Title: State v. Hyde
Citation: 352 N.C. 37
Docket Number: 529A98
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 529A98
FILED 16 JUNE 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOHNNY WAYNE HYDE
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Wainwright,
J., on 23 July 1998 in Superior Court, Onslow County, upon a jury
verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  On
21 April 1999, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s motion to
bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of additional
judgments.  Heard in the Supreme Court 14 March 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William N.
Farrell, Jr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Elizabeth G. McCrodden for defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Defendant Johnny Wayne Hyde was indicted for one count
each of first-degree murder; first-degree burglary; robbery with
a dangerous weapon; and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder,
first-degree burglary, and robbery with a dangerous weapon.  He
was tried for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, robbery
with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit first-degree
burglary at the 6 July 1998 Criminal Session of Superior Court,
Onslow County.  Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder
on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the
-2-
felony-murder rule, first-degree burglary, and conspiracy to
commit first-degree burglary; he was found not guilty of robbery
with a dangerous weapon.  Upon the jury’s recommendation
following a capital sentencing proceeding, the trial court, on
23 July 1998, sentenced defendant to death for the murder; the
trial court also sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 77
to 102 months’ imprisonment for first-degree burglary and 29 to
44 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree
burglary.
Based on defendant’s statement to Onslow County
Sheriff’s Detective W. Len Condry and Onslow County Sheriff Ed
Brown, the State’s evidence tended to show that on the night of
1 August 1996, defendant was drinking with James Blake and Joel
Coleman at a shed next to defendant’s house.  Defendant heard
Blake and Coleman discussing where they could obtain other drugs
since the blue pills that they were ingesting were not
intoxicating enough.  Blake and Coleman mentioned that Leslie
Egbert Howard, the victim, always had drugs in his residence. 
Defendant then listened as Blake and Coleman planned the break-in
of the victim’s mobile home; the victim was considered an easy
target since he was always alone.  Sometime after midnight, Blake
and Coleman asked defendant for his assistance in breaking into
the victim’s residence to steal “weed.”  Defendant agreed, and
they gathered several items from defendant’s shed.  Blake and
Coleman dressed in camouflage-style coats, gloves, and toboggans. 
Defendant carried a knife and a hand saw, while Blake carried an
ax head and a pipe.
-3-
Defendant, Blake, and Coleman then walked to the
victim’s mobile home.  Blake used the ax head and pipe to pry
open the front door.  Defendant led the way down the hallway to
the victim’s bedroom and found the victim sitting up in the bed. 
The victim then lunged at defendant, and defendant stabbed the
victim several times with the knife.  When the victim fell to his
knees, either Blake or Coleman hit the victim in the back of the
head with the pipe.  The victim then fell to the floor on his
back.  Defendant stabbed the victim in the side and in the back
with a drill bit from the shed.  Defendant then began cutting the
victim’s throat with the hand saw until the sight of blood and
the foul smell became nauseating.  Sheriff Brown asked defendant
about his intention when he used the saw.  Defendant replied, “I
guess to kill him.  I guess we thought he would tell the next day
if we didn’t after all we did.”  Defendant further stated, “I
went over there that night just to be the muscle to help them get
the herb.  I had no intention of killing [the victim] when we
went over there.”  Coleman resumed cutting the victim’s throat
for about three minutes while Blake was in the living room
keeping a lookout.  Someone then yelled that a car was
approaching, and then all three men ran from the victim’s mobile
home back to defendant’s shed.  Blake set fire to all the weapons
in a barrel to “burn off the blood” and then placed them in a
trash receptacle to be picked up the next day.
When defendant returned to his residence, his sister
saw that defendant was covered in blood and asked him what had
happened.  Defendant told his sister that he thought that he and
-4-
the others “had just killed [the victim].”  Defendant’s sister
assisted defendant in washing his bloody clothing.  All the
clothing came clean except for a small spot of blood on the
T-shirt he had worn.
On 2 August 1996 the victim’s father discovered the
victim’s body.  Shortly thereafter members of the Onslow County
Sheriff’s Department and the Onslow County Emergency Medical
Services arrived.  An emergency medical technician determined
that the victim was deceased.  The cause of death was a
combination of multiple stab wounds to the chest and abdomen,
blunt trauma to the head, and massive lacerations to the neck. 
None of the weapons used to kill the victim were recovered at the
murder scene.
Additional facts will be presented as needed to discuss
specific issues.
On appeal to this Court, defendant brings forward
sixteen assignments of error.  For the reasons stated herein, we
conclude that defendant’s trial and capital sentencing proceeding
were free of error and that the death sentence is not
disproportionate.
PRETRIAL ISSUES
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
sequestration and segregation of the State’s witnesses during
motion hearings.  In his motion defendant alleged “[t]hat a
collective gathering of the State’s witnesses during the motion
hearings may well lead to a loss of individual recollection and
-5-
the substitution of a ‘mass consensus’ recollection when the
witnesses are actually called upon to testify.”  Defendant argues
that the trial court’s ruling allowing witnesses to hear the
testimony of one another on the same subject matter undermined
his ability to effectively cross-examine those witnesses in
violation of both the North Carolina and the United States
Constitutions.  We disagree.
“A ruling on a motion to sequester witnesses rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court’s
denial of the motion will not be disturbed in the absence of a
showing that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision.”  State v. Call, 349 N.C.
382, 400, 508 S.E.2d 496, 507-08 (1998).  In this case, defendant
has failed to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
ruling.  Moreover, although defendant claims that the denial of
his motion to sequester violated several of his federal and state
constitutional rights, he made no constitutional claims at trial. 
“Constitutional questions not raised and ruled upon at trial
shall not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”  Id., 508 S.E.2d
at 508.  Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and
to exclude from evidence defendant’s inculpatory statements made
to Onslow County Sheriff Ed Brown, Onslow County Sheriff’s
Detective Len Condry, and Onslow County Sheriff’s Detective
Captain Keith Bryan on 1 November 1996.  Defendant contends that
the statements were involuntary since they were improperly
-6-
obtained as a direct result of promises and threats made by the
law enforcement officers.  We disagree.
At the voir dire on defendant’s motion, at which
defendant testified, the trial court made certain findings of
fact, which we summarize:  On 1 November 1996 at 3:30 p.m. in an
interview room of the Onslow County Sheriff’s Department,
Detective Condry advised defendant of his rights.  Defendant
waived his rights orally and in writing.  Defendant remained in
the locked interview room for approximately one hour while
Detective Condry was interviewing another suspect.  Defendant
knocked on the door in order to go to the rest room, and Captain
Bryan escorted defendant to the rest room and gave defendant
access to a water fountain.  While waiting back at the interview
room, Captain Bryan told defendant that “if the defendant was
asked any questions, it would be best if the defendant told the
truth because the truth would come out anyway and it would take a
load off of him.”  Captain Bryan never made any promises or
threatened defendant.
Detective Condry moved defendant from the interview
room down the hallway to the conference room.  Before starting
the examination, Detective Condry readvised defendant of his
rights; and defendant agreed to talk with the officers. 
Defendant appeared coherent and did not appear to be impaired
from alcohol or drugs.  After initially denying any involvement
in the murder, defendant admitted his participation in the
murder.  During the questioning, neither Detective Condry nor
Sheriff Brown made any promises, threats, or suggestions of
-7-
violence to defendant in order to induce him to make a statement. 
Defendant stated that a shirt he had worn when he committed the
murder was located at his residence, and he gave the police
permission to retrieve the shirt.  Defendant also made a drawing
of two of the murder weapons.  The interview ended at
approximately 6:30 p.m.  Around 7:00 p.m. defendant rode with
Detective Condry and Detective Frank Terwiliger to his residence
to retrieve his shirt and was allowed to visit his mother, who
lived at the residence.  After leaving defendant’s residence, the
officers purchased food for defendant.  The officers made no
promises, threats, or suggestions of violence to defendant in
order to persuade defendant to obtain the shirt.  On 3 November
1996 during the booking of defendant, defendant “spontaneously
and voluntarily told Detective Condry that he not only deserved
the death penalty, but that he also wanted the death penalty.”
Based upon its findings of fact, the trial court
concluded that defendant’s statements had been made after
“defendant, on two occasions, freely, knowingly, intelligently,
understandingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda Rights.”  The
trial court further concluded that none of defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated.
In State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 208-09, 394 S.E.2d
158, 166 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1062
(1991), this Court stated the following:
North Carolina law is well established
regarding this Court’s role in reviewing a
trial court’s determination of the
voluntariness of a confession.
-8-
Findings of fact made by a trial judge
following a voir dire hearing on the
voluntariness of a confession are
conclusive upon this Court if the
findings are supported by competent
evidence in the record.  No reviewing
court may properly set aside or modify
those findings if so supported.  This is
true even though the evidence is
conflicting.
State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 569, 304
S.E.2d 134, 145 (1983) (citations omitted).
We conclude that the trial court’s findings were amply supported
by competent evidence in the record.
Our next task is to determine whether the trial court’s
conclusion of law is supported by the findings.  The trial
court’s conclusion of law that defendant’s statements were
voluntarily made is a fully reviewable legal question.  See State
v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994).  “[T]he
court looks at the totality of the circumstances of the case in
determining whether the confession was voluntary.”  Jackson, 308
N.C. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 152.  Factors the court considers are
whether defendant was in custody, whether he
was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were
honored, whether he was held incommunicado,
the length of the interrogation, whether
there were physical threats or shows of
violence, whether promises were made to
obtain the confession, the familiarity of the
declarant with the criminal justice system,
and the mental condition of the declarant.
Hardy, 339 N.C. at 222, 304 S.E.2d at 608.
Applying these principles, we find no error in the
trial court’s conclusion.  Defendant testified at the voir dire
that he was read his Miranda warnings, that he understood his
rights, that he did not want a lawyer, and that he signed the
-9-
waiver.   Defendant was coherent and not under the influence of
any intoxicating substance during the interview.  Defendant was
familiar with the criminal justice system, having been previously
arrested and convicted for assault on a female, possession of
stolen property, and simple assault.  The length of the interview
was approximately two hours, and the record is devoid of any
evidence that the atmosphere was inherently coercive or
intimidating.  Defendant’s argument that Captain Bryan’s
statement to him “that it would take a load off of his shoulders
if he would be honest because the truth would come out”
constitutes an implicit promise that confessing would benefit him
is not persuasive.  See State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 52, 311
S.E.2d 540, 547 (1984) (admitting defendant’s statement after
officer told him that “things would be a lot easier on him if he
went ahead and told the truth”).  Given the totality of
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
concluding that defendant’s statements were voluntarily made. 
This assignment of error is overruled.
JURY SELECTION ISSUES
In another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by not requiring that prospective jurors
swear to tell the truth during jury voir dire.  We disagree.  The
record discloses that the jurors were properly sworn pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 9-14.  While defendant concedes that an oath of
truthfulness is not statutorily mandated, he nonetheless argues
that the trial court’s failure to require the jurors to tell the
truth during voir dire tainted the jury selection process. 
-10-
However, defendant did not request that jurors so swear, nor did
he object to any lack of oath during voir dire.  Therefore, this
assignment of error is not properly preserved for appellate
review and is overruled.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); State v.
Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 122, 512 S.E.2d 720, 731, cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999).  See also State v.
McNeil, 349 N.C. 634, 643-44, 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998).
Next, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s
denial of his motion for individual voir dire and sequestration
of the jurors during voir dire.
“In capital cases the trial judge for good cause shown
may direct that jurors be selected one at a time, in which case
each juror must first be passed by the State.  These jurors may
be sequestered before and after selection.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1214(j) (1999).  “Whether to grant sequestration and
individual voir dire of prospective jurors rests within the trial
court’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion.”  Fleming, 350 N.C. at 120,
512 S.E.2d at 729.  A trial court will not be reversed for an
abuse of discretion absent “a showing that its ruling was so
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.”  State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 679, 343 S.E.2d 828,
839 (1986).
Defendant’s first argument in support of an abuse of
the trial court’s discretion in refusing to permit individual
voir dire is that the trial court did not understand or follow
-11-
the statutory process providing for collective voir dire. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214 provides, in pertinent part:
(d)  The prosecutor must conduct his
examination of the first 12 jurors seated and
make his challenges for cause and exercise
his peremptory challenges.  If the judge
allows a challenge for cause, or if a
peremptory challenge is exercised, the clerk
must immediately call a replacement into the
box.  When the prosecutor is satisfied with
the 12 in the box, they must then be tendered
to the defendant.  Until the prosecutor
indicates his satisfaction, he may make a
challenge for cause or exercise a peremptory
challenge to strike any juror, whether an
original or replacement juror.
(e)  Each defendant must then conduct
his examination of the jurors tendered him,
making his challenges for cause and his
peremptory challenges.  If a juror is
excused, no replacement may be called until
all defendants have indicated satisfaction
with those remaining, at which time the clerk
must call replacements for the jurors
excused.  The judge in his discretion must
determine order of examination among multiple
defendants.
(f)  Upon the calling of replacement
jurors, the prosecutor must examine the
replacement jurors and indicate satisfaction
with a completed panel of 12 before the
replacement jurors are tendered to a
defendant.  Only replacement jurors may be
examined and challenged.  This procedure is
repeated until all parties have accepted 12
jurors.
Defendant notes two instances where the trial court
called replacement jurors for prospective jurors Donald Shipley,
Marion Jones, Jr., and Antonio Kuhn contrary to the statutory
selection process.  We disagree.  With respect to the first group
of jurors, the record indicates that the State made its
challenges for cause, exercised its peremptory challenges, and
accepted twelve prospective jurors.  Thereafter defendant made
his challenges for cause, exercised his peremptory challenges,
-12-
and accepted five jurors of the initial twelve.  The trial court
then seated seven more prospective jurors.  The State repeated
the process and passed the seven jurors to defendant.  Defendant
examined these seven jurors and successfully challenged for cause
Mr. Shipley.  Prior to defendant’s exercise of peremptory
challenges to the remaining six jurors, the trial court stated,
Let the record reflect the jury has exited
the courtroom.  Tomorrow morning we’ll
proceed with Ms. Geracos [defendant’s
counsel] going ahead and let [sic] us know
what she wants to do about the remaining six
jurors.
When court resumed, defendant renewed challenges for cause for
Jones and Kuhn which had previously been denied.  The trial court
reconsidered and allowed those challenges for cause for these
jurors whom defendant had previously peremptorily excused.  The
following colloquy then transpired between the trial court, the
defense counsel, and the prosecution:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Now we have more
challenges.  The other thing is since you
have challenged Mr. Shipley, do you expect us
to exercise our remaining challenges or
challenge these jurors before the State
examines, puts another juror back in seat
number 1.  They’ve not passed the full twelve
at this point.
THE COURT:  I thought y’all would
probably with this new development talk to
your client and see what we want to do with
the ones that exist right now and state’s
nodding its head in agreement with that.  I
think we ought to deal with these six jurors.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  My position is the
state is, they are to pass us a full box of
12 and right now we’ll only have eleven
because you’ve allowed the challenge for
cause for Mr. Shipley.
[PROSECUTOR]:  That’s correct.
-13-
[PROSECUTOR]:  Here’s how it happened. 
We passed y’all full twelve.  Y’all didn’t
challenge Mr. Shipley for cause until you
started your examination.  I think the
appropriate thing to do is put somebody in
the box and let them exercise their
peremptory.
THE COURT:  In other words, let’s go
ahead and replace Mr. Shipley and let [the
prosecutor] examine that juror number 1 and
then we’ll turn it back to [defense counsel],
is that correct?
[PROSECUTOR]:  That will be fine.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That’s agreeable,
Your Honor.
Defendant notes another instance involving prospective
juror James Graham, whom he had successfully challenged. 
Defendant again argues that the trial court acted contrary to
statute by attempting to seat a juror before defendant passed on
the only other juror he was questioning.  We disagree.  The
following colloquy transpired between the trial court, defense
counsel, and the prosecution in a bench conference:
THE COURT:  It may be six of one, half
dozen of the other.  What ran through my mind
was whether or not you [defense counsel]
wanted to go ahead and complete your
questioning process also with Mr. Beasley and
maybe then make your motion [for cause].  I
don’t really care.  We can do it either way. 
Well, basically not that we have to, but
basically if we were eliminating someone for
cause, then we’re [sic] releasing another
juror, then [the prosecutor] would take back
over.  I’m just thinking about in the
interest of time whether or not anyone has an
opinion about that of [sic] whether to go on
with Mr. Beasley, and again I say that may be
six of one--
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We would need a
ruling, though, on the motion for challenging
him for cause.
-14-
THE COURT:  What I was thinking, did you
get finished?  You could come back to
Mr. Graham and complete your questioning? 
Does anybody--
[PROSECUTOR]:  I think that the Court,
based upon what [defense counsel] just said,
I think the Court probably needs to rule on
the challenge for cause.
THE COURT:  And go ahead and replace?
[PROSECUTOR]:  No, I think they have to
decide if they want the other and question
him and we get the panel back after they’ve
passed on them.  They did not pass on them.
THE COURT:  The consensus is we’ll make
a ruling on Mr. Graham?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  You complete your
questioning on Mr. Beasley and then decide
what you’re going to do with Mr. Beasley and
with Mr. Graham, depending on which way the
decision goes.  Everybody is nodding
affirmatively.  Is everybody in agreement?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir.
We conclude that the record discloses no confusion or
error by the trial court.  Defendant specifically requested or
consented to any deviation from the prescribed statutory
procedure.  Moreover, defendant concedes that the trial court’s
jury selection method did not disadvantage or prejudice him.
Defendant’s second argument in support of an abuse of
the trial court’s discretion in refusing to sequester the jury is
that the method of questioning prospective jurors before other
prospective jurors tainted the jury selection process against
him.  Specifically, defendant notes that one prospective juror
stated that he would give one of defendant’s potential witness’
testimony less credibility since he knew the witness and that
-15-
another prospective juror stated that she knew one of the defense
lawyers and that the defense counsel had “misrepresented” her
former son-in-law in a child abuse case.  Defendant asserts that
the trial court’s abuse of discretion violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a
fair and impartial jury; however, defendant did not assert any
constitutional basis for his motion in the trial court and has,
thus, waived appellate review of this issue on constitutional
grounds.  See Fleming, 350 N.C. at 122, 512 S.E.2d at 730. 
Further, in his brief defendant argues only that the damage to
defendant from these statements made in open court in the
presence of jurors and prospective jurors is obvious.  Taken to
its logical conclusion, defendant’s argument would require
individual voir dire in every capital case to avoid the potential
of a prospective juror saying something unexpected.  We conclude
that defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice in the
manner in which the jury was selected and how the trial court
abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion. 
Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.
In the next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the jury selection procedure prescribed in N.C.G.S. §
15A-1214(d) through (f) is unconstitutional since it allows the
prosecutor a greater number of prospective jurors from which to
choose than it allows defendant.  As in Fleming, defendant did
not raise this constitutional issue at trial; therefore,
defendant has failed to preserve this assignment of error for
appellate review.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); see Fleming, 350
-16-
N.C. at 122, 512 S.E.2d at 730 (holding that defendant waived
appellate review of constitutional issue since issue was not
raised at trial); State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 276, 506 S.E.2d
702, 709-10 (1998) (same), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1135, 143 L.
Ed. 2d 1015 (1999).  This assignment of error is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by excusing, deferring, or disqualifying
several prospective jurors prior to defendant’s case being called
for trial.  Defendant argues that the trial court improperly 
excused these jurors because of stated religious scruples and for
reasons other than compelling personal hardship or because the
service would be contrary to the public welfare, health, or
safety.  See N.C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (1999).  He claims that he was
deprived of the right to reject prospective jurors in violation
of his constitutional rights.  We disagree.
 N.C.G.S. § 9-6(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a)  The General Assembly hereby
declares the public policy of this State to
be that jury service is the solemn obligation
of all qualified citizens, and that excuses
from the discharge of this responsibility
should be granted only for reasons of
compelling personal hardship or because
requiring service would be contrary to the
public welfare, health, or safety.
(b)  Pursuant to the foregoing policy,
each chief district court judge shall
promulgate procedures whereby he . . . ,
prior to the date that a jury session (or
sessions) of superior or district court
convenes, shall receive, hear, and pass on
applications for excuses from jury
duty. . . .
. . . .
(f)  The discretionary authority of a
presiding judge to excuse a juror at the
-17-
beginning of or during a session of court is
not affected by this section.
“Decisions concerning the excusal of prospective jurors are
matters of discretion left to the trial court.”  State v. Neal,
346 N.C. 608, 619, 487 S.E.2d 734, 741 (1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1125, 140 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1998).  Based on a review of the
record, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error in
excusing prospective jurors prior to the calling of defendant’s
case.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court failed to comply
with the statute strictly, defendant is not entitled to a new
trial absent a showing of “corrupt intent, discrimination or
irregularities which affected the actions of the jurors actually
drawn and summoned.”  State v. Murdock, 325 N.C. 522, 526, 385
S.E.2d 325, 327 (1989).  Other than defendant’s blanket
conclusion that the trial court’s actions in excusing these
jurors were arbitrary and capricious, defendant has failed to
demonstrate corrupt intent or that he was prejudiced by the jury
that was impaneled.
“Defendant’s right to be present at all stages of his
trial does not include the right to be present during preliminary
handling of the jury venires before defendant’s own case has been
called.”  State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 498, 476 S.E.2d 301,
309-10 (1996); see also State v. Cole, 331 N.C. 272, 415 S.E.2d
716 (1992) (not error to excuse prospective jurors after
unrecorded bench conferences when trial had not commenced).  The
record reflects and defendant acknowledges that the jury was
impaneled before the State called defendant’s case for trial.  We
-18-
conclude that defendant had no right to be present during the
preliminary qualification of prospective jurors since the jurors
were excused before defendant’s trial began.  Accordingly, we
overrule this assignment of error.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by sustaining objections to his
questioning of prospective jurors about their ability to consider
a life sentence.  Specifically, defendant contends that the trial
court limited his voir dire of prospective jurors Wilkie, Whaley,
and Marshburn.
The examination of prospective juror Wilkie is
representative of the questioning of the other two prospective
jurors at issue in this case which defendant claims chilled his
ability to question succeeding prospective jurors in violation of
his right to a fair and impartial jury.  In the first round of
voir dire, the trial court sustained an objection to the form of
the following questions on the ground that defendant was “staking
out” the juror:
Q.
. . . Mr. Wilkie, if a person
intentionally takes the life of another, they
are convicted of first degree murder, do you
think that he should get the death penalty
and should not get life?
. . . .
Q.
Mr. Wilkie, I take it from what you’re
saying, sir, that your attitude is strong
enough about the death penalty that we would
have to prove to you that and offer you
evidence that you should spare his life and-- 
. . . .
Q.
So if we didn’t offer any mitigating
circumstances you would then feel that if we
-19-
offered none you would vote for the death
penalty then, wouldn’t you?
. . . .
Q.
Well, then, what you’re saying, sir, is
if we offered no mitigating circumstances you
would, in fact, automatically vote for the
death penalty.
. . . .
Q.
Well, if we offered no evidence at all
would[] you still consider life in prison
without parole?
“The extent and manner of questioning during jury voir
dire is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  State
v. Richardson, 346 N.C. 520, 529, 488 S.E.2d 148, 153 (1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1056, 239 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1998).  In order
to reverse a conviction based on an error in the jury selection
process, defendant must demonstrate “a clear abuse of discretion,
as well as prejudice.”  Id.
“Counsel may not pose hypothetical questions designed
to elicit in advance what the juror’s decision will be under a
certain state of the evidence or upon a given state of facts.” 
State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 336, 215 S.E.2d 60, 68 (1975),
death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1206 (1976). 
“[S]uch questions tend to ‘stake out’ the juror and cause him to
pledge himself to a future course of action.”  Id.  Defendant
contends the questions excluded by the trial court prevented him
from asking juror Wilkie whether he would automatically impose
the death penalty upon convicting defendant of first-degree
murder.
-20-
Even if it be assumed without deciding that the
questions were proper, defendant cannot prevail on this issue. 
Although defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse
Marshburn, he accepted jurors Wilkie and Whaley and did not
exhaust all his peremptory challenges.  Defendant cannot
demonstrate prejudice in the jury selection process if he does
not exhaust his peremptory challenges.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-1214(h); State v. Billings, 348 N.C. 169, 182, 500 S.E.2d
423, 431 (no prejudice results from the trial court’s limiting
defendant’s questioning of a prospective juror where defendant
does not exhaust his peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1005, 142 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1998); State v. McCarver, 341 N.C.
364, 378, 462 S.E.2d 25, 32 (1995) (same), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996).  Thus, we conclude that defendant
cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from the trial court’s
rulings.  This assignment of error is overruled.
GUILT/INNOCENCE ISSUES
Next, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s
denial of his pretrial motion in limine to exclude or limit
photographs of the crime scene and of the autopsy and a motion to
limit the number of photographs of the victim.  Defendant argues
that these photographs had no probative value and that they were
excessive and inflammatory.  Defendant argues that these gory
photographs were so prejudicial that he is entitled to a new
trial.  We find that none of defendant’s arguments has merit.
-21-
“Photographs of a homicide victim may be introduced
even if they are gory, gruesome, horrible or revolting, so long
as they are used for illustrative purposes and so long as their
excessive or repetitious use is not aimed solely at arousing the
passions of the jury.”  State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 284, 372
S.E.2d 523, 526 (1988).  “Even where a body is in advanced stages
of decomposition and the cause of death and identity of the
victim are uncontroverted, photographs may be exhibited showing
the condition of the body and its location when found.”  State v.
Wynne, 329 N.C. 507, 517, 406 S.E.2d 812, 816-17 (1991). 
Photographs depicting “[t]he condition of the victim’s body, the
nature of the wounds, and evidence that the murder was done in a
brutal fashion [provide the] circumstances from which
premeditation and deliberation can be inferred.”  State v.
Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 111, 499 S.E.2d 431, 448, cert. denied, 525
U.S. 915, 142 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998).  “The large number of
photographs, in itself, is not determinative.”  State v. Goode,
350 N.C. 247, 259, 512 S.E.2d 414, 421 (1999).
The trial court allowed the State to use approximately
fifty-one photographs.  These photographs, albeit numerous, were
unique in subject matter and in detail in that they all depicted
the exceedingly large number of wounds inflicted upon different
parts of the victim’s body by various weapons, including a knife,
a drill bit, a pipe, an ax head, and a limb or pruning saw.  They
depicted the condition of the victim’s body, its location, and
the crime scene.  The photographs also corroborated defendant’s
confession in that they demonstrated that the victim was attacked
-22-
in his bedroom, that he fell to the floor with his head toward
the closet, that he was stabbed while on the floor, and that his
neck was cut with a saw while on the floor.  Further, the autopsy
photographs illustrated the testimony of the medical examiner,
who described which injuries were consistent with a particular
weapon.  We conclude that the photographs were relevant and had
probative value.
We must now determine whether the prejudicial effect of
the photographs outweighs their probative value.  “Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403
(1999); see also State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 372 S.E.2d 523. 
This determination is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be overturned on
appeal unless the ruling was “manifestly unsupported by reason or
[was] so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.”  Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.
After having reviewed the photographs and determined
that they were relevant and probative, that they corroborated
defendant’s confession, that they illustrated the medical
examiner’s testimony, and that they contributed to the finding of
premeditation and deliberation, we cannot say that the trial
court’s decision to admit these photographs was so arbitrary that
-23-
it could not have been supported by reason.  Accordingly, we
overrule this assignment of error.
SENTENCING ISSUES
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in submitting, over defendant’s objection,
the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed to
avoid lawful arrest.  Defendant argues that the evidence did not
support the submission of this aggravating circumstance to the
jury.  We disagree.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4) provides that a jury in a
capital sentencing hearing may consider as an aggravating
circumstance that “[t]he capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(4) (1999).  “Submission of the aggravating
circumstance that the capital felony was committed to avoid or
prevent a lawful arrest has been upheld in circumstances where a
murder was committed to prevent the victim from capturing
defendant and where a purpose of the killing was to eliminate a
witness.”  McCarver, 341 N.C. at 400, 462 S.E.2d at 45.
The evidence in the case before us tends to show that
defendant burglarized the victim’s residence and that he killed
him since he believed the victim would report him to the
authorities.  While defendant was describing the assault on the
victim in his statement to police investigators, Sheriff Brown
asked defendant, “[W]hat was your intention when you used the
saw?”  Defendant replied, “I guess to kill him . . . .  I guess
-24-
we thought he would tell the next day if we didn’t [kill him]
after all we did.”  “Trying to kill him.  After all the other
stuff[,] if we didn’t kill him we knew he would tell on us the
next day.”  Further, this statement is corroborated by another
statement defendant made to his girlfriend, Ginger Guthrie,
shortly after the victim was murdered.  Ms. Guthrie testified
that defendant said that “he wasn’t for sure about [whether the
victim would say anything] after all that he knows he stabbed him
with the drill bit and everything; he wasn’t too sure about
that.”
Defendant argues that his statement to the law
enforcement officers three months after the murder evidences an
“‘after-the-fact desire not to be detected or apprehended’” and
“‘cannot raise a reasonable inference that at the time of the
killing defendant killed for the purpose of avoiding lawful
arrest.’”  (Quoting State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 425, 284
S.E.2d 437, 456 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932, 72 L. Ed. 2d
450 (1982).  This argument is without merit.  We conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to support a rational jury’s finding
that one of defendant’s purposes for killing the victim was to
eliminate a witness whom he thought would report him to the
authorities.  Therefore, the trial court properly submitted this
aggravating circumstance for the jury’s consideration.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
In the next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to make an
allegedly improper closing argument.  Specifically, he argues
-25-
that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s statements suggesting
that the imposition of the death penalty was warranted since the
victim was killed in his own home.  Defendant argues that these
statements improperly placed before the jury an aggravating
circumstance not listed in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e).  We disagree.
During the sentencing hearing, defendant failed to
object during closing argument.  Thus, “defendant must establish
that the argument was so grossly improper that the trial court
abused its discretion by not intervening ex mero motu.  To
establish such an abuse, defendant must show the prosecutor’s
comments so infected the trial with unfairness that it rendered
the conviction fundamentally unfair.”  State v. Robinson, 346
N.C. 586, 606-07, 488 S.E.2d 174, 187 (1997).
“Trial counsel is allowed wide latitude in argument to
the jury and may argue all of the evidence which has been
presented as well as reasonable inferences which arise
therefrom.”  State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 257, 506 S.E.2d 711,
721 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013
(1999).  The trial court’s exercise of discretion over the
latitude of counsel’s argument will not be disturbed absent any
gross impropriety in the argument that would likely influence the
jury’s verdict.  See State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 685, 518
S.E.2d 486, 503 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 146 L. Ed. 2d
321 (2000).
The evidence in this case tends to show that defendant
and others committed the first-degree murder of the victim while
engaged in first-degree burglary.  Based on this evidence, the
-26-
trial court had a duty to submit the aggravating circumstance
that “[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged, or was an aider or abettor, in the commission of . . .
burglary.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5).  The offense of first-
degree burglary necessarily requires that the dwelling be
actually occupied at the time of intrusion.  See State v. Fields,
315 N.C. 191, 196, 337 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1985).  The prosecutor’s
statements about the victim being killed in his home served to
inform the jury about this aggravating circumstance.  Contrary to
defendant’s contention, the prosecutor’s argument did not compel
the imposition of the death sentence upon any circumstance not
listed in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e).  We conclude that the
prosecutor’s argument was not so “grossly improper” as to require
the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
In his final assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his requests to instruct
the jury that statutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating
value.  Defendant further argues that the instructions given did
not adequately address the significant distinction between
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  We
disagree.
“A trial court must give a requested instruction that
is a correct statement of the law and is supported by the
evidence.”  State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 328, 480 S.E.2d 626,
629, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997).  “The
trial court need not give the requested instruction verbatim,
-27-
however; an instruction that gives the substance of the requested
instructions is sufficient.”  Id.
“If a juror determines that a statutory mitigating
circumstance exists, . . . the juror must give that circumstance
mitigating value.  The General Assembly has determined as a
matter of law that statutory mitigating circumstances have
mitigating value.”  State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 285, 464
S.E.2d 448, 470 (1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996).  The thrust of defendant’s
argument is that the jury may not have fully understood that the
statutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating value as a
matter of law.  This Court has considered and rejected this
argument in State v. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 348-49, 462 S.E.2d
191, 209-10 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1161, 134 L. Ed. 2d
194 (1996), and in Conner, 345 N.C. at 328, 480 S.E.2d at 629.
Here, the trial court gave virtually identical
instructions to the jury with regard to the (f)(1), (f)(2),
(f)(6), (f)(7), and (f)(8) mitigating circumstances, in part, as
follows:
Accordingly, as to this mitigating
circumstance, I charge you that if one or
more of you find the facts to be as all . . .
the evidence tends to show, you will answer
“yes” as to mitigating circumstance number
one on the issues and recommendation form.
With respect to all of the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, the trial court instructed the jury, in part, as
follows:
If one or more of you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that any of the
following circumstances exist and also are
-28-
deemed by you to have mitigating value, you
would so indicate by having your foreperson
write “yes” in the space provided.  If none
of you find any circumstance to exist or if
none of you deem it to have mitigating value,
you would so indicate by having your
foreperson write “no” in that space.
The trial court also gave a virtually identical instruction after
setting out each nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.
With respect to the statutory catchall mitigating
circumstance, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
If one or more of you so find by a
preponderance of the evidence, you would so
indicate by having your foreperson write
“yes” in the space provided after this
mitigating circumstance on the issues and
recommendation form.  If none of you find the
circumstance to exist, you would so indicate
by having your foreperson write “no” in that
space.
The instructions given with respect to Issues Three and
Four required the jury to give weight to any found mitigating
circumstances.  As we noted in Conner, “defendant’s request for
an instruction that conveyed to the jury that it must give value
to found statutory mitigators was fulfilled by the instruction
given.”  345 N.C. at 328, 480 S.E.2d at 629.  We conclude the
same in this case.  Further, these instructions are consistent
with the pattern jury instructions for separate capital
sentencing proceedings.  See N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.10 (1996) 
(amended June 1997).  Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of
error.
PROPORTIONALITY
Finally, this Court exclusively has the statutory duty
in capital cases to review the record and determine (i) whether
-29-
the record supports the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury; (ii) whether the death sentence was entered under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
and (iii) whether the death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).  Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the
transcripts, and briefs in the present case, we conclude that the
record fully supports the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury.  Further, we find no suggestion that the sentence of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary consideration.  Accordingly, we turn to our final 
statutory duty of proportionality review.
The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder
on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the
felony-murder rule, first-degree burglary, and conspiracy to
commit first-degree burglary.  At defendant’s capital sentencing
proceeding, the jury found the three submitted aggravating
circumstances:  (i) that the murder was committed to avoid lawful
arrest, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4); (ii) that the murder was
committed while defendant was engaged, in the commission of a
burglary, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5); and (iii) that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(9).
The jury found five statutory mitigating circumstances
that:  (i) defendant had no significant history of prior criminal
activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1); (ii) the murder was
-30-
committed while defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2); (iii)
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6); (iv) defendant aided in the
apprehension of another capital felon, Joel Coleman, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(8); and (v) defendant aided in the apprehension of
another capital felon, James Blake, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(8). 
Two other statutory mitigating circumstances were submitted but
not found:  (i) defendant’s age at the time of the crime,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7); and (ii) the catchall, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(9).  Of the thirty-four nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances submitted, the jury found twenty-four that had
mitigating value.
We begin our analysis by comparing this case to those
cases in which this Court has determined the sentence of death to
be disproportionate.  We have determined the death penalty to be
disproportionate on seven occasions.  State v. Benson, 323 N.C.
318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352
S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713
(1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C.
647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d
177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d
373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985);
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v.
Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson,
309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  We conclude that this case
-31-
is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has
found the death penalty disproportionate.
Several characteristics in this case support the
determination that the imposition of the death penalty was not
disproportionate.  Defendant was convicted of both felony murder
and premeditated and deliberate murder.  We have noted that “the
finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-
blooded and calculated crime.”  State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278,
341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other
grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).  Moreover,
defendant killed the defenseless victim in his home.  “A murder
in the home ‘shocks the conscience, not only because a life was
senselessly taken, but because it was taken [at] an especially
private place, one [where] a person has a right to feel secure.’” 
State v. Adams, 347 N.C. 48, 77, 490 S.E.2d 220, 236 (1997)
(quoting State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 231, 358 S.E.2d 1, 34,
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987)) (alterations
in original), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1096, 139 L. Ed. 2d 878
(1998).
We also consider cases in which this Court has found
the death penalty to be proportionate.  “However, we will not
undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we
carry out that duty.”  State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 244, 433
S.E.2d 144, 164 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed.
2d 895 (1994).  We conclude that the present case is more similar
to certain cases in which we have found the sentence of death
proportionate than to those in which we have found the sentence
-32-
disproportionate or to those in which juries have consistently
returned recommendations of life imprisonment.
We conclude that defendant received a fair trial and
capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error, and
that defendant’s death sentence was not excessive or
disproportionate.  The judgments of the trial court are,
therefore, left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.
Justice WAINWRIGHT did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.