Title: IN RE HERRON/LAGRONE/JEFFERSON MINORS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122666
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2004

____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 14, 2004 
In re: KH, KL, KL, AND KJ, 
MINORS. 
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122666 
TINA JEFFERSON, RICHARD JEFFERSON,
FREDERICK HERRON, AND LARRY LAGRONE, 
Respondents-Appellants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine 
whether our court rules, MCR 5.900 et seq.,1 allow a 
biological father to request a paternity determination 
1 Effective May 1, 2003, MCR 5.900 et seq. were amended 
and relocated to MCR 3.900 et seq. 
While the former court 
rules were in effect during the pendency of this case, the
subsequent amendments do not alter the analysis or outcome
of this case. 
 
 
 
during a child protective proceeding in which the subject 
children have a legal father. We hold that our court rules 
do not permit a biological father to participate in a child 
protective proceeding where a legal father exists. Indeed, 
where a legal father exists, a biological father cannot 
properly be considered even a putative father. 
Under Michigan law, a presumption of legitimacy 
attaches to a child born or conceived during an intact 
marriage. 
Unless and until the presumption of legitimacy 
is rebutted in a prior proceeding, an alleged biological 
father cannot seek a determination that he is the natural 
father of the child pursuant to MCR 5.921(D), and cannot 
establish a legal paternal relationship in accordance with 
MCR 5.903(A)(4). 
The Family Independence Agency erred by 
naming multiple men in the termination petition where a 
legal father existed. 
In this case, the alleged biological father was not a 
proper party to the proceedings and could not request a 
determination that he was the biological father of the 
children because the children already had a legal father at 
the time of the proceedings. 
However, the record contains 
evidence that could support a finding that both the mother 
and the legal father, during the course of the proceedings, 
rebutted the presumption that the children were the issue 
of the marriage. 
The trial court did not make a finding 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that the presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by the 
parents. 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial 
court for such a determination. 
If the court finds that 
the presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by the parents 
by clear and convincing evidence that the children are not 
the issue of the marriage, the court may take further 
action in accordance with MCR 5.921(D). 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
On April 25, 2002, the Oakland Circuit Court, Family 
Division, authorized a petition requesting the termination 
of the parental rights of Tina and Richard Jefferson. 
The 
petition also named Larry Lagrone and Frederick Herron as 
the “putative” fathers of the children.2  On motion of the 
prosecution at a pretrial hearing, the petition was 
subsequently amended by the Family Independence Agency to 
request that the court terminate the parental rights of 
fathers Jefferson, Herron, Lagrone, “and/or father John 
Doe.” 
At a bench trial conducted on July 8, 2002, the family 
division referee took testimony establishing that Tina 
Jefferson was legally married to Richard Jefferson during 
each child’s conception and birth, as well as during the 
pendency of the child protective proceedings. 
The referee 
2 Lagrone was named as the putative father of KL, KL,
and KJ. Herron was named as the putative father of KH.
3 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
noted that because Richard Jefferson was the legal father 
of the children, there was “no reason” for Lagrone or 
Herron to participate in the proceedings “unless there’s a 
challenge otherwise.” 
Lagrone’s counsel asked the referee to make a finding 
that Richard Jefferson was not the “natural father” of the 
children 
so 
that 
Lagrone 
could 
establish 
“a 
legal 
relationship.” Tina Richardson testified that Herron was 
the biological father of KH, and that Larry Lagrone was the 
biological father of KL, KL, and KJ. 
Through counsel, 
Richard Jefferson indicated that he was not the biological 
father of the children named in the petition and did not 
wish to participate further in the proceedings. 
According 
to the Family Independence Agency, DNA (deoxyribonucleic 
acid) testing established that Lagrone was the biological 
father of KL, KL, and KJ. 
On the basis of this evidence, 
the referee determined that Lagrone was the biological 
father of the three children. 
Lagrone filed a motion in the circuit court seeking a 
ruling that Jefferson was not the father of the three 
children within the meaning of MCR 5.903. 
The children’s 
mother argued that a putative father did not have standing 
to establish paternity in a neglect proceeding. Relying on 
In re Montgomery,3 the circuit judge held that Lagrone was 
3 185 Mich App 341; 460 NW2d 610 (1990).
4 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
the biological father of the children and had standing to 
seek paternity. 
It did not make an express finding that 
the children were not the issue of the marriage. Lagrone’s 
motion to establish paternity was granted, although the 
circuit judge indicated that it was “troubled” by the 
result. 
Relying on the circuit court ruling, the referee at 
the termination hearing indicated that Lagrone was the 
legal father of three children. 
The referee ordered 
Herron, the alleged biological father of KH, to establish 
paternity within fourteen days or “lose all rights” to the 
child. 
The lawyer-guardian ad litem sought leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals, which was 
denied. After the case was held in abeyance for In re CAW,4 
we granted leave to appeal.5 
II. Standard of Review 
On appeal, the guardian ad litem argues that the trial 
court erred by granting the biological father’s motion to 
establish paternity because he lacked standing, either in 
the context of a child protective proceeding or under the 
Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq. 
Whether a party has 
4 469 Mich 192; 665 NW2d 475 (2003).  
5 469 Mich 896 (2003).  
5  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
standing to bring an action involves a question of law that 
is reviewed de novo.6 
When called on to construe a court rule, this Court 
applies the legal principles that govern the construction 
and application of statutes.7
 Accordingly, we begin with 
the plain language of the court rule. When that language is 
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, without 
further 
judicial 
construction 
or 
interpretation.8 
Similarly, common words must be understood to have their 
everyday, plain meaning.9 
III. Analysis 
a. The Court Rules 
The juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq., delineates the 
scope 
and 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
court 
in 
juvenile 
proceedings, including child protective proceedings, but 
does not address paternity issues. 
MCR 5.901 et seq., now 
MCR 3.901 et seq., were the court rules that governed 
juvenile proceedings. 
The scope of those rules, as 
articulated in MCR 5.901(A), was to “govern practice and 
6 Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs, 464 Mich 726, 734; 629 
NW2d 900 (2001).
7 CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass'n, 465 Mich 549,
553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002). 
8 Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 160;
645 NW2d 643 (2002). 
9 See MCL 8.3a; see also Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 
Mich 602, 609; 608 NW2d 45 (2000). 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
procedure . . . in all cases filed under the Juvenile 
Code.” 
MCR 5.921, now MCR 3.921, described the parties who 
were entitled to notice in various juvenile proceedings. 
MCR 5.921(D), now MCR 3.921(C), provided a mechanism for 
identifying and providing notice to a putative father. 
That rule stated that “[i]f at any time during the pendency 
of a proceeding, the court determines that the minor has no 
father as defined in MCR 5.903(A)(4),[10] the court may, in 
10 Father was defined in our court rules at MCR 
5.903(A)(4) as: 
(a) a man married to the mother at any time
from a minor’s conception to the minor’s birth 
unless the minor is determined to be a child born 
out of wedlock; 
(b) a man who legally adopts the minor; 
(c) a man who was named on a Michigan birth
certificate . . . or 
(d) a man whose paternity is established in
one of the following ways . . . : 
(i) the man and the mother of the minor 
acknowledge that he is the minor’s father by
completing 
and 
filing 
an 
acknowledgment 
of 
paternity. . . . 
(ii) the man and the mother file a joint
written 
request 
for 
a 
correction 
of 
the 
certificate of birth pertaining to the minor that
results in issuance of a substituted certificate 
recording the birth [.] 
(iii) the man acknowledges that he is the
minor’s father by completing and 
filing 
an 
acknowledgment of paternity, without the mother
joining 
in 
the 
acknowledgment 
if 
she 
is 
7 
 
  
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
its discretion” take action to determine the identity of 
the minor’s natural father.11 
disqualified from signing 
the acknowledgement
by reason of mental incapacity (or) death. . . . 
(iv) a man who by order of filiation or by
judgment of paternity is determined judicially to
be the father of the minor. 
11 MCR 5.921(D) provided in pertinent part: 
(1) The court may take initial testimony on
the tentative identity and address of the natural
father. If the court finds probable cause to
believe that an identifiable person is the 
natural father of the minor, the court shall
direct that notice be served on that person
. . . . 
(2) After notice to the putative father, 
. . . the court may conduct a hearing and 
determine that: 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
(b) 
a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence 
establishes that the putative father is the 
natural father of the minor and justice requires
that he be allowed 14 days to establish his
relationship according to MCR 5.903(A)(4)[now MCR
3.903 (A)(7)] . . . . 
(3) The court may find that the natural
father waives all rights to further notice,
including the right to notice of termination of
parental rights, and the right to legal counsel
if 
(a) he fails to appear after proper notice,
or 
(b) he appears, but fails to establish 
paternity within the time set by the court. 
8 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
The court rule clearly permitted a putative father to 
be identified and given notice of court hearings only where 
the minor had “no father.” MCR 5.921(D), now MCR 3.921(C). 
Therefore, 
if 
a 
father 
already 
existed 
under 
MCR 
5.903(A)(4), a putative father could not be identified as a 
respondent or otherwise given notice.12 
It is uncontested that Tina and Richard Jefferson were 
legally married at the time of each minor’s conception and 
birth. 
Our court rules contemplated that only one man be 
identified as a respondent in a termination proceeding.13 
Pursuant to MCR 5.903(A)(4)(a), Richard Jefferson is the 
children’s father.14
 No other man may be identified as a 
12 The amended court rules include MCR 3.903(A)(23),
defining putative father as “a man who is alleged to be the
biological father of a child who has no father as defined
in MCR 3.903(A)(7).” 
13 In termination proceedings, “respondent” included
“the father of the child as defined by MCR 5.903(A)(4) [now
MCR 3.903(A)(7)].” MCR 5.974(B)(2). (Emphasis added.) The
rule contemplated only one man, not a series of identified
and unidentified men. See also amended court rule MCR 
3.977(B)(2). 
14 In this case, the Family Independence Agency failed
to follow the plain language of the court rule when it
named multiple men as respondents in the termination 
petition where the minor children already had a father. At
oral argument, the parties indicated that the Family
Independence 
Agency 
routinely 
names 
multiple 
men 
on 
termination petitions, including “John Doe,” even where a
legal father exists. 
We reiterate that there is no basis 
in the court rules for naming serial men on a termination
petition when a legal father exists.
9 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
putative father unless the minors are determined to be 
“born out of wedlock.”15 
The term “child born out of wedlock” was defined at 
MCR 5.903(A)(1) as a child “conceived and born to a woman 
who is unmarried from the conception to the birth of the 
child, or a child determined by judicial notice or 
otherwise to have been conceived or born during a marriage 
but who is not the issue of that marriage.”16 Respondent 
Lagrone 
maintains 
that 
the 
children 
were 
judicially 
determined to be “born out of wedlock” when the referee 
determined that Lagrone was the biological father of the 
three children. 
15 It is worth noting that where a child had no father,
and a putative father was properly identified, the putative
father had to establish a legal relationship with the child
in order to be named as a respondent in the termination
petition. See MCR 5.974(B)(2), now MCR 3.977(B)(2). If a
putative father failed to establish paternity within the 
time set by the court, he could be deemed to have waived
all rights to further notice and any right to counsel. MCR
5.921(D)(3), now MCR 3.921(C)(3). 
16 Under the amended court rules, the definition of
“child born out of wedlock” was removed and incorporated
into 
the 
amended 
definition 
of 
“father.” 
See 
MCR 
3.903(A)(7)(a)(“Father” means “[a] man married to the 
mother at any time from a minor’s conception to the minor’s
birth, unless a court has determined, after notice and a
hearing, that the minor was conceived or born during the
marriage, but is not the issue of the marriage[.]”). 
10  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
b. The Paternity Act 
In 
this 
case, 
respondent 
Lagrone 
sought 
a 
judicial determination that his biological relationship to 
three of the children named in the petition was sufficient 
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and establish 
Lagrone’s status as the legal father of the children. 
In 
essence, Lagrone sought to establish legal paternity in a 
child 
protective 
proceeding 
rather 
than 
through 
the 
legislatively provided mechanism designed to govern the 
establishment of paternity claims—the Paternity Act. 
Standing to pursue relief under the Paternity Act, MCL 
722.711 et seq., is conferred on the mother or father of a 
child born out of wedlock, or on the Family Independence 
Agency in limited circumstances.17 Under the statute, a 
“child born out of wedlock” is defined as “a child begotten 
and born to a woman who was not married from the conception 
to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the 
court has determined to be a child born or conceived during 
a marriage but not the issue of that marriage.”18
 
In Girard v Wagenmaker,19 this Court held that a 
biological father had no standing to establish paternity of 
a child born during an intact marriage “without a prior 
17 MCL 722.714(1),(4). 
18 MCL 722.711(a). 
19 437 Mich 231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991).
11 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
determination 
that 
the 
mother’s 
husband 
is 
not 
the 
father.”20  A “prior determination” was required because the 
Legislature used the present perfect tense of the verb 
“determine,” which was indicative of a past action rather 
than a contemporaneous action. Additionally, requiring a 
prior 
determination 
comported 
“with 
the 
traditional 
preference for respecting the presumed legitimacy of a 
child born during a marriage.”21 
Clearly, if respondent Lagrone had sought to establish 
paternity under the Paternity Act, his claim would have 
failed for lack of standing because, at the time he sought 
to establish paternity, there was no prior adjudication 
that the children were born out of wedlock. 
In In re CAW, the majority opinion did not reach the 
question presented in this case, because “no finding was 
ever made by the court that [the child] was not the issue 
of the marriage.”22 However, Justice WEAVER’S concurring 
opinion did address the issue, reconciling the court rules 
with the Paternity Act. We agree with and adopt this 
analysis. 
Specifically, 
Justice 
WEAVER 
noted 
that 
the 
20 Id. at 235. In Girard, the plaintiff claimed to be
the biological father of a child conceived and born during
the marriage of the defendant and her husband. Defendant’s
husband “continuously accepted and supported the child as
his own.” Id. 
21 Id. at 246.  
22 In re CAW, supra at 199.  
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
definition of “child born out of wedlock” in the court 
rules varies from that in the Paternity Act “only in its 
additional provision that a child may be determined to be 
born out of wedlock ‘by judicial notice or otherwise’ and 
in its use of the past tense of the verb ‘to determine,’ 
rather than the present perfect tense of that verb.”23 
Accordingly, we conclude, consistently with the language of 
the Paternity Act, that a determination that a child is 
born out of wedlock must be made by the court before a 
biological father may be identified in a child protective 
proceeding. 
Under either version of the court rule, 
MCR 5.921(D) 
or MCR 3.921(C), a prior out-of-wedlock determination does 
not confer any type of standing on a putative father. 
Rather, the rules give the trial court the discretion to 
provide notice to a putative father, and permit him to 
establish 
that 
he 
is 
the 
biological 
father 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence. Once proved, the biological 
father is provided fourteen days to establish a legally 
recognized paternal relationship. 
Nothing in the prior or amended court rules permits a 
paternity determination to be made in the midst of a child 
protective proceeding. 
Rather, once a putative father is 
identified in accordance with the court rules, the impetus 
23 469 Mich 202-203. 
13  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
is clearly placed on the putative father to secure his 
legal relationship with the child as provided by law. 
If 
the legal relationship is not established, a biological 
father may not be named as a respondent on a termination 
petition, the genetic relationship notwithstanding. MCR 
5.974(B)(2). 
c. The Presumption of Legitimacy 
The presumption that children born or conceived during 
a marriage are the issue of that marriage is deeply rooted 
in our statutes and case law.24 This presumption of 
legitimacy, most recently reaffirmed in In re CAW,25 has 
been consistently recognized throughout our jurisprudence, 
24 The divorce act, MCL 552.1 et seq., at MCL 552.29
states that “[t]he legitimacy of all children begotten
before the commencement of any action under this act shall
be presumed until the contrary be shown.” (Emphasis added.)
See also MCL 700.2114(1)(a) (“If a child is born or 
conceived during a marriage, both spouses are presumed to
be the natural parents of the child for the purposes of
intestate succession.”). See also the vital records act,
MCL 333.2824(1) (“The name of the husband at the time of
conception or, if none, the husband at birth shall be
registered as the father of the child” on the birth 
certificate.) and MCL 333.2824(6) (“A child conceived by a
married woman with the consent of her husband following the
utilization 
of 
assisted 
reproductive 
technology 
is 
considered to be the legitimate child of the husband and
wife.”). 
25 In re CAW, supra at 199. 
14 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
and can be overcome only by a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence.26 In Case, this Court stated: 
The rule that a child born in lawful wedlock 
will be presumed to be legitimate is as old as
the common law. It is one of the strongest 
presumptions in the law. The ancient 
rule 
made 
the presumption conclusive, if the husband was
within the four seas. The modern one permits the
presumption to be overcome, but only upon proof
which is very convincing. [Id. at 284 (emphasis
added).] 
By requiring a previous determination that a child is 
born out of wedlock, the Legislature has essentially 
limited the scope of parties who can rebut the presumption 
of legitimacy to those capable of addressing the issue in a 
prior proceeding—the mother and the legal father.27  As this 
Court noted in Girard, paternity claims generally arise 
during divorce or custody disputes, and the Legislature 
contemplated “situations where a court in a prior divorce 
or support proceeding determined that the legal husband of 
the mother was not the biological father of the child.”28 If 
the mother or legal father does not rebut the presumption 
26 See Serafin v Serafin, 401 Mich 629; 258 NW2d 461
(1977); Wechsler v Mroczkowski, 351 Mich 483; 88 NW2d 394
(1958), overruled in part on other grounds by Bunda v 
Hardwick, 376 Mich 640; 138 NW2d 305 (1965); Bassil v Ford 
Motor Co, 278 Mich 173; 270 NW 258 (1936); People v Case,
171 Mich 282, 284; 137 NW 55 (1912). 
27 As this Court has noted previously, "[t]here is no 
area of law more requiring finality and stability than
family law.” 
Hackley v Hackley, 426 Mich 582, 598; 395
NW2d 906 (1986)(opinion by BOYLE, J.).  
28 
437 Mich 246. 
15  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
of legitimacy, the presumption remains intact, and the 
child is conclusively considered to be the issue of the 
marriage despite lacking a biological relationship with the 
father.29 
d. Resolution of this case 
In this case, Larry Lagrone should not have been 
permitted to participate in the termination proceedings or 
request a determination that he was the biological father 
of three of the four children because, at the time of the 
proceedings, Richard Jefferson was the legal father of the 
children and the presumption of legitimacy remained intact. 
29 
The trial court relied on In re Montgomery in 
granting 
respondent 
Lagrone’s 
motion 
to 
establish 
paternity. However, we believe that Montgomery was wrongly
decided and overrule it to the extent that it is 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
In Montgomery, the legal father was dismissed as a
party in parental termination proceedings against his wife.
After admitting that he was not the child’s biological
father, the legal father was dismissed from the proceedings
and another man was declared to be the child’s biological
father. The legal father appealed his dismissal from the
proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that once the legal
father admitted that he was not the biological father,
respondent was “not the minor child’s father within the
meaning of the court rules” and did not have standing to
participate in the termination hearing. 185 Mich App 343. 
That the legal father admitted having no biological
relationship to his child does not indicate that he was
interested in relinquishing his parental rights to his 
child. 
Because the legal father appealed his dismissal
from the proceedings, it is fair to infer that he wanted to
be part of the termination proceedings, and may have been
interested in planning for the child. Nothing in Montgomery
indicates that the legal father was given the opportunity
to claim the benefit of the presumption of legitimacy.
16 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
However, the record contains evidence that could 
plausibly support the conclusion that, during the course of 
the proceedings, both the mother and the legal father 
rebutted the presumption that the children were the issue 
of the marriage.30
 Tina Jefferson testified that her 
husband was not the father of the children named in the 
petition. 
Richard Jefferson indicated that he was not the 
children’s father; in addition, Jefferson maintained that 
he did not wish to further participate in the proceedings. 
The latter statement could reasonably be construed as an 
indication that Jefferson was prepared to renounce the 
benefit afforded him by the presumption of legitimacy and 
to not claim the children as his own.31 
However, the trial court did not make a finding that 
the presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by the parents. 
If such a finding had been made, the children would have no 
“father” as defined in MCR 5.903(A)(4), and another man, 
presumably Larry Lagrone, could have been identified as a 
putative father pursuant to MCR 5.921(D). 
30 
We read MCR 5.903(A)(1) to have been consistent
with the Paternity Act and to have required a prior
judicial determination that the subject children were not
the issue of the marriage before a claimed biological
father could be permitted an opportunity to establish a
legal relationship pursuant to MCR 5.921(D)(2)(b). However,
there is no basis for using the language of the Paternity
Act against the legal parents to restrict a mother or legal
father’s ability to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. 
17  
 
 
 
 
If Mr. Lagrone had been so identified, and elected to 
establish paternity as permitted by MCR 5.921(D)(2)(b), the 
out-of-wedlock determination made in the child protective 
proceeding could serve as the prior determination needed to 
pursue a claim under the Paternity Act. Girard, supra. 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court 
for such a determination. 
If the court finds that the 
presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence from either parent that the children 
are not the issue of the marriage, the court may take 
further action in accordance with MCR 5.921(D). 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re: K.H., K.L., K.L., and
K.J., Minors. 
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
No. 122666 
TINA JEFFERSON, RICHARD JEFFERSON,
FREDERICK HERRON, and LARRY LAGRONE. 
Respondents-Appellants. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today, the majority holds yet again that our court 
rules deprive a putative father of the right to participate 
in child protective proceedings. 
This viewpoint is not 
supported by our court rules and it denies putative 
fathers, as well as children, their due process rights. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
As stated in my dissent in In re CAW, 469 Mich 192, 
209; 665 NW2d 475 (2003), “the Legislature intended to 
allow putative fathers an opportunity to intervene in child 
protective proceedings. 
Hence, the majority errs by 
applying MCR 5.921(D) in a manner that prohibits standing.” 
The court rules allow for a judicially determined judgment 
of paternity to be used to determine that a man is a 
 
 
“father,” and the court rules make no mention that this 
must be done pursuant to the Paternity Act. 
See MCR 
5.903(A) and 5.921(B)(3), now MCR 3.903(A) and 3.921(B), 
(C). 
In this case, the putative father was named a party to 
the child protective proceedings by the Family Independence 
Agency. 
His participation was compelled, which makes the 
majority’s determination that he does not have the right to 
participate even more outrageous. 
However, even if he had 
not been named a party, to summarily deny him the right to 
be determined to be a “father” denies the putative father 
his due process rights, but, more importantly, it denies 
courts the opportunity to determine what is in the best 
interests of the children. This is never more evident than 
in a child protective proceeding, where the children’s 
legal parents may have their parental rights terminated, 
thereby leaving the children with no legal parents and, 
possibly, no caregivers. 
Denying putative fathers the 
right to participate in the proceedings may deprive the 
children of a chance to have a loving relationship with an 
interested and caring parent. 
The children’s legal mother in this case was a cocaine 
addict and frequently homeless. 
After years of abuse and 
neglect, her rights are being terminated. 
The children’s 
2  
 
 
 
legal father is in prison and wants nothing to do with the 
children. 
The children’s putative father seeks nothing 
more than a chance to be determined a “father” so that he 
may have his custody and visitation rights considered by 
the courts. 
Denying him this right deprives the courts of 
valuable information necessary to determine the best 
interests of the children. 
“Courts making paternity and 
custody determinations have the authority to inquire about 
a child’s putative father or parent in fact. Without it, a 
court would be deprived of the means necessary to ensure 
that a child’s best interests and due-process rights are 
protected.” 
CAW, supra at 209 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
Further, as detailed in my dissent in Girard v 
Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231, 253-278; 470 NW2d 372 (1991), 
nothing in our statutes or court rules requires that a 
putative father must first establish paternity in a 
separate legal proceeding. This untenable rule effectively 
precludes 
a 
putative 
father 
from 
establishing 
a 
relationship with his child unless approved by the legal 
mother, regardless of whether the child has a legal father 
who plays a role in his life and regardless of the reasons 
the legal mother may choose to exclude the putative father. 
Allowing a putative father standing to bring a 
paternity 
claim 
does 
not 
mean 
that 
the 
claim 
will 
3  
 
 
automatically be decided in his favor. 
As I stated in 
Girard, supra at 272, allowing a putative father “standing 
to bring his paternity claim would not in any way endorse 
or prejudge his claim to provide support for the child, or 
his claim to custody or visitation rights.” 
The best 
interests of the child are paramount, and the child’s best 
interests can only be properly assessed if all parties are 
given the opportunity to have their day in court. 
Unlike 
the majority, “I am unwilling to make the arbitrary 
assumption that no support, custody, or visitation claim by 
a putative father, regarding the child of a married woman, 
will ever have sufficient merit to justify recognizing the 
standing of any such claimants.” Id. 
Further, unlike the majority, I do not believe in 
closing my eyes and pretending that the putative father 
does not exist. 
Some may argue that denying the putative 
father standing protects the sanctity of marriage. 
But as 
I stated in Girard, supra at 271, “It is surely a bit late 
to talk of preserving the ‘sanctity’ of the marital family 
by the time a situation like the one alleged in this case 
has arisen.” 
I do not believe a putative father should be cast as a 
villain merely because he seeks to establish a relationship 
with his child. 
Whether the establishment of such a 
4  
 
                                                 
 
 
relationship will be in the child’s best interests is a 
matter for the court to decide,1 but to deny a putative 
father standing to even make such a request deprives him, 
and the 
child, of due process rights. 
Further, it is 
noteworthy that the majority’s refusal to allow putative 
fathers standing does not emanate solely from a concern to 
protect intact families. 
In cases in which there was not 
an intact family, the majority has continued to deny 
putative fathers, and their children, their due process 
rights. See, e.g, Pniewski v Morlock, 469 Mich 898 (2003); 
CAW, supra at 199. 
An arbitrary, bright-line rule puts the illusion of an 
intact family over the reality that children’s lives are at 
stake. This case highlights the problem. The legal mother 
testified that the putative father was the biological 
father of the children and the legal father also testified 
that he was not the biological father of the children and 
did not want to participate in the proceedings. 
However, 
if the legal mother and the legal father had not offered 
testimony rebutting the presumption of legitimacy, the 
putative father would have had no recourse. 
1 See, e.g., In re Jesusa V, 32 Cal 4th 588; 10 Cal
Rptr 3d 205; 85 P3d 2 (2004). 
5  
  
 
 
 
Finally, a court is statutorily mandated to assess the 
best interests of the child in all disputes involving a 
minor child’s custody. 
See MCL 722.24. 
However, the 
majority finds that the best interests control when there 
is a custody dispute between two legal parents, but not 
when a dispute involves a putative parent. 
Children have 
due process rights to be protected from arbitrary harm by 
the government. 
The child’s right to have his best 
interests decided by a court of law should not be inferior 
to a legal father’s right to custody. 
I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that the 
record contains evidence that supports a finding that, 
during the proceeding, the legal mother and the legal 
father rebutted the presumption that the children were the 
issue of their marriage. 
However, while I believe that 
there is more to being a parent than mere biology, I also 
believe that there is more to being a parent than the 
rights conveyed by a marriage license. 
A narrow view of 
standing grounded in neither statute nor court rule should 
not defeat a meaningful examination of the best interests 
of the children. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
6