Title: People v. Nelson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88186
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 2000

Docket No. 88186-Agenda 33-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								TRACY GENE NELSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2000.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
	On April 23, 1997, defendant Tracy Nelson was tried before
a jury in the circuit court of Vermilion County on two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2), (a)(4)
(West 1996)) and two counts of home invasion (720 ILCS
5/12-11(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)). Following a mistrial entered
on motion of defendant, he was again tried on January 20, 1998,
and was found guilty on all four counts. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse defendant's convictions.
	On October 12, 1996, a man entered the victim's home
without authority, beat her and forced her to perform oral sex on
him. The victim identified the defendant as her assailant, and on
April 23, 1997, defendant was tried before a jury for aggravated
criminal sexual assault and home invasion.
	During the course of that trial, the prosecutor became aware
of a person (Sherry Beck) who claimed to have overheard an
inculpatory statement about defendant made by his wife.
Specifically, when the charges for home invasion were read,
defendant's wife allegedly said, "He told me the door was open."
	Two days after the State became aware of Sherry Beck,
defendant called his wife as a witness in his defense. During cross-examination, the State asked defendant's wife whether, when the
charge of home invasion was read, she stated "that wasn't true, he
said the door was unlocked." Defendant's wife denied making the
statement. Later that day, the State advised defense counsel that he
intended to call Sherry Beck as a rebuttal witness to impeach
defendant's wife.
	The following day, defendant moved for a mistrial. During
oral argument on the motion, defense counsel advised that she was
unaware of this alleged statement until the State's cross-examination, and was unaware of Sherry Beck's identity until the
State advised of its intention to call her as a rebuttal witness. The
State conceded the timing of the disclosures, but argued that the
question on cross-examination was made in the hope that lightning
would strike and that the need for the rebuttal witness was
unknown until defendant's wife denied making the statement. The
trial court granted the mistrial, finding that the prejudice from this
line of questioning outweighed its probative value.(1)
	On January 20, 1998, defendant was tried again, and was
ultimately convicted on all four counts. After the appellate court
affirmed defendant's convictions in an unpublished opinion, this
court granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
	In his appeal, defendant initially argues that the second trial
was precluded by the double jeopardy clause. Alternatively, he
argues that a series of alleged instances of prosecutorial
misconduct requires reversal. We find that the second trial was not
barred by the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
However, we further find that two of defendant's assertions of
prosecutorial misconduct are well taken, and compel retrial.
	We first address the issue of double jeopardy. Defendant did
not raise this argument at his second trial, but the State has not
argued waiver to this court.(2) Defendant argues that, when the State
questioned defendant's wife concerning a statement which was in
effect double hearsay, it did so knowing that such a statement was
inadmissible. He also argues that the State's failure to disclose the
existence of Sherry Beck until after defendant's wife testified, a
full day after it learned of her existence, was an intentional
discovery violation. Defendant argues that these improper acts
were committed to induce him to move for a mistrial. In the
alternative, defendant requests that the cause be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on the prosecutor's motives in this regard.
	A motion for mistrial by a defendant is deemed to be a
deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his
guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact. People
ex rel. Roberts v. Orenic, 88 Ill. 2d 502, 509 (1981). For double
jeopardy principles to bar a retrial, the prosecutor must actually
intend to cause a defendant to seek a mistrial. People v.
Marchbanks, 125 Ill. App. 3d 796, 798-99 (1984); People v.
Townsend, 119 Ill. App. 3d 529, 531 (1983). This court has
rejected more generalized standards focusing on whether the
prosecutor's conduct was in bad faith or was intended to harass a
defendant. People v. Ramirez, 114 Ill. 2d 125, 130 (1986). See also
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 674, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2088-89 (1982).
	Here, the record does not support the assertion that the
prosecutor actually intended to cause a mistrial. A prosecutor does
not demonstrate this intent merely by offering evidence in error,
even if done purposely. Ramirez, 114 Ill. 2d  at 131. Moreover, the
record demonstrates that the prosecutor believed the evidence was
admissible; he actively fought the motion for a mistrial, and
believing the original ruling to be merely a discovery sanction,
sought to submit the same evidence at the second trial. We do not
believe the strong showing required to invoke the protection
against double jeopardy has been made. Nor do we believe an
evidentiary hearing would be useful; the trial court listened to
extended argument on the merits of the motion for mistrial, which
shed significant light on the prosecutor's thought processes and
motives. The second trial against defendant appropriately went
forward without infringement on defendant's right against being
twice placed in jeopardy.
	Defendant next argues that a series of acts constituting
prosecutorial misconduct was committed by the State, denying
him a fair trial. The State initially responds that defendant's failure
to raise these arguments at trial constitutes waiver. Defendant
concedes his failure to adequately preserve the arguments, but
urges this court to consider them because they amount to plain
error.
	Plain error bypasses the waiver rule. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
Plain error exists when (1) the evidence is closely balanced; or (2)
an error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the
defendant was denied a fair trial. People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461,
482 (1992). While plain error will be found in either instance, we
find that both situations exist in the instant case. First, the
evidence was closely balanced. The conviction rested primarily on
the identification of defendant by the victim, which was
supplemented by police testimony regarding the underlying
investigation. The victim conceded that she was under the
influence of a mild sedative at the time of the incident, which in
the past has affected her by way of "disassociation" (the victim's
term). She further described this disassociation as having the effect
of making her lose time. One police officer testified that the victim
related the time of the offense as between 6 and 6:15 p.m. Sunset
on that day was at 6:18 p.m. No physical evidence linking
defendant to the crime was introduced.
	In his defense, defendant introduced alibi evidence from three
witnesses stating that defendant was with them until after sunset.
One witness was able to supplement her estimate of the timeline
with an unrelated incident report she had prepared at a gas station
with the local police at 6 p.m. After completing the incident report
she returned to her home, which is where all of the alibi witnesses
testified that defendant spent his day and early evening. Combined
with the testimony that the crime occurred before 6:15 p.m., i.e.,
during daylight hours, defendant sought to establish that he could
not have been the perpetrator.
	We find this evidence very closely balanced. Three persons
accounted for defendant's whereabouts through the day into the
evening. The time of the incident was pinpointed to a 15-minute
period shortly before sunset. Defendant's link to the crime was
established through a single witness on mild sedation. While it is
the jury's province to weigh these competing facts, it can hardly
be said that reasonable juries could only draw from them a
conclusion of guilt.
	We also find that one of the alleged errors, concerning an
improper argument to the jury, was so fundamental and of such
magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. The basis for
this finding is more fully set forth infra. Given that both
circumstances giving rise to plain error are present with the
improper jury argument, and that one circumstance giving rise to
plain error is present with all three arguments, we will address
defendant's contentions on their merits.
	Defendant's first contention of prosecutorial misconduct
concerns "mug shot" evidence. During the course of the trial, the
State elicited the following testimony from Officer Jack Smith:
			"Q. Okay. Why did you meet with [the victim] that
day?
			A.  I was asked to assist Investigator Anderson who
could not be present in order to show-afford [the victim]
an opportunity to look at some photographs.
			Q. What kind of photographs?
			A. Particular photographs that were shown to her
initially were what we call mug shots. They are in books.
These are photographs that are taken when someone is-
			Q. Okay.
			A. in custody.
			***
			[Officer Smith]: She stated that-she wanted to know if
we had by chance another photograph, because that
particular photograph she stated it appeared to be the
person, but the hair was different, something was different
about the hair. She thought the hair was too long in the
photograph she was looking at.
			Q. So what did you do when she said that?
			A. In looking at the photograph that she had depicted it
was a photograph that was dated meaning it was a couple
three years old. I checked our files and found out that
particular person would have a more recent photograph.
I then went to records and obtained a more recent
photograph of the same person and brought it to [the
victim] and showed her that particular photograph, which
was a more updated photograph.
			***
			Q. Okay. And do you recall why did you meet with [the
victim] on the second time?
			A. There had been a police report made involving the
same person and an opportunity arose for a new
photograph to be taken of the same person that [the
victim] had pointed out on the two earlier occasions."
	When identification is a material issue at trial, testimony
relating the use of mug shots in an investigation may be introduced
to show how a defendant was initially linked to the commission of
an offense. However, mug shot evidence tending to inform the jury
of a defendant's commission of other, unrelated criminal acts
should not be admitted. People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 123
(1989). Here, the jury was informed in a not-so-subtle manner that
defendant had had mug shots taken on three different occasions,
with enough time in between to affect how he looked in the
photos. The testimony also implied that the most recent
photograph was taken at a time proximate to the commission of
the underlying incident. This is precisely the type of evidence
prohibited by Arman. Nor do we view this as harmless error.
When admitted in error, "mug shot" evidence will not warrant a
reversal when competent evidence establishes the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and it can be concluded that retrial
without the challenged evidence would produce no different result.
Arman, 131 Ill. 2d  at 124. Given the close nature of the evidence,
jury speculation as to what might have led to three separate arrests
(including one near the time of the underlying crime) could have
been the difference between conviction and acquittal. The
admission of the mug shot evidence was reversible error.
	Defendant next contends that the State misled the jury during
closing argument concerning the timing of the incident. During
closing argument, defense counsel's principal theme was that the
crime took place before sunset, and that three alibi witnesses
accounted for defendant's whereabouts until after sunset. In
support of this theme, defense counsel called upon the jury to rely
on, inter alia, the victim's testimony in this regard.
	The State then led off its rebuttal argument as follows:
			"One problem, think back to yesterday. Despite what
[defense counsel] wants you to say [the victim] never told
us what time, because she didn't know. She never said
between six and 6:15. [Defense counsel] stands up here
and says again and again through [her] argument six to
6:15, but [the victim] never said it. She never gave us a
time. *** We don't know what time it happened, because
[the victim] doesn't know what time it happened, because
she couldn't tell us."
	In actuality, during the second trial the victim was never asked
the time of the incident. However, she gave the following
testimony during her first trial:
			"Q. Okay. As best you can estimate about what time of
day was this?
			A. It had to be like in between six and 6:30.
			Q. Could it have been later?
			A. I don't-I don't think so.
			Q. Okay. Could it have been earlier?
			A. No.
			Q. And you know that because?
			A. Because of the phone calls I made and when I laid
down."
This was the only testimony given by the victim concerning the
time of the incident.
	Defendant argues that the prosecutor misled the jury when he
argued that the victim did not know when the attack occurred. In
so arguing, he asserts that the prosecutor made statements he knew
to be false, given the victim's testimony in the prior trial.
	We agree that, if the prosecutor actually remembered this
testimony, his argument would have been improper. However, we
also believe defendant imputes too much knowledge on the
prosecutor from the short testimony given nine months prior.
Indeed, defense counsel (who also represented defendant at the
first trial) apparently forgot this testimony; despite the heavy
reliance on the time frame, defense counsel asked no questions of
the victim to clarify the timing of the incident. While we agree that
the State's principal role is procure justice, we do not forget that
a criminal trial is an adversarial one. We will not impute a duty on
the State to remember and secure favorable testimony for the
defendant in a situation such as this; that is the role of defense
counsel. Nor will we presume an improper motive on the part of
the prosecutor absent more to suggest the same. The State's
argument to the jury in this regard was a fair one, given the
evidence adduced at the second trial.
	Defendant's final assertion of prosecutorial misconduct also
concerns the State's rebuttal argument. The prosecutor culminated
that argument by stating the following:
		"When we get down to it and the case gets into your
hands, you took an oath to well and truly try the issues in
this case. We've all taken oaths. [Defense counsel] and I
took an oath when we became lawyers. The Judge took a
similar oath-took an oath when he became a judge. We
present our cases. We argue it to you. The witnesses took
an oath and told you what they said.
			The Judge will instruct you on the law, but you took an
oath to well and truly try the issues. And part of that oath
is what you come in here you don't just forget everything
you learned in your entire life. You bring in here your
obligation to judge it on your common sense. And your
oath is to enforce the law when the law has been proven
if the evidence proves it.
			Whenever a jury acquits a person who has been proven
guilty they don't follow their oaths. And if you let the
defendant, Tracy Nelson, walk out of this courtroom on
this evidence I would suggest you have not lived up to
your oaths.
			Many lawyers thank the jury at this point. I don't. I'm
not going to thank you today, because you haven't earned
that thanks yet. You earn the thanks of the People of the
State of Illinois when you rule on the evidence and find in
this case on this evidence the defendant guilty. Only when
you have come to your verdict have you finished your job.
			And you are now the people that you read about in the
paper all the time those people-how could they let that
guy go? How could they convict [sic] that guy? You're
those people now.
			And I would suggest your oaths require you on the
evidence here, *** you can see that the defendant is
guilty. And I would suggest your oaths require you to find
him guilty on this evidence."
	As noted above, defendant failed to preserve his objection to
this argument. We have already held that the evidence was closely
balanced, compelling us to consider defendant's argument under
the plain error rule. With regard to this particular argument, we
also find that the error was so fundamental and of such magnitude
that the defendant was denied a fair trial.
	Indeed, this argument is wholly inappropriate. In People v.
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 50-51 (1996), we recognized this type of
argument as constituting prosecutorial misconduct. Other courts
have come to the same conclusion. Our own appellate court has
held that remarks regarding a jury violating its oath by acquitting
a defendant are inappropriate. People v. Castaneda, 299 Ill. App.
3d 779, 786 (1998). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has noted
that, "[R]emarks implying that jurors will violate their oaths if
they fail to convict *** are improper. [Citations.] *** Although
the prosecution in a criminal case may use forceful language in
summing up the State's case [citation], it may not, as here,
explicitly tell the jurors that they are obligated by their oath to
return a particular verdict." State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 576,
575 A.2d 816, 831 (1990). The Florida Court of Appeals, when
faced with a prosecutor who argued that a verdict for a defendant
would be "in violation of your oath [sic] as jurors," quoted its
supreme court when it ruled that " '[u]ltimate deductions from the
evidence are for the jury to draw. Counsel may argue what
deductions in his judgment the evidence would reasonably
support, but under no circumstances is he warranted in offering
dogmatic statements as to what the evidence proves.' " Redish v.
State, 525 So. 2d 928, 930-31 (Fla. App. 1988), quoting Carlile v.
State, 176 So. 862, 864 (Fla. 1937).
	In Kidd, this court held that a similar argument made during
the sentencing hearing of a capital case was prosecutorial
misconduct. However, we concluded that the defense's prompt
objection and the trial judge's instruction to disregard the
comment cured the error. Here, on the other hand, there was no
objection, and no curative instruction. This fundamental error casts
significant doubt on the reliability of the jury's verdict. In
combination with the erroneous mug shot testimony, it cannot be
said that defendant received a fair trial. His convictions must
therefore be reversed.
	Although we find the evidence in this case to be closely
balanced, we nevertheless hold, after a thorough review of the
record, that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's
convictions, hence permitting retrial. In so holding, however, we
make no conclusion as to defendant's guilt that would be binding
on retrial. See People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 390-91 (1998).
	The judgments of the appellate court and circuit court are
hereby reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
1.     1There was initially some ambiguity as to whether the mistrial was
granted simply as a discovery sanction for failure to timely disclose the
statement, causing prejudice to the defense. On re-trial, the court
clarified that it had ruled the statement substantively inadmissible, and
on Defendant's motion in limine barred the State from pursuing this line
of questioning.

2.      2The State argued waiver to the appellate court but that court
addressed the double jeopardy issue on the merits, finding the failure to
raise the argument amounted to plain error.