Title: People v. Richards
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S223651
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 2016

PLEASE SEE CONCURRING OPINIONS 
Filed 5/26/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
) 
S223651 
In re WILLIAM RICHARDS 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E049135 
      on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SWHSS700444 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In 1997, petitioner William Richards was convicted of the 1993 murder of 
his wife, Pamela.  In 2012, by a 4 to 3 decision, this court rejected his claim on 
habeas corpus that his conviction should be overturned because the prosecution‘s 
dental expert had recanted his expert opinion testimony at trial that a lesion on 
Pamela‘s hand was a human bite mark matching petitioner‘s unusual teeth.  (In re 
Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 948 (Richards I).)  The majority concluded that the 
expert‘s recantation did not constitute ―false evidence‖ within the meaning of 
Penal Code section 1473 as the statute then read1 because, in the absence of ―a 
generally accepted and relevant advance in the witness‘s field of expertise‖ or ―a 
widely accepted new technology‖ that would allow ―experts to reach an 
objectively more accurate conclusion,‖ petitioner had failed to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the expert‘s opinion at trial was ―objectively 
                                              
1 
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
2 
untrue.‖  (Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 963, 966.)  In 2014, however, the 
Legislature responded to our decision in Richards I by amending section 1473 to 
state that ― ‗false evidence‘ shall include opinions of experts that have either been 
repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial 
or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological 
advances.‖  (§ 1473, subd. (e)(1), as added by Stats. 2014, ch. 623, § 1.)  
Petitioner has filed a new petition for writ of habeas corpus before this 
court in which he contends that, under the 2014 legislative revision of section 
1473, he is now entitled to relief and that his conviction should be overturned.  For 
the reasons discussed hereafter, we agree. 
I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The San Bernardino County District Attorney charged petitioner with the 
August 10, 1993, murder (§ 187) of his wife, Pamela Richards.   
Petitioner‘s first two full trials ended in mistrials with hung juries.  A third 
trial ended in a mistrial because the trial court recused itself during jury selection.  
In petitioner‘s fourth trial, the jury announced it was deadlocked; it then received 
further instruction concerning reasonable doubt, after which the jury returned a 
conviction of first degree murder.  The trial court sentenced petitioner to 25 years 
to life, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal in August 2000.   
In 2007, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San 
Bernardino County Superior Court, asserting that his 1997 murder conviction was 
based on false evidence and that new evidence unerringly established his 
innocence.  The superior court issued an order to show cause and subsequently 
held an evidentiary hearing in 2009.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the 
superior court granted the petition and vacated petitioner‘s judgment of 
conviction.   
3 
The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed in November 
2010.  We granted review, and, as noted above, affirmed the Court of Appeal 
judgment by a 4 to 3 vote on December 3, 2012.  (Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 
948.) 
Following the Legislature‘s 2014 amendment to section 1473, petitioner 
filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus.  We issued an order to show 
cause returnable before this court, and respondents, the Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation and the warden of the California facility at which petitioner is 
incarcerated, represented by the San Bernardino County District Attorney, have 
filed a return in opposition to the petition.2 
II.  PETITIONER’S JURY TRIAL 
The following evidence was presented at petitioner‘s 1997 jury trial. 
A.  Petitioner’s relationship with his wife 
Petitioner and his wife, Pamela, lived on a remote property they owned in 
the Mojave Desert in San Bernardino County.  The plot had a small house and a 
camper parked nearby.  They used a generator, kept in a small, fenced shed, for 
electricity.  To access their home, one had to ascend a steep, sand-and-gravel 
driveway.  The couple kept several dogs on the property to ward off intruders.   
                                              
2 
In their return, respondents do not dispute petitioner‘s reliance on the 
record of the 2009 habeas corpus evidentiary hearing to support the claims raised 
in the present petition.  Although we are not aware of any previous habeas corpus 
proceeding presenting a comparable procedural history and setting, in the absence 
of any contention that the testimony at the prior evidentiary hearing does not 
provide a proper basis for resolving the issues presented in the present habeas 
corpus petition, we shall resolve the petition on that basis.  Because of the change 
in the applicable law concerning the definition of false evidence, the petition is not 
subject to the procedural bar of successiveness.  (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 
767.) 
4 
Petitioner and his wife had been having financial and marital difficulties, 
and both had sexual relationships outside the marriage.  At the time of her death 
Pamela had been having a sexual relationship with Eugene Price, whom she had 
helped to recover from a helicopter accident.  Pamela planned to leave petitioner 
and find an apartment with Price.   
B.  The night of August 10, 1993 
On the night of her death, August 10, 1993, petitioner was working a night 
shift.  Price received a message from Pamela on his answering machine sometime 
between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m.  At approximately, 9:30 p.m., Price tried calling 
Pamela at the camper but received a busy signal.  Price continued to try to call 
Pamela, calling approximately every five minutes, but he continued to receive a 
busy signal.  Because of past problems with the telephone service in that area, 
Price contacted the phone company to check the line.  Price continued to call 
Pamela, but without success.   
At approximately 11:55 p.m., Price telephoned Pamela again, but this time 
petitioner answered.  He sounded stressed and agitated.  When Price asked for 
Pamela, petitioner said she was dead — and he told Price that her head was bashed 
in and her eye was hanging out of its socket.  Price told petitioner to call 911.   
At 11:58 p.m., petitioner called 911.  In that call, petitioner stated he had 
just come home and discovered his wife was dead.  He said he thought Pamela fell 
off the porch steps and hit her head.   
Petitioner placed a second call to 911 at 12:06 a.m.  In that call, petitioner 
asked when responders would arrive.  He said that he thought that she had fallen, 
but that ―things don‘t look right here at all,‖ that ―there‘s things moved,‖ and that 
they should send someone who could examine the scene.  The 911 operator 
assured petitioner that dispatch would send someone who could examine the scene 
5 
and advised petitioner not to touch anything.  Petitioner responded that he had not 
touched anything but the phone and the door and that he had rolled Pamela‘s body 
over to see if she was all right.   
Petitioner placed a third call to 911 at 12:33a.m.  In that call, he again asked 
when responders would arrive.  He also stated that, when he went to start the 
generator, he observed blood and Pamela‘s pants in that area and saw there was 
blood inside the camper.  He stated his belief that Pamela had been attacked and 
killed near the generator because oil had been spilled there as well.  Petitioner 
expressed anger as to why responders had not yet arrived.  The dispatcher 
repeatedly advised petitioner not to touch anything and suggested he go sit in his 
car.  Petitioner said he had not touched anything and that he would go sit with 
Pamela.   
San Bernardino County Sheriff‘s Deputy Mark Nourse arrived at the scene 
shortly after 12:30 a.m.  The sky was overcast and the property was dark, with no 
light source.  Deputy Nourse used his patrol vehicle lights and his flashlight to 
illuminate the scene.   
Petitioner led Deputy Nourse to Pamela‘s body; the couple‘s dogs acted 
aggressively toward Deputy Nourse as he approached.  According to Deputy 
Nourse, it appeared that part of Pamela‘s skull had been gouged out by some kind 
of blunt object and that pieces of her skull were nearby.  One of her eyes was 
gouged out and an ear partially ripped off.  Deputy Nourse could not detect a 
pulse.  The body was neither warm nor cold.  Her arm was pliable.  Her blood was 
still wet, bright red, and puddled; it had not coagulated or soaked into the sandy 
soil.  Based on his prior experience as a trained emergency medical technician and 
as a first responder firefighter, Deputy Nourse believed she had very recently died.   
Petitioner began discussing the crime scene with Deputy Nourse.  He told 
the deputy that Pamela was ―stone cold dead‖ and that she must have been dead a 
6 
long time because the battery in the camper had run out.  Petitioner pointed out a 
cinder block that he said was used to kill her and stated there was also a stepping 
stone with blood on it.  Petitioner gave his scenario concerning how he thought the 
assault and killing took place, including that he thought the attack had begun near 
the generator.  According to Deputy Nourse, petitioner also said:  ―It don‘t matter 
any, all the evidence that relates to this case I already touched and moved trying to 
figure out how this whole thing happened.‖  Deputy Nourse described petitioner‘s 
demeanor as ―very calm, cool, [and] collected,‖ but occasionally petitioner would 
fall to his knees crying, after which he would get back up and then continue 
talking.  To the deputy, it seemed as if petitioner was speaking ―like he had 
rehearsed or was reading from a script.‖   
Deputy Nourse became suspicious of petitioner and began surreptitiously 
recording their conversation.  During this recording, petitioner explained that 
when he came home from work around midnight he found his wife lying 
facedown on the ground with her head against a cinder block.  When he rolled her 
over in the dark, petitioner said that his fingers went into the hole in her head.  
Petitioner told Deputy Nourse that he initially thought that she had fallen and hit 
her head on the cinder block, but that he found blood on pillows inside the camper.  
Petitioner said that ―things ain‘t right here‖ and expressed anger that Pamela‘s 
pants were lying next to the generator.  He explained that Pamela ―had to squeeze 
into those jeans‖ that morning because she had gained weight and that they would 
not have come off easily, adding, ―trust me.‖  Petitioner stated that her underpants 
were inside the camper.  He also stated that Pamela had placed the vacuum cleaner 
inside the camper and theorized that that she intended to start the generator so she 
could vacuum but was assaulted near the generator instead.  Petitioner showed 
Deputy Nourse a spilled oil bottle the couple usually used to fill the generator 
before starting it.  He stated that he knew there was ―blood on rocks up against the 
7 
hill,‖ and that there was a bloodstained paving stone that had been thrown ―over 
the side of the hill.‖  Petitioner remarked that his dogs had failed to protect his 
wife from her killer.  He did not report anything missing from the premises.  And 
he surmised that the killer had used a cinder block to kill Pamela.   
Deputy Nourse directed petitioner to stay away from the crime scene while 
they waited for the homicide team to arrive.  The homicide detectives did not 
arrive until 3:15 a.m.  Because of the darkness, they decided not to process the 
crime scene until dawn.  They tried but were unable to secure the couple‘s dogs 
before leaving.   
C.  The crime scene 
Detective Norman Parent, Criminalist Dan Gregonis, and Forensic 
Specialist Valerie Seleska began examining the crime scene at 6:00 a.m.   
Approximately 25 feet away from Pamela‘s body, near the small shed for 
the generator, there were bloodstains on the ground, on a gasoline container, and a 
bloodied rock, along with one of Pamela‘s shoes.  One of Pamela‘s broken 
fingernails was also found in this area.  In front of the generator was Pamela‘s 
other shoe, her jeans, and a spilled bottle of oil.  There was also blood spatter on 
the fencing surrounding the shed for the generator.   
The team found Pamela‘s body lying on its back, covered with a sleeping 
bag, on the ground between the camper and the house‘s porch.  Her right arm lay 
upon some heavy, metal-grate fencing material that lay flattened on the ground.  
She was naked from the waist down, except for socks.  Her tank top had numerous 
bloodstains and blood spatter.  Her head was crushed, an eye was hanging out, and 
a large pool of blood was beside her.  The dogs had partially buried her head 
during the night.   
8 
A large, bloody cinder block was near her body and a bloody 12-by-12-inch 
stepping stone was a little further away on the edge of a slope.  Based on the blood 
on them and their proximity to the body,  Detective Parent believed that both the 
cinder block and stepping stone had been used to smash Pamela‘s head.   
The porch nearby had signs of blood spatter on it, as did the side and top of 
a table cart that was on the other side of her body.  Stepping stones leading from 
the porch to the camper also had obvious blood spatter.  The bottom of the 
entryway into the camper had blood smeared on it.   
 Inside the camper was a couch with pillows stacked on one end.  The 
pillows had bloodstains on them as well as dirt and small pebbles.  Detective 
Parent believed that Pamela had already been bleeding outside before she bled on 
the pillows in the camper.  There was also a blood smear on a telephone hanging 
on a wall.  A vacuum cleaner stood upright in the middle of the floor, near her 
underpants, and was plugged in.   
Pamela‘s Suzuki Samurai was parked in front of the camper.  On the 
passenger seat was Pamela‘s purse, and it contained a letter signed and dated by 
petitioner nearly one month earlier in which petitioner proposed a division of their 
assets and personal property.   
Detective Parent examined the area for tire tracks and was able to account 
for tracks left by the patrol vehicles, petitioner‘s truck, and Pamela‘s Suzuki.  
There was no evidence of any other tire tread marks.  He also examined the area 
for shoe prints.  He found three prints consistent with Pamela‘s shoes, and one 
print consistent with petitioner‘s shoes, which were very worn, with little tread.  
Other than these and the prints left by the officers, there were no other shoe prints.  
However, on several parts of the property, the soil was generally hard packed and 
not very conducive to retaining prints.   
9 
D.  Defendant’s interviews 
Detective Tom Bradford interviewed petitioner for several hours on August  
11, 16, and 30, and September 3, 1993.  Petitioner‘s statements in those interviews 
were generally consistent with what he had told Deputy Nourse at the crime scene.  
He also stated that he had been home approximately five to 10 minutes before 
Eugene Price called his home and petitioner told him that Pamela was dead.  He 
explained that he and Pamela kept several guns on their property and that Pamela 
knew how to use them.  Petitioner admitted that he knew Pamela was having 
sexual encounters with Price because she would tell him about them, which 
bothered him.  He also admitted that he thought Pamela was going to leave him.   
E.  Autopsy evidence 
Dr. Frank Sheridan, chief medical examiner for the Coroner‘s Office of San 
Bernardino County, performed the autopsy on Pamela‘s body.  He determined that 
Pamela had been strangled, first unsuccessfully by ligature, and then manually.  
According to Dr. Sheridan, the strangulation was sufficient in itself to cause her 
death.  In addition, the left side of her skull was smashed, which crushed her brain.  
According to Dr. Sheridan, this injury was also sufficient to cause her death.  He 
believed that the strangulation came first and that Pamela was dead or nearly dead 
when the blunt force was inflicted because there was very little bleeding or 
bruising in the area of her skull injury.   
Pamela‘s body had several defensive wounds, and there was bruising across 
her body, and lacerations and abrasions to her face.  There were no signs of sexual 
assault.  However, based on the significant blood spatter on her jeans and the lack 
of spatter on her bare legs, it appeared that someone had removed her pants after 
the blunt force was applied to her head.   
Dr. Sheridan examined the lividity on the body.  Lividity is the deep red-
purple discoloration seen on a body after death, which is created when the heart 
10 
stops beating and the blood settles down into the lowest parts of the body by way 
of gravity.  Lividity becomes fixed on the body after six to 10 hours.  According to 
Dr. Sheridan, if Pamela had died facedown, and stayed in that position for a few 
hours, but was later turned on her back, he would expect that the blood would 
drain toward her back, showing lividity there instead.  At the crime scene, lividity 
was present on Pamela‘s back, consistent with the body‘s having lain on its back 
for several hours.  However, the lividity was very weak, indicating she had lost a 
lot of blood as a result of her injuries.   
Dr. Sheridan could give no opinion as to the time of death, and no liver 
temperature was taken when the officers first arrived at the crime scene.  At the 
time, it was not standard practice for the coroner‘s office to take a body‘s liver 
temperature at the crime scene in order to estimate the time of death.   
F.  Petitioner’s clothing 
Detectives collected the clothing that petitioner wore on the night of 
Pamela‘s death.  They also took pictures of his body and his arms and hands, none 
of which showed any fresh wounds, injuries, or other visible marks.   
Criminalist Gregonis examined petitioner‘s cotton shirt, jeans, and shoes 
for blood spatter.  He found no blood spatter on petitioner‘s shirt, but found blood 
transfer stains on the right collar and sleeve, consistent with petitioner‘s account of 
cradling his wife‘s head at the crime scene.  Based on his experiments with a 
dummy head, however, Gregonis testified that he would have expected to see 
more blood transferred to petitioner‘s shirt as a result of cradling a bloodied head, 
as well as blood dripped onto petitioner‘s jeans, but the jeans contained no such 
drip patterns.  Petitioner‘s jeans had three small bloodstains that were consistent 
with Pamela‘s blood and appeared to Gregonis to have been deposited as the result 
11 
of blood spatter.3  They were present in the right knee area, the right mid-thigh 
area, and to the left of the zipper, on the left leg.  Blood consistent with Pamela‘s 
was found on both of petitioner‘s shoes, with blood on the left shoe‘s toe area and 
blood spatter on the lacing of the right shoe.   
Although he initially expected to find much more blood on petitioner‘s 
clothing, Gregonis surmised that the cinder block may have shielded petitioner 
from significant blood spatter due to its size.   
G.  Other forensic evidence 
During the autopsy, Dr. Sheridan severed some of Pamela‘s fingertips from 
her body for later testing.  Criminalist Gregonis later examined the severed 
fingertips under a microscope and noticed blue cotton fibers wedged deep in a 
crack of a broken fingernail on one of the fingertips.  The microscope was 
equipped with a video recording device, and Gregonis recorded a video of his 
extraction of the fibers from the fingernail.  A matching broken fragment 
apparently torn from the same fingernail was found on the ground at the crime 
scene, suggesting that the fingernail broke during Pamela‘s struggle with her 
assailant.   
Gregonis examined the blue cotton shirt petitioner wore on the night of the 
killing, and he concluded that its blue fibers were indistinguishable from the fibers 
removed from the crack in Pamela‘s broken fingernail.  Gregonis, however, also 
acknowledged that cotton fiber is probably the most common fiber in the world, 
that blue cotton is common, and that there was nothing particularly unique about 
petitioner‘s blue cotton work shirt.   
                                              
3 
There were other small bloodstains on petitioner‘s jeans, but they were 
either consistent with petitioner‘s blood or were too small to return any DNA tests 
results.   
12 
Gregonis examined both the bloody cinder block and the bloody stone.  The 
cinder block had hairs and a significant amount of blood spatter and areas of 
saturated blood on it, indicating that it was used to smash Pamela‘s head.  Based 
on the amount of blood also present on the stone, Gregonis believed that it too 
could have been dropped on or thrown at Pamela‘s head.   
H.  Bite mark evidence 
Specialist Valerie Seleska, who photographed the crime scene, also took 
photographs of Pamela‘s autopsy.  She took a photograph of a crescent-shaped 
lesion on Pamela‘s right hand.  Seleska acknowledged that if a body exhibited 
signs of a bite mark, it was standard practice to swab the suspected bite mark to 
collect any saliva.  During the autopsy, she did not see anyone take a swab of the 
lesion on Pamela‘s hand.   
Ten days before petitioner‘s final jury trial began in 1997, the San 
Bernardino County District Attorney‘s Office contacted Dr. Norman Sperber, a 
dentist and forensic odontologist, to examine the photograph taken by Seleska at 
Pamela‘s autopsy.  Dr. Sperber testified that he had over 40 years of experience in 
dentistry.  He explained that he was the chief forensic dentist for two counties — 
San Diego and Imperial.  Dr. Sperber said that he was one of 100 people in the 
country certified in forensic odontologly by the American Board of Forensic 
Odontology.  He had received a congressional appointment to set up a national 
system for identifying persons through dental records.  Dr. Sperber had previously 
qualified as a forensic odontologist in 26 states in more than 100 cases, more than 
80 of which involved bite mark evidence.  He also described testifying as a 
forensic odontolgist in the Jeffrey Dahmer case and in the Ted Bundy case, in 
which he matched a bite mark on one of the victims to Bundy.   
13 
As described hereafter, in explaining his conclusion that the photograph 
revealed that the lesion on Pamela‘s hand was consistent with petitioner‘s teeth, 
Dr. Sperber‘s testimony was composed of a series of opinions and factual 
observations that integrated various exhibits. 
First, Dr. Sperber opined that the lesion on Pamela‘s hand was a bite mark.  
Second, he believed that the bite mark was of human origin.  Third, Dr. Sperber 
testified that, based on the overall shape of the human bite mark, it was made from 
the lower teeth of the human jaw.  Fourth, he believed that the human bite mark 
showed an abnormality — the presence of only one of the two canine teeth of the 
lower jaw.  Fifth, he made a casting of petitioner‘s teeth, took a photograph of the 
casting of petitioner‘s lower jaw, enlarged the photograph of the victim‘s bite 
mark to match the proportions of the photo of the lower jaw, drew a tracing of 
petitioner‘s teeth on a transparency, and then overlaid that transparency over the 
enlarged photo of the bite mark.  Dr. Sperber then stated that the overlaid 
transparency made a ―pretty good alignment‖ with the photo of the bite mark.   
In addition to his exhibits, Dr. Sperber explained why he believed 
petitioner‘s lower teeth were consistent with the lesion on Pamela‘s hand.  
According to Dr. Sperber, because one of petitioner‘s canine teeth was ―under-
erupted‖ and crooked, it did not protrude as much as the other teeth on the jaw 
line, and this circumstance could account for the missing canine mark on Pamela‘s 
hand.  He described the missing tooth mark as a ―common sense expectation‖ or 
―common sense understanding‖ based on petitioner‘s abnormal canine tooth.  He 
further noted that whoever made the bite mark had something wrong with one of 
his canine teeth, as did petitioner.  Dr. Sperber also noted that petitioner‘s lower 
teeth were in an asymmetrical curve, with three teeth lined up straight, whereas a 
normal jaw would exhibit greater curvature of those teeth.  He believed that 
characteristic was another factor showing a match with the bite mark photo.   
14 
Dr. Sperber explained that there were no studies in forensic odontology 
regarding the statistical rarity of an under-erupted canine tooth.  When asked, 
based on his personal experience as a dentist, how often Dr. Sperber had observed 
an under-erupted canine tooth in his patients, he explained that the under-eruption 
plus the asymmetry of petitioner‘s teeth made petitioner‘s teeth ―even more 
unusual‖ and that he would expect ―one or two or less‖ out of 100 people to have 
such features.   
Dr. Sperber further explained that he uses four categories to assess bite 
mark evidence in order of increasing confidence of a match:  ―not consistent,‖ 
―consistent,‖ ―probable,‖ and ―reasonable doubt certainty.‖  Dr. Sperber explained 
that the angular distortion of the photo of Pamela‘s lesion prevented his ability to 
classify his match with any degree of certainty greater than ―consistent,‖ meaning 
that defendant could have left the lesion and could not be ruled out.   
I.  Other evidence 
The time clock at petitioner‘s work indicated that he had left there at 11:03 
p.m. on the night of the killing.  A few weeks after the killing, a sheriff‘s 
investigator went to petitioner‘s place of employment.  The investigator left 
petitioner‘s workplace at 11:03 p.m., walked to his car in the parking lot, and then 
left the lot at 11:06 p.m.  Although the posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour, 
the investigator that night was able to drive 75 miles per hour with the flow of 
traffic for most of the trip to petitioner‘s property.  Forty-one minutes later, he 
arrived at petitioner‘s residence at 11:47 p.m.   
J.  Defense evidence 
Wayne Kozica, Pamela‘s brother, telephoned and spoke with her at 
approximately 7:15 to 7:30 p.m. on the night of her death, and she seemed normal 
15 
at that time.  Pamela had told Kozica that she and petitioner had been arguing, and 
Kozica offered to let her stay with him in San Diego.   
Arthur Quas testified that he called petitioner‘s residence but no one 
answered.  According to Quas, he called just before 10:00 p.m. and the phone rang 
a few times followed by clicks and then a dial tone.  He called again but the phone 
rang with no response.  Quas was aware that petitioner and Pamela were in an 
open relationship and would have sexual affairs outside the relationship.   
On three occasions, Christian Filipiak, a defense investigator, left the 
parking lot of petitioner‘s place of employment at 11:06 p.m. and drove, at 
different speeds, the same route as petitioner did on the night of Pamela‘s death.  
Driving with the cruise control set at 60, 65, and 70 miles per hour, it took Filipiak 
52 minutes, 48 minutes, and 44 minutes, respectively, to arrive at the residence.  
The distance was 44.8 miles.   
Griffith Thomas, a physician specializing in pathology and forensic 
pathology, explained that time of death is a complex determination.  Factors 
include rigor mortis, lividity, core body temperature, and environmental 
conditions.  Depending on the ambient temperature, a dead body cools at a rate of 
1.5 to 2 degrees Fahrenheit per hour.  According to Thomas, the closer to the time 
of death observations are made, the more accurate the findings will be.  Thomas 
also stated that it was ―outrageously wrong‖ for the investigation team to have 
waited till the next morning to dispatch a coroner‘s investigator to examine 
Pamela‘s body.  As a result, he explained, it cannot be said when death occurred in 
this case.  Thomas also believed that several of the wounds and bruises on 
Pamela‘s body had been inflicted several hours before her death because of the 
advanced coloring of the contusions, which normally takes significant time to 
develop.   
16 
Dr. Gregory S. Golden, a dentist and chief odontologist for San Bernardino 
County, compared his own models of petitioner‘s teeth with an enlarged, life-sized 
photograph similar to the autopsy photograph used by Dr. Sperber.  Dr. Golden 
could not eliminate petitioner as a suspect, but then did further studies, by 
randomly using dental models of patients he had treated in the past.  Out of 15 
different dental models of patients he had treated, Dr. Golden found five dental 
models whose teeth appeared to match the lesion on the photograph.  Accordingly, 
Dr. Golden believed that the bite mark evidence should be disregarded because of 
the generic nature of the bite and the low quality of the photograph.  On cross-
examination, however, Dr. Golden also stated that petitioner‘s under-erupted, 
displaced canine was ―unique‖ and that ―there is a very low probability that you 
are going to find an individual with a tooth in that position in the same orientation 
down to maybe two percent of the population, if that.‖   
Dean Gialamas, senior criminalist with the Los Angeles County Sheriff‘s 
Department, testified regarding his examination of the bloodstains on petitioner‘s 
clothes.  Gialamas explained that he had been trained in blood spatter 
interpretation and has presented papers on the subject.  He had received awards 
from regional and international associations for his achievements in criminalistics.  
Although he testifies for the prosecution about 75 percent of the time, Gialamas 
stated that he had been appointed to examine the evidence for the defense in the 
present case.   
Gialamas examined the photographs of the crime scene with special 
attention to the blood spatter around Pamela‘s body, noting that the blood had 
radiated out in numerous directions.  He stated that he would have expected to see 
multiple blood patterns on the person who dropped the cinder block on Pamela‘s 
head.  In his assessment, Pamela‘s head suffered at least three blows, based on her 
17 
wounds and the fact that she had to have sustained an open, bleeding wound for 
the spattering to be generated.   
Gialamas conducted and videotaped multiple experiments in which he 
dropped a cinder block on a sponge shaped into a dummy head and soaked with 
human blood.  The blood spatter invariably came back toward him in the lower leg 
to thigh area, despite the cinder block‘s shielding of some of the spatter.  In 
another experiment, the blood spatter reached as high as his shirt collar.  Although 
he was wearing gloves, the rough edges of the cinder block cut his hand.   
Gialamas also conducted experiments using bloodied hair being dragged 
across the laces of a canvas shoe like the one petitioner wore the night of Pamela‘s 
death.  The contact transfer of blood from the hair to the shoe created a pattern 
similar to those found on the laces of petitioner‘s right shoe, creating a pattern that 
looked very similar to blood spatter.  Gialamas could not rule out either the 
transfer of blood from hair or blood spatter as the origin of the bloodstains found 
on the laces of petitioner‘s right shoe but found it odd that the dots of spatter on 
petitioner‘s shoe lined up in a straight row, as opposed to being randomly 
deposited.  Gialamas testified that the bloodstains found on the toe portion of 
petitioner‘s left shoe had no characteristics of spatter, but was simply a contact-
type transfer stain.  Gialamas further believed that the blood pattern on the shoes 
were inconsistent with the extensive spattering that occurred in his cinder block 
experiments.   
Gialamas also examined the three areas of petitioner‘s jeans that Gregonis 
testified had signs of blood spatter.  Gialamas concluded the bloodstains on the 
right knee area were transfer stains consistent with the wearer‘s kneeling on some 
kind of blood source, perhaps bloody gravel, because the stains in that area varied 
in size, shape, and intensity.  Regarding the bloodstain found on the right upper 
thigh, Giamalas testified that the stain looked more like a transfer stain, but could 
18 
not rule out that it was ―an oddball fly-off medium energy spatter.‖  Regarding the 
bloodstains to the left of the zipper, Gialamas believed they were transfer stains 
because the stains went along the rise of three natural creases on that area of the 
pants, which would mimic spatter stains once flattened out.  But he also could not 
rule out that they were created by spatter because it was remotely possible that the 
three drops of spatter precisely landed on the crease areas.   
Gialamas examined petitioner‘s shirt and found no evidence of blood 
spatter.  In his opinion, the evidence on petitioner‘s shirt was more consistent with 
the wearer‘s cradling a bloodied head.  He also testified that blue cotton is not 
uncommon, and that cotton is ―the most ubiquitous fiber we have.‖   
In sum, Gialamas concluded:  ―Given the lack of spatter on [petitioner‘s] 
clothing, no, I don‘t think that this clothing is consistent with this individual being 
the perpetrator.‖   
III.  2007-2009 HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
In 2007, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the San Bernardino 
County Superior Court, claiming that his 1997 murder conviction was based on 
false evidence and that new evidence unerringly established his innocence.  
Petitioner also presented evidence challenging the blue cotton fibers found under 
Pamela‘s fingernail and presenting new DNA evidence taken from the cinder 
block and from a hair found under one of Pamela‘s fingernails.  (See Richards I, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 958-959.)  But these facts are not related to petitioner‘s 
false evidence claim raised in his current petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
Accordingly, we will focus only on the significance of the prosecution expert‘s 
recantation of his trial testimony concerning bite mark evidence. 
The 2007 petition included a declaration from Dr. Sperber, the 
prosecution‘s forensic dentist at petitioner‘s jury trial, in which he repudiated his 
19 
testimony at trial that only 1 or 2 percent of the population had petitioner‘s dental 
irregularity.  According to Dr. Sperber‘s declaration:  ―These percentages were 
based on my own experience and were not scientifically accurate.‖  He added:  
―With the benefit of all of the photographs [of the crime scene and Pamela‘s 
injuries], and with my added experience, I would not now testify as I did in 1997,‖ 
and ―I cannot now say with certainty that the injury on the victim‘s hand is a 
human bite mark injury.‖   
The 2007 petition also included declarations and reports by other experts in 
the field of forensic dentistry.  Dr. Golden, the defense forensic dentist at 
petitioner‘s jury trial, declared that he ―enlarged the image [of Pamela‘s hand 
lesion] to life-size‖ and that after comparing the enlarged image to petitioner‘s 
teeth, he ―would tend to exclude [petitioner] as the suspected biter.‖  In his 
declaration, Dr. Charles M. Bowers described how he and Dr. Raymond J. 
Johansen had used computer software to remove the angular distortion from the 
photograph of Pamela‘s hand lesion, thereby allowing a more accurate comparison 
between the lesion and petitioner‘s lower teeth.  According to Dr. Bowers‘s 
declaration, ―The new scientific methods demonstrably contradict the conclusion 
at trial that [petitioner] could not be ruled out as a suspected biter.‖  Dr. Bowers 
was also critical of the methodology used by Dr. Sperber at petitioner‘s trial.  In an 
earlier report, Dr. Bowers wrote that there is ―significant doubt that the hand 
injury is even a bitemark.‖   
After the superior court issued an order to show cause, the court received 
further briefing and eventually held an evidentiary hearing in 2009 in which the 
forensic dentists testified consistently with their declarations.  In addition to the 
points made in his posttrial declaration, Dr. Sperber described the angular 
distortion in the photograph of the lesion on Pamela‘s hand and stated that he had 
examined autopsy photographs depicting other lesions on Pamela‘s body.  
20 
Concerning the autopsy photograph of the lesion on Pamela‘s hand, Dr. Sperber 
explained:  ―I don‘t know for sure that . . . that photograph depicts a bite mark.‖  
He added:  ―My opinion today is that [petitioner‘s] teeth . . . are not consistent 
with the lesion on the hand.‖  Dr. Golden also testified consistently with the points 
in his declaration.  He concluded that the lesion was not from petitioner‘s teeth 
and speculated that it might have been a dog bite or from some other source.   
Drs. Bowers and Johansen both explained how they used computer 
software to digitally correct the photograph of Pamela‘s hand by removing angular 
distortion.  They testified that they are experts in this process and have published 
articles and a book on the digital analysis of bite mark evidence.  They explained 
that the technique was first used in 1996 or 1997 by a doctor in Canada.  But Drs. 
Bowers and Johansen further developed the precision of the technique to correct 
angular distortion in photographs, and their method has become accepted in the 
field of forensic dentistry.   
After correcting the angular distortion in the autopsy photograph, Dr. 
Johansen created outlines depicting petitioner‘s lower and upper teeth.  He 
concluded that petitioner‘s lower teeth did not match the lesion on Pamela‘s hand 
because it was obvious to him ―that this mark, if indeed a bite mark, was more 
likely to have been made by an upper arch.‖   Using an outline of petitioner‘s 
upper teeth, Dr. Johansen concluded the upper teeth matched the lesion in some 
places, but not others.  Dr. Johansen could not exclude petitioner‘s teeth as a 
possible source of the lesion, but in his opinion it was just as likely that the 
indistinct lesion was caused by the fencing material under Pamela‘s right arm as it 
was by petitioner‘s teeth.  Dr. Johansen conceded, however, that he had removed 
angular distortion from the same photograph in 2000, and had concluded at that 
time that the lesion was a human bite mark that was consistent with petitioner‘s 
teeth.   
21 
Dr. Bowers testified that he also corrected the angular distortion from the 
autopsy photograph and compared the corrected photograph to a digital exemplar 
of petitioner‘s lower teeth.  After superimposing the image of petitioner‘s lower 
teeth to the corrected autopsy photograph, he found no match.  According to Dr. 
Bowers, the lesion was 11 millimeters shorter than petitioner‘s lower teeth, and 
three of his teeth did not align with the lesion.  Dr. Bowers examined photographs 
of other lesions on Pamela‘s body that appeared to have been caused by the metal 
fencing on the ground and doubted whether the hand lesion was a human bite 
mark, believing that it might have been left by the fencing material under her right 
arm.   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the superior court granted habeas corpus 
relief, concluding that the new evidence unerringly established petitioner‘s 
innocence and ordered that petitioner be remanded for a new trial.  The People 
appealed the trial court‘s decision and the Court of Appeal, after briefing and 
argument, vacated the superior court‘s order granting the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  We granted petitioner‘s petition for review in 2011. 
IV.  THE RICHARDS I DECISION 
Section 1473, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part:  ―A writ of habeas 
corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:  [¶]  (1) 
False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or 
punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his 
or her incarceration.‖  If a petitioner fails to show that false evidence affected the 
outcome of petitioner‘s trial, a petitioner may present new evidence to challenge 
the conviction, but in order to prevail, ― ‗such evidence, if credited, must 
undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or 
reduced culpability.‘  [Citation.]‖  (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.) 
22 
Prior to 2014, section 1473 did not specifically provide guidance as to the 
meaning of ―false evidence‖ for purposes of determining falsity, but we 
interpreted section 1473 to require a petitioner to show that the evidence was false 
by ―a preponderance of the evidence.‖  (In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 962 
(Malone), citing In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 546 [a petitioner ― ‗bears 
the burden of proving‘ ‖ those facts supporting the petition for habeas corpus ― ‗by 
a preponderance of the evidence‘ ‖].)  In Richards I, we were presented with the 
question of alleged falsity concerning expert witness testimony in the context of 
Dr. Sperber‘s recanted trial testimony regarding the lesion on Pamela‘s hand and 
whether it matched petitioner‘s teeth.  As previously described, in Richards I this 
court split 4 to 3 on the issue of whether petitioner had shown that Dr. Sperber‘s 
trial testimony was false evidence within the meaning of section 1473. 
The majority in Richards I held that if an expert witness‘s opinion given at 
trial later changes, without any significant advances in the expert‘s field of 
expertise or in any technologies employed by the expert, ―it would not be accurate 
to say that the witness‘s opinion at trial was false.‖  (Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 
at p. 963.)  The majority reasoned that the fact that an expert recants an opinion 
given at trial does not necessarily establish that the opinion at trial was false.  
Instead, the expert‘s change in opinion ―has merely demonstrated the subjective 
component of expert opinion testimony.‖  (Ibid.)  The majority concluded that the 
―false evidence‖ standard under section 1473 as it then read was satisfied ―[i]f, and 
only if, a preponderance of the evidence shows that an expert opinion stated at 
trial was objectively untrue.‖  (Ibid.) 
For purposes of petitioner‘s case, the majority recognized that new 
technology that was not available at the time of petitioner‘s 1997 trial had been 
applied to remove the angular distortion from the autopsy photograph, but it 
concluded that the new technology failed to prove ―that any portion of Dr. 
23 
Sperber‘s trial testimony was objectively untrue.‖  (Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 
at p. 965.)  The majority explained that petitioner‘s experts at the habeas corpus 
hearing had merely cast doubt on Dr. Sperber‘s trial testimony and that ―these 
experts still could not definitively rule out petitioner‘s teeth as a possible source of 
the mark‖ on Pamela‘s hand, thus failing to prove that Dr. Sperber‘s opinion at 
trial was ―objectively untrue.‖  (Id. at pp. 965-966, italics omitted.)  Accordingly, 
the majority concluded, petitioner had not shown that Dr. Sperber‘s testimony was 
false for purposes of applying the standard of review for false evidence under 
section 1473.  (Richards I, at p. 966.)  Instead, the majority held that Dr. Sperber‘s 
recantation and the evidence presented by the other forensic dentists must properly 
be reviewed under the more demanding standard applicable to new evidence, and 
concluded that this new evidence did not ― ‗unerringly‘ ‖ establish petitioner‘s 
innocence and thus did not support setting aside the challenged conviction.  (Id. at 
p. 968, quoting In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 766.) 
The dissenting opinion in Richards I criticized the majority for treating the 
recantation of expert testimony differently from the recantation of lay testimony 
for purposes of section 1473, maintaining that the statute ―makes no distinction 
between lay and expert testimony.‖  (Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 972 (dis. 
opn. of Liu, J.).)  The dissent noted that prior case law had established that lay 
testimony can be deemed false merely if the witness recants his or her prior 
testimony, whether or not other evidence demonstrated ―the truth or falsity of the 
ultimate fact to which the witness testified.‖  (Id. at p. 973, citing In re Hall (1981) 
30 Cal.3d 408 [granting relief where the trial witnesses later recanted their prior 
eyewitness identification of petitioner as the gunman].)  According to the dissent, 
―[t]here is no reason to treat expert testimony differently‖ because ―[j]ust as the 
truth or falsity of eyewitness testimony under section 1473(b) depends on the truth 
or falsity of underlying facts concerning the witness‘s perceptual abilities, the truth 
24 
or falsity of expert testimony depends on the truth or falsity of underlying facts 
essential to the expert‘s inferential method and ultimate opinion.‖  (Richards I, at 
p. 973.)  The dissent further explained that Dr. Sperber‘s perception of whether 
petitioner‘s lower teeth were consistent with the lesion on Pamela‘s hand was 
based on an autopsy photograph that had not been corrected for angular distortion.  
The dissent observed that all of the petitioner‘s experts on habeas corpus now 
agreed that the autopsy photograph, when the angular distortion was corrected, 
either excluded petitioner‘s teeth as the source of the lesion or was simply too poor 
to serve as a basis on which to make any conclusion regarding a match.  (Richards 
I, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 974-975 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)  According to the dissent, 
―the critical underlying fact — that the single uncorrected photograph provided 
Dr. Sperber with a sufficient basis for matching petitioner‘s teeth to a lesion on the 
victim‘s hand — was proven false.‖  (Id. at p. 975.)  The dissent further asserted 
that, just as lay eyewitness testimony can be false ―because it depended crucially 
on the witnesses having seen something that it turns out they did not actually see, 
the expert testimony here was false because it depended crucially on Dr. Sperber 
having seen something — a true photographic representation of the lesion on the 
victim‘s hand — that it turns out he did not actually see.‖  (Id. at pp. 975-976.)  
The dissent concluded that because petitioner had ―shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the essential premise of Dr. Sperber‘s trial testimony was false, it 
follows that the testimony was false evidence under section 1473(b).‖  (Id. at 
p. 976.)  Applying the standard of review applicable to false evidence under 
section 1473, the dissent concluded that, because there was a reasonable 
probability that the false evidence affected the outcome of petitioner‘s trial, the 
conviction should be set aside.  (Richards I, at p. 982 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
25 
V.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The 2014 revision of the definition of false evidence for purposes of 
expert opinion under section 1473  
After this court‘s decision in Richards I, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
No. 1058 (2013-2014 reg sess.), which added subdivision (e)(1) to section 1473.  
That provision now states in full:  ―For purposes of this section, ‗false evidence‘ 
shall include opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert 
who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been 
undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.‖  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1473, subd. (e)(1).) 
The plain meaning of the amendment to section 1473 makes clear that an 
expert opinion given at trial can later be deemed ―false evidence‖ under two 
circumstances:  (1) if the expert repudiates his or own opinion given at trial; or (2) 
if the opinion given at trial is undermined by subsequent ―scientific research or 
technological advances.‖  (§ 1473, subd. (e)(1).)  We conclude that, under this 
amendment to section 1473, petitioner has met his burden to show that Dr. 
Sperber‘s trial testimony constituted false evidence under either circumstance.   
First, Dr. Sperber clearly repudiated his trial testimony.  In the habeas 
corpus proceedings, Dr. Sperber testified that he no longer was certain that the 
autopsy photograph depicted a human bite mark, stating, ―I don‘t know for sure 
that . . . that photograph depicts a bite mark.‖  He also repudiated his trial 
testimony concerning whether petitioner‘s teeth were consistent with the lesion 
depicted on the autopsy photograph, stating, ―My opinion today is that 
[petitioner‘s] teeth . . . are not consistent with the lesion on the hand.‖  Because 
section 1473 as amended in 2014 states false evidence is established when an 
expert‘s trial testimony has ―been repudiated by the expert who originally 
provided the opinion,‖ petitioner has shown through Dr. Sperber‘s subsequent 
26 
testimony during the 2009 proceedings on habeas corpus that Dr. Sperber‘s 
testimony was false.  (§ 1473, subd. (e)(1).) 
Second, the evidence petitioner presented in the prior habeas corpus 
proceedings also established that new technological advances undermined 
Dr. Sperber‘s trial testimony.  Technology that was not available at the time of 
petitioner‘s 1997 jury trial was used to correct the angular distortion of the lesion 
depicted in the autopsy photograph.  That corrected photograph informed the 
opinions of the experts at the habeas corpus proceedings. 
In light of the corrected photograph, Dr. Sperber and Dr. Golden testified 
that they would exclude petitioner‘s teeth as the source of the lesion.  Dr. Bowers 
noted that the length of the lesion in the corrected autopsy photograph was 
inconsistent with the size of petitioner‘s lower teeth and that three of petitioner‘s 
teeth did not match the lesion, and he expressed doubt whether the lesion was a 
bite mark at all.  After examining the corrected photograph and photographs of 
other lesions on Pamela‘s body, Dr. Johansen testified that, because of the poor 
quality of the autopsy photograph, he could not include or exclude petitioner‘s 
teeth as the source of the mark and that it was just as likely that the lesion was 
created by the fencing material and not a bite.   
As a result, petitioner has shown that Dr. Sperber‘s trial testimony 
constituted false evidence because that opinion has ―been undermined by later 
scientific research or technological advances.‖  (§ 1473, subd. (e)(1).)  The 
legislative history of the 2014 amendment of section 1473 bolsters our 
interpretation of that section.  (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity 
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1120.) 
An Assembly committee analysis of Senate Bill No. 1058 stated that the 
impetus for the bill was the issue addressed in Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 948:  
―The 4-3 majority in Richards held that expert opinion stated at trial is ‗false 
27 
evidence‘ supporting . . . habeas relief if the expert‘s conclusion is proved to be 
objectively untrue.‖  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1058 
(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2014, p. 5 (Assembly Analysis).)  The 
analysis included a detailed summary of the facts of the case, described the 
positions of the majority and dissent, and concluded by stating: 
―This bill specifies that ‗false evidence‘ for purposes of prosecuting a writ 
of habeas corpus, includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by 
the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have 
been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.  This bill 
removes the distinction between testimony by lay witnesses and testimony of 
experts created by the Richards decision but still requires that the court make a 
finding that it is reasonably probable that the verdict at trial would have been 
different without the expert‘s testimony before granting habeas relief.‖  (Assem. 
Analysis, supra, at pp. 8-9.) 
Similarly, a Senate committee analysis of Senate Bill No. 1058 stated: 
―The issue this bill seeks to address was clearly depicted in the California 
Supreme Court case, In Re Richards, 55 Cal.4th 948 (2012).  The Richards 4-3 
majority upheld petitioner‘s conviction, holding that ‗expert testimony‘ is different 
from other types of testimony in that it is merely the opinion of the expert, not 
evidence in and of itself, and so can never be ‗true‘ or ‗false.‘  Because of this, the 
court found Richards had failed to establish the falsity of the original expert 
testimony, which had served as the basis for his conviction.  The Richards dissent, 
written by Justice Liu, pointed out the injustice of the majority opinion; noting that 
the false evidence statute Penal Code Sec. 1473(b), used by the majority, did not 
make a distinction between lay and expert testimony, but that the majority‘s 
opinion placed a heavier burden on any petitioner seeking relief from false 
evidence presented by expert testimony.  Liu noted that there is no reason to treat 
28 
the two types of testimony differently because, just as the truth or falsity of the 
eyewitness testimony under [Section] 1473(b) depends on the truth or falsity of the 
underlying facts concerning their perceptual abilities, so too does the truth or 
falsity of the expert‘s testimony depend on the underlying facts essential to the 
expert‘s inferential method and opinion.‖  (Sen. Rules Com., third reading analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 1058 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2014, p. 3.) 
From this legislative history, it is apparent that the Legislature agreed with 
the dissent‘s conclusion in Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 948.  The Senate 
committee analysis supports the notion that the Legislature intended courts to treat 
lay and expert opinion equally in determining whether the testimony of an expert 
witness at trial satisfies the false evidence language of section 1473. 
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner has shown that Dr. Sperber‘s trial 
testimony that the lesion on Pamela‘s hand was consistent with the assertedly 
unusual dentition of petitioner‘s lower teeth constituted ―false evidence‖ within 
the meaning of section 1473 as amended in 2014.  
B.  False evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence 
The San Bernardino County District Attorney does not extensively discuss 
whether Dr. Sperber‘s trial testimony constitutes false evidence for purposes of 
section 1473.  Rather, the district attorney primarily argues that petitioner‘s claim 
of false evidence concerning Dr. Sperber‘s trial testimony is an attempt to present 
a sufficiency of the evidence claim, which is a type of claim not cognizable on a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  (See In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 
[―Upon habeas corpus, . . . the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the 
conviction of the petitioner is not a proper issue for consideration‖].)  The district 
attorney contends that petitioner‘s claim is not cognizable because if Dr. Sperber‘s 
trial testimony is eliminated from consideration, the remainder of the evidence 
29 
admitted against petitioner must be considered in evaluating his guilt and such 
reweighing of the evidence would amount to nothing more than a sufficiency of 
the evidence claim. 
This contention is based on a misunderstanding of the standard that section 
1473 establishes for determining when relief on habeas corpus is available upon a 
showing that false evidence was admitted at trial.  The statute and the prior 
decisions applying section 1473 make clear that once a defendant shows that false 
evidence was admitted at trial, relief is available under 1473 as long as the false 
evidence was ―material.‖  Our case law further explains that false evidence is 
material ― ‗if there is a ‗reasonable probability‘ that, had it not been introduced, 
the result would have been different.‘ ‖  (In re Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 726, 
742.)  The remedial purpose of the statute is to afford the petitioner relief if the 
―false evidence [was] of such significance that it may have affected the outcome 
of the trial . . . .‖  (In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 788, 808-809.)  Thus, the 
crucial question is whether the false evidence was material — not whether, 
without the false evidence, there was still substantial evidence to support the 
verdict. 
Our courts have held that ― ‗[f]alse evidence is ―substantially material or 
probative‖ if it is ―of such significance that it may have affected the outcome,‖ in 
the sense that ―with reasonable probability it could have affected the outcome 
. . . .‖  [Citation.]  In other words, false evidence passes the indicated threshold if 
there is a ―reasonable probability‖ that, had it not been introduced, the result 
would have been different.  [Citation.]  The requisite ―reasonable probability,‖ we 
believe, is such as undermines the reviewing court‘s confidence in the outcome.‘ ‖  
(Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 965 (Malone), quoting In re Wright, supra, 78 
Cal.App.3d 788, 814, italics added by Malone.)  This required showing of 
prejudice is the same as the reasonably probable test for state law error established 
30 
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.  (Wright, supra, 78 
Cal.App.3d at p. 812.)  We make such a determination based on the totality of the 
relevant circumstances.  (Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 965.) 
Accordingly, we will apply this standard to determine whether the false 
evidence was substantially material and probative on the issue of petitioner‘s guilt. 
C.  Reasonable probability that the false evidence affected the outcome 
Dr. Sperber‘s qualifications were impressive.  At the time of petitioner‘s 
1997 jury trial, Dr. Sperber had more than 40 years of experience in dentistry, 
which included being the chief forensic dentist for two counties.  He had testified 
in more than 100 cases, including well-known high profile cases.  He also received 
a congressional appointment to set up a national system to identify missing 
persons through dental records.  Dr. Sperber‘s credentials very likely added to the 
credibility of his testimony. 
It is important to note that Dr. Sperber not only testified that he believed the 
lesion on Pamela‘s hand was consistent with the unusual dentition of petitioner‘s 
lower teeth, he also prepared an exhibit.  On a poster board, Dr. Sperber assembled 
an enlarged photo of the autopsy photograph depicting Pamela‘s lesion, a photo of 
petitioner‘s lower jaw casting, and a transparency tracing of petitioner‘s lower 
canine and incisor teeth.  He taped the transparency between the two photos so 
that the transparency tracing could be flipped back and forth between the two 
photos for purposes of visualizing the match.  This exhibit and the casting of 
petitioner‘s teeth  were admitted in evidence and given to the jury during its 
deliberations.   
 
Although in Richards I, supra, 55 Cal.4th 948, we characterized the 
evidence against petitioner as strong, we did so in the context of whether the 
evidence was strong enough to overcome any suggestion that evidence 
31 
discrediting Dr. Sperber‘s conclusion pointed ―unerringly‖ to petitioner‘s 
innocence.  Now, however, we must decide whether the evidence is strong enough 
to rule out a reasonable probability that the admission of Dr. Sperber‘s trial 
testimony affected the outcome of the case.  In that context, the case against 
petitioner was entirely based on circumstantial evidence, and much of that 
evidence was heavily contested.  Upon examination of this circumstantial 
evidence admitted against petitioner, it appears that Dr. Sperber‘s testimony was 
―material‖ for purposes of section 1473. 
Assuming that, like the prosecution‘s investigator, petitioner was able to 
drive 20 miles per hour over the speed limit on the night of the killing, petitioner 
would have had anywhere from only eight to 11 minutes to kill the victim, 
depending on whether Eugene Price‘s phone call or petitioner‘s first call to 911 is 
used as the time reference for when the attack on Pamela was completed.  If 
petitioner drove 10 miles per hour over the speed limit on his way home that night, 
then he would have had anywhere from only one to four minutes to kill the victim.  
According to the county‘s chief medical examiner, Dr. Sheridan, death by 
strangulation alone can take anywhere from two and a half to three minutes. 
Although some parts of the property contained looser soil that was 
amenable to shoe prints, the fact that shoe prints of only the victim and petitioner 
were found at the crime scene is not remarkable, given that some of the landscape 
was generally not conducive to creating shoe prints.  In fact, only four shoe prints 
were found at the crime scene, with three of them belonging to Pamela — despite 
evidence that she was chased around the crime area.   
Petitioner‘s familiarity with the crime scene and with what items were used 
to strike Pamela may appear suspicious in the abstract, but he had had to wait for 
more than a half-hour before Deputy Nourse arrived.  It is not unreasonable to 
conclude that petitioner, while waiting for the police to arrive, explored the area to 
32 
determine how his wife died.  Moreover, when Detective Parent examined the 
crime scene, it was readily apparent to him that both the cinder block and stone 
had been used to hit Pamela in the head because those items were covered with 
blood and blood spatter.  In fact, he agreed that it did not take a ―rocket scientist‖ 
for someone to make such a conclusion.   
The time of death was a significant issue at trial.  It is undisputed that there 
was no evidence definitively establishing that point.  But evidence suggested that 
Pamela stopped answering her phone hours before petitioner arrived.  Although 
Deputy Nourse, upon examining Pamela‘s body, believed she had very recently 
died because the body still had wet puddled blood around it and no rigor mortis, he 
described her body as neither warm nor cold.  Both the prosecution and defense 
forensic pathologists agreed that, after death, the body cools at a rate of 1.5 
degrees to 2 degrees Fahrenheit per hour with some variance depending on the 
environmental conditions, the weight of the body, and the circumstances leading 
to death.  Thus, if Pamela had died an hour before petitioner arrived, Deputy 
Nourse‘s observation that her body was neither warm nor cold might be consistent 
with that hypothesis because he arrived less than an hour after petitioner did. 
The fact that there were no visible, fresh injuries on petitioner‘s face, arms, 
and hands on the night of the killing was also unusual.  The scene of the crime 
established that Pamela fought her attacker.  Two of her fingernails were torn off 
during the attack.  Her body had numerous pre-mortem bruises and lacerations.  
There was evidence she was assaulted outside first and then brought inside the 
camper where she bled on pillows.  Pamela was strangled first by ligature and then 
manually.  The presence of blood in multiple locations further suggested that 
Pamela tried to fight off and flee her attacker.  However, petitioner‘s body showed 
no evidence of a recent physical altercation. 
33 
Even more unusual was the evidence of blood on petitioner‘s clothing.  The 
few stains that the prosecution‘s expert identified as blood spatter on petitioner‘s 
shoes and jeans were millimeter sized.  But the area around Pamela‘s body 
exhibited a radial spray of significant blood spatter, much of which was centimeter 
sized.  More important, the defense expert provided evidence that the alleged 
blood spatter on petitioner‘s jeans and shoes could have been the result of transfer 
scenarios that were consistent with petitioner‘s claim that he had cradled Pamela‘s 
head at the scene.  The expert believed the assailant‘s clothes would have 
displayed far more blood spatter than was found on the clothing petitioner wore on 
the night of the killing.  As a result, the defense expert believed that petitioner‘s 
clothing was not consistent with his being the perpetrator. 
Accordingly, with the exception of the bite mark evidence, the defense had 
a substantial response to much of the prosecution‘s evidence against petitioner.  
Under these unique circumstances, it is reasonably probable that the false evidence 
presented by Dr. Sperber at petitioner‘s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that 
proceeding. 
34 
 
VI.  DISPOSITION 
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted.4  The judgment of the San 
Bernardino County Superior Court in People v. William Richards, No. 
SWHSS700444, is vacated. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
                                              
4 
On November 6, 2015, petitioner filed a motion for release on unscheduled 
bail amount or own recognizance pending determination on merits of petition for 
writ of habeas corpus and a motion to expedite case and for calendar preference.  
In light of the disposition of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, both are 
dismissed as moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to address the 
observations put forward in the concurring opinion of my colleague.  The separate 
opinion emphasizes the ―relevance‖ of the fact that two previous juries were 
unable to reach a verdict without the bite mark evidence.  (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., 
post, at p. 1.)  To conclude that the case is weak merely because a jury, or even 
two, did not return a verdict is often an exercise in speculation.   
 
Our role as a reviewing court is to determine whether the false evidence 
admitted in this case was ― ‗material,‘ ‖ a standard equivalent to the ―reasonably 
probable test for state law error‖ under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  Under that standard, we must ―examine ‗each 
individual case to determine whether prejudice actually occurred in light of the 
entire record.‘ ‖  (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801-802, 
italics added.)  Prejudice must appear as a ― ‗demonstrable reality,‘ not simply 
speculation.‖  (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)  The majority 
opinion aptly identifies several facts in the record that show a reasonable 
probability defendant suffered prejudice from admission of the bite mark 
evidence.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30-33.)       
   
By contrast, it is very difficult to read any significance into the fact that two 
other juries hung in this case.  Juries fail to agree for a variety of reasons and the 
rules of evidence prohibit inquiry into the jurors‘ subjective reasoning process.  
(Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)  Particularly when the split is 11 to one, as it was 
in the second trial here, the disagreement may be driven as much by the 
2 
personality of a juror, a uniquely held world view, or even some friction during 
deliberations, as by any weakness in the underlying case.  The point is that, in 
most cases, a reviewing court, writing at a great remove from trial proceedings, 
may seldom know why a jury did not reach consensus.  Such is the case here.   
 
My colleague accepts defendant‘s assertion that ― ‗the difference between 
the first two unsuccessful trials and the third trial was the introduction of bite mark 
evidence through Dr. Sperber.‘ ‖  (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.)  However, 
complete records of the first two trials are not before us, and the record that we do 
have shows the assertion is inaccurate, to say the least.  Defendant testified in his 
own defense in the first two trials.  He did not do so here.  Of course, the last jury 
could not draw any negative inference from his failure to testify and there is 
nothing in this record to indicate why that choice was made.  The fact remains 
that, in the first two trials, those juries received different evidence, and heard it 
from defendant himself.  The availability of that testimony may have swayed some 
dissenting jurors in his favor. 
 
In addition, the minute orders from the first two trials were made a part of 
this habeas corpus petition record.1  A comparison of all three sets of minute 
orders reveals that there were a total of 37 witnesses called at all three trials, 21 on 
behalf of the prosecution and 16 called exclusively by the defense.  But only 12 of 
these witnesses testified at all three trials, 10 for the prosecution and two for the 
defense.  In terms of prosecution witnesses, Robert Fenstermacher, Buster Price, 
Alvera Price, and Marie Starg testified only at the first trial; Kathy Sue Blades and 
Rosalin Scamihorn only at the second.  Hobart Gray, Valerie Seleska, and Dr. 
Norman Sperber were called only in the last trial.  Craig Ogino did not testify at 
                                              
1  
There was actually an additional trial which was begun after the first 
mistrial.  That case was mistried because the trial judge recused herself during voir 
dire.  (In re Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 948, 955.)  In discussing the three trials 
here, I refer to the three times the case was given to a jury to decide.   
3 
the first trial but did at the second and third.  For the defense, Mike Au, Pedro 
Galvan, Michael Stansell, and Allen Walkner testified only at the first trial; Tom 
Bradford and Norman Parent only at the second.2  Christian Filipiak, Robert 
Gager, Dr. Gregory Golden, Wayne Kozica, Gregory Randolph, Jean Paul Rios, 
and Dr. Griffith Thomas were never heard by the two hung juries, testifying only 
at trial three.  As noted, defendant testified only at the first two trials.   
 
Although the substance of the testimony at the first two trials is not 
available for our review, it is clear each case was tried with substantially different 
sets of witnesses.  Defendant was represented by the public defender in the first 
two trials, and by privately retained counsel in the third.  One judge presided over 
the first trial, and a different judge presided over the second and third.  We cannot 
know whether there were significant differences in evidentiary rulings made in 
each case.  We cannot know how the first two cases were argued by different 
counsel or whether the theory or nuances of those cases differed from either the 
prosecution or defense perspective.   
 
I do not suggest that we can conclude that those differences, and others that 
may have flowed from them, influenced the outcome here.  The pivotal point is 
that we do not know.  I strongly urge that we cannot and should not speculate 
about the import of the fact that two other juries failed to reach consensus, 
particularly when so many factors can lead to such a result, and when the trials 
were so demonstrably different. 
 
My colleague asserts that we ―do know‖ the prosecution here ―never 
meaningfully disputed Richards‘s observation that the bite mark evidence was a 
material difference‖ among the trials.  (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 2.)  First, 
as noted, that is simply not the case as to the main evidentiary difference.  Second, 
it misstates the People‘s position. 
                                              
2  
Bradford and Parent also testified for the prosecution in all three trials. 
4 
              In their return to the habeas corpus petition, the People affirmatively 
―deny each and every allegation of the Petition,‖ except as stated otherwise.  In the 
briefing at issue here the focus was always the bite mark evidence.  The People 
properly concentrated their argument on that question.  They had no reason to 
wander far afield arguing at length about the strength of cases not under review.  
As the People point out in their briefing, this petition rests solely on a statutory 
change.  They clearly state their position that ―[t]he only relevant analysis is 
whether the changes to Penal Code [section] 1473 require relief here.‖  In their 
return the People refer to the great body of evidence they assert points to 
defendant‘s guilt, and note that that evidence relates to other aspects of the case 
that have been ―repeatedly parsed throughout numerous appeals and petitions.‖  It 
is a substantial overreach to suggest the People concede a point they explicitly 
deny, particularly to imply they acknowledge weakness in a case they have 
strongly pursued for over 20 years. 
 
My colleague cites other cases in which the fact of prior hung juries was 
recognized as ―relevan[t].‖  (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 1-2.)  People v. 
Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932 was a death penalty case in which the first jury 
convicted the defendant of multiple murders but hung on the penalty question.  A 
second jury returned a death verdict.  (Id. at p. 938.)  The court held that the 
prosecution improperly failed to provide discovery of rebuttal evidence in the 
second penalty trial, prejudicing the defendant.  (Id. at pp. 955, 957, 961-962.)  
The court‘s discussion reveals that it was able to compare the evidence from the 
first and second penalty trials in a number of particulars.  The same counsel 
participated in both penalty phases, which were apparently tried before the same 
judge.  (Id. at pp. 961-962.)  In reversing, we observed that ―a death verdict was 
not a foregone conclusion.  Indeed, the first penalty trial ended with a hung jury.‖  
(Id. at p. 962.)  Of course, a death verdict is never a ―foregone conclusion‖ 
because the penalty decision is normative.  Even if all jurors agree that the 
evidence shows the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating, they 
5 
remain free to return a verdict for a life sentence if they conclude death is not 
appropriate.  (People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 55-56.)  The observation that a 
death sentence was not a foregone conclusion does little to support an argument 
that a prior hung jury in the guilt phase is strong evidence of a weak factual case.      
 
In People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, we found the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of the defendant‘s unlawfully obtained confessions to 
uncharged sexual acts as circumstantial proof that he committed the charged 
offenses.  (Id. at pp. 236-251.)  In assessing prejudice, we noted ―that at the first 
trial when such evidence was excluded the jury was unable to agree but at this trial 
when the evidence was admitted a unanimous verdict resulted.‖  (Id. at p. 245.)  
We found this fact relevant given that the two trials were ―otherwise substantially 
similar.‖  (Ibid.; accord People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 385.)  As 
noted, defendant has failed to make such a showing here.          
 
Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419 was also a death penalty case.  There 
the original jury hung as to guilt and a second jury convicted and returned a death 
judgment.  (Id. at p. 421.)  The case was reversed for significant Brady violations 
(Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83).  (Kyles, at pp. 441-454.)  The court had 
before it an extensive evidentiary record, produced in connection with habeas 
corpus review, allowing a comparison of the evidence presented and the theories 
relied upon in each trial.  (Id. at pp. 429-431.)  Justice Stevens wrote separately in 
response to a four-justice dissent.  Even Justice Stevens‘s opinion, joined in by 
two other justices, cannot be fairly said to support a reliable conclusion that a hung 
jury means the factual case is weak.  (Id. at p. 455 [conc. opn. of Stevens, J.].)  
Indeed, as the majority noted, ―Because the State withheld evidence, its case was 
much stronger, and the defense case much weaker, than the full facts would have 
suggested.‖  (Id. at p. 429, italics added.)  Justice Stevens‘s concurrence merely 
relied on the previous hung jury as one factor in concluding the Brady errors were 
prejudicial.  (Id. at p. 455 [conc. opn. of Stevens, J.].) 
6 
 
My colleague also cites cases from federal courts of review and the states of 
Georgia and Massachusetts.  Those cases are not binding precedent, and my 
colleague does not suggest otherwise.  It appears that in most of those cases the 
courts had far more complete records of all proceedings involved.  They did not 
draw speculative conclusions as to the strength of a case from the mere fact of a 
hung jury.3 
 
I am not suggesting that a full record can never provide sufficient evidence 
for a reviewing court to make a proper evaluation of the strength of cases as 
presented.  I do counsel that courts should be hesitant to label a case weak due to a 
hung jury in a previous case, the record of which is not before them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.           
                                              
3  
The exception is Commonwealth v. Broomhead (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) 855 
N.E.2d 413, a driving under the influence case.  The court reversed for violation of 
a state rule of criminal procedure.  (Id. at p. 417.)  There the court did conclude the 
case was a close one, because two previous juries had hung and the final jury had 
sent out a note asking what would happen if it could not agree on a verdict.  (Id. at 
p. 420.)  The case does not reveal how the previous juries were divided, nor does it 
discuss the possible differences in evidence or theories presented.  The paucity of 
information makes it difficult to evaluate whatever persuasive value the case may 
have.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
I join today‘s opinion, including its determination that it is reasonably 
probable that the false evidence presented by Dr. Norman Sperber at petitioner 
William Richards‘s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that proceeding.  The 
bite mark evidence falsely established ―a direct and visceral link‖ between  
Richards and the victim (In re Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 948, 981 (Richards I) 
(dis. opn. of Liu, J.)), and the remaining evidence was too close for us to have 
confidence in the verdict (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30–33). 
In assessing the significance of the bite mark evidence, I think it is also 
relevant that two previous juries were unable to reach a verdict without this 
evidence.  It was only at the final trial, where the false evidence was admitted, that 
a jury convicted Richards.  In similar circumstances, this court and others have 
recognized the relevance of prior hung juries to the determination of prejudice.  
(See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 962 [concluding that the 
improper denial of discovery of rebuttal evidence in a penalty retrial was 
prejudicial because it was reasonably possible that defense counsel would have 
presented mitigating evidence and the first jury hung when such evidence was 
admitted]; People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 245 [finding it significant that 
the first jury was unable to agree when the disputed evidence was excluded, but a 
unanimous verdict resulted when the evidence was erroneously admitted at the 
later trial]; People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 385 [a previous hung jury 
2 
―supports a finding of prejudice in light of the fact that the evidence presented at 
both trials was similar, with the significant exception that the [improperly 
admitted] videos were not shown at the first trial‖]; Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 
U.S. 419, 455 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.) [―the fact that the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict at the conclusion of the first trial provides strong reason to believe 
the significant errors that occurred at the second trial were prejudicial‖]; Ouber v. 
Guarino (1st Cir. 2002) 293 F.3d 19, 35 [finding that defense counsel‘s failure to 
present the repeatedly promised testimony of petitioner was prejudicial because 
the only ―salient difference‖ between the petitioner‘s third trial and the previous 
trials was the absence of petitioner‘s testimony]; Perry v. United States (D.C. 
2011) 36 A.3d 799, 821 [finding erroneous jury instruction to be prejudicial where 
previous jury deadlocked without such instruction]; Bass v. State (Ga. 2009) 674 
S.E.2d 255, 258 [―A prior hung jury is a factor this Court has recognized in 
addressing the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim.‖]; Com. v. Broomhead 
(Mass.App.Ct. 2006) 855 N.E.2d 413, 420 [finding prosecutor‘s erroneous 
statements to be prejudicial at third trial where presentation of the same evidence, 
without the statements, resulted in two prior hung juries].) 
Justice Corrigan argues that “it is very difficult to read any significance into 
the fact that two other juries hung in this case.”  (Conc. opn. of Corrigan, J., ante, 
at p. 1.)  Noting various differences among the three trials, she says we cannot 
know whether these differences influenced the outcomes in the three proceedings.  
(Id. at pp. 2–3.)  What we do know, however, is that the San Bernardino County 
District Attorney, whose office has litigated this case throughout the trial and 
appellate levels, has never meaningfully disputed Richards’s observation that the 
bite mark evidence was a material difference between the final trial and the first 
two trials. 
3 
In his opening brief in Richards I, Richards observed that in each trial “the 
prosecution relied on blood spatter evidence, the absence of evidence indicating 
the presence of a third party at the crime scene, the tuft of blue fibers found in a 
crack of Pamela‘s fingernail which was similar to the fibers in a shirt that Richards 
had worn on the night of the murder, and evidence of some marital discord.  It was 
not until the third full trial that the prosecution, for the first time, introduced 
evidence suggesting Richards was responsible for a bitemark found on Pamela and 
that only 2% of the population had a dentition which could have made that 
bitemark.  That trial resulted in Richards‘ conviction.‖  In his most recent petition, 
he again noted that ―the difference between the first two unsuccessful trials and 
the third trial was the introduction of bite mark evidence through Dr. Sperber.‖  
The District Attorney‘s office has not specifically contested these assertions, even 
as it has vigorously opposed reversal of Richards‘s conviction.  If the three trials 
had differed in material respects other than the bite mark evidence, one would 
have expected to see this argument made in the course of multiple rounds of 
briefing by the party with the knowledge and incentive to make it. 
In sum, the fact that two prior juries hung without the bite mark evidence 
further suggests that admission of this evidence at the third trial was prejudicial, 
and I join the court in holding that Richards‘s conviction must be reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Richards on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S223651 
Date Filed: May 26, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Margaret Powers 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
California Innocence Project, Jan Stiglitz, Justin Brooks and Alexander Simpson for Petitioner. 
 
Steven F. Napolitano, Edward L. Tulin; Richard A. Schwartz, Jeffrey B. White; and Barry C. Scheck for 
Innocence Project, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
David L. Faigman for Thomas Albright, Thomas L. Bohan, Barbara E. Bierer, Michael Bowers, Mary A. 
Bush, Peter J. Bush, Arturo Casadevall, Simon A. Cole, M. Bonner Denton, Shari Seidman Diamond, 
Rachel Dioso-Villa, Jules Epstein, Lisa Faigman, Stephen E. Fienberg, Brandon L. Garrett, Paul C. 
Giannelli, Henry T. Greely, Edward Inwinkelried, Allan Jamieson, Karen Kafadar, Jerome P. Kassirer, 
Jonathan ―Jay‖ Koehler, David Korn, Jennifer Mnookin, Alan B. Morrison, Erin Murphy, Nizam Peerwani, 
Joseph L. Peterson, D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, George F. Sensabaugh,. Jr., Clifford Spiegelman, 
Hal Stern, William C. Thompson, James L. Wayman, Sandy Zabell and Ross E. Zumwalt as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Michael A. Ramos, District Attorney, and Stephanie H. Zeitlin, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jan Stiglitz 
California Innocence Project 
225 Cedar Street 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 515-1525 
 
Stephanie H. Zeitlin 
Deputy District Attorney 
303 W. Third Street, Fifth Floor 
San Bernardino, CA  92415-0511 
(909) 382-7735