (voluntary encounter); City of Topeka v. 
Grabauskas, 33 Kan. App. 2d 210, 99 P.3d 1125 (2004) (community caretaking 
function).  
 
The evidence is compelling that Kent unlawfully detained Ellis. He kept her 
driver's license, he escorted her out of the restroom and out of the store, and he directed 
her to place calls for a ride. This was clearly more than a welfare check; she reasonably 
would have felt she was being subject to a criminal investigation and she was not free to 
10 
 
 
 
leave. Her testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress was that she did not feel 
free to leave after she handed Kent her license and she was not free to ask for her license 
back. 
 
In Pollman, we held that an officer's retention of an identification card is one 
factor to be considered in applying the totality of the circumstances test for whether an 
interaction was consensual, and, without offsetting circumstances, that factor may mean a 
reasonable person would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate an encounter with 
the officer. 286 Kan. at 889. Here, there were no apparent offsetting circumstances that 
might have led Ellis to believe she was free to end the contact with Kent. 
 
Furthermore, the presence of more than one officer increases the coerciveness of 
an encounter, and, although the presence of two uniformed and armed officers does not 
automatically transform every police-citizen encounter into a nonconsensual one, it is a 
relevant factor for courts to consider in determining whether a citizen's interaction with 
law enforcement is consensual. United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th 
Cir. 2017). Officer Law arrived while Kent was escorting Ellis out of the store, and the 
presence of two police officers for what was supposed to be a welfare check on a possibly 
ill customer would certainly have given Ellis reason to believe she was being detained 
and was not free to leave. 
 
In order for an officer to go beyond a voluntary encounter or a public safety check 
and detain a person for further investigation, the officer must have "'reasonable suspicion 
the seized individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime or 
traffic infraction. [Citations omitted.]'" State v. Chapman, 305 Kan. 365, 370, 381 P.3d 
458 (2016).  
 
11 
 
 
 
This case does not involve a traffic stop, but it involves the scope of an 
investigation and warrant check that the police may undertake when they have no 
indication of criminal activity of a particular individual. In that respect, it resembles the 
circumstances in State v. Damm, 246 Kan. 220, 787 P.2d 1185 (1990), where this court 
reviewed evidence produced following a vehicle stop after an officer observed its 
taillights were defective. After he stopped the car, the officer demanded identification 
from the driver and his two passengers. The check on one of the passengers revealed an 
outstanding arrest warrant, whereupon the officer arrested the passenger and then 
searched the car. The search turned up drugs and related paraphernalia, and the officer 
arrested all three occupants. This court suppressed the evidence, holding: 
 
"The officer in this case had no reasonable suspicion that there were outstanding 
warrants for the passengers. He had no report of the commission of a crime, saw nothing 
within the car which would indicate to him that the occupants had committed any 
offense, and had no reasonable justification for requiring identification of the passengers 
and running record checks on them. The seizure of the three occupants of the vehicle 
while 'routine record checks' were made of all occupants was unreasonable. 
 
"Without the unreasonable detention, the officer had no reason to arrest [the 
passengers or the driver]. Without the arrest, there could be no search. Without the 
search, there was no evidence against [the defendant driver]. The detention and search 
being unlawful, the evidence is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. [Citations 
omitted.]" 246 Kan. at 224-25. 
 
Our caselaw makes it clear that police may not lawfully extend a welfare check by 
running a warrant check on an individual who is the subject of the check unless some 
other circumstances support prolonging the check and converting it into a detention. 
 
12 
 
 
 
Here, Kent had no reasonable suspicion that Ellis was committing, had committed, 
or was about to commit a crime. Kent testified that he saw no evidence of criminal 
activity and that Ellis assured him that she was not in need of assistance. Kent 
nevertheless retained her license and placed a call to dispatch for the express purpose of 
extending his investigation into whether she had any outstanding warrants. He directed 
her to go outside and call for someone to pick her up, and he interrogated her about drug 
use and told her he wanted to search her belongings. All of these activities broke the 
chain of lawful conduct that began when he responded to a welfare call. 
 
The district court judge in the present case, however, attached no importance to 
Kent retaining Ellis' license after he confirmed that she was in no danger or in need of 
medical attention. The judge declared that, once Ellis handed him her identification, Kent 
was free to perform a record check on her. At the hearing on Ellis' motion to reconsider, 
the judge went further, saying that Kent "cajoled her out of the bathroom" and there was 
nothing unlawful about then checking to see if she "had some pick up order or 
something."  
 
In light of the holdings of this court and the Court of Appeals, the district court's 
understanding of the law was incorrect. Checking to see if Ellis "had some pick up order" 
exceeded the scope of the safety check. It was completely unnecessary to serve the 
purpose for which Kent was dispatched, and it converted the stop into an investigatory 
stop and search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
 
Having determined that Kent's conduct constituted an unlawful seizure and 
consequent search, we next consider whether the evidence should have been suppressed. 
 
13 
 
 
 
Suppression results from applying the exclusionary rule under which a court may 
suppress the "primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure" 
and "evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality"—the so-called 
"'fruit of the poisonous tree'"—if it finds officers obtained evidence in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. 
Ed. 2d 599 (1984); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (explaining fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine); State v. 
Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598, 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (same).  
 
But "'the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of 
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 600, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (quoting United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]); see Christian, 310 
Kan. at 235. 
 
The exclusionary doctrine has four major exceptions:  (1) when police acted in 
"good faith" reliance on legal authority, such as warrants, statutes, or caselaw; (2) when 
subsequent information was gathered from a source independent of the poisoned tree; (3) 
when the information would have been inevitably discovered, regardless of the illegality; 
or (4) when there has been sufficient attenuation between the illegality and the discovery 
of the evidence such that the taint of the illegality has been dissipated. Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 142-44, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (good faith); 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988) 
(independent source); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 
2d 377 (1984) (inevitable discovery); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593, 126 S. Ct. 
2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (attenuation doctrine). 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
It is upon the last of these exceptions that the State seeks to hang its hat in this 
case. It argues that the discovery of an outstanding warrant attenuated the illegality of the 
detention and legitimized arresting Ellis and subsequently searching her, resulting in the 
discovery of drugs and paraphernalia. 
 
Under the attenuation doctrine, the poisonous taint of an unlawful search or 
seizure dissipates when the connection between the unlawful police conduct and the 
challenged evidence becomes attenuated. State v. Jefferson, 297 Kan. 1151, 1162, 310 
P.3d 331 (2013). The State bears the burden of establishing sufficient attenuation to 
purge the taint of an illegal search or seizure and avoid application of the exclusionary 
rule. To demonstrate that the taint of an illegal seizure has dissipated, the government 
must prove, from the totality of the circumstances, a sufficient attenuation or break in the 
causal connection between the illegal detention and the conduct leading to the discovery 
of incriminating evidence. See Jefferson, 297 Kan. at 1162. 
 
In Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016), 
the United States Supreme Court explored and further explained the attenuation doctrine. 
Strieff involved a police-citizen encounter that was an investigatory detention from the 
outset. While conducting intermittent surveillance of a residence identified in an 
anonymous tip about drug activity, a police officer observed the defendant leave the 
residence. Believing there was reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in 
criminal activity, the officer stopped him in a nearby parking lot. The officer obtained his 
identification, checked with the dispatcher, and learned of an outstanding arrest warrant 
for the defendant. The officer arrested him and searched him, finding drugs and drug 
paraphernalia. 
 
15 
 
 
 
In the resulting criminal proceedings, the defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. The 
district court denied the motion, finding that the existence of a valid arrest warrant 
sufficiently attenuated the connection between the stop and the discovery of the 
contraband. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that only a defendant's voluntary act could sufficiently break the connection 
between an illegal search and evidence subsequently discovered. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to apply the attenuation doctrine to the facts of the case, 
assuming without deciding that the initial stop was unconstitutional.  
 
The Strieff Court held that an officer's discovery of a valid, preexisting arrest 
warrant attenuated the connection between an unlawful investigatory stop and drug-
related evidence seized from the defendant during a search incident to arrest. 136 S. Ct. at 
2062-63. Under this doctrine, evidence obtained through an unconstitutional seizure is 
admissible if the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the 
discovery of the evidence is remote or has been sufficiently interrupted by an intervening 
circumstance, so long as the police did not commit the misconduct purposefully or 
flagrantly. Particularly relevant to our present case is that, in Strieff, the stop was made 
consequent to a bona fide criminal investigation. This court recognized and applied 
Strieff in State v. Tatro, 310 Kan. 263, 445 P.3d 173 (2019), and Christian, 310 Kan. 229. 
 
The State in the present case urges this court to apply the attenuation doctrine as 
articulated in Strieff to preserve the admissibility of the seized evidence. The State 
complains that a recent line of cases from this court and the Court of Appeals essentially 
eviscerates the attenuation doctrine. Despite the State's passionate argument, we conclude 
that the facts of this case render application of the attenuation doctrine inappropriate. 
 
16 
 
 
 
No bright-line rule defines when the attenuation doctrine applies. Courts must, 
instead, examine the facts of each case to determine whether the circumstances attenuate 
the taint of illegality. Christian, 310 Kan. at 235. 
 
The Strieff Court identified three nonexclusive factors for determining whether the 
attenuation doctrine applies. First, courts look to the temporal proximity between the 
unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of incriminating evidence to determine how 
closely the discovery of the evidence was linked to the unconstitutional seizure. Second, 
courts consider intervening circumstances. Third, courts examine the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct. No single factor is controlling, and other factors 
may also be relevant to the analysis. See Strieff, 236 S. Ct. at 2062; Christian, 310 Kan. 
229, Syl. ¶ 5. 
 
We now apply the three Strieff factors to the facts of the present case. It should be 
noted that the district court made no ruling on attenuation or the Strieff factors, instead 
deciding that Kent's conduct was completely lawful and they had a right to run Ellis' 
license to see if she "had some pick up order or something." 
 
a. Temporal proximity 
 
This factor tends to support suppression. Kent testified that the encounter outside 
the store lasted "a few minutes," or "[a]round five minutes." Law confirmed Kent's 
testimony that no more than 10 minutes elapsed between the encounter at the store 
bathroom and the warrant confirmation and arrest.  
 
A finding of attenuation is not generally appropriate unless significant time 
elapses between an unlawful act and when law enforcement obtains the evidence. 
17 
 
 
 
Christian, 310 Kan. 229, Syl. ¶ 6. In Strieff, the Supreme Court held that the temporal 
factor does not favor attenuation unless "'substantial time'" elapses between an unlawful 
act and when the evidence is obtained, and the passage of only "minutes" "counsels in 
favor of suppression." 136 S. Ct. at 2062. The Court cited to Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 604-05, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975), where a time interval of "less than 
two hours" separated the unconstitutional arrest and the resulting incriminating statement, 
and the short time interval was a factor supporting suppression. 
 
Here, the time lapse was, at most, 10 minutes. In fact, the district court, in ruling 
against suppression, found it was "a very short period of time" between the detention and 
the receipt of the incriminating warrant information. The passage of so little time weighs 
heavily in favor of suppression in this case. 
 
b. Intervening circumstances 
 
This factor, at first blush, weighs heavily in favor of the State. 
 
The discovery of an arrest warrant can be an intervening factor that "strongly 
favors the State." See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. To a significant degree, it is the 
preexisting nature of the warrant that attenuates the taint of the unconstitutional seizure. 
Tatro, 310 Kan. at 272. The Strieff Court explained that a warrant is a judicial mandate 
requiring that an officer conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer has a duty to 
carry out its provisions. 136 S. Ct. at 2062. This means that a valid warrant that is 
unconnected to the stop independently compels the officer to make an arrest, and that 
officer does not exercise discretion in executing the order.  
 
18 
 
 
 
The problem for the State in the present case is that Kent was already engaging in 
an unconstitutional criminal investigation of Ellis before he received information about 
the possible warrant. He continued to exercise control over her, escorting her (or, in the 
words of the district court, "cajol[ing] her") outside the store and directing her to call for 
her ride, before the warrant was confirmed. Under the State's theory, police could 
approach random people on the street, demand their identification cards, and run warrant 
checks on them. If no warrant came up, then the detainee would be released—no harm, 
no foul. If a warrant came up, then the warrant would attenuate the unconstitutional stop 
and justify arrests and searches incident thereto. The police could routinely carry out 
criminal investigatory detentions of all citizens without risking suppression of discovered 
evidence. 
 
We specifically commented on this undesirable result in State v. Moralez, 297 
Kan. 397, 415, 300 P.3d 1090 (2013). While Strieff abrogated a portion of Moralez that 
held the discovery of a preexisting warrant carries little weight when applying the 
attenuation doctrine, Strieff did not abrogate the other portions of Moralez. See State v. 
Sanders, 310 Kan. 279, Syl. ¶ 13, 445 P.3d 1144 (2019). 
 
This court has held that the development of probable cause to arrest after a police 
officer's discovery of evidence of a crime when the officer has illegally detained an 
individual does not attenuate the taint of an illegal seizure and allow admission of 
evidence obtained in a later search. The probable cause flows directly from the unlawful 
seizure and does not break the causal connection between the Fourth Amendment 
violation and the search. Probable cause developed in such a way is, therefore, not an 
intervening circumstance. Christian, 310 Kan. 229, Syl. ¶ 7.  
 
19 
 
 
 
In Christian, the Court of Appeals held that the initial investigatory stop was not 
justified based on reasonable suspicion. State v. Christian, No. 116,133, 2017 WL 
3947406, at *8 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion). Because the State did not cross-
petition for review of that holding, the issue was not before this court and the case was 
decided with the understanding that the initial detention and subsequent arrest were 
unlawful. 310 Kan. at 234.   
 
We held that detaining the defendant for an expired tag and arresting him for no 
proof of insurance were not ministerial acts consistent with the officer's duty to carry out 
the provisions of an arrest warrant. They were, instead, discretionary acts carried out in 
the officer's investigatory law enforcement role. Christian, 310 Kan. at 238. The grounds 
for detaining the defendant arose from and were directly related to the unlawful initial 
detention. 310 Kan. at 238. "Discovering evidence of a crime when that discovery flows 
directly from the unconstitutional seizure does not attenuate the taint of the Fourth 
Amendment violation." 310 Kan. at 239. 
 
Under Christian, Tatro, and Moralez, the discovery of an outstanding warrant was 
not an attenuating factor in this case. Kent was detaining Ellis and conducting an 
unreasonable criminal investigation of her before the so-called attenuating factor came 
into play. The discovery of a warrant under these circumstances does not satisfy the 
second factor of Strieff, an attenuating intervening circumstance. 
 
c. Purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct 
 
It has been the clearly stated law of this state since at least 1992 that public safety 
or welfare checks based on specific and articulable facts are distinct from stops based on 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, e.g., Vistuba, 251 Kan. at 824. Our 
20 
 
 
 
appellate courts have repeatedly held that a public safety check must end upon a 
determination that the individual who has been stopped is not in need of assistance. 
 
Whether purposeful or flagrant misconduct weighs in favor of suppression turns 
on multiple considerations, including whether the officer acted in good faith, committed 
multiple unconstitutional acts following the unconstitutional seizure, or acted as part of a 
systemic and recurrent pattern of police misconduct. The officer's subjective state of 
mind weighs heavily in evaluating good faith. Courts will generally find purposeful and 
flagrant misconduct if the impropriety of the official's misconduct was obvious or the 
official knew at the time that his or her conduct was likely unconstitutional but 
nevertheless carried it out and if "the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose 
and executed in the hope that something might turn up." Christian, 310 Kan. 229, Syl.  
¶ 8; see Tatro, 310 Kan. 263, Syl. ¶ 8; State v. Cleverly, 305 Kan. 598, 612, 385 P.3d 512 
(2016). 
 
Kent testified that his sole purpose for going to the women's restroom at the store 
was a welfare check; there was no information suggesting criminal activity. Ellis told 
Kent she was having stomach issues. He testified that he had no information suggesting 
that her behavior was the result of anything other than stomach issues. He testified that he 
never asked her whether she needed medical assistance, and he didn't know if he asked 
her whether she needed an ambulance. He took her driver's license immediately after she 
emerged from the bathroom stall. He testified that she was able to walk and she did not 
appear to be suffering from any critical medical situations. He acknowledged that the 
welfare check had been satisfied by the time he took her license.  
 
Kent openly conceded that the purpose of requesting her identification was to 
transform the check into a criminal investigation. Kent asked her for her driver's license 
21 
 
 
 
"so I could run it, so I could let my dispatch know who I was talking to." He had no 
indication of criminal activity at that time. He asked her to go outside with him to see if 
the driver of a silver car he had seen in the parking lot was the person who gave her a 
ride, and he kept possession of her driver's license during that time. Although he did not 
physically restrain her while he waited with her by the parking lot, he retained the 
license.  
 
Kent did not receive the information of a possible Rice County warrant until after 
he had taken her driver's license, walked her outside, directed her to call her ride to come 
for her, and asked to search her purse. It was only after he was informed of the possible 
warrant that he asked her whether she was using drugs in the restroom and learned from 
her that she had drugs in her purse. He allowed her to finish her telephone call for a ride 
and then placed her in handcuffs. He then received a dispatch confirming the warrant. 
 
Testimony by the arresting officers at both the suppression hearing and the trial 
revealed that their transformation of a safety check into a criminal investigatory detention 
was "part of a systemic and recurrent pattern." See Christian, 310 Kan. 229, Syl. ¶ 8.  
 
Kent testified that it was standard procedure in his department to keep the driver's 
licenses of people whom he is called to assist for welfare checks so that he can run 
warrant checks. Law testified that officers in his department don't always ask to see a 
license when investigating a welfare call because "sometimes it's not necessary." He 
offered no explanation why it would have been considered "necessary" in this case. He 
confirmed that Ellis was not dressed in a fashion conducive to concealing a weapon and 
she took no action that led either officer to believe that she would attempt to harm them.   
 
22 
 
 
 
Kent's decision to run a warrant check as part of a welfare stop violated well-
established Kansas caselaw, going back to Damm in 1990 and Vistuba in 1992, which 
emphasized that a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must 
end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help. See Vistuba, 251 
Kan. at 824; Damm, 246 Kan. at 224-25; Gonzalez, 36 Kan. App. 2d at 457. The clarity 
of Kansas law forbidding Kent's illegal conduct supports a finding of flagrant official 
misconduct. Furthermore, Kent testified that running identification cards pursuant to 
safety checks was his standard practice. Routinely engaging in constitutionally forbidden 
conduct does not convert that conduct into permissible police activity. See State v. 
Manwarren, 56 Kan. App. 2d 939, 956, 440 P.3d 606, rev. denied 310 Kan. 1068 (2019). 
 
We conclude that all three Strieff factors weigh against admissibility of the drug 
evidence under the attenuation doctrine. 
 
       
We acknowledge the position of the concurring opinion, but we note that the 
three Strieff factors do not necessarily exist independent of one another. Temporal 
proximity, the discovery of an arrest warrant, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct 
may be intertwined and considered together. Flagrant misconduct and the presence of an 
intervening factor may bear on each other, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
suggested in United States v. Lowry, 935 F.3d 638, 644 (8th Cir. 2019): 
 
"But Strieff did not announce a per se rule that the discovery of a warrant would always 
vitiate subsequent searches. Whether it is characterized as a part of the second element of 
the attenuation test (that the intervening event be unconnected to the purpose for the stop) 
or as a part of the third element of the attenuation test (that the officer not have a flagrant 
or unconstitutional purpose), Strieff instructs that we should decline to find attenuation 
where there is evidence that the police officer was engaged in a fishing expedition for old 
warrants. [Citation omitted.]" 
23 
 
 
 
In the present case, unlike the circumstances in Strieff and Tatro, the police-citizen 
contact began, not as part of a criminal investigation or suspicion of criminal activity, but 
as a public welfare check. These facts substantially distinguish this case from the others. 
The discovery of the warrant occurred after the flagrantly unlawful detention disguised as 
a welfare check, and we conclude that, in such a circumstance, the warrant was not an 
intervening factor favoring the State in this case. 
 
The State complains that decisions by the Court of Appeals and this court have so 
attenuated the attenuation doctrine that it has no room for operation in Kansas. This is not 
the situation. 
 
Unlike in a public safety stop, which is not for investigative purposes, it is 
constitutionally permissible for a law enforcement officer to obtain a person's 
identification and check for outstanding warrants when the officer has reasonable 
suspicion to detain and investigate the person for criminal activity. See State v. Walker, 
292 Kan. 1, 14-16, 251 P.3d 618 (2011). Likewise, as part of the routine investigation of 
a traffic infraction, the officer has a right to check the driver's license, inspect the 
vehicle's registration and proof of insurance, and determine whether there are outstanding 
warrants against the driver. State v. Jimenez, 308 Kan. 315, 325, 420 P.3d 464 (2018). 
And, of course, if the public safety stop had in itself given Kent grounds to form a 
reasonable suspicion that Ellis had engaged or was engaging in criminal activity, he could 
have lawfully expanded the scope of the check into a criminal investigation, including a 
warrant check. 
 
In other words, once an officer has legal grounds to conduct an investigatory 
detention, the officer is free to check the person for outstanding warrants as part of the 
investigation. If a warrant is discovered, then, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Strieff, 
24 
 
 
 
an arrest may follow and evidence consequent to the arrest is admissible. 136 S. Ct. at 
2062 (once police discover warrant, have obligation to arrest detainee); see United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984) ("'A warrant is 
a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer has 
a sworn duty to carry out its provisions.'"). 
 
Despite repeated admonitions to the State that police may not use public welfare 
checks as a basis for conducting background investigations and warrant checks for 
citizens who may exhibit need for medical attention or police help, such conduct persists. 
Our caselaw stands firmly against police detaining citizens and seizing their driver's 
licenses when there is no indication that the citizens have engaged in criminal conduct. 
See Chapman, 305 Kan. at 370; Moralez, 297 Kan. at 415; Vistuba, 251 Kan. at 824; 
Damm, 246 Kan. 224-25; Manwarren, 56 Kan. App. 2d at 949-50; State v. Messner, 55 
Kan. App. 2d 630, 636, 419 P.3d 642 (2018); State v. Griffith, No. 120,794, 2020 WL 
399070, at *13-14 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion); State v. Bluthardt, No. 
116,401, 2017 WL 948330, at *3 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion); cf. State v. 
McKenna, 57 Kan. App. 2d 731, 735-40, 459 P.3d 1274, 1278-80 (2020), petition for rev. 
filed March 2, 2020 (applying same analytic structure as other cases but finding particular 
facts of case justified retaining defendant's license and running warrant check). 
 
It may appear to be a harsh result to suppress evidence when arrest warrants are 
readily available to police and when the evidence would certainly come to light after a 
valid arrest. But here, as in several Court of Appeals decisions, it was unlawful police 
conduct that led to the discovery of the warrant, and suppression is the long-standing 
remedy for illegal government seizure and searches. 
  
25 
 
 
 
 
We, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals decision reversing the district 
court. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the evidence seized 
subsequent to the initial contact must be suppressed. The case is remanded for 
further proceedings. 
 
MICHAEL E. WARD, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., concurring:  I concur with the result we reach today, but write 
separately to note that the majority appears to back away from the more stringent 
requirements of Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016). 
I would instead stick to our application of Strieff as outlined in State v. Tatro, 310 Kan. 
263, 445 P.3d 173 (2019). In Tatro, we made it clear that the United States Supreme 
Court had found that the discovery of a preexisting valid warrant is always an intervening 
circumstance which effectively renders the first, temporal prong of the attenuation test 
irrelevant, and which will always supersede the exclusionary rule unless the police 
misconduct was purposeful or flagrant. See Tatro, 310 Kan. at 265, 273 ("[A] court may 
admit evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional seizure if the connection 
between the unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of the evidence is remote  
 
___________________________ 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Ward was appointed to hear case No. 120,046 
under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on 
the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.  
 
26 
 
 
 
or has been sufficiently interrupted by an intervening circumstance, as long as the police 
did not commit the misconduct purposefully or flagrantly. . . . [And] a preexisting, valid, 
and untainted arrest warrant presents an intervening circumstance."). 
 
Thus, under both Strieff and Tatro, when a preexisting valid warrant is discovered, 
the only question remaining is whether the unconstitutional conduct was purposeful or 
flagrant. Here, I agree with the majority that it was flagrant misconduct. But I would limit 
the analysis in these circumstances to that question only. 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., and WILSON, J., join the foregoing concurring opinion.