Title: Young v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 180515
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2019

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL ANTHONY YOUNG 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 180515 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
July 3, 2019 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Michael Anthony Young appeals from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
affirming his convictions for grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95; conspiracy to commit 
grand larceny, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-22 and 18.2-95; and false identification to a law 
enforcement officer, in violation of Code § 19.2-82.1.  On appeal, Young argues that his right to 
a speedy trial was violated and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s 
denials of his motions to dismiss. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On November 25, 2015, Michael Anthony Young was arrested on a charge of having 
robbed a minor.  Young was charged with robbery (Count 1), which was bound over for the 
grand jury by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on March 2, 2016.  The grand jury 
indicted Young on Count 1 on March 14, 2016.  Young was directly indicted on March 14, 2016 
for conspiracy to commit robbery, grand larceny, conspiracy to commit a felony, and giving false 
identification to law enforcement (Counts 2-5).  The indictment return order indicated “no bond 
on all counts.”  For purposes of speedy trial determinations, Young’s period of incarceration 
began March 2, 2016.  Absent any intervening events extending the applicable period, his speedy 
 
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trial period would expire on August 3, 2016 for Count 1 and August 15 for Counts 2 through 5.  
Young’s jury trial was scheduled for August 1-3, 2016. 
 
On July 15, 2016, Young filed a motion to dismiss the indictments against him based 
upon discovery issues with the Commonwealth.  Young argued in his motion that he was 
“forced . . . to choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to the effective assistance 
of counsel.”  The trial court held a hearing on Young’s motion to dismiss on July 19.  Young 
made various arguments in support of his motion to dismiss.  Among other things, he specifically 
argued that the indictments should be dismissed due to the Commonwealth’s late production of 
1005 recorded jail phone calls made by Young which totaled 225 hours in length and the 
revelation of the existence of a previously undisclosed certificate of analysis from the victim’s 
cell phone.  Counsel for Young argued: 
I would suggest at the end of the day the Commonwealth has put 
[Young] in a position, and he has no choices.  He can choose to 
stand on his rights to a speedy trial and go to trial on August 1st 
and be unprepared and put himself in a position to not be able to 
redevelop his defense, reinvestigate his case; reconfigure what he 
is going to do or how he is going to present it; never mind the fact 
that there is an absolute impossibility at this point in time to listen 
to all of those recordings; that there is still information that we 
simply don’t know and we don’t know if or when we’re going to 
know it; that it could come in tomorrow or a week from tomorrow 
or the day before trial, and just take his chances in court on a 
charge that is not insignificant in any way. . . . 
Or he can say to the [c]ourt, I need to have this case continued 
because I want my case to be prepared. 
 
After the trial court indicated it would take the motion to dismiss under advisement, 
counsel for Young stated: 
if the [c]ourt doesn’t grant the motion to dismiss, regardless of 
whatever other remedies the [c]ourt chooses to fashion or not 
fashion, [Young’s] position is going to be that we’re certainly not 
in a position to go forward with trial on August 1st, regardless of 
the ways in which the Commonwealth is suggesting that this 
 
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evidence be limited in some fashion.  I don’t want to be 
disingenuous to the [c]ourt and say I’m going to wait for your 
ruling and then have it and then turn around and come back to this 
[c]ourt and say, [“]If you’re not dismissing this case, then we’re 
now not ready to go forward.[”]  I do want to be up front with the 
[c]ourt. 
The trial court scheduled a hearing for July 25 for its ruling on Young’s motion to dismiss. 
 
At the July 25 hearing, the trial court held that it did not “find that this [was] a 
comprehensive failure to provide discovery.”  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but 
imposed sanctions against the Commonwealth, prohibiting it from relying on the jail phone calls 
at trial, binding the Commonwealth to a stipulation regarding the certificate of analysis, and 
ordering it to file supplemental discovery by August 8. 
 
Despite the sanctions the trial court imposed, Young continued to argue that  
we don’t feel this should be a situation which Mr. Young has to 
forfeit his rights to a speedy trial in light of his rights to have the 
information that he’s entitled to, which again, once we move this 
court date will all but ensure we will be outside the speedy trial 
time. 
In light of Young’s position, a discussion regarding bond ensued.  In response to the trial court’s 
statement that “it’s a practical concession that bond would need to be granted,” Young stated that 
bond was “not really a solution . . . because he [was] being held on other matters from other 
jurisdictions.  So setting a bond in this case will actually do nothing to provide him any liberty.”  
At the conclusion of the discussion, Young recommended placing the case on the August 15 
scheduling docket but stated, “I don’t want the [c]ourt to take that as the defense is now agreeing 
that this, in essence, three-week window would be attributable to Mr. Young because I’m asking 
to use the 15th.”  In light of the fact that August 15th was outside the speedy trial window, the 
Commonwealth offered to try to provide the required responses earlier in order to keep the trial 
date and keep Young’s speedy trial rights intact.  Directly addressing the speedy trial issue, the 
 
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Commonwealth raised the issue of whether Young was requesting a continuance or if “we’re just 
kind of putting the case out.”  In response, defense counsel stated: 
[w]e’re certainly not in a position to go forward even if a response 
came in. 
. . . . 
To now attribute this idea and say this is now the defendant’s 
continuance and he has to eat this time or it should be held against 
him, again, would be fundamentally unfair and quite frankly 
inappropriate.  The Commonwealth had this information all along. 
. . . . 
[T]his time should be attributable to the Commonwealth. 
In response to this colloquy, the trial court replied, “this [c]ourt is not today ruling that this is the 
defendant’s motion to remove this case from the docket.  I don’t know what that means down the 
road, but I do not count this as a defense motion.” 
 
Thereafter, on August 8th and 15th, Young filed additional motions to dismiss the 
charges against him alleging violations of the speedy trial statute.  Young argued that his speedy 
trial rights were violated because the trial court failed to count the continuance against the 
Commonwealth.  In response, the Commonwealth argued that Young stated that he would not be 
ready for trial by August 1, thus causing the trial court to remove the matter from the August 1 
trial docket.  Prior to rendering its decision, the trial court recounted the events leading up to the 
continuance.  Specifically, the trial court recounted that 
[o]n July 19th, the [trial court] recognized that the August 1st trial 
date was approaching and when attempting to determine a date to 
set for a ruling on the pending motion . . . defense counsel 
informed the [c]ourt that regardless of the [c]ourt’s ruling on the 
motion to dismiss, that the defense would not be [in] a position to 
try the case on August 1st due to various discovery issues . . . . 
 
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Taking note of that, and without objection of either counsel, the 
[c]ourt then set July 25th as the date for the ruling on the motion to 
dismiss. 
. . . . 
[J]ust because the [c]ourt has determined that [Young] didn’t file a 
motion to continue does not [lead to] the conclusion that the 
speedy trial provisions had been violated and the [c]ourt is required 
to dismiss the charges. 
Against this backdrop, the trial court continued: 
As I said, the defense had not filed any document that was styled 
motion to continue but the removal of the August 1 trial date was 
originated by [Young’s] declaration that he would not be prepared 
to try the case on August 1st. 
So the [c]ourt finds that the process then occurred that resulted in 
the removal of the trial date was in pari ratione, that is by like 
mode or reasoning or for the like reason as if [Young] had filed a 
motion to continue. 
Having reached this conclusion, the trial court applied the analysis of Taylor v. Commonwealth, 
4 Va. App. 45 (1987) (holding that absent a showing of bad faith by the Commonwealth, 
continuances requested by defendant will not be charged to the Commonwealth), specifically 
found no bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth, and denied the motion to dismiss. 
 
Young thereafter pled guilty to Count 5 (false identification to a law enforcement 
officer).  At his November 2016 jury trial, the trial court granted the motion to strike Counts 1 
(robbery) and 2 (conspiracy to commit robbery).  The jury found Young guilty on Counts 3 
(grand larceny) and 4 (conspiracy to commit larceny).  Young was sentenced to a total of 16 
months’ incarceration. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Young v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0265-17-4, 2018 WL 1385405 (Mar. 20, 2018) (unpublished).  
Contrary to the trial court’s finding that Young’s actions were in pari ratione to a defense 
 
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continuance motion, the Court of Appeals found that the continuance was court-ordered.  The 
Court of Appeals held that a court-ordered continuance is considered an implied exception to the 
time periods under the speedy trial act under Howard v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 455, 461 
(2011).  Young, 2018 WL 1385405, at *6.  It found that the trial court expressly ruled that the 
Commonwealth did not act in bad faith, that this determination was not contested on appeal, and 
that it was the “law of the case.”  Id. at *7.  The Court of Appeals also applied its previous 
holding in Taylor and held that “even though the Commonwealth’s discovery failures 
necessitated the court-ordered continuance, because the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth 
did not act in bad faith, we cannot impute the continuance to the Commonwealth.”  Id. at *7.  
This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, a statutory speedy trial challenge presents a mixed question of law and fact.  
The Court reviews legal questions de novo, while giving deference to the trial court’s factual 
findings.  Harris v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 28, 32 (2003). 
The defendant’s right to a speedy trial is one accorded him under 
the[S]ixth [A]mendment of the United States Constitution and 
under article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution.  This right 
has been supplemented by Code §§ 19.2-241 and 19.2-243, held to 
be a legislative interpretation of what constitutes a speedy trial. 
Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 229-30 (1983).  Code § 19.2–241 provides 
[w]hen an indictment is found against a person for felony or when 
an appeal has been perfected from the conviction of a 
misdemeanor or traffic infraction, the accused, if in custody, or if 
he appear according to his recognizance, may be tried at the same 
term and shall be tried within the time limits fixed in [Code] 
§ 19.2-243. 
 
Code § 19.2-243, the speedy trial statute, provides that if a defendant, who stands accused 
of a felony, is continuously held in custody from the time he was indicted or from his 
 
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preliminary hearing, he “shall be forever discharged from prosecution for such offense if no trial 
is commenced in the circuit court within five months.”  Here, Young had been continuously 
incarcerated since the March 2, 2016 preliminary hearing and, for purposes of speedy trial, his 
trial should have commenced within five months of the preliminary hearing date.  Young was not 
tried until November 14-17, 2016, well beyond the five-month time limit set forth in Code 
§ 19.2-243.  The Court of Appeals found that the trial’s continuance from August 2016 until 
November 2016 was a court-ordered continuance that was not counted against the 
Commonwealth.  The Court of Appeals held that because the trial court found the 
Commonwealth did not act in bad faith,* it could not “impute the continuance to the 
Commonwealth” and affirmed Young’s convictions.  Young, 2018 WL 1385405 at *7.  “While 
we do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ rationale in” affirming Young’s convictions, we do 
agree that Young’s speedy trial rights were not violated.  Ricks v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 470, 
480-81 (2015) (applying the right result, wrong reason doctrine).  Because Young’s failure to 
make an affirmative objection to the trial court’s continuation of the case is dispositive, we need 
not address the arguments that the continuance should be attributed to the Commonwealth and 
that Taylor should be overruled, modified, or reversed. 
 
The five-month period provided for in Code § 19.2-243 is not absolute.  Code § 19.2-243 
provides that the calculation of the time period for commencing the trial will be tolled for time 
attributed to a continuance granted on a motion made by the defendant and his counsel, or time 
attributed to a continuance granted on a motion made by the Commonwealth in which the 
defendant or his counsel concurred or did not make a timely objection.  In Howard, we 
                                                 
 
* We take no position on the correctness of the trial court’s finding that the 
Commonwealth did not act in bad faith. 
 
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recognized that not all continuances will be requested by either the Commonwealth or the 
defendant.  Indeed, due to the nature of trial proceedings, sometimes continuances are initiated 
by the court.  We specifically held in Howard that even continuances “entered by the court sua 
sponte . . . are subject to the same requirements regarding objections [by the defendant] as other 
continuances.”  281 Va. at 461. 
 
Young argues that while the Court of Appeals correctly applied the reasoning of Howard 
in finding that the provisions of Code § 19.2-234(4) apply to a “court-ordered” continuance, he 
nevertheless contends that the Court of Appeals erred in the sequencing of its analysis because, 
under Howard, after deciding there was a court-ordered continuance, the threshold issue is 
whether or not Young objected to the court-ordered continuance.  We agree with Young that that 
analytical sequencing applies under the facts of this case.  We disagree, however, with Young’s 
interpretation of the facts. 
 
Young argues that because he objected to any court-ordered continuance if the time 
would not be attributed to the Commonwealth, this period of delay may not be attributed to him.  
Young takes the position that the Court of Appeals agreed that he objected because it found that 
Young “did not concur in, agree to, or initiate the continuance” and that he “repeatedly and 
emphatically stated at multiple stages of the proceeding that he was not waiving his speedy trial 
right.”  Young, 2018 WL 1385405, at *7.  Again, while Young is correct as to the statement 
made by the Court of Appeals, he reads too much into that statement.  While Young is correct as 
to the things the Court of Appeals identified and on which he relies, none of these actions and/or 
inactions equates to an objection to the continuance.  Had Young objected, he would be correct.  
However, the facts of this case indicate that Young was not averse to the granting of the 
continuance nor did he affirmatively object. 
 
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Young continually argued that he would not be ready for trial on August 1 and that he did 
not want the continuance counted against him for purposes of speedy trial.  Young recommended 
placing the case on the August 15 scheduling docket and stated, “I don’t want the [c]ourt to take 
that as the defense is now agreeing that this, in essence, three-week window would be 
attributable to Mr. Young because I’m asking to use the 15th.”  Young’s opposition to the 
resulting delay being attributable to him, while simultaneously reiterating that he could not be 
ready for trial and suggesting a control date outside the speedy trial window is not the same as 
affirmatively objecting to a continuance.  Indeed, defense counsel never used the word “object” 
during the discussion regarding the continuance of trial.  In Howard, we specifically stated, 
“[t]he provisions of paragraph 4 of Code § 19.2-243 . . . clearly demonstrate that in order to 
avoid the tolling provision, the defendant must be adverse to the granting of the continuance and 
must affirmatively express his objection.”  281 Va. at 460.  While Young did not explicitly 
concur, agree to, or request a continuance, nowhere in the record is there an actual affirmative 
objection to the court-ordered continuance.  “The defendant’s failure to object to the court’s 
action in fixing the trial date is an acquiescence in the fixing of a trial date beyond the five-
month speedy trial period and [these circumstances] constitute[] a continuance of the trial date 
under Code § 19.2–243(4).”  Heath v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 389, 394 (2001).  With Young 
having failed to lodge an affirmative objection to the continuance, we are constrained by Code 
§ 19.2-243(4) and will not consider Young’s request to overturn, modify, or reverse the Court of 
Appeals decision in Taylor.  We will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals finding that 
“[t]he continuance was court-ordered; an implied exception to Code § 19.2-243” to which no 
affirmative objection was made.  Young, 2018 WL 1385405, at *8. 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming Young’s 
convictions for grand larceny, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and providing false 
identification to a law enforcement officer. 
Affirmed.   
 
 
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting in part and concurring 
in the result. 
   
 
Although I concur in the result, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the 
defendant did not preserve an objection to the court-ordered continuance.  The record is crystal 
clear that Young strenuously objected to any continuance counting against him for purposes of 
speedy trial.  The fine distinction the Court draws between objecting to a continuance tout court 
and objecting to the continuance counting against the defendant for purposes of speedy trial 
strikes me as artificial, particularly when the defendant needs additional time to prepare for trial 
due to a late disclosure by the Commonwealth.  What the defendant sought to preserve through 
his objection was not simply delay, but, in his view, delay caused by the Commonwealth in 
violation of the speedy trial statute. 
Although the objection required here is statutory, in concept its purpose is the same as the 
contemporaneous objection rule found in Rule 5:25 and Rule 5A:18.  In applying the 
contemporaneous objection rule, we have held that its purpose “is to avoid unnecessary appeals 
by affording the trial judge an opportunity to rule intelligently on objections.”  Maxwell v. 
Commonwealth, 287 Va. 258, 264-65 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The objection “allows the circuit court to remedy the error while also giving the opposing party 
 
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the opportunity to meet the objection at that stage of the proceeding.”  Id. at 265.  Defense 
counsel’s objection was more than sufficient to alert the trial court that, in the context of a 
discussion of speedy trial, the defendant was taking issue with the continuance counting against 
him. 
 
I would resolve the case on the same basis as the Court of Appeals, by applying the 
holding in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 45 (1987).  Taylor has supplied the rule of 
decision in this circumstance for over 30 years.  Jurisprudential stability counsels in favor of 
maintaining its holding.  The trial court found that there was no bad faith by the Commonwealth, 
and, therefore, the delay caused by the court-ordered continuance was not attributable to the 
Commonwealth.