Title: Dunn County v. Judy K.
Citation: 2002 WI 87
Docket Number: 2000AP003135
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2002

2002 WI 87 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3135 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Judy K.: 
 
Dunn County,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Judy K.,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn   
 
JUDGE: 
William C. Stewart   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and SYKES, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Nicholas P. Lange, assistant corporation counsel. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there were briefs by Roy W. 
Froemming, Mitchell M. Hagopian and the Wisconsin Coalition for 
Advocacy, Inc., Madison, and James T. Parent and Burgfechtel & 
Parent, Menominee, and oral argument by Mitchell M. Hagopian. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert Theine Pledl and 
Schott, Bublitz & Engel, S.C., Brookfield, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Coalition of Independent Living Centers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen J. Henningsen, 
Madison, on behalf of the Elder Law Center of the Coalition of 
Wisconsin Aging Groups. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John J. Prentice, 
Andrew T. Phillips and Prentice & Phillips LLP, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
2002 WI 87 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3135  
(L.C. No. 
79 GN 10184 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Judy  
K.: 
 
Dunn County,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Judy K.,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dunn County, 
William C. Stewart, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1999-
2000).1  Dunn County appeals from an order requiring the County 
to take affirmative steps to seek funding to support the cost of 
Judy K.'s protective placement and to develop community-based 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
00-3135   
 
2 
 
placement resources appropriate for Judy K.2  The County asserts 
that under Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a), it cannot be required to 
contribute any funds to Judy K.'s placement costs.  We disagree 
and conclude that the County is required to make an affirmative 
showing of a good faith, reasonable effort to find and fund an 
appropriate placement in accordance with the factors outlined in 
§ 55.06(9)(a).  Because the County failed to make such a showing 
at the time of the final hearing on placement, we affirm the 
circuit court's order. 
I 
¶2 
Judy K. is a 56-year-old developmentally disabled 
woman.  While living in a supervised apartment setting through 
Aurora 
Residential 
Alternatives, 
she 
began 
experiencing 
deterioration in her walking ability.  She fell eleven times and 
sustained a severe head injury as a result of one of her falls.  
Dunn County filed a petition requesting that she be protectively 
placed.3   
¶3 
Before the final hearing on the petition could be 
held, Judy K. was transferred to the Trempealeau County Health 
Care Center pursuant to an emergency placement order.  At the 
hearing on permanent placement, the parties stipulated to a 
finding of the need for placement, and the circuit court 
                                                 
2 Dunn County appealed from an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dunn County, William C. Stewart, Judge. 
3 Judy K. previously had been the subject of a protective 
placement that was vacated because she was at the time living in 
the least restrictive environment capable of meeting her needs. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
3 
 
received evidence in support of the finding.  Judy K.'s 
adversary counsel, her guardian, and her guardian ad litem all 
indicated that issues remained with respect to whether the 
Trempealeau County Health Care Center was the least restrictive 
environment appropriate for Judy K. 
¶4 
The circuit court found that as of the hearing date, 
the parties were unaware of appropriate alternatives for 
placement.  Accordingly, the court ordered further assessment of 
Judy K. and the preparation of placement proposals.  The court 
set a date for a continued hearing approximately two and one-
half months later. 
¶5 
At the continued hearing, the County conceded that at 
least two of the proposed placement options were appropriate for 
Judy K. and less restrictive.  However, its position was that 
Judy K. should remain at the Trempealeau County Health Care 
Center where there was no additional cost to the County.  Judy 
K.'s guardian ad litem and adversary counsel advocated for a 
placement proposal that Judy K. reside in a Hudson facility 
through Community Living Specialists. 
¶6 
The circuit court reserved a final decision, ordered 
briefing, and conducted an evidentiary hearing approximately one 
week later.  Dennis Ciesielski, the long-term support supervisor 
with the County's Department of Human Services, testified at the 
hearing. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Ciesielski explained that Judy K. received funding 
through the CIP IA program,4 and that when she was in a 
supervised apartment setting at Aurora, the cost was $125.57 per 
day, which represented a consolidation of county, state, and 
federal funds.  The $125.57 included $125.00 of federal and 
state dollars.  The remaining $0.57 was comprised of county 
funds and additional federal funds at a ratio of approximately 
41% to 59%.5  Thus, the County's contribution was approximately 
$0.24 per day. 
¶8 
In addition, Ciesielski stated that the County was 
unwilling to place Judy K. in a setting that would cost more 
                                                 
4 The Legislative Fiscal Bureau's Informational Paper #50, 
titled "Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities" 
and dated January, 2001, provides useful background on the 
CIP IA program.  Page nine of the Paper explains as follows: 
Federal law authorizes the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing 
Administration 
to 
waive 
certain 
MA 
[Medical 
Assistance] requirements to enable states to provide 
home- and community-based services to persons who 
would otherwise require care in an institution.  In 
Wisconsin, there are six such programs that operate 
under four MA waivers:  (1) the community integration 
program IA (CIP IA); (2) . . . . 
According to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau's Informational Paper 
#43, "Medical Assistance and BadgerCare," at page 44, the four 
waiver programs "are intended to reduce the number of persons 
who would receive long-term care services in nursing homes or 
institutions." 
5 Ciesielski in his testimony referred to figures of 42% and 
58%, although Legislative Fiscal Bureau sources cited by Judy K. 
indicate that the ratio is 41% to 59%.  For purposes of our 
review, the precise rate is not important. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
5 
 
than $125.57 per day.  He acknowledged that the Hudson facility 
currently was the only facility that would provide the least 
restrictive placement for Judy K.  The average daily cost for 
the Hudson facility was $224.22 per resident.  When asked if an 
appropriate 
placement 
for 
$125.57 
was 
viable, 
Ciesielski 
responded that he could not say without further study. 
¶9 
The circuit court subsequently ordered that Judy K. be 
transferred to the Hudson facility.  In addition, the court 
required the County to take affirmative steps to seek additional 
federal, state, local, or other funding to support the cost of 
Judy K.'s placement.  Finally, the court ordered the County to 
develop community-based placement resources appropriate for Judy 
K. and others on a County waiting list. 
¶10 The County appealed, arguing that Judy K. should have 
been permanently placed in the Trempealeau County Health Care 
Center because no community placements were available within the 
limits of state and federal funds and county funds required to 
be appropriated to match state funds.  Section 55.06(9)(a) 
provides in part:  "The county may not be required to provide 
funding, in addition to its funds that are required to be 
appropriated to match state funds, in order to protectively 
place an individual."  Based on this statutory language, the 
County asserted that the amount of County funds required under 
the statute for Judy K.'s placement was zero. 
¶11 The court of appeals certified the County's appeal to 
this court.  It interpreted the circuit court's decision to 
place three affirmative obligations on the County:  (1)  to 
No. 
00-3135   
 
6 
 
exhaust all potential additional sources of federal funding to 
support placement in the least restrictive environment; (2) to 
exhaust all potential sources of increased state funding; and 
(3) to affirmatively seek to develop additional community-based 
placements within the constraints of state and federal funding. 
¶12 In 
addition, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
noted 
that 
§ 55.06(9)(a) recently was amended by 1995 Wis. Act 92 and that 
"several other appeals had been commenced in [the court of 
appeals] challenging protective placements on the ground that 
they exceed the spending limits authorized by 1995 Wis. Act 92."  
We accepted certification, and the County renews its arguments 
here. 
II 
¶13 The question we address is whether in a protective 
placement pursuant to § 55.06(9)(a), a county may be required to 
make affirmative efforts to find and fund an appropriate 
placement.  This requires the interpretation and application of 
a statute, a question of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶16, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607.  The legal backdrop for this 
question is set by a decision of this court and subsequent 
legislative action. 
¶14 In D.E.R. v. La Crosse County, 155 Wis. 2d 240, 242, 
455 N.W.2d 239 (1990), the court addressed whether the circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
failing 
to 
order 
placement 
for 
two 
developmentally disabled persons in 
the least 
restrictive 
environment, as required by Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a) (1987-88), 
No. 
00-3135   
 
7 
 
on the sole ground of lack of funding.  The court concluded that 
the legislature did not intend to limit a county board's duty to 
fund protective placements under ch. 55 to the funds the county 
receives in state and federal funding and the funds the county 
appropriates to match state funds.  Id. 
¶15 In support of its conclusion, the court observed that 
there was no provision in ch. 55 that required the circuit court 
to consider the availability and source of funds when placing an 
individual in the least restrictive environment.  D.E.R., 155 
Wis. 2d at 248.  Rather, the court explained, "the factors 
enumerated in sec. 55.06 for consideration in making protective 
placement, although not all inclusive, relate to the individual 
only——the needs of the person to be protected and the level of 
supervision——and do not refer to appropriations by the county 
board of supervisors."  Id.6  
¶16 Subsequently, 
the 
legislature 
amended 
several 
provisions in ch. 55 and Wis. Stat. ch. 51 to include language 
that 
provides 
a 
limitation 
on 
a 
county's 
financial 
responsibility for certain services under these chapters.  See 
1995 Wis. Act 92.  Before it was amended by Act 92, 
§ 55.06(9)(a) (1987-88) provided, in part, as follows: 
                                                 
6 Shortly after D.E.R. v. La Crosse County, 155 Wis. 2d 240, 
455 N.W.2d 239 (1990), the court of appeals held that a county's 
obligation to place developmentally disabled individuals in the 
least restrictive environment applied even where the type of 
community placement sought did not already exist.  See Fond du 
Lac County v. J.G.S., 159 Wis. 2d 685, 687, 465 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. 
App. 1990). 
No. 
00-3135   
 
8 
 
When ordering placement, the court, on the basis of 
the evaluation and other relevant evidence shall order 
placement through the appropriate board designated 
under s. 55.02 or an agency designated by it.  
Placement shall be made in the least restrictive 
environment consistent with the needs of the person to 
be placed.  Factors to be considered in making 
protective placement shall include the needs of the 
person 
to 
be 
protected 
for 
health, 
social 
or 
rehabilitative services and the level of supervision 
needed.  
(Emphasis added.)  Section 55.06(9)(a) now provides, in part:7 
When ordering placement, the court, on the basis of 
the evaluation and other relevant evidence shall order 
the appropriate board specified under s. 55.02 or an 
agency designated by it to protectively place the 
individual. Placement by the appropriate board or 
designated 
agency 
shall 
be 
made 
in 
the 
least 
restrictive environment consistent with the needs of 
the person to be placed and with the placement 
resources of the appropriate board specified under s. 
55.02.   
Factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
making 
protective 
placement shall include the needs of the person to be 
protected 
for 
health, 
social 
or 
rehabilitative 
services; 
the 
level 
of 
supervision 
needed; 
the 
reasonableness of the placement given the cost and the 
actual benefits in the level of functioning to be 
realized by the individual; the limits of available 
state and federal funds and of county funds required 
to be appropriated to match state funds; and the 
reasonableness of the placement given the number or 
projected 
number 
of 
individuals 
who 
will 
need 
protective placement and given the limited funds 
available. 
The county may not be required to provide funding, in 
addition to its funds that are required to be 
                                                 
7 The excerpted portions of Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a) appear 
in one continuous paragraph in the official version of the 
statutes, but we have broken that paragraph into several for 
ease of reading. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
9 
 
appropriated to match state funds, in order to 
protectively place an individual. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶17 The County asserts that under the amended version of 
the statute, it cannot be required to contribute any funds to 
the cost of Judy K.'s placement.  Thus, under the County's 
position, its financial obligation to fund the daily cost of 
protective placements like Judy K.'s is zero, and even the $0.24 
per day it previously provided was gratuitous. 
¶18 We reject the County's interpretation of the statute 
because it cannot account for the language in § 55.06(9)(a) 
referring to county funds that are "in addition to its funds 
that are required to be appropriated to match state funds."  
Also, the County's interpretation fails to account for the 
multi-factor approach to placement in the statute and the 
individual 
liberty 
interests 
that 
are 
recognized 
by 
the 
statutory scheme. 
¶19 When the legislature inserted language explaining that 
a county cannot be required to provide funding "in addition to 
its funds that are required to be appropriated to match state 
funds," it must have intended that county funds "required to be 
appropriated to match state funds" refer to something.  Section 
55.06(9)(a) (emphasis added).  The County maintains that the 
legislature was referring only to community aids funding.8 
                                                 
8 The Legislative Fiscal Bureau's Informational Paper #48, 
"Community 
Aids," 
dated 
January, 
2001, 
begins 
with 
this 
explanation: 
No. 
00-3135   
 
10 
 
¶20 The County, however, is able to offer no explanation 
of how it is that county dollars directed to community aids 
funds are "required to be appropriated to match state funds" any 
more than are county dollars that might be used to match funds 
available through the CIP IA program.  During oral argument, the 
County conceded that county money directed toward community aids 
is "required to be appropriated to match state funds" in the 
sense that if a county does not appropriate community aids 
monies, it foregoes state and federal community aids matching 
funds.  Other matching-type funding programs may be required 
similarly in the sense that there is a "carrot" but no "stick."  
Accordingly, we reject the County's argument that the language 
in § 55.06(9)(a) referring to county funds "required to be 
appropriated to match state funds" must be intended to refer 
only to community aids funds. 
¶21 In addition, the 
County's 
interpretation of the 
statute fails to account for the multi-factor statutory scheme 
and the individual liberty interests at stake that this scheme 
recognizes.  Section 55.06(9)(a) as amended lists several 
factors to be considered in making a protective placement, many 
of which implicate financial considerations.  Unquestionably, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Community aids are state and federal funds which 
are distributed by the Department of Health and Family 
Services (DHFS) to counties for the provision of human 
services in two broad, statutorily-defined areas:  (1)  
social services for low-income persons and children in 
need of protection and services; and (2) services for 
persons 
with 
needs 
relating 
to 
mental 
illness, 
substance abuse or developmental disabilities. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
11 
 
§ 55.06(9)(a) now indicates that the availability of funds must 
be considered in an individual protective placement decision, 
and the statute also provides a limitation on county financial 
liability. 
¶22 Nonetheless, 
the 
statute 
retains 
the 
previous 
version's factors of "the needs of the person to be protected" 
and "the level of supervision needed."  Also, it retains the 
mandate that placement "shall be made in the least restrictive 
environment consistent with the needs of the person to be 
placed," although it now states that the placement should be 
"consistent 
with . . . the 
placement 
resources 
of 
the 
appropriate board . . . ."9 
                                                 
9 The legislature amended other provisions similarly in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 55.  Section 55.001 now provides that protective 
services:  
should, to the maximum degree of feasibility under 
programs, services and resources that the county board 
of supervisors is reasonably able to provide within 
the limits of available state and federal funds and of 
county funds required to be appropriated to match 
state funds, allow the individual the same rights as 
other citizens, and at the same time protect the 
individual from exploitation, abuse and degrading 
treatment. 
Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 55.045 now provides: 
The 
appropriate 
county 
department 
designated 
under s. 55.02 shall, within the limits of available 
state and federal funds and of county funds required 
to be appropriated to match state funds, provide for 
the reasonable program needs of persons who are 
protectively placed or who receive protective services 
under this chapter, including reasonable expenses for 
the evaluations required by s. 55.06(8). 
No. 
00-3135   
 
12 
 
¶23 The statute's continued recognition of the concept of 
least restrictive environment and its concern with the needs of 
the placed individual recognize the individual liberty interests 
at stake.  A protective placement has many effects on an 
individual, 
including 
"loss 
of 
liberty, 
adverse 
social 
consequences, [and] intrusion on personal security."  State ex 
rel. Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 81, 362 
N.W.2d 104 (1985).  In reaching its holding that protectively 
placed individuals have a constitutional right to periodic 
judicial review of the placement, the court in Watts emphasized 
the inherent problems in allowing county financial interests to 
be the only factor in placement.  The court explained: 
[T]he responsible protective services agency may be 
influenced in its decision making by the economics of 
the placement.  If the person remains in the nursing 
home, this is cost free to the county.  If the person 
is in a county operated nursing home, there may be 
pressure not to remove a person due to possible loss 
of revenue for the facility.  If the person is sent 
from a nursing home, there may be a necessity for the 
state and county to purchase community services. 
Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 78.  The court's holding in Watts was 
reaffirmed just last term in County of Dunn v. Goldie H., 2001 
WI 102, ¶28, 245 Wis. 2d 538, 629 N.W.2d 189. 
¶24 The 
consequences 
of 
the 
County's 
arguments 
run 
contrary to the multi-factor approach to placement prescribed by 
§ 55.06(9)(a) and to the liberty interests that must, according 
to Watts, be shielded from incentives pressuring counties to 
make financial considerations the sole factor in placement.  The 
County interprets the statute to provide essentially that it has 
No. 
00-3135   
 
13 
 
no 
responsibility 
to 
provide 
funds. 
 
Its 
interpretation 
disregards "the needs of the person to be protected" and 
disregards the "the level of supervision needed."  The County's 
interpretation of the statute would also allow it to provide 
zero funds without regard to what is the "least restrictive 
environment." 
¶25 Under the County's position, the multi-factor approach 
in the statute is transformed into a one-factor approach in 
which that one factor is that the County be free not to 
contribute any funds to a particular placement.  Moreover, in 
cases where all possible placement alternatives would cost some 
county funds, the court would be unable to order any placement 
whatsoever. 
¶26 Although we reject the County's interpretation of 
§ 55.06(9)(a), we recognize that the language of the statute 
indicates that the legislature intended that the availability of 
funds be considered in protective placement decisions.  The 
purpose of the statutory language that the County "may not be 
required to provide funding, in addition to its funds that are 
required to be appropriated to match state funds" is clear:  it 
provides a limitation on county financial liability.  The 
statute gives the County a defense against being compelled in an 
individual placement to contribute funds "in addition to its 
funds that are required to be appropriated to match state 
funds." 
¶27 Our goal must be to implement the legislative intent 
while also preserving the statutory scheme and continuing to 
No. 
00-3135   
 
14 
 
recognize 
the 
liberty 
interests 
of 
protectively 
placed 
individuals.  The County's interpretation of the statute does 
not achieve this goal.  However, the circuit court's decision 
that the County take affirmative steps to seek additional funds 
and to develop an appropriate community-based placement for Judy 
K. does.  In order to ensure that counties utilize available 
funds but are not forced to contribute funds in addition to 
required funds, we agree with the circuit court that the 
counties must bear the burden of showing whether funds are 
available and whether appropriate placements may be developed 
within the limits of required funds. 
¶28 We therefore determine that in protective placements 
pursuant to § 55.06(9)(a), counties must make an affirmative 
showing of a 
good faith, 
reasonable 
effort 
to find an 
appropriate placement and to secure funding to pay for an 
appropriate placement.  Put more succinctly, the county must 
show it has made a good faith, reasonable effort to find and 
fund an appropriate placement. 
¶29 The determination of what is an appropriate placement 
depends upon the application of all the factors outlined in 
§ 55.06(9)(a).  At the same time, the statute provides a 
limitation on a county's ultimate financial liability:  "The 
county may not be required to provide funding, in addition to 
No. 
00-3135   
 
15 
 
its funds that are required to be appropriated to match state 
funds, in order to protectively place an individual."10 
¶30 The find and fund standard will help ensure that 
protective placements comport with the multi-factor statutory 
scheme, which recognizes the needs and rights of placed 
individuals as well as the significant role that counties play 
in the protective placement system.  Placing the burden on the 
counties to show a good faith, reasonable effort to find and 
fund 
also 
makes 
sense 
because 
the 
counties' 
substantial 
responsibility in the protective placement system means they are 
the repository of much of the information and other resources 
pertinent to funding and placement. 
                                                 
10 The facts and posture of this case do not require that we 
determine all possible sources of funds encompassed by this 
statutory language.  Thus, we need not determine today exactly 
what funds are "required to be appropriated to match state 
funds."  This question, however, is answered implicitly by the 
dissent.  The dissent assumes, in apparent agreement with the 
County, that the language "funds that are required to be 
appropriated to match state funds" applies only to county funds 
required to match community aids.  It is by making this 
assumption that the dissent can reach its incorrect conclusion 
that 
our 
decision 
requires 
the 
County 
"to 
spend 
more 
money . . . than 'the limits of available state and federal 
funds and of county funds required to be appropriated to match 
state funds.'"  Dissent at ¶58. 
While it is laudable that most counties provide community 
aids "overmatch," see dissent at ¶64, this does not answer the 
question of what funds are "required to be appropriated to match 
state funds" in an individual protective placement.  The dissent 
apparently agrees with the County that its funding obligations 
in any given placement may be zero because it has made the only 
required match via community aids funds. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
16 
 
¶31 In 
contrast, 
individuals 
subject 
to 
protective 
placement are not in a position to know what funding sources 
might be available.  Those individuals do not know whether 
appropriate placements may be located, created, or funded 
through a good faith, reasonable effort.  Similarly, the court 
making the protective placement determination has no inherent 
way of knowing whether appropriate placements or funds are 
available. 
¶32 An affirmative obligation on the County to show 
efforts to find and fund also serves to recognize the liberty 
interests at stake and embodied in the statutory scheme.  It 
honors the dictates of Watts, and ensures that counties do not 
make decisions based solely on financial considerations when 
placement needs can be met through a good faith, reasonable 
effort.  At the same time, however, the find and fund standard 
recognizes that resources are not limitless and that counties 
carry a substantial burden in meeting the needs of individuals 
subject to protective placements. 
¶33 Indeed, this case serves as an illustration that the 
legislature's intent to provide a limitation on county financial 
liability while recognizing the needs and interests of those who 
are protectively placed can be well served by an affirmative 
obligation on the counties to find and fund.  At oral argument, 
counsel for the County explained that the County ultimately was 
able to obtain additional personal care funds for Judy K. 
through Medical Assistance.  Counsel further explained that even 
though Judy K. was in a community setting pursuant to court 
No. 
00-3135   
 
17 
 
order, "the cost is actually quite low at this time."  The 
annual cost to the County was estimated by counsel to be $600. 
¶34 In contrast, the record before us does not support a 
determination that the County, at the time of the final hearing 
on permanent placement, had made a good faith, reasonable effort 
to find and fund an appropriate placement for Judy K.  At that 
hearing, Dennis Ciesielski, the County's long-term support 
supervisor with its human services department, gave testimony 
suggesting that the County's decision with regard to Judy K.'s 
placement was based solely on financial considerations: 
Q 
Mr. Ciesielski, the one——the $125.57——or $125.57 
per diem rate, it's my understanding that's the amount 
that the County will not pay greater than, correct? 
A 
Correct. 
Q 
At the present time anyway. 
A 
That is correct. 
Q 
Okay.  And that number was established solely 
based upon the amount it had paid prior to the 
protective placement? 
A 
Prior to her placement at the health care center? 
Q 
Yes. 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And that's the only basis upon which that 125.57 
number was reached, true? 
A 
That is the figure we reached based on our fiscal 
situation, yes.  Our decisions are based on our 
Department's financial situation. 
¶35 Ciesielski testified similarly upon questioning by the 
Court, also seeming to indicate that the County had a blanket 
No. 
00-3135   
 
18 
 
rule to deny funding regardless of individual circumstances or 
the potential for funding in individual cases: 
THE COURT: 
So going back to that 125.57 cent per 
day that the County is willing to make available for 
Judy 
K.'s 
placement, 
is 
essentially what 
you're 
telling me that the County at this time is either 
unwilling or unable to utilize County dollars, except 
to the extent they might have to deal with this 57 
cents for the least restrictive placement of Judy K.? 
THE WITNESS: 
Yes, your honor. 
THE COURT: 
And is that a determination you have 
made? 
THE WITNESS: 
Based on the guidance and direction 
given to us by our County Board. 
THE COURT: 
And they have directed you essentially 
not to spend County funds on placements in CIP 1 A 
cases? 
THE WITNESS: 
Among other cases, your Honor. 
¶36 Finally, Ciesieski explained the efforts the County 
had made to fund Judy K.'s placement consisted only of general 
lobbying of its representatives in the legislature for increased 
state appropriations: 
THE COURT: 
What affirmative efforts have been made 
by the Department since July of this year? 
THE WITNESS: 
I guess I would have to say, your 
Honor, it comes down to, for want of a better term, 
politics in that it is approaching our legislatures 
[sic] to help them recognize the long waiting list 
that exists in Dunn County, among many other counties, 
and that we only have three funding sources, and that 
recognizing the position of Dunn County, it is helping 
the State hopefully to understand that to eliminate 
the waiting list there is a need for the State to take 
a greater responsibility in providing funding to meet 
the needs of the individuals on our waiting list. 
No. 
00-3135   
 
19 
 
THE COURT: 
Okay.  But I'm just talking about the 
federal government now.  And I guess my question is, 
have any efforts been made to attempt to, with regard 
to Judy, expand the potential federal funding to 
support her community placement?  Yes or no, since 
July of this year. 
THE WITNESS: 
We have——I'm 
not 
sure if 
I 
fully 
understand.  But if you're saying have we directed a 
very 
specific 
effort 
to 
the 
State 
or 
federal 
government on behalf of Judy K. and Judy K. alone, I 
would say no. 
 
¶37 Based on this and other testimony by Ciesieski, in 
addition to other evidence, the circuit court made a number of 
findings of fact.  Those findings included that: 
Appropriate, 
less 
restrictive 
community-based 
placements for Judy K[] could be developed and 
available 
through 
independent 
providers 
in 
the 
community, that meet the ward's needs, at a daily rate 
of not in excess of $125.57 but the Department has not 
made efforts to develop such sites. 
The Department has not taken any affirmative steps 
since July of 2000, to secure additional federal, 
state or county funds to support a placement of Judy 
K[] in the least restrictive placement possible, in 
the community, in excess of the authorized $125.57. 
There is no indication in the record the Department is 
currently 
undertaking 
any 
efforts 
to 
seek 
an 
appropriate, least restrictive placement for Judy K[] 
in the community at a rate of $125.57. 
¶38 We defer to the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are unsupported by the record and therefore clearly 
erroneous.  Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 223 Wis. 2d 417, 
426, 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999).  Here, the court's findings are well 
supported by the record, and the evidence leads to the 
conclusion that the County failed to show that it made a good 
No. 
00-3135   
 
20 
 
faith, reasonable effort to find and fund an appropriate 
placement for Judy K. 
¶39 Because we reject the County's interpretation of 
§ 55.06(9)(a) to provide that it need not contribute any funds 
to Judy K.'s placement, and because we also conclude that the 
County failed to show that it made a good faith, reasonable 
effort to find and fund an appropriate placement for Judy K. at 
the time of the final hearing on placement, we do not grant the 
primary relief the County seeks:  a remand to the circuit court 
for entry of an order that Judy K. be placed at the Trempealeau 
County Health Care Center. 
¶40 Nonetheless, we must briefly address the breadth of 
the circuit court's order in light of our decision.  In addition 
to ordering that Judy K. be transferred to a community-based 
setting and that the County take affirmative steps to seek 
additional funding to support the cost of Judy K.'s placement, 
the 
court 
ordered 
the 
County 
to 
develop 
community-based 
placement resources appropriate for others on a County waiting 
list. 
¶41 Section 55.06(9)(a) 
calls 
for 
an 
individualized 
determination of placement.  Nothing in that statute gives the 
circuit court authority to order action on the placement of 
other individuals who are not before it.  To the extent the 
court's order required the County to act on cases other than 
Judy K.'s, it went beyond the issue before it.  The only 
placement before the court was Judy K.'s.  Accordingly, although 
No. 
00-3135   
 
21 
 
we affirm the circuit court's order, we limit its effect to Judy 
K.'s case.11 
III 
¶42 In sum, we conclude that the County is required under 
§ 55.06(9)(a) to make an affirmative showing of a good faith, 
reasonable effort to find and fund an appropriate placement in 
accordance with the factors outlined in the statute.  Because 
the County failed to make such a showing at the time of Judy 
K.'s placement hearing, we affirm the circuit court's order.  
However, we limit the effect of the order to Judy K., the case 
that was before the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Because we affirm the circuit court's order to the extent 
it provided relief specific to Judy K., we need not reach her 
arguments as to the constitutionality of § 55.06(9)(a) or its 
interaction with the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
In 
addition, 
we 
need 
not 
remand 
this 
case 
for 
a 
determination on placement.  The parties at oral argument 
acknowledged that Judy K. was presently in a community placement 
pursuant to the circuit court's order.  Judy K.'s placement, 
like all ch. 55 placements, is subject to annual review.  See 
State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 
65, 84, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985). 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶43 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Many of our 
citizens need protective services.  Children who have been 
abused, neglected, or abandoned by parents need protective 
services.  The aged infirm, incapacitated mentally or physically 
by the degenerative process of old age, need protective 
services.  Men and women who are mentally ill, dependent on 
alcohol or drugs, or homeless and without food need protective 
services.  
¶44 Developmentally 
disabled 
persons, 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 55.01(2) 
as 
individuals 
"having 
a 
disability 
attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, 
autism or another neurological condition closely related to 
mental retardation," are especially needy.  Their disabilities 
make them vulnerable to exploitation, and their conditions 
usually 
continue 
indefinitely. 
 
When 
the 
developmentally 
disabled are so totally incapable of providing for their own 
care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm 
to themselves or others, they are subject to involuntary 
placement under Chapter 55.  Wis. Stat. § 55.06. 
¶45 Historically, human needs have outpaced government 
resources.  Human services must compete for funding with other 
worthy causes such as education, public safety, and the natural 
environment.  In this milieu, citizens organize to promote their 
preferences.  When they do not achieve their goals, they 
sometimes turn to the judiciary, hoping to win in court what 
they have been unable to secure in the legislature.  Vincent v. 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
2 
 
Voight, 2000 WI 93, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388, is a case 
in point.   
¶46 Advocates for the developmentally disabled are among 
those who have used litigation to gain their objectives.  Twelve 
years ago, these advocates attempted to compel additional 
expenditures by Wisconsin counties for the developmentally 
disabled.12  Their vehicle was a case from La Crosse County, in 
which a circuit judge had declined to order the transfer of two 
developmentally disabled persons from the Northern Wisconsin 
Center to facilities in the community.  D.E.R. v. La Crosse Co., 
155 Wis. 2d 240, 455 N.W.2d 239 (1990).  The circuit court 
concluded that the county had fulfilled its statutory duty by 
funding protective placements with moneys the county had 
received from the state and federal governments and with moneys 
the county had appropriated as matching funds.  Id. at 242. 
¶47 This court responded with a historic decision.  The 
issue, we said, was whether the circuit court erred in refusing 
to order placements in the least restrictive environments under 
Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a) "on the sole ground that the county had 
fulfilled its statutory duty by funding protective placements 
with moneys the county receives from the federal and state 
governments and with moneys the county appropriates as matching 
funds."  Id. at 246.  The court responded that "the legislature 
did not intend to limit the county board's duty to fund 
                                                 
12 The legislature has assigned to county boards the primary 
responsibility for the care of the mentally ill, developmentally 
disabled, and substance abusers residing in their counties.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.42(1)(b). 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
3 
 
protective placements under ch. 55 to the funds the county 
receives in state and federal funding and the funds the county 
appropriates to match state funds."  Id. at 242.  The court 
explained that: 
The legislature has not expressly limited the 
county's responsibility in ch. 55 to make placements 
to 
the 
least 
restrictive 
environment 
to 
funds 
available from state or federal sources and county 
matching funds.  Nothing in ch. 55 indicates that the 
funding limitations of secs. 51.42 and 51.437 apply to 
protective placements under sec. 55.06. 
Id. at 252 (emphasis added). 
 
¶48 The court's opinion carefully analyzed the existing 
statutes and turned aside the county's statutory interpretation. 
¶49 The county relied on a phrase——"to the maximum degree 
of feasibility"——contained in the legislative declaration of 
policy for Chapter 55.  It argued that this language meant that 
practical financial considerations limit the circuit court's 
discretion 
to 
order 
placements 
in 
the 
least 
restrictive 
environment.  Id. at 247.  The court disagreed, asserting that: 
"We cannot find a legislative statement in sec. 55.001 or any 
other provision in ch. 55 that requires the circuit court to 
consider the availability and source of funds when placing an 
individual in the least restrictive environment."  Id. at 248. 
¶50 The county argued that the funding restraints under 
Chapter 51 apply with equal force to protective placements made 
pursuant to Chapter 55.  Id. at 250.  The court disagreed.  It 
observed that sections 51.42(3)(ar)4 and 51.437(4m)(a) both used 
the phrase "within the limits of available state and federal 
funds and of county funds appropriated to match state funds," 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
4 
 
id. at 250-51, but that "neither ch. 51 nor ch. 55 expressly 
applies the ch. 51 funding limitations to ch. 55 protective 
placements."  Id. at 251.  "Nothing in ch. 55 indicates that the 
funding 
limitations 
of 
secs. 
51.42 
and 
51.437 
apply 
to 
protective placements under sec. 55.06."  Id. at 252. 
¶51 Responding to the county's fiscal arguments, the court 
acknowledged that the county and its taxpayers may suffer a 
significant financial burden when the state mandates county 
action and fails to provide funds adequate to carry out the 
mandate.  Id. at 253-54.  "The counties must, however, look to 
the legislature, not the courts, for relief when the fiscal 
burdens created by legislative mandates become onerous."  Id. at 
254 (emphasis added).  "We conclude that the legislature did not 
intend to limit the county board's duty to fund protective 
placements in the least restrictive environment under ch. 55 to 
the funds the county receives in state and federal funding and 
the funds the county appropriates in matching funds."  Id. at 
255. 
 
¶52 In 1995 the legislature enacted 1995 Wis. Act 92 (the 
Act) in direct response to the D.E.R. decision.  The Legislative 
Reference Bureau Analysis of 1995 Assembly Bill 244, which 
became the Act, refers to the D.E.R. case by name and states 
that "the bill prohibits requiring a county to provide funding 
in addition to its funds required to match state funds, to 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
5 
 
protectively place a person."13  1995 Wis. Act 92 addresses the 
D.E.R. decision point by point. 
 
¶53 First, the Act firmed up the funding limitations in 
Chapter 
51, 
strengthening 
the 
provisions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 51.42(3)(ar)4 and 51.437(4m)(a) and adding new language to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 51.001(1), 
51.42(1)(b), 
51.437(4)(a), 
and 
51.61(1)(e). 
 
¶54 Second, the Act borrowed the exact limiting language 
cited by this court from Chapter 51 and places it in three 
different 
sections 
of 
Chapter 
55: 
Wis. Stat. §§ 55.001, 
55.06(9)(a), and 55.045.  One of these sections is the 
"Declaration of Policy" referenced in the D.E.R. opinion.  Wis. 
Stat. § 55.001. 
 
¶55 Third, 
the 
Act 
amended 
the 
specific 
provision 
litigated in D.E.R., Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a).  This subsection 
now reads in relevant part: 
Factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
making 
protective 
placement shall include the needs of the person to be 
protected 
for 
health, 
social 
or 
rehabilitative 
services; 
the 
level 
of 
supervision 
needed; 
the 
reasonableness of the placement given the cost and the 
actual benefits in the level of functioning to be 
realized by the individual; the limits of available 
state and federal funds and of county funds required 
to be appropriated to match state funds; and the 
reasonableness of the placement given the number or 
                                                 
13 The Legislative Reference Bureau analysis specifically 
points out that under the court's decision in D.E.R. v. 
La Crosse Co., 155 Wis. 2d 240, 455 N.W.2d 239 (1990), a county 
could be "required to provide funding in addition to federal, 
state and matching county funds" in order to protectively place 
a person.  See Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 
1995 Wis. Act 92, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau 
of 1995 A.B. 244 at 1. 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
6 
 
projected 
number 
of 
individuals 
who 
will 
need 
protective placement and given the limited funds 
available.  The county may not be required to provide 
funding, in addition to its funds that are required to 
be appropriated to match state funds, in order to 
protectively place an individual. 
Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
emphasized 
portion of the subsection is the language added by 1995 Wis. Act 
92.   
¶56 These provisions echo the precise concerns articulated 
in the D.E.R. decision.  In short, counties took their cue from 
this court and looked to the legislature for relief.  The 
legislature responded to the court's opinion almost word for 
word and provided the relief requested.   
¶57 The legislative history of 1995 Assembly Bill 244 
supports the plain, unambiguous language of the Act.  Opponents 
of the proposed funding limitations offered amendments to the 
bill seeking to insert a reasonableness standard in lieu of a 
funding limitation.14  These amendments were rejected. 
¶58 The majority opinion professes not to understand the 
intended effect of the legislature's clear language.  It devises 
                                                 
14 In a letter calling for amendments, the Wisconsin 
Coalition For Advocacy states: "AB 244 makes cost to counties an 
overriding factor and makes all the other considerations 
(including overall cost to taxpayers) secondary."  Legislative 
Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 92, Letter from 
Wisconsin Coalition For Advocacy to Senator Carol Buettner dated 
September 5, 1995.  Senator Gwendolynne S. Moore introduced 
numerous amendments suggested by advocacy groups concerned with 
the strong limitations on funding.  The legislature was fully 
aware that the cost to counties was the dominant consideration 
and passed the bill in its original form.  See Legislative 
Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 92, Bill 
History for A.B. 244. 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
7 
 
a new rule: "[T]he County is required to make an affirmative 
showing of a good faith, reasonable effort to find and fund an 
appropriate placement in accordance with the factors outlined in 
§ 55.06(9)(a)."  Majority op. at ¶1.  It opines that Dunn County 
failed to make such a showing at the time of the final hearing 
on placement, and thus affirms the circuit court's order 
requiring 
the 
County 
to 
spend 
more 
money 
on 
protective 
placements than "the limits of available state and federal funds 
and of county funds required to be appropriated to match state 
funds."  Id. at ¶¶1, 42.  It fudges on the proposition that the 
sentence, "The county may not be required to provide funding, in 
addition to its funds that are required to be appropriated to 
match 
state 
funds, 
in 
order 
to 
protectively 
place 
an 
individual," is a defense against a court order that requires 
spending more money.  
¶59 What 
does 
"a 
good 
faith, 
reasonable 
effort 
to . . . fund an appropriate placement in accordance with the 
factors 
outlined 
in 
§ 55.06(9)(a)" 
mean? 
 
In 
Wis. 
Stat. § 55.06(9)(a), the sentence limiting a county's duty to 
provide funding is not a listed factor; it is a separate 
sentence.  If the sentence is treated as a factor, it is the 
dominant factor.  If it is not treated as a factor, it must be 
treated as a condition that overrides the factors. 
¶60 Even the sentence in subsection (9) that calls for 
placement "in the least restrictive environment consistent with 
the needs of the person to be placed" is not unconditional.  It 
reads "consistent with the needs of the person to be placed and 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
8 
 
with the placement resources of the appropriate board specified 
under s. 55.02."  Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(emphasis added).  The 
primacy of the funding limitation could not be more plain. 
¶61 Counties are creatures of the legislature.  State ex 
rel. Conway v. Elvod, 70 Wis. 2d 448, 450, 234 N.W.2d 354 
(1975).  "In governmental matters, the county is simply the arm 
of the state."  Dane Co. v. H&SS Dep't, 79 Wis. 2d 323, 330, 255 
N.W.2d 539 (1977).  It exists "in large measure to help handle 
the 
state's 
burden 
of 
political 
organization 
and 
civil 
administration."  Id.  If the state has plenary power to direct 
counties what to do, it must also have power to limit their 
responsibilities.  It exercised that power in 1995 Wis. Act 92. 
¶62 State and federal governments provide most of the 
funding for protective services for persons with developmental 
disabilities.  The principal funding sources are community aids 
and the waiver programs related to Medical Assistance.   
¶63 Community aids are the largest source of state aid to 
counties.  See Yvonne M. Arsenault, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau, Informational Paper No. 48, Community Aids 1 (2001) 
[hereinafter Community Aids].  Counties received $304.9 million 
in community aids in fiscal year 2000.  Id.  By contrast, the 
state's other large source of aid to counties, the shared 
revenue program, totaled only $189.7 million in that year.  Id.  
Community aids are distributed to the counties through the 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS), to 
provide services in two broad categories: (1) social services 
for low-income persons and children in need; and (2) services 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
9 
 
for persons with mental illness, substance abuse problems, or 
developmental disabilities.  Id.  County allocations are 
determined by a three-factor statutory formula that takes into 
consideration a county's needs, an urban-rural factor, and the 
county's ability to pay.  Id. at 2.  In 2000 the statutes 
required counties to provide matching funds in the amount of 
9.89 percent for the basic county allocation of community aids.  
Wis. Stat. § 46.495(1)(d); Community Aids, supra, at 6. 
¶64 Most Wisconsin counties appropriate more money for 
protective services than they are required to appropriate under 
state law.  Community Aids, supra, at 6.  Dunn County is no 
exception.  Dunn County's "overmatch" for calendar years 1994-
1999 is shown as follows: 
1994: 
1,056,54715 
1995: 
1,010,08116 
1996: 
1,255,05517 
 
1997: 
1,054,70918 
1998: 
1,169,69319 
1999: 
2,192,24920 
                                                 
15 See Rachel Cissne, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
Informational Paper No. 50, Financial Assistance to Counties for 
Human Services 23 (1997).  
16 Id. 
17 See Rachel Carabell, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
Informational Paper No. 49, Financial Assistance to Counties for 
Human Services 18 (1999).  
18 Id. 
19 See Yvonne M. Arsenault, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau, Informational Paper No. 48, Community Aids 17 (2001). 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶65 In 1999 Dunn County's overmatch of $2,192,249 exceeded 
the $1,859,550 allocation from the state.   Id. at 17, 22.  Dunn 
County spent approximately $13.5 million on health and human 
services in 1999.  Wisconsin Department of Revenue, County and 
Municipal Revenues and Expenditures 1999 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.dor.state.wi.us/html/stats.html.  This subject area 
was the largest single item in the county budget.  Id.  The 
county's 1999 overmatch of $2,192,249 represented more than 6 
percent of its total budget.  Id.  No amount of overmatch 
spending will secure a greater allocation of community aids for 
a 
county 
than 
the 
legislature 
has 
budgeted.  
Wis. Stat. § 46.40(2). 
¶66 Medical Assistance waiver programs are another major 
source of assistance to counties for protective services.  See 
Yvonne M. Arsenault and Richard Megna, Wisconsin Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau, Informational Paper No. 50, Services for Persons 
with Developmental Disabilities 9 (2001) [hereinafter Services 
for 
Persons 
with 
Developmental 
Disabilities]. 
 
Medical 
Assistance is a program that provides health services to low-
income persons.  See Rachel Carabell and Richard Megna, 
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational Paper No. 43, 
Medical Assistance and BadgerCare 1 (2001) [hereinafter Medical 
Assistance and BadgerCare].  "Medicaid," as it is otherwise 
known, is administered by DHFS within strict federal guidelines 
regarding eligibility, types of services, payment levels and 
administration.  Id.   
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Id. 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶67 The state has secured a series of federal waivers to 
develop innovative methods of delivering or paying for medical 
assistance services.  Id. at 44.  For instance, CIP IA and CIP 
IB are two "community integration programs" that help people 
with developmental disabilities.  Id. at 45.  The CIP IA program 
funds services for people who are relocated from state centers 
for the developmentally disabled.  See Services for Persons with 
Developmental Disabilities, supra, at 9.  The CIP IB program 
funds services for people relocated or diverted from nursing 
homes and 
intermediate care 
facilities 
to 
community-based 
programs.  Id.  The state pays a 41 percent match to obtain 
federal Medicaid dollars for these programs and then reimburses 
the counties for their costs of community integration services.  
Id. at 10.  Counties have the option to step forward and put up 
additional match money from community aids or local taxes to 
secure federal funds.  See Medical Assistance and BadgerCare, 
supra, at 45.  This occurs in more than two-thirds of the CIP IB 
cases.  Id. 
¶68 Clearly, a county may appropriate additional money for 
protective services and may acquire additional federal funds as 
a result.  But Chapter 55 does not require a county to do so.  
"The county may not be required to provide funding, in addition 
to its funds that are required to be appropriated to match state 
funds, 
in 
order 
to 
protectively 
place 
an 
individual."  
Wis. Stat. § 55.06(9)(a).   
¶69 As a practical matter, a county may not be able to 
locate additional funds when a circuit court issues an order for 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
12 
 
a less restrictive placement, unless it diverts money from other 
programs.  Not all community aids dollars are spent on 
developmentally disabled persons.  In the future, the biggest 
source of additional funding for the developmentally disabled 
may be money diverted from other persons in need.  These 
spending priorities ought to be decided by policymakers in other 
branches of government, not by the courts.   
¶70 Thousands 
of 
Wisconsin 
citizens 
need 
protective 
services.  This case is not about the legitimacy of these needs.  
This case is about the power of state courts to force additional 
county spending for human services when a county has fulfilled 
all its obligations under state law. 
¶71 In my view, supporters of the developmentally disabled 
must look to the legislature, not the courts, for the relief 
they seek.  Because the majority appears to decide otherwise, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No. 00-3135.dtp 
 
 
 
1