Title: State v. Dominique
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-1613
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1613 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
NICOLAS DOMINIQUE,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 30, 2017] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Dominique v. State (Dominique II), 171 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2015).  The district court certified that its decision is in express and direct 
conflict with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Dawkins v. 
State, 170 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons we explain, we quash the decision in 
Dominique II and approve the decision in Dawkins. 
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Nicolas Dominique was charged with first-degree murder and ultimately 
convicted of the second-degree murder of Dwayne Clementson.  Dominique II, 
171 So. 3d at 204.  The district court provided a brief summary of the facts as 
follows:   
At the trial, the state presented evidence that the defendant was 
outside of his former girlfriend’s house when her new boyfriend 
arrived by car.  When the new boyfriend exited his car, the defendant 
chased the new boyfriend down the street while firing a gun, shooting 
the new boyfriend in the leg which caused him to fall, and then 
shooting the new boyfriend in the back of the head, killing him.  
The state argued that the defendant’s actions constituted first-
degree murder.  The defendant argued that his actions in chasing the 
new boyfriend down the street while firing his gun was [sic], at worst, 
manslaughter by culpable negligence. 
The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, manslaughter by act, and manslaughter by 
culpable negligence.  The jury found the defendant guilty of second-
degree murder. 
 
Id. at 204-05. 
 
Dominique’s jury was instructed on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter by act with the same instruction that this Court found to be 
fundamentally erroneous in State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010), which 
instructed the jury that to convict for manslaughter by act, the jury must find that 
the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim—a finding of an intent to 
kill that was not an element of the offense of manslaughter by act.  On direct 
appeal, Dominique argued that he was entitled to relief in light of Montgomery, but 
 
 
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the Fourth District disagreed and affirmed.  See Dominique II, 171 So. 3d at 205.  
The Fourth District rejected the fundamental error claim based on the fact that the 
trial court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter by 
culpable negligence.  See Dominique v. State (Dominique I), 40 So. 3d 33, 36 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2010).   
The case then came to this Court on petition for review of the decision in 
Dominique I.  However, we stayed that case pending the disposition of the review 
of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Haygood v. State, 54 So. 
3d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), which was then before this Court.  Our decision in 
Haygood v. State, 109 So. 3d 735 (Fla. 2013), was subsequently issued and held 
that the fundamental error caused by the erroneous Montgomery manslaughter by 
act instruction was not cured by giving the instruction on manslaughter by culpable 
negligence where there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably 
convict of manslaughter by culpable negligence.  See id. at 743.  After our decision 
in Haygood was issued, and upon review of the response to this Court’s Order to 
Show Cause, we granted the petition for review, summarily quashed the decision 
of the Fourth District in Dominique I, and remanded to the district court for 
reconsideration in light of our decision in Haygood.  See Dominique v. State, 160 
So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014) (table report of unpublished order).   
 
 
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On remand, the Fourth District reversed the conviction and held that 
fundamental error occurred in the giving of the jury instruction for manslaughter 
by act, requiring a new trial.  Dominique II, 171 So. 3d at 204.  The Fourth District 
interpreted our decision in Haygood to require a new trial any time the erroneous 
manslaughter by act instruction is given and the defendant is convicted of an 
offense not more than one step removed from manslaughter—regardless of 
whether the evidence could support a finding of manslaughter by culpable 
negligence.  The district court certified express and direct conflict with Dawkins v. 
State, 170 So. 3d 81, 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), and the State sought review of 
Dominique II in this Court based on that certified conflict.  
In this case, the State contends that the Fourth District in Dominique II 
misreads Haygood and other cases following Montgomery to incorrectly hold that 
the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction is fundamental error in all cases, 
regardless of whether the manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction is given 
and regardless of whether there is evidence that reasonably supports manslaughter 
by culpable negligence.  Thus, this iteration of a Montgomery challenge focuses on 
the district court’s interpretation of this Court’s decision in Haygood.   
 
 
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The Fourth District concluded that this Court’s evolution from Montgomery 
to Haygood to Griffin1 demonstrates that giving the manslaughter by act 
instruction is per se reversible error, even where there is evidence that could 
support a finding of manslaughter by culpable negligence.  The court stated that 
the culpable negligence instruction “cannot under any circumstance cure” the error 
created by the faulty manslaughter by act instruction because the error is always 
pertinent or material to what the jury had to consider to convict the defendant of 
manslaughter.  Dominique II, 171 So. 3d at 207.  The district court also noted, “We 
recognize the state’s factual distinction from Haygood that giving the erroneous 
manslaughter by act instruction is fundamental error where the evidence does not 
support the accompanying manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction, 
whereas here the evidence arguably supported the accompanying manslaughter by 
culpable negligence instruction.”  Id. at 205.  Nevertheless, the district court went 
on to find the error fundamental and per se reversible.  The Fourth District 
explained: 
In contrast to the Third District [in Dawkins], under our reading 
of the evolving precedent from Montgomery to Haygood to Griffin, 
giving the manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction cannot 
under any circumstance cure the fundamental error caused by giving 
                                          
 
 
1.  Griffin v. State, 160 So. 3d 63, 70 (Fla. 2015) (holding that the giving of 
the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction constituted fundamental error where 
the defendant offered a misidentification defense at trial, which did not concede the 
element of intent).  The Haygood issue was not present in Griffin. 
 
 
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the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction, even where the 
evidence reasonably could support a finding of manslaughter by 
culpable negligence. 
 
Id. at 207 (bracketed material added).  Dawkins held that “where the jury was also 
instructed in manslaughter by culpable negligence and the evidence could 
reasonably support so finding, the error in giving the flawed Montgomery 
manslaughter by act instructions was not per se fundamental error.”  170 So. 3d at 
83.  Thus, the Fourth District certified conflict with Dawkins.  Before resolving the 
certified conflict, we review our decision in Haygood, which is central to this case. 
Haygood v. State 
 
 
In 2013, this Court issued its decision in Haygood, which is yet another case 
arising out of a Montgomery fundamental error claim.  In Haygood, we stated: 
We hold that giving the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction, 
which we found to be fundamental error in State v. Montgomery, 39 
So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010), is also fundamental error even if the 
instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence is given where the 
evidence supports manslaughter by act but does not support culpable 
negligence and the defendant is convicted of second-degree murder. 
 
Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 737 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  In Montgomery, 
we held that the standard jury instruction on manslaughter by act was erroneous 
because it imposed an element of an intent to kill not contained in section 782.07, 
Florida Statutes (2005), the manslaughter statute.  The error was found to be 
fundamental in Montgomery, where the defendant was charged with first-degree 
murder but was convicted of second-degree murder, only one step removed from 
 
 
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manslaughter.  Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 260.  We reiterated in Montgomery that 
the erroneous jury instruction was fundamental error because it was “pertinent or 
material to what the jury must consider in order to convict” and it pertained to an 
element of the crime that was in dispute.  Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 258 (quoting 
State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1991)).  Whether the error could be cured 
because of the giving of a culpable negligence instruction was not at issue in 
Montgomery. 
 
In Haygood, we were asked to apply the Montgomery decision to a case in 
which the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction was given, but where the jury 
was also instructed on the lesser included offense of manslaughter by culpable 
negligence.  The circumstances of the homicide were the driving factors in 
determining whether fundamental error occurred by the erroneous instruction or 
whether also giving the instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence 
“cured” the error.  We explained in Haygood that the defendant was angry with his 
girlfriend and beat her, causing her to fall, hit her head, and become unconscious.  
Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 737.  At that point, Haygood had his mother call for an 
ambulance and he attempted to perform CPR.  Haygood told police that he had 
consumed nine beers and was not completely sober, and had hit her in a rage over 
her infidelity.  Id.  He said he did not mean to seriously injure her, and called her 
death an accident because “I didn’t mean to kill her.”  Id.  
 
 
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A main consideration by this Court in concluding that the manslaughter by 
culpable negligence instruction did not cure the erroneous manslaughter by act 
instruction in Haygood was explained as follows: 
The evidence in this case supported a finding that Haygood 
intentionally committed an act or acts, and that the act or acts resulted 
in the victim’s death.  The evidence also supported a finding that he 
had no intent to kill the victim.  Significantly, there was no evidence 
to support a finding that Tuckey’s death resulted from culpable 
negligence.  Haygood’s unambiguous admission that he intended to 
strike, head butt, choke, and trip Tuckey essentially eliminated the 
alternate means of committing manslaughter—manslaughter by 
culpable negligence—as a viable lesser offense.  Thus, second-degree 
murder was the only offense realistically available to the jury under 
the evidence presented in this case and the instructions given—
instructions that required the jury to find intent to kill in order to 
convict Haygood for manslaughter by act. 
 
Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 741-42 (emphasis added).  Thus, where second-degree 
murder is the only viable lesser included offense when the jury finds there is no 
intent to kill, the error in the manslaughter by act instruction in requiring an intent 
to cause death is fundamental if the defendant is convicted of second-degree 
murder, one step removed from manslaughter.  In applying both Montgomery and 
Haygood to a given case in which the defendant is convicted of an offense not 
more than one step removed from manslaughter, and in which both the erroneous 
manslaughter by act instruction and the correct manslaughter by culpable 
negligence instruction are given, the court will examine whether there is any 
evidence that could “reasonably support a finding that the death occurred due to 
 
 
- 9 - 
the culpable negligence of the defendant” in determining whether the fundamental 
error is cured.  Haygood, 109 So. 2d at 743.  With our decision in Haygood in 
mind, we turn to an analysis of the issue in this case. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
The certified conflict identified by the district court below presents solely a 
legal question; thus, review is de novo.  See Daniels v. State, 121 So. 3d 409, 413 
(Fla. 2013); Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 739 (citing Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 
352 (Fla. 2008)).  Where, as here, the error is unpreserved, we have repeatedly held 
that jury instructions are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule and, 
without an objection, error in an instruction can only be raised as fundamental 
error on appeal.  Daniels, 121 So. 3d at 417.  Although the defendant has a right to 
have the jury correctly instructed on the “essential and material elements of the 
crime charged,” id. (quoting Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644), not all errors in jury 
instructions are fundamental.  See Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 
2008).  We explained in Delva: 
To justify not imposing the contemporaneous objection rule, “the 
error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent 
that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.”  Brown[ v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 
(Fla. 1960)].  In other words, “fundamental error occurs only when the 
omission is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in 
order to convict.” 
 
 
 
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Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644-45 (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 
1982)).  With these standards in mind, and in light of our decision in Haygood, a 
more detailed review of the evidence and instruction given at trial in this case is 
necessary.   
Discussion 
Dominique was charged with and tried for first-degree murder, but was 
convicted of second-degree murder.  The manslaughter instructions given at his 
trial were as follows: 
To prove the crime of manslaughter, the State must prove the 
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. Dwayne Clementson is dead. 
2. (a) Nicolas Dominique intentionally caused the death of 
Dwayne Clementson. 
or 
(b) The death of Dwayne Clementson was caused by the 
 
culpable negligence of Nicolas Dominique.   
However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the 
killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have 
previously explained those terms. 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated 
intent to cause death. 
I will now define “culpable negligence” for you.  Each of us has 
a duty to act reasonably toward others.  If there is a violation of that 
duty, without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is 
negligence.  But culpable negligence is more than a failure to use 
ordinary care toward others.  In order for negligence to be culpable, it 
must be gross and flagrant.  Culpable negligence is a course of 
conduct showing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of 
persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or such an entire want of 
care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to 
consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a 
 
 
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grossly careless disregard for the safety and welfare of the public, or 
such an indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an 
intentional violation of such rights. 
The negligent act or omission must have been committed with 
an utter disregard for the safety of others.  Culpable negligence is 
consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the 
defendant must have known, or reasonably should have known, was 
likely to cause death or great bodily injury. 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the Defendant had a premeditated 
intent to cause death. 
 
No objection was made to the manslaughter instruction as given, even though the 
manslaughter by act instruction erroneously required the jury to find an intent to 
kill.  See Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 255.   
 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, on remand from this Court, correctly 
quoted our Haygood decision by stating: 
[G]iving the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction, which we 
found to be fundamental error in State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 
(Fla. 2010), is also fundamental error even if the instruction on 
manslaughter by culpable negligence is given where the evidence 
supports manslaughter by act but does not support culpable 
negligence and the defendant is convicted of second-degree murder. 
 
Dominique II, 171 So. 3d at 205 (quoting Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 737).  This 
portion of the Haygood decision shows that this Court was leaving open the 
possibility that the error can be cured even when the defendant is convicted of 
second-degree murder, one step removed from manslaughter, under certain 
circumstances.  Those circumstances include when the instruction for 
 
 
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manslaughter by culpable negligence is also given and the evidence reasonably 
supports a finding of manslaughter by culpable negligence. 
 
The Fourth District in Dominique II also quoted the portion of Haygood that 
reiterated the principle that fundamental error occurs where “the instruction 
pertains to a disputed element of the offense and the error is pertinent or material to 
what the jury must consider.”  171 So. 3d at 205 (quoting Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 
741).  The district court concluded that the factual distinction between cases where 
the evidence does not support culpable negligence and cases where, as here, the 
evidence “arguably supported the accompanying manslaughter by culpable 
negligence instruction” was “not central to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Haygood.”  Id. at 205-06.  Thus, the district court in Dominique II held that “under 
our reading of the evolving precedent from Montgomery to Haygood to Griffin, 
giving the manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction cannot under any 
circumstance cure the fundamental error caused by giving the erroneous 
manslaughter by act instruction, even where the evidence reasonably could support 
a finding of manslaughter by culpable negligence.”  Id. at 207.  
In reaching this holding, the district court misapplied our decisions in 
Haygood and Griffin to the issue of fundamental error under the facts of cases such 
as this one.  The distinction between cases in which there is evidence that could 
reasonably support manslaughter by culpable negligence and those, like Haygood, 
 
 
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where it cannot was indeed central to our decision in Haygood.  Although the 
Fourth District is correct that this Court has held intent is always pertinent or 
material to what the jury must consider to convict in a homicide prosecution, that 
statement cannot be considered in isolation when determining if fundamental error 
in the giving of the erroneous jury instruction for manslaughter by act can ever be 
cured.  Intent is always pertinent in a homicide prosecution and where, as here, the 
jury concludes there was no intent to kill, the question then arises what 
nonintentional homicide lesser offenses are available for the jury’s consideration 
and supported by the evidence.  In Haygood, we found fundamental error occurred 
because manslaughter by act was misinstructed to require an intent to kill and was 
thus unavailable as a nonintentional lesser included offense.  The instruction on 
manslaughter by culpable negligence was given but was not supported by the 
evidence—thus not curing the fundamental error created by the erroneous 
manslaughter by act instruction. 
The district court’s reliance on Griffin to explain its holding in this case was 
also misplaced.  First, the issue in Griffin did not turn on the culpable negligence 
instruction.  Instead, the issue was whether a defense of misidentification in a 
homicide prosecution waives all elements of the crime other than identity—
including the element of intent.  We clarified in Griffin that intent remains in 
dispute, and remains the burden of the State to prove, in a homicide prosecution 
 
 
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even when misidentification is the defense, because intent determines what level of 
offense has been committed.  We explained: 
When the question before the jury is whether an unlawful 
homicide occurred, and the jury finds that the killing was not 
justifiable or excusable, the jury must then determine the degree of the 
offense based upon the intent, if any, that the State proves existed at 
the time of the homicide.  A homicide found to be unlawful is not 
automatically just one offense, but will be one of several possible 
homicide offenses depending upon the nature of the intent or the lack 
of any intent at the time of the homicide.  For example, if the State has 
charged first-degree murder, a necessary jury inquiry is whether the 
State proved premeditated intent to kill.  Lacking that proof, the jury 
must then determine whether the defendant killed “by an act 
imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved mind 
without regard for human life.”  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.4.  
“Imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved 
mind” is defined in pertinent part as an act that “is done from ill will, 
hatred, spite, or an evil intent.”  If the jury concludes that the killing 
was neither premeditated nor done with a depraved mind as that term 
is defined, the jury must then decide if the defendant is guilty of 
manslaughter by having committed an intentional act that resulted in 
death, but without any intent to kill or evil intent (depraved mind) on 
the defendant’s part.  Thus, it can be seen that in every killing alleged 
to be an unlawful homicide, the jury must necessarily consider the 
intent behind the killing, or find lack of any intent behind the killing, 
before it can determine what, if any, offense has been committed. 
 
Griffin, 160 So. 3d at 68-69.  Second, Griffin did not recede sub silentio from 
Haygood or modify in any respect the principle announced in that case that giving 
the culpable negligence instruction does not cure the fundamental error created by 
the erroneous manslaughter by act jury instruction where the evidence does not 
reasonably support manslaughter by culpable negligence.  The converse of this 
holding, which is applicable here, is that the culpable negligence instruction can 
 
 
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cure the fundamental error created by the erroneous manslaughter by act 
instruction where the evidence does reasonably support manslaughter by culpable 
negligence.   
 
In the present case, because the manslaughter by culpable negligence 
instruction was given, the question becomes whether the evidence could support a 
finding of that nonintentional homicide, thus curing the fundamental error created 
by the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction.  And, as explained in Haygood 
and other cases concerning fundamental error, the fact that the evidence could 
arguably support a verdict for second-degree murder, an offense also not requiring 
an intent to kill, is not determinative of whether fundamental error occurred.  See, 
e.g., Haygood, 109 So. 3d at 741. 
 
The instruction for second-degree murder, in part, asks the jury to determine 
if the killing was the result of an act that was “imminently dangerous to another 
and demonstrating a depraved mind.”  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.4 Murder—
Second Degree.  This is defined as an act done with “ill will, hatred, spite, or an 
evil intent” showing “indifference to human life,” and which a person of ordinary 
intelligence would know is “reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury.”  
Id.   
The instruction for manslaughter by culpable negligence also requires, in 
part, evidence that the killing was the result of an act showing “reckless disregard 
 
 
- 16 - 
of human life” and was an act that the defendant “must have known, or reasonably 
should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury.”  Fla. Std. 
Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7 Manslaughter.  In these two respects the offenses have 
somewhat similar elements.  However, as noted above, to convict for second-
degree murder, the jury must also find that the actions demonstrate a “depraved 
mind” which is proven by acts that are “done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil 
intent.”  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.4.  Manslaughter by culpable negligence has 
no requirement that the jury find a depraved mind, ill will, hatred, spite, or evil 
intent.  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7.   
Thus, where a jury determines that the evidence does not prove an intent to 
kill, the jury must then determine if any lesser included offense not requiring an 
intent to kill is available for their consideration and has been proven.  Where the 
instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence is given as well as the 
instruction for second-degree murder, the jury will examine the evidence for proof 
of the level of disregard for safety and human life and for evidence, if any, of an 
act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved mind without 
regard for human life.  Both lesser included offenses lack any requirement of an 
intent to kill.  Whether the defendant is guilty of one or the other will turn in large 
part on whether the defendant is proved to have committed the homicide with a 
level of ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent rising to the level of a depraved mind 
 
 
- 17 - 
required for second-degree murder.  Therefore, we examine the evidence presented 
during trial to determine if it reasonably could support a finding by the jury that the 
killing resulted from culpable negligence, thus providing the jury with a viable 
alternative to second-degree murder that also did not require an intent to kill.   
This Case 
Dominique was charged with and prosecuted for first-degree murder.  
Clearly, the jury did not find a premeditated intent to kill because he was convicted 
of second-degree murder, an offense that does not require an intent to kill.  The 
jury also had the option to find him guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence, 
a lesser included offense also not requiring an intent to kill.  We have examined the 
evidence presented at trial and conclude that it reasonably supported the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter by culpable negligence.  Even though the jury 
was foreclosed from finding Dominique guilty of manslaughter by act due to the 
erroneous instruction, the jury still had a viable, nonintentional lesser included 
homicide offense for which he could have been convicted.   
  
The testimony established that on the night of the shooting, Dominique was 
on the telephone with his girlfriend, Vonshell Lindsay, when she told him their 
breakup was final and that she was getting back together with Clementson, the 
victim in this case.  At that same moment, Dominique, who was sitting in a 
borrowed car in Lindsay’s neighborhood, saw Clementson drive toward the house 
 
 
- 18 - 
where Lindsay was visiting.  Although Dominique was in the neighborhood, he 
told police it was only to talk with Lindsay, and there was no evidence that 
Dominique knew Clementson would be there.  Dominique told police that he had a 
gun with him in the car he borrowed from his sister, explaining to police that he 
usually had it with him.  When Dominique started walking toward Lindsay’s 
house, Clementson drove by him.  Dominique told officers that at that point, he 
grabbed the gun and went after Clementson, firing “a whole bunch of shots” while 
running.  He told police he was shooting wildly without aiming, and that he hoped 
Clementson was still alive.  Witnesses also testified that Dominique was running in 
the dark while firing with his arm extended.  The only witness who saw Dominique 
actually fire the gun testified first that he took aim, but she almost immediately 
receded from that testimony and agreed that “[i]t was not like he stood there and 
[sighted in on] the man before he took the shot.”   
We conclude that this evidence reasonably meets the test for “reckless 
disregard for human life” and that the defendant must have known, or reasonably 
should have known, that these actions were likely to cause death, as required by 
the jury instruction for manslaughter by culpable negligence as well as second-
degree murder.  Certainly, Dominique’s actions demonstrated want of care, 
wantonness, recklessness, or gross disregard for the safety of others, as is required 
under both the manslaughter by culpable negligence jury instruction and the 
 
 
- 19 - 
instruction for second-degree murder.  Accordingly, the jury had before it two 
viable alternatives, neither of which required an intent to kill.  It was for the jury to 
determine if the evidence rose to the level of depraved mind such that second-
degree murder was proven, a conclusion the jury reached in this case.   
Because the jury was correctly instructed on manslaughter by culpable 
negligence, which does not require an intent to kill, the jury did have a 
nonintentional homicide offense for which they could have convicted Dominique 
as an alternative to second-degree murder.  Under these facts, it cannot be said that 
“the verdict of guilty [of second-degree murder] could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Delva, 575 So. 2d at 645 (bracketed 
material added) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  Thus, 
under Haygood, the fundamental error in giving the erroneous manslaughter by act 
instruction was cured.  For the reasons discussed, we quash the decision in 
Dominique II.  Because this case is before the Court on certified conflict, the 
certified conflict case of Dawkins is discussed next. 
The Certified Conflict Case 
 
The Fourth District in Dominique II certified conflict with the decision of 
the Third District in Dawkins v. State.  In Dawkins, the district court had before it 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for failure to move for rehearing based on the Third District’s decision in 
 
 
- 20 - 
Cubelo v. State, 41 So. 3d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and the Second District’s 
decision in Haygood v. State, 54 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), both of which 
this Court quashed.2  See Dawkins, 170 So. 3d at 82.  
The Third District denied the petition in Dawkins.  In doing so, the court 
stated that “where the jury was also instructed in manslaughter by culpable 
negligence and the evidence could reasonably support so finding, the error in 
giving the flawed Montgomery manslaughter by act instruction was not per se 
fundamental error.”  Id. at 83.  Applying our holding in Haygood, the Dawkins 
court concluded that there existed some disputed evidence from which the jury 
reasonably could have found Dawkins guilty of manslaughter by culpable 
negligence, in contrast to the facts in Haygood.  See Dawkins, 170 So. 3d at 82.  
Because the Third District correctly interpreted this Court’s analysis and principle 
announced in Haygood, the Dawkins decision is approved. 
CONCLUSION 
   
The evidence in this case reasonably supported the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter by culpable negligence.  Thus, under Haygood, the giving of the 
                                          
 
 
2.  On remand, the Third District reversed Cubelo’s conviction and 
remanded for a new trial because of the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction.  
The court concluded that the error was not cured by the culpable negligence 
instruction because the evidence did support manslaughter by act but did not 
support manslaughter by culpable negligence.  Cubelo v. State, 137 So. 3d 1193, 
1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 
 
 
- 21 - 
manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction cured the fundamental error in the 
giving of the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction.  Accordingly, we quash 
the decision of the Fourth District in Dominique v. State, 171 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2015), and remand to the district court with instructions to further remand to 
the trial court to reinstate the conviction and sentence.  We approve the conflict 
decision of Dawkins v. State, 170 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
LAWSON, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D08-2031 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Celia A. Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Jeanine Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Richard B. Greene, and Patrick B. Burke, 
Assistant Public Defenders, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent