Title: Guzman v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-1002
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1002 
____________ 
 
VICTOR GUZMAN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 6, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Victor Guzman appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence 
of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm Guzman’s conviction but reverse his sentence of death 
and remand this case to the trial court for a new penalty phase. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On December 9, 2000, Severina Fernandez was found stabbed to death in 
her Miami apartment.  The case went cold until 2004, when DNA from blood left 
at the crime scene was determined to match Victor Guzman’s DNA.  As a result, 
Guzman was indicted for first-degree murder, stood trial, and was convicted.  The 
 
 
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jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of seven to five, and the trial court 
followed the jury’s recommendation.  This appeal follows. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
Severina “Lola” Fernandez was an eighty-year-old widow who lived alone 
in her Miami apartment.  She was last seen alive around 3:30 p.m. on December 9, 
2000, when she went out to retrieve her newspaper.  At approximately 6:15 p.m., a 
neighbor discovered Fernandez’s door was half open and, when Fernandez did not 
answer, the neighbor entered the apartment where she found Fernandez stabbed to 
death on her bed.  Fernandez’s body was nude.  Her dress was underneath her, 
covered in blood with stab holes and a torn zipper.  Her panties, which had been 
pulled down and were dangling off of her right leg, also had stab holes in them.  
The evidence suggested that Fernandez was killed shortly after she returned from 
getting the newspaper.   
There was blood throughout the apartment, which was swabbed for DNA 
analysis.  A plastic cup, which appeared to be out of place on the recliner in the 
living room, was also swabbed for DNA analysis. 
Initial DNA analysis conducted in 2000 revealed that a single male DNA 
profile was present on swabs of blood obtained from inside the kitchen sink, the 
floor of the bedroom to the west of the bed, and the bedroom dresser.  That same 
male DNA profile could not be excluded as a contributor to a mixture of DNA 
 
 
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profiles obtained from the cup found on the recliner.  Specimens from a sexual 
battery kit done on Fernandez tested negative for the presence of sperm.   
In 2003, the case was assigned to Detective Andres Arostegui, a member of 
the cold case homicide division.  Detective Arostegui testified that he learned of 
information1 in 2004 that led him to suspect that Guzman was responsible for 
Fernandez’s murder.  Based on this information, Detective Arostegui interviewed 
Guzman several days later.   
After being advised of his constitutional rights, Guzman agreed to speak 
with Detective Arostegui.  Detective Arostegui told Guzman that he was 
investigating a homicide.  When shown pictures of Fernandez and her apartment 
building, Guzman denied knowing her or ever having been to her building.  
According to Detective Arostegui, Guzman’s demeanor was nervous and fidgety at 
times during the three-hour interview but he repeatedly denied any involvement in 
the homicide.  During the last forty-five minutes of the interview, Guzman stated 
that he was sorry two or three times, but he would not explain what he was sorry 
for.  Detective Arostegui kept talking to Guzman and saying to him, “I know you 
did it.”  Guzman then started asking for bathroom breaks, which struck Detective 
                                          
 
1.  This “information”—which was not introduced at trial—was a “hit” from 
the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), indicating that Guzman’s DNA 
matched the male DNA found at the scene of Fernandez’s murder. 
 
 
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Arostegui as “awkward.”  Guzman eventually invoked his right to counsel, and 
questioning ceased. 
After a DNA standard was obtained from Guzman, the crime lab confirmed 
that the male DNA profile obtained from the sink and the cup found in Fernandez’s 
apartment matched Guzman’s DNA profile.  Further analysis in 2005 revealed that 
two other bloodstains in Fernandez’s apartment also matched Guzman’s DNA 
profile.  At trial, evidence was presented that the chance of finding the same DNA 
profile as the profile obtained from the male blood in Fernandez’s apartment in an 
individual at random in the population at large is 1 in 153 trillion.  The likelihood 
of a random match between Guzman and the DNA mixture on the cup in 
Fernandez’s apartment was 1 in 5,099,000. 
The medical examiner, Dr. Lew, testified regarding the results of the autopsy 
performed on Fernandez.  According to Dr. Lew, Fernandez was an eighty-year-
old woman with an enlarged heart, an artificial heart valve, and flat feet.  The 
autopsy revealed that “the cause of death was multiple stab wounds and trauma to 
the neck or strangulation.”  Fernandez suffered a total of fifty-eight stab and 
incised wounds covering multiple areas of her body.  Two of the wounds to her 
chest penetrated the aorta and were individually fatal.  There were also incised 
wounds to both sides of Fernandez’s neck, which would have bled profusely.  
Many of the wounds to Fernandez’s torso were deep enough to penetrate the 
 
 
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abdominal wall but not deep enough to penetrate the bowel or other internal 
organs.  Two of the torso wounds nicked the liver.  There were at least five wounds 
to the fingers, which were likely defensive wounds.  Fernandez also suffered blunt 
trauma to her head while she was still alive, consistent with being struck.  Her 
hyoid bone was fractured, indicating that a great deal of pressure was applied to 
both sides of her neck.  According to Dr. Lew, at least several minutes passed from 
the time the attack began until Fernandez died. 
It appeared to Dr. Lew that Fernandez was either sexually assaulted or an 
attempt to sexually assault her had been made because her clothing was torn off, 
her panties were hanging off her right ankle, and bloodstain patterns on her body 
indicated that her “left leg was raised up enough so that her thigh was contacting 
her abdomen in order to pull her panties off her left leg.”  There were also blood 
smears on the insides of her thighs, which likely indicated that bloodied hands tried 
to push her thighs apart.  Although there was no trauma to the vaginal area, Dr. 
Lew testified that the absence of trauma was not conclusive evidence that no 
sexual assault occurred. 
Guzman did not testify at trial, and the defense rested without calling any 
witnesses.  The jury found Guzman guilty of first-degree murder. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
 
 
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At the penalty phase, the State introduced a certified copy of the judgment 
evincing Guzman’s prior convictions for attempted felony murder, lewd or 
lascivious battery on a child twelve years of age or older but less than sixteen years 
of age, and aggravated battery causing great bodily harm.  The State also elicited 
victim impact evidence and recalled Dr. Lew to testify further about the injuries 
Fernandez received during the attack. 
Guzman presented testimony from a number of his family members.  The 
sum of their testimony established the following.  Guzman was born into poverty 
in Peru.  Guzman’s father disciplined Guzman and his brother with whippings.  
Guzman’s parents had a troubled relationship until his father left the family to 
marry another woman when Guzman was around six or seven years old.  After the 
separation, Guzman’s mother started drinking, and the boys were sometimes sent 
to live with their grandmother. 
When he was in his teens, Guzman started drinking and cutting himself.  His 
drinking eventually led to many negative consequences, including eviction, 
deportation, termination of employment, and convictions for driving under the 
influence.  In the late 1990s, Guzman moved to California, where some of his 
family members had relocated.  He attempted to reunite with his father in 
California, but his father rejected him.   
 
 
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Shortly before Fernandez’s murder, Guzman lived with his brother, Juan 
Carlos, for a few months in Miami before Juan Carlos was deported.  During that 
time, Guzman began to drink heavily, appeared depressed, was cutting himself, 
and was angry at his father.  After his arrest in this case, Guzman “came to an 
understanding of peace” about his relationship with his father, who died before the 
trial. 
Guzman presented testimony from three expert witnesses.  Two of the 
experts opined that Guzman was under extreme emotional distress at the time of 
the murder and discussed numerous points of nonstatutory mitigation, focused 
mainly on Guzman’s upbringing, substance abuse, and cognitive functioning.  The 
third expert testified that he saw nothing in Guzman’s incarceration records to 
indicate that Guzman would be dangerous during future incarceration. 
Three volunteer prison chaplains testified that Guzman is a man of faith who 
conducts religious services in the jail.  An inmate from Guzman’s pod at the jail 
testified about the Bible study Guzman conducts in the pod and his belief that 
Guzman is remorseful and rehabilitated.   
Guzman did not testify at the penalty phase.  The jury recommended a 
sentence of death by a vote of seven to five.   
C.  Sentencing 
 
 
 
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The trial court concluded that four aggravating circumstances were proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel (HAC) (extremely great weight); (2) Guzman was previously convicted of 
another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence (great 
weight); (3) the capital felony was committed while Guzman was engaged in or 
attempting to commit a sexual battery (some weight); and (4) the victim of the 
capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability 
(considerable weight).  And after having considered and rejected the extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance mitigating circumstance and four nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances,2 the trial court found that no statutory mitigating 
circumstances and twenty-five nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were 
established.3  In following the jury’s recommendation and imposing a sentence of 
                                          
 
 
2.  The four proffered and rejected nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 
were: (1) Guzman has a brain that did not fully develop due to nutritional 
deficiencies, hazardous environmental conditions and the extreme poverty he 
experienced growing up; (2) Guzman has suffered malnutrition; (3) Guzman began 
a change in his life before he dedicated his life to God and before he became aware 
of the homicide charge; and (4) Guzman has a son and daughter who need his 
parental guidance.   
3.  The nonstatutory mitigating circumstances found by the trial court were: 
(1) Guzman suffers from mild/moderate and severe cognitive deficits and 
impairments (little weight); (2) Guzman has borderline intellectual functioning, 
slightly higher than that of a fully intellectually disabled person (minimal weight); 
(3) Guzman has mental impairments that prevent him from functioning 
consistently in a job or maintaining appropriate social relationships (miniscule 
weight); (4) Guzman witnessed the traumatic domestic abuse of his mother and 
 
 
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death, the trial court concluded that the HAC and prior violent felony aggravators 
each substantially outweighed all of the mitigation presented. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
                                          
 
brother (slight weight); (5) Guzman was repeatedly brutally and physically abused 
by his father (little weight); (6) Guzman has a mother who became an alcoholic, 
and drank during her pregnancy (slight weight); (7) Guzman was neglected by his 
parents, abandoned by his father, and experienced a transient home life separated 
by periods of homelessness (little weight); (8) Guzman was not allowed in his 
father’s house when he moved to California, rejected a second time (minor 
weight); (9) Guzman was angry and resentful towards his father, and that bitterness 
affected his judgment (little weight); (10) Guzman has a serious and severe alcohol 
and drug problem (slight weight); (11) Guzman has a personality character 
disorder that prevents him from developing healthy attachments to others (little 
weight); (12) Guzman suffers from depression, paranoia, cognitive impairment, 
anger management issues, personality disintegration, mild to moderate 
psychological distress, and exhibits symptoms of psychosis or inappropriate 
emotions (minor weight); (13) Guzman lacks education, having dropped out of 
school in the sixth grade (slight weight); (14) Guzman has a loving daughter who 
wants to maintain a long-distance relationship with him (little weight); (15) 
Guzman has a young son whose mother wants to maintain a long-distance 
relationship with him (minimal weight); (16) Guzman has had excellent jail 
behavior for ten years (little weight); (17) Guzman will not be a future danger to 
inmates and correctional officers in the prison system (slight weight); (18) Guzman 
is stable in a structured environment without alcohol (minor weight); (19) Guzman 
has dedicated his life to ministering the word of God as a mentor and rehabilitator 
for other inmates (slight weight); (20) Guzman has dedicated his life to God’s 
service and has repented (slight weight); (21) Guzman has expressed remorse (little 
weight); (22) Guzman grew up very poor and without running water and electricity 
(miniscule weight); (23) Guzman has a mother who wants to maintain a long-
distance relationship with him (little weight); (24) Guzman has family from 
California and Peru who want to maintain a long-distance relationship with him 
(little weight); and (25) Guzman has emotional scars that will last a lifetime (slight 
weight).   
 
 
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Guzman raises two guilt phase issues and six penalty phase issues on appeal.  
We address both of Guzman’s guilt phase issues as well as the sufficiency of the 
evidence, but as to the penalty phase, we address only the dispositive issue. 
A.  References to Jail and Possible DNA Match 
 
Guzman first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for 
mistrial during the guilt phase after the State elicited testimony suggesting that 
Guzman was in jail on other charges during the investigation of Fernandez’s 
murder and that his DNA was in a database of offenders.  
At trial, Carolyn Grayer, a crime scene investigator, testified that on April 
20, 2004, she collected buccal swabs from Guzman in order to obtain a DNA 
standard for comparison to DNA left at the scene of Fernandez’s murder.  During 
her testimony, Grayer stated that she “went with Detective Arostegui to [M]etro 
West jail.”  Guzman objected, moved to strike the statement, and moved for a 
mistrial, arguing that the jury had heard the statement and it would not be possible 
to “unring the bell.”  The trial court granted the motion to strike, denied the motion 
for mistrial, and instructed the jury: “[P]lease disregard that last question and 
answer.  Where this incident occurred with regard to the DNA swab is of no 
concern to you, and it shouldn’t be considered further by you.”   
After CSI Grayer’s testimony, Detective Arostegui was called to discuss the 
steps he took in his investigation.  At one point during his testimony, Detective 
 
 
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Arostegui stated, “the next thing that occurred is on March 9, 2004, I was told that 
there was a possible DNA match.”  Guzman objected to hearsay and again moved 
to strike the statement and for a mistrial.  The trial court again granted the motion 
to strike but denied the motion for mistrial.  The court instructed the jury to 
“disregard the last statement by Detective Arostegui.”  The court also instructed 
the State to proceed by asking Detective Arostegui, “Did you develop through your 
investigation any other leads of individuals that you might want to speak to?”  The 
State complied. 
The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 678, 695 (Fla. 2013).  “The granting of a motion 
for mistrial is not based on whether the error is ‘prejudicial.’ ”  Scott v. State, 66 
So. 3d 923, 931 (Fla. 2011).  “Rather, the standard requires that a mistrial be 
granted only ‘when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial,’ such that 
a mistrial is ‘necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.’ ”  
Gosciminski, 132 So. 3d at 695-96 (citations omitted).  “Under the abuse of 
discretion standard of review, a ruling will be upheld unless the ruling is ‘arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused 
only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ”  
Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 997 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3d 1, 
19 (Fla. 2008)).   
 
 
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Guzman asserts that CSI Grayer’s reference to the jail gave the jury the 
impression that Guzman was incarcerated for a different crime at the time that the 
buccal swabs were obtained.  While Grayer’s statement did indicate that Guzman 
was in jail at the time the buccal swabs were obtained, and he was indeed in jail, 
the only charge for which he was in custody at that time was Fernandez’s murder.  
There is no reason to believe that the jury speculated that Guzman was in jail on 
another charge rather than Fernandez’s murder.  There was no testimony during the 
guilt phase that Guzman was charged with or convicted of any other crimes, and “a 
reasonable juror would know that [the defendant] had been in jail for at least some 
period of time prior to trial because he was charged with first-degree murder.”  
Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 1999).  Even if the jurors might have 
inferred that Guzman was jailed for a different crime, the reference to the jail was 
brief, isolated, inadvertent, and not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  See 
Fletcher v. State, 168 So. 3d 186, 207 (Fla. 2015) (“A comment [regarding a 
defendant’s prior imprisonment] that is brief, isolated, and inadvertent may not 
warrant a mistrial.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 980 (2016).  Thus, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 
Guzman argues that the reference made by Detective Arostegui to “a 
possible DNA match” “had the unmistakable effect of telling the jury that Mr. 
Guzman’s DNA was already in a database of criminal offenders.”  We disagree.  
 
 
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As previously stated, there was no evidence introduced at the guilt phase that 
Guzman was charged with or convicted of any prior crimes, nor was there any 
evidence that his DNA was in a database of criminal offenders.  Further, the 
comment was brief, isolated, inadvertent, and the jury was instructed to disregard 
it. 
In Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 837 (Fla. 2012), the defendant moved for 
a mistrial based on a detective’s testimony regarding the events leading up to 
Braddy’s arrest: 
[W]hen I noticed Mr. Braddy’s demeanor, how it changed, and for our 
safety, due to the circumstances, I placed handcuffs on him.  I advised 
him I was going to handcuff him, he wasn’t under arrest at the 
moment, but it was for his safety and my safety dealing with the 
history that I had of him. 
(Alteration in original.)  Braddy argued that the statement improperly informed the 
jury of his violent criminal past.  We disagreed, explaining: 
Prior to the challenged testimony, Detective Milito had testified 
that he was dispatched to Braddy’s home after learning that Braddy 
had been implicated in a violent kidnapping, attempted murder, and 
possible murder of a child.  Given this information and the change in 
Braddy’s demeanor upon being confronted, Detective Milito’s 
reference to Braddy’s history could most reasonably be interpreted in 
context as referring to the facts of the crime that was being 
investigated.  The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Braddy’s motion. 
Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 837.   
 
 
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At the point in Guzman’s trial when Detective Arostegui mentioned “a 
possible DNA match,” the jury had already learned from earlier witnesses that 
Guzman’s DNA matched the male DNA found in blood and on the cup at the 
crime scene, and that DNA analysis was conducted more than once in this case.  
As in Braddy, Detective Arostegui’s testimony did not implicate Guzman in prior 
criminal activity but would “most reasonably be interpreted in context as referring 
to the facts of the crime that was being investigated.”  Thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 
B.  Improper Comments During the State’s Closing Arguments 
In his second guilt phase claim, Guzman asserts that he is entitled to relief 
based on improper arguments made by the State during closing arguments.  
Guzman alleges that the State improperly inflamed the jury, shifted the burden of 
proof, and commented on Guzman’s right to remain silent.  Because Guzman 
concedes that he failed to object to any of these statements, we review each only 
for fundamental error.  See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898-99 (Fla. 2000) 
(“As a general rule, this Court has determined that failing to raise a 
contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are made 
waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review.  The sole 
exception to the general rule is where the unobjected-to comments rise to the level 
of fundamental error, which has been defined as error that reaches down into the 
 
 
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validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”) (citations omitted)). 
1.  Inflaming the Jury 
 
 
Guzman asserts that the State improperly inflamed the jury in order to gain 
an emotional response by the manner in which it began and ended its guilt phase 
closing argument.  The State began its initial closing argument by stating: 
“Members of the jury, horrific, an atrocity, gruesome, ghastly, grizzly.  What word 
would you use to describe this indescribable and unthinkable murder?”  At the end 
of the argument, the prosecutor stated: “And Lola unwittingly opened that door to 
death, destruction, torture, and pain, and his name is Victor Guzman, and he knows 
it.”   
Assuming that these arguments were improper, we conclude that they do not 
rise to the level of fundamental error and therefore Guzman is not entitled to relief. 
2.  Burden Shifting 
 
Guzman next argues that the State improperly shifted the burden to the 
defense by stating that defense counsel should answer some questions, including: 
“What evidence is there . . . that mistakes are made in this case?”; “What evidence 
in this case is there of contamination?”; and “Why did Defendant Guzman 
apologize to Detective Arostegui?”   
“It is well settled that due process requires the [S]tate to prove 
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  “For that 
 
 
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reason, it is error for a prosecutor to make statements that shift the 
burden of proof and invite the jury to convict the defendant for some 
reason other than that the State has proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”   
Warmington v. State, 149 So. 3d 648, 652 (Fla. 2014) (citations omitted). 
 
a.  DNA Evidence 
In opening statement and during cross-examination throughout the trial, 
Guzman put forth a theory that the match between his DNA and the male DNA left 
at the crime scene might have been the result of a mistake or contamination, rather 
than a valid match.  Guzman asked the jury in his opening statement to keep in 
mind that the processing of evidence for DNA analysis is done by “imperfect 
human beings.”  He told the jurors that it will be up to them to decide whether the 
State proved that it was truly his DNA in Fernandez’s apartment.   
The evidence presented at trial was that Guzman’s DNA profile matched the 
male DNA found in blood in Fernandez’s apartment and that the probability of a 
random match of that DNA profile in the population at large is 1 in 153 trillion.  
The crime scene investigators and DNA analysts testified extensively about the 
processes used in collecting and processing DNA and the care that is taken and 
procedures that are in place in order to avoid contamination or mistake in the 
collection and analysis of DNA.  The head of the crime lab, Commander Stoiloff, 
testified that any mistake or violation of standard operating procedures would have 
 
 
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been brought to her attention, but no mistake or violation that had any relation to 
this case was brought to her attention.  
In its closing argument, the State addressed the theory that the DNA match 
was the result of a mistake, arguing: 
I’ll call it the imperfect human being theory.  Human beings are 
imperfect.  They make mistakes.  DNA analysts are human.  And, 
therefore, it’s possible that the DNA analysts made a mistake in this 
case according to this theory, but you’ve got to look at the evidence.  
Where in the evidence is it that Commander Stoiloff even possibly 
made a mistake?  Where is it in the evidence that Supervisor Wolson 
even possibly made a mistake in this case.  And it’s not in the body of 
evidence that you follow this case.  It’s imaginary, it’s speculative, 
and it’s forced.  It doesn’t give you a reasonable doubt whether 
Defendant Guzman left his blood behind by the bed, on the floor in 
front of the kitchen sink, and at the kitchen sink. 
The State then discussed the theory that the DNA match was the result of 
contamination of the evidence.  The State recounted the manner in which the DNA 
evidence was collected and analyzed and then referenced testimony elicited from 
one of the DNA analysts at trial, stating: 
And then [defense counsel] asked Commander Stoiloff about 
this molecular biology science trying to assess the validity of it before 
you, and he said something to the effect of Commander Stoiloff, well 
these molecules [of DNA] aren’t they just floating all around and they 
can get contaminated with all the other stuff?  Commander Stoiloff 
was very clear about that.  These molecules aren’t just floating 
around.  This DNA analysis is done in a controlled environment[], 
special care is taken, the evidence is not touched with other evidence 
in this case, they wear these white lab coats, they make sure 
everything is sterile in there, they use controls, negative controls, 
positive controls.  No.  These molecules aren’t just flying around.  
 
 
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There is no contamination in this case.  There’s no evidence in the 
body of evidence for your consideration of contamination. 
 . . . State’s exhibit 61 . . . .  This was the DNA swabs from the 
recliner[,] . . . the west side of the bedroom, the armrest, and the 
backrest.  This evidence is taken in the year 2000.  Sealed.  And 
Defendant Guzman’s DNA, his standard was taken four years later by 
Detective Arostegui with Crime Scene Investigator Grayer.  It’s in a 
separate sealed envelope.  When did these worlds collide?  When was 
there any co-mingling with this stuff?  There was not contamination 
of this evidence.  Defendant Guzman[’s] standard didn’t slip into this 
other evidence.  It’s not the evidence in this case. 
Guzman argues that the State shifted the burden of proof to the defense by 
posing the question to defense counsel “[W]hat evidence in this case is there of 
contamination?” and pointing out that the defense counsel “didn’t take out any of 
this evidence and show you, ah, this is what happened, this is where the 
contamination took place, because there’s no evidence of contamination in this 
case.”   
Here, the State did not invite the jury to convict Guzman for some reason 
other than that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt by arguing that 
there was no evidence of contamination introduced during the trial.  The State’s 
case included evidence regarding the methods used in collecting and analyzing the 
evidence in this case and the care taken by those who processed the crime scene 
and analyzed the evidence to ensure that no mistakes were made and the evidence 
was not contaminated.  And even if we were to assume that the State improperly 
directed a question to defense counsel and commented on the defense’s failure to 
 
 
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produce evidence of contamination, any such impropriety would not constitute 
fundamental error rising to the level that the conviction could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.  Thus, Guzman is not entitled 
to relief. 
b.  Apology 
During the trial, Detective Arostegui testified that when he interviewed 
Guzman in 2004, Guzman denied any involvement in Fernandez’s murder but 
stated that he was “sorry” two or three times and would not explain why he said he 
was sorry.  On cross-examination, Guzman asked Detective Arostegui if he knew 
why Guzman said he was sorry during the interrogation.  Detective Arostegui 
admitted that he did not.  During closing arguments, the State posed “another 
question for [defense counsel]: Why did Defendant Guzman apologize to Detective 
Arostegui?”  Even assuming that this question improperly shifted the burden 
because it was posed directly to defense counsel, any impropriety did not rise to 
the level of fundamental error such that the conviction could not have been 
obtained without the error. 
To the extent that Guzman argues that the prosecutor’s question was an 
improper comment on Guzman’s right to remain silent, we disagree.  Prior to his 
interview with Detective Arostegui, Guzman was advised of his constitutional 
rights and expressly waived his right to remain silent.  He thereafter freely 
 
 
- 20 - 
conversed with Detective Arostegui, refusing only to tell him why he said he was 
sorry.  We therefore conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was not an improper 
comment on Guzman’s right to remain silent.  See Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 
906, 911-12 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the State is not precluded from admitting 
evidence of defendant’s refusal to answer one question of many where defendant 
has not invoked his Fifth Amendment rights); Ragland v. State, 358 So. 2d 100, 
100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (holding that where defendant waived his Fifth 
Amendment rights and freely and voluntarily conversed with police, comment on 
the failure to answer one question of many is not a violation of defendant’s right to 
remain silent). 
3.  Use of Jury Hypothetical as a Comment on Silence 
 
 
Guzman asserts that the State twice commented on his right to remain silent 
during closing argument by referencing a hypothetical used by Guzman during voir 
dire.  During voir dire, Guzman asked one of the veniremen, a retired teacher, if he 
would want to hear from “both sides” regarding a disruption in his classroom.  The 
juror stated that he would.  Guzman took that opportunity to explain to the venire 
that the way the retired teacher felt is a natural way to feel, but in the context of a 
criminal trial, “we have to train ourselves” away from wanting to hear both sides of 
a story.  Guzman then gave the venire a hypothetical situation in which one student 
said another student hit him, and the second student denied it.  Guzman asked the 
 
 
- 21 - 
retired teacher: if the accused student refused to talk, would he automatically 
believe the first student’s claim that he was hit or would he “have to look at the 
student who was talking and . . . weigh their credibility?”  Guzman’s point in 
asking the question was that even if the State presents “some evidence, but if you 
weigh the evidence and it doesn’t meet the burden [of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt], then the verdict is not guilty.” 
During its closing argument, the State referenced this portion of Guzman’s 
voir dire, saying: 
During the voir dire when you jurors were beginning to get selected in 
this case, there[ was] a discussion by opposing counsel about 
credibility.  Defense counsel used the example of two kids in a 
classroom.  One kid hits the other, the teacher asks the students, all 
right, did you hit him, and the student says no.  And then he changes 
that example a little bit and he says, then what do you do with the 
student who doesn’t say anything?  In this case, what you have are the 
DNA analysts, and they’re not saying one thing.  I mean, the[ir] 
testimony doesn’t conflict, it complements each other.  It corroborates 
each other.  There’s no conflict in the testimony.  This is not a case 
about credibility. 
Guzman then raised a general objection stating, “Objection, Your Honor: [r]eserve 
a motion.”  After the State’s initial closing and Guzman’s closing but prior to the 
State’s rebuttal closing, Guzman explained to the court the basis for the objection 
he made when the State referenced the student hypothetical.  Guzman argued that 
because the State “was commenting on the credibility of the other side,” and 
Guzman did not testify or present any evidence in his case, the State was actually 
 
 
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commenting on Guzman’s failure to testify and present evidence.  Guzman also 
moved for a mistrial at that time.  In overruling the objection and denying the 
motion for mistrial, the trial court concluded that the State’s comment was not a 
comment on Guzman’s credibility but a response to “a perceived argument from 
[Guzman] of contrasting the credibility of the two DNA experts that testified.”  
Guzman concedes that he failed to properly preserve this argument for review.  We 
therefore review it only for fundamental error.   
It is clear from the entire context of the trial that the student hypothetical 
was not used by the State to comment on Guzman’s failure to testify at trial.  
During voir dire, the example was used not only to discuss a defendant’s right to 
remain silent but also to explain to the jury that even if the defense presents no 
evidence, the jury must still weigh the credibility of the State’s evidence.  In 
closing, the State used the example to argue that the jury should find the testimony 
of the State’s DNA analysts credible because their testimony was consistent.  Even 
if the State’s use of the student hypothetical in closing could be construed as a 
comment on silence, it would not rise to the level of fundamental error.  Moreover, 
even if Guzman’s objection were preserved through his subsequent motion for 
mistrial and explanation for the basis of the objection, we would conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial in the 
context of this case. 
 
 
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C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Although Guzman does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain his conviction for first-degree murder, this Court independently reviews the 
record in death penalty cases to determine whether competent, substantial evidence 
supports the conviction.  Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (“On direct appeal in death 
penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an 
issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, 
remand for the appropriate relief.”).  Our duty on appeal is “to review the record in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing theory and to sustain that theory if it is 
supported by competent[,] substantial evidence.”  Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 
262 (Fla. 1996).  However, if the State’s evidence of guilt is wholly circumstantial, 
“not only must the evidence be sufficient to establish each element of the offense” 
but it must also be “inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
proposed by the defendant.”  Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 188 (Fla. 2010).  
“The [S]tate is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events 
which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent 
evidence which is inconsistent with the Defendant’s theory of events.”  Kocaker v. 
State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1225 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 
543, 557 (Fla. 2010)).   
 
 
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Guzman’s conviction is based on the fact that the DNA profile obtained 
from the male blood discovered in multiple areas around Fernandez’s apartment 
matched Guzman’s DNA profile, with the chances of a random match in the 
population at large being 1 in 153 trillion, and the fact that Guzman denied 
knowing Fernandez or having even been to her apartment building.  There was no 
connection established between Guzman and the victim other than the fact that 
they both lived in Miami at the time of the murder.  There were no eyewitnesses, 
no confession, and no fingerprints or other forensic evidence.  The murder weapon 
was never identified.  Although the evidence was wholly circumstantial, Guzman 
offered no reasonable hypothesis of innocence at trial other than to argue the 
possibility that a mistake was made or contamination occurred during the 
collection and processing of the DNA evidence, which led to an error in the 
analysis and a false “match.”  But the detailed testimony about the steps taken to 
avoid any mistake or contamination from those who collected the evidence from 
the crime scene and processed the evidence at the crime lab—which was 
unimpeached and unrebutted—provided competent, substantial evidence of a valid 
DNA match, which was inconsistent with Guzman’s theory of events.   
Further, although the State presented no direct evidence or testimony 
regarding how Guzman’s blood came to be in Fernandez’s apartment or the age of 
the bloodstains matching Guzman’s DNA profile, the effect of the blood evidence 
 
 
- 25 - 
in this case went beyond merely placing Guzman at the scene at some unknown 
time and, for the following reasons, actually implicated him in the murder.  First, 
Guzman’s blood was located in several areas throughout the apartment, in large 
enough amounts to be clearly visible to the naked eye.  Fernandez was stabbed or 
cut fifty-eight times, and the wounds had clean edges, consistent with the blade of 
a knife.  Blood was found on the hose in the kitchen sink and blood matching 
Guzman’s DNA profile was visible inside the kitchen sink.  From these facts it can 
be inferred that Guzman cut himself while stabbing Fernandez and cleaned up in 
the kitchen sink after the murder.  It can be inferred that Guzman’s blood was not 
deposited inside the kitchen sink at some time remote to the murder since it had not 
washed down the drain.  It could also be inferred based on testimony that 
Fernandez’s apartment was otherwise “neat and tidy” that the other blood matching 
Guzman’s DNA profile was deposited at the time of the murder. 
The jury was instructed on theories of both premeditated murder and felony 
murder, with the underlying felony being attempted sexual battery.  The jury 
returned a general verdict of guilty of first-degree murder without specifying 
whether the State proved first-degree murder, felony murder, or both. 
To establish first-degree premeditated murder, the State was required to 
prove the following elements: (1) Severina Fernandez is dead; (2) the death was 
caused by the criminal act of Guzman; and (3) there was a premeditated killing of 
 
 
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Severina Fernandez.  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2.  “Premeditation is a fully 
formed conscious purpose to kill that may be formed in a moment and need only 
exist for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act 
he is about to commit and the probable result of that act.”  Asay v. State, 580 So. 
2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991).  “Premeditation is a factual issue to be determined by the 
jury and, like other factual matters, may be established by circumstantial 
evidence.”  Twilegar, 42 So. 3d at 190.  The deliberate use of a knife to stab a 
victim multiple times in vital organs is evidence that can support a finding of 
premeditation.  Jackson v. State, 180 So. 3d 938, 956 (Fla. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 2015 (2016).  The evidence established that Fernandez was an eighty-year-
old woman who suffered fifty-eight stab and incised wounds to her neck, abdomen, 
hands, arms, and chest—two of which were individually fatal—as well as blunt-
force trauma to her head, and that the attack started in another room before ending 
in the bedroom.  The whole of these facts provides competent, substantial evidence 
to support a finding of premeditation. 
To prove first-degree felony murder, the State was required to prove the 
following three elements: (1) Severina Fernandez is dead; (2) the death occurred as 
a consequence of and while Guzman was attempting to commit sexual battery on 
Severina Fernandez; and (3) Guzman was the person who actually killed Severina 
Fernandez.  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.3.  The evidence presented established 
 
 
- 27 - 
that Fernandez’s dress was forcibly removed during the attack, and her panties 
were pulled down and left hanging off of one ankle.  Bloodstain pattern evidence 
on Fernandez’s body indicated that her left leg was raised up during the attack high 
enough to contact her abdomen.  There were also blood smears on the insides of 
her thighs, which indicated that bloodied hands were used to push her legs apart.  
The absence of trauma to the genital area and of sperm on the vaginal swabs did 
not conclusively establish that no sexual battery occurred.  The totality of this 
evidence provides competent, substantial evidence to support a finding that 
Fernandez’s death occurred as a consequence of and while Guzman was attempting 
a sexual battery and therefore to sustain a felony-murder conviction. 
D.  Hurst 
During the pendency of Guzman’s appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016), in which it held 
that Florida’s former capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment 
because it “required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine whether 
sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty” 
even though “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact 
necessary to impose a sentence of death.”  On remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 
40, 57 (Fla. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-998 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2017), we held 
that  
 
 
- 28 - 
before the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the 
jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the 
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death.   
In light of the nonunanimous jury recommendation to impose a death 
sentence, it cannot be said that the failure to require a unanimous verdict was 
harmless.  See Franklin v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S573, S575 (Fla. Nov. 23, 
2016) (“In light of the non-unanimous jury recommendation to impose a death 
sentence, we reject the State’s contention that any Ring[ v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002)]- or Hurst v. Florida-related error is harmless.”).  We therefore reverse 
Guzman’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Guzman’s conviction of first-degree 
murder, vacate Guzman’s death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur as to the conviction but dissent as to the 
sentence. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,  
Dennis James Murphy, Judge - Case No. 132004CF0153890001XX 
 
 
- 29 - 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps and Berdene B. 
Beckles, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee