Title: James Cobb v. Gary A. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP000925
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2022

2022 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP925 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
James Cobb and Judith Cobb, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Gary A. King, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oconto   
 
JUDGE: 
Jay N. Conley    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, 
in which DALLET, J., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents-
petitioners, there were briefs filed by George Burnett, Laina P. 
Stuebner, and Law Firm of Conway, Oleniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green 
Bay. There was an oral argument by George Burnett.  
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
brief by Josiah R. Stein and Law Office of Josiah R. Stein, LLC, 
Green Bay. There was an oral argument by Josiah R. Stein. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 59 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP925 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV139) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James Cobb and Judith Cobb, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-  
Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary A. King, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Dismissed as 
improvidently granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   James and Judith Cobb petitioned for 
review of a decision of the court of appeals, Cobb v. King, No. 
2020AP925, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 11, 2021), 
which affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to 
Gary King.  After reviewing the record and the briefs, and after 
hearing oral arguments, we conclude that this matter should be 
dismissed as improvidently granted. 
No. 
2020AP925   
 
2 
 
By the Court.—The review of the decision of the court of 
appeals is dismissed as improvidently granted. 
No.  2020AP925.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶2 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately because, as I have written in the past, I believe 
that this court should explain to the litigants and the public 
the reason for the dismissal.  See Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 
2021 WI 41, ¶3, 396 N.W.2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530 (Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J., dissenting).   
¶3 
Although the court has been inconsistent, in my view 
the court's general practice should be to provide an explanation 
for a dismissal of a petition for review as improvidently 
granted.  See id., ¶¶6-10.  It is the least we can do for 
parties who have expended substantial time, energy, and money 
litigating this case and seeking a resolution from this court. 
¶4 
After reviewing the court of appeals opinion, together 
with the record and the briefs, and after hearing oral 
arguments, this review is deemed improvidently granted.  The 
issues for which we took the case will not lead to any further 
development, clarification, or harmonization of the law.  See 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) (2019-20).  Thus, further review 
by this court and publication of an opinion would not serve any 
purpose. 
¶5 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶6 
I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶7 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
It must not be.  There is no power in Venice 
Can alter a decree established. 
'Twill be recorded for a precedent, 
And many an error by the same example 
Will rush into the state.  It cannot be. 
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 4, sc. 1, ll. 
215–19 (Jay L. Halio ed., 1993) (statement of the character 
Portia). 
 
¶8 
A majority of this court forgoes an opportunity to 
correct an objectively erroneous interpretation of law.  In 
Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson County, this court 
created a flawed——yet binding——precedent, which requires lower 
courts to ignore the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  
2010 WI 95, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615.  This court should 
adopt a meaning grounded in the statutory text.   
 
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3) states, "[i]n conveyances 
of lands words of inheritance shall not be necessary to create 
or convey a fee, and every conveyance shall pass all the estate 
or interest of the grantor unless a different intent shall 
appear expressly or by necessary implication in the terms of 
such conveyance."  In Borek, this court held both clauses of 
§ 706.10(3) apply to easements, although it acknowledged "a 
cursory reading of § 706.10(3) might suggest that its provisions 
do not govern easements[.]"  328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶22.  It then 
muddled 
the 
language 
of 
the 
two 
clauses 
and 
concluded 
§ 706.10(3) creates a presumption that an easement runs with the 
land unless the deed creating the easement "expressly or by 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
2 
 
necessary implication" says otherwise.  Section 706.10(3) has 
nothing to say about whether an easement runs with the land or 
is personal and non-transferrable. 
 
¶10 Applying 
a 
textual 
methodology 
of 
statutory 
interpretation leads inexorably to the conclusion that the 
statute's first clause governs only a document creating or 
conveying a fee.  See generally State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(embracing the textualist approach to statutory interpretation).  
The court was not asked to interpret such a document in Borek, 
nor has it been asked to in this case.   
 
¶11 "An easement is something quite different from a fee 
or a limited fee.  In the one case title does not pass, but only 
a right of use or privilege in the land of another.  In the 
other cases the title does pass, even though the use be 
limited."  Polebitski v. John Week Lumber Co., 157 Wis. 377, 
381, 147 N.W. 703 (1914); see also Colson v. Salzman, 272 
Wis. 397, 
401, 
75 
N.W. 421 
(1956) 
(citing 
Polebitski 
as 
establishing "that an easement differs from a fee or a limited 
fee in that in case of an easement title does not pass but only 
a right to use or privilege in the land of another").  This 
court did not address Polebitski or other cases reciting this 
black letter law, although the dissent relied heavily on them.  
Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶57–63 & nn.7–9 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting).   
 
¶12 The second clause, while applicable to easements, was 
irrelevant in Borek, and it is in this case as well.  After an 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
3 
 
easement is created, the second clause codifies a strong 
presumption that a transfer of the easement passes all interest 
in the easement.  If the interest is only personal, attempting 
to transfer it does not create a right of transferability.  Id., 
¶67.   
 
¶13 Only this court can fix its misinterpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 706.10(3) in Borek.  See Johnson v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶21, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (quoted 
source omitted).  Short of legislative action, unless this court 
overturns Borek, its erroneous rule will continue to govern 
easements.  This need not be the case.  "Because these decisions 
are objectively wrong, we must overturn them in fulfilling our 
duty to properly interpret the law."  Friends of Frame Park, 
U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI __, ¶42, __ Wis. 2d __, __ 
N.W.2d __ (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (citing Wenke 
v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405).  
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision not to 
decide the law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶14 This case involves a dispute among neighbors.  The 
record contains the diagram below.  Gary King's property, shown 
in purple, is landlocked.  The Cobbs' property is shown in 
yellow.  King moves through the Cobbs' property, along the path 
marked by a series of red "X"s, to enter and exit his property.  
Whether he has an ingress/egress easement giving him a legal 
right to move along the path for this purpose turns on whether 
the 
Cobbs' 
predecessors-in-interest 
conveyed 
to 
King's 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
4 
 
predecessors an easement running with the land or merely a 
personal, non-transferrable easement. 
 
 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶15 In 1978, the Cobbs' predecessors, the Rierdons, 
granted an ingress/egress easement to the Hessils, King's 
predecessors.  In relevant part, the deed creating the easement 
states: 
The undersigned, BARBARA RIERDON, GERALD GEHLING AND 
MARGARET GEHLING, wife of GERALD GEHLING, being 
holders and owners to the same, do hereby, in 
consideration of One Dollar and other good and 
valuable consideration, grant, convey, give over and 
allow to HERBERT HESSIL and JEAN HESSIL, his wife, a 
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of 
vehicular traffic only to the following described 
property[.] 
The easement was recorded with the Oconto County Register of 
Deeds. 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶16 In the 1980s, the Rierdons sold their land to the 
Cobbs.  The land contract noted the property was "SUBJECT to an 
easement[.]"  In 2009, the Hessils conveyed their property to 
King and Melissa Hermes.  This conveyance did not mention the 
easement.  Hermes subsequently executed a quitclaim deed to 
King. 
¶17 The Cobbs sued King, seeking a declaration that the 
easement conveyed by the Rierdons to the Hessils was personal to 
the Hessils, i.e., that King has no right to the easement.  They 
also sought injunctive relief.  King counterclaimed for a 
declaration that the easement ran with the land and was 
transferred to him by the Hessils.  
 
¶18 King moved for summary judgment, which the circuit 
court granted.1  The circuit court reasoned that words of 
inheritance, such as "heirs and assigns," are unnecessary for an 
easement to run with the land.  The Cobbs appealed and lost 
because the court of appeals was bound by Borek.2  The court of 
appeals explained: 
King correctly argues that Borek . . . controls our 
decision of whether Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) applies to 
easements. . . .   
The Borek decision made clear that . . . § 706.10(3) 
applies to easements, thus precluding the Cobbs' 
argument that the statute does not apply in this case.  
We are bound by this controlling precedent.[3]   
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jay N. Conley, Oconto County, presided. 
2 Cobb v. King, No. 2020AP925, slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 
11, 2021) (per curiam). 
3 Id., ¶¶18, 20 (internal citation omitted). 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
7 
 
This court granted the Cobbs' petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶19 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which this court reviews independently.  Eau 
Claire Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. S.E., 2021 WI 56, ¶13, 397 
Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 391 (citing State v. Stephenson, 2020 WI 
92, ¶18, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819).  Whether to dismiss a 
petition as improvidently granted is a discretionary decision.  
Cf. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) (explaining whether to grant 
a petition is "a matter of judicial discretion").4   
                                                 
4 "The construction of an unambiguous deed is . . . a 
question of law.  However, if the language of the deed is 
ambiguous, then the intent behind the language presents a 
question of fact."  Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶23, 326 
Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432 (citations omitted). 
The construction of the deed is beyond the scope of my 
writing because my primary concern is with the Borek majority's 
erroneous 
statutory 
interpretation. 
 
Even 
if 
this 
court 
overturned Borek, the Cobbs' argument might not prevail for 
another reason.  The circuit court concluded that the easement 
is appurtenant.  An "appurtenant easement" is "[a]n easement 
created to benefit another tract of land, the use of easement 
being 
incident 
to 
the 
ownership 
of 
that 
other 
tract."  
Appurtenant easement, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
Arguably, such an easement is presumed to run with the land.  
See, e.g., Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of 
Easements & Licenses in Land § 9:1 (updated Apr. 2022) ("Unless 
prevented by the terms of its creation, an easement appurtenant 
is transferred with the dominant property even if this is not 
mentioned in the instrument of transfer."); 25 Am. Jur. 
Easements and Licenses § 9 ("[A]n easement appurtenant runs with 
the land."); 28A C.J.S. Easements § 17 ("An easement appurtenant 
runs with the land, which is to say that the benefit conveyed by 
or the duty owed under the easement passes with the ownership of 
the land to which it is appurtenant."). 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
8 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Borek & Its Clear Errors 
 
¶20 Borek's facts are indistinguishable from the facts of 
this case.  Carl Nemitz purchased an easement from Jackson 
County.  328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶1.  The deed granted water flowage 
rights to "CARL NEMITZ, his heirs, and assigns" and sand removal 
rights to "the Grantee," who the document identified as "CARL 
NEMITZ."  Id.  Nemitz transferred the land to the Boreks, who 
then transferred it to Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. (BCM).  Id.  
When BCM attempted to remove sand, the county objected, claiming 
the sand removal rights did not run with the land.  Id., ¶2.  
BCM sued.  Id. 
 
¶21 This court held the easement ran with the land.  It 
reasoned 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) 
governs 
easements; 
then, 
twisting the text, it concluded the sand removal rights could be 
transferred because the deed did not contain an "express 
statement" or "necessary implication" that the easement was 
"only a limited, non-transferable right[.]"  Id., ¶3.  The 
negative implication that could be drawn based on the presence 
of words of inheritance for the water flowage rights and their 
conspicuous absence from the sand removal rights was not a 
"necessary" implication.  
Error 1:  Ignoring the Text & Mixing Two Independent Clauses 
 
¶22 The Borek majority did not start with the statute's 
language.  "[T]he beginning seems to be more than half the 
whole, and many of the points being sought seem to become 
manifest on account of it."  Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
9 
 
No. 2022AP91, unpublished order (Wis. Mar. 28, 2022) (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
ch.7 (approximately 340 B.C.)).  An opinion resting on a weak 
foundation is not be entitled to application of stare decisis.  
See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶259, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, 
971 
N.W.2d 402 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting), summarily rev'd sub. nom., Wis. Legislature v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (2022) (per 
curiam) ("The primary and most important factor to weigh in 
considering whether to overrule an earlier decision is its 
correctness."  (quoting Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of 
Judicial Precedent 397 (2016))). 
 
¶23 In dissent, then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson 
explained Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) has two clauses, "each complete 
by itself and capable of standing as a separate sentence."  
Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶53 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
Section 706.10(3), broken into those clauses, provides: 
1. In conveyances of lands words of inheritance shall 
not be necessary to create or convey a fee, and 
2. every conveyance shall pass all the estate or 
interest of the grantor unless a different intent 
shall appear expressly or by necessary implication 
in the terms of such conveyance. 
"As written, the first clause of . . . § 706.10(3) provides that 
in conveyances of lands, words of inheritance (that is, words 
like 'heirs' and 'assigns') are not necessary to create or 
convey a fee."   Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶55.  "The second 
clause . . . provides that every conveyance shall pass all of 
the estate or interest of the grantor unless a different 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
10 
 
implication appears expressly or by necessary implication in the 
terms of such conveyance."  Id., ¶56.  Legislative history 
(discussed in more detail in the next section), confirms the 
independence of these clauses.  Id., ¶¶74–80. 
 
¶24 The 
first 
clause 
has 
two 
key 
phrases:  
(1) "conveyances of land"; and (2) "create or convey a fee."  
The clause does not apply to every document that could be deemed 
a 
"conveyance 
of 
land" 
but 
"only 
to 
a 
subset 
of 
conveyances . . . that 'create or convey a fee.'"  Id., ¶60.  
While an easement could be a conveyance of land,5 it certainly is 
not a fee.  See id., ¶57.  "[I]t is abundantly clear that the 
granting of easement does not convey title to the land to an 
easement holder but only a right or privilege."  Id., ¶58 
(citing Polebitski, 157 Wis. at 381); see also Berger v. Town of 
New Denmark, 2012 WI App 26, ¶¶12–14, 339 Wis. 2d 336, 810 
N.W.2d 833 (noting the common law distinction between a fee and 
an easement).  Chief Justice Abrahamson correctly concluded, 
"[t]he conveyance of the easement for water flowage and the 
conveyance of sand removal rights in the instant case are not 
conveyances of land creating a fee within the scope of the first 
clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3)."  Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶60. 
                                                 
5 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Borek noted that 
"land" 
is 
a 
statutorily-defined 
term. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(18) notes:  "'Land' includes lands, tenements and 
hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein."  
Given this definition, a deed granting an easement could be a 
conveyance of land because the deed creates a "right[]" or 
"interest[]" in land.  Regardless, the deed would not create or 
convey a fee.  
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
11 
 
 
¶25 The second clause applies more broadly to "every 
conveyance."  Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  Notably, an easement is 
not an "estate[.]"  Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶66.  "This court 
has repeatedly affirmed that an easement 'does not create an 
estate in land,' but rather 'a right to use the land of another 
for a special purpose not inconsistent with the general property 
in the owner.'"  Id., ¶58 (quoting Hunter v. McDonald, 78 
Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977)).  "[A] right or 
privilege is not an estate.  The grantor of an easement is not 
passing an estate."  Id., ¶66.  A grantor, however, may convey 
an "interest" in an easement.  Id., ¶67.  Therefore: 
[I]f an easement holder conveys the easement, the 
entire interest the grantor holds in the easement is 
transferred, unless there is a different expressed 
intent or necessary implication.  If, however, the 
holder of the easement owns less than a full interest—
—let us say she owns a one-half interest in the 
dominant estate and thus a one-half interest in the 
easement——she 
then 
conveys 
all 
of 
her 
one-half 
interest unless a different intent shall appear 
expressly or by necessary implication. 
Id.  While the second clause applies to easements, it was no 
more relevant in Borek than the first.  The focus of the case 
was on the type of interest (personal or transferrable) 
initially 
created, 
not 
whether 
the 
interest 
had 
been 
subsequently transferred in full.  Id., ¶78. 
 
¶26 Because the first clause does not apply, it does not 
foreclose the Cobbs' argument that the lack of words of 
inheritance in the deed indicates King's predecessors received a 
personal, non-transferrable easement.  The second clause is not 
particularly relevant either because if King's predecessors did 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
12 
 
not receive a transferrable right, no reason exists to even 
consider whether the Hessils' conveyance of the dominant estate 
to King also transferred their easement.  As the Cobbs put it, 
"Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) fails to apply because its second clause 
confirmed only what King received, not what the Hessils (his 
grantors) acquired."  Instead of recognizing the independent 
nature of the first and second clause, the Borek majority melded 
the clauses together. 
 
¶27 "The [Borek] majority bypasse[d] the precise language 
and 
structure 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) 
and 
breezily 
paraphrase[d] the two clauses[.]"  Id., ¶68.  The majority is 
difficult to follow, but as Chief Justice Abrahamson summarized: 
The majority's construction seems to use words of the 
first clause addressing words of inheritance to modify 
the second clause.  At the same time the majority 
takes the words "unless a different intent shall 
appear," which appears only in the second clause, and 
construes them to modify the first clause.   
Id., ¶71.  Stated differently: 
[T]he majority mixes and matches words from the two 
clauses of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) to conclude (1) that 
words of inheritance shall not be necessary in any 
conveyance of lands, of an estate, or of an interest 
in land; (2) that every conveyance of an interest in 
land automatically implies words of inheritance (that 
is, that every conveyance of an interest in land 
includes the right of the grantee to transfer the same 
interest in the future); and (3) that a different 
intent, such as the intent that the conveyed interest 
in land be nontransferable, must appear expressly or 
by 
necessary 
implication 
in 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
conveyance. 
Id., ¶70.  At other points, the majority also seemed to read 
words into the statute.  Id., ¶69 ("The majority substitutes 
'full title' for the words 'estate' and 'interest.'  The 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
13 
 
majority does not explain why the words 'estate' and 'interest' 
can be transformed into the words 'full title' and does not 
explain the significance of the words 'full title.'").  "This 
interpretation contravenes the plain text of the statute."  Id., 
¶71. 
 
¶28 The Borek majority "usurped the legislative function" 
when it chose to "rewrit[e] the statute."  St. Augustine Sch. v. 
Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶125, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Having misconstrued 
the statute, this court should not sidestep its duty to restore 
its meaning.  Id. ("The majority's refusal to correct Vanko's 
irrefutably erroneous interpretation of the law 'does not 
comport with our duty [to exercise our constitutionally-vested 
'judicial power'] because it elevates demonstrably erroneous 
decisions——meaning decisions outside the realm of permissible 
interpretation——over the text of . . . duly enacted . . . law."  
(quoting Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 
1981 (2019) (Thomas J., concurring)) (modifications in the 
original)). 
Error 2:  Misapplying the Borrowed-Statute Doctrine 
 
¶29 The majority in Borek started its statutory analysis 
by giving undue weight to pseudo-legislative history disguised 
as statutory history.6  The majority noted a predecessor statute 
                                                 
6 Statutory history is a part of a proper "plain meaning 
analysis"; legislative history is not.  See generally Brey v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶¶20-21, 400 
Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (explaining "[s]tatutory history, 
which involves comparing the statute with its prior versions, 
'may . . . be used as part of a "plain meaning analysis"'" while 
"legislative history," which is primarily "the byproduct of 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
14 
 
to Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) was partly based on a New York statute 
enacted in 1835.  Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶19 (majority op.) 
(quoting 1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 5, § 1 (1835)).  
It came to this conclusion based on an annotation in an 1889 
codification of the Wisconsin statutes, which stated the 
predecessor statute had been composed partly "with additions of 
words from the New York statute to give it full effect."  Id., 
¶18 (quoting the annotation). 
 
¶30 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent provides a more 
detailed historical analysis.  As she explained, in 1874 the 
Wisconsin legislature adopted "the near-verbatim equivalent of 
the first clause of the present [Wis. Stat.] § 706.10(3)."  Id., 
¶74 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  "In 1878, the legislature 
then amended the statute.  It added additional language that 
would become the forerunner of the second clause of the present 
version of § 706.10(3).  The legislative history thus confirms 
that § 706.10(3) is composed of two distinct clauses with 
distinct origins and independent operation."  Id., ¶75. 
 
¶31 Well after 1878, New York's intermediate appellate 
court purportedly held "an easement" is "an estate in fee" under 
the New York statute.7  Id., ¶19 (majority op.) (quoting Whitney 
                                                                                                                                                             
legislation" does not evidence plain meaning (quoted sources 
omitted)); Wis. Judicial Comm'n v. Woldt, 2021 WI 73, ¶81, 398 
Wis. 2d 482, 
961 
N.W.2d 854 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting) (distinguishing statutory history from 
legislative history). 
7 The Borek majority, or at least some of its members, may 
have been operating under a common, yet faulty, assumption.  New 
York's high court is called the "New York Court of Appeals."  
Its lower court is called the "New York Supreme Court," which 
consists of a trial division and an appellate division.   
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
15 
 
v. Richardson, 13 N.Y.S. 861, 862 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1891)).  
Oddly, this New York case, Whitney, takes center stage in 
Borek's analysis.  
 
¶32 The majority appears to have relied on a corrupted 
version of the "Borrowed-Statute Doctrine."  See Garner et al., 
The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 716.  According to a leading 
treatise, this doctrine holds: 
When one state enacts another state's statutory 
language that has a settled judicial interpretation, 
it 
is 
sometimes 
presumed 
that 
the 
settled 
interpretation is adopted with the statute.  But this 
overstates the matter:  properly viewed, the decision 
of the source state's high court on a point concerning 
the statute are merely persuasive precedents and are 
not binding on the courts of the borrowing state. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority noted the decision was from "the Supreme Court 
of New York," suggesting it wanted to highlight the prestige of 
that 
institution 
to 
increase 
the 
persuasiveness 
of 
its 
reasoning.  Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson Cnty., 2010 
WI 95, ¶19, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615 (citing Whitney v. 
Richardson, 13 N.Y.S. 861, 862 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1891)).  Compare 
Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 243 (2016) 
("A court's rank and standing are important in considering a 
precedent's weight.  Great deference is paid to those courts 
possessing an acknowledged reputation for learning and ability 
or a special and intimate familiarly with the branch of the law 
to which the decision in question relates.") and id. at 655 
("Whether construing a state's constitution, statutes, or 
regulations, or for that matter developing common law, the state 
high court has the final say——and thus final authority——over the 
interpretation of its own state's laws."), with id. at 253 
("Opinions of trial and other inferior courts generally rank low 
on the scale of authority but may be followed by higher courts 
or courts of another jurisdiction when no precedent exists or 
for other special reasons.").  This notation, however, only 
serves to weaken the majority's reasoning——to place such weight 
on a decision from another state's intermediate appellate court 
is unusual. 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
16 
 
Id.  This doctrine derives from the (questionable) presumption 
that when a state's legislature adopts a statute based on 
language in another state's statute, it is aware of how that 
language has been interpreted and desires that interpretation to 
be applied in its state.  See id. at 717.  Multiple problems 
imbue the Borek majority's application of this doctrine. 
 
¶33 First, the borrowed-statute doctrine does not apply 
unless the other state's interpretation was rendered before the 
statute was enacted.  Id. at 722 ("The doctrine should never 
apply 
to 
judicial 
interpretations 
of 
the 
source 
statute 
occurring after its adoption."  (emphasis added)); 2B Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 52:2 (7th ed. updated Nov. 2021) ("When 
the state of origin interprets a statute after the adopting 
state statute has been enacted, courts do not presume the 
adopting state also adopted the subsequent construction.").  The 
reason why is clear:  a legislature does not have a crystal ball 
that tells it how some future court in another state will decide 
a case, so it obviously is not basing statutory language on that 
future decision.  See Garner et al., The Law of Judicial 
Precedent, at 722; see also Goodell v. Yezerski, 136 N.W. 451, 
452 (Mich. 1912) (explaining the borrowed-statute doctrine had 
no application "because the statute under consideration did not 
receive judicial construction [in the source state] . . . until 
long after its adoption by this state"). 
 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3)'s predecessor was adopted 
in 1878 (according to the Borek majority), and Whitney, the New 
York Supreme Court decision on which it relies, was decided over 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
17 
 
a decade later in 1891.  Whitney, the Borek majority claimed, 
was based on a New York Court of Appeals decision, but even that 
decision was rendered in 1888——a full decade after the statutory 
enactment.  Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶19 (citing Whitney, 13 
N.Y.S. at 862 (citing Nellis v. Munson, 15 N.E. 739, 741 
(1888))).  For this reason alone, the New York cases are no more 
persuasive than decisions from any other state——notwithstanding 
the Borek majority's fallacious claim that they deserve special 
weight because Wisconsin's statute was based on New York's.  See 
id., ¶21; see also Goodell, 136 N.W. at 452 (rejecting an 
argument to apply the borrowed-statute doctrine and noting the 
opinion from the source state "should receive just that 
consideration as authority to which it would be entitled under 
ordinary 
circumstances"); 
Sutherland 
§ 52:2 
("A 
subsequent 
construction in the state of origin is never more than 
'persuasive,' 
and 
usually 
has 
no 
more 
weight 
than 
the 
interpretation 
of 
any 
similar 
statute 
from 
another 
jurisdiction."). 
 
¶35 Second, Whitney is an intermediate appellate court 
decision.  The borrowed-statute doctrine does not apply (or at 
least applies with much less force) to decisions of lower 
courts——regardless of when they were rendered.  Garner et al., 
The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 722; see also Sutherland 
§ 52:2 ("Decisions from intermediate courts in the state of 
origin, and from administrative tribunals, have less effect than 
those of the highest court, because states normally adopt only 
decisions from a court of last resort when they adopt a 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
18 
 
statute."). 
 
Intermediate 
appellate 
courts 
decide 
an 
extraordinary number of cases, and whether a state legislature 
is aware of its own state intermediate appellate court's 
decisions is questionable——let alone those of another state.  
See Friends of Frame Park, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶¶57–68; see also 
Lewis v. State, 256 P. 1048, 1049–50 (Ariz. 1927) ("It is the 
general rule that when we take a statute from a sister state we 
take it with the interpretation previously placed upon it by the 
court of last resort of that state.  This, however, is not an 
absolute rule, and if we think the construction so given is not 
consonant with common sense, reason, and our public policy, we 
are not absolutely bound to accept it.  Still less are we bound 
when the decision is one of an intermediate appellate court, and 
rendered after we have adopted the statute."  (internal citation 
omitted)); Given v. Owen, 175 P. 345, 346 (Okla. 1918) ("The 
decision was handed down July 8, 1898, long after the adoption 
of the Kansas Code of Procedure by the territory of Oklahoma; 
for which reason, and the additional reason that the court 
rendering the opinion was not a court of last resort in the 
state of Kansas, this court will not hold itself bound by the 
construction promulgated."). 
 
¶36 Third, the Borek majority misread Whitney and Nellis.  
Whitney did not interpret the New York statute.  Borek, 328 
Wis. 2d 613, ¶77 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  In fact, it 
said very little on the topic at all.  While the Borek majority 
leaves the impression Whitney thoroughly analyzed this issue, 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
19 
 
the entire discussion of the statute is little more than a quote 
of the statutory text followed by a conclusory statement: 
1 Rev. St. 748, § 1, is as follows:  "The term 'heirs' 
or other words of inheritance shall not be requisite 
to create or convey an estate in fee, and every grant 
or devise of real estate, or any interest therein, 
hereafter to be executed, shall pass all the estate or 
interest of the grantor or testator, unless an intent 
to pass a less estate or interest shall appear by 
express terms, or be necessarily implied in the terms 
of such grant."  In Nellis v. Munson, 108 N. Y. 453, 
15 N. E. Rep. 739, it was adjudged that an easement to 
carry water across the lands of another, for the 
benefit of the dominant estate, is an interest in fee 
or of the freehold, within the meaning of the statute. 
In that case the instrument was not acknowledged or 
recorded.  It was therefore held to be void as against 
the purchaser.  In the case at bar the instrument was 
both acknowledged and recorded.  The omission of the 
words "heirs or assigns" did not limit the extent of 
the grant.  Nicoll v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. 121; Cole 
v. Lake Co., 54 N. H. 242, 243–278; Kirk v. 
Richardson, 32 Hun, 434, 435. 
Whitney, 13 N.Y.S. at 862–63.  The word "easement" appears 
exactly once in the entire opinion, in a passing reference to 
another case.  This passage is far from "sound reasoning" worthy 
of deference.  Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 
164; see also Friends of Frame Park, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶66 
(explaining a case's persuasiveness stems from "the decisive 
nature of the conclusions announced, and the deliberation and 
care with which they have been investigated"  (quoting John 
Cleland Wells, A Treatise on the Doctrine of Res Adjudicata and 
Stare Decisis 535 (1878))). 
 
¶37 Nellis is no more on point.  As Chief Justice 
Abrahamson noted in dissent, that case did not interpret the New 
York statute on which the Wisconsin statute was partly based.  
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
20 
 
Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶79.  Nellis interpreted another 
statute, on a related subject matter, which stated:   
Every grant in fee or of a freeehold estate shall be 
subscribed and sealed by the person from whom the 
estate or interest conveyed is intended to pass, or 
his lawful agent.  If not duly acknowledged previous 
to its delivery, . . . its execution and delivery 
shall be attested by at least one witness; or, if not 
so attested, it shall not take effect, as against a 
purchaser or incumbrancer, until so acknowledged. 
3 N.Y. Rev. Stat. § 137 (as quoted in Nellis, 15 N.E. at 740).  
An interpretation of a different statute, notwithstanding its 
similar subject matter, does not trigger the borrowed-statute 
doctrine.  See Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 
718 ("For the doctrine to have any persuasive force, the statute 
in the adopting state must be precisely the same as the one in 
the source state."  (emphasis added)).   
 
¶38 On a similar note, the Borek majority acknowledged 
Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) was revised and renumbered in 1969, but 
declared the changes "appear[ed]" to be merely "stylistic" 
edits.  Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶20 (majority op.).  The 1969 
law revised the statute as follows: 
In conveyances of lands, words of inheritance shall 
not be necessary to create or convey a fee, and every 
conveyance grant of lands or any interest therein 
shall pass all the estate or interest of the grantor, 
unless a different the intent to pass a less estate or 
interest shall appear expressly by express terms or by 
be necessary implication necessarily implied in the 
terms of such conveyance grant. 
Created by comparing 1969 Wis. Act 285, § 28, with Wis. Stat. 
§ 2206 (1878) (as quoted in Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶18).  These 
changes are substantive, not merely stylistic.  Regardless, the 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
21 
 
text of the statute the court interpreted in Borek was 
substantially different from the text of the statute purportedly 
interpreted by the New York courts, as even a "cursory" 
comparison of the two reveals.  See Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶22 
(acknowledging a "cursory reading § 706.10(3) might suggest that 
its provisions do not govern easements"). 
 
Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) 
1 N.Y. Rev. St. 748, § 1 (as 
quoted in Whitney) 
In conveyances of lands words 
of inheritance shall not be 
necessary to create or convey a 
fee, and every conveyance shall 
pass all the estate or interest 
of 
the 
grantor 
unless 
a 
different intent shall appear 
expressly 
or 
by 
necessary 
implication in the terms of 
such conveyance. 
The term 'heirs' or other words 
of inheritance shall not be 
requisite to create or convey 
an estate in fee, and every 
grant or devise of real estate, 
or 
any 
interest 
therein, 
hereafter to be executed, shall 
pass all the estate or interest 
of the grantor or testator, 
unless an intent to pass a less 
estate or interest shall appear 
by 
express 
terms, 
or 
be 
necessarily 
implied 
in 
the 
terms of such grant. 
Error 3:  Giving Too Much Weight to the Borrowed-Statute 
Doctrine 
 
¶39 The Borek majority failed to recognize the limited 
reach of the borrowed-statute doctrine.  Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Bryan A. Garner have called the canon "dubious[.]"  See 
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 325–26 (2012).  They asked 
rhetorically, "[h]ow is the competent lawyer (or the court, for 
that matter) to know that a statute has been 'copied' from that 
of another state?"  Id. at 326.  As they explain, resort to 
legislative history is often inappropriate.  Id.   
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
22 
 
 
¶40 Whether the borrowed-statute doctrine can even be 
considered an intrinsic source of statutory meaning, as the 
Borek majority seemed to treat it,8 is doubtful.  Indeed, at 
least one list of canons catalogs the doctrine under "extrinsic 
source canons."  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Foreword, Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 100 
(1994).  The doctrine exists as a particular application of 
legislative history, which may occasionally be useful to resolve 
an ambiguity.  See Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent, 
at 717–18 ("[T]he borrowed-statute doctrine is actually a 
tenuous canon of construction that typically requires an 
extensive use of legislative history (which is hardly a 
recommendation for it in the eyes of traditionalists).  Although 
some will consider the doctrine helpful as an occasional aid in 
statutory construction, it should never bind the courts when 
other interpretative tools indicate a better interpretation.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has viewed the principle this way[.]"). 
                                                 
8 The Borek majority reasoned, "if there were any doubt 
[about the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3)], courts in other 
states with similar statutes, including the New York statute 
upon which ours was based, have construed this language to apply 
to easements as well as conveyances of land."  328 Wis. 2d 613, 
¶21.  This statement indicates the court merely used the New 
York decisions to confirm § 706.10(3)'s plain meaning; however, 
the opinion read as a whole negates this possibility.  The 
opinion does not lead with a textual analysis; it dives right 
into legislative history to establish the Wisconsin Legislature 
considered the New York statute (although it did not adopt the 
statute verbatim), then it discusses the New York cases, and 
only then does it try to provide a rationale grounded in the 
text of the statute.  Id., ¶¶17–22. 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
23 
 
 
¶41 Additionally, overreliance on the borrowed-statute 
doctrine is inconsistent with this court's general hesitancy 
toward comparative law.  Even if two states have similar 
statutes, they may have vastly different methods of statutory 
interpretation.  "The hard truth of the matter is that American 
courts 
have 
no 
intelligible, 
generally 
accepted, 
and 
consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation."  Henry 
M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1169 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).  While Wisconsin 
courts have long employed textualism, not every state does.  See 
generally Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 
Marq. L. Rev. 969 (2017) (explaining the general consensus among 
Wisconsin 
judges 
to 
employ 
textualism 
is 
a 
notable 
accomplishment).  "This court has no apprehension about being a 
solitary beacon in the law if our position is based on a sound 
application of this state's jurisprudence."9  Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
 
¶42 The 
Borek 
majority 
never 
declared 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) ambiguous, so resort to extrinsic sources as the 
                                                 
9 The Borek majority stated in conclusory fashion that 
"[o]ther states with nearly identical language have similarly 
interpreted their statutes to include easements as well as 
conveyances of land."  328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶19 n.9 (citing two 
cases from the Iowa Supreme Court and one from the Missouri 
Court of Appeals).  Three cases from two states falls far short 
of a thorough survey.  Regardless, these cases are not on point.  
Id., ¶79 n.15 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority's 
reference to case law from other jurisdictions is inapposite.  
The statutes are not the same as Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  The 
cases revolve around the words 'heirs' or 'assigns.'"). 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
24 
 
basis for interpreting the statute is impermissible.  The 
opinion seems to search for ambiguity, but none exists.  See 
Lamar Cent. Outdoors, LLC v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2019 
WI 109, ¶18, 389 Wis. 2d 486, 936 N.W.2d 573 ("[S]tatutory 
interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a 
search for ambiguity."  (quoted source omitted)). 
Error 4:  Guessing Legislative "Intent" 
 
¶43 Much of the Borek opinion either implicitly or 
explicitly seeks to determine legislative intent.  Its emphasis 
on the borrowed-statute doctrine is but one example.  As one 
court recognized, "the purpose of the borrowed-statute doctrine 
is to predict what the Legislature intended when it enacted a 
substantive law."  Antilles Sch., Inc. v. Lembach, 64 V.I. 400, 
420 (2016) (cited source omitted). 
 
¶44 The majority concluded the 1969 changes "appear[ed]" 
stylistic because it was "unable to find any evidence, textual 
or extra-textual, that these revisions reflected a legislative 
intent to change the meaning of the statute."  Borek, 328 
Wis. 2d 613, ¶20 (emphasis added).  This court has long 
disavowed reliance on so-called "legislative intent," the search 
for which leads to pure judicial activism.  See, e.g., Townsend 
v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 WI 86, ¶24, 399 Wis. 2d 599, 967 
N.W.2d 21 (noting the court of appeals erred by relying on "its 
perception of legislative intent when construing a statute" 
instead of focusing on the words "the legislature actually 
enacted into law" (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 
387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165)).   
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
25 
 
 
¶45 The very idea that legislative intent is even possible 
to determine is a legal fiction: 
The notion that you can pluck statements from a couple 
of legislators or even from a committee report, which 
is usually written by some teenagers, and . . . very 
often not even read by the committee, much less read 
by the whole House, much less less read by the other 
House, . . . [and 
presume 
the 
statements] 
somehow 
[are] reflective of the intent of the whole Congress 
and of the President . . . it truly is the last 
surviving fiction in American law. 
Clean Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 2021 W I71, ¶90, 
398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Hoover Inst., Uncommon Knowledge with 
Justice Antonin Scalia, YouTube, at 17:40 (Oct. 30, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DaoLMW5AF4Y 
(modifications 
in 
the original)); see also Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 
WI 2, ¶103, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting) 
(calling 
"legislative 
intent" a fiction).   
 
¶46 Even if courts could somehow divine legislative 
intent, the Borek majority's claim that courts could determine 
it based on a lack of "extra-textual" evidence is extraordinary, 
particularly given the scant state of most Wisconsin legislative 
drafting files from the mid-twentieth century (and which do not 
exist at all for laws passed in the nineteenth century).10  The 
                                                 
10 Legislative history research, particularly for older laws 
in Wisconsin, is a notoriously difficult exercise.  See Michael 
J. Keane & Kristina Martinez, Researching Legislative History in 
Wisconsin, Wisconsin Briefs from the Legislative Reference 
Bureau, 
updated 
Nov. 
2014, 
1, 
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/digital/collection/p16831c
oll2/id/1238/rec/1 ("Researching the legislative history of a 
Wisconsin statute involves several practical obstacles.  The 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
26 
 
Borek majority never cited anything from the 1969 drafting file 
indicating the changes were stylistic; notably, its conclusory 
statement was prefaced with the word "appear":  "the changes 
appear merely stylistic."  Borek, 328 Wis. 2d 613, ¶20 (emphasis 
added). 
 
¶47 The majority also ignored one particularly important 
intrinsic source, which the dissent mentioned.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 706.001(3) provided then (and provides now), "[t]his chapter 
shall be liberally construed, in cases of conflict or ambiguity, 
so as to effectuate the intentions of parties who have acted in 
good faith."  The Borek majority "violate[d] this specific rule 
of construction by defeating the intent of the parties as 
manifest in the terms of the document itself."  Borek, 328 
Wis. 2d 613, ¶73 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
                                                                                                                                                             
legislative process in Wisconsin, as in many states, is not 
geared toward documenting legislative intent.  Many of the 
resources commonly associated with legislative intent research 
with respect to the United States Congress have no counterpart 
in the Wisconsin Legislature.  There is no verbatim record of 
floor speeches.  There are no formal reports of standing 
committees indicating the reasons why legislation should be 
enacted.  There is no transcript of committee proceedings.  
Without those resources, documentation of legislative intent 
must rely on other resources which are not necessarily relevant 
to intent, are often not useful, and usually must be interpreted 
in order to be helpful to the researcher at all."); see also 
Glendon M. Fisher, Jr. & William J. Harbison, Trends in the Use 
of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation, 3 Vand. L. 
Rev. 586, 591 (1950) ("In contrast with the situation in the 
Federal Government is that to be found in the average state, 
where 
almost 
no 
legislatively-created 
extrinsic 
aids 
are 
available to assist the courts in interpreting statutes."). 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
27 
 
B.  Stare Decisis Is Not Absolute 
¶48 Reflexively cloaking every judicial opinion with 
the adornment of stare decisis threatens the rule of 
law, particularly when applied to interpretations 
wholly unsupported by the statute's text. 
Manitowoc Cnty. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6, ¶81 n.5, 379 Wis. 2d 189, 
906 
N.W.2d 130 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring).  
"[S]tare decisis is a judicially-created policy and 'not an 
inexorable command;' for this reason, we will overturn precedent 
if it is objectively wrong."  Friends of Frame Park, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶64 (quoting Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶97).  
The majority in this case allows an erroneous interpretation of 
a statute to prevail over the statute's actual text; however, 
"[w]e cannot mistake 'the law' for 'the opinion of the judge' 
because 'the judge may mistake the law.'"  Johnson, 400 
Wis. 2d 626, ¶259 (quoting Introduction, William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *71).  "[W]e do more damage to the rule of law by 
obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating 
injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision."  Friends 
of Frame Park, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶65 (quoting State v. Roberson, 
2019 WI 102, ¶49, 389 Wis. 2d 813, 935 N.W.2d 813). 
 
¶49 Borek's analysis is "unsound in principle" because it 
employed an approach to statutory interpretation inconsistent 
with the textual approach reaffirmed in Kalal.  Id., ¶95 (citing 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633).  "Kalal was a 'watershed decision in 
the modern history of the Wisconsin Supreme Court' and is 
Wisconsin's 'most cited case of modern times.'"  Clean Wis., 
Inc., 398 Wis. 2d 386, ¶86 (quoting Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin 
Statutes, at 969–70).  By one scholar's count, as of 2017, "the 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
28 
 
case ha[d] already been cited in over 800 subsequent published 
decisions 
of 
Wisconsin's 
appellate 
courts[.]" 
 
Suhr, 
Interpreting 
Wisconsin 
Statutes, 
969. 
 
Strikingly, 
Borek 
contains not a single reference to Kalal. 
 
¶50 Borek is an outlier.  Even if Borek reached the 
correct outcome, its analysis demands reconsideration and 
correction.  Allowing Borek to stand embeds this court's error 
in the law.  See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 192 (Richard Tuck ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) ("No man's error becomes his 
own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it.  Neither (for the 
same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges."). 
 
¶51 While property owners who have structured their 
decisions around Borek have a reliance interest, Wisconsin's 
interest in correct interpretations of the law is paramount in 
preserving the rule of law.  The deed in this case pre-dates 
Borek, as do all conveyances, so neither party can claim a 
reliance interest.  As for other deeds that post-date Borek, 
this court could apply its holding prospectively. 
C.  The Majority's Erroneous Exercise of Discretion 
 
¶52 This case presents a compelling issue, worthy of this 
court's reconsideration.  No other court in the state can 
address the problem this court created.  "Dismissing a case as 
improvidently granted is thankfully an uncommon occurrence in 
this court."  Fond Du Lac Cnty. v. S.N.W., 2021 WI 41, ¶2, 396 
Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 520 (mem) (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
dissenting from the opinion dismissing the petition for review 
as improvidently granted).  To grant a petition is to recognize 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
29 
 
a case as important and parties "expend[] substantial effort and 
resources" to inform our decisionmaking.  Id., ¶3. 
 
¶53 The 
majority's 
decision 
to 
declare 
this 
case 
improvidently granted is peculiar.  The majority must believe 
one of two faulty premises:  (1) Borek is clearly correct; or 
(2) even if Borek is questionable, stare decisis necessitates 
adherence to it.  Borek is clearly incorrect.  Its faulty 
reasoning produced a misinterpretation of law.  No principle 
forming the doctrine of stare decisis compels upholding Borek.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶54 Stare decisis does not create rigid rules that cement 
faulty interpretations of law.  Consistency for consistency's 
sake unavoidably perpetuates injustice.  The majority in this 
case fails to recognize the limited role of stare decisis, 
leaving the impression that once an issue has been decided, the 
decision may never be reexamined. 
¶55 In the matter of reforming things, as distinct 
from deforming them, there is one plain and simple 
principle; a principle which will probably be called a 
paradox.  There exists in such a case a certain 
institution or law; let us say, for the sake of 
simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road.  
The more modern type of reformer goes [happily] up to 
it and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us 
clear it away."  To which the more intelligent type of 
reformer will do well to answer:  "If you don't see 
the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it 
away.  Go away and think.  Then, when you can come 
back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may 
allow you to destroy it." 
G.K. Chesterton, The Thing:  Why I am Catholic 27 (Dodd, Mead 
and Co., Inc. 1930).  Properly understood, stare decisis should 
be applied as Chesterton's more intelligent type of reformer 
No.  2020AP925.rgb 
 
30 
 
would have it.  Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶203–04, 393 
Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Kelly, J., concurring/dissenting).  
Making this analogy, Justice Daniel Kelly explained the purpose 
of stare decisis:  "To remind us that those who came before were 
diligent and capable in their work, and that in doubtful matters 
it is best to leave settled things settled unless there is a 
clear and present need to do otherwise."  Id., ¶203.  An ill-
reasoned court opinion should not be "a permanent fence[.]"  
Id., ¶204.  When an answer can be given to Chesterton's more 
intelligent type of reformer, that is, when a later court can 
identify precisely how an earlier court went wrong, the fence 
may come down. 
 
¶56 The Borek majority erected a fence where one did not 
belong.  In this case, the majority reinforces that fence, 
without so much as an explanation.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2020AP925.bh 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  I dissent because 
I would address the questions presented rather than dismissing 
the case as improvidently granted. 
 
No.  2020AP925.bh 
 
 
 
1