Title: SWANSON v ST JOHN S LUTHERAN HOSP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-106
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 1980

N o . 79-106 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1980 MARJORIE C . S W A N S O N , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, ST. JOHN'S L U T H E R A N HOSPITAL, a Montana Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln. Honorable Robert C. Holter, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Fennessy, Crocker and Harman, Libby, Montana For Respondent: Smith Law Firm, Helena, Montana W i l l i a m s and Sverdrup, Libby, Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : A p r i l 2 4 , 1980 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Marjorie Swanson o r i g i n a l l y brought t h i s a c t i o n under Montana's "Conscience Law," s e c t i o n 50-5-504, MCA, i n t h e Lincoln County D i s t r i c t Court. Judgment was entered i n favor of defendant. The judgment was reversed and remanded by t h i s Court i n June 1979. Swanson v. S t . John's Lutheran Hospital (1979), Mont. , 597 P. 2d 702, 36 St.Rep. 1075. O n remand, t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded damages t o t a l i n g $11,950.86. P l a i n t i f f b r i n g s t h i s appeal from t h e damage award, and defendant cross-appeals. P l a i n t i f f ' s employment a s a nurse-anesthetist was terminated on August 24, 1977, by defendant h o s p i t a l f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s r e f u s a l t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n a tuba1 l i g a t i o n . P l a i n t i f f had been employed by t h e h o s p i t a l f o r e i g h t years p r i o r t o her dismissal and had e i g h t years remaining u n t i l retirement. A t t h e t i m e of her discharge, she had s l i g h t l y more than seven months remaining on her employment c o n t r a c t . O n t h e i n i t i a l appeal, t h i s Court found t h a t she w a s e n t i t l e d t o "monetary damages f o r i n j u r i e s suffered" under s e c t i o n 50-5-504(2), MCA. W e remanded t h e case s t a t i n g , " [ i ] t i s t h e function of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o determine t h e amount of and kind of monetary damages t o which she i s e n t i t l e d . " 597 P.2d a t 711. The D i s t r i c t Court awarded damages equal t o t h e amount of wages p l a i n t i f f would have received f o r t h e seven months remaining on her employment c o n t r a c t p l u s insurance b e n e f i t s mitigated by wages she received i n another job during t h e period. While a v a r i e t y of i s s u e s have been r a i s e d by t h i s appeal and cross-appeal, t h e following i s s u e i s d i s p o s i t i v e : Did t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court err i n t h e manner and amount it chose t o award damages? P l a i n t i f f contends on appeal t h a t t o r t and exemplary damages should have been awarded. Defendant contends on cross-appeal t h a t t h e amount of wages awarded should have been reduced by t h e amount of p a y r o l l t a x e s which would have been deducted from t h e wages and by t h e amount of unemploy- ment compensation received by p l a i n t i f f . Section 50-5-504, MCA, provides: "Unlawful t o i n t e r f e r e with r i g h t of r e f u s a l . (1) It s h a l l be unlawful t o i n t e r f e r e o r a t - tempt t o i n t e r f e r e with t h e r i g h t of r e f u s a l authorized by t h i s p a r t , whether by duress, coercion, o r any o t h e r means. " ( 2 ) The person i n j u r e d thereby s h a l l be en- t i t l e d t o i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , when appropriate, and s h a l l fukther be e n t i t l e d t o monetary damages f o r i n j u r i e s suffered." ( ~ m p h z i s supplied.) While no case i n Montana has construed t h i s s t a t u t e , t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is c l e a r . The s t a t u t e i s designed a t t h e o u t s e t t o prevent unlawful a c t i o n s under t h i s s e c t i o n through i n j u n c t i o n , where appropriate, and f u r t h e r t o monetarily compensate persons who s u f f e r i n j u r i e s a s a r e s u l t of s a i d unlawful a c t i o n s . This law c r e a t e s a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o r e c e i v e damages above and beyond the employment contract. A s such, t h e r e i s no s p e c i f i c theory s e t f o r t h f o r determining damages (e.g., c o n t r a c t o r t o r t ) a s is argued by t h e p a r t i e s here. The l e g i s l a t u r e i n s t e a d sought t o compensate i n j u r e d persons no matter what form t h e i n j u r i e s took. Its e f f e c t i s s i m i l a r t o 42 U.S.C. 81983, which i s derived from 81 of the C i v i l Rights Act of 1871. The b a s i c purpose of a 51983 damages award i s t o compensate persons f o r i n j u r i e s caused by t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Carey v. Piphus (1978), 435 U.S. 247, 254, I n Carey t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court provided an e x c e l l e n t discussion of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e compensation theory t o a 51983 action. I t s t a t e d : ". . . Rights, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and otherwise, do n o t e x i s t i n a vacuum. Their purpose i s t o pro- t e c t persons from i n j u r i e s t o p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r - ests, and t h e i r contours a r e shaped by t h e in- terests they p r o t e c t . "Our l e g a l system's concept of damages r e f l e c t s t h i s view of l e g a l r i g h t s . 'The c a r d i n a l prin- c i p l e of damages inAnglo-Americanlaw is t h a t of compensation f o r t h e i n j u r y caused t o plain- t i f f by defendant's breach of duty.' [Authority omitted.] The Court i m p l i c i t e d l y has recog- nized t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s p r i n c i p l e t o a c t i o n s under 81983 by s t a t i n g t h a t damages a r e a v a i l a b l e under t h a t s e c t i o n f o r a c t i o n s 'found . . . t o have been v i o l a t i v e of . . . c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l r i g h t s and t o have caused compensable --- i n j u r y . ' . . . ". . . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t Congress intended t h a t awards under 51983 should d e t e r t h e deprivation of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , t h e r e is no evidence t h a t it meant t o e s t a b l i s h a d e t e r r e n t more formidable than t h a t i n h e r e n t i n t h e award of compensatory damages. [ C i t a t i o n omitted.] " I t i s l e s s d i f f i c u l t t o conclude t h a t damages awards under 5 1983 should be governed by t h e p r i n c i p l e of compensation than it i s t o apply t h i s p r i n c i p l e t o concrete cases. But over t h e c e n t u r i e s t h e common law of t o r t s has developed a set of r u l e s t o implement t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a person should be compensated f a i r l y f o r i n j u r i e s caused by t h e v i o l a t i o n of h i s l e g a l r i g h t s . These r u l e s , defining t h e elements of damages and t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r t h e i r recovery, provide t h e appropriate s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r t h e i n q u i r y under 5 1983 as well. " I t i s n o t c l e a r , however, t h a t common-law t o r t r u l e s of damages w i l l provide a complete solu- t i o n t o t h e damages i s s u e i n every 8 1983 case. I n some cases, t h e i n t e r e s t s protected by a p a r t i c u l a r branch of t h e common law of t o r t s may p a r a l l e l c l o s e l y t h e i n t e r e s t s protected by a p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . I n such cases, it may be appropriate t o apply t h e t o r t r u l e s of damages d i r e c t l y t o t h e 5 1983 a c t i o n . [ C i t a - t i o n s omitted.] " I n o t h e r cases, t h e i n t e r e s t s protected by a p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t may n o t a l s o be protected by an analogous branch of t h e common l a w of t o r t s . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] I n those cases, t h e t a s k w i l l be t h e more d i f f i c u l t one of adaptingcornmon-lawrules of damages t o pro- vide f a i r compensation f o r i n j u r i e s caused by t h e deprivation of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . "Although t h i s t a s k of adaptation w i l l be one of some delicacy--as t h i s case demonstrates--it must be undertaken. The purpose of 8 1983 would be defeated i f i n j u r i e s caused by t h e deprivation of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s went uncompensated s i m - p l y because t h e common law does n o t recognize an analogous cause of a c t i o n . [ C i t a t i o n s omit- ted. ] I n order t o f u r t h e r t h e purpose of 5 1983, t h e r u l e s governing compensation f o r i n j u r i e s caused by t h e deprivation of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s should be t a i l o r e d t o t h e i n t e r e s t s pro- t e c t e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t i n question--just as t h e common-law r u l e s of damages themselves were defined by t h e i n t e r e s t s protected i n t h e various branches of t o r t law. W e agree with M r . J u s t i c e Harlan t h a t ' t h e experience of judges i n dealing with p r i v a t e [ t o r t ] claims supports t h e conclusion t h a t c o u r t s of law a r e capable of making t h e types of judgment concerning causa- t i o n and magnitude of i n j u r y necessary t o accord meaningful compensation f o r invasion of [consti- t u t i o n a l ] r i g h t s . ' Bivens v. S i x Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 U.S. a t 409, 91 S.Ct. a t 2011 (Harlan, J., concurring i n judg- ment.)" 435 U.S. a t 254-259. Federal c o u r t s appear t o generally agree t h a t damages awards under 51983 should be determined by t h e compensation p r i n c i p l e . United S t a t e s e x r e l . T y r r e l l v. Speaker (3rd C i r . 1976), 535 F.2d 823; Magnett v. P e l l e t i e r (1st C i r . 1973), 488 F.2d 33; Donovan v. Reinbold ( 9 t h C i r . 1970), 433 F.2d 738. Furthermore, exemplary o r p u n i t i v e damages may be awarded i n a proper c a s e under 81983 with t h e s p e c i f i c purpose of d e t e r r i n g o r punishing v i o l a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l r i g h t s . S i l v e r v. Cormier (10th C i r . 1976)r 529 F.2d 161, 163-164; Stengel v. Belcher ( 6 t h C i r . 1975), 522 F.2d 9 7 3 7 5 ' 438, 4 4 4 n. 4 , c e r t . dismissed 429 U.S. 118, 4 % - S.Ct. 5 0 dbp 47- L.Ed. 2d + H I . Montana follows a s i m i l a r compensatory scheme f o r awarding damages. There i s no question t h a t i n Montana every person who s u f f e r s detriment from t h e unlawful a c t o r omission of another may recover damages from t h e person a t f a u l t . Section 27-1-202, MCA. An i n j u r e d person i s a l s o e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e compensation f o r f u t u r e damages which a r e shown t o be reasonably c e r t a i n . Section 27-1-203, MCA; Frisnegger v. Gibson (1979), - Mont. , 598 P.2d 574, 36 St.Rep. 1335. Further, i n any a c t i o n f o r breach of an o b l i g a t i o n n o t a r i s i n g from c o n t r a c t where t h e defendant has been g u i l t y of oppression, fraud o r malice, a c t u a l o r pre- sumed, exemplary damages may be allowed. Section 27-1-221, MCA . Based on t h e above cases and s t a t u t e s , w e f i n d t h a t a compensation theory is t o be used when determining damages under s e c t i o n 50-5-504, MCA. Therefore, with these prin- c i p l e s i n mind, w e now t u r n t o t h e problem of compensation i n t h e c a s e a t hand. During t h e hearing on damages evidence was introduced concerning t h e amount of wages and b e n e f i t s p l a i n t i f f would have received during t h e remainder of her c o n t r a c t . The D i s t r i c t Court a l s o heard evidence concerning p l a i n t i f f ' s projected f u t u r e earnings had she remained employed a t t h e h o s p i t a l u n t i l her retirement i n 1987. There was no evi- dence introduced as t o p u n i t i v e damages, nor w a s t h e r e evidence introduced a s t o mental d i s t r e s s . The ~ i s t r i c t Court u l t i m a t e l y awarded p l a i n t i f f $11,950.86. This amount i s t h e equivalent of what she would have received i n wages and b e n e f i t s , less c e r t a i n m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s , during t h e remainder of her 1977-1978 c o n t r a c t . N o reasons w e r e given as t o t h e c o u r t ' s decision n o t t o g r a n t f u t u r e damages. W e must, however, assume t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court was aware t h a t it had t h e power t o g r a n t f u t u r e damages under s e c t i o n 27-1-203, MCA, and ~ r i s n e g g e r v. Gibson, supra. Therefore, we can only conclude t h a t , i n i t s opinion, the D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t f e e l t h a t t h e f u t u r e damages, a s claimed by p l a i n t i f f , w e r e reasonably c e r t a i n t o occur. I t was properly within t h e D i s t r i c t Court's d i s c r e - t i o n t o make t h i s determination, and we cannot hold t h a t it w a s e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t t o refuse t o g r a n t f u t u r e damages. P l a i n t i f f ' s claim f o r exemplary damages, a s w e l l a s her claim f o r damages f o r mental d i s t r e s s , must f a i l . P l a i n t i f f d i d n o t introduce any evidence of e i t h e r a t the D i s t r i c t Court l e v e l , and t h e matter i s not properly before t h i s Court on appeal. This does not imply an approval o r d i s - approval of such claims; t h e r e i s simply nothing i n t h e record t o support them. A s s t a t e d e a r l i e r , exemplary dam- ages, a s w e l l as damages f o r mental d i s t r e s s o r any o t h e r i n j u r y susceptible of proof, may be awarded i n a proper case under s e c t i o n 50-5-504, MCA. W e see no p a r t i c u l a r d i f - f i c u l t y i n producing evidence t o support a claim f o r exem- p l a r y damages under s e c t i o n 27-1-203, MCA, o r t o show t h a t mental and emotional d i s t r e s s a c t u a l l y was caused by the defendant's actions. These a r e concepts f a m i l i a r t o t h e law, which can be proven i n t h e case of exemplary damages by showing t h e defendant was g u i l t y of oppression, fraud o r malice, a c t u a l o r implied, and i n the case of mental d i s - t r e s s by showing t h e nature and t h e circumstances of t h e wrong and i t s e f f e c t on p l a i n t i f f . I n sum, although both are compensable under section 50-5-504, MCA, we hold t h a t n e i t h e r t h e likelihood of such improper behavior o r i n j u r y nor the d i f f i c u l t y of proving e i t h e r i s so g r e a t t o j u s t i f y awarding exemplary o r compensatory damages without proof t h a t such improper behavior took place o r t h a t such i n j u r y a c t u a l l y occurred. A s t h e record below provides no support f o r e i t h e r , there i s no b a s i s f o r such an award i n t h i s case. The supplemental statement by p l a i n t i f f i n l i e u of o r a l argument has been disregarded, and t h e m a t t e r decided exclu- s i v e l y on t h e b r i e f s . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e