Title: Howard v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 080383
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2009

Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
E. DUANE HOWARD 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 080383            SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
                                   
January 16, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Roanoke, the defendant, E. Duane Howard, was convicted on a 
summons charging him with disorderly conduct in violation of 
Section 21-9(a)(2) of the Roanoke City Code for his alleged 
disruption of a meeting of the city council.  The circuit court 
imposed upon Howard a fine of $100.00, suspended upon condition 
that he keep the peace and be of good behavior for a period of 
six months.  Howard appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia.  In a published opinion, the court affirmed 
Howard’s conviction.  Howard v. City of Roanoke, 51 Va. App. 36, 
654 S.E.2d 322 (2007).  We awarded Howard this appeal.  We will 
also affirm his conviction. 
 
Roanoke City Code § 21-9 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
(a) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the 
intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
 
                . . . . 
 
(2) Wilfully . . . disrupts any meeting of the city council 
. . . if such disruption prevents or interferes with the 
orderly conduct of such meeting . . .; provided, however, 
such conduct shall not be deemed to include the utterance 
or display of any words. 
 
 
Roanoke City Code § 21-9 parallels the provisions of Va. 
Code § 18.2-415, which authorizes the governing bodies of 
counties, cities, and towns “to adopt ordinances prohibiting and 
punishing the acts and conduct prohibited by this section.”  The 
state statute includes the same exception as the Roanoke City 
Code regarding “the utterance or display of any words.” 
BACKGROUND 
 
The following narrative is taken from a transcript of the 
evidence at trial and a videotape of the city council meeting in 
question.  The meeting was held on November 7, 2005, for public 
discussion of the question whether Roanoke’s Victory Stadium, a 
memorial to World War II veterans, should be renovated or 
demolished.  The issue was an emotional one, and the council 
chamber was filled to capacity with other attendees viewing 
proceedings on a remote television in another room.  
 
Officer John T. Rogers of the Roanoke City Police 
Department was assigned to provide security at the meeting.  
Prior to the scheduled two o’clock p.m. start of the meeting, 
Howard and a companion engaged Officer Rogers in conversation 
and asked him why he was present.  Rogers replied that he “was 
there to make sure that everything ran fast and smoothly and 
 
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everything was secure.”  Rogers was questioned about whether he 
would ask people “to leave,” and he replied, “yes, sir.”  Howard 
asked,  “what if they don’t want to leave?”  Rogers responded, 
“sir, fortunately there’s a thing called pain compliance.”  
Howard “just kind of halfway laughed.” 
 
At the two o’clock beginning of the meeting, Mayor Nelson 
Harris made an opening statement in which he outlined the rules 
that would apply to the meeting.  The rules provided that each 
of the 54 scheduled participants could speak only once for three 
minutes from the podium, that comments would be confined to the 
issue of the disposition to be made of Victory Stadium, and that 
no “outbursts” or “verbal attacks . . . against city council or 
any other people” would be tolerated.  The mayor told the 
audience that police officers were present “to make sure that 
[the rules were] enforced” and that any offenders would “first  
. . . be asked to leave, and if they didn’t,” the officers would 
“escort them out.” 
 
Howard was one of the scheduled speakers, and after his 
turn at the podium he took a seat at the rear of the council 
chamber.  At 4:10 p.m., the twenty-seventh speaker, John Kepley, 
stated that the middle initial of the mayor’s name, “L.,” meant 
“liar.”  The mayor “stopped the council meeting,” stated “that 
this would not be tolerated,” again “laid down the rules of 
 
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exactly what he expected,” and urged everyone to conduct 
themselves in a civil manner. 
 
Howard interrupted the mayor, “yelling out loud,” with his 
hands “[c]upped around his mouth” and saying, “let him speak, 
let him speak.”  While “[e]verybody was a little bit rumbling, 
[Howard] was the loudest all the way from the back row.” 
 
The mayor said, “Mr. Howard,” and then called out, “where 
is the police officer?  Where is the officer?”  Officer Rogers, 
who had stepped outside the council chamber to speak to his 
relief, Officer Johnson, heard the mayor’s call for “the police 
officer” over the intercom.  Officer Rogers immediately returned 
to the council chamber and approached Howard, whereupon the 
mayor said, “thank you sir, thank you sir. Council stands in 
recess, Mr. – officer,” and rapped the gavel. 
 
Officer Rogers approached Howard from the back because 
“he’s on the last row.”  The officer “bent over” Howard and 
said, “you’ve already had your time . . . why don’t you be a 
gentleman, stand up with me, and we’ll walk out of here like two 
. . . full-grown adults?”  Howard responded, “I have a right to 
speak.”  Officer Rogers asked Howard again, “why don’t you stand 
up and walk with me?”  Howard replied, “if you want me out of 
here, you have to drag me out.”  Officer Rogers asked two women 
sitting alongside Howard to move.  When they had moved, Officer 
Rogers came around in front of Howard and he and Officer Johnson 
 
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tried to get Howard to stand up but he said again, “[i]f you 
want me out, you have to drag me out.”  Officer Rogers then “put 
on [Howard] what we call a wristlock,” which made Howard “stand 
up.”  Officer Rogers “walked [Howard] out applying pressure each 
time he went to stop.” 
 
Once outside the council chamber, Howard claimed that 
Officer Rogers had broken his wrist, and Officer Rogers asked 
him “if he wanted rescue.”  Howard replied, “yes,” the rescue 
squad was summoned, and Howard “went with the rescue.”  Officer 
Rogers later went to a magistrate and secured the summons upon 
which Howard was tried in the circuit court.  
 
Howard testified in his own defense at trial.  He conceded 
that the mayor had the right to establish rules for the meeting, 
that he broke the rules by speaking out of turn and not having 
been recognized to address the council from the podium, that the 
mayor was speaking when he, Howard, was “yelling out,” and that 
he resisted Officer Rogers’ request to leave by saying, “you 
would have to drag me out.” 
 
On appeal, Howard argues that a violation of the mayor’s 
rules is not an element of the crime of disorderly conduct.  
Howard says that while the mayor “had a right to set rules and 
enforce rules that don’t violate the First Amendment, he did not 
have the right to create for that one day a new element of the 
crime of disorderly conduct under Roanoke City [Code §] 21-9.”  
 
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Continuing, Howard asserts that “[a] person can be guilty of 
violating the rules of the meeting (a civil violation) without 
being guilty under the criminal [provisions of the Roanoke City 
Code].” 
 
Howard next argues that Roanoke City Code § 21-9 was 
enacted to punish conduct and not words and, with the exclusion 
of “the utterance . . . of any words” from its coverage, has 
insulated him from any criminal responsibility for his “let him 
speak, let him speak” utterance at the council meeting.  He 
concedes that he was not insulated from all consequences, that 
“the mayor had a right to [evict] people who violated his rules 
[from] the meeting,” but contends that the “matter should have 
ended when [he] was escorted from the city council chambers.”  
And, Howard maintains, the fact he may have “yell[ed] loudly” 
does not make him a criminal.  He asks, “[w]ho is to determine 
when the volume rises to criminal levels?”  “This blurring of 
the line between conduct and speech,” Howard opines, “could 
result in arguments that the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague.” 
 
Howard also argues that, while “[t]here was conduct during 
the recess that the Commonwealth could argue was disorderly,”  
he is not criminally responsible for his refusal to leave the 
council chamber when ordered to do so.  “[A]t that point, there 
was no public meeting going on,” Howard avers, “so there was 
 
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nothing that prevented or interfered with the orderly conduct of 
the meeting.” 
ANALYSIS 
 
In Adams Outdoor Advertising v. City of Newport News, 236 
Va. 370, 381, 373 S.E.2d 917, 922 (1988), we stated as follows: 
 
To safeguard free speech, the Supreme Court requires 
that a regulatory measure be content neutral.  The doctrine 
of content neutrality provides that governmental 
regulations may not “restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”  
Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
(1972). 
 
 
The doctrine of content neutrality, however, does not 
preclude all governmental regulation that restricts 
expression.  Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of 
expression are permissible if “they are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . 
serve a significant governmental interest and . . . leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”  Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).   
 
 
Furthermore, “[a]lthough citizens may be given the 
privilege to speak during a public meeting, the right to do so 
is not unlimited.”  Mannix v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 271, 
280-81, 522 S.E.2d 885, 890 (2000).  “Whether the forum be the 
courtroom or the chamber of the legislature itself or of a 
political subdivision of the State, there must be order.  It is 
frivolous to suggest the First Amendment stands in the way of 
that imperative.”  State v. Smith, 218 A.2d l47, 150 (N.J. 
1966).  
 
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Howard correctly argues that the exception in Roanoke City 
Code § 21-9 pertaining to the “utterance . . . of any words” has 
a plain meaning and needs no interpretation.  See Jenkins v. 
Johnson, 276 Va. 30, 34-35, 661 S.E.2d 484, 486 (2008).  Howard 
is also correct in arguing that, since the Code section is 
criminal in nature, it must be strictly construed against the 
Commonwealth.  See Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 
S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008). 
 
We agree with Howard that a violation of the mayor’s rules 
is not an element of the crime of disorderly conduct.  This does 
not mean, however, that conduct which violates the rules cannot 
also be a violation of Roanoke City Code § 21-9. 
 
With respect to Howard’s argument that the Code section’s 
exclusion from coverage of the “utterance . . . of any words” 
insulates him from any criminal responsibility for saying what 
he did just before the recess, we will give him the benefit of 
the doubt and assume for the purpose of this discussion that he 
is not punishable for saying, “let him speak, let him speak.”  
We will give the same treatment to Howard’s argument on the 
loudness issue and assume that he is not punishable because he 
“yell[ed] loudly” during the city council meeting.∗ 
                     
 
∗ This treatment of the loudness question renders moot 
Howard’s contention that any “blurring of the line between 
conduct and speech could result in arguments that the [Roanoke 
City Code section] is unconstitutionally vague.” 
 
8
 
It does not follow, however, that we must reverse Howard’s 
conviction.  His troubles did not end when he stopped yelling.  
We disagree with Howard’s contention that he cannot be held 
accountable for his conduct after the recess was called, conduct 
he admits “the Commonwealth could argue was disorderly,” because 
there was then “no public meeting going on so there was nothing 
that prevented or interfered with the orderly conduct of the 
meeting.” 
 
The circuit court held at one point in the trial that the 
mayor “called the recess because [Howard] was disrupting the 
meeting” and at another point that “the recess was called solely 
to facilitate the removal of Mr. Howard from the chambers.”  
Howard does not question either ruling.  Indeed, Howard’s 
counsel said with respect to the latter ruling that, “I accept 
that ruling.”  It is the client, however, who must accept the 
consequences of the rulings:  Howard will not be allowed to use 
the recess he caused as a shield against the disorderly conduct 
in which he engaged during the recess. 
 
Howard argues, however, that there was no evidence that his 
refusal to leave the council chamber lengthened the recess and 
thus disrupted the meeting.  “We do not know,” Howard says, 
“whether the Council went out to dinner during the recess or how 
long the recess was . . . .  [I]t could literally have been a 
minute or two.”  But Howard himself supplied some information on 
 
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the subject.  He testified to the warnings the mayor gave “to 
people during the four (4) hours of council meeting.”  The 
meeting started at 2:00 p.m.  The recess occurred about 4:10 
p.m., after twenty-seven, or half, of the speakers had been 
heard and about two hours had passed.  If the meeting ended at 
6:00 p.m., as Howard’s testimony indicates, after twenty-seven 
more speakers had been heard and another two hours had passed, 
it is highly unlikely the council members went out to dinner or 
otherwise lingered during the recess. 
 
In any event, how long the recess lasted is irrelevant.  
What is relevant is the length of time it took the police 
officers to talk to Howard in an effort to get him to leave 
peacefully, to get him on his feet by use of a wristlock when 
that effort failed, and to force him by “pain compliance” across 
the chamber and out the chamber door, force sufficient to make 
Howard think his wrist had been broken by Officer Rogers. 
 
Whether the time taken to remove Howard was one or two 
minutes or something more or less, it was of sufficient length 
to disrupt the meeting in a manner proscribed by the Roanoke 
City Code section.  As the circuit court stated in finding 
Howard guilty, “the conduct associated with [Howard’s] removal 
. . . certainly lengthened . . . the recess and prevented the 
orderly conduct of the meeting.” 
 
10
 
11
 
That the disruption was wilful cannot be doubted.  Howard 
disclosed his disruptive inclinations in his conversation with 
Officer Rogers before the meeting even started and continued to 
display them throughout the meeting until he was finally evicted 
from the council chamber. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The evidence amply supports the conclusion that Howard, 
“with the intent to cause public inconvenience [and] annoyance, 
. . . [w]ilfully . . . disrupt[ed the] meeting of the city 
council [of Roanoke on November 7, 2005, and] such disruption 
prevent[ed] or interfere[d] with the orderly conduct of such 
meeting.”  Hence, he was properly proven guilty of disorderly 
conduct under Roanoke City Code § 21-9(a)(2).  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.