Title: Chambers v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 629, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH CHAMBERS,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 629, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0305016220 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 16, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    November 12, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 12th day of November 2009, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Joseph Chambers, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s December 10, 2008 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
In March 2005, Chambers was found guilty by a Superior Court 
jury of Capital Murder in the First Degree and two weapon offenses.  He 
 
2 
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or 
parole.  This Court affirmed Chambers’ convictions on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, Chambers claims that, at trial, the Superior Court erred 
by failing to a) declare a mistrial when a detective and a witness for the State 
conversed during a break in the witness’ testimony; b) properly instruct the 
jury regarding accomplice liability; c) exclude the out-of-court statement of 
a witness; and d) suppress his statement to his probation officer.  Chambers 
also claims that, to the extent his claims are procedurally barred, his 
attorney’s ineffective assistance resulted in a miscarriage of justice 
sufficiently egregious to warrant consideration of his claims on their merits.  
To the extent that Chambers has not argued other grounds to support his 
appeal that were previously raised, those grounds are deemed to be waived 
and will not be addressed by this Court.2 
 
(4) 
In postconviction proceedings, the Superior Court must first 
determine whether the procedural requirements of Rule 61 have been met 
before addressing the merits of the movant’s claims.3  Here, the record 
                                                 
1 Chambers v. State, 930 A.2d 904 (Del. 2007). 
2 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his postconviction motion filed 
in the Superior Court, Chambers also argued that the Superior Court erred by permitting a 
videotaped statement to be played that did not meet the requirements of Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, §3507. 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
3 
reflects that Chambers’ first claim regarding the Superior Court’s refusal to 
declare a mistrial was unsuccessfully raised both at trial and on direct 
appeal.  As such, it is procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated unless 
Chambers can demonstrate that reconsideration of the claim is warranted in 
the interest of justice.4  In the absence of any such evidence, we conclude 
that the Superior Court properly denied Chambers’ first claim.   
 
(5) 
Chambers’ second claim is that the Superior Court failed to 
properly instruct the jury regarding accomplice liability.  To the extent that 
this claim is the same as Chambers’ claim, asserted on direct appeal, that the 
jury should have been instructed to view the testimony of his accomplices 
with special caution, it is procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated.5  
Moreover, because Chambers presents no evidence that the claim should be 
reconsidered in the interest of justice,6 we conclude that the Superior Court 
properly denied it.  To the extent that the claim has been raised for the first 
time in these postconviction proceedings, it is procedurally defaulted under 
Rule 61(i)(3).  In the absence of any evidence of cause for the default and 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
 
4 
resulting prejudice,7 the Superior Court’s denial of the claim must be 
affirmed.  
 
(6) 
Chambers’ third claim is that his constitutional right to confront 
his accuser was violated when the Superior Court permitted the State to 
present the out-of-court statement of a witness.  The record reflects that, 
while this claim was raised at trial, albeit unsuccessfully, it was subsequently 
abandoned on direct appeal.  As such, the claim is procedurally defaulted 
unless Chambers is able to demonstrate cause for the default and resulting 
prejudice.8  In the absence of any such evidence, we conclude that this 
claim, too, was properly denied by the Superior Court. 
 
(7) 
Chambers’ fourth claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
failed to suppress his statement to his probation officer.  Again, while this 
claim was raised at trial, it was later abandoned on direct appeal and, 
therefore, is procedurally defaulted.9  And again, in the absence of any 
evidence supporting cause for the default and resulting prejudice,10 we 
conclude that the Superior Court properly denied the claim.   
 
(8) 
Chambers, finally, attempts to overcome the procedural bars to 
his claims by arguing that his attorneys’ ineffective assistance resulted in a 
                                                 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A) and (B). 
8 Id.; Oney v. State, 482 A.2d 756, 758 (Del. 1984). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A) and (B). 
 
5 
miscarriage of justice.11  The record reflects that no claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was raised in the Superior Court.12  As such, we 
decline to address any such claims for the first time in this appeal.13   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
12 In fact, both of Chambers’ trial attorneys declined to file affidavits because Chambers 
had raised no such claims.   
13 Supr. Ct. R. 8.