Title: Commonwealth v. LeClair
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11469
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2014

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SJC-11469 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JASON J. LECLAIR & another.1 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     March 6, 2014. - October 10, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & 
Lenk, JJ.2 
 
 
Contempt.  Practice, Criminal, Contempt.  Constitutional Law, 
Self-incrimination.  Witness, Self-incrimination. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Northampton Division of 
the District Court Department on May 2, 2012.  
 
 
An adjudication of contempt was made by W. Michael Goggins, J.  
 
 
The 
Supreme 
Judicial 
Court 
on 
its 
own 
initiative 
transferred 
the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Dana 
Goldblatt with him) for the intervener. 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michael C. Walsh & Stephanie K. Fattman, pro se, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  A nonimmunized witness in a criminal trial  
                                                 
1 Mark Sheehan, intervener. 
 
2 
Chief 
Justice 
Ireland 
participated 
in 
the 
deliberation 
on 
this 
case prior to his retirement. 
 
2 
repeatedly refused to answer questions posed by the prosecutor 
concerning his use of illegal drugs on the ground of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The prosecutor represented to the 
witness and the trial judge that the Commonwealth had no intention 
of pursuing such a prosecution, but when the witness, advised by his 
attorney, 
refused 
to 
answer, 
the 
judge 
directed 
the 
witness 
to 
do 
so.  
When the witness continued to refuse, the judge found the witness in 
summary criminal contempt and imposed a sentence of ninety days' 
incarceration, which he stayed pending resolution of the witness's 
interlocutory appeal.  
 
In 
considering 
the 
witness's 
appeal, 
we 
are 
confronted 
with 
the 
question whether the judgment of contempt should not have entered 
because, regardless of the Commonwealth's intention, the compelled 
admission was a violation of the witness's privilege against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
art. 
12 
of 
the 
Massachusetts 
Declaration 
of 
Rights.  
We 
conclude 
that, 
in 
these 
circumstances, 
the 
witness 
validly 
invoked 
his privilege against self-incrimination, that his compelled 
responses to such questioning did not constitute a waiver of the 
privilege, and that the judgment of summary contempt should not have 
entered. 
 
Background 
and 
prior 
proceedings.  On 
May 
2, 
2012, 
the 
defendant 
was 
arraigned 
on 
a 
charge 
of 
assault 
and 
battery, 
G. L. 
c. 265, 
§ 13A, 
as a result of an incident between the defendant and his girl friend 
 
3 
that had taken place in his friend Mark Sheehan's apartment at 
approximately 10 A.M. that morning.3 
 
On August 1, 2012, the day that trial was scheduled to begin, 
the Commonwealth indicated its intent to call Sheehan as a witness, 
and the trial judge appointed counsel to represent Sheehan with 
respect to a potential assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege 
against 
self-incrimination.  Sheehan's 
counsel 
reported 
that 
Sheehan 
did indeed have a 
Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, because, 
based on his answers to questions expected to be posed to him, the 
testimony could expose him to criminal charges of possession of a 
controlled substance and conspiracy to violate the drug laws.  
Counsel stated that Sheehan intended to assert that privilege.  
Following a brief in camera hearing,4 the judge ruled that the 
invocation 
of 
the 
privilege 
was 
not 
valid 
because 
Sheehan 
had 
not 
shown 
that he faced a real risk that his answers to questions would "tend 
to indicate involvement in illegal activity, as opposed to a mere 
                                                 
3 Mark Sheehan telephoned police after he had been awakened by 
the defendant yelling, "Call the police; call the police," amid a 
confrontation between the defendant and his girl friend. 
 
4 When the judge initially asked counsel to describe the 
substance of Sheehan's claim in open court, counsel requested an in 
camera 
hearing 
because 
she 
had 
informed 
her 
client 
that 
his 
statements 
to her would remain confidential; the judge declined to conduct the 
hearing in camera.  Upon further questioning, counsel then informed 
the judge, without detail, that Sheehan's statements would involve 
an 
admission 
to 
illegal 
drug 
use, 
which 
could 
be 
used 
to 
impeach 
him.  
After counsel explained the criminal charges she believed might be 
implicated, 
the 
judge 
conducted 
a 
brief 
in 
camera 
hearing 
concerning 
the substance of Sheehan's potential testimony, as presented by his 
counsel.  
 
4 
imaginary, remote, or speculative possibility of prosecution."  See 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 502 (1996).   
 
The jury-waived trial commenced, and the Commonwealth called 
Sheehan 
as 
its 
first 
witness.  On 
direct 
examination, 
the 
prosecutor 
did not pose any questions on Sheehan's use of illegal drugs during 
the evening prior to the incident.  On cross-examination, defense 
counsel first asked Sheehan about his use of alcohol that evening, 
and 
then 
inquired 
as 
to 
Sheehan's 
use 
of 
illegal 
drugs.  In 
response, 
Sheehan invoked his privilege against self-incrimination.  When the 
judge nonetheless instructed him to respond to defense counsel's 
questions concerning whether he had used illegal drugs on the night 
in 
question, 
and 
what 
type 
of 
drugs, 
Sheehan 
replied 
that 
he 
had 
used 
cocaine.  When 
defense 
counsel 
asked 
Sheehan 
how 
much 
cocaine 
he 
had 
used, Sheehan's counsel objected, and the objection was overruled.  
On his counsel's advice, Sheehan thereafter continued to invoke his 
privilege 
and 
declined 
to 
respond 
to 
counsel's 
questions 
on 
the 
amount 
of 
cocaine 
Sheehan 
had 
used, 
or 
to 
any 
further 
questions 
on 
drug 
use.   
 
The judge admonished Sheehan that his refusal could result in 
immediate criminal sanctions.  After a brief recess, the judge 
explained that refusal to answer questions based on a mistaken 
assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege would be summarily punished 
as criminal contempt.  He then inquired into the possibility of 
 
5 
immunizing Sheehan.5  After another brief recess during which the 
prosecutor consulted with his office, the prosecutor reported that 
no formal offer of immunity could be made.  The prosecutor stated 
also, 
however, 
"I 
don't 
think 
that 
it's 
something 
we 
have 
an 
interest 
in pursuing at this time."  He then proffered a written statement in 
which he represented that should Sheehan testify "to the use of 
controlled substances under [G. L. c. 94C] on that occasion the 
Commonwealth has no present, nor future interest in the prosecution 
of . . . Sheehan for such activity," and that Sheehan's "testimony 
alone 
that 
he 
consumed 
a 
controlled 
substance 
on 
that 
occasion 
is 
not 
enough to bring a formal prosecution against . . . Sheehan for that 
activity." 
 
Sheehan's counsel informed the judge that she had advised her 
client of his privilege not to testify in response to questions 
regarding illicit drug use, and that her client would continue to 
invoke 
that 
privilege; 
counsel 
sought 
a 
stay 
of 
any 
criminal 
sanction, 
and stated that if it were determined on appeal that Sheehan had no 
valid Fifth Amendment privilege, he would testify immediately and 
purge 
the 
contempt.  The 
judge 
once 
again 
warned 
that 
Sheehan 
risked, 
on a finding of criminal contempt, an immediate sanction of 
incarceration, 
and 
inquired 
whether 
that 
changed 
counsel's 
position.  
                                                 
5 
Later 
in 
the 
proceedings, 
the 
judge 
informed 
the 
parties 
that, 
upon further inquiry, it appeared 
that immunity was not available in 
the 
District 
Court.  The 
judge 
was 
correct.  See 
G. L. 
c. 233, 
§ 20E; 
Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 520-522 (2001). 
 
6 
Sheehan's counsel informed the court that her client was "asserting 
his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, understanding that . . . 
he 
may 
be 
jailed 
for 
doing 
so."  At 
that 
point, 
the 
judge 
told 
Sheehan 
directly 
that 
his 
continued 
refusal 
to 
answer 
the 
question 
regarding 
drug use was "impermissible, and that contempt sanctions may be 
imposed, and that that may include 
criminal sanctions, and that that 
may include a penalty of up to [three] months incarceration, or [a] 
$500 fine."6  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 43, 378 Mass. 919 (1979). 
 
The first question posed by defense counsel on resuming his 
cross-examination 
was 
whether 
on 
the 
morning 
of 
May 2 
Sheehan 
had 
been 
using cocaine, to which Sheehan responded by invoking his privilege 
under the Fifth Amendment.  The judge thereupon found Sheehan in 
summary criminal contempt for failure to answer questions based on 
                                                 
6 
Counsel 
for 
Sheehan 
again 
objected, 
stating 
that 
she 
understood 
the matter to be in the nature of civil, not criminal, contempt, 
because the witness intended to purge himself of contempt upon a 
determination 
by 
an 
appellate 
court 
that 
his 
invocation 
was 
not 
valid. 
The judge disagreed, noting that the failure could be considered 
criminal contempt where the witness refused in the middle of trial 
to answer a question as to which the court had ruled he had no valid 
privilege and had ordered the witness to testify.  When the judge 
repeated his warning to the witness that continued refusal could 
result in a finding of criminal contempt "that would expose [the 
witness] 
to 
incarceration, 
beginning 
forthwith, 
of 
up 
to 
[ninety] 
days 
in a [h]ouse of [c]orrection or a $500 fine," the witness stated:  
"Your 
Honor, 
what 
I 
don't 
understand 
is, 
as 
a[n] 
American, 
why 
I 
cannot 
exercise a constitutional right."  Responding to further statements 
made 
by 
the 
judge, 
the 
witness 
indicated 
that 
he 
respected 
that 
there 
was a dispute regarding the question and understood the sanctions he 
faced, whereupon cross-examination resumed.  
 
 
7 
a mistaken claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege,7 ordered that he 
be incarcerated for ninety days, and stayed the sentence pending the 
resolution of the interlocutory appeal.  The criminal trial itself 
was 
also 
stayed 
during 
the 
pendency 
of 
the 
appeal.  Sheehan's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
was 
denied.  Sheehan 
was 
allowed 
to 
intervene 
in 
the criminal proceeding, and he appealed the judgment of contempt to 
the Appeals Court.  We transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion.  
 
Discussion.  "The 
right 
of 
a 
witness 
not 
to 
incriminate 
himself 
                                                 
7 
On 
a 
form 
captioned 
"Criminal 
Contempt, 
Summary 
Judgment," 
the 
judge checked off the following as the bases for the summary action:  
"The conduct occurred during court proceedings and in the judge's 
sight 
or 
hearing"; 
"Contemnor 
had 
been 
warned"; 
"Punishment 
does 
not 
exceed three months['] imprisonment or $500 fine"; and "Immediate 
adjudication of contempt was necessary to prevent disorder or 
disruption in courtroom."  In the block requesting a description of 
the conduct, the judge wrote: 
 
"Mr. Sheehan is a Comm. witness in an A&B prosecution.  
Counsel was apptd to represent him in connection w/ a possible 
5th Amendment privilege.  His atty stated at side bar and later 
in camera that the privilege was his potential prosecution for 
possession of cocaine and/or conspiracy to violate drug laws.  
Reason she claimed was that [the witness] would testify that he 
had been using cocaine at the time of the alleged A&B.  Court 
ruled that was insufficient basis and the invocation of the 
privilege was denied.  Ordered to testify by the court, he 
refused three times and was found in contempt."  
 
In a footnote, the judge added:   
 
"Mr. Sheehan was friends w/ def. and was a reluctant 
witness.  Ct. was concerned his claim of drug use was a 
fabrication 
for 
trial 
and 
lacked 
credibility 
and 
was 
being 
used 
as a vehicle to facilitate a path to acquittal for his friend, 
the [defendant], so that the evidence of drug use was so 
imaginary, 
remote 
or 
speculative 
that 
it 
should 
not 
serve 
as 
the 
basis for invocation of 5th Amendment privilege."  
 
8 
is secured by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
art. 
12 
of 
the 
Massachusetts 
Declaration 
of 
Rights."  
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 183, 187 (1975).  Although "art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides broader 
protection from self-incrimination than does the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution," Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 
827, 
832 
n.6 
(2009), 
citing 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Mavredakis, 
430 
Mass. 
848, 
858–859 (2000), "[s]ince the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to a witness testifying in a State 
court the protection of the Fifth Amendment, we have applied Federal 
standards 
in 
determining 
whether 
a 
claim 
of 
privilege 
is 
justified."  
Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra, citing Murphy v. Commonwealth, 354 
Mass. 81 (1968).     
 
"The 
proscription 
of 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
that 
'[n]o 
person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself' may be invoked whenever a witness reasonably believes that 
the testimony could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead 
to other evidence that might be so used."  Pixley v. Commonwealth, 
supra at 832, citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–
445 
(1972).  See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Funches, 
379 
Mass. 
283, 
289 
(1979).  
Because the privilege against self-incrimination is "a fundamental 
principle 
of 
our 
system 
of 
justice," 
it 
"is 
to 
be 
construed 
liberally 
in favor of the claimant."  Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 
 
9 
455 (1983).  Accordingly, "a refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment 
grounds must be upheld unless it is 'perfectly clear, from a careful 
consideration of all the circumstances in the case, 
that the witness 
is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such 
tendency' to incriminate."  Id. at 456, quoting Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951). 
 
Here, 
there 
was 
a 
more 
than 
adequate 
basis 
from 
which 
to 
determine 
that the anticipated testimony would have been an admission of 
violations of the drug laws that would tend to incriminate Sheehan, 
that the testimony could lead to other evidence that might have been 
used in a criminal prosecution, and therefore that 
invocation of the 
privilege 
not 
to 
testify 
was 
justified.  The 
incriminatory 
potential 
of 
the 
testimony 
was 
apparent 
from 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
specific 
questions 
intended to be propounded, concerning Sheehan's drug use and his 
ability 
to 
perceive 
and 
remember 
the 
incident; 
from 
this 
it 
was 
evident 
that 
there 
was 
a 
"real 
risk 
that 
his 
answers 
to 
questions 
[would] 
tend 
to indicate his involvement in illegal activity."  Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 
423 
Mass. 
496, 
502 
(1979).  See 
Murphy 
v. 
Commonwealth, 
supra 
at 
84, 
quoting 
Hoffman 
v. 
United 
States, 
supra 
at 
486-487 
(to 
sustain 
privilege "it need only be evident from the implications of the 
question, in the setting in which it was asked, that a responsive 
answer 
to 
the 
question 
or 
an 
explanation 
of 
why 
it 
cannot 
be 
answered 
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result").  
 
That the substance was not available to be tested would not, in 
 
10 
and of itself, preclude prosecution for possession of a controlled 
substance approximately three months prior to the admission, see 
Commonwealth v. Dawson, 399 Mass. 465, 467 (1987) ("Proof that a 
substance is a particular drug need not be made by chemical analysis 
and 
may 
be 
made 
by 
circumstantial 
evidence"), 
and, 
in 
any 
event, 
such 
testing would not be required in a prosecution for conspiracy to 
violate the drug laws.  See Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 
288 n.5 (1979) ("Answering the questions concerning a conversation 
about drugs could lead to prosecution for conspiracy to violate the 
drug laws, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 40, or 
for the substantive offense, G. L. 
c. 94C, §§ 34-35").  
 
Moreover, assuming, as the Commonwealth argues, that the 
confession to possession or use of an illicit substance is not alone 
sufficient to support a conviction, we nonetheless apply broad and 
"highly protective" standards to determine whether a claim of 
privilege is justified.  Commonwealth v. Martin, supra at 502.  Any 
admission by Sheehan to drug use on the night in question might have 
been 
used 
in 
questioning 
others 
concerning 
Sheehan's 
drug 
use 
on 
that 
night, or to provide leads for a subsequent criminal investigation.  
"The privilege 'not only extends to answers that would in themselves 
support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would 
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the 
claimant.'"  Commonwealth v. Borans, supra at 456, quoting Hoffman 
v. United States, supra at 486.  See, e.g., National Fed'n of Fed. 
 
11 
Employees 
v. 
Greenberg, 
983 
F.2d 
286, 
292 
(D.C. 
Cir. 
1993) 
("Admitting 
the use of illegal drugs, at least use so recent that the statute[] 
of limitations [has] not run, would doubtless be incriminating"); 
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 213 (2012) (concluding trial 
judge correctly informed witness she had Fifth Amendment privilege 
not to answer questions regarding her drug use at time of incident 
about which she was testifying).  Whether, as the judge believed, 
Sheehan 
may 
have 
had 
an 
additional 
motive 
not 
to 
testify 
was 
irrelevant 
where 
the 
circumstances 
otherwise 
support 
the 
determination 
that 
his 
responses would tend to incriminate him. 
 
Nor was Sheehan's invocation rendered invalid because of the 
prosecutor's assertion that the Commonwealth did not intend to 
prosecute him on the basis of his testimony regarding the use of 
illicit 
drugs 
on 
the 
night 
in 
question.8  See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Martin, 
supra at 503 n.3 ("The prosecutor’s denial of an intent to prosecute 
a 
witness 
is 
not 
sufficient 
to 
defeat 
an 
assertion 
of 
the 
privilege"); 
Commonwealth v. Borans, supra at 459, and cases cited.  We have not 
embraced a rule that "would require the trial court, in each case, 
                                                 
8 Even had the District Court judge had the authority to issue 
an immunity order, see note 5, supra, art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights requires that an immunized witness be granted 
transactional immunity, which protects a witness from being 
prosecuted not only by an individual assistant district attorney or 
by a district attorney's office, but also by any State prosecutorial 
authority.  See Vaccari, petitioner, 460 Mass. 756, 759-761 & n.5 
(2011).  An 
assertion 
by 
an 
assistant 
district 
attorney 
for 
a 
single 
county could not suffice to meet this requirement. 
 
 
12 
to 
assess 
the 
practical 
possibility 
that 
prosecution 
would 
result 
from 
incriminatory 
answers."  United 
States 
v. 
Miranti, 
253 
F.2d 
135, 
139 
(2d 
Cir. 
1958).  In 
any 
event, 
"[t]his 
is 
not 
a 
case 
where 
recalcitrant 
witnesses have been granted immunity and then continued to refuse to 
testify."  Taylor v. Commonwealth, supra at 188-189.  
 
We also reject the Commonwealth's argument, advanced for the 
first time on appeal, that Sheehan waived his privilege when he 
answered 
two 
questions 
posed 
by 
defense 
counsel 
on 
cross-examination.  
Sheehan's answers were given in response to the judge's instruction 
that he was required to answer, and came after Sheehan had invoked 
his 
privilege 
prior 
to 
trial, 
and 
repeatedly 
during 
trial, 
immediately 
before the judge instructed him that he must respond.  See 
Commonwealth v. Borans, supra at 458-459.  In these circumstances, 
Sheehan's testimony "was not so freely and voluntarily given as to 
effect a waiver of his privilege on later questioning."  Taylor v. 
Commonwealth, 
supra 
at 
193.  See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
King, 
436 
Mass. 
252, 
259 (2002);9 Commonwealth v. Koonce, 418 Mass. 367, 378 (1994).  
                                                 
9 
In 
Commonwealth 
v. 
King, 
436 
Mass. 
252, 
259 
(2002), 
we 
described 
the doctrine of waiver by prior testimony as follows: 
 
"[T]he doctrine of waiver by prior testimony . . . is based on 
two pragmatic ramifications of the witness's prior voluntary, 
but potentially incriminating, testimony.  One is that 'when a 
witness has freely testified as to incriminating facts, 
continued testimony as to details would no longer tend to 
incriminate.'  [Taylor v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 183, 190 
(1975)].  The 
second 
rationale 
given 
in 
support 
of 
the 
doctrine 
of 
waiver 
by 
testimony 
is 
that 
'allowing 
the 
testimony 
to 
remain 
in a witness-selected posture would result in serious, unjust 
 
13 
Sheehan's testimony "could hardly be considered voluntary; he had 
sought to claim his privilege against self-incrimination and [the 
trial] 
judge 
had 
ruled 
that 
he 
had 
no 
such 
privilege."  Commonwealth 
v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 318 n.33 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 
1181 (2009) (witness did not waive privilege by testifying before 
grand jury where judge ruled he had no such privilege).10   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment of contempt vacated. 
                                                                                                                                                               
distortion; and the witness, having chosen to answer when he 
could have remained silent, "cannot be allowed to state such 
facts 
only 
as 
he 
pleases 
to 
state, 
and 
to 
withhold 
other 
facts."'  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray 472, 476 (1858)." 
 
10 Because of our decision that the judgment of contempt should 
not have entered, we need not reach the intervener's argument that 
civil, rather than criminal, contempt would have been applicable in 
these circumstances.  We emphasize, however, that "we give wide 
latitude to persons claiming privilege under the Fifth Amendment in 
order to give meaning to the privilege."  Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 
387 Mass. 1, 9 n.11 (1982).