Title: People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89300
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2001

Docket No. 89300Agenda 14September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. MICHAEL J.
WALLER, State's Attorney of Lake County, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND J. McKOSKI,
Circuit Judge of the 19th Judicial Circuit, et al., Respondents.
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
Michael J. Waller, State's Attorney of Lake County, brings
this original action for mandamus (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a)) to
compel the circuit court, pursuant to section 584(b) of the Unified Code
of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998)), to impose consecutive,
rather than concurrent, sentences upon defendant, Roberto Flores. For the
reasons that follow, the writ of mandamus is granted.
 
BACKGROUND
On August 17, 1999, defendant was convicted by a jury of
three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. 720 ILCS 5/1214.1
(West 1998). These convictions related to three separate incidents, involving
three different minors, which occurred in Lake County between December 1, 1997,
and August 1, 1998. Defendant's sentencing hearing was held on October 22,
1999. During this hearing, the prosecutor argued that "pursuant to
statute," specifically, section 584(a) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/584(a) (West 1998)), the sentences imposed upon
defendant with respect to each count must be imposed consecutively. The relevant
portion of subsection (a) of section 584 provides:
"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences
    for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct
    during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal
    objective, unless *** the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section
    *** 1214.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall
    enter sentences to run consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/584(a) (West
    1998).
Subsequent to the prosecutor's request for the imposition
of consecutive sentences, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor
and the court:
"THE COURT: What do you mean pursuant to statute?
    This isn't the single transaction on three different victims?
[Prosecutor]: It is in the same course of conduct.
THE COURT: Three different victims, three different days
    isn't the same course of conduct. He can't interpret the same course of
    conduct as being an overall reason to sexually assault children any more
    than rob a gas station.
* * *
Maybe the law has changed, but I looked this up a few
    years ago. You can't tell from the statute. Your interpretation would be
    plausible by the words of the statutes themselves."
In the alternative, the prosecutor argued before the circuit
court that, even if the offenses forming the basis of defendant's convictions
were found to have not been committed in the "same course of conduct"
within the meaning of subsection (a) of section 584, the imposition of
consecutive sentences was nevertheless required pursuant to subsection (b) of
section 584. The relevant portion of subsection (b) provides:
"The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence
    except as provided for in subsection (a) unless *** multiple sentences of
    imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for offenses that were not committed
    as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial
    change in the nature of the criminal objective, and one of the offenses for
    which the defendant was convicted was *** a violation of Section *** 1214.1
    of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the Court shall enter sentences
    to run consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998).
The prosecutor contended that, under the facts presented in
this case, subsection (b) mandated that the circuit court impose consecutive
sentences upon defendant. First, the prosecutor noted, defendant had been
convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under
section 1214.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1214.1 (West
1998)), a triggering offense mandating the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Second, the prosecutor argued that the nature of defendant's criminal
objective, specifically, his sexual gratification, had not substantially changed
during the course of committing the offenses. After a brief recess, the circuit
court rejected the State's argument that either subsection (a) or (b) of
section 584 mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences. The circuit
court stated:
"The problem is not only the time span, but the
    single course, the nature of the criminal objective. In my opinion, we have
    three victims, the nature of the criminal objective changes. We can't
    classify this as the criminal objective being sexually assaulting children.
    That is my opinion on the cases."
The circuit court sentenced defendant to a 25-year term of
imprisonment on each of the three counts, and ordered that the sentences be
served concurrently.
Thereafter, the State filed with the circuit court a
"motion to conform the sentences to section 584," arguing in the
alternative that either subsection (a) or (b) applied, and concluding that
either section mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences. No response was
filed to the State's motion. The circuit court denied the motion. We allowed
the State's motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus.
155 Ill. 2d R. 381. No response has been filed in this court to the State's
petition.
 
ANALYSIS
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to enforce,
as a matter of right, a public officer's performance of his or her public
duties where no exercise of discretion on the officer's part is involved. Lewis
E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999); Madden v. Cronson,
114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). A writ of mandamus "provides
affirmative rather than prohibitory relief [citation] and can be used to compel
the undoing of an act." Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997). A writ of mandamus will be
granted only if a plaintiff can establish a clear, affirmative right to relief,
a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear authority in the public
officer to comply with the writ. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d  at 229; Noyola,
179 Ill. 2d  at 133. Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. Kellerman
v. Crowe, 119 Ill. 2d 111, 118 (1987).
Before this court, the State has abandoned as its primary
argument the contention advanced in the circuit court that subsection (a) of
section 584 mandates that consecutive sentences be imposed upon defendant.
Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal, we accept the finding of the circuit
court that defendant did not commit the offenses as part of a "single
course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of
the criminal objective," within the meaning of subsection (a). The State
presently focuses its argument on subsection (b) of section 584, and
maintains that defendant is subject to mandatory consecutive sentences under
this provision. We agree.
Subsection (b) of section 584 was amended by Public Act
90128, effective July 22, 1997. Prior to the 1997 amendment, subsection (b)
left within the circuit court's discretion the question of whether to impose
consecutive sentences upon a defendant convicted of committing multiple offenses
in separate courses of conduct. The provision allowed the court to impose
consecutive sentences if, based upon the "nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and character of the defendant," the court was
"of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant." 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West
1996).
This court, in People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188 (1993),
observed that the interplay between subsection (a) of section 584 and the
preamended version of subsection (b) created "something of an anomaly, [in
that it mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences for offenses committed
in a single course of conduct, while] leaving the question of consecutive
sentences within the discretion of the trial judge in what must be deemed the
more serious situation of multiple offenses committed in separate courses of
conduct." Bole, 155 Ill. 2d  at 198. We opined that although this
result "might simply have been an oversight by the legislature," it
was "not one that we are able to correct under the guise of statutory
interpretation." Bole, 155 Ill. 2d  at 198-99.
In response to Bole, the Illinois General Assembly
passed the 1997 amendment to subsection (b), which mandated that the circuit
court "shall enter sentences to run consecutively" when two factors
are present. First, "multiple sentences of imprisonment" must be
"imposed on a defendant for offenses that were not committed as part of a
single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the
nature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998).
Second, a defendant must be convicted of one of several triggering offenses
enumerated in subsection (b). 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998). A review of
the 1997 amendment to subsection (b) of section 584 establishes that these
changes "eliminat[ed] the trial court's discretion to impose concurrent
sentences when the enumerated offenses are committed in separate courses of
conduct." People v. Conley, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 n.1 (1999).
The offenses in this case were committed by defendant between
December 1997 and August 1998, after the July 1, 1997, effective date of the
amendment to subsection (b). Therefore, the amended version of this statutory
subsection governs the matter at bar. Applying the provisions of subsection (b)
to the instant cause, we find that the two factors requiring imposition of
mandatory consecutive sentences on defendant were present here. First, multiple
sentences of imprisonment were imposed upon defendant for "offenses that
were not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was
no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS
5/584(b) (West 1998). Second, defendant was found guilty of three counts
of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under section 1214.1 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1214.1 (West 1998)), one of the enumerated
offenses which trigger the application of mandatory consecutive sentences under
subsection (b).
As stated, a writ of mandamus will not be granted
unless a plaintiff can show a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty
on the part of the public officer to act, and clear authority in the public
officer to comply with the writ. We find that the necessary factors for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus are present in this case.
Section 584(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections
imposes specific requirements upon the circuit court with respect to the
imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences, and the circuit court is
responsible under the statute for enforcement of these sentencing requirements
and imposing the appropriate sentence. The record reveals that, in the matter at
bar, the circuit court did not apply the law as specified in section 584(b).
Once the circuit court determined that defendant was not subject to mandatory
consecutive sentences pursuant to subsection (a) of section 584 because
defendant had not committed the offenses "as part of a single course of
conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the
criminal objective," the circuit court's exercise of discretion was
completed. Subsection (b) of section 584 unequivocally mandates imposition
of consecutive sentences when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on
a defendant for the enumerated offenses when the offenses are committed in
separate courses of conduct. See Conley, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 11 n.1.
Because the circuit court had previously determined that defendant had not
committed the offenses as part of a single course of conduct during which there
was no substantial change in the nature of his criminal objective, and had
imposed multiple sentences of imprisonment for an enumerated triggering offense,
the circuit judge had no further discretion to exercise when sentencing
defendant. It is well established that a sentencing judge "cannot impose a
penalty not otherwise allowed by the sentencing statute in question." People
v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 506 n.1 (1999); People ex rel. Daley v.
Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1988). Because the concurrent sentences
imposed upon defendant by the circuit court were not authorized by section 584(b),
those sentences are void. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113
(1995). Under the circumstances presented, the issuance of a writ of mandamus
is appropriate to compel the circuit court to comply with mandatory legal
standards. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d  at 336 (writ of mandamus
appropriate in a homicide case to compel the trial court to comply with
mandatory sentencing guidelines imposed by statute); see also Baltimore &amp;
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321, 334 (1977) (writ of mandamus
issued to correct clear errors in the circuit court's application of mandatory
venue requirements); People ex rel. Chesapeake &amp; Ohio Ry. Co. v. Donovan,
30 Ill. 2d 178, 180-81 (1964) (writ of mandamus issued directing circuit
court to vacate order denying dismissal motion and "to rule upon that
motion in the light of the applicable legal standards").
 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
is vacated. The writ of mandamus is issued. The matter is remanded to the
circuit court, which is directed to resentence defendant in conformity with
section 584(b) of the Uniform Code of Corrections, which requires that the
sentences imposed upon defendant for each conviction for predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child be served consecutively. It remains within the
discretion of the circuit court to determine, within the permissible statutory
sentencing range (see 720 ILCS 5/1214.1 (West 1998); 730 ILCS 5/581(a)(3)
(West 1998)), the length of each sentence to be imposed.
 
Judgment vacated;
writ issued;
cause remanded with directions.
 
JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that this cause should be remanded for a new
sentencing hearing. I do not agree that the remedy of mandamus is proper
in this cause.
We should refrain from granting mandamus relief for
two reasons. First, the remedy of mandamus does not lie to question the
discretionary fact-finding authority of a trial judge. Second, the remedy of mandamus
is only available when the right to relief is clear as a matter of law. The
sentencing statute at issue is open to multiple interpretations and the State is
not clearly entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, based upon the
following brief analysis, I do not concur with the majority's remedy of mandamus
and I recommend that we remand this matter through the exercise of our
supervisory authority.
Initially, the general sentencing statute at issue in section
584 gives a trial judge discretion to impose "as determined by the
court" either concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses.
730 ILCS 5/584(a) (West 1998). The balance of the statute then limits the
exercise of discretion in certain circumstances. In subparagraph (a), the
discretion to impose consecutive sentences is removed when multiple offenses are
committed as part of a single course of conduct and there is no substantial
change in the nature of the criminal objective. The second part of subsection
(a) removes that consecutive sentencing limitation and then requires consecutive
sentences when, in a single course of conduct and with no substantial change in
the criminal objective, the defendant commits a Class X or Class 1 felony
involving severe bodily injury or the defendant commits certain enumerated sex
offenses in sections 1213, 1214, or 1214.1 of the Criminal Code of
1961, as amended. 730 ILCS 5/584(a) (West 1998).
In subsection (a) the key factors are whether the offenses
are part of a single course of conduct with no substantial change in the
criminal objective and whether the sentencing is for the commission of certain
crimes. Here, the majority notes that the trial judge found that the offenses
were not part of a single course of conduct and that subsection (a) is not
applicable in this case. Slip op. at 4. The majority also acknowledges that the
State's argument is focused on the subsection (b) sentencing provisions. Slip
op. at 4. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is limited to the subsection (b)
sentencing provisions and whether the trial court found "no substantial
change in the nature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS 5/584(b)
(West 1998).
In subsection (b) the trial judge's discretion is limited
and consecutive sentences can only be imposed if the trial court makes certain
factual findings. 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998). Under the first part of
subsection (b), a trial court may make the requisite factual findings "to
protect the public from further criminal conduct" as one justification for
the imposition of a consecutive sentence. 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998).
The record in this proceeding is abundantly clear that the trial judge made no
public safety findings under that first part of subsection (b).
Alternatively, consecutive sentences are authorized when a
trial judge makes the requisite factual findings that the offenses were not part
of a single course of conduct and that "there was no substantial change in
the nature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS 5/584(b) (West 1998).
Again, the trial judge did not make those requisite factual findings to trigger
consecutive sentences. In fact, the trial judge unequivocally stated that
" the nature of the criminal objective changes.' "
(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 3. Accordingly, if the nature of the criminal
objective changes, then subsection (b) does not mandate the imposition of
consecutive sentences.
The trial judge also found as a matter of fact that the
offenses were not part of a single course of conduct. That factual finding is
conceded by the majority. Slip op. at 4. The trial judge further found a change
in the criminal objective involving three separate offenses. The trial judge
made no public safety findings under subparagraph (a). Therefore, none of the
limitations in either paragraph (a) or (b) applied to the sentence and the trial
judge relied upon the general statutory grant of discretionary authority and
imposed concurrent sentences.
Despite the trial judge's findings in the record, the
majority opinion seems to overlook the trial court's clear, discretionary
factual finding that there had indeed been a change in the criminal objective.
Unfortunately, the majority's result is premised upon the unsupported
conclusion that there was no substantial change in the criminal objective when
the trial judge articulated a contrary finding. The majority's approach
amounts to a virtual de novo reversal of the trial judge's
discretionary fact-finding decision. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). Since the trial judge exercised his discretionary authority
and in effect made a finding of fact regarding the nature of the criminal
objective, the trial judge's ruling is not subject to challenge by the remedy
of mandamus. Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986).
Therefore, even though the majority disagrees with the trial court's exercise
of discretion in finding that the criminal objective changed in this case, we
simply have no legal authority to allow the challenge of that discretion through
a mandamus action.
The record also strongly suggests that the trial judge
struggled with the uncertainty of the statute. At best, the operative language
of the sentencing statute is muddy. The trial judge may have justifiably
interpreted the statute in one of at least three different ways. The specific
statutory sentencing provisions refer to offenses committed or not
committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there
was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. 730
ILCS 5/584(a), (b) (West 1998).
In People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 193 (1993), we
questioned whether the phrase "no substantial change" might possibly
(1) define, (2) describe, or (3) limit the "single course of conduct"
phrase in a similar sentencing provision. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d  at 193.
Hence, this court previously pondered but never determined the meaning of the
operative sentencing phrase now at issue in this case. Since Bole, this
court has not resolved the questions posed in that case.
Furthermore, mandamus relief is only appropriate when
the application involves a clear right to relief. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo,
186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). In light of Bole, it seems premature to
ascribe a level of certainty to the statute when the interpretation of the
statute remains not so certain. The Bole questions prevent us from
holding that the State is clearly entitled to the statutory right of a mandatory
consecutive sentence. Additionally, the questions raised in Bole were
neither briefed nor argued in this case and we are now hindered in attempting to
resolve those questions at this time. Thus, the State cannot satisfy the burden
of entitlement to a clear, legal right to relief.
On a final point, the trial judge may have innocently
confused the change of the criminal objective standard with the change of
victims. For example, the trial judge stated: " The problem is not
only the time span, but the single course, the nature of the criminal objective.
In my opinion, we have three victims, the nature of the criminal objective
changes.' " (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 3. Without a doubt,
the trial judge attempted to address the necessary sentencing standards
involving the single course of conduct and criminal objective standards. On the
other hand it is unclear whether the trial judge properly interpreted the
criminal objective standard in the sentencing statute.
The trial judge's above-referenced statement suggests that
he may have equated the statutory reference to "victim" with the
statutory phrase "criminal objective." The trial judge may have
concluded that the criminal objective changed because the defendant sexually
offended three different victims. The mere involvement of one or more victims
does not, however, exclusively describe or define a change or lack of change in
the criminal objective.
For instance, an individual may commit the offense of a
robbery at three different stores. The robberies may not occur within a single
course of conduct, thus bringing the offenses arguably within subsection (b) of
the sentencing statute. The criminal objective is to obtain money from each of
the three stores. Thus, the criminal objective does not change merely because
the robberies were committed at three different stores. The criminal objective
remains the same, namely, the illegal taking of property.
In the present case, it appears that the criminal objective
probably remained constant, namely, the defendant's sexual gratification
involving three separate victims. The victim is the conduit for the defendant's
pursuit of a common criminal objective of sexual gratification. The victim is
not the criminal objective. The defendant's attacks upon three different
victims do not change the common criminal objective of sexual gratification. It
seems that the trial judge's ruling is based in part upon a misapprehension of
the criminal objective standard. Despite any apparent misapprehension, the
determination of any change in the criminal objective rests within the trial
court's sole discretionary, fact-finding authority.
Therefore, acknowledging our unresolved questions in Bole
and the trial judge's apparent misapprehension of the criminal objective
standard, we should not subject the trial judge in this case to an order of mandamus.
Instead this court should exercise its supervisory authority and provide
guidance to the trial court in interpreting and applying a confusing sentencing
statute. We should also note that this case does not involve a judge who
blatantly disregarded the clear mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute. At
worst this case involves a judge who might have slightly missed the mark in
attempting to untangle a confusing statute.
In conclusion, I readily agree with the majority that upon remand the trial
court may exercise discretion to determine the appropriate sentence within the
permissible statutory sentencing range. In short, the remand should be cloaked
in a supervisory order and not in mandamus. Therefore, I specially concur
in the remand and I respectfully dissent from granting the remedy of mandamus.