Title: Guinn v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 584, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NATHAN L. GUINN,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 584, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0207018218 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: October 4, 2010 
Decided: November 24, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 24th day of November 2010, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Nathan L. Guinn, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s August 20, 2010 order denying his third motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in May 2003, Guinn was found guilty 
by a Superior Court jury of Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, 
Possession of Cocaine Within 300 Feet of a Park and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia.  On the conviction of possession with intent to deliver, he 
was sentenced to 30 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 16 
years.  On the conviction of possession within 300 feet of a park, he was 
sentenced to 5 years at Level V, to be suspended after 9 months for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  On the conviction of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, he was sentenced to 1 year at Level V, to be suspended for 6 
months at Level II probation.  This Court affirmed Guinn’s convictions on 
direct appeal.2  Guinn unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief on two 
prior occasions. 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his latest 
postconviction motion on procedural grounds,3 Guinn claims that his two 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Guinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239 (Del. 2004). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1), (2) and (3). 
 
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felony possession convictions constitute a violation of double jeopardy, 
thereby permitting him to bypass the procedural bars.4    
 
(4) 
The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution 
prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.  The test to determine 
whether separate counts of an indictment constitute one or more offenses for 
double jeopardy purposes is whether each count requires proof of at least 
one element the other does not.5  Guinn’s claim of a double jeopardy 
violation fails because Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine6 and 
Possession of Cocaine Within 300 Feet of a Church7 contain separate and 
distinct statutory elements.8  As such, there is no constitutional double 
jeopardy violation and the Superior Court correctly denied Guinn’s 
postconviction motion on procedural grounds.   
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
5 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 375 (Del. 1999). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §4751. 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §4768. 
8 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice