Title: New Jersey Republican State Committee v. Murphy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2020

New Jersey Republican State Committee v. Murphy Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary To make up for the tax revenue shortfall COVID-19 created and to maintain the State’s fiscal integrity, the New Jersey Legislature passed, and the Governor signed into law a bill that authorized the State to borrow up to $9.9 billion. Under the new law, the “New Jersey COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act” (Bond Act or Act), the State could issue bonds for private sale or borrow funds from the federal government. Up to $2.7 billion in borrowing could be used for the period from July 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020, and up to $7.2 billion for the period from October 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021. Before the Bond Act was enacted, the Assembly Minority Leader asked the Office of Legislative Services (OLS) to offer an opinion on “whether or not the State may issue general obligation bonds without voter approval to meet the needs of the State arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.” OLS issued an opinion letter on May 7, 2020, answering in the affirmative: “the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster contemplated by the [Emergency Exception], and the State therefore may issue bonds, without the usual requirement for voter approval, to meet COVID-19 related emergency needs.” The opinion letter drew a distinction between “borrowing to supplement revenue for future fiscal year budgets,” which OLS believed would violate the Constitution, and “borrowing money where the anticipated revenue certified in accordance with . . . the Constitution becomes insufficient due to an unexpected event” -- a reference to FY2020 -- which OLS found permissible. The New Jersey Republican State Committee filed a complaint contending the asserted legislation violated the Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution, and sought to restrain the Governor from signing or enforcing the bill. After review, the Supreme Court determined the Bond Act did not violate the Constitution, subject to limits imposed by the Court in this opinion. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. New Jersey Republican State Committee v. Philip D. Murphy (A-82-19) (084731)Argued August 5, 2020 -- Decided August 12, 2020RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. This appeal addresses whether the State’s plan to issue bonds and borrow funds from the federal government in response to the emergency caused by COVID-19, in an amount up to $9.9 billion, is constitutional. To make up for the tax revenue shortfall COVID-19 has created and to maintain the State’s fiscal integrity, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law a bill that authorizes the State to borrow up to $9.9 billion. Under the new law, the “New Jersey COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act” (Bond Act or Act), the State can issue bonds for private sale or borrow funds from the federal government. Up to $2.7 billion in borrowing can be used for the period from July 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020, and up to $7.2 billion for the period from October 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021. The law represents a policy choice made by the Legislative and Executive Branches to address the current crisis. It is not for the Judiciary to assess the wisdom of that decision. The only question here is whether the borrowing scheme violates the State Constitution. Basic principles about the State’s fiscal affairs are set out in Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution. That section includes two key clauses that relate to the State’s appropriations and creation of debt in any fiscal year. The Appropriations Clause requires that “one general appropriation law covering one and the same fiscal year” be adopted. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2. The Clause also calls for a balanced budget each year. Ibid. Under Lance v. McGreevey, proceeds from contract bonds cannot be counted as revenue in balancing the budget. 180 N.J. 590, 593 (2004). The Debt Limitation Clause, as its name suggests, imposes limits on incurring debt. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3. The Clause bars the State from creating debt that exceeds one percent of the total amount appropriated in the general appropriations law without voter approval. Id. ¶ 3(a). The Clause, however, provides an exception for any debts or liabilities created “to meet an emergency caused by disaster.” Id. ¶ 3(e) (the “Emergency Exception”). 1 The language of the Emergency Exception requires the Court to address (1) whether COVID-19 qualifies as a “disaster,” and, if so, the nature of the emergency it has caused; (2) what type of borrowing “meet[s] an emergency caused by disaster”; and (3) the interplay between the Emergency Exception and the fiscal clauses of the Constitution. Laypeople, scientists, and legal scholars alike would agree that COVID-19 is a true disaster with widespread consequences. The pandemic has caused a health emergency, a broad-based economic one that has devastated many individuals and families, and a fiscal crisis for the State. The present “emergency caused by disaster” extends to all three areas. Second, the State is permitted to incur debt and borrow money “to meet” the emergency. At a minimum, any borrowing under the Act must relate to or provide for the pending emergency. The Court defers to the Legislature as to which programs will best respond to the pandemic, provided the choices do not run afoul of the Constitution. That said, not every act of borrowing would “meet” the emergency caused by the pandemic. Further, the Bond Act uses only general language to state its purpose. It authorizes borrowing “to respond to the fiscal exigencies caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic and to maintain and preserve the fiscal integrity of the State.” Bond Act, § 2(ll). The Act thus links permissible borrowing to the State’s fiscal exigency -- the shortfall in revenue caused by the pandemic -- but does not specify particular types of relief. Whether borrowing meets the emergency therefore depends on what the fiscal exigency or revenue shortfall actually is. The Legislature acted on the best information available when, on July 16, 2020, it adopted a law that called for up to $9.9 billion in borrowing. But those projections are likely to continue to change in the months ahead, as the State Treasurer acknowledges. To avoid borrowing in excess of what the law allows, and to be faithful to the Emergency Exception, the Court requires that the Governor or the Treasurer certify the State’s projected revenue figures and the shortfall resulting from the pandemic before each tranche of borrowing. The State may not borrow more than the amount certified, and not more than $9.9 billion in total. In other words, if, at the time the State seeks to borrow money or issue bonds, the Governor or the Treasurer certifies that the shortfall resulting from the pandemic is estimated to be $7 billion, the State cannot borrow more than that amount. The Court reads the Emergency Exception in light of the purpose of the fiscal clauses of the Constitution, considered as a whole, and the Framers’ intent, thus avoiding absurd outcomes that would, for example, allow the State to borrow funds to meet an emergency but not be able to spend them. The Court also gives meaning to the underlying purpose of the relevant clauses: to impose discipline on the State’s fiscal practices and provide flexibility to respond to emergencies caused by disaster. The Court concludes that the Act is valid under the Debt Limitation Clause and that the Appropriations Clause does not bar the new law.HELD: Subject to the limits imposed here by the Court, the Bond Act does not violate the Constitution. 2 Section II of the Court’s opinion chronicles the human toll and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as measures taken by the State in response to the crisis. (pp. 8-13) The Court then details the provisions of the Bond Act. (pp. 13-16) Before the Bond Act was enacted, the Office of Legal Services opined that the State could borrow, under the Emergency Exception, “for expenses directly addressing COVID- 19” and “to replace certified, anticipated revenue” -- relating to FY2020 -- “that was never realized due to COVID-19,” but not “to replace general revenue to support non-COVID-19 related spending in future budgets.” (pp. 16-18) Plaintiffs filed a complaint on July 16, 2020, asserting that the Bond Act violated the Debt Limitation Clause, and the Court granted direct certification the next day, ___ N.J. ___ (2020), because the issues raised are critical to both the budget process and the public and because the matter needs to be resolved with finality before the end of the fiscal year on September 30, 2020. (pp. 18-19) Section III summarizes the arguments raised by the parties. (pp. 19-21) Section IV of the Court’s opinion sets forth principles of constitutional interpretation, including the strong presumption of validity that attaches to legislation and the need to avoid interpretations that render language in the Constitution superfluous or meaningless, or that lead to absurd results. In the end, the polestar of constitutional construction is always the intent and purpose of the particular provision. (pp. 21-24) Section V of the opinion traces the relevant constitutional history relating to appropriations and debt limits. That history reveals the extent to which the Framers of the 1947 Constitution were influenced by the recent experience of the Great Depression and the need for the State to be able to respond to emergencies. (pp. 24-37) Section VI examines the current Appropriations Clause, which calls for the State’s finances to be conducted on the basis of a single fiscal year covered by a single balanced budget. The Clause does not contain an emergency exception. The Court interpreted the Clause in Lance when it considered whether the State could “rely on borrowed funds to balance its annual budget.” 180 N.J. at 593. The Lance Court held that proceeds from contract bonds “do not constitute 'revenue’ for purposes of . . . the Appropriations Clause[], and cannot be used to balance the annual budget.” Ibid. The Court in Lance declined to consider plaintiffs’ challenge under the Debt Limitation Clause -- noting the question raised had been resolved in Lonegan v. State (Lonegan II), 176 N.J. 2 (2003) -- and had no other reason to consider that Clause or the Emergency Exception. See 180 N.J. at 593. (pp. 37-39) Section VII studies the current Debt Limitation Clause, which, as relevant here, requires voter approval for the State to incur debts that together exceed one percent of the general appropriation for the fiscal year -- except for debts created “to meet an emergency caused by disaster.” The Constitution does not define “emergency” or “disaster,” and no case law has addressed the meaning of the Emergency Exception or its interplay with the Appropriations Clause. In Lonegan II, the Court held that “only debt that is legally enforceable against the State is subject to the Debt Limitation Clause.” 176 N.J. at 13. Because contract bonds are not backed by the full faith and credit of the State and are subject 3 to future legislative appropriations, they are not legally enforceable against the State and, as a result, do not violate the Debt Limitation Clause. Id. at 14-15, 21. Lonegan II did not address possible tensions between the Appropriations and Debt Limitation Clauses. (pp. 39-43) Section VIII addresses several issues that the Bond Act presents: (1) whether COVID-19 qualifies as a “disaster,” and, if so, the nature of the emergency it has caused; (2) what type of borrowing “meet[s] an emergency caused by disaster”; and (3) the interplay between the Emergency Exception and the fiscal clauses of the Constitution. (pp. 43-56) (1) Here, the parties agree that the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster within the meaning of the exception. Whatever else the Emergency Exception may encompass, it includes a rare, once-in-a-century, infectious disease of the magnitude of COVID-19, which has caused a health emergency, a broad-based economic one that has left individuals and families struggling, and a fiscal crisis for the State. The nature of the “emergency” extends to all three. Any debate over whether the disaster and its effects are foreseen or unforeseen at this point misses the mark. The distinction does not appear in the text of the Emergency Exception and is illogical when it comes to a continuing emergency. (pp. 44-46) (2) The second component of the Emergency Exception -- that borrowing must “meet an emergency” -- begs the question as to what type of borrowing is permitted. The Court considers the definition of “meet” and discerns that, at a minimum, incurring debt to meet an emergency caused by disaster means that borrowing must relate to or provide for that emergency. The Bond Act authorizes borrowing “[1] to respond to the fiscal exigencies caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic and [2] to maintain and preserve the fiscal integrity of the State.” Bond Act, § 2(ll). The Court does not read those phrases as separate, stand-alone justifications for borrowing under the Emergency Exception. If borrowing were done solely to maintain the State’s fiscal integrity, untethered to the effects of the pandemic, it would not satisfy the exception. Both clauses must relate to the effects of COVID-19. In this case, borrowing “to meet an emergency” raises two issues: the type of borrowing and spending, and the overall amount of borrowing. (pp. 46-47) Here, borrowing may be allowed to meet all three aspects of the current emergency. Debt can be incurred to provide not only for masks, respirators, and field hospitals, and for direct aid to individuals and families afflicted by the disease, but also for the impact on the public fisc caused by COVID-19. For example, the State may borrow to provide for public services like education, police, fire, first aid, child welfare, and prisons -- to secure the continued functioning of government. In other words, because the collapse in revenue brought on by the pandemic affects the State’s ability to provide for direct aid and other government services, the Emergency Exception permits the State to borrow in order to meet them. But not every act of borrowing would “meet” the current emergency. Borrowing for programs unrelated to the emergency, such as the subsidization of a new sports arena, would not satisfy the language of the exception or the Act. To incur debt for such a project would require additional legislation that might well need voter approval. The above examples are 4 illustrative only. Questions about which projects best respond to the pandemic are for the Legislature and the people to decide, subject only to constitutional bounds. (pp. 47-50) Because of how the Bond Act was drafted, this case presents an additional issue: whether the overall amount of borrowing meets the current emergency. The Act caps the total amount of borrowing at $9.9 billion. That amount matches the projected revenue shortfall the State Treasurer reported on May 22, 2020 -- an estimate that has been reduced and is expected to continue to fluctuate. To avoid borrowing in excess of what the law allows, and to be faithful to the Emergency Exception, the State cannot issue bonds or borrow funds beyond the actual fiscal exigency caused by the pandemic. In order to satisfy those concerns, it will be necessary for the Governor or the Treasurer to certify publicly the State’s projected revenue and consequent shortfall “as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic” before each tranche of borrowing. What this means in practice is that, even though the Bond Act allows for borrowing of up to $9.9 billion, if the Governor or the Treasurer were to certify that the fiscal shortfall due to COVID-19 was $7 billion, then the State could borrow only up to that amount at the time. (pp. 50-52) The Bond Act’s generic language, which is linked to the State’s fiscal shortfall, calls for this added level of protection. Had the Act instead specified particular efforts to meet the emergency, there would be no need for the additional periodic certifications that the Court requires. The Court encourages greater specificity for laws issued under the Emergency Exception and for how borrowed money will be spent. (pp. 52-53) (3) Applying the principles of constitutional interpretation noted above, the Court concludes that the Appropriations Clause does not stand in the way of borrowing for appropriate purposes under the Emergency Exception. A contrary reading would lead to a situation in which the State could borrow funds to meet an emergency but not be able to spend them. And the history of the 1947 Constitutional Convention revealed the Framers had dual concerns: to impose discipline on the State’s fiscal practices and, at the same time, provide flexibility to respond to emergencies caused by disaster. Read in tandem, and in light of the Framers’ intent, the fiscal clauses allow the State to borrow and spend for that particular purpose and do not pose a bar to the Bond Act. The Court notes that its decision does not overrule the holding in Lance, which did not consider the Debt Limitation Clause, the Emergency Exception, or their interplay with the Appropriations Clause. (pp. 53-56) Section IX concludes that the Bond Act is constitutional, subject to the limiting principles set forth in the opinion. (pp. 56-57)JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 82 September Term 2019 084731 New Jersey Republican State Committee a/k/a the NJGOP; Declan O’Scanlon; Hal Wirths; Lisa Natale-Contessa; and Ileana Schirmer, Plaintiffs, v. Philip D. Murphy, in his official capacity as Governor of New Jersey, Defendant. On direct certification by the Supreme Court from the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County . Argued Decided August 5, 2020 August 12, 2020Michael L. Testa, Jr., argued the cause for plaintiffs (Testa Heck Testa & White, attorneys; Michael L. Testa, Jr., Justin R. White, and Anthony M. Imbesi, of counsel and on the briefs, and Mark D. Sheridan, Jason F. King, and James K. Webber, Jr. (Squire Patton Boggs and Webber McGill), on the reply brief).Jean P. Reilly, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for defendant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Jean P. Reilly, of counsel and on the briefs, and 1 Jamie M. Zug, Eric L. Apar, Eileen W. Siegeltuch, Victoria G. Nilsson, and Susan J. Wilkerson, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs). Mark D. Sheridan argued the cause for amici curiae Jack M. Ciattarelli and Assemblyman James K. Webber, Jr. (Squire Patton Boggs and Webber McGill, attorneys; Mark D. Sheridan, Jason F. King, and James K. Webber, Jr., of counsel and on the brief). Seth Grossman submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Liberty and Prosperity 1776, Inc., and Michael E. Smith. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal addresses whether the State’s plan to issue bonds andborrow funds from the federal government in response to the emergencycaused by COVID-19, in an amount up to $9.9 billion, is constitutional.Because the issue is vitally important and must be resolved quickly, wedirectly certified the matter for the Court’s prompt review. I. Introduction The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been felt in many ways. Thehuman toll is staggering. Millions worldwide have contracted the virus, andhundreds of thousands have passed away from it. Our nation and State havebeen particularly hard hit by the pandemic. New Jersey has the second highestnumber of COVID-19 deaths in the nation, and the eighth highest number of 2 cases. Altogether, up until now, more than 185,000 New Jerseyans have fallenill from the virus, and an estimated 15,800 have died. The economic fallout has been enormous as well. In a matter of months,countless businesses have shuttered and millions of people have lost their jobs,resulting in immense personal and professional hardships. About 1.4 millionNew Jersey residents filed for unemployment benefits from mid-March to mid-July. Tax revenues have also plummeted. Unlike in the federal system, ourState Constitution requires the Governor and Legislature to adopt a balancedbudget every year. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2. To make up for theshortfall COVID-19 has created and to maintain the State’s fiscal integrity, theLegislature passed and the Governor signed into law a bill that authorizes theState to borrow up to $9.9 billion. Under the new law, the “New JerseyCOVID-19 Emergency Bond Act” (Bond Act or Act), the State can issuebonds for private sale or borrow funds from the federal government. Up to$2.7 billion in borrowing can be used for the period from July 1, 2019 throughSeptember 30, 2020, and up to $7.2 billion for the period from October 1, 2020through June 30, 2021. The law represents a policy choice made by the Legislative andExecutive Branches to address the current crisis. It is not for the Judiciary to 3 assess the wisdom of that decision. The only question before the Court iswhether the borrowing scheme violates the New Jersey Constitution. Basic principles about the State’s fiscal affairs are set out in Article VIII,Section 2 of the Constitution. That section includes two key clauses that relateto the State’s appropriations and creation of debt in any fiscal year. The Appropriations Clause requires that “one general appropriation lawcovering one and the same fiscal year” be adopted. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶2. The Clause also calls for a balanced budget each year. Ibid. Under Lancev. McGreevey, proceeds from contract bonds cannot be counted as revenue inbalancing the budget. 180 N.J. 590, 593 (2004). The Debt Limitation Clause, as its name suggests, imposes limits onincurring debt. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3. The Clause bars the State fromcreating debt that exceeds one percent of the total amount appropriat ed in thegeneral appropriations law without voter approval. Id. ¶ 3(a). The Clause,however, provides an exception for any debts or liabilities created “to meet anemergency caused by disaster.” Id. ¶ 3(e). For short, we refer to that languageas the “Emergency Exception.” It is central to the outcome of this case. Like so much else brought on by COVID-19, the legal issue before theCourt is unprecedented. The above passage first appeared in the Constitutionof 1947 and has not previously been considered by the courts. As discussed in 4 more detail below, the record of the 1947 Constitutional Convention revealshow the nation’s recent experience with the Great Depression influenced theConvention -- and, in particular, the Framers’ decision to amend theConstitution to allow for greater flexibility to respond to emergencies. The language of the Emergency Exception requires us to address severalissues: (1) whether COVID-19 qualifies as a “disaster,” and, if so, the natureof the emergency it has caused; (2) what type of borrowing “meet[s] anemergency caused by disaster”; and (3) the interplay between the EmergencyException and the fiscal clauses of the Constitution. The first issue is straightforward. Laypeople, scientists, and legalscholars alike would agree that COVID-19 is a true disaster with widespreadconsequences. The pandemic has caused a health emergency, a broad-basedeconomic one that has devastated many individuals and families, and a fiscalcrisis for the State. The present “emergency caused by disaster” extends to allthree areas. Second, the State is permitted to incur debt and borrow money “to meet”the emergency. At a minimum, any borrowing under the Act must relate to orprovide for the pending emergency. We defer to the Legislature as to whichprograms will best respond to the pandemic, provided the choices do not run 5 afoul of the Constitution. That said, not every act of borrowing would “meet”the emergency caused by the pandemic, as noted below. Further, the Bond Act uses only general language to state its purpose.The law authorizes borrowing “to respond to the fiscal exigencies caused bythe COVID-19 Pandemic and to maintain and preserve the fiscal integrity ofthe State.” Bond Act, § 2(ll). The Act thus links permissible borrowing to theState’s fiscal exigency -- the shortfall in revenue caused by the pandemic -- butdoes not specify particular types of relief efforts or programs. Whetherborrowing meets the emergency therefore depends on what the fiscal exigencyor revenue shortfall actually is. The Legislature acted on the best information available to it when, onJuly 16, 2020, it adopted a law that called for up to $9.9 billion in borrowing.The amount reflected current projections around that time. But thoseprojections are likely to continue to change in the weeks and months ahead, asthe State Treasurer acknowledges. To avoid borrowing in excess of what thelaw allows, and to be faithful to the Emergency Exception, we require that theGovernor or the Treasurer certify the State’s projected revenue figures and theshortfall resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic before each tranche ofborrowing. 6 The State may not borrow more than the amount certified, and not morethan $9.9 billion in total. In other words, if, at the time the State seeks toborrow money or issue bonds, the Governor or the Treasurer certifies that theshortfall resulting from the pandemic is estimated to be $7 billion, the Statecannot borrow more than that amount. Finally, we read the Emergency Exception in light of the purpose of thefiscal clauses of the Constitution, considered as a whole, and the Framers’intent. By doing so, we avoid absurd outcomes that would, for example, allowthe State to borrow funds to meet an emergency but not be able to spend them.We also give meaning to the underlying purpose of the relevant clauses: toimpose discipline on the State’s fiscal practices and provide flexibility torespond to emergencies caused by disaster. We therefore conclude that the Act is valid under the Debt LimitationClause and that the Appropriations Clause does not bar the new law. Subjectto certain limits we impose, the Bond Act does not violate the Constitution. 7 II. Facts and Procedural History A. COVID-19 is a contagious disease caused by a new type of coronavirus. 1The virus, first identified in an outbreak in Wuhan, China in December 2019,has since spread around the globe. The Governor declared a public healthemergency and state of emergency on March 9, 2020. The World HealthOrganization declared the outbreak a pandemic on March 11, 2020. ThePresident proclaimed the pandemic a national emergency on March 13, 2020.At this time, there is no vaccine or cure for the virus. COVID-19 has taken an enormous toll. There are more than 20.1million confirmed cases worldwide and more than 5.1 million in the UnitedStates.2 737,520 people have lost their lives -- 163,681 of them in the UnitedStates. New Jersey has been hit particularly hard, with 185,031 confirmed1 World Health Org., “Q&A on coronaviruses (COVID-19)” (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/question- and-answers-hub/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses. 2 Except where otherwise noted, the data in this paragraph comes from the Johns Hopkins University of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center , and is current as of August 11, 2020. The data can be found at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/. 8 cases and 15,878 deaths. Our State ranks second in the nation in COVID-19deaths and eighth in the number of cases. 3 The virus has also triggered staggering economic consequences for thenation and the State. As states and cities imposed restrictions to slow thespread of the virus, business closures led to mass layoffs and furloughs. GrossDomestic Product fell 32.9% on an annualized basis during the second quarterof this year, marking one of the steepest declines in the country’s history. 4The nation’s unemployment rate rose from 3.5% in February 2020 to 14.7% inmid-April.5 In May, the number of people seeking unemployment benefitspeaked at nearly 25 million nationwide. 6 By June, New Jersey’s3 CDC COVID Data Tracker, “United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State,” https://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).4 Ben Casselman, “A Collapse That Wiped Out 5 Years of Growth, With No Bounce in Sight,” N.Y. Times (July 30, 2020); Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Gross Domestic Product,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1#0. 5 Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Unemployment Rate,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE (compiling data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).6 Id., “Continued Claims,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CCSA. 9 unemployment rate had reached 16.6%. 7 Nearly 1.4 million New Jerseyresidents filed unemployment claims between mid-March and mid-July.8 Evenas workers returned to their jobs, the number of continuing claims remainedclose to 500,000 in mid-July.9 In response to the crisis, Governor Philip D. Murphy issued a series ofExecutive Orders, including stay-at-home orders and directives that closednon-essential retail businesses. 10 On April 14, 2020, the State enacted theCOVID-19 Fiscal Mitigation Act, which extended Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020)through September 30, 2020,11 and required the State Treasurer to prepare a7 Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., Press Release: “Challenges Remain as New Jersey Employment Continues Rebound in June,” (July 16, 2020), https://nj.gov/labor/lpa/pub/emppress/pressrelease/prelease.pdf. 8 Id., Press Release: “NJ Labor Dept. Has Distributed $10.7B in Unemployment Benefits Since Start of Pandemic” (July 16, 2020), https://www.nj.gov/labor/ lwdhome/press/2020/20200716_paymentsupdate.shtml.9 Certification of Lesley Hirsch, ¶ 17 (July 31, 2020). 10 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 104 (EO 104) (Mar. 16, 2020) and EO 107 (Mar. 21, 2020). 11 L. 2020, c. 19, § 3. The fiscal year traditionally runs from July 1 to June 30. In ordinary times, “FY2020,” for example, would run from July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020. At the outset of the fiscal year, Governors certify the amount of revenue from taxes, fees, and other sources, which they reasonably anticipate will be available to spend, consistent with the Appropriations Clause. 10 report on the State’s financial condition for FY2020 and FY2021. 12 Thereport, submitted on May 22, 2020, states that New Jersey potentially faces “acombined revenue shortfall of nearly $10 billion” for the remaining months ofFY2020 and through the end of FY2021. 13 The report projected that budgetrevenues will be $2.7 billion lower than previously forecast for FY2020, and$7.2 billion lower for FY2021. 14 By June, the estimates improved slightly to a $2.3 billion shortfall forFY2020 and a $6.9 billion shortfall for FY2021.15 Revenue trends throughJuly suggested higher overall revenue than predicted on May 22 and June 30. 16The State Treasurer also noted that “the revenue forecast will most certainlychange in the coming weeks and months as actual collections data aretabulated and as state specific economic impacts of the pandemic begin to 12 L. 2020, c. 19, § 5. The shortened FY2021 will begin on October 1, 2020 and end on June 30, 2021. Id. § 3(a). 13 Dep’t of the Treasury, Report on the Financial Condition of the State Budget for Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021 2 (May 22, 2020). 14 Id. at 8. 15 Certification of Elizabeth Maher Muoio ¶ 65 (July 31, 2020). 16 Id. ¶ 66. 11 crystalize.”17 At the same time, the Treasurer testified before the Legislaturethat the demand for public services has “increased significantly” -- referencing“[d]emand for and reliance on public health professionals, law enforcement,first responders, financial assistance, and Medicaid, just to name a few.” 18 To balance the budget for the extended FY2020, the State enacted aSupplemental Appropriations Act on June 30, 2020, which deferred and cutbillions in spending.19 The original State budget for FY2020 appropriated$38.7 billion in state funds. 20 As of the end of March 2020, the State hadalready spent approximately $30 billion. 21 In the Governor’s budget messagedelivered on February 25, 2020, he estimated $41.1 billion in revenues for theupcoming FY2021 budget. 22 The budget message preceded the now widelyknown COVID-19 pandemic.17 Id. ¶ 59. 18 Id. Ex. C. 19 L. 2020, c. 43. 20 L. 2019, c. 150.21 Muoio Cert. ¶ 77. 22 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, The Governor’s FY2021 Budget at B-2, B-3 (March 2020). 12 In an effort to stabilize the economy in April and May 2020, the federalgovernment made available up to $500 billion for states and local governmentsto borrow. New Jersey is eligible to borrow up to $9.2 billion of thatamount.23 Any borrowing must be backed by the State’s “strongest securitytypically pledged to repay publicly offered obligations” and must be repaidwithin three years. 24 B. In response to the effects of the pandemic, on July 16, 2020, theLegislature passed and the Governor signed into law the New Jersey COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act. L. 2020, c. 60. The law authorizes the State toborrow up to $9.9 billion. The Act identifies the “severe impact” COVID-19 has had on the State’seconomy: (1) “expect[ed] precipitous declines in revenue” in FY2020 andFY2021, including “significant reductions” in revenues from gross incometaxes, corporate business taxes, sales and use taxes, motor fuels taxes, casino -related taxes, and lottery sales, id. § 2(hh), 2(ii)(1); (2) the “need tosignificantly revise the estimated revenues and projected appropriations for23 Certification of Michael B. Kanef ¶¶ 51-56 (July 31, 2020) (describing Municipal Liquidity Facility). 24 Id. ¶¶ 57, 74. 13 Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021,” id. § 2(ii)(2); and (3) potential increases in “theactuarially recommended contributions to the State’s pension plans to theextent that the valuation of pension plans is affected by the deterioration invalue in the investment markets,” id. § 2(ii)(3). “[T]o respond to the fiscal exigencies caused by the COVID-19Pandemic and to maintain and preserve the fiscal integrity of the State” -- thelaw’s stated purpose -- the Act authorizes the State to issue bonds and borrowfrom the federal government. Id. § 2(ll); see also id. § 4(a). Bonds may besold to the federal government and at any public or private sale for a totalamount of up to $9.9 billion. Id. § 4(a). The State may issue up to $2.7 billionin bonds for the three-month period that ends on September 30, 2020, and upto $7.2 billion for the upcoming shortened FY2021. Ibid. The Act alsoprovides for the State to issue “[r]efunding bonds” in order to refund bondsthat were previously issued and pay “the principal of the outstanding bonds.”Id. § 4(b). The Act establishes a Select Commission on Emergency COVID-19Borrowing. Id. § 6. The Commission is comprised of two Senators selected bythe Senate President and two members of the Assembly selected by theSpeaker. Ibid. 14 According to the Act, the process for borrowing is as follows. TheGovernor, State Treasurer, and Director of the Division of Budget &Accounting within the Department of the Treasury, or any two of them --referred to as the “issuing officials” -- make an initial decision to issue bonds.Ibid. They then transmit a report that describes the proposed bonds to theSelect Commission, which must vote on the proposal within six days. Ibid.Approval by three members is required before the State can issue any bonds.The Commission’s failure to meet, act, or approve the report constitutesdisapproval. Ibid. Proceeds from the sale of bonds are to be deposited by the StateTreasurer in a separate fund -- the “New Jersey COVID-19 State EmergencyFund.” Id. § 13. The Act directs the Treasurer to transfer those proceeds to“the General Fund or the Property Tax Relief Fund as needed to supportappropriations made by the Legislature” for FY2021. Id. § 14. According tothe Act, “such amounts shall constitute State revenues.” Ibid. The balance inthe Emergency Fund is subject to appropriation by the Legislature. Ibid. All bonds issued under the Act are a “direct obligation of the State” andare backed by its “faith and credit.” Id. § 7. The State is thus obligated tomake interest payments and redeem the principal amount of the bonds whenthey mature -- no later than thirty-five years after the date they were issued. 15 Id. §§ 5, 7. To provide funds to repay the principal and interest, the Actappropriates, or pledges, taxes collected under the Sales and Use Tax Act, N.J.S.A. 54:32B-1 to -55. Id. § 22(a). If necessary, the State is authorized tolevy and collect an annual tax on real and personal property in eachmunicipality. Id. § 22(b). If, however, there is money in the General Fund atthe end of the calendar year that is “beyond the needs of the State,” theTreasurer is directed to transfer those funds for the payment of principal andinterest on the bonds. Ibid. C. Before the Bond Act was enacted, the Assembly Minority Leader askedthe Office of Legislative Services (OLS) to offer an opinion on “whether ornot the State may issue general obligation bonds without voter approval tomeet the needs of the State arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.” OLS issued an opinion letter on May 7, 2020. In it, OLS opined “thatthe COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster contemplated by the [EmergencyException], and the State therefore may issue bonds, without the usualrequirement for voter approval, to meet COVID-19 related emergency needs.”The opinion letter, however, drew a distinction between “borrowing tosupplement revenue for future fiscal year budgets,” which OLS believed wouldviolate the Constitution, and “borrowing money where the anticipated revenue 16 certified in accordance with . . . the Constitution becomes insufficient due toan unexpected event” -- a reference to FY2020 -- which OLS foundpermissible. OLS noted that “the Constitution does not define 'emergency’ or themeaning of 'to meet an emergency.’” Examining the language in the contextof the entire Emergency Exception, OLS opined that “'to meet an emergency’appears to be limited to borrowing to directly resolve the presently identifiableemergency,” such as the purchase of “ventilators and personal protectiveequipment.” OLS also concluded that “the sudden, unanticipated and precipitousshortfall of expected revenue resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic is thetype of emergency contemplated by” the Emergency Exception. According toOLS, the State could therefore borrow “for expenses directly addressingCOVID-19” and “to replace certified, anticipated revenue” -- relating toFY2020 -- “that was never realized due to COVID-19.” The EmergencyException, OLS opined, permitted “the State to address a specific, unforeseenspending need that arises” after the enactment of a budget that certifiedanticipated revenues. In OLS’s view, the Emergency Exception “do[es] not provide anexemption to the balanced budget requirement[].” As to the FY2021 budget, 17 OLS observed that the decline in revenue “will not be a precipitous andunforeseen shortfall, but rather an anticipated decline.” Borrowing tosupplement that shortfall, OLS opined, would be inconsistent with theconstitutional requirement of a balanced budget. In short, OLS stated that“borrowed money may not be used to replace general revenue to support non -COVID-19 related spending in future budgets.” D. In anticipation of the Governor signing the Act, plaintiffs -- the NewJersey Republican State Committee, Declan O’Scanlon, Hal Wirths, LisaNatale-Contessa, and Ileana Schirmer -- filed a complaint on July 16, 2020.The complaint asserted the legislation violated the Debt Limitation Clause ofthe State Constitution and accordingly sought to restrain the Governor fromsigning or enforcing the bill, S. 2697/A. 4175. The following day, plaintiffsfiled an amended complaint that acknowledged the Governor had enacted thelegislation. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the samegrounds. We granted direct certification on July 17, 2020. ___ N.J. ___ (2020);see also R. 2:12-1, -4. We acted because the issues raised are critical to boththe budget process and the public at this challenging time in our State’shistory. We also recognized that the matter needed to be resolved with finality 18 before the end of the fiscal year on September 30, 2020, which is fastapproaching. We denied a motion by Jack M. Ciattarelli and James K. Webber, Jr. tointervene but granted their alternative request to participate as amici curiae.We also granted leave to Liberty and Prosperity 1776, Inc. and Michael Smithto participate as amici. III. Parties’ Arguments Plaintiffs argue that the Bond Act is unconstitutional because it violatesboth the Appropriations Clause and the Debt Limitation Clause. They contendthe Act seeks to fund general operating expenses of the State with proceedsfrom bonds, contrary to the ruling in Lance. Because debt financing cannot beconsidered revenue or counted toward a balanced budget, plaintiffs argue, theAct violates the Appropriations Clause. Plaintiffs also submit the Act isunconstitutional under the Debt Limitation Clause because the debt itauthorizes is not limited to a single object. In addition, plaintiffs assert that the Emergency Exception “does notobviate the Appropriations Clause.” According to plaintiffs, the emergencythat struck New Jersey in the first quarter of 2020 during FY2020 -- theCOVID-19 pandemic -- “is no longer a surprise or unforeseen.” An 19 anticipated decline in tax collection and income, plaintiffs submit, “is not an'emergency’ that allows circumventing the Appropriations Clause.” Amici Ciattarelli and Webber likewise contend the Bond Act violates theAppropriations Clause and the Debt Limitation Clause. They claim the Act isa “direct assault on the holding” in Lance and thus runs afoul of theAppropriations Clause. In addition, they argue the Act fails to satisfy theEmergency Exception because it permits borrowing to recreate lost revenue,not to meet an emergency. Read together, amici maintain, the AppropriationsClause and the Debt Limitation Clause prohibit debt financing of generalexpenses. Amici add that the Act is bad public policy that threatens the publicfisc. Amici Liberty and Prosperity 1776 and Michael Smith also argue the Actis unconstitutional and stress the importance of voter approval under theConstitution. They further contend there is no objective evidence the Statemust spend $9.9 billion to meet an emergency. The State urges that the Bond Act be upheld. It contends that theemergency and federal funds exceptions to the Debt Limitation Clause permitthe government to create debt to meet the current fiscal emergency. The Statealso maintains that proceeds from bonds can be used to replace revenue andfund operating expenses across multiple fiscal years. It submits that 20 longstanding practice confirms such a reading of the Debt Limitation andAppropriations Clauses. The State also draws on the Framers’ intent in 1947,with the Great Depression in mind, to provide flexible tools to respond tofiscal emergencies. According to the State, Lance does not call for a different result. Anyambiguity relating to the fiscal clauses, the State adds, should be resolved infavor of the more specific language of the Debt Limitation Clause. In thealternative, the State submits that if the Court finds the Bond Act isunconstitutional, it should exercise its equitable powers to fashion a remedyfor the present fiscal emergency. IV. Interpretative Principles Statutes challenged on constitutional grounds are entitled to a strongpresumption of validity. State v. Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 14 (2015); State v.Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., 160 N.J. 505, 526 (1999); HamiltonAmusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 285 (1998). A law can be declaredvoid only if its “repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond reasonabledoubt.” Buckner, 223 N.J. at 14 (quoting Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10(1957)). The Judiciary “has the obligation and the ultimate responsibility tointerpret the meaning of the Constitution.” State v. Lunsford, 226 N.J. 129, 21 153 (2016). When called on to do so, courts must apply the provisions of theconstitution in a way “that serves to effectuate fully and fairly [their]overriding purpose.” Trump Hotels, 160 N.J. at 527 (emphasis added)(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Lance, 180 N.J. at 596. To assess the constitutionality of a statute, courts are “guided by thelanguage and history of the New Jersey Constitution.” Lunsford, 226 N.J. at 153. Judges consider “the text and structure of the Constitution, the relevanthistorical materials, and, most importantly, the 'basic principles of ourdemocratic system.’” Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez From the Office ofU.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 123 (2010) (interpreting the FederalConstitution and quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 ,806 (1995)). We look first to the plain language of a constitutional provision tounderstand its meaning and the Framers’ intent. Buckner, 223 N.J. at 15. Indoing so, courts give words their normal and ordinary meaning. Vreeland v.Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302 (1977). Absent “a clear indication to the contrary,”when a word or phrase appears more than once, “it should have the samemeaning throughout.” L.A. v. DYFS, 217 N.J. 311, 333 (2014) (interpreting astatute and quoting Oldfield v. N.J. Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63, 69 (1948)). Beyondthat, “resort may be had to pertinent constitutional and legislative history” to 22 help determine “the true sense and meaning of the language used.” Atl. CityRacing Ass’n v. Attorney Gen., 98 N.J. 535, 542 (1985). Courts avoid interpretations that render language in the Constitutionsuperfluous or meaningless. Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175, 203 (2015); Statein Interest of K.P., 311 N.J. Super. 123, 139 (Ch. Div. 1997). Indeed, “wheninterpreting a constitution, 'real effect should be given to all the words ituses.’” State Conference-NAACP v. Harvey, 381 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App.Div. 2005) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 , 151 (1926)). Courts must also avoid interpretations that lead to absurd results. SeeSun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 238 N.J. 157, 174n.3 (2019) (“Statutes cannot 'be construed to lead to absurd results. All rulesof construction are subordinate to that obvious proposition.’” (quoting State v.Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 (1961))); Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202,214 (2014) (same). “[W]hen 'a literal interpretation would create a manifestlyabsurd result . . . ,’ courts may consider [a] law’s overall purpose fordirection.” Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 541(2012) (quoting Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001)). 2525 “When confronted with words whose literal application would cause absurd, anomalous or otherwise inconceivable results, courts must always be prepared to ask whether the 'instant case involves a situation which apparently escaped the attention of the draftsman.’” First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Bridgeton 23 Those principles apply with equal force to the interpretation of both statutorylanguage and the text of the Constitution. In the end, “[t]he polestar of constitutional construction is always theintent and purpose of the particular provision.” State v. ApportionmentComm’n, 125 N.J. 375, 382 (1991). In this case, with two relevant provisions,“[t]he true rule of construction 'is not to consider one provision of theConstitution alone, but to contemplate all,’” in order to give effect to thepurpose of the Constitution as a whole. Behnke v. N.J. Highway Auth., 13 N.J. 14, 26 (1953) (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 , 312 (1901)). V. History To fully understand the fiscal framework of the modern Constitution andthe interplay between the current Appropriations and Debt Limitation Clauses,we first trace the relevant constitutional history relating to appropriations anddebt limits. That history reveals the extent to which the Framers of the 1947Constitution were influenced by the recent experience of the Great Depressionand the need for the State to be able to respond to emergencies.Mun. Port Auth., 338 N.J. Super. 324, 327 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Dvorkin v. Township of Dover, 29 N.J. 303, 313 (1959) (involving statutory interpretation)). 24 A. The fiscal clauses first appeared in the 1844 Constitution. Thethreadbare Appropriations Clause of Article IV, Section 6, Paragraph 2 of the1844 Constitution did not require a single, balanced budget. It merelyprovided that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury but forappropriations made by law.” N.J. Const. of 1844 art. IV, § 6, ¶ 2. The clausedid not attract much attention or debate. See Proceedings of the New JerseyState Constitutional Convention of 1844 (1844 Proceedings) 114, 519 (1942)(presenting the proposed clause and noting it was “agreed to, withoutamendment”). The longer Debt Limitation Clause garnered significantly more attention.“As in most states, New Jersey’s Debt Limitation Clause had its origins in thedepression years that followed the economic boom of the 1830s.” Lonegan v.State (Lonegan I), 174 N.J. 435, 443 (2002). Early in the 19th Century many of the states borrowed for the development of highways, canals and other internal improvements. Business boomed, money was plentiful, and the states had little difficulty in selling their bonds. By 1840 the bonded indebtedness of the states exceeded the then tidy sum of $200,000,000. However, with the aftermaths of the financial crisis of 1837, the borrowing states found themselves in difficulties and many states defaulted on their bond obligations. [Clayton v. Kervick, 52 N.J. 138, 146-47 (1968).] 25 “New Jersey was not caught 'so badly as were some of the other states’ in thenational 'speculative boom in internal improvements, in new business, . . . andin land operations’ in the ’20’s and early ’30’s.” John Bebout, “Introduction”to 1844 Proceedings, at xciv (quoting Eugene E. Agger, “Banking in NewJersey,” in 4 New Jersey, A History 1213-14, 1223 (Irving S. Kull, ed., 1930)).Nevertheless, it is clear that “the delegates to the 1844 ConstitutionalConvention had in mind liability such as State bond indebtedness.” Clayton, 52 N.J. at 147. Indeed, “[t]he history of the times renders evident the purposeof the 1844 provision.” Id. at 146. When Rhode Island adopted its first state constitution in 1842, itincluded the nation’s first limitation on state debt. See Amos Tilton,“Constitutional Limitations on the Creation of State Debt,” in 2 Proceedings ofthe Constitutional Convention of 1947 (1947 Proceedings) 1708, 1709 (1951).The Rhode Island clause provided that [t]he general assembly shall have no power, hereafter, without the express consent of the people, to incur state debts to an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars, except in time of war, or in case of insurrection or invasion; nor shall they in any case, without such consent, pledge the faith of the state for the payment of the obligations of others. This section shall not be construed to refer to any money that may be deposited with this state by the government of the United States. [R.I. Const. of 1842 art. IV, § 13 (emphasis added).] 26 Two years later in New Jersey, the Committee on the LegislativeDepartment presented a draft debt limitation provision for the New JerseyConstitution. See 1 844 Proceedings at 111-15. Section Nineteen of the draftpermitted double the amount of debt ($100,000); supplied greater detail as tohow debt would be calculated, spent, obtained, and repaid; and included theexception contained in the Rhode Island provision “for purposes of war, or torepel invasion, or to suppress insurrection.” Id. at 114. Various parts of the proposal were debated, with particular attention tothe amount of time for the repayment of borrowed money. See generally id. at310-11, 519-22. Ultimately, the twenty-year time period in the draft wasexpanded to thirty-five years, and the final clause retained the exception in theRhode Island Constitution of 1842 for times of war, invasion, and insurrection .N.J. Const. of 1844 art. IV, § 6, ¶ 4. The Legislature invoked the exception on several occasions during theCivil War. See L. 1861 (extra session), c. 8 (authorizing the issuance of up to$2 million in general obligation bonds to pay expenses related to suppressingthe rebellion and repelling any invasion); L. 1863, c. 250 (authorizing anadditional $1 million in bonds); L. 1864, c. 433 (same).2626 Funds raised were used for “supplies of every kind pertaining to . . . recruiting, subsisting, clothing, arming, equipping, and transporting ” troops, 27 B. When the 1947 Constitution was adopted, both the AppropriationsClause and the Debt Limitation Clause were expanded. 1. Dedicated funds and related concerns -- a point of focus and contentionat the 1947 Convention -- drove the expansion of the Appropriations Clause. The 1844 Constitution “deal[t] with state finances in four shortparagraphs,” leaving “the state fiscal structure . . . almost entirely” to beresolved through legislation. George C. Skillman & Sidney Goldmann, “TheSingle Budget, Single State Fund and Single Fiscal Year: The Preparation ofthe Budget as an Executive Function,” in 2 1 947 Proceedings 1668, 1668. Asa result, “[b]eginning with 1923 there had been two fiscal years in state affairs-- the calendar year of the Highway Department and the July 1-June 30 fiscalyear of the State Government.” Id. at 1670. Eventually, arguments to abolishdifferent fiscal years and dedicated or special funds prevailed, and a singlefiscal year and budget were adopted through legislation in 1944 and 1945. Seeid. at 1671-83.Lewis Perrine, Annual Report of the Quartermaster General for the Year 1862 3 (Jan. 13, 1863); for medical services including opening two hospitals, see id. at 19-23; as well as for payments to “families or dependent widowed mothers” of soldiers totaling nearly $750,000 per year, R.F. Stockton, Jr., Annual Report of the Adjutant General for the Year 1862 16 (Dec. 31, 1862). 28 At the 1947 Convention, many favored preserving those statutoryprotections in the Constitution. Abram M. Vermeulen, Supervisor of theAccounting Bureau of the Department of Taxation and Finance, for example,was of the view that the Appropriations Clause of 1844 “does not go farenough.” 5 1 947 Proceedings 542. He explained that [t]here should be a single, all-inclusive budget covering expenditures for all departments. Legislation presently provides for this. This legislation should be protected in the Constitution so that we could never revert to a system such as prevailed before 1944. The State Highway Department formerly operated under a different fiscal year and under a separate budget from the rest of the State. [Ibid.]James Kerney, Jr., testified similarly on behalf of the New Jersey Committeefor Constitutional Revision. Id. at 646, 649-50. A. R. Everson, Executive Vice-President of the New Jersey Taxpayers’Association, tied the need to abolish dedicated funds to the fiscal exigenciesthat accompanied the Great Depression and argued that a single treasury wouldbetter enable the State to meet similar fiscal catastrophes in the future: One of the most powerful arguments against dedication of funds was provided during the depression when we were faced with the question of utilizing available highway funds to keep the people from starving, or retaining these funds to build roads. . . . In the dreary year of 1932, for example, over $8,000,000 was diverted from the State Highway Fund, the motor 29 vehicle fuel tax and the motor vehicle license tax, to state unemployment funds to sustain human life. From 1931 through 1939, an eight-year period, the State expended for emergency relief over $143,000,000. Of this amount, $31,000,000 came from the State Highway Fund . . . . If we now dedicate highway and kindred funds by constitutional provision, we shall forever seal off this vital source of revenue and foreclose its use for human need should the chaos and disaster of a depression or any other catastrophe come upon us again in New Jersey. . . . You cannot be sure today, when you are writing a Constitution for years to come, that nothing like this will ever happen again. [Id. at 741, 743 (emphasis added).] Irene Baldwin, testifying on behalf of the New Jersey League of WomenVoters, likewise anticipated that emergency appropriations might be neededwhen she spoke in “favor of all state monies in a single treasury.” Id. at 748. The Revision Commission of 1941 also supported a single fiscal yearand budget, and one general appropriations bill. See Report of theCommission on Revision of the New Jersey Constitution, in 5 1 947 Proceedings 827, 827-29. Among other suggestions, the Commissionrecommended the following expansion to the Appropriations Clause: No other bill appropriating public money for any purpose shall be enacted unless it shall (1) provide for some single object or purpose, (2) receive the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the membership of each house of the Legislature, and (3) together with all prior appropriations for the same fiscal period, shall not exceed the total amount of revenue available therefor. 30 [Id. at 829.]The Report explained the draft clause would both promote fiscal soundnessand allow the State to respond to emergencies that might arise. Id. at 827-28;accord 5 1 947 Proceedings 599-601 (testimony of Robert C. Hendrickson,State Treasurer, summarizing the Report). The Committee on Taxation and Finance proposed an appropriationsclause to the Convention on July 30, 1947. It featured a single budget andfiscal period but took a more flexible approach to emergencies than TreasurerHendrickson and the Revision Commission had recommended. TheCommittee did not adopt the two-thirds-vote and single-object requirementsfor supplemental appropriations. Its proposed language instead spoke ofreasonable foreseeability and limited the general annual appropriation law andadditional appropriations to available and anticipated revenue, rather thanavailable revenue alone. Proposal of the Committee on Taxation and Finance,in 2 1 947 Proceedings 1234, 1235. The Appropriations Clause adopted by the Convention contained theCommittee’s recommended language with only minor changes. See 2 1 947 Proceedings 1241, 1306. The full text of the current clause appears in sectionVI below. 31 2. Although the Debt Limitation Clause was the subject of considerabledebate in 1844, “[n]o attempt was made to amend [that] provision” until theCommission on Revision’s 1942 Report. Tilton, 2 1 947 Proceedings at 1715.The Report of the Revision Commission proposed various changes to theclause but recommended retaining “the requirement of a referendum upon allindebtedness exceeding $100,000.” 5 1 947 Proceedings at 828. As it did with the Appropriations Clause, the Committee on Taxationand Finance generally took a more flexible approach than the RevisionCommission. The Committee proposed the following debt limitation clause tothe Convention on July 30, 1947: The Legislature shall not, in any manner, create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities, of the State, which shall singly or in the aggregate with any previous debts or liabilities at any time exceed $100,000.00, except for purposes of war, or to repel invasion, or to suppress insurrection, or to meet an emergency caused by act of God or disaster, unless the same shall be authorized by a law for some single object or work, to be distinctly specified therein; which law shall provide the ways and means, exclusive of loans, to pay the interest of such debt or liability as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt or liability within thirty-five years from the time of the contracting thereof, and shall be irrepealable until such debt or liability, and the interest thereon, are fully paid and discharged. And no such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people, and have received the sanction of a majority of 32 all the votes cast for and against it at such election; and all money to be raised by the authority of such law shall be applied only to the specific object stated therein; and to the payment of the debt thereby created. This section shall not be construed to refer to any money that has been, or may be, deposited with this State by the Government of the United States. [2 1 947 Proceedings 1235 (emphases added).]27 Reporting for the Committee on August 5, 1947, Chairman Readstressed the Committee’s determination to remain flexible as to the manner ofdebt acquired. See 1 1 947 Proceedings 149. He also underscored that theCommittee expanded the 1844 Clause by adding to its exceptions for war,invasion, and insurrection the phrase, “or to meet an emergency caused by act of God or disaster,” which was practically done in 1932 by the Legislature and looked upon with a great deal of propriety by the people of the State because those things had to be done. Therefore, we placed those words in there. [Ibid. (emphases added).] There can be little doubt that the practical enactment Chairman Readreferred to was the creation of the State Emergency Relief Administration,27 The underscored language was also included in the proposed 1944 Constitution, which was defeated at the polls. See Revised Constitution of 1944 art. VII, § 5; accord Tilton, 2 1 947 Proceedings 1718-19; see also Robert F. Williams, The New Jersey Constitution 25 (2d ed. 2012). 33 accompanied by an initial appropriation of $8 million, see L. 1931, c. 394,along with the 1932 authorization of $20 million in bonds “for the relief of theunemployed and dependents in this State,” see L. 1932, c. 251.28 Indeed,“New Jersey’s borrowing from 1932 to 1939 was mainly for the purpose offinancing unemployment relief, with one issue in 1933 dedicated toeducational aid.” Tilton, 2 1 947 Proceedings 1713. Because of those efforts,New Jersey’s bonded indebtedness rose and reached a peak in 1935, “when theState’s outstanding obligations totaled $197,000,000.” Ibid. In response to the hardships of the Great Depression, the EmergencyRelief Administration provided aid through food, shelter, fuel, clothing, healthservices, work projects, and support for governing bodies and state agencies.See State Emergency Relief Administration, Emergency Relief in New Jersey,October 13, 1931-April 15, 1936: Final Report to the Governor and to theSenate and General Assembly (Emergency Relief Final Report) 31-52 (July 31,1936). The Administration also provided a diverse array of special programsincluding recreation activities, rural rehabilitation, relief gardens, adulteducation, student aid, junior college, and vocational rehabilitation, among28 There were other relief provisions around the same time as well. See, e.g., L. 1933, c. 398 (additional $5 million “for the relief of the unemployed and dependents”); L. 1934, c. 255 (additional $10 million); L. 1939, c. 329 (additional $21 million). 34 others. Id. at 53-61. That history informs the meaning of the phrase “meet anemergency caused by disaster,” which the Framers added to the 1947Constitution. As required under the 1844 Constitution, which did not have anemergency exception, the Depression-relief bond measures identified abovewere submitted for voter approval at general elections. At the 1947Convention, James J. Smith, on behalf of the New Jersey State League ofMunicipalities, opposed any constitutional provision that would dedicatecertain tax revenues to highway funds. See 5 1 947 Proceedings 720. Beyondthat, Smith asserted in his testimony that citizens benefit when the Legislaturehas the authority to respond to emergencies without the need to amend theConstitution: [T]he original dedication of highway funds by the act of 1927 was a legislative enactment. A Legislature enacts laws to meet current needs. It developed during the depression years that the social welfare of the citizens of the State required that certain highway funds be diverted for unemployment relief which was more necessary at that time than the extension of our highway system. It was generally conceded that it was a very wise thing to do, and approximately $65,000,000 was appropriated for relief. We do not know what lies ahead. It is quite possible that in the future the people of the State of New Jersey through their legislators would again decide to use highway funds and other funds for urgent needs. If such an emergency should arise it would be most 35 unfortunate for us to find that to meet a pressing need would require an amendment to the State Constitution. Emergencies cannot be met or anticipated by a constitutional provision. [Id. at 722 (emphases added).] The revised Debt Limitation Clause the Framers adopted eliminated theneed to divert dedicated funds at a time of emergency and also provided theState flexibility to borrow funds for emergencies without waiting for voterapproval. Chairman Read noted that, aside from the Emergency Exception, theCommittee’s proposed Debt Limitation Clause was “practically the same as the[1844] one.” 1 1 947 Proceedings 149. A later amendment replaced the$100,000 cap with a one-percent limit. See 2 1 947 Proceedings 1240. The fulltext of the current Debt Limitation Clause appears in section VII below. C. In sum, the history of the fiscal provisions reveals the extent to whichthey were shaped by the times. The short Appropriations Clause adopted in1844 generated little discussion or disagreement at that constitutionalconvention. In 1947, by contrast, considerable debate about the existence oftwo fiscal years and numerous dedicated funds led to an expandedAppropriations Clause that calls for a single general appropriations act and abalanced budget. And the Debt Limitation Clause, initially adopted in 36 response to financial crises encountered by other states, was made moreflexible in 1947 with the shift from a $100,000 to a one-percent cap and theadded exception for borrowing “to meet an emergency caused by disaster.”The latter change, in particular, reflected the events of the Great Depressionexperienced in New Jersey and the lessons learned from them. We turn next to the current version of the two clauses and recent caselaw that interprets them. VI. Appropriations Clause The Appropriations Clause calls for “the State’s finances [to] beconducted on the basis of a single fiscal year covered by a single balancedbudget.” City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 151 (1980); see also Burgos, 222 N.J. at 206. The Clause provides as follows: No money shall be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law. All moneys for the support of the State government and for all other State purposes as far as can be ascertained or reasonably foreseen, shall be provided for in one general appropriation law covering one and the same fiscal year; except that when a change in the fiscal year is made, necessary provision may be made to effect the transition. No general appropriation law or other law appropriating money for any State purpose shall be enacted if the appropriation contained therein, together with all prior appropriations made for the same fiscal period, shall exceed the total amount of revenue on hand and anticipated which will be available to meet such appropriations during such fiscal period, as certified by the Governor. 37 [N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2.]The Clause does not contain an emergency exception. The Court interpreted the Appropriations Clause in Lance when itconsidered whether the State could “rely on borrowed funds to balance itsannual budget.” 180 N.J. at 593. That seminal case involved the FY2005budget, which relied in part on $1.9 billion in bond proceeds from theCigarette Tax Securitization Act of 2004, L. 2004, c. 68, and the MotorVehicle Surcharges Securitization Act of 2004, L. 2004, c. 70. Id. at 594.Proceeds from the bonds went to the General Fund, and the State was obligatedby contract to repay those obligations, subject to appropriations from theLegislature. Ibid. The Court held that proceeds from contract bonds “do not constitute'revenue’ for purposes of . . . the Appropriations Clause[], and cannot be usedto balance the annual budget.” Id. at 593. As the Court explained, “borrowedmonies, which themselves are a form of expenditure when repaid, are notincome (i.e., revenues).” Id. at 598. To rely on them to fund general expensesin the ordinary course would “defeat[] the very purpose behind theAppropriations Clause” -- “to bar the State from adopting an annual budget inwhich expenditures exceed revenues.” Id. at 596. The Court referenced 38 several dictionary definitions for “revenue” in reaching that conclusion. Id. at597-98. The Court acknowledged its ruling might require a “significant . . . if not. . . complete overhaul of[] the current fiscal year’s budget.” Id. at 599.Because the “disruption to the State government could be great” and the“legislative and executive branches acted in good faith,” the Court applied itsholding prospectively. Ibid. The Court in Lance declined to consider plaintiffs’ challenge under theDebt Limitation Clause -- noting the question raised had been resolved inLonegan v. State (Lonegan II), 176 N.J. 2 (2003) -- and had no other reason toconsider that Clause or the Emergency Exception. See 180 N.J. at 593. VII. Debt Limitation Clause Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitutioncontains the Debt Limitation Clause. Most relevant for this case, the Clauserequires voter approval for the State to incur debts that together exceed onepercent of the general appropriation for the fiscal year -- except for debtscreated “to meet an emergency caused by disaster.” The Clause has five subparagraphs, two of which are central to this case.The core of the Debt Limitation Clause, subparagraph (a), provides as follows: The Legislature shall not, in any manner, create in any fiscal year a debt or debts, liability or liabilities of the 39 State, which together with any previous debts or liabilities shall exceed at any time one per centum of the total amount appropriated by the general appropriation law for that fiscal year, unless the same shall be authorized by a law for some single object or work distinctly specified therein. Regardless of any limitation relating to taxation in this Constitution, such law shall provide the ways and means, exclusive of loans, to pay the interest of such debt or liability as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within thirty-five years from the time it is contracted; and the law shall not be repealed until such debt or liability and the interest thereon are fully paid and discharged. Except as hereinafter provided, no such law shall take effect until it shall have been submitted to the people at a general election and approved by a majority of the legally qualified voters of the State voting thereon. [Id. ¶ 3(a).] Exceptions to the requirement that debt be approved by the public appearin subparagraph (e): This paragraph shall not be construed to refer to any money that has been or may be deposited with this State by the government of the United States. Nor shall anything in this paragraph contained apply to the creation of any debts or liabilities for purposes of war, or to repel invasion, or to suppress insurrection or to meet an emergency caused by disaster or act of God. [Id. ¶ 3(e).]2929 The Debt Limitation Clause has been amended twice since 1947. In 1983, an exception to the requirement of voter approval was added for refinancing bonds. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3 (1984) (now codified at id. ¶ 3(c). In 2009, an amendment requiring voter approval when the State borrows money 40 The opening reference to “[t]his paragraph” applies to all of paragraph 3 -- theDebt Limitation Clause in its entirety. Thus, the requirements of the DebtLimitation Clause do not apply to the creation of debt “to meet an emergencycaused by disaster.” The State Constitution does not define “emergency” or “disaster.” The1931 law that created the State Emergency Relief Administration, however,discussed the meaning of “emergency” as follows: “The hardships occasionedby and attendant upon the lack of gainful employment and the economicdepression generally prevailing are so acute and so affect the public health andwelfare of the people that there is now an emergency which requires Staterecognition and aid.” L. 1931, c. 394. In his testimony at the 1947Convention, the Chair of the Committee on Taxation and Finance alluded tothe 1931 law. 1 1 947 Proceedings 149. No case law has addressed the meaning of the Emergency Exception orits interplay with the Appropriations Clause. Litigation has instead largelythrough a state agency or independent authority was ratified. See “Interpretive Statement,” Public Question No. 1 (2008), https://www.nj.gov/state/elections/ assets/pdf/election-results/2008/2008-official-gen-elect-tallies-public-ques- 120208.pdf; see also N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3(b). The Clause was broken down into five subparagraphs when the new language was adopted. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3(a) to (e). 41 focused on whether “a variety of bonding mechanisms” without voter approvalran afoul of the Debt Limitation Clause. Lonegan I, 174 N.J. at 439 (citing, asexamples, Enourato v. N.J. Bldg. Auth., 90 N.J. 396 (1982); N.J. Sports &Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1 (1972); Holster v. Bd. of Trs. ofPassaic Cty. Coll., 59 N.J. 60 (1971); Clayton, 52 N.J. 138; N.J. Tpk. Auth. v.Parsons, 3 N.J. 235 (1949)). In Lonegan I, the plaintiffs challenged the use of contract debt30 to funda large-scale school construction program. By statute, the EconomicDevelopment Authority was authorized to issue up to $8.6 billion in bonds forthat purpose. Id. at 459. Although the Court restated the principle thatcontract debt does not implicate the Debt Limitation Clause because “debts of30 As the Court explained, “contract bond” (or “contract debt”) describes bonds issued by an independent state authority on a contract between the State Treasurer and the authority stating that payment on the bonds by the State is subject to legislative appropriations. In contrast, general obligation bonds are enforceable state debts backed by the full faith and credit of the State. [Lonegan I, 174 N.J. at 439 n.1 (citing John Downs & Jordon Elliott Goodman, Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 171 (1991)).]Contract bonds often have an independent revenue stream to repay the debt, like tolls or payments on a lease. Id. at 445-46. 42 an independent authority are not debts of the State,” see id. at 438, 449-50,462-63, the Court upheld the statute in light of the State’s reliance on Abbottv. Burke, 153 N.J. 480 (1998), and because the act furthered the educationprovision of the State Constitution, see id. at 441, 462 (citing N.J. Const. art.VIII, § 4, ¶ 1). The Court ordered additional briefing on the broader questionwhether contract bonds violate the Debt Limitation Clause. Id. at 464-65. Lonegan II resolved the issue. The Court affirmatively held that “onlydebt that is legally enforceable against the State is subject to the DebtLimitation Clause.” 176 N.J. at 13. Because contract bonds are not backed bythe full faith and credit of the State and are subject to future legislativeappropriations, they are not legally enforceable against the State and, as aresult, do not violate the Debt Limitation Clause. Id. at 14-15, 21. Neither Lonegan I nor II addressed possible tensions between theAppropriations and Debt Limitation Clauses. VIII. Analysis Against that backdrop, we consider several issues that the Bond Actpresents: (1) whether COVID-19 qualifies as a “disaster,” and, if so, thenature of the emergency it has caused; (2) what type of borrowing “meet[s] anemergency caused by disaster”; and (3) the interplay between the EmergencyException and the fiscal clauses of the Constitution. 43 A. To answer those questions, we examine the key components of thelanguage in the Emergency Exception -- “to meet an emergency caused bydisaster.” N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3(e). The phrase has two parts: (1) theemergency must be caused by disaster; and (2) any proposed borrowing mustmeet the emergency. As to the first requirement, not every emergency qualifies under theEmergency Exception because not every emergency is “caused by disaster.” Aheavy snowstorm or ice storm that requires additional snow removal and extracaution on the roadways may lead a governor to declare a temporary state ofemergency. The declaration alone, however, would not establish that theemergency was caused by disaster. Nor would the nature of the storm itself inmany instances. Likewise, a routine budgetary shortfall might present anemergency, but that does not mean it was necessarily the result of a disaster.And without a “disaster,” the Emergency Exception does not apply. Here, the parties agree that the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster withinthe meaning of the exception. Whatever else the Emergency Exception mayencompass, it includes a rare, once-in-a-century, infectious disease of themagnitude of COVID-19. 44 The effects of the pandemic are widespread. As outlined in section II,the disease has taken a toll on human life, on the global and nationaleconomies, and on the public fisc in our State. Millions have contracted thevirus; hundreds of thousands have died; millions have lost their jobs; and taxrevenues here and elsewhere have plummeted. In short, COVID-19 -- anindisputable “disaster” -- has caused a health emergency, a broad-basedeconomic one that has left individuals and families struggling, and a fiscalcrisis for the State. The nature of the “emergency” extends to all three. 31 As to the third area -- the impact on the public fisc -- not only did massunemployment lead to lower tax revenues, but direct efforts to combat thepandemic have also exacerbated its effect on the State’s finances. Shutteringprivate businesses and ordering individuals to stay at home to fight thedisease’s spread have contributed to a dramatic drop in revenue from varioussources. As a result, the State’s ability to provide important public services isat risk. Any debate over whether the disaster and its effects are foreseen orunforeseen at this point misses the mark. The distinction does not appear in31 See Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 514 (1954) (defining “emergency” in the context of a shortage of rental housing as “an unusual public exigency calling for the exercise of the police power to alleviate the common peril or need”). 45 the text of the Emergency Exception and is illogical when it comes to acontinuing emergency. Today, unlike in February, we know that each weekahead will bring more cases and more deaths. Just because one can foresee thecontinuation of an emergency does not make it any less of one. SeeWorthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 195 (1982) (noting that, in the context ofthe Disaster Control Act, “it is not a necessary component of an 'emergency’that it be sudden or unforeseen”). B. The second component of the Emergency Exception -- that borrowingmust “meet an emergency” -- begs the question as to what type of borrowing ispermitted. “Meet” is not a precise term. It is also not a limiting term in everydayuse. Among other definitions, Webster’s Dictionary defines “meet” as “tocontend successfully with” -- for example, to meet a problem -- and “toprovide for” -- for example, “public and private agencies labored to meet acritical housing shortage.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary(Unabridged) 1404 (1981). The State aptly points out that the term “meet” also appears in theAppropriations Clause where it means, in essence, “to match fully.” TheClause requires that the State have enough revenue on hand to “meet” 46 expenditures. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2. There is no “clear indication”why the term should not “have the same meaning throughout” the fiscalclauses. See L.A., 217 N.J. at 333. At a minimum, then, incurring debt to meet an emergency caused bydisaster means that borrowing must relate to or provide for that emergency.We interpret the stated purpose of the Bond Act with that in mind. Toreiterate, it authorizes borrowing “[1] to respond to the fiscal exigenciescaused by the COVID-19 Pandemic and [2] to maintain and preserve the fiscalintegrity of the State.” Bond Act, § 2(ll). We do not read those phrases asseparate, stand-alone justifications for borrowing under the EmergencyException. If borrowing were done solely to maintain the State’s fiscalintegrity, untethered to the effects of the pandemic, it would not satisfy theexception. Both clauses must relate to the effects of COVID-19. In this case, borrowing “to meet an emergency” raises two issues: thetype of borrowing and spending, and the overall amount of borrowing. 1. As described in section V, the Framers were influenced by theexperience of the Great Depression when they drafted the EmergencyException. To repeat, during the 1947 Constitutional Convention, the chair ofthe Committee on Taxation and Finance referred to what “was practically done 47 in 1932 by the Legislature,” in response to the Great Depression, to justify anexpanded exception to the Debt Limitation Clause “to meet an emergency.” 11 947 Proceedings 149. The State’s prior efforts in that regard included a widearray of borrowing and spending to meet the crisis at hand, including direct aidin the form of food, shelter, and health care, and also recreation activities,adult education, vocational rehabilitation, and then some. Emergency ReliefFinal Report 31-61. Here, borrowing may be allowed to meet all three aspects of the currentemergency. In practical terms, debt can be incurred to provide not only formasks, respirators, and field hospitals, and for direct aid to individuals andfamilies afflicted by the disease, but also for the impact on the public fisccaused by COVID-19. As to the latter category, the State, for example, mayborrow to provide for public services like education, police, fire, first aid,child welfare, and prisons, among other services -- to secure the continuedfunctioning of government. In other words, because the collapse in revenuebrought on by the pandemic affects the State’s ability to provide for direct aidand other government services, the Emergency Exception permits the State toborrow in order to meet them. That said, not every act of borrowing would “meet” the currentemergency. Borrowing for programs unrelated to the emergency would not 48 satisfy the language of the exception or the Act. For example, using $1 bi llionin borrowed funds to subsidize a new sports arena could hardly be said “torespond to the fiscal exigencies caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic” or“preserve” the State’s “fiscal integrity.” Bond Act, § 2(ll). To incur debt forsuch a project would require additional legislation that might well need voterapproval. The above examples are illustrative only. It is not for the courts todecide which projects best respond to the pandemic, or to get drawn into adebate about them. Reasonable people may differ about how to meet thechallenges society now faces. Those questions “are for the Legislature and thepeople to decide, subject only to constitutional bounds.” N.J. Ass’n on Corr.v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 211 (1979). Courts traditionally defer to the will of theLegislature and the choices it makes, provided they do not run afoul of theConstitution. See McCrane, 61 N.J. at 8; Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 229(1964).32 A more restrictive view would reason that because a multi-billion dollarshortfall in revenue on account of the pandemic is predictable today -- in a way32 Lan, 80 N.J. at 212-20, and Behnke, 13 N.J. at 32, provide examples of legislative deference related to the “single object or work” requirement of the Debt Limitation Clause. 49 that was not foreseeable one year ago -- the State cannot borrow to cover anyof that shortfall other than costs tied directly to health aspects of the pandemic,such as respirators and field hospitals. Such an approach would not “meet” thedevastation caused by a broad-based emergency like the COVID-19 pandemicor the Great Depression. Nor does that approach find support in the words ofthe Constitution, which does not limit borrowing in such a stringent way at atime of a continuing emergency caused by disaster. 2. Because of how the Bond Act was drafted, this case presents anadditional issue: whether the overall amount of borrowing meets the currentemergency. Certain laws enacted during the Great Depression authorizedborrowing of amounts ranging from $5 million to $20 million “for the relief ofthe unemployed and dependents in this State.” See, e.g., L. 1932, c. 251; L.1933, c. 398; L. 1934, c. 255. Unlike those statutes, the Bond Act uses generallanguage. Once again, the stated purpose of the borrowing is “to respond tothe fiscal exigencies caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic and to maintain andpreserve the fiscal integrity of the State.” Bond Act, § 2(ll). That language calls into question the total amount of borrowing allowedunder the Emergency Exception. Simply put, because the proposed borrowingis keyed to the fiscal exigency caused by COVID-19 -- that is, the revenue 50 shortfall the pandemic has caused through the end of FY2021 -- whether theborrowing meets the emergency depends on what the exigency or shortfallactually is. The Act caps the total amount of borrowing at $9.9 billion. That amountmatches the projected revenue shortfall the State Treasurer reported on May22, 2020. The Legislature relied on the best available evidence at the time itheld hearings in early June. By the end of June, improved estimates reducedthe projected shortfall by $700 million -- to $9.2 billion. 33 The trend throughJuly also suggested higher overall revenue than predicted, which would meanthe State’s shortfall was even less. And as the Treasurer noted on July 31,2020 in her certification to the Court, the “forecast will most certainly changein the coming weeks and months.” To avoid borrowing in excess of what the law allows, and to be faithfulto the Emergency Exception, the State cannot issue bonds or borrow fundsbeyond the actual fiscal exigency caused by the pandemic. In order to satisfythose concerns, it will be necessary for the Governor or the Treasurer to certify33 Citations for this paragraph appear in section II.A. 51 publicly the State’s projected revenue and consequent shortfall “as a result ofthe COVID-19 pandemic” before each tranche of borrowing. 34 What this means in practice is that, even though the Bond Act allows forborrowing of up to $9.9 billion, if the Governor or the Treasurer were tocertify that the fiscal shortfall due to COVID-19 was $7 billion, then the Statecould borrow only up to that amount at the time.35 Based on the Treasurer’sJuly 31, 2020 certification to the Court, which projected a shortfall of $9.2billion as a result of the pandemic, the State could have borrowed only up tothat amount had it been able to borrow funds or issue bonds that day. Changes in revenue projections may head in the opposite direction aswell, and may support a higher level of borrowing to meet the fiscal exigencycaused by the pandemic than current projections do. In no event, however, canborrowing exceed $9.9 billion under the Act. Once again, the Bond Act’s generic language, which is linked to theState’s fiscal shortfall, calls for this added level of protection. Had the Actinstead specified particular efforts to meet the emergency -- for example, the34 The quoted language matches the Treasurer’s certification to the Court. See, e.g., Muoio Cert. ¶¶ 74-75. 35 We use an aggregate figure for simplicity. Projections and certifications would necessarily address FY2020 and FY2021, respectively, as the Treasurer has done to date. 52 borrowing of a specific sum for direct relief to the unemployed -- there wouldbe no need for the additional periodic certifications by the Governor or theTreasurer that we require. We encourage greater specificity for laws issued under the EmergencyException and for how borrowed money will be spent. C. We next consider how the Emergency Exception relates to the fiscalclauses of the Constitution. The Emergency Exception appears only in the Debt Limitation Clause,not the Appropriations Clause. That distinction is the basis for plaintiffs’argument that the exception applies only to the act of borrowing but not to theappropriations process. At oral argument, counsel for amici Ciattarelli and Webber thoughtfullyacknowledged that the Appropriations Clause does not stand in the way ofborrowing for appropriate purposes under the Emergency Exception. 36 Weagree. A contrary reading would lead to a situation in which the State couldborrow funds to meet an emergency but not be able to spend them. Also, anoverly literal reading could result in the State being able to borrow more36 We recognize that amici have a different view of the type of borrowing considered appropriate. 53 modest amounts of money to meet the needs of a relatively limited crisis --which ultimately might not throw revenues and expenses out of balance, giventhe size of the overall State budget -- yet not be able to borrow far largeramounts in times of great crisis, when it would simply not be possible tobalance revenues and expenses. Such a reading would be flawed for a number of reasons. First, it leadsto absurd results like the ones noted above, and courts must avoid interpretingthe Constitution and statutes in a way that creates absurd outcomes. See SunLife, 238 N.J. at 174 n.3; Perez, 218 N.J. at 214. Second, such a reading of thefiscal clauses would also render the Emergency Exception meaningless when itis needed the most. Courts avoid interpretations that render language in theConstitution superfluous. Burgos, 222 N.J. at 203. Third, such a reading isnot what the Framers intended. We consider the Emergency Exception in light of the language andpurpose of the fiscal clauses of the Constitution, considered as a whole, andthe Framers’ intent in drafting them. By doing so, we give effect fully andfairly to the overriding purpose of the fiscal clauses. See Lance, 180 N.J. at 596; Trump Hotels, 160 N.J. at 527; see also Behnke, 13 N.J. at 26 (“The truerule of construction 'is not to consider one provision of the Constitution alone,but to contemplate all.’” (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 312)). 54 As discussed previously, the history of the 1947 ConstitutionalConvention revealed the Framers had dual concerns: to impose discipline onthe State’s fiscal practices and, at the same time, provide flexibility to respondto emergencies caused by disaster. To achieve those ends, the Constitutioncalls for a single fiscal year and an annual balanced budget, and it imposescertain limitations on incurring debt. Yet the Framers also added an exceptionto empower the State to respond quickly and effectively in times of truedisaster and emergency. They did so against the backdrop of the GreatDepression and the crises that befell our State during that time. In fact, debateat the Convention reveals the Framers were thinking of large-scale reliefefforts in the face of great calamity when they added the Emergency Exceptionto the Constitution. “The history of the times renders evident the purpose”underlying the fiscal clauses. See Clayton, 52 N.J. at 146. We are reminded that “[t]he polestar of constitutional construction isalways the intent and purpose” of the language of the Constitution.Apportionment Comm’n, 125 N.J. at 382. The Framers did not intend for theAppropriations Clause to bar what the Debt Limitation Clause allows; theirpurpose was to enable the government to act to “meet an emergency caused bydisaster.” Read in tandem, and in light of the Framers’ intent, the fiscal 55 clauses allow the State to borrow and spend for that particular purpose and donot pose a bar to the Bond Act. To be clear, we do not overrule the holding in Lance. Lance concludedthat proceeds from contract bonds “do not constitute 'revenue’ for thepurposes of . . . the Appropriations Clause[], and cannot be used to balance thebudget.” 180 N.J. at 593. That remains the law. Lance, however, did notconsider the Debt Limitation Clause, the Emergency Exception, or theirinterplay with the Appropriations Clause. 37 IX. Conclusion Statutes challenged on constitutional grounds can be declared void onlyif their “repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.”Buckner, 223 N.J. at 14. Plaintiffs have not met that heavy burden. We37 In light of our analysis, we need not consider a number of arguments the parties have raised. Because the Emergency Exception to the Debt Limitation Clause applies here, the Clause’s single-object requirement, like its requirement of voter approval, does not apply. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3(a). We do not rely on the federal funds exception in the first sentence of N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 3(e), and therefore do not need to interpret its scope. Nor do we address the refinancing or refunding of bonds, an issue raised by amici. See ibid. ¶ 3(c); State in Interest of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 359 n.1 (2020); Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 91 N.J. 38, 48-49 (1982). Finally, we decline to consider plaintiffs’ separation of powers argument, raised for the first time in their reply brief. See State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970); L.J. Zucca v. Allen Bros. Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 434 N.J. Super. 60, 87 (App. Div. 2014). 56 therefore conclude that the Bond Act is constitutional, subject to the limitingprinciples set forth above. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 57