Title: Jack Kephart, Et Al. v. Lucy D. Hadi, Etc., Et Al
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-936
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
Nos. SC02-936 & SC02-2280 
____________ 
JACK KEPHART, et al., 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
LUCY D. HADI, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
____________ 
LUCY D. HADI, etc., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
JACK KEPHART, et al., 
Respondents. 
____________ 
 
[June 8, 2006] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
QUINCE, J. 
We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Kephart v. Kearney, 826 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which certified conflict 
with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Melvin v. State, 804 So. 2d 
 
 
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460 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
For the reasons which follow below, we quash the decision of the Fourth District 
and hold that the probable cause petitions for Jimmy Ryce cases do not have to be 
supported by an affidavit or live testimony. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
At various times in 1999, 2000, and 2001, the State filed petitions seeking 
the involuntary civil commitment, pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act1 (the Act), of 
Jack Kephart and eleven others (petitioners) as sexually violent predators.  In each 
case, the initial commitment petitions were signed by an assistant state attorney 
without any oath, verification, or affidavits from psychologists or other parties.  
However, after the Second District issued its opinion in Melvin,2 the assistant state 
attorney in each case filed an amended petition.  The amended petitions were 
identical to the original, except for the inclusion of a verification by the assistant 
state attorney.  The verification provided:  “I [name of assistant state attorney 
signing petition], Assistant State Attorney in and for the 19th Judicial Circuit of 
Florida, hereby certify that I have read the foregoing petition and know the 
                                          
 
1.  The Jimmy Ryce Act, sections 394.910-.931, Florida Statues (2001), 
provides for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators upon 
their release from prison or other confinement. 
 
2.  In Melvin, the Second District held that the State’s petitions for 
involuntary civil commitment violated the defendants’ due process rights because 
they were issued without sworn proof of probable cause.  
 
 
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contents thereof and attest that the same is true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge.”  The assistant state attorney’s signature was notarized.  The various 
trial courts concluded that the amended petitions satisfied Melvin and found that 
there was probable cause to continue petitioners’ detention prior to their civil 
commitment trials. 
Petitioners filed three separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Fourth District.3  Petitioners argued that they were being illegally detained 
pursuant to an ex parte probable cause determination based on insufficiently sworn 
documents.  The Fourth District agreed and held “that the ex parte probable cause 
determination must be supported by sworn proof in the form of either an affidavit 
from, or live testimony by, at least one mental health care professional who has 
examined and evaluated the individual to be so held.”  Kephart, 826 So. 2d at 519.  
The Fourth District further held that “it is reasonable to allow the state a period of 
seven working days in which to present such affidavits or testimony to the circuit 
court that initially made the ex parte probable cause determination.”  Id.  The 
Fourth District denied the petitions, without prejudice.  Additionally, the Fourth 
District certified conflict with the Second District: 
To the extent that Melvin would permit the ex parte probable 
cause determination to be made on the basis of a verified petition 
without sworn proof by one who has performed such evaluation, and 
to the extent that the Melvin court ordered the immediate release of 
                                          
 
3.  The Fourth District consolidated the three separate petitions. 
 
 
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those petitioners, where we would allow a seven day “cure” period, 
we certify conflict with Melvin. 
 
Id.    Petitioners and the State now seek review of the Fourth District’s decision. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The case presents this Court with two issues: (1) whether the Act requires 
the probable cause petition to be supported by sworn proof in the form of an 
affidavit or live testimony by a mental professional who has evaluated the 
individual, and (2) whether the Act can be construed to give the State a seven-day 
period in which to cure defects in the probable cause petition.  The interpretation of 
a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of 
review.  See Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 2000); Operation Rescue 
v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 670 (Fla. 1993), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
Probable Cause Petition 
As an initial matter, this Court must first consider whether the Act requires a 
probable cause petition to be supported by sworn proof.  The Second District 
concluded that the “ex parte probable cause determination prescribed by section 
394.915(1) must be supported by sworn proof in the form of a verified petition or 
affidavit.”  See Melvin, 804 So. 2d at 463.  The Second District noted “that the Act 
does not state whether a petition initiating a commitment proceeding must be 
 
 
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sworn, nor does it identify the basis on which the court is to make its initial 
probable cause determination.”  Melvin, 804 So. 2d at 463.  Despite the Act’s 
failure to require a sworn petition, the Second District concluded sworn proof was 
necessary.  The Second District reasoned: 
For at least two reasons, we conclude this determination must 
be founded on sworn proof.  First, determining whether there is 
probable cause to believe something requires a consideration of 
factual circumstances and the making of mixed conclusions of law 
and fact.  Absent the parties’ stipulations, courts may only find facts 
based on sworn evidence; mere unsworn allegations are insufficient to 
prove any fact.  Blimpie Capital Venture, Inc. v. Palms Plaza Partners 
Ltd., 636 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994);  State v. Brugman, 588 So. 
2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).  It is plain to see, then, that by charging 
the court with a duty to determine the existence of probable cause, the 
legislature necessarily contemplated that the court would receive 
sworn proof. 
Second, it is apparent that the legislature prescribed the early ex 
parte judicial probable cause determination in order to furnish the 
alleged predator due process before depriving him of his liberty 
pending trial on the merits of the commitment petition.  See 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 
(1979) (holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection);  
Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2001) (noting that “individual 
who faces involuntary commitment to a mental health facility has a 
liberty interest at stake”).  Id. at 1116.  But the promise of due process 
would be hollow if it required merely that the judge search the 
commitment petition for the requisite allegations. 
 
Id. at 463.  In the instant cases, the Fourth District was faced with identical factual 
scenarios and agreed with the Second District on this point and held that sworn 
proof was needed to support an ex parte probable cause determination.  See  
Kephart, 826 So. 2d at 519.   The Fourth District, however, contrary to the 
 
 
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conclusion reached by the Second District, further concluded that the affidavits 
provided by the assistant state attorneys were inadequate because “[d]etention after 
these individuals have finished serving their sentences is a serious deprivation of 
liberty, which cannot be allowed without proof in the form of some reliable 
individual’s personal knowledge.”  Id. 
We agree with both the Second and the Fourth Districts’ determinations that 
due process requires that a probable cause petition filed pursuant to section 
394.914 be supported by sworn proof.4  As we said in State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 
817, 825-26 (Fla. 2002), “[c]ivil commitment proceedings involve a serious 
deprivation of liberty and, thus, such proceedings must comply with the due 
process clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.”  We have also 
recognized that confinement under the Act implicates an individual’s liberty 
interest in being free from physical restraint.  See Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 
93, 104 (Fla. 2002).  When such fundamental liberty interests are at stake, the State 
at a minimum must be required to swear to the allegations made before the trial 
judge.  This is especially true when the appearance before the trial judge is ex 
parte. 
                                          
 
4.  The Constitution protects the right to substantive and procedural due 
process.  Substantive due process protects fundamental rights from unwarranted 
encroachment from the government.  See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real 
Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991).  In cases where substantive due process 
rights are at issue, procedural due process protects an individual’s right to a fair 
judicial proceeding.  See id.  
 
 
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However, we disagree with the Fourth District’s further conclusion that the 
sworn proof filed with the petition must be provided in “either an affidavit from, or 
live testimony by, at least one mental health care professional who has examined 
and evaluated the individual to be so held.”  Kephart, 826 So. 2d at 519.  The 
Fourth District’s conclusion fails to acknowledge that the Act delegates the 
responsibility of filing the probable cause petition to the state attorney.  Section 
394.914 specifically provides:  “Following receipt of the written assessment and 
recommendation from the multidisciplinary team, the state attorney, in accordance 
with s. 394.913, may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is 
a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support such allegation.”  
§ 394.914, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). 
In interpreting a statute, this Court looks primarily at the plain meaning of 
the statute to determine the legislative intent.  “If the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used 
without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature 
intended.”  Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 1993); see also Forsythe 
v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992); St. 
Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982).   Section 
394.914 clearly states that the state attorney should file the probable cause petition.  
Since the Legislature has given the state attorney this duty, we conclude that the 
 
 
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Legislature intended for the state attorney to swear to the facts contained in the 
petition. 
The probable cause petition under the Act is similar to an application for an 
arrest warrant.  In order to obtain a warrant for an arrest, a law enforcement officer 
must present a written affidavit or sworn complaint to the committing magistrate 
demonstrating probable cause to believe that the accused has violated the criminal 
law of the State.  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.120.  Rule 3.120 conforms to the Fourth Amendment requirement that probable 
cause be supported by “oath or affirmation” and to the procedural requirements 
discussed in Gerstein v. Pugh.5  See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.  The complaint or 
affidavit that is presented to the committing magistrate must contain sufficient 
information to support the magistrate’s independent determination on probable 
cause.  In other words, 
[t]he basis for a finding of probable cause must appear on the face of 
the complaint.  A complaint which states as a mere conclusion that the 
accused has committed a specific crime, without alleging that the 
affiant speaks from personal knowledge, indicating any sources for his 
or her belief, or setting forth any other sufficient basis on which a 
                                          
 
5.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
 
- 9 - 
finding of probable cause could be made, is an insufficient basis for 
the issuance of an arrest warrant, since it does not permit the 
magistrate to make any independent assessment of the probability that 
the accused committed the crime charged. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 20 (1995); accord Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 
480 (1958). 
In the warrant context, courts have allowed the probable cause to be supplied 
by a sworn complaint or by affidavit.  Either may be based on the personal 
knowledge of the complainant or affiant but can also be based on information 
received from others, e.g., fellow officers or confidential informants.  See Johnson 
v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1995) (finding “the obligation to establish 
probable cause in an affidavit may be met by hearsay, by fleeting observations, or 
by tips received from unnamed reliable informants whose identities often may not 
lawfully be disclosed”).  Thus, the person who supplies the information to the 
officer need not, but may, execute an affidavit or appear before the magistrate in 
support of the issuance of the arrest warrant.  The warrant may be issued based 
simply on the sworn complaint or affidavit of the officer if sufficient facts are 
alleged to demonstrate probable cause.  Id. at 654-55. 
Just as the arrest warrant is the State’s authority to compel a defendant to 
answer to criminal charges lodged against him or her, the petition provided for in 
section 394.914 and the trial court’s determination of probable cause based on that 
petition give the State the authority to hold a soon-to-be-released prisoner beyond 
 
 
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the expiration of his or her sentence and to require him or her to answer to the 
allegations of being a sexual predator.  The procedures outlined by both statutes 
and rules for issuance of an arrest warrant and by statute for consideration of 
probable cause to detain pursuant to the Act are analogous and must be interpreted 
in a like manner. 
As the State points out, whoever signs the probable cause petition or an 
affidavit in a proceeding brought under the Act is essentially in the same position 
as an officer preparing an affidavit for an arrest warrant.  Both the prosecutor and 
the psychologists rely on sources of information furnished by others.  See § 
394.913(2)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2002) (stating that the multidisciplinary team will be 
provided with the person’s criminal history, including police reports, victim 
statements, presentence investigation reports, mental health records, and any other 
documents containing reports of the person’s criminal history).  Additionally, 
section 394.9155 permits hearsay evidence to be used in proceedings brought 
under the Act.  Section 394.9155 provides in pertinent part: 
Hearsay evidence, including reports of a member of the 
multidisciplinary team or reports produced on behalf of the 
multidisciplinary team, is admissible in proceedings under this part 
unless the court finds that such evidence is not reliable.  In a trial, 
however, hearsay evidence may not be used as the sole basis for 
committing a person under this part. 
§ 394.9155(5), Fla. Stat. (2002).  Since the Act permits the state attorney to file a 
petition based upon the recommendation of the multidisciplinary team (a 
 
 
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recommendation which may itself rely upon hearsay evidence), we find that the 
sworn proof for the probable cause petition may be supplied by the prosecutor by 
swearing to the allegations in the petition or by affidavit attached to the petition 
from one or more of the mental health professionals.   
Cure Period 
The second issue before this Court is whether the Act gives the State a 
seven-day period in which to cure defects in the probable cause petition.  The 
Fourth District concluded that “it is reasonable to allow the state a period of seven 
working days in which to present such affidavits or testimony to the circuit court 
that initially made the ex parte probable cause determination.”  Kephart, 826 So. 
2d at 519.  We disagree. 
As enacted, the Act provides numerous safeguards to ensure that a prisoner’s 
due process rights are protected.   For example, section 394.913(1)(a) requires the 
Department of Corrections to give written notice of an inmate’s proposed release 
date to the multidisciplinary team and to the state attorney of the circuit where the 
prisoner was last convicted of a sexually violent offense at least 545 days prior to 
the prisoner’s anticipated release from custody.  § 394.913(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
The multidisciplinary team then has 180 days after receipt of the notice to assess 
whether the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator who should 
be subject to commitment and to provide the state attorney with its written 
 
 
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assessment and recommendation.  § 394.913(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2002).  In the event 
that a person’s anticipated release becomes immediate, the agency with jurisdiction 
must transfer the individual to the Department of Children and Families and within 
seventy-two hours of transfer, the multidisciplinary team shall assess the person.  § 
394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (2002).  Finally, the trial court is required to conduct a trial 
within thirty days of a probable cause determination.  § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2002). 
 
The confinement of an individual past the expiration of his or her 
incarcerative sentence requires “scrupulous compliance” with the Act’s 
requirements.  See, e.g., State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 826 (Fla. 2002).  In 
Westerheide, this Court found that confinement under the Act did not violate an 
individual’s right to due process “provided that ‘the confinement takes place 
pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.’”  831 So. 2d at 104 
(quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997)).   Accordingly, serious 
due process concerns are implicated when the State attempts to amend a probable 
cause petition and the filing of the petition causes an individual to remain 
incarcerated beyond his or her sentence.6 
                                          
 
6.  As we noted in State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 825 (Fla. 2002), the 
Legislature clearly intended that “the review process of potential sexual predators 
would be concluded while the person was still in prison.”  However, we also 
recognized “that while the Legislature intended that the Ryce Act operate in this 
way, there is evidence that in practice this is not occurring and that often people 
 
 
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Therefore, we hold that if the State files a probable cause petition which is 
not sworn to or accompanied by an affidavit, the State is not granted a cure period.  
Instead, in cases where a prisoner is detained beyond the expiration of his or her 
sentence, the trial court must hold the hearing delineated in section 394.915(2)-(3) 
within twenty-four hours from the filing of the probable cause petition.7  A person 
who is arrested is taken before a judicial officer within twenty-four hours of his 
arrest pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130.  Accordingly, we 
believe that a person detained beyond the expiration of his sentence pursuant to the 
Jimmy Ryce Act should have at least as much protection.  The twenty-four-hour 
requirement, however, is not retroactive.  This requirement is to be applied 
prospectively only.  Therefore, the twenty-four hour requirement is applicable only 
to those cases arising after the effective date of this opinion.  See, e.g., Fenelon v. 
State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992) (holding that courts may not comment on 
evidence by giving the flight instruction, but also holding the decision should be 
applied prospectively).  Thus, the twenty-four-hour requirement announced today 
                                                                                                                                        
are being detained for long periods after their scheduled release date without being 
taken to trial.”  Id. at 825 n.7. 
 
7.  “Presumably, if the State followed the time periods established in the 
Ryce Act, the commitment trial would take place well in advance of the 
respondent’s date of release from prison and the due process concerns of 
commitment beyond imprisonment would be alleviated.  Under this scheme, the 
State would have multiple opportunities to initiate and pursue these commitments 
before the respondent’s criminal sentence expires.”  Goode, 830 So. 2d at 826.  
 
 
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is not applicable to those currently being held past their release date on the basis of 
proof that does not meet the requirements set forth in this opinion, including the 
petitioners in this case and any other person similarly situated.  Thus, for all 
presently pending cases the State shall have seven days to cure the deficiency.    
The Jimmy Ryce Act provides a procedure for a probable cause 
determination by the trial court.  Section 394.915 (2)-(3) provides: 
(2)   Upon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence and 
before the release from custody of a person whom the 
multidisciplinary team recommends for civil commitment, but after 
the state attorney files a petition under s. 394.914, the court may 
conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing if it determines such 
hearing is necessary.  The court shall only consider whether to have 
an adversarial probable cause hearing in cases where the failure to 
begin a trial is not the result of any delay caused by the respondent.  
The person shall be provided with notice of, and an opportunity to 
appear in person at, an adversarial hearing.  At this hearing, the judge 
shall: 
(a)   Receive evidence and hear argument from the person and 
the state attorney; and 
(b)   Determine whether probable cause exists to believe that 
the person is a sexually violent predator. 
(3)  At the adversarial probable cause hearing, the person has 
the right to: 
(a)  Be represented by counsel; 
(b)  Present evidence; 
(c)  Cross-examine any witnesses who testify against the 
person;  and 
(d) View and copy all petitions and reports in the court file. 
 
§ 394.915(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2002).  This procedure, as we stated in Goode, “was 
apparently intended by the Legislature to be a fallback procedure for persons who 
were entitled to release from prison but still had not been brought to trial under the 
 
 
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commitment petition.”  830 So. 2d at 827.  Because the adversarial probable cause 
hearing provides the person with more rights than the ex parte probable cause 
determination, we find that this procedure adequately protects the constitutional 
rights of an individual who is about to be released from custody when the State 
files a probable cause petition without the required affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude, as did the Second District in Melvin and the Fourth District in 
Kephart, that the Act requires the probable cause petition to be supported by sworn 
proof.  However, we disapprove the Fourth District’s opinion in Kephart to the 
extent that Kephart requires a mental health professional to provide the sworn 
proof accompanying the petition.  We hold that a probable cause petition 
accompanied by an affidavit similar to that found in an arrest warrant is sufficient 
under the Act.  This construction is consistent with the Legislature’s delineation of 
the state attorney’s duties in the Act.  Finally, we hold that if the State files a 
probable cause petition without the necessary affidavit, the trial court must hold a 
probable cause hearing within twenty-four hours from the filing of the petition.  
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we quash the opinion of the 
Fourth District in Kephart to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion and 
approve the Second District’s opinion in Melvin. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
CANTERO, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
 
CANTERO, J., specially concurring. 
 
 
Although I concur with the majority, I believe the majority opinion can be 
interpreted in a way that would, in my view, sweep too broadly.  I certainly agree 
that in a probable cause petition filed under the Ryce Act, “[w]hen . . . fundamental 
liberty interests are at stake, the State at a minimum must be required to swear to 
the allegations made before the trial judge.”  Majority op. at 6.  However, 
sometimes fundamental liberty interests are not at stake.  As the majority notes, 
due process concerns are implicated when “the filing of the petition causes an 
individual to remain incarcerated beyond his or her sentence.”  Majority op. at 12.  
But the majority does not mention that conversely, when the filing of the petition 
will not cause an individual to remain incarcerated after the sentence expires, due 
process concerns are not implicated.  As we noted in an earlier case, “if the State 
followed the time periods established in the Ryce Act, the commitment trial would 
take place well in advance of the [offender’s] date of release from prison and the 
due process concerns of commitment beyond imprisonment would be substantially 
alleviated.”  State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 826 (Fla. 2002).   
 
 
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I would clarify that due process does not require a probable cause petition to 
be sworn unless it represents the difference between freedom and confinement, as 
it did here.  In practice, this may be a small distinction, but it is constitutionally 
significant.  To explain the distinction, I first discuss the timing of the civil 
commitment process delineated in the Ryce Act.  I then analyze whether either the 
statute itself or due process concerns require that, in some or all situations, a 
petition for civil commitment be sworn. 
A.  Timing of the Civil Commitment Process 
 
The Ryce Act imposes specific deadlines for the events leading up to civil 
commitment.  To initiate a commitment, the agency with jurisdiction over an 
alleged sexually violent offender must give written notice to a multidisciplinary 
team of mental health professionals of the offender’s anticipated release date, with 
a copy to the appropriate state attorney.  § 394.913(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).  The 
notice must be given “at least 545 days prior to the anticipated release from total 
confinement” of the offender.  § 394.913(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).8  The team then 
has 180 days to “assess and evaluate” the offender and recommend to the state 
attorney whether the offender is a sexually violent predator.  § 394.913(3)(b), (e), 
                                          
 
8. The deadline is reduced for certain offenders.  See § 394.913(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2002). 
 
 
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Fla. Stat. (2002).  At that point, if all of the above procedures have been followed9 
and the offender’s release date has not been accelerated,10 no less than 365 days of 
the offender’s sentence should remain. 
 
After receiving the team’s written report and recommendation, the state 
attorney may file a probable cause petition in the circuit court.  § 394.914, Fla. 
Stat. (2002).  The court must then determine whether probable cause exists that the 
offender is a sexually violent predator who qualifies for civil commitment.  If the 
offender’s sentence has not yet expired, the probable cause determination is made 
ex parte.  § 394.915(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).  However, if the offender’s sentence 
expires or has already expired, the court must determine whether to hold an 
adversarial probable cause hearing with evidence, witnesses, and representation by 
counsel.  § 394.915(2), Fla. Stat. (2002); see also Goode, 830 So. 2d at 827 (stating 
that “this secondary probable cause determination was apparently intended by the 
Legislature to be a fallback procedure for persons who were entitled to release 
from prison but still had not been brought to trial”).  After determining probable 
                                          
 
9. Failure to follow the proper procedures “in no way prevents the state 
attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to [the Act].”  § 
394.913(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
10. If the offender’s anticipated release date becomes immediate, this whole 
process is expedited.  The individual must be transferred to the custody of DCF at 
the scheduled time of release.  Within 72 hours, a multidisciplinary team must 
assess the individual and provide a written recommendation to the state attorney.  
The state attorney then has 48 hours to file a probable cause petition with the 
circuit court; otherwise the individual is released.  § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2002). 
 
 
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cause by either method, the circuit court has thirty days to conduct a trial.  
§ 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2002). 
 
To summarize, the Ryce Act’s timeline provides for the state attorney to 
receive a recommendation regarding civil commitment at least one year before a 
sexual offender is scheduled for release.  The state attorney then has the discretion 
to file a probable cause petition.  If a petition is filed, the court must hold a trial 
within thirty days of its probable cause determination, which ideally will be 
months before the offender’s scheduled release.  This timeline can be extended, 
however, if the state attorney delays filing the petition or the circuit court continues 
the trial.  See Goode, 830 So. 2d at 830 (holding that the thirty-day time limit 
between the probable cause determination and trial is “mandatory, although not 
jurisdictional”).  Because of such delays, an offender can be detained beyond the 
expiration of the sentence solely on the basis of an ex parte probable cause 
determination. 
B.  The Probable Cause Petition 
The primary question in this case is whether a probable cause petition filed 
under the Ryce Act must be supported by sworn proof.  There are two possible 
sources for such a requirement: (1) the Ryce Act itself, or (2) the Due Process 
Clause of the federal or Florida constitutions.  The majority concludes that sworn 
 
 
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proof is required, but does not pinpoint the source of this requirement.11  The 
majority does state that “due process requires that a probable cause petition filed 
pursuant to section 394.914 be supported by sworn proof.”  Majority op. at 6.  
Later in the opinion, however, the majority asserts that “the Legislature intended 
for the state attorney to swear to the facts contained in the petition,” majority op. at 
7 (emphasis added), and that “the Act requires the probable cause petition to be 
supported by sworn proof.”  Majority op. at 14 (emphasis added).  In an effort to 
resolve this ambiguity, I will separate my statutory analysis from my constitutional 
analysis. 
1.  The Statute 
We have repeatedly recognized that “the intent of the Legislature must guide 
our [statutory] analysis, and that intent must be determined primarily from the 
                                          
 
11. The district courts have also been ambiguous.  In the case below, the 
Fourth District concluded that “[d]etention after these individuals have finished 
serving their sentences is a serious deprivation of liberty, which cannot be allowed 
without proof in the form of some reliable individual’s personal knowledge.”  
Kephart v. Kearney, 826 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).  The reference to 
“serious deprivation of liberty” implies a constitutional holding, but the court’s 
subsequent analogies to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Florida 
Statutes are more easily explained as statutory interpretation.  Id.  Similarly, in 
Melvin v. State, 804 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), the case with which conflict 
was certified, the Second District attributed the requirement of a sworn petition 
both to due process and to the statute.  Id. at 463 (stating that “the legislature 
necessarily contemplated that the court would receive sworn proof,” but also that 
“the promise of due process would be hollow if it required merely that the judge 
search the commitment petition for the requisite allegations”). 
 
 
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language of the statute.”  Hale v. State, 891 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. 2004) (citing 
Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 1995)).  I see no 
evidence in the language of the Ryce Act that the Legislature intended for probable 
cause petitions to be sworn.  The relevant provision states that the state attorney 
“may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a sexually 
violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support such allegations.”  
§ 394.914, Fla. Stat. (2002).  The provision is silent about whether the state 
attorney must swear to those facts.  This silence strongly indicates that the 
Legislature did not intend to require the probable cause petition to be sworn.  Cf. 
Exceletech, Inc. v. Williams, 597 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 1992) (“[W]e find no 
requirement in the rules that the [interpleader] petition must be sworn to, and, if 
this is to be a requirement, it should be expressly set forth in the rules of civil 
procedure.”).  When the Legislature has wanted to require a sworn petition, it has 
said so.  See, e.g., § 194.011(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Such petition shall be sworn 
to by the petitioner.”); § 617.2006(3), Fla. Stat. (2004) (“[T]he articles of 
incorporation shall be accompanied by a petition, signed and sworn to by the 
subscribers . . . .”); § 741.30(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (“The sworn petition shall 
allege the existence of such domestic violence . . . .”); § 812.061(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2004) (“Such petition shall be under oath, sworn to by the petitioner . . . .”).  
 
 
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The Legislature may have decided not to require sworn petitions because 
other provisions in the Ryce Act seemed to address any due process concerns.  As 
we explained in Goode, “the Legislature intended that ordinarily the review 
process of potential sexual predators would be concluded while the person was still 
in prison.”  830 So. 2d at 825.  Under this framework, the petition ordinarily would 
not affect the length of the detention, thus reducing or eliminating the need for 
sworn proof.  The Legislature did recognize that, in some cases, extra detention 
would be required.  But rather than requiring a sworn petition to protect against 
improper detention, the Legislature provided for an adversarial probable cause 
hearing as a “fallback procedure” in such cases.  Goode, 830 So. 2d at 827; see 
§ 394.915(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Upon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence 
and before the release from custody . . . , but after the state attorney files a 
[probable cause] petition under s. 394.914, the court may conduct an adversarial 
probable cause hearing if it determines such hearing is necessary.”).   
Nothing in the Ryce Act itself requires probable cause petitions to be sworn.  
Therefore, any such requirement must derive from due process principles.  I read 
the majority opinion as reaching this same conclusion.  See majority op. at 6 
(“[D]ue process requires that a probable cause petition filed pursuant to section 
394.914 be supported by sworn proof.”).  Due process analysis would be 
superfluous if the statute itself required a sworn petition. 
 
 
- 23 - 
I now analyze whether and under what circumstances due process principles 
require a petition to be sworn. 
2.  The Due Process Clause 
Whether due process requires probable cause petitions to be sworn is 
obviously a separate question from whether the statute includes such a 
requirement.  See, e.g., Hollywood Jaycees v. State, 306 So. 2d 109, 112 (Fla. 
1974) (“Even though the statute is silent as to due process requisites, they are 
constitutionally implied.”).  The majority concludes that “[w]hen . . . fundamental 
liberty interests are at stake, the State at a minimum must be required to swear to 
the allegations made before the judge.”  Majority op. at 6.  I agree.  What the 
majority does not mention, though, and what I wish to clarify, is that fundamental 
liberty will not always be at stake. 
Not every probable cause petition filed under the Ryce Act represents the 
difference between freedom and confinement.  In fact, as I explained above, the 
Act is specifically designed so that the probable cause petition will be filed long 
before the offender’s anticipated release date, leaving enough time to hold the civil 
commitment trial during the offender’s sentence.  When this timeline is followed, 
the probable cause petition does not place “fundamental liberty interests at stake.”  
Majority op. at 6.  In such circumstances, the petition has no effect whatsoever on 
 
 
- 24 - 
the length of detention.  I recognize that, unfortunately, the timeline is often not 
followed.12  This fact, however, does not change the analysis. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that “‘[d]ue process’ . . . is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time.”  Cafeteria & 
Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).  Rather, 
“due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  When more 
is at stake, more procedural protection is due.  When less is at stake, less protection 
is due.  Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring an evidentiary 
hearing before termination of welfare benefits) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 341 (1976) (not requiring an evidentiary hearing before termination of Social 
Security disability benefits, in part because “[t]he potential deprivation here is 
generally likely to be less than in Goldberg”).  “The fundamental requirement of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.’”  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).   
                                          
 
12. We noted in Goode that “the overwhelming majority of the people 
currently in the system [in October 2002] are detainees awaiting trial after the 
expiration of their sentences.”  830 So. 2d at 825 n.7.  This appears still to be true.  
See Office of Economic & Demographic Research, Sexually Violent Predator 
Program, Time from Referral to DCF to Trial, available at 
http://www.myflorida.com/edr/conferences/criminaljustice/svpptime.pdf. 
 
 
- 25 - 
The issue of timing is significant in determining the due process rights of 
individuals detained in anticipation of civil commitment trials.  Some are detained 
during their sentences; others beyond them.  The difference is constitutionally 
crucial.  As the majority recognizes, when someone is being detained after a 
criminal sentence expires, the detainee’s “fundamental liberty interests are at 
stake.”  Due process requires some determination of probable cause for such a 
detention.  A sworn petition is a minimum requirement. 
But the inverse is also true: procedural concerns are less compelling when 
the individual would remain incarcerated even without the filing of a probable 
cause petition.  See Goode, 830 So. 2d at 826.  In such circumstances, the 
detainee’s freedom does not hang in the balance. 
A rigorous due process analysis must treat these different circumstances 
differently.  It may be true that, as a practical matter, the offender’s sentence 
almost always has expired, or will be expiring soon, by the time the state attorney 
files the petition.  Nevertheless, our constitutional holding should not extend 
beyond the circumstances that raise constitutional concerns. 
This case clearly involves fundamental liberty interests.  The petitioners 
were detained beyond the expiration of their sentences based solely on ex parte 
probable cause determinations.  See Kephart v. Kearney, 826 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2002) (stating that each petitioner was seeking “immediate release”).  
 
 
- 26 - 
The same was true in the case with which conflict was certified, where the 
probable cause petition was filed “[o]n the day [the offender] was scheduled to be 
released.”  Melvin v. State, 804 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).  Both courts 
emphasized that, but for the ex parte probable cause determinations, the offenders 
already would have been released from custody.  See Kephart, 826 So. 2d at 519; 
Melvin, 804 So. 2d at 463.   
The majority understandably focuses on this post-sentence posture.  See 
majority op. at 9 (referring to cases where the State “hold[s] a soon-to-be-released 
prisoner beyond the expiration of his or her sentence”); id. at 13 (referring to 
“cases where a prisoner is detained beyond the expiration of his or her sentence”).  
However, some of the statements in the majority opinion seem to reach beyond 
these facts and perhaps even beyond the post-sentence context.  For example, the 
majority states without exception that “the Act requires the probable cause petition 
to be supported by sworn proof.”  Majority op. at 14.  Elsewhere, the majority 
broadly states that “due process requires that a probable cause petition filed 
pursuant to section 394.914 be supported by sworn proof.”  Majority op. at 6. 
I do not agree that due process always requires a probable cause petition to 
be sworn.  Due process requires a sworn petition only when the petition itself will 
result in confinement beyond the prescribed sentence.  See majority op. at 12 
(“[S]erious due process concerns are implicated when . . . the filing of the petition 
 
 
- 27 - 
causes an individual to remain incarcerated beyond his or her sentence.”).  Due 
process protections are triggered when the government deprives an individual of 
“life, liberty, or property.”  Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; amend. XIV, U.S. Const.  A 
petition filed while the offender is serving a criminal sentence, and which will not 
itself extend the sentence, causes no loss of liberty.  At that point, the filing of a 
petition is just another procedural step toward a civil commitment trial.  The trial 
itself will provide the required due process.  As long as the offender’s prison 
sentence has not yet expired and will not expire before that trial, I would hold that 
the circuit court constitutionally may determine probable cause ex parte based on 
an unsworn petition, and may proceed to trial. 
 
I recognize that this distinction may be of limited practical value.  If state 
attorneys are required to file a sworn petition some of the time, they may decide to 
file sworn petitions all of the time to avoid possible problems with sentences about 
to expire.  Nevertheless, I believe it important to be analytically rigorous when 
determining what is constitutionally required, as opposed to what is merely 
desirable. 
 
For these reasons, I would hold that due process requires a petition for civil 
commitment to be sworn only when filing the petition will result in the offender’s 
confinement beyond the expiration of a criminal sentence, as happened in this case. 
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
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Two Cases Consolidated: 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case Nos. 4D01-5056; 4D02-33; 4D02-192 
 
 
(Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee and St. Lucie Counties) 
 
Diamond R. Litty, Public Defender and Russell L. Akins, Assistant Public 
Defender, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Fort Pierce, Florida and Juan F. Torres, III 
of Blake, Torres and Mildner, P.A., Fort Pierce, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners/Respondents 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Richard L. Polin, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents/Petitioners