Title: Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S260736
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
VERA SEROVA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S260736 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B280526 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC548468 
 
 
August 18, 2022 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
1 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
S260736 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
 
Plaintiff Vera Serova purchased Michael, an album of 
music billed as Michael Jackson’s first posthumous release.  The 
album’s back promised “9 previously unreleased vocal tracks 
performed by” the pop superstar, but Serova now thinks some of 
these tracks, the so-called Cascio tracks, feature a Jackson 
imitator.  She asserts Michael’s marketers misled her and 
violated two California consumer protection laws, the unfair 
competition law and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, by 
misrepresenting the vocalist on the Cascio tracks through the 
album’s packaging and in a promotional video.  
 
The question before us is whether Serova’s claims, 
premised on Michael’s packaging and video, are subject to the 
album marketers’ motion to strike under California’s anti-
SLAPP statute, which calls for early dismissal of meritless 
lawsuits if they arise from a defendant’s acts in furtherance of 
free speech rights in connection with a public issue.  (Code. Civ. 
Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)1  The Court of Appeal concluded 
the motion to strike should be granted, reasoning the First 
Amendment shields the album marketers from liability.  Even 
if the statements about Jackson’s contributions were false, said 
the court, the First Amendment requires classifying them as 
noncommercial speech, a classification that would offer the 
 
1  
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure unless noted. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
statements greater protection from government regulation and, 
per the parties’ agreement, put them beyond the reach of the 
consumer protection laws Serova invokes.  (Serova v. Sony 
Music Entertainment (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 103, 124 (Serova).)  
The album marketers’ statements were, in the court’s view, 
noncommercial, because they “were directly connected to music 
that itself enjoyed full protection under the First Amendment” 
and “concerned a publicly disputed issue about which [the 
speaker] had no personal knowledge.”  (Id. at p. 126.)  We 
disagree and reverse. 
 
The album-back statement and video were commercial 
advertising meant to sell a product, and generally there “can be 
no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public.”  (Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n (1980) 447 U.S. 557, 
563 (Central Hudson).)  We recognize artistic works such as 
albums, in some instances, enjoy robust First Amendment 
protections, but that does not turn all marketing of such works 
into noncommercial speech, and it does not do so in this case.  
Additionally, a seller’s purported lack of knowledge of falsity 
does not tell us whether that seller’s speech is commercial or 
noncommercial, and commercial speech does not shed its 
commercial nature simply because a seller makes a statement 
without knowledge or that is hard to verify.  The First 
Amendment has long coexisted with no-fault false advertising 
laws. 
 
Lastly, we reject the album marketers’ tardily raised 
argument that federal copyright law preempts Serova’s 
consumer deception claims and deprives California courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
I. 
FACTS 
A. 
Michael’s Release 
 
Michael Jackson died in 2009.  A posthumous, 2010 album 
titled Michael stirred controversy even before its release.   
 
According to Serova, people familiar with Jackson’s voice 
disputed the authenticity of three of the album’s tracks:  
“Breaking News,” “Monster,” and “Keep Your Head Up.”  These 
tracks apparently emerged from a basement recording studio in 
the New Jersey home of Edward Cascio, whose family had 
befriended Jackson.  Doubters allegedly included Jackson’s 
mother, three of his brothers (of The Jackson 5 fame), two of his 
children, three of his nephews, and two former music producers.   
 
A month before Michael’s debut, the album’s publisher, 
Sony Music Entertainment, spoke to the tracks originating from 
Cascio’s basement.  It allegedly offered the public “complete 
confidence in the results of our extensive research as well as the 
accounts of those who were in the studio with Michael that the 
vocals on the new album are his own.”  
 
A week later, a lawyer for Jackson’s estate issued an open 
letter to fans.  The estate named people who believed Jackson 
was indeed the lead vocalist on the Cascio tracks.  These 
included six of Jackson’s former producers or engineers, who 
reviewed raw vocals at a listening session; one of Jackson’s 
previous musical directors; one of Jackson’s vocal directors; two 
hired 
forensic 
musicologists; 
and 
two 
other 
industry 
professionals with connections to Jackson.  The estate, 
furthermore, had obtained assurances a Jackson imitator 
rumored to be involved was not.  Though asserting 
“overwhelming objective evidence” of authenticity, the estate 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
pledged to follow up and noted, “[U]ltimately, Michael’s fans will 
be the judges of these songs.”   
 
As 
Michael’s 
release 
approached, 
Sony 
Music 
Entertainment, the Jackson estate, and possibly MJJ 
Productions, Inc., the copyright holder for Michael, produced a 
video commercial juxtaposing images of Jackson with a 
voiceover announcing, “Michael,  the brand new album from the 
greatest artist of all time.”  Cascio, meanwhile, appeared on The 
Oprah Winfrey Show and, in an episode featuring the album, 
asserted Jackson had sung the lead vocals on the disputed 
tracks.   
 
When Sony Music Entertainment and the Jackson estate 
released Michael, the album’s front cover contained images of 
the pop legend.  The album’s back, after listing the included 
songs, stated, “This album contains 9 previously unreleased 
vocal tracks performed by Michael Jackson.” 
B. 
Serova Purchases Michael 
 
Serova purchased a CD of Michael, relying, she claims, on 
representations that Jackson had sung the lead vocals on the 
Cascio tracks.  Specifically, she claims to have relied upon the 
album’s packaging, the video commercial, Cascio’s statements 
on The Oprah Winfrey Show, and the Jackson estate’s letter.   
 
As more information about the Cascio tracks emerged, 
Serova began to doubt Jackson was the lead vocalist, going so 
far, it appears, as commissioning an audio expert to evaluate the 
tracks.  That expert allegedly found it “very likely” Jackson was 
not the singer, and an independent reviewer allegedly found the 
expert’s methods and conclusions reasonable.   
 
Serova also came to suspect that Cascio and his associates 
had “exclusive knowledge” Jackson was not the lead vocalist and 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
had “actively concealed” this from Sony Music Entertainment 
and the Jackson estate in dealings over the tracks.  Serova 
asserts Sony Music Entertainment and the Jackson estate chose 
to include “Breaking News,” “Monster,” and “Keep Your Head 
Up” in part because Cascio offered assurances of their 
authenticity.   
C. 
Serova’s Class Action Lawsuit and Sony’s Special 
Motion To Strike 
 
Serova filed suit seeking to represent a class of all 
California purchasers of the Cascio tracks.  She alleges Sony 
Music Entertainment, Jackson’s estate, and MJJ Productions, 
Inc., (collectively Sony) violated the Consumers Legal Remedies 
Act (CLRA) and the unfair competition law (UCL) in marketing 
the disputed songs through the album packaging, video 
commercial, and estate letter.  She alleges Cascio and his 
associates not only violated those same consumer protection 
laws, but also intentionally defrauded her and her fellow 
purchasers with misstatements on The Oprah Winfrey Show 
and, indirectly, by deceiving Sony.  Serova sought to enjoin 
marketing the Cascio tracks as Jackson performances and to 
obtain restitution, disgorgement of profits, damages, punitive 
damages, costs of suit, and attorney fees.   
 
Sony filed a special motion to strike Serova’s CLRA and 
UCL causes of action, invoking Code of Civil Procedure section 
425.16.  This statute — the anti-SLAPP statute — calls for early 
dismissal of claims if they arise from a defendant’s acts in 
furtherance of free speech rights in connection with a public 
issue and if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate a probability of 
prevailing.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  Sony’s memorandum of 
points and authorities supporting its motion argued the 
album-back statement, video commercial (which it assumed, for 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
the motion, similarly conveyed that Jackson had sung all of 
Michael’s lead vocals), and estate letter were protected by the 
anti-SLAPP statute and were not actionable.  
 
To facilitate having its motion to strike heard without 
discovery (see § 425.16, subd. (g) [allowing discovery into 
challenged claims for good cause]), Sony stipulated it would, for 
the time being, only argue Serova’s consumer deception claims 
lacked merit for two reasons:  (1) its speech was noncommercial, 
conferring it heightened First Amendment protection and 
putting it beyond the reach of consumer protection laws; and (2) 
its speech was “not sufficiently false or misleading,” even 
“assuming solely for purposes of this determination . . . Michael 
Jackson did not sing the lead vocals on” the Cascio tracks.  
Because Sony did not otherwise contest the merits of Serova’s 
claims, Serova had no reason to otherwise support them.2 
 
The superior court partially granted Sony’s motion.  It 
ruled Serova’s challenges to the album packaging, video 
 
2  
The parties’ stipulation produced an anti-SLAPP motion 
with almost no evidentiary submissions.  There was no 
declaration from Serova explaining what she knew and why she 
purchased Michael, nor do we have any of the experts’ 
conclusions regarding Michael.  And Serova has not had to 
square her alleged harm with her prepurchase knowledge of the 
Cascio track controversy.  (See, e.g., Kwikset Corp. v. Superior 
Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 326–327 [UCL plaintiff must show 
economic loss and causation to have standing to sue].)  Initially, 
the superior court refused the parties’ issue-limiting stipulation 
and declined ruling on Sony’s anti-SLAPP motion.  But Sony 
sought a writ petition and, after the Court of Appeal issued a 
Palma notice suggesting it would grant the petition (see Brown, 
Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 
1233 [describing the Palma process]), the superior court agreed 
to address the anti-SLAPP motion on the parties’ terms.  We 
have not been called upon to address these procedures.  
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
commercial, and estate letter targeted protected speech under 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  The superior court viewed the letter as 
noncommercial speech unregulable under the CLRA and UCL.  
But it concluded the album packaging and video were 
commercial speech that, given Sony’s stipulation, could be 
sufficiently false or misleading to permit Serova’s lawsuit to 
proceed.   
 
Sony appealed, but Serova did not, removing the estate’s 
letter from the present dispute.  (Serova v. Sony Music 
Entertainment (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 759, 769–770 & fn. 5.)  The 
Court of Appeal agreed with the superior court that Serova’s 
challenges to the album packaging and video targeted Sony’s 
protected speech.  (Id. at pp. 772–773.)  But it concluded this 
speech was more than mere commercial speech for purposes of 
the First Amendment and therefore immune from the statutes 
Serova had invoked.  (Id. at pp. 773–781.)  Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeal effectively directed judgment for Sony in full.  
(Id. at p. 782.) 
 
We granted Serova’s petition for review but paused all 
proceedings related to her petition for FilmOn.com v. 
DoubleVerify, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, which also concerned 
the anti-SLAPP statute and corporate speech.  After resolving 
FilmOn, we transferred this case back to the Court of Appeal for 
reconsideration.  When the Court of Appeal reached the same 
result, we again granted review. 
 
After full briefing from the parties and amici curiae, and 
after oral argument in this court, Sony informed us that the 
parties “reached an agreement to settle the case independent of 
the outcome of the opinion from this Court, subject to the 
superior court’s approval of the dismissal of the action pursuant 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
to California Rules of Court 3.770,” governing dismissals of class 
actions.  Serova responded, asking us to decide this matter 
because the settlement is not yet approved and because of the 
importance of the issues.  Whether or not the yet-to-be-approved 
settlement moots the parties’ dispute, we render this opinion 
“[i]n light of the important issues presented.”  (Berroteran v. 
Superior Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th 867, 877; see State of Cal. ex 
rel. State Lands Com. v. Superior Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 
62.) 
II. 
THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
 
The anti-SLAPP statute enables courts, early in litigation, 
to strike meritless claims in lawsuits when those claims risk 
chilling 
“continued 
participation 
in 
matters 
of 
public 
significance.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a); see id., subds. (b)(1), (f).)  “A 
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free 
speech under the United States Constitution or the California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to 
a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the 
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  (Id., subd. (b)(1).)  Thus, 
when a defendant seeks to strike a plaintiff’s claim under the 
anti-SLAPP statute there are two inquiries:  First, does the 
claim call for the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections?  Second, if 
so, does it have sufficient merit?  (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health 
System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) 
 
Typically, a defendant must establish the anti-SLAPP 
statute’s applicability before the burden shifts and a plaintiff 
must establish a claim has sufficient merit.  (Baral v. Schnitt 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)  But only a claim “ ‘that satisfies both 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute . . . is a SLAPP, subject to 
being stricken under the statute.’ ”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. 
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)  Given this and “this 
court’s ‘inherent, primary authority over the practice of law,’ ” 
we may conclude a contested portion of an anti-SLAPP motion 
should be denied solely based on a plaintiff’s showing of merit, 
as a sufficiently meritorious claim cannot be struck regardless 
of whether it arises from activity the anti-SLAPP statute 
protects.  (Ibid.; see generally Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. 
City of Redding (2018) 6 Cal.5th 1, 7 [when one argument 
resolved a case, we did not need to discuss an alternative 
argument that would have led to the same result].)  Considering 
Serova’s showing of merit, we choose this approach. 
III. SEROVA’S PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING 
 
The parties’ stipulation eases Serova’s burden of showing 
she could prevail.  Under it, she had to address only Sony’s 
contentions that its challenged representations elude regulation 
because they are (1) noncommercial and enjoy heightened First 
Amendment protection, or (2) insufficiently false or misleading, 
even assuming Jackson did not sing lead vocals on the Cascio 
tracks.  Although the superior court addressed both issues, the 
Court of Appeal addressed only the speech classification issue.  
The parties’ petition and answer before this Court, as well as 
their briefing, omit the falsity issue.  We likewise limit our 
discussion. 
A. 
Commercial 
Speech 
Doctrine 
and 
Consumer 
Deception Laws 
 
“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate . . . .”  
(New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 271.)  We 
therefore tolerate some falsehoods, even if they do not directly 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
advance society’s interests.  (United States v. Alvarez (2012) 567 
U.S. 709, 719 [invalidating a law criminalizing lies about having 
received congressional military decorations]; see generally 
Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 953 (Kasky).)  
 
But under First Amendment3 doctrine, “commercial 
speech that is false or misleading . . . ‘may be prohibited 
entirely.’ ”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 953; see id. at p. 959; 
see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996) 517 U.S. 484, 
501 [embracing regulation of “commercial messages to protect 
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales 
practices”]; Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 563 [“there 
can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public 
about lawful activity,” thus “government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform 
it”]; Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 609, 624 [noting states 
can regulate “ ‘deceptive or misleading’ ” advertising, even if not 
“ ‘probably false, or even wholly false’ ”].)  This reflects the high 
court’s view that the First Amendment, in the commercial 
sphere, aims to safeguard the flow of “accurate . . . information” 
to consumers.  (Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, 766; see 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (1985) 471 U.S. 626, 
651 [“extension of First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
information such speech provides”]; Central Hudson, at p. 563 
 
3  
Sony has not argued the California Constitution’s free 
speech clause, article I, section 2, requires a different analysis 
of whether its speech is commercial.  (See Kasky, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 959 [“This court has never suggested that the state 
and federal Constitutions impose different boundaries between 
the categories of commercial and noncommercial speech”].)  
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
[reasoning the protection of commercial speech relates to “the 
informational function of advertising”].) 
 
There are three common justifications for permitting 
greater regulation of commercial, as opposed to noncommercial, 
speech.  First, commercial speech “ ‘may be more easily verifiable 
by its disseminator,’ ” who “ ‘presumably knows more about’ ” a 
“ ‘product or service . . . than anyone else.’ ”  (Kasky, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 955.)  Second, because profit motivates commercial 
speech, that speech is “hardier” — that is, less likely to suffer 
the chilling effect of regulation.  (Ibid.)  Third, prevention of 
commercial harm is a traditional and worthy goal of 
government.  (Ibid.; Cincinnati v. Discovery Network (1993) 507 
U.S. 410, 426.) 
 
“[T]he category of commercial speech consists at its core  
of ‘ “speech proposing a commercial transaction.” ’ ”  (Kasky, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 956, quoting Central Hudson, supra, 447 
U.S. at p. 562; see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, supra, 
517 U.S. at p. 499 [commercial speech is speech “ ‘linked 
inextricably’ ” with “commercial transactions”].)  “[W]hen a 
court must decide whether particular speech may be subjected 
to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of 
commercial deception, categorizing a particular statement as 
commercial or noncommercial speech requires consideration of 
three elements:  the speaker, the intended audience, and the 
content of the message.”  (Kasky, at p. 960, italics omitted.) 
 
Serova alleges Sony’s marketing of Michael violated the 
CLRA and the UCL.  The CLRA (Civ. Code, §§ 1750 et seq.) 
prohibits sellers of consumer goods from representing that goods 
have “characteristics” they lack.  (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. 
(a)(5).)  The UCL (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 et seq.) proscribes 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and 
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”  (Id., § 
17200; see Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 949–950.)  These 
statutes provide for, and Serova seeks, both injunctive and 
monetary relief.  (Civ. Code, § 1780, subd. (a); Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17203; Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 371.)   
 
Serova and Sony agree the CLRA and UCL — without 
distinguishing between the statutes’ available remedies — can 
constitutionally 
restrict 
speech 
properly 
classified 
as 
commercial.  They dispute, however, whether the album 
packaging and video for Michael, insofar as they make claims 
about Jackson’s contributions to the album, are commercial or 
noncommercial speech under First Amendment doctrine.4 
B. 
Sony’s Statements About Michael Are Commercial 
Speech 
 
We start with Sony’s promotion of Michael in the video 
and on the album’s back as “a brand new album from the 
greatest artist of all time” with “9 previously unreleased vocal 
tracks performed by Michael Jackson.”  For the moment, we 
leave aside the other components of the album’s packaging, the 
title and imagery. 
 
1. 
Speaker and Audience 
 
Sony, the speaker here, is promoting its album for sale.  
(See Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database Inc. (2007) 150 
Cal.App.4th 941, 948 [contrasting an online purveyor of 
 
4  
At times, the parties discuss whether it would be fair to 
compel Sony to say the Cascio tracks “might not” contain 
Jackson vocals.  But the precise issue presented here is whether 
the challenged marketing is commercial and can be subject to 
specific state law claims if false. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
information about movies with those who sell films].)  The 
audience for its promotional statements is potential purchasers 
of Michael, such as Serova, who will read the album’s packaging 
while shopping or will watch the album’s promotional video.  So 
far, this is quintessential commercial speech.  (Kasky, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 960–961, 963; see Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 
152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262 [treating product labeling as 
commercial speech]; United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 
(1993) 509 U.S. 418, 421 [treating broadcast advertising as 
commercial speech]; Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc. (3d Cir. 2008) 
542 F.3d 1007, 1018 [holding long-form promotional video for 
video game was commercial speech]; cf. PPX Enters. v. 
Audiofidelity Enters. (2d Cir. 1987) 818 F.2d 266, 272 [“A record 
album’s cover . . . is one of the primary means of advertisement 
for a record album”].) 
2. 
Content 
 
Speech’s content is typically commercial if it makes 
“representations of fact about the business operations, products, 
or services of the speaker (or the individual or company that the 
speaker represents) . . . for the purpose of promoting . . . the 
speaker’s products or services.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 
961 [noting alcohol content listed on a beer bottle, descriptions 
of an attorney’s qualifications, and advertisements showing 
prices of prescription drugs were all commercial].)  A message 
that, for instance, identifies those affiliated with a product or 
service might be commercial.  (Id. at p. 961; see id. at p. 969 
[statement that cherries are picked by union workers would be 
commercial].)  
 
Commercial speech routinely “relates to a matter of 
significant public interest or controversy.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
Cal.4th at p. 964.)  “[M]any, if not most, products may be tied to 
public concerns” including “the environment, energy, economic 
policy, or individual health and safety.”  (Central Hudson, supra, 
447 U.S. at p. 563, fn. 5.)  Further, a “consumer’s interest in the 
price, availability, and characteristics of products and services 
‘may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the 
day’s most urgent political debate.’ ”  (Kasky, at p. 965.)   
 
Yet even when commercial speech touches on important 
public issues, “the State retains the power” to ensure 
commercial information flows “ ‘cleanly as well as freely.’ ”  
(Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 563, fn. 5.)  Thus, 
“advertising that links a product to a current public debate,” 
even an important one, is not immunized from regulation.  
(Ibid.; see Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 966; see United States 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia (3d Cir. 
1990) 898 F.2d 914, 937 [“advertisements for specific health care 
products do not escape the commercial speech category” simply 
because of the public interest surrounding them].)  Further, 
consumer advertising does not lose its commercial character 
even if the speaker “has a secondary purpose to influence” 
discourse beyond the consumer realm.  (Kasky, at p. 968.)  “A 
company has the full panoply of protections available to its 
direct comments on public issues, so there is no reason for 
providing 
similar 
constitutional 
protection 
when 
such 
statements are made in the context of commercial transactions.”  
(Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60, 68, 
fn. omitted; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
supra, 471 U.S. at p. 637, fn. 7 [holding otherwise protected 
speech about the legal rights of persons injured by a medical 
device 
is 
commercial 
speech 
when 
included 
in 
an 
advertisement].) 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
 
The commercial speech we identified in Kasky was a series 
of statements Nike made praising working conditions in its 
subcontractors’ overseas factories.  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
pp. 947–948.)  Nike’s press releases, letters to newspapers and 
universities, public relations materials, and advertisements 
claimed that workers in these factories “are protected from 
physical and sexual abuse, that they are paid in accordance with 
applicable local laws and regulations governing wages and 
hours, that they are paid on average double the applicable local 
minimum wage, that they receive a ‘living wage,’ that they 
receive free meals and health care, and that their working 
conditions are in compliance with applicable local laws and 
regulations governing occupational health and safety.”  (Id. at 
p. 947.)   
 
We 
concluded 
these 
representations, 
despite 
not 
pertaining to specific products and despite sometimes appearing 
outside traditional advertising formats, were commercial.  
(Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 965–966; see id. at p. 976 (dis. 
opn. of Chin, J.).)  Nike was “describing its own labor policies, 
and the practices and working conditions in factories where its 
products are made,” which were “factual representations about 
its own business operations.”  (Id. at p. 963.)  We further noted, 
“The wages paid to the factories’ employees, the hours they 
work, the way they are treated, and whether the environmental 
conditions under which they work violate local health and safety 
laws, are all matters likely to be within the personal knowledge 
of Nike executives, employees, or subcontractors.  Thus, Nike 
was in a position to readily verify the truth of any factual 
assertions it made on these topics.”  (Ibid.)  Further, Nike’s 
message sought to bolster consumer goodwill and shore up 
profits, and, if that message misrepresented how Nike’s 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
products were being made, it was the sort of speech government 
has traditionally been empowered to regulate.  (Id. at pp. 963–
964.) 
 
The content of Sony’s statements on Michael’s packaging 
and in the video — made in traditional advertising contexts — 
strikes us as commercial.  The statement on the back of Sony’s 
album indicated that Michael “contains 9 previously unreleased 
vocal tracks performed by” Jackson; a statement about the 
album’s characteristics that would induce purchases by those 
wishing to hear new Jackson vocals.  The promotional video — 
which proclaimed the album as the newest “from the greatest 
artist of all time” alongside Jackson’s name and likeness — also, 
concededly, conveys Jackson’s vocal contributions and likewise 
would foster album sales amongst Jackson followers. 
3. 
Michael, Though an Expressive Work, Is a 
Product for Sale. 
 
Sony argues its statements promoting Michael convey 
noncommercial content because they pertain to art and identify 
an artist, whose identity “can be an important component of 
understanding the art itself.”  (Serova, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 130.)  But if Sony’s assertion that Jackson contributed lead 
vocals affects consumers’ experience of Michael, this illustrates 
how misrepresentations about an artist’s contributions can 
harm consumers in ways that matter to them. 
 
“The purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, 
in the identity of the producer of the physical tome (the 
publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the 
creator of the story it conveys (the author).”  (Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (2003) 539 U.S. 23, 33 
(Dastar).)  And “[t]he purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
17 
a can of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the 
product.”  (Rogers v. Grimaldi (2d Cir. 1989) 875 F.2d 994, 997 
(Rogers); see Dastar, at p. 38 [suggesting misrepresentations 
about the content of an artistic work could be false advertising 
under the federal Lanham Act];5 Murdock v. Pennsylvania 
(1943) 319 U.S. 105, 111 [suggesting retailing and wholesaling 
of books via pamphlets, outside of proselytizing, are commercial 
enterprises].)  “Movies, plays, books, and songs,” though 
themselves protected artistic works, “are also sold in the 
commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, 
making the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern 
that warrants some government regulation.”  (Rogers, at p. 997.)  
Indeed, the dividing line between artistic and utilitarian goods 
may sometimes blur.  (See Rothman, Was Steve Jobs an Artist? 
(Oct. 
14, 
2015) 
The 
New 
Yorker 
 
5  
Dastar initially addressed the Lanham Act’s prohibition, 
in section 43(a)(1)(A) (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)), on confusing 
designations of a good’s origin.  It held the origin of an artistic 
work, under that section, is the origin of the physical 
embodiment of the work, not the artist.  Thus, there could be no 
Lanham Act section 43(a)(1)(A) claim for failure to attribute a 
work.  But, if an artistic work’s advertiser gave purchasers false 
impressions of the work, then there might be “a cause of 
action — not . . . under the ‘confusion . . . as to the origin’ 
provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the 
‘misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities’ 
provision of § 43(a)(1)(B).”  (Dastar, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 38; see 
generally 5 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
(5th ed. June 2022 update) § 27:85 [discussing Dastar]; U.S. 
Copyrights Office, Register of Copyrights, Authors, Attribution, 
and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in the United States 
(Apr. 2019) p. 55 [same].)  Dastar, in interpreting the Lanham 
Act’s scope, never suggested a First Amendment concern with 
applying that law, or any other consumer protection law, to 
expressive works. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
<https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/was-
steve-jobs-an-artist> [as of Aug. 18, 2022] [discussing the 
intersection of art and technology products].)6 
Relief has long been available in California to unwitting 
purchasers of imitation art who relied on false representations 
about authenticity.  (E.g., Smith v. Zimbalist (1934) 2 
Cal.App.2d 324, 326, 332–333 [finding unenforceable the sale of 
a violin represented as a Stradivarius when buyer and seller 
were both mistaken and the violin was a cheap copy].)   
 
Additionally, numerous courts have entertained false 
advertising claims premised on statements about creative 
contribution.  (E.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee (9th Cir. 2000) 202 
F.3d 1227, 1237 [reversing dismissal of a writer’s California 
UCL claim accusing another writer of plagiarizing his work]; 
King v. Innovation Books (2d Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 824, 829 
[allowing Stephen King to enjoin, under the Lanham Act, a film 
distributor from describing a film, The Lawnmower Man, as 
Stephen King’s The Lawnmower Man, where King had no 
involvement in the creative process except for selling his rights 
to his short story of the same name]; PPX Enters. v. 
Audiofidelity Enters., supra, 818 F.2d at p. 268 [affirming a jury 
verdict of Lanham Act false advertising when a record company 
marketed “eight albums purporting to contain feature 
performances by Jimi Hendrix, but which either did not contain 
Hendrix performances at all or contained performances in which 
Hendrix 
was 
merely 
a 
background 
performer 
or 
undifferentiated session player”]; Benson v. Paul Winley Record 
 
6  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
Sales Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 452 F.Supp. 516, 518 [holding that 
misleading attributions on a record jacket might not only 
confuse consumers under the Lanham Act but also harm a 
performer’s reputation7].)  The use of an artist’s name in 
advertising “should usually qualify as a use ‘in commercial 
advertising or promotion’ ” under the Lanham Act.  (5 McCarthy 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, supra,  § 27:85; see 1 
McKenney & Long, Federal Unfair Competition: Lanham Act 
43(a) (Dec. 2021 update) § 7:7, fn. 2 [collecting further cases].)8 
 
Moreover, courts have recognized other causes of action 
could be viable where disputes about creative contribution form 
the basis of suit.  (E.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, supra, 202 F.3d 
 
7  
As to artistic reputation, if Jackson’s estate believed 
another music publisher were selling subpar recordings and 
erroneously attributing the lead vocals to Jackson, one could 
imagine the estate filing its own false advertising suit and 
asserting it was challenging commercial speech.  The risk of 
such reputational harm “is particularly acute in the arts and 
entertainment industries, in which the marketability of a 
person's goods or services is in large measure dependent upon 
recognition 
for 
past 
achievements.” 
 
(Rest.3d 
Unfair 
Competition, § 5, com. c., p. 58.)  We have held, moreover, a 
celebrity may assert violations of publicity rights if another’s use 
of the celebrity’s name or likeness in an expressive work is not 
transformative — that is, does not add some sufficient new 
meaning or expression.  (Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 387, 405 [a T-shirt artist’s use 
of an image he created of The Three Stooges]; accord, Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc. (3d Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 141, 170 [a videogame’s 
use of an athlete’s name and likeness].) 
8 
Though the reasoning of some of these Lanham Act cases 
may not survive Dastar’s narrowing of what origin-of-goods 
claims may entail, many feature false advertising claims still 
potentially cognizable under the act or possibly other laws.  (See 
ante, fn. 5.) 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
20 
at pp. 1230–1236 [rejecting claim of joint authorship under 
copyright law]; Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc. (2d Cir. 
2004) 368 F.3d 77, 81 [concluding a collector of Dorothy Parker 
poems could not credibly assert he exercised, in assessing 
whether poems were written by Parker, originality sufficient to 
merit copyright protection].) 
 
None of these cases hints that product-touting statements 
about artistic contribution are, by their nature, noncommercial 
or otherwise beyond traditional consumer protection regulations 
on constitutional grounds.  In contrast, Rogers, supra, 875 F.2d 
994 and its progeny have considered the First Amendment and 
applied the federal false advertising statute not to mere 
promotional materials for expressive works but to their titles.  
Ginger Rogers, one of those rare entertainers “readily called to 
mind by just their first names,” sued film producers over Ginger 
and Fred, a film about a fictious cabaret duo in Italy who earned 
the nickname Ginger and Fred.  (Rogers, at p. 996.)  Rogers 
invoked the Lanham Act, claiming the film title falsely implied 
it was about her or that “she sponsored, endorsed, or was 
otherwise involved in the film.”  (Id. at p. 997.)  Though the 
Second Circuit rejected liability against the film’s producers, it 
concluded titles of expressive works have a commercial 
component, and the First Amendment would, in some cases, 
pose no barrier to regulating them.  (Id. at p. 998.)  For instance, 
Rogers reasoned if a title has no artistic relevance to its work, or 
if an artistically relevant title nonetheless explicitly misleads as 
to the work’s source or content, regulation could ensue.  (Id. at 
pp. 997–999.)  Thus, said the court, a title that falsely conveyed 
someone authored a work had a sufficient commercial aspect 
and could be prohibited.  (Id. at p. 999 [suggesting “ ‘Nimmer on 
Copyright’ ” or “ ‘Jane Fonda’s Workout Book’ ” conveyed 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
21 
representations to consumers].)  At least one precept from 
Rogers — the regulability of explicitly misleading titles — 
appears to have met acceptance amongst California appellate 
courts.  (Winchester Mystery House, LLC v. Global Asylum, Inc. 
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 579, 588, 590; see No Doubt v. Activision 
Publishing, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1039, fn. 8.) 
 
The reasons commonly given for why commercial speech 
is subjected to greater regulation — a commercial speaker’s 
close relationship to a product or service, profit motive, and the 
government’s traditional role in preventing commercial harm 
(Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 955) —  still have relevance when 
an artistic product is marketed.  We would not want false 
advertising laws to stifle the next great album or medical 
advance.  But consumer protection remains important in both 
arenas, as it does in others.  Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has allowed prohibition of false commercial speech in 
categorical terms, never embracing a wholesale exemption for 
entire classes of goods or services.  (See Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th 
at pp. 953–954 [citing cases].)  And despite the long history of 
cases entertaining false advertising claims premised on 
representations about artistic contribution, we have been 
presented no evidence of a chilling effect on the for-profit 
creative industry. 
 
There may be instances where statements about artistic 
contribution, or artistic works more generally, are not offered to 
convey product information but are themselves part of an 
expressive enterprise, possibly parody or satire.  (See, e.g., 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) 485 U.S. 46, 57 [attributing 
a made-up, salacious interview to a nationally known minister 
was protected parody]; Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods. (9th 
Cir. 2003) 353 F.3d 792, 812 [concluding “[p]arody is a form of 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
22 
noncommercial expression if it does more than propose a 
commercial transaction”].)  And it is conceivable that an album 
seller might include, in liner notes, an essay theorizing about 
artistic contributions that is itself an expressive work.  (See 
Armstrong v. Eagle Rock Entm’t, Inc. (E.D.Mich. 2009) 655 
F.Supp.2d 779, 787 [extending 1st Amend. protection to a liner-
note essay about the history of a jazz festival].)  And artists 
might choose to obscure their identities for expressive reasons 
through pen names or pseudonyms.  But the case before us does 
not raise these or other like scenarios. Instead, having put 
Michael’s title and artwork aside for the moment, this case 
concerns an explicit promise of a superstar’s vocal contributions 
to a product.  We, again, view this as commercial content. 
4. 
Sony’s Speech Is Not Inextricably Intertwined 
with or Adjunct to an Expressive Work. 
 
Sony alternatively contends that if its representations 
about Michael seem commercial, they are nonetheless so 
connected with fully protected, noncommercial speech —
Michael’s musical content — that they must be treated as, and 
receive the heightened protection due, noncommercial speech.  
But, like the Court of Appeal below (Serova, supra, 44 
Cal.App.5th at p. 131, fn. 19), we do not see the requisite 
connection.  
Sometimes 
speech 
will 
have 
commercial 
and 
noncommercial components.  If a legal command or law of 
nature makes it “impossible” to separate the commercial 
components from the noncommercial, the two are “ ‘inextricably 
intertwined,’ ” and we bestow noncommercial status on both 
components.  (Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox 
(1989) 492 U.S. 469, 474.)  This principle derives from Riley v. 
National Federation of Blind (1988) 487 U.S. 781, in which a 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
23 
state had required conceded noncommercial speech (charitable 
solicitations by professional fundraisers) to include assumed 
commercial speech (a disclosure of the percentage of 
contributions retained by those professionals).  Because state 
law required the commercial disclosure, that disclosure, held the 
high 
court, 
was 
“inextricably 
intertwined” 
with 
the 
noncommercial solicitation and lost “its commercial character,” 
such that the disclosure requirement was subject to “exacting 
First Amendment scrutiny.”  (Riley, at pp. 796, 798; see Fox, at 
p. 474.)   
 
We considered entwinement in Kasky but found none.  “No 
law required Nike to combine factual representations about its 
own labor practices with expressions of opinion about economic 
globalization, nor was it impossible for Nike to address those 
subjects separately.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 967.)  We 
further held, “Nike may not ‘immunize false or misleading 
product information from government regulation simply by 
including references to public issues.’ ”  (Id. at p. 966.)  The 
“alleged false and misleading statements” conveyed a 
commercial message about how Nike’s products were made.  
(Ibid.)   
 
Apart from the entwinement concept is the notion that 
advertising adjunct to an expressive work should at times enjoy 
the same protected status as that work.  Several Courts of 
Appeal have held the truthful use of a name and likeness to 
promote an expressive work cannot support a claim for violation 
of the right of publicity.  (E.g., De Havilland v. FX Networks, 
LLC (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 862 [name of Olivia De 
Havilland to promote a program about her]; Polydoros v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 318, 
325 [“photographs of an actor resembling an actual personage to 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
24 
promote a fictional work” about that personage]; Montana v. 
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 790, 797 [“a 
newspaper has a constitutional right to promote itself by 
reproducing its originally protected articles or photographs”].)  
But another court has held where advertisements “did not 
reflect any character or portion of” an expressive work and 
instead “contained a fictitious critic’s favorable opinion,” the 
advertisements were not entitled to heightened protection as 
adjuncts to an expressive work and were instead subject to 
consumer 
protection 
laws. 
 
(Rezec 
v. 
Sony 
Pictures 
Entertainment, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 135, 142–143 
[rejecting a regime in which film advertisements would evade 
consumer protection laws when traditionally utilitarian 
products would not]; cf. Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc. (1999) 
75 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229 (Keimer) [holding that even 
promotional materials on book cover reflecting false claims of 
book could be commercial speech].)9 
 
The Ninth Circuit addressed both entwinement and 
advertising adjunct to expressive works in Charles, supra, 
697 F.3d 1146.  It held that although a television program was 
itself noncommercial, expressive speech, a billboard advertising 
 
9  
Keimer, which involved advertising material on a book 
cover excerpted directly from the book’s text (Keimer, supra, 75 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1225, 1233), has been criticized as 
insufficiently protective of free speech (e.g., Lacoff v. Buena 
Vista Publ’g, Inc. (2000) 705 N.Y.S.2d 183, 191 [183 Misc.2d 600, 
610] [classifying the identical advertising material as 
noncommercial and expressly rejecting Keimer]).  Given Sony’s 
advertising does not reproduce the music on Michael, we need 
not address this criticism of Keimer, or, for that matter, address 
the full contours of a doctrine governing the promotion of 
expressive works.  (See Charles v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 
2012) 697 F.3d 1146, 1155 (Charles) [noting the conflict].) 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
25 
the program was commercial speech and did “not present 
intertwined speech.”  (Id. at p. 1152.)  The program’s protected 
status did “not cloak all advertisements for the program with 
noncommercial status,” because “speech inviting the public to 
watch” a program “is not inherently identical to the speech that 
constitutes the program itself.”  (Ibid.)  The Ninth Circuit 
separately observed that the principle motivating California’s 
protection of advertisements adjunct to expressive works “is the 
need to protect advertisers from tort actions that would 
otherwise threaten the ability of publishers to truthfully 
promote particular works” by accurately conveying the content 
of those works, even when that content is itself false.  (Id. at p. 
1155.)  An adjunct advertisement doctrine, it asserted, would be 
“justified only to the extent necessary” to achieve this purpose.  
(Id. at p. 1156; see Cher v. Forum Int’l, LTD (9th Cir. 1982) 
692 F.2d 634, 639 [viewing tabloid magazine headlines, cover 
content, and advertising inserts as potentially “adjunct” to an 
article within the magazine but refusing to protect “patently 
false” representations].) 
 
We conclude Sony’s identification of Jackson as lead 
vocalist is not inextricably intertwined with the music on 
Michael or any of the album’s arguably expressive elements.  No 
legal command nor law of nature compelled Sony to include 
what, for present purposes, it concedes are false claims about 
the Cascio tracks or to market the album with a video 
commercial.  It was hardly “impossible” (Kasky, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 967) for Sony to market Michael without these 
statements.  Additionally, Sony’s alleged false representations 
are distinct from, rather than adjunct to or reflective of, any 
artistic expression on Michael.  Serova is not suing because 
Michael’s artistic expression has spilled over into promotional 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
26 
advertising, but because she believes Sony falsely advertised the 
lead vocalist.  (See Charles, supra, 697 F.3d at pp. 1154–1155.)  
Thus, even if we fully embraced the proposal to limit claims 
premised on the truthful advertising of expressive works, that 
limit would not apply to Serova’s claims.  To invoke the 
entwinement or adjunct advertising doctrines here would, in our 
view, strike the wrong balance between the interests of 
consumers and those of sellers advertising expressive works.  
5. 
Sony’s Lack of Knowledge Does Not 
Decommercialize Its Speech. 
 
Sony offers a broader argument why its statements about 
Jackson’s artistic contributions should not be viewed as 
containing commercial content.  Sony argues the truth of its 
statements was not readily verifiable and thus Sony, though it 
knew of the controversy over the Cascio tracks, lacked 
knowledge of falsity.  The Court of Appeal embraced this 
argument, concluding Sony’s statements were not commercial 
because they “lacked the critical element of personal knowledge 
under the Kasky standard.”  (Serova, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 127; see id. at pp. 128–129 & fn. 12.)  We disagree. 
 
“Apart from . . . the identities of the speaker and the 
audience, and the contents of the speech,” Kasky found “nothing 
in the United States Supreme Court’s commercial speech 
decisions that is essential to a determination that particular 
speech is commercial in character in the context of a consumer 
protection law intended to suppress false or deceptive 
commercial messages.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 962.)  
Nor 
does 
Kasky’s 
definition 
of 
commercial 
content —  
“representations of fact about the business operations, products, 
or services of the speaker (or the individual or company that the 
speaker represents) . . . for the purpose of promoting . . . the 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
27 
speaker’s products or services” (id. at p. 961) — mention a 
requirement that particular representations be made with 
personal knowledge or be readily verifiable. 
 
Kasky, in more expansively viewing commercial speech as 
potentially including letters and press releases, saw its 
“understanding of the content element of commercial speech” as 
“consistent” with the traditional explanations for “denying First 
Amendment protection to false or misleading commercial 
speech.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 962.)  One such 
explanation is that “ ‘truth of commercial speech . . . may be 
more easily verifiable by its disseminator . . . in that ordinarily 
the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific 
product or service that he himself provides and presumably 
knows more about than anyone else.’ ”  (Id. at p. 955, italics 
added & omitted, quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer 
Council (1976) 425 U.S. at p. 772, fn. 24.)  “This explanation,” 
continued Kasky, “assumes that commercial speech consists of 
factual statements and that those statements describe matters 
within the personal knowledge of the speaker or the person 
whom the speaker is representing.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th 
at p. 962.)   
Undoubtedly, commercial statements are sometimes 
made with personal knowledge.  But a “may be more easily 
verifiable” rationale does not, with words such as “may,” 
“ordinarily,” and “presumably,” impose either a personal 
knowledge requirement or a requirement that a particular 
statement be readily verifiable.  (See Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th 
at p. 955.)  To the contrary, the rationale presumes that 
sometimes commercial speech may not be more easily verifiable 
or may not be known to the speaker as true or false.  In all 
events, the rationale, in offering a justification for greater 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
28 
regulation of commercial speech generally, does not serve as a 
litmus test for classifying speech in a particular instance.  (See 
id. at p. 957 [highlighting the flexible nature of the commercial 
speech inquiry].) 
Thus, while Kasky identified the scenario in which 
commercial speech is within the speaker’s personal knowledge, 
Kasky went on to say the “may be more easily verifiable” 
explanation implied the very definition of commercial content 
just announced —  that is, promotional representations of fact 
about the business, products, or services of a speaker or whoever 
the speaker represents.  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 955, 
961–962.)  Consistent with this, our primary basis for 
concluding Nike’s speech had commercial content was its 
connection to Nike’s “own business operations.”  (Id. at pp. 963, 
964.)  This was so even though Nike’s representations addressed 
factories run not by its employees, but its subcontractors (id. at 
pp. 955, 962–963), and matters only “likely to be within the 
personal knowledge” of those subcontractors, which suggested 
only that “Nike was in a position to readily verify” its assertions 
(id. at p. 963, italics added).  By alluding to likely knowledge and 
potential verifiability to bolster its conclusion that Nike’s speech 
was commercial, Kasky did not establish a knowledge or 
verifiability requirement.  (See Rosen v. State Farm General Ins. 
Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1076 [“ ‘an opinion is only authority 
for those issues actually considered or decided’ ”].)  Nor has this 
court or the high court otherwise imposed such requirements.   
Moreover, it seems problematic to assess the commercial 
or noncommercial content of speech by measuring a speaker’s 
level of personal knowledge.  For example, if we correlate 
knowledge with commercial speech, then two identical 
promotional statements might face differing regulations 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
29 
because of something invisible to consumers:  the speaker’s 
mental state.  (People v. Superior Court (Olson) (1979) 96 
Cal.App.3d 181, 191, 195 [injury to consumers is the same 
regardless of what an advertiser knows]; accord P&G v. Amway 
Corp. (5th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3d 539, 552, fn. 26 [speech’s 
commercial status is established “regardless of [a speaker’s] 
knowledge of falsity”].)  Also, if actual knowledge were the 
standard, that knowledge could be easily avoided.  Sellers 
making claims about their offerings surely do not avoid false 
advertising regulation, or have their claims treated as 
noncommercial speech, by scrupulously declining to verify those 
claims or to acquire knowledge.  A knowledge test would 
undermine false advertising law and reward turning a blind eye. 
 
Correlating commercial speech with a statement’s 
verifiability presents similar problems.  Illustrating the tenuous 
correlation, at least one Court of Appeal employing Kasky has 
classified advertising claims that appear unverifiable or difficult 
to verify as commercial speech, reasoning claims that 
professionals 
had 
“ ‘ “the 
highest 
ethical 
and 
moral 
standards” ’ ” or were “ ‘ “dedicated to neutrality, integrity, 
honesty” ’ ” were meant to influence consumers about services 
for sale.  (JAMS, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 
984, 995 (JAMS) [but stating whether that speech, puffery in 
the eyes of the speaker, was actionable was a separate 
question].)10  At the same time, consumer protection laws “serve 
the purpose of commercial speech protection” by encouraging a 
 
10 
In JAMS, the Court of Appeal concluded the speech was 
commercial under section 425.17, which, as explained above, 
exempts certain claims arising from commercial speech from the 
reach of the anti-SLAPP statute.  In doing so, it employed 
Kasky’s framework.  (JAMS, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.) 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
30 
seller “to make greater efforts to verify the truth of its 
statements.”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 963–964.)  And it 
is when statements about products or services are hard to verify 
that the need for consumer protection may be strongest.  (See 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977) 433 U.S. 350, 366 
[advertising claims “not susceptible of precise measurement or 
verification . . . might well be deceptive or misleading to the 
public, or even false”]; see also California Dental Assn. v. FTC 
(1999) 526 U.S. 756, 773–774 [noting the possible goal of 
“promoting competition by reducing the occurrence of 
unverifiable 
and 
misleading 
across-the-board 
discount 
advertising”].)  Indeed, the high court has not deployed 
verifiability 
to 
distinguish 
between 
commercial 
and 
noncommercial speech but to discuss whether truthful 
commercial speech is nonetheless sufficiently misleading to 
warrant a state’s “categorical ban.”  (Peel v. Attorney 
Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill. (1990) 496 U.S. 91, 100.) 
 
Ultimately, then, otherwise commercial speech does not 
lose its commercial nature simply because a seller makes a 
statement without knowledge or that is hard to verify. 
 
Even assessing the potential verifiability of Sony’s claims 
in line with the verifiability justification for regulation of 
commercial speech, whether Jackson sang lead vocals on the 
Cascio tracks “may be more easily verifiable” (Kasky, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 955, italics omitted) by Sony in exactly the sense 
that justifies commercial speech regulation more broadly.  
Sony’s claims relate directly to its product.  Few were likely 
better positioned to identify the Cascio tracks’ singer than 
Michael’s producers and sellers, who had not only profit motive, 
but also access to and business dealings with the album’s 
primary creators.  Further, Sony had the incentive to secure any 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
31 
necessary licenses or rights, and, as prudent, warranties of 
authenticity.11  (Cf. Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 963 [noting 
“Nike was in a position to readily verify” those things its 
contractors “likely” knew].)  Sony, before releasing Michael, 
conducted research and allegedly had “complete confidence” in, 
and indeed noted “overwhelming objective evidence” of, the 
authenticity of Jackson’s vocals, a message at least in tension 
with its present claim that verifiability was unattainable.   
 
Notwithstanding Sony’s temporary concession that its 
statements about Jackson’s contributions turned out to be false, 
it remains that experts allegedly disagree on who sang the 
Cascio 
tracks. 
 
But 
expert 
disagreement 
about 
the 
characteristics of a product does not change the fact that a seller 
“ ‘presumably knows more about’ ” its product “ ‘than anyone 
else.’ ”  (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 955.)  Such expert 
disagreements, even if they portend verifiability or knowledge 
issues and possibly difficulties of proof at trial, do not render a 
seller’s promotional speech noncommercial and, for that reason, 
constitutionally insulated from false advertising laws.  And as 
discussed above, advertising does not shed its commercial status 
though it touches or links a product to an important public 
debate.  (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 562, fn. 5; Kasky, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 966; Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, 
Inc. (5th Cir. 2014) 775 F.3d 230, 236 [“Advertisements do not 
 
11 
Presumably, Sony would seek to invoke any warranties, or 
assert fraud or other claims, against Cascio and his associates if 
it believed they peddled fake recordings. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
32 
become immune from . . . scrutiny simply because their claims 
are open to scientific or public debate”].)12   
 
Our conclusion would not foreclose Sony, despite its 
present willingness to concede falsity, from later attempting to 
argue its statements are insufficiently false or misleading 
statements of fact to be regulable under the CLRA or UCL.  But 
the separate inquiry into liability, on which we express no 
opinion, is different from the speech classification issue before 
us now.  (See Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 970 [noting the 
falsity inquiry is separate]; id. at p. 974, fn. 2 (dis. opn. of Chin, 
J.) [“Whether a company’s statements are allegedly false or 
misleading does not determine the threshold question” of 
“whether the speech is commercial or noncommercial”]; JAMS, 
supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 [whether statements are true 
“goes to the issue of whether or not [plaintiff] can prevail on his 
claim, not to whether the statements qualify as commercial 
speech” as that term is understood].)  
6. 
Strict Liability Regulation of Commercial 
Speech Is Common. 
 
Offering a variation on its verifiability and knowledge 
argument, Sony argues we should classify its alleged 
misrepresentations about Michael as noncommercial because 
regulating them on a strict liability basis, as Serova seeks to do 
 
12  
We caution that our discussion of potential verifiability is 
not based on a developed factual record, and we express no 
opinion on whether Sony could have actually verified the Cascio 
tracks’ vocals.  Verifiability as a potential requirement for 
commercial speech only factored into the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, not the superior court’s, and the parties, as evidenced 
by their issue-limiting stipulation, saw no need to conduct 
discovery concerning verifiability or any other matters related 
to Sony’s motion.  (See ante, fn. 2.) 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
33 
under the CLRA and UCL,13 would unduly “chill expression” in 
a way inconsistent with traditional government regulation.   
 
Yet “[s]trict liability regimes regulating commercial 
speech” are not anomalous but consistent with traditional 
notions of government’s regulatory role.  (American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn (6th Cir. 2005) 418 
F.3d 600, 611, fn. 7.)  A hundred years ago, states, in their early 
efforts to curtail false advertising, enacted variants of a model 
statute criminalizing “ ‘untrue, deceptive or misleading’ ” 
advertisements.  (Comment, Untrue Advertising (1927) 36 Yale 
L.J. 1155, 1156, fn. 6 (Untrue Advertising).)  This Printer’s Ink 
Model Statute,14 and a majority of the states implementing it, 
imposed “absolute responsibility,” even absent “knowledge or 
intent to deceive.”  (Untrue Advertising, at p. 1157 & fn. 12; see 
Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 305, fn. 11 [discussing the model statute 
in relation to California’s UCL and the state’s other, more 
modern consumer protection laws, but noting California’s 1915 
version of the model statute required negligence regarding 
falsity].) 
We have already explained why Kasky does not make a 
speaker’s knowledge of truth or falsity the determiner of 
speech’s commercial status.  Additionally, the disagreement in 
Kasky between the majority, which found Nike’s speech 
 
13 
Neither party, nor any of the amici curiae, contends the 
CLRA or UCL, when applied to alleged false advertising, 
requires proof of a defendant’s knowledge. 
14  
The model statute was “drawn up in 1911 by Mr. Harry D. 
Nims at the instance of Printer’s Ink, a magazine published for 
advertisers.”  (Untrue Advertising, supra, 36 Yale L.J. at p. 
1157.) 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
34 
regulable, and the dissents was, as the dissenters framed it, not 
whether the First Amendment permitted strict liability for false 
advertising, but what kind of corporate speech should be deemed 
“commercial” and therefore subject to such regulation.  (Kasky, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 983–984, 996 & fn. 8. (dis. opn. of 
Brown, J.); id. at pp. 979–980 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.) [“If Nike’s 
press releases, letters and other documents are commercial 
speech, then the application of . . . strict liability for false and 
misleading ads — is constitutional”]; id. at p. 971 (dis. opn. of 
Chin, J.) [warning strict liability would apply to Nike if its 
speech were commercial].)  
 
Further, the CLRA and UCL provisions that Serova 
invokes have kinship with section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
which prohibits, on a strict liability basis, false designations of 
the origin of goods, services, or commercial activities as well as 
false advertising.  A Lanham Act false advertising claim, which 
must target “commercial advertising or promotion” (15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(B), “exists regardless of whether . . . the defendant 
acted willfully or with intent to deceive” (2 Callmann on Unfair 
Competition, Trademarks, and Monopolies (4th ed., June 2022 
update) § 5:3).  “The deceptive or misleading quality of an 
advertisement is not vitiated by the advertiser’s good faith and, 
accordingly, intent to deceive is not an element of the violation.  
An innocent state of mind does not diminish the false 
advertiser’s unfair advantage over competitors.”  (Ibid., fns. 
omitted; see Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (2020) __ U.S. 
__, __ [140 S.Ct. 1492, 1495] [the Lanham Act’s “language has 
never required a showing of willfulness to win a defendant’s 
profits,” and its silence regarding a mental state is striking in a 
statute that, elsewhere, “often and expressly” incorporates 
them].)  
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
35 
 
Strict liability under the Lanham Act has been held 
consistent with the First Amendment.  (E.g., United States 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, supra, 
898 F.2d at p. 937 [“the First Amendment requires no higher 
standard of liability than that mandated by the substantive 
law,” namely the Lanham Act, such that a heightened “actual 
malice” standard would not apply]; P&G v. Amway Corp., supra, 
242 F.3d at p. 557 [“false commercial speech cannot qualify for 
the heightened protection of the First Amendment,” and neither 
actual malice nor negligence must be shown to prove a Lanham 
Act claim]; see Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 
Cal.App.4th 664, 683 [citing P&G].) 
 
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 
§§ 43, 52) has widely been held to prohibit an advertiser’s 
deceptive acts regardless of good faith.  (Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Algoma Co. (1934) 291 U.S. 67, 81 [the act applies to 
representations “however innocently made”]; Curtis Lumber Co. 
v. La. Pac. Corp. (8th Cir. 2010) 618 F.3d 762, 779 & fn. 14 
[collecting cases]; see generally Pridgen & Alderman, Consumer 
Protection and the Law (Nov. 2021) § 10:2 [“the Commission and 
the courts have concluded that the seller's intent is irrelevant to 
a finding that a deceptive trade practice has been committed”].)   
 
In contrast to these regulations of commercial speech, the 
First Amendment requires state laws impinging on certain 
noncommercial speech to include fault-based liability.  (Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 347 [defamation of 
private individuals requires “fault”]; New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 279–280 [defamation of a public 
official requires actual malice]; Smith v. California (1959) 361 
U.S. 147, 154 [banning the mere possession for sale of obscene 
books limits the nonobscene books a bookseller will review and 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
36 
sell, and thus the government must insist on some “mental 
element” for criminal liability].)   
 
But “the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression 
that has been allowed in [these] other contexts has little force in 
the commercial arena.”  (Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, 
433 U.S. at p. 383; see Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 953–954 
[quoting Bates].)  “Since the advertiser knows his product and 
has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little 
worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage 
protected speech.  [Citation.]  And any concern that strict 
requirements 
for 
truthfulness 
will 
undesirably 
inhibit 
spontaneity seems inapplicable because commercial speech 
generally is calculated.  Indeed, the public and private benefits 
from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy 
and reliability.”  (Bates, at p. 383.)   
In line with these principles, the numerous cases 
described ante at pages 18 through 21 have long applied the 
UCL and Lanham Act to representations about contributions to 
artistic works and did so without assessing scienter.  (See, e.g., 
King v. Innovation Books, supra, 976 F.2d at p. 829; PPX Enters. 
v. Audiofidelity Enters., supra, 818 F.2d at pp. 268, 273; Rogers, 
supra, 875 F.2d 994.)  If the CLRA and UCL lack a scienter 
requirement, we still classify Sony’s speech as commercial. 
C. 
Sony’s Album Title and Artwork 
 
Serova has sufficiently established, in connection with the 
anti-SLAPP inquiry into the merits of her claims, that Sony’s 
promise of “9 previously unreleased vocal tracks performed by 
Michael Jackson” and its promotional video are commercial 
speech regulable under the CLRA and UCL.  We turn briefly to 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
37 
address the album’s title, Michael, and its artwork, containing 
images of Jackson.   
 
As already noted, some courts view titles as integral to 
“expression as well as a significant means of marketing.”  
(Rogers, supra, 875 F.2d 994, 998 [“The artistic and commercial 
elements of titles are inextricably intertwined”].)  Album art 
might also be expressive.  (Compare Winchester Mystery House, 
LLC v. Global Asylum, Inc., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 592 
[applying heightened scrutiny to trademark claims targeting 
artwork on DVD packaging] with No Doubt v. Activision 
Publishing, Inc., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039, fn. 8 
[doubting whether such heightened scrutiny should apply to a 
claim that use of a celebrity’s likeness in a video game was 
actionable as a misappropriation].)  
 
Given the framing of Sony’s anti-SLAPP motion, however, 
and the conclusions we have reached so far, we do not address 
whether Michael’s artwork and title are commercial speech or 
possess expressiveness that might impact their classification or 
otherwise limit their regulability under state law. 
Sony’s initial memorandum of points and authorities 
supporting its motion did not address the artwork and title, even 
though Serova’s complaint noted these items as relevant to her 
claims.  Sony, discussing what it called its “attributional 
statements,” analyzed only the album-back statement and 
video.  Serova, in opposition, referred to the album’s artwork 
and title and asserted those items were misleading, but grouped 
them with the album-back statement for the commercial speech 
analysis.  Consistent with this, Serova argued elsewhere that all 
components of the album’s packaging should, in evaluating its 
claims, be “taken together” and viewed “as a whole.”  Sony, 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
38 
replying on the commercial speech issue, followed suit and 
discussed the album’s “CD case” as a whole, not singling out the 
artwork or title for separate treatment.  It instead asserted 
“what the court must decide” is whether a statement of artistic 
contribution is commercial speech and argued, “Naming 
Jackson the performer of the tracks at issue is noncommercial.”  
The parties’ issue-limiting stipulation, meanwhile, while 
acknowledging 
Serova’s 
claims 
arose 
from 
“various 
representations,” only sought a determination of whether 
Serova could “allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action under” the CLRA or UCL.  When the superior and 
appellate courts below ruled on Sony’s motion and the 
commercial speech issue, neither considered possible doctrinal 
wrinkles related to artwork or titles for expressive works and 
neither applied a unique analysis to them.  (See Serova, supra, 
44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 126–132.)   
Sony’s motion, then, as limited by the parties’ stipulation, 
does not now require a stand-alone assessment of the 
commercial nature of Michael’s artwork and title, especially in 
light of Serova’s showing that the album packaging contains 
speech “naming Jackson the performer” of the Cascio tracks that 
is commercial and can thus support a cause of action under the 
CLRA and UCL.  Consistent with our long-standing preference 
for narrower resolutions of constitutional questions (see People 
v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 949; cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.516(b)(3) [this court retains discretion over the issues to 
decide]), we do not consider how to address the artwork and title 
consistent with First Amendment dictates. 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
39 
D. 
Copyright Preemption 
 
There is one final matter, however, to address regarding 
the merits of Serova’s claims.  In its answering brief in this 
court, Sony argues, for the first time, that Serova’s consumer 
deception claims are meritless because federal copyright law 
preempts them and deprives California courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Sony believes it can argue preemption now, despite 
the parties’ issue-limiting stipulation and the preliminary 
nature of an anti-SLAPP motion, because challenges to a court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and 
because subject matter jurisdiction “ ‘ “cannot be conferred by 
waiver, estoppel, or consent.” ’ ”  (See Kabran v. Sharp Memorial 
Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339.)  Serova does not dispute 
Sony’s framing of its preemption argument as jurisdictional.  
She has, in fact, briefed the issue without objecting to us 
considering it.  Whether or not Sony’s preemption claim tests 
our fundamental jurisdiction, we, out of an abundance of 
caution, choose to consider it, and we reject it. 
 
Copyright law is held to preempt state claims when state 
claims vindicate rights equivalent to those copyright law 
protects.  (17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3); see Kodadek v. MTV Networks, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 152 F.3d 1209, 1212.)  Copyright law protects 
copyright 
owners 
against 
unauthorized 
reproduction, 
distribution, and other uses of their works (17 U.S.C. § 106) but 
does not speak to false advertising and consumer confusion as 
the CLRA and UCL do (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(5) 
[prohibiting misrepresentations about goods’ characteristics]; 
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 [prohibiting “deceptive, untrue or 
misleading advertising”]).  When a consumer brings a CLRA or 
UCL claim requiring proof of false or misleading advertising, the 
claim requires something a copyright claim does not.  (See 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
40 
Kabehie v. Zoland (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 513, 530 [noting the 
“ ‘ “extra element of misrepresentation” ’ ” distinguishes a fraud 
claim from a copyright claim]; Gladstone v. Hillel (1988) 203 
Cal.App.3d 977, 987 [same]; accord, Computer Mgmt. Assistance 
Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc. (5th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 396, 404 
[Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act requires proof of 
misrepresentation, an “ ‘extra element’ ”]; Samara Bros. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (2d Cir. 1998) 165 F.3d 120, 131 [New York 
consumer claim requiring consumer confusion and “deceptive 
acts,” even if unintentional, was not preempted]; Valente-Kritzer 
Video v. Pinckney (9th Cir. 1989) 881 F.2d 772, 776 [“the 
element of misrepresentation . . . distinguishes [a California 
fraud] claim from one based on copyright”]; Meyers v. Fabrics 
(1985) 65 N.Y.2d 75, 78 [479 N.E.2d 236, 238] [a New York 
“cause of action for false labeling” was not preempted].)  In fact, 
state laws that “prevent consumer confusion” and prohibit “false 
descriptions” of products have long “coexisted harmoniously” 
with federal intellectual property law.  (Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989) 489 U.S. 141, 165–166 [noting 
the coexistence of patent law with state unfair competition laws 
similar to the Lanham Act].) 
 
Serova is plainly not asserting ownership in copyrightable 
material associated with Michael.  She sues as a consumer, not 
a purported rights holder claiming infringement.  More than 
that, Serova’s claims do not depend on who owns such rights.  In 
fact, as Sony itself noted in its answering brief, there appears to 
be no dispute in this lawsuit that those rights belong to MJJ 
Productions, Inc., regardless of who provided lead vocals for the 
Cascio tracks.  Finally, Serova is not seeking to enjoin 
reproduction or distribution of the sound recordings on Michael, 
but rather contests the album’s marketing claims.  (See 
SEROVA v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
41 
Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3d 
1137, 1152 [a UCL claim insofar as it was “based on copyright 
infringement” was preempted, but a UCL claim based on 
“alleged misrepresentations” remained].)  Federal copyright 
law, then, and Serova’s consumer deception claims — at least as 
they have taken shape here on Sony’s anti-SLAPP motion — can 
coexist harmoniously. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Serova has sufficiently demonstrated, for purposes of the 
anti-SLAPP proceedings before us, that her CLRA and UCL 
claims related to Michael’s packaging and promotional video 
have sufficient merit.  Perhaps in another context the First 
Amendment would limit the reach of our consumer protection 
laws, but Sony’s album-back promise and video are commercial 
advertising making claims about a product, and we will not 
place them beyond the reach of state regulation.  We therefore 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it ordered 
struck, per the anti-SLAPP statute, those claims of Serova 
against Sony that remained after the trial court’s order, and we 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, 
including any dismissal proceedings contemplated by the 
parties’ settlement agreement. 
JENKINS, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 44 Cal.App.5th 103 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S260736 
Date Filed:  August 18, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles  
Judge:  Ann I. Jones 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Katten Muchin Rosenman, Zia F. Modabber, Andrew J. Demko, Tami 
Kameda Sims, Shelby A. Palmer, Charlotte S. Wasserstein, Leah E.A. 
Solomon; Kinsella Weitzman Iser Kump & Aldisert, Kinsella 
Weitzman Iser Kump, Jonathan P. Steinsapir, Howard Weitzman and 
Suann C. Macisaac for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Dan 
Laidman for First Amendment Coalition as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Moss Bollinger, Jeremy F. Bollinger, Ari E. Moss and Dennis F. Moss 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Seth E. Mermin and Eliza J. Duggan for UC Berkeley Center for 
Consumer Law and Economic Justice, Truth in Advertising, Inc., 
Public Counsel, Legal Aid Society of San Diego, Housing & Economic 
Rights Advocates, East Bay Community Law Center, Consumers for 
 
 
Auto Reliability and Safety, Consumer Action and Bay Area Legal Aid 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Arbogast Law, David M. Arbogast; and Micha Star Liberty for 
Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan, 
State Solicitor General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Samuel T. Harbourt and Amari L. Hammonds, 
Deputy State Solicitors General, for the Attorney General as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Wilfredo R. Rivera, 
Deputy Chief City Attorney, Christina V. Tusan, William R. Pletcher 
and Miguel J. Ruiz, Deputy City Attorneys, for the Los Angeles City 
Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Zia F. Modabber 
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2600 
Los Angeles, California 90067 
(310) 788-4627 
 
Dennis F. Moss 
Moss Bollinger LLP 
15300 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 207 
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 
(310) 985-0555 
 
Samuel T. Harbourt 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3919