Title: Foster v. State
Citation: 286 So. 2d 549
Docket Number: 43931
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1973

286 So. 2d 549 (1973)
Willie Clyde FOSTER, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 43931.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 5, 1973.
Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 276 So. 2d 512. Our jurisdiction is based on conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and Yost v. State[1] and Cone and Sanders v. State.[2]
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner, defendant below, was charged, by information, with breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, and with possession of burglary tools. Following a hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence, the trial court granted the motion as it related to certain wire cutters, but denied it as to a certain screwdriver. At the conclusion of the trial, the *550 jury returned a verdict, finding petitioner guilty of both counts as charged, and subsequently, petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on the first count, and five years imprisonment on the second count, the sentences to run concurrently.
In its opinion, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held as follows:
The First District then proceeded to "distinguish" these two prior cases from the instant case. It would appear, however, that distinctions made by the court are highly questionable, at best. The First District noted:
What the court has done in this case, however, is to look at the Yost case and the Cone and Sanders case in one perspective, and to look at the instant case in an entirely different perspective.
Reversing the perspective of the three cases, and looking first at Yost, it certainly can be said that one can be convicted of possession of marijuana without being convicted of the sale of marijuana. Applying the same reverse perspective to Cone and Sanders, it certainly can be said that one can be convicted of displaying or using a firearm during the commission of a felony without being convicted of armed robbery. Finally, reversing our perspective, and looking at the instant case [and noting the facts of the instant case, i.e., that the "burglary tool" which petitioner was convicted of possessing was, in fact, a simple screwdriver], it can hardly be said that the petitioner could have been convicted of possession of burglary tools, in this case only a screwdriver, had he not been participating in a breaking and entering. Dissenting Judge Johnson in the instant case made just such an observation:
Thus, just as in the Yost case and in the Cone and Sanders case, we are faced with two facets of the same transaction. For, while it is true that one can be convicted of breaking and entering without being convicted of possession of burglary tools, one cannot be convicted of possession of burglary tools, when those tools are nothing more than a simple screwdriver, without the use of such a tool in a burglary, breaking and entering, et cetera. To rule otherwise, would be to hold that the state has the police power to criminalize possession of a simple household tool, i.e., a screwdriver. It does not. It would be an unconstitutional act  in excess of the State's police power  to criminalize the simple possession of a screwdriver, just as much as it would be to criminalize the possession of such items as ladies' hat pins, automobile tire iron kits, et cetera, without first requiring that they first be used as burglary tools. An examination of the burglary tools statute[6] reveals the potential for any number of common household tools to be "illegal" unless the statute is construed, in an appropriate case, such as this, to require that for such a tool to be "illegal", it must be used as a burglary tool  thus becoming a facet of the burglary, breaking and entering transaction, etc.
We hold, therefore, that in light of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the trial court erred imposing sentence of fifteen years on petitioner's conviction of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, and imposing an additional concurrent sentence of five years on petitioner's conviction of possession of burglary tools. In a case such as this, only one sentence may be imposed, and that sentence, *552 obviously, cannot exceed that which could be imposed solely upon conviction for the highest offense contained within the transaction. We therefore must reverse the First District on this point.
Petitioner has raised an additional point, to-wit: that the evidence presented by the state as to both counts of the information was insufficient, either to go before a jury, or to support a verdict of guilt. The First District found this contention to be "without merit". Briefly, we agree, and affirm the First District on this point.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents.
[1]  243 So. 2d 469 (Fla.App.3d 1971).
[2]  285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973).
[3]  276 So. 2d  at 512.
[4]  Id.
[5]  Id. at 513.
[6]  810.06, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: "Whoever makes or mends, or begins to make or mend, or knowingly has in his possession any engine, machine, tool or implement adapted and designed for cutting through, forcing or breaking open any building, vault, safe or other depository, in order to steal therefrom money or other property, or to commit any other crime, knowing the same to be adapted and designed for the purpose aforesaid, with intent to use or employ or allow the same to be used or employed for such purpose, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten years, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars." (Emphasis supplied).
For an examination of how that which is normally thought to be "legal" can suddenly become "illegal" when measured against an overbroad or improperly construed state statute, and for an examination of the constitutional problems which result therefrom, see, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S. Ct. 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1960).