Title: Commonwealth v. MacCormack
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13022
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 2023

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13022 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANDREW MacCORMACK. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2022. - May 9, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Third-party culprit, 
Inference, Consciousness of guilt, Inflammatory evidence, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 31, 2017. 
 
The case was tried before Mary K. Ames, J. 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (Ian 
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, see G. L. c. 265, § 1, in the killing of his wife, 
Vanessa MacCormack, by blunt force trauma and strangulation.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient 
2 
 
evidence to support his conviction.  He also contends that the 
police investigation focused exclusively on him, rather than 
pursuing other leads, and that the judge abused her discretion 
in permitting the introduction of certain evidence that the 
defendant argues was used improperly as propensity evidence.  In 
addition, the defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to direct the entry of a 
verdict of not guilty or to order a new trial.  Having carefully 
reviewed the record, we discern no error that would warrant 
vacating the conviction, or ordering a new trial, and no reason 
to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). 
 
The defendant and the victim were married in August of 
2015, and purchased a house in Revere a few months later.  Both 
of their families lived nearby and were intimately involved in 
the couple's lives.  At the time of the victim's killing in 
September of 2017, the defendant's mother was living with the 
defendant and the victim, as she had been since the previous 
April.  Ordinarily, the defendant already would have left for 
work by the time his mother would wake up at 6 A.M.  The victim 
was in daily contact with members of her family, calling and 
sending text messages to them multiple times a day, and to 
3 
 
family and friends, the victim and the defendant appeared to be 
happy. 
 
Beginning in early 2017, however, issues arose stemming 
from the defendant's financial improprieties, which the victim 
suspected were to fund his growing use of drugs.  In February 
2017, the victim realized that approximately $6,000 had been 
taken from her bank account.  Evidence at trial pointed to the 
defendant:  he had forged and cashed at least two checks to 
himself, each for $350, from the victim's account, and there was 
no evidence of third-party access.  That same month, the victim 
realized that her wedding ring was missing.  The couple 
purchased a replacement, but it also went missing two weeks 
later.  When the couple called police to investigate a potential 
robbery, officers found no signs of forced entry.  The defendant 
mentioned to officers that the baby monitor had been "hacked," 
and a small basement window was open.  Police determined that 
the window was too small for anyone to have entered through it.  
The second ring was never found. 
 
The defendant began frequenting local pawn shops, taking 
out loans on gift cards and other jewelry, including his wedding 
ring, and then defaulting on the loans.  Unbeknownst to his 
wife, the defendant repeatedly opened, overdrew, and closed bank 
accounts throughout 2017.  By the summer, the defendant was 
spending between $100 and $400 on cocaine and steroids weekly. 
4 
 
 
On July 28, 2017, the victim sent a text message to the 
defendant saying that he was ruining their marriage and that she 
was unhappy and furious.  The defendant tried to assure her that 
everything would be fixed, but the victim said that she knew the 
defendant was doing something suspicious, as she had seen a 
notification on his cellular telephone from someone she knew to 
be a drug seller, and the defendant had attempted to take out a 
loan without her knowledge.  The victim continued to send the 
defendant a series of angry and indignant text messages, full of 
profanity, throughout the night.  Text messages over the 
following month indicated that the victim's frustration with the 
defendant continued to grow.1 
 
On August 31, 2017, the defendant and the victim got into 
another argument.  The victim sent a text message to the 
defendant saying that she was going to sell the house and find a 
 
 
1 Among other things, the victim sent the defendant a text 
message saying, "I'm furious.  You are ruining this marriage.  
It's not fair.  I'm unhappy in this marriage because of you.  
You need to fix this."  In subsequent messages, she reiterated 
that the situation was not fair to her, she did not trust the 
defendant, she was "at the end of [her] rope in this marriage," 
and the defendant was "making [her] fucking miserable." 
 
 
Over the course of the month, the victim, on separate 
occasions, sent the defendant messages saying that she was "so 
fucking mad," demanded detailed information about the 
defendant's whereabouts, said that she was "blind-sided" that he 
was not where she thought he had been, protested that she 
"thought [they] were trying to work on [their] marriage," and 
repeatedly asked about different sums of money that had gone 
missing from their joint account. 
5 
 
divorce lawyer and that she could not stop thinking about the 
possibility of divorce.  The following day, the defendant 
responded that the victim was "crazy" and that he would not sign 
anything to sell the house or to obtain a divorce.  On September 
2, the victim continued to express her anger to the defendant in 
text messages, and the following day, she demanded answers from 
the defendant about times when she felt that he had lied to her, 
including instances of missing cash, mysterious bank 
withdrawals, and her missing credit card. 
On September 8, 2017, the victim sent the defendant a 
message about additional money that was missing from their bank 
account, and accused him of creating their financial problems 
because of his drug habit and only saying he would improve 
things and repay her missing money in order to avoid a divorce.  
The next day, the victim again told the defendant that she was 
unhappy with him and their marriage.  These later messages were 
in response to the defendant's accrual of hundreds of dollars in 
unpaid parking tickets for the victim's father's sport utility 
vehicle (SUV), which the defendant had been using regularly 
since February. 
 
On September 22, 2017, the victim checked into her gym at 
6:36 P.M.  Later, after returning home, she had an audio-video 
call with her parents so they could say goodnight to her 
daughter.  At 8:17 P.M., the defendant sent the victim a 
6 
 
photograph of his new haircut and they both called each other.  
At 8:58 P.M., the victim sent the defendant a text message 
asking where he was. 
 
The defendant ultimately spent the evening in the basement 
of the house, where he intended to sleep.  He devoted his time 
that evening to browsing Internet escort listings advertising 
sex for money. 
 
a.  Events of September 23, 2017.  In the early morning 
hours of September 23, 2017, the defendant sent a text message 
to an escort and arranged to meet her at 10 A.M. on Route 1 in 
Peabody.  He continued to peruse similar listings until after 
3 A.M. 
 
The defendant's mother testified that she left the house at 
around 8:30 A.M.  At 8:28 A.M., surveillance camera footage 
showed the defendant driving toward a liquor store at the end of 
the street, circling it, and returning home at 8:35 A.M.  During 
this brief trip, the victim called the defendant's cellular 
telephone twice. 
 
Throughout the morning, the defendant made a series of 
telephone calls to his friend James Caruso, the first at 
around 10 A.M.  Caruso lived in Saugus, which is north of 
Revere.  Earlier that week, the defendant and Caruso had 
discussed the defendant going to Caruso's house to help finish 
some work on the house.  Surveillance video footage and cell 
7 
 
site location information (CSLI) for the defendant's telephone 
showed that he did not leave his house again until 12:49 P.M., 
when he drove away with his daughter in the SUV.  By that time, 
according to the medical examiner, the victim was dead.  The 
defendant had killed the victim and left her body on the floor 
of their bedroom. 
 
After leaving the house, the defendant called Caruso at 
12:54 P.M.  He told Caruso that he had taken the baby for a walk 
and was going to see if the victim was home from the gym before 
heading to Caruso's house.  Approximately four minutes later, as 
he was driving south on Route 107 toward Revere, the defendant 
called the victim at 12:58 P.M., and the call went directly to 
voicemail.2  He then sent the victim two text messages saying 
that he would be going to visit Caruso and asking why she was 
not responding, respectively.  The defendant drove a meandering 
route through Revere, and then drove north on Route 107 toward 
Saugus; he arrived at Caruso's house, a five-minute drive from 
his own house, at 1:30 P.M. 
 
As he was completing the work on Caruso's home, the 
defendant called his mother-in-law.  He told her that the victim 
had not been home when he left the house and that she was 
 
 
2 Other calls to the victim's cellular telephone that 
afternoon, from the defendant and from the victim's sister and 
parents, also went directly to voicemail. 
8 
 
probably at the gym.  He said that he had been at Caruso's house 
for approximately one hour with the baby and would be leaving in 
about fifteen minutes.  After ending the call, the defendant 
mentioned to Caruso that he had not heard from the victim since 
she left for the gym that morning.  The defendant seemed 
concerned and said that it was unusual not to have heard from 
her, as the two usually spoke while the victim was at the gym.  
The defendant called his home telephone for six seconds, and 
then again called the victim's cellular telephone.  The victim's 
mother called the defendant again at around 2:10 P.M.; he said 
that he was still at Caruso's house, and would be leaving in 
about twenty minutes. 
 
The defendant left Caruso's house a few minutes later.  He 
bought gasoline in Winthrop, drove to a pharmacy in the East 
Boston section of Boston, and then met his drug supplier in East 
Boston, where he purchased cocaine.  The defendant took an 
indirect route back to his house in Revere, approaching it from 
Saugus to the north, rather than from Caruso's house to the 
south.  During the drive, he again spoke with his in-laws 
concerning the victim's whereabouts. 
 
The victim's mother called the defendant again at around 
3:30 P.M., as the defendant was pulling into his driveway.  The 
defendant remained on the telephone with her as he parked and 
entered the house.  Then he screamed, "Call 911.  She's dead."  
9 
 
The victim's mother hung up and called 911.  When the defendant 
called the victim's mother again, he told her that the victim 
was "dead" and "cold."  The defendant picked up the baby, still 
in her carrier seat, and ran out of the house to call 911. 
 
First responders found the victim in the couple's bedroom, 
lying face-down in a pool of blood, with a garbage bag partially 
full of trash over her head.  An autopsy later revealed that the 
cause of death had been a combination of blunt force trauma to 
the face, strangulation, and stab and slash wounds to the neck.  
Blood pooling indicated that she had been alive when some of the 
blunt force injuries and lacerations occurred, although the stab 
and slash wounds to the victim's neck were inflicted "pretty 
near death" or postmortem. 
 
b.  The investigation.  That evening, police officers 
brought the defendant to the Revere police station for an 
interview.  There were no signs of bruising, scratches, 
injuries, or marks on the defendant's body.  The defendant 
described to the officers the course of his actions that day.  
He also said that he and the victim were "very happily" married 
and did not have any problems related to infidelity, drugs, or 
finances.  He explained that all of the doors had been locked 
when he left the house that morning and that he had had to use a 
key upon his return.  When the interviewing officers brought up 
the issue of the missing rings, the defendant suggested that the 
10 
 
second ring must have been stolen and said that police had found 
a "suspicious" window in the basement that was unlocked. 
 
When police searched the defendant's and the victim's 
house, they found no signs of forced entry.  Blood spatter on 
the inside of the bedroom door, walls, closet doors, and 
bedframe also showed no signs of a struggle.  The bathroom 
appeared to have been cleaned recently, and the television and 
other surfaces had been wiped down.  The bed linen had been 
removed and was in a laundry basket, but contained no trace of 
blood.  A large butcher knife was missing from the knife block 
in the kitchen, and there was no bag in the kitchen garbage 
container.  There was an overwhelming odor of bleach throughout 
the house.  The investigation uncovered no useful fingerprints 
or deoxyribonucleic acid. 
 
A forensic examination of the defendant's cellular 
telephone revealed that he had deleted several items from it 
shortly after the victim's death.  Those items included Internet 
browsing history of visits to an escort Web site, and several 
text messages in which the defendant attempted to arrange a 
meeting with an escort, in the week leading up to the victim's 
death and in the early morning hours of September 23, 2017. 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  The grand jury indicted the 
defendant on one count of murder in the first degree.  At trial, 
the Commonwealth proceeded on theories of deliberate 
11 
 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant 
maintained a defense that the Commonwealth's evidence did not 
establish him as the killer beyond a reasonable doubt.  He 
called two witnesses to testify for the defense.  His mother 
testified to his former drug use and the time he spent in drug 
rehabilitation.  Thomas Riley, who knew the defendant from 
playing in a local hockey league, testified that the defendant 
had given him a ride that afternoon.  The judge denied the 
defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty at the 
close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all the 
evidence.  The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was the 
perpetrator and that, thus, his motions for a required finding 
should have been allowed.  Specifically, the defendant asserts 
that the Commonwealth's case rested on improper speculation 
about his character and that the prosecutor did not introduce 
evidence that affirmatively demonstrated that the defendant had 
committed the crime. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In reviewing the denial 
of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we consider 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found 
12 
 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 678 (1979), citing 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).  "The 
relevant question is whether the evidence would permit a jury to 
find guilt, not whether the evidence requires such a finding."  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988).  
Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 354 
(1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986), and the reasonable 
inferences drawn from such evidence "need not be necessary or 
inescapable," only "reasonable and possible" (citation omitted), 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).  At the same time, a 
conviction may not rest on the piling of inference upon 
inference or on conjecture and speculation.  Id. 
 
Here, the jury reasonably could have found that it was the 
defendant, and not a third-party culprit, who committed the 
murder, where the evidence supported an inference that the 
defendant was the only person in the house with the victim and 
their baby during the relevant time frame.  Video surveillance 
footage showed the defendant driving away from the house in the 
SUV at 12:49 P.M.; that is the first time the defendant appears 
on surveillance footage near his street after he was shown 
returning home at 8:35 A.M. 
13 
 
 
Moreover, the prosecutor introduced sufficient evidence 
from which the jury reasonably could have found that the 
defendant was alone with the victim, because there was no 
evidence that anyone else was present in the house at that time.3  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Coonan, 428 Mass. 823, 829 (1999) (evidence 
showing that victim and defendant were together at time of 
killing, in conjunction with other incriminating evidence, was 
sufficient to support conviction).  The defendant told police, 
the victim's mother, and Caruso that the victim intended to go 
to the gym that morning.  CSLI evidence, however, indicated that 
the victim's telephone had been at her house all morning, as did 
testimony from employees of the victim's gym asserting that her 
last visit to the gym had been the previous evening.  The 
defendant's mother testified that she left the house at around 
8:30 A.M, and the victim's mother and father testified that they 
were out of town that day.  No evidence was introduced to 
suggest that any other person had entered the house; given the 
 
 
3 Testimony by a paramedic who responded to the 911 call 
indicated that in her opinion, the victim had been dead for at 
least two to three hours based on the state of rigor mortis in 
the victim's jaw when first responders arrived at the scene 
shortly after 3:30 P.M.  The jury later heard testimony from a 
State medical examiner that there was no certain way to 
establish a time of death from rigor mortis, nor a current 
reliable formula to establish the precise time of death from 
temperature.  If the jury credited the paramedic's testimony, 
drawing all inferences in the Commonwealth's favor, the victim 
would have been dead when, as the surveillance video footage 
indicated, the defendant left the house at 12:49 P.M. 
14 
 
locked doors and windows, the jury reasonably could have 
concluded that no one had done so.  The jury thus could have 
discredited the defendant's version of events and found instead 
that the victim had remained home that morning and that the 
defendant was the only one there with her and the baby after the 
defendant's mother left the house.  See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
484 Mass. 211, 217 (2020) (jury may credit or reject some, part, 
or all of particular witness's testimony). 
 
In addition, the prior bad act evidence that the defendant 
challenges, which was introduced to show the nature of his and 
the victim's prior relationship, was properly before the jury as 
evidence of consciousness of guilt.  Evidence of consciousness 
of guilt, while not conclusive, may be considered in conjunction 
with other evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 715, cert. 
denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014), S.C., 480 Mass. 231, cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 649 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 
626, 629 (1983).  Such evidence may include making false or 
inconsistent statements to police and giving a false alibi.  
Woods, supra.  See Rojas, supra at 629-630. 
 
As discussed, quite a few of the defendant's statements 
about his location and activities on the day of the crime were 
inconsistent with other evidence introduced at trial.  In his 
statement to police, the defendant said that he went to the 
15 
 
beach at around 12:30 P.M. with his daughter, and then stopped 
at a pharmacy and a gasoline station, before he headed to 
Caruso's house at around 2 P.M.  The defendant also stated that 
after leaving Caruso's house, he drove directly home, where he 
discovered the victim's body.  Riley testified that he saw the 
defendant at the beach in East Boston that afternoon and said 
that the defendant had given him a ride to a liquor store. 
 
The jury, however, reasonably could have inferred that the 
images on the surveillance footage, and the CSLI records, 
reflected the defendant's actual location.  The CSLI and 
telephone records suggested that the defendant had remained at 
his house until 12:49 P.M., not 12:30 P.M.  Video surveillance 
footage then showed the defendant driving around Revere and 
Saugus, in a direction away from his and Caruso's houses, for 
approximately forty minutes.  Additional footage showed the 
defendant leave Caruso's house and drive to a pharmacy and a 
gasoline station before going to East Boston to purchase 
cocaine.  The jury could have inferred from the CSLI and video 
surveillance footage that the defendant returned home from East 
Boston using a deliberately circuitous route, in order to delay 
his report of having found the victim dead in their house.4 
 
 
4 CSLI from that period was consistent with the defendant's 
route as seen in the surveillance footage. 
16 
 
 
In his statement to police, the defendant repeatedly 
emphasized how concerned he was about the victim and that he had 
communicated his concern to others throughout the day.  In the 
defendant's concerned calls to the victim's telephone, his 
statements to Caruso, and his meandering drives, the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant was attempting 
to orchestrate a timeline that placed him away from the house at 
critical moments and provided a way for him to express concern 
for his wife.  See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 
594 (2012) (defendant's fabricating alibi by parking truck in 
driveway so it would be visible, and recounting false series of 
events to police, was consistent with consciousness of guilt). 
 
Additionally, Kimberly Donovan, a friend of the victim's 
mother, testified that she gave the defendant a ride to the 
victim's parents' house on the evening of the killing.  During 
that ride, the defendant insisted to Donovan, without prompting, 
that investigators had asked him repeatedly about the presence 
of bleach in the house in efforts to "trick" him.  During that 
interview, however, the officers deliberately had not mentioned 
bleach.  Here, too, the jury reasonably could have inferred that 
the defendant's non sequitur protestations to Donovan that the 
police were trying to "trick" him were intended as an attempt to 
fabricate sympathy and protest his innocence. 
17 
 
 
The defendant also repeatedly told police that he and the 
victim were "very happily" married, had no financial 
difficulties, and were faithful.  From the victim's text 
messages, testimony by the defendant's friends and members of 
the victim's family, and content on the defendant's cellular 
telephone, however, the jury could have determined that the 
relationship was quite different from what the defendant 
described.  The jury heard evidence from which they could have 
concluded that the defendant was buying and using drugs, had 
stolen money, jewelry, and credit cards from the victim, and had 
sought to exchange money for sex with escorts.  The victim's 
text messages suggested a degree of frustration with, and anger 
at, the defendant to such an extent that she was contemplating 
obtaining a divorce. 
 
The forensic investigation of the defendant's telephone 
indicated that he had deleted certain text messages and browsing 
history from his telephone that portrayed him in an unflattering 
light, detailed his efforts to find escorts, including hours 
before the victim's death, and showed contentious discussions 
between the victim and himself concerning financial 
difficulties.  The jury could have understood these deleted 
telephone records as a willful attempt at concealment, and as 
evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 423 Mass. 863, 869-870 (1996), S.C., 
18 
 
447 Mass. 161 (2006) (defendant's repeated denial of serious 
difficulties between couple in face of consistent evidence to 
contrary was evidence of his consciousness of guilt).  While 
such evidence by itself would be insufficient to sustain a 
conviction, it may be considered as part of the "mosaic of 
evidence" upon which the jury could have concluded that the 
Commonwealth had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 284 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Salim, 399 Mass. 227, 233 (1987). 
 
And although the Commonwealth need not prove motive for a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, evidence of a 
defendant's motive may be relevant and admissible, as it was 
here, to show that the defendant intended and acted as argued.  
See Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 Mass. 501, 508-509 (2007). 
 
The jury heard multiple types of evidence from which they 
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had a motive 
to kill the victim.  Text messages from the victim, as well as 
police testimony, indicated certain underlying reasons for the 
increasingly fraught relationship between the defendant and the 
victim and the growing animosity the victim directed at the 
defendant.  This evidence, among other things, showed that the 
defendant forged and cashed two checks from the victim's 
accounts, repeatedly opened and closed bank accounts, was 
dishonest about having paid parking tickets, pawned his wedding 
19 
 
ring and household gift cards, and caused the disappearance of 
the victim's two wedding rings, in the victim's view, to support 
his drug habit.  The defendant also repeatedly told the victim 
that their bank accounts had been hacked, notwithstanding the 
absence of any evidence indicating that this had occurred.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 347 (2013) (victim's 
statements expressing dissatisfaction with marriage and hopes 
for divorce were relevant to defendant's motive); Commonwealth 
v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464-465 (2004) (evidence of husband's 
financial irregularities, use of cocaine, and consorting with 
prostitutes established existence of strained marital 
relationship as possible motive for killing). 
 
The victim told the defendant multiple times that she was 
thinking of divorcing him.  Each time, the defendant responded 
that he did not want the marriage to end, apologized, and 
promised that he would do better.  See Lao, 443 Mass. at 780 
(defendant's knowledge of termination of marriage was evidence 
of motive); Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 463 (2000) 
(evidence showing deteriorating relationship between victim and 
defendant in year prior to murder was probative of motive). 
 
b.  Defendant's arguments.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's case was based on attacking his character and 
speculation about his behavior in the months leading up to the 
victim's death, rather than on any direct evidence that he had 
20 
 
played a role in the killing.  The only way he could have been 
convicted, the defendant contends, is if the jury failed to 
presume him innocent while weighing the evidence, in violation 
of his right to due process.  He argues that because the 
Commonwealth did not demonstrate to the jury that it ruled out 
other suspects and lacked direct evidence that he had played a 
role in the killing, his conviction cannot stand. 
 
The theory of the defense at trial, consistent with the 
defendant's statement to police, was that the defendant was not 
at home at the time of the killing.  In his statement to police 
on the evening of the victim's death, the defendant said that he 
had slept in the basement the previous night.  According to the 
defendant, the victim woke him up at around 9 A.M. with the 
baby, and his mother left the house at approximately 9:30 A.M.  
At 11:30 A.M., the victim told him that she wanted to go to the 
gym.  He told the victim he would take the baby for a walk and 
then go to Caruso's house.  The victim was still at home when 
the defendant left at 12:30 P.M. and took the baby in her 
stroller to the beach.  When he got to the beach, he contacted 
Caruso to arrange his visit.  The defendant showed the officers 
his cellular telephone, which indicated that he had tried to 
call the victim and had sent her a text message at 12:59 P.M. 
 
The jury reasonably could have rejected the defendant's 
account.  The absence of any sign of entry by anyone else, the 
21 
 
locked doors, the lack of any means of alternate entry, and the 
absence of any struggle by the victim, in conjunction with the 
testimony, video surveillance footage, and CSLI, discussed 
supra, would have allowed a reasonable juror to infer that the 
defendant had not been where he claimed he had been at the time 
of the killing.  Rather, he and the victim had been alone with 
their daughter in the house at the time of the victim's death.  
See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 396 Mass. 306, 311-313 (1985) 
(evidence that defendant was alone with victim at about time of 
murder, along with evidence of consciousness of guilt, was 
sufficient to sustain verdict); Rojas, 388 Mass. at 629-630 
(same). 
The defendant's argument that the Commonwealth improperly 
relied on solely circumstantial evidence also fails.  When 
reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, we "must look at the 
evidence as a whole and not examine exhaustively each piece of 
evidence separately."  Salim, 399 Mass. at 233.  Each inference 
drawn from the evidence must be a reasonable and logical 
conclusion, and the jury may not rely upon conjecture, 
guesswork, or speculation to choose between alternate 
inferences.  See Commonwealth v. Dostie, 425 Mass. 372, 376-377 
(1997).  Thus, where the Commonwealth's evidence is entirely 
circumstantial, it cannot meet its burden if the evidence 
equally supports inconsistent propositions, as resolution of 
22 
 
such a case necessarily requires conjecture or surmise.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass. 653, 663 (2009). 
 
The case before us, however, is not one of equally 
inconsistent propositions, as there was no evidence of a 
plausible culprit aside from the defendant.  See Merry, 453 
Mass. at 663 (evidence did not equally support defendant's and 
Commonwealth's theories of crime).  Rather, the evidence would 
have supported an inference that the defendant and the victim 
were home alone with their infant daughter on the morning of the 
killing, and there was no evidence of a forced entry.  See 
Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 535 (1989).  From the 
inconsistencies between the defendant's statements and the 
record evidence of the location of his cellular telephone and 
the surveillance footage showing the location of the SUV, the 
jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's 
statements were false and represented an attempt to construct an 
alibi, demonstrating consciousness of guilt.  See Rojas, 388 
Mass. at 629-630.  In addition, evidence was introduced of a 
troubled marriage, resulting from the defendant's financial 
improprieties, which coincided with his return to, and 
increasing use of, drugs.  There also was abundant evidence of 
the victim's escalating anger toward the defendant and her 
contemplation of leaving the marriage in the weeks and days 
leading up to her death.  See Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. at 594. 
23 
 
 
While a conviction may rest entirely on circumstantial 
evidence, "[t]he evidence and the inferences permitted to be 
drawn therefrom must be 'of sufficient force to bring minds of 
ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 
447 Mass. 370, 377 (2006), quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.  
Here, no single inference the jury reasonably could have drawn 
would have been sufficient, in isolation, to establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Combined, however, those reasonable 
inferences create a "fabric of proof" that is sufficient to 
warrant the jury's finding that the defendant was the person who 
killed the victim beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rojas, 388 Mass. 
at 629-630.  See Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. at 594.  As the 
defendant emphasizes, the evidence against him was wholly 
circumstantial.  Nonetheless, it was not, as he contends, 
insufficient to warrant the jury's conclusion that he killed the 
victim.  See Lao, 443 Mass. at 780. 
 
The defendant also objects that the criminal investigation 
improperly focused on him to the exclusion of all others.  The 
defendant moved in limine to introduce evidence that police 
improperly and immediately focused on him, and did not pursue 
any other investigative leads.  The defendant argued that there 
was evidence of hostility between a boyfriend of the victim's 
sister and the victim's family; the boyfriend's telephone number 
24 
 
was stored in the mother's telephone under the moniker 
"asshole."  At the time of the victim's death, the boyfriend 
lived a short distance away, on the same street as the victim.  
At a hearing on the motion, the defendant explained that the 
victim's family told investigators that when her family was 
trying to locate her on the day of her death, they looked at a 
map showing the location of all telephones enrolled in their 
family's cellular provider's plan.  On that map, the victim's 
cellular telephone appeared in near vicinity to the boyfriend's 
telephone, suggesting that the two were close by.  The defendant 
maintained that police should have investigated this individual 
further. 
 
The defendant also argued in his motion in limine that 
police failed to investigate the hacking of the baby monitor.  
When they spoke to police after the victim's replacement wedding 
ring vanished, the defendant and the victim both mentioned that 
they had seen the motorized baby monitor moving as if it were 
being operated, but without either of them doing so.  The 
defendant also mentioned the baby monitor in his statement to 
police.  The judge allowed the defendant's motion to introduce 
both pieces of Bowden evidence, but declined the request for a 
Bowden instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 
485-486 (1980).  At trial, the defendant attempted to suggest 
25 
 
the possibility of an unknown third-party culprit through cross-
examination. 
 
A defendant has a constitutional right to a defense and to 
present evidence that another may have committed the crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 559 (2015).  
Consequently, we afford such evidence wide latitude, insofar as 
it tends to show that another person had the motive, intent, or 
opportunity to commit the offense.  Commonwealth v. Steadman, 
489 Mass. 372, 383 (2022), citing Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-801 (2009).  Such evidence "must 
have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, 
and the evidence cannot be too remote or speculative."  
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996). 
 
Information concerning a third-party culprit whose 
existence was known to police, but whose potential involvement 
was never investigated, may be admissible in order to defend 
against a criminal charge by suggesting the existence of other 
possible culprits whom police did not investigate.  See Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802; Rosa, 422 Mass. at 22. 
 
Here, as the defendant concedes, although his motion in 
limine regarding Bowden evidence was allowed, he did not present 
any evidence at trial that a specific third-party culprit 
26 
 
existed.5  The Commonwealth was not required to prove that no one 
else possibly could have killed the victim.  See Merola, 405 
Mass. at 533, citing Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 175 
(1980).  The Commonwealth's burden was to prove that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant had done so.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. 
at 677.  They have done so here. 
 
Finally, the defendant argues that the judge abused her 
discretion in allowing the introduction of evidence that, during 
the evening before the killing, the defendant spent several 
hours browsing websites advertising escort services, scheduled a 
meeting with an escort, and sent an explicit photograph of 
himself to her (escort evidence).  The defendant maintains that 
the admission of the escort evidence resulted in overwhelmingly 
unfair prejudice that was disproportionate to its limited 
probative value.  By associating him with a website that he 
describes as "the most infamous illicit sexual marketplace in 
America," the defendant contends, the prosecution improperly 
played on the jury's emotions and caused them to conclude that 
he was capable of killing his wife.  He argues that the escort 
evidence was not probative, because it was not logically related 
 
 
5 No evidence regarding the victim's sister's boyfriend or 
the family's view of him was introduced at trial, nor did the 
jury hear any specific evidence concerning the absence of any 
investigation of the baby monitor. 
27 
 
to the crime charged and, to the extent that it suggested 
marital strain, it was cumulative of other evidence.  The 
defendant also argues that any limiting instructions would have 
been ineffective, as the evidence left the jury to conclude that 
he was deceitful.  As a result, he contends, the jury must have 
inferred, based only on his "sinister" behavior, rather than on 
any direct evidence, that the defendant was the killer. 
 
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts may not be 
introduced to show the defendant's bad character or propensity 
to commit the crimes charged.  See Commonwealth v. Da Lin Huang, 
489 Mass. 162, 173 (2022), citing Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 
Mass. 214, 224 (1986); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2022).  Such 
evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as 
to establish motive, state of mind, or intent.  See Commonwealth 
v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  Even where relevant for a permissible purpose, 
such evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
See Crayton, supra at 249 n.27; Mass. G. Evid. § 403. 
 
Evidentiary rulings on relevance, probative value, and 
prejudice are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  
See Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 805 (2021).  A judge's 
decision to permit the introduction of prior bad act evidence 
will be upheld unless the judge made a clear error of judgment, 
28 
 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives.  Id. at 805-806.  When assessing whether the risk 
of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the 
challenged evidence, a reviewing court considers, inter alia, 
(1) whether the trial judge carefully weighed the probative 
value and prejudicial effect of the evidence to be introduced; 
(2) whether the judge mitigated the prejudicial effect through 
proper limiting instructions; (3) whether the challenged 
evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, 
thereby reducing the risk of any additional prejudicial effect; 
and (4) whether the challenged evidence was so similar to the 
charged offense that it increased "the risk of propensity 
reasoning by the jury."  Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. at 174, quoting 
West, supra at 807. 
 
Here, the judge initially denied the Commonwealth's 
pretrial motion to introduce the escort evidence because she 
found that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice; she also allowed the Commonwealth to renew its 
motion as the evidence before the jury developed.  When the 
Commonwealth again sought to introduce the escort evidence on 
the ninth day of trial, the judge again denied the motion, but 
allowed the Commonwealth to resubmit it based on the state of 
the evidence introduced.  After the Commonwealth filed a 
subsequent renewed motion following the introduction of the 
29 
 
defendant's statement to police, and having reviewed the 
transcript of that statement, the judge found that the escort 
evidence bore on the defendant's motive and state of mind.  The 
judge commented that the defendant's assertion that the marriage 
had been happy was the "tipping point" and concluded that the 
escort evidence was more probative than unfairly prejudicial, 
based on the defendant's "repeated remonstration[s]" of how 
happy the marriage was, in conjunction with the remainder of the 
evidence. 
 
The judge then undertook efforts to limit any possible 
unfair prejudice to the defendant.  When the escort evidence was 
introduced, the judge instructed the jury on the "very, very, 
very circumscribed" way that they could consider the evidence:  
"on the very limited issue of motive of the defendant and [the] 
defendant's state of mind."  The judge also required the 
prosecutor to redact the explicit photograph and the substance 
of the escort websites so that the jury's attention would not be 
drawn to the redactions.  The judge reiterated the limiting 
instruction in her final charge. 
 
Given the juxtaposition of the defendant's statements of 
happiness and his efforts in the hours before his wife's death 
to meet with an escort, there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's decision to permit the introduction of the challenged 
evidence after concluding that the risk of unfair prejudice was 
30 
 
outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.  At several 
different times, after considering the totality of the evidence 
that had been presented to that point in the trial, the judge 
had denied the motion.  See Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 
394 (2020) ("A record of the thoughtful weighing of the risks of 
unfair prejudice . . . may indicate a reasonable exercise of 
discretion").  It was only after the defendant's statement to 
police was introduced that the judge found that the balance had 
shifted.  Evidence that a defendant has sought out an 
extramarital relationship also may form the basis of a finding 
that the defendant entertained feelings of hostility toward his 
or her spouse.  See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 444 Mass. 678, 683 
(2005).  Such inferences are permissible where the potential 
adultery is not too remote in time from the killing.  Id. at 
682.  See Mendes, 441 Mass. at 465 (defendant's history of 
spending money on drugs and prostitutes was probative of 
deterioration of marital relationship). 
 
Without the challenged evidence, at a minimum, the jury 
would have lacked context about the defendant's state of mind in 
the hours before the killing, and could have concluded that the 
killing was "an essentially inexplicable act of violence."  
Mendes, 441 Mass. at 464, quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 
Mass. 244, 269 (1982).  The judge's decision to allow 
introduction of the evidence, for limited purposes and with a 
31 
 
clear, contemporaneous limiting instruction, was not outside the 
"range of reasonable alternatives."  West, 487 Mass. at 805-806. 
 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having carefully 
reviewed the entire record, we discern no reason to exercise our 
authority to grant extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.