Title: Atkins v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 981477
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1999

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
DARYL RENARD ATKINS 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 981477 & 981478 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
February 26, 1999*
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and 
death sentence imposed by a jury on Daryl Renard Atkins. 
I. 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
On November 19, 1996, indictments were returned against 
Atkins charging that on August 17, 1996, Atkins abducted, 
robbed, and murdered Eric Michael Nesbitt in the commission of 
the robbery.  Code §§ 18.2-48, -58, and -31(4).  Atkins was also 
charged with use of a firearm while committing each of these 
offenses.  Code § 18.2-53.1.1
 
Atkins filed a pre-trial motion to have the Virginia 
capital murder and death penalty statutes declared 
unconstitutional.  Along with this motion, Atkins filed an 
extensive brief containing multiple theories for his assertion 
that the substantive criminal law and procedural statutes 
                     
*The January 8, 1999 opinion was withdrawn when a petition 
for rehearing was granted February 23, 1999. 
 
1Prior to trial, Atkins pled guilty to the abduction and 
robbery charges and their associated firearm crimes.  He does 
governing capital crimes in Virginia are constitutionally 
deficient.  The trial court, relying on conclusive statements of 
this Court supporting the constitutionality of these statutes, 
overruled this motion.  The trial court also denied Atkins’ 
motion for additional peremptory juror challenges. 
 
In a motion in limine, Atkins sought to limit the 
introduction by the Commonwealth of DNA evidence related to 
blood samples found in Nesbitt’s truck which indicated that 
Atkins and Nesbitt were the sources of that blood.  Atkins 
asserted that this evidence was not sufficiently credible 
because William A. Jones was also an occupant of the truck and 
his blood had not been subjected to the DNA testing.  In the 
alternative, Atkins sought to have a blood sample obtained from 
Jones and DNA tests performed thereon to establish whether Jones 
was a potential source for the blood found in the truck.  The 
trial court received a proffer from the Commonwealth that there 
was no evidence that Jones had been wounded and, thus, that 
Jones was excluded as a possible source of the blood.  On this 
ground, the trial court denied the motion. 
 
Jury selection began on February 9, 1998 and continued the 
next day.  Starr D. Christian, a 19-year-old black female, was 
called from the venire and questioned by the trial court and 
                                                                  
not challenge his convictions or sentences for these crimes in 
this appeal. 
 
2
counsel for the Commonwealth and Atkins.  The trial court asked 
Christian if she or any member of her immediate family had “ever 
been the victim of a violent crime.”  Christian responded in the 
negative.  Atkins’ counsel subsequently asked Christian if she 
or any member of her immediate family had “ever been the victim 
of a crime, not just a violent crime, but a crime.”  Christian 
responded that her brother’s car had been broken into on one 
occasion.  Neither party challenged Christian for cause, and the 
trial court retained her in the venire for final jury selection.  
Thereafter, the Commonwealth used one of its four peremptory 
strikes to remove Christian from the jury.  Code §19.2-262.  
Atkins asserted that Christian had been struck based upon her 
race in violation of the ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 89 (1986). 
 
Responding to Atkins’ challenge, the Commonwealth initially 
asserted that it struck Christian because she was young and 
unmarried and, thus, would be less likely, in its view, to have 
empathy for the victim.2  The Commonwealth further noted that it 
had acquired information that, contrary to her testimony, 
                     
2The Commonwealth also contended that Christian might lack 
empathy for the victim because she was not a parent, but 
subsequently conceded that Christian had not been questioned as 
to whether she had children or not.  In addition, the 
Commonwealth conceded that it had discovered an offense report 
concerning an altercation between Christian and a relative that 
indicated that Christian possibly was a parent. 
 
 
3
Christian had been the victim of a grand larceny within the past 
year.  The Commonwealth provided defense counsel with a copy of 
an offense report that listed Christian as the victim and 
complainant in the theft of a ring.  Based upon this incident, 
the Commonwealth ultimately asserted Christian’s lack of 
truthfulness as its race-neutral reason for removing her from 
the jury. 
 
Atkins contended that a peremptory strike premised on the 
age of the prospective juror might also “run[] afoul of the 
Batson ruling.”  Atkins further contended that the Commonwealth 
gave “no indication nor were we told that there was a concern 
about [Christian’s] truthfulness” at the time she was examined. 
 
Noting its express concern over “the apparent oversight or 
flagrant incorrect answer to the Court’s question and to 
counsel’s question relative to victims of a crime,” the trial 
court found that the Commonwealth had stated an adequate race-
neutral reason for striking Christian from the jury.  
Accordingly, the trial court overruled Atkins’ Batson challenge. 
II. 
EVIDENCE 
 
A. Guilt Phase 
 
We will review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth.  Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 84, 472 
S.E.2d 263, 265 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997).  On 
 
4
the afternoon of August 16, 1996, William A. Jones3 and Atkins 
were “drinking and smoking weed” at the home Atkins shared with 
his father.  During the course of that afternoon, “[a] couple of 
[Atkins’] friends came by, in and out.”  On several occasions 
during the afternoon and later that evening, those present 
pooled their money, and Atkins and Jones walked to a nearby 
convenience store to buy beer or were driven by one of Atkins’ 
friends to an ABC store to buy liquor. 
 
That evening between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., a friend of 
Atkins, known to Jones only as “Mark,” arrived at the home.  
Mark had brought a handgun with him and gave it to Atkins after 
Atkins said “that he wanted to use it, he would bring it back in 
the morning.”  A short time later, Atkins and Jones again walked 
to the convenience store to buy beer.  Atkins told Jones that he 
did not have enough money and was going to “panhandle and get 
some change up.”  Atkins had the handgun he had borrowed from 
Mark tucked behind the waistband of his pants, partially 
concealed by his belt buckle. 
 
While Jones waited, Atkins approached several people to ask 
for money and collected some from one or two.  Nesbitt, who was 
a stranger to Atkins, arrived at the store in his truck at 
                     
3Prior to Atkins’ trial, Jones entered into a plea agreement 
with the Commonwealth dated September 5, 1997, in which Jones 
agreed to testify against Atkins in exchange for a reduction in 
the charges against him arising out of the murder of Nesbitt. 
 
5
approximately 11:30 p.m.  After a brief conversation with 
Atkins, Nesbitt went into the store.  When Nesbitt returned to 
his truck and was preparing to leave the parking lot, Atkins 
“whistled” at him and Nesbitt stopped his truck. 
 
Atkins went to the passenger’s side of the truck and Jones 
went to the driver’s side.  Atkins then pointed the handgun at 
Nesbitt and ordered Nesbitt to “[m]ove over, let my friend 
drive.”  Jones entered the truck from the driver’s side and 
Atkins entered from the passenger’s side. 
 
As Jones drove the truck away from the convenience store, 
Atkins demanded that Nesbitt surrender his wallet.  Atkins 
removed $60 from the wallet and was returning it to Nesbitt when 
he noticed a bankcard inside the wallet.  On Atkins’ 
instruction, Jones drove to a branch of Crestar Bank where 
Atkins forced Nesbitt to withdraw $200 using the bankcard from 
the bank’s drive-through automatic teller machine.  The security 
camera in this automatic teller machine recorded the truck 
arriving at the bank shortly after midnight on August 17, 1996.  
The videotape produced by the camera showed that Jones was 
driving, Atkins was in the passenger seat, and Nesbitt was 
between them.  Nesbitt had to lean across Jones in order to 
operate the machine.  During this entire time, Atkins kept the 
handgun pointed at Nesbitt. 
 
6
 
Jones then drove to the parking lot of a nearby school 
where he and Atkins discussed what they should do with Nesbitt.  
Jones urged Atkins to “just tie him up so we can get away.”  
Atkins told Jones he knew of a place near his grandfather’s 
house in Yorktown where they could leave Nesbitt and directed 
Jones to drive toward Yorktown on Interstate 64.  Nesbitt asked 
them “just don’t hurt me” and made no attempt to escape. 
 
Upon arriving in a secluded area of York County off the Lee 
Hall exit of Interstate 64, Atkins exited the truck and ordered 
Nesbitt to do the same.  “Nesbitt stepped out of the vehicle and 
probably took two steps” when Atkins began shooting him.  Jones 
attempted to exit the truck because he feared that some of the 
shots were “coming in the truck.”  Unable to open the driver’s 
side door, Jones rolled down the driver’s side window and 
“jumped” out of the truck. 
 
Jones began to struggle with Atkins for the handgun and 
Atkins was shot in the leg during that struggle.  After Jones 
obtained the handgun, he drove Atkins to the emergency room of a 
local hospital, leaving Nesbitt’s dead body at the scene of the 
shooting.  Outside the emergency room, Jones asked Atkins for 
some of the money that had been taken from Nesbitt and then 
drove away alone in Nesbitt’s truck. 
 
After leaving Atkins at the emergency room, Jones drove to 
a motel in Newport News where he abandoned Nesbitt’s truck.  
 
7
Jones spent the next several days moving from motel to motel.  
He cut his hair in an attempt to disguise his appearance.  Jones 
subsequently returned to the first motel, where police, who 
previously had discovered the abandoned truck at the motel and 
were maintaining a surveillance of the area, arrested him.  The 
handgun was not found in the truck and was never recovered. 
 
Garland S. Clay discovered Nesbitt’s body at the crime 
scene sometime after 3:45 a.m. on August 17, 1996 and contacted 
police.  Investigator Frederick T. Lyons, a member of the major 
crimes section of the York County Sheriff’s Office, arrived at 
the crime scene at 5:15 a.m. 
 
Lyons discovered six shell casings near Nesbitt’s body.  
After determining that Nesbitt had an account at Crestar Bank, 
Lyons learned that two withdrawals from the account had been 
made at Crestar automatic teller machines the previous night, 
one for $60 and one for $200.  Lyons obtained still photographs 
and the videotapes from the automatic teller machines’ security 
cameras and distributed copies to local police and media. 
 
After the media broadcast the photographs, several callers 
to a “crime line phone number” identified Jones as the driver of 
Nesbitt’s truck.  One caller told police that “a person that Mr. 
Jones runs with was a Daryl Atkins.”  Based upon these 
identifications, Lyons obtained an arrest warrant for Jones.  
After interviewing Jones’ father and the father’s girlfriend, 
 
8
Lyons “learned that Mr. Atkins was with William Jones,” and 
obtained Atkins’ address.  Finding Atkins at home, Lyons was 
able to identify Atkins from the security camera photographs and 
placed him under arrest. 
 
Dr. Leah L. E. Bush, an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner 
for the Commonwealth, performed an autopsy on Nesbitt’s body.  
This autopsy revealed that Nesbitt had sustained eight separate 
gunshot wounds to the thorax, chest, abdomen, arms and legs.  
Several of the bullets exited and reentered the body.  Three of 
the gunshot wounds were lethal.  However, Nesbitt could have 
lived for several minutes before “the bleeding was to the point 
where his blood pressure would not support consciousness and 
life.”  Three bullets were recovered during the autopsy. 
 
Additional forensic evidence showed that the six shell 
casings recovered from the crime scene had all been fired from 
the same weapon, as were the three bullets recovered from 
Nesbitt’s body, a bullet recovered from Nesbitt’s truck, and a 
bullet recovered from Atkins’ leg.  Bloodstains found on the 
passenger seat and interior passenger side door of Nesbitt’s 
truck were identified as consistent with either Nesbitt’s or 
Atkins’ blood types.  None of the tested samples was identified 
as likely to have come from another source. 
 
Subsequent to his arrest and prior to his trial, while an 
inmate in the York County jail, Atkins shared a cell with 
 
9
Stephen R. Burton.  According to Burton, Atkins told him “[t]hat 
he had put a boy out of a truck in York County, that he had shot 
at a boy to scare him.”  Atkins told Burton that he was not 
worried about being convicted because the police “wouldn’t find 
the weapon . . . they didn’t have the weapon, the only thing 
they had on him was a picture holding a gun to a boy” at the 
automatic teller machine.  Atkins also told Burton that he had 
shot himself in the leg, but that he could not remember it 
because he was “too messed up” on drugs and alcohol to realize 
it. 
 
Atkins testified on his own behalf and was the only defense 
witness on the issue of guilt.  Atkins’ account of the robbery 
and murder was in direct conflict with that of Jones.  According 
to Atkins, he and Jones had gone to the convenience store with 
the intent to rob someone, and it was Jones who was armed and 
who initiated the contact with Nesbitt.  Atkins maintained that 
Jones forced his way into Nesbitt’s truck, and then gave the 
handgun to Atkins so that Jones could drive.  Atkins admitted 
taking money from Nesbitt’s wallet and forcing Nesbitt to 
withdraw money from the automatic teller machine. 
 
Atkins further maintained that Jones said “he know [(sic)] 
a place and he never told me” where they could take Nesbitt and 
“tie him up.”  After leaving the interstate, according to 
Atkins, Jones stopped the truck, took the handgun back from 
 
10
Atkins, placed it in a holster on his belt, and directed Atkins 
and Nesbitt to change places so that Nesbitt was sitting by the 
passenger door.  Jones then drove “a little more” and then 
exited the truck and ordered Nesbitt to get out of the truck as 
well.  With regard to the critical issue of who was the 
“triggerman” in the murder of Nesbitt, Atkins maintained that 
Jones shot Nesbitt several times and that one of the shots 
struck Atkins in the leg. 
 
The jury was instructed and heard closing arguments from 
counsel.  After its deliberations, the jury returned verdicts 
convicting Atkins of capital murder and the associated firearm 
crime. 
B. Penalty Phase 
 
The Commonwealth sought the imposition of the death penalty 
based on the aggravating factors of future dangerousness and 
vileness.  Code § 19.2-264.2.  During the penalty phase, to 
prove future dangerousness, the Commonwealth presented evidence 
of Atkins’ prior felony convictions, which included robbing and 
maiming, the testimony of several victims of prior robberies and 
assaults committed by Atkins, and victim impact testimony from 
Nesbitt’s mother.  After concluding the presentation of this 
evidence, the Commonwealth rested, and Atkins made a motion to 
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to the aggravating factor 
of vileness on the ground that no evidence presented in the 
 
11
penalty phase would support such a finding.  Code § 19.2-
264.4(C).  Over Atkins’ objection, the trial court permitted the 
Commonwealth to reopen its case in order to have the exhibits 
introduced during the guilt phase included in the evidence to be 
considered in the penalty phase.  Those exhibits included 
pictures of Nesbitt’s body, the autopsy report, and other items. 
 
Atkins presented the testimony of Dr. Evan Stuart Nelson, a 
forensic psychologist.  Dr. Nelson testified that Atkins’ full 
scale IQ is 59 with a verbal IQ of 64 and a performance IQ of 
60.4  Based on these scores, Dr. Nelson stated that Atkins “falls 
in the range of being mildly mentally retarded.”  Dr. Nelson 
concluded that, based on Atkins’ prior behavior while 
incarcerated, there was a “very high likelihood” that Atkins 
would not be “violent within the prison” if given a life 
sentence. 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Nelson conceded that he “did not 
find a reason to raise a concern to the Court or counsel about 
[Atkins’] competency” to stand trial.  In addition, Dr. Nelson 
concluded from the data available to him that “there were no 
indications that [Atkins] could not appreciate the nature of his 
behaviors and control himself.” 
                     
4Dr. Nelson explained that “the full scale IQ score is not a 
simple mathematical average between 64 and 60.  It’s actually 
putting all of the items back together, charting out a graph of 
the scores and then figuring out where people stand.” 
 
12
 
After all the evidence relating to the penalty phase had 
been received, the trial court and counsel considered jury 
instructions and the verdict form.  The trial court granted the 
Commonwealth’s first instruction which properly detailed the 
necessity of the jury finding that either one or both of the 
statutory aggravating factors of future dangerousness and 
vileness were proven beyond a reasonable doubt before it could 
impose the death penalty.  It further provided that the jury 
could nonetheless impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or 
a sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine if “the death 
penalty is not justified.”  Finally, this instruction properly 
directed the jury that if the Commonwealth failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the aggravating 
factors of future dangerousness or vileness, then it was 
required to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or a 
sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine. 
 
The Commonwealth’s second instruction defined “imprisonment 
for life” to mean “life without possibility of parole.”  The 
Commonwealth’s third instruction detailed the possible sentences 
for the firearm crime.  The trial court granted both of these 
instructions. 
 
The Commonwealth proffered an instruction on mitigating 
circumstances.  Atkins’ counsel expressly stated that he did not 
want the trial court to give this instruction, and the 
 
13
Commonwealth withdrew it.  Atkins did not proffer an alternative 
instruction on mitigating circumstances and raised no objection 
to the absence of an express instruction on mitigation. 
 
During the discussion of the instructions, several 
references were made to the proposed jury verdict forms.  At 
that time, the Commonwealth advised the trial court that it was 
in the process of redrafting its proposed verdict form because 
“there was a revision that [Atkins’ counsel] wanted [the 
Commonwealth] to make” in that verdict form.  Atkins’ counsel 
responded, “[U]nless [the Commonwealth has] done a major 
redraft, I prefer mine which gives the jury every option.  [The 
Commonwealth’s], from what I saw, was . . . limited to death.”  
The trial court then stated, “Well, they obviously have the 
option of life.” 
 
A short time later, the Commonwealth’s redrafted verdict 
form was given to the trial court and Atkins’ counsel.  
Referring to this form, the Commonwealth stated, “Ours are the 
same as the Defense’s, Judge.  They are both Model 
Instructions.” 
 
Atkins’ proposed verdict form contained seven alternative 
findings.  The first six of these, in order, permitted the jury 
to impose either a sentence of death or one of imprisonment for 
life and a fine if it found that both aggravating factors were 
proven, if it found future dangerousness alone was proven, or if 
 
14
it found vileness alone was proven.  The seventh finding on 
Atkins’ form permitted the jury to impose only a sentence of 
life imprisonment and a fine if neither aggravating factor was 
found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The Commonwealth’s proposed verdict form contained six 
alternative findings corresponding, although in a different 
order, with the first six alternative findings on Atkins’ 
proposed form.  It did not provide a finding permitting the jury 
to impose only a life sentence and fine if neither aggravating 
factor was found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
After the instructions were agreed upon, the trial court 
reviewed the two sets of proposed verdict forms and stated, 
“Either is okay with the Court.  I think they both say the same 
thing, identically the same thing.”  Atkins’ counsel responded, 
“Pretty close the same thing.”  The Commonwealth then stated 
that the findings in its form were merely listed in a different 
order from that of the defense’s form.  The Commonwealth 
asserted that the order of its form, giving options for death 
and life imprisonment verdicts based on the individual 
aggravating factors and then the option for a verdict premised 
on both factors being present was more appropriate.  The trial 
court accepted the Commonwealth’s proposed verdict form.  Atkins 
did not object to the content of the Commonwealth’s verdict form 
 
15
at the time it was adopted by the trial court or when it was 
subsequently read to the jury. 
 
In closing argument, Atkins’ counsel made brief references 
to Atkins’ low intelligence, and urged the jury to impose a 
sentence of life without possibility of parole rather than a 
death sentence.  Counsel argued that a life sentence would be 
appropriate, based on Dr. Nelson’s opinion that Atkins would be 
able to exercise some level of self-control within the 
structured environment of prison. 
 
The jury found that Atkins both represented a future danger 
to society and that the murder of Nesbitt had been outrageously 
or wantonly vile.  Based upon its finding of these aggravating 
factors, the jury returned a verdict imposing a sentence of 
death on Atkins for the murder of Nesbitt. 
C. Sentencing Hearing 
 
At sentencing, Atkins’ counsel objected for the first time 
to the failure of the verdict form to include a finding 
permitting the jury to impose only a life sentence and fine if 
it found that neither aggravating factor was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Counsel made a motion to set aside the jury’s 
verdict imposing the death penalty.  The trial court ruled that 
the objection was not timely, and further noted that the 
evidence was adequate to support the jury’s findings of future 
dangerousness and vileness, precluding the possibility of it 
 
16
imposing the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the 
absence of such factors.  The trial court then confirmed the 
jury’s verdict and sentenced Atkins to death.  This appeal 
followed. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
 
We begin by noting that Atkins has modified the order and 
phrasing of his assignments of error in his opening brief from 
those originally designated by him under Rule 5:22(b).  In our 
discussion, we shall refer only to the 19 original assignments 
of error as listed by Atkins in the Rule 5:22(b) designation.5  
Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 385-86, 464 S.E.2d 131, 
135 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996).  Atkins has not 
briefed or argued assignments of error 9, 13, and 20 and, thus, 
we will not consider them.  Id. at 386, 464 S.E.2d at 135. 
A. Issues Previously Decided 
 
In assignments of error 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, Atkins raises 
various challenges to the constitutionality of the Virginia 
capital murder statute and the statutory scheme under which 
capital murder trials are conducted and death sentences are 
reviewed on appeal.  In addition, in assignment of error 12, 
Atkins asserts the general proposition that “the Virginia Death 
                     
5In the Rule 5:22(b) designation, the assignments of error 
are numbered from 1 to 20, but there is no assignment of error 
numbered 18. 
 
17
Penalty Statutes Violate the Virginia and United States 
Constitutions.”  On brief, Atkins does not make a particularized 
argument relevant to assignment of error 12, but simply 
identifies it as being subsumed within the argument of his other 
constitutional challenges.  The arguments raised in these 
assignments of error, which in several instances are 
overlapping, have been thoroughly addressed and rejected in 
numerous prior capital murder cases.6  We find no reason to 
modify our previously expressed views on these issues. 
 
Atkins further assigns error to the trial court’s failure 
to grant him additional peremptory strikes during jury 
selection.  See Code § 19.2-262.  We have repeatedly held that 
there is no right to additional peremptory challenges in a 
                     
6See, e.g., Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 178-79, 
477 S.E.2d 270, 280 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997) 
(aggravating factors of future dangerousness and vileness are 
not unconstitutionally vague); Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 
78, 82, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 
(1995)(death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment; appellate review process does not deprive defendant 
of statutory rights and due process of law); Breard v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 971 (1994)(method of instructing jury on mitigation 
does not impermissibly interfere with jury’s consideration of 
evidence offered in mitigation); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 
Va. 222, 229, 427 S.E.2d 394, 400, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 
(1993)(proof of future dangerousness by prior criminal 
convictions does not violate double jeopardy); Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 476-77, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (1978), 
cert. denied,  441 U.S. 967 (1979)(“vileness” and 
“dangerousness” predicates for imposition of the death penalty 
do not impermissibly fail to guide the jury’s discretion). 
 
 
18
capital murder trial.  See, e.g., Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 482, 489, 404 S.E.2d 227, 232, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 
(1991). 
B. Request for Blood Sample 
 
Atkins assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his 
motion in limine to have a blood sample taken from Jones or in 
the alternative limiting the Commonwealth’s presentation of the 
results of DNA testing of the blood found at the scene of the 
murder.  Atkins contends that in doing so, the trial court 
interfered with his “right to call evidence in his favor.”  We 
disagree. 
 
In arguing his motion, Atkins conceded that there was no 
evidence to suggest that Jones was a potential source of any of 
the blood evidence recovered from the crime scene.  The evidence 
at trial showed that each of the blood samples could almost 
certainly be linked to either Nesbitt or Atkins.  Therefore, 
Atkins’ request that a sample of Jones’ blood be taken for DNA 
comparison to the blood found at the crime scene was not founded 
on any reasonable claim that it was necessary to his defense.  
See O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 686, 364 S.E.2d 491, 
499, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).  Moreover, Atkins cannot 
demonstrate that the failure to make that evidence available to 
him was materially prejudicial to the presentation of his theory 
 
19
of the case.  See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 244-45, 
421 S.E.2d 821, 836 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993). 
C. Batson Challenge 
 
Atkins contends that the trial court erred in overruling 
his Batson challenge to the Commonwealth’s peremptory strike of 
Christian.  While making only a cursory argument on this issue 
on brief, during oral argument of this appeal Atkins’ counsel 
asserted that the Commonwealth’s proffer of the offense report 
was insufficient to establish that Christian had actually been 
the victim of a crime and, thus, that it would not support the 
Commonwealth’s contention that Christian had failed to answer 
the trial court’s and counsel’s questions truthfully. 
 
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that 
purposeful discrimination based on race in selecting jurors 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.  
If an accused makes a prima facie showing of the prosecution’s 
use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the burden 
shifts to the prosecution to articulate race-neutral reasons for 
such strikes.  Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 323, 448 
S.E.2d 638, 646 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995).  On 
appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that Atkins made a 
prima facie showing of a discriminatory strike.  Thus, we 
consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
accepting the Commonwealth’s articulated race-neutral reason for 
 
20
striking the prospective juror.  A trial court’s determination 
whether the reason given is race-neutral is entitled to great 
deference, Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 310, 384 S.E.2d 
785, 795 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990), and will 
not be reversed on appeal unless it is “clearly erroneous.”  
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991). 
 
There is no merit to Atkins’ contention on this issue.  The 
trial court was not required to determine whether the criminal 
complaint filed by Christian would ultimately prove sufficient 
to establish that she had actually been the victim of a crime. 
Nor was the Commonwealth required to show that Christian could 
have been struck for cause.  Rather, the Commonwealth’s burden 
was to show that it had a sufficient race-neutral reason for 
using one of its peremptory strikes in removing Christian from 
the jury.  At the time the Commonwealth exercised this 
peremptory strike, it had a sufficient subjective basis for 
questioning Christian’s truthfulness.  The trial court accepted 
the Commonwealth’s stated basis for its action, and that 
decision is clearly supported by the record. 
D. Admission of Atkins’ Statement to Police 
 
On August 21, 1996, Atkins voluntarily gave a statement to 
Investigator Lyons in which Atkins admitted his participation in 
the abduction, robbery, and murder of Nesbitt.  In that 
statement, however, Atkins denied that he had been the 
 
21
“triggerman” and asserted that Jones alone had shot Nesbitt.  At 
trial, during cross-examination of Lyons, Atkins’ counsel 
attempted to elicit testimony from Lyons that Atkins’ statement 
contained this denial and assertion.  The Commonwealth objected 
on the ground that, while the statement inculpated Atkins as a 
participant in these crimes, Atkins’ denial that he was the 
“triggerman” was self-serving and inadmissible hearsay.  The 
trial court ultimately sustained that objection and cautioned 
the jury to disregard any reference to this statement. 
 
Subsequently during his testimony, Atkins was permitted to 
reference the content of this statement in great detail.  
Significantly, Atkins testified that in his prior statement he 
“told them that William Jones pulled the trigger.”  Consistent 
with that assertion, Atkins further testified that he did not 
“shoot a gun” on the night of the murder and that Jones had shot 
Nesbitt. 
 
On brief, Atkins asserts only that “Mr. Atkins’ statement 
to the [police] should have been admitted as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under the statement against penal interest 
exception.”  This assertion simply ignores the fact that the 
statement was ultimately admitted in conjunction with Atkins’ 
testimony, and that the jury clearly had the benefit of Atkins’ 
prior consistent assertion to bolster his trial testimony that 
he was not the triggerman.  Thus, no prejudice resulted to 
 
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Atkins.  Moreover, there is no merit to Atkins’ assertion that 
his prior statement should have been admitted during Lyons’ 
testimony. 
 
At the time of Lyons’ testimony, Atkins had not testified 
and the limited circumstances in which a prior consistent 
statement is admissible were not applicable.  See Manetta v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123, 128 n.3, 340 S.E.2d 828, 831, n.3 
(1986).  Atkins’ prior consistent statement on the triggerman 
issue provided no basis to impeach the testimony of Lyons 
because Lyons was not the declarant or otherwise bound by the 
statement.  Nor could the statement have been admitted as being 
against penal interest, since Atkins, the declarant, was not 
“unavailable” to testify at trial, which is a prerequisite to 
invoke that exception to the hearsay rule.  Ellison v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408, 247 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1978) 
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Atkins contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
set aside the jury’s verdict convicting him of capital murder 
because the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was the triggerman in the killing of Nesbitt.  On 
brief, Atkins candidly states that “[t]his case comes down to 
the testimony of Mr. William A. Jones and Stephen R. Burton 
against the testimony of Mr. Atkins.”  During oral argument of 
this appeal, Atkins’ counsel conceded that, to find error in the 
 
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trial court’s action, this Court would be required to reweigh 
the evidence and make determinations as to the credibility of 
the witnesses and their testimony. 
 
“[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 
accorded their testimony are questions for the fact finder.”  
Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 113, 406 S.E.2d 39, 42, 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).  Where the jury has seen and 
heard the witnesses and assessed their credibility and the 
weight of their testimony, its determination of the facts will 
not be overturned on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Code § 8.01-680. 
 
Thus, while Atkins may selectively craft an interpretation 
of the evidence to fit his claims of innocence, and attack the 
credibility and motivation of Jones and Burton, the trial court, 
and this Court on appeal, may not substitute its own judgment 
for that of the jury where a reasonable interpretation of the 
evidence supports the verdict.  Here, the evidence when viewed 
in its entirety supports the jury’s determination that, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Atkins was directly responsible for Nesbitt’s 
death and that Atkins was the triggerman.  Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the conviction 
for capital murder. 
 
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F. The Verdict Form7
 
Atkins asserts that the jury was not properly “instructed” 
during the penalty phase because the verdict form failed to 
provide the jury with the option of sentencing Atkins to life 
imprisonment upon a finding that neither of the aggravating 
factors of future dangerousness or vileness was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We agree. 
 
It is a well established rule that under normal 
circumstances a trial court is under no obligation to amend or 
correct an instruction that contains a misstatement of law.  
However, “when the principle of law is materially vital to [the] 
defendant in a criminal case, it is reversible error for the 
                     
7This issue was raised in assignment of error 19, which 
asserts errors in the instruction of the jury in both the guilt 
phase with respect to accomplice testimony, and in the penalty 
phase on the issue discussed herein.  During oral argument of 
this appeal, Atkins’ counsel conceded that he had not proffered 
an instruction on accomplice testimony at the conclusion of the 
guilt phase or objected to the trial court’s failure to give 
such an instruction sua sponte and, thus, that the issue was not 
properly preserved for appeal.  Rule 5:25.   
 
In addition, the Commonwealth asserts on brief that 
assignment of error 19 is inadequate to encompass a challenge to 
the verdict form because a verdict form is not an “instruction” 
to the jury, but is merely a tool to aid the jury in rendering 
its verdict.  However, during discussion of this issue at trial, 
the trial court, the Commonwealth, and Atkins’ counsel used the 
terms “verdict form,” “finding form,” and “finding instructions” 
interchangeably.  Moreover, in this context, the term 
“instruction” is sufficiently broad to cover any statement of 
the law given by the trial court to the jury, which would 
necessarily include the written verdict form required by Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(D). 
 
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trial court to refuse a defective instruction instead of 
correcting it and giving it in the proper form.”  Whaley v. 
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973); 
accord Bryant v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 390, 392-93, 219 S.E.2d 
669, 671-72 (1975).  Clearly, it is materially vital to the 
defendant in a criminal case that the jury have a proper verdict 
form.  Moreover, Atkins submitted a proper verdict form, as 
required by Code § 19.2-264.4(D) and, thus, there can be no 
question that the trial court, while having the discretion to 
elect between the two forms proffered to it, had the duty to 
give the jury a proper verdict form.  It was the Commonwealth’s 
verdict form that was erroneous and, thus, when the trial court 
accepted the Commonwealth’s assertion that the order of 
sentencing options in its form was preferable, it was the 
Commonwealth, and not Atkins, that placed the trial court in the 
position of erring when it failed to correct the omission in the 
Commonwealth’s form.8
                     
8We note further that, while not raising a precise objection 
to the Commonwealth’s proposed verdict form at the time it was 
selected by the trial court, Atkins’ counsel consistently stated 
his preference for the form he had submitted to the trial court.  
Cf. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Karcher, 217 Va. 497, 498, 229 
S.E.2d 884, 885 (1976)(where a party proffers an alternative 
instruction that is a correct statement of the law, this, 
without more, will be adequate to preserve for appeal a 
challenge to the instruction actually given). 
 
 
26
In the present case, the Commonwealth represented to both 
the trial court and Atkins’ counsel that its proposed verdict 
form was “the same as the Defense’s” except that the alternative 
findings varied in order.  This simply was not accurate.  The 
Commonwealth’s form contained no alternative finding permitting 
the jury to impose only a life sentence if neither future 
dangerousness nor vileness had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Thus, each of the Commonwealth’s alternative verdicts 
required the jury to find at least one of the aggravating 
factors to have been present before imposing a sentence of 
either death or life imprisonment.  Although neither the trial 
court nor Atkins’ counsel noted the discrepancy between the 
Commonwealth’s proposed verdict form and Atkins’ form, Atkins’ 
counsel was entitled to rely upon the Commonwealth’s 
representation that there was no discrepancy between the forms 
and it had merely varied the order of the findings from that in 
Atkins’ form. 
The trial court’s use of the Commonwealth’s form resulted 
in the jury receiving a verdict form which was incomplete and 
which did not comport with the correct statement of law given to 
the jury by the trial court in its first instruction.  We need 
go no further in our analysis to determine whether the jury in 
fact was left with the impression, contrary to the trial court’s 
instruction, that it was required first to find that at least 
 
27
one of the aggravating factors was present.  The jury was 
presented with a confusing situation in which the trial court’s 
instructions and the form the jury was given to use in 
discharging its obligations were in conflict. 
For these reasons, we will set aside the sentence of death 
imposed by the jury and remand the case to the trial court for a 
new penalty proceeding. 
G. Reopening of Commonwealth’s Case in the Penalty Phase  
 
Asserting that the Commonwealth failed to introduce any 
evidence of vileness prior to resting its case during the 
penalty phase, Atkins contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to that 
aggravating factor and instead permitting the Commonwealth to 
reopen its case in order to reintroduce the exhibits used in the 
guilt phase to establish the vileness of the crime.  Because of 
the ultimate disposition we make in this appeal, this issue is 
moot.  We note, however, that because Code § 19.2-264.4(B) 
requires that the sentencing jury consider “the circumstances 
surrounding the offense” in determining punishment, the 
Commonwealth will be permitted to reintroduce such evidence on 
remand as is relevant to prove the existence of either 
aggravating factor. 
 
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H. Statutory Review of Death Penalty 
 
Because we have determined that there was reversible error 
in the penalty phase of Atkins’ trial which will necessitate a 
remand to the trial court, we need not consider at this time 
“[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor” and 
“[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Code § 17.1-313.9   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
For the reasons stated, we find no reversible error in the 
guilt phase of Atkins’ trial, and, accordingly, we will affirm 
Atkins’ conviction for capital murder.  Because there was error 
in the penalty phase of the trial with respect to the imposition 
of the death penalty, we will reverse the sentence of death and 
remand the case to the trial court for a new penalty proceeding 
on the capital murder conviction. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
                     
9Title 17.1 superseded former Title 17 effective October 1, 
1998 and prior to the argument of this appeal. The current 
statute, Code § 17.1-313, provides for review by this Court in 
the same manner as the now superseded provisions of Code § 17-
110.1, the statute under which the parties briefed the appeal. 
 
 
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