Title: Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. v. Jordan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140528, 1140586
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 12, 2016

Rel: 02/12/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
_________________________
1140528
_________________________
Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc.
v.
James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as
representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased
_________________________
1140586
_________________________
James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as
representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased
v.
Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc.
Appeals from DeKalb Circuit Court
(CV-09-000275)
1140528; 1140586
MAIN, Justice.
James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan,
as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs"),
sued Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. ("TJF"), in the DeKalb
Circuit 
Court, 
stating 
the 
following 
counts: 
(1)
misrepresentation; 
(2) 
"slander, 
libel, 
and 
trade
infringement"; 
(3) 
fraud; 
(4) 
wantonness; 
(5) 
suppression; 
(6)
negligence; (7) breach of contract; and (8) tortious
interference with business relations. Only the enumerated
claims (6), (7), and (8) above were presented to the jury; the
remaining claims were disposed of before the case went to the
jury.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of TJF on all
three counts, and the trial court entered a judgment on the
jury's verdict.  
The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, arguing,
in pertinent part, that TJF did not disclose that it had
insurance and that, therefore, "the venire was not properly
qualified as to insurance."  The plaintiffs' brief, at 4.  The
trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and
vacated its prior judgment, basing its new ruling solely on
the 
plaintiffs' argument that the trial court, believing there
2
1140528; 1140586
was no insurance, had erroneously prevented the plaintiffs
from conducting voir dire on the issue of insurance.  TJF
appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court
erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.  The
plaintiffs have cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court
erred in granting TJF's Rule 50(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML")  and dismissing, as
1
a matter of law, the plaintiffs' suppression claim.  We
reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and we affirm the trial
Rule 50(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
1
"(a) Judgment as a matter of law.
"(1) If during a trial by jury a party has
been fully heard on an issue and there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that
issue, the court may determine the issue
against that party and may grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law against that party
with respect to a claim or defense that cannot
under the controlling law be maintained or
defeated without a favorable finding on that
issue.
"(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of
law may be made at any time before submission
of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall
specify the judgment sought and the law and the
facts on which the moving party is entitled to
the judgment."
3
1140528; 1140586
court's judgment insofar as it granted TJF's motion for a JML
on the plaintiffs' suppression claim.
I. Facts and Procedural History  
TJF is a nonprofit organization that owns and curates a
museum in Monticello, the historic home of Thomas Jefferson,
located 
near 
Charlottesville, 
Virginia. 
 Visitors 
to
Monticello can view items that were once the property of
Thomas Jefferson, reproductions of items that were once the
property of Thomas Jefferson, and "period pieces," which,
although not the property of Thomas Jefferson, were made
during his lifetime.  Some of the items on display at
Monticello are owned by TJF, and some items are on loan from
individuals.  TJF conducts continuous research on Jefferson's
life, including research regarding property thought to have
been owned by him.  This research (1) can confirm that a
particular item is authentic and/or that it was once owned by
Jefferson; (2) can confirm that a particular item is not
authentic and/or that it was not once owned by Jefferson; and
(3) can reveal that items once thought to be authentic and to
have been the property of Jefferson (two issues relevant in
this case) are, in fact, not authentic and/or are not property
previously owned by him.
4
1140528; 1140586
In 1957, Juliet Graves Cantrell, a resident of Rome,
Georgia, lent TJF a piece of furniture known as a "filing
press" for display at Monticello.  The plaintiffs claim that
it is undisputed that the filing press once belonged to
Jefferson.  Cantrell also owned a piece of furniture known as
a "dressing table," which was thought to have been the
property of Jefferson, although Cantrell's belief apparently
was 
never officially confirmed. 
 Cantrell passed away sometime
in or about 1976 and bequeathed the filing press, which was
then on loan to TJF, and the dressing table to Emma.  In 1977,
Emma lent TJF the dressing table for use in the museum. 
Certain documents entitled "loan agreements" were executed
with TJF when the filing press and, later, the dressing table,
were lent to TJF, and there were subsequent loan agreements
executed by Emma,  James, and Sara.
2
3
The loan agreements for the filing press and the dressing
table executed in 1976 and 1977, respectively, were silent as
Emma died in 2013.
2
It is undisputed that, at all times relevant to this
3
case, the filing press and dressing table were jointly owned
by Emma and her children, James and Sara, although it is not
clear how James and Sara acquired their interests.  However,
ownership of the filing press and dressing table is not an
issue on appeal. 
5
1140528; 1140586
to whether TJF had the authority to perform any "conservation"
work on the furniture without first obtaining permission from
Emma, James, and/or Sara, the owners of the property; however,
in 1977, Sara drafted a letter to TJF granting it permission
to perform conservation work on the dressing table.  The 1976
loan agreement governing the filing press was replaced by a
new loan agreement in 1987, which stated that TJF could not
perform any conservation work on the filing press without
James's permission.  The 1977 loan agreement governing the
dressing table was replaced by a new loan agreement in 1988,
which stated that TJF could not perform any conservation work
on the dressing table without Sara's permission.  However, TJF
had already performed conservation work on the filing press in
1983 and on the dressing table in 1984, without first
receiving authorization from either James or Sara, prior to
the execution of the 1987 and 1988 loan agreements that
expressly 
required 
James's 
and/or 
Sara's 
permission 
to 
perform
any conservation work on the furniture.
In November 2007 (30 years after the loan agreements were
executed in 1976 and 1977), the plaintiffs removed the
furniture from Monticello and shipped it to Sotheby's, an
antiques auction house located in Manhattan, New York, to be
6
1140528; 1140586
sold 
at 
auction. 
 
Thereafter, 
Sotheby's 
"research 
consultants"
investigated the authenticity of the dressing table and
questioned whether it had actually been owned by Jefferson. 
Sotheby's consultants also determined that the filing press
was not in sufficiently original condition to be offered for
bid.   Therefore, Sotheby's declined to place either piece of
furniture for sale at auction; according to the plaintiffs,
Sotheby's found that the value of the dressing table had been
"destroyed" and that the filing press then had a market value
of $20,000 to $30,000, whereas "its fair market value would be
around $4 million," the plaintiffs' brief, at 21, had it not
been the subject of the conservation work by TJF.  In any
event, Sotheby's identified TJF as the most likely purchaser
of the furniture if it were to be sold at auction. 
Accordingly, James and Sara offered to sell the furniture to
TJF; however, according to the plaintiffs, TJF declined to
purchase the furniture "at a price commensurate with the fair
market value of the ... furniture."  The plaintiffs then sued
TJF, alleging that, "[a]s a proximate result of the aforesaid
acts[, i.e., the allegedly unauthorized conservation work on
the furniture by TJF], the plaintiffs are unable to sell the
7
1140528; 1140586
subject chattels for their true market value that could only
have been achieved at a Sotheby's auction."  
As stated above, only the plaintiffs' claims of 
negligence, 
breach 
of 
contract, 
and 
tortious 
interference 
with
business relations were presented to the jury. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of TJF, and the trial court
entered a judgment on that verdict.  However, the trial court
subsequently granted the plaintiffs' Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
motion for a new trial and vacated its previous judgment.  TJF
appeals from the trial court's order granting the plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial; the plaintiffs cross-appeal from the
trial court's order granting TJF's motion for a JML as to
their suppression claim. 
II. Standards of Review
A. Motion for a New Trial
"When the court grants a motion for a new trial on
grounds other than a finding that the verdict is
against the great weight or preponderance of the
evidence, this Court's review is limited.
"'"It is well established that a
ruling on a motion for a new
trial rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
The exercise of that discretion
carries with it a presumption of
correctness, which will not be
disturbed by this Court unless
8
1140528; 1140586
some legal right is abused and
the record plainly and palpably
shows the trial judge to be in
error."'
"Curtis v. Faulkner Univ., 575 So. 2d 1064, 1065–66
(Ala. 1991) (quoting Kane v. Edward J. Woerner &
Sons, Inc., 543 So. 2d 693, 694 (Ala. 1989), quoting
in turn Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So. 2d 1357, 1359
(1986))."
Baptist Med. Ctr. Montclair v. Whitfield, 950 So. 2d 1121,
1125-26 (Ala. 2006).
B. Motions for Judgments as a Matter of Law
"'The standard of review applicable to
a ruling on a motion for [a JML] is
identical to the standard used by the trial
court in granting or denying [that motion].
Thus, in reviewing the trial court's ruling
on the motion, we review the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant, and
we determine whether the party with the
burden of proof has produced sufficient
evidence to require a jury determination.
"'....
"'... In ruling on a motion for a
[JML], the trial court is called upon to
determine 
whether 
the 
evidence 
was
sufficient to submit a question of fact to
the jury; for the court to determine that
it was, there must have been "substantial
evidence" before the jury to create a
question of fact. "[S]ubstantial evidence
is evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be
proved."'
9
1140528; 1140586
"American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d
1362, 1366–67 (Ala. 1993). (Citations omitted.)" 
Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d 1, 12 (Ala. 2001).
III. Analysis
TJF and the plaintiffs raise numerous issues on appeal. 
First, TJF argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion
in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial because, it
says, the plaintiffs waived their opportunity to conduct voir
dire on the issue of insurance and there was no evidence
regarding insurance by which the jury could have been
influenced.  TJF argues, alternatively, that the trial court
erred in denying TJF's Rule 50(a) motion for a JML as to the
plaintiffs' claims of negligence, tortious interference with
business relations, and breach of contract.  Finally, TJF 
contends that the trial court erred by not granting TJF's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The
plaintiffs contend in their cross-appeal that the trial court
erred in granting TJF's motion for a JML as to the plaintiffs'
suppression claim. 
 A. Motion for a New Trial
TJF argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion
in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial because,
10
1140528; 1140586
TJF says, the plaintiffs, who complained in the motion of
being improperly denied the right to conduct voir dire on the
issue of insurance, waived that right by making no request or
attempt to question the venire on the issue of insurance.  It
is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not seek to conduct voir
dire on the issue of insurance; the record on appeal clearly
establishes that fact.  See R. 1768 (Plaintiffs' counsel
stating: "Well, Judge, I did not raise it [the issue of
insurance] in venire.  I'll be perfectly candid.  I did not
raise it in venire.").  We agree with TJF.
The facts surrounding whether TJF disclosed the existence
of insurance to the trial court are not entirely clear.  For
all that appears, the trial court summoned counsel for both
sides to the bench for an off-the-record sidebar during voir
dire; there is no transcript of the sidebar.  According to the
parties, during the sidebar, the trial court asked one of two
things: "Is there insurance in this case?" or "Is there
insurance coverage in this case?"   In response to the trial
4
None of the parties remembers the exact wording of the
4
question.  Presumably, the distinction the parties are
attempting to make between the two questions is that the first
question (whether there exists insurance in this case) would
show only the ownership of one or more insurance policies by
TJF, whereas the second question (whether there exists
11
1140528; 1140586
court's question, TJF's counsel answered in the negative. 
Curiously, 
the 
plaintiffs' 
counsel 
remained 
silent 
after 
TJF's
counsel's response, despite the fact that it is undisputed
that plaintiffs' counsel was, at that very moment, in physical
possession of TJF's insurance policy, which had been obtained
during discovery, and that the insurance policy was listed on
both sides' respective exhibit lists.  In any event, the trial
court, 
based on TJF's representation that there existed 
either
no insurance or no insurance coverage in this case, determined
that there would be no voir dire on the issue of insurance;
the plaintiffs did not object to the trial court's decision at
that time or at any time during trial.  It is undisputed that
the plaintiffs did not complain of the lack of voir dire on
the issue of insurance until they filed their motion for a new
trial, which sought a new trial based solely on that one
allegation of error on the part of the trial court.
By failing to timely object to the trial court's decision
to forgo voir dire on the issue of insurance, the plaintiffs
waived that issue both in the trial court and at the 
insurance coverage in this case) would show whether any
potential monetary judgment against TJF in this case would
actually be covered, i.e., paid, by one or more of its
insurers.  
12
1140528; 1140586
appellate level.  It is well settled that "[w]hen a party
fails to use reasonable diligence in questioning potential
jurors, that party waives any right to later challenge the
jury on a motion for new trial."  Volkswagen of America, Inc.
v. Marinelli, 628 So. 2d 378, 389 (Ala. 1993) (citing Aaron v.
State, 273 Ala. 337, 139 So. 2d 309 (1961), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 846 (1962) (emphasis added)).  See also Holland v.
Brandenberg, 627 So. 2d 867, 870 (Ala. 1993) ("Failure to use
due diligence in testing jurors as to qualifications or
grounds of challenge is an effective waiver of grounds of
challenge; a [party] cannot sit back and invite error based on
a 
juror's disqualification." (citing Beasley v. State, 337 
So.
2d 80 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)) (emphasis added)); and Gwin v.
Church, 272 Ala. 674, 680, 133 So. 2d 880, 887 (1961) (noting
the well settled rule that a party is entitled "to have the
jurors qualified as to their relation to, or interest, in any
insurance company which would be liable, in whole or in part,
for any judgment that might be rendered against the defendant"
13
1140528; 1140586
but only upon the filing of a "seasonable[ ] and proper
5
motion" (citing numerous authorities) (emphasis added)).
The plaintiffs, by failing to exercise "due diligence" in
raising the issue of their right to conduct voir dire on the
issue of insurance and thereby failing to raise the issue in
a "seasonable" manner -- i.e., by waiting until an adverse
judgment had been entered against them and then raising the
issue for the first time in their motion for a new trial --
waived their opportunity to present an objection as to this
issue.  See Volkswagen, supra; Holland, supra; and Gwin,
supra.  Furthermore, "a party 'cannot by his own voluntary
conduct invite error and then seek to profit thereby.'" 
Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v. Hooper, 707 So. 2d 209,
213 n. 5 (Ala. 1997) (citing Slaton v. State, 680 So. 2d 879,
892 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), and Phillips v. State, 527 So. 2d
154 (Ala. 1988)).  The plaintiffs, by making no objection or
not requesting the opportunity to conduct voir dire on the
issue of insurance after TJF allegedly falsely informed the
trial court that it had either no insurance or no insurance
"Seasonable" is defined, in pertinent part, as "within
5
a reasonable time."  Black's Law Dictionary 1554 (10th ed.
2014). 
14
1140528; 1140586
coverage in this matter, clearly invited the error of which
they now complain; this Court will not provide relief to a
party who, by his or her own conduct, created the error for
which he or she seeks redress.  See Mississippi Valley Title
Ins. Co., supra.  Thus, the trial court exceeded its
discretion in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial,
and that order is due to be reversed.
Because we hold that the judgment on the jury verdict in
favor of TJF is due to be reinstated, we pretermit discussion
of TJF's additional grounds for appellate review.   Instead,
6
we now turn to the plaintiffs' cross-appeal.
B. The Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal
The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erroneously
granted TJF's motion for a JML insofar as it dismissed the
plaintiffs' suppression claim.  The plaintiffs' suppression
claim is fairly straightforward: They argue that TJF "never
disclosed the restoration or finishing work" it had performed
on the filing press and the dressing table (thus suppressing
a material fact) and that, as a result of TJF's alleged
Because 
we 
do 
not 
reach 
the 
JML 
and 
personal-jurisdiction
6
issues, we also do not address the plaintiffs' argument
concerning our appellate jurisdiction to consider those
issues.
15
1140528; 1140586
suppression of that material fact, the plaintiffs "were
deprived of the opportunity to seek advice from any furniture
conservation 
or appraisal experts."  The plaintiffs' brief, 
at
69.  We agree with TJF, however, that the suppression claim is
barred by the 20-year rule of repose and thus was properly
dismissed.
In Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 825 So.
2d 758 (Ala. 2002), this Court presented a detailed
explanation of Alabama's 20-year rule of repose, stating, in
pertinent part:
"Since 1858, causes of action asserted in
Alabama courts more than 20 years after they could
have been asserted have been considered to have been
extinguished by the rule of repose. See Rector v.
Better Houses, Inc., 820 So. 2d 75, 77 n. 2 (Ala.
2001) ('Since this Court decided McArthur v.
Carrie's Administrator, 32 Ala. 75 (1858), Alabama
has followed a rule of repose, or rule of
prescription, of 20 years.'). The well-established
rule recognizes the realities that surround the
inverse relationship between the passage of time and
the ability to fairly and justly resolve disputes:
"'As a matter of public policy, and
for the repose of society, it has long been
the settled policy of this state, as of
others, that antiquated 
demands will not be
considered by the courts, and that, without
regard to any statute of limitations, there
must 
be 
a 
time 
beyond 
which 
human
transactions will not be inquired into....
It is necessary for the peace and security
of society that there should be an end of
16
1140528; 1140586
litigation, and it is inequitable to allow
those who have slept upon their rights for
a period of 20 years, after they might have
[brought an action], and after, as is
generally 
the 
case, 
the 
memory 
of
transactions has faded and parties and
witnesses passed away, to [bring an
action]. The consensus of opinion in the
present day is that such presumption is
conclusive, and the period of 20 years,
without some distinct act in recognition of
the [claimant's right], a complete bar;
and, as said in an early case, "the
presumption rests not only on the want of
diligence in asserting rights, but on the
higher ground that it is necessary to
suppress frauds, to avoid long dormant
claims, which, it has been said, have often
more of cruelty than of justice in them,
that it conduces to peace of society and
the happiness of families, 'and relieves
courts from the necessity of adjudicating
rights so obscure by the lapse of time and
the accidents of life that the attainment
of 
truth 
and 
justice 
is 
next 
to
impossible.'"'
"Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 276, 280–81, 58
So. 201, 201–02 (1912); see also Oxford v. Estes,
229 Ala. 606, 611, 158 So. 534, 538 (1934) ('Failure
of memory, loss of evidence, death of parties, the
probability 
that 
the 
whole 
truth 
cannot 
be
ascertained and justice done, enter into the
equation as a reason for the rule [of repose].').
"The rule of repose arose within the context of
property disputes; however, the rationale underlying
the rule is not so limited and, accordingly, the
rule has been applied in other contexts, including
those alleging tort claims. See Tierce v. Ellis, 624
So. 2d 553, 554–55 (Ala. 1993) (applying the rule to
a paternity dispute); Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So. 2d
927, 930–31 (Ala. 1989) (applying the rule in the
17
1140528; 1140586
context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So. 2d
1256, 1257–58 (Ala. 1987) (applying the rule to bar
a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by
fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
271 Ala. 318, 322, 123 So. 2d 166, 169 (1960)
(holding that a conversion claim was barred by the
rule of repose, and stating that '[t]he rule has
been applied to various situations but always
consistently and unvariably'); see also Moore v.
Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co., 108 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1274–75
(N.D. Ala. 2000) (applying Alabama's rule of repose
to bar claims virtually identical to the claims
asserted in this case), aff'd, 267 F.3d 1209 (11th
Cir. 2001).
"While the rule [of repose] is similar to a
statute of limitations, the rule of repose is not
'dependent upon a statute and is broader in scope
than a statute of limitations.' Rector, 820 So. 2d
at 77 n. 2. The rule of repose is broader in scope
than a statute of limitation in at least two ways.
"First, the rule is based solely upon the
passage of time, see Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d
89, 91 (Ala. 1982) ('[T]he only element of the rule
of repose is time. It is not affected by the
circumstances 
of 
the 
situation, 
by 
personal
disabilities, or by whether prejudice has resulted
or evidence obscured.') (emphasis added), and is not
based upon concepts of accrual, notice, or discovery
-- concepts that are applicable to statutes of
limitation. See Baugher v. Beaver Constr. Co., 791
So. 2d 932, 934 n. 1 (Ala. 2000) (noting that
because the limitations period set forth in Ala.
Code § 6–5–221(a) -- applicable to certain actions
brought 
against 
architects, 
contractors, 
and
engineers -- begins to run 'upon the substantial
completion of the improvements, rather than upon the
injury to the plaintiff's person or property or upon
the accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action
otherwise,' the statute is a statute of repose
rather than a simple statute of limitations.)
18
1140528; 1140586
(emphasis added); see Ballenger, supra, 271 Ala. at
322, 123 So. 2d at 169 (stating that '[l]ack of
notice is not sufficient to avert the application of
the doctrine' of repose); Merrill v. Merrill, 260
Ala. 408, 411, 71 So. 2d 44, 45–46 (1954) (noting
that 'absence of notice' does not control the
application of the rule, and that '[n]otice does
have influence on the question of laches, but not on
[repose]'); see generally 54 C.J.S. Limitations of
Actions § 4 (1987) ('A statute of repose, however,
limits the time within which an action may be
brought and is not related to the accrual of any
cause of action; the injury need not have occurred,
much less have been discovered.'). Instead, the
'rule is couched in terms of the "running of the
period against claims," "absolute bar to unasserted
claims," "lack of diligence in asserting rights,"
"sleeping 
upon 
their 
rights," 
etc.' 
and 
is
accordingly based upon 'the pre-existing right to
assert a claim.' Boshell, 418 So. 2d at 92.
Therefore, the 20–year period begins to run against
claims the first time those claims could have been
asserted, regardless of the claimant's notice of a
claim. See Moore, supra, 108 F.Supp.2d at 1275
('Application of the rule of repose has only one
element -- the passage of twenty years time from the
moment that the actions giving rise to the claim
occurred -- and, if that time has elapsed, no claim
can be pursued.').
"Second, the rule is broader than a statute of
limitation in that '[w]hile a statute of limitations
generally is procedural and extinguishes the remedy
rather than the right, ... repose is substantive and
extinguishes both the remedy and the actual action.'
51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 32 (2000); see
Boshell, supra, 418 So. 2d at 92; Oxford, supra, 229
Ala. at 611, 158 So. at 538 ('It is not a
presumption merely, but a rule of law, raising an
absolute bar to ancient causes of action.'); Green
v. Dixon, 727 So. 2d 781, 784 (Ala. 1998)
('"statutes of limitations affect the remedy"')
(quoting Odom v. Averett, 248 Ala. 289, 291, 27 So.
19
1140528; 1140586
2d 479, 480 (1946)); Jefferson County Sav. Bank v.
Ben F. Barbour Plumbing & Elec. Co., 191 Ala. 238,
247, 68 So. 43, 46 (1915) ('Statutes of limitation
go to the remedy, not the rights of parties.');
Moore, supra, 108 F.Supp.2d at 1275 ('While a
statute of limitations is a procedural device that
sets forth the time period within which an action is
deemed to have accrued and that is capable of being
waived or tolled, a rule of repose is substantive
doctrine of the State, eliminating a cause of
action, irrespective of its date of accrual.')."
825 So. 2d at 763-65 (footnotes omitted; some emphasis added).
The plaintiffs state that the first conservation work on
the 
filing press and dressing table occurred, respectively, 
in
1983 and 1984; TJF states that it actually performed
conservation work on the dressing table several years prior to
1984 and that that work was completed in either 1977 or 1978. 
TJF also states, in similar fashion to the plaintiffs, that it
performed conservation work on the furniture in 1983 and 1984. 
Thus, under Alabama's rule of repose (as explained in the
quotation above from Ex parte Liberty National), the claim
expired no later than 2004 -- 20 years after the repair of the
dressing table in 1984 and the restoration of the filing press
in 1983.  The plaintiffs' assertion that they only recently
discovered the alleged suppression does not toll the
application of the 20-year rule of repose.  Spain v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So. 2d 101, 129 (Ala. 2003)
20
1140528; 1140586
(Johnstone, J., concurring in part, concurring specially in
part, and dissenting in part) ("[T]he plaintiff's lack of
discovery or notice of the existence of the claim does not
prevent the running of the 20-year period of the rule of
repose.").  Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted
TJF's motion for a JML as to the plaintiffs' suppression
claim.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order granting the
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and we remand the cause to
the trial court to reinstate the original judgment entered on
the jury's verdict for TJF.  As to the plaintiffs' cross-
appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
1140528
–-
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
Murdock, J., concurs in the judgment of reversal and
remand.
1140586
–-
AFFIRMED.
Bolin, J., concurs.  
Moore, C.J., and Murdock and Bryan, JJ., concur in the
result.
21
1140528; 1140586
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the judgment of reversal and
remand in appeal no. 1140528 and concurring in the result in
appeal no. 1140586).
I question whether the Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc.,
had sufficient contacts with the State of Alabama to give the
trial court personal jurisdiction over it.
22