Title: City of Virginia Beach v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990535
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 990535  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 14, 2000 
BRENDHAN B. HARRIS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Leonard B. Sachs, Judge Designate 
 
 
Brendhan B. Harris was terminated from his employment 
as a police officer with the City of Virginia Beach (the 
City) Police Department.  Harris subsequently filed this 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge against 
the City and several members of the police department.  The 
circuit court struck the City’s evidence and held it liable 
as a matter of law, and a jury returned a verdict against 
the individual defendants and assessed damages against all 
the defendants.  We awarded the City and the individual 
defendants this appeal. 
On appeal, we will address two issues: (1) whether 
Harris’ claim against the individual defendants is barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata because of prior proceedings in 
federal court, and (2) whether Code § 18.2-460 and former § 
15.1-1381 embody sufficient public policies to support 
______________________ 
1 The General Assembly repealed Code § 15.1-138 
effective December 1, 1997.  Code § 15.2-1704, which became 
effective on that date, includes the provisions of Code § 
Harris’ cause of action for wrongful discharge based on the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
articulated in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 
534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).  See Stonega Coal and Coke Co. 
v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 
(1906) (stating that Virginia adheres to the employment-at-
will doctrine).  Because we conclude that the principle of 
res judicata bars relitigation of Harris’ claim against the 
individual defendants, and because we do not find public 
policies in Code § 18.2-460 and former § 15.1-138 sufficient 
to support Harris’ wrongful discharge cause of action, we 
will reverse the circuit court’s judgment in favor of 
Harris. 
In order to address these two issues, we must recite 
not only the facts surrounding Harris’ discharge, but also 
the course of proceedings in the action he pursued in 
federal court before filing the present case. 
FACTS AND FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
While on duty as a police officer on August 28, 1992, 
Harris investigated a burglary complaint at an apartment 
complex in the City.  Upon arriving at the apartment 
complex, Harris spoke with Terry Grey, an occupant of one of 
_______________ 
15.1-138 that are pertinent to this appeal.  We shall cite 
former Code § 15.1-138 in this opinion. 
 
2
the apartments.  Grey told Harris that a man claiming to be 
a maintenance worker used a key to enter her apartment while 
she was undressed.  Harris then contacted the apartment 
manager to determine whether the alleged intruder was indeed 
a maintenance worker.  In the meantime, Grey’s sister, 
Dierdre Gamble, and Anthony Ortiz, a police officer who was 
assisting Harris, arrived at the apartment complex. 
 
When the apartment manager returned with a work order 
pertaining to the alleged intruder, who was a maintenance 
worker, Grey snatched the work order from the apartment 
manager’s hand and refused to return it when ordered to do 
so by Harris.  Harris then grabbed Grey’s wrist in an 
attempt to retrieve the work order from her and to enable 
him to handcuff her.  At that point, Gamble attacked Harris 
from the rear, and they exchanged punches until Harris 
subdued her with pepper spray. 
 
After placing Gamble in handcuffs, Harris transported 
her to a hospital, which was standard procedure when a 
police officer used pepper spray.2  While en route to the 
hospital, Harris reported the incident to his supervisor, 
Lieutenant Gary Van Auken.  Meanwhile, Ortiz also contacted 
Van Auken and related a version of the events that was 
______________________ 
2 Grey was not arrested since she “took off” after the 
altercation between Harris and Gamble. 
 
3
different from Harris’ version.  Ortiz believed that Harris 
had mishandled the situation, causing it to escalate.  
Having received conflicting information about the incident, 
Van Auken consulted his supervisor and an attorney for the 
City, and decided that, pending the outcome of an 
investigation of the incident, formal charges should not be 
placed against Gamble nor should she be incarcerated. 
 
After Gamble was treated at the hospital, Harris took 
her before a magistrate for the purpose of formally placing 
charges against her.  However, during the course of several 
telephone conversations between Van Auken and Harris, Van 
Auken advised Harris of the decision regarding Gamble and 
ordered Harris to not place charges against Gamble, and to 
release her into the custody of the police department’s 
internal affairs division.  Harris complied with that order, 
but later, after consulting with an attorney, he obtained 
warrants against both Gamble and Grey.  Harris asked another 
police officer to serve the warrants on Gamble, but he kept 
the ones for Grey in his possession. 
 
When Van Auken discovered that Harris had sworn out the 
warrants against Grey and Gamble, he instructed Harris to 
give him the unserved Grey warrants.  After complying with 
Van Auken’s order, Harris observed Van Auken place the 
 
4
warrants in his desk drawer.  According to Harris, those 
warrants were never served on Grey. 
However, the warrants against Gamble were served.  When 
those charges came to trial, Van Auken presented the general 
district court with a letter from police Captain M.E. Beane 
to the City attorney, which requested that the charges 
against Gamble be “nolle prossed” because Harris had been 
ordered to not obtain the warrants until all the facts in 
the case had been reviewed by the police department. 
 Following that court proceeding, Harris received a 
letter from his precinct captain, E.E. Rorrer, ordering 
Harris to take no further action with regard to the incident 
in his capacity as a police officer, but advising Harris 
that he was free to act in his capacity as a private 
citizen.  Rorrer also informed Harris that if he had doubts 
with regard to what actions he could take, Harris should 
contact Rorrer personally. 
 
Harris then filed an administrative complaint against 
Rorrer and Van Auken, alleging that they had obstructed 
justice.  Harris also complained that Ortiz had failed to 
assist him during the incident at the apartment complex.  An 
investigation of the complaint by the internal affairs 
division resulted in a finding that Harris’ charges were 
unfounded. 
 
5
The internal affairs division also received complaints 
from Grey and Gamble regarding Harris’ conduct at the 
apartment complex.  After an investigation of those 
complaints, Grey’s allegations were determined to be 
founded, while Gamble’s were not.  Thereafter, a 24-hour 
suspension of Harris was recommended due to his 
insubordination and disobedience of an order.  He appealed 
the recommended suspension. 
 
On July 30, 1993, while on duty and in uniform, Harris 
appeared before a magistrate and obtained warrants for Van 
Auken, charging him with two violations of Code § 18.2-460, 
obstruction of justice, and a violation of Code § 18.2-469, 
delay in executing lawful process.  After learning about 
Harris’ actions, Police Chief Charles R. Wall met with Major 
Douglas G. McCloud; Captains Woodrow R. Baker, Beane, and 
Rorrer; and Van Auken.  They agreed that Harris should be 
terminated for appearing in uniform before the magistrate 
and swearing out the warrants against Van Auken.  According 
to the August 19, 1993 letter of termination from the chief 
of police, this action by Harris constituted disobedience of 
an order and abuse of his position.  Harris appealed his 
 
6
termination to the City’s personnel board, which upheld his 
dismissal.3
 
Harris subsequently filed a lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
against the City, Van Auken, Beane, Baker, McCloud, Wall and 
two other City officials, alleging that those defendants had 
violated his First Amendment rights by terminating him, and 
further asserting that he had been wrongfully discharged in 
violation of Virginia law.  Harris v. City of Virginia 
Beach, Virginia, No. 2:93cv1151 (E.D. Va. first amended 
complaint filed Dec. 7, 1993).  A jury returned a verdict 
for Harris on both counts of his lawsuit.  Importantly, with 
regard to his state law claim, the jury found both the City 
and the individual defendants liable, awarded compensatory 
and punitive damages against the City, but assessed only 
punitive damages against the individual defendants.  In 
post-trial orders, the district court directed the City to 
pay damages to Harris and to reinstate him to his former 
position, but the court set aside the award of punitive 
damages against the City and each of the individual 
defendants. 
______________________ 
3 Because of his termination, a hearing on Harris’ 
appeal of the recommended 24-hour suspension was not 
conducted. 
 
7
 
The City, but not the individual defendants, appealed 
the district court’s judgment to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  Harris cross-appealed, 
assigning as error the district court’s judgment to set 
aside the awards of punitive damages.4  The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that Harris had no First Amendment right 
to seek the warrants against Van Auken since his “swearing 
out of the complaint did not implicate a subject of public 
concern.”  Harris v. City of Virginia Beach, Nos. 94-2091 
and 94-2122, slip. op. at 14 (4th Cir. Oct. 30, 1995).  The 
court then remanded Harris’ state law claim to the district 
court to determine whether it should survive dismissal of 
the federal constitutional claim.  Id. at 16. 
 
On remand, the district court entered the same judgment 
that it had previously entered in favor of Harris on his 
state law claim.  The court did so without conducting a new 
trial.  Only the City appealed the district court’s second 
judgment to the court of appeals, which again reversed and 
remanded the case with instructions to the district court to 
grant a new trial on the state law claim, or alternatively, 
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss 
the case without prejudice in light of the prior dismissal 
______________________ 
4 Harris assigned other errors in his cross-appeal, but 
those issues are not relevant to this proceeding. 
 
8
of the federal claim.  Harris v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 
96-1743, slip op. at 8 (4th Cir. Mar. 31, 1997).  The 
district court dismissed the case without prejudice, and 
Harris then filed this action in the circuit court against 
the City, Van Auken, Beane, Baker, McCloud and Wall. 
 
During pre-trial proceedings in the present case, 
Harris non-suited his claim against Van Auken.  The case 
then proceeded to a trial by jury against the remaining 
defendants.  At the close of all the evidence, the circuit 
court struck the City’s evidence and found it liable, as a 
matter of law, for Harris’ discharge.  The court reasoned 
that it is mandatory that police officers arrest people who 
violate the law, and that no one - including a police 
supervisor – may lawfully order a police officer to refrain 
from doing so.  Thus, the circuit court held that the order 
Harris disobeyed was an unlawful order, and that Harris’ 
subsequent termination for violating that order contravened 
the public policies of the Commonwealth. 
The court then submitted the case to the jury on the 
remaining issues.  Those issues were whether the individual 
defendants were also liable for Harris’ termination in 
violation of Virginia’s public policy, what amount of 
damages should be awarded against the City, and what damages 
should be assessed against the individual defendants if they 
 
9
were found liable.  The jury returned a verdict finding all 
the individual defendants liable; awarding Harris 
compensatory damages from the City and the individual 
defendants, jointly and severally; and assessing punitive 
damages against the individual defendants. 
In a letter opinion denying the defendants’ post-trial 
motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, the court again 
concluded, as it had at trial, that Harris’ dismissal for 
securing the warrants against Van Auken violated the public 
policy of Virginia set forth in the Code sections specified 
by the magistrate as the basis for issuing those warrants.  
The court stated that  
[i]t is contrary to the public policy of Virginia to 
prohibit a police officer from doing his sworn duty as 
mandated by the Code of Virginia where the officer was 
justified in fact and in law in attempting to comply 
with these statutes which deal with the safety of the 
public. 
 
The court also overruled the individual defendants’ renewed 
plea of res judicata5 and concluded that the jury’s verdict 
was not excessive. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Although the City and the individual defendants raise 
______________________ 
5 The court had previously denied a pre-trial motion for 
summary judgment filed by all the individual defendants 
except Van Auken.  Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, 
they had asserted in that motion that the federal court's 
 
10
 several assignments of error, we conclude that two of them 
are dispositive of this appeal: (1) that the circuit court 
erred in finding that Harris’ claim against the individual 
defendants is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
because of the federal court proceedings, and (2) that the 
court erred by finding that Code § 18.2-460 and former § 
15.1-138 enunciate public policies that support Harris’ 
wrongful discharge claim.  Accordingly, we will address only 
those two assignments of error. 
First, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
entering judgment against the individual defendants because 
the principle of res judicata bars relitigation of Harris’ 
claim against them.  We have previously discussed the 
rationale for this judicially created doctrine, stating that 
it 
rests upon public policy considerations which favor 
certainty in the establishment of legal relations, 
demand an end to litigation, and seek to prevent the 
harassment of parties. . . . The doctrine prevents 
“relitigation of the same cause of action, or any part 
thereof which could have been litigated, between the 
same parties and their privies.” 
 
Bill Greever Corp. v. Tazewell Nat’l Bank, 256 Va. 250, 254, 
504 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1998) (quoting Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 
667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 920-21 (1974)).  Because “the 
_______________ 
judgment with regard to them barred relitigation of Harris’ 
state law claim for wrongful discharge. 
 
11
same parties” that were present in Harris’ federal lawsuit 
are also present in this state court action, we conclude 
that the liability of those individual defendants, which was 
litigated in federal court, cannot now be relitigated in 
this subsequent action.6  See Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 413, 
419, 417 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1992) (doctrine of res judicata 
rests upon principle that one person cannot relitigate with 
the same person a cause of action that was tried and finally 
determined upon the merits). 
 
Harris pled, as a separate Count II of his federal 
complaint, a cause of action for wrongful discharge under 
Virginia law.  That count remained in the case throughout 
the preparation stages in the federal litigation, and was 
presented to the jury.  The federal district court’s jury 
verdict form clearly indicates that the jury found that each 
individual defendant named in that case had unlawfully 
discharged Harris, or caused his discharge, in violation of 
Virginia’s public policy.  Even though the district court 
set aside the jury’s assessment of punitive damages, the 
court did not set aside the jury’s finding of liability with 
regard to the individual defendants.  After the first appeal 
in which the court of appeals dismissed Harris’ federal 
______________________ 
6 Three other individuals, including Van Auken, were 
also held liable in federal court but are not parties in the 
 
12
constitutional claim and remanded the state law claim, the 
district court specifically stated in its new order that the 
judgment in favor of Harris on his state law claim for 
wrongful discharge remained the same as the judgment 
previously entered by the court.  Since neither Harris nor 
the individual defendants noted an appeal from that order, 
the court of appeals did not have the individual defendants 
before it in the second appeal and therefore lacked 
jurisdiction over them.  Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. 
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399-400 (1981).  Thus, the district 
court’s order stands as a final judgment regarding the 
liability of the individual defendants for Harris’ discharge 
and, under the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation 
of his claim against them in the present case. 
 
Nevertheless, Harris contends that the federal district 
court never entered a final order with regard to the 
individual defendants because the court did not specifically 
state in either of its judgment orders whether the 
individual defendants were liable to Harris along with the 
City, or whether they were responsible for payment of the 
compensatory damages.  Although a final order is an 
essential element for the bar of res judicata to apply, 
Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239-40, 495 S.E.2d 809, 812 
_______________ 
instant case. 
 
13
(1998), we find no merit in Harris’ contention for two 
reasons. 
 
First, the district court stated in its initial 
judgment order that the jury had tried the issues and 
rendered its verdict.  The court altered the jury’s verdict 
only with regard to the award of punitive damages.  In an 
order entered after the first appeal to the court of 
appeals, the district court stated that the judgment in 
favor of Harris on his state law wrongful discharge claim 
remained as previously entered by the district court.  Thus, 
the district court never modified the jury’s finding that 
the individual defendants unlawfully discharged, or caused 
the discharge of, Harris in violation of Virginia’s public 
policy, but instead implicitly incorporated such finding in 
its final orders. 
Second, there are only two ways by which the court of 
appeals could have acquired jurisdiction to review the 
judgment of the federal district court.  The federal courts 
of appeal have jurisdiction of appeals from the final 
decisions of the district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  The federal appellate courts can also exercise 
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders if there is an appeal 
 
14
by permission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).7  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 3(a)(4) and 5 (district court must enter order 
granting permission for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) or stating that necessary conditions for such 
appeal are met).  There is no evidence of an order by the 
district court in accordance with § 1292(b) or Fed. R. App. 
P. 5(a)(3), nor other evidence that an appeal of an 
interlocutory order was permitted in Harris’ federal 
lawsuit.  Because of that fact, we conclude that the court 
of appeals was necessarily reviewing a final judgment order 
from the district court in both appeals.  Otherwise, the 
parties would have been required to utilize the procedure 
specified in Fed. R. App. P. 5.  Thus, the district court’s 
order was final as to all the parties, and that portion of 
it pertaining to the individual defendants was not affected 
by the court of appeals’ decision in the second appeal 
because, as we have already stated, the individual 
defendants were not parties to that appeal.  Federated Dep’t 
Stores, 452 U.S. at 399-400. 
______________________ 
7 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides that a court of appeals, 
in its discretion, may permit an appeal from an 
interlocutory order if the district court states in writing 
that “an order not otherwise appealable under this section, 
. . . involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 
 
15
 
Since relitigation of Harris’ claims against the 
individual defendants is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata, we are left only with the claim against the City.  
Before addressing the merits of the circuit court’s judgment 
holding the City liable as a matter of law, we first must 
determine the basis for the court’s ruling that the City’s 
discharge of Harris violated certain public policies. 
During a discussion between the court and the attorneys 
for the parties with regard to proposed jury instructions, 
the court stated that the evidence presented did not 
establish a “whistle blowing case.”  Instead, the court 
declared that the issue was whether it was a violation of 
the public policy of Virginia to attempt to prohibit Harris 
from obtaining the warrants against Van Auken and to fire 
him for doing so.  It is in the context of this discussion 
that the court decided to strike the City’s evidence and 
hold, as a matter of law, that the City’s termination of 
Harris was unlawful because the discharge violated 
Virginia’s public policy. 
However, the circuit court later told the jury that the 
City had violated several of Virginia’s public policies, 
including the policy “that a Virginia public employer, such 
as the City of Virginia Beach, shall not retaliate against a 
public employee because the employee has complied with any 
 
16
law of the United States or the Commonwealth of Virginia or 
has reported any violation of such law to a governmental 
authority.”  Nevertheless, in the circuit court’s post-trial 
letter opinion, which was incorporated in its final order, 
the court clearly did not rely on any public policy 
prohibiting retaliatory discharges in its decision to hold 
the City liable as a matter of law.  The following excerpts 
from the court’s letter opinion underscore its rationale. 
 
 
The Court held at trial and holds today that 
[Harris’] dismissal for obtaining those warrants was 
contrary to the public policy of Virginia as set forth 
in the sections of the code which were specified by the 
magistrate as the basis for the warrants and which are 
a matter of record in this case.[8] 
 
 
 
It is contrary to the public policy of Virginia to 
prohibit a police officer from doing his sworn duty as 
mandated by the Code of Virginia where the officer was 
justified in fact and in law in attempting to comply 
with these statutes which deal with the safety of the 
public. 
 
Thus, we conclude that when the court struck the City’s 
evidence and found it liable for Harris’ discharge as a 
matter of law, the court relied only on the public policies 
underlying Code §§ 18.2-460 and -469, and former § 15.1-138. 
Turning now to the merits of the circuit court’s 
decision on this issue, we first observe that in our 
______________________ 
8 The Code sections specified in the warrants against 
Van Auken were §§ 18.2-460 (obstructing justice) and –469 
(refusing or delaying the execution of process for a 
criminal). 
 
17
previous cases dealing with Bowman-type exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine, this Court has consistently 
characterized such exceptions as “narrow.”  Lawrence 
Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98, 465 
S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996); Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. 
Corp., 247 Va. 98, 104, 439 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1994); Bowman, 
229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.  While all statutes of 
the Commonwealth reflect public policy to some extent, since 
otherwise they presumably would not have been enacted by our 
General Assembly, termination of an employee in violation of 
the policy underlying any one of them does not automatically 
give rise to a common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. 
A review of our prior cases involving this area of the 
law also reveals that this Court has found a public policy 
sufficient to allow a common law wrongful discharge claim to 
go forward as an exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine in only two instances.  The first instance involves 
laws containing explicit statements of public policy (e.g. 
“It is the public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
[that] . . .”).  Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at  
331.  The second one involves laws that do not explicitly 
state a public policy, but instead are designed to protect 
the “property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or 
 
18
welfare of the people in general.”  Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 
234 Va. 462, 468, 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1987).  Such laws 
must be in furtherance of “an [underlying] established 
public policy” that the discharge from employment violates.  
Bowman, 229 Va. at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 801.  “Each of the 
illustrative cases . . . cited in Bowman[, where we first 
recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine,] involved violations of public policies of 
that character.”9   Miller, 234 Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 
918.  Even if a specific statute falls within one of these 
categories, an employee must also be a member of the class 
of individuals that the specific public policy is intended 
to benefit in order to state a claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy.  Dray v. New 
Market Poultry Products, Inc., 258 Va. 187, 191, 518 S.E.2d 
312, 313 (1999). 
 
Applying these principles regarding the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in the present 
case, we conclude that the statutes relied upon by the 
circuit court do not fit within either of the instances 
______________________ 
9 In Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ 
(2000), decided today, this Court holds that an at-will 
employee asserted a valid common law cause of action for 
wrongful termination of employment when she alleged that her 
discharge violated the public policy underlying two criminal 
statutes, Code §§ 18.2-344 and -345. 
 
19
where we have found public policies that support a Bowman-
type cause of action.  Code § 18.2-460 defines the elements 
of, and sets forth the criminal penalties for, the crime of 
obstruction of justice, and, accordingly, reflects the 
General Assembly’s intent to prohibit interference with the 
administration of justice.  That section does not explicitly 
state any public policy, but, like all criminal statutes, it 
has as an underlying policy the protection of the public’s 
safety and welfare.  Miller, 234 Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 
918.  However, Harris’ reliance on the statute is not in 
accord with that policy.  Instead, Harris is attempting to 
use Code § 18.2-460 as a shield to protect himself, not the 
public, from the consequences of his decision to charge Van 
Auken with obstruction of justice despite his supervisor’s 
order to take no further action in an official capacity with 
regard to any aspect of the incident involving Grey and 
Gamble.  To utilize this criminal statute as Harris suggests 
would allow wrongful discharge lawsuits to be pursued by 
virtually any police officer who believes that personnel 
decisions obstructed the officer’s enforcement of the law.  
In light of our prior decisions addressing the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, we find no 
 
20
established public policy underlying Code § 18.2-460 that 
would support Harris’ wrongful discharge cause of action.10
 
A similar analysis applies to former Code § 15.1-138.  
That statute provided, in pertinent part, that a police 
officer “shall endeavor to prevent the commission . . . of 
offenses against the law of the Commonwealth . . . ; shall 
observe and enforce all such laws . . . ; [and] shall detect 
and arrest offenders . . . .”  By its terms, the statute did 
not state any public policy but merely described the powers 
and duties of a police force.  Nor was the statute designed 
to protect any public rights pertaining to “property . . . , 
personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare.”  Miller, 234 
Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918.  See also Childress v. City 
of Richmond, 907 F.Supp. 934, 942 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d per 
curiam, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 524 
U.S. 927 (1998) (holding that statute did not create any 
public rights).  As we said in Lawrence Chrysler, 251 Va. at 
98, 465 S.E.2d at 809, the Bowman exception is not broad 
enough to make actionable the discharge of an at-will 
employee that violates only private rights or interests. 
______________________ 
10 The circuit court generally referenced the statutes 
cited in the warrants against Van Auken but did not actually 
name them.  However, its discussion of Virginia’s public 
policy implicated both statutes.  Our analysis and 
conclusion that Code § 18.2-460 cannot be used as a source 
 
21
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and enter final judgment here in favor of the 
City and the individual defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reversed and final judgment. 
_______________ 
of public policy to support Harris’ wrongful discharge cause 
of action applies equally to Code § 18.2-469. 
 
22