Title: Dorough v. Ricks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120260
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2014

REL:02/07/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120260
____________________
Ex parte Denise Scott Ricks
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Adam Dorough, Rufus Dorough, James Dorough, Patrick
Dorough, and Robert Dorough
v.
Denise Scott Ricks)
(Autauga Circuit Court, CV-09-900165;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2101130)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
1120260
Denise Scott Ricks sought to admit a self-proving will to
probate in the Autauga Probate Court. After the will was
admitted, Adam Dorough, Rufus Dorough, James Dorough, Patrick
Dorough, 
and Robert Dorough 
(hereinafter referred 
to
collectively as "the Dorough brothers") brought a 
will contest
in the Autauga Circuit Court. The Autauga Circuit Court
declared the will to be valid, and the Dorough brothers
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of
the Autauga Circuit Court. This Court granted certiorari
review, and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals. 
I. Facts and Procedural History
On June 9, 2009, Joseph Paul Dorough ("Joseph") executed
a will leaving all his property to Ricks and naming Ricks as
his personal representative. Ricks is the daughter 
of 
Margaret
Farmer, who died in 2009. Joseph and Margaret had dated off
and on since 1988, when Ricks was 14 years old. Although Ricks
was not related to Joseph by blood or marriage, Ricks
testified that they had a close relationship and that she
considered him a surrogate father. Joseph died on August 22,
2009. Ricks petitioned to admit the will to probate in the
2
1120260
Autauga Probate Court, and the Dorough brothers filed an
answer to Ricks's petition, indicating 
their 
intent 
to 
contest
the will in the Autauga Circuit Court in a later proceeding. 
On October 13, 2009, the Autauga Probate Court entered an
order titled "Decree Admitting Self-Proving Will to Probate."
In the order, the court said: 
"'The Court finds that the said instrument was
made self-proving at the time of its execution by
acknowledgment of [Joseph] and the affidavits of the
witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to
administer oaths and evidenced by the officer's
certificate, under official seal, attached to or
following the will in the form required by law; and
further finds that there has been no showing of
fraud, forgery, undue influence or unsound mind of
[Joseph].'"
Dorough v. Ricks, [Ms. 2101130, Nov. 16, 2012] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (emphasis added by the Court of
Civil Appeals). Thus, the probate court declared the will to
be Joseph's last will and admitted it to probate. 
On October 15, 2009, the Dorough brothers, who were
Joseph's brothers and next of kin, filed a will contest in the
Autauga Circuit Court. On December 15, 2009, the circuit court
ordered the probate court to transfer the case. The probate
court filed certified copies of all the documents with the
3
1120260
circuit court but did not file the originals with the circuit
court.
Although 
the 
proper 
procedure 
in 
a 
will-contest
proceeding is for the proponent of the will to introduce the
proceedings from the probate court before the contestant
presents his or her case-in-chief,  the Dorough brothers
1
presented their case-in-chief first without asserting that
they had no obligation to present their case until Ricks first
introduced the proceedings from the probate court. During
their case-in-chief, the Dorough brothers introduced a 
copy of
the will, showing that Joseph and the witnesses had signed the
will and that the notary public had signed a certificate as
required by § 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975.  However, the copy did
2
not adequately show an impression of the notary public's seal,
as required by § 43-8-132. The Dorough brothers challenged the
See Smith v. Bryant, 263 Ala. 331, 334, 82 So. 2d 411,
1
414 (1955).
Self-proving 
wills 
are 
"self-proved, 
by 
the
2
acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of
the witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to
administer oaths under the laws of the state where the
acknowledgment 
occurs 
and 
evidenced 
by 
the officer's
certificate, under the official seal, attached or annexed to
the will." § 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).
4
1120260
will on the grounds of 1) lack of valid execution, 2) undue
influence, 3) fraud, and 4) lack of testamentary capacity. 
After 
the 
Dorough 
brothers 
presented 
their 
case-in-chief,
Ricks called Joy Booth, the attorney who had drafted the will
and had signed the notary certificate in her capacity as a
notary public, to testify as to the execution of Joseph's
acknowledgment and the two subscribing witnesses' affidavits.
Booth testified that Joseph signed the will in the presence of
the 
two 
subscribing 
witnesses. 
She 
was 
never 
asked
specifically whether she had affixed her official seal to the
will, but she did testify that she notarized the signatures of
Joseph and the two subscribing witnesses.
On March 25, 2011, the circuit court entered an
interlocutory order declaring that the will met the statutory
requirements of a self-proving will under § 43-8-132 and that
the will was Joseph's last will. The Dorough brothers then
filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the interlocutory
order, arguing for the first time that they were entitled to
a judgment on partial findings because Ricks failed to show
that the notary public had affixed her seal to the will, as
required by § 43-8-132. Ricks responded with a motion asking
5
1120260
the court to take judicial notice that the probate court had
found that the will was self-proving. The court granted
Ricks's motion, denied the Dorough brothers' motion, and
entered an order certifying its March 25 interlocutory order
as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
The Dorough brothers then appealed the order to the Court of
Civil Appeals.  
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's
order, holding that the will did not comply with the
requirements of a self-proving will under § 43-8-132. In
examining the record, the Court of Civil Appeals said: 
"The certified copy of the will filed with the trial
court by the Autauga Probate Court shows what may be
a circular impression near the notary public's
signature, and, if it is indeed a circular
impression, it is possible that that circular
impression is the notary public's official seal;
however, even when the evidence is viewed in the
light 
most 
favorable 
to 
Ricks, 
it 
is 
not
sufficiently clear from the certified copy of the
will that what may be a circular impression near the
notary public's signature is indeed the notary
public's official seal to meet Ricks's burden of
making a prima facie showing that the notary
public's official seal is affixed to the will. The
original of the will, which would be the best
evidence of whether the notary public's official
seal is affixed to the will, was not introduced into
evidence."
6
1120260
Dorough, ___ So. 3d at  ___. The Court of Civil Appeals also
held that the probate court's finding that the will was self-
proving had no probative value in the circuit court action and
that, therefore, the probate court's order did not constitute
a prima facie showing that the will was self-proving. Id. at
____. 
On rehearing in the Court of Civil Appeals, Ricks argued
that the Dorough brothers had waived their objection to
Ricks's not having made a prima facie showing because they
made their case-in-chief first without asserting that they had
no obligation to present their case until Ricks introduced the
proceedings from the probate court. The Court of Civil Appeals
found this argument meritless, holding that the Dorough
brothers could make their objection in the circuit court
before the judgment was entered. ___ So. 3d at ___. Ricks also
argued that the Dorough brothers had waived their objection
based on the failure to affix the notary public's seal because
they did not object on that basis until they moved to alter,
amend, or vacate the interlocutory order, which 
occurred 
after
the will had been admitted into evidence by the circuit court.
However, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that the circuit
7
1120260
court's order was an interlocutory order, not a final
judgment, 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
the 
Dorough 
brothers' 
objection
did not come too late and was not waived. ___ So. 3d at ___.
Ricks petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming that
the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals conflicted with
prior decisions of this Court. This Court granted her
petition. We now reverse and remand.
II. Standard of Review
"'On certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption
of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate
appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de novo the standard
of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals.'"
Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex
parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996)).
Ordinarily, the standard of review of a ruling on a motion for
a judgment on partial findings is the ore tenus standard.
Burkes Mech., Inc. v. Ft. James-Pennington, Inc., 908 So. 2d
905, 910 (Ala. 2004). However, "the ore tenus standard is
inapplicable 'where the evidence is undisputed, or where the
material facts are established by the undisputed evidence.'"
8
1120260
Id. (quoting Salter v. Hamiter, 887 So. 2d 230, 234 (Ala.
2004)). In such a case, the standard of review is de novo. Id.
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction of Probate Court to Admit Will
The parties argue extensively over the legal relevance of
the probate court's admission of the will to probate.
According to Ricks, the judgment of the probate court
admitting the will to probate had probative value in the will
contest in the circuit court. In response, the Dorough
brothers argue that, pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975,
once they filed their answer in the probate court, the probate
court did not have jurisdiction to do anything other than
transfer the case and that, therefore, the judgment admitting
the will to probate was void. Thus, before proceeding to the
merits, it is necessary to determine whether the probate court
had jurisdiction to admit the will to probate. 
Section 43-8-198 states, in relevant part: "Upon the
demand of any party to the contest, made in writing at the
time of filing the initial pleading, the probate court, or the
judge thereof, must enter an order transferring the contest to
the circuit court of the county in which the contest is made
9
1120260
...." Moreover, this Court stated in Summerhill v. Craft, 425
So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Ala. 1982), that once a demand in writing
to transfer a will contest to the circuit court was made, the
probate court "had no jurisdiction to hold a hearing to
probate the will nor to issue its order that the will was duly
provided," and therefore such an order was void. 
However, in this case, the Dorough brothers stated the
following in their answer in the probate court: "The heirs
will be contesting the Will and so pursuant to [§ 43-8-198,
Ala. Code 1975, t]hey will so request this matter be
transferred to Circuit Court. This as well will be addressed
by way of a separate motion." (Emphasis added.) Both the
future tense and the explicit statement that the transfer
request would be addressed by a separate motion indicate that
the Dorough brothers were not making a demand to transfer the
case to the circuit court in their answer, as contemplated by
§ 43-8-198, but were notifying the probate court of their
intent to move to transfer the case in the future. Therefore,
although the Dorough brothers properly brought a will contest
in the circuit court under § 43-8-199 after the will was
admitted to probate, the Dorough brothers did not make a
10
1120260
proper demand under § 43-8-198 to transfer the case when they
filed their answer; therefore, the probate court did not lose
jurisdiction to admit the will to probate. See also Newman v.
Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Ala. 2003) (holding that the
opportunity to remove a case to circuit court under § 43-8-198
is lost if the movant does not file a pleading with the motion
to transfer). 
B. Conflict of the Court of Civil Appeals' Decision with
Prior Decisions
Turning now to the merits, Ricks argues that the decision
of the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with prior decisions
of this Court that establish the proper procedures in a will-
contest proceeding. In Smith v. Bryant, 263 Ala. 331, 82 So.
2d 411 (1955), this Court discussed the procedures for
introducing a will that had been admitted to probate into the
circuit court in a will contest under what is now § 43-8-199,
Ala. Code 1975. Relying on McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457,
19 So. 810 (1895), the Smith Court stated that "those who
claim under the probated will must show affirmatively its
validity and become the actors." Smith, 263 Ala. at 334, 82
So. 2d at 413. However, the Court thereafter stated: 
11
1120260
"While we have seen no statement by this court
as to the exact manner in which trials should be had
under the provisions of § 64, Title 61, Code of 1940
[now § 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975], providing for a
will contest in the equity court, we would say that
the respondent, who is in effect the proponent,
should first introduce the proceedings in the
probate court, that is the petition to probate the
will, the order fixing the time for hearing and
giving notice, testimony of the attesting witnesses
and proof of will, the decree admitting the will to
probate and the will itself. Section 44, Title 61,
Code of 1940 [now § 43-8-171, Ala. Code 1975],
provides in effect that a will which has been
admitted to probate must be received without further
proof. The complainant, who is in effect the
contestant, should then introduce testimony on which
the alleged invalidity of the will is based. The
respondent should then introduce the rebuttal
testimony, if any. The respondent should then make
the opening argument to the jury, the complainant
should then make the argument for complainant and
the respondent should have the closing argument."
Smith, 263 Ala. at 334, 82 So. 2d at 414.
This Court drew on Smith in Hancock v. Frazier, 264 Ala.
202, 86 So. 2d 389 (1956), in which this Court further
discussed the procedures in a will contest under what is now
§ 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, as follows:
"We have recently considered the question where
there was a contest in equity under section 64,
Title 61, Code, with a jury trial. Smith v. Bryant,
263 Ala. 331, 82 So. 2d 411, 414 [(1950)]. There
referring to our previous cases in such a suit, it
is stated that the proper procedure is that the
respondent, who is in effect the proponent, should
first introduce the proceedings admitting the will
12
1120260
to probate in the probate court, citing 57 Am. Jur.
608, section 925. It is also there stated that
complainant, who is the contestant, 'should then
introduce testimony on which the alleged invalidity
of the will is based. The respondent should then
introduce the rebuttal testimony, if any. The
respondent should then make the opening argument.'
Some of our older cases are cited by the Court.
Mathews v. Forniss, 91 Ala. 157, 8 So. 661 [(1890)];
McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So. 810, 812
[(1896)]. It means, as we said in McCutchen v.
Loggins, that in such a suit as this 'those who
claim 
under 
the 
probated 
will 
must 
show
affirmatively its validity, and become the actors.'
But we interpret Smith v. Bryant, supra, to mean
that 
this 
is 
prima 
facie 
sustained 
by 
the
proceedings in the probate court admitting the will
to probate. The duty, not a shifting of the burden
of proof, is then upon complainants to introduce
evidence on which it is claimed the 'alleged
invalidity of the will is based.' We further take
that to mean that when complainants introduce such
evidence from which its invalidity may be inferred,
the judgment in the probate proceedings will have
lost its value as evidence, for the trial is de
novo. It is also said in McCutchen v. Loggins,
supra, that when complainants showed their interest
and right to contest in equity 'the burden was
placed upon the respondents to affirm and maintain
the validity of the probated will. Complainants have
no standing in the chancery court, except as
contestants.'
"In both Smith v. Bryant, supra, and McCutchen
v. Loggins, supra, the contest was tried in the
equity court with a jury under sections 64 to 67,
Title 61, Code. The burden of proof is the same of
course whether it is tried with a jury or without
one. The procedure outlined in Smith v. Bryant does
not prescribe the course to be pursued in taking the
depositions of witnesses prior to trial. There is no
rule of procedure as to when that should be done.
13
1120260
When the trial comes on to be had on testimony, then
to be taken in open court, the procedure is outlined
in that case. When it is based on depositions,
without a jury as in this case, counsel must prepare
notes of the evidence which has been taken and which
they wish to use. Equity Rule 57, Code 1940, Tit. 7
Appendix. The court in considering the case should
then apply the rule fixing the burden of proof as
outlined in McCutchen v. Loggins, supra. Section 67,
Title 61, further provides that on the trial before
the jury, or hearing before the circuit judge on a
contest in equity, the testimony of the witnesses
which had been reduced to writing by the judge of
probate according to section 42, Title 61, is to be
considered by the judge or jury. That should be
shown in the note of testimony, when a note is
necessary. But on such contest the judgment in the
probate court has no probative value, and only
serves to give direction to the order of procedure
in the circuit court in equity and support for
equity jurisdiction."
Hancock, 264 Ala. at 203-04, 86 So. 2d at 390-91 (emphasis
added).
Finally, in Ray v. McClelland, 274 Ala. 363, 365-66, 148
So. 2d 221, 222 (1963), this Court stated: 
"When 
the 
respondent 
introduced 
the 
probate
proceedings, the validity of the will was prima
facie sustained and it became the duty of the
complainant to offer evidence upon which the
invalidity of the will was based. Hancock v.
Frazier, 264 Ala. 202, 86 So. 2d 389 [(1956)]; Smith
v. Bryant, 263 Ala. 331, 82 So. 2d 411, 414
[(1955)]; McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So.
810 [(1896)]."
  
14
1120260
Ricks argues that these cases stand for the proposition
that once the proponent introduces the probate proceedings in
the will contest in the circuit court, including the judgment
admitting the will to probate, the validity of the will is
prima facie sustained, and it is then the duty of the
contestant to produce evidence contesting the validity of the
will. We agree with Ricks. 
Ricks correctly observes that the rules arising from
Smith, Hancock, and Ray are akin to a rebuttable presumption
under Rule 301(b), Ala. R. Evid., which states:
"(b) Types of rebuttable presumptions. Every
rebuttable presumption is either:
"(1) A presumption that affects the burden of
producing evidence by requiring the trier of fact to
assume the existence of the presumed fact, unless
evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is introduced, in
which event the existence or nonexistence of the
presumed fact shall be determined from the evidence
without regard to the presumption; or
"(2) A 
presumption 
affecting the 
burden 
of 
proof
by imposing upon the party against whom it operates
the burden of proving the nonexistence of the
presumed fact." 
This Court stated in Hancock: 
"The duty, not a shifting of the burden of proof, is
then upon complainants to introduce evidence on
which it is claimed the 'alleged invalidity of the
15
1120260
will is based.' We further take that to mean that
when complainants introduce such evidence from which
its invalidity may be inferred, the judgment in the
probate proceedings will have lost its value as
evidence, for the trial is de novo."  
Hancock, 264 Ala. at 204, 86 So. 2d at 390. Consequently, the
rebuttable presumption here would be a presumption under Rule
301(b)(1), not Rule 301(b)(2). 
In this case, the Court of Civil Appeals interpreted
Hancock to mean: 
"(1) [T]hat it is only the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses reduced to writing by the
probate judge pursuant to what is now § 43-8-169,
Ala. Code 1975, that is probative regarding the
issue whether the will was validly executed, (2)
that the probate court's order admitting the will to
probate has no probative value regarding the issue
whether the will was validly executed, and (3) that
the probate court's order admitting the will to
probate is only admissible for the limited purpose
of giving direction as to the procedure to be
followed in the circuit court and support for the
circuit court's jurisdiction over the will contest." 
Dorough, ___ So. 3d at ___. The Court of Civil Appeals appears
to have based this reading on the second paragraph of the
excerpt 
of 
Hancock, 
quoted 
supra. 
However, 
such 
an
interpretation 
would 
render 
the 
previous 
paragraph
meaningless. Such an interpretation cannot be sustained,
especially in light of this Court's subsequent holding in Ray
16
1120260
that, 
"[w]hen 
the 
respondent 
introduced 
the 
probate
proceedings, the validity of the will was prima facie
sustained and it became the duty of the complainant to offer
evidence upon which the invalidity of the will was based."
Ray, 274 Ala. at 365, 148 So. 2d at 222. Thus, the decision of
the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with this Court's prior
decisions.   
Under the rules discussed above, Ricks was obligated to
introduce the proceedings from the probate court before the
Dorough brothers presented their case-in-chief, but the
Dorough brothers made their case-in-chief without asserting
that Ricks was obligated to, and had failed to, introduce the
proceedings from the probate court. "[I]t is a settled
principle that neglect to take advantage of rights at the
proper time will be regarded as a waiver of such rights."
Smith, 263 Ala. at 334, 82 So. 2d at 414. Because the Dorough
brothers did not assert that Ricks was obligated to introduce
the proceedings from the probate court before they proceeded
with their case-in-chief, they waived their right to object to
Ricks's not following the proper procedures for introducing
evidence.
17
1120260
As discussed above, it was the Dorough brothers who
offered a copy of the will into evidence. At the close of
evidence, the Dorough brothers made a motion for a judgment on
partial findings, arguing that Ricks had not made a prima
facie case because none of the attesting witnesses had
testified as to the validity of the will. Ricks, however, was
attempting to admit to probate a self-proving will. Under §
43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975, if the requirements of the statute
are met, then the proponent does not need to call witnesses.
Because the Dorough brothers had introduced the evidence that
would have been Ricks's duty to present -- either by
introducing the proceedings from the probate court or by
introducing the will itself in the circuit court -- the
evidence necessary to decide whether to accept the will was
ultimately presented to the circuit court. Thus, Ricks did not
fail to make a prima facie case, nor did the circuit court err
in denying the Dorough brothers' motion for a judgment on
partial findings. 
The final question is whether the Dorough brothers waived
their argument that the notary seal was not properly affixed
to the self-proving page of the will by not asserting that
18
1120260
argument until after the circuit court had entered its order.
"[I]t is a settled principle that neglect to take advantage of
rights at the proper time will be regarded as a waiver of such
rights." Smith, 263 Ala. at 334, 82 So. 2d at 414. Because the
Dorough brothers did not object on the basis that the self-
proving will did not comply with the requirements of § 43-8-
132, Ala. Code 1975, until after the circuit court ruled on
the will-contest claim, they waived their objection. 
The Court of Civil Appeals, however, held that because
the circuit court's order was interlocutory in nature, the
Dorough brothers were entitled to raise their objection even
after that order had been entered. However, the Court of Civil
Appeals based its holding on the rule that "[a] trial court is
not required to consider a new legal argument raised for the
first time in a postjudgment motion ...." Dorough v. Ricks,
___ So. 3d at ___. The Court of Civil Appeals thus reasoned
that because postjudgment motions under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ.
P., are contemplated only when there has been a final judgment
and because the circuit court's order was not a final
judgment, the rules applicable to postjudgment motions do not
apply here and that, therefore, the Dorough brothers "were
19
1120260
entitled to raise their argument that Ricks had failed to
prove that the notary public's official seal was affixed to
the will for the first time in that motion." ___ So. 3d at
___. However, it does not follow that, just because the
Dorough brothers' motion was not a postjudgment motion, they
were therefore entitled to raise their new argument. On the
contrary, the rule that failure to raise an argument at the
right time results in a waiver is the default rule. Smith, 263
Ala. at 334, 82 So. 2d at 414. Because the Dorough brothers
did not raise the argument that the notary seal was not
sufficiently affixed before the circuit court entered its
order, the Dorough brothers waived that argument.
Moreover, even if the Dorough brothers had not waived
their objection, the Court of Civil Appeals did not consider
the testimony of Joy Booth, who testified that she had
notarized the will. Although the will admitted as evidence in
the circuit court was a copy and not the original will, the
copy was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 1007, Ala. R.
Evid., when Ricks testified to its contents. "[H]istoric
Alabama practice has recognized that a party's testimony,
admitting the contents of an original, opens the door to
20
1120260
secondary evidence of those contents, without accounting for
the 
nonproduction 
of 
the 
original." 
Advisory 
Committee's 
Notes
to Rule 1007, Ala. R. Evid. (citing Donahay v. State, 287 Ala.
716, 255 So. 2d 599 (1971), and Kessler v. Peck, 266 Ala. 669,
98 So. 2d 606 (1957)). Consequently, if there was a question
about the notary seal, it was logical to consider Booth's
testimony that she had notarized the will. See Rule 402, Ala.
R. Evid. Although Booth did not testify specifically as to
whether she had affixed her seal, notarizing a document
necessarily includes affixing the notary public's seal. See §
36-20-73(2), Ala. Code 1975. Therefore, because Booth
testified that she had notarized the will and because the
circuit court received such testimony ore tenus, the Court of
Civil Appeals should have considered Booth's testimony and
given the judgment of the circuit court its proper deference
in determining whether the notary seal was sufficiently
affixed to the will. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court
of Civil Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
21
1120260
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart and Parker, JJ., concur.
Bolin and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
Shaw, J., dissents. 
Wise and Bryan,* JJ., recuse themselves.
___________________
*Justice Bryan was a member of the Court of Civil Appeals
when that court considered this case.
22
1120260
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I find the procedural history of this case in the probate
court and the circuit court confusing, and I express no view
as to the description of that history in the main opinion. 
For purposes of casting my vote in this case, I merely accept
the fact that a contest of the will in question was in fact
filed in the circuit court at a point in time after the will
had been admitted to probate in the probate court.  See Ala.
Code 1975, § 43-8-199.  That said, I believe that the judgment
of the circuit court at issue here (finding that the will was
executed 
with 
the 
proper 
formalities) 
finds 
sufficient 
support
in the record and, accordingly, that the decision of the Court
of Civil Appeals reversing that judgment is, itself, due to be
reversed.  
Albeit pursuant to one or more motions filed by the
contestants to the will (sometimes referred to in the main
opinion and here as "the Dorough brothers"), a copy of both
the will and the probate court's order admitting the will to
probate were before the circuit court.  The probate court's
order in this regard constituted prima facie evidence that the
will was validly executed.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-132(c);
23
1120260
see also Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-171; Hancock v. Frazier, 264
Ala. 202, 86 So. 2d 389 (1956); Smith v. Bryant, 263 Ala. 331,
82 So. 2d 411 (1955).  
As indicated in the main opinion, if the contestant to
the will puts on evidence that the execution formalities were
not properly observed, then the prima facie case is rebutted,
and it is then incumbent on the proponent of the will to
present sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof.  ___
So. 3d at ____ (also explaining that the circuit court's
consideration of a will contest is de novo); see also Hancock,
264 Ala. at 204, 86 So. 2d at 390. In the present case,
however, the record does not reflect the submission to the
circuit court by the Dorough brothers of any evidence by which
they challenge the adequacy of the formalities attendant to 
the execution of the will.  Although counsel for the Dorough
brothers did cross-examine both Denise Scott Ricks and Joy
Booth (the attorney who drafted the will and who, in her
capacity as a notary public, notarized the will), who
testified as to her notarization of the will, at the hearing
conducted by the circuit court, this cross-examination failed
to adduce any evidence that would serve to rebut the prima
24
1120260
facie showing effected by the order of the probate court
admitting the will to probate.  Also, the circuit court had
before it a copy of the will itself (certified and filed by
the probate court), and the circuit court was able to inspect
the acknowledgment form signed by Booth and see for itself the
circular impression that Ricks contends was the notary seal.
In their examination of Booth, the contestants posed no
questions regarding this impression or specifically whether
Booth had affixed her seal to the acknowledgment form; at no
time during the hearing did the contestants raise any issue as
to whether the acknowledgment form was lacking the seal
required by § 43-8-132(a), Ala. Code 1975.  Under these
circumstances, I am reluctant to consider the copy of the will
introduced at trial by the Dorough brothers, which was
identified as a copy of the will that Ricks had offered for
probate, as evidence that rebuts the prima facie showing made
by the certified filings from the probate court.  Moreover,
even if it were to be considered such evidence, the fact of
such circular impression was on the will for the circuit court
to see and assess for itself.   The impression is consistent
3
In addition, this Court is in receipt only of an
3
electronic copy of the document before the circuit court, and
25
1120260
with the affixation of a notary seal to the acknowledgment. 
I am unwilling to conclude as a matter of law, particularly
under the circumstances presented in this case, that the
circuit court could not have inferred from that impression
that a seal had in fact been affixed by Booth to her
acknowledgment. 
In addition, the circuit court heard the testimony of
Booth herself to the effect that she had "notarized" the
signature of the two witnesses and of the testator.  The
circuit court certainly was free to treat this as additional
evidence indicating that Booth had affixed her seal to the
acknowledgment 
form, 
given 
the 
requirement 
for 
such 
affixation
in the event of a "notarization" of a will, see § 43-8-132(a),
and given the circuit court's ability to assume or to infer
that Booth, as an attorney and experienced notary public, was
aware of this requirement when testifying that she 
"notarized"
the document. 
Based on the foregoing, I agree that the judgment of the
circuit court holding that the will in question was validly
it cannot foreclose the possibility that the circular
impression on the document actually viewed by the circuit
court was more "definite" than what is before this Court and
what was before the Court of Civil Appeals.
26
1120260
executed should have been affirmed, and, accordingly, I
concur.
27
1120260
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  I do not believe that the main
opinion correctly applies this Court's decision in Hancock v.
Frazier, 264 Ala. 202, 86 So. 2d 389 (1956); the main opinion
actually alters the traditional burdens of proof in a will
contest filed in the circuit court under Ala. Code 1975, § 43-
8-199.  I additionally believe that this Court has denied the
respondents, the Dorough brothers, due process of law by
reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals on issues
as to which this Court actually denied certiorari review. 
Finally, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the main
opinion reversing the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment on an
issue raised by none of the parties.
In ground "A" of Denise Scott Ricks's petition for
certiorari review, she contended that the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision conflicted with prior caselaw regarding
"whether the proceedings of the Probate Court establish a
prima facie case of due execution of the subject will." 
Petition at 3.  Specifically, Ricks contended in ground "A"
that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision "misconstrues and
28
1120260
misapplies the language of Hancock."  This Court granted the
petition solely as to this ground.
Section 43-8-199 provides for an action in the circuit
court to contest a will that has been previously admitted to
probate by the probate court.  In Hancock, this Court stated
that "in such a suit as this 'those who claim under the
probated will [here, Ricks] must show affirmatively its
validity ....'"  Hancock, 264 Ala. at 203-04, 86 So. 2d at 390
(quoting McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 462, 19 So. 810,
812 (1895)).  See Ferrell v. Minnifield, 275 Ala. 388, 389-90,
155 So. 2d 345, 346 (1963) ("On a will contest in equity
court, the burden of proof is on the proponents of the will
....").  This Court further noted that the validity of the
will is "prima facie sustained by the proceedings in the
probate court admitting the will to probate."  Hancock, 264
Ala. at 204, 86 So. 2d at 390.  Hancock makes clear in the
very next sentence, however, that the admission of the will to
probate by the probate court does not shift any burden to the
persons contesting the will to disprove the will: "The duty,
not a shifting of the burden of proof, is then upon the
[plaintiffs, who are contesting the will,] to introduce
29
1120260
evidence on which it is claimed the 'alleged invalidity of the
will is based.'"  Hancock, 264 Ala. at 204, 86 So. 2d at 390
(quoting Smith v. Bryant, 263 Ala. 331, 334, 82 So. 2d 411,
414 (1955) (emphasis added)). If the submission in the circuit
court of the proceedings in the probate court does not shift
the burden of proof to the party contesting the will, then it
cannot be said that the submission of the probate judgment in
any way proves or supports the case of the will's proponent. 
Any purported presumption in favor of the validity of the will
indicated by this language, however, is destroyed--not merely
rebutted--when the party contesting the will in the circuit
court action submits evidence indicating that the will was
invalid: 
"[W]hen 
[the 
plaintiffs] 
introduce 
such 
evidence 
from
which [the will's] invalidity may be inferred, the judgment in
the probate proceedings will have lost its value as evidence,
for the trial is de novo."  Hancock, 264 Ala. at 204, 86 So.
2d at 390.  The circuit court action, as explained in Hancock,
is essentially a "trial de novo" of the probate proceeding; in
a trial de novo, the actions and judgment in the lower court
carry no weight.  Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 309, 132 So. 2d
120, 122 (1961) ("A trial de novo, within the common
30
1120260
acceptation of that term, means that the case shall be tried
in the Circuit Court as if it had not been tried before, and
that that court may substitute its own findings and judgment
for that of the lower tribunal.").  The Hancock Court further
stated that, in a circuit court will contest, "the judgment in
the probate court has no probative value."  Hancock, 264 Ala.
at 204, 86 So. 2d at 391 (emphasis added).  The circuit court
action is a new trial to determine the validity of the will;
the probate court's judgment has no value as evidence of the
validity of the will ("no probative value").   This is in
4
accord with the idea of a trial de novo, where the lower
court's judgment is treated as if it did not exist.  
5
The main opinion, however, appears, contrary to Hancock,
to assign probative value to the probate court's judgment,
i.e., giving the probate court's judgment "value as evidence"
and "probative value," despite the holding of Hancock.  The
main opinion further posits that the submission of the probate
Certain evidence submitted in the probate court is still
4
admissible in the circuit court proceeding.  See Ala. Code
1975, §§ 43-8-171 and -202. 
Subsequent decisions repeating language from Hancock did
5
not alter this proposition.  Ferrell v. Minnifield, 275 Ala.
388, 155 So. 2d 345 (1963); Ray v. McClelland, 274 Ala. 363,
148 So. 2d 221 (1962).
31
1120260
proceedings in the circuit court creates a rebuttable
presumption under Rule 301(b)(1), Ala. R. Evid., i.e., a
"presumption ... requiring the trier of fact to assume the
existence of the presumed fact."  This is the complete
opposite of what Hancock says: "[T]he judgment in the probate
court has no probative value."  264 Ala. at 204, 86 So. 2d at
391.  
The main opinion attempts to bolster its contrary
reasoning by noting a purported inconsistency in Hancock,
namely, that the portions of that opinion stating that the
fact that the probate court admitted the will to probate has
no evidentiary value conflict with the portion of the opinion
stating that the introduction of the probate proceedings
"prima facie sustain[s]" the will.   However, there is no
6
actual inconsistency in Hancock; there is only a perceived
inconsistency as a result of the odd posture of the parties in
a will contest in the circuit court.  The persons contesting
the will file the circuit court action and are the plaintiffs;
the proponent of the will in the probate court proceedings is
The main opinion provides no reason as to why it chooses
6
one side of this purported conflict as correct and rejects the
other.
32
1120260
now the defendant.  Normally the plaintiff in an action proves
his or her case, but the defendant here--the proponent--must
first put forth the will (by introducing the probate
proceedings) that the plaintiff/contestant intends to attack. 
Thus Hancock states that the "prima facie" showing made by the
probate court proceedings "only serves to give direction to
the order of procedure in the circuit court," not that it
proves the proponent's position.  Hancock, 264 Ala. at 204, 86
So. 2d at 391 (emphasis added).  Further, the submission of
the probate court's judgment was required to provide a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the circuit court, sitting in
equity, to hear the case: 
"It is also said in McCutchen v. Loggins, supra,
that when complainants showed their interest and
right to contest in equity 'the burden was placed
upon the respondents to affirm and maintain the
validity of the probated will. Complainants have no
standing 
in 
the 
chancery 
court, 
except 
as
contestants.' 
"... [O]n such contest the judgment in the
probate court has no probative value, and only
serves to give direction to the order of procedure
in the circuit court in equity and support for
equity jurisdiction."
Hancock, 264 Ala. at 204, 86 So. 2d at 390-91 (emphasis
added).  See also Ferrell, 275 Ala. at 391, 155 So. 2d at 347
33
1120260
("The admission of the will to probate in the probate court
is, therefore, a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of
the equity court to entertain such a contest.").  The probate
court's judgment did not provide substantive support for the
proponent's case; it "only" provided a starting point for the
proceedings and the support for the exercise of equity
jurisdiction.  When the party contesting the will presents
evidence 
showing 
the 
invalidity 
of 
the 
will, 
the
proponent/defendant must rebut that evidence.  Hancock lays
out this procedure as follows:
"[T]he proper procedure is that the [defendant], who
is in effect the proponent, should first introduce
the proceedings admitting the will to probate in the
probate court.... [The plaintiff,] who is the
contestant, 'should then introduce testimony on
which the alleged invalidity of the will is based.
The [defendant] should then introduce the rebuttal
testimony....'"
Hancock, 264 Ala. at 203, 86 So. 2d at 390.  The introduction
of the probate court's judgment admitting the will to probate
serves only to set the stage for the plaintiffs'/contestants'
will 
contest 
and 
to 
establish 
the 
circuit 
court's 
jurisdiction.  The introduction of the probate proceedings
does not, in a trial de novo, satisfy a burden on the part of
the defendant that the plaintiffs must rebut in their case-in-
34
1120260
chief.  I dissent from any holding in the main opinion to the
contrary. 
Even if the main opinion's application of Hancock is set
aside, the argument might be made that the evidence submitted
by Ricks at trial nevertheless supported the will and thus
supports the circuit court's decision.  This is the issue
presented in ground "B" of Ricks's certiorari petition. 
Specifically, she alleged, among other things, that the Court
of Civil Appeals erred in holding: (1) that the will contained
no official seal; (2) that the testimony of the notary public
that she had "notarized" the signatures was insufficient to
show that the will contained a seal; (3) that the circular
mark on the copy of the will was not indicative of a seal; and
(4) that Ricks did not introduce the probate proceedings into
evidence, despite the fact that a copy of the probate court's
record was transferred to the circuit court.  This Court
denied certiorari review as to ground "B"; thus, those issues
are not before us, and I express no opinion as to whether the
Court of Civil Appeals correctly decided those issues.  I
believe that ruling on an issue this Court expressly stated it
35
1120260
would not review is erroneous and arguably denies the
respondents due process of law.
Additionally, the main opinion holds that the respondents
waived their argument that no seal was affixed to the will
because the argument was raised for the first time in an
interlocutory motion filed after the circuit court 
had 
entered
a nonfinal order.  This argument was rejected by the Court of
Civil Appeals, and Ricks did not oppose that holding in either
her certiorari petition or her brief to this Court. The
respondents, with no notice that waiver was even at issue,
also do not discuss the issue in their brief.  Because the
issue is not raised or discussed, and is, in any event, 
material only to the issues upon which this Court denied
certiorari review, I must respectfully dissent.
36