Title: Hampton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-1360, SC16-6
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1360 
____________ 
 
JOHN LEE HAMPTON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-6 
____________ 
 
JOHN LEE HAMPTON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[May 4, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John Lee Hampton appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
 
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habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court’s order to the extent it 
denies Hampton relief based upon his claim of ineffective assistance of guilt phase 
counsel.  However, we decline to address the remaining issues because we grant 
the habeas petition and order that Hampton receive a new penalty phase 
proceeding in light of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 16-998 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2017). 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This Court set forth the following facts on direct appeal: 
 
On June 10, 2007, at approximately 10 a.m., the nude body of 
Renee McKinness (the victim), a twenty-five-year-old single mother 
of three, was found dead, lying face up in her own blood on the floor 
of her bedroom in her apartment in Clearwater, Florida.  The victim’s 
bedroom was in a state of disarray, with drawers, clothes, and a 
mattress strewn about the room.  The victim had suffered numerous 
injuries, including hemorrhaging of the brain, multiple sharp trauma 
injuries, defensive wounds, and the complete severing of her jugular 
vein.  The victim’s face and eyes were bruised and swollen.  The 
victim’s legs were spread open and her body had a petroleum-like 
odor.  A blue soapy liquid was found in her vagina, along with semen. 
Two bloody handprints were found on the floor, one on each side of 
the body; and the walls and floor of the victim’s bedroom had blood 
spatters and stains suggestive of a struggle occurring on the floor. 
A police officer who was called to the scene inspected the 
contents of a garbage dumpster outside the victim’s apartment and 
found bloody socks, a canister of lighter fluid, a bottle of cleaning 
solution, and bloody bed linens—all of which were collected for 
testing.  While the police were processing the crime scene and 
gathering information by talking to the victim’s friends and neighbors, 
Reginald Span and his wife Dorothy, family friends of the victim who 
had received a telephone call regarding the victim’s demise, drove to 
 
 
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the crime scene and approached the police.  Dorothy’s brother-in-law, 
John Lee Hampton (the defendant), a thirty-three-year-old man who 
had recently moved from Georgia into the Span household, had come 
with the Spans to the crime scene at Dorothy’s insistence.  Although 
the Spans immediately approached the police, Hampton indicated he 
was “not going up there,” and walked to another part of the apartment 
complex to avoid the police. 
Unbeknownst to Dorothy Span, her husband Reginald was 
having a romantic affair with the victim.  And, on the previous 
evening into the early morning hours, Reginald, the victim, Hampton, 
and a female friend of the victim were at the victim’s apartment 
drinking gin and playing cards.  Although Reginald Span knew that 
his story would not help his marriage, he told the police and his wife 
about the “card party” at the victim’s apartment.  Upon hearing her 
husband’s version of events, Dorothy Span set out to find Hampton to 
encourage him to talk to the police.  The lead detective from the 
Clearwater Police Department spoke to Hampton at the crime scene, 
and he noticed that Hampton was not wearing socks.  The detective 
also noticed that Hampton had what appeared to be dried blood on his 
feet, pants, and his necklace. . . . 
 
. . . . 
. . . Testimony introduced at trial established that none of the 
physical evidence that was collected linked Reginald Span to the 
murder of the victim. 
 
Hampton’s Post-Miranda Statement 
 
At the Clearwater Police Department, Hampton was 
photographed and swabs were taken from his feet, pants, and his 
necklace for DNA testing.  Other than a small scrape on Hampton’s 
right foot, he had no injuries.  After waiving his Miranda[1] rights, 
Hampton gave a two-hour videotaped statement to the police.  During 
his post-Miranda statement, Hampton relayed at least eight different 
descriptions of what occurred in the early morning hours preceding 
the victim’s death. . . .   
 
                                          
 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
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In his first account of the events, Hampton told police that once 
he arrived at the Span residence in the early morning hours, he went 
inside, drank a beer, and went to sleep in a chair downstairs.  After 
further questioning, Hampton then relayed another version of the 
events, one that indirectly implicated Reginald Span as the individual 
who might have harmed the victim.  In this narrative, Hampton stated 
that he “dozed off” at the victim’s apartment after playing cards, and 
was awakened by Reginald Span who declared it was time to go 
home.  Hampton recounted that he saw the victim lying on the floor, 
and that he tried to help her by performing CPR on her.  Hampton 
reported that this was how his socks became saturated with the 
victim’s blood.  In this version of the events, Reginald Span and 
Hampton then went back to the Span residence at 3 a.m. and went to 
sleep.  While relaying this story, Hampton twice told the detectives 
that he did not have sex with the victim. 
After further questioning by police, Hampton provided 
numerous additional narratives wherein he and the victim had sexual 
intercourse and he thereafter killed the victim.  In each of the varying 
descriptions of his sexual encounter with the victim, Hampton 
reported that at some time during or after the sexual event, the victim 
attacked him with a knife, and that his act of killing the victim was in 
self-defense or accidental.  In his final version of the events leading 
up to the victim’s death, Hampton stated that he and Reginald Span 
left the victim’s apartment at approximately 3 a.m., and after they 
arrived at the Span residence, Hampton did not go inside, but rather 
returned alone to the victim’s apartment.  Hampton recounted that 
upon his return to the victim’s apartment, he had sex with her, she fell 
asleep, and he then attempted to steal money or drugs from her.  
According to Hampton, the victim caught Hampton riffling through 
her drawers, and in response to her attempt to stop him, he killed her 
with a knife.  In this version of the story—consistent with the 
testimony of Reginald and Dorothy Span—Hampton returned to the 
Span residence when it was light outside.  Hampton also admitted to 
using a rag, cleaning solution, and lighter fluid to try to clean his 
semen from the victim’s vagina.  Nevertheless, he insisted that his 
sexual encounter with the victim was consensual.  Hampton also 
admitted to throwing his bloody socks, the bloody bed linens, and the 
cleaning solution in the dumpster near the victim’s apartment.  Upon 
further questioning, Hampton told police that Reginald Span was not 
involved in the victim’s death, and that Span was not at the victim’s 
 
 
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apartment when Hampton killed her.  Based on the evidence collected 
by the Clearwater Police Department, Hampton was charged on a 
single count of first-degree murder.  Hampton pled not guilty. 
 
The Trial 
 
. . . After the jury was empaneled and sworn, the State 
introduced the testimony of Reginald and Dorothy Span, the 
detectives who processed the crime scene, forensic experts, and other 
witnesses who observed the crime scene and confirmed the 
occurrence of the card party. . . .  A DNA analyst testified that the 
substance found on Hampton’s pants, feet, and necklace was the 
victim’s blood, and that Hampton’s semen was found inside the 
victim’s vagina. . . .  During its case-in-chief, the State played the 
video of Hampton’s post-Miranda statement, wherein he admitted 
numerous times to killing the victim in the early morning hours of 
June 10, 2007. 
After the State rested its case-in-chief, Hampton testified on his 
own behalf.  He testified that he did not kill, harm, or steal from the 
victim, and his post-Miranda confessions admitting as much were lies.  
At trial, Hampton furnished a new narrative regarding his sexual 
encounter with the victim, one that differed from the various accounts 
furnished to the police in his post-Miranda statement.  According to 
Hampton’s trial testimony, at some point during the card party 
Reginald Span stepped outside of the victim’s apartment to make a 
series of telephone calls, and during this time, Hampton and the 
victim had consensual sex in the victim’s bedroom.  Hampton testified 
that Reginald Span then came back into the victim’s apartment, and 
Hampton fell asleep on a sofa.  According to Hampton, he was later 
awakened by Reginald Span who said it was time to go home. 
Hampton saw the victim lying on the floor wounded and he tried to 
help her, but his efforts were thwarted by Span.  According to 
Hampton, he noticed the blood on his socks, removed them, and threw 
them into a plastic trash can, which he then threw into the dumpster.  
Thereafter, according to Hampton’s trial testimony, he and Reginald 
drove back to the Spans’ apartment, where they each drank a beer and 
went to sleep.  At trial, Hampton stated that the reason he told the 
police in his post-Miranda statement that he killed the victim was 
because he had told the police the truth at first, but grew tired of 
answering questions. 
 
 
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On cross-examination at trial, Hampton testified that he had 
previously been convicted of four felonies, including a conviction for 
a crime involving dishonesty, and that he was on felony probation at 
the time of the victim’s death. . . .  Hampton admitted that consistent 
with his post-Miranda statement, he indeed attempted to remove his 
semen from inside the victim’s vagina with a rag and cleaning 
solutions.  He testified that he did this while the victim was gasping 
for air and pleading for help. . . . 
. . . After deliberation, the jury unanimously reached a guilty 
verdict on the charge of first-degree murder, the only charge filed 
against Hampton. . . . 
 
. . . On June 25, 2009, the jury made a recommendation of 
death by a vote of nine to three . . . .  
 
Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98, 103-07 (Fla. 2012). 
 
After conducting a Spencer2 hearing, the trial court entered a sentencing 
order following the jury’s recommendation and imposing the death penalty.  The 
court found three aggravating circumstances, each of which was afforded great 
weight: (1) the murder was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony 
and on probation; (2) the murder was committed during the commission of a 
robbery, sexual battery, and burglary; and (3) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  Id. at 108.  Regarding mitigation, the trial court found 
that while Hampton had “mental health issues,” he failed to establish statutory 
mental mitigation.  However, his mental health issues were considered 
nonstatutory mitigation and afforded little weight.  Id. at 108-09.  In addition, the 
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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court found Hampton established the following six nonstatutory mitigators, each of 
which was afforded little weight: (1) Hampton was neglected during his childhood; 
(2) Hampton was physically abused by his stepfather during his childhood; 
(3) Hampton was abandoned by his parents and was raised poorly; (4) Hampton 
has a family that cares about him; (5) Hampton has an exemplary discipline record 
in jail and displayed model behavior during his week-long trial; and (6) the 
nonunanimous (nine to three) jury verdict.  Id. at 109.  The trial court found the 
aggravating factors were “horrendous” and greatly outweighed the “comparatively 
insignificant mitigating factors,” and therefore the death penalty was appropriate 
and proportional.  Id. 
Direct Appeal Proceedings 
 
 
Hampton raised five issues on direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred 
in denying Hampton’s requests for a juror interview or a new trial based on the 
assertion that one member of the jury was “under prosecution” while serving; 
(2) whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it could find 
Hampton committed first-degree felony murder based on the commission of the 
underlying felony of sexual battery; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
introduction of certain autopsy photographs; (4) whether Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (5) whether 
the trial court erred in rejecting the testimony of forensic psychologist Dr. Robert 
 
 
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Berland, introduced during the Spencer hearing.  This Court rejected all claims and 
affirmed Hampton’s conviction and sentence.  Hampton, 103 So. 3d at 122.    
Postconviction Proceedings 
 
In April 2014, Hampton timely filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment of 
Conviction and Sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  In 
his motion, Hampton raised six claims: (1)(a) Hampton was not competent to stand 
trial, (b) trial counsel should not have stipulated to the expert’s finding that he was 
competent, and (c) trial counsel should have requested a third “tiebreaker” expert 
regarding competence; (2) Hampton is intellectually disabled, prohibiting 
imposition of the death penalty, and trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 
raise this claim; (3) trial counsel were ineffective for (a) failing to prepare 
Hampton to testify, (b) allowing the State to present evidence that Hampton had an 
active warrant, (c) failing to move to redact portions of Hampton’s video 
interrogation, and (d) allowing improper victim impact testimony without a proper 
limiting instruction; (4) trial counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase for 
failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigation regarding the underlying 
causes of Hampton’s drug abuse and bad behavior; (5) trial counsel were 
ineffective during the penalty phase for not presenting the testimony of Dr. Robert 
Berland to the jury, and for failing to present evidence of Hampton’s brain injury; 
and (6) cumulative error.   
 
 
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An evidentiary hearing was granted on all claims.  Fourteen witnesses 
testified, including Hampton’s trial counsel, Randall Lane Lastinger and Richard 
Watts,3 several medical experts, and family members. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court entered an order 
denying all claims.  Hampton appeals the denial of his motion, raising five issues: 
(1) whether trial counsel were ineffective for stipulating to Hampton’s competency 
to stand trial and failing to obtain an additional competency evaluation; (2) 
whether trial counsel were ineffective for allowing the State to present evidence of 
Hampton’s outstanding warrant, failing to redact portions of the videotaped 
interrogation, and allowing improper victim impact evidence; (3) whether trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to fully investigate and present mitigation;    
(4) whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present mental health 
mitigation to the jury and for failing to obtain a positron emission tomography 
(PET) scan; and (5) whether Hampton is intellectually disabled, and whether trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this claim.   
Hampton also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court in 
which he raised the following claims: (1) whether appellate counsel was ineffective 
                                          
 
 
3.  Attorney Lastinger was Hampton’s lead guilt phase counsel, and attorney 
Watts was Hampton’s lead penalty phase counsel.  However, the record indicates 
that Watts also assisted with portions of the guilt phase and vice versa.  For this 
reason, Lastinger and Watts will collectively be referred to as “trial counsel.” 
 
 
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for failing to challenge Florida’s capital punishment scheme on grounds that it 
violates the Eighth Amendment; (2) whether Hampton’s sentence is 
unconstitutional under Hurst; and (3) whether the execution of Hampton would 
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment because Hampton is mentally ill. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove:  
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the 
defendant.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also 
Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998).  If the defendant fails to establish 
prejudice, the reviewing court need not make a specific ruling regarding 
deficiency.  See Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010).   
To establish deficiency, the defendant must show a specific act or omission 
by counsel that falls below an objective standard of reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms.  Francois v. State, 423 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1982).  
The act or omission must constitute an error “so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687.  However, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s 
performance was not ineffective, and “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 
 
 
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must be highly deferential.”  Id. at 689.  We have held “strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”  Occhiocone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  
Therefore, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 
(1955)).  Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id.   
To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “Reasonable 
probability” is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id.  Mere speculation is not sufficient to form the basis for 
postconviction relief.  See Derrick v. State, 983 So. 2d 443, 462 (Fla. 2008) (“[I]n 
order to sufficiently undermine this Court’s confidence in the outcome of 
resentencing, [the defendant] must rely on more than mere speculation.”); see also 
 
 
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Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000) (“Postconviction relief cannot be 
based on speculation or possibility.”).   
 
When reviewing a postconviction court’s ruling on an ineffectiveness claim, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s 
findings on factual issues that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
and reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Bruno v. State, 807 So. 
2d 55, 62 (Fla. 2001). 
A.  Competency 
Hampton argues that trial counsel were ineffective for stipulating to the 
finding of Dr. Darren Rothschild that Hampton was competent to stand trial, and 
for failing to request that another mental health expert evaluate Hampton for 
competency.  However, we agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that 
trial counsel were not ineffective.  
In determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed, a court must 
consider whether he “has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether the defendant has a 
rational, as well as a factual, understanding of the pending proceedings.”  Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.211(a)(1).   
Hampton was evaluated for competency three times: twice before trial and 
once prior to the Spencer hearing.  Hampton was first evaluated by Dr. Robert 
 
 
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Berland, a forensic psychologist retained by the defense, who concluded Hampton 
was not competent to proceed.  In reaching his conclusion, Dr. Berland relied on 
data from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Second Edition 
(MMPI-2) test that he administered to Hampton just days after the murder, two 
interviews with Hampton, and Hampton’s medical, school, and prison records.  
Dr. Berland determined Hampton was unable to consult with his attorneys with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding, had unrealistic expectations regarding 
the outcome of his trial, and lacked a rational appreciation of the nature of the 
proceedings against him.  
Trial counsel subsequently moved for the court to appoint an expert to 
examine Hampton for competency.  Co-counsel Watts later testified during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing that he wanted another expert to evaluate 
Hampton primarily because trial counsel’s own experiences in dealing with 
Hampton were inconsistent with what Dr. Berland described in his report.  In 
response to the motion, the court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Rothschild, to 
examine Hampton.  After conducting a four-hour clinical interview and 
administering psychological testing, Dr. Rothschild concluded Hampton was 
competent to stand trial.  Dr. Rothschild detailed his findings in an extensive report 
that stated, “Hampton was feigning and/or exaggerating symptoms of psychosis, 
particularly after he realized that if he was found incompetent, he could not stand 
 
 
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trial.  Nonetheless, he demonstrated sufficient appreciation of the charge against 
him, along with an adequate awareness of the range and nature of potential 
consequences for this charge.”    
Finally, Hampton was evaluated for competency a third time prior to the 
Spencer hearing by a psychologist, Dr. Jill Poorman, who concluded Hampton was 
competent to proceed.  
When considering this claim, the postconviction court rejected Hampton’s 
assertion that trial counsel should not have stipulated to the competency finding of 
Dr. Rothschild and instead should have requested an additional “tiebreaker” expert 
to evaluate him.  The record includes competent, substantial evidence to support 
this conclusion.  Trial counsel indicated during the evidentiary hearing that their 
own experiences interacting with Hampton were inconsistent with Dr. Berland’s 
findings.  Counsel testified they did not have any difficulty communicating with 
Hampton, and Hampton had no difficulty assisting counsel in preparing for trial.  
Counsel also testified that they knew Dr. Berland’s reputation for being friendly to 
the defense, and they sought the advice of a psychiatrist who did not have such a 
reputation and who would conduct an objective evaluation of Hampton.  That 
psychiatrist, Dr. Rothschild, concluded Hampton was competent, and trial counsel 
testified during the evidentiary hearing that Dr. Rothschild’s findings were entirely 
consistent with their own observations of Hampton.  Counsel did not have 
 
 
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reasonable grounds to further question Hampton’s competency, and therefore we 
agree with the postconviction court that they were not deficient for failing to 
pursue this claim.   
 
Even if trial counsel were deficient, Hampton has failed to establish 
prejudice.  As the postconviction court explained: 
[A]lthough Hampton argues that a “tiebreaker” expert would have 
reconciled the conflict between Dr. Berland’s incompetency finding, 
and Dr. Rothschild’s competency finding, . . . the record reflects that a 
third mental health expert did evaluate Hampton.  Dr. Poorman 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that she evaluated Hampton prior to 
the Spencer hearing and found him to be competent to proceed.  
Therefore, Hampton merely speculates that had Dr. Poorman or 
another mental health expert evaluated him prior to trial, that their 
finding would be an incompetency finding.  This claim is wholly 
speculative and not supported by the record before the court. 
 
We agree.  As previously discussed, mere speculation is insufficient to establish 
prejudice.  See Derrick, 983 So. 2d 443.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s holding that trial counsel were not ineffective. 
B.  Videotaped Interrogation 
 
 
During the State’s case-in-chief, a videotape of Hampton’s interrogation by 
law enforcement was presented to the jury.  During the interrogation, Hampton 
twice mentioned he had an outstanding warrant.  Hampton argues trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to object to the presentation of this evidence because 
allowing the jury to hear about the outstanding warrant cast him in a negative light.  
Hampton also contends trial counsel should have objected when the trial court 
 
 
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precluded counsel from speaking with Hampton during a recess while his warrant 
and prior felonies were being discussed.  Hampton further asserts trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to redact other portions of the videotape on the basis 
that it contained allegedly inflammatory statements by detectives.  We address 
each contention in turn. 
1.  Reference to Outstanding Warrant 
During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, attorney Lastinger testified 
that, although he could not recall, he believed leaving in the reference to the 
warrant in the videotaped interrogation was strategic: the existence of a warrant 
explained why Hampton avoided the police at the crime scene.  Lastinger also 
testified that the fact that the warrant is referenced twice in the video led him to 
believe it was intentionally left in.  Based on this testimony, the postconviction 
court found the “reference to the warrant was strategically left in the videotape to 
explain Hampton’s reluctance to speak with police,” and “[i]t also explained 
Hampton’s failure to render aid to the victim.”  The court determined that “[u]nder 
the circumstances it was reasonable to allow some testimony to explain why 
Hampton was avoiding the police other than consciousness of guilt.”  The court 
also found “Hampton’s brief reference to the warrant did not prejudice the 
defense,” because “[f]ailure to assist the victim to avoid arrest is callous but much 
 
 
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less so than leaving the jury with the assumption that Hampton wanted the victim 
to die so she could not identify him.”   
However, the postconviction court’s conclusion as to deficiency is 
undermined by the discussion between the court, the State, and Hampton’s counsel 
after Hampton mentioned the warrant again while testifying at trial.  Outside the 
presence of the jury, co-counsel Lastinger expressed concern that, because 
Hampton placed the existence of the warrant at issue, it would open the door for 
the State to question the grounds for the warrant.  During the subsequent recess, 
the State and defense counsel reached a compromise limiting the State’s questions 
regarding the warrant.   
If trial counsel intended for the jury to learn about Hampton’s warrant 
through the videotape, they would not have been caught off guard when Hampton 
mentioned the warrant again while testifying.  Conceivably, they would have 
discussed the issue with the State and reached a compromise before the videotape 
was introduced, particularly because the State performed the actual redactions.  At 
no time during the discussion between the court, the State, and the defense did 
counsel mention their now-asserted rationale for wanting the jury to know about 
the warrant, namely, to explain why Hampton avoided the police.  No one 
mentioned that the jury had been made aware of the warrant by way of the 
videotape.  Although Lastinger testified that, in hindsight, it was likely a strategic 
 
 
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decision to keep the reference in the videotape, he also testified it may have been a 
mistake on his part.  The facts suggest it was the latter.4  Therefore, the record does 
not support the postconviction court’s conclusion that trial counsel were not 
deficient for failure to redact Hampton’s reference to the warrant from the 
videotape. 
Nevertheless, Hampton has failed to establish prejudice.  Even if the jury 
had not learned of Hampton’s warrant from the videotape, they still would have 
learned about it from Hampton himself when he mentioned it while testifying.  
Moreover, even if the jury never learned of the warrant, they still would have heard 
the overwhelming evidence of Hampton’s guilt, including his own statements to 
law enforcement, DNA evidence, and witness testimony.  Further, although the 
mere existence of a warrant could have possibly cast Hampton in a negative light, 
the jury never heard the underlying grounds for the warrant, namely, because 
Hampton failed to register as a sex offender.  Therefore, we conclude there is no 
                                          
 
 
4.  Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that reference to the warrant was 
redacted at least twice from the videotape.  In the transcript of the unedited 
version, the detective begins questioning Hampton by asking, “Mr. Hampton, 
you’re aware you had a warrant out of Georgia, correct?  Okay, so technically 
you’re in custody for a warrant so I gotta read you your Miranda because you’re in 
custody for a warrant, okay?”  After reading Hampton his rights, the detective 
continues, “And you understand I’m not going to talk about anything that has to do 
with your warrant.”  The version shown to the jury does not include these 
references to Hampton’s warrant.   
 
 
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reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different if the jury 
did not learn of Hampton’s warrant.  Our confidence in the outcome has not been 
undermined.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
2.  Failure to Request Opportunity to Consult with Hampton During Recess 
Shortly after Hampton mentioned the warrant during trial, and outside the 
presence of the jury, defense counsel Lastinger expressed concern that Hampton’s 
testimony had opened the door for the State to ask Hampton about the basis for the 
warrant.  The trial court stated it would take a recess, and if the parties wished, the 
court would hear arguments on the subject after recess.  The court added, “The 
Defendant is on the stand.  He is not to talk to any attorney.”  Upon return from 
recess, and in Hampton’s presence, Lastinger informed the court that the parties 
had reached a compromise regarding how the State would limit its questioning in 
order to avoid bringing up Hampton’s sex offender status: on cross-examination, 
the State would first ask Hampton if he had ever been convicted of a felony, and if 
so, how many times.  The State would then ask if he was on probation for one of 
those felonies at the time of the murder, and if the outstanding warrant Hampton 
previously mentioned was due to being in violation of that probation.  However, 
when cross-examination commenced, Hampton initially answered inaccurately that 
he had only been convicted of one felony, rather than four. 
 
 
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Hampton argues the trial court erred in precluding trial counsel from 
speaking with him during the recess, and trial counsel were ineffective for failing 
to object to this alleged bar on consultation.  According to Hampton, he would not 
have answered the State’s question incorrectly if he had been able to consult with 
counsel during the recess.  The postconviction court rejected this claim, and found 
trial counsel did not ask to consult with Hampton during the recess because they 
needed the time to meet with the State to ensure it did not reveal that Hampton was 
a registered sex offender.  The postconviction court concluded this was a 
reasonable strategy.  We agree. 
Hampton asserts that his case is like Thompson v. State, 507 So. 2d 1074, 
1074 (Fla. 1987), where this Court granted a new trial because “the court precluded 
the defendant from consulting with his counsel during recess.”  However, this case 
is distinguishable.  In Thompson, the State “was granted a thirty-minute recess for 
the sole purpose of researching ways to impeach [Thompson] regarding a 
subsequent arrest which his lawyer had apparently advised him would be 
inadmissible.  Thus, Thompson was denied the guidance and support of his 
attorney when he needed it most (i.e., when the State was preparing for a major 
attack on his credibility).”  Id. at 1075.  This Court determined that Thompson’s 
credibility was a crucial issue, and denial of consultation with counsel left 
Thompson nervous and confused.  Id.   
 
 
- 21 - 
Here, unlike the defendant in Thompson, there was no indication that 
Hampton was nervous or confused.  Moreover, in Thompson, the court denied 
defense counsel’s request to consult with Thompson during recess.  Id. at 1074.  
Here, trial counsel never requested to speak with Hampton during the recess 
because, as co-counsel Lastinger testified during the evidentiary hearing, the 
primary concern was reaching an agreement with the State that would avoid 
discussion of Hampton’s sex offender status.  The postconviction court determined 
this strategy “minimized the effect of Hampton’s unexpected testimony.”  Given 
the circumstances, we conclude it was reasonable for trial counsel to use the recess 
to prevent potentially damaging cross-examination. 
We further conclude Hampton cannot establish prejudice.  Prior to cross-
examination, trial counsel explained to the court the compromise reached with the 
State and announced the correct number of prior convictions in Hampton’s 
presence.  It is purely speculative that Hampton’s incorrect testimony as to his 
number of convictions would have been any different had his counsel consulted 
with him during the recess.  Therefore, Hampton’s trial counsel were not 
ineffective. 
3.  Alleged Prejudicial Statements in Videotaped Interrogation 
 
The videotape of Hampton’s interrogation contained several statements by 
detectives describing the murder, the victim, and the impact the murder had on the 
 
 
- 22 - 
victim’s children.  Hampton argues these comments should have been redacted and 
counsel were ineffective for failing to do so.  Below is a summary of the relevant 
statements the jury heard during the guilt phase. 
 
(1) Comments regarding the victim’s children and suggesting Hampton 
thought the murder was funny:  
We’ve got a family out there and we got people that want some 
answers here, okay, especially those little girls.  Those little precious 
girls that that girl that you killed gave birth to, okay? . . .  Those little 
girls now who don’t have a mom because their mom is laying in that 
bedroom hacked up. . . .  Do the right thing here, and let’s come clean 
with what’s going on, so I can give this family some answers.  You’d 
want me to do the same with your children, if something happened to 
you, wouldn’t you? . . .  You hacked the shit out of this girl, okay, and 
you left her there and you left blood all over that place. . . .  Don’t 
laugh because this isn’t a laughing matter, man.  This is serious shit.   
 
 
(2) Additional comments regarding the victim’s family and urging Hampton 
to confess:   
When are you going to drop all this other stuff and just come 
completely clean?  Do the right thing.  Think of her kids, think of her 
family, okay? . . .  John, the family, the girls, what do I tell them, 
man?  What do I freaking tell them? . . .  Wouldn’t you rather me go 
back to them when the day comes . . . and say, you know what, he told 
me what really happened, he was sorry, he feels horrible for what he 
did. . . .  These little girls are going to grow up someday, John.  They 
need to know the answers.  The truth. . . .  Where did you put that 
knife?  Let us find it, so those little girls don’t think there’s some little 
weapon flying around that’s going to hurt them. . . .  I need to know so 
that I can tell those little girls the truth. . . .  [W]e want to be able to 
give these little girls some clear-cut answers, all right? . . .  What do 
 
 
- 23 - 
you want me to tell Peanut’s[5] family?  What do you want me to tell 
her daughters? . . .  What about if her kids were sitting in here right 
now, what would you say to them?  What would I tell those precious 
little girls?  Especially that little one who was tugging on my leg this 
morning right there at the crime scene.  Saying, hello to me.  Saying, 
Hi Mr. Police.  Having no idea that her mom was dead laying in a 
puddle of blood. . . .  What would you tell her? . . .  You can’t think of 
one thing you would tell her?  How about maybe, I’m sorry for what 
happened. . . . Your mom isn’t supposed to be dead right now.  I’m 
sorry.   
 
 
(3) Suggesting the jury would view Hampton as a monster: “Do you want to 
be made out to be a complete monster in the courtroom when this . . . trial comes 
up?”   
 
(4) Detectives’ comments following Hampton’s repeated denials of rape:   
You already committed a much bigger crime than rape. . . . [If] you 
hide it from us . . . then it’s going to make you look like a bad guy. . . . 
Do you want to have us go up in front of a judge and say look, John 
made a mistake.  He was honest with us.  Or do you want us to have 
us go, John said he didn’t rape her.  Here’s the crime scene photos, 
Your Honor.  Here’s the results of the medical examiner’s inspection 
of her vagina.  Here’s where those tears and rips in her vagina 
showing that there was forcible sex.  That’s only going to make you 
look like a liar.   
 
 
(5) Suggesting Hampton intended to burn the victim’s body:  
It sounds to me like you were getting ready to light the match. . . .  So 
you want me to believe that you just poured lighter fluid on her to 
clean her off when you had cleaning stuff there, too?  It’s just not 
adding up.  I think you were really in a panic mode and you were 
probably going to light the place up to cover your tracks. . . .  But you 
know what, I think about it, John, and I say, maybe this cat does have 
                                          
 
 
5.  The victim’s family and friends called her by the nickname Peanut. 
 
 
- 24 - 
a conscience.  He was probably getting ready to throw the match and 
then he said, I can’t do this.  I can’t take it that far, and that’s when 
you pulled out the cleaning stuff.  I’m wondering.  You know what I 
mean?  Because you’re not a dumb guy, lighter fluid doesn’t really 
clean anything.   
 
 
(6) Suggesting witness elimination as a motive: “She was stabbed so many 
times she was bleeding like a stuffed [sic] pig.  And she was screaming and she 
was fighting and you had to silence her because the neighbors were going to hear 
and your ass was going to be in trouble, right?”  
 
(7) Suggesting Hampton had sex with the victim after she died: “You had 
sex with her after she was dead, didn’t you?”   
The postconviction court determined trial counsel were not deficient, 
concluding: 
The comments by police during the two-hour long videotaped 
confession showed how police were treating Hampton, how they were 
interrogating him, and the pressure they were exerting to elicit a 
confession.  This was supported by Hampton’s own testimony.  In 
addition, trial counsel used the detective’s misrepresentations and 
pressure to show that law enforcement neglected to fully investigate 
[Reginald Span] as a suspect. 
   
The court also held Hampton was not prejudiced as a result of the comments: 
Hampton’s confession was a difficult thing for the defense to 
overcome because it contained several different stories and was filled 
with prejudicial statements that could not necessarily be excluded.  
There was overwhelming evidence of Hampton’s guilt in this case 
including witness testimony, Hampton’s DNA inside the victim, the 
victim’s DNA on Hampton and his clothes, Hampton’s effort to cover 
up the crime by cleaning the victim’s vagina and throwing away 
evidence, Hampton’s fingerprints at the scene, and Hampton’s 
 
 
- 25 - 
admissions to police.  Considering the comments in the context of the 
positive effects and the overwhelming evidence of Hampton’s guilt, 
the court finds that there is no reasonable probability of a different 
outcome had the comments been removed.   
 
We agree.  Trial counsel were in the difficult position of having to explain 
Hampton’s confession.  They hired and consulted with an expert in false 
confessions, but the expert was unable to find evidence of coercion during 
Hampton’s interrogation.  Co-counsel Lastinger explained during the evidentiary 
hearing that the detectives’ remarks were not redacted in order to explain why 
Hampton kept changing his story: the detectives’ comments showed how Hampton 
was being treated, and why he may have felt pressured to keep coming up with 
new facts or explanations.  Indeed, Hampton testified on the stand that he told 
multiple versions of the events because he was tired of being questioned.  This was 
reiterated in the defense’s closing statement where Lastinger contended detectives 
immediately focused on Hampton without fully investigating Reginald Span.  As a 
result, Hampton “start[ed] saying anything to get out of there,” and “as [the 
detectives] pushed and . . . pushed, [Hampton] changed his story.”  Further, 
Lastinger explained that Hampton’s defense was he did not commit the murder, 
suggesting Span did instead.  Thus, comments regarding the condition of the 
victim’s body (e.g., “bleeding like a stuck pig”) did not bear on Hampton’s guilt.  
Lastinger also testified they did not redact the detective’s comments about setting 
the victim on fire because, other than the lighter fluid, there was no other evidence 
 
 
- 26 - 
to suggest this was what Hampton was trying to do.6  According to Lastinger, the 
statements demonstrated that the detectives were overreaching and jumping to 
conclusions to provide an explanation for Hampton’s actions.   
In sum, trial counsel needed to explain to the jury why Hampton confessed 
and why his statements to the police were wildly inconsistent.  Although the 
detectives’ statements are troubling, counsel’s strategy of showing the detectives’ 
high-pressure tactics was reasonable in light of the difficult circumstances 
presented in this case.  Therefore, because counsel’s “decision was reasonable 
under the norms of professional conduct,” Occhiocone, 768 So. 2d at 1048, we 
conclude Hampton has failed to establish deficiency. 
However, even if trial counsel were deficient, Hampton has failed to 
establish a reasonable probability that the comments in the videotape affected the 
outcome of the trial.  As the postconviction court noted, the evidence of Hampton’s 
guilt is overwhelming.  Even if the videotape had been shown to the jury with the 
allegedly inflammatory comments redacted, the jury still heard about the nature 
and extent of the victim’s injuries through the forensic evidence presented during 
trial, crime scene and autopsy photographs, and Hampton’s own testimony during 
trial about how he poured chemicals on the victim while she was gasping for 
                                          
 
 
6.  For example, no matches or lighters were found at the scene.    
 
 
- 27 - 
breath and begging for help.  See Hampton, 103 So. 3d at 115.  Therefore, we 
affirm the denial of relief on this claim. 
II.  Intellectual Disability 
 
Hampton challenges the postconviction court’s determination that he is not 
intellectually disabled and trial counsel were not ineffective for failure to raise 
intellectual disability as a bar to execution. 
To prove intellectual disability, a defendant must demonstrate: 
(1) significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent 
deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition prior to age 
eighteen.  § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2016).  Significantly sub-average general 
intellectual functioning is defined as “two or more standard deviations from the 
mean score on a standardized intelligence test.”  Id.  In addition, the standard error 
of measurement must be taken into account when reviewing intellectual disability 
claims.  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).  In other words, when a 
defendant’s IQ score is 75 or below, he must be given the opportunity to present 
evidence of intellectual disability, “including deficits in adaptive functioning over 
his lifetime.”  Id. 
Regarding the second prong, the term adaptive behavior “means the 
effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal 
 
 
- 28 - 
independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, 
and community.”  § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.   
In reviewing claims of intellectual disability, the standard of review is 
whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination.  
See Johnston v. State, 960 So. 2d 757, 761 (Fla. 2006).   
A.  Sub-Average Intellectual Functioning 
 
The evidence presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing 
revealed Hampton was administered four separate IQ tests throughout his life.  
Two of those were of the type that are approved for purposes of diagnosing 
intellectual disability: a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Fourth Edition 
(WAIS-IV) in 2013 in which Hampton received a score of 71, and another WAIS 
in 1989, in which Hampton received a score of 78.7    
Of the four IQ tests Hampton was administered, only one had an unadjusted 
score that fell within the standard error of measurement (i.e., below 75).  Notably, 
this test was administered in preparation for postconviction proceedings, and 
                                          
 
 
7.  The other two tests—the Slosson Intelligence Test (SIT) and the Culture 
Fair Intelligence Test (CFIT)—are narrow-band IQ tests that are not approved to 
diagnose intellectual disability; rather, they are primarily used to identify 
individuals in need of more intensive evaluation.  The SIT was administered in 
1983, and he achieved a score of 115.  The CFIT was administered in 1993, and he 
received a score of 89.  These unapproved tests do not bear upon our decision 
regarding Hampton’s intellectual disability. 
 
 
- 29 - 
testimony was presented that the test’s raw data indicated Hampton was 
malingering.  In fact, State expert Dr. Michael Gamache, a clinical psychologist 
and neuropsychologist, testified during the evidentiary hearing that at least three 
other independent sources of information raised a concern about malingering.  
First, Dr. Gamache testified that Dr. Joseph Sesta (who administered Hampton’s 
2013 WAIS-IV test) used six measures of premorbid intellectual ability,8 and all 
the measures indicated Hampton’s actual IQ falls within the range of 75-88.  
Dr. Gamache found the significant difference between the IQ score of 71 and the 
premorbid scores to be suspicious, and concluded Hampton’s premorbid scores 
within the 75-88 range correspond with his actual IQ.   
Second, Dr. Gamache testified that Hampton’s responses on the MMPI-2, 
administered by Dr. Berland during his competency evaluation, showed evidence 
of malingering.  Dr. Gamache explained that the MMPI-2 contains built-in 
“validity scales” which are used to analyze, among other things, whether the test-
taker is over-reporting symptoms in a way that is atypical of someone with genuine 
mental illness.  Dr. Gamache testified that Hampton’s scores on one of these scales 
was five standard deviations above the mean and strongly associated with a person 
                                          
 
 
8.  A premorbid IQ score is calculated based on records, formulas, or tests, 
and is then compared with a current IQ score to gauge whether the IQ has 
potentially declined due to a neurological problem or disease.  A premorbid IQ 
allows for the quantification of the cognitive impact of an injury. 
 
 
- 30 - 
who is either faking mental illness or answering the questions randomly.  
Dr. Gamache concluded the score rendered the test invalid and meaningless.  
Finally, Dr. Gamache noted that Hampton’s jail records also showed evidence of 
malingering. 
Dr. Gamache found Dr. Rothschild’s findings of malingering to be 
significant.  As previously discussed, Dr. Rothschild was appointed by the court to 
evaluate Hampton for competency prior to trial.  As a part of his evaluation, 
Dr. Rothschild administered the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms 
(SIRS).  Dr. Rothschild found that Hampton’s “markedly elevated scores are 
characteristic of individuals who are feigning a mental disorder and are rarely seen 
in individuals who are responding truthfully.  Based on the SIRS, the predicted 
probability of dishonest responding regarding psychotic symptoms was greater 
than 99.9% and the likelihood of honest responding was less than 0.01%.”  
Dr. Rothschild also found the “[e]vidence of malingering . . . was more apparent 
toward the end of the evaluation (i.e., with the SIRS), after Mr. Hampton learned 
that, if found incompetent, he would not stand trial.” 
Regarding the score of 78 on the WAIS administered in 1983, Hampton 
argues it should be adjusted for the Flynn effect9 and discounted because he was 
                                          
 
 
9.  “The Flynn effect acknowledges that as an intelligence test ages, or 
moves farther from the date on which it was standardized, or normed, the mean 
score of the population as a whole on that assessment instrument increases, thereby 
 
 
- 31 - 
not administered the version appropriate for his age.  However, testimony was 
presented during the evidentiary hearing that adjusting for the Flynn effect is 
controversial and not routinely applied in a clinical setting; even defense expert 
Dr. Mark Douglas Cunningham conceded as much.  Moreover, according to Dr. 
Gamache, Hampton would have scored even higher had he been administered the 
correct version of the WAIS for his age. 
The postconviction court acknowledged there was conflicting testimony 
regarding Hampton’s actual IQ score.  However, as Dr. Gamache explained, while 
it is possible for someone to feign intellectual impairment, it is not possible to 
“fake being smarter.”  Based on the foregoing, there is competent, substantial 
evidence to support the postconviction court’s conclusion that Hampton did not 
establish significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning. 
B.  Concurrent Deficits in Adaptive Functioning 
As the postconviction court found, the “evaluation of Hampton’s skills in the 
community after age eighteen is complicated by his being in prison for all but three 
years of his adulthood.”  Nevertheless, the postconviction court concluded that 
                                          
 
artificially inflating the IQ scores of individual test subjects.  Therefore, the IQ test 
scores must be recalibrated to keep all test subjects on a level playing field.”  
Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 
 
- 32 - 
Hampton had failed to establish concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning.  We 
agree. 
According to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which Dr. Cunningham utilized in his evaluation of 
Hampton, a diagnosis of intellectual disability requires that the individual exhibit 
“impairment in everyday adaptive functioning, in comparison to an individual’s 
age-, gender-, and socioculturally matched peers.”  American Psychiatric 
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 37 (5th ed. 
2013).  There are three domains of adaptive functioning: (1) conceptual (or 
academic), involving “competence in memory, language, reading, writing, math 
reasoning, acquisition of practical knowledge, problem solving, and judgment in 
novel situations”; (2) social, involving “awareness of others’ thoughts, feelings, 
and experiences; empathy; interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; 
and social judgment”; and (3) practical, involving “learning and self-management 
across life settings, including personal care, job responsibilities, money 
management, recreation, self-management of behavior, and school and work task 
organization.”  Id. at 37.  The deficits “must be directly related to the intellectual 
impairments” associated with the first prong; namely, “reasoning, problem solving, 
planning, abstract thinking, judgment, learning from instruction and experience, 
and practical understanding.”  Id. at 37-38.  The diagnostic requirements of the 
 
 
- 33 - 
second prong are met when at least one of these domains “is sufficiently impaired 
that ongoing support is needed in order for the person to perform adequately in one 
or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the community.”  Id. at 38. 
 
As Dr. Cunningham explained, “Deficient adaptive functioning doesn’t 
mean devoid; . . . substantial deficits are not required in all arenas, only some 
arenas; . . . this is a diagnosis that’s made based on the presence of limitations and 
is not contraindicated by the presence of the strengths.”  However, only minimal 
evidence was presented regarding the existence of such limitations.  Regarding 
deficits in conceptual skills, evidence was presented that Hampton’s wife Paula 
would read restaurant menus to him, fill out his job applications, and read letters 
and other correspondence to him. 
Regarding deficits in social skills, evidence was presented that Hampton had 
few friends and was generally untrusting of others.  Dr. Cunningham testified he 
had difficulty communicating with Hampton: he often answered questions 
impulsively, and obtaining simple information from Hampton sometimes 
necessitated that a question be asked multiple times.  Regarding deficits in 
practical skills, evidence was presented that Hampton never lived autonomously; 
he lived with family or romantic partners instead.  Hampton did not have a bank 
account and did not handle the family finances.  Although he knew how to drive, 
he did not obtain a driver license.  He did not use public transportation as a part of 
 
 
- 34 - 
his daily routine, and often relied on others for rides.  According to Paula, 
Hampton did not always consider the long-term consequences of his decisions, 
exemplified, for instance, by his failure to turn himself in to authorities in Georgia 
for his outstanding warrant and failure to disclose to Paula his status as a sex 
offender. 
However, these alleged deficits should be viewed in light of the fact that 
Hampton spent all but three years of his adulthood in prison, conceivably making it 
more difficult to reach a level of personal independence normally expected in the 
community.  Moreover, the record does not reflect Hampton was incapable of 
performing many of the tasks he now presents as deficits; rather, it could have been 
a lifestyle choice or personal preference.  For example, there is no evidence that 
Hampton was unable to read restaurant menus, fill out job applications, or read 
correspondence; Paula testified she did these things for him because he was her 
husband and he asked her to.  Similarly, there was no evidence Hampton was 
incapable of opening a bank account or handling the family finances; these were 
just things Paula took care of.  Likewise, there is no indication that Hampton 
would have been incapable of living alone if he had chosen to do so.  In addition, 
the purported existence of deficits in communication is undermined by conflicting 
testimony: while Dr. Cunningham opined that he had difficulty communicating 
with Hampton, Paula and other family members testified to the exact opposite. 
 
 
- 35 - 
Overall, there is no indication that Hampton’s adaptive functioning is so 
“sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed in order for [him] to perform 
adequately in one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the 
community.”  DSM-5 at 38.  Accordingly, we agree with the postconviction court 
that Hampton failed to meet the second prong of intellectual disability. 
C.  Onset Before Age Eighteen 
 
Dr. Cunningham testified during the evidentiary hearing that there is 
evidence of onset before age eighteen, including that Hampton’s mother had 
deficient intelligence and engaged in prenatal drinking, the latter being “a 
significant factor in the occurrence of [intellectual disability].”  However, there 
were no witnesses to support the claim of prenatal alcohol exposure.  In fact, 
Hampton’s mother adamantly denied drinking once she discovered she was 
pregnant, and the postconviction court found her testimony to be unimpeached.  
Although testimony was presented that Hampton contracted spinal meningitis at 
age two, and the disease could have caused damage to Hampton’s brain, there are 
no hospital records to support the claim that Hampton suffered from this disease.  
Moreover, when Hampton’s mother was asked whether Hampton appeared slower 
than other children after his purported hospital stay for meningitis, she responded 
he was normal when he returned home. 
 
 
- 36 - 
 
Further, while Hampton was held back in school and was disruptive in class, 
there was also evidence of average or above average grades in most subjects.  
Moreover, there was testimony that Hampton showed signs of social leadership. 
 
Based on the foregoing, there is competent, substantial evidence to support 
the postconviction court’s conclusion that Hampton failed to establish that he 
suffers from intellectual disability. 
 
As a sub-claim of this issue, Hampton also challenges the postconviction 
court’s determination that trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to argue 
Hampton is intellectually disabled.  However, trial counsel cannot be deficient for 
failing to raise a claim where counsel does not have a good-faith basis to do so.  
See Williams v. State, 987 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 2008) (holding counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to seek the disqualification of the trial judge where counsel 
felt that he did not have a good-faith basis for filing a disqualification motion).  
Because we conclude Hampton has failed to establish that he is intellectually 
disabled, we also conclude trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise this 
claim.  When trial counsel took over Hampton’s case from the public defender, 
Hampton’s records showed that his most recent IQ score was 89 on the CFIT.  
Attorneys Lastinger and Watts testified they each spent over sixty hours with 
Hampton, and nothing about Hampton’s demeanor was inconsistent with this IQ 
score.  They also reviewed Hampton’s medical, school, and prison records, 
 
 
- 37 - 
interviewed family members, and consulted with mental health experts, and none 
of these sources revealed any indication Hampton could be intellectually disabled.  
Moreover, none of the mental health experts who evaluated Hampton raised the 
possibility of intellectual disability, including Dr. Berland, who found Hampton to 
be incompetent to stand trial.  Accordingly, there was no basis for trial counsel to 
file a motion to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty.  Trial counsel 
reasonably relied on their observations of Hampton and the opinions of their 
mental health experts.  Therefore, we agree with the postconviction court’s 
determination that trial counsel were not deficient. 
 
Because we conclude that Hampton is entitled to a new penalty phase 
proceeding in light of Hurst, we decline to address his remaining claims, which 
relate to penalty phase issues. 
III.  Hurst 
In Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the United States Supreme Court 
held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to 
impose a sentence of death.  A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  Id. at 
619.  On remand, this Court held that a unanimous jury recommendation is 
required before the trial court may impose a sentence of death.  Hurst, 202 So. 3d 
at 57-58.  Moreover, this Court held that “in addition to unanimously finding the 
 
 
- 38 - 
existence of any aggravating factor, the jury must also unanimously find that the 
aggravating factors are sufficient for the imposition of death and unanimously find 
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation before a sentence of death may 
be considered by the judge.”  Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).  We also determined 
that Hurst error is capable of harmless error review.  Id. at 67. 
Hurst applies retroactively to defendants whose sentences became final after 
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002).  Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016).  Hampton’s 
convictions and sentences became final after the issuance of Ring.  Further, he 
presented a Ring challenge on direct appeal, see Hampton, 103 So. 3d at 116.  
Thus, Hurst is applicable to him. 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the Hurst error during Hampton’s 
penalty phase proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  “[I]n the 
context of a Hurst error, the burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of the error, 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s failure to unanimously find all 
the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to [the] 
death sentence.”  Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68.  As applied to the right to a jury trial 
with regard to the facts necessary to impose the death penalty, it must be clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found 
 
 
- 39 - 
there were sufficient aggravating factors and the aggravating factors outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances. 
 
We conclude the State cannot establish that the error in Hampton’s case was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury in this case did not make the 
requisite factual findings, and the jury did not unanimously vote to impose a 
sentence of death.  Instead, the jury vote was nine to three.  Further, Hampton was 
not formally charged with or convicted of the underlying felonies in support of the 
aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission 
of a robbery, sexual battery, and burglary.  Therefore, there is no way of knowing 
whether this aggravating factor was found unanimously by the jury.  Likewise, 
there is no way of knowing whether the jury unanimously found the HAC 
aggravator, or whether the jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigation found to be established. 
Any attempt to determine what findings were made by the three jurors who 
voted for life and the nine jurors who voted for death would amount to speculation, 
and cannot rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, the 
error in this case cannot be considered harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief as to 
Hampton’s claim alleging that counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of 
 
 
- 40 - 
the trial.  We further affirm the determination that Hampton is not intellectually 
disabled.  However, we grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacate 
Hampton’s sentence of death, and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding.   
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Richard A. Luce, Judge - Case No. 522007CF012699XXXXNO 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and James L. 
Driscoll, Jr., David Dixon Hendry, and Gregory W. Brown, Assistant Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Christina Z. 
Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent