Title: People v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88468
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2002

Docket No. 88468-Agenda 3-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
JAMES HARRIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Defendant James Harris petitioned the circuit court of Cook
County for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)). The circuit
court dismissed defendant's amended petition without an
evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals directly to this court. 134
Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on certain
claims raised by defendant.

BACKGROUND
	On direct review, this court recited the details of defendant's
crimes. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123 (1989) (Harris I);
People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322 (1994) (Harris II). We need not
repeat those details here. In 1984, following a jury trial in the
circuit court of Cook County, defendant was convicted of the
murder of Jesse James, Sr., the owner of a tavern on the South
Side of Chicago, and the attempted murder of Theresa Woods,
who worked as a waitress at the tavern. Defendant also was
convicted of one count of aggravated battery and two counts of
attempted robbery in connection with this incident, which occurred
on February 10, 1983. Defendant received the death penalty for the
murder conviction and sentences of imprisonment for the
remaining felonies.
	During the pendency of his appeal, the United States Supreme
Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69,
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), and this court remanded for a hearing, in
light of Batson, on defendant's claim of discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges. Following this hearing, the
circuit court denied relief. On direct appeal in Harris I, this court
again remanded, determining that additional proceedings were
required for resolution of the Batson issue. The court also found
that during the sentencing hearing, the circuit court had improperly
considered evidence of a 1969 "murder" for which defendant was
never convicted. We vacated defendant's death sentence, and
conditionally vacated his convictions and nondeath sentences
subject to reinstatement. Harris I, 129 Ill. 2d  at 189. On remand
from Harris I, the circuit court resolved the Batson issue adversely
to defendant and reinstated his convictions. The case was then
assigned to a different judge for a new sentencing hearing.
Following this hearing, the circuit court again sentenced defendant
to death for the murder conviction. On appeal, this court affirmed
in Harris II.
	On June 27, 1995, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Subsequently, through appointed counsel,
defendant filed an amended petition and a supplement to the
amended petition. The amended post-conviction petition raised
eight claims for post-conviction relief. We set forth only those
claims that are raised by defendant in this appeal.
	First, the amended post-conviction petition alleged that
defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) when, during his
initial Batson hearing, his attorneys failed to establish the race of
two venirepersons who were excused by the State. The petition
asserted that, because of this allegedly defective performance,
defendant's subsequent Batson appeal was reviewed as to only 15
excused venirepersons rather than the 17 that the petition alleges
were excused by the State.
	Second, the amended post-conviction petition alleged that
defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of
counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) with regard to
his counsel's handling of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence.
Defendant alleged errors on the part of his trial counsel, post-trial
counsel and appellate counsel with regard to this issue. According
to the petition, defendant's trial counsel failed to impeach one of
the State's witnesses during the pretrial hearing on the motion to
suppress and failed to ask during trial that the motion to suppress
be reopened on the ground that this same witness materially
changed his testimony at trial. Defendant alleges that his post-trial
counsel failed to point to these alleged deficiencies in trial
counsel's performance as a basis for granting a new trial.
Defendant alleges in addition that, "[t]o the extent that this issue
arguably could have been raised on appeal, Mr. Harris was also
denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel."
	The amended petition also set forth a claim alleging that
defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of
counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) during the
eligibility phase of his second capital sentencing hearing.
According to the petition, defense counsel failed to call as a
witness former Chicago police officer Phyllis Ham Garth, whose
testimony defendant claims would have raised a reasonable doubt
as to whether he acted with the mental state required to render him
death eligible.
	In addition, the amended post-conviction petition alleged that
defendant was denied due process of law when the State
knowingly presented false aggravation evidence at the second
capital sentencing hearing and failed to turn over to defense
counsel medical reports that would have shown the evidence to
have been false. According to the amended petition, John
Szumigala, who testified in aggravation at the hearing,
exaggerated the extent of the injuries he suffered as the victim of
a 1971 robbery for which defendant was convicted.
	In a related claim, the amended post-conviction petition
alleged that defendant was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel at his second capital sentencing hearing
when his attorneys failed to rebut the testimony of John Szumigala
in aggravation. The focus of this claim is that defense counsel
failed to investigate and present a readily available defense to the
State's primary evidence in aggravation.
	Finally, the amended post-conviction petition alleged that
defendant was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel
when his attorney failed to raise a meritorious issue on direct
appeal concerning the use of victim impact evidence from a prior
unrelated offense. According to the petition, the evidence in
question was victim impact testimony given by John Szumigala
during defendant's second capital sentencing hearing.
	In support of the allegations in his petition, defendant attached
affidavits of the two venire members whose race had not been
established at the first Batson hearing. Edward Shealy, one of
these venirepersons, stated in his affidavit that he is African
American, and Christine Riley Brown, the other venireperson,
stated that she is Latino-American. Also attached were affidavits
of investigators Jonathan Lyon, Appolon Beaudouin, Jr., and
Edward Torres, as well as a copy of a Cook County circuit court
record, all of which indicated that Brown appeared to be African
American. Defendant also attached an affidavit of Michael Levitin,
one of his attorneys at the Batson hearing, stating that he had made
no strategic decision not to present affidavits or other documentary
evidence to establish the race of Shealy or Brown.
	Defendant's amended post-conviction petition was also
supported by a separate affidavit of attorney Michael Levitin, who
was also defendant's post-trial counsel. In his affidavit, Levitin
stated that he made no strategic decision to exclude from his post-trial motions any issues regarding trial counsel's ineffectiveness in
handling defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Also
attached was an affidavit of attorney James Chadd, defendant's
counsel in his first appeal to this court. Chadd stated in his
affidavit that he made no strategic decision to exclude from his
appellate brief the issue of trial counsel's handling of defendant's
motion to suppress.
	In addition, defendant attached to his amended post-conviction petition a copy of a police report signed by former
Chicago Police Officer Phyllis Ham (now Garth) recounting her
interview with Theresa Woods following the incident on February
10, 1983, in which Jesse James, Sr., was killed. Defendant also
attached a separate affidavit of investigator Jonathan Lyon
recounting conversations with Officer Garth in which Garth
confirmed Woods' statements to her and the accuracy of Garth's
report.
	Defendant's amended post-conviction petition was also
supported by a copy of the medical records from the hospital
where John Szumigala was treated after the 1971 robbery. The
injuries reflected in these records do not appear to be as severe as
those described by Szumigala at the sentencing hearing. Defendant
also attached an opinion letter from a physician stating that the
medical records do not "bear out the allegations of Mr.
Szumigala's permanent injury," which the physician stated "would
certainly have appeared by the time he was discharged from the
hospital." In addition, defendant attached a copy of Szumigala's
1971 testimony in the trial on the robbery charge, which differs
somewhat from the testimony Szumigala gave at the sentencing
hearing in 1992. Also attached was an affidavit of attorney Joseph
McElligott, who represented defendant at his second capital
sentencing hearing. In his affidavit, McElligott averred that he did
not receive Szumigala's 1971 medical records from the State.
McElligott added that if he had received the records, he "would
have used them to further impeach Mr. Szumigala's testimony."
	Finally, defendant's amended post-conviction petition was
supported by an affidavit of Charles Hoffman, who represented
defendant on appeal from the second capital sentencing hearing.
In his affidavit, which addressed the issue of the admissibility of
John Szumigala's victim impact testimony, Hoffman stated that he
made no strategic decision not to raise this issue.
	On August 20, 1997, the State filed an amended motion to
dismiss defendant's amended post-conviction petition. Following
oral argument, the circuit court granted the State's motion to
dismiss defendant's amended post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
	The circuit court concluded that the issues raised in the
petition were either previously litigated or "do not raise questions
of law such that the defendant's constitutional [rights] have been
neglected or sacrificed." The court rejected defendant's claim that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his Batson
hearing. The court also rejected defendant's claim that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of
the improper use of victim impact evidence from a prior unrelated
offense.
	Defendant moved to reconsider and vacate judgment, and the
motion was denied. Because defendant was sentenced to death for
the underlying murder conviction, his appeal lies directly to this
court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). We will recount additional relevant
facts in the context of the issues on appeal.

ANALYSIS
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a
mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert that their
convictions and sentences were the result of a substantial denial of
their rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois
Constitution, or both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1996). An
action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding and is
not an appeal from the underlying judgment. People v. Mahaffey,
194 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (2000); People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500,
528 (1999). In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a
defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or
state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the
judgment being challenged. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; People v.
Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997).
	The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to permit
inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original
conviction and sentence that were not, and could not have been,
adjudicated previously on direct appeal. People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 464 (2000); People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998).
Issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502; People v.
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996), overruled on other
grounds, People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998). Issues that
could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are
waived. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 465; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503.
However, the doctrines of res judicata and waiver are relaxed in
three situations: where fundamental fairness so requires, where the
alleged waiver stems from the incompetence of appellate counsel,
or where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face
of the original appellate record. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at 171;
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371-72.
	A defendant filing a post-conviction petition is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at
171; Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 370-71. An evidentiary hearing on
post-conviction claims is warranted only where the allegations of
the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the
trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial
showing that the defendant's constitutional rights have been
violated. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 465; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. In
determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits
are taken as true. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45
(1995); Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. A trial court's determinations
regarding the sufficiency of the allegations in a post-conviction
petition are reviewed de novo. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; People
v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
	With these principles in mind, we consider whether the circuit
court erred in dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. Before this court, defendant raises
six claims for review. We address each of them seriatim.

I. Batson Claim
	Defendant argues that his attorneys were ineffective at his first
Batson hearing when they failed to establish the race of Edward
Shealy and Christine Riley Brown, two venirepersons who were
excused by the State.
	At the start of the hearing, which took place in 1987, the
parties disputed the total number of African American
venirepersons who had been peremptorily challenged by the State.
Defense counsel argued that the number was 17, while the State
maintained that the total was 15. The two disputed venirepersons
were Shealy and Brown. At the behest of the trial court, defense
counsel investigated the matter and informed the court that while
he had been unable to speak directly to Shealy and Brown, he had
spoken by telephone with members of their households, who
informed him that Shealy and Brown were African Americans.
The State presented no evidence to refute this assertion, and the
trial court judge concluded that Shealy and Brown were African
Americans. Having found that the State used 17 of its 20
peremptories to excuse African Americans, the judge then
determined that defendant had established a prima facie case of
Batson discrimination. Pursuant to Batson, the State was then
required to provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory
challenges. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found
that "the challenges were used for neutral reasons[,] not for racial
reasons." On appeal in Harris I, this court determined that
Shealy's and Brown's race had not been properly established, and
that defendant therefore had waived his Batson claim as to these
two venire members. Accordingly, in reviewing defendant's
Batson claim, we considered only the 15 excused venirepersons
that the parties agreed were African Americans. Harris I, 129 Ill. 2d  at 172.
	Before this court, the State initially argues that defendant's
Batson claim is barred by the doctrines of waiver and res judicata.
Pointing to our decision in Harris I, the State asserts: "this Court
has already decided that Petitioner forfeited his right to challenge
the exclusion of jurors Riley [Brown] and Shealy when counsel
failed to make an adequate record" of their race. The State
contends that our recognition of waiver in Harris I is res judicata
as to defendant's claim in the case at bar with regard to Shealy and
Brown. We disagree.
	As noted, the doctrines of res judicata and waiver are relaxed
where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of
the original appellate record. Here, as this court noted in Harris I,
there was nothing in the record establishing the race of the two
venire members in question. Harris I, 129 Ill. 2d  at 172. Indeed,
it is the absence of facts establishing Shealy's and Brown's race
that is at the heart of defendant's claim, which, as noted, is that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to establish their race. The facts
relating to this claim do not appear on the face of the original
appellate record, and res judicata and waiver therefore do not
apply in this instance.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State points to this court's
decision in People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83 (1999), where a similar
post-conviction claim was found to have been waived because the
defendant failed to include in the record the race of the witnesses
who testified at trial. However, the defendant in Evans did not
claim, as does defendant in the instant case, that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to establish the witnesses' race. Instead, his
post-conviction claim was simply a variation of the fourteenth
amendment Batson claim that he had raised on direct appeal.
Defendant in the instant case raises a different, sixth amendment
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we find
Evans inapposite to the case at bar.
	Turning to the merits of defendant's claim, we recall the
familiar standard by which we review ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under the first prong of this test, the defendant
must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient. In
other words, "the defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064. However, even if it is established that counsel's
performance was professionally unreasonable, this, by itself, is
insufficient to warrant reversal. The defendant must also meet the
second prong of the Strickland test: he must demonstrate that
counsel's deficiencies resulted in prejudice. In order to establish
prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068. A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
699-700, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 530.
	In the case at bar, defendant argues that his counsel's failure
to establish the race of venirepersons Shealy and Brown at the
Batson hearing was professionally unreasonable. Defendant also
contends that he suffered prejudice as a result of this allegedly
deficient performance. According to defendant, there is a
reasonable probability that, had these venirepersons' race been
properly established, this court in Harris I would have found the
State's reasons for excusing Shealy and Brown to be pretextual
and would have reversed defendant's convictions. Alternatively,
defendant argues that there is a reasonable probability that this
court would have found the trial court judge's findings as to these
two venirepersons erroneous and would have remanded for further
Batson proceedings as to Shealy and Brown.
	In Batson, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional
for the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a
prospective juror solely on the basis of race. The Court in Batson
outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims of Batson
discrimination. First, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on
the basis of race. Once a prima facie case is made, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for
excusing the venirepersons in question. Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405, 111 S. Ct. 1859,
1866 (1991); People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1994). At this
stage of the process, the explanation given by the prosecutor need
not be persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995).
A neutral explanation is one based on a reason other than race.
Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 333. "Unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral." Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d 406, 111 S. Ct.  at 1866. Once the prosecutor articulates his reasons
for striking the prospective jurors in question, the process moves
to the third step: the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 405,
111 S. Ct.  at 1866. Because the trial court's decision as to
discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact, this
determination is entitled to great deference and will be disturbed
on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at
364-65, 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 409, 412, 111 S. Ct.  at 1869, 1871;
People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 274 (1995); Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d 
at 333. Where more than one explanation has been offered for the
exclusion of a venire member, it is sufficient for our purposes if at
least one of these explanations is race neutral. People v. Andrews,
155 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (1993); Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 278.
	In the case at bar, defendant's Batson argument turns on
whether the reasons given by the State for excusing Brown and
Shealy were pretextual, and on whether the trial court's
determination that they were race neutral was clearly erroneous. If
these questions are answered in the negative, it follows that
defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to
establish Shealy's and Brown's race. Accordingly, defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim would fail. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 530. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
defendant's Batson claim is without merit.

Christine Riley Brown
	During voir dire, which was conducted by the trial court judge
on April 23 and 24, 1984, Christine Riley (now Brown) stated that
she graduated from Richard Vocational High School and had
worked for six years as a directory assistance operator for Illinois
Bell. With regard to her place of residence, she agreed with the
judge when he stated that she lived in "Hyde Park or Kenwood,"
which are two neighborhoods in the same vicinity on Chicago's
South Side. Riley had a friend who was a lawyer. She had never
spoken to this friend about her philosophies of law or law
enforcement. Riley was separated from her husband, who had
done auto body work during the time that they were together. Her
nephew had been the victim of a crime. He was stabbed "about
three months ago" in front of his house on the South Side of
Chicago. Riley said "[i]t was a fight," and she did not know
"exactly what happened."
	The Batson hearing was conducted by the same judge who
presided at trial. At this hearing, Daniel Franks, one of the
prosecutors in the case, explained his reasons for excusing Brown.
One of these reasons was that she "lived in the Hyde Park area."
Franks explained that, based on his experience, it was his belief
that people who live in the Hyde Park and University of Chicago
area "have a certain attitude about themselves and that
community." According to Franks, "[t]hey are more interested in
scholastic endeavors and maybe would be more open to new ideas
and other types of ideas than people in the rest of the Chicago
area." Franks stated that in selecting jurors, he looks for people
who "are going to listen to the evidence and make their findings
of fact based on the evidence that they get in this courtroom, and
not guess or attempt to go beyond the rulings of the court or the
jury instructions."
	Defendant argues that the reasons given by the prosecutor for
excusing Brown "appear either pretextual or unsupported by the
record." With regard to Brown's place of residence, defendant
notes that Brown never stated that she was a resident of Hyde
Park. Instead, she simply answered "yes" when the judge stated:
"You live in Hyde Park or Kenwood, did you say?" In addition,
defendant emphasizes that Brown graduated from a vocational
high school and worked as a directory assistance operator.
According to defendant, "there is no evidence she possessed the
characteristics of Hyde Parkers which Franks found
objectionable."
	As defendant correctly notes, Brown did not state that she
lived in Hyde Park. Her answer to the judge's question about her
place of residence indicated that she lived either in Hyde Park or
Kenwood. However, the prosecutor, in explaining why he
excluded Brown, did not say that she lived in Hyde Park. His
statement was that she "lived in the Hyde Park area." (Emphasis
added.) This statement could apply to Brown whether she lived in
Hyde Park or Kenwood.
	Defendant also contends, as noted, that Brown did not
necessarily possess the characteristics that the prosecutor found
objectionable in "Hyde Parkers." Defendant raised this identical
argument in Harris I regarding a different venire member. There,
defendant challenged the prosecutor's explanation that a venire
member was excluded in part because of her residence in Hyde
Park. According to defendant, the State could not rely on such an
explanation unless it could show that Hyde Park residents actually
did tend to be scholarly, open to new ideas and not likely to base
their findings of fact on evidence, and that the venireperson in
question actually possessed these traits. Harris I, 129 Ill. 2d  at
176-77. We rejected defendant's argument. We determined in
Harris I that the State's failure to show that a group actually
possesses the undesirable traits attributed to it by the State, or that
an excluded venire member also possesses these traits, is a factor
that should be considered by the trial court in evaluating the
legitimacy of the State's explanation. However, the State is not
required, at the second stage of the Batson process, to make such
a showing. At the second stage, "it is not necessary that the State
establish the empirical truth of the reason it cites in support of a
challenge to a juror." Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 338. All that is
required of the State at the second stage is that the prosecutor's
explanation be facially race-neutral. Hernandez, 500 U.S.  at 360,
114 L. Ed. 2d  at 406, 111 S. Ct.  at 1866.
	We conclude that, in the case at bar, the prosecutor's
explanation that Brown was excluded because she lived in the
Hyde Park area is race-neutral. As noted previously, at the
conclusion of the Batson hearing, the trial court judge found that
"the challenges were used for neutral reasons[,] not for racial
reasons." With regard to Brown, the judge specifically found that
the explanation that she lived in "the community of Hyde Park"
was race-neutral. We cannot say that the judge's determination
here was clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
364-65, 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 409, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869, 1871
(1991); Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 274; Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 333. We
therefore reject defendant's Batson claim as to the exclusion of
venire member Christine Riley Brown.

Edward Shealy
	During voir dire, Edward Shealy stated that he had a
bachelor's degree in music and worked as a docket manager at a
Chicago law firm. Shealy had worked at this firm for 3½ years,
and prior to this had been a docket manager at a different firm for
six years. Shealy told the judge that he had "plenty" of close
friends who were attorneys but did not discuss with them their
philosophies about law or law enforcement because "[t]hey don't
have time." Shealy also indicated that he had a close friend who
was a "new recruit" with the Chicago police department. When
asked if he ever talked to this friend about his work with the police
department, Shealy answered, "None whatsoever." Shealy also
stated that he did not talk to this friend about his police training.
	At the Batson hearing, prosecutor Daniel Franks offered
several explanations for excusing Shealy. One of them was that,
while Shealy indicated he had "plenty" of close friends who were
attorneys, he insisted that he never talked to any of them about
their philosophies of law or law enforcement. Franks stated that
this response "did not make sense," and he commented on the
demeanor that Shealy displayed while giving it: "I don't think I
can do justice in [sic] the way that the juror answered [the judge's]
question in terms of his tone of voice and his mannerisms while
answering that question." According to Franks, Shealy's answer
was "the type of response that did not give me a feeling that I
wanted him on that jury."
	Defendant argues that this explanation "appears pretextual."
He points to three white venire members-Theresa Najdowski,
Richard Gray, and Michael Dolan-who had friends or family
members who were attorneys(1) and who were accepted as jurors,
even though they were never asked if they discussed legal matters
with the attorney. Defendant notes that the State expressed no
concern about this issue with regard to these jurors.
	This court has consistently held that where a prosecutor
excludes a minority venireperson based on a certain characteristic,
but does not reject a white venireperson who shared the same
characteristic, "it does not follow that this in itself shows that the
prosecutor's explanations were pretextual." People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1989); Harris I, 129 Ill. 2d  at 179; see Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 282. In Wiley, this court explained:
		"The State's purposeful discrimination is not
automatically established by the mere coincidence that an
excluded juror shared a characteristic with a juror who
was not challenged. The excluded juror may possess an
additional trait that caused the State to find him
unacceptable, while the juror who was not challenged
may possess an additional characteristic that prompted the
State to find him acceptable to serve as a juror. ([People
v.] Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d [498,] 520 [(1972)].) '[A]
peremptory challenge is based on a combination of traits,
and a juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be
accepted while another juror possessing that same
negative trait, but also possessing other negative traits,
may be challenged.' [People v.] Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d
[274,] at 295 [(1992)]." Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 282-83.
	In the case at bar, while Shealy and the three white jurors
shared the characteristic that they all had close friends or family
members who were attorneys, Shealy possessed "an additional
trait that caused the State to find him unacceptable." Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 283. In this instance, the additional trait was that, unlike
Najdowski, Gray or Dolan, Shealy had "plenty" of close friends
who were attorneys, yet he insisted that he never talked to them
about their philosophies of law or law enforcement. In such a
situation, the fact that white jurors also had close friends or family
members who were attorneys does not render the State's
explanation for excluding Shealy pretextual. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1989).
	As noted, defendant also objects that no one asked the white
jurors if they discussed legal matters with their friends or relatives
who were attorneys. The voir dire in this case was conducted by
the trial court judge. This court has held that "[t]he State's failure
to pose additional questions does not lead to the conclusion that
the reasons given by the State were a mere pretext for racial
discrimination." Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 276, citing People v. Kitchen,
159 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 (1994); Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 334.
	At the conclusion of the Batson hearing, the judge found that
the State had exercised its peremptory challenges for race-neutral
reasons and had rebutted defendant's prima facie case. With
regard to Shealy, the judge specifically mentioned the explanation
that Shealy "works at a law firm" and had "plenty of friends who
were lawyers," and concluded that this was an adequate basis for
excluding Shealy. In elaborating upon this explanation, the judge
opined that because Shealy worked for a large civil law firm,
Shealy might take the view that criminal law is not very important.
	Defendant challenges the judge's findings on the ground that
they do not reflect the reasons actually given by the prosecutor.
Defendant argues that Franks' actual reasons for excusing Shealy
were not that he worked at a law firm and had friends who were
lawyers, or that Shealy thought criminal law was unimportant.
Rather, the prosecutor stated that he doubted Shealy's candor
when Shealy stated that he never talked to his attorney friends
about law enforcement issues or philosophies of the law.
	This court has repeatedly held that there is no need for a trial
court judge to enter findings with respect to each black member of
the venire excluded by the prosecution. People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 245-46 (1989); People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 76 (1994);
Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 335. In both Mack and Fair, the circuit
court judges who conducted the Batson hearings found at the
conclusion of the hearings that the explanations offered by the
prosecution were race-neutral and sufficient under Batson. In each
case, the judge made only this general finding and did not enter
specific factual findings for each black venireperson excluded by
the State. We held in both Fair and Mack that such a general
finding was specific enough for our purposes and that there was no
need for the circuit court judge to make specific findings as to the
State's explanations for each such peremptory challenge. "In both
of those cases, we noted that the record contained the prosecutor's
explanations for the separate challenges made to the minority
members of the venire, and, in reviewing in each case the trial
judge's findings of no discriminatory intent, we considered the
explanations provided by the prosecution." Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d 
at 335. If our review of a Batson claim may proceed in the absence
of specific findings by the circuit court as to each minority person
challenged by the State, we see no reason why, in a case where the
judge does make specific findings, we should be limited only to
those findings and prevented from independently considering
explanations provided by the State but not expressly ruled on by
the judge.
	Our decision in People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1 (1994), is
exactly on point as to this issue. Following the trial court judge's
decision that defendant had made a prima facie case with regard
to the exclusion of Alvin Pettigrew, an African American
venireperson, the State in Williams then provided its reasons for
exercising a peremptory challenge against Pettigrew. The first two
of these reasons were that Pettigrew kept his hat on during voir
dire, which the prosecutor said she thought was disrespectful, and
that Pettigrew gave short, cryptic answers to the questions asked.
The judge mentioned each of these reasons in finding that the
State's explanation was legitimate and race-neutral. However, the
judge did not mention the third reason provided by the State:
"Pettigrew's lack of knowledge concerning the employment of one
of his four children, a 24-year-old son who, he said, '[w]orks
downtown somewhere.' " Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 20.
Nevertheless, this court proceeded to consider this reason and
concluded: [It] "appears to be a legitimate, race-neutral one. The
record makes plain that the finding of the circuit court is not
clearly erroneous." (Emphasis added.) Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 21.
Just as this court in Williams examined a reason not explicitly
ruled upon by the trial judge, so here we have considered the
reasons advanced by the prosecutor for excluding Shealy,
including those not explicitly ruled upon by the trial judge. Based
on our review of these reasons, we cannot say that the judge's
determination that they were legitimate and race-neutral is clearly
erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65, 369,
114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 409, 412, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869, 1871 (1991);
Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 274; Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 333. We therefore
reject defendant's Batson claim as to the exclusion of venire
member Edward Shealy.
	Because defendant's Batson claims as to Shealy and Brown
are meritless, defendant has failed to show that he suffered
prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to establish the race of
Shealy and Brown. Even if counsel had established the race of
these two venirepersons, defendant has not demonstrated that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068. In other words, even if this court had
considered the State's exclusion of Shealy and Brown, it is not
reasonably probable that the court would have found the State's
reasons to be pretextual or that the trial judge's determination that
the reasons were race-neutral was clearly erroneous. Defense
counsel's failure to establish the race of Shealy and Brown did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699-700, 104 S. Ct at 2069; Morgan,
187 Ill. 2d  at 530.
	Defendant makes an additional Batson claim regarding
defense counsel's failure to establish the race of Christine Riley
Brown. According to defendant, Brown is a "Black Latina" and is
therefore one of three Hispanic members of the venire, two of
whom (Brown and Eva Morales) were peremptorily challenged by
the State. Defendant contends that if defense counsel had
established Brown's Latina heritage, there is a reasonable
probability that in Harris II this court would have found a prima
facie case of discrimination against Hispanic venire members. In
Harris II we held that defendant failed to establish such a prima
facie case, based in part on "the apparent presence of only one
Hispanic in the venire." Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 344. Defendant
argues that this court's decision might have been different if we
had known that Riley was also Hispanic and that the State thus had
peremptorily challenged two of three Hispanic venire members, or
66%. We disagree.
	In order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination under Batson, a defendant must show that the
relevant facts and circumstances "raise an inference that the
prosecutor used [peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen
from the petit jury on account of their race." Batson, 476 U.S.  at
96, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 88, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723. In other words, the
defendant must show that "the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 94, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 86, 106 S. Ct.  at 1721.
	This court has enumerated a number of factors that are
relevant in determining whether a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in jury selection has been established. These factors
include:
			"a 'pattern' of strikes against [minority] jurors; 'the
prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire
examination and in exercising his challenges' [citation];
the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against
[members of a minority] [citations]; the level of
[minority] representation in the venire as compared to the
jury [citations]; whether the excluded [minority members]
were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only
common characteristic [citation]; the race of the defendant
and victim [citations]; and the race of the witnesses
[citation]." People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 63-64 (1988).
	In the case at bar, defendant contends that there were three
Hispanic members of the venire (Brown, Lucio Martinez, and Eva
Morales) and that the State used peremptory challenges to remove
two of them, Brown and Morales. The State thus used peremptory
challenges to remove 66% of the Hispanic members of the venire.
However, "[s]imply because [minority] veniremen are
peremptorily challenged does not, without more, raise the specter
or inference of discrimination." Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 64, citing
Batson, 476 U.S.  at 101, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 91, 106 S. Ct.  at 1725
(White, J., concurring) ("it is not unconstitutional, without more,
to strike one or more blacks from the jury"); People v. Hooper,
118 Ill. 2d 244, 248 (1987) (Ryan, J., specially concurring) (the
court must avoid arbitrarily deciding this delicate question "solely
from the number of blacks peremptorily excused as disclosed by
the record").
	Defendant does not contend here that the prosecutor, in
exercising peremptory challenges against Hispanics, made
statements indicating discriminatory intent. More importantly,
neither defendant nor his two victims, one of whom was the
State's chief witness, were Hispanic. All three of them were
African Americans. We are aware that a criminal defendant may
bring a Batson claim "whether or not the defendant and the
excluded jurors share the same race." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 419, 111 S. Ct.  at 1364, 1366 (1991).
However, even though racial identity is not required in order to
bring the claim, such identity, or lack thereof, "remains a relevant
factor in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination
has been established." People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 163
(1992); People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 425 (1992). In Harris
II this court held that defendant had failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination with regard to an excluded Hispanic
venire member. In reaching this decision, the court stated: "The
defendant was of a different ethnic group, and there would have
been no likely reason for the prosecutor to have attempted to
discriminate against Hispanics." Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 344. We
draw the same conclusion here as to the racial-identity factor.
	Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
totality of the relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose on the part of the State. See Batson, 476 U.S.  at 93, 94, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 85-86, 106 S. Ct.  at 1721. Even if
defense counsel had established Brown's Hispanic heritage, a
prima facie case of discrimination against Hispanic venire
members would not have been established. Accordingly, defendant
has failed to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of his
counsel's failure to establish Brown's Hispanic heritage.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068. Defense counsel's alleged error here did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699-700, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
530.
	Defendant's Batson claim is without merit. Accordingly, the
trial court correctly dismissed defendant's post-conviction Batson
claim without an evidentiary hearing.

II. Motion to Suppress
	Defendant next argues that his counsel mishandled his pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, thereby denying him the effective
assistance of counsel. According to defendant, if counsel had
effectively handled this motion, the gun that was allegedly taken
from defendant at his arrest would have been suppressed and the
State's case without this evidence would have been insufficient to
convict.
	Prior to trial defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress
evidence, arguing that his conduct prior to the arrest did not
constitute probable cause to suspect that he had committed or was
about to commit a crime. A hearing was held in which three
witnesses testified. We begin with a review of their testimony and
the trial judge's conclusions, along with relevant testimony given
at trial by the same witnesses.
	Cleveland Johnson, a Chicago resident who worked in a
western suburb, testified at the hearing that on the morning of
February 10, 1983, he was driving west on 63rd Street when, at
about 4:15 or 4:25 a.m., he stopped at a traffic light at the
intersection of 63rd and South State streets. While he was at the
intersection, Johnson noticed a young man on foot who was
headed north on State Street. The man, whom Johnson identified
as defendant, stopped, turned, and looked back toward 64th Street.
He then stepped around the corner, headed east, and stood behind
a traffic control box. Johnson said he continued to watch
defendant because he felt that there was "something wrong with
this guy." When the light changed, Johnson turned right and
headed north on State Street. In his rearview mirror he saw
defendant come across 63rd Street, step up onto the sidewalk, and
start running north on State. Defendant, who was to the right of
Johnson's car, then hooked his left hand on the car's right front
door handle, and hit the car with his right hand. Johnson stopped
the car and opened the passenger-side window a few inches.
Defendant asked Johnson if he would take him to 51st Street, and
he offered to pay five dollars for the ride. Johnson said, "No, I do
not think so," and defendant reached down and pulled up on the
front of his pants at the waist.
	Johnson testified further that at this point a Chevy Blazer
drove up from behind and pulled in front of Johnson's car. Two
officers came out of the Blazer, one from the right-hand side and
the other from the driver's side. Both had guns. One of the officers
came around the rear of Johnson's car and pushed defendant over
the car's hood, telling him, "Don't move." The officer then took
a gun from defendant's belt. Johnson did not see the gun before
the officer took it from defendant.
	Michael Grady, who was employed as a railroad police officer
for the Consolidated Railroad Corporation (Conrail), testified that
on the morning of February 10, 1983, he and his partner, Theodore
Kurzweil, were patrolling in their Chevy Blazer near the
intersection of 63rd and South State streets. Sometime prior to
4:20 a.m., Chicago police officers drove up and gave the Conrail
officers a description of a man they said was wanted for attempted
armed robbery: "a male Black, approximately five-ten to six foot,
in his twenties, wearing a blue jean jacket [and] blue jeans, [with
a] large, bushy Afro-style hairdo." The Chicago police officers
said the man was armed with a small caliber handgun. They then
drove away.
	Grady testified further that a short time later, at about 4:20
a.m., he and his partner were at the intersection of 63rd and State
streets when they saw a man whom Grady identified as defendant
running alongside Johnson's car. The car was moving north on
State Street. According to Grady, defendant had a handgun
"openly displayed" in his right hand, and his left hand was on the
car's passenger-side door. The Conrail officers turned north onto
State Street and pulled in front of Johnson's car, which by now
had stopped about a half block north of 63rd on State. Grady and
his partner got out of their vehicle with their guns drawn and
arrested defendant, from whom they recovered the gun.
	Kurzweil, who was driving the Blazer on February 10, gave
essentially the same testimony. He stated that at about 4:20 that
morning he saw a man whom he identified as defendant going
north on State Street at 63rd Street. The man, who was alongside
a moving car, had in his right hand what "appeared to be a
revolver." At that time defendant was wearing a blue jean jacket
and blue jeans, and "[h]is hair was in a large Afro."
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied
defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The
judge stated that there was probable cause to arrest defendant on
either of two grounds: (1) "at a time closely connected with the
[February 10, 1983] incident," defendant matched the description
given to the Conrail officers, or (2) defendant was observed
carrying a handgun "within the City of Chicago."
	Evidence presented at trial included testimony from these
same three witnesses-Cleveland Johnson and Conrail officers
Michael Grady and Theodore Kurzweil. All three gave essentially
the same testimony that they had given previously. With regard to
the gun that Grady and Kurzweil had seen in defendant's hand,
Grady stated at trial that he observed defendant running alongside
the car, with a gun in his right hand, and his arm extended to his
right side. The gun was below the level of the car window. When
Grady subsequently told defendant to drop the gun, defendant
"[p]laced the weapon into his waistband." Grady then recovered
the gun from defendant, who was placed under arrest. Kurzweil
gave similar testimony regarding the gun. Kurzweil stated that
defendant "was running alongside [Johnson's] car," with a
"revolver" in his right hand and his left hand "toward the car."
Grady subsequently recovered the gun from defendant.
	With respect to the description of defendant given by Chicago
police officers, Grady's testimony at trial differed somewhat from
his pretrial testimony. At the motion hearing, as noted, Grady
stated that the officers told him "they were looking for a male
Black, approximately five-ten to six foot, large Afro-style hair,
wearing blue jean jacket, blue jeans, and armed with a small
caliber handgun, wanted for Attempted Armed Robbery." At trial,
however, Grady gave the description as "Male black, wearing a
blue jean jacket with a large 'fro." Under cross-examination at
trial, Grady conceded that when he stated during the motion
hearing that the description included a height of "five, ten to six
foot," this was "conjecture" on his part.
	As noted, Johnson's testimony at trial was similar to his
previous testimony. Johnson testified that he was in his car at the
intersection of 63rd and State streets, stopped at a stop light, when
he observed defendant acting suspiciously. Johnson turned right
off 63rd and headed north on State, looked in his rearview mirror,
and saw defendant running toward him, but saw nothing in
defendant's hands. Johnson subsequently lost sight of defendant
in his rearview mirror, and when he saw him again, defendant was
alongside Johnson's car, on the right-hand side, with his left hand
on the passenger door. Defendant hit the passenger door with his
right hand, and Johnson stopped the car. Johnson could not see
defendant's hand when defendant hit the door. He saw only
defendant's "arm swinging." A short time later, one of the officers
recovered a gun from defendant.
	Before this court, defendant argues that his counsel's handling
of the motion to suppress was deficient in three ways: (1) during
the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel
failed to impeach Grady regarding his testimony as to the
description that he was given by Chicago police; (2) during the
trial, defense counsel failed to ask that the motion to suppress be
reopened in light of Grady's different testimony at trial regarding
the description; and (3) after the trial, defendant's newly appointed
post-trial counsel failed to point to these deficiencies in trial
counsel's performance as a basis for granting defendant a new
trial. Defendant contends in addition that "[t]o the extent that the
issue could have been raised on direct appeal, [defendant] allege[s]
that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel."
	The State initially argues that defendant has waived this issue
by failing to raise it either in post-trial motions or on direct appeal.
As noted, the purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to permit
inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original
conviction and sentence that were not, and could not have been,
adjudicated previously on direct appeal. People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 464; People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). Issues that
could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are
waived. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 465 (2000); Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at
503. However, the doctrine of waiver is relaxed where the alleged
waiver stems from the incompetence of appellate counsel. People
v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 171 (2000); People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). Here, defendant alleges not only that he
was deprived of the effective assistance of trial and post-trial
counsel, but also that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the motion-to-suppress issue on direct appeal. We
therefore address the merits of defendant's claim. People v.
Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 371-72 (2000).
	Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are
evaluated under the same two-prong standard set forth in
Strickland for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476; People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (2000).
		" 'A defendant who contends that appellate counsel
rendered ineffective assistance, e.g., by failing to argue an
issue, must show that the failure to raise that issue was
objectively unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced
the defendant. Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief
every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not
incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues
which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless
counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong.
Accordingly, unless the underlying issues are meritorious,
defendant has suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure
to raise them on appeal. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435
(1999) (and cases cited therein).' " Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at
476, quoting People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 328-29
(2000).
	The State argues that defendant cannot show Strickland
prejudice here because, regardless of the merits of his insufficient-physical-description claim, the trial court judge found a separate,
independent ground for denying defendant's motion to suppress:
defendant was observed with a handgun "in his hand, within the
City of Chicago." According to the State, defendant's argument
with regard to the physical description "in no way weakens the
second and alternative finding that [the judge] made when he
denied [defendant's] motion to quash: Grady and [Conrail officer
Theodore] Kurzweil had probable cause to arrest [defendant] as
soon as they saw him running alongside [Cleveland] Johnson's car
with a gun in his hand, in what appeared to be an attempt to enter
the car and harm the driver."
	With regard to this argument, defendant contends that
Johnson "completely contradicted" Grady's and Kurzweil's
testimony about the gun. Defendant points to Johnson's testimony
at the pretrial hearing and at trial, in which, according to
defendant, Johnson stated that defendant "had not been carrying a
gun." Defendant notes that Johnson did not see the gun until one
of the Conrail officers took it from defendant.
	A careful reading of Johnson's testimony at the pretrial
hearing and at trial shows that Johnson did not "completely
contradict" the Conrail officers' testimony. In both his pretrial
testimony and at trial, Johnson stated that he first saw the gun
when it was in the officer's hands. However, he clearly stated that
the gun was taken from defendant. In his pretrial testimony, the
following exchange took place between defense counsel and
Johnson.
			"MR. KUNZ [Assistant Public Defender]: Did you see
a gun?
			THE WITNESS [Johnson]: The officer got it from ***
him. That is when I [saw] it.
			MR. KUNZ: Did you see the officer take it from him?
			THE WITNESS: I am looking at the officer when he
pulled it up from his jacket.
* * *
			MR. KUNZ: And, before the officer took the gun, you
had not seen it?
			THE WITNESS: No.
			MR. KUNZ: Was it hidden by his jacket? Had it been
hidden by his jacket?
			THE WITNESS: It had to be, because I did not see it."
	Johnson gave similar testimony at trial, but he provided
additional details. The following colloquy took place between the
prosecutor and Johnson.
			"MR. FRANKS [Assistant State's Attorney]: Describe
the gun that you saw taken from the defendant?
			THE WITNESS: It was a small caliber, dark gun.
Looked to me like it was a .32.
			MR. FRANKS: When the officer was touching the
defendant or frisking him, did that officer-
* * *
			MR. FRANKS: Did that officer have a gun in his hands
at that moment?
			THE WITNESS: No.
			MR. FRANKS: Did you see that gun then for the first
time when it was in the officer's hands?
			THE WITNESS: That's the first time I [saw] it.
* * *
			MR. FRANKS: Where was the gun taken from?
* * *
			THE WITNESS: He [took] the gun from under the
man's jacket where it was pushed down the waist of his
pants.
			MR. FRANKS: Did the officers [sic] have anything in
his hands before he put his hands in the defendant's waist
area?
			THE WITNESS: Yeah, he put his gun away and then he
put his hands on the man and started patting him down.
			MR. FRANKS: At the time he was patting him down,
the officer had put his gun away?
			THE WITNESS: That's right.
			MR. FRANKS: He had nothing in his hands at that
time?
			THE WITNESS: That's right."
	Contrary to defendant's contention, Johnson made no explicit
assertion that defendant was not carrying a gun. Rather, as noted,
Johnson's testimony indicated that he did not see the gun until one
of the officers took it from defendant. This is consistent with what
Grady and Kurzweil stated, particularly in light of Grady's
testimony that the gun that the officers saw in defendant's right
hand was below the level of the car window. This explains why
Grady and Kurzweil, who were driving behind Johnson's car, were
able to see the gun and Johnson was not. In addition, while
Johnson stated that he first saw the gun when it was in the
officer's hand, Johnson never wavered from his assertion that the
gun was taken from defendant. We note in particular Johnson's
testimony that he saw the officer put his own gun away before he
searched defendant, and that the officer had "nothing in his hands"
at that time. This appears to counter any suggestion that it was the
officer who placed the gun in defendant's waistband.
	Defendant has failed to show that he suffered prejudice from
any deficiency on the part of his trial counsel, post-trial counsel or
appellate counsel in handling the motion to suppress. The circuit
court had a valid basis for finding that there was probable cause to
arrest defendant, and the court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to suppress. There is thus no merit in defendant's claim
that his trial counsel and post-trial counsel were ineffective.
Further, because this underlying claim lacks merit, it was not
incompetence on the part of appellate counsel to refrain from
raising this issue on direct appeal. The appraisal of this issue by
defendant's appellate counsel was not " 'patently wrong.' "
Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476, quoting Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 329;
Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 412. Accordingly, the trial court
correctly dismissed this specific post-conviction claim without an
evidentiary hearing.

III. Second Capital Sentencing Hearing
	The remainder of defendant's claims refer to his second
capital sentencing hearing, which was conducted on remand from
Harris I. We consider each of these claims in turn.

A. Testimony of Phyllis Ham Garth
	Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to call former Chicago police officer Phyllis Ham Garth as a
witness during the eligibility phase of his second capital
sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that Garth's testimony
would have impeached the credibility of Theresa Woods, the
State's chief witness, regarding whether defendant possessed the
mental state required to render him death eligible. Section
9-1(b)(6)(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a
defendant may be sentenced to death if he "killed the murdered
individual intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which
caused the death created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm." (Emphases added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(6)(b).
	We begin with a review of portions of the testimony given at
trial and at the second sentencing hearing, along with relevant
argument of counsel and findings of the trial court in the
sentencing hearing. At trial, Woods testified that on February 10,
1983, she and her employer, Jesse James, Sr., closed his tavern at
about 2 a.m. and left the premises together between 3:30 and 4
o'clock that morning. As they walked to their cars, they were
approached by defendant, who grabbed Woods and pointed a gun
at her head. Following defendant's instructions, James got into the
driver's seat of his car, and Woods sat in the back seat on the
driver's side. Defendant, who sat in the front passenger's seat, then
ordered James to drive a short distance and park in a nearby alley.
Once they had parked, defendant demanded $300 from James and
Woods, threatening to kill them if they did not comply. Defendant
explained that if he was caught he was going back to jail "for
good," so it did not matter if he killed them.
	James told defendant that he had some money back at the
tavern, so they returned to that area and parked in the mouth of an
alley with the car facing outward toward the street. Defendant told
Woods to go to the tavern and get the money, and he warned her
that he would kill James if she did not return within three minutes.
Woods then ran into the tavern, grabbed paper currency from the
cash register, and went back outside. Emerging from the tavern,
she noticed that the car had pulled out of the alley and was parked
next to the curb. Woods walked to the driver's side of the car, and
defendant, who was still in the front passenger seat next to James,
told her to get into the vehicle. James objected, asking why Woods
had to get back in the car. Defendant told James to "shut up" and
that "he was running this." According to Woods, defendant then
pulled James toward him so they were facing each other, and
defendant shot James.
	Woods attempted to run away from the car. As she was
running she heard another gunshot and tripped and fell. She landed
on her left side and rolled over onto her back. When she looked
up, she saw defendant standing over her with the gun. Defendant
said, "You bitch." Woods raised her hand to protect herself,
pleading with him not to shoot, and rolled over onto her stomach.
Woods heard another shot and then lay motionless, pretending to
be dead. A short time later she heard footsteps running from the
scene. Woods got up, saw that James was still alive, and noticed
that the car had crashed into the window of a nearby storefront.
She then ran into the tavern and called the police. It was then that
she noticed she had been shot. The wound was in her right
shoulder.
	Also testifying at trial was Chicago police detective Geraldine
Perry, who gave a somewhat different account of the incident.
According to Perry, who spoke to Woods at Billings Hospital the
day of the incident, Woods told Perry that when she emerged from
the tavern with the money, she saw the car moving down the street
and saw "some movement in the front seat of the car." As Woods
watched, she saw the car crash into the storefront. Woods did not
tell Perry that she approached the driver's side of the car or that
she heard any words spoken by James or defendant.
	At defendant's second sentencing hearing, Woods gave
essentially the same testimony that she gave at trial. She stated that
when she emerged from the tavern with the money, the car in
which Jesse James, Sr., and defendant were seated had already
moved out of the alley and was parked next to the curb. Woods did
not see the car moving, nor did she see the two persons in the front
seat struggling. Woods also did not see the car go up over the curb
and crash into the storefront window. It was not until after she had
been shot that she noticed the car "had moved up into the
building."
	In order to impeach this testimony by Woods, the defense
called Detective Perry, who also gave essentially the same
testimony that she gave at trial. According to Perry, Woods said
that when she emerged from the tavern, she observed the car
moving slowly along the street, and she saw movement of the two
persons in the front seat. Woods also told Perry that she saw the
car go up over the curb and crash into the storefront window.
	During argument in the first phase of the sentencing hearing,
defense counsel referred to this testimony by Perry and stated:
			"[It] suggests that there was a struggle going on in the
car and that is certainly corroborated by the fact that the
car rolled forward and crashed into a window. It
contradicts any suggestion by the State's witness that this
was in any way, shape, or form a cold-blooded killing."
	In rebuttal, the State offered a different explanation.
According to the State, it was reasonable to infer that the car was
in gear when James was shot and that "[t]he car simply moved as
cars will move when [an] automatic transmission is in gear[,] and
[it] went up the curb and bumped in the window and cracked the
window. *** It does not mean that somebody was driving that car
wildly after the shot was fired."
	At the conclusion of this phase of the sentencing hearing, the
judge found defendant eligible for the death penalty. He stated:
"The Court's finding of eligibility will stand."
	Before this court, defendant argues that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to call former police officer Garth as a
witness at the second sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that
Garth's testimony "would not only have impeached the credibility
of Woods' testimony but it also could have provided substantive
evidence (under the excited utterance-spontaneous declaration
exception to the rule against hearsay) that the shooting was a
negligent or accidental act rather than an intentional or knowing
one." Attached to defendant's amended post-conviction petition
are a February 10, 1983, police report prepared by Officer Phyllis
Ham (now Garth) and a "second affidavit" of State Appellate
Defender's office investigator Jonathan Lyon. According to these
attachments, Garth and her partner were the first officers on the
scene of the February 10, 1983, incident. Garth interviewed
Woods, who Garth said was "upset," and Garth was told by
Woods that "when she came out of the bar she observed a struggle
inside the car after which the car crashed into a building."
Defendant argues that if Garth's testimony had been presented, it
is reasonably probable that the judge at the sentencing hearing
"would have found that the State had failed to prove the requisite
mental state beyond a reasonable doubt."
	The State initially contends that defendant made "[v]irtually"
the same claim on direct appeal in Harris II and that this court's
decision as to this claim is res judicata as to this issue. In Harris
II, defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
present Detective Perry's testimony "as substantive evidence under
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule" (Harris II, 164
Ill. 2d at 348), rather than merely as impeachment of Woods'
testimony. This court rejected defendant's ineffective assistance
argument, concluding that defendant had failed to show that he
was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to offer Perry's testimony
as substantive evidence at the sentencing hearing. Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 349.
	The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to allow
inquiry into constitutional issues that have not been, and could not
have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal. Accordingly,
determinations of a reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are
res judicata as to issues actually decided. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at
502; Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371. While defendant's argument in
the case at bar is similar to the argument he raised about the Perry
testimony in Harris II, the two contentions are not the same. In
Harris II, defendant argued that Perry's testimony, which had
already been presented as impeachment, should have been offered
as substantive evidence as well. In other words, Perry's testimony
would have carried more weight had it been introduced as
substantive evidence. In the case at bar, defendant argues,
similarly to his previous contention, that Perry's testimony should
have carried more weight, but here the device by which the weight
is to be added is different. In this instance, unlike Harris II,
defendant complains that Garth's testimony was not presented at
all. If it had been, defendant contends, it would have corroborated
Perry's testimony and would have thereby given it greater weight.
Because of this distinction between these contentions, we
conclude that defendant's argument in the case at bar was not
"actually decided" in Harris II, and res judicata does not apply.
We therefore consider the merits of defendant's claim.
	Under the Strickland standard, a defendant must establish not
only that his counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the
defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
529-30. Prejudice is shown if the defendant establishes "that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	We agree with defendant that Garth would have been a
separate witness from Perry, and that Garth's testimony would
have recounted a different interview with Woods. However, the
gist of Garth's testimony would have been exactly the same as
Perry's: that Woods, upon emerging from the tavern, observed a
struggle inside the car and saw the car crash into the storefront.
Even if Garth's testimony had been presented, it is not reasonably
likely that the judge at the second sentencing hearing would have
accepted defendant's theory that the shooting was accidental.
	In considering defendant's similar claim in Harris II, we
stated: "the prosecutor explained at the sentencing hearing [that]
the more reasonable inference from the description of the offenses
provided by Woods to police was that James was shot while the
car was in gear, and that the vehicle rolled forward when the driver
lost control." Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 349. In addition, we stated:
		"Other evidence established that the shooting was not
accidental. The defendant initially threatened to kill James
and Woods because, he said, he had 'nothing to lose.'
When Woods reentered the tavern to obtain money, the
defendant said that he would kill James if she did not
return shortly. When Woods came back to the car, the
defendant rejected James' plea that Woods be allowed to
go, saying that he was 'running this.' After James was
shot, the defendant straddled Woods, said to her, 'You
bitch,' and shot her at close range." Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d 
at 349.
	At the conclusion of the second sentencing hearing, the circuit
court judge stated that the murder of James was " 'totally
unnecessary,' " suggesting that he did not accept defendant's
accident theory. Harris II, 164 Ill. 2d  at 347-48. The judge made
this comment after hearing Perry's testimony in support of this
theory during the first phase of the hearing. Garth's testimony, if
presented, would have been to the same effect as Perry's. Given
the "other evidence" establishing that the shooting was not
accidental, it is not reasonably probable that Garth's testimony
would have altered the result of the proceeding.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant points to People v.
Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d 1 (1993). In Pugh, as in the case at bar, the
defendant contended that his shooting of the victim was accidental
and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence
that he lacked the culpable (intentional or knowing) mental state
required to render him eligible for the death penalty. We held in
Pugh that the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's errors,
and we vacated his death sentence.
	Pugh is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Pugh, the
defendant entered a blind plea of guilty to felony murder, and he
stipulated to his eligibility for the death penalty. This stipulation
was entered based on defense counsel's incorrect belief that a
finding of felony murder by itself rendered the defendant eligible
for the death penalty. Defense counsel was unaware that the State
also was required to prove that the defendant possessed the
culpable mental state of intent or knowledge. Accordingly, "[n]one
of defendant's evidence was presented by defense counsel at the
first phase of sentencing because counsel believed such evidence
was irrelevant once felony murder was established." Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d  at 20.
	Here, by contrast, there was no misapprehension of the law on
the part of defense counsel, nor was there any stipulation that
defendant was eligible for the death penalty. Defendant in the
instant case does not allege that counsel presented no evidence
during the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing. Rather, he
complains that counsel did not augment the testimony that was
presented by calling an additional witness who would have
testified to precisely the same effect as did Perry. Given the "other
evidence" establishing that the shooting was not accidental, we do
not believe that defendant has shown that he was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to augment Perry's testimony with Garth's.
Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed this post-conviction
claim without an evidentiary hearing.

B. Brady claim
	Defendant argues that portions of the testimony of one of the
State's witnesses in aggravation were false and that the State knew
this testimony was perjurious. Defendant also contends that the
State failed to disclose medical records showing that the testimony
was false and thus violated the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Defendant's claim focuses on the testimony of
John Szumigala, the victim of a 1971 robbery for which defendant
received a four- to eight-year prison sentence. Szumigala testified
at the sentencing hearing that defendant severely beat him during
the 1971 robbery, and that as a result Szumigala sustained
numerous injuries, both immediate and long-term. According to
defendant, Szumigala's hospital records, which were not disclosed
by the State, demonstrate that Szumigala exaggerated the extent of
his injuries in his testimony.
	We begin with a review of Szumigala's testimony at the 1992
sentencing hearing, along with other relevant evidence and the
judge's conclusions. At the sentencing hearing, Szumigala stated
that in February 1971 he was a 17-year-old student at the
Goodman Theater in Chicago. At about 7:45 p.m. on February 19,
1971, he was crossing the Jackson Street bridge en route to the
theater when he was approached by six young men, one of whom
was defendant. According to Szumigala, defendant walked up and
punched Szumigala in the stomach, and two others grabbed him
and dragged him under the bridge. The group robbed him of $40,
a watch, two rings, and a coat. Defendant then punched Szumigala
in the stomach several more times. At about this time, one of the
other young men in the group told defendant that they had what
they wanted and should leave. According to Szumigala, defendant
replied: "No. I'm going to kill this guy." Defendant then slammed
Szumigala's head into a brick wall, kicked him in the right eye,
and kicked him again in the nose and forehead. Another member
of the group rolled Szumigala over and said, "He's dead."
Szumigala then "played dead" until he was sure the group was
gone. He was subsequently taken to the hospital.
	Szumigala said his hands were "very badly cut up," his
shoulders were "pretty well scraped," and he had "absolutely
blurred vision" in his right eye. According to Szumigala, his right
eye had been forced up into its socket, with pieces of stone and
gravel lodged in the eye and the eye canal. A surgical procedure
was performed to remove "the rocks and rubble out of the eye and
out of the eye canal." In addition, Szumigala's right shoulder was
dislocated and "was put back into [its] socket at the hospital that
night." Szumigala added that his fingers, his right knee, and his
right ankle were dislocated.
	Testifying further at the sentencing hearing, Szumigala
described the long-term effects of the 1971 incident. He said he
had difficulty distinguishing certain colors, and this had prevented
him from pursuing his chosen career as a costume and set
designer. Szumigala added that, since the incident, he has suffered
recurring, "almost violent" headaches, as well as chronic
dislocation of his right shoulder. In addition, he lost "a great deal
of dental work on the right side of [his] face." According to
Szumigala, his teeth had to be wired following the beating. He
also stated that he has difficulty reading for more than half an hour
at a time because of pressure on his eyes.
	Defense counsel attempted to impeach Szumigala with his
1971 testimony at trial in the robbery case. Szumigala was asked
whether, during that testimony, he had stated that one of the young
men who attacked him had said he was going to kill him.
Szumigala answered that he had said that. However, the State
stipulated that such a statement did not appear in the transcript of
the 1971 testimony.
	The State introduced into evidence a certified statement of
defendant's conviction in the Szumigala robbery, as well as a
certified statement of his conviction for a 1970 burglary for which
he was sentenced to five years' probation. Also introduced were
certified statements of defendant's convictions in two armed
robberies.
	Defendant himself made a statement on his own behalf during
the sentencing hearing. He essentially denied having committed
the present offenses, assuring the court repeatedly that he was not
a violent person. On cross-examination, defendant was questioned
about the 1971 robbery of John Szumigala. Defendant
acknowledged that he was present at the scene on the night of the
robbery. According to defendant's version of the incident,
defendant was alone on February 19, 1971, when Szumigala
approached him and said something that provoked a fight. In the
course of the fight, defendant kicked Szumigala in the face. When
asked how many times he kicked Szumigala in the face, defendant
responded: "It couldn't have been no more than once." Defendant
asserted that once he had won the fight, he left.
	At the conclusion of the evidence and argument, the trial court
sentenced defendant. The judge referred to evidence presented in
mitigation regarding defendant's childhood and family, observing
that "there are some rips and tears in the canvas of his life" such
as the "violence between his mother and father" that are "certainly
negatives in Mr. Harris' life." However, the judge pointed to
testimony from defendant's sister that none of the other children
in the family were convicted of felonies. The judge stated: "[N]o
one else *** found that based upon that family life *** they must
go out and commit crimes and be involved in criminal activity."
	Turning to the killing of James in 1983, the judge stated:
"[D]espite Mr. Harris' indication on the stand that he did not
commit this offense, based upon the records, based upon my
opportunity to observe the *** surviving witness who testified,
Ms. Woods, there is no question in this court's mind *** that Mr.
Harris did in fact kill Mr. James and that he in fact shot Ms.
Woods." The judge called defendant's murder of James "totally
unnecessary." The judge also referred to "the beating that was
administered to" John Szumigala "20 some years ago." He termed
defendant's explanation of this incident "just unbelievable."
	In sentencing defendant, the trial court judge stated:
			"I have searched this record. I have searched my mind.
I have listened [to] and looked at Mr. Harris. I have
looked at his art work. I have listened to his family,
looking, searching, and hoping in all candor that there
would be some mitigating circumstance to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty. Despite that diligent
search, I have been unable to find any such mitigating
circumstance."
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death for the
murder of James.
	Before this court, the State contends that defendant waived his
Brady claim by failing to file a post-sentencing motion following
the second sentencing hearing. Defendant concedes that no such
motion was filed. Ordinarily, waiver would apply. People v.
Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1986). However, as noted, the rules of
waiver are relaxed where the facts relating to the claim do not
appear on the face of the original appellate record. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at 171. Here, the facts forming the core of defendant's claim
are in Szumigala's medical records, which first appeared in the
record as an attachment to defendant's amended post-conviction
petition. We therefore address the merits of defendant's claim.
	Szumigala's medical records from Henrotin Hospital, where
he was treated after the robbery, provide little or no support for
many of his injury claims. The records show that Szumigala
complained of pain in his right shoulder in the emergency room,
but the only reference to dislocation is a notation that his right
shoulder had been dislocated one year earlier. There does not
appear to be any indication that the shoulder was dislocated when
he was admitted to the hospital, or that hospital personnel put it
back into its socket.
	The "Physical Examination" section of the records lists major
areas of the body, with notes next to each area that was injured.
Next to "Head-Eyes," the records note the "presence of an
abrasion at the occipital region, right upper and lower eyelids with
hematoma, small lacerations of the right upper eyelid,
subconjunctival hemorrhage present, vision not impaired."
(Emphasis added.) Regarding other areas of the body, the notes
indicate, inter alia, "tenderness and discoloration at the right side
of the nose," "hematoma upper lip with laceration," and "slight
tenderness" to the xiphoid, or breast bone. There are no notes of
injuries next to "Skin," despite Szumigala's testimony that his
hands were cut and his shoulders were abraded, or next to "Bones-Joints-Muscles," despite Szumigala's testimony that his right
knee, shoulder and ankle were dislocated. In addition, though
Szumigala testified at the sentencing hearing that defendant
punched him in the stomach numerous times, the notation next to
"Abdomen" states: "non-remarkable."
	There also does not appear to be any indication in the medical
records that Szumigala's eye was out of place, or that a surgical
procedure was required to repair injuries. In addition, despite
Szumigala's testimony that he suffered "blurred vision" in his
right eye, the notation next to "Head-Eyes" stated: "vision not
impaired." A similar notation appeared in the "Progress Notes"
section, which stated that, as of February 20, 1971, the day after
the robbery, Szumigala had "no headache or dizziness or any
visual disturbance."
	As previously noted, defendant also attached to his amended
post-conviction petition an opinion letter from a physician stating
that the medical records did not support Szumigala's allegations
regarding his long-term injuries. This letter, by Burton Russman,
M.D., stated:
			"There is no evidence in the records that [Szumigala]
had any specific eye injury other than a laceration of the
lid, as well as a subconjunctival hemorrhage and some
contusions about the eye. X-rays were completely
negative for any fractures, and it was stated in the records
that 'He has no headache or dizziness or any visual
disturbance.' *** When he was discharged from the
hospital, the discharge note was as follows: 'No
complaints, alert and oriented, swelling much better,
doing fine, to go home now.' As to Mr. Szumigala's
alleged loss of color vision, there is no evidence that he
had such a loss, nor evidence to show that he had any
peripheral field of vision loss. *** In short, I do not find
that the records bear out the allegations of Mr.
Szumigala's permanent injury, as they would certainly
have appeared by the time he was discharged from the
hospital." (Emphasis added.)
	The United States Supreme Court held in Brady that the State
has an affirmative duty in a criminal prosecution to disclose
evidence favorable to a defendant, where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 391;
Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196-97.
There are three situations to which the general rule of Brady
applies. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 388-89 (2000);
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 391. In the first, the undisclosed evidence
demonstrates that the prosecution's case includes perjured
testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known,
of the perjury. In this situation, the test for materiality is whether
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 389. The second
situation is characterized by a pretrial request for specific evidence
followed by the prosecution's noncompliance with the request. In
the third situation, the defense makes either no discovery request
or only a general request for "Brady" material, and exculpatory
matter is withheld by the State. "In the second and third situations,
favorable evidence is material and constitutional error results from
its suppression by the government, if the evidence could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at
389. In addition, "the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence
also informs the materiality determination." Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at
389; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 393.
	In situations such as the case at bar that involve both the use
of perjured testimony and the failure to disclose Brady material,
the test for materiality is the former of the two tests set forth
above: whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment. We explained in
Coleman why it is this standard, which is more lenient to the
defendant, that is to be applied in such situations:
		"[W]here undisclosed Brady material undermines the
credibility of specific testimony that the State otherwise
knew to have been false, the standard of materiality
applicable to the first [United States v.] Agurs[, 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976),] category
applies. In such circumstances, the failure to disclose is
'part and parcel of the presentation of false evidence to
the jury and therefore "corrupt[s] *** the truth-seeking
function of the trial process," [citation] and is a far more
serious act than a failure to disclose generally exculpatory
material.' United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 392
(2d Cir. 1997). Therefore, the standard of materiality in
this case is whether there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 394.
	In the instant case, we may affirm the circuit court's decision
to dismiss defendant's Brady claim without an evidentiary hearing
only if we can conclude, as a matter of law, that Szumigala's
allegedly false testimony does not fall within this strict standard of
materiality. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 391; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 394.
	In considering this question, we note that Szumigala, who was
a prominent witness(2) in aggravation, provided damaging
testimony. While the State presented evidence that defendant had
numerous prior convictions, Szumigala's testimony provided the
only evidence that defendant had injured another person prior to
the shooting of James and Woods. Szumigala's testimony thus
provided the only evidence that defendant was a chronically
violent offender.
	Excluding Szumigala's testimony, the evidence in aggravation
and mitigation that was presented at the sentencing hearing was
closely balanced. The evidence in mitigation included the
testimony of seven witnesses, three of whom were correctional
officers who had contact with defendant. In addition, a report
prepared by a mitigation specialist was admitted into evidence, as
were two letters in support of defendant, one from a daughter and
the other from his mother-in-law. The correctional officers
described defendant as a "model inmate" and "a very good
prisoner."
	Another factor bearing on our decision regarding the Brady
claim is the judge's comments during sentencing. In explaining his
decision to impose the death penalty, the judge specifically
mentioned Szumigala's testimony. The judge stated:
			"The conduct on the bridge on Jackson Street some 20
years ago, the beating that was administered to this
individual, the comments that Mr. Szumigala had testified
about other people saying we got what we want and let's
go, and the defendant's position that I am going to kill
this guy, the defendant's indication to me in open court or
indication to [Assistant State's Attorney] Mr. Meyer in
response to questions that he didn't do that, that this was
just an encounter[,] that it was a fair fight and that he
happened to win[,] is just unbelievable."
	Having reviewed the entire transcript, we cannot say that
"there exists no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false
testimony [c]ould not have affected the [judge's decision] to
impose the death penalty." Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 392.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State argues that it did not
allow false testimony to stand uncorrected. The State contends that
Szumigala's medical records do not establish that his testimony
was false. In addition, the State challenges Russman's affidavit,
asserting that it "would be probative only if Russman could state
that, based on his own examination of Szumigala and his own
medical knowledge, Szumigala could not possibly have suffered
the injuries that he claimed."
	In making these arguments, the State is contesting the truth of
defendant's allegations that Szumigala gave false testimony and
that Szumigala's medical records demonstrate that this testimony
was false. The difficulty with the State's contentions is that they
ignore the procedural posture of this case. As noted, this appeal is
before us as a result of the circuit court judge's dismissal of
defendant's amended post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing. This action by the judge came in response to
the State's motion to dismiss the petition. By seeking to dismiss
the petition, as opposed to answering it, the State assumed the
truth of the factually supported allegations contained in the
petition, at least for purposes of the motion. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 390; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503; Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d  at 244-45.
The State, as movant, thus eliminated all factual issues from the
inquiry, and the sole question remaining is whether the petition's
allegations are sufficient, as a matter of law. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 390. It is premature for the State to contest factual matters at
this juncture. Such determinations are to be made at the
evidentiary stage of the post-conviction proceeding. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 390-91.
	In determining the sufficiency of defendant's allegations, we
look to the support provided for them. In this instance, defendant
has provided a copy of Szumigala's medical records, as well as a
copy of Russman's opinion letter. These materials support
defendant's Brady allegations, the truth of which may not be
determined at this stage of the proceedings.
	We hold that defendant's Brady allegations are sufficient to
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation and to
require an evidentiary hearing to determine if the violation did in
fact occur. The circuit court's dismissal of these particular claims
without an evidentiary hearing was improper. We express no
opinion as to the actual merits of these claims. Rather, we reverse
and remand with instructions for the circuit court to proceed to the
evidentiary stage on defendant's Brady claims. See Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 392. We note in passing that there appears to be some
dispute as to whether the State was in possession of Szumigala's
medical records at the time when defense counsel requested
discovery as to such records. This question, of course, will be
determined in the evidentiary hearing.

C. Defense Counsel's Alleged Failure to Investigate
	In a related argument, defendant contends that his defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to use Szumigala's medical
records to challenge Szumigala's testimony at the second
sentencing hearing. Defendant asserts that these records were
readily available by subpoena, and he argues that if counsel had
properly investigated, he would have obtained them and could
have used them to attack Szumigala's testimony. According to
defendant, this "failure to investigate and present a readily
available defense" was professionally unreasonable. He argues in
addition that if this defense had been presented, there is a
reasonable probability that he would not have been sentenced to
death.
	As noted, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
evaluated according to the two-prong test set forth in Strickland,
which requires a showing that counsel's performance was
deficient and that defendant suffered prejudice as a result. "Both
prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied before a defendant
can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	In order to satisfy the first element of this test, a defendant
must demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Regarding the application
of this standard to an alleged failure to investigate, the Court in
Strickland stated:
			"These standards [for determining whether counsel's
performance was deficient] require no special
amplification in order to define counsel's duty to
investigate ***. *** [S]trategic choices made after
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and
strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.
In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in
all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.
Thus, any decision by counsel to conduct a less-than-complete
investigation would fall within the wide range of professionally
competent assistance, so long as the decision were supported by a
reasonable professional judgment.
	At defendant's first sentencing hearing, which took place in
1984, Szumigala did not testify. The evidence presented with
reference to Szumigala consisted of a certified copy of defendant's
conviction for the 1971 robbery of Szumigala; the testimony of
Chicago police detective Bernard Stahl, who investigated the
robbery and whose testimony comprised about six transcript
pages; and a stipulation to the testimony of the physician who
treated Szumigala in the hospital on the night of the robbery. The
injuries described in this stipulation, which was read into the
record by the prosecutor, correspond fairly closely to the injuries
mentioned in Szumigala's medical records. According to the
stipulated testimony, Szumigala suffered contusions of the right
eye, nose, upper lip and chest, as well as a laceration to the right
upper eyelid. In addition, he had a possible cerebral concussion. X
rays of Szumigala's chest, jaw, shoulder, skull and other areas
were negative with respect to fractures. According to the
stipulation, "the injuries were confined to the tissues themselves."
The stipulation makes no mention of any dislocation of
Szumigala's shoulder or any other joint or of his eye being out of
place.
	Defendant acknowledges that "[a]t Mr. Harris' first
sentencing hearing, the State presented a relatively accurate
account of Mr. Szumigala's rather minor injuries." However,
defendant argues that because the State introduced such evidence
at the first sentencing hearing, defense counsel "should have
anticipated that Mr. Szumigala would be a witness or at least that
the State would attempt to introduce evidence of his injuries" at
the second sentencing hearing. According to defendant, counsel's
failure to follow up and obtain Szumigala's medical records so
that he could use them to challenge Szumigala's testimony
constituted deficient performance on counsel's part.
	As Strickland instructs, we evaluate the reasonableness of
counsel's challenged conduct "from counsel's perspective at the
time," taking all of the circumstances into consideration.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065, 2066. Prior to the second sentencing hearing, defense
counsel filed two motions for discovery pertaining to this matter.
As defendant asserts in his amended post-conviction petition, one
of these motions "specifically requested discovery regarding the
testimony of aggravation witnesses," and the other included a
request for any reports of experts made in connection with the
case, including the results of physical examinations. In response
to counsel's discovery requests, the State turned over a copy of
Szumigala's 1971 testimony in the robbery trial, and defense
counsel used this testimony to cross-examine Szumigala in the
second sentencing hearing. However, as indicated previously, the
State did not disclose Szumigala's medical records. Given that
these records were not disclosed, and given the "rather minor"
nature of the injuries described in the stipulation in the first
sentencing hearing, it would be professionally reasonable for
counsel to conclude that further investigation regarding
Szumigala's injuries was unnecessary and that counsel's
investigative energies would be more profitably directed
elsewhere. As noted, counsel presented extensive mitigation
evidence at the second sentencing hearing, including the testimony
of seven witnesses. In addition, a report prepared by a mitigation
specialist was admitted into evidence.
	Applying "a heavy measure of deference to counsel's
judgments" (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104
S. Ct. at 2066), and taking all of the circumstances into
consideration (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695,
104 S. Ct. at 2066), we conclude that defendant has failed to
establish that his counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. The failure to obtain Szumigala's
medical records was not an error "so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment" (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693,
104 S. Ct. at 2064). Because defendant has not shown that his
counsel's performance was deficient, he has failed to satisfy the
first prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
530. The trial court correctly dismissed this post-conviction claim
without an evidentiary hearing.

D. Victim Impact Evidence
	Finally, defendant contends that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge on direct appeal the State's use
of victim impact evidence from an unrelated crime. The evidence
in question is Szumigala's testimony as to the injuries he suffered
as a result of the 1971 robbery. According to defendant, in 1993
when his appeal in Harris II was filed, there was a strong
possibility that such evidence was inadmissible, particularly as it
related to long-term effects such as Szumigala's alleged color-blindness. In defendant's view, his appellate counsel should have
recognized this possibility and included this issue in his brief on
appeal.
	As noted, a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is evaluated under the same two-prong standard set forth
in Strickland for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476; Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 412.
Where a defendant contends that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise an issue, the defendant must show that this
failure was objectively unreasonable and that the defendant
suffered prejudice as a result. Both prongs of this test must be
satisfied in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim.
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 530. In order to satisfy the first prong, i.e.,
that counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must
demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Determinations as to whether this
standard has been met are based on "the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. In addition,
judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is "highly deferential."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at
2065. There is a strong presumption that counsel's assistance was
adequate and that counsel "made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.
	In the case at bar, the determination of whether appellate
counsel's performance was deficient turns to a large extent on the
state of the relevant law in 1993 when the appeal in Harris II was
filed. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that
evidence about the victim of a murder and about the impact of the
murder on the victim's family is admissible during the penalty
phase of a capital trial. Payne, 501 U.S.  at 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at
736, 111 S. Ct.  at 2609. The Court in Payne did not address the
question of whether victim impact evidence from unrelated crimes
was admissible. People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 56-57 (1998)
(Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).(3) The decision
in Payne overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2527 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), which had
held that victim impact evidence was inadmissible in a capital
sentencing proceeding.
	A few months after the Supreme Court's decision in Payne,
this court decided People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103 (1991),
which adopted the holding in Payne. In Howard, similar to the
case at bar, the defendant complained about the State's use of
victim impact evidence at his capital sentencing hearing. This
evidence consisted of testimony from the victims of other offenses
committed by the defendant. While the court in Howard "left
unanswered" the question of the admissibility of victim impact
evidence from other crimes (Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 49), it
nevertheless found "no error" in the presentation of this evidence
in the case before it (Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 158). The court in
Howard affirmed the defendant's death sentence.
	Given the decisions in Payne and Howard, a reasonably
competent attorney in 1993 might very well have decided not to
raise on direct appeal the issue of whether other-crimes evidence
was admissible. Based on Payne and Howard, there did not appear
to be a strong possibility that such evidence would be held
inadmissible. " 'Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every
conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel
to refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are
without merit, unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently
wrong.' " Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476, quoting Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at
329.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant points to two 1992
decisions by this court in which, according to defendant, we "gave
indications that victim impact evidence from a prior unrelated
offense might well be inadmissable [sic]." We disagree. Neither
People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118 (1992), nor People v. Mitchell,
152 Ill. 2d 274 (1992), considered the admissibility of victim
impact evidence from other crimes. In Mitchell the defendant
challenged the admission during sentencing of life photographs of
the two murder victims. The court in Mitchell found that this issue
had been waived and concluded that the admission of the
photographs was not plain error. In explaining this decision, the
court noted that "the Supreme Court in Payne recently held that
victim impact evidence is admissible during sentencing
proceedings in capital cases." Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 338. In
Mitchell, as in Payne, the challenged evidence dealt with victims
of the crime in question, not with victims of other crimes
committed by the defendant. The court in Mitchell also stated:
			"We caution, however, that Payne does not give the
prosecution free rein to introduce and argue anything it
wants. As the Payne court warned: 'In the event that
evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
mechanism for relief.' " Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 338,
quoting Payne, 501 U.S.  at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2608.
	Given the specific evidence upon which the court in Mitchell
was ruling, i.e., life photographs of the victims of the crime in
question, we do not believe this language could be taken to
indicate, as defendant contends, "that victim impact evidence from
a prior unrelated offense might well be inadmissable [sic]". The
key to the import of this language is the sentence that is quoted
from Payne. In Payne, the purpose of this sentence was to help
explain that not all victim impact evidence from the crime in
question is per se admissible. The Court's precise holding as to
this issue was that "the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar"
to such evidence. Payne, 501 U.S.  at 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 736,
111 S. Ct.  at 2609. The Court explained:
		"We think the Booth Court was wrong in stating that this
kind of evidence leads to the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. In the majority of cases, and in this case,
victim impact evidence serves entirely legitimate
purposes. In the event that evidence is introduced that is
so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief."
(Emphasis added.) Payne, 501 U.S.  at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d 
at 7 35, 111 S. Ct.  at 2608.
The quoting of this italicized sentence in the passage from
Mitchell indicates that the court in Mitchell was simply stating
what the court in Payne had stated: not all victim impact evidence
from the crime in question is automatically admissible during
sentencing. There is nothing in the passage quoted from Mitchell
to indicate that the court was referring to victim impact evidence
from other crimes.
	In Johnson, the defendant challenged the State's use at his
sentencing hearing of testimony from the father of the murder
victim. In this testimony, the father "explained the effect of the
victim's death upon him and other family members." Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d  at 152. The court in Johnson rejected the defendant's
argument, noting that the Supreme Court in Payne had held that
such evidence was admissible. The court also cited this court's
decision in Howard and concluded that "[t]o the extent Payne and
Howard permit the introduction of victim impact evidence, we
concur." Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d  at 153.
	Here again, as in Mitchell, the challenged evidence concerns
the victims of the crime in question, not the victims of other
crimes committed by the defendant. Similar to Mitchell, the
decision in Johnson cannot be taken to indicate "that victim
impact evidence from a prior unrelated offense might well be
inadmissable [sic]." Indeed, because it mentions Howard, the
decision in Johnson might be seen as supporting the admissibility
of such evidence.
	There is nothing in Johnson or Mitchell that persuades us to
alter our view as to the state of the law on other-crimes evidence
at the time when defendant's appeal in Harris II was filed. Based
on the legal landscape in 1993 regarding this issue, a reasonably
competent attorney might very well have declined to raise this
question on direct appeal.
	Defendant also points to an affidavit of Charles Hoffman, his
appellate counsel in his appeal in Harris II. In this affidavit, which
was attached to defendant's amended post-conviction petition,
Hoffman states that his failure to raise on direct appeal the
admissibility of Szumigala's victim impact testimony was not a
"strategic decision." Rather, Hoffman indicates that he failed to
read the Howard decision carefully enough to realize that the issue
of the admissibility of such other-crimes evidence had been left
unanswered in Howard. Accordingly, at the time he prepared
defendant's brief on appeal in Harris II, Hoffman "assumed that
Mr. Szumigala's testimony about the impact of the crime
committed upon him was admissible under the reasoning of Payne
and Howard."
	Defendant appears to argue that this affidavit demonstrates
that appellate counsel's performance was deficient. However, as
we held in People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 490 (1996),
"[c]ounsel's own admission of ineffectiveness is not binding on us
or determinative of the issues raised here." As Strickland instructs,
counsel's performance is assessed against an "objective standard
of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064, cited in Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 490. In
evaluating defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, the appropriate question is not whether defendant's
counsel himself viewed his performance as deficient, but rather
whether a reasonably competent attorney, in the same
circumstances, would have decided not to raise the admissibility
of other-crimes evidence on direct appeal. As we have indicated,
we believe that a reasonably competent attorney in 1993 might
well have made such a decision. Viewing appellate counsel's
performance "as of the time of counsel's conduct" (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066), and taking
into consideration all of the relevant circumstances, we conclude
that counsel's performance fell within the "wide range of
professionally competent assistance" (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066) and therefore was not
deficient. Because defendant has failed to satisfy the performance
prong of the Strickland test, his claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel is without merit. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 530.
Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed this post-conviction
claim without an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's amended post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The circuit court is instructed to hold an
evidentiary hearing with respect to defendant's Brady claims. As
to the dismissal of the remaining claims, the circuit court's order
is affirmed.
Circuit court judgment affirmed in part
 and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	The majority correctly reverses in part the judgment of the
circuit court and remands this cause for an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's Brady claims. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth
in my dissents in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v.
Simpson, Nos. 85084, 86926, slip op. at 35-38 (September 27,
2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe that the majority fails to
grant defendant the constitutionally required relief of a new trial
conducted in accordance with the new supreme court rules
governing capital cases. The procedures in capital cases prior to
this court's adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable
and did not adequately protect a defendant's constitutional rights.
Consequently, since the new rules were promulgated to address the
deficiencies of constitutional dimension that regularly occurred
under the old system, the rules must be applied retroactively to all
capital cases. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21
(1997).
 
 
1.      1Najdowski had a close friend who was a corporate attorney; Gray's
father was a corporate attorney; and Dolan had a cousin who was an
attorney. 

2.      2Szumigala's testimony consumed some 30 transcript pages. 

3.      3In People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39 (1998), this court explicitly held
that the unforeseen effects of a defendant's prior crimes upon the
victims of those crimes are too attenuated to be relevant to the
defendant's sentencing for the murder in question. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at
52-53. Accordingly, such other-crimes victim-impact evidence is
inadmissible at sentencing. We note that this decision was issued in
1998, five years after the filing of the appeal in Harris II, and therefore
has no relevance to an assessment of counsel's performance in 1993.