Title: Wall v. State
Citation: 573 N.E.2d 890
Docket Number: 35S00-8912-CR-935
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 1991

573 N.E.2d 890 (1991)
Jarrod Michael WALL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 35S00-8912-CR-935.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 27, 1991.
*891 William N. Mills, Mills &amp; Northrop, Huntington, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Geoff Davis, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
On August 3, 1989, appellant pled guilty but mentally ill to a murder charge. He was sentenced to forty (40) years enhanced by twenty (20) years for aggravating circumstances.
The facts are: In January of 1989, appellant and John Velasquez planned to burglarize the home of Eldon Anson in Huntington County. The purpose of the burglary was to steal guns. Appellant disliked Anson because he believed Anson was a homosexual drug abuser who might have been responsible for his uncle developing Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
On the night of February 3, 1989, appellant went to Velasquez' home, and following a discussion, he requested that Erick Esch help him burglarize Anson's home. Velasquez informed appellant and Esch that he was unable to go to Anson's home, but he did provide them with jackets, a satchel, and a knife. Appellant was armed with a loaded .22 caliber pistol and a hatchet that he had purchased.
Appellant and Esch drove to Anson's house and rang the doorbell. Anson answered the door, and appellant told him *892 they were interested in looking at one of his old vehicles. Anson let them in and then led them outside where he showed them vehicles in his garage and driveway. Appellant grew angry when he heard Anson's voice and thought of his uncle. As Anson was unlocking one of the vehicles, appellant pulled out his gun and shot Anson in the head. Appellant then shot Anson five more times. Upon noticing that Anson was not dead, appellant went to his vehicle to retrieve his hatchet and returned to strike Anson in the head. As appellant struck Anson, he covered his head with his hands further angering appellant and prompting him to strike Anson's hands. He also struck Anson in the back and on the buttocks.
Believing Anson to be dead, appellant and Esch went into Anson's home to look for the guns. When they were unable to locate the guns, appellant took a radio. Appellant and Esch hid a bloody jacket in a trash bin and threw the hatchet in the river. Anson did not die until four days later.
On February 24, appellant, Velasquez, and another individual burglarized the home of Deputy Sheriff Larry Kingrey, and a handgun was stolen. Thereafter, subsequent crimes relating to the possession of the handgun took place. Following his arrest and murder charge, appellant testified at the juvenile waiver hearing of codefendant Velasquez. However, before doing so the State extended to him, in exchange for his testimony, immunity from prosecution for burglary and subsequent crimes relating to the possession of the handgun. The Court granted appellant immunity pursuant to a written order which stated:
During appellant's sentencing hearing, the judge questioned him regarding the burglary and theft on February 24. In addition, the judge questioned appellant concerning other acts involving the weapon, which appellant admitted. In listing the aggravating circumstances, the court referred to these crimes committed after the murder of Anson as evidence that appellant would likely commit other crimes and that he lacked remorse for the killing.
Ind. Code § 35-37-3-3 provides:
Assuming for the sake of argument that the use-immunity agreement was violated, any error would be harmless due to the court's finding of other aggravating circumstances supporting the enhanced sentence. We find no reversible error.
Appellant contends the imposition of a sixty (60) year sentence is manifestly unreasonable.
He argues the sentencing order was inconsistent. The court sentenced appellant as follows:
We note that appellant has failed to cite any authority to support his argument. Thus this issue is waived. See Ind.Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7). However, notwithstanding the waiver, appellant pled guilty but mentally ill. Ind. Code § 35-36-2-5 provides:
We find the trial court was not inconsistent. The trial court's recommendation regarding evaluation and treatment followed the procedure as provided in the statute.
Appellant argues the sentencing order failed to identify significant mitigating and aggravating factors and failed to articulate a balancing process.
As this Court stated in Henderson v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 68, 71-2 the sentencing statement must contain the following:
Aside from the immunity question dealt with above, the court found numerous aggravating circumstances including:
In addition, the court stated that it received letters from appellant's family, friends, and teachers indicating his good character and accomplishments. However, the court found the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating factors and enhanced the sentence. In addition, the record shows the court went to great lengths in determining appellant's sentence. In fact, the court noted having "agonized for hours" in determining the sentence. The court took into consideration the presentence report and the arguments of counsel and witnesses. We find no error in the court's findings.
Appellant contends the trial court ignored evidence of his remorse. However, a review of the record shows this not to be the case. Instead, the court found appellant not truly remorseful based upon his acts following the murder. In fact, the court noted that appellant mentioned going to the hospital to tamper with the victim's medical equipment. We find no error.
Appellant argues the trial court failed to recognize as a mitigating circumstance his mental illness. In the instant case, the court considered the presentence report, which contained reports of doctors who evaluated appellant. The reports indicated that appellant did not suffer from any neurotic disorder or any emotional disturbance. We cannot say the court failed to consider the evidence as a mitigating factor. We find no error.
Appellant contends this Court should determine an appropriate sentence. *894 In Duvall v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 34, 36, this Court stated:
In addition, the finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory but rests within the trial court's discretion. Graham v. State (1989), Ind., 535 N.E.2d 1152. This Court will not alter a sentence which is authorized by statute unless the sentence is manifestly unreasonable. Valle v. State (1989), Ind., 542 N.E.2d 1339.
Given the facts of this case, we cannot say a reasonable person could not find the sentence appropriate. We find the sentence to be reasonable.
Appellant contends the trial judge failed to disclose to him that the victim had consulted with him once.
In his motion to correct error, appellant contends that newly-discovered evidence revealed that the trial judge had been consulted by the victim while the trial judge was in private practice. Appellant requested the court to set aside all previous rulings. In denying appellant's request, the trial judge stated:
To support his position, appellant cites Ind.Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1) which provides that a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In the instant case, appellant has failed to show in any way that the trial judge was biased or prejudiced against him. It is obvious that the trial judge clearly explained his relationship with the decedent. His impartiality can not reasonably be questioned in this case. We find no error.
The trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate opinion.
DeBRULER, Justice, dissenting.
At the time appellant went on this destructive rampage and killed, he was seventeen years old, had no history of criminal conduct, had been an able and willing worker, good student, 4-H club member and church member, and was suffering from a delusional paranoid disorder. These are significant mitigating factors which are clearly supported by the record. In any felony sentencing process, a personal history of this character has a commanding mitigating value, as it indicates a willingness to cooperate with others and some belief in the ethical value of aiding others.
The record of the sentencing hearing reveals that the trial judge had given great consideration to Wall's sentence. He "agonized for hours" over the decision, a matter which he had "considered every side." He specifically stated that he had considered the written presentence report, the arguments of counsel, witnesses and exhibits. After having done these things, and in specifically stating his reasoning as is required by law, Henderson v. State (1986), Ind., *895 489 N.E.2d 68, the court ultimately concluded:
This summary rejection of the body of evidence of mitigating circumstances is error. It is tantamount to overlooking mitigating circumstances supported by the record. Tunstill v. State (1991), Ind., 568 N.E.2d 539. However, the result of the error in this instance is a manifestly unreasonable sentence. I would remand and order the imposition of the standard forty-year sentence.