Title: McFadden v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC14-93
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 29, 2015

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-93 
____________ 
 
DARRICK L. MCFADDEN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 29, 2015] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in McFadden v. State, 130 So. 3d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2013).  The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the 
decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Cooper v. State, 106 So. 3d 32 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2013).  Darrick McFadden also seeks review of McFadden, on the 
ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864 
(Fla. 2010), Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2008), Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 
284 (Fla. 2007), Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and 
Ritter v. State, 885 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), on a question of law.  We 
 
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have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const.  Because we conclude that 
orders denying relief under section 921.186, Florida Statutes (2010), the substantial 
assistance statute, are appealable, we quash the decision below, and we disapprove 
Cooper. 
FACTS 
 
In September 2008, Darrick McFadden was convicted of two counts of 
second-degree murder with a firearm and two counts of robbery with a firearm 
causing great bodily harm or death in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee 
County.  For these crimes, McFadden received a fifty-five-year prison sentence.1  
In October 2011, the State moved to reduce or suspend McFadden’s sentence 
pursuant to section 921.186.2  The State explained that it sought McFadden’s 
assistance in its prosecution of codefendant Carlos McSwain.  McFadden was 
deposed and the following month McSwain entered a plea of no contest to two 
counts of manslaughter and was sentenced to ten years in prison.  According to the 
State, but for McFadden’s cooperation and substantial assistance, it would not have 
been able to obtain McSwain’s plea and would have had no alternative but to enter 
a nolle prosequi order.  
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court’s judgment was per curiam affirmed on direct appeal.  See 
McFadden v. State, 17 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (table). 
 
 
2.  Section 921.186 affords the trial court discretion to reduce or suspend a 
sentence if it finds that the defendant rendered substantial assistance.   
 
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The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion to reduce or 
suspend.  The State outlined the following evidence which was presented at 
McFadden’s trial.  McFadden was driving a stolen van with McSwain and a Mr. 
Gibbs as passengers; they were looking for individuals to rob.  While at a stop 
sign, McSwain exited the van and approached a man inside of a vehicle.  An 
altercation ensued, and the man was shot and killed; the victim’s cell phone was 
taken.  McFadden then drove the van to another location where McSwain and 
Gibbs exited the van to approach two men.  McSwain shot and killed one of the 
men; money was taken.  After all three men abandoned the van, a Eugene Flores 
took the van before it was pulled over pursuant to a BOLO (“be on the look out” 
alert).  
 
The prosecutor maintained that the State encountered “very unusual and 
unique difficulties” in prosecuting McSwain: (1) the trial court suppressed 
McSwain’s confession; (2) the only surviving eyewitness to either of the crimes 
was an illegal alien who had disappeared; (3) Flores confessed to murder; (4) 
Gibbs was no longer cooperating despite having entered into a plea agreement; and 
(5) other witnesses either recanted or refused to cooperate.  The only evidence 
against McSwain for the crimes was his fingerprint found inside of the van.   
 
The prosecutor informed the trial court that he initiated contact with 
McFadden, advising him that if he were to provide substantial assistance and 
 
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testify against McSwain, then the State would recommend that his sentence be 
suspended or reduced, although such decision was within the trial court’s 
discretion.  The prosecutor made no promises to McFadden that reduction or 
suspension would in fact occur.  McFadden agreed to testify against McSwain.  
McFadden’s deposition and statements were consistent with his trial testimony.  
The prosecutor told the court: 
[B]ut for [McFadden’s] assistance in first agreeing to cooperate 
and then providing his deposition and then being here ready to testify, 
the State would not have been able to proceed against Mr. McSwain.  
We really would have had no alternative but to nolle [prosse] because 
we couldn’t even have gotten to the fingerprint so to speak. 
. . . 
[T]here certainly was substantial assistance.  There’s no 
question but for him we could not have acquired and achieved the plea 
that we got. 
 
Thus, the State recommended that McFadden’s sentence “be reduced or suspended, 
completely within your discretion as to the amount, if any.”   
 
The trial court expressed concerns pertaining to section 921.186: 
What are the ramifications of approving things like this?  
. . . 
Has anyone attacked that statute yet? 
. . . 
Shouldn’t it be attacked?  
. . . 
 [Y]ou know you’ve always been allowed after 60 days to mitigate a 
sentence; this was what three years? 
. . . 
It just seems that I see everyone up in prison serving a life sentence or 
10 years or more saying God what can I come up with. 
. . . 
 
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I’m just trying to avoid a tit for tat so to speak, a deal either 
threatening or promising anything. 
. . . 
We’re going to get more now after this one. 
. . . 
But it stirs up everybody. 
. . . 
And cause[s] a lot of problems in that regard. 
 
 
In addition, the trial court questioned the prosecutor’s use of the statute in 
this case and whether substantial assistance was provided because the State already 
had McFadden’s trial testimony.3  The trial court also wondered why the 
prosecutor did not simply ask McFadden if he would be willing to testify in 
McSwain’s trial.  The trial court believed that the prosecutor “didn’t follow all the 
affidavits to be sure that there wasn’t some other way to get that testimony.”  The 
trial court also speculated that if McSwain later decided to withdraw his plea, then 
no substantial assistance would have been rendered by McFadden.  The trial court 
questioned whether McFadden was actually interested in providing substantial 
assistance since he did not do so before.4  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 
court denied the State’s motion to reduce or suspend McFadden’s sentence: “After 
reviewing the testimony, the statute itself, the Court finds it has no alternative than 
                                          
 
3.  The State asserted that McFadden’s trial testimony could not have been 
used against McSwain because he was not a codefendant or represented by counsel 
during the trial.   
 
 
4.  The trial court learned that the State originally sought McFadden’s 
assistance in 2007. 
 
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to deny the motion.  The philosophy is good, sir and everything else if I could 
substantiate—I did take some of that into consideration at the time that I sentenced 
you.”5  The trial court informed the defense that it had thirty days to appeal its 
ruling.   
McFadden appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when 
it denied the motion based on improper factors.  The State countered, contending 
that the motion was properly denied, but that in any event the order was not 
appealable.  In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Second District held: 
Though we agree with the First District that the decision to reduce or 
suspend a defendant’s sentence falls squarely within the discretion of 
the trial court, see Cooper, 106 So. 3d at 32, we nonetheless hold that 
we have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s order denying a motion 
filed pursuant to section 921.186 where the defendant alleges, as 
McFadden has here, that the trial court misapplied the statute. 
 
McFadden, 130 So. 3d at 698 (citing United States v. Manella, 86 F.3d 201, 203 
(11th Cir. 1996)).  Accordingly, the district court certified conflict with the First 
District’s decision in Cooper “[t]o the extent that [the decision] holds that an order 
denying a motion filed pursuant to section 921.186 is never appealable.”  Id. 
 
 
                                          
 
5.  Counsel for McFadden requested that the remainder of his sentence be 
suspended or reduced to five years in prison, or in the alternative, ten years in 
prison with credit for time served. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The question presented is whether a trial court’s denial of a motion to reduce 
or suspend a sentence filed pursuant to section 921.186, Florida Statutes, is 
appealable.  Because this is a pure question of law, this Court’s review is de novo.  
Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 366 (Fla. 2012).  Section 921.186, titled 
“Substantial assistance,” which became effective on July 1, 2010, provides as 
follows: 
Notwithstanding any other law, the state attorney may move the 
sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who 
is convicted of violating any felony offense and who provides 
substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any 
of that person’s accomplices, accessories, coconspirators, or principals 
or of any other person engaged in criminal activity that would 
constitute a felony.  The arresting agency shall be given an 
opportunity to be heard in aggravation or mitigation in reference to 
any such motion.  Upon good cause shown, the motion may be filed 
and heard in camera.  The judge hearing the motion may reduce or 
suspend the sentence if the judge finds that the defendant rendered 
such substantial assistance. 
 
§ 921.186, Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added); see also ch. 2010-218, §§ 1, 2, Laws 
of Fla.   
Under the Florida Constitution, the district courts of appeal “shall have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final 
judgments or orders of trial courts . . . not directly appealable to the supreme court 
or a circuit court.”  See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Article V, section 4(b), 
grants the district courts jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals and affords criminal 
 
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defendants a constitutional right to an appeal.  State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 
664 (Fla. 2000).  In Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 
So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1996), this Court  
recede[d] from [State v.]Creighton[,469 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1985)] to the 
extent that we construe the language of article V, section 4(b) as a 
constitutional protection of the right to appeal.  However, we believe 
that the legislature may implement this constitutional right and place 
reasonable conditions upon it so long as they do not thwart the 
litigants’ legitimate appellate rights. 
 
Id. at 1104.  “Appeals to . . . the District Courts of Appeal are constitutionally 
guaranteed rights in this State.  This being true, it is fundamental that statutes or 
rules regulating the exercise of such rights should be liberally construed in favor of 
the appealing party and in the interest of manifest justice.”  Robbins v. Cipes, 181 
So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 1966) (footnote omitted). 
 
A criminal defendant may appeal “orders entered after final judgment.”  See 
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D).  We conclude that an order denying a motion filed 
under section 921.186 is an appealable final order pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D).  See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 
1205, 1208 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that the district court has jurisdiction to review 
an order designating a defendant a sexual predator); State v. Schultz, 720 So. 2d 
247, 248 (Fla. 1998) (agreeing that an order withholding adjudication of guilt 
without placing the defendant on probation is appealable).  Accordingly, we quash 
the Second District’s decision in McFadden, which conditions jurisdiction on 
 
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whether the defendant claims a misapplication of section 921.186.  130 So. 3d at 
698.  We also disapprove the First District’s decision in Cooper, which held that 
orders denying motions filed under section 921.186 are not appealable.  106 So. 3d 
at 32.     
Having concluded that McFadden was authorized to appeal the trial court’s 
ruling under section 921.186, we must determine whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion to reduce or suspend McFadden’s sentence.  
“Discretion is abused only when the trial court’s decision is ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable.’ ” Gonzalez v. State, 990 So. 2d 1017, 1033 (Fla. 2008) (quoting 
Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 405 (Fla. 2005)).  McFadden claims that the 
motion was denied because the trial court disagreed with the philosophy behind the 
law and the prosecutor’s choice to utilize the law, and that the court improperly 
considered McFadden’s exercise of his right to trial as a factor.   
The record clearly demonstrates that McFadden provided substantial 
assistance under section 921.186, as it relates to codefendant McSwain’s plea.  
Faced with “very unusual and unique difficulties” in the case against McSwain, the 
State would have had to nolle prosse the charges absent McFadden’s agreement to 
cooperate, be deposed, and be ready to testify against McSwain.  McFadden’s 
substantial assistance caused McSwain to plead no contest to two manslaughter 
counts for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison.  However, this does not 
 
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end the analysis as section 921.186 does not mandate the trial court to reduce or 
suspend a sentence upon a showing of substantial assistance.  See § 921.186, Fla. 
Stat. (“The judge hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if the 
judge finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance.”) (emphasis 
added). 
Due to the trial court’s consideration of improper reasons, we conclude that 
the court committed a clear abuse of discretion in this case.  In finding it had “no 
alternative than to deny the motion,” the trial court questioned whether any 
substantial assistance was given by McFadden, speculated that McSwain may 
withdraw his plea in the future, and noted that McFadden did not provide 
substantial assistance in the past.  Moreover, the trial court was unnecessarily 
hostile to the enactment of section 921.186, even so far as suggesting, “Shouldn’t it 
be attacked?”   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we quash the Second District Court’s decision in 
McFadden, and we disapprove the First District Court’s decision in Cooper.  We 
remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
LEWIS, J., dissents. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D11-6172 
 
 
(Lee County) 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Karen Mary Kinney, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; John M. Klawikofsky, 
Bureau Chief, and Peter N. Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent