Title: People v. Superior Court of Orange County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S225562
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
 
RICHARD ANTHONY SMITH, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S225562 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G050827 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
M-9531 
 
 
December 13, 2018 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Segal* concurred.   
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Seven assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
S225562 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
In California, mental health professionals and law 
enforcement personnel endeavor to identify and treat 
individuals likely to engage in sexually violent criminal 
behavior because of a mental disorder.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 
6600-6609.3, SVPA or Act; see Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 
19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143.)  Although designation as a sexually 
violent predator (SVP) is not a punitive measure, individuals so 
designated are subject to a variety of serious consequences, 
including civil commitment.  (§ 6604.)   
Whether someone qualifies as an SVP is determined by a 
judge or jury at a trial.  (Ibid.)  Key to that determination are 
the opinions of the mental health professionals designated by 
the State Department of State Hospitals (SDSH) to examine the 
alleged SVP and to consider, among other things, the factors 
known to be associated with the risk of reoffending.  (§ 6601, 
subd. (c).)  We granted review in this case to decide whether the 
district attorney prosecuting a civil commitment petition under 
the SVPA may obtain copies of the treatment records supporting 
the updated or replacement evaluators’ opinions about an 
individual’s suitability for designation as an SVP.  We must also 
resolve whether those records may be shared with a mental 
health expert retained by the district attorney to assist in the 
prosecution of the SVP petition.   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
What we conclude is that a recent amendment to the 
SVPA, enacted after we granted review, allows the district 
attorney to obtain those otherwise confidential records.  The 
district attorney may then disclose those records to its retained 
expert, subject to an appropriate protective order, to assist in 
the cross-examination of the SDSH evaluators or mental health 
professionals retained by the defense and, more generally, in 
prosecuting the SVP petition.  We therefore affirm the Court of 
Appeal.     
I. 
A. 
The SVPA defines an SVP as “a person who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more 
victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes 
the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it 
is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal 
behavior.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600, subd. (a)(1); all further 
undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  Once the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation determines an 
inmate nearing release from prison may be an SVP, the SDSH 
designates two psychiatrists or psychologists to examine the 
person using a standardized assessment protocol.  The protocol 
requires an “assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as 
well as various factors known to be associated with the risk of 
reoffense among sex offenders.”  (§ 6601, subd. (c).)  If the 
evaluators concur that the person qualifies as an SVP, then the 
Director of State Hospitals must forward a request that a 
petition for commitment be filed in the superior court of the 
county that imposed the sentence the person is currently 
serving.  (Id., subds. (d), (i).)  The petition is filed by either the 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
district attorney or the county counsel, whichever has been 
designated by the county board of supervisors to assume 
responsibility for SVP proceedings, if the designated counsel 
concurs with the SDSH determination.  (Id., subd. (i).)  In this 
instance, the proceedings are being handled by the district 
attorney, so we will refer to the designated counsel as the 
district attorney throughout.   
Because resolution of the SVP petition often stretches over 
months or years, the district attorney may request that SDSH 
evaluators perform an updated evaluation of the alleged SVP.  
(§ 6603, subd. (c)(1); see Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 796, 805, fn. 7 (Albertson).)  If the original evaluator is 
no longer available to testify, the district attorney may also 
request that the SDSH appoint someone to perform a 
replacement evaluation.  (§ 6603, subd. (c)(1).)   
The SVPA provides that following the initial evaluation, 
“[c]opies of the evaluation reports and any other supporting 
documents shall be made available” to the district attorney.  
(§ 6601, subd. (d).)  Thereafter, copies of any updated or 
replacement evaluations shall likewise be provided to the 
district attorney (§ 6603, subd. (c)(1)), along with “all records” 
reviewed by “the evaluator performing an updated evaluation,” 
if requested.  (Id., subd. (j)(1).)   
The statute also includes protections for alleged SVPs.  An 
alleged SVP is “entitled to a trial by jury, to the assistance of 
counsel, to the right to retain experts or professional persons to 
perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to have access 
to all relevant medical and psychological records and reports.”  
(§ 6603, subd. (a).)  Civil commitment is authorized under the 
SVPA only if the trier of fact determines beyond a reasonable 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
doubt that the person in question is an SVP.  (§ 6604.)  A person 
found to be an SVP “shall be committed for an indeterminate 
term to the custody of the [SDSH] for appropriate treatment and 
confinement in a secure facility . . . .”  (Ibid.)  While the person 
is confined, the SDSH must conduct an examination at least 
once a year to determine whether the person currently meets 
the definition of an SVP and whether conditional release to a 
less restrictive alternative or an unconditional discharge is 
appropriate.  (§ 6604.9, subds. (a), (b).)   
B. 
In March 2002, the Orange County District Attorney filed 
a petition to commit Richard Anthony Smith, then a prison 
inmate with a parole date later that month, as an SVP.  
Attached to the petition were evaluations by mental health 
professionals Dana Putnam, Ph.D., and Charles Jackson, Ph.D., 
conducted earlier that year.  After a long series of continuances 
stipulated to or requested by Smith or his attorney, the district 
attorney in 2006 requested that the SDSH perform updated and 
replacement evaluations under section 6603, subdivision (c)(1).  
After another series of stipulated continuances, the trial court 
granted Smith’s request for a new set of updated evaluations.  
In February 2011, Nancy Rueschenberg, Ph.D., and Dr. Putnam 
evaluated Smith, and each concluded that he no longer qualified 
as an SVP.  Based on the updated evaluations, Smith filed a 
motion to enter a plea in abatement and dismiss the petition, 
which the trial court denied.  The Court of Appeal, though, 
granted Smith’s writ petition in an unpublished opinion and 
directed the trial court to enter a new order dismissing the SVP 
petition.  This court subsequently granted review, holding the 
matter pending our decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 641, and thereafter transferred the matter back to 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
the Court of Appeal for reconsideration.  The Court of Appeal 
subsequently denied the writ petition insofar as it sought entry 
of a plea in abatement and dismissal of the SVP petition.   
In 2014, the district attorney requested yet another 
updated evaluation from Dr. Putnam.  The district attorney also 
asked the court for an order permitting his retained expert, 
Dawn Starr, Ph.D., to review the SDSH evaluations as well as 
the documentation and records on which the evaluators had 
relied.  The trial court denied the request, but the Court of 
Appeal directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and enter 
a new order granting the request.   
What the appellate court observed at the outset is that the 
documents on which the experts relied were already in the 
lawful possession of the district attorney, citing sections 6601, 
subdivision (h) and 6603, subdivision (c)(1).  The court then 
weighed Smith’s privacy interest against the government’s 
interest in protecting the public from SVPs (as well as the 
judicial system’s interest in providing accurate information to 
the trier of fact who is making the SVP determination).  Its 
assessment led the court to conclude that “the district attorney’s 
retained expert should be able to review Smith’s section 
6603(c)(1) evaluations and the mental health records and 
documents relied upon by the evaluators and Smith’s retained 
experts,” with an appropriate protective order. 
We granted Smith’s petition for review to decide whether 
the district attorney is entitled to review the confidential 
medical and psychological records on which the evaluators had 
relied, and, if so, whether those records may be shared with an 
expert who has been retained by the district attorney for the 
purpose of assisting with the SVP proceeding.   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
II. 
We begin by resolving whether the alleged SVP’s mental 
health records may be provided to the district attorney.  
Generally, such records are confidential.  (§ 5328, subd. (a).)  But 
certain exceptions apply.   
One such exception applies when the mental health 
professionals designated by the Director of State Hospitals 
evaluate an individual and agree that the individual qualifies as 
an SVP.  When this occurs, “[c]opies of the evaluation reports 
and any other supporting documents shall be made available to 
the attorney designated by the county . . . who may file a petition 
for commitment.”  (§ 6601, subds. (d), (h)(1), italics added.)  
Shortly after the Legislature amended the SVPA in 2000, 
allowing the district attorney to request updated or replacement 
evaluations, we concluded that the statutory scheme granted 
the district attorney “access to treatment record information” 
insofar as that information was contained in an updated or 
replacement evaluation.  (Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 805; 
see also People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 380, fn. 11.) 
The appellate courts split following our decision in 
Albertson.  The crux of their disagreement was whether the 
records subject to discovery were limited to the specific excerpts 
contained in an updated or replacement evaluation, or whether 
the district attorney could instead be “ ‘granted direct access to 
the records’ ” themselves.  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
July 2, 2015, p. 4; see id. at p. 8 [“ ‘In the last few years, Los 
Angeles courts have denied requests for subpoenas for state 
hospital records when requested by the People.  A review of 
California counties revealed that courts in every other 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
California county surveyed grant the People access to these 
records’ ”].)   
The Legislature addressed the conflict after we granted 
review in this case.  It added subdivision (j) to section 6603 “to 
ensure that the prosecuting attorney has access to all the 
records on which the evaluators have based their evaluations.”  
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507, 
supra, as amended July 2, 2015, p. 7.)  The statute now provides:  
“Notwithstanding any other law, the evaluator performing an 
updated evaluation shall include with the evaluation a 
statement listing all records reviewed by the evaluator pursuant 
to subdivision (c).  The court shall issue a subpoena, upon the 
request of either party, for a certified copy of these records.  The 
records shall be provided to the attorney petitioning for 
commitment and the counsel for the person subject to this 
article.  The attorneys may use the records in proceedings under 
this article and shall not disclose them for any other purpose.”  
(§ 6603, subd. (j)(1), italics added.)  
We are unpersuaded by Smith’s efforts to evade the 
amended statute.  He argues first that the amended statute 
cannot apply to the records supporting his 2011 evaluations, 
which predated the amendment to section 6603.  Because 
section 6603, subdivision (j)(1) “does not apply retroactively,” it 
entitles the district attorney (in Smith’s view) only to 
“information and records obtained in the course of providing 
services performed on or after January 1, 2016,” the 
amendment’s effective date.  Yet Smith cites nothing to support 
his contention that application of the expanded discovery rule to 
the current SVP proceeding would qualify as “retroactive.”  And, 
in general, the law is otherwise:  “[C]hanges to rules governing 
pending litigation, for example, frequently have been designated 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
as prospective, because they affect the future; that is, the future 
proceedings in a trial.”  (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 
956.)   
At the core of Smith’s “retroactivity” argument appears to 
be a belief that his pre-2016 communications with mental health 
professionals were completely confidential.  Smith contends that 
it would be unfair to change the rules after he had already 
participated 
in 
treatment. 
 
Although 
a 
measure 
of 
confidentiality in this context may be valuable, it is not clear 
why Smith assumed his conversations with these professionals 
would necessarily remain forever confidential.  Before section 
6603 was amended, appellate courts were divided on the 
question whether the attorney prosecuting an SVP petition 
could obtain the records underlying an updated or replacement 
evaluation.  Even if Smith had relied on the line of cases barring 
a prosecuting attorney from subpoenaing the underlying 
records, he would have had reason to know that the prosecuting 
attorney could nonetheless obtain that same information insofar 
as those communications or other information were set forth in 
an updated or replacement evaluation.  (See Albertson, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 805.)  Accordingly, Smith had no assurance that 
any individual communication in connection with his treatment 
would be protected from disclosure to the prosecuting attorney 
— even before section 6603 was amended.  
Indeed, we applied newly amended provisions governing 
discovery to a pending SVP proceeding involving closely 
analogous circumstances in Albertson.  The issue presented 
there was whether the SVPA authorized an updated mental 
health evaluation and the disclosure of the confidential 
treatment records underlying such an evaluation.  (Albertson, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 798.)  After we granted review, the 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
Legislature enacted urgency legislation authorizing updated 
and replacement evaluations as well as disclosure of the alleged 
SVP’s treatment records in certain circumstances.  (Ibid.)  We 
held that the amended statute could and did apply “to any future 
pretrial and/or trial proceedings in this litigation.”  (Id. at p. 
804.)  The same is true here.  Even though the treatment records 
might have been created before section 6603 was amended, the 
statute now allows copies of those records to be disclosed to the 
district attorney to the extent they were reviewed as part of an 
updated or replacement evaluation.  (§ 6603, subd. (j)(1).) 
Smith argues next for a narrow reading of section 6603, 
subdivision (j)(1).  In his view, the statute should be read to 
authorize access only to the records reviewed by an evaluator 
performing an updated evaluation, not to those records reviewed 
by an evaluator performing a replacement evaluation.1  Smith 
correctly points out that section 6603’s new subdivision (j)(1) 
refers only to “the evaluator performing an updated evaluation” 
and does not mention replacement evaluations — and that 
subdivision (c)(1), by contrast, refers distinctly to “updated 
evaluations” and “replacement evaluations.”  He infers from this 
that the Legislature reasonably expected the district attorney 
would have access to the underlying treatment records only 
when there has been an updated — not a replacement — 
evaluation.   
True:  Courts often presume that a word used in more than 
one provision of a statute has precisely the same meaning 
                                        
1  
In this proceeding, Dr. Putnam evaluated Smith in 2002 
in connection with the SVP petition and provided an updated 
evaluation in 2011.  Due to Dr. Jackson’s unavailability, Dr. 
Rueschenberg provided a replacement evaluation in 2011.   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
throughout –– a logical inference rooted not only in how people 
ordinarily use language, but also in how one generally might 
expect legislative bodies to draft statutory provisions.  (People v. 
Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 463, 468.)  Yet this is merely a 
presumption, not an inflexible rule.  (People v. Jones (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 585, 595.)  Just as people sometimes use the same word 
to convey different meanings even in the same sentence, so too 
have we held that certain statutes are sometimes best read in 
context to assign different meanings to the same word used in 
different portions of a statute.  (See, e.g., Jones, at pp. 594-595 
[assigning different meanings for the word “crimes” in Pen. Code 
§ 667.6, subds. (c) and (d)].)  Our interpretive task is not 
necessarily to slavishly assign a word precisely the same 
meaning every time it is used in a statute — regardless of the 
context — but to accord it the meaning best suited to 
effectuating the statute’s intended purpose.  (Hernandez, at p. 
468.)  When we take account of the relevant provisions and 
structure of the law, and the SVPA’s broad purpose of 
identifying dangerous sex offenders so that they may receive 
treatment, we conclude that the best understanding of “an 
updated evaluation” within the meaning of section 6603, 
subdivision (j)(1) encompasses all evaluations that update 
previous SDSH evaluations.      
Consider, for instance, the similar roles of updated and 
replacement evaluations.  A replacement evaluation, like an 
updated evaluation, is triggered by the district attorney’s 
request.  (§ 6603, subd. (c)(1).)  In both instances, the SDSH 
performs the evaluations and forwards them to the petitioning 
attorney and the attorney for the alleged SVP.  (Ibid.)  Both 
types of evaluations are required to include a review of the same 
medical and psychological records.  (Ibid.)  Neither a 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
replacement nor an updated evaluation may be ordered “except 
as necessary to update one or more of the original evaluations 
or to replace the evaluation of an evaluator who is no longer 
available to testify for the petitioner in court proceedings.”  
(Ibid.)  In short, both types of evaluations originate in similar 
circumstances, are governed by the same rules, and serve 
similar purposes — to present the trier of fact with the most up-
to-date assessment of the alleged SVP’s mental condition.  In 
this sense, both types of evaluations serve to update the 
information provided in earlier evaluations.   
The legislative history also supports the conclusion that 
the term “updated evaluation” in subdivision (j)(1) of section 
6603 encompasses both types of the evaluations authorized by 
subdivision (c)(1).  Bill analyses repeatedly described the 
amendment as providing that “the prosecutor and the attorney 
for an alleged SVP shall have access to records considered by an 
expert who performed replacement or updated evaluations . . . .”  
(Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished 
Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended July 2, 2015, p. 1, italics added; see Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507, supra, as amended 
July 2, 2015, p. 7 [“This bill seeks to ensure that the prosecuting 
attorney has access to all the records on which the evaluators 
have based their evaluations” (italics added)]; Sen. Rules Com., 
Office of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 507 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 2, 2015, p. 1 
[“the prosecutor or county attorney petitioning for commitment 
. . . shall have access to records considered by the expert 
evaluators who performed replacement or updated evaluations” 
(italics added)]; see generally Judicial Council of Cal., Summary 
of Court-Related Legislation (Nov. 2015) p. 10 [Sen. Bill No. 507 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
provides that “the prosecutor and the attorney for an alleged 
SVP shall have access to the records that were reviewed by the 
expert who performed replacement or updated evaluations” 
(italics added)].)  Accordingly, the best reading of the phrase “the 
evaluator performing an updated evaluation” in section 6603, 
subdivision (j)(1) is that it includes both the evaluators who are 
updating their own prior evaluations as well as the evaluators 
who are updating evaluations performed by a prior evaluator 
who is no longer available.   
Finally, we reject Smith’s contention that granting the 
district attorney access to his treatment records would violate 
his right to equal protection of the law under the state and 
federal Constitutions.  Smith contends that the amended SVPA 
gives the district attorney access “to the confidential therapy 
records of alleged SVPs, but not to the confidential therapy 
records of any other recipient of those services, including 
similarly situated mentally disordered offenders (MDOs) and 
mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSOs)” — yet “the 
government has not shown why only SVPs should lose the right 
to keep their treatment records confidential from prosecutors.”  
Smith does not identify in what way, if any, the statutory 
schemes associated with designation as either an MDO or 
MDSO operate differently from the SVPA with respect to 
discovery of these types of records.  His submission thus fails to 
satisfy “the required threshold” for an equal protection claim — 
i.e., “a credible showing of different treatment.”  (United States 
v. Armstrong (1996) 517 U.S. 456, 470.)  Whether the particular 
dangers posed by SVPs relative to those posed by MDOs or 
MDSOs warrant differential treatment is not an issue we need 
to address here.  
 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
III. 
Smith argues next that even if the district attorney may 
lawfully access the relevant treatment records, section 5328 
bars the government from sharing those records with its 
retained expert.  We disagree.     
Under new subdivision (j)(1) of section 6603, attorneys for 
either side “may use the records in proceedings under this 
article and shall not disclose them for any other purpose.”  So 
long as attorneys do not disclose the confidential records for any 
other purpose, subdivision (j)(1) at the very least suggests that 
attorneys may disclose them “in proceedings under this article.”  
(§ 6603, subd. (j)(1).)  Given the “critical” importance of expert 
testimony in an SVP proceeding (People v. McKee (2010) 47 
Cal.4th 1172, 1192) — and the likelihood that counsel will need 
expert assistance to grasp the scientific nuances underlying 
another expert’s opinion — the disclosure most needed by each 
party “in proceedings under this article” (§ 6603, subd. (j)(1)) 
would almost certainly be to its retained expert. 
 Yet this recently enacted statutory change contains its 
own share of nuances.  We must read the text of section 6603, 
subdivision (j)(1) in conjunction with the rest of Senate Bill No. 
507, including its uncodified section.  Somewhat cryptically, this 
uncodified section provides:  “Nothing in this act is intended to 
affect the determination by the Supreme Court of California, in 
People v. Superior Court (Smith) (Docket No. S225562), whether 
an expert retained by the district attorney in a proceeding under 
the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Article 4 (commencing with 
Section 6600) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 6 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code) is entitled to review otherwise 
confidential treatment information under Section 5328 of the 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
Welfare and Institutions Code.”  (Stats. 2015, ch. 576, § 2.)  The 
Legislature’s explicit reference to this case in the uncodified 
section evinces an awareness that we had already granted 
review to consider these issues.  (See Assem. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507, supra, as amended July 2, 
2015, p. 10.)  What it does not imply is that we should ignore the 
legislative changes underlying section 6603, subdivision (j)(1) in 
resolving them. 
Before we granted review, an earlier version of the bill 
included a paragraph in subdivision (j) providing that “[t]his 
subdivision does not create any new rights or limitations 
regarding the retention of an expert witness by either party or 
access to records by an expert retained or sought to be retained 
by either party.  The attorney petitioning for commitment shall 
not provide access to the records obtained under paragraph (1) 
to any third party, including an expert retained or sought to be 
retained by that attorney, without the consent of the court upon 
noticed motion.”  (Sen. Bill No. 507 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Apr. 30, 2015, § 1; see Sen. Rules Com., Office of Sen. 
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507, supra, 
as amended June 2, 2015, p. 1 [“This bill . . . prohibits the 
prosecutor from disclosing the records to a retained expert”].)  
This paragraph was deleted in a subsequent amendment, after 
we granted review in this case.  We are left to garner what 
insight we can about the Legislature’s purpose in crafting the 
uncodified section above.     
We have been unable to find another instance in which a 
statute included a provision declaring an intent not to influence 
the pending judicial resolution of the issue presented.  Even so, 
nothing in the uncodified section or elsewhere in the statute 
conveys a categorical bar on considering subdivision (j)(1) of 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
section 6603 in resolving the matter before us.   We can further 
observe that the Legislature adopted two different strategies to 
address the two separate issues presented in this case.   
On the question of making treatment records available to 
the district attorney, the Legislature addressed the issue 
directly.  It provided a straightforward answer through an 
explicit legislative provision governing these records.  In 
contrast, the Legislature refrained from providing a direct 
answer to the question whether the district attorney’s retained 
expert could review those records.  Yet the Legislature did not 
include an explicit provision rendering the amendment entirely 
irrelevant to the latter question.  Nor does it seem likely, given 
how the amendment was drafted and what we know about its 
history, that the Legislature wanted us to completely ignore the 
2015 amendments to section 6603 — that is, to pretend that the 
district attorney might not have access to these otherwise 
confidential records and therefore could not possibly share 
information that it did not possess.  So we shall instead construe 
the uncodified section’s declaration of intent as cautioning us 
that while section 6603, subdivision (j)(1) may be relevant to the 
question whether the government can share these records with 
its retained expert, it cannot alone be dispositive of the issue 
before us. 
We therefore broaden our analysis to encompass the text, 
structure, and purpose of the entire SVPA as well as section 
5328, which makes confidential the information and records 
obtained in the course of providing services to an alleged SVP.  
The purpose of the SVPA is to identify, confine, and treat those 
persons who have mental disorders that render them “a danger 
to the health and safety of others in that they are likely to 
engage in acts of sexual violence.”  (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
p. 5921; see People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 540.)  The 
primary mechanism for identifying an SVP is assessment of the 
person by psychiatrists or psychologists using a standardized 
protocol.  (§ 6601, subds. (c), (d).)  Although the SVP 
determination requires proof that the person has been convicted 
of a sexually violent offense, the bulk of the evidence at trial 
typically focuses on whether the person has a diagnosed mental 
disorder that makes it likely he or she will engage in sexually 
violent behavior.  (See § 6600, subd. (a).)  Accordingly, the civil 
commitment trial usually turns on the quality and credibility of 
the expert witnesses and the extent to which their evaluations 
are persuasive.  (See People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 
1192; see generally People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 
772 [“expert prediction, unreliable though it may be, is often the 
only evidence available to assist the trier of fact”]; Ake v. 
Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 81 (Ake) [“psychiatrists disagree 
widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the 
appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and 
symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future 
dangerousness”].) 
Unfortunately, as the legislative history suggests, the 
SDSH “ ‘has not ensured that it conducts these evaluations in a 
consistent manner’ ” and sometimes “ ‘evaluators did not 
demonstrate that they considered all relevant information.’ ”  
(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 507 (2015-
2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 30, 2015, p. 3, quoting Cal. 
State Auditor, Cal. Dept. of State Hospitals Report No. 2014-125 
(Mar. 2015) p. 1.)  A key way in which one party counters an 
opposing expert’s opinion is to uncover and challenge the expert 
about the bases for his or her opinion.  (See People v. Smith 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 509; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
81.)  This is particularly true for a mental health professional’s 
assessment of whether an individual qualifies as an SVP.  
Because an evaluator exercises professional judgment within 
the legal framework specified by the SVPA, the evaluator’s 
“legally accurate understanding of the statutory criteria is 
crucial to the Act’s proper operation.”  (People v. Superior Court 
(Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 910.)   
Cross-examination may assist the trier of fact in 
determining whether the evaluator has “accurately understood 
the statutory criteria.”  (Ibid.)  But that opportunity would be a 
hollow one if the district attorney does not have the assistance 
of an expert to interpret and explain the significance of the 
specialized information at issue.  (See Bonds v. Roy (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 140, 146-147; accord, Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 
418, 429 [“Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous 
to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy 
turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by 
expert psychiatrists and psychologists”].)  Without an expert’s 
assistance in preparing the cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses, “the risk of an inaccurate resolution . . . is extremely 
high.”  (See Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 82.)  An expert would also 
need to examine the relevant records to offer an opinion about 
the potential SVP’s mental health.  (See People v. Burroughs 
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 402.) 
So it is not surprising to find that nothing in the text of 
the SVPA bars the government from sharing otherwise 
confidential information in its possession with the expert it has 
retained for the purpose of assisting in an SVP proceeding.  Nor 
would sharing such information with an expert retained to 
assist in the SVP proceeding violate in particular section 6603, 
subdivision (j)(1), which states in pertinent part, “The attorneys 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
may use the records in proceedings under this article and shall 
not disclose them for any other purpose.”     
Finally, we reject Smith’s argument that access must be 
limited to avoid a conflict with section 5328.  Smith argues that 
a conflict with this section arises if the government’s retained 
expert is granted access to the treatment records already 
reviewed by the SDSH evaluators or by his own retained 
experts.  Section 5328 itself lists 25 separate exceptions, 
including an exception for disclosure “[t]o the courts, as 
necessary to the administration of justice.”  (§ 5328, subd. (a)(6).)  
Following section 5328 are more than a dozen separate statutes, 
each allowing disclosure in various circumstances.  (See 
§ 5328.01 et seq.)  In addition, section 6603 specifies still more 
exceptions to the confidentiality of these records, including the 
disclosure of the records used by the SDSH evaluators to the 
attorney prosecuting the SVP petition.  (See § 6603, subd. (j)(1).)  
Nothing in section 5328 appears to contemplate limiting one 
member of the prosecution team in an SVP proceeding from 
sharing these otherwise confidential records with another 
member of the prosecution team, provided an appropriate 
protective order is in place.  (Cf. People v. Garcia (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 792, 811 [the effectiveness of the sex offender 
management program “depends on ‘ “open and ongoing 
communication” ’ 
among 
the 
professionals 
involved 
in 
‘ “supervising, assessing, evaluating, treating, supporting, and 
monitoring sex offenders” ’ ”].)  That team includes paralegals, 
secretaries, and retained experts.  Confidential information that 
is shared among that group for the purpose of furthering the 
representation remains confidential.  (See Evid. Code, § 952.)   
In light of the legislative goals embodied in the SVPA, the 
role of confidentiality in this context is to “encourage[] persons 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (SMITH) 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
with mental problems to seek, accept and undergo treatment 
and to be open and candid in treatment.”  (State Dept. of Public 
Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 948.)  It seems 
implausible that a person would be dissuaded from initiating or 
participating fully in treatment simply because his or her 
treatment records, in addition to being disclosed to the SDSH 
mental health professionals and the district attorney, might be 
disclosed to a mental health professional retained by the district 
attorney.   
IV. 
Our society uses trials to advance the search for truth.  
That search generally work best when each side — and each 
side’s experts — have access to the records and information on 
which the opposing side’s experts rely.  The Legislature adopted 
this reciprocal model in the current version of the SVPA.  The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
SEGAL, J.*  
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Seven assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Superior Court (Smith) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 2/24/15 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S225562 
Date Filed: December 13, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Kimberly Menninger 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Elizabeth Molfetta, Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Frank Ospino, Public Defender, Sharon Petrosino, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Dan Cook and Mark S. 
Brown, Assistant Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth Molfetta 
Deputy District Attorney 
401 Civic Center Drive W 
Santa Ana, CA  92701 
(714) 834-3600 
 
Mark S. Brown 
Assistant Public Defender 
14 Civic Center Plaza 
Santa Ana, CA  92701-4029 
(714) 834-2144