Title: Commonwealth v. Deconinck
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12198
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12198 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER DECONINCK. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2018. - August 10, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Self-Defense.  Evidence, Self-defense, Testimony 
before grand jury, Declaration of deceased person, Hearsay, 
Prior violent conduct, Bias.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Disqualification of judge, Instructions to jury, 
Question by jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 20, 2013. 
 
 
The case was tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney (Masai-Maliek 
King, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty for the fatal stabbing of Ronald Russo on August 24, 
2013.  That evening, the defendant and the victim, who were 
2 
 
 
 
 
long-time friends, got into an argument and shoving match inside 
a mobile home.  Both had been consuming alcohol before the 
shoving match.  They then armed themselves with kitchen knives.  
During the ensuing fight, the defendant stabbed or slashed the 
victim sixty-nine times, while sustaining a stab wound to his 
right leg. 
 
At trial, the defendant claimed that he had stabbed the 
victim in self-defense or, in the alternative, that the 
Commonwealth's evidence, at best, supported a conviction of 
voluntary manslaughter due to the excessive use of force in 
self-defense, sudden combat, or heat of passion. 
 
The defendant argues that a new trial is required for a 
number of reasons.  He contends first that he was deprived of 
the right to present a defense, based on the judge's rulings on 
the admissibility of an out-of-court statement to police made by 
the only eyewitness to the altercation, a few hours after the 
fight.  The witness, a mutual friend of the defendant and the 
victim, was unavailable to testify because he died unexpectedly 
prior to trial.  Over the Commonwealth's objection, the 
defendant was permitted to introduce the witness's grand jury 
testimony in evidence as prior recorded testimony.  Defense 
counsel's repeated efforts to introduce an audio-video recording 
of the witness's statement to police, however, were denied on 
the ground that the recording was hearsay evidence.  The 
3 
 
 
 
 
defendant maintains, as he did strenuously at trial, that the 
statement should have been played for the jury because it was 
admissible under the narrow exception to the hearsay rule carved 
out by this court in Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 25, 
40 (2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018). 
 
In addition, the defendant argues that he is entitled to a 
new trial because the judge abused her discretion in excluding 
so-called Adjutant evidence, including the unavailable witness's 
recorded statement to police and other evidence of the victim's 
violent conduct.  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 
664 (2005).  The defendant contends that this evidence suggests 
that the victim was the first aggressor in the knife fight.  The 
defendant claims further that his right to a fair trial was 
violated by the judge's failure sua sponte to conduct a recusal 
analysis, given that she had found his trial counsel in contempt 
of court in an unrelated prior case, and that the judge 
improperly instructed the jury in response to a question 
regarding self-defense.  The defendant also asks that we use our 
extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
verdict.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction 
and decline to exercise our authority to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving some facts for later discussion of particular issues. 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
a.  Commonwealth's case.  In the summer of 2013, the victim 
had been staying with John Fay at a trailer park located on 
Revere Beach Parkway in Revere.  Sometime during the day of 
August 24, 2013, a neighbor encountered the victim and the 
defendant in the driveway of Fay's trailer.  The neighbor, who 
had known both the victim and the defendant for years, went 
inside the trailer with them and spoke with them briefly. 
 
At around 8:15 P.M. that evening, the neighbor stopped by 
Fay's trailer to ask the victim for help moving an appliance.  
After calling out to see if anyone was there, he entered the 
trailer and found that it was in complete disarray.  He saw a 
body on the kitchen floor and ran across the street to another 
neighbor to telephone 911. 
 
The responding police officers and emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs) found the victim on the kitchen floor, lying 
on his back in a pool of blood.  There were extensive 
bloodstains throughout the kitchen, and the table and several 
chairs had been tipped over.  The victim was holding a detached 
blade from a chef-style knife in his right hand.  Officers found 
a bloodstained handle belonging to the chef-style knife, and a 
5 
 
 
 
 
bloodstained kitchen knife with a slightly bent blade, on the 
kitchen counter.1 
The victim died as a result of multiple sharp force 
injuries.  Of the sixty-nine stab wounds, there were nineteen on 
his chest and stomach, twenty-six on his back, and fifteen on 
his hands.  Most of the wounds were superficial.  One deep stab 
wound in the victim's chest, and two deep stab wounds to his 
back, pierced internal organs; each independently would have 
been fatal. 
 
Sometime around 8 P.M., a resident of the trailer park had 
been walking home along Revere Beach Parkway.  He a saw 
shirtless white male, covered in blood "from head to toe" 
approaching from the opposite direction.  When he reached the 
trailer park, he told one of the officers who had responded to 
the crime scene what he had seen.  As a result, officers headed 
to Revere Beach Parkway in search of the suspect. 
 
A Revere police officer located the defendant at the closed 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Beachmont station.  
                     
1 Subsequent deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of a 
bloodstain from the intact knife showed that the victim's blood 
matched the major male profile; the minor DNA profile was 
inconclusive.  The bloodstain on the knife handle contained a 
mixture of DNA that matched the defendant's DNA and the victim's 
DNA.  The victim's DNA matched the major DNA profile from the 
bloodstain on the tip of the knife blade found in the victim's 
hand; the defendant's DNA did not match the major male profile 
on the tip of the blade, and the minor DNA profile was 
inconclusive. 
6 
 
 
 
 
The defendant was unsteady on his feet and staggering, yanking 
on the station doors and biting the lock.  After disregarding 
multiple orders to lie on the ground, and after staring for more 
than thirty seconds at the officer, who had drawn his weapon and 
was pointing it at the defendant, the defendant ultimately 
complied.  The officer saw that the defendant was bleeding from 
an injury to his lower right leg.  EMTs responded to the scene 
to treat the defendant.  During this time, the defendant was 
combative, screaming, yelling, and threatening to kill the 
officers and EMTs. 
The defendant was transported to a hospital for further 
treatment.2  At around 10 P.M., a State police detective entered 
the defendant's hospital room.  Upon seeing the detective, the 
defendant said, "I don't remember where I was."  The defendant 
then declined to be interviewed, and the detective left the 
room.  The defendant later called for the detective to come 
back.  While the detective was attempting to read the defendant 
the Miranda rights, the defendant interrupted and said that the 
victim had stabbed him first in the leg.  The defendant later 
called the detective a "moron," and requested to be taken to 
court because "it was self-defense."  In a subsequent statement 
                     
 
2 The defendant's medical records indicate that he was 
treated for a wound on the back of his right leg that appeared 
to look more like a "stab injury."  He also had abrasions on his 
left leg, face, hands, and fingers. 
7 
 
 
 
 
to police, the defendant said that he had been at his friend 
"Johnny Fay's" house, he had not killed anyone, and he had been 
shot or stabbed in the back of his leg. 
At trial, the Commonwealth played for the jury thirty-nine 
short "snippets" from twenty-four recorded telephone calls made 
by the defendant from the Suffolk County jail approximately one 
month after his arrest.3  In these telephone conversations, the 
defendant said that he stabbed the victim in self-defense, he 
had been stabbed multiple times by the victim, he had not 
intended to kill the victim, and he had been impaired by 
Klonopin or Xanax.  At other points, the defendant characterized 
himself as a "stone cold killer" and reported that he had 
"knocked [the victim] out, [taken] the knife, and . . . kept 
sticking till [the victim] stopped moving." 
b.  Defendant's case.  The only percipient witness, John 
Fay, died unexpectedly prior to trial.  In support of his theory 
of self-defense, and that the victim had been the first 
                     
 
3 The Commonwealth introduced two compact discs (CDs) 
containing 174 recorded telephone calls from the Suffolk County 
jail, between August 27, 2013, and October 18, 2013, but played 
only certain small portions for the jury.  The judge initially 
allowed the recordings of the calls to be introduced in their 
entirety and to be available for the jury to play during 
deliberations.  She later ordered portions of the recordings 
redacted as not relevant.  Ultimately, toward the end of the 
trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to the 
admission of certain portions of specific calls.  The two CDS 
were withdrawn, and the jury were given a recording of only 
those calls. 
8 
 
 
 
 
aggressor, the defendant introduced Fay's grand jury testimony 
as prior recorded testimony.  A transcript of Fay's grand jury 
testimony was read into the record; trial counsel read the 
prosecutor's questions and counsel's investigator read Fay's 
responses. 
 
Fay's testimony is summarized as follows.  On the morning 
of August 24, 2013, the victim went to Revere Beach, where he 
encountered the defendant, who was one of his long-time friends.  
The victim invited the defendant and the defendant's brother 
back to Fay's trailer.  While Fay was in the kitchen cooking, 
the others were talking and drinking vodka.  The victim and the 
defendant also sniffed cocaine, and the defendant took some 
prescription pills.4  Other friends stopped by, and the victim 
instigated a shoving match with one of the guests. 
By 6 P.M., the other guests had left and only the defendant 
and the victim remained in the trailer with Fay.  The others 
decided to leave because "[the victim] was being disruptive, 
pounding on the table.  He was drunk and . . . it wasn't a good 
scene . . . ."  The victim pushed Fay into the stove so hard 
that a pot was almost knocked over.  The defendant, who had been 
sitting at the kitchen table, stood up and told the victim to 
leave Fay alone and to stop causing trouble.  This resulted in 
                     
4 When the defendant was arrested, police seized a bottle of 
Xanax pills from his pants pocket. 
9 
 
 
 
 
several arguments and shoving matches between the victim and the 
defendant.  The quarrel became more heated when the defendant 
mentioned "an old prison beef."  They also quarreled because the 
defendant said the victim had stolen prescription pills from him 
earlier that day.  Fay separated the victim and the defendant 
three or four times. 
While Fay was in the bathroom, he heard the two men 
continuing to argue about the allegedly stolen pills.  From the 
hallway, Fay saw the two seated at opposite ends of the kitchen 
table.  The defendant jumped up from his chair, lifting the 
table off the floor in doing so.  He went around the table 
toward the victim.  The victim jumped up to face the defendant.  
According to Fay, the defendant and the victim each took a knife 
from the table.  Fay did not actually see either man reach for a 
knife, and could not tell who was the first to arm himself.  
"[I]t just happened so quick.  I just saw two people with 
knives.  I don't know how or what they grabbed." 
The victim and the defendant moved to the side of the 
table.  Fay saw them "stabbing each other."  He did not see 
whether the victim or the defendant was the first to swing a 
knife or stab the other.  "I don't know who struck who or 
whatever.  They were wrestling back and forth, and then I saw 
the knives, and then I seen each other sticking.  I don't know 
who struck who first."  Fay described the victim as "fighting 
10 
 
 
 
 
for his life" against a much larger and more hostile opponent.5  
The victim and the defendant swung their knives at each other 
"back and forth."  The defendant got the better of the victim, 
and connected at least three to five times.  The victim 
collapsed on the kitchen floor, and the defendant fled the 
trailer.  Fay did not telephone for help.  He left to go to a 
neighborhood bar.6 
 
The defendant called two expert witnesses.  The first, a 
chemist, extrapolated from the defendant's blood alcohol content 
(BAC) of 0.11 when he was admitted to the hospital, and opined 
that the defendant had had a BAC of approximately 0.15 to 0.16 
earlier in the evening.  The expert also testified to the 
effects of Xanax and cocaine on cognitive functioning.  The 
second expert, a forensic neuropsychologist, testified that the 
defendant suffered from impaired judgment and impulse control 
due to past traumatic brain injuries, depression, and substance 
abuse. 
 
The judge instructed the jury on self-defense, murder in 
the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
                     
5 According to Fay, the victim was six feet tall and weighed 
approximately 220 pounds, and the defendant was six foot three 
or four inches tall and weighed approximately 280 pounds. 
 
 
6 Some of Fay's testimony to the grand jury was consistent 
with what he had told police in the audio-video recorded 
statement a few hours after the incident; other portions 
differed or were more detailed. 
11 
 
 
 
 
murder in the second degree, and voluntary manslaughter on 
theories of excessive force in self-defense, heat of passion, 
and sudden combat.  The jury convicted the defendant of murder 
in the first degree. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
contends that Fay's recorded statement to police was admissible 
under an exception to the hearsay rule discussed in Drayton, 
473 Mass. at 25, 40, because it bore indicia of reliability, was 
contemporaneous with the events, and was critical to his 
defense; the defendant argues that the denial of his motion to 
introduce this evidence deprived him of the right to present a 
defense and requires a new trial.  Second, the defendant asserts 
that the judge abused her discretion in excluding other Adjutant 
evidence concerning prior acts of the victim.  Third, the 
defendant contends that the judge should have considered 
recusing herself, sua sponte, after considering her order of 
civil contempt against his trial counsel in an unrelated case 
prior to his trial.  The defendant argues that the judge's bias 
toward his counsel, and her decision not to even consider 
recusing herself, deprived him of the right to a trial by a fair 
and impartial tribunal.  Fourth, the defendant argues that the 
judge's answer to a jury question concerning self-defense 
foreclosed the possibility of a lesser verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter.  In addition, the defendant asks us to exercise 
12 
 
 
 
 
our extraordinary authority to overturn the conviction and order 
a new trial, or to reduce the verdict. 
 
a.  Admissibility of Fay's videotaped statement.  In 
Drayton, 473 Mass. at 33, we considered whether to adopt a 
narrow, constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule.  
In the "unusual circumstances" presented in that case, the 
defendant sought to admit an affidavit of a deceased witness as 
newly discovered evidence in support of a motion for a new 
trial.  Id. at 25, 27-28.  Applying the dying declaration 
exception to the hearsay rule, the judge had excluded the 
affidavit and denied the motion for new trial.  Id. at 32. 
 
We concluded that the affidavit "plainly would have been 
critical to the defense" because it directly contradicted the 
sole eyewitness's testimony implicating the defendant in the 
fatal shooting.  Id. at 36.  Recognizing a constitutionally 
based hearsay exception "rooted in the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Chambers v. Mississippi," 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973), we held that the deceased witness's affidavit could be 
admissible at postconviction proceedings, notwithstanding that 
it did not fall into any traditional category of a hearsay 
exception.  Drayton, 473 Mass. at 33, 36.  See Chambers, supra 
("hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the 
ends of justice").  Accordingly, we remanded the case to the 
Superior Court to allow the defendant to establish that the 
13 
 
 
 
 
deceased witness's affidavit was sufficiently reliable.  
Drayton, supra at 36, 40.  Notwithstanding this ruling, the 
opinion ended "by emphasizing the narrowness of the 
constitutional principle that governs this case and necessitates 
our remand. . . .  In the vast majority of cases, the 
established hearsay exceptions will continue to govern the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence at most criminal trials, with 
this constitutional hearsay exception operating only in the 
rarest of cases, where otherwise inadmissible evidence is both 
truly critical to the defendant's case and bears persuasive 
guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id. at 40. 
Here, the judge excluded Fay's recorded statement to police 
on hearsay grounds.  She found that the audio-video recorded 
statement was inadmissible hearsay.  She also noted that, as 
compared to Fay's grand jury testimony, which she allowed to be 
introduced at trial as prior recorded testimony because Fay was 
unavailable, the recorded statement did not materially advance 
the defendant's claim of self-defense.  In the recorded 
statement, Fay said that, after he saw the defendant and the 
victim facing each other holdings knives, he left and went to a 
bar. 
The defendant concedes that Fay's grand jury testimony, 
which was read to the jury, "does overlap with much of the Fay 
[s]tatement."  He contends, however, that there are crucial 
14 
 
 
 
 
differences between the recorded statement and the grand jury 
testimony.  "[W]hat the jury would have gotten from the Fay 
[s]tatement that it did not get from the grand jury testimony 
[introduced at trial] was the fact that [the victim] was an 
instigator of violence who was provoking both [the defendant] 
and Fay to the point where even Fay pushed [the victim] and 
slammed [the victim]." 
We agree with the judge's conclusion that the statement did 
not fit within the narrow hearsay exception set forth in 
Drayton.  Notably, the defendant did not establish that its 
admission was critical to his case.  By introducing Fay's grand 
jury testimony, the defendant was able to demonstrate that the 
victim had been intoxicated and belligerent.  The jury heard 
that the victim pushed one guest to the floor and that almost 
all of the guests left the gathering because the victim had been 
so disruptive and was banging on the table.  After the others 
left, the victim continued to pound on the kitchen table with 
his fists, got into multiple heated arguments, and pushed his 
friends.7 
                     
 
7 There are other differences in Fay's recorded statement as 
compared to his grand jury testimony.  For instance, in his 
statement, Fay told police that he was so frustrated with the 
victim that, "[I] finally . . . slammed him.  I pushed him.  I 
said, 'Don't -- stop.  Go sit down.  You know, I'm trying to 
cook.  Go sit down."  The victim, chastened, did so.  In his 
grand jury testimony, Fay did not mention that he "slammed" the 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
In addition, Fay's statement did not bear "persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness" (citation omitted).  See Drayton, 
473 Mass. at 36.  Fay told the police that he left the trailer 
as soon as he saw the victim and the defendant holding knives.  
By contrast, Fay testified before the grand jury that he was 
present during the knife fight and saw the victim collapse onto 
the kitchen floor, upon which Fay left the trailer.  Fay also 
testified at the grand jury that he had lied to the police in 
his initial statement.  He explained that, at the time of the 
recorded statement, "I was basically scared to death.  I mean, I 
didn't want to get hemmed up in something that I had nothing to 
do with and had no control of.  We're all friends, and it was 
just a -- nutty situation.  And at that point I was in shock, 
and what I saw I never saw before in my life.  And that was it.  
                                                                  
victim, or that he ordered the victim to sit down.  These facts, 
and some other differences in Fay's description of the events, 
were not material to the defendant's claim of self-defense. 
 
 
The defendant makes much of the fact that the judge issued 
her ruling based on a transcript of Fay's statement, without 
viewing the audio-video recording.  We have watched the 
recording and conclude that the video portion of the interview 
did not add any substantive evidence.  The recording does show 
that Fay spoke using many gestures, and demonstrated parts of 
the altercation, such as the victim pounding on the table; Fay 
also made pushing motions to indicate the victim pushing others. 
Fay insisted that he left the trailer as soon as the victim and 
the defendant armed themselves, and that he did not see the 
knife fight.  As such, Fay did not reenact the stabbing. 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
I just, I wasn't right in my mind at that point."8  See 
Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 533 n.17, cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 132 (2016) (rejecting defendant's claim that Drayton 
exception applied where excluded statements were contradicted by 
other evidence). 
For these reasons, we conclude that the judge did not err 
in excluding Fay's recorded statement from being introduced in 
evidence. 
 
b.  Adjutant evidence.  In Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 650, 664, 
we modified our common law of evidence and decided that, in a 
case involving a claim of self-defense where the identity of the 
initial aggressor is in dispute, a defendant may introduce 
evidence of specific prior acts of violence that had been 
initiated by the victim.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(a)(2)(B) 
(2018).  Departing from our prior case law, see Commonwealth v. 
Fontes, 396 Mass. 733, 735-736 (1986), we held that this 
evidence is admissible whether or not the victim's prior acts of 
violence were known to the defendant.  Adjutant, supra at 649-
650.  The purpose of so-called Adjutant evidence "is to give the 
                     
8 Over the defendant's objection, the judge allowed the 
Commonwealth to impeach Fay's grand jury testimony with portions 
of the audio-video recording.  Thus, the jury heard that, on a 
prior occasion, Fay had told the police that he left the trailer 
before the stabbing, and did not see a knife fight.  This 
evidence was admissible to impeach the credibility of a hearsay 
declarant.  See Commonwealth v. Mahar, 430 Mass. 643, 649 
(2000); Mass. G. Evid. § 806 (2018). 
17 
 
 
 
 
jury a full picture of the altercation so as to make an informed 
decision about the identity of the initial aggressor."  
Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 737 (2007).  See 
Commonwealth v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 307 (2013) (noting that 
self-defense cases often involve "confusing and conflicting 
evidence of what actually happened and a dispute about the 
identity of the first aggressor"). 
 
Subsequently, we clarified that the term "first aggressor" 
is not limited to the person who provokes or initiates a 
nondeadly assault.  See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 
528-530 (2013).  Adjutant evidence is relevant to the issue 
which person initiated the hostilities, and also as to which 
person escalated the potential for violence through the use or 
threat of deadly force.  See id. at 529-530.  Where either fact 
is at issue, a defendant may introduce Adjutant evidence to 
assist the jury in deciding whether the Commonwealth has proved 
that the defendant did not act in self-defense.  Id. at 530. 
 
A trial judge plays a critical role in evaluating proffered 
Adjutant evidence and allowing the admission of "so much of that 
evidence as is noncumulative and relevant to the defendant's 
self-defense claim."  Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 663.  See Pring-
Wilson, 448 Mass. at 738 (admissibility of Adjutant evidence 
left to sound discretion of trial judge).  Accordingly, we do 
not disturb a judge's finding on the admissibility of Adjutant 
18 
 
 
 
 
evidence unless the finding results from "a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (citation and quotation omitted).  See L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Here, in support of his argument that he was forced to stab 
the victim in self-defense, the defendant filed a motion in 
limine seeking to admit four prior acts of violence committed by 
the victim.  The four specific acts were (1) the victim's 2009 
admission to sufficient facts to charges of assault and battery; 
(2) a 2010 violation of a restraining order; (3) the victim's 
guilty plea to charges of assault and battery; and (4) a 2001 
burglary conviction.  In addition, the defendant moved to 
introduce Fay's audio-video recorded statement also for this 
second purpose, as Adjutant evidence.  He argued that, "[d]uring 
this interview just a few hours after the fatal stabbing, Fay 
[told] the police that [the victim] was drunk on vodka, started 
pounding the table with his fists, pushed Fay and repeatedly got 
into a shoving match with the defendant right before the fatal 
knife fight."  The Commonwealth objected to the admission of the 
proffered Adjutant evidence on the ground that certain of the 
incidents were too remote, and others failed to establish that 
the victim had been the first aggressor. 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
The judge allowed the defendant's motion to introduce 
evidence of the victim's 2009 admission to sufficient facts to a 
charge of assault and battery.  In that case, as described in a 
police report, the victim approached his former girl friend at 
the restaurant where she worked and slapped her face with the 
back of his hand.  A few minutes later, the victim assaulted her 
with a knife that he had grabbed from the restaurant kitchen, 
and threatened to "snap" her neck. 
 
Over the Commonwealth's objection, the judge ruled that the 
defendant would be able to introduce a certified copy of the 
admission to sufficient facts.  The judge did not allow the 
defendant to introduce the police report, reasoning that it was 
inadmissible hearsay and that, in any event, the defendant had 
the opportunity to introduce this evidence through the testimony 
of the victim's former girl friend and the court records.  When 
defense counsel argued that calling the former girl friend would 
be infeasible because she had been hostile and uncooperative 
with counsel and his investigator, the judge commented, "Just 
because she's uncooperative with you, doesn't mean you still 
can't call her to the stand and put her under oath and ask her 
about that incident."  The judge denied the defendant's motion 
as to the other proffered Adjutant evidence.  She found that the 
violation of the restraining order was not probative of the 
victim's aggression and use of a deadly weapon.  With respect to 
20 
 
 
 
 
Fay's recorded statement, the judge found that it did not 
qualify as Adjutant evidence because it did not establish that 
the victim had been the first to use deadly force. 
 
At trial, the defendant decided to forgo introducing 
Adjutant evidence.  Defense counsel noted, "I don't feel that 
the Adjutant is powerful with just the one witness, although the 
[c]ourt disagrees."  On appeal, the defendant contends that the 
judge abused her discretion in her rulings on the admissibility 
of the proffered Adjutant evidence.  He argues that it was error 
to exclude the audio-video recording of Fay's statement to 
police because the statement showed that the victim initiated 
the aggression "close in time to the introduction of deadly 
force."  The defendant argues also that the judge erred in 
excluding the police report on hearsay grounds and in excluding 
the victim's violation of the restraining order issued regarding 
his former girl friend.9 
                     
9 The defendant also claims that the judge erred by 
"threatening" to allow the Commonwealth to introduce Adjutant 
rebuttal evidence.  Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved to 
introduce evidence that, in 2005, the defendant had been the 
first aggressor in a barroom brawl with an off-duty fire 
fighter.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 310-311 
(2013); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(a)(2)(B) (2018).  The judge ruled 
that if the defendant chose to introduce Adjutant evidence, she 
would conduct a voir dire of the fire fighter to determine 
whether the defendant had been the first aggressor in that 
fight.  Who had been the first aggressor in that incident was a 
disputed issue at the trial in the case, because the 
Commonwealth also had charged the fire fighter with a crime, and 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 We first consider the argument that the judge's exclusion 
of the audio-video recording of Fay's statement to police 
deprived the defendant of the right to introduce admissible 
evidence that the victim had been the first aggressor.  The 
defendant maintains that the statement included "compelling 
evidence on the question of who initiated the assault."  
According to the defendant, this "compelling" evidence consisted 
of the victim's intoxication, the victim acting aggressively by 
pounding on the kitchen table and starting a fight with the 
defendant, and the victim pushing Fay. 
 
Contrary to the defendant's claim, however, he was in fact 
able to, and did, present this evidence to the jury in the form 
of Fay's testimony to the grand jury, which was read in evidence 
in a question and answer form, as it had been given.  Fay's 
testimony, through the grand jury transcript, included his 
statement that the victim had been drinking vodka and sniffing 
cocaine.10  Fay described the victim as "drunk" and "disruptive."  
                                                                  
the fire fighter admitted to sufficient facts.  In making this 
ruling, the judge noted that the defendant had changed his 
position on whether he intended to introduce Adjutant evidence 
at trial.  She requested that defense counsel discuss with the 
defendant the strategic choice of going forward with the 
Adjutant evidence and consider the possibility of rebuttal 
evidence if he chose to do so.  This was not a "threat." 
 
 
10 This testimony was corroborated by the medical evidence. 
The medical examiner testified that the victim's blood alcohol 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
Fay testified that that the victim, in an intoxicated state, had 
pushed Fay and another guest without provocation.  Fay also 
testified that the victim had been continuously pounding the 
kitchen table and that he had fought with the defendant.  Fay 
stated that he had been forced to separate the victim and the 
defendant three or four times because the victim and the 
defendant "were arguing back and forth, and they got into a few 
pushing contests."11  Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in 
the judge's decision not to allow the introduction of the audio-
video recording of Fay's earlier statement, which the judge 
determined to be hearsay. 
 
We turn to the police report in the 2009 case of assault 
and battery, in which the victim admitted to sufficient facts.  
The judge excluded the police report as inadmissible hearsay.  
As stated, in Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664, we concluded that, in 
                                                                  
content was .10, and that the toxicology screen was positive for 
cocaine. 
 
11 During a hearing on the defendant's motion, trial counsel 
agreed that Fay's grand jury testimony included the Adjutant 
evidence contained in the audio-video recording of Fay's 
statement to police. 
 
The judge:  "And I believe [the Adjutant evidence] has to 
do with the portion of the recorded interview of Mr. Fay 
dealing with the allegations that [the victim] was drunk, 
started pounding on the table with his fist, pushed Mr. 
Fay, and repeatedly got into a shoving match.  It's my 
understanding that that testimony is in Mr. Fay's grand 
jury testimony.  Is that correct . . . ?" 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "Yes." 
23 
 
 
 
 
a case involving a claim of self-defense, where the identity of 
the first aggressor is disputed, a defendant may introduce 
evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim to 
demonstrate that the victim had been the first aggressor.  The 
decision did not, however, "alter the rule against the admission 
of hearsay evidence."  See Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 
295, 306 & n.18 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009) 
(police reports detailing specific incidents of violence were 
inadmissible).  "The case merely permitted the admission of 
evidence that previously had been deemed irrelevant."  Id. at 
306 n.18. 
 
We do not agree with the defendant's argument that Clemente 
has been abrogated by the court's holding in Drayton.  As 
discussed, in that case we carved out a narrow exception for the 
"rarest" of cases "where otherwise inadmissible evidence is both 
truly critical to the defense's case and bears persuasive 
guarantees of trustworthiness."  Drayton, 473 Mass. at 40.  
Here, by contrast, the police report was not critical to the 
defense because the victim's former girl friend, although 
apparently hostile to defense counsel, was available to testify 
to the incident of assault and battery. 
 
Finally, we discern no error in the judge's decision not to 
allow introduction of the victim's violation of the restraining 
order.  In April, 2010, the victim repeatedly telephoned his 
24 
 
 
 
 
former girl friend in violation of a protective order not to 
have any contact with her.  During one of those telephone calls, 
the victim asked his former girl friend, "What's going on -- Are 
you going to [c]ourt? . . .  Are you trying to lock me up?"  In 
another telephone call, the former girl friend asked the victim, 
"What do you want from me?"  The victim replied, "I want your 
blood."  Relying on Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
71, 75-76 (2008), the judge found that the violation of the 
restraining order did not qualify as an incident of specific 
violence admissible to prove that the victim had been the first 
aggressor.  The violation of the restraining order was different 
in nature from the knife fight.  See id.  The victim's threats 
to his former girl friend were made by telephone, and there was 
no indication that the victim followed through on those threats.  
On this evidence, the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
finding that the violation of the restraining order did not tend 
to show that the victim was the initial aggressor in this 
incident. 
 
c.  Recusal.  Six years prior to this trial, defense 
counsel was counsel for a different defendant in an unrelated 
murder case before the same judge.  The judge found defense 
counsel in contempt of court.  Although the defendant did not 
seek the judge's recusal at trial, on appeal, the defendant 
raises the question whether the judge's failure to consider 
25 
 
 
 
 
recusal sua sponte deprived him of the right to trial before an 
impartial tribunal.  Because the defendant did not ask the judge 
to recuse herself prior to or during trial, we consider this 
claim to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
The issue requires us to examine the judge's prior decision 
to hold defense counsel in civil contempt.  During the course of 
a 2010 trial, the judge found that counsel had behaved "like a 
five year old" and "in the most unprofessional, unethical manner 
that [she had] ever witnessed . . . in [her] nineteen years on 
the bench."  At the end of the trial, the judge conducted a 
contempt hearing and found, among other things, that defense 
counsel had made repeated, loud outbursts at sidebar; had acted 
"absolutely out of control"; had displayed a lack of respect and 
disdain for the court and the court's rulings; and had called 
the prosecutor "jackass" in a voice loud enough to be heard by 
the jury.  The judge held counsel in contempt for violating 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4, 426 Mass. 1389 (1998) (fairness to 
opposing party and counsel), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5, 426 
Mass. 1391 (1998) (decorum of tribunal).  She commented that he 
was a zealous advocate but had stepped far over the line; 
accordingly, she fined him $500.  The judge noted, however, that 
26 
 
 
 
 
counsel's actions had not been undertaken with a malicious 
intent and, therefore, she would not report him to bar counsel. 
 
The defendant maintains that, based on this prior finding, 
the judge was required sua sponte to consider the issue of 
recusal.  Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:09, Canon 2, Rule 
2.11 (A) (2016), provides that a judge shall "disqualify himself 
or herself in any proceeding in which the judge cannot be 
impartial or the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned."  The duty to disqualify includes circumstances 
where "[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party or a party's lawyer."  Id.  "The touchstone for the 
principle of judicial impartiality are the words memorialized in 
art. 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, requiring 
that judges be "as free, impartial and independent as the lot of 
humanity will admit" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Eddington, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 142-143 (2008).  See 
Commonwealth v. Leventhal, 364 Mass. 718, 721 (1974) (rigid 
adherence to principles embodied in art. 29 "is essential to the 
maintenance of free institutions" [citation omitted]). 
 
We have held that bias requiring removal "ordinarily 
arise[s] from an extrajudicial source."  Commonwealth v. Gogan, 
389 Mass. 255, 259 (1983).  A judicial ruling, standing alone, 
"almost never constitute[s] a valid basis for a bias or 
partiality motion."  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 
27 
 
 
 
 
(1994).  See Erickson v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 1006, 1007 
(2012) (recusal not required where defendant was unable to 
demonstrate that judge's rulings were "influenced by any 
considerations other than the law" [citation omitted]).  
"[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are 
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the 
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or 
partiality challenge.  They may do so if they reveal an opinion 
that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so 
if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as 
to make fair judgment impossible."  Liteky, supra.  See LoCascio 
v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 495-496 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1010 (2007) (trial judge's decision to hold defense 
counsel in contempt and his fourteen-year history of denying 
defendant's motions "do not raise even a suspicion of a 'deep-
seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair 
judgment impossible'" [citation omitted]). 
 
The defendant contends that the judge in his case 
"displayed an improper judicial temperament and a clear bias 
toward counsel in front of [the] jury."  He maintains that she 
exhibited bias against defense counsel by repeatedly criticizing 
28 
 
 
 
 
and scolding him, raising her voice,12 admonishing counsel in 
front of the jury, and declining to provide counsel with the 
opportunity to be heard. 
 
There is no need to discuss every exchange between the 
judge and defense counsel over the course of the defendant's 
trial.  It suffices to say that, on multiple occasions, defense 
counsel raised issues that previously had been fully argued and 
decided by the judge.  The judge was required to admonish him to 
stop interrupting her and to keep his voice down at sidebar 
conferences so that he would not be overheard by the jury.  
After one sidebar conference towards the end of the trial, the 
judge commented that defense counsel was acting unprofessionally 
and was "absolutely out of control." 
 
Notwithstanding counsel's persistence in continuing this 
type of behavior, the judge admonished him before the jury on a 
single occasion.  During cross-examination of a police officer, 
defense counsel sought to inquire into the reason why the 
                     
12 The defendant provided this court with the audio 
recordings of the trial.  Based upon our thorough review of 
those recordings, including all of the instances in which the 
defendant claims that the judge "yelled" at defense counsel, we 
are not persuaded that the record evinces bias against defense 
counsel.  The few isolated exchanges, when viewed in context, 
show that counsel repeatedly questioned and rejected the judge's 
rulings, at many points talking over her.  Although clearly 
frustrated by defense counsel's conduct, the judge took great 
care to explain the legal basis for her rulings and displayed 
appropriate judicial demeanor while maintaining control of the 
trial. 
29 
 
 
 
 
defendant was hostile toward members of the Revere fire 
department.  The judge sustained the prosecutor's objection to 
this line of questioning.  Ignoring the judge's ruling on the 
objection, as well as the judge's request to see the parties at 
sidebar, defense counsel twice repeated the prohibited question.  
The judge instructed defense counsel in open court, "When there 
is an objection, you stop.  Please, you know better than that." 
 
It is well established that "a trial judge is responsible 
for controlling the trial, maintaining order in the courtroom, 
and guarding against improper conduct of counsel."  Commonwealth 
v. Perez, 390 Mass. 308, 316 (1983).  After carefully 
considering the record, we discern no evidence of "deep-seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 
impossible."  See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Erickson, 462 Mass. 
at 1007.  The judge remained as respectful as possible to 
defense counsel while fulfilling her obligation to control the 
trial and to maintain order in her court room.  See Commonwealth 
v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 588 (2018) (judge sometimes required 
to admonish counsel to maintain order). 
 
Our conclusion is supported by the judge's careful 
instructions to the jury that were intended to mitigate any 
potential prejudice that may have resulted from the jury's 
perception that the judge viewed defense counsel as having been 
out of line.  The judge twice instructed the jury to "applaud" 
30 
 
 
 
 
the lawyers for acting as "zealous advocates."  She explained 
further that the jury should not infer anything from her rulings 
on objections or motions, or from her comments to the lawyers.  
See Imbert, 479 Mass. at 588; Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 
512, 526 (2016).  In sum, we discern no evidence of bias and no 
reason that the judge should have, sua sponte, considered 
recusing herself. 
 
d.  Jury question.  The defendant argues that the judge 
committed reversible error when she provided supplemental 
instructions to the jury in response to a question concerning 
self-defense.  During deliberations, the jury posed the 
following question: 
 
"Dear Judge, If we find that the sole basis self-
defense is not available to the defendant is his use of 
excessive force (reason #4 on pg. 20 of your instructions), 
are we limited to a conviction of voluntary manslaughter 
due to mitigating circumstances? Or, are First & Second 
degree murder convictions still possible if we find that 
the other elements of those crimes are satisfied by the 
facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt?"13 
 
Defense counsel requested that the judge instruct the jury that, 
if they found that the defendant had used excessive force in 
                     
 
13 "[R]eason #4 on pg. 20 of [the judge's written] 
instructions" refers to that section of the judge's written 
final charge which listed the five ways in which the 
Commonwealth could establish the absence of the proper use of 
self-defense.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 20-21 
(2013).  See also Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 166-
167 (2008).  The fourth proposition stated:  "4. The defendant 
used more force than was reasonably necessary under all the 
circumstances." 
31 
 
 
 
 
self-defense, they would be limited to a verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter.  The judge determined that the question called for 
a broader explanation of self-defense, because the jury's note 
conflated the defense of self-defense with the mitigating factor 
of excessive use of force in self-defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 780 (2009) (Gants, J., dissenting) ("The 
defense of self-defense is related to, but separate and distinct 
from, the mitigating factor of excessive use of force in self-
defense").  See also Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 172 
(2016) ("the use of excessive force . . . does not cause the 
defendant to lose the benefit of the defense entirely . . . but 
instead may warrant a finding of manslaughter" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
Over the defendant's objection, the judge instructed: 
 
"If you find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant used more force than 
was reasonably necessary under the circumstances, then the 
defense of self-defense is not available to the defendant, 
and you may not acquit him on the basis of such a defense. 
 
 
"You may convict the defendant of either first or 
second degree murder if the Commonwealth has proven to you 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to all the other 
elements of either first or second degree murder, that 
there were no mitigating circumstances, including but not 
limited to the excessive use of force in self-defense." 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant acknowledges that the jury's 
question was ambiguous.  Nonetheless, the defendant asserts that 
the proper answer to the jury's question should have been a 
32 
 
 
 
 
simple "no."  That is, a conviction of murder is not possible if 
the jury were to find that the defendant used excessive force in 
self-defense.  Relying on Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430 
(2015), the defendant contends that the effect of the 
supplemental instructions was to obscure or eliminate the 
possibility that he could be found guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter. 
 
Unlike the instructions in Tavares, however, the 
instruction here accurately stated the law.  The complete 
defense of self-defense is not available to an individual who 
uses excessive force.  See Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 
163, 167 (2008).  It is the Commonwealth's burden to prove that 
there were no mitigating circumstances that would reduce the 
crime from murder to manslaughter.  Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 
Mass. 479, 485 (1995). 
 
Moreover, in her final charge before the jury began 
deliberations, the judge provided the jury with comprehensive 
instructions concerning the possibility of a verdict of 
voluntary manslaughter based on the excessive force in self-
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 395 Mass. 296, 301 (1985) 
(supplemental instructions considered in light of entire set of 
instructions).  The judge informed the jury that, "[i]f you do 
not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first-degree or 
murder in the second-degree, you shall consider whether the 
33 
 
 
 
 
Commonwealth has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter."  In 
concluding her instructions on the elements of murder, she 
explained, "[I]n addition to these elements, the Commonwealth 
must also prove that there were no mitigating circumstances."  A 
mitigating circumstance, the judge instructed, "is a 
circumstance that reduces the seriousness of the offense in the 
eyes of the law.  A killing that would be murder in first or 
second degree is reduced to the lesser offense of voluntary 
manslaughter where the Commonwealth has failed to prove that 
there were no mitigating circumstances."  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 36, 41-42 (2013). 
 
The judge also properly instructed the jury on the lesser 
included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on excessive 
use of force in self-defense.  She explained, "I have already 
told you that to prove the defendant guilty of murder, the 
Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant did not act in the proper exercise of self-
defense.  If the Commonwealth proves that the defendant did not 
act [in] proper self-defense solely because the defendant used 
more force than was reasonably necessary, then the Commonwealth 
has not proved that the defendant committed the crime of murder.  
But if the Commonwealth has proved the other required elements, 
34 
 
 
 
 
you shall find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter."  
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, supra at 71. 
 
Because the supplemental instructions, viewed in light of 
the entire charge, did not eliminate or reduce the possibility 
of a verdict of voluntary manslaughter based on the excessive 
use of force in self-defense, there was no error. 
 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
asks the court to consider all of the claims of error, taken as 
a whole, and to come to the conclusion that justice was not 
done.  In particular, the defendant argues that he is entitled 
to relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, because he was tried by a 
judge who failed to safeguard his rights, and was represented by 
a lawyer who antagonized the judge. 
 
As discussed, we do not agree with the defendant's 
contention that he was deprived of a fair trial because of 
animus between the judge and defense counsel, and therefore 
decline to disturb the verdict on that basis. 
 
Pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have 
carefully examined the entire record to determine whether relief 
should be granted on some other ground.  We have considered the 
evidence of self-defense and sudden combat that the defendant 
emphasizes, including the senseless nature of the fight, 
evidence of both the victim's and the defendant's levels of 
intoxication, and the fact that the victim was armed with a 
35 
 
 
 
 
knife.  We also have considered evidence that the defendant and 
the victim had been arguing and fighting earlier, and that they 
had been separated a number of times because of that.  In 
addition, we have considered evidence that, although Fay gave 
inconsistent statements concerning what he saw of the fight, in 
one of those statements, Fay said that he saw the smaller victim 
"fighting for his life" and being overpowered by the larger and 
stronger defendant. 
 
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
The issue of self-defense, which was the central theory of 
defense, was fully aired at trial.  Furthermore, based upon the 
nature, number, and severity of the victim's wounds, we discern 
no reason to disturb the jury's verdict that the offense was 
murder in the first degree, not murder in the second degree or 
manslaughter, nor was it a killing in self-defense.  The record 
does not suggest a fight between two equally matched combatants 
or that the defendant was overpowered and had no other means by 
which to escape an onslaught from the victim.  The victim, who 
was approximately four inches shorter and sixty pounds lighter 
than the defendant, sustained three stab wounds, any one of 
which could have been fatal, in addition to more than sixty 
other knife wounds.  The defendant sustained a single cut on the 
back of one leg. 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
"The search under [G. L. c. 278, § 33E,] is a more general 
and an obligatory one for a result that may be 'more consonant 
with justice,'" Commonwealth v. Davis, 380 Mass. 1, 15 n.20 
(1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 94 (1977), 
but "[w]e do not sit as a second jury to pass anew on the 
question of the defendant's guilt."  Commonwealth v. Reddick, 
372 Mass. 460, 464 (1977).  See Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 
Mass. 213, 229 (2005).  In light of the entirety of the record, 
we discern no reason to set aside the verdict or to reduce the 
degree of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 464 Mass. 425, 
429-430, 436 (2013) (court declined to exercise its 
extraordinary authority to set aside murder verdict despite 
evidence that victim had reached for firearm, had threatened to 
shoot defendant, and had grabbed defendant by throat).  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 365-367 (2016) (verdict 
of voluntary manslaughter more consonant with justice where 
defendant was fearful of victim, "who was much larger" and was 
"trained to kill," and where fight was result of "uncontrolled 
violent actions on the part of the defendant"). 
 
Having carefully considered all of the evidence, we discern 
no reason to use our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.