Title: State v. Luis A. Cruz, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-42-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This capital murder case requires the Court to establish the appropriate jury instruction for serious bodily injury (SBI) capital murder. The Court also considers the state-of-mind requirement for SBI murder and whether the Code of Criminal Justice contemplates prosecutions for both capital and non-capital SBI murder. SBI murder is the purposeful or knowing infliction of serious bodily injury resulting in death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (1) and (2). Since the adoption of the so-called Gerald amendment to the State's constitution in November 1992, SBI murder may result in the imposition of the death penalty. In State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416 (1999), the Court held that only purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death satisfies the serious bodily injury capital murder requirement. The Court said that an injury that creates a substantial risk of death means one from which death is practically certain to ensue. It acknowledges that the definition results in only a minimal distinction between knowing murder and knowing or purposeful SBI murder. Accordingly, the Court has determined that it should reconsider the definition of substantial risk of death in the context of SBI murder. Luis Cruz, Jr., was implicated in the murder of 74-year-old Santina Leonardi, the owner of a combination convenience store and home in Woolwich Township, Gloucester County. Mrs. Leonardi had been beaten about the head and face and stabbed fourteen times in the chest. Thirteen of the fourteen stab wounds penetrated the heart and major blood vessels surrounding the heart. After his arrest, Cruz made a taped statement confessing to Mrs. Leonardi's murder. He said that at the insistence of an unidentified individual, he and his codefendant went to Leonardi's house and store to steal the deed to the property. He further stated that after Mrs. Leonardi was knocked to the floor by his codefendant, defendant stabbed her twice because she knew him and could identify him. Defendant claimed that his codefendant reentered the store alone and remained there for a short time before the two left the area. The codefendant pled guilty to armed robbery and other offenses. Cruz was indicted for capital murder and other related offenses. The Gloucester County Prosecutor filed notice of aggravating factors, alleging the murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection and in the commission of a robbery. The trial court, believing that this Court's opinion in Simon was susceptible to more than one interpretation regarding the appropriate jury charge for SBI murder, requested and received the parties' positions on that issue. Accepting the jury charge submitted by defense counsel, the trial court instructed each prospective juror during voir dire that defendant could be guilty of SBI capital murder if he had the purpose to inflict serious bodily injury, the injury was such that death was practically certain to ensue, and defendant was aware that his actions were practically certain to cause death, and the victim did, in fact, die. The trial court entered a pre-trial ruling that the charge on SBI murder would be the same as that given to potential jurors in voir dire. The Appellate Division granted the Prosecutor's motions for leave to appeal and for a stay of the trial. The Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief proposing his own variation of the SBI murder charge. The Appellate Division, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court and ordered the trial court to use the jury charge proposed by the Prosecutor. This charge did not include any reference to the requirement that defendant knew that the injury was practically certain to cause Mrs. Leonardi's death. The Appellate Division dismissed the Attorney General's position as moot. HELD: For the prosecution to prevail on a charge of purposeful or knowing SBI capital murder, it must prove that it was defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury (purposeful) or knew that it was practically certain that the conduct would cause serious bodily injury (knowing), and also that defendant knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable death would result. 1. In State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40 (1988), this Court determined that, although the death penalty act by its literal terms extended the death penalty to purposeful or knowing SBI murder, the imposition of the death penalty on one who acted without purpose to cause death or knowledge that death would ensue would be grossly disproportionate and would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In response to that case, the State Constitution was amended to provide that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death. N.J. Const. Art. I, 12. In a later case, the Court observed that in formulating charges to juries, the mental state required for a capital conviction based on SBI murder must be consonant with the federal constitutional mandate - that the actor be recklessly indifferent to whether the result of the conduct would be death. The Trial Judges Committee on Capital Causes redrafted the model murder charge to include this reckless indifference requirement. (Pp. 8-14) 2. In Simon, the Court noted that in cases where both SBI capital murder and aggravated manslaughter are charged to the jury, the reckless indifference language could lead to some confusion because the word reckless appears in the model jury charges for both aggravated manslaughter (a non-death-eligible crime) and for SBI murder (a death eligible crime). The defendant in Simon had argued that when he pled to capital murder, his factual statements regarding his mental state reflected only a reckless state of mind. The Court stated to convict a defendant of SBI capital murder, a prosecutor need not prove the defendant acted with purpose or knowledge that death would result, but only with purpose or knowledge to cause serious bodily injury from which death would be practically certain to ensue. The Court acknowledges that the instruction proposed in Simon has the capacity to blur any distinction between knowing murder, where an actor's conduct is practically certain to cause death, and purposeful or knowing SBI murder, where an actor's conduct is practically certain to cause an injury that is practically certain to cause death. (Pp. 14-17) 3. Although the Gerald amendment resolves any constitutional challenge to the SBI murder statute under the State Constitution, it does not affect the question of constitutionality under the Federal Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has required that there be a sufficient connection between the victim's death and the defendant's state of mind before a defendant can be found death-eligible. The Court is persuaded that to sustain a conviction of purposeful and knowing SBI capital murder, a higher degree of culpability is required than the culpability standard that must be proved for aggravated manslaughter (defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of death; i.e., a probability that death would result). To prevail on a charge of purposeful SBI capital murder, the prosecution must prove that it was the defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death, and knew that it was highly probable that death would result. For the prosecution to prevail on a charge of knowing SBI capital murder, it must prove that the defendant was aware that it was practically certain that his or her conduct would cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death, and knew that it was highly probable that death would result. (Pp. 17-22) 4. A secondary issue in this appeal is whether the crime of non-capital SBI murder exists under our Code. The Court holds that it does, and that non-capital SBI murder is to be confined to the same offense that has been described as capital SBI murder, the only distinction being that no notice of aggravating factors is served in non-capital SBI murder cases. (Pp. 22-25) The Appellate Division judgment is MODIFIED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUIS A. CRUZ, JR., Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 4, 2000-- Decided May 8, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Foddai and Linda A. Rinaldi, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. This capital murder case, on interlocutory appeal, requires the Court to establish the appropriate jury instruction for serious bodily injury (SBI) capital murder. We also consider the state-of-mind requirement for SBI murder and whether the Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 104-9 (Code), contemplates prosecutions for both capital and non-capital SBI murder. SBI murder is the purposeful or knowing infliction of serious bodily injury resulting in death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2). It is a form of murder that, since the so-called Gerald amendment to our state's constitution in November 1992, N.J. Const. Art. I, 12, may result in the imposition of the death penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. In State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416 (1999), we held that only purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death satisfies the serious bodily injury capital murder requirement. There we said that an injury that creates a substantial risk of death means one from which death is practically certain to ensue. Id. at 449. We acknowledge that that definition results in only a minimal distinction between knowing murder and knowing or purposeful SBI murder. Accordingly, we reconsider the definition of substantial risk of death in the context of SBI murder. Subsequently, in Simon, supra, we noted that in cases where both SBI capital murder and aggravated manslaughter are charged to the jury, inclusion of the reckless indifference language in the charge conceivably could lead to some confusion. 161 N.J. at 452. The potential confusion referred to in Simon stems from the inclusion of the word reckless in the model jury charges for both aggravated manslaughter (a non-death-eligible crime) and for SBI murder (a death-eligible crime). The jury instruction for a charge of aggravated manslaughter states that a person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter if he or she recklessly causes the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. Model Jury Charges (Criminal), (April 20, 1998). As noted, the redrafted SBI murder instruction stated that for a defendant to be subject to capital punishment, all jurors must agree that the defendant either purposely or knowingly caused death or serious bodily injury resulting in death while demonstrating reckless indifference as to whether his conduct would cause death. Judges Bench Manual for Capital Causes, supra, Appendix F(2). To resolve the possible confusion we recommended that the Trial Judges Committee On Capital Causes re-examine the charge. Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 452. More relevant to the issues in this case was the Simon defendant's claim that, when pleading guilty to capital murder, his factual statements to the trial court regarding his mental state at the time of the murder did not satisfy the state-of-mind requirement necessary for a conviction of purposeful or knowing murder. Id. at 447. Rather, the defendant contended that his state of mind at the time of the commission of the murder reflected only a reckless state of mind. Ibid. We observed that a charge of SBI murder does not require proof that the actor acted with purpose or knowledge that death would result from his or her conduct. Id. at 451. We stated that only purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury, which creates a substantial risk of death, can satisfy the SBI capital murder requirement. Objectively speaking, an injury that creates a substantial risk of death means one from which death is practically certain to ensue. Id. at 448-49. Thus, in order to convict a defendant of SBI capital murder, a prosecutor must prove that a defendant purposely or knowingly caused an injury from which death is practically certain to ensue. Id. at 449. We acknowledge that the instruction we proposed in Simon might in some circumstances be difficult for jurors to apply. That instruction leaves only a minimal distinction between knowing murder, where an actor's conduct is practically certain to cause death, and purposeful or knowing SBI murder, where an actor's conduct is practically certain to cause an injury that is practically certain to cause death. In the context of that instruction, the distinction between knowing murder and knowing or purposeful SBI murder is so subtle that it has the capacity to blur any distinction between those crimes. We are certain that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the crime of knowing SBI murder. Our revised jury instruction, infra at ____ (slip op. at 23-24), illuminates the distinction between knowing murder and knowing or purposeful SBI murder. proceedings in accordance with this opinion. NO. A-42 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUIS A. CRUZ, JR., Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED May 8, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz