Title: Commonwealth v. Weaver
Citation: 54 N.E.3d 495, 474 Mass. 787
Docket Number: SJC-10932
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-10932 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KENTEL MYRONE WEAVER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 12, 2016. - July 20, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of 
constitutional rights by juvenile, Assistance of counsel, 
Public trial.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Waiver, Assistance of counsel, Public trial, 
Motion to suppress, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 5, 2003. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Geraldine S. Hines, J.; the cases were tried before Stephen E. 
Neel, J.; and a motion for a new trial, filed on June 1, 2011, 
was heard by Geraldine S. Hines, J., and Jeffrey A. Locke, J. 
 
 
 
Ruth Greenberg for the defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  On the evening of August 10, 2003, fifteen year 
old Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. The defendant, who was 
2 
 
sixteen at the time of the shooting, subsequently admitted to 
committing the murder after prolonged questioning by the police 
and by his mother. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
his statements to the police.  That motion was denied following 
an evidentiary hearing.  In 2006, a jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  He was also convicted of the unlicensed 
possession of a firearm.  In 2011, the defendant filed a motion 
for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), claiming that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in two respects:  first, that counsel 
failed to adequately investigate the defendant's claim that his 
statements to police were coerced because counsel did not 
consult with a mental health expert or present expert testimony 
about the voluntariness of those statements; second, that 
counsel failed to object to the closure of the court room during 
jury empanelment in violation of the defendant's right to a 
public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The motion was bifurcated, and different judges 
considered, and ultimately rejected, the claims.  The denial of 
the motion was consolidated with the defendant's direct appeal. 
 
In his appeal, the defendant asks us to expand our rule 
requiring the corroboration of extrajudicial statements as it 
3 
 
applies to juvenile confessions pursuant to our extraordinary 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  He also claims error in (1) 
the denial of his motion to suppress; (2) the denial of his 
motion for a new trial; and (3) the denial of his motion for a 
directed verdict on the firearms charge.  We affirm the 
defendant's convictions and decline to grant relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our analysis 
of the legal issues raised on appeal. 
 
On August 10, 2003, the victim went to Wendover Street to 
sell some small jewelry charms to a woman and her children.  
After the transaction, the woman reentered her home, and the 
daughter remained outside.  The woman heard two gunshots.  She 
stepped back out of the doorway and saw the victim lying in the 
street on top of his bicycle.  The bag in which he had carried 
the jewelry was gone.  The woman went back inside and telephoned 
911. 
 
The daughter testified that, just before the shooting, she 
noticed a group of males of varying ages gathered at the top of 
Dudley and Wendover Streets.  The group rushed toward the 
victim, who threw his bag on the ground.  They began to fight.  
An older member of the group, who appeared to be about thirty 
years of age and was wearing a straw hat, threw the first punch.  
4 
 
A younger member of the group, who appeared to be about fifteen 
years of age and was wearing jean shorts and a white "doo-rag", 
picked up the victim's bag and ran toward Dudley Street.  The 
daughter ran up the steps toward her front door and heard two 
gunshots fired in quick succession. 
 
A third witness, who lived on nearby Humphreys Street, was 
sitting outside on his second-floor porch when he heard gunshots 
from the direction of Wendover Street.  He then saw a young 
black man run down Humphreys Street away from Dudley Street.  
The young man wore dark jeans and was trying to pull off a dark 
shirt, under which he wore a white t-shirt.  The young man 
stumbled and hopped and pulled a pistol from his pants leg.  The 
pistol had a flat handle and a round silver barrel.  As he did 
so, the baseball cap he was wearing fell off of his head.  The 
cap was collected by the police later that evening. 
   
The cap was a Detroit Tigers baseball cap, with a stitched 
white "D" on the front and what appeared to be hand-drawn or 
painted white "D" letters on the sides.  The police had seen the 
defendant wearing a cap matching the same description when they 
spoke to him approximately two weeks before the victim was 
murdered.  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) matching the defendant's 
DNA profile was found on the hatband.  An analyst testified that 
the possible contributors to the DNA profile found on the 
5 
 
hatband were one in 40 billion Caucasians, one in 1.6 billion 
African-Americans, and one in 65 billion Southeastern Hispanics. 
 
A ballistics expert testified that shell fragments 
recovered from the victim were consistent with having been fired 
from a revolver and not a semiautomatic weapon.   A revolver has 
a round barrel, consistent with the description of the handgun 
in the possession of the fleeing suspect, and does not eject 
shell casings.  No shell casings were recovered from Wendover 
Street. 
 
When emergency medical services arrived at the scene, the 
victim showed no signs of life.  He had a bleeding head wound 
with brain matter visible and a second wound to his lower right 
back.  The medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the 
victim determined that the cause of death was the two gunshot 
wounds. 
 
At trial, there was a great deal of testimony regarding the 
investigation leading up to the incriminating statements that 
the defendant made to police, especially his admission, made 
after discussing the particulars with his mother, that he "shot 
the [victim]."  The defense strategy was to claim that the 
defendant’s statements were involuntary, and the result of 
coercion by a combination of lengthy questioning first by police 
and then by his mother, Iris Weaver (Weaver).  We leave the 
details concerning the questioning of the defendant and the 
6 
 
resultant incriminating statements to the discussion of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, infra, as the trial 
testimony of the involved police officers and the defendant's 
mother, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
are substantively identical to the testimony given at the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, a humane practice 
instruction was given to the jury.  The judge instructed the 
jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant made his statement to the 
police "voluntarily, freely, and rationally."  The judge further 
stated: 
 
"In order for a statement of a defendant to be 
voluntary, it must not, in any way, be coerced by physical 
intimidation or psychological pressure.  Under the law of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a statement may be 
coerced not only by law enforcement officials but also by a 
private citizen. That is, coercion -- You may find that the 
defendant was coerced. Let me put it this way, coercion may 
occur not only by law enforcement officials, but in order 
to be coercion, it may also be caused by a private citizen.  
A statement made by a defendant is not voluntary if it is 
psychologically coerced.  Therefore, if you find that the 
statement made by the defendant was coerced by his mother 
or any other person, you may not consider that statement in 
reaching a verdict." 
 
 
During deliberations, the jury asked for a legal definition 
of "psychological coercion."  After receiving the question, the 
court adjourned for the day.  Neither the judge nor counsel 
located any case law defining the term before court reconvened 
7 
 
the next morning.  The judge then repeated his original 
instructions to the jury, adding that the jurors should "give 
the term psychological coercion its plain and ordinary meaning 
as you understand it.  But I will tell you that psychological 
coercion refers to inappropriate or inordinate psychological 
pressure."  The jury subsequently convicted the defendant. 
 
2. Discussion.  a.  Corroboration rule.  In Commonwealth v. 
Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984), we announced the corroboration 
rule, which "requires corroboration that the underlying crime 
was in fact committed, thus preventing convictions against 
persons who have confessed to fictitious crimes."  Commonwealth 
v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 430 (2004), citing Forde, 
supra at 458.  In DiGiambattista, we declined to expand the rule 
to require corroboration that a defendant was the actual 
perpetrator of the crime, or to require a showing that a 
confession is reliable under the circumstances in which it was 
given.  DiGiambattista, supra at 431-432.  Acknowledging the 
phenomenon of false confessions, we concluded that the problem 
is best addressed through the "strict analysis of the 
circumstances of [an] interrogation as they affect the 
voluntariness of a defendant's statement."  Id. at 432. 
 
On appeal, the defendant asks us to reconsider expanding 
the corroboration rule as it applies to juvenile confessions in 
light of research that juveniles are more likely than adults to 
8 
 
confess to crimes they did not commit -- research to which no 
citation is provided.  He argues that his case illustrates the 
need for an expanded rule requiring additional evidence that the 
accused perpetrated the crime because although there is no 
question that a crime occurred -- satisfying Forde -- there is 
no evidence, aside from the defendant's confession, linking him 
to it. 
 
We decline to expand the rule on this record.  The 
defendant fails to articulate why our practice of rigorously 
examining the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is an 
inadequate prophylactic measure against the use of false 
confessions in securing a conviction.  Indeed, even if we were 
to expand the rule, it would not aid the defendant's case.  In 
addition to the defendant's admission, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence at trial linking the defendant to the murder, 
including testimony that (1) a young man was seen fleeing from 
the scene of the shooting; (2) the young man had a firearm 
fitting the description of a revolver in his possession as he 
fled; (3) the young man was wearing a distinctive baseball cap, 
which fell to the ground; (4) the cap belonged to the defendant; 
and (5) the victim and the defendant were known to each other.  
 
The defendant also asks for unspecified relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, on the basis that the jury could not properly 
assess the voluntariness of his admission in this case.  We 
9 
 
disagree, as the jury heard extensive evidence about the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements, and were 
properly instructed on the humane practice rule.  We therefore 
decline to grant relief under § 33E. 
 
b.  Motion to suppress the defendant's statements.  The 
defendant next asserts error in the denial of his pretrial 
motion to suppress his statements to the police based on his 
claim that they were involuntary and coerced.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the defendant waived this argument by failing to 
brief the issue in accordance with Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as 
amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).1  In his brief, the defendant does 
not dispute the factual findings of the judge who heard the 
motion (pretrial motion judge) as to the credibility of 
witnesses, but the defendant states that he "does dispute the 
conclusions of law."  The defendant then states that he 
incorporates by reference the authorities cited in the 
defendant's application to a single justice in the county court 
for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal "in the interests 
of judicial economy and brevity."  The defendant additionally 
cites to authorities apparently not cited in the prior filings, 
 
1 Rule 16 (a) (4) of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975), requires that the 
appellant's argument "contain the contentions of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on. . . . The appellate court need not pass upon 
questions or issues not argued in the brief." 
                                                          
 
10 
 
but does not provide complete citations or any argument as to 
why those authorities undermine the rulings of the pretrial 
motion judge. 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth that the defendant's 
treatment of this issue in his brief does not rise to the level 
of appellate argument required by rule 16 (a) (4) and is 
therefore technically waived.2  However, review under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, requires us "to consider all issues apparent from 
the record, whether preserved or not."  Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  Thus, we review the denial 
of the motion to suppress, and if there was error, we determine 
whether the error created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice in the verdict.  Id. 
 
"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error 'but 
conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 
(2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 
(2002). 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the pretrial motion judge 
found the following facts that we conclude are supported by the 
 
2 In his reply brief and at oral argument, the defendant 
argued it was not his intention to waive this claim, but rather 
incorporated the authority contained in the trial pleadings in 
the interest of "judicial economy."  This contention is 
unavailing. 
                                                          
 
11 
 
evidence.  In investigating the victim's murder, the detectives 
initially brought the defendant's older brother, Cassim, to the 
police station for questioning because they had received 
information that he had been seen wearing a blue Detroit Tigers 
baseball cap, similar to the one found near the scene of the 
shooting.  Apparently satisfied that Cassim was not involved in 
the shooting, he was subsequently dropped off at home by a 
police officer after the interview.  Weaver was upset that 
Cassim had been taken to the police station. 
 
After speaking with Cassim, the focus of the investigation 
shifted to the defendant.  O'Leary went to the Weaver residence, 
apologized for bringing Cassim to the police station, and told 
Weaver that he wanted to speak to the defendant about the 
victim's murder.  Weaver knew the victim and was aware of the 
shooting.  Weaver told the police that the defendant was away at 
camp and that he would be returning on Sunday, August 24.  
Weaver and O'Leary agreed that they would meet, with the 
defendant present, on Monday, August 25. 
 
In the time between speaking with Weaver and the 
anticipated interview with the defendant, O'Leary learned that 
the Boston police had arrested the defendant on a drug offense 
on July 26, 2003.  The booking sheet generated after that arrest 
indicated that the defendant was wearing a Detroit Tigers 
12 
 
baseball cap.  This baseball cap closely resembled the baseball 
cap found near the scene of the victim's shooting. 
 
At approximately 8:30 P.M. on August 25, O'Leary returned 
to the Weaver home with another detective to meet with the 
defendant.  Although Weaver was cordial and respectful, the 
presence of the detectives in her home caused her to feel very 
uncomfortable.  Weaver had not had any previous contact with the 
police and she was still upset and concerned about the 
detectives conducting the interview with Cassim.  She invited 
the detectives to sit at the dining room table where she and the 
defendant joined them.  At some point during the conversation, 
Weaver left the table to continue cooking dinner in the 
adjoining kitchen.  The apartment had an open floor plan and the 
view from the dining room table to the kitchen was unobstructed.  
 
Before the detectives began questioning the defendant, 
O'Leary produced a waiver form that contained a printed version 
of the Miranda warnings especially for juveniles.  Upon seeing 
the form, Weaver asked if it was necessary to give her son the 
Miranda warnings.  O'Leary told her that it was "routine" and 
then explained that because his purpose was to question the 
defendant about the victim's shooting, the defendant should be 
advised of his Miranda rights before any questioning took place.  
O'Leary first asked the defendant to complete the part of the 
form containing his personal information.  The defendant did so 
13 
 
at his mother's direction.  O'Leary read each of the rights from 
the form and then asked Weaver and the defendant if they 
understood them.  He also asked them to initial the form after 
each warning to indicate that the rights had been explained to 
them.  The pretrial motion judge concluded that Weaver, though 
not highly educated, is an intelligent woman and understood 
those rights. 
 
Weaver noticed that the defendant was becoming "aggravated 
and frustrated" as the rights were being explained.  She told 
him to relax and breathe while encouraging him to sign the form.  
She and the defendant verbally acknowledged that they understood 
the rights being explained and initialed the form as requested.  
Weaver never explained her understanding of these rights to the 
defendant. 
 
After Weaver and the defendant signed the form, O'Leary 
told Weaver that she could speak with her son privately.  They 
went to the area near the stairs, away from where they had been 
sitting.  After a few minutes, they returned to the dining room.  
O'Leary stated that if they understood the rights and if they 
agreed to speak with them, the defendant should sign the part of 
the form that acknowledged that he had taken advantage of the 
opportunity to speak with his mother outside the presence of the 
police officers.  The defendant and his mother signed the form. 
14 
 
 
The detectives then questioned the defendant about the 
victim's shooting for about three hours.  Weaver occasionally 
left the table to continue cooking dinner but remained within 
earshot of the interview at all times.  The defendant denied 
that he was in the area of Wendover Street on the night of the 
shooting, that he was associated with any of the individuals 
named by the police, or that he knew about a fight involving the 
victim and other youths who had accused the victim of stealing a 
bicycle. 
 
The detectives asked more difficult questions that left no 
doubt that they suspected the defendant of having been involved 
in the shooting.  The defendant was unaware that the detectives 
had information that the defendant had fallen from his bicycle 
the night of the shooting.  O'Leary asked the defendant how (not 
if) the defendant had hurt his leg; the defendant said that he 
had injured it playing basketball.  Signaling his disbelief, 
O'Leary asked the defendant if it was possible that he had 
injured himself by falling off his bicycle the night of the 
shooting.  The defendant denied this, and said whoever said that 
was lying.  When pressed about when the basketball injury 
occurred, the defendant was unable to specify the date.  Weaver 
volunteered that they had gone to church on August 10 and that 
the defendant was not limping at that time.  After consulting a 
calendar and reviewing the events of the weeks passed, the 
15 
 
defendant said that his injury occurred two days after the 
shooting. 
 
The detectives then questioned the defendant about his 
Detroit Tigers baseball cap.  The defendant admitted to wearing 
such a cap when he was arrested on July 26.  He also agreed that 
the cap was distinctive on account of the airbrushed letter "D" 
on either side of the logo.  The defendant said that he had 
taken the cap to an establishment in downtown Boston to have the 
distinctive markings placed on it.  When asked where the cap 
was, the defendant stated that it was lost or stolen the same 
day that he hurt his leg playing basketball.  When pressed on 
the date, the defendant stood by his statement that it was lost 
on August 12. 
 
O'Leary then told the defendant that a witness had observed 
a black male matching the defendant's description running from 
the scene of the shooting and losing a baseball cap that had 
been recovered by the police.  He said that if the defendant was 
not wearing the cap it must have been Cassim.  The defendant 
denied that Cassim was at the scene.  O'Leary expressed his 
confidence that the defendant was present on Wendover Street on 
August 10 and was involved in the shooting.  The interrogation 
was terminated shortly thereafter.  O'Leary told the defendant 
that he "needed to know the truth" and that the investigation 
16 
 
would continue.  O'Leary told Weaver that he did not believe the 
defendant's story. 
 
Although he made no promises of leniency, O'Leary urged 
Weaver to "sit down and talk with [the defendant]," "have a 
heart to heart talk," and "try to figure out" his role in the 
events of the shooting.  O'Leary did not suggest questions to 
Weaver, but he suspected that the defendant was involved and was 
hoping for whatever information Weaver could provide to assist 
in the investigation. 
 
The pretrial motion judge found that neither Weaver nor the 
defendant asked the detectives to leave their home, nor did they 
ever request an attorney or seek in any way to terminate the 
interview.  The defendant's demeanor during the questioning was 
sober and coherent, except for when he seemed to be agitated 
that the same questions were being asked repeatedly.  The 
defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, incapacitated, or incompetent.  Although the detective 
suspected that the defendant was involved in the shooting, he 
did not have an arrest warrant and Weaver was free to terminate 
the questioning at any time. 
 
After the detectives left, Weaver began questioning her 
son.  She was upset that the detectives had come to her home and 
was concerned with some of the defendant's answers to their 
questions.  She was particularly concerned that the defendant's 
17 
 
baseball cap may have been found at the scene of the shooting 
and she wanted answers from him.  The pretrial motion judge 
found that she was as much concerned with her own need to 
clarify her son's involvement in a very serious crime as she was 
with the detective's request that she speak with the defendant.  
In her own words, she "wanted to have some peace with this 
thing."  She asked the defendant the same questions that she had 
heard the detectives asking and did not believe the defendant's 
answers.  After about an hour, she stopped questioning the 
defendant, and then sat in a chair for most of the night 
thinking about what had just happened. 
 
O'Leary telephoned Weaver the next morning while she was at 
work to ask if she had had the "heart to heart" talk with the 
defendant.  Weaver told him that she had not, but would when she 
got home from work.  She did not tell O'Leary about her 
conversation with the defendant from the night before.  
 
Because she was distracted by the events of the previous 
evening, Weaver decided to leave work early and arrived home 
around 10 A.M.  She decided to talk with the defendant again 
because she "didn't have peace with this thing in my mind."   
After about an hour she stopped questioning him because the 
questions and answers gave her a headache.  About one-half hour 
later, she called the defendant back to resume her questioning.  
She brought God into the conversation, and told the defendant 
18 
 
that a boy had died and that such a thing could not be a secret 
between children, that God knew about it, and that the defendant 
would have no life at all if he did not tell what he knew about 
the killing.  She continued to question him on and off until the 
late afternoon.  In an effort to get the defendant to tell the 
truth, she resorted to pounding her fist on the kitchen table 
and gritting her teeth.  The pretrial motion judge found that in 
seeking the truth about the defendant's involvement in the 
shooting, Weaver was motivated by a desire to do the right thing 
in accordance with her personal spiritual beliefs and was not 
acting as an agent of the police. 
 
Weaver then prayed again and told the defendant she would 
ask him two questions.  She asked if he was in the area when the 
shooting occurred; the defendant said, "Yes."  She then asked if 
he did it or if he knew who did it.  The defendant put his head 
down but said nothing; Weaver took this gesture to mean "Yes." 
Weaver, who the pretrial motion judge found to be a woman of 
sincere and deeply held religious convictions, began to cry and 
to pray out loud.  The defendant's sister came into the house 
and joined her mother in prayer.  Having realized the defendant 
may have been involved in a murder, Weaver insisted that the 
defendant had to confess for the good of his soul. 
 
The pretrial motion judge found that the concern and love 
that Weaver felt for her son expressed itself at this point in 
19 
 
her singular focus on his spiritual rather than his legal well-
being.  She did not give the defendant any advice or counsel 
that would have made him aware of the need to avail himself of 
the constitutional protections to which he was entitled.  She 
did not tell the defendant to remain silent but rather advised 
him to tell the truth to the police.  She did not seek legal 
assistance for her son. 
 
At approximately 4 P.M., Weaver tried to contact O'Leary. 
He called her back at around 8 P.M. and she told him that she 
was bringing the defendant to speak with him.  O'Leary replied 
that he assumed the defendant was involved and Weaver said, 
"Yes." 
 
In the midst of the talk about God and surrender as the way 
to salvation, the defendant told his mother that he did not want 
to go to the police station.  In the end, however, he succumbed 
to his mother's entreaties that he confess for the good of his 
soul and turn himself in to the police.  Weaver formulated a 
plan that they would go to the police station, that he would 
say, "I shot Germaine Rucker," and the detectives would then 
take him into custody.  He was to say nothing more until a 
lawyer was appointed to represent him.  Sometime after midnight 
on August 27, the Weaver family concluded their prayer session 
and left their home to go to the police station which was a 
short distance away.  On the way, they prayed out loud.  When 
20 
 
they arrived at the station, at approximately 12:30 A.M., they 
stood together in a circle, praying for the defendant.  The 
defendant was crying.  They waited for O'Leary and the other 
detective to arrive.  No police officer had requested that the 
defendant be brought to the police station. 
 
When the detectives arrived, Weaver told O'Leary that the 
defendant had something to say to them, that she expected them 
to take him into custody after his statement and that she wanted 
him to have an attorney before they questioned him any further.  
Realizing that the defendant was about to make an inculpatory 
statement, O'Leary indicated that he would not take any 
statement until the defendant was represented by counsel.  
However, he did not tell the defendant to remain silent until 
they could arrange for an attorney.  At the same time, O'Leary 
produced a juvenile Miranda form from his briefcase and began 
reciting the warnings to the defendant.  As he did so and before 
he could finish reading the rights, the defendant said, "I shot 
Germaine Rucker."  O'Leary then arrested the defendant and read 
him his rights.  Until the defendant made the statements, he was 
free to leave the station. 
 
i.  August 25 statements.  The defendant first argues that 
the statements made in his home on August 25, 2003, should have 
been suppressed because he did not validly waive his Miranda 
rights before speaking with the police and because his 
21 
 
statements were not voluntary.  Rejecting these contentions, the 
pretrial motion judge concluded that the Miranda warnings were 
not required and that the defendant's statements were 
voluntarily made.  We agree. 
 
A.  Custodial interrogation.  Miranda warnings are required 
only when a defendant is subjected to a custodial interrogation, 
and "a defendant's failure to receive or understand Miranda 
warnings, or police failure to honor Miranda rights, does not 
result in suppression of a voluntary statement made in a 
noncustodial setting" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 40 (2015).  Whether an interrogation is 
custodial depends on the "objective circumstances of the 
interrogation, and not on the subjective views of either the 
interrogating officers or the person being questioned."  
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 220 (2003).  This inquiry 
focuses on whether a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would believe that his freedom of movement was 
restricted to the degree associated with formal arrest.  
Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 123 (1998).  In 
determining whether a defendant was in custody, the court 
considers "(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
police conveyed any belief or opinion that the person being 
questioned was a suspect; (3) whether the questioning is 
aggressive or informal; and (4) whether the suspect was free to 
22 
 
end the interview by leaving the place of interrogation, or 
whether the interview ended with the defendant's arrest."  
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 493 (2004). 
 
We agree with the pretrial motion judge's findings that the 
environment in which the defendant was questioned was not 
inherently coercive because it occurred in the defendant's home, 
on a date and time of his convenience, and in his mother's 
presence.  See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 144 
(1999), S.C., 443 Mass. 60 (2004) (interrogation not custodial 
where defendant allowed police into home to question him).  
Although the detectives informed the defendant that they 
believed he was involved in the crime being investigated, they 
did not coerce or threaten the defendant during the interview, 
and the defendant and his mother were free to terminate the 
interview at any time. 
 
We appreciate that Weaver, and not the defendant, invited 
the detectives into their home and permitted them to conduct the 
interview.  Nonetheless, we agree with the pretrial motion judge 
that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not 
have viewed his questioning as coercive or believed that his 
freedom of movement was curtailed to the degree of arrest.  
Accordingly, the Miranda warnings were not required in 
connection with the August 25 interrogation. 
23 
 
 
B.  Interested adult.  We also agree with the pretrial 
motion judge's conclusion that, even if Miranda warnings were 
required, there is no merit to the defendant's argument that his 
waiver was invalid because he was not afforded the special 
protections due to juveniles.  "Investigating officials 
permissibly may interview a juvenile suspected of a crime, and a 
statement that is the product of that interview, if knowing and 
voluntary, may be admitted at trial against the juvenile."  
Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. 804, 808 (1993).  However, 
the Commonwealth bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that a 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Commonwealth v. Berry, 410 Mass. 
31, 34 (1991), S.C., 420 Mass. 95 (1995)  Where a defendant is a 
juvenile, the court proceeds with "special caution when 
reviewing purported waivers of constitutional rights" (quotation 
omitted).  Id.  Where a juvenile is at least fourteen years of 
age, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that prior to waiving his 
rights, he was given the opportunity to consult with an 
interested adult who was informed of, and understood, those 
rights.  Id. at 35. 
 
In his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that his 
mother was not an "interested adult" because she did not 
understand the Miranda warnings and because she felt compelled 
to sign the waiver to have the defendant sign the waiver.  The 
24 
 
defendant also denied having the opportunity to consult with 
her. 
 
In determining whether an adult is an interested adult, 
"the facts must be viewed from the perspective of the officials 
conducting the interview."  Philip S., 414 Mass. at 809.  The 
court examines whether, at the time of the investigation, "it 
should have been reasonably apparent to the officials 
questioning a juvenile that the adult who was present on his or 
her behalf lacked capacity to appreciate the juvenile's 
situation and to give advice, or was actually antagonistic 
toward the juvenile."  Id.   If such facts are present, the court 
is warranted in finding that the juvenile was not assisted by an 
interested adult and was not afforded the opportunity for 
consultation.  Id. 
 
Here, the pretrial motion judge explicitly found that 
Weaver understood the Miranda warnings, and we see no grounds to 
disturb this finding.  To the extent that the testimony of 
Weaver and that of the detectives differed on this point, we 
note that credibility determinations "are the province of the 
motion judge."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 48 
(2011).  Moreover, viewing the circumstances from the 
perspective of the officers, it appeared that Weaver was an 
intelligent, responsible adult who cared for her son and was 
concerned for his welfare.  Additionally, the record reflects 
25 
 
that Weaver understood why the police were questioning her son, 
and she remained present or within listening distance throughout 
the interview.  Nor was there any apparent animosity between the 
defendant and Weaver. 
 
The judge also found that Weaver and the defendant had had 
a private consultation prior to signing the form and waiving 
their rights.  Even if Weaver and the defendant did not speak 
during this time, we note that "[i]t is not necessary for such a 
juvenile actually to consult with the interested adult, for it 
is the opportunity to consult that is critical."  Berry, 410 
Mass. at 35. 
 
Additionally, the motion judge correctly found that Weaver 
was an interested adult despite encouraging the defendant to 
speak with the detectives and to tell the truth.  "We reject the 
notion that a parent who fails to tell a child not to speak to 
interviewing officials, who advises the child to tell the truth, 
or who fails to seek legal assistance immediately is a 
disinterested parent."  Philip S., 414 Mass. at 810.  See 
Commonwealth v. Quint Q., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 507, 517 (2013) 
(mother who advised son to be truthful with police was 
interested adult despite giving advice that would not have 
comported with that of lawyer).  In other words, an interested 
adult is not a proxy for a lawyer.  Accordingly, we conclude 
26 
 
that the defendant was afforded the protections of the 
interested adult rule. 
 
C.  Valid waiver.  Even assuming the Miranda warnings were 
required, we conclude the defendant's waiver of his Miranda 
rights was valid.  In determining whether a waiver is knowing 
and voluntary, the court examines the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the waiver.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 52-53 (2016).  Factors relevant to this 
inquiry include "promises or other inducements, conduct of the 
defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and 
emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice 
system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the 
discussion of a deal or leniency . . . and the details of the 
interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Walker, 466 Mass. 268, 274 
(2013). 
 
The facts support the pretrial motion judge's conclusion 
that the defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary.  The 
defendant and his mother were provided with Miranda warnings, 
which both understood.  The interrogation took place in the 
defendant's home and in the presence of his mother.  The record 
did not show that the defendant's will was overborne by his 
mother's directions to sign the form.  Although the interview 
lasted some time, the questioning was generally nonaggressive 
27 
 
and the police did not make any threats or promises to the 
defendant.  The defendant was young, but was of average 
intelligence and had had at least one prior experience with the 
police.  His responses to questions were coherent, and there was 
no evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol or other 
substances.  Nor did the defendant present any evidence that his 
mental state was otherwise compromised.  The defendant also made 
several statements aimed at exculpating himself, including 
stating that he was not at the scene of the shooting and 
providing an explanation for the injury to his leg.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 387 Mass. 96, 100 (1982) (exculpatory 
statements tend to show defendant's statements are voluntary). 
 
D.  Voluntariness.  Due process requires a separate inquiry 
into the voluntariness of a defendant's inculpatory statements.  
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 559 (2011).  "A 
voluntary statement is one that is the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will, and not induced by physical or 
psychological coercion" (citation and quotations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015).  The court 
examines the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
the defendant's statements were the product of free will and 
rational intellect and "not the product of inquisitorial 
activity which had overborne his will" (citation omitted).  Siny 
Van Tran, supra at 559.  Relevant factors include "the 
28 
 
defendant's age, education, intelligence, physical and mental 
stability, and experience with the criminal justice system."  
Id.  Applying these factors to the circumstances, we conclude 
that the defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary for 
largely the same reasons set forth above.  Additionally, 
although the defendant expressed frustration with the 
questioning, the record does not show that he was agitated or 
emotionally overwrought.  Cf. Monroe, 472 Mass. at 470-471 
(statements coerced where defendant demonstrated disturbed 
emotional state, was threatened by police and was crying, and 
was subjected to hostile interview).  Given these circumstances, 
the pretrial motion judge did not err in concluding that the 
defendant's statements on August 25, 2003, were voluntary, and 
not the product of physical or psychological coercion. 
 
ii.  August 27 statement.  The defendant also argues that 
the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress his 
statement at the police station, "I shot Germaine Rucker," 
because it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and 
was involuntary.  As the pretrial motion judge correctly 
concluded, the Miranda warnings were not required because the 
defendant's statement was not the product of interrogation or 
its functional equivalent by the police.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 675 (2013) ("term 'functional 
equivalent' includes 'any words or actions on the part of the 
29 
 
police [other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody] that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect'" [citation 
omitted]).  Here, the detective was reciting the Miranda 
warnings when the defendant made his statement.  Although the 
detectives anticipated that the defendant would make a statement 
and were therefore providing the Miranda warnings, the statement 
was not made because of words or actions by the detectives meant 
to elicit it. 
 
A.  Agent of the police.  The defendant also argues that 
his statement should have been suppressed because his mother 
acted as an agent of the police when she brought him to the 
police station to make the statement.  A private party is 
considered a State agent when government officials prompt the 
party to act or participate with the party in an action which 
they themselves could not have legally engaged.  Commonwealth v. 
Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 686 (1995).  An individual is not a State 
agent if no promises are made in exchange for the individual's 
help and if nothing was offered or asked of that individual.  
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 393 (1999), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Harmon, 410 Mass. 425, 428 (1991).  Here, the 
detectives urged Weaver to have a heart to heart conversation 
with her son to determine whether he participated in the 
shooting, and although he followed up on this request with a 
30 
 
telephone call to Weaver, he did not otherwise make any threats 
or promises to obtain her assistance.  Additionally, the 
detectives do not appear to have been trying to gain information 
through Weaver that they could not otherwise legally obtain 
themselves, especially where the defendant voluntarily submitted 
to questioning about the shooting.  Moreover, the pretrial 
motion judge's finding that Weaver aggressively questioned the 
defendant out of her desire to do what was right in accordance 
with her personal spiritual beliefs undercuts the defendant's 
argument.  See Commonwealth v. Foxworth, 473 Mass. 149, 158 
(2015); Reynolds, 429 Mass. at 393 (individual who has not 
entered into agreement with government or who reports 
incriminating evidence to police out of conscience not acting as 
government agent [quotation and citation omitted]).  We 
therefore reject the defendant's contention that Weaver was 
acting as an agent of the police in encouraging the defendant's 
confession. 
 
B.  Voluntariness.  We lastly consider the defendant's 
argument that his statement at the police station was 
involuntary and the product of coercion by his mother.  "[U]nder 
the law of this Commonwealth, a judge must determine the 
voluntariness of statements extracted by private coercion, 
unalloyed with any official government involvement" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 
31 
 
176-177 (1984).  "[A] statement obtained through coercion and 
introduced at trial is every bit as offensive to civilized 
standards of adjudication when the coercion flows from private 
hands as when official depredations elicit a confession" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 455 
(1985).  Accordingly, our inquiry is governed by the same 
analysis delineated above regarding the voluntariness of the 
defendant's August 25 statements. 
 
The defendant argues that his mother coerced his August 27 
confession by relentlessly questioning him for two days about 
his involvement in the shooting, by demanding that he tell the 
truth, and by making him feel guilty by praying and invoking God 
and the need to "be at peace," and by forcing him to travel to 
the police station to confess.  It is well-settled that a 
defendant may offer evidence that a relative's involvement in 
questioning about a crime is coercive.  See Commonwealth v. 
McCra, 427 Mass. 564, 569 (1998); Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 
Mass. 55, 60-61 (1993).  The pretrial motion judge concluded 
that although Weaver's exhortations played a major role in the 
defendant's decision to confess, the circumstances of the 
confession did not evidence that the defendant's will was 
overborne to the extent that he lost his ability to make an 
independent decision.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Burgess, 434 Mass. 
307, 314 (2001) (police may "broadly" suggest that it would be 
32 
 
best for suspect to tell truth); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 405 
Mass. 646, 658 (1989) (defendant's statement, prompted by urging 
of police and priest that it would be best to tell truth, not 
psychologically coerced where defendant made voluntary decision 
to make statement, in part to unburden troubled conscience); 
Philip S., 414 Mass. at 813 (court declined to consider requests 
that juvenile tell truth as coercive practice). 
 
We agree with the pretrial motion judge's findings that the 
defendant was not physically or psychologically coerced by his 
mother and her religious beliefs such that he could not resist 
her pleas that he tell the truth.  The defendant and his family 
prayed at the police station, and the defendant cried, but he 
was not otherwise overwrought such that his statement was not 
the product of free will and a rational intellect.  Moreover, 
the defendant does not argue that his mother's efforts to get 
him to confess were an improper appeal to his religious beliefs.  
In fact, the record does not demonstrate whether the defendant 
held the same beliefs as his mother.  Cf. United States v. 
Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
893 1993);  Mersereau v. State, 286 P.3d 97, 115 (Wyo. 2012) 
(court considered whether appeal to suspect's religious beliefs 
was unduly coercive).  Nor did his mother, in invoking God, 
indicate that the defendant would be treated more leniently if 
he confessed.  We thus conclude that Weaver's questioning of the 
33 
 
defendant did not rise to the level of improper psychological 
coercion that would render his statement involuntary, and the 
defendant's confession on August 27 was a free and voluntary 
act. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the judge did not err in 
denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress on the 
various grounds asserted by the defendant. 
 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  a.  Mental health 
expert.  The defendant argues that the judge who heard one 
portion of his motion for a new trial (first new trial motion 
judge)3 erroneously denied that portion of the motion, which was 
based on the failure of the defendant's trial counsel to 
investigate the defense of psychological coercion adequately by 
not consulting with a mental health expert or presenting expert 
testimony about the voluntariness of the defendant's confession 
at either the suppression hearing or at trial.4  The defendant 
also contends that the first new trial motion judge erred 
 
3 In his motion for a new trial, the defendant asserted two 
bases for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because the trial 
judge had retired, the issues were bifurcated and decided by 
judges other than the trial judge. 
 
 
4 The defendant initially argued that trial counsel should 
have consulted with an expert and presented expert testimony on 
the existence and etiology of false confessions, in addition to 
expert testimony on the issue of voluntariness.  On appeal, the 
defendant abandons this argument and acknowledges we have not  
yet ruled such evidence admissible.  Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 
Mass. 395, 419 (2014). 
                                                          
 
34 
 
because he failed to distinguish between testimony concerning 
the voluntariness of a statement and the phenomenon of false 
confessions.  We conclude that the motion was properly denied, 
although for reasons different than those stated by the judge. 
 
In a written memorandum of decision and order issued after 
three days of evidentiary hearings, the first new trial motion 
judge made the following findings of fact.5  The defendant's 
trial counsel is a very experienced and highly regarded defense 
attorney.  He has practiced law for over forty years and handled 
over one hundred murder trials at the trial and appellate level.  
Because the defendant was sixteen years of age, trial counsel 
spent a great deal of time speaking with the defendant's mother 
about the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements 
to her, and formulated the defense that the police used Weaver 
as their agent to induce the defendant to admit his involvement 
in the homicide.  Trial counsel moved to suppress the 
defendant's August 27, 2003, statement to the police on that 
 
5 Because the judge who heard this portion of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial (first new trial motion 
judge) drew facts about the murder, investigation, and 
defendant's admission from those found by the judge had who 
presided over the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, we do 
not repeat them here.  Insofar as relevant here, the first new 
trial motion judge based his additional findings on the 
affidavits and testimony of the defendant's trial counsel and 
Dr. Frank DiCataldo, a psychologist whom the defendant had 
retained, as well as the affidavits of the defendant and his 
mother, Weaver.  The affidavits submitted by the defendant and 
Weaver reiterated that the defendant's statements were not the 
product of his free will,  but rather were coerced by Weaver. 
                                                          
 
35 
 
ground, as well as on the ground that Weaver failed to act as an 
interested adult for her son by impermissibly pressuring him to 
confess to the police. 
 
Trial counsel testified that he prepared a defense by 
learning the facts of a case and then, starting from scratch, 
researching the law as it related to the issues presented.  The 
judge found that at the time trial counsel litigated the motion 
to suppress and tried the case, he had researched but was not 
aware of any appellate or trial court decisions permitting 
expert testimony on claimed coerced or false confessions.6  
According to trial counsel, there was no strategic reason not to 
consult with or present an expert on psychological coercion, and 
that given the nature of the defense, it would not have harmed 
the defense to do so. 
 
In connection with the motion for a new trial, Dr. Frank 
DiCataldo, a forensic psychologist, examined the defendant and 
testified at the evidentiary hearing.  DiCataldo did not find 
any evidence that the defendant suffered from any significant 
cognitive limitations and did not detect any signs of mental 
illness.  After administering two psychological tests, 
 
6 The first new trial motion judge noted that trial counsel 
had defended one case where a codefendant's request to present 
expert testimony on coerced and false confessions was denied 
because it failed to satisfy the standards of expert testimony, 
and that the ruling was affirmed on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 5-7 (2007).  Trial counsel acknowledged 
he would have been aware of the decision. 
                                                          
 
36 
 
interviewing the defendant, and gaining an understanding of the 
defendant's family dynamics, DiCataldo opined that by virtue of 
a protracted investigation by his mother, the defendant's 
admissions were not the product of his own free will or rational 
intellect.  DiCataldo acknowledged that the basis for his 
opinion was limited because he had never evaluated a 
voluntariness claim where the asserted coercive force was a 
parent, or where the statement was made ten years prior to the 
evaluation.  DiCataldo also acknowledged that neither of the 
tests he administered to the defendant was specifically focused 
on juveniles and that there are no specific psychological tests 
to determine whether a person's will has been overborne. 
 
Applying the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), the first new trial motion 
judge denied the defendant's motion.  In doing so, he rejected 
the defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to consult with an expert witness.  The judge found that 
it was more likely than not that trial counsel was aware of the 
absence of Massachusetts case law permitting expert testimony on 
the psychology of coerced and false confessions, and did not 
consult an expert because it would not have added value to the 
defense. 
 
The judge further concluded that the defendant failed to 
satisfy the prejudice prong of a Saferian analysis because he 
37 
 
could not demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that DiCataldo's 
testimony would have been admissible under the foundational 
requirements of Mass. G. Evid. § 702(b) (2016).  Additionally, 
the judge found that the parent-child dynamic is so generally 
familiar to a fact finder that expert testimony was not required 
to further illuminate the issue for a jury.  Moreover, the 
psychological influences of a parent on her child are 
categorically different from those of other authority figures, 
such as the police.  Thus, the judge found, DiCataldo's reliance 
on scientific research involving the impact of psychologically 
coercive or manipulative techniques by police to obtain a 
statement do not provide a basis for his opinion that, in this 
case, the defendant was coerced by his mother's conduct.  The 
judge concluded that because DiCataldo's proffered testimony was 
inadmissible under § 702(b), trial counsel's failure, either to 
consult an expert or attempt to present expert testimony, could 
not have prejudiced the defendant's case. 
 
Where a defendant has been convicted of murder in the first 
degree, the court evaluates a claim of infective assistance 
claim to determine whether "there exists a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice," Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 204 (2009).  The court asks "[1] 
whether there was an error in the course of trial (by defense 
counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge), and, [2] if there was, 
38 
 
whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 
1, 19 (2015) (Lenk, J., concurring).  This standard is more 
favorable than the constitutional standard for determining 
ineffectiveness of counsel.  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 
799, 808 (2005).  The court considers the defendant's claim 
"even if the action by trial counsel does not constitute conduct 
'falling measurably below that . . . of an ordinary fallible 
lawyer'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 808-809. 
 
Where a defendant challenges tactical or strategic 
decisions by trial counsel, the court will find ineffective 
assistance "only if such a decision was manifestly unreasonable 
when made."  Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448 Mass. 286, 288 (2007).  
However, the "manifestly unreasonable standard" only applies 
"where the attorney's purportedly constitutionally ineffective 
conduct involved a strategic decision, rather than some other 
claimed inadequacy such as a lack of appropriate investigation 
or preparation by defense counsel."  Lang, 473 Mass. at 20 
(Lenk, J., concurring), citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 
816, 822 (1998). 
 
In Lang, trial counsel was aware of the defendant's 
psychiatric history but chose to pursue another defense without 
investigating a criminal responsibility defense.  Lang, 473 
Mass. at 11-12 (Hines, J., concurring).  A majority of justices 
39 
 
concurred that the "manifestly unreasonable standard" did not 
apply in these circumstances because "strategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are reasonable [only] to 
the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitation on investigation."  Id. at 19 (Lenk, J., concurring), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 529 (2003).  
Although Lang and the cases cited therein relate to the adequacy 
of an investigation into a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense, these cases provide a useful framework for evaluating 
the defendant's claim. 
 
Here, the first new trial motion judge found that there was 
no evidence showing that trial counsel's failure to consult with 
a mental health expert was a lapse rather than a reasoned 
decision.  This finding was confined to trial counsel's 
investigation into case law permitting expert testimony on 
psychological coercion as it related to false confessions and 
did not address trial counsel's strategy with respect to expert 
testimony about voluntariness.  We therefore assume without 
deciding that trial counsel's failure to consult with a mental 
health expert was not a strategic or tactical decision and thus 
manifestly unreasonable.  Accordingly, we ask only whether the 
failure to consult a mental health expert or to present expert 
testimony at trial as to the voluntariness of the defendant's 
statements "was likely to have influenced the jury's 
40 
 
conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
In order to carry his burden of demonstrating that the 
expert consultation and testimony would have accomplished 
something material for the defense, Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 
Mass. 294, 303 (2011), the defendant, as a threshold matter, 
must demonstrate that DiCataldo's testimony would have been 
admissible.  The first new trial motion judge correctly 
concluded that DiCataldo's testimony regarding a child's 
susceptibility to parental coercion generally, or the 
defendant's susceptibility to coercion by his mother would not 
have been admissible. 
 
Section 702 of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 
governing the admission of expert testimony provides: 
 
"A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if 
 
 
"(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; 
 
 
"(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts 
or data; 
 
 
"(c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and 
 
 
"(d) the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case." 
 
Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2016). 
41 
 
 
 
DiCataldo's evaluation of the defendant was based on his 
assessment of the defendant through the administration of 
psychological tests and information provided by the defendant 
and his mother.  The first new trial motion judge noted that the 
facts relied on by DiCataldo were substantially different from 
those presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress and 
found by the pretrial motion judge.  Additionally, DiCataldo 
created his own methodology for forming an opinion about the 
voluntariness of the defendant's statement because he was not 
aware of any peer-reviewed or generally accepted methodology 
within the psychological community that would apply to the 
circumstances in this case. 
 
We have explained that "expert testimony is sufficiently 
reliable if the underlying theory or methodology is either (1) 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; . . . 
or (2) satisfies the alternative requirements adopted in 
[Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24-26 (1994)]" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761-762, 
(2010).  The defendant claims that he demonstrated the 
admissibility of DiCataldo's testimony by establishing general 
acceptance in the psychological community.  We disagree. 
 
First, the defendant relies on the false logic that because 
DiCataldo has rendered his expert opinion in other cases in the 
42 
 
Commonwealth, his opinion was admissible in this case.  We 
reject this unsubstantiated statement.  The defendant does not 
point to a single case where DiCataldo testified about the 
coercion of a child by a parent. 
 
The defendant further argues that the first new trial 
motion judge erred in ruling that DiCataldo's testimony was 
inadmissible because the courts of the Commonwealth have long 
recognized that a defendant is entitled to present expert 
testimony by a mental health expert regarding the voluntariness 
of a statement, and that trial counsel should have sought expert 
testimony in light of this precedent, and that such testimony is 
admissible.  The defendant cites to several cases to illustrate 
this point.  Notably, in each of these cases, the proffered 
expert testimony related to a mental impairment that called into 
question the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 713 (2008) (panic 
disorder); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 429 Mass. 60, 67 (1999), 
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 
Mass. 71 (2007) (battered woman's syndrome and posttraumatic 
stress disorder); Commonwealth v. Monico, 396 Mass. 793, 798-799 
(1986) (head trauma that impacted voluntariness of statements 
and raised question of criminal responsibility); Commonwealth v. 
Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 608 (1975) (intellectual disability); 
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 342 Mass. 279, 289, 293 (1961) (head 
43 
 
trauma, mental illness, personality disorder, "defective 
intelligence," psychosis); Commonwealth v. Banuchi, 335 Mass. 
649, 655-656 (1957) (effect of sudden deprivation of alcohol on 
mental capacity of confirmed alcoholic). 
 
The defendant argues that in rejecting DiCataldo's 
testimony as inadmissible, the first new trial motion judge 
concluded that "psychology as a science was incapable of 
yielding reliable admissible evidence probative of a statement's 
voluntariness." Such an assertion is unfounded.  Rather, our 
case law demonstrates that when expert testimony as to a novel 
or developing area of science is offered, the court carefully 
considers whether it is "sufficiently reliable to reach the 
trier of fact."  Shanley, 455 Mass. at 761.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 419 (2014); Crawford, 429 
Mass. at 67. 
 
In addition to determining the reliability of an expert's 
proffered testimony, "[t]he judge must also determine whether 
the reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in 
issue -- that is, whether there is a proper 'fit' between the 
two."  Shanley, 455 Mass. at 761 n.13.  Here, DiCataldo, in 
addition to employing a one of a kind methodology to evaluate 
the defendant, relied on research involving the impact of 
psychologically coercive or manipulative techniques by police to 
obtain a statement to evaluate whether the defendant had been 
44 
 
coerced by his mother.  Not only is this reasoning a poor "fit," 
but it also depends on expert testimony on false confessions, 
which we have not yet ruled admissible.  Hoose, 467 Mass. at 
419. 
 
Similarly misplaced is the defendant's reliance on our 
decisions in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 264 n.5 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1158 (2016), and Adams, 416 
Mass. at 61, where expert testimony was admitted to aid the jury 
in assessing the voluntariness of a juvenile's statements.  In 
Jackson, supra at 264 n.5, the voluntariness of the defendant's 
statements to the police was an important issue at trial.  The 
defendant called a clinical psychologist to testify "about his 
examination of the defendant and his opinion with regard to the 
defendant's susceptibility to being influenced by persons in 
authority like the police."  Id. 
 
While these facts are superficially similar to the 
defendant's case, there are important distinctions to be drawn.  
Although the admissibility of the expert testimony was not at 
issue in our decision in Jackson, our review of the record 
before the court in that case reveals that the defendant was 
evaluated by the clinical psychologist because there was a 
question of criminal responsibility and competency to stand 
trial.  The psychologist conducted a forensic mental health 
assessment of the defendant, which included extensive 
45 
 
investigation into the defendant's past as well as interviews 
and a number of psychological assessment tests of the defendant.  
He testified that the defendant suffered from attention deficit 
disorder and dependent personality disorder, and that these 
conditions made him more susceptible to being influenced by 
people in positions of authority.  The methodology used by the 
psychologist and its application to the facts in Jackson were 
profoundly different from those used by DiCataldo.  Moreover, 
the defendant in Jackson, 471 Mass. at 264 n.5, presented 
evidence that it was his mental health impairments that made him 
more susceptible to pressure by authority figures.  Here, the 
defendant sought to present evidence that his will was simply 
overborne by his mother.  These inquiries are fundamentally 
distinct. 
 
Similarly, in Adams, 416 Mass. at 60-61, we held that it 
was error to exclude testimony from the defendant's mother and a 
forensic psychiatrist tending to show that the defendant had 
been coerced into confessing by the presence of his mother.  
Although we do not know the methodology employed by the 
psychiatrist in evaluating Adams, it is apparent from the 
unpublished memorandum and order that the Appeals Court issued 
pursuant to its rule 1:28 following Adams's retrial that there 
was a contention that his intellectual abilities or disabilities 
may have affected the voluntariness of his statement.  As 
46 
 
discussed earlier, while we regularly admit expert testimony 
regarding the voluntariness of a statement where the defendant 
suffers from a mental impairment or mental health issue, there 
is no evidence that the defendant here had cognitive limitations 
or suffers from a mental illness that would affect his capacity 
to make a voluntary statement. 
 
Finally, we agree with the first new trial motion judge's 
determination that the parent-child dynamic is generally 
familiar to a fact finder, and that the likelihood of a child 
being influenced by a parent is not a matter outside the common 
understanding of the average juror, nor is the proposition that 
a parent may exert pressure on his or her child a novel one.  
Thus, the jury's evaluation of whether the defendant's 
statements were psychologically coerced by his mother "could be 
accomplished through its common understanding without need of 
expert testimony."  Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 496 
(2007). 
 
Our conclusion that DiCataldo's testimony would not have 
been admissible at trial does not foreclose a defendant from 
presenting expert testimony regarding coercion and 
voluntariness.  "Determining whether . . . scientific testimony 
is reliable often will hinge on the presentations made by the 
parties in a particular case . . . and these determinations may 
vary appropriately on a case-by-case basis."  Canavan's Case, 
47 
 
432 Mass. 304, 312 (2000).  In this case, the defendant failed 
to show that the methodology used by DiCataldo would be 
generally accepted by the scientific community or was otherwise 
admissible under the factors articulated in Lanigan.  Because 
the testimony would not have been admissible at the defendant's 
trial, we cannot conclude that it would have accomplished 
something material for the defense such that the jury verdict 
would have been different.  Accordingly, the defendant's claim 
of ineffective assistance must fail. 
 
b.  Public trial.  The defendant next claims error in the 
denial of the portion of his motion for a new trial that rested 
on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the closure of the court room during the entirety 
of jury empanelment. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the judge who hear this 
portion of the motion (second new trial motion judge) issued a 
written memorandum of decision in which she found the following 
facts, which are supported by the evidence.  Jury selection 
spanned two days.  The approximately ninety venire members made 
the court room was very crowded.  They took every available 
seat, and those who could not find seats stood wherever they 
could.  On the first day of empanelment, a court officer 
informed the defendant's mother that she and those accompanying 
her that the court room was "closed for jury selection."  They 
48 
 
were also denied entry the second day of empanelment for the 
same reason.  Trial counsel lodged no objection. 
 
The second new trial motion judge concluded that the sole 
reason that a court officer closed the court room to the 
defendant's family and other members of the public was the 
crowded condition.  The judge found that facts surrounding the 
empanelment did not satisfy the criteria articulated in Waller 
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), that may justify a court 
room closure, but concluded that the closure did not prejudice 
the defendant's case, and accordingly denied the motion. 
 
A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
constitutes structural error.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 
Mass. 262, 268 (2015), citing United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 
258, 263 (2010).  We agree with the second new motion judge's 
conclusion that the closure was a full, rather than partial, 
closure of the court room.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 
456 Mass. 94, 111 (2010); Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 80 Mass. App. 
Ct. 546, 551-552 (2001), S.C., 464 Mass. 83, cert denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2356 (2013). 
 
Where a meritorious claim of structural error is timely 
raised, the court presumes "prejudice, and reversal is 
automatic."  Jackson, 471 Mass. at 268, quoting Commonwealth v. 
LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 856 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
317 (2015).  However, the right to a public trial can be waived 
49 
 
in some circumstances.  Jackson, supra.  "[W]here the defendant 
has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim 
by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his 
conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from 
counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that 
would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error 
does not apply."  LaChance, supra at 856. 
 
The defendant did not raise an objection to the court room 
closure because his attorney did not understand that the public 
had a right to be present during the jury empanelment phase of 
the trial proceedings.  The second new trial motion judge's 
analysis, which anticipated the rule announced in LaChance, 
supra, correctly determined that counsel's inaction was the 
product of "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention 
to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, and 
was not objectively reasonable," but that the defendant 
otherwise failed to show that trial counsel's conduct caused 
prejudice warranting a new trial. 
 
On appeal, the defendant does not dispute that he failed to 
demonstrate prejudice, but rather asks us to revise the LaChance 
rule and instead hold that that a defendant who raises an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and has established 
50 
 
that, in failing to object to a court room closure, counsel's 
performance fell below that of an ordinary fallible attorney, is 
entitled to a presumption of prejudice.  See LaChance, supra at 
860-868 (Duffly, J., dissenting).  We decline to do so. 
 
Moreover, the defendant has not advanced any argument or 
demonstrated any facts that would support a finding that the 
closure subjected him to a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Relief is therefore not warranted under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and the denial of the motion for a new 
trial is affirmed. 
 
4.  Firearms conviction.  The defendant lastly asks the 
court to vacate his firearms conviction on the grounds that the 
Commonwealth presented no evidence that he lacked the required 
firearms licenses, and thus failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he did not have a license to carry.  Contrary to the 
defendant's assertion, lack of license is not an element of 
unlicensed possession, but rather an affirmative defense.  
Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 174 (2016), and cases 
cited.  Accordingly, the defendant bore the burden of producing 
evidence that he held a license, and he failed to carry that 
burden. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we discern no 
basis on which to reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
51 
 
degree or to order a new trial.  The defendant's convictions are 
affirmed.  Based on the record before us, it appears that the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of a corrected mittimus to 
reflect that his life sentence under G. L. c. 265, § 2 carries 
with it the opportunity for parole consideration after fifteen 
years because he was a juvenile at the time of his conviction.  
See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 
Mass. 655, 673 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass 12 (2015), and 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 688-689 (2013), S.C., 474 
Mass. 576 (2016).  The matter is accordingly remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.