Title: Gary Herzfeld v. Frank Herzfeld
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-054
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95054
____________
GARY HERZFELD,
Petitioner,
vs.
FRANK HERZFELD,
Respondent.
[March 15, 2001]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review the opinion in Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 3d DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the opinion in Richards v.
Richards, 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V,
§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  At issue in this case is whether the public policies served by
the parental immunity doctrine continue to support its valid application to claims of
sexual abuse by a parent against a child.  Because we find that in such cases family
harmony is already substantially diminished, and the remaining relevant policy
considerations are insufficient to support application of the doctrine to these
-2-
circumstances, we approve the decision in Herzfeld.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The intentional torts alleged here are: (1) assault and battery; (2) false
imprisonment; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, all based on
allegations of sexual abuse.  The facts underlying the alleged abuse by the parent
against the child are summarized in the Third District’s opinion as follows: 
     The plaintiff [minor child] was placed in the defendant's care as a
foster child in 1988.  The defendant adopted the plaintiff three years
later when the plaintiff was sixteen years old.  On June 5, 1997, the
plaintiff filed a four count civil complaint against the defendant,
alleging repeated sexual abuse.  The plaintiff alleged intentional torts in
counts I through III, and negligence in count IV.
     The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss counts I
through III on the ground that intentional tort claims are barred by the
parental immunity doctrine.  After finding that the defendant's
insurance policy [did] not cover the plaintiff's negligence claim, the
trial court also found the parental immunity doctrine applicable to
count IV and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on that count.
Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d at 1103.  The minor child appealed the trial court's orders
granting his adoptive father's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.  In an
opinion containing a comprehensive and thorough analysis authored by Judge
Gersten, the Third District reversed and held that because family harmony is
already destroyed in sexual abuse cases, "the parental immunity doctrine does not
bar the action by the minor child against his parent for damages arising from sexual
1The court found the daughter unemancipated even though she was married
because the necessary parent-child relationship was intact at the time the incident
subject of the suit occurred. 
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abuse."  Id.  Notwithstanding, the court acknowledged that its ruling was in direct
conflict with Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), which
held that parental immunity barred a similar intentional tort suit by a child against his
father predicated upon the father’s alleged sexual assaults.  We approve Judge
Gersten’s opinion and the decision of the Third District.
FAMILY MEMBERS’ IMMUNITY
As noted, Judge Gersten’s opinion contains a thorough analysis, and we
borrow from much of that analysis here.  Legal commentators note that the rule
granting parents legal immunity from tort actions brought by their children does not
have its origins or any long roots in the English common law, but appears, rather,
to have been created by American state courts.  Commentators trace the rule’s
origin to an opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court decided in 1891.  The case
involved a young married woman, separated from her husband at the time, who
sued her mother for wrongfully confining her to an insane asylum when she was a
minor.1  See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).  In reviewing the young
woman's claim, the court noted that "so long as the parent is under obligation to
care for, guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
2The doctrine has since been partially abrogated in Mississippi in the context
of automobile accident cases in which a minor child was injured as a result of a
parent's negligent operation of a vehicle.  See Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906
(Miss. 1992).   
-4-
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained."  Id. at 887.  The
court explained its rationale: 
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent.  The state, through its criminal
laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and
wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.       
Id.2  The doctrine was accepted and further developed in opinions by the Supreme
Courts of Tennessee and Washington, and later by other state courts.  See Roller
v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), overruled in part by Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d
149 (Wash. 1952); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903), overruled
by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994).  
In McKelvey, the Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned that allowing a minor's
suit would interfere with public policy supporting discretionary parental control and
discipline.  See McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664-65.  In Roller, the Supreme Court of
Washington emphasized its concerns that no practical line could be developed to
separate meritorious claims from those based on actions properly and routinely
3The adoption and expansion of the doctrine by these three cases is referred
to by some legal writers and commentators as "the great trilogy" of cases in the
development of the parental immunity doctrine.  See, e.g., William E. McCurdy,
Torts Between Parents and Child, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 521 (1960).  
4See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992);
Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 256-57 (Iowa 1983); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 137 (Kan. 1980).
5The following seven jurisdictions never adopted the doctrine or explicitly
refused to recognize it: District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah
and Vermont.  See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987); Petersen v. City
& County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d
1013 (Nev. 1974); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 366 (N.D. 1967); Elkington v.
Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (Vt.
1977).  South Dakota appears to have never addressed it.       
6Eleven states have abrogated the doctrine completely: Arizona, California,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
-5-
taken by a parent against a child as part of the exercise of a broad parental
discretion.3  See Roller, 79 P. at 789.  Other courts have added a concern of the
possibility of fraud and collusion between family members and the depletion of
family resources as additional rationales for the immunity doctrine.4  However, the
concern with family integrity has remained at the core of the doctrine.
RECENT TRENDS
Although the majority of states in this country initially adopted the parental
immunity doctrine in varying degrees,5 many have now either abrogated the doctrine
completely6 or have established significant exceptions to its application.7  Those
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.  See Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50
(Ariz. 1995); Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955) (abrogating doctrine for
intentional or malicious torts), Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971)
(abrogating doctrine for negligence suits); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595,
601 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 858 (Mo. 1991); Briere v.
Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871
(N.M. 1981); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. 1969); Kirchner v.
Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 785 (Or.
1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1971); Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d
109, 112 (S.C. 1980).
Some of these jurisdictions have adopted a standard of care evaluating what
an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent would have done in similar
circumstances.  See, e.g., Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995);
Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 855-57
(Mo. 1991).
7Thirty-two states have established exceptions to the doctrine.  In fact,
Louisiana appears to be the only state that continues to apply the doctrine as it was
originally formulated.  See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:571 (1997).  
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courts have reexamined and, in many instances, rejected outright the public policy
rationales originally asserted in support of the doctrine.  For example, in Guess v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981), the New Mexico Supreme Court
concluded that family relationships are affected to a far greater extent by the
misconduct of the party against whom the suit is filed than by the legal action based
on that misconduct.  And, in Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971), the
California Supreme Court held that the policy reasons originally cited in support of
the doctrine had been demonstrated to be insufficient to sustain a continued total
8See, e.g. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Williams v. Williams,
369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me.
1979); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Glaskox v. Glaskox,
614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J.
1970); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013
(R.I. 1982); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988); Smith v. Kauffman, 183
S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891 (Wash. 1980); Lee v.
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153
-7-
bar to parent-child suits based upon wrongful conduct:
We think that the reasoning of those decisions [abrogating the
doctrine] has totally destroyed two of the three grounds traditionally
advanced in support of parental immunity: (1) disruption of family
harmony and (2) fraud or collusion between family “adversaries.”  The
third ground, the threat to parental authority and discipline, although of
legitimate concern, cannot sustain a total bar to parent-child negligence
suits.
Id. at 651; see also Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ohio 1985) (stating
that “[i]f the elimination of parental immunity were a bad legal position, one would
reasonably expect to find that those states [that have now rejected the doctrine after
initially adopting it] were experiencing problems with the abrogation . . . [and] there
is no evidence or persuasive material that any of these states [that never adopted the
doctrine] ever suffered adverse consequences for the lack of such a rule”).  Other
courts have partially retreated from use of the doctrine and have held it should not
apply in circumstances which include negligence claims involving accidents
covered by liability insurance,8 or some intentional tort claims.9
(Wyo. 1992).
9See, e.g., Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989); Attwood v. Estate
of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982); Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d
1385 (Colo. 1990); Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303 (Conn. 1994); Wright v.
Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525
(Ill. 1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951); Pullen v. Novak, 99
N.W.2d 16 (Neb. 1959); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983); Doe v. Holt,
418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992); Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1984);
Pavlick v. Pavlick, 491 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1997); Jenkins v. Snohomish County
Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986); Courtney v. Courtney, 413
S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971).
-8-
Abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in accident cases has been
largely based on the prevalence of liability insurance.  Importantly, the courts have
emphasized that the domestic harmony policy concern is diminished under these
circumstances because the injured child's dispute is actually with the financially
responsible insurance carrier rather than with the parents.  See Streenz v. Streenz,
471 P.2d 282, 284 (Ariz. 1970) (“Where such insurance exists, the domestic
tranquility argument is hollow, for in reality the sought after litigation is not between
child and parent but between child and parent's insurance carrier."), overruled on
other grounds by Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995).  The courts
have also noted that allowing recovery against an insurance fund would not impact
family assets.  See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975)
(stating that "when insurance is involved, . . . both parties seek recovery from the
10This Court relied heavily on both of these cases in recognizing an
automobile insurance exception to the parental immunity doctrine in Ard v. Ard,
414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982). 
11There also appears to be a trend in state courts toward recognizing an
exception to the immunity doctrine for unemancipated minor children injured by the
intentional torts of a parent.  See, e.g., Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d
366 (Ark. 1982); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A. 2d 1145 (N.J. 1983); Elkington v. Foust,
618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980).  
-9-
insurance carrier to create a fund for the child's medical care and support without
depleting the family's other assets").10  Similarly, claims that fraud would increase in
such cases have been rejected either outright as no greater than concerns about
fraud in any litigation, or as insufficiently demonstrated.  See, e.g., Glaskox v.
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 912 (Miss. 1992); Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275,
278 (Ohio 1984).
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE EXCEPTION
Notably, some courts have created specific exceptions to the parental
immunity doctrine for sexual abuse cases.11  See, e.g., Henderson v. Wooley, 644
A.2d 1303 (Conn. 1994); Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989); Doe
v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992); Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th
Cir. 1984).  However, courts have sometimes reached different conclusions
depending on whether such claims are raised in a negligence or intentional tort
12A claim arises in negligence most often as an allegation that a parent failed
to protect or prevent the child from sexual abuse by another person, including the
other parent.  See, e.g. Robinson v. Robinson, 914 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1996)
(negligence suit filed by child against her mother for mother's failure to prevent
sexual abuse by father); Phinney v. Morgan, 654 N.E.2d 77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)
(same).  As an intentional tort, the claim is usually asserted directly against the
abusing parent as in this case.  See Robinson, 914 S.W.2d at 293 (intentional tort
suit brought by child against father for sexual abuse committed during child’s
minority).    
-10-
context.12  
For instance, in Robinson v. Robinson, 914 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1996), a child
brought an intentional tort suit against her father based on sexual abuse committed
during her minority and a separate negligence claim against her mother for failing to
prevent such abuse.  The child prevailed at trial.  See id. at 293.  Upon review, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that it would continue to recognize parental immunity
for negligence claims.  See id. at 293.  However, while remanding for a new trial,
the court nevertheless allowed the intentional tort suit to go forward, recognizing
that under Arkansas law, parental immunity does not preclude minors from suing
their parents for willful and wanton sexual abuse.  See id.  Similarly, in McGee v.
McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App. 1996), the Texas court recognized an
exception to the parental immunity doctrine for the minor's claims of intentional
sexual assault, while holding that the negligence claims were barred by the
13Texas has recognized three exceptions to the doctrine: (1) intentional or
malicious acts; (2) acts committed by parents in an employer-employee relationship
with their child; and (3) the negligent operation of an automobile.  See McGee, 936
S.W.2d at 367.
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doctrine.13  See id. at 367. 
Other courts have not only permitted intentional tort claims but also those
based on negligence against a parent for not protecting the child or preventing the
sexual abuse.  See Spikes v. Banks, 586 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(stating that foster parent's failure to prevent sexual abuse by parent's nephew was
not an exercise of reasonable parental discretion and therefore parent was not
entitled to avail herself of the parental immunity doctrine); Phillips v. Deihm, 541
N.W.2d 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that grandfather's wife's failure to act
to prevent the sexual abuse by grandfather against minor was not a reasonable
exercise of parental discretion; therefore, wife was not entitled to parental
immunity). 
It is apparent that courts have expressed a special concern about the
continued application of the parental immunity doctrine to defeat intentional sexual
abuse claims.  For example, in Hurst, a minor sued her stepfather and natural
mother for damages based on sexual abuse.  See Hurst, 539 So. 2d at 265.  In
allowing the suits to proceed, the court created an exception for sexual abuse
-12-
cases, explaining: "[T]o leave children who are victims of such wrongful,
intentional, heinous acts [sexual abuse acts] without a right to redress those wrongs
in a civil action is unconscionable, especially where the harm to the family fabric
has already occurred through that abuse."  Id. at 266.  Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Connecticut conducted a comprehensive reevaluation of the doctrine in
Henderson, and, relying primarily on the authority of Hurst and Doe, declared: 
[W]e do not believe that the purpose of the doctrine would be served
by extending it to shield a parent from a civil action alleging sexual
abuse.  Familial discord or dysfunction obviously exists where
parental sexual abuse occurs.  Therefore, the purpose of the
preservation of family harmony cannot justify immunity in the case of
sexual abuse of a child by a parent.
     Furthermore, there is a point at which parental conduct properly
becomes a matter of public concern, and sexual abuse, assault and
exploitation are well within that realm.  When a parent perpetrates such
a crime upon his or her child, that act constitutes a breach of duty
owed not only to the child, but to the public at large, and there is no
reason to immunize such conduct from a civil action in damages
merely because of the familial relationship. 
Henderson, 644 A.2d at 1307 (citations omitted).  Further, in response to the often-
cited premise from Hewellette that minors can obtain redress through the criminal
justice system, the court noted: 
[R]edress is not necessarily available for this type of misconduct
through the criminal justice system [because] [t]he conduct may not be
brought to the attention of the state within the time limits of the
criminal statute of limitations because of the child's continued
dependency on the parent.  Also, the child may not recognize the
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wrong for many years because children often accept unquestioningly
the actions of their parents.  Finally, as in the present case, the plaintiff
may allege facts that are claimed to have been blocked from conscious
memory for many years.     
Id. (footnote omitted).
FLORIDA LAW
It appears that the parent-child immunity doctrine was first discussed in a
Florida appellate opinion in 1961.  In Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1961), a father sued his minor son for the wrongful death of another one of
his minor sons.  While observing that no other Florida case could be found that
had addressed the question, the court held that the father’s action was barred,
relying on the view already adopted in other states barring parents from maintaining
tort actions against an unemancipated minor child.  See id. at 777.  The court relied
upon the often cited concerns relating to the encouragement of family unity and the
maintenance of family discipline as sufficient public policy reasons to support the
ban.  See id.  In 1967, the Second District again applied the doctrine to bar a
negligence suit by a minor child against his parents and discussed the public policy
concerns: 
This rule [parental immunity], like that forbidding at common law the
bringing of an action by a wife against her husband for a personal tort,
is not the product of any inherent disability of the child to sue its
parent, but rather is based upon the interest that society has in
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preserving harmony in the domestic relations.  It is said that the rule is
not an absolute one, but exists only where the suit would disturb the
family relations.   
Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (quoting 39 Am. Jur.
Parent and Child § 90).  
OREFICE
Subsequently, this Court followed the precedent set by the district court and
held that permitting tort suits between members of a family unit would be
inconsistent with Florida public policy favoring the integrity of the family.  See
Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970).  The Court emphasized that the
major purpose of the rule, including the bar of suits between children and parents,
was to protect family harmony and resources.  See id.  The family immunity
doctrine as adopted in Orefice remained unchanged in Florida until 1982 and this
Court’s decision in Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).  
In Ard this Court carved out an exception to the parental immunity doctrine
for negligence actions brought by a minor child against a parent who was protected
by liability insurance for the incident giving rise to the action.  See Ard, 414 So. 2d
at 1067.  Importantly, we noted the trend among other states toward abrogating or
limiting parental immunity where changes in the contemporary conditions and life
14At the time the opinion was released, twenty-four states had either limited
or abolished the application of the doctrine.  See Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1068, n.4.    
15In Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993), we rejected concerns
about marital discord and fraud in concluding that the interspousal immunity
doctrine should be abolished.  We concluded that there was no basis to believe that
married couples were more likely to commit fraud against insurers than anyone else,
and that no additional marital discord was likely to occur beyond that brought
about by the circumstances which gave rise to the tort suit itself.  See id. at 1361. 
Because the policy considerations underlying the parental immunity doctrine are
similar to those that supported the interspousal immunity doctrine, it is not
surprising to find they are often treated alike by courts and commentators.  See
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (looking back on thirty-five years
since the abrogation of interspousal immunity to predict possible effect of
abrogating parental immunity).
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diminished the strength of the policies supporting the doctrine.14  See id. at 1067-
68.  We recognized, for example, that many states had long since created an
exception to the doctrine in cases dealing with the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by a parent where there was liability insurance covering such incidents.  See
id.  This Court also rejected the potential for fraud or collusion by family members
as a valid reason to refuse to recognize any exceptions to the doctrine, noting that
the potential for fraud generally existed in any lawsuit.  See id. at 1069.15
INTENTIONAL SEXUAL TORTS
After carefully evaluating the policies behind the parental immunity doctrine,
the national trends, and our own prior case law, we conclude that the district court
was correct in holding that the policies relied upon to support the doctrine are
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insufficient to continue application of the doctrine to bar intentional sexual tort
claims by a child against a parent.  We agree with the district court that the fear of
disrupting the fabric and nucleus of families by allowing actions based upon
intentional sexual abuse simply appears to be without merit.  If indeed the principal
reason for the parental immunity doctrine is to preserve family harmony, then it
appears that the immunity can have no justification in such cases of intentional and
malicious sexual abuse, for in those cases the inescapable conclusion is that the
family fabric has already been tragically disrupted by the serious misconduct
alleged.  We agree that the mere additional stress of a lawsuit in such circumstances
is an insufficient reason by itself to bar a claim for that misconduct.  
Further, while we have genuine concerns that some may abuse the judicial
system through false claims in domestic relations cases as well as tort cases, we
believe the protections available in the judicial process are adequate to address the
issue of false or fraudulent claims in this context as well as others.  We find the
depletion of family resources argument unpersuasive as well.  As was noted by the
court below, it is apparent that the depletion of family resources by itself cannot
justify the parental immunity theory, since "any time a person is sued for actions
not covered by liability insurance, his or her family's resources are threatened." 
16As a final and alternative point, the minor in this case argues that the trial
court erred in even applying the parental immunity doctrine to bar his suit because
he was at least twenty years old when he filed it and the doctrine only precludes
suits by unemancipated minor children.  We find this argument to be without merit. 
Although the parental immunity doctrine only applies to suits filed by minors, the
child's argument is contrary to numerous cases holding that the relevant measuring
period is from the time when the alleged misconduct occurred, not the time that the
actual suit was filed.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 914 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Ark.
1996) (holding that doctrine was applicable to the child's case because although she
had attained her legal age when the action was commenced, she was an
unemancipated minor at the time of the alleged tort); Henderson v. Woolley, 644
A.2d 1303 (Conn. 1994) (analyzing the parental immunity doctrine based on claim
brought by a thirty-three-year-old plaintiff who alleged to have been sexually abused
by her father from the age of four until she turned fourteen).
-17-
Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d at 1106.16
The petitioner-father asserts that the Legislature rather than the judiciary is the
only branch of government with the authority to make such a change to the
application of the doctrine.  We disagree.  As was noted by Justice Harding in his
concurrence in Waite, because the "doctrine of interspousal immunity is rooted in
the common law and is not a statutory creation[,] . . . it is appropriate for this Court
to abrogate the doctrine rather than defer to legislative action."  Waite, 618 So. 2d
at 1362; see also Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (“Because the
[parental immunity] doctrine was judicially created, it is not exclusively a legislative
issue and it may be judicially qualified.”); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198
(Wis. 1963).  In Waite, this Court recognized that the "common law will not be
17Although the minor child encourages us to completely abrogate the
doctrine for all torts, we decline his invitation to do so at this time.  Several years
ago in Ard, this Court was presented with the question of whether to abrogate the
doctrine in negligence actions.  After extensively analyzing the policy considerations
justifying the parental immunity doctrine in the negligence context, the Court found
that although the doctrine was no longer justified in cases where the parent had
insurance, it was still applicable to bar other claims.  See Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1067. 
Because we continue to recognize a significant distinction between intentional and
negligent acts, as well as the possible threat of disruption that claims of simple
negligence can have on the family unit and on parents’ rights to discipline their
children, we decline to consider the application of the doctrine in other contexts at
this time. 
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altered or expanded by this Court unless demanded by public policy necessity or
to vindicate fundamental rights."  Waite, 618 So. 2d at 1361.  As in Waite,
however, we conclude that public policy, as well as the vindication of fundamental
rights, requires our action here.  Therefore, because the parental immunity doctrine
was judicially created, we have not only the authority to abrogate it, but an
affirmative duty to review the wisdom of continuing to maintain it in the challenged
circumstances.17 
CONCLUSION  
In sum, we are in essential agreement with the view expressed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Doe:
     It would be unconscionable if children who were injured by
heinous acts [sexual abuse acts] of their parents such as alleged here
should have no avenue by which to recover damages in redress of
those wrongs.  Where a parent has injured his or her child through a
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willful and malicious act, any concept of family harmony has been
destroyed.  Thus, the foremost public purpose supporting the parent-
child immunity doctrine is absent, and there is no reason to extend the
doctrine’s protection to such acts.
     We wish to make it clear that no issue involving reasonable
chastisement of children by their parents is before us in the present
case, and we expressly do not intend to be understood as commenting
on situations involving such issues.  Furthermore, our opinion in the
present case is not intended to permit interference in the proper scope
of discretion parents must utilize in rearing their children.  As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized in Foldi, there is no
universally correct philosophy on how to raise one’s child.  In no way
do we intend to indicate that reasonable parental decisions concerning
children should be reviewed in the courts of this state.  Such decisions
make up the essence of parental discretion, discretion which allows
parents to shape the views, beliefs and values their children carry with
them into adulthood.  These decisions are for the parents to make, and
will be protected as such.
Doe, 418 S.E.2d at 514-15 (citations omitted).  
Accordingly, because we find that the policies behind the parental immunity
doctrine are insufficient to justify barring a minor from recovering for intentional
sexual abuse perpetrated by a parent, we approve the opinion and decision below
and disapprove Richards.  
It is so ordered. 
SHAW, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and
LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
18Section 2.01, Florida Statutes (1999), incorporates the common and statute
laws of England in force on July 4, 1776, as the law in Florida.
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IF FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority's decision to abrogate the doctrine of parental
immunity for sexual abuse claims brought by children.  While alterations of the
common law are rarely entertained or allowed, they are within this Court's
prerogative.  See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588, 594 (Fla. 1992).  However, the
common law will only be altered or expanded when demanded by public necessity
or where required to vindicate fundamental rights.  Id. at 595 (finding no basis to
expand the common law to equate anencephaly with death); Waite v. Waite, 618 So.
2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (abrogating the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity).
As explained in Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1979), the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity was originally a part of the common law of
England and was adopted into the law of Florida in 1829 by the enactment of what
is now section 2.01, Florida Statutes.18  "As a general rule, that part of the common
law codified by section 2.01 should be changed through legislative enactment and
not by judicial decision.  Only in very few instances and with great hesitation has this
Court modified or abrogated any part of the common law enacted by section 2.01,
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and then only where there was a compelling need for the change and the reason for
the law no longer existed."  Id. at 353-54.
In contrast, the doctrine of parent-child immunity did not have its origin in the
common law of England, but rather can be traced back to the 1891 Mississippi case
of Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).  The Mississippi Supreme Court
based its decision on the "peace of society . . . [and] the repose of families."  Id. at
887.  It appears that Florida case law did not discuss the doctrine until the 1960s. 
See Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (applying doctrine to
bar negligence suit by minor child against parents) Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So. 2d
776, 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) (relying on "view of the majority of states" to
conclude that father's suit against minor son for wrongful death of another minor
son was barred).  In 1970, this Court stated that it is "established policy . . . that
suits will not be allowed in this state among members of a family unit for tort. 
Spouses may not sue each other, nor children their parents.  The purpose of this
policy is to protect family harmony and resources."  Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d
142, 145 (Fla. 1970) (holding that neither mother nor estate of decedent minor child
could maintain suit against father for negligence).  However, in 1982, this Court
waived the doctrine of parental immunity in tort actions for negligence brought by an
unemancipated minor child where the negligence arose from an accident and to the
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extent of the parent's available liability insurance coverage.  See Ard v. Ard, 414 So.
2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982).  The Court noted that the public policy reasons behind
parental immunity (preservation of domestic harmony and tranquility; depletion of
family assets in favor of the claimant at the expense of the other family members;
danger of fraud and collusion between the parent and child when insurance is
involved; interference with parental care, discipline, and control; and the possibility
of inheritance by the parent of the amount recovered by the child) were changed by
the development and widespread use of liability insurance.  See id. at 1068.  The
Court concluded that where insurance is involved the action between parent and
child is not truly adversary and the action is more likely to preserve the family unit as
the insurance assets are likely to ease financial difficulties stemming from the family
member's injuries.  See id. at 1068-69.  The Court also noted that the possibility of
fraud exists in every lawsuit and should not be the basis for denying a child
compensation for negligent injuries.  See id. at 1069.  Finally, the Court cited a
number of instances where Florida Statutes have waived immunity when there is
liability insurance.  See id.  Accordingly, the Court, and not the Legislature,
abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity to the extent of available insurance
coverage.  See id. at 1070.
In Waite, this Court completely abrogated the doctrine of interspousal
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immunity even though it had been adopted into the law of Florida in 1829 by section
2.01.  The Court concluded that the public policy reasons for applying the doctrine
were no longer applicable and that both public necessity and the vindication of
fundamental rights demanded this abrogation.  See Waite, 618 So. 2d at 1361.
In light of the fact that parental immunity is totally judicial in origin, there is
even less reason for this Court to defer to legislative action in abrogating the
doctrine.  Thus, the real issue is whether the policy reasons underlying parental
immunity are still valid.  The Court has already abrogated parental immunity for
negligence actions to the extent of liability insurance coverage.  See Ard.  W. Page
Keeton, a respected authority on American tort law, has observed that the very act
of creating exceptions to a doctrine renders the doctrine increasingly less justifiable. 
See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §122, at 902-
04 (5th ed. 1984).  Moreover, Keeton has criticized that the retreat from the doctrine
of parental immunity has lagged behind the abrogation of interspousal immunity
when there is "no shadow of a difference in principle or policy" between the
doctrines.  Id. at 906.  Thus, the judicial whittling down of parental immunity and the
complete abrogation of interspousal immunity both cut in favor of judicial
abolishment of parental immunity in Florida.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished parent-child immunity nearly forty
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years ago.  See Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).  Other states have
followed suit by either completely abrogating the doctrine or establishing significant
exceptions to its application.  See majority op. at 5-7 and accompanying footnotes.
The majority advocates a progressive and compassionate judicial course in
the instant case:  the abrogation of parental immunity for all claims of sexual abuse
raised by a child against a parent.  The majority notes that in cases of intentional and
malicious sexual abuse "the family fabric has already been tragically disrupted" and
there is no family harmony to preserve.  Majority op. at 16.  "[T]he mere additional
stress of a lawsuit in such circumstances is an insufficient reason by itself to bar a
claim for that misconduct."  Id.  This is almost identical to the reasoning behind this
Court's decision in Waite, i.e., "marital harmony" is already disrupted where one
partner commits a wrong against the other.  See Waite, 618 So. 2d at 1361.
Based upon this Court's reasoning in Waite, the history of parental immunity,
and the actions of other states, I believe the time has come to completely abrogate
the doctrine of parental immunity for claims of intentional sexual abuse brought by
children in Florida.  Accordingly, I join in the majority's first step in this case.
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
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I would quash Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999),
and approve Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
This Court’s precedent is to uphold family immunity except in the limited
instance set out in Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).  That policy has served
the state for a long period, and disturbing it has not been justified.
I am concerned that this decision will be used to foster litigation involving
children in stances in which the real battle is between the two parents.  Although I
certainly agree with dealing harshly with parents who abuse their children–sexually,
physically, mentally, or emotionally–I find a great deal of wisdom in Judge Cobb’s
opinion in Richards:
Recovery against a parent by an individual child for an intentional tort,
where insurance is not available, decreases the assets available for the
support of other family members who may also be in need of
assistance.  Moreover, the majority of any punitive damage recovery by
the child/plaintiff would pass to the state, further depleting family
assets.
We also note that opening the doors to tort actions for damages
by children against parents would avail an unscrupulous parent of the
opportunity to manipulate a minor child and the legal system by
bringing frivolous actions against the other parent.  The criminal court,
rather than the civil court, is better equipped to process charges such
as those leveled in the instant case.  As succinctly pointed out in the
appellee’s brief:
The benefits to be gained by a child’s
intentional tort action against a parent do not justify
abrogating the parent/child immunity doctrine.  If a parent
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abuses a minor child, the parent is already obligated by
law to provide the minor child with all necessary care,
including medical and psychological care.  The law also
recognizes the child’s right to enforce this obligation.  It
is not necessary that the child be given the right to sue a
parent for intentional tort for the obligation to be
enforced.  The parent’s obligation to provide for the child
also continues beyond the age of majority if the child is
unable to provide for himself or herself as a result of a
physical or psychological disability.
. . . . 
If the parent/child immunity doctrine is to be
abrogated to allow a child to bring an intentional tort
action against a parent, it should be done by statute.  The
legislative setting is better equipped to solve such a
complex social issue as that presented by this case.  In a
legislative setting the whole spectrum of compelling
interests can be considered, and a broad solution can be
crafted.  In the judicial setting, the complex social issue
of sexual abuse comes before the court upon a set of
facts by a single case.
Richards v. Richards, 599 So. 2d at 136-37.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Direct Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D98-362 
(Dade County)
Sharon L. Kegerreis and Mayda Prego of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed LLP, Miami,
Florida,
for Petitioner
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David C. Rash, North Miami Beach, Florida,
for Respondent