Title: Young v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 462, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH YOUNG, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 462, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0701026598 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 16, 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: June 28, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of June 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Joseph Young, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s summary dismissal of his first motion for postconviction relief.  After 
careful consideration of the parties’ contentions on appeal, we find no error in 
the Superior Court’s judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Young was convicted following a 
suppression hearing and bench trial based on stipulated facts in July 2007.  
The Superior Court found him guilty of trafficking in more than 100 grams of 
cocaine and sentenced him to fourteen years at Level V imprisonment to be 
 
2
suspended after serving eight years for decreasing levels of supervision.  This 
Court affirmed Young’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal.1 The 
mandate on appeal was issued on April 18, 2008.2  Young filed his motion for 
postconviction relief on May 11, 2009.  The Superior Court summarily 
dismissed Young’s motion as untimely because it was not filed within one 
year after the issuance of the mandate on appeal3 and because Young had 
failed to establish a “miscarriage of justice”4 in order to overcome the 
procedural bar.   
(3) 
Young raises five issues in his opening brief on appeal.  All five 
issues address the merits of his postconviction claims, which challenge the 
State’s reliance upon information supplied by a confidential informant as well 
as the constitutionality of the search and seizure leading to his arrest.  None of 
the issues in Young’s opening brief were presented to the Superior Court for 
review as part of his postconviction motion.  Thus, to the extent Young has 
failed to brief claims that he raised below, those claims are deemed waived.5 
                                                 
1 Young v. State, 2008 WL 880164 (Del. Apr. 2, 2008). 
2 In its order denying Young’s motion for postconviction relief, the Superior Court 
mistakenly asserted that the Supreme Court mandate issued on April 23, 2008.  In fact, this 
Court issued the mandate on April 18, 2008.  The Superior Court received and filed the 
mandate on April 23, 2008. 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. 61(i)(1). 
4 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). 
 
3
(4) 
Before we can address the substantive merits of Young’s claims 
on appeal, this Court must first consider the procedural requirements of 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.6  Rule 61(i)(1) provides that a motion for 
postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment 
of conviction is final.  The Superior Court found in this case that Young’s 
motion was time-barred and that Young had failed to establish that his claims 
warranted consideration under the fundamental fairness exception of Rule 
61(i)(5).  
(5) 
In his opening brief, Young does not challenge the correctness of 
the Superior Court’s holding, nor do we find any basis for such a challenge.  
Young’s motion for postconviction relief clearly was not filed within the one-
year time limitation of Rule 61(i)(1).  Moreover, Young has failed to establish 
that consideration of his untimely claims is warranted under Rule 61(i)(5). 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
6Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).