Title: People v. Drum
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88503
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 22, 2000

Docket No. 88503-Agenda 10-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								CHARLES C. DRUM, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 22, 2000.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Charles Drum, was charged with first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1996)). The circuit court of
Coles County denied the State's pretrial motion to admit certain
hearsay statements at defendant's trial. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.2
(West 1998). The State brought an interlocutory appeal to the
appellate court pursuant to our Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1)). The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. 307 Ill. App. 3d 743. We allowed the State's petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
	The State charged defendant; his brother, Thomas Drum; and
their friend, Marcus Douglas with the first degree murder of the
victim, Shane Ellison. Thomas and Marcus were tried separately.
At their trials, Thomas and Marcus each testified in his own
defense; each acknowledged that he was involved in the victim's
murder; but each characterized his involvement as minimal and
defendant's involvement as primary. Marcus testified at Thomas'
trial, but Thomas refused to testify at Marcus' trial. Thomas and
Marcus were each convicted of first degree murder.
	Other than defendant, Thomas and Marcus were the only
witnesses to the murder. Thomas and Marcus, respectively,
through each of their counsel, indicated that they did not intend to
testify at defendant's trial.
	In pretrial motions, the State sought to admit the prior
testimony of Thomas and Marcus at defendant's trial, pursuant to
the statutory residual hearsay exception. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.2
(West 1998). At the close of a hearing, the trial court denied the
State's motions.
	Pursuant to our Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), the
State brought an interlocutory appeal from the denial of these
motions to the appellate court, which held as follows:
			"The State contends that we have jurisdiction pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) [citation]. We disagree
and instead hold that when (1) the State files a motion in
limine that seeks the admission of evidence and (2) the
trial court enters a discretionary ruling-that is, a ruling
that we would normally review deferentially-denying that
motion, then (3) Rule 604(a)(1) does not confer
jurisdiction on this court to hear an interlocutory appeal of
that ruling." 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745.
Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court
dismissed this interlocutory appeal. The State appeals to this court.
DISCUSSION
	As in People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d 87, 90 (1980): "The issue on
this appeal is very narrow. It is simply whether the State may take
an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's pretrial order." At the
outset, we note the following:
			"Under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the final
authority to prescribe the scope of interlocutory appeals
by the State in a criminal case rests exclusively with this
court [citation], and whether a particular order may be
appealed depends solely upon our construction of our
Rule 604(a)(1)." People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 239
(1980).
The interpretation of a supreme court rule, like a statute, is a
question of law that we review de novo. In re Estate of Rennick,
181 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (1998).
I. Substantive Effect of Pretrial Order

	The law is quite settled. Rule 604(a)(1) provides in pertinent
part: "In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or
judgment the substantive effect of which results in ***
suppressing evidence." 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). In Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d  at 90-91, this court concluded that the State could bring an
interlocutory appeal from a pretrial order, reasoning as follows:
		"In our recent decision in People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 234, we held 'that Rule 604(a)(1) allows an
interlocutory appeal by the State of a pretrial suppression
order whenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial court
that the suppression substantially impairs the State's
ability to prosecute the case.' (People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247.) The court stated that 'suppressed
evidence' is to have a broader meaning than evidence
which is illegally obtained. (82 Ill. 2d 234, 242-43, 246.)
Thus, the instant inquiry is whether the trial court's order
could be considered to have suppressed evidence.
			We think that in its substantive effect, rather than
simply its form, the trial court's order in this case does
operate to prevent evidence from being admitted."
(Emphasis in original.)
	Despite Young and Phipps, defendant relies on People v. Van
De Rostyne, 63 Ill. 2d 364 (1976), in contending that, under Rule
604(a)(1), the State may not bring an interlocutory appeal from a
pretrial order that excludes evidence. Van De Rostyne stressed the
distinction between the "exclusion" of evidence and the
"suppression" of evidence. That decision stated: "Rule 604 was
not intended to give the State the right to an interlocutory appeal
from every ruling excluding evidence offered by the prosecution."
Van De Rostyne, 63 Ill. 2d  at 368.
	However, this court in Young concluded that "the State should
be allowed to appeal from a pretrial suppression order which
substantially impairs its ability to prosecute the case involved. To
the extent that Van De Rostyne may be read to the contrary it is
overruled." Young, 82 Ill. 2d  at 247. The reasoning of Young has
overruled Van De Rostyne on this point and allows the State to
bring an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial evidentiary ruling that
has the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. See, e.g.,
People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d 32, 38-39 (1992); People v. Kite, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 817, 822-23 (1981).
	This court has repeatedly stressed that the substantive effect
of a trial court's pretrial order, not the label of the order or its
underlying motion, controls appealability under Rule 604(a)(1).
See, e.g., People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 152 (1997); Keith, 148 Ill. 2d  at 38-39. Four of the five districts of our appellate court
have applied this conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Sargeant, 292 Ill.
App. 3d 508, 510 (1st Dist. 1997); People v. Smith, 248 Ill. App.
3d 351, 356-57 (2d Dist. 1993); People v. Thompson, 213 Ill. App.
3d 1027, 1029-30 (5th Dist. 1991); People v. Keith, 206 Ill. App.
3d 414, 416-17 (3d Dist. 1990), aff'd, 148 Ill. 2d  at 38-39.
Scholars have so recognized:
		"Following Young and Phipps, the appellate court has
repeatedly entertained state appeals in which the order
suppressing evidence was based on an evidentiary ground
rather than a finding that the evidence was obtained
illegally. These cases rejected defense claims that the
Young holding should be limited to cases of constitutional
or statutory violations or that it did not extend to rulings
of mere exclusion of evidence." 2 R. Ruebner, Illinois
Criminal Procedure §7.13, at 7-36 (2d ed. 1997).
Courts in other jurisdictions are in accord. See, e.g., State v.
Griffin, 246 Kan. 320, 321-24, 787 P.2d 701, 703-04 (1990) (State
may appeal from pretrial discretionary evidentiary ruling that has
substantive effect of excluding evidence so as to substantially
impair state's ability to prosecute case).
	We note that in Young this court cited federal criminal
procedure to support its holding. Young, 82 Ill. 2d  at 248. The
issue in this case is a nonissue under federal law (18 U.S.C. §3731
(1994)). The federal government may bring an interlocutory appeal
from a pretrial order that has the practical effect of excluding
evidence, although not expressly doing so. 9A Federal Procedure
Lawyers Edition §22:1988, at 531 (1993); accord United States v.
Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 454 (1st Cir. 1998) (collecting cases)
("pretrial orders that have the practical effect of excluding material
evidence at trial are appealable under section 3731, regardless of
nomenclature"); see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 1992).
	However, the appellate court in this case reached a contrary
conclusion. After quoting from Young, the appellate court
reasoned as follows:
		"[T]he supreme court did not intend to create unlimited
appellate jurisdiction to hear the State's interlocutory
appeals from the sort of discretionary rulings that a trial
court traditionally makes in determining whether evidence
is 'otherwise probative and admissible.' Instead, the
supreme court in Young focused on the need to review
trial court rulings, whether pursuant to statute or
constitutional provision, that exclude evidence for reasons
other than its evidentiary value. In other words, a
distinction exists between traditional, discretionary
rulings relating to the evidentiary value of proffered
evidence on one hand and suppression of evidence in the
furtherance of some social policy on the other hand." 307
Ill. App. 3d at 746.
	We disagree. For the purposes of this aspect of Rule
604(a)(1), there is no substantive distinction between evidence that
is "excluded" and evidence that is "suppressed." The reasoning of
the appellate court in this case is contrary to Phipps and the other
above-referenced authority. This court has already explained that
"[t]he focus of the holding in Young is on the effect of the
suppression order and not on the nature of the evidence
suppressed." People v. Carlton, 98 Ill. 2d 187, 191, 193 (1983).
This well-settled interpretation of Young permits "the State to take
interlocutory appeals from all orders which substantially impair
the prosecution of a case without fitting those orders into neatly
compartmentalized classifications." (Emphasis added.) Carlton,
98 Ill. 2d  at 193.
II. The Present Case
	Turning to the facts of this case, the trial court's order simply
had the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. The State
sought to admit the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus at
defendant's trial because they indicated that they would not testify.
The trial court's order barred the use of this testimony; the
evidence "is thus being 'suppressed' as of the moment." Phipps,
83 Ill. 2d  at 91. Substantively, the trial court's order bars the use
of this testimony at defendant's trial, regardless of whether the
order is characterized as "excluding" the testimony or
"suppressing" it.
	Indeed, the trial court and the parties recognized the
substantive effect of the court's order. The court concluded that
the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus did not meet the
requirements of the statutory residual hearsay exception. In
denying the State's motion to admit this testimony, the court ruled:
			"I now conclude that the statements of Thomas *** and
the statements of Marcus *** lack the equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and so I am
going to at this time exclude the transcripts as evidence,
or if you will, I will suppress them as evidence. Is my
ruling clear?"
The State and defense counsel each answered in the affirmative.
Thus, the trial court and the parties believed that this pretrial order
had the substantive effect of suppressing this evidence.
	This case is distinguishable from our decision in Truitt. This
court in Truitt concluded that the State could not appeal from a
pretrial order regarding how it would be required to prove that
certain material was an illegal controlled substance. The Truitt
court reasoned that the pretrial order did not prevent any
information from being presented to the jury. Rather, the sole
impact of the order was on the means by which that information
was presented. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d  at 152.
	In this case, however, the trial court's order substantively bars
the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus; for the moment, the
order prevents this information from being presented to the fact
finder. Accordingly, the State may appeal therefrom under Rule
604(a)(1). Of course, we express no opinion as to the merits of the
trial court's order.
CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the appellate court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.