Title: State v. Cooper
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP000375-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2019

2019 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP375-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tyrus Lee Cooper, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 380 Wis. 2d 508,913 N.W.2d 514 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 15, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph M. Donald 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
DALLET, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Nora E. Gierke and Gierke Law LLC, Wauwatosa. There was 
an oral argument by Nora E. Gierke. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer. 
 
 
2019 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP375-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF2815) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tyrus Lee Cooper, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Mr. Tyrus Lee Cooper moved the 
circuit court, prior to sentencing, to withdraw his guilty plea.  
The circuit court refused his request.  Two years later, we 
disciplined his attorney (Michael J. Hicks) for professional 
misconduct that included his handling of Mr. Cooper's defense.1  
Mr. Cooper believes our opinion in that disciplinary proceeding 
proved his counsel had provided ineffective assistance in his 
                                                 
1 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 2016 
WI 31, 368 Wis. 2d 108, 877 N.W.2d 848. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
2 
 
criminal case.  That, he says, is a "fair and just reason" for 
withdrawing his plea.  For the following reasons, we disagree.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Mr. Cooper was charged with a single count of armed 
robbery as a party to a crime.3  The State Public Defender 
appointed Mr. Hicks to represent Mr. Cooper after the circuit 
court permitted his previous counsel to withdraw.  Shortly 
afterwards, Mr. Cooper wrote to Mr. Hicks (in January of 2013) 
requesting a copy of discovery materials and raising concerns 
about his case——requests and concerns that he would repeat in 
subsequent letters.  On October 8, 2013, which was approximately 
two weeks before his scheduled trial, Mr. Cooper personally 
wrote to the circuit court to claim that Mr. Hicks was 
interfering with his right to aid in his defense.  He said Mr. 
Hicks had not provided him with a copy of the discovery 
materials and had failed to subpoena key witnesses.  He also 
said he had not spoken to Mr. Hicks, by phone or in person, and 
therefore could not be prepared for trial. 
                                                 
2 This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision affirming the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable M. Joseph Donald presiding.  State v. Cooper, No. 
2016AP375-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 
2018). 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1)(a), Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2), and 
Wis. Stat. § 939.05 (2017-18).  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Shortly before trial, the State offered to recommend a 
sentence of three years of initial confinement and three years 
of extended supervision if Mr. Cooper pled guilty as charged.  
He agreed, and on October 21, 2013, the circuit court heard his 
plea.  Prior to accepting it, the circuit court4 confirmed that 
Mr. Cooper understood the plea agreement, maximum penalties, and 
elements of the charge.  In response to the circuit court's 
questions, Mr. Cooper affirmatively asserted that he was aware 
of the constitutional rights he was waiving.  The circuit court 
confirmed on the record that Mr. Cooper was of sound mind and 
capable of "freely, knowingly, and voluntarily"5 entering the 
plea. 
¶4 
The circuit court specifically asked Mr. Cooper about 
the allegations he made in his letter of October 8, 2013.  Mr. 
Cooper stated that he wanted the circuit court to take "[n]o 
actions" with respect to the letter and indicated that he wanted 
                                                 
4 The Honorable Dennis Flynn presided over the plea hearing 
while the Honorable M. Joseph Donald presided over the hearing 
of Mr. Cooper's motion to withdraw his plea.   
5 Our statutes require that a plea be "made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).  Wisconsin 
courts typically express this standard as requiring a plea made 
"knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently," rather than one 
that is "freely, knowingly, and voluntarily" made.  But we have 
concluded before that there is no substantive difference between 
the two phraseologies. See State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶¶25, 57, 
317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794 (concluding "that the defendant 
entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" 
despite the circuit court finding "a free, knowing and voluntary 
plea"). 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
4 
 
the letter "disposed of."  Mr. Cooper's final statement with 
respect to his plea was "I fully understand.  I feel confident 
in what I did."  The circuit court set sentencing for January 9, 
2014. 
¶5 
Approximately 
three 
weeks 
before 
sentencing, 
Mr. 
Cooper personally sent another letter to the circuit court, this 
time asking to withdraw his plea "due to the fact of ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  Mr. Cooper wrote that he was unaware 
that Mr. Hicks had been suspended from practicing law during 
part of his representation.6  And he claimed Mr. Hicks lied by 
failing to notify him of his suspension.  He also said Mr. Hicks 
misled him into accepting the plea by stating he was destined to 
lose at trial.  The circuit court allowed Mr. Hicks to withdraw 
as counsel and rescheduled the sentencing hearing.  
¶6 
Mr. Cooper's newly-appointed counsel formally moved to 
withdraw the plea.  The motion asserts that the issues raised in 
the October 2013 letter were not resolved before the circuit 
court accepted the plea.  It repeats many of the concerns Mr. 
Cooper listed in that letter, including that Mr. Hicks had not 
met with him from December 2012 until October 8, 2013, to 
discuss his case, and that Mr. Hicks failed to provide him with 
a copy of discovery materials.  The motion also repeats the 
assertion that he had been unaware that Mr. Hicks' law license 
                                                 
6 Mr. Hicks' law license was temporarily suspended from 
February 12, 2013, through March 11, 2013, for reasons unrelated 
to his representation of Mr. Cooper.  Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, 
¶9. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
5 
 
had been suspended.  Finally, Mr. Cooper alleged that he did not 
knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. 
¶7 
At the hearing on the plea-withdrawal motion, Mr. 
Cooper's new counsel said that if Mr. Cooper had known Mr. 
Hicks' license had been suspended, he would have asked for 
another lawyer.  He also asserted that Mr. Cooper entered his 
plea in haste because he believed his attorney was not prepared 
for trial.  However, Mr. Cooper's counsel also indicated that, 
if the circuit court granted his motion, Mr. Cooper might just 
enter the same plea because he was satisfied with the State's 
recommendation.  Mr. Cooper testified at the hearing and claimed 
that he had believed part of the plea agreement included 
reducing the armed robbery charge to something with a lower 
maximum penalty.  He did not say what he believed the reduced 
charge would have been.  The circuit court questioned Mr. Cooper 
on this point, noting that the charge to which he pled had been 
read to him at the plea hearing, as well as its elements and the 
maximum penalty, and that he had affirmatively responded that he 
understood and wanted to enter his plea.  Mr. Cooper said he 
thought the circuit court was required to read the original 
charge, but that he would actually be convicted of a lesser 
offense.   
¶8 
The circuit court denied Mr. Cooper's motion on June 
27, 2014 (a date that will have some significance to our 
analysis).  It concluded that the plea colloquy demonstrated 
that Mr. Cooper knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered his plea, and that the matters in the October 8, 2013, 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
6 
 
letter had been properly addressed.  It also concluded that 
granting Mr. Cooper's motion would cause substantial prejudice 
to the State.  The circuit court made no factual findings 
regarding communications between Mr. Hicks and Mr. Cooper.  In 
due course, the circuit court sentenced Mr. Cooper to five years 
of confinement and five years of extended supervision.  Mr. 
Cooper appealed. 
¶9 
Two years after Mr. Cooper moved to withdraw his plea 
(and while his appeal was pending), we decided a disciplinary 
case brought by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) against 
Mr. Hicks.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 
2016 WI 31, 368 Wis. 2d 108, 877 N.W.2d 848.  After initially 
contesting the charges, Mr. Hicks withdrew his answer and filed 
a written "no contest" plea, agreeing that the referee could use 
the complaint's facts as a basis for identifying violations of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.7  Id., ¶¶6-7.  
Based on that representation, the OLR referee concluded that Mr. 
Hicks had engaged in nineteen acts of misconduct, including five 
                                                 
7 The OLR complaint is not in the record in this proceeding.  
However, the complaint was in the record in Hicks, 368 
Wis. 2d 108.  This court has a practice of judicially noticing 
files of cases that have previously come before this court.  See 
Deluhery v. Sisters of St. Mary, 244 Wis. 254, 255-56, 12 
N.W.2d 49 (1943); see also Sisson v. Hansen Storage Co., 2008 
WI App 111, ¶11, 313 Wis. 2d 411, 756 N.W.2d 667 ("'Judicial 
notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding,' . . . and 
this means that an appellate court may take judicial notice when 
that is appropriate[.]" (citations omitted)). 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
7 
 
that related to his representation of Mr. Cooper.  Id., ¶¶6, 28.8  
The OLR's complaint said that Mr. Hicks had failed to provide 
requested discovery documents to Mr. Cooper and failed to notify 
him and the circuit court of his license suspension for part of 
the time he was representing Mr. Cooper.  Id., ¶¶23, 26.  The 
                                                 
8 The OLR complaint's formal accusations of misconduct, as 
far as they relate to Mr. Hicks' representation of Mr. Cooper, 
are as follows:  
[Count Thirteen] By failing between the date on which 
he received [Mr. Cooper's] letter in January 2013 and 
February 12, 2013, between March 11, 2013 and August 
16, 2013, and between August 18, 2013 and October 20, 
2013, to communicate with [Mr. Cooper] regarding the 
issues raised in [Mr. Cooper's] January 2013 letter 
and to otherwise consult with [Mr. Cooper] regarding 
trial strategy and preparation, thereby preventing 
[Mr. 
Cooper] 
from 
adequately 
understanding 
and 
participating in his own defense, [Attorney] Hicks 
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2). 
[Count Fourteen] By failing to timely provide [Mr. 
Cooper] 
with 
a 
complete 
copy 
of 
the 
discovery 
materials, despite [Mr. Cooper's] requests, [Attorney] 
Hicks violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). 
[Count Fifteen] By failing to provide a written notice 
to [Mr. Cooper] of his February 12, 2013 suspension, 
[Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b). 
[Count Sixteen] By failing to provide written notice 
to the court and opposing counsel in [Mr. Cooper's 
pending criminal case] that his license to practice 
law 
had 
been 
suspended 
on 
February 
12, 
2013, 
[Attorney] Hicks violated SCR 22.26 (1)(c). 
[Count Seventeen] By failing to timely file a response 
to [Mr. Cooper's] grievance, [Attorney] Hicks violated 
SCR 22.03(2) and (6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶28 (some alterations in original). 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
8 
 
complaint also said that Mr. Hicks did not discuss preparation 
for trial with Mr. Cooper, nor did he address the issues raised 
in Mr. Cooper's letters.  Id., ¶¶23-24.  Based on these facts, 
the OLR referee concluded, as a matter of law, that Mr. Hicks' 
misconduct 
"prevent[ed] 
[Mr. 
Cooper] 
from 
adequately 
understanding and participating in his own defense" in violation 
of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).9  Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶28.   
¶10 After reviewing the referee's report, we accepted his 
"factual findings as taken from the OLR's complaint."  Id., ¶39.  
We also agreed "with the referee that those factual findings are 
sufficient to support a legal conclusion that Attorney Hicks 
engaged in the professional misconduct set forth in the 19 
counts" contained in the OLR's complaint.  Id.  
¶11 On appeal, Mr. Cooper argued (in part) that our 
decision in Hicks established that he had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel prior to entering his guilty plea.  The 
court of appeals considered the well-known analytical structure 
we use to assess such claims10 and concluded that Mr. Cooper had 
                                                 
9 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.4(a)(2) provides in pertinent 
part:  "(a) A lawyer shall:  . . . (2) reasonably consult with 
the client about the means by which the client's objectives are 
to be accomplished . . . ." 
10 "First, 
the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
counsel's 
performance was deficient. . . .  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is reliable."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
9 
 
failed to show the allegedly deficient performance caused him 
prejudice.  Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court.  State v. Cooper, No. 2016AP375-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).   
¶12 We granted Mr. Cooper's petition for review, which 
presented the first and third of the following three issues.  We 
asked the parties to brief the second issue:   
1. 
When 
Cooper's 
counsel 
engaged 
in 
serious 
professional 
misconduct, 
preventing 
Cooper 
from 
adequately understanding and participating in his own 
defense, did this constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel and provide Cooper with a fair and just reason 
to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing? 
2. 
In deciding whether Cooper may withdraw his 
guilty plea, is the circuit court bound by the Supreme 
Court's 
findings 
and/or 
conclusions 
in 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 2016 WI 31, 
368 Wis. 2d 108, 877 N.W.2d 848 (2016), including, but 
not limited to, language stating that the failure of 
Cooper's trial counsel to properly communicate with 
him prevented him from adequately understanding and 
participating in his own defense . . . ? 
3. 
Did the circuit court erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing without a 
sufficient evidentiary record to support a finding 
that withdrawal of the plea pre-sentencing would 
result in substantial prejudice to the State? 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the court of appeals.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 "[W]hether a defendant may withdraw his plea is left 
to the sound discretion of the circuit court."  State v. Bollig, 
2000 WI 6, ¶28, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199 (citation 
omitted).  We review the circuit court's decision for an 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
10 
 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, 
¶30, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24.  We will sustain an 
exercise of discretion if the circuit court "examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable 
judge 
could 
reach." 
 
Loy 
v. 
Bunderson, 
107 
Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).   
¶14 "A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law."  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 
¶16, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  We sustain the circuit 
court's factual findings "unless they are clearly erroneous."  
State 
v. 
Doss, 
2008 
WI 93, 
¶23, 
312 
Wis. 2d. 570, 
754 
N.W.2d. 150.  "Whether counsel's performance was deficient and 
prejudicial to his . . . client's defense is a question of law 
that we review de novo."  State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶22, 360 
Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d. 434. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶15 A court will generally grant a pre-sentencing request 
to withdraw a guilty plea upon presentation of a fair and just 
reason for doing so.  State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 582, 469 
N.W.2d 163 (1991) ("The appropriate and applicable law in the 
case before the court, is that a defendant should be allowed to 
withdraw a guilty plea for any fair and just reason, unless the 
prosecution 
would 
be 
substantially 
prejudiced.") 
(emphasis 
omitted).  This has been described as a "liberal rule" that 
fosters "the efficient administration of criminal justice" by 
"reduc[ing] the number of appeals contesting the 'knowing and 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
11 
 
voluntariness' of a guilty plea . . . ."  Libke v. State, 60 
Wis. 2d 121, 127–28, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973).  If the defendant 
establishes an appropriate reason by a preponderance of the 
evidence, 
Canedy, 
161 
Wis. 2d at 
583-84, 
the 
State 
may 
nonetheless defeat the motion by proving substantial prejudice.  
Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶34. 
¶16 The phrase "fair and just" is not, of course, 
susceptible to precise definition, and our cases have identified 
many reasons for withdrawing a plea that meet this standard.  
For example, an adequate reason "will likely exist if the 
defendant shows that the circuit court failed to conform to its 
statutory or other mandatory duties in the plea colloquy, and 
the defendant asserts misunderstanding because of it."  Jenkins, 
303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶62.  See also Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶31 
("[I]f [the defendant] was unaware of his requirement to 
register as a convicted sex offender, he presented a fair and 
just reason for plea withdrawal."); State v. Shanks, 152 
Wis. 2d 284, 290, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989) ("Genuine 
misunderstanding of a guilty plea's consequences is a ground for 
withdrawal.") (citation omitted).  "[H]aste and confusion in 
entering the plea" is a fair and just reason for withdrawing a 
plea, as is "coercion on the part of trial counsel."  State v. 
Shimek, 230 Wis. 2d 730, 739, 601 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(citation omitted).  Indeed, we have said that "the mere showing 
of some adequate reason for defendant's change of heart" will 
suffice.  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583 (citation and internal 
marks omitted).  But there are limits on the reasons we will 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
12 
 
accept as adequate.  At a minimum, a "fair and just reason" must 
be something other than a bare desire to have a trial.  Id. 
¶17 Mr. Cooper says he should be allowed to withdraw his 
plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel from 
Mr. Hicks before he pled.  If true, that would certainly entitle 
him to relief because such a justification satisfies even the 
more 
rigorous 
post-sentencing 
"manifest 
injustice" 
plea-
withdrawal standard.  State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶84, 358 
Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44 ("One way to demonstrate manifest 
injustice 
is 
to 
establish 
that 
the 
defendant 
received 
ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
A.  Hicks as Proof of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶18 The 
proof 
Mr. 
Cooper 
offers 
to 
establish 
the 
deficiency of his counsel is of no small moment, for he offers 
us the words of our own opinion in which we announced Mr. Hicks' 
discipline for his misconduct in handling Mr. Cooper's defense.  
Specifically, he says we conclusively answered the deficiency 
question when we addressed Count 13 of the OLR's complaint, 
which says: 
By failing between the date on which he received [Mr. 
Cooper's] letter in January 2013 and February 12, 
2013, between March 11, 2013 and August 16, 2013, and 
between August 18, 2013 and October 20, 2013, to 
communicate with [Mr. Cooper] regarding the issues 
raised in [Mr. Cooper's] January 2013 letter and to 
otherwise consult with [Mr. Cooper] regarding trial 
strategy and preparation, thereby preventing [Mr. 
Cooper] 
from 
adequately 
understanding 
and 
participating in his own defense, [Attorney] Hicks 
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2). 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
13 
 
Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶28 (quoting OLR's complaint) (emphasis 
added) (some alterations in original).  However, for the 
following three reasons, we conclude that our decision in Hicks 
has no material effect on the resolution of Mr. Cooper's case. 
¶19 First, with respect to what we said in Hicks, there is 
a distinction to be drawn between our quotation of the OLR's 
complaint, on the one hand, and on the other our review of the 
referee's factual findings and our independent conclusions of 
law.  We said we would accept the referee's "factual findings as 
taken from the OLR's complaint," id., ¶39, which means we must 
review the referee's findings of fact and the OLR complaint's 
allegations to determine whether we adopted the statement upon 
which Mr. Cooper relies.  The factual background supporting Mr. 
Hicks' misconduct appears in paragraphs 52-62 of the OLR's 
complaint.  The passage on which Mr. Cooper relies appears in 
paragraph 63, which is not part of the factual background but is 
the formal accusation of misconduct against Mr. Hicks.  The 
referee's report tracked the complaint's distinction between the 
facts, on the one hand, and on the other the formal accusation 
of misconduct.  Consequently, the referee's findings of fact do 
not contain the assertion that Mr. Hicks "prevent[ed] [Mr. 
Cooper] from adequately understanding and participating in his 
own defense . . . ."  See Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶28.  That 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
14 
 
statement appears in the referee's conclusions of law.11  So it 
cannot be said that we adopted the statement on which Mr. Cooper 
relies as a factual matter.  
¶20 Nor could it be said that we adopted the referee's 
statement as a conclusion of law.  Our analysis in Hicks started 
with 
the 
usual 
assertion 
that 
we 
"review 
the 
referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis."  Id., ¶38 (citation 
omitted).  We did not deviate from that standard practice.  Our 
terse 
conclusion 
did 
not 
comment 
on 
whether 
Mr. 
Hicks' 
misconduct interfered with Mr. Cooper's defense.  Instead, we 
said we "agree with the referee that [the] factual findings are 
sufficient to support a legal conclusion that Attorney Hicks 
engaged in the professional misconduct set forth in the 19 
counts described above."  Id., ¶39.  The professional misconduct 
to which the complaint and referee referred in Count 13 was a 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).  So our conclusion of law, as 
relevant here, was that Mr. Hicks failed to "reasonably consult 
with the client about the means by which the client's objectives 
are to be accomplished . . . ."  SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).  The 
referee's statement that the misconduct had also "prevent[ed] 
[Mr. Cooper] from adequately understanding and participating in 
                                                 
11 Mr. Hicks predicated, and we accepted, his no contest 
plea on the facts as contained in the complaint.  As the referee 
recognized, the OLR complaint's accusation of misconduct was not 
a factual assertion, but an asserted legal conclusion.  So it 
would have been inappropriate for us treat the accusation as a 
factual finding.     
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
15 
 
his own defense" had no necessary bearing on whether Mr. Hicks 
had violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).  See Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶28.  
Our opinion did not specifically address that statement, analyze 
it, or in any other fashion suggest it was a conclusion we were 
adopting.12  Our conclusion went no further than a judgment that 
the referee's findings of fact described a violation of SCR 
20:1.4(a)(2).13 
¶21 The second reason Hicks does not stand for the 
proposition that Mr. Cooper received ineffective assistance of 
counsel bears a close relation to the first.  Our purpose in 
Hicks was not to inquire into the validity of Mr. Cooper's 
                                                 
12 One of the dissent's key foundational assertions is that 
"[w]e agreed with the referee that the factual findings support 
the 
conclusion 
that . . . Mr. 
Cooper 
was 
prevented 
from 
'adequately 
understanding 
and 
participating 
in 
his 
own 
defense.'"  Dissent, ¶1.  But as described above, we did not say 
we agreed with that conclusion.  We agreed only that the facts 
in the complaint (which do not contain this statement) described 
a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2). 
13 The dissent is concerned we are ignoring what we said in 
Hicks:  "Mr. Cooper's case is notable because this court 
accepted the legal conclusion that a defendant was prevented 
from 'adequately understanding and participating in his own 
defense.'  This court should not now pretend our words in Hicks 
were meaningless."  Dissent, ¶15.  We are not pretending they 
are meaningless; we are carefully distinguishing what we said 
from what the referee said.  They are not necessarily the same.  
Our analysis establishes that we did not accept the referee's 
statement as either a finding of fact or as a conclusion of law.  
This should come as no surprise——the question before us was not 
whether Mr. Cooper had been prejudiced in his case, it was 
whether Mr. Hicks violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).  Those are 
different questions with different legal standards and different 
factual predicates. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
16 
 
guilty plea.  It was to determine whether Mr. Hicks had engaged 
in professional misconduct.  In particular, our inquiry into 
Count 13's allegations required us to go no further than 
considering the adequacy of Mr. Hicks' consultation with Mr. 
Cooper about the "means by which the client's objectives are to 
be accomplished."  SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel, on the other hand, arises only when a defendant suffers 
prejudice as a result of his counsel's deficient performance. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶18, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  
Although it is possible for an attorney's misconduct to be so 
grave that it deprives a defendant of the effective assistance 
of counsel, the causal link between the two is not one of 
necessity, but of possibility.  That is to say, it is possible 
that an attorney could violate SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) without running 
afoul of Strickland; not every violation of the Rules will rise 
to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.  That is so 
because 
the 
standards 
established 
by 
the 
Rules 
do 
not 
necessarily 
correlate 
exactly 
with 
those 
described 
in 
substantive areas of the law.   
Violation of a rule should not itself give rise to a 
cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create 
any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has 
been breached. . . .  Furthermore, the purpose of the 
rules can be subverted when they are invoked by 
opposing parties as procedural weapons.  The fact that 
a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, 
or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration 
of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an 
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction 
has 
standing 
to 
seek 
enforcement 
of 
the 
rule.  
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
17 
 
Nevertheless, since the rules do establish standards 
of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a rule 
may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard 
of conduct. 
SCR Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble, ¶20.     
¶22 Therefore, our conclusion that Mr. Hicks failed to 
meet the demands of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) cannot mean, ipso facto, 
that he performed deficiently within Strickland's meaning.  More 
to the point, it may not be taken to mean we had specifically 
measured the impact of Mr. Hicks' violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) 
on Mr. Cooper's ability to enter an appropriate plea.  We simply 
did not address that subject, even tangentially.  Nor could we 
have done so based on the record before us in Hicks.  The OLR's 
complaint simply did not contain the information necessary for 
us to evaluate whether Mr. Hicks' performance was so deficient 
that 
it 
prejudiced 
Mr. 
Cooper's 
ability 
to 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter a plea. 
¶23 The third reason Hicks is uninstructive concerns its 
temporal relationship to this case.  As we foreshadowed in our 
recitation of the procedural history, the date on which Mr. 
Cooper's motion was denied is important.  We are reviewing the 
circuit court's exercise of its discretion, which necessarily 
means we focus on the facts available to the circuit court when 
it made its decision.  Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 
306 N.W.2d 16 (1981) ("A discretionary determination, to be 
sustained, must demonstrably be made and based upon the facts 
appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and 
applicable law.").  We did not decide Hicks, of course, until 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
18 
 
almost two years after the circuit court denied Mr. Cooper's 
motion.  And that means the referee's statement about the impact 
of Mr. Hicks' misconduct on Mr. Cooper's defense was not part of 
the record before the circuit court.  We will not reverse a 
circuit court's discretionary decision based on facts outside of 
the record.  Although there are mechanisms by which to challenge 
a court's judgment with facts discovered after its entry, Mr. 
Cooper 
does 
not 
engage 
them 
in 
this 
case. 
 
This 
is 
understandable because Hicks does not really present anything 
new, at least as it specifically relates to Mr. Cooper's plea 
(as we will discuss further below).  For these three reasons, we 
conclude that Hicks has nothing instructive to say in evaluating 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Cooper's motion to withdraw his plea. 
B.  Hicks Adds Nothing to the Ineffective Assistance Analysis 
¶24 Aside from the referee's statement regarding the 
effect of Mr. Hicks' misconduct on Mr. Cooper's defense (which 
we did not adopt), our opinion in Hicks suggests no additional 
support for Mr. Cooper's claim that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel prior to entering his plea.  To the extent 
the opinion bears on Mr. Cooper's case, it reflects that Mr. 
Hicks: 
 
• had minimal communications with Mr. Cooper prior to the 
plea hearing; 
 
• had not timely provided a copy of discovery material to 
Mr. Cooper; and 
 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
19 
 
• had not notified his client, the circuit court, or 
opposing counsel that his license to practice law had 
been suspended for part of the time he had been 
representing Mr. Cooper. 
Hicks, 
368 
Wis. 2d 108, 
¶28. 
 
The 
consequence 
of 
this 
misconduct, Mr. Cooper tells us, is that he acted with such 
haste and confusion in entering his plea that he genuinely did 
not understand its consequences.  He also claims Mr. Hicks gave 
him misleading advice and coerced him into entering his plea.  
¶25 All of these facts and allegations were already before 
the circuit court when it considered Mr. Cooper's motion to 
withdraw his plea.  Thus, in January of 2014, Mr. Cooper 
personally wrote to the circuit court asserting that Mr. Hicks 
had misled him into pleading guilty and that Mr. Hicks had said 
Mr. Cooper was destined to lose at trial.  His formal motion to 
withdraw his plea explained that the issues raised in his letter 
of October 8, 2013, had not been resolved.  It also faulted Mr. 
Hicks for failing to disclose that his license had been 
suspended during part of the time the criminal case was pending.  
Finally, Mr. Cooper's motion claimed his plea was not knowing or 
voluntary, had been given in haste, and without sufficient 
consultation with his counsel or consideration of discovery 
materials.   
¶26 At the hearing on his motion, Mr. Cooper once again 
asserted these deficiencies.  He told the circuit court that he 
was confused regarding the charge to which he was pleading and 
the sentence range.  He argued that Mr. Hicks had misled him 
about the nature of the charge, as well as the content of the 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
20 
 
plea agreement with the State.  And he renewed his complaint 
about Mr. Hicks' lack of communication and his dissatisfaction 
with Mr. Hicks' failure to notify him of the temporary license 
suspension.  
¶27 Our review of the record in this case, therefore, 
reveals that everything in Hicks relating to Mr. Cooper's 
defense had already been brought to the circuit court's 
attention 
before 
it 
decided 
the 
plea-withdrawal 
motion.  
Everything, that is, but for the referee's statement regarding 
the effect of Mr. Hicks' misconduct on Mr. Cooper's defense.  
But we are not bound by the statements of OLR referees, and as 
we discussed above, we did not adopt the referee's statement as 
our own.  Consequently, Hicks adds nothing relevant to the 
universe of facts that the circuit court was responsible for 
considering. 
C.  No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶28 Hicks cannot do the work Mr. Cooper assigns to it.  It 
does not, of its own force, establish that Mr. Hicks provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  That leaves Mr. Cooper with 
the burden of showing:  (1) "that counsel's performance was 
deficient"; and (2) "that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  This analytical 
structure applies specifically in the context of the plea 
process:  
Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington 
dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding, and was 
premised in part on the similarity between such a 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
21 
 
proceeding and the usual criminal trial, the same two-
part standard seems to us applicable to ineffective-
assistance claims arising out of the plea process. 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).  Even if we agreed 
that Mr. Hicks' misconduct rose to the level of deficient 
performance within the meaning of Strickland (a question on 
which we express no opinion), Mr. Cooper would nonetheless be 
unable to prove the prejudice element of the Strickland 
analysis.14 
¶29 In considering whether counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant, we "evaluate whether 'there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, 
the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding 
would 
have 
been 
different.'"  State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶33, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 
912 N.W.2d 89 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  When the 
alleged deficiency concerns the plea process, Hill says the 
prejudice component specifically requires that "the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
                                                 
14 The nature of the dissent's analysis is unclear.  The 
author says she would dispense with the "deficient performance" 
component when assessing counsel's ineffectiveness with respect 
to a plea withdrawal motion:  "[B]y requiring Mr. Cooper to 
prove deficiency as part of a motion for plea withdrawal pre-
sentencing, the majority opinion equates the standard for 
withdrawal of a plea post-sentencing, 'manifest injustice,' with 
the lower pre-sentence standard of a 'fair and just reason.'"  
Dissent, ¶39.  Whether the motion is pre-sentence or post-
sentence, the ineffective assistance paradigm established by 
Strickland requires deficient performance as an indispensable 
element of the analysis.  So it seems the dissent is proposing a 
relaxed standard for establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel when the underlying issue relates to a motion to 
withdraw a plea before sentencing. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
22 
 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial."  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  A 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence exists when there 
is "a 'substantial,' not just 'conceivable,' likelihood of a 
different result."  Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 
(2011).   
¶30 Determining whether a likelihood is substantial, as 
opposed to merely conceivable, can be a difficult undertaking 
when evaluating how an attorney's performance affects, for 
example, a jury's verdict, or the court's imposition of a 
sentence.  We cannot, of course, reassemble and poll the jury to 
determine what it would have done in the absence of counsel's 
deficient performance.  Neither do we return to the sentencing 
court to inquire into whether the sentence would have been 
different if counsel had performed better.  Here, however, we 
need only know whether there is a substantial likelihood that 
Mr. Cooper would have pled differently if Mr. Hicks' performance 
did not fall below the Strickland standard.  That information 
is, obviously, readily available to Mr. Cooper, and he had an 
opportunity to present it to the circuit court at the hearing on 
his motion to withdraw his plea.  He did not comment, however, 
on whether his plea would have been different if Mr. Hicks had 
not performed as he did.  To the contrary, his counsel said that 
"if the Court were to allow Mr. Cooper to withdraw his plea, he 
still might decide to enter a plea, because he does like——he's 
satisfied, I guess, with the recommendation that [the State] 
made."  This does not describe a substantial likelihood of a 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
23 
 
different outcome.  At best, it describes something conceivable.  
Therefore, he has shown no prejudice.  Without prejudice, there 
can be no ineffective assistance of counsel.  And because the 
ineffectiveness of counsel is the only "fair and just reason" 
Mr. Cooper gave for withdrawing his plea (at least in this 
court), his argument cannot prevail.15 
¶31 The dissent is of a different mind.  The author says:  
"I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that Mr. 
Cooper 
failed 
to 
allege 
that 
Attorney 
Hicks' 
deficient 
performance caused prejudice.  Although Mr. Cooper's counsel 
stated at the hearing that Mr. Cooper still 'might' decide to 
enter a plea, Mr. Cooper is now asking this court to 'allow him 
to withdraw his guilty plea, and remand this case for further 
proceedings and a trial on the merits.'"  Dissent, ¶38 (emphasis 
omitted).  Our project here, of course, is reviewing whether the 
facts 
of 
record 
demonstrate 
"a 
'substantial,' 
not 
just 
'conceivable,' likelihood," Cullen, 563 U.S. at 189, that Mr. 
                                                 
15 In addition to his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Mr. Cooper says the circuit court erred in not allowing 
him to withdraw his plea because he pled so hastily that it 
caused him to be confused and to genuinely misunderstand the 
plea's consequences.  He also said he was subject to the 
coercion and misleading advice of his counsel.  Those have been 
recognized as adequate reasons for withdrawing a plea.  State v. 
Shimek, 230 Wis. 2d 730, 739, 601 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1999).  
His only argument supporting this assignment of error is that, 
in rejecting those grounds for withdrawal, the circuit court did 
not account for our decision in Hicks.  But because we have 
concluded that Hicks does not bear on the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion (as described above), this argument 
cannot succeed. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
24 
 
Cooper would demand a trial.  Although he conversed with the 
court at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, he did 
not say he wanted to go to trial.  To the contrary, his counsel 
told the circuit court that Mr. Cooper just might enter the plea 
again because he was satisfied with the State's recommendation.16  
¶32 In any event, the dissent says, United States v. 
Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2005), relieves defendants in 
Mr. 
Cooper's 
position 
of 
the 
obligation 
to 
even 
allege 
prejudice.17  The Ninth Circuit tried to reconcile its decision 
with 
Hill 
by 
distinguishing 
between 
pre-sentencing 
plea-
withdrawal (Davis) and post-sentencing plea-withdrawal (Hill).  
It said that requiring a showing of prejudice in the former 
category would eliminate the distinction between the tests 
applied to each.  Davis, 428 F.3d at 806.  We disagree.  The 
purpose of the "prejudice" component is to winnow the cases in 
which counsel's deficient performance would have no effect on 
the outcome of the proceedings:  "This additional 'prejudice' 
requirement was based on our conclusion that '[a]n error by 
                                                 
16 Furthermore, the dissent's formulation of the "prejudice" 
component of the Strickland test suggests the defendant can 
satisfy it by merely "alleging" prejudice.  But Strickland says 
the 
defendant 
"must 
show 
that 
the 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced the defense."  Id., 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).  
Mr. Cooper has not shown he was prejudiced. 
17 Combined with the proposition that Mr. Cooper need not 
establish deficient performance, dissent ¶39, the dissent would 
apparently let defendants prove ineffective assistance of 
counsel without satisfying any of its elements.  Not even Mr. 
Cooper advanced such pioneering arguments. 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
25 
 
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant 
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error 
had no effect on the judgment.'"  Hill, 747 U.S. at 57 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691) (alteration in original).  We agree 
with Hill that Mr. Cooper cannot show prejudice unless "there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial."  Hill, 747 U.S. at 59. 
* 
¶33 One final point bears mentioning.  The dissent is 
embarking on a significantly different project from the one 
presented by this case.  Our task here is to review the record 
of Mr. Cooper's criminal proceedings.  The dissent, however, 
wants to create and review a hybrid record comprising Mr. 
Cooper's criminal case and Mr. Hicks' disciplinary proceedings.  
To further complicate matters, this hypothetical record did not 
become hybridized until after the circuit court completed its 
work, so the author is retroactively reading into the Cooper 
record information that was not available to the circuit court 
when the actions and decisions under review occurred.  Making 
the dissent's proposed experiment in hybrid records even more 
problematic is the fact that one is criminal and the other is 
disciplinary.  The differences between the two types of cases 
with respect to evidentiary standards, procedural safeguards, 
constitutional requirements, and interests of the different 
parties are too vast to catalogue here.  Neither the dissent nor 
Mr. Cooper explain how we can iron out all of those differences 
No. 
2016AP375-CR   
 
26 
 
in a way that would allow one record to rationally inform the 
other.  Ultimately, the dissent's proposal to hybridize the 
record simply creates a path for collaterally attacking a 
criminal conviction via our attorney disciplinary proceedings.  
We are unwilling to blaze that trail.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 Our conclusions with respect to the three issues 
presented by this case are as follows.  First, the record does 
not demonstrate that the professional misconduct described in 
Hicks 
prevented 
Mr. 
Cooper 
from 
receiving 
the 
effective 
assistance of counsel.  Because that was the only rationale he 
offered (in this court) for withdrawing his plea, we conclude 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Cooper's motion.  Second, we conclude that we 
did not adopt the referee's statement regarding the effect of 
Mr. Hicks' professional misconduct on Mr. Cooper's defense.  And 
third, we need not determine whether the State would have been 
prejudiced if Mr. Cooper had been allowed to withdraw his plea 
because we conclude he did not present a "fair and just reason" 
for doing so.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation 
prior to oral argument. 
 
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶36 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (dissenting). 
In 
determining that Attorney Michael J. Hicks violated the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys in his representation of Mr. 
Cooper, we accepted and relied upon the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation ("OLR") referee's factual findings.  The referee 
found that during the 10 months leading up to the trial date on 
which Mr. Cooper entered his guilty plea, Attorney Hicks failed 
to consult with Mr. Cooper regarding trial strategy and 
preparation and failed to provide Mr. Cooper with requested 
discovery.1  We agreed with the referee that the factual findings 
support the conclusion that Attorney Hicks engaged in the 
professional misconduct outlined by the referee, including a 
statement that Mr. Cooper was prevented from "adequately 
understanding and participating in his own defense."  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 2016 WI 31, ¶28, 368 
Wis. 2d 108, 877 N.W. 2d 848.2  I disagree with the majority 
opinion's conclusion that this court's decision in Hicks "has no 
material effect" on Mr. Cooper's motion to withdraw his plea 
pre-sentencing.  Majority op., ¶18.  I therefore dissent.   
                                                 
1 The OLR referee found that Attorney Hicks failed between 
"January 2013 and February 12, 2013, between March 11, 2013 and 
August 16, 2013, and between August 18, 2013 and October 20, 
2013 to communicate with [Mr. Cooper] regarding the issues 
raised in [Mr. Cooper's] January 2013 letter [requesting 
discovery and raising concerns about his case] and to otherwise 
consult 
with 
[Mr. 
Cooper] 
regarding 
trial 
strategy 
and 
preparation."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 
2016 WI 31, ¶28, 368 Wis. 2d 108, 877 N.W.2d 848.   
2 The majority opinion attempts to distance itself from our 
language and holding in Hicks.  The majority seems to be saying:  
"just because we said it does not mean we actually meant it."   
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
¶37 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court adopted a two-part standard for 
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  First, 
the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, which requires showing that "counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Id. at 687.  
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
A 
reasonable 
probability 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."   Id. at 694.  In Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Court held that the two-
part Strickland test applied to a defendant's post-sentencing 
motion to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
¶38 The majority opinion ultimately determines that even 
if Attorney Hicks' performance was deficient, Mr. Cooper failed 
to allege prejudice resulting from that deficient performance, 
and therefore his motion to withdraw his plea fails.  Majority 
op., ¶¶28-30.  I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion 
that Mr. Cooper failed to allege that Attorney Hicks' deficient 
performance caused prejudice.  Although Mr. Cooper's counsel 
stated at the hearing that Mr. Cooper still "might" decide to 
enter a plea, Mr. Cooper is now asking this court to "allow him 
to withdraw his guilty plea, and remand this case for further 
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
proceedings and a trial on the merits."  (emphasis added).  Mr. 
Cooper alleges sufficient prejudice that resulted from Attorney 
Hicks' deficient performance, namely, hasty entry of a plea 
because Attorney Hicks was not prepared to defend him on the day 
of trial.  
¶39 Moreover, by requiring Mr. Cooper to prove deficiency 
as part of a motion for plea withdrawal pre-sentencing, the 
majority opinion equates the standard for withdrawal of a plea 
post-sentencing, "manifest injustice," with the lower pre-
sentencing standard of a "fair and just reason."  See State v. 
Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 
(emphasizing that while a circuit court should "'freely allow a 
defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any fair 
and just reason, unless the prosecution [would] be substantially 
prejudiced,'" this standard should not be confused with the 
post-sentencing rule "'where the defendant must show the 
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.'") 
(quoted source omitted).  "A manifest injustice is a serious 
flaw in the fundamental integrity of the plea, generally of a 
constitutional dimension" and must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence.  State v. Shimek, 230 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 
601 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1999).  To prove that ineffective 
assistance of counsel resulted in a manifest injustice, this 
court has required a defendant to demonstrate both prongs of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See State v. Dillard, 
2014 WI 123, ¶¶84-85, 358 Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44; see also 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311-12, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). 
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
¶40 In contrast, to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing, a 
defendant need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence a 
"fair and just reason."  State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 584, 
469 N.W.2d 163 (1991).  A "fair and just reason" is defined as 
"the mere showing of some adequate reason for the defendant's 
change of heart."  Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128, 208 
N.W.2d 331 (1973).  Less proof is therefore needed to prevail on 
a motion to withdraw a plea pre-sentencing than post-sentencing.  
See, e.g., id. at 124 ("It should be easier to withdraw a plea 
before sentence than after."); see also State v. Reppin, 35 
Wis. 2d 377, 384, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967). 
¶41 Guidelines have emerged from appellate cases that aid 
in the consideration of whether the reason given for plea 
withdrawal is fair and just.  See State v. Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d 
284, 290, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989); see also United States 
v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that "the 
terms 
'fair 
and 
just' 
lack 
any 
pretense 
of 
scientific 
exactness."). 
 
Several 
factors 
courts 
consider 
include:  
assertion of innocence, a genuine misunderstanding of a plea's 
consequences, hasty entry of a plea, confusion of the defendant, 
coercion by trial counsel, and expeditiously seeking plea 
withdrawal.  See Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 290-91.  If a defendant 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence a fair and just reason 
for withdrawal of his or her plea prior to sentencing, then the 
burden shifts to the State to show substantial prejudice in 
order to defeat the plea withdrawal.  State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 
6, ¶34, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199.   
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
¶42 It is noteworthy that both Strickland and Hill 
involved a motion to withdraw a plea post-sentencing and that 
there is no United States Supreme Court or Wisconsin precedent 
requiring a defendant to show prejudice as a result of counsel's 
deficient performance when moving to withdraw a plea pre-
sentencing.  In United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 808 (9th 
Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant does not 
have to show prejudice as a result of his counsel's deficient 
performance, instead he need only show that the deficient 
performance "could have motivated his decision to plead guilty" 
(emphasis in original).  The Davis court concluded that "[t]o 
require a defendant to satisfy the prejudice prong of Hill in 
order to withdraw a plea based on counsel's erroneous advice 
eviscerates the distinction between a motion to withdraw a plea 
made pre-sentence and a post-sentence challenge to a plea."  Id. 
at 806.  
¶43 I therefore focus my attention not on whether Mr. 
Cooper must show prejudice, which may be inconsequential pre-
sentencing, but on whether the circuit court erred in finding 
that Attorney Hicks' performance was not deficient.  See State 
v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987) 
(applying a clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court's 
findings of fact).  By making factual findings now known to be 
incorrect, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
determined 
that 
Attorney Hicks was prepared for trial at the time of Mr. 
Cooper's plea.  This court should therefore remand this case for 
a new plea withdrawal hearing.   
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
¶44 At the plea withdrawal hearing, Mr. Cooper's new 
counsel articulated two ways in which Attorney Hicks was 
deficient.  First, Attorney Hicks did not inform Mr. Cooper of 
the suspension of his law license.  Second, Mr. Cooper "entered 
the plea in haste" based upon his belief that "he felt like his 
attorney wasn't prepared" to proceed to trial.  This belief led 
Mr. Cooper to answer the circuit court's questions at the plea 
hearing in the manner in which he did.   
¶45 The majority opinion broadly discounts Attorney Hicks' 
deficient performance and mistakenly states that "[a]ll of these 
facts and allegations were already before the circuit court when 
it considered Mr. Cooper's motion . . . ."  Majority op., ¶25.  
According to the majority opinion, this court's disciplinary 
decision in Hicks "suggests no additional support for Mr. 
Cooper's claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel prior to entering his plea."  Id., ¶24.  However, it is 
apparent that the circuit court drew conclusions based upon 
incomplete and incorrect information.  
¶46 Regarding Attorney Hicks' failure to inform Mr. Cooper 
of his license suspension, the circuit court stated:   
I 
don't 
know 
what 
attempts 
Mr. 
Hicks 
made 
to 
communicate [his license suspension] or whether or not 
he did . . . I don't see anything in the record, at 
least at this point, to say that Mr. Hicks didn't 
communicate that or if he did communicate that whether 
or not Mr. Cooper cared. 
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
It is now undisputed that Attorney Hicks never communicated the 
fact that his law license was suspended to Mr. Cooper.3  Mr. 
Cooper further testified at the plea withdrawal hearing about 
how he felt misled by Attorney Hicks due to the lack of 
disclosure regarding his law license suspension.  The circuit 
court's finding was therefore erroneous. 
¶47 It is Mr. Cooper's second proffered reason, his hasty 
entry of a plea because Attorney Hicks was not prepared and did 
not turn over requested discovery, that causes even more concern 
in light of this court's conclusions in Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108.  
On October 8, 2013, Mr. Cooper wrote a letter to the circuit 
court stating that "[t]here are approximately 13 days till trail 
[sic] and I have yet to receive a copy of the discovery material 
to review the evidence against me."  Mr. Cooper further stated 
that he was not prepared for trial and that his alibi witness 
was not subpoenaed.  In his December 21, 2013 letter to the 
circuit court asking to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Cooper 
said that he was never provided with the documents he sought and 
that he "was misslead [sic] by my counsel that I was dstined 
[sic] to loss [sic] my case if I go to trial, and [i]f I take 
this plea I will still go home on time.  Even [i]f I didn't 
commit this case a plea will be in my best interest."  
¶48 Based upon Mr. Cooper's statements at the plea hearing 
indicating that he wanted the circuit court to take "no actions" 
                                                 
3 In Hicks, we accepted the referee's factual finding that 
Attorney Hicks failed to notify Mr. Cooper of his law license 
suspension.  Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶¶26, 28.   
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
with respect to the letters he had sent, the circuit court 
discounted the letters.  The circuit court made no factual 
findings about whether or not Attorney Hicks had communicated 
with Mr. Cooper regarding trial preparation or whether he had 
turned over the requested discovery to Mr. Cooper.  The circuit 
court concluded that "prior to the plea Mr. Cooper is sitting, 
they weren't ready for trial, there were alibi witnesses 
available, he felt he had a defense, and all of those things 
seem to be consistent with someone who is prepared and going to 
trial."  The circuit court further emphasized the generous plea 
deal and speculated that Attorney Hicks prevailed upon Mr. 
Cooper to take the deal.   
¶49 The circuit court erroneously found that Mr. Cooper 
was prepared to proceed to a jury trial on October 21, 2013.  
The factual findings accepted in Hicks establish that for the 10 
months prior to trial, Attorney Hicks failed to communicate with 
Mr. Cooper regarding trial strategy and preparation and failed 
to give Mr. Cooper discovery that he had requested to review 
prior to trial.  This court agreed with the referee that the 
factual findings support the conclusion that the lack of 
communication between Attorney Hicks and Mr. Cooper resulted in 
Mr. Cooper being prevented from "adequately understanding and 
participating in his own defense."  Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108, ¶28.  
The fact that Mr. Cooper took a plea on the day of trial to take 
advantage of what the circuit court characterized as a "good 
deal," is inapposite.  Based on Attorney Hicks' lack of 
communication and consultation with Mr. Cooper and his failure 
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
to turn over discovery, the circuit court erroneously found that 
Mr. Cooper was prepared to proceed to trial.4 
¶50 The majority opinion claims that I am "hybridiz[ing] 
the record" and creating "a path for collaterally attacking a 
criminal conviction via our attorney disciplinary proceedings."  
Majority op., ¶33.  However, Mr. Cooper's case is notable 
because this court accepted the legal conclusion that a 
defendant was prevented from "adequately understanding and 
participating in his own defense."  This court should not now 
pretend our words in Hicks were meaningless.  While I 
acknowledge 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
concern, 
in 
the 
rare 
situation that this issue arises again, the right to effective 
assistance of counsel is fundamental and therefore justifies 
remand to the circuit court for a new plea withdrawal hearing.   
¶51 For the foregoing reasons I would remand the case to 
the circuit court for a new plea withdrawal hearing.  At that 
hearing, the circuit court should consider all of these now 
undisputed facts and make a determination as to whether Mr. 
Cooper offered a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his 
plea.  Factors for the circuit court to consider include:  
Attorney Hicks' lack of communication and preparation for trial, 
possible coercion by Attorney Hicks to accept a plea, Mr. 
Cooper's potentially hasty entry of a plea, and Mr. Cooper's 
                                                 
4 Of note, Mr. Cooper filed a grievance with OLR against 
Attorney Hicks well before his plea withdrawal hearing.  In 
December 2013, OLR requested specific documents and information 
from Attorney Hicks surrounding Mr. Cooper's claims.   
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
subsequent expeditious request to withdraw his plea.  If the 
circuit court determines Mr. Cooper has demonstrated a fair and 
just reason to withdraw his plea, the burden shifts to the State 
to show substantial prejudice to defeat the plea withdrawal.5  
See Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶34.   
¶52 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
5 The circuit court summarily stated "for purposes of the 
record":  "given the age of the case and the time lapse, I would 
find that there would be a substantial prejudice to allow [Mr. 
Cooper] to withdraw the plea at this point in time."  However, 
because the circuit court did not find a fair and just reason to 
support plea withdrawal, this analysis was incomplete.   
No.  2016AP375-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1