Title: Goe v. Comm’r of Probation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11841
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11841 
 
GEORGE GOE1  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 2, 2015. - March 14, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation.  Interstate Compact for Adult 
Offender Supervision.  Global Positioning System Device. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 29, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cordy, J. 
 
 
 
Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Lily Lockhart, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Spencer 
Lord with her) for the petitioner. 
 
Steven R. Strom, of Connecticut, for the intervener. 
 
Sarah M. Joss, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Commissioner of Probation. 
 
U. Gwyn Williams, Laura Carey, & Charles Stones, for 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice & another, amici curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, 
intervener. 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  This case comes to us on a reservation and 
report from the single justice asking the following questions: 
 
"(1) Whether the Massachusetts courts are the 
appropriate forum for challenging additional probation 
conditions imposed on a probationer transferred to 
Massachusetts pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult 
Offender Supervision; and, if so, what is the proper 
mechanism for mounting such a challenge? 
 
 
"(2) Whether a transferee probationer is entitled to 
actual notice of mandatory [global positioning system 
(GPS)] monitoring pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47[,] from 
the sentencing judge, or whether such notice is implied or 
waived by a petitioner's voluntary transfer to 
Massachusetts[?] 
 
 
"(3) Whether mandatory GPS monitoring for crimes 
committed as a minor constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, where the minor was convicted as an adult in 
another jurisdiction? 
 
 
"(4) Whether the Commissioner of Probation's Policy on 
the Issuance of Travel Permits is ultra vires; and, if not, 
whether the application of that policy to the petitioner 
violated his right to interstate travel?" 
 
 
In answer to the first question, we conclude that, where a 
probationer whose supervision is transferred to Massachusetts 
under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision 
(compact) contends that a special condition of probation that 
was added by Massachusetts is not mandated by Massachusetts law 
or is unconstitutional, this determination is appropriately made 
by a Massachusetts court, and the appropriate mechanism to 
obtain such a determination is through a complaint for 
declaratory relief.  We also conclude that the Massachusetts 
probation department may not add mandatory GPS monitoring under 
3 
 
G. L. c. 265, § 47, as a special condition of probation for this 
probationer.  In light of that conclusion, we decline to answer 
questions two and three because they are moot.  In answer to 
question four, regarding the Policy on the Issuance of Travel 
Permits promulgated by the Massachusetts Commissioner of 
Probation (commissioner), we conclude that the prohibition on 
out-of-State travel for probationers being supervised for sex 
offenses is not an additional condition of probation imposed on 
a transferred probationer.  We, therefore, reject the contention 
that the policy is ultra vires as an additional condition.  We 
decline to answer whether the application of that policy to the 
petitioner violated his right to interstate travel because the 
appropriate forum for such a constitutional claim is the sending 
State, where it may be considered with the petitioner's 
nonconstitutional arguments for modification of the sending 
State's condition that he not travel out-of-State without 
permission from his probation officer.3 
 
Background.  On April 29, 2013, the petitioner, who was the 
defendant in criminal proceedings in the Connecticut Superior 
Court (defendant), pleaded guilty to two crimes that he 
committed at the age of fourteen against a six year old 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the brief submitted by the intervener 
Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision and the 
amicus brief submitted by the Citizens for Juvenile Justice and 
the Children's Law Center for Massachusetts. 
4 
 
relative:  sexual assault in the third degree and risk of injury 
to a minor.  Although he was a juvenile when he committed these 
crimes and only fifteen years old when he pleaded guilty to 
their commission, he was convicted as an adult.  After 
completing a residential treatment program, he was sentenced to 
a period of incarceration of five years (the execution of which 
was suspended) and ten years of probation supervision.  The 
judge ordered a number of special conditions and, as permitted 
under Connecticut law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(b) (2015), 
authorized the probation department to add "any other conditions 
deemed appropriate." 
 
As a general condition of probation, the defendant was 
ordered not to leave the State of Connecticut "without 
permission from the Probation Officer."  The Connecticut 
probation department also added twenty-four special conditions, 
including that the defendant "will submit to electronic 
monitoring as directed by a Probation Officer."  The defendant 
signed the probation form that set forth these conditions and 
that obliged him to "abide by them," and his signature was 
witnessed by his grandmother. 
 
The defendant applied pursuant to the compact to transfer 
his probation supervision to Massachusetts, where he intended to 
5 
 
live with his maternal grandparents.4  His application was 
granted and his supervision was transferred to Massachusetts, 
where he was assigned to the probation service of the Middlesex 
County Division of the Juvenile Court Department in Lowell 
because he was then sixteen years old. 
 
On February 19, 2014, the defendant filed a "Motion to 
Reopen and Modify Conditions of Probation" in the Superior Court 
in Connecticut that requested modification of several 
conditions, claiming they were unnecessary, impossible to comply 
with, or detrimental to his rehabilitation.  Among the 
conditions he sought to modify were (1) that he submit to 
electronic monitoring as directed by a probation officer, and 
(2) that he not travel out of Massachusetts without the 
permission of a probation officer.5  As to these conditions, the 
defendant asked the judge to modify or eliminate the requirement 
of electronic monitoring, and to authorize him, with prior 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant's application fell within the Interstate 
Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (compact) rather than the 
Interstate Compact for Juveniles because the compact defines 
"[a]dult" to mean "both individuals legally classified as adults 
and juveniles treated as adults by court order, statute, or 
operation of law."  Interstate Commission for Adult Offender 
Supervision, ICAOS Rules, Rule 1.101, at 5 (effective Mar. 1, 
2014) (ICAOS Rules), 
http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/0/library/legal/ICAOS_R
ules.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM9H-NQBL]. 
 
 
5 The defendant claimed that "[t]he Massachusetts 
[p]robation [d]epartment refuses to permit [him] to travel out 
of state during the [ten] year period of his probation." 
6 
 
approval of the Connecticut or Massachusetts probation 
department, to travel with his maternal grandparents to New 
Hampshire every weekend from May 23 to September 1, 2014.  On 
April 3, 2014, as to these conditions, the judge granted the 
defendant's motion only to the extent that "GPS monitoring will 
be at [the] discretion of [the State] of Massachusetts Dept. of 
Probation (Juvenile)." 
 
On June 3, 2014, the defendant's attorneys wrote a letter 
to the commissioner asking that the defendant not be subjected 
to mandatory GPS monitoring, and that he be considered for 
travel permits to New Hampshire and Florida, "so long as his 
itinerary and other aspects of his travel meet approval by his 
Probation Officer."  On August 22, 2014, the commissioner 
responded that the probation department considered the 
defendant's arguments for relief from the GPS requirement but 
decided to impose GPS monitoring because of the level of 
seriousness of the crime, the difference in age between the 
defendant and the victim, "the nature of the supervision for 
another state," the level of risk posed by the above factors, 
"the fact that he was treated in Connecticut as an adult on a 
long adult probation order[,] and . . . that Connecticut 
originally included GPS as a condition and then modified its 
Order to leave it to Massachusetts' discretion."  He added that, 
"[b]efore Probation can consider any adjustment to the GPS 
7 
 
requirement, [the defendant] will have to complete one year of 
supervision with no violations and with full compliance."6  The 
commissioner also declared that, once the defendant turned 
eighteen years of age [which he did in July, 2015], "Probation 
will continue the GPS as it would for any adult under [G. L. 
c. 265, § 47]."7,8 
 
The commissioner also wrote that the defendant had not 
justified an exception to the probation department's travel 
policy, dated January 11, 2012, which declared that the 
"Probation Service shall not authorize travel permits" under 
various circumstances, including where "[t]he probationer has an 
order of electronic monitoring . . . as a condition of 
probation," where "[t]he probationer is being supervised for a 
sex offense," or where the probationer is an "interstate compact 
sex offender unless the sending state court has approved, and 
                                                          
 
 
6 The Massachusetts Commissioner of Probation (commissioner) 
added that the probation department would need "an independent 
evaluation of his level of risk." 
 
 
7 General Laws, c. 265, § 47, provides in relevant part: 
 
"Any person who is placed on probation for any offense 
listed within the definition of 'sex offense', a 'sex 
offense involving a child' or a 'sexually violent offense', 
as defined in [G. L. c. 6, § 178C], shall, as a requirement 
of any term of probation, wear a global positioning system 
[GPS] device . . . ." 
 
 
8 The commissioner characterized the defendant's letter as 
requesting that the defendant "be free of GPS monitoring, 
despite G. L. c. 265, § 47." 
8 
 
the probationer has produced, a travel permit in writing" 
(emphasis in original).  The commissioner noted that, although 
the probation department will not authorize travel permits in 
these circumstances, "out of state travel is possible where a 
judge authorizes it." 
 
On March 13, 2015, the defendant appeared the Superior 
Court in Connecticut and admitted that he violated conditions of 
his probation by joining and participating in the Boy Scouts and 
by accessing a Facebook account without permission.  The judge 
found the defendant in violation of his probation and placed him 
on a six-month "watch" during which he would be monitored month-
to-month in what the judge described as "intensive sex offender 
probation."  If the defendant completed the six-month period 
with no violations of the conditions of probation, he would be 
returned to probation with the same termination date and the 
same conditions as were originally imposed.9 
                                                          
 
 
9 The commissioner contends that the judge at this probation 
violation hearing ordered mandatory GPS monitoring because the 
docket sheet regarding that hearing included a clerk's note that 
the "[defendant] can go back to live in Mass.  Do GPS there."  
The docket notation, however, is not supported by the transcript 
of that hearing, which reflects that the judge explained to the 
defendant that, if he complied with all the conditions of his 
probation during the six-month "watch" period, he would "be put 
back on probation with the original conditions reimposed."  The 
only reference to GPS monitoring at the hearing occurred after 
the judge had accepted the defendant's admission to a violation 
of probation and ordered that a finding of violation may enter, 
when the defendant's attorney informed the judge that the 
defendant was "under a GPS monitoring system" in Massachusetts 
9 
 
 
In January, 2015, the defendant filed the instant petition 
in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking 
extraordinary relief from what he characterized as the 
unconstitutional and "otherwise unreviewable" orders of the 
commissioner to mandate GPS monitoring of the defendant and to 
forbid him from traveling out of State.  On March 13, 2015, the 
same day the defendant was found in violation of probation 
conditions by a Connecticut judge, the single justice reserved 
and reported the case, along with his four questions. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Interstate Compact for Adult Offender 
Supervision.  The compact regulates the interstate transfer of 
supervision of those individuals on probation or parole due to 
the commission of a criminal offense.  Interstate Commission for 
Adult Offender Supervision, ICAOS Rules, Rule 1.101, at 6 
(effective Mar. 1, 2014) (ICAOS Rules), 
http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/0/library/legal/ICAOS_R
ules.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM9H-NQBL]. (defining "[o]ffender" 
subject to compact).  The compact has been enacted by statute in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but the Connecticut Department of Corrections cut the GPS 
bracelet off his ankle the previous day.  Defense counsel sought 
assurance that this removal of the GPS bracelet would not result 
in a violation of probation.  The judge asked if the 
Massachusetts probation department would resume the GPS 
monitoring upon the defendant's return to Massachusetts, and the 
prosecutor told the judge that "[t]hey most certainly will" but 
"the state is not seeking a violation on something that was cut 
off him."  There is nothing in the transcript to suggest that 
the judge mandated GPS monitoring of the defendant. 
10 
 
all fifty States as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands.  Interstate 
Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, ICAOS Bench Book for 
Judges and Court Personnel, at 40-41 (2014) (ICAOS Bench Book), 
http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/0/library/publications/
Benchbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DFZ-RUEQ].  It was enacted in 
Massachusetts in 2005.  St. 2005, c. 121.  The compact was 
created to address weaknesses in the earlier Interstate Compact 
for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, which was 
drafted in 1937.  ICAOS Bench Book, supra at 35, 38.  The 
compact created the Interstate Commission on Adult Offender 
Supervision and empowered it to promulgate rules regulating the 
transfer of offenders that have the force of statutory law in 
all of the compacting States.  ICAOS Bench Book, supra at 38, 
43-44.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 127, § 151E (b).  The compact is the 
exclusive means to transfer supervision from one State to 
another for those offenders who are eligible under the compact.  
ICAOS Rule 2.110(a), supra at 21. 
 
The application of the rules of the compact can be 
illustrated by considering the case of the defendant, who sought 
to transfer probation supervision from Connecticut to 
Massachusetts.  Once an offender has been convicted and 
sentenced to some form of supervision in Connecticut, transfer 
of that supervision to Massachusetts must first be permitted by 
11 
 
Connecticut.  ICAOS Rule 3.101, supra at 22.  ICAOS Bench Book, 
supra at 53.  If approved, the offender must complete an 
application, which Connecticut must transmit to Massachusetts.  
ICAOS Rule 3.102, supra at 28.  In certain situations, such as 
where the offender is a resident of Massachusetts or where the 
offender has means of support and family in the Commonwealth who 
can assist in the offender's plan of supervision, acceptance of 
the transfer by Massachusetts is mandatory; in other cases 
acceptance is discretionary.  ICAOS Rules 3.101, 3.101-2, supra 
at 22, 26. 
 
Where an offender transfers probation supervision from 
Connecticut (the sending State) to Massachusetts (the receiving 
State) pursuant to the compact, Connecticut must inform 
Massachusetts of the special conditions that it has imposed at 
the time of sentencing or during the period of probation.  ICAOS 
Rule 4.103(c), supra at 42 ("A sending state shall inform the 
receiving state of any special conditions to which the offender 
is subject at the time the request for transfer is made or at 
any time thereafter").  Massachusetts must enforce those 
conditions unless it is unable to do so, and if it is unable, it 
must notify Connecticut of its inability to do so at the time 
the request for transfer of supervision is made.  ICAOS Rule 
4.103(d), supra at 42.  See ICAOS Bench Book, supra at 68 
("Although a court may as a condition of probation impose a 
12 
 
special condition and require that the condition be met in the 
receiving state, the receiving state can refuse to enforce the 
special condition if the receiving state is unable to do so").  
If Massachusetts were to inform Connecticut that it is unable to 
enforce a special condition of probation, Connecticut has the 
option of removing the problematic condition or withdrawing the 
transfer request and requiring the offender to complete 
supervision in Connecticut.  ICAOS Bench Book, supra. 
 
At the time Massachusetts accepts the probationer or during 
the term of supervision, Massachusetts may add a special 
condition, but only "if that special condition would have been 
imposed on the offender if sentence had been imposed in the 
receiving state."  ICAOS Rule 4.103(a), supra at 42.  Because 
the compact authorizes Massachusetts (the receiving State) to 
add only those conditions that "would have been imposed" if the 
offender had been sentenced in Massachusetts, the probation 
department in Massachusetts may add a special condition only 
where a judge would have been required by law to impose that 
special condition on the defendant at sentencing; it may not 
impose a condition of probation that a sentencing judge simply 
had the discretion to impose.10  If Massachusetts were to add a 
                                                          
 
 
10 We note that although the compact empowers the probation 
department to impose special conditions on offenders who 
transfer their supervision from another State, ICAOS Rule 
4.103(b), supra at 42, the probation department does not have 
13 
 
special condition, it must notify Connecticut of the nature of 
the special condition and its purpose.  ICAOS Rule 4.103(b), 
supra at 42.  If Connecticut were to decide not to accept that 
condition, it may exercise its authority to retake the 
probationer, thereby revoking the transfer.  See ICAOS Rule 
5.101(a), supra at 55. 
 
After a Connecticut probationer is transferred to 
Massachusetts, the probationer must be supervised in a manner 
"consistent with the supervision of other similar offenders 
sentenced in [Massachusetts]."  ICAOS Rule 4.101, supra at 40.  
However, Connecticut retains jurisdiction over the probationer 
and may "retake" him or her at any time for any reason.11  ICAOS 
Rule 5.101(a), supra at 55.  If the probationer were to commit a 
significant violation of probation, Massachusetts would be 
required to inform Connecticut of the violation but could not 
institute proceedings to revoke the offender's probation.  ICAOS 
Rule 4.109, supra at 49.  Only Connecticut could initiate 
revocation proceedings, and such proceedings could only occur in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that power with offenders sentenced in Massachusetts, where, 
unlike in Connecticut, conditions of probation must be ordered 
by a judge.  See A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 242 (1988) 
("it is the function of the sentencing judge to set the 
conditions of probation," and it is duty of probation officer to 
enforce conditions set by judge). 
 
 
11 There is an exception to this rule whereby Massachusetts 
could decline to return an offender who has pending criminal 
charges in Massachusetts.  ICAOS Rule 5.101-1, supra at 56. 
14 
 
Connecticut, subject only to a hearing in Massachusetts 
establishing probable cause for the violation.  ICAOS Bench 
Book, supra at 76.  ICAOS Rule 5.108, supra at 65.  Of course, 
if a defendant were to violate a probation condition by 
committing a new crime in Massachusetts, the defendant may be 
prosecuted for that crime in Massachusetts, but any probation 
revocation must take place in Connecticut.12  ICAOS Bench Book, 
supra. 
 
With this background regarding the operation of the 
compact, we turn now to the reported questions. 
 
2.  Question one.  Question one asks "[w]hether the 
Massachusetts courts are the appropriate forum for challenging 
additional probation conditions imposed on a probationer 
transferred to Massachusetts pursuant to [the compact]; and, if 
so, what is the proper mechanism for mounting such a challenge."  
This question is raised in the context of the commissioner's 
somewhat confusing position regarding GPS monitoring of the 
defendant.  We characterize it as confusing because, after April 
3, 2014, when the judge in Connecticut modified the defendant's 
special condition of probation to provide that "GPS monitoring 
will be at [the] discretion" of the Massachusetts probation 
department -- suggesting that the probation department should 
make an individualized determination whether the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
12 See note 11, supra. 
15 
 
should be subject to GPS monitoring -- the defendant's probation 
officer informed defense counsel on April 23, 2014, that GPS 
monitoring of the defendant would continue because it was 
mandated by G. L. c. 265, § 47.  The probation officer stated 
that, even though the defendant was a juvenile, he had been 
convicted as an adult in Connecticut, and all adult sex 
offenders were required by § 47 to be monitored by GPS.  
However, as earlier noted, when the commissioner on August 22, 
2014, denied the defendant's request to be relieved of the 
requirement of GPS monitoring, the commissioner gave 
individualized reasons for continuing GPS monitoring, but stated 
that, when the defendant reached the age of eighteen, GPS 
monitoring would become mandatory under § 47.  We need not dwell 
on this confusion to determine whether the probation 
department's reason for imposing GPS monitoring on the defendant 
before he turned eighteen was the claimed statutory mandate of 
§ 47 or an individualized determination, because the defendant 
has turned eighteen and it is clear that the probation 
department has determined that GPS monitoring of the defendant 
is now mandated by § 47.  The first question essentially asks 
whether the Massachusetts courts are the appropriate forum to 
challenge this determination.  We conclude that they are. 
 
As noted earlier, the Massachusetts probation department 
under ICAOS Rule 4.103(a), supra at 42, may add a special 
16 
 
condition of probation only where that condition is mandated by 
law in Massachusetts.  Where a probationer contends that the 
special condition added by Massachusetts is not mandated by 
Massachusetts law or is unconstitutional, this determination is 
appropriately made by a Massachusetts court.  Allowing a 
Massachusetts court to make this determination neither impairs 
the jurisdiction of the sending State court nor undermines the 
judgment or conditions of supervision imposed by the sentencing 
court.  If a Massachusetts court were to find that Massachusetts 
has improperly added a special condition, Massachusetts 
probation authorities would merely be precluded from imposing 
the additional condition.  Because the probation condition may 
be added by Massachusetts only where it is mandated by 
Massachusetts law, a Connecticut court could not eliminate the 
condition of the transferred probationer by modifying the 
defendant's probation conditions.  Thus, the courts of the 
sending State (here, Connecticut) are not the appropriate forum 
to determine whether Massachusetts law truly mandates a 
probation condition added by Massachusetts. 
 
In contrast, if a probationer were to challenge whether a 
probation condition that was imposed by the sending State was 
prohibited by the statutory or constitutional law of the United 
States or the sending State, the only appropriate forum to bring 
such a claim would be a court in the sending State, because only 
17 
 
a court in the sending State could modify or eliminate a 
condition imposed by the sending State.13 
 
Having concluded that the defendant is entitled to 
challenge in a Massachusetts court the probation department's 
determination that GPS monitoring of the defendant is mandated 
by § 47 once the defendant reaches the age of eighteen, we now 
turn to that issue.  As noted earlier, mandatory GPS monitoring 
is in conflict with the special condition imposed by the judge, 
which required the probation department in Massachusetts to 
exercise its discretion in determining whether to subject the 
defendant to GPS monitoring and implicitly required an 
individualized evidence-based determination.  Requiring GPS 
                                                          
 
 
13 If enforcement of a special condition imposed by the 
sending State would be in violation of the Constitution or laws 
of the receiving State, the receiving State should notify the 
sending State under ICAOS Rule 4.103(d), supra at 42, that it 
must refuse to enforce the special condition, and the sending 
State would then have to decide whether to remove the special 
condition or withdraw the transfer request.  Interstate 
Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, ICAOS Bench Book for 
Judges and Court Personnel, at 68 (2014), 
http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/0/library/publications/
Benchbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DFZ-RUEQ].  If a probationer 
were to claim that the receiving State erred in enforcing an 
illegal special condition, a court in the sending State would be 
the most appropriate forum to challenge the lawfulness of the 
special condition, because a judge of that court could obviate 
the need to determine whether the special condition violated the 
Constitution or laws of the receiving State by modifying or 
eliminating the special condition.  A judge in the receiving 
State could not modify or eliminate the special condition; the 
judge could only order that the receiving State probation 
department not enforce the special condition if the judge were 
to find it in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
receiving State. 
18 
 
monitoring for the duration of supervision without giving a 
probation official the discretion, where appropriate, to 
discontinue such monitoring constitutes a more restrictive 
condition of supervision that must be considered an additional 
condition imposed by Massachusetts under the compact.  See 
Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, Advisory 
Opinion 1-2015, at 3 (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/0/library/legal/advisor
yopinions/AdvisoryOpinion_1-2015_NC.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ9Q-
7XRM] (North Carolina statute allowing probationers who violate 
conditions of probation to be confined for up to three days in 
lieu of revocation proceedings constitutes additional condition 
imposed by North Carolina when applied to out-of-State offenders 
transferred to North Carolina under compact).  This additional 
condition of mandatory GPS monitoring is permissible under the 
compact only if Massachusetts law, specifically § 47, requires 
that it be imposed on the defendant. 
 
The commissioner contends that § 47 requires GPS monitoring 
for "[a]ny person who is placed on probation for any . . . 'sex 
offense,'" and that the defendant is subject to that statutory 
requirement once he becomes eighteen because, even though he 
committed the sex offense when he was fourteen years old, he was 
convicted in Connecticut of a sex offense as an adult. 
19 
 
 
Certainly, if the defendant were an adult when he committed 
the Connecticut sex offense, GPS monitoring would be required 
under § 47, because he was placed on probation for a "sex 
offense," as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 178C, which includes an 
indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 
fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, "or a like 
violation of the laws of another state."  The defendant's 
conviction in Connecticut of sexual assault in the third degree, 
in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-72a(a) (2015), is a "like 
violation" of the Massachusetts crime of indecent assault and 
battery.14 
 
The defendant, although convicted as an adult, was not an 
adult when he committed these sexual offenses; he was fourteen 
                                                          
 
 
14 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-72a(a) (2015) provides in relevant 
part: 
 
"A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree 
when such person (1) compels another person to submit to 
sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other 
person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of 
force against such other person or against a third person, 
which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical 
injury to himself or herself or a third person . . . ." 
 
 
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor told the judge that the 
defendant, when he was fourteen years old, touched a six year 
girl who was "a closely related family member . . . in a sexual 
manner, . . .  holding her hip . . . [and] thrusting his hip and 
grinding into her, . . . French kissing her by putting his 
tongue in her mouth, also touching her in her genital area 
. . . .  [T]he child asked him to stop [but] he continued with 
the activity.  And the child did have a bruise on her arm 
afterwards." 
20 
 
years old.  Because of his age, if these crimes had been 
committed in Massachusetts, the Commonwealth could not have 
initiated a criminal proceeding against the defendant as an 
adult; it could only have proceeded against him as a juvenile.  
See G. L. c. 119, § 74.  Therefore, if these crimes had been 
committed in Massachusetts, the defendant, at worst, would have 
been adjudicated delinquent in the Juvenile Court.15  See id.  If 
he were adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to probation, he 
would not be subject to mandatory GPS monitoring pursuant to 
§ 47.  See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 816 (2013) 
("mandatory GPS monitoring pursuant to § 47 does not apply to 
juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent").  Therefore, if 
the defendant had committed these crimes in Massachusetts, a 
Juvenile Court judge in the exercise of discretion could order 
                                                          
 
 
15 The Commonwealth could not have proceeded against the 
defendant as a youthful offender, because he had not previously 
had any involvement with the juvenile justice system that would 
have resulted in him being committed to the Department of Youth 
Services, did not commit a crime involving possession of a 
firearm, and did not commit an offense that "involves the 
infliction or threat of serious bodily harm in violation of 
law."  See G. L. c. 119, § 52 (defining "[y]outhful offender").  
In Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 861 (2001), the 
juvenile, when he was between fifteen and sixteen years old and 
the victim was between three and five years of age, touched the 
victim's vagina on approximately ten occasions and caused the 
victim to touch his penis.  We concluded that this conduct did 
not "involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm" 
where, as here, there was no evidence of sexual penetration, and 
"no evidence that the defendant overtly threatened [the 
complainant] or that serious bodily injuries were actually 
inflicted."  Id. at 863-864. 
21 
 
GPS monitoring as a condition of his probation, but that 
condition would not be mandated by law.  See id. at 816-817. 
 
Nor, where the crime was committed by a juvenile, would GPS 
monitoring become a mandatory condition of probation once the 
juvenile reached the age of eighteen.  Where a judge at 
sentencing did not order GPS monitoring as a special condition 
of a juvenile's probation, a judge in the exercise of discretion 
could add this special condition if (and only if) a probationer 
were found in violation of the conditions of probation.  
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 22-23 (2010).  But the 
judge could not add this punitive special condition without a 
probation violation simply because the offender turned eighteen, 
and § 47 cannot reasonably be interpreted to mandate that 
result. 
 
Under ICAOS Rule 4.103(a), supra at 42, Massachusetts, as 
the receiving State, could add GPS monitoring as a special 
condition of probation only "if that special condition would 
have been imposed on the offender if sentence had been imposed 
in the receiving state."  Because that special condition would 
not necessarily have been imposed in Massachusetts had the 
defendant been sentenced in Massachusetts for the crimes he 
committed when he was fourteen years old, the Massachusetts 
probation department is prohibited from imposing GPS monitoring 
as a mandatory condition of probation.  Rather, as required by 
22 
 
the judge's order on April 3, 2014, GPS monitoring may be 
ordered only at the discretion of the Massachusetts probation 
department, based on an individualized determination.  We 
therefore remand this matter to the single justice, who shall 
direct the commissioner to make an individualized determination 
in the exercise of his discretion whether to subject the 
defendant to GPS monitoring. 
 
Having answered the reported question and resolved the 
underlying issue, we now turn to the second part of that 
question:  "what is the proper mechanism for mounting such a 
challenge?"  We conclude that the proper mechanism is a 
complaint for declaratory judgment.  A declaratory judgment 
action filed pursuant to G. L. c. 231A and Mass. R. Civ. P. 57, 
365 Mass. 826 (1974), will allow a court to determine whether an 
additional special condition is mandated by Massachusetts law 
and whether such a condition is constitutional.  In the future, 
an offender supervised in Massachusetts pursuant to the compact 
should utilize that procedure to adjudicate his or her 
challenge; the existence of this alternative procedure 
forecloses extraordinary relief from this court.  See Hicks v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 425 Mass. 1014, 1014-1015 (1997).  
We addressed the substantive claims raised by the defendant in 
this case under G. L. c. 211, § 3, because the proper procedure 
had not been clearly established and the single justice reserved 
23 
 
and reported the case to this Court.  See Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 
14-15, quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 113, 119 (2008) 
("[w]here the single justice has, in [her] discretion, reserved 
and reported the case to the full court, we grant full appellate 
review of the issues reported"). 
 
3.  Questions two and three.  Questions two and three ask 
whether a transferee probationer is entitled to actual notice of 
mandatory GPS monitoring pursuant to § 47 from the sentencing 
judge, and whether mandatory GPS monitoring for crimes committed 
as a minor constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, where the 
minor was convicted as an adult in another jurisdiction.  
Because we have concluded that the defendant is not subject to 
mandatory GPS monitoring in Massachusetts under the compact, 
these questions are moot, and we decline to answer them. 
 
4.  Question four.  The fourth question asks "[w]hether the 
[commissioner's] Policy on the Issuance of Travel Permits 
[(travel policy)] is ultra vires; and, if not, whether the 
application of that policy to the petitioner violated his right 
to interstate travel."  We examine this question in the context 
of the circumstances of this case.  As earlier noted, at 
sentencing, the judge authorized the Connecticut probation 
department to add any other conditions it deemed appropriate.  
It is a general condition of probation in Connecticut that a 
probationer may not leave the State without permission from a 
24 
 
probation officer.16  When probation was transferred to 
Massachusetts, the defendant remained subject to this probation 
condition that he not leave the State without his probation 
officer's permission. 
 
Under ICAOS Rule 4.101, supra at 40, a receiving State 
(here, Massachusetts) "shall supervise an offender transferred 
under the [compact] in a manner . . . consistent with the 
supervision of other similar offenders sentenced in the 
receiving state."  Therefore, with respect to granting 
permission for interstate travel, the Massachusetts probation 
department must treat a transferred probationer as it would a 
probationer sentenced in Massachusetts.  The commissioner has 
given effect to that condition by applying a policy that 
regulates the exercise of discretion to grant travel permits.  
The travel policy issued on January 11, 2012, by the then acting 
commissioner treats all probationers who are under supervision 
for sex offenses and all probationers with a special condition 
of GPS monitoring the same, whether transferred or not:  the 
probation department shall not authorize the issuance of travel 
                                                          
 
 
16 A substantially identical provision is a general 
condition of probation in Massachusetts.  See commentary to Rule 
4, District/Municipal Courts Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, at 86 (LexisNexis 
2015) (identifying failure to "obtain permission to leave the 
Commonwealth" as violation of general probation conditions). 
25 
 
permits to them.17  The only way they can obtain a travel permit 
is to request their sentencing judge or, where that judge is 
unavailable, another judge in that trial court department, to 
order the issuance of a travel permit.  For a transferred 
probationer, that means filing a motion to modify the conditions 
of probation in the defendant's criminal case in the sending 
State.  The defendant sought such relief when he moved to modify 
the conditions of his probation, but that part of the request 
was not granted by the judge in his order of April 3, 2014.  
Nothing bars the defendant from again seeking such relief in 
Connecticut, which retains jurisdiction over the defendant.  
Such relief may not be sought in Massachusetts. 
 
The defendant contends that the commissioner, by issuing a 
policy that prohibits certain categories of probationers from 
being issued a travel permit by a probation officer, has imposed 
an additional special condition forbidding interstate travel 
that is not mandated by law and, therefore, is ultra vires.  We 
disagree for two reasons.  First, the general condition of 
probation imposed on the defendant in Connecticut provided that 
he could not "leave the State of Connecticut without permission 
                                                          
 
 
17 In his letter to the defendant, the commissioner 
articulated the reasons for not granting travel permits to 
probationers who are being supervised for sex offenses, 
including the difficulty of monitoring the probationer while out 
of State, of verifying the address where the offender will be 
staying, and of ensuring that the probationer will not encounter 
minors. 
26 
 
from the Probation Officer."  This condition does not appear to 
prohibit a probation department from issuing a travel policy 
governing the grant or denial of permission for out-of-State 
travel.  Thus, the application of the policy in Massachusetts is 
not inconsistent with the condition imposed in Connecticut.  
Second, in the letter from the commissioner to the defendant, 
the commissioner stated that he "remain[ed] unconvinced that 
[the defendant] presents a viable justification to make an 
exception to the [t]ravel [p]olicy in [the defendant's] case," 
which indicates that the commissioner retained the discretion to 
make an exception from his travel policy where the circumstances 
warranted.18 
 
The defendant further argues that the travel restriction 
applied by the Massachusetts probation department violates his 
right to interstate travel.19  Where the travel restriction was 
imposed as a condition of probation by the sending State (here, 
Connecticut) and was not an additional condition imposed by the 
                                                          
 
 
18 Also, it is significant that the defendant has recourse 
to the sentencing judge in Connecticut, who can modify the 
conditions of probation if the judge believes the application of 
the travel policy to be unnecessarily restrictive. 
 
 
19 Although the defendant cites arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in addition to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 
support of his argument that the travel restriction is 
unconstitutional, he does not argue that his right of interstate 
travel under the Massachusetts Constitution is broader than his 
rights under the United States Constitution. 
27 
 
receiving State, we conclude that the appropriate forum for such 
a constitutional claim is Connecticut, where it may be combined 
with the defendant's nonconstitutional claims for modification 
of this probation condition, and where the court, in its 
discretion, may avoid the constitutional question by modifying 
the condition.  Therefore, we decline to answer the fourth 
reported question; the appropriate forum to answer this question 
is a court in the sending State, Connecticut. 
 
Conclusion.  In summary, we conclude that probationers 
whose supervision is transferred to Massachusetts pursuant to 
the compact may challenge a special condition of probation that 
was added by Massachusetts through a declaratory judgment action 
in a Massachusetts court, where they may claim that the 
additional special condition is not mandated by law or is 
unconstitutional.  We also conclude that the Massachusetts 
probation department may not add mandatory GPS monitoring as a 
special condition of probation for this probationer because it 
is not required by G. L. c. 265, § 47.  Finally, we conclude 
that the travel restriction applied by the Massachusetts 
probation department to the defendant was not an additional 
condition of probation, and that the appropriate forum to 
challenge the constitutionality of the application of that 
condition is a Connecticut court, where it may be combined with 
the defendant's nonconstitutional claims for modification of 
28 
 
this probation condition.  We remand this matter to the single 
justice for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.