Title: State of Florida v. Andrew Nelson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-2325
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2325 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ANDREW NELSON,  
Respondent. 
 
[January 14, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Nelson v. State, 993 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), in 
which the district court certified the following question of great public importance: 
Does a motion for continuance made after the expiration of the speedy 
trial period but before a defendant files a notice of expiration under 
the rule, which activates the right of recapture period, waive a 
defendant’s speedy trial rights under the rule? 
Id. at 1077.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We answer 
the certified question in the affirmative.  When the State is entitled to the recapture 
period, a continuance that is chargeable to the defense and made after the 
expiration of the speedy trial period but before a defendant files a notice of 
 
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expiration waives a defendant’s speedy trial rights under the default period of the 
rule.  Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
As a juvenile, Andrew Nelson was arrested on May 16, 2007, for armed 
burglary and carrying a concealed weapon.  See Nelson, 993 So. 2d at 1074.  Both 
the ninety-day juvenile and 175-day adult speedy-trial periods began to run from 
the date of Nelson’s arrest.  See id.  In June 2007, before the expiration of either of 
these speedy-trial periods, the State filed a petition for delinquency that charged 
Nelson with grand theft and carrying a concealed firearm.  See id.  However, the 
case was not scheduled for an adjudicatory hearing before the juvenile speedy-trial 
period expired.  On August 15, 2007, within days of the expiration of the period, 
the trial court conducted a hearing.  See id.  During this hearing, the defense 
requested a continuance to participate in discovery.  See id.   
Time passed without either the trial court conducting an adjudicatory 
hearing or Nelson invoking his speedy trial rights.  In November 2007, a few days 
after the adult speedy trial period expired, the State direct-filed an information in 
felony court that charged Nelson with one count of armed burglary of a dwelling 
and twelve counts of grand theft of various firearms.  See id.  Thereafter, the State 
 
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filed a nolle prosequi of the juvenile petition and filed another felony information 
charging the same counts as those contained in the juvenile petition.  See id.   
Later, in early March 2008, Nelson filed motions for discharge in both 
felony cases.  See id.  The trial court considered these motions and denied them 
based on a determination that the defense continuance, which was requested and 
taken after the expiration of the speedy trial time in the juvenile case but before the 
filing of a notice of expiration under the rule, waived the speedy trial time for all 
charges arising from the same criminal episode.  See id.  After the trial court 
denied the motions, it attempted to schedule trial dates within the ten-day recapture 
period.  However, Nelson again requested a continuance in both cases, and 
specifically acknowledged that the continuances constituted a waiver of his speedy 
trial rights.  The trial court granted the continuances, but charged one to the State 
because it had failed to provide Nelson with discovery.   
From the orders denying the motions for discharge, Nelson filed petitions for 
writ of prohibition in the Fourth District that sought to prevent further prosecution 
in each felony case.  See id.  The district court granted both petitions based on its 
interpretation of the nullity rule, which would deem any request for a continuance 
after the expiration of the speedy-trial period void and inoperative as a waiver of 
the right to a speedy trial when the State is otherwise barred from further 
prosecution.  See id. at 1074-75.  Specifically, the district court held that a defense 
 
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continuance taken after the expiration of the default speedy trial period but before 
the defendant moves for discharge does not affect a defendant’s right to demand 
his speedy trial rights.  See id. at 1074.  In the view of the district court, the post-
expiration request for a continuance in the juvenile proceeding did not operate as a 
waiver of Nelson’s speedy trial rights, and did not toll the running of the speedy-
trial period.  See id. at 1075. 
After determining that the request for a continuance did not operate as a 
waiver, the Fourth District analyzed the effect of the State filing the adult charges 
after the expiration of the adult speedy-trial period.  In both cases, the district court 
determined that the State was not entitled to the recapture period, and Nelson was 
therefore entitled to discharge of all charges.  See id. 
On rehearing, the State asserted that this Court’s decision in State v. 
Naveira, 873 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2004), stood for the principle that any post-
expiration continuance requested by a defendant waives all rights under the speedy 
trial rule.  See id. at 1076.  In Naveira, we held that a defendant’s right to a speedy 
trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 was not violated where a 
defendant invoked the speedy trial rule through a notice of expiration, a trial was 
scheduled as provided in the rule’s recapture provisions, and the only reason the 
trial was not held according to the recapture provision was the defendant’s own 
motion for a continuance.  See Naveira, 873 So. 2d at 310.   
 
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The Fourth District denied the State’s motion and issued an amended 
opinion which included a narrow reading of Naveira.  The district court 
distinguished Naveira because Nelson had not invoked the recapture period 
through the filing of a notice of expiration.  See Nelson, 993 So. 2d at 1076.  In the 
view of the district court, Nelson was not unavailable for trial during the term 
provided by the rule (i.e., the ninety-day juvenile speedy trial term and the 
recapture period), and had not requested a continuance after invocation of the rule-
based speedy trial rights, which would have constituted a waiver under Naveira.  
See Nelson (citing State v. Gilliam, 884 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)).  Thus, 
the Fourth District maintained its conclusion that the post-expiration continuance 
did not waive Nelson’s speedy trial rights.  See id.   
The district court then attempted to harmonize Naveira with Stewart v. State, 
491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986), which held that “when a defendant requests a 
continuance prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the 
crime with which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all 
charges which emanate from the same criminal episode.”  Stewart, 491 So. 2d at 
272.  To do so, the Fourth District held that a motion for continuance is a nullity 
when filed after the speedy trial period has expired but before the notice of 
expiration invokes the State’s right of recapture.  See Nelson, 993 So. 2d at 1077.  
In addition, the Fourth District certified the aforementioned question of great 
 
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public importance to this Court, and the State invoked this Court’s discretionary 
jurisdiction to answer that certified question.  See id.   
II.  ANALYSIS  
The certified question presented requires us to determine the effect of a post-
expiration defense continuance on the procedural provisions of the speedy trial 
rule.1  It involves the interpretation of the rules of procedure with regard to the 
right to a speedy trial and is therefore a question of law subject to de novo review 
by this Court.  See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 
2006).  We conclude that the decision of the Fourth District misapprehends the 
procedures under the current speedy trial rule and, in particular, the impact of the 
State’s right to a recapture period on the nullity principle.   
The Purpose and Operation of the Speedy Trial Rule  
As expressly guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions and the 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant possesses the right to a 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Fourth District framed the question solely in terms of the adult 
speedy trial rule.  Therefore, we utilize the terminology related to the adult rule 
with the understanding that it also generally applies to the juvenile rule, except 
where specifically noted otherwise.   
 
In addition, the Fourth District declined to address whether the filing of a 
juvenile petition could be considered the initiation of charges which the State could 
later amend into a felony information.  Therefore, we do not address this issue 
because the district court did not pass upon the issue and it is thus outside the 
scope of the certified question.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4); Fla. R. App. P. 
9.030(a)(2)(A)(v); Gee v. Seidman & Seidman, 653 So. 2d 384, 384 (Fla. 1995); 
Revitz v. Baya, 355 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1977).  
 
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speedy and public trial.  See U.S. Const. amend VI; art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.191; Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090.  Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.191(a), all defendants are entitled to be brought to trial within a 
specific period prescribed by the rule without demanding the right to speedy trial.  
The issue before this Court involves the procedures related to the default period in 
this rule, which is 175 days in adult proceedings and ninety days in juvenile 
proceedings.   
Although all defendants are entitled to the benefit of the default rule, the rule 
is not self-executing and requires a defendant to take affirmative action to avail 
him- or herself of the remedies afforded under the rule based on the State’s failure 
to comply with the time limitations.  See State v. Clifton, 905 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2005) (citing State v. Gibson, 783 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2001)).  When a defendant is charged within the speedy trial period, the remedy for 
a violation of the rule is not an automatic discharge.  Rather, the remedy for the 
State’s failure to try a defendant within the specified time is provided for in Florida 
Rule of Procedure 3.191(p).  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p); see also Fla. R. Crim. 
P. 3.191 committee notes (1984); Fla. Bar re Amendment to Rules—Criminal 
Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1984).   
Specifically, at any time after the expiration of the speedy trial period, the 
defendant may initiate application of the rule by filing and serving on the State a 
 
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separate pleading entitled “Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time.”  This 
pleading invokes the defendant’s speedy trial rights and triggers the recapture 
window, which is an additional ten-day period for the State to bring the defendant 
to trial after the default speedy trial period expires.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), 
(p)(2)-(3).  The recapture provision requires the trial court to hold a hearing within 
five days of the filing of the notice to determine whether any of the exceptions 
enumerated in rule 3.191(j) exist.  See id. 3.191(p)(3).  A defendant is not entitled 
to discharge until the trial court conducts the required inquiry under subdivision (j) 
of rule 3.191.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(1).  This provision advances the four 
exceptions that require a motion for discharge to be denied, which include the 
unavailability of the defendant and when the failure to hold trial is attributable to 
the accused.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(j) (2)-(3).  Unavailability includes 
circumstances where either the defendant or defense counsel is not ready for trial 
on the date it is scheduled.   
If none of the exceptions exist, the trial court must order that the defendant 
be brought to trial within the ten-day recapture period.  See id.  This allows the 
State an additional opportunity to prosecute the defendant after the expiration of 
the speedy trial period.  If the State fails to bring the defendant to trial within the 
recapture period and none of the exceptions exists, the defendant “shall be forever 
discharged from the crime.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(n), (p)(3).    
 
- 9 - 
Similarly, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide a right to a speedy trial 
with procedures analogous to the adult speedy trial rule.  Florida Rule of Juvenile 
Procedure 8.090 provides that a juvenile charged by petition with committing a 
delinquent act “shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing without demand within 
90 days” of the “date the child was taken into custody” or the “date of service of 
the summons that is issued when the petition is filed,” whichever is earlier.  Fla. R. 
Juv. P. 8.090(a).  This rule also includes a recapture provision that mirrors its adult 
counterpart.  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(m).  If an adjudicatory hearing has not 
commenced within ninety days of the dates provided in rule 8.090(a), the juvenile 
may file a motion for discharge, which operates as a notice of expiration would in 
an adult proceeding.  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(b).   
Similar to the adult rule, the trial court must conduct an inquiry to determine 
whether the exceptions to discharge listed in rule 8.090(d) exist.  The exceptions 
relevant to the certified question include when (1) “[t]he child has voluntary 
waived the right to speedy trial”; (2) “[t]he failure to hold an adjudicatory hearing 
is attributable to the child . . . or [his or her] counsel”; and (3) “[t]he child was 
unavailable for the adjudicatory hearing.”  Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(d)(1), (3)-(4).  If 
none of these exceptions exist and the State fails to commence the adjudicatory 
hearing within the recapture period, the juvenile is entitled to dismissal of the 
petition.  Dismissal functions in the same manner as the adult rule in that it bars 
 
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prosecution of the delinquent act charged and all other offenses that arise from the 
same criminal episode.  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(k). 
As demonstrated by these provisions, a defendant is not automatically 
entitled to discharge based on the State’s failure to meet the mandated time limit, 
and the State is generally entitled to the recapture period provided for by rules 
3.191(p)(3) and 8.090(m)(3).  However, when the rule was promulgated in 1971, 
the State was not afforded the benefit of a recapture period.  If the default period 
expired, the defendant was generally entitled to automatic discharge upon motion, 
provided that the defendant was continuously available for trial and an extension of 
time had not been ordered.  See generally In re Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro., 245 So. 2d 
33, 36 (Fla. 1971).  In addition, some courts held that the trial court lost 
jurisdiction over the defendant at the expiration of the speedy trial period under the 
provisions of the earlier rule.  See Llanusa v. Glickstein, 376 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1979).   
In 1984, the rule was amended to repeal the remedy of automatic discharge 
and to create the recapture period, as demonstrated by the committee notes to the 
amendment.   
The intent of [the amendment] is to provide the state attorney with 15 
days within which to bring a defendant to trial from the date of the 
filing of the motion for discharge. . . .  [I]t gives the system a chance 
to remedy a mistake; it does not permit the system to forget about the 
time constraints. 
 
 
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Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 committee notes (1984) (emphasis supplied); Fla. Bar re 
Amendment to Rules—Criminal Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1984).  The 
creation of the recapture period emphasizes the purpose of the rule—“to promote 
the efficient operation of the court system and to act as a stimulus to prosecutors to 
bring defendants to trial as soon as practicable, thus minimizing the hardships 
placed upon accused persons awaiting trial.”  Lewis v. State, 357 So. 2d 725, 727 
(Fla. 1978).  In other words, the recapture period illustrates the principle that a 
defendant has a right to speedy trial, not a right to speedy discharge without trial.  
Cf. State v. Thomas, 659 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).  
 
The procedures provided in the default rule are premised on the assumption 
that the defendant has not previously waived the right to speedy trial.  Therefore, 
we must next consider the effect of pre- and post-expiration waiver to determine 
the purpose and application of the nullity principle.    
The Effect of Waiver on the Prescribed Default Period 
As with other rights that constitute a personal privilege, a defendant may 
waive his or her right to a speedy trial, after which the defendant may not assert the 
statutory right to be tried within the default period.  Likewise, a juvenile charged 
by petition with committing a delinquent act may waive his or her right to a speedy 
hearing.  A defendant waives his or her right to speedy trial by being unavailable 
for trial or by taking actions that render the failure to hold a trial attributable to the 
 
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accused.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(j)(2).  In addition to these circumstances, a 
juvenile may voluntarily waive his or her speedy trial rights.  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 
8.090(d)(1).   
Consequently, waiver is presumed when a defendant is granted a requested 
continuance because this action causes a delay in the prosecution that is 
attributable to the defendant and demonstrates that the defendant is not available 
for trial.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(j)(3); see also State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 
253 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. 1971) (“When the [defense] continuance was granted, 
the time limitations in the rule were no longer applicable and the Court had the 
right and authority to set the case for trial within a reasonable time.”).  This waiver 
is construed as an ongoing waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charges which 
emanate from the same criminal episode, including any newly filed charges arising 
out of the incident.  See Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. 1986); Atkins 
v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Morris v. State, 715 So. 2d 
1177, 1178-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  Here, the parties concede that the post-
expiration continuance in the juvenile proceeding is the dispositive issue in 
reviewing the viability of the adult charges, which were filed after the expiration of 
both the juvenile and adult speedy-trial periods.  If the continuance is considered a 
nullity rather than a waiver, the State filed both of the adult charges after the 
speedy trial period expired, and Nelson would be entitled to seek discharge of all 
 
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charges.  If the continuance constitutes a waiver, the State is entitled to bring 
Nelson to trial through the recapture period if no other exceptions apply.   
 
When analyzing whether a defendant’s actions constituted a waiver of 
speedy trial rights, courts have distinguished between pre- and post-expiration 
continuances.  It is clear that a pre-expiration continuance operates as a waiver, as 
this Court articulated in Stewart:  “[W]hen a defendant requests a continuance 
prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the crime with 
which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges 
which emanate from the same criminal episode.”  491 So. 2d at 272.  The Stewart 
decision still presents the correct principle of law for pre-expiration continuances.  
Although the Fourth District narrowly read this principle to limit waiver to pre-
expiration continuances, the certified question in Stewart did not request the Court 
to consider the effect of post-expiration waivers.2  Therefore, Stewart is not 
dispositive because it did not address the issue before the Court today.  
In contrast to the clear rule applied to pre-expiration continuances, some 
courts have treated post-expiration continuances as a nullity.  A nullity is defined 
                                          
 
 
2.  In Stewart, the First District Court of Appeal certified the following 
question of great public importance:  “If the state files a felony charge against the 
defendant and the defendant moves for a continuance more than 90 days but less 
than 180 days after his arrest, and the state then nol prosses the felony charge and 
refiles the information charging a misdemeanor, is the defendant entitled to an 
immediate discharge under the speedy trial rule?”  491 So. 2d at 271. 
 
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as something that is legally void.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1173 (9th ed. 2009).  
Prior to the 1984 amendments to the rule, a series of decisions established that a 
defense continuance taken after the expiration of the period was considered a 
“nullity” because the defendant was entitled to automatic discharge based on the 
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the proceeding.  For example, in White v. 
State, 338 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), the district court held that it was 
unnecessary to consider waiver where discovery was commenced after the speedy 
trial period expired.  See id. at 256.  In Llanusa v. Glickstein, 376 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1979), the Fourth District extended White to include a post-expiration 
continuance taken for the purposes of additional discovery.  See id. at 46.  This 
result was premised on the conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
conduct a trial of the petitioner “[a]bsent a proper extension of time within which a 
defendant must be brought to trial or a justifiable excuse under the terms of [the 
rule] why trial was not commenced within 180 days.”  Id.  Because the court no 
longer possessed jurisdiction over the defendant, the Fourth District concluded that 
the post-expiration motion for continuance had no effect.  See id.; see also Ballard 
v. Kaney, 397 So. 2d 1042, 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“When the speedy trial rule 
period has run the right of the accused to discharge is not affected by acts which 
might have earlier constituted a waiver.”); Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037, 1039 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (applying Llanusa to post-expiration continuance taken prior 
 
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to the filing of a motion for discharge); Hammock v. State, 330 So. 2d 522, 524 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (“A demonstration of unpreparedness for trial which is 
developed after the 180-day period has elapsed, and which has no record support 
during the 180-day period, does not toll the speedy trial rule.”).  Each of these pre-
1984 decisions is implicitly founded on the conclusion in Llanusa that the trial 
court lacks jurisdiction to try a defendant after the expiration of the default period. 
All of these cases involved a speedy trial rule that did not have the 
“recapture” concept.  The subsequent amendments to the rule have made the above 
decisions no longer controlling when faced with the current rule.  The 
amendments, which repealed the previous right to automatic discharge and created 
the window of recapture to remedy the “mistake” of failing to bring the defendant 
to trial, limit the application of the nullity principle under the current rule.   See 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 committee notes (1984); Fla. Bar re Amendment to Rules—
Criminal Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1984).  For instance, the trial court 
is no longer deemed to lose jurisdiction at the expiration of the default period, as 
demonstrated by the extension of time to bring the defendant to trial through the 
recapture window.  In addition, the nullity principle is inapplicable where the State 
is entitled to the recapture period because the defendant is not subject to automatic 
discharge.   
 
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The nullity principle may or may not have continued life in circumstances 
where the State is not entitled to the recapture period.  In limited circumstances, 
the current rule provides for discharge after the filing of a notice of expiration 
without affording the State the opportunity to bring the defendant to trial during the 
recapture period.  We do not address those circumstances today.  
   
The court below primarily relied upon State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1997), as the authority for its decision.  In Leslie, the Third District Court 
of Appeal applied the nullity principle when the State filed the charging documents 
two days after the expiration of the default period.  The Leslie court determined 
that under Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1994), the defendant was 
entitled to immediate discharge, and accordingly, the post-expiration continuance 
was a nullity under the Third District’s decision in Muller.  See Leslie, 699 So. 2d 
at 833.  The Fourth District’s reliance on Leslie ignores a dispositive factual 
distinction between that decision and Nelson.  The State in Leslie was not entitled 
to the recapture period because it had failed to file the charging document before 
the expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period.  See Leslie, 699 So. 2d at 832.  
Under no circumstances would the State be able to bring the defendant to trial 
because it failed to timely file the charges; therefore, a defendant’s post-expiration 
continuance would neither contribute to nor impact the reason that trial could not 
commence.  See id.  This distinction is reiterated in the special concurrence in 
 
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Leslie, where Judge Shevin clarified that under the factual circumstances, the State 
was not entitled to the recapture window and the defendant’s discharge was 
mandated.  See Leslie, 699 So. 2d at 833 (Shevin, J., specially concurring).  
However, in Nelson, the State filed the delinquency proceeding within the speedy 
trial period and was therefore entitled to the recapture window.    
A similar analysis applies to Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2000), which was also relied upon by the court below.  In that decision, the 
defendant requested a post-expiration continuance, which was granted.  See id. at 
20.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a notice of expiration.  See id.  There is 
no indication that the effect of the continuance was considered at that time.  The 
trial court scheduled a trial during the recapture period, but the State still failed to 
bring the defendant to trial within that time.  See id.  Relying on Leslie, Muller, 
and Stewart, the Third District in Ryan concluded that under these circumstances, 
the defendant was properly entitled to automatic discharge despite the post-
expiration continuance.  See id.  Though the post-expiration continuance initially 
operated as a waiver because the State was entitled to the recapture period, this 
decision is distinguishable from Nelson because the State failed to assert the 
waiver issue prior to the case being set for trial.  Furthermore, the State failed to 
bring the defendant to trial within the recapture period.  Thus, the continuance 
operated as a nullity because it was not the principal reason the trial could not 
 
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commence.3  In sum, these decisions illustrate circumstances in which the nullity 
rule is still applicable under the current speedy trial rule.     
However, in Nelson, the Fourth District has crafted a rule that distinguishes 
between post-expiration continuances taken before and after the filing of a notice 
of expiration without consideration of the recapture period.  This is a distinction 
without a legally cognizable difference when the State is entitled to the recapture 
window.  To approve this result would apply the nullity principle without 
consideration of its operative effect or the current rule.  As demonstrated by 
Llanusa, the nullity principle only applies in circumstances in which the effect of 
the continuance is void because the defendant is entitled to discharge for reasons 
attributable to the State or the trial court.  In other words, the continuance does not 
operate as a waiver because the defendant would be discharged regardless.   
Under the current rule, there is no practical reason for distinguishing 
between pre- and post-expiration continuances where the defendant is not entitled 
to automatic discharge and the State retains the opportunity to commence trial for 
                                          
 
 
3.  In Nelson, the Fourth District also relied on Von Waldner v. State, 860 
So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), which held that the general rule with regard to 
waiver did not apply to a post-expiration continuance taken because of the State’s 
failure to provide discovery until after the expiration of the speedy trial period.  
Von Waldner is distinguishable from the instant decision because the continuance 
there was chargeable to the State, not the defense.  Here, the district court’s 
decision states that Nelson requested a continuance without any implication that it 
was charged to the State.   
 
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the defendant within the window of recapture.  Moreover, a defendant is required 
to invoke the provisions of the rule to receive the benefit of the nullity principle, 
unless the continuance actually operates as a nullity.  To hold otherwise frustrates 
the purpose of the speedy trial rule, thereby rendering it a right to speedy 
discharge rather than a right to speedy trial.  Cf. Zabrani v. Cowart, 502 So. 2d 
1257, 1259 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).   
In addition, a post-expiration continuance can be construed as a delay 
attributable to the defendant under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(j)(2).  
This is logical when considered under the facts of the present case.  Here, Nelson’s 
right to a speedy trial under the default period existed until he declined to exercise 
it.  Once the period expired, Nelson possessed the option to either file a notice of 
expiration, which would require the State to bring him to trial within fifteen days, 
or take a continuance to further prepare for trial.  Rather than avail himself of his 
right to a speedy trial under the default period by filing a notice of expiration and 
proceeding with trial, Nelson appeared at a hearing, which was set after the 
expiration of the period, and requested a continuance for purposes of conducting 
further discovery.  It was this continuance that delayed the trial proceedings.  
Therefore, the continuance does not operate as a nullity without legal effect 
because the delay was solely attributable to the actions of the defendant.  In other 
words, when Nelson requested a post-expiration continuance for purposes of 
 
- 20 - 
discovery without filing a notice of expiration, he necessarily waived his right to a 
speedy trial within the default period. 
Regardless of when a continuance occurs, a defendant must avail himself of 
the procedural mechanisms available under the current rule.  This requires a 
defendant to file a notice of expiration to trigger the recapture provisions of the 
rule.  There is no effective distinction in a post-expiration continuance taken before 
the filing of a notice of expiration that would require this type of continuance to 
operate as a nullity rather than a waiver.   
Moreover, this type of continuance must operate as a waiver to avoid an 
anomaly within the rule.  As demonstrated by Nelson’s actions, the decision of the 
Fourth District would allow a defendant to avoid the provisions of the rule, thus 
creating a gray period without consequence between the expiration of the default 
period and the filing of a notice of expiration.  Nelson requested a continuance, 
engaged in further discovery, and then waited until a time after the expiration of 
the juvenile and adult periods before filing a notice of expiration, presumably 
under the assumption that this would entitle him to automatic discharge.  Clearly, 
Nelson filed the notice of expiration to invoke his right to discharge, not to a trial.  
Consequently, the decision of the Fourth District would afford defendants a 
windfall that does not reflect either the purpose of the rule or the terms of the rule 
while creating a potential for abuse by which a defendant could perpetually delay a 
 
- 21 - 
trial without consequence or legal ramifications.  To approve such a result would 
require this Court to ignore the terms of the rule and the intent of the 1984 
amendment to allow the State an opportunity to remedy a mistake through the 
recapture period.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the above reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative 
and hold that when the State is entitled to the recapture period, a continuance that 
is chargeable to the defense and made after the expiration of the speedy trial period 
but before a defendant files a notice of expiration waives a defendant’s speedy trial 
rights under the default period of the rule.  Accordingly, we quash the decision of 
the Fourth District and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
We further disapprove of the decisions under the current speedy trial rule to the 
extent that they hold otherwise. 
 
It is so ordered.    
QUINCE, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result only. 
PARIENTE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D08-1751 and 4D08-1753 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Thomas 
D. Winokur, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Tammy Forrest of Glantz and Glantz, P.A., Plantation, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent