Title: State v. Kerr
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP002455-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2018

2018 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2455-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Christopher John Kerr, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Bayfield 
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Anderson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs, joined by ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., GABLEMAN, J., and KELLY, J., (joins 
footnote 2) (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by Misha 
Tseytlin, solicitor general, with whom on the briefs were Brad 
D. Schimel, attorney general, and Amy C. Miller, assistant 
solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Misha 
Tseytlin, solicitor general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Linda I. Coleman, John R. Carlson, and Sears, Carlson & Coleman, 
S.C., Washburn.  There was an oral argument by John R. Carlson.
 
 
2018 WI 87
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP2455-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF139) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher John Kerr, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Bayfield 
County, John P. Anderson, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of 
the Bayfield County circuit court's order granting Christopher 
John Kerr's ("Kerr") motion to suppress evidence discovered 
during a search incident to arrest on the basis that "'judicial 
integrity' is vital enough to justify exclusion of evidence when 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
2 
 
the issuing court's arrest warrant was invalid ab initio."1  We 
reverse.   
¶2 
On September 27, 2015, two officers were dispatched to 
follow up on a 9-1-1 hang-up call from Kerr's residence.  En 
route, they were advised by dispatch that there was an 
outstanding arrest warrant for Kerr in Ashland County.  When the 
officers arrived at Kerr's residence, they discovered that the 
9-1-1 call was in error, but arrested Kerr pursuant to the 
arrest warrant.  In conducting a search incident to arrest, the 
officers discovered methamphetamine in Kerr's pants pocket.  The 
State subsequently charged Kerr with one count of possession of 
methamphetamine in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(g) 
(2015-16).2 
¶3 
Kerr filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered during the search incident to arrest.  He argued 
that, while a warrant had been issued, and law enforcement did 
not engage in any misconduct in executing the warrant, his 
constitutional rights were nonetheless violated because he was 
jailed without the issuing court first inquiring as to his 
ability to pay, without being given notice that his ability to 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Robert E. Eaton of Ashland County issued the 
warrant (the "issuing court"), but, because the arrest occurred 
in Bayfield County, the Honorable John P. Anderson of Bayfield 
County presided over the motion to suppress and reviewed the 
warrant (the "reviewing court").   
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-
16 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
3 
 
pay is at issue, and without a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard.  He argued that the warrant would not have been issued, 
and he would not have been arrested or searched incident to 
arrest, if he had been afforded due process in the forfeiture 
action.3   
¶4 
After extensive briefing and three hearings, the 
reviewing court granted Kerr's motion to suppress.  It concluded 
that, although "[t]here is no question that the [issuing court], 
as a court of general jurisdiction, has the constitutional and 
statutory authority to hear and process municipal citations," 
the 
warrant 
was 
"not 
in 
compliance 
with 
the 
statutory 
requirements and clearly violated defendant's statutory due 
process rights."  The reviewing court then concluded that 
suppression under the exclusionary rule was proper based on the 
"Wisconsin rule that 'judicial integrity' is vital enough to 
justify exclusion of evidence when the issuing court's arrest 
warrant was invalid ab initio."  In so concluding, the reviewing 
                                                 
3 At the reviewing court, Kerr's arguments were somewhat 
different than the arguments he presented to this court.  He 
asserted that the issuing court did not follow the requirements 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 818 in issuing a civil bench warrant.  He also 
argued that, because there was no affidavit and there was no 
contempt in the presence of the court, there was simply no 
authority for this warrant to be issued.  The reviewing court 
ordered further briefing on the issue of whether the issuing 
court had authority to proceed as a municipal court pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0114, 800.09, 800.095.  At the hearing on that 
issue, the State informed the court that the arrest warrant was 
issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 778.09, but, before this court, 
both parties apparently agree that Wis. Stat. § 800.095 governs 
the issuance of the warrant.  
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
4 
 
court referenced the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
and how "[h]ere the conduct is not isolated and may be the rule, 
not the exception.  Dete[r]rence certainly is a greater 
consideration under these facts."   
¶5 
The State sought interlocutory review and filed a 
petition to bypass the court of appeals, seeking immediate 
review from this court.  We granted the State's petition to 
bypass. 
¶6 
Our overarching inquiry in this case is whether the 
reviewing court erred in granting Kerr's motion to suppress.  
Fundamental to our analysis is whether evidence discovered 
during a search incident to arrest is properly suppressed under 
the exclusionary rule when there is no police misconduct.  We 
conclude that suppression is not appropriate because the sole 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, 
and there is no police misconduct here.  Neither judicial 
integrity 
nor 
judicial 
error 
is 
a 
standalone 
basis 
for 
suppression under the exclusionary rule.4  We therefore conclude 
that the reviewing court's grant of Kerr's motion to suppress on 
the basis of judicial integrity is error.  
                                                 
4 In so concluding, we consider whether to overrule State v. 
Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568.  We conclude 
that Hess need not be overruled because the lead opinion's view 
in Hess of "judicial integrity" as a standalone justification 
for suppression under the exclusionary rule did not garner the 
support of a majority of the court; as such, it has no 
precedential value that requires reconsideration in this case. 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
5 
 
¶7 
Accordingly, we reverse the Bayfield County circuit 
court.  
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  The Warrant 
¶8 
A certified copy of the record for City of Ashland v. 
Kerr, No. 2015FO219, is included in the record before us, but it 
is particularly lean.  This record reflects that, on June 16, 
2015, Kerr was mailed a citation for disorderly conduct, in 
violation of City of Ashland ordinance 201.03.5  This citation 
notified Kerr to appear, if he so chose, at 10:00 a.m. on 
July 21, 2015.6  This record also reflects that, on July 21, 
2015, when Kerr failed to appear, the issuing court entered a 
default judgment in the amount of $263.50 with 60 days to pay, 
and that on July 31, 2015, the clerk sent notice of the default 
judgment to Kerr (although neither the judgment nor the notice 
is in the record).7  On September 22, 2015, 60 days after default 
                                                 
5 Disorderly conduct may also be prosecuted as a crime.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01.  Kerr was not charged with a crime; rather, 
a civil municipal ticket was issued. 
6 This ticket, unlike some, did not require a mandatory 
appearance in court; instead, Kerr could avoid coming to court 
by paying the citation.  
7 In his brief before this court, Kerr alleges that the 
notice of default judgment was not sent to him until "September 
of 2016."  While the reviewing court decision did state that 
"[t]he record of [2015FO219] indicates a notice of default 
judgment on July 31, 2015, and then again on September 15, 
2016," this is clearly in error.  
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
6 
 
judgment was entered, the court issued a commitment order/arrest 
warrant8 for Kerr to "detain [him] in custody for 90 days or 
until $298.50[9] is paid, or until the person is discharged by 
due course of law."  This warrant was issued on the basis that 
                                                                                                                                                             
The four-page record for 2015FO219, a certified copy of 
which is in the record before this court, is devoid of any 
indication of a notice sent in September of 2016, but it does 
reference a notice of certification sent in September of 2015.  
Thus, a simple review of the record reveals that such an 
assertion must be mistaken.  Additionally, Kerr filed his motion 
to suppress on June 8, 2016, and in that motion did not dispute 
this timeline: "The warrant that had been issued in Ashland 
County was issued under case number [2015FO219], which was an 
ordinance violation case in which default judgment was issued 
against Mr. Kerr requiring him to pay a fine of $298.50 on 
July 31, 2015." Moreover, Kerr was arrested on this non-payment 
warrant on September  27, 2015; the criminal complaint for the 
Possession of Methamphetamine charge was filed October 7, 2015; 
and the Clerk of Court certification reflects that the reviewing 
court was provided the record with respect to that motion in 
July of 2016——all of which happened well before September of 
2016.   
Clearly then, it is not as argued in Kerr's brief that "the 
court failed to send Mr. Kerr any notice that default judgment 
was entered until over a year later, and after the events giving 
rise to this case."   
8 The record indicates that "arrest warrant" and "commitment 
order" are used interchangeably in this case.  This may not 
always be the case and we decline to decide whether a commitment 
order is always equivalent to an arrest warrant, as that issue 
was not presented for our review or briefed by the parties.  We 
agree with the State, however, that any difference in this case 
is not legally significant because the order here, like an 
arrest warrant, required law enforcement to arrest the subject 
of the order.   
9 This total reflects a local forfeiture of $263.50, a 
clerk's fee of $5.00, and a warrant fee of $30.00. 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
7 
 
"[t]he balance due has not been paid within the period ordered 
by the court."  
 
B.  The Arrest 
¶9 
On September 27, 2015, around midnight, 9-1-1 received 
a call from a phone number later-identified as Kerr's.  When the 
9-1-1 operator picked up the call, there was a female yelling, 
but the operator did not have the opportunity to discover the 
nature of her distress before the line went dead.  When the 
operator called back, a male answered the phone and the operator 
heard him say "shut the fuck up."  When the operator asked whom 
the male had been talking to, he responded that he was talking 
to his cat.  He denied that there was a female there and said 
that there was no problem and that the call had been made by 
accident.   
¶10 The operator ran the number and discovered it was 
registered to Kerr and that Kerr had an active arrest warrant in 
Ashland County.  The operator then dispatched Officer Matt 
Ladwig of the City of Bayfield Police Department and Deputy Matt 
Leino of the Bayfield County Sheriff's Department to Kerr's 
residence to follow up on the 9-1-1 call, advising them both 
that Kerr had a warrant for his arrest in Ashland County.  When 
they arrived, they spoke with Kerr and his girlfriend, R.E., and 
determined that, although the two had had an argument, the 9-1-1 
call was an accidental dial.  Officer Ladwig then informed Kerr 
that there was a warrant for his arrest in Ashland County for an 
unpaid judgment in the amount of $298.50 and placed Kerr under 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
8 
 
arrest.  He conducted a search incident to arrest and discovered 
a plastic bag containing a white-colored rock in Kerr's pants 
pocket, 
which, 
after 
testing, 
was 
revealed 
to 
be 
methamphetamine.   
 
C.  The Motion To Suppress 
¶11 On October 7, 2015, the State filed its criminal 
complaint, charging one count of possession of methamphetamine 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(g).10   
¶12 On June 8, 2016, prior to trial, Kerr filed a motion 
to suppress the methamphetamine discovered during the search 
incident to his arrest.11  The crux of Kerr's argument is that 
issuance of the civil municipal arrest warrant violated his due 
process rights because, contrary to the statutory requirements, 
"[t]here was no hearing that was noticed to provide [him] an 
opportunity to be heard on the issue of his ability to pay prior 
to the issuance of a warrant."  Kerr argued that the warrant for 
this civil municipal ticket never should have been issued, Kerr 
never should have been arrested, and the methamphetamine never 
should have been discovered.  Therefore, says Kerr, the evidence 
should be suppressed because it was discovered as a result of an 
                                                 
10 To be clear, these criminal charges were not the basis of 
the arrest warrant, which issued after Kerr failed to pay a 
civil municipal forfeiture ticket. 
11 Kerr filed an amended motion to suppress on June 13, 
2016.  The only revision made was to type (rather than hand-
write) the date and time at which the suppression motion would 
be heard.  Otherwise the motions are identical. 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
9 
 
unlawful arrest in violation of his constitutional and statutory 
rights.   
¶13 On July 12, 2016, the reviewing circuit court held its 
first hearing on the motion, at which Officer Ladwig, Deputy 
Leino, and Kerr all testified.  Officer Ladwig and Deputy Leino 
testified to the facts described above regarding the arrest.  
They also both testified that they had not attempted to look up 
the arrest warrant.  Kerr testified that he had been unaware of 
any warrant from Ashland County, and that he had had no hearing 
about owing any money prior to his arrest on September 27, 2015.   
¶14 On September 6, 2016, after further briefing, the 
reviewing court held its second hearing on the motion, hearing 
arguments from the parties.  Kerr argued that the arrest warrant 
was facially invalid because, regardless of the statutory basis, 
the statutory procedures were not followed:  defendants cannot 
be arrested and incarcerated for being poor——there must be some 
showing of ability to pay.  The State argued that exclusion was 
improper because there was no police misconduct; officers should 
be able to rely on dispatch——they cannot be the arbiters of 
whether a court had authority to issue a warrant because they 
are never in a position to question a court order.  The State 
further argued that, where a warrant is defective but there is 
no police misconduct, the proper remedy is either a writ of 
habeas corpus or a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  After 
hearing these arguments, the reviewing court ordered further 
briefing on the issue of whether a circuit court has competency 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
10 
 
to proceed as a municipal court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 66.0114, 800.09, and 800.095.  
¶15 On October 5, 2016, the reviewing court held its third 
hearing on the motion, hearing argument from the parties on that 
issue.  Kerr argued that a circuit court could proceed under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 800, but that, even if this is what the issuing 
court had done, it still had not adhered to the procedural 
requirements, and a police officer cannot reasonably rely on a 
warrant that has no statutory basis.  The State informed the 
reviewing court that the arrest warrant was issued pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 778.09,12 and argued that suppression is not 
designed to correct judicial misconduct and would have no 
deterrent effect here.  Kerr responded that police officers 
cannot be allowed to avoid suppression on a hear-no-evil-see-no-
evil basis by not looking at the warrant.   
¶16 On October 31, 2016, the reviewing court issued its 
decision and order granting Kerr's motion to suppress.  It 
concluded that the issuing court had authority to issue the 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 778.09 states as follows: 
 
Judgment, costs, commitment of defendant.  Where 
judgment is recovered pursuant to this chapter it 
shall include costs and direct that if the judgment is 
not paid the defendant, if an individual, shall be 
imprisoned in the county jail for a specified time, 
not exceeding 6 months, or until otherwise discharged 
pursuant to law.  The commitment shall issue, as in 
ordinary criminal actions, and the defendant shall not 
be entitled to the liberties of the jail. 
§ 778.09. 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
11 
 
warrant because it has general jurisdiction under Article VII, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 753.03 
to impose and collect municipal forfeitures under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 66.0114(1)(c), 800.09, 800.095, 345.47(1)(a), and/or 778.10.  
It nonetheless concluded that the arrest warrant was defective 
because the issuing court did not comply with statutory 
procedural requirements in issuing the warrant.  In this regard, 
the reviewing court took the issuing court to task for what it 
perceived to be "an institutional or administrative disregard 
for the law governing civil commitments."13  The reviewing court 
then acknowledged that the officers engaged in no wrongdoing, 
also noting that "neither the defendant nor the State alleges 
even the slightest hint of misconduct or wrongdoing by law 
enforcement."  It nonetheless concluded, after discussion of 
                                                 
13 The reviewing court's written decision makes clear, 
however, that, instead of relying on the facts of record, the 
court rested its conclusions on its own familiarity with how the 
issuing court "issues civil commitments [and how] the error in 
this case results in several, or dozens or hundreds of arrest 
warrants being issued in complete disregard for the applicable 
law."  The court stated: 
While there is no reason in this case to assume 
intentional malfeasance on the issuing court, the 
record from the [issuing county] case shows an 
institutional or administrative disregard for the law 
governing civil commitments.  While the record does 
not reflect this, I am administratively aware that 
[the issuing county] follows the procedure that 
occurred in this case in almost all of its civil 
nonpayments.  In [the issuing county], nonpayment of a 
civil forfeiture generally means summary issuance of a 
civil commitment.  There may be hundreds of similar 
commitments of record. 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
12 
 
State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568, in 
light of State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 
N.W.2d 562, that exclusion of the evidence was proper because 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is served where 
the judicial misconduct is systemic. 
¶17 On December 9, 2016, the State appealed.14  On July 10, 
2017, the State petitioned this court for bypass of the court of 
appeals.  On October 17, 2017, the State's petition for bypass 
was granted. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 "'Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact.'"  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶27, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 
857 N.W.2d 120 (quoting State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463).  "When presented with a question 
of constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step 
inquiry.  First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under a deferential standard, upholding them 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Second, we independently 
apply constitutional principles to those facts."  Id., ¶27 
(citations omitted). 
¶19 The interpretation and application of a constitutional 
provision are questions of law that we review de novo.  See, 
e.g., 
Black 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
2016 
WI 
47, 
¶21, 
                                                 
14 The reviewing court has suspended proceedings pending the 
outcome of this appeal.   
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
13 
 
369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333 (citing Appling v. Walker, 
2014 WI 96, ¶17, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 N.W.2d 888).  "When 
interpreting constitutional provisions and amendments, we look 
to intrinsic as well as extrinsic sources."  State v. Williams, 
2012 WI 59, ¶15, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (citing Buse v. 
Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976)).  In 
particular, we look to (1) the plain meaning of the words in the 
context used; (2) the historical analysis of the constitutional 
debates that the court may reasonably presume were known to the 
framers; (3) the prevailing practices when the provision was 
adopted; and (4) the earliest interpretation of the provision by 
the legislature, as manifested in the first law passed following 
its adoption.  Id. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶20 There is no dispute that the exclusionary rule applies 
in Wisconsin.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Conrad v. 
State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 636, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974).  The parties 
before us, however, argue two competing views of when evidence 
must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  The State's 
view is that evidence is suppressed only where suppression will 
likely serve to deter future police misconduct.  This is, and 
has been, the view of the majority of this court.  See Scull, 
361 Wis. 2d 288, ¶¶47-61 (Roggensack, J., concurring, joined by 
Crooks, Ziegler, and Gableman, JJ.).  Kerr's view is that 
evidence may be suppressed either where suppression serves to 
deter future police misconduct or where it serves to preserve 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
14 
 
"judicial integrity."  The view that "judicial integrity" is a 
standalone justification for suppression under the exclusionary 
rule is error, as this view has not garnered favor among a 
majority of this court, nor of the United States Supreme Court.15  
¶21 In fact, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that 
"[t]he rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter 
future Fourth Amendment violations."  Davis v. United States, 
564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011); see also Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("Its purpose is to deter . . . by 
removing the incentive to disregard it.").  And this purpose is 
punitive, not remedial.  See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("The purpose of the exclusionary rule 
is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search 
victim . . . ."); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 ("The rule is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair.").  Thus, the singular 
                                                 
15 When "judicial integrity" has been discussed in relation 
to the suppression of evidence, it has been tethered to the 
taint of police misconduct.  See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (citation omitted) ("Although our decisions 
often have alluded to the 'imperative of judicial integrity,' 
they demonstrate the limited role of this justification in the 
determination whether to apply the rule in a particular 
context."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) (citation 
omitted) ("The rule also serves another vital function——'the 
imperative of judicial integrity.' . . . A ruling admitting 
evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary 
effect 
of 
legitimizing 
the 
conduct 
which 
produced 
the 
evidence . . . ."); State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133, 423 
N.W.2d 823 
(1988) 
("The 
protection 
of 
rights 
and 
the 
preservation of judicial integrity depend in reality on the 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule."). 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
15 
 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct,16  
and the exclusionary rule does not apply in order to preserve 
judicial integrity or to correct judicial error.17 
                                                 
16 In so concluding we consider whether to overrule Hess, 
327 Wis. 2d 524.  The State argues that Hess should be overruled 
because its view of "judicial integrity" as a standalone 
justification for suppression is a significant departure from 
United States Supreme Court precedent.  Kerr argues that Hess 
should not be overruled because its discussion of judicial 
integrity as a standalone justification for suppression was 
correct.  We conclude that Hess need not be overruled because 
the lead opinion's view of "judicial integrity" as a standalone 
justification for suppression under the exclusionary rule did 
not garner the support of a majority of the court. 
Justice Prosser authored the lead opinion, joined by then-
Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice A.W. Bradley; Justice 
Ziegler concurred and filed an opinion that did not adopt the 
"judicial integrity" rationale of the lead opinion; Justice 
Gableman dissented and filed an opinion that then-Justice 
Roggensack 
joined, 
which 
specifically 
rejected 
"judicial 
integrity" as a standalone rationale; and Justice Crooks did not 
participate 
in 
the 
case. 
 
Justice 
Crooks 
did, 
however, 
participate in State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 
N.W.2d 562, where he joined the concurring majority in rejecting 
judicial integrity as a standalone rationale.  Thus, Hess has no 
precedential value that requires reconsideration in this case. 
17 In fact, in general, the exclusionary rule does not even 
apply to deter mistakes made by judicial employees: 
First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter 
police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of 
judges and magistrates.  Second, there exists no 
evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are 
inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or 
that 
lawlessness 
among 
these 
actors 
requires 
application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.   
 
Third, and most important, we discern no basis, 
and are offered none, for believing that exclusion of 
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a 
significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
16 
 
¶22 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent establishes that the 
manner in which the warrant was issued by the court and executed 
by law enforcement in this case does not afford suppression 
under the exclusionary rule.  As noted above, see supra ¶21, for 
the exclusionary rule to apply, there must have been some police 
misconduct.  Although Kerr argues that the officers' failure to 
look at the warrant itself constitutes such misconduct, this 
view is incorrect.  As a practical matter, officers should be 
able to rely on dispatch in the same way they are able to rely 
on their computer records.  See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
14-16 (1995).  Relatedly, absent some evidence in the record to 
the contrary, dispatch personnel are not "adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime."  Id. at 15.  Additionally, to the extent 
that looking at a warrant before executing it may be best 
practice, the officers' conduct here is at most negligent, and 
isolated negligence is not "misconduct" for the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146-
47 (2009).  Thus, the officers here did not engage in any 
misconduct that renders the evidence suppressible under the 
exclusionary rule. 
                                                                                                                                                             
magistrate. . . . Judges 
and 
magistrates 
are 
not 
adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral 
judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome 
of particular criminal prosecutions. 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-17 (1984); see also 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009). 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
17 
 
¶23 The parties also make arguments regarding the good-
faith exception, which applies when an "officer's conduct is 
objectively reasonable, [because] 'excluding the evidence will 
not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable 
way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer is 
acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar 
circumstances.'"  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 
(1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) 
(White, J., dissenting)).  In Wisconsin, we have adopted the 
good-faith exception.  See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶52, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 ("[A] good faith exception for 
objective, reasonable reliance upon a search warrant does not 
offend the Wisconsin Constitution [because in that situation,] 
applying the exclusionary rule will have no deterrent effect.").  
But, because the exclusionary rule applies to deter police 
misconduct, and there is no police misconduct here, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply; the good-faith exception thus, 
also need not be further analyzed and the evidence is not 
excluded.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶24 Our overarching inquiry in this case is whether the 
circuit court erred in granting Kerr's motion to suppress.  
Fundamental to our analysis is whether evidence discovered 
during a search incident to arrest is properly suppressed under 
the exclusionary rule when there is no police misconduct.  We 
conclude that suppression is not appropriate because the sole 
No. 
2016AP2455-CR   
 
18 
 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, 
and there is no police misconduct here.  Neither judicial 
integrity 
nor 
judicial 
error 
is 
a 
standalone 
basis 
for 
suppression under the exclusionary rule.18  We therefore conclude 
that the circuit court's grant of Kerr's motion to suppress on 
the basis of judicial integrity is error.    
¶25 Accordingly, we reverse the Bayfield County circuit 
court. 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
                                                 
18 In so concluding, we consider whether to overrule Hess, 
327 Wis. 2d 524.  We conclude that Hess need not be overruled 
because the lead opinion's view of "judicial integrity" as a 
standalone justification for suppression under the exclusionary 
rule did not garner the support of a majority of the court; as 
such, it has no precedential value that requires reconsideration 
in this case. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶26 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I, of 
course, join the opinion that I wrote for the majority.  I write 
separately to address issues that three of the four members of 
the majority conclude are also relevant.  
¶27 The reviewing circuit court in this case took issue 
with the manner in which the neighboring circuit court issued 
the warrant.1  It concluded that the neighboring court issued 
this warrant contrary to statutory provisions, that the issuing 
court did so on a regular basis, that all such warrants were 
void ab initio, and that, therefore, this case represented "an 
institutional or administrative disregard for the law governing 
civil commitments."  The reviewing court, thus, suppressed the 
evidence because of "judicial error on a wide administrative 
level," concluding that "'judicial integrity' is vital enough to 
justify exclusion of evidence when the issuing court's arrest 
warrant was invalid ab initio."  
¶28 This case cannot be so easily resolved by relying on 
the issuing court's alleged statutory violation, because neither 
the facts of record nor the plain language of the applicable 
statutes support that conclusion.  Relatedly, while it may be 
tempting to do so, this case cannot be resolved by relying on my 
concurrence in State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Robert E. Eaton of Ashland County issued the 
warrant (the "issuing court"), but, because the arrest occurred 
in Bayfield County, the Honorable John P. Anderson of Bayfield 
County presided over the motion to suppress and reviewed the 
warrant (the "reviewing court").   
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
N.W.2d 568, because the arrest warrant was not void ab initio 
here, where the issuing court had authority to issue it.2 
¶29 Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
I.  FACTS OF RECORD 
¶30 Recall that the record regarding the issuance of the 
warrant in this case is rather lean.  This record reflects that, 
on June 16, 2015, Kerr was mailed a citation for disorderly 
conduct, in violation of City of Ashland ordinance 201.03.  This 
citation notified Kerr to appear, if he so chose, at 10:00 a.m. 
on July 21, 2015.  He did not.  This record also reflects that, 
on July 21, 2015, when Kerr failed to appear, the court entered 
a default judgment in the amount of $263.50 with 60 days to pay, 
and that on July 31, 2015, the clerk sent notice of the default 
judgment to Kerr (although neither the judgment nor the notice 
is in the record).  On September 22, 2015, 60 days after default 
judgment was entered, the circuit court issued an arrest warrant 
for Kerr to "detain [him] in custody for 90 days or until 
                                                 
2  For an egregious example of abuse of power see State ex 
rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, 363 
Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165.  The facts of this case, however, are 
dramatically different.  And regardless, given the forward-
looking nature of the exclusionary rule, it is incapable of 
functioning as a remedy.  Here it cannot, and never has.  While 
it may be tempting to judicially create a remedy for these 
wrongful searches and seizures, repurposing the exclusionary 
rule to be a remedy, rather than a tool to deter police 
misconduct, will not fix the problem and will, in fact, create 
downstream problems of its own.  In fact, it would disband the 
exclusionary rule in its entirety.  Stated differently, it turns 
a forward-facing pedagogical tool backward into a purported 
remedy.   
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
$298.50[3] is paid, or until the person is discharged by due 
course of law."  This warrant was issued on the basis that "the 
balance due has not been paid within the period ordered by the 
court." 
¶31 There is also very little in the record created by the 
reviewing court to support its conclusion that the issuing court 
issued warrants in a similar manner on a regular basis.  In 
fact, the record regarding the review of this singular warrant 
reflects that it is largely the reviewing court's own opinion 
and personal belief, rather than fact finding, that this 
procedure reflects "an institutional or administrative disregard 
for the law governing civil commitments": 
[A]s 
already 
known 
to 
this 
Court 
due 
to 
its 
familiarity with how [the issuing county] issues civil 
commitments, the error in this case results in 
several, or dozens or hundreds of arrest warrants 
being issued in complete disregard for the applicable 
law. 
 
In 
isolated 
cases 
of 
judicial 
malfeasance, 
exclusion will not likely deter future conduct, as the 
conduct is often remarkably isolated.  Here the 
conduct is not isolated and may be the rule, not the 
exception.  Deter[r]ence certainly is a greater 
consideration under these facts. . . .   
While there is no reason in this case to assume 
intentional malfeasance on the issuing court, the 
record from the [issuing county] case shows an 
institutional or administrative disregard for the law 
governing civil commitments.  While the record does 
not reflect this, I am administratively aware that 
[the issuing county] follows the procedure that 
occurred in this case in almost all of its civil 
                                                 
3 This total reflects a local forfeiture of $263.50, a 
clerk's fee of $5.00, and a warrant fee of $30.00. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
nonpayments.  In [the issuing county], nonpayment of a 
civil forfeiture generally means summary issuance of a 
civil commitment.  There may be hundreds of similar 
commitments of record.   
(Emphasis added.)  Additionally, the record reflects that the 
reviewing court acknowledged that there is not "even the 
slightest hint of misconduct or wrongdoing by law enforcement in 
this matter," and that it concluded that the issuing court "had 
statutory authority to issue a bench warrant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.095(1)(b)1 for Kerr's arrest for failure to pay the fine 
imposed."   
¶32 Thus, the reviewing court's decision to suppress the 
evidence was based solely on its view that the neighboring court 
issued this warrant without following statutory procedures, that 
the neighboring court did so on a regular basis, and that, 
because of that systemic failure, this warrant was "invalid ab 
initio."  This view, however, is not supported by the facts of 
record; rather, it is based on the reviewing court's own 
understanding 
of 
a 
neighboring 
county's 
practice. 
 
Even 
assuming, however, that there were facts of record to support 
the reviewing court's conclusion that arrest warrants in civil 
forfeiture cases were regularly issued in this manner, and that 
doing so fails to comply with Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)2.,4 that 
procedural defect does not render the warrant "void ab initio." 
 
II.  DISTINGUISHING "VOID AB INITIO" 
¶33 Warrants may be defective for a variety of reasons.  
Most typically, a warrant is later challenged because of a 
                                                 
4 But see Part III. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
defect, for example, lack of probable cause or procedural 
irregularity, but not because it was issued without authority.  
And warrants are deemed "void ab initio" only when the person 
issuing the warrant lacks authority to ever issue that warrant 
in that type of case.  Thus, when a judge has the authority to 
issue a warrant, as is the case here, but fails to properly 
adhere 
to 
prescribed 
requirements,5 
that 
warrant 
may 
be 
defective, but it is not void ab initio.   
¶34 In other words, the type of defective warrant that 
issues when a judge fails to follow statutory procedural 
requirements in issuing it differs from the type of defective 
warrant that issues when a judge lacks authority to issue it: 
the former, although defective, is not void ab initio; the 
latter is per se void ab initio.  The reality of this 
distinction is evident from the fact that, if there were no 
distinction, there would be no place for the exclusionary rule 
or its companion good-faith exception.  In all exclusionary rule 
cases, the warrant is defective, but nonetheless the evidence 
discovered in a search incident to arrest is upheld unless there 
is police misconduct.  Notably, the reviewing court stated that 
there is not "even the slightest hint of misconduct or wrong 
doing by law enforcement in this matter."  Thus, although I 
assume without deciding that the reviewing court correctly 
                                                 
5 For the purposes of this section we assume without 
deciding that the issuance of the arrest warrant failed to 
follow the requirements of Wis. Stat.  § 800.095(1)(b)2.  But 
see Part III. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
concluded that the warrant was defective, it incorrectly used 
the term "invalid ab initio" because it is clear from the 
reviewing court's decision——which concluded that the issuing 
court "had statutory authority to issue a bench warrant under 
Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)1"——that its grant of Kerr's motion to 
suppress was based upon the "institutional or administrative 
disregard for the law governing civil commitments," not a lack 
of court authority to issue this type of warrant. 
 
A.  Authority To Issue 
¶35 I agree with the reviewing court that the issuing 
court had the authority to issue this warrant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.095.  Chapter 753 of the Wisconsin Statutes governs the 
circuit courts.  Under Wis. Stat. § 753.03, "circuit courts have 
power to hear and determine, within their respective circuits, 
all civil and criminal actions and proceedings unless exclusive 
jurisdiction is given to some other court . . . ."  § 753.03 
(emphasis added); see also Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8 ("Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this 
state . . . .").   
¶36 Chapter 
755 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
governs 
municipal courts.  Under Wis. Stat. § 755.045, a "municipal 
court has exclusive jurisdiction over an action in which a 
municipality seeks to impose forfeitures for violations of 
municipal ordinances of the municipality that operates the 
court . . . ."  § 755.045(1) (emphasis added); see also Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 14 ("All municipal courts shall have uniform 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
jurisdiction limited to actions and proceedings arising under 
ordinances of the municipality in which established.").   
¶37 Chapter 800 of the Wisconsin Statutes promulgates 
"Municipal Court Procedure[s]," and where, as here, Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.095 operates to impose a forfeiture for violation of a 
municipal ordinance, authority to act under § 800.095 would be 
exclusive to a municipal court if a municipal court has been 
established 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 755.01. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 755.045.  However, where, as here, there is no municipal 
court, the circuit court of the county in which the municipality 
is located has authority vis-à-vis its general jurisdiction to 
resolve violations of municipal ordinances pursuant to Chapter 
800. 
¶38 Thus, the reviewing court is correct that (1) "[t]here 
is no question that the [issuing court], as a court of general 
jurisdiction, has the constitutional and statutory authority to 
hear and process municipal citations," and (2) the issuing court 
"had statutory authority to issue a bench warrant under Wis. 
Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)1 for Kerr's arrest for failure to pay the 
fine imposed."  
 
B.  Procedural Defects 
¶39 The reviewing court errs, however, when it concludes 
that the warrant here was "invalid ab initio" on the basis that 
the issuing court issued the warrant in violation of the 
statutory procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. § 800.095.  
Kerr, who agrees with this conclusion, and the State, which 
concedes this point, thus also err.  In particular, the State 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
inaccurately cites my concurrence in Hess for the proposition 
that "[a] warrant can be void ab initio when the judge or 
magistrate lacked legal authority to issue any warrant, or when 
a mandatory condition precedent to the court's authority to 
issue a warrant was not met from the outset."  Procedural 
defects (the latter) are different from lack of authority to 
issue the warrant in the first instance (the former).  To 
conflate authority to issue with procedural defects is error, 
and that error is aptly demonstrated in a case where, as here, 
the alleged defect is procedural in nature, and not related the 
issuing court's authority.  Again, if lack of authority to issue 
and procedural defect were both to result in a warrant being 
deemed void ab initio, the exclusionary rule (and its good-faith 
exception) would be read out of existence because every 
exclusionary rule case is analyzed in light of a defective 
warrant, yet under the exclusionary rule the evidence discovered 
in a search incident to arrest is not suppressed unless there is 
police misconduct because the good-faith exception otherwise 
applies.  
 
1.  Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶¶71-74 (Ziegler, J., concurring) 
¶40 In Hess, I concurred on the basis that exclusion of 
the evidence was proper because the warrant was "void ab 
initio."6  I cited three cases for the principle that evidence 
discovered as a result of a warrant void ab initio must be 
                                                 
6 The parties, and the reviewing court, have used the term 
"void ab initio" rather loosely in this case.  
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
excluded.  See Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶71 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring) (citing State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 N.W. 
896 (1927), State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 430-31, 367 
N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985), and State v. Loney, 110 Wis. 2d 256, 
259-60, 328 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1982)).  I continue to agree 
with this principle. 
¶41 In these three cases, however, the warrant was held 
void ab initio because the issuing judicial officer lacked 
authority to issue the warrant in question.  See Kriegbaum, 194 
Wis. at 231-32 (concluding that the warrant was void ab initio 
because justices of the peace "can exercise only the judicial 
power conferred upon [them] by the statutes" and the statutes 
did not grant authority "to issue a warrant for the search of a 
person"); Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d at 430-31 (concluding that the 
warrant was void ab initio because "the state conceded that [the 
commissioner] was not authorized to issue search warrants 
pursuant to sec. 757.69(1)"); Loney, 110 Wis. 2d at 259-60 
(concluding that the warrant was void ab initio because the 
power of the court commissioner to issue warrants, "must be 
conferred by express delegation" and "the order appointing the 
commissioner fails to delegate authority to issue warrants").  
Here, these cases are inapplicable because, as noted above, see 
supra ¶¶35-38, the issuing judge in this case had the authority 
to issue the warrant. 
 
2.  Distinguishing authority to act from failure to act 
¶42 I also noted in my Hess concurrence that "[w]hile a 
per se void ab initio warrant is always defective, a defective 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
warrant is not always per se void ab initio." 327 Wis. 2d 524, 
¶73 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  As noted above, see supra ¶¶33-
34, a warrant issued by someone with authority that is later-
found defective for failure to fulfill a requirement such as 
probable cause, or deficient oath or affirmation——both of which 
are also requirements for a warrant to issue——does not render 
the warrant void ab initio and require exclusion of the 
evidence.  Again, this is evident from the fact that, if it did, 
there would be no need for the exclusionary rule or its 
companion good-faith exception because every exclusionary rule 
case involves a defective warrant.  Similarly, a warrant that is 
later-found defective for failure to adhere to statutory 
procedural requirements does not render the warrant void ab 
initio.  Again, this is evident from the fact that there is a 
difference between a lack authority to issue and a failure to 
fulfill procedural requirements. 
¶43 Thus, while it may be tempting to conclude that this 
warrant is void ab initio by citing to cases which involved a 
justice of the peace or court commissioners who had no authority 
in the first instance to issue the warrant, that line of 
reasoning is inapplicable because the judge here did have 
authority to issue the warrant.  Compare supra ¶41 (discussing 
Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, and Loney, 
110 Wis. 2d 256) with supra ¶¶35-38.  In other words, the 
warrants in Kriegbaum, Loney, and Grawien were void ab initio 
because the person who issued the warrant could never issue the 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
warrant under any circumstances, but that is not what we have 
here. 
¶44 The difference between failing to comply with the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)2. and lacking authority 
to issue the warrant is a difference that is significant because 
Kriegbaum and its progeny stand for the proposition that, when 
the person issuing the warrant had no authority to do so, that 
warrant is void ab initio and evidence may be excluded on that 
basis.  See Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶30 ("[Loney and Grawien] 
together with Kriegbaum, support the conclusion that exclusion 
is an appropriate remedy where evidence was obtained by a 
warrant [that] issued by a magistrate who lacked the authority 
to issue the warrant."); id., ¶29 ("Because the circuit court 
had no authority to issue the warrant it did, exclusion is an 
appropriate remedy for evidence obtained as a result of that 
warrant."). 
¶45 Here, because the judge did have authority to issue 
the warrant, the warrant cannot be deemed void ab initio.  
Instead, the type of defect at issue here is akin to the type of 
defect that arises when a warrant is challenged post-search or 
post-arrest and is found to lack probable cause, oath or 
affirmation, and/or particularity; in those circumstances, the 
warrant is defective as a result of a judge's failure to adhere 
to specific requirements before issuing a warrant.  Such later-
discovered defects do not, however, render the warrant void ab 
initio.   
 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
III. PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTES7 
¶46 As discussed above, see supra ¶31, the reviewing court 
concluded that the issuing court "failed to comply with the 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)2," and that, 
therefore, 
"how 
[the 
neighboring 
county] 
issues 
civil 
commitments . . . results in several, or dozens or hundreds of 
arrest warrants being issued in complete disregard for the 
applicable law."  Because of that "systemic" failure, the 
reviewing court determined that "[h]ere the conduct is not 
isolated and may be the rule, not the exception.  Deter[r]ence 
certainly is a greater consideration under these facts." 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, it suppressed the evidence discovered 
incident to arrest because "'judicial integrity' is vital enough 
to justify exclusion of evidence when the issuing court's arrest 
warrant was invalid ab initio."   
                                                 
7 The interpretation and application of a statute present 
questions of law that this court reviews de novo.  See, e.g., 
State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶23, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 
N.W.2d 158 (citing State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346).  When interpreting a statute, we 
begin with the language of the statute, and, "[i]f the meaning 
of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning is not plain, 
we look to the context in which the statute is used, "in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes," and may consult the scope and purpose of the statute 
where they are ascertainable from the text and structure of the 
statute itself.  Id., ¶¶46, 48.  Resort to legislative history 
and other extrinsic sources is traditionally inappropriate "in 
the absence of a finding of ambiguity," "although legislative 
history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-
meaning interpretation."  Id., ¶51. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
¶47 In other words, the circuit court granted Kerr's 
motion to suppress the evidence discovered incident to arrest 
because it concluded that there was not just procedural 
malfeasance with respect to this one warrant, but rather with 
respect to "several, or dozens or hundreds of arrest warrants," 
and, therefore, a greater need for deterrence, considering the 
pervasive systemic nature of the issuance of these warrants in 
violation of the procedural requirements of the statute.  While 
not fundamental to the conclusion that we reach today, I thus 
also consider whether the plain language of the applicable 
statutes 
supports 
the 
strength 
of 
the 
reviewing 
court's 
conviction that the issuing court's actions were a violation of 
the statute. 
 
A.  Default Judgment 
¶48 The reviewing court's conclusion that the issuing 
court "may have failed to issue or render a written default 
judgment in 2015" is subject to question.  Entry of default 
judgment in civil forfeiture cases is governed by Wis. Stat. 
§§ 800.08 and 800.09.  Section 800.08 provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: "If a defendant does not appear at trial, the 
court 
may 
enter 
a 
default 
judgment 
under 
s. 
800.09."  
§ 800.08(5).  Section 800.09 provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: "If the defendant is not present, the court shall 
ensure that the information is sent to the defendant by mail."  
§ 800.09(1g).   
¶49 Here, the parties do not dispute that Kerr did not 
appear on July 21, 2015; thus, entry of default judgment was 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
proper.  See Wis. Stat. § 800.08(5).  As noted above, the 
certified record from the issuing court reflects that default 
judgment was entered on July 21, 2015.  Additionally, the record 
is completely devoid of any indication that the notice sent on 
July 31, 2015, was somehow deficient.  Consequently, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the notice Kerr 
presumably received8 did not properly advise him of the 
consequences of failure to timely pay or appear, including 
"imprisonment" and that "the defendant should notify the court 
if he or she is unable to pay the judgment because of poverty."9  
See Wis. Stat. § 800.09(1g).  The reviewing court concluded in 
fact that the standard default judgment form contained the 
information required to be given by statute.10  Thus, there is 
nothing 
in 
the 
record 
to 
support 
the 
reviewing 
court's 
conclusion that the issuing court "may have failed to issue or 
render a written default judgment in 2015." 
                                                 
8 The statute's language does not impose any requirement to 
ensure that the defendant receive the notice; rather, the court 
need only "ensure that the information is sent to the defendant 
by mail."  Wis. Stat. § 800.09(1g).  In this regard, I note that 
the record indicates that the address to which the ticket, and 
presumably the notice of default judgment, was sent is different 
from the address where Kerr was arrested.  This difference does 
not affect my analysis, however, as a court is not required to 
verify that the address of record is accurate and there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the notices were not 
mailed as required or that they were returned to the court. 
9 Kerr never made any such request to the court. 
10 The reviewing court said: "The standard default judgment 
form, which was eventually used in this case, contains the 
information required to be provided in writing to a defendant if 
he or she is not in court when judgment is entered, pursuant to 
§§ 345.47 and 800.09(1g)." 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
 
B.  Arrest Warrant 
¶50 The reviewing court's conclusion that the issuing 
court "failed to comply with the requirements under Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.095(1)(b)2." in issuing the arrest warrant is also subject 
to question.  Issuance of an arrest warrant in civil forfeiture 
cases is governed by Wis. Stat. § 800.095.  Section 800.095 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) If the defendant fails to pay a monetary 
judgment 
ordered 
by 
the 
court, 
the 
court 
may 
order . . .  
(b) 1.  That the defendant be imprisoned until 
the forfeiture, assessments, surcharge, and costs are 
paid.  If the court orders imprisonment under this 
subdivision, all of the following apply: 
a. 
The maximum period of imprisonment shall be 
90 days for any one judgment, and the defendant shall 
receive credit against the amount owed at the rate of 
at least $50 for each day of imprisonment, including 
imprisonment following an arrest but prior to the 
court making a finding under subd. 2. 
b. 
The court may impose a term of imprisonment 
under this subdivision that is either concurrent with 
or consecutive to any other term of imprisonment 
imposed at the same time or any term of imprisonment 
imposed by any court. 
2.  No defendant may be imprisoned under subd. 1. 
unless the court makes one of the following findings: 
a. 
Either at sentencing of thereafter, that the 
defendant has the ability to pay the judgment within a 
reasonable time.  If a defendant meets the criteria in 
s. 814.29(1)(d), the defendant shall be presumed 
unable to pay under this subsection and the court 
shall either suspend or extend payment of the judgment 
or order community service.  
b. 
The 
defendant 
has 
failed, 
without 
good 
cause, to perform the community service authorized 
under this subsection or s. 800.09. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
c. 
The defendant has failed to attend an 
indigency hearing offered by the court to provide the 
defendant with an opportunity to determine whether he 
or she has the ability to pay the judgment. 
d. 
The 
defendant 
has 
failed, 
without 
good 
cause, to complete an assessment or treatment program 
related to alcohol or drugs that was ordered in lieu 
of a monetary forfeiture. 
§ 800.095(1)(b)1.-2. 
¶51 The plain language of this statute contemplates 
imprisonment before a subd. (b)2. hearing is held when it states 
that imprisonment may be imposed up to "90 days for any one 
judgment, and the defendant shall receive credit against the 
amount owed at the rate of at least $50 for each day of 
imprisonment, including imprisonment following an arrest but 
prior 
to 
the 
court 
making 
a 
finding 
under 
subd. 
2."  
§ 800.095(1)(b)1.a. 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, 
while 
§ 800.095(1)(b)2. indeed provides that no defendant may continue 
to be imprisoned under subd. (b)1. unless the court makes 
certain findings, subd. (b)1. does seem to permit "imprisonment 
following an arrest but prior to the court making a finding 
under subd. 2." 
¶52 As an initial matter, Kerr has not challenged Wis. 
Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)1.a. in any way; rather, Kerr rests his 
argument on the court's failure to determine his ability to pay 
the forfeiture imposed prior to arrest.  While that may be a 
good practice, it is less than clear that the statutes require 
it because, as noted above, see supra ¶¶50-51, this argument is 
not necessarily borne out by the plain language of the 
applicable statutes.  Additionally, the facts of this case 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
demonstrate precisely why an arrest and/or imprisonment prior to 
the court making a finding under § 800.095(1)(b)2. may be both 
necessary and prudent: Kerr was entirely absent.  He was never 
present for the court to ask him whether he could pay the 
forfeiture, nor did Kerr ever ask for an indigency hearing.  
Nothing in the record indicates that the notice Kerr presumably 
received was deficient in so advising him, and, in fact, the 
reviewing court stated that he received proper notice.  See 
supra ¶49.  Thus, the issuing court's ability to resolve the 
ticket by arrest and/or imprisonment under subd. (b)1., followed 
by findings under subd. (b)2. is not definitively prohibited.  
See Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)1.a.   
¶53 In sum, even if the facts of record demonstrated that 
the issuing court regularly proceeded in the manner described 
above, it is not clear that such actions violated the plain 
language of the applicable statutes.  First, entry of default 
judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.09(5) was proper because, 
although the ticket issued to Kerr did not require his 
appearance in court, failure to appear at the time designated on 
the ticket endows the court with authority to enter default 
judgment.  Second, the record reflects that notice of default 
judgment was sent by mail pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.09(1g), 
and the record is devoid of any indication that the notice might 
have been lacking; in fact, the court stated that proper notice 
was given.  Third, Kerr's assertion that suppression is 
warranted because "no hearing was noticed to provide [him] with 
an opportunity to be heard on the issue of ability to pay prior 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
to the issuance of a warrant" is not clearly supported by the 
statute; 
rather, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 800.095(1)(b)1.a. 
permits 
"imprisonment following an arrest but prior to the court making 
a finding under subd. 2."  And this might make sense in cases 
such as this one when no indigency hearing has been requested by 
the defendant, and, where, at the only court appearance held, 
the defendant did not appear.  In such cases, the statute's 
language does not appear to always place the onus on the court 
to set an indigency hearing and ask questions of a non-appearing 
defendant.11  It might also make sense to give notice again and 
set an order to show cause, but the statute is less than clear 
that that is always required.  We need not decide this today, 
however, as it is not fundamental to our decision.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 I, of course, join the opinion that I wrote for the 
majority.  I write separately to address issues that three of 
the four members of the majority conclude are also relevant.  
¶55 The reviewing circuit court in this case took issue 
with the manner in which the issuing circuit court issued the 
warrant.  It concluded that the neighboring court issued this 
warrant contrary to statutory provisions, that the issuing court 
did so on a regular basis, that all such warrants were void ab 
initio, 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
this 
case 
represented 
"an 
                                                 
11 The statute appears to place the onus on the defendant to 
request that hearing.  See Wis. Stat. § 800.09(1g) ("[T]he 
defendant should notify the court if he or she is unable to pay 
the judgment because of poverty . . . ."). 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
institutional or administrative disregard for the law governing 
civil commitments."  The reviewing court, thus, suppressed the 
evidence because of "judicial error on a wide administrative 
level," concluding that "'judicial integrity' is vital enough to 
justify exclusion of evidence when the issuing court's arrest 
warrant was invalid ab initio."  
¶56 This case cannot be so easily resolved by relying on 
the issuing court's alleged statutory violation, because neither 
the plain language of the applicable statutes nor the facts of 
record support the conclusion that the issuing court acted 
wrongfully.  Relatedly, this case cannot be resolved by relying 
on my concurrence in Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, because the arrest 
warrant was not void ab initio here, where the issuing court had 
authority to issue it. 
¶57 Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this 
concurrence.  I am also authorized to state that Justice DANIEL 
KELLY joins footnote 2. 
 
 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  When a court 
issues a warrant without regard for any legislatively mandated 
statutory safeguards, the use of evidence discovered through 
execution of such a warrant calls into question the fairness of 
the process.  "Public confidence in the fair and honorable 
administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the 
rule of law," is a "transcending value at stake."  Sherman v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).     
¶60 As was explained in State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶64-
65, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568, even though the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is primarily to deter police misconduct, a 
"secondary consideration" of the rule is to preserve judicial 
integrity.  I conclude that judicial integrity remains an 
independent basis for the application of the exclusionary rule 
and, like the circuit court, I would apply it here.   
¶61 For well over a half century, the rationale of 
judicial 
integrity 
has 
coursed 
through 
exclusionary 
rule 
jurisprudence in both this court and the United States Supreme 
Court.  In the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, the United States 
Supreme Court wrote that in addition to deterring police 
misconduct, the exclusionary rule "also serves another vital 
function——'the imperative of judicial integrity.'"  392 U.S. 1, 
12-13 (1968) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 
(1960)). 
¶62 Subsequently, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
reaffirmed 
that 
although the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
deter police misconduct, judicial integrity is a "relevant, 
albeit subordinate factor" that may require exclusion of 
evidence in "unusual circumstances."  United States v. Janis, 
428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 921 n.22 (1984). 
¶63 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), altered 
this analysis.  In Davis, the Supreme Court departed from 
judicial integrity and determined that pursuant to the federal 
Constitution, the "sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
deter misconduct by law enforcement."  Id. at 246. 
¶64 However, this court need not follow the United States 
Supreme Court's departure.  "[W]e retain the right to interpret 
our constitution to provide greater protections than its federal 
counterpart."  
State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶41, 285 
Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  This court "will not be bound by 
the minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be 
afforded."  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶59, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899 (quoting State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 
N.W.2d 210 
(1977)). 
 
To 
provide 
true 
meaning 
to 
our 
constitution's protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, it is appropriate to do so here. 
¶65 There is ample support in our prior case law for 
maintaining judicial integrity as an independent basis for 
applying the exclusionary rule pursuant to the Wisconsin 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Constitution.  In State v. Felix, an opinion decided post-Davis 
and based in part on the Wisconsin Constitution, this court 
referenced the dual purposes of the exclusionary rule, including 
judicial integrity.  2012 WI 36, ¶39, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 
N.W.2d 775.  Similarly, in Hess we referenced both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.1  See Hess, 327 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶¶20, 33.  Likewise, in State v. Eason, the court 
referred to the exclusionary rule's dual purpose of deterring 
police 
misconduct 
and 
ensuring 
judicial 
integrity 
while 
explicitly basing its conclusion on the Wisconsin Constitution.  
2001 WI 98, ¶¶3, 31 n.10, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. 
¶66 The 
consideration 
of 
judicial 
integrity 
in 
the 
application 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
also 
fulfills 
the 
"important purposes" of "enabl[ing] the judiciary to avoid the 
taint of partnership in official lawlessness" and "assur[ing] 
the 
people——all 
potential 
victims 
of 
unlawful 
government 
                                                 
1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
sets forth: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution contains substantially the same language.  See 
State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶18 n.3, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 
N.W.2d 562. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
conduct——that the government would not profit from its lawless 
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining 
popular trust in government."  See Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1957) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A 
More Majestic Conception":  The Importance of Judicial Integrity 
in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 47 
(2010). 
¶67 Eight years ago, Hess provided an instructive analysis 
of 
the 
judicial 
integrity 
consideration 
in 
applying 
the 
exclusionary 
rule. 
 
See 
Hess, 
327 
Wis. 2d 524, 
¶¶63-67.  
"[J]udicial integrity is implicated when a judge issues a 
warrant that does not comply with statutory requirements and is 
not 
supported 
by 
the 
constitutionally 
required 
oath 
or 
affirmation."  Id., ¶63.  Further, "[t]he consideration of 
judicial integrity must take into account the nature of the 
defects in the warrant."  Id., ¶66. 
¶68 In Hess, a civil bench warrant issued for Hess's 
arrest because he failed to meet with the agent assigned to 
complete his pre-sentence investigation.  Id., ¶8.  The defects 
in Hess's warrant "were not technical irregularities or errors 
of judgment:  The defendant's failure to cooperate with the 
agent in preparing a PSI was not a crime.  It did not violate a 
court order, and it did not violate a condition of his bond."  
Id., ¶66. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶69 Further we explained that "[t]he bench warrant civil 
that the court issued was void ab initio because it did not 
comply with any statute authorizing the court to issue a 
warrant.  It was defective on its face because it was a civil 
warrant in a criminal case."  Id.  "In short, the warrant was 
void ab initio because it was unauthorized and defective in 
nearly every respect."  Id.  For this reason, we concluded that 
"[w]hen fundamental constitutional and statutory requirements 
for issuing a warrant are completely absent, the good-faith 
exception cannot save the resulting unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence."  Id., ¶67. 
¶70 This case turns on similar concerns.  The Ashland 
County Circuit Court issued an arrest warrant for Kerr because 
he had not paid a forfeiture imposed for disorderly conduct.  
Majority op., ¶8.  Wisconsin Stat. § 800.095 provides specific 
procedures for the filing of such a warrant.  The Ashland County 
Circuit Court followed none of them, yet issued the warrant 
anyway.2   
¶71 Accordingly, the Ashland County Circuit Court had no 
authority to issue the warrant.  It was, like the warrant in 
Hess, 
"void 
ab 
initio 
because 
it 
was 
unauthorized 
and 
                                                 
2 The concurrence latches onto an argument not advanced by 
either party, concluding that "neither the plain language of the 
applicable statutes nor the facts of record support the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
issuing 
court 
acted 
wrongfully."  
Concurrence, ¶56.  Even the state concedes that "the arrest 
order here was void ab initio."  Rather than engage an argument 
that was not briefed or argued, I determine that the State's 
concession is reasonable and conclude the warrant was void ab 
initio. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
defective . . . ."  See Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶66.  As in Hess, 
maintaining the integrity of the judicial process demands 
suppression of the evidence here. 
¶72 The Bayfield County Circuit Court agreed in its ruling 
suppressing the evidence.  In its thoughtful written decision, 
the circuit court stated:  "There are obvious reasons why 
judicial integrity is a valid consideration.  While there is no 
reason in this case to assume intentional malfeasance on the 
issuing court, the record from the Ashland County case shows an 
institutional or administrative disregard for the law governing 
civil commitments." 
¶73 Using judicial integrity as the sole basis for the 
application of the exclusionary rule is admittedly only proper 
in "unusual circumstances."  See Hess, 327 Wis. 2d 524, ¶64 
(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22).  The warrant here was 
issued without regard for the mandatory procedural safeguards of 
Wis. Stat. § 800.095.  Such a situation presents the "unusual 
circumstances" necessary to suppress evidence based solely on 
the concern for judicial integrity. 
¶74 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
1 
 
 
¶76 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
The 
majority applies federal Exclusionary Rule jurisprudence in this 
case despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has 
never addressed whether that rule applies in the context of a 
void ab initio warrant.  We have our own Constitution in the 
State of Wisconsin and it provides:  "The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized."1  For nearly a 
century, this court deemed unauthorized warrants to be void ab 
initio and required any evidence recovered under such warrants 
to be suppressed, a rule this court reaffirmed just eight years 
ago.2  Instead of applying long-standing Wisconsin law, the 
majority allows the admission of evidence obtained under a 
warrant with no basis in the law——a warrant the State concedes 
was void ab initio and which caused the unlawful arrest and 
search of a Wisconsin citizen.  Notably, the invalid warrant for 
Christopher Kerr's arrest stemmed from an unpaid municipal 
citation for an ordinance violation——a civil, not a criminal 
offense. 
                                                 
1 Wis. Const. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). 
2 State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 232, 215 N.W. 896 
(1927); State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 
N.W.2d 568. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
2 
 
¶77 Perhaps it is easy to acquiesce in the circuit court's 
infringement of constitutional rights when the defendant is 
found with an illegal drug in his pocket, but the majority's 
decision applies equally to the innocent citizens of Wisconsin 
who may be unlawfully arrested and searched under the guise of a 
warrant.  An alarming example of the abuse of the judicial power 
to issue warrants occurred just five years ago when unelected 
"Reserve Judge [Barbara] Kluka authorized search warrants for 
the homes and offices of" citizens of Wisconsin, which "were 
executed . . . in pre-dawn, armed, paramilitary-style raids in 
which bright floodlights were used to illuminate the targets' 
homes."  State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 
WI 85, ¶28, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165.  An unelected reserve 
judge issued these search warrants against "citizens who were 
wholly innocent of any wrongdoing" and despite the absence of 
probable cause that any crime had been committed.  Id. at ¶¶34-
35, 133. 
¶78 Under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
statutes, 
and 
longstanding case law, the evidence in this case must be 
suppressed because it was obtained only as a result of an 
unlawful arrest warrant issued in violation of statutory 
procedures and Kerr's constitutional rights.  A warrant issued 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 800.095 is void ab initio, and any 
search or seizure pursuant to such a warrant violates Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  I would affirm the 
circuit court's order suppressing the unlawfully obtained 
evidence. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
3 
 
¶79 Just two years ago, I cautioned against judicial 
approval of governmental intrusion into the home in violation of 
a 
citizen's 
constitutional 
guarantee 
to 
be 
free 
from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.3  The infringement in this 
case is perhaps more alarming because it was accomplished by law 
enforcement's blameless execution of a warrant that the judge 
issued on his own initiative and with no legal basis whatsoever; 
rather, the warrant was issued in violation of procedural 
preconditions set forth in the Wisconsin Statutes.  The majority 
minimizes the gravity of the judge's error by altogether 
ignoring it.  But the danger of tolerating a breach of statutory 
procedures was powerfully explained by the United States Supreme 
Court over a century ago:   
[I]llegitimate 
and 
unconstitutional 
practices 
get 
their first footing . . . by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.  This 
can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that 
constitutional provisions for the security of person 
and property should be liberally construed.  A close 
and literal construction deprives them of half their 
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in 
substance.  It is the duty of the courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, 
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).  The majority 
strengthens the foothold of an illegitimate and unconstitutional 
judicial 
practice, 
disregards 
its 
duty 
to 
protect 
the 
constitutional rights of Wisconsin citizens, and permits a 
                                                 
3 State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶141, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 
N.W.2d 554 (R. Grassl Bradley, J. dissenting). 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
4 
 
stealthy encroachment of the right to be free from unlawful 
searches and seizures.  I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶80 There is no dispute that the evidence discovered by 
police during the search of Kerr, incident to his arrest, was 
unlawfully obtained.  Both parties agree that the warrant should 
not have issued because the circuit court failed to follow the 
statutory procedures required for issuing a valid warrant.  The 
State argues that despite the statutory violation resulting in 
the unlawful search, the evidence is admissible because the 
Exclusionary Rule does not apply absent police misconduct, and 
everyone agrees the police did nothing wrong.  I agree that 
suppression under the Exclusionary Rule is limited to instances 
of police misconduct and the court should not extend its 
application.  See State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶44, 327 
Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97.  The police did not engage in any 
misconduct in this case; therefore, the Exclusionary Rule does 
not apply. 
¶81 Nonetheless, the evidence must be suppressed under 
Wisconsin law because the warrant was void ab initio, making the 
search violative of Kerr's constitutional rights.  Wisconsin 
case law requires suppression of evidence obtained under a 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
5 
 
warrant that was void ab initio.4  The purpose of this rule is 
not to provide a remedy for the citizen whose rights were 
violated; the harm attendant to an unlawful arrest and search is 
irreparable.  Rather, suppression partially restores the status 
quo ante:  but for the issuance of the unlawful warrant, no 
arrest would have been made, no search would have been 
conducted, and no evidence would have been discovered. 
II 
¶82 In its brief, the State explicitly concedes the 
warrant was void ab initio:  "[T]he court that issued the arrest 
warrant had no authority to do so, rendering the warrant void ab 
initio."  Additionally, the State notes: 
This arrest warrant, as it turns out, was void ab 
initio.  A warrant is "void ab initio" when it was 
"[n]ull from the beginning, as from the first moment."  
Void, 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
(10th 
ed. 
2014) 
(including definition of "void ab initio"); see also 
[State v.]Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶2 n.1.[5] 
The 
State, 
citing 
Justice 
Annette 
Kingsland 
Ziegler's 
concurrence in State v. Hess,6 as well as State v. Kriegbaum,7 
                                                 
4 Relying on federal appellate court decisions, the State 
asserts that the Exclusionary Rule applies even when a warrant 
is void ab initio.  The United States Supreme Court, however, 
has not subjected a void ab initio warrant to the exclusionary 
rule-good faith analysis.  This court is "bound on the subject 
of federal law only by the pronouncements of the United States 
Supreme Court."  State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 426 n.4, 338 
N.W.2d 474 (1983).  Wisconsin case law requires suppression and 
it is our state law we should apply. 
5 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568. 
6 Id., ¶¶71-73 (Ziegler, J. concurring). 
7 194 Wis. at 232. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
6 
 
State v. Loney,8 and State v. Grawien,9 correctly explains:  "A 
warrant can be void ab initio when the judge or magistrate 
lacked legal authority to issue any warrant, or when a mandatory 
condition precedent to the court's authority to issue a warrant 
was not met from the outset." 
¶83 Neither party disputes that the circuit court failed 
to comply with the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)2., 
and therefore lacked any authority to issue the warrant.10  
Wisconsin law prohibits imprisoning a defendant for failing to 
pay a fine imposed for a municipal ordinance violation unless 
the court finds, as pertinent here, that the defendant has the 
financial ability to pay the fine or failed to attend an 
indigency hearing to determine his ability to pay.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.095(1)(b)2.  Accordingly, the warrant for Kerr's arrest 
was null from the beginning——it was void ab initio.  As a 
result, Kerr's constitutional rights were violated and the 
evidence discovered should be suppressed. 
                                                 
8 110 Wis. 2d 256, 260, 328 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1982). 
9 123 Wis. 2d 428, 430-31, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 800.095 provides that "[n]o defendant 
may be imprisoned under [Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1) for failure to 
comply with certain court ordered requirements] unless the court 
makes one of [four] findings."  These include finding that the 
defendant has the ability to pay the judgment within a 
reasonable time (subd. para. a.), has failed without good cause 
to perform required community service (subd. para. b.), has 
failed to attend an indigency hearing (subd. para. c), or has 
failed without good cause to complete certain drug or alcohol 
programs (subd. para. d). 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
7 
 
¶84 Longstanding precedent——Kriegbaum, Loney, and Grawien—
—controls this case.  In Kriegbaum, this court held that a 
warrant issued without authority violates Article I, Section 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which guarantees to the defendant 
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures:  "A search 
made pursuant to warrant issued by a justice of the peace to 
whom the legislature had not granted the power to issue such a 
warrant is an unreasonable search and in violation of the 
defendant's constitutional rights under this section of that 
fundamental law."  194 Wis. 229, 233, 215 N.W. 896 (1927). 
¶85 The same principle applies in Kerr's case.  The 
circuit court did not have authority under Wis. Stat. § 800.095 
to issue the warrant because it did not make any of the four 
findings under subd. 2.  Compliance with the statutory mandates 
is necessary to confer authority on the circuit court to issue 
the warrant. 
¶86 The circuit court's failure to comply with the 
statutory procedures deprived it of any lawful authority to 
issue this warrant in the first place.  The warrant's issuance 
rendered the search constitutionally unreasonable.  This court 
in Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. at 233, concluded that the admission of 
the 
evidence 
obtained 
from 
an 
unlawful 
warrant 
violated 
Wisconsin's 
Constitution. 
 
This 
court 
should 
apply 
this 
precedent in Kerr's case and suppress the evidence. 
¶87 Our court of appeals reached the same conclusion in 
Loney and Grawien.  In Loney, the court of appeals held that 
evidence obtained as a result of an unlawfully issued warrant 
necessitated suppression of the evidence.  110 Wis. 2d 256, 259-
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
8 
 
60, 328 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1982).  Because the court 
commissioner who issued the warrant lacked the authority to do 
so, the circuit court should have granted the defendant's motion 
to suppress, and the court of appeals accordingly reversed 
Loney's conviction.  Id. at 260.  In Grawien, the court of 
appeals likewise held that when a warrant is issued by a court 
commissioner who had no authority to issue it, the evidence 
obtained under the unlawful warrant must be suppressed.  123 
Wis. 2d 428, 431-33, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985). 
¶88 In this case, the circuit court similarly lacked legal 
authority to issue the warrant because it did not make any of 
the findings mandated by Wis. Stat. § 800.095(1)(b)2.  Any 
evidence discovered upon execution of a warrant void ab initio 
must be suppressed as a violation of Kerr's right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.11  See also State v. Vickers, 964 P.2d 756, 762 
(Mont. 1998) (holding that a void ab initio warrant requires 
suppression, and "the inquiry stops and all other issues 
pertaining to the validity of the search warrant, such as 
whether the purpose of the exclusionary rule is served, are 
moot"); People v. Carrera, 783 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. 2002); State v. 
Surowiecki, 440 A.2d 798, 799 (Conn. 1981) (suppressing evidence 
                                                 
11 Case law also supports suppression as a sanction when 
statutes are violated.  See, e.g., State v. Renard, 123 
Wis. 2d 458, 461, 367 N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Suppression 
of the blood test is an appropriate sanction for failure to 
comply with [Wis. Stat. §] 343.305(5)"); see also State v. 
McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277, 286-97, 385 N.W.2d 161 (1986) 
(discussing sanctions including suppression arising from due 
process violations). 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
9 
 
obtained under void ab initio warrant because it was "fatally 
defective, invalid and void and conferred no authority to act 
thereunder") (quoted source omitted); State v. Nunez, 634 A.2d 
1167, 1169 (R.I. 1993) (reversing conviction based on evidence 
obtained from void ab initio warrant); People v. Hentkowski, 397 
N.W.2d 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) (suppressing 
evidence obtained from void ab initio warrant); State v. Covert, 
675 S.E.2d 740, 742-43 (S.C. 2009) (reversing conviction because 
evidence should have been suppressed where warrant was not 
signed; not reaching good faith exception because an unsigned 
warrant is "not a warrant" at all). 
¶89 Justice 
Ziegler's 
distinction 
between 
void 
and 
defective warrants is unconvincing.12  The warrant issued here is 
no different than the problematic warrants in Hess, Kriegbaum, 
Loney, and Grawien.  The individual official issuing the warrant 
in each case lacked the statutory authority to do so.  In Hess, 
just like this case, the circuit court judge lacked statutory 
authority to issue an arrest warrant.  327 Wis. 2d at 524, ¶23.  
The fact that judges generally possess authority to issue 
warrants does not authorize judges to issue warrants that 
                                                 
12 There is a dearth of precedent distinguishing between 
warrants that are void ab initio and warrants that are simply 
defective on both the federal and state level.  Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence in Hess is the only case identifying a 
notable difference between the two, but Justice Ziegler did not 
cite to any case law to support her proposition.  See Hess, 327 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶73 (Ziegler, J., concurring) ("While a per se void 
ab initio warrant is always defective, a defective warrant is 
not always per se void ab initio.").  Justice Ziegler's 
concurrence in this case fares no better——it cites no cases 
supporting the distinction she makes here. 
No.  2016AP2455-CR.rgb 
10 
 
violate statutory law or constitutional rights.  That the judge 
in Kerr's case would have had legal authority to issue the 
warrant if he had complied with the statutory requisites does 
not alter the nature of the constitutional violation.  A void ab 
initio warrant is not a warrant at all——it is as if the warrant 
never existed; therefore, the analysis stops and the evidence 
should be suppressed.  These cases are different from situations 
involving a warrant that was valid when issued, but a reviewing 
court later declared the warrant invalid.  For example, a 
warrant may be valid upon issuance, but subsequently become 
invalid because a statute is declared unconstitutional, case law 
is overruled, the legislature changes the law, or a reviewing 
court decides the warrant was not supported by probable cause.  
In these examples, the law or the analysis of it changed.  In 
Kerr's situation, the judge did not follow governing law, 
rendering the warrant void from the beginning.13  The judge who 
issued Kerr's warrant lacked any legal authority to do so.  
Hess, Kriegbaum, Loney, and Grawien control under these facts.  
The evidence should be suppressed because it was obtained only 
as a result of an arrest warrant that was void ab initio and 
                                                 
13 In her concurrence, Justice Ziegler attempts to vindicate 
the judge's issuance of the warrant for Kerr's arrest.  The text 
itself 
categorically 
negates 
her 
statutory 
construction.  
Section 800.095(1)(b)2 unambiguously declares:  "No defendant 
may be imprisoned under subd. 1 unless the court makes one of 
the following findings: . . . ."  As pertinent in this case, 
these include finding that the defendant has the ability to pay 
the judgment within a reasonable time (subd. para. a.), and has 
failed to attend an indigency hearing (subd. para. c).  It is 
uncontested that the requisite finding was not made; therefore, 
Kerr's arrest and imprisonment were unlawful. 
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therefore in violation of Kerr's right to be free from 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶90 The Fourth Amendment, the language of which the 
framers of the Wisconsin Constitution adopted verbatim, was 
designed to protect the people from the odious English practice 
of issuing writs of assistance empowering revenue officers to 
indiscriminately search homes.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-25.  This 
practice was rightly described as "the worst instrument of 
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and 
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an 
English law book."  Id. at 625 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, 
Constitutional Limitations 301-303 (1868)).  If evidence seized 
under an unlawful warrant may be used against a person whose 
constitutional rights were violated by an unreasonable search 
and seizure, "declaring his right to be secure against such 
searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus 
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution."  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 
(1914).14  While allowing Kerr to circumvent punishment for 
illegal drug possession may be an unpalatable outcome for the 
majority, "[t]he efforts of the courts and their officials to 
bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are 
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles 
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have 
                                                 
14 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), extended the 
exclusionary rule established in Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 393 (1914), to state criminal cases. 
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resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the 
land."  Id. 
¶91 I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
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