Title: In re Lawrence
Citation: 44 Cal. 4th 1181 original opinion
Docket Number: S154018
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2008

1
Filed 8/21/08 (this opn. precedes companion case, S155872, also filed 8/21/08) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
S154018 
In re SANDRA DAVIS LAWRENCE 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B190874 
on Habeas Corpus 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. A174924 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In 1971, Sandra Davis Lawrence (petitioner) murdered her lover’s wife, 
Rubye Williams.  Petitioner fled the state, remaining a fugitive until 1982, when 
she voluntarily returned to California and surrendered to the authorities.  Petitioner 
declined a plea offer that would have resulted in a two-year prison sentence.  After 
the jury returned a guilty verdict on a charge of first degree murder, the trial court 
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment — the statutory penalty for murders 
committed prior to November 8, 1978 — and set a minimum eligible parole date 
of November 29, 1990. 
In August 2005, after numerous hearings before the Board of Parole 
Hearings (the Board),1 that entity for the fourth time found petitioner suitable for 
parole and set a parole date.  In finding petitioner suitable for parole, the Board 
emphasized the presence of multiple statutory factors favoring suitability, 
                                              
1  
The Board of Parole Hearings replaced the Board of Prison Terms in July 
2005.  (Pen. Code, § 5075, subd. (a).)  For ease of reference, and because both 
entities have performed the same duties, we refer to both as “the Board.” 
 
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including petitioner’s exemplary record of rehabilitation, her acceptance of 
responsibility for the crime, her realistic parole plans, and her close ties to her 
family, who would offer her support in reintegrating into the community. 
The Governor, however, as he had done previously, found that the gravity 
of the commitment offense indicated petitioner remained unsuitable for parole, 
and reversed the Board’s decision.  In an original petition for writ of habeas 
corpus filed in the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, petitioner 
challenged on several grounds the Governor’s decision denying parole.  Finding 
the Governor lacked “some evidence” upon which to conclude, consistently with 
state and federal constitutional standards, that petitioner’s release on parole would 
represent an “unreasonable risk” of danger to the community, the Court of Appeal 
in a split decision issued a writ vacating the Governor’s reversal and reinstating 
the Board’s 2005 grant of a parole release to petitioner. 
We granted review to consider the Attorney General’s contention that the 
Court of Appeal improperly applied the highly deferential “some evidence” 
standard of review set forth in our decision in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
616 (Rosenkrantz) and later applied in In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061 
(Dannenberg).  The Attorney General disputes the appellate court’s view that in 
order to uphold the Governor’s decision, there must be some evidence 
demonstrating that petitioner remains a current threat to public safety, rather than 
merely some evidence supporting the Governor’s characterization of the 
commitment offense as particularly egregious.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that because the core statutory determination entrusted to the Board and 
the Governor is whether the inmate poses a current threat to public safety, the 
standard of review properly is characterized as whether “some evidence” supports 
the conclusion that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently 
is dangerous.  Moreover, with regard to the aggravated circumstances of a 
 
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commitment offense, we conclude that to the extent our decisions in Rosenkrantz 
and Dannenberg have been read to imply that a particularly egregious 
commitment offense always will provide the requisite modicum of evidence 
supporting the Board’s or the Governor’s decision, this assumption is inconsistent 
with the statutory mandate that the Board and the Governor consider all relevant 
statutory factors when evaluating an inmate’s suitability for parole, and 
inconsistent with the inmate’s due process liberty interest in parole that we 
recognized in Rosenkrantz.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 664.)  In some 
cases, such as this one, in which evidence of the inmate’s rehabilitation and 
suitability for parole under the governing statutes and regulations is 
overwhelming, the only evidence related to unsuitability is the gravity of the 
commitment offense, and that offense is both temporally remote and mitigated by 
circumstances indicating the conduct is unlikely to recur, the immutable 
circumstance that the commitment offense involved aggravated conduct does not 
provide “some evidence” inevitably supporting the ultimate decision that the 
inmate remains a threat to public safety. 
Applying the “some evidence” standard to the case presently before us, we 
agree with the Court of Appeal that the record fails to support the Governor’s 
conclusion that petitioner remains a current danger to public safety.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal rendered in favor of petitioner.2 
                                              
2  
In the companion case of In re Shaputis (Aug. 21, 2008, S155872) ___ 
Cal.4th ___ [pp. 22-26] filed concurrently with this opinion, the Court of Appeal 
also properly recognized that the relevant inquiry is whether some evidence 
supports the Governor’s ultimate decision that the inmate poses a current risk to 
public safety.  As we explain in Shaputis, however, our clarification that the 
“some evidence” standard of review focuses upon evidence supporting the core 
statutory determination of public safety does not alter our recognition in 
Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg that the decisions of both the Board and the 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
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I 
The facts underlying the commitment offense and the history of petitioner’s 
parole hearings are not in dispute.  The following summary is taken from the 
Court of Appeal’s lengthy and thorough statement of the facts. 
A 
Petitioner was born and raised in Birmingham, Alabama, the youngest of 
12 children.  Following her graduation from high school, she moved to Chicago, 
where she married and had two children.  After her marriage dissolved due to her 
husband’s infidelity and her own immaturity, petitioner relocated to Los Angeles, 
where several of her siblings resided.  She took a position as a receptionist in her 
brother’s dental office, where she met and began a romantic affair with Robert 
Williams, a married dentist employed by her brother.  Williams’s wife, the victim 
Rubye Williams, was aware of the affair.  She frequently confronted both 
petitioner and her husband about the relationship in telephone calls and notes left 
on the front door of the apartment that Dr. Williams rented for petitioner.   
Dr. Williams repeatedly told petitioner he would divorce his wife and 
marry her.  When he failed to follow through with any of these promises, however, 
petitioner terminated the relationship in late 1970, ceasing all contact with Dr. 
Williams.  On February 10, 1971, petitioner was celebrating her 24th birthday at a 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
Governor are entitled to deference.  In Shaputis, the Court of Appeal 
impermissibly substituted its own evaluation of the record for that conducted by 
the Governor.  Because, unlike the record before us in the present case, the record 
in Shaputis contains some evidence supporting the Governor’s determination that 
the inmate poses a current threat to public safety, we reverse the judgment 
rendered by the Court of Appeal in his case.  (In re Shaputis, ___ Cal.4th ___,  
___ [p. 2].) 
 
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family party held at her brother’s home, when Dr. Williams unexpectedly arrived, 
uninvited.  He announced that he intended to leave his wife and return to 
petitioner.  During the next few days, petitioner and Dr. Williams planned their 
romantic and professional future together, which was to include petitioner’s 
obtaining certification as a dental assistant in order to assist Dr. Williams in the 
new dental practice he was then in the process of opening. 
On February 13, 1971, however, Williams telephoned petitioner and told 
her he had changed his mind; he could not bear losing his children, and hence 
would remain with his wife.  During the conversation, he mentioned Mrs. 
Williams would be helping him set up his new dental practice, and that she was at 
that time present at the new office waiting for the delivery of some equipment. 
Petitioner was enraged with Dr. Williams, but as she subsequently 
recognized in therapy sessions with prison psychologists, she instead took out this 
anger on Mrs. Williams, perceiving her as an obstacle to the relationship.  She 
drove to Dr. Williams’s new dental office.  Anticipating a possible confrontation 
with Mrs. Williams in light of previous highly charged encounters, she stopped at 
her sister’s home to acquire a pistol and a potato peeler.  When she arrived at the 
office, the two women argued and physically struggled, pushed, threw punches, 
and at one point wrestled on the floor.  At some point, petitioner produced the 
firearm.  She fired wildly at Mrs. Williams, wounding her in the hand, arm, leg, 
and neck, and then stabbed her repeatedly with the potato peeler.  Mrs. Williams 
died as a result of the gunshot wounds. 
Petitioner returned to her sister’s home and replaced the pistol under the 
mattress.  A few weeks later, petitioner’s sister discovered the pistol had been 
fired.  She contacted the police and reported the handgun had been used and not 
by her or anyone in her household.  She also informed the police that petitioner 
 
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had told family members that petitioner had killed Mrs. Williams as a birthday 
present to herself. 
The authorities did not immediately investigate petitioner’s involvement in 
Mrs. Williams’s death, and petitioner moved to Chicago, Illinois with her children.  
A few weeks later, petitioner’s family telephoned to tell her that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation had informed them there existed a fugitive warrant for her 
arrest, arising from the death of Mrs. Williams.  Petitioner left her children with 
their father in Chicago and flew back to Los Angeles, but during the flight she 
decided against turning herself in.  She instead fled by bus to Las Vegas, Nevada.  
In the ensuing years, she resided in Puerto Rico, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
and worked in various professions, including real estate, sales, and cosmetology.  
In 1982, some 11 years after the murder, petitioner voluntarily returned to Los 
Angeles, hired an attorney, and surrendered to the police.  Thereafter, she pleaded 
not guilty and suggested that Dr. Williams may have committed the crime. 
As reflected in the report prepared by the probation department after her 
subsequent conviction, petitioner rejected a plea offer that would have resulted in 
a two-year prison sentence.  The case went to trial in 1983, and the jury returned a 
guilty verdict on the charge of first degree murder. 
The probation department’s report noted that petitioner had no prior 
criminal record as a juvenile or as an adult, but recommended the court deny 
probation based upon the seriousness of the offense.  The report recounted the 
circumstances surrounding the murder and petitioner’s subsequent flight, but 
stated:  “Defendant presented herself as an intelligent, articulate, and thoughtful 
woman who stands convicted of a premeditated murder which occurred 12-and-a-
half years ago.  Defendant fled the jurisdiction of the court and has now 
surrendered herself to the court and has been found guilty by a jury of the 
crime. . . .  [¶]  . . .  It is undoubtedly true that defendant is not now the same 
 
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person she was when the crime was committed and it is not expected that 
defendant would be involved in another similar crime.  However, given that 
defendant has been convicted of first degree murder, probation does not appear to 
be an appropriate recommendation.”  The trial court imposed a sentence of life 
imprisonment — the standard statutory penalty for such offenses committed prior 
to November 8, 1978, and set a minimum parole eligibility date of November 29, 
1990.3 
B 
During the 23 years petitioner spent in prison serving her sentence on the 
present offense, she was free of serious discipline, except for two administrative 
violations for being late to work assignments, and several other instances of being 
counseled for administrative violations that did not result in discipline.  Within a 
year of her incarceration, she was placed in Miller A Honor house, housing 
reserved for discipline-free inmates.  She worked as a plumber for the prison and 
volunteered as a tennis coach for other inmates.  She was a charter member of the 
Yes-I-Can tutorial program, a member of Toastmasters International and the 
Friends Outside parenting program, and a physical trainer for other inmates.  
Petitioner earned a bachelor’s degree in computer science from the University of 
La Verne, and was described by prison staff as a “team player who interacts with 
everyone in a courteous manner.” 
Petitioner’s psychological reports map the path of her rehabilitation.  Her 
initial report, received in September 1984 shortly after her incarceration, 
concluded petitioner was narcissistic, lacked emotional insight, repressed her 
                                              
3 
Pursuant to Penal Code section 3046, persons sentenced to life 
imprisonment cannot be paroled during the first seven years of their confinement. 
 
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emotions, and avoided reality through excessive activity.  The examining 
psychologist predicted these characteristics could lead to problems with other 
inmates and staff.  He recommended greater altruistic involvement in activities 
benefiting others.  The report also characterized petitioner as “explosive” and a 
“high flight risk if she loses her appeal.” 
By 1989, petitioner’s psychological report provided a positive review of 
petitioner’s health, intelligence, and overall psychological condition.  Although 
the examining psychologist found she exhibited some indicia of an “avoidant 
personality disorder,” he also reported that she has “much to offer any 
community.”  Significantly, the examining psychologist found petitioner no longer 
represented a danger to society. 
The psychological assessment in August 1991 was less favorable, 
recommending intensive psychotherapy based upon a finding that petitioner 
exhibited features of three psychological disorders — borderline personality 
disorder, antisocial disorder, and avoidant personality disorder.  In an addendum 
to this August report (dated October 3, 1991), the examining psychologist reported 
that petitioner had appealed and had requested a followup interview.  Petitioner 
reportedly became angry during the interview, feeling the psychologist had been 
biased in his appraisals of her psychological condition.  The examining 
psychologist concluded she might be “moderately psychopathic,” possessing a 
narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial features.  Nonetheless, he 
concluded she had made significant progress through psychotherapy and 
recommended she participate in once-a-week group therapy sessions. 
Petitioner’s November 1992 psychological evaluation reflected 
improvement.  The examining psychologist reported petitioner had gained insight 
into the monstrous dimension of her crime.  She also now comprehended her 
psychological motivation — that she killed Dr. Williams’s wife in order to 
 
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retaliate against him.  The examining psychologist assessed petitioner’s violence 
potential at the time of the crime as greater than the average person’s, but opined 
that this potential had substantially decreased. 
The psychological report from 1994 repeated the positive findings in the 
earlier reports, and stated that petitioner “would not have surrendered [to the 
authorities] back in 1982, if the earlier narcissistic, antisocial or borderline 
personality disorder diagnoses had been correct.”  Positive psychological reports 
continued in subsequent years, although in July 1996, the psychological evaluation 
reported that petitioner received her first “disciplinary CDC 115” in January 1996 
for allegedly stealing excess food from the kitchen.  Although this troubled the 
examining psychologist, he found petitioner exhibited no indicia of any 
psychological disorder.  The June 1997 evaluation reported that petitioner 
successfully had appealed the food-theft-related discipline from the previous year 
and hence her record remained discipline-free. 
Psychological reports after 1997 disqualified petitioner from receiving any 
further psychotherapy, concluding she no longer tested as having any psychiatric 
or psychological disorder.  In total, five psychologists conducting 12 separate 
evaluations since 1993 concluded that petitioner no longer represented a 
significant danger to public safety. 
C 
In late December 1993, the Board made the first of four positive 
recommendations that petitioner should be granted parole.  Among its findings, 
the Board concluded that petitioner committed the crime as a result of significant 
stress, and had demonstrated motivation, growth, and a greater understanding of 
herself and the crime she committed.  It also found a reduced probability of 
recidivism and that petitioner exhibited signs of remorse.  The Board 
 
10
acknowledged that the examining psychologists had concluded petitioner no 
longer represented a significant danger to public safety. 
Employing a matrix applicable to first degree murderers who committed 
their crime prior to November 8, 1978 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2282, subd. 
(b)),4 the Board assigned petitioner the maximum term available under that matrix, 
based upon the great violence involved in the murder she committed and upon her 
having evaded prosecution for more than 11 years.  This yielded a term of 204 
months, from which was deducted 40 months for her discipline-free 10 years at 
the institution.  The result of this computation was a net term of 164 months 
(13 years 8 months) before she would be eligible for release.  Accordingly, the 
proposed release date was set almost three and a half years in the future — for late 
July 1997. 
In March 1994, former Governor Pete Wilson reversed the Board’s 
recommendation, providing two reasons for his decision.  First, he stated “public 
safety” might require a lengthier incarceration.  Second, he found the Board had 
given inadequate consideration to the “public interest in a punishment 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime.”  These findings gave primary 
credence to the earlier psychological reports and tests reflecting various 
psychological disorders, as opposed to the more recent reports finding no current 
evidence that petitioner remained subject to those problems.  The Governor’s 
statement also asserted the base term should be longer. 
In both 2000 and 2001, petitioner’s parole hearings resulted in split 
decisions, with one commissioner voting against release.  This required en banc 
                                              
4 
Unless otherwise indicated, all further unspecified statutory references are 
to the Penal Code, and all further undesignated references to Regulations are to 
title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. 
 
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consideration and each time, parole was denied.  In November 2002, the Board 
issued its second positive recommendation that petitioner be granted parole.  
The reasons given at this time parallel the findings contained in the Board’s 
favorable recommendation in 1993.  Additionally, there was further psychiatric 
evidence indicating that petitioner had taken responsibility for her crime and felt 
greater remorse, and that she would not be a danger to public safety.  By then, she 
also had a much longer record as a model inmate.  She was only a few credits 
short of a master’s degree in business administration, held membership in the 
plumbers union, and had made major contributions to a number of educational and 
public service programs at the prison.  The Board calculated the appropriate period 
of incarceration as 216 months for the aggravated term and 12 more for use of a 
firearm.  From this, however, it deducted 64 months in postconviction credits for a 
net term of 152 months (12 years 8 months, in contrast to the 13 years 8 months 
calculated in 1993).  By this time, however, petitioner already had been 
imprisoned some 18 years — far longer than the net term of 152 months. 
In April 2003, former Governor Gray Davis reversed petitioner’s second 
positive parole recommendation. 
In May 2004, the Board again recommended granting parole to petitioner.  
This time the net term was calculated at 130 months (10 years 9 months).  After 
reciting essentially the same list of findings as in the previous two parole 
recommendations, the Board highlighted that petitioner had no “115’s” (that is, 
serious rules violations) in her nearly two decades at the prison.  Although she had 
received a few “128(a)’s” (administrative rules violations) for being late to work 
appointments or counseling sessions, the last of those had been received a decade 
earlier, in April 1993.  An April 2004 psychological evaluation once again had 
been favorable and reported petitioner was not a danger to public safety and 
understood the seriousness of her crime and what had led to it.  The Board 
 
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recommended as a condition of parole that petitioner be required to undergo drug 
counseling and monitoring for one year. 
A month later, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed this third 
positive parole recommendation.  He based his decision upon a finding that 
petitioner’s release would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.  
His decision characterized the murder as a vicious crime committed for an 
“incredibly petty” reason, and found that this constituted “reason enough to pose 
an unreasonable risk to public safety.” 
In August 2005, the Board again recommended petitioner be paroled.  The 
Board’s report reflects that the panel heard testimony from petitioner, considered 
her prison record, read some 24 letters from petitioner’s family and other 
supporters, studied the full statement issued by the Governor in reversing the May 
2004 Board recommendation that petitioner be released, and considered arguments 
from a representative of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office 
opposing parole as well as from petitioner’s attorney.  The panel commended 
petitioner for her resilience after experiencing the disappointment of a 
gubernatorial reversal of her third parole-release-recommendation.  It then recited 
a number of favorable developments subsequent to the Governor’s action, 
including a laudatory note from a staff member describing petitioner as a “team 
player who interacts with everyone in a courteous manner.”  Another internal 
evaluation reflects her continued participation in a conflict transformation 
program.  Other reports discuss activities that have further improved her 
employability, such as her participation in Toastmasters, a Women’s First Job 
Fair, and other programs, as well as religious and charitable work. 
Additional developments described in the Board’s report include the 
circumstance that petitioner obtained her master’s degree in business 
administration in June 2005.  She also updated her computer skills and received 
 
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above-average evaluations in her “office services” assignment.  The file also 
contained a letter from a lieutenant on the prison staff commending petitioner for 
her work as a physical fitness trainer during the previous five years, stating she is 
“a superb motivator and trainer.”  This was accompanied by a letter bearing the 
signatures of 78 physical fitness trainees praising petitioner for what she “has done 
for us in reference to getting some self-esteem, along with some know-how, along 
with mental strength and physical strength.”  This letter proceeds “to commend 
[petitioner] on being just one person that has to deal with hundreds of women with 
different personalities and attitudes, and still continues to get up each morning and 
encourage and teach us how to be just as strong. . . .  I truly believe that if a person 
such as [petitioner] gives so much of herself to so many people, then the least we 
can do is give something back.” 
The Board’s report also discussed numerous other letters written by persons 
outside the institution in support of petitioner’s parole, which variously describe 
petitioner as a good student and a “remarkable woman.”  A letter from the 
coordinator of the Partnership for Reentry Program stated that petitioner had 
applied for and been accepted into the Los Angeles Archdiocese’s Partnership for 
Reentry Program, a four-year program in which, upon release, a mentor and a 
team meet with the participant weekly.  The coordinator expressed confidence that 
petitioner would succeed in the program and in reentry into society.  Additional 
letters from various clergy and social workers who knew petitioner stated the 
writers’ belief that petitioner would be a productive member of society if released 
from prison.  With the sole exception of a pro forma argument from the District 
Attorney, no one spoke or wrote in opposition to a grant of parole.  
After reviewing the evidence that became available following the 
Governor’s reversal of the 2004 Board recommendation — as well as the earlier 
evidence relevant to her suitability — the panel announced its decision orally, 
 
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stating its reasons for concluding that petitioner was suitable for parole and would 
not pose any unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if 
released.  Those reasons included the circumstances that petitioner has no juvenile 
record of assaulting others, nor any adult record other than the underlying offense; 
her exemplary record of participating in self-help, vocational, and educational 
programs while in prison, including her recent attainment of a master’s degree in 
business administration; her leadership role among other inmates; and her realistic 
parole plans, which included a job offer and family support.   
The Board concluded, as it had in prior recommendations, that petitioner 
should be granted parole.  In reaching this conclusion, the Board found that the 
crime was committed as the result of stress, and that the possibility of recidivism 
was low because of petitioner’s maturation, growth, greater understanding, and 
advancing age, and the absence of a history of significant violent crime.  The 
Board also found that petitioner “understands the nature and magnitude of the 
offense, and accepts responsibility for her criminal behavior and has decided to 
change towards good citizenship.”  The Board further cited favorably the most 
recent psychological report, in which the examining psychologist explained that 
petitioner had demonstrated substantial insight and understanding into her life and 
the circumstances that led her to commit the crime, including her past 
relationships with predatory and pathological men, and that petitioner is “now able 
to look at her behavior and formulate a number of different options in order to 
avoid conflict and violence in other settings and situations.”  Consulting its matrix 
once again, the Board set the total period of confinement at 130 months — less 
than half of  petitioner’s actual incarceration at that time, which was nearly 24 
years. 
In mid-January 2006, the Governor again reversed the Board’s decision.  
His statement recounted the circumstances of the crime and petitioner’s 
 
15
subsequent flight from the authorities.  The Governor, while acknowledging that 
petitioner had surrendered voluntarily, discounted this circumstance by observing 
that at the time, petitioner denied any involvement in Mrs. Williams’s murder and 
instead attempted to blame Dr. Williams.  
The Governor observed that subsequent to her incarceration, petitioner had 
been counseled eight times for misconduct, including as recently as 2005, but 
acknowledged that she has not been subject to any disciplinary actions.  He further 
acknowledged that petitioner had made additional efforts toward rehabilitation 
subsequent to the Governor’s last statement.  “She has, since my last reversal of 
the Board’s decision to grant [petitioner] parole in 2004, earned a Master’s degree 
in Business Administration.  Prior to that, she earned her Bachelor’s degree in 
Human Development and an Associate of Arts degree.  She received vocational 
training in data processing, word processing, and plumbing and has worked within 
the institutional setting as a library porter, which is her current position, and as a 
plumber, fitness trainer, and food manager’s clerk.  [Petitioner] has continued to 
avail herself of self-help and therapy, including Conflict Transformation Skills, 
Pathways to Wholeness, an array of substance-abuse programs, Stress 
Management, and Anger Management.  She has participated in charitable events, a 
job fair, Toastmasters, Friends Outside programs, and other activities.  Moreover, 
she has established and maintained seemingly solid relationships with family and 
others and has made realistic parole plans in Los Angeles for housing in a 
residential program and employment at a local newspaper.  These are all factors 
supportive of [petitioner’s] parole suitability.” 
Nonetheless, the Governor again relied upon the circumstances of the 
offense to justify his reversal of the Board’s decision: “[T]he murder perpetrated 
by [petitioner] demonstrated a shockingly vicious use of lethality and an 
exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering because after she shot Mrs. 
 
16
Williams — four times — causing her to collapse to the floor, [petitioner] stabbed 
her repeatedly.  And the gravity alone of this murder is a sufficient basis on which 
to conclude presently that [petitioner’s] release from prison would pose an 
unreasonable public-safety risk.”  The Governor described petitioner’s crime as “a 
cold, premeditated murder carried out in an especially cruel manner and 
committed for an incredibly petty reason.”  
Despite acknowledging petitioner’s recent positive mental health 
evaluations, the Governor noted that early prison reports by mental health 
evaluators characterized petitioner as sociopathic, unstable, and moderately 
psychopathic.  He also emphasized that for many years, petitioner denied killing 
Mrs. Williams, although “she since has admitted that she committed this crime.  
She says that she fully understands and is sorry for what she did.”  The Governor 
further observed that at both the 2004 and 2005 parole hearings, petitioner denied 
having brought the gun to the dental office with the intent to shoot the victim.  
Regarding the Board’s finding that that the “commitment of the crime was 
the result of stress and life, [petitioner] was spurned by a lover in favor of his 
wife,” the Governor concluded that “there is evidence in the record that any stress 
under which [petitioner] was operating at the time was not of such level or 
significance to mitigate her murderous conduct.”  In this respect, he emphasized 
that as petitioner herself admitted at the 2005 Board hearing, “she returned the gun 
to her sister’s home, even put it back under the mattress, right after murdering 
Mrs. Williams. . . .  [J]ust after returning the gun, she proceeded to another sister’s 
home and went to sleep on her couch before ultimately fleeing the state.” 
Although petitioner had been incarcerated nearly 24 years at the time of the 
Governor’s review and had “made creditable gains” during that time, he 
concluded that “the factors weighing against [petitioner’s] parole suitability 
presently outweigh the positive ones tending to support it.  Accordingly, because I 
 
17
continue to believe that her release from prison would pose an unreasonable risk 
of danger to society, I REVERSE the Board’s 2005 decision to grant parole to 
[petitioner].” 
In an original petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Court of 
Appeal, petitioner challenged on several grounds the latest decision of the 
Governor denying parole.  In a split decision, the appellate court found that the 
Governor’s decision “is not supported by some evidence rationally indicating 
[petitioner] presently represents an unreasonable risk to public safety if released 
on parole.”  The majority found that the commitment offense did not demonstrate 
a more “shockingly vicious use of lethality” or a more “exceptionally callous 
disregard for human suffering” than other premeditated first degree murders, or 
than the murders in other appellate cases in which courts had found no evidence 
supporting the Governor’s decision.  The majority also concluded that even if 
some evidence supported his characterization of the seriousness of the murder, the 
gravity of the commitment offense did not supply some evidence “rationally 
demonstrating [petitioner] represents an unreasonable danger to public safety at 
the present time.”   
The dissent criticized the majority for misapplying the deferential standard 
of review set forth in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, and for relying upon 
federal authority to consider the predictive value of the offense.  The dissent 
concluded that, because the commitment offense involved facts beyond the 
minimum necessary for a conviction of first degree murder, the aggravated 
circumstances of the commitment offense supplied some evidence supporting the 
Governor’s decision. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal issued a writ vacating the Governor’s 
reversal of the Board’s decision, and reinstated the Board’s 2005 grant of parole to 
petitioner.  After we declined to issue a writ of supersedeas to stay the judgment 
 
18
rendered by the Court of Appeal, petitioner was paroled on July 11, 2007.  The 
Attorney General sought review in this court, which we granted on September 19, 
2007.  
II 
A 
The applicable statutes provide that the Board is the administrative agency 
within the executive branch that generally is authorized to grant parole and set 
release dates.  (§§ 3040, 5075 et seq.)  The Board’s parole decisions are governed 
by section 3041 and Title 15, section 22815 of the California Code of Regulations 
(Regs., § 2230 et seq.)  Pursuant to statute, the Board “shall normally set a parole 
release date” one year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole release date, 
and shall set the date “in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of 
similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public . . . .”  
(§ 3041, subd. (a), italics added.)  Subdivision (b) of section 3041 provides that a 
release date must be set “unless [the Board] determines that the gravity of the 
current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past 
convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety 
requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a 
parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.”  (Italics added; see 
Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 654, fn. omitted.)   
                                              
5  
Because petitioner’s murder was committed prior to November 8, 1978, 
title 15, section 2281 governs her parole suitability.  Title 15, section 2402, which 
we discussed in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, as excerpted in substantial 
part below, provides parole consideration criteria and guidelines for murders 
committed on or after November 8, 1978.  The two sections are identical. 
 
19
Title 15, Section 2281 of the California Code of Regulations sets forth the 
factors to be considered by the Board in carrying out the mandate of the statute.  
The regulation is designed to guide the Board’s assessment of whether the inmate 
poses “an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” and thus 
whether he or she is suitable for parole.  (Regs., § 2281, subd. (a).)6  The 
regulation also lists several circumstances relating to unsuitability for parole7 — 
such as the heinous, atrocious, or cruel nature of the crime, or an unstable social 
                                              
6  
These factors include “the circumstances of the prisoner’s:  social history; 
past and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other 
criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other 
commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past 
and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control, 
including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be 
released to the community; and any other information which bears on the 
prisoner’s suitability for release.  Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly 
establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a 
finding of unsuitability.”  (Regs., § 2281, subd. (b).) 
7  
Unsuitability factors are:  (1) a commitment offense carried out in an 
“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) a “[p]revious [r]ecord of 
[v]iolence”; (3) “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; 
(4) “[s]adistic [s]exual [o]ffenses”; (5) “a lengthy history of severe mental 
problems related to the offense”; and (6) “[t]he prisoner has engaged in serious 
misconduct in prison or jail.”  (Regs., § 2281, subd. (c)(1)-(6).)  This subdivision 
further provides that “the importance attached to any circumstance or combination 
of circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.”  (Regs., 
§ 2281, subd. (c).) 
 
Factors supporting a finding that the inmate committed the offense in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner include the following:  (A) multiple 
victims were attacked, injured, or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) the 
offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an 
execution-style murder; (C) the victim was abused, defiled, or mutilated during or 
after the offense; (D) the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrates an 
exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering; and (E) the motive for the 
crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.  (Regs., § 2281, 
subd. (c)(1).) 
 
20
background; and suitability for parole — such as an inmate’s rehabilitative efforts, 
demonstration of remorse, and the mitigating circumstances of the crime.8  (Regs., 
§ 2281, subd. (d).)  Finally, the regulation explains that the foregoing 
circumstances “are set forth as general guidelines; the importance attached to any 
circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case is left to the 
judgment of the panel.”  (Regs., § 2281, subds. (c), (d).)  The Governor’s power to 
review a decision of the Board is set forth in article V, section 8, subdivision (b) of 
the California Constitution.9 
                                              
8  
Suitability factors are:  (1) the absence of a juvenile record; (2) “reasonably 
stable relationships with others”; (3) signs of remorse; (4) a crime committed “as 
the result of significant stress in [the prisoner’s] life”; (5) battered woman 
syndrome; (6) the lack of “any significant history of violent crime”; (7) “[t]he 
prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism”; (8) “[t]he prisoner 
has made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be 
put to use upon release”; and (9) the inmate’s “[i]nstitutional activities indicate an 
enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.”  (Regs., § 2281, subd. 
(d)(1)-(9).) 
9  
Article V, section 8, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution provides 
in full: “No decision of the parole authority of this State with respect to the 
granting, denial, revocation, or suspension of parole of a person sentenced to an 
indeterminate term upon conviction of murder shall become effective for a period 
of 30 days, during which the Governor may review the decision subject to 
procedures provided by statute.  The Governor may only affirm, modify, or 
reverse the decision of the parole authority on the basis of the same factors which 
the parole authority is required to consider.  The Governor shall report to the 
Legislature each parole decision affirmed, modified, or reversed, stating the 
pertinent facts and reasons for the action.” 
 
The statutory procedures governing the Governor’s review of a parole 
decision pursuant to California Constitution article V, section 8, subdivision (b), 
are set forth in Penal Code section 3041.2, which states: “(a)  During the 30 days 
following the granting, denial, revocation, or suspension by a parole authority of 
the parole of a person sentenced to an indeterminate prison term based upon a 
conviction of murder, the Governor, when reviewing the authority’s decision 
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 8 of Article V of the Constitution, shall 
review materials provided by the parole authority.  [¶]  (b) If the Governor decides 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
21
In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, we were presented with the 
threshold question of whether courts are authorized to review the merits of a 
Governor’s decision affirming, reversing, or modifying a parole decision of the 
Board.  We held that both the Board and the Governor must consider the statutory 
factors concerning parole suitability set forth by section 3041 and Board 
regulations (Regs., § 2230 et seq.), and that “because due process of law requires 
that a decision considering such factors be supported by some evidence in the 
record, the Governor’s decision is subject to judicial review to ensure compliance 
with this constitutional mandate.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.  664.)   
“[T]he governing statute provides that the Board must grant parole unless it 
determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration for the 
individual because of the gravity of the offense underlying the conviction.  (Pen. 
Code, § 3041, subd. (b).)  And as set forth in the governing regulations, the Board 
must set a parole date for a prisoner unless it finds, in the exercise of its judgment 
after considering the circumstances enumerated in section 2402 of the regulations, 
that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole.  Accordingly, parole applicants in this 
state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in 
the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the 
circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 654, italics added.  See also In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 
366) [“parole is the rule, rather than the exception”].) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
to reverse or modify a parole decision of a parole authority pursuant to subdivision 
(b) of Section 8 of Article V of the Constitution, he or she shall send a written 
statement to the inmate specifying the reasons for his or her decision.” 
 
22
Nonetheless, we emphasized in Rosenkrantz that the Board’s “ ‘discretion 
in parole matters has been described as “great” [citation] and “almost unlimited” ’ 
[citation].”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655.)  “Resolution of any 
conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are within the 
authority of the Board.”  (Id. at p. 656.)  We further concluded that the broad 
discretion to be granted to the Board also exists with regard to decisions rendered 
by the Governor.  (Id. at p. 677.)  Although “the Governor’s decision must be 
based upon the same factors that restrict the Board in rendering its parole 
decision” (id. at p. 660), the Governor undertakes an independent, de novo review 
of the inmate’s suitability for parole.  (Ibid.)  Thus, the Governor has discretion to 
be “more stringent or cautious” in determining whether a defendant poses an 
unreasonable risk to public safety.  (Id. at p. 686.)  “[T]he precise manner in which 
the specified factors relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced lies 
within the discretion of the Governor. . . .  It is irrelevant that a court might 
determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far 
outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole.  As long as the 
Governor’s decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied 
to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the 
court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the 
record that supports the Governor’s decision.”  (Id. at p. 677, italics added.) 
Although we emphasized that a court’s review should be highly deferential, 
we rejected the Governor’s contention that the judicial branch is authorized to 
review parole decisions only to ensure that all procedural safeguards have been 
satisfied, but not to consider the merits of a parole decision.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 657.)  In doing so, we cautioned against a less stringent standard 
of review that would permit the Board to render a decision without any “basis in 
fact” and not supported by any evidence in the record simply because “the 
 
23
decision, on its face, recited supposed facts corresponding to the specified factors 
and appeared reasonable.”  (Id. at p. 665.)  Such a decision would be arbitrary and 
capricious and, because it affects a protected liberty interest, would violate 
established principles of due process of law.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, “ ‘[r]equiring a 
modicum of evidence to support a decision . . . will help to prevent arbitrary 
deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue 
administrative burdens.’ ”  (Id. at p. 658, quoting Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 
472 U.S. 445, 455 (Hill).) 
We held that despite the broad authority granted to the Board and the 
Governor, and the limited nature of judicial review, a petitioner is entitled to a 
constitutionally adequate and meaningful review of a parole decision, because an 
inmate’s due process right “cannot exist in any practical sense without a remedy 
against its abrogation.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 664.)  Accordingly, 
the judiciary is empowered to review a decision by the Board or the Governor to 
ensure that the decision reflects “an individualized consideration of the specified 
criteria” and is not “arbitrary and capricious.”  (Id. at p. 677.)   
Subsequently, in Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1061, we specifically 
rejected the petitioner’s contention that the Board must schedule an indeterminate 
life inmate’s release on parole, within the parameters of uniform terms for similar 
offenses, unless it finds the callousness and brutality of a particular inmate’s 
offense, or other indicia of his or her dangerousness, so extreme that the case falls 
outside the uniform-term matrices set forth in the Board’s regulations.  Instead, in 
construing section 3041, we considered it “obvious” that the public-safety 
provision of subdivision (b) takes precedence over the “uniform terms” principle 
of subdivision (a).  We recognized that the “statute expressly provides that the 
fixing of a ‘uniform’ parole release date shall occur unless the Board finds the 
indeterminate life inmate unsuitable on grounds of ‘public safety.’ ”  
 
24
(Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1082, italics omitted.)  Accordingly, 
emphasizing that the primary, overriding consideration for the Board is public 
safety, we affirmed the “some evidence” standard of review, but our decision did 
not specifically reconsider, limit, or amplify the contours of the standard of review 
recognized and outlined in Rosenkrantz. 
In sum, the Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the 
fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety (§ 3041; Regs., 
§§ 2281, 2402), and our discussion in both Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg 
emphasized this point.  Moreover, it is apparent from the foregoing discussion that 
the core determination of “public safety” under the statute and corresponding 
regulations involves an assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness.  As 
noted above, a parole release decision authorizes the Board (and the Governor) to 
identify and weigh only the factors relevant to predicting “whether the inmate will 
be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts.”  
(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655.)  These factors are designed to guide an 
assessment of the inmate’s threat to society, if released, and hence could not 
logically relate to anything but the threat currently posed by the inmate.  (Regs., 
§ 2281, subds. (c) & (d); Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655.) 
B 
In the years since our decision in Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 
courts have struggled to strike an appropriate balance between deference to the 
Board and the Governor, and meaningful review of parole decisions.  A growing 
tension has emerged in the decisions regarding the precise contours of the “some 
evidence” standard of review.  This conflict is rooted in the practical reality that in 
every published judicial opinion addressing the issue, the decision of the Board or 
the Governor to deny or reverse a grant of parole has been founded in part or in 
whole upon a finding that the inmate committed the offense in an “especially 
 
25
heinous, atrocious or cruel manner,”10 and in the growing recognition that in some 
instances, the circumstances of the underlying offense, remote in time and 
attenuated by post-conviction rehabilitation, bear little relationship to the 
determination we recognized in Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg as critical — 
whether the inmate remains a threat to public safety.   Accordingly, a conflict has 
emerged concerning the extent to which a determination of current dangerousness 
should guide a reviewing court’s inquiry into the Governor’s (or the Board’s) 
decision and, more specifically, as to whether the aggravated circumstances of the 
commitment offense, standing alone, provide some evidence that the inmate 
remains a current threat to public safety. 
In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, we held that “[t]he nature of the 
prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole.”  
(Id. at p. 682.)  We also observed, however, that a parole denial based upon the 
circumstances of the offense might deny due process under the California 
Constitution when “no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be 
considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a 
conviction for that offense.  Denial of parole under these circumstances would be 
                                              
10  
(Regs., §§ 2281, subd. (c)(1), 2402, subd. (c)(1); see In re Bettencourt 
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 780, 791 (Bettencourt); In re Roderick (2007) 154 
Cal.App.4th 242, 260 (Roderick); In re Gray (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 396 
(Gray); In re Tripp (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 306, 316 (Tripp); In re Barker (2007) 
151 Cal.App.4th 346, 361-362 (Barker); In re Burns (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 
1318, 1323 (Burns); In re Andrade (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 807, 813 (Andrade); 
In re Lee (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405 (Lee); In re Weider (2006) 145 
Cal.App.4th 570, 581 (Weider); In re Elkins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 475, 486 
(Elkins); In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 587-588 (Scott); In re DeLuna 
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 585, 590 (DeLuna); In re Honesto (2005) 130 
Cal.App.4th 81, 89 (Honesto); In re Fuentes (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 152, 158 
(Fuentes); In re Lowe (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1414-1415 (Lowe).)  
 
26
inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a parole date normally shall be set 
‘in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and 
magnitude in respect to their threat to the public. . . .’  (Pen. Code § 3041, subd. 
(a).)  . . .  [¶]  ‘Therefore, a life term offense or any other offenses underlying an 
indeterminate sentence must be particularly egregious to justify the denial of a 
parole date.’ ”  (Id. at p. 683.) 
In Dannenberg, we confirmed that “[w]hen the Board bases unsuitability 
on the circumstances of the commitment offense, it must cite ‘some evidence’ of 
aggravating facts beyond the minimum elements of that offense.  (Rosenkrantz, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, 658, 683.)”  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1095-
1096, fn. 16.)  We also clarified that “[o]ur use of the phrase ‘particularly 
egregious’ ” in Rosenkrantz did not mandate a proportionality review as a 
threshold inquiry in every case, but “conveyed only that the violence or 
viciousness of the inmate’s crime must be more than minimally necessary to 
convict him of the offense for which he is confined.”  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 1095, quoting Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683.)   
In considering whether such evidence existed in petitioner Dannenberg’s 
case, we recounted that the inmate had bludgeoned his wife with a pipe wrench 
and then either pushed his wife into a bathtub of water, or left her to drown in the 
tub despite awareness of her injuries.  In light of these circumstances, we 
concluded “there clearly was ‘some evidence’ (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
616, 658) to support the Board’s determination that Dannenberg’s crime was 
‘especially callous and cruel,’ showed ‘an exceptionally callous disregard for 
human suffering,’ and was disproportionate to the ‘trivial’ provocation.  
Accordingly, under Rosenkrantz, the Board could use the murder committed by 
Dannenberg as a basis to find him unsuitable, for reasons of public safety, to 
 
27
receive a firm parole release date.”  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1095, fn. 
omitted, italics added.) 
Although we did not explicitly consider whether the aggravated 
circumstances of the commitment offense established that the inmate remained a 
current threat to public safety, it is apparent that in basing our conclusion that the 
inmate’s due process rights were not violated upon the existence of evidence in the 
record establishing that the commitment offense was particularly egregious, we 
presumed that the evidence of egregiousness supported the ultimate determination 
that the inmate posed a threat to public safety, as opposed to merely providing 
support for the Board’s or the Governor’s conclusion that the crime was 
particularly aggravated.  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [finding 
“some evidence” supported Board’s determination that the petitioner’s crime was 
particularly egregious, and concluding under Rosenkrantz that the Board could 
employ the murder committed by the petitioner as a basis for finding him 
unsuitable for parole “for reasons of public safety”]; Rosenkrantz, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 682 [“the decision of the Governor made clear that he 
independently found that petitioner poses a risk of danger based upon the nature of 
the offense and petitioner’s conduct before he surrendered”].) 
Applying the presumption that evidence of egregiousness supports the 
ultimate determination that an inmate poses a threat to public safety, some courts 
have concluded that a denial-of-parole decision must be affirmed if “some 
evidence” supports the Board’s or the Governor’s factual determination that the 
commitment offense was particularly aggravated, or that some other factor 
establishing unsuitability is present.  (See Bettencourt, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 800; Andrade, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 819; Burns, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 1327-1328; Fuentes, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163; Honesto, 
supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 96; Lowe, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427-1428; 
 
28
DeLuna, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 593.)  Under this approach, if some 
evidence supports a finding that the crime is especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel, and the record establishes that the Board or the Governor gave consideration 
to the factors required by law to be taken into account, the court will not weigh the 
balance of relevant factors differently, and will not independently assess whether 
an inmate poses an “unreasonable risk” to public safety.11  (Regs., § 2402, subd. 
(a).) 
Conversely, an emerging majority of courts, concluding that an inquiry 
focused only upon the existence of unsuitability factors fails to provide the 
meaningful review guaranteed by the due process clause, define the “some 
evidence” standard by focusing upon those aspects of our earlier opinions in 
which we stated that the judicial inquiry is centered upon an evaluation of the 
evidence supporting the Board or the Governor’s decision,12 — and that decision 
is whether or not an inmate continues to pose a threat to public safety.  
(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 654 [“the governing statute provides that 
the Board must grant parole unless it determines that public safety requires a 
lengthier period of incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of the 
offense underlying the conviction”]; Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1083, 
                                              
11  
As discussed in part III, post, implicit in this approach is the assumption, 
gleaned from our application of the standard in Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg, that 
evidence establishing that a commitment offense was particularly egregious 
inherently assesses the threat currently posed by the inmate to public safety. 
12  
(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658 [“the court may inquire only 
whether some evidence in the record before the Board supports the decision to 
deny parole, based upon factors specified by statute and regulation”(italics 
added)]; Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 455-456 [“the relevant question is whether 
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 
the decision maker.”])   
 
29
1084, 1098 [“the suitability determination should focus upon the public safety risk 
posed by ‘this individual’ ”; “the determination of suitability for parole involves a 
paramount assessment of the public safety risk posed by the particular offender, 
without regard to a comparative analysis of similar offenses committed by other 
persons”;  some evidence “indicated exceptional callousness and cruelty with 
trivial provocation, and thus suggested [Dannenberg] remains a danger to public 
safety” (italics added)].)13 
These cases emphasize that public safety is the overarching consideration 
for both the Board and the Governor, and interpret the Rosenkrantz “some 
evidence” test as “meaning that suitability determinations must have some basis in 
fact.”  (Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 590, fn. 6.)  Accordingly, these 
decisions conclude that the some evidence standard described in Rosenkrantz and 
Dannenberg poses not simply a question of whether some evidence supports the 
factors cited for denial, but instead, whether the evidence supports the core 
determination required by the statute before parole can be denied — that an 
inmate’s release will unreasonably endanger public safety.  (Roderick, supra, 154 
Cal.App.4th at p. 263; Gray, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 410; Barker, supra, 151 
Cal.App.4th at p. 366; Tripp, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 313; Weider, supra, 
145 Cal.App.4th at p. 589; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 499; Lee, supra, 
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408; Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.)  As 
articulated in Lee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, these decisions conclude that 
                                              
13 
(Roderick, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 263; Gray, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 410; Barker, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 366; Tripp, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 313; Weider, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 589; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 499; Lee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408; Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 595.) 
 
30
“[s]ome evidence of the existence of a particular factor does not necessarily equate 
to some evidence the parolee’s release unreasonably endangers public safety.”  
(Id. at p. 1409, fn. omitted.) 
In most of the decisions discussed above, the courts have not explicitly 
recognized a conflict between the two alternative approaches.  Several dissenting 
justices, however, including Justice Perluss in the present case, as well as the 
majority in several cases in which we have granted review (and which we have 
held pending resolution of the present case), have criticized the so-called current 
dangerousness approach as incompatible with our analysis in Rosenkrantz and 
Dannenberg.  (E.g. Roderick, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 311-312 (dis. opn. of 
Sepulveda, J.).)  These justices view a standard of review focusing upon the 
ultimate statutory decision rather than the existence of an unsuitability factor as 
one that transmutes the deferential standard of review set forth in Rosenkrantz into 
one that impermissibly reweighs the evidence, recalibrates the relevant factors, 
and permits an independent determination whether the inmate continues to pose a 
risk to public safety.   
We disagree with the view that a standard of review that focuses upon the 
existence of “some evidence” that an inmate poses a current threat to public 
safety — rather than merely some evidence of the existence of an unsuitability 
factor — is incompatible with either Rosenkrantz or Dannenberg.  As set forth 
above, our previous cases recognize that the paramount consideration for both the 
Board and the Governor under the governing statutes is whether the inmate 
currently poses a threat to public safety and thus may not be released on parole.  
(Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1070-1071, 1079-1080, 1083-1084, 1091, 
1094, 1098; Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 653-654, 682-683.)  We have 
held that to ensure that a Board’s decision comports with due process, a court must 
consider whether “some evidence in the record before the Board supports the 
 
31
decision to deny parole, based upon the factors specified by statute and regulation.  
If the decision’s consideration of the specified factors is not supported by some 
evidence in the record and thus is devoid of a factual basis, the court should grant 
the prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to 
vacate its decision denying parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with 
due process of law.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658, italics added.) 
We also have emphasized that under the some evidence standard, a 
reviewing court reviews the merits of the Board’s or the Governor’s decision, and 
is not bound to affirm a parole decision merely because the Board or the Governor 
has adhered to all procedural safeguards.  We have remarked that “[a]s long as the 
Governor’s decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied 
to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the 
court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the 
record that supports the Governor’s decision.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 677, italics added.)  This standard is unquestionably deferential, but certainly is 
not toothless, and “due consideration” of the specified factors requires more than 
rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational 
nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision — 
the determination of current dangerousness.  “It is well established that a policy of 
rejecting parole solely upon the basis of the type of offense, without individualized 
treatment and due consideration, deprives an inmate of due process of law.”  (Id. 
at p. 684.)   
Indeed, our conclusion that current dangerousness (rather than the mere 
presence of a statutory unsuitability factor) is the focus of the parole decision is 
rooted in the governing statute.  We have observed that “ ‘[t]he Board’s authority 
to make an exception [to the requirement of setting a parole date] based on the 
gravity of a life term inmate’s current or past offenses should not operate so as to 
 
32
swallow the rule that parole is ‘normally’ to be granted.  Otherwise, the Board’s 
case-by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality contemplated by Penal 
Code section 3041, subdivision (a), and also by the murder statutes, which provide 
distinct terms of life without possibility of parole, 25 years to life, and 15 years to 
life for various degrees and kinds of murder.  (Pen. Code, § 190 et seq.)’ ”  
(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th p. 683.)  Consistent with this statutory regime, the 
Board’s regulations, establishing a matrix of factors for determining the suggested 
base terms for life prisoners, contemplates that even those who committed 
aggravated murder may be paroled after serving a sufficiently long term if the 
Board determines that evidence of postconviction rehabilitation indicates they no 
longer pose a threat to public safety.  (See, e.g., Regs., §§ 2282(b), 2403(b)) 
[formulating longer suggested base terms for first degree murderers who have no 
prior relationship to their victim and who inflict trauma on their victims].)  Of 
course, as we stated in Dannenberg, the statute does not contemplate that the goal 
of uniformity will take precedence over the goal of public safety.  (See 
Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1087.)  But the statutory and regulatory 
mandate to normally grant parole to life prisoners who have committed murder 
means that, particularly after these prisoners have served their suggested base 
terms, the underlying circumstances of the commitment offense alone rarely will 
provide a valid basis for denying parole when there is strong evidence of 
rehabilitation and no other evidence of current dangerousness. 
In expressly rejecting a purely procedural standard of review in 
Rosenkrantz, we recognized that in light of the constitutional liberty interest at 
stake, judicial review must be sufficiently robust to reveal and remedy any evident 
deprivation of constitutional rights.  If simply pointing to the existence of an 
unsuitability factor and then acknowledging the existence of suitability factors 
were sufficient to establish that a parole decision was not arbitrary, and that it was 
 
33
supported by “some evidence,” a reviewing court would be forced to affirm any 
denial-of-parole decision linked to the mere existence of certain facts in the 
record, even if those facts have no bearing on the paramount statutory inquiry.  
Such a standard, because it would leave potentially arbitrary decisions of the 
Board or the Governor intact, would be incompatible with our recognition that an 
inmate’s right to due process “cannot exist in any practical sense without a remedy 
against its abrogation.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th. at p. 664; In re Scott 
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 871, 898 [observing that the deferential standard of 
review set forth in Rosenkrantz, although requiring courts to be “exceedingly 
deferential” to the Board’s findings, “does not convert a court reviewing the denial 
of parole into a potted plant”].) 
Accordingly, if we are to give meaning to the statute’s directive that the 
Board shall normally set a parole release date (§ 3041, subd. (a)), a reviewing 
court’s inquiry must extend beyond searching the record for some evidence that 
the commitment offense was particularly egregious and for a mere 
acknowledgement by the Board or the Governor that evidence favoring suitability 
exists.  Instead, under the statute and the governing regulations, the circumstances 
of the commitment offense (or any of the other factors related to unsuitability) 
establish unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to the 
determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public.  It is not the existence 
or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the 
parole decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to 
support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the public. 
Accordingly, when a court reviews a decision of the Board or the 
Governor, the relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the decision of 
the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public 
safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain 
 
34
factual findings.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658; Dannenberg, supra, 
34 Cal.4th at p. 1071; Lee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408, fn. omitted.) 
Contrary to the Attorney General’s contention, our recognition that judicial 
review contemplates an evaluation of the record for some evidence supporting the 
decision reached by the Board or the Governor does not impermissibly shift the 
ultimate discretionary decision of parole suitability from the executive branch to 
the judicial branch.  In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, we expressly 
recognized that judicial review of a Governor’s parole decision for adherence to 
both statutory and constitutional mandates was both (a) contemplated by the 
governing statutes and the California Constitution, and (b) integral to protecting an 
inmate’s constitutional liberty interest in the setting of a parole date.  (Id. at 
p. 664.)  Our recognition today that the focus upon current dangerousness is the 
appropriate articulation of the “some evidence” standard does not alter the role 
assigned either to the executive or to the judiciary, but merely articulates the 
circumstance that the relevant consideration both for the executive decisionmakers 
and for reviewing courts is the core statutory determination of public safety.  (Id. 
at p. 662.) 
The Attorney General further asserts that the some evidence standard, 
focused upon current dangerousness, does not lend itself to appropriate judicial 
review, because a “predictive” determination regarding parole suitability is not 
subject to objective proof and thus is not amenable to review under the some 
evidence standard.  We disagree.  As explained above, as specified by statute, 
current dangerousness is the fundamental and overriding question for the Board 
and the Governor.  In addition, and as further explained below, evidence in the 
record corresponding to both suitability and unsuitability factors — including the 
facts of the commitment offense, the specific efforts of the inmate toward 
rehabilitation, and, importantly, the inmate’s attitude concerning his or her 
 
35
commission of the crime, as well as the psychological assessments contained in 
the record — must, by statute, be considered and relied upon by both the Board 
and the Governor, whose decisions must be supported by some evidence, not 
merely by a hunch or intuition.  By reviewing this evidence, a court may 
determine whether the facts relied upon by the Board or the Governor support the 
ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety.  A standard of 
review focusing upon the existence of some evidence supporting the determination 
required by statute does nothing more than ensure that the Board and the Governor 
have complied with the statutory mandate and have acted within their 
constitutional authority. 
III 
The Attorney General contends that the aggravated circumstances of a 
commitment offense inherently assess current dangerousness, and that the 
existence of “some evidence” demonstrating that the offense was aggravated 
beyond the minimum elements of the offense therefore is sufficient to support the 
conclusion that an inmate is currently dangerous.  Arguably, the manner in which 
we applied the some evidence standard in Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg implicitly 
endorsed the Attorney General’s position.  In each case, we evaluated the 
egregiousness of the commitment offense by considering whether the offense 
involved some act beyond the minimum required for conviction of the offense, 
and upon finding that the circumstances of the offense established egregiousness, 
we affirmed the Board’s or the Governor’s decision without specifically 
considering whether there existed a rational nexus between those egregious 
circumstances and the ultimate conclusion that the inmate remained a threat to 
public safety. 
In light of the conflict among the Courts of Appeal discussed above, it is 
necessary to clarify the manner in which courts must apply the some evidence 
 
36
standard.  As we explain below, an inquiry into whether the offense is more 
aggravated than the minimum elements necessary to sustain a conviction was not 
intended by this court to be the exclusive measure of due process, and has proved 
in practice to be unworkable, leading to arbitrary results.  Most importantly, the 
circumstance that the offense is aggravated does not, in every case, provide 
evidence that the inmate is a current threat to public safety.  Indeed, it is not the 
circumstance that the crime is particularly egregious that makes a prisoner 
unsuitable for parole — it is the implication concerning future dangerousness that 
derives from the prisoner having committed that crime.  Because the parole 
decision represents a prospective view — essentially a prediction concerning the 
future — and reflects an uncertain conclusion, rarely (if ever) will the existence of 
a single isolated fact in the record, evaluated in a vacuum, suffice to support or 
refute that decision. 
Accordingly, we conclude that although the Board and the Governor may 
rely upon the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for a 
decision denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of 
itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the 
record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration 
history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the 
implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness that derive from his or her 
commission of the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory 
determination of a continuing threat to public safety.   
A 
Although we relied upon a “minimum elements” inquiry to determine 
whether the commitment offenses in Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg were 
particularly egregious, by doing so we did not intend to define the exclusive 
situation in which a decision relying solely upon the circumstances of the 
 
37
commitment offense to justify a denial-of-parole decision might be found to be 
arbitrary or capricious.  After all, we recognized that the fundamental purpose of 
judicial review is to permit courts to provide a remedy for arbitrary decisions.  As 
noted above, we observed that a parole denial based upon the circumstances of the 
offense might, “for example,” violate due process under the California 
Constitution “where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be 
considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a 
conviction for that offense. . . . [¶]  ‘Therefore, a life term offense or any other 
offenses underlying an indeterminate sentence must be particularly egregious to 
justify the denial of a parole date.’ ”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683.)  
To the extent this language has been read to suggest that reliance solely upon the 
circumstances of the commitment offense would violate an inmate’s due process 
rights only in those cases in which the circumstances of the crime are not 
particularly egregious, we emphasize that due process cannot, and should not, be 
so narrowly defined. 
B 
Nonetheless, reading the minimum elements language as talismanic, Court 
of Appeal decisions have interpreted our cases as establishing this focus as the 
sole relevant consideration in determining whether an inmate’s due process rights 
were violated by the Board’s or the Governor’s reliance upon the circumstances of 
the commitment offense.  This preoccupation with minimum elements has created 
an irrational dichotomy between those appellate decisions that are premised upon 
the existence of “some evidence” of an unsuitability factor and those decisions 
premised upon the existence of “some evidence” of current dangerousness.  
Decisions in the first category uniformly have concluded that the circumstances of 
the underlying homicide were, in fact, particularly egregious and extended beyond 
the minimum elements necessary for conviction (and therefore, because the 
 
38
statutory factor corresponding to the gravity of the offense applied, these decisions 
have affirmed the denial of parole.)14  Decisions in the second category have 
focused upon the existence of “some evidence” of current dangerousness, and, 
with a few exceptions,15 have concluded that the underlying homicide was not 
particularly egregious and did not exceed the minimum elements required for 
conviction of that offense (thereby mandating reversal of the Board’s or the 
Governor’s action, because the record did not contain some evidence supporting a 
finding of current dangerousness).16 
                                              
14  
(See Bettencourt, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 807; Burns, supra, 136 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1329; Andrade, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 818-819; Fuentes, 
supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 163; Honesto, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 96-97; 
Lowe, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429.)   
 
The court in DeLuna, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 600, found no 
evidence in the record supporting the existence of any of the multiple factors cited 
by the Board, except for the aggravated nature of the commitment offense.  The 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision granting petitioner’s habeas 
corpus petition, but did not affirm the Board’s decision, instead ordering the trial 
court to remand the matter to the Board for a new hearing.  (Ibid.) 
15  
Two cases diverged from the pattern by applying the some-evidence-of-
current-dangerousness approach and finding both that the crime involved more 
than the minimum elements, and that the circumstances of the crime continued to 
be predictive of current dangerousness.  In Tripp, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pages 
314, 320, the court recognized the current dangerousness test, but concluded that 
the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s commitment offense were particularly 
egregious, and could constitute some evidence if the Governor duly considered all 
other relevant factors.  In In re Hyde (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1215 (Hyde), 
the court analyzed the record for some evidence of current dangerousness, and 
also concluded that the circumstances of petitioner’s numerous commitment 
offenses were both particularly egregious and provided evidence of his continuing 
threat to public safety.   
16  
(See Roderick, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 278; Gray, supra, 151 
Cal.App.4th at p. 410; Barker, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377-378; Weider, 
supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 590-591; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 502-
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
39
A review of these cases reveals that resort to a minimum elements inquiry 
has proved to lead to arbitrary results.  For example, in Bettencourt, supra, 156 
Cal.App.4th at page 800, the court found the commitment offense particularly 
aggravated where the petitioner and his friend beat and stabbed the victim with a 
screwdriver and a knife, and after the murder the petitioner cleaned the victim’s 
apartment and dumped the body off a cliff.  (See also Burns, supra, 136 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1327 [crime found particularly aggravated where the petitioner 
confronted the victim, his ex-girlfriend, in a dark and isolated area and shot her in 
the head with a stolen gun; the victim died several hours later; and after the 
shooting, the petitioner went to his dorm room where he watched television].)17  
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
503; Lee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1414-1415; Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 603-604.) 
17 
(See also Andrade, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 819 [crime found 
particularly aggravated where during an altercation between the petitioner and 
another man, the petitioner’s adversary cut his neck with a knife; the petitioner left 
the scene, returned with a shotgun, and shot two bystanders, one of whom was 
believed by the petitioner to have stabbed him; the petitioner fired three shots, 
killing one victim and injuring the second]; Fuentes, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 162-163 [crime found particularly aggravated where the petitioner and his 
acquaintance had an altercation with two men; during the altercation, either the 
petitioner or his acquaintance pulled a knife and stabbed one of the men once in 
the face and once in the chest; after the stabbing, the petitioner fled the scene]; 
Honesto, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 96 [crime found particularly aggravated 
where the petitioner and two co-conspirators planned to kidnap, rob, and possibly 
kill the victim, who was the head clerk at a grocery store and once had refused to 
cash a check for one of the men; the men confronted the victim at his home with 
firearms and forced him to drive to the store; during the drive, the petitioner shot 
the victim with a shotgun, causing a collision; victim died several hours later]; 
Lowe, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427-1428 [crime found particularly 
aggravated where the petitioner and the victim had a sexual relationship; after the 
relationship deteriorated, the petitioner purchased a gun and fired five shots at the 
victim’s head and chest while he was asleep; after the murder, the petitioner 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
40
In contrast, in Barker, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pages 377-378, the court 
found the commitment offense was not particularly aggravated where the 
petitioner and his accomplice planned to kill the accomplice’s parents for money.  
After the accomplice shot the parents, the petitioner killed the accomplice’s 76-
year-old grandfather by striking him on the head with a chisel several times and 
then shooting him twice in the head.  Following the murders, the petitioner and his 
accomplice ransacked the house to make the crime look like a burglary.  (See also 
Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 502 [crime found not particularly aggravated 
where the petitioner, a drug dealer, owed the victim money; after drinking 
alcoholic beverages and consuming cocaine, the petitioner planned to rob the 
victim of money and drugs; the petitioner killed victim by repeatedly beating him 
over the head with a baseball bat while he was sleeping; after the murder, the 
petitioner dumped the body in a remote area, burglarized victim’s storage area and 
his girlfriend’s house, and left the state].)18 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
covered the body in sheets and blankets, leaving it on the bed for two months; the 
petitioner later placed the body in a coffin, which he used as a nightstand; after 
learning that the police discovered the body, the petitioner fled].) 
18  
(See also Weider, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 587 [crime found not 
particularly aggravated where after the petitioner’s wife moved in with the victim, 
the petitioner confronted wife and victim in a bar with a gun, intending to kill 
himself; after a struggle over the gun, the petitioner shot at the victim, killing him 
and wounding two patrons]; Lee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [crime found 
not particularly aggravated where after a buyer repeatedly failed to make promised 
periodic payments to the petitioner, the petitioner confronted him with a gun, 
shooting at him five times until the gun jammed; the buyer, hit twice, survived the 
shooting, but one of the bullets killed the buyer’s wife]; Scott, supra, 133 
Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [crime found not particularly aggravated where victim was 
the lover of the petitioner’s wife; the petitioner approached victim while he was 
watching fireworks with the petitioner’s wife and son, shot the victim twice in the 
head and thigh, and left the scene].) 
 
41
Furthermore, as the Attorney General points out, undue focus upon 
minimum elements has led many courts that also properly focus upon some 
evidence of current dangerousness — including the Court of Appeal majority in 
the present case — to compare the facts under review with the circumstances of 
other murders in other cases as a means of considering whether the underlying 
crime is particularly egregious in comparison with others, and whether the 
evidence supports the conclusion that the petitioner poses a threat to public safety.  
(See, e.g., Gray, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 405-410; Weider, supra, 145 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 588-589; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 500-502; Lee, 
supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1410-1412; Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 598.) 
Focus upon whether a petitioner’s crime was “particularly egregious” in 
comparison to other murders in other cases is not called for by the statutes, which 
contemplate an individualized assessment of an inmate’s suitability for parole, nor 
is it a proper method of assessing whether “some evidence” supports the 
Governor’s conclusion that a particular inmate represents an unreasonable threat to 
public safety.  The circumstance that some inmates who committed murders were 
or were not adjudged to be threats to public safety has a minimal bearing upon 
whether any other inmate poses such a threat.  Moreover, comparative analysis is 
incompatible with our decision in Dannenberg.  In Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 
1061, we held that nothing in section 3041 suggests that the Board’s members 
must vote in favor of parole unless the inmate’s offense is substantially more 
serious than most others of the same class.  (34 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1084, 1095.)  
In other words, we recognized that the statute does not require the Board to 
compare the inmate’s actual period of confinement with that of other individuals 
serving life terms for similar crimes.  (Id. at pp. 1070-1071.)  Rather, the statutory 
 
42
suitability determination is individualized, and focuses upon the public safety risk 
posed by the particular offender.  (Ibid.)   
C 
Reiterating the contention that the statutory factors inherently assess 
unsuitability for parole, and thus that no additional inquiry regarding current 
dangerousness is required, the Attorney General contends that if it is determined 
that a crime involves an act beyond the minimum necessary for conviction of that 
offense, some evidence necessarily supports the Governor’s decision, and that if 
the record establishes the Governor has considered all other relevant statutory 
factors, a court must affirm the Governor’s decision.  To address the arbitrary 
results that in practice have resulted from resort to a minimum elements inquiry, 
the Attorney General suggests we disavow the trend toward comparative analysis 
and instead resurrect a pure minimum-elements inquiry that determines whether a 
crime is particularly egregious, by determining whether “the violence or 
viciousness of the inmate’s crime [was] more than minimally necessary to convict 
[defendant] of the offense for which he [or she is] confined.”  (Dannenberg, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1095, italics omitted.)    
A survey of the appellate court decisions reveals, however, that the 
minimum elements inquiry is unworkable in practice, not merely because it has 
led courts to engage in comparative analysis or to characterize clearly aggravated 
conduct as not particularly egregious, but also because it has become evident that 
there are few, if any, murders that could not be characterized as either particularly 
aggravated, or as involving some act beyond the minimum required for conviction 
of the offense.  Accordingly, because it also is apparent that the gravity of the 
offense is the sole or primary determinative factor in each of these cases, a strict 
minimum elements inquiry would mandate upholding in every case the denial of 
parole, regardless of whether other evidence in the record clearly attenuates the 
 
43
predictive value of the offense, and without any consideration of whether the 
gravity of the offense continues to provide some evidence that the inmate remains 
a threat to public safety many years after commission of his or her offense.  
Similarly, the unexceptional nature of the commitment offense will not inevitably 
reflect a lack of current dangerousness without due consideration of the inmate’s 
post-conviction actions and progress toward rehabilitation. 
More importantly, the minimum elements inquiry, which assesses only the 
gravity of the commitment offense, fails to provide a workable standard for 
judicial review, because it is now apparent that the aggravated nature of the 
commitment offense does not, in every case, provide some evidence that the 
inmate remains a current threat to public safety.  (Roderick, supra, 154 
Cal.App.4th at p. 277 [although record indicated the petitioner had a long criminal 
history, court required the Board to hold a new hearing, noting inmate’s age and 
“the immutability of [his] past criminal history and its diminishing predictive 
value for future conduct”]; Elkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498-499 
[recognizing that the predictive value of the commitment offense may be very 
questionable after a long period of time, and concluding that “[g]iven the lapse of 
26 years and the exemplary rehabilitative gains made by [the petitioner] over that 
time, continued reliance on these aggravating facts of the crime no longer amounts 
to ‘some evidence’ supporting denial of parole”]; Lee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1412 [court concluded that the petitioner’s crimes had “little, if any, predictive 
value for future criminality,” because the crimes committed 20 years ago had “lost 
much of their usefulness in [predicting] the likelihood of future offenses”]; Scott, 
supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 [the “predictive value of the commitment offense 
may be very questionable after a long period of time”]; see also Tripp, supra, 150 
Cal.App.4th at p. 319 [“[e]stablishing that the commitment offense involved some 
elements more than minimally necessary to sustain a conviction is a step on the 
 
44
path of evaluating a prisoner’s current dangerousness, but it is not the final step 
under the regulations.”].)  
An evaluation of the circumstances of the crime in isolation allows a fact 
finder or reviewing court to determine whether a commitment offense was  
particularly egregious — a designation that we have seen applied in nearly every 
murder case considered by the Board or the Governor — and to conclude that the 
prisoner was a danger to the public at or around the time of his or her commission 
of the offense.  Absent affirmative evidence of a change in the prisoner’s demeanor 
and mental state, the circumstances of the commitment offense may continue to be 
probative of the prisoner’s dangerousness for some time in the future.  At some 
point, however, when there is affirmative evidence, based upon the prisoner’s 
subsequent behavior and current mental state, that the prisoner, if released, would 
not currently be dangerous, his or her past offense may no longer realistically 
constitute a reliable or accurate indicator of the prisoner’s current dangerousness.     
As we recognized in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, when evaluating 
whether an inmate continues to pose a threat to public safety, both the Board and 
the Governor must consider all relevant statutory factors, including those that 
relate to post-conviction conduct and rehabilitation.  (Id., at p. 2655 [noting that 
the Board “ ‘cannot, consistently with its obligation, ignore postconviction factors 
unless directed to do so by the Legislature,’ ” and that “ ‘[a]lthough a prisoner is 
not entitled to have his term fixed at less than maximum or to receive parole, he is 
entitled to have his application for these benefits “duly considered” based upon an 
individualized consideration of all relevant factors’ ”].)  Indeed, in directing the 
Board to consider the statutory factors relevant to suitability, many of which relate 
to postconviction conduct and rehabilitation, the Legislature explicitly recognized 
that the inmate’s threat to public safety could be minimized over time by changes 
in attitude, acceptance of responsibility, and a commitment to living within the 
 
45
strictures of the law.  In other words, contrary to the Attorney General’s 
contention that if the circumstances of the commitment offense are egregious, 
those circumstances will provide some evidence of current dangerousness in 
perpetuity, it is evident that the Legislature considered the passage of time — and 
the attendant changes in a prisoner’s maturity, understanding, and mental state — 
to be highly probative to the determination of current dangerousness.   
The minimum elements test, because it functionally removes consideration 
of relevant suitability factors and fails to assess current dangerousness, 
substantially undermines the rehabilitative goals of the governing statutes.19  
                                              
19  
Although we have not previously emphasized the rehabilitative aspects of 
the governing statutory requirements and the underlying legislative intent that the 
Board and the Governor consider an inmate’s rehabilitation when evaluating 
parole suitability, an examination of the regulatory factors favoring suitability 
(quoted, ante, fn. 8) establishes that in determining whether further incarceration is 
necessary to protect the public, the Board (and the Governor) must consider, 
among other factors, whether the inmate exhibits signs of remorse, has made 
realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use 
upon release, and whether the inmate’s institutional activities reflect an enhanced 
ability to function within the law upon release.  (Regs. § 2281, subd. (d)(3), (8) & 
(9).)  Moreover, the Board must consider the inmate’s past and present mental 
state and past and present attitude toward his or her crime.  (Regs. § 2281, subd. 
(b).)  These suitability factors clearly establish that the statutes contemplate the 
consideration of an inmate’s rehabilitation as an integral element of a parole 
suitability determination, and that a determination of the current threat posed by an 
inmate necessarily involves consideration of the inmate’s postconviction conduct 
and mental state as it relates to his or her current ability to function within the law 
if released from prison. 
 
Additionally, the regulatory emphasis on institutional behavior, and the 
specific proviso that “serious misconduct in prison or jail” is an indicator of 
unsuitability for parole (Regs., §§ 2042, subd. (c), 2281, subd. (c).), suggest that 
the possibility of parole acts as an incentive — encouraging good behavior and 
discouraging misconduct by confined prisoners.  Failure to consider a prisoner’s 
postconviction behavior when evaluating suitability for parole would undermine 
the practical institutional benefits of this regulatory incentive. 
 
46
Moreover, because the minimum elements test would mandate affirmance in every 
parole-denial case in which the crime is aggravated, and we have determined that 
there are few, if any, cases in which the underlying offense is not aggravated in 
some way, the minimum elements inquiry has proved to be incompatible with our 
earlier recognition that the “some evidence” standard of review contemplates 
review of a parole decision on the merits in order to prevent arbitrary and 
capricious decision-making.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655.)20   
Accordingly, as we held in Dannenberg, the determination whether an 
inmate poses a current danger is not dependent upon whether his or her 
commitment offense is more or less egregious than other, similar crimes.  
(Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1084, 1095.)  Nor is it dependent 
solely upon whether the circumstances of the offense exhibit viciousness above 
the minimum elements required for conviction of that offense.  Rather, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the circumstances of the commitment offense, when 
considered in light of other facts in the record, are such that they continue to be 
predictive of current dangerousness many years after commission of the offense.  
                                              
20  
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cogently 
observed in Biggs v. Terhune: “To insure that a state-created parole scheme serves 
the public interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence, the Parole Board must 
be cognizant not only of the factors required by state statute to be considered, but 
also the concepts embodied in the Constitution requiring due process of 
law. [¶]. . .  [¶]We must be ever cognizant that ‘[d]ue [p]rocess is not a mechanical 
instrument.  It is not a yardstick.  It is a process.  It is a delicate process of 
adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the 
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.’  [Citations.]  A 
continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the 
offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative 
goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.”  
(Biggs v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3d 910, 916-917.) 
 
47
This inquiry is, by necessity and by statutory mandate, an individualized one, and 
cannot be undertaken simply by examining the circumstances of the crime in 
isolation, without consideration of the passage of time or the attendant changes in 
the inmate’s psychological or mental attitude.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 682 [“although the state expects prisoners to behave well in prison, the absence 
of serious misconduct in prison and participation in institutional activities that 
indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release are factors 
that must be considered on an individual basis by the Governor in determining 
parole suitability”]; see also In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 639, 645; Irons v. 
Carey (9th Cir. 2007) 505 F.3d 846, 854 [“in some cases, indefinite detention 
based solely upon an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his 
rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in 
parole that flows from the relevant California statutes”].) 
In sum, the Board or the Governor may base a denial-of-parole decision 
upon the circumstances of the offense, or upon other immutable facts such as an 
inmate’s criminal history, but some evidence will support such reliance only if 
those facts support the ultimate conclusion that an inmate continues to pose an 
unreasonable risk to public safety.  (Regs., § 2281, subd. (a).)  Accordingly, the 
relevant inquiry for a reviewing court is not merely whether an inmate’s crime was 
especially callous, or shockingly vicious or lethal, but whether the identified facts 
are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when considered in 
light of the full record before the Board or the Governor.   
IV 
Turning now to the facts of the present case, we observe that the Governor 
concluded that the murder of Rubye Williams “demonstrated a shockingly vicious 
use of lethality and an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering because 
after she shot Mrs. Williams — four times — causing her to collapse to the floor, 
 
48
[petitioner] stabbed her repeatedly. . . .  She made it a point to arm herself, not 
with one weapon but with two, and show up at a location where she knew she 
would find her victim. . . .  This was a cold, premeditated murder carried out in an 
especially cruel manner and committed for an incredibly petty reason.  According 
to the appellate decision, [petitioner] told a relative that the killing was a ‘birthday 
present’ to herself.  [Petitioner’s] birthday was two days before the murder.”  
Although the Governor alluded to other possible grounds for denying petitioner’s 
parole, he expressly relied only upon the nature of petitioner’s commitment 
offense to justify petitioner’s continued confinement, because “the gravity alone of 
this murder is a sufficient basis on which to conclude presently that [petitioner’s] 
release from prison would pose an unreasonable public-safety risk.”  
Before evaluating the Governor’s reliance upon the gravity of the 
commitment offense, we first consider his discussion of facts not related to the 
circumstances of the commitment offense.  Although his statement does not 
directly rely upon a lack of remorse to justify denial of parole, the Governor 
suggested that petitioner continued to pose a threat to public safety because she 
was not remorseful and because she continued to attempt to justify the victim’s 
murder.  As support, the Governor pointed to quotations excerpted from the 
proceedings at petitioner’s 2002 and 2005 Board hearings, such as petitioner’s 
observation at the latter hearing that “ ‘I always viewed [Mrs. Williams] as the 
obstacle in my fantasy romance.  That she was the one that was keeping me from 
having what I wanted.  So in my mind, it was natural for me to confront her as 
though she would disappear . . . .’  [Petitioner also] said that she saw Mrs. 
Williams as her ‘problem.’ ”   
We agree with the Court of Appeal majority that it is evident from the full 
context of petitioner’s statements that she merely was explaining her state of mind 
at the time of the homicide, not justifying it.  “To the contrary, these and like 
 
49
statements were made in the course of condemning her own behavior on that 
occasion and expressing deep remorse for what she had done and why she had 
done it.”21  Additionally, as the Court of Appeal recognized and as the record 
amply demonstrates, petitioner consistently, repeatedly, and articulately has 
expressed deep remorse for her crime as reflected in a decade’s worth of 
psychological assessments and transcripts of suitability hearings that were before 
the Board.22  Accordingly, the Governor’s conclusion that petitioner showed 
                                              
21  
Later at the hearing, in answer to the question why she took out her rage on 
Mrs. Williams instead of Dr. Williams, who had chosen to remain with his wife, 
petitioner explained: “Because women blame women when not getting what they 
want.  They don’t blame men.  And a 24-year-old distraught, betrayed woman 
looked for the easiest probably person to take out any frustration on.  I wanted 
him, so in my 24-year-old [mind], she was my problem — he wasn’t my problem.  
So it’s irrational, it’s unfounded, it’s unfair, and I understand that now.  She was 
not the person to blame for my rage.  I just took it out on her because it was — it 
was just probably the easiest thing to do to confront her instead of Robert.” 
22  
As the Court of Appeal majority noted, at the 2005 hearing — after 
discussing the commission of the crime and petitioner’s flight from prosecution 
two months later — she was asked whether there was anything else she had to say 
about the crime itself.  Petitioner responded: “I would like to let you know, you 
know, that I’m totally, totally aware of what I did.  I take full responsibility for 
what I did. . . .  And I made that first step back into reality to come and let you 
know that I do understand that I did something horrible, and I’m willing to suffer 
the consequences for what I did.  And I lived here for 21 ½ years suffering those 
consequences, and have grown and gotten stronger behind it.  So I come to you 
today, apologizing as I do on a daily basis when it comes up in my mind —
apologize to [Rubye] Williams, knowing that I took her life.  She was not my 
victim.  She was the object of my rage.  She was the object of my disgust with 
everything that had happened to my life, and my unfulfillment in my life up to that 
point.  And it was an irrational act that I committed against her, her family, and 
[that] stone knife that I threw in that river that morning, how it affected so many 
people.  I understand that.  And I have stood strong here for 21 years letting 
everyone know that I was willing to make a change, and I worked every day to 
make a change and to let anybody and everybody know that nothing like that 
could happen in my life again, and anybody’s life that comes within my contact, 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
50
insufficient remorse is not supported by any evidence; rather, it is clearly 
contradicted by abundant evidence in the record.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
at p. 681 [upholding the Governor’s decision but finding “no evidence supporting 
the Governor’s additional determination that petitioner has continued . . . to avoid 
responsibility for his crime by lying about pertinent events or by improperly 
attempting to portray himself as a victim”].) 
Although again the following circumstance is not expressly advanced as a 
ground for reversing the Board’s grant of parole, there is an implication in the 
Governor’s statement that petitioner has serious psychiatric problems and 
therefore her release would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public.  
Specifically, his statement recites the negative language found in several early 
psychiatric evaluations.  “[Petitioner] was categorized in early prison reports by 
mental-health evaluators as sociopathic, unstable and moderately psychopathic.  
Subsequent mental-health evaluations have been more favorable and include low 
risk assessments.”  
Here, too, we agree with the Court of Appeal majority that the Governor’s 
conclusion is not supported by any evidence.  Rather, the positive psychological 
assessments of petitioner in every evaluation conducted during the last 15 years 
have undermined the evidentiary value of these dated reports setting forth stale 
psychological assessments.  Moreover, in the negative psychological assessments 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
because my life is an open book where anybody could see how they can [be] 
involved in situations that [lead] to much damage to people and society.  So I just 
want to apologize to [Rubye] and her children for doing that to her, as well as to 
my children and my family, and to the community at large.  I can’t take it back.  
All I’ve done is try to work to improve myself and improve my surroundings.  
And that’s all I can do today.” 
 
51
cited by the Governor, the treating psychologists recommended petitioner should 
undergo specific forms of therapy — which she did for many years, resulting in 
successive positive evaluations.  Indeed, several consistent psychiatric evaluations 
have found petitioner no longer suffers from any psychiatric problems, and since 
1997 the annual psychological evaluations have recommended that petitioner not 
participate in therapy of any kind because she does not suffer from any psychiatric 
condition.  As we stated above, the passage of time is highly probative to the 
determination before us, and reliance upon outdated psychological reports — 
clearly contradicted by petitioner’s successful participation in years of intensive 
therapy, a long series of reports declaring petitioner to be free of psychological 
problems and no longer a threat to public safety, and petitioner’s own insight into 
her participation in this crime — does not supply some evidence justifying the 
Governor’s conclusion that petitioner continues to pose a threat to public safety.   
The Governor also stated that “[s]ince her incarceration, while [petitioner] 
has been counseled eight times for misconduct, including as recently as 2005, she 
has avoided any disciplinary actions.”  Again, it is unclear whether the Governor 
directly relied upon this circumstance to justify his reversal of the Board’s parole 
decision, but in any event the record indicates that petitioner was counseled when 
she was late to a class or other appointment.  Nothing in the record supports a 
conclusion that petitioner poses a threat to public safety because she was 
occasionally late to appointments or job assignments during her almost 24 years of 
incarceration.23 
                                              
23 
As noted in his statement quoted above, the Governor also relied upon 
petitioner’s flight from California and her fugitive status for 11 years following 
the murder, as well as her denial of involvement in the crime when she finally 
returned to California in 1982, as relevant to his action vacating the Board’s parole 
decision.  Petitioner, however, voluntarily ended her fugitive status more than 25 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
52
The sole remaining ground supporting the Governor’s decision is the 
gravity of petitioner’s commitment offense.  Under the standard of review 
recognized above, we must determine whether some evidence in the record 
supports the Governor’s conclusion that petitioner poses an unreasonable public 
safety risk because of the gravity of her commitment offense.  The facts cited by 
the Governor — the use of multiple weapons, the premeditated nature of the 
offense, the cruelty attendant to the murder, as well as the petty motive attributed 
to petitioner — undoubtedly supply some evidence supporting the Governor’s 
conclusion that the commitment offense was carried out in an “especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel manner.”  (Regs., § 2281, subd. (c)(1).)  As noted above, 
however, few murders do not involve attendant facts that support such a 
conclusion.  As further noted above, the mere existence of a regulatory factor 
establishing unsuitability does not necessarily constitute “some evidence” that the 
parolee’s release unreasonably endangers public safety.  (Lee, supra, 143 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.)  Accordingly, even as we acknowledge that some 
evidence in the record supports the Governor’s conclusion regarding the gravity of 
the commitment offense, we conclude there does not exist some evidence 
supporting the conclusion that petitioner continues to pose a threat to public 
safety.   
In the present case, the Board found, as it had after three previous parole 
hearings resulting in a grant of parole, that petitioner’s record exhibited all the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
years ago, when surrendering to the authorities in 1982.  From at least 1992, she 
also has taken responsibility for the murder of Mrs. Williams.  Accordingly, these 
circumstances, even if the Governor relied upon them, would fail to establish that 
petitioner currently remains a danger to public safety. 
 
53
factors listed in the regulations indicating suitability for release on parole, except 
for the factor applicable only to battered spouses.  The Board noted petitioner’s 
long-standing involvement in self-help, vocational, and educational programs, her 
insight into the circumstances of the offense, her acceptance of responsibility and 
remorse, and her realistic parole plans, which included a job offer and family 
support.  Regarding the commitment offense, the Board found petitioner had 
committed the murder while under the stress of an emotional love triangle.  The 
Board found no evidence establishing the existence of any other statutory factor 
relevant to an inmate’s unsuitability for parole.  Petitioner had no prior criminal 
record or history of violent crimes or assaultive behavior.  There also was no 
evidence of sadistic sexual acts or an unstable social history.  Although earlier 
psychological reports were mixed or negative, petitioner’s psychological 
examinations for the most recent 15 years were uniformly positive, finding her to 
be psychologically sound and to pose no unusual danger to public safety should 
she be released.  Finally, petitioner was free of “serious misconduct” during her 
more than two decades of incarceration, and exhibited exemplary efforts toward 
rehabilitative programming.  
The commitment offense occurred 36 years ago when petitioner, who is 
now 61 years of age, was 24 and, as the Board found, under significant emotional 
stress as a result of her love affair with the victim’s husband.  Although the 
Governor’s statement sought to diminish the emotional stress factor by suggesting 
that, even if genuine, it still does not reduce petitioner’s culpability for the murder, 
the existence of emotional stress as a mitigating factor favoring suitability is not 
dependent upon a degree of stress that would fully negate culpability for the 
murder.  Indeed, if facts fully negated culpability, the inmate would not have been 
convicted of murder.  In the present case, there is no doubt petitioner is culpable 
for the premeditated murder of Rubye Williams, despite the emotional stress she 
 
54
was experiencing at the time.  The Governor, however, was reviewing petitioner’s 
twelfth parole suitability hearing and the fourth grant of parole by the Board.  
Psychological evaluations of petitioner conducted during the last 15 years, as well 
as the conclusion of four panels of the Board authorizing parole, have emphasized 
that petitioner committed this crime while she was experiencing an unusual 
amount of stress arising from circumstances not likely to recur, and that for this 
reason (as well as her prior crime-free life, her age, and her record of 
rehabilitation) there was a low risk she would commit another violent act if 
released.  The Governor’s conclusion regarding culpability does not negate this 
reasonable evaluation of the evidence, nor does it provide some evidence that 
petitioner remains a threat to public safety. 
 
 
Moreover, other factors establishing suitability, which the Governor 
considered but did not find dispositive in making his final evaluation, strongly 
support our view that the Governor’s ultimate conclusion is not supported by some 
evidence.  Petitioner was incarcerated for nearly 24 years and during that period 
had an exemplary record of conduct.  She participated in many years of 
rehabilitative programming specifically tailored to address the circumstances that 
led to her commission of the crime, including anger management programs as well 
as extensive psychological counseling, leading to substantial insight on her part 
into both the behavior that led to the murder and her own responsibility for the 
crime.  Petitioner repeatedly expressed remorse for the crime, and had been 
adjudged by numerous psychologists and by the Board as not representing any 
danger to public safety if released from prison. 
In light of petitioner’s extraordinary rehabilitative efforts specifically 
tailored to address the circumstances that led to her criminality, her insight into her 
past criminal behavior, her expressions of remorse, her realistic parole plans, the 
support of her family, and numerous institutional reports justifying parole, as well 
 
55
as the favorable discretionary decisions of the Board at successive hearings — 
decisions reversed by the Governor based solely upon the immutable 
circumstances of the offense — we conclude that the unchanging factor of the 
gravity of petitioner’s commitment offense had no predictive value regarding her 
current threat to public safety, and thus provides no support for the Governor’s 
conclusion that petitioner is unsuitable for parole at the present time.   
Our deferential standard of review requires us to credit the Governor’s 
findings if they are supported by a modicum of evidence.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 658.)  This does not mean, however, that evidence suggesting a 
commitment offense was “especially heinous” or “particularly egregious” will 
eternally provide adequate support for a decision that an inmate is unsuitable for 
parole.  As set forth above, the Legislature specifically contemplated both that the 
Board “shall normally” grant a parole date, and that the passage of time and the 
related changes in a prisoner’s mental attitude and demeanor are probative to the 
determination of current dangerousness.  When, as here, all of the information in a 
postconviction record supports the determination that the inmate is rehabilitated 
and no longer poses a danger to public safety, and the Governor has neither 
disputed the petitioner’s rehabilitative gains nor, importantly, related the 
commitment offense to current circumstances or suggested that any further 
rehabilitation might change the ultimate decision that petitioner remains a danger, 
mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent 
articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, 
fails to provide the required “modicum of evidence” of unsuitability.   
Accordingly, under the circumstances of the present case — in which the 
record is replete with evidence establishing petitioner’s rehabilitation, insight, 
remorse, and psychological health, and devoid of any evidence supporting a 
finding that she continues to pose a threat to public safety — petitioner’s due 
 
56
process and statutory rights were violated by the Governor’s reliance upon the 
immutable and unchangeable circumstances of her commitment offense in 
reversing the Board’s decision to grant parole.  Contrary to the assertion of the 
dissent, the Governor’s action vacating the Board’s grant of parole to petitioner 
runs contrary to both his statutory and his constitutional obligations.  As set forth 
in detail above, both the governing statutes and constitutional due process 
principles require the Governor to base his decision to set aside a grant of parole 
on “some evidence” of current dangerousness.  The evidence relied upon by the 
Governor in this case — the egregiousness of the commitment offense — does not 
provide “some evidence” that petitioner remains a current threat to public safety.  
Accordingly, the Governor’s decision is not supported by “some evidence” of 
current dangerousness and is properly set aside by this court. 
We emphasize that our recognition that a proper review of a parole decision 
must focus upon “some evidence” of current dangerousness, does not alter our 
recognition in Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg that the purpose of the parole statutes 
is to guarantee that the decision makers fully have addressed the public safety 
implications of releasing on parole any inmate serving a maximum term of life 
imprisonment.  The relevant determination for the Board and the Governor is, and 
always has been, an individualized assessment of the continuing danger and risk to 
public safety posed by the inmate.  If the Board determines, based upon an 
evaluation of each of the statutory factors as required by statute, that an inmate 
remains a danger, it can, and must, decline to set a parole date.  The same holds 
true for the Governor’s decision to set aside a decision of the Board.  Notably, 
despite the conclusion we reach in the present case, we reiterate our recognition in 
Dannenberg that pursuant to section 3041, subdivision (b), the Board has the 
express power and duty, in an individual case, to decline to fix a firm release date, 
and thus to continue the inmate’s indeterminate status within his or her life 
 
57
maximum sentence, if it finds that the circumstances of the inmate’s crime or 
criminal history continue to reflect that the prisoner presents a risk to public 
safety.  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1084, 1095.) 
Our conclusion that petitioner’s conviction offense does not reliably 
predict, 36 years after commission of the offense and following 24 years of 
incarceration and demonstrated rehabilitation, that petitioner currently poses a 
danger to society, does not alter our affirmation that certain conviction offenses 
may be so “heinous, atrocious or cruel” that an inmate’s due process rights would 
not be violated if he or she were to be denied parole on the basis that the gravity of 
the conviction offense establishes current dangerousness.  In some cases, such as 
those in which the inmate has failed to make efforts toward rehabilitation, has 
continued to engage in criminal conduct postincarceration, or has shown a lack of 
insight or remorse, the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense may 
well continue to provide “some evidence” of current dangerousness even decades 
after commission of the offense.   
Indeed, as established in the companion case of In re Shaputis, supra, ___ 
Cal.4th___,___[pp. 22-26], filed concurrently with this opinion, the Governor 
does not act arbitrarily or capriciously in reversing a grant of parole when 
evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the circumstances of the crime 
continue to be predictive of current dangerousness despite an inmate’s discipline-
free record during incarceration.  As explained in detail in that case, where the 
record also contains evidence demonstrating that the inmate lacks insight into his 
or her commitment offense or previous acts of violence, even after rehabilitative 
programming tailored to addressing the issues that led to commission of the 
offense, the aggravated circumstances of the crime reliably may continue to 
predict current dangerousness even after many years of incarceration.  (See also 
 
58
Hyde, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215; Tripp, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 314, 320.) 
Finally, it should be noted that our recognition that the proper articulation 
of the some evidence standard focuses upon the inmate’s current dangerousness 
should not produce a wave of reversals of decisions denying parole.  In the 
overwhelming majority of post-Rosenkrantz/Dannenberg appellate decisions that 
have applied the strict minimum elements inquiry, the affirmance of a denial-of-
parole determination was not founded solely upon the conclusion that the 
circumstances of the commitment offense were more than what was minimally 
required to obtain a conviction of that offense, but rather upon the presence of 
other additional statutory factors establishing unsuitability.  (Bettencourt, supra, 
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 807 [unsuitability based upon criminal history, social 
history, institutional behavior, psychological evaluations, and behavior at the 
parole hearing]; Burns, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328 [unsuitability based 
upon history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others, and 
psychological evaluations]; Fuentes, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 163 
[unsuitability based upon criminal history as evidence of inmate’s repetitive and 
recidivist nature]; Honesto, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 97 [unsuitability based 
upon unstable social history, inadequate participation in prison programs, and 
inadequate parole plans].)24   
                                              
24  
Although the majority of appellate opinions applying the strict minimum 
elements test have affirmed the decision to deny parole, only one — Andrade, 
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 807 — based its determination solely upon the Governor’s 
findings regarding the gravity of the commitment offense.  (Id. at pp. 818-819.).  
That conclusion elicited a dissent by Justice Pollak, who contended that the 
Board’s conclusion could not be sustained based solely upon the circumstances of 
the commitment offense, because there was no evidence in the record establishing 
that the petitioner would “ ‘pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
59
 
V 
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
released from prison.’ ”  (Andrade, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 819 (dis. opn. of 
Pollak, J..) 
 
1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion.  I write separately to explain this 
concurrence in light of my dissent in In Re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 
1100 (dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).  In that case, the majority held that a denial of 
parole was justified if there is some evidence that the particular circumstances of 
the prisoner’s underlying offense beyond the “minimum elements” indicated 
exceptional callousness and cruelty.  (Id. at p. 1098.)  I found the minimum 
elements test to be both unworkable and not consistent with the statutory mandate 
to normally grant parole to life prisoners.  (Id. at pp. 1101-1104 (dis. opn. of 
Moreno, J).)  I would have instead required an inquiry into whether the 
commitment offense was particularly egregious as measured by the Board of 
Parole Hearings’ (Board) own matrices for determining the seriousness of the 
commitment offense.  (Id. at pp. 1106-1107; see Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (a); Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2403.) 
After observing the courts of appeal grappling with the parole suitability 
issue since Dannenberg was decided, I now agree with the majority opinion that 
neither a minimum elements test nor some other sort of metric for determining the 
gravity of the commitment offense is workable or called for by the statutory 
scheme.  As the majority rightly recognizes, the seriousness of the commitment 
defense as determined by the Board’s own matrix of factors is used primarily to 
calculate the prisoner’s base term and release date.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32; see 
 
2 
Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (a).)  In order to deny parole outright, as opposed to 
merely delay the release date, the gravity of the commitment offense must be 
linked to a prisoner’s current dangerousness (Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (b)), and 
the other factors that go into a determination of current dangerousness must be 
taken into account.  The majority opinion appropriately reconciles Penal Code 
section 3041, subdivision (a) with subdivision (b) by recognizing that a parole 
date shall normally be granted except when some evidence of current 
dangerousness, after considering the totality of the circumstances, justifies denial 
of parole.  The majority opinion therefore properly balances the statutory mandate 
to normally grant parole to life prisoners with the statutory mandate to protect the 
public, and also properly balances the need for judicial deference in reviewing 
executive decisions with the judicial obligation to ensure the executive complies 
with statutory and due process mandates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I dissent. 
The Governor carefully considered whether petitioner, Sandra Davis 
Lawrence, is suitable for parole.  He issued a reasoned report that assessed 
petitioner’s case individually.  The report considered the relevant factors — both 
those supporting parole and those weighing against parole.  It recognized the 
progress petitioner has made over the years that weighs in favor of parole.  
Nevertheless, balancing these factors, the Governor concluded “that her release 
from prison would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society” and reversed 
the finding of the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) that she was suitable for 
parole. 
The majority cites to no factual misstatements in this report.  It agrees that 
evidence supports every fact cited.  It identifies nothing the Governor did that was 
incorrect or contrary to his constitutional and statutory obligations.  Rather, the 
majority simply substitutes its own judgment in place of the Governor’s 
considered judgment that petitioner is not suitable for parole. 
The awesome responsibility of deciding whether to release a convicted 
murderer on parole — an act that inherently runs the risk of recidivism, i.e., the 
risk that the inmate will again kill an innocent person — lies with the executive 
branch, not the judicial branch.  We made this clear in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 616 (Rosenkrantz) and later in In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061 
 
2 
(Dannenberg).1  In those cases, we held both that the executive branch may deny 
parole based on the seriousness of the crime (as long as the executive branch has 
considered all relevant factors, and the seriousness determination is based on an 
individualized assessment of the specific case), and that the judicial branch will 
overturn the executive branch’s decision only if no evidence supports it.  These 
holdings were consistent with, indeed compelled by, the applicable statute.  (Pen. 
Code, §  3041, subd. (b) (section 3041(b)).) 
Today, the majority departs dramatically from these basic legal standards.  I 
cannot agree; accordingly, I dissent. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder.  Because the Governor’s 
three-page report denying parole states the underlying facts, I attach it as an 
appendix to this opinion and adopt by reference its factual recitation.  (See appen., 
post.)  I see no need to repeat those facts, as the report speaks for itself.2 
                                              
1  
I dissented in Rosenkrantz on the basis that permitting the Governor to 
overturn the Board’s findings violated the constitutional proscription against ex 
post facto laws.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 690-696.)  At this point, I 
accept the majority’s holding as the law of California.  I agreed, and still agree, 
with the rest of the Rosenkrantz opinion.  (See id. at p. 696, fn. 6.) 
2  
Cryptically, the third sentence of the majority opinion states:  “Petitioner 
declined a plea offer that would have resulted in a two-year prison sentence.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1; see also id. at p. 6 [reiterating the fact in reviewing the 
procedural history].)  Readers will naturally assume that a fact mentioned in the 
opinion’s opening paragraph has some relevance to the case, and that the opinion 
will again refer to it in discussing the legal standard and its application.  But the 
majority never mentions this fact again and never explains its relevance.  In fact, 
except to the extent it shows that petitioner utterly failed to accept any personal 
responsibility for her actions, that petitioner turned down a plea offer is irrelevant.  
The record does not reveal why the prosecutor apparently offered petitioner a 
good deal.  The offer might simply have reflected the difficulty of prosecuting a 
12-year-old crime.  (Petitioner had been a fugitive from justice for 11 years.)  
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
3 
Petitioner is now eligible for parole, and has been for some time.  Over the 
years the Board, or its predecessor, the Board of Prison Terms, has found 
petitioner suitable for parole several times.  Three different Governors, Pete 
Wilson, Gray Davis, and Arnold Schwarzenegger, have overturned these 
determinations, most recently Governor Schwarzenegger in January 2006.  
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal asking 
that court to overturn the Governor’s January 2006 determination.  Over Presiding 
Justice Perluss’s dissent, the majority did so and ordered petitioner’s release on 
parole.  We granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The applicable law is not as complex as the majority opinion makes it 
appear.  We settled the legal standard in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, and 
Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1061. 
The Board determines whether persons sentenced to an indeterminate term, 
such as convicted murderers, are suitable for parole.  (Pen. Code, § 3041.)  The 
Board “shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current 
convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past 
convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety 
requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a 
parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.”  (§ 3041(b).)  Under this 
statute, “the Board, exercising its traditional broad discretion, may protect public 
safety in each discrete case by considering the dangerous implications of a life-
maximum prisoner’s crime individually.”  (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
What is relevant here is that petitioner went to trial and the jury convicted her of 
first degree murder. 
 
4 
1071.)  In making this determination, the Board must consider various criteria 
established by regulation.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 653-654.) 
In murder cases such as this one, the Governor has the power to reverse the 
Board’s decision, while considering the same criteria.  (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, 
subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 3041.2; see Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 625-626, 
660.)  The Board’s parole decision and the Governor’s decision reviewing the 
Board are subject to the same standard of judicial review.  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 626.)  (Because the Board and the Governor must consider the same 
criteria, and their actions are subject to the same standard of judicial review, I will 
sometimes describe the entity that denied parole generally as the executive branch 
or the parole authority rather than specifically either the Board or the Governor.) 
The executive branch, not the judicial branch, makes the parole decision, 
although it may not simply deny parole to all convicted murderers.  (Rosenkrantz, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 655, 683-684.)  Accordingly, as we explained in 
Rosenkrantz, “the precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole 
suitability are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of the Governor, 
but the decision must reflect an individualized consideration of the specified 
criteria and cannot be arbitrary or capricious.  It is irrelevant that a court might 
determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far 
outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole.  As long as the 
Governor’s decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied 
to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the 
court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the 
record that supports the Governor’s decision.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 677, italics added.)  This “some evidence” standard is “extremely deferential” 
(id. at p. 665) and requires “[o]nly a modicum of evidence.”  (Id. at p.677; see also 
id. at p. 679.) 
 
5 
Applying this standard in this case is not difficult.  Readers may review the 
attached report and judge for themselves whether the Governor acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously, failed to engage in an individualized assessment of petitioner’s case, 
failed to consider the factors supporting as well as those weighing against parole, 
failed to do anything else he should have done, or did anything he should not have 
done.  In fact, he did exactly what he was supposed to do.  He fulfilled his 
statutory and constitutional obligations precisely.  His conclusion that petitioner 
remains too dangerous to release into society was not arbitrary or capricious.  It 
was based on an individualized assessment of all the relevant factors, both those 
supporting and those weighing against parole.  His factual recitation was accurate 
and everything he stated, including his conclusions, was supported by far more 
than a modicum of evidence.  As Presiding Justice Perluss stated in dissent in the 
Court of Appeal, whether petitioner is suitable for parole “may be a close 
question,” but whether some evidence supports the Governor’s decision is not 
close. 
When a person is paroled, that person is released into the general society, to 
interact with many vulnerable people who may be unaware of the person’s 
background.  The parole decision thus involves the inherent risk of recidivism 
which, in the case of a convicted murderer, means the risk that an innocent person 
may die.  Parole must be granted in proper cases, but the decision is an awesome 
responsibility, one entrusted to the executive branch.  In deciding whether to grant 
or deny parole, i.e., whether to release the person into society, it is entirely 
appropriate for the executive branch to examine the facts of the crime (and here, 
surrounding circumstances) and, exercising its broad discretion, conclude that 
those facts are so horrendous, and so frightening, that it is not yet willing to take a 
chance and approve parole.  The statute makes this clear.  It permits the parole 
authority to deny parole if “it determines that the gravity of the current convicted 
 
6 
offense or offenses . . . is such that consideration of the public safety requires a 
more lengthy period of incarceration . . . .”  (§ 3041(b).)  In Rosenkrantz, we 
interpreted this statute to mean what it says:  “The nature of the prisoner’s offense, 
alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole.”  (Rosenkrantz, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 682; see also Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1094 [reiterating 
this point].) 
Petitioner committed a particularly vicious and premeditated first degree 
murder, shooting her lover’s wife multiple times, then repeatedly stabbing the 
victim after she collapsed to the floor.  She did this as a “birthday present” to 
herself because she was disappointed that her lover would not leave the victim for 
her.  On her way to confront the victim, she stopped to arm herself with a pistol 
and a potato peeler.  (See appen., post.) 
Moreover, other facts support the denial of parole.  As Presiding Justice 
Perluss explained in dissent, petitioner remained a fugitive for 11 years after the 
cold-blooded killing.  “During that time she lived in several different cities under 
various assumed names and with related false identity papers (including, it 
appears, Social Security numbers and passports).”  When she surrendered, she still 
denied involvement in the murder and tried to blame her former lover.  “Testifying 
on her own behalf at trial in August 1983, [petitioner] denied killing Mrs. 
Williams, insisted she did not want to marry Dr. Williams and asserted it was 
‘ “no big thing” ’ when he ended their relationship. . . .  [¶]  [Petitioner’s] flight 
from California and her fugitive status for 11 years following the murder of Mrs. 
Williams, as well as her denial of involvement in the crime when she finally 
returned to California in 1982, were also identified by the Governor in explaining 
his reasons for reversing the Board’s parole decision.”  Presiding Justice Perluss 
also explained that, “[a]lthough observing that more recent mental health 
evaluations of [petitioner] were favorable and included low risk assessments, in 
 
7 
reversing the Board’s parole decision the Governor noted [petitioner] had been 
identified in early evaluations as ‘sociopathic, unstable, and moderately 
psychopathic.’ ” 
All this provides ample evidence supporting the Governor’s denial of 
parole.  It is true that the facts of the crime, petitioner’s fugitive status, and the 
early psychological evaluations do not change, and hence these factors do not 
grow stronger over time.  It is also true that the facts supporting parole may be 
dynamic and may grow stronger over time.  They appear to have done so here.  At 
some point, the parole authority might conclude that the facts supporting parole 
have increased sufficiently to finally outweigh the immutable facts of the crime 
and the other circumstances supporting denial of parole.  When that occurs, the 
parole authority may exercise its authority to grant parole notwithstanding the 
horrendous facts of the crime.  But this weighing process is for the executive 
branch to perform, not the judicial branch.  Nothing in the statute or our previous 
cases permits the judiciary to engage in its own weighing process and to conclude 
that the evidence supporting parole outweighs the evidence supporting denial of 
parole and, on that basis, grant parole. 
Certainly, as both the Governor and Presiding Justice Perluss noted, the 
record contains evidence that would support a grant of parole.  Obviously, the 
majority would weigh the competing factors differently than the Governor and 
would reach a different decision than he did.  But this circumstance is “irrelevant” 
and cannot negate the evidence that supports the Governor’s decision.  
(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.)  “In short,” as Presiding Justice Perluss 
stated in dissent, “there is no doubt that [petitioner] is a strong candidate for 
release on parole or that the Board’s decision to release her was a reasonable one.  
But that . . . is simply not the question we are to address.” 
 
8 
I agree with the majority that the “some evidence” test asks whether 
evidence supports the conclusion that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because 
he or she currently is dangerous.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2-3.)  But, as section 
3041(b) and our cases make clear, the facts of the crime can alone justify the 
conclusion that the inmate is currently dangerous.  If, as here, some evidence 
supports the Governor’s determination that the facts of the crime (and the other 
individualized facts the Governor cited) show petitioner is dangerous, that should 
end the inquiry.  As Presiding Justice Perluss correctly explained, “if a factor is 
properly part of the evaluation of a prisoner’s suitability for parole [such as, here, 
the facts of the crime, petitioner’s lengthy fugitive status, and her early 
unfavorable mental health evaluations], . . . and if the existence of that factor is 
supported by some evidence, to hold the same evidence does not support the 
ultimate conclusion concerning parole suitability is possible only if the court 
decides the probative (or predictive) value of that factor is outweighed by other 
indicia of suitability.  It is precisely that determination the electorate entrusted to 
the Governor’s discretion, not the courts’, when it adopted article V, section 8, 
subdivision (b), of the California Constitution.” 
I also agree that “the relevant inquiry is whether the circumstances of the 
commitment offense, when considered in light of other facts in the record, are 
such that they continue to be predictive of current dangerousness many years after 
commission of the offense.  This inquiry is, by necessity and by statutory mandate, 
an individualized one, and cannot be undertaken simply by examining the 
circumstances of the crime in isolation, without consideration of the passage of 
time or the attendant changes in the inmate’s psychological or mental attitude.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 46-47.)  This inquiry is exactly what the Governor 
undertook.  No one can read the Governor’s report and reasonably conclude he 
simply examined the crime in isolation without considering the passage of time 
 
9 
and changes in petitioner’s psychological or mental attitude.  The only thing the 
Governor did wrong, according to the majority, was to assess the predictive value 
of the circumstances of the crime and the post-crime factors he cited differently 
than the courts would later do.  But making that assessment is for the executive 
branch to do, not the courts. 
To try to justify its conclusion, the majority appears to create a new test for 
courts to apply when reviewing the executive branch’s decision to deny parole:  
“Accordingly, we conclude that although the Board and the Governor may rely 
upon the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for a 
decision denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of 
itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the 
record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or postincarceration 
history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the 
implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness that derive from his or her 
commission of the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory 
determination of a continuing threat to public safety.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.) 
This language distorts Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg beyond recognition.  
Apparently, under the new test, the courts decide whether the circumstances of the 
crime (and presumably the other circumstances weighing against parole) “continue 
to be predictive of current dangerousness.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 46.)  But 
nothing in Penal Code section 3041 or Rosenkrantz or Dannenberg supports such 
a conclusion.  Rather, it is for the parole authority, not the courts, to decide, while 
exercising its “traditional broad discretion” (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 
1071), when, if ever, the commitment offense loses its predictive value on the 
issue of current dangerousness.  This point is particularly crucial, for permitting 
the courts to decide whether the facts of the crime continue to be predictive of 
current dangerousness also permits those courts to ignore the deferential “some 
 
10 
evidence” standard of review.  A court merely has to decide, contrary to the 
considered judgment of the parole authority, that the crime no longer has a 
predictive value — as the majority has done in this case — then it can ignore the 
evidence supporting the executive branch’s decision and substitute its own 
judgment.  The majority’s new test renders the “highly deferential” standard of 
review of Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg a phantom.  In effect, the standard now is 
independent review. 
By this convoluted method, the majority has created a new scheme in 
which a court may effectively grant parole whenever it wishes, contrary to 
California Constitution, article V, section 8, subdivision (b), Penal Code section 
3041, Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, and Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 
1061.  I cannot agree.  Some evidence, indeed, much evidence, supports the 
Governor’s well-reasoned, individualized decision.  The judicial branch must 
defer to this executive branch decision, for that is the branch entrusted with 
making parole decisions. 
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and deny the petition 
for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
CHIN, J.  
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Lawrence on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 150 Cal.App.4th 1511 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S154018 
Date Filed: August 21, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Carrie L. Hempel, Michael J. Brennan and Heidi L. Rummel for Petitioner Sandra Davis Lawrence. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Blanca F. Young and Hailyn J. Chen for Stanford Criminal Justice Center as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Sandra Davis Lawrence. 
 
Sean Kennedy, Federal Defender (Central District), Daniel Broderick, Federal Defender (Eastern District) 
and Monica Knox, Assistant Federal Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Sandra Davis 
Lawrence. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, J. Conrad Schroeder, Jennifer 
A. Neill, Gregory J. Marcot and Anya M. Binsacca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent State of 
California. 
 
John R. Poyner, District Attorney (Colusa); Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney (San Diego); Albert C. 
Locher, Assistant District Attorney (Sacramento); Richard J. Sachs, Deputy District Attorney (San Diego); 
and W. Scott Thorpe for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carrie L. Hempel 
USC Post Conviction Justice Project 
University of Southern California 
699 Exposition Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90089-0071 
(213) 740-2586 
 
Julie L. Garland 
Assistant Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-704 
(415) 703-5713