Title: Commonwealth v. Minor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 030401
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
v. Record No. 030401  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  January 16, 2004 
KURVYN DARNELL MINOR 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant, who 
was indicted for offenses against three victims occurring 
on three different dates, should have been granted separate 
trials for the offenses allegedly committed against each 
victim.  We conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the 
charges because evidence of the other crimes was not 
relevant to the only contested issue, whether each victim 
did or did not consent to sexual intercourse.  We will 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
which reversed the trial court’s judgment and the 
defendant’s convictions. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
 
The defendant, Kurvyn Darnell Minor, was charged with 
14 offenses that arose out of three separate incidents 
involving three different victims.  First, he was charged 
with the April 3, 2000, abduction of C.M. and use of a 
firearm in the commission of that felony.  Second, he was 
charged with the April 13, 2000 abduction, rape, robbery, 
oral sodomy, attempted anal sodomy, credit card theft, and 
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, all against 
W.S.  Third, the defendant was charged with the September 
30, 2000, abduction, rape, robbery, oral sodomy, and anal 
sodomy of G.C. 
 
Minor filed a motion to sever the charges, asking that 
he be tried separately for the offenses related to each 
victim.  He asserted that evidence admissible in the trial 
of the charges involving one victim would not be relevant 
to the other offenses involving different victims.  The 
Commonwealth opposed the defendant’s motion and moved for 
joinder of the charges in a single trial.  In a memorandum 
in support of its motion for joinder, the Commonwealth 
stated that, “[i]n the present case, modus operandi, 
opportunity, relationship to the victims, absence of 
mistake or accident and interconnection of the offenses are 
all relevant to the trial of these three cases.”  The 
Commonwealth also stated that “[t]he place of attack, the 
type of victim, the method of transportation, the topics of 
conversation and other factors are sufficiently 
idiosyncratic to permit an inference of pattern or purpose 
for proof showing a common predator or common modus 
operandi.” 
 
2
 
At a hearing on the parties’ motions, the Commonwealth 
admitted that there was no dispute regarding the identity 
of the perpetrator in the charged offenses.  Despite that 
admission, the Commonwealth stated that the evidence of 
other crimes was admissible “to show that the defendant’s 
modus operandi was the same.”  The defendant, however, 
suggested that the only contested issue was whether the 
victims consented to sexual intercourse.  Defense counsel 
acknowledged that Minor had admitted, in a statement to the 
police, that he knew these women and had contact with them, 
including sexual intercourse.  Defense counsel then stated, 
“I don’t think that it’s going to be the Commonwealth’s 
position necessarily that on the issue of whether it was 
consensual or not that there was — there’s something so 
unique that occurred between the women that [the 
Commonwealth] would need to try all the cases on the same 
day in order to present that issue.”  The Commonwealth did 
not disagree with that statement. 
The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for 
joinder of the indictments for trial, finding that joinder 
was proper under Rule 3A:10(c).  At trial, Minor did not 
testify.  The court instructed the jury on the issue of 
consent only with regard to the victim identified as W.S.  
That instruction stated: 
 
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Consent by [W.S.] is an absolute bar to a 
conviction of rape.  However, consent, once 
given, may be withdrawn prior to sexual 
intercourse.  If after consideration of all of 
the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether [W.S.] consented to have intercourse with 
the defendant, then you shall find him not 
guilty. 
 
 
The jury convicted Minor of three counts of abduction; 
two counts each of rape, oral sodomy, and robbery; and one 
count each of anal sodomy, attempted anal sodomy, credit 
card theft, and use of a firearm in the commission of 
abduction.  The jury fixed Minor’s total punishment for 
these convictions at two life sentences plus 113 years 
imprisonment.  The trial court, however, struck the charge 
of attempted anal sodomy and reduced the defendant’s 
sentence to 108 years plus two life sentences. 
 
Minor appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court 
of Appeals.  In an unpublished opinion reversing the 
judgment of the trial court, the Court of Appeals held 
that, under Rule 3A:10(c), justice required separate trials 
because “[n]either the number of alleged victims nor the 
strength of similarities between or among the offenses has 
any bearing on the admissibility of evidence of other 
offenses where, as here, the only issue genuinely in 
dispute is whether the acts were consensual or forcible.”  
Minor v. Commonwealth, No. 3105-01-2, slip op. at 11 (Dec. 
 
4
31, 2002).  The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
 
The three incidents at issue occurred in the late 
evening to early morning hours on the respective dates 
alleged in the indictments.  Minor approached each 
pedestrian victim within the same relative area on the 
north side of the City of Richmond and identified himself 
as “Kevin Wilkinson” to C.M. and as “Kevin” to W.S.  He 
offered each one a ride in his vehicle, which C.M. and W.S. 
willingly accepted by getting into Minor’s vehicle.  
Although G.C. initially accepted Minor’s offer of a ride to 
her home, she refused to get into his car when Minor told 
her that he wanted to take her to his house.  At that 
point, Minor pulled out a knife, held it to G.C.’s throat, 
made her get into his vehicle, and told her that he was 
going to rape her. 
 
After each victim got into his vehicle, whether 
willingly or otherwise, Minor drove along Interstate 95, 
taking each victim to a secluded area in Hanover County.  
Minor took C.M. and W.S. to a location near a church, and 
he took G.C. to a wooded area about a mile away from the 
same church. 
 
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C.M. testified that, as she and Minor traveled to 
Hanover County, they discussed “getting together, having 
sexual performance or act, and I, you know, didn’t mind at 
that particular time.”  She further testified that she and 
Minor agreed to stop at a gasoline station, where she 
purchased a condom using Minor’s money.  According to C.M., 
Minor then told her “that he wanted anal sex.”  At that 
point, C.M. objected, “I said no, that’s okay.  I change my 
mind.  I don’t want to do that.”  C.M. testified that 
Minor’s “whole tone and attitude just change[d]” then and 
“his voice [got] real harsh and nasty.” 
 
When Minor stopped his vehicle near the church, he 
took the keys out of the ignition and went back to the 
trunk of the vehicle.  As he started to reenter the 
vehicle, C.M. “jumped out” and went over by the church.  
Minor then drove away “real fast” but suddenly stopped, 
backed up, and told C.M. that he was not going to leave her 
there.  He ordered C.M. to get back into the vehicle, but 
she refused.  Minor pointed an “object out of the car that 
look[ed] like a gun,” and C.M. started running behind the 
church.  As she ran, C.M. heard a sound “[l]ike a 
firecracker or a pop.” 
 
When W.S. got in Minor’s car, he offered her $100 
“[t]o have some sex.”  W.S. agreed and testified that, as 
 
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they were driving along, Minor was “a very nice, very nice 
guy.”  However, W.S. stated that “all of a sudden on the 
interstate, he started getting — attitude start[ed] 
changing, . . . he really was getting very forceful 
. . . .”  According to W.S., Minor forced her to perform 
oral sodomy on him while he was driving on the interstate. 
 
Minor stopped his vehicle in the middle of a road near 
the church.  W.S. testified that they had vaginal sexual 
intercourse in the front seat of the vehicle and that she 
did so because she was scared.  Minor also attempted to 
have anal sodomy with W.S.  Eventually, Minor drove to 
another location where he pulled out a gun and pointed it 
at W.S.’s head, telling her not to scream.  W.S. then 
opened the passenger door, and as she was trying to exit 
the vehicle, Minor grabbed her purse, which contained her 
identification and a credit card.  He then drove away.  In 
the early morning hours of April 13, 2000, Minor attempted 
to use that credit card three times at two different 
automatic teller machines. 
 
After Minor made G.C. get into his car, he drove along 
Interstate 95 and stopped in a wooded area.  According to 
G.C., Minor dragged her out of his vehicle with a knife 
held to her throat and then took her back to the vehicle 
where he started removing her clothes.  G.C. testified that 
 
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Minor forced her to engage in acts of vaginal intercourse, 
oral sodomy, and anal sodomy, while “poking” her with the 
knife or “bang[ing]” her head on the vehicle.  Minor drove 
off, leaving G.C. in the woods and taking most of her 
clothes, her cellular telephone, a pager, and approximately 
$40 in cash. 
 
Evidence established that, during a traffic stop in 
May 2000, a police officer seized a handgun from Minor.  
That seizure took place after the first two incidents at 
issue had transpired but before the third one occurred. 
ANALYSIS 
 
It is well established in our jurisprudence that 
evidence of other offenses is generally not admissible to 
prove guilt of the crime for which a defendant is presently 
on trial.  See Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 142, 
314 S.E.2d 371, 383 (1984); Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
72, 76, 278 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1981); Eccles v. Commonwealth, 
214 Va. 20, 22, 197 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1973).  This is so 
because “[s]uch evidence implicating an accused in other 
crimes unrelated to the charged offense . . . may confuse 
the issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the 
defendant.”  Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 
S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998).  There are, however, some 
recognized exceptions to this general principle: 
 
8
“Evidence of other offenses is admitted if 
it shows the conduct and feeling of the accused 
toward [the] victim . . . or if it tends to prove 
any relevant element of the offense charged.  
Such evidence is permissible in cases where the 
motive, intent or knowledge of the accused is 
involved, or where the evidence is connected with 
or leads up to the offense for which the accused 
is on trial.  Also, testimony of other crimes is 
admissible where the other crimes constitute a 
part of the general scheme of which the crime 
charged is a part.” 
 
Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 230, 421 S.E.2d 821, 
828 (1992) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 
269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970)); accord Scates v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 757, 761, 553 S.E.2d 756, 759 (2001); 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 645, 651, 529 S.E.2d 787, 
790-91 (2000).  For such evidence to be admissible under 
one of these exceptions, the legitimate probative value of 
the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.  Guill, 
255 Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 491-92; Satcher, 244 Va. at 
231, 421 S.E.2d at 828. 
 
The question whether an accused, pursuant to Rule 
3A:10(c), can be tried in a single trial for all offenses 
then pending against that defendant is a matter resting 
within a trial court’s sound discretion.  Cheng v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 33, 393 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1990) 
(citing Fincher v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 552, 553, 186 
S.E.2d 75, 76 (1972); Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 
 
9
315, 53 S.E.2d 54, 56 (1949)).  Thus, on appeal, a trial 
court’s decision to join different offenses for trial will 
not be reversed absent a showing that the court abused its 
discretion.  Cheng, 240 Va. at 33-34, 393 S.E.2d at 603. 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether “justice” required 
separate trials under Rule 3A:10(c).  To resolve that 
issue, we must determine whether evidence showing the 
defendant’s rape of one victim was relevant to prove that a 
different victim did not consent to sexual intercourse.  
The only contested issue identified at the hearing on the 
defendant’s motion to sever the charges was whether the 
victims consented.  Similarly, the Court of Appeals stated 
that “the only issue genuinely in dispute [was] whether the 
acts were consensual or forcible.” 1  Minor, No. 3105-01-2, 
slip op. at 11. 
 
Before answering that evidentiary question, we must 
clarify one matter with regard to a defendant’s intent to 
commit the crime of rape vis-à-vis a victim’s lack of 
consent to sexual intercourse.  The Commonwealth never 
articulated at trial exactly to what relevant issues the 
evidence of other crimes pertained.  However, the 
Commonwealth maintains on appeal that such evidence was 
 
10
admissible to show the defendant’s intent and thus the 
victims’ lack of consent to sexual intercourse.  In its 
argument, the Commonwealth seems to equate those two 
issues.  For example, the Commonwealth states on brief, 
“Simply put, the other crimes evidence here showed the 
defendant’s intent, in each instance, to force the victim 
to submit to sexual contacts of various sorts, regardless 
of the victim’s wishes.”  In discussing the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in this case, the Commonwealth asserts 
that “the Court of Appeals has established a rule of law 
that prohibits the introduction of other crimes evidence in 
rape cases when the principal issue to be resolved is 
whether the sexual act was consensual.”  But, in the same 
paragraph, the Commonwealth states that the decision in 
Moore “clearly holds that other crimes evidence is 
admissible on the issue of intent.” 
 
However, a defendant’s intent to commit the crime of 
rape is not the same issue as whether a victim consented to 
sexual intercourse.  Those two issues are distinct and 
should not be blurred. 
Although proof of rape requires proof of 
intent, the required intent is established upon 
proof that the accused knowingly and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
1  On appeal to this Court, neither party challenged 
the scope of the contested issue addressed by the Court of 
Appeals. 
 
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intentionally committed the acts constituting the 
elements of rape.  The elements of rape . . . 
consist of engaging in sexual intercourse with 
the victim, against her will, by force, threat, 
or intimidation.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Clifton v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 178, 184, 468 S.E.2d 
155, 158 (1996); see also, People v. Mangiaracina, 424 
N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[W]hether the 
defendant intended to commit the offenses without the 
victim’s consent is not relevant, the critical question 
being whether the victim did, in fact, consent.  This 
involves her mental state, not the defendant’s.”); 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 464 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Mass. 1984) (the 
crime of rape does not require proof that the defendant 
harbored a “specific intent that the intercourse be without 
consent”); State v. Ayer, 612 A.2d 923, 925 (N.H. 1992) 
(Rape is generally considered to be “a general intent, 
rather than a specific intent, crime. . . . [T]he general 
intent requirement for rape means that ‘no intent is 
requisite other than that evidenced by the doing of the 
acts constituting the offense.’”) (citations omitted).  The 
issue of a victim’s consent pertains to the element of rape 
requiring proof that sexual intercourse was against the 
victim’s will, not to whether a defendant “knowingly and 
intentionally committed” the acts constituting rape.  
Clifton, 22 Va. App. at 184, 468 S.E.2d at 158. 
 
12
 
We now turn to the dispositive evidentiary question.  
In doing so, we recognize that evidence showing that a 
defendant committed similar sexual offenses against an 
individual other than the victim in a particular case is, 
on occasion, admissible to prove certain contested matters, 
such as a defendant’s identity or the attitude of a 
defendant toward a victim, provided the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  See 
Satcher, 244 Va. at 231, 421 S.E.2d at 828.  Indeed, if the 
evidence of other similar offenses had been offered as 
proof on a contested issue about the defendant’s identity 
in these offenses, that evidence would likely have been 
admissible. 
 
In fact, this Court reached that exact result in 
Satcher, a case in which the defendant denied committing 
the crimes and identity was an issue.  Satcher was 
convicted in one trial of the robbery, assault and battery, 
and attempted rape of Deborah Abel; and the robbery, rape, 
and capital murder of Ann Elizabeth Borghesani.  Id. at 
225, 421 S.E.2d at 824.  We upheld the trial court’s denial 
of Satcher’s motion for separate trials.  Id. at 229, 421 
S.E.2d at 827.  We stated that the evidence of the Abel 
offenses would have been admissible in a separate trial for 
the Borghesani offenses because that evidence established 
 
13
Satcher as the assailant in both crimes.  Id. at 229-30, 
421 S.E.2d at 827; see also Turner, 259 Va. at 651, 529 
S.E.2d at 790-91 (evidence of similar offenses involving 
different victims was admissible to prove a common 
perpetrator); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 89, 393 
S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990) (same); Hewston v. Commonwealth, 18 
Va. App. 409, 412, 444 S.E.2d 267, 268-69 (1994) (same); 
cf. Herron v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 326, 327-28, 157 S.E.2d 
195, 196-97 (1967) (evidence of other incidents of sexual 
intercourse with the same victim was admissible to show the 
defendant’s disposition with respect to the particular act 
charged). 
Also, in Moore, a case discussed at length by the 
Commonwealth on brief, we approved the admission of 
evidence concerning a sexual offense against a third party 
but not for the purpose of proving the victim’s lack of 
consent.  There, the defendant was charged both with 
enticing a male child under the age of 14 to enter a house 
for the purpose of fondling or feeling the sexual or 
genital parts of the child and with the actual fondling of 
that child.  222 Va. at 73, 278 S.E.2d at 823.  The 
challenged testimony concerned the defendant’s subsequent 
attempted homosexual act upon the third party, also a teen-
ager.  That subsequent offense occurred at the defendant’s 
 
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office when the victim and the third party were both 
present.  During that encounter, the defendant described 
homosexual acts he had performed with other boys, offered 
the victim and the third party money to engage in similar 
acts with him, pulled down the third party’s pants, told 
the victim to hold the third party, and attempted to 
perform a sexual act upon the third party.  Id. at 75, 278 
S.E.2d at 824.  Although the evidence involved an offense 
against a third party, we noted that it also concerned the 
victim and “showed the conduct or attitude of the defendant 
toward [the victim], indicated the ongoing nature of their 
relationship, and negated the possibility that the 
defendant’s touching of [the victim] in the [prior] 
incident was accidental or for a purpose misunderstood by 
[the victim].”  Id. at 77, 278 S.E.2d at 825. 
In our view, evidence showing that a defendant raped 
one or more individuals other than the victim in the crime 
charged is generally not relevant to the question whether 
that victim did or did not consent to sexual intercourse 
with the defendant.  This is so because “[t]he fact that 
one woman was raped . . . has no tendency to prove that 
another woman did not consent.”  Lovely v. United States, 
169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948); accord Foster v. 
Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 316, 320, 362 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Va. 
 
15
Ct. App. 1987); see also Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 
379 (Ind. 1984) (where the only issue was consent of the 
prosecutrix, evidence of prior rapes was not admissible 
because the fact that one woman was raped did not tend to 
prove that another woman did not consent); State v. 
Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 847  (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) 
(“[n]either . . . does one woman’s lack of consent to 
intercourse with a man imply a different woman’s lack of 
consent to intercourse with the same man”); State v. 
Hatcher, 372 So.2d 1024, 1034 n.1 (La. 1979) (in a 
prosecution for rape where the only issue is consent, 
“[t]he lack of consent by other victims is not probative of 
lack of consent by the complainant of the charged 
offense”); State v. Alsteen, 324 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Wis. 
1982) (evidence of defendant’s prior acts had no probative 
value on the issue of the complainant’s consent because 
“[c]onsent is unique to the individual”); cf. Winfield v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 211, 218, 301 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1983) 
(“there is no logical connection between a woman’s 
willingness to submit to the defendant accused of raping 
her, and her willingness to share intimacies with another 
man with whom she might have had a special relationship”). 
As the court in Lovely explained, “evidence of other 
similar offenses is held admissible for the purpose of 
 
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establishing intent in cases of assault with the intent to 
commit rape . . . , and evidence of other offenses of like 
character is admissible in prosecutions for crime involving 
a depraved sexual instinct.”  169 F.2d at 390.  However, 
the court observed that “the overwhelming weight of 
authority is that such evidence is not admissible in 
prosecution for rape” for obvious reasons.2  Id.  “Other 
attempts to ravish have a tendency to show that an assault 
under investigation was made with like intent.  Acts 
showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances which 
with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect an 
accused with a crime of that character.”  Id.  But, as 
already noted, the issue of consent concerns a victim’s 
state of mind and is unique with regard to each individual 
victim.3
                                                          
 
2  We recognize that the decision in Lovely predates 
the adoption of Fed. R. Evid. 413.  However, that rule 
states that evidence of a defendant’s commission of similar 
sexual offenses is admissible and “may be considered for 
its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
3  The Commonwealth argued on brief that the Court of 
Appeals’ reliance on the decision in Lovely was misplaced 
because of the later decision of the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414 (4th 
Cir. 1981).  We do not agree.  In Beahm, the court approved 
the admission of testimony from two male witnesses, neither 
of whom was a victim in the case being tried.  That 
testimony showed that the defendant had made sexual 
advances to them within three years prior to the offenses 
 
17
Based on the specific circumstances presented in this 
case, we hold, as did the Court of Appeals, that “the 
testimony of each victim . . . was inadmissible at the 
trial for the offenses allegedly committed against each of 
the other victims.”4  Minor, No. 3105-01-2, slip op. at 11.  
For that reason, we conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever 
the charges and will therefore affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
at issue.  The evidence was admissible because the 
“defendant was insisting that under the Virginia statute 
the burden was on the government to show that defendant’s 
acts were performed with lascivious intent and did not 
occur by accident.”  Id. at 417.  The evidence was not 
admitted to prove whether the victim consented. 
 
 
4  As the Court of Appeals noted, it is not necessary 
to decide whether the charged offenses satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 3A:6(b) because “justice” required 
separate trials.  Rule 3A:10(c). 
 
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