Title: Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S063914
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2017

No. 11	
March 2, 2017	
115
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
Christopher S. BARRETT,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC 15CV27317; SC S063914)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted November 10, 2016.
Wendy M. Margolis, Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, 
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for relator. 
Also on the brief was Julie A. Smith.
Douglas A. Rossi, Rossi Vucinovich PC, Seattle, argued 
the cause for adverse party. James K. Vucinovich filed 
the brief for adverse party. Also on the brief was Paul S. 
Bovarnick, Rose Senders & Bovarnick LLC, Portland.
Lisa T. Hunt, Law Office of Lisa T. Hunt, Lake Oswego, 
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers 
Association.
Lawrence M. Mann, Alper & Mann, PC, Bethesda, 
Maryland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Academy of Rail 
Labor Attorneys.
KISTLER, J.
Peremptory writ to issue.
Walters, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which 
Brewer, J., joined.
______________
	
*  On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah County 
Circuit Court, Kenneth R. Walker, Judge.
116	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Case Summary: Plaintiff brought an action in Oregon against a foreign 
corporation to recover for injuries that he sustained in Idaho. The corporation 
moved to dismiss because Oregon lacks general jurisdiction over it. The trial 
court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of 
mandamus to the trial court. Held: (1) Under Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 US 
___, 134 S Ct 746, 187 L Ed 2d 624 (2014), a state ordinarily can exercise general 
jurisdiction in one of two places: where the corporation is incorporated and where 
it maintains its principal place of business; (2) this case does not come within 
the limited exception recognized in Daimler to that rule: Oregon cannot be con-
sidered a surrogate for the corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place 
of business; and (3) the Federal Employee Liability Act does not bring this case 
within the exception that Daimler recognized.
Peremptory writ to issue.
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
117
	
KISTLER, J.
	
The primary question in this case is whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits 
Oregon to exercise general jurisdiction over an interstate 
railroad for claims unrelated to the railroad’s activities in 
this state. The trial court ruled that it could exercise gen-
eral jurisdiction over the railroad and denied the railroad’s 
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. After the railroad petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus, we issued an alternative writ to the trial court, 
which adhered to its initial ruling. The case accordingly 
came to us for briefing and argument. We now hold that due 
process does not permit Oregon courts to exercise general 
jurisdiction over the railroad.
	
Plaintiff sustained injuries while working for Union 
Pacific Railroad Company “as a spiker machine operator 
near Minidoka, Idaho.”1 According to plaintiff’s complaint, 
the machine that he used to set spikes was in a “state of 
disrepair,” which subjected him to “excessive vibration and 
jarring.” Additionally, Union Pacific’s decision to reduce 
“the spiker machine’s customary three-[person] crew to a 
two-[person] crew” placed greater physical demands on 
plaintiff, causing or contributing to the injuries he suffered. 
As a result of Union Pacific’s alleged negligent maintenance 
of the spiker machine and its decision to reduce the num-
ber of persons operating that machine, plaintiff suffered 
economic and noneconomic damages totaling approximately 
$615,000.
	
Union Pacific is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Omaha, Nebraska.2 It currently 
	
1  This mandamus proceeding arises out of plaintiff’s negligence action 
against Union Pacific. We take the facts from the record that was developed in 
the underlying action on Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. See Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 352 Or 191, 195 n 2, 282 P3d 867 
(2012) (explaining that the record on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction includes the complaint, affidavits, and other evidence that the par-
ties submitted on the motion). We assume, for the purposes of this proceeding, 
that the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint are true and construe any disputed 
facts consistently with the trial court’s ruling. See id.
	
2  Union Pacific’s corporate offices are located in Omaha, as are its “rail traffic 
control headquarters.”
118	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
operates railroads in 23 states, including Oregon. It has 
been engaged in business in Oregon on an ongoing basis 
for a substantial period of time; one of its now-merged sub-
sidiaries first began operating in Oregon in 1863.3 Oregon 
also forms a significant part of Union Pacific’s business. 
The company owns approximately 32,000 miles of track in 
23 states, with approximately 3.4 percent of those tracks in 
Oregon. In terms of the amount of track that Union Pacific 
owns, Oregon is thirteenth among the 23 states. Oregon 
is ninth in terms of employees and fourteenth among the 
23 states in revenues generated.
	
Plaintiff brought this action in Oregon to recover 
for injuries that he sustained in Idaho. In response to Union 
Pacific’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
plaintiff raised essentially two arguments. First, he argued 
that Oregon has general jurisdiction over Union Pacific 
under the Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat 
65, as amended, codified as 45 USC sections 51-60. Second, 
he argued that, apart from FELA, Oregon has general juris-
diction over Union Pacific because Union Pacific’s actions in 
Oregon were “so substantial and of such a nature as to jus-
tify suit against [Union Pacific] on causes of actions aris-
ing from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 
(Quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 US 915, 924, 131 S Ct 2846, 180 L Ed 2d 796 (2011).) On 
review, plaintiff adds a third argument. He contends that 
Oregon has specific jurisdiction over Union Pacific in this 
case. We begin with plaintiff’s second argument.4
	
3  The Oregon Steam Navigation Co. began in 1863 as a portage railroad 
to carry steamship travelers around rapids and falls on the Columbia River. It 
merged with Oregon Railway & Navigation Co. (OR&N), which became part of a 
railroad system that Union Pacific leased and that connected to a Union Pacific 
subsidiary, Oregon Short Line (OSL). Although OR&N and OSL operated as sep-
arate corporate entities well into the twentieth century, they merged with Union 
Pacific in 1987.
	
4  Ordinarily, we would begin with the federal statutory issue that plain-
tiff raises before reaching any constitutional limitation on exercising jurisdic-
tion over Union Pacific. However, plaintiff has not explained how Congress can 
authorize states to exercise jurisdiction that due process forbids. Moreover, as 
explained below, the section of FELA on which plaintiff relies does not purport to 
confer authority on state or federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
out-of-state corporate defendants. We accordingly begin with plaintiff’s constitu-
tional claim and then turn to his reliance on the federal statute.
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
119
I.  GENERAL JURISDICTION
	
ORCP 4 L authorizes Oregon courts to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the extent 
permitted by the state and federal constitutions. Union 
Pacific identifies no state constitutional limit on the trial 
court’s authority to hear plaintiff’s claims, and the question 
accordingly becomes whether due process permits Oregon to 
exercise general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. In answer-
ing that question, we focus initially on the Court’s discus-
sion of general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 
US ___, 134 S Ct 746, 187 L Ed 2d 624 (2014).
	
The Court held in Daimler that California courts 
could not exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler AG, 
a German public stock company, to hear claims that were 
unrelated to that state.5 134 S Ct at 762. We discuss 
Daimler in greater detail below. Essentially, however, the 
Court explained that a corporation will be “at home” in a 
state and thus subject to general jurisdiction in two par-
adigmatic places: the corporation’s place of incorporation 
and its principal place of business. Id. at 760. Although the 
Court did not foreclose the possibility that a corporation 
could be “at home” in other places, it identified a limited set 
of “exceptional” circumstances that will provide compara-
ble contacts. Id. at 761 n 19. In doing so, the Court rejected 
the argument that plaintiff raises here—that a substantial 
and continuous business presence within a state is, in and 
of itself, sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state corporate defendant. Id. at 761-62.
	
In reaching those conclusions, the Court began by 
tracing the development of specific and general jurisdiction. 
The Court explained that both doctrines find their roots in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 66 S Ct 
154, 90 L Ed 95 (1945). The plaintiff’s claim in International 
Shoe arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
	
5  In Daimler, employees of Daimler’s Argentinean subsidiary sued Daimler 
in federal district court in California, claiming that Daimler’s Argentinean sub-
sidiary had conspired with the security police in that country to kidnap, torture, 
and kill the subsidiary’s employees. Because the plaintiffs’ claims had no con-
nection to California, the plaintiffs had to establish that Daimler’s presence in 
California was sufficient to give that state general jurisdiction over it.
120	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
state, and the question in that case was whether those 
in-state contacts were sufficient to give the forum state per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. That type of personal 
jurisdiction, now called specific jurisdiction, turns on “ 
‘the 
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion.’ 
” Daimler, 134 S Ct at 754 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 US 186, 204, 97 S Ct 2569, 53 L Ed 2d 683 (1977)). That 
is, specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliatio[n] between 
the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activ-
ity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and 
is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear, 564 
US at 919 (alteration in original; internal quotation marks 
omitted).
	
International Shoe also recognized a related but 
separate category of personal jurisdiction, which has been 
labeled general jurisdiction. More specifically, International 
Shoe recognized that a foreign corporation’s “continuous 
corporate operations within a state [may be] so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes 
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 
activities.” 326 US at 318. The Court did not have occasion 
in International Shoe to determine how substantial an out-
of-state corporation’s activities within the forum state must 
be before the forum could exercise general jurisdiction over 
the corporation. International Shoe, as well as most of the 
Court’s subsequent personal jurisdiction cases, have focused 
instead on specific jurisdiction.
	
After International Shoe and before Daimler, only 
three of the Court’s cases had considered when a foreign 
corporation’s contacts with a forum will be sufficient to per-
mit the forum state to exercise general jurisdiction over it. 
One case held that a Philippine mining company that tem-
porarily had relocated to Ohio during the Second World War 
was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio. See Daimler, 134 
S Ct at 756 (describing Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 
US 437, 72 S Ct 413, 96 L Ed 485 (1952)). As the Court 
explained in Daimler, “[g]iven the wartime circumstances, 
Ohio could be considered a surrogate for the [mining com-
pany’s] place of incorporation or head office.” Id. at 756 n 8 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goodyear, 564 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
121
US at 928 (describing Perkins the same way).6 Each of the 
other two cases concluded that the out-of-state defendant’s 
occasional contacts with the forum state were insufficient 
to give that state general jurisdiction. Goodyear, 564 US at 
929;7 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 US 
408, 104 S Ct 1868, 80 L Ed 2d 404 (1984).8
	
The Court’s decision in Goodyear has proved nota-
ble not so much for its holding but for its explanation of when 
a corporation’s activities within a forum state will be suffi-
cient to give rise to general jurisdiction. The Court explained 
in Goodyear that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction 
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations 
to hear any and all claims against them when their affili-
ations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as 
to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” 564 
US at 919. The Court did not define with any specificity in 
Goodyear when a foreign corporation will be “essentially at 
home” in the forum state; the contacts in that case were so 
few that further definition was unnecessary.9 Rather, the 
task of defining when a foreign corporation will be “essen-
tially at home” fell to Daimler.
	
6  In Daimler, Justice Sotomayor read Perkins for the proposition that the 
displaced company had a substantial presence in Ohio but also maintained 
extensive operations elsewhere. 134 S Ct at 769-70 n 8 (opinion concurring in 
the judgment). She accordingly disagreed that Ohio was a surrogate for the 
company’s head office. Id. Whatever the merits of that reading of Perkins, the 
Court’s interpretation of Perkins in Goodyear and Daimler controls our view of 
that case.
	
7  In Goodyear, the Court held that the North Carolina courts lacked gen-
eral jurisdiction over the European subsidiaries of a United States parent to 
hear claims against those subsidiaries arising out of an accident in France. The 
subsidiaries had no presence in North Carolina, and the tires that they manu-
factured were sold primarily in European and Asian markets. 564 US at 920-
21. Only a small percentage of the subsidiaries’ tires were distributed in North 
Carolina by other Goodyear affiliates. Id.
	
8  In Helicopteros, the Court held that Texas lacked general jurisdiction over a 
Colombian corporation when the corporation’s contacts with Texas were confined 
to “sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation ses-
sion; accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; 
purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a Texas-based 
helicopter company] for substantial sums; and sending personnel to [Texas] for 
training.” Helicopteros, 466 US at 416.
	
9  In Goodyear, the Court explained that a corporation would be “at home” in 
a state if the corporation were comparable to a domestic enterprise in that state, 
but it did not provide further guidance. See 564 US at 924.
122	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
	
On that issue, there was no dispute in Daimler that 
the German corporation’s own activities in California were 
insufficient to permit that state to exercise general juris-
diction over it. Rather, the plaintiffs’ theory (and the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding) turned on the proposition that Mercedes 
Benz USA (MBUSA), Daimler’s United States subsidiary, 
was Daimler’s agent, that MBUSA’s in-state activities were 
attributable to Daimler, and that MBUSA was subject to 
general jurisdiction in California—a proposition that was 
undisputed in that case.
	
In considering that theory, the Court questioned 
whether, even if MBUSA were Daimler’s agent, its activ-
ities were attributable to Daimler. Id. at 759 (holding out 
the possibility that MBUSA’s activities in California would 
be attributable to Daimler only if MBUSA were Daimler’s 
alter ego). In a similar vein, the Court questioned whether 
an agent’s contacts with the forum would be attributable to 
the principal for the purpose of establishing general juris-
diction even though those contacts would be attributable to 
the principal for the purpose of establishing specific juris-
diction. Id. Finally, the Court questioned whether California 
could exercise general jurisdiction over MBUSA. See id. at 
758.
	
The Court concluded, however, that “[e]ven if we 
were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, 
and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to 
Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to 
general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim con-
tacts with the state hardly render it at home there.” Id. at 
760. In reaching that conclusion, the Court identified two 
paradigmatic places where a corporation will be “at home”: 
“the place of incorporation and principal place of business.” 
Id. The Court did not “foreclose the possibility that in an 
exceptional case, see, e.g., Perkins,” a corporation could be 
at home in some place other than its place of incorporation 
and its principal place of business. Id. at 761 n 19. However, 
the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that a corpo-
ration will be at home “in every State in which a corpora-
tion engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic 
course of business”—an argument that the Court described 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
123
as “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at 761 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).10
	
The Court explained why MBUSA’s activities in 
California—even if they were imputed to Daimler and even 
if they were sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction over 
MBUSA—were not sufficient to establish general jurisdic-
tion over Daimler:
“[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not ‘focu[s] solely 
on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.’ 
* 
* 
* General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of 
a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and 
worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can 
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, ‘at 
home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing business’ tests 
framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United 
States. * 
* 
* Nothing in International Shoe and its prog-
eny suggests that ‘a particular quantum of local activity’ 
should give a State authority over a ‘far larger quantum of 
. . . activity’ having no connection to any in-state activity.”
Id. at 762 n 20 (citation omitted; bracket in original). The 
Court reasoned that, if MBUSA’s California activities gave 
that state general jurisdiction over Daimler, then every 
other state in which MBUSA’s sales were sizeable could also 
assert general jurisdiction over Daimler—a result that the 
Court rejected as an “exorbitant exercis[e] of all purpose 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 761.
	
Given Daimler, we conclude that Oregon may not 
exercise general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. There is no 
dispute that Union Pacific has engaged in a “substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business” in Oregon. 
However, Union Pacific’s activities in Oregon, while sub-
stantial, are only a small part of its larger business activ-
ities in 23 states. To paraphrase the Court’s reasoning in 
Daimler, if Oregon can exercise general jurisdiction over 
Union Pacific because that company’s activities in this state 
	
10  The Court recognized that a corporation’s “continuous and systematic” 
activities in the forum state will give rise to specific jurisdiction when they “also 
give rise to the liabilities sued on.” 134 S Ct at 761 (quoting International Shoe, 
326 US at 317). However, as noted, it rejected the plaintiff’s argument that sys-
tematic and continuous activities in the forum state were sufficient to give rise to 
general jurisdiction in every state in which those activities occurred.
124	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
are substantial and continuous, then every state in which 
Union Pacific has engaged in similar activities can assert 
general jurisdiction over it, and the Court was clear that a 
rule of decision that results in multiple jurisdictions simul-
taneously asserting general jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant is at odds with the Due Process Clause.11
	
Plaintiff, however, advances three interrelated rea-
sons why Daimler does not foreclose Oregon from exercising 
general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. He contends initially 
that the touchstone of International Shoe is “fairness” and 
that there is nothing unfair in subjecting Union Pacific to 
general jurisdiction in a state, such as Oregon, where it has 
a substantial and continuous business presence. Second, 
and perhaps in support of the first point, plaintiff notes 
that Union Pacific employs 1,700 persons in Oregon, has 
an annual Oregon payroll of $144.6 million, owns and oper-
ates almost 1,100 miles of track throughout the state, and 
generates over $645 million annually in revenue from its 
Oregon operations. Finally, plaintiff notes that this case is 
factually distinguishable from Daimler. It does not require 
attributing the activities of an in-state agent to a foreign 
corporation to hear a claim that arose in another country, 
as in Daimler. Rather, this case focuses on Union Pacific’s 
activities in Oregon to determine whether that company is 
subject to general jurisdiction in this state for an injury that 
resulted from Union Pacific’s alleged negligence in a neigh-
boring state.
	
While we appreciate the distinctions that plain-
tiff identifies, we are not persuaded that Daimler can be 
distinguished so easily. We agree with plaintiff that, in 
	
11  The Court identified primarily two reasons why “only a limited set of affili-
ations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction.” 
Daimler, 134 S Ct at 760. First, the Court explained that, following International 
Shoe, specific jurisdiction has become (and should be) the predominant means 
by which a state may assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. General 
jurisdiction should play only a subsidiary role. Id. at 757-58 and n 9. Second, the 
rules for determining general jurisdiction should provide clear guides to out-of-
state defendants, thus “permit[ting] out-of-state defendants to structure their 
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will 
and will not render them liable to suit.” Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The rules that the Court announced for determining general jurisdic-
tion further those goals.
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
125
International Shoe, the Court invoked fair play as a touch-
stone of due process. However, since that time, the Court 
has refined and clarified the rules that guide our determina-
tion of when due process permits states to exercise general 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. We cannot rely on 
the general invocation of fair play in International Shoe to 
undo the more specific rules for determining general juris-
diction that the Court announced in Daimler.12
	
Plaintiff’s related point—that Union Pacific is 
engaged in substantial and continuous business activi-
ties in Oregon—does not provide a viable basis for distin-
guishing Daimler. In Daimler, the Court explicitly assumed 
that MBUSA’s activities in California could be imputed to 
Daimler. Those activities included “the presence of multi-
ple offices, the direct distribution of thousands of prod-
ucts accounting for billions of dollars in sales, and contin-
uous interaction with customers” in California. Id. at 764 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). As the Court 
explained, however, in response to the concurring opinion, 
“the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focu[s] solely on the 
magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts. * 
* 
* General 
jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s 
activities in their entirety.” Id. at 762 n 20. Similarly, in this 
case, while Union Pacific’s activities in Oregon are substan-
tial, they form only a small part of its activities in the 23 
states in which it operates. Viewed through the lens that 
Daimler provided, those contacts are not sufficient to confer 
general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. If they were, most (if 
not all) of the states in which Union Pacific operates could 
exercise general jurisdiction over it. However, as the Court 
explained, due process does not permit such an “exorbitant 
exercise” of general jurisdiction.
	
Finally, plaintiff argues that this case is factu-
ally distinguishable from both Daimler and Goodyear. 
To be sure, there are differences between the two cases. 
Daimler involved an international corporation, whose ties to 
	
12  Plaintiff has not explained why he could not have brought an action in 
Idaho where the injury occurred or why it would be unfair, as International Shoe 
used that concept, to limit personal jurisdiction over Union Pacific to the state 
in which it allegedly caused the injury and those states in which Union Pacific is 
incorporated and maintains its principal place of business.
126	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
California depended on attributing its subsidiary’s in-state 
activities to it. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ claims in Daimler 
arose outside of the United States while plaintiff’s claims 
in this case arose in a neighboring state. Perhaps the Court 
could have relied on those facts in holding that California 
lacked general jurisdiction over Daimler. It did not do so, 
however. Rather, the Court expressly assumed that MBUSA’s 
activities in California were attributable to Daimler but 
found MBUSA’s activities in California insufficient in the 
context of Daimler’s larger operations. Nor does the interna-
tional character of the issues in Daimler provide a basis for 
distinguishing that decision. The Court expressly declined 
to adopt the rationale advanced by Justice Sotomayor’s opin-
ion concurring in the judgment, which turned on the lack of 
a connection between California and a claim by Argentinean 
plaintiffs against a German corporation. Id. at 762 n 20.13 
However narrowly the Court might have written Daimler, 
we are not persuaded that the decision, as written, can be 
fairly distinguished.
II.  SECTION 56 OF FELA
	
Plaintiff also relies on section 56 of FELA. Congress 
enacted FELA in 1908 to provide a federal cause of action for 
injured railroad workers. 35 Stat 65.14 As initially enacted, 
FELA left venue to the general federal venue statute, which 
“fixed the venue of suits in the United States courts, based 
in whole or in part * 
* 
* in districts of which the defendant 
was an inhabitant.” Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 
US 44, 49, 62 S Ct 6, 86 L Ed 28 (1941). It quickly became 
apparent, however, that it was an “injustice to an injured 
employee” to permit the employee to bring an action only in 
the district where the defendant railroad was an inhabitant. 
	
13  At the end of its opinion, after the majority had concluded that the Ninth 
Circuit erred in holding that California courts could exercise general jurisdiction 
over Daimler, the majority noted that the “transnational context of this dispute 
bears attention,” but that context merely confirmed the Court’s holding. 134 S 
Ct at 762. It did not control it. Had it done so, the Court would have agreed with 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion concurring in the judgment. 
	
14  As enacted in 1908, FELA focused on substantive issues, such as the stan-
dard of care and who can recover in the event of the employee’s death; it made 
railroads liable for their negligence, eliminated the defenses of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk, and replaced those defenses with comparative 
fault. 35 Stat 65-66.
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
127
Id. Accordingly, in 1910, Congress added what is now codi-
fied as section 56 of FELA. That section provided and still 
provides:
	
“Under this chapter an action may be brought in a 
[District Court of the United States], in the district of the 
residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action 
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at 
the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States under this chapter shall be con-
current with that of the courts of the several States, and no 
case arising under this Act and brought in any state court 
of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of 
the United States.”
36 Stat 291; see 45 USC § 56.
	
Relying on Kepner and Miles v. Illinois Central R. 
Co., 315 US 698, 62 S Ct 827, 86 L Ed 1129 (1942), plaintiff 
argues that the Supreme Court “has consistently upheld 
the jurisdiction of courts in FELA cases even though those 
[cases were brought] in states different from the location 
of an injury, or the headquarters or place of incorporation 
of the defendant railroad.” In plaintiff’s view, the Court 
has “consistently done so because of the ‘exceptional’ 
nature of interstate railroads,” a proposition that plaintiff 
sees as bringing FELA cases within the class of “excep-
tional” cases that, under footnote 19 in Daimler, will give 
rise to general jurisdiction in a forum other than a corpo-
rate defendant’s place of incorporation and primary place 
of business.
	
The difficulty with plaintiff’s argument is that sec-
tion 56 of FELA addresses venue and subject matter jurisdic-
tion. It does not address personal jurisdiction. As explained 
below, the FELA cases on which plaintiff relies apparently 
assumed (no defendant raised the issue in those cases) that 
personal jurisdiction over the railroads existed because the 
railroads were “doing business” in the jurisdiction in which 
they were sued. That basis for asserting personal jurisdic-
tion over out-of-state corporate defendants predated Kepner 
and Miles, was not unique to railroads but applied to all out-
of-state corporate defendants, and did not survive Daimler. 
With that preface, we turn to the terms of section 56.
128	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
	
Section 56 consists of two sentences. The first sen-
tence is a venue provision that defines the venues in which 
FELA claims may be brought in federal district courts. See 
Kepner, 314 US at 50-51 (describing that sentence as confer-
ring venue); Sen R 432 (1910), printed in 45 Cong Rec 4040, 
4041 (stating that the first sentence in the 1910 amendment 
pertains to “the venue of such an action”). That sentence pro-
vides that claims under FELA can be brought in the federal 
district courts in three places: the district where the defen-
dant resides, the district where the cause of action arose, or 
the district where the defendant was doing business when 
the action was commenced. Kepner, 314 US at 50. As the 
Court recognized in Kepner, the first sentence of section 56 
does not confer personal jurisdiction over out-of-state cor-
porate defendants but instead provides for expanded venue 
“ 
‘if there is jurisdiction.’ 
” Id. at 51 (quoting Hoffman v. 
Foraker, 274 US 21, 23, 47 S Ct 485, 71 L Ed 905 (1927)); 
accord Missouri ex rel Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield, 340 
US 1, 3, 71 S Ct 1, 95 L Ed 3 (1950) (noting personal jurisdic-
tion as a prerequisite to the application of section 56).
	
Plaintiff fares no better under the second sentence 
in section 56. That sentence confirms that state courts have 
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over federal FELA 
claims. Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 US 1, 56, 
32 S Ct 169, 56 L Ed 327 (1912).  The Court explained in 
Second Employers’ Liability Cases that, when Congress 
enacted FELA in 1908, the general jurisdictional provision 
giving state courts concurrent subject matter jurisdiction 
over federal claims was sufficient, without more, to estab-
lish the state courts’ jurisdiction over those claims. Id. The 
second sentence of section 56 was added to emphasize the 
existence of concurrent subject matter jurisdiction but did 
not itself confer it. Id. That sentence was intended to con-
firm the authority (and duty) of state courts to hear federal 
FELA claims “when [the state court’s] ordinary jurisdiction 
as prescribed by its local laws is appropriate to the occasion 
and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cogni-
zance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery.” Id. at 
56-57; accord Testa v. Katt, 330 US 386, 394, 67 S Ct 810, 91 
L Ed 967 (1947) (holding that state courts generally may not 
refuse enforcement of federal claims if state courts would 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
129
enforce the same type of state-law claims).15 Confirming 
the state courts’ concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over 
federal claims is not the same thing as conferring personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendants.
	
Nothing in section 56 purports to confer personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendants on state 
or federal courts. It is true, as plaintiff argues, that in Kepner 
the Court upheld the ability of an Ohio plaintiff injured in 
that state to bring a FELA claim in a New York federal dis-
trict court when the basis for filing an action in that forum 
was that the defendant railroad was doing business there. 
314 US at 48. The only issue, however, raised in Kepner was 
whether the broad venue provision in the first sentence of 
section 56 precluded the railroad from asserting a forum 
non conveniens defense. Id. at 51. The railroad did not argue 
and the Court did not address whether a New York court 
could assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corpo-
ration for injuries that occurred in another state. A similar 
pattern occurred in Miles, on which plaintiff also relies.
	
Plainitff concludes from Kepner and Miles that sec-
tion 56 of FELA gave the courts in those cases personal 
jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporate defendants. Not 
only is that conclusion difficult to draw from the Court’s fail-
ure to address personal jurisdiction in those cases, but it 
is also at odds with the history that preceded those cases. 
Cf. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 US 345, 349, 41 S Ct 
506, 65 L Ed 963 (1921) (noting that “a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic”). As early as 1882, the Court held 
that a state could assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state corporate defendant if the corporation was “doing busi-
ness” in the state through its agent and the state served the 
corporate defendant’s agent. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 US 350, 
355-56, 1 S Ct 354, 27 L Ed 222 (1882). The Court reached 
	
15  In explaining the 1910 amendment, Senator Borah stated that, in his 
view, the sentence was not necessary because the general jurisdictional provision 
applied. 45 Cong Rec 4034-35 (remarks of Sen Borah). He noted, however, that 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut “ha[d] refused to take jurisdiction of this class 
of [FELA] cases, holding that it was the evident intent of Congress to confine this 
class of cases to the jurisdiction of the federal court.” Id. at 4035. The second sen-
tence was added to make clear that state courts have concurrent subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear FELA cases. Id.
130	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
a similar conclusion in International Harvester v. Kentucky, 
234 US 579, 34 S Ct 944, 58 L Ed 1479 (1914), even though 
the corporate defendant in that case had structured its busi-
ness practices to avoid complying with a state law requiring 
that an agent be appointed for service of process.16
	
In Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Co., 262 US 
312, 316, 43 S Ct 556, 67 L Ed 996 (1923), the Court cited 
International Harvester for the proposition that the forum 
state had personal jurisdiction over the defendant railroad 
because it was doing business there.17 In light of Davis, 
International Harvester, and St. Clair, it should come as no 
surprise that the defendant railroads in Kepner and Miles 
did not question whether the forum had personal jurisdic-
tion over them. In both cases, those railroads were doing 
business in the states in which the FELA actions were 
brought. Rather, the only question that the defendant rail-
roads raised was whether venue could be transferred to a 
more convenient forum.18
	
16  There are two related but separate types of “doing business” cases. One 
arose as a result of state statutes that required out-of-state corporations doing 
business within a state to appoint a registered agent for the service of process. 
St. Clair, 106 US at 355-56. Although the Court initially stated that personal 
jurisdiction was limited to the corporation’s in-state activities, it later recognized 
that such statutes could provide for general jurisdiction. See Pennsylvania Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 US 93, 95-96, 37 S Ct 344, 61 L Ed 610 
(1917). The other class of cases arose in the absence of such statutes and rec-
ognized that a forum state could assert personal jurisdiction over corporations 
doing business within the state as long as a corporate agent was served with 
process in the state. See International Harvester, 234 US at 585-86 (discussing 
amount of business activity within a state necessary under the Due Process 
Clause to justify personal jurisdiction). In this case, plaintiff relies on the latter 
line of cases, not the former.
	
17  Because the courts in which railroads were “doing business” had personal 
jurisdiction over them, the issue in FELA cases shifted from personal jurisdic-
tion under the Due Process Clause to whether asserting a FELA claim in an 
unrelated jurisdiction placed an undue burden on interstate commerce in viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause. See Davis, 262 US at 317. Davis held that it did. Id. 
After a series of cases that initially followed but later limited Davis, the Court 
finally confined Davis to its “particular facts” in Kepner. See Kepner, 314 US at 51 
n 11.
	
18  Plaintiff also relies on a statement that Senator Borah made in introduc-
ing the 1910 amendment. After explaining that the first sentence of the amend-
ment “has reference to the venue” of a FELA action, he added that the amendment 
“enables the plaintiff to find the corporation at any point or place or State where 
it is actually carrying on business, and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do 
so.” 45 Cong Rec 4034 (1910). Plaintiff’s reliance on that statement is misplaced 
for three reasons. First, Senator Borah specifically focused on venue, not personal 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
131
	
The most that plaintiff can extract from Kepner and 
Miles is that the parties in those cases implicitly assumed 
that the forum states had jurisdiction because the rail-
roads were “doing business” there. And the parties’ implicit 
assumptions will advance plaintiff’s jurisdictional argu-
ments only if “doing business” in a forum is enough, with-
out more, to assert general jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
corporate defendant. As Daimler makes clear, however, it 
is not. As explained above, the Court held in Daimler that 
the fact that an out-of-state corporation “engages in a sub-
stantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” in a 
state is not sufficient, in and of itself, to give that state gen-
eral jurisdiction over the corporation. Daimler also rejected 
the proposition that “at home,” as it used that phrase, is 
“synonymous with ‘doing business’ tests framed before spe-
cific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.” 134 S Ct at 
762 n 20. And the Daimler Court observed that, although 
Perkins had relied on two cases upholding “the exercise of 
general jurisdiction based on the presence of a local office, 
which signaled that the corporation was ‘doing business’ in 
the forum,” those “doing business” cases “should not attract 
heavy reliance today.” Id. at 761 n 18.
	
As we read Daimler, it concluded that the recogni-
tion of specific jurisdiction in International Shoe foreclosed 
reliance on older cases finding general jurisdiction based 
solely on “doing business” within a forum.19 We cannot follow 
jurisdiction. Second, the “doing business” cases provided for personal jurisdiction 
“where [the railroad was] actually carrying on business.” Id. Put differently, per-
sonal jurisdiction where the railroad was actually carrying on business was a prem-
ise not a consequence of the amendment. Third, even if Congress intended to confer 
personal jurisdiction on state courts where it would not otherwise exist, plaintiff 
never explains how Congress can do so in violation of the Due Process Clause.
	
19  As noted, plaintiff does not argue that Oregon courts can assert personal 
jurisdiction over Union Pacific based on Oregon’s statute requiring out-of-state 
corporations doing business within this state to appoint agents for service of pro-
cess. See ORS 60.731. We accordingly do not decide in this case whether Oregon’s 
statute purports to confer personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants; 
whether, if it does, it purports to confer jurisdiction only over claims that arise 
out of a corporation’s activities within this state; or whether, if it purports to 
confer general jurisdiction, Oregon could do so consistently with the federal con-
stitution. It is sufficient in this case to hold that the quantum of business activ-
ity necessary to constitute “doing business” under cases such as International 
Harvester is no longer sufficient, in and of itself, to confer general jurisdiction 
under Daimler. 
132	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
the Court’s decision in Daimler and give continued effect to 
the “doing business” cases that plaintiff implicitly urges us 
to follow, nor can we find in the terms of FELA, the cases 
interpreting it, or the history that preceded it a basis for 
saying that cases brought against railroads under that stat-
ute constitute an “exceptional” case that, like Perkins, will 
permit a court to exercise general jurisdiction over a corpo-
rate defendant in a forum other than its state of incorpo-
ration or principal place of business. We accordingly reach 
a different conclusion from the Montana Supreme Court, 
which relied on earlier “doing business” cases in upholding 
general jurisdiction over a railroad. See Tyrrell v. BNSF 
Railway Co., 373 P3d 1 (Mont 2016), cert granted, ___ US 
___ (2017). We agree instead with the majority of courts 
that have held that the fact that a corporation is doing busi-
ness within a state is not sufficient in and of itself to give 
that state general jurisdiction over the corporation. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F3d 619 (2d Cir 2016); 
Kipp v. Ski Enterprise Corp., 783 F3d 695, 698-99 (7th Cir 
2015); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F3d 1062, 1070 (9th 
Cir 2014).
III.  SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
	
Plaintiff argues that we can affirm the trial court’s 
ruling on an alternative ground—that the relationship 
among Union Pacific, the forum, and this litigation are suf-
ficient to give Oregon specific jurisdiction over Union Pacific. 
See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 
Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001) (explaining when an 
appellate court can affirm the lower court’s ruling under 
the “right for the wrong reason” doctrine).20 Plaintiff did not 
raise this issue below, and, as he notes, “the factual record 
	
20  In Outdoor Media Dimensions, the court explained that an appellate court 
can affirm a lower court’s ruling on a different ground when “certain conditions 
are met.” Among other things,
“if the question presented is not purely one of law, then the evidentiary record 
must be sufficient to support the proffered alternative basis for affirmance. 
That requires: (1) that the facts of record be sufficient to support the alter-
native basis for affirmance; (2) that the trial court’s ruling be consistent 
with the view of the evidence under the alternative basis for affirmance; and 
(3) that the record materially be the same one that would have been developed 
had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance below.”
331 Or at 659-60. 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
133
in regard to specific jurisdiction is not fully developed.” We 
agree. The only Oregon-specific fact before the trial court on 
Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss was plaintiff’s residence. 
The complaint alleged that, at all material times, plain-
tiff “was a resident of the City of Albany, State of Oregon.” 
Plaintiff does not identify any other evidence in the record 
that would provide a basis for finding specific jurisdiction 
over his claim against Union Pacific, nor are we aware of 
any. Without more, we cannot say that the trial court had 
specific jurisdiction over Union Pacific.21 See Robinson v. 
Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 354 Or 572, 574, 316 P3d 287 
(2013) (holding that Oregon courts could not exercise spe-
cific jurisdiction over a claim brought by an Oregon resident 
for injuries sustained elsewhere because “this litigation did 
not arise out of or relate to [the] defendant’s activities in 
Oregon”).
	
Peremptory writ to issue.
	
WALTERS, J., dissenting.
	
Oregon should have authority to adjudicate a FELA 
claim brought by one of its residents against a railroad that 
has laid tracks and conducted its unique interstate railway 
business here for over one hundred years. For the reasons 
that follow, I would hold that this is one of the “exceptional” 
cases to which the court referred in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
571 US __, 134 S Ct 746, 187 L Ed 2d 624 (2014), and that 
defendant is “at home” in Oregon and is subject to its gen-
eral jurisdiction.
	
In Daimler, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that a corporation will be “at home” in two par-
adigmatic places: the corporation’s place of incorporation 
and its principal place of business. Barrett v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 361 Or 115, 122, __ P3d __ (2017); Daimler, 
134 S Ct at 760. However, the Court did not “foreclose the 
possibility that[,] in an exceptional case,” a corporation’s 
operations in another forum could be “so substantial and of 
such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that 
	
21  We express no opinion on whether plaintiff’s failure to develop the issue of 
specific jurisdiction in the trial court forecloses him from doing so when this case 
goes back to the trial court. The parties have not briefed that procedural issue in 
this court, and we leave that issue initially to the trial court.
134	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
State.” Daimler, 134 S Ct at 761 n 19 (emphasis added). This 
is one of those exceptional cases.
	
To understand why, it is important to understand 
the historical bases for state court jurisdiction over rail-
roads and the Court’s reasons for circumscribing general 
jurisdiction in Daimler.
	
Before 1977, corporations, including railroads, were 
subject to in rem jurisdiction, meaning that they could be 
sued in states in which they owned real property, to the 
extent of that property. Under that form of jurisdiction, a 
corporation could be sued in a forum state in which a defen-
dant owned property for wrongful acts that occurred outside 
the forum state. Thus, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 723-
24, 24 L Ed 565 (1877), the Supreme Court explained why 
the defendant’s ownership of property in Oregon provided a 
sufficient basis for Oregon to exercise judicial power over the 
defendant:
“So the State, through its tribunals, may subject property 
situated within its limits owned by non-residents to the 
payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; 
and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes 
upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are 
domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citizens; 
and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate 
and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any 
property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims 
of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State’s jurisdiction over 
the property of the non-resident situated within its limits 
that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident’s obli-
gations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be car-
ried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition 
of the property. If the non-resident[s] have no property in 
the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can 
adjudicate.”
At the time of Pennoyer, it was the forum state’s relation-
ship to the defendant and the defendant’s property, and not 
the nature of the plaintiff’s claims, that determined juris-
diction. Thus, what later was referred to as “general juris-
diction” was the basis on which all jurisdiction was justified. 
Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv 
L Rev 610, 614-15 (1988).
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
135
	
That understanding of jurisdiction was the prevail-
ing understanding when Congress enacted FELA in 1908 
to provide a federal cause of action for injured workers. 361 
Or at 126 (discussing legislative history of FELA). In 1910, 
Congress amended FELA to add what is now codified as sec-
tion 56, which provides, in part:
“Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district 
court of the United States, in the district of the residence 
of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or 
in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time 
of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of 
the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent 
with that of the courts of the several States.”
45 USC § 56 (1908).
	
Senator William Borah of Idaho, who delivered 
Senate Report Number 432, H.R. 17263, 61st Congress, 
Second Session, 45th Congressional Record 4034 (1910), 
explained the intent of that amendment as “enabl[ing] the 
[p]laintiff to find a corporation at any point or place or state 
where it is actually carrying on business and there lodge 
his action if he chooses to do so.” Senator Borah stated 
that, in his view, the second sentence of that provision was 
not necessary because the general jurisdictional provi-
sions applied. 45 Cong Rec 4034-35. From the text of that 
provision and Senator Borah’s statement, it appears that 
Congress intended to grant FELA plaintiffs the right to sue 
for injury in any state in which a railroad does business 
and to grant state courts personal jurisdiction over such 
railroads.
	
The majority understands the intent of Congress 
more narrowly. It reads FELA as giving state courts concur-
rent subject matter jurisdiction to hear FELA claims and as 
specifying the venues in which such claims may be heard. I 
am not sure that that is correct. As explained, at the time 
that FELA was enacted, state courts had unquestioned 
jurisdiction to adjudicate state law personal injury claims 
and to impose liability against railroads that owned and 
operated facilities within their states. In enacting FELA, 
Congress may well have intended to grant state courts the 
same jurisdictional reach when adjudicating FELA claims. 
136	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
But, even if the majority is correct and FELA does not grant 
personal jurisdiction, it at least assumes it. Venue cannot lie 
where jurisdiction does not exist, and FELA reflects a con-
gressional assumption that state courts will have personal 
jurisdiction over railroads that own and operate facilities in 
their states.
	
Two United States Supreme Court cases that the 
majority discusses also reflect that assumption. In Miles v. 
Illinois Central R. Co., 315 US 698, 62 S Ct 827, 86 L Ed 
1129 (1942), and Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 US 
44, 49, 62 S Ct 6, 86 L Ed 28 (1941), the plaintiffs did not 
bring actions in the states where they resided and where 
the railroads that injured them owned tracks. Instead, the 
plaintiffs brought actions in other, distant states, and the 
defendant railroads argued that requiring them to defend 
there placed a burden on interstate commerce and resulted 
in inequity, vexatiousness, and harassment. Miles, 315 US 
at 700; Kepner, 314 US at 47. In both cases, the Court held 
against the carriers and refused to enjoin the distant actions 
to proceed. Miles, 315 US at 705; Kepner, 314 US at 54. In 
doing so, the Court assumed, rather than decided, that the 
distant courts had jurisdiction over the railroads because 
the railroads were doing business there. But an even more 
basic assumption, shared by all the parties, was that the one 
undisputed place that the plaintiffs surely could bring their 
claims was in the states in which they resided and in which 
the railroads owned tracks. See Morris v. Missouri Pac. R. 
Co., 107 Neb 788, 187 NW 130 (1922) (plaintiff resident of 
forum state brought claim against defendant railroad in 
state where railroad owned tracks but that was not its place 
of incorporation or principal place of business); Hoogbruin v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 213 Cal 582, 2 P2d 992 (1931) 
(same).
	
It was not until 1977, when the Court decided 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US 186, 97 S Ct 2569, 53 L Ed 2d 683 
(1977), that principles of Due Process limited the exercise 
of in rem jurisdiction based on a defendant’s ownership of 
property within a state. In Shaffer, the Court held that the 
Due Process Clause precludes the exercise of state author-
ity in the absence of the minimum contacts required by 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
137
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 66 S Ct 
154, 90 L Ed 95 (1945). Shaffer, 433 US at 207.1
	
In 2011, the Court placed additional limits on a 
state’s exercise of general jurisdiction when it held that state 
authority does not extend to actions against foreign corpo-
rations unless their affiliations with a forum state are “so 
continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum state.” Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 US 915, 131 S Ct 2846, 2853, 180 L Ed 
2d 796 (2011). And, in 2014, in Daimler, the Court concluded 
that the defendant’s affiliations with California did not 
meet that test: California did not have general jurisdiction 
in a case arising from the torture and killing of workers 
in Argentina brought against a German corporation whose 
only connection with California was that its wholly-owned 
foreign subsidiary regularly sold cars there. 134 S Ct at 751.
	
Thus, from 1877, when Pennoyer was decided, until 
at least 2014, when Daimler was decided, state courts had 
undisputed jurisdiction to protect their residents from inju-
ries inflicted by railroads that owned tracks and conducted 
substantial business within their borders. The facts in 
Daimler do not compel a different result here; the question 
is whether the Court’s reasoning necessarily does so.
	
In Daimler, the Court gave four reasons for hold-
ing that California did not have jurisdiction over the defen-
dant corporation. First, the Court reviewed its decision in 
Goodyear and affirmed that it had “declined to stretch gen-
eral jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recognized.” Id. 
at 757-58. Second, the Court described the paradigm fora 
for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation 
as the corporation’s place of incorporation and principal 
place of business. Id. at 760. The Court observed that those 
places have the twin virtues of being unique and easily 
ascertainable. Id. Third, the Court rejected as “unaccept-
ably grasping” the plaintiffs’ suggestion that a corporation 
is at home in every state in which it “engages in substantial, 
	
1  Applying those principles in Shaffer, the Court concluded that jurisdiction 
could not be premised on the defendants’ stock ownership in the forum state; 
defendants’ stock ownership did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts. 433 
US at 216. 
138	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
continuous, and systematic course of business.” Id. at 761. 
The Court explained that “[i]f Daimler’s California activi-
ties sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted 
case in California, the same global reach would presumably 
be available in every other State in which [it’s subsidiary’s] 
sales are sizeable.” Id. That, the Court reasoned, would 
“scarcely permit out-of-state defendants ‘to structure their 
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where 
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.’ 
” 
Id. at 762 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US 
462, 472, 105 S Ct 2174, 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985)). Fourth, the 
Court noted that a more expansive view of general jurisdic-
tion would pose risks to international comity; other nations 
do not share the “uninhibited approach to personal jurisdic-
tion” that the plaintiffs’ view represented. Id. at 763.
	
None of those reasons raise concerns about Oregon’s 
assertion of authority here. First, permitting Oregon to 
exercise authority to decide this case does not “stretch gen-
eral jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recognized.” 
Id. at 757-58. Rather, it gives effect to state jurisdictional 
reach that has long been assumed and exercised. It is true 
that, in Daimler, the Court cautioned that its decisions from 
the era of “Pennoyer’s territorial thinking,” basing jurisdic-
tion only on the presence of local offices in the forum state, 
“should not attract heavy reliance today.” Id. at 761 n 18. 
However, although the Court cautioned against heavy reli-
ance on those cases, it did not jettison them entirely. I cite 
Pennoyer and its description of the reasons for recognizing 
state authority not as determinative, but as demonstrative: 
It would be far more novel to preclude Oregon from exercis-
ing jurisdiction in this case than it would be to permit it.
	
Second, recognizing general jurisdiction in states in 
which interstate railroads lay tracks may be fairer to those 
railroads and more easily ascertainable than recognizing 
general jurisdiction in states in which railroads are incor-
porated or have their principal place of business would be. 
Here, for example, defendant is far more “at home” in the 
23 states in which it owns tracks and conducts business than 
it is in Delaware, the state in which it is incorporated, but in 
which it does not own tracks or conduct any business. And 
it may be easier to ascertain the states in which a railroad 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
139
lays tracks than to ascertain the one state that constitutes 
its “principal place of business.” Here, for example, defen-
dant takes the position that its principal place of business 
is in Nebraska, but it owns more tracks and employs more 
people in Texas. In Daimler, the Supreme Court cited Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, 559 US 77, 92-93, 130 S Ct 1181, 175 L Ed 
2d 1029 (2010), as providing a predictable rule for determin-
ing the “principal place of business” of a defendant. Daimler, 
134 S Ct at 760. But that rule, used for determining diver-
sity, requires consideration of “where a corporation’s officers 
direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” 
Hertz Corp., 559 US at 92-93. For an interstate railroad, 
that factual inquiry could prove more complex than a deter-
mination of the states in which the railroad has laid down 
tracks.
	
Third, permitting Oregon to exercise its sovereign 
authority here would not require application of the test that 
the Court rejected in Daimler as “unacceptably grasping,” 
134 S Ct at 761, nor would it offend “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice,” International Shoe, 326 
US at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining 
application of Due Process Clause). I do not advocate for 
jurisdiction in Oregon because, as the plaintiffs argued 
in Daimler, defendant railroad “engages in substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business” here. 134 
S Ct at 761. Although it is true that, in Oregon, defen-
dant railroad employs 1,619 employees with an annual 
payroll of $244.6 million; recently generated in excess of 
$645 million in annual revenue; made capital expenditures 
in excess of $81 million; and made purchases in excess of 
$116 million, it is not the size of defendant’s Oregon oper-
ations on which I rely. I rely, instead, on Oregon’s right to 
protect one of its residents from harm done by a corpora-
tion with a permanent, physical presence here, that is, by 
its nature, unique.
	
Traversing this state with permanent tracks, defen-
dant railroad is “at home” here in ways that other businesses 
are not. Defendant railroad owns and operates almost 1,100 
miles of track in Oregon. It operates switching yards and 
locomotive facilities in Portland; operates a classification 
yard in Hinkle; and considers La Grande an important 
140	
Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
operation and crew change point. By its very nature, a rail-
road requires such an extensive, physical presence.
	
What is more, an interstate railroad requires an 
extensive, physical presence in more than one state. The 
purpose of such a railroad is not to do business in one state or 
primarily in one state; its purpose is to connect the business 
interests in a number of states, and it is physically struc-
tured to do so. When an interstate railroad lays its tracks 
in and between states, it moves into each of those states in 
an obvious, physical way, and is as much “at home” in each 
one of those states as it is in any other. That does not mean, 
however, that interstate railroads are not able “ 
‘to structure 
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.’ 
” Id. at 762 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 US at 472). 
Interstate railroads move into states with careful delibera-
tion and with a great deal of governmental oversight.
	
Congress regulates interstate railroads at the fed-
eral level and preempts state regulation of the construction, 
operation, and abandonment of rail lines. See 49 USCA 
§ 10101-11908 (1995); Emerson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. 
Co., 503 F3d 1126 (2007). And when railroad workers are 
injured, Congress provides them with a federal cause of 
action that is uniformly applied throughout the nation. 45 
USC § 56 (1908); see Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 US 
359, 361, 72 S Ct 312, 96 L Ed 398 (1952) (“[O]nly if fed-
eral law controls can the federal Act be given that uniform 
application throughout the country essential to effectuate 
its purposes.”). There is nothing “unacceptably grasping” or 
unfair about requiring that interstate railroads that have 
notice that they are subject to suit in all states in which they 
do business answer FELA claims in those states.
	
Finally, giving effect to congressional intent and 
Oregon sovereignty in this exceptional circumstance would 
raise no international comity concerns. It would be rare for a 
multinational corporation to own tracks or operate railroads 
in the United States or in Oregon, and if it did, it would do so 
with notice of FELA’s jurisdictional reach. Allowing Oregon 
to assert personal jurisdiction here would not permit all 
states in the union to assert jurisdiction over this railroad 
Cite as 361 Or 115 (2017)	
141
or extend Oregon’s jurisdiction in all instances in which a 
foreign business operates or has a physical presence here. 
Rather, allowing Oregon to proceed in this case would stand 
only for the proposition that the business of this railroad is 
“so substantial and of such a nature as to render [it] at home 
in [this] State.” Daimler, 134 S Ct at 761 n 19.
	
The general jurisdictional opening that the Court 
preserved in Daimler may be slim, but the principles of dual 
sovereignty at play here should permit these plaintiffs to 
step through. Congress has an interest in protecting inter-
state railroad employees from harm and in permitting them 
to bring federal FELA claims in all states in which such a 
railroad does business. Oregon has an interest in protect-
ing its residents from harm inflicted by railroads that own 
tracks traversing its lands. This is one of the “exceptional” 
circumstances in which defendant is essentially “at home” in 
Oregon, even though it is not incorporated and does not have 
its principal place of business here. To deny Oregon the right 
to exercise its sovereign authority here would be to deny its 
traditional exercise of its sovereign powers. I respectfully 
dissent.
	
Brewer, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.