Title: IN RE HON SUSAN CHRZANOWSKI
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116721
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 2001

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 28, 2001  
In re HON. SUSAN R. CHRZANOWSKI  
JUDGE OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, 
WARREN, MICHIGAN. 
No. 116721  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
The 
Judicial 
Tenure 
Commission 
(JTC) 
has 
recommended 
that  
we suspend respondent, 37th District Court Judge Susan R.  
Chrzanowski, for twelve months without pay for misconduct in  
the performance of her judicial duties.  Respondent has filed  
a petition to reject this recommendation.  We affirm the JTC’s  
findings, and conclude that the JTC’s recommendation of a one­
year suspension of respondent is a reasonable one. Pursuant  
to MCR 9.225, we modify the recommendation of the JTC to  
require a six-month suspension without pay, beginning  
  
 
January 1, 2002, in order to accord respondent partial credit  
for the seventeen-month interim suspension with pay that she  
has already served.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
The bases for the JTC’s complaint concern two aspects of  
respondent’s conduct between April 1998 and August 1999.  
First, on a substantial number of occasions, respondent  
appointed 
then-attorney 
Michael 
Fletcher 
to 
represent 
indigent  
defendants, and presided over such cases, as well as presided  
over a criminal case in which Fletcher was retained counsel,  
without disclosing that she was engaged at the time in an  
intimate relationship with Fletcher.  Second, respondent made  
false statements to police officers investigating the August  
16, 1999, murder of Leann Fletcher, Michael Fletcher’s wife.1  
Respondent and Fletcher met in 1996 and became friends in  
1997.  In February of 1998, Fletcher entered the private  
practice of law.  Respondent began assigning him to represent  
indigent criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases in her  
court.  In July of 1998, respondent and Fletcher began an  
intimate relationship. 
Throughout the course of their  
1  In July 2000, a  trial court convicted Fletcher of  
second-degree murder, finding that he shot and killed his 
wife, Leann.  
2  
 
 
  
subsequent relationship, between July 1, 1998, and August 15,  
1999, 
respondent 
assigned Fletcher to fifty-six cases.  Fifty­
five of these cases, without a city attorney being present,  
resulted in guilty pleas accepted by respondent.  These  
appointments generated in excess of $16,000 in income for  
Fletcher.  In addition, respondent presided over People v  
Donald Thomas Richards, Case No W224162, in which Fletcher was  
retained counsel.  Respondent entered an order dismissing the  
case 
against 
Fletcher’s client.  Respondent failed to disclose  
her ongoing relationship with Fletcher in any of these cases.  
On August 16, 1999, Fletcher shot and killed his wife,  
Leann. 
Sometime after committing the murder, Fletcher  
telephoned respondent and left her a message.  In the message,  
Fletcher asked respondent to call him when she returned home.  
Respondent received this message during the pre-dawn hours of  
August 17.  Respondent then paged Fletcher, but received no  
response. She then left Fletcher a message, and he returned  
the call approximately one-half hour later. 
He told  
respondent that he could not talk, but that something  
“horrible” had happened.  In the morning, respondent was  
informed by a co-worker that Leann Fletcher had committed  
suicide.  Respondent went home early because she was too upset  
to complete her docket.  
3  
 
 
During the initial investigation of the murder, Hazel  
Park Police officers discovered evidence that respondent had  
been engaged in an intimate relationship with Fletcher.  On  
August 17,  the police interviewed respondent at her home.  
The interviewing detective asked respondent whether she had  
been 
involved 
with 
Fletcher.  Judge Chrzanowski responded that  
she had. 
When questioned about the length of the  
relationship, respondent indicated that the relationship had  
begun in February of 1999 and had lasted only until March of  
1999. The detective also asked respondent if she had spoken  
to Fletcher since the death of Leann, and respondent stated  
that she had not. 
Because respondent was emotionally  
distraught, the interview ceased.  
On August 19, respondent went to the Hazel Park police  
station for a second interview.  At this time, respondent  
indicated that her relationship with Fletcher had actually  
begun in August of 1998 and continued sporadically until  
August 15, 1999.  Respondent also acknowledged, contrary to  
her August 17 statement, that she had spoken to Fletcher  
following his wife’s death.  
In September of 1999, the JTC received a request from  
Macomb County Prosecutor Carl Marlinga for an investigation  
into respondent’s appointment of Fletcher during their  
4  
 
 
relationship. Following respondent’s replies, the JTC filed  
Formal Complaint No. 65 on April 14, 2000.  First, the  
complaint asserted that respondent had engaged in misconduct  
by appointing Fletcher to appear in cases before her without  
disclosing their relationship.  Second, the complaint alleged  
that respondent made false statements to Hazel Park police  
officers in the August 17 interview concerning the murder of  
Fletcher’s wife.  
On April 26, 2000, this Court appointed former Justice  
Charles  Levin to serve as master in this case. Meanwhile,  
respondent testified at the murder trial of Fletcher and  
indicated that she had made false statements during the  
initial police inquiry.  The JTC then filed a petition for  
interim suspension pursuant to MCR 9.220.2  On July 28, 2000,  
this Court entered an order suspending respondent with pay.  
In re Chrzanowski, 463 Mich 1201 (2000).  
II. MASTER’S FINDINGS  
After conducting a formal hearing, the master issued his  
report on December 7, 2000. 
He found that respondent had  
appointed 
Fletcher 
as 
counsel 
for 
indigent 
criminal 
defendants  
in matters over which she presided, and had approved payment  
2  MCR 9.220 provides that the JTC “may petition the 
Supreme Court for an order suspending a judge from acting as 
a judge until final adjudication of a complaint.”  
5  
 
 
of legal fees to Fletcher during the period between April 1998  
and August 1999, when she and Fletcher had been engaged in an  
intimate relationship.  The master also found that Fletcher  
had received “a disproportionate number” of appointments in  
comparison 
with 
other 
attorneys 
who 
practiced 
before  
respondent.  He concluded that respondent violated the Code of  
Judicial Conduct by making these appointments to Fletcher.3  
He stated that a judge is enjoined by this provision from  
allowing 
social 
or 
other relationships to influence conduct or  
judgment, and is further prohibited from making appointments  
on the basis of considerations other than merit.4  The master  
also found that such appointments had “the appearance of  
impropriety” 
and 
“erode[d] 
public 
confidence 
in 
the  
judiciary.”5  Nonetheless, the master concluded that he could  
3  Canon 2(C) provides: “A judge should not allow family, 
social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct 
or judgment.”  
4  Canon 3(B)(4) provides: “All appointments shall be 
based upon merit.”  
5  Canon 2(A) provides:  
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded 
by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A  
judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of 
impropriety.  A judge must expect to be the subject  
of constant public scrutiny. 
A judge must  
therefore accept restrictions on conduct that might 
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and 
should do so freely and willingly.  
6  
 
 
not recommend discipline because the JTC “has not promulgated  
a policy respecting disproportionate assignments to close  
personal friends of the judge, and consequently the Supreme  
Court has not been called upon to enunciate a rule of law  
. . . justifying a recommendation for the imposition of  
discipline.”  Moreover, the master determined that, because  
respondent had a subjective good-faith belief that she could  
impartially hear cases in which Fletcher appeared, she was not  
required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, or by MCR 2.0036 to  
6  MCR 2.003 provides:  
(A) Who May Raise. 
A party may raise the 
issue of a judge’s disqualification by motion, or  
the judge may raise it.  
(B) Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the 
judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but 
not limited to instances in which:  
(1) 
The 
judge 
is 
personally 
biased 
or  
prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.  
* * *  
(5) The judge knows that he or she . . . has  
an economic interest in the subject matter in 
controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has 
any other more than de minimis interest that could 
be substantially affected by the proceeding.  
(D) Remittal of Disqualification. 
If it  
appears 
that 
there 
may 
be 
grounds 
for  
disqualification, the judge may ask the parties and 
their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of 
the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If, 
following 
disclosure 
of 
any 
basis 
for  
7  
 
 
disclose the relationship with Fletcher, or to raise on her  
own the matter of her disqualification.  The master concluded  
that he was unable to recommend disciplinary action against  
respondent for this conduct.  
Concerning allegations that respondent had made false  
statements to the police, the master determined that the  
statements were “inaccuracies.”  However, he concluded that  
“[t]he substance, if not the detail, of Chrzanowski’s  
responses was accurate” and “[v]iewed as a whole, the  
information conveyed to the officers was accurate.”
 The  
master found “as a matter of law” that, “unless a statement by  
a judge is a lie, i.e., ‘a false statement made with  
deliberate intent to deceive,’ there is not misconduct or  
conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice  
within the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 30, justifying a  
recommendation of discipline.”  The master concluded that  
respondent “did not make statements to the police with  
deliberate intent to deceive, and did not lie to the police.”  
On the basis of these findings, the master recommended  
disqualification other than personal bias or  
prejudice concerning a party, the parties without 
participation by the judge, all agree that the 
judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is 
then 
willing to 
participate, 
the 
judge 
may 
participate in the proceedings.  The agreement 
shall be in writing or placed on the record.  
8  
 
dismissal of the charges concerning respondent’s statements.  
III. JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION  
The JTC adopted most of the findings of fact of the  
master, but not his conclusions of law.7  The JTC disagreed  
with the master’s conclusion that respondent did not have a  
duty to disclose her relationship with Fletcher when she  
appointed him to represent indigent defendants, or where he  
appeared before her as retained counsel.  Further, the JTC  
disagreed with the master’s conclusion that “as a matter of  
law,” in order for the false statements to have constituted  
judicial misconduct, they had to be what the master  
characterized as “lies.”  
7  All eight members of the JTC panel found misconduct on 
the part of respondent.  There was unanimity that respondent’s 
assignments to Fletcher and his appearances before her while 
the two were engaged in a sexual relationship was improper, 
and constituted misconduct in office and conduct clearly 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. A five-member  
majority 
recommended 
that respondent be suspended for one year 
without pay.  Commissioners James Kingsley and Henry Baskin 
agreed with most of the findings and recommendation of a one­
year suspension, but dissented from the finding that  
respondent had made “false statements to the police.” 
Commissioner Pamela Harwood wrote separately and agreed with 
the majority findings concerning the appointments without 
disclosure.  However, she also dissented from the finding that  
respondent had made false statements to the police. 
Commissioner Harwood recommended that respondent be suspended 
for forty-five to ninety days without pay, and that she  be  
returned to active judicial service upon her reimbursement to 
the 37th District Court funding unit for ninety days of pay.  
9  
 
 
After 
setting 
forth the factors promulgated by this Court  
in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (1999) (Brown I), see  
also In re Brown (After Remand), 464 Mich 135, 138; 626 NW2d  
403 (2001) (Brown II), the JTC proceeded to find factors one  
through three, and five, relevant to respondent’s conduct.8  
With regard to factor one, the JTC determined that  
8  In Brown I and II, we stated that, in making judicial 
disciplinary recommendations, the JTC should consider:  
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or 
practice  is more serious than an isolated instance  
of misconduct;  
(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more 
serious than the same misconduct off the bench;  
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the 
actual administration of justice is more serious 
than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the 
appearance of propriety;  
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the 
actual administration of justice, or its appearance 
of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct 
that does;  
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is 
less serious than misconduct that is premeditated 
or deliberated;  
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of 
the justice system to discover the truth of what 
occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the 
most just result in such a case, is more serious 
than misconduct that merely delays such discovery 
. . . .  [Brown I, supra at 1292-1293; Brown II,  
supra at 138.]  
10  
 
respondent’s fifty-six appointments to Fletcher over the  
course of seventeen months while the two were engaged in an  
intimate relationship, and her failure to disclose that fact,  
constituted a “pattern or practice” of misconduct.9
 With  
regard to factor two, the JTC observed that this misconduct  
constituted “misconduct on the bench.”  With regard to factor  
three, the JTC concluded that, although no evidence existed  
that respondent’s conduct resulted in any actual prejudice to  
the administration of justice, such conduct did have a  
negative effect on the appearance of propriety in judicial  
decision making and the integrity of the judicial office in  
general.10  With regard to factor five, the JTC concluded that  
respondent’s misconduct was “deliberate” as opposed to  
“spontaneous,” because she had considered whether the  
appointments to Fletcher were improper and had reached the  
9  Respondent argues that the fact that the proceedings 
over 
which 
she 
presided were “nonadversarial” in nature, i.e., 
that there was no prosecuting attorney present during 
Fletcher’s representation of the indigent defendants, somehow 
lessened her duty to disclose her relationship with Fletcher. 
We disagree with this argument because, as the JTC noted, 
despite respondent’s apparently fair disposition of these 
cases, her conduct did have a negative effect on the 
appearance of propriety in judicial decision making, and the 
appearance of integrity of the judicial office in general.  
10  The JTC acknowledged that respondent had fairly 
decided the issues before her in the cases in which she had  
appointed Fletcher.  
11  
subjective conclusion that they were not.  In this regard, the  
JTC found that respondent’s subjective conclusions about the  
propriety of presiding over these cases did “not negate the  
fact that the relationship existed and opposing counsel and  
others concerned with the integrity of the judiciary should  
have been so advised.” With respect to factor five, the JTC  
also determined that respondent’s “false statements” to the  
police appeared calculated to deflect any suspicion that she  
was the motive behind Leann Fletcher’s murder.  The JTC  
concluded that the fact that respondent corrected her  
erroneous statements “within a matter of days . . . [did] not  
diminish the gravity of her having made statements . . . on a  
material factor—the motive for the murder of Leann Fletcher.”  
In addition to these four factors, the JTC considered  
four additional factors.11
 First, the JTC concluded that  
11  As this Court noted in Brown I, supra at 1295, the JTC 
“should 
consider 
[the 
factors 
specified] 
and 
other 
appropriate 
standards that it may develop” when making recommendations. 
Here, the JTC additionally considered:  
(1) The judge’s conduct in response to the 
commission’s inquiry and disciplinary proceedings. 
Specifically, whether the judge showed remorse and 
made an effort to change his or her conduct and 
whether the judge was candid and cooperated with 
the commission;  
(2) 
The 
judge’s 
discipline 
record 
and  
reputation;  
12  
respondent had reacted to the JTC investigation and the  
subsequent disciplinary proceedings candidly, cooperatively,  
and in good faith.  Second, concerning the appointment  
procedures, the JTC found that respondent had instituted a  
“blind draw rotation system” subsequent to the investigation.  
According to the JTC, this demonstrated respondent’s ability  
to improve her conduct.  Further, concerning her statements to  
the police, the JTC found that, except for the first  
interview, 
respondent 
had 
fully 
cooperated 
with 
authorities 
in  
the prosecution of Fletcher.  The JTC also determined that  
respondent had no prior disciplinary record, and that there  
was considerable evidence of her competency and good  
reputation in the community.  Finally, the JTC found that  
respondent’s relatively short judicial career constituted a  
mitigating circumstance, and that there was no reason to  
believe that she would repeat the misconduct.  We now address  
(3) The effect the misconduct had upon the 
integrity of and respect for the judiciary;  
(4) Years of judicial experience. [In re  
Chrzanowski, Decision and Recommendation of the 
Judicial Tenure Commission, April 9, 2001, at 19­
21, 
citing 
American 
Judicature 
Society, 
How  
Judicial Conduct Commissions Work (1999), pp 15­
16.]  
We find the application of each of these factors to be 
reasonable in the present context.  
13  
  
 
 
  
the issues raised by respondent in her petition to reject the  
JTC’s recommendation.  
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review the recommendations of the JTC de novo. In re  
Hathaway, 464 Mich 672, 684; 630 NW2d 850 (2001); see also In  
re Ferrara, 458 Mich 350, 358-59; 582 NW2d 817 (1998).  We  
also review the JTC’s findings of fact de novo.  In re  
Jenkins, 437 Mich 15, 18; 465 NW2d 317 (1991); see also In re  
Somers, 384 Mich 320, 323; 182 NW2d 341 (1971).  
V. ANALYSIS  
Respondent first contends that the JTC’s conclusion that  
her statements were false is contrary to the master’s  
findings, and that the JTC should have deferred to such  
findings.  Second, respondent argues that the JTC’s lack of  
deference to the findings of the master was violative of her  
right to due process of law.  Specifically, she contends that  
the JTC’s combined function as an investigatory, as well as an  
adjudicatory body, created an actual risk of bias in the  
proceedings contrary to her entitlement to due process.  
Third, respondent contends that the JTC’s recommended  
suspension of twelve months without pay is disproportionate.  
We will address these issues in turn.  
A. THE JTC’S DEFERENCE TO THE MASTER’S FINDINGS  
14  
  
 
We do not believe that the JTC disputed the factual  
findings of the master concerning respondent’s statements to  
the police.12 
Rather, the JTC and the master agreed that  
respondent had initially indicated that her relationship with  
Fletcher started in February 1999 and ended one month  
afterward, when in fact, as respondent later acknowledged,  
this relationship lasted from January 1998 to August 1999.  
Further, both the master and the JTC agreed that respondent  
had initially indicated that she did not speak with Fletcher  
on August 17, 1999, following his wife’s death, when in fact,  
as respondent later acknowledged, she did speak with him.  
Nonetheless, respondent questions the JTC’s conclusions  
of 
fact 
concerning 
these 
statements. 
 
Specifically, 
respondent  
challenges the JTC’s conclusions that the statements were  
false in light of the master’s conclusion that, because the  
statements were taken from a “narrative” of the police  
interview, 
rather 
than 
from 
a 
direct 
transcript 
of  
respondent’s statements, the “substance if not the detail” of  
respondent’s 
statements 
“was 
accurate.”13  
Respondent 
therefore  
12  As noted in the JTC’s brief, “[The JTC] did not 
overrule any of the master’s findings of fact.  The [JTC] did, 
however, accord different weight than the master did and, at 
times, drew different inferences and conclusions.”  
13  Concerning the length of respondent’s relationship  
with 
Fletcher, 
the 
master 
stated 
that 
“[respondent]  
15  
 
  
 
contends that the JTC exceeded its authority in determining  
that the statements were false.  
In response to this argument, the JTC asserts that it  
reviews the findings and conclusions of law of the master de  
novo, and that the JTC is not compelled to defer to the  
master’s findings of fact.  We agree. The JTC is established  
by 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution 
and 
vested 
with 
the  
responsibility of determining whether to recommend to this  
Court that a judge be disciplined for “misconduct in office  
. . . or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the  
administration of justice.”  Const 1963, art 6, § 30. Section  
30(2) further provides that on recommendation of the JTC,  
the supreme court may censure, suspend with or 
without salary, retire or remove a judge for 
conviction 
of 
a 
felony, 
physical 
or 
mental  
disability which prevents the performance of  
judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent 
failure 
to 
perform 
his 
duties, 
habitual  
intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial  
acknowledged, during the interview, when identifying papers 
seized at the Fletcher home, that her relationship with 
Fletcher stretched back to at least November, 1998.” 
With  
respect to the contact with Fletcher, the master stated that 
“[respondent] provided the police with the substance of the 
communication from Fletcher” and “[i]t was of no importance 
whether Fletcher had spoken directly to her or by voice mail.” 
Thus, according to the master, even though respondent did not 
speak truthfully, i.e., that the relationship had begun in 
1998, and that she had in fact spoken to Fletcher, the 
information 
she 
provided 
implicitly 
acknowledged 
the 
length 
of 
the relationship and the “substance” of her conversation with 
Fletcher, and was therefore accurate.  
16  
 
to the administration of justice.  The supreme 
court shall make rules implementing this section 
and providing for confidentiality and privilege of 
proceedings.  
Thus, pursuant to this provision, it is the JTC’s, not the  
master’s conclusions and recommendations that are ultimately  
subject to review by this Court.  Additionally, § 30 provides  
that the Supreme Court shall make rules implementing the JTC’s  
authority and procedures. Subchapter 9.200 of the Michigan  
Court Rules was promulgated for this purpose.  As to the  
actual procedures in decision making, the court rules clearly  
indicate that the JTC has authority to review the master’s  
findings de novo.  MCR 9.221 governs the final decision of the  
JTC. In subsection (A) it provides in relevant part:  
The affirmative vote of 5 [JTC] members who  
have considered the report of the master and  
objections and who were present at an oral hearing 
provided for in MCR 9.217 . . . is required for a 
recommendation . . . . [Emphasis supplied.]  
Accordingly, all that is needed for the JTC to make a valid  
recommendation is that it consider the report of the master  
and objections, and that a five-member majority agree on the  
facts 
and 
the 
recommended discipline.  Further, subsection (B)  
of that court rule outlines procedures with regard to the  
JTC’s recommendation itself:  
The commission must make written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law along with its  
17  
 
 
 
recommendation for action with respect to the 
issues of fact and law in the proceedings, but may  
adopt the findings of the master, in whole or in 
part, by reference. [Emphasis added.]  
Although this provision addresses creation of the record, its  
language provides further explication of the JTC’s reviewing  
authority. The provision distinguishes between what the JTC  
must do, to wit, “make written findings of fact and  
conclusions of law”, and what the JTC may do, to wit, “adopt  
the findings of the master . . .”  Court rules, like statutes,  
are to be interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning.  
Kelley v Mich Public Serv Comm, 392 Mich 660, 668; 221 NW2d  
299 (1974); see also Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App  
701, 722; 575 NW2d 68 (1997).  Giving this court rule its  
plain meaning, we conclude that the JTC is not compelled to  
defer to the master’s findings of fact, but rather may review  
the findings of fact, and the conclusions of the master, de  
novo.14  In so concluding, we agree with the JTC that  
respondent’s statements were “false” and “deliberately made,  
14  While we conclude that, where a master is appointed, 
the JTC may exercise de novo review of the record, it must, 
like all other reviewing tribunals apply the standard of proof 
applicable in civil proceedings:  a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. MCR 9.211 (“the commission or the master 
shall proceed with a public hearing which must conform as 
nearly as possible to the rules of procedure and evidence 
governing the trial of a civil action”); see also In re Seitz, 
441 Mich 590, 593; 495 NW2d 559 (1993).  
18  
  
 
and with a full understanding of their implication,” and we  
disagree with the master that such statements were mere  
“inaccuracies”, which did not rise to the level of judicial  
misconduct.  
B. RESPONDENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAIM  
Respondent further claims that the JTC’s “simultaneous”  
role as a prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory body  
is violative of her due process rights. In particular, Judge  
Chrzanowski asserts that the JTC’s failure to defer to the  
factual findings of the master demonstrates that it could not  
separate 
itself 
from 
the 
fact-finding 
function, 
and 
therefore,  
that it could not, and did not impartially recommend  
discipline.
 We conclude that, while the JTC accepted the  
pertinent findings of fact of the master, it nonetheless based  
its recommendation upon a different characterization of the  
facts, to wit, that respondent’s statements to the officers  
were false, rather than merely “inaccurate”.  On the basis of  
our review of the record, we do not disagree with this  
conclusion, and, for the reasons set forth below, we hold that  
the JTC afforded respondent due process.  
It is uncontroverted that judges, like all other  
citizens, have protected due process interests under the  
Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1 § 17, and the Due  
19  
 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United  
States Constitution.  The scope and meaning of due process  
protections in circumstances where there is some commingling  
of prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory roles has  
been discussed by the United States Supreme Court in a  
circumstance similar to the present case.  In Withrow v  
Larkin, 421 US 35; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975), the  
United States Supreme Court held that there is no broad  
prohibition against members of an administrative agency  
investigating facts, instituting proceedings, and then making  
the necessary adjudication.  The Withrow case arose in  
Wisconsin where the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board  
commenced an investigation to determine whether a doctor had  
committed 
certain 
illegal 
acts. 
The 
board 
subsequently 
decided  
to hold a hearing to determine whether the doctor had  
committed the alleged acts and whether to suspend the doctor’s  
license temporarily. Id. at 39-41. The Court held that the  
board could adjudicate the same charges it had investigated  
and decided to prosecute without violating the doctor’s due  
process rights. Id. at 47-55. The Court stated:  
The 
contention 
that 
the 
combination 
of  
investigative 
and 
adjudicative 
functions  
necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of 
bias in administrative adjudication has a much more 
difficult burden of persuasion to carry.  It must  
20  
 
 
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in 
those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince 
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological 
tendencies 
and 
human 
weakness, 
conferring 
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same 
individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if 
the guarantee of due process is to be adequately 
implemented. [Id. at 47; see also McIntyre v Santa  
Barbara Co Emp Ret System, 91 Cal App 4th 730; 110 
Cal Rptr 2d 565, 569 (2001) (the combination of 
investigative and adjudicative functions does not, 
without more, constitute a due process violation); 
Marshall v Cuomo, 192 F3d 473, 484-485 (CA 4,1999) 
(due process rights are not violated simply by the 
combination of the investigatory, prosecutorial, 
and adjudicatory functions in one agency, but 
rather by actual bias or the high probability of 
bias); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 GA 
843; 462 SE2d 728 (1995) (the combination of 
investigative and adjudicative functions does not, 
per se, violate the requirements of due process).  
Notably, the Court further observed that, while the  
combination of investigative and adjudicative functions is  
not, without more, a due process violation, this “does not, of  
course, preclude a court from determining from the special  
facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the  
risk of unfairness is intolerably high.”  Withrow, supra at  
58.
 However, the Court found no such special facts and  
circumstances 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
professional 
discipline 
board  
in Withrow.  
This Court also has had occasion to address this due  
process issue especially in reference to the JTC and has  
21  
 
 
 
adopted the Withrow standards.15  In In re Del Rio, 400 Mich  
665, 690; 256 NW2d 727 (1977), we noted that “the authority is  
legion in support of the proposition that combining the  
investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does  
not necessarily violate due process in administrative  
adjudications such as judicial fitness hearings.”  Id., see  
also In re Moore, 464 Mich 98, 128-131; 626 NW2d 374 (2001).  
Further, we held in In re Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 530; 243  
NW2d 86 (1976), that “the combination of investigative and  
adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a  
due process violation . . . .” Quoting from Withrow, supra at  
58.  Thus, in accordance with Withrow, this Court held that a  
court should examine the matter to see if there are “special  
facts and circumstances present in the case before it” that  
present an “intolerably high” risk of unfairness. Id.  
15  In Brown I, we noted that the JTC’s application of the 
listed factors to judicial misconduct proceedings, by 
“ensur[ing] a consistent rule of law,” would assist in 
maintaining due process rights for JTC respondents.  Brown I,  
supra at 1295. We recognized that “[d]ue process of law is 
essentially the legal equivalent of procedural fairness . . . 
[and] a concept that ‘calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands.’” 
Id., citing Mathews v  
Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333-334; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 
(1976), and In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 110-111; 499 NW2d 752 
(1993).
 As we have indicated in this opinion, the JTC 
appropriately analyzed respondent’s conduct in light of the 
Brown factors, and in doing so, afforded respondent adequate 
due process protection.  
22  
  
  
We find, in reliance upon Withrow and the Michigan  
authorities, that the procedures followed by the JTC in  
reaching its decision conformed to the constitution and the  
court rules, and afforded respondent sufficient due process  
protections. We further conclude that there were no special  
facts or circumstances which would suggest that the risk of  
unfairness here, if indeed there was any, was “intolerably  
high.” Mikesell, supra at 531.  As to the procedures, first,  
pursuant to MCR 9.207(B)(3), the JTC conducted a preliminary  
investigation to determine whether respondent’s alleged  
conduct warranted further action. Second, after determining  
that sufficient evidence of misconduct existed, the JTC filed  
a formal complaint pursuant to MCR 9.208. Third, a master was  
appointed,16 notice was given, and a hearing was then afforded  
respondent under MCR 9.210(A) and MCR 9.211, with the JTC’s  
executive director serving as prosecutor-examiner under MCR  
9.201(6).  Fourth, after the hearing, when objections were  
lodged against the master’s findings, the examiner under MCR  
9.216 issued such objections in writing, with a supporting  
brief. MCR 9.216. Finally, the JTC’s conclusion that Judge  
Chrzanowski should be disciplined was ultimately just a  
16  Although it is not required that a master preside at 
a disciplinary hearing, the JTC under MCR 9.210 may request 
this Court to appoint a master, as it did in this case.  
23  
 
 
  
recommendation to this Court that we are charged to review de  
novo pursuant to deciding what discipline, if any, is  
appropriate.
 As in Withrow, the JTC’s investigative and  
adjudicative 
procedures 
are 
functionally 
separate;  
additionally, as distinct from Withrow, in which the  
investigation and the decision were undertaken by the same  
Medical Examining Board, here the master, the examiner, and  
the JTC panel are separate entities. If the board in Withrow  
did not violate due process rights by investigating, and then  
adjudicating claims, it can hardly be argued that the JTC’s  
procedures violated due process. Further, a majority of the  
members of the JTC are judges, and all the members who  
ultimately recommend discipline are assumed to be fair and  
impartial.  We conclude then that there was no actual bias in  
the JTC’s decision. It had authority to review the master’s  
findings 
de 
novo, 
and 
reasonably 
determined, 
by 
a  
preponderance of the evidence, that respondent had in fact  
made false statements.  We find these procedures adequately  
separated 
the 
JTC’s 
investigative 
and 
adjudicative 
functions.17  
C. THE PROPORTIONALITY OF THE JTC’S RECOMMENDATION  
17  There were three levels of review in the instant case:  
(1)  the master’s findings and conclusions issued after the 
public hearing, (2) the JTC’s de novo findings and  
recommendations, and (3) this Court’s de novo review.  
24  
 
 
  
The JTC has recommended that respondent be suspended for  
one year without pay.  Respondent argues that, in light of  
previous 
JTC 
recommendations, 
this 
sanction 
is  
disproportionate. Respondent cites several opinions written  
before Brown I and Brown II in which various sanctions were  
meted out for incidents of judicial misconduct. However, as  
Brown I indicated, review by this Court of previous judicial  
disciplinary proceedings has sometimes been “hampered because  
the standards by which the JTC [produced] its recommendations  
[were not always] apparent.”  Brown I, supra at 1292. Rather  
than analyze each of the cases raised by respondent in her  
argument challenging the proportionality of the recommended  
sanction, 
we 
have 
chosen 
instead 
to 
examine 
the  
proportionality of her sanction in light of the JTC’s  
application of the Brown factors. Here, as outlined in part  
III, the JTC set forth its analysis in the context of these  
factors.  We find this analysis to be reasonably done and  
therefore accord the recommendations of the JTC considerable  
deference.18  
18 Respondent argues that the inordinate amount of  
publicity 
surrounding her case influenced the JTC to recommend 
a harsher sanction than deserved. We disagree. As noted in  
this opinion, Canon 2(A) provides that “[a] judge must avoid 
all 
impropriety 
and 
appearance of impropriety,” and “[a] judge 
must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.”  
25  
  
This Court assesses the proportionality of the JTC’s  
recommendations 
of 
discipline, 
with 
the 
goal 
of 
“maintain[ing]  
the honor and the integrity of the judiciary, deter[ring]  
similar conduct, and further[ing] the administration of  
justice.” In re Hocking, 451 Mich 1, 24; 546 NW2d 234 (1996).  
“[T]he purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish but to  
maintain the integrity of the judicial process.”  In re Moore,  
supra at 118.  We conclude that the JTC’s recommendation of a  
one-year suspension of respondent without pay was a clearly  
reasonable one.  
However, the JTC could not have known, and thus did not  
consider, 
the 
overall 
length 
of 
respondent’s 
interim  
suspension, which has continued until the issuance of this  
opinion. We believe that some consideration should be given  
to the chastening effect of respondent’s seventeen-month  
interim suspension from judicial duties, although such  
suspension has been with pay.  In a democratically elected  
These provisions embody the concept that judges are  
particularly susceptible to public scrutiny, and that they 
must take appropriate account of the effects of their conduct 
upon the public’s perception of the courts and the justice 
system. While we do not agree that the JTC’s recommendation 
here was unduly influenced by the media’s focus, we  
nevertheless 
observe 
that 
caution 
must 
invariably 
be 
exercised 
by the JTC (as well as by this Court) to ensure that the 
attentions of the media upon particular judicial misconduct 
are placed in an appropriate perspective.  
26  
 
judicial system, such as we have in Michigan, suspension of a  
judge from judicial activities is itself a sanction with  
considerable consequences, and we believe that respondent has  
incurred many of those consequences.  We conclude that in this  
unique case it is reasonable to accord respondent credit for  
six months of her seventeen-month interim suspension.  
Accordingly, 
pursuant 
to 
MCR 
9.225,19 
we 
modify 
the  
recommendation of the JTC only to accord respondent credit for  
six months of the seventeen-month interim suspension that she  
has already served.20
 Therefore, we direct the following  
disciplinary action in this case:  
This cause having been brought to this Court  
by the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure  
Commission and having been briefed and argued by 
counsel, it is ordered that Respondent Hon. Susan  
19 MCR 9.225 provides:  
The Supreme Court shall review the record of 
the proceedings and shall file a written opinion 
and judgment which may direct censure, removal, 
retirement, suspension, or other disciplinary 
action, or reject or modify the recommendations of  
the commission. [emphasis added.]  
See also In re Hathaway, 464 Mich 672, 685; 630 NW2d 850  
(2001).  
20 We concur with the JTC that respondent should not be 
permanently removed from the bench.  We believe that evidence  
of respondent’s reputation and her past conduct on the court, 
apart from that at issue in the present case, suggest that she 
possesses the ability to serve honorably upon the bench, and 
to fully live up the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
27  
 
 
    
  
R. 
Chrzanowski 
shall 
be 
suspended 
from 
the  
discharge of all judicial and administrative  
duties, without pay, for a period of twelve months. 
However, respondent shall receive credit for six 
months served during the period of her interim 
suspension.  Respondent shall serve the remainder 
of her twelve-month suspension, six months without 
pay, to begin January 1, 2002.  After June 30, 
2002, respondent may return to the bench of the 37th  
District Court to serve the remainder of her term.  
Respondent’s conduct on the bench was unbecoming of the  
office that she holds. 
Her actions undermined public  
confidence 
in 
the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,  
and were prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Const  
1963, art 6, § 30.  “As the cornerstone of our tripartite  
system of government, the judiciary has a public trust to both  
uphold and represent the rule of law.” Hocking, supra at 6.  
“[J]udges . . . are bound to conduct themselves with honor and  
dignity.” Id.  
We conclude, as did the JTC, that respondent’s conduct  
was 
violative 
of 
the 
standards 
established 
by 
the  
constitution, the Michigan Court Rules, and the Code of  
Judicial Conduct.  We emphasize, moreover, that respondent is  
being disciplined only for her improper appointments of  
counsel, her failure to disclose those appointments, and for  
her false statements to the interviewing officers.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 We conclude that the JTC reasonably determined that  
respondent’s actions in the foregoing case constituted  
28  
 
 
 
 
judicial 
misconduct 
sufficient to subject her to the sanctions  
set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the  
Clerk is directed to issue the judgment order forthwith.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, 
WEAVER, 
KELLY, 
TAYLOR, and YOUNG,  
JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
29