Title: People v. Harvey
Citation: 2018 IL 122325
Docket Number: 122325
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2018

2018 IL 122325 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket No. 122325) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
SHANE D. HARVEY, Appellant. 
Opinion filed September 20, 2018. 
CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, Theis, and Neville concurred in the 
judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
In this appeal, defendant asks us to consider, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), forfeited claims that the circuit court has erroneously 
ordered certain fines or fees. The State has conceded error on one assessment, and 
another—that the court never ordered—has been administratively rectified. We 
find there was no error with respect to imposition of the remaining fee at issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, there is no error to address and no need to determine whether relief 
would be available by way of Rule 615. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court, with the modification hereinafter noted. 
¶ 2 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
Defendant, Shane D. Harvey, was charged with domestic battery (720 ILCS 
5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2012)), with that charged offense elevated to a Class 4 felony 
due to a prior aggravated battery conviction (see id. § 12-3.2(b)). Following a 
November 18, 2013, trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant, 
through counsel, filed a posttrial motion, and that motion was ultimately denied. 
¶ 4 
On February 4, 2014, the Adams County circuit court sentenced defendant to 
the maximum sentence of three years in prison, followed by a four-year term of 
mandatory supervised release. As part of the judgment, the court ordered defendant 
to pay certain fines and fees clearly identified—with correlative statutory 
citations—on a separate sheet titled “Felony Fines, Costs and Assessments.” 
Defendant expressed a desire to appeal, so the court appointed the Office of the 
State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to represent him. Notice of appeal was filed on 
February 10, 2014, and the appeal was docketed as case No. 4-14-0100. 
¶ 5 
While that appeal was pending, on March 6, 2014, defendant filed a pro se 
“Petition for Reduced Sentence,” alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel should 
have pointed out several errors that appeared in the presentence investigation report 
(PSI)—errors which, defendant claimed, caused the trial court to impose the 
maximum sentence. Defendant—who was obviously otherwise active in his own 
behalf and attentive to his case—did not raise any issue regarding the imposition of 
fines, fees, or per diem credit. As a result of defendant’s pro se filing, the trial court 
reappointed defendant’s trial counsel. On April 16, 2014, the appellate court 
granted OSAD’s motion for the voluntary dismissal of the pending appeal. People 
v. Harvey, No. 4-14-0100 (Apr. 16, 2014) (dismissed on defendant’s motion). 
¶ 6 
On June 25, 2014, trial counsel filed a document—purportedly pursuant to Rule 
604(d)—averring that she had consulted with defendant and had “ascertained his 
contentions of error in the sentencing hearing.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 
2013). Counsel also claimed to have “examined the transcripts of the trial and of the 
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sentencing hearing” and to have “ascertained that no additional or amended 
pleadings” were “necessary to adequately present his contentions of error.” That 
same day, at a hearing on defendant’s motion, defendant’s attorney indicated she 
wished to stand on defendant’s pro se motion. After considering arguments of 
counsel, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion. OSAD was 
again appointed as counsel on appeal. Notice of appeal was filed June 30, 2014. 
¶ 7 
On appeal, defendant first argued that the circuit court erred by failing to 
conduct any inquiry into his claim that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective 
assistance. As the appellate court noted, “[s]pecifically, in his pro se motion to 
reduce his sentence, defendant had stated: ‘Several points in the PSI were incorrect 
(which should have been argued by “my” public defender at sentencing).’ ” 2017 
IL App (4th) 140576-U, ¶ 11. Citing relevant colloquies of the circuit court and the 
attorneys, the appellate court observed that the circuit court, at the hearing on 
defendant’s motion, “addressed neither those alleged errors in the PSI nor 
defendant’s contention that counsel failed to address those alleged errors at 
sentencing.” Id. ¶ 14. The appellate court concluded that the circuit court’s failure 
to “conduct any inquiry” warranted “remand *** to the trial court for that stated 
purpose.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 21. 
¶ 8 
The court then turned to defendant’s contentions that some of his fines and fees 
were improperly assessed and that he otherwise did not receive the proper per diem 
credit to which he was entitled. The court noted the State’s concession of error with 
respect to one of defendant’s contentions and the State’s argument—reiterated 
before this court—that the remainder of defendant’s claims were forfeited for 
failure to raise them in the circuit court. Id. ¶ 23. 
¶ 9 
Without invoking the plain-error rule and citing People v. Buffkin, 2016 IL App 
(2d) 140792, ¶ 11, for the proposition that the State’s confession of error permits 
review of an otherwise precluded claim, the appellate court accepted the State’s 
concession that the $20 court-appointed special advocate (CASA) fee is 
comparable to the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) fee, that it is actually a fine, 
and that it is thus subject to the application of per diem credit. 2017 IL App (4th) 
140576-U, ¶ 24.1 The appellate court referenced People v. Millsap, 2012 IL App 
1Defendant in this case raised the monetary assessment issues in a timely filed appeal 
in which he asserted an issue otherwise properly preserved, i.e., an issue relating to the 
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(4th) 110668, ¶ 30, for supporting authority that, notwithstanding the statutory 
label of “fee,” the CAC fee is actually a fine. In light of the State’s concession and 
the holding of Millsap, the appellate court, as an additional charge to the circuit 
court upon remand, directed the circuit court to apply defendant’s $5 per diem 
credit toward the $20 CASA assessment. 2017 IL App (4th) 140576-U, ¶ 24. 
¶ 10 
The appellate court then summarized defendant’s remaining claims: (1) the $2 
state’s attorney automation fee is actually a fine and is subject to per diem credit; 
(2) the sheriff’s fee was improperly assessed; (3) the circuit clerk should not have 
assessed the $250 deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) fee because defendant was already 
in the DNA database; and (4) the trial court should not have imposed the $10 Crime 
Stoppers assessment. The appellate court rejected defendant’s first claim, relying 
upon its prior decision in People v. Warren, 2016 IL App (4th) 120721-B, ¶ 115, 
wherein the court held the state’s attorney automation fee is in fact a fee because it 
is intended to reimburse the state’s attorneys for their expenses related to 
automated record-keeping systems.2 2017 IL App (4th) 140576-U, ¶ 25. 
¶ 11 
With respect to defendant’s remaining contentions, “relat[ing] to the imposition 
of fees, not fines,” the appellate court concluded those claims “do not rise to the 
level of errors affecting the fundamental fairness or integrity of the judicial 
process.” Id. ¶ 26. The only authority cited by the appellate court is a “Cf.” citation 
to this court’s decision in People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2009), with a 
parenthetical explanation that the “imposition of a fine without an evidentiary basis 
implicates fundamental fairness and the integrity of the judicial process sufficient 
to apply plain-error review.” 2017 IL App (4th) 140576-U, ¶ 26. The appellate 
court considered the fine-fee distinction determinative: “[D]efendant cites cases 
applying plain error to challenges regarding the imposition of fines, not fees. As 
such, we agree with the State that defendant forfeited review of the issues he raises 
in this appeal pertaining to the imposition of fees. Such issues were not raised in the 
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel and the circuit court’s failure to adequately inquire 
regarding same. Revestment of jurisdiction—as discussed in Buffkin and People v. Griffin, 
2017 IL App (1st) 143800, appeal allowed, No. 122549 (Nov. 22, 2017)—is not relevant 
here; forfeiture is. We express no opinion with respect to those procedural circumstances 
or the analyses of those cases. 
2Neither party disputes the character of the state’s attorneys automation fee before this 
court. 
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trial court proceedings, are forfeited, and are not subject to plain-error review.” Id. 
¶ 12 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 13 
Before this court, defendant claims that three assessments were erroneously 
imposed: the DNA analysis fee, the sheriff’s fee, and the Crime Stoppers 
assessment. No other assessments are challenged. Although he concedes that those 
claims were not preserved by timely objection in the circuit court or inclusion in a 
postsentencing motion, defendant submits that error with respect to those three 
assessments may be remedied pursuant to the provisions of Rule 615. 
¶ 14 
Rule 615 provides as follows: 
“(a) Insubstantial and Substantial Errors on Appeal. Any error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed 
although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. 
(b) Powers of the Reviewing Court. On appeal the reviewing court may: 
(1) reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal 
is taken; 
(2) set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to 
or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; 
(3) reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted; 
(4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or 
(5) order a new trial.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). 
¶ 15 
In order to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous 
objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required. People 
v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010); see also 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West 2008) 
(“[a] defendant’s challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the 
sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days 
following the imposition of sentence”). “Under the plain-error rule, codified in 
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Supreme Court Rule 615, ‘[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded’ unless the appellant demonstrates 
plain error.” People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 60 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 615 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 1967)). Pursuant to the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may address a 
forfeited claim in two circumstances: “ ‘(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred 
and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the 
scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error and 
(2) where a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it 
affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the 
judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Hood, 
2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48). The 
initial step under either prong of the plain error doctrine is to determine whether the 
claim presented on review actually amounts to a “clear or obvious error” at all. 
People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 33. 
¶ 16 
Before we take that initial step, however, we pause to consider what is actually 
in controversy here. 
¶ 17 
The State suggests that defendant’s challenges to the DNA identification fee 
and the Crime Stoppers “fine” are moot “because there is no effectual relief to be 
granted: defendant’s DNA identification fee does not exist, even as a scrivener’s 
error in the clerk’s electronic accounts receivable records, and his Crime Stoppers 
fine was entirely offset by presentence custody credits.” The State notes, and the 
record confirms, that the circuit court in fact assessed no DNA identification fee, 
and the State represents—without contradiction—that the circuit clerk was 
contacted by an attorney for the State and has corrected its electronic accounts 
receivable records to remove the erroneous reference to “the unassessed fee.” In 
short, there is no fee to vacate. Moreover, the State now concedes it was error for 
the circuit court to impose a Crime Stoppers “fine,” pursuant to section 
5-6-3(b)(13) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(13) (West 
2012)), because, as noted in People v. Jernigan, 2014 IL App (4th) 130524, 
¶ 48—among other cases—that “fine” may be imposed only as a condition of 
probation. However, the State argues that erroneous imposition of that assessment 
is moot because it is in fact a fine entirely offset by defendant’s presentence 
custody credits. In light of the foregoing considerations, i.e., correction and offset, 
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respectively, the State argues that issues relating to the DNA assessment and the 
Crime Stoppers assessment are moot. 
¶ 18 
In his reply brief, the defendant first acknowledges that the DNA fee has been 
vacated, though defendant notes the manner in which it was done—at the request of 
an attorney for the State—and expresses concerns over reliance upon the State in 
future cases where a DNA fee is improperly assessed a second time following a 
prior DNA submission and fee. Though defendant concedes that this issue is moot, 
he argues that this court should consider the issue under the public interest 
exception to the mootness doctrine. Defendant then notes that the State concedes 
the imposition of a Crime Stoppers “fine” was unauthorized, and defendant agrees 
with the State’s assertion that his presentence custody credit covered his applicable 
fines, including the Crime Stoppers “fine.” In light of those accords, defendant 
necessarily agrees with the State’s assessment that this issue is moot. Defendant 
requests that we also consider this issue under the public interest exception to the 
mootness doctrine. 
¶ 19 
An issue on appeal is moot where it no longer presents an actual controversy. 
Cf. In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349 (2006). Reviewing courts will not decide moot or 
abstract questions or render advisory opinions. Id. A court of review may, however, 
review an otherwise moot issue pursuant to the public interest exception to the 
mootness doctrine. Id. at 350. The narrowly construed public interest exception to 
the mootness doctrine requires that (1) the question presented is of a public nature, 
(2) a need exists for an authoritative determination of the question for the future 
guidance of public officers, and (3) the question is likely to recur. In re Jarquan B., 
2017 IL 121483, ¶ 17. We find that the public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine does not warrant any meaningful discussion of the DNA fee issue, for 
which defendant could receive no further relief, and it merits only a brief discussion 
of the Crime Stoppers assessment. We begin with those issues. 
¶ 20 
First, with respect to the DNA assessment—well, there never was a DNA fee 
assessed by the court. The judgment sheet titled “Felony Fines, Costs and 
Assessments,” dated the day of the sentencing hearing and signed by the sentencing 
judge, clearly marked—as should be the procedure in all cases—the fines, fees, and 
costs the judge imposed. The judge left blank the line associated with the “$250 
DNA Analysis Fee.” This court has affirmed and reaffirmed, in a succession of 
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recent cases, the principle that the circuit clerk’s assessment of a fee not authorized 
by the circuit court does not reflect the judgment of the court. See People v. 
Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶¶ 21-24; People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 55; 
People v. Vara, 2018 IL 121823, ¶¶ 25, 28. No one now disputes that the erroneous 
DNA fee entry in this case has been deleted from the circuit clerk’s electronic 
accounts receivable records. No further relief can be afforded defendant. Moreover, 
there is no question that a defendant who, like this defendant, is already in the DNA 
database cannot be ordered to pay another DNA analysis fee. See People v. 
Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 303 (2011) (“[S]ection 5-4-3 authorizes a trial court to 
order the taking, analysis and indexing of a qualifying offender’s DNA, and the 
payment of the analysis fee only where that defendant is not currently registered in 
the DNA database.”). Thus, the second criterion for invocation of the public 
interest exception is lacking here: there is no need for “an authoritative 
determination of the question *** for the future guidance of public officers.” See 
In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 16. Marshall provides the guidance and the 
pertinent authority. 
¶ 21 
In our view, the same deficiency would seem to militate against public interest 
consideration of the circumstances requisite to the Crime Stoppers assessment. It 
should be self-evident to all that the section 5-6-3 assessment does not apply here. 
All that is required is that one actually look at the authorizing statute. A look at the 
heading of section 5-6-3 tells us that it pertains to “Conditions of Probation and of 
Conditional Discharge.” Subsection 13 sets forth one of those conditions, but it 
does not apply unless the defendant has been sentenced to probation or conditional 
discharge. This defendant was not so sentenced; hence, subsection 13 obviously 
does not apply to him. We strongly encourage state’s attorneys, defense counsel, 
and sentencing judges to look at the authorizing statutes before the court imposes 
attendant fines and fees. The circumstances for application of this fine seem 
straightforward enough: either incarceration (no assessment) or community-based 
disposition (potential assessment). See generally People v. Goossens, 2015 IL 
118347, ¶ 10 (“This court has repeatedly interpreted section 5-6-3(b) of the Code 
(730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b) (West 2010)) to mean a court may in its discretion require a 
probationer to comply with any of the enumerated conditions” therein. (Emphases 
added.)) Since the parties agree that the assessment should not have been imposed 
in the first place, it does not matter here what it is—fine or fee. 
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¶ 22 
That brings us to the assessment actually contested in this case: the sheriff’s fee. 
Defendant’s contention that the sheriff’s fee—imposed pursuant to section 4-5001 
of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-5001 (West 2012)), as permissibly increased by 
county ordinance—was erroneously excessive. The basis for defendant’s argument 
is that the Adams County ordinance, which increased the amount that could be 
charged for various services performed by the sheriff, did not specifically address 
the service of subpoenas and the fee for return of process served. Thus, defendant 
argues that those services should have been charged at the lower statutory rate.3 In 
brief, the State’s contention is that the language of the county ordinance could be 
construed to subsume service of subpoenas and return of process and that was the 
intent of county officials when they enacted the ordinance. 
¶ 23 
Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a clear or obvious error. People v. 
McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 497-98 (2009). He has not carried that burden. 
¶ 24 
Defendant’s argument that the sheriff’s fee exceeded allowable limits is 
premised upon the contention that the Adams County ordinance (Adams County, 
Ill., Ordinance to Increase Fees in the Sheriff’s Office (Oct. 11, 2011)) that 
purported to raise the sheriff’s fees again in 2011—after they had been increased in 
2003 above the monetary limits set forth in the applicable statute—was ineffective 
to increase the fees for “subpoenas” and “criminal process” because neither term 
was specifically used in the 2011 ordinance.4 The enacting ordinance and the 
accompanying cost study required for the fee increase refer only to “civil process 
service and return.” In the 2011 ordinance, the then “current fee amount” for that 
service was listed as $30, with a “proposed new price” of $40, which was adopted 
by the county board. There is, in the ordinance, no breakdown for types of service 
beyond “civil process,” “tax notice,” and “warrant/body attachment,” whereas 
section 4-5001, the base statutory provision, includes an extensive list of specific 
categories of service. See 55 ILCS 5/4-5001 (West 2012). Although defendant, in 
his reply brief, instructs us on the difference between criminal and civil process, the 
statute does not draw a generic distinction between “civil” and “criminal” process. 
3The statutory rate for service of a subpoena is $10 and $5 for return of process. 55 
ILCS 5/4-5001 (West 2012). 
4There is no copy of the 2003 ordinance in the record, so we have no way of knowing 
what language was employed therein. 
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For example, there is no differentiation between subpoenas served in civil and 
criminal cases. 
¶ 25 
The State argues that the term “civil process,” as employed in the ordinance and 
accompanying cost study, is intended to—and does in fact—subsume service of 
subpoenas in criminal cases. The State notes that the term “civil process” is defined 
in the cost study attached to the ordinance and is explicitly “made a part [t]hereof.” 
The State claims that term is defined as “service of all papers except tax notices and 
warrants.” That is a somewhat loose interpretation of the definition in the cost 
study. However, the cost study does state: “Papers of the same priority that are 
served using the same method were classified generically as ‘Civil Process’ and the 
cost of activity was determined as a group.” 
¶ 26 
This court’s primary objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislative body. Henderson Square 
Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 67. What was 
true 64 years ago is still true today: “All laws should receive a sensible 
interpretation, and [an] *** ordinance will not be so literally construed as to 
produce an absurd result which, even though within its letter, is contrary to the 
obvious legislative intent.” Village of Itasca v. Luehring, 4 Ill. 2d 426, 429 (1954). 
We do not believe that the county board intended that service of “civil process” be 
compensated, under the most recent fee enhancement ordinance, at $40, while 
“criminal process” and all subpoenas are compensated at $10, the amount set forth 
in the base statute. It appears to us that the umbrella term, “civil process,” is 
sufficient, as defined in the ordinance, to cover the fees charged here. If it were 
necessary to read the terms at issue into the ordinance, we would do so using our 
analogous authority with respect to statutory omission. See People v. Masterson, 
207 Ill. 2d 305, 329 (2003) (“When the intent of the legislature is otherwise clear, 
the judiciary possesses the authority to read language into a statute which has been 
omitted through legislative oversight.”). 
¶ 27 
If an error has been made, it would seem it is, as the State argues, one in 
defendant’s favor. It appears that some of the charges for served subpoenas were 
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entered at the previous rate of $30. 
5 Defendant does not challenge the prior 
ordinance.6 He has not demonstrated error. 
¶ 28 
In sum, pursuant to the State’s confession of error, we vacate the Crime 
Stoppers assessment, and we accept the State’s representation—undisputed by 
defendant—that there is no DNA fee assessed in the circuit clerk’s database. There, 
of course, never was a judicially imposed assessment in that regard. In light of the 
foregoing circumstances, the appellate court judgment is modified to the extent that 
the Crime Stoppers assessment is vacated. In all other respects, as regards issues 
actually raised before this court, concerning judicially imposed assessments, the 
judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.7 
¶ 29 
Appellate court judgment affirmed as modified. 
5The charge of $30 for the service of 10 subpoenas and $40 for the remaining 5 would, 
as the State points out, account for the total sheriff’s fee of $515, when “the one dollar for 
the one-mile round trip per subpoena” is included. 
6Defendant opines that “the State cites no authority providing for assessing a Sheriff’s 
fee pursuant to a superceded version of an ordinance, or otherwise allowing for a $31 fee.” 
In light of our finding that the 2011 ordinance permitted a charge of $40 for service and 
return of each subpoena, we deem it unnecessary to respond to defendant’s argument that a 
$30 charge in his favor was error. What relief could we provide? Moreover, since 
defendant has not provided a copy of the 2003 ordinance, we have no way of knowing what 
language was employed in that ordinance, such that the 2011 enactment would be, in 
defendant’s words, “superceding.” 
7In passing, we welcome the enactment of Public Act 100-987 (eff. in part July 1, 
2018, in part July 1, 2019), which will bring to sentencing assessments much needed 
simplicity and transparency that will inure to the benefit of the parties and courts. The 
Public Act, laudably, will also empower the sentencing courts to grant payment waivers in 
those circumstances where that relief is warranted. 
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