Title: Robin G. Barnett, Candace Penry, and Jeffrey Barnett v. Estate of Barbara Anderson (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: CV-05-3097.51). Reversed And Remanded. 1051829 (consolidated) W. Perry Hall, guardian ad litem for minors Abby E. Reed, Ella K. Reed, Michael J. Barnett, Alexandra B. Penry, Sarah G. Penry, William G. Holmes, and Virginia A. Holmes v. Kathryn A. Reed and Gertrude A. Holmes Penton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051676
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 2007

REL: 03/16/2007 Barnett v. Anderson
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1051676 and 1051829
____________________
Robin G. Barnett, Candace Penry, and Jeffrey Barnett
v.
Estate of Barbara C. Anderson
__________
W. Perry Hall, guardian ad litem for minors Abby E. Reed,
Ella K. Reed, Michael J. Barnett, Alexandra B. Penry, Sarah
G. Penry, William G. Holmes, and Virginia A. Holmes
v.
Kathryn A. Reed and Gertrude A. Holmes Penton
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-05-3097.51)
LYONS, Justice.
1051676; 1051829
2
These appeals are from a final order of the Mobile
Circuit Court in a declaratory-judgment action in which the
plaintiffs were seeking an interpretation and declaration of
the legal effect of certain language contained in a will.  We
have consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one
opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The facts are undisputed.  Barbara C. Anderson ("the
testatrix") died in 1970.  Her will, executed on April 5,
1965, was admitted to probate in August 1970.  The testatrix's
two daughters, Kathryn A. Reed and Gertrude A. Holmes Penton
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the daughters") were
issued letters testamentary as coexecutors for the estate.  In
July 2005 the daughters filed a petition for a declaratory
judgment, seeking an interpretation and a declaration of the
legal effect of item four of the testatrix's will, which reads
as follows:
"ITEM FOUR
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my
property of every kind or nature, I GIVE, DEVISE AND
BEQUEATH unto my two daughters, Gertrude Holmes and
Kathryn Reed, to have and to hold share and share
alike provided however that 'The Farm' adjacent to
the 
extension 
of 
the 
Blackwell 
Nursery 
Road
1051676; 1051829
The daughters' lineal descendants are: Mark B. Reed,
1
Timothy P. Reed (deceased), Kathryn K. Reed, Anderson L. Reed,
Damon Benjamin Reed, Byron Anderson Reed, Abby E. Reed, Ella
K. Reed, Oliver W. George (deceased), Edward E. Holmes, Sr.
(deceased), Robin G. Barnett, Candace G. Penry, Aimee H.
Stone, Edward E. Holmes II, Jeffrey J. Barnett, Michael J.
Barnett, Alexandra B. Penry, Sarah G. Penry, William G.
Holmes, and Virginia A. Holmes.
3
consisting of approximately three hundred acres
shall not be sold during the terms of their natural
lives and twenty-one years thereafter.  Upon their
deaths, title to 'The Farm' shall vest in the heirs
of their bodies per stirpes, but not to be sold or
otherwise disposed of for a period of twenty-one
years succeeding the death of the survivor of my two
daughters."
(Emphasis added.)
Specifically, the daughters sought a judgment declaring
that the language in item four restricting the sale of the
farm was void as an unlawful restraint on the alienation of
property and declaring that they owned the farm outright in
fee simple.  The petition lists the lineal descendants  (20
children and grandchildren) of each daughter as necessary
parties.   Of the 17 living lineal descendants, the following
1
filed separate and various motions, including motions in
opposition to the petition as well as motions to dismiss it:
Robin G. Barnett, Candace Penry, and Jeffrey Barnett
(represented by Patrick Collins), and Abby E. Reed, Ella K.
1051676; 1051829
At some point during the proceedings below, Richard G.
2
Alexander was appointed guardian ad litem for two minors who
had previously been represented by W. Perry Hall: Anderson L.
Reed and Kathryn K. Reed.  Alexander, acting on behalf of
these minors, filed a brief in these appeals, in essence
adopting the daughters' brief and taking the daughters'
position on appeal.
4
Reed, Michael J. Barnett, Alexander B. Penry, Sarah G. Penry,
William G. Holmes, and Virginia A. Holmes (represented by
guardian ad litem W. Perry Hall).   Those lineal descendants
2
who have objected to the daughters' petition for a declaratory
judgment are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
heirs."
Following a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment
declaring that the daughters owned the farm in fee simple,
reasoning (1) that under § 35-4-2, Ala. Code 1975, all estates
in land are presumed to be fee-simple estates unless there is
clear and unambiguous language indicating that a lesser estate
was intended; (2) that the will failed to reference a life
estate; (3) that the language in the will was an attempt to
create a common-law estate in fee tail, which by operation of
§ 35-4-3, Ala. Code 1975, is converted into an estate in fee
simple; and (4) that the restriction in the will providing
that the farm shall not be sold during the daughters' natural
1051676; 1051829
The heirs also contend that the daughters' petition is
3
barred by the statute of repose.  Our resolution of the appeal
in favor of the heirs on the issue of construction of the will
renders it unnecessary to  consider this alternative basis for
reversing the trial court's judgment.    
5
lives and for 21 years thereafter was an unlawful restriction
on the alienation of land and was therefore void as against
public policy. 
The heirs appeal, contending that trial court erred in
concluding that the testatrix's will did not evidence an
intent to convey a lesser title to the farm than fee simple.
Specifically, they argue that the trial court's reliance on
Hacker v. Carlisle, 388 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1980), a case dealing
with a deed rather than a will, is misplaced and that its
judgment is due to be reversed.  The daughters, on the other
hand, claim that the language in the will conveys the farm to
them in fee simple.  The issue on appeal is whether the
testatrix's intent regarding the disposition of the farm can
be ascertained from the four corners of her will.  We conclude
that it can.3
II.  Standard of Review
The operative facts in this case are undisputed, and we
are presented with a pure question of law.  Thus, "[t]his
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6
Court's review of the application of the law to the undisputed
facts is de novo."  Lyons v. Norris, 829 So. 2d 748, 750 (Ala.
2002).
III.  Analysis
Section 35-4-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides: "Every estate
in lands is to be taken as a fee simple, although the words
necessary to create an estate of inheritance are not used,
unless it clearly appears that a less estate was intended." 
Regarding the construction of deeds, it is well settled
that a deed is construed most strongly against the grantor.
See Moss v. Williams, 822 So. 2d 392, 396-97 (Ala. 2001)
("This Court has long recognized that § 35-4-2 is simply 'a
statutory affirmance of the general rule that a deed is
construed most strongly against the grantor.'"). "[G]reater
strictness is required in the construction of deeds than of
wills."  Porter v. Henderson, 203 Ala. 312, 315, 82 So. 668,
671 (1919). 
The law in Alabama regarding the interpretation of wills
is well settled:
"[T]he intention of the testatrix is the law of the
will, which the court should consider as a whole,
giving effect to each provision where it is possible
to do so; it is the court's duty to carry out the
1051676; 1051829
7
testatrix's intention where that intent can be
ascertained.  To determine the intent of a testator
or testatrix, the court must look to the four
corners of the instrument, and if the language is
unambiguous and clearly expresses the testator's or
testatrix's intent, then that language must govern.
Galin v. Johnson, 457 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1984).  Where
a will contains ambiguous or doubtful expressions,
it is the duty of the court to determine what the
testator or testatrix intended.  Brittain v. Ingram,
282 Ala. 158, 205 So. 2d 653 (1968)."
Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala. 1995) (emphasis
added).  Therefore, the statutory presumption that every
estate in land should be taken to be in fee simple unless it
clearly appears otherwise, although applicable in the context
of a will, must be read in that context in light of the rules
governing ascertainment of the intent of the testatrix. 
The trial court, relying primarily on Hacker, supra,
found that the testatrix's will in the instant case conveyed
to the daughters fee-simple title to the farm based on the
absence of any express reference in the will to a life estate.
The trial court apparently reasoned that without such language
there could be no intent on the testatrix's part to convey a
lesser estate than fee simple.
We find Hacker readily distinguishable.  Hacker involved
a deed executed in 1914 by Jasper Carlisle to his son, John
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8
Carlisle.  The deed contained the following handwritten
clause:  "It is understood that [John Carlisle] is not to sell
above described lands but it is to go to his heirs."  388 So.
2d at 949.  After John Carlisle died, his heirs sought an
interpretation and declaration of the interest conveyed by the
deed.  The trial court found that Jasper Carlisle had conveyed
a life estate to his son John Carlisle with a remainder
interest in John's heirs.  This Court reversed the trial
court's judgment, concluding, in part, that the handwritten
portion of the deed neither "clearly" nor "minimally"
designated a life estate in order to overcome the presumption
in favor of a conveyance of a fee-simple estate.  In
ascertaining the intent of Jasper Carlisle, this Court also
relied upon the conduct of the parties after the conveyance,
which confirmed Jasper Carlisle's intent to convey a fee-
simple estate.  Hence, the language in the deed when viewed as
a whole, coupled with the parties' conduct, indicated that the
estate conveyed was a fee-simple estate.  
In keeping with the well-settled law of wills as opposed
to deeds, our only inquiry is whether the testatrix's intent
can be ascertained from the four corners of the will or, in
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9
this case, from the four corners of item four in the will.  Of
course, a bequest in a will does not become effective until
the death of the testatrix; thus, unlike the circumstances
involving a deed as evidenced by Hacker, the occasion to
evaluate the postdisposition conduct of the testatrix/grantor
never presents itself.
The first provision in item four regarding the farm
states that the farm "shall not be sold during the terms of
[the 
daughters'] 
natural 
lives 
and 
twenty-one 
years
thereafter." (Emphasis added.) The daughters claim that this
language is legally insufficient to create a life estate.  The
daughters, however, ignore the well-settled principle that a
court has an obligation to consider the language of the entire
will in order to ascertain the testatrix's intent as to a
particular provision.  See McLean v. Brasfield, 460 So. 2d
153, 155 (Ala. 1984) ("The polestar to guide a court in the
construction of a will is the intent of the testator and that
intent should be determined by considering the instrument as
a whole and not by construing any subpart separately.").
Standing alone, the language in the first provision may seem
lacking in complete meaning, being silent as to the creation
1051676; 1051829
10
of a remainder interest in favor of others.  However, when the
first provision is read in conjunction with the second
provision, which states that "[u]pon [the daughters'] deaths,
title to 'The Farm' shall vest in the heirs of [the
daughters'] bodies per stirpes," the testatrix's intent is
clear.  (Emphasis added.)  The second provision shows that the
testatrix did not intend for the daughters to have a fee-
simple estate, and a reading of the first provision, in light
of the second provision, imports that the testatrix intended
the daughters to have only a life estate in the farm with a
remainder interest to vest in the daughters' heirs per
stirpes.  The language in both provisions, when read together,
should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.  In Prater v.
Hughston, 202 Ala. 192, 193, 79 So. 564, 565 (1918), this
Court stated:
"It may be true that, if clause 1 stood alone in
a deed, it would be void for uncertainty, but wills
are liberally construed so as to effectuate the
intention of the testator, and must receive greater
liberality of construction than is to be given to
ordinary legal instruments."
We find no language in item four of the testatrix's will
to suggest that the testatrix intended to convey the farm to
the daughters outright in fee simple.  Instead, the language
1051676; 1051829
11
imports that the testatrix intended to convey a lesser estate,
and such intention overcomes the presumption set forth in §
35-4-2, Ala. Code 1975.  Accordingly, the daughters have only
a life estate in the farm and that their heirs have a
remainder interest therein.  
The trial court also found that the language in the will
stating that "[u]pon [the daughters'] deaths, title to 'The
Farm' shall vest in the heirs of their bodies per stirpes, but
not to be sold or otherwise disposed of for a period of
twenty-one years succeeding the death of the survivor of my
two daughters" was merely an attempt by the testatrix to
create a fee tail, which is automatically converted by statute
into a fee-simple estate.  See § 35-4-3, Ala. Code 1975
("Every estate in real or personal property in fee tail, now
or hereafter created, becomes an estate in fee simple, and the
person in whom such a conditional fee vests has the same power
over the estate as in case of pure and absolute fees.").
Black’s Law Dictionary 650 (8th ed. 2004) defines "fee tail"
as "[a]n estate that is heritable only by specified
descendants of the original grantee, and that endures until
its current holder dies without issue (e.g., 'to Albert and
1051676; 1051829
12
the heirs of his body')."  The trial court's rationale
presupposes the validity of its conclusion that the daughters
otherwise hold a conditional fee-simple interest, as opposed
to a mere life estate.  Because we have determined that the
daughters hold only a life estate, we need not address the
effect of the statutory conversion of a conditional fee tail
to a fee-simple estate that might otherwise be presented by
such language.  
We note that the trial court, after holding that the
daughters held a fee-simple interest in the farm, declared
void the restriction on the sale of the farm until 21 years
after the death of the last of the two daughters to die.
Because the trial court did not find that the heirs held any
remainder interests, it therefore never answered the question
of 
the 
effect, 
if 
any, 
of 
that 
restriction 
on 
the
remaindermen.  In other words, the premise upon which the
trial court based its declaration that the restriction was
void as an unlawful restriction on the alienation of land was
based on an erroneous finding that the daughters held title in
fee simple.  We decline to review an issue, i.e., the effect,
1051676; 1051829
13
if any, of that restriction on the remaindermen, that was not
considered by the trial court.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
is reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.