Title: Pearce v. The Estate of Daniel Lea Day, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200623
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2022

Rel:  May 27, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022 
 
_________________________ 
 
1200623 
_________________________ 
 
Icylene Pearce, as personal representative 
of the Estate of Dewitt Ray Pearce, deceased 
 
v. 
 
The Estate of Daniel Lea Day, deceased, 
and Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC 
 
 
Appeal from Dale Circuit Court 
(CV-17-900057) 
 
 
MENDHEIM, Justice. 
1200623 
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Icylene Pearce ("Pearce"), as the personal representative of the 
estate of her late husband, Dewitt Ray Pearce ("Dewitt"), appeals from a 
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in her 
wrongful-death action commenced in Dale Circuit Court against the 
estate of Daniel Lea Day, deceased, and Enterprise Leasing Company-
South Central, LLC ("Enterprise"). Dewitt was killed when the vehicle 
Day was driving collided head-on with Dewitt's vehicle. Pearce's appeal 
concerns the defense that Day suffered a sudden loss of consciousness 
before the collision. Pearce objects to the trial court's exclusion of certain 
evidence that she believes relates to that defense, and she asserts that, 
even without considering that evidence, the trial court should have 
ordered a new trial. We affirm. 
I.  Facts 
 
At the time of the accident at issue, which occurred on April 7, 2017, 
Dewitt had been married to Pearce for 33 years; they had 5 children and 
2 grandchildren. 
Day began working for Enterprise in 2016 as a part-time driver. 
Before working for Enterprise, Day had been a commercial truck driver, 
but he had been forced to retire from that profession due to his inability 
1200623 
3 
 
to meet the health requirements set by the United States Department of 
Transportation. At the time of the accident, Day was 63 years old, was 
5 feet, 9 inches tall, weighed 261 pounds, and received Social Security 
disability benefits. It appears that Day's retirement from truck driving 
and his eligibility for Social Security disability benefits stemmed at least 
in part from his having an aortic-valve replacement in 2009.1 
 
Day's primary job duty for Enterprise involved transferring rental 
vehicles from one Enterprise location to another. On March 1, 2017, Day 
transported a vehicle from the Enterprise location near the Montgomery 
airport to an Enterprise location in Demopolis. Another Enterprise 
employee, David Montgomery -- a friend of Day's who had known Day 
since 2015 from recreational motorcycling they did together -- traveled 
with Day, transporting another vehicle. Montgomery testified that Day 
"was not feeling well that day" from the start. Montgomery stated that, 
after he and Day picked up vehicles in Demopolis to take back to 
 
1As is explained later in this opinion, the trial court granted a 
motion in limine filed by Enterprise seeking to exclude from evidence 
many of Day's past medical records, including the medical record 
documenting that Day had received an aortic-valve replacement in 
November 2009. However, the jury was made aware that Day had a 
mechanical aortic valve from testimony by witnesses David Montgomery, 
Dr. David Rydzewski, and Dr. Amy Cooper. 
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Montgomery, Day pulled over on the side of the road outside Uniontown 
because he "was having a hard time." Montgomery asked Day if he 
needed an ambulance, but Day said that he would try to make it back to 
Montgomery. However, a mile or so later Day pulled over again, and 
Montgomery testified that Day was "not doing well at all" because he was 
"having a hard time breathing" and "having pains in his chest." So, 
Montgomery said, they called an ambulance, and Day was transported to 
Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC") in Selma, where he was 
diagnosed with having a heart attack. Day had surgery at VRMC, during 
which a stent was implanted to relieve a blockage around his heart. Day 
was discharged from VRMC on March 4, 2017. Montgomery testified that 
Day's demeanor and appearance before and after he had the stent 
implanted was "[l]ike night and day" and that, after the stent had been 
implanted, Day was "feeling so much better, and his color was back to 
normal." Montgomery stated that, after he received the stent, Day never 
complained to Montgomery "about any issues with his heart." 
Portions of the video-deposition testimony from Day's cardiologist, 
Dr. Amy Cooper of Montgomery Cardiovascular Associates, were shown 
to the jury, and other portions of her testimony were read into the record. 
1200623 
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Dr. Cooper testified that Day first started seeing her in late 2016. She 
stated that, during a scheduled visit to her on February 8, 2017, Day 
received an echocardiogram, "which is just a way to look at that valve 
and the function of his heart to be clear that everything was working 
appropriately. And it was a normal study. The [aortic] valve replacement 
was stable, and everything was normal." Dr. Cooper placed no limitations 
on Day's "everyday activities" at that time, and he was okay to drive as 
far as she was concerned. Dr. Cooper was aware that Day drove cars for 
Enterprise, and she did not "restrict his ability to shuttle vehicles back 
and forth as an employee of Enterprise." Day visited Dr. Cooper again on 
March 9, 2017, for a follow-up appointment after his heart attack of 
March 1, 2017. Dr. Cooper testified that Day "really had no complaints 
at that time. He denied any issues with recurrent chest pain or shortness 
of breath. He was really stable." Day's "[e]lectrocardiogram … and blood 
pressure rate values were all normal." At that time, Dr. Cooper gave Day 
a "return to work" authorization, signifying that he was cleared to work 
for Enterprise driving vehicles. Dr. Cooper stated that she saw no reason 
why Day should not be "cleared to drive vehicles like he had been" and 
that she had "no reservations" about allowing Day to return to work. 
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On cross-examination by Pearce's counsel, Dr. Cooper addressed 
the fact that Day had a history of sleep apnea, which she stated can have 
a "long-term" effect on a person's heart by "increas[ing] the risk of rhythm 
disturbances and heart failure if left untreated." Dr. Cooper admitted 
that Day's medical records showed that he had a history of being 
"noncompliant" with the use of his continuous positive airway pressure 
("CPAP") machine, which, she said, could "induc[e] the tendency for 
arrhythmias and increased strain on the heart." Dr. Cooper also stated 
that Day's body mass index at the March 9, 2017, visit was rated to be 
38.5, which indicated that "he [was] morbidly obese," a condition, she 
said, that "absolutely" could contribute to heart issues. Dr. Cooper also 
noted that Day had "elevated blood pressure" and "coronary 
arteriosclerosis," which, she said, "means coronary artery disease that 
led to his [March 1, 2017,] heart attack, blockage in the heart arteries." 
Dr. Cooper testified that Day had been counseled to exercise, to lose 
weight, and to eat a healthier diet but that, to her knowledge, he had not 
been doing those things. Dr. Cooper stated that Day's lack of compliance 
with taking medications or following "lifestyle instructions" had placed 
him at a "certainly higher" risk of having another heart attack "than 
1200623 
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someone that did follow those instructions." Dr. Cooper admitted that she 
was unaware that Day had been diagnosed with chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease ("COPD"), and she stated that COPD can have heart 
implications because "[t]he more advanced the lung disease is, the more 
strain it puts on the heart." Dr. Cooper then reiterated on redirect 
examination that there was "nothing obvious in the information that we 
had at the time [March 9, 2017,] that would indicate there was something 
going on with [Day's] heart." 
Day returned to work for Enterprise on March 13, 2017. Day's 
supervisor, Joseph Lumansoc, testified that he asked Day how he was 
feeling on the day he returned to work and that Day replied that he was 
"[b]etter than ever." Lumansoc also stated that, between March 13 and 
April 7, 2017, he did not observe anything out of the ordinary with Day's 
demeanor as far as his health, his attitude, or his mental state. Lumansoc 
further testified that he had no concerns during that period about Day's 
"physical, mental or emotional ability and well-being such that he could 
drive an automobile, shuttling cars as he had been doing for Enterprise." 
 
On April 7, 2017, Day and four other Enterprise employees were 
assigned to transfer rental vehicles between Montgomery and Dothan. 
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The employees met at the Enterprise location near the Montgomery 
airport at 8:00 a.m., and each drove in a separate vehicle toward Dothan 
on Highway 231 heading south.2 Enterprise employee Susan Frances 
testified that she saw Day that morning when they met at the airport 
location, when the group stopped at a Circle K gas station in Troy for 
drinks, and then when they arrived at the Dothan Enterprise location. 
She stated that she did not observe anything unusual about Day's health 
or behavior on that day. Frances also testified that, in general, after Day 
had received the stent "his color was much better. He was more spry. I 
think he could breathe better," and that Day had told her that "he felt a 
lot better." 
 
Enterprise employee Sandra George testified that she knew Day 
fairly well because he lived near her in addition to their being coworkers 
 
2There are some discrepancies in the testimonies of Enterprise 
employees regarding whether they each drove a separate vehicle to 
Dothan on April 7, 2017. Susan Frances testified that each employee 
drove separately. Sandra George testified that she and Susan Frances 
had their own vehicles, but that Day rode with two other men in a vehicle, 
and that James Berry was in the "chase van" that day. The employees' 
supervisor, Joseph Lumansoc, testified that all the employees rode 
together to Dothan and that each employee drove a separate vehicle back 
to Montgomery. The witnesses agreed, however, that each employee rode 
in a separate vehicle on the return trip to Montgomery.  
1200623 
9 
 
at Enterprise. She stated that they would talk on the telephone, text, and 
go to each other's houses on occasion. She testified that Day had told her 
about his health issues, i.e., that "[h]e had high blood pressure. He had 
COPD. He had sleep apnea. He had heart issues." She stated that she 
knew that Day had sustained a heart attack about a month before the 
accident and that "after [the heart attack] he got the stent put in, [and] 
he was feeling much better." George further testified that she sometimes 
felt the need to "fuss at [Day] about his medication and about wearing 
his CPAP [device] and about wearing his seatbelt" because "he wouldn't 
necessarily do it." She also stated that she did not observe Day make any 
lifestyle changes after the March 1, 2017, heart attack even though "he 
was way overweight"; she "tried to get him to, but he didn't." However, 
George also admitted that Day neither complained about his health after 
the heart attack nor said that he was worried about his health or the 
condition of his heart. George described Day as someone who "joked a lot 
and laughed a lot and cut up, but I also think he suffered from 
depression." 
 
George testified that on the day of the accident she remembered 
being with Day and the other employees at the Enterprise location near 
1200623 
10 
 
the Montgomery airport before they left for Dothan and that Day and the 
other employees "were just laughing and talking while waiting to get our 
assignment for the day, and [Day] was drinking hot chocolate." She did 
not notice anything unusual about Day that morning before they started 
driving. George stated that the last time she saw Day was in Dothan 
before they got in their individual cars to drive back to Montgomery, that 
they waived to each other, and that she did not notice anything unusual 
with Day at that time either. 
Enterprise employee James Berry testified that he drove the "chase 
van" that followed the other employees on their April 7, 2017, trip. Before 
leaving the Dothan Enterprise location, Day notified Berry that his car, 
a Jeep Grand Cherokee, needed gas, so Day and Berry stopped at a gas 
station in Dothan while the other employees started back to Montgomery. 
Berry testified that he did not notice anything unusual about Day's 
manner or health when they stopped for gas: no fatigue, shortness of 
breath, or any other health issue. Berry stated that, after Day pumped 
the gas, both drivers got in their vehicles and got onto Highway 231 
heading north. Berry initially did not notice anything unusual about 
Day's driving on the highway. Berry testified that, at approximately 
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11 
 
11:00 a.m., he was driving behind Day's Jeep Grand Cherokee in the left-
hand lane of the northbound portion of Highway 231, near Ozark, when 
he observed that Day 
"gradually ran off the left edge of the road into the weeds. And 
then he didn't correct that steering. He just continued there 
and continued to ease further into the median. ... [H]e got all 
the way into the median off of the pavement and then was 
slowing down, of course, as he did that. And I passed him as 
he was moving in the median. And so I started to -- at that 
point, I'm not watching him anymore, of course. I can't turn 
around and look at him and drive too. But I had to work my 
way back to the right lane and then off of the highway to park 
to go back and see what happened to him. 
 
".... 
 
"Q. [Enterprise's counsel:] And, at any point that you saw 
Mr. Day's car veer into the median, did you ever see any brake 
lights from behind? 
 
"A. No. I specifically remember thinking to myself that he did 
not put on brakes, and he didn't appear to try to correct his 
steering, I mean, or nothing. The car did not -- it just very 
easily veered into the weeds, and there were no brake lights 
and no change of steering. So, you know, it was just 
interesting to me that he didn't try to brake, and he didn't try 
to steer back onto the highway or anything. So then I passed, 
and I didn't know what happened after that until I walked 
back down and found out." 
 
 
The evidence at trial indicated that Day drove off the road, into the 
median, and then into the oncoming traffic of the southbound lanes of 
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Highway 231. Day's Jeep Grand Cherokee hit two vehicles and a 
semitruck. One of the vehicles Day's Jeep Grand Cherokee collided with 
was a Cadillac driven by Dewitt.  Both Dewitt and Day were killed in the 
accident.  
 
Dr. David Rydzewski, a forensic pathologist and senior medical 
examiner for the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, performed 
an autopsy on Day's body. Dr. Rydzewski testified that the immediate 
cause of Day's death was blunt-force trauma. However, Dr. Rydzewski 
examined the body further and discovered that Day had an "enlarged" 
heart, "what we call cardiac hypertrophy," and Dr. Rydzewski stated that 
such a condition can cause a heart attack or that "a person can die 
suddenly with an enlarged heart." He also discovered that Day's coronary 
arteries had a "narrowing" "from about 75 percent to 95 percent." 
Dr. Rydzewski testified that such a narrowing can cause "arrhythmia" 
and a "loss of consciousness." He stated that the blunt-force trauma did 
not cause those conditions in Day:  "the findings that I basically described 
in the heart were of a chronic nature, meaning that he had them before 
the accident." Dr. Rydzewski explained that the reason he listed blunt-
1200623 
13 
 
force trauma -- not a heart attack or another cardiac issue -- as the cause 
of Day's death in his autopsy report was because  
"if a person has a heart attack and then dies in an accident 
and gets all banged up and traumatized -- I can't really tell 
whether he had a heart attack before when someone gets all 
banged up. Because when someone dies, the body isn't 
working to repair anything, and I can't age when a person had 
a heart attack. … 
 
"…. 
 
"And when someone has that trauma and, let's say, a 
heart condition, which could also be fatal in the right context, 
we basically default as far as the cause and manner of death 
to the blunt force trauma. We give it precedence because we 
know that it's obviously fatal, okay? … 
 
"So, in the right circumstances, what I saw in the heart 
would be -- if someone was found dead and there was nothing 
else to suggest an alternative cause of death, I would call the 
cause death, you know, due to his heart." 
 
 
On April 17, 2017, Pearce commenced this action by filing a 
complaint in the Dale Circuit Court against Day's estate and Enterprise.3 
On September 12, 2018, Pearce filed a motion to appoint an 
 
3Joseph Lumansoc also was a named defendant in the action, but 
Lumansoc was dismissed at the summary-judgment stage of the 
litigation. 
 
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administrator ad litem to represent Day's estate pursuant to § 43-2-250, 
Ala. Code 1975,4 because, Pearce indicated, no estate had been opened 
for Day and, thus, Pearce had not been able to perfect service upon Day's 
estate as a party to the litigation. On September 14, 2018, the trial court 
granted Pearce's motion and appointed an administrator ad litem to 
represent Day.5 
Pearce filed the operative second amended complaint on 
December 12, 2018. In that complaint, Pearce asserted counts against 
Day's estate and/or against Enterprise alleging: (1) negligence and/or 
 
4Section 43-2-250, Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
 
"When, in any proceeding in any court, the estate of a 
deceased person must be represented, and there is no executor 
or administrator of such estate, or he is interested adversely 
thereto, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint an 
administrator ad litem of such estate for the particular 
proceeding, without bond, whenever the facts rendering such 
appointment necessary shall appear in the record of such case 
or shall be made known to the court by the affidavit of any 
person interested therein." 
 
5Aside from a single summary-judgment motion, the record is 
devoid of any arguments submitted directly by Day's administrator 
ad litem. It appears that Enterprise's counsel argued on behalf of both 
defendants at trial and on appeal. Therefore, when this opinion refers to 
arguments by Enterprise, it generally encompasses both defendants. 
 
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wantonness; (2) vicarious liability; (3) negligent and/or wanton 
entrustment; (4) negligent hiring; and (5) negligent supervision.6 On 
January 11, 2019, Enterprise filed an answer in which it pleaded, among 
other defenses, the defense of sudden loss of consciousness. 
Following discovery and multiple summary-judgment filings, the 
trial court on December 17, 2019, dismissed Pearce's claims of negligent 
entrustment, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision. The trial court 
expressly ruled that "claims of negligence (Count One) and vicarious 
liability (Count Two) plead[ed] in [Pearce's] Second Amended Complaint 
dated December 12, 2018, remain justiciable for subsequent resolution at 
trial, including as to [Enterprise's] defense of sudden loss of 
consciousness ...."7 
On January 27, 2020, Enterprise filed three motions in limine 
seeking to exclude certain evidence. First, Enterprise sought to exclude 
 
6The remaining counts of Pearce's second amended complaint 
asserted claims against fictitiously named defendants that Pearce never 
identified before trial. "'[T]he beginning of trial operates as a dismissal 
of fictitiously named parties,' Ex parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d 447, 452 (Ala. 
1997) (citing Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.)." Ryals v. Lathan Co., 77 So. 3d 
1175, 1181 (Ala. 2011). 
 
7Pearce conceded her claim of wanton entrustment before trial. 
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evidence, testimony, and argument regarding whether Day had 
"committed suicide, intended to commit suicide, or suffered from suicidal 
ideations." Enterprise argued that such evidence was irrelevant under 
Rule 402, Ala. R. Evid., because Enterprise could not be held vicariously 
liable if Day had committed suicide. Enterprise additionally argued that, 
under Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., such evidence should be excluded because, 
even if such evidence was relevant, the unfair prejudice it would produce 
outweighed any relevance. Second, again under Rule 403, Enterprise 
sought to exclude Pearce from "introducing, referencing, or otherwise 
discussing at trial the Toxicology Report prepared by the Alabama 
Department of Forensic Sciences, and any evidence, testimony, or 
argument that [Day] consumed marijuana or other controlled substance 
on the day of the subject motor vehicle accident" because, it said, any 
relevance of such evidence was outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
Specifically, Enterprise argued that "evidence of one's mere consumption 
of a controlled substance is inadmissible to prove liability in a vehicle 
accident unless it is also established that the person was impaired at the 
time of the accident," for which, it said, there was no evidence in this case. 
In this regard, Enterprise noted that Dr. Curt Harper, the chief 
1200623 
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toxicologist for the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, had 
testified by deposition that there was no scientific basis to conclude that 
Day was impaired to any degree based on the level and type of THC, the 
chief intoxicant in marijuana, found in Day's body fluid. Enterprise also 
observed that Pearce had attempted to offer expert testimony as to when 
Day had consumed marijuana, but the trial court previously had 
excluded that expert's report and testimony. Third, Enterprise sought to 
exclude Pearce from "introducing, referencing, or otherwise discussing at 
trial any evidence, testimony, or argument regarding the medical history 
of [Day] that has no causal relationship to the subject accident." 
Specifically, Enterprise conceded that medical records and testimony 
directly concerning Day's March 1, 2017, heart attack were relevant, but 
it contended that evidence of sleep apnea, COPD, the aortic-valve 
replacement, and depression should be excluded because, it said, there 
was no evidence that those conditions contributed to the accident.  
On January 29, 2020, Enterprise filed a fourth "omnibus" motion 
in limine in which it sought to exclude Pearce from "introducing, 
referencing, or otherwise discussing" several topics. Pertinent to this 
appeal, Enterprise sought exclusion of evidence pertaining to Day's 
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alleged previous noncompliance with taking medications and the number 
of hours per day driven by Enterprise employees. Enterprise argued that 
such information was not relevant to this particular accident and that 
any possible relevance would be outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
On February 14, 2020, Pearce filed a response in opposition to 
Enterprise's motions in limine in which she argued that the evidence 
Enterprise sought to exclude was relevant to refuting the defense of 
sudden loss of consciousness. Specifically, Pearce contended that 
evidence indicating that Day had smoked marijuana, regarding his 
plethora of medical conditions -- including his aortic-valve replacement, 
sleep apnea, depression, obesity, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, 
COPD, and ideations of suicide -- and regarding his noncompliance with 
medications and failure to use his CPAP machine were all "extremely 
relevant" to establishing that Day had knowledge that he could suffer a 
heart attack while driving. 
After multiple delays in the case due to COVID-19, the trial court 
entered an order granting each of Enterprise's motions in limine on 
February 27, 2021. With respect to each motion, the trial court concluded 
that the subject evidence was due to be excluded "pursuant to Rule 403 
1200623 
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of the Alabama Rules of Evidence as the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, it would be misleading to 
the jury, and it would confuse the issues." On March 2, 2021, Pearce filed 
a motion to reconsider the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Following a 
hearing on that motion, the trial court, on March 5, 2021, denied the 
motion to reconsider. 
The case proceeded to trial on March 8, 2021. The evidence and 
arguments at trial focused on Enterprise's sudden-loss-of-consciousness 
affirmative defense. On March 10, 2021, the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Day's estate and Enterprise; the same day, the trial court entered 
an order confirming the jury's verdict. On March 26, 2021, Pearce filed a 
postjudgment motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to vacate, 
amend, or alter the judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied 
Pearce's postjudgment motion on May 24, 2021. On June 4, 2021, Pearce 
appealed. 
II.  Standard of Review 
 
In her appeal, Pearce challenges the trial court's order granting 
Enterprise's motions in limine, and she also argues that the verdict was 
against the great weight of the evidence. 
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"'"[T]he trial court has great discretion in determining 
whether evidence ... is relevant and whether it should be 
admitted or excluded." Sweeney v. Purvis, 665 So. 2d 926, 930 
(Ala. 1995). When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are 
reviewed on appeal, "rulings on the admissibility of evidence 
are within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not 
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion." 
Bama's Best Party Sales, Inc. v. Tupperware, U.S., Inc., 723 
So. 2d 29, 32 (Ala. 1998), citing Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Ryan, 589 So. 2d 165 (Ala. 1991).'" 
Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., 16 So. 3d 86, 92 (Ala. 2008) (quoting 
Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So. 2d 63, 71 (Ala. 2001)). 
"'A strong presumption of correctness attaches to a jury 
verdict in Alabama. Christiansen v. Hall, 567 So. 2d 1338, 
1341 (Ala. 1990). This presumption of correctness is 
strengthened by a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial. 
Id. This Court will not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion 
for new trial when evidence has been presented that, if 
believed, would support the jury's verdict.'" 
City of Birmingham v. Moore, 631 So. 2d 972, 974 (Ala. 1994) (quoting 
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Sturdivant, 622 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (Ala. 
1993)). 
III. Analysis 
Pearce argues that the trial court erred in granting Enterprise's 
motions in limine, thereby excluding evidence related to several topics 
that Pearce believes are relevant to Enterprise's defense of sudden loss 
of consciousness. Pearce also contends that, even without the excluded 
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evidence, the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Both 
of those arguments -- and Enterprise's counterpoints -- hinge on the 
sudden-loss-of-consciousness defense.  
As Pearce observes, the sudden-loss-of-consciousness defense "is 
rarely used and has little [Alabama] caselaw interpreting it." Pearce's 
brief, p. 38. Sudden loss of consciousness was first mentioned as a 
possible defense in Alabama in Moore v. Cooke, 264 Ala. 97, 84 So. 2d 748 
(1956), in which the Court noted that the appellant in that case had "cited 
cases from other jurisdictions wherein it has been held that a driver of 
an automobile is not liable for injuries sustained in a collision which 
resulted solely from the fact that the driver fainted or became 
unconscious from an unforeseen cause immediately before the collision." 
264 Ala. at 101, 84 So. 2d at 750-51. The Moore Court did not expound 
upon the defense because the Court concluded that, unlike the cases the 
appellant had cited, Moore was not a case "where the evidence of the 
driver's sudden unconsciousness was uncontradicted or would support no 
other reasonable inference." 264 Ala. at 101, 84 So. 2d at 751. In Walker 
v. Cardwell, 348 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 1977), the Court implicitly approved 
the availability of the sudden-loss-of-consciousness defense by quoting 
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the jury charge on the defense in that case and then concluding that the 
evidence supported the jury's finding that the defense applied: 
"Part of the jury charge read as follows: 
 
"'The Court charges the jury that if you are 
reasonably satisfied that Donald Frank Cardwell 
had lapsed into unconsciousness prior to the 
accident without any warning symptoms, or 
knowledge that such a condition would occur, then 
he could not be considered guilty of negligence or 
wantonness for anything which would have 
occurred after he lost consciousness.'[8] 
 
"The question of whether Donald Cardwell lapsed into 
unconsciousness without prior knowledge was a jury 
question. We hold that sufficient evidence existed to support 
the jury's conclusion:  no alcohol was found in Donald's blood; 
he had a history of fainting spells but his last one occurred at 
least 2 years before the accident; he had driven 3/4 of a 
vacation visiting three states a few months prior to the 
accident; and his car was seen drifting back and forth down 
the wrong side of the highway for 1/2 mile preceding the 
accident." 
 
Id. at 1051. The only other Alabama case that has addressed the sudden-
loss-of-consciousness defense is Malone v. Noblitt, 65 So. 3d 404 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2010), in which the Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that the 
 
8In this case, the charge to the jury on sudden loss of consciousness 
tracked the charge from Walker with nearly identical language. 
1200623 
23 
 
defendant had introduced substantial evidence for being able to invoke 
the defense. 
"Noblitt's testimony that he had no recollection of anything 
between the time he terminated his call with his stepson 
several miles before the accident occurred and the time he 
woke up in the hospital; his testimony denying that he had 
consumed alcohol since 1971; his testimony that the only 
drugs he had taken the day of the accident were prescription 
medications for high blood pressure and high cholesterol and 
that he had never had any adverse reactions to those drugs; 
Poe's testimony that, after the accident, he did not detect any 
indication that Noblitt had consumed alcohol; Dr. Arora's 
testimony that, after the accident, he did not detect any 
indication that Noblitt was under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs; and Noblitt's testimony that he had never suffered a 
similar loss of consciousness or awareness before he suffered 
such a loss immediately before the accident, and the absence 
of any evidence indicating that Noblitt suffered a head injury 
in the accident that would have caused amnesia, constituted 
substantial evidence tending to prove that Noblitt suffered an 
involuntary and unforeseeable loss of consciousness or 
awareness immediately before the accident ...." 
65 So. 3d at 410. 
 
Pearce's arguments in this appeal focus on what constitutes 
"'knowledge that such a condition [sudden loss of consciousness] would 
occur.'" Walker, 348 So. 2d at 1051. More specifically, Pearce does not 
dispute, for purposes of this appeal, that Day suffered a heart attack or 
other cardiac event that rendered him unconscious before the April 7, 
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24 
 
2017, accident.9 Instead, she contends that Day was aware that he was 
likely to have a heart attack and that, therefore, it was dangerous for him 
to be driving on the roadway at all on April 7, 2017.  
 
With that general background in mind, we will first examine 
Pearce's arguments with respect to Enterprise's motions in limine, and 
then we will evaluate her argument that the verdict was against the 
great weight of the evidence. 
A. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Granting Enterprise's Motions in 
Limine 
 
 
Preliminarily, we note that Enterprise contends that Pearce did not 
preserve for appellate review her objections to the motions in limine 
because, it asserts, the trial court's rulings on those matters were not 
absolute and unconditional and Pearce did not make an offer of proof at 
trial. This Court has explained: 
 
9For example, Pearce states:  "Mr. Day suffering another heart 
attack is, in fact, what one would reasonably expect, given his continued 
noncompliance with his doctors' instructions and reckless disregard for 
his own health." Pearce's brief, p. 38. It is true that, in her rendition of 
the facts, Pearce notes that Dr. Rydzewski could not definitively state 
that Day had suffered a heart attack on the day of the accident. However, 
the whole tenor of Pearce's arguments center on contending that Day 
knew or should have known that he was susceptible to suffering another 
heart attack and that, therefore, the sudden-loss-of-consciousness 
defense should not apply. 
1200623 
25 
 
"'In some cases an order granting a motion in limine is not 
absolute, but only preliminary, and the non-moving party 
may offer the disputed evidence at trial and, if the other party 
objects and the court sustains the objection, the party offering 
the evidence may appeal from this ruling.' Ex parte Houston 
County, 435 So. 2d [1268] at 1271 [(Ala. 1983)]. A prohibitive-
absolute or unconditional granting of a motion in limine 
preserves the issue for review at the pretrial stage and 
eliminates the need for a specific objection at trial. See Bush 
v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 175 
(Ala. 1991). Thus, whether an order granting a motion in 
limine is 'absolute' or 'preliminary' merely determines how 
the issue is preserved for review on direct appeal." 
 
Ex parte Sysco Food Servs. of Jackson, LLC, 901 So. 2d 671, 674 (Ala. 
2004).  
 
We find Enterprise's argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, 
it is debatable whether the trial court's February 27, 2021, order granting 
the motions in limine was preliminary or absolute. Although the order 
did not expressly exclude Pearce from making an offer of proof at trial, 
the order also did not indicate that the trial court would reconsider its 
rulings at trial. Compare Ex parte Houston Cnty., 435 So. 2d 1268, 1271 
(Ala. 1983) (concluding that "[t]he order entered below appears to be of 
the preliminary sort allowing offers at trial, because it ends with the 
words 'without further order of this Court'"), with Bush v. Alabama Farm 
Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 175, 178 (Ala. 1991) (finding that 
1200623 
26 
 
"[t]here is no evidence that the ruling on the motion in limine was 
absolute or unconditional" because the trial court "did not prohibit 
counsel from making an offer of proof of the excluded evidence"). 
Moreover, as Pearce observes in her reply brief, the trial court initially 
granted the motions in limine but then granted Pearce's motion to 
reconsider the rulings and held a second hearing on the evidentiary 
issues before it ultimately granted the motions in limine. It is unlikely 
that the trial court held two hearings on the evidentiary issues and yet 
deemed its rulings to be preliminary in nature. Second, even if the rulings 
in the February 27, 2021, order were preliminary, at the close of her case 
Pearce made an offer of proof concerning Day's medical records that the 
trial court had excluded. Those medical records make up the bulk of the 
evidence that Pearce asserts should not have been excluded.10 Therefore, 
Pearce did preserve for appellate review the evidentiary issues she 
raises. 
 
10Pearce did not make an offer of proof with respect to evidence 
indicating that Enterprise drivers were asked to drive up to 14 hours per 
day. However, the undisputed evidence revealed that Day had driven, at 
most, only three total hours on the day of the accident -- including his 
breaks to pick up another car and to get gas. Thus, such evidence was 
irrelevant, and Pearce treats it as an afterthought in her briefs to this 
Court.  
1200623 
27 
 
 
Pearce's arguments concerning Enterprise's motions in limine 
address four categories of evidence:  (1) evidence that Day had told 
various doctors that sometimes he did not take his medications because 
he wanted to see if his failure to do so would kill him; (2) evidence of Day's 
general medical history -- including his COPD, sleep apnea, depression, 
and aortic-valve replacement; (3) evidence that Day had smoked 
marijuana within 24 to 48 hours of the accident; and (4) evidence of what 
Pearce calls Day's "pattern of reckless and wanton conduct." Although we 
will discuss the evidence that Pearce highlights for each of those 
categories, we note that there is an overarching theme to Pearce's 
arguments for each category. That is, Pearce argues that various 
elements of Day's past medical history demonstrate that Day knew or 
should have known that he was susceptible to losing consciousness and 
that, therefore, he should not have been driving on April 7, 2017. 
Enterprise's consistent response asserts that the excluded evidence 
Pearce highlights is not sufficiently relevant to the accident to outweigh 
the substantial unfair prejudice that would have resulted from admission 
of that evidence.  
1200623 
28 
 
 
The trial court's stated basis for excluding Pearce's proffered 
evidence was Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.,11 i.e., that the unfair prejudice of 
the subject evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. Thus, 
it is worth keeping in mind what this Court has said pertaining to the 
standard for excluding evidence under Rule 403: 
"The proper test for determining whether relevant evidence 
has been properly excluded under Rule 403 is to determine 
whether 'its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.' (Emphasis added.) McElroy's 
Alabama Evidence clarifies the Rule 403 standard by stating: 
'This principle does not empower the trial judge to exclude 
evidence simply because it is prejudicial or because its 
prejudice outweighs its probative value. Rather, exclusion is 
merited only when the prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value.' Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama 
Evidence, § 21.01(4) (5th ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis original). 
 
"'Unfair prejudice' under Rule 403 has been defined as 
something more than simple damage to an opponent's case. 
Dealto v. State, 677 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). A 
litigant's case is always damaged by evidence that is contrary 
to his or her contention, but damage caused in that manner 
does not rise to the level of 'unfair prejudice' and cannot alone 
be cause for exclusion. Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. 
 
11Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., provides:  "Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." 
1200623 
29 
 
Crim. App. 1993), reversed in part on other grounds, 674 
So. 2d 1365 (Ala. 1994). 'Prejudice is "unfair" if [it] has "an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis."' 
Gipson v. Younes, 724 So. 2d 530, 532 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), 
quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 (Advisory Committee Notes 1972). 
See, also, Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid." 
 
Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92, 95-96 (Ala. 1999) (final emphasis added). 
With that standard in mind, we will examine each category of 
evidence Pearce believes the trial court erred in excluding. 
1. Evidence of Suicidal Ideations 
Pearce contends that the trial court should not have excluded 
evidence indicating that Day admitted to various doctors that he had not 
taken medications to see if it would kill him. In this regard, Pearce 
highlights two pieces of excluded evidence. The first is a May 5, 2014, 
letter written by Dr. George M. Handey for the purpose of helping Day 
receive Social Security disability benefits. The letter stated: 
"As per our conversation, you are 100% disabled due to 
multiple medical problems. You are status post aortic valve 
replacement and you are on chronic anticoagulation. You 
continue to have symptoms of shortness of breath and 
dyspnea on exertion. Furthermore, you have COPD and 
depend on inhalers. You have a history of sleep apnea and use 
[a] CPAP [machine]. You have [hypertension,] degenerative 
arthritis and joint disease, and obesity.  As a result of these 
medical problems and the inability to work, you have 
developed major depression and suicidal ideation, which has 
1200623 
30 
 
resulted in your further neglecting your health and 
contributing 
to 
noncompliance 
with 
medication 
and 
treatment. You are in the trucking business and cannot drive 
because 
you 
cannot 
qualify 
for 
a 
[Department 
of 
Transportation] health card as you do not meet the physical 
and mental standards due to multiple medical problems. I 
recommend you apply for social security disability. Please 
consider putting in your application and requesting your 
medical records to support your claim." 
 
(Emphasis added.) The second piece of evidence is a note from Dr. Cooper 
in the medical file for Day's visit to Montgomery Cardiovascular 
Associates on February 8, 2017: 
"[Day] is also somewhat depressed. He states he isn't suicidal, 
but doesn't want to live anymore. He reports medical 
noncomplian[ce] with medications to see if it would kill him. 
He denies a plan for suicide. I am concerned for his 
depression. He does take a medication for this. Again, he 
denies a plan or intent and states he is fine and will get passed 
[sic] it." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Pearce contends that the foregoing pieces of evidence were relevant 
because "[i]t is beyond dispute that a person cannot die without losing 
consciousness. Therefore, Mr. Day's admission is compelling evidence of 
not only Mr. Day's knowledge that he could suffer loss of consciousness, 
but evidence that he recklessly failed to prevent loss of consciousness." 
1200623 
31 
 
Pearce's brief, p. 24. In other words, Pearce argues that Day's statements 
in medical records as to why he sometimes would not take his 
medications were relevant because they show that Day knew that not 
taking his medications could cause him to lose consciousness.  
 
We first note what Pearce is not seeking to establish with this 
evidence:  Pearce does not contend that the evidence was relevant 
because Day was attempting to commit suicide via the accident.12 The 
jury heard testimony from Day's friend and coworker Sandra George and 
from Dr. Cooper that Day had a history of not taking his medications. 
Thus, the excluded evidence merely offered a reason why Day sometimes 
did not take his medications, i.e., suicidal thoughts, without directly 
connecting that reason to the accident. Absent a direct connection 
between suicidal thoughts and the accident itself, the relevance of the 
evidence is tenuous, while the potential for unfair prejudice is palpable. 
Suicide is an emotional topic that could mislead or confuse a jury about 
 
12In her reply brief, Pearce stated:  "[Enterprise] incorrectly states 
that [Pearce] sought to introduce evidence that Mr. Day committed 
suicide. The evidence and the record clearly indicate that Mr. Day's 
admissions were sought to be admitted into evidence to show Mr. Day's 
knowledge of his potential for loss of consciousness." Pearce's reply brief, 
p. 3. 
1200623 
32 
 
the issues before it. See State v. Onorato, 171 Vt. 577, 579, 762 A.2d 858, 
860 (2000) (noting that "[b]ecause it is highly equivocal and 
circumstantial, the admissibility of attempted suicide evidence may 
introduce remote, secondary concerns that might confuse a jury"). 
Pearce's argument is also based on speculation. At most, the 
excluded evidence shows that Day wondered whether not taking his 
medications could kill him, not that he knew what effect not taking his 
medications would have upon him. Moreover, as Enterprise observes, the 
letter from Dr. Handey was written three years before the accident, and 
the note from Dr. Cooper was written almost two months before the 
accident, so their probative value is diminished. There is no evidence 
indicating (1) that not taking the medications Day had been prescribed 
could cause immediate unconsciousness or (2) that Day had not taken his 
medications in the days or hours immediately preceding the accident. In 
fact, testimony from all of Day's coworkers indicated that Day was in an 
excellent mood on the morning of April 7, 2017, and that he had been 
feeling physically much better since he had received the stent on 
March 1, 2017. Again, absent a direct connection between the act of not 
1200623 
33 
 
taking medications and the accident, the relevance of the evidence is 
weak, but its potential to create unfair prejudice is strong.13 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not 
exceed its discretion by excluding evidence of Day's suicidal ideations. 
 
13Moreover, even if it could be said that the prejudicial effect of 
broaching the topic of suicide would not outweigh the relevance of 
evidence indicating that Day, against medical advice, sometimes did not 
take his medications, as we discuss in more detail in Part B of this 
analysis, evidence pertaining to foreseeability should be directly linked 
to a condition that is likely to lead to sudden loss of consciousness. That 
is not the case with respect to this evidence. 
 
"With some diseases or impairments, the conditions that 
may otherwise cause sudden loss of consciousness are 
controllable, and a motorist who is suffering from one of these 
diseases or impairments may lose consciousness or conscious 
control of a vehicle while driving as a consequence of failing 
to follow a prescribed medical regimen that requires the 
taking of pills, injections, medicines, foods, and the like, at 
specified periods. For example, a diabetic who fails to eat the 
proper foods at the proper times or departs from the 
timetables and dosages of his or her insulin injection may go 
into insulin shock or experience diabetic acidosis, either of 
which can cause the diabetic to lose consciousness. The same 
thing can happen to an epileptic who does not take his or her 
antiseizure pills at the prescribed intervals." 
 
Russell L. Wald, Liability for Sudden Loss of Consciousness While 
Driving, 17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, 10 (1992). 
1200623 
34 
 
 
2. Evidence of Day's Past Medical History 
 
Pearce contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
Day's "serious medical issues, noncompliance with his doctors' 
instructions, multiple visits to the emergency room, etc." Pearce's brief, 
p. 30. Pearce contends that such history was relevant because, she 
asserts, 
"[i]f Mr. Day did, in fact, suffer a heart attack and lose 
consciousness on the day of the subject accident, his heart 
attack would have been years in the making. Any reasonable 
review of Mr. Day's medical history would indicate that 
Mr. Day would suffer another heart attack if he did not take 
steps to improve his health." 
 
Id. at 31. Because the excluded evidence indicated that Day did not try 
to take steps to improve his health, Pearce contends that the evidence 
was relevant to show that Day knew he could have another heart attack. 
 
There are multiple problems with Pearce's argument. First, as with 
evidence about Day's failure to take medications, Pearce never 
established a direct connection between Day's medical conditions -- his 
COPD, sleep apnea, and aortic-valve replacement -- and the accident. As 
Enterprise observed in its brief, "[t]here is a distinction between evidence 
suggesting Day had risk factors for a possible medical episode and 
1200623 
35 
 
evidence Day knew he should not drive because he was likely to lose 
consciousness." Enterprise's brief, p. 46.  The fact that Day knew he had 
medical conditions related to his heart does not establish that Day knew 
he could have a heart attack at any moment and that, therefore, he 
should not have been driving. In other words, Day's past medical history 
was not necessarily relevant to establishing Day's "'knowledge that 
[sudden loss of consciousness] would occur.'" Walker, 348 So. 2d at 1051.  
This is a problem with Pearce's overarching argument with respect 
to all the categories of evidence she complains were excluded:  Pearce 
assumes that the sudden-loss-of-consciousness defense must be referring 
to a person's generalized knowledge about his or her health, but cases 
and authorities on the subject focus on specific knowledge of a condition 
that renders someone subject to losing consciousness. 
"It is generally recognized that the driver of a motor 
vehicle has the duty to exercise ordinary, reasonable, or due 
care, and that this duty includes keeping his or her vehicle 
under control at all times so as to avoid collision or contact 
with vehicles, pedestrians, and other persons properly using 
the highway. In accord with this general principle, in 
jurisdictions where the courts have been confronted with the 
question of physical impairment, they have generally held 
that where a driver has knowledge that he or she is suffering 
from a disorder likely to interfere with his or her ability to 
drive safely, the driver also knows that his or her subsequent 
1200623 
36 
 
conduct in operating the vehicle endangers the lives of all 
people traveling on the highway. In particular, it is recognized 
that a breach of a driver's duty of care occurs where the driver 
knows that his or her condition is such that he or she is prone 
to suddenly 'black out,' faint, or suffer a sudden 'attack or 
stroke,' and the driver causes injury to others as a result of 
losing consciousness and control of his or her car due to this 
condition. Thus, the courts in a number of cases have stated 
the rule to be that if an operator of a motor vehicle knows that 
he or she is subject to attacks in the course of which he or she 
is likely to lose consciousness, the operator is or may be 
chargeable with negligence (or even a higher degree of 
misconduct, such as gross negligence or wanton misconduct) 
for an automobile accident that occurs when he or she is 
stricken by a loss of consciousness." 
Russell L. Wald, Liability for Sudden Loss of Consciousness While 
Driving, 17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, 6-7 (1992) (footnotes omitted 
and emphasis added). See also McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 154 
(Tenn. 1995) (noting that "[t]he generally accepted approach is to accept 
as a defense the sudden loss of physical capacity or consciousness while 
driving provided that the loss of capacity or consciousness was 
unforeseeable" and citing cases from several jurisdictions, including 
Walker). Similarly, Pearce never demonstrated that the specific medical 
conditions highlighted in the excluded portions of Day's medical history 
were likely to render Day subject to a loss of consciousness, thus making 
them relevant to the affirmative defense. 
1200623 
37 
 
The second problem with Pearce's argument is that the jury 
ultimately was informed about most of the medical history that Pearce 
complains was excluded. Friend and coworker Sandra George testified 
that Day had COPD and sleep apnea and that he often would not use his 
CPAP machine. Dr. Cooper testified that Day's sleep apnea could 
increase the risk of heart failure if it was left untreated, that Day's failure 
to use his CPAP machine could increase the strain on his heart, and that 
COPD can put strain on a person's heart. Dr. Cooper also testified that 
Day's morbid obesity "absolutely" could affect the condition of his heart. 
Additionally, Dr. Cooper, Dr. Rydzewski, and Day's friend and coworker 
David Montgomery all testified about Day's aortic-valve replacement. 
Consequently, the jury was given the opportunity to consider whether 
Day's cumulative medical history demonstrated Day's knowledge that 
sudden unconsciousness could occur. Thus, even if the trial court erred 
in excluding portions of Day's medical history -- and we do not believe 
that it did -- the error was remedied at trial. See, e.g., Untreinor v. State, 
146 Ala. 26, 34, 41 So. 285, 288 (1906) (observing that, generally, "[i]f the 
evidence was erroneously excluded when first offered, its subsequent 
admission cured the error"). 
1200623 
38 
 
3. Evidence that Day had Used Marijuana within 24 to 48 Hours of 
the Accident 
 
Pearce contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence 
indicating that Day had THC in his body fluid the day of the accident. As 
we recounted in the rendition of the facts, Dr. Harper, a toxicologist, 
testified by deposition that Day had a small amount of THC in his body 
fluid at the time of the accident. Pearce argues that Day must have 
smoked the marijuana because David Montgomery had testified that he 
and Day had smoked marijuana together before. Pearce also notes that 
Dr. Cooper had told Day that smoking could increase his risk of having 
another heart attack. Based on all of that, Pearce contends that the trial 
court should have admitted the evidence about the presence of THC in 
Day's body fluid because it "show[s] Mr. Day's knowledge regarding the 
possibility that smoking could lead to another heart attack, which was 
directly related [to] the defense of sudden loss of consciousness and to 
show Mr. Day's wanton conduct and his reckless disregard for the safety 
of others." Pearce's brief, p. 36. In essence, Pearce wanted to introduce 
evidence of Day's marijuana use to show that he was smoking even 
though he had been told that smoking could increase his risk of having a 
second heart attack. 
1200623 
39 
 
Once again, there are multiple problems with Pearce's argument. 
First, there is no actual evidence indicating that Day smoked marijuana 
within 24 to 48 hours of the accident. Dr. Harper testified that there was 
no way to know from the THC sample how the marijuana was consumed. 
Moreover, he also testified that there was no way to be certain when the 
consumption occurred but that, if he had to estimate, he would say that 
the consumption had occurred within 24 to 48 hours of the accident. 
Second, it is undisputed that Pearce did not seek to introduce the 
evidence to argue that Day was impaired by marijuana at the time of 
accident.14 Pearce made this concession, no doubt, because:  (1) the trial 
court had ruled that Pearce's drug expert could not testify; (2) Dr. Harper 
had testified that there was no scientific basis to conclude from the 
amount and type of THC in Day's system that he would have been 
impaired at the time of the accident; and (3) testimony from all of Day's 
coworkers describing Day's behavior on the day of the accident gave no 
indication that Day was impaired in any way. Because Pearce was not 
attempting to draw a direct connection between Day's marijuana use and 
 
14"During the hearing on [Enterprise's] motions in limine, [Pearce] 
stated that she was willing to stipulate that Mr. Day was not impaired 
and his marijuana use did not cause the accident." Pearce's brief, p. 36. 
1200623 
40 
 
the accident, the relevance of the evidence was remote, but such evidence 
clearly had the potential to be substantially prejudicial.  
In Carter v. Haynes, 267 So. 3d 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018), the Court 
of Civil Appeals addressed "the question of the propriety of admitting 
evidence of use of a controlled substance to prove wrongful conduct when 
there has been no other evidence of impairment." Id. at 867. Unable to 
find an Alabama case on point, the Court of Civil Appeals quoted from a 
Pennsylvania court's opinion on the subject: 
"'Generally, the mere evidence of a party's 
consumption of alcohol or controlled substance is 
inadmissible to prove recklessness or carelessness 
of the party, unless it is established that the party 
was intoxicated and physically impaired at the 
time of the accident. Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa. 
Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380 (1992); Hawthorne v. 
Dravo Corp., Keystone Division, 352 Pa. Super. 
359, 508 A.2d 298 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 
617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987). Thus, any evidence 
tending to establish intoxication of a pedestrian is 
inadmissible, unless it is also proven that the 
pedestrian was unfit to cross the street due to 
physical impairment resulting from intoxication; 
the intoxication and physical impairment may be 
established by circumstantial evidence, such as 
"evidence that the injured party was staggering or 
had liquor on his breath." Kriner v. McDonald, 223 
Pa. Super. 531, 302 A.2d 392, 394 (1973).' 
 
1200623 
41 
 
"Chicchi v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 727 
A.2d 604, 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). 
 
 
"We agree with the reasoning of the Pennsylvania 
appellate court. There is no evidence of a causal relationship 
between the accident and Haynes's drug use at least six hours 
before the accident, nor is there any evidence tending to show 
that Haynes was impaired at the time of the accident. We 
disagree with Carter that the accident itself gives rise to an 
inference that Haynes was impaired at the time of the 
accident. Without evidence indicating that Haynes was 
impaired at or near the time of the accident, we cannot say 
that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the 
evidence of Haynes's use of marijuana and methadone on the 
ground that it was unduly or unfairly prejudicial to Haynes." 
 
267 So. 3d at 867.  
 
Enterprise cites Carter in support of its position that there was no 
error by the trial court in concluding that the unfair prejudice that could 
result from introducing evidence of Day's marijuana use substantially 
outweighed its probative value. We agree with the logic in Carter:  
without evidence that Day's marijuana use impaired him, and therefore 
contributed in some way to the accident, admission of the evidence could 
lead to the jury's deciding the case on an improper basis. Therefore, the 
trial court did not exceed its discretion by excluding such evidence.  
1200623 
42 
 
4. Evidence of Day's "Pattern of Reckless and Wanton Conduct" 
Pearce argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that 
"clearly indicates a pattern of reckless and wanton conduct" by Day. 
Pearce's brief, p. 32. Pearce is vague as to whether she is referring to any 
evidence not included in the other categories of evidence she highlights. 
However, it appears that Pearce simply means that Day's previous 
medical history established reckless or wanton behavior and that, 
therefore, the trial court should have admitted the evidence.15 Evidence 
of reckless or wanton conduct is relevant, Pearce argues, because that is 
the kind of "wrongful conduct for which the Alabama Wrongful Death 
Statute was designed to deter." Pearce's brief, p. 33.  
It is difficult to perceive how Day's action of driving could be deemed 
reckless or wanton given that his cardiologist, Dr. Cooper, had cleared 
him to return to work following his heart attack of March 1, 2017. Indeed, 
Dr. Carter testified that she had "no reservations" about allowing Day to 
return to work. Moreover, none of Day's coworkers indicated that they 
noticed anything wrong with Day on the morning of April 7, 2017. Their 
 
15In the portion of her brief addressing this category of excluded 
evidence, Pearce stated:  "Cumulatively, Mr. Day's medical history shows 
a pattern of reckless disregard for his health." Pearce's brief, p. 33.  
1200623 
43 
 
testimony sharply contrasts with David Montgomery's testimony 
concerning the morning of March 1, 2017 -- the date of Day's first heart 
attack -- when Montgomery had noticed that Day "was not feeling well 
that day" from the start, and yet Day initially had tried to push through 
the discomfort and keep driving.  
In addition to the evidentiary problem with this argument, Pearce 
seems to be attempting to shoehorn a wantonness claim into her case 
even though, for all that appears in the record, no such claim was 
presented to the jury. In her response to the motions in limine, Pearce 
argued that evidence of Day's medical history and marijuana use "is 
relevant and necessary to show that Day engaged in wanton conduct by 
his conscious disregard for his health and his knowledge that such an 
event could occur." In its reply, Enterprise contended that Pearce had 
conceded her wantonness claim, citing to a colloquy during the summary-
judgment hearing. That concession concerned only Count 6, Pearce's 
entrustment claim against Enterprise, not Count 1, Pearce's negligence 
claim against Day's estate. However, the trial court's final summary-
judgment order specifically stated that "claims of negligence (Count One) 
and vicarious liability (Count Two) plead[ed] in [Pearce's] Second 
1200623 
44 
 
Amended Complaint dated December 12, 2018, remain justiciable for 
subsequent resolution at trial, including as to [Enterprise's] defense of 
sudden loss of consciousness and all other adequately [pleaded] 
affirmative defenses." That order made no mention of a surviving 
wantonness claim. Moreover, no instruction on wantonness was given to 
the jury. Furthermore, Pearce does not argue on appeal that a 
wantonness claim was submitted to the jury. Therefore, we find no legal 
basis for Pearce's contention that medical records pertaining to Day's 
past medical history should have been admitted because the evidence 
established wanton conduct by Day. 
B. Whether the Verdict Was Against the Great Weight of the Evidence 
 
Pearce contends that, even without the excluded evidence, the 
jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence because, she 
asserts, the evidence established that  
"Mr. Day knew or should have known, that not following his 
doctors' instructions after having already suffered a heart 
attack increased the chances of him having another heart 
attack, which could result in a loss of consciousness. Not only 
did Mr. Day have knowledge he could suffer a heart attack, he 
had knowledge he could suffer a heart attack while driving for 
Enterprise."  
 
Pearce's brief, p. 38.  
1200623 
45 
 
But again, Day's having knowledge that he possessed certain risk 
factors that could lead to a heart attack is not the same as having 
knowledge of a condition that is likely to lead to a loss of consciousness. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions support this critical distinction. In 
Denson v. Estate of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), a case 
in which the defendant had similar health risks, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals observed: 
"While Denson designated evidence that shows that 
Dillard was prescribed medication for his heart, and that his 
prior heart attack would have put him on notice that he 
suffered from coronary artery disease, this evidence does not 
equate to knowledge of peril or create an inference that a 
reasonable man in Dillard's position would have altered his 
behavior regarding driving.6 This is especially true in light of 
the undisputed lack of driving restrictions or warnings not to 
drive by trained medical personnel. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that Dillard suffered any symptoms prior to his 
decision to drive on November 20, which would have alerted 
him of the impending physical incapacity. 
 
"____________________ 
 
"6Denson submitted expert medical testimony which 
broadly stated that '[g]iven his medical history on 
November 20, 2016[,] before the incident in question, Delmer 
Dillard was at a significantly increased risk of future cardiac 
events.' Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 231. This is a far cry from 
evidence that Dillard knew or had reason to believe that he 
1200623 
46 
 
was at imminent risk for an attack and should not have been 
driving." 
 
Id. at 542 (emphasis added and footnote 7 omitted). Similarly, in McCoy 
v. Murray (No. 4-08-36, Apr. 6, 2009), ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (not 
published in North Eastern Reporter), the Ohio Court of Appeals 
reasoned: 
"Although one can look at Murray's history as a smoker with 
high blood pressure and cholesterol, and a family history of 
heart disease and determine that he was bound to suffer a 
heart condition, it would have been impossible to predict how 
and when such a condition might occur. Moreover, there was 
nothing in Murray's history that would lead a reasonable 
person to believe they were in danger of suffering a loss of 
consciousness. While the McCoys make much of Murray's 
history, 
nothing 
indicated 
a 
known 
risk 
of 
losing 
consciousness." 
(Emphasis added.) In Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 99 Ohio St. 3d 260, 791 
N.E.2d 422 (2003), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the implications 
of accepting an argument like the one presented by Pearce: 
"[A]ppellants argue that a driver who operates a vehicle with 
knowledge of any medical condition should bear the risk of 
injuries 
that 
result 
from 
loss 
of 
consciousness 
or 
incapacitation due to the condition. Appellants contend that 
assumption-of-the-risk principles should apply in a situation 
where a driver with a medical condition chooses to operate a 
vehicle. 
 
1200623 
47 
 
"If we accept this argument, then only those defendants 
who have never had any inkling of any medical condition 
would be able to assert and prevail on the sudden-medical-
emergency defense, and all other drivers would be precluded 
from relying on the defense. 
 
"As it did in this case, the foreseeability inquiry in cases 
in which a defendant raises the defense of sudden medical 
emergency frequently amounts to a consideration by the 
factfinder of whether the defendant driver should have been 
driving at all. See 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 
18, Section 283C, Comment c:  '[A]n automobile driver who 
suddenly and quite unexpectedly suffers a heart attack does 
not become negligent when he loses control of his car and 
drives it in a manner which would otherwise be unreasonable; 
but one who knows that he is subject to such attacks may be 
negligent in driving at all.' 
 
"As urged by appellants, the foreseeability inquiry in 
cases such as these would be redefined to remove any 
consideration of the reasonableness of choosing to drive 
despite imperfect health and would essentially mean that all 
drivers with any history of illness are unable as a matter of 
law to prevail on a sudden-medical-emergency defense." 
99 Ohio St. 3d at 271-72, 791 N.E.2d at 431-32 (emphasis added).  
In short, if the type of "warning" Day had could constitute 
"'knowledge that [sudden loss of consciousness] would occur,'" Walker, 
348 So. 2d at 1051, then it would not be reasonable for a significant 
segment of the population to be driving at all. That is not the type of 
"knowledge" that is referred to in the context of the defense of sudden 
1200623 
48 
 
loss of consciousness. As stated in these opinions from other jurisdictions, 
this knowledge must involve a condition that makes it reasonably 
foreseeable that it was dangerous for the defendant to be driving at all. 
Moreover, the question whether Day had sufficient knowledge that 
would lead to the conclusion that he should not have been driving is 
quintessentially one for the jury. The jury heard testimony about Day's 
other medical conditions, his aortic-valve replacement, and his heart 
attack of March 1, 2017, and yet the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Day's estate and Enterprise. The fact that it did so does not mean that 
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence but, rather, that the 
jury believed Day's knowledge was not sufficient to put him on notice that 
he was likely to lose consciousness while driving. Given the evidence 
presented, the jury reached a reasonable conclusion, which we will not 
disturb. 
As a final effort, Pearce argues: 
"The undisputed evidence was Mr. Day left the 
Enterprise Rental Car location in Dothan, Alabama alone, he 
stopped to fuel his vehicle and then traveled approximately 
thirty minutes alone, without any communication with 
anyone prior to the accident. There was no evidence admitted 
at trial which could lead a jury to determine whether Mr. Day 
1200623 
49 
 
was without warning symptoms that he was going to have a 
heart attack and lose consciousness." 
 
Pearce's brief, p. 43.  
That paragraph is not an accurate characterization of the evidence. 
David Montgomery testified that when Day had a heart attack on March 
1, 2017, Day had noticeably not been feeling well all morning, and he also 
stated that Day was able to pull over to the side of the road when he was 
having symptoms of the heart attack. In contrast, several Enterprise 
coworkers testified that they saw Day the morning of the accident and 
that Day gave no indication that he was not feeling well. James Berry, 
who drove the "chase van" that followed Day from Dothan back to 
Montgomery, testified that he was with Day at a gas station 
approximately 30 minutes before the accident and that Day seemed 
perfectly fine at that time. Berry also testified that, just before the 
accident occurred, he observed Day's car "gradually" go off the road and 
into the grass median without it making any correction in steering and 
without the brakes being engaged. Dr. Rydzewski testified that "what I 
saw in [Day's] heart would be -- if someone was found dead and there was 
nothing else to suggest an alternative cause of death, I would call the 
cause death, you know, due to his heart." Taken together, that testimony 
1200623 
50 
 
certainly constituted substantial evidence indicating that Day had 
experienced a sudden loss of consciousness due to a heart attack before 
the accident. Thus, Pearce is incorrect in asserting that "a reasonable 
jury could not have found for the defense on this issue based on the 
evidence." Pearce's brief, p. 43.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 The trial court did not exceed its discretion by granting 
Enterprise's motions in limine on the basis that the potential for unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the subject 
evidence. Likewise, Pearce has not overcome the presumption of 
correctness we afford to the trial court's denial of Pearce's motion for new 
trial because the jury's verdict was reasonable based on the presented 
evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart, and 
Mitchell, JJ., concur.