Title: Commonwealth v. Valentin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11448
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2016

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SJC-11448 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELVIN VALENTIN. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 12, 2016. - May 20, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Intoxication.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Relevancy 
and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Argument by prosecutor, Request for jury instructions, 
Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
John F. Palmer for the defendant. 
 
Rachel W. van Deuren, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury of murder in the first degree in the shooting deaths of 
Nettie Becht and Luis Diaz, on theories of premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  On appeal, the defendant asserts 
error in the judge's decision to permit the introduction in 
2 
 
evidence of weapons and related items that he lawfully owned and 
that were not alleged to have been used in the shooting.  The 
defendant asserts error also in the denial of his request that 
the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a 
theory of reasonable provocation, and in the instruction that 
was given that the jury must "find" the defendant was 
intoxicated.  He also challenges portions of the prosecutor's 
closing argument in several respects. 
Concluding that there was no error, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and decline to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or reduce the 
verdicts to a lesser degree of guilt. 
1.  Background.  a.  Commonwealth's case.  We recite the 
facts the jury could have found, reserving certain facts for 
later discussion.  The defendant and Becht lived in different 
apartments in the same housing complex in New Bedford.  They had 
been involved in an intermittent relationship that spanned a 
four-year period; during that period, the defendant and Becht 
occasionally spent the night at each other's apartments and the 
defendant had loaned Becht money.  According to the defendant, 
Becht had "cheated" on him and he felt that she was "using" him.  
Becht ended the relationship prior to the shootings. 
Becht was treated at a hospital on the night before she was 
3 
 
killed.1  When the defendant attempted to visit her there, she 
told him that she did not want to see him.  The next day, August 
14, 2009, at approximately 8 P.M., the defendant went to the 
home of a friend of Becht, after Becht failed to return the 
numerous telephone calls he had made throughout the day.  Becht 
came out of the house and spoke with the defendant while they 
were standing outside the house.  She told him that she had 
started a relationship with someone else and that she was "done" 
with him.  The defendant responded by saying, "[W]e'll see, 
we'll see," and told her not to do it "in [his] face."  He left 
and returned to his apartment. 
Later that night, at approximately 10 P.M., Becht's friend 
drove her to a bus station to pick up Luis Diaz, a man Becht had 
met on a "chat line."2  Becht had spoken with Diaz on the 
telephone, but the two had not met in person.  After picking 
Diaz up from the bus station, the friend drove Diaz and Becht to 
Becht's apartment and left.  At that time, the defendant was in 
his apartment in the same apartment complex, sitting in his 
kitchen with the lights turned off.  He saw Becht and Diaz from 
                                                 
1 The reason for the hospitalization was unrelated to the 
events leading to her death, and the judge excluded it from 
evidence. 
 
2 A witness described the "chat line" as a telephone chat 
line.  A chat line makes it possible for multiple people to 
communicate with one another at the same time by telephone call, 
and is often used as an alternative to online dating.  See 
Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 2006). 
4 
 
his window as they walked toward her apartment.  He armed 
himself with a loaded nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol, 
which he subsequently told police that he kept readily 
accessible for protection because he recently had been the 
victim of a robbery. 
The defendant emerged from his apartment carrying the 
loaded gun.  Becht saw that the defendant was armed and 
screamed, "No, no."  The defendant first pointed the gun at Diaz 
and fired; he then pointed the gun at Becht and fired several 
more shots.  When Diaz tried to get up after he had been shot, 
the defendant said, "What?  You not ready to die yet?" and again 
fired the gun at Diaz.  In all, the defendant fired ten shots.  
Police and paramedics arrived within minutes of the shootings; 
Diaz was still breathing but Becht was not.  Both victims were 
taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital where, later that night, 
they were pronounced dead.  Each died of gunshot wounds to the 
torso. 
The defendant returned to his apartment and changed his 
clothes and shoes.3  He put the gun in a closet in the living 
room and left the apartment.  Immediately after the shootings, 
the defendant spoke to his son on his cellular telephone, and 
                                                 
3 Testing of deoxyribonucleic acid samples taken from the 
defendant's shoes recovered from his apartment, the gun used to 
shoot the victims, and the doorknob on his apartment door 
established that Becht's blood was on each item. 
5 
 
said, "Hey, I killed Netti because I find her with another guy 
and I killed that other guy, too."  Shortly thereafter, a police 
officer noticed the defendant walking away from the crowd of 
people that had gathered.  The officer followed the defendant, 
who was still talking on his cellular telephone, and ordered him 
to stop.  When the officer approached, the defendant said, "Yes, 
yes.  I'm the one who did it."  The officer read the defendant 
his Miranda rights, in English, and handcuffed him.4  The 
defendant indicated that he understood his rights.  Before the 
officer had asked any questions, the defendant asked, "Is the 
lady dead?"  When the officer responded that he did not know, 
the defendant asked, "How about the guy?  Is he dead?"  The 
defendant's tone was "casual" and without emotion.5 
As the officer spoke to the defendant, the crowd of people 
that had gathered at the scene of the shootings began angrily to 
approach the defendant.  The officer placed the defendant in his 
police cruiser for the defendant's safety.  As they sat in the 
cruiser, the defendant told the officer that he was concerned 
the crowd would burn his automobile.  When the officer asked why 
he had that concern, the defendant replied that it was because 
                                                 
4 The officer asked the defendant whether he spoke and 
understood English, and the defendant said that he did.  The 
defendant also indicated that he spoke Spanish. 
 
5 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
his various statements to police.  The motion was denied, and, 
on appeal, the defendant does not challenge that denial. 
6 
 
he had shot the victims.  The officer asked the defendant why he 
had done so, and the defendant responded that he had told Becht 
not to cheat on him.  The defendant told another officer that 
the gun used in the shootings was located in his apartment.6 
Police transported the defendant to the police station, 
where he agreed to be interviewed.  In a video-recorded 
interview, conducted in English, the defendant explained that he 
had been in a relationship with Becht for about four years, but 
that she wanted to date other people.7  The defendant stated that 
he had been sitting in his kitchen with the lights turned off, 
drinking whiskey, as he waited for Becht to return to her 
apartment.  He said that he had consumed one-half of a bottle of 
whiskey in the hours before the shootings, and went "crazy" when 
he saw Becht walk by his apartment with Diaz because he had been 
drinking.8  When asked whether he had made the decision to shoot 
                                                 
6 The gun was found in a closet in the defendant's living 
room. 
 
7 Prior to this interview, an off-duty bilingual officer 
read the defendant his Miranda rights, this time in Spanish.  
The defendant stated that he did not want to speak to the 
officers and that he wanted an attorney.  Then, unprompted, the 
defendant told the officer that, earlier that night, he had 
sought out Becht at her friend's house to ask about the status 
of their relationship, and Becht had said that it was over 
between them and that she was seeing someone else.  The 
defendant told the officer that he had said to Becht, "We'll see 
about that."  He also said that he had consumed three to four 
glasses of whiskey as he waited for Becht to return home. 
 
8 A half-empty bottle of whiskey was found in the 
7 
 
Becht and Diaz when he walked out of the apartment with his gun, 
the defendant said, "Well, yeah, I think that the alcohol made 
me do the shooting." 
b.  Defendant's case.  The primary defense at trial was 
that the defendant's intoxication warranted convictions of a 
lesser offense than murder in the first degree.  The defendant 
called a forensic psychiatrist as an expert witness to explain 
generally the effects of alcohol intoxication.9  In addition, one 
police officer testified that he smelled the odor of alcohol 
emanating from the defendant as they sat in the police cruiser 
immediately after the defendant was arrested. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Admission of evidence of other 
weapons.  The defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the 
Commonwealth's improper introduction of evidence concerning his 
ownership of weapons other than the weapon used in the 
shootings, which the defendant categorizes as evidence of prior 
bad acts.  The Commonwealth introduced testimony that the 
defendant owned several handguns, a rifle, a shotgun, several 
boxes of ammunition, gun magazines, a National Rifle Association 
certificate, and a buck knife.  Photographs of these items were 
introduced in evidence, as were the boxes of ammunition and 
                                                                                                                                                             
defendant's apartment. 
 
9 The expert had not reviewed any of the evidence in the 
case and had not spoken with the defendant. 
8 
 
other items themselves.  The defendant did not object to the 
introduction of the testimony or this evidence.  On cross-
examination, the defendant elicited testimony establishing that 
he had been required to satisfy specific criteria to obtain 
licenses for the firearms.  The prosecutor also referred to some 
of the weapons evidence in the opening statement.10  Because the 
defendant did not object, we review his claim to determine 
whether the evidence should not have been admitted and, if it 
was admitted erroneously, whether the admission created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
We have cautioned against the admission of evidence of 
weapons or firearms where those items "definitively could not 
have been used in the commission of the crime" charged.  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  We have 
expressed concern in such circumstances that the introduction of 
evidence of firearms unrelated to the crime charged "creates a 
risk that the jury will use the evidence impermissibly to infer 
that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity to commit 
the crime charged."  Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 
(2014).  We also have recognized, however, that there may be a 
                                                 
10 The prosecutor told the jury, "You will hear the choices 
that the defendant made over that evening.  First, he had the 
choice of which gun he was going to use.  He had a .357, he had 
a .45 caliber, he had a .40 caliber; all handguns.  He had a .12 
gauge shotgun, and he had a Colt 223 rifle.  However, this 
defendant chose his Smith & Wesson, a nine millimeter, loaded 
with ten rounds in the magazine." 
9 
 
permissible purpose for the admission of such weapons-related 
evidence, and have "not unconditionally disapproved" of it.  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, supra at 122-123, and cases cited.  The 
critical questions are whether the weapons-related evidence is 
relevant and, if so, whether the probative value of the evidence 
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See 
Commonwealth v. McGee, supra. 
Here, it is undisputed that none of the weapons-related 
evidence that the defendant challenges was relevant to the 
crimes charged.  The defendant kept the gun used in the 
shootings loaded and accessible, apparently not locked in his 
gun safe.  The police recovered that gun from a closet in the 
defendant's living room; the defendant has not challenged its 
admission, nor has he challenged the introduction of a box of 
ammunition from which ten bullets apparently had been used to 
load the gun used in the shootings.  That box of ammunition and 
the other weapons and ammunition were found locked in a gun safe 
in the defendant's bedroom. 
The Commonwealth contends that the weapons evidence 
properly was admitted to show that the shootings were 
premeditated.  In the circumstances here, we do not agree.  
Unlike the scenario presented in Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 
Mass. 340, 352-353 (2013), there was no evidence in this case 
that the defendant "deliberately chose" the murder weapon from a 
10 
 
cache of other available weapons, and there was no evidence 
that, on the night of the shootings, the defendant even unlocked 
the safe where the other weapons were stored.  Further, the 
Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant decided to 
kill Becht because she had told him earlier that day, as well as 
the night before, that she no longer wanted to be involved in a 
relationship with him.  There is no suggestion that the 
defendant acquired or handled any of his other weapons at some 
point after Becht rebuffed him.  The fact that the defendant 
lawfully owned multiple firearms and a buck knife, which he kept 
securely locked in a gun safe, bears no relevance to whether he 
deliberated before he shot Becht and Diaz.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Carney, 472 Mass. 252, 256 (2015) (evidence 
defendant owned and was familiar with firearms relevant to show 
shooting was not accident as defendant claimed). 
Likewise, we conclude that the weapons evidence is not 
relevant to the question whether the murder was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  In total, the defendant fired ten 
shots at the two victims, and both died of multiple gunshot 
wounds.  The Commonwealth contends that the weapons evidence 
permitted the jury reasonably to infer that the defendant was 
familiar with weapons, and that, based on that inference, the 
jury could draw the further inference that the disproportionate 
means the defendant used to inflict death was not the result of 
11 
 
an unskilled shooter, but rather the result intended by an 
experienced shooter.  Such a "piling of inference upon 
inference" is improper in this context.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 693 (2015).  The defendant made no claim 
at trial that the multiple bullets fired, or the shootings 
themselves, were the result of a lack of familiarity with guns 
or ignorance regarding the damage multiple gunshots could 
inflict.  Nothing about the defendant's skill level as a shooter 
or familiarity with guns was related to any of the issues at 
trial.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 Mass. 548, 560 (2007) 
(testimony that defendant was skilled with knife "tended to 
prove that [he] possessed the means and ability to commit the 
crime, thus making it relevant to whether he was the killer").  
Because the evidence of the defendant's lawful ownership of 
other firearms, ammunition, and a buck knife was not relevant to 
the jury's determination whether the shootings were committed 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, the evidence should not have 
been admitted. 
Even if we were to agree, as the Commonwealth argues, that 
it had some "tenuous relevancy" to show that the defendant "was 
acquainted with weapons and was able to use them," that 
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  See Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 358 (1985).  
The Commonwealth contends also that because the defendant 
12 
 
lawfully owned the weapons and ammunition, he cannot argue that 
evidence of his ownership was prejudicial "bad act" evidence.  
The rules of evidence, however, do not contemplate only the 
exclusion of evidence relating to unlawful acts.  A trial judge 
"may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice."  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016).  In addition, "[e]vidence of a 
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's 
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 
person acted in accordance with the character."  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2016). 
Accordingly, our focus is on whether the weapons evidence 
"creates a risk that the jury will use the evidence 
impermissibly to infer that the defendant has a bad character or 
a propensity to commit the crime charged."  See Commonwealth v. 
McGee, supra at 156.  As the defendant argues, the evidence of 
his ownership of multiple firearms portrayed him as someone who 
was likely to commit murder, the crime with which he was 
charged, and should not have been admitted. 
The improperly admitted evidence, however, did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The 
evidence against the defendant was strong.  There was a vast 
quantity of evidence that he was the shooter and shot both 
victims with the firearm recovered by police, and no evidence to 
13 
 
the contrary.  There were several witnesses to the shootings 
and, immediately after the shootings, the defendant confessed 
and explained his motive to police.  In this context, the 
evidence of the defendant's other weapons would have been 
"insignificant" in the jury's thinking.  See Commonwealth v. 
Toro, supra at 359.  Although the judge did not provide a 
limiting instruction on the use of the unrelated weapons 
evidence, defense counsel effectively cross-examined the police 
witness who testified about the other weapons in order to 
establish that the defendant lawfully owned them, and thus that 
he had satisfied the required criteria for a firearms license, 
and that the other weapons had not been used in the crime 
charged.  This mitigated some of the danger that the jury would 
draw a prejudicial inference from the evidence.  In sum, the 
jury's verdicts would not have been different had the improperly 
admitted weapons evidence been excluded. 
b.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant asserts 
that several aspects of the prosecutor's closing argument were 
improper.  He claims that the prosecutor suggested, without 
evidentiary basis, that the defendant was "lying in wait" for 
Becht to return on the night of the shootings, and that she was 
"begging" for her life as the shots were being fired.  The 
defendant also contends that the prosecutor injected her own 
view of the witnesses' credibility into her closing, and 
14 
 
improperly asked the jury to put themselves in the place of the 
defendant.  Because the defendant did not object to any portion 
of the closing argument at trial, we review to determine whether 
the improprieties, if any, posed a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 
243, 253-254 (2012).  We discern no error. 
 "Prosecutors must limit the scope of their closing 
arguments to facts in evidence and the fair inferences that may 
be drawn therefrom."  Commonwealth v. Guy, 441 Mass. 96, 110 
(2004).  Here, there was evidence that the defendant was in his 
apartment, sitting in the dark, waiting for Becht to come home, 
and that he had a loaded gun nearby.  The prosecutor's statement 
that the defendant was "lying in wait" and other similar remarks 
were fair arguments grounded in the evidence, and were related 
to the issue of premeditation.  There also was testimony that 
Becht yelled, "No, no," as the defendant shot at her.  The 
prosecutor's argument that Becht was "begging for her life" was 
not improper in light of this evidence, and was relevant to the 
Commonwealth's theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 383 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987) ("A prosecutor 
may argue 'forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence and 
on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence"). 
The defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly 
15 
 
injected her own view of the witnesses' credibility into her 
closing in discussing the issue of intoxication.  In reviewing 
this claim, we consider the context in which the prosecutor made 
her remarks.  At trial, defense counsel elicited testimony from 
a police officer that the police had found a half-empty bottle 
of whiskey in the defendant's apartment.  In his closing 
argument, defense counsel drew attention to the presence of the 
whiskey bottle, stating, "As a matter of fact, when [the 
detective] testified, and [the prosecutor] was introducing a 
number of items, you didn't see him pick up that bottle and 
introduce it.  I did.  I did.  They want this [half-empty bottle 
of whiskey] to be nonexistent.  It's not.  It exists.  And you 
can't disregard it." 
The prosecutor began her closing argument by responding to 
defense counsel's argument.  She stated: 
"Defense counsel made mention [of] the fact that he 
had to put [the half-empty whiskey bottle] into evidence 
through [the detective].  Well, do you remember the 
testimony of [the detective]?  He wasn't the one who found 
it.  Why would it go in through him?  [A State police 
trooper] was the person who found the alcohol, who hadn't 
testified yet.  So is that what you think, ladies and 
gentlemen?  That [we] have been trying to keep things from 
you during the course of this trial?  We've put well over a 
hundred exhibits before you.  I'm not asking you to ignore 
the alcohol at all." 
 
This argument was not improper, but, rather, was in direct 
response to the defendant's suggestion that the Commonwealth 
sought to hide evidence that a partially consumed bottle of 
16 
 
whiskey had been recovered from the defendant's home.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013) ("prosecutor 
may address a particular point in defense counsel's closing 
argument"). 
Likewise, the prosecutor's final statement to the jury 
"ask[ing]" them, "on [her] behalf, and on the behalf of [her co-
prosecutor], and on behalf of the Commonwealth, that [they] find 
this defendant . . . guilty of . . . murder in the first degree" 
was not improper.  The phrase was a "rhetorical flourish" that 
the prosecutor used to argue that the jury should render guilty 
verdicts.  "[W]e presume the jury 'know that the prosecutor is 
an advocate' . . . and that they recognize arguments as 
'advocacy and not statements of personal belief'" (citations 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Mejia, supra at 254. 
The defendant's final contention is that "the prosecutor 
improperly urged the jurors to rely on their own experiences 
with intoxication, instead of the evidence, in evaluating 
the . . . intoxication defense."  The prosecutor stated, 
"Use your common sense and life experience. . . . 
Certainly you guys over your various years have seen people 
intoxicated, might have been intoxicated yourself.  You 
know what the reaction is.  You know what outward signs you 
might have had.  Would you have the capability to do this?  
To walk up calmly, confidently, deliberately, put up a gun, 
hold your hand straight, shoot ten times?" 
 
Inviting the jurors to draw upon their own life experience and 
common sense is permissible.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 
17 
 
12, 22 (2011) ("request that jury apply their common sense was 
proper").  Although the suggestion that the jury put themselves 
in the place of the defendant would have been better not made, 
here the statement was made in the context of asking the jurors 
to consider their own life experiences and common sense in 
evaluating the effect of intoxication.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Pontes, 402 Mass. 311, 318 (1988) (asking jury to put themselves 
in place of victim's father not improper where, in context, it 
was attempt to suggest father acted reasonably).  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 420 (2011) ("jury 
should not be asked to put themselves 'in the shoes' of the 
victim, or otherwise be asked to identify with the victim").  
There was no error in the prosecutor's closing argument. 
 
c.  Jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  At the 
close of all the evidence, the defendant orally requested an 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on the theory that 
the defendant killed the victims in the heat of passion because 
he was reasonably provoked when he saw Becht with Diaz on the 
night of the shooting.  Concluding that the evidence did not 
warrant a finding of reasonable provocation, the judge denied 
the request and the defendant objected. 
The defendant contends that the judge should have 
instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter because the 
defendant still considered Becht to be his "girl friend" at the 
18 
 
time of the shootings.  The defendant acknowledges that Becht 
had told him that their relationship was over and that she was 
dating other people, but points to his statement that he had 
warned her "[not to] do it in [his] face."  The defendant 
maintains that he went "crazy" when he saw Becht walking with 
Diaz, and thus that the instruction was warranted. 
Where an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is 
requested, a trial judge should so instruct the jury if any view 
of the evidence would warrant a finding that the unlawful 
killing arose not from malice, but "from . . . sudden passion 
induced by reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or excessive 
force in self-defense."  See Commonwealth v. Avecedo, 446 Mass. 
435, 443 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 
267 (1990).  Reasonable provocation means that a reasonable 
person would have been provoked "to lose his self-control in the 
heat of passion," and that person would not have had time to 
"cool off" before the killing (citations omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Avecedo, supra at 442-443.  Because the standard 
is both objective and subjective, the jury must be able to infer 
from the evidence not only that a reasonable person would have 
been so provoked, but also that the defendant was in fact 
provoked and that he or she did not have sufficient time to cool 
off in the period that elapsed between the provocation and the 
homicide.  See id. at 443; Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 
19 
 
201, 220 (2001).  We "view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant to determine whether an instruction 
on reasonable provocation was warranted."  Commonwealth v. 
Avecedo, supra. 
Here, the evidence introduced at trial would not have 
permitted the jury to find reasonable provocation.  Even 
assuming that the defendant still believed that Becht was his 
girl friend on the day of the shootings, the facts do not 
support a finding of reasonable provocation as defined in our 
case law.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
he and Becht had been involved in an occasional romantic 
relationship, which Becht had ended several hours prior to the 
shootings.  Moreover, on the night before the shootings, Becht 
had rebuffed the defendant when he tried to visit her at the 
hospital.  The defendant thus had no reason to expect that Becht 
would not become romantically involved with other people, and 
has no basis upon which to claim that he was reasonably provoked 
when he saw Becht with Diaz.  See Commonwealth v. Benson, 453 
Mass. 90, 95 (2009) ("provocation occurs only when an action of 
the victim triggers a sudden loss of self-control in the 
defendant").  Contrast Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 Mass. 236, 
238 (1996) (evidence supported inference that defendant observed 
spouse with another man, thus confirming his suspicion of 
unfaithfulness). 
20 
 
Even were we to assume that the defendant reasonably could 
have expected fidelity from Becht, the evidence would not have 
permitted the jury to find that the defendant was reasonably 
provoked.  The defendant did not come upon Becht and Diaz 
engaged in romantic or sexual activity; he observed them merely 
walking together towards her apartment.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 325 (2011) (defendant discovered victim, 
whom he had been dating for six weeks, engaging in oral sex with 
another man).  On these facts, the jury could not infer that a 
reasonable person would have become sufficiently provoked to 
shoot and kill two people.  See Commonwealth v. Benson, supra.  
There was no error in the denial of the defendant's request for 
a manslaughter instruction. 
d.  Jury instruction on intoxication.  In her final charge, 
the judge properly instructed the jury on intoxication, and the 
defendant does not challenge that instruction.  After a few 
hours of deliberation, the jury submitted a note with a question 
concerning the "subcategories" of murder.  After a sidebar 
discussion, neither the judge nor counsel were able to determine 
precisely what information the jury sought.  With counsel's 
approval, the judge decided to "go over the instructions again, 
perhaps in a more summary fashion." 
In his summary review of the instructions, after describing 
the elements of the various degrees and theories of murder, the 
21 
 
judge instructed, 
 
"Intoxication does not necessarily excuse murder.  The 
question is did the intoxication prevent the defendant from 
forming the intent or from having knowledge of the 
circumstances giving rise to the plain and strong 
likelihood of death.  So you can consider any believable 
evidence -- if you find that the defendant was intoxicated 
from the consumption of alcohol, you can consider that 
evidence on several points. . . .  And then you can also 
consider any intoxication, if you find intoxication, on the 
issue of whether the defendant acted in a cruel or 
atrocious manner in causing the death of the 
deceased. . . .  So I'll just repeat. . . . So the 
intoxication bears on, if you find intoxication, you can 
consider it in evaluating the defendant's intention and the 
defendant's knowledge of the circumstances" 
 
In total, the judge stated three times that if the jury found 
the defendant was intoxicated, they could consider his 
intoxication when evaluating both theories of murder in the 
first degree. 
The defendant argues that the instruction that the jury had 
to "find" intoxication improperly shifted the burden of proof 
from the Commonwealth to him.  Because the defendant did not 
object at trial, we review to determine whether there was a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Although we 
have observed that this "finding" language is disfavored in a 
jury instruction, it "is not in error when the charge, read as a 
whole, clearly places the burden on the Commonwealth to prove 
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 192 (2011), citing 
22 
 
Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 153 (1980), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 973 (1981).  Moreover, our concern with the 
"finding" language is most acute when used in conjunction with 
"complete, malice-negating defenses," such as self-defense, 
accident, or necessity.  See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 
792, 805 (1996), and cases cited.  Because "intoxication and 
impairment do not negate premeditation, but are mere subsidiary 
facts that the jury consider in sifting the circumstantial 
evidence as to [the defendant's] mental state . . . , there is 
no particular standard of proof that 'finding' language can 
impermissibly alter."11  Id. at 805-806. 
Here, as the defendant concedes, the instructions provided 
to the jury before they began deliberating were proper.  
Although the judge used the disfavored "finding" language in his 
summary reiteration of the instructions, the use of this 
language did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant.  
When viewed as a whole, the instructions clearly placed the 
burden of proof on the Commonwealth to prove each element of 
                                                 
11 We decline the defendant's invitation to reconsider our 
line of cases distinguishing "subsidiary facts" from facts that 
bear on "malice-negating offense" based on the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2151 (2013).  There, the Court held that any fact that increases 
a mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the crime, not 
merely a sentencing factor, and therefore a criminal defendant 
has a right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to have the jury decide all such facts.  Id. at 
2162-2163.  Those Sixth Amendment concerns are not implicated 
here. 
23 
 
murder, including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and conclude that there is no reason to order a new trial or to 
reduce the degree of guilt. 
Judgments affirmed.