Title: White v. State
Citation: 531 So. 2d 711
Docket Number: 69948
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 1988

531 So. 2d 711 (1988)
Don WHITE, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 69948.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 29, 1988.
*712 Don White, Belle Glade, in pro per.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Calvin L. Fox and Fariba N. Komeily, Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent.
OVERTON, Justice.
This is a petition to review the per curiam affirmed opinion of White v. State, 499 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In its decision, the Third District Court expressly relied on the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Rowe v. State, 496 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). This Court has accepted jurisdiction in Rowe v. State. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The issue before us concerns the authority of the trial judge to depart from the guidelines sentence when the departure is part of the terms of a plea agreement. Under the circumstances of this case, we approve the district court's decision allowing the departure and distinguish our decision in Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986).
The relevant facts reflect that the petitioner, Don White, was indicted for first-degree murder. He subsequently agreed to enter a plea of guilty to second-degree murder and, as part of the plea agreement, agreed to waive the imposition of the sentencing guidelines and allow the court discretion to impose any sentence it felt appropriate, ranging from a possible minimum sentence of three years to a possible life sentence. The following represents the relevant portions of the plea colloquy:
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced White to thirty-years' imprisonment. White now claims he should have been sentenced under the guidelines for a period of twelve to seventeen years. In his motion for postconviction relief, White asserts that had he known the sentence was being imposed under the old sentencing structure rather than the current sentencing guidelines, he would not have entered into the plea agreement and would instead have chosen to go to trial.
The Second District Court, addressing a similar contention in Rowe v. State, 496 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), rejected the argument that a negotiated plea resulted in an impermissible departure from the sentencing guidelines and imposition of an excessive sentence. The court found that the bargained-for sentence resulted from Rowe's own initiative in entering into a plea agreement to avoid sentencing under the habitual offender statute. In concluding that the sentence was permissible, the Second District Court specifically noted that the sentence did not stem from any action by the trial court independent of the plea bargain, stating:
Id. at 859. The Third District Court, in per curiam affirming the lower court decision in the instant case, clearly relied on this reasoning in Rowe to affirm White's thirty-year sentence.
We disagree with White's argument that our decision in Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986), controls and requires a resentencing in accordance with the guidelines. *714 Williams is clearly distinguishable from this case. The plea entered by Williams was conditioned upon the following three matters: "1) that his criminal record was what he said it was; 2) that he reappear for sentencing on July 20, 1984; and 3) that he refrain from engaging in any further criminal activity." Id. at 501-02. At the time of the plea, Williams agreed to these conditions. Williams failed to reappear for sentencing and was arrested in Texas four months later. The trial judge based his departure on Williams' failure to appear for sentencing and imposed a fifteen-year sentence. We found that sentence improper, determining it was "impermissible to deviate from the guidelines based upon a crime for which the defendant had not been convicted." Id. at 502. We noted that Williams' failure to appear would have been punishable by a maximum of five-years' imprisonment as a third-degree felony. Further, had Williams been convicted of that offense, it would have been considered in computing the guidelines score. Under the facts of Williams, we found a departure sentence cannot be justified by conduct constituting an offense for which a defendant has not been convicted. That is not the situation in this case.
White, in entering a plea to second-degree murder, was pleading to a reduced offense. He clearly understood that, as part of the plea agreement, the trial judge could impose a sentence of from three years to life imprisonment and that the plea was being entered on condition that the guidelines not apply. The record clearly establishes that White knowingly entered a plea to a reduced charge of second-degree murder with possible imposition of a life sentence in order to avoid a possible conviction of first-degree murder and the imposition of a death sentence or a life sentence without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Nothing in the record indicates that this plea was involuntary. To the contrary, the record clearly shows that White knew exactly the terms of this plea bargain at the time he entered into it.
Accordingly, we find the sentence was validly imposed and approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.