Title: Rodriguez v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 456, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ,
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No. 456, 2001
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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in and for Kent County
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Cr. ID No. 0005017581
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: January 7, 2003
Decided: April 7, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
O R D E R
This 7th day of April, 2003, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
appears to the Court that:
1) Victor Rodriguez appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, of second
degree arson, third degree arson, and attempted second degree arson.  He also appeals
his convictions, following a guilty plea, of two counts of terroristic threatening.
2) Rodriguez was indicted on four counts of terroristic threatening, eight counts
of arson and one count of misdemeanor theft relating to bomb threats, fires and other
events that occurred during the period from March through early May, 2000.  He was
1Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312 (Del. 1988).
2
indicted separately on two counts of second degree arson and one count of attempted
second degree arson based on fires that he allegedly started on May 19 and 20, 2000.
3) Rodriguez entered into a plea agreement with respect to the first indictment.
He pled guilty to two counts of terroristic threatening and the State nolle prossed the
remaining charges. Rodriguez contends that his guilty plea should be withdrawn
because it was involuntary and that his rights were violated when the police showed
a picture of him to two witnesses without his counsel being present. 
4) Rodriguez waived both of these claims.  He filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea before sentencing, but he withdrew that motion.  At sentencing, he
confirmed to the trial court that he did not wish to withdraw his guilty plea.  Pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 8, absent plain error, this Court will not review claims that
were not presented to the trial court.  Based on our review of the transcript, we find
nothing to suggest that Rodriguez’s plea was involuntary or unknowing and, therefore,
we find no plain error.  Rodriguez’s guilty plea, in turn, eliminates his claim relating
to events that occurred before the entry of the plea, such as the photographic lineup.1
   
5) Rodriguez went to trial on the three arson charges contained in the second
indictment.  The charges were based on fires discovered on May 19 and 20, 2000.
2Virdin v. State, 780 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2001).
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One fire was in the passenger compartment of a car that was parked at the rear of the
Precision Tune repair shop in Dover, Delaware.  The Fire Marshal testified that there
were scorch marks from the car fire on the wall of the repair shop.  Another fire was
discovered the following night in a trash dumpster that was located against the back
wall of a beauty shop, also in Dover, Delaware.  There was no evidence that the
dumpster fire in any way damaged the adjacent building. Rodriguez was apprehended
within a few minutes after the dumpster fire was discovered, and he confessed to
starting both fires.
6)  Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on the lesser included offense of reckless burning.  As to count one, the automobile
fire, and count three, the dumpster fire, the issue is moot because the jury rejected the
lesser included offenses of arson third and attempted arson third and convicted
Rodriguez as charged.  Thus, there is no basis on which to complain about the failure
to give instructions on other lesser included offenses.2   
7) On count two, the Precision Tune fire, the jury returned a guilty verdict on
arson third degree, the lesser included offense of the charged, arson second degree.
Rodriguez argues that the jury should have been given the opportunity to select an
even less serious charge, reckless burning.  The court is obligated to give instructions
3 11 Del.C. §206(c).
4 11 Del. C. §802(a).
5 11 Del. C. §801(a).
6 11 Del. C. §804(a).
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on lesser included offenses only if there is a rational basis in the evidence to acquit the
defendant of the more serious crime and convict him of the lesser included offense.3
 The difference between reckless burning and arson third is that reckless burning does
not require actual damage to property.  Here, since the undisputed evidence
established damage from the fire, a rational jury could not acquit Rodriguez of arson
third and find him guilty of reckless burning.  Thus, this claim fails.
8) Finally, Rodriguez argues that the arson and reckless burning statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, as applied, because he could have been convicted of a
felony, arson third, or a misdemeanor, reckless burning, for the same conduct.  This
argument lacks merit.  There are clear distinctions between the levels of arson and
reckless burning.  Arson second requires an intentional fire and intentional damage
to a building;4 arson third requires an intentional fire and reckless damage to a
building;5 and reckless burning requires a reckless fire and reckless risk of damage to
a building or other property.6  Conduct that causes damage to a building is arson and
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reckless conduct that causes no damage, or causes damage to other property is reckless
burning.  Thus, the different statutes do not proscribe the same conduct.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice