Title: Nowden v. Division of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, Missouri Department of Public Safety
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96496
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2018

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
GRAYLAND NOWDEN, 
) 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96496 
) 
DIVISION OF ALCOHOL & TOBACCO 
) 
CONTROL, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF ) 
PUBLIC SAFETY, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY 
The Honorable Jon E. Beetem, Judge 
Grayland Nowden appeals from a circuit court’s judgment granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Missouri Department of Public Safety’s Division of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control and dismissing, with prejudice, Nowden’s first amended petition for 
review under chapter 5361 on the grounds Nowden failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Because the circuit court lacked authority to review the petition as pleaded, the 
judgment is affirmed.  
1  Statutory citations are to RSMo 2016. 
Opinion issued June 12, 2018
2 
 
I.  Factual and Procedural History 
 
In 2013, Nowden was working as a special agent with the Division of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control.  After taking his state vehicle to be serviced, the Division opened an 
investigation when it was reported the vehicle contained prohibited items, such as bullets, 
condoms, and a bottle of non-alcoholic beer.  Also located in the vehicle were unissued 
summonses and evidence bags containing unlogged evidence.  Investigators further 
discovered envelopes for A&D Mini Mart utility services and Sam’s Club receipts for 
purchases of tobacco products to be sold at A&D Mini Mart.  A&D Mini Mart is a store 
regulated by the Division. 
 
Nowden admitted the items in the car were his. He also had a Sam’s Club card in 
his name on an A&D Mini Mart account. And he was a bookkeeper for A&D Mini Mart.  
He also admitted to inspecting A&D Mini Mart despite having a conflict of interest.  
Nowden was terminated following the Division’s investigation.  The Division notified 
Nowden by letter he was terminated “subject to [his] right to appeal as set forth in Missouri 
Department of Public Safety’s Policy G-2.”  Enclosed with the letter was a copy of the 
department’s policy and a notification of disciplinary action dated October 1, 2013, 
advising Nowden his application for appeal must be submitted by October 8, 2013.  
Nowden did not submit his application for appeal until October 10, 2013.  On  
November 4, 2013, the Division notified Nowden his appeal was untimely. 
 
Nowden filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission on 
November 1, 2013, and sought a hearing before the Commission.  The Commission 
dismissed Nowden’s complaint, finding Nowden was not a merit employee entitled to a 
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hearing before the Commission and the Division had internal appeal procedures for its 
employees. 
 
Subsequently, Nowden sought review of his termination in the circuit court.  After 
being granted permission to amend his original petition, Nowden filed a first amended 
petition for review pursuant to § 536.100.  In his first amended petition, Nowden alleges 
he had the right to appeal his termination to the Division and this appeal constituted a 
“contested case” providing for review in the circuit court pursuant to § 536.100.  Nowden 
filed a second amended petition for injunctive relief and “non-contested case” review 
pursuant to § 536.150 upon being granted approval by the circuit court.2  Thereafter, 
Nowden filed a motion to withdraw his second amended petition, and the circuit court 
ordered the cause to proceed on the first amended petition.  The parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  The circuit court sustained the Division’s motion for summary 
judgment, overruled Nowden’s motion, and dismissed Nowden’s first amended petition 
with prejudice because Nowden failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.   
 
Nowden appealed and, after opinion by the court of appeals, this Court transferred 
the case pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution. 
  
II. Analysis 
“The standard of review on appeal of summary judgment is de novo, and summary 
judgment will be upheld on appeal if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the 
                                              
2  Section 536.150 provides for injunctive or writ review and relief of actions taken by an 
administrative officer or body and is distinct from the review provided by § 536.100. See 
§ 536.150.2 
4 
 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys & Cir. Att’ys 
Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot Cty., 256 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 2008).  “[T]he trial court’s 
judgment may be affirmed on any basis supported by the record.”  Nail v. Husch Blackwell 
Sanders, LLP, 436 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Mo. banc 2014).  In this appeal, Nowden makes 
several arguments alleging the circuit court erroneously applied the law in dismissing his 
first amended petition for review.  However, the circuit court properly dismissed Nowden’s 
action because it lacked authority to review the Division’s administrative decision as a 
“contested case” pursuant to § 536.100 as alleged in the first amended petition.   
When reviewing a governmental agency’s decision, this Court considers whether 
the matter before the agency was a “contested” or “non-contested case” to determine the 
scope of judicial review.  Furlong Cos., Inc. v. City of Kan. City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 165 
(Mo. banc 2006).  The Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) provides for 
judicial review in the circuit court for parties aggrieved by an administrative decision in 
two types of cases: contested and non-contested.  Id.  A contested case is “a proceeding 
before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required 
by law to be determined after hearing.”  Section 536.010(4).  The “law” requiring a hearing 
“includes any ordinance, statute, or constitutional provision that mandates a hearing.”  
McCoy v. Caldwell Cty., 145 S.W.3d 427, 428–29 (Mo. banc 2004).  A non-contested case, 
although not defined by MAPA, is “a decision that is not required by law to be determined 
after a hearing.”  Furlong, 189 S.W.3d at 165.   
“The classification of a case as ‘contested’ or ‘noncontested’ is determined as a 
matter of law.”  City of Valley Park v. Armstrong, 273 S.W.3d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 2009).  
5 
 
The distinction between a contested and non-contested case is significant because the scope 
of judicial review is different.  As explained in Furlong: 
Contested case review is controlled by sections 536.100 to 536.140. 
Contested cases provide the parties with an opportunity for a formal hearing 
with the presentation of evidence, including sworn testimony of witnesses 
and cross-examination of witnesses, and require written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  The review of a contested case is a review by the trial 
court of the record created before the administrative body. The trial court’s 
decision upon such review is appealable, but the appellate court also looks 
back to the record created before the administrative body.  
 Non-contested cases do not require formal proceedings or hearings 
before the administrative body.  As such, there is no record required for 
review.  In the review of a non-contested decision, the circuit court does not 
review the administrative record, but hears evidence, determines facts, and 
adjudges the validity of the agency decision.  Under the procedures of section 
536.150, the circuit court conducts such a hearing as an original action.   
 In either a contested or a non-contested case the private litigant is 
entitled to challenge the governmental agency’s decision.  The difference is 
simply that in a contested case the private litigant must try his or her case 
before the agency, and judicial review is on the record of that administrative 
trial, whereas in a non-contested case the private litigant tries his or her case 
to the court. Depending upon the circumstances, this difference may result in 
procedural advantages or disadvantages to the parties, but in either situation, 
the litigant is entitled to develop an evidentiary record in one forum or 
another.  
 
189 S.W.3d at 165 (internal citations omitted).  
The Division contends the case is contested because its internal Policy G-2 
“substantially follow[s] the requirements for a hearing outlined in Chapter 536, RSMo.”  
What the Division ignores, however, is the policy does not actually require a hearing.  
Rather, Policy G-2 provides the director of the Department of Public Safety with four 
options when an employee appeals a disciplinary decision: (1) request additional 
information from the parties or from any witness having relevant information; (2) conduct 
an “informal hearing” if the recommended disciplinary action is believed to be 
6 
 
inappropriate or excessive; (3) concur in the recommended discipline; or (4) convene a 
board to conduct a hearing substantially following the procedures in chapter 536.  The 
policy is purely discretionary as to whether employees receive a hearing regarding the 
imposed discipline. 
Moreover, even if a hearing following the procedures in chapter 536 is conducted, 
the director retains the final decision pursuant to Policy G-2.  As this Court has held, when 
a proceeding is merely advisory and does not bind the decision maker, then the 
administrative proceeding or hearing does not make the matter a contested case, and review 
is not pursuant to § 536.100.  See McCoy, 145 S.W.3d at 428-29; Kunzie v. City of Olivette, 
184 S.W.3d 570, 572-73 (Mo. banc 2006).  Here, the board is tasked with making written 
findings and recommendations, but Policy G-2 states the director makes “a final decision” 
and provides “written findings and conclusions” to the parties.  Although the Division 
contends Policy G-2 requires the director to “review all majority and dissenting findings 
and recommendations, and all relevant portions of the record of the hearing,” requiring the 
director to review the board’s recommendations prior to making a decision does not negate 
the fact it is the director who, not the board after hearing, determines the employee’s rights, 
duties, or privileges and that, in doing so, the director is not bound “to any gauge or 
criteria.”  Kunzie, 184 S.W.3d at 573; McCoy, 145 S.W.3d at 428–29.   
This is a non-contested case because any hearing pursuant to Policy G-2 would not 
determine Nowden’s rights, duties, or privileges.  Nowden’s first amended petition 
improperly sought review of a contested case.  The circuit court’s dismissal was 
appropriate because it did not have authority to grant relief based on a petition for review 
7 
 
of a contested case.  See McCoy, 145 S.W.3d at 428-29.  In McCoy, the plaintiffs sought 
review in the circuit court following the termination of their employment with the Caldwell 
County Sheriff’s Department.  Id. at 427-28.  The plaintiffs’ petitions sought review of 
their terminations as “contested cases” pursuant to § 536.100.  Id. at 428.  The circuit court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ petitions, and the plaintiffs appealed.  Id.  After determining the 
plaintiffs’ cases were not contested cases, this Court affirmed the dismissals of the 
plaintiffs’ petitions holding the circuit court lacked authority to review the plaintiffs’ 
claims pursuant to § 536.100 because this statute only authorized review of contested 
cases.3  Id. at 428–29.  Likewise, because Nowden’s termination from the Division was not 
the result of a contested case before the agency, the circuit court lacked the authority to 
review this decision pursuant to § 536.100 as alleged in his first amended petition.    
III. Conclusion 
Accordingly, the circuit court’s judgment dismissing Nowden’s petition is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
All concur. 
                                              
3  In McCoy, this Court stated the circuit court lacked “jurisdiction” over a petition for 
review improperly brought pursuant to § 536.100.  145 S.W.3d at 429.  Because a circuit 
court has jurisdiction over petitions brought pursuant to either § 536.100 (contested cases) 
or § 536.150 (non-contested cases), a circuit court in this situation lacks statutory authority 
rather than jurisdiction.