Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JOEZELL WILLIAMS II
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 128533
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2006

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 31, 2006 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 128294 
JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 128533 
JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MEMORANDUM.  
In this case, we examine the double-jeopardy concerns1 that are involved 
1 Const 1963, art 1, § 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
when a defendant who has committed a felony and a concurrent, single homicide 
is charged with and convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree 
felony-murder, and the felony underlying the felony-murder charge.  Under the 
current case law, to avoid double-jeopardy implications, the defendant receives 
one conviction of first-degree murder, supported by two theories, and the 
conviction of the predicate felony underlying the felony murder is vacated.  See 
People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328; 308 NW2d 112 (1981); People v Bigelow 229 
Mich App 218; 581 NW2d 744 (1998).  The defendant thus receives one 
conviction and one sentence for having committed one crime.   
In this case, the trial court followed that procedure in part, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part, but invited us to consider modifying 
Bigelow. 265 Mich App 68; 692 NW2d 722 (2005).  We decline to do so, 
affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we provide a brief analysis of 
our reasoning. 
The prosecutor in this case is concerned that if the judgment vacates 
defendant’s larceny conviction, in the unlikely situation that defendant’s 
conviction of murder is overturned for some reason unrelated to his conviction of 
larceny, defendant could “go free” even though there is no question that he was 
found guilty of larceny. Although such a situation is unprecedented in Michigan 
case law, we find reassurance in the federal law that these concerns are 
groundless. Although the United States Supreme Court has not considered this 
specific context, it came close in Rutledge v United States, 517 US 292; 116 S Ct 
2  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
1241; 134 L Ed 2d 419 (1996). We believe Rutledge presents the correct method 
of handling this case. 
In Rutledge, the defendant was convicted of both conducting a continuing 
criminal enterprise (CCE) and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and 
was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences.  The Court held that under the 
common-elements test of Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 
76 L Ed 306 (1932), the conspiracy was a lesser included offense of CCE.  The 
Court then found that the defendant could not receive two sentences and that the 
second conviction, even without a second sentence, was presumptively 
impermissible under Ball v United States, 470 US 856; 105 S Ct 1668; 84 L Ed 2d 
740 (1985).2 
Next, the Court addressed the government’s concern that without a 
“backup” conviction, the defendant might escape punishment altogether if he 
successfully challenged the CCE conviction in a manner that did not affect his 
conspiracy conviction.  Rutledge at 305. The Court found “no reason why this 
pair of greater and lesser offenses should present any novel problem,” and noted 
that “federal appellate courts appear to have uniformly concluded that they may 
direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included offense when a conviction for a 
2 The Court did not ultimately decide whether the second conviction was 
impermissible under Ball alone because the fact that each conviction carried its 
own $50 “special assessment” established a second punishment, even without a 
second prison term.  Rutledge at 301. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
greater offense is reversed on grounds that affect only the greater offense.”  Id. at 
306. Justice Stevens continued, “This Court has noted the use of such a practice 
with approval.” Id. 
Under this approach, if defendant’s murder conviction is reversed on 
grounds only affecting the murder element, entry of a judgment of conviction of 
larceny may be directed by the appellate court.  Such was the practice of this Court 
in, for example, People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532, 553; 648 NW2d 164 (2002), 
and People v Bearss, 463 Mich 623, 631; 625 NW2d 10 (2001).  We continue to 
support this approach and thus affirm defendant’s conviction.3 
Affirmed. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
3  In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal in Docket No. 
128533 is denied. 
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_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 128294 
JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 128533 
JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
WEAVER J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the Court of Appeals 
judgment that vacated defendant’s conviction of larceny from the person of 
another and would affirm defendant’s convictions because I continue to adhere to 
the position expressed in my dissent in People v Curvan, 473 Mich 896 (2005).
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 128294 
JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 128533 
JOEZELL WILLIAMS II, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
CORRIGAN, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s declination to tackle the central 
question presented in this case, i.e., whether double-jeopardy principles prohibit 
the imposition of multiple punishments for the underlying offense of larceny from 
the person of another, MCL 750.357, and first-degree murder based on alternative 
theories of premeditated murder and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1).  I would 
hold this case in abeyance for the decision in People v Smith (Docket No. 130353), 
lv gtd 475 Mich ___ (2006), in which we have granted leave to appeal to consider 
 
 
 
 
 
the appropriate test for resolving a “multiple punishments” double-jeopardy claim 
that arose from a conviction of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and felony murder 
based on a predicate felony of larceny. 
An abeyance for Smith is appropriate for the following reasons: 
First, this case and Smith are in similar postures. 
In both cases, the 
defendant received dual convictions for felony murder and a predicate felony or an 
offense related to the predicate felony.  In Smith, the defendant was convicted of 
armed robbery and felony murder based on larceny.  In this case, the defendant 
was convicted of larceny from the person of another and first-degree murder based 
on alternative theories of premeditated murder and felony murder. 
Second, both cases potentially present the question whether People v 
Robideau, 419 Mich 458; 355 NW2d 592 (1984), or Blockburger v United States, 
284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), sets forth the proper test to 
determine whether multiple punishments are barred on double-jeopardy grounds 
under Const 1963, art 1, § 15.  Our grant order in Smith directed the parties to 
consider “this Court’s prior precedent in ‘multiple punishment’ claims and the 
common understanding of ‘same offense’ as it relates to the ‘multiple 
punishments’ prong of double jeopardy.  Cf. People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565 (2004).”  
Smith, supra at ___. 
Thus, our resolution of the appropriate test in Smith may offer guidance in 
addressing the “multiple punishments” claim in this case.  If this Court decides in 
Smith that the Blockburger test governs the resolution of multiple punishments 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
claims, then we should consider the proper application of that test in this case. 
Therefore, because an abeyance for Smith is warranted, I must respectfully dissent. 
Next, I will articulate what I believe to be the correct disposition of this 
case under the currently controlling Robideau test. For the following reasons, I 
believe that double jeopardy does not preclude the imposition of multiple 
punishments for larceny from the person of another and first-degree murder based 
on alternative theories of premeditation and felony murder.  
In People v Curvan, 473 Mich 896 (2005) (Corrigan, J., dissenting), I 
agreed with Justice Riley’s dissenting view in People v Harding, 443 Mich 693; 
506 NW2d 482 (1993), that felony murder and the predicate offense of armed 
robbery are not the “same offense” for the purposes of the protection against 
double jeopardy. Plainly, the two offenses protect against distinct societal harms. 
Felony murder punishes homicide committed with malice in the course of a 
felony, while armed robbery protects against the violent deprivation of property. 
Id. Moreover, the structure of the first-degree murder statute reflects that felony 
murder is one of three classifications of the crime of first-degree murder.  The 
predicate felonies are used to differentiate felony murder “from the other two 
types of first-degree murder, and from second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, 
rather than merely to enhance the penalty for the enumerated predicate felonies.” 
Curvan, supra at 904 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
As in Curvan, the majority here again declines to answer a fairly 
straightforward question:  Are first-degree murder supported by alternative 
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theories and larceny from the person the “same offense”?  Under our current test 
set forth in Robideau, legislative intent is the fundamental criterion in discerning 
whether multiple punishments are authorized.  Although this Court held in People 
v Wilder, 411 Mich 328; 308 NW2d 112 (1981), and Harding, supra, that separate 
convictions and sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony are not 
permitted, this Court has never addressed whether multiple punishments for an 
underlying felony and first-degree murder are permitted where, as here, the 
murder conviction is based on alternative theories of premeditated murder and 
felony murder.1 
I would decide this case on the basis of the views I expressed in Curvan. 
First-degree murder and the underlying felony of larceny from the person simply 
are not the “same offense.” I can discern no indication that our Legislature ever 
prohibited multiple punishments for these distinct offenses.  The two offenses 
protect against distinct social harms. That is particularly true where, as here, the 
murder conviction is supported by an alternative theory of premeditation.  It 
cannot reasonably be disputed that protecting against a premeditated homicide is a 
1 The Court of Appeals special panel in People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 
218; 581 NW2d 744 (1998), of which I was a member, vacated the conviction for 
a felony underlying a murder conviction based on alternative theories of 
premeditated murder and felony murder.  In his dissent in this case, Judge 
O’Connell, who was a member of the Bigelow special panel, opined that he and 
the other members of the Bigelow special panel had erred in holding that the 
underlying felony conviction must be vacated in this situation.  I share Judge 
O’Connell’s view that the special panel members in Bigelow, myself included, 
erred in this regard. 
4  
 
 
 
social interest that is distinct from the aim of preventing the taking of property 
from the person of another. 
In lieu of answering any of these questions or holding this case in abeyance, 
the majority has imported a doctrine from federal case law allowing a conviction 
that has been vacated to be revived in certain circumstances.  Because I question 
the majority’s avoidance of the double-jeopardy issues that are so clearly before 
us, and because an abeyance for Smith is warranted, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s decision. 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
5