Title: Thomas v. State
Citation: 59 So. 2d 517
Docket Number: N/A
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 1952

59 So. 2d 517 (1952)
THOMAS
v.
STATE.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B.
June 13, 1952.
R.H. Merritt, Pensacola, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
MATHEWS, Justice.
The appellant was informed against for second degree murder growing out of the killing of his wife by cutting and stabbing her with a knife. He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Appellant raises four questions:
(1) Was it prejudicial to admit in evidence photographs of the deceased lying in a pool of blood when said photographs are not necessary to throw any light on any material fact?
(2) Is it proper for a hired special prosecutor to take over the lead as was done in this case?
(3) Was it prejudicial to the defendant for evidence of previous convictions of crime of a person of the same name without showing the defendant in such cases to be the defendant in this case?
(4) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter?
Photographs should be received in evidence with great caution. Those received in evidence in this case showed a hideous scene with a dead woman stretched on the sidewalk and blood running into the street. Every fact shown by the photographs was testified to and there was no contradiction. In addition to showing the pool of blood, the photographs exposed a knife near the hand of the dead woman clearer than the oral testimony. Showing the knife near the hand of the dead woman corroborated the testimony of the appellant. In view of our prior decision in Mardorff v. State, 143 Fla. 64, 196 So. 625, in which other cases are cited, we hold that it was not reversible error to admit the photographs in evidence. There is a limit, however, to admission of photographs which prove, or show, nothing more than a gory scene.
The first and second questions will be considered together because the discussion of the third question shows to some extent *518 the lead taken over by the special prosecutor and his over-zealousness. It appeared that a practicing attorney was specially employed by the deceased's daughter to assist in the prosecution of the case. The County Solicitor was not present but the Assistant County Solicitor, Hopkins, was present. The Assistant County Solicitor conducted the examination of witnesses up to a certain point. When Dorothy Bland, the daughter of the deceased, who had employed the special attorney, took the stand, she was examined by the special prosecutor and he also cross-examined the appellant. During the examination of Dorothy Bland the following proceedings took place:
Thereafter the over-zealousness of the special prosecutor was shown by the following proceedings while Dorothy Bland was on the stand:
Objection was promptly made and sustained and the Court advised the jury that the question and answer was stricken from the record and they must disregard it. Although the Court correctly instructed the jury, the thought had been implanted in their minds by the question that by killing his wife the appellant would receive the home by eliciting a conclusion from the witness which she was not qualified to express.
When the appellant was on the stand, the special hired prosecutor asked the appellant if he had ever been convicted of crime, and he stated, "* * * about nineteen or twenty years ago." He then asked him how many times he had been convicted, and the witness answered, "I think once." (Italics supplied.) Then the following took place:
Although the record does not disclose that the trial degenerated into a private prosecution, or that the administration of the criminal law was made a vehicle for oppression for the gratification of malice, it does show an over-zealousness on the part of the private prosecutor which we cannot approve.
With reference to the cross-examination of the appellant concerning other crimes, the record shows that the special prosecutor said while interrogating the witness concerning other crimes: "I am going to read the record." He had papers ("the record") in his hand from which he read and which he exhibited to the jury. He asked the witness about numerous crimes with which the appellant had no connection. This took place in the presence of the jury. It requires no imagination to visualize this courtroom scene. This cross-examination was prejudicial and is reversible error.
Reversed with directions to set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence and to grant a new trial.
SEBRING, C.J., CHAPMAN, J., and TAYLOR, Associate Justice, concur.