Title: Com. v. Ryan
Citation: 394 Pa. Super. 373, 575 A.2d 949
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 1990

394 Pa. Superior Ct. 373 (1990) 575 A.2d 949 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Bernard D. RYAN, Jr. Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted April 23, 1990. Filed June 5, 1990. *375 Kim W. Riester, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Maureen A. Flynn, Asst. Dist. Atty., Warren, for Com. Before KELLY, HUDOCK and HESTER, JJ. HESTER, Judge: This is an appeal from the May 16, 1989 order denying appellant, Bernard D. Ryan, Jr., relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. We affirm. On June 21, 1982, appellant pled guilty to rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in exchange for a nol pros of charges of burglary. On July 9, 1982, he was sentenced to fifteen to thirty years imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely motion to modify sentence, which was denied on the basis of his significant history of violent *376 crimes, including a prior rape. He did not, however, file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a direct appeal. On November 15, 1982, appellant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (repealed), alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was induced unlawfully in that counsel had informed him that his sentences would be served concurrently. In 1983, he filed a petition for habeas corpus relief with this court. The habeas corpus petition was remanded and denied, together with the PCHA petition, by the trial court on October 18, 1984. Appellant appealed, and we affirmed, concluding that the five issues raised by appellant were without merit since the record established that his plea was not induced unlawfully either by promises from or ineffective assistance of his guilty plea counsel. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 354 Pa.Super. 630, 508 A.2d 343 (1986). On February 22, 1989, with privately-retained counsel, appellant filed his second petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal followed denial of that petition without a hearing. Appellant's allegations on appeal all relate to alleged deficiencies in the plea colloquy. Initially, we note that since this is appellant's second petition for post-conviction relief, it "will not be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred." Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 513, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988); see also Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 384 Pa.Super. 251, 558 A.2d 107 (1989) (applying Lawson standard of review to second or subsequent petitions filed under the PCRA). This standard is met if the petitioner can demonstrate either that the proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice which no civilized society can tolerate occurred or that he is innocent of the criminal charges. With this standard in mind, we examine appellant's allegations. He contends that the guilty plea colloquy demonstrates that: 1) there was no factual basis for the *377 plea; 2) there were no on-the-record admissions of guilt to rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; 3) he received no explanation of his right to petition to withdraw his guilty plea; 4) the definition of reasonable doubt was not explained to him; and 5) he was not informed of his privilege not to testify at trial and that the right not to testify could not be used as an inference of guilt. Appellant alleges that he never actually admitted to committing the crimes. Since this is a critical element to a valid guilty plea in the absence of other evidence of guilt, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), and because a knowing waiver of important constitutional rights also is a critical component of a valid guilty plea, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2257 n. 13, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 114 n. 13 (1976), we conclude that appellant presents allegations that if true, would establish that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred or that he may be innocent of the charges. Accordingly, we will entertain the petition. Appellant's eligibility for relief is governed by the provisions of the Post-Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543 controls appellant's eligibility for relief under the PCRA and lists four factors that must be met before such relief may be granted. The third factor requires: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a). Section 9544 of the PCRA provides in relevant part that an issue is waived if the petitioner failed to raise it and if it could have been raised in a habeas *378 corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted. In the present case, appellant could have raised all of the issues presented herein in his prior PCHA petition. Accordingly, the issues have been waived under section 9544. The waiver in this instance results from appellant's failure to raise the issues in his prior post-conviction proceedings. Since the waiver was not during pretrial, trial, post-trial or direct appeal proceedings, section 9543(a)(3)(iii) is not applicable. Accordingly, appellant has waived the issues presented herein unless 9543(a)(3)(ii) applies. Section 9543(a)(3)(ii) does not apply because appellant is guilty. The plea colloquy reads in relevant part: Notes of Testimony, 6/21/82, at 4-8 (emphasis added). The plea court then discussed various constitutional rights that appellant relinquished by pleading guilty. The notes of testimony at the arraignment demonstrate that appellant's constitutional rights were discussed extensively with him. Thus, contrary to his allegations on appeal, appellant stated unequivocally during his plea colloquy that he committed the offenses. He stated that he raped the victim and that she did not consent. He admitted to gagging her. He equivocated only when asked if he threatened to kill her, stating that he did not remember threatening to kill her, but "probably did" so. This is not a denial of the relevant charges, it is only (arguably) a denial of threatening to kill her. Further, he did not deny forcing the victim to engage in oral sex and stated only that he did not remember that specific event since he only remembered portions of his vicious assault on the victim. He went on to admit, however, that the victim was forced to perform oral sex against her will. Justice McDermott has stated the following regarding the entry of a guilty plea: Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 558-59, 475 A.2d 1303, 1307-08 (1984). Since we believe that appellant's statements at the colloquy establish that he actually committed the crimes to which he pled guilty, section 9543(a)(3)(ii) does not apply to overcome his waiver of the issues presented. Appellant is not innocent, and he is not eligible for relief under the PCRA. Order affirmed.