Title: Gallion v. State
Citation: 517 So. 2d 1364
Docket Number: 57035
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 1987

517 So. 2d 1364 (1987) Richard GALLION v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 57035. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 23, 1987. Rehearing Denied January 13, 1988. Jerry L. Mills, Richard C. Williams, Jr., Pyle, Harris, Dreher, Mills &amp; Woods, Jackson, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by H.M. Ray, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and ROBERTSON, JJ. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the court: Richard Gallion appeals from his conviction of armed robbery in the circuit court *1365 of the First Judicial District of Hinds County and sentence to life imprisonment. Only one issue of substance is presented on this appeal, whether the State's use of photographs not shown to defense counsel prior to trial constituted a discovery violation of Uniform Criminal Rule 4.06 requiring reversal. Under the circumstances of this case we find it did not, and affirm. On October 19, 1981, the Poindexter branch of the First National Bank, located in downtown Jackson, was robbed by two males of approximately $19,400. The men entered the bank around 10:00 a.m. and proceeded to the window of the head teller Ethel Fisher. One of the men, wearing a lady's sheer blue scarf over his face, stepped up to the window and asked for money. The other man, who was wearing a straw hat, pointed a pistol at Fisher while the first man stuffed money in a bag. After taking funds from Fisher, the "bag man" proceeded to the teller window of Pamela Roberts, and under pistol threat took money from her. Fisher identified the defendant, Richard Gallion, as the "bag man." Bank teller Brenda Burse Walker testified that the gunman wore black clothes and a straw hat, and the bag man wore a blue scarf, blue shirt and slacks, and a light blue knit hat. Walker identified Richard Gallion as the bag man. (At the first trial, Walker had stated that Richard was the gunman. R. 70) Bank secretary Inez Little testified that the bagman wore a light blue shirt, darker pants, a chiffon-like scarf, and a straw hat. Little testified that the gunman had black pants and a shirt. Little identified Richard Gallion as the bagman and noted that he had put on weight. Bank customer A.D. Montgomery testified that the bagman wore a powder blue ski cap, a blue veil, and dark blue clothes. Montgomery identified Richard Gallion as the gunman. Although there were some discrepancies by the witnesses as to clothing worn by the defendant, all eyewitnesses identified Richard Gallion as one of the two men participating in the bank robbery that day. The other robber was M.C. Gallion, a brother of the defendant. Detective C.M. Crisco recovered a portion of a sheer blue scarf and other items of clothing while searching the basement of an abandoned house next door to the residence of Gallion's sister, Hilda Gallion. Inside the trousers appeared the names "M.C. Gallion, Michael Gallion, M.C. John Gallion" marked with a laundry pencil. At trial, Fisher and Walker recognized the clothing as resembling that worn by the men who robbed the bank. Richard Gallion denied robbing the bank. He testified that on the morning of October 19, 1981, he walked from his car to Hilda's house around 8:15, and went with his sister and her children to the Unifirst Bank, leaving about 9:30. Gallion stated that he remained in the car with his sister's children while she went inside to make a withdrawal. Hilda corroborated Richard's alibi. Unifirst Bank records also revealed evidence that Hilda did make a $10.00 withdrawal from Unifirst Bank at 9:51 a.m. on that date. Gallion testified that he had only two or three dollars when he went to the bank with his sister, but when he was arrested later that day he had $164 in cash on his person. Gallion was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Rule 4.06 of the Uniform Criminal Rules provides, in pertinent part: Defense counsel's August 15, 1985, letter to the prosecution contained the following paragraphs: The photographs referred to by defense counsel were Polaroid snapshots taken from a videotape made by the bank's surveillance camera. During trial Officer Crisco did in fact testify that the photographs were never used or tagged as evidence because of their poor quality. We now factually detail how the bank's video and the photographs therefrom create the Rule 4.06 violation issue on this appeal. The opening statement of defense counsel contained the following comments: Vol. I, pp. 11-12 During cross-examination of bank teller Ethel Fisher, Gallion's attorney asked the following: Fisher was then asked to describe what Gallion was wearing the day of the robbery, but was unable to do so. During direct examination of Officer Crisco, he testified that photographs were taken, but they were of poor quality. Crisco stated that he did not know where the photographs were at the time he was testifying. On cross-examination, Crisco admitted that the photographs showed the location of the participants in the robbery, but did not recall whether or not the photographs were used in the investigation of the case. At the beginning of the second day of trial, the following proceedings were had: Following the testimony of the State's last witness in its case in chief, the State rested without offering any photographic evidence of the bank robbery. After the overruling of defendant's motion for directed verdict, the following proceedings occurred: When Gallion took the stand in his defense, his attorney had him try on the clothes worn by the bagman to show that the clothes were too small. Gallion testified that he weighed 183 pounds. On cross-examination, the State had Gallion read his weight that was on the line-up card, which was 170 pounds. At that point the District Attorney sought to introduce the photographs into evidence and the following proceedings were had: Rule 4.06 serves two dissimilar purposes. The first is to give the defendant an opportunity well in advance of trial to learn all evidence the State is going to offer in support its case. Whatever evidence the State proposes to offer to convict him, he is entitled to discover well in advance of trial. This is to prevent surprise, or "trial by ambush." The other purpose is quite different. The defendant is also entitled to examine *1371 and get a copy of any material which would tend to prove him innocent. 4.06(a)(6). In analyzing this case, these two basic dissimilar purposes of Rule 4.06 must be borne in mind. A video tape was made of the robbers during the course of the robbery. From this tape some Polaroid pictures were made by either the bank or the Jackson Police Department, and the Jackson Police Department for a time had these Polaroid pictures taken from portions of the tape. Someone with the police department concluded the pictures were of such poor quality as to be useless. They were discarded. Whether they were discarded prior to or following the first trial is not shown. In any event no robbery pictures were offered in evidence at the first trial. Gallion's first conviction was reversed by this Court. Gallion v. State, 469 So. 2d 1247 (Miss. 1985). Gallion was represented on his first appeal and his second trial by the same law firm. Prior to the second trial, in response to Gallion's request, a State's attorney responded that the photographs in the possession of the Jackson Police Department had been destroyed. This was factually correct, of course. Whether the two attorneys knew the pictures the Jackson Police Department had were in turn Polaroid pictures of a tape still in possession of the bank is not shown. Of course, when defense counsel was apprised the pictures had been destroyed, he knew that no pictures taken during the robbery would be, or could be offered by the State to incriminate his client. He already knew no pictures had been offered at the first trial. The Jackson Police Department obviously had viewed the pictures as useless to either party. This is why they were discarded. Defense counsel nevertheless endeavored to cast a pall of suspicion over the police department's destruction of the pictures. He chose to insinuate to the jury that the pictures would prove his client innocent. According to Gallion's counsel, this particularly significant, important evidence which had been in the State's possession would not be produced before the jury. He asked the jury to keep in the back of its mind, "Where are the photographs?" The State listened to these insinuations made by defense counsel in his opening statement and in his cross-examination of State's witnesses throughout the first day of trial. No doubt the State got aroused over this issue the defense was making over the lack of photographs, and sought to find out from the bank if there were others. The district attorney then learned the bank had a video type. (Why both attorneys did not already know this is strange.) On the second morning of trial, the district attorney announced to the court in chambers that the bank did in fact have a video tape, and that it would be made available to defense counsel. There followed a colloquy between the court and counsel, and then the defendant made a motion for a mistrial because the defense "trial strategy" had been upset because of this development. The court overruled the motion for a mistrial, but granted defense counsel the opportunity to look at the video tape. The video tape was brought to court and defense counsel had an opportunity to look at it. Defense counsel obviously thought the tape was not exculpatory for his client, because he made no effort to offer it into evidence. The first part of rule 4.06 advance notice of incriminating evidence clearly was not involved at this point in the trial proceedings. The State had no intention of offering any such photographs into evidence. What about the other reason for the rule? Would the photographs have tended to prove Gallion innocent, or were they, as the State said, useless? Clearly the tape was not exculpatory, because, as noted, after viewing it defense counsel chose not to offer it into evidence before the jury. The only value of this tape (or the photographs from it) was the "trial strategy" of the defense to insinuate to the jury that the *1372 State had destroyed evidence which would have proved his client innocent. The State cannot be faulted for correcting before the jury this accusation with no basis in fact. Clearly no reversible error had occurred at that stage of the trial because of a Rule 4.06 violation. The State had not attempted to offer any portion of the tape to the jury, and therefore defense could not complain about the State offering incriminating evidence not revealed prior to trial. Nor, could defense complain that exculpatory evidence was kept from Gallion, because it was shown to him and his counsel, and an opportunity given to offer it into evidence if he chose. True, Gallion's trial strategy had been burst. But, this was a strategy he undertook wholly apart from what the tape would have revealed. Nothing the State did or said prior to trial caused or led Gallion into adopting the strategy he adopted. At this stage of the trial, the circuit judge also quite properly directed that photographs be made of the tape for this record. Here again, Gallion complains of something which he adopted as a defense all on his own, and brought upon himself. Gallion had been furnished ample opportunity to examine not merely photographs from the tape, but the tape itself to ascertain whether he would benefit from exhibiting them to the jury. The State offered to recall all State's witnesses for further examination if Gallion chose. All this was declined. The exculpatory purpose of the rule was thus fully satisfied. Also, at this point in the trial the slate was clean. Gallion and his attorney knew precisely what the tape and photographs taken from it (ordered by the court) revealed. It was Gallion's move. If Gallion had not then known what the photographs revealed, we could have an entirely different matter. But Gallion and his counsel did know. When Gallion took the stand, he proclaimed his innocence, insisted on his alibi defense, and then testified the clothes were not his, they were too small. Had he stopped there, he would not have ensnared himself in his self-made trap. Gallion chose to go further. To demonstrate the clothes were not his, much too tight, he donned them in the presence of the jury. These photographs were useless for identification, but they do show one thing. The clothes the robber wore were a tight fit, too. When Gallion put these clothes on, the State could not ask for a continuance or a mistrial. Jones v. State, 398 So. 2d 1312 (Miss. 1981). The State had just this one opportunity to show the clothes were tight on the robber as well. No accused should be permitted to deliberately mislead the jury when he knows precisely that the State has in its possession evidence to contradict him, and not expect the State to offer such evidence before the jury. This was clearly rebuttal evidence under the circumstances of this case. Rule 4.06 is not a constitutional guaranty, and it should not be stretched to proportions now argued by Gallion. A lawsuit is not simply some game. It is an adversarial proceeding in which a fair trial is guaranteed by law, with each side being prohibited from taking unfair advantage of the other. In this case the State did not mislead or misrepresent any discovery fact to the defense. The photographs had indeed been destroyed. Defense counsel no doubt already knew before the discovery request the State had no intention of offering any photographs of the robbery into evidence, because none were offered in the first trial. *1373 Indeed, a minimum of inquiry by counsel would have revealed that the bank had the source of any photographs. Defense counsel chose to insinuate before the jury some sinister purpose on the part of the State in not producing the photographs. When the district attorney, or the police department realized there was a videotape, the State had a duty to report this fact to the court in order for Gallion to determine if the tape was exculpatory. See: Foster v. State, 493 So. 2d 1304 (Miss. 1986); Hentz v. State, 489 So. 2d 1386 (Miss. 1986). It did this, and rather than determine whether the tape helped him or not, Gallion moved for a mistrial. The court overruled the motion for a mistrial, allowed defense counsel to view the tape and determine if it was exculpatory. Defense counsel found the tape to be precisely what the State had initially told him, worthless for identification purposes. Gallion then chose on his own to adopt a unique defense of physically demonstrating the clothes were too tight for him. Indeed they were. The only trouble was, the clothes, as the photographs revealed, fit the robber rather tightly, too. Discovery violations have come before our courts in disparate shapes and forms, Stewart v. State, 512 So. 2d 889 (Miss. 1987), and this case is a glaring example. If this were a case of the State withholding discovery of material it reasonably could have expected might be useful as trial evidence, even though it never got around to using it except as rebuttal or for impeachment, we would have an entirely different matter. See: Coates v. State, 495 So. 2d 464, 466 (Miss. 1986); Johnson v. State, 491 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1986); Tolbert v. State, 441 So. 2d 1374 (Miss. 1983). This is not that case. If the State did indeed violate Rule 4.06, it was clearly inadvertent, the State had no intention of using this evidence, and no reason to expect it to have any trial utility whatever. The defense on its own employed unique (and to the State no doubt completely unexpected) demonstrative evidence knowing full well the State had within its possession one unique way to demonstrate its falsity. It was a card the defense chose to play knowing full well what card the opponent held. This was clearly good faith rebuttal proof by the State of a trial development which the State had no reason to anticipate. This was proper trial proceeding, and no error was committed. AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. ANDERSON, J., not participating.