Title: Com. v. Edmunds
Citation: 373 Pa. Super. 384, 541 A.2d 368
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 1988

373 Pa. Superior Ct. 384 (1988) 541 A.2d 368 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Louis R. EDMUNDS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued November 19, 1987. Filed April 25, 1988. *386 Kenneth B. Burkley, Greensburg, for appellant. William C. Gallishen, Assistant District Attorney, Greensburg, for Com., appellee. Before WIEAND, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ. WIEAND, Judge: The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), is to be followed by the courts of this Commonwealth with respect to evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant which is subsequently invalidated under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The issue arises in an appeal by Louis R. Edmunds from a judgment of sentence imposed following a bench trial in which he was found guilty of possession of marijuana and related offenses after a substantial quantity of marijuana had been seized from his residence and an adjoining building. The facts leading to the conviction are as follows. On August 4, 1985, in response to a telephone call, State Trooper Michael Deise met with two hunters who told him that while hunting in a wooded area they had come upon a white, corrugated building in which they saw growing marijuana plants. Trooper Deise questioned them about their familiarity with marijuana plants and satisfied himself that they were able to recognize marijuana plants. The men described the building to Trooper Deise and told him that *387 Edmunds was the owner. On the following day, Deise flew over the area and spotted the building. He also drove past the property and by examining the mailbox confirmed the residency of Edmunds. Trooper Deise then applied to District Justice Margaret Tlunac for a search warrant and offered in support thereof the following probable cause affidavit: *388 The warrant issued upon presentation of this affidavit described the premises to be searched as follows: "Residence of Louis R. Edmunds . . . A one story stone and frame residence and white corrugated building and curtilege." With the intent of serving the warrant on the owner of the premises, Trooper Deise and other state policemen went to the residence, where they were met by Edmunds. When Edmunds went upstairs to find a written lease for the white, corrugated building, Deise accompanied him. At the top of the stairs, in plain view, Deise observed four bags of a green substance which he believed and which later was determined to be marijuana. A subsequent search of the white, corrugated building revealed marijuana plants. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the marijuana. He contended that the affidavit had been insufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. More specifically, he argued that the affidavit had failed to show when the hunters had observed the marijuana plants and that there were insufficient facts from which it could be determined that the information given by the hunters was reliable.[1] The suppression court held that the failure of the affidavit to state the date of the hunters' observations rendered the affidavit inadequate to establish probable cause to believe that marijuana was growing in the building at the time when the warrant was issued. However, because the evidence established that the hunters had made their observations on August 4, 1985 and because this information had been communicated to the issuing authority but had been omitted inadvertently from the affidavit when it had been prepared in the magistrate's office, the court held that the police had exercised good *389 faith. As such, the court held, suppression was not required. In Commonwealth v. Conner, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d 341 (1973), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a warrant issued without reference to the time when an informant had obtained his information was defective. The Court said: Id., 452 Pa. at 339-340, 305 A.2d at 345 (emphasis in original). See also: Commonwealth v. Kalinowski, 303 Pa.Super. 354, 359-360, 449 A.2d 725, 727-728 (1982). In this instant case, the affidavit did not contain facts from which the date of the hunters' observations could be determined. Therefore, it was insufficient to permit the issuing authority to make a determination that probable cause existed at the time the warrant was issued. Did this defect compel the suppression of the contraband discovered by police when they executed the warrant if, as the suppression court found, the police acted reasonably in relying upon the warrant which had been issued by the magistrate? It is clear now, in view of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Leon, supra, that suppression is not required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In creating a "good faith exception" to the judge-made exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court said: Id. 468 U.S. at 922-923, 104 S. Ct. at 3420-3421, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698-699 (footnotes omitted). *392 Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution contains language which is the same as that of the Fourth Amendment. It contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. Although the Pennsylvania courts may interpret the state constitution to afford greater protections than the federal constitution, see Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 63-64, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983), it is generally recognized that decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting an identically worded clause of the federal constitution must be carefully considered in interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution. We may digress from such interpretations only when there is compelling reason to do so. Id., 504 Pa. at 49, 407 A.2d at 459, quoting Brennen, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 535 (1986). See also: Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979). We perceive no compelling reason to deviate from the reasoning of Leon by excluding evidence under the Pennsylvania Constitution which is not subject to exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. The exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania has been the direct product of the exclusionary rule adopted by the federal courts in enforcing the guarantees afforded by the federal constitution. The Pennsylvania exclusionary rule is based on the same rationale, and it is no more firmly entrenched in Pennsylvania constitutional law than the exclusionary rule is embedded in federal constitutional law. A good faith exception, as articulated in Leon, is based on the premise that the exclusionary rule should not hinder prosecution in cases where the rule ceases to serve its intended purpose of deterring police misconduct. The cost of denying to the prosecution inherently trustworthy, tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate is too great unless the exclusion of such evidence pays its way by deterring official unlawfulness. We discern no reason for rejecting this reasoning when called upon to apply the *393 protections of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In the absence of a contrary holding by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, therefore, we elect to follow the holding of the Leon court and adopt it in applying Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In the instant case, the suppression court found, after hearing, that the hunters had made their observations on August 4, 1985, the same day on which they spoke with Trooper Deise. The court also found that this time-frame had been communicated to the magistrate. When the affidavit had been prepared in the magistrate's office, however, the date of the hunters' observations had been inadvertently omitted. Thus, neither police nor magistrate had reason to believe the information was stale. Because the police had acted reasonably and in good faith reliance upon the magistrate's impartial finding of probable cause, the suppression court refused to suppress evidence of marijuana plants seized from the corrugated building pursuant to warrant. The suppression court's determination comported with the decision in Commonwealth v. Morris, 368 Pa.Super. 237, 533 A.2d 1042 (1987), where a panel of this Court held that a good faith exception would be applied to a situation in which facts sufficient to establish probable cause were known to the officer and issuing authority but were inadvertently omitted from the affidavit. The suppression court's holding finds further support in Commonwealth v. Melilli, 361 Pa.Super. 429, 522 A.2d 1107 (1987), allocatur granted, where we held that suppression was not necessary when a neutral magistrate, acting on existing judicial authority, had authorized the use of pen registers in the belief that a showing of probable cause was unnecessary and where the law subsequently developed to require such a showing. The suppression court's holding in the instant case, therefore, does not warrant a reversal of the conviction. Appellant argues that it was improper for the suppression court to allow testimony regarding the date of the *394 hunters' observations. Such testimony, he argues, was violative of the Pennsylvania "four corners rule." See: Commonwealth v. Simmons, 450 Pa. 624, 626, 301 A.2d 819, 820 (1973), codified at Pa.R.Crim.P. 2003. However, the "four corners rule," which requires that probable cause be established by reference to the written affidavit, is of utility only in determining the validity of the warrant. The rule can have no application in determining the separate issue of whether the police acted in an objectively reasonable manner and, therefore, in good faith. Appellant also challenged the Commonwealth's use at trial of the four bags of manicured marijuana found in his residence. The suppression court determined that this marijuana was in "plain view" where it was observed by police who had entered appellant's home with his permission after announcing that they had a warrant to search the white, corrugated building. It had been discovered inadvertently at the top of the stairs when Trooper Deise, with appellant's consent, accompanied appellant to the second floor to obtain a copy of the lease for the white, corrugated building. Because Deise was lawfully in a position from which he was able to see the marijuana in plain view, the court held, the marijuana was not subject to suppression. See: Commonwealth v. Gabrielle, 269 Pa.Super. 338, 409 A.2d 1173 (1979); Commonwealth v. Adams, 234 Pa.Super. 475, 341 A.2d 206 (1975). These findings are supported by competent evidence and, therefore, will not be disturbed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 488 Pa. 227, 412 A.2d 481 (1980); Commonwealth v. Neely, 298 Pa.Super. 328, 444 A.2d 1199 (1982). It is of no consequence that the police did not have separate probable cause to search the residence. The suppression court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress the marijuana which constituted the principal evidence against him at trial. The judgment of sentence is affirmed. POPOVICH, J., files a dissenting opinion. *395 POPOVICH, Judge, dissenting: I cannot join the Majority in the face of record evidence that the affidavit, upon which the warrant to search the defendant's premises was based, lacked the specificity as to the point in time the alleged observations of drugs on the said premises were made by two anonymous informants. Also, contrary to the Majority, I find the suppression court's receipt of testimony from the affiant/officer to fill this void, and, in effect, supplement the "four-corners" of the warrant to be violative of Pa.R.Crim.P. 2003's prohibition against evaluating "evidence outside the warrant affidavit[] on the issue of probable cause. . . ." Commonwealth v. Graham, 334 Pa.Super. 170, 178, 482 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1984), citing Commonwealth v. Swint, 256 Pa.Super. 169, 389 A.2d 654 (1978). Surely, the absence of the time in the warrant, as to when the informants viewed the defendant's premises and drugs, undermines a predicate for probable cause to believe that a crime is or was being committed and that the defendant was the guilty party. For the Majority to dismiss the lack of such a fact from the warrant, and condoning its inclusion into the warrant by the use of extraneous information/testimony as to what the officer supposedly told the magistrate at the moment the warrant was secured, is at odds with this writer's understanding of the Fourth Amendment and its strictures. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kalinowski, 303 Pa.Super. 354, 449 A.2d 725 (1982) (POPOVICH, J.). Moreover, there appears to be no indication from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that it is receptive to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). See Commonwealth v. Weisenthal, 517 Pa. 241, 535 A.2d 600 (1988). As such, my reading of the facts does not disclose the mere non-compliance with a technical requirement under the law. Rather, we have a warrant which is facially defective in not meeting the requirements necessary to invade the defendant's substantive rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, I *396 respectfully dissent to the Majority's determination to the contrary. [1] There is no merit in the latter contention. The hunters were "disinterested observers" who had been eyewitnesses to the marijuana growing in appellant's building. See: Commonwealth v. McCain, 275 Pa.Super. 192, 194, 418 A.2d 677, 678 (1980), allocatur denied. Moreover, the same information had emanated from two independent informants. "When two independent informants both supply the same information about a particular crime . . . each source tends inherently to bolster the reliability of the other." Commonwealth v. Sudler, 496 Pa. 295, 306, 436 A.2d 1376, 1381 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 259, 297 A.2d 471, 477 (1972).