Title: People v. Jones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97710
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2005

Docket No. 97710-Agenda 18-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES
							JONES, Appellee.
Opinion filed February 3, 2005. 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI). Afterward, hospital personnel administered blood and urine
tests at the request of the arresting officer, but without defendant's
consent. In defendant's DUI proceedings, he moved to suppress the
results of the blood and urine tests on the ground the tests were
nonconsensual. The circuit court granted defendant's motion and
ordered suppression of the test results. The State appealed, and the
appellate court affirmed the suppression order. This court granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal. The issue before us is whether
section 11-501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625
ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 2002)) grants a statutory right to refuse
chemical testing to a DUI arrestee in a situation not involving the
death or personal injury of another. We hold it does not and reverse
and remand.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant James Jones was involved in a car accident on April
3, 2002. The accident did not result in the death or personal injury of
another party. When the police officer responding to the accident
asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests, defendant complained
of pain in his sternum and was transported to Elmhurst Hospital.
Defendant stated he would not consent to a blood draw or urine
sample. At the hospital, the officer read the warning to motorist
document to defendant, informing him of the consequences of refusing
to submit to chemical testing. The hospital did not request blood or
urine samples for defendant's medical treatment. Although defendant
continued to object to the taking of the samples, he said he would not
physically resist their collection. Defendant provided a urine sample
to the officer, and at the officer's direction, a hospital phlebotomist
obtained a blood sample. The samples were then analyzed for alcohol
and drug content.
	On April 25, 2002, a bill of indictment was issued charging
defendant with four counts of aggravated driving while under the
influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (c-1)(3)
(West 2002)) and one count of aggravated driving while license
revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d) (West 2002)). On June 6, 2002,
he filed a motion in the circuit court of Du Page County to suppress
the results of his blood and urine tests, arguing the test results were
inadmissible as evidence against him because his blood and urine were
taken without his consent and were not taken in the course of
providing him with medical treatment.
	On June 26, 2002, the circuit court granted defendant's motion
to suppress on the ground that section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Vehicle
Code prohibited the tests. Section 11-501.2(c)(2) provides:
			"Notwithstanding any ability to refuse under this Code to
submit to these tests or any ability to revoke the implied
consent to these tests, if a law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in
actual physical control of a person under the influence of
alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or
compounds, or any combination thereof has caused the death
or personal injury to another, that person shall submit, upon
the request of a law enforcement officer, to a chemical test or
tests of his or her blood, breath or urine for the purpose of
determining the alcohol content thereof or the presence of
any other drug or combination of both." 625 ILCS
5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2002).
In a memorandum opinion, the circuit court reasoned that section
11-501.2(c)(2) clearly implies that "there is an ability to refuse to
submit to the testing required under the [Vehicle] Code" and that in
DUI arrests not involving the death or personal injury of another, the
legislature intended "to give the person [arrested] the ability to refuse
testing and not be compelled to do so."
	The State filed a motion to reconsider on July 18, 2002, arguing
the circuit court erred in finding that the legislature intended to
provide a DUI arrestee with the right to refuse blood or urine testing
under section 11-501.2(c)(2). The State suggested section
11-501.2(c)(2) merely addresses a distinction between the civil and
criminal aspects of the Vehicle Code. Section 11-501.2(c)(2), the
State argued, was enacted to ensure that an individual subjected to a
nonconsensual blood or urine draw after refusing to comply with an
officer's request for the draw in a situation involving the death or
personal injury of another would still be subject to summary
suspension of driving privileges on the basis of his or her refusal, as
provided by section 11-501.1. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West
2002). According to the State, even in a situation not involving the
death or bodily injury of another, an officer's decision to order
chemical testing after a DUI arrestee's refusal to submit would not
affect the admissibility of the test results in the arrestee's DUI
prosecution. It would, however, violate the section 11-501.1
summary suspension requirements and prevent summary suspension
of the arrestee's driving privileges. In an oral ruling, the circuit court
rejected this interpretation of section 11-501.2(c)(2) and denied the
State's motion to reconsider. The State then filed notice of appeal.
	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's suppression order.
344 Ill. App. 3d 684, 689. In interpreting section 11-501.2(c)(2), the
appellate court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius and concluded that by enumerating specific situations where
an alleged impaired driver can be subjected to nonconsensual chemical
testing in section 11-501.2(c)(2), the legislature implicitly excluded
all other situations. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 688-89. Specifically, the
appellate court reasoned that because section 11-501.2(c)(2)
explicitly authorizes nonconsensual chemical tests in situations
involving the death or personal injury of another, it does not authorize
them in situations not involving the death or personal injury of
another. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 688-89. In addition, the appellate court
concluded that its interpretation of section 11-501.2(c)(2) was
consistent with the legislative history and case law relating to
nonconsensual chemical testing in DUI cases. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 689.
The appellate court explained that because nonconsensual chemical
testing based on probable cause of impairment was permissible
without further restriction before the legislature enacted section
11-501.2(c)(2) (344 Ill. App. 3d at 689, citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 918, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
1834 (1966), People v. Todd, 59 Ill. 2d 534, 544 (1975)), and because
section 11-501.2(c)(2) specifically authorized nonconsensual chemical
testing in two situations where it was already permissible, the
legislature must have intended section 11-501.2(c)(2) to prohibit
nonconsensual chemical testing in situations other than the two
enumerated in the statute. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 689.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal in this case
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and we
now reverse the decisions of the appellate and circuit courts.

ANALYSIS	
The State challenges both the methodology and result of the
appellate court's interpretation of the statute at issue in this case. In
addition, the State argues that even if the appellate court was correct
in concluding section 11-501.2(c)(2) prohibits nonconsensual
chemical testing in situations that do not involve death or personal
injury, suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a
violation of that section. We review the statutory interpretation issue
de novo. See People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172 (2003). Because
we resolve that issue in favor of the State and find there was no
violation of the statute, we need not address the State's suppression
argument.

I
	The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to determine
and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 497 (2003). This inquiry properly begins by examining the
language of the statute at issue. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 15
(2004). The statute should be read as a whole and construed so that
no part of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous. People v. Ellis,
199 Ill. 2d 28, 39 (2002). Where the legislature's intent is not clear
from the statute's plain language, the court may examine the
legislative history. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 97-98 (1999).
	Section 11-501.2(c)(2) clearly allows nonconsensual chemical
testing where a police officer has probable cause to believe that a
vehicle driven by an individual under the influence has caused the
death or personal injury of another. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West
2002) ("[I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe
that a motor vehicle driven by or in actual physical control of a person
under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating
compound or compounds *** has caused the death or personal injury
to another, that person shall submit, upon the request of a law
enforcement officer, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood,
breath or urine"); see also People v. Ruppel, 303 Ill. App. 3d 885, 892
(1999) (holding that section 11-501.2(c)(2) authorizes nonconsensual
chemical testing in situations involving the death or personal injury of
another). The statute is silent on situations not involving death or
personal injury.
	The State suggests nonconsensual chemical testing is permissible
in all situations based on section 11-501.2(a)'s provision that
evidence of chemical test results "shall be admissible" when the tests
have been conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in
the statute. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(a) (West 2002). Defendant, on
the other hand, argues section 11-501.2(c)(2)'s provision that
nonconsensual chemical testing is permissible in situations involving
the death or personal injury of another "[n]otwithstanding any ability
to refuse under this Code to submit to these tests or any ability to
revoke the implied consent to these tests" recognizes a motorist's
right to refuse chemical testing. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West
2002). Section 11-501.2(a), however, merely refers to and
incorporates section 11-501.2(c)(2). Further, section
11-501.2(c)(2)'s negative references to "any ability to refuse"
chemical testing and "any ability to revoke the implied consent" to
chemical tests under the Vehicle Code do not unambiguously establish
a statutory right to refuse chemical testing. It is thus unclear, based
solely on the plain language of the statute, if section 11-501.2 of the
Vehicle Code grants a right to refuse chemical testing to a DUI
arrestee in situations not involving the death or personal injury of
another. As a result, we turn for guidance to the history of the right
to refuse chemical testing under Illinois law.

II
	The State and defendant agree on the status of Illinois law
regarding nonconsensual chemical testing prior to the enactment of
section 11-501.2(c)(2)-specifically, that nonconsensual chemical
testing of a DUI arrestee was permissible in all DUI situations, not
merely those involving death or personal injury. We concur.
	In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held the taking
of a blood sample without the defendant's consent or a search warrant
was a "reasonable" search under the fourth amendment where there
was probable cause to believe the defendant was intoxicated, and the
delay caused by obtaining a search warrant might have resulted in loss
of evidence of the defendant's intoxication, given the natural
dissipation of the alcohol in the defendant's blood. See Schmerber,
384 U.S.  at 768-72, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 918-20, 86 S. Ct.  at 1834-36. In
examining the reasonableness of the blood test procedure itself, the
Court observed blood "tests are a commonplace in these days of
periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that
the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people
the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Schmerber,
384 U.S.  at 771, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 920, 86 S. Ct.  at 1836. The Court
further noted that the manner in which the procedure was conducted
was reasonable, as the defendant's blood was taken "in a hospital
environment according to accepted medical practices." Schmerber,
384 U.S.  at 771, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 920, 86 S. Ct.  at 1836.
	This court endorsed the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Schmerber in People v. Todd, 59 Ill. 2d 534 (1975). Todd was a
consolidated appeal from three DUI convictions in which the
defendants sought interpretation of a provision of the applicable
Illinois DUI statute, arguing the statute prohibited the evidentiary use
of blood samples obtained without a DUI arrestee's consent. Todd, 59 Ill. 2d  at 536 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95½, par. 144, and Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 95½, par. 11-501). This court held the statute did
require consent to chemical testing for test results to be admissible as
evidence. Todd, 59 Ill. 2d  at 544. The court noted, however, that the
statute gave protection to DUI defendants greater than that required
by Schmerber, stating Schmerber made it "clear that a compulsory
blood test does not violate any constitutional rights of an individual
merely because he objected to such tests." Todd, 59 Ill. 2d  at 544. In
the absence of "a more limiting statutory provision," the court stated,
taking a blood sample does not require a DUI arrestee's consent.
Todd, 59 Ill. 2d  at 545.
		Todd focused on section 11-501 the Vehicle Code, which, at the
time Todd was decided, provided:
		"Evidence based upon a chemical analysis of blood, urine,
breath or other bodily substance shall not be admitted unless
such substance was procured and such analysis made with the
consent of the person as provided by this Chapter, whose
bodily substance was so analyzed." (Emphasis added.) Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95½, par. 11-501(c)(3).
The legislature eliminated this consent requirement through Public Act
82-311, effective January 1, 1982. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½,
par. 11-501; 625 ILCS Ann. 5/11-501, Historical &amp; Statutory Notes,
at 324-25 (Smith-Hurd 2002).
	Public Act 82-311 also rewrote section 11-501.1 to provide:			"A person requested to submit to a [blood, breath, or
urine] test as provided above shall be warned by the law
enforcement officer requesting the test that a refusal to
submit to the test will result in suspension of such person's
license to operate a motor vehicle ***. Following this
warning, if a person under arrest refuses upon the request of
a law enforcement officer to submit to a test designated by
the law enforcement agency ***, none shall be given ***."
(Emphases added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par.
11-501.1(c).
See 625 ILCS Ann. 5/11-501.1, Historical &amp; Statutory Notes, at 386-89 (Smith-Hurd 2002). This right to refuse chemical testing was, in
turn, repealed by Public Act 84-272, effective January 1, 1986.(1) See
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 11-501.1; 625 ILCS Ann.
5/11-501.1, Historical &amp; Statutory Notes, at 388-89 (Smith-Hurd
2002); see also People v. Giere, 192 Ill. App. 3d 520, 524-25 (1989)
(acknowledging that Public Act 84-272's amendment of section
11-501.1(c) in 1986 abrogated cases requiring consent on the basis of
the preamended version of that section).
	Finally, Public Act 82-311 added section 11-501.2 to the Vehicle
Code, providing for the admissibility of evidence of refusal. This
section stated, in part:
			"If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical
test ***, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed while the person under the influence of
alcohol, or other drugs, or combination of both was driving
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle." Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par. 11-501.2(c).
The current version of this provision is codified in section
11-501.2(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(1)
(West 2002).
	In sum, by 1986, the Vehicle Code clearly did not provide a right
to refuse chemical testing. Public Act 82-311 eliminated Illinois'
explicit consent requirement in 1982, but it added a right to refuse a
police officer's request for chemical testing, qualifying that right by
allowing the admission of evidence of refusal in court. Public Act
84-272 then eliminated altogether the right to refuse chemical testing
in 1986.
	A series of appellate court decisions subsequently confirmed the
absence of such a statutory right under Illinois law, holding that the
results of nonconsensual chemical tests of DUI arrestees were
admissible in court as evidence of intoxication. See, e.g., Village of
Algonquin v. Ford, 145 Ill. App. 3d 19, 21 (1986) ("No consent is
necessary to admit a breath-alcohol test into evidence in a DUI case");
People v. Brown, 175 Ill. App. 3d 725, 726-27 (1988) ("We hold that
voluntary consent is not a prerequisite to admissibility of the
breathalyzer results"); Giere, 192 Ill. App. at 524 ("[T]here is no
statutory requirement of consent before blood-alcohol test results may
be admitted in a DUI prosecution since that requirement was
abolished by the General Assembly effective January 1, 1982");
People v. Franciskovich, 202 Ill. App. 3d 693, 696 (1990) ("Any lack
of consent was no basis to prohibit admission of the defendant's
blood-alcohol test results"); People v. Byrd, 215 Ill. App. 3d 468,
470-71 (1991) ("[Section 11-501] no longer provides a restriction on
compulsory tests of bodily substances"); People v. Ayres, 228 Ill.
App. 3d 277, 279 (1992) ("Voluntary consent is not a prerequisite to
the admissibility of breathalyzer results in a DUI prosecution"
(emphasis omitted)). These decisions recognized as the law of Illinois
that a chemical test does not require consent absent a statutory
provision to the contrary. See, e.g., Ford, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 21;
Giere, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 524; Byrd, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 470; Ayres,
228 Ill. App. 3d at 279. Thus, before section 11-501.2(c)(2) went into
effect in 1995 (625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 1994)), the Illinois
Vehicle Code clearly did not provide a right to refuse chemical testing,
and under Todd, the absence of such a "limiting statutory provision"
(Todd, 59 Ill. 2d  at 545 ) meant results of nonconsensual chemical
tests were admissible in DUI prosecutions.

III
	Having established there was no right to refuse chemical testing
before section 11-501.2(c)(2) became law, we must decide whether
section 11-501.2(c)(2) created that right. It is presumed that, in
enacting new legislation, the legislature acts with full knowledge of
previous judicial decisions addressing the subject matter of that
legislation. Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1996). Likewise, it is
presumed the legislature acts rationally and with full knowledge of all
prior legislation. State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247-48 (1990). In
general, a statute will not be construed to change the settled law of the
state unless its terms clearly require such a construction. In re May
1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 388 (1992).
	We presume that, when the legislature enacted section
11-501.2(c)(2), it was aware of this court's acceptance in Todd of
Schmerber's principle that nonconsensual chemical testing is
permissible. In addition, we presume the legislature enacted section
11-501.2(c)(2) with full knowledge of its previous legislation on
chemical testing. In Illinois, the settled law regarding chemical testing
prior to the enactment of section 11-501.2(c)(2) was that no right to
refuse chemical testing existed. As a result, we are unwilling to
construe the language of section 11-501.2(c)(2) as creating a right to
refuse chemical testing. To do so would require a strained reading of
the statutory language and would ignore Illinois' past experience with
legislative enactments governing consent to chemical tests. We note
the legislature's prior enactments set forth consent requirements in
terms far more certain than section 11-501.2(c)(2)'s passing mention
of "any ability to refuse" and "any ability to revoke the implied
consent." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2002). The consent
requirement in the repealed version of section 11-501(c)(3) explicitly
provided that chemical test results "shall not be admitted" unless
obtained "with the consent" of the person tested. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975,
ch. 95½, par. 1-501(c)(3). Likewise, the language governing chemical
testing in the repealed version of section 11-501.1(c) stated in clear
terms that upon refusal to submit to chemical testing, "none shall be
given." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par. 11-501.1(c). Section
11-501.2(c)(2) does not contain comparatively clear and specific
language, and in its absence, we will not interpret it as altering the
settled law of this state.
	We find In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury to be
particularly instructive in this case, because there, as here, this court
declined to apply the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
in construing statutory language that enumerated specific situations in
which the statute applied without expressly excluding others. Will
County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 387-88. Instead, this court relied on
the principle that a statute will not be interpreted to effect a change in
settled law unless its terms clearly require such a construction. Will
County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 388. In Will County Grand Jury, a
grand jury issued a subpoena requiring two men to appear in a lineup
and submit head and pubic hair samples. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 385-86. The first issue this court disposed of was whether
the relevant statute imposed limitations on the grand jury's power to
gather physical evidence through the subpoenaing of witnesses. Will
County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 386. The statute provided that the
grand jury had a right to subpoena witnesses to testify and provide
documents. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 387. The men who
were subpoenaed argued that the statute did not give the grand jury
the right to subpoena other evidence, such as hair samples and in-person lineup appearances. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at
387. In rejecting this interpretation of the statute, this court noted that
while, generally, the expression of one thing in a statute excludes all
others, "that principle is not a rule of law," but rather "a rule of
statutory construction used by courts in arriving at the intention of the
legislature." Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d  at 387. Based on the
settled law of the state, as reflected in case law that existed prior to
the enactment of the statute at issue in that case, this court concluded
the statute did not exclude the right of the grand jury to demand
physical evidence from witnesses. Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 
at 388.
	For purposes of clarification, our holding in this case does not
give law enforcement officers unbridled authority to order and
conduct chemical tests. We do not suggest that a DUI arrestee's lack
of a right to refuse chemical testing under section 11-501.2(c)(2)
permits law enforcement officers to use physical force in obtaining
blood, urine, and breath samples. The Vehicle Code already eliminates
any advantage a DUI arrestee might hope to gain from refusing
chemical testing. Under section 11-501.2(c)(1), if a DUI arrestee
refuses to submit to chemical testing, evidence of the refusal is
admissible in the arrestee's DUI prosecution. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.2(c)(1) (West 2002); see also People v. Edwards, 241 Ill.
App. 3d 839, 843 (1993) (indicating that a defendant's refusal to
submit to blood testing has "some tendency to indicate a
consciousness of guilt" and is thus relevant and admissible in a DUI
prosecution). In addition, refusal to submit will result in the summary
suspension of the arrestee's driving privileges. This penalty is the same
as that imposed where tests are conducted and the results indicate a
blood-alcohol concentration over the legal limit. See 625 ILCS
5/11-501.1(c) (West 2002).

CONCLUSION
	We hold section 11-501.2(c)(2) does not grant a statutory right
to refuse chemical testing to a DUI arrestee. This interpretation of
section 11-501.2(c)(2) is consistent with well-established principles
of statutory interpretation. Thus, while the circumstances surrounding
defendant's DUI arrest did not involve death or personal injury, and
the chemical tests of defendant's blood and urine were performed over
defendant's objection, the results of defendant's chemical tests should
not have been suppressed. The circuit court erred in ordering
suppression of the test results, and the appellate court erred in
affirming that order. Accordingly, the judgments of the appellate court
and the circuit court are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
circuit court for trial.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.



JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In my view, the
appellate court properly affirmed the circuit court's order granting
defendant's motion to suppress.
	Section 11-501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2002)) is unambiguous. "The primary rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention
of the legislature ***." People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443
(1997). To determine legislative intent, a court should first look to the
plain language of the statute and accord the language its plain and
commonly understood meaning. Department of Public Aid ex rel.
Davis v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998); Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d  at
443; People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2004).
	The introductory clause of section 11-501.2(c)(2) provides:
"[n]otwithstanding any ability to refuse under this Code to submit to
these tests or any ability to revoke the implied consent to these tests
***." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2002). The plain language of
this clause clearly indicates the legislature's recognition of the right to
refuse to submit to chemical testing. The remaining clause of section
11-501.2(c)(2) provides:
			"[I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to
believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in actual physical
control of a person under the influence of alcohol, other drug
or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any
combination thereof has caused the death or personal injury
to another, that person shall submit, upon the request of a
law enforcement officer, to a chemical test or tests of his or
her blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the
alcohol content thereof or the presence of any other drug or
combination of both." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS
5/11-501.2(c)(2) (West 2002).
The plain language of this clause means exactly what it says. Section
11-501.2(c)(2) specifically authorizes nonconsensual chemical testing
of a suspected impaired driver only when a law enforcement officer
has probable cause to believe the intoxicated driver has caused death
or personal injury to another. Thus, the plain language of section
11-501.2(c)(2) mandates nonconsensual chemical testing only under
those two specific circumstances.
	Even if I accepted the majority's position that the statute is
ambiguous (slip op. at 5), I disagree with the majority's refusal to
apply the well-known aid of statutory construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, meaning "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990).
Although expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of law (slip
op. at 11), it is, however, an aid of statutory interpretation. Metzger
v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (2004). When a statute makes specific
references, it is to be inferred that all omissions are understood as
exclusions. Burke v. 12 Rothchild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429,
442 (1992). "This rule of statutory construction is based on logic and
common sense. It expresses the learning of common experience that
when people say one thing they do not mean something else."
Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d  at 44.
	Here, section 11-501(c)(2) explicitly authorizes nonconsensual
chemical testing when a suspected impaired driver has caused death
or personal injury to another. It does not expressly authorize
nonconsensual chemical testing in any other circumstance.
Accordingly, under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, by enumerating the specific circumstances when a suspected
impaired driver can be subjected to nonconsensual chemical testing,
the legislature implicitly excluded circumstances not involving death
or personal injury to another.
	Moreover, in applying rules of statutory construction, a statute
should be read as a whole and construed so that no word, phrase, or
section is rendered meaningless or superfluous. People v. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39 (2002). As the majority notes, prior to the enactment of
section 11-501.2(c)(2), nonconsensual chemical testing of a suspected
impaired driver was permissible in all circumstances. Slip op. at 5-6,
9. In order to give the subsequent enactment of section
11-501.2(c)(2) meaning, it must be interpreted as changing the prior
law.
	Since nonconsensual chemical testing was already permissible
before enactment of section 11-501.2(c)(2), the legislature's
subsequent enactment of section 11-501.2(c)(2) must be construed to
prohibit nonconsensual testing of a suspected driver in situations not
involving death or bodily injury. Conversely, the majority's
interpretation renders section 11-501.2(c)(2) meaningless surplusage
and enactment of the statute pointless.
	Additionally, the legislative debates negate the majority's
conclusion that section 11-501.2(c)(2) applies when no death or
personal injury to another occurs. "Valuable construction aids in
interpreting an ambiguous statute are the provision's legislative
history and debates, and the purposes and underlying policies."
Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996). On May
20, 1994, during the third reading of House Bill 3094 in the Senate,
Senator Raica stated:
		"What House Bill 3094 does is provides [sic] that if a police
officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is being
driven by a person who's under the influence and that
individual has caused the death or personal injury, the officer
can require the person to submit to a drug, breath, or urine
test." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20,
1994, at 110 (statements of Senator Raica).
	On June 14, 1994, during the House debate on House Bill 3094,
the following exchange occurred:
			"Deering: Senate Amendment #1 as I understand it,
requires a driver to submit to a breath or urine test under
stated circumstances, what are those circumstances?
			Dart: They've killed somebody or they've caused major
injury to them.
			Deering: So it's not if they get pulled over for suspected
DUI?
			Dart: Correct, correct. There has to be probable cause that
the death of the person was based upon their actions or that
the severe injury was.
			Deering: Thank you." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, June 14, 1994, at 116 (statements of
Representatives Deering &amp; Dart).
Thus, the legislative debates show that the legislature did not intend
the result obtained by the majority.
	Finally, the majority is inconsistent when it asserts "[w]e do not
suggest that a DUI arrestee's lack of a right to refuse chemical testing
under section 11-501.2(c)(2) permits law enforcement officers to use
physical force in obtaining blood, urine, and breath samples." Slip op.
at 11. Essentially, the majority concludes that a suspected impaired
driver does not have the right to refuse chemical testing, yet law
enforcement officers do not have the right to compel nonconsensual
testing. If law enforcement officers may not employ compulsion, how
does the majority suggest law enforcement officers obtain the
samples?
	In sum, Jones was arrested for driving under the influence and the
alleged violation did not result in death or personal injury to another.
It was, therefore, statutorily improper for the law enforcement officer
to order blood and urine samples to be taken over Jones' objection.
For these reasons I would affirm the circuit court and appellate court
rulings suppressing the test results. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
1.               
 Neither defendant nor the State mentioned the version of section 11501.1(c) in effect between 
January 1, 1982, and January 1, 1986 in its briefs. The enactment and repeal of this version of section 11501.1(c) are relevant to this 
case because they further clarify that no right of refusal existed in the Vehicle Code at the time section 11501.2(c)(2) was enacted.