Title: State Highway Dept. v. Morgan
Citation: 584 So. 2d 499
Docket Number: 1900920, 1900921, 1900922
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 1991

584 So. 2d 499 (1991)
STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT
v.
Bert MORGAN and Morgan Oil Company.
Bert MORGAN and Morgan Oil Company
v.
STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT.
STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT
v.
Bert MORGAN, et al.
1900920, 1900921 and 1900922.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 28, 1991.
Jack F. Norton, Chief Counsel, and Jerry L. Weidler and Janie Baker Clarke, Counsel, Alabama Highway Dept., for appellant.
Hayden R. Battles of Bland, Battles, Harris &amp; McClellan, Cullman, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The State of Alabama Highway Department appeals the judgments of the Circuit Court of Cullman County requiring the Highway Department to pay "just compensation" to Bert Morgan and Morgan Oil Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Morgan"), pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 23-1-278, and denying relief to the Highway Department, stipulating that it must join other defendants in the action before being able to obtain relief.[1] The *500 orders were in response to the Highway Department's actions for declaratory judgments and injunctive relief regarding two commercial billboards alongside the Cullman exit off Interstate Highway 65. The Highway Department claims the outdoor advertising signs are illegal and need to be removed by Morgan.[2]
The trial court granted the Highway Department's request as to one sign and ordered that the sign be removed by either the Highway Department or Morgan. However, the court ordered the Highway Department to pay Morgan just compensation before the removal of the sign. As to the second sign, the trial court's order denied the Highway Department any relief and suggested that the Highway Department join other defendants who were not parties to the present suit as a condition to obtaining any future relief against Morgan and Paul Duke, Jr.[3] The Highway Department appeals the trial court's order regarding the stated conditions.
The evidence at an ore tenus hearing indicated that a sign located on northbound Interstate 65 at the intersection of State Highway 157 had been erected by Morgan sometime after April 11, 1978; that that sign contained an advertisement for an Econo Lodge motel; and that it had been erected without a permit. The evidence also revealed that a second sign, located on northbound Interstate 65 at State Highway 69 had been erected by Morgan, but the actual date of construction is unknown; nonetheless, the second sign was also erected without a permit. Morgan concedes that both signs were erected without the necessary permits. After the hearing regarding both signs, the trial court issued a separate order regarding each sign. We will address each order separately.
Initially, we point out that our review of the trial court's judgment in this matter is governed by the familiar standard of the ore tenus rule. By that rule, the judgment of the trial judge, sitting without a jury, based upon factual findings arrived at from disputed evidence presented orally to the court, is presumed to be correct and will be affirmed on appeal as long as "`it is fairly supported by credible evidence under any reasonable aspect and is not palpably wrong or manifestly unjust.'" Charles Israel Chevrolet, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller &amp; Co., 476 So. 2d 71, 73 (Ala.1985) (quoting Whitt v. McConnell, 360 So. 2d 336, 337 (Ala.1978). With this standard in mind, we address the trial court's findings.
As to the first sign, the trial court's order reads:
The Highway Department argues that the Econo Lodge sign is an illegal sign, not a nonconforming sign, and that it is not required to pay compensation to Morgan for the removal of the illegal sign. The Highway Department relies on the language of §§ 23-1-278 and -279, which read, in pertinent part:
Essentially, § 23-1-279 sets forth a grandfather provision whereby owners of outdoor advertising signs are entitled to compensation for removal of those signs, but they must have been lawfully erected prior to February 10, 1972. Although the statute provides exceptions to this rule for signs erected prior to April 11, 1978, the trial court ruled that the Econo Lodge sign *502 was erected "on or after April 11, 1978," a fact not disputed by Morgan. Furthermore, the record supports the trial court's finding that the sign was erected "on or after April 11, 1978." Nonetheless, based on the record and the trial court's order, § 23-1-279 has no application to the facts surrounding the Econo Lodge sign. Rather, § 23-1-278 applies, which gives the director of the State of Alabama Highway Department the authority to remove illegal signs without just compensation to the owners, provided there is adequate notice. Thus, the trial court erroneously concluded that the Econo Lodge sign was nonconforming and erroneously ordered the Highway Department to pay Morgan just compensation.
The trial court's order regarding the second sign reads:
We acknowledge that a trial court has the broad discretion to add or drop parties on its own motion in order to serve the ends of justice. Wood v. City of Huntsville, 384 So. 2d 1081 (Ala.1980). The trial court also has the discretion to order the dismissal of a complaint with leave to amend to add a party or parties if such parties are necessary and indispensable to the action. Withington v. Cloud, 522 So. 2d 263 (Ala.1988). See, also, Rule 19(b), A.R.Civ.P. However, in the instant case, the trial court's findings of fact are inconsistent with its final ruling. The court stated that there are two other signs located in the general area of the sign the *503 Highway Department seeks to remove: the Quality Inn sign, which the court declares is a permitted sign, and the Holiday Inn sign, which is a nonconforming sign. There was also a structure where a sign once was but, without dispute, has been removed. Therefore, it appears from the record that the Highway Department sought only the removal of illegal signs and not the removal of permitted or nonconforming signs. Thus, because Morgan was the only owner of an illegal sign and Duke was the only owner of land on which an illegal sign was placed, the court had before it all of the parties necessary to resolve the illegal-sign dispute. The trial court erred in denying the Highway Department's petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief regarding the sign designated in the Highway Department's exhibit 8 and Morgan's exhibits I and J.
In closing, we note that because of our ruling in this case, we need not address Morgan's issue regarding alleged discriminatory enforcement of the laws by the Highway Department.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand these causes for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
[1]  Morgan filed a cross-appeal (case number 1900921), but failed to file a brief or to present any argument regarding the cross-appeal. Thus, the cross-appeal is not properly before this Court for review.
[2]  Paul Duke, Jr., who is named as a party in one suit, is the owner of the property on which the signs are located. He leases the property to Bert Morgan, but has no other interest in the signs.
[3]  See footnote two.