Title: Commonwealth v. Watkins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-09950
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 2015

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SJC-09950 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KYLE WATKINS. 
 
 
Bristol.     January 9, 2015. - November 24, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Identification.  Evidence, Identification, Disclosure 
of evidence, Exculpatory, Third-party culprit, Hearsay.  
Due Process of Law, Disclosure of evidence.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion for a required finding, New 
trial, Disclosure of evidence, Agreement between prosecutor 
and witness, Prosecutor's conflict of interest, Conduct of 
prosecutor, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 25, 2003. 
 
 
The cases were tried before E. Susan Garsh, J., and a 
motion for a required finding of not guilty or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial, filed on March 21, 2011, was heard 
by her. 
 
 
 
Janet H. Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  In June, 2005, a Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree in the April 26, 
2 
 
2003, shooting death of Paul Coombs on a New Bedford street.1  
The defendant appealed from his convictions and also filed in 
the Superior Court a motion for a required finding of not 
guilty, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2), as amended, 420 
Mass. 1502 (1995), or, in the alternative, for a new trial, 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001).  The defendant's motion for a stay of appeal was 
allowed so that he could pursue his motion in the Superior 
Court.  After conducting an extensive evidentiary hearing, the 
motion judge, who had been the trial judge, denied both requests 
made in the motion.  The defendant's appeal from that denial was 
consolidated with his direct appeal.2 
The defendant argues, as he did in his motion for a new 
trial, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
conviction.  He argues further that a new trial is required 
because the Commonwealth failed to make mandatory disclosures of 
exculpatory evidence; the judge abused her discretion in 
allowing the Commonwealth's motion to exclude evidence of a 
third-party culprit, and in denying the defendant's motion to 
                     
1 The defendant also was found guilty of unlawful possession 
of a firearm.  G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b). 
 
2 The defendant appeals also from the denial of his motion 
for admission of exhibits at the hearing on the motion for new 
trial, and the denial, in part, of his motion to expand the 
record at that hearing.  We discern no abuse of discretion in 
the motion judge's evidentiary rulings on these motions. 
3 
 
exclude hearsay testimony; there was prosecutorial misconduct; 
and his counsel was ineffective.  The defendant also asks that 
we exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to reduce the degree of guilt. 
We affirm the convictions and the denial of the motion for 
a new trial, and discern no reason to reduce the degree of guilt 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain facts for later discussion. 
On the evening of April 25, 2003, the defendant was at a 
private club on Mill Street in New Bedford, where he spent 
fifteen minutes loudly arguing on his cellular telephone with 
the victim.  Vernon Rudolph, a long-time friend of both the 
victim and the defendant, was also present at the club.  Through 
a window, Rudolph saw the victim "frisking" people on the 
sidewalk who were attempting to enter the club, and suggested 
that the defendant should go outside and engage in a fist fight 
with the victim, who was much larger than the defendant.  The 
defendant declined, and he did not leave the club until after 
the victim had left the area. 
The following morning, April 26, 2003, the victim told his 
girl friend that he wanted to "whoop" the defendant.  That 
afternoon, the defendant was again at the club.  He seemed upset 
and told the bartender that he was "tired of people [messing] 
4 
 
with him."  The defendant returned to the club that evening, but 
was now acting "tough" and saying that "[t]hings are going to 
change around here."  He left the club at some point after 
9:30 P.M., wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, black jeans, white 
and black sneakers, and batting gloves.  At approximately 9:50 
P.M. that evening, the victim and his girl friend were talking 
by telephone.  At the end of the call, the girl friend heard the 
victim shout, "Why don't you fight me now?"  At about the same 
time, sisters Ernestina and Beatriz Soares3 were driving on Cedar 
Street, approaching the intersection with Mill Street.  
Ernestina, the driver, waited at the intersection, where 
vehicles moving in their direction encountered a stop sign, 
because a blue Lincoln Mark VIII automobile was stopped on Mill 
Street and had the right of way.  The Mark VIII flashed its head 
lights, and Ernestina turned left onto Mill Street.  The windows 
of the Mark VIII were dark, and Ernestina could not see if there 
was anyone in the vehicle. 
As they drove down Mill Street, the sisters saw a man 
standing next to a Honda Accord automobile parked on the left 
side of the street, and another man standing on the opposite 
sidewalk.  They described the man on the sidewalk as 
approximately six feet tall, well built, and African-American.  
                     
3 Because Ernestina Soares and Beatriz Soares share a last 
name, we refer to them by their first names. 
5 
 
He was bald or had a receding hairline, and was wearing dark 
clothing, including a hooded sweatshirt.4  The man standing by 
the Honda was "yelling" across the street, "Don't [mess] with 
me.  I'm not the one to be [messed] with."  After driving past, 
Ernestina saw the man who had been standing on the sidewalk 
approach the Honda and raise his hand; the sisters then heard 
multiple gunshots.  While they proceeded further down Mill 
Street, Beatriz telephoned 911. 
Also at approximately 9:50 P.M. that evening, Michael 
Couture was driving on Cedar Street approaching the intersection 
with Mill Street.  Like the Soares sisters, he waited at the 
intersection because a stopped automobile on Mill Street had the 
right of way.  When a white automobile started to swerve around 
the stopped vehicle, Couture drove through the intersection.  He 
heard a loud noise to his left and saw a man fire multiple shots 
at a parked vehicle.  Couture described the man as an African 
American, between six feet and six feet two inches tall, with a 
slim to medium build.  The shooter was wearing dark clothes, 
including a mask, hat or hood. 
                     
4 Beatriz described the man as being African-American, about 
six feet tall, 220 or 230 pounds, well built, either bald or 
with a receding hairline, and dressed in dark clothing, 
including a hooded sweatshirt.  Ernestina described the man as 
being a light-skinned African-American, possibly Spanish or Cape 
Verdean, between six feet and six feet two inches tall, 220 or 
240 pounds, well built, bald, and dressed in dark clothing, 
including a hooded sweatshirt. 
6 
 
At approximately the same time, Rudolph, who had left the 
club at about 9:40 P.M., was driving down Mill Street in his 
white Nissan Maxima automobile.  As he approached the 
intersection with Cedar Street, he encountered a blue Lincoln 
Mark VIII with tinted windows blocking his way.  He was swerving 
around the Mark VIII when he saw a man he recognized as the 
defendant standing in front of a parked vehicle on the other 
side of the intersection; the defendant was wearing the same 
clothing he had been wearing at the club.  Rudolph saw the 
defendant step back and fire seven to eight shots at the parked 
vehicle.  Rudolph, who had known the defendant from childhood, 
recognized the defendant's face when the defendant's hood 
slipped backwards as he fired.  Rudolph also recognized the 
defendant by his body actions and by the way that he 
"bounce[d]."  Rudolph drove to his mother's house and told her 
that he had just witnessed a shooting.  His mother testified at 
trial that Rudolph arrived at 10 P.M. that evening, and stated 
that he had recognized the shooter, but refused to disclose the 
shooter's identity. 
Officer Bryan Safioleas of the New Bedford police 
department was the first police officer to arrive at the scene 
of the shooting.  Safioleas had been parked approximately one-
half block away from the intersection of Mill and Cedar Streets 
until 9:40 P.M., and had noticed a blue Lincoln Mark VIII with 
7 
 
tinted windows drive around the block a "couple" of times.  When 
Safioleas reached the Honda, the victim was unconscious and was 
bleeding from multiple gunshot wounds; he and another officer 
removed the victim from the Honda and attempted to administer 
CPR.  After emergency medical technicians arrived, the victim 
was transported by ambulance to a local hospital, where he was 
declared dead. 
Although police officers immediately identified the 
defendant as a suspect, they were unable to locate him for more 
than three months; the defendant's friends and acquaintances 
likewise did not see him after the shooting.  Officers were able 
to locate the blue Lincoln Mark VIII.  It had been wiped clean 
so that no fingerprints were identifiable either on the inside 
or outside of the vehicle.  Ultimately, police linked the 
defendant to the vehicle.5 
On August 5, 2003, State troopers arrested the defendant in 
Lynn, after troopers conducting surveillance of the area near a 
particular address saw the defendant entering a restaurant.  
When officers approached the defendant, he provided a false name 
and produced a driver's license in that name.  He was unable to 
                     
5 Police learned that the defendant had asked a friend to 
register the Lincoln Mark VIII in her name, but had paid for the 
costs of registering and insuring it; the friend never drove the 
Mark VIII.  The victim's girl friend had seen the defendant in 
the Mark VIII, and the defendant's girl friend's landlord had 
taken a photograph of the Mark VIII parked in the defendant's 
girl friend's driveway. 
8 
 
state the date of birth on the license, however, and after 
admitting his real identity, was placed under arrest.  When a 
New Bedford police officer arrived to transport the defendant 
back to New Bedford, he noticed that the defendant was unshaven 
and sweating, was wearing a soiled T-shirt, and had lost weight.  
When the officer told the defendant that he looked "bad," the 
defendant responded that he was under a lot of stress.  During 
the drive to New Bedford, the defendant remarked that he was 
"enjoying the ride."  The officer noted that there was not much 
to see because it was dark and they were driving on a highway, 
to which the defendant replied that he still was enjoying the 
ride because it was "going to be the last ride he was going to 
have for a long time." 
The defendant did not testify.  He called one alibi 
witness, Joseph Correia, who testified that he was in the club 
with the defendant until about 10:45 P.M. on the evening of the 
shooting. 
The theory of defense focused on impeaching Rudolph's 
credibility.  Defense counsel elicited testimony that the 
weather on the night of the shooting was foggy and rainy, and 
that Rudolph was almost a block away from the Honda when the 
shots were fired.  Counsel also elicited testimony that Rudolph 
had not agreed to speak with police until after he learned that 
police were seeking to speak with him and his brother, and that 
9 
 
Rudolph and the prosecutor had entered into an agreement that 
resulted in Rudolph's early release from incarceration. 
Discussion.  The defendant raises a myriad of claims on 
appeal, all of which were considered and denied by the trial 
judge, in an exhaustive, detailed, and thoughtful eighty-page 
memorandum of decision, after an extensive, four-day hearing6 on 
the defendant's motion for a required finding under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 25, or for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30. 
The defendant's brief reiterates all of the evidentiary 
issues that were considered and rejected by the motion judge, 
who discredited several of the witnesses and found explicitly, 
contrary to the defendant's repeated assertions, that the 
prosecutor did not lie, there was no prosecutorial misconduct, 
and there was no conflict of interest between the prosecutor and 
the defendant's trial counsel.7  As to certain claims, the 
                     
6 Most of the Commonwealth's trial witnesses testified at 
the hearing.  A number of witnesses who had not been part of the 
original trial either testified or submitted affidavits for the 
defense, and additional discovery, that the defendant had not 
received prior to trial, was admitted in evidence.  The judge 
also considered additional documentary evidence and affidavits 
by witnesses who did not testify at the hearing, which she 
allowed to be introduced on the defendant's motion to reopen the 
evidence, more than five months after the hearing. 
7 The only claim in his motion for a new trial which the 
defendant does not pursue on appeal concerns an assertion that 
he was denied the right to a public trial because the court room 
was closed during jury empanelment.  As to that claim, the 
motion judge found that several of the witnesses were not 
credible; she noted particularly that she was very familiar with 
the right of public access during jury voir dire, and had been 
10 
 
defendant asserts facts, without comment, directly contrary to 
what the motion judge found.  For instance, the defendant states 
that his counsel's "complete failure" to impeach the 
Commonwealth's primary witness requires a new trial, whereas the 
judge found that defense counsel "thoroughly" impeached the 
principal witness, and strategically chose to focus the jury's 
attention on those areas, among the many possible grounds for 
impeachment, that he deemed the most effective.  In some of his 
other claims, the defendant's brief simply asserts, without 
explanation, that the motion judge's evidentiary and credibility 
rulings were clearly erroneous, and then reiterates the 
arguments made in his motion for a new trial. 
Having carefully reviewed all of the defendant's claims, we 
limit our discussion to those claims which rise to the level of 
appellate argument.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 
367 Mass. 921 (1975).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 
Mass. 654, 661 (2002).  Because many of the issues raised 
involve credibility determinations which were before the motion 
judge, we note the deference we accord a motion judge's findings 
of fact, made after an evidentiary hearing, if supported by the 
record, Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 224 (2005), and 
the special deference given to the action of a motion judge who, 
                                                                  
"particularly vigilant in ensuring that accommodations were made 
for the public to attend all phases of the trial, including jury 
selection." 
11 
 
as here, was also the trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 
397 Mass. 303, 307 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. De 
Christoforo, 360 Mass. 531, 543 (1971). 
1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In reviewing whether the 
evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction, we 
consider "whether the evidence, in its light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence 
presented by the defendant, is sufficient . . . to permit the 
jury to infer the existence of the essential elements of the 
crime charged" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 
378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  "Additionally, the evidence and 
the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be of 
sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and 
sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 677.  "As long as the 
inferences are 'reasonable and possible,' the evidence may be 
wholly circumstantial."  Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 
482 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 544 
(2010). 
The focus of the defendant's sufficiency argument is 
Rudolph's identification of him as the shooter.  The defendant 
contends that it would have been physically impossible for 
Rudolph to identify him, given that it was dark, foggy, and 
12 
 
rainy,8 and that Rudolph was almost a block away from a shooting 
that lasted only for a few seconds.  The defendant argues also 
that police coerced Rudolph's testimony by suggesting that he or 
his brother might be considered suspects if he did not testify 
against the defendant, and that the evidence at trial showed 
that Rudolph lied about the distance between the intersection 
and the parked Honda where the victim was shot.9  All of the 
defendant's arguments, however, concern the weight and 
credibility of Rudolph's testimony, which is the province of the 
jury.  See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 411 (1978) 
("Credibility is a question for the jury to decide; they may 
accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony presented 
to them"). 
                     
8 Responding officers testified that, although there was 
some fog, the fog was "misty" rather than dense, it was more 
rainy than foggy, and they were able to see from the scene of 
the shooting to the private club on another block where the 
defendant and Rudolph had been earlier in the evening.  This 
testimony is supported by photographs of the scene taken shortly 
after the shooting. 
 
9 Rudolph testified that the Honda was in front of the fire 
hydrant near the NAACP building when the shooting took place 
(the "tail end of [the] car was just about at the fire 
hydrant"), and rolled slightly to the location where it was 
found (close to a later-established memorial, on the fence 
surrounding the NAACP building's parking lot) after the 
shooting.  Other witnesses said that, at the time of the 
shooting, the vehicle was near the site of the memorial, 
approximately one hundred feet from the corner (Honda was "a 
short distance in front of the fire hydrant, maybe a little more 
up"; "right next to the NAACP building";  and "relatively close" 
to area of current memorial).  When police arrived, the Honda 
was near the location of the current memorial. 
13 
 
A rational juror could have believed Rudolph's testimony 
that he saw the defendant shoot the victim.  Among other things, 
this was not a stranger identification.  Rudolph testified that 
he had known the defendant since childhood, they had grown up 
together, and he recognized the defendant's clothing and 
movements even before he saw the defendant's profile when his 
hood slipped.  The jury also took a view of the scene, standing 
at the northeast corner of Mill and Cedar Streets, and then 
walking a short way down Mill Street.  The prosecutor pointed 
out to them the location of the fire hydrant, the stop sign at 
the corner, the NAACP building that is the first building on the 
street, and the location of the next street.  The jury were able 
to decide for themselves what would have been visible from the 
corner, the distance to the fire hydrant, and the distance to 
the memorial on the fence surrounding the NAACP building, 
slightly farther along Mill Street than the fire hydrant.  The 
jury also were able to determine from the crime scene 
photographs the distance between the location where the green 
Honda was found and the fire hydrant. 
Moreover, and notwithstanding the defendant's statements to 
the contrary, although Rudolph was the Commonwealth's primary 
witness, his testimony was far from the only evidence tying the 
defendant to the shooting.  Three bystanders driving past near 
the time of the shooting provided descriptions of the shooter 
14 
 
and his clothing that were consistent with each other and with 
the defendant's physical characteristics and the clothing that 
Rudolph testified the defendant had been wearing.  Several 
witnesses, including the victim's girl friend, were aware that 
the victim and the defendant had been in an argument and that 
the defendant wanted to "fight" the victim.  The Mark VIII that 
the defendant had arranged to be registered in a friend's name, 
and which he drove, matched the description of the vehicle seen 
at the corner of Mill and Cedar Streets shortly before the 
shooting, and a Mark VIII, wiped clean of fingerprints and other 
possible evidence, was located by police early in the 
investigation.  See note 5, supra. 
In addition, a rational juror could have inferred that the 
defendant's actions after the shooting indicated consciousness 
of guilt.  The defendant fled from New Bedford to Lynn after the 
shooting, where he was living under a false name.  He offered a 
false name to police when they first apprehended him in Lynn, 
and made several seemingly inculpatory statements during the 
drive in a police cruiser from Lynn to New Bedford, among them 
that the drive was "going to be the last ride he was going to 
have for a long time." 
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's 
conviction. 
2.  Failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  The 
15 
 
defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to disclose a 
number of pieces of exculpatory evidence, contrary to the due 
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 
(2004).  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 714 (2010).  
Evidence is exculpatory if it "provides some significant aid to 
the defendant's case, whether it furnishes corroboration of the 
defendant's story, calls into question a material, although not 
indispensable element of the prosecution's version of the 
events, or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution 
witness."  Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 401-402 
(2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978). 
To obtain a new trial when exculpatory evidence has been 
withheld, a defendant "must establish prejudice."  Commonwealth 
v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 20-21 (2011).  Where a defendant 
requested specific exculpatory evidence prior to trial, the 
defendant must demonstrate only the existence of a substantial 
basis for claiming prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Daniels, supra at 
404-405.  Where, on the other hand, a defendant's pretrial 
motion was merely a general request for exculpatory evidence, 
the defendant must show that the withheld evidence "would 
probably have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations."  
16 
 
See Commonwealth v. Murray, supra at 21, quoting Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 664 (2011). 
a.  Crime scene diagram.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth failed to produce a hand-drawn crime scene diagram  
detailing the distance between the Honda Accord and shell 
casings found near the vehicle.  The diagram shows the Honda as 
having been located part-way down the block from the 
intersection of Mill and Cedar Streets.  The defendant contends, 
as he did in his motion for a new trial, that he could have used 
this diagram to impeach Rudolph's testimony that the shooting 
occurred near the intersection.  The motion judge treated this 
diagram as having been specifically requested by the defendant 
prior to trial, but concluded that the defendant had no 
substantial basis for claiming prejudice resulting from the 
Commonwealth's failure to disclose.  We agree. 
The hand-drawn diagram is not to scale.  It was drawn by a 
crime scene investigator primarily to record the distance of 
each shell casing from the Honda.  More importantly, the 
defendant has not shown that it would have been exculpatory.  
See Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 431 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Williams, supra at 714.  Safioleas, the first 
responding officer, testified at trial concerning the location 
of the Honda when he arrived at the scene, and his testimony 
corresponded generally to the location of the vehicle shown on 
17 
 
the diagram.  The defendant also was able to impeach Rudolph's 
testimony regarding the location of the shooting with 
contradictory testimony from Beatriz and Couture.  The diagram 
would have served only as weak and cumulative impeachment 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 401 Mass. 828, 838 
(1988). 
b.  Nature of Rudolph's incentive agreement.  The defendant 
contends that the Commonwealth concealed the true nature of the 
agreement between Rudolph and the prosecutor by not informing 
the defendant that (1) Rudolph would be released on the day that 
he testified; (2) Rudolph had asked for favorable treatment at 
his dangerousness hearing following his December, 2003, arrest 
(subsequent to his initial statements to police); (3) Rudolph's 
former girl friend had telephoned the prosecutor asking for 
preferential treatment concerning her own pending felony drug 
charges; and (4) Rudolph purportedly received $5,000 from the 
New Bedford Chamber of Commerce following his testimony.  As the 
defendant argues, evidence of any understanding or agreement 
between the government and a key witness may be used to impeach 
that witness and is exculpatory.  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 
Mass. 340, 358 (2001). 
The motion judge found after hearing evidence on this issue 
that the Commonwealth did not conceal the nature of its 
agreement with Rudolph from the defendant, and the record amply 
18 
 
supports this finding.  The prosecutor agreed to support 
Rudolph's request for early release, knowing that it would 
result in Rudolph's release from incarceration immediately after 
he testified, and knowing that Rudolph had an engineer who was 
prepared to testify that the school zone conviction against 
Rudolph could not stand because the location of his drug 
transaction was not within 1,000 feet of a school or park.  The 
prosecutor sent a copy of this agreement to the defendant prior 
to the start of trial.  Thus, there was no basis upon which the 
defendant legitimately could claim surprise or failure to 
disclose when Rudolph was released on the day that he testified. 
There is likewise no merit in the defendant's remaining 
claims concerning the incentive agreement.  The defendant 
suffered no prejudice by not learning that Rudolph had asked for 
favorable treatment at his dangerousness hearing.  Rudolph did 
not receive favorable treatment at the hearing, and the 
agreement that Rudolph eventually reached with the prosecutor, 
provided to the defendant, clearly informed the defendant that 
Rudolph had been seeking an incentive in return for his 
testimony.  The record does not support any favorable treatment 
of Rudolph's girl friend in her felony drug case, and the motion 
judge found that there was no indication that the Commonwealth 
gave preferential treatment to her, or that Rudolph requested 
such treatment.  The motion judge also found that there was no 
19 
 
evidence or suggestion that the New Bedford Chamber of Commerce 
paid Rudolph $5,000, or any other amount, in return for his 
testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 105 
(2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). 
c.  Police report on accidental shooting.  The defendant 
asserts that the Commonwealth failed to provide the defendant 
with a police report detailing an incident in October, 2003, in 
which Rudolph accidentally shot himself in the finger.  No 
charges were filed against Rudolph as a result of the incident.  
The motion judge found that, "while the evidence is far from 
conclusive," the Commonwealth most likely failed to provide the 
defendant with this report.  The defendant argues that Rudolph 
avoided any charges because he told police that he was the key 
witness in the Commonwealth's case against the defendant.  The 
judge found, however, that there was no evidence that 
investigating officers were aware that Rudolph was a 
Commonwealth witness, no evidence that he either sought or 
received favorable treatment in that matter, and that his 
anticipated testimony had no bearing on the decision not to 
prosecute Rudolph for "shooting himself."  The record supports 
the judge's findings.  The defendant therefore suffered no 
prejudice as a result of the Commonwealth's failure to disclose 
this police report. 
3.  Exclusion of third-party culprit evidence.  The 
20 
 
defendant argues that the judge abused her discretion in 
allowing the Commonwealth's motion to exclude third-party 
culprit evidence.  Relatedly, he argues that the Commonwealth 
failed to disclose certain notes taken by one of the officers 
during Rudolph's first police interview, and that these notes 
would have bolstered his opposition to the Commonwealth's motion 
in limine to exclude. 
"A defendant may introduce evidence that tends to show that 
another person committed the crime or had the motive, intent, 
and opportunity to commit it," Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 
277, 291 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 
378, 387 (1989), and "[i]f the evidence is of 'substantial 
probative value, and will not tend to prejudice or confuse, all 
doubt should be resolved in favor of admissibility.'"  
Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra at 291, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008).  
See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009), 
and cases cited. 
The introduction of such evidence, however, is not without 
limit.  The proffered evidence must have "a rational tendency to 
prove the issue the defense raises, and the evidence cannot be 
too remote or speculative" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 461 Mass. 435, 445-446 (2012).  In addition, because the 
evidence is "offered for the truth of the matter asserted," 
21 
 
e.g., "that a third party is the true culprit," where third-
party culprit evidence is hearsay that does not fall within a 
hearsay exception, it is admissible, in the judge's discretion, 
only if it is otherwise relevant and will not tend to prejudice 
or confuse the jury, and if there are "other substantial 
connecting links" between the proffered third-party culprit and 
the crime.  Commonwealth v. Smith, supra. 
Here, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the 
victim had been convicted of manslaughter for the death of 
Zachary Suoto, and therefore that Barry Suoto,10 Zachary's 
brother, had a motive to kill the victim on Zachary's birthday, 
April 26.  The defendant argues that the judge abused her 
discretion in granting the Commonwealth's motion to exclude this 
evidence.  He maintains that if he had had access to the notes 
of Rudolph's first interview with the police, he would have been 
successful in arguing against the Commonwealth's motion to 
exclude. 
While another person's motive to commit the crime properly 
may be considered in determining whether third-party culprit 
evidence is admissible, it is far from the "sole factor."  
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. at 292.  The defendant offered 
nothing in his opposition, nor does he offer anything on appeal, 
                     
10 Because Zachary Suoto and Barry Suoto share a last name, 
we refer to them by their first names. 
22 
 
to indicate that Barry, who had been released from incarceration 
more than a year before the victim's death, had a then-present 
intent to kill the victim, or was even present in the same city 
at the time of the shooting.  The defendant also did not proffer 
any witnesses, affidavits, or other evidence that might have 
connected Barry to the killing.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 
432 Mass. 578, 589 (2000).  There was no abuse of discretion in 
the judge's conclusion that, in the absence of any such 
evidence, the admission of evidence that Barry might have had a 
motive to kill the victim on the date that the victim died was 
overly speculative and of little probative value, and would tend 
to prejudice and confuse the jury. 
The notes of the police interview would have added little 
to suggest the judge should have reached a different conclusion 
and, to the contrary, tended to support her decision to exclude 
the proffered motive.  The notes state that Rudolph had spoken 
with Barry a few weeks prior to the shooting, and that Barry had 
told Rudolph that "it was behind him."  Barry also told Rudolph 
that he was afraid of the victim, and that "he did not hire a 
hitman."  The judge determined that the notes were not 
exculpatory because they did not support the defendant's theory 
that Barry killed the victim.  Rather, they supported the 
opposite inference.  We conclude that there was no substantial 
basis to support the defendant's claim of prejudice due to the 
23 
 
Commonwealth's failure to provide him with these notes.  The 
notes would not have changed the judge's decision to allow the 
Commonwealth's motion to exclude the proposed third-party 
culprit evidence, where there were no substantial connections 
linking Barry to the crime.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 461 
Mass. at 445-446. 
4.  Conflict of interest.  The defendant argues that a new 
trial is required because the prosecutor had represented him on 
several previous occasions.  The defendant made the same 
argument in his motion for a new trial, in which the judge 
found, after hearing testimony from the prosecutor and examining 
records of the defendant's prior cases, that there was no 
conflict. 
A defendant who demonstrates an actual conflict of interest 
is entitled to a new trial, under both Federal and State 
Constitutions, unless he or she knowingly and voluntarily waived 
the conflict.  See Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 806, 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 947 (2008).  An actual conflict of 
interest arises if a prosecutor has formerly represented a 
defendant in a matter that is substantially related to the 
pending case.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9(a), 426 Mass. 1342 
(1998).  If a defendant establishes only a potential or tenuous 
conflict of interest, however, the conviction will not be set 
aside unless the defendant demonstrates that the conflict 
24 
 
resulted in actual prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Holliday, 
supra. 
The prosecutor represented the defendant as a public 
defender in a 1986 probation surrender matter, a 1988 robbery 
charge, and a 1989 charge of receiving stolen property and 
possession of controlled substances.  None of these cases, each 
of which ended many years before the current matter, is 
substantially related to the murder case.  Contrary to the 
defendant's argument, the fact that the stolen property matter 
involved a nine millimeter handgun, the same caliber that was 
used to kill the victim, does not make that case, more than 
twenty years before the shooting, substantially related to the 
current case, nor does it show that the prosecutor was exposed 
to confidential information.  Indeed, the judge found that the 
prosecutor's representation of the defendant had been "distant 
and fleeting . . . on substantially unrelated matters" and that 
he "acquired no facts upon which the prosecution of the 
defendant was predicated."  Moreover, the record does not 
indicate that the defendant ever informed his trial counsel, 
either before or during trial, of a potential conflict of 
interest by the prosecutor.  Nor did the defendant seek to have 
the prosecutor disqualified on the ground of a potential 
conflict.  In the absence of an actual conflict of interest, the 
defendant must establish that the conflict resulted in actual 
25 
 
prejudice.  See id.  The defendant has not done so.11 
5.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant raises 
numerous claims regarding the prosecutor's purportedly improper 
statements and arguments at trial, as well as the prosecutor's 
conduct outside the court room.  We address the following three 
claims, and discern no reason to address the remainder of the 
claims, which were considered and rejected by the motion judge. 
First, the defendant argues that the prosecutor knowingly 
presented false testimony to the jury regarding the location of 
the Honda at the time of the shooting.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 362-363 (2004).  The defendant did not 
object to this testimony at trial, and his claim is unavailing.  
The basis of the claim rests on the fact that there was somewhat 
differing trial testimony regarding the location of the Honda at 
the time of the shooting.  Rudolph testified that the vehicle 
was close to the fire hydrant located near the intersection, 
while Beatriz stated that the Honda was a "little bit more up" 
than a short distance in front of the hydrant.  That Rudolph's 
testimony was to some extent contradicted does not establish 
that it was false, or that the prosecutor knowingly and 
                     
11 Although we conclude that there was no actual conflict of 
interest in these circumstances, and no potential conflict 
resulting in any actual prejudice, we emphasize that the better 
practice for the prosecutor would have been to avoid the risk of 
reversal of a conviction, following a later determination that 
there was a conflict of interest, by simply choosing not to 
prosecute a former client. 
26 
 
intentionally suborned false testimony, as the defendant 
contends. 
Nor was the testimony about the location of the Honda 
significantly contradictory; Beatriz's testimony that the 
vehicle was a little farther up than the hydrant did not 
establish that Rudolph would have been unable to see the 
vehicle, and both he and a responding officer testified that 
they were able to see farther up the street, past the NAACP 
building and its parking lot beyond the fire hydrant. 
Second, the defendant argues that the prosecutor committed 
"fraud on the court" by, inter alia, supporting the incentive 
agreement with Rudolph that had the effect of releasing him from 
incarceration immediately following his testimony.  This claim 
is without merit.  See Rockdale Mgt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 
418 Mass. 596, 598 (1994), quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).  A prosecutor 
does not commit "fraud on the court" by facilitating the 
government's entry into a plea agreement with a key witness, 
properly disclosed to the defendant, and permissibly may argue 
that the witness's testimony is truthful, so long as he does not 
express a personal belief in the witness's credibility.  See 
Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 459 Mass. 271, 280-281 (2011), and 
27 
 
cases cited.12 
Third, the defendant argues that the prosecutor disregarded 
a pretrial order that precluded the Commonwealth from 
introducing evidence of an alleged threat to Rudolph as 
substantive evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt.  
In explaining in his closing argument why he had supported 
Rudolph's release from prison, the prosecutor stated:  "Folks, 
what do you think Mr. Rudolph's life would be worth in prison 
after testifying?"  Defense counsel objected, and the judge 
ordered the comment struck, instructing the jury to disregard 
the statement.  "We presume that the jury followed the judge's 
instruction."  Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 190 
(2005).  Beyond the single passing comment in closing, the 
prosecutor made no mention of the threats against Rudolph's life 
that had been made by, among others, the defendant's brother, 
and that Rudolph had testified to in earlier proceedings. 
6.  Introduction of hearsay statements by victim's girl 
friend.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying 
his motion in limine to exclude testimony from the victim's girl 
                     
12 The defendant continues to argue on appeal that the 
prosecutor "knew" that Rudolph committed his drug offense within 
a school zone, and should not have agreed to an early release on 
that charge, notwithstanding the judge's finding that the 
prosecutor was aware that Rudolph had an engineer who intended 
to testify that Rudolph's drug offense had taken place close to, 
but outside, the 1,000-foot school zone.  The defendant has not 
established by this argument that the prosecutor committed fraud 
on the court. 
28 
 
friend that, when she was speaking with him by telephone at 
approximately 9:50 P.M. on the evening of the shooting, she 
heard him say, "Why don't you fight me now?"  The motion was 
considered at a hearing prior to opening statements but after 
the jury had been empanelled, and then again immediately before 
the girl friend testified, at which the parties and the judge 
reviewed and discussed each challenged statement.  Trial counsel 
did not object as the statements were considered, and did not 
seek an ongoing objection at the end of the hearing, nor did he 
object when the statement was introduced. 
"The broad rule on hearsay evidence interdicts the 
admission of a statement made out of court which is offered to 
prove the truth of what it asserted, [but] the state of mind or 
intent of a person, whenever material, may be shown by his 
declarations out of court" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 167 (1997), S.C., 440 Mass. 576 
(2003).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(i) (2015) ("Statements 
of a person as to his or her present friendliness, hostility, 
intent, knowledge, or other mental condition are admissible to 
prove such mental condition").  "The state-of-mind exception to 
the hearsay rule calls for admission of evidence of a murder 
victim's state of mind as proof of the defendant's motive to 
kill the victim when and only when there also is evidence that 
the defendant was aware of that state of mind at the time of the 
29 
 
crime and would be likely to respond to it."  Commonwealth v. 
Qualls, supra. 
Here, there was evidence that the defendant was aware that 
the victim wanted to engage in a fight with him.  On the evening 
before the shooting, Rudolph and the defendant saw the victim 
waiting outside the entrance to the club, and Rudolph suggested 
that the defendant should go outside and fight the victim 
without weapons.  There was also evidence that the defendant 
responded to the possibility of a fight with the victim by 
killing him.  The Soares sisters testified that, immediately 
before the victim was shot, he had been yelling at a man across 
the street, and Rudolph testified that the defendant was that 
man.  There was no error in the judge's decision to allow this 
statement to be introduced to establish the defendant's motive 
to kill the victim. 
7.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally 
deficient in numerous respects.  He asserts that counsel was 
ineffective for, among other things, inadequate efforts to 
impeach Rudolph, failure to develop evidence of the crime scene, 
and failure to interview and call additional alibi witnesses.13  
                     
13 The defendant also argues that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel 
previously had represented Rudolph, and had a conflict of 
interest.  This claim is unavailing.  The defendant's trial 
30 
 
When addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we 
"consider whether there was an error in the course of trial, and 
if so, whether such error was likely to have influenced the 
jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 791 
(2004).  "A strategic decision by an attorney . . . constitutes 
error 'only if it was manifestly unreasonable when made.'"  
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 804-805 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Coonan, 428 Mass. 823, 827 (1999).  In 
considering ineffective assistance claims in a case of murder in 
the first degree, we review under the standard of a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, "as it is more favorable 
to the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra.  We conclude 
that none of the asserted failures shows any inadequacy in trial 
counsel's performance. 
a.  Impeachment of Rudolph.  We apply "a stringent standard 
of review to claims of ineffective assistance because of failure 
to impeach a witness."  Commonwealth v. Jenkins, supra at 805.  
The defendant claims that trial counsel failed to impeach 
Rudolph with his prior convictions.  "[F]ailure to introduce the 
                                                                  
counsel represented Rudolph in 1988, in a case involving the 
malicious destruction of property.  Rudolph received probation 
in that case; his term of probation ended in 1993.  The motion 
judge found after an evidentiary hearing that counsel had no 
memory of having represented Rudolph, and the two cases, more 
than ten years apart, were not related.  Furthermore, the judge 
found that the defendant's trial counsel "conducted a vigorous 
cross-examination of Rudolph," which was not impacted by his 
prior representation. 
31 
 
criminal record of a witness for impeachment purposes generally 
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."  
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 93 (2002).  Here, 
counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for a new trial 
that he made a strategic decision to focus on other methods of 
impeachment.  His decision to do so was not manifestly 
unreasonable.  Indeed, the motion judge found that counsel's 
cross-examination of Rudolph had been "vigorous" and effective. 
The defendant claims also that trial counsel failed to 
impeach Rudolph with his recantations, prior to trial, of his 
identification of the defendant.  In response to a motion in 
limine, however, the judge had ruled that if counsel impeached 
Rudolph with his recantations, Rudolph would be permitted to 
testify that the recantations were as a result of threats that 
he had received, including from the defendant's brother.  See 
part 5, supra.  Counsel's strategic decision to avoid this line 
of impeachment was not manifestly unreasonable. 
The defendant argues that counsel should have impeached 
Rudolph with evidence that he was a heavy drug user in 2003.  
There was, however, no evidence that Rudolph had been using 
drugs on the night of the shooting.  Counsel's decision to forgo 
this line of impeachment for other, more powerful grounds of 
impeachment was not manifestly unreasonable.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Sena, 429 Mass. 590, 595 (1999), S.C., 441 Mass. 
32 
 
822 (2004). 
b.  Introduction of crime scene evidence.  The defendant 
claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 
evidence that would have proved conclusively that the shooting 
took place farther away from the intersection than where Rudolph 
testified it occurred.  Specifically, the defendant contends 
that trial counsel should have introduced photographs showing 
where the responding officers parked when they arrived at the 
scene, and should have argued that the location where the shell 
casings landed proves that the Honda was parked farther down the 
street from the intersection when the shooting occurred.  
Throughout the trial, however, counsel effectively elicited 
testimony that the shooting occurred farther down the street, 
and not directly at the intersection.  In his closing argument, 
counsel also emphasized that Rudolph's testimony concerning the 
location of the shooting differed from the testimony of the 
other witnesses.  Counsel was not constitutionally ineffective 
for failing to introduce cumulative evidence concerning the 
location of the Honda that would have added little to support 
the defendant's vigorous attack on Rudolph's credibility as to 
the location of the vehicle at the time of the shooting. 
c.  Additional alibi witnesses.  The defendant argues that 
counsel was ineffective because he should have called additional 
alibi witnesses.  To establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
33 
 
based on a failure to call additional witnesses, a defendant 
"must show that the purported testimony would have been relevant 
or helpful."  Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 178 (2004).  
The defendant has not done so.  Prior to trial, his investigator 
interviewed five potential alibi witnesses.  Four did not have 
memories that would have been helpful, and the fifth was called 
to testify.  In his motion for a new trial, the defendant 
submitted an affidavit from a potential alibi witness that 
stated that the witness ran into the club following the shooting 
and saw the defendant watching basketball on television.  During 
the hearing on the motion for a new trial, however, that 
potential witness contradicted the statements in his affidavit. 
The defendant also challenges numerous "other defense 
counsel failings."  As did the motion judge, we conclude that 
trial counsel's conduct did not result in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
Relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we 
discern no reason to exercise our extraordinary power to reduce 
the degree of guilt or to grant a new trial. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction on the 
indictments charging murder in the first degree and unlawful 
possession of a firearm are affirmed.  The order denying the 
motion for a required finding of not guilty or, in the 
34 
 
alternative, for a new trial is also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.