Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael G. Trewin
Citation: 2004 WI 116
Docket Number: 2002AP003314-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2004

2004 WI 116 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3314-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael G. Trewin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael G. Trewin,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TREWIN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 27, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 29, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part/dissents in part.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Mark J. 
Steichen and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Mark J. Steichen. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Julie M. Falk. 
 
 
2004 WI 116 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3314-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael G. Trewin, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael G. Trewin,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 27, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Michael G. Trewin has appealed 
from 
a 
referee's 
report 
concluding 
that 
he 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of five 
months. 
¶2 
We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We further 
determine that the seriousness of Attorney Trewin's misconduct 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
2 
 
warrants the suspension of his license to practice law for a 
period of five months.  We also agree with the referee that all 
costs of the proceeding should be assessed against Attorney 
Trewin. 
¶3 
Attorney Trewin was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1985 and practices in New London.  He has not 
previously been the subject of a disciplinary action.  He 
focuses his practice on bankruptcy and debt reorganization and 
specializes in farm bankruptcies.  He is also the sole owner of 
a corporation called Midwest Comics, Inc.   
¶4 
In December 2002 the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
filed a complaint alleging that Attorney Trewin engaged in 
professional misconduct with respect to his representation of a 
number 
of 
clients 
in 
bankruptcy 
or 
debt 
reorganization 
proceedings.  Konrad T. Tuchscherer was appointed referee.  In 
September 2003 the referee granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of Attorney Trewin, dismissing portions of the misconduct 
counts alleged by the OLR.  A two-day hearing was held before 
the referee in November 2003 on the remaining counts.  The 
referee's report and recommendation was issued on December 16, 
2003. 
¶5 
The majority of the counts of misconduct alleged by 
the OLR involve Attorney Trewin's representation of D.S., a 
farmer who retained Attorney Trewin in December 1997 to 
represent him concerning financial difficulties, including the 
possible repossession of his farm equipment and a possible farm 
foreclosure.  In January 1998 Attorney Trewin filed a "quick-
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
3 
 
file" Chapter 12 bankruptcy action on behalf of D.S. to 
forestall the repossession of the farm equipment and to permit 
D.S. to reorganize.  In April 1998 Attorney Trewin filed a 
reorganization plan for D.S.  Soon thereafter Attorney Trewin 
began negotiating with D.S.'s creditors, which included John 
Deere and Associated Bank North.  Attorney Trewin negotiated 
settlements with two judgment creditors which required D.S. to 
pay $12,500 to satisfy the judgments.   
¶6 
In 
the 
months 
following 
the 
filing 
of 
the 
reorganization plan, D.S. was unable to meet the payments 
required, and the bankruptcy was converted into a Chapter 7 
proceeding which allowed D.S. to discharge his unsecured debts 
and attempt to renegotiate his secured debt with his secured 
creditors.  D.S. did not have the money to pay the $400 fee to 
convert the bankruptcy from a Chapter 12 to a Chapter 7, nor did 
he have the funds to pay off the judgment creditors.  Attorney 
Trewin recommended that D.S. try to borrow the money from 
family, friends, or financial institutions.  When D.S. was 
unable to do so Attorney Trewin agreed to lend D.S. $12,900, 
$400 to convert the bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 and $12,500 to pay 
off the two judgments.  Attorney Trewin did not request or 
obtain any security for the loan.  The loan itself was made 
through Midwest Comics, Inc.  Attorney Trewin admitted he did 
not advise D.S. about the possible adverse results of an 
attorney loaning money to a client, nor did D.S. sign a written 
conflict waiver prior to signing the $12,900 promissory note to 
Midwest Comics.  Attorney Trewin also did not obtain written 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
4 
 
consent from D.S. to continue to represent him in the bankruptcy 
action, or in continued negotiations with creditors after he 
became D.S.'s creditor himself.  Attorney Trewin said he did 
tell D.S. to seek independent counsel and said he explained to 
D.S. the potential for conflicts of interest to arise in the 
event of defaults on loans or contracts and the consequences 
that Attorney Trewin would be unable to represent D.S. in the 
event of such a conflict.  
¶7 
On or about September 21, 1998, D.S. returned the 
signed promissory note to Attorney Trewin along with the first 
month's payment on the loan.  Attorney Trewin had disbursed the 
$400 fee to convert the bankruptcy action to a Chapter 7 in 
August 1998 but did not disburse the funds to pay off the two 
judgments until he received the signed promissory note from D.S.  
The September 21, 1998, payment and all subsequent payments made 
by D.S. were deposited into either Attorney Trewin's personal or 
law office account.   
¶8 
While D.S.'s bankruptcy action was still pending, 
Attorney Trewin submitted a proposal to Associated Bank whereby 
D.S. would reaffirm his debt to Associated Bank in lieu of 
Associated Bank exercising its right to foreclose on D.S.'s 
property secured by various mortgages and security agreements.  
D.S. received a discharge in bankruptcy on December 3, 1998.  
Discussions continued between Associated Bank and Attorney 
Trewin regarding reaffirmation of the Associated Bank's secured 
debt so D.S. could stay in business on the farm.  Associated 
Bank's attorney sent Attorney Trewin a proposal in early January 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
5 
 
1999 containing a number of conditions, including requiring D.S. 
to bring the interest on his loan current and keep his payments 
current throughout the term of the agreement.  D.S. did not have 
the means to meet the conditions set by Associated Bank. 
¶9 
In February 1999 Attorney Trewin sent D.S. a bill for 
legal services rendered since December 1997.  The bill totaled 
$7899.58.  Among the disbursements itemized was $400 to convert 
the bankruptcy to a Chapter 7.  Neither D.S. nor Attorney Trewin 
noticed that this sum was already reflected in the $12,900 
promissory 
note. 
 
After 
the 
inception 
of 
the 
OLR's 
investigation, Attorney Trewin corrected the $400 overcharge on 
a revised loan accounting.  
¶10 While negotiations with Associated Bank continued, 
D.S. discussed with Attorney Trewin the need for more dairy cows 
to increase the farm's cash flow.  D.S. also discussed this 
matter with his son, K.S.  Although D.S. was not well and was 
suffering from cancer at the time, K.S. agreed that purchasing 
additional cattle was a good way to increase cash flow.  When 
D.S. was unable to obtain financing to buy cattle from other 
sources, Attorney Trewin agreed to lend him money through 
Midwest Comics, Inc., at 12 percent interest.  Attorney Trewin 
prepared two promissory notes, a security agreement, a UCC 
financing statement, a mortgage on the farm, and an assignment 
of dairy income and sent them to D.S.  Attorney Trewin said 
although he advised D.S. orally that he should consult another 
attorney for advice on the transaction, he did not obtain a 
separate written conflict waiver from D.S. 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 D.S. signed two promissory notes on May 17, 1999.  The 
first, in the amount of $130,000, reflected disbursements for 
additional cattle, points and document preparation fees and the 
payment of Attorney Trewin's legal fees from the February 1999 
bill.  The second note, in the amount of $29,326.52, represented 
an operating loan.  D.S. acquired additional dairy cows with the 
loan proceeds.  The second promissory note was labeled a "line 
of credit."  As part of the line of credit Attorney Trewin 
provided several of his credit card numbers to Harmony Co-op in 
Colby, Wisconsin, and allowed D.S. to purchase feed and other 
supplies on Attorney Trewin's credit.  Attorney Trewin then made 
direct payments to the Co-op on D.S.'s behalf.   
¶12 Charges incurred on behalf of D.S. were added to a 
loan spreadsheet by Attorney Trewin.  Attorney Trewin charged 
D.S. interest on the date D.S. made purchases at the Co-op 
rather than the due date on Attorney Trewin's credit card bill.  
Attorney Trewin did not obtain D.S.'s written consent as to when 
interest would begin to accrue on the charges D.S. made at the 
Co-op.  Attorney Trewin's accounting to D.S. as to the balances 
owed and charges made contained a number of errors.  After the 
OLR initiated its investigation Attorney Trewin acknowledged the 
errors and made corrections. 
¶13 There was no public record of Attorney Trewin's 
security interest in Midwest Comics at the time of the May 1999 
loans to D.S. because Midwest Comics had been administratively 
dissolved in June 1996 as the result of a failure to file an 
annual report with the Wisconsin Department of Financial 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
7 
 
Institutions.  Attorney Trewin did not file and record the 
financing statement which evidenced Midwest Comic's interest in 
the cattle or the mortgage on D.S.'s real estate.   
¶14 In May 1999 Associated Bank's attorney sent Attorney 
Trewin a proposed workout agreement providing that its loan 
would be due in full on April 20, 2000.  Associated Bank's 
attorney requested that Attorney Trewin provide information on 
the purchase money financing of D.S.'s new dairy cows so that 
Associated Bank could distinguish the cows in which it had an 
interest from the later acquired cows.  Attorney Trewin 
initially did not tell the bank that he was behind the purchase 
money financing for the new cows.  D.S. never returned the loan 
workout agreement and in July 1999 Associated Bank commenced a 
foreclosure action against D.S. in Wood county.  
¶15 At the time the foreclosure action was commenced, 
Midwest Comics, Inc. was not named a defendant since it had not 
filed or recorded evidence of the loans to D.S.  Attorney Trewin 
understood that Associated Bank's security interests were higher 
in priority than those of Midwest Comics.  After the foreclosure 
action was filed, Attorney Trewin assigned Midwest Comics' 
promissory notes and security interest to his brother-in-law, 
Daniel Schommer.  Under the terms of the assignment Schommer had 
no real ownership interest and all interest earnings reverted to 
Midwest Comics.  As expressed in a memo to Schommer, Attorney 
Trewin's interest in entering into the assignment was to avoid 
any possibility that he might be called to testify in the 
foreclosure action and therefore be prevented from representing 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
8 
 
D.S. under the rules of professional conduct dealing with 
lawyers as witnesses.  At the conclusion of the foreclosure 
action the loan was reassigned by Schommer to Midwest Comics.   
¶16 When Associated Bank discussed possible settlement 
with Attorney Trewin, Attorney Trewin informed the bank that 
Schommer held the purchase money interest in the cattle.  
Attorney Trewin did not tell the bank he was a shareholder of 
Midwest Comics or that he had a security interest in D.S.'s real 
estate and personal property, including the cattle.  Attorney 
Trewin proposed that D.S. stipulate to a default judgment with 
the redemption period for the recovery of the animals and farm 
equipment being tied to the 12-month redemption period for the 
real estate.  That proposal allowed D.S. to maintain an income 
from the farm during the redemption period.  
¶17 On October 19, 1999, D.S. wrote Attorney Trewin a 
$5000 check payable to the Michael G. Trewin Trust Account.  The 
money was earmarked for payment to John Deere.  Although the 
check was made payable to the trust account and constituted 
funds belonging to D.S., it was deposited into Attorney Trewin's 
business checking account.  Attorney Trewin made a payment to 
John Deere on D.S.'s behalf on December 31, 1999, and credited 
D.S. with the $5000 payment.  
¶18 On October 29, 1999, Attorney Trewin sent a letter to 
Associated Bank's attorney with a list of the new cattle 
purchased by D.S.  The letter identified Midwest Comics as the 
lender. 
 
Attorney 
Trewin 
signed 
Schommer's 
name 
on 
the 
stipulation 
identifying 
the 
purchase 
money 
cows. 
 
This 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
9 
 
information was incorporated into a default judgment entered by 
the court providing that Associated Bank would forego the 
recovery of its collateral until November 1, 2000, subject to a 
number of conditions, including that D.S. remain current on his 
payments.  As an inducement to get Associated Bank to agree to 
the terms of the default judgment, Attorney Trewin permitted 
Associated Bank to take a security interest in the new cows 
ahead of Midwest Comics' purchase money security interest.  
¶19 In November 1999 D.S. asked Attorney Trewin to reduce 
the amount of his milk assignment for that month by $1150 to 
allow him to cure a default to Associated Bank.  Attorney Trewin 
agreed and D.S. asked to pick up a check from Attorney Trewin in 
that amount payable to Associated Bank on November 22, 1999.  
Attorney Trewin entered the transaction on a loan spreadsheet 
and charged interest as of that date but D.S. did not pick up 
the check.  Attorney Trewin delivered the check to Associated 
Bank on December 2, 1999.  D.S. defaulted on his loan payments 
to Associated Bank a number of times in the summer of 2000 and 
Attorney Trewin forwarded checks and an insurance binder to 
Associated Bank to cure the defaults.  
¶20 In May 2000 D.S. requested a new line of credit from 
Attorney Trewin to plant crops.  Attorney Trewin informed D.S. 
that any new loans would require a refinancing of the old notes 
and that the interest rate would be 14 percent, with the payment 
amount remaining the same.  On May 17, 2000, Midwest Comics 
loaned D.S. $9800 to pay John Deere, less a $2900 payment from 
D.S.  Attorney Trewin did not obtain a signed written consent 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
10 
 
from D.S. prior to increasing the interest rate and adding $6900 
to D.S.'s indebtedness.  According to a loan spreadsheet, on May 
17, 
2000, 
Attorney 
Trewin 
added 
$11,521.88 
to 
D.S.'s 
indebtedness to Midwest Comics and immediately began charging 
D.S. 14 percent interest on that amount although no funds were 
disbursed by Attorney Trewin on D.S.'s behalf on or before May 
17. 
¶21 In June 2000 D.S. entered into a new promissory note 
with Midwest Comics in the amount of $164,636.35 at 14 percent 
interest and also entered into a new dairy assignment.  The note 
was also secured by the security agreement and mortgage entered 
into in May 1999.  The new loan incorporated all existing 
indebtedness under the earlier note and the $11,521.88 that 
still had not been disbursed.  Attorney Trewin did not obtain a 
written conflict waiver from D.S. regarding the June 2000 
promissory note.  D.S. continued charging purchases on Attorney 
Trewin's credit card which exceeded the $11,521.88.  Attorney 
Trewin prepared a revised loan spreadsheet showing the excess 
charges.  Although Attorney Trewin knew the dates D.S. had 
incurred the extra charges and the dates Trewin had paid the 
credit card bills, D.S. was charged 14 percent interest on the 
amount of $15,244.38 beginning May 17, 2000.  As part of the OLR 
investigation Attorney Trewin corrected the actual disbursement 
dates on a revised loan accounting to reflect the dates Attorney 
Trewin had actually paid the credit card bills.  
¶22 In late 2000 D.S. was falling more in debt and it was 
obvious he could not secure financing to pay off Associated 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
11 
 
Bank.  Attorney Trewin devised a proposal whereby he would 
borrow money from F&M Bank of Antigo and lend that money to D.S. 
to pay off Associated Bank.  Attorney Trewin said he recommended 
that D.S. consult independent counsel and reminded him there was 
a potential for a conflict of interest to arise if D.S. 
defaulted on the loan.  On October 6, 2000, Attorney Trewin 
prepared a promissory note for $482,651.59, incorporating the 
prior D.S. indebtedness plus the additional loan to pay off 
Associated Bank and other creditors as well as points and fees 
for the transaction.  Attorney Trewin also prepared a mortgage 
and UCC financing statement.  D.S. signed the loan and security 
documents.  Attorney Trewin did not ask D.S. to sign a separate 
written conflict waiver.  
¶23 At the same time Attorney Trewin loaned the additional 
money to D.S., Attorney Trewin borrowed $325,000 from F&M Bank 
and assigned his interest in D.S.'s loan to F&M as collateral.  
Prior to entering into the transaction, D.S. requested that 
$7840 be paid to John Deere.  Attorney Trewin prepared a closing 
statement showing such a payment to John Deere, but the payment 
was not made.   
¶24 D.S. died on December 25, 2000.  D.S.'s estate made 
payments on the loan to Attorney Trewin until April 2001.  In 
October 2001 the estate filed an action against Attorney Trewin 
and Midwest Comics alleging a number of counts, including 
allegations of malpractice predicated on alleged violations of 
the rules of professional responsibility.   
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
12 
 
¶25 On October 5, 2001, F&M Bank filed a foreclosure 
action against Attorney Trewin and D.S. arising out of the 
estate's default on the loan to Attorney Trewin.  The estate's 
lawsuit against Attorney Trewin and the foreclosure action were 
consolidated.  In November 2002 the circuit court granted 
Attorney Trewin's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 
estate's claims against Attorney Trewin and ordered judgment in 
his favor for principal and interest in the amount set forth in 
his accounting.  The court also declared that Attorney Trewin 
was entitled to a judgment of foreclosure.  The estate appealed 
and the court of appeals affirmed.  Most of the property owned 
by D.S. has been sold and Attorney Trewin has been paid part of 
his judgment.  
¶26 Attorney Trewin was delinquent in filing both Midwest 
Comics' 1999 tax return and his personal 1999 tax return, both 
of which were filed in May 2001.  He filed his 2000 income tax 
return in June 2003.  He initially obtained an extension to file 
the returns but failed to obtain additional extensions.  His tax 
returns showed a combined refund of $3523 due him for state and 
federal taxes for 2000.   
¶27 The OLR's complaint also alleged that Attorney Trewin 
engaged in misconduct with respect to his representation of 
various other clients.  Attorney Trewin represented A.C. in a 
bankruptcy filing and debt restructuring.  A.C. had been 
represented for many years by Attorney Raymond S. Huber, who is 
now a Waupaca county circuit judge.  During Attorney Trewin's 
representation of A.C., Attorney Trewin and Schommer purchased 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
13 
 
A.C.'s business, Menominee Gas, which distributed propane on the 
Menominee reservation.  Attorney Trewin did not obtain written 
consent from A.C. prior to purchasing the business, and A.C. was 
not told that Schommer was Attorney Trewin's brother-in-law.  
¶28 Attorney Trewin and Schommer formed Menominee Gas, 
Inc.  It is unclear whether Huber represented A.C. in the sale 
of the assets of the sole proprietorship to the new corporation.  
The new corporation hired A.C. to manage the business and paid 
him a salary.  A.C. was treated as a one-third owner of the new 
company but evidence of any ownership was avoided because his 
creditors could have sought to attach it.  Attorney Trewin later 
filed a bankruptcy action for A.C.  Attorney Trewin did not 
explain 
to 
A.C. 
any 
potential 
conflicts 
of 
interest 
in 
representing him in the bankruptcy after Attorney Trewin had 
purchased Menominee Gas assets, and Attorney Trewin failed to 
obtain a written consent or conflict waiver from A.C. prior to 
representing him in the bankruptcy action.  The referee found 
that A.C.'s testimony was less than credible.  
¶29 Mr. and Mrs. S. owned a restaurant in Marinette.  They 
met with Attorney Trewin and told him they wanted to avoid 
bankruptcy.  Attorney Trewin proposed to negotiate with their 
creditors and take as a fee one-third of any reduction he could 
obtain in their indebtedness.  Attorney Trewin agreed to lend 
Mr. and Mrs. S. the funds to pay the reduced balance at 12 
percent interest.  He advised them verbally to seek independent 
counsel but a written conflict waiver was never prepared or 
signed.  
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
14 
 
¶30 Attorney 
Trewin 
prepared 
a 
promissory 
note 
for 
$80,000, two real estate mortgages, and a security agreement 
giving him an interest in all of Mr. and Mrs. S.'s business 
equipment, inventory, and fixtures.  Mr. and Mrs. S. eventually 
sold their business and paid off their indebtedness to Attorney 
Trewin.  Mrs. S. testified at the hearing before the referee 
that Attorney Trewin helped them when no one else would and that 
he was very fair in his dealings with them. 
¶31 Attorney Trewin represented Mr. and Mrs. M. in 1998 
and loaned them $127,000.  Again, Attorney Trewin gave Mr. and 
Mrs. M. an opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel 
but failed to obtain a written conflict waiver from them.   
¶32 Attorney Trewin loaned Mr. and Mrs. P., bankruptcy 
clients, $1500 in 1999.  He did not obtain a written consent or 
conflict waiver from them.  Attorney Trewin advised Mr. and Mrs. 
P. that they should not reaffirm the secured debt on their 
house.  Attorney Trewin entered into a transaction with Mr. and 
Mrs. P. to purchase their property and lease it back to them 
after their bankruptcy was completed.  Attorney Trewin did not 
obtain a written consent or conflict waiver from Mr. and Mrs. P.  
¶33 Attorney Trewin represented R.V.S. in a bankruptcy 
action.  After his bankruptcy discharge, the mortgage lender on 
the home held a foreclosure sale.  The bank's judgment was for 
more than the value of the house.  Attorney Trewin advised 
R.V.S. he 
could let the 
house be 
sold 
at 
foreclosure, 
anticipating that the bank would buy the property, and then 
attempt to buy the house back from the bank at a lower amount.  
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
15 
 
When R.V.S. could not find anyone else to buy the house or loan 
him money to do so, Attorney Trewin agreed to buy the home and 
lease it back to R.V.S.  R.V.S. testified that the transaction 
saved him roughly $30,000 and gave him lower monthly payments 
than he would otherwise have had, and he said Attorney Trewin 
had been fair with him throughout their dealings.  Attorney 
Trewin did not obtain written consent or a conflict waiver from 
R.V.S.  
¶34 Attorney Trewin represented R.L. regarding financial 
problems in a potential bankruptcy filing.  No bankruptcy 
petition was ever filed.  Attorney Trewin prepared a warranty 
deed that transferred ownership of R.L.'s land to Schommer and 
also prepared a lease/option agreement that called for R.L. to 
pay rent of $1100 per month to Schommer with the option of 
repurchasing the land.  Attorney Trewin did not obtain a written 
conflict waiver from R.L. prior to drafting the real estate 
documents transferring the property from R.L. to Schommer.  R.L. 
subsequently filed an action against Attorney Trewin and 
Schommer alleging he had been swindled.  The referee found that 
R.L.'s testimony was less than credible.   
¶35 Attorney Trewin admitted that by failing to timely 
file his own income tax returns he violated a supreme court 
decision 
regulating 
the 
conduct 
of 
lawyers 
in 
State 
v. 
Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 45, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963), which held 
that an attorney's intentional violation of the tax laws 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
16 
 
constitutes an ethics violation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(f).1  
Attorney Trewin also admits that by depositing the October 19, 
1999, check from D.S. into his business account rather than into 
his trust account, he violated SCR 20:1.15(a).2  Attorney Trewin 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (f) violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
2 SCR 20:1.15(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity. Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c). The trust 
account shall be maintained in a bank, savings bank, 
trust 
company, 
credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account. Unless the client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import. Other property of 
a client or third person shall be identified as such 
and 
appropriately 
safeguarded. If 
a lawyer 
also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
17 
 
takes issue with the referee's conclusions that he violated any 
other rules of professional conduct.   
¶36 The referee found that Attorney Trewin violated SCR 
20:1.8(a)3 in two respects.  First, the referee found a violation 
of the rule by virtue of Attorney Trewin's entering into lender-
debtor or business relationships with at least seven clients 
without securing written, informed consent waivers.  While 
Attorney Trewin admits he did not provide disclosure in writing 
or obtain written consent from his clients before entering into 
the loan agreements, he asserts this was not required.  Attorney 
Trewin notes that SCR 20:1.8(a)(3) requires that "the client 
consents in writing thereto."  He argues that the word "thereto" 
must refer to something earlier in the rule and the only logical 
                                                                                                                                                             
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
3 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless:  
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing to the client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the client;  
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity 
to seek the advice of independent counsel in the 
transaction; and  
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.  
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
18 
 
conclusion is that it must refer to subsection (1) regarding 
consent to enter into the transaction itself and the terms on 
which the lawyer acquires the interest.  Attorney Trewin thus 
argues that it is sufficient for the client to sign the loan 
documents and there is no need for a written waiver of any 
potential conflict of interest.   
¶37 The OLR argues that the written client consent 
required by SCR 20:1.8(a)(3) cannot be satisfied solely by the 
client signing the underlying loan documents, which terms are 
already required to be in writing under SCR 20:1.8(a)(1).  The 
OLR contends the rule also requires the client to consent in 
writing to the conflict of interest in entering into a business 
transaction with his or her attorney.  The OLR says to interpret 
the rule in any other manner flies in the face of the rule's 
purpose, which is to ensure that the client is aware of and 
acknowledges all the risks and conflicts present in entering 
into a business transaction with an attorney with whom they have 
a 
fiduciary 
relationship. 
 
We 
agree 
with 
the 
OLR's 
interpretation.   
¶38 It is a cardinal rule that when interpreting a statute 
a court must "attempt to give effect to every word, so as not to 
render any portion of the statute superfluous."  Osborn v. Board 
of Regents, 2002 WI 83, ¶22, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 N.W.2d 158.  
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(a)(1) requires the terms of a business 
transaction, i.e., the loan documents, between lawyer and client 
to be in writing.  Attorney Trewin's argument that having the 
client sign the loan documents is all that is required would 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
19 
 
render the remainder of SCR 20:1.8 superfluous.  Supreme Court 
Rule 20:1.8(a)(2) requires that before entering into a business 
transaction with his or her attorney the client be given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek advice of independent counsel.  
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(a)(3) requires that "the client 
consents in writing thereto."  The only interpretation that 
would give effect to all three subsections of SCR 20:1.8(a) is 
that the client must give separate consent to the transaction 
with the lawyer, waiving the conflict of interest, and the 
client must indicate in writing he or she has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel.   
¶39 Two prior cases in which attorneys were found to have 
violated SCR 20:1.8(a)(3) indicate that the rule clearly 
contemplates two separate writings.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Steiner, 225 Wis. 2d 422, 429, 591 N.W.2d 
857 (1999).4  See also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
                                                 
4 Attorney Steiner loaned money to a client.  In upholding 
the referee's findings that Steiner violated SCR 20:1.8(a), this 
court said: 
That transfer constituted a loan from Attorney Steiner 
to [his client], made at his request, but it was not 
evidenced by a promissory note, and the terms of the 
transaction had not been provided to [the client] in 
writing. Also, there was no evidence suggesting that 
[the client] had been advised to seek the advice of 
independent counsel in the transaction, and Attorney 
Steiner did not obtain his written consent to the 
transaction. The loan was satisfied, and [the client] 
did not complain about it. The referee concluded, as 
the parties had stipulated, that by lending money to 
his 
client 
without 
any 
written 
terms 
or 
other 
documentation, without advising his client to obtain 
the 
advice 
of 
independent 
counsel, 
and 
without 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
20 
 
Tritschler, 169 Wis. 2d 298, 305, 485 N.W.2d 261 (1992).5  
Further support for our interpretation of the rule is found in 
the comment to SCR 20:1.7, the general conflict of interest rule 
which provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation will be directly adverse to another client unless 
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client and each 
client consents in writing after consultation.  The committee 
comment to this rule states, "In conflict of interest situations 
where the lawyer may continue to represent the client or clients 
if each client consents, the client's consent must be in 
writing, . . . ."  We agree with the OLR and the referee that a 
separate written conflict waiver was required prior to Attorney 
Trewin entering into the business transactions with his clients.  
Attorney Trewin admits he did not obtain written consent from 
the clients.  Thus, he violated SCR 20:1.8(a). 
                                                                                                                                                             
obtaining 
his 
client's 
written 
consent, 
Attorney 
Steiner violated SCR 20:1.8(a). 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steiner, 225 Wis. 2d 
422, 429, 591 N.W.2d 857 (1999).  (Emphasis added.) 
5 In agreeing with the referee that the attorney violated 
SCR 20:1.8(a), this court said: "When he obtained the loan, 
Attorney Tritschler did not advise the clients of any actual or 
potential conflict of interest nor did he obtain their written 
consent to continue their representation after obtaining the 
loan."  In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Tritschler, 169 
Wis. 2d 298, 305, 485 N.W.2d 261 (1992). (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
21 
 
¶40 The referee also found that Attorney Trewin violated 
SCR 20:1.8(a) by virtue of errors made on his loan accountings 
to D.S.  The referee made the following conclusion of law: 
162. The frequency and the magnitude of the loan and 
business transactions in which Respondent participated 
with his clients were such that they appeared to be a 
common occurrence to Respondent's practice making it 
look as though he was more of a banker than a lawyer. 
Unlike a bank, however, Respondent's mathematical 
accuracy when dealing with his clients in these 
transactions 
resulted 
in 
many 
over-charges 
for 
interest 
and, 
in 
some 
instances, 
billings 
for 
disbursements that either were never made or, albeit, 
were made at dates well after interest was shown to 
have accrued.  None of the typical disclosure protocol 
a bank would follow was used by Trewin.  This type of 
activity was unfair and unreasonable to each and every 
client where such activity occurred and was in 
violation of SCR 20:1.8(a). 
¶41 Attorney Trewin asserts that he readily corrected the 
few accounting errors that were identified and that none of the 
errors amounted to anything more than ordinary bookkeeping 
mistakes.  He also asserts that charging interest on credit card 
purchases from the dates D.S. made the purchases rather than the 
date Attorney Trewin paid his credit card bill was not unfair or 
unreasonable.  He further contends that since neither D.S. nor 
his estate objected to using the date credit was obtained by 
D.S. in order to compute interest, the OLR should be barred by 
issue preclusion from objecting to this course of dealing.   
¶42 The OLR responds to the issue preclusion argument by 
noting that the issue of the propriety of Attorney Trewin's loan 
accountings was not litigated in the circuit court and the 
question of whether Attorney Trewin engaged in professional 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
22 
 
misconduct by virtue of the numerous mathematical inaccuracies 
in his accountings to D.S. and the estate was also not 
litigated.  We agree with the OLR's analysis and conclude that 
issue preclusion does not apply here.  We also agree with the 
referee's conclusion that Attorney Trewin violated SCR 20:1.8(a) 
by making numerous errors on loan accountings, apparently none 
of which were either identified or corrected by Attorney Trewin 
until after the OLR commenced its investigation.  Even accepting 
Attorney Trewin's argument that the errors were not intentional 
and were simply the result of sloppy bookkeeping, they were 
nevertheless significant enough to constitute a violation of SCR 
20:1.8(a).  
¶43 The referee also found that by failing to include a 
commentary on A.C.'s one-third ownership interest in the gas 
company in A.C.'s bankruptcy schedules, Attorney Trewin violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).6  In addition, the referee made findings of fact 
that Attorney Trewin violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by assigning various 
loan interests to his brother-in-law, Schommer.  For example, 
Finding of Fact 40 said that Attorney Trewin's assignment of 
Midwest Comics' interest in the D.S. notes to Schommer was 
"purely a ruse."  Although the referee's conclusions of law do 
not specifically mention the assignments to Schommer, this court 
adopts the referee's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
23 
 
and it reviews conclusions of law de novo.  The record supports 
the conclusion that the assignments to Schommer violated SCR 
20:8.4(c).   
¶44 The referee also found that by entering into the 
lender-debtor relationship with his clients without advising 
them of the possible adverse consequences, Attorney Trewin 
violated SCR 20:1.7(b).7  Attorney Trewin argues the OLR never 
offered any evidence of the likelihood of the alleged possible 
adverse effects, and he says the referee ignored evidence that 
such hypothetical risks were unlikely to occur.  Attorney Trewin 
points to testimony from some of his clients that he helped them 
when no one else would and that he was fair in his dealings with 
them.  The OLR argues that the creditor-debtor relationship 
created a relationship between Attorney Trewin and his clients 
in which they had differing and competing interests.   
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.7(b) provides: 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation 
of 
that 
client 
may 
be 
materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless:  
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and  
(2) the 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation. When representation of multiple clients 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
24 
 
¶45 We agree with the referee's conclusion that Attorney 
Trewin's failure to advise his clients in writing of the 
possible adverse effects of entering into business relationships 
with them violated SCR 20:1.7(b).  The rule does not require any 
particular degree of likelihood that adverse effects will accrue 
by the attorney entering into business relationships with 
clients.  Supreme Court Rule 20:1.7(b) provides that a lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation may be 
materially adverse unless: "(1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
the representation will not be adversely affected" and "(2) the 
client consents in writing after consultation."  If the lawyer 
believes there will be an actual adverse effect on the 
representation, the lawyer may not represent the client, even if 
the client would be willing to agree to the representation.  It 
is only where the lawyer believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected and the client consents in writing that the 
representation can continue.  By failing to obtain the clients' 
written consent before entering into the business transactions, 
Attorney Trewin violated the rule.  
¶46 This court will adopt the referee's findings of fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 
(1993).  The court does not grant deference to the referee's 
conclusions of law and reviews them on a de novo basis.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 
N.W.2d 789 (1981).  The court may also impose whatever sanction 
it sees fits regardless of the referee's recommendation.  In re 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
25 
 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 
45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  Since the referee's findings of fact have 
not been shown to be clearly erroneous, we adopt them.  We also 
agree with the referee's conclusions of law.   
¶47 The referee recommended a five-month suspension of 
Attorney Trewin's license to practice law in Wisconsin and also 
recommended that he pay the full costs of the proceeding.  We 
agree with both of these recommendations.  Attorney Trewin 
entered 
into 
loan 
transactions 
with 
clients 
who 
were 
experiencing serious financial problems and thus were in a 
vulnerable position.  The fact that some of the clients thought 
Attorney Trewin did them a favor by loaning them money does not 
exonerate him from the rule violations.  We agree with the 
referee that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that Attorney Trewin violated SCR 20:1.8(a), SCR 
20:8.4(c), and SCR 20:1.7(b).  In addition, Attorney Trewin has 
admitted to violating SCR 20:1.15(a) and SCR 20:8.4(f).  We 
agree with the referee that a five-month suspension of Attorney 
Trewin's license to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate 
sanction for these violations.  
¶48 The OLR is seeking costs in excess of $25,000.  
Attorney Trewin has filed an objection to the OLR's bill of 
costs in which he argues that the assessment of costs is 
discretionary.  He asserts that the costs requested by the OLR 
that are attributable to undisputed claims of misconduct amount 
to only $132.  He says even if the court were to find against 
him on any claims disputed on appeal, the reasonable costs 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
26 
 
attributable to those claims would add little as most of the 
underlying facts were undisputed and the vast majority of the 
costs incurred by the OLR relate either to claims that were 
dismissed and are not challenged on appeal by the OLR or were 
unreasonably 
and 
unnecessarily 
incurred 
in 
excessive 
and 
redundant discovery of undisputed facts.   
¶49 This court has previously rejected objections to a 
full assessment of costs based on an apportionment of the number 
of misconduct allegations established.  See e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 460, 
574 N.W.2d 232 (1998).  We follow that past practice here and 
conclude that Attorney Trewin should be required to pay the full 
costs and fees associated with this proceeding.  While the facts 
of the case may have been substantially undisputed, the ultimate 
question of whether the facts translated into one or more 
violations of the rules of professional conduct was hotly 
contested.  We find that the costs sought by the OLR were 
reasonably incurred in the prosecution of this case.  
¶50 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael G. Trewin to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of five 
months, effective August 31, 2004, and until further order of 
the court.  
¶51 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michael G. Trewin pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, provided that if the 
costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within 
No. 
02-3314-D   
 
27 
 
that time, the license of Michael G. Trewin to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court.  
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael G. Trewin comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.  
 
All work on this per curiam was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004.  
No.  02-3314-D.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part; dissenting 
in part).  This case raises several procedural issues that 
require comment. 
¶54 On December 12, 2002, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) 
filed 
a 
12-count, 
48-page 
complaint 
against 
the 
respondent, Michael Trewin.  The complaint asked that the 
respondent "be found in violation of the Supreme Court Rules as 
alleged," and "that the Court impose discipline commensurate 
with the severity of Trewin's misconduct, along with such other 
and further relief as may be just and equitable, including an 
award of costs."  The costs to the respondent, not including his 
own legal fees, now exceed $25,000. 
¶55 The 12 counts in the complaint alleged violation of 
the following rules: 
 
Count 1 
Rule 20.1.8(a) 
Count 2 
Rule 20.1.7(b) 
Count 3 
Rule 20.8.4(c) 
Count 4 
Rule 20.8.4(c) 
Count 5 
Rule 20.1.15(a) 
Count 6 
Rule 20.1.8(a) 
Count 7 
Rule 20.1.8(a) 
Count 8 
Rule 20.8.4(c) 
Count 9 
Rule 20.1.7(b) 
Count 10 
Rule 20.8.4(f) 
Count 11 
Rule 20.1.8(a) 
No.  02-3314-D.dtp 
 
2 
 
Count 12 
Rule 10.1.7(b) 
¶56 The referee concluded that the respondent had violated 
numerous rules, but the referee's report did not neatly track 
the 12 counts seriatim, so that a reader could keep score of the 
counts that OLR proved and the counts that it did not prove.  An 
accurate "score" would help the court evaluate the appropriate 
costs. 
¶57 What is evident from this case is the following: 
First, the complaint against Trewin at the outset was so open-
ended that he had no idea what discipline OLR was seeking, or 
what the potential consequences would be if he simply conceded 
every count.  This uncertainty about likely or potential 
consequences provided a strong incentive for the respondent to 
resist the discipline. 
¶58 Second, some of the counts charged contained multiple 
alleged violations against multiple clients.  Consequently, 
unless the respondent was willing to acknowledge wrongdoing to 
every part of every count, he had no choice but to resist some 
of the counts, particularly when he did not know what the 
consequences would be if he did not resist. 
¶59 Third, OLR contends that Trewin should pay the entire 
cost of the proceeding.  This means he is asked to pay the costs 
to prosecute him on counts on which he successfully defended 
himself. 
¶60 To illustrate, OLR charged Trewin in Counts 1, 6, 7, 
and 11 with alleged violations of Rule 20:1.8(a).  Each count 
alleged that Trewin entered into a business transaction or 
No.  02-3314-D.dtp 
 
3 
 
business transactions (a) the terms of which were unfair and 
unreasonable to the client; and (b) without obtaining the 
client's written approval.  On each such count, the referee 
dismissed the allegation that the terms of the allegation were 
unfair and unreasonable as to the client.  In retrospect, these 
counts were overcharged by OLR but the cost of getting them 
partially dismissed is to be borne entirely by Attorney Trewin.  
Count 9 was not proven but the cost of prosecuting that failed 
count is to be borne by Attorney Trewin.  Allegations involving 
transactions 
with 
two 
named 
individuals 
were 
dismissed.  
Attorney Trewin is to pay for those unsuccessful allegations. 
¶61 In Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 
112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, this court adopted the 
"lodestar" method for determining reasonable attorney fees under 
fee-shifting statutes.  The court needs to ask itself whether 
the 
cost 
assessment 
in 
some 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
is 
consistent with the lodestar methodology, or whether it is 
driven by nothing more than OLR's legitimate need for funding 
and our cold-blooded political determination that additional 
costs should not be assessed to the members of the state bar.  
Both of these factors are reasonable, but not if they completely 
override the element of fair play to a respondent attorney. 
¶62 I concur in the discipline imposed by the court but 
would adjust some of the costs to reflect the respondent's 
success in defending himself against some of OLR's charges. 
No.  02-3314-D.dtp 
 
 
 
1