Title: Freeman v. State
Citation: 231 N.E.2d 246, 249 Ind. 211
Docket Number: 30,653
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1967

249 Ind. 211 (1967)
231 N.E.2d 246
FREEMAN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,653.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 5, 1967.
*212 Delmbert &amp; Pushor, of Columbus, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Wilma T. Leach, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, J.
This is an appeal from a conviction of the crimes of Second-Degree Burglary, Grand Larceny, and Automobile Banditry. Trial was held before a jury.
The affidavit, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
At approximately 5:30 A.M. one morning, the appellant, who was driving a truck, was stopped by Columbus police. They had discovered that a burglary had been committed in a T.V. store in the area shortly before. Appellant was arrested for not having a driver's license and taken to police headquarters in Columbus. The truck was then searched and some of the items reported missing from the T.V. store were positively identified as those stolen. Also found in the truck were several burglary tools. The T.V. store's door had been pried open. The tools showed use and one had some paint on it that could have matched that on the store, but it was not identified as such.
When apprehended the appellant stated that he was from Indianapolis and was in Columbus to "try out" the truck with the possibility of buying it in mind. Later he said he had *214 been brought to Columbus by a named party and hired to drive the truck back for $50.00.
On trial the appellant introduced three (3) witnesses who testified, in substance, that he had been hired to drive the truck at 2:30 A.M. of the morning in question by the same-named individual. His sister drove him to Columbus and deposited him at the truck by 3:30 A.M. She did not testify as to the contents of the truck at that time. Due to routine checks by the Columbus police on local businesses, the time of the burglary was fixed as after 4:00 A.M. and before 5:30 A.M. when the appellant was apprehended.
A large five-feet long stereo-T.V. combination, a color T.V. set, two (2) transistor radios, some T.V. repair equipment, and approximately $8.00 was taken. Some of this was not in the truck when impounded by the police and was never found.
The appellant raises, validly, four (4) errors on appeal:
In his first issue raised for this appeal, appellant states that it was reversible error for the Trial Court to refuse to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of Entering to Commit a Felony pursuant to Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 10-704, (1956 Repl.). Appellant argues that entering to commit a felony is a lesser included offense of Second-Degree Burglary as covered by Count I of the affidavit. In pressing his point he relies on Watford v. State of Indiana (1957), 237 Ind. 10, 143 N.E.2d 405. *215 This case is sound authority for the rule that such an error by the Court is, indeed, reversible error. We, therefore, concur with appellant in that the conviction for Second-Degree Burglary should be reversed.
In his second issue, the appellant maintains that there is insufficient evidence to support the convictions. On appeal this Court may not weigh the evidence, but will only look to see if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the jury would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilty. There must be such evidence to prove every material element of the crime charged. Gilmore v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 359, 98 N.E.2d 677, Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185, Carlin v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 644, 184 N.E. 543.
Examining the conviction of Auto Banditry, first we note that the statute sets out the following:
In Todd v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 85, 101 N.E.2d 922, this Court reversed a conviction of Auto Banditry wherein the State did not prove that the appellant had on or near the premises, an automobile, or similar vehicle, which he intended or did use in an attempt to escape or in which they did escape. The only evidence is that the stolen goods were found in the truck which the appellant was driving. *216 In Todd, the goods  derived as the fruits of a fraudulent check  were found in the car which appellant was apprehended in as well. Though the goods were heavy and bulky, the Court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence from which a jury could return a verdict of guilty. We so conclude in this case.
The remaining crime, Grand Larceny, will be affirmed. It is well settled in Indiana law that unexplained possession of stolen goods shortly after the crime in the proximity will support a conviction of larceny. Gilley et al. v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 701, 88 N.E.2d 759. Appellant had introduced evidence as to how he came into possession of the goods. However, the jury chose not to believe his testimony and we may not overturn the conviction here when there is sufficient evidence to support it.
Appellant's third issue contends that the Court committed error when it gave Instruction No. 13 which reads as follows:
*217 Appellant objected, stating there was no evidence showing more than one person was involved. We conclude there was. Due to the bulkiness of the items taken we think it is very probable that two or more people were involved. In giving this instruction the Court was suggesting the possibility to the jury. We do not feel that the Trial Court committed prejudicial error in this matter and his objection was properly overruled.
The last issue raised by the appellant is that the Trial Court erred in overruling appellant's tendered Instruction No. 7 which reads as follows:
We believe that this instruction was amply covered in instructions numbered 12 and 15 as given by the Trial Court, which, respectively, read as follows:
The convictions of Second-Degree Burglary and Automobile Banditry are each reversed for the above-discussed reasons, and the conviction for Grand Larceny affirmed.
Hunter, J., and Arterburn, J., concur.
Jackson, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.
Mote, J., not participating.
JACKSON, C.J.
Appellant was charged by affidavit in three counts with the crimes of second degree burglary, grand larceny and automobile banditry. Trial was had by jury resulting in a finding of guilty on all three counts.
Judgment of the court rendered upon the verdict of the jury was as follows:
I concur in the majority opinion in the reversal of the convictions of second degree burglary and automobile banditry.
I dissent to the conclusion in the majority opinion affirming the conviction of grand larceny. By the third paragraph of the judgment of the court set forth above, the trial court held that the charge of grand larceny under Count II of the affidavit was included in the offense of automobile banditry as charged in Count III of the affidavit. It therefore follows that the reversal of Count III by the majority opinion carried with it the included offense of grand larceny charged in Count II of the affidavit.
NOTE.  Reported in 231 N.E.2d 246.