Title: Haynes-Garrett v. Dunn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 171055
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2018

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JUNE HAYNES-GARRETT 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 171055 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
October 4, 2018 
DREW A. DUNN, ET AL. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
 
June Haynes-Garrett (“Haynes-Garrett”) appeals from the judgment of the circuit court 
striking her evidence at the trial of her personal injury action against Drew and Cynthia Dunn 
(the “Dunns”) and Sandbridge Properties, Inc., d/b/a Siebert Realty (“Siebert”).  Haynes-Garrett 
argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that the defendants only owed her the duty of care that 
a landlord owes its tenant when she rented the Dunns’ vacation rental house for her family’s one-
week vacation at Virginia Beach.  We affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Complaint 
 
Haynes-Garrett filed a complaint against the Dunns and Siebert alleging that the Dunns 
“owned, controlled, operated and/or managed a rental house located at 3601 Sandpiper Road,” in 
Virginia Beach and that Siebert “controlled, operated and/or managed the house for and on 
behalf of the Dunns, including, but not limited to, renting the house on behalf of the Dunns to 
week long vacationers.”  According to her complaint, she “entered into a rental agreement with 
the Dunns, through [Siebert], to rent the house, for valuable consideration, for one week.” 
 
Haynes-Garrett alleges that when she “arrived at the house for the first time” at “the start 
of [her] one week rental period,” she “walked from a carpeted room into an adjoining tiled 
hallway” and “a lip or rise created by the unevenness of the threshold between the carpeted room 
 
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flooring and the tiled hallway flooring . . . caused [her] to fall to the ground and sustain serious 
injuries.”  She contends that the Dunns and Siebert were negligent because they “failed to 
maintain the house’s floors in a safe and fit condition,” “failed to make reasonable inspection of 
the house’s floors,” and “failed to warn [her] of the hidden, dangerous and hazardous condition 
that caused her fall.” 
B. Evidence at Trial 
 
“When ruling on a motion to strike the plaintiff’s evidence, the circuit court must ‘accept 
as true all the evidence favorable to the plaintiff as well as any reasonable inference a jury might 
draw therefrom which would sustain the plaintiff’s cause of action.’”  Gelber v. Glock, 293 Va. 
497, 514 (2017) (quoting Austin v. Shoney’s, Inc., 254 Va. 134, 138, (1997)).  Thus, “[w]hen 
reviewing a circuit court’s decision granting a motion to strike the plaintiff’s evidence, we 
likewise review the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 514-15. 
1. The Rental House 
 
The Dunns, who reside in Northern Virginia, purchased the rental house, referred to as 
“Dolphin’s Paradise,” in 2004, to serve as a “multipurpose second house” for them “to spend 
some time with family in Virginia Beach,” as “an investment for [their] future, and, eventually, 
[their] retirement home.”  It is a single-family, two-level beach house with seven bedrooms, four 
bathrooms, two family rooms, a dining area, and kitchen.  The Dunns rent the house from May 
through October.  Mr. Dunn testified that the house is only rented to “families” and is not “a 
party house for kids from college.” 
The rental of Dolphin’s Paradise is managed by Siebert, which has an office located 
approximately three or four miles from the rental house.  Pursuant to the management agreement, 
the Dunns appoint Siebert “as their sole and exclusive agent to rent and manage the property, and 
 
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to enter into lease/contracts with Tenant(s)/Guest(s).”  The agreement provides that Siebert will 
send the Dunns an “annual addendum reflecting [Siebert’s] rate recommendations” and be 
granted “the exclusive right to rent and manage the property for the rental rate agreed to on the 
addendum or such rental rate or terms as may hereafter be agreed upon.” 
The management agreement requires the Dunns to “provide a minimum of 8 weeks 
during the In/Peak Seasons for the purpose of rentals” and authorizes Siebert to “collect all rents 
and deposits in connection with the rental of the Property.”  The agreement provides for a 
“monthly Winter Rental,” at the option of the Dunns, upon various terms and conditions. 
The agreement states that Siebert will require payment of security deposits by occupants 
“for the protection of the property and to assist in repairs when necessary.”  In particular, 
occupants are charged, “on all weekly and short stays less than 21 days, a fee for an accidental 
damage protection program which protects the property.”  A security deposit of $500 is collected 
“for all rentals in excess of 21 days and less than 90 days, and no less than one month’s rent on 
longer stays in excess of 90 days.”  “Any security deposit not withheld for damage must be 
returned to the Guest within 45 days after the end of lease.” 
 
Pursuant to the agreement, when Dolphin’s Paradise is occupied by a guest, the Dunns 
are not permitted to “enter the Property or instruct any other person to enter the Property without 
prior notification to [Siebert].”  The agreement provides that a “standard General Cleaning” will 
be performed “between Guests for weekly or short stay reservations” and a “Deep Cleaning” will 
be conducted, at a minimum, once a year.  Mrs. Dunn routinely spends a week at Dolphin’s 
Paradise in the spring to prepare the house for the leasing season and Mr. Dunn generally spends 
a week vacationing there following the end of the leasing season. 
 
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Dolphin’s Paradise is furnished with beds, other furniture, appliances, and utility 
services, all of which is considered part of the “rental.”  Siebert also provides the linens and 
towels.  The Dunns, who live in Northern Virginia, are not present at Dolphin’s Paradise when it 
is rented.  They provide no food service, room service, daily maid service or security personnel 
for Dolphin’s Paradise. 
2. Haynes-Garrett’s Rental of Dolphin’s Paradise and the Accident 
 
 
Haynes-Garrett testified that her extended family has “a tradition of getting together for a 
week every summer.”  In November 2013, her daughter, Beth Acord, conducted online computer 
research to locate vacation rentals that would accommodate their family.  Based on that research, 
Mrs. Haynes-Garrett chose Dolphin’s Paradise for her family’s 2014 summer vacation.  Haynes-
Garrett sent a check to Siebert for payment of the rental fee but did not speak directly with any 
representative from Siebert.  She also did not meet the Dunns or have any communication with 
them before she rented their home.  She testified that she did not sign the rental agreement with 
Siebert, but believed that Acord signed the agreement. 
 
On the day the accident occurred, Haynes-Garrett’s grandson, Ben Fabian, along with his 
wife and children, were the first members of the family to arrive at Dolphin’s Paradise.  Fabian’s 
family went “to the realty office, picked up the packet that had the keys and instructions, and 
then . . . drove back to the property.”  The Fabians brought in the linens which were provided by 
Siebert and contained in “tubs.” 
 
When Haynes-Garrett and her husband arrived to Dolphin’s Paradise, Fabian and his wife 
were in a bedroom they selected for their family.  Haynes-Garrett entered through the front door 
and walked up the inside steps.  She walked around the kitchen, went into the family room, and 
then walked into the master bedroom.  Fabian called out to her from the bedroom he and his wife 
 
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had selected, and Haynes-Garrett proceeded to walk on the carpeted floor from the master 
bedroom, across the family room, toward a ceramic tiled hallway outside the room where Fabian 
was located.  As Haynes-Garrett walked from the carpeted area to the tiled hallway, she stubbed 
her toe on the transition strip or “lip” where the floor was raised.  When she stubbed her toe, she 
fell onto the ceramic tile floor, injuring her elbow, which subsequently required two surgeries. 
C. Motion to Strike 
 
 
At the conclusion of Haynes-Garrett’s evidence, the defendants moved to strike her 
evidence and enter judgment for defendants. 
1. The Dunns 
 
The Dunns asserted that the evidence failed to prove a breach of any duty they owed to 
Haynes-Garrett.  Specifically, they argued that where “possession of the premises are 
surrendered to even a short-term vacation rental, such as a one-week rental,” the relationship of 
the owner and guest is one of landlord and tenant.  The Dunns explained that neither they nor 
their agent, Siebert, “maintained a presence on the property, or were in direct or continued 
control of the property during the time that Mrs. Haynes-Garrett rented it.”  Therefore, according 
to the Dunns, they only owed Haynes-Garrett the duty of care that a landlord owes its tenant. 
 
The Dunns asserted that as landlords, in the absence of fraud or concealment, they owed 
no duty of care to maintain or repair the premises and no duty to warn of a dangerous condition 
on the premises unless they knew of a dangerous condition that was not open and obvious or 
discoverable by Haynes-Garrett upon making a reasonable inspection.  The Dunns further argued 
that, assuming the “lip” on which Haynes-Garrett tripped was a dangerous condition, it was open 
and obvious, and discoverable by making a reasonable inspection.  Therefore, according to the 
Dunns, the evidence proved no breach of duty owed by them to Haynes-Garrett. 
 
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In response to the Dunns’ motion to strike, Haynes-Garrett asserted that the Dunns owed 
her the same duty that an innkeeper owes its guest.  Haynes-Garrett argued that “[t]he house is 
turnkey” and “everything is provided” as with a hotel or bed and breakfast, such that the only 
difference between a hotel and Dolphin’s Paradise is the “type of physical structure.”  Haynes-
Garret also argued that “if the relationship is not one of innkeeper and guest, at a minimum, it is 
one of owner/invitee.”  Haynes-Garrett further argued that because the “lip” is “short” and 
“appears identical to the flat surface of the tiled foyer flooring,” it is not open and obvious. 
2. Siebert 
 
In support of its motion to strike, Siebert asserted that it had no relationship with Haynes-
Garrett and owed no duty of care to her with regard to the condition of Dolphin’s Paradise.  
More specifically, Siebert argued that it was “not a landlord,” “didn’t own the property,” and 
“had a property management agreement with the Dunns that governs [Siebert’s] . . . contractual 
obligations with the Dunns.”   Thus, according to Siebert, it “assume[d] no duty to Mrs. Haynes-
Garrett with regard to the condition of the property” and “the law [did] not impose upon Siebert 
Realty any duty regarding the condition of the property.”  Haynes-Garrett responded that Siebert 
owed “a duty to the people who come within its sphere of conduct” and also a duty of care as 
part of a “joint endeavor” with the Dunns. 
 
The circuit court granted the defendants’ motions to strike on the grounds they argued 
and entered judgment in their favor. 
II.   ISSUE ON APPEAL 
 
Haynes-Garrett’s assignment of error is limited to the issue of whether the circuit court 
“erred in granting the defendants’ motion to strike at the end of Mrs. Haynes-Garrett’s evidence 
 
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on the grounds the defendants only owed Mrs. Haynes-Garrett a duty of care commensurate with 
that of landlord and tenant.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
Siebert did not assert that it owed a duty of care commensurate with that of landlord and 
tenant.  Rather, Siebert asserted that it owed no duty of care to Haynes-Garrett because it had no 
relationship with her.  The circuit court sustained Siebert’s motion to strike on the grounds it 
asserted.  Therefore, the circuit court’s ruling as to Siebert, that it owed no duty of care to 
Haynes-Garrett, is not before us on appeal. 
 
The Dunns asserted that Haynes-Garrett’s evidence established that they only owed a 
duty of care to Haynes-Garrett that a landlord owes its tenant and that they did not breach this 
duty.  The circuit court sustained the Dunns’ motion to strike on these grounds.  Haynes-Garrett 
does not assign error to the circuit court’s ruling that the Dunns did not breach their duty of care 
to her. 
 
Accordingly, the sole issue before us on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in ruling 
that the Dunns only owed a duty of care to Haynes-Garrett commensurate with that of landlord 
and tenant. 
III.   ANALYSIS 
Haynes-Garrett contends that the Dunns owed her the elevated duty of care that an 
innkeeper owes its guest.  We disagree and hold, under the evidence presented by Haynes-
Garrett, that the Dunns only owed her the duty of care that a landlord owes its tenant.1 
                                                 
 
1 Haynes-Garrett argues, alternatively, that the Dunns owed her a duty of care 
commensurate with the duty a property owner/occupant owes to its invitee.  Haynes-Garrett was 
an occupant of the premises, and, therefore, could not also be an invitee. See, e.g., Bauer v. 
Harn, 223 Va. 31, 36-37 (1982) (acknowledging that “[t]he term ‘invitee’ in tort law describes 
the status of a person entering land in respect to the duties owed him by [an] owner or occupier 
of [such] land,” and distinguishing invitees from “landowner[s] or occupier[s]”). The issue for 
 
 
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Under the common law, a landlord has “no duty to maintain in a safe condition any part 
of the leased premises that [is] under [a tenant’s] exclusive control.”  Isbell v. Commercial Inv. 
Assocs., 273 Va. 605, 611 (2007) (citation omitted).  “Where the right of possession and 
enjoyment of the leased premises passes to the lessee . . ., in the absence of concealment or fraud 
by the landlord as to some defect in the premises, known to him and unknown to the tenant, the 
tenant takes the premises in whatever condition they may be in, thus assuming all risk of 
personal injury from defects therein.”  Id.2 
 
In contrast, “an elevated duty of care” is imposed upon a property owner that operates an 
inn on its premises.  “An innkeeper holds out his house as a public place” as an “accommodation 
for travelers.”  Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 947 (1946).  See also Black’s Law 
Dictionary at 792 (7th ed. 1999) (defining an “innkeeper” as “[a] person who, for compensation, 
keeps open a public house for the lodging and entertainment of travelers”).  When the 
relationship is that of innkeeper and guest, “[t]he responsibility for the premises is primarily on 
the innkeeper, and the guests may generally assume that they are safe.”  Kirby v. Moehlman, 182 
Va. 876, 884 (1944) (citation omitted).  Thus, the innkeeper owes a duty “to take every 
                                                 
our determination is whether she occupied the premises as the guest of an innkeeper or the tenant 
of a landlord. 
 
 
2 Although Haynes-Garrett testified that her daughter may have signed the rental 
agreement, Haynes-Garrett asserted in her complaint that it was she who “entered into a rental 
agreement with the Dunns, through [Siebert], to rent the house, for valuable consideration, for 
one week.”  Thus, the issue in this case as made by the pleadings is whether the rental agreement 
gave rise to a duty on the part of the Dunns to maintain the premises in a safe condition as she 
alleged in her complaint.  See Dabney v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Va. 78, 86 (2011) (noting 
that “[t]he issues in a case are made by the pleadings, and not by the testimony of witnesses or 
other evidence”) (citation omitted).  In any event, regardless of who signed the rental agreement, 
the duties and liabilities of a landlord to invitees and guests of its tenant, with respect to personal 
injuries, are ordinarily the same as those of the landlord to its tenant since invitees and guests 
“stand in the tenant’s shoes.”  Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 543 (1951). 
  
 
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reasonable precaution to protect the person and property of their guests and boarders.”  
Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corp., 182 Va. 713, 716 (1944). 
 
The distinction between the landlord-tenant relationship and the innkeeper-guest 
relationship is based upon the extent to which the owner of the premises maintains possession of 
and control over the premises during its occupancy.  “[U]nlike a landlord, an innkeeper is in 
direct and continued control of the property and usually maintains a presence on the property 
personally or through agents.”  Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 324 (2006).  The 
innkeeper’s continued presence on and control over the property during the guest’s occupation 
justifies the elevated duty of care owed by an innkeeper to its guest just as a common carrier’s 
continued presence on and control over its vehicle justifies the elevated duty owed by a common 
carrier to its passengers.  See id. at 325.  On the other hand, a lessee enjoys “the right of 
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises” and, therefore, “assum[es] all risk of personal 
injury from defects therein.”  Isbell, 273 Va. at 611.  “[T]he controlling factor in determining 
whether the relationship of innkeeper and guest has been established is the intent of the parties.”  
Alpaugh, 184 Va. at 949.3 
                                                 
 
3 Haynes-Garrett relies on Jarmak v. Ramos, Case No. 6:10-cv-00048, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 75304 (W.D. Va. July 13, 2011) (unpublished), wherein the court ruled that an 
innkeeper-guest relationship was established because the owner of a cabin “intended for the 
cabin to be used for short stays by visitors attracted to a scenic area of Virginia, and that 
[plaintiff] intended to use the cabin for those purposes.”  Id. at *15.  The court in Jarmak focused 
on factors supporting an intention “to accommodate travelers for brief stays,” such as the 
advertisement of the cabin as a “fully equipped place to stay,” as “non-smoking,” as being 
located “near attractions that would typically interest travelers,” and the use of a “daily or weekly 
rate pricing structure.”  Id. at *13-14.   On appeal, neither of the litigants contested the district 
court’s conclusion that an innkeeper-guest relationship had been established, and accordingly, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted this ruling as controlling for 
purposes of the appeal, without subjecting it to inquiry. Jarmak v. Ramos, 497 Fed. Appx. 289, 
292, 295 (4th Cir. 2012) (vacating summary judgment in defendant’s favor and remanding for 
further proceedings).  The proper inquiry, however, is not whether the parties intended a short-
 
 
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Applying these principles, we agree with the circuit court that Haynes-Garrett did not 
establish a relationship of innkeeper and guest.  As an initial matter, the Dunns did not hold 
Dolphin’s Paradise out as a “public place” for “the accommodation for travelers.”  Id. at 947.  
Dolphin’s Paradise was used by the Dunns as a “second house” to “spend time with family” 
during certain times of the year and was available for rental only during the months of May 
through October.  Furthermore, the Dunns did not make Dolphin’s Paradise available to the 
“public” generally, based solely on the requirement that their stated rental price be paid, but 
rented their vacation house only to “families.”  Thus, the Dunns cannot be characterized as 
“innkeepers” in the traditional sense. 4 
 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the parties did not intend for the Dunns, or their 
agent, Siebert, to maintain possession and control of Dolphin’s Paradise during the occupancy by 
Haynes-Garrett and her family.5  The Dunns, who live in Northern Virginia, were not present at 
Dolphin’s Paradise and, in fact, were not permitted to enter the premises without prior 
notification to Siebert, which is located three or four miles from Dolphin’s Paradise.  Cleaning of 
                                                 
term stay, but whether parties to a short-term rental agreement intended that the occupants be 
entitled to exclusive possession and control of the premises during their stay. 
 
 
4 For example, Mr. Dunn’s uncontradicted testimony that Dolphin’s Paradise is subject to 
“restrictions [and] requirements on people that [it is] rent[ed] to,” including that it is only rented 
to “families” and is not “a party house for kids from college,” and that there is “a[ minimum] age 
requirement to rent it,” establish that the house is readily distinguishable from the 
accommodations offered by innkeepers in these respects. 
 
 
5 Haynes-Garrett notes that the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“VRLTA”) 
excludes from its provisions an occupant in a vacation residential facility if the occupant “does 
not reside in such lodging as his primary residence.”  Code § 55-248.3:1(D)(1).  Whether or not a 
landlord-tenant relationship exists under common law, however, is not dependent on whether an 
occupancy or tenancy is a residential tenancy subject to the rights and obligations of the VRLTA. 
 
 
 
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Dolphin’s Paradise only took place between the periods of occupancy and security deposits were 
required from occupants for an accidental damage protection program to protect the property.6  
The fact that the Dunns provided no food service, room service, daily maid service or security 
for the benefit of Dolphin’s Paradise occupants is inconsistent with any intention on the part of 
the Dunns, or expectation on the part of Haynes-Garrett, that the Dunns maintain possession and 
control of the premises during the occupancy of the house by Haynes-Garrett and her family.  To 
the contrary, the evidence shows the parties intended for Haynes-Garrett and her family to have 
“the right of [exclusive] possession and enjoyment of the leased premises” during the term of 
their occupancy of Dolphin’s Paradise.  Isbell, 273 Va. at 611. 
 
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in ruling that the Dunns only owed a duty of care 
to Haynes-Garrett commensurate with the duty a landlord owes its tenant.7 
                                                 
 
6 Haynes-Garrett places significance on the use of the term “guests” to refer to occupants 
of Dolphin’s Paradise in the management agreement between the Dunns and Siebert.  The 
management agreement does use terms that are generally associated with an innkeeper, such as 
“guests,” “reservations,” and “rates,” but it also uses terms that are generally associated with a 
landlord such as “lease,” “contract,” “rent,” and “rentals.”  Thus, the use of these terms in the 
management agreement is, at best, equivocal regarding the status of the occupants of Dolphin’s 
Paradise.  In any event, the determination of the relationship between Haynes-Garrett and the 
Dunns is based on whether they intended for the Dunns to maintain control of the premises 
during the period of Haynes-Garrett’s occupancy. 
 
 
7 Both parties direct our attention to the treatment of vacation rental homes by North 
Carolina.  In Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 556, 558 (N.C. 1999), the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina held that the common law rules governing landlord-tenant relationships 
applied to short-term vacation rentals.  Under North Carolina law, a landlord owes no common 
law duty to inspect or to maintain the leasehold premises.  Id. at 559.  Subsequent to the decision 
in Conley, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the North Carolina Vacation Rental 
Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42A-1 et seq.  That Act imposes upon lessors of vacation homes the duty 
to “do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the property in a fit and habitable 
condition.”  Id. at § 42A-31(2).  The Virginia General Assembly has not enacted a statute 
imposing such a duty upon lessors of vacation homes in Virginia.  Thus, as we hold herein, the 
common law rules governing landlord-tenant relationships apply to the rental of the vacation 
home at issue here. 
 
 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.