Title: HSBC Realty Credit Corporation v. City of Glendale
Citation: 2007 WI 94
Docket Number: 2005AP001042
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2007

2007 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1042 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re City of Glendale Community Development 
Authority Condemnation Award, Parcel 14: 
 
 
HSBC Realty Credit Corporation, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Glendale, 
          Respondent, 
 
John Barrett, 
          Intervenor-Appellant, 
 
Bayshore Town Center, LLC, 
          Interested Person-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
Alterra Coffee Roasters, Athletes Foot of 
Glendale, Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
Barnes & Noble, Blockbuster Entertainment, Regis 
Corporation, GNC Store #2956, Gymboree Retail 
#433, Luxottica Retail Group, Touchdown, Inc., 
d/b/a Pro Image, Mutual Savings Bank, 
Tumbleweed/Diamondback Management, Nautilus, 
Voicestream PCS II, North Shore Bank, Walgreen 
Company #647 and Sears Roebuck & Company, 
          Interested Persons. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 160 
Reported at: 295 Wis. 2d 493, 721 N.W.2d 489 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 4, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
 
2 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
BUTLER, Jr., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the interested person-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Daniel Kelly, Paul J. Stockhausen, and Reinhart 
Boerner Van Deuren s.c., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Daniel 
Kelly. 
 
For the intervenor-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Mark A. Grady, principal assistant corporation 
counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea 
H. Roschke, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Community Development Authority of the City of 
Glendale. 
 
 
2007 WI 94
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1042   
(L.C. No. 
2004CV10624) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re City of Glendale Community Development 
Authority Condemnation Award, Parcel 14: 
 
HSBC Realty Credit Corporation, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Glendale, 
 
          Respondent, 
 
John Barrett, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant, 
 
Bayshore Town Center, LLC, 
 
          Interested Person-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
Alterra Coffee Roasters, Athletes Foot of 
Glendale, Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
Barnes & Noble, Blockbuster Entertainment, 
Regis Corporation, GNC Store #2956, Gymboree 
Retail #433, Luxottica Retail Group, Touchdown, 
Inc., d/b/a Pro Image, Mutual Savings Bank, 
Tumbleweed/Diamondback Management, Nautilus, 
Voicestream PCS II, North Shore Bank, Walgreen 
Company #647 and Sears Roebuck & Company, 
 
          Interested Persons. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Richard J. Sankovitz, Judge, 
that transferred the condemnation award in an eminent domain 
case from the control of the Milwaukee County Clerk of Court to 
a money market account at a private bank.  The review requires 
us to interpret the interplay among three statutory provisions: 
Wis. Stat. §§ 59.40(3)(b), 59.40(3)(c), and 32.05(7)(d).2  We are 
also required to interpret Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1. on a 
different issue. 
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) grants a clerk of court 
(clerk) authority to invest "any funds" that are paid into the 
clerk's office and are being held for repayment, but it requires 
that the interest earned on these funds be paid into the county 
general fund.  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) allows a circuit 
court judge to direct that § 59.40(3)(b) not apply to "certain 
funds."  The specific question we must decide is whether, after 
directing that § 59.40(3)(b) not apply to a condemnation award 
deposited with the clerk, a circuit judge has additional 
authority to transfer the award from the clerk's control into a 
                                                 
1 HSBC Realty Credit Corp. v. City of Glendale, 2006 WI App 
160, 295 Wis. 2d 493, 721 N.W.2d 489. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted.   
No.  2005AP1042 
 
3 
 
private money market account so that it can earn interest for 
the benefit of the ultimate recipients of the award.   
¶3 
A third statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), is relevant 
because 
it 
provides 
that 
"compensation" 
awards 
(i.e., 
condemnation awards) may "be deposited with the clerk of the 
circuit court . . . for the benefit of the persons named in the 
award." 
¶4 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) empowers a 
circuit judge not only to veto the clerk's authority to invest 
"certain funds" and pay all interest on those funds into the 
county general fund, but also to direct the clerk to transfer 
"certain funds" from the clerk's control into a secure private 
account for the benefit of persons ultimately entitled to the 
funds.  The judge's power under § 59.40(3)(c) is especially 
clear with respect to condemnation awards, when § 59.40(3)(c) is 
read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d).  Nonetheless, 
the judge's power under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) should be 
exercised with sound discretion, with the consent, if possible, 
of all affected parties, and with a prudence that assures that 
any funds transferred from the clerk's control be placed in 
"suitably protected accounts."  We conclude that the circuit 
judge met these standards in this case.  In addition, we 
conclude that in this case the clerk was not entitled to a 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
4 
 
transfer fee under Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a).3  Consequently, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
The City of Glendale's Community Development Authority 
(CDA) embarked on a project to redevelop the Bayshore Mall.  It 
condemned a parcel of commercial real estate containing a number 
of existing businesses.  On December 10, 2004, the CDA deposited 
the condemnation award of $14,439,294.84 with Milwaukee County 
Clerk of Court John Barrett (Clerk Barrett) for the benefit of 
the "parties of interest" or "interested persons," pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d).4  The "interested persons" in these 
circumstances were HSBC Realty Credit Corporation; Bayshore Town 
Center, LLC; Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.; Alterra Coffee 
Roasters; Athlete's Foot of Glendale; Barnes & Noble #2655; 
Blockbuster Entertainment; GNC Store #2956; Luxottica Retail 
Group; Mutual Savings Bank; Nautilus; North Shore Bank; Regis 
                                                 
3 We are not asked to redistribute the interest the county 
earned 
on 
the 
condemnation 
award 
before 
the 
award 
was 
transferred by the court. 
4 The condemnation award named multiple interested persons.  
They included the property owner, the bank, and numerous parties 
with leasehold interests.  The circuit court began proceedings 
on December 21, 2004, to apportion the award among the named 
interested parties.  The substantial gap between the amount of 
the condemnation award and the amounts that the various parties 
believed they were owed, resulted in a protracted dispute.  At 
the time Bayshore Town Center, LLC (Bayshore) filed its brief in 
October 2006, there were only three remaining parties with any 
claim to the condemnation award: HSBC Realty Credit Corporation, 
Bayshore, and Walgreen Co. #647.  The award of $14,439,294.84 is 
the amount of the condemnation award, $14,755,000.00, minus the 
prorated 2004 real estate taxes. 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
5 
 
Corporation 
(Trade 
Secrets 
#7615); 
Gymboree 
Retail 
#433; 
Touchdown Inc. d/b/a Pro Image; Sears Roebuck & Company; 
Tumbleweed/Diamondback 
Management; 
Voicestream 
PCS 
II; 
and 
Walgreen Company #647. 
¶6 
The parties were notified of the deposit and were 
advised that a party entitled to all or part of the award could 
receive its proper share by filing a petition to distribute.  
The size of the award and how it was to be apportioned among the 
parties were both issues in dispute, but these issues are not 
before us in this appeal. 
¶7 
Upon deposit of the award, Clerk Barrett exercised his 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) to invest the funds.5  
He invested the award in Milwaukee County's general fund with 
the interest to go to the fund.  The award would earn about 2 
percent interest annually, producing about $24,000 a month for 
Milwaukee County. 
¶8 
On 
January 
6, 
2005, 
Bayshore 
Town 
Center, 
LLC 
(Bayshore) filed a motion with Judge Sankovitz, asking for an 
order to place the award into an interest bearing account for 
the benefit of the ultimate recipients of the award.  Bayshore 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) provides the following: 
Except as provided in par. (c), the clerk may 
invest any funds that are paid into his or her office 
and are being held for repayment.  The investments 
shall be made in suitably protected accounts in the 
manner specified in s. 66.0603(1m) and all income that 
may accrue shall be paid into the county general fund.   
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b). 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
6 
 
named a preferred depository.  Bayshore estimated that the award 
would earn between $400 and $800 of interest per day.  Bayshore 
also sought an order prohibiting Clerk Barrett from collecting 
the fee under Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1. for transferring the 
award to a private bank.  None of the "interested persons" 
objected to Bayshore's motion, but Clerk Barrett successfully 
moved to intervene to challenge the motion. 
¶9 
On February 3, 2005, the circuit court granted 
Bayshore's motion and ordered that Clerk Barrett transfer the 
award from the county general fund into a separate money market 
account at the suggested private bank, with interest accruing to 
the benefit of the ultimate recipients of the award.  The court 
also provided that neither the award nor the interest be 
released or disbursed without court order and that the transfer 
of 
the 
award 
not 
be 
subject 
to 
the 
fee 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1. 
¶10 In an opinion supporting the order, the circuit court 
reasoned that it had discretion under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) 
to decide whether the award could be transferred or should 
remain invested in the county's general fund.6  The circuit court 
weighed the value of the interest to the county against the 
impact upon the ultimate recipients of the award and decided 
that the amount of interest that would be diverted to the county 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) provides the following: "A 
judge may direct that par. (b) does not apply to certain funds 
paid into the office.  The judge's authority applies only to 
funds 
relating 
to 
cases 
before 
his 
or 
her 
court."  
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c). 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
7 
 
would be "truly a windfall."  The court observed that the county 
did not need to expend much effort to protect or manage the 
award and to the extent that the county had expended any effort, 
the county had "been more than handsomely compensated by the 
$24,000 or more that it already ha[d] earned on the funds just 
over the passage of the past month." 
¶11 Clerk Barrett appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) is ambiguous because the language, "A 
judge may direct that par. (b) does not apply to certain funds 
paid into the office," is capable of differing interpretations.  
HSBC Realty Credit Corp. v. City of Glendale, 2006 WI App 160, 
¶20, 295 Wis. 2d 493, 721 N.W.2d 489.  The court stated that the 
language could be interpreted as affecting the following: "(1) a 
clerk's authority to invest deposited funds; (2) a clerk's 
authority to invest funds in certain investment vehicles; (3) 
the directive that interest shall accrue for the benefit of the 
general fund; or (4) a clerk's authority to continue to manage 
the deposited funds."  Id.  
¶12 Because it concluded that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) was 
ambiguous, the court of appeals relied on legislative history to 
determine 
that 
"the 
legislature's 
intent 
in 
creating 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) was not to allow the trial court to 
remove funds from the clerk's management or direct that any 
earned interest be given to the litigants rather than the 
county's general fund."  Id., ¶30.  The court of appeals 
therefore ruled that the circuit court did not have statutory 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
8 
 
authority to order Clerk Barrett to transfer the award into a 
private money market account.  Id.  The court of appeals also 
ruled that the circuit court did not have any inherent or 
equitable authority to order a transfer from Clerk Barrett's 
office.  Id., ¶13.   
¶13 Judge Ralph Adam Fine dissented, reasoning that the 
clerk's grants of authority in Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) to 
invest the award and direct the interest to the county general 
fund are limited by § 59.40(3)(c).  Id., ¶32 (Fine, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Fine declared that § 59.40(3)(c) encompasses 
the entirety of § 59.40(3)(b) and thus allows the circuit court 
judge "to direct that income from funds relating to cases 
pending in his or her court not be paid into the county's 
general fund, but, rather, as required here by § 32.05(7)(d), be 
held 'for the benefit of the persons named in the award.'"  Id. 
¶14 Bayshore petitioned for review, which we granted on 
September 12, 2006.7 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 This 
case 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 59.40(3)(b), 59.40(3)(c), and 32.05(7)(d).  It 
also involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we 
                                                 
7 Because we decide this case on statutory grounds, we do 
not address the parties' arguments concerning the circuit 
court's inherent and equitable authority or the constitutional 
right to interest on a condemnation award. 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
9 
 
review de novo.  State v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 
2004 WI 56, ¶14, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 N.W.2d 514.   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶16 This case requires us to interpret the interplay among 
three statutory provisions, namely Wis. Stat. §§ 59.40(3)(b), 
59.40(3)(c), and 32.05(7)(d).  Bayshore and Clerk Barrett agree 
that these statutes are not ambiguous.  They disagree, however, 
as to their interpretation.  Bayshore argues that the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) allows a judge to veto the 
clerk's authority to invest and retain interest on the award.  
Bayshore argues that § 59.40(3)(c) also allows the judge to 
transfer the funds out of the clerk's control into a private 
interest bearing account to fulfill the statutory mandate in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d) that the award be held for the benefit 
of the persons named in the award. 
¶17 Clerk Barrett agrees that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) allows a judge to veto the clerk's 
authority to invest and collect interest on the award for the 
county.  However, Clerk Barrett argues that nowhere in their 
plain language do any of the statutes allow a judge to transfer 
the award out of the clerk's custody and control into a private 
account so that interest can accrue for the benefit of the 
persons named in the award. 
¶18 We agree with both parties that the language of the 
statutes is not ambiguous.  We disagree with Clerk Barrett's 
interpretation, however, and hold that the statutes allow the a 
judge not only to deny the clerk authority to invest the award 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
10 
 
and pay all interest into the county general fund, but also to 
transfer the award from the clerk's control into a private 
interest bearing account, so that the interest can accrue for 
the benefit of persons ultimately entitled to the award.  We 
reach this conclusion to avoid plainly unreasonable results. 
¶19 We begin our analysis with the language of the 
statutes.  When the meaning of statutes is plain, we usually 
stop our inquiry.  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  We give statutory language its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶20 Keeping these canons of statutory construction in 
mind, 
we 
begin 
by 
analyzing 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3).  Section 59.40(3) reads as follows: 
(3) Clerk of court; fees; investment of funds. 
(a) The clerk of the circuit court shall collect 
the fees that are prescribed in ss. 814.60 to 814.63.  
The clerk may refuse to accept any paper for filing or 
recording until the fee prescribed in subch. II of ch. 
814 or any applicable statute is paid. 
(b) Except as provided in par. (c), the clerk 
may invest any funds that are paid into his or her 
office and are being held for repayment.  The 
investments shall be made in suitably protected 
accounts in the manner specified in s. 66.0603(1m) and 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
11 
 
all income that may accrue shall be paid into the 
county general fund.   
(c) A judge may direct that par. (b) does not 
apply to certain funds paid into the office.  The 
judge's authority applies only to funds relating to 
cases before his or her court.   
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3). 
¶21 Paragraph (a) of the statute begins with a broad 
statement of the clerk's rights and duties, including the 
clerk's right to collect certain fees "prescribed" in Chapter 
814. 
¶22 Paragraph (b) appears to have four components: 
1. 
The clerk may invest any funds paid into the 
clerk's office that are being held for repayment; 
2. 
The clerk's investment strategy is limited to the 
options set out in Wis. Stat. § 66.0603(1m) and must be in 
"suitably protected accounts;"8 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0603(1m) is part of Subchapter VI 
(Finance; Revenues) of Chapter 66 (Municipal Law).  Section 
66.0603 is entitled "Investments," and subsection (1m) provides 
in part that a "county . . . may invest any of its funds not 
immediately needed in any of the following."  The "following" 
include: 
 
1. 
Time deposits in any credit union, bank, 
savings bank, trust company or savings and loan 
association which is authorized to transact business 
in this state if the time deposits mature in not more 
than 3 years. 
 
2. 
Bonds or securities issued or guaranteed as 
to principal and interest by the federal government, 
or by a commission, board or other instrumentality of 
the federal government. 
Subsection (1m) gives the clerk a broad but not unlimited 
array of investment options. 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
12 
 
3. 
All income from the clerk's investment shall be 
paid into the county general fund; and 
4. 
The prior three components apply unless a judge 
acts under paragraph (c). 
¶23 Paragraph (c) has the following components: 
1. 
The judge may direct that paragraph (b) does not 
apply to certain funds paid into the clerk's office. 
2. 
The judge's authority to "veto" the application 
of paragraph (b) applies only to funds relating to cases 
before the judge's court. 
¶24 Paragraph (c) does not spell out the extent of the 
judge's authority beyond his or her power to direct that 
paragraph (b) does not apply.  Hence, there are two possible 
interpretations.  The first interpretation is that after the 
judge exercises authority under paragraph (c) to direct that 
paragraph (b) does not apply, the judge has no complementary 
authority to transfer funds from the clerk's control or direct 
the clerk to act differently from how he or she would act under 
paragraph (b).  According to this interpretation, the judge's 
authority is purely negative: he or she may block the clerk from 
investing certain funds and earning interest on these funds for 
the county, but the judge may not in any way orchestrate the 
investment of funds for the benefit of someone other than the 
county. 
¶25 The second interpretation is that after the judge 
exercises authority under paragraph (c) to direct that paragraph 
(b) does not apply, the judge has complementary authority to 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
13 
 
direct the investment of the funds and order that interest 
accrue to the persons entitled to the funds instead of to the 
county. 
¶26 The first interpretation, which grants the judge only 
negative authority, is in essence the interpretation espoused by 
Clerk Barrett.  As Bayshore points out, this interpretation is 
the equivalent of saying that if the clerk cannot retain control 
of the condemnation award, then no one can control it and put it 
to good use.  This ascribes to the legislature an intent to 
limit a judge's authority to no more than directing the clerk to 
stash the funds under a mattress for safekeeping. 
¶27 Courts try to avoid unreasonable results in the 
interpretation of statutes, and we will attempt to achieve that 
objective here.  Under paragraph (b) the clerk is granted 
authority to invest "any funds that are paid into his or her 
office and are being held for repayment."  We note that the 
statute does not require the clerk to invest these funds; yet 
there are situations in which a clerk who merely held deposited 
funds and did not invest them would be considered guilty of 
nonfeasance, or failing to act as a trustee or good steward.9  
                                                 
9 A clerk who kept all deposited funds in a safe and did not 
invest them would be reminiscent of the fearful servant in the 
New Testament Parable of the Talents.  See Matthew 25:14-27: 
 
For it will be as when a man going on a journey 
called 
his 
servants 
and 
entrusted 
to 
them 
his 
property; to one he gave five talents, to another two, 
to another one, to each according to his ability.  
Then he went away.  He who had received the five 
talents went at once and traded with them; and he made 
five talents more.  So also, he who had the two 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
14 
 
Accordingly, one must conclude that if a clerk is expected to 
invest certain funds entrusted to him, a judge should be subject 
to the same expectations.  Hence, when the statute gives a judge 
explicit authority to deny the clerk power to invest certain 
funds, it must implicitly convey to the judge authority to 
effect a productive use of the funds, else the judge would be 
foolish for acting under the statute. 
                                                                                                                                                             
talents made two talents more.  But he who had 
received the one talent went and dug in the ground and 
hid his master's money.  Now after a long time the 
master of those servants came and settled accounts 
with them.  And he who had received the five talents 
came forward, bringing five talents more, saying, 
"Master, you delivered to me five talents; here I have 
made five talents more."  His master said to him, 
"Well done, good and faithful servant; you have been 
faithful over a little, I will set you over much; 
enter into the joy of your master."  And he also who 
had the two talents came forward, saying, "Master, you 
delivered to me two talents; here I have made two 
talents more."  His master said to him, "Well done, 
good and faithful servant; you have been faithful over 
a little, I will set you over much; enter into the joy 
of your master."  He also who had received the one 
talent came forward, saying, "Master, I knew you to be 
a hard man, reaping where you did not sow, and 
gathering where you did not winnow, so I was afraid, 
and I went and hid your talent in the ground.  Here 
you have what is yours."  But his master answered him, 
"You wicked and slothful servant!  You knew that I 
reap where I have not sowed, and gather where I have 
not winnowed?  Then you ought to have invested my 
money with the bankers, and at my coming I should have 
received what was my own with interest." 
The Oxford Annotated Bible, Revised Standard Version 1205-06 
(1962) (emphasis added).  See also Luke 19:12-13, The Oxford 
Annotated Bible, supra, at 1273. 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
15 
 
¶28 We acknowledge that the clerk's "if I can't have it, 
no one can" interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) can be 
squared with the text.  However, for the reasons stated above, 
such a rigid interpretation would be unreasonable.  In addition, 
because we are dealing with a condemnation award in this case, 
another 
statute 
must 
be 
considered. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(7)(d) directs a condemnor to mail the compensation award 
to one of the owners of the property condemned or deposit it 
"with the clerk of the circuit court of the county for the 
benefit of the persons named in the award."  Id. (emphasis 
added).10  If the condemnor exercises the first option, the 
owners will have the condemnation award to safeguard and to 
invest.  If the condemnor exercises the second option, the 
owners and persons interested in the award will not have control 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(7)(d) provides the following: 
On or before said date of taking, a check, naming 
the parties in interest as payees, for the amount of 
the award less outstanding delinquent tax liens, 
proportionately allocated as in division in redemption 
under ss. 74.51 and 75.01 when necessary and less 
prorated taxes of the same year, if any, likewise 
proportionately allocated when necessary against the 
property taken, shall at the option of the condemnor 
be mailed by certified mail to the owner or one of the 
owners of record or be deposited with the clerk of the 
circuit court of the county for the benefit of the 
persons named in the award.  The clerk shall give 
notice thereof by certified mail to such parties.  The 
persons entitled thereto may receive their proper 
share of the award by petition to and order of the 
circuit court of the county.  The petition shall be 
filed with the clerk of the court without fee.   
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d) (emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
16 
 
of the award and will gain no interest on the award unless the 
clerk or the court invests it for them.  In the context of the 
three 
statutory 
provisions——Wis. Stat. §§ 59.40(3)(b), 
59.40(3)(c), and 32.05(7)(d)——the only reasonable interpretation 
is that the legislature has given the judge complementary 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) 
to 
fulfill 
the 
statutory directive under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), either by 
ordering the clerk to transfer a condemnation award from the 
clerk's office to a suitably protected interest bearing account 
for the benefit of the ultimate recipients, or by capturing the 
interest on the clerk's investment of the award for the benefit 
of the ultimate recipients.  To take either action, the judge 
must possess positive authority. 
¶29 Focusing 
solely 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), 
the 
parties disagree as to whether a statute that provides that a 
condemnation award be held "for the benefit of the persons named 
in the award" requires that any interest on that award also be 
held "for the benefit of the persons named in the award."  This 
issue implicates the clerk's duty with respect to a condemnation 
award under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b), regardless of whether a 
judge acts under § 59.40(3)(c).   
¶30 This issue was answered, at least tentatively, in 
Bronfman v. Douglas County, 164 Wis. 2d 718, 476 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. 
App. 1991).  In Bronfman, the city of Superior condemned 
property and tendered approximately $1.5 million to the owners 
by depositing the funds with the clerk.  Id. at 721.  The owners 
declined the award and appealed.  Id.  They later changed their 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
17 
 
minds, withdrew the appeal, and demanded the interest earned on 
the deposited funds during the pendency of the appeal.  Id.  
When 
the 
circuit 
court 
rejected 
their 
demand, 
citing 
Wis. Stat. § 59.42(2) (1989-90) (now § 59.40(3)(b)), the owners 
appealed.  They attempted to distinguish certain funds like 
condemnation awards from other funds deposited with the clerk, 
and they challenged the assignment of all interest from such 
funds to the county as an unconstitutional taking. 
¶31 In affirming the circuit court, the court of appeals 
set out the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 59.42, Bronfman, 
164 Wis. 2d at 722-24; ruled that the words "any funds" were 
intended to include condemnation awards, id. at 724; and upheld 
the constitutionality of the statute, id. at 727. 
¶32 We need not revisit the constitutional issue here 
because 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
paragraph 
(b) 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3) is not before us so long as we interpret 
paragraph (c) of the statute to permit a judge to capture the 
interest on certain deposited funds (such as condemnation 
awards) for the benefit of interested persons.  The interested 
persons here do not challenge the county's retention of 
approximately $24,000 in interest earned on their award before 
the circuit court ordered the funds sent to a money market 
account at a private bank. 
¶33 We do, however, need to revisit the legislative 
history of Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3) set out in Bronfman because in 
one respect it is not correct.   
No.  2005AP1042 
 
18 
 
¶34 The 
legislature 
created 
the 
forerunner 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) in 1969.  See ch. 43, Laws of 1969.  
The vehicle was 1969 A.B. 226, introduced by Representative 
Joseph E. Jones of Milwaukee "by request of Milwaukee County."  
The bill gave clerks of court the power to invest funds they 
received that were not identifiable to any account.  The 
investments had to be made in protected accounts "and all income 
that may accrue shall be paid into the county general fund."  
See Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14) (1969-70).11   
¶35 The Bronfman plaintiffs argued that the reference to 
"any funds" in the statute did not apply to interest on money 
tendered into court for the benefit of the parties in civil 
litigation, for that would have meant that plaintiffs would lose 
the interest on their condemnation award to the county.   
¶36 To address this question, the Bronfman court made this 
incorrect statement about the legislative history of the 1969 
legislation: 
                                                 
11 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14) (1969-70) reads 
as follows: 
Investment of funds not identifiable.  The clerk 
may invest any funds paid into his office and which 
are being held for repayment, but which are not 
specifically identifiable to any account because of 
their 
necessary 
intermingling 
with 
related 
transactions.  Such investments shall be made in 
suitably protected accounts in the same manner as a 
trustee would be required to invest funds held in 
trust, and all income that may accrue shall be paid 
into the county general fund.   
No.  2005AP1042 
 
19 
 
The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) records show 
that 
the 
request 
for 
a 
statute 
to 
authorize 
investments by the clerk of the circuit court came 
from Milwaukee County and dealt specifically with 
condemnation awards paid into court. 
Bronfman, 164 Wis. 2d at 722-23 (emphasis added).  The court 
supported its statement by quoting at length from an opinion 
letter by Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel Robert P. Russell 
explaining proposed legislation: 
 
Under the existing law money paid to the clerk of 
the circuit court as damages for the taking of 
property in condemnation proceedings is paid to the 
clerk for the benefit of the property owner.  The 
refusal of the property owner to accept the amount 
tendered as damages does not change the fact that the 
money actually belongs to him and the clerk is simply 
holding the funds as trustee.  While the existing law 
does not require that the clerk invest such money, if 
it is invested, the interest thereon belongs to the 
property owner.  This would be true regardless of the 
manner of investment, whether by the clerk directly or 
indirectly through the county treasurer. 
 
We 
assume 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
recommendations . . . is to change the existing law 
not only with respect to monies deposited as damages 
in condemnation proceedings, but also to cover other 
monies which might be deposited with the clerk of the 
circuit court.  Without passing upon the merits of 
such legislation, it would be our opinion that the 
legislature could properly authorize the clerk of the 
circuit court, with certain exceptions, such as monies 
representing the proceeds of minor settlements, to 
deposit monies received by him . . . where it would be 
mingled with other funds of the county . . . and with 
the county retaining the interest earned on such 
funds.  Accordingly, we find no legal obstacle to the 
adoption of the proposed resolution. 
Id. at 723 (emphasis added). 
 
¶37 What the Bronfman court did not explain is that the 
Russell letter concerned the failure of Milwaukee County in the 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
20 
 
1965 
legislative session——not the 1969 session——to secure 
legislation that would have permitted the county to capture 
interest on condemnation awards deposited with the clerk.  This 
failure required the Milwaukee County Clerk of Circuit Court to 
submit a new proposal for the 1969 session, namely: 
a proposal to amend or create a section of the 
statutes to enable the Clerk of Circuit Court to 
invest "idle" or "floating funds" pursuant to accepted 
standards of trustees, so that such "funds in transit" 
being held by the Circuit Court and not identifiable 
as belonging to any particular persons may draw 
interest and pay for their keep. 
Letter from Gerard S. Paradowski for Milwaukee County to Rupert 
Theobald, Drafting Records, 1969 A.B. 226 (on file with the 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin) (emphasis 
added).  This new proposal did not deal "specifically with 
condemnation awards paid into court."  Contra Bronfman, 164 
Wis. 2d at 722-23. 
¶38 Hence, the scaled-back legislation in 1969 allowed the 
clerk to invest only "funds . . . which are not specifically 
identifiable 
to 
any 
account 
because 
of 
their 
necessary 
intermingling with related transactions" (i.e., floating funds) 
and to pay interest on these funds to the county general fund.   
¶39 A decade later, in the 1979 session, the legislature 
broadened the statute to read: 
 
(14) Investment of Funds.  (a) Except as provided 
in par. (b), the clerk may invest any funds paid into 
his or her office and which are being held for 
repayment.  The investments shall be made in suitably 
protected accounts in the manner specified in s. 
66.04(2) and all income that may accrue shall be paid 
into the county general fund. 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
21 
 
 
(b) A judge may direct that par. (a) does not 
apply to certain funds paid into the office.  The 
judge's authority applies only to funds relating to 
cases before his or her court. 
Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14) (1979-80) (emphasis added). 
¶40 The principal purpose of this 1980 revision was to 
specify that the investment provisions "relate to all funds paid 
into the clerk's office, but that a judge may direct that the 
investment provisions do not apply to certain funds paid into 
the office relating to cases handled by the judge."  Analysis by 
Legislative Reference Bureau, 1979 A.B. 756; §§ 2-3, ch. 241, 
Laws of 1979 (emphasis added).  In short, after the 1980 
legislation, "any funds" did apply to condemnation awards, but 
the statute also allowed the court to intervene to change the 
result dictated by then paragraph (a) of the statute.  When a 
judge invoked paragraph (b) of Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14) (now 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c)) to direct that paragraph (a) (now 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b)) does not apply, the statute effected a 
return to the law as it existed before paragraph (a) of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14) 
was 
enacted. 
 
As 
Milwaukee 
County 
Corporation Counsel Robert Russell noted in his letter, the 
existing 
law 
(prior 
to 
any 
enactment 
or 
amendment 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14)) required that any interest earned on a 
condemnation award deposited with the clerk belonged to the 
property 
owner. 
 
Thus, 
implicit 
in 
paragraph 
(b) 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.42(14) is the legislature's intent to give the 
judge authority, in addition to veto authority, to remove 
control of "funds relating to cases before his or her court" 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
22 
 
from the clerk so that interest earned on the funds may be paid 
to the persons ultimately entitled to them. 
¶41 The legislative history of 1979 A.B. 756 does not 
provide an extensive written explanation of the changes in the 
statute.  Consequently, we rely on the statutory language 
without 
the 
luxury 
of 
extensive 
legislative 
comment 
to 
substantiate our interpretation. 
¶42 The court of appeals took a different tack.  It 
employed the absence of legislative comment to establish 
legislative intent: 
There is no suggestion in any of the legislative 
history that the legislation was intended to remove 
the clerk's authority to manage deposited funds or to 
cast doubt on the intent that the counties benefit 
from such investment.  These facts provide convincing 
evidence that the intent of the legislature . . . was 
only to allow the trial court to limit or veto the 
clerk's 
investment 
authority. 
 
Nothing 
in 
the 
legislative history supports a legislative intent to 
create a new procedure in this statute whereby the 
trial court could remove the award from the clerk's 
control and direct that those whose land was condemned 
receive future interest on the award. 
HSBC, 295 Wis. 2d 493, ¶26. 
 
¶43 We are not persuaded by this analysis.  The court of 
appeals did not address the legislature's significant broadening 
of 
the 
statute 
in 
1980 
or 
explain 
its 
purpose 
in 
contemporaneously granting a judge authority to countermand the 
clerk's investment of funds.  Surely, the legislature did not 
give the judge this authority because it was worried about the 
safety of funds in the clerk's control.  We think it likely that 
the legislature wanted to deal fairly with property owners on 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
23 
 
condemnation awards and other private funds deposited with the 
clerk, so as to prevent a county from overreaching and to 
protect the county's interest in other deposited funds.  The 
legislature would have understood, for instance, that counties 
also 
condemn 
property. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 32.02. 
 
If 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) did not give a judge the ability to 
intervene, Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) would allow a county to keep 
the county's condemnation award in a county official's control 
where the county would earn interest on it.  The legislature 
would have understood that giving a county control of condemned 
property and the condemnation award for that property and the 
interest on the award would raise serious constitutional 
questions. 
¶44 In addition, unless we enter into the realm of a 
court's inherent authority, the absence of statutory authority 
for the court to direct that funds be prudently invested 
elsewhere would prevent the court from acting on an agreement 
among all parties with a legal claim to the funds. 
¶45 We reject any notion that our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 59.40(3)(b), 
59.40(3)(c), 
and 
32.05(7)(d) 
is 
against public policy and discourages speedy resolution of 
claims by allowing litigants to collect interest pending 
litigation.  As we noted, this case involved a significant 
condemnation award of $14,439,294.84.  The interested persons 
included the property owner, the bank, and parties with 
leasehold interests.  A condemnation award of this magnitude 
that names so many interested persons is obviously susceptible 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
24 
 
to litigation.  Property owners should not be denied the 
interest on their condemnation award as a penalty for litigation 
delay.  Such a penalty, which in this case would have amounted 
to about $400 to $800 a day, would be against public policy. 
¶46 We conclude that when Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) is read 
in 
conjunction 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) empowers a circuit judge not only to 
veto the clerk's authority to invest a condemnation award but 
also to direct the clerk to transfer a condemnation award from 
the clerk's control into a private money market account "for the 
benefit of the persons named in the award" or otherwise invest 
the funds for the benefit of such persons.  Moreover, we think 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) empowers a circuit judge not only to 
veto the clerk's authority to invest and control the interest on 
condemnation awards but also veto the clerk's authority over 
"certain" other funds deposited with the clerk, so long as the 
funds relate to a case before the judge's court.  When the judge 
exercises his authority under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c), the 
judge may cooperate with the clerk to invest the funds and 
redirect the interest to the persons ultimately entitled to the 
funds, or it may transfer the funds from the clerk's control 
into a secure private account where it can earn interest for 
interested persons.   
¶47 We are bound to comment that our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) entails responsibilities not sought by 
circuit courts.  When a court is asked to invoke its power under 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c), it need not automatically grant the 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
25 
 
request.  A court should have a good reason to transfer funds 
from the clerk's control.  In every instance, a court should 
exercise its power with sound discretion, with the consent, if 
possible, of all interested parties, and with a prudence that 
assures that any funds transferred from the clerk's control be 
placed in "suitably protected accounts."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 54.12(1)(a) authorizes a circuit court to order a register in 
probate to deposit the property of a minor or an individual 
found incompetent "in an interest-bearing account in a bank or 
other financial institution insured by an agency of the federal 
government 
or 
invest 
the 
property 
in 
interest-bearing 
obligations of the United States."  Wis. Stat. § 54.12(1)(a).  
We think this statute describes for a court what is meant by 
investments in "suitably protected accounts."  A court is not an 
investment advisor.   
¶48 Because we find that the circuit court did have 
authority to transfer the award in this case, the issue arises 
whether Clerk Barrett is entitled to a fee for the transfer 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1.12  The circuit court found 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1. provides in part: 
The clerk shall collect the following fees: 
. . . . 
1. 
For receiving a trust fund, or handling or 
depositing money under s. 757.25 . . . at the time the 
money is deposited with the clerk, a fee of $10 or 
0.5% of the amount deposited, whichever is greater.  
In addition, a fee of $10 shall be charged upon each 
No.  2005AP1042 
 
26 
 
that the transfer of the award was not subject to the 
disbursement fee provided in § 814.61(12)(a)1.  We agree. 
¶49 A condemnation award is not "a trust fund" under 
Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1. 
 
Hence, 
we 
look 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 757.25 
to 
understand 
"handling 
or 
depositing 
money."  Wisconsin Stat. § 757.25 provides the following: 
Money in court, how deposited.  The judge of any 
court of record on the application of a party to any 
action or proceeding therein who has paid $1,000 or 
more into court in the action or proceeding may order 
the money to be deposited in a safe depository until 
the further order of the court or judge thereof.  
After the money has been so deposited it shall be 
withdrawn only upon a check signed by the clerk of the 
court pursuant to whose order the deposit was made and 
upon an order made by the court or the judge thereof.  
The fee for the clerk’s services for depositing and 
disbursing 
the 
money 
is 
prescribed 
in 
s. 
814.61(12)(a).   
Wis. Stat. § 757.25.  This statute has two prerequisites for a 
fee: (1) a party to the action has paid at least $1000 into 
court; and (2) that same party has obtained from the judge an 
order directing the clerk of court to deposit the money in a 
safe depository.  See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 3, 4-5 (1984).   
 
¶50 The CDA deposited the condemnation award with the 
clerk.  If the CDA is deemed a party and if the CDA paid the 
award "into court," the CDA is still not the party that obtained 
an order directing Clerk Barrett to deposit the award with a 
bank into a money market account.  Consequently, one of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
withdrawal or any or all of the money deposited with 
the clerk. 
Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1.   
No.  2005AP1042 
 
27 
 
prerequisites is not present, and Clerk Barrett is not entitled 
to a disbursement fee under Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1.  In any 
event, as Judge Sankovitz observed, the Bronfman court stated 
that "Wisconsin does not provide both a service fee and 
retention of the interest."  Bronfman, 164 Wis. 2d at 727.  In a 
situation like this one, such a fee would be unconscionable 
because it would bear no relationship to the clerk's actual 
service. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶51 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) empowers a 
circuit judge not only to veto the clerk's authority to invest 
"certain funds" and pay all interest on those funds into the 
county general fund, but also to direct the clerk to transfer 
"certain funds" from the clerk's control into a secure private 
account for the benefit of persons ultimately entitled to the 
funds.  The judge's power under § 59.40(3)(c) is especially 
clear with respect to condemnation awards, when § 59.40(3)(c) is 
read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d).  Nonetheless, 
the judge's power under Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) should be 
exercised with sound discretion, with the consent, if possible, 
of all affected parties, and with a prudence that assures that 
any funds transferred from the clerk's control be placed in 
"suitably protected accounts."  We conclude that the circuit 
judge met these standards in this case.  In addition, we 
conclude that Clerk Barrett is not entitled to a transfer fee 
under Wis. Stat. § 814.61(12)(a)1. in this case.  Consequently, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.   
No.  2005AP1042 
 
28 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1042.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Butler's concurrence.  This case could be decided on 
narrow grounds.  The problems with the existing statute could be 
identified and the task of redrafting the statute left to the 
legislature or to a case in which the court must settle a 
dispute on constitutional grounds. 
¶53 I write separately to raise an issue that no party 
addresses but that might be a matter of some concern.  This case 
involved the powers and duties of the office of clerk of circuit 
court.  The office of clerk of circuit court is a constitutional 
office, Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 121 (see also Art. VI, § 4),2 and 
                                                 
1 Article VII, section 12 (as amended Nov. 1882, Apr. 2005) 
states in full that:   
(1) There shall be a clerk of circuit court chosen in 
each county organized for judicial purposes by the 
qualified electors thereof, who, except as provided in 
sub. (2), shall hold office for two years, subject to 
removal as provided by law. 
(2) Beginning with the first general election at which 
the governor is elected which occurs after the 
ratification of this subsection, a clerk of circuit 
court shall be chosen by the electors of each county, 
for the term of 4 years, subject to removal as 
provided by law. 
(3) In case of a vacancy, the judge of the circuit 
court may appoint a clerk until the vacancy is filled 
by an election. 
(4) The clerk of circuit court shall give such 
security as the legislature requires by law.   
No.  2005AP1042.ssa 
 
2 
 
the clerk of circuit court has been a constitutional office 
since the 1848 state constitution, 1848 Wis. Const. Art. VII, 
§ 12.3  State ex rel. Allen v. Lyon, 45 Wis. 246, 248 (1878); 
State v. Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. 441, 449 (1927) (Eschweiler, J., 
dissenting) (explaining "[t]he clerk of the circuit court is a 
constitutional officer").   
¶54 We have had occasion to discuss the implications of 
the constitutional nature of the office of sheriff.  An issue 
sometimes raised when a statute governs the constitutional 
office of sheriff is whether by virtue of being a constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                             
(5) The supreme court shall appoint its own clerk, and 
may appoint a clerk of circuit court to be the clerk 
of the supreme court. 
2 Article VI, section 4, as amended most recently in April 
2005, states in pertinent part that: 
(1)(a) Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c) and 
sub. (2), coroners, registers of deeds, district 
attorneys, and all other elected county officers, 
except 
judicial 
officers, 
sheriffs, 
and 
chief 
executive officers, shall be chosen by the electors of 
the respective counties once in every 2 years. 
. . . . 
(c) Beginning with the first general election at which 
the president is elected which occurs after the 
ratification of this paragraph, district attorneys, 
registers of deeds, county clerks, and treasurers 
shall be chosen by the electors of the respective 
counties, or by the electors of all of the respective 
counties 
comprising 
each 
combination 
of 
counties 
combined by the legislature for that purpose . . . . 
3 Article VII, section 12, of the 1848 constitution stated 
in pertinent part:  "There shall be a clerk of the circuit 
court, chosen in each county, organized for judicial purposes, 
by the qualified electors thereof, who shall hold his office for 
two years, subject to removal as shall be provided by law." 
No.  2005AP1042.ssa 
 
3 
 
office certain duties attach to the office that cannot be 
altered by statute.  Cases addressing this issue as it relates 
to the office of sheriff date as far back as State ex rel. 
Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412 (1870), and are as recent as  
Kocken v. Wis. Council 40, 2007 WI 72, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
¶55 The applicability of this line of cases to the office 
of clerk of circuit court has not been explored recently by this 
court.  The court of appeals, however, has examined some of the 
constitutional underpinnings and ramifications of the office of 
the clerk of circuit court.  See, e.g., Granado v. Sentry Ins., 
228 Wis. 2d 794, 801-02, 599 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1999); Harbick 
v. Marinette County, 138 Wis. 2d 172, 179-80, 405 N.W.2d 724 
(Ct. App. 1987) (relating to the powers and duties of the office 
of county clerk). 
¶56 The parties do not ask us to decide a constitutional 
issue, and I will not comment on it further.  Litigants, courts, 
and the legislature must be mindful, however, to consider any 
constitutional powers of the office of clerk of circuit court. 
¶57 For the reasons set forth, I concur.  
 
No.  2005AP1042.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶58 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  Perhaps I am 
missing something.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), which is 
applicable to this case, provides that a condemnor's check for 
the amount of the award either be sent to the property owners 
"or be deposited with the clerk of the circuit court of the 
county for the benefit of the persons named in the award."  
(Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3) sets the general 
rule as to how money deposited with the clerk is handled.  The 
pertinent portions of that section are as follows: 
 
(b) Except as provided in par. (c), the clerk may 
invest any funds that are paid into his or her office 
and are being held for repayment.  The investments 
shall be made in suitably protected accounts in the 
manner specified in s. 66.0603(1m) and all income that 
may accrue shall be paid into the county general fund. 
 
(c) A judge may direct that par. (b) does not 
apply to certain funds paid into the office.  The 
judge's authority applies only to funds relating to 
cases before his or her court. 
No.  2005AP1042.lbb 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3).1  Thus, paragraph (b) of the general 
statute grants the clerk of courts the authority to invest funds 
paid into that office in suitably protected accounts, and 
requires interest income that accrues to be paid into the county 
general fund.  Paragraph (c), on the other hand, provides a 
judge, in cases before that judge, the authority to veto the 
application of paragraph (b) to certain funds paid to the clerk.  
Should a judge direct that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) does not 
apply to certain funds, then gone is the authority of the clerk 
to invest funds held for repayment under the statute; gone is 
the authority to invest in suitably protected accounts under the 
statute; and gone is the requirement that interest income 
accrued be paid into the county general fund under the statute. 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) grants the court only a 
negative 
statutory 
veto 
authority 
to 
deem 
§ 59.40(3)(b) 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3) provides in full:  
Clerk of court; fees; investment of funds. (a) 
The clerk of the circuit court shall collect the fees 
that are prescribed in ss. 814.60 to 814.63.  The 
clerk may refuse to accept any paper for filing or 
recording until the fee prescribed in subch. II of ch. 
814 or any applicable statute is paid. 
(b) Except as provided in par. (c), the clerk may 
invest any funds that are paid into his or her office 
and are being held for repayment.  The investments 
shall be made in suitably protected accounts in the 
manner specified in s. 66.0603(1m) and all income that 
may accrue shall be paid into the county general fund. 
(c) A judge may direct that par. (b) does not 
apply to certain funds paid into the office.  The 
judge's authority applies only to funds relating to 
cases before his or her court. 
No.  2005AP1042.lbb 
 
3 
 
inapplicable in some cases.  It does not grant the court an 
additional positive authority to affirmatively order a transfer 
of funds from the clerk's office into a private interest-bearing 
account, which the majority contends is implicit in the meaning 
of the statute.  Majority op., ¶¶4, 27-28, 51. 
¶60 I note that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) does not provide 
a judge with the authority to parse the statute in a manner that 
would allow the circuit court to disregard a portion of 
paragraph (b).  Thus, under the statute in question, once a 
judge invokes paragraph (c), a clerk's authority to invest the 
funds held in the condemnation award must be found elsewhere. 
¶61 This takes us back to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), which 
allows a condemnor to deposit with the clerk of circuit court a 
check "for the benefit of the persons named in the award."  The 
clerk then gives notice to the parties, who may receive their 
proper share of the award by petition to and order of the 
circuit court.  Id.  Nowhere in the statute does the legislature 
provide the judge with the authority to order the clerk of 
courts to invest the award in the first instance, much less 
invest it in a particular account.  And nowhere does the statute 
allow the clerk to keep any interest accrued at the expense of, 
as opposed to the benefit of, the parties.   
¶62 Thus, 
when 
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) 
is 
rendered 
inapplicable by a judge pursuant to § 59.40(3)(c), and those 
sections are read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), 
which requires condemnation awards to be held for the benefit of 
the parties, these statutes do not grant the judge the power to 
No.  2005AP1042.lbb 
 
4 
 
order the clerk of court to transfer funds to a private 
interest-bearing account.  Without a clear legislative grant of 
power, and without any other source of authority identified, 
such as the inherent powers or equitable authority of the court,2 
the majority is simply rewriting the statute in a manner that 
produces a result it deems to be reasonable.3   
¶63 I concur with the result only because none of the 
"interested persons" in this case objected to the request for 
transfer of funds by one of the parties to a private interest-
bearing account for the benefit of the parties.  Majority op., 
¶8.  It was their money.  Whether the circuit court had the 
authority to order the transfer of funds to an interest-bearing 
account in the first instance is one thing.  That in no way 
alters the fact that the circuit court in this case did order 
the transfer of funds to an interest-bearing account.  Now that 
that has occurred, something must be done with the interest that 
was earned during the period of the transfer.  Because the 
circuit court invoked Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c), the clerk of 
courts lacked the authority under paragraph (b) to pay the 
income accrued into the county general fund.  Pursuant to 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 548, 
576 N.W.2d 245 (1998); Perpignani v. Vonasek, 139 Wis. 2d 695, 
737, 408 N.W.2d 1 (1987); Weeden v. City of Beloit, 29 Wis. 2d 
662, 673, 139 N.W.2d 616 (1966); but c.f. majority opinion at 
¶14 n.7 ("[b]ecause we decide this case on statutory grounds, we 
do not address the parties' arguments concerning the circuit 
court's inherent and equitable authority . . ."). 
3 Indeed, the result may not only be reasonable, it may be 
preferable.  Nevertheless, that determination is for the 
legislature, 
absent 
some 
legitimate 
independent 
grant 
of 
authority. 
No.  2005AP1042.lbb 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), the award was to be held for the 
benefit of the parties.  Thus, any interest accrued in this case 
must, under § 32.05(7)(d), revert to the parties.  
¶64 I have no quarrel with the public policy advocated in 
the majority opinion.  Nonetheless, it remains the role of the 
legislature, not the judiciary, to rewrite legislation where 
necessary 
to 
implement 
positive 
public 
policy 
goals.  
Accordingly, while I concur with the court's mandate, I decline 
to join its opinion.   
¶65 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurring opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP1042.lbb 
 
 
 
1