Title: Yancy v. Shatzer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50280
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2004

FILED:  September 16, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TERRY YANCY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
WILLIAM W. SHATZER,
Portland City Code Hearings Officer;
and CITY OF PORTLAND,
Respondents on Review.
(CC 0008-08313; CA A114776; SC S50280)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 6, 2004.
Thomas M. Christ, of Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
briefs were Ed Johnson and Marc Jolin, Oregon Law Center.
Harry Auerbach, Senior Deputy City Attorney, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondents on review.
Roy Pulvers, of Lindsay, Hart, Neil &amp; Weigler, LLP,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon State
Bar.
Charles F. Hinkle, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated.  
Balmer, J., specially concurred and filed an opinion, in
which Riggs, J., joined.
* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, 
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judge. 185 Or App 740, 60 P3d 1156 (2003).
DE MUNIZ, J.
Portland police stopped petitioner Yancy for
jaywalking.  In the course of that contact, the police searched
petitioner and discovered less than an ounce of marijuana.  The
police then issued petitioner a citation that excluded him from
two Portland city parks for a period of 30 days.  Petitioner
timely appealed to the City of Portland Hearings Officer, which
affirmed the exclusion.  After the exclusion period had run,
petitioner sought to challenge the exclusion citation by means of
a writ of review in circuit court.  The circuit court rejected
petitioner's arguments on the merits.  Petitioner appealed.  The
Court of Appeals observed that the case was moot, because the
exclusion period had expired and ordered the circuit court to
vacate its judgment and dismiss the matter as moot.  Yancy v.
Shatzer, 185 Or App 704, 705, 60 P3d 1156 (2003).  Petitioner
sought review in this court.  We allowed review to consider
whether Oregon courts have the power to consider disputes that,
like the present one, are capable of repetition and yet evade
review because they became moot at some point in the proceedings. 
Having considered the question, we conclude that our judicial
power does not include the authority to adjudicate cases in which
there is no existing controversy.  We therefore affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.On June 9, 2000, the Portland police stopped petitioner
after he left Tom McCall Waterfront Park and proceeded across
Front Avenue against a pedestrian "Don't Walk" signal.  During
that contact, the police searched petitioner and discovered less
than an ounce of marijuana.  Based on the discovery of the
marijuana, the police issued petitioner a citation that excluded
him from Waterfront Park and Ankeny Plaza. (1)
  Under the terms
of the exclusion, which took effect immediately, petitioner would
be subject to arrest for criminal trespass if he were to return
to either park within 30 days.  
On June 13, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the
Code Hearings Officer.  By June 21, 2000, the hearing date,
almost half of the exclusion period had run.  The hearings
officer upheld the exclusion, citing petitioner's failure to obey
the traffic signal.  
On July 9, 2000, the exclusion period expired.  On
August 18, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of review
in the circuit court raising various constitutional challenges to
the ordinance.  See ORS 34.020 (authorizing use of writ by
circuit court to review proceedings before inferior tribunal). 
On September 9, 2000, the City of Portland filed a return to the
writ of review, after which the parties briefed and argued the
matter.  The return addressed petitioner's constitutional
arguments on their merits; it did not mention the fact that the
30-day exclusion period had run.  On April 20, 2001, the circuit
court issued an opinion in which it rejected petitioner's
constitutional challenges.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In a per
curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because the
period of exclusion expired on July 9, 2000, the case was moot
before the circuit court rendered its judgment.  The Court of
Appeals therefore remanded the matter to the circuit court with
instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the writ of
review.  Yancy, 185 Or App at 705.  We allowed petitioner's
petition for review.  
Since the adoption of the Oregon Constitution in 1857,
this court, from time to time, has been required to determine
whether a matter before it is one that is appropriate for
judicial disposition.  Historically, this court has described
that undertaking as a determination whether a "justiciable
controversy" exists.  In that regard, this court has stated that
"[a] controversy is justiciable, as opposed to abstract, where
there is an actual and substantial controversy between parties
having adverse legal interests."  Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293
Or 446, 449, 648 P2d 1289 (1982).  Similarly, this court has
observed that justiciability contemplates "that the court's
decision in the matter will have some practical effect on the
rights of the parties to the controversy."  Brumnett v. PSRB, 315
Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993).  Encompassed within the broad
question of justiciability are a constellation of related issues,
including standing, ripeness, and mootness.  For example, this
court has recognized that, even if a case is otherwise
justiciable, the court will dismiss it as moot if a "decision no
longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights
of the parties."  Id. at 406.  This court also has observed that
"[m]ootness is a species of justiciability, and a court of law
exercising the judicial power of the state has authority to
decide only justiciable controversies."  First Commerce of
America, Inc. v. Nimbus Center Assoc., 329 Or 199, 206, 986
P2d 556 (1999). 
Petitioner acknowledges the foregoing authorities, but
points out that this court at times has appeared to recognize an
exception to the rule against deciding moot cases.  For example,
in 1947, this court utilized such an exception in Perry v. Oregon
Liquor Commission, 180 Or 495, 498-99, 177 P2d 406 (1947).  In
Perry, the Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) suspended a
supper club's liquor license for 60 days.  A circuit court held
that the OLCC had overstepped its authority in suspending the
license and reinstated it.  The OLCC appealed to this court, but
the club moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that "the question
as to the suspension of the license [is] a moot one--and
therefore improper to consider" because the period of suspension
already had expired.  Id. at 498.  The court denied the motion,
indicating that the court would exercise its discretion to decide
a moot question for the guidance of an official administrative
agency, if the question involved the public welfare and was
likely to arise again in the future.  Id. at 498-99.  In reaching
that conclusion, the court did not examine the text and history
of the Oregon Constitution, but relied on cases from other
jurisdictions.  Id. at 499.  The court reversed the circuit
court's decision to lift the suspension of the license.  Id. at
500-01.  Subsequently, this court has followed Perry on several
occasions.  See, e.g., Stowe v. School District No. 8-C, Malheur
County, 240 Or 526, 528, 402 P2d 740 (1965); Linklater v. Nyberg,
234 Or 117, 120, 380 P2d 631 (1963); Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or
283, 333, 253 P2d 289 (1953); State ex rel Smith v. Smith, 197 Or
96, 126, 252 P2d 550 (1953); State ex rel Stadter v. Newbry, 196
Or 331, 337, 248 P2d 840 (1952); Oregon State Grange v. McKay,
193 Or 627, 631, 239 P2d 834 (1952) (illustrating proposition). 
However, none of those cases purported to analyze this court's
statement in Perry beyond citing it.
More recently, however, this court has rejected Perry's
rationale for deciding moot cases.  In Kay v. David Douglas
School Dist. No. 40, 303 Or 574, 577, 738 P2d 1389 (1987), this
court observed that no justiciable controversy existed between
the parties when the circuit court entered judgment.  Therefore,
the court concluded, the case was moot and should have been
dismissed.  In Mid-County Future Alternatives Comm. v. Metro Area
Local Gov't Boundary Comm'n, 304 Or 89, 92, 742 P2d 47 (1987),
this court asserted that it would not decide moot, nonjusticiable
cases, regardless of claims of public importance, "because of
[the court's] regard for the constitution of this state, which
separates the power and functions of the departments of
government, Or Const, Art III, § 1, and vests in the courts only
the 'judicial power.'  Or Const, Art VII (Amend), § 1."  A few
years later, in Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 189, 895 P2d 765
(1995), this court reaffirmed the observations that it had made
in Mid-County. 
In summary, Kay, Mid-County, and Barcik indicate, at
least in general terms, that the constitutional grant of
governmental power to the judiciary is limited by the
justiciability requirement.  Although the decisions in Mid-County
and Barcik express doubts about this court's constitutional
authority to decide moot cases, this court has not undertaken a
full constitutional analysis of that subject.  This case presents
the occasion to do so.
Two constitutional provisions, Article III, section 1,
and Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution
make reference to the judiciary.  Article III, section 1, was
adopted as part of Oregon's original constitution.  That
provision states:
"The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three [separate] departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, including the administrative, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of
the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided." 
The phrase "judicial power" appears in Article VII (Amended),
section 1, which provides that "[t]he judicial power of the state
shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as
may from time to time be created by law."  Article VII (Amended),
section 1, adopted by the people on November 8, 1910, superseded 
similar text set out in Article VII (Original), section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution.  That former section provided that "[t]he
Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a [Supreme] Court,
[Circuit] Courts, and County Courts, which shall be Courts of
Record having general jurisdiction, to be defined, limited, and
regulated by law in accordance with this Constitution." (2)
 
The text of Article III, section 1, prompts an initial
observation.  The scope of judicial power can be defined in two
ways:  by what it is and by what it is not.  The judicial power
is distinct from the executive power and the legislative power,
and it resides in a department separate from the legislative and
the executive departments.  The judicial department may not
exercise any of the functions of one of the other departments,
unless the constitution expressly authorizes it to do so. 
However, standing alone, that constitutional limitation is of
little assistance.  That is, the concept of separation of powers
suggests what judicial power is not, but, without further
investigation, it does little to explain what judicial power is.  
To make that determination, we must ascertain the
intended scope of the "judicial power" described in Article VII
(Amended), section 1.  That provision does not define judicial
power.  Instead, Article VII (Amended), section 1, identifies the
entities that exercise judicial power, namely, "one supreme court
and * * * such other courts as may from time to time be created
by law."  Article VII (Original) also merely identified the
location of judicial power, establishing it in "a [Supreme]
Court, [Circuit] Courts, and County Courts[.]"  Like Article III,
the text of Article VII (Amended), section 1, offers no other
textual clues about the scope of the "judicial power."  That lack
of assistance notwithstanding, the present case requires us to
determine the intended meaning of that term.  
When "interpreting a constitutional provision adopted
through the initiative petition," the court's "task is to discern
the intent of the voters."  Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or
38, 56, 11 P3d 228 (2000) (citing Roseburg School Dist. v. City
of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595 (1993)).  In
determining that intent, the "best evidence [] is the text of the
provision itself[; however, the] context of the language of the
ballot measure may also be considered."  Id.  "If the intent of
the voters is not clear from the text and context of the
initiated constitutional provision, the court turns to the
history of the provision."  Id. (citing Ecumenical Ministries v.
Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994)).
As noted above, Oregon voters adopted Article VII
(Amended) through the initiative process in 1910.  In doing so,
the phrase "judicial power" was repeated, without modification,
from Article VII (Original) in 1910.  The term was left undefined
and unchanged, except for removal of the capitalization of the
letter "J."  In the new provision, the list of entities that
would exercise judicial power was changed slightly, but that
change does not reveal any particular intent as to the meaning of
the phrase, "judicial power."  Neither are we aware of any
historical evidence that suggests that the voters intended to
alter the meaning of the term "judicial power" from the meaning
that the term enjoyed in 1857.  Given the drafter's decision to
carry over the old term into the new amendment, and given the
lack of any evidence from any source of which we are aware that,
identical phrasing aside, something new and different was
intended, we conclude that the voters intended no change to the
substantive meaning of the term "judicial power" in their
adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 1.  See generally
State v. Conger, 319 Or 484, 491-502, 878 P2d 1089 (1994) (to
understand meaning of text set out in Article VII (Amended),
section 5, court examined historical background of identical text
in Article VII (Original)).  
Because we conclude that the 1910 voters did not intend
to change the meaning or scope of "judicial power" in Article VII
(Amended), section 1, from what it was understood to include in
1857, we must inquire into the meaning and scope of "judicial
power" when Article VII (Original) of the Oregon Constitution was
adopted in 1857.  When construing original provisions of the
Oregon Constitution, this court ascertains and gives effect to
the intent of the framers of the provisions at issue.  Stranahan,
331 Or at 54-55.  That intent is determined by (1) analyzing the
text and context of the provisions, giving words the same meaning
that the framers would have ascribed to them; (2) reviewing the
historical circumstances that led to their creation; and (3)
examining the case law interpreting those provisions.  Priest v.
Pearce, 314 Or 411, 416, 840 P 2d 65 (1992).  This court's goal
is to apply faithfully the principles embodied in those
provisions to modern circumstances.  State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282,
297, 4 P3d 1261 (2000). 
As we observed previously, the meaning of "judicial
power" is not clear from the text and context of Article VII
(Original), section 1.  We therefore turn to the historical
circumstances surrounding the creation of that provision.  In
doing so, we necessarily, and briefly, address the history of the
development of the Oregon judiciary and the judicial power
associated with that branch of government. (3)
  
The creation of an Oregon judiciary is related to the 
death, on February 15, 1841, of Ewing Young, the "wealthiest
American citizen" from the Pacific Northwest territory.  Lawrence
T. Harris, A History of the Judiciary of Oregon, in Oregon
Supreme Court Record 73, 75 (Portland, Stevens-Ness 1938).  Young
had died intestate and had no known heirs.  Id.  Because Young's
business had been such an important economic influence on the
territory, the territory's inhabitants felt that they needed to
devise a system to settle his affairs in an orderly fashion.  Id. 
At a meeting involving "'some of the inhabitants of the
Willamette Valley,'" a "provisional government" was formed
consisting of "a Governor, a supreme judge with probate powers,
three justices of the peace, three constables, and an attorney
general."  Id.
Later, in May 1843, another public meeting was held to
institute more formally the provisional government.  Id. at 76. 
At that meeting, a legislative committee was formed, and, in July
1843, that committee presented a report intended to be "the first
body of rules or regulations which made any approach to laws" of
the Oregon Territory.  Id.  The report was adopted by vote of the
inhabitants of the territory and vested the judicial power "in a
supreme court consisting of a supreme judge and two justices of
the peace, [and] a probate court * * *."  Id. at 76-77.
It was later determined that the original laws required
reorganization, and, in July 1845, the inhabitants overwhelmingly
adopted a new Organic Law.  Id. at 79-80.  Article I, section 8,
provided that "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in a supreme
court, and such inferior courts of law, equity and arbitration,
as may by law, from time to time be established."  Organic Law of
the Provisional Government of Oregon (reprinted in General Laws
of Oregon, p 62 (Deady 1845-64)).  The Supreme Court was to
consist of "one judge."  Id.  Section 8 provided further that,
"whenever called upon by the house of representatives, the
supreme judge shall give his opinion, touching the validity of
any pending measure." (4)
  Id.  The Organic Law, therefore
approved of the supreme judge providing advisory opinions to the
so-called legislature regarding the validity of proposed
measures. 
After Congress officially recognized Oregon as a
territory of the United States in 1848, An Act to Establish the
Territorial Government of Oregon (reprinted in General Laws of
Oregon, p 66 (Deady 1845-64)), the citizens of the Oregon
Territory voted, in 1857, to allow a group of sixty persons to
convene and draft a constitution that would serve as a precursor
to a petition for statehood.  David Schuman, The Creation of the
Oregon Constitution, 74 Or L Rev 611, 611-15 (1995).  The
drafters adapted Article VII (Original), section 1, from Article
VII, section 2, of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The Oregon
Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention of 1857 475-76 (Charles Henry Carey ed, State Printing
Dept, 1926).  Article VII (Original) did not include any
provision directing the judiciary to provide advisory opinions at
the legislature's request.  The historical record contains no
discussion about the meaning or scope of judicial power or any
explanation as to why the authorization for advisory opinions
expressed in the Organic Law was not included in the new
constitution. (5)
  See Claudia Burton, A Legislative History of
the Oregon Constitution of 1857 — Part II, 39 Willamette L Rev
245, 253-58, 395-400 (2003) (describing proceedings surrounding
the adoption of Article III, section 1, and Article VII
(Original), section 1). 
Because no definitive answer regarding the scope of
judicial power has emerged from the constitutional text and
historical underpinnings of that text, we turn next to the
accepted understanding of the concept of judicial power predating
the adoption of the Oregon Constitution in 1857 as reflected in
contemporary secondary sources, United States Supreme Court case
law, and that of this court.  See generally DeMendoza v. Huffman,
334 Or 425, 437, 51 P3d 1232 (2002) (examining legal works that
were "pervasive in American courts in 1850s"); Smothers v.
Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 94-112, 23 P3d 333 (2001)
(examining early commentaries and treatises, colonial history,
and case law from other jurisdictions).
Although British courts enjoyed the power to announce
advisory opinions, the basis for American concepts of
justiciability and judicial power lies not in English precedents,
but in the structure of government as set out in the United
States Constitution and its description of "the uniquely American
relationship between the courts and other branches of
government."  13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller &amp; Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice &amp; Procedure §3529, 294 (2ed 1984). 
Article III, section 1, of the United States Constitution (6) makes reference to the judicial power of federal courts, but
without defining the phrase.  At the 1787 constitutional
convention, James Madison "doubted whether it was not going too
far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases
arising Under the Constitution, &amp; whether it ought not to be
limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature."  2 Max Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 430 (1911).  He
believed that "[t]he right of expounding the Constitution in
cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that
Department."  Id.  In other words, Madison believed that
"expounding the Constitution" should take place only in cases "of
a Judiciary Nature."  That remark suggests that the drafters
understood that constitutional exegesis ought to occur only in
the context of dispute resolution.  We now turn to case law
addressing the nature of judicial power. 
Early federal case law is more instructive.  In 1792, a
federal statute provided that disabled Revolutionary War veterans
could apply to the federal circuit court for benefits, which
would determine veterans' eligibility.  Hayburn's Case, 2 US 408, 
409 (2 Dall), 1 L Ed 436 (1792).  The Secretary of War then could
decide whether to withhold benefits if he suspected that the
court had erred in its judgment, and Congress could review the
decision of the Secretary of War.  In other words, the court's
function was to render a nonfinal opinion, subject to executive-branch revision.  As a result, some federal courts refused to
enforce the act.  The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus to enforce the law.  Id.  At first,
the Attorney General's mandamus petition maintained that its
request for relief was "ex officio, without an application from
any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution
of an act of congress, particularly interesting to a meritorious
and unfortunate class of citizens[.]"  Id.  When the court
rejected that argument, the Attorney General claimed that he was
acting on behalf of Hayburn, a veteran.  Id. at 409.  The court
ultimately declined to issue a decision in the case because
Congress had changed the procedure for relief, and the case had
become moot.  Id. at 410.  Furthermore, in a footnote, the
Hayburn court related, with apparent approval, letters from three
lower courts to President Washington.  Id. at n 2.  The letters
rebuffed, on separation-of-powers grounds, the idea that courts
could provide the kind of advisory opinion that the statute
contemplated.  Id.   
Viewed narrowly, Hayburn's Case decided only that the
Attorney General could not prosecute the matter ex officio.  Once
Congress enacted new legislation, the court considered the
controversy at an end and refused to consider the matter further;
it made no direct comment on the subject of advisory opinions.   
See generally Maeva Marcus and Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A
Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wisc L Rev 527 (discussing
procedural posture of case).  The presence of the letters,
however, has led subsequent courts to rely on Hayburn's Case as
counseling against the practice of courts issuing advisory
opinions.
In 1852, the United States Supreme Court relied on
Hayburn's Case in a dispute involving claims arising out of a
treaty between the United States and Spain.  United States v.
Ferreira, 54 US 40, 49 (13 How) 14 L Ed 40 (1852).  Congress had
enacted legislation providing that the federal court in Florida
would evaluate the claims and then forward them to the Secretary
of the Treasury for approval and payment.  Id. at 45.  In that
instance, the Supreme Court concluded that, where the executive
had some discretion in approving the court's judgment, the lower
court was not acting pursuant to the judicial power, because it
was providing an advisory, non-final, opinion.
Another United States Supreme Court case, discussing a
dispute over a state's ability to grant railroad construction
rights, further illustrates the court's reluctance, during the
period just before Oregon statehood, to issue advisory opinions:
"But on this application for an injunction against the
construction of respondents' [rail]road, the chancellor
was not bound to decide the question, by anticipation: 
And, although he may have thrown out some intimation as
to his present opinion on that question, he has very
properly left it open for future decision, to be
settled by a suit at law, or in equity, 'upon the facts
of the case as they may then appear.'  But however
probable as this dispute or contest may be, it is not
for this court to anticipate it, and volunteer an
opinion in advance."  
Richmond Fredericksburg &amp; Potomac RR Co v. Louisa RR Co, 54 US
71, 81, (13 How 71), 14 L Ed 55 (1851).  
Early Oregon cases discussing judicial power are
scarce; however, one offers some insight with regard to the
question here.  Burnett v. Douglas County, 4 Or 388 (1873),
involved an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court denying 
a writ of review.  Id. at 389.  The appellants had sought a writ
of review to challenge the manner of financing a county road and
the court's general order regarding redemption of county-issued
warrants.  Id.  The order, however, was not entered in the
context of litigation, but was directed to the county clerk.  Id.
at 390.  The court concluded that, in directing the county clerk,
the circuit court had not acted in a judicial capacity.  Id. at
392.  In that regard, the court stated that, in an exercise of
the judicial power, "proper parties [must appear] before the
court, for in all judicial proceedings there must be proper
parties who must be, in some way, particularly affected by the
judgment, order or determination." (7)
  Id. at 391-92.  
Some years later, in David v. Portland Water Committee,
14 Or 98, 104-05, 12 P 174 (1886), a number of taxpayers
challenged the constitutionality of a statutorily authorized
committee that had the power to issue bonds.  However, at that
point, the committee had not levied a tax on the taxpayers.  At
the end of the opinion, the court expressed doubt that it had the
authority to hear the suit, but decided to consider it anyway: 
"A question has been raised as to the right of the respondents to
maintain the suit -- as to whether they have any standing in
court.  My impressions are adverse to the right; but in view of
the importance of the case, we have concluded not to consider
[the standing issue]."  Id. at 125.  The court offered no
justification, constitutional or otherwise, for entertaining a
case in which the plaintiffs seemed to lack standing, beyond the
fact that the court seemed to believe that the public needed an
answer.  We deem David of little assistance in determining the
parameters of judicial power, because it offered no substantial
premise for its decision to decide a matter other than its
importance.  In order to act, courts must exercise "judicial"
power; the importance of the issue that the courts are asked to
decide, standing alone, does not transform resolution of the
issue into an exercise of judicial power. 
While the Oregon courts wrestled with the issue, the
United States Supreme Court eventually changed its own course and 
recognized an exception to the federal mootness doctrine that
allows for discretionary review of disputes "capable of
repetition, yet evading review."  See Southern Pacific Terminal
Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 US 498, 514, 31 S
Ct 279, 55 L Ed 310 (1911) (recognizing exception).  Since that
time, every state, except Oregon, has adopted that exception and
has employed the exception from time to time in cases involving
alleged harms of a short-term effect -- harms that are too
ephemeral for courts to adjudicate before factual developments
render the disputes involving those harms moot.  
The United States Supreme Court itself, however,
continues to grapple with the constitutional basis for the
nonjusticiability of moot disputes, the very concept that led to
the creation of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exception.  In Honig v. Doe, 484 US 305, 108 S Ct 592, 98 L Ed 2d
686 (1988), the Court split over both the origin and the
parameters of the mootness doctrine.  Honig involved a claimed
violation of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)
respecting two students, Doe and Smith.  The majority concluded
that, although Doe's case was moot because he no longer was
eligible for EHA benefits, the case remained justiciable because
there was a reasonable likelihood that Smith again would suffer
the deprivation of EHA rights that had given rise to the action. 
As part of that analysis, the majority observed: 
"Under Article III of the Constitution this Court may
only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 US 539, 546, [49 L
Ed 2d 683, 96 S Ct 2791] (1976); Preiser v. Newkirk,
422 US 395, 401, [45 L Ed 2d 272, 95 S Ct 2330] (1975). 
That the dispute between the parties was very much
alive when suit was filed, or at the time the Court of
Appeals rendered its judgment, cannot substitute for
the actual case or controversy that an exercise of this
Court's jurisdiction requires.  Steffel v. Thompson,
415 US 452, 459, n 10, [39 L Ed 2d 505, 94 S Ct 1209]
(1974); Row v. Wade, 410 US 113, 125, [35 L Ed 2d 147,
93 S Ct 705] (1973)."
Honig, 484 US at 317-18.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a separate
concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's comments
regarding Article III.  The Chief Justice observed that that
Court's mootness cases often purported to find their support in
Article III of the United States Constitution, yet the Court
simultaneously asserted an exception -- cases capable of
repetition yet evading review -- that was not in that section of
the constitution:
"If it were indeed Art. III which — by reason of
its requirement of a case or controversy for the
exercise of federal judicial power — underlies the
mootness doctrine, the 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review' exception relied upon by the Court in
this case would be incomprehensible.  Article III
extends the judicial power of the United States only to
cases and controversies; it does not except from this
requirement other lawsuits which are 'capable of
repetition, yet evading review.'  If our mootness
doctrine were forced upon us by the case or controversy
requirement of Art. III itself, we would have no more
power to decide lawsuits which are 'moot' but which
also raise questions which are capable of repetition
but evading review than we would to decide cases which
are 'moot' but raise no such questions."
Id. at 330 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  The Chief Justice,
recognizing the dilemma, suggested that the federal mootness
doctrine enjoyed an "attenuated connection" to Article III that
could be disregarded if the court deemed it necessary.  Id. at
331.  With regard to the case that established the exception,
Southern Pacific, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that the
exception was premised on pragmatic considerations, rather than
Article III.  Id. at 330-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
As we already have explained, this court followed
Southern Pacific and adopted that exception in Perry.  Like
Southern Pacific, Perry purported to recognize the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception.  In doing so, however,
the Perry court simply cited Southern Pacific (8)
 as well as
cases from other states, and announced the exception as a
convenience to the executive branch of government:  "Where the
question is one involving the public welfare, and there is a
likelihood of it being raised again in the future, a court in the
exercise of its discretion may decide it for the guidance of an
official administrative agency."  Perry, 180 Or at 498-99.  Perry
thus established an exception to the mootness doctrine without
undertaking any effort to determine whether such an exception was
compatible with the scope of judicial power granted under the
Oregon Constitution.
We cannot assert that the constitutional text and pre-1857 state and federal cases lead to a definitive conclusion
regarding the scope of judicial power under the Oregon
Constitution.  We believe, however, that the prevailing view
throughout the American legal landscape in 1857 was that the
constitutional grant of judicial power did not include the power
to decide cases that had become moot at some stage of the
proceedings.  As petitioner acknowledges, instances of courts
deciding moot cases based on the perceived need to resolve a
recurring issue involving the public welfare did not occur until
the period between 1895 and 1915.  See, e.g., In re Fairchild,
151 NY 359, 361, 45 NE 943 (1897) (deciding moot election issue
because it "was of sufficient importance to require * * *
determination by [that] court"); In re Madden, 148 NY 136, 42 NE
534, 535 (1895) (deciding question "of no practical importance in
the particular case" because it was likely to recur); Matter of
Cuddeback, 3 App Div 103, 39 NY Supp 388, 392 (1896) (deciding
moot case because it was of "great public interest").  As we have
explained, however, the adoption of Article VII (Amended) in 1910
did nothing to change the earlier understanding of judicial power
as that phrase appeared in Article VII (Original). 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the framers of
the Oregon Constitution, and those who later adopted that
constitution, are most likely to have understood the grant of
judicial power in the restrained sense espoused in the early
Supreme Court cases -- that is, an authority limited to the
adjudication of an existing controversy.  Because the scope of
judicial power that they created is limited in the manner just
described, this court did not, in 1857, have the authority to
create a rule that exceeded that circumscribed grant of power. 
Neither did the court acquire such authority in 1910.  
It follows, we believe, that Perry and the cases that
relied on Perry were wrongly decided.  They are overruled.  The
more recent cases, such as Barcik, are correct.  The judicial
power under the Oregon Constitution does not extend to moot cases
that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Petitioner has requested this court to decide a matter
that no longer is a controversy between the parties.  As we have
explained, Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution constrains us from doing so.  The circuit court
therefore must vacate its judgment and dismiss petitioner's writ
of review as moot.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated.
BALMER, J., specially concurring.
This case never presented a justiciable controversy,
because petitioner's 30-day exclusion order had expired before he
filed his petition for review in circuit court.  For that reason,
I agree with the majority that the circuit court judgment should
be vacated and that the petition filed in the circuit court
should be dismissed as moot. (9)
  The majority, however, like
the parties, has framed and decided a different and important
issue: "whether Oregon courts have the power to consider disputes
that, like the present one, are capable of repetition and yet
evade review because they become moot at some point in the
proceedings."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 1).  I write separately,
because I disagree with the majority's view that Oregon courts
have no power to consider such disputes.
The majority holds that "[t]he judicial power of the
state," as that phrase is used in Article VII (Amended), section
1, of the Oregon Constitution, does not extend to a case that
becomes moot after filing because the events involved are of such
short duration.  Unlike the majority, I find nothing in the text,
context, or historical background of that constitutional
provision to suggest that a case that presents a dispute that is
subject to the "judicial power" when it is filed somehow moves
beyond that power simply because the events involved are so brief
that they inevitably conclude before the courts can render a
final decision.  On the contrary, along with the federal courts
and the courts of the other 49 states, I would recognize an
exception to the general mootness doctrine for that small group
of cases that are capable of repetition but evade judicial review
because the events involved are of such brief duration. (10)

The majority properly begins its analysis by attempting
to determine whether that exception fits within the Oregon
Constitution's grant of judicial power.  Countless appellate
opinions have considered what the judicial power entails, and the
precise scope of that power cannot be delineated in the
abstract. (11)
  This court, like the federal courts and other
state courts, interprets the constitutional grant of the judicial
power to authorize courts to decide only cases that present a
"justiciable controversy."  Cummings Constr. v. School Dist. No.
9, 242 Or 106, 109-110, 408 P2d 80 (1965). (12)
  Whether a case
is "justiciable" depends on whether "the interests of the parties
to the action are adverse" and whether "the court's decision in
the matter will have some practical effect on the rights of the
parties."  Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194
(1991).  Mootness is one application of the latter principle: 
"Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court's
decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning
the rights of the parties, will be dismissed as moot."  Id. at
406.  
Those attributes of "justiciability" are part of an
interpretive effort by this court to identify the boundaries of
the "judicial power," and I do not disagree with them.  The
constitutional test, however, is whether the resolution of a
particular case is within the "judicial power"; the attributes of
a justiciable controversy are simply devices to help courts
interpret and apply the constitutional text.  Viewed from that
perspective, the mootness doctrine, although rooted in the
constitutional authorization that the courts exercise "judicial
power," includes an important prudential component.  For reasons
that I explain below, in my view, when strict application of the
mootness doctrine would have the effect of preventing judicial
review of an issue of law because the issue is one that is
capable of repetition, yet evades review, the court may exercise
its discretion to decide an otherwise justiciable case that has
become moot. (13)
  Nothing in the text of Article VII (Amended)
compels the conclusion that such a case is outside the judicial
power, and such a case retains sufficient traditional attributes
of justiciability that a court is not constitutionally barred
from deciding it.
Decades of this court's decisions support the
conclusion stated above.  During the 50-year history of the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception in Oregon,
the exception has been viewed as a pragmatic, prudential response
to the adverse consequences of a strict application of the
mootness doctrine.  Half a century ago, this court stated its
rule with admirable clarity:
"We agree that courts ordinarily do not determine moot
questions.  There is, however, a well recognized
exception to this general rule.  Where the question is
one involving the public welfare, and there is a
likelihood of it being raised again in the future, a
court in the exercise of its discretion may decide it
for the guidance of an official administrative agency." 

Perry v. Oregon Liquor Commission, 180 Or 495, 498-99, 177 P2d
406 (1947).  The majority argues that the reference in Perry to
deciding the case "for the guidance of an official administrative
agency" suggests that the court viewed the case as involving an
advisory opinion.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 6).  However, the
dispute in Perry came to the courts as a justiciable case, it was
litigated between two adverse parties, the same issue was likely
to be raised in the future, and this court correctly saw the
benefit of rendering a decision on the merits.  In the 40 years
after Perry, this court on at least five occasions, and the Court
of Appeals on at least two additional occasions, decided cases
that were technically moot, but that came within the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception. (14)
  In each of
those cases, the appellate courts decided important legal
questions that otherwise would have remained unresolved.  In my
view, those decisions involved the proper exercise of the
judicial power.  I would overrule this court's decision in Barcik
v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 188, 895 P2d 765 (1995), which,
building on statements in several earlier cases, expressly
repudiated the "capable of repetition, but evading review"
exception.
The majority is certainly correct that the mootness
doctrine, and the exceptions to it, are closely related to the
"judicial power" as that term is used in Article VII (Amended),
section 1.  However, this court consistently has viewed the
contours of mootness as a prudential, rather than a
constitutional, matter.  See Oregon State Grange v. McKay, 193 Or
627, 631, 238 P2d 778 (1951) on reh’g, 239 P2d 834 (1952) ("We,
of course, recognize that courts will, in the exercise of
discretion, decide moot questions when the conditions referred to
in the Perry case are present.").  With this decision, the
majority bases the mootness doctrine entirely on its
interpretation of the Oregon Constitution and concludes that the
limits of the "judicial power" bar this court from ever
considering a case that has become moot.
In my view, however, nothing in the Oregon Constitution
prohibits this court from deciding a case that becomes moot
during the pendency of the case, when the case involves issues
that are capable of repetition, yet evade review.  First I
consider the authorities on which the majority relies in
interpreting Article VII (Amended), section 1, and then I turn to
this case and the reasons why I read the phrase "the judicial
power" more broadly than the majority does.
The majority relies on federal cases decided before
1857 in its effort to establish that "the framers of the Oregon
Constitution, and those who later adopted that constitution, are
most likely to have understood the grant of judicial power in the
restrained sense espoused in the early Supreme Court cases -- an
authority limited to the adjudication of an existing
controversy."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 25).  With respect, the
majority's analysis is unpersuasive.  The cases on which the
majority relies all stand for general propositions regarding the
scope of the judicial power that are not in dispute here.  As the
majority acknowledges, the United States Supreme Court refused to
render a decision in Hayburn's Case, 2 US (2 Dallas) 408, 1 L Ed
436 (1792), because Congress adopted a new statute.  See ___ Or
at ___ (slip op at 19) (so noting).  Thus, the issue in that case
was not going to arise again. (15)
  The court reporter in
Hayburn's Case included in a footnote the opinions of several
members of the Court, sitting as circuit judges.  Id. at 410 n *. 
Those judges had expressed the view that the judicial power and
related separation of powers concepts did not permit the courts
to determine eligibility for veterans' benefits when that
determination was subject to later review by the Secretary of War
and by Congress.  Such a determination would be merely advisory
because it would be subject to review by another branch of
government.  
The majority also cites United States v. Ferreira, 54
US (13 Howard) 40, 14 L Ed 40 (1851), in which a similar statute
directing federal courts to evaluate war-related claims was
subject to further review by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Ferreira thus also concerned a situation in which a court was
asked to render an opinion that was "advisory" because it could
be revised by another branch of government.The debates at the
Constitutional Convention and in the early years of the republic
also make it clear that the federal judicial power never has
included the authority to "provid[e] purely advisory opinions to
the Executive * * * ."  Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681, 700, 117 S
Ct 1636, 137 L Ed 2d 945 (1997); see Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 328-330 (3d ed 2000) (describing basis and
scope of doctrine).  The authorities that the majority cites
simply demonstrate that the federal judicial power does not
authorize the judicial branch to provide "purely advisory
opinions" outside the context of an actual dispute. (16)
 
Neither does the federal judicial power permit the courts to
operate as administrative subordinates of the other branches by
making determinations that do not result in final judgments.  I
agree with the majority that those principles articulated in the
early federal cases inform our understanding of "[t]he judicial
power," as that phrase is used in the Oregon Constitution.  
This case, however, is not about "purely advisory
opinions" or court determinations subject to review by other
branches of government.  None of the pre-1857 cases that the
majority discusses addressed whether the federal judicial power
prevents a court from deciding a case that (1) was justiciable at
the time that the parties initiated it, but (2) became moot
during the litigation, and (3) involved events that were likely
to recur, but were of such short duration that they typically
evade judicial review.
The majority declines to rely on cases from other
jurisdictions decided after 1857.  Instead, the majority asserts
that post-1857 cases are irrelevant to understanding what the
framers of the Oregon Constitution intended to include within the
"judicial power" because, when that term was used in Article VII
(Amended) (adopted in 1910), it was intended to have the same
meaning as the term had in Article VII (Original)(drafted in
1857).  ___ Or ___ (slip op at 24-25).  I disagree. 
First, the majority notes that the drafters of Article
VII (Amended) indicated no intent to change the meaning of
"judicial power" from Article VII (Original).  However, that does
not mean that the drafters necessarily intended to preclude the
exercise of the judicial power in the cases at issue here.  The
drafters also indicated no intent to set Oregon apart from other
jurisdictions that, by 1910, viewed the judicial power as
extending to those cases that had become moot by the passage of
time, but presented legal issues likely to recur.  As the
majority recognizes, the New York courts had determined by the
late 1800s that they properly could decide election law cases
involving issues that were likely to arise again, even though the
particular election had occurred and had rendered the case moot. 
In re Madden, 148 NY 136, 139, 423 NE 534 (1895) (deciding
dispute over form of ballot after election, because issue was
likely to recur).  Similarly, in Boise City Irrig. &amp; Land Co. v.
Clark, 131 F 415, 419 (9th 1904), the court adjudicated a
challenge to irrigation rates even though the effective period of
the disputed rate had ended during the litigation.  The court
noted that "the courts have entertained and decided [moot] cases
heretofore * * * partly because of the necessity or propriety of
deciding some question of law presented which might serve to
guide the municipal body when again called upon to act in the
matter."  131 F at 419.
It is at least as reasonable as the majority's position
to suggest that the voters who adopted Article VII (Amended)
intended the phrase "judicial power" to have the same meaning
that it had in 1857 and that that meaning would be the one that,
by 1910, many state and federal courts recognized as containing
from inception the authority that is in question here.  As the
above cases indicate, by 1910, state and federal courts did not
think that the "judicial power" limited their authority to decide
moot cases that raised issues capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
Second, federal cases arising after 1857 provide some
guidance in determining the scope of the judicial power under the
Oregon Constitution, because they involve the similar judicial
power exercised by the federal courts under Article III of the
United States Constitution.  Those cases, moreover, address the
precise issue involved here.  The majority relies on early
federal cases that present undeniably different factual and legal
scenarios than this case, but rejects later federal cases that
are directly on point.  The leading federal case, of course, is
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 US 498, 31 S Ct 279, 55
L Ed 310 (1911), in which the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue raised here and held that it could decide a
moot case involving a dispute that was capable of repetition, yet
evaded review. (17)
  Significantly, the Court saw no need to
discuss or overrule decisions such as Hayburn's Case and
Ferriera, indicating that it perceived no conflict between those
earlier decisions and its holding in Southern Pacific.  In other
words, although Southern Pacific and the many decisions that
follow it came long after the Oregon Constitution was written,
there is no reason to think that they represented a uniquely
post-1857 view of the kinds of cases that federal courts could
decide. 
Not a single one of the decisions cited by the
majority, whether from Oregon, the federal courts, or other state
courts, stands for the proposition that a justiciable case that
becomes moot by the passage of time, but presents a controversy
likely to recur, is beyond the "judicial power" -- until this
court's decisions beginning in the late 1980s.  As stated above,
I would overrule those later cases.
With those considerations in mind, I return to this
case.  This case presents a traditional dispute between two
parties, litigated through established judicial processes.  In
this dispute, however, the challenged governmental action lasted
only 30 days and therefore ended before petitioner's
constitutional challenge could be adjudicated.  Thus, the
majority is correct that a ruling from this court (or from the
trial court, for that matter) will have no effect on the
particular exclusion that was the basis for petitioner's
challenge.  As discussed above, however, that is not the same as
saying that a judicial ruling would be simply "advisory."  On the
contrary, two adverse parties are before the court, presenting
opposing arguments on the merits of the case; a ruling on the
merits would establish whether the city's ordinance is
constitutional or not and, thus, would have a direct, immediate
effect on the city; and a ruling on the merits would have an
indirect effect on persons who may be issued exclusion orders in
the future.  Finally -- and critically -- any other person in
petitioner's position would face the same, insurmountable hurdle
that the majority places in front of his challenge to the
exclusion order:  In every case, the order will expire before
judicial review of any challenge can be completed, and, in every
case, the challenge then will be dismissed as moot. (18)

Petitioner's dilemma is not unique.  There are other
cases in which the brief nature of the challenged action or the
expiration of short and immovable deadlines renders otherwise
justiciable cases moot, not because the defendant has changed its
policy or the plaintiff has abandoned its challenge, but simply
by the passage of time.  Moreover, in any subsequent case raising
the same issue, the passage of time again will cause the issue to
become moot. (19)
  In those cases, a court is presented with a
controversy that is plainly within "the judicial power" at the
time that it is filed but that becomes moot during the ordinary
conduct of the litigation.  The majority's decision that Oregon
courts are barred by the Oregon Constitution from deciding such
cases significantly diminishes the "judicial power" of Oregon
courts and ensures that important issues of regulatory authority
and constitutional law will remain undecided. 
In my view, the "judicial power" of the Oregon courts
is not so limited.  Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch)
137, 2 L Ed 60 (1803), state and federal courts have agreed with
Chief Justice Marshall:  "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."  Id. at
177.  Courts "say what the law is" in the course of deciding
contested court cases.  Consistently with that judicial power and
with separation of powers requirements, the Oregon courts long
have deemed it to be their province, rather than that of the
legislature or the executive, finally to determine the meaning of
constitutional provisions, statutory and regulatory enactments,
and the common law. (20)
  Within the structure of the Oregon
judiciary, this court has the last word, and only this court can
"describe the law of this state authoritatively."  Jones v.
General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 416, 939 P2d 608 (1997).  For
the Oregon courts to fulfill that role -- and not leave private
parties and governmental entities to guess as to whether
particular actions are consistent with law -- the "judicial
power" should be interpreted to allow the courts, in appropriate
circumstances, to review cases that become moot during appeal
because they involve events of such brief duration.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned in Honig v. Doe, 484
US 305, 331, 108 S Ct 592, 98 L Ed 2d 686 (1988) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring), that the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception to mootness was a prudential method to avoid
"squander[ing of judicial resources] after the decisional process
is underway."  Id. at 332 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  Another
authority similarly describes the reasons that a "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness does not
undermine the reasons for the justiciability requirement: 
"(i) an actual course of conduct, even if past,
continues to frame litigation in a factual context and
thereby focus[es] judicial decisionmaking; (ii) the
unlawful causation of a past injury deprives a
defendant of any moral entitlement to freedom from
judicial intervention; (iii) sharp, adversarial
presentation of issues may occur despite the mooting of
a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome; (iv) since
a defendant who has caused wrongful conduct would
otherwise remain free to repeat it, a judicial decision
forbidding such conduct is not an advisory opinion in
any objectionable sense; and (v) judicial investment in
the resolution of an issue of public importance should
not be squandered."
Richard H. Fallon, David L. Shapiro, and Daniel J. Meltzer, Hart
&amp; Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System § 4, 219
(4th ed 1996); see also Tribe at 347-50 (describing basis for
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to
mootness).
That position is consistent with Article VII (Amended),
section 1, Article VII (Original), section 1, and Article III,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution and with decades of cases
decided by this court.  Nothing in the text of any of those
constitutional provisions compels the conclusion that this court
is powerless to decide a case that was justiciable when filed,
but was destined to became moot by the mere passage of 30 days. 
The constitutional grant of the "judicial power" to the Oregon
courts should not be so narrowly construed. (21)
  
For the foregoing reasons, although I agree with the
majority's disposition of this case, I disagree with its
conclusion that the judicial power of Article VII (Amended),
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution does not extend to cases
that become moot during the litigation process, but involve
issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review.
Riggs, J., joins in this specially concurring opinion.
1. At the time of petitioner's arrest, Portland City Code
20.12.265 (2000) provided:
"In addition to other measures provided for
violation of this Code, or any of the laws of the State
of Oregon, any peace officer, as defined by ORS
133.005(3), as amended, or any park official or
employee * * * may exclude any person who violates any
provision of this Code, any City ordinance, [or] any of
the laws of the State of Oregon * * * from any park for
a period of not more than 30 days.
"A. Written notice shall be given to any person
excluded from any City park.  Such notice shall specify
the dates and places of exclusion.  It shall be signed
by the issuing party.  Warning of consequences for
failure to comply shall be prominently displayed on the
notice. 
"B. A person receiving such notice may appeal to
the Code Hearings Officer in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter 22.10 of this Code to have the
written notice rescinded or the period shortened. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22.10.030A,
the appeal shall be filed within 5 days of receipt of
the exclusion notice, unless extended by the Code
Hearings Officer for good cause shown.
"C. At any time within the 30 days, a person
receiving such notice may apply in writing to the
Commissioner in Charge of the Bureau of Parks for a
temporary waiver from the effects of the notice for
good reason."
On March 21, 2004, the Portland City Council modified
the ordinance.  In particular, it added the following subsection
H:
"If an appeal of the exclusion is timely filed
under Subsection F of this Section, the effectiveness
of the exclusion shall be stayed, pending the outcome
of the appeal.  If the exclusion is affirmed, the
remaining period of exclusion shall be effective
immediately upon the issuance of the Hearing Officer's
decision, unless the Hearing's [sic] Officer specifies
a later date."
Under new subsection H, the stay created by an appeal
of an exclusion citation will prevent the matter from becoming
moot through expiration of the period of exclusion.  The modified
ordinance has no application to this case.
2. Although Article VII (Original) of the Oregon
Constitution preceded the present Article VII (Amended) by 61
years, it is the later provision that is the source of this
court's power.  Thus, our analysis of the concept of "judicial
power" focuses, as it must, on the phrase in the 1910
constitutional amendments.  However, as we demonstrate below,
Article VII (Original) still has a pivotal role to play in
interpreting the meaning of its successor.
3. For a more detailed description of the development of the
Oregon judiciary, see Lawrence T. Harris, A History of the
Judiciary of Oregon, in Oregon Supreme Court Record 73 (1938);
Mirth Tufts Kaplan, Courts, Counselors and Cases:  The Judiciary
of Oregon's Provisional Government, 1961 Or Hist Q 117; Lawrence
T. Harris, History of the Oregon Code (pts 1 &amp; 2), 1 Or L Rev
129, 1 Or L Rev 184 (1922).
4. In 1845, similar wording authorizing or requiring the
state's highest court to provide advisory opinions to other
governmental branches on important questions of law was included
in at least four other state constitutions.  See Me Const Art VI,
§ 3 (1819); Mass Const Pt II, c III, art II (1780); NH Const pt
II (1784); RI Const art X, § 3 (1842). 
5. We have not found a pre-1857 Wisconsin case that
discussed, in depth, the scope of the judicial power.  We have
found one case that acknowledged that the powers of the judiciary
are separate and distinct from those of the legislative and
executive departments of government.  See State ex rel Resley and
others v. Farwell, Gov., 3 Pin 393 (1852) (so observing). 
6. Article III, section 1, of the United States Constitution
provides:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office."
7. Consistent with that observation, we note
that, before 1857, other jurisdictions also declined to
decide "speculative question[s,]" Williams v.
Cheeseborough, 4 Conn 356, 1822 WL 42 (Conn 1822), that
would have no present practical effect on the rights of
the parties, Pelletreau v. Jackson, 7 Wend 471 (NY
1831). 
8. The reasoning of Southern Pacific is
unhelpful because there is no constitutional analysis
to support the adoption of such an exception to the
mootness doctrine.  Rather, in that case, the Court
simply determined, in a conclusory fashion, that it
needed to engage in a law-announcing function
concerning government regulation.  In support of that
claim, the Court quoted two prior cases for the
proposition that important public questions required
answers to guide executive conduct without
consideration of whether a controversy continued to
exist between the parties.  See Southern Pacific, 219
US at 515-16 (discussing United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 US 290, 17 S Ct 540 (1897)
and Boise City Irrigation &amp; Land Co v. Clark, 131 F 415
(9th cir 1904)) (both so stating). 
9. One might argue that, given my view that
courts may decide some moot cases, I also should find
that the trial court had jurisdiction over this case
because the relevant event (the duration of
petitioner's 30-day exclusion order) was so short that
petitioner could not challenge the order in an
administrative hearing, obtain a result, and file his
petition for judicial review before the order had
expired.  Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of that
position, it was not addressed by the trial court, the
Court of Appeals, or the majority opinion in this
court.  Rather, the trial court addressed the merits of
petitioner's constitutional challenge to the exclusion
ordinance, and the Court of Appeals and the majority
opinion in this court focus on whether the judicial
power extends to deciding a case that becomes moot
after it has been filed in the trial court.  I limit my
discussion to that issue.  
10. A list of decisions from the other 49 states,
each recognizing a "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception to mootness is set out in the
appendix.  While those decisions provide limited
guidance for our interpretation of the Oregon
Constitution, to the extent that the doctrine rests, at
least in part, on prudential considerations, as I argue
below, they suggest that virtually every other court
that has considered the doctrine finds it useful. 
Moreover, other state constitutions use the same phrase
that appears in the Oregon Constitution -- the
"judicial power" -- to describe the scope of the
judiciary's authority.  The majority's interpretation
of that term to mean something different than it means
to every other court in this country suggests that the
majority has the less persuasive argument, as I assert
in the text.
11. See, for example, the diverse opinions (and
the cases and commentators on which they rely) in the
Court of Appeals decision in Utsey v. Coos County, 176
Or App 524, 529-47, 32 P3d 933 (2002) (Landau, J.), rev
dismissed, 335 Or 217 (2003); 176 Or App at 562-72
(Deits, C.J., dissenting); id. at 574-85 (Armstrong,
J., dissenting); id. at 588-95 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting).
12. This court's cases discussing the origins and
scope of the justiciability requirement have not always
been consistent, however.  See Utsey, 176 Or App at
537-38 (discussing justiciability case law).
13. In that regard, I agree with the conclusion
Chief Justice Rehnquist reached after reviewing the
federal mootness cases: 
"The logical conclusion to be drawn from
these cases, and from the historical
development of the principle of mootness, is
that while an unwillingness to decide moot
cases may be connected to the case or
controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an
attenuated connection that may be overridden
where there are strong reasons to override
it.  The 'capable of repetition, yet evading
review' exception is an example."
Honig v. Doe, 484 US 305, 331, 108 S Ct 592, 98 L Ed 2d
686 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
14. In addition to Perry, this court decided
technically moot cases in State ex rel. v. Newbry, 196
Or 331, 337, 248 P2d 840 (1952); State ex rel. v.
Smith, 197 Or 96, 126, 252 P2d 550 (1953); Huffman v.
Alexander, 197 Or 283, 290, 253 P2d 289 (1953);
Linklater v. Nyberg, 234 Or 117, 120, 380 P2d 631
(1963); and Stowe v. School District No. 8-C, 240 Or
526, 528, 402 P2d 740 (1965).  The Court of Appeals
issued decisions on the merits in similar circumstances
in Whipple v. OSAA, 52 Or App 419, 422, 629 P2d 384,
rev den 291 Or 504 (1981), and OSAA v. Stout, 71 Or App
405, 407, 692 P2d 633 (1984).
15. Similarly, the Portland ordinance at issue
here has been amended in a way that appears to permit
an exclusion order to be appealed without the dispute
becoming moot.  See___ Or at ___ (slip op at 2 n 1)
(describing amendment to ordinance).  If so, this case
would not come within the "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" exception to mootness, even if this
court were to hold that such an exception exists.
16. This court consistently has recognized a
clear distinction between "advisory" opinions, which
are not authorized in Oregon, and proceedings in which
a party seeks a judgment in court.  The latter
proceedings, including this case, seek to invoke the
"judicial power" and will be decided by the courts if
they meet the attributes of justiciability discussed in
the text.  See Oregon Medical Association v. Rawls, 281
Or 293, 301-02, 574 P2d 1103 (1978) (distinguishing
between advisory opinions and proceedings that seek
court judgments but are nonjusticiable).
17. The majority opinion essentially dismisses
Southern Pacific as a "conclusory" exercise of the
Court's law-announcing function.  ___ Or at ___n 8
(slip op at 23 n 8).  In my view, the Court correctly
observed that, if it adhered to its usual rule
regarding moot cases, legal challenges to Interstate
Commerce Commission actions could be "defeated, by
short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading
review, and at one time the government, and at another
time the carriers, have their rights determined by the
Commission without a chance of redress."  Southern
Pacific, 219 US at 515.  The Court properly saw that
its law-determining role required it to decide the case
even though it had become moot.
18. I note that, earlier this year, the Portland
City Council amended the ordinance involved here to
stay the effectiveness of an exclusion order if the
order is appealed.  See ___ Or at ___ n 1 (slip op at 2
n 1) (quoting amendment to ordinance).  I agree that,
if the effectiveness of an exclusion order -- or any
similar order that is challenged in court -- is stayed
while the challenge to the order is litigated, then the
case does not become moot and there is no occasion to
resort to the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception to the mootness doctrine.
19. Similar mootness issues arise when a person
challenges a short-term administrative agency order
that then expires, see, e.g., Perry, 180 Or at 495
(liquor commission order expired after 60 days); a
student claims that a sectarian prayer at a school
graduation is unconstitutional, and the graduation
ceremony is held while the case is pending, Kay v.
David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 303 Or 574, 738 P2d
1389 (1987), cert den, 484 US 1032 (1988); or when a
political party challenges the state's interpretation
of an election statute, but the case cannot be finally
resolved before the election.  E.g., Oregon Republican
Party v. State of Oregon, 301 Or 437, 722 P2d 1237
(1986) (dismissing as moot party's challenge to state
determination that plan to encourage absentee voting by
providing stamped envelopes to voters, along with
absentee ballot request forms, was unlawful).  
20. See, e.g., Automobile Club v. State of
Oregon, 314 Or 479, 487, 840 P2d 674 (1992) ("We hold
that the underground storage tank assessment is a 'tax'
under Article IX, section 3a(1)(a), and that, no matter
what label the legislature may attach to a tax on motor
vehicle fuel, whether it be 'fee,' 'excise,' 'tithe,'
'assessment,' or some other term, the revenues derived
therefrom must be dedicated to the listed purposes." 
(Emphasis added.))
21. I do not argue, however, that the courts
should decide every case that becomes moot because it
involves events of short duration.  The mootness
doctrine has important constitutional roots, even
though, as I have argued above, its contours and
exceptions are in part prudential.  In many cases, it
will be appropriate for a court to dismiss a case that
has become moot after it has been filed,
notwithstanding that the issue is one capable of
repetition, yet evading review.  And the fact that a
case has or may become moot by the expiration of an
order, the passing of a deadline, or a party's change
in age or status, may well be relevant in this court's
consideration of whether it should allow or deny a
petition for review.  See ORAP 9.07 (including, among
criteria for granting discretionary review, whether
issue arises often and whether consequences of decision
are important to the public).  I also recognize that
different courts have disagreed as to whether the
"repetition" of the circumstances must involve the same
party and as to the degree of likelihood that the
circumstances will recur.  Tribe at 349.  If this court
were to adopt the position that I advocate, then those
issues would be addressed in the context of specific
cases; there is no occasion to consider the precise
outlines of the exception in this opinion.