Title: STATE v HOUGH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12486
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 24, 1973

No. 12486 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - JOANN G. HOUGH, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Edward T. Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps 111, lhp&y County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Michael J. Milodragovich, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Missoula , Montana For Respondent : Donald R. Matthews argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: September 11, 1973 Decided : OCT 2 4 1973 Filed: WT 2 4.1973 M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion o f the Court. Defendant was charged w i t h unlawful possession o f dangerous drugs i n the d i s t r i c t court o f Missoula County. She moved t o suppress the evidence seized by the Missoula County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e . From the order o f the d i s t r i c t court suppressing the evidence, the state appeals. B r i e f l y stated the facts are as follows: O n January 20, 1973, deputy s h e r i f f s Frojen and Churchwell o f Missoula County were p a t r o l l i n g an area i n Missoula, Montana. The deputies, who work f o r the drug team, were d r i v i n g an unmarked car and wearing p l a i n clothes. Defendant was hitchhiking on Brooks Street i n Missoula. The o f f i c e r s stopped and picked her up. They i d e n t i f i e d themselves t o defendant as b i l l collectors and expressed t o her an i n t e r e s t i n buying some drugs. Defendant t o l d the o f f i c e r s she had extensive involvement w i t h drugs, but she d i d n o t have any w i t h her a t t h a t time and d i d not know where the o f f i c e r s could obtain any. While d r i v i n g around f o r a period o f time, the o f f i c e r s urged defendant t o l e t them know where they could get some narcotics. Defend- ant t o l d the officers t h a t she r e a l l y d i d n ' t know many people i n Missoula. The o f f i c e r s estimated defendant's age t o be 15 o r 16 because she looked extremely young. Defendant stated her age was 19 years and t h a t her f i r s t name was Ginnie. Suspecting defendant was a runaway juvenile the o f f i c e r s i d e n t i f i e d themselves as deputy s h e r i f f s . Defendant t o l d them she was 18 and not 19 years o f age and gave the o f f i c e r s a welfare card and a check guarantee card f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The welfare card i d e n t i f i e d the subject as JoAnn Hough. The welfare card revealed the subject had two children. Defendant was unable t o accurately state the children's birthdates upon being questioned by the o f f i c e r s . She was asked i f she had graduated from high school. She stated she had graduated, but could not remember the year i n which she grad- ila ted. The officers brought defendant t o the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e f o r the purpose o f i d e n t i f y i n g her, t o contact her parents and inform them t h a t t h e i r daughter had been located. While a t the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e O f f i c e r Churchwell examined the contents o f defendant's purse. The o f f i c e r s claim t h a t defendant had no objection t o them going through her purse. O f f i c e r Churchwell t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant v o l u n t a r i l y handed him the purse, a1 - though he d i d not explain t o her t h a t she had any alternative. Defendant claims she objected t o t h e i r going through her purse. O f f i c e r Churchwell dumped the contents o f defendant's purse out on the desk. He opened a zippered purse which was i n the larger purse and therein found the drugs. Defendant exclaimed, "Well, you have got m e now," but there i s a c o n f l i c t as t o when t h i s statement was made. The o f f i c e r discovered a quantity o f hashish and marijuana. De- fendant was then formally arrested and advised o f her r i g h t s . An evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's motion t o suppress the evidence. The d i s t r i c t court, the Hon. Edward T. Dussault presiding, suppressed the seized drugs on the grounds t h a t the search and seizure was unreasonable. The single issue presented on appeal i s whether the drugs were properly seized by the deputy s h e r i f f s . The 4th Amendment t o the Constitution of the United States and Art. 111, s 7, Montana Constitution o f 1889 (Art. 11, B 11, Montana Consti- t u t i o n of 1972) protects c i t i z e n s from "unreasonable searches and seizures." Section 95-701, R.C.M. 1947, states: "A search o f a person, object o r place may be made and instruments, a r t i c l e s o r things may be seized i n accord- ance w i t h the provisions of t h i s chapter when the search i s made: "(a) As an incident t o a lawful arrest. "(b) With the consent o f the accused o r o f any person who i s l a w f u l l y i n possession o f the object o r place t o be searched, o r who i s believed upon reasonable cause t o be i n such lawful possession by the person making the search. "(c) By the authority o f a v a l i d search warrant. "(d) Under the a u t h o r i t y and w i t h i n the scope o f a r i g h t of lawful inspection granted by the law." The state presents three alternatives f o r f i n d i n g t h a t the drugs were properly seized. F i r s t , the s t a t e argues there was no search under the circumstances o f t h i s case as the term i s defined i n i t s 4 t h Amendment sense. This Court i n State v. Williams, 153 Mont. 262, 269, 455 P.2d 634, said: " * * * we f i n d t h a t a 'search' has been held t o imply an examination o f one's premises o r person w i t h a view t o the discovery o f contraband o r evidence o f g u i l t t o be used i n prosecution o f a criminal action; it implies an exploratory investigation o r quest. ( C i t i n g authority. ) I n the aggregate,a 'search' i n i t s 4th Amendment sense simply denotes (1 ) a quest by an o f f i c e r o f the law (Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652) (2) with an i n t e n t i o n o f f i n d (United States v. Lodahl, D.C.Mont. 264 F.Supp. 927), (3) which invades a consti- t u t i o n a l l y protected area (Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399); Weeks v. United States, supra)." I n the instant case the o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t the drugs were discovered i n an attempt t o i d e n t i f y the defendant. There was no "examin- a t i o n o f one's premises o r person with a view t o the discovery o f contraband o r evidence o f g u i l t t o be used i n prosecution o f a criminal action". Under t h e foregoing d e f i n i t i o n there was no "search" under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s case. The question presented, however, i s whether the seizure was proper, and the s t a t e argues t h a t it was under the " p l a i n view" doctrine. I n the recent case o f State v. Gallagher, Mont . , 509 P.2d 852, 30 St.Rep. 467, 476, t h i s Court said: "The r u l e i s : Where there i s p r i o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the police t o search an area, and i n searching the area, they inadvertently f i n d incriminating evidence which they had no reason t o anticipate, they may law- f u l l y seize t h a t incriminating evidence." (Citing authority. ) I n Gallagher the s h e r i f f was searching the house f o r a prowler when he entered the bedroom o f defendant and noticed the evidence. I n f i n d - ing t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s reason f o r being i n defendant's bedroom was lawful ana t h a t the evidence seized c l e a r l y came w i t h i n the "plain view" doctrine, w e quoted extensively from the United States Supreme Court decision of Coolidge v . N e w Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, which thoroughly discusses the "plain view" doctrine, i t s rationale and appl i - cation. In Coolidge a t 29 L ed 2d 564, 583, the Court said: "The rationale for the 'plain view' exception i s evident if w e keep in mind the two distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. First, the magistrate's scrutiny i s intended to eliminate al- together searches not based on probable cause. The premise here i s that a?y intrusion in the way of search or seizure i s an evil, so that no intrusion a t all i s justified without a careful prior determination of necessity. (Citing authority.) The second, distinct objective i s that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil i s the 'general warrant' abhorred by the colonists, and the problem i s not that of intrusion per se, b u t of a gen- eral , exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. (Citing authority.) * * * "The 'plain view1- doctrine is not in conflict with the f i r s t objective because plain view does not occur until a search i s in progress. In each case, this initial intrusion i s justified by a warrant or by an exception such as 'hot pursuit' or search incident to a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer's presence. * * *" The question in this case becomes whether there was a "prior justification" for the officer to be in defendant's purse. There was no warrant for another object. Hot pursuit was not involved. W a s there an extraneous valid reason for the officer's presence in the purse, or pur- suant to section 95-701 ( d ) , R.C.M. 1947, was the inspection under the authority and within the scope of a right granted by law? Let us examine the facts in more detail. After the officers identified themselves, defendant showed the officers her welfare card and told them that she lived on Sussex street where she had a birth certificate. Before going to the sheriff's office the t r i o drove w i t h i n a few blocks of the Sussex address. In response to questions asked of Officer Churchwell concerning going to the house on Sussex, the officer gave the following answers: "Q. And would i t have been much trouble to go to her house t o check out the birth certificate part of i t ? A. That's not usually h o w w e operate. "Q. Well -- A. I wouldn't have done it t h a t way, no. "Q. You obviously d i d n ' t do i t t h a t way; but would it have been much trouble f o r you t o have done that? A. It could have been done. "Q. F a i r l y easy, could it not? A. Yes." Defendant t o l d the o f f i c e r s t h a t her s i s t e r l i v e d w i t h her a t the Sussex address and t h a t her s i s t e r could prove defendant's i d e n t i f i - cation. She also t o l d them t h a t her parents l i v e d i n Warm Springs. O f f i - cer Churchwell could not remember whether o r not he called defendant's parents. He t e s t i f i e d as follows: "Q. Mr. Churchwell, i s i t usual for you t o phone the parents when you bring a juvenile i n ? A. I often do that, yes. "Q. Don't you do t h a t most o f the time, p r a c t i c a l l y every time? A. Yes, s i r . "Q. Did you phone JoAnn's parents? A. No -- I 'm not sure whether I d i d or not. I r e a l l y d o n ' t remember. "Q. If I t o l d you t h a t she t o l d me, and she found out from her f o l k s t h a t you d i d not, would you be1 ieve that? A. Yes, s i r . " O f f i c e r Frojen d i d not c a l l defendant's parents. Defendant's s i s t e r was c a l l e d l a t e r i n the evening. The drugs were discovered before she arrived. Officer Frojen was handed defendant's w a l l e t while r i d i n g i n the car. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was the type of b i l l f o l d t h a t would hold c r e d i t cards, papers and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . He d i d not, however, a t t h a t time ex- amine the contents o f the wallet. Deferldant t e s t i f i e d t h a t the zippered purse i n which the drugs were found was a make-up bag. According t o Officer Churchwell, he asked f o r other i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from the defendant than what she had produced. Defendant informed him t h a t what she had given t o the o f f i c e r was a l l t h a t she had with her. Officer Churchwell was asked what the normal procedure i s w i t h a suspected runaway juvenile. He said: "A. Normally I take them t o the office; i n the case o f run-away juveniles, take them t o the office, interview them b r i e f l y and then advise them t h a t I a m going t o call their parents. I obtain a phone number from them and call the parents." I t was the officers' responsibility to identify the defendant and notify the proper parties. W e observe from the facts, however, that the officers had several opportunities by which they could obtain identi- fication. Present in this case i s an apparent deviation from the normal procedure for identifying the defendant. This deviation cannot extend into constitutionally protected areas and be justified for the purpose of proving identification. Noticeably, the available and more reliable alternatives were not pursued by the officers. There was no valid reason for the officer's presence in the defendant's purse, and the "plain view" doctrine i s not applicable. In addition, the state argues that the seizure can also be justified on the basis that there was a search made incidental to an arrest. W e do not overlook the fact that the officers had reasonable grounds to be1 ieve the defendant was a runaway juvenile. Defendant, however, was not arrested; she was simply taken into custody for the purpose of proving her identification. W e note, as did the district court, that defendant was not told that even though she was suspected of being a juvenile that she could call her parents, her sister, the address a t Sussex or an attorney. She was not arrested until after the drugs were found. There was no search incident to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the seizure was not proper on this basis and i t cannot serve as a prior justifi- cation for the "plain view" doctrine. A s a third alternative the state contends that the seizure can be sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Terry v . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L ed 2d 889. In Terry the court justi- fied the "stop and frisk" procedures used by police officers. The doctrine enunciated i n Terry has no application to the facts of this case. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court suppressing the drugs i s hereby a W e concur: /7 / i Justices -- Mr. J u s t i ce John Conway Harrison dissenting: I dissent.