Title: Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13490
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13490 
 
WILLIAM GOOD  vs.  UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2024. - June 7, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Arbitration, For services, Offer and acceptance.  
Arbitration, Appeal of order compelling arbitration, 
Appropriateness of judicial proceedings.  Notice.  Cellular 
Telephone. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 25, 2022. 
 
A motion to compel arbitration was heard by Debra A. 
Squires-Lee, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Michael R. Huston, of the District of Columbia (Sopen Shah, 
of Wisconsin, & Matthew Manuszak also present) for Uber 
Technologies, Inc., & another. 
Christopher A. Monson for Jonas Yohou. 
Matthew W.H. Wessler (Bradley M. Henry & Jessica M. Gray 
also present) for the plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
1 Rasier, LLC; and Jonas Yohou. 
 
2 
 
 
Rhonda T. Maloney, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, 
& Kristie A. LaSalle for Massachusetts Academy of Trial 
Attorneys. 
 
Jennifer B. Dickey, of the District of Columbia, Kevin R. 
Palmer, Mark C. Fleming, & Neal Quenzer for Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America. 
 
Jeffrey R. White, of the District of Columbia, & Thomas R. 
Murphy for American Association for Justice. 
 
Derek M. Gillis for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In this case, we are called on to apply 
basic principles of contract formation to a nonnegotiable, 
standard form "terms of use" contract that the defendants Uber 
Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), 
presented to the plaintiff, William Good, when he opened Uber's 
digital mobile platform application (app).  The app matches 
users needing transportation with drivers willing to provide a 
ride.  One of the terms required Good to arbitrate his 
negligence-based claims against Uber and one of its drivers, the 
defendant Jonas Yohou. 
Relevant to this narrow inquiry, Uber presented its terms 
of use to Good through its app in a manner that prevented Good 
from continuing to use Uber's services on his cellular telephone 
unless Good both clicked a checkbox indicating that he had 
"reviewed and agree[d]" to the terms and activated a button 
labeled "Confirm," further indicating his assent.  This blocking 
interface included a large graphic image of a clipboard holding 
a document; near the bottom of the document was an "X" alongside 
3 
 
a graphic of a pencil poised as if to sign a legal instrument.  
The interface was focused and uncluttered; it clearly alerted 
Good multiple times, in prominent boldface text, that the 
purpose of the blocking screen was to notify Good of Uber's 
terms of use.  It encouraged Good to review those terms and 
provided an identifiable hyperlink directly to the full text of 
the terms of use document. 
We conclude that these and other features of Uber's 
"clickwrap"2 contract formation process put Good on reasonable 
notice of Uber's terms of use, one of which was the agreement to 
arbitrate disputes, like the present one, concerning the 
personal injuries he suffered.  Further concluding that Good's 
selection of the checkbox adjacent to the boldfaced text stating 
that he "agree[d]" to the terms and his activation of the 
"Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms, 
we reverse the order of the Superior Court judge denying Uber's 
motion to compel arbitration, and we remand for entry of an 
order to submit the claims to arbitration.3 
 
2 "Clickwrap refers to the assent process by which a user 
must click [a button indicating] 'I agree,' but not necessarily 
view the contract to which she is assenting."  Cullinane v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018), quoting 
Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 394-395 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 
3 We acknowledge the briefs of amici curiae the American 
Association for Justice, Chamber of Commerce of the United 
 
4 
 
1.  Background.4  Uber is a Delaware corporation, registered 
to do business in the Commonwealth.  It maintains an app, which 
connects individuals seeking transportation with drivers.  Yohou 
was one such driver. 
Good, who was a chef at a Boston restaurant, first 
registered a customer account with Uber in August 2013.  On 
April 25, 2021, when Good opened Uber's app to secure a ride, he 
was presented with a blocking screen, announcing that Uber had 
updated its terms of use.  Good clicked a checkbox next to text 
indicating that he had "reviewed and agree[d]" to the terms.  
Good also activated a button at the bottom of the interface 
labeled "Confirm."  These features are discussed in depth below.  
Only after performing these actions could Good order a ride. 
Five days later, Good again used Uber's app, this time to 
order a ride from his work in Boston to his home in Somerville.  
In response, Yohou was dispatched.  During the drive, Yohou's 
car collided with another vehicle.  In the ensuing impact, Good 
was thrust forward and hit his head on the front passenger's 
seat headrest, breaking his neck.  Good instantly was paralyzed 
 
States of America, Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, and 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. 
 
4 The following material facts generally are undisputed.  
Where there is a dispute, the disputed fact is set forth in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  See Hill-Junious 
v. UTP Realty, LLC, 492 Mass. 667, 668 (2023); Miller v. Cotter, 
448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007). 
5 
 
and later was diagnosed with a severe spinal injury and 
quadriplegia. 
a.  Blocking screen.  On April 25, 2021, when Good opened 
Uber's app on his cellular telephone, he received the following 
"in-app blocking pop-up screen," displayed infra, that covered 
nearly the entire footprint of his device's display; this 
interface blocked further access to, and use of, Uber's app. 
 
6 
 
As shown, set against a largely white-colored background, 
at the top of the pop-up screen, text written in black, 
boldfaced, medium-sized5 font stated, "We've updated our terms."  
Underneath the text, below a faint, gray line, the screen 
displayed a large image of a blue rectangle with a black 
clipping element, indicative of a clipboard.  The clipboard was 
shown holding a white rectangular shape reminiscent of a sheet 
of paper with a blue-colored, prominent "X" on its lower left 
corner; adjacent to the "X" was an image of a pencil positioned 
diagonally to suggest its use for writing.  The image, which in 
view of these features suggested the execution of a legal 
instrument, was centered horizontally in the top third of the 
screen and was the single largest item on the screen. 
Below the image, at approximately the vertical center of 
the interface, and in larger, boldfaced, black lettering, the 
screen stated, "We encourage you to read our updated Terms in 
full."  As set forth, the word "Terms" was capitalized.  The 
statement spanned two lines with the new line beginning between 
the words "read" and "our," such that the words "updated Terms" 
were centered on the screen.  Immediately below this statement 
were two black bullet points, each adjacent to medium-sized 
text, which was underlined and colored blue.  The first bullet 
 
5 The size of the fonts is stated in relation to the other 
text on the pop-up screen. 
7 
 
point stated, "Terms of Use," and the second stated, "Privacy 
Notice."  Each was a hyperlink that, if activated by clicking on 
it, presented the user with the full text of Uber's terms of use 
and privacy notice, respectively. 
On the bottom third of the screen, beneath a faint, gray 
line, was a checkable box.  The box was centered next to two 
statements.  The first statement was shown in medium-sized, 
black, boldfaced font and stated, "By checking the box, I have 
reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the 
Privacy Notice."  As shown, the words "Terms," "Use," and 
"Privacy Notice" each were capitalized.  The statement spanned 
three lines with the second line beginning between the words 
"reviewed" and "and agree" and the third line beginning between 
the words "and" and "acknowledge."  The checkbox was centered 
between the second and third lines of this first statement.  The 
second statement was shown just below the first; it was written 
in faint, gray-colored, noticeably smaller font and stated, "I 
am at least 18 years of age." 
At the bottom of the screen, underneath the checkbox and 
accompanying text, a large black bar stretched across most of 
the display's width.  Centered in the bar, which resembled, and 
thus was suggestive of, a mechanical push button, white medium-
sized text stated, "Confirm." 
8 
 
As the name suggests, the blocking screen prevented the 
user from using the app.  To proceed past the screen, the user 
was required to engage in two actions.  First, the user had to 
check the box adjacent to the text indicating that the user had 
"reviewed and agree[d]" to the terms of use and the smaller text 
indicating that the user was at least eighteen years old; 
second, the user had to click the large button stating 
"Confirm."  The user was not required to click on the hyperlinks 
to proceed and thus was not required actually to review either 
the terms of use document or the privacy notice discussed infra. 
When Good was presented with this screen, he checked the 
checkbox and clicked the "Confirm" button.  The record does not 
reflect whether Good either activated the hyperlink that opened 
the contents of Uber's terms of use or reviewed those terms.  
Good has no specific recollection of doing so. 
b.  Uber's terms of use.  The terms of use document, 
accessible from the interface via the hyperlink discussed supra, 
comprised a nonnegotiable contract of adhesion.6  As the name 
 
6 A contract of adhesion is "[a] standard-form contract 
prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker 
position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres to the contract with 
little choice about the terms."  Black's Law Dictionary 403 
(11th ed. 2019).  See Patterson, The Interpretation and 
Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 856 n.96 
(1964) (possible original use of term "contract of adhesion" was 
to describe decision of nonsignatory nation to "adhere" to 
treaty negotiated between other nations). 
 
9 
 
suggested, the document set forth Uber's terms for using its 
services.  It was comprehensive in scope, covering topics such 
as the nature of the relationship between Uber and the user, 
dispute resolution, user conduct expectations, ownership of 
intellectual property, payment procedures, choice of law, 
disclaimers, limitation of liability, indemnification, and forum 
selection. 
The first section of the document, entitled "Contractual 
Relationship," established that the terms of use "govern" a 
user's access to and use of Uber's services, that the terms 
"CONSTITUTE A LEGAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN [THE USER] AND UBER," and 
that the terms superseded any prior agreements between the user 
and Uber, with limited exceptions.  Pertinent here, the fifth 
full paragraph of the first section called the reader's 
attention, in all-capitalized, boldfaced letters, to an 
"IMPORTANT" warning that the terms included an "ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT," requiring the user to resolve "ALL DISPUTES" with 
Uber, with limited exceptions,7 through "FINAL AND BINDING 
ARBITRATION."8  The paragraph concluded by requiring users to 
 
7 The agreement contained limited, enumerated exceptions to 
the mandatory arbitration provision for the following claims:  
individual claims in small claims court, individual sexual 
assault or sexual harassment claims, and suits for injunctive or 
equitable relief relating to intellectual property. 
 
8 The provision stated in full: 
 
10 
 
acknowledge that they have "TAKEN TIME TO CONSIDER THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS IMPORTANT DECISION."9  The first section 
ended with a reference to Uber's "Privacy Notice," which 
governed Uber's collection and use of personal information in 
connection with its services.  As discussed infra, the privacy 
notice also was noted in the interface, which provided a 
hyperlink thereto. 
 
 
"IMPORTANT:  PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS 
PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU AND UBER CAN 
BE BROUGHT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (SEE 
SECTION 2 BELOW).  PLEASE REVIEW THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
BELOW CAREFULLY, AS IT REQUIRES YOU TO RESOLVE ALL DISPUTES 
WITH UBER ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND, WITH LIMITED 
EXCEPTIONS, THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION (AS 
DESCRIBED IN SECTION 2 BELOW).  BY ENTERING INTO THIS 
AGREEMENT, YOU EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ AND 
UNDERSTAND ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND HAVE 
TAKEN TIME TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS IMPORTANT 
DECISION." 
 
9 The section also purported to allow Uber unilaterally to 
change the terms "from time to time," providing "notice" to the 
user by several means, including merely by "updating the date at 
the top" of the terms and apparently placing the burden on the 
user to check frequently for such changes.  A similar provision 
was held to be unenforceable.  See, e.g., Douglas v. United 
States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 
1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Talk 
Am., Inc. v. Douglas, 552 U.S. 1242, (2008).  One author has 
noted that online contracts "frequently include disclaimers that 
actually are unenforceable, and that the drafters know are 
unenforceable, but are included anyway."  Preston, "Please Note:  
You Have Waived Everything":  Can Notice Redeem Online 
Contracts?, 64 Am. U.L. Rev. 535, 555 (2015). 
 
11 
 
The terms of use's second section, entitled "Arbitration 
Agreement," set forth a requirement to submit claims, including 
personal injury claims "arising out of or relating to . . . 
accidents," to arbitration.  The arbitration agreement further 
waived the right to a trial by jury or to bring or to 
participate in a class, or other representative, action.10 
The section delineated the exclusive authority of the 
arbitrator 
"to resolve any disputes relating to the interpretation, 
applicability, enforceability or formation of this 
Arbitration Agreement, including any claim that all or any 
part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable.  
The Arbitrator shall also be responsible for determining 
all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues 
relating to whether the Terms are applicable, 
unconscionable or illusory and any defense to arbitration, 
including waiver, delay, laches, or estoppel.  If there is 
a dispute about whether this Arbitration Agreement can be 
enforced or applies to a dispute, [the user] and Uber agree 
that the arbitrator will decide that issue." 
 
 
10 The arbitration agreement also stated:  "This Arbitration 
Agreement shall be binding upon, and shall include any claims 
brought . . . against any third-parties, including but not 
limited to . . . third-party beneficiaries . . . , where their 
underlying claims are in relation to your use of the Services."  
Yohou contends, and Good does not contest, that this provision, 
inter alia, requires arbitration of Good's claims against Yohou.  
See Machado v. System4 LLC, 471 Mass. 204, 216 (2015) (applying 
arbitration agreement to require arbitration between signatory 
plaintiffs and nonsignatory).  In fact, Good raises no arguments 
against arbitration as it pertains to Yohou that are in addition 
to, or different from, the arguments he marshals against 
arbitration with regard to Uber. 
 
12 
 
The section provided that the arbitration agreement was governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.11 
The third section of the terms stated in all capitalized 
letters that Uber was not a "PROVIDER OF TRANSPORTATION," and 
that "DRIVERS ARE NOT ACTUAL AGENTS, APPARENT AGENTS, OSTENSIBLE 
AGENTS, OR EMPLOYEES OF UBER IN ANY WAY."  This latter statement 
appeared multiple times in the terms. 
 
The sixth section of the terms set forth Uber's disclaimer 
of all representations and warranties, express, implied, or 
statutory.  It stated that "UBER DOES NOT CONTROL, MANAGE OR 
DIRECT . . . DRIVERS."  This section also provided that 
"UBER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING LOST PROFITS, LOST DATA, PERSONAL INJURY, OR 
PROPERTY DAMAGE RELATED TO, IN CONNECTION WITH, OR 
OTHERWISE RESULTING FROM ANY USE OF THE SERVICES, 
REGARDLESS OF THE NEGLIGENCE (EITHER ACTIVE, AFFIRMATIVE, 
SOLE, OR CONCURRENT) OF UBER, EVEN IF UBER HAS BEEN ADVISED 
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES."12 
 
11 If the user prevailed in arbitration, the user could seek 
attorneys' fees and expenses; Uber waived any right to pursue 
attorneys' fees and expenses should it prevail in arbitration. 
 
12 In Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 486 Mass. 557 (2021),  
we noted that a Superior Court judge held a similar provision to 
be unenforceable at least insofar as it released or waived 
certain statutory damages.  Kauders vs. Uber Techs., Inc., Mass. 
Super. Ct., No. SUCV20162180D (Suffolk County Jan. 3, 2019).  
Since Kauders, Uber has amended this provision by eliminating 
language that stated, "IN NO EVENT SHALL [UBER] AND/OR ITS 
LICENSORS BE LIABLE TO ANYONE FOR . . . OTHER DAMAGES OF ANY 
TYPE OR KIND," and on which the judge's conclusion was based.  
Notably, the provision purports to limit Uber's liability for 
"personal injury" only to the extent such injury results in 
 
13 
 
 
That same section of the terms also provided an indemnification 
provision in favor of Uber. 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In January 2022, Good commenced 
this action in the Superior Court against Uber and Yohou, 
alleging negligence and seeking damages for the injuries he 
suffered in the crash.13  The defendants filed a joint motion to 
compel arbitration, pursuant to G. L. c. 251, § 2,14 contending 
 
"indirect, incidental, special, exemplary, punitive, or 
consequential damages." 
 
A subsequent paragraph disclaims liability arising out of 
the use of Uber's "services" –- a term that is defined to 
include only Uber's app and adjacent services such as payment 
processing.  Additionally, the terms no longer direct the 
arbitrator to award damages consistent with the limited 
liability provision.  Cf. Kauders, 486 Mass. at 563 (discussing 
prior version of Uber's terms, requiring arbitrator to conform 
damages to limited liability provision).  The terms state that 
the limited liability provision does not alter users' consumer 
rights under applicable laws and cannot exceed what may be 
legally disclaimed. 
 
13 Against Uber, Good alleged negligence for failure to 
screen and supervise drivers and for incentivizing dangerous 
driving, negligence as a common carrier, and respondeat 
superior.  Against Yohou, Good alleged negligence for careless 
driving. 
 
14 General Laws c. 251, § 2 (a), provides: 
 
"A party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to 
proceed to arbitration under an agreement described in 
[§ 1] may apply to the superior court for an order 
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.  If the 
opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to 
arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the 
determination of the issue so raised and shall, if it finds 
 
14 
 
the terms of use bound Good to pursue his claim only through 
arbitration.  In opposition, Good asserted that a contract was 
not formed because Good neither had reasonable notice of Uber's 
terms of use nor had manifested assent to the terms.  The motion 
judge agreed and denied the motion. 
The defendants timely appealed, and we transferred the case 
to this court on our own motion. 
3.  Discussion.  We review a denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration de novo.  Archer v. Grubhub, Inc., 490 Mass. 352, 
355 (2022).  Such motions generally are treated as motions for 
summary judgment.15  Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007).  
Accordingly, the party seeking to enforce the arbitration 
provision bears the burden of proving that the parties entered 
into an agreement to arbitrate disputes.  Kauders v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 486 Mass. 557, 572 (2021).  In conducting our 
review, we construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party.  
See Miller, supra ("judge correctly treated . . . defendants' 
 
for the applicant, order arbitration; otherwise, the 
application shall be denied." 
 
15 If there are material disputes of fact, the motion judge 
should hold an expedited evidentiary hearing.  McInnes v. LPL 
Fin., LLC, 466 Mass. 256, 265 (2013).  If an evidentiary hearing 
is held, we then "defer to the motion judge's findings of fact 
unless clearly erroneous."  Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC, 
466 Mass. 793, 796 (2014).  No such hearing was held in the 
present case. 
 
15 
 
motion to compel arbitration as one for summary judgment," and 
"[w]e review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all 
facts in favor of the nonmoving party"). 
"Congress enacted the FAA in response to widespread 
judicial hostility to arbitration."  American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 232 (2013) (Italian 
Colors).  This hostility included a "paternalistic attitude" 
prevalent among some judges that "only they could ensure that 
individual plaintiffs would be afforded a fair opportunity to 
challenge corporate defendants."  Broome, An Unconscionable 
Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine:  How the 
California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 
3 Hastings Bus. L.J. 39, 42 (2006).  Indeed, "[i]n many 
jurisdictions, courts once viewed agreements to arbitrate as a 
'lesser caste' of contract provisions that could be ignored with 
impunity."  Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the 
Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 6 (1997). 
Enacted in response to this hostility and to quash the 
notion that only a judge could ensure a fair hearing, the FAA 
embodies a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" 
(citation omitted).  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 339 (2011).  Massachusetts's counterpart, the Massachusetts 
Arbitration Act (MAA), G. L. c. 251, §§ 1 et seq., likewise 
"expresses a strong public policy favoring arbitration."  
16 
 
Miller, 448 Mass. at 676, quoting Home Gas Corp. of Mass., Inc. 
v. Walter's of Hadley, Inc., 403 Mass. 772, 774 (1989).  The FAA 
and our State counterpart require "courts 'rigorously' to 
'enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.'"  
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 506 (2018), quoting 
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233.  See Miller, supra. 
Ultimately, "[t]he FAA reflects the fundamental principle 
that arbitration is a matter of contract."  Rent-A-Center, W., 
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (Rent-A-Center).  Thus, 
whether parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes is 
governed by ordinary State law contract principles.  Kauders, 
486 Mass. at 571.  First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 944 (1995) ("When deciding whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . apply 
ordinary [S]tate-law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts").  Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 
581 U.S. 246, 251 (2017) ("generally applicable contract" 
principles govern whether parties have agreed to arbitration 
[citation omitted]).  Both the FAA and the MAA "establish[] an 
equal-treatment principle," precluding any rule "discriminating 
. . . against arbitration."  Id.  See Miller, 448 Mass. at 677. 
Therefore, in determining whether the notice and reasonable 
assent requirements of contract formation are met, we approach 
an agreement that includes an arbitration provision in the same 
17 
 
manner as we would any other provision; the party seeking to 
enforce an agreement to arbitrate must demonstrate both offer 
and acceptance.  See, e.g., Battle v. Howard, 489 Mass. 480, 492 
(2022), citing McCarthy v. Tobin, 429 Mass. 84, 86 (1999) 
(contract requires accepted offer); Canney v. New England Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 353 Mass. 158, 164 (1967) (burden on proponent). 
In the context of a nonnegotiable standard form contract, 
to show that a contract in fact was formed, "there must be both 
. . . notice of the terms [of the contractual offer] and a 
reasonable manifestation of assent to those terms [so as to 
constitute acceptance of the offer]."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
572.  While the dissent now chides the court for failing to 
alter fundamentally the principles of contract formation under 
the auspices of developing the "common law," post at    , we 
have concluded recently and unanimously that "the fundamentals 
of online contract formation should not be different from 
ordinary contract formation."  Kauders, supra at 571.  "The 
touchscreens of Internet contract law must reflect the 
touchstones of regular contract law," we explained (emphasis 
added).  Id.  Of course, that does not mean that our approach is 
static or unadaptable to new technologies; for example, as 
discussed infra, we have emphasized the need, tailored to the 
unique circumstances of mobile app-based transactions, for a 
18 
 
clear interface to govern the reasonable notice inquiry.  See 
id. 
 
a.  Notice of the offer.  With these principles in mind, we 
turn to the issue whether Uber provided Good with notice of the 
terms of the contractual offer.  The notice element can be 
satisfied in two ways.  First, "[w]here the offeree has actual 
notice of the terms, [the notice] prong is satisfied without 
further inquiry."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 572.  "Actual notice 
will exist where the [offeree] has reviewed the terms."  Archer, 
490 Mass. at 361, quoting Kauders, supra.  Actual notice "will 
also generally be found where the user must somehow interact 
with the terms before agreeing to them," including by scrolling 
through them.  Kauders, supra. 
Second, "[a]bsent actual notice, the totality of the 
circumstances must be evaluated [to] determin[e] whether 
reasonable notice has been given of the terms."  Kauders, 486 
Mass. at 573.  "Reasonable notice of a contract's terms [may] 
exist[] even if the party did not actually view the agreement, 
so long as the party had an adequate opportunity to do so."  
Archer, 490 Mass. at 361. 
i.  Actual notice.  Uber contends Good had actual notice of 
the terms because the record reflects that Good clicked the 
checkbox on Uber's interface adjacent to text stating, "By 
19 
 
checking the box, I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use 
. . . ."  We disagree.16 
Checking a box next to the statement that he reviewed the 
terms is not equivalent to an admission by Good that he, in 
fact, reviewed the terms of use, or even scrolled through them.  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 36, 365 Mass. 795 (1974).  Cf. Sgouros v. 
TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2016) ("we 
cannot presume that a person who clicks on a box that appears on 
a computer screen has notice of all contents not only of that 
page but of other content that requires further action 
[scrolling, following a link, etc.]").  It is entirely 
plausible, indeed likely, that Good did not review the terms.  
Uber's interface did not require Good to click on the hyperlink 
to the terms themselves.  While Uber has provided computer logs 
showing that Good checked the box, it has not provided any 
similar logs to suggest he followed the hyperlink to the terms 
themselves.  We previously have noted empirical studies showing 
 
16 Good mistakenly asserts that the defendants waived the 
argument that Good received actual notice of Uber's terms of 
use.  In the Superior Court, Uber argued that Good "actually 
received the in-app blocking pop-up notice" and, "by checking 
the box, agreed that . . . he read, understood, and agreed to be 
bound" by the terms.  The Superior Court judge, in turn, 
understood that the argument was raised and addressed it in her 
decision.  Cf. Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 
285 (2006) (argument waived where party never put judge on 
notice of theory). 
 
20 
 
that most users of mobile applications "do not read the terms of 
use."17  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 577.  See Ayres & Schwartz, The 
No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 
545, 547-548 (2014) (describing empirical evidence showing 
number of consumers who read terms is "miniscule").  See also 
Conroy & Shope, Look Before You Click:  The Enforceability of 
Website and Smartphone App Terms and Conditions, 63 Boston Bar 
J. 23, 23 (Spring 2019) ("Most users will not have read the 
terms . . ."). 
Accordingly, in the absence of record evidence that Good 
accessed the terms of use through the hyperlink or "somehow 
interact[ed] with the terms before agreeing to them," Uber has 
not met its burden to show actual notice.  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
572. 
ii.  Reasonable notice.  We next consider whether Uber 
provided reasonable notice of the terms of use.  See Kauders, 
486 Mass. at 573.  In doing so, we "evaluate 'the totality of 
the circumstances.'"  Archer, 490 Mass. at 361, quoting Kauders, 
supra.  We consider, inter alia, "the nature, including the 
 
17 Good averred that on the occasions when he was presented 
with an in-app pop-up screen, he "would simply click the button 
that allowed [him] to continue using the app as quickly as 
possible so that [he] could request a ride."  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 406 (2024) (personal habit inadmissible to prove action in 
conformity therewith). 
 
21 
 
size, of the transaction," "the interface by which the terms are 
being communicated," "the form of the contract," and "whether 
the notice conveys the full scope of the terms and conditions."  
Kauders, supra.  "Ultimately, the offeror must reasonably notify 
the user that there are terms to which the user will be bound 
and give the user the opportunity to review those terms" 
(emphasis added).18  Id. 
A.  Nature and size of the transaction.  "The full context 
of any transaction is critical to determining whether any 
particular notice is sufficient to put a consumer on . . . 
notice of contractual terms contained on a separate, hyperlinked 
page."  Sellers v. JustAnswer LLC, 73 Cal. App. 5th 444, 453 
(2021).  The nature of the transaction is viewed from the 
perspective of "reasonable people in the position of the 
parties."  Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 77 (2d Cir. 
2017), quoting Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
The transaction giving rise to the present action involved 
using Uber's app to secure a ride, an action in which presumably 
Good had engaged numerous times between 2013, when he first 
 
18 Contrary to the dissent's statement, post at note 17, we 
do not narrow the test in Kauders.  As Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
573, provides, we look to the totality of the circumstances, 
including, as discussed infra, the clear provision of a 
hyperlink to the terms of use on an uncluttered interface 
directing the user to read the terms and to agree to them. 
22 
 
registered an account with Uber, and 2021, when he was presented 
with the terms of use at issue here.  In this context, Good may 
not have expected to be entering a contract at all, let alone a 
contract comprising the comprehensive set of terms offered by 
Uber.  But see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77 (warning against 
presumption that "the user has never before encountered an app 
or entered into a contract using a smartphone"). 
Moreover, the presumably modest price of purchasing a 
single local ride also might have lulled Good into believing 
that his use of Uber's service would not be accompanied by 
extensive contractual conditions.  The circumstances giving rise 
to Good's activation of the app to secure transportation 
certainly would not call upon the reasonably prudent consumer to 
believe that the advice of an attorney was required or even to 
suggest such advice might be beneficial.19  Contrast H1 Lincoln, 
Inc. v. South Washington St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1 (2022) 
 
19 The record does not support the dissent's view that the 
transaction between the user, Uber, and the driver was of a 
particularly "counterintuitive triangular nature"; tellingly, 
the dissent cites to nothing to support its statement that "what 
is unusual [here]" is the liability disclaimer for the actions 
of a third party.  Post at    & n.8.  See Hagiu, Strategic 
Decisions for Multisided Platforms, MITSloan Mgt. Rev. (2014), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/strategic-decisions-for-
multisided-platforms [https://perma.cc/QVS7-BNMG] (noting that, 
in addition to Uber and Lyft, other commonly used, consumer-
facing platforms operate through similar multisided structure, 
such as Airbnb, eBay, Amazon, Facebook, and Ticketmaster). 
23 
 
(commercial transaction by sophisticated parties represented by 
counsel). 
B.  Interface and form of the contract.  Where the nature 
of the transaction is such that a reasonably prudent consumer 
may proceed without realizing that she is also agreeing to a set 
of comprehensive contractual terms, a particular onus is placed 
on the offeror to ensure that the interface is designed to 
disabuse the user of that notion and to put the user on 
reasonable notice of the terms.  Moreover, especially where 
there is no face-to-face transaction between the contracting 
parties, it is imperative that the interface convey to the user 
that a contract is being presented.  See, e.g., Kauders, 486 
Mass. at 573, citing Polonsky v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
334 Mass. 697, 701 (1956) ("terms may not be enforceable where 
document containing or presenting terms to offeree does not 
appear to be contract"); Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035 ("a person 
using the Internet may not realize that she is agreeing to a 
contract at all").  Thus, we examine the interface carefully to 
determine whether it "reasonably focused" the otherwise 
unsuspecting user "on the terms and conditions" being imposed, 
Kauders, supra at 575-576; "[f]or Internet transactions, the 
specifics and subtleties of the 'design and content of the 
relevant interface' are especially relevant," Id. at 573, 
quoting Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75.  We ask whether the interface 
24 
 
presented the terms in a manner that to a reasonable person in 
the user's circumstance would "appear to be [a] contract."  
Kauders, supra, citing Polonsky, supra. 
We "evaluate the clarity and simplicity of the 
communication of the terms."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573.  In 
doing so, we consider the language used to notify the user of 
the terms, the prominence with which the hyperlink, if any, to 
the terms was displayed, and the clarity and extensiveness of 
the process to access the terms, along with "any other 
information that would bear on the reasonableness of [the] 
communicati[on of the terms]."  Id., quoting Cullinane v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2018).  "This is an 
objective test:  the sufficiency of the notice turns on whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, [the] communication 
would have provided a reasonably prudent [user] notice of the 
[terms being offered, including the arbitration provision]."  
Archer, 490 Mass. at 362, quoting Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. 
Supp. 3d 284, 295 (D. Mass. 2016), aff'd, 918 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 
2019). 
Here, despite the nature of the transaction and the 
electronic, online presentation, Uber's interface focused the 
reasonably prudent consumer on the terms being offered by Uber 
for the continued use of its services.  The interface 
unequivocally and transparently communicated to such a consumer 
25 
 
that by checking the checkbox and clicking "Confirm" on the 
blocking pop-up screen, the user was agreeing to Uber's terms of 
use. 
Specifically, the blocking pop-up screen referenced the 
terms of use four times -- at the top, twice in the center, and 
at the bottom of the screen.  See Wu v. Uber Techs., Inc., 78 
Misc. 3d 551, 556-557, 589-590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022), aff'd, 219 
A.D.3d 1208 (N.Y. 2023) (examining materially identical 
interface and concluding reasonable notice given in view of 
uncluttered interface's reference to Uber's terms four times).  
Contrast Kauders, 486 Mass. at 559-561 (no reasonable notice 
where reference to terms of use was displayed only once, at 
bottom of final screen, which itself focused on user's payment 
information, of three-screen registration process).  Uber's 
display clearly and expressly stated:  "We've updated our terms" 
and "We encourage you to read our updated Terms in full."20  This 
 
20 Good contends that the interface's use of the word 
"update" renders the notice misleading because in Kauders we 
concluded that a prior version of Uber's interface failed to 
provide reasonable notice; accordingly, for users in 
Massachusetts, this interface did not provide an "update," but 
rather it provided terms of use anew.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
580-581 (concluding no contract formed).  The argument rests on 
the dubious proposition that the reasonably prudent consumer was 
aware of our prior holding issued just three months before Uber 
presented Good with its new terms of use.  A consumer unaware of 
our decision would have believed that an existing terms of use 
contract -- one that contained terms similar to those presented 
 
26 
 
text was set forth in prominent typeface; the latter occupied 
the middle of the screen and used a font size that was larger 
than any other shown on the screen.   
The link to the terms of use was not buried on a cluttered 
screen or presented inconspicuously at the tail end of a 
cumbersome registration and payment process.  See Meyer, 868 
F.3d at 78, 79 (conspicuous notice provided where interface was 
"uncluttered"); Mallh vs. Showtime Networks Inc., U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 17-cv-6549 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2017) ("page was 
uncluttered and dedicated to the steps required to transact the 
 
to Good as an "update" -- controlled its use of Uber's app, 
making Uber's use of the term "update" apt.    
 
Even if the avid reader of this court's decisions 
understood that there was no existing contract between the user 
and Uber, it strains credulity to conclude that such a 
discerning consumer would have been misled by the term "update."  
Indeed, a more reasonable conclusion to draw is that such a 
voracious reader likely would click the hyperlink and read the 
terms of use document.   
 
In any event, the new terms were in fact an "update," 
bringing the terms of use "up to date" with current information 
governing the use of Uber's services.  See Oxford English 
Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?scope 
=Entries&q=update [https://perma.cc/F83K-6D9Y] (defining verb 
"update" as bringing information "up to date").  The use of the 
word "update" did not discourage users from reviewing the 
"update" or indicate that the "update" was minor or innocuous.  
Post at    .  To the contrary, the interface expressly 
"encourage[d]" users to review the terms of use.  In that 
context, we do not agree that the user would have placed such 
weight on, or been dissuaded by, the interface's use of the term 
"update." 
 
27 
 
purchase" and "did not contain any [extraneous] photos or links 
to promotional material").  The interface addressed only the 
terms of use and accompanying privacy notice.21  Nothing 
distracted from the interface's singular focus on providing 
notice of, and obtaining assent to, the terms of use, along with 
acknowledgment of the privacy notice.  Contrast Kauders, 486 
Mass. at 560-561, 578 (hyperlink to terms obscured within screen 
focused on payment information); Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 
("Other similarly displayed [content] presented simultaneously 
to the user . . . diminished the conspicuousness of the 'Terms 
of Service & Privacy Policy' hyperlink"). 
The interface both "encourage[d]" the user to review the 
terms of use and provided a hyperlink labeled "Terms of Use."  
See Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035 ("Where the terms . . . must be 
brought up by using a hyperlink, courts . . . have looked for a 
clear prompt directing the user to read them").  And it stated, 
"By checking the box, I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of 
 
21 Given the clear manner by which the terms were presented, 
the additional two references to the privacy notice -- once in a 
hyperlink and once next to the checkbox -- would not distract 
the reasonably prudent consumer.  The interface presented an 
opportunity also to discuss Uber's privacy practices, a topic 
about which consumers have expressed considerable concern.  See 
McClain, Faverio, Anderson, & Park, How Americans View Data 
Privacy, Pew Research Ctr. (Oct. 18, 2023), https://www.pew
research.org/internet/2023/10/18/how-americans-view-data-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/K4SP-KRDL] (majority of Americans "concerned" 
about how private companies use their data). 
 
28 
 
Use . . . ."22  "Requiring a user to expressly and affirmatively 
assent to the terms, such as by indicating 'I Agree' or its 
equivalent, . . . puts the user on notice that the user is 
entering into a contractual arrangement."23  Kauders, 486 Mass. 
at 574. 
The interface also alerted the otherwise unsuspecting user 
that a contract was being formed by displaying a large pictorial 
representation of signing a contract; specifically, a graphic of 
a clipboard holding a document marked by an "X" alongside a 
pencil poised to sign it.  Such an illustration meaningfully 
conveyed that the user was being presented with a legal document 
 
22 The use of the phrase "I agree" rather than the word 
"agreement" did not detract from the otherwise reasonable 
notice.  Moreover, the use of the phrase "terms of use," rather 
than "contract," more accurately conveyed the nature of the 
agreement -- a standard, nonnegotiable contract of adhesion.  
Indeed, "[a]s websites became ubiquitous, so did terms of use."  
Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 Am. U.L. Rev. 1635, 1641 
(2011) (Hartzog). 
 
23 See, e.g., Mallh, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cv-6549 ("the 'I 
have read and agree to' language clearly prompts users to review 
the [terms of use]"); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 
829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[C]licking the hyperlinked phrase is 
the twenty-first century equivalent of turning over the cruise 
ticket.  In both cases, the consumer is prompted to examine 
terms of sale that are located somewhere else").  Contrast 
Berman v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 856-857 (9th 
Cir. 2022) (no notice where "text disclosing the existence of 
the terms . . . [was] the antithesis of conspicuous," was 
"printed in a tiny gray font considerably smaller than the font 
used in the surrounding website elements," and was "deemphasized 
by the overall design"). 
 
29 
 
to execute.  See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62 (use of symbols can 
help make terms conspicuous).24  The large graphic portraying a 
legal document with a pencil poised to sign at the "X" would 
evoke in the mind of the reasonable consumer the "solemnity of 
physically signing a written contract."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
574.  See Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 
57 Rutgers L. Rev. 1307, 1316 (2005) ("In contract law, a 
written signature provides the traditional evidence of assent 
because when we are asked to sign something, we are conditioned 
to think that we are doing something important"). 
The interface also clearly conveyed that the terms were 
readily available through a hyperlink, which was underlined, 
written in blue text, and placed in the center of the screen.  
 
24 See also Dewan, Words Versus Pictures:  Leveraging the 
Research on Visual Communication, Partnership:  Can. J. Libr. 
Info. Pracs. & Res., vol. 10, no. 1, at 2 (2015) ("Adding 
illustrations to text, researchers have concluded, aids 
comprehension and learning"); Harvard University, Digital 
Accessibility, https://accessibility.huit.harvard.edu/use-
images-and-media-enhance-understanding [https://perma.cc/UFP7-
M7YE] ("Images . . . are powerful communication devices" that 
are "useful for conveying concepts and information, and they can 
help improve comprehension" so long as they "support or add to 
the information and concepts of the page").  Cf. Noar et al., 
Pictorial Cigarette Pack Warnings:  A Meta-analysis of 
Experimental Studies, 25 Tobacco Control 341, 341-354 (2016) 
(graphical warnings more effective at preventing smoking or 
getting smokers to quit than text warnings).  Despite the 
effectiveness of such graphics, "some lawyers think a word is 
worth a thousand pictures."  R.A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 
143 (2013). 
 
30 
 
The clickable link, which provided the user with direct access 
to the terms, was displayed with "the common appearance of a 
hyperlink."  Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 ("hyperlinks . . . are 
commonly blue and underlined" [quotation and citation omitted]).  
See Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 2014) ("being 
embedded in blue, underlined text" is "the customary manner" of 
displaying hyperlinks); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 
829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), quoting United States v. Hair, 178 
Fed. Appx. 879, 882 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1140 (2007) (underlining text indicates that it is hyperlink 
that "sends users who click on it directly to a new location").  
Contrast Sarchi v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2022 ME 8, ¶ 35 ("lack of 
underlining and the muted gray coloring . . . mean[t] that [link 
to terms was] not obviously identifiable as a hyperlink"). 
One simple click on the hyperlink directed the user to the 
full text of the terms of use document, which stated at the top, 
"Contractual Relationship"; no additional steps were required.25  
See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573, citing Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62 
(noting that number of steps required to access terms is factor 
in determining reasonableness of notice).  The first paragraph 
 
25 Contrast Kauders, 486 Mass. at 559, 560 (notice not 
reasonable where hyperlink, found only on third screen of 
registration and payment process, if clicked, directed user to 
second hyperlink, which if clicked would permit user to view 
terms and conditions). 
  
31 
 
of the terms of use stated that the terms "CONSTITUTE A LEGAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND UBER."  Within the first five 
paragraphs, a warning alerted the user "THAT THIS AGREEMENT 
CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU AND UBER 
CAN BE BROUGHT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT."  The very 
next section, titled "Arbitration Agreement," set forth those 
provisions.  Thus, within the terms of use document itself, the 
binding arbitration agreement was apparent.  See Wu, 78 Misc. 3d 
at 589 (concluding with respect to materially identical version 
of Uber's terms:  "The arbitration agreement, in short, is not 
hidden or disguised; rather, it is clear and conspicuous such 
that a prudent user would be on notice of it"). 
Critically, the interface -- an "in-app blocking pop-up 
screen" -- prevented the user from proceeding to order a ride 
using Uber's services without first interacting with the 
interface.26  It interrupted the user, who likely was distracted 
by the singular goal of obtaining immediate transportation, and 
 
26 Uber's occasional use of blocking pop-ups for promotional 
offers, while a factor in the analysis, does not detract 
materially from the significance of the interface; the interface 
causes the user to stop, even if only momentarily, and to 
consider the message being conveyed -- here, as discussed, that 
Uber was conditioning the use of its services upon acceptance of 
the terms of use.  In any event, the record does not suggest 
that on the occasions where a blocking pop-up screen was used 
for promotional purposes the user was invited both to "agree" by 
checking a box and to "confirm" agreement in order to clear the 
blocking pop-up screen.  
 
32 
 
forced the user to attend to the information conveyed on the 
screen.27  At a minimum, the interface required the user to skim 
the screen to identify the box adjacent to the medium-sized 
boldface text stating, "By checking the box, I have reviewed and 
agree to the Terms of Use . . . ," to check the box, and then to 
press the "Confirm" button in order to proceed.28  Even such a 
 
27 The blocking pop-up interface appeared when Good was 
using the app to seek a ride -- an apt time to provide a user 
with notice; this is when the user most likely is thinking 
actively about using Uber's services and weighing the trade-offs 
and costs.  The dissent acknowledges that the interface 
"prevented [users] from accessing the Uber app until they 
signaled their assent."  Post at    .  Far from detracting from 
the reasonable notice, this blocking aspect could not have been 
clearer.  The terms presented were the "terms of use" of the 
Uber app; to use the app, the user was required to assent.  
Nothing, other than a self-imposed desire to use the app and 
secure a ride, foiled a user from clicking on the hyperlink and 
reviewing the terms.  Indeed, the time it would take a user to 
click on the hyperlink is measured in seconds and immediately 
would have provided the user with the words "Contractual 
Relationship," and a statement that the terms "CONSTITUTE A 
LEGAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND UBER."  There is no indication, 
let alone any argument, that Good was under duress.  Indeed, 
Good had five additional days after he assented to the terms to 
read them over before the accident. 
 
28 Other courts and jurisdictions also have concluded that 
similar interfaces provided reasonable notice.  See, e.g., 
Oberstein v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 60 F.4th 505, 515-
516 (9th Cir. 2023) (notice given where prominently displayed 
hyperlink to terms of use was accompanied by "Sign in" button 
adjacent to text stating, "By continuing past this page, you 
agree to the Terms of Use"); Hancock v. American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 
U.S. 948 (2013) (reasonable notice provided where user required 
to click button indicating assent before user could continue 
with registration process); Wickberg v. Lyft, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 
3d 179, 184 (D. Mass. 2018) (reasonable notice given where 
 
33 
 
cursory review of the interface would have alerted the 
reasonably prudent user that a contract was being offered, that 
its terms were readily available through the hyperlink, and that 
assent thereto was required in order to continue to use Uber's 
app.29 
 
"screen required [offeree] to click a box stating that he 
'agree[d] to Lyft's terms of services' before he could continue 
with the registration process"); Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 235 
F. Supp. 3d 656, 661 (D.N.J. 2017), vacated on other grounds, 
939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (reasonable notice given where "[t]o 
advance past the screen with the hyperlink and actively use the 
Uber App, [the driver] had to confirm that he had first reviewed 
and accepted the [agreement] by clicking 'YES, I AGREE'" and 
then confirm for second time); Eubanks vs. GasBuddy, LLC, U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 22-CV-10334-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2022) (notice 
provided where user could not complete registration without 
clicking button indicating assent); Brooks v. Yang, 216 A.D.3d 
505, 506 (N.Y. 2023) (reasonable notice given to Uber's updated 
terms of use, which twice required user to indicate assent).  
Contrast Kauders, 486 Mass. at 578 ("user could complete . . . 
process without ever focusing on the link or the notice on the 
screen"); Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62 (defendant "chose not to use 
a common method of conspicuously informing users of the 
existence and locations of terms and conditions:  requiring 
users to click a box stating that they agree to a set of terms, 
often provided by hyperlink, before continuing to the next 
screen"). 
 
29 Uber's interface stands in stark contrast to "browsewrap" 
agreements, in which a user need not interact with the interface 
at all.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 
1171, 1177-1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (browsewrap agreement did not 
provide reasonable notice).  "A 'browsewrap' agreement is an 
agreement where 'website terms and conditions of use are posted 
on the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the 
screen.'"  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 579 n.26, quoting Hines v. 
Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff'd, 380 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d Cir. 2010).  Of course, 
"[c]lassification of web-based contracts alone . . . does not 
resolve the notice inquiry."  Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 
 
34 
 
Good's argument that the interface must require the user to 
open or scroll through the terms of use for the interface to 
comply with the reasonable notice requirement confuses 
reasonable notice with actual notice.30  See post at note 17; 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 572-573 (notice requirement satisfied 
through actual notice or reasonable notice).  Actual notice 
requires that the user interact with or scroll through the 
terms.  Kauders, supra at 572.  Reasonable notice does not; 
instead, reasonable notice suffices where the totality of the 
circumstances provides the reasonably prudent user with 
information sufficient to understand that terms of use are being 
offered and makes those terms readily available for the user to 
access.  See Archer, 490 Mass. at 361-362.  We do not require, 
for purposes of reasonable notice, that the user actually scroll 
 
F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2017).  The question "[w]hether an 
interface provides reasonable notice" does not "turn on the 
classification of the agreement as a scrollwrap, clickwrap, 
browsewrap, or sign-in wrap agreement."  Sarchi v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 2022 ME 8, ¶ 26.  Whether the reasonable notice element of 
contract formation is met is a fact-intensive inquiry, guided by 
the totality of the circumstances.  Kauders, supra at 573. 
 
30 In contrast to clickwrap contracts, "[s]crollwrap 
requires users to physically scroll through an internet 
agreement [before] click[ing] on a separate 'I agree' button in 
order to assent to the terms and conditions of the host 
website."  Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61 n.10, quoting Berkson, 97 
F. Supp. 3d at 395. 
 
35 
 
through the terms.31  See Kauders, supra at 574 (clickwrap 
agreements "are regularly enforced"); Emmanuel v. Handy Techs., 
Inc., 992 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2021) ("we are not aware" of "any 
precedent . . . that would indicate that Massachusetts law 
imposes . . . a requirement" that user scroll through terms of 
use); Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 
(D. Mass. 2019) ("courts in this Circuit are in near universal 
agreement that clickwrap contracts are enforceable"). 
That Uber may use a marginally different contracting 
process for onboarding drivers is neither dispositive nor 
surprising.  Entering a relationship for one's livelihood 
typically is far more consequential than seeking a ride. 
 
31 Indeed, there is reason to be skeptical that requiring a 
user to scroll through the terms would increase the likelihood 
of a user in fact reading the terms.  See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 211 comment b (1981) ("Customers do not in fact 
ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms.  They 
trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the 
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted 
regularly by others similarly situated.  But they understand 
that they are assenting to the terms not read or not understood, 
subject to such limitations as the law may impose"); Second 
Tentative Draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts 
§ 2, Reporters' Notes (Apr. 2022) ("credible empirical evidence, 
as well as common sense and experience, suggests that consumers 
rarely read standard contract terms no matter how those terms 
are disclosed"); Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure 
Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's "Principles of 
the Law of Software Contracts," 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 181-182 
(2011) (discussing empirical evidence suggesting users also 
spend little, if any, time reading scrollwrap contracts, and 
concluding that "no matter how prominently [terms] are 
disclosed, they are almost always ignored"). 
 
36 
 
In any event, the user interface that Uber employed with 
Good bears a striking similarity to the interface that it used 
with drivers and that we previously cited approvingly.  See 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 576-577 (describing Uber's driver app as 
presenting prospective driver with blocking screen with 
hyperlink to terms, requiring driver to click "I AGREE" to 
confirm that driver had reviewed and accepted terms, and 
requiring driver to "confirm" same for second time).  Indeed, 
the driver interface addressed in Capriole vs. Uber Techs., 
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-CV-19941 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 
2020), and reproduced below, which in Kauders we approvingly 
presented as an exemplar of reasonable notice of the terms and 
conditions of Uber's agreement with drivers, including a term 
requiring arbitration, is nearly identical in all material 
respects to the user interface at issue here.  See Kauders, 
supra at 577, 580.  
 
 
37 
 
 Driver Interface Providing 
Reasonable Notice of 
Arbitration Agreement 
User Interface 
 
 
 
As with the present interface, the driver interface, 
displayed supra, directed drivers to review the terms and 
provided hyperlinks to the same.  See Capriole, supra.  It then 
required drivers to click a button stating, "YES I AGREE" 
following a statement in font size much smaller than the one 
38 
 
used for the user interface, which stated, "By clicking below, 
you represent that you have reviewed all the documents above and 
that you agree to all the contracts above."  Id.  The interface 
required drivers to "CONFIRM" that they had reviewed and agreed 
to those terms.  Id.  Aside from marginally different language, 
the driver interface does not differ materially from Uber's 
current user interface.  In Kauders, we approved of the driver 
interface as providing reasonable notice requiring arbitration 
even though it did not require review of the terms; did not 
display any of the terms themselves, instead making them 
available through a hyperlink that was less prominent than the 
one used in the user interface; included hyperlinks to two 
separate agreements; used the terms "I agree" and "Confirm"; and 
did not highlight particular terms, including the requirement of 
arbitration, that might later be determined to be 
unconscionable.  See id. 
C.  Full scope of terms.  Finally, we consider whether 
Uber's "notice convey[ed] the full scope of the terms and 
conditions."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573.  As discussed supra, 
the interface expressly communicated that Uber was presenting 
its terms of use.  The interface then conspicuously linked to 
those terms of use, making "readily available" the entirety of 
the terms to which the user would be bound upon indicating 
assent.  See id. (we consider whether notice makes terms readily 
39 
 
available).  See also Archer, 490 Mass. at 354, 361-362 
(reasonable notice given where terms were available through 
hyperlink).32 
Because Uber's interface sufficiently "focused the user on 
the terms and conditions," thereby "notify[ing] the user that 
there are terms to which the user will be bound," and made those 
terms readily available, "giv[ing] the user the opportunity to 
review those terms," reasonable notice was conveyed (emphasis 
added).33  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573, 576.  See Meyer, 868 F.3d 
 
32 The fact that the terms offered by Uber were 
nonnegotiable does not make their contractual nature any less 
apparent.  Nonnegotiable, "take it or leave it" contracts are 
not new.  Over a century ago, Henry Ford, the founder of the 
automobile company that bears his name, famously proclaimed, 
"Any customer can have a [Model T] painted any [color] that he 
wants so long as it is black."  See H. Ford & S. Crowther, My 
Life and Work 72 (1922).  We encounter standard form contracts 
in contexts spanning from home mortgages to "admission to the 
bleachers at Fenway Park."  In re Daily Fantasy Sports Litig., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., MDL No. 16-02677 (D. Mass. Nov. 27, 2019) 
(describing standard form contracts as "a staple of modern 
commercial law, used in all kinds of transactions:  home 
mortgages, credit card financing, transportation tickets, bills 
of lading, ski lift tickets, bailments, warranties, and myriad 
other routine transactions").  Uber is not the first to employ 
such contracts online; they are a common feature of the digital 
age.  See, e.g., Hartzog, 60 Am. U.L. Rev. at 1641 (discussing 
"omnipresence" of online standard-form contracts).  Such 
contracts generally "are enforceable unless they are 
unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair 
in the particular circumstances."  McInnes, 466 Mass. at 266, 
quoting Miller, 448 Mass. at 684 n.16.  We leave such 
determinations to the arbitrator. 
 
33 Although the requirement to "convey[] the full scope of 
the terms," see Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573, might suggest that an 
 
40 
 
at 79 ("While it may be the case that many users will not bother 
reading the additional terms, that is the choice the user makes; 
the user is still on . . . notice").  Contrast Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(offer "did not carry an immediately visible notice of the 
existence of license terms or require unambiguous manifestation 
of assent to those terms"). 
The dissent's position notwithstanding, reasonable notice 
does not demand that the offeror highlight particular provisions 
 
offeror must highlight particular terms in the notice, that 
interpretation is inconsistent with both the holding in Kauders 
and with the authorities to which Kauders cites.  Instead, the 
requirement as set forth in Kauders is to put users on 
reasonable notice that there are terms and to make those terms 
readily available.  See Kauders, supra.  This requirement is 
consistent with our sister jurisdictions across the country.  
See, e.g., Berman, 30 F.4th at 857 ("it is permissible to 
disclose terms and conditions through a hyperlink, [so long as] 
the fact that a hyperlink is present [is] readily apparent"); 
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78-79 (concluding notice given where Uber's 
"Terms of Service were available only by hyperlink" and 
interface made no mention of particular provisions); Sgourous v. 
TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034-1035 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(evaluating whether notice reasonably "communicate[d] the 
existence of the terms and conditions at issue" [citation 
omitted; emphasis added]); Plazza v. Airbnb, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 
3d 537, 553-554, 559 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding notice of 
terms and enforcing arbitration agreement where interface 
contained no reference to specific provisions within terms of 
use, which contained provision limiting liability that 
plaintiffs asserted was unconscionable); Santana v. 
SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super. 279, 283-285, 286-288, 
291-292 (App. Div. 2023) (reasonable notice provided even though 
assent screen linking to terms did not specify that terms 
contained arbitration provision). 
 
41 
 
of the terms of use where, as here, the interface provides a 
readily identifiable hyperlink to all of the terms, none of 
which was buried in fine print.34  See discussion supra.  
Instead, the offeror can either "require the user to open the 
terms or make them readily available" (emphasis added).  
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573.  Ultimately, reasonable notice 
requires that an offeror "reasonably notify the user that there 
are terms to which the user will be bound and give the user the 
opportunity to review those terms" (emphases added).  Id.  
Indeed, we have acknowledged that a prominently displayed 
statement explaining the connection between creating an account 
and agreeing to Uber's terms of use "would encourage opening and 
reviewing the terms."  Id. at 578.  Unlike Uber's prior user 
interface, which we determined did not provide reasonable 
notice, the present one expressly "encourage[d]" the user to 
open the hyperlink to the terms of use, "prominently" displayed 
that hyperlink, and made clear that use of the app was 
conditioned on agreement to those terms.  Id. at 559-562, 573. 
 
34 See, e.g., Second Tentative Draft Restatement of the Law 
of Consumer Contracts § 2 comment 5 illustration 8 (Apr. 2022) 
(consumer using website to purchase product creates contract 
that includes "Terms of Sale" agreement where hyperlink to terms 
is included prominently next to "Purchase Now" button because 
interface thus provides "reasonable notice of the terms and the 
intent to include them in the consumer contract, as well as a 
reasonable opportunity to read them").  The court in Kauders 
cited this restatement approvingly.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
577. 
42 
 
Moreover, demanding that the offeror highlight particular 
terms, even if one could agree as to which terms to highlight, 
ignores the well-established and widely recognized principle 
that offerees have a duty to read the terms of a contract to 
which they assent and are not excused from a contract's terms 
solely by virtue of having chosen not to do so.35  See Haufler v. 
Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 501 (2006), quoting Wilkisius v. Sheehan, 
258 Mass. 240, 243 (1927) ("The general rule is, that, in the 
absence of fraud, one who signs a written agreement is bound by 
its terms whether he reads and understands it or not"); Grace v. 
Adams, 100 Mass. 505, 507 (1868) ("It was [the offeree's] duty 
to read [the contract].  The law presumes, in the absence of 
fraud or imposition, that he did read it, or was otherwise 
informed of its contents, and was willing to assent to its terms 
 
35 References to, for example, the limited liability 
provision or the disclaimer that Uber considers drivers to be 
independent contractors and not employees, or other provisions 
of the terms of use later determined to be significant, 
inevitably would clutter the interface and might even detract 
from its effectiveness.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 578, quoting 
Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64 (presence of "other terms" on same 
screen interfered with "hyperlink's capability to grab the 
user's attention"); Sarchi, 2022 ME 8, ¶ 23 ("Where notice or 
the hyperlink to agreement terms appears on an interface that is 
cluttered with other features and therefore is not easily 
spotted, an agreement is less likely to be binding on the 
user").  The dissent contends both that the interface used by 
Uber "included [too] many concepts" and that more should be 
squeezed into the constrained real estate of the blocking 
screen.  See post at notes 4, 10. 
  
43 
 
without reading it"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 23 
comment e (1981) ("An offeree, knowing that an offer has been 
made to him, need not know all its terms.  Knowing that an offer 
has been made, he can accept without investigation of the exact 
terms, either intentionally or by words or conduct creating an 
unintended appearance of intention to accept").36  This same 
principle applies to standard form contracts.37 
 
36 See also Soto v. State Indus. Prods., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 
78 (1st Cir. 2011), quoting 1 R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts 
§ 4:19 (4th ed. 2010) ("it is a general and well established 
principle of contract law that 'one who is ignorant of the 
language in which a document is written, or who is illiterate,' 
may be bound to a contract by negligently failing to learn its 
contents"); 1 T. Murray & J. Hogue, Corbin on Massachusetts 
Contracts § 29.05[2] (2021) ("There is a duty to read things 
that look like contracts -- one cannot sign or accept the 
benefits of a document that looks like a contract and later 
claim that its terms are not binding because the party signing 
it did not read it"). 
 
37 See, e.g., Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 103 (2002) 
(plaintiffs not excused from terms of adhesion contract where 
they "had ample opportunity to read and understand the release 
before signing it, and they are therefore deemed to have 
understood it"); Cormier v. Central Mass. Chapter of the Nat'l 
Safety Council, 416 Mass. 286, 289 (1993) ("plaintiff had an 
opportunity to read the release and [therefore] is deemed to 
have understood it" [footnote omitted]); Carpenter v. Suffolk 
Franklin Sav. Bank, 370 Mass. 314, 327 (1976), quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 comment b (Tent. Drafts 
Nos. 1-7, 1973) ("Customers who adhere to standardized 
contractual terms ordinarily 'understand that they are assenting 
to the terms not read or not understood, subject to such 
limitations as the law may impose'"); Lee v. Allied Sports 
Assocs., Inc., 349 Mass. 544, 548-551 (1965) (stating, in 
connection with contract of adhesion, that "the failure to read 
or to understand the contents of a release, in the absence of 
fraud or duress, does not avoid its effects," including 
 
44 
 
As discussed supra, Uber's interface provided a clearly 
identifiable hyperlink to the terms of use document.  That Good 
chose not to read the terms of use document made readily 
accessible to him does not detract from the reasonableness of 
the notice provided.  See Archer, 490 Mass. at 361-363. 
 
b.  Reasonable manifestation of assent.  We turn next to 
the question whether Good reasonably manifested assent to the 
terms.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 572.  In evaluating whether 
assent was obtained, "we consider the specific actions required 
to manifest assent."  Id. at 573-574.  "The connection between 
the action [that manifests assent] and the terms [should be] 
direct [and] unambiguous."  Id. at 580.  See, e.g., Archer, 490 
 
absolving track owner from personal injury liability when 
plaintiff was struck by racing car wheel); Grace, 100 Mass. at 
505 (applying duty to read to adhesion contract).  The dissent 
relies on Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 289 Mass. 587, 
593 (1935), in support of its contention that the contract of 
adhesion at issue here was not formed.  See post at    .  In 
Brennan, the court concluded only that the amusement park 
"ticket [for a ride that contained the terms] had the appearance 
of a mere check or token rather than of a contract," and thus 
the plaintiff had no notice of the terms; the substance of those 
terms had no bearing on the court's conclusion.  Brennan, supra 
at 594.  Contrast Fonseca v. Cunard S.S. Co., 153 Mass. 553, 557 
(1891) (contract ticket governing passage by ship disclaimed 
liability even where passenger did not read terms).  Here, the 
interface expressly stated multiple times that the use of the 
Uber app was conditioned on acceptance of the terms of use, 
contained a graphic of signing a legal instrument, 
"encourage[d]" the user to read the terms, required the user to 
agree to the terms by checking a box, and further required the 
user to confirm agreement by clicking a button. 
 
45 
 
Mass. at 362-363 (use of "and/or" in signature line stating 
plaintiffs "read, understand, and/or agree to be bound by the 
terms" not so "indirect or ambiguous that the agreement cannot 
be enforced"). 
Where a user is "required to expressly and affirmatively 
manifest assent to an online agreement by clicking or checking a 
box that states that the user agrees to the terms and 
conditions," such "'clickwrap' agreements . . . are regularly 
enforced."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 574.  See Gaker v. Citizens 
Disability, LLC, 654 F. Supp. 3d 66, 76 (D. Mass. 2023) 
("'clickwrap' agreement[s] . . . carry a degree of presumption 
of validity").  Clicking a box to indicate assent provides "an 
action comparable to the solemnity of physically signing a 
written contract," by "help[ing] alert users to the significance 
of their actions."  Kauders, supra at 574-575.  Thus, "[w]here 
[users] so act, they have reasonably manifested their assent."  
Id. at 575. 
Here, the interface required Good to affirmatively manifest 
his assent twice.  He was required to check a box immediately 
adjacent to text stating, "By checking the box, I have reviewed 
and agree to the Terms of Use . . . ."  Thereafter, he was 
required to activate a button stating "Confirm."  This 
connection between checking the box and indicating assent to the 
46 
 
terms was express and unambiguous, particularly as Good could 
not proceed past the screen without so indicating his assent.38 
Good contends that by presenting the blocking screen at the 
moment he intended to use Uber's services to secure a ride, Uber 
failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to review 
the terms.  We disagree.  Arguably, the moment a user wants to 
use the services may be the time when the user is most likely to 
focus on the terms and to determine whether to abide by them or 
to take one's business elsewhere.  In any event, the interface 
did not contain a limited time frame governing Good's 
consideration of the terms; presumably, he could have taken as 
long as he desired to review the terms.  During that time, he 
could have considered other available means of transportation, 
including obtaining transportation from another ride share app, 
a taxicab, or public transportation.39  In these circumstances, 
 
38 To be sure, the words, "I am at least 18 years of age," 
appeared in gray, smaller font just above the "Confirm" bar; 
this, however, did not disrupt the clear connection between 
checking the box and manifesting assent to the terms of use. 
 
39 Moreover, five days passed between the time of Good's 
assent and when he again used Uber's services to secure the ride 
that led to his injury.  This window provided additional time 
for Good to reconsider whether the contents of the terms of use 
would change his decision to continue using Uber's application, 
including on the date of the accident. 
47 
 
we conclude that Good reasonably manifested his assent to Uber's 
terms of use.40 
c.  Contractual defenses.  We do not decide, as the dissent 
suggests, that Uber bears no "responsibility or liability" for 
the injuries Good suffered.  Post at note 8.  Rather, we decide 
only that the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate such 
disputes.  The dissent disagrees, contending that Uber's 
interface failed to provide reasonable notice because provisions 
purporting to disclaim Uber's liability, among other terms, 
would not fall within "a user's reasonable expectations."  Id. 
at    .  This contention appears to be rooted in well-founded 
concerns regarding the fairness of certain terms of Uber's 
comprehensive standard form contract,41 specifically, whether the 
 
40 The circumstances of Good's assent differ from those in 
the cases on which Good relies.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Redbox 
Automated Retail, LLC, 448 F. Supp. 3d 873, 883-888 (N.D. Ill. 
2020) (no reasonable assent without reasonable notice); Najarro 
v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 5th 871, 890-891 (2021), as 
modified (Oct. 22, 2021) (offeror physically blocked offeree 
from reviewing terms and verbally pressured her to sign 
immediately). 
 
41 Contracts of adhesion are construed strictly against the 
drafter, and an adjudicator, whether a court or an arbitrator, 
may decline to enforce terms inconsistent with public policy or 
the parties' expectations, applying a lower threshold for 
finding unconscionability than for other contracts.  See James 
B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy, 478 Mass. 664, 672 (2018), 
quoting Lechmere Tire & Sales Co. v. Burwick, 360 Mass. 718, 
720-721 (1972) ("an 'adhesion' contract [is] to be construed 
strictly against [the party] in whose behalf it ha[s] been 
drafted"); Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 156, 161 
 
48 
 
provision that purports to limit Uber's liability for personal 
injuries resulting from the use of Uber's services to book a 
ride presented a Hobson's choice42 that is unconscionable, 
unenforceable, or voidable.  We agree that these are valid 
concerns that must be addressed in due time.43  But they are not 
 
(2013) (construing scope of adhesive insurance policy in light 
of "what an objectively reasonable insured . . . would expect to 
be covered" [quotations and citation omitted]); Minassian v. 
Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 400 Mass. 490, 492 (1987) (consumer 
adhesion contract may have lower bar for unconscionability). 
 
42 This term is derived from the practices of the prominent 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century English stable owner, Thomas 
Hobson, who allowed customers to rent any horse, so long as it 
was the horse "which happened to be nearest the stable door."  
Oxford English Dictionary Online, "Hobson's choice." 
 
43 Unconscionability, for example, is an affirmative defense 
to the enforcement of a contract; perforce, analysis of whether 
a contract term is unenforceable because it is unconscionable 
requires an initial determination whether a contract exists at 
all.  See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 
n.2 (2010) (Rent-A-Center) ("The issue of the agreement's 
'validity' is different from the issue whether any agreement 
between the parties 'was ever concluded' . . ." [citation 
omitted]); Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. 775, 
782, 788 n.18 (2013) (unconscionability is "affirmative," 
"contractual defense"); Waters v. Min Ltd., 412 Mass. 64, 68, 69 
n.4 (1992) (affirming "rescission" of unconscionable contract, 
noting, "[i]f the sum total of the provisions of a contract 
drive too hard a bargain, a court of conscience will not assist 
its enforcement"); Bose Corp. v. Ejaz, 732 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 
2013) (applying Massachusetts law and noting 
"[u]nconscionability is an affirmative defense, placing the 
burden of proof on" party challenging contract).  See also G. L. 
c. 106, § 2-302 (under Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code, if 
contract or term is unconscionable "court may refuse to enforce 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause"); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 208 (1981) ("If a contract or term thereof is 
 
49 
 
before us today.  Instead, as set forth supra, this case 
concerns the much more limited question of who will decide these 
and other important matters:  a court of competent jurisdiction 
or an arbitrator. 
Importantly, an agreement to arbitrate is "severable from 
the remainder of the contract" and "unless the challenge is to 
the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's 
validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance."  
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-446 
(2006).  See Boursiquot v. United Healthcare Servs. of Del., 
Inc., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 630 (2020), quoting Rent-A-Center, 
561 U.S. at 71 ("the unconscionability challenge must 'be 
directed specifically to the agreement to arbitrate [in 
question] before the court will intervene'").44 
Nothing in the conclusion that a contract was formed 
precludes Good from presenting a defense challenging any of its 
 
unconscionable . . . a court may refuse to enforce the contract, 
or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term . . ."); id. at § 8 ("An unenforceable 
contract is one for the breach of which neither the remedy of 
damages nor the remedy of specific performance is available, but 
which is recognized in some other way as creating a duty of 
performance . . ."); 1 R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 1:21 
(4th ed. 2022) ("Contracts may be unenforceable due to 
unconscionability"). 
 
44 Neither Good nor the dissent contends that the 
arbitration clause or delegation provision itself is 
unconscionable. 
 
50 
 
provisions.45  See Second Tentative Draft Restatement of the Law 
of Consumer Contracts § 5 (Apr. 2022) (discussing available 
defense of unconscionability for terms of contracts that 
"unreasonably exclude or limit the business's liability or the 
consumer's remedies . . . for . . . death or personal injury," 
as analytically separate from issue whether contract was formed 
because reasonable notice and reasonable manifestation of assent 
were given); id. at § 2.46 
We do not suggest that the terms of Uber's standard form 
contract are valid or enforceable; we leave those grave 
decisions, as we must, in the hands of the arbitrator, 
 
45 The parties agreed to delegate questions of 
unconscionability to the arbitrator; our sole task is to 
determine whether the parties entered into an agreement to 
arbitrate.  The arbitrator will determine whether any particular 
terms of the agreement are unconscionable or otherwise 
unenforceable.  See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, 
Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 69 (2019); Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 70 
("party's [unconscionability] challenge to another provision of 
the contract, or to the contract as a whole, does not prevent a 
court from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate"); 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-446 
(2006); Machado, 471 Mass. at 218-220. 
 
46 See Second Tentative Draft Restatement of the Law 
Consumer Contracts § 5 comments 1, 4 illustration 3 (Apr. 2022) 
("Because consumers rarely read or review the non-core standard 
contract terms, and because such faintly reviewed terms may 
nevertheless be adopted by the principles [of contract 
formation], the doctrine of unconscionability is a primary tool 
against the inclusion of intolerable terms in the consumer 
contract. . . .  The adoption of terms [pursuant to contract 
formation principles] does not prevent a finding of procedural 
or substantive unconscionability . . ."). 
 
51 
 
consistent with the express directives of the FAA and MAA.  See 
Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 70-71.  Our decision concludes only 
that the contract formation requirements were met. 
4.  Conclusion.  We reverse the order of the Superior Court 
judge denying Uber's motion to compel arbitration, and we remand 
for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration.47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
 
47 Yohou filed a motion to strike certain allegations that 
he contends are unsupported by reference to record material.  
Because none of the challenged materials has any bearing on the 
legal question before us or factors into our judgment, we deny 
the motion as moot. 
KAFKER, J. (dissenting).  A reckless Uber driver crashes 
his car, permanently paralyzing his passenger.  Do Uber 
Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), have 
any responsibility or liability for this terrible injury?  A 
reasonable user of Uber would think, "I am paying a large 
technology company money for a ride that it has set up to take 
me from one place to another and I would expect them to have 
some responsibility for the safety of that ride, right?"  Not 
according to the court.  Rather, by checking a box required to 
continue to use the Uber digital mobile platform application 
(app) and secure a ride, the passenger has contracted away all 
his or her rights against Uber without ever being aware of doing 
so.  Because I disagree that the passenger in these 
circumstances has reasonable notice of any such contract, I 
dissent.   
This case is not in any way ordinary, as the court 
contends.  The terms and conditions that Uber seeks to impose 
through the click of a box differ greatly from what a user would 
ordinarily expect in such a simple transaction.  William Good, 
like an ordinary Uber user, likely understood that he was 
continuing his relationship with Uber in which he sought and 
paid for Uber rides pursuant to the terms of use for the 
services.  Indeed, his explicit goal was to receive a ride from 
his Somerville apartment to a destination in Boston in exchange 
2 
 
for a promise to pay Uber for the ride.  What he did not 
understand was that the terms to which he had purportedly agreed 
were wide ranging and provided that Uber was not responsible in 
any way for the ride services procured using the app, even if 
the services led to the death of or serious injury to the user 
due to the recklessness or negligence of the driver or Uber, as 
is alleged to have occurred here.  The terms further provided 
that Uber drivers were not the agents or employees of Uber, and 
thus not Uber's responsibility, and that all disputes arising 
out of the ride services were subject to arbitration. 
None of this was in any way readily apparent to Good when 
he was presented with a blocking pop-up screen that prevented 
him from securing a ride until he checked a box saying he had 
reviewed Uber's terms.  This is because nothing on the blocking 
pop-up screen alerted the user as to the scope and substance of 
the terms.  The terms themselves were accessed only through a 
hyperlink that the court recognizes Good likely did not open, as 
it concludes that he did not have actual notice.  The court 
further recognizes, as we did in Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
486 Mass. 557, 577 (2021), the reality that simply presenting a 
user with hyperlinked terms will not provide users with notice 
of the contents of those terms because almost no one will click 
on the hyperlink or review the terms.  Nonetheless, the court 
3 
 
concludes that the presence of such a hyperlink provides 
reasonable notice here.  Again, I disagree.  
This case, I understand, presents a difficult and 
unresolved legal issue:  how to provide reasonable notice of 
unexpected contract conditions in the Internet age when most if 
not all users choose not to open hyperlinks.  I conclude, unlike 
the court, that we must confront this reality.  I am also 
confident that Uber, a sophisticated technology company, is 
undoubtedly aware of its users' practices, and is easily able to 
provide other forms of notice with a simple software update.  
Consequently, because the empirical research discussed infra 
shows that a hyperlink, without more, is not effective at 
communicating to a user the scope of a contract's terms and 
conditions, I would instead require that the notice interface 
itself, that is, the screen the user actually sees, should at 
least alert a user as to the scope and significance of the 
contract that the user is being asked to sign.  At a minimum, in 
these circumstances, the blocking pop-up screen should alert 
users that they are entering into a legally binding contract, 
and that pursuant to the contract Uber is not responsible in any 
way for ride services procured using the Uber app, including for 
injury or death resulting therefrom.  I so conclude recognizing 
that we have not previously directly addressed how to resolve 
the problem that most of those contracting over the Internet do 
4 
 
not review the terms of those agreements.  The common law, 
including the common law of contracts, must, however, adapt to 
changing circumstances. 
In 1882, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked that "[t]he 
doctrine of contract has been . . . thoroughly remodelled to 
meet the needs of modern times."  O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common 
Law 247 (1882).  Just as the jurists of the late Nineteenth 
Century remodeled the common law to fit the needs of their 
times, so too are we called to ensure that our law of contract 
is suited to the world of the Twenty-first Century, where 
consumers are surrounded by a plethora of contracts they do not 
read and may not understand, and simply providing a hyperlink to 
terms of use will not meaningfully inform consumers of the 
rights and obligations they take on by using Internet services.  
When such contracts differ starkly from the reasonable 
expectations of those entering into the Internet transactions, 
as they do here, with tragic consequences, more is required than 
a hyperlink. 
In sum, I would hold, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, that the blocking pop-up screen did not provide 
reasonable notice to users of such a contractual arrangement.  
Although the users may have understood that they were entering 
into some sort of legal relationship with Uber in which they 
paid Uber in return for ride services, they would not, based on 
5 
 
the notice they were provided, reasonably understand that Uber 
would receive payment but would have no responsibility for the 
rides services, even if such services led to death or injury due 
to negligent or reckless conduct by the drivers or Uber.  Users 
would also not reasonably understand that their only recourse 
was against drivers with whom they had not contracted, and whom 
the contract defined as a third party for whom Uber had no 
responsibility. 
The factors that contribute to this conclusion are, as 
discussed further infra, the parties to the agreement (that is, 
Uber and the user, not the user and the driver); the relatively 
innocuous language of the notice (presented as an update of 
Uber's terms of use); the nature of the agreement (short-term, 
small-money transactions for individual rides); the blocking 
pop-up interface's failure to identify the terms of use as a 
contract or otherwise as a legally binding agreement containing 
wide-ranging terms, including those disclaiming Uber's liability 
for personal injury or death arising out of negligence or 
recklessness and leaving such liability with a third party; the 
distinctive aspects of contracting over the Internet, in which 
users do not read agreements unless they are prompted to 
understand their significance; and finally, the time pressure 
imposed on users by blocking access to Uber's ride-hailing app 
until users assented to the updated terms.  Considering all 
6 
 
these factors in conjunction with one another, I cannot 
conclude, as the court does, that the innocuous notice of 
updated terms provided here, even with a hyperlink to those 
terms, is sufficient to satisfy the reasonable notice standard 
established in Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573. 
1.  Background.  a.  Kauders decision.  Three months prior 
to Good's receipt of the pop-up notice at issue in the instant 
case, we examined Uber's contracting process for signing up 
users, as well as its terms of use, and concluded that Uber 
failed to give users reasonable notice of the extensive terms of 
their contract with Uber.  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 559.  It is 
undisputed that as a consequence of Kauders, no enforceable 
contract existed between Good and Uber before the evening of 
April 25, 2021. 
b.  The blocking pop-up screen.  On April 25, 2021, Good 
opened the Uber app and was confronted with a blocking pop-up 
screen that prevented him from accessing or using the Uber app.1  
The pop-up screen stated, "We've updated our terms," at the top 
of the screen, and further provided, "We encourage you to read 
our updated Terms in full."2  Between these two sentences was a 
 
1 The blocking pop-up screen is reproduced, ante at    . 
 
2 This language differs significantly from the notice 
provided by Uber to its drivers.  For example, around 2016, 
drivers seeking to provide services through the Uber app were 
 
7 
 
graphic3 of a blue cartoon clipboard with a letter "x" on the 
bottom left corner of the clipboard, and a blue pencil with the 
tip pointed near the x.  The screen provided blue hyperlinks to 
Uber's terms of use and to Uber's privacy notice.  Users were 
required to click a checkbox next to text that stated, "By 
checking the box, I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use 
and acknowledge the Privacy Notice.  I am at least 18 years of 
age."  Finally, users were required to click a button4 at the 
bottom of the screen labeled "Confirm." 
Although the blocking pop-up screen references updated 
"Terms" or "Terms of Use" several times, it does not use the 
words "contract" or "agreement" to describe Uber's terms of use, 
or otherwise alert the user that significant legal rights are at 
stake.  None of this becomes clear unless the user clicks on the 
 
informed in all capital letters, "TO GO ONLINE, YOU MUST REVIEW 
ALL THE DOCUMENTS BELOW AND AGREE TO THE CONTRACTS BELOW."  
Capriole vs. Uber Techs., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-cv-
11941-IT (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2020). 
 
3 Although the court characterizes the graphic as "large" in 
relation to the other elements on the blocking pop-up screen, 
see ante at    , the screen was presented to users on a "smart 
phone" screen.  The blocking pop-up screen presented here 
included many concepts, including the terms of use, the privacy 
policy, and a confirmation that the user is at least eighteen 
years old. 
 
4 The blocking pop-up screen is a "clickwrap" interface, an 
interface that requires a user "to expressly and affirmatively 
manifest assent to an online agreement by clicking or checking a 
box that states that the user agrees to the terms and 
conditions."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 574.   
8 
 
terms of use hyperlink.  By contrast, the first paragraph of the 
terms of use, accessed via the hyperlink, warns users in capital 
letters, "PLEASE READ THESE TERMS CAREFULLY, AS THEY CONSTITUTE 
A LEGAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND UBER."  As I discuss in detail 
infra, few users click on hyperlinks, especially when they are 
not on notice as to the hyperlinks' significance.  Although it 
appears that Uber could have tracked whether users, including 
Good, clicked on the hyperlink, it did not do so. 
c.  Uber's terms of use.  Uber's 2021 terms of use, 
accessible via the hyperlink, are substantially similar to the 
terms and conditions discussed in Kauders, 486 Mass. at 561-563.  
Although the purpose of Uber's app is to provide transportation 
services for its users, the terms attempt to distance Uber from 
the services procured using the Uber app, informing consumers, 
"YOUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS AND/OR DELIVERY 
SERVICES FROM THIRD PARTY PROVIDERS THROUGH THE USE OF THE UBER 
MARKETPLACE PLATFORM AND SERVICES DOES NOT ESTABLISH UBER AS A 
PROVIDER OF TRANSPORTATION . . . OR AS A TRANSPORTATION OR 
PROPERTY CARRIER."  Uber also represents that its services "ARE 
PROVIDED 'AS IS' AND 'AS AVAILABLE.' . . .  UBER MAKES NO 
REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY, OR GUARANTEE REGARDING THE 
RELIABILITY, TIMELINESS, QUALITY, SUITABILITY, OR AVAILABILITY 
OF THE SERVICES OR ANY SERVICES OR GOODS REQUESTED THROUGH THE 
USE OF THE SERVICES, OR THAT THE SERVICES WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED 
9 
 
OR ERROR-FREE."  The terms explicitly disclaim an agency 
relationship between Uber and its drivers.  Rather, the updated 
terms state that "[THE USER] ACKNOWLEDGE[S] THAT INDEPENDENT 
THIRD PARTY PROVIDERS, INCLUDING DRIVERS ARE NOT ACTUAL AGENTS, 
APPARENT AGENTS, OSTENSIBLE AGENTS, OR EMPLOYEES OF UBER IN ANY 
WAY." 
Uber's terms of use also sharply limit its liability to its 
users: 
"UBER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING LOST PROFITS, LOST DATA, PERSONAL INJURY, OR 
PROPERTY DAMAGE RELATED TO, IN CONNECTION WITH, OR 
OTHERWISE RESULTING FROM ANY USE OF [UBER'S] SERVICES, 
REGARDLESS OF THE NEGLIGENCE (EITHER ACTIVE, AFFIRMATIVE, 
SOLE, OR CONCURRENT) OF UBER, EVEN IF UBER HAS BEEN ADVISED 
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES" (emphasis added). 
 
Users agreeing to the Uber terms of use further "agree to 
indemnify and hold Uber and its affiliates and their officers, 
directors, employees, and agents harmless from and against any 
and all actions, claims, demands, losses, liabilities, costs, 
damages, and expenses (including attorneys' fees), arising out 
of or in connection with" the use of Uber's services.  The terms 
of use also explain that Uber is free to amend the terms at any 
time and may choose to inform a user of changes to the agreement 
by updating the date at the top of the terms, meaning the burden 
is on the user to frequently check if any changes have been 
made.  Users have no opportunity to object to changes with which 
10 
 
they disagree; they must discontinue their use of Uber entirely 
to signal that they do not agree to changes imposed by Uber. 
Finally, the terms of use agreement includes an arbitration 
agreement that requires that almost all disputes5 between users 
and Uber or its drivers be resolved through arbitration.  The 
arbitration agreement precludes users "from bringing or 
participating in any kind of any class, collective, coordinated, 
consolidated, representative or other kind of group, multi-
plaintiff or joint action against Uber." 
2.  Discussion.  Although this case comes before us as an 
appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the 
preliminary inquiry is whether a contract has been formed.  
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 571.  "When deciding whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally 
. . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
formation of contracts."  First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. 
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) ("The [Federal Arbitration 
Act] reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a 
matter of contract"); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 
110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Whether or not the parties have agreed 
 
5 Individual claims of sexual harassment or sexual assault 
are exempted from the arbitration agreement, though seemingly 
not from the limitations on Uber's liability discussed supra. 
 
11 
 
to arbitrate is a question of state contract law").  The 
arbitration provision is also just one of many significant 
provisions in the terms of use.  We must therefore consider 
whether a binding contract exists between Uber and Good.  See 
Kauders, supra at 572.  As this transaction occurred on the 
Internet, we turn to our cases defining the requirements of 
online contracts, particularly Kauders, supra at 573, in which, 
as explained above, we interpreted the requirements for online 
ride service contracts.  Indeed, there we considered essentially 
the same contract at issue in the present case.  Id. at 561-562. 
For an online contract to be enforceable, "there must be 
both reasonable notice of the terms and a reasonable 
manifestation of assent to those terms."  Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
572, citing Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 574-
575 (2013), S.C., 478 Mass. 169 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. 
Oath Holdings, Inc. v. Ajemian, 584 U.S. 910 (2018).  "[T]he 
burden of proof on both prongs is on Uber, the party seeking to 
enforce the contract."  Kauders, supra, citing Canney v. New 
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 353 Mass. 158, 164 (1967). 
Whether a consumer has been provided reasonable notice of 
the terms and conditions of an online contract is "a fact-
intensive inquiry," Kauders, 486 Mass. 573, quoting Meyer v. 
Uber Techs, Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2017), requiring 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.  Among the 
12 
 
factors courts should consider in determining reasonable notice 
are "the nature, including the size, of the transaction, whether 
the notice conveys the full scope of the terms and conditions, 
and the interface by which the terms are being communicated."  
Kauders, supra, citing Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 
1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2016).  We have also explained that "[f]or 
Internet transactions, the specifics and subtleties of the 
'design and content of the relevant interface' are especially 
relevant in evaluating whether reasonable notice has been 
provided."  Kauders, supra, quoting Meyer, supra at 75. 
 
a.  Nature of the transaction and full scope of terms.  In 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 575, we observed:  "Reasonable users may 
not understand that, by simply signing up for future ride 
services over the Internet, they have entered into a contractual 
relationship."  See, e.g., Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035 (signing up 
for credit-score information over Internet not obviously 
contractual).  Even if users understand they may be entering 
into some sort of contractual relationship, "[i]t is . . . by no 
means obvious that signing up via an app for ride services would 
be accompanied by the type of extensive terms and conditions 
present here."  Kauders, supra. 
 
Additionally, as we explained in Kauders, 486 Mass. at 577, 
"Uber is undoubtedly aware . . . [that] most of those 
registering via mobile applications do not read the terms of use 
13 
 
or terms of service included with the applications."  See, e.g., 
Ayres & Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract 
Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 547-548 (2014) (describing empirical 
evidence showing less than one percent of consumers access 
online contracts); Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, & Trossen, Does 
Anyone Read the Fine Print?  Consumer Attention to Standard-Form 
Contracts, 43 J. Legal Stud. 1, 3 (2014) ("Our main finding is 
that regardless of how strictly we define a shopper, only one or 
two in 1,000 shoppers access a product's [End User License 
Agreement] for at least [one] second . . .").  See also Conroy & 
Shope, Look Before You Click:  The Enforceability of Website and 
Smartphone App Terms and Conditions, 63 Boston Bar J. 23, 23 
(Spring 2019) ("Most users will not have read the terms and, in 
some instances, may not have even seen the terms or any 
reference to them"); Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure 
Help?  Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's "Principles 
of the Law of Software Contracts," 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 179-
181 (2011) (clickwrap contracts increased proportion of 
consumers who access contract terms by only 0.36 percent 
compared to "browsewrap" agreements, where users are only 
provided notice of contract terms by link somewhere on website 
14 
 
and are not required to click box to indicate assent).6  This may 
not be a major concern when the terms of an online agreement are 
straightforward and obvious -- for example, a payment for an 
article of clothing at a set amount -- this is far more 
problematic when the significance and complexity of the legal 
arrangements are not readily apparent from the transaction 
itself.  My dissent addresses the latter problem. 
 
Further complicating the nature of the transaction and the 
notice requirements here is the counterintuitive triangular 
nature of the relationship where the user contracts only with 
Uber, but the only person responsible and liable for the 
services under the terms of use is Uber's driver.  The terms 
require users to acknowledge that Uber's drivers are third-party 
providers and not Uber's agents or employees, regardless of 
whether this is a correct statement of the law, and regardless 
 
6 The court recognizes this well-documented phenomenon and 
concludes it is unlikely that Good actually clicked on the 
hyperlink to Uber's terms of use.  See ante at    .  
Nonetheless, the court holds that the notice provided here was 
sufficient to constitute reasonable notice, because the blocking 
pop-up screen provided a hyperlink to the terms of use, and thus 
Good could conceivably have chosen to review the terms if he had 
wanted to, even if this choice would have situated him within a 
tiny minority of consumers.  See id. at    .  It is not at all 
clear why the court considers a notice that has little or no 
effect on most users to be reasonable. 
 
15 
 
of a user's understanding of the legal consequences of such an 
acknowledgement.7 
The legal relationships created by the terms differ 
strikingly from a user's reasonable expectations.  Using the 
Uber app, users enter into small-dollar ride service 
transactions with Uber and provide payment to Uber in exchange 
for these Uber rides.  They have been asked to read and agree to 
Uber's terms of use.  Users do not contract in any way with 
individual drivers, and the blocking pop-up screen interface 
makes no mention of drivers.  Nonetheless, the terms of use that 
Uber would have users sign shift responsibility for the services 
solely to the drivers.  The terms go so far as to state that 
Uber is not a transportation company and does not provide 
transportation services, something that would obviously surprise 
 
7 It is by no means obvious to users based on the nature of 
the transaction and the notice provided through the blocking 
pop-up screen that Uber is not the employer of its drivers or 
otherwise responsible for the actions of its drivers.  See El 
Koussa v. Attorney Gen., 489 Mass. 823, 835 (2022) ("the 
classification of app-based drivers as employees or agents, or 
as independent contractors, has been a contested issue in 
Massachusetts tort suits against the network companies Uber and 
Lyft").  The court notes that many companies provide services 
through third-party independent contractors and therefore such a 
triangular relationship is not entirely unusual.  See ante at 
note 19.  What is unusual in my view, or at least should require 
clear notice, is that the company (Uber) with which the user is 
contracting has no responsibility or liability under the 
contract, but all such responsibility or liability is cast off 
onto a third party (the driver). 
 
16 
 
the ordinary user,8 who has ordered an "Uber."  There is nothing 
on the face of the notice indicating that Uber is not the party 
providing the transportation services and is not responsible in 
any way for those services.  Users would reasonably expect Uber 
to be responsible for those services and the drivers providing 
them.  The terms provide for the opposite of these expectations. 
The terms of use thus establish a counterintuitive three-
party relationship in which Uber receives payment for requested 
transportation services but has no liability for serious injury 
or death arising out of such transportation services.  Rather, a 
user's only recourse is against a third party, the driver, with 
whom the user never contracted.9  With these concerns in mind, I 
 
8 See, e.g., El Koussa, 489 Mass. at 825, 835 (discussing 
proposed ballot initiative question that defined companies like 
Uber and Lyft as "transportation network companies"). 
 
9 I note, as does the court, ante at note 9, that the 
contract contains provisions that have been found unenforceable 
in other jurisdictions, and that the drafters should know or 
suspect are unenforceable, including provisions that allow Uber 
to unilaterally modify the contract with essentially no notice 
to users.  Douglas v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. 
Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), 
cert. denied sub nom. Talk Am., Inc. v. Douglas, 552 U.S. 1242 
(2008) (holding that party could not unilaterally change terms 
of contract without giving user proper notice of proposed 
changes).  I likewise share the court's concerns regarding the 
worrying trend of Internet contracts including provisions that 
drafters know or suspect are unenforceable, to the detriment of 
consumers.  See ante at note 9.  See also Cheng, Guttel, & 
Procaccia, Unenforceable Waivers, 76 Vand. L. Rev. 571, 574 
(2023) (discussing "dozens of cases, from dozens of states, in 
which the defendants or their successors continued to require 
 
17 
 
turn to the notice and the interface at issue, and whether it 
provided reasonable notice of this counterintuitive contractual 
arrangement to a user. 
 
b.  Interface and notice.  I begin by recognizing that the 
notice interface here differed from the notice we considered in 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 577-578, in a variety of respects.  In 
Kauders, the notice was provided as part of the original sign-up 
and payment process.  The notice was not presented in a blocking 
pop-up screen as a user requested and expected a ride.  The 
terms in Kauders were therefore newly presented to a user and 
not framed as an update.  Id. at 578.  And whereas in Kauders 
users were "simply never directed to the notice and the link" to 
Uber's terms of use without going through a multistep process, 
the blocking pop-up screen at issue here did direct a user's 
attention to the terms of use hyperlink.  See id. at 579.  All 
these distinctions are relevant to the reasonable notice 
inquiry, including whether the user would have reason and enough 
time to open and review the terms of use. 
 
the same or equivalent liability waivers even after having them 
declared unenforceable by courts").  The existence of such wide-
ranging and potentially unenforceable provisions in the terms of 
use underscores the importance of the user interface the user 
actually sees, here the blocking pop-up screen, providing notice 
to users of the substance or at least the significance of the 
contract to which they are being asked to agree.  See Kauders, 
486 Mass. at 573. 
18 
 
More specifically, the blocking pop-up screen presented to 
Good in April of 2021 as he requested a ride informed him that 
Uber had "updated [its] terms."  It "encourage[d]" him "to read 
[the] updated Terms in full[,]" and provided a hyperlink to the 
terms of use and Uber's privacy notice.  If the hyperlink was 
clicked, the user would very quickly be put on notice that 
significant legal rights were at stake, as the first paragraph 
identified the terms as "A LEGAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN [THE USER] 
AND UBER" and directed users to "PLEASE READ THESE TERMS 
CAREFULLY."  None of this urgency, however, was present or 
readily ascertainable on the basis of the blocking pop-up screen 
presented to users.  My focus is on the deficiencies in the 
notice provided in the blocking pop-up screen, which I consider 
significant for the reasons discussed infra, all of which 
suggest that a user would not click on the hyperlink or review 
the terms in these circumstances. 
The blocking pop-up screen, which all users would see when 
accessing the Uber app, did not use the term "contract" or 
"agreement," which would better alert users as to the 
significance of the transaction that they were to enter into 
with Uber.  It makes no mention of limitation of liability, or 
otherwise indicate that Uber has no responsibility for the 
drivers it is providing the user for the ride services.  Cf. 
Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 289 Mass. 587, 593-594 
19 
 
(1935) (where defendant sought to bind plaintiff through 
contract "printed on the ticket which the plaintiff bought," 
plaintiff would only "be bound thereby, if [the conditions and 
limitations in the contract] were brought to his attention in 
such a manner that a person of ordinary intelligence in his 
position would have known of and understood"); Fonseca v. Cunard 
S.S. Co., 153 Mass. 553, 556 (1891) ("The precise question . . . 
is whether the 'contract ticket' was of such a kind that the 
passenger taking it should have understood that it was a 
contract containing stipulations which would determine the 
rights of the parties . . ."); Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (noting 
that contracts printed on cruise ship tickets "present problems 
similar to those of agreements formed on the Internet").10 
Furthermore, even the notice's reference to updated terms 
is somewhat inaccurate and misleading.  At the time Good 
received the blocking pop-up screen, there were no legally 
binding terms and conditions in existence between Uber and Good.  
See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 579.  The use of the term "updated" 
suggested some substantial similarity in the relationship 
between Uber and its users before the "update" and after, which 
downplayed the significance of the user's assent to the 
 
10 By contrast, the notice provided in Archer, 490 Mass. at 
362, expressly referred to an arbitration agreement, leaving no 
doubt as to the subject matter and significance of the contract 
delivery drivers were being asked to sign. 
20 
 
"updated" terms.  In reality, no enforceable contract whatsoever 
existed between Massachusetts users and Uber prior to the 
update, whereas after the update, users purportedly agreed to an 
extensive set of contractual terms that severely abridged their 
rights against Uber.  See id. at 559.  Although the pop-up 
screen "encourage[d]" users to review the terms, framing the 
terms as only an "update" obscured the importance and far-
reaching consequences of the terms of use and thereby 
discouraged users from reviewing the terms.11  Moreover, the 
updates were delivered using an interface apparently used by 
Uber on other occasions to present users with advertisements and 
promotional offers, further diminishing the terms' significance 
to a user. 
Importantly, users were presented with the "updated" terms 
at a time when they were seeking immediate use of Uber's 
services and were prevented from accessing the Uber app until 
 
11 This conclusion does not rely, as the court suggests, on 
the faulty presumption that the reasonably prudent user was 
aware of our decision in Kauders.  See ante at note 20.  Indeed, 
I agree that users, unlike Uber, were unlikely to be aware of 
our decision in Kauders.  They therefore did not know, as Uber 
did, that the original contract with Uber they had signed had no 
legal effect whatsoever, as it was never successfully formed.  
See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 580-581.  Thus, these terms were not 
updated but rather an attempt to create a legally binding 
agreement where no such agreement previously existed.  This, of 
course, Uber obscured by suggesting that the new contract 
presented was an "update." 
 
21 
 
they signaled their assent.  The timing of the pop-up screen, 
coupled with the "update" framing discussed supra, thus prompted 
users just to accept the terms and conditions rather than review 
them because the terms were presented as a relatively innocuous 
update to a long-running relationship in a circumstance where 
many users would not have the time to fully review a lengthy 
contract.12  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 577.  See also Archer, 490 
Mass. 361 (reasonable notice requires that party had adequate 
opportunity to view terms of agreement).  Contrast Singh v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 656, 661 (D.N.J. 2017), vacated on 
other grounds by 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (driver accepted 
agreement with Uber three months after it was presented to him 
for review). 
I therefore cannot conclude that users, having already 
decided to use the Uber app to order a ride and potentially 
facing time pressure to get to a destination, would, when 
confronted with a blocking pop-up screen that simply informed 
them of "update[s]" to Uber's terms of use, choose to postpose 
 
12 I agree with the court's observation that Good was 
presented with the blocking pop-up screen in a context where he 
"may not have expected to be entering a contract at all, let 
alone a contract comprising the comprehensive set of terms 
offered by Uber."  Ante at    .  I find perplexing, however, 
that notwithstanding this context and the recognition that very 
few users would actually access the terms when confronted with 
the blocking pop-up screen, the court concludes a contract has 
been formed. 
 
22 
 
their trip or change their mode of travel in order to review the 
updates to the terms of use before next using the Uber app.13  
Rather, confronted with an innocuous notice such as was 
presented here, a user would simply click through the pop-up 
screen to access Uber's services.  The potential time pressure 
imposed on users through the blocking pop-up interface is thus 
another factor contributing to our conclusion that users were 
not provided reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use.14 
In analyzing the interface, I again emphasize the reality 
that most users will not click a hyperlink to access the terms, 
especially when there is nothing alerting the user to their 
 
13 Notably, case law shows that Uber has used other methods 
to provide users or drivers with less time-sensitive notice for 
contracts.  See, e.g., Singh, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 661 (driver 
took several months to review terms before agreeing); Wu v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 186 N.Y.S.3d 500, 507 (2022), aff'd, 219 A.D.3d 
1208 (N.Y. 2023) (e-mail message sent to user before updated 
terms of use went into effect).   
 
14 The court holds that the blocking pop-up screen did not 
create time pressure on users because they could have eschewed 
the use of Uber's services and used other forms of 
transportation while they reviewed Uber's terms of use and 
contemplated whether to assent to the terms.  See ante at    .  
However, signing up for another car service or calling a taxicab 
is much more difficult than simply accepting the terms, 
especially when the terms are described merely as an update.  
For these same reasons, I disagree with the court's conclusion 
that a user about to request a ride is well positioned to 
"weigh[] the trade-offs and costs" of using Uber's services.  
See ante at note 27.  They are not weighing trade-offs and 
costs; they are trying to figure out how to quickly secure a 
ride. 
 
23 
 
importance.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 577, quoting Ayres & 
Schwartz, supra at 547-548.  See also Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, & 
Trossen, 43 J. Legal Stud. at 3; Conroy & Shope, 63 Boston Bar 
J. at 23; Marotta-Wurgler, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 179-181.  
Where, as here, the terms diverge significantly from the 
reasonable expectations associated with the transaction at 
issue, and involve a waiver of important legal rights, I would 
hold that reasonable notice requires that an interface in some 
way communicate the scope and significance of the contract 
terms.  See Kauders, supra at 573 (reasonable notice depends in 
part on "whether the notice conveys the full scope of the terms 
and conditions").15 
I do recognize, however, that the terms and conditions were 
more readily accessible than they were in the interface 
discussed in Kauders, 486 Mass. at 578-579.  Had the notice 
reasonably alerted the user to the significance and scope of the 
 
15 The pencil and clipboard graphic does not, in my view, 
put users on notice that they are entering into a significant 
legal contract.  Although the graphic may aid a user in 
understanding that they are agreeing to the terms by clicking 
"Confirm," it does not convey the importance of the legal rights 
being bargained away.  Moreover, the choice to use a simplified 
cartoon-style graphic could have led a reasonable user to 
discount the significance of the terms of use.  Cf. Kauders, 486 
Mass. at 574 (lack of "action comparable to the solemnity of 
physically signing a written contract" created concern that user 
would not be aware of implications of agreeing to terms).  It is 
also worth noting that legal documents are not ordinarily signed 
in pencil. 
 
24 
 
terms, users would have been more likely to access the terms, or 
at least would have been adequately warned about the need to do 
so.16  In these circumstances, notice that users were being asked 
to sign a legally binding contract, and that pursuant to the 
contract Uber was not responsible for the ride services procured 
through the app, would have been sufficient. 
c.  Clickwrap agreements:  the difference between notice 
and assent.  Next, I address the effects of requiring the user 
to check a box stating, "I have reviewed and agree to the Terms 
of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice.  I am at least 18 
years of age," and click a button at the bottom of the screen 
labeled "Confirm."  Uber argues that because the blocking pop-up 
 
16 By concluding that an offeror must do no more than put a 
user on notice as to the existence of terms, and make those 
terms accessible pursuant to a hyperlink, the court in my view 
narrows the holding of Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573.  In Kauders, 
we stated that reasonable notice is a fact-intensive inquiry, 
involving numerous considerations, including "whether the notice 
conveys the full scope of the terms and conditions."  Id.  We 
did not state that a readily accessible hyperlink alone was 
sufficient.  Rather, we emphasized that "[i]mportantly, the 
interface did not require the user to scroll through the 
conditions or even select them."  Id. at 576.  Furthermore, we 
expressed our concern that "most of those registering via mobile 
applications do not read the terms of use or terms of service 
included with the applications."  Id. at 577.  For all of these 
reasons we required a totality of the circumstances inquiry to 
determine the reasonableness of notice.  Despite the hyperlinked 
terms, here, like in Kauders, supra at 579, "a user may 
reasonably believe he or she is simply signing up for a service 
without understanding that he or she is entering into a 
significant contractual relationship governed by wide-ranging 
terms of use." 
25 
 
screen presented to Good in 2021 is an example of a clickwrap 
agreement, it is per se enforceable.  This misunderstands and 
impermissibly simplifies the analysis a court must undertake to 
determine the enforceability of an online contract.  See 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573-574.  A court must consider both 
whether the user had reasonable notice of contract terms and 
conditions and whether there was a reasonable manifestation of 
assent by the user.  Id. at 572.  The significance of a 
clickwrap interface differs depending on whether the court is 
considering the reasonableness of the notice or the 
reasonableness of the manifestation of assent.  
In Kauders, we observed that a clickwrap agreement, by 
"[r]equiring an expressly affirmative act, . . . can help alert 
users to the significance of their actions.  Where they so act, 
they have reasonably manifested their assent."  Id. at 575.  A 
clickwrap agreement therefore serves two different purposes.  It 
can first help alert the reader as to the significance of the 
transaction, and thereby contribute to the reasonableness of the 
notice.  Second, requiring users to click that they agree can 
demonstrate the reasonableness of their assent.  The clickwrap 
interface may thus be determinative of a reasonable 
manifestation of assent but is only one factor among many in 
determining whether a user-facing interface, as a whole, 
provides reasonable notice of a contract's terms and conditions.  
26 
 
See id.  This is in part because empirical research suggests 
that clickwrap interfaces only marginally increase the frequency 
with which users actually interact with the terms of online 
contracts.  Marotta-Wurgler, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 179-181.  
Unless users are on reasonable notice of the terms and their 
scope and significance, users may be assenting to something very 
different from what they expected or understood.  
In the instant case, the small-dollar nature of the 
transaction, the innocuous framing of the terms of use as an 
"update" to Uber's terms of use, the reasonable expectations of 
a user as to what this update would contain, and the pressure to 
assent in order to access Uber's rideshare service all 
discounted the importance of reading the terms and discouraged 
the user from reviewing the terms, even where the terms were 
accessible and the user was required to check a box saying he or 
she had reviewed them.  In sum, in the totality of these 
circumstances, there has not been reasonable notice of the 
significance and scope of the contract. 
d.  The different notice provided to drivers.  Finally, as 
we explained in Kauders, the deficiencies in the notice provided 
by Uber to its users are brought into sharper focus when one 
considers the interfaces it has used to inform its drivers about 
the contracts that govern their relationship with Uber.  Around 
2016, users seeking to register as drivers on Uber's platform 
27 
 
were presented with a blocking pop-up screen that informed them 
in capital letters, "TO GO ONLINE, YOU MUST REVIEW ALL THE 
DOCUMENTS BELOW AND AGREE TO THE CONTRACTS BELOW."  Capriole vs. 
Uber Techs., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-cv-11941-IT (D. 
Mass. Mar. 31, 2020).17  The screen provided links to two 
agreements, the "RASIER Technology Services Agreement" and a 
"Service Fee Addendum."  Id.  Finally, a button at the bottom of 
a driver's screen stated, "YES, I AGREE."  Id.  After a driver 
clicked the button, "a new box popped up in the middle of the 
screen, which read 'PLEASE CONFIRM THAT YOU HAVE REVIEWED ALL 
THE DOCUMENTS AND AGREE TO ALL THE NEW CONTRACTS.'"  Id.  See 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 559 ("a review of the case law reveals 
that Uber has no trouble providing such reasonable notice . . . 
[to] its own drivers"); Singh, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 661 (driver 
was required twice to confirm he had reviewed and accepted 
agreement with Uber by clicking "YES, I AGREE" on two different 
screens, and driver had as much time as he found necessary to 
review agreement, accepting agreement three months after it was 
made available to him).   
Here, by contrast, the blocking pop-up screen did not use 
the term "contract" or "agreement," and misled users by 
suggesting that they were agreeing to updated terms rather than 
 
17 A representation of the notice provided to drivers in 
Capriole is reproduced ante at    . 
28 
 
an entirely new contract.  Whereas Uber used mandatory language 
to inform drivers that they "MUST REVIEW" documents, it merely 
"encourage[d]" its riders to review its terms of use.  See 
Capriole, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-cv-11941-IT .  See also 
Kauders, 486 Mass. at 577 ("As Uber is undoubtedly aware, most 
of those registering via mobile applications do not read the 
terms of use or terms of service included with the applications. 
. . .  Yet the design of the interface for the app here enables, 
if not encourages, users to ignore the terms and conditions").  
Drivers were also given ample time to review agreements before 
accepting, but riders were presented with the "updated" terms in 
a situation where they faced time pressure to use Uber's 
rideshare services.  See Singh, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 661.   
For these reasons, I disagree with the court's suggestion 
that the interface in Capriole is "nearly identical" to the 
blocking pop-up screen at issue here.  See ante at    .  The 
court explicitly acknowledges that the reasonable expectations a 
user would have regarding a contract to drive for Uber are very 
different from the reasonable expectations of a user who is 
simply seeking a ride.  Compare id. at     ("Entering a 
relationship for one's livelihood is far more consequential than 
seeking a ride"), with id. at     ("In this context, Good may 
not have expected to be entering a contract at all, let alone a 
contract comprising the comprehensive set of terms offered by 
29 
 
Uber" [emphasis added]).  The inquiry into whether notice 
"conveys the full scope of the terms and conditions," Kauders, 
486 Mass. at 573, should necessarily encompass "the form and 
nature of the transaction" and the effect of those factors on 
the reasonable expectations of the user, see id. at 575 (signing 
up for ride services is "not comparable to the purchase or lease 
of an apartment or a car, where the size of the personal 
transaction provides some notice of the contractual nature of 
the transaction even to unsophisticated contracting parties").   
e.  The evolution of the common law.  As explained supra, I 
recognize that we have previously addressed but not resolved the 
problem that those contracting over the Internet do not open 
hyperlinks and review the terms.  The common law, however, 
including the common law of contract, is not static.  It evolves 
to take into account changing societal conditions, including 
technological change.  It is "founded . . . upon 'justice, 
fitness and expediency,'" and is "designed to meet and be 
susceptible of being adapted 'to new institutions and conditions 
of society'" and "new usages and practices, as the progress of 
society in the advancement of civilization may require.'"  
Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 333 (1931), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Temple, 14 Gray 69, 74 (1859).  "The courts 
must, and do, have the continuing power and competence to answer 
novel questions of law arising under ever changing conditions of 
30 
 
the society which the law is intended to serve."  Alberts v. 
Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 69, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985), 
quoting George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 249 (1971).   
As explained in detail above, contracting over the Internet 
in the Twenty-first Century is different.  Thus, the meaning of 
reasonable notice must adapt to the times, as I attempt to 
explain and do here.  This development of the common law is not 
revolutionary but evolutionary.  See, e.g., Lanier v. President 
& Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 58 (2022) 
(describing "common-law reasoning, which is a precedent-based, 
evolutionary decision-making process providing for both 
continuity and change").  "The common law is . . . incremental 
in adapting to society's changing circumstances, developing 
gradually to reflect our policies, customs, norms, and values."  
Id. at 66 (Budd, C.J., concurring), quoting Rafaeli, LLC v. 
Oakland County, 505 Mich. 429, 472-473 (2020).  We have made 
similar incremental changes to the common law in analogous 
contexts.18  For example, we have moved beyond the old common-law 
 
18 Similarly, our constitutional jurisprudence responds to 
new technologies and empirical research.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 489 Mass. 436, 437 (2022) ("As law 
enforcement capabilities continue to develop in the wake of 
advancing technology, so too must our constitutional 
jurisprudence"); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 669-670 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) 
(taking into account "current scientific research on adolescent 
brain development," and concluding that life sentences without 
 
31 
 
rule of caveat emptor in the sale of new homes, recognizing that 
such sales carry an implied warranty of habitability to 
"protect[] purchasers from structural defects that are nearly 
impossible to ascertain by inspection."  See Albrecht v. 
Clifford, 436 Mass. 706, 710 (2002).  See also Boston Hous. 
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973) (recognizing 
implied warranty of habitability in residential leases).  These 
considerations lead me to my conclusion that technology 
companies, like Uber, that can easily provide clear notice of 
their terms of use on screens that users will actually see, as 
opposed to providing hyperlinks users will not open, should be 
affirmatively required to do so, to ensure that consumers have a 
reasonable notice and understanding of the contracts they are 
asked to sign.  If this moves the common law of contracting 
closer to contemporary realities, that is exactly how it should 
be.  
f.  Arbitration.  I do not share the court's apparent view 
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., 
or the Massachusetts Arbitration Act (MAA), G. L. c. 251, §§ 1 
 
possibility of parole for those under eighteen violated 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment pursuant to art. 
26 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216, 217, 224-225 (2024) 
(extending prohibition of life sentences without possibility of 
parole to eighteen to twenty year olds based in part on further 
development of such science). 
32 
 
et seq., somehow compels the court to rule as it does today.  Of 
course, the FAA and the MAA express "a strong public policy 
favoring arbitration as an expeditious alternative to litigation 
for settling commercial disputes," Kauders, 486 Mass. at 567, 
quoting Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007), but it is 
also "well settled that where the dispute at issue concerns 
contract formation, the dispute is generally for courts to 
decide," Granite Rock Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 
561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010).  See First Options of Chicago, Inc., 
514 U.S. at 944 ("When deciding whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . apply 
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts").  Without reasonable notice, as explained above, 
there is no agreement concluded between the parties.  Here, 
there was not reasonable notice.19  
The conclusion that Good did not have reasonable notice of 
Uber's terms does not in any way single out the arbitration 
 
19 It is true, as the court notes, that when a party 
challenges a provision in an arbitration agreement as 
unconscionable or void, "the issue of [a] contract's validity is 
considered by [an] arbitrator in the first instance" if the 
parties have agreed to delegate that question to an arbitrator.  
See ante at    , quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-446 (2006).  However, "[t]he issue 
of [a] contract's validity is different from the issue whether 
any agreement between the [parties] was ever concluded."  
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., supra at 444 n.1.  This case 
concerns only the latter issue, that is, whether a contract has 
been formed, which is for a court to decide.  See id.   
33 
 
provision in the contract for any special treatment.  Although 
this case comes before us on appeal from the denial of a motion 
to compel arbitration, the arbitration provision in the contract 
is only one of many contract terms of which Good did not have 
reasonable notice, the most important of which were those that 
effectively extinguished any liability Uber might face.  We must 
treat significant unexpected contractual conditions and the 
reasonable notice they require alike, and I believe I am doing 
so here.  I am not singling out arbitration in any way for any 
type of disfavored treatment by concluding that there was not 
reasonable notice of the wide-ranging terms of the contract 
here, including its arbitration provision.  
Parties are of course free to choose arbitration as the 
venue for the resolution of disputes, and we have regularly 
upheld contracts that compel arbitration between parties who 
have chosen to do so, so long as they were reasonably notified.  
See, e.g., Archer, 490 Mass. at 353, 354 (compelling arbitration 
of claims where "plaintiffs were . . . specifically informed 
that they were signing an arbitration agreement, both on the 
page preceding the signature page and on the signature page 
itself").  The problem here is the lack of reasonable notice.  
See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 573. 
g.  The difference between unconscionability and reasonable 
notice.  My interpretation of whether the blocking pop-up 
34 
 
interface provides reasonable notice to users as to the full 
scope of the contract also does not, as the court suggests, 
conflate the threshold inquiry of whether there was reasonable 
notice of the contract with the question of whether any of the 
terms in the contract are unconscionable.  Whether particular 
contract terms are substantively or procedurally unconscionable 
is distinct from the requirement that an online contract provide 
reasonable notice to users of the scope and significance of the 
contract as a whole.  Reasonable notice and contract formation 
are decisions for a court, and the rules regarding notice of 
contract formation using new forms of contracts has long been a 
concern of this court.  See, e.g., Kergald v. Armstrong Transfer 
Express Co., 330 Mass. 254, 255-256 (1953) (where consumer 
received contract terms printed on what was "apparently a means 
of identification of . . . property bailed, rather than a 
complete contract, the bailor [was] not bound by a limitation 
upon the liability of the bailee unless it [was] actually known 
to the bailor"); Brennan, 289 Mass. at 593-594 (where contract 
was printed on reverse of ticket, plaintiff "would be bound 
thereby, if [the contract terms] were brought to his attention 
in such a manner that a person of ordinary intelligence in his 
position would have known of and understood them").  The fact 
that an arbitrator would address unconscionability does not 
relieve this court of its obligation to decide whether there was 
35 
 
reasonable notice.  And although the issue of unconscionability 
itself is not before us, I remain concerned that the court's 
decision that Good had reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use 
will allow Uber to argue before the arbitrator that its terms of 
use are not unconscionable because Good did not suffer an 
"unfair surprise."  Miller, 448 Mass. at 680, quoting Zapatha v. 
Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 293 (1980) (procedural 
unconscionability concerns in part whether "contract provision 
could result in unfair surprise"). 
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.