Title: People v. Westerfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S112691
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DAVID ALAN WESTERFIELD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S112691 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD 165805 
 
 
February 4, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the court, 
in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and 
Slough concurred. 
 
 
                                        
  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
S112691 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant David Alan Westerfield of the 
2002 first degree murder of seven-year-old Danielle Van Dam.  
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).1)  It found true the special 
circumstance that the murder was committed during a 
kidnapping.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)  The jury also found 
defendant guilty of the kidnapping of Danielle, a child under the 
age of 14 (§§ 207, 208, subd. (b)), and misdemeanor possession 
of child pornography.  (former § 311.11, subd. (a).)  Following the 
penalty phase of trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The 
trial court denied defendant’s motion for modification of the 
penalty to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
(§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced him to death on the murder 
count.  The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 
11 years for his conviction of kidnapping, which it stayed 
pursuant to section 654.  Defendant was sentenced to time 
served for his child pornography conviction.   
 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm 
the judgment in its entirety.   
                                        
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Overview 
 
On the night of Friday, February 1, 2002, Damon Van 
Dam put his two sons and his seven-year-old daughter, Danielle, 
to bed.  His wife, Brenda, went out with her girlfriends to a bar 
where they saw defendant, David Westerfield, who lived two 
doors down from the Van Dams.  When Brenda, her girlfriends, 
and two male friends came home, they noticed an alarm monitor 
was flashing, and the side garage door was open.  They closed 
the door and had something to eat.  Damon got up and joined 
them.  After the friends left, Brenda and Damon went to bed.  
Sometime later during the night, Damon awoke and noticed an 
alarm monitor flashing.  He went downstairs and noticed the 
door to the backyard was open.  He closed it and made sure the 
other doors were closed.  He went back to sleep without checking 
on the children.  The next morning, Danielle was missing.  A 
neighborhood search failed to find her, and defendant was not 
at home. 
 
Defendant 
spent 
the 
weekend 
after 
Danielle’s 
disappearance driving around in his motorhome away from his 
house in the Sabre Springs neighborhood of San Diego to various 
state parks outside the San Diego area.  He had awkward 
encounters with rangers and volunteers who worked at the 
Silver Strand state park near the city of Coronado.   
 
On Monday morning, defendant arrived in his motorhome 
at his neighborhood dry cleaner’s shortly after the business 
opened to have bedding and a jacket cleaned.  Although it was a 
cold morning, he was wearing a thin T-shirt, thin shorts, no 
shoes, and no socks.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
 
An examination of the forensic evidence revealed that the 
jacket that defendant left at the dry cleaner’s contained 
Danielle’s blood.  Danielle’s blood was also found on the carpet 
of defendant’s motorhome between the bathroom and the closet; 
her handprint, including several associated fingerprints, was on 
a cabinet above the motorhome’s bed.  Hairs consistent with 
Danielle’s DNA profile were found in the bathroom of 
defendant’s motorhome and at his residence in his washing 
machine, dryer, and on the bedding from his master bedroom.  
Fibers matching others later found with Danielle’s body were 
discovered in defendant’s motorhome, SUV, laundry, and 
bedding.  Fibers similar to those from the carpeting in Danielle’s 
bedroom were found by the bed, in the bathroom, and in the hall 
of defendant’s motorhome.  Hairs from the Van Dams’ family 
dog were discovered on one of the comforters defendant dropped 
off at the dry cleaner’s, on the hallway carpet and bathroom rug 
in defendant’s motorhome, and in defendant’s laundry.   
 
Danielle’s badly decomposed body was discovered off the 
side of a road in a remote part of San Diego County on February 
27, 2002.  Her mummified remains had been ravaged by 
animals, such that no sexual assault testing could be performed 
and no definite cause of death determined.  The coroner could 
not rule out suffocation.   
 
In defendant’s home, officers discovered computer files 
containing child pornography.   
 
Defendant principally relied on an alibi defense based on 
entomological evidence from Danielle’s body that suggested her 
death occurred sometime subsequent to February 5, after 
defendant was under constant police surveillance.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
2.  The Prosecution’s Trial Evidence 
a.  The events leading to Danielle’s disappearance 
 
A week before Danielle’s disappearance, on January 25, 
2002, her mother Brenda went out to a local bar called “Dad’s” 
with her two girlfriends — Denise Kemal and Barbara Easton.  
They met defendant there, whom Brenda recognized as her 
neighbor from two doors down the street.  Defendant introduced 
himself, and bought the women drinks.  Brenda and defendant 
briefly spoke, but otherwise Brenda spent the time with her 
girlfriends.   
 
The following Tuesday, Brenda accompanied her daughter 
Danielle while she sold Girl Scout cookies in the neighborhood 
along with her five-year-old brother Dylan.  They stopped at 
defendant’s house, and he invited them inside so he could fill out 
an order form to purchase cookies.  While Brenda and defendant 
were in the dining room, Danielle and Dylan went into 
defendant’s backyard to see his pool.  When the children were 
outside, defendant discussed the previous Friday night and his 
interest in Easton and that he wanted to be introduced to her.  
Brenda told defendant that she and Easton might be going to 
Dad’s again the upcoming Friday, depending on whether she 
could find a babysitter because her husband was planning on 
being away that weekend.  After the children came inside, they 
stayed with Brenda in the dining room, and went nowhere else 
in defendant’s house.   
b.  The night of Danielle’s disappearance   
 
Kemal and Easton arrived at the Van Dam house around 
8:00 p.m. on Friday, February 1, 2002.  Brenda and her two 
girlfriends went into the garage and smoked marijuana.  
Someone opened the garage side door to let the smoke out.  
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Brenda was uncertain whether anyone closed it.  Kemal recalled 
closing the side door, but not locking it.  The Van Dams had 
reversed the lock on the interior garage door leading into the 
house so that they could, if they chose, prevent their children 
from entering the garage. A person inside the garage could 
unlock the door without a key and enter the house.    
 
After Brenda and her two girlfriends left for Dad’s, Damon 
stayed home with the children, Danielle, Dylan, and Derek.  
Around 10:00 p.m., Damon put the children to bed for the night, 
each in his or her own room, and left each door ajar.  Damon 
watched television downstairs for 20 to 30 minutes.  He then 
went up to the master bedroom, taking Layla, the family puppy, 
with him.  He closed the door to keep the puppy in the room and 
continued watching television until he fell asleep.  He briefly 
woke up at around 1:45 a.m. to allow the puppy to relief herself 
in the backyard, after which he closed the door and went back 
upstairs.   
 
Brenda, Kemal, and Easton were at Dad’s during this 
time.  When they arrived at the bar, defendant was already 
there with two of his friends.  Brenda pointed defendant out to 
Easton, who went over to him and introduced herself.  
Defendant came over and bought them drinks, but they did not 
include him in their conversation.  Sometime after 9:00 p.m., the 
Van Dams’ friends, Rich Brady and Keith Stone, arrived.  Brady 
and Stone joined Brenda and her friends.  At one point, 
defendant’s friends joined Brenda’s group playing pool.  
Defendant was not part of the group but watched for at least 
part of the time.  Later that night, around 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., 
the group went to Brenda’s car where they smoked marijuana.  
When they went back inside the bar, the group started dancing.  
Defendant was still inside.  The group left Dad’s shortly before 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
closing at 2:00 a.m.  Brenda was unsure whether defendant was 
at the bar when they left, although one of defendant’s friends, 
Garry Harvey, said that defendant was gone when Harvey 
returned to the bar around 12:30 a.m.  Brenda, her girlfriends, 
Brady, and Stone went to the Van Dams’ home.   
 
When Brenda entered her home, she noticed a red 
blinking light on the alarm monitor, indicating that there was a 
window or door open.  Brenda and Kemal started looking for the 
open window or door.  Upstairs, Brenda also went to tell Damon 
that Brady and Stone were visiting.  Brenda and Kemal found 
that the garage side door was open.  Brenda closed it and went 
back upstairs, where she found Easton with Damon.2  Brenda 
told them to come downstairs.  Brenda did not check on the 
children, but closed their doors due to the potential noise.  
Downstairs, everyone ate leftover pizza.  About 20 minutes 
later, the guests left.  Damon and Brenda locked up the house 
and went to bed.  Damon placed Layla in Derek’s room.  It was 
around 2:30 a.m.   
 
Sometime after 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. Damon woke again.  
When he got up, he noticed a red light flashing on the alarm 
monitor in their bedroom.  He went downstairs and noticed a 
cold draft of air in the hallway.  He found the sliding glass door 
to the backyard was open.  He closed the door, made sure all of 
the other doors were closed, including the side garage door, and 
                                        
2  
Brenda found Easton and Damon “snuggling” and kissing.  
In an effort to attack their credibility, the defense presented 
testimony that neither Damon nor Brenda had initially told 
officers that Damon had previously had sex with Easton in the 
presence of Brenda and that he had also had sex with Kemal in 
the presence of Brenda and Kemal’s then husband.  Brenda later 
acknowledged she had had a sexual encounter with Kemal.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
checked the alarm panel.  Damon went back to bed without 
checking on the children.   
 
The next morning, Brenda woke and went downstairs to 
make breakfast and await the arrival of two neighborhood 
children whom she was to watch that day.  Damon and the two 
boys were already downstairs.  The neighborhood children 
arrived around 9:30 a.m.  Because Danielle had not yet come 
downstairs, Brenda went to wake her.  Danielle was nowhere to 
be found.  Brenda called 911 and their neighbors, reporting that 
Danielle was missing.  The police arrived and conducted a 
forensic investigation of their house that day and overnight.   
c.  The investigation of Danielle’s disappearance 
 
By Sunday, February 3, the San Diego Police Department 
had set up a “command post” on the Van Dams’ street.  Detective 
Johnny Keene arrived to contact neighbors and to obtain 
statements concerning any information about Danielle’s 
disappearance.  He knocked on defendant’s door and received no 
answer.  The following morning, Keene returned to defendant’s 
home upon learning that defendant had returned and other 
officers had spoken with him in his driveway.   
 
Keene asked defendant about his activities that weekend.  
Defendant said that he awoke around 6:30 a.m. on Saturday and 
decided he wanted to go to the desert.  He drove his Toyota 
4Runner SUV to his storage location in “High Valley” where he 
left it to retrieve his motorhome.  He drove the motorhome back 
to his house, where he stocked it with groceries and filled the 
water tank.  Defendant said he left home around 9:50 a.m.  
When he realized that he did not have his wallet and did not 
have enough money to go to the desert, he instead drove to a 
state park called Silver Strand near the city of Coronado.  When 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
he arrived, he filled out a registration envelope, placed money 
for a three-night stay inside, and parked his motorhome.  A park 
ranger came by and told him he had overpaid by $30, apparently 
placing a $50 bill in the envelope.  Once the ranger left, 
defendant said that he did not stay much longer because it was 
too cold.  He decided, instead, to return home to find his wallet.   
 
Defendant thought he arrived home around 3:30 p.m.  He 
saw news vans and police activity on the street.  One of his 
neighbors told him about the missing girl and defendant decided 
to check his house and pool.  After he did so, he drove back to 
where he had left his 4Runner because he thought, as it turned 
out correctly, that he might have left his wallet in it.   
 
Once he had his wallet, defendant put gas in his 
motorhome and drove the “back way” to Glamis, a sand dune 
area about 160 miles away.  He estimated that he arrived 
around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m.  Defendant did not bring with him 
any of his “sand toys,” meaning the vehicles he usually drove on 
the sand dunes.  He pulled into a spot for the night, but got stuck 
in the sand.  He spent the night there and began digging himself 
out the next morning.  Eventually someone came by and towed 
him out of the sand.   
 
Defendant said that once he was out of the sand, he left 
Glamis and drove to a place called Superstition Mountain to see 
if it was a place he would want to take his son camping.  He 
continued on to Borrego Springs, where he once again got the 
motorhome stuck in the sand.  Defendant estimated that he left 
Borrego Springs about 6:00 p.m. after digging himself out.  He 
drove back to Silver Strand, but arrived too late to gain 
admittance to the park.  Defendant said that he parked the 
motorhome for the night across the street in a parking lot at 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
Coronado Cays.  He woke up early, around 4:00 a.m., and drove 
back to High Valley.  But thinking it was still too early to park 
his motorhome and retrieve his 4Runner, he drove straight 
home.  The police arrived a short time later.   
 
Keene asked defendant about his night at Dad’s on Friday, 
February 1.  Defendant mentioned seeing Brenda there and that 
her husband told her he felt their daughter was growing up too 
quickly.  Defendant paused and then said, “I could have sworn 
she said she had a babysitter.  I didn’t know her husband was 
home with the kids.”  Keene had not asked a question to prompt 
such a response.   
 
Defendant told Keene that he left Dad’s around 11:00 or 
11:30 p.m. that night, drove home, and went to bed.  When asked 
about other previous interactions with Brenda, defendant told 
Keene about meeting Brenda at Dad’s the week before and 
buying Girl Scout cookies from Danielle the previous week.  
Defendant said that while he was filling out the cookie order 
form and speaking with the Brenda, the kids were “running all 
over the house.”   
 
Keene asked defendant if it was okay to look inside his 
house, 4Runner, and motorhome.  Defendant said it was, and 
signed consent forms for all of them.  Once inside defendant’s 
home, Keene immediately noticed how immaculately clean it 
was.  Keene noted that the master bed did not have a comforter 
on it, but was otherwise made with sheets.  During their search, 
Keene believed defendant was overly cooperative, pointing out 
places that the detectives had missed.  Keene and Parga looked 
at defendant’s 4Runner, which was parked in the garage.  It 
seemed very clean inside and out.  Parga detected the smell of 
bleach in the garage.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
 
Defendant led the detectives to High Valley where he 
stored his motorhome.  Defendant unlocked all of the storage 
compartments on the outside of the motorhome and even 
pointed out that they had failed to check one smaller 
compartment.  When they went inside, Keene observed that the 
motorhome bed, like the master bed, had no comforter.  After 
they inspected the motorhome, defendant pointed out the trailer 
that contained his dune buggy, quad runners, and various 
equipment, offering it for inspection as well.  When the 
detectives were finished, they all returned to defendant’s house.   
 
Defendant consented to be interviewed at the police 
station.  During the subsequent interview with San Diego Police 
Officer Paul Redden, defendant again described his weekend 
activities.  As he recounted one stop he made, defendant told 
Redden that it was “this little place that we, where we were was 
just a little small turn type place.”  (Italics added.)   
 
Keith Sherman owned the property where defendant 
stored his motorhome and sand vehicles.  He testified that on 
Saturday morning, February 2, 2002, defendant came to collect 
it.  Sherman intended to go out and offer to move his own 
motorhome out of the way so defendant could move the trailer 
he used to carry his sand vehicles, but defendant was already 
pulling away.  Unusually, defendant was not with his son, but 
was alone.  It was also unusual that defendant left his 4Runner 
on the property and did not take his trailer.  Defendant brought 
his motorhome back around 7:30 a.m. on Monday.   
 
At the Silver Strand beach, on Saturday, February 2, 
2002, several other campers noticed defendant’s motorhome.  
When defendant’s motorhome pulled into its camping spot, 
someone immediately closed the front curtains across the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
windshield.  All of the other curtains were also closed.  No one 
came out to set up anything for camping.  Contrary to 
defendant’s description, the weather was cool, but nice.   
 
State Park Ranger Olen Golden noticed that defendant 
had placed $54 in his registration envelope when only $24 was 
due.  State Park Ranger Brian Neill went to defendant’s 
motorhome to return the overpayment.  Neill also noticed that 
the curtains were drawn so that he could not see inside, and 
nothing was set up outside the motorhome.  Neill knocked on 
the door, but no one immediately responded.  He had started 
back to his vehicle when defendant emerged.  Defendant 
immediately shut the door behind himself.  Neill informed 
defendant that he had overpaid.  Defendant insisted that he had 
not, but Neill returned the extra money to him.  Defendant 
remained outside while Neill walked back to his vehicle.  
Minutes after Neill left, defendant drove off in his motorhome.  
He approached a volunteer who worked at the Silver Strand and 
continued to insist he had not overpaid.  Contrary to the 
narrative defendant told Detective Keene in which he claimed 
he had misplaced his wallet, the volunteer saw defendant pull 
out his wallet and show the volunteer that he had only $20 bills.   
 
In Glamis, where defendant drove next, other visitors 
noticed that defendant’s motorhome had been driven unusually 
far off the road, close to the sand dunes, where it became stuck 
in the sand.  On Sunday morning, defendant tried to convince 
other campers to tow him out, but they were unwilling or unable 
to help him.  Don Conklin, a Glamis resident who provided tow 
services, arrived to help defendant.  Conklin successfully pulled 
defendant’s motorhome out of the sand.  But when Conklin went 
to retrieve defendant’s ramps and the shovel that they had used 
in the towing process, he could not return them to defendant 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
because defendant had driven away immediately after being 
towed.   
 
Julie Mills knew defendant as a longtime customer of 
Twin Peaks Cleaners in Poway, where she worked.  According 
to Mills, defendant arrived at the dry cleaner’s on Monday, 
February 4, 2002, between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m.  Although it was 
cold, defendant was wearing very thin shorts, a very thin T-
shirt, with no shoes and no socks.  Defendant brought to be 
cleaned a sport jacket, a couple of comforters, and some other 
bedding.  Several things struck Mills as unusual.  Mills had 
never before seen defendant dressed in this manner.  Defendant 
was not his usual talkative self and would not look her in the 
eye.  Defendant also arrived in his motorhome, which she had 
never seen him do before.  Defendant had not mentioned a trip 
to the dry cleaner’s in his recounting of his weekend to Detective 
Keene.   
 
Defendant made a second trip to the dry cleaner’s that 
same day around 1:40 p.m.  He arrived in his 4Runner.  He 
dropped off a sweater, pants, and a T-shirt, requesting same day 
service.  He again acted differently from normal, not smiling or 
chatting.   
 
Jim Frazee, a volunteer canine handler from the San 
Diego Sheriff’s Department, and his trained search and cadaver 
dog Cielo, searched defendant’s motorhome.  Cielo “alerted” to 
the first storage compartment behind the passenger’s door; an 
area where air from inside the motorhome would naturally 
escape.  When the storage door was opened, Cielo showed 
“interest” in a shovel and lawn chair that were inside.  According 
to Frazee, Cielo’s alert indicated that a body had been 
somewhere in the motorhome.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
d.  The discovery of Danielle’s body and other 
forensic evidence 
 
Karsten Heimburger was part of a volunteer search party 
looking for Danielle.  On February 27, 2002, he discovered the 
nude, decomposed body of a young girl, lying on her back in the 
dirt off the side of Dehesa Road, a desert-type area of open space.  
The body was identified as Danielle based on her dental records.   
 
San 
Diego County Medical 
Examiner Dr. Brian 
Blackbourne arrived at the Dehesa Road location the night of 
February 27, 2002.  He observed the Danielle’s body was in a 
state of marked decomposition.  Her body had been extensively 
fed upon by animals so that much of her body tissue was 
missing.  Her left foot was missing, as was her genital area.  Her 
skin was mummified.  Danielle was wearing no clothes and none 
were in the immediate area.  At the autopsy the following day, 
Blackbourne attempted to determine a cause of death.  He ruled 
out stabbing, gun shot, blunt force trauma, strangulation, and 
disease, but could not rule out suffocation.  He concluded the 
death was a homicide.  Blackbourne could not determine 
whether Danielle had been sexually assaulted because her 
genital organs were gone.  He stated that Danielle had been 
deceased for a considerable period of time.  He believed she had 
died at least 10 days prior to being found and as much as six 
weeks earlier.   
 
Jeffrey Graham, Jr., a latent fingerprint examiner for the 
San Diego Police Department, was able to obtain Danielle’s 
fingerprints.  He compared them to a set of prints lifted from 
defendant’s motorhome.  One handprint, lifted from a cabinet 10 
inches above the motorhome bed, contained four associated 
fingerprints, two of which contained sufficient ridge detail to 
match two of Danielle’s fingers on her left hand.  It was apparent 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
from the way the print had been left that Danielle was moving 
when it was made, that is, her hand did not simply make the 
print and then lift back up.   
 
San Diego Police Department criminalist Sean Soriano 
examined stains on the jacket defendant had left at the dry 
cleaner’s.  Three stains on the jacket presumptively tested 
positive for the presence of blood.  San Diego Police Department 
forensic biologist Annette Peer located a stain on the carpeted 
floor between the bathroom and closet of defendant’s motorhome 
that also presumptively tested positive for blood.  Peer tested a 
cutting of the bloodstain found on the shoulder of defendant’s 
jacket for 13 genetic markers, and the 13-marker DNA profile of 
the bloodstain on the shoulder area of defendant’s jacket 
matched Danielle’s 13-marker DNA profile.  Peer testified that 
the expected frequency of that identical 13-marker DNA profile 
in the Caucasian population is approximately one in 670 
quadrillion.  
 
Forensic scientist Mitchell Holland, of the Bode 
Technology Group, tested cuttings of the bloodstain located on 
the carpet for defendant’s motorhome for 13 genetic markers, 
and the 13-marker DNA profile of that bloodstain matched 
Danielle’s 13-marker DNA profile.  Holland testified that the 
expected frequency of that identical 13-marker DNA profile in 
the Caucasian population is approximately one in 660 
quadrillion of unrelated persons.3   
                                        
3  
 Before Holland’s testing, Annette Peer of the San Diego 
Police Department had tested a different cutting of the 
bloodstain located on the carpet of defendant’s motorhome.  Her 
testing did not return a complete 13-marker genetic profile, 
 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
 
Holland also conducted nuclear DNA testing on a hair root 
extracted from a hair recovered from the sink drain in 
defendant’s motorhome bathroom and obtained a partial profile 
that matched Danielle’s DNA profile.  The DNA test for that hair 
root returned results for 12 out of the 13 tested genetic markers.  
Although the missing genetic marker resulted in a lower rarity 
statistic than that of a full 13-marker DNA profile, Holland 
testified that the expected frequency of that 12-marker DNA 
profile in the Caucasian population, nonetheless, is one in 25 
quadrillion of unrelated persons.   
 
Catherine Theisen, employed at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation laboratory in Washington, D.C., conducted 
mitochondrial DNA4 analysis on several hairs discovered in 
defendant’s motorhome.  She could not exclude Danielle as the 
source of a hair recovered from the bathroom rug of the 
motorhome.  Holland conducted mitochondrial DNA testing on 
two hairs collected from defendant’s washing machine and 
dryer, six hairs collected from the defendant’s master bedroom 
bedding, and one hair recovered from defendant’s motorhome 
hallway carpet.  All of the hairs contained the same 
mitochondrial DNA profile as Danielle.   
                                        
resulting in a lower rarity statistic of one in 130 quadrillion 
persons within the Caucasian population.   
4  
Theisen explained that nuclear DNA is inherited from 
both the mother and father.  It confers a unique identity.  
Mitochondrial DNA in inherited only from the mother.  It is, 
therefore, shared with siblings, the mother, the mother’s 
siblings, and anyone else related in the maternal line.  
Nevertheless, mitochondrial DNA is extremely useful in 
analyzing items of evidence that contain little nuclear DNA, 
such as hair that does not have the hair root attached.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
 
San Diego Police Department criminalist Tanya Dulaney 
collected fiber trace evidence in this case.  Dulaney discovered 
in defendant’s motorhome blue fibers on the kitchen bench seat, 
on the upholstered headboard, on the couch, and on the front 
passenger seat.  Chemical analysis revealed that all of these 
blue fibers were consistent with fibers discovered with Danielle 
or in the sheet used by the medical examiner to wrap Danielle’s 
body for the purpose of collecting potential trace evidence that 
might fall off the body when it was removed from the Dehesa 
Road location.   
 
Dulaney also collected at defendant’s residence many 
orange and blue fibers from clothing found on top of, and inside, 
defendant’s washing machine and dryer.  She found similar 
orange fibers on the pillow cases from his master bedroom.  
Jennifer Shen, another San Diego Police Department 
criminalist, found more orange fibers inside defendant’s 
4Runner and on a towel discovered inside a laundry bag in his 
4Runner.  Entangled in the necklace on Danielle’s body was an 
orange fiber similar to the orange fibers found on defendant’s 
laundry, bedding, and in his vehicle.   
 
Dulaney also collected tan fibers from the area by the bed, 
in the bathroom, and in the hall of defendant’s motorhome, 
which, when examined, were consistent with fibers from the 
carpeting in Danielle’s bedroom.   
 
James Watkins, Jr., a law enforcement computer forensic 
examiner, copied and examined images found on the computer 
hard drives and other computer-related material located in 
defendant’s bedroom and home office.  He discovered 85 images 
and 39 movies that he deemed “questionable,” meaning they 
depicted children under the age of 18 in sexual acts that might 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
constitute child pornography.  He also discovered two “anime” 
files that contained two storyboard-type drawings of young girls 
being abducted, bound, and raped.   
3.  Defense Evidence 
 
The defense called several witnesses to testify regarding 
defendant’s habits and customs regarding his motorhome, 
including that he would leave it unlocked when it was parked by 
his house, that he had on other occasions made similar trips by 
going first to Silver Strand and then to the desert, that he did 
not always take the trailer with his “sand toys” with him, that 
he sometimes went alone, and that getting stuck in a desert 
wash was not uncommon. 
 
The defense called several witnesses who were at Dad’s 
bar on the night of February 1, 2002.  They testified to seeing 
Brenda and her girlfriends drinking, dancing in sexually 
suggestive manners, and flirting.  Brenda was seen rubbing up 
against defendant as she danced with him.   
 
Defendant challenged the prosecution’s physical evidence 
by emphasizing that fingerprint identification cannot establish 
when or under what circumstances a print was made, 
biochemical analysis cannot determine how or when a biological 
fluid was deposited, and trace evidence of fibers and hairs are 
highly mobile, easily transferred, and can be consistent with an 
indirect or derivative contact.  The defense pointed out that the 
fibers found were not unique.   
 
The defense questioned the “alert” by Cielo, the search and 
cadaver dog handled by Jim Frazee, to the side compartment of 
his motorhome.  The defense also queried why Frazee had not 
reported the alert when it was supposedly made, but waited 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
until after defendant’s arrest, when Frazee sent an email 
describing it to two friends and Cielo’s breeder.   
 
Defendant relied heavily on an alibi defense based on 
entomological evidence suggesting that Danielle’s body could 
not have been placed at the Dehesa Road site until a date after 
defendant was either in actual contact with police or under 
constant police surveillance.  Specifically, defendant was almost 
constantly in police presence beginning around 9:00 a.m. on 
Monday, February 4, 2002, until his arrest on February 22, 
2002.  He did not go near the Dehesa Road site during this time.  
David Faulkner, a forensic entomologist called by the defense, 
attended Danielle’s autopsy where he collected insects from her 
remains and later went to the Dehesa Road site to assess insect 
activity.  He testified that such insect information can be used 
to approximate time of death or the post-mortem interval.  In 
Faulkner’s expert opinion, based upon the age of the insect 
material he collected, as well as the known temperature and 
weather conditions at the time, the insect activity on Danielle’s 
body would have occurred 10 to 12 days prior to the recovery of 
her remains on February 27, 2002.  That is, the body was first 
available for exposure to insect activity between February 16 
and 18, 2002.  The defense also called forensic entomologist Neal 
Haskell, who opined based upon the age of the insect material 
he received from Faulkner, Faulkner’s trial testimony, as well 
as data regarding weather conditions at the time, that Danielle’s 
body would have been first available for exposure to insect 
activity between February 14 and 21, 2002.   
 
Marcus Lawson, a computer forensics expert testified that 
he found pornographic images on the computers belonging to 
defendant’s son, Neal Westerfield.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
4.  Prosecution’s Rebuttal 
 
To rebut the defense entomological evidence, the 
prosecution called forensic anthropologist William Rodriguez.  
Rodriguez specialized in assessing human skeletons in difficult 
cases, such as where the body is decomposed, in an effort to 
identify the deceased as well as to determine the manner and 
cause of death.  Rodriguez noted that Danielle’s body was 
mummified to a high degree, which can happen very quickly 
with the body of a small child.  Rodriguez explained that 
mummification slows the decomposition process.  He related 
that insects will either not be able to penetrate a mummified 
body or, if inside, would die for lack of nutrients.  But if animals 
feed on a mummified body, the body can be opened for insect 
activity.  Rodriguez testified that it is difficult to estimate 
accurately how long an individual has been dead because many 
variables are involved in the decomposition process, including 
weather, sunlight, and insects.  He believed it is important to 
use various methodologies, and not just entomology, which on 
its own can suggest only a minimum post mortem interval.  
Based on his review of all of the data, reports, and testimony, 
Rodriguez opined that Danielle had been deceased four to six 
weeks when she was found, i.e., she died sometime earlier than 
February 6, 2002.   
 
The prosecution also called forensic entomologist Madison 
Lee Goff.  He testified that determining how long a body has 
been deceased is not possible by employing forensic entomology.  
That process, he explained, can be used only to determine a 
minimum time the body would have been available for insect 
activity.  Goff also noted that the presence and extent of insect 
predators and scavengers of the body could alter the rate of 
decomposition of the body and affect the entomological analysis.  
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
Based on his review of all of the data, reports, and testimony, 
Goff opined that the earliest date Danielle’s body would have 
been available for exposure to insect activity was February 12, 
2002.  There was no way to determine the latest date.  By 
employing the tools of forensic entomologist, he was unable to 
say that Danielle had been alive from February 1 through 
February 12, 2002.   
5.  Defense Surrebuttal 
 
Forensic entomologist Robert Hall reviewed the same 
information as the other experts and opined that the insect 
activity on Danielle’s body began no earlier than February 12, 
2002, and no later than February 23, 2002.  He testified that 
insect activity would begin almost immediately upon the body 
being dumped in the location where it was found.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution’s Case in Aggravation 
 
In addition to relying on the evidence admitted during the 
guilt phase, the prosecution introduced evidence at the penalty 
phase relating to an act of uncharged lewd conduct by 
defendant, as well as victim impact testimony.  
a.  Uncharged Lewd Conduct   
 
J.N. is defendant’s niece.  J.N. testified that when she was 
between five and seven years old, she was sleeping in an 
upstairs bedroom, with her sister and cousin, while her parents 
were having a party downstairs.  At some point, J.N. woke up.  
She realized defendant was there and that he had his fingers in 
her mouth.  J.N. described defendant as rubbing or massaging 
her teeth.  J.N. pretended to be asleep and rolled over.  J.N. saw 
defendant walk over to her sister, but she could not tell what he 
was doing.  Defendant came back and again put his fingers in 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
J.N.’s mouth.  J.N. bit down on defendant’s hand.  Defendant 
moved over to where J.N.’s cousin was sleeping.  J.N. watched 
to see what defendant was doing.  She saw him adjust the sides 
of his shorts before leaving the room.   
A short time later, J.N. went downstairs and told her 
mother that “Uncle Dave [defendant] was in the room and he 
was being weird and it bothered me [J.N.].”  J.N. did not tell her 
mother anything more because she was scared.  Her mother 
confronted defendant, but after a short talk, thought nothing 
more of the situation.   
Officer Paul Redden testified about an interview he had 
with defendant.  Redden testified that defendant was concerned 
regarding an incident that had occurred in 1994.  Defendant told 
Redden about the incident J.N. described.  Defendant claimed 
that on the night of the incident, he had heard a commotion 
upstairs where J.N., her sister, and cousin were sleeping.  Upon 
entering the room, defendant found one girl with her foot in the 
other girl’s pajamas.  Defendant separated the girls and went 
downstairs.  Defendant stated that approximately a week later, 
J.N.’s mom accused defendant of molesting J.N..  A recording of 
the interview was played for the jury.   
b. Victim Impact Evidence 
 
The 
prosecution 
called 
Danielle 
Van 
Dam’s 
kindergarten/first grade teacher, Amy De Stefani, and second 
grade teacher, Ruby Puntenney, as victim impact witnesses.  
Both spoke of Danielle’s intellect, curiosity, and compassion, 
with Stefani saying Danielle was “just a very caring little girl.  
She wanted to make sure that nobody else had their feelings 
hurt. . . .  She got along with everyone.”   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
 
Thereafter, Danielle’s father took the stand.  Damon was 
involved in his daughter’s education, both participating at her 
school and tutoring Danielle at home.  He said Danielle enjoyed 
helping him around the house with chores.  Damon also testified 
about an upcoming father-daughter dance he had planned to 
attend with Danielle.  Damon spoke about his emotions when he 
discovered Danielle was missing.  He described how he became 
less and less hopeful that she would be found and how he would 
have emotional outbursts in front of his friends when 
contemplating the possibility that Danielle might never be 
found.  He explained how he felt when her body was found.   
 
Damon described how Danielle’s brothers handled their 
sister’s death.  Dylan (her younger brother) became more 
childish, needing to sleep with his parents or brother.  Her older 
brother, Derrick, became “introverted and clammed up a lot.”  
Damon testified that Derrick now suffers from emotional 
outbursts, and the whole family sought therapy after Danielle’s 
disappearance.   
 
Finally, Danielle’s mother, Brenda, testified that she 
volunteered for school projects, planned parties, and attended 
Danielle’s class to spend time with her daughter.  Brenda 
testified that Danielle loved writing and math, was involved in 
the Daisies (a precursor to the Girl Scouts), and was a dancer, 
as well as a piano player.  Brenda confirmed Damon’s testimony 
that her sons had become emotionally distraught over Danielle’s 
death.  She explained how difficult it was for her to walk past 
defendant’s house and past her daughter’s room every day.   
2.  Mitigating Evidence  
 
The defense introduced evidence describing defendant’s 
involvement as a design engineer with the creation and 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
development of various new technologies, including important 
medical rehabilitation devices.  In addition, the defense 
introduced testimony of friends and family members who could 
speak to defendant’s character.   
a.  Defendant’s Engineering Contributions  
 
Ron Lawrence, David Petch, and William Townsend were 
defendant’s co-workers at various companies.  Each testified 
that defendant played an important role in the creation, design, 
and development of medical devices at their companies.   
 
Carmen Genovese was a former supervisor of defendant.  
According to Genovese, defendant played a crucial role in 
leading design teams that significantly contributed to the 
development of medical devices for joint rehabilitation and 
optical lenses.  He testified that these devices were exceptionally 
important and improved the life of a great many people.  
Genovese also described a significant security device designed 
by defendant.   
 
Judy Ray was the owner of a company that employed 
defendant.  She spoke of defendant’s important contributions to 
her company, including the design of a shoulder rehabilitation 
device that helped more than 600,000 people.   
b.  Defendant’s Friends and Family   
 
Susan L. was defendant’s former girlfriend.  Susan and 
her daughter, Christina G., along with Christina’s one-year-old 
son, lived with defendant for a year.  Susan testified that 
defendant helped rescue Christina from an abusive relationship 
and allowed her and her infant son to live with them.  Defendant 
also planned and threw Christina’s son a birthday party because 
Christina could not afford to do so.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
 
Margaret 
Hennon 
was 
defendant’s 
high 
school 
sweetheart.  Defendant’s family and Hennon’s family were very 
close.  Hennon testified that she loved defendant and he was 
important to her, although she admitted that she had not seen 
or spoken to defendant in person since 1973 or 1974.   
 
Several of defendant’s friends and neighbors testified to 
his importance to their families.  They testified that defendant 
was always helpful.  He would go above and beyond to assist 
whenever needed.  Defendant was considerate and protective of 
his own and other children.  Defendant was a positive influence 
in their children’s lives.   
 
The defense also called a number of defendant’s family 
members to testify.  Defendant’s younger sister, Tania P., spoke 
about defendant’s upbringing and noted that defendant worked 
to put himself through college.  Tania testified that traditional 
family values were very important to defendant.  She said 
defendant was protective of her.  Several of defendant’s aunts 
testified concerning their association with defendant over the 
years.  Defendant’s children, Neal and Lisa, both described how 
much they loved and missed their father.  They described 
themselves as a close family.  Neal testified that his father 
taught him to do the right thing and accept responsibility for his 
actions.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Claims 
1.  Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Obtained Pursuant to Five Search Warrants   
 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence 
law enforcement obtained pursuant to five search warrants, 
claiming the warrants were illegally obtained in violation of his 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Among other things, defendant 
argued that his purported failure of a polygraph examination 
was improperly considered by the magistrate as part of the 
prosecution’s showing of probable cause.  The trial court denied 
the motion, finding the warrants were supported by probable 
cause.  With respect to the foundational first warrant, the court 
ruled that the magistrate had properly considered the polygraph 
evidence offered in support of the warrant, but also found that 
even if the evidence to which defendant objected was excised, 
there was still sufficient probable cause for the warrant’s 
issuance.  Moreover, the court further concluded that even if 
probable cause was lacking for the first warrant, the search 
following its issuance was justified based on defendant’s 
consent.   
The trial court, however, granted defendant’s motion to 
suppress, under the Fifth Amendment, statements he made to 
detectives just before he signed a consent-to-search form and 
before the execution of the first warrant.  The court found that 
defendant had made those statements in circumstances under 
which no reasonable person would have felt free to leave and 
without being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).   
 
Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement 
obtained pursuant to the five search warrants.  He argues that 
the first warrant was erroneously based on consideration of his 
failure to pass a polygraph examination.  He argues both 
statutory and constitutional error, and contends that without 
the polygraph results, there was insufficient evidence of 
probable cause.  Defendant asserts that the first search was not 
otherwise justified by the good faith reliance of the police on the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
magistrate’s issuance of the warrant.  And, finally, he contends 
that his consent to the search in question was not freely given 
and that concluding otherwise is incompatible with the court’s 
determination that his statements to detectives should be 
suppressed under Miranda.  Because the results of the first 
search were relied upon to obtain the subsequent four warrants, 
defendant contends the evidence from all five warrants should 
have been suppressed. 
 
As explained below, we conclude the trial court properly 
denied defendant’s motion to suppress.  Probable cause 
supported issuance of the first search warrant even without 
consideration of the polygraph results.  Therefore, we need not 
reach defendant’s claims regarding the propriety of the 
magistrate’s consideration of polygraph results as part of the 
probable cause showing for issuance of a search warrant.  
Moreover, because the first search was valid, the subsequent 
warrants and searches were as well.  Finally, given these 
conclusions, we need not reach whether the first search was 
justified by the good faith reliance of the police on the 
magistrate’s issuance of the warrant or whether the trial court’s 
finding of voluntary consent provided an alternative basis for 
the first search.   
a.  The affidavits supporting the warrants 
1.  The first warrant 
 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on Tuesday, February 5, 2002, 
Detective Alldredge telephonically obtained a warrant from 
Judge Cynthia Bashant to collect biological samples from 
defendant and to search his house and three vehicles — his 
SUV, motorhome, and trailer.  In a conference call, Alldredge 
testified under oath before Judge Bashant in response to 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
questioning by a deputy district attorney.  At the end of 
Alldredge’s testimony, Judge Bashant decided to issue the 
warrant.  A transcript of Alldredge’s testimony was later 
attached to the warrant.  
 
As set out in that transcript, Allredge testified that 
Danielle Van Dam was “now considered to be abducted” and 
provided the details of her disappearance on February 2, 2002.  
He explained that the police responded and completed a door-to-
door check of the neighborhood looking for Danielle.  During the 
initial survey, most of the other immediate neighbors were at 
home and contacted, but defendant, who lived two houses away 
from the Van Dams, was not home.  Alldredge further noted that 
the police conducted a second canvas of the neighborhood on 
February 3, 2002, and defendant was still not home.   
 
Alldredge testified that he learned from Danielle’s mother, 
Brenda Van Dam that she had previously met defendant twice 
at a local bar, including on the night before Danielle’s 
disappearance.  Brenda also told Alldredge that she and 
Danielle had been inside defendant’s house a few days before 
Danielle’s disappearance to sell girl scout cookies.    
 
Allredge explained that the police first made contact with 
defendant when he came home the morning of February 4, 2002.  
Defendant gave them written consent to search his house and 
motorhome, including a dog scent search.  The dog twice 
displayed an interest toward the garage door, although it was 
not enough to be considered an “alert.”  In response, defendant 
explained that Danielle and her brother had recently been in his 
home while selling girl scout cookies and that they had run 
around inside the house, including upstairs, downstairs, in the 
garage, and outside to visit the pool.  The officers again 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
contacted Brenda, and she confirmed that the children had 
neither entered the garage nor had gone upstairs.   
 
Alldredge testified that officers then searched defendant’s 
motorhome, which was parked about 30 miles away in Poway, 
California.  According to the detectives, defendant displayed an 
unusual amount of cooperativeness during the search by 
opening drawers, lifting cushions, and pointing out areas missed 
by the detectives.   
 
Alldredge further testified that on February 4, he 
participated in a phone conversation with Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) agents known for profiling abductors.  
According to the FBI profilers, a person involved in an abduction 
often may offer to help officers or display excessive cooperation.  
Further, according to a 10-year study, most abductions of 
children ages five and above are for sexual purposes.  The 
abductors are mostly males who either live close to the victim’s 
residence or are an acquaintance of the victim’s family.  The 
profilers believed it was highly unlikely that a complete 
stranger abducted Danielle because of the high risk of entering 
an unknown residence to take a victim.  The profilers also 
thought the perpetrator was someone familiar with the inside of 
the Van Dam home.  According to Alldredge, defendant’s house 
was similar to the Van Dam’s home.   
 
Alldredge testified that in an interview with Detective 
Keene, defendant described encountering Brenda at the local 
bar on the night before Danielle’s disappearance.  Contrary to 
Brenda’s description of that same encounter, defendant told 
Detective Keene that Brenda had discussed her daughter 
Danielle.  Defendant said that Brenda had mentioned an 
upcoming father-daughter dance at school, that she had bought 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
a new blouse for Danielle, and that Danielle’s father was 
concerned about how fast his little girl was growing up.  
According to Keene, “out of the clear blue sky” defendant stated 
that Brenda had told him a babysitter, and not her husband, 
was watching her children that night.  Keene knew that 
Danielle’s father Damon had been watching the children, 
although this was not common knowledge.  Often the Van Dams 
would have a babysitter watch the children on Friday nights.   
 
Alldredge testified that a detective recontacted Brenda 
and confirmed that she had not told anyone about the upcoming 
father-daughter dance.  According to Brenda, the only persons 
who were aware of the dance were immediate family members 
and one neighbor, not defendant.   
 
Alldredge testified that defendant also described to 
detectives the trip he took on the weekend of Danielle’s 
disappearance, including how he, on the morning of February 2, 
2002, had driven to Poway to pick up his motorhome from 
storage.  Alldredge noted that a neighbor had told detectives 
that defendant’s motorhome was parked in the neighborhood 
the night prior to February 2.  In one part of his police interview, 
Alldredge recounted, defendant said to a detective that “we 
drove back to Silver Strand.”  Defendant’s reference to “we” 
suggested someone else was in the motorhome with him.  
However, when questioned as to why he said “we,” defendant 
responded that it was “just a slip.”   
Alldredge also explained that detectives spoke with a park 
ranger at the Silver Strand camping spot.  The ranger described 
how defendant had behaved suspiciously when the ranger tried 
to return defendant’s overpaid camping fee by preventing the 
ranger from seeing inside the motorhome.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
 
Alldredge finally testified about defendant having 
completed, and failed, a polygraph examination.  During the 
examination, defendant was asked whether he was involved in 
or responsible for the disappearance of Danielle and whether he 
knew her location.  Although defendant answered “no” to each 
question, the polygraph examiner found defendant had been 
deceptive in each response.   
 
Based on this testimony provided by Alldredge over the 
telephone, Judge Bashant found the existence of sufficient 
probable cause and authorized a search warrant as requested.  
The warrant was issued at 2:28 a.m. on February 5, 2002.   
2.  The second warrant 
 
Detective Alldredge prepared a second affidavit in support 
of a search warrant later on February 5, the same day the first 
warrant was issued and executed.  Alldredge declared that 
during the course of the first search, computer forensic 
examiners saw “in plain view” three CD’s and three computer 
diskettes.  The items were marked by the letters “X” and “XO,” 
which based on the examiners’ prior experience, indicated they 
may contain pornographic material.  Following defendant’s 
written consent to search his entire residence and all of its 
contents, the examiners inserted the media into their own 
computers.  They discovered “possible child pornography with 
minors engaged in sexual activity with each other and adults.”  
Based on the items discovered, the examiners believed that 
defendant’s computer might have child pornography stored on it 
as well.  A second warrant was issued authorizing the search of 
defendant’s computer and its files, as well as computer disks and 
other forms of media “depicting nudity and/or sexual activities, 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
whether real or simulated, involving juveniles, juveniles with 
juveniles, and juveniles with adults.”   
3.  The third warrant 
 
The next day, February 6, 2002, Detective Johanna 
Thrasher applied for a third search warrant requesting 
defendant’s cell phone records, including the location from 
which calls were made and received between February 1 and 
February 4, 2002.  She stated that defendant had made several 
inconsistent statements regarding his whereabouts the night of 
Danielle’s disappearance.  Defendant had also told investigators 
that he used his cell phone at different times during the 
weekend after her disappearance to contact his son and ex-wife 
about his plans and activities.  Thrasher stated that by 
obtaining defendant’s cell phone records, investigators could 
corroborate or disprove defendant’s account concerning where 
he was when calls were made.  In support of her application for 
the warrant, Thrasher relied on the facts demonstrating 
probable cause for the first and second search warrants, as well 
as the results of the search in which child pornography was 
found in defendant’s home.  Judge Bashant issued the requested 
warrant.   
4.  The fourth warrant 
 
On February 7, 2002, Detective Terry Torgersen, applied 
for a fourth warrant to search any clothing and bedding that 
defendant had taken to Twin Peaks Cleaners.  Torgersen 
presented the same factual basis for probable cause as 
previously submitted with the additional information that two 
dry cleaning receipts had been found during the search of one of 
defendant’s vehicles.  Torgersen stated that defendant admitted 
to investigators that he dropped off items at the Twin Peaks 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
Cleaners on Monday morning, February 4, 2002.  Employees at 
Twin Peaks Cleaners were contacted and told Torgersen that 
defendant was one of their long-time customers.  One of the 
employees said that defendant had showed up at the cleaners 
much earlier than usual on the morning of February 4 and had 
asked for “same day service,” which he had never done before.  
The employee noticed that defendant was dressed in short 
pants, a shirt, and no shoes.  She commented to defendant that 
this was unusual on such a cold morning and defendant replied 
that he had just returned from the desert.  Torgersen spoke with 
the supervising criminalist at the San Diego Police Department 
crime laboratory and was told that DNA technology could obtain 
DNA evidence and blood from items that have been dry cleaned 
or laundered.  Judge Bashant issued the warrant.   
5.  The fifth warrant 
 
On February 13, 2002, Detective James Hergenroeather 
applied for a fifth and final warrant for a more extensive search 
for evidence, including trace evidence, located in defendant’s 
home.  Hergenroeather incorporated the affidavits from the 
previous warrants in support of his request, as well as the child 
pornography found in defendant’s home.  He also indicated that 
a strand of blond hair microscopically similar to Danielle’s hair 
had been found in defendant’s 4Runner.  Judge Bashant issued 
the warrant.   
b.  Analysis 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires 
search warrants to be issued only upon a showing of “probable 
cause” describing with particularity “the place to be searched, 
and the . . . things to be seized.”  (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
 
The pertinent rules governing a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the validity of a search warrant, and the search 
conducted pursuant to it, are well-settled.  “The question facing 
a reviewing court asked to determine whether probable cause 
supported the issuance of the warrant is whether the magistrate 
had a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed 
that a search would uncover wrongdoing.”  (People v. Kraft 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040 (Kraft), citing Illinois v. Gates (1983) 
462 U.S. 213, 238-239.)  “The test for probable cause is not 
reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’ ”  (Florida v. 
Harris (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 243 [133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055].)  But we 
have stated that it is “ ‘less than a preponderance of the evidence 
or even a prima facie case.’ ”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and 
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 370.)  “ ‘The task of the issuing 
magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place.’ ”  (Kraft, supra, at pp. 1040-1041, quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, supra, at p. 238.)  “The magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause is entitled to deferential 
review.”  (Id., at p. 1041; accord People v. Carrington (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 145, 161.)  We explained in Skelton v. Superior Court 
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 150, that the warrant “can be upset only if 
the affidavit fails as a matter of law to set forth sufficient 
competent evidence” supporting the finding of probable cause.   
 
Applying these principles, we find a substantial basis for 
the trial court’s conclusion that there was sufficient probable 
cause to conduct a search of defendant, his residence, and his 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
vehicles that would uncover evidence related to the abduction of 
Danielle, even without considering the polygraph evidence.   
 
As explained in sworn testimony used to support the 
application for the first search warrant, Detective Alldredge had 
information suggesting defendant may have lied about 
retrieving his motorhome from storage on the morning after 
Danielle’s abduction.  A neighbor had seen it parked in the 
neighborhood the previous night.  Regardless, it appeared that 
defendant left in a hurried manner the next morning, and then 
did not return to his home for two days.  When defendant did 
return and was contacted by officers, he displayed an unusual 
amount of cooperativeness — a distinct trait associated with 
abductors, according to FBI profilers.  In addition, defendant 
matched other characteristics identified by the profilers as 
typical of abductors.  When the search and rescue dog displayed 
an interest in defendant’s garage, defendant provided a 
convenient explanation that was inconsistent with the 
information Brenda had provided the officers concerning her 
children’s visit to defendant’s house.  In his interview with 
Detective Keene, defendant related information concerning 
Danielle (the upcoming school dance, her new blouse, her 
father’s concern that she was growing up too fast) that, 
according to Brenda, only Danielle, her family, and one other 
neighbor would have known.  These circumstances, at least as 
understood at the time of the execution of the first search 
warrant, led to the reasonable inference that defendant had 
learned of the planned father-daughter dance from Danielle 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
herself.5  Moreover, defendant oddly voiced “out of the blue” 
surprise that Brenda’s children were being watched not by a 
babysitter, but by her husband, on the night of the abduction. 
 
Defendant’s description of his weekend contributed 
further to suspicion about him and his version of events.  
Defendant first drove his motorhome to Silver Strand where he 
overpaid to camp for several nights, despite claiming he did not 
have his wallet with him.  All of the blinds on the motorhome 
were closed, and the park ranger who sought to return 
defendant’s overpayment to him described defendant’s conduct 
as suspicious.  Although he had paid for several nights, 
defendant left the campsite soon after being contacted by the 
park ranger.  More important, after describing how he dug his 
motorhome out of the sand, defendant said “we drove back to 
Silver Strand,” suggesting he was not alone during the trip.  
Moreover, defendant stayed only briefly at Silver Strand and 
returned home relatively early on the morning of February 4. 
 
Considering the totality of these circumstances, and 
without consideration of defendant’s polygraph examination, 
there was sufficient probable cause to issue the first search 
warrant because there existed a “fair probability” that the 
search of his home, vehicle, and motorhome would reveal 
evidence of a crime.  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) 
 
As for the subsequent warrants, each one was based on 
additional, potentially incriminating evidence discovered via 
                                        
5  
After the execution of the first warrant, Alldredge learned 
from Brenda that she might have discussed the father-daughter 
dance in defendant’s presence. 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
either a prior warrant or based on other additional information 
learned during the continuing investigation. 
Concerning the second warrant, the execution of the first 
warrant had led to the discovery of possible child pornography 
stored on CD’s.  According to the FBI profilers, most abductions 
of children ages five and above are for sexual purposes, and the 
CD’s suggested that defendant had a sexual interest in children.  
This discovery, in addition to the evidence asserted in the prior 
warrant that was not related to the polygraph examination, 
provided a “substantial basis” to believe that there was a “fair 
probability” that additional incriminating evidence might be 
stored in defendant’s computer and other electronic media.  
(Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) 
The discovery of possible child pornography from the first 
and second warrants, in addition to the non-polygraph-related 
facts demonstrating probable cause from the first warrant, 
justified the issuance of the third warrant.  The evidence 
obtained from the execution of the prior warrants demonstrated 
defendant’s possible sexual interest in children.  The first 
warrant affidavit described defendant’s inconsistent statements 
regarding his whereabouts on the night of Danielle’s 
disappearance and his odd behavior with the park ranger at the 
Silver Strand camping spot.  These circumstances provided a 
“substantial basis” upon which to believe that there was a “fair 
probability” that a search of defendant’s cell phone records, 
including his location, would reveal that he had not been 
truthful to investigators concerning his activities during the 
weekend in question.  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) 
Regarding the fourth warrant to seize and search the 
clothing and bedding defendant had taken to the dry cleaners, 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
the supporting affidavit incorporated the facts asserted in the 
prior three search warrant affidavits.  In addition, the fourth 
search warrant affidavit also alleged that two dry cleaning 
receipts had been found during the search of one of defendant’s 
vehicles and that defendant had admitted he had dropped off 
items at the cleaners on the weekend in question.  The affidavit 
also alleged that the employees at the dry cleaner’s had noted 
that defendant had presented his items at an unusual time and 
was wearing clothing inconsistent with the cold weather that 
morning.  Specifically, he wore no jacket, yet turned in a jacket 
for dry cleaning.  Moreover, the affidavit alleged that DNA 
evidence could still be obtained from items that had been dry 
cleaned.  Placing aside the polygraph evidence alleged in the 
first warrant, these additional facts, in conjunction with those 
previously alleged in the prior affidavits, provided a “substantial 
basis” on which to believe there was a “fair probability” that a 
search of defendant’s clothing and bedding would uncover 
evidence relevant to Danielle’s disappearance.  (Kraft, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 1040.) 
Concerning the fifth and final warrant for a more 
extensive search for evidence, including trace evidence, located 
in defendant’s home, the supporting affidavit incorporated the 
facts asserted in the prior search warrant affidavits.  The 
affidavit also described the discovery, in defendant’s 4Runner, 
of a strand of blond hair that was microscopically similar to 
Danielle’s hair.  Without consideration of the polygraph 
evidence alleged in the first warrant, this fact, in conjunction 
with those facts previously alleged in the prior affidavits, 
provided a “substantial basis” on which to believe there was a 
“fair probability” that a trace evidence search of defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
home would uncover additional evidence relevant to Danielle’s 
disappearance.  (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) 
Given the above conclusions, we need not reach whether 
the first search was justified by the good faith reliance of the 
police on the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant or whether 
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that 
defendant’s voluntary consent provided an alternative basis for 
the first search. 
2.  Denial of Defendant’s Challenges for Cause 
 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his 
challenge for cause concerning Prospective Juror number 19.  
He claims prejudice from the fact that he was forced to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror number 19, 
leaving him with no remaining peremptory challenges to use on 
two allegedly biased prospective jurors — Prospective Juror 
number 34, who became seated Juror number 4, and Prospective 
Juror number 51, who became seated Juror number 2.  Although 
we conclude that defendant adequately preserved this issue for 
appeal, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
challenge for cause to Prospective Juror number 19.  In any 
event, defendant fails to show that the court’s denial resulted in 
him being tried by a biased juror.  In addition, to the extent that 
defendant further contends or suggests that other jurors should 
have also been removed for cause, we also reject those 
arguments. 
a.  Background 
 
Prospective Juror 
number 19 was a 58-year-old 
elementary school principal who lived in Poway.  She indicated 
on her jury questionnaire that she had “a positive attitude 
toward law enforcement officers,” whom she often dealt with in 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
connection with her work.  However, she indicated that her 
attitudes concerning the criminal justice system would not 
influence her in favor of either the prosecution or the defense 
regardless of the evidence.  She believed that she was a good 
judge of a person’s credibility.  She explained that she dealt with 
all types of people in her work and often had to make judgments 
about a person’s character.  She felt that she could be an 
impartial juror because she “practice[d] this with children in 
discipline situations.”  She stated that she was “pleased to serve 
[as a juror], but . . . very uneasy about her work responsibilities.”  
She indicated on her jury questionnaire that “[i]t would be 
extremely difficult to be away from [her] school (work) for the 
length of time this case requires.”   
 
In response to the questionnaire inquiry regarding 
whether she “[w]ould like to be a juror in this case,” Prospective 
Juror number 19 checked “no,” and stated: “I cannot serve on a 
case where the victim was a child.”  She believed that her 
objectivity might be “colored,” although she continued to 
consider herself fair.  When asked on the questionnaire about 
her ability to view photographs of the victim’s decomposed body, 
Prospective Juror number 19 indicated this would affect her 
ability to be fair and impartial because “[c]hildren have been 
[her] life for 37 years.”  Prospective Juror number 19 indicated 
that she had basic background information about the case from 
the news and had formed opinions based on that information 
that the parents were guilty of neglecting their responsibilities 
and that defendant had acted strangely by driving to the beach 
and then the desert.  When asked whether she could set aside 
her opinions and decide the case based on the evidence 
presented in court, Prospective Juror number 19 checked the 
box indicating “yes.”  When asked whether, despite anything she 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
had seen, heard, or read, she could be fair to both sides, she 
again checked the box indicating “yes.”  She indicated she would 
not automatically choose either death or life in prison, but would 
consider all of the evidence in determining the appropriate 
penalty.  However, when asked at the end of the questionnaire 
whether she was willing to serve as a juror on this case, 
Prospective Juror number 19 answered “no,” because she could 
not “fulfill her obligations to her staff and students if [she was] 
away from school for 12 weeks.”  Again, she stated that there 
was no reason she would not be a fair juror in this case.   
 
When Prospective Juror number 19 appeared in court for 
oral voir dire, she reiterated to defense counsel her 
questionnaire responses that she could not serve on a case 
involving a child victim, that this might color her objectivity, 
and that she could not be fair and impartial because children 
had been her life for 37 years.  When asked whether she was 
saying that she could not be fair and impartial in this particular 
case because it involved an allegation of murder of a child, she 
stated that it “would color [her] feelings.”  Defense counsel noted 
that she used the word “color” in her response, but in her 
questionnaire she used words like “I cannot serve.”  He asked 
her to explain.  Prospective Juror number 19 responded that she 
had spent “a great deal of [her] life protecting children.  [She 
had] gone to the authorities about abuse for children.  The rights 
of children are uppermost in [her] mind and [she would have] a 
hard time looking at a defendant in a child — a case where a 
child has been a victim.”  She confirmed that sitting as a juror 
on the case would create a professional hardship for her.   
 
In response to voir dire by the prosecution, Prospective 
Juror number 19 confirmed that she had to be fair and impartial 
in her type of work and that she was fair even when the children 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
were not her “favorites.”  When asked if she could be fair and 
impartial in this case, she said that she could not answer that 
question because she did not know if she could be fair and 
impartial.  The prosecutor then asked: “If you were told that you 
had to make your decisions based upon the evidence that came 
forward in this case and only that evidence, could you do that?”  
Prospective Juror number 19 answered, “yes.”  Asked if she 
would “let us know” if she found that she could not, Prospective 
Juror number 19 said, “yes.”   
 
The following colloquy then occurred between the court 
and Prospective Juror number 19: 
 
[THE COURT]:  “Juror 19, you’re sort of a rare breed.  In 
reading your questionnaire you’re obviously very educated and 
so forth, but you give what I will describe, as a judge, conflicting 
messages. 
 
“Counsel have each asked you questions from their 
perspective, and I’m going to ask you point blank and direct. 
 
“Knowing everything that you know about yourself, and 
what you’ve seen and heard to this point in this case, do you 
believe that you can be fair and impartial to both sides in this 
case?” 
 
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 19]:  “I honestly believe that 
I am fair and impartial in this particular case.  I’m not sure that 
my beliefs wouldn’t color the case.”   
 
[THE COURT]:  “Okay.” 
 
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 19]:  “I don’t know what else 
to tell you. 
 
[THE COURT]:  “And I appreciate that.  You’re just not 
sure?” 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
 
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 19]:  “Yeah.”   
 
The defense challenged Prospective Juror number 19 for 
cause, additionally pointing to her questionnaire response that 
her fairness and impartiality would be affected by viewing 
photographs of the victim’s body.  The trial court responded: 
“Well, I understand that, but the reason I ask[ed] the question 
[was] because my own notes show what a dilemma she is.  
Because of her experience and her training, she has made it 
quite clear that she’s very objective and she’s a very fair 
individual.  The answers she’s given do not indicate an extreme 
bias or prejudice that would prohibit her from doing her job.  I’ll 
note a challenge to nineteen and it will be denied.”   
b.  Discussion 
 
“ ‘As a general rule, a party may not complain on appeal of 
an allegedly erroneous denial of a challenge for cause because 
the party need not tolerate having the prospective juror serve on 
the jury; a litigant retains the power to remove the juror by 
exercising a peremptory challenge.  Thus, to preserve this claim 
for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually exercise a 
peremptory challenge and remove the prospective juror in 
question.  Next, the litigant must exhaust all of the peremptory 
challenges allotted by statute and hold none in reserve.  Finally, 
counsel . . . must express to the trial court dissatisfaction with 
the jury as presently constituted.’ ”  (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 1210, 1239, quoting People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
158, 186; accord People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 539.) 
 
The People contend defendant failed to satisfy the third 
requirement and thus, forfeited the issue on appeal.  It is 
undisputed that defendant exercised a peremptory challenge as 
to Prospective Juror number 19.  And defendant moved for 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
additional peremptory challenges after he had exhausted his 20 
peremptory challenges.  The defense based its request on “the 
challenges for cause that were denied,” and identified in 
particular Prospective Juror number 19.  Defense counsel took 
the position that the defense was “entitled to an additional 
challenge for her and also the other challenges for cause that 
were made and denied.”  The trial court denied the request and 
the jury was sworn.  The following day, the defense recognized 
that it had “failed to make clear” that the reason it requested 
additional peremptory challenges the previous day “was that we 
were dissatisfied with the panel as it was presently constituted 
and that if we had had those peremptory challenges, we would 
be challenging Jurors 2, 4, 6, . . . 11 and 12.”  As the People 
observe, defendant did not expressly state his dissatisfaction 
with the composition of the jury before the jury was sworn.  
Defendant contends, however, his dissatisfaction was implicit in 
his request for additional peremptory challenges based on the 
trial court’s denial of defendant’s challenge for cause to 
Prospective Juror number 19 and other prospective jurors, as he 
expressly clarified the next day.   
 
In People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, we found 
forfeiture where the defendant had exercised a peremptory 
challenge to remove the prospective juror in question, had 
exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, and had asked “for 
more” peremptory challenges.  (Id., at p. 1290.)  We found that 
defendant had not expressed dissatisfaction with the jury as 
constituted.  (Ibid.)  Here, however, defendant specifically tied 
his request for additional peremptory challenges to the denial of 
his challenge for cause to Prospective Juror number 19 and 
“others,” which could have included his denied challenges to 
seated Juror numbers 2 and 4.  And, he specifically clarified the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
next day that the defense was dissatisfied with the panel as it 
was presently constituted, identifying, among others, Juror 
numbers 2 and 4.  We conclude defendant adequately stated his 
dissatisfaction with the jury as sworn.  (People v. Rices, (2017) 4 
Cal.4th 49, 75; see also People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 
130.) 
 
Although defendant preserved the issue for appeal, we 
reject the claim on the merits. 
 
“We will uphold a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for 
cause ‘ “ ‘ “if it is fairly supported by the record.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]  
The trial court is in the best position to determine the potential 
juror’s true state of mind because it has observed firsthand the 
prospective juror’s demeanor and verbal responses.  [Citations.]  
Thus, ‘ “ ‘ “[o]n review of a trial court’s ruling, if the prospective 
juror’s statements are equivocal or conflicting, that court’s 
determination of the person’s state of mind is binding.’ ” ’  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th. 856, 895 (Clark); 
accord People v. Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1241; People v. 
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 489 (Hillhouse) [“The trial 
court is present and able to observe the juror itself.  It can judge 
the person’s sincerity and actual state of mind far more reliably 
than an appellate court reviewing only a cold transcript”].) 
Here, Prospective Juror number 19 gave equivocal and 
conflicting responses regarding her ability to be fair and 
impartial in this case.  Ultimately, the trial court credited her 
final statement that, knowing everything that she knew about 
herself and considering what she had seen and heard to that 
point, she could be fair and impartial in this particular case.  
Under settled law, the trial court’s determination of her state of 
mind is, appropriately, binding on our review.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
 
Defendant argues, however, that Prospective Juror 
number 19’s final statement was not an unqualified assertion.  
He notes that Prospective Juror number 19 also concluded with 
the statement that she could not be sure that her beliefs 
“wouldn’t color the case.”  But Prospective Juror number 19 had 
previously explained what she meant by the word “color” in her 
voir dire answers.  She indicated that because of her lengthy 
professional background in education, the rights of children 
were “uppermost in [her] mind” and that she would have “a hard 
time looking at a defendant” in a case involving a child victim.”  
Essentially, Prospective Juror number 19 acknowledged that 
because of the nature of her work, she would have a difficult 
emotional reaction to this case involving an alleged murder of a 
child.  Of course, “[a]ny juror sitting in a case such as this would 
properly expect the issues and evidence to have an emotional 
impact.  A juror is not to be disqualified for cause simply because 
the issues are emotional.”  (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
1046, 1091 (Bittaker).)  Nor do we expect jurors to “ ‘ “shed their 
backgrounds and experiences” ’ ” in deliberating on a verdict.  
(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 717, 777.)  We find it 
significant that Prospective Juror number 19 repeated to 
counsel and the court that she could nevertheless make her 
decision based solely upon the evidence and would let them 
know “if she found that she could not.”  Overall, the trial court 
reasonably could have found that the voir dire responses of 
Prospective Juror number 19 reflect a thoughtful and cautious 
self-awareness that supports the trial court’s conclusion that 
she could be a fair and impartial juror.  (See Hillhouse, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
 
Arguing against such a conclusion, defendant urges us to 
find his challenge for cause concerning Prospective Juror 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
number 19 analogous to the challenge for cause to Juror Staggs 
in Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pages 1089-1090, and Juror 
McAdam in People v. Vitelle (1923) 61 Cal.App. 695, 697-700 
(Vitelle), both of which were found to have been erroneously 
denied.  These cases are distinguishable from the circumstances 
here. 
 
In Bittaker, Juror Staggs told the trial court “that she had 
worked at a rape crisis center, and did not believe she would be 
impartial in a case involving charges of rape,” which Bittaker’s 
was.  (Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1089, fn. omitted.)  “Her 
voir dire present[ed] no unqualified statement that she actually 
felt that she could be fair and impartial in the penalty phase of 
this case.”  (Ibid.)  Indeed, she told defense counsel that she 
would be unable to fairly and impartially judge and evaluate the 
situation because of her strong feelings about victims of rape.  
(Id., at pp. 1089-1090.)  “The prosecutor attempting to 
rehabilitate her, could obtain only a statement that she would 
act impartially at the guilt phase.”  (Id., at p. 1090.)  When 
questioned by the trial court, she said that she could try to listen 
to the evidence and be a fair and impartial juror, “ ‘but I believe 
it would be difficult’ ” and she thought that she “ ‘wouldn’t be 
listening wholly to the evidence.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Given that Juror 
Staggs did not think she could be impartial at the penalty phase, 
and that she might not listen to all the evidence, we concluded 
the trial court erred by denying the challenge for cause.  (Ibid.)  
In contrast, Prospective Juror number 19 did state that she 
could be a fair and impartial juror, despite her qualms regarding 
the nature of the case.  She did believe she could make a decision 
in the case based solely on the evidence and nothing in the 
record suggests she would not listen to and consider all of the 
evidence presented.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
 
In Vitelle, counsel for each side knew that the evidence 
would show that the defendant was a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan and that the charged assault was alleged to be a Klan 
activity.  (Vitelle, supra, 61 Cal.App. at p. 696.)  On voir dire, 
then Prospective Juror McAdam stated that he “ ‘was not in 
favor of the Klan,’ ” and that it would create in his mind bias 
and prejudice if it turned out that the defendant was a leading 
member of the Klan.  (Id., at p. 697.)  Asked whether, with such 
bias and prejudice, he could still act fairly and impartially 
toward the defendant, McAdam replied that he did not think he 
could.  (Id., at pp. 697-698.)  He thought that the defendant’s 
membership in the Klan “ ‘would weigh with [him] to such an 
extent that [he] would be influenced in hearing the testimony.’ ”  
(Id., at p. 698.)  He admitted that the mere fact that the 
defendant was a Klan member would bias him.  (Id., at p. 699.)  
If the evidence showed that the defendant took part in any Klan 
activities, McAdam said that he would have a prejudice against 
the defendant.  (Ibid.)  Although McAdam also stated his 
willingness to accept the court’s instructions, to attempt to 
decide the case in accordance with the law, and to give the 
defendant the legal presumption of innocence until the complete 
establishment of his guilt (id., at pp. 698-699), the reviewing 
court found error in the trial court’s denial of a defense challenge 
for cause to McAdam.  According to the appellate court, there 
was “no escape from the conclusion that there existed in the 
mind of McAdam a state of mind in reference to the case which 
necessarily prevented him from acting with entire impartiality 
and without prejudice.”  (Id., at p. 700.)  Here, Prospective Juror 
number 19 affirmatively stated that she could be fair and 
impartial.  The trial court, which questioned her and observed 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
her voir dire responses, believed her.  We will not overturn its 
credibility call.   
 
We find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
challenge for cause to Prospective Juror number 19. 
c.  Prejudice 
 
Moreover, even assuming error concerning Prospective 
Juror number 19, we also reject defendant’s related claim of 
prejudice or any suggestion that the trial court incorrectly 
denied defendant’s other challenges for cause.  Specifically, 
defendant fails to show that the trial court’s ruling improperly 
forced him to be judged by Juror numbers 2 and 4, both of whom 
defendant suggests should have been removed for cause.  (See 
People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 920.) 
 
Defense counsel challenged Juror number 2 for cause on 
the ground that Juror number 2 had expressed his belief in “a 
life for a life,” and would reach an automatic death verdict if 
defendant were found guilty. 
The prospective juror who became Juror number 2 wrote 
that he strongly supported the death penalty, and that his views 
regarding it were “a life for a life.”  But he wrote he did not hold 
his belief in favor of the death penalty so strongly that he would 
be unable to impose life without possibility of parole regardless 
of the facts.  He also indicated that his opinion in favor of the 
death penalty would not “substantially impair” his ability to 
perform as a juror such that he would vote only for the death 
penalty.  He acknowledged his willingness to weigh and consider 
all the evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors before 
deciding the appropriate punishment.  He indicated that he 
would not automatically vote for a verdict of death in a case 
involving these charges and special circumstances, but instead 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
would listen and consider all of the evidence at the penalty 
phase before reaching a decision. 
During voir dire, Juror number 2, consistent with his 
questionnaire, affirmed he would not automatically impose the 
death penalty if the trial reached a penalty phase.  Juror 
number 2 further explained that he would “have to hear all the 
evidence” but would have a hard time imposing the death 
penalty based on circumstantial evidence.  He stated that if the 
matter reached the penalty phase that he could not “say right 
now which way [he] would go.”  However, when asked to assume 
that defendant had already been found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, he affirmed his belief of a life for a life, 
explaining that his belief is “pretty strong,” because he thought 
that “a life is precious.”  Yet on further questioning by the 
prosecutor about considering evidence presented at the penalty 
phase, Juror number 2 reverted to his prior answers and stated 
he would first listen to the evidence, including mitigating 
evidence, before reaching a decision. 
The trial court denied the defense challenge for cause of 
the prospective juror who eventually became Juror number 2.  
The court indicated that Juror number 2’s questionnaire was 
clear and unequivocal that he could be fair and impartial.  And 
the court did not “believe that one question couched in such a 
way as to change the ground rules . . . is going to make him have 
cause to create an inability not to follow the law.” 
With one exception, Juror number 2’s questionnaire and 
voir dire answers were clear that, despite his views in favor of 
the death penalty, he would first consider the penalty phase 
evidence and not automatically vote for death.  On a single 
question during voir dire, defense counsel elicited one conflicting 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
response, by asking him to assume that defendant was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but outside the context of 
considering aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at a 
penalty phase.  Juror number 2 subsequently made clear that 
he would consider evidence presented during the penalty phase 
before deciding punishment.  In that sense, the trial court 
reasonably determined that the one conflicting response elicited 
by the defense through a leading question did not represent 
Juror number 2’s true state of mind and properly denied the 
defense challenge for cause.  We must defer to that 
determination because it is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. 
Defense counsel challenged Juror number 4 for cause on 
the ground that Juror number 4 had been intimidated by the 
court into saying that she could be fair and impartial when in 
fact she was biased. 
The prospective juror who became Juror number 4 
identified herself as being from Germany and asserted that 
English was her second language.  She stated nothing in her 
questionnaire or during her first voir dire that disqualified her. 
She had initially been passed for cause by both sides. 
But after the court denied her hardship request, Juror 
number 4 wrote a note to the court explaining that she had 
misunderstood one of the questions on the form, specifically the 
question asking whether she had friends or relatives in law 
enforcement.  She thought the question applied to only police 
officers, but she now wanted to disclose that she had a close 
personal friend who was a retired deputy district attorney.  She 
explained that they had discussed the criminal justice system, 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
and as a result, she had formed opinions “favorable towards 
prosecutors.” 
Because of her note, Juror number 4 was called into court 
for further voir dire.  Defense counsel asked Juror number 4 
whether her personal friendships would result in her favoring 
the prosecution such that she could “no longer be completely, 
one-hundred percent objective.”  Juror number 4 responded 
affirmatively.  Defense counsel then asked: “So as a result of 
your acquaintance with the prosecutors, in your view, you have 
a bias such that it would prevent you from being a fair juror in 
this case?”  Juror number 4 responded, “I would think so, yes.” 
The court asked Juror number 4, who had previously said 
she could be fair to both sides, why she had changed her mind.  
Juror number 4 explained that she had seen her friend the prior 
night and that he had advised her to disclose the existence of 
their friendship.  She further explained that she was “not 
familiar with the justice system the way everybody else seems 
to be.”  Because her answer was not directly responsive to the 
court’s question, the court again asked Juror number 4 whether 
she was trying to tell the court that she could not be fair, and 
she responded:  “I’m not a hundred percent sure.  But it seems 
like I have to explain this to you that I have this connection, and 
we have talked about the judicial system.  So that’s all I’m trying 
to say here.” 
On further questioning by the prosecutor, Juror number 4 
stated that her friend, the retired prosecutor, had advised her to 
inform the court of their friendship to the court, because she 
would perjure herself if she did not disclose it.  The prosecutor 
also asked Juror number 4 whether she could be fair, and she 
replied:  “Yes. I think I can be fair, but the thing is I don’t — I 
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did not tell you about this gentleman because I wasn’t aware 
that this is required of me.” 
The court then interrupted and explained its concern 
about why she had told defense counsel that she could not be 
fair and then told the prosecutor she could be fair, and asked:  
“Now, what is it, Ma’am?  Can you be fair and objective to both 
sides or not?”  She replied:  “I don’t see why I can’t be, but I am 
thoroughly confused at this point.”  Juror number 4 affirmed 
again that she did not know of any reason why she could not be 
fair and impartial. 
In contending that Juror number 4 should be dismissed 
for cause, defense counsel acknowledged that her statements 
about fairness were unequivocal but was critical of “the court’s 
tone of voice” in questioning her and contended that she might 
have been intimidated.  Defense counsel also questioned 
whether Juror number 4 had difficulty understanding because 
English was not her first language.  The prosecutor responded 
that Juror number 4 told him without any pressure that she 
could be fair.  The trial court found no basis for disqualification 
and denied the challenge. 
Defendant claims on appeal that Juror number 4 was 
influenced and intimidated by the court into saying that she 
could be fair and impartial when in fact she was biased.  But 
viewing the totality of her expressed concerns, it appears that 
Juror number 4 was merely attempting to state that her 
friendship with the retired prosecutor caused her to doubt 
whether she could be “a hundred percent” objective, but that she 
still believed she could be fair.  In assessing whether a claim of 
juror misconduct indicates juror bias requiring reversal of the 
judgment, we have acknowledged that “[j]urors are not 
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53 
automatons” but are “imbued with human frailties as well as 
virtues” and that our system cannot survive by demanding 
“theoretical perfection from every juror” and that we “must 
tolerate a certain amount of imperfection short of actual bias.”  
(In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 654-655.) 
Here, Juror number 4, in an abundance of caution, alerted 
the court and the parties to something she had overlooked.  She 
acknowledged that it did not make her objectivity 100 percent 
perfect but repeatedly clarified that she thought she could still 
be fair overall.  The trial court acted within its discretion in 
denying the defense challenge for cause of Juror number 4. 
As a result, defendant fails to show that the court erred in 
denying his challenges for cause of the prospective jurors who 
became seated as Juror numbers 2 and 4.  Therefore, even 
assuming the court erred in not removing Prospective Juror 
number 19 for cause, defendant fails to show prejudice. 
3. Denial of Defendant’s Motion for Additional 
Peremptory Challenges  
 
a.  Background 
On the day jury selection began, the defense noted that a 
large number of those who were summoned for that day had 
failed to appear.  The defense moved the court “to do what it 
[could] to enforce” the summons to ensure that defendant 
obtained a fair and representative cross-section of the 
community and a jury of his peers.  Believing that 80 percent of 
those summoned had failed to appear, the defense requested a 
proportionate number of additional peremptory challenges “as a 
remedy.”  The trial court denied the request.   
 
After the defense exhausted its 20 peremptory challenges 
during jury selection, the defense again moved for additional 
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54 
peremptory challenges.  The defense based its request on “the 
challenges for cause that were denied,” particularly with regard 
to Prospective Juror Number 19.  The trial court denied the 
request and the jury was sworn.  The following day, the defense 
told the court that what it meant the previous day was that it 
was dissatisfied with the composition of the jury — specifically 
Juror Numbers 2, 4, 6, 11, and 12 — and that this had been the 
reason for requesting additional peremptory challenges.  The 
trial court found the request untimely because the panel had 
already been sworn, but noted that it would have denied the 
request even if it had been made before the panel was sworn.   
 
b.  Discussion 
 
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 
denying his requests for additional peremptory challenges, 
resulting in a violation of his constitutional right to due process.  
He argues that the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding his 
case required that he be granted the requested additional 
peremptory challenges to ensure a fair and impartial jury.  (See 
People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 679 (Bonin).)  The People 
respond that defendant forfeited his claim by failing to raise this 
ground as a basis for his requests.  (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 900, 946.)  In turn, defendant claims the trial court 
and parties were acutely aware of the problem of pretrial 
publicity and, thus, the court would have fairly understood that 
defendant’s request for additional peremptory challenges was 
ultimately based on such publicity.  (Clark, 52 Cal.4th at p.966; 
People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 290.)   
 
The record reflects the trial court’s general concern with 
the media attention that defendant’s case was receiving.  But it 
does not support defendant’s claim that the trial court would 
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55 
have understood his request for additional peremptory 
challenges as being based on an effort to offset the effect of the 
pretrial publicity.  Nothing in defendant’s request to “remedy” 
either the failure to appear of a large percentage of those 
summoned for jury duty or the trial court’s denial of defense 
challenges for cause would have alerted the court to a defense 
concern that the jury venire might be pervasively biased 
because of the media interest in and accounts of the case.  We 
conclude defendant’s failure to cite pretrial publicity as a basis 
for his requests for additional peremptory challenges forfeited 
his claim on appeal. 
 
Even if we were to conclude otherwise, we would reject his 
claim on the merits.   
 
“Peremptory challenges are intended to promote a fair and 
impartial jury, but they are not a right of direct constitutional 
magnitude.”  (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 438, citing 
Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 88-89.)  “To establish a 
constitutional entitlement to additional peremptory challenges, 
the defendant must at least show that he is likely to receive an 
unfair trial before a biased jury if the request is denied.”  (People 
v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 23 (DePriest).)   
 
Turning to such circumstances here, we note that defense 
counsel stated the defense needed additional peremptory 
challenges because of dissatisfaction with seated Juror numbers 
2, 4, 6, 11, and 12.  Of those five, the defense challenged for cause 
only Juror numbers 2 and 4.  As we have explained above, 
because the trial court properly denied these challenges, 
defendant fails to show that he was tried by a juror who would 
have been removed if defendant had been granted additional 
peremptory challenges.  Therefore, this was not a scenario in 
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56 
which “an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause can be cured 
by giving the defendant an additional peremptory challenge.”  
(Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1088.) 
 
We also reject defendant’s assertion that the pretrial 
publicity resulted in him being tried by a biased jury.  As we will 
explain, none of the seated jurors expressed biased created by 
pretrial publicity.  Moreover, the trial court took numerous steps 
to protect the jurors from the public awareness and interest in 
the case. 
 
Juror number 1 indicated that she had not “followed the 
case closely” and did not know “much” about it.  She averred 
under penalty of perjury that she had formed no opinion, and 
would be able to decide the case exclusively on the evidence 
presented at trial even if it conflicted with what she had 
previously heard.   
Similarly, Juror numbers 2, 3, 4, 9, and 11, as well as 
alternate Juror numbers 13, 15, 16, and 18, declared that they 
did not know much about the case, had formed no opinion about 
it, and could decide the case based solely on the trial evidence.   
The jurors who had been exposed to more of the media 
coverage of the case also dispelled any belief that they had been 
biased.  Juror number 5 indicated she knew “very little” about 
the case, and the opinion she formed was that she was not 
inclined to believe what the media or others had said.  Juror 
number 6 knew “some” details of the case and had formed the 
opinion that there was enough evidence to arrest defendant and 
that the authorities were being careful because it was a highly 
publicized matter, but declared the ability to decide the case 
exclusively on the trial evidence.  The responses of alternate 
Juror numbers 14 and 17 were similar.  Juror number 7 knew 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
that a child had disappeared from her room and that her body 
had been discovered some weeks later.  She had formed no 
opinion from the publicity and averred that she could base her 
decision entirely on the evidence presented at trial.  Juror 
number 8 had similar knowledge of the case and thought that 
defendant “could possibly be guilty,” but declared that she could 
set aside any opinion she had formed and base her decision “on 
[the] evidence fairly.”  Juror number 10 knew the “basic facts” 
of the case, but had formed no opinion and could decide the case 
based solely on the trial evidence.   
Lastly, Juror number 12 stated he did not believe that he 
knew anything about the case, despite the media coverage.  He 
had formed no opinion and could decide the case on the evidence.   
We find no reason to disregard these assurances, by the 
prospective jurors who were eventually seated, that they could 
set aside whatever they learned from the media and decide the 
matter based entirely on the evidence presented at trial.  
(Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) 
Finally, we note that the trial court took numerous 
precautions to prevent infection of the jury pool with prejudicial 
information and to ensure a fair trial.  Although the search 
warrants themselves were made public, the trial court ordered 
the attached affidavits and exhibits sealed.  A gag order was 
issued against the attorneys and law enforcement officers 
involved in the case.  Pretrial hearings concerning the 
admissibility of evidence were closed to the public and media.  
The trial court ordered that voir dire, although open to the 
public, was not to be filmed.  No one entering the courthouse 
was to be photographed on the day the prospective jurors were 
to report, and no names were to be utilized in the selection 
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process.  The trial court took the unusual step of directing the 
jury commissioner to inform the prospective jurors appearing for 
defendant’s case that they were not to discuss “anything about 
what they might think they were there for.”  As soon as the 
prospective jurors appeared in the courtroom, the trial court 
emphasized that the trial was to be based solely on evidence 
presented in the courtroom and not by any information from 
media sources.  The jurors were told that the media had been 
instructed to have no contact with them and that they were not 
to read, listen to, or watch any programs or news items that 
related to the case.  Our review of the record persuades us that 
the proceedings were conducted with solemnity and sobriety.   
 
Defendant, therefore, has not met his burden to show that 
he was likely to receive an unfair trial because of asserted bias 
based on pretrial publicity.  (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 
23-24.)  If defendant had properly preserved this issue for 
appeal, we would find no error in the trial court’s denial of his 
requests for additional peremptory challenges. 
4.  The Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Sequester the 
Jury  
 
Defendant contends the publicity and public sentiment 
surrounding his case was so extreme as the trial progressed that 
it was not only an abuse of discretion under section 1121 for the 
trial court to have declined on multiple occasions to sequester 
the jury, but also, under a de novo standard of review, it 
amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to due 
process.  Defendant argues that the trial court, in fact, did not 
even truly exercise its discretion, but improperly left the 
decision on sequestration up to the jury.  We disagree with 
defendant’s characterization and find no error. 
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a.  Background 
 
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to sequester the 
jury for the entire trial in lieu of a motion for change of venue.  
Pointing to the extensive publicity the case was receiving, the 
defense contended that sequestering the jury was necessary in 
order to ensure that it was free from outside influences and to 
guarantee defendant a trial by an impartial jury.  The defense 
noted that such publicity had been the basis for the trial court’s 
order sealing pretrial motions and its gag order.  The court 
deferred a ruling on the motion.   
 
In its initial charge to the jury, the court raised the subject 
of the media’s coverage of the case.  It told the jurors that “there 
is a lot of misinformation that is out on the media regarding this 
trial” and if they listened to and used such misinformation, it 
would do “a grave disservice to both sides in this case.”  The trial 
court reminded the jurors that they had been selected because 
they had agreed to base their decisions solely on the evidence 
presented.  It then told them that it had many options “in terms 
of handling the media,” but it had selected “self-polic[ing]” as the 
best option for the jurors and the trial.  The court directed the 
jurors to “not look at anything that has anything to do with this 
case, whether it be print, radio, or television media.”  If problems 
came up, the court promised it would address them.   
 
And indeed, some problems arose.  When the trial court 
noticed that a number of individuals in the courtroom audience 
were wearing buttons containing a picture of Danielle, the court 
told the audience that such buttons, placards, and T-shirts were 
unacceptable and not allowed.  The court warned all those 
present that it would not allow the jury to be intimidated.  When 
it later came to the court’s attention that members of the public 
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were still wearing the buttons in the courthouse hallway, it 
reminded the jury that this had nothing to do with the lawyers, 
the evidence before them, or the jury’s job.  It was “just one more 
form of the kinds of publicity or bias that [the jury had] been 
selected to overcome.”   
 
As television reporting continued, the trial court 
specifically admonished the jury to avoid the coverage “at all 
costs,” unplugging their television if necessary.  The court 
advised the jury to stay out of internet chat rooms and avoid any 
internet coverage of the case.  The court frequently repeated its 
admonishments.   
 
At one point, the trial court was advised that the county 
probate office had received a number of phone calls after a 
newspaper had published the occupations of the jurors.  Juror 
number 7 was one of only seven probate examiners in the office, 
so it would not be difficult to ascertain her identity in light of 
her altered work schedule.  The court made arrangements with 
the probate office to avoid pressure on Juror number 7 from 
coworkers or the public.   
 
Defendant’s renewed motion for sequestration was denied 
without prejudice to the issue being raised again and 
reevaluated as circumstances warranted.   
 
Subsequently, the jury sent the trial court a note 
indicating that it believed Brenda Van Dam was “glaring or 
staring” at them.  The court addressed the matter in closed 
session.  The court asked the jurors to raise a hand if they felt 
they were being intimidated in any way by the Van Dams.  No 
juror did so.  When the court inquired whether any juror felt 
Brenda’s presence in the courtroom would in any way affect his 
or her ability to be fair and impartial to both parties, no juror 
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indicated that it would.  The court told the jury that it should 
notify the court if at any time the conduct of the Van Dams or 
anyone else in the courtroom started to affect their ability to 
listen to the testimony and be fair and impartial.  The court later 
repeated that any juror was welcome to raise any concern that 
arose regarding perceived interference or intimidation.  When 
Damon Van Dam was subsequently expelled from the courtroom 
for glaring at defendant, the jurors were admonished that the 
court had made rulings that might or might not be reported in 
the press.  The court reemphasized that the jurors must be 
vigilant in their self-policing.   
 
The defense renewed its motion for jury sequestration 
three days later, in light of further media attention, most 
significantly false reports of the number of child pornography 
images recovered from defendant’s computers.  The trial court 
responded that it would not sequester the jury because the court 
had no reason to believe that the jurors were disregarding the 
court’s order to pay no attention to the publicity.   
 
Due to weekends, court holidays, and the trial court’s pre-
planned vacation, the jury was to be excused for 11 days from 
Wednesday July 10 until Monday July 22, 2002.  Before the 
jurors were excused, the trial court again reminded them that 
they must “guard against, in the utmost way possible, reading 
or listening to” media coverage of the case.  The court suspected 
that “all of the talking heads” would try to keep interest in the 
case going until the trial started up again and it was “very, very 
important” that they continue to “self-police.”   
 
When the trial resumed on July 22, the defense made a 
motion for mistrial based on the “tremendous amount of 
publicity” concerning the case.  The defense took the position 
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that the media coverage was “inescapable and at least some 
jurors must have . . . been exposed to something in this case.”  
This, according to the defense, was compounded by news stories 
about another case in which a five-year-old girl, Samantha 
Runnion, was kidnapped and sexually molested.  Noting the 
denial of its requests for sequestration, defendant requested a 
mistrial.  The prosecution opposed the motion, which it 
characterized as being based on speculation.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  It explained that the media coverage was no 
different from what had been occurring throughout the trial and 
that it intended to discuss with the jury its duty to ignore the 
media focus on the Runnion case.  Importantly, it noted that 
there was “no evidence that any media coverage is being viewed 
by these jurors, and [it had] every reason to believe they [were] 
abiding by the court’s orders.”   
 
On July 27, the court conducted a closed session to discuss 
with the parties an incident that had been reported the prior 
evening.  When Juror number 2 was walking out of the 
courthouse with two other jurors, Juror number 17 and Juror 
number 18, Juror number 2 noticed someone following them.  
Juror number 2, who was not wearing his juror badge at this 
point, fell back and watched as a man, dressed in a blue shirt 
and gray trousers, followed the other two jurors into the trolley 
station.  The man got onto the trolley with the three jurors and 
exited at the “Old Town” station with them.  The two jurors 
proceeded to their cars, still followed by the same man, who was 
keeping his distance.  The man took out a piece of paper and 
pencil, and wrote something down as the two jurors got into 
their cars.  Juror number 2 called the contact number he had 
been given for the court to report the incident.  There was no 
indication who the person was that was following the jurors, but 
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the court surmised that it was likely someone affiliated with the 
media.   
 
Brought in and questioned by the court, Juror number 2 
confirmed these observations and added that as the jurors were 
driving away, the man ducked and attempted to hide.  Juror 
number 2 indicated that Juror number 17 was aware of the 
incident, but he did not believe Juror number 18 was.  Asked if 
anything about this experience would in any way affect his 
ability to be fair and impartial to both sides in this case, Juror 
number 2 replied, “No.”  The court questioned Juror number 17 
and received a similar account of the incident.  When asked 
whether he felt intimidated by the occurrence, Juror number 17 
thought he was “fine with it . . . not happy with it, but . . . fine 
with it.”  The court also questioned Juror number 18, who said 
she was not aware of the person that the other jurors believed 
was following them.  She indicated that the incident would not 
affect her ability to be fair or elevate her safety concerns.   
 
The court then addressed the entire jury, informing it that 
some jurors may have been followed to their cars the previous 
evening.  The court indicated it was providing this information 
not in an effort to make them paranoid, but to encourage them 
to report any such behavior.  The court assured the jurors that 
law enforcement was investigating the incident.  It also 
informed them that motions to sequester the jury had been 
made.  But, the court said, it had decided that sequestration was 
not appropriate.  Nevertheless, all security options were being 
considered and sequestration was a future possibility.  The court 
encouraged any juror who believed that this incident would have 
a negative impact on his or her ability to be fair and impartial, 
or on his or her ability to act as a juror, to communicate with the 
court by written note.  The trial court received no such notes. 
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On July 29, defense counsel brought to the court’s 
attention that a show had been earlier aired on cable television 
titled “Body Farm,” which dealt with the science of 
decomposition.  Forensic entomologist Haskell had mentioned 
the Body Farm as a research facility at the University of 
Tennessee during his testimony.  Additionally, defense counsel 
noted that media coverage of the Runnion case had increased, 
including coverage of the fact that the defendant in that case 
had been previously acquitted of an earlier crime.  The defense 
was concerned that the jury here would think that if it acquitted 
defendant in this case, he would kill another little girl.  The 
defense renewed its request for sequestration.  The trial court 
responded that, as it had mentioned with regard to the problem 
of the jurors being followed, it would continue to consider jury 
sequestration as a potential option, but its preference was 
against it.  The court explained that the jurors appeared to be a 
hardy group, “they don’t appear to be intimidated by what 
occurred and I continue to believe in their integrity.”  The court 
denied the defense motion.   
 
When the jurors returned the following day, the trial court 
told them that despite its understanding that all of the jurors 
were in complete compliance, there was still a potential for 
sequestering.  The court acknowledged that a number of jurors 
had shared a concern about not being available to their families, 
and assured the jurors that it would take such concerns into 
account.  It advised the jurors that it was the court’s 
responsibility to make such decision and although the decision 
had not yet been made, it was the court’s current plan to allow 
the jury to continue without sequestration.  The trial court went 
on to recognize that the Runnion case had been recently 
receiving publicity and that it might appear to some to be 
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65 
similar to this case.  The court told the jury it was not similar 
and it had no bearing on the issues the jury was to decide in this 
case.  The court also warned the jury about the “Body Farm,” 
advising it not to watch the show.  It reminded the jurors that 
the only scientific evidence they were to consider about 
decomposition had been provided by the experts who testified in 
court.   
 
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court noted that 
defense counsel had again raised the issue of sequestration.  The 
court informed counsel that it did not intend to sequester the 
jury based on its understanding of the feelings of the jurors and 
everything that it had observed.  The court was confident that 
the jury could still do its job and abide by the court’s orders.   
 
Defense counsel subsequently brought to the court’s 
attention a newspaper article that contained leaked information 
regarding defendant’s case.  The court stated that it was aware 
of the article and intended to follow up with law enforcement 
regarding the source of the leak.  Defense counsel observed that 
another newspaper article had been published over the 
weekend, which specifically addressed CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 
2.61 and criticized the concept of a defendant’s right not to 
testify.  In addition, there was an article in San Diego Magazine 
discussing the Van Dams and the bar called Dad’s.  The defense 
asked the court to “either sequester or specifically direct the jury 
that there’s more landmines out there.”  The court indicated that 
these were the same kinds of materials that had been covered 
by his previous admonitions.  It denied the renewed request for 
sequestration, explaining that by allowing the jurors to separate 
and not be sequestered, it was expecting them to abide by the 
court’s orders.  For the record, the court noted again its 
impression from dealing with the incident in which jurors had 
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66 
been followed that these jurors were “a hardy group of people,” 
who did not “want their lives disrupted” by sequestration.  It 
observed that sequestration also had its “own pitfalls.”  In later 
admonishing the jury to avoid media coverage, the court again 
emphasized that “in order for the court to abide by its 
commitment to you not to sequester you,” it was relying on the 
jurors “self-policing.”  It told the jury that “[i]f that changes for 
any reason, I’m going to have to change my position.”   
 
In the course of closing argument, the court received a note 
from Juror number 12 indicating that the increased media 
coverage of the case was making it hard to have “a clear mind” 
because people around him were talking and interested in the 
case.  The court addressed the issue with the entire panel, 
telling the jurors that they “have to figure out ways to avoid 
personally becoming involved” in such conversations and they 
must disregard anything they accidentally overhear in light of 
their obligation to base their decision solely on the evidence.  
The court advised them that to avoid sequestration, they must 
continue to abide by the court’s order requiring self-policing.  
The court expressed its faith in them.   
 
The court essentially repeated these comments in its 
concluding instruction to the jury.  The court also instructed the 
jurors that it expected them to alert the court if they discovered 
that they could not deliberate without outside influences and 
wished to be isolated for deliberations.   
 
Later the same day, the court received a note from the jury 
indicating that one of the jurors was being “harassed” at work 
to the point that he would rather be sequestered than go to work 
on Fridays when the court was not in session.  Because 
sequestering would significantly affect the other jurors, the 
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remainder of the jury proposed that they be allowed to 
deliberate all or part of the day on Fridays, so that the other 
juror could avoid going to work.  In closed session with the entire 
panel, the court worked out a plan that allowed them to come in 
on Fridays.  They could convene for a short time and then leave, 
which would generally be sufficient to excuse them from work.   
 
The court then separately questioned Juror number 12, 
who was the juror who felt harassed at work.  He confirmed that 
the court’s plan for brief attendance on Fridays would excuse 
him from work.  Asked to describe what kind of things were 
occurring at work that caused him concern, Juror number 12 
related that nothing had been said to him, but everyone at work 
had a radio and read the paper.  It was becoming hard for him 
to go to work because “a lot of people [were not] as respectful as 
they should be.”  Juror number 12 stated that this was not 
influencing the way he looked at the evidence “or anything like 
that,” but it was getting to the point that he was avoiding his 
work and getting “written up for it.”  He did not feel he should 
be placed in such a position.  Juror number 12 stated that his 
concern was not with the media coverage, which he was strong 
enough to keep away from, but with the people at work who were 
making it hard for him.  The new scheduling, he confirmed, 
would solve the problem.  Asked whether any information he 
had received from his workplace affected his ability to be fair 
and objective, Juror number 12 responded: “Oh, no.  None.”  
Meeting again with the entire panel in closed session, the trial 
court confirmed that the majority would prefer not to be 
sequestered.   
 
On August 13, the trial court held another closed session 
to discuss information received by the defense that reported 
Juror number 12 had stated to a coworker that “he wasn’t going 
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68 
to believe anything [one of the defense counsel] said because he 
didn’t like him.”  The defense wanted the court to “become 
involved” and question Juror number 12.  The defense also felt 
that there was increasing media and public pressure that 
justified moving for a mistrial.  In support of the motion, defense 
counsel related his own experience of name-calling, threats, and 
protests that seemed to be aimed at influencing the progress of 
the trial.  The court found no basis for a mistrial and declined to 
inquire further of Juror number 12 because the allegations were 
hearsay, if not double hearsay, and unrelated to the juror’s duty 
to decide the case based on the evidence alone.  It suggested the 
parties were free to follow up on the matter to find out if there 
was further basis for the claim.   
 
Two days later, one of the alternate jurors reported she 
felt that she and Juror number 2 had been followed when they 
left the courthouse one evening.  She confirmed that nothing 
about the incident would have any effect on her or prohibit her 
from fulfilling any duty she was called upon to perform in the 
trial.  When questioned, Juror number 2 did not feel they had 
been followed.  He also confirmed that nothing about the 
incident would affect his ability to be fair and impartial in the 
deliberations.   
 
On the same day, the trial court heard and denied another 
request from the defense to sequester the jury based on what the 
defense felt was pressure being placed on them by media 
scrutiny.  The court granted the defense’s alternative request 
that the jury be provided a place to gather during breaks and 
lunch away from the media and public.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
69 
b.  Discussion 
 
Section 1121 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he jurors 
sworn to try an action may, in the discretion of the court, be 
permitted to separate or be kept in charge of a proper officer.”  
It is well settled that under this statute and prior case law, 
“sequestration is discretionary with the trial court even in 
capital cases.”  (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1218, 
accord People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 169; People v. Ruiz 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 616.)  “The trial court stands in the best 
position to evaluate the necessity of sequestration in a 
particular case.”  (Ruiz, at p. 616.)  “ ‘[I]n reviewing a trial court’s 
denial of a defendant’s motion for individual sequestered jury 
selection, we apply the “abuse of discretion standard,” under 
which the pertinent inquiry is whether the court’s ruling “falls 
outside the bounds of reason.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Perez 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 443, quoting People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 1, 34.) 
 
Defendant argues, however, that in this case due process 
requires a higher standard of review, principally relying on 
some general language found in Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384 
U.S. 333 (Sheppard), regarding the increasing prevalence of 
unfair and prejudicial media coverage of pending trials that may 
impact a defendant’s constitutional right to “receive a trial by 
an impartial jury free from outside influences.”  (Id. at p. 362.)  
The high court stated that “trial courts must take strong 
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against 
the accused” and “appellate tribunals have the duty to make an 
independent evaluation of the circumstances.”  (Id., at pp. 362-
363.) 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
70 
 
But this language from Sheppard was not directed at the 
standard of review of a trial court’s choice of method for ensuring 
the jury is not subject to any such prejudicial influences from 
the media.  Instead, the high court’s observations were made in 
the context of the defendant’s failed attempt to obtain a change 
of venue and the subsequent effect of the intense media presence 
and coverage on the jury and the defendant’s verdict.  
(Sheppard, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 345-349.)  The high court was 
critical of the fact that the trial court in the Sheppard case had 
allowed a table “within a few feet of the jury box and counsel” 
where “sat some 20 reporters staring at Sheppard and taking 
notes” and that “[p]articipants in the trial, including the jury, 
were forced to run a gantlet of reporters and photographers each 
time they entered or left the courtroom.”  (Id. at p. 355.)  The 
court also pointed out that two of the sitting jurors admitted to 
learning, during the trial, of “the highly inflammatory charge 
that a prison inmate claimed Sheppard as the father of her 
illegitimate child.”  (Id. at p. 357.) 
It was the extraordinary circumstances involved in the 
Sheppard case, where “bedlam reigned at the courthouse,” 
because of the oppressive nature of the media’s presence both 
inside and outside the courtroom, resulting in a “carnival 
atmosphere,” that triggered the finding of a constitutional 
violation.  (Sheppard, supra, at pp. 355, 358.)  Those 
circumstances do not exist here.  We conclude, therefore, in 
accordance with our prior case law, that a trial court’s decision 
whether to sequester a jury is subject to an abuse of discretion 
standard of review.  We find no abuse of discretion here.   
 
First, we disagree with defendant that the trial court 
abdicated its responsibility to decide whether to sequester the 
jury, leaving it up to the jury to choose.  The trial court 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
71 
recognized and explicitly told the jury “that it was the court’s 
responsibility to make such decision.”  The court informed the 
jurors that, in making its decision, it would take their concerns 
and preference “into account.”  The court did so, but in denying 
defendant’s requests for sequestration, it also weighed the fact 
that “self-policing” appeared to be working and that 
sequestration has its “own pitfalls.”   
 
Second, as demonstrated by our extensive summary of the 
relevant proceedings, the record reflects that the trial court 
carefully and repeatedly addressed the potential impact of 
media coverage, peer pressure, and public sentiment by ordering 
the jurors to avoid any publicity regarding the case, 
admonishing them concerning their duty to decide the case 
solely based on the evidence presented, inquiring about the 
impact of outside influences on their ability to be fair and 
impartial, and crafting when necessary methods by which 
outside influences could be reduced or avoided.  Defendant has 
not pointed to anything in the record suggesting that the jurors 
failed to abide by the court’s orders and admonishments or 
misrepresented their continued ability to decide the case fairly 
on the trial evidence alone.  “[W]e cannot assume on a silent 
record that they ignored [such orders and admonishments] and 
were exposed to prejudicial material.”  (People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 
Cal.3d at p. 617.)  Indeed, the trial court expressly noted at one 
point that it had “every reason to believe [the jurors were] 
abiding by the court’s orders.”  Certainly, in the absence of any 
evidence that the jury was materially affected by the publicity 
and interest that this case generated, we cannot say there was 
any “substantial likelihood” that defendant did not receive a fair 
trial, as defendant urges.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
72 
5.  Joinder of the Child Pornography Charge with the 
Murder and Kidnapping Charges; Denial of 
Defendant’s Motion to Sever  
 
Defendant contends that the misdemeanor possession of 
child pornography charge alleged against him in count three 
(former § 311.11, subd. (a)6) did not meet the statutory 
requirements for joinder with the charges of capital murder and 
kidnapping.  (§ 954.)  Even if it did, defendant claims the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying severance.  We conclude 
the child pornography charge was properly joined with the 
murder and kidnapping charges.  We further conclude 
defendant failed to preserve the claim that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying severance, although we would find no 
error in any event. 
a.  Background 
 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to sever the child 
pornography charge from the kidnapping and murder charges 
on the ground that it was improperly joined to such charges 
under section 954.  Defendant did not request discretionary 
severance.  The court deferred consideration of the severance 
motion until it ruled on defendant’s related motion to exclude 
any evidence of pornography under Evidence Code section 1101.   
 
At the in limine hearing that followed, the prosecution 
identified the portion of pornographic materials found in 
defendant’s home office that it proposed to introduce as evidence 
at trial.  First, there were six video clips each lasting 
                                        
6  
In 2006, section 311.11 was amended to classify a first-
time commission of the offense as a “wobbler.”  (Stats. 2006, ch. 
337, § 23.)  In 2007, a first-time commission of the offense was 
designated a felony.  (Stats. 2007, ch. 579, § 38.) 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
73 
approximately 30 seconds or less, depicting forcible sexual 
attacks on young girls.  Next, there was a photograph depicting 
a young girl having sexual intercourse with an adult male.  
Another exhibit was composed of nine individual cartoon or 
anime images portraying forcible sexual acts; three of which 
depicted the rape of a female with a fully mature body, but with 
girlish facial features, and six of which depicted forcible sexual 
acts with pubescent girls.  Two other exhibits contained 
sequences of multiple anime images showing the rape of females 
with girlish features, hairstyles, and clothing.  Finally, the 
prosecution offered an exhibit containing another nine 
photographic images of unclothed pubescent and prepubescent 
females in what could be considered seductive poses.  The six 
video clips and the first photograph were specifically offered in 
support of the child pornography charge.  All of the images were 
offered as relevant to defendant’s motive and intent in 
kidnapping and murdering Danielle.  It was the prosecution’s 
position that “[t]aken together [the images] provide an 
extremely rare insight into the reasons for this kidnapping and 
murder. . . .  They demonstrate graphically [defendant’s] special 
attraction to young girls.”  The prosecution asserted that one of 
the images even looked similar to Danielle.   
 
The defense responded that because the pornography 
involving minors was a small percentage of the pornographic 
materials seized from defendant’s computers, it was misleading 
to suggest that possession of the materials reflected defendant’s 
interest in young girls.  The defense suggested that it might 
have to counter with the entire collection.  In addition, the 
defense argued that the images and video clips were not 
admissible on the issues of motive and intent without some 
explicit connection between them and the crimes committed 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
74 
against Danielle.  Finally, the defense contended that the 
prejudice emanating from this evidence was overwhelming.   
 
The trial court confirmed that the prosecution’s evidence 
would show that “the body of Danielle was found in a nude state, 
severely decomposed so that the cause of death could not be 
determined, and there were no biological samples recognizable 
or identifiable on the body at the time of the autopsy.”  The 
prosecution added that the evidence would also show Danielle’s 
fingerprints on a cabinet just above the bed in defendant’s 
motorhome, her blood in the motorhome hallway, and her hair 
in the motorhome bathroom and other places.  In light of the 
totality of these circumstances, the trial court ruled that the 
proffered pornography material would be “highly relevant” and 
“probative” on the issues of motive and intent.  Although it did 
not resolve at the time the question of which of the proffered 
images would be allowed to be introduced, it expressly found 
sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution’s theory of 
admissibility.   
 
Revisiting the issue the following day, the defense 
contended that the pictures were inadmissible character 
evidence suggesting that defendant was a pedophile.  Because 
there was no physical evidence that Danielle had been molested, 
it continued to be the position of the defense that there was no 
nexus between the images and the charged offenses.  The trial 
court reiterated its ruling from the previous day and added that, 
balancing the appropriate interests, it declined to exclude the 
evidence under Evidence Code section 352.  The court observed 
that the prosecution’s presentation of the evidence could be 
succinct and to the point, as it had been at the hearing.  The 
court doubted the claim made by defense counsel that the 
defense would respond by introducing defendant’s entire 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
75 
collection of pornography.  It felt the defense could adequately 
address its stated concern by establishing that the percentage of 
images depicting young girls out of the total number of 
pornographic images on defendant’s computers was small.  The 
court observed that the images the prosecution had elected to 
show were not as inflammatory as some of the photographs that 
they could have chosen to use.   
 
The trial court subsequently ruled that the video clips, the 
photograph depicting a young girl having sexual intercourse 
with an adult male, and the nine photographic images of 
unclothed pubescent and prepubescent females in seductive 
poses were admissible evidence on the charge of child 
pornography, as well as on the other charges.  The court ruled 
that the two sequences of multiple anime images and three of 
the individual anime images portraying forcible sexual conduct 
with females depicted with adult bodies were not admissible.  
However, it concluded that the six individual anime images 
showing forcible sexual acts with pubescent girls were 
admissible on the issue of defendant’s possible motive and 
intent.   
 
The trial court next considered defendant’s motion to sever 
the child pornography charge from the other charges in light of 
its rulings.  The defense contended that the child pornography 
charge was not within the same class of crimes as the 
kidnapping and murder charges, and that the commission of the 
one was not connected to the commission of the other two.  The 
prosecution conceded that the child pornography charge was not 
within the same class of crimes, but referencing its previous 
argument regarding the admissibility of the child pornography 
as evidence of defendant’s motive and intent in kidnapping and 
murdering Danielle, it contended that the crimes were clearly 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
76 
connected in their commission so as to permit joinder.  The trial 
court denied defendant’s severance motion.   
b.  Discussion of joinder 
 
Section 954 permits the joinder of “two or more different 
offenses connected together in their commission . . . or two or 
more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.”  
There is no claim that the child pornography charge alleged 
against defendant is of the same class of crime as the kidnapping 
and murder charges.  The issue is whether the child 
pornography offense is properly considered to be connected 
together with the kidnapping and murder of Danielle.  “Whether 
offenses properly are joined pursuant to section 954 is a question 
of law and is subject to independent review on appeal.”  (People 
v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 984.) 
 
We agree with the People that the charges here were 
connected in their commission.  “ ‘Offenses “committed at 
different times and places against different victims are 
nevertheless ‘connected together in their commission’ when they 
are . . . linked by a ‘ “common element of substantial 
importance.” ’  [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]”  (People v. Valdez (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 73, 119; accord People v. Alcala (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1205, 1219 (Alcala).)  Motive or intent may be such a common 
element of substantial importance.  (Alcala, supra, at pp. 1219-
1220 and cases cited therein; People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
73; Ghent v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 944, 958.)  In 
this case, defendant’s possession of child pornography reflected 
an interest in sexual conduct with, indeed sexual assault of, 
young girls that was highly relevant to explain why he would 
have kidnapped Danielle and ultimately murdered her.  Such 
interest and motivation had an evidentiary connection to the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
77 
kidnapping and murder charges in the physical evidence of 
Danielle’s handprint located near the bed of the motorhome, her 
blood and hair found in the motorhome, her hair found on 
defendant’s home bedding, and in the fact that she was abducted 
from her bed at night and her nude body was subsequently left 
in the desert.   
 
Defendant raises a number of objections to our reaching 
this conclusion. 
 
First, he points out that there was no evidence that he 
created the pornographic images seized or that he viewed them 
immediately prior to Danielle’s disappearance.  Defendant 
asserts that to qualify for joinder of the charges, the possession 
of proscribed pornography had to be connected to the evidence 
of the kidnapping and murder, and not to some speculation or 
theory of the prosecution concerning how or why those offenses 
were committed.  He further notes that there was no evidence 
that any of the images were of Danielle herself or that the 
images depicted a scene corresponding to the kidnap or murder 
of Danielle.  Defendant refers us to several cases in which such 
factors, under their respective facts, have been present or have 
posed an evidentiary concern.  But because none of these cases 
addressed the relevance of those factors as applied to the issue 
of joinder, they are inapposite.  (People v. Memro (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 786, 864-865; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 129; 
People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d 719, 727-728 (Guerrero); 
People v. Ghent, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 944, 955-956, 958; People 
v. Bales (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 694, 701.)  As the People observe, 
the presence of any of these factors would have made the 
evidence all the more damaging to defendant, but the absence of 
these factors does not compel a conclusion that, under the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
78 
circumstances present here, the child pornography charge was 
unconnected to the charged kidnapping and murder. 
Defendant appears to assume that intent or motivation 
cannot constitute evidence connecting crimes for purposes of 
joinder and, instead, that such connection can be made only 
through physical evidence or objectively measurable factors.  
But we have previously rejected the argument that the lack of 
physical evidence or other objectively measurable factors is 
necessary to establish the appropriateness of joinder.  Instead, 
we have expressly held that a connected intent or motivation, 
including a sexual motive, is sufficient in and of itself to 
establish the appropriateness of joinder.  (Alcala, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1220 [rejecting the contention that “intent or 
motivation cannot constitute a ‘common element of substantial 
importance,’ and, instead, only physical or objectively 
measurable factors, such as use of a specific individual weapon, 
can suffice” for joinder].) 
 
Defendant next contends that the unclothed state of 
Danielle’s body provides insufficient evidence of sexual 
motivation and intent.  He principally relies on People v. Craig 
(1957) 49 Cal.2d 313, 318-319 (Craig I).  In Craig, the issue was 
whether the evidence supported a theory of first degree felony 
murder perpetrated in the commission or attempted commission 
of a rape.  (Craig, supra, at p. 318.)  The lacerated and battered 
body of the victim was found lying under a car, legs spread 
slightly apart, clothed in a raincoat over a nightgown or slip and 
panties.  Each of the garments had been torn open, exposing the 
front of the body, but there was also evidence that the body had 
been dragged some 20 to 25 feet.  (Id., at p. 316.)  We concluded 
the evidence indicated a “terrific struggle,” but did not suffice to 
prove the killing was committed in the attempt to commit rape 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
79 
or in the commission of rape.  (Id., at p. 319.)  The issues before 
this court in Craig, and the other cases cited by defendant 
(People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 41-42; People v. Anderson 
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 34-36; People v. Granados (1957) 49 Cal.2d 
490, 497), are distinguishable from the issue of joinder 
presented here.  (See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 527 
[distinguishing the issues considered in Craig and Guerrero].)  
Here we are examining the prosecution’s proposed evidence to 
determine whether there is a substantial connection between 
the alleged crimes for purposes of joinder.  That inquiry does not 
depend on the sufficiency of the evidence that a sexual assault 
was ultimately attempted or completed.   
 
Moreover, contrary to the argument of defendant, there 
was other evidence besides the child pornography that 
suggested a sexual motivation for the kidnapping and murder of 
Danielle.  There was the evidence of her abduction from her bed 
at night, her handprint found on the cabinet above the bed in 
defendant’s motorhome, her hair found in his home bedding, and 
the absence of any clothing on or near her decomposed body.  We 
are not persuaded by defendant’s claim that the implication 
from the location of Danielle’s handprint is diminished 
significantly because a motorhome is such a cramped space.  
That Danielle’s handprint was found near the bed, therefore, 
still retained evidentiary significance.   
 
We conclude that the child pornography charge was 
validly joined with the kidnapping and murder charges under 
section 954.   
c.  Discussion of discretionary severance 
 
Because it ordinarily promotes efficiency, joinder “is the 
course of action preferred by the law.”  (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
80 
at p. 1220.)  “Nonetheless, a trial court has discretion to sever 
properly joined charges in the interest of justice and for good 
cause.”  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122.)   
 
“When exercising its discretion, the court must balance 
the potential prejudice of joinder against the state’s strong 
interest in the efficiency of a joint trial.”  (People v. Arias (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 92, 126 (Arias).)  To successfully claim that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever, a 
“ ‘ “defendant must make a clear showing of prejudice” ’ ” by 
demonstrating that the denial “exceeded the bounds of reason.”  
(People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 848 (Capistrano).)  
“An appellate court evaluates such claims in light of the 
showings made and the facts known by the trial court at the 
time of the court’s ruling.”  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 1, 37 (Merriman).)  “ ‘[A] party seeking severance must 
make a stronger showing of potential prejudice than would be 
necessary to exclude other-crimes evidence in a severed trial.’ ”  
(Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1222, fn. 11, quoting Arias, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 127; accord, People v. Soper (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 759, 773-774 (Soper).)   
 
“In determining whether a trial court’s refusal to sever 
charges amounts to an abuse of discretion, we consider four 
factors: (1) whether evidence of the crimes to be jointly tried is 
cross-admissible; (2) whether some charges are unusually likely 
to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak 
case has been joined with a stronger case so that the spillover 
effect of aggregate evidence might alter the outcome of some or 
all of the charges; and (4) whether any charge carries the death 
penalty or the joinder of charges converts the matter into a 
capital case.”  (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 968 
(O’Malley).)  “We then balance the potential for prejudice to the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
81 
defendant from a joint trial against the countervailing benefits 
to the state.”  (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775, fn. omitted.)  
However, “[i]f the evidence underlying the joined charges would 
have been cross-admissible at hypothetical separate trials, ‘that 
factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of 
prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly 
joined charges.’  [Citations.]”  (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 38.)  
 
Defendant complains that it is not clear that the trial court 
even considered the relevant factors and exercised its discretion 
in denying his motion for severance.  He argues that, in any 
event, the denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion.   
 
Defendant contended in his written motion and oral 
comments to the trial court  that the child pornography charge 
alleged in count three did not meet the statutory requirements 
for joinder with the kidnapping and capital murder charges.  He 
did not request, in the alternative, that the court exercise its 
discretion to sever the charges if it found the charges to be 
properly joined.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the trial 
court did not state for the record that it would deny such a 
request and explain its reasoning.  Under these circumstances, 
we conclude defendant has failed to preserve the claim that the 
trial court erred in denying discretionary severance pretrial. 
 
Even if we were to find no forfeiture, however, we would 
not find any error.  Here the evidence underlying the child 
pornography charge would have been cross-admissible at a 
hypothetical separate trial of the kidnapping and murder 
charges, as we have discussed in the previous section.  Indeed, 
the cross-admissibility of the two crimes flows in both directions 
because each crime illuminates the motive for the other. 
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82 
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 
does not persuade us otherwise.  In Page, defendant claimed 
prejudicial error in the admission of pornographic magazines to 
show his intent in committing a lewd act on a child.  (Id., at p. 
39.)  We found that the magazines “may have been probative 
with respect to defendant’s commission of the crimes,” although 
we found them to have “less probative value than the images 
considered in prior cases.”  (Id., at p. 40.)  But we declined to 
reach the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion 
under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the magazines 
because we found any error to be harmless under the 
circumstances.  (Id., at pp. 41-45.)  Because Page did not reach 
the issue of admissibility, it does not assist defendant’s claim 
that evidence of his possession of child pornography was 
irrelevant to the kidnapping and murder charges and therefore, 
not cross-admissible.  Moreover, the nature of the child 
pornography possessed by defendant here provided a much 
stronger inference of motive and intent than apparent in the 
magazines possessed by the defendant in Page.  (Id., at p. 39.) 
 
Further, if we were to reach the remaining three 
discretionary severance factors, we would still find no abuse of 
discretion. 
 
The 
second 
factor considers 
whether 
an 
inflammatory offense is being joined to one that is not 
inflammatory “under circumstances where the jury cannot be 
expected to try both fairly.”  (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 
909, 934.)  “The danger to be avoided is ‘that strong evidence of 
a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak 
prosecution case’ on another crime.”  (Ibid; accord Capistrano, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 850.)  Here the charge of possessing 
images of child pornography was no more inflammatory than 
the charges of kidnapping a young girl from her bed at night, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
83 
murdering her, and leaving her body to be ravaged by animals 
in the desert.  The evidence supporting each crime was strong, 
and this defeats the notion that strong evidence of one 
inflammatory crime was improperly used to bolster any weak 
evidence supporting the other crime.  In fact, defendant 
concedes, relevant to both the second and third factors, this was 
not a situation where “a weak case [was] joined with a stronger 
case” creating a “spillover effect of aggregate evidence [that] 
might alter the outcome of some or all of the charges.”  
(O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 968.)  Finally, the joinder of 
the child pornography charge did not convert defendant’s case 
into a capital one.  (Ibid.)   
6.  The Trial Court’s Admission of Additional 
Pornography Evidence   
 
At trial, the prosecution presented, through the testimony 
of its computer forensic examiner, James Watkins, Jr., a limited 
subset of the still images and video child pornography found 
recorded on CD-ROM’s and zip disks located in defendant’s 
home office.  The trial court subsequently ruled, however, that 
by its cross-examination of Watkins, the defense opened the 
door to the admission of almost all of the rest of defendant’s 
collection of pornography.   
 
Defendant claims that he did not “open the door” and if the 
cross-examination was in some way misleading, the appropriate 
remedy was corrective redirect examination by the prosecution, 
not the admission of additional pornography.  Defendant 
contends the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence 
Code section 352 by allowing Watkins to describe and the jury 
to view the additional pornography.  Defendant further asserts 
that admission of the additional evidence revealed the gross 
unfairness of the joinder of counts.  Defendant argues the trial 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
84 
court’s rulings undermined the fundamental integrity of the 
trial and amounted to a violation of due process.  We find no 
error.   
a.  Background 
 
As previously recounted, a pretrial hearing was held 
regarding defendant’s motion to sever the child pornography 
charge and related motion in limine to exclude the child 
pornography found on defendant’s computers and related 
storage mediums.  At the hearing, the prosecution proffered a 
limited number of images and video it intended to introduce, 
both as evidence of defendant’s possession of child pornography 
and of his intent and motive in kidnapping and murdering 
Danielle.  The trial court further narrowed the images that it 
would allow, exercising its discretion under Evidence Code 
section 352.  In so doing, the court indicated, among other 
things, its belief that the defense could adequately respond to 
the prosecution’s introduction of the child pornography by 
establishing that the percentage of images depicting young girls 
was small when considered in light of the total number of 
pornographic images possessed.  The court also observed that 
the images the prosecution had elected to show were not as 
inflammatory as some of the photographs that it could have 
chosen to use.   
 
During its case-in-chief, the prosecution called forensic 
examiner Watkins to testify about the “questionable” digital 
images — images that in his view were pornographic depictions 
of children under the age of 18 — that he found on two CD-
ROM’s and three zip disks located in defendant’s home office.  
The prosecution showed the jury fewer than 20 still images, 
including anime images, plus three movie segments.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
85 
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that on the 
four computers and related storage files located in defendant’s 
home, there were approximately 100,000 graphic or digital 
image files.  Out of this total, there were between 8,000 and 
10,000 depicting nudes, including adults.  Counsel then asked 
Watkins to confirm that the “17 stills” the jury saw were 
included in the 8- to 10,000 images.  Watkins agreed.  Defense 
counsel, with what the trial court later described as raised 
eyebrows expressing dismay, responded: “So apparently culled 
out of a hundred thousand you identified down 8- to 10,000, and 
then of the 8- to 10,000 you spotted 14 or so that the jury just 
saw?”  Watkins said: “Yes, sir.”  Defense counsel then confirmed 
with Watkins that there were also several hundred digital 
movies in the collection and asked if Watkins had noticed that 
there was a “common theme” in them of sexual intercourse with 
mature women.  The trial court allowed the questioning over the 
prosecution’s “best evidence” objection, indicating that the court 
and parties would likely need to discuss the matter further.  
Defense counsel continued by asking whether virtually all of the 
movies depicted adults engaged in various consensual sex acts.  
Watkins agreed.  Returning to the 8- to 10,000 still images, 
counsel asked Watkins to confirm that the theme of such images 
was large-breasted women.  Watkins responded that “there 
were a large amount of those.”  Defense counsel pressed Watkins 
whether this was not also true of the movies.  Watkins agreed 
that “there were quite a few of those.”   
 
At the beginning of the redirect examination of Watkins, 
the prosecution indicated that it wished to mark two binders for 
identification, containing all of the pornographic images seized 
from defendant’s home office.  The trial court stated that it 
thought doing so would be appropriate.  Defense counsel 
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86 
immediately asked for a sidebar conference.  The trial court 
excused the jury and the matter was discussed outside its 
presence.   
 
The court informed defense counsel that by virtue of his 
cross-examination, he had “put everything in issue.”  The court 
stated:  “You’ve represented to this jury, . . . that out of a 
hundred thousand images there are only 13 that are such that 
the District Attorney can find against your client.  You know, I 
know, that is not true.”  The trial court reminded defense 
counsel of the proceedings on the in limine motion and the fact 
that the court had directed the prosecution to pare down the 
number of images it intended to use at trial out of those that 
were admissible.  The court said it took such action under 
Evidence Code section 352 for the specific purposes of 
minimizing defendant’s exposure to the prejudicial impact of 
this evidence.  But, according to the trial court, the defense 
turned around and tried to suggest the images introduced were 
the only such images found.   
 
The defense denied that it had opened any door, although 
counsel acknowledged that Watkins’s report indicated there 
were about 80 questionable images.  Defense counsel 
complained that the prosecution had not requested a sidebar; 
instead objecting on the grounds of best evidence — a rule no 
longer in existence.  The trial court responded that if the defense 
had any doubt concerning the trial court’s position on the matter 
it could have requested a sidebar instead of immediately going 
“for the jugular” in cross-examination.  The court explained that 
the trial was “a search for the truth . . . and the truth is there 
are more than 13 images.”  The court indicated it would allow 
the jury to look at all of the identified pornographic material if 
it wanted to do so.   
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87 
 
The discussion between the court and counsel continued 
the next day with the defense maintaining its position that no 
door had been opened, that its cross-examination was within the 
scope authorized by the court during the pretrial hearing, and 
that if the defense had opened any door, Evidence Code section 
352 nevertheless required the evidence to be excluded.  The trial 
court responded that it believed defense counsel had 
intentionally and strategically questioned Watkins in a manner 
that left a “false impression” with the jury, which was not 
contemplated by the court’s prior ruling and which the 
prosecution was entitled to correct.  The court specifically ruled 
that the prosecution would be allowed to establish the true 
number of child pornography images and the nature of the other 
items.   
 
The defense asked for a specific “352 ruling” regarding a 
set of photographs depicting defendant’s girlfriend, Susan L., 
and her daughter, Danielle L.  The prosecution explained that it 
intended to show Watkins several images, including the 
photographs of Danielle L., and to have him describe the images 
but without showing them to the jury.  The court reviewed the 
photographs of Danielle L., indicating for the record that four of 
them showed a young girl laying on a sun chair with her legs 
spread apart.  The photographer in one of the photographs was 
taking the shot from an angle near the bottom of the chaise 
lounge, “shooting directly up the crotch area” of the young girl.  
The court agreed that Watkins could describe the content of the 
picture, but reserved ruling on whether the jury would be 
permitted to see it.   
 
The defense then asked the court to address several 
images depicting bestiality.  The prosecution indicated that it 
intended to have Watkins describe them generally.  The court 
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found that based on defense counsel’s prior cross-examination 
and accompanying “theatrics,” it would allow the prosecution to 
do so.   
 
In the jury’s presence, on redirect, Watkins clarified that 
when he stated that there were a total of 100,000 graphic image 
files, that number included every single image on the 
computers, including all icons, arrows, buttons and things of 
that nature.  Watkins identified the two binders that had been 
previously marked and described them as containing about 
8,000 images, including cartoon and anime images, showing 
mostly adult women, naked, and often engaged in sexual acts.  
Also included in the binders were images of nude or partially 
clothed children beyond those already shown to the jury.  He 
described two series of anime images he found that showed a 
young girl who is assaulted, bound, and ultimately raped.  The 
images had accompanying dialog text.  From the bedroom 
computer, Watkins testified that he recovered several digital 
photographs of bestiality, by which he meant “a person having 
sex acts with animals.”  Watkins briefly described a set of 
images showing his girlfriend’s daughter, Danielle L., in a 
“portrait-type setting” and sunbathing in a bikini on a chaise 
lounge with her legs spread.  Watkins also described some of the 
cartoons that were organized into digital file folders with labels 
of “Jetsons,” “Flintstones,” “Star Trek,” and the like.  In the 
folder marked “Jetsons,” there were images depicting the father 
having sexual relations with his daughter.  Other images were 
pictures of Mrs. Jetson unclothed.  Other folders, including the 
“Flintstones” and the “Simpsons,” were similar.   
 
On recross-examination, defense counsel asked Watkins 
to confirm that he had identified only 85 images of possible child 
pornography out of the 8- to 10,000 images of pornography; a 
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89 
percentage of about 1 percent.  The jury had seen 15 to 17 of 
those 85.  Watkins agreed, but noted that there were several 
images that were “borderline” as to the subject’s age, and he did 
not include those in the 85 he deemed questionable.  Out of the 
2600 movies Watkins examined, he believed 39 of them depicted 
juveniles under the age of 18; two of which had been shown to 
the jury.   
 
The defense subsequently moved for a mistrial based on 
two grounds — the ruling allowing all of the pornography into 
evidence and the denial of the severance motion.  Defense 
counsel noted for the record that several women jurors began to 
cry when watching the videos.  The trial court denied the 
motion.   
 
Ultimately, the trial court directed the prosecution to 
eliminate duplicate images from the two binders, but otherwise 
admitted them into evidence.  It indicated, however, that the 
evidence would not be given to the jurors for deliberations unless 
they requested it.  The court ruled that the bestiality 
photographs would remain part of the record because they had 
been referenced in testimony, but they would be sealed 
separately and the jury would not be allowed to see them even 
if requested.  During deliberations, the jury requested to see the 
pornography evidence.  The jury was provided the two binders 
and the photograph of Danielle L.   
b.  Discussion 
 
Defendant contends defense counsel did not “open the 
door” to the admission of the additional pornography and that if 
his counsel’s cross-examination was in some way misleading, 
the appropriate remedy was corrective redirect examination by 
the prosecution regarding the total number of questionable 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
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90 
images located by Watkins in the collection of pornography he 
examined.  We disagree. 
 
Our review of the record shows that the trial court, in 
ruling on defendant’s pretrial in limine motion, carefully 
circumscribed the pornography evidence that the prosecution 
would be allowed to introduce.  And at trial, the prosecution 
initially offered, through the testimony of its forensic examiner 
Watkins, less than what was permitted by the court’s pretrial 
ruling.  As the trial court recognized during the pretrial 
proceedings, it would have been permissible for the defense to 
counter the prosecution’s evidence with testimony establishing 
that the percentage of images depicting young girls out of the 
total number of pornographic images on defendant’s computers 
was small.   
 
On cross-examination of Watkins, however, defense 
counsel did not elicit the total number of questionable images 
and the total number of pornographic images that Watkins 
located so as to establish an approximate ratio of the one to the 
other.  The defense questioning, accompanied by the theatrical 
body language described by the trial court, instead misleadingly 
suggested that out of 8- to 10,000 pornographic images in 
defendant’s collection, the prosecution could find only the less 
than 20 questionable images that it had shown to the jury.  The 
defense knew this was not true.  The images and segments of 
video introduced at this point were both fewer in total number 
and, according to the trial court, less inflammatory than other 
images and videos depicting young girls found in defendant’s 
collection.  Moreover, defense counsel went on to ask Watkins 
whether the “theme” of the pornography collection was in fact 
sexual acts with large-breasted adult women.  In effect, the 
defense suggested the child pornography was not only limited in 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
91 
quantity, but importantly, was substantively a subject of little 
interest to defendant while ignoring the existence of numerous 
“borderline” pictures.  Defendant implicitly suggested to the jury 
that the videos and images it had seen were not representative 
of defendant’s sexual interest or fantasies. 
 
The prosecutor objected based on “best evidence.”  
Defendant contends the testimony sought by the defense cross-
examination was not subject to the best-evidence rule, which in 
its traditional form no longer exists.  (See Evid. Code, § 1521.)  
The prosecutor’s objection, however, may have reflected the idea 
that a review of the remainder of the pornography collection 
would best reveal whether the images of young girls was as de 
minimis in quantity and substance as defendant claimed.  The 
full collection would more accurately establish the true nature 
of defendant’s sexual interests.   
This concept is properly embodied by Evidence Code 356, 
the rule of completeness.  Evidence Code section 356 provides, 
in relevant part, that “[w]here part of [a] . . . writing is given in 
evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be 
inquired into by an adverse party; . . . ; . . . when a writing is 
given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or 
writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be 
given in evidence.”  “The purpose of Evidence Code section 356 
is to avoid creating a misleading impression.”  (People v. 
Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 130.) 
Under the rule of completeness, we agree with the trial 
court’s response that by its cross-examination, the defense had 
“opened the door” to the admission of the other pornography 
evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 356; see People v. Vines (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 830, 861; People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 643-
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644.)  The additional pornography became relevant in order for 
the jury to test defendant’s implicit assertion that the 
pornography in his collection did not reflect a particular sexual 
interest in young girls, much less an interest in violent sexual 
assault of young girls.  Under the circumstances, the 
prosecution was not limited to corrective redirect examination 
in order to counter defendant’s apparent attempt to mislead the 
jury.   
 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion under Evidence 
Code section 352 by allowing Watkins to describe and the jury 
ultimately to view the additional pornography.  “A trial court’s 
exercise of discretion under section 352 will be upheld on appeal 
unless the court abused its discretion, that is, unless it exercised 
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 
manner.”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 806.)  The 
trial court’s decision to allow Watkins to testify regarding the 
remainder of defendant’s collection and to allow the jury on 
request to view the collection, minus the images of bestiality, 
was not abuse of discretion under the circumstances.   
 
Finally, because the additional evidence was properly 
introduced, defendant has shown neither gross unfairness in the 
joinder of counts nor a violation of due process. 
7.  The Cross-Examination of Susan L.  
 
The prosecution portrayed defendant’s series of activities 
on the weekend of Danielle’s disappearance as being highly 
suspicious.  The defense called defendant’s former girlfriend, 
Susan L., to testify that such activities were not uncommon for 
defendant.  Her testimony also suggested that she was 
comfortable bringing her children on camping trips with 
defendant.   
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Specifically, Susan L. testified that she had been camping 
with defendant in his motorhome more times than she could 
count.  Her children, including her daughter Danielle L., often 
accompanied them.  On occasion they went to Silver Strand to 
camp, but when the weather was bad, they left after only a 
couple of hours and went instead to the desert at Borrego.  
Sometimes they arrived in the desert at night.  Susan recalled 
getting stuck in the sand at the desert several times.  Defendant 
would dig the sand out from the wheels and put boards 
underneath in order to get out.  They would abandon the boards 
because once they were going, they could not stop for fear of 
getting stuck again.   
 
Susan L. testified that when defendant was planning a 
camping trip, he would park the motorhome near his home.  
Sometimes the motorhome was parked for two days prior to 
camping.  When the motorhome was being loaded, its front door 
would sometimes be open.  Susan said that the area was a family 
neighborhood with children out walking on the sidewalks.  
According to Susan, the last thing that they would do before 
leaving to go camping was fill the motorhome with water.  When 
they were finished, they would just throw the hose in the front 
yard.   
 
On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to show 
that, despite Susan L.’s descriptions, defendant’s activities on 
the weekend of Danielle’s disappearance were still out of the 
ordinary for him.  When the prosecution sought to explore two 
other areas of cross-examination, however, defendant objected.  
Defendant now argues on appeal that the trial court 
prejudicially erred in overruling his objections.   
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First, defendant complains that the prosecution was 
allowed to question Susan L. regarding an incident that 
defendant characterizes as an alleged stalking.  The questioning 
arose in the following context.   
 
The prosecution elicited from Susan L. that she had twice 
left defendant and was no longer living with him, but that she 
still cared about him.  She had last seen defendant about three 
weeks before his arrest.  At that time, she had already broken 
up with defendant and she was out with a male friend.  At the 
end of the evening, the friend walked her to the door and gave 
her a kiss on the cheek.  At trial, Susan said she did not see 
defendant at the time, but spoke with him the next day.  When 
the prosecutor asked if defendant told her that he had been 
present the previous night, defense counsel’s objection was 
sustained.  The prosecutor asked to approach the bench.   
 
In the ensuing bench discussion, the prosecutor informed 
the court that Susan L. had previously told law enforcement 
that she saw defendant that night, but, regardless, Susan L. also 
said that defendant called her the following day and told her 
that he had been present the previous night to tell her about a 
business opportunity.  Defendant stated that he had watched 
Susan and her friend approach.  The defense contended that the 
inference the prosecution was trying to draw was that defendant 
was stalking Susan and urged the court to exclude the testimony 
under Evidence Code section 352.  The court expressed concern 
about the relevance of the proposed testimony.  The prosecutor 
responded it was relevant in that, although Susan L. still 
thought positively of defendant, it had “freaked her out” that he 
was surreptitiously present on this occasion.  The court ruled 
that the prosecutor would be allowed to go into “her state of 
mind,” specifically “that she didn’t have good feelings for him 
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95 
back on that particular date,” because that would be “in conflict 
with the way she is today.”  However, it ordered the prosecutor 
not to elicit testimony that she had “freaked out.”   
 
When 
cross-examination 
resumed, 
the 
prosecutor 
impeached Susan L. with a transcript of her interview with law 
enforcement in which she stated that she had found defendant 
sitting outside that night.  Susan also responded that defendant 
had called her the next day.  She admitted that after their 
conversation, she did not feel comfortable with defendant “at 
that time.”   
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing this 
cross-examination.  He concedes that evidence a witness bears 
enmity towards a party against whom he testifies is relevant to 
show bias — just as evidence that a witness is friendly toward a 
party for whom he testifies is also relevant to show bias.  
Therefore, as defendant concedes, the prosecutor’s questioning 
of Susan L. concerning whether she still cared for defendant was 
appropriate.  But, defendant argues, the questioning of Susan 
L. regarding the incident of alleged stalking suggested only that 
she should be hostile to defendant and accordingly, it was not 
proper impeachment of her testimony in favor of defendant.  In 
defendant’s view, the testimony was inadmissible character 
evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)  We are not persuaded. 
 
“The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at 
trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and 
affecting the weight of his testimony.’ ”  (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 
415 U.S. 308, 316.)  “The state of mind of a witness as to bias, 
prejudice, interest involved, friendship or hostility toward a 
party are all proper subjects for investigation in the trial of a 
case.”  (People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Cal.2d 27, 41.)  In exploring 
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such states of mind, we agree with the People that a witness 
may be impeached with evidence that she has previously held 
an opinion concerning a party different from her opinion 
expressed at trial.  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 474.)  
Defendant offers no authority supporting his claim that the 
prosecution could not both suggest Susan L.’s testimony in favor 
of defendant was biased because she still cared for him and at 
the same time impeach her implicit testimony that she felt 
comfortable with defendant by pointing out that she did not 
always feel that way.  We conclude the trial court acted within 
its discretion in allowing this line of questioning. 
 
In another area of cross-examination, the prosecution 
asked Susan L. if defendant would drink alcohol when they went 
out to the desert.  She testified that he did.  The prosecution 
then asked if defendant’s attitude or personality would change 
when he drank.  Defense counsel objected on grounds of 
Evidence Code section 352 and that the question called for 
inadmissible character evidence.  The trial court overruled the 
objection and Susan answered that she did notice a change in 
defendant’s behavior when he drank.  He became quiet, 
sometimes “a little upset,” and depressed.  His drinking was one 
of the reasons Susan left him.   
 
Later, the prosecutor asked to approach the bench.  He 
told the court that he had a transcript of an interview with 
Susan L. in which she stated that when defendant drank he 
became sexually and verbally abusive.  The prosecutor 
represented that he would not elicit this, but he did want to ask 
Susan if defendant became more “forceful” when he drank.  
Defense counsel objected that, among other things, such 
testimony would constitute inadmissible character evidence.  
The trial court observed that the evidence was overwhelming 
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that defendant had been drinking on the night Danielle 
disappeared.  It stated that Susan L. was a “percipient witness” 
regarding how defendant “changes when he [has] been 
drinking,” which it found to be relevant and probative.  The 
court stated that the proposed testimony would not be 
“character evidence in the true sense” and overruled defendant’s 
objection.  The prosecutor proceeded to ask Susan if defendant 
would become forceful when he had been drinking and she 
answered that she remembered “an occasion that he did.”   
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing 
Susan L. to testify concerning defendant’s “character for 
violence when intoxicated,” and that such evidence is generally 
prohibited character evidence under Evidence Code section 
1101, subdivision (a).  But even assuming the trial court erred, 
we conclude that the error in admitting this testimony was 
nevertheless harmless.  The physical evidence against 
defendant — Danielle’s hairs found in the bedding of 
defendant’s master bedroom, her handprint above the 
motorhome bed, the presence of her blood and hair in the 
motorhome, and the significant fiber evidence — combined with 
defendant’s strange activities over the weekend of her 
disappearance, his weak explanations to investigating officers, 
and the evidence of his interest in child pornography as a 
possible motive, presented a strong case supporting defendant’s 
guilt.  The alibi entomological evidence presented by the defense 
was powerfully rebutted.  In this context, it is not reasonably 
probable that the jury’s verdict would have been different if it 
had not heard from Susan L. that on one occasion defendant had 
been forceful with her when he had been drinking.  (People v. 
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)   
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Finally, defendant fails to persuade us that this error, 
even combined with any assumed error in allowing the other 
challenged cross-examination of Susan L., resulted in a 
fundamentally unfair trial that offends due process.  (People v. 
Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) 
8.  Restriction on Defendant’s Cross-Examination of 
Officer Redden  
 
San Diego Police Officer Paul Redden interviewed 
defendant on the afternoon of February 4, 2002, and 
administered a polygraph examination.  At trial, the prosecution 
called Redden to testify and introduced a version of the taped 
interview that had been redacted to eliminate all references to 
the polygraph examination, which evidence is inadmissible 
under Evidence Code section 351.1 as we have previously noted.  
In the cross-examination of Redden, defendant sought to elicit 
other discrete portions of the interview, but was warned by the 
trial court that if he did so, the entire interview might become 
admissible.  Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court’s 
restrictions on his cross-examination of Redden violated his 
right to present evidence under Evidence Code section 356, as 
well as his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  We 
disagree. 
a.  Background  
 
Defense counsel began his cross-examination of Redden by 
asking him how many hours he spent with defendant and how 
many times defendant asked him for counsel.  The trial court 
sustained the prosecutor’s Evidence Code section 352 objections 
to both questions.  At a bench conference outside the hearing of 
the jury, the court explained that it had made pretrial rulings 
regarding the admissibility of the interview tape and that 
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defendant’s requests for counsel were contained in the excluded 
parts of the interview.  It warned defense counsel that further 
questioning in this area would come “dangerously close to 
opening up this entire interview.”  Defense counsel responded 
that his questions went to the voluntariness of defendant’s 
responses, an issue defendant was entitled to present to the 
jury.  The court responded that it had ruled on defendant’s 
motion for exclusion that the interview was voluntary and that 
it had based that ruling on “the entire tape.”  If defense counsel 
wanted to pursue this line of questioning, the court warned 
again, it would “open the door” to the whole tape being admitted 
into evidence, and yet that would be defendant’s choice.  Defense 
counsel stated that “[g]iven the court’s ruling,” he would not “go 
there,” yet wanted to voice his objection “as to the 
voluntariness.”   
 
Later, defense counsel asked Redden whether he had 
asked defendant what his job was.  Redden said yes.  When 
counsel asked what defendant had told him, the prosecutor 
objected.  Defense counsel responded “[Evidence Code section] 
356.”  The trial court called counsel to a second bench conference 
at which it reminded defense counsel that the court and 
prosecutor had done everything they could to excise references 
to inadmissible evidence in the interview tape and transcript 
and that by asserting section 356, the court understood defense 
counsel to be implicitly requesting the introduction of the entire 
interview.  The court noted that the defense could make such a 
strategic move and that it could give a limiting instruction to 
the jury, but it wanted to make it clear that counsel was “on the 
brink of bringing [the entire interview] in.”  Defense counsel 
denied that his assertion of section 356 constituted a request to 
admit the entire interview.  Rather, counsel said, he was trying 
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to introduce portions of the interview that were relevant to the 
jury’s consideration of matters contained in the redacted tape.  
The court suggested that defense counsel should have raised 
these concerns when the tape was being edited.  Counsel 
responded that it had simply been assumed that the defense 
would be permitted to probe these areas.  The prosecutor 
objected that the defense was really trying to introduce 
sympathetic character evidence.  The court ruled that the 
defense could not cross-examine regarding matters that were 
not on the tape.   
 
Defense counsel then noted that the tape contained two 
statements by defendant in which he used the word “we” when 
talking about a stop he made during his weekend travels.  In 
order to explain defendant’s usage of the pronoun, defense 
counsel felt it was necessary to establish a foundational record 
that defendant had been in custody for a long time, he was 
fatigued, he had not eaten breakfast, he did not have a lot of 
sleep, and he had asked for counsel.  The trial court ruled that 
the defense could ask Redden about his observations regarding 
whether defendant appeared fatigued, but the court remained 
concerned that other questioning would alert the jurors to the 
fact that the tape had been redacted, something the defense had 
not wanted them to be told.  It ruled that defendant should 
“work with the tape you’ve got” at the risk of opening the door.  
Defense counsel subsequently elicited from Redden, without 
objection, that defendant told him that he had five hours of sleep 
the previous night and that he had not eaten.   
 
After Redden finished testifying, however, defendant 
raised the matter again and offered to waive any objection to the 
jury learning that the tape had been redacted.  In a further 
discussion outside the presence of the jury, the trial court 
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repeated its belief that the parties had worked together to edit 
the tape.  But, the court stated, if defense counsel still wanted 
to probe other areas not covered by the tape, it offered to provide 
a limiting instruction informing the jury that “there were 
redactions and that those redactions somehow didn’t get into the 
tape and that these other issues were covered.”  It again warned 
defense counsel “that this is a slippery slope . . . because the 
context of the Redden interview [wa]s the entire interview” and 
at some point, the entire statement would have to be introduced 
in order for the jury to understand the points being made.  The 
court left it up to the defense whether to recall Redden.  The 
defense did not recall him.   
b.  Discussion 
 
Defendant reasserts on appeal that he had a right to 
submit the facts regarding the voluntariness of his interview 
statements to the jury for its consideration of the reliability of 
the statements.  (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 689-
690.)  Defendant claims that he also had a right to question 
Redden regarding the context of his use of the pronoun “we” 
when he told Redden about making a stop during his weekend 
travels.  Defendant contends the pursuit of these relevant lines 
of inquiry would not have opened the door to introducing the 
inadmissible portions of the tape concerning his polygraph 
examination.  (Evid. Code, § 351.1.)  In support, defendant cites 
cases stating the principle that a party cannot take advantage 
of another party’s improper introduction of inadmissible 
evidence by failing to object and then claiming the door had been 
opened to further inadmissible evidence.  (People v. Steele (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 1230, 1271-1273 (conc. opn. of George, C. J.) (Steele); 
People v. Gambols (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 187, 192 (Gambols); 
People v. Arends (1958) 155 Cal.App.2d 496, 508-509 (Arends).)  
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Defendant, therefore, asserts the trial court erred in ruling that 
further cross-examination of Redden would open the door to 
admission of the entire interview, and he claims that, as a 
result, he had no real choice but to forego further questioning. 
 
We agree that defense counsel’s effort to cross-examine 
Redden about whether defendant had asked for an attorney did 
not constitute a waiver of the broad protection afforded by 
Evidence Code section 351.1, which prohibits any reference to 
“the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an 
offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph 
examination.”  (Evid. Code § 351.1, subd. (a).) 
 
But 
we 
reject 
defendant’s 
contention 
that 
the 
circumstances underlying Steele, Gambols, and Arends were 
present here.  No inadmissible evidence had been admitted, and 
the trial court’s ruling did not give the prosecution permission 
to introduce the entire tape containing the inadmissible 
polygraph evidence after a failure to object.   
In any event, the court’s warnings did not prejudicially affect 
the evidence before the jury.  Defendant’s comments about 
procuring a lawyer occurred after he had been told that he had 
failed the polygraph examination and were made in direct response 
to his failure of that test.  For this reason, the parties had originally 
agreed to redact these portions of the interrogation.   Consequently, 
whether defendant had requested an attorney does not seem 
strongly probative on the issue of whether defendant had made the 
“we” reference because he was tired.    
We also note that defendant was able to elicit from Redden 
that defendant said he had only five hours of sleep the previous 
night and that he had not eaten.  Thus, defendant was able to argue 
he was fatigued and hungry at the time of the interview, which 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
103 
could explain his “slip” in using the pronoun “we.”  As defendant 
notes in his reply brief, there was also testimony that defendant 
often was accompanied by others when he took his motor home 
excursions.  Nothing prevented defendant from arguing that 
defendant’s use of the plural pronoun when describing such 
excursions was a matter of habit.  In sum, even if we were to find 
error, it would be harmless given the other means by which 
defendant could have raised the same points and in light of the 
strength of the evidence against him.  (Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
pp. 156-157 [applying harmless error standard of People v. Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 to claim of error under Evid. Code § 356].)   
9.  Exclusion of the February 15 Anonymous 
Telephone Call to Brenda Van Dam 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously refused to 
admit evidence that Brenda Van Dam received a telephone call 
from an anonymous man on February 15, 2002, who asked her 
if she wanted her daughter back, and told her that Danielle had 
been abused but was still alive.  In defendant’s view, the 
telephone call supported his alibi defense because it was 
consistent with the testimony of his entomological expert 
Faulkner, who opined that Danielle’s body was first available 
for insect activity on February 16.  Defendant offered the 
telephone call as a declaration against the caller’s interest 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1230 and also argued its 
admissibility on federal due process grounds.   
 
Evidence Code section 1230 provides that the out-of-court 
declaration of an unavailable witness may be admitted for its 
truth if the statement, when made, was so far against the 
declarant’s interests, penal or otherwise, that a reasonable 
person would not have made the statement unless he or she 
believed it to be true.  “ ‘The proponent of such evidence must 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
104 
show “that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration 
was against the declarant’s penal [or other] interest, and that 
the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission 
despite its hearsay character.” ’ ”  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 555, 584.)  “The focus of the declaration against interest 
exception to the hearsay rule is the basic trustworthiness of the 
declaration.  [Citations.]  In determining whether a statement 
is truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code 
section 1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be 
admissible, the court may take into account not just the words 
but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the 
possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant’s 
relationship to the defendant.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Frierson 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745.)  We review the trial court’s finding 
for an abuse of discretion.  (Ibid.) 
 
We find no abuse of discretion here.  The trial court 
sustained the prosecution’s hearsay objection when the matter 
of the telephone call first came up during defendant’s cross-
examination of Brenda.  It specifically found that the 
anonymous caller’s statements lacked the reliability necessary 
for their admission.  The court reiterated its ruling excluding 
the evidence when the defense subsequently made a formal 
motion to have the evidence admitted.  It observed that the 
identity of the caller and the place from which the call was made 
were unknown.  The court also noted the publicity that this case 
had received and the possibility of a “crank” call being made.   
 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by finding “that 
statements by an anonymous tipster fail to satisfy the 
fundamental requirement of a declaration against interest — 
that the declarant actually believes himself to be at some 
significant risk of civil or criminal liability when he makes the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
105 
statement sought to be admitted.”  (Clark v. Optical Coating 
Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 171.)  Defendant 
argues, however, that this case falls outside of this rule because 
there was only one anonymous call conveyed and it occurred 
under circumstances in which the caller would likely have 
anticipated that the Van Dams’ telephone would be monitored.  
Indeed, the February 15 call might have been traced but for the 
fact that the warrant for a “tap and trace” on the Van Dam 
telephone had been inadvertently allowed to lapse.   
 
It is purely speculative that the person who made the 
single February 15 telephone call to the Van Dams believed his 
call would be traced.  And even if he thought the communication 
would be traced, there is no basis to conclude he believed that 
his identity would thereby be discovered, subjecting him to 
criminal liability or social opprobrium, within the meaning of 
Evidence Code section 1230.  As the trial court noted, nothing 
indicated the place from which the telephone call was made.  
The communication could have easily been made from a number 
unassociated with the caller precisely in order to maintain his 
anonymity.  Moreover, the caller gave no details regarding the 
basis for his claimed knowledge that could be tested and given 
the extensive publicity the case had been receiving, the 
possibility that the communication was a “crank” call was real.  
Under these circumstances, the trial court’s finding of 
untrustworthiness was eminently reasonable.   
 
The situation present here is not, as defendant argues, 
comparable to the exclusion of evidence that otherwise “bore 
persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” found by the high 
court to have violated due process in Chambers v. Mississippi 
(1972) 410 U.S. 284, 302.  Rather, as we have stated before, the 
“foundational prerequisites are fundamental to any exception to 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
106 
the hearsay rule.”  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 57.)  
“ ‘[A] defendant does not have a constitutional right to the 
admission of unreliable hearsay statements.’ ”  (People v. Ayala 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 269.)  Application of “the ordinary rules 
of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right 
to present a defense.”  (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834; 
accord People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1229.) 
10.  The Adequacy of CALJIC No. 2.16 in Considering 
Dog-Scent Evidence   
 
As noted in the statement of facts, Jim Frazee, a volunteer 
canine handler from the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, 
testified that he and his trained search and cadaver dog Cielo 
were called upon to search defendant’s motorhome.  Cielo 
“alerted” to the first storage compartment behind the 
passenger’s door; an area where air from inside the motorhome 
would naturally escape.  When the storage door was opened, 
Cielo showed “interest” in a shovel and lawn chair that were 
inside.  According to Frazee, Cielo’s alert indicated that a body 
had been some place in the motorhome.   
 
Defendant does not claim error in the admission of the 
dog-scent evidence.  Rather, he claims two errors in the trial 
court’s instruction to the jury regarding its consideration of the 
evidence.  First, he argues that CALJIC No. 2.16, which 
instructed the jury in its consideration of dog-tracking evidence, 
was inadequate because it failed to admonish the jury to view 
the evidence with caution.  Second, he argues that CALJIC No. 
2.16 is inadequate because it fails to relate the jury’s 
consideration of the evidence to the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof.  We reject both claims.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
107 
a.  Lack of Cautionary Admonishment 
 
The admission of dog-tracking or dog-scent evidence7 was 
first approved in People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905 
(Craig II).  The foundational requirements for admission of such 
evidence were further developed in People v. Malgren (1983) 139 
Cal.App.3d 234 (Malgren).  Specifically, the Malgren court 
identified the following five foundational requirements:  “(1) the 
dog’s handler was qualified by training and experience to use 
the dog; (2) the dog was adequately trained in tracking humans; 
(3) the dog has been found to be reliable in tracking humans; (4) 
the dog was placed on the track where circumstances indicated 
the guilty party to have been; and (5) the trail had not become 
stale or contaminated.”  (Id., at p. 238.)  When the issue was 
recently presented to us, we approved the admission of dog-scent 
evidence upon a sufficient foundational showing of the first four 
Malgren requirements.  (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 
325-326.)  We determined that the fifth Malgren factor “is not 
an independent requirement; it is satisfied by evidence that 
establishes the other four factors.”  (Id., at p. 325.)  We have not, 
however, had an occasion to consider the jury instruction that 
should accompany the admission of such evidence.   
 
The trial court in this case instructed the jury with the 
language of CALJIC No. 2.16, as follows:  “Evidence of dog 
tracking has been received for the purpose of showing, if it does, 
that the defendant is the perpetrator of the crimes of kidnapping 
and murder.  This evidence is not by itself sufficient to permit 
an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crimes of 
                                        
7  
CALJIC No. 2.16 refers to this type of evidence as dog-
tracking evidence.  Under the circumstances here, the evidence 
is more readily understood as dog-scent evidence.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
108 
kidnapping and murder.  Before guilt may be inferred, there 
must be other evidence that supports the accuracy of the 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes 
of kidnapping and murder.  [¶]  The corroborating evidence need 
not be evidence which independently links the defendant to the 
crime.  It is sufficient if it supports the accuracy of the dog 
tracking.  [¶]  In determining the weight to give to dog-tracking 
evidence, you should consider the training, proficiency, 
experience, and proven ability, if any, of the dog, its trainer, and 
its handler, together with all the circumstances surrounding the 
tracking in question.”   
 
Although CALJIC No. 2.16 specifically instructs the jury 
that dog-tracking (dog-scent) evidence is not sufficient alone to 
permit a finding of guilt and that corroboration of the accuracy 
of the identification is necessary, defendant claims that still 
more cautionary directions are required.  He argues that the 
instruction is inadequate because it fails to expressly admonish 
the jury to view the dog-scent evidence “with care and caution” 
and contends that the trial court had a duty to add such 
admonition on its own motion.8  According to defendant, such an 
express cautionary admonition is necessary because dog-scent 
                                        
8  
Defendant did not object to the instruction on this ground, 
but raises the claim on appeal relying on section 1259, which 
provides instructional errors are reviewable “if the substantial 
rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”  (§ 1259; People 
v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247.)  The People do not 
challenge the applicability of section 1259.  But we have 
previously recognized that “it is more appropriate to permit 
defendants to determine whether to request the instruction than 
to require the trial judge to give it in every case” because dog 
tracking evidence can be either inculpatory or exculpatory.  
(People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1192 (Diaz).) 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
109 
evidence, like accomplice testimony, in-custody informant 
testimony, and evidence of an oral confession or admission by a 
defendant, presents a substantial risk of “specious reliability.”  
He notes that the dog-scent instruction given in Craig included 
an admonition that such evidence “must be viewed with the 
utmost of caution.”  (Craig II, supra, 86 Cal.App3d at p. 917.)   
 
The majority of the court in Malgren, however, specifically 
rejected the argument that “the court was obligated to instruct 
that dog trailing evidence must be viewed with caution.”  
(Malgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 241.)  It reasoned that 
“[u]nlike accomplice testimony, dog tracking evidence is not 
inherently suspect because of a self-interested source.  
[Citation.]  The notion that such evidence is of slight probative 
value or must be viewed with caution stems at least in part from 
a fear that a jury will be in awe of the animal’s apparent powers 
and will give the evidence too much weight.  [Citation.]  In light 
of the stringent foundational requirements which must be met 
before such evidence is admissible at all, however, we see no 
reason to categorize that evidence thereafter as inferior or 
untrustworthy, and instruct that it be given less weight than 
other evidence.  The Craig II court itself suggested that what 
the law in this state actually requires is not that dog trailing 
evidence be viewed with caution, but that it be treated as any 
other evidence, with its weight left to the trier of fact.  (Craig II, 
supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 918.)”  (Malgren, at pp. 241-242.) 
 
Defendant urges us to disapprove Malgren on this point.  
He argues that dog-scent evidence is “highly problematic” and 
in this way is akin to accomplice testimony, in-custody 
informant testimony, and evidence of an oral confession or 
admission by a defendant, which he asserts have similar 
questionable reliability and so warrant a cautionary instruction 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
110 
on its own motion.  Subsequent to the filing of defendant’s 
briefing, however, we have concluded that trial courts do not 
have a duty to instruct the jury on its own motion to view with 
caution evidence of a defendant’s extrajudicial statements.  
(Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th, at pp. 1189-1190.)  In reaching that 
conclusion, we started with the observation that a trial court has 
such a duty to instruct only “ ‘on the general principles of law 
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.  [Citations.]  The 
general principles of law governing the case are those principles 
closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and 
which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’ ”  
(Id., at p. 1189.)  We then considered “whether the cautionary 
instruction [regarding defendant’s extrajudicial statements] is 
one of those ‘general principles of law’ so ‘necessary for the jury’s 
understanding of the case’ that the instruction must be given by 
the trial court even when the defendant does not request it.”  
(Ibid.)  We ultimately concluded that “[t]he cautionary 
instruction is no longer ‘necessary for the jury’s understanding 
of the case’ [citation] because courts are now required to instruct 
the jury, in all criminal cases, concerning the general principles 
that apply to their consideration of witness testimony.”  (Id., at 
p. 1190.)   
 
Considering defendant’s contention in light of this 
framework of analysis, we conclude an express cautionary 
admonition regarding dog-scent evidence is not a general 
principle of law necessary to the jury’s understanding of the 
case.  (Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1189-1190.)  First, we agree 
with the Malgren majority that “the stringent foundational 
requirements which must be met before such evidence is 
admissible at all” ensure that this type of evidence is not 
inherently “inferior or untrustworthy,” requiring that the jury 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
111 
be instructed to give it “less weight than other evidence.”  
(Malgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 241.)9   Second, we note 
CALJIC No. 2.16 observes that the “[e]vidence of dog tracking 
has been received for the purpose of showing, if it does, that the 
defendant is the perpetrator of the crimes of kidnapping and 
murder.”  (Italics added.)  The highlighted language alerts the 
jury to consider the possibility that the evidence does not reflect 
that defendant is the perpetrator.  Combined with the language 
of CALJIC No. 2.16 instructing the jury that dog-scent evidence 
is not sufficient alone to permit a finding of guilt, that 
corroborating evidence is necessary, and that the jury should 
consider the training, proficiency, experience, and proved 
ability, if any, of the dog, its trainer, and its handler, along with 
all of the surrounding circumstances, CALJIC No. 2.16 already 
contains limitations and safeguards ensuring that the jury will 
carefully evaluate dog-scent evidence.  Moreover, the jurors also 
were apprised of the general rules advising caution in the 
consideration of circumstantial evidence.  (CALJIC No. 2.01.)  A 
further cautionary instruction is neither necessary nor 
appropriate for the jury’s understanding.   
                                        
9  
Defendant fails to persuade us that the foundational 
requirements are so easy to satisfy in this “age of the credential 
and the certification” that they do not provide an adequate 
measure of reliability.  The fact that a dog and its handler have 
been certified by a credentialed organization specializing in 
canine search and rescue is only one of many circumstances that 
a trial court may considered in determining whether the 
foundational requirements for admissibility of proffered dog-
scent evidence have been met.  If the evidence is allowed, it is 
only one of many circumstances that may be considered by the 
jury in deciding the weight to give the evidence.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
112 
 
Defendant, therefore, has not shown any error in the trial 
court’s failure to insert a cautionary admonition in CALJIC No. 
2.16.   
b.  Lessening of the Burden of Proof 
 
Defendant claims there is a further problem with CALJIC 
No. 2.16.  Defendant contends the instruction is deficient 
because it fails to relate the issue of dog-scent evidence to the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  According to 
defendant, to avoid lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof, 
CALJIC No. 2.16 should include further language along the 
lines used in current CALCRIM No. 376 [Possession of Recently 
Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime], which closes with the 
following admonition:  “Remember that you may not convict the 
defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact 
essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that 
crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”   
 
CALJIC No. 2.16, regarding dog-scent evidence, bears 
substantial similarity to the standard pattern instructions 
(CALJIC No. 2.15; CALCRIM No. 376), concerning a jury’s 
consideration of evidence of a defendant’s possession of recently 
stolen property.  CALJIC No. 2.15 and CALCRIM No. 376 both 
instruct a jury that the defendant’s conscious possession of 
recently stolen property is not by itself sufficient to permit an 
inference of the defendant’s guilt and that there must be other 
corroborating evidence of the defendant’s guilt before guilt may 
be inferred.  (CALJIC No. 2.15; CALCRIM No. 376.)  Similarly, 
CALJIC No. 2.16 instructs the jury that evidence of dog tracking 
that shows a defendant to be the perpetrator of a charged crime 
is not by itself sufficient to permit an inference of the 
defendant’s guilt and that there must be corroborating evidence 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
113 
that either supports the accuracy of the dog scent evidence itself 
or independently supports the identification of the defendant as 
the perpetrator.  The instructions differ in that both CALJIC 
No. 2.15 and CALCRIM No. 376 instruct the jury that the 
corroborating evidence need only be “slight.”  CALJIC No. 2.16 
does not include that language. 
 
Like CALJIC No. 2.16, CALJIC No. 2.15 contains no 
language similar to the closing reminder in CALCRIM No. 376 
regarding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.  
Nevertheless, as defendant recognizes, we have rejected the 
argument that CALJIC No. 2.15 erroneously lessens the 
prosecution’s burden of proof.  We have found that “there is 
nothing in the instruction that directly or indirectly addresses 
the burden of proof, and nothing in it relieves the prosecution of 
its burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People 
v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 355-356.)  Moreover, we 
determined, “given the court’s other instructions regarding the 
proper consideration and weighing of evidence and the burden 
of proof, there simply ‘is “no possibility” CALJIC No. 2.15 
reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof.’ ”  (Id at p. 356.)  
Subsequently, in People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, we 
explained that the trial court’s giving of CALJIC No. 2.15, 
although erroneous in applying the “slight” corroboration rule to 
a murder charge, “in no way altered the trial court’s proper 
instructions concerning the elements of [the charged offense] 
that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The jury was instructed it could draw merely ‘an 
inference of guilt’ from the fact of possession with slight 
corroboration, which any rational juror would understand 
meant he or she could consider this inference in deciding 
whether the prosecution has established the elements of [the 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
114 
charged offense] elsewhere defined in the trial court’s 
instructions.  The instruction purported to explain to the jury its 
proper consideration of a particular item of circumstantial 
evidence in reaching a verdict on the charges; it did not alter the 
defining elements of those charges.”  (Id., at p. 1131.)   
 
Defendant asks that we reach a different conclusion with 
respect to CALJIC No. 2.16 in light of the CALCRIM 
committee’s decision to add to CALCRIM No. 376 the closing 
reminder regarding the burden of proof and in light of his 
assertion that dog-scent evidence is “typically unreliable.”  
Contrary to defendant’s view, however, the additional language 
of CALCRIM No. 376 does not reflect a legal inaccuracy or 
deficiency in CALJIC No. 2.16.  CALJIC No. 2.16 provided the 
jury with instructions regarding an inference that the jury 
might draw from this particular item of circumstantial evidence 
but did not alter the court’s other instructions concerning the 
necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  (CALJIC Nos. 
2.01, 2.90.)  And, as explained in the previous section, courts 
have treated dog-scent evidence that has passed the stringent 
foundational requirements for admission into evidence as not 
“inferior or untrustworthy.”  (Malgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 241.)  Defendant fails to persuade us that our previous 
rejection of this argument in the context of CALJIC No. 2.15 
should not be applied by analogy to CALJIC No. 2.16.  Doing so, 
we reject defendant’s claim of error. 
11.  The Trial Court’s Refusal to Modify CALJIC No. 
2.51   
 
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.51 
that “[m]otive is not an element of the crime charged and need 
not be shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of 
motive as a circumstance in this case.  Presence of motive may 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
115 
tend to establish the defendant is guilty.  Absence of motive may 
tend to show the defendant is not guilty.”  The trial court denied 
defendant’s request to add language instructing the jury that 
“motive is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight 
and significance, if any, are for you to decide.”   
 
Pointing to other instructions that contain language 
cautioning the jury that certain evidence is not sufficient to 
establish guilt, including CALJIC Nos. 2.15 and 2.16, defendant 
argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse his request.  
Defendant contends that under the specific circumstances of 
this case, in which inflammatory images of child pornography 
were offered as evidence of motive, the additional language was 
not only salutary, but necessary.   
 
This court has previously rejected the argument that it is 
necessary to instruct the jury that motive alone is insufficient to 
establish guilt.  We have explained that if CALJIC No. 2.51 “ 
‘somehow suggested that motive alone was sufficient to 
establish guilt, defendant’s point might have merit.  But in fact 
the instruction tells the jury that motive is not an element of the 
crime charged (murder) and need not be shown, which leaves 
little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish 
all the elements of murder.  When CALJIC No. 2.51 is taken 
together with the instruction on the concurrence of act and 
specific intent (CALJIC No. 3.31) and the instruction outlining 
the elements of murder and requiring each of them to be proved 
in order to prove the crime (CALJIC No. 8.10), there is no 
reasonable likelihood [citation] it would be read as suggesting 
that proof of motive alone may establish guilt of murder.’ ”  
(People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1168 (Livingston), 
quoting People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 97-98 (Snow).) 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
116 
 
Defendant argues that because Livingston, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at page 1168, involved a claim that the trial court had a 
duty to modify CALJIC No. 2.51 on its own motion, it is not 
authority for rejecting his contention that the trial court erred 
in denying his request for the additional language.  However, 
nothing in Snow or Livingston suggests our rejection of the 
argument was limited to claims concerning the trial court’s duty 
to instruct on its own motion.  Indeed, the defendant in 
Livingston noted that the court had instructed the jury in his 
case regarding flight, using the language of CALJIC No. 2.52, 
which told the jury that evidence of flight is not sufficient by 
itself to establish guilt.  Livingston contended that “the failure 
to so state regarding motive would cause the jury to believe that 
motive alone was enough to convict.”  (Livingston, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at p. 1168)  As relevant here, we found there was no 
error and no prejudice.  We stated: “The court fully instructed 
the jury on the reasonable doubt standard.  We find no 
reasonable likelihood the jury would infer from the motive 
instruction that motive alone could establish guilt.  Moreover, 
given the strong evidence of guilt aside from motive, the jury 
certainly did not base its verdicts solely on motive.”  (Id., at p. 
1169.)  The same can be said here.   
12.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of Forcible Asportation 
Underlying the Kidnapping Conviction  
 
Defendant contends that the evidence presented at the 
guilt phase of trial was insufficient to support his conviction of 
kidnapping under section 207 — and therefore his conviction of 
felony murder predicated on kidnapping — because there was 
assertedly no evidence that Danielle was removed from her 
house by force or fear.  Defendant emphasizes that there is no 
evidence showing how Danielle was taken, no evidence of a 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
117 
disturbance or commotion noticed by those at the house or the 
family dog, and no trace evidence linking defendant to the 
interior of the Van Dam home.  He contends, therefore, that the 
circumstances amount to a taking effected by fraud or deceit, 
which does not constitute kidnapping within the meaning of 
section 207.  (See People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 327-
328.)  Defendant further asserts that the record contains no 
evidence of later use of force or exploitation of fear.  We reject 
defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim.  
Defendant was charged with kidnapping Danielle in 
violation of section 207, subdivision (a), which provides that 
“[e]very person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling 
fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in 
this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or 
county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of 
kidnapping.”  (§ 207, subd. (a).) 
 
“As can be seen by this language, in order to constitute 
section 207(a) kidnapping, the victim’s movement must be 
accomplished by force or any other means of instilling fear.”  
(People v. Majors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 326.)  Defendant’s jury 
was instructed accordingly with CALJIC No. 9.50, which in 
relevant part, told the jury that “[i]n order to prove this crime,” 
it must be proved that “[a] person was unlawfully moved by the 
use of physical force, or by any other means of instilling fear[.]”  
Defendant points out that “asportation by fraud alone does not 
constitute general kidnapping in California.”  (People v. Davis 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517, fn. 13.)   
 
In evaluating a claim regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we review the record “in the light most favorable to 
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
118 
substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, 
credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  “The federal 
standard of review is to the same effect:  Under principles of 
federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not 
the determination whether the reviewing court itself believes 
the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 
citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320; accord 
People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1322.)  “The 
standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution 
relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”  (People v. Rodriguez, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11; accord People v. Watkins (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 999, 1019-1020.)  “We presume in support of the 
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably 
could infer from the evidence.  [Citation.]  If the circumstances 
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the 
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances 
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”  
(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 (Lindberg).) 
 
There is no dispute that seven-year-old Danielle was 
removed from her bedroom in the Van Dam home sometime 
between 10:30 p.m. on February 1, after her father Damon first 
went to bed, and 9:00 a.m. on February 2 when she was 
discovered to be missing.  We agree with the People that the jury 
could have reasonably inferred that defendant abducted 
Danielle by either using force to quietly subdue her or by 
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119 
threatening her with harm if she made any noise.  Although it 
is possible that defendant persuaded or tricked Danielle into 
secretly leaving with him, even assuming such a possibility 
reasonably exists, it simply presents a contrary view of the 
evidence.  Reversal is “not warranted simply because the 
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 
contrary finding.”  (Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.)   
 
More important, even assuming Danielle had been moved 
by a ruse and not through force or fear, the evidence was 
sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for kidnapping.  
Danielle’s status as a young child is significant because we have 
long recognized an alternative standard for such victims for 
purposes of kidnapping under section 207.  We have held that 
the kidnaping of a minor can be accomplished without the same 
kind of force or fear applicable to adult victims provided that it 
was done for an improper purpose, because a minor is “too young 
to give his [or her] legal consent to being taken.”  (People v. 
Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 764 (Oliver).)  Accordingly, we have 
construed section 207, “as applied to a person forcibly taking and 
carrying away another, who by reason of immaturity or mental 
condition is unable to give his [or her] legal consent thereto, . . . 
[to constitute] kidnaping only if the taking and carrying away is 
done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  (Oliver, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768.)  In Oliver, we applied this 
construction of section 207 to the taking of a two-year-old child.  
We later applied the same construction to the takings of even 
younger children.  (See People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 857-
858 [seven-month-old]; In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 
607 (Michele D.) [12-month-old].) 
Moreover, at the time of defendant’s trial, the use note for 
CALJIC 9.50 described the exception we established in Oliver:  
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“If the victim of the alleged kidnapping is incapable of giving 
consent, the People must prove the movement was done for an 
illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  (CALJIC No. 9.50 
(1999 rev.) (6th ed. 1996), citing Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 
768.)  Thus, it was well-established at the time of defendant’s 
trial that the forcible taking language of section 207 as charged 
against defendant involves an alternative standard when the 
child victim is “too young to give his [or her] legal consent to 
being taken.”  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 764.) 
Consequently, even if Danielle was persuaded into leaving 
her home, she could not have legally consented and was still 
kidnapped if she was taken away a substantial distance for an 
illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.  Kidnapping is, 
moreover, a continuous offense.  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 1044, 1159 [kidnapping continues “until such time as 
the kidnapper releases or otherwise disposes of the victim and 
has reached a place of temporary safety”].) 
The evidence indicated that defendant had moved 
Danielle.  The mitochondrial DNA profiles of six hairs recovered 
from the master bedroom of defendant’s residence matched 
Danielle’s mitochondrial DNA profile, suggesting she had been 
in defendant’s bedroom.  According to the latent fingerprint 
examiner, the handprint Danielle left on the cabinet above 
defendant’s motorhome bed showed pressured movement of her 
hand.  Moreover, the mitochondrial DNA profiles of two hairs 
recovered from the floor of defendant’s motorhome matched 
Danielle’s mitochondrial DNA profile, and a third hair found in 
the motorhome sink matched Danielle’s more distinct nuclear 
DNA profile, all of which further support her presence in 
defendant’s motorhome.  Viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the judgment, these circumstances suggests she 
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121 
was alive at some point when defendant drove the motorhome 
to various locations.  Thus, defendant’s movement of Danielle — 
likely to his house and certainly in his motorhome — continued 
the kidnapping. 
Defendant suggests, however, that this recognized 
exception to the force requirement of section 207 has been 
applied to only the takings of infants, and not older children 
such as Danielle.  But the Courts of Appeal have applied Oliver 
to child victims with ages similar to seven-year-old Danielle.  
(See People v. Dalerio (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 775, 782 [nine-
year-old]; Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392, 
403, fn. 3 [seven-year old]; see also People v. Ojeda-Parra (1992) 
7 Cal.App.4th 46, 50 [three-year-old].)  As a result, the record 
overwhelmingly meets the standard of force as we apply it to 
children, given that Danielle was removed from her house 
without her parents’ consent and moved from there to where her 
body was eventually found.   
 
Defendant further objects, however, to the application of 
the standard of force described by the Oliver line of cases on the 
grounds that “this alternate theory of forcible kidnapping” was 
not alleged against him and the jury was not instructed on this 
alternative theory.  He contends that these circumstances also 
contributed to the insufficiency of the evidence to support his 
conviction for kidnapping because a conviction cannot be 
affirmed on appeal on a factual theory never tried before a jury. 
Concerning the alleged pleading error, defendant’s 
argument is inapt because Oliver and Michele D., and the other 
related cases described above, did not create a new or different 
crime of kidnapping that needed to be expressly pleaded against 
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122 
the defendant.  Instead, these cases simply applied an 
alternative standard in kidnapping cases involving children.   
Moreover, the information made clear that defendant was 
being charged with the kidnapping of a child.  In fact, defendant 
concedes that his kidnapping charge alleged that Danielle was 
“a child under the age of fourteen years.”  In a similar context, 
we have held that “an accusatory pleading charging murder 
need not specify the theory of murder upon which the 
prosecution intends to rely.”  (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
891, 937.)  Here, the information filed against defendant, if 
anything, highlighted the theory of which he now complains by 
alleging the kidnapping of a child, thereby placing him on notice 
that the prosecution could rely on the theory of kidnapping used 
in Oliver and Michele D. 
Nor does it matter for purposes of defendant’s 
insufficiency of the evidence claim that the jury was not 
informed of the alternative standard applicable to the 
kidnapping of a child.  The jury was instructed that, in order to 
convict defendant of kidnapping, the evidence must show that 
defendant moved Danielle using the standard threshold of force 
required for kidnapping, which is higher than the threshold of 
force we established in Oliver.  Additionally, the jury’s finding 
of guilt for the kidnapping charge necessarily indicates it 
believed she had been moved against her will, either by force or 
by inducing fear, or both. 
Thus, if the jury concluded that Danielle had accompanied 
defendant out of fear, then any definition of force, alternatively 
defined or not, was irrelevant to defendant’s conviction for 
kidnapping.  On the other hand, if the jury concluded that a 
seven-year old would have made some effort to resist but was 
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123 
overcome through defendant’s use of force to move her, then the 
alternative definition of force under Oliver is also irrelevant to 
defendant’s conviction for kidnapping.  Consequently, with the 
understanding that the showing of force required for a child 
victim like Danielle is greatly reduced, there is no doubt that, 
construing the facts most favorable to the judgment, any 
rational trier of fact could have reasonably inferred from the 
evidence that Danielle had been removed from her home against 
her will for purposes of kidnapping. 
 
Admittedly, however, defendant’s jury was not instructed 
that it must find Danielle was taken and carried away “for an 
illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.”  We have recognized 
the importance of the “illegal purpose or illegal intent” 
requirement that was established in Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at 
page 764, because, without such a requirement in cases 
involving children, “every time a person picks up and moves a 
child, he or she could be charged with kidnapping.”  (Michele D., 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 612; Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768 
[“So construed the legislative purpose will be preserved and 
furthered, and innocent persons who cannot have been within 
the legislative intention in adopting section 207 will be excluded 
from the operation of the law”].) 
Although this element concerning the Oliver theory of 
kidnapping was not presented to the jury, any asserted error 
was harmless under either the state or federal constitutions.  
(See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 17 [under the 
federal constitution, the failure to instruct the jury on an 
element of the crime is reviewed for whether the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1158, 1208, citing People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 
p. 836 [under the state constitution, the inquiry is whether there 
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124 
is no reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant’s trial 
would have been different had the trial court properly instructed 
the jury].)  Defendant relied on an alibi defense and made no 
claim asserting that Danielle willingly left her home with him 
on the night of February 2, 2002.  More important, the record 
reflects there could have been no possible lawful purpose for 
surreptitiously removing seven-year-old Danielle from her home 
without her parents’ knowledge and consent.  There was no fire 
or other emergency, for example.  There can be no other 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence that shows, or 
remotely suggests, defendant took Danielle for a lawful 
purpose.  And this is all that the law requires. 
13.  The Trial Court’s Failure to Instruct on Second 
Degree Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter as 
Lesser Included Offenses of First Degree Felony 
Murder   
 
Over defendant’s objection that the jury should also be 
instructed on first degree premeditated murder, the trial court 
instructed the jury on first degree felony murder only, and his 
liability for murder was tried solely on that basis.  Defendant 
contends the trial court had a duty to instruct on second degree 
murder and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included 
offenses on the court’s own motion.  For his claim that second 
degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree felony 
murder, defendant relies on our discussion of the law regarding 
second degree felony murder in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
1172.  Defendant contends the failure to instruct on the lesser 
included offenses constituted both state law error; and a 
violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth 
Amendment. (Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 638)   
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125 
 
As defendant observes, we have previously declined to 
address the question of whether second degree murder is a 
lesser included offense of first degree felony murder.  (People v. 
Castaneda, supra, 51 Cal.4th, at pp. 1328-1329 (Castaneda); 
People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 402; People v. Valdez, 
supra, 32 Cal.4th, at p. 114, fn. 17.)  We do so again here.  Even 
assuming for purposes of argument that second degree murder, 
and involuntary manslaughter, are lesser included offenses of 
first degree felony murder, we conclude that the trial court did 
not error in failing to instruct the jury on them here. 
 
“ ‘[I]t is the “court’s duty to instruct the jury not only on 
the crime with which the defendant is charged, but also on any 
lesser offense that is both included in the offense charged and 
shown by the evidence to have been committed.”  [Citation.]’  
[Citations.]” (Castaneda, supra, 51 Cal.4th, at p. 1327, italics 
added.)  “Speculation is an insufficient basis upon which to 
require the giving of an instruction on a lesser offense.”  (People 
v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941.)  “ ‘[T]he existence of “any 
evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a 
lesser included offense . . . .’  [Citation.]  Rather, substantial 
evidence must exist to allow a reasonable jury to find that the 
defendant is guilty of a lesser but not the greater offense.  
[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to 
“deserve consideration by the jury,” that is, evidence that a 
reasonable jury could find persuasive.’ ” ’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 116 fn. omitted.) 
 
We conclude that there was no substantial evidence 
introduced at defendant’s trial that the killing of Danielle was 
other than a murder during the commission of a kidnapping.  
First, to the extent defendant’s argument that the jury could 
have concluded he was guilty of only second degree murder or 
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involuntary manslaughter relies on his view of the evidence of 
forcible asportation for purposes of kidnapping, as discussed and 
rejected in the previous section, we find it purely speculative in 
this context.  Second, as we have previously explained, it was 
uncontested that Danielle was taken from her home during the 
night without her parents’ consent.  Someone kidnapped her.  
Defendant contended that he was neither her abductor nor her 
killer.  But blood and trace evidence showed Danielle’s presence 
in defendant’s home, SUV, and motorhome.  Her naked, animal-
ravaged body was subsequently found off the side of a road in a 
remote part of San Diego County miles away from her home.  
There was no evidence from which the jury could find, for 
example, that defendant simply came upon her and killed her 
where her body was found, warranting instructions on the 
assumed lesser included homicide offenses.   
14.  The Trial Court’s Refusal to Instruct the Jury on 
First Degree Premeditated Murder   
 
As just noted, the prosecution tried this case solely on a 
first degree felony murder theory.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s request to instruct the jury on premeditated and 
deliberate murder, finding that there was no substantial 
evidence to support that theory.  Defendant argues that the trial 
court erred.  He contends the jury could have drawn an inference 
from the evidence that defendant put thought and planning into 
Danielle’s abduction, transportation, and later in the disposal of 
her body and on that basis, the jury could have found him guilty 
of first degree premeditated murder.  Defendant claims 
prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to instruct on 
premeditated murder because it concomitantly denied him the 
right to instructions on the lesser included offenses of second 
degree murder and involuntary manslaughter.   
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
127 
 
The inference of premeditation and deliberation defendant 
argues contradicts the position taken by the defense at trial.  
There, defense counsel argued that the jury should be instructed 
on premeditated first degree murder because the evidence 
warranted a jury finding that defendant was the killer, yet not 
Danielle’s kidnapper.  That position was not supported by the 
evidence, as we have explained, and the trial court did not err 
in refusing to instruct the jury on premeditated murder, or its 
lesser included offenses, on that basis. 
 
Moreover, assuming for purposes of argument that the 
jury could have drawn the inference defendant now urges based 
on the circumstances of defendant’s kidnapping, transportation, 
and disposal of Danielle’s body, the jury would also have 
necessarily found that defendant committed the murder during 
the commission of a kidnapping.  There would have been no 
evidentiary basis for a finding by the jury that defendant killed 
Danielle with premeditation and deliberation, but did not do so 
her during the commission of the kidnapping.  Thus, at most 
defendant has shown that the jury might have found him guilty 
of both first degree felony murder and first degree premeditated 
murder, not that there was substantial evidence on which the 
jury could have found him guilty of only lesser offenses to 
premeditated murder.  Under these circumstances, defendant 
could have suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to 
instruct on a supplementary theory of first degree murder.   
B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Admission of the J.N. Incident as Factor (b) 
Evidence   
 
Factor (b) of section 190.3 permits the jury, in determining 
the penalty in a capital case, to consider “[t]he presence or 
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128 
absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the 
use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence.”  Factor (b) evidence 
“shows the defendant’s propensity for violence, and helps jurors 
decide whether [the defendant] deserves to die.”  (People v. 
Stiteley (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 564.)   
 
The prosecution proffered evidence of an incident 
involving defendant’s niece, J.N., as factor (b) aggravating 
evidence.  As recounted earlier, J.N. described an incident, when 
she was between five and seven years old, involving defendant 
placing his fingers into her mouth and rubbing or massaging her 
teeth while she had been sleeping.  J.N. testified that she first 
pretended to be asleep during the initial touching, but she bit 
him the second time he touched her teeth.  J.N. thereafter told 
her mother that defendant had behaved “weird,” and that it 
bothered her.  Years later, when Officer Redden asked 
defendant if anyone might think defendant was involved in the 
kidnapping of Danielle, defendant recalled the incident 
involving J.N. and said that her mother had accused him of 
molesting J.N..   
 
The defense objected that the incident at most constituted 
a “technical battery” and was not a crime of force or violence.  
The prosecution took the position that defendant had committed 
an assault and battery, as well as a lewd act in violation of 
section 288.  The trial court agreed with the prosecution that the 
incident constituted a crime of force or violence that was 
admissible at the penalty phase and allowed J.N. to testify 
regarding it.   
 
Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred.  He 
contends first that the court misinterpreted section 190.3, factor 
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(b), to require only the amount of force necessary for a battery, 
i.e., the slightest touching done in an offensive manner.  (See 
People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899-900, fn. 12; CALJIC 
No. 16.141; CALCRIM No. 960.)  Defendant argues that “force 
or violence” as used in factor (b) must instead be construed to 
mean “forcible violence” or “violent force.”  Applying such a 
standard, defendant contends that the J.N. incident could not 
qualify as anything more than a “non-factor (b) battery” and that 
its admission into evidence constituted a violation of due 
process.   
 
Factor (b) is not  limited in all circumstances to acts as to 
which the defendant has used forcible violence or violent force.  
We have stated previously that “[f]or the purpose of 
admissibility under section 190.3, factor (b): ‘ “[T]he ‘force’ 
requisite . . . does not mean bodily harm but the physical power 
required in the circumstances to overcome [the victim’s] 
resistance.” ’ ”  (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 907 
(Raley).)  But how that standard would apply to the unwanted 
touching here is not entirely clear. 
 
“Force or violence” for purposes of factor (b) has a 
conventional and commonsense meaning.  (People v. Dunkle 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 922 (Dunkle), citing Tuilaepa v. 
California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975.)  Those circumstances may 
include an inequality in size between the defendant and victim 
as an element of physical power.  (Raley, supra, at p. 907.)  
 
When the victim is a child, for example, the child may be 
too surprised, shocked, or intimidated by the defendant to offer 
much, if any, resistance.  (See People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
229, 243 [children are uniquely susceptible to abuse because of 
their dependence upon adults, their smaller size, and relative 
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130 
naiveté].)  Here, the victim was between five and seven years old 
when defendant placed his fingers in her mouth. 
 
Defendant argues that, even so, we should find that the 
trial court erred in admitting the evidence.  We review “ ‘a trial 
court’s decision to admit “other crimes” evidence at the penalty 
phase . . . for abuse of discretion, and no abuse of discretion will 
be found where, in fact, the evidence in question was legally 
sufficient.’ ”  (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 225; 
accord People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1127.)   
 
Defendant argues that the evidence here was legally 
insufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of its discretion 
and that its admission constituted an abuse of discretion.  In 
defendant’s view, there is nothing in the record reflecting that 
when he put his fingers into J.N.’s mouth, he used any physical 
power to overcome resistance that was offered by J.N. as she 
slept or feigned sleep.  He emphasizes J.N.’s memory was of his 
rubbing or massaging her teeth, not his use of any “force” in 
putting his fingers into her mouth.  The People respond that 
defendant’s conduct was not only a battery, but a touching of the 
body of a child under the age of 14 with sexual intent, that is, a 
lewd act on a child, in violation of section 288, subdivision (a) 
(section 288(a)).  Moreover, in the view of the People, 
defendant’s acts were more than a touching for purposes of 
section 288(a) or a slight offensive touching for purposes of 
battery. The People argue that an adult’s insertion of a finger 
into a sleeping child’s mouth is a forceful act.  The People 
characterize it as an “attack.”   
 
  We need not decide whether, under these standards, the 
touching here involved the use of force for factor (b) purposes.  
Even if the evidence was improperly admitted, we conclude that 
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the record does not demonstrate prejudice.  (People v. Rodrigues 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1170.)  The jury had already convicted 
defendant of the abduction and murder of seven-year-old 
Danielle.  It had found true the special circumstance of a murder 
committed during the commission of a kidnapping.  The jurors 
had heard all of the circumstances of the crimes and special 
circumstance, which involved the snatching of a very young girl 
from the safety of her bedroom in the middle of the night, her 
subsequent murder, and the dumping of her naked body out in 
the desert.  The jury learned of defendant’s likely sexual 
motivation for the kidnapping through the child pornography 
evidence.  The jury heard evidence regarding the impact of 
defendant’s crimes on Danielle’s family and teachers.  (§ 190.3, 
factor (a).)  The evidence admitted in aggravation in our view 
was significant and, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the case 
in mitigation was, by comparison, not particularly substantial.  
It reflected defendant’s outward positive contribution to society 
and value to his coworkers, employers, friends, and family.  But 
such evidence did not significantly address or undermine the 
evidence of defendant’s apparent inner sexual compulsions 
toward young girls.  Defendant fails to persuade us that the 
defense entomological evidence was so strong that it necessarily 
raised a lingering doubt concerning his guilt.  The entomological 
evidence was seriously called into doubt through the rebuttal 
evidence introduced by the prosecution.  And the J.N. incident 
itself was subject to reasonable questions and ambiguities, 
which may explain the jury’s request early during its penalty 
phase deliberations for a reread of the relevant testimony 
regarding that incident.  Nothing in the record suggests the jury 
ultimately relied on that evidence in reaching its penalty verdict 
or that it tipped the scale in favor of death.  Under these 
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circumstances, we are confident that under any standard, the 
admission of the J.N. incident, if erroneous, was harmless.   
2.  The Labeling of the J.N. Incident as a Lewd Act 
with a Child   
 
CALJIC No. 8.87 instructs the jury on consideration of 
other criminal activity by the defendant involving the use of 
force or violence as an aggravating circumstance.  When the 
parties discussed the penalty phase jury instructions, defendant 
requested that, if the jury was to be instructed with CALJIC No. 
8.87, the evidence of the J.N. incident should be labeled a 
battery and that the jury be separately instructed on the 
elements of battery.  The prosecution took the position that the 
J.N. incident was not only a battery, but also a lewd act upon a 
child under 14 in violation of section 288(a).  The prosecution 
requested that the jury also receive instructions regarding the 
elements of section 288(a).  The defense opposed the 
prosecution’s requests, contending that a violation of section 
288(a) is not a factor (b) crime because it can be committed 
without the use of force or violence.  The trial court observed 
that it had previously rejected defendant’s argument.  It 
tentatively ruled that both battery and lewd act on a child would 
be identified in the version of CALJIC No. 8.87 given to the jury 
and that the jury would be instructed on the elements of both 
crimes.  The trial court later confirmed that the instruction 
would name both crimes, but offered defendant the choice of 
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133 
whether the trial court should instruct on their elements.10  The 
defense ultimately requested that no instruction be given on the 
elements of either of the designated crimes.  Over defendant’s 
objection, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.87, 
identifying battery “and/or” lewd act with a child under 14 years 
old as defendant’s asserted criminal acts.11   
 
Defendant argues that even if the J.N. incident was 
admissible as a factor (b) crime, labeling it as a lewd act with a 
child was unduly prejudicial because that aspect of the conduct 
was irrelevant to the purpose of factor (b) and the incident could 
have been adequately identified as a battery.  Defendant 
contends that the lewd act label risked distracting, misleading, 
inflaming, and provoking the jury to use the evidence as 
character evidence beyond that allowed by factor (b).  Defendant 
                                        
10  
Subsequent to defendant’s trial, we have expressly 
confirmed that a defendant is entitled to instructions on the 
elements of alleged other factor (b) crimes on request, but may 
make a tactical choice to forego them.  (People v. Brown (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 518, 571.)   
11  
The full version of CALJIC No. 8.87 given to the jury 
stated that: “Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of 
showing that the defendant has committed the following 
criminal acts:  battery and/or lewd act with a child under 
fourteen years, which involved the express or implied use of 
force or violence.  Before a juror may consider any of such 
criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a 
juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did in fact commit the criminal acts.  A juror may not 
consider any evidence of any other criminal acts as an 
aggravating circumstance.  [¶]  It is not necessary for all jurors 
to agree.  If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that 
activity as a fact in aggravation.  If a juror is not so convinced, 
that juror must not consider that evidence for any purpose.”   
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134 
claims that it was far from clear that a violation of section 288(a) 
had even occurred and that the jury was prevented from 
reasonably and rationally assessing the event because of the 
trial court’s instruction that “if” anything happened, it was a 
lewd act with a child under 14 years.   
 
To the extent defendant’s argument suggests that a 
violation of section 288(a) cannot constitute factor (b) evidence, 
we reference our previous discussion and expressly reject the 
claim that section 288(a) is categorically outside of the scope of 
factor (b).  A violation of section 288(a) may under the 
circumstances be a crime involving force or violence or the 
implied or express threat of force or violence within the meaning 
of factor (b).  (Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 907.)  We have 
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that to be the case here.   
 
To the extent defendant’s argument is premised on a view 
that his conduct may not have constituted a violation of section 
288(a), we find substantial evidence in the record to support a 
rational juror’s finding that defendant put his fingers in J.N.’s 
mouth and massaged her teeth with the requisite sexual intent.  
Defendant’s tactical decision to forego instructions on the 
elements of section 288(a) waived his right to the jury’s 
determination of the issue.   
 
With respect to purely the labeling of the J.N. incident as 
a lewd act on a child, we reject defendant’s claim that the 
naming of it in the instruction prejudicially misled or distracted 
the jury from the proper focus of factor (b) evidence.  CALJIC 
No. 8.87, as given, expressly told the jury that the evidence had 
been introduced for the purpose of showing that defendant had 
committed battery and/or a lewd act with a child involving the 
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135 
use of force or violence.  The jury was thus given the possibility 
of alternative crimes.  It was not told that defendant’s conduct 
was definitively criminal lewd conduct with a child.  More 
importantly, its attention was specifically directed at the facts 
of defendant’s past criminal conduct as involving the use of force 
or violence — the specific focus of factor (b).   
 
Furthermore, accurately labelling defendant’s conduct as 
a lewd act provided the jury with an appropriate legal 
description of defendant’s criminal offense, if the jurors found 
that the conduct occurred.  When evidence of a defendant’s 
factor (b) conduct violates multiple criminal provisions, a court 
may identify those offenses for the jury.  To the extent the cases 
defendant cites in support of his argument that a court must 
exercise its discretion to eliminate unnecessary labeling of factor 
(b) evidence (People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 775-775; 
People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 462 (dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.); 
People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 905; People v. Avitia 
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 185, 194) are apposite, we find no abuse 
of discretion in the trial court’s decision here to name both 
offenses in the instruction.   
 
Finally, for the same reasons given in the previous section 
finding harmless any error in the admission of the evidence 
concerning the J.N. incident, we similarly find any error in the 
trial court’s labelling of defendant’s criminal conduct in CALJIC 
No. 8.87 to be harmless.  (See People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
175, 219 [a factor (b) incident of marginal significance given an 
inappropriate label could not have affected the outcome within 
any reasonable possibility]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 
681 [same].)   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
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136 
3.  Failure of CALJIC No. 8.87 to Submit the Question 
of Force or Violence to the Jury   
 
Defendant complains that CALJIC No. 8.87 improperly 
fails to submit to the jury whether the crime involved the use or 
threatened use of force or violence.  Although this court has 
repeatedly rejected this claim (e.g., People v. Streeter (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 205, 266; People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 745; 
People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720 (Nakahara)), 
defendant asks us to reconsider our position in light of Evidence 
Code section 403.   
 
Initially, we reject the People’s argument that the issue is 
forfeited because defendant failed to renew, when jury 
instructions were discussed with the court, his written request 
to so modify the instruction.  We note that even if defendant had 
completely failed to object at trial, we may review his claim on 
appeal to the extent his claim of instructional error affected his 
substantial rights.  (People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 302.) 
 
Nevertheless, on the merits, defendant fails to persuade 
us to reconsider our position that CALJIC No. 8.87 is not 
defective for failing to submit the question of force or violence 
for purposes of factor (b) other crimes evidence to the jury.  As 
we have explained, “[t]he question whether the acts occurred is 
certainly a factual matter for the jury, but the characterization 
of those acts as involving an express or implied use of force or 
violence . . . [is] a legal matter properly decided by the court.”  
(Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 720.)  In contrast, Evidence 
Code section 403 is concerned with a trial court’s initial 
determination that sufficient evidence has been produced to 
show the existence of a preliminary fact necessary to support 
admission of proffered evidence, and the court’s duty to instruct, 
on request, that the jury determine whether the preliminary 
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137 
facts exists before it considers the evidence introduced.  (People 
v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 362.)  Evidence Code section 403, 
dealing with a factual determination, is inapplicable to the legal 
question involved here.   
4.  Admission and Use of the Child Pornography 
Evidence at the Penalty Phase  
 
Defendant claims his death sentence must be reversed 
because of the assertedly erroneous admission of the child 
pornography evidence at the penalty phase of his trial.   
 
Defendant first reasserts his claims that the trial court 
improperly joined the child pornography count to the other 
charges and erroneously admitted the pornography evidence at 
the guilt phase.  He contends that the prejudicial effect of these 
errors was compounded in the penalty phase by admission of the 
evidence as part of the prosecution’s case in aggravation and the 
prosecutor’s references to it in his penalty phase closing 
argument.  Because we have rejected defendant’s claims of error 
in joinder and admission of the evidence (see ante, Part II.A.5 & 
Part II.A.6), there is no error to be compounded.   
 
Defendant next contends that even if there was no error 
in joinder or in the guilt phase admission of the child 
pornographic evidence, nevertheless, the admission of the child 
pornography at the penalty phase as evidence in aggravation 
under factor (a) constituted independent error.   
 
Factor (a) allows the jury to consider “[t]he circumstances 
of the crime of which defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found 
to be true.”  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)  Defendant argues that factor 
(a) evidence is limited under the statute to the circumstances of 
only the crimes that triggered the death penalty.  Thus, he 
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138 
claims, the evidence submitted to prove the joined count of 
possession of child pornography does not come within factor (a) 
and was improperly introduced as such.  We have previously “ 
‘assumed that factor (a), though it speaks in the singular of the 
“crime” of which defendant was currently convicted, covers the 
“circumstances” of all offenses, singular or plural, that were 
adjudicated in the capital proceeding.’ ”  (People v. Thomas, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th, at p. 821, quoting People v. Montiel (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 877, 938, fn. 33; accord People v. Rogers (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 826, 909; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 70.)  
Although defendant questions this assumption, we need not 
definitively resolve the issue here because the child 
pornography, along with the other pornography depicting 
children in cartoon and anime forms, was also properly admitted 
as evidence of defendant’s motive in committing the kidnapping 
and murder of Danielle, that is, as evidence pertaining to the 
crimes that subjected defendant to the death penalty.12   
                                        
12  
During his penalty phase closing argument, the 
prosecutor referred to all three convictions — the child 
pornography, the kidnapping, and the murder — as coming 
within the crimes covered by factor (a).  The trial court overruled 
defendant’s objection that this misstated the law.  Defendant on 
appeal claims that the prosecutor’s comment was a form of 
prosecutorial misconduct because it misrepresented the scope of 
factor (a).  We disagree.  At the time of defendant’s trial, our 
cases generally construed factor (a) to cover all crimes alleged 
as part of the capital proceeding.  (People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 
Cal.4th at p. 70.)  Moreover, even if it were otherwise, there is 
no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s brief mention of 
the child pornography conviction prejudiced defendant given 
that the evidence underlying the charge could be considered as 
motive evidence relevant to the kidnapping and murder 
convictions.  (People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 821.) 
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139 
 
In this regard, defendant contends that evidence of motive 
admitted at the guilt phase under Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b), is not properly considered a “circumstance” of 
the crime within the meaning of factor (a) because in this case 
it constituted neither “evidence relevant to ‘the immediate 
temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime,’. . .[nor] 
additional evidence, like victim impact evidence, that ‘ 
“surrounds materially, morally, or logically” the crime.” ’ ”  
(People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1042.)  Defendant 
elaborates that even if motive itself could be a factor (a) 
circumstance, specific acts of conduct from which motive is 
inferable are not in themselves factor (a) circumstances.   
 
On the contrary, we have previously concluded that 
consideration of a defendant’s prior use of drugs is permissible 
under section 190.3, factor (a) to demonstrate that he killed the 
victim with the “particularly base motive” to obtain money to 
buy drugs.  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 708.)  
Similarly, here, defendant’s prior interest in the depiction of 
sexual conduct with children, and sometimes violent sexual 
assault of children, as reflected by his specific action of 
possessing such pornography, provided evidence that logically 
connected to the jury’s moral assessment of the crimes at the 
penalty phase.   
 
In addition to arguing that the child pornography was 
improperly admitted as factor (a) evidence, defendant contends 
the prosecutor improperly and misleadingly urged the jury to 
also use the evidence as factor (b) evidence.  Defendant points to 
a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument in which the 
prosecutor told the jury that the J.N. incident reflected a 
beginning stage of defendant’s fantasies, that those fantasies 
continued with defendant’s possession of the pornography 
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140 
depicting children, and ultimately progressed to the kidnapping 
and murder of Danielle.  Not only did defendant fail to object to 
this portion of the prosecutor’s argument, thereby forfeiting any 
claim of misconduct, we are not persuaded that any misconduct 
occurred.  The record reflects that the complained-of 
prosecutorial comments came after the prosecutor identified the 
J.N. incident as the factor (b) evidence in this case.  The 
prosecutor explained how that incident could fit into the jury’s 
penalty consideration.  Specifically, the prosecutor suggested 
that beginning with the J.N. incident, there was a pattern or 
“history” of defendant’s sexual interest in children, which not 
only reflected defendant’s fantasies and desires but should 
provide the jury with additional confidence that defendant 
committed the crimes against Danielle in the event the defense 
argued lingering doubt.  The prosecutor stated that defendant 
“is not the saint he has been portrayed.”  Nothing in the 
prosecutor’s argument urged the jury to view the child 
pornography as factor (b) evidence and no rational juror could 
have construed the argument as urging the jury to do so.   
 
In sum, defendant has shown no error in the admission 
and use of the child pornography evidence at the penalty phase 
of his trial. 
5.  Penalty Phase Prejudice from the Cross-
Examination of Susan L.   
 
Defendant reminds us of his guilt phase claim that the 
trial court erroneously allowed cross-examination of Susan L. 
regarding an alleged “stalking” incident and her opinion 
concerning defendant’s “forcefulness” after he had been 
drinking.  (See ante, Part II.A.7.)  Defendant now contends that 
even if we reject his claim of prejudicial error at the guilt phase, 
the use of such evidence at the penalty phase was prejudicial.  
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141 
He argues that the evidence was responsive to none of the 
factors listed in section 190.3 and violated his right under the 
Eighth Amendment’s heightened reliability requirement for 
capital cases.   
 
Initially, we note the defendant failed to object to the 
prosecutor’s closing argument regarding Susan L.’s testimony 
and so forfeited his claim that the prosecutor improperly used 
the evidence as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  (See 
People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776.)  In any event, we 
agree with the Attorney General that the prosecution never 
asked the jury to consider this evidence as improper 
nonstatutory aggravating evidence.  Rather, the prosecution 
used the evidence to rebut the penalty phase testimony of Susan 
L. and her daughter Christina G. that defendant had been kind, 
helpful, and generous to them.  “A defendant who offers evidence 
of his or her good character widens the scope of the evidence of 
bad character that may be introduced in rebuttal.  [Citation.]  
‘The scope of rebuttal legitimately embraces argument by the 
prosecutor “suggesting a more balanced picture of [the 
accused’s] personality.”  [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 1024; accord People v. 
Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 92.)   
6.  Asserted Cumulative Error  
Although defendant contends that each of the penalty 
phase errors he has alleged is prejudicial standing alone, he also 
argues that any combination of the errors would also warrant 
reversal of the penalty judgment.   
 
We have rejected defendant’s claims of error.  When we 
have alternatively assumed error, we have found each possible 
error also to be harmless.  Considering the possible errors 
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142 
together for the purposes of this claim, we also conclude that 
their cumulative effect does not warrant reversal of the 
judgment.  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 479-480.) 
7.  Victim Impact Evidence   
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing, over 
defense objection, Danielle’s teachers to testify regarding 
Danielle’s character and contributions, and to the effect of her 
murder on themselves and Danielle’s classmates.  Defendant 
asserts that the abduction and murder of “a middle-class young 
girl, living happily with her brothers and parents in a nice, safe 
neighborhood in San Diego” was itself sufficient victim impact 
evidence and anything more “could only irrationally exploit 
feelings that would be extremely close to the surface in any 
event.”   
It is well settled that the prosecution may introduce victim 
impact evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case.  “ ‘Unless 
it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the 
devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the 
community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of the 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).’ (People v. Lewis and Oliver 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056–1057.) ‘The federal Constitution 
bars victim impact evidence only if it is “so unduly prejudicial” 
as to render the trial “fundamentally unfair.” ’ (Id. at p. 1056, 
quoting Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)”  (People 
v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 682.)   
 
“The purpose of victim impact evidence is to demonstrate 
the immediate harm caused by the defendant’s criminal 
conduct.”  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 1153, 1183.)  That 
harm is not limited to immediate family members.  (People v. 
Williams (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 1244, 1285.)  Friends, coworkers, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
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classmates, and teachers, may all be affected by the death of the 
victim under the specific circumstances of a case.  (E.g., ibid. 
[coworkers]; People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 507-508 [a 
friend and classmate]; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 
645-646 [the director of an afterschool program at which the 
victim volunteered]; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 792 
[the victim’s work supervisor]; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 779-780 [the victim’s teacher].)  Here, defendant’s shocking 
abduction and murder of seven-year-old Danielle caused 
emotional harm to her teachers and classmates.  Our review of 
the record does not persuade us that her teachers’ testimony 
regarding Danielle and those effects would invite a purely 
irrational response from the jury or that it rendered defendant’s 
trial fundamentally unfair under the circumstances.   
8.  Failure to Sequester the Jury as Constituting 
Penalty Phase Error   
 
Defendant contends the trial court’s failure to sequester 
the jury at the guilt phase created prejudice reaching into the 
penalty phase, requiring reversal of the penalty judgment.  In 
the alternative, defendant claims that, given the public’s 
reaction to the guilty verdicts and the publicity surrounding the 
penalty phase, the trial court committed independent reversible 
error at the penalty phase by failing to sequester the jury at that 
time.  We have found no error in the trial court’s failure to 
sequester the jury at the guilt phase.  (See ante Part II.A.4.)  
Therefore, there is no prejudice to carry forward to the penalty 
phase, and we reject defendant’s initial claim.  Reviewing the 
circumstances surrounding the penalty phase of trial (see post), 
we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to 
sequester the jury at that time and therefore reject defendant’s 
alternate claim.   
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a.  Penalty Phase Background 
 
The guilt phase verdicts were announced in open court on 
August 21, 2002.  The jurors were ordered to return on August 
28 for the beginning of the penalty phase and were released with 
the standard admonition not to discuss the case or anything 
concerning their deliberations with anyone.  They were directed 
to report to the court if anyone contacted or attempted to contact 
them about the case.  The trial court denied defendant’s renewed 
motion for sequestration with the comment that it had “every 
confidence [the jury] is abiding by the orders of this court.”  It 
noted that it had not “seen nor heard nor read anything to 
indicate otherwise.”   
 
After the jury’s verdicts were announced, onlookers who 
were congregated around the courthouse let out a cheer that was 
televised along with the news of the verdicts.  A photographer 
snapped a photograph of the Van Dams in the courtroom just as 
the verdict was announced in violation of court rules and the 
photograph appeared in a local newspaper a short time later.  
On the same day, in violation of the trial court’s gag order, the 
San Diego Police Chief gave a news conference in which he 
commented on the handling of the matter by his department.  
The trial court initially considered issuing an order to show 
cause to the Police Chief, but decided that there was no 
meaningful sanction it could impose at the time and noted the 
Chief’s comments were “fortunately” “limited in context.”  With 
respect to the offending photographer, however, the court barred 
that person from the balance of the trial.   
 
When the jurors returned on August 28, they heard the 
victim impact evidence and the testimony of defendant’s niece, 
J.N., concerning defendant touching her teeth while she slept.  
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
145 
In releasing the jury at the end of the day, the trial court noted 
that there were two professional sports games being televised 
that night, implicitly suggesting that the jury could safely watch 
the games to avoid seeing any televised news concerning the 
trial.  The court had followed a similar pattern during the guilt 
phase by suggesting to the jury that it could watch television 
and still be insulated from outside influences by watching such 
sporting events.  This time, however, the station televising the 
San Diego Chargers football game broadcast during halftime a 
report concerning the proceedings in defendant’s trial.  The 
report mentioned allegations of child molestation.   
Defendant renewed his request for jury sequestration the 
next day based on the television coverage.  The trial court denied 
his request, noting that if any jurors had inadvertently seen 
anything during the halftime report, it was not different from 
J.N.’s testimony that they had heard during the trial.  When the 
jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial court observed that if 
any juror was watching the previous night’s football game, he or 
she would have been exposed to some coverage of the trial at 
halftime.  The court assumed, in line with its previous repeated 
admonitions to avoid watching any news coverage of the trial, 
that the jurors would have “just looked another way or [switched 
channels] to see how the Padres were doing.”  No juror indicated 
differently.   
 
On the morning of the next day of trial, the defense asked 
to make a record of its investigation regarding a previously 
received second-hand report that Juror number 12 had said at 
work that he would not believe anything one of defendant’s 
counsel said because he did not like counsel.  (See ante, Part 
II.A.4.a.)  The defense reported that its investigator was told 
that Juror number 12 had been essentially “tight-lipped” at 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
146 
work and had said nothing.  Juror number 12, however, became 
aware of the defense inquiries and, later that day, sent the court 
a note to ask why they had been made.  The defense requested 
that the trial court bring Juror number 12 into the courtroom in 
order to assure him that nothing improper had been done by the 
defense.  The court granted the request and Juror number 12 
was called in.   
The trial court explained to Juror number 12 that courts 
sometimes receive reports regarding the conduct of jurors, 
substantiated or not, and when such a situation arises, it is 
incumbent on the court to allow the parties to investigate.  The 
court had received such a report from someone at Juror number 
12’s work that had caused some concern among both sides and 
the court had authorized each side to pursue the rumor in order 
to allay any concerns they might have.  The defense had chosen 
to do so, but, the court explained, nothing in the results caused 
it any concern.  The court then enquired of Juror number 12 
whether there was anything about this situation that affected 
his ability to be fair and neutral.  Juror number 12 responded 
that it did not affect him at all and repeated that assurance 
when asked a second time by the defense.  After Juror number 
12 left the courtroom, the defense renewed its motion to 
sequester the jurors.  The trial court again denied the motion.   
b.  Discussion 
 
We earlier concluded, in accordance with our prior law, 
that a trial court’s decision whether to sequester a jury is subject 
to an abuse of discretion standard of review.  (See ante, Part 
II.A.4.b.)  Applying that standard again to the trial court’s 
decision not to sequester the jury during the penalty phase of 
trial, we find no error.  Although defendant has demonstrated 
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147 
that there was considerable ongoing public and media interest 
in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
jury did not continue to abide by the trial court’s repeated 
admonitions and orders to avoid exposure to the news and 
publicity concerning the case or that Juror number 12, or any 
other juror, misrepresented his or her ability to reach a penalty 
phase verdict on the trial evidence alone.  We repeat that “we 
cannot assume on a silent record that [jurors] ignored [such 
orders and admonishments] and were exposed to prejudicial 
material.”  (People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 617.)  
9.  Denial of Defendant’s Challenge for Cause to 
Prospective Juror No. 19 As Effecting the Penalty 
Judgment   
 
Referring back to his guilt phase argument, defendant 
contends the trial court’s assertedly erroneous denial of his 
challenge for cause to Prospective Juror number 19 requires 
reversal of the penalty judgment because it left the defense with 
no remedy for the allegedly improper retention of not only Juror 
number 4, but also of Juror number 2. Defendant claims that 
insofar as the record reflects that Juror number 2 was 
incompetent to sit as a juror in the penalty phase (People v. 
Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 158; Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 
469 U.S. 412, 424; Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 
522, fn. 21), the error in denying the challenge for cause to 
Prospective Juror number 19 was prejudicial.   
 
We have previously concluded that the trial court did not 
err in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to Prospective 
Juror number 19, and we further concluded that, even assuming 
error, defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced by the 
retention of Juror numbers 2 and 4.  (See ante, Part II.A.2.)  
Therefore, defendant fails to show that any error concerning 
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
148 
Prospective Juror number 19 prejudiced his penalty phase 
judgment. 
10.  The Trial Court’s Failure to Grant Additional 
Peremptory Challenges As Effecting the Penalty 
Judgment   
 
As part of his guilt phase arguments, defendant contends 
the amount of media and public attention focused on his case 
required, as a federal constitutional matter, that the trial court 
grant his requests for additional peremptory challenges.  We 
have concluded that defendant’s failure to cite pretrial publicity 
as a basis for his requests for additional peremptory challenges 
forfeited his claim on appeal.  We have also determined that 
even if defendant had preserved his claim for appeal, we would 
reject it on the merits because defendant has not met his burden 
to show that he was likely to receive an unfair trial because of 
juror bias based on pretrial publicity.  (See ante, Part II.A.3.)   
 
Defendant reasserts his claim with respect to the penalty 
phase and contends that the trial court’s failure to at least grant 
the defense requests for additional peremptory challenges 
rendered his penalty trial unfair.  Pointing us to virtually the 
same portions of the record, he argues that the penalty 
judgment should be reversed.  Again, we conclude defendant 
forfeited his claim by failing to raise it as a ground supporting 
his request for additional peremptory challenges.  Defendant 
also fails to persuade us that, if we addressed the merits of his 
claim, we would reach a different conclusion for purposes of the 
penalty phase of this trial.   
PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
149 
11.  Challenges to the Constitutionality of California’s 
Death Penalty Law   
 
Defendant raises several challenges to California’s death 
penalty scheme that we have previously considered and 
rejected.  We find no persuasive reason to reexamine those 
conclusions and we therefore reject defendant’s claims as 
follows: 
 
Defendant contends California’s death penalty statute 
fails to narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death 
penalty and thus violates the federal constitution.  (Furman v. 
Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238.)  In support, defendant has 
supplied a declaration from a law professor who in 1997 
conducted a statistical study of California murder convictions 
for the five-year period 1988 to 1992.  Defendant claims the 
statistics show that section 190.2 fails to sufficiently narrow the 
class of death-eligible defendants.  On the contrary, we continue 
to conclude that “ ‘the statutory [death penalty] scheme 
“adequately narrows the class of murder for which the death 
penalty may be imposed [citation], and is not overbroad . . . 
because of the sheer number and scope of special circumstances 
[that] define a capital murder . . . .” ’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1206-1207; People v. Vieira (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 264, 303-304.) 
 
Contrary to defendant’s arguments, to reach a death 
verdict jurors do not have to find that death is the appropriate 
penalty using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.  
(People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1207; People v. 
Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 33.)  Except for the verdict itself, 
there is no requirement that the jury unanimously agree on 
which aggravating factors apply.  (People v. Banks, supra, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
150 
59 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)  “ ‘Review for intercase proportionality is 
not constitutionally compelled.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
SLOUGH, J.*
 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Westerfield 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S112691 
Date Filed: February 4, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: William D. Mudd 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mark David Greenberg, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Robin 
Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark David Greenberg 
484 Lake Park Avenue, No. 429 
Oakland, CA  94610 
(510) 452-3126 
 
Robin Urbanski 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9115