Title: MATTHEW ISERAL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2001-SC-000602-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2003

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREPROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED AS AUTHORITYINANY OTHER CASE INANY COURTOF THIS STATE. a supreum (gourf of ~Rtttfu~k 2001-SC-0602-MR MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED MATTHEW ISERAL APPELLANT APPEAL FROM McCREARY CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, JUDGE McCREARY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CR-0038-2 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE AFFIRMING, IN PART, AND REVERSING_ AND REMANDIN G, IN PART A jury of the McCreary Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Matthew Iseral, for the crimes of murder and first-degree rape . The Commonwealth sought the death penalty for Appellant ; however, the jury recommended sentences of fifty years for the murder and twenty years for the rape, the court fixing each sentence to run concurrently . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . On June 8, 2000, police discovered a shallow grave in McCreary County containing the remains of T .D . Testimony at trial described the events surrounding T .D .'s final hours progressing from her rape to her eventual murder on July 29, 1999 . She began the evening innocently enough, visiting area bars in the company of a friend . 2001-SC-0602-MR MATTHEW ISERAL APPELLANT APPEAL FROM McCREARY CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, JUDGE McCREARY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CR-0038-2 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ,$ixptr Court of ~~xcfur.~~rr AFFIRMING, IN PART, AND REVERSING AND REMANDING, IN PART A jury of the McCreary Circuit Court convicted Appellant, Matthew Iseral, for the crimes of murder and first-degree rape . The Commonwealth sought the death penalty for Appellant ; however, the jury recommended sentences of fifty years for the murder and twenty years for the rape, the court fixing each sentence to run concurrently . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . On June 8, 2000, police discovered a shallow grave in McCreary County containing the remains of T . D . Testimony at trial described the events surrounding T.D.'s final hours progressing from her rape to her eventual murder on July 29, 1999 . She began the evening innocently enough, visiting area bars in the company of a friend . As night advanced into early morning, however, T.D . found herself on the darkened porch of a burned out house and at the mercy of several men, including Appellant, his father Walter Iseral, and Daniel Tapley . The Commonwealth indicted each of these three men for repeatedly raping T.D . while they sat about the porch drinking and taking pills . Following these attacks the men trundled their victim, naked but for a sleeping bag wrapped around her, deep into the woods where she was raped once again . An eyewitness described his incredulity as he watched Appellant next lead the victim to a newly dug grave into which she silently laid herself down . Appellant then pulled back the hammer of his sawed-off shotgun and killed T.D . I . Surprise Testimony During pretrial conference on the first day of trial, the Commonwealth's Attorney disclosed that he had just learned of self-incriminating statements allegedly made by Appellant . According to the Commonwealth, earlier that morning a teary-eyed Daniel Crabtree, Appellant's cousin and a potential prosecution witness, revealed what may best be described as Appellant's confession to T.D .'s murder . In light of the potential evidentiary problems associated with such newly-discovered evidence, the trial court severed Appellant's trial from that of his co-defendants, but denied Appellant's motion for a continuance . Appellant now complains that he required additional time to investigate Crabtree's background in order to prepare for the cross-examination of this prosecution witness . Whether a continuance is warranted depends on the unique circumstances of each case . Ungar v . Sarafite , 376 U .S . 575, 589, 84 S .Ct . 841, 850, 11 L.Ed .2d 921, 931 (1964) . In keeping with Ungar , we have developed a number of factors for trial courts to consider when making this decision, including : the length of delay, the number of prior continuances granted, the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court, which party caused the delay, the availability of other competent counsel, the complexity of the case and finally whether denying the continuance would lead to identifiable prejudice . Snodgrass v . Commonwealth , Ky., 814 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1991) . The trial court had originally scheduled December 19, 2000, for the start of trial for Appellant, his father and Daniel Tapley . Courthouse renovations forced the court to push back this date some four months . When the morning of trial finally arrived, the court faced the possibility of continuing not one, but up to three separate trials, since Appellant and his two co-defendants were originally slated to stand trial together . Although Appellant was not responsible for this disruption in the court calendar, a continuance of all three cases would likely have caused substantial inconvenience for the court, counsel and witnesses . Weighing in favor of Appellant's continuance request is the fact that he faced the death penalty, a situation which magnified the complexity of his defense . See Eldred v . Commonwealth , Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694, 700 (1994), cert . denied 516 U .S . 1154 (1996) . Nonetheless, defense counsel had ample time for preparation, thanks in no small part to the courthouse renovation delay . In addition, defense counsel was not caught completely unaware of Crabtree's relation to this case, since counsel had previously furnished this potential witness to the prosecution . Defense counsels' preparation was evident at trial, for they elicited substantial evidence to impeach the credibility of Crabtree . This included the testimony of Crabtree's mother, who contradicted key portions of her son's testimony . Simply because counsel was able to point out weaknesses in Crabtree's testimony, however, is not dispositive on the issue of whether Appellant had the opportunity to adequately research Crabtree's background . As we opined in Eldred , "a defendant cannot be made subject to the `Catch 22' argument that he got enough investigation in the time available to obviate the need for a continuance, since such an argument begs the question of whether a continuance was actually appropriate ." Id . at 700 . Unlike the defendant in Eldred , though, Appellant does not point to any significant avenues of investigation which were foreclosed by the trial court's denial of a continuance . Appellant suggests he did not have time to research Crabtree's alleged criminal history and AWOL status from the military . Further, Appellant claims he was unable to investigate Crabtree's possible relation to the anonymous phone calls made to the police which led to the discovery of T.D .'s body and Appellant's eventual arrest . Although the record is silent regarding military offenses, at trial defense counsel questioned Crabtree about his drug use and involvement in criminal activity . Appellant has failed to demonstrate how further investigation of Crabtree's involvement in drugs and crime could have aided in the impeachment of his testimony . In regards to the identities of the anonymous callers, separate testimony generally described them as a male and a female who refused to give their names . Appellant has not explained what special factors necessitated a continuance in order to investigate Crabtree's particular relationship with these callers, since defense counsel had adequate time before trial to look into this evidence as it related to all other prosecution witnesses . A defendant must show sufficient cause in order for a court to grant a continuance . RCr 9.04 . In this case, Appellant has demonstrated that the last minute disclosure was dramatic, but little else . The decision of whether or not to grant a continuance remains within the sound discretion of the trial court . Woodall v . Commonwealth , Ky., 63 S .W.3d 104 (2001) ; Dishman v . Commonwealth , Ky., 906 S.W.2d 335 (1995) ; Snodgrass , supra , at 581 . We find no abuse of this discretion, and the trial court's ruling will not be reversed . II . Evidence of Bias Appellant claims he was improperly denied the opportunity to establish the bias of two prosecution witnesses . Appellant theorizes that his attempts to protect his aunt from harm by these two witnesses generated hostility that caused these individuals to slant their testimony . However, on both occasions that Appellant tried to elicit evidence relating to the potential bias of these witnesses, the trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objections on the grounds of relevancy . We have long held "that any evidence of a witness' bias, hostility, or interest is germane to the question of the [sic] credibility and should be presented to the jury." Barrett v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 608 S .W.2d 374, 376 (1980), citing Campbell v . Commonwealth , 234 Ky . 552, 28 S .W.2d 790 (1930) ; Holt v . Commonwealth , Ky., 259 S .W .2d 463 (1953) . Nonetheless, trial judges retain wide latitude to limit the scope and extent of cross-examination . Moore v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 771 S .W.2d 34 (1988), cert . denied , 494 U .S . 1060 (1990) ; Parsley v . Commonwealth , Ky., 306 S.W.2d 284 (1957) . After reviewing the trial transcripts, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting cross-examination, because Appellant failed to clearly establish the relevance of the excluded testimony . For example, when cross-examining one prosecution witness, counsel for Appellant bluntly asked, "Did you ever beat your mother up?" In sustaining the Commonwealth's objection to this question, the trial judge had no indication from counsel, nor from the prior testimony, that the question was an effort to portray the witness as biased against Appellant . Similarly, the court later prevented Appellant's aunt from answering the question, "Was there ever an occasion that you suffered any abuse by [prosecution witness] McDonald?" Admittedly, counsel for Appellant briefly explained, out of hearing of the jurors, how the answer to this question could convey the alleged bias of the witness . But counsel also argued that this testimony was relevant to show the witness had engaged in a general pattern of abuse toward women . After admitting the essential facts establishing bias, a trial court may "impose reasonable limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness, to take account of such factors as `harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant ."' Olden v . Kentucky , 488 U .S . 227, 232, 109 S . Ct . 480, 483, 102 L . Ed . 2d 513 (1988) quoting Delaware v . Van Arsdall , 475 U.S . 673, 679, 106 S . Ct . 1431, 1435, 89 L . Ed . 2d 674 (1986) . See also Weaver v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (1997) . Counsel skipped over the most basic evidence of bias and instead chose to focus solely on the witnesses' abusive behavior . Viewed alone, this alleged behavior had little relevance to this case . Appellant introduced no other evidence supporting his theory of bias, therefore the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this testimony . 1111 . Violation of Separation Order On the third day of trial, counsel for Appellant attempted to call Mildred Coffey to the witness stand for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of her son, Ben Coffey . As a prosecution witness, Ben had earlier identified the suspected murder weapon, a now-rusty shotgun, as the same firearm he had loaned to Appellant . Because Mildred was present in the courtroom during her son's testimony, in violation of the court's order to separate all witnesses, the trial court prevented her from testifying . Appellant claims the trial judge abused his discretion in two ways : first, by failing to consider the effect Ms . Coffey's presence in the courtroom would have on her potential testimony ; and second, by refusing to allow Ms . Coffey to testify by avowal . The complementary provisions of RCr 9.48 and KRE 615 govern the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom . These rules help to prevent a witness from adapting her testimony to conform with those who have already testified . See Mills v . Commonwealth , Ky., 95 S .W.3d 838, 840-841 (2003) ; Jacobs v . Commonwealth , Ky., 551 S.W.2d 223, 225 (1977) . While exclusion under these rules is now mandatory upon the request of a party, see Mills , supra, at 841, a witness who fails to comply with a separation order is not automatically prohibited from testifying . Jones v . Commonwealth , Ky., 623 S.W.2d 226 (1981) ; Jacobs , supra, at 225 . Upon discovering that a witness has violated a separation order, a trial judge has broad discretion to determine whether or not to allow the witness to testify . Jones , supra , at 227 . Among the factors that we have suggested a trial judge weigh are the length of time the proposed witness has been in the courtroom and the content of the witness' proposed testimony . Ballard v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 743 S .W .2d 21, 21-22 (1988) . A trial judge may also consider the failure of counsel to enforce a separation rule, a rule which they may have requested . Jones , su ra, at 227 . After reviewing the record, we find that the trial judge did in fact delve into the circumstances surrounding Ms . Coffey's proposed testimony . The court learned Ms . Coffey had been present during the testimony of her son, and that she had observed the trial for several days . The trial judge also questioned defense counsel and Ms. Coffey regarding the content of her proposed testimony . Finally, the judge noted that the separation order was requested by both Appellant and the Commonwealth . After gathering this information, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by precluding the testimony of Ms . Coffey . We likewise decline to reverse because the trial court refused to permit Ms . Coffey to testify by avowal . In Cain v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 554 S .W.2d 369, 375 (1977), we stated that "without an avowal to show what a witness would have said an appellate court has no basis for determining whether an error in excluding his proffered testimony was prejudicial." There is no need in this appeal to reach the issue of prejudice, because we have already concluded that the trial court did not err by excluding Ms . Coffey's testimony at trial . Therefore, we consider any error in preventing the avowal testimony of this witness harmless . IV . Motion for Directed Verdict Appellant claims the trial court erred by summarily denying his motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree rape charge . In Commonwealth v . Benham , Ky ., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991), we set forth our appellate standard of review for this matter : "if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Id . Appellant posits that the eyewitness to the rape lacked credibility, and that no direct evidence proved the rape actually occurred . Appellant ignores that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give to the evidence are matters for the jury to decide . Estep v . Commonwealth , Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 194 (1997) ; Benham , supra , at 187 . The Commonwealth presented more than ample evidence for reasonable jurors to conclude that Appellant raped T .D . . The evidence introduced at trial included : an eyewitness account of the multiple instances of sexual intercourse between T.D ., Appellant, and his two co-defendants on the night of her murder ; a statement by the victim telling Appellant to stop intercourse ; and the subsequent shooting and burial of T.D., an apparent attempt to destroy evidence of the rape . We therefore find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion for directed verdict . V . Consciousness of Innocence While awaiting trial at the McCreary County jail, Appellant alerted authorities to two jailbreaks rather than taking the opportunity to escape himself. Defense witnesses were prepared to testify to these events, however the trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the introduction of this evidence on relevancy grounds . Appellant argues that the trial court erred by excluding this evidence, which he claims reveals a "consciousness of innocence." It has been long established that flight, resisting arrest and escape from custody are admissible to show a "consciousness of guilt." Commonwealth v. Howard , Ky ., 287 S .W.2d 926 (1956) ; Fallis v . Commonwealth , 197 Ky . 313, 247 S .W . 22 (1923) ; Clark v . Commonwealth , 17 Ky . L . Rptr. 540, 32 S .W . 131 (1895) ; Basham v . Commonwealth , 87 Ky . 440, 9 S .W . 284, (1888) . "Flight and attempt at concealment are circumstantial evidence of guilt, because they suggest a guilty state of mind ." Fu, ante v_ . Commonwealth , Ky ., 445 S .W.2d 675, 681 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v . Sawhill , Ky ., 660 S.W .2d 3 (1983) . In contrast, attempts to justify the probative value of "consciousness of innocence" testimony have been met with skepticism . See Grubbs v. Commonwealth , 240 Ky . 473, 42 S .W.2d 702 (1931) ; Chittenden v. State , 436 N .E.2d 86 (Ind . 1982) ; People v . Montgomery , 53 Cal . 576 (1879) . Wigmore stands somewhat alone by arguing in favor of admitting this type of testimony : 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 293 (Chadbourn rev . 1979) . Id . at 477. Let the accused's whole conduct come in ; and whether it tells for consciousness of guilt or for consciousness of innocence, let us take it for what it is worth, remembering that in either case it is open to varying explanations and is not to be emphasized . Let us not deprive an innocent person, falsely accused, of the inference which common sense draws from a consciousness of innocence and its natural manifestations . Equally sound reasoning, and the precedent of an earlier Kentucky decision, supports the ruling of the trial judge in the present matter to exclude Appellant's "consciousness of innocence" testimony . In Grubbs , the defendant, like Appellant, refused to escape during a general jailbreak . Id . at 476 . Our predecessor Court reasoned : What appellant's motive was in refusing to escape we cannot tell . It may have been that he preferred to take the chances of a trial, or that he was deterred from going by the fear of capture and the effect that it would have on the jury . But whatever may have been his motive, his conduct was wholly self-serving, and was not admissible either to prove his innocence or to overcome the effect of his flight immediately after the homicide . Appellant relies upon the slightly more recent Kentucky decision, Patton v. Commonwealth , 289 Ky . 771, 160 S.W.2d 180 (1942), to bolster his claim that the jailbreak testimony was improperly excluded . In Patton , the Court reversed a manslaughter conviction after concluding that there was not a "scintilla of evidence" establishing the defendant's guilt . Id . at 773 . The Court described some of the evidence against the defendant in the following manner : Dennis was unarmed ; he alighted from the car with his hands in the air and remained in that position throughout the entire affray ; in fact, his every act connotes his innocence . That his mind seemed free of guilty knowledge of any wrongdoing is strongly shown by his failure to flee or 1 0 attempt to escape, although, under the circumstances, it would have been an easy matter for him to have done so . Id . at 775 . Patton is inapposite because the above quoted passage is largely dicta, an appellate court's interpretation of the evidence presented at trial . No ruling was made in Patton regarding the admissibility of such evidence to establish a "consciousness of innocence" defense, separate from other evidentiary considerations . Despite the fact that Patton created no explicit right for a defendant to present a "consciousness of innocence" defense, our ruling today neither endorses nor bars the introduction of such evidence . Instead, we look to the rules of relevancy and exclusion set forth in KRE 401, 402 and 403. As the trial court noted, perhaps Appellant refused to escape because he was simply "afraid to get another charge against him ." We therefore find no error in the exclusion of this evidence on relevancy grounds, this matter being well within the trial court's sound discretion . VI . Jury Instructions In a criminal case, the trial court must present "instructions applicable to every state of the case deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony." Taylor v . Commonwealth , Ky., 995 S .W.2d 355, 360 (1999) . RCr 9.54 . In the matter sub judice, the trial court instructed the jury only on the indicted offenses of murder and first-degree rape . Appellant contends the trial court erred by refusing to also instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication, the lesser-included offenses of wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter, third-degree rape and sexual misconduct as well as an adverse inference instruction on missing evidence . A . Voluntary Intoxication . A voluntary intoxication instruction is warranted when intoxication "negatives the existence of an element of the offense ." KRS 501 .080(1) . For murder offenses, 11 voluntary intoxication counteracts the intentional aspect of the crime . Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 575 S.W .2d 451 (1978) ; KRS 507.020(1)(a) . Sufficient evidence must be introduced at trial to raise a reasonable doubt in jurors' minds of the defendant's guilt . Jewell v . Commonwealth , Ky., 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Payne v . Commonwealth , Ky., 623 S.W.2d 867 (1981) . Undeniably, the testimony showed that Appellant and others consumed alcohol and pain pills on the night before T.D.'s murder . However, none of the evidence presented indicates that Appellant was incoherent, out-of-control, or unable to understand the nature of his actions . We have often described the necessary foundation for a voluntary intoxication instruction as evidence showing the defendant was "so drunk he did not know what he was doing ." Rogers v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 86 S .W.3d 29, 44 (2002), uotin Meadows v. Commonwealth , Ky., 550 S.W.2d 511, 513 (1977) . "Mere drunkenness" will not suffice . Rogers , supra , at 44 ; Jewell , supra , at 812 . After raping and sodomizing T.D . over the course of the night, Appellant showed enough presence of mind to lead his victim to a previously prepared grave, whereupon he murdered her . This sequence of events portrays a level of planning inconsistent with one who is so intoxicated that he is unaware of what he is doing . There was no abuse of discretion . B . Lesser-Included Offenses . Appellant's requested instructions on lesser-included offenses were required only "if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense." Houston v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (1998), citing Wombles v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 831 S.W.2d 172, 175 (1992) . A 1 2 lesser-included offense "is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged ." KRS 505 .020(2)(a) . See also Commonwealth v . Day , Ky ., 983 S .W.2d 505, 509 (1999) . Wanton murder is not a lesser-included offense of murder, but is rather "murder committed with a different state of mental culpability ." Smith v . Commonwealth , Ky., 737 S .W .2d 683, 689 (1987) . The circumstances of T .D.'s murder required both intent and planning on the part of Appellant . Furthermore, the evidence does not indicate Appellant engaged in wanton conduct . The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing this instruction . Likewise, the trial court also did not err in excluding Appellant's requested instruction on second-degree manslaughter . In Fields v . Commonwealth , Ky., 12 S.W.3d 275, 282 (2000), we held that instructions on second-degree manslaughter are required when a jury has also been instructed on voluntary intoxication as a defense to intentional murder . See also Springer v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 998 S .W .2d 439, 454-455 (1999) . Stripped of his intoxication defense, and lacking evidence of wanton conduct, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on this lesser offense . The evidence also fails to support Appellant's claim the jury could have found him guilty of third-degree rather than first-degree rape had the proper instruction been given . A person is guilty of third-degree rape when "he engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent because he is mentally retarded or mentally incapacitated ." KRS 510 .060(1)(a) . Appellant argues that T .D . was "mentally incapacitated" by alcohol and drug consumption . A careful reading of the applicable statutes frustrates Appellant's contention . KRS 510 .010(5) defines "mentally incapacitated" as rendering a person "temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct as a result of the influence of a controlled or intoxicating substance administered to him without his consent or as a result of any other act committed upon him without his consent." (emphasis added) . The commentary accompanying KRS 510.010(5) explains that "the definition is not intended to include the innocent situation in which men invite women to drink more than they should, nor is it intended to cover the situation in which the actor and the complainant engage in a joint bout of drinking or using controlled substances." While the evidence suggests that T .D . may have been intoxicated, no evidence was presented to show that she became intoxicated against her will . Therefore, the trial court did not err in omitting this instruction . Lastly, Appellant's claim that he was entitled to an instruction on sexual misconduct as a lesser-included offense to first-degree rape is without merit . A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when "he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's consent." KRS 510.140(1) . Although the commentary indicates that the ages of the victim and defendant are not always material, "our long standing rule" is that this statute "was intended to apply only in cases where the victim is fourteen or fifteen and the defendant less than twenty-one, or where the victim is twelve-to-fifteen and the defendant is less than eighteen years of age." Johnson v . Commonwealth , Ky., 864 S.W.2d 266, 277 (1993) . (emphasis added) . See also Cooper v . Commonwealth , Ky., 550 S.W.2d 478 (1977) . Here, the victim was over twenty-one years of age, rendering this statute inapplicable . C . Missing Evidence . In the first week of June, 2000, the Kentucky State Police recorded two anonymous phone calls wherein the callers identified a witness who could locate T.D .'s body . The police destroyed the tape recordings after thirty days as part of their normal recycling process . At trial, Appellant tendered missing evidence instructions in regard to these erased conversations, as well as in regard to a make-up bag, known to have been in the victim's possession hours before her murder, but was not collected as evidence by the police . The trial court rejected Appellant's instructions, finding they "are not the law." "Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law ." Kirk v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 6 S .W.3d 823, 826 (1999), citing Arizona v . Youngblood, 488 U.S . 51, 58, 109 S.Ct . 333, 337, 102 L.Ed .2d 281 (1988) . Appellant has not demonstrated that the police acted in "bad faith" by recycling the audio tapes or by failing to collect and preserve T.D .'s make-up bag . Neither the tapes nor the make-up bag possessed any obvious evidentiary value necessitating preservation . The audio tapes were destroyed as part of a normally scheduled police operation, with no suggestion by Appellant of an attempt to conceal evidence . Additionally, it is unclear if police were even aware of the existence of the make-up bag before trial . Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the exclusion of the missing evidence instructions . VII . Demonstrative Evidence Appellant asserts the trial court erred by permitting the use of demonstrative evidence during the testimony of Dr . Emily Craig, the Commonwealth's forensic expert . To help describe her findings, Dr . Craig utilized a scale model of the shallow gravesite 1 5 and hillside where T.D . was murdered and buried . The model simulated the rocks and foliage of the remote crime scene, and plastic bones replicated the position where T.D .'s remains were found . Appellant concedes the accuracy of the model, but questions its relevancy and probative value . No argument has been advanced by Appellant that the scale model was inflammatory or prejudicial, therefore we must confine ourselves to the question of relevancy . KRE 402 provides, with certain exceptions, that "all relevant evidence is admissible," with KRE 401 defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ." In Calhoun v . Commonwealth , 301 Ky . 789, 193 S .W.2d 420 (1946), our predecessor Court found that graphic photographs of a mutilated body served "no useful purpose and should have been omitted ." Id . at 794 . However, the Calhoun decision did not create a blanket prohibition against all graphic crime scene photos, but rather balanced the need for such evidence against the tendency of such evidence to "arouse the emotions of sympathy for the victim and of passion against the perpetrator of this crime." Id . Other cases cited by Appellant are in accord . See Funk v. Commonwealth , Ky., 842 S .W.2d 476 (1992) ; Holland v . Commonwealth , Ky., 703 S .W.2d 876 (1985) . Dr . Craig referred to the scale model during her testimony to demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions regarding T.D .'s murder . For example, Dr . Craig showed how the shotgun pellets found in the soil beneath the victim's skull indicated that T.D . was shot while lying in the grave . Undoubtedly such evidence is relevant to show how the murder occurred . Absent a showing that the model somehow inflamed the jury, we can find no error in the use of this demonstrative evidence . VIII . Hearsay On direct examination, the Commonwealth asked witness Joey Spradlin, "Now, did-during this period of time that they were sleeping with her there on the porch, did you ever hear her say anything about rape?" Spradlin answered, over defense counsel objection, "I didn't actually hear her say that they are raping me, but it seems like I heard her say no, but they didn't stop, so." Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay statement of T.D . . The Commonwealth argues that evidence of T . D.'s protestation should be admitted under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule . Excited utterances are "statement[s] relating to a startling event of condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition ." KRE 803(2) . In Souder v . Commonwealth , Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730, 733 (1986), we set forth several general, although not exclusive, criteria to help guide the determination of whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance : (i) lapse of time between the main act and the declaration, (ii) the opportunity or likelihood of fabrication, (iii) the inducement to fabrication, (iv) the actual excitement of the declarant, (v) the place of the declaration, (vi) the presence there of visible results of the act or occurrence to which the utterance relates, (vii) whether the utterance was made in response to a question, and (viii) whether the declaration was against interest or self-serving . T.D .'s protest was made while three men repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the side porch of a darkened, burned out house . Certainly her predicament was sufficient to generate great stress and nervous excitement . In Robey 1 7 v . Commonwealth , Ky., 943 S .W.2d 616, 619 (1997), we found a rape victim's statements made soon after an attack "trustworthy because the stress of her nervous statement stilled her reflective faculties and removed her control so that her utterance was a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by the rape ." The spontaneity of T.D .'s statement, made during, not after the events in question, makes it extremely unlikely that she fabricated her exclamation of resistance . The trial court properly admitted this hearsay testimony . IX . Jury Pool Appellant alleges several separate errors in the jury selection process . First, Appellant claims the trial court improperly excused twenty-four potential jurors from jury duty . At trial, counsel for Appellant complained that individuals who miss jury duty in order to stay at their jobs are typically desirable as jurors because they don't have "a dog in the race" and "tend to be more fair to both sides ." KRS 29A.100 provides that a trial judge who excuses a juror "shall record the juror's name, as provided in KRS 29A.080, and his reasons for granting the excuse ." The referred-to provision in KRS 29A .080 directs a trial judge to record the reasons for excusal "on the juror qualification form and on the list of names drawn from the juror wheel ." We have repeatedly emphasized the need for substantial compliance with these rules to ensure the selection of an impartial jury . See , e.g_, Sanborn v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 754 S.W.2d 534, 548 (1988) . At trial, counsel for Appellant did not contend that the trial court failed to follow the proper procedures for excusing jurors . Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that the missing jurors were actually excused, or that the trial court failed to order these individuals to show cause for their absence . See KRS 29A .150(1) . Likewise, the record 1 8 does not support Appellant's claim that the clerk, rather than the trial judge, excused the absent jurors . A mere complaint that some members of venire did not appear for jury duty is insufficient to demonstrate the trial court erred . Grundy v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 25 S .W.3d 76 (2000) . Appellant also claims the trial court improperly rehabilitated two jurors after some question was raised regarding their views toward the death penalty . The transcripts of voir dire show that the trial judge questioned each of these jurors extensively regarding their views on sentencing . No attempt was made, as Appellant suggests, to gloss over potential bias or prejudice through the use of a "magic question ." See Montgomery v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 819 S.W.2d 713 (1992) . Appellant's final argument regarding jury selection involves the order in which jurors were called during individual voir dire . This claim lacks merit, and Appellant cites no authority supporting his claim. We therefore find no error in the qualification of these jurors . X . Charge to a Deadlocked Jury Appellant first contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by making reference to an "Allen Charge" in the presence of the jury . After several hours of penalty phase deliberations, the jury Foreperson informed the court "we're close," but added, "I don't think we can reach a decision . Unanimous, no ." While considering whether or not to discharge the jury as hopelessly deadlocked, the trial judge informed the jurors : Well, I guess, I will let you go, you sure don't want to be sequestered for the night . I'd have to justify it up to somebody anyway, when they get a bill for rooms and board and all of that . But you think there is no way at all that 12 of you can agree on a sentence? See, (- They don't want you-The problem with juries is, I have to be real careful, anything I say or do, because it will come back that I've encouraged you to 1 9 do this and that . As a matter of fact, they used to have a rule they called the Allen Charge, which that was before the days when they had a bifurcated trial . That's when the jury went out and didn't know anything about him other than what was presented at the trial, and they're supposed to find-decide if he's guilty or innocent and come back with a sentence all at the same time . And there was a thing that you could read to them saying that, well, you should a lot of things, and no use in saying it . But, at any rate, it was the law for years and finally some high court said, no, you can't do that no more . And, in that decision, they wrote down and said what a Judge should tell a jury that was deadlocked to try to get them to reach a decision . And some Judge read that and then they said, no, you can't do that either . They reversed that . They even passed it as a rule . The term "Allen Charge" derives its name from the case of Allen v . United States , 164 U .S . 492, 17 S . Ct . 154, 41 L . Ed . 528 (1896), and pertains to a set of instructions given to deadlocked juries which generally encourage jurors who find themselves in the minority to reexamine their views . Prior to the adoption of RCr 9 .57 in 1992, "Allen Charges" were permitted in Kentucky courts . Earl v . Commonwealth , Ky . App., 569 S .W .2d 686 (1978) . More recently, however, one Court of Appeals panel indicated how the charge had fallen into disfavor, noting "there are those who think it one of the darkest hours in our jurisprudence." McCampbell v . Commonwealth , Ky . App., 796 S .W.2d 596, 598 (1990) . The mandatory language of RCr 9.57(1) now effectively precludes continued "Allen Charge" usage by enumerating an exclusive list of elements that trial judges may include in instructions to deadlocked juries . Deviation from these elements may result in reversible error if the instructions are deemed coercive . Mills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 996 S .W.2d 473, 493 (1999) ; Commonwealth v. Mitchell , Ky ., 943 S.W.2d 625, 627-628 (1997) . If viewed alone, the trial judge's description of the changes surrounding "Allen Charge" usage in Kentucky was not in itself coercive . However, the comments were not 20 made in isolation, but were instead accompanied by further discourse that potentially led the jurors to believe that any sentence they recommended could be modified on appeal : Let me tell you some other things and they can reverse it or do whatever they want to about it . You mentioned appeal on one of those questions . Every case just about it, I'd say 99 percent of them, since I have been in the business, in which a jury found a person guilty is appealed . Just about everyone of them . And I don't have any problem with that . The difference in some appeals, they go through the Court of Appeals and then some of them go on to the Supreme Court . In Kentucky, an appeal from a Circuit Court decision, if the sentence is 20 years or more, automatically bypasses the Court of Appeals and goes to the Supreme Court of Kentucky . Now, that part of it, I don't think there's any wrong with you knowing that anymore than it is to know that-what the sentence will be . But that, really, is not your concern . But I will tell you-Well, from that, you know that your decision is not final. But you should make the decision and let the law and the process go from there . And if you can-And I don't want you to do something that's against your conscience, or whatever you want to call it, what your honest convictions and beliefs are . . . . But I don't want to encourage anybody to say, ah, what's the use, I will just go along with them to get it over . I don't want you to do that either . We have often condemned comments by the prosecution or the court that diminish a jury's sense of responsibility in capital sentencing determinations . See Jacobs v . Commonwealth , Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412 (1994) ; Thomas v . Commonwealth , Ky., 864 S .W.2d 252 (1993) ; Clark v . Commonwealth , Ky., 833 S .W.2d 793 (1991) ; Tamme v . Commonwealth , Ky., 759 S.W.2d 51 (1988) ; Ward v. Commonwealth , Ky., 695 S .W.2d 404 (1985) ; Holland v . Commonwealth , Ky., 703 S.W.2d 876 (1985) ; Ice v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 667 S .W.2d 671(1984), cert . denied , 469 U .S . 860 (1984) . Similarly, in Caldwell v . Mississippi , 472 U .S . 320, 325, 105 S.Ct . 2633, 86 L.Ed .2d 231 (1985), the United States Supreme Court reviewed the impact of comments virtually identical to those made by the trial judge here, holding "the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents 2 1 an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role." Id . at 333 . Although the jury recommended fifty years imprisonment rather than death for Appellant's capital crime, we find the trial judge's comments were nonetheless prejudicial . Statements such as "your decision is not final," and "99 percent" of convictions are appealed, were undoubtedly sufficient to minimize juror responsibility in considering sentencing options . The effect of the judge's comments in this case was magnified, because they came at a critical juncture when the jurors were deadlocked in their sentencing deliberations . Such comments could easily influence a juror in the minority to loosen his or her convictions or abdicate sentencing responsibility to a higher authority . Hence, the comments rendered the penalty phase so fundamentally unfair as to deny Appellant due process of law . See Donnelly v . DeChristoforo , 416 U .S . 637 ; 94 S . Ct . 1868 ; 40 L . Ed . 2d 431 (1974) ; Lisenba v. California , 314 U .S . 219 ; 62 S . Ct . 280, 86 L. Ed . 166 (1941) . For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's convictions, but remand for a new sentencing phase in accordance with Boone v . Commonwealth , Ky., 821 S .W.2d 813 (1992) . Lambert, C .J ., Graves, Johnstone, Keller, Stumbo, and Wintersheimer, J.J ., concur . Cooper, J., concurs in result only . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT Misty Dugger Department of Public Advocacy Assistant Public Advocate 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE A.B . Chandler III Attorney General Dennis W . Shepherd Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601