Title: Dir. of Dep’t of Corr. v. Kozich
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 141788
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 2015

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141788                                                           JUSTICE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 
                                                                                                             December 10, 2015 
DOUGLAS TODD KOZICH 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Lorraine Nordlund, Judge 
 
The circuit court issued a writ of habeas corpus to Douglas Todd Kozich, finding that his 
trial counsel had violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective legal representation by not 
timely filing, and obtaining a ruling on, a motion seeking a reconsideration of Kozich’s sentence.  
Disagreeing with several aspects of the court’s reasoning, we nonetheless affirm the judgment 
granting the writ in this case on alternative grounds legally supported by the habeas court’s 
factual findings. 
I. 
In 2013, Kozich pled guilty to one count of grand larceny and two counts of obtaining 
money by false pretenses.  After the trial court approved the plea, the court entered an order 
finding him guilty of all charges, ordered the presentation of a presentence report, and scheduled 
a hearing to determine the sentences. 
At the sentencing hearing on June 7, 2013, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the 
presentence report and Kozich’s sentencing memorandum and considered the applicable 
sentencing guidelines.1  Kozich’s criminal record included about fourteen prior felony 
                                                 
1 Kozich’s sentencing memorandum summarized his argument and provided an attached 
letter from a substance-abuse professional.  These documents, along with the presentence report, 
were sealed by the trial court.  To the extent that we mention facts found only in the sealed 
2 
 
convictions, more than fifteen misdemeanor convictions, and several probation violations.  
Kozich’s sentencing memorandum informed the court that Kozich’s criminal record was 
“entirely the product of his addictions” to various drugs that he had been using “for three 
decades.”  Counsel called attention to the presentence report, which noted Kozich’s use of LSD, 
cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and prescription opiate medications (morphine and Vicodin).  In that 
report, Kozich admitted that he committed the crimes for which he was being sentenced while 
under the influence of cocaine and heroin. 
Relying on these facts, Kozich’s counsel pled for mercy at the sentencing hearing, 
pointing out that Kozich’s criminal behavior was “the direct proximate result of addiction and 
mental health problems.”  Counsel directed the court’s attention to counsel’s sentencing 
memorandum provided to the court.  In it, counsel requested that Kozich be placed in 
“Crossroads or some other residential treatment program” and given a suspended sentence.  The 
memorandum also informed the court that Kozich had attended a mental illness and substance 
abuse program operated by Pathway Homes.  He “met weekly with a licensed counselor and was 
supervised by a licensed psychologist who served as a house volunteer.”  Kozich also 
participated in Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings and, at the time of 
sentencing, was enrolled in several substance abuse programs. 
Kozich’s counsel implored the court, “I would suggest to the Court that you strongly 
consider the letter that’s attached to the sentencing memorandum.”  That letter, written by the 
mental health manager of the Program for Assertive Community Treatment and South County 
Intensive Community Treatment Team, recommended “an inpatient substance abuse treatment 
program” like “Crossroads” and suggested that the court mandate “treatment to one of those 
                                                                                                                                                             
record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to our decision in this case.  
The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed. 
3 
 
programs instead of jail time.”  After counsel’s argument, Kozich used his allocution to make an 
impassioned request for drug treatment and psychological counseling rather than imprisonment. 
In its ruling, the court stated to Kozich that “putting you in programs doesn’t work 
because even when you’re given the opportunity of the programs, even when you’re given the 
opportunity of probation, you can’t help yourself.  And so it’s come to the point where I have to 
protect the public from you.”  The court then concluded, “What I’m going to do is this[:]  I’m 
going to impose a sentence here today which I think is an appropriate sentence in the absence of 
an actual program for me to look at and determine whether or not it’s appropriate.”  The court 
added that it would “give leave” to Kozich’s counsel to “file a motion to reconsider” if he later 
wished to produce additional information on treatment programs.  The court ended the hearing 
by issuing two-year active sentences, running consecutively, for each of the three offenses.  
“That is what I think is the appropriate sentence,” the court announced. 
The court entered three sentencing orders more than two weeks later, on June 24, 2013, 
each of which imposed a two-year active sentence on the respective convictions.  The orders 
remanded Kozich to the custody of the sheriff for incarceration by the Virginia Department of 
Corrections and directed Kozich’s court-appointed counsel to be paid the statutory attorney fee.  
Nothing in the written orders granted leave for further motions, stayed the proceedings for any 
reason, or made any suggestion that the court intended to take the case under advisement.  No 
appeal followed. 
On September 27, 2013, more than three months after entry of the final sentencing 
orders, Kozich’s counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence.  By this time, Kozich was 
incarcerated in a state penitentiary.  On November 13, 2013, the court denied the motion to 
reconsider because “the Court no longer ha[d] jurisdiction over this case.”  See generally Code 
4 
 
§ 19.2-303 (authorizing the power to “suspend or otherwise modify” the sentences of felons who 
have “not actually been transferred to a receiving unit of the Department [of Corrections]” if the 
court finds that doing so would be “compatible with the public interest and there are 
circumstances in mitigation of the offense”). 
In May 2014, Kozich filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and naming the 
Virginia Department of Corrections as respondent.  The case was assigned to the same judge 
who had previously presided over Kozich’s sentencing hearing.  At an evidentiary hearing on the 
petition, Kozich’s habeas counsel contended that Kozich’s trial attorney had provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to present a specific drug-treatment plan at the sentencing 
hearing as an alternative to incarceration.  Habeas counsel also argued that trial counsel had 
failed to file a timely motion to reconsider the sentence. 
In reply, the Commonwealth argued that Kozich’s trial counsel did not breach his duty of 
effective assistance of counsel by not presenting at the sentencing hearing a detailed plan for 
drug treatment in lieu of incarceration — in addition to his argument, sentencing memorandum, 
its supporting letter from a treatment professional, and Kozich’s personal allocution.  The 
Commonwealth also argued that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to post-
judgment motions to reconsider a criminal sentence. 
The habeas court ruled for the Commonwealth on the first claim, which focused on the 
absence of a specific plan for treatment at the time of sentencing.2  The judge explained:  “As to 
whether or not [trial counsel] was deficient in his performance, I do not find that at the time of 
                                                 
2 Kozich did not assert an assignment of cross-error challenging this ruling or otherwise 
argue on appeal that it should be overturned.  See Oral Argument Audio at 16:05 to 16:38 
(concession by counsel that Kozich did not cross-appeal this finding because he “did not think it 
was necessary”); cf. id. at 3:54 to 4:31, 10:10 to 11:14 (affirmations by both parties that the trial 
court did not find ineffective assistance of Kozich’s counsel as of the date of the sentencing 
hearing at which the trial court imposed the original six-year term of incarceration). 
5 
 
the original sentencing that he was deficient for failing to bring me that plan, and the reason is 
because the [presentence report] showed a person who had really not been taking opportunities 
seriously.”  She continued, “I don’t find that . . . in and of itself was deficient.”  Accord J.A. at 
73 (“I don’t think that’s ineffective assistance. . . .  I don’t expect attorneys to read my mind” 
because “[e]very single [judge] is different.”). 
On the second claim, alleging ineffectiveness due to counsel’s failure to file a timely 
motion for reconsideration, the habeas court ruled against the Commonwealth.  On this issue, the 
judge noted, “I find myself benefitting from knowing what was going on in my head.”  Based 
upon that knowledge and her personal practice of “rarely issu[ing] an invitation to counsel to 
submit something more,” the judge stated that the written sentencing orders were not truly final 
orders.  It was “within my mind,” the judge revealed, “that I [was] not finally sentencing 
[Kozich].”  If she does not “invite” more from a party, she explained, “it’s the end, period,” and, 
in her mind, the order is actually final.  Here, she intended only to “impose a sentence here 
today” with the resulting effect of “continuing” the case as “an open sentencing.”  On that 
reasoning, she found that Kozich “had a constitutional right to counsel at the time of the conduct 
in question, because it occurred during the time that the overall sentencing process was still in 
progress.” 
That finding left two issues to be resolved:  Was Kozich’s trial counsel ineffective by not 
timely filing, and obtaining a ruling on, a motion to reconsider the sentences, and, if so, was 
Kozich prejudiced?  The judge answered both questions in the affirmative.  The failure to file a 
timely motion to reconsider and to ensure that the court had an opportunity to rule on it, the 
judge held, constituted ineffective assistance.  “As far as the prejudice is concerned,” the judge 
reasoned, “heroin addicts” show a higher propensity for favorable treatment outcomes than other 
6 
 
drug addicts.  If the motion to reconsider had been timely filed, the judge stated she “would have 
placed Mr. Kozich in a program with a sufficient aftercare component.  I know that that is what I 
was considering.  I know that that was what I was intending. . . .  I had every intention of putting 
this gentleman in a program and giving him a chance.”  The court issued the writ of habeas 
corpus based upon “the reasons stated by the court” from the bench. 
The court thereafter vacated the sentencing orders entered on June 24, 2013, which 
imposed six years of active incarceration, and entered new sentencing orders on January 9, 2015.  
The amended sentencing orders imposed three consecutive two-year terms of incarceration, 
suspending one year of each sentence, resulting in a total of three years of active incarceration.  
Each order noted that Kozich “is to enter into and successfully complete the Crossroads Long 
Term Residential Program . . . to include the aftercare program as a condition in place of serving 
the one (1) year of incarceration.”  A footnote on each amended sentencing order further stated, 
“Serve sentence in Crossroads Long Term Residential Program,” which is a private, drug 
rehabilitation program.3 
II. 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the habeas court’s sui generis “open 
sentencing” interpretation of its sentencing orders has no support in Virginia law.  Under settled 
principles, the Commonwealth contends, the sentencing orders were final, appealable orders.  
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has never been recognized for the assertion of a 
                                                 
3 By letter, attorneys for the Commonwealth and the Department of Corrections informed 
the trial court that it had no authority to order a prisoner to serve his penitentiary sentence 
(which, for Kozich, amounted to three years of active incarceration) in an “unsecured facility” 
operated by a private entity.  They later filed legal memoranda inviting the court to “effectuate” 
its apparent intent by amending the sentencing orders to require Kozich to complete the 
residential drug treatment program “as a condition of his suspended term of incarceration and 
active probation.”  The record before us does not show any response by the trial court on this 
issue. 
7 
 
motion to reconsider a sentence after a final, appealable order in a criminal case has been 
entered, the Commonwealth concludes that we should vacate the issuance of the writ.  We agree 
with much of the Commonwealth’s reasoning, but disagree that it wholly undermines the legal 
basis for issuing the writ of habeas corpus in this case. 
A.  THE FINALITY OF THE SENTENCING ORDERS 
 
Virginia law recognizes a rebuttable presumption that “trial courts speak only through 
their written orders.”  McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 (2001); 
see also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979).  We have 
emphasized this point on “numerous occasions” in various contexts.  McMillion, 262 Va. at 469, 
552 S.E.2d at 367.  The subjective intentions of a judge upon entering a written order cannot 
change its character or legal efficacy.  If the rule were otherwise, litigants would never know the 
true scope of their rights, and appellate courts would never know the true grounds for lower 
courts’ decisions. 
 
Tracking the form order requirements of Code § 19.2-307 and Rule 3A:22 (Form 10), the 
sentencing orders in this case recited that Kozich was “found guilty” and that: 
 The court had reviewed the “sentencing guidelines and the guideline 
worksheets.” 
 Kozich was allowed to allocute prior to the court’s “pronouncing the 
sentence” and offered an opportunity to give “any reason why 
judgment should not be pronounced.” 
 Kozich was “SENTENCED” to two-year penitentiary terms for 
each of the three offenses, with credit for time served, and placed 
upon his release in “post release supervision.” 
 Kozich was ordered to pay costs and, where applicable, restitution. 
 Kozich’s counsel was entitled to his court-appointed attorney fee 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-163, a statute authorizing payment pursuant 
to a timely request after “the completion of all proceedings in that 
court.” 
8 
 
J.A. at 10-15 (capitalization and bold in original) (quoting Code § 19.2-163).  The orders 
conclude by directing that Kozich be “remanded” to the custody of the sheriff. 
 
We concede that, in the occasional case, the distinction between an interlocutory and a 
final order sometimes involves an imprecise exercise in judicial line-drawing.  “It is not always 
easy to determine on which side of the line a case falls.”  Brooks v. Roanoke Cty. Sanitation 
Auth., 201 Va. 934, 936, 114 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1960).  We face no such difficulty here.  In this 
case, the trial court entered sentencing orders that were final, appealable orders in every respect.  
No provision of the orders suspended the execution of the court’s judgment, stayed its 
enforcement, continued the case for further proceedings, or in any way suggested that the orders 
were non-appealable, non-final orders.  In short, nothing “appears upon the face of the 
judgment[s]” stating “that further action in the cause is necessary to give completely the relief 
contemplated by the court.”  Turner v. Holloway, 146 Va. 827, 832, 132 S.E. 685, 686 (1926) 
(citation omitted).  The habeas court erred, therefore, in interpreting these orders as interlocutory 
decrees putting into motion a “continuing” and “open sentencing” process. 
B.  SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO PURSUE MOTIONS TO 
     RECONSIDER SENTENCES AFTER ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that in “all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”  
U.S. Const. amend. VI.4  As a general rule, the entry of a final judgment adjudicating guilt and 
imposing a sentence marks the end of a criminal prosecution.5  No matter what timeline 
                                                 
4 Kozich’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus claimed only a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases.  See generally Scott v. United States, 473 F.3d 
1262, 1264 (8th Cir. 2007) (refusing to address a putative due process right to counsel when the 
arguments on brief relied solely on a Sixth Amendment basis). 
5 A few excursions beyond this general line of demarcation, however, have been 
judicially accepted.  One recognizes a right to counsel — based not on the Sixth Amendment, but 
9 
 
milestones presumptively trigger or extinguish the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, 
the right applies only to “critical stages” of a criminal prosecution.  Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 
554 U.S. 191, 212 n.16 (2008).  While there is no “comprehensive and final one-line definition 
of ‘critical stage,’” Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 312 (6th Cir. 2007), the analysis usually turns on 
the likelihood of “substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights” during the “particular 
confrontation” and “the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice,” United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). 
These distinctions are important given that “the right to effective assistance of counsel is 
dependent on the right to counsel itself.”  Howard v. Warden, 232 Va. 16, 19, 348 S.E.2d 211, 
213 (1986) (alteration omitted) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 n.7 (1985)); see also 
Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982) (holding that the defendant “could not be 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel” due to counsel’s “failure to file the application 
timely” because the defendant “had no constitutional right to counsel”); United States v. Hamid, 
461 A.2d 1043, 1044 (D.C. 1983) (holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel does not apply to the post-conviction process in seeking a reduction of 
sentence,” and thus, the defendant could not have been “deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel”). 
In the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the consensus view is that a 
motion to reduce a criminal sentence — no matter the procedural vehicle used to assert it — is 
                                                                                                                                                             
on due process and equal protection principles — for purposes of filing the first direct appeal of 
right from a final order.  See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1985); see also United 
States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the “right to counsel on direct 
appeal as of right stems from due process and equal protection interests,” not the Sixth 
Amendment).  But even that right to counsel does not extend to a second appeal to a higher 
appellate court, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), or to purely collateral attacks, 
including state habeas corpus actions, Howard v. Warden, 232 Va. 16, 19, 348 S.E.2d 211, 213 
(1986). 
10 
 
not a critical stage of a “trial-related proceeding” when it occurs “after judgment has been 
entered and a sentence imposed.”  United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(applying this principle to motions for reduction of a sentence previously imposed by the court, 
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)).  As a matter of law, “no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches at this stage.”  Id. 
From this perspective, “[t]he right to request a reduction in sentence is not a right of 
sufficient substance to trigger the Sixth Amendment.”  Hamid, 461 A.2d at 1044.  Thus, the 
“Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel does not apply to the post-
conviction process in seeking a reduction of sentence.”  Id.; see also 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 26.4(e), at 765 (3d ed. 2007) (“Post-trial proceedings to reduce a 
sentence . . . are not a ‘critical stage’ of the ‘criminal prosecution’ triggering the sixth 
amendment right to counsel.”).6 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(collecting cases recognizing no constitutional right to counsel for sentence-reduction motions 
filed after final judgment); United States v. Harris, 568 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (finding no Sixth Amendment right to counsel “beyond the first appeal” and collecting 
cases holding that “there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in sentence modification 
proceedings under [18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c)”); United States v. Brown, 565 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a “motion to reduce a sentence is largely a matter of discretion” and the district 
judge “can appoint counsel for a movant, but need not do so”); United States v. Townsend, 98 
F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (finding no right to counsel because the defendant’s 
“conviction is final” after defendant “appealed from neither his conviction nor his sentence” and 
holding that his subsequent “attempt to characterize his [18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c) motion as a means 
for resentencing, bringing with it all of the rights that attach to the original sentencing, fails”); 
United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting an argument for Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel for a post-judgment motion seeking a sentence reduction); United 
States v. Nevarez-Diaz, 648 F. Supp. 1226, 1230-31 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that a motion to 
reduce a sentence under Rule 52(b) “is a post-trial proceeding and, logically, because it is not 
part of the criminal prosecution, it is outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment”); see also Scott, 
473 F.3d at 1263-64 (noting that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel 
[applies] to trial and critical pre-trial stages” but that “a right to effective post-trial or appellate 
counsel is analyzed under the Due Process Clause”). 
11 
 
We find similar supporting precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit.  See United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 536 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that a 
motion to reduce a sentence under Rule 35(b) is not a “trial-related proceeding and, therefore, the 
Sixth Amendment cannot serve as a source of [a defendant’s] claimed right to counsel”); United 
States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that the 
trial court “denied him due process by not . . . appointing counsel to represent him on the motion 
for reduction of sentence”).7 
This approach is consistent with our own practice.  In a long series of unpublished orders, 
we have held that no Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to motions to reconsider 
sentences after the entry of final judgment.8  The United States District Courts in Virginia, 
                                                 
7 We acknowledge Kozich’s citations to United States v. Williamson, 706 F.3d 405 (4th 
Cir. 2013), and Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1969).  In Williamson, the Fourth 
Circuit held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel to file a collateral motion under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 based on newly discovered evidence.  706 F.3d at 415.  
In Nelson, the Fourth Circuit held that, during the “hiatus” between the conviction and the 
deadline for appeal, a defendant has a constitutional right to be informed by counsel “that he has 
the right to appeal, how to initiate an appeal and whether, in the opinion of counsel, an appeal is 
indicated.”  415 F.2d at 1157.  Neither Williamson nor Nelson, however, specifically addresses a 
post-judgment motion to reconsider a criminal sentence. 
8 See, e.g., Compton v. Clarke, No. 141747 (Aug. 4, 2015); Myrick v. Clarke, No. 
141233 (Jan. 26, 2015); Stimon v. Clarke, No. 140148 (Sept. 12, 2014); McConnell v. Clarke, 
No. 140167 (July 10, 2014); Wilson v. Clarke, No. 140231 (July 7, 2014); Farris v. Warden, No. 
131850 (June 26, 2014); Burrell v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 131561 (Apr. 2, 2014); 
Moody v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 130372 (Dec. 3, 2013); Walker v. Director of the 
Dep’t of Corrs., No. 120890 (Oct. 12, 2012); Watkins v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 
111749 (Apr. 4, 2012); Ezefili v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 111695 (Apr. 3, 2012); 
Hinton v. Warden, No. 111756 (Mar. 28, 2012); Broderick v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 
111630 (Jan. 17, 2012); Alvarado v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 111049 (Dec. 1, 2011); 
Gunter v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 110984 (Sept. 29, 2011); Vencill v. Warden, No. 
101019 (Jan. 13, 2011); Hayes v. Director of the Dep’t of  Corrs., No. 101180 (Dec. 15, 2010); 
Staubs v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 100986 (Dec. 14, 2010); Johnson v. Director of the 
Dep’t of Corrs., No. 101391 (Dec. 6, 2010); Patten v. Warden, No. 091924 (Apr. 15, 2010); 
Minor v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 092284 (Mar. 12, 2010); Hicks v. Director of the 
Dep’t of Corrs., No. 091452 (Feb. 24, 2010); Braden v. Warden, No. 090900 (Feb. 9, 2010); 
Cockrell v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 090370 (Sept. 2, 2009); Tinsley v. Director of the 
12 
 
reviewing our decisions in the federal habeas context, have found them to be reasonable 
applications of clearly established federal law.  See, e.g., Broderick v. Clarke, No. 7:12-cv-00064, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170905, at *16 (W.D. Va. Dec. 3, 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s adjudication of these claims is neither contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established federal law.”).9  Given the absence of any binding authority to the contrary, 
we think it unwise to make an abrupt change in our jurisprudence on this issue. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dep’t of Corrs., No. 090160 (July 2, 2009); Hickey v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 
082178 (June 24, 2009); Wyatt v. Superintendent of the Riverside Regional Jail, No. 081500 
(Jan. 22, 2009); Ingram v. Warden, No. 081297 (Dec. 22, 2008); Lee v. Director of the Dep’t of 
Corrs., No. 080743 (Oct. 23, 2008); Shendock v. Warden, No. 080074 (July 14, 2008); Brooks v. 
Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 070285 (June 26, 2007); Fisher v. Director of the Dep’t of 
Corrs., No. 070171 (June 26, 2007); Talbert v. Warden, No. 062572 (June 22, 2007); Hooks v. 
Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 061344 (Jan. 12, 2007); Cain v. Director of the Dep’t of 
Corrs., No. 060637 (Aug. 28, 2006); Talbott v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 060188 (July 
3, 2006); Balentine v. Warden, No. 052486 (May 2, 2006); Cerato v. Warden, No. 040572 (Aug. 
31, 2004); Taylor v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 031675 (Jan. 13, 2004); Kovacs v. 
Warden, No. 031257 (Nov. 25, 2003); Smith v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 030144 (Oct. 
6, 2003); James v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 030707 (Oct. 3, 2003); Mills v. Warden, 
No. 012592 (Jan. 16, 2003). 
9 See also Walker v. Clarke, No. 2:12cv424, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117497, at *13-14 
(E.D. Va. July 26, 2013) (stating that this Court’s holding that “a motion to reconsider 
sentencing is not an integral part of the criminal justice system” and that “no right to counsel 
exists” was “a fair application of federal law, and a reasonable application of the United States 
Supreme Court’s precedent”); Hinton v. Pruett, No. 3:12cv524-HEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88236, at *21 n.11 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2013) (finding “no unreasonable application of law or 
determination of facts” in this Court’s finding that petitioner had no right to counsel for a motion 
to modify his sentence); Watkins v. Director, No. 7:12cv00255, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 558, at 
*10 (W.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2013) (noting that “[i]nasmuch as a motion to reconsider [petitioner’s] 
sentence was not an ‘integral part of the system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or 
innocence,’ . . . the state court’s adjudication of [petitioner’s] claim was not contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” (citations omitted)); Tinsley v. 
Johnson, No. 7:09-cv-00407, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76116, at *16 (W.D. Va. July 28, 2010) 
(finding that “because ‘a motion to reconsider is not an integral part of the system for finally 
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,’” this Court’s determination that the petitioner 
“did not state a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance was not contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” (alterations and citation omitted)); 
Talbott v. Johnson, No. 7:06-cv-00633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23703, at *5-6 (W.D. Va. Mar. 
30, 2007) (stating that this Court had “reasonably applied” Evitts in holding that no right to 
counsel applied to a motion to reconsider a criminal sentence). 
13 
 
 
The habeas court in this case attempted to sideline this limiting principle by denuding 
Kozich’s sentencing orders of their finality based entirely upon the subjective intentions of the 
sentencing judge.  Under this view, the finality of the court’s judgment turned on the sentencing 
judge’s personal view that “heroin addicts” (unlike other drug addicts) are typically “smart 
enough to be able to remove themselves from th[e] vicious cycle of addiction.”  J.A. at 117.  The 
implication seemed to be that the judge welcomed motions to reconsider filed by heroin addicts 
while treating as unwelcome motions to reconsider asserted by other drug addicts.  This 
problematic view raises serious questions.10  Suffice it to say, it has no place in determining 
whether a final sentencing order is truly final for the purpose of demarcating the boundaries of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
C.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE PRIOR TO ENTRY 
    OF THE FINAL SENTENCING ORDERS 
 
Though Kozich disagrees with much of this reasoning, his argument on appeal does not 
ultimately hinge on this disagreement.  Rather, Kozich contends that we should nonetheless 
affirm the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the narrower ground that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance after the sentencing hearing but prior to the entry of the final 
judgment.  During this two-and-a-half week period, Kozich argues, his trial counsel violated the 
Sixth Amendment by not filing a timely motion to reconsider after the trial judge had specifically 
invited him to do so and by not taking any action to obtain a ruling on the motion prior to the  
 
                                                 
10 Putting aside whether such an overgeneralization should be a proper basis for treating 
drug defendants differently, the trial court’s remarks overlooked the fact that Kozich also abused 
LSD, cocaine, marijuana, and prescription opiate medications (morphine and Vicodin), as well as 
the fact that Kozich had committed his most recent crimes while under the influence of both 
heroin and cocaine. 
14 
 
entry of final judgment.11  Had the motion been timely filed, Kozich concludes, the trial judge 
would have entered entirely different final sentencing orders. 
 
Kozich’s argument presupposes that a motion to reconsider a sentence, even in the 
interim period between the oral pronouncement of the sentence and the entry of a written final 
order, constitutes a critical stage of his criminal prosecution for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.  Cf. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04 (2001) (addressing sentencing 
generally).  We need not address this question as a categorical matter because this case, unlike 
every other one we have previously addressed, involved a motion to reconsider expressly invited 
by the trial court during the sentencing hearing. 
The unusual nature of the trial court’s sua sponte grant of leave to file such a motion, 
offered to Kozich just prior to imposing upon him three wholly unsuspended sentences, 
demonstrates that he remained in a critical stage of his criminal prosecution even after the 
conclusion of the sentencing hearing.  In this unique context, Kozich faced “potential substantial 
prejudice” if he refused the trial court’s offer to contest the oral pronouncement of his 
unsuspended sentences and thus needed “the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”  
Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. 
 
The existence of a right to counsel, however, is only the beginning of the Sixth 
Amendment analysis.  Kozich must still satisfy the familiar framework of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires that we “determine whether counsel’s 
representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’” and then “ask whether ‘there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
                                                 
11 “In this case,” Kozich argues on appeal, “it was clear at sentencing and during all of 
trial counsel’s deficient performance after the initial sentencing hearing, that what was at stake 
was either six years in prison, or a drug treatment program.”  Appellee’s Br. at 7; see also id. at 
4, 8-9; Oral Argument Audio at 10:52 to 11:05. 
15 
 
proceeding would have been different.’”  Hinton v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 
1081, 1088 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).  Kozich argues that the habeas court’s 
findings on ineffectiveness and prejudice — despite its application of these findings (which we 
reject) after the entry of the final sentencing orders — apply logically with equal force during the 
period between the sentencing hearing and the entry of the orders.  We agree that the trial court’s 
findings can be segmented in this manner and, thus, should be scrutinized under the Strickland 
standard.12 
 
The first prong of Strickland requires a showing that trial counsel’s performance fell 
“below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  On this issue, the 
habeas court found that counsel was not ineffective at the sentencing hearing, but was ineffective 
thereafter because he failed to file a timely motion to reconsider during the time frame in which 
the trial court had ongoing jurisdiction to suspend or modify the sentence prior to Kozich’s 
transfer to the Department of Corrections.  See Code § 19.2-303.13  If this were correct, it would 
be equally correct during the two-and-a-half weeks between the sentencing hearing and the entry 
of the final sentencing orders. 
 
We hold that the habeas court was correct in finding counsel ineffective in this regard.  
The sentencing hearing presented counsel with deeply conflicting signals.  On the one hand, the 
                                                 
12 We take this approach relying on the “the axiom that a ‘prevailing party seeks to 
enforce not a [trial] court’s reasoning, but the court’s judgment.’” Alexandria Redevelopment & 
Hous. Auth. v. Walker, 290 Va. 150, 156 n.1, 772 S.E.2d 297, 300 n.1 (2015) (alteration and 
emphasis in original) (quoting Jennings v. Stephens, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 793, 799 
(2015)); see also Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 581-82, 701 S.E.2d 431, 437 (2010). 
13 In announcing its ruling, the habeas court stated, “we don’t have any 21 day rule,” 
referring to Rule 1:1, “that applies in these criminal cases and the Court retains jurisdiction over 
the matter until [the defendants] are transferred to the Department of Corrections.”  That is only 
partly true.  Rule 1:1 does apply to criminal cases, as does Code § 19.2-303.  The latter is a 
narrow exception to the former.  See Kelley v. Stamos, 285 Va. 68, 77-79, 737 S.E.2d 218, 223-
24 (2013); Holland v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 445, 452, 749 S.E.2d 206, 209 (2013). 
16 
 
trial court suggested that it had reviewed all the relevant sentencing information, which included 
extensive information on Kozich’s lengthy history of substance abuse.  Based upon this review, 
the trial court told Kozich:  “[P]utting you in programs doesn’t work because even when you’re 
given the opportunity of the programs, even when you’re given the opportunity of probation, you 
can’t help yourself.  And so it’s come to the point where I have to protect the public from you.”  
In nearly the same breath, however, the trial court suggested that it would consider placing 
Kozich in a “program” if it were “appropriate” and invited Kozich’s counsel to present a specific 
plan along those lines.  The court then imposed unsuspended sentences on all three charges and 
sua sponte granted leave to Kozich’s trial counsel “to file a motion to reconsider when a 
program’s found” that would be suitable for Kozich. 
In the face of such conflicting signals, objectively reasonable counsel would have 
resolved the quandary in favor of accepting the invitation to file a motion to reconsider and 
simultaneously making an effort to ensure that the motion was heard before the entry of any final 
sentencing orders.  There would have been several ways trial counsel could have accomplished 
this.  He could have requested, for example, that final sentencing orders not be entered until he 
had an opportunity to file a motion to reconsider and the court had an opportunity to rule on it.  If 
the court nonetheless insisted on entering sentencing orders, counsel could have asked that the 
orders specifically state that leave to file a motion to reconsider had been granted and that the 
matter would be held in abeyance until further order of the court.  Such efforts would have been 
important because the entry of final sentencing orders not only triggered the twenty-one day 
period of Rule 1:1, but even more significantly, they immediately put Kozich at risk of being 
transferred to a receiving unit of the Department of Corrections, thereby closing the door to the  
 
17 
 
trial court’s power under Code § 19.2-303 to “suspend or otherwise modify” the sentences.  By 
not making any of these efforts, Kozich’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
The prejudice prong asks whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694; see also Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (stating 
that prejudice can be shown by “a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal 
process would have been more favorable by reason of . . . a sentence of less prison time”).  “It is 
not enough,” however, “for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding.  Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, 
and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the 
reliability of the result of the proceeding.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (citation omitted). 
On the topic of prejudice, we are faced with a peculiar circumstance in this case.  If the 
judge presiding over the habeas case were not the trial judge who had presided over Kozich’s 
sentencing, we would be inclined to say prejudice could not be shown — particularly given 
Kozich’s extensive criminal record, his multiple unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation, and the 
trial judge’s statement at the sentencing hearing implying that further programs would be futile.  
But, in this case, the habeas judge was the trial judge, and she made a factual finding based on 
“knowing what was going on in [her] head.”  Had a motion to reconsider been filed with a 
specific program recommended, the judge stated, “I know that that is what I was considering.  I 
know that that was what I was intending. . . .  I had every intention of putting this gentleman in a 
program and giving him a chance.” 
 
18 
 
We question, but do not pass judgment on, the propriety of a habeas court’s reliance on 
subjective intentions of this kind for purposes of establishing prejudice.  The Commonwealth 
waived the issue below and did not challenge this aspect of the trial court’s ruling on appeal.14  
With that caveat, we accept the judge at her word and concur that her findings establish prejudice 
under the Strickland standard. 
III. 
 
In sum, the habeas court erred in granting a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the 
sentencing orders were only to have the effect of “continuing” the case as an “open sentencing.”  
J.A. at 112.  The sentencing orders were final, appealable orders under Virginia law.  No binding 
precedent recognizes a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue a motion to reconsider a 
                                                 
14 At the habeas hearing, the judge appropriately inquired of the Senior Assistant 
Attorney General representing the Virginia Department of Corrections whether he had any 
objection to her presiding over the habeas case.  The judge stated, “I didn’t know whether or not 
that was inappropriate since the judge is adding a component to the factual presentation that’s 
not necessarily something that’s available to counsel.”  Counsel for the Department of 
Corrections replied that he had no objection in light of “the proposition that the trial judge who 
did try the case is in the best position to know the record and in the best position to supervise the 
habeas corpus proceeding in the interests of judicial economy.” 
Because the Commonwealth, as appellant, took this position in the habeas court and did 
not attempt to repudiate it on appeal, we leave for another day the question whether this practice 
should be encouraged or discouraged.  Cf. Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-07 (1904) 
(stating that “no [judge’s] testimony should be received [explaining a judgment] except of open 
and tangible facts — matters which are susceptible of evidence on both sides” and that a 
“judgment is a solemn record” that “should not lightly be disturbed, and ought never to be 
overthrown or limited by the oral testimony of a judge or juror of what he had in mind at the time 
of the decision”); Perkins v. LeCureux, 58 F.3d 214, 220-21 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
district court erred in considering “a statement made by the sentencing judge ten years after the 
fact, regarding his thought processes at the time of sentencing”); 1 Randy Hertz & James S. 
Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 21.2, at 1154 (2014) (“The emerging 
rule seems to be that, except in rare circumstances, the testimony of trial judges who presided at 
criminal trials (and assumedly those who adjudicated the petitioners’ state appeals and 
postconviction proceedings) is not admissible on the question whether constitutional errors 
affected either their own deliberations or those of jurors.”). 
19 
 
sentence after the entry of final judgment.  The habeas court erred in granting the writ on this 
basis. 
 
We nonetheless agree with Kozich that the habeas court’s findings of ineffectiveness of 
counsel and prejudice support the issuance of the writ based upon trial counsel’s failure to file a 
timely motion to reconsider the sentences and to ensure that the trial court had an opportunity to 
rule on it.  Counsel’s failure to do so in response to an express invitation by the trial court was 
objectively unreasonable.  This omission, coupled with the habeas court’s finding that the motion 
would have been granted, demonstrated prejudice.  The writ of habeas corpus, therefore, was 
properly issued for these reasons. 
Affirmed.   
 
 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to reconsider Kozich’s sentence and to ensure that the trial court had an 
opportunity to rule on it, thus causing prejudice to Kozich.  The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel should not be recognized for a motion to reconsider a criminal sentence as the motion is 
not considered a part of the criminal prosecution of a defendant. 
 
While the majority correctly acknowledges that in order for the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel to apply, the motion to reconsider must constitute a critical stage of the criminal 
process, it declines to address that issue as applied to these facts as a categorical matter.  Rather, 
it focuses on the trial court’s “express invitation” to file a motion to reconsider to divorce these 
20 
 
facts from previous cases.  In my opinion, the majority draws a blurred line, one that we need not 
draw, and one that will be almost impossible to apply.* 
Prior to today, there has been no Sixth Amendment right to counsel to file a motion to 
reconsider sentence based on the analysis that it is not a critical stage of a criminal prosecution.  
If a motion to reconsider sentence is not a critical stage of the process, it is not made so no matter 
when it is filed, pre- or post-entry of the final judgment, and at whose invitation — even the trial 
judge’s invitation.  The Sixth Amendment only requires “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Unlike an arraignment, trial, or sentencing, the filing of a motion to reconsider sentence 
is not an aspect of a criminal prosecution that would substantially prejudice the rights of an 
accused.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (holding that the critical stage 
analysis usually turns on the likelihood of “substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights”); United 
States v. Hamid, 461 A.2d 1043, 1044 (D.C. 1983) (“[t]he right to request a reduction in 
sentence is not a right of sufficient substance to trigger the Sixth Amendment.”).  At the time of a 
motion to reconsider, the accused has already been adjudicated guilty and given a sentence.  Any 
motion made thereafter can only be made for the purpose of reducing that sentence.  The 
consensus view, as recognized by the majority, is that a motion to reconsider a sentence is not a 
                                                 
* The majority specifically finds that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
reconsider during a segmented window of time between the oral pronouncement of the sentence 
and the entry of the final order.  The alleged ineffectiveness of Kozich’s trial counsel only 
became apparent when the trial court judge, during the later habeas case, revealed her previously 
undisclosed personal views on sentencing heroin addicts.  It is hard to imagine how trial counsel 
would have known this a year earlier — when the trial judge, herself, admitted in the habeas case 
that she was having to “benefit[] from knowing what was going on in [her] head” during 
sentencing.  The fact that Kozich was addicted to heroin was well known at the time of 
sentencing.  Kozich’s trial counsel orally and in writing requested a referral to a drug-treatment 
program in lieu of incarceration.  Faced with this information, the judge’s response to Kozich at 
his sentencing hearing was unqualified:  “[P]utting you in programs doesn’t work,” and “so it’s 
come to the point where I have to protect the public from you.” 
21 
 
trial-related proceeding.  Insofar as it is a post-trial or pre-appeal proceeding, I note that in Ross 
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1974), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a  
criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue post-conviction 
review by way of discretionary appeal. 
Thus, the post-trial issue here cannot be of sufficient substance to trigger the Sixth 
Amendment.  I respectfully believe the majority takes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel a 
step too far by asserting that the trial court could make the motion to reconsider sentence a 
critical stage by extending an invitation for Kozich’s counsel to file the motion to reconsider 
sentence at the end of the formal sentencing hearing, but before the entry of the final order.  The 
purpose behind a motion to reconsider sentence is the same no matter when it is filed or at whose 
behest it is filed.  If it is not a critical stage after the entry of final judgment, it cannot be a critical 
stage before the entry of final judgment. 
In the federal system, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for a motion to 
vacate or modify sentence.  A motion to reconsider sentence poses no more threat to the 
likelihood of substantial prejudice to a defendant’s rights whether it is filed before or after final 
judgment is entered.  “This is not a situation where an indigent defendant needs legal 
representation to defend himself against governmental action; that is, it is not an action brought 
by the government against the defendant such as one to revoke probation or to revoke his 
parole.”  Burrell v. United States, 332 A.2d 344, 345 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975).  See United States v. 
Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a motion to reduce sentence filed 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) “is simply a vehicle through which appropriately sentenced 
prisoners can urge the court to exercise leniency to give certain defendants the benefits of an 
amendment to the [Sentencing] Guidelines”).  Accord United States v. Harris, 568 F.3d 666, 669 
22 
 
(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 565 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 793-95 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1996). 
As noted by the majority in footnote 8, our unpublished orders in habeas cases have 
repeatedly denied claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a modification or 
reduction of petitioner’s sentence because a motion to modify or reconsider a sentence is not 
“‘an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant.’”  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
18 (1956)).  We have consistently focused on the nature of the motion to reconsider itself and the 
purpose for which it is filed (to obtain a lesser sentence) in holding that it is not a critical stage of 
the trial and we have done so without regard to the point at which it is filed, i.e. before or after 
entry of the final order.  Significantly, as applied to these facts, our position has remained the 
same even when considering a claim made regarding the failure to file a motion before the final 
order has been entered.  See Farris v. Warden, No. 131850 (June 26, 2014) (rejecting claims that 
counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to reconsider as requested immediately after 
sentencing); Burrell v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 131561 (Apr. 2, 2014) (rejecting 
claims that counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to reconsider sentence requested in the 
back of the courthouse after sentencing); Tate v. Warden, No. 060745 (Oct. 10, 2006) (rejecting 
claims that counsel was ineffective for arguing a motion to reconsider on the same date as 
sentencing); James v. Director of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 030707 (Oct. 3, 2003) (rejecting 
claims that counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to reconsider after final order was 
entered). 
23 
 
Whether filed the day before or the day after entry of final judgment, a motion to 
reconsider sentence is not a critical stage of the proceedings.  Because it is not a critical stage of 
the proceedings under the Constitution, it cannot be made one by the trial court judge.  I would 
find that counsel was not ineffective, that we need not reach the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
analysis, and would reverse the judgment of the trial court finding counsel ineffective.