Title: State v. McCall
Citation: 223 S.E.2d 303, 289 N.C. 512
Docket Number: 10
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 1976

223 S.E.2d 303 (1976) 289 N.C. 512 STATE of North Carolina v. Lawrence McCALL. No. 10. Supreme Court of North Carolina. April 6, 1976. *307 Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Edwin M. Speas, Jr., and Associate Atty., Joan H. Byers, Raleigh, for the State. Ransdell &amp; Ransdell by William G. Ransdell, Jr., Raleigh, for defendant-appellant. MOORE, Justice. Defendant first assigns as error the denial of his motions for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence. Defendant contends that the evidence tending to show that defendant murdered Mrs. Hice was insufficient to be submitted to the jury. Upon considering a motion for nonsuit, the court must find that there is "substantial evidence . . . both that an offense charged . . . has been committed and that the defendant committed it" before such motion can be overruled. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 383, 156 S.E.2d 679, 682 (1967). See 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 104 and 106. The evidence for the State, considered in the light most favorable to it, is deemed to be true and the State is entitled to the benefit of all inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom. State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 184 S.E.2d 866 (1971); State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E.2d 289 (1971); State v. Cutler, supra. The State's evidence in this case tends to show that Mrs. Hice died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by a shot fired from Gary McCall's trailer some eighty feet away. The State's evidence further tends to show that defendant, a short time before the shooting, had test fired a 12 gauge shotgun, that 12 gauge shotgun wadding was found in a straight line between the trailer and the bodies after the shooting, and that a freshly-fired 12 gauge shotgun was later found in defendant's house hidden between the quilts and mattress of a bed. The State also produced evidence tending to show that defendant was the only person in Gary McCall's trailer when the fatal shots were fired. Murder in the first degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation. State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E.2d 393 (1971); State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 178 S.E.2d 65 (1970); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); G.S. 14-17. The killing of Mrs. Hice with a deadly weapon, when established beyond a reasonable doubt, raises two presumptions: first, that the killing was unlawful, and second, that it was done with malice. State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971). Indeed, actual ill will can be inferred from defendant's attempt to run down deceased shortly before the shooting. Premeditation and deliberation can be inferred from defendant's (1) obtaining and test firing the weapon before the fatal shooting, (2) driving back and forth by the victims before the killing, (3) shooting the unsuspecting victims from ambush some eighty feet away, (4) firing the second shot after two of those wounded by the first shot were able to rise, and (5) leaving the scene hurriedly and passing the wounded victims immediately after the shooting without offering assistance. Thus, there was ample evidence tending to show that the crime of murder in the first degree was committed and that defendant committed it. Contradictions and discrepancies, even in the State's evidence, are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant nonsuit. State *308 v. Mabry, 269 N.C. 293, 152 S.E.2d 112 (1967); 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law § 104, and cases therein cited. The motions for judgment as of nonsuit were properly overruled. By his next assignment of error, defendant insists that the trial court erred in permitting the district attorney to make an argument to the jury "which tended to belittle, demean and ridicule appellant's counsel for the apparent purpose of diminishing counsel's effectiveness." Defendant claims this argument denied him due process and the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution of North Carolina and the Constitution of the United States. The remarks complained of followed the following arguments of defense counsel: A review of the comments of the district attorney reveals that they were made in response to the above attacks by defense counsel on the credibility of the Owenses and the law enforcement officers in Transylvania County. Excerpts from the district attorney's comments are as follows: It is well established that the control of the arguments of counsel must be left largely in the sound discretion of the trial judge with wide latitude given counsel to argue all the law and the facts presented by the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E.2d 125 (1975); State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E.2d 750 (1974); State v. Thompson, 278 N.C. 277, 179 S.E.2d 315 (1971); State v. Graves, 252 N.C. 779, 114 S.E.2d 770 (1960). It should also be noted that none of the remarks of the district attorney quoted above, with the exception of the last exchange, were objected to in apt time by defense counsel. An objection after verdict ordinarily comes too late. State v. Noell, supra; State v. Williams, 276 N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503 (1970). We hold, however, that even if properly objected to, the arguments of the district attorney were not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. Defense counsel is in fact from Raleigh and in our opinion his remarks invited the response of the district attorney. This Court has disapproved the type of argument made by defense counsel. In State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 157 S.E.2d 335 (1967), we stated that "[i]t is improper for a lawyer in his argument to assert his opinion that a witness is lying. He can argue to the jury that they should not believe a witness, but he should not call him a liar." Defense counsel severely attacked the credibility of the two State's witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Owens, and the honesty of the local law enforcement officers. The district attorney answered by attempting to restore the credibility of these witnesses and to defend the performance of the investigating officers. Mr. Ransdell opened the door with abusive comments. The response he received was justified. State v. Stegmann, 286 N.C. 638, 654, 213 S.E.2d 262, 274 (1975); State v. Seipel, 252 N.C. 335, 113 S.E.2d 432 (1960). This assignment of error is overruled. The trial court in its charge to the jury placed the burden upon the State to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further charged: Defendant challenges this portion of the charge, contending that it contravenes the holding in the recent case of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975), that the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt rests on the State. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Mrs. Hice on 7 June 1975. The date of the Mullaney decision was 9 June 1975. Therefore, Mullaney does not control unless it is to be applied retroactively. This Court has recently held that Mullaney will not be given retroactive effect *310 insofar as North Carolina cases are concerned. State v. Hankerson, supra. Therefore, defendant's challenge based on Mullaney is without merit. Even if Mullaney should later be found to be retroactive, Mullaney does not invalidate the use of the presumptions of unlawful killing and malice in the present case. In State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975), Justice Branch addressed the issue of whether the presumptions of malice and unlawfulness must fall after Mullaney. In holding that they do not, Justice Branch, speaking for the Court, stated: The evidence in present case was sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally fired the shots that killed Mrs. Hice, thereby raising the presumed facts of malice and unlawfulness. Defendant then was faced with the burden of going forward with some evidence to contest the facts presumed, which he failed to do. This assignment of error is overruled. Finally, defendant challenges the constitutionality of North Carolina's death penalty. Questions raised by this assignment of error have been considered and found to be without merit in State v. Armstrong, 287 N.C. 60, 212 S.E.2d 894 (1975); State v. Vick, 287 N.C. 37, 213 S.E.2d 335 (1975); State v. Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975); State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 213 S.E.2d 280 (1975); State v. Stegmann, supra; State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 213 S.E.2d 214 (1975); State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975); State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 212 S.E.2d 142 (1975); State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 212 S.E.2d 113 (1975); State v. Sparks, 285 N.C. 631, 207 S.E.2d 712 (1974); State v. Honeycutt, 285 N.C. 174, 203 S.E.2d 844 (1974); State v. Dillard, 285 N.C. 72, 203 S.E.2d 6 (1974); State v. Noell, supra; State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974). We adhere to those decisions. In view of the seriousness of the charge, we have carefully examined each of defendant's assignments of error. Our examination of the entire record discloses that defendant has had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error. No error.