Title: STATE v PEARSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84-541
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 1985

No. 8 4 - 5 4 1 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 5 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- CLINTON CHARLES PEARSON, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FRO!I: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the T e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of J u d i t h B a s i n , T h e H o n o r a b l e P e t e r L. R a p k o c h , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: F o r A p p e l l a n t : T o r g e r S. O a a s argued, L e w i s t o w n , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t : Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana B a r b a r a C l a a s s e n argued, A s s t . A t t y , G e n e r a l , H e l e n a M a r k L. S t e r m i t z argued, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , Stanford, rlon tana F i l e d : S u b m i t t e d : June 1 7 , 1 9 8 5 D e c i d e d : A u g u s t 2 2 , 1 9 8 5 P C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , J u d i t h Basin County, d e c l a r i n g C l i n t o n Charles Pearson g u i l t y o f c r i m i n a l possession o f dangerous drugs i n v i o l a t i o n of § 45-9-102, MCA. During t h e e a r l y morning hours o f March 10, 1984, S h e r i f f Deputies Steve Knecht and John S c h i l l i n g w e r e on p a t r o l and received a c a l l about a problem w i t h a v e h i c l e near Windham, Montana. Upon responding t o t h e c a l l t h e d e p u t i e s discovered a pickup parked i n t h e highway w i t h l i g h t s on and motor running. The d r i v e r o f t h e pickup, defendant C l i n t o n Pearson, was a s l e e p on t h e f r o n t s e a t . The d e p u t i e s turned o f f t h e i g n i t i o n , removed t h e keys, and then woke up Pearson. They d i r e c t e d him t o t h e r e a r o f t h e pickup where t h e y performed f i e l d s o b r i e t y tests. Pearson was a r r e s t e d f o r d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e and placed i n custody i n t h e p a t r o l c a r . He was n o t i f i e d t h a t h i s pickup was being impounded and would be d r i v e n t o t h e J u d i t h Basin County S h e r i f f ' s Office. A f t e r a r r e s t i n g Pearson and removing him t o t h e p a t r o l c a r , Deputy Rnecht e n t e r e d t h e cab o f t h e pickup and looked f o r empty b e e r cans. H e did n o t f i n d b e e r cans b u t he d i d d i s c o v e r a r o l l e d up white bag i n t h e pocket o f t h e s e a t covers (saddlebag covers) located below t h e s e a t . "A green s t e m o r s t i c k " p r o t r u d i n g from t h e bag made Knecht s u s p i c i o u s t h a t t h e bag might c o n t a i n an i l l e g a l substance. Without touching t h e bag he drove t h e pickup t o t h e S h e r i f f I s O f f i c e i n Stanford. A s he d i d s o he noticed a p i e c e o f paper on t h e dashboard which looked l i k e a " n i c k e l bag," commonly used i n t h e drug t r a d e t o hold cocaine. A f t e r a r r i v i n g i n Stanford he parked and locked t h e pickup. H e t h e n phoned t h e Deputy County Attorney. On t h e advice o f t h e Deputy County Attorney he r e t u r n e d t o t h e pickup without a warrant and removed t h e w h i t e bag under t h e s e a t . H e opened it and d i s c o v e r e d mari- juana. Based upon t h i s , Pearson was a d v i s e d t h a t h e would be charged w i t h misdemeanor p o s s e s s i o n o f m a r i j u a n a . A c e l l o p h a n e wrapper o f s u s p e c t marijuana was a l s o found on t h e f l o o r o f t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e under a c h a i r i n which Pearson had been s i t t i n g . T h i s was s e i z e d and p l a c e d i n t h e e v i d e n c e l o c k e r . L a t e r t h a t same day Deputy Knecht o b t a i n e d a w a r r a n t and made a s e a r c h o f t h e pickup. Cocaine was d i s c o v e r e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s s e a r c h . O n March 1 2 , 1984, Pearson was charged w i t h a v i o l a t i o n o f 45-9-102 ( 3 ) , M C A . Pearson moved f o r t h e s u p p r e s s i o n o f a l l e v i d e n c e s e i z e d from t h e pickup on March 10, 1984. A f t e r a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d t h a t t h e s e i z u r e o f t h e w h i t e bag o f marijuana w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t was i l l e g a l . S a i d s e a r c h and s e i z u r e , t h e lower c o u r t r e a s o n e d , could n o t b e j u s t i f i e d a s a s e a r c h i n c i d e n t t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t n o r could it b e j u s t i f i e d under t h e " p l a i n view d o c t r i n e . " I n a d d i t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e s e i z u r e o f evidence on t h e f l o o r o f t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e was l e g a l and a l s o found t h a t e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d under t h e w a r r a n t was l e g a l d e s p i t e t h e f i r s t , i l l e g a l , s e i z u r e o f t h e w h i t e bag. A nonjury t r i a l was h e l d on May 24, 1984. O n June 1 3 , 1984, Pearson was found g u i l t y o f c r i m i n a l p o s s e s s i o n o f dangerous d r u g s i n v i o l a t i o n o f 45-9-102, MCA. H e was s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e y e a r s imprisonment w i t h t h r e e suspended. H e a p p e a l s t h e c o n v i c t i o n and t h e s e n t e n c e . The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d by t h i s a p p e a l : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y allowed t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f evidence s e i z e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t ? 2. Whether t h e c h a r g e a g a i n s t Pearson should have been d i s m i s s e d because o f a d e f e c t i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s i n f o r m a t i o n ? 3. Whether the procedure used to sentence Pearson was proper? In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, the Court held invalid a subpoena that had been issued on the basis of information acquired through an illegal search. This gave rise to the rule against admission of derivative evidence or the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Evidence gathered as a result of an unconstitutional search was deemed inadmissible. In this case, Pearson wants to keep out evidence of cocaine possession based on a legal search because a prior illegal search had turned up marijuana. The argument is that knowledge of the marijuana gave probable cause to search further and tainted the discovery of the cocaine. There are, however, exceptions to the rule that evidence gathered as a result of an unconstitutional search is inadmissible. These exceptions were succinctly stated by this Court in State v. Allies (1979), 186 Mont. 99, 117, 606 P.2d 1043, 1052-53. "There are three genera1 exceptions to exclusion of the fruit of the poisonous tree. (1) If the evidence is attenuated from the constitutional violation so as *LO remove its primary taint, it will be admissible. [ ' [W] hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'] Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455. ( 2 ) If the evidence is obtained from a source independent of the defendant's confession, it will be admissible. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v . United States, 251 U.S. at 392, 40 S.Ct. at 183, 64 L.Ed. at 321. (3) If it is inevitable that the evidence would have been discovered apart from the defendant's confession, it is admissible. [Citation omitted. 1 " In Allies the primary taint was an illegal confession. The exceptions apply equally, however, to an illegal search. Our facts fit four-square into the foregoing exceptions. Even if we grant the illegality of the marijuana seizure, the seizure o f t h e cocaine was n o t a r e s u l t of t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h a t i l l e g a l i t y . There was knowledge independent o f t h e i l l e g a l search t h a t supported probable cause. Deputy Knecht had s e e n t h e "nickel. bag" i n p l a i n view. I n a d d i t i o n , Pearson dropped a cellophane wrapper c o n t a i n i n g marijuana on t h e f l o o r o f t h e S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e . These two f a c t s would be s u f f i c i e n t t o support probable cause independent o f t h e i l l e g a l s e i z u r e o f t h e marijuana. There seems l i t t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e cocaine was discovered f o r reasons independent o f t h e p r i o r i l l e g a l search. F i n a l l y , even if Deputy Knecht had n o t been i n a hurry t o seize t h e marijuana without a w a r r a n t , t h e cocaine would i n e v i t a b l y have been discovered. This is because t h e r e w e r e t h e independent sources supporting probable cause mentioned above, most notably t h e f a c t t h a t Knecht had a l r e a d y seen t h e " n i c k e l bag." W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y allowed t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of evidence s e i z e d pursuant t o t h e s e a r c h warrant. There i s no question t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s information f i l e d a g a i n s t Pearson c o n t a i n s e r r o r . Count I r e a d s i n f u l l a s follows: "1. That t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e o f f e n s e o f Count I a r e t h a t a t and i n t h e s a i d t i m e and p l a c e , t h e Defendant did then and t h e r e have under h i s c o n t r o l and possession a dangerous drug, c o c a i n e , a s defined i n (550-32-lOl(18) MCA (1983). A l l of t h e above, done i n v i o l a t i o n o f S45-9-102 (3) MCA (19831, e n t i t l e d criminal possession of an o p i a t e , a s defined i n (550-32-101 (18) MCA (1983) , t o be considered a felony under s a i d s t a t u t e . " Section 45-9-102(3), MCA, i s t h e p e n a l t y s e c t i o n f o r possession of an o p i a t e . For whatever reason, t h e information makes r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p e n a l t y p r o v i s i o n f o r possession of an o p i a t e ((5 45-9-102 ( 3 ) ) while charging possession o f cocaine. The c o r r e c t p e n a l t y p r o v i s i o n f o r possession o f cocaine and o t h e r dangerous drugs i s S 45-9-102(4). Pearson moved a t t h e c l o s e o f t r i a l f o r t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c h a r g e on t h e grounds t h a t t h e S t a t e had proved t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f c o c a i n e b u t had n o t proved t h a t c o c a i n e was an o p i a t e ; t h e r e f o r e , a l l e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e charged had n o t been proved. The District C o u r t denied P e a r s o n ' s motion t o d i s m i s s and found him g u i l t y o f $ 45-9-102, MCA. W e concur and n o t e t h e f o l l o w i n g from o u r r e c e n t o p i n i o n i n S t a t e v. Hankins ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 680 P.2d 958, 962, "Montana f o l l o w s t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t an i n f o r m a t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t i f it p r o p e r l y c h a r g e s an o f f e n s e i n t h e language o f t h e s t a t u t e d e s c r i b i n g t h e o f f e n s e . S t a t e e x re1 G l a n t z v. District Court ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 132, 461 P.2d 193. 'An i n f o r m a t i o n need o n l y b e s u f f i c i e n t t o a p p r i s e t h e accused o f t h e c r i m e charged. It need n o t be p e r f e c t . ' S t a t e v . Coleman (1978), 177 Mont. 1, 22, 579 P.2d 732, 745." I n t h i s c a s e , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o p e r l y c h a r g e s t h e o f f e n s e o f p o s s e s s i o n o f c o c a i n e i n t h e language o f t h e s t a t u t e p r o s c r i b i n g such p o s s e s s i o n , § 45-9-102, MCA. F u r t h e r , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c l e a r l y p u t Pearson on n o t i c e t h a t he was b e i n g charged w i t h p o s s e s s i o n o f c o c a i n e . The f a c t t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e wrong p e n a l t y p r o v i s i o n d i d n o t p r e j u d i c e Pearson o r i n any way i m p a i r h i s a b i l i t y t o p r e p a r e a d e f e n s e . The i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d h a r m l e s s e r r o r and was t h e r e f o r e s u f f i c i e n t . F i n a l l y , Pearson r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s Court o r d e r a r e s e n t e n c i n g on t h e grounds t h a t he was s e n t e n c e d i n v i o l a t i o n o f h i s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s . A s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g was h e l d i n t h i s c a s e on August 1 3 , 1984. A p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t was f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t Court on J u l y 23, 1984, and a copy o f t h e r e p o r t was made a v a i l a b l e t o P e a r s o n ' s a t t o r n e y a t t h a t t i m e . The r e p o r t d i d n o t recommend i n c a r c e r a t i o n a t t h e S t a t e Prison. i n Deer Lodge. A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e S t a t e c a l l e d t h e a u t h o r o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t who t e s t i f i e d t h a t based on i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d a f t e r t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t , h e had a 6 new recommendation o f f i v e y e a r s a t D e e r Lodge w i t h t h r e e suspended. Pearson a r g u e s t h a t t h e new recommendation v i o l a t e d h i s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s t o have advance n o t i c e o f f a c t s t h a t make up a s e n t e n c i n g recommendation. N e i t h e r Pearson n o r h i s lawyer r e c e i v e d n o t i c e t h a t t h e recommendation would b e changed based on f a c t s g a t h e r e d a f t e r t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t was f i l e d . W e n o t e f i r s t o f a l l t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o P e a r s o n ' s c o n t e n t i o n , t h e r e i s no due p r o c e s s r i g h t on t h e p a r t o f a d e f e n d a n t t o have advance n o t i c e o f a l l f a c t s t h a t make up a s e n t e n c i n g recommendation. There i s , however, a due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e a g a i n s t a s e n t e n c e p r e d i c a t e d on m i s i n f o r m a t i o n . Spurlock v. C r i s t ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 188 Mont. 449, 614 P.2d 498; S t a t e v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138; S t a t e v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509. The r e a l i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s whether, given t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n r e v e a l e d a t t h e p r e s e n t e n c e h e a r i n g , Pearson was a f f o r d e d t h i s due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n . W e h o l d t h a t he was. F i r s t , Pearson was r e p r e s e n t e d by an a t t o r n e y a t t h e p r e s e n t e n c e h e a r i n g , t h e t i m e t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n was r e v e a l e d . Second, t h e a t t o r n e y cross-examined t h e a u t h o r o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t e x t e n s i v e l y d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i r d , Pearson s t a t e s i n h i s b r i e f t h a t t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n "is t o t a l l y i n c o r r e c t b u t g i v e n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t e x i s t e d h e r e h e was denied t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e f u t e [it] .If T h i s i s n o t so. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t Pearson had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o t a k e t h e s t a n d d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g a t which t i m e he could have r e b u t t e d t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n a s w e l l a s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n provided i n t h e r e p o r t . Pearson c a n n o t now complain because h e d i d n o t a v a i l h i m s e l f o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y . F o u r t h , c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n a t t h e p r e s e n t e n c e h e a r i n g , Pearson could have asked f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e i n o r d e r t o c a l l h i s own r e b u t t a l w i t n e s s e s . Once a g a i n , he c a n n o t now complain because he d i d n o t d o so. In S t a t e v. Radi ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 185 Mont. 38, 6 0 4 P.2d 318, and Spurlock v. C r i s t , s u p r a , w e s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e i s an a f f i r m a t i v e duty on t h e p a r t of a defendant t o p r e s e n t evidence t h a t demonstrates t h e i n a c c u r a c i e s i n a presentence r e p o r t . " [ F l a i l u r e on t h e p a r t o f t h e defendant t o c h a l l e n g e t h e a c c u r a c i e s o f s t a t e m e n t s o r t o o f f e r c o n t r a r y evidence a t t h e t i m e o f sentencing i s f a t a l . " Radi, 185 Mont. a t 4 1 , 604 P.2d a t 320. Pearson was given t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o t e c t h i s due process r i g h t n o t t o be sentenced based on misinformation. The f a c t t h a t he d i d n o t a v a i l himself o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o expose information he considered erroneous i s i r r e l e v a n t . N o grounds e x i s t on which t o o r d e r a resentencing. The c o n v i c t i o n and t h e sentence a r e affirmed. 1 J u s t i c e s