Title: Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutors Office
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2018

Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutors Office Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In January 2014, a General Order was issued under the authority of the Chief of the Barnegat Township Police Department that applied only to that department. The Order instructed officers to record by MVR several categories of incidents. It was undisputed that the MVR recordings at the center of this appeal were made in compliance with the Order. The MVR recordings at issue documented an incident in which police officers pursued and arrested a driver who had allegedly eluded an officer attempting a traffic stop. One officer’s decision to deploy a police dog during the arrest led to internal investigations and criminal charges against the officer. Approximately four months after the driver’s arrest, plaintiff John Paff sought access to the MVR recordings under OPRA and the common law. The Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) opposed disclosure. Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause, seeking access to the MVR recordings on the basis of OPRA and the common-law right of access. The trial court ordered disclosure of the MVR recordings. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division panel, concurring with the panel’s dissenting judge that the MVR recordings were not “required by law” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, that they constituted criminal investigatory records under that provision, and that they were therefore not subject to disclosure under OPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration of plaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access to the MVR recordings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) John Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office (A-17-16) (078040)Argued February 27, 2018 -- Decided August 13, 2018PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court applies the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, to recordings made by mobile video recorders (MVRs) in police vehicles in compliance with a municipal police chief’s general order. In January 2014, a General Order was issued under the authority of the Chief of the Barnegat Township Police Department that applied only to that department. The Order instructed officers to record by MVR several categories of incidents. It is undisputed that the MVR recordings at the center of this appeal were made in compliance with the Order. The MVR recordings at issue documented an incident in which police officers pursued and arrested a driver who had allegedly eluded an officer attempting a traffic stop. One officer’s decision to deploy a police dog during the arrest led to internal investigations and criminal charges against the officer. MVR equipment installed in two Barnegat Township police vehicles recorded the pursuit and arrest of the driver, who was charged with eluding and resisting arrest and was issued four summonses for motor vehicle violations. Approximately four months after the driver’s arrest, plaintiff John Paff sought access to the MVR recordings under OPRA and the common law. The Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) opposed disclosure based on three OPRA provisions: the statute’s exclusion of a “criminal investigatory record” from the definition of a “government record,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1; its exemption for records pertaining to an “investigation in progress,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a); and its mandate that a public agency “safeguard from public access” a citizen’s personal information entrusted to it, where disclosure of that information “would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Counsel for the driver advised the OCPO of the driver’s objection “to the release of any audio or video tapes at this time, because of privacy and other related issues.” Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause, seeking access to the MVR recordings on the basis of OPRA and the common-law right of access. The trial court ordered disclosure of the MVR recordings. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination. 446 N.J. Super. 163, 177 (App. Div. 2016). The panel’s dissenting member concluded that the MVR recordings constitute criminal investigatory records for purposes of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Id. at 203 (Gilson, J., dissenting). 1 The OCPO appealed as of right with respect to the issue raised in the dissent. R. 2:2- 1(a). The Court granted the OCPO’s petition for certification regarding the remaining issues addressed by the Appellate Division panel. 228 N.J. 403 (2016).HELD: The Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division panel, concurring with the panel’s dissenting judge that the MVR recordings were not “required by law” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, that they constitute criminal investigatory records under that provision, and that they are therefore not subject to disclosure under OPRA. The Court agrees with the panel’s conclusion that the recordings are not within OPRA’s “investigations in progress” provision, and that OPRA’s privacy clause does not exempt the recordings from disclosure. The Court remands the matter to the trial court for consideration of plaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access to the MVR recordings.1. The Legislature enacted OPRA to promote transparency in the operation of government, declaring it public policy that government records “shall be readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination by the citizens of this State, with certain exceptions, for the protection of the public interest,” and that any limitation of the right of action accorded by OPRA “shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of access.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. OPRA imposes on public agencies “the burden of proving that the denial of access is authorized by law.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. This appeal requires interpretation of three of OPRA’s exemptions. (pp. 17-18)2. The Court first considers the criminal investigatory records exemption set forth in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. “[C]riminal investigatory records” are among the several categories of records that the statute excludes from its definition of “government record[s].” Ibid. That term is defined as “a record which is not required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file that is held by a law enforcement agency which pertains to any criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding.” Ibid. Accordingly, an agency seeking to withhold a record from disclosure as a criminal investigatory record must satisfy “both prongs of the exception” by demonstrating that the record is not required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file, and that it “pertains” to a criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 556 (2017). (pp. 18-28) In Lyndhurst, the Court applied the “not required by law” prong to Use of Force Reports (UFRs) prepared in accordance with a policy promulgated by the Attorney General. Id. at 565. Recognizing the Attorney General’s role as New Jersey’s chief law enforcement officer, with the authority to adopt guidelines, directives, and policies that bind police departments statewide, the Court deemed the policy to have “the force of law for police entities” and concluded that the defendant municipality failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the UFRs were “not required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. See ibid. The Court finds significant distinctions between the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy in Lyndhurst and the Barnegat Township Police Chief’s General Order. First, no statute gives a General Order promulgated by the Barnegat Township Police Chief the force of law. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118, cited by the Appellate Division majority in support of its conclusion that the General Order was “required by law,” falls short of the mark. That statute empowers a 2 municipality to create a police department and to appoint a police chief as the head of that department, and generally describes the duties of a police chief. It does not grant to a municipal police chief authority analogous to the Attorney General’s statutory power to adopt guidelines, directives, and policies that bind law enforcement throughout New Jersey. The 1981 amendment to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 redefined the relationship between a municipal governing body and the chief of police; it did nothing to invest police chiefs with the authority to impose binding legal obligations on their subordinates. If, as the Appellate Division majority concluded, a municipal police chief’s directive to his or her subordinates were deemed to carry the force of law, the exemption would be limited to criminal investigatory records that are not addressed in any order or instruction from a police chief to his or her officers. Such an interpretation would effectively write the criminal investigatory records exemption out of OPRA, contrary to rules of statutory construction. Here, the MVR recordings were not made and retained in compliance with any law or directive carrying the force of law. The OCPO has therefore satisfied the first prong of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s standard. (pp. 19-26) In Lyndhurst, the Court held that the MVR recordings in dispute met the second prong of the test for OPRA’s criminal investigatory records exemption because they pertained to two investigations: the officers’ investigation of “actual or potential violations of criminal law,” and the investigation by the Attorney General’s Shooting Response Team into the fatal shooting of one suspect. 229 N.J. at 569. That holding governs application of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s requirement that the disputed record “pertain[] to any criminal investigation” in this appeal. By the time plaintiff sought the MVR recordings, those recordings pertained to not one but several investigations: the criminal investigation of the driver for eluding and resisting arrest, and the internal affairs and criminal investigations of the police officer who deployed the police dog. Accordingly, the OCPO has satisfied the second prong of OPRA’s criminal investigatory records exemption. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. That exemption warrants the OCPO’s decision to withhold the MVR recordings from disclosure under OPRA, and the Court reverses the Appellate Division panel’s determination on that ground. (pp. 26-28)3. The Court next considers OPRA’s “investigations in progress” exemption, prescribed byN.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a). In order to invoke that exemption, a public agency must demonstrate that “(1) the requested records 'pertain to an investigation in progress by any public agency,’ (2) disclosure will 'be inimical to the public interest,’ and (3) the records were not available to the public before the investigation began.” 229 N.J. at 573 (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a)). The OCPO has met N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a)’s first and third requirements. The OCPO, however, has failed to satisfy the second prong of the N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a) standard, which requires proof that disclosure would be “inimical to the public interest.” In Lyndhurst, the Court considered whether disclosure of the MVR recordings of a police shooting would be “inimical to the public interest,” 229 N.J. at 575-77, and noted that “officer safety, the reliability of ongoing investigations, and transparency” are relevant to the question, id. at 576. Here, the OCPO has identified no threat to officer safety, so the first component of the test weighs in favor of disclosure. Here, as in Lyndhurst, there is no assertion that when plaintiff sought the MVR recordings four months after the incident depicted in those recordings, any eyewitness interview relevant to the criminal investigation of the driver, or the criminal or internal affairs 3 investigations of the police officer, had yet to be conducted. The second factor identified in Lyndhurst therefore supports disclosure. Finally, there is a strong public interest in the interaction of police officers and the driver, and the setting of this case. The final factor identified in Lyndhurst thus weighs in plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Appellate Division panel that the OCPO did not sustain its burden to show that the MVR recordings are within OPRA’s “investigation in progress” exemption. (pp. 28-31)4. Finally, OPRA’s privacy clause instructs a public agency to refrain from disclosing “a citizen’s personal information with which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. In Burnett v. County of Bergen, the Court viewed OPRA’s legislative history to “offer[] direct support for a balancing test that weighs both the public’s strong interest in disclosure with the need to safeguard from public access personal information that would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy,” 198 N.J. 408, 427 (2009), and identified seven factors to be relevant to that balancing test, ibid. (relying on Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995)). Here, the MVR recordings depicted a driver’s arrest in a public place. The driver’s face is not shown, and the recordings disclosed no private information. Moreover, when the driver objected to disclosure of the recordings, she identified no specific privacy concerns. The driver’s privacy interest did not warrant the OCPO’s decision to withhold recordings from disclosure in this case. In other settings, a third party’s reasonable expectation of privacy may warrant withholding a record from disclosure. In making these sensitive determinations, courts should give serious consideration to the objections of individuals whose privacy interests are implicated. The Court reminds objecting parties and their attorneys that a generic objection based on privacy gives a court scant basis to explore the issue, and that any privacy concerns about a disclosure sought pursuant to OPRA or the common law should be explained in detail. (pp. 32-34) REVERSED and REMANDED. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that the General Order has the force of law and that, because the video recording was “required by law to be made,” it does not constitute an exempt record under OPRA’s criminal investigatory records exception. Justice Albin notes that, through a 1981 legislative amendment to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118, the Legislature delegated to the Chief of Police the power to issue the General Order to his officers, and reasons that the chief of police’s power to bind police officers to follow a general order is in no meaningful way distinguishable from the Attorney General’s power to bind police forces to follow his directives. According to Justice Albin, the distinction created by the majority is arbitrary and undermines the effectiveness of OPRA in an area where the transparency of the government’s conduct in its affairs with the public is of critical importance to an informed citizenry. Justice Albin notes that the Attorney General can adopt a statewide policy that addresses whether and how police video recordings are made and maintained.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-VINA and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and TIMPONE join. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 17 September Term 2016 078040JOHN PAFF, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.OCEAN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Defendant-Appellant. Argued February 27, 2018 – Decided August 13, 2018 On appeal from and certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 446 N.J. Super. 163 (App. Div. 2016). Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel J. Marzarella, of counsel and on the briefs, and Nicholas D. Norcia, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Richard M. Gutman argued the cause for respondent (Richard M. Gutman, on the briefs). Raymond R. Chance, III, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Raymond R. Chance, III, of counsel, and Daniel M. Vannella, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Ian C. Kennedy, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey 1 (Richard T. Burke, President, attorney; Ian C. Kennedy and Annmarie Cozzi, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Vito A. Gagliardi, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, attorneys; Vito A. Gagliardi, Jr., of counsel and on the brief, and David L. Disler, on the brief). Richard D. Pompelio argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center (New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center, attorneys; Richard D. Pompelio, of counsel and on the brief). CJ Griffin argued the cause for amici curiae Latino Leadership Alliance of New Jersey, Garden State Equality, People’s Organization for Progress, and the New Jersey Chapter of the Society for Professional Journalists (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief). Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero, and Iris Bromberg on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we apply the Open Public Records Act(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, to recordings made by mobilevideo recorders (MVRs) in police vehicles in compliance with amunicipal police chief’s general order. The MVR recordings atissue documented an incident in which police officers pursuedand arrested a driver who had allegedly eluded an officer 2 attempting a traffic stop. One officer’s decision to deploy apolice dog during the arrest led to internal affairsinvestigations and criminal charges against the officer. Plaintiff John Paff sought access to the MVR recordingsunder OPRA and the common law, and filed suit when defendant theOcean County Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) declined his request.The OCPO opposed disclosure of the MVR recordings based on threeOPRA provisions: the statute’s exclusion of a “criminalinvestigatory record” from the definition of a “governmentrecord,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1; its exemption for recordspertaining to an “investigation in progress,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a); and its mandate that a public agency “safeguard frompublic access” a citizen’s personal information entrusted to it,where disclosure of that information “would violate thecitizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. The trial court rejected the OCPO’s arguments and ordereddisclosure of the MVR recordings. A divided Appellate Divisionpanel affirmed the trial court’s determination. Paff v. OceanCty. Prosecutor’s Office, 446 N.J. Super. 163, 177 (App. Div.2016). The panel’s dissenting member concluded that the MVRrecordings constitute criminal investigatory records forpurposes of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Id. at 203 (Gilson, J.,dissenting). The OCPO appealed as of right on that issue, andwe granted its petition for certification on the applicability 3 of OPRA’s “investigations in progress” exemption, N.J.S.A.47:1A-3(a), and the statute’s privacy clause, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division panel.We concur with the panel’s dissenting judge that the MVRrecordings were not “required by law” within the meaning ofN.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, that they constitute criminal investigatoryrecords under that provision, and that they are therefore notsubject to disclosure under OPRA. We agree with the AppellateDivision panel’s conclusion that the recordings are not withinOPRA’s “investigations in progress” provision, and that OPRA’sprivacy clause does not exempt the recordings from disclosure.We remand the matter to the trial court for its consideration ofplaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access to the MVRrecordings. I. A. 1. On January 9, 2014, the Barnegat Township Police Departmentissued a revised version of its General Order No. 08-02 (GeneralOrder), entitled “Mobile Video Recording Equipment.”1 TheGeneral Order was issued under the authority of the Chief of the1 We summarize the facts based on the record submitted to the trial court. 4 Barnegat Township Police Department, and applied only to thatdepartment. The General Order stated the Barnegat Township PoliceDepartment’s policy “to use [MVRs] in order to protect themembers of this agency and to record information related tomotorist contacts and other patrol related activities.” TheGeneral Order instructed officers to record by MVR severalcategories of incidents. The incidents to be recorded included,among others, “[a]ll traffic stops, criminal enforcement stops,motorist aid situations, motor vehicle collisions, andpedestrian contacts in their entirety”; “[p]olice pursuits asdefined by department policy”; “[m]ajor crime scenes”; and“[s]ituations which arise wherein the officer by reason oftraining or experience determines that the incident should berecorded.” Noting that “[t]he record function of the MVR equipment isautomatically initiated when the patrol vehicle’s emergencylights are activated or the wireless microphone is turned on,”the General Order barred officers from deactivating the MVR’srecording function when the vehicle’s emergency lights areactivated “except for dismounted posts or traffic details.”Pursuant to the General Order, officers were prohibited fromdeactivating an MVR once it was activated to document an 5 “incident or [motor vehicle] stop” until the conclusion of theincident or the release of the detained vehicle. It is undisputed that the MVR recordings at the center ofthis appeal were made in compliance with the General Order. 2. On January 29, 2014, a Tuckerton Borough police officer onpatrol activated his overhead lights and attempted to pull overa motorist. The driver disregarded the officer and continued todrive, prompting a police chase. As the driver approachedBarnegat Township, officers in that Township were alerted andtwo Barnegat Township patrol vehicles joined the Tuckertonofficer’s pursuit of the driver. The chase ended when thedriver stopped her vehicle in the parking lot of a BarnegatTownship municipal building. As officers at the scene removedthe driver from her vehicle, a Tuckerton Borough police officerand his police dog arrived and participated in the driver’sarrest. According to the OCPO, the officer unlawfully causedthe police dog to injure the driver. MVR equipment installed in two Barnegat Township policevehicles recorded the police pursuit and arrest of the driver.The trial court found, and the parties agree, that therecordings documented the interaction between the driver and thepolice dog. 6 As a result of the contact between the police dog and thedriver, the OCPO and the Tuckerton Police Department initiatedinternal affairs investigations of the Tuckerton Borough policeofficer. The OCPO later charged the officer with two counts ofsecond-degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2; third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1);2 fourth-degreefalse swearing, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a); third-degree tampering withpublic records or information, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(1); andsecond-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A.2C:29-3(b). The driver was charged with eluding, N.J.S.A.2C:29-2(b), and resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3), andwas issued four summonses for motor vehicle violations.Accordingly, the driver was both a victim of the Tuckertonofficer’s alleged criminal offenses and the defendant incriminal and motor vehicle violation proceedings arising fromthe same incident. 3. Approximately four months after the driver’s arrest,plaintiff wrote to the OCPO. He stated that he had read in alocal newspaper that “the police dog’s interaction with [thedriver] may have been captured by a video camera that is owned2 Although the indictment stated that the officer was charged with “aggravated assault-third degree,” the Code provision cited in the indictment sets forth a second-degree offense. 7 or under the control of Barnegat Township.”3 Pursuant to OPRAand the common-law right of access, plaintiff requested “a copyof the video of this incident.”4 The OCPO objected to the release of the requested MVRrecordings on the ground that they involved a “criminalinvestigation in progress, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3 as wellas an internal affairs matter,” under the New Jersey AttorneyGeneral’s Guidelines on Internal Affairs and Procedures. Plaintiff contested the OCPO’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3. He argued that any record that was public before a criminalinvestigation or internal affairs investigation would not beexempt from production under OPRA. The OCPO responded byreiterating its objections to the production of the MVRrecordings. By letter dated June 30, 2014, counsel for the driveradvised the OCPO of the driver’s objection “to the release ofany audio or video tapes at this time, because of privacy andother related issues.”3 Plaintiff represented to the OCPO that in an identical OPRA and common-law request, he sought video recordings from Barnegat Township. That request is not relevant to this appeal.4 Plaintiff also requested any summonses issued against the driver, with the driver’s name and address unredacted. Although the OCPO initially stated that it had no records responsive to that request, it later produced a criminal complaint and four motor vehicle summonses issued to the driver as a result of the January 29, 2014 incident. 8 B. Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to showcause, seeking access to the MVR recordings on the basis of OPRAand the common-law right of access. In opposition to the orderto show cause, the OCPO presented certifications by two officerssetting forth the General Order governing MVR recordings, thedriver’s objection to production of the recordings, and thecriminal and internal affairs investigations that arose from theJanuary 29, 2014 incident. In its initial opinion in this matter, the trial courtfound the MVR recordings to be government records under N.J.S.A.47:1A-1.1. The court stated that “at this juncture,” the OCPOhad failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the MVRrecordings were criminal investigatory records under N.J.S.A.47:1A-1.1. It held that the OCPO had not proven that therecordings were “not required by law,” as N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1mandates in order for a record to be exempt from OPRA, andstated that it was unclear whether the recordings were made aspart of an investigation.55 In its brief, the OCPO clarified that it relied on OPRA’s exemption for a “criminal investigatory record,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A- 1.1, as well as the statute’s exemption for records pertaining to an “investigation in progress,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a), and its privacy clause, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. The trial court noted that the OCPO had not cited N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 in its initial objection to plaintiff’s request, but ruled on the merits of that objection nevertheless. 9 The trial court also rejected the OCPO’s contention thatthe MVR recordings were subject to OPRA’s exemption for recordspertaining to an “investigation in progress,” pursuant toN.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a). It reasoned that any investigationregarding the police officer and the driver did not commenceuntil after the MVR cameras captured the incident. The courtdid not reach the question whether the OCPO had met OPRA’ssecond requirement for the “investigation in progress”exemption: that the release of the recordings would be“inimical to the public interest.” Ibid. Finally, the trial court held that the driver had noreasonable expectation of privacy that would justify the OCPO’sdenial of plaintiff’s request pursuant to OPRA’s privacy clause,N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Accordingly, the trial court held that the OCPO hadimproperly withheld the MVR recordings. However, pendingsupplemental briefing as to the applicability of the criminalinvestigatory exemption, it stayed its determination for thirtydays and ordered the OCPO to submit the MVR recordings for incamera review to allow the court to further assess the impact ofthe release of the recordings on the driver’s privacy interest. Following further briefing, in camera review of the MVRrecordings, and a second oral argument, the trial court issued asupplemental opinion. It determined that by virtue of the 10 Barnegat Township Police Department’s General Order, which itconstrued to carry the “force of law,” the MVR recordings were“required by law” to be made, and were therefore outside thescope of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s exemption for criminalinvestigatory records. The court did not reach that provision’sadditional requirement that the recordings pertain to “anycriminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding.”N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The trial court reiterated its prior holding that therelease of the recordings would not violate the driver’sreasonable expectation of privacy because the recordingsdepicted a “motor vehicle traffic stop in a public area,” anddid not show the driver’s face. The court found that therecordings were not “so horrific or chilling” as to warrantnondisclosure. The court therefore found that plaintiff hadproven his claim under OPRA, and awarded attorneys’ fees toplaintiff. It did not address plaintiff’s common-law claim. The OCPO appealed the trial court’s judgment, and theAppellate Division panel granted amicus curiae status to theAttorney General and the County Prosecutors Association of NewJersey. The majority of the Appellate Division panel affirmed thetrial court’s judgment. Paff, 446 N.J. Super. at 177. Themajority concurred with the trial court that the MVR recordings 11 constitute government records and were not exempt as recordspertaining to a criminal investigation under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.Id. at 184-85. The majority construed the phrase “required bylaw” in that provision to encompass any record that is requiredby a local law enforcement order, as long as the order is issuedpursuant to a delegation of power under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.Ibid. That statute authorizes a municipality to create andestablish a police force, provide for its maintenance,regulation and control, and adopt an ordinance appointing achief of police. The panel also held that because the MVRrecordings preceded the commencement of any criminalinvestigation, they did not “pertain” to any such investigation,and that the OCPO therefore failed to meet its burden under thecriminal investigatory exemption’s second prong. Id. at 188. The majority of the panel also affirmed the trial court’sdetermination as to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a)’s “investigations inprogress” exemption. Id. at 188-90. It held that the exemptiondid not apply to the MVR recordings because the recordings weremade prior to the investigations and the OCPO did notdemonstrate that disclosure would be inimical to the publicinterest. Ibid. Finally, based on its in camera review of the recordingsand its consideration of the factors that this Court identifiedin Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995), the panel’s majority 12 found that the driver’s privacy interest did not outweigh thepublic’s interest in disclosure under OPRA’s privacy clause,N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Paff, 446 N.J. Super. at 192-93. One member of the panel dissented from the majority’sholding regarding N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s exemption for criminalinvestigatory records. Id. at 194 (Gilson, J., dissenting).The dissenting judge focused on the first of that provision’stwo prongs, under which a record must not be “required by law tobe made, maintained, or kept on file” in order to qualify forthe exemption. Id. at 195-201 (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1).The dissenting judge rejected the majority’s conclusion that arecord is “required by law” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 because itwas created pursuant to the order of a police chief. Id. at199-201. He observed that “[i]t is hard to imagine that thereare any criminal investigatory documents created in a policedepartment for which there is not an order, directive orinstruction calling for that document to be prepared.” Id. at199. The dissenting judge reasoned that the majority’s broadconstruction of the “required by law” prong in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 would exclude virtually any document generated in a policedepartment from OPRA’s criminal investigatory records exception.Ibid. He further concluded that the MVR recordings pertained toa criminal investigation, as N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 mandates inorder for the exemption to apply. Id. at 201-03. 13 The OCPO appealed as of right with respect to the issueraised in the dissent. R. 2:2-1(a). We granted the OCPO’spetition for certification regarding the remaining issuesaddressed by the Appellate Division panel. 228 N.J. 403 (2016).We also granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey StateAssociation of Chiefs of Police, the New Jersey Crime Victims’Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey,the Latino Leadership Alliance of New Jersey, Garden StateEquality, People’s Organization for Progress, and the New JerseyChapter of the Society of Professional Journalists. II. The OCPO contends that the MVR recordings are within OPRA’sexemption for criminal investigatory records. It argues thatwhen the Legislature replaced the Right to Know Law (RTKL), L.1963, c. 73, with OPRA, L. 2001, c. 404, it intended to preservethe narrow definition of “required by law” that applied underthe RTKL. According to the OCPO, the MVR recordings were not“required by law” because the General Order at issue here is notanalogous to the Attorney General Directive mandating Use ofForce Reports that we reviewed in North Jersey Media Group, Inc.v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 565-66 (2017). The OCPOasserts that the MVR recordings satisfy the second part of thedefinition of “criminal investigatory records” as well becausethey pertain to the early stage of a criminal investigation, as 14 did the recordings of a police shooting in Lyndhurst, 229 N.J.at 569. The OCPO also argues that the MVR recordings are within theexemption set forth in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3 for records of aninvestigation in progress because they pertain to criminal andinternal affairs investigations, and their disclosure would beinimical to the public interest. Finally, the OCPO contendsthat disclosure of the recordings would violate the driver’sreasonable expectation of privacy recognized in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Plaintiff counters that the OCPO failed to demonstrate thatthe MVR recordings fall within the criminal investigatoryrecords exemption. He notes that in Lyndhurst, we rejected thedefinition of “required by law” that had been set forth in theRTKL. Plaintiff contends that the General Order is analogous tothe Attorney General Directive addressed in Lyndhurst forpurposes of OPRA. He urges, further, that we consider only aninvestigator’s work product to “pertain” to a criminalinvestigation, as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Plaintiff asserts that the MVR recordings are not withinN.J.S.A. 47:1A-3’s exemption for records of an investigation inprogress because they were created before any investigationbegan and the public has a compelling interest in disclosure.He contends that there is no showing in this case that 15 disclosure of the MVR recordings would intrude on the driver’sreasonable expectation of privacy, or that any privacy interestoutweighs the public interest in the recordings. Amici curiae the Attorney General, the County ProsecutorsAssociation of New Jersey, and the New Jersey State Associationof Chiefs of Police assert that the MVR recordings are exemptfrom disclosure as criminal investigatory records because theyare not required by law to be made, maintained, or kept, andthey pertain to a criminal investigation. They argue that therecordings should be withheld from disclosure to protect thedriver’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Amicus curiae NewJersey Crime Victims’ Law Center contends that a crime victim’sprivacy interest and right to be treated with fairness,compassion, and respect outweigh the public interest indisclosure. Amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jerseyargues that MVR recordings are made to protect law enforcementand to serve as instructional material, not to investigatecriminal activity. Amicus asserts that police conduct andcriminal activity in a public setting do not implicate privacyinterests, and that when the factors set forth in Doe, 142 N.J.at 88, are applied to this case, the public’s interest indisclosure outweighs any privacy interest. 16 Amici curiae the Latino Leadership Alliance of New Jersey,Garden State Equality, People’s Organization for Progress, andthe New Jersey Chapter of the Society of ProfessionalJournalists assert that the criminal investigatory exemptiondoes not apply to this appeal. Amici contend that recordscreated pursuant to a police chief’s directive are “required bylaw” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 and that the MVR recordings didnot pertain to any investigation for purposes of OPRA’sexemptions for criminal investigatory records and records of aninvestigation in progress. They argue that redaction of arecord prior to production under OPRA adequately protects theprivacy interest of a crime victim. III. The Legislature enacted OPRA “to promote transparency inthe operation of government.” Carter v. Doe (In re N.J.Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation), 230 N.J. 258, 276 (2017) (quotingSussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 541(2012)). The statute serves “the bedrock principle that ourgovernment works best when its activities are well-known to thepublic it serves.” Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408,414 (2009). In OPRA, the Legislature declared it public policythat government records “shall be readily accessible forinspection, copying, or examination by the citizens of thisState, with certain exceptions, for the protection of the public 17 interest,” and that any limitation of the right of actionaccorded by OPRA “shall be construed in favor of the public’sright of access.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. OPRA imposes on publicagencies “the burden of proving that the denial of access isauthorized by law.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. This appeal requires that we interpret three of OPRA’sexemptions: the exclusion of “criminal investigatory records”from N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s definition of “government records”;the exemption for records pertaining to an “investigation inprogress,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3; and the statute’s privacy clause,N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. In our construction of those provisions, ourobjective “is to determine and carry out the Legislature’sintent.” Sussex Commons, 210 N.J. at 540-41; accord Carter, 230 N.J. at 274; Gilleran v. Township of Bloomfield, 227 N.J. 159,171 (2016). “We look first to the plain language of the statuteto try to give meaning to the Legislature’s intent.” Lyndhurst,229 N.J. at 557. If that language is ambiguous, we “may examineextrinsic evidence for guidance.” Sussex Commons, 210 N.J. at 541. A. We first consider the criminal investigatory recordsexemption set forth in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. In OPRA, the Legislature expansively defined the term“[g]overnment record[s]” to encompass any record “made, 18 maintained or kept on file in the course of his or its officialbusiness by any officer, commission, agency or authority of theState or of any political subdivision thereof,” or any record“that has been received in the course of his or its officialbusiness by any such officer, commission, agency, or authorityof the State or of any political subdivision thereof.” N.J.S.A.47:1A-1.1. “[C]riminal investigatory records” are among the severalcategories of records that the statute excludes from itsdefinition of “government record[s].” Ibid. That term isdefined as “a record which is not required by law to be made,maintained or kept on file that is held by a law enforcementagency which pertains to any criminal investigation or relatedcivil enforcement proceeding.” Ibid. Accordingly, an agency seeking to withhold a record fromdisclosure as a criminal investigatory record must satisfy “bothprongs of the exception” by demonstrating that the record is notrequired by law to be made, maintained or kept on file, and thatit “pertains” to a criminal investigation or related civilenforcement proceeding. Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 556. 1. In Lyndhurst, decided while this appeal was pending, werejected the narrow construction of OPRA’s definition of apublic record adopted by the Appellate Division in that appeal 19 as inconsonant with OPRA’s more expansive reach. Id. at 566.Instead, we construed the criminal investigatory exemption “inlight of the current law’s stated purpose, which favors broadaccess, and not prior case law that analyzed the narrower RTKL.”Ibid. In accordance with that principle, we applied the “notrequired by law” prong of the N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 standard to twocategories of records relating to a police shooting: Use ofForce Reports (UFRs) and MVR recordings of the incident. Id. at564-69. The contested UFRs were prepared in accordance with a Useof Force Policy that was promulgated by the Attorney General andgoverned law enforcement across the State. Id. at 565. Thatpolicy mandated that “'[i]n all instances when physical,mechanical, or deadly force is used [by law enforcement], eachofficer who has employed such force shall complete’ a 'Use ofForce Report’ and '[a]ny reports made necessary by the nature ofthe underlying incident.’” Ibid. (first and third alterationsin original) (quoting Attorney General, Use of Force Policy 7(Apr. 1985, rev. June 2000) (Use of Force Policy)). Recognizing the Attorney General’s role as New Jersey’schief law enforcement officer, with the authority to adoptguidelines, directives, and policies that bind policedepartments statewide, we deemed the Use of Force Policy to be 20 “a clear, pointed statement of policy from the chief lawenforcement official to all officers who have used deadlyforce.” Ibid. We viewed the Use of Force Policy to have “theforce of law for police entities.” Ibid. (quoting O’Shea v.Township of West Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 382 (App. Div.2009)). We concluded that the defendant municipality failed tomeet its burden to demonstrate that the UFRs were “not requiredby law to be made, maintained or kept on file” under N.J.S.A.47:1A-1.1. See ibid. We reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the MVRrecordings at issue in the Lyndhurst appeal. Id. at 567-69. Wenoted that the parties identified no Attorney General directiveaddressing such recordings. Id. at 567. Moreover, it wasunclear whether the MVR cameras had recorded the police shootingautomatically, or had been activated by police officers “in anexercise of discretion or in response to an order at the locallevel.” Ibid.6 We thus found no evidence that the policeofficers in Lyndhurst were “required by law” to make the MVRrecordings in dispute. Id. at 567-68.6 In Lyndhurst, we acknowledged but did not reach the “intriguing issue” raised in this appeal -- whether a local police chief’s order is analogous to a directive from the Attorney General for purposes of OPRA’s exemption for criminal investigatory records -- because there was no indication that the officers in Lyndhurst “acted pursuant to any local directives.” Id. at 567-68. 21 We rejected the plaintiff’s argument in Lyndhurst that theMVR recordings in that case were “required by law” because theywere retained in accordance with retention schedules generatedin compliance with the Destruction of Public Records Law,N.J.S.A. 47:3-15 to -32. Id. at 568. We observed that thecriminal investigatory records exemption “would have littlemeaning” if records were deemed “required by law” simply becauseretention schedules required that they be maintained for aspecific period. Ibid. In short, we found no evidence in the record in Lyndhurstthat the MVR recordings in that case were “required by law to bemade, maintained or kept on file” in accordance with a directivecarrying the force of law. Ibid. We held that those recordingswere within N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s criminal investigatory recordsexemption to OPRA. Id. at 569. Guided by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 and theprinciples set forth in Lyndhurst, we apply the first prong ofthe test for criminal investigatory records to the MVRrecordings in this case. We find significant distinctions between the AttorneyGeneral’s Use of Force Policy -- deemed in Lyndhurst to carrythe force of law for police entities -- and the BarnegatTownship Police Chief’s General Order. First, no statute givesa General Order promulgated by the Barnegat Township Police 22 Chief the force of law. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118, cited by theAppellate Division majority in support of its conclusion thatthe General Order was “required by law,” falls short of themark. That statute empowers a municipality to create a policedepartment and to appoint a police chief as the head of thatdepartment, and generally describes the duties of a policechief.7 It does not grant to a municipal police chief authorityanalogous to the Attorney General’s statutory power to adoptguidelines, directives, and policies that bind law enforcementthroughout our State. See Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 565 (notingAttorney General’s authority under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 to -117);O’Shea, 410 N.J. Super. at 382-83 (same). We do not considerthe Barnegat Township Police Chief’s General Order to constitutea “law” as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. We are unpersuaded by our dissenting colleagues’invocation of the 1981 amendment to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 as7 N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 permits a municipality’s governing body, by ordinance, to “create and establish . . . a police force, whether as a department or as a division, bureau or other agency thereof, and provide for the maintenance, regulation and control thereof.” For a municipality that chooses to appoint a chief of police, the statute provides that the chief “shall be the head of the police force” and “shall be directly responsible to the appropriate authority for the [police force’s] efficiency and routine day to day operations.” Ibid. The police chief “shall, pursuant to policies established by the appropriate authority,” undertake a range of functions including the administration and enforcement of “rules and regulations and special emergency directives for the disposition and discipline of the force and its officers and personnel.” Id. § 118(a). 23 evidence that the Legislature intended to enable municipalpolice chiefs to promulgate orders with the “force of law.”Post at ___ (slip op. at 4-5). As its plain language confirms,the Legislature amended the statute to simply “redefine therelationship between a municipal governing body and the chief ofpolice.” Falcone v. De Furia, 103 N.J. 219, 221 (1986). Asamended, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 limited the authority ofmunicipalities to regulate the internal affairs of policedepartments, designated properly-appointed chiefs of police asthe heads of police forces, and granted such chiefs theauthority to “[p]rescribe the duties and assignments of allsubordinates and other personnel.” N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118(c). Theamended statute thus “sought to avoid undue interference by agoverning body into the operation of the police force.”Falcone, 103 N.J. at 221. It does nothing to invest policechiefs with the authority to impose binding legal obligations ontheir subordinates. Second, we agree with the dissenting Appellate Divisionjudge that the majority’s construction of the criminalinvestigatory records exemption would exclude all but a fewrecords from that provision. Paff, 446 N.J. Super. at 199(Gilson, J., dissenting). If, as the Appellate Divisionmajority concluded, a municipal police chief’s directive to hisor her subordinates were deemed to carry the force of law, any 24 record pertaining to a criminal investigation that was createdin accordance with a directive would be ineligible for N.J.S.A.47:1A-1.1’s exemption for such records. The exemption would belimited to criminal investigatory records that are not addressedin any order or instruction from a police chief to his or herofficers. In short, the vast majority of criminal investigatoryrecords would fall outside of the exemption for such records. Such an interpretation of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 wouldeffectively write the criminal investigatory records exemptionout of OPRA, contrary to our rules of statutory construction.See Carter, 230 N.J. at 274 (“[L]egislative language must not,if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluousor meaningless.” (alteration in original) (quoting State v.Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011))). We decline to construe the“required by law” language of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 so as tovirtually eliminate the criminal investigatory records exemptionfrom OPRA.88 Our dissenting colleagues suggest that we should view the General Order to be “required by law,” and thus outside the scope of the criminal investigatory records exemption, in order to give greater weight to other exemptions that may apply in a given case. Post at ___ (slip op. at 8-9). They also suggest that OPRA’s general objective to promote disclosure compels us to exclude the MVR recordings at issue from that exemption. Post at (slip op. at 5-6, 10). Both arguments are unavailing. We base our holding on the plain language of the exemption, which expresses the Legislature’s intent to exclude from disclosure records that “pertain[] to any criminal investigation,” if those records are “not required by law to be 25 Here, the MVR recordings were made and retained inaccordance with a local police chief’s order to hissubordinates, not in compliance with any law or directivecarrying the force of law. The OCPO has therefore satisfied thefirst prong of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s standard for OPRA’s criminalinvestigatory records exemption. 2. In Lyndhurst, we held that the MVR recordings in disputemet the second prong of the test for OPRA’s criminalinvestigatory records exemption because they “pertain[] to anycriminal investigation.” 229 N.J. at 569 (alteration inoriginal) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1). We agreed with theAppellate Division panel in that case that “when an officerturns on a mobile video recorder to document a traffic stop orpursuit of a suspected criminal violation of law, that recordingmay pertain to a 'criminal investigation,’ albeit in itsearliest stages.” Id. at 569 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp.,Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 441 N.J. Super. 70, 104-05 (App.Div. 2015)). Observing that the MVR recordings in that casedepicted a series of police actions -- officers’ attempts tostop and arrest two suspects, their pursuit of a suspect “as hemade, maintained or kept on file.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1; see also Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 557 (stating that courts should construe OPRA exemptions in accordance with their plain language). 26 attempted to elude [officers] in violation of the law,” andtheir response to his resistance -- we concluded that the MVRrecordings pertained to two investigations: the officers’investigation of “actual or potential violations of criminallaw,” and the investigation by the Attorney General’s ShootingResponse Team into the fatal shooting of one suspect. Ibid.;cf. O’Shea, 410 N.J. Super. at 385 (noting “the absence of afactual showing that any of the reports sought in this matterpertained to an actual criminal investigation or to an existingrelated civil enforcement proceeding”). Our holding in Lyndhurst governs our application ofN.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s requirement that the disputed record“pertain[] to any criminal investigation” in this appeal. See229 N.J. at 569. When the MVR recordings in this matter weremade, they pertained -- at a minimum -- to the investigation ofthe driver’s alleged eluding of police. That investigation wasat its inception, but it was clearly underway. By the timeplaintiff sought the MVR recordings, those recordings pertainedto not one but several investigations: the criminalinvestigation of the driver for eluding and resisting arrest,and the internal affairs and criminal investigations of theTuckerton Borough police officer. Accordingly, the OCPO has satisfied the second prong ofOPRA’s criminal investigatory records exemption. N.J.S.A. 27 47:1A-1.1. We hold that that exemption warrants the OCPO’sdecision to withhold the MVR recordings from disclosure underOPRA, and we reverse the Appellate Division panel’sdetermination on that ground. B. We next consider OPRA’s “investigations in progress”exemption, prescribed by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a).9 That exemption provides in relevant part that where it shall appear that the record or records which are sought to be inspected, copied, or examined shall pertain to an investigation in progress by any public agency, the right of access provided for in [OPRA] may be denied if the inspection, copying or examination of such record or records shall be inimical to the public interest; provided, however, that this provision shall not be construed to allow any public agency to prohibit access to a record of that agency that was open for public inspection, examination, or copying before the investigation commenced. [N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a).] As we observed in Lyndhurst, in order to invoke thatexemption, a public agency must demonstrate that “(1) the9 Although we conclude that the MVR recordings are exempt from disclosure under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, we nonetheless consider the two other OPRA exemptions at issue in this case to offer guidance about the exemptions. See Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 570- 78 (addressing application of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3 exemption to MVR recordings notwithstanding determination that recordings were exempt from disclosure under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1). 28 requested records 'pertain to an investigation in progress byany public agency,’ (2) disclosure will 'be inimical to thepublic interest,’ and (3) the records were not available to thepublic before the investigation began.” 229 N.J. at 573(quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a)). The OCPO has met N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a)’s first requirement:at the moment that the MVR cameras were activated in this case,the recordings pertained to the police investigation of thedriver’s alleged eluding of officers. As the incidentprogressed, portions of those recordings also pertained to thepolice investigation of the driver’s alleged offense ofresisting arrest, and the police and internal affairsinvestigation of the Tuckerton police officer’s alleged officialmisconduct and aggravated assault offenses. The OCPO has alsosatisfied the third component of the test; the MVR camerasrecorded the eluding incident as it unfolded, and the recordingswere not publicly available before the investigation began. The OCPO, however, has failed to satisfy the second prongof the N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a) standard, which requires proof thatdisclosure would be “inimical to the public interest.” SeeCourier News v. Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 358 N.J.Super. 373, 381-83 (App. Div. 2003) (rejecting agency’s claimthat ongoing investigations exemption applied because release of9-1-1 tape would make it difficult to empanel jury at trial); 29 Serrano v. South Brunswick Township, 358 N.J. Super. 352, 367(App. Div. 2003) (same); cf. Asbury Park Press v. Lakewood Twp.Police Dep’t., 354 N.J. Super. 146, 161-64 (Law Div. 2002)(finding that release of 9-1-1 tapes would not be inimical topublic interest under RTKL). That aspect of the test calls for“a fact-specific analysis of how the statutory standardapplies.” Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 576. In Lyndhurst, we considered whether disclosure of the MVRrecordings of a police shooting would be “inimical to the publicinterest” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a). 229 N.J. at 575-77. We noted that “officer safety, the reliability of ongoinginvestigations, and transparency” are relevant to the questionwhether disclosure of a given record is “inimical to the publicinterest.” Id. at 576. In that setting, we found that therelease of the MVR recordings posed no threat to officer safetyor the integrity of the ongoing investigation, and that thepublic interest in disclosure was compelling. Id. at 576-77. Here, the OCPO has identified no threat to officer safety,so the first component of the test weighs in favor ofdisclosure. Its concerns about the impact of a disclosure onthe reliability of the investigations at issue are notcompelling. As we noted in Lyndhurst, when addressing a policeshooting, a court should consider “whether investigators haveinterviewed the available, principal witnesses to the incident 30 -- namely, the witnesses on the scene who saw the shooting andare willing to speak with law enforcement.” 229 N.J. at 576.Here, as in Lyndhurst, there is no assertion that when plaintiffsought the MVR recordings four months after the incidentdepicted in those recordings, any eyewitness interview relevantto the criminal investigation of the driver, or the criminal orinternal affairs investigations of the police officer, had yetto be conducted. The second factor that we identified inLyndhurst to be relevant to the “inimical to the publicinterest” standard therefore supports disclosure. Finally, there is a strong public interest in theinteraction of police officers and the driver, and the settingof this case. As we observed in Lyndhurst, “non-disclosure ofdash-cam videos can undermine confidence in law enforcement andthe work that officers routinely perform” and “fuel theperception that information is being concealed.” Id. at 576-77.The final factor identified in Lyndhurst as pertinent to thequestion whether disclosure is “inimical to the public interest”under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a) thus weighs in plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Division panelthat the OCPO did not sustain its burden to show that the MVRrecordings are within OPRA’s “investigation in progress”exemption. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a). C. 31 Finally, we apply OPRA’s privacy clause, which instructs apublic agency to refrain from disclosing “a citizen’s personalinformation with which it has been entrusted when disclosurethereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation ofprivacy.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. In our inquiry, we consider thefact that in this case, the driver formally objected todisclosure based on unspecified privacy concerns. In Burnett, we applied the privacy clause to bar an OPRArequest for “eight million pages of land title records of alltypes, extending over a period of twenty-two years, whichcontain names, addresses, social security numbers, andsignatures of countless citizens of this State.” 198 N.J. at 414. We viewed OPRA’s legislative history to “offer[] directsupport for a balancing test that weighs both the public’sstrong interest in disclosure with the need to safeguard frompublic access personal information that would violate areasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 427. Relying on our decision in Doe, 142 N.J. at 88, weidentified the following factors to be relevant to thatbalancing test: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized 32 disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized public interest militating toward access. [Burnett, 198 N.J. at 427 (quoting Doe, 142 N.J. at 88).] In the “unusual circumstances” of Burnett, we found thatOPRA’s privacy clause warranted disclosure only after theredaction of social security numbers from the records, with thecost of such redaction imposed on the requestor. Id. at 415,437-40. We reach a different conclusion in the setting of thisappeal. The MVR recordings depicted a driver’s arrest in apublic place. The trial court, which conducted an in camerareview of the recordings, stated that the driver’s face is notshown in the recordings, and the Appellate Division panel agreedthat the recordings disclosed no private information. Moreover, when the driver objected to disclosure of therecordings, she identified no specific privacy concerns.Indeed, the driver’s counsel’s letter disclosed that she hadfiled a civil suit against the Borough of Tuckerton arising fromher interaction with the Tuckerton police officer and the police 33 dog.10 As plaintiff notes, in such a lawsuit, the MVR recordingsof the incident would constitute crucial evidence. We concur with the determinations of the trial court andAppellate Division panel that the driver’s privacy interest didnot warrant the OCPO’s decision to withhold recordings fromdisclosure in this case. In other settings, a third party’s reasonable expectationof privacy may warrant withholding a record from disclosureunder N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. For example, if a sexual assault orsimilar crime were recorded by MVR, the victim would have acompelling objection to the disclosure of that recording, evenin redacted form. In other circumstances, the blurring of avictim’s face or other methods of redaction prior to disclosureof an MVR recording may resolve a privacy concern. In making these sensitive determinations, courts shouldgive serious consideration to the objections of individualswhose privacy interests are implicated. We remind objectingparties and their attorneys that a generic objection based onprivacy gives a court scant basis to explore the issue, and thatany privacy concerns about a disclosure sought pursuant to OPRAor the common law should be explained in detail.10 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel represented that the driver filed an action in the United States District Court as a result of the incident. The record contains no details regarding that action. 34 IV. By virtue of its conclusion that the MVR recordings aregovernment records under OPRA and are not within any exemptionfrom the statute, the trial court did not reach the questionwhether plaintiff has a common-law right of access to therecordings. Nor did the Appellate Division address that issue. As we noted in Lyndhurst, OPRA does not determine theoutcome when a request for disclosure is evaluated under thecommon law. 229 N.J. at 578. The common-law right of accessapplies to a more expansive class of records than the categoryof government records defined by OPRA; to qualify as a publicrecord under the common law, “the item must be 'a writtenmemorial[] . . . made by a public officer, and . . . the officer[must] be authorized to make it.’” Mason v. City of Hoboken,196 N.J. 51, 67 (2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Nerov. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222 (1978)). As we noted in Lyndhurst, To gain access to this broader class of materials, the requestor must make a greater showing than OPRA requires: “(1) the person seeking access must establish an interest in the subject matter of the material; and (2) the citizen’s right to access must be balanced against the State’s interest in preventing disclosure.” [ 229 N.J. at 578-79 (quoting Mason, 196 N.J. at 67-68).] In Lyndhurst, we identified considerations relevant to acommon-law claim of access to the MVR recording of a police 35 shooting and other materials relating to that incident; thoseconsiderations were distilled from factors that we identified inLoigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986), and from the“core concerns” arising from N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a). Lyndhurst,229 N.J. at 579. The considerations identified in Lyndhurst are(1) the State’s and public’s “interest in thorough and reliableinvestigations that are untainted by the early disclosure ofinvestigative details”; and (2) the plaintiff’s objective topromote the public good by requesting materials that may “shedlight on the 'possible use of excessive force by police,’” andmay “also reassure the public that the police actedprofessionally and lawfully.” Id. at 579 (quoting Lyndhurst,441 N.J. Super. at 117). In the careful balancing “that eachcase -- and this sensitive area -- require, we look inparticular at the level of detail contained in the materialsrequested.” Id. at 580. We concluded in Lyndhurst that the balancing of thoseconsiderations, as applied to “investigative reports, witnessstatements, and other comparably detailed documents,” weighedagainst disclosure. Id. at 580. We determined, however, thatthe balancing test favored disclosure in the case of the MVRrecordings of the police shooting that were disputed in thatappeal. Ibid. We held that the recordings should be disclosedunder the common law. Ibid. 36 We remand this matter to the trial court so that the courtmay address plaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access tothe MVR recordings at issue. In that inquiry, the trial courtshould consider the interests identified by the parties as wellas any other relevant factors. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and thematter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistentwith this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-VINA and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and TIMPONE join. 37 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 17 September Term 2016 078040JOHN PAFF, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.OCEAN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. “An informed citizenry is essential to a well-functioningdemocracy.” Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 357(2017). To that end, the Open Public Records Act (OPRA),N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, “is designed to promote transparency inthe operation of government,” Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v.Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 541 (2012), because “our government worksbest when its activities are well-known to the public itserves,” Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009).Although today’s majority opinion gives a nod to those generalprinciples, it does not follow them. In the wake of today’s majority opinion, the operations ofour government will be less transparent and our citizenry lessinformed, which may lead to greater misunderstanding and moredistrust between the public and the police. The majoritydrastically limits the public’s right to access video recordings 1 made by police officers when they interact or haveconfrontations with members of the public. This closing of whatordinarily should be an open door of access to records violatesboth specific statutory provisions and the broad principles ofOPRA, and is inconsistent with our own jurisprudence. For thosereasons, I respectfully dissent. I. A. In this case, a Barnegat Township police vehicle’s mobilevideo recorder (MVR) filmed an officer setting a police dog on awoman pulled from her car after she committed several motorvehicle infractions and eluded the police. No public safetyjustification warranted the officer allowing the dog to attackand injure the driver. The video recording clearly establishedwhat occurred, and its release might have quelled rumors orfalse reports. Importantly, at this point, the release of thevideo would not undermine any ongoing police investigation. Plaintiff John Paff sought access to the video recording byfiling an OPRA request with the Ocean County Prosecutor’sOffice. The Prosecutor’s Office denied Paff access, citing asone of its reasons for nondisclosure the criminal investigatoryrecords exception to OPRA. Under OPRA, government records, which include videorecordings, must generally be made available for examination by 2 our citizens, and any limitation on the right to disclosure must“be construed in favor of the public’s right of access.”N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. There are exceptions, however, to the rule ofgeneral disclosure. The one at issue here is the criminalinvestigatory records exception. A law enforcement agency doesnot have to disclose “a record which is not required by law tobe made, maintained or kept on file that is held by a lawenforcement agency which pertains to any criminal investigationor related civil enforcement proceeding.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1(emphasis added). Here, the Barnegat Township Chief of Police issued aGeneral Order to members of the police department to video-record certain interactions with the public. The General Orderstates that “[i]t is the policy of [the Barnegat Township PoliceDepartment] to use mobile video recorders in order to protectthe members of this agency and to record information related tomotorist contacts and other patrol related activities.” TheChief’s General Order is a command to all officers in the policedepartment explicitly directing when and how to video-recordencounters with the public. No police officer under the Chief’scommand has the discretion to disobey that Order. In otherwords, that Order has the force of law. Because the videorecording was “required by law to be made,” it therefore does 3 not constitute an exempt record under OPRA’s criminalinvestigatory records exception. That the Chief’s command has the force of law is clear fromthe powers delegated to him by the Legislature. N.J.S.A.40A:14-118 provides that the chief of police “shall be the headof the police force and that he shall be directly responsible tothe appropriate authority for the efficiency and routine day today operations thereof.” The chief of police has the duty to“[a]dminister and enforce rules and regulations and specialemergency directives for the disposition and discipline of theforce and its officers”; “exercise, and discharge the functions,powers and duties of the force”; and “[p]rescribe the duties andassignments of all subordinates.” N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118(a) to (c)(emphasis added). The current version of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 isthe product of a 1981 legislative amendment, L. 1981, c. 266,§ 1, which gave chiefs of police “express statutory authority. . . to avoid undue interference by a governing body into theoperation of the police force.” Falcone v. De Furia, 103 N.J. 219, 221-22 (1986). Before the amendment, a chief of policederived his power from “ordinances, resolutions, rules andregulations adopted and promulgated by the governing body in theexercise of its broad statutory responsibility.” Grasso v.Borough Council of Glassboro, 205 N.J. Super. 18, 29 (App. Div.1985) (quoting Gauntt v. City of Bridgeton, 194 N.J. Super. 468, 4 480-81 (App. Div. 1984)); cf. Sponsor’s Statement to S. 1243 (L.1981, c. 266, § 1) (“This bill clarifies responsibility for theconduct of municipal police activities by providing for theduties and responsibilities of chiefs of police.”). The Legislature delegated to the Chief of Police the powerto issue the General Order to his officers. The failure toabide by that direct order presumably would subject an officerto discipline, perhaps even removal. See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181(referencing Police Bureau of the Div. of Criminal Justice,Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures (Nov. 2017)). Under OPRA’sbroad right of disclosure, a chief of police’s direct order hasthe force of law, and therefore the video recordings were“required by law” in this case, meaning that the criminalinvestigatory records exception does not apply. B. The majority, however, concludes that because the Chief ofPolice’s General Order is not an ordinance or statute, or evenan Attorney General directive, the video recording is not arecord “required by law” to be maintained and therefore notsubject to OPRA’s disclosure requirement. Ante at ___ (slip op.at 23). To reach that conclusion, however, the majorityabandons OPRA’s declaration that any limitation on the right todisclosure must “be construed in favor of the public’s right ofaccess,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, and eviscerates our holding in North 5 Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541(2017). In Lyndhurst, this Court recognized that the AttorneyGeneral, as the State’s chief law enforcement officer, “has theauthority to adopt guidelines, directives, and policies thatbind police departments throughout the State.” Id. at 565.With that in mind, we held that the Attorney General’s policyrequiring officers to complete a Use of Force Report had “theforce of law for police entities.” Ibid. (quoting O’Shea v.Township of West Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 382 (App. Div.2009)). Because the Attorney General’s policy had “the force oflaw,” we determined that the “Use of Force Reports are 'requiredby law to be made’” and therefore “cannot be exempt fromdisclosure under OPRA’s criminal investigatory recordsexemption.” Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1). Lyndhurst supports the disclosure of the video recording inthis case because the chief of police’s power to bind policeofficers to follow a general order is in no meaningful waydistinguishable from the Attorney General’s power to bind policeforces to follow his directives. Both a chief of police and theAttorney General act under authority delegated by theLegislature. The majority’s claim that there are “significantdistinctions between the Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy 6 . . . and the Barnegat Township Police Chief’s General Order”does not hold water. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 22). Themajority states that “no statute gives a General Orderpromulgated by the Barnegat Township Police Chief the force oflaw,” citing N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 22-23). Although I do not dispute that the Legislature has giventhe Attorney General the power to “bind police departmentsthroughout the State” to follow statewide directives, Lyndhurst,229 N.J. at 565, it is also true that the Legislature hasdelegated to chiefs of police the power to issue generaldirectives that are binding on police officers under N.J.S.A.40A:14-118. The arbitrary distinction created by the majorityundermines the effectiveness of OPRA in an area where thetransparency of the government’s conduct in its affairs with thepublic is of critical importance to an informed citizenry.Sunlight is the greatest disinfectant when the government actsin dark corners. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 67 (1976)(quoting Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, in OtherPeople’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 62 (National HomeLibrary Foundation ed. 1933)). In Lyndhurst, this Court generally observed: Ready access to government records lies at the heart of OPRA. And in the case of a police shooting, non-disclosure of dash-cam videos 7 can undermine confidence in law enforcement and the work that officers routinely perform. It can also fuel the perception that information is being concealed -- a concern that is enhanced when law enforcement officials occasionally reveal footage that exculpates officers. [ 229 N.J. at 576-77.]The concerns expressed by the Court in favor of disclosure of adash-cam video in a police shooting case apply with equal forcehere where a police dog was allowed to attack a driver stoppedfor motor vehicle infractions and eluding. The majority’sdecision will make exceedingly more difficult the ability ofcitizens to gain access to police video recordings and reports.That is not in keeping with a statute that calls itself the OpenPublic Records Act. C. The majority’s decision will have far-ranging consequences.For the most part, this decision will render superfluous theongoing investigation exception under OPRA. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3. When records, such as the video recording in this case, areexempt under the criminal investigatory records exception, theanalysis ends. The Legislature evidently intended that theongoing investigation exception and other exceptions wouldnarrow the scope of criminal records subject to disclosure.Thus, if the video recording in this case -- and other records-- were not subject to the criminal investigatory records 8 exception, its disclosure would still be contingent on theanalyses under a number of other potential OPRA exceptions, suchas the ongoing investigation exception, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3; thevictim’s personal identifying information exception, N.J.S.A.47:1A-2.2; the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacyexception, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1; the emergency or securityinformation exception, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1; the security measuresand surveillance techniques exception, ibid.; and executiveorders of the Governor, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Those additionalsafeguards refute the majority’s suggestion that the sky wouldfall if a chief of police’s direct order were to have the forceof law. With the majority’s expansive reading of the criminalinvestigatory records exception, the general rule effectivelywill be nondisclosure. In that way, the majority has turnedOPRA on its head. Contrary to the majority’s approach,exceptions to OPRA should be construed narrowly in light ofOPRA’s declaration that “any limitations on the right of access. . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s right ofaccess.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. The majority still gives Paff and the public a pathway todisclosure under the common law. But that will be a difficultand burdensome path fraught with litigation and increased costs.Because of the complicated formula under the common law right to 9 access, which requires the weighing of a number of competingfactors, custodians will be loath to disclose recordsvoluntarily. The responsibility will fall to judges to engagein factfinding and balance the factors for and against release.The common law is not an adequate substitute for OPRA becausethe Legislature intended a streamlined and simplifiedmethodology for records custodians to make decisions. See Pub.Hearing Before S. Judiciary Comm., S. 161, 351, 573, 866 80(Mar. 9, 2000) (“[I]f [OPRA] is passed, [requestors are] goingto get the records a lot more quickly . . . and a lot lessexpensively, than having to litigate under the common law.”). II. In accordance with Lyndhurst, the Attorney General or theLegislature can undo the damage caused by today’s decision. TheAttorney General can adopt a statewide policy that addresseswhether and how police video recordings are made and maintained,as he did with Use of Force Reports. The public -- particularly marginalized communities -- willhave greater trust in the police when law enforcement activitiesare transparent. Because the majority’s decision does notadvance that purpose, I respectfully dissent. 10