Title: Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore
Citation: 49 Cal. 4th 12
Docket Number: S164174
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2010

1 
Filed 5/17/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SIMPSON STRONG-TIE COMPANY, 
) 
INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S164174 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H030444 
PIERCE GORE et al., 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CV0576666 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In this case we consider the scope of the commercial speech exemption to 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16, 425.17, subd. (c).)1   
In February 2006, plaintiff Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc. (Simpson) 
filed this action for defamation and related claims against defendants Pierce Gore 
and The Gore Law Firm arising from a newspaper advertisement placed by Gore a 
few weeks earlier.  The advertisement, which was directed to owners of wood 
decks constructed after January 1, 2004, advised readers that “you may have 
certain legal rights and be entitled to monetary compensation, and repair or 
replacement of your deck” if the deck was built with galvanized screws 
                                              
1  
SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”   
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1.)  All 
further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 
manufactured by Simpson or other specified entities, and invited those persons to 
contact Gore “if you would like an attorney to investigate whether you have a 
potential claim.”   
Gore moved successfully in the superior court to have the entire complaint 
stricken under section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed.  We granted review to consider the limited issue whether Simpson‟s 
complaint was exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute because of section 425.17, 
subdivision (c) (section 425.17(c)), which excludes causes of action arising from 
representations of fact about the speaker‟s or a competitor‟s “business operations, 
goods, or services . . . made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, 
or securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or 
services” or “made in the course of delivering the person‟s goods or services.”  
Having found that the complaint is not exempt from dismissal under the anti-
SLAPP statute, we affirm.   
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Simpson is a California corporation in the business of designing, 
manufacturing, and marketing building products, including metal connectors and 
other hardware for use in wood frame construction.  According to Simpson, it is 
well known in the wood frame construction industry that pressure-treated wood, 
which is commonly used in outdoor decks to protect against termites and fungal 
decay, can have a corrosive effect on steel products, including galvanized screws.  
Corrosion potentially shortens the service life of these fasteners and connectors 
and compromises their ability to support their recommended loads or endure 
seismic and environmental stresses.    
In early 2004, at the recommendation of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, the construction industry stopped selling lumber treated with 
chromium copper arsenate, due to health hazards posed by its arsenic content.  
3 
Alternative lumber products, such as wood treated with alkaline copper quaternary 
and copper azole, were substituted, but, as Simpson explains, these chemicals are 
“more corrosive” to galvanized steel products.  Simpson states that it 
communicated this potential problem to the building industry and to the public 
generally through its Web site, annual catalog, articles in engineering and building 
magazines, bulletins issued to the building industry, point-of-sale information, and 
annual report.   
Gore, a California attorney, learned from television reports about the 
potential for corrosion of galvanized deck fasteners and connectors when used on 
wood pressure-treated with alkaline copper quaternary or copper azole and 
contacted Ted Todd, a senior inspector with the Contra Costa County District 
Attorney‟s Office who was featured in the television reports.  At that time, the 
district attorney‟s office was conducting an investigation into the risk posed by 
galvanized fasteners and connectors when used with these types of pressure-
treated wood.  The office ultimately issued a “Consumer Alert” warning of the 
corrosive effect of the new pressure-treated wood products “on the metal 
connector brackets typically used in construction.”  The alert noted that advisories 
had been posted in some retail stores about the potential incompatibility of the two 
products but cautioned that the advisories “tend to be in very small print or 
somewhat inconspicuously posted.”   
Gore also visited the company Web site, where Simpson had advised in 
bold type that “[m]any of the new Pressure Treated Woods use chemicals that are 
corrosive to steel.  By selecting connectors that offer greater corrosion resistance 
. . . you can extend the service life of your connectors.  However, corrosion will 
still occur.  You should perform periodic inspection of your connectors and 
fasteners to insure their strength is not being adversely affected by corrosion.  In 
some cases, it may be necessary to have a local professional perform the 
4 
inspections.  Because of the many variables involved, Simpson Strong-Tie cannot 
provide estimates on service life of connectors, anchors or fasteners.”     
In addition, Gore discovered that a class action complaint had been filed in 
Massachusetts against one of Simpson‟s competitors, Phillips Fastener Products, 
Inc., which sought relief on behalf of consumers allegedly damaged by defective 
galvanized fasteners and connectors used with pressure-treated lumber, and that 
Gore‟s former law firm, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, was 
investigating claims that some of the newly designed fasteners were failing, in 
spite of the manufacturers‟ representations that the “special coatings” were 
intended to resist corrosion.  
Based on this information, Gore arranged for an advertisement to be placed 
in the San Jose Mercury News in order to locate individuals who had purchased 
galvanized fasteners and connectors manufactured by Simpson and two other 
companies, which together were responsible for most of the metal fasteners sold to 
consumers in California.  The advertisement, which commenced Christmas Day 
2005 and ran four more times over a 28-day period in the Mercury News and once 
in the Los Gatos Weekly-Times, read as follows:  
5 
ATTENTION: 
WOOD DECK OWNERS 
If your deck was built after January 1, 2004 with 
galvanized screws manufactured by Phillips Fastener 
Products, Simpson Strong-Tie or Grip-Rite, you may 
have certain legal rights and be entitled to monetary 
compensation, and repair or replacement of your deck. 
 
Please call if you would like an attorney to investigate  
whether you have a potential claim: 
 
Pierce Gore 
GORE LAW FIRM 
900 East Hamilton Ave. 
Suite 100 Campbell, CA 95008 
408-879-7444 
 
Gore has asserted that the wording of the advertisement was modeled after 
notices he or his cocounsel had used in this state and in others during the 
preceding three years in connection with potential class actions based on consumer 
fraud or product defects.  
In a letter dated January 9, 2006, counsel for Simpson advised Gore that the 
advertisement falsely implied that Simpson‟s galvanized screws fail to meet 
appropriate industry standards and that a valid claim may exist against Simpson 
based upon negligence or product liability.  The letter demanded that Gore cease 
publication of any further defamatory advertisements directed at Simpson and 
reserved Simpson‟s right to recover against Gore for any costs or damages that 
may have already resulted from this or any similar publication.  Gore did not 
respond to the letter.  In a letter dated January 27, 2006, counsel for Simpson 
declared that Gore‟s failure to respond “suggests that your claims are without 
merit, and that your newspaper advertisement is false, misleading, and defames 
Simpson. . . .  Unless you can present specific evidence to support your charges, 
6 
Simpson intends to pursue its defamation claim against your firm[] and vindicate 
its rights.”  Again, Gore did not respond.       
Prior to filing this action, Simpson retained an opinion survey firm to 
confirm that the advertisement had caused injury to Simpson‟s reputation.  The 
survey firm intercepted 214 randomly selected shoppers at nine different home 
improvement stores in January and February 2006 and obtained their responses to 
a set of questions with and without exposure to the Gore advertisement.  The 
survey revealed that the shoppers, after reading the advertisement, were 
significantly more likely to believe that Simpson‟s galvanized screws were 
defective or of low quality and were significantly less likely to purchase 
galvanized screws manufactured by Simpson.     
Two days after the survey was completed, Simpson filed this action for 
defamation, trade libel, false advertising, and unfair business practices.  The 
complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.   
When Gore moved to strike the complaint under section 425.16, Simpson 
invoked the exemption to the anti-SLAPP law for commercial speech under 
section 425.17(c).  The trial court granted the special motion to strike and entered 
a judgment of dismissal, finding Gore had made a threshold showing that the 
statements were made in furtherance of his right of petition or free speech on an 
issue of public interest (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)), that Simpson had failed to 
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), and 
that the commercial speech exemption did not apply because the advertisement 
made no statement about a business competitor‟s products or services.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed in a published opinion.  The court first 
considered “who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the applicability of 
[the section 425.17(c)] exemption—the party invoking the anti-SLAPP law (i.e., 
the defendant), or the party invoking the exemption (the plaintiff)?”  In assigning 
7 
the burden to the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Brill Media Co., 
LLC v. TCW Group, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 324 (Brill), which had assigned 
the burden to the defendant to establish that the cause of action is not exempt.  The 
court next determined that while the advertisement was “made for the purpose of 
. . . promoting . . . [Gore‟s] services” (§ 425.17(c)(1)), Simpson‟s causes of action 
did not “ „aris[e] from‟ ” any representation of fact “ „about‟ Gore‟s or a 
competitor‟s services or business operations.”   
In construing the exemption in section 425.17(c)(1) for causes of action 
arising from statements or conduct “made in the course of delivering the person‟s 
goods or services,” the Court of Appeal once again disagreed with Brill, which 
had found this prong was satisfied where “the statements were made and conduct 
engaged in as part of . . . . the type of business transaction engaged in by 
defendants.”  (Brill, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 341.)  The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that the Legislature had enacted instead “a much narrower exemption, 
predicated by its plain terms on conduct in the course of delivering the goods or 
services the defendant is in the business of selling or leasing.”  The court then 
found that the advertisement here “was seeking business from prospective clients, 
not delivering services to them.”  Concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute applied 
and that Simpson had failed to establish a probability of prevailing on any of its 
claims, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the special motion to 
strike and the judgment of dismissal.   
We granted review to address the conflict in the case law concerning the 
construction of the commercial speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute.   
DISCUSSION 
A SLAPP is a civil lawsuit that is aimed at preventing citizens from 
exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so.  “ „While 
SLAPP suits masquerade as ordinary lawsuits such as defamation and interference 
8 
with prospective economic advantage, they are generally meritless suits brought 
primarily to chill the exercise of free speech or petition rights by the threat of 
severe economic sanctions against the defendant, and not to vindicate a legally 
cognizable right.‟ ”  (Castillo v. Pacheco (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 242, 249-250, 
quoting Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997-1998 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 12, 1997, pp. 1-2.) 
In 1992, out of concern over “a disturbing increase” in these types of 
lawsuits, the Legislature enacted section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.  
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  The statute authorized the filing of a special motion to strike 
to expedite the early dismissal of these unmeritorious claims.  (§ 425.16, subds. 
(b)(1), (f).)  To encourage “continued participation in matters of public 
significance” and to ensure “that this participation should not be chilled through 
abuse of the judicial process,” the Legislature expressly provided that the anti-
SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)   
A special motion to strike involves a two-step process.  First, the defendant 
must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff‟s “cause of action  . . . aris[es] 
from” an act by the defendant “in furtherance of the [defendant‟s] right of petition 
or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue.”2  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  If 
a defendant meets this threshold showing, the cause of action shall be stricken 
unless the plaintiff can establish “a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim.”  (Ibid.) 
In 2003, concerned about the “disturbing abuse” of the anti-SLAPP statute, 
the Legislature enacted section 425.17 to exempt certain actions from it.  (§ 
425.17, subd. (a).)  We recently discussed the exemption for public interest 
                                              
2  
See Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 609, 624 (lawyer advertising is 
protected by the First Amendment).   
9 
lawsuits in Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
309, where we “narrowly construed” section 425.17, subdivision (b) and held that 
it applied “only when the entire action is brought in the public interest.”  (Club 
Members for an Honest Election, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 312, 316.)   
This case involves the scope and operation of the exemption for 
commercial speech under section 425.17(c), which provides:  “Section 425.16 
does not apply to any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged 
in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, including, but not limited to, 
insurance, securities, or financial instruments, arising from any statement or 
conduct by that person if both of the following conditions exist:  [¶]  (1) The 
statement or conduct consists of representations of fact about that person‟s or a 
business competitor‟s business operations, goods, or services, that is made for the 
purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or 
commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or services, or the statement or 
conduct was made in the course of delivering the person‟s goods or services.  [¶]  
(2)  The intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person 
likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or prospective 
buyer or customer, . . .”   
The commercial speech exemption, like the public interest exemption, “is a 
statutory exception to section 425.16” and “should be narrowly construed.”  (Club 
Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 316; see 
also Major v. Silna (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1494; accord, Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 
1, 2003, pp. 7-8 [“before us for consideration in [Senate Bill] 515 is a measure that 
seeks to trim off a few bad branches as argued and identified by the [Consumer 
Attorneys of California]”].)   
 
10 
A.  Which Party Bears the Burden to Establish the Applicability of the 
“Commercial Speech” Exemption Under Section 425.17(c)? 
The Court of Appeal determined that Simpson, as the plaintiff, bore the 
burden of establishing that Gore‟s advertisement fell within the commercial 
speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP law, relying on the general rule that “ „[o]ne 
claiming an exemption from a general statute has the burden of proving that he 
comes within the exemption.‟ ”  Simpson argues that the burden should have been 
placed on Gore, as the defendant, to establish that the exemption does not apply.  
He relies in particular on our summary in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, 
Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon), of the “two-step process” for analyzing 
anti-SLAPP motions:  “First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a 
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected 
activity. . . .  If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines 
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.”  
(Italics added.)  We agree with the Court of Appeal‟s construction.   
It is a “familiar” and “longstanding” legal principle that “ „[w]hen a proviso 
. . . carves an exception out of the body of a statute or contract those who set up 
such exception must prove it.‟ ”  (Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 
(2008) 554 U.S. 84 [128 S.Ct. 2395, 2400]; see also Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt 
Co. (1948) 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 [“the burden of proving justification or exemption 
under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one 
who claims its benefits . . .”]; accord, 29 Am.Jur.2d (2008) Evidence § 176, p. 
193.)  Likewise, in California, “it has been declared that where the statute has 
exemptions, exceptions or matters which will avoid the statute the burden is on the 
claimant to show that he falls within that category.”  (Colonial Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. 
Com. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 437, 441; see also Briggs v. McCullough (1869) 36 Cal. 
542, 551-552; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1345 [“one who 
11 
claims an exemption from a general statute has the burden of proving that he or 
she comes within the exemption”].)     
Simpson does not dispute that section 425.16 sets forth a general statute or 
that section 425.17 creates specified exemptions to it.  Simpson contends, though, 
that the familiar and long-standing rule of statutory construction governing 
exemptions to a general statute was abrogated by the enactment in 1965 of 
Evidence Code section 500, which provides:  “Except as otherwise provided by 
law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence 
of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” 
Although it is true that Evidence Code section 500 superseded former 
section 1981, which had provided that the burden of proof was on the party 
holding the affirmative of the issue, the change in wording did not upset the 
traditional rule of statutory construction.  As the Law Revision Commission 
Comments to Evidence Code section 500 explain, the phrase the “ „affirmative of 
the issue‟ ” in former section 1981 had been criticized “as establishing a 
meaningless standard,” inasmuch as “ „practically any proposition may be stated in 
either affirmative or negative form.‟ ”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 
29B West‟s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 500, p. 554.)  Evidence Code 
section 500 was intended to make the allocation of the burden of proof “easier to 
ascertain” than the “classic formulation,” but not to signal a sea change in the law.  
(Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388, fn. 5; see also Los 
Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 150 
Cal.App.3d 823, 829 [citing the two formulations together].)  Tellingly, Simpson 
cites nothing to support its novel claim that Evidence Code section 500 abrogated 
the ordinary rule of statutory construction.  (Cf. 31 Cal.Jur.3d (2002) Evidence § 
90, p. 151 [“What facts are essential to a particular party‟s claim for relief or 
defense is generally a matter to be determined by the substantive law, not the law 
12 
of evidence; Evid. Code, § 500 does not purport to determine which facts are 
„essential‟ to the plaintiff‟s claim for relief and which facts are „essential‟ to a 
claimed defense, but rather leaves those substantive determinations to be resolved 
in light of the particular cause of action or defense at issue,” (fns. omitted)].)  
Indeed, the Law Revision Commission Comments note that Evidence Code 
section 500 “follows th[e] basic rule”—i.e., “ „that whatever facts a party must 
affirmatively plead he also has the burden of proving‟ ”—and is even broader, in 
that it “appl[ies] to issues not necessarily raised in the pleadings.”  (Cal. Law 
Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B West‟s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 500, 
p. 554.)  Inasmuch as Simpson concedes that “[t]he initial burden should be on the 
plaintiff to invoke the exemption in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion,” it 
follows that the plaintiff also has the burden of proving the applicability of the 
exemption. 
Furthermore, the “general principle” of Evidence Code section 500 is “that 
a party who seeks a court‟s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion 
thereon.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  Because 
establishing the commercial speech exemption is essential to Simpson‟s defense to 
the special motion to strike, Evidence Code section 500 places the burden of proof 
on Simpson.  (See generally City of Lafayette v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1993) 
16 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1017 [“ „ “One seeking to be excluded from the sweep of the 
general statute must establish that the exception applies” ‟ ”].)   
Nothing in Equilon or its discussion of the “two-step process” alters the 
analysis.  (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)  In Equilon, we explained that the 
defendant has the burden to show that the cause of action being challenged under 
the anti-SLAPP statute is one arising from protected activity.  (Equilon, supra, at 
p. 67.)  In discussing the defendant‟s burden at the first stage, Equilon construed 
only section 425.16, and did not purport to identify the party with the burden to 
13 
establish the existence or nonexistence of the public interest exemption in section 
425.17, subdivision (b), or the commercial speech exemption in section 425.17(c), 
inasmuch as Equilon predated the enactment of section 425.17.  It is worth noting, 
though, that nothing in Equilon purported to abrogate the long-standing rule of 
construction that the party seeking to benefit from an exception to a general statute 
bears the burden to establish the exception.3 
Simpson argues, correctly, that the ordinary rules governing allocation of 
the burden of proof may be disregarded for policy reasons in exceptional 
circumstances.  (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 119-120; Cassady v. 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 234 (Cassady).)  Yet 
such exceptions are “few, and narrow” (Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp. 
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1670), and the reasons justifying a shift in the 
normal allocation of the burden of proof must be “compelling.”  (Aydin Corp. v. 
First State Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1183, 1193; accord, Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Lab., supra, 554 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2400].)  Simpson 
fails to identify any compelling justification.   
                                              
3  
As Simpson points out, Brill did place the burden on the defendant.  But 
Brill analyzed only whether the applicability of the commercial speech exception 
was part of Equilon‟s first step, where the court decides whether the defendant has 
made a threshold showing the challenged cause of action arises from protected 
activity, or part of Equilon‟s second step, where the court determines whether the 
plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.  (Brill, supra, 
132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 329-331.)  Brill‟s conclusion that the defendant had the 
burden of proof to establish the nonapplicability of the commercial speech 
exception was based solely on its classification of the issue as a first-step 
determination and did not at all consider section 425.17‟s status as an exception to 
section 425.16 or any canons of construction.  (Brill, supra, at p. 331.)  Brill 
Media Co., LLC v. TCW Group, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 324, is therefore 
disapproved to the extent it is inconsistent with our holding here.     
14 
Simpson does assert that the facts underlying the commercial speech 
exemption are “peculiarly” within the speaker‟s knowledge.  But Simpson does 
not explain how a plaintiff would be significantly disadvantaged in demonstrating 
that the statement or conduct underlying its cause of action “consists of 
representations of fact about [the defendant]‟s or a business competitor‟s business 
operations, goods, or services”; that the defendant‟s statement or conduct was 
“made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or 
leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or services” or “in the 
course of delivering the persons‟ goods or services”; or that the “intended 
audience” was “an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to 
repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or 
customer.”  (§ 425.17(c)(1), (2); see generally Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 546 U.S. 
49, 60 [“ „Very often one must plead and prove matters as to which his adversary 
has superior access to the proof‟ ”].)  In sum, Simpson does not persuade us that 
section 425.17(c) presents one of those “ „rare occasions‟ ” justifying a deviation 
from the normal allocation of the burden of proof.  (Cassady, supra, 145 
Cal.App.4th at p. 234.)   
The burden of proof as to the applicability of the commercial speech 
exemption, therefore, falls on the party seeking the benefit of it—i.e., the plaintiff.      
B.  Were Simpson’s Causes of Action Exempted from the Anti-SLAPP 
Statute by Section 425.17(c)? 
As noted, section 425.17(c) provides, in pertinent part:  “Section 425.16 
does not apply to any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged 
in the business of selling or leasing goods or services . . . arising from any 
statement or conduct by that person if both of the following conditions exist:  [¶]  
(1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of fact about that person‟s 
or a business competitor‟s business operations, goods, or services, that is made for 
15 
the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or 
commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or services, or the statement or 
conduct was made in the course of delivering the person‟s goods or services.  [¶]  
(2)  The intended audience is an actual buyer or potential buyer or customer, or a 
person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual buyer or 
customer . . . .”   
There are no disputed issues of fact here.  We review the applicability of 
the commercial speech exemption independently.  (Soukup v. Law Offices of 
Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.) 
The Court of Appeal held, and the parties‟ initial briefing assumed, that 
section 425.17(c)(1) prescribes a “content exemption” and a “delivery exemption” 
and that these exemptions have distinctly different elements.  The content 
exemption shields a cause of action from the anti-SLAPP statute if the cause of 
action arises from a statement or conduct that “consists of representations of fact 
about that person‟s or a business competitor‟s business operations, goods, or 
services, that is made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or 
securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or 
services.”  (§ 425.17, subd. (c)(1).)  The delivery exemption provides a similar 
shield for any statement or conduct “made in the course of delivering the person‟s 
goods or services.”  (Ibid.)  In other words, this approach divided the first 47 
words of subdivision (c)(1) from the last 17 to create two independent and parallel 
theories of exemption from the anti-SLAPP law. 
Although section 425.17(c)(1) is grammatically susceptible to such a 
construction, that construction was not necessarily the only plausible one.  Gore 
had observed, in a footnote in its initial briefing, that the statute might also be read 
to exempt a cause of action arising from a statement or conduct that consists of 
representations of fact about that person‟s or a competitor‟s business operations, 
16 
goods, or services that was made either “for the purpose of obtaining approval for, 
promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the 
person‟s goods or services” or “in the course of delivering the person‟s goods or 
services.”  (§ 425.17(c)(1).)  We granted the parties the opportunity to file 
supplemental briefing as to which construction was the correct one and, as will 
appear, agree with Gore‟s construction.      
As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to 
determine the Legislature‟s intent so as to effectuate the law‟s purpose.  (People v. 
Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 491.)  “We begin with the text of the statute as the 
best indicator of legislative intent” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
836, 844), but we may reject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative 
intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results.  (Ornelas v. 
Randolph (1992) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1105.)      
Simpson‟s argument, at least at the outset, relies on the plain language of 
section 425.17(c)(1) and the canon of construction of avoiding surplusage.  
According to Simpson, section 425.17(c)(1) creates two independent commercial 
speech exemptions, each introduced by the phrase “the statement or conduct,” and 
to hold otherwise would render the second iteration of “the statement or conduct” 
in the subdivision redundant.  In Simpson‟s view, therefore, the delivery 
exemption encompasses a cause of action arising from “any statement or conduct 
made in the course of delivering the person‟s goods or services.”  Gore argues that 
such a construction would contravene the legislative intent and lead to absurd 
results.   
The Legislature‟s findings supporting the enactment of section 425.17 are 
set forth in subdivision (a), which states that “there has been a disturbing abuse of 
Section 425.16, the California Anti-SLAPP Law, which has undermined the 
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 
17 
redress of grievances, contrary to the purpose and intent of Section 425.16.  The 
Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage 
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation 
should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process or Section 425.16.” 
The construction favored by Simpson does not effectively fulfill the 
statute‟s purposes.  Under that construction, the Legislature can be seen to have 
carefully devised specific requirements in order to exempt a cause of action under 
the content prong—i.e., the statement or conduct underlying the cause of action 
must (1) consist of representations of fact (2) about that person‟s or a business 
competitor‟s business operations, goods, or services, and (3) have been made for 
the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing transactions in the 
person‟s goods or services.  Yet, under Simpson‟s construction of the delivery 
prong, the Legislature apparently imposed no particular requirements—i.e., a 
cause of action arising from any statement or conduct on any subject for any 
purpose is exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute, as long as it was made in the 
course of delivering goods or services.  Simpson has not offered any rationale for 
why the stage of the transaction should play such a critical factor in determining 
whether to exempt a cause of action from the reach of the anti-SLAPP law.  
Moreover, under Simpson‟s approach, a business that was sued because of 
political or religious statements made by an employee in the course of delivering 
the product or service to a customer would be deprived of the protection of the 
anti-SLAPP law, but that same business would be able to invoke the anti-SLAPP 
law if the same statements were made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, 
promoting, or securing transactions in its products.  Neither the Legislature‟s 
findings nor common sense endorses or justifies such a result. 
Simpson effectively concedes that such a result would be problematic, but 
argues that the statements in these hypotheticals “are not a part of the delivery of 
18 
goods or services” and thus fall outside the delivery exemption as Simpson would 
interpret it.  But, as we recently observed, “ „[d]uring‟ means „at some point in the 
course of.‟ ”  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 514.)  Statements or 
conduct made during the delivery of goods or services thus would qualify as 
statements or conduct made in the course of delivering the goods or services.  (Cf. 
§ 425.17(c)(1).)   
Simpson attempts to narrow the definition of the delivery exemption by 
combining language that appears in two different sentences in Brill, supra, 132 
Cal.App.4th at page 341, to argue that the exemption extends only to “ „statements 
. . . made and conduct engaged in as part of . . . the type of business transaction 
engaged in by defendants.‟ ”  But this formulation does not appear anywhere in 
the text of section 425.17(c)(1).  If, as Simpson effectively concedes, the delivery 
prong requires an interpretive gloss to avoid absurd results, it seems more 
consonant with legislative intent to adopt the restriction the Legislature articulated 
earlier in the sentence setting forth the exemption rather than to rummage about 
elsewhere for new limitations arising out of whole cloth.     
Moreover, Simpson‟s construction of the delivery prong would render the 
first part of section 425.17(c)(1)—the so-called “content and purpose” prong—
surplusage.  Statements or conduct that are “ „part of . . . the type of business 
transaction engaged in by defendants‟ ” would necessarily encompass 
“representations of fact about that person‟s . . . business operations, goods, or 
services, that [are] made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or 
securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or 
services” (§ 425.17(c)(1))  inasmuch as every business engages in efforts to obtain 
approval for, promote, or secure sales or transactions in its goods or services.  
Indeed, Simpson concedes that “a grocer‟s advertisement in advance of intended 
sales” falls within its broad definition of the delivery prong “to the extent the 
19 
advertising informs the public about the availability of the product for delivery” or 
“to the extent the advertising keeps the product in the public eye and bolsters its 
prestige.” With such a broad definition of the delivery prong, there would be no 
need for the content and purpose prong. 
The legislative history further undermines Simpson‟s interpretation of the 
statute.  Summaries of the bill prepared for various legislative committees 
consistently stated that section 425.17(c) would prohibit “the anti-SLAPP motion 
from being used in specified causes of action against businesses sued for 
statements or conduct consisting of representations of fact about their goods, 
services or business operations, or those of a competitor, when those statements or 
conduct were for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing 
sales or leases of the person‟s goods or services, or in the course of delivering the 
person‟s goods or services, if the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer 
or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, 
an actual or potential buyer or customer, . . .”  (Legis. Analyst, 3d reading analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 8, 2003, p. 1, italics 
added; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended June 27, 2003, p. 2, italics added; Assem. Republican Caucus, 
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2003, p. 
1, italics added; see also Sen. Sheila Kuehl, letter to Governor Gray Davis, Sept. 3, 
2003, p. 2.)  In addition, an analysis prepared for the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary noted that Senate Bill 515 was “consistent with the recommendation of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis last year on [Senate Bill] 1651[,] which 
urged the sponsors to look at the content and context of the statement or conduct 
when crafting an exemption, rather than enacting a wholesale exclusion of a class 
of defendants[,] which had been proposed in [Senate Bill] 1651.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 
20 
1, 2003, p. 9, italics added.)  Simpson offers no explanation why the Legislature 
would have been so concerned about the content of the statement or conduct in the 
first part of section 425.17(c)(1) but would have abandoned any such concern in 
the remainder of the sentence. 
For these reasons, we interpret section 425.17(c) to exempt from the anti-
SLAPP law a cause of action arising from commercial speech when (1) the cause 
of action is against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing 
goods or services; (2) the cause of action arises from a statement or conduct by 
that person consisting of representations of fact about that person‟s or a business 
competitor‟s business operations, goods, or services; (3) the statement or conduct 
was made either for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing 
sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person‟s goods or services or 
in the course of delivering the person‟s goods or services; and (4) the intended 
audience for the statement or conduct meets the definition set forth in section 
425.17(c)(2). 
Gore does not dispute that he is in the business of selling legal services, that 
Simpson‟s causes of action arise from Gore‟s advertisement, that the purpose of 
the advertisement was to promote Gore‟s legal services, or that the advertisement 
was addressed to a qualifying audience under section 425.17, subdivision (c)(2).  
The point of contention concerns whether the causes of action “aris[e] from . . . 
representations of fact about [Gore‟s] . . . business operations, goods, or services.”  
(§ 425.17(c)(1).)  We find that they do not. 
Simpson‟s complaint asserts claims for defamation, trade libel, false 
advertising, and unfair business practices.  The common theme among these 
causes of action is the allegation that the advertisement “communicates that 
Simpson‟s galvanized screws are defective.”  The complaint alleges in particular 
that the advertisement “is libelous on its face in that it falsely communicates to the 
21 
reader that Simpson‟s products are defective”; that the advertisement “disparaged 
Simpson‟s goods in that the Advertisement falsely communicates to the reader that 
Simpson‟s galvanized screws are defective”; that these assertions in the 
advertisement “are false and misleading”; and that using “the false and misleading 
Advertisement to recruit potential plaintiffs to participate in an unjustified class 
action lawsuit against Simpson” was an unfair business practice.     
We will assume arguendo that the advertisement implies that Simpson‟s 
galvanized screws are defective.  As the Court of Appeal recognized, however, 
even an implication that Simpson‟s screws are defective “is not „about‟ Gore‟s or 
a competitor‟s „business operations, goods, or services . . . .‟  (§ 425.17(c)(1).)  It 
is, rather, a statement „about‟ Simpson—or, more precisely, Simpson‟s products.”  
It therefore falls squarely outside section 425.17(c)‟s exemption for commercial 
speech.     
Simpson contends that the advertisement does nonetheless satisfy the 
commercial speech exemption in that it “expressly states that „an attorney‟ will 
„investigate whether you have a potential claim” and that it also supports the 
inference “that Gore has investigated the named companies and has discovered 
that they are selling defective screws.”  Both of these statements are “about” 
Gore‟s business operations, but neither satisfies the elements of the commercial 
speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP law. 
Simpson‟s causes of action plainly do not “arise from” (§ 425.17(c)) the 
representation that an attorney will investigate “whether you have a potential 
claim.”  Simpson‟s complaint does not allege that this statement is false or even 
that it is defamatory.  In addition, a promise of what an attorney will do if the 
reader were to respond to the advertisement “is not a representation of fact, but an 
agreement to take certain actions in the future.”  (Navarro v. IHOP Properties, 
Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 841.)  Consequently, it does not constitute 
22 
“representations of fact about that person‟s . . . business operations, goods, or 
services.”  (§ 425.17(c)(1).)   
The alleged inference that Gore has investigated Simpson and discovered 
that the galvanized screws are defective is not obvious from the advertisement 
itself, which asserts only that users of these fasteners “may” have certain (but 
unspecified) legal rights and that an attorney would need to “investigate whether 
you have a potential claim.”  Even if one were to draw this inference, however, it 
would be no more than an attempt to layer the allegedly defamatory inference 
itself—i.e., that Simpson‟s galvanized screws are defective—with an alleged 
inference that Gore had discovered the defect.  Simpson cites no authority for 
expanding the scope of the commercial speech exemption in this manner.  (Cf. 
Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 676 [the commercial 
speech exemption did not apply to a claim that the defendant magazine wrongfully 
used plaintiffs‟ names for a Camel advertisement; “as plaintiffs concede, the goods 
they sell are copies of Rolling Stone magazine, not Camel cigarettes.  More 
significantly, the statement or conduct at issue here did not consist of 
„representations of fact about the business operations, goods, or services‟ of 
Rolling Stone or of any of defendants‟ business competitors.  Instead, the 
representation at the center of this lawsuit is the representation that plaintiffs and 
their fellow musicians endorse the sale and use of Camel cigarettes”]; accord, 
New.Net v. Lavasoft (C.D.Cal. 2004) 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1104 [the commercial 
speech exemption did not apply because “the purportedly offending statements are 
not statements made about Defendant‟s product, but rather statements about 
Plaintiff and its products” and the two were not competitors]; see also Troy Group, 
Inc. v. Tilson (C.D.Cal. 2005) 364 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1151, 1155 [defendant 
investment adviser‟s e-mail asking whether plaintiff corporation is one of “the 
biggest crooks on the planet or what?” is “clearly not about [defendant]‟s business, 
23 
rather it is about [plaintiff], which, as [plaintiffs] admit, is not a business 
competitor of [defendant]”].)  We are reluctant to allow plaintiffs to evade the 
limitations of the statutory text by mere wordplay, especially given our obligation 
to construe the commercial speech exemption narrowly.   
Moreover, Simpson has not attempted to recover damages here because of 
any implied representation that Gore allegedly discovered that Simpson‟s products 
were defective, but because Gore allegedly implied that they were defective.  
Whether the Simpson products are in fact defective is beyond the scope of this 
proceeding, but the inference that they are defective is not a representation of fact 
about Gore’s business operations, goods, or services.  The Court of Appeal stated 
the issue succinctly:  “To the extent that Gore‟s advertisement „consists of‟ 
representations about his services, Simpson‟s action does not „aris[e] from‟ it; to 
the extent that Simpson‟s action „aris[es] from‟ a representation by Gore, the 
representation was not „about‟ Gore‟s or a competitor‟s services or business 
operations.” 4         
Simpson argues next that the commercial speech exemption from dismissal 
under the anti-SLAPP statute should not require that the statement itself giving 
rise to the cause of action include factual representations about the defendant‟s or 
a business competitor‟s business operations, goods, or services, as long as the 
statement giving rise to the cause of action is accompanied by factual 
representations about the defendant‟s or a business competitor‟s business 
operations, goods, or services.  The statute‟s plain language, however, is 
                                              
4  
One can conceive of a cause of action arising from a representation of fact 
about the attorney‟s own services—such as a false claim that the attorney had 
already recovered a judgment against the manufacturer for the defective product—
but the advertisement in this case did not contain such a representation.     
24 
otherwise.  The commercial speech exemption applies only to a cause of action 
“arising from” a statement (or conduct) that “consists of representations of fact 
about that person‟s or a business competitor‟s business operations, goods, or 
services . . . .”  (§ 425.17(c)(1).)   
Simpson complains, with rhetorical flourish, that the advertisement 
“defam[es] Simpson in order to tout Gore and his services. . . .  The tout and the 
defamation were of an inseparable whole, with the defamation serving as bait for 
the tout.  The Court of Appeal‟s approach is as if to parse cheese from a 
mousetrap.”  But this is merely another way of saying that the speaker made a 
representation of fact about a noncompetitor’s goods for the purpose of promoting 
the speaker‟s own services.  Had the Legislature intended the commercial speech 
exemption to encompass representations of fact about any business operations, 
goods, or services made for the purpose of promoting sales, leases, or transactions 
in the speaker‟s own goods or services, then it would not have limited the 
exemption to statements or conduct consisting of “representations of fact about 
that person’s or a business competitor’s business operations, goods, or services 
. . . .”  (§ 425.17(c)(1); see Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc. 
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652 [“the Legislature appears to have enacted 
section 425.17, subdivision (c), for the purpose of exempting from the reach of the 
anti-SLAPP statute cases involving comparative advertising by businesses”].)        
The legislative history accords with the statute‟s plain language.  As stated 
earlier, committee reports summarized the bill as “[p]rohibit[ing] the anti-SLAPP 
motion from being used in specified causes of action against businesses sued for 
statements or conduct consisting of representations of fact about their goods, 
services or business operations, or those of a competitor, when those statements 
. . . were for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or 
leases of the person‟s goods or services, or in the course of delivering the person‟s 
25 
goods or services . . . .”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 
(2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2003, p. 3, italics added.)  The plain 
language and the legislative history each confirm that the statement or conduct 
giving rise to the cause of action must consist of factual representations about the 
speaker‟s (or a competitor‟s) goods, services, or business operations.  Nothing in 
the plain language or the legislative history suggests it would be enough to protect 
against dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute if the factual representations about 
the speaker‟s or a competitor‟s business simply appeared in the same publication 
as the statements actually giving rise to the cause of action.5   
Indeed, Simpson‟s proposed construction would seriously undermine the 
anti-SLAPP statute itself.  As Gore points out, a press release critical of a political 
candidate—i.e., core political speech—would lose the protection of the anti-
SLAPP statute if the press release also mentioned the products sold by the 
business.  We therefore reject Simpson‟s expansive construction of the 
commercial speech exemption and conclude, in accordance with the trial court and 
the Court of Appeal, that Simpson‟s complaint was not exempted from the anti-
SLAPP statute by section 425.17(c)(1).   
The trial court went on to consider Gore‟s special motion to strike the 
complaint under section 425.16, determined that Simpson had failed to establish a 
probability of prevailing on the merits, and granted the special motion to strike.  
                                              
5  
Simpson complains that a party should not be able to defeat the commercial 
speech exception to the anti-SLAPP statute by parsing a two-sentence 
advertisement into its component parts.  We agree.  The proper test does not turn 
on the punctuation used in the advertisement, but on the basis for the cause of 
action.  Here, the causes of action all arise from the inference that Simpson‟s 
products are defective, an inference that Simpson alleges is implied from the text 
of the advertisement.  This inference, though, contains no representations of fact 
about Gore’s business operations, goods, or services.   
26 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  The correctness of those rulings is beyond the 
scope of our grant of review, which was limited to the applicability of the 
commercial speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute set forth in section 
425.17(c)(1).   
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc. v. Gore 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 162 Cal.App.4th 737 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S164174 
Date Filed: May 17, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: John F. Herlihy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Shartsis Friese, Arthur J. Shartsis, Erick C. Howard; Eisenberg and Hancock, Jon B. Eisenberg and William 
N. Hancock for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke and Rochelle L. Wilcox for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Arkin & Glovsky and Sharon Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Levy, Ram & Olson and Karl Olson for Senator Sheila Kuehl and California First Amendment Coalition as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jon B. Eisenberg 
Eisenberg and Hancock 
180 Montgomery Street, Suite 2200 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 984-0650 
 
Thomas R. Burke 
Davis Wright Tremaine 
505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 
San Francisco, CA  94111-6533 
(415) 276-6500