Title: Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 96153
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2004

Docket No. 96153-Agenda 5-March 2004.
JAMES E. HAWES, Appellee, v. LUHR BROTHERS, INC., 							
Appellant.
Opinion filed June 4, 2004. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:	After
entering a voluntary dismissal order, the circuit court of St. Clair County
allowed plaintiff's motion to reinstate his complaint for damages under the
Jones Act (46 U.S.C. §688 et seq.). The initial order of voluntary
dismissal was without prejudice, but it did not specifically reserve to
plaintiff the right to reinstate. The defendant appealed (155 Ill. 2d R. 301),
claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction to allow the reinstatement.
The appellate court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. No. 5-01-0952
(unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

BACKGROUND
	Plaintiff, a resident of Marshall County, Kentucky, was employed as
a deck hand crew member of a barge operated by defendant. On July 14,
1998, he was injured while on board defendant's vessel on a portion of
the Ohio River near Livingston County, Kentucky. On June 15, 2001,
plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of St. Clair County, Illinois,
alleging causes of action under the Jones Act and related admiralty
theories. The defendant first filed an answer and jury demand and later
filed, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187), a motion
to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer, on the ground of forum non
conveniens.
	The motion, supported by affidavit, claimed that defendant is an
Illinois corporation with its principal office in Monroe County, Illinois; that
the witnesses were residents of Kentucky or Illinois working in or around
Livingston County, Kentucky; that plaintiff received medical treatment in
Calloway County, Kentucky; and that the courts of St. Clair County are
more congested than those of the proposed alternative forum, Pope
County, Illinois. The motion was set for hearing on October 23, 2001.
Plaintiff, in turn, filed a written motion for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice. The motion was served on defendant's counsel and granted ex
parte on October 23, 2001. The order made no reference to the pending
forum non conveniens motion and did not reserve to plaintiff the right to
reinstate the case.
	On November 6, 2001, plaintiff filed a Jones Act complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Defendant
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it had not been
commenced within three years of the accident as required by the Jones
Act.
	On November 19, 2001, while the case was still pending in federal
court, plaintiff filed a motion in this case to vacate the order of dismissal.
The motion was granted, despite defense counsel's oral motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. Defense counsel's dismissal motion was pursuant
to section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-301 (West 2000)), governing objections to jurisdiction over the
person. At the hearing on the motion to vacate, plaintiff's counsel stated
that he telephoned defendant's counsel prior to the hearing on the Rule
187 motion and told him he would concede the forum non conveniens
issue. Defendant's counsel disputed that account of the conversation. He
contended that plaintiff's counsel said that he was either going to move for
voluntary dismissal or concede to avoid the delay of an appeal if the forum
motion was denied, and that defense counsel replied that "it's up to you."
The trial court found the forum motion was conceded and that the order
allowing the voluntary dismissal did not state what was actually done. The
trial court noted that the only motion pending at the time of the voluntary
nonsuit was the forum motion and that there was no other reason to
nonsuit the case. This finding appears in the transcript of the hearing but
is not reflected in the order. The order, entered on November 21, 2001,
recited:
			"This cause coming before the Court; the Court being fully
advised in the premises and having jurisdiction of the subject
matter; The Court finds: Both parties present through counsel.
Arguments heard on plaintiff's motion to vacate filed pursuant to
735 ILCS 5/2-1203. Motion is hereby granted. Cause to be
reset for status on 1-30-02 at 9:00 a.m. in Ct. Rm 404."
	On December 11, 2001, the defendant filed, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301), a notice of appeal from this order.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), asserting that the appeal was frivolous and filed
intentionally for the purpose of delay because the order being appealed
was not even final. The sanctions motion was set for hearing on January
7, 2002, with defendant's pending forum non conveniens motion. The
trial court found that it had jurisdiction, denied the motion for sanctions,
and denied the forum non conveniens motion, finding that defendant had
refused to waive the statute of limitations defense as a condition of the
dismissal order.
	Fearing that the first notice of appeal may have been premature,
defendant subsequently filed a second notice of appeal. Defendant also
filed, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306 (166 Ill. 2d R. 306), a petition
for leave to appeal in the appellate court from the order denying the forum
non conveniens motion. That motion was granted, and the appeals were
consolidated for hearing.
	The appellate court affirmed the vacation of the voluntary dismissal
order, but remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings on
the forum motion. The appeal before us involves only the order vacating
the voluntary dismissal order.

ANALYSIS		
The primary issue before us is whether a plaintiff may move to vacate
a voluntary dismissal order when the trial court did not specifically reserve
to plaintiff any right to reinstate. Defendant asserts that under the rule in
Weisguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 272 Ill. 541, 543 (1916), a
plaintiff must reserve the right to move for reinstatement following a
voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff contends, however, the Weisguth was
subsequently preempted by the enactment of section 2-1203 of the Code
(735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2000)). This issue presents a question of law
subject to de novo review. See Cameron v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 296 Ill. App. 3d 978, 983 (1998). To make this determination, we
must examine the interaction between this court's prior case law and the
subsequent enactment of section 2-1203 of the Code.

A. The Weisguth Rule and Its Progeny
	The defendant's argument hinges on a statement by this court in
Weisguth. In that case, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her action at the
close of her case in chief to prevent a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant. Upon her motion, the case was reinstated and tried a second
time, with a verdict in her favor. A new trial was then granted, and the
case was tried a third time. Again, plaintiff prevailed, and a judgment was
entered in her favor. The appellate court affirmed, and this court reviewed
the record by writ of certiorari.
	The first ground urged for reversal before this court was that the trial
court erred in setting aside the order of dismissal entered upon the motion
for voluntary nonsuit and in reinstating the cause. We observed:
		"In case of a voluntary non-suit upon motion of a plaintiff the
court has no power to set aside the order of dismissal and re-instate the cause unless at the time the non-suit is taken leave is
given the plaintiff to move to set it aside. [Citation.] The reason
for this rule is apparent. If a plaintiff by his deliberate and
voluntary act secures the dismissal of his suit he must be held to
have anticipated the effect and necessary results of this action
and should not be restored to the position and the rights which
he voluntarily abandoned. Having taken a non-suit, his only
recourse is to begin his action anew."  Weisguth, 272 Ill.  at 543.
	Despite this cautionary pronouncement, the court held that defendant
had forfeited the right to complain of the court's reinstatement of the
complaint. The court stated:
		"After the cause was re-instated [the defendant] appeared in two
trials in the city court and contested the case on the merits. By
doing so it conferred upon the court the power to proceed and
waived its right to object to the re-instatement of the cause.
(Herrington v. McCollum, 73 Ill. 476; Grand Pacific Hotel
Co. v. Pinkerton, 217 id. 61.) As we said in Herrington v.
McCollum, supra: 'The court unquestionably had jurisdiction of
the subject matter of litigation, and it has never been questioned
that parties may so far control jurisdiction over their own
persons, in such a case, as to confer upon the court the right to
proceed by voluntarily entering an appearance. The defendants,
to avail of the right to question the jurisdiction of the court when
the case was re-instated, should either have not appeared at all
or limited their appearance to the objection against the
jurisdiction of the court.' " Weisguth, 272 Ill.  at 543.
After a review of the evidence, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of
the plaintiff. Weisguth, 272 Ill.  at 551.
 	Thus, it is clear that the decision of the Weisguth court did not rely
on its jurisdictional statement. Hence, its pronouncement on the power of
the court to set aside a voluntary nonsuit was not necessary to the
disposition of the case and is dicta. Since the issue was briefed and
argued by the parties, the court's pronouncement is judicial dicta, rather
than mere obiter dicta. People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 206 (2003)
(explaining that both obiter dicta and judicial dicta are unnecessary
comments but differentiating judicial dicta because it involves a question
that was briefed and argued by the parties, while obiter dicta does not).
Judicial dicta have the force of a determination by a reviewing court and
should receive dispositive weight in an inferior court. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 
at 206. Thus, the quoted principle from Weisguth has been cited as
controlling by this court and in a number of appellate court opinions.
	 In Bettenhausen v. Guenther, 388 Ill. 487 (1944), the court, after
restating the Weisguth dicta, reversed a trial court order allowing
petitioners leave to withdraw their oral motions to dismiss their petition
after the court had already granted the motions. That ruling was assigned
as error on appeal. The court held that because the action had been
voluntarily dismissed, the jurisdiction of the court ended with that order of
dismissal and the court was wholly without power to enter the order
appealed. The court further explained that defendants appeared specially
both before and after the order of dismissal and thus did not waive
jurisdiction of the person. Bettenhausen, 388 Ill.  at 491.
	The First, Second, Third, and Fifth Districts of our appellate court
have all acknowledged the Weisguth rule, but have taken varying
approaches to its application.  In the First District, the appellate court has
uncritically applied the rule.  In Mayian v. Yellow Cab Co., 63 Ill. App.
2d 449, 451 (1965), and in Nashlund v. Sabade, 39 Ill. App. 3d 139,
144 (1976), the reviewing court, relying on Weisguth, held that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to set aside a voluntary nonsuit. In People ex rel.
Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, Inc., 60 Ill. App. 3d 331, 349 (1978), the
court held that, in light of Weisguth, the trial court incorrectly ordered
reinstatement, although it did not phrase its holding in jurisdictional terms.
Most recently, in Noakes v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 312 Ill.
App. 3d 965, 971 (2000), the First District held that the trial court
correctly applied Weisguth in denying the reinstatement of a cause after
voluntary dismissal where defendant made a timely objection to the motion
to vacate the dismissal.
	In the Second District, the appellate court acknowledged the
Weisguth rule in Miller v. Bloomberg, 60 Ill. App. 3d 362, 364 (1978),
but characterized it in terms of equitable estoppel. The Miller court held
that even though the party taking a voluntary nonsuit is equitably estopped
from vacating the order or reinstating the cause, the trial court has the
inherent power to reinstate the cause on its own motion in order to bring
necessary parties into the suit. Miller, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65.
However, in Ryan v. School District No. 47, 267 Ill. App. 3d 137
(1994), the court declined to apply the Weisguth rule to prevent
reinstatement of a case against the school district after a voluntary
dismissal because the cause remained pending against another defendant.
The Ryan court held that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155
Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), the trial court had jurisdiction to vacate a voluntary
dismissal as to fewer than all of the parties and reinstate the complaint on
motion of the plaintiff. Ryan, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The court further
cited with approval the holding of the Fifth District in Ripplinger v.
Quigley, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1010 (1992), stating that the Weisguth
rule is a "relic[ ] of the past" superseded by the Code of Civil Procedure
and by Supreme Court Rule 304(a). Ryan, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 142.
	In the Third District, the appellate court has consistently applied the
Weisguth rule. In Herman v. Swisher, 115 Ill. App. 3d 179, 182 (1983),
the reviewing court affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow reinstatement
of a voluntarily dismissed complaint, relying on the Weisguth rule as
restated in Bettenhausen. The opinion does not discuss jurisdiction,
although the motion to reinstate was presented within 30 days of the
dismissal. In Howard v. Francis, 204 Ill. App. 3d 722, 724 (1990), the
court, relying on Weisguth, also affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to
reinstate following a voluntary dismissal.
	In Johnson v. Sumner, 172 Ill. App. 3d 70, 72 (1988), the Third
District again applied the Weisguth rule to vacate the order of the trial
court reinstating a case after a voluntary dismissal, holding that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction. However, in a special concurrence, Presiding
Justice Stouder questioned the continuing vitality of Weisguth and
Bettenhausen. Justice Stouder noted that neither case discusses the right
of a trial court to deal with its judgments for a period of 30 days after their
rendition in any manner required by fairness and justice. Justice Stouder
contended that the court's authority is not qualified in a jurisdictional sense
but, as in other cases, requires a showing of good cause. Johnson, 172
Ill. App. 3d at 72-73 (Stouder, P.J., specially concurring).
	In the Fifth District, the appellate court has taken a different approach
to the Weisguth rule. In Weilmuenster v. H.H. Hall Construction Co.,
72 Ill. App. 3d 101 (1979), the reviewing court declined to apply
Weisguth to bar reinstatement of a case voluntarily dismissed by
agreement of counsel. The court further held that jurisdiction is derived
from article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and that
jurisdiction will generally terminate upon passage of 30 days after entry of
a final order. Within that 30-day period, however, the trial court retains
jurisdiction to reconsider its judgments and orders. Therefore, the court
had the power to vacate a dismissal and reinstate the cause within 30 days
of the entry of the dismissal order. Weilmuenster, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 105-06. In Ripplinger v. Quigley, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (1992), the trial
court, citing the Weisguth rule, denied plaintiff's motion to reinstate a suit
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement
allegedly breached by the defendant. Ripplinger, 231 Ill. App. 3d at
1003. The Fifth District reversed, holding that dismissals and
reinstatements are governed by the Civil Practice Act and by supreme
court rule. As the court observed:
		"There is no reason to continue common law technical
exceptions to these statutes based upon the dicta of a 76-year-old case. To do so may be fundamentally unfair to a party,
discourage settlements of lawsuits, and promote further lawsuits."
Ripplinger, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 1010.
	Here, in its unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23, the
appellate court reasoned that Weilmuenster and Ripplinger were
dispositive and that the trial court had jurisdiction to reinstate the case
pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1203 (West 2002)). Plaintiff argues that the Code, rather than
common law principles derived from cases before its enactment, controls
the power of the court to vacate judgments. Thus, we must examine the
effect of the Code on the Weisguth rule.

B. Effect of the Code of Civil Procedure on the Weisguth Rule
	Defendant argues that section 2-1203 of the Code is a codification
of a trial court's authority to correct its own errors, thus obviating the need
for appellate review. Defendant contends that the purpose of a motion to
vacate is to allow a party to call the court's attention to its own errors and
afford an opportunity for correction.  Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602, 611
(1950). In In re Marriage of Stuart, 141 Ill. App. 3d 314, 316 (1986),
the court also found the same purpose underlying posttrial motions filed
under section 2-1203 of the Code, also at issue in this case. According
to defendant, the trial court's dismissal of this case did not require
correction because any error would be attributable to the plaintiff and not
to the court. Therefore, defendant concludes that allowing a litigant to
change his mind after making an irrevocable strategic decision is not in
accordance with the purpose of section 2-1203.
	To determine whether plaintiff's motion to vacate is governed by
section 2-1203, we must consider the changes to our court system since
Weisguth and Bettenhausen were decided in 1916 and 1944,
respectively. The Civil Practice Act was not enacted until 1933. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1933, ch. 110, par. 125 et seq. Thus, in 1916, the common law
governed pleading and practice in our trial courts. Even in 1944, no statute
addressed the power of the court to grant posttrial relief in nonjury cases,
although the Civil Practice Act had been enacted 11 years earlier. Thus,
the Bettenhausen court's decision still relied on the common law.
	In 1955, the legislature enacted the antecedent to the present section
2-1203. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 110, par. 68.3. The pertinent provisions
of that statute have remained unchanged under the present Code. Section
2-1203 provides:
			"Motions after judgment in non-jury cases. (a) In all cases
tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry
of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow
within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a
rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to
vacate the judgment or for other relief.
			(b) A motion filed in apt time stays enforcement of the
judgment." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2002).
	Our primary role in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the legislature. The plain language of a statute provides the
most reliable indicator of legislative intent, and we must not depart from
the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Kingbrook v.
Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24, 29 (2002), quoting Zimmerman v. Village of
Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 56 (1998), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park
District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996). Statutory construction presents a
question of law, and our review is de novo. Midstate Siding &amp; Window
Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 319 (2003).
	The plain language of section 2-1203(a) extends to any party,
without qualification, the right to file a motion to vacate a judgment
within 30 days of its entry. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial
court's order allowing the voluntary dismissal in this case is a judgment. If
it is, plaintiff had a right to file a motion to vacate within the statutory 30
days.
	This court has previously held that an order allowing a voluntary
dismissal is a final judgment under Supreme Court Rule 272 (137 Ill. 2d
R. 272) for purposes of appeal. Swisher v. Duffy, 117 Ill. 2d 376, 379-80 (1987). There is no reason to hold otherwise for motions filed under
section 2-1203(a). Moreover, section 1-108 of the Code provides that
the practice at common law applies to all matters not already regulated
by statute or rule of court. 735 ILCS 5/1-108 (West 2000). The clear
implication is that the Code, to the extent that it regulates procedures,
takes precedence over the common law. Since Weisguth and
Bettenhausen were decided long before the 1955 enactment of the
statutory antecedent to section 2-1203(a), those common law rule cases
may not be applied to defeat the jurisdiction of the court to consider a
timely filed motion for relief under that section. As we said in Swisher, an
order allowing voluntary dismissal under Supreme Court Rule 272 is a
final judgment for purposes of appeal. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d  at 379-80.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff's motion to vacate in this case. In reaching this conclusion, we
express no opinion on the issue of whether allowing the motion was an
abuse of discretion.
	Since the judgment vacating the order of dismissal left the case
pending on the merits, it was not a final judgment, as required for appeals
under Supreme Court Rule 301. Unless specifically authorized by supreme
court rules, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review judgments,
orders, or decrees that are not final. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices
Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 349 (2002). Thus, the appellate court should have
dismissed the appeals taken pursuant to that rule.
	As a final matter, a motion by the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association
(ITLA) for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff was
taken with the case. Supreme Court Rule 345(b) provides that an amicus
curiae brief "shall be filed on or before the due date of the initial brief of
the party whose position it supports." 155 Ill. 2d R. 345(b). Plaintiff's
brief was due and filed on December 29, 2003. ITLA's motion was filed
nearly three months later on March 22, 2004. The motion is denied as 
untimely. Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 128 Ill. 2d 437, 446-47 (1989).

CONCLUSION
	Section 2-1203 of the Code supercedes the common law rule in
Weisguth, 272 Ill. 541, and Bettenhausen, 388 Ill. 487, and thus governs
the power of the court to vacate the voluntary dismissal order in this case.
Since plaintiff's motion to vacate was made within the 30-day period
allowed by section 2-1203 of the Code, the trial court had jurisdiction to
hear and decide it. However, orders allowing motions to vacate are
generally not final and appealable. Here, defendant appealed under
Supreme Court Rule 301. This rule requires the entry of a final order.
Therefore, the appellate court erred by addressing the merits of that
portion of the appeal, and we now dismiss the appeal before us.
Appeal dismissed.