Title: Com. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Cty.
Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 32
Docket Number: S163680
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2010

1 
 
Filed 2/11/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
COMMITTEE FOR GREEN FOOTHILLS, ) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S163680 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H030986 
SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD OF 
) 
SUPERVISORS et al., 
)  
Santa Clara County 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. CV065186 
 
Defendants and Respondents; ) 
 
 
) 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
)  
LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR 
) 
UNIVERSITY et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest and 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
In general, challenges to governmental action under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)1 face unusually short statutes of limitation.  
(§ 21167.)  Most limitation statutes are triggered by the filing of a public notice, 
which reports an agency‟s determination about the applicability of CEQA or the 
potential environmental impact of a project.  (§§ 21108, 21152.)  As we explain in 
greater detail, an action challenging this determination must generally be brought 
within 30 days after the notice is filed.  (§ 21167, subds. (b), (c) & (e).) 
                                              
1  
Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq.  All statutory references are to 
the Public Resources Code. 
2 
 
 
This case involves a particular kind of challenge following a notice of 
determination (NOD).  If an NOD has been filed, but an action alleges that no 
environmental review was undertaken, which statute of limitations applies:  (1) the 
general 30-day limit on challenges following a notice, or (2) the longer 180-day 
period provided for a case alleging that no environmental determination was made 
(§ 21167, subd. (a))?  We hold that the filing of an NOD triggers a 30-day statute 
of limitations for all CEQA challenges to the decision announced in the notice.  
This interpretation is consistent with the language of section 21167 and the general 
approach of all notice-based statutes of limitation.  The Legislature clearly 
intended the 30-day statute to apply when an agency files an NOD, and this 
limitations period may not be extended based on the nature of the CEQA violation 
alleged. 
 
Because the Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse that 
judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In 2000, the Leland Stanford Junior University (Stanford) applied for a 
community plan and general use permit (Permit) to add buildings on its campus.  
An environmental impact report (EIR) prepared for the overall project (the Permit 
EIR) identified potential environmental effects and proposed specific mitigation 
measures.  The Permit EIR found that the development would significantly impact 
public access to recreational facilities.  In addition to requiring improvements to 
area parks, a mitigation measure in the Permit EIR directed that Stanford dedicate 
certain trail easements shown on the Santa Clara County (County) Trails Master 
Plan2 and coordinate with the County parks department regarding the trails‟ 
                                              
2  
The Trails Master Plan was adopted in 1995 as part of the County‟s general 
plan.  It establishes County policies for the location, management, dedication and 
use of trails.  The Trails Master Plan also describes the general alignment of 
various proposed trail routes, including the S1 subregional trail and the C1 
connector trail. 
3 
 
locations, uses, construction and management.  On December 12, 2000, the 
County‟s Board of Supervisors (Board) certified the Permit EIR and approved the 
Permit.  The Permit was expressly conditioned on satisfaction of mitigation 
measures discussed in the Permit EIR.  Relevant here, condition I.2 required 
Stanford to “dedicate easements for, develop, and maintain the portions of the two 
trail alignments which cross Stanford lands shown in the 1995 Santa Clara 
Countywide Trails Master Plan (Routes S1 and C1) . . . .”  Specifically, within one 
year after Permit approval, Stanford was required to identify trail easements and 
reach agreements with the County on issues of trail construction, management and 
maintenance.3 
 
Stanford and County staff proposed an agreement in December 2001, but 
the Board took no action and directed the parties to explore other alternatives for 
alignment of the S1 trail.  In June 2002, the Board directed County staff to proceed 
with environmental analysis of five S1 routes and four C1 routes.  A dispute soon 
arose about the location of the C1 route, and the Board directed that work be 
suspended on the C1 alignment.  Analysis of the S1 alignment proceeded, 
however, and a supplemental EIR (SEIR) analyzing three potential S1 routes was 
published on September 20, 2004.  A final SEIR for the S1 trail was completed 
and presented to the Board on September 13, 2005. 
 
Stanford and the County explored possible alignments for the C1 trail on 
both sides of San Francisquito Creek.  An alignment on the western side would 
require the agreement and cooperation of San Mateo County, the City of Menlo 
Park, and the Town of Portola Valley.  A trail located on the eastern side would be 
within Santa Clara County‟s jurisdiction.  However, the eastern alignment was 
thought to have potentially significant environmental impacts, and County staff 
believed regulatory approval could be difficult to obtain.  On September 13, 2005, 
                                              
3  
We presume, and appellant does not dispute, that the County filed 
appropriate NOD‟s during these initial stages of the project‟s approval. 
4 
 
the Board instructed County staff to pursue an agreement with Stanford on the 
location of the C1 alignment. 
 
Subsequent negotiations produced the “Trails Agreement,”4 which was 
presented to the Board in December 2005.  The Trails Agreement recites that its 
purpose is to satisfy condition I.2 of the Permit.  Stanford agreed to dedicate 
easements for the S1 trail and portions of the C1 trail, construct and maintain the 
S1 trail, and fund improvements to the C1 trail by providing $8.4 million to San 
Mateo County and $2.8 million to the Town of Portola Valley.  The agreement 
also requires that Stanford provide $1.05 million to the Town of Los Altos Hills 
for improvements to the C2 connector trail.5  These funds were intended to pay for 
C1 trail construction and for “costs to comply with CEQA or to implement 
mitigation measures . . . .”  A map attached to the Trails Agreement shows the C1 
trail on the western side of San Francisquito Creek.  Elsewhere, however, the 
agreement explains that this route is “only one possible alignment.”  The final 
placement of the C1 trail would depend on further environmental analysis and 
Stanford‟s agreement with San Mateo County and the Town of Portola Valley. 
 
On December 13, 2005, the Board authorized the County to enter the Trails 
Agreement.  It also made numerous CEQA findings about existing and proposed 
trails and certified a final SEIR for the S1 trail.  The Board found that no CEQA 
review was currently required for the C1 trail because approval of the Trails 
Agreement did “not constitute County approval of construction, operation or 
maintenance of specific trail improvements” of the C1 trail.  Instead, the Trails 
Agreement contemplated that, before any trail improvements were made, “detailed 
                                              
4  
Formally called the Agreement for Trail Easements, Construction, 
Management and Maintenance and Grant of Easements. 
5  
If these neighboring jurisdictions do not agree to construct the trail 
improvements by December 31, 2011, the money must be paid to the County and 
used for the sole purpose of mitigating the adverse impact on recreation identified 
in the Permit. 
5 
 
construction plans [would] be reviewed and considered by the jurisdictions of San 
Mateo County, Town of Portola Valley and Town of Los Altos Hills . . . .”  The 
Board observed that when these jurisdictions ultimately consider detailed designs 
and construction plans, “they will be required by CEQA to determine the type and 
extent of environmental review that is necessary for their actions,” and the Trails 
Agreement provides funds to pay for this environmental review.  Accordingly, the 
Board concluded the County was not required to conduct further CEQA review 
before entering into the Trails Agreement.  The Board thus implicitly determined 
this aspect of the agreement did not constitute a new project subject to 
independent CEQA review.  Because the agreement obligated Stanford to build 
trail segments on its own land and to provide funding “for trail construction and 
environmental compliance” on segments outside the County, the Board found that 
Stanford had satisfied Permit condition I.2. 
 
On December 16, 2005, the County filed an NOD with the county clerk.  
The notice described only the S1 trail alignment.  It reported that an EIR had been 
prepared for this trail project and findings had been made “pursuant to section 
15091 of CEQA.”6  Four days later, on December 20, 2005, the County filed a 
revised NOD.  The revised notice included the C1 and C2 trail routes in its 
description of the project and identified the Board‟s actions with respect to the 
trail alignments as part of the project description.  Specifically, the notice reported 
that the County had approved an agreement for the C1 and C2 alignments, but had 
not approved any specific trail improvements.  It explained that plans for such 
improvements would be reviewed and considered by San Mateo County and the 
towns of Portola Valley and Los Altos Hills.  The revised NOD again stated that 
an EIR had been prepared and findings made under CEQA.  The revised NOD was 
posted for 30 days, from December 20, 2005, through January 19, 2006. 
                                              
6  
This reference is to section 15091 of the CEQA Guidelines.  (Cal. Code 
Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.; hereafter Guidelines.) 
6 
 
 
On June 9, 2006, 171 days after the revised NOD was filed and posted, the 
Committee for Green Foothills (Committee) filed a petition for writ of mandamus 
challenging the County‟s approval of the Trails Agreement.  The Committee 
complained that the County had violated CEQA by approving a C1 trail alignment 
located in San Mateo County and Portola Valley without having conducted the 
necessary environmental review.  The County demurred on the ground that the 
petition was barred by the statute of limitations.  The court took judicial notice of 
both NOD‟s and sustained the demurrer, reasoning that the timely filing of the 
notices had triggered the 30-day statute of limitations in section 21167, 
subdivisions (b), (c) and (e).  Although the court initially allowed the Committee 
leave to amend, it later sustained a demurrer to the amended petition without leave 
to amend and entered judgment in favor of the County and Stanford. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed and directed the trial court to grant the 
Committee another opportunity to amend the petition.  The Court of Appeal 
concluded there was “a reasonable possibility” the Committee could allege facts 
sufficient to bring its case within the 180-day statute of limitations for actions 
claiming that an agency approved a project without having determined its potential 
environmental effects.  (§ 21167, subd. (a).)  We reverse. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Standard of Review 
 
On review from an order sustaining a demurrer, “we examine the complaint 
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action 
under any legal theory, such facts being assumed true for this purpose.  
[Citations.]”  (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.)  We 
may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed.  (Serrano v. Priest 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591; City of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality 
Management Dist. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 861, 869-870.)  “ „A demurrer based 
on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not 
necessarily, barred.  [Citation.]  In order for the bar . . . to be raised by demurrer, 
7 
 
the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is 
not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.  [Citation.]‟  
[Citation.]”  (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San 
Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.) 
II. 
Statute of Limitations 
 
Whenever a local agency “approves or determines to carry out a project” 
that is subject to CEQA, the agency must file an NOD within five working days in 
the county clerk‟s office of each county where the project will be located.  
(§ 21152, subd. (a).)7  The notice must reflect the agency‟s determination as to 
whether the project will have a significant effect on the environment and must 
state whether an EIR has been prepared.  (§§ 21108, subd. (a), 21152, subd. (a).)  
A similar procedure is required if the agency decides to embark on a project it 
believes is exempt from CEQA (§§ 21080, subd. (b), 21172).  If a local agency 
finds a project is exempt from CEQA, it must file a notice of exemption with all 
appropriate county clerks.  (§ 21152, subd. (b).)  Both types of notice must be 
available for public inspection for 30 days.  (§§ 21108, subd. (c), 21152, subd. 
(c).) 
 
The purpose of these filings is to alert the public about environmental 
decisions.  “Public notification serves the public‟s right „to be informed in such a 
way that it can intelligently weigh the environmental consequences of any 
contemplated action and have an appropriate voice in the formulation of any 
decision.‟  (Karlson v. City of Camarillo (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 789, 804.)  This 
public participation assists the agency in weighing mitigation measures and 
alternatives to a proposed project.  (§§ 21100, 21151.)”  (Concerned Citizens of 
Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 938.) 
                                              
7  
State agencies must file an NOD with the Governor‟s Office of Planning 
and Research.  (§ 21108, subd. (a).) 
8 
 
 
The NOD plays a crucial role in determining the period during which 
CEQA challenges may be brought.  Section 21167 establishes statutes of 
limitation for all actions and proceedings alleging violations of CEQA.  
(International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Board of Supervisors 
(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 (ILWU).)8 
                                              
8  
Section 21167 states, in relevant part: 
 
“An action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the 
following acts or decisions of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance 
with this division shall be commenced as follows: 
 
“(a) An action or proceeding alleging that a public agency is carrying out or 
has approved a project that may have a significant effect on the environment 
without having determined whether the project may have a significant effect on 
the environment shall be commenced within 180 days from the date of the public 
agency‟s decision to carry out or approve the project, or, if a project is undertaken 
without a formal decision by the public agency, within 180 days from the date of 
commencement of the project. 
 
“(b) An action or proceeding alleging that a public agency has improperly 
determined whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment 
shall be commenced within 30 days from the date of the filing of the notice 
required by subdivision (a) of Section 21108 or subdivision (a) of Section 21152. 
 
“(c) An action or proceeding alleging that an environmental impact report 
does not comply with this division shall be commenced within 30 days from the 
date of the filing of the notice required by subdivision (a) of Section 21108 or 
subdivision (a) of Section 21152 by the lead agency. 
 
“(d) An action or proceeding alleging that a public agency has improperly 
determined that a project is not subject to this division pursuant to subdivision (b) 
of Section 21080 or Section 21172 shall be commenced within 35 days from the 
date of the filing by the public agency, or person specified in subdivision (b) or (c) 
of Section 21065, of the notice authorized by subdivision (b) of Section 21108 or 
subdivision (b) of Section 21152.  If the notice has not been filed, the action or 
proceeding shall be commenced within 180 days from the date of the public 
agency‟s decision to carry out or approve the project, or, if a project is undertaken 
without a formal decision by the public agency, within 180 days from the date of 
commencement of the project. 
 
“(e) An action or proceeding alleging that another act or omission of a 
public agency does not comply with this division shall be commenced within 30 
 
9 
 
 
Which subdivision of section 21167 applies depends upon the nature of the 
CEQA violation alleged.  “In substance, subdivision (a) pertains to an action 
charging the public agency with approving or undertaking a project having a 
significant effect on the environment without any attempt to comply with CEQA, 
subdivision (b) pertains to an action alleging that the public agency has improperly 
determined that the project does not have a significant effect on the environment, 
subdivision (c) pertains to an action alleging that the EIR fails to comply with the 
requirements of CEQA, subdivision (d) pertains to an action charging that the 
public agency has improperly determined that the project is exempt from CEQA, 
and subdivision (e) is a catchall provision governing an action based on any other 
failure of the public agency to comply with CEQA.”  (ILWU, supra, 116 
Cal.App.3d at p. 271.)  A subdivision (a) challenge alleges that an agency 
approved a project without determining its potential environmental impact.  
Obviously, the time for filing a subdivision (a) claim is not triggered by an NOD, 
because the allegation is that no determination was ever made.  For all other 
claims, however, subdivisions (b) through (e) link the start of the limitations 
period to the filing of a notice of determination or exemption.9 
 
This case does not challenge the initial approval of a project.  The County 
granted a permit and certified a program EIR for Stanford‟s development project 
more than five years before the Committee filed suit.  The Committee has instead 
challenged the approval of an activity that was undertaken to ameliorate an 
environmental impact of Stanford‟s project.  The Trails Agreement, the target of 
the Committee‟s attack, sets guidelines for the future construction and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
days from the date of the filing of the notice required by subdivision (a) of 
Section 21108 or subdivision (a) of Section 21152.” 
9  
Subdivisions (b), (c), and (e) of section 21167 all provide for a 30-day 
limitations period.  Subdivision (d) provides a 35-day period for projects found to 
be exempt from CEQA, but it extends this period to 180 days if no notice of 
exemption was filed. 
10 
 
maintenance of certain trails.  Stanford was required to construct these trails by a 
condition of its Permit, and the condition was imposed to implement a mitigation 
measure identified in the Permit EIR.  Under these circumstances, the Trails 
Agreement cannot be considered an independent project.  Rather, it is a 
subsequent activity encompassed within the original project.  After a program 
EIR, like the Permit EIR, has been prepared, subsequent activities in the program 
must be examined in light of the EIR to determine whether additional 
environmental review is necessary.  (Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (c).)  If no new 
environmental effects are expected, the agency can approve the activity as within 
the scope of the prior EIR.  (Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (c)(2).)  In addition to the 
Permit EIR, the Trails Agreement was also a subsequent activity encompassed 
within the SEIR prepared for the Trails Master Plan.  This program EIR 
“evaluate[d], at a broad level, the environmental effects of implementing the 
County‟s policies for the planning, acquisition, design, operations, and 
maintenance of Countywide trails and trail facilities.” 
 
Because the Committee‟s suit does not challenge either of these prior 
EIR‟s, or the SEIR prepared for the S1 trail alignment, the limitations period in 
section 21167, subdivision (c) does not apply.  Nor are we concerned with 
subdivision (d), because this case does not concern an activity claimed to be 
exempt from CEQA.  Here, the Committee artfully alleges that the Trails 
Agreement constituted a “project” and that the County approved this project 
without determining its environmental effects.  The Committee contends these 
allegations bring the case within the 180-day statute of limitations of 
subdivision (a).  The County and Stanford counter that the 30-day statute of either 
subdivision (b) or (e) applies because the County filed an NOD announcing its 
finding that approval of the Trails Agreement would not have a significant effect 
on the environment. 
 
Whether the Committee‟s action is barred as a matter of law thus rests on a 
threshold legal question:  Does the filing of an NOD invariably trigger one of the 
11 
 
30-day statutes of limitation in section 21167, regardless of the type of CEQA 
violation alleged?  To answer this question, we apply well-established principles 
of statutory construction to determine the Legislature‟s intent in enacting section 
21167, “ „so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose 
of the law.‟  [Citations.]”  (City of Burbank v. State Water Resources Control Bd. 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 625.)  “ „We begin with the statutory language because it is 
generally the most reliable indication of legislative intent.  [Citation.]  If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it 
said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.  (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 1002, 1009.)‟  (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 
211.)  We consider extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, only if the statutory 
language is reasonably subject to multiple interpretations.  (People v. King 
[(2006)] 38 Cal.4th [617,] 622.)”  (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 888.) 
 
A. 
Statutory Language 
 
The language of section 21167 strongly suggests that the Legislature 
intended the filing of an NOD to trigger a 30-day statute of limitations.  With the 
exception of subdivision (a), each of the limitation periods in section 21167 is 
triggered by the filing of a notice of determination or exemption and continues for 
only 30 or 35 days.  (§ 21167, subds. (b)-(e).)  In contrast, the limitations period in 
subdivision (a) starts when a project is approved or begun, and it continues for 180 
days.  (§ 21167, subd. (a).)  Because subdivision (a) applies to suits alleging that 
an agency has approved or undertaken a project “without having determined 
whether the project may have a significant effect on the environment” (§ 21167, 
subd. (a), italics added), it would not have made sense to measure the limitations 
period from the filing of an NOD.  If an agency has made no determination about 
the environmental impact of a project, it has no determination to announce.  As we 
have explained in the past, subdivision (a) reflects “the Legislature[‟s] 
determin[ation] that the initiation of the project provides constructive notice of a 
12 
 
possible failure to comply with CEQA.  Such a notice is a substitute for the public 
notification measures set forth in section 21092.”10  (Concerned Citizens of Costa 
Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 939; see also 
Oceanside Marina Towers Assn. v. Oceanside Community Development Com. 
(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 735, 741-742.) 
 
But what do we make of a situation in which an agency decides no 
environmental review of a certain activity is required, approves the activity 
without conducting review, but also announces its conclusion in an NOD?  This is 
essentially what happened here.  The County approved the Trails Agreement after 
deciding that no environmental review was presently required, and it disclosed 
these findings to the public in an NOD.  As noted, the Trails Agreement was not a 
project but a subsequent activity encompassed within the Permit EIR and the 
Trails Master Plan SEIR.  Because in-depth environmental review was previously 
undertaken in these program EIR‟s, further review is generally not required except 
in limited circumstances.  (§ 21166; Guidelines, §§ 15162, 15168.)  This situation 
is not particularly unusual.  Agencies may determine that supplemental 
environmental review is not required for a subsequent activity, and CEQA requires 
them to publicly notice these determinations.  (See §§ 21108, subd. (a), 21152, 
subd. (a).) 
 
Section 21167 does not specifically define the limitations period that 
applies to this factual scenario.  However, a related subdivision, not on point here, 
sheds light on the importance the Legislature has given to the filing of a public 
notice in determining the applicable limitations period.  Section 21167, 
                                              
10  
Section 21092 requires an agency to give the public notice that it is 
preparing an EIR or a negative declaration for a proposed project.  (See Concerned 
Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn., supra, 42 Cal.3d at 
p. 935.)  This notice is different from a notice of determination, which announces 
the agency‟s ultimate conclusion about the project‟s expected environmental 
consequences. 
13 
 
subdivision (d) addresses the analogous situation that arises when an agency 
conducts no environmental review because it believes a project is statutorily 
exempt from CEQA.11  If the agency files a notice of exemption alerting the 
public to its conclusion (§§ 21108, subd. (b), 21152, subd. (b)), any action or 
proceeding challenging this decision must be brought within 35 days after the 
notice was filed.  (§ 21167, subd. (d).)  But if the agency simply proceeds with a 
project it believes to be exempt and does not file the required notice, 
subdivision (d) permits a legal challenge to be brought up to 180 days after the 
agency‟s decision or commencement of the project.  (§ 21167, subd. (d).) 
 
This difference indicates that the determinative question, for purposes of 
defining the statute of limitations, is not what type of violation the plaintiff has 
alleged, but whether the action complained of was disclosed in a public notice.  
When an agency gives the public notice of its decision that a project is exempt 
from CEQA, just like a notice of any other determination under CEQA, the public 
can be expected to act promptly in challenging this decision.  However, when an 
agency does not give the statutorily required notice, and the public is held to 
constructive notice based on the start of the project, the Legislature has determined 
that a longer limitations period should apply. 
 
The principle illustrated in subdivision (d) is evident in all the other 
limitation periods set forth in section 21167.  If a state or local agency has filed an 
NOD stating whether a project will have a significant environmental impact (see 
§§ 21108, subd. (a), 21152, subd. (a)), the statute of limitations for all types of 
CEQA claims related to the project is 30 days from the date the notice was filed.  
The 30-day statute applies to claims challenging an agency‟s determination about 
environmental impact (§ 21167, subd. (b)), claims challenging the adequacy of an 
                                              
11  
A project is exempt from CEQA if, for example, it is purely ministerial, or 
if it involves emergency preparedness or emergency repairs.  (See § 21080 [listing 
exemptions]; see also § 21172.) 
14 
 
EIR (§ 21167, subd. (c)), and all other claims alleging CEQA violations (§ 21167, 
subd. (e)).  If a state or local agency has made no environmental impact 
determination, the statute of limitations is 180 days, measured from the date of the 
agency‟s approval or the start of the project.  (§ 21167, subd. (a).)  In such cases, 
project approval or initiation is deemed constructive notice for potential CEQA 
claims. 
 
Accordingly, the plain language of section 21167 makes the filing of a 
notice of determination of paramount importance for determining which statute of 
limitations applies to a CEQA claim.  If a valid NOD has been filed (§§ 21108, 
subd. (a), 21152, subd. (a)), any challenge to that decision under CEQA must be 
brought within 30 days, regardless of the nature of the alleged violation.  The 
statutory language does not authorize an extension of this 30-day period if the suit 
alleges that, despite the filing of an NOD, the project was approved without a prior 
environmental assessment. 
 
B. 
Other Evidence of Legislative Intent 
 
To the extent the language of section 21167 is ambiguous, we may consult 
extrinsic aids to determine the Legislature‟s intent.  (Miklosy v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 888.)  Here, both the regulatory 
guidelines implementing CEQA12 and relevant legislative history suggest that the 
Legislature meant to impose a shorter statute of limitations for all types of CEQA 
claims following a notice of determination or exemption. 
 
Section 15112, subdivision (c) of the Guidelines summarizes the limitation 
periods for CEQA challenges as follows:  “(1) Where the public agency filed a 
                                              
12  
Although this court “has not decided the issue of whether the Guidelines 
are regulatory mandates or only aids to interpreting CEQA,” we have observed 
that, “[a]t a minimum, . . . courts should afford great weight to the Guidelines 
except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous under CEQA.”  
(Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 
47 Cal.3d 376, 391, fn. 2.) 
15 
 
notice of determination in compliance with Sections 15075 or 15094, 30 days after 
the filing of the notice and the posting on a list of such notices.  [¶] (2) Where the 
public agency filed a notice of exemption in compliance with Section 15062, 
35 days after the filing of the notice and the posting on a list of such notices. 
[¶] . . . [¶] (5) Where none of the other statute of limitations periods in this section 
apply, 180 days after either:  [¶] (A) The public agency‟s decision to carry out or 
approve the project, or [¶] (B) Commencement of the project if the project is 
undertaken without a formal decision by the public agency.”13  Thus, the 
Guidelines explain that the applicable statute of limitations depends in the first 
instance on whether a public notice was filed.  If a notice of determination or 
exemption was properly filed, a 30-day or 35-day statute applies.  This period is 
extended to 180 days only in cases where no public notice was given.  (See also 
Remy et al., Guide to the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (10th ed. 1999) 
p. 574 [“In cases where agencies are proceeding with no CEQA compliance 
whatsoever and have failed to file a notice of exemption, aggrieved persons have 
180 days to file a legal challenge . . .”], italics added.)  Sections of the Guidelines 
describing the requirements for an NOD also state that the filing of such a notice 
invariably “start[s] a 30-day statute of limitations on court challenges to the 
approval [of a project] under CEQA.”  (Guidelines, §§ 15075, subd. (g), 15094, 
subd. (g).) 
 
Legislative history, although shedding little light on the question before us, 
contains some support for the Guidelines‟ interpretation.  Section 21167 was 
added to the Public Resources Code in 1972, as part of a bill that also added the 
notice of determination provisions of sections 21108 and 21152.  (Stats. 1972, 
                                              
13  
Omitted subdivisions concern CEQA actions challenging the certification 
of a state agency‟s regulatory program (§ 21080.5).  These suits are also subject to 
a 30-day statute of limitations.  (Guidelines, § 15112, subd. (c)(3)-(4).) 
16 
 
ch. 1154, §§ 9, 12 & 16, pp. 2275-2278.)14  As first enacted, section 21167 
defined only the three limitation periods set forth in subdivisions (a) through (c).  
(Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 16, pp. 2277-2278.)  Less than two years later, the 
Legislature amended section 21167 to add subdivisions (d) and (e).  (Stats. 1974, 
ch. 56, § 3, pp. 125-126.)  Assembly Bill No. 2338 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.), which 
made these changes, was passed as an urgency measure to clarify the limitation 
periods for CEQA claims.  (Stats. 1974, ch. 56, § 5, at p. 126.) 
 
Two enrolled bill reports concerning Assembly Bill No. 2338 (1973-1974 
Reg. Sess.) are of interest here.15  A Department of Water Resources report noted 
that, in addition to creating a new 35-day statute of limitations for challenges to 
exemption determinations, the bill also retained the 30-day statute of limitations 
for claims that challenge an agency‟s determination of environmental impacts or 
challenge the adequacy of an EIR.  “Thus,” the report concluded, “essentially any 
determinations made by public agencies under the Environmental Quality Act will 
be subject to a 30 or 35 day challenge limitation, provided a notice of 
determination has been filed.  If no notice is filed or utilized, a 180-day period of 
limitation applies.”  (Dept. Water Resources, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill 
No. 2338 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 25, 1974.)  A similar conclusion was drawn 
in an enrolled bill report prepared by the Governor‟s Office of Planning and 
Research, which has special expertise in interpreting the CEQA statutes.  (See, 
e.g., § 21083 [directing the Office of Planning and Research to develop the 
Guidelines].)  This report noted that, in addition to providing a 35-day statute of 
limitations for exemption determinations, Assembly Bill No. 2338 “[r]equires that 
                                              
14  
At the request of both sides, we have taken judicial notice of the relevant 
legislative history for section 21167. 
15  
“[W]e have routinely found enrolled bill reports, prepared by a responsible 
agency contemporaneous with passage and before signing, instructive on matters 
of legislative intent.”  (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 934, fn. 19.) 
17 
 
any action alleging that any act or omission of a public agency does not comply 
with the provisions of CEQA must be commenced within 30 days after the 
required filing of notice.”  (Governor‟s Off. of Planning & Research, Enrolled Bill 
Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2338 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 1, 1974.)16 
 
In enacting and amending section 21167, the Legislature clearly sought to 
place strict limits on the time during which projects may be challenged under 
CEQA.  To this end, it mandated that CEQA suits be brought within 30 days after 
an NOD is filed.  (§ 21167, subds. (b), (c) & (e).)  The Committee has directed us 
to nothing in the legislative history that suggests the Legislature intended to extend 
this period sixfold whenever, despite the notice, the plaintiff alleges no true 
environmental determination was made. 
 
The interpretation we reach is also consistent with a key policy served by 
these statutes:  “the prompt resolution of challenges to the decisions of public 
agencies regarding land use.  [Citation.]”  (Citizens for a Megaplex-Free Alameda 
v. City of Alameda (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 91, 111 (Megaplex-Free Alameda).)  
CEQA “contains a number of provisions evidencing the clear „legislative 
determination that the public interest is not served unless challenges under CEQA 
are filed promptly‟ (Oceanside Marina Towers Assn. v. Oceanside Community 
Development Com.[, supra,] 187 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 741) . . . .”  (Board of 
Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.)  In addition to the 
short statutes of limitation in section 21167, other statutes impose expedited 
schedules for briefing (§ 21167.4) and preparation of the administrative record 
(§ 21167.6), and require that CEQA cases be given preferential hearing in the trial 
                                              
16  
This statement may have been an inartful summary of the new “catchall” 
provision in section 21167, subdivision (e).  However, it may also have reflected 
an interpretation of section 21167 as prescribing a 35-day statute in the exemption 
context and a 30-day statute for all other claims brought after a notice of 
determination.  As noted, this interpretation is reflected in the Guidelines.  
(Guidelines, §§ 15112, subd. (c), 15075, subd. (g), 15094, subd. (g).) 
18 
 
and appellate courts (§ 21167.1).  “Patently, there is legislative concern that 
CEQA challenges, with their obvious potential for financial prejudice and 
disruption, must not be permitted to drag on to the potential serious injury of the 
real party in interest.”  (Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court, at p. 837.) 
 
A bright-line rule that the filing of an NOD triggers a 30-day statute of 
limitations promotes certainty, allowing local governments and developers to 
proceed with projects without the threat of potential future litigation.  (Cf. 
§ 21167.2 [after expiration of the 30-day period in § 21167, subd. (c), an EIR is 
conclusively presumed to be valid]; Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents 
of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1130 [“This presumption acts to 
preclude reopening of the CEQA process even if the initial EIR is discovered to 
have been fundamentally inaccurate and misleading in the description of a 
significant effect or the severity of its consequences.”].)  If the 30-day limitation 
periods triggered by the filing of an NOD could be defeated by a mere allegation 
that the parties proceeded without having made a sufficient determination about 
potential environmental impacts, the certainty normally afforded by the filing of 
an NOD would be lost.  Developers would have to wait a full 180 days before 
embarking on a project to avoid potential interruption by litigation.  Such delay 
and uncertainty are precisely what the Legislature sought to avoid when it enacted 
the unusually short limitation periods in section 21167.  (See San Franciscans for 
Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 
498, 504 [“Obviously, the rationale of the statutory scheme is to avoid delay and 
achieve prompt resolution of CEQA claims”].) 
III. 
Application to the Present Case 
 
A. 
Thirty-Day Statute of Limitations Applies 
 
Because the County filed an NOD concerning its approval of the Trails 
Agreement, any CEQA challenge to this approval had to be brought within 30 
days.  The Committee‟s argument that a longer limitations period should apply 
19 
 
because the County allegedly approved the agreement without conducting any 
environmental review turns the notice-based system of section 21167 on its head. 
 
A similar argument was rejected decades ago in California Manufacturers 
Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 95, 124-125.  There, an 
association argued that the 30-day statutes of limitation in section 21167, 
subdivisions (b) and (e) apply only if the agency has undertaken an environmental 
investigation and filed a valid notice of determination and negative declaration.  
(California Manufacturers, at pp. 124-125.)  The Court of Appeal disagreed, 
noting this assertion “flies in the face of the clear language of the statutes which 
provide that they apply in (b), where it is alleged that the agency has „improperly 
determined‟ whether there will be a significant impact and in (e), where it is 
alleged that agency action or omission „does not comply‟ with statutory 
requirements.”  (California Manufacturers, at p. 125.)  We agree with this 
analysis.  For purposes of the CEQA statutes of limitation, the question is not the 
substance of the agency‟s decision, but whether the public was notified of that 
decision. 
 
Thus, the Committee cannot avail itself of the 180-day statute of limitations 
in section 21167, subdivision (a).  Subdivision (a) addresses claims that an agency 
has ignored CEQA and made no attempt to satisfy its requirements.  When an 
NOD has been filed, the agency has at a minimum acknowledged CEQA and 
attempted compliance.  In these situations, the Legislature has limited the time for 
filing suit to 30 days. 
 
Precisely which 30-day statute in section 21167 applies in this case is 
somewhat harder to discern.  Subdivision (b) addresses claims that an agency has 
made an improper determination about the environmental impact of a project.  
Because the Committee takes issue with the County‟s determination that approval 
of the Trails Agreement would have no significant effect on the environment, this 
claim can be understood as a challenge to an “improper determination” about 
potential impacts of the agreement.  But this case does not fit neatly within 
20 
 
subdivision (b).  Subdivision (b) typically governs challenges to the initial 
approval of a project, when a negative declaration or mitigated negative 
declaration has been filed.  The Trails Agreement was not a CEQA project being 
considered for initial approval.  It was a “[s]ubsequent activit[y]” to Stanford‟s 
broader development project and the County‟s Trails Master Plan.  (Guidelines, 
§ 15168, subd. (c).)  Each of these larger projects had been previously evaluated in 
a program EIR. 
 
If subdivision (b) does not apply here, however, the appropriate limitations 
period is still 30 days under the catchall provision of subdivision (e).  In addition 
to the CEQA claims addressed elsewhere in the statute, section 21167, 
subdivision (e) states that CEQA challenges to any other act or omission by a 
public agency must be filed within 30 days after an NOD is filed.  (§ 21167, 
subd. (e).)  Because the Committee brought this challenge more than 30 days after 
the County disclosed its approval of the Trails Agreement in an NOD, the action is 
clearly time-barred under section 21167, subdivision (e). 
 
B. 
Notice of Determination Was Not Defective 
 
The Committee also argues the County‟s NOD did not trigger a 30-day 
statute of limitations because the notice was invalid. 
 
Several cases have made an exception to the strict limitation periods in 
section 21167 when the notice of determination is materially defective.  The 
CEQA Guidelines describe the contents and filing procedures required for an 
NOD filed in connection with a negative declaration (Guidelines, § 15075) or EIR 
(id., § 15094).  Among other things, the NOD must identify and briefly describe 
the project; identify the lead agency and responsible agency (if applicable); state 
the date of project approval and the agency‟s environmental impact determination; 
report that a negative declaration, mitigated negative declaration or EIR has been 
adopted, and give the address where it may be examined; and state whether 
mitigation measures were required as a condition of approval.  (Id., §§ 15075, 
21 
 
subd. (b), 15094, subd. (b).)  The Guidelines contain a similar list for notices of 
exemption.  (Id., § 15062, subd. (a).) 
 
In ILWU, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 265, 273, the court refused to hold 
plaintiffs to the 35-day statute of limitations in section 21167, subdivision (d) 
because the notice of exemption filed for the project “was not in substantial 
compliance with the notice requirements” in the Guidelines.  There, “[t]he project 
description was the only required item of information contained in the notice and 
even that was of debatable adequacy.”  (ILWU, at p. 273.)  Most notably, the 
notice did not state that the project had been found to be exempt or explain the 
reasons for this finding.  (Ibid.)  Because of these substantial deficiencies, the 
court concluded the notice was not adequate to trigger the short limitations period 
in section 21167, subdivision (d).  (ILWU, at pp. 273-274; see also County of 
Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 962-963 
[notice of exemption was not valid, and did not trigger 35-day limitations period, 
because it was filed before the project was approved]; Sierra Club v. City of 
Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 532 [notice of determination that misstated 
project approval date did not trigger 30-day limitations period in § 21167, subd. 
(c)].)  Defects in the posting of the notice have also been held to prevent the 
running of the limitation periods in section 21167.  In Citizens of Lake Murray 
Area Assn. v. City Council (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 436, 438, 440-441, the court 
excused the plaintiffs from the 30-day statute of limitations because, although a 
valid NOD had been filed, the county clerk had failed to post the notice in 
accordance with section 21152, subdivision (c). 
 
The Committee attempts to rely on these defective notice cases.  It 
complains the County‟s revised NOD of December 20, 2005, was either 
inadequate or an improper attempt to “bootstrap” a determination about the C1 
trail alignment onto the NOD of December 16, 2005, concerning certification of 
the SEIR for the S1 alignment.  These arguments are unpersuasive.  The trial court 
found that both the initial and the revised NOD‟s “were at a minimum in 
22 
 
substantial compliance with CEQA Guidelines § 15094,” and the Committee does 
not dispute that the revised notice contained every item of information this 
provision required.  The notice appropriately identified the three applicable EIR‟s 
for the project:  the S1 SEIR, the Permit EIR, and the Trails Master Plan SEIR.  
The Committee argues these references should have been explained so that the 
public would understand how the EIR‟s related to the C1 trail; however, section 
15094 of the Guidelines does not require such a discussion.  We decline to impose 
additional requirements for an NOD beyond those described in the Guidelines.  
(Cf. Lee v. Lost Hills Water Dist. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 630, 634 [in CEQA 
context, due process does not require better notice than that prescribed by statute].) 
 
The Committee also argues the County‟s use of a revised notice was 
misleading.  Because the initial notice concerned only the S1 trail, the Committee 
asserts the public would likely expect a “revised” notice also to be limited to the 
S1 trail.  The Committee suggests a separate NOD should have been issued for the 
C1 trail alignment because this alignment was a separate project, and “it would 
invite mischief” to permit the inclusion of additional projects in a revised NOD.  
This argument is also unpersuasive.  The County filed an NOD to advise the 
public about the resolution it adopted on December 13, 2005.  In this resolution, 
the Board certified an SEIR for the S1 trail and gave the County authority to enter 
the Trails Agreement.  Among other things, the Trails Agreement addressed the 
future development of the C1 and C2 trails.  It was appropriate for the County to 
notify the public about both aspects of the resolution.  Although it might have 
done so by filing separate NOD‟s for the S1 trail SEIR and the agreement 
concerning the C1 and C2 trails, the Committee cites nothing in the CEQA statutes 
or Guidelines that prevented the disclosure of both approvals in a single notice.  
Nor is there reason to believe the County acted with some nefarious intent when it 
issued a revised notice to include the C1 and C2 trails.  The Committee suggests 
the County was trying to hide this approval in the revised notice, but the Board‟s 
resolution was passed after a public meeting in which the Committee‟s own 
23 
 
representative participated.  Moreover, the revised notice itself clearly alerted the 
public to the agreements pertaining to the C1 and C2 trails.  The Legislature has 
given great significance to the NOD as a trigger for CEQA‟s short statutes of 
limitation.  It is the responsibility of potential litigants to review these notices, and 
any revisions, with care. 
 
C. 
No New CEQA Document Was Required 
 
The Committee also contends the revised NOD was invalid because “the 
legislative scheme does not permit an agency to file notices of determination 
anytime it deems fit.”  (Initial capitalization omitted.)  Instead, according to the 
Committee, an agency may file an NOD only when it has made an environmental 
determination and prepared a corresponding negative declaration or EIR.  This 
argument is yet another artful way of asserting that a facially valid NOD does not 
trigger one of the 30-day limitation periods in section 21167 if the underlying 
approval process does not comply with CEQA.  As we have explained, however, a 
merits-based inquiry is irrelevant to a statute of limitations analysis.  The 
argument also fails on its own terms. 
 
The notice of determination statutes do not mention the need for a 
corresponding EIR or negative declaration, nor do they state that the required 
NOD may be filed only when a CEQA document has been prepared.  (§§ 21108, 
21152.)  Indeed, CEQA does not require an EIR to be prepared for every step 
taken in the course of a project.  Once a proper EIR has been prepared, no 
subsequent or supplemental EIR is required unless (1) “[s]ubstantial changes” are 
proposed in the project, requiring “major revisions” in the EIR; (2) substantial 
changes arise in the circumstances of the project‟s undertaking, requiring major 
revisions in the EIR; or (3) new information appears that was not known or 
available at the time the EIR was certified.  (§ 21166; see also Guidelines, 
§ 15162; Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1317.)  
“[S]ection 21166 comes into play precisely because in-depth review has already 
occurred, the time for challenging the sufficiency of the original EIR has long 
24 
 
since expired (§ 21167, subd. (c)), and the question is whether circumstances have 
changed enough to justify repeating a substantial portion of the process.”  
(Bowman v. City of Petaluma (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1065, 1073, italics omitted.) 
 
When the environmental effects of a large or complex project have been 
reviewed in a program EIR, “[s]ubsequent activities in the program must be 
examined in the light of the program EIR to determine whether an additional 
environmental document must be prepared.”  (Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (c).)  If 
the later activity could have environmental effects not previously examined in the 
program EIR, the agency must prepare an initial study, leading to an EIR or 
negative declaration for the new activity.  (Id., § 15168, subd. (c)(1).)  However, 
“[i]f the agency finds that . . . no new effects could occur or no new mitigation 
measures would be required, the agency can approve the activity as being within 
the scope of the project covered by the program EIR, and no new environmental 
document would be required.”  (Id., § 15168, subd. (c)(2), italics added; see also 
id., § 15168, subd. (c)(5) [noting that many subsequent activities may be found 
within the scope of a comprehensive program EIR, such that “no further 
environmental documents would be required”].) 
 
As discussed, the Trails Agreement was a “[s]ubsequent activit[y]” 
described by section 15168, subdivision (c) of the Guidelines.  It was entered for 
the express purpose of satisfying a mitigation measure that was identified in the 
Permit EIR.  Accordingly, the County was required to evaluate the activities 
contemplated in the Trails Agreement to determine whether they could produce 
any environmental effects not examined in the relevant program EIR‟s.  
(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (c).)  It apparently did so.  The Board of Supervisors 
issued a resolution that referenced the Permit EIR and the Trails Master Plan SEIR 
and found no additional CEQA review was required before execution of the Trails 
Agreement.  The resolution explained that the precise locations of the C1 and C2 
alignments had not been decided, and the Trails Agreement contemplated further 
CEQA review once more detailed plans for these trails were developed. 
25 
 
 
We need not decide whether the County‟s determination was proper.  Such 
arguments go to the merits of the Committee‟s complaint.  For our purposes, it 
matters only that the County evaluated the Trails Agreement as a subsequent 
activity to a program EIR.  The record indicates that it did.  When the County 
determined that no environmental review of the agreement was presently required, 
it impliedly found the agreement to be within the scope of the Permit EIR and the 
Trails Master Plan SEIR.  (See Megaplex-Free Alameda, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 114-115 [no express findings are required when agency determines no 
further EIR is required for a subsequent activity under section 21166].)  Under 
these circumstances, no new environmental document was required.  (Guidelines, 
§ 15168, subd. (c)(2).) 
 
When, as in this case, an agency determines a subsequent activity is within 
the scope of a program EIR and requires no further environmental review, must it 
file an NOD concerning its approval of the activity?  The CEQA statutes and 
Guidelines do not directly address this question, although such a notice would 
seem to be required under the general rule that an agency file an NOD 
“[w]henever [it] approves or determines to carry out a project that is subject to” 
CEQA.  (§§ 21108, subd. (a), 21152, subd. (a).)  Moreover, CEQA specifically 
requires the filing of an NOD in the analogous context of subsequent projects to a 
master EIR.  Even when the agency concludes a subsequent project will have no 
significant environmental effect not evaluated in the master EIR, and thus does not 
produce findings or prepare a new CEQA document, it must file an NOD 
announcing approval of the project.  (§ 21157.1, subd. (c).)17  We need not decide 
                                              
17  
One CEQA treatise states that the filing of an NOD is mandatory for 
subsequent activities to a master EIR but discretionary for subsequent activities to 
a program EIR.  (Remy et al., Guide to the Cal. Environmental Quality Act 
(CEQA), supra, at pp. 520-521.)  The authors suggest that agencies may wish to 
file NOD‟s in the discretionary context to gain the benefit of a 30-day statute of 
limitations.  (Id., at p. 521, citing § 21167.) 
26 
 
whether CEQA requires an NOD for every subsequent activity approved as being 
within the scope of an earlier EIR.  It is sufficient to observe that NOD‟s are 
frequently filed for approvals of subsequent activities under section 21166.  (See, 
e.g., Mani Brothers Real Estate Group v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 153 
Cal.App.4th 1385, 1393; Megaplex-Free Alameda, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 99; American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth v. City of 
American Canyon (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1069; Santa Teresa Citizen 
Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689, 699; Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 
268, 278.) 
 
When an agency files an NOD for the approval of a subsequent activity, 
and, in accordance with section 21166 and Guidelines, section 15168, no negative 
declaration or EIR has been prepared for the activity, section 21167, subdivision 
(e) appears to furnish the appropriate statute of limitations for challenges to the 
agency‟s action.  The issue in such cases is “ „ “limited to the legality of the 
agency‟s decision about whether to require a subsequent or supplemental EIR, or 
subsequent negative declaration . . . .” ‟ ”  (Megaplex-Free Alameda, supra, 149 
Cal.App.4th at p. 110.)  A lawsuit challenging this decision might attack the 
agency‟s evaluation of the activity‟s potential environmental effects, or it might 
attack the agency‟s interpretation of the scope of the program EIR.  Either way, it 
is “[a]n action or proceeding alleging that [an] act or omission of a public agency 
does not comply with” CEQA, and section 21167, subdivision (e) requires that it 
be brought within 30 days after the filing of the NOD. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
Because the Committee filed its petition more than 30 days after the County 
reported its approval of the Trails Agreement in an NOD, the suit is time-barred.  
(§ 21167, subd. (e).) 
27 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded 
for entry of judgment in favor of the County and Stanford. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 161 Cal.App.4th 1204 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S163680 
Date Filed: February 11, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Leslie C. Nichols 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Wittwer & Parkin, William P. Parkin and Jonathan Wittwer for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Frank G. Wells Environmental Clinic, Sean B. Hecht and Katherine Trisolini for Sierra Club, Endangered 
Habitats League, Planning and Conservation League, Center for Biological Diversity, Environmental 
Defense Center and Communities for a Better Environment as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel, Miguel Márquez, Acting County Counsel, and Lizanne Reynolds, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Bingham McCutchen, Stephen L. Kostka, Barbara J. Schussman, Julie Jones and William Bates III for Real 
Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
Remy, Thomas, Moose and Manley and Sabrina V. Teller for League of California Cities, California State 
Association of Counties and Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents and Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
Miller Brown & Dannis, Mark W. Kelley and Clarissa Canady for Education Legal Alliance of the 
California School Boards Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Real 
Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck and Lisabeth D. Rothman for California Building Industry Association as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents and Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William P. Parkin 
Wittwer & Parkin 
147 South River Street, Suite 221 
Santa Cruz, CA  95060 
(831) 429-4055 
 
Lizanne Reynolds 
Deputy County Counsel 
70 West Hedding Street 
9th Floor, East Wing 
San Jose, CA  95110-1770 
(408) 299-5900 
 
Barbara J. Schussman 
Bingham McCutchen 
1333 N. California Boulevard, Suite 210 
Walnut Creek, CA  94596-1270 
(925) 937-8000