Title: P. v. Griffin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S029174
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2004

Filed 7/19/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
S029174 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
County of Fresno 
DONALD GRIFFIN, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 252758-8 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
__________________________________ ) 
 
 
Defendant Donald Griffin appeals from a judgment of the Fresno County Superior 
Court imposing a sentence of death (Pen. Code, § 190 et seq.).1  His appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
 
At the guilt phase of his initial trial, a jury found defendant guilty of the murder of 
Janice Kelly Wilson (Kelly), his 12-year-old stepdaughter, finding that he committed the 
murder under the special circumstances of felony-murder rape, felony-murder sodomy, 
and felony-murder lewd conduct, and also that he personally used a deadly or dangerous 
weapon, a knife.  The jury also found defendant guilty of rape, sodomy, and lewd or 
lascivious conduct against Kelly.  At the penalty phase, the jury fixed the punishment for 
the murder at death.  The trial court rendered judgment, sentencing defendant to death for 
the murder, and staying imposition of sentence as to the rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct 
offenses. 
                                             
 
1 
All further unspecified section references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
 
In People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011 (Griffin I), we affirmed the judgment 
as to defendant’s guilt of these offenses and the related special-circumstance and 
personal-use findings, but reversed the sentence of death because the trial court 
committed error under People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, by giving the so-called 
Briggs Instruction.  That instruction informed the jury that the Governor could commute 
a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that 
would include the possibility of parole, but did not inform the jury that the Governor 
similarly could commute a sentence of death as well.  We remanded defendant’s case for 
a new trial on the issue of punishment. 
 
On remand, upon retrial of the penalty phase, a new jury again fixed defendant’s 
punishment at death.  The trial court rendered judgment, again sentencing defendant to 
death for the murder and staying imposition of sentence as to the rape, sodomy, and lewd 
conduct offenses. 
 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
 
In Griffin I, we summarized the evidence presented at the guilt phase of the initial 
trial as follows: 
 
“Defendant conceded that he had killed his stepdaughter, 12-year-old Kelly . . . , 
but denied any sexual assault.  The prosecution evidence was that defendant stopped by 
his wife’s workplace in Kerman, California, about 7 p.m. on December 13, 1979, along 
with Kelly.  He said they were going to his parents’ house nearby, and they left.  A few 
minutes after 10 p.m. he returned, saying that he had allowed Kelly to leave his parents’ 
house for home in the company of a little girl wearing horn-rimmed glasses, but that 
Kelly had never returned home.  He made several expeditions in search of Kelly during 
the evening and repeated this story of her disappearance.  He reported to the police that 
3 
Kelly was missing, that she had left in the company of a little Mexican girl wearing 
glasses.  He said to several witnesses that if anyone had hurt Kelly, he would kill them. 
 
“When the police received a radio report that an injured person had been found on 
a nearby rural road, they asked defendant to follow them to the police station.  An officer 
coming on duty saw defendant in a cell latrine, on his tiptoes, straddling a washbasin, 
with his hands in front of him.  The officer could not see what defendant was doing, as 
his back was facing the officer.  When defendant turned around, he asked for paper 
towels, and dried his hands.  The officer saw that defendant had a buck knife in a holster 
at his waist.  Defendant went out again to search for Kelly.  He returned to the police 
station later that night, wearing clean pants and a different jacket.  An officer observed 
some spots of blood on his boots, and defendant said that they were oil spots and tried to 
wipe them off.  The officer asked where defendant’s knife was, and he said he had lost it 
during his search for Kelly. 
 
“. . . [Kelly’s] body was discovered that night on the side of a rural road.  The 
blouse and sweater were pulled up partially over her face, the back of her bra was torn, 
the left shoulder strap had been torn loose, and one of the cups had been cut with a knife.  
The left leg was bent at an awkward angle, and the underwear and pants were pulled 
down below the hips.  The left leg of the underwear was cut through.  The pants were 
torn and had also been cut near the zipper.  There were stab wounds in the neck and 
abdominal incisions from the pubic bone to the breast bone, exposing the internal organs.  
There was a large pool of blood nearby, and a bloody partial footprint.  An officer 
returning from the scene thought that the print matched defendant’s boots.  An officer 
went out into the police parking lot and shone a light into the truck defendant had been 
driving all evening; there was blood on the floorboard on the driver’s side and another 
bloody footprint which looked like the one at the scene and looked like it could have 
been made by defendant’s boots.  Later analysis of the blood in the truck showed that it 
was . . . [Kelly’s] unique blood. 
4 
 
“After defendant’s arrest, he said, ‘I think I need a psychiatrist.’  Then on his way 
from the crime lab to booking, he said to an officer, ‘Do you think I’ll get 10 years for 
this?’  When an officer took defendant out of his cell after the arrest, defendant said, ‘Go 
ahead man, it’s all right, why don’t you just go ahead and kill me.  It’s all right, just go 
ahead and kill me.’  To the officer transporting him from Kerman to Fresno, defendant 
said, ‘Give me your shotgun so I can blow my head off.  I’m a fool.’ 
 
“Dr. [Thomas] Nelson performed the autopsy and testified that the cause of death 
was strangulation and severing of the carotid artery.  The abdominal incision occurred 
after death.  It was his opinion that there had also been a rape and an act of sodomy.  The 
hymen was partly torn and there was a little bleeding near the tear.  There was also a 
small bruise near the opening of the vagina and a bruise of an inch and a quarter to an 
inch and a half near the tear in the hymen.  This testimony was impeached with prior 
inconsistent statements; in his autopsy report Dr. Nelson had not mentioned any bleeding 
near the tear in the hymen, and had described the bruise near the tear as much smaller.  
He explained that the shape of the bruise had become clearer after the tissue had been 
fixed in formaldehyde. 
 
“Dr. Nelson also testified that the anus was quite dilated, and he thought it had 
been stretched so far that it could not close.  This testimony was impeached with his prior 
inconsistent statements; in his autopsy report he said the anus was somewhat ‘prominent.’  
He explained at trial that this was a nicer word than dilated.  At the preliminary hearing 
he said that the anus was somewhat dilated.  He explained that he was not very precise in 
his speech.  The doctor also testified that he took a fluid sample from the anus which 
showed no sperm, but which in his opinion showed the presence of prostatic acid 
phosphatase. 
 
“Acid phosphatase is an enzyme which occurs in the body in both sexes, but it 
occurs at higher levels in the male prostate gland and is contained in seminal emissions.  
Dr. Nelson removed 0.1 milliliters of fluid from the anus.  His technician, . . . [Joyce] 
5 
Gordon, diluted this with 0.2 milliliters of saline solution, and divided the sample in half.  
The first test on one-half of the sample showed 14.5 sigma units of acid phosphatase.  
The test on the other half, involving a chemical reaction with tartrate buffer, showed that 
of the total, 8.1 sigma units of the acid phosphatase was prostatic acid phosphatase. 
 
“The defense experts testified that in the absence of sperm or physical injury to the 
anus, they would not use any level of acid phosphatase to express an opinion that there 
had been an act of sodomy.  They also disputed the accuracy and reliability of the tartrate 
buffer test to identify acid phosphatase as prostatic acid phosphatase; one expert went so 
far as to say that the tartrate buffer test was worthless and that prostatic acid phosphatase 
could not be distinguished from any other acid phosphatase except electrophoretically.  
There was also a great deal of controversy among the experts on the conversion factor 
between sigma units and international units, and about dilution factors.  One defense 
expert, using his conversion factor and dilution factor, found an amount of acid 
phosphatase which was below the minimum amount which the scientific literature said 
showed the presence of prostatic acid phosphatase.  However, another of the defense 
experts agreed with the prosecution’s dilution factors and used an even higher conversion 
factor, coming to a total well above the minimum which the literature said indicated the 
presence of prostatic acid phosphatase.  He maintained, however, that high levels of the 
substance should not be used to support an opinion that there had been an act of sodomy 
in the absence of sperm or physical injury to the anus.  The defense experts also testified 
that sperm breaks down faster than acid phosphatase, so with the levels of acid 
phosphatase found here, they would certainly expect to find sperm if there had been any 
seminal emission. 
 
“The defense pathologist, Dr. [Paul] Herrmann, said that there was insufficient 
evidence to show either rape or sodomy, that the injuries which Dr. Nelson had described 
in his autopsy report were not indicative of rape, that dilation of the anus could be simply 
muscle relaxation after death and before rigor mortis, and that in a child of this age, he 
6 
would expect much more injury if there had been a rape or act of sodomy.  He thought 
that the injuries to the vagina could have been caused by a tampon (though the mother 
testified in rebuttal that the child had not started menstruating yet) or by a finger.  He also 
thought that Dr. Nelson had erred in considering changes in tissue after fixation in 
formaldehyde, as the formaldehyde distorts the appearance of the tissue.”  (Griffin I, 
supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 1017–1020.) 
 
In Griffin I, we summarized the evidence presented at the penalty phase of the 
initial trial as follows: 
 
“Defendant was 30 years old at the time of the offense and had no prior 
convictions.  There was no evidence of any prior misconduct; in fact, the prosecution 
presented no evidence at the penalty phase of trial. 
 
“In mitigation, . . . defendant called his parents and other family members who 
described defendant’s family background.  Defendant had little schooling and had been 
placed in classes for slow learners.  He left school at age 15 or 16 and started working as 
a laborer and security guard.  He was considered cooperative and hardworking.  
Defendant was a loving stepfather to . . . [Kelly] for seven years.  However, at the time of 
the offense defendant’s relationship with his wife had seriously deteriorated, in part due 
to financial difficulties.  Defendant had been laid off a day or two before the offense. 
 
“The evidence presented at the penalty phase of trial showed that there was no 
indication of any violence in defendant’s nature, and no sign before the offense of the 
coming explosion.  His friends and family were shocked, believing him incapable of such 
an act.  There was also testimony that after the offense, defendant was extremely 
remorseful, asking that his own life be taken.”  (Griffin I, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 1031–
1032.) 
 
At the penalty phase retrial, the People, in their case in aggravation, presented 
evidence similar to that introduced at the guilt phase of the initial trial.  This evidence 
related circumstances of the crimes against Kelly, including expert testimony tending to 
7 
establish the commission of rape and sodomy and specifically the crucial issue of 
penetration, as well as evidence of defendant’s consumption of alcohol and possibly 
drugs, although not to the point of intoxication.   
 
The People presented additional evidence, not introduced at the initial trial, 
relating to the crimes against Kelly, including evidence disclosing the following three 
matters.  First, the owner of a slaughterhouse testified that some years prior to the crimes 
in question, defendant was employed at that establishment, and that sheep were 
slaughtered in a manner similar to the way Kelly’s body was mutilated.  Second, a police 
officer testified that some months preceding the commission of the crimes, defendant 
struck up a conversation with the officer, and the two men discussed how crimes — 
including rape — were investigated.  Third, two of Kelly’s friends and classmates 
testified that on the day the crimes were committed, Kelly acted unusual at school, and 
told one of them that defendant had been fondling her for some time and that she 
intended to confront him if he continued to do so.  
 
The People also presented evidence of other violent criminal activity committed 
by defendant, which also had not been introduced at the initial trial.  This evidence 
revealed the following.  First, a few years prior to the commission of the crimes against 
Kelly, John Hogan, who was the father-in-law of defendant’s sister and the property 
manager of a house that defendant had rented and was in the process of vacating, 
approached defendant in front of the house, cursing him and telling him he still owed rent 
and would have to pay for damage he had caused to the premises.  When defendant paid 
no attention, Hogan touched his shoulder.  In response, defendant sprang up, pulled out a 
knife with a folding blade, flicked the blade open, and took a step toward Hogan.  
Defendant’s sister stepped between the men, with her face to defendant and her back to 
Hogan.  As Hogan continued to curse defendant, saying, “[W]ell, come on, come on,” 
defendant repeatedly told his sister, “[G]et him away or I’ll cut his throat” or “I’ll kill 
him.”  After she told defendant to put his knife away and leave, he did so.  Second, 
8 
perhaps a year or two preceding the commission of the present crimes, defendant had 
engaged in lewd conduct on two separate occasions with four- or five-year-old Lisa B., 
his wife’s niece by marriage.  Once, defendant touched Lisa with his fingers in the area 
of her vagina; on the other occasion, he penetrated her vagina with his fingers and then 
flicked open a knife with a folding blade.  Each time, he threatened harm to others if Lisa 
revealed what he had done. 
 
In his case in mitigation, defendant presented evidence similar to what he had 
presented at the guilt phase of the initial trial relating to the rape, sodomy, and lewd 
conduct offenses that preceded his murder of Kelly, including expert evidence offered to 
raise a lingering doubt as to the element of penetration required for the commission of 
rape and sodomy. 
 
Defendant also presented evidence bearing on his background and character.  
Some of this testimony, given by lay witnesses, was much like the evidence he presented 
at the penalty phase of his initial trial, describing his minimal schooling and placement in 
classes for slow learners, his departure from school in his early to middle teens in order to 
perform manual and essentially unskilled labor, his reputation as cooperative and 
hardworking, his loving care for Kelly, his seriously deteriorating relationship with his 
wife, and his financial difficulties during the period leading up to the commission of the 
crimes against Kelly, the loss of his job a day or two before the crimes were committed, 
and the remorse he subsequently expressed. 
 
Additional testimony related to defendant’s background and character was given 
by expert witnesses, and was substantial and far different from his evidence at the penalty 
phase of his initial trial.  This evidence was to the following effect:  Defendant suffered 
physical abuse as a child and youth under his father’s harsh discipline.  In addition, 
defendant repeatedly suffered severe and violent sexual abuse within an extended and 
pervasively aberrant family, which comprised the Sextons and the McDonalds as well as 
the Griffins, especially at the hands of his uncles Lonnie and Charles Sexton and even 
9 
from his own father.  This abuse had various adverse consequences, including the 
translation of his experiences as a victim into an inclination to victimize others.  
Defendant was borderline mentally retarded and suffered from severe neuropsychological 
defects, profound learning disabilities, and a speech impediment.  Defendant committed 
the crimes against Kelly during a “psychotic experience.”  According to defendant, after 
getting into his truck with Kelly, “he had an extremely weird experience in which he felt 
that he was being threatened by what looked like some sort of a monster that was trying 
to get at him”; “at that point he drew his knife and tried to defend himself against this 
weird monster that was taking over and then passed out”; and “sometime thereafter he 
came to and saw the body and got out of there.”  Lastly, according to expert testimony 
presented, defendant had performed well in prison and could be expected to continue to 
do so. 
 
In rebuttal, the People presented evidence to show that defendant was not 
borderline mentally retarded and did not commit the crimes against Kelly during a 
psychotic experience.  An expert witness testified that defendant was not psychotic when 
he committed the crimes and was not mentally retarded, and that the qualifying term 
“borderline” was psychiatrically “inappropriate.”  This expert witness further testified 
that when observed by several individuals shortly before and shortly after the 
commission of the crimes, defendant was behaving normally, whereas a “person who’s 
suffering [from] a psychosis has a significant” and “usually quite obvious” “impairment” 
of appreciable duration.  This witness added:  “[T]hat theory that there was a monster is 
just ridiculous.  There’s no psychiatric disorder . . . that comes on in a half hour and goes 
in a half hour.  There’s also the inconsistency if he thought he were protecting himself 
from a monster with his knife, why would he have had sex with the monster, raped the 
monster, sodomized the monster before killing the monster.”  The expert witness 
concluded that defendant acted in a rational manner, intending to commit the crimes 
without being detected and to avoid suspicion thereafter.   
10 
 
Finally, in surrebuttal, defendant presented evidence concerning the poor grades 
he received in school, the resulting angry reaction from his father including spankings 
and insults, and defendant’s inability to complete job applications.   
 
As noted above, at the conclusion of the penalty phase retrial the jury again fixed 
the punishment at death. 
II.  CLAIMS 
 
Defendant raises several claims in an attempt to establish error requiring reversal 
of the judgment.  As will appear, we conclude that the judgment must be affirmed. 
A.  Denial of Wheeler Motion 
 
After 12 jurors and two of four alternate jurors were selected and sworn for the 
penalty phase retrial, and in the midst of the selection of the two remaining alternate 
jurors, defendant moved, in his counsel’s words, “for a mistrial . . . , under what is known 
as a Wheeler Motion,” which the trial court understood as a motion based on People v. 
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 to dismiss all of the jurors and alternate jurors and to 
quash the remaining venire.  In Wheeler, we held that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of membership in a cognizable group, 
including African-Americans, violates the right of a defendant under article I, section 16 
of the California Constitution to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section 
of the community.  (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–277, & 280, fn. 26.)  
Defendant, who is European-American, asserted that the prosecutor struck, in his 
counsel’s words, “every prospective black juror that has been called.  And I have counted 
five” — the last being Prospective Alternate Juror G. R.2  The trial court denied the 
                                             
 
2 
As indicated in part II.C, one of the 12 sworn jurors was excused for cause after 
completion of the selection of the four alternate jurors. 
11 
motion, determining that it was “not timely” and additionally that there was no “prima 
faci[e] showing as to . . . the people that were excused.” 
 
At this point, the following colloquy ensued between the trial court and 
defendant’s counsel.  Counsel stated, “Your Honor, could I put on the record the last 
alternate who was excused was black.  Mr. [G. R.]”  The court responded, “I don’t know.  
Was he?  [¶]  He appeared to be of minority [sic].  I can’t say that he was black.  I don’t 
know.  Was he?  In your opinion?”  Counsel replied, “Well, perhaps I should have 
inquired, but, yes, he certainly appeared to be black to me.”   
 
Selection of the alternate jurors then proceeded.  After the two remaining alternate 
jurors were selected and sworn, the prosecutor volunteered a comment apparently 
disputing the number of African-Americans whom he had peremptorily challenged, and 
articulating a reason explaining his peremptory challenge of Prospective Alternate 
Juror G. R.:  “And with respect to — assuming that [defense counsel] was correct in his 
opinion that Mr. [G. R.] was black, there were comments made by Mr. [G. R.] in his juror 
questionnaire about the responsibility of persons who are using drugs or otherwise 
intoxicated which are closely related to the issues or some of the issues, which I believe 
will be raised in this case.  And [I] would have excused anyone with those attitudes.”  
The trial court did not respond to the prosecutor’s comment, but instead “point[ed] out 
for the record” — without contradiction or objection by defense counsel — “that Mr. 
[G. R.] was asleep during most of the voir dire.  He was in the back row and I asked the 
bailiff to wake him up.”3 
                                             
 
3 
Subsequently, just prior to the hearing on defendant’s automatic application to 
modify the verdict of death, the People made a motion seeking what they styled 
“augmentation of [the] trial record” in order, in pertinent part, to allow the prosecutor to 
articulate reasons for his peremptory challenges against prospective jurors or alternate 
jurors whom he believed were African-Americans.  Defense counsel opposed the motion, 
arguing that the “record should stand on its own.”  The trial court denied the motion. 
12 
 
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by denying his Wheeler motion.4 
 
Under Wheeler, there is a presumption that a prosecutor who employs a 
peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group 
does so for a purpose other than to discriminate.  (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at 
p. 278.)  If a defendant believes that the prosecutor is using a peremptory challenge for a 
discriminatory purpose, the defendant “must raise the point in timely fashion.”  (Id. at 
p. 280.)  At the threshold, the defendant must establish a “prima facie case of 
[purposeful] discrimination.”  (Ibid.)  “First, . . . [the defendant] should make as complete 
a record of the circumstances as is feasible.”  (Ibid.)  “Second, [the defendant] must 
establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group . . . .”  (Ibid.)  
“Third, from all the circumstances of the case [the defendant] must show a strong 
likelihood” (ibid.) — or, stated in other terms, must raise a “reasonable inference” (id. at 
                                             
 
4 
In the course of proceedings to prepare the record on appeal, defendant applied for 
permission to prepare a settled statement essentially for the purpose of identifying which 
of the prospective jurors or alternate jurors whom the prosecutor peremptorily challenged 
were African-Americans and also to identify whether a certain prospective juror whom 
the prosecutor challenged for cause was African-American.  We denied the application. 
 
Defendant claims that to the extent the record on appeal is inadequate to support 
his claim of error as a result of our denial of his application for permission to prepare a 
settled statement, he has been denied meaningful appellate review in violation of the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and also the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution (see People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8).  We 
disagree.  A settled statement operates to make up for the absence of a reporter’s 
transcript of oral proceedings (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 7 & 36(b); see generally 
Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 192–197), and not to supply what was 
omitted from those proceedings (see People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 585, affd. 
sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California (1993) 512 U.S. 967 [stating that the “settlement . . . 
process does not allow parties to create proceedings . . . which they neglected to [create] 
earlier”]).  If the record on appeal is inadequate, it is defendant who is responsible, 
inasmuch as he failed to include in the oral proceedings at trial the information that he 
improperly sought to insert through a settled statement. 
13 
p. 281; accord, People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1306, 1312–1318, cert. 
granted sub nom. Johnson v. California (2003) ___ U.S. ___ [124 S.Ct. 817], cert. 
dismissed (2004) ___ U.S. ___ [124 S.Ct. 1833]) — “that such persons are being 
challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias” 
(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280).  In order to demonstrate such a “strong 
likelihood,” or raise such a “reasonable inference,” the defendant “must show that it is 
more likely than not the [prosecutor’s] peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based 
on impermissible group bias” or purposeful discrimination.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at p. 1306; accord, id. at p. 1318.)  If the defendant succeeds in establishing a 
prima facie case of such discrimination, the prosecutor must articulate neutral reasons 
explaining the peremptory challenges in question.  (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 
at pp. 281–282.)  Ultimately, the defendant must prove purposeful discrimination.  (See 
id. at pp. 278–282 [placing the “burden of proof” on the defendant].)  If the defendant 
succeeds in proving such discrimination, the trial court must dismiss any jurors thus far 
selected and sworn, and quash any remaining venire.  (Id. at p. 282.) 
 
We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s Wheeler 
motion.  We need not consider whether it erred in determining that the motion was 
untimely because, in any event, the trial court did not err in determining that defendant 
failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. 
 
When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion with a finding that the defendant 
failed to establish a prima face case of purposeful discrimination, we review the record 
on appeal to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the ruling.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 135; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
900, 993–994; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 116–117.)5  The record includes 
                                             
 
5 
Some of our decisions, including People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 
1201, and People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 167, have implied that a finding that a 
(footnote continued on next page) 
14 
voir dire (see, e.g., People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 135; People v. Jenkins, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 993; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 116) as well as 
any juror questionnaires (see People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 419–423).  We 
sustain the ruling when the record discloses grounds upon which the prosecutor properly 
might have exercised the peremptory challenges against the prospective jurors in 
question.  (E.g., People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 135; People v. Crittenden, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 117.) 
 
During voir dire, Prospective Alternate Juror G. R. stated that he never had served 
as a juror, had lived in Fresno approximately 14 years, worked as a track man for the San 
Joaquin Valley Railroad making repairs, was unmarried, and spent his leisure time 
playing basketball, and also implied that he could choose either death or life 
imprisonment with possibility of parole as the penalty for defendant, depending on the 
evidence to be presented at trial. 
 
In his juror questionnaire, this prospective juror disclosed further information, 
including the following:  G. R. was 19 years of age, was a recent high school graduate, 
and was the father of a 10-month-old daughter.  Expressing a desire to become a highway 
patrol officer, G. R. stated that relatives and friends had been arrested for, charged with, 
or incarcerated for, the sale of drugs, and also stated that he had witnessed various 
crimes, including theft, the sale of drugs, and a shooting.  As for his general attitudes 
regarding the use of drugs and alcohol, G. R. expressed beliefs that included the 
following:  “[T]hey should stop selling alcohol because all it does it cause [sic] 
problems”; alcohol use affects individuals by “mak[ing] them do crazy things” and by 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination is subject to 
review for abuse of discretion.  Subsequent decisions, including those cited in the text, 
clarify that such a finding is examined for substantial evidence. 
15 
causing them to “forget what happen [sic] the day before”; similarly, drug use affects 
individuals by “mak[ing] them do crazy things and hurt people” and by “caus[ing]” them 
“to do other crimes just to get some more”; drug users are more likely than others to be 
guilty of crimes with which they are charged, “[b]ecause they dont [sic] remember if they 
did it or not”; and “I don’t like [drug use] because I have family members on it,” adding 
that a drug user is a “person looking for an excuse.”  G. R. also made various other 
comments, expressing a belief that violent crime had increased recently because “[t]here 
are more crazy people because of drug users and gangs,” and that the penalty of death is 
imposed “[r]andomly,” whereas the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole is “no good if they will never get out why live.”  
 
Having reviewed the record on appeal, we find substantial evidence to support the 
trial court’s finding that defendant failed to establish a prima face case of purposeful 
discrimination.  The record discloses grounds upon which the prosecutor properly might 
have made his peremptory challenge against G. R.  First, he apparently had substantial 
acquaintance with persons engaged in criminal activity.  Second, he held a negative view 
of the nature of the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole as “no 
good,” and a similarly negative view of the administration of the penalty of death as 
random.  Third, his comments on various points suggested that he may have been lacking 
in attention, in conformity with the trial court’s observation — uncontradicted and 
unobjected to by defense counsel — that G. R. was “asleep during most of the voir 
dire.”6  The foregoing constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding 
that defendant failed to make a prima face case of purposeful discrimination.7 
                                             
 
6 
Defendant apparently claims that under People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 
1233–1234, the trial court erred by failing to conduct any inquiry into whether 
Prospective Alternate Juror G. R. was asleep.  In DeSantis, we concluded that the trial 
court did not err when it conducted a “self-directed inquiry” into whether certain jurors 
had fallen asleep.  (Id. at p. 1234.)  The trial court here conducted just such an inquiry 
(footnote continued on next page) 
16 
 
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying his Wheeler motion 
insofar as the motion also implicated Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79.  In Batson, 
which followed Wheeler by some eight years, the United States Supreme Court held that 
a prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror on the basis of 
membership in a cognizable group, including African-Americans, violates a defendant’s 
right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 84–89.)  Batson requires 
of defendant substantially the same prima face case of purposeful discrimination as is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
when it noticed that G. R. was “asleep during most of the voir dire” and then “asked the 
bailiff to wake him up.”  The trial court was not required to do more. 
7 
Our conclusion that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding 
that defendant failed to establish a prima face case of purposeful discrimination would be 
no different were we to review the record on appeal relating to the three — not four, as 
claimed by defendant — other prospective jurors struck by the prosecutor’s peremptory 
challenges, and the additional prospective juror struck by the prosecutor’s challenge for 
cause, who defendant now represents may have been African-Americans:  C. F., J. H., 
W. M., and V. P. 
 
J. H., W. M., and V. P. were struck by peremptory challenge.  V. P. made it plain 
that if she were sworn as a juror, she likely would not vote to impose the death penalty in 
this case.  W. M. did so as well, and also expressed opposition to the death penalty 
generally.  By contrast, J. H. indicated her rather strong support for the death penalty in 
the abstract, but at the same time stated that if she were a juror she probably could not 
vote to impose that punishment. 
 
C. F. was struck pursuant to a challenge for cause.  As discussed hereafter (post, 
pp. 20-21), C. F. was a warden at a state prison at which women condemned to death 
were incarcerated pending execution of sentence.  C. F. stated that she would experience 
a personal and professional conflict of interest if she were to serve as a juror in a capital 
case at the same time as she participated in the administration of the death penalty.  She 
indicated that she desired not to serve as a juror.  In light of her statement, the prosecutor 
challenged her for cause, and the trial court excused her. 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that with respect to the excusal of these four 
prospective jurors, there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that 
defendant failed to establish a prima face case of purposeful discrimination. 
17 
required by Wheeler.  (See People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 115–118; see also 
People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1313-1314.)  Because defendant failed to 
satisfy Wheeler, he likewise failed to satisfy Batson.  (See People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at pp. 115–118.)8 
B.  Excusal of Prospective Jurors for Cause Related to Capital Punishment 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred under the impartial-jury guaranties of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution by excusing four prospective jurors at the penalty phase retrial 
because of their views on capital punishment.  As we shall explain, we conclude that this 
claim lacks merit. 
 
In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a prospective juror cannot be excused for cause based on his or her views on 
capital punishment without violating a defendant’s right to an impartial jury under the 
Sixth Amendment, unless, as pertinent here, the prospective juror made it “unmistakably 
clear” that he or she would “automatically vote against the imposition of capital 
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the 
case . . . .”  (Id. at p. 522, fn. 21.)  In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, however, 
the court revisited Witherspoon and declared that the proper standard was “whether the 
[prospective] juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”  (Id. at p. 424.)  In 
People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767, we adopted the Witt standard as the test for 
determining whether a defendant’s right to an impartial jury under article I, section 16 of 
                                             
 
8 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s asserted error in denying his Wheeler 
motion resulted in a judgment of death violative of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  But, as we have concluded, the trial 
court’s ruling was not erroneous. 
18 
the state Constitution was violated by an excusal for cause based on a prospective juror’s 
views on capital punishment. 
 
On the People’s challenge, the trial court excused Prospective Jurors E. B., M. C., 
J. D., and C. F. for cause based on their views concerning capital punishment.  The trial 
court found that each held views that would substantially impair the performance of her 
duties as a juror in accordance with her instructions and her oath. 
 
Substantial evidence is the standard of review applicable to a finding on the 
potential effect of a prospective juror’s views related to capital punishment.  (E.g., People 
v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 817–818; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 
1262.)  The standard is the same for the threshold finding regarding the nature of such 
views:  “Such a finding, we have stated, is generally ‘binding’ ‘if the prospective juror’s 
responses are equivocal . . . or conflicting . . . .’ ”  (People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 
932, 962; see People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1147; People v. Kaurish (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 648, 675; see also People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1025.)  As we 
explained in People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 60:  “[W]e pay due deference to the trial 
court, which was in a position to actually observe and listen to the prospective jurors.  
Voir dire sometimes fails to elicit an unmistakably clear answer from the juror, and there 
will be times when ‘the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective 
juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . .  [T]his is why 
deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ” (Quoting 
Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 426.) 
 
In this case, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that each of the 
prospective jurors in question held views concerning capital punishment that 
substantially impaired her ability to perform her duties. 
 
Prospective Juror E. B. stated, alternately, that she could, and could not, vote to 
impose the death penalty.  Although she stated that earlier in her life she strongly had 
supported the death penalty, she admitted that she presently entertained mixed feelings 
19 
and was at a crossroads in her thinking, further revealing that she believed that it was 
wrong to impose the death penalty and that life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole was sufficient punishment.  She added that she had been much affected by the 
recent deaths of her father and her mother, which occurred on the same day; that she had 
been unsettled by the execution of Robert Alton Harris, placing herself in his place in the 
gas chamber in her thoughts; and, lastly, that she had been unable even to have a gravely 
ill dog put down just three weeks earlier.  The trial court reasonably could find 
substantial impairment in her reactions to each of these very different events. 
 
Prospective Juror M. C. indicated that she would not want to take responsibility 
for voting for the death penalty and, upon further questioning, stated and reiterated that 
she did not know whether she ever could vote to impose the death penalty, regardless of 
the state of the evidence in a case.9  In similar fashion, Prospective Juror J. D., although 
stating that she supported the death penalty generally, also stated she did not know 
                                             
 
9 
The relevant passage of M. C.’s voir dire reads as follows: 
 
“Q [Prosecutor]:  You can’t answer that question about whether you believe there 
should either be such a death penalty? 
 
A:  I don’t know.  I don’t feel like I should make that decision if there should be. 
 
Q:  Okay.  Well, bearing that in mind, do you think then that you should make the 
decision about whether someone gets the death penalty or not? 
 
A:  No. 
 
Q:  Okay.  Why do you think that you should not? 
 
A:  I wouldn’t want to take that responsibility. 
 
Q:  And feeling that way as you’ve described in these last few answers in a real 
case, do you think that you could ever impose the death penalty on another human being? 
 
A:  I guess.  I really — I can’t say definite yes or no. 
 
Q:  Please, if I’m not making myself clear, I’m not asking you how you would 
vote in this case because you couldn’t know.  You haven’t heard the evidence. 
 
A:  I know, it’s if I could do anybody. 
 
Q:  Exactly.  And your best response is you don’t know. 
 
A:  I’m being honest. 
 
Q:  And it’s okay for you to feel that way. It’s fine. 
 
A:  Okay.” 
20 
whether she actually could vote to impose the death penalty — even in a case in which 
she had concluded that the defendant deserved the death penalty.10  With respect to each 
of these prospective jurors, the trial court, having had the opportunity to observe the 
demeanor of each and to assess the degree of reluctance and apprehension expressed by 
each prospective juror in responding to questioning, reasonably could find that each 
prospective juror’s views on the death penalty would substantially impair her ability to 
perform the duties of a juror in accordance with the trial court’s instructions. 
 
Lastly, Prospective Juror C. F. was the warden of a state prison at which women 
condemned to death are incarcerated pending execution.  C. F. stated that in light of her 
professional responsibilities as warden and the potential adverse effect on conditions in 
her institution that might result if it became known she had voted to impose the death 
penalty, she would have difficulty imposing that punishment and did not know whether 
her employment would affect her choice of penalty.11  The trial court, having heard 
                                             
 
10  
The relevant passage of J. D.’s voir dire reads: 
 
“Q [Prosecutor]:  [L]et’s assume . . . [y]ou’ve heard the evidence and it’s just the 
kind of case you think [the death penalty is] deserved in.  Because of your belief that hey, 
I can’t be a person to make this decision, would you be able to?  Would you be able to 
impose the death penalty? 
 
A:  I don’t know. 
 
Q:  Even if it was a case that you thought deserves it you still might have a 
problem? 
 
A:  Yes. 
 
Q:  And that’s the best you can tell us now, I don’t know. 
 
A:  I’m sorry. 
 
Q:  I’m not giving you a hard time. 
 
A:  I honestly do not know if I could impose that.  I might be able to when I heard 
the evidence but I might not.” 
11 
The relevant passages of C. F.’s voir dire read as follows: 
 
“Q [The Court]:  Do you feel that you could listen to the evidence in this case, 
evidence as to mitigation, evidence of aggravation, and listen to the court’s instructions 
before you make up your mind as to what you feel the appropriate punishment should be? 
(footnote continued on next page) 
21 
C. F.’s responses and observed her demeanor, reasonably could find that her position and 
responsibilities as warden would substantially impair her ability to perform the duties of a 
juror. 
 
Defendant, maintaining substantial evidence does not exist to support the trial 
court’s excusal of any of the prospective jurors in question, focuses on equivocal and 
conflicting responses by each of the four women in her juror questionnaire and on voir 
dire.  As already explained, however, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the 
demeanor and to assess the degree of uncertainty and reluctance of each prospective juror 
and resolved any equivocal and conflicting responses in a manner that caused the court to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
A:  I would have some difficulty with it, Sir. 
 
Q:  In what way? 
 
A:  As a Warden of a State prison, I am struggling with a — not only a personal 
and professional kind of conflict.  I currently house the condemned row for women at my 
prison and as a result, my position has always remained that I am charged by the State to 
carry out whatever the penalties are.  And I struggle then with the potential of being 
responsible for not only carrying it out, but imposing it.  [¶] . . . [¶] 
 
Q [Prosecutor]:  [Ms. C. F.], you told us a little bit about a conflict you feel 
between being a juror in a capital case and your employment.  Do you think that that 
conflict would impact upon your choosing between the two possible sentences in a case 
like this? 
 
A:  I would hope not, but I could not honestly tell you that today.  [¶] . . . [¶] 
 
Q [The Court]:  Let me ask a couple questions if I may [Ms. C. F.].  If you sat on 
this jury, do you feel that the inmates in your institution would find out that you had sat 
on a death penalty case? 
 
A:  Yes 
 
Q:  Do you feel there is a possibility of an uprise in your institution if they found 
out that you voted for the death penalty? 
 
A:  Not an uprise but I believe it would cause problems.  An uprise is a very 
serious word for a prisoner. 
 
Q:  Well, yes, it is.  Do you feel that whatever took place in the institution as a 
result of you sitting on a jury and possibly casting a vote for the death penalty, that that 
would cause you personal problems at your institution? 
 
A:  Yes.”  
22 
conclude that each of these jurors’ views or employment would substantially impair the 
juror’s ability to make a penalty determination in accordance with the court’s 
instructions.  On this record, we have no reason or basis for second-guessing that finding.  
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the fact that at some point each of these prospective 
jurors may have stated or implied that she would perform her duties as a juror did not 
prevent the trial court from finding, on the entire record, that each nevertheless held 
views or had employment responsibilities that substantially impaired her ability to serve. 
 
Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate standard 
in excusing the prospective jurors in question.  The record does not support this assertion.  
With regard to one of the prospective jurors, the trial court expressly invoked the 
requisite standard.  As for the others, the court did so by implication.  Defendant’s point 
seems to be that the trial court must have failed to apply the appropriate standard because 
substantial evidence does not exist to support its excusal of any of these prospective 
jurors.  But as we have explained, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s action in 
excusing each of the jurors in question.12 
C.  Failure to Reopen Jury Selection 
 
Moments after the 12 regular jurors were selected and sworn at the penalty phase 
retrial, and prior to the selection of any of the four alternate jurors, one of the 12 jurors, 
E. L., who the record reflects was “hysterical” and “in tears,” asked to be discharged 
because her son had been arrested, adding, “I have too many things on my mind.  I can’t 
even think.”  The trial court, outside the presence of the other jurors and prospective 
                                             
 
12 
We reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s asserted error in excusing the 
prospective jurors in question for cause violated his rights both under the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as under the analogous 
clauses of article I, sections 1, 7, and 15 of the California Constitution.  As we have 
concluded, the trial court’s excusals were not erroneous. 
23 
alternate jurors, questioned E. L. concerning her situation.  E. L., who remained 
distraught, responded that her son had been arrested for seven armed robberies four days 
earlier, apparently after the conclusion of the last court session.  When the trial court 
asked why she had failed to bring the fact to its attention earlier that day, E. L. replied, “I 
didn’t even know I could say anything about it.  I just can’t do this.”  The trial court 
addressed the prosecutor and defense counsel:  “I suspect that what we should do is to — 
if you stipulate that she can be excused, we’ll seat the alternates and then select an 
alternate to replace her at this point in time.  The jury has been sworn in.”   
 
After asking Juror E. L. to leave the courtroom, the trial court engaged in colloquy 
with the prosecutor and defense counsel.  The prosecutor stated that “[t]he jury’s been 
sworn and in a hypertechnical sense, jeopardy is attached and/or at least there’s an 
argument to be made for that.”  The trial court asked the prosecutor, “Well, would you 
stipulate she could be excused and we could then seat her [replacement] and there would 
be no challenges to the other eleven but only as to this one seat?”  The prosecutor 
responded with his view that “defendant personally [should] be part” of any such 
stipulation.  Defense counsel interjected that defendant could not do so.  The trial court 
replied, “Well, all [the prosecutor] is suggesting is that . . . whatever procedure we use 
. . . your client personally agree as to what procedure we’re going to go through.”  “If 
there’s a stipulation that [E. L.] . . . be excused, we re-seat a new juror to take this juror’s 
place before we start selecting the alternates.  That your client stipulate to it . . . .  That’s 
all [the prosecutor] is suggesting.”  Defense counsel asked for an opportunity to research 
the question, and the trial court ordered a recess for that purpose. 
 
Following the recess, defendant moved for a mistrial.  Defense counsel stated:  
“Jeopardy has attached, the jury was sworn.  The defense is also at a significant 
disadvantage.  We have used sixteen peremptory challenges.  We have had twenty-six to 
use.  If . . . juror [Ms. E. L.] . . . had said that five seconds before, we would still have 
those ten peremptories to use plus the ones on the alternates, and we feel that this is a 
24 
significant disadvantage to the defense . . . .”  The trial court inquired:  “Well, aside from 
the mistrial, would you stipulate to excusing this juror at this time and reopening and 
proceeding to select a person to sit in [her place] . . . ?”  Defense counsel responded:  
“Your Honor, not giving up any issues on the mistrial issue, which I think is preserved at 
this point, is the court saying would we agree to — would we feel we are not in so much 
of a disadvantage —”  The trial court interrupted:  “No, I’m asking if you want to 
stipulate to this procedure, the procedure you suggested.  Now if you stipulate to it then 
you are giving up your advantage and your objection.”  Defense counsel replied:  “No.” 
 
Invited by the trial court to comment on the procedure to be followed, the 
prosecutor expressed his position that the trial court should select and swear the intended 
four alternate jurors, and then should turn to considering whether to discharge Juror E. L. 
and, if she were discharged, replacing her with one of the alternate jurors.  In response, 
defense counsel stated:  “Your Honor, for the record, the defense would like to indicate 
that I believe this decision has already been made by the court.  That they are going to 
excuse that juror . . . .”  The trial court cited its authority in section 233 (mistakenly 
transcribed or referenced as section 234) of the Code of Civil Procedure to put an 
alternate juror in the place of a juror who has been discharged.  Defense counsel 
responded:  “The difference I see we have before us, your Honor, is we don’t have any 
alternates.”  The trial court replied:  “I understand that and we’re in the process of 
obtaining the alternates.  And the court is therefore going to proceed to select the 
alternates and then we’ll seat the alternates, seat one of the alternates to replace juror 
[E. L.] . . . .  We’ll select four alternates.  Each . . . side will have one peremptory per 
alternate, that means four peremptories.” 
 
The prosecutor requested clarification:  “If I understood your comments correctly 
a few moments ago when you were speaking with the defense here on the record, that 
you were making available or offering to them the procedure whereby we reopen jury 
selection so that they could proceed with whatever the peremptories were that were 
25 
remaining if they opted to avail themselves to that procedure that was available to them?”  
The trial court responded:  “Well, it was except they declined it and still insisted on the 
mistrial.”  The prosecutor stated:  “Right.  I understand.  That’s what I thought had 
occurred there.”  Defense counsel made no statement. 
 
The trial court continued:  “And then the procedure after we seat the alternates, 
first alternate will replace juror [E. L.] . . . if we get to that point and juror [E. L.] . . . is 
excused.  Then if . . . another juror wishes to be excused during the course of the trial, 
alternate number 2 will replace and then alternate number 3, and then alternate number 4.  
Any objection to that procedure?”  Defense counsel and the prosecutor each answered, 
“No.” 
 
Thereupon, in open court the four alternate jurors were selected and sworn.  
Immediately thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing in chambers as to whether to 
discharge Juror E. L.  The trial court questioned E. L. as previously, concerning her son’s 
recent arrest, and E. L. continued to indicate she was too distraught to serve as a juror.  
The trial court then asked the prosecutor and defense counsel whether they would 
stipulate to E. L.’s discharge.  Defense counsel answered:  “Your Honor, the Defense 
can’t do that at this time.”  The trial court responded:  “All right, . . . then we’ll keep 
[Ms. E. L.] on as a juror.  Is that what you want?”  Defense counsel replied:  “No.  I think 
it’s the Court’s decision.”  Upon further questioning by the trial court and the prosecutor, 
E. L. responded, “I can’t do this right now.  I am very emotional” and “I don’t know if I 
could [do it]” even weeks later.  The trial court discharged E. L. as unable to perform her 
duty, noting later its “opinion that she could not pay attention to the evidence based on 
her emotional state,” and replaced her with an alternate juror.  The trial court then 
admonished the jury and the remaining three alternate jurors, and excused them for the 
day. 
 
Defendant again moved for a mistrial.  Defense counsel stated:  “We had asked for 
a mistrial earlier, but that was before [Ms. E. L.] had been excused.  [¶]  We would ask 
26 
for a mistrial now, because we did not stipulate or agree to have [Ms. E. L.] be excused 
and the jury was sworn and then the alternates were picked right after the jury was sworn.  
[¶]  This is on the record already.  [¶]  [Ms. E. L.] indicated a problem with serving as a 
juror and we are still of the same mind, we feel that a mistrial should be granted and 
should be granted at this time in this case.”  The trial court denied the motion. 
 
Subsequently, after the jury returned its penalty determination and just prior to the 
hearing on defendant’s automatic application to modify the verdict of death, defendant 
moved for a new trial, in pertinent part effectively renewing his mistrial motions.  The 
trial court denied the new trial motion, stating as to the mistrial motions that the court 
“stands by its ruling[s].” 
 
On appeal, defendant does not contend the trial court erred by discharging 
Juror E. L..  Instead, defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to reopen jury 
selection completely, in order to allow him to exercise his remaining peremptory 
challenges against jurors already sworn. 
 
The legal principles applicable to the claim before us are set out in our decisions in 
In re Mendes (1979) 23 Cal.3d 847, People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, and 
People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035. 
 
In Mendes, we held that jeopardy does not attach for purposes of the double 
jeopardy clause of either the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
article I, section 15 of the California Constitution until empanelment of the jury is 
complete, which entails selecting and swearing in not only the 12 regular jurors but also 
any alternate jurors.  (In re Mendes, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 852–854.)  We further held 
that discharge of a regular juror before empanelment of the jury has been completed — 
with the selection and swearing in of the alternate jurors — does not amount to discharge 
of the jury for double jeopardy purposes.  (Id. at pp. 852–856.) 
 
In Mendes, we also concluded that when the trial court discharges a regular juror 
prior to the selection and swearing in of any alternate jurors, the court possesses authority 
27 
to reopen jury selection completely to allow each of the parties to exercise any 
peremptory challenges remaining against any of the remaining regular jurors already 
sworn.  (In re Mendes, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 855.)  In reaching this conclusion, we 
observed that inasmuch as the “composition of the 12-member panel [would] . . . 
change,” there could be a “valid reason” for the trial court to allow the parties to exercise 
their remaining peremptory challenges against remaining regular jurors already sworn in 
order to “satisfy themselves to the best of their ability with the final composition of the 
jury.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Next, in Armendariz, we considered a claim by the defendant that, following the 
trial court’s discharge of two regular jurors prior to the selection and swearing in of the 
alternate jurors, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to completely 
reopen jury selection to allow him to exercise his remaining peremptory challenges 
against the remaining regular jurors already sworn.  Applying the abuse-of-discretion 
standard (People v. Armendariz, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 581), we found that the trial court 
in that case was unaware of its authority to reopen jury selection, and that had it been 
aware of that authority, it could not reasonably have denied the defendant’s motion (id. at 
pp. 581–583).  On that ground, we reversed the judgment rendered against the defendant 
and remanded the matter for a new trial. 
 
Thereafter, in Caro, we considered a claim by the defendant that the trial court 
erred by failing to reopen jury selection completely to allow him to exercise his 
remaining peremptory challenges against the remaining regular jurors already sworn, 
following discharge of a regular juror prior to the selection and swearing of the alternate 
jurors.  In light of the procedural posture of that case, however, we rejected defendant’s 
argument, concluding that a trial court does not have a duty to reopen jury selection sua 
sponte, that is, on its own initiative in the absence of a request by the defendant (People 
v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1046).  We therefore held that a defendant “may not be 
heard to complain” of any such omission on appeal unless he or she requested such action 
28 
by the trial court (id. at p. 1047).  Because the defendant in Caro had not asked the trial 
court to reopen jury selection, we concluded he could not complain on appeal of the trial 
court’s failure to do so. 
 
Applying the principles set forth above in Mendes, Armendariz, and Caro, we 
reject defendant’s claim that the trial court in this case erred by failing to reopen jury 
selection completely in order to allow him to exercise his remaining peremptory 
challenges against the remaining regular jurors already sworn, following the discharge of 
Juror E. L. and prior to the selection and swearing in of the alternate jurors.  As in Caro, 
defendant did not seek any such action from the trial court.  What defendant in fact did 
seek, twice, was a mistrial — under what defendant now concedes was the erroneous 
belief that jeopardy had attached.  In support of a mistrial, defense counsel cited the 
assertedly “significant disadvantage to the defense” flowing from the circumstance that 
had the 12 regular jurors not been selected and sworn, the defense would have had 10 
remaining peremptory challenges for use against any prospective jurors called to voir dire 
for Juror E. L.’s seat as a regular juror, in addition to the four peremptory challenges 
available for use against any prospective jurors summoned to voir dire as potential 
alternate jurors.  When the trial court inquired of defense counsel whether they were 
willing to stipulate to the procedure that the trial court believed they had suggested — 
that is, to reopen jury selection — defense counsel responded in the negative.  Any 
uncertainty in this regard was dispelled later when, in response to the prosecutor’s 
request for clarification, the trial court stated — without contradiction by defense 
counsel — that defense counsel had “declined” what the prosecutor described as the 
“procedure whereby we reopen jury selection so that they could proceed with whatever 
the peremptories were that were remaining.”  Thus, not only did defendant not seek to 
reopen jury selection, he in fact actively opposed such action, and his two motions for 
mistrial were not the equivalent of a request that the trial court do otherwise. 
29 
 
In support of his claim, defendant argues that the trial court was unaware of its 
authority to reopen jury selection completely in order to allow each of the parties to 
exercise remaining peremptory challenges against remaining regular jurors already 
sworn.  The argument, however, does not establish that the trial court erred in failing to 
take such a course.  Although the trial court provided an opportunity for counsel to 
research this issue, defense counsel did not even cite Mendes, Armendariz, or Caro.  
More importantly, under Caro, which had been decided some years earlier, the trial court 
did not have a sua sponte duty to reopen jury selection.  Defendant did not request such 
action, and the trial court was not under any obligation to act on its own initiative. 
 
Defendant alternatively argues that the trial court improperly required him to 
withdraw his first motion for mistrial as a condition of the court’s exercising its authority 
to reopen jury selection completely so as to allow each of the parties to exercise its 
remaining peremptory challenges against the remaining regular jurors already sworn.  
Defendant relies upon the trial court’s inquiry:  “Well, aside from the mistrial, would you 
stipulate to excusing . . . juror [E. L.] at this time and reopening and proceeding to select 
a person to sit in [her place] . . . ?”  (Italics added.)  Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we 
do not discern in the italicized phrase the imposition of any condition on defendant, 
improper or otherwise, but only an attempt to clarify whether defendant would accept the 
procedure proposed as an acceptable resolution short of mistrial. 
 
Defendant finally argues that the trial court should not have continued the hearing 
on whether to discharge Juror E. L. until after the four alternate jurors were selected and 
sworn, having done so assertedly to avoid any discharge of the jury that might have been 
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 233.13  But the trial court’s action in 
                                             
 
13 
Code of Civil Procedure section 233 provides:  “If, before the jury has returned its 
verdict to the court, a juror becomes sick or, upon other good cause shown to the court, is 
found to be unable to perform his or her duty, the court may order the juror to be 
discharged.  If any alternate jurors have been selected as provided by law, one of them 
(footnote continued on next page) 
30 
continuing the hearing has no bearing on the resolution of the matter before us, inasmuch 
as under Caro the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to reopen jury selection.14 
D.  Denial of Motion for Order Recusing the District Attorney’s Office for Conflict 
of Interest 
 
Prior to the penalty phase retrial, defendant moved under section 1424 for an order 
recusing the district attorney’s office based on an asserted conflict of interest arising out 
of that office’s employment of Noemi Yolanda Summi.  The People opposed the motion.   
 
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion.  Summi 
testified at the hearing as follows:  She currently was employed in the district attorney’s 
office as an investigator with the civil section of the juvenile division in what she 
described as an extra-help, temporary position, having begun work there about seven 
months earlier.  Her office was situated in a building located miles from the building in 
which the prosecutor’s office was situated.  Previously, she was self-employed as a 
private investigator; about three years earlier, she had been hired to work as an 
investigator for defense counsel representing defendant’s brother Elzie Griffin when 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
shall then be designated by the court to take the place of the juror so discharged.  If after 
all alternate jurors have been made regular jurors or if there is no alternate juror, a juror 
becomes sick or otherwise unable to perform the juror’s duty and has been discharged by 
the court as provided in this section, the jury shall be discharged and a new jury then or 
afterwards impaneled, and the cause may again be tried.  Alternatively, with the consent 
of all parties, the trial may proceed with only the remaining jurors, or another juror may 
be sworn and the trial begin anew.” 
14 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s asserted error in failing to reopen jury 
selection completely so as to allow him to exercise his remaining peremptory challenges 
against jurors already sworn violated his rights under the due process clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the impartial jury clause 
of the Sixth Amendment, and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, as well as his rights under the analogous clauses of article I, sections 7, 15, 
16, and 17 of the California Constitution.  But as we have concluded, the trial court’s 
action was not erroneous. 
31 
Elzie was charged with murder (with one or more special-circumstance allegations) 
unrelated to the charges against defendant.  She worked in that capacity for a year or so, 
during which time she also collaborated with an investigator who worked for defense 
counsel representing defendant.  Along with six or seven other persons, she once 
attended a team meeting relating to defendant’s case, but never engaged in any 
discussions about defendant’s case with any person other than counsel representing 
defendant and the agents of those counsel.  Since the beginning of her employment in the 
district attorney’s office, she never had been approached by anyone in that office with 
any questions about defendant’s case and she never had occasion to do any work 
whatsoever for that office with respect to defendant’s case.  Indeed, she believed that no 
one in the district attorney’s office knew about her indirect involvement in defendant’s 
case or her direct involvement in defendant’s brother Elzie’s case. 
 
Following Summi’s testimony, defense counsel presented argument, conceding 
that “it is apparent that there is no actual conflict in that . . . Miss Summi has not talked to 
. . . [the prosecutor] or anyone on his team or to anyone about the case,” but adding that 
“[j]ust because Miss Summi has not spoken to anyone so there is no actual conflict, it 
doesn’t mean there isn’t an apparent conflict or appearance of impropriety.”  
 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to recuse the district attorney’s office, 
stating:  “I agree there is no actual conflict and any apparent conflict is simply that.  It’s 
clear from Miss Summi’s testimony she has not spoken to anyone in the District 
Attorney’s office concerning her former services on . . . [defendant’s] case.  In fact, her 
thinking is no one in the District Attorney’s office is even aware of the fact that she 
worked on that case.”  The trial court then admonished Summi, “specifically ordering 
[her] to not discuss this case at all with anyone from the District Attorney’s office or 
anyone at all that is involved in this case, directly or indirectly involved in the 
prosecution of [defendant].”   
32 
 
In People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, (Greer) we held that a 
trial court has general statutory authority to order recusal of a member of a district 
attorney’s office, and inferentially the office itself, for a conflict of interest.  (Id. at 
pp. 261–265; see generally People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 590–594.)  In 
Greer, we further held that the applicable standard for the trial court’s exercise of such 
authority is whether there exists a conflict of interest that “might prejudice [the conflicted 
person or entity] . . . against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, [its] . . . 
ability to impartially perform [its] . . . discretionary functions.”  (Greer, supra, 19 Cal.3d. 
at p. 269; see generally People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 590–591.) 
 
After our decision in Greer, the Legislature added section 1424 to the Penal Code.  
That statute sets forth the procedure for a defendant to seek an order from the trial court 
recusing a member of the district attorney’s office, or the office as a whole, for a conflict 
of interest.  (See People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 123, fn. 7; People v. Eubanks, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 591.)  The statute also makes a substantive change (see People v. 
Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 123, fn. 7; People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 
p. 591), replacing the standard set forth in Greer with a standard that, in its present form, 
provides that a trial court may not order recusal “unless the evidence shows that a conflict 
of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair 
trial” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1)).  (See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 591; 
People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 147.)  A conflict of interest exists “whenever the 
circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the . . . [conflicted person 
or entity] may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.”  (People 
v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 148; accord, People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 86; 
Hambarian v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 833; People v. Millwee, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 123; People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592.)  Whether characterized 
as “actual” or merely “apparent,” a conflict requires recusal only if it is “so grave as to 
render it unlikely that [the] defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the 
33 
criminal proceedings.”  (People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 148; accord, People v. 
Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 86; Hambarian v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 833; People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 123; People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 592.) 
 
On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for an order recusing a member of the 
district attorney’s office, or the office as a whole, for a conflict of interest is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, and its findings as to any underlying facts are reviewed for 
substantial evidence.  (People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 594.) 
 
In the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying 
defendant’s motion.  In light of the facts set out in Summi’s testimony, the trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion was supported by substantial evidence and did not amount 
to an abuse of discretion.  The court reasonably determined, in effect, that there was no 
conflict of interest that would have rendered it unlikely that defendant would receive a 
fair trial.  There was no showing as to what confidential information Summi might have 
obtained about defendant’s case while working as an investigator on defendant’s brother 
Elzie’s case, other than what related to their “common upbringing.”  The evidence further 
established that Summi had not disclosed any such confidential information to anyone in 
the district attorney’s office, and in light of the trial court’s order there was no reasonable 
basis to believe she would do so in the future.  Furthermore, although defendant argues 
that the trial court applied an erroneous standard in denying his motion, the record does 
not support that assertion.  Both defendant and the People cited the proper standard to the 
trial court, and it is reasonable to conclude that the trial court applied that standard, even 
if it did not quote it exactly.  In stating “there is no actual conflict and any apparent 
conflict is simply that,” the trial court merely was responding to defense counsel, who 
had been first to use that language.  Moreover, in context, the trial court’s words imply its 
34 
view that “any apparent conflict” arising out of the district attorney’s employment of 
Summi would not render it unlikely that defendant would receive a fair trial.15 
E.  Granting of Motion to Permit the Presence of the Victim’s Mother and Sister 
 
Prior to opening statements at the penalty phase retrial, defendant made a motion, 
apparently under section 777 of the Evidence Code, to exclude from the courtroom any 
witness not then testifying, in order to prevent such witness from hearing the testimony of 
others.  The trial court granted the motion. 
 
The People then made a motion of their own to permit the presence of Marvene 
Nordin, Kelly’s mother, and Tamara Wilson, Kelly’s sister, pursuant to former 
section 1102.6.  Former section 1102.6 provided in pertinent part that a “victim shall be 
entitled to be present and seated at the trial,” unless the trial court “finds that the presence 
of the victim would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of any 
testimony.”  (Former § 1102.6, subd. (a), as enacted by Stats. 1986, ch. 1273, § 2, p. 4448 
and repealed by Stats. 1995, ch. 332, § 2, p. 1824; hereafter former section 1102.6.)  
Former section 1102.6 also defined “victim” as “(1) the alleged victim of the offense and 
one member of the victim’s immediate family and (2) in the event that victim is unable to 
attend the trial, up to two members of the victim’s immediate family who are actual or 
potential witnesses.”  (Former § 1102.6, subd. (e).)  Nordin and Wilson were “victims” 
within the meaning of former section 1102.6, because Kelly was unable to attend and 
they were members of her family who were expected to be called as witnesses.  
Defendant opposed the motion; defense counsel, invoking experience with other trials, 
stated:  “I would object strongly to having witnesses in the courtroom, reacting and 
                                             
 
15 
Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion 
for an order recusing the district attorney’s office for a conflict of interest, we reject as 
well defendant’s claim that the trial court’s asserted error violated his rights under the 
United States Constitution, specifically the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
35 
letting the jury see their reactions.”  Noting that no witnesses then were present, the trial 
court took the motion under submission and stated it would make a ruling at a later time.  
Pending such a ruling, the trial court excluded from the courtroom any witness not then 
testifying. 
 
In their case in aggravation, the People called Nordin, Kelly’s mother, as their first 
witness.  Nordin testified concerning such matters as her first marriage, the birth of her 
children, including Kelly, and her marriage to defendant and their life together, including 
observations that he appeared not to use drugs, but did consume alcohol — at least on 
one occasion to the point of intoxication.  Nordin also testified about events that occurred 
on the night the crimes were committed against Kelly, including further observations that 
defendant was uncharacteristically upset, with tears in his eyes, and although smelling of 
alcohol did not act as though he was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. 
 
Later the same day, the People called Wilson, Kelly’s sister, as a witness.  Wilson 
also testified about events on the night in question, including observations that defendant 
was uncharacteristically upset and, although smelling of alcohol, did not act as though he 
were intoxicated. 
 
The next day, the trial court returned to the People’s motion to permit the presence 
of Nordin and Wilson as victims under former section 1102.6. 
 
In arguing in favor of the motion, the prosecutor relied upon the language of 
former section 1102.6, which provides that a “victim shall be entitled to be present and 
seated at the trial” (former § 1102.6, subd. (a)).  Although conceding that Nordin and 
Wilson might testify again in rebuttal, the prosecutor also noted that the two women 
already had testified, in conformity with the spirit of a separate requirement of former 
section 1102.6, namely that on the granting of a motion of this sort, the “victim shall 
testify first” “if the defendant . . . object[s] to the order of the victim’s testimony” (former 
§ 1102.6, subd. (b)). 
36 
 
In opposition, defense counsel relied upon the language of former section 1102.6 
that withdrew a victim’s entitlement to be present in the event the trial court “finds that 
the presence of the victim would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the 
content of any testimony.”  (Former § 1102.6, subd. (a).)  Defense counsel likened the 
question to one of undue prejudice under section 352 of the Evidence Code:  “[I]t’s like a 
352 issue would be brought to the case by having these people sit in court.” 
 
One of defense counsel’s concerns related to the possibility of further testimony 
by Nordin or Wilson:  “In a case like this, it would be our contention that to have two of 
the key witnesses present in court for all the testimony and probably being called in 
rebuttal later after having listened to everything in court, it’s very, very prejudicial to our 
client and would overweigh any other considerations.” 
 
Another of defense counsel’s concerns related to any reaction by Nordin or 
Wilson to evidence such as crime scene and autopsy photographs — an issue that the trial 
court had raised.  For his part, the prosecutor had given his assurance that he would 
caution at least Nordin about the nature of the evidence.  Defense counsel nevertheless 
was unsatisfied:  “And I was personally present in another trial where the audience was 
admonished not to react and they did again and again after being admonished . . . .  And 
the jury’s attention was constantly brought to the audience and the reactions from the 
different evidence that came in which was very gruesome.  And once it’s done, it’s too 
late is the problem.  And it doesn’t — in my opinion, if . . . [the prosecutor] talks to them, 
if the court admonishes them, it doesn’t mean it’s not going to happen.” 
 
Thereupon, the trial court granted the motion to permit the presence of Nordin and 
Wilson, but directed the prosecutor to “caution” them against “any emotional outbreak” 
and to instruct the two witnesses that “[t]hey will be given one opportunity only.” 
 
After the People completed their case in aggravation, defendant began his case in 
mitigation.  Among defendant’s witnesses was Nell Riley, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist 
with a specialty in neuropsychology, who testified that defendant was borderline 
37 
mentally retarded and suffered from a speech impediment.  Dr. Riley also testified that 
defendant was not malingering when he performed poorly during the testing to which she 
subjected him.  Another of defendant’s witnesses, Harry Kormos, M.D., a psychiatrist, 
also testified that defendant was borderline mentally retarded.  Dr. Kormos testified 
additionally that defendant was laboring under substantial stress at the time of the 
murder.  In support, Dr. Kormos related various statements defendant had made to him 
indicating that Nordin put pressure on defendant to move up from lower paying 
employment that he enjoyed to higher paying employment for which he was unsuited; 
that she and her children ridiculed him as stupid; and that she had threatened separation.   
 
Another of defendant’s witnesses, James Chiminillo, taught defendant reading and 
mathematics while he was incarcerated on Death Row.  Chiminillo testified that 
defendant started out at a first grade, eighth month, level in reading and at a third grade, 
fourth month, level in mathematics, and that although he worked hard, he did not make 
substantial progress.  On cross-examination, Chiminillo was presented with an 
inmate/parolee appeal form, signed with defendant’s name, that purportedly bore 
defendant’s handwriting and that suggested by its contents that defendant functioned at a 
higher level than defendant revealed to Dr. Riley and therefore may have been 
malingering when he performed poorly during the tests she administered to him.  
Chiminillo, however, testified that he could not identify the handwriting as defendant’s. 
 
After defendant completed his case in mitigation, the People presented rebuttal.  
Among other witnesses, the People called Nordin.  Nordin denied defendant’s statement 
that she put pressure on him to move up to higher paying employment; she denied his 
statement that she or any of her children ridiculed him; and she denied his statement that 
she had threatened separation.  Nordin also testified that defendant did not appear to be 
mentally retarded and could speak without impediment.  In addition, Nordin identified 
handwriting on the inmate/parolee appeal form as defendant’s.  The People also called 
Wilson.  Like Nordin, Wilson denied that she or any of the other members of Nordin’s 
38 
family ridiculed defendant, testified that he did not appear to be mentally retarded, and 
identified handwriting on the inmate/parolee appeal form as defendant’s. 
 
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by granting the People’s motion 
to permit the presence of Nordin and Wilson as victims under former section 1102.6. 
 
The question of the appropriate standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a 
motion to permit the presence of a victim under former section 1102.6 has not been 
addressed in any reported decision.  In resolving this question, we look to the standard of 
review for a ruling on a motion to exclude witnesses, as to which a ruling on a motion to 
permit the presence of a victim operates as an exception.  A ruling on a motion to exclude 
witnesses is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (See, e.g., People v. Lariscy (1939) 14 
Cal.2d 30, 32; People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 330.)  We believe that the 
same standard should apply to a ruling on a motion to permit the presence of a victim.  In 
making any determination as to who may attend or not attend a trial or any portion of a 
trial, a trial court exercises its authority over the course and conduct of the proceedings.  
(See § 1044.)  The exercise of that authority in the making of such determinations 
generally is subject to review for abuse of discretion.  (See People v. Halbert (1926) 78 
Cal.App. 598, 613.)  We see no reason to exempt from that rule a trial court’s 
determination allowing the presence of a victim. 
 
Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we find no error in the trial court’s 
granting of the People’s motion to permit the presence of Nordin and Wilson as victims 
under former section 1102.6.  In light of the circumstances, the trial court reasonably 
determined that the presence of Nordin and Wilson would not pose a “substantial risk of 
influencing or affecting the content of any testimony.”  (Former § 1102.6, subd. (a).)  
Nothing before the trial court at the time it made its ruling suggested that Nordin’s or 
Wilson’s presence posed a substantial risk that either woman would craft or shape her 
own testimony, or cause any other witness to do so, as a result of her presence.  In 
arguing against the motion on this point, defense counsel asserted only that such a risk 
39 
existed, but an assertion of this sort is insufficient to support a claim that the trial court 
abused its discretion (see People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 132).  Further, 
although we review the trial court’s ruling on the basis of the record of the proceedings 
before it at the time the ruling was made, we note that subsequent events do not suggest 
that either Nordin or Wilson tailored her testimony on rebuttal to conform with what she 
had learned from being present at trial, but instead show that each woman simply testified 
to matters she was likely to know without regard to what was disclosed at trial.  In 
addition, subsequent events do not support any inference that either Nordin nor Wilson, 
by her presence, caused any other witness to give testimony different from what the 
witness otherwise would have given, inasmuch as even defense counsel characterized 
each woman as “very composed” and “very restrained.”16 
F.  Admission of the Victim’s Precrime Out-of-court Statement 
 
In their case in aggravation at the penalty phase retrial, the People presented 
evidence, not offered at the initial trial, that on the day on which the crimes were 
committed, Kelly did not act as she usually did at school, and told another girl that 
defendant had been fondling her for some time and that she intended to confront him if 
he continued to do so. 
 
The events leading to the admission of Kelly’s statement were as follows.  
Michelle Acosta, who had been a friend and classmate of Kelly, was the girl to whom 
                                             
 
16 
Because we conclude that the trial court’s ruling was not erroneous, we find no 
merit in defendant’s related claim that the trial court’s asserted error in granting the 
People’s motion to permit the presence of Nordin and Wilson as victims under former 
section 1102.6 violated his rights under the following provisions of the United States and 
California Constitutions:  (1) the due process clauses of the Fourteen Amendment and 
article I, section 15; (2) the impartial jury clause of the Sixth Amendment and analogous 
clauses of article I, sections 15 and 16; (3) the confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment and article I, section 15; and (4) the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of 
the Eighth Amendment and of article I, section 17. 
40 
Kelly had made this statement.  Not long after the murder, Acosta had spoken about 
Kelly’s statement with someone whom she could not remember but did not mention the 
statement again for about 12 years until shortly prior to the penalty phase retrial when, 
after a chance meeting with an estranged sister of defendant’s, she related it to a 
detective.  It was only about three weeks prior to opening statements, shortly after trial 
commenced with jury selection, that the prosecutor learned of the existence of Acosta 
and of Kelly’s statement to her.  Within a day or two, the prosecutor notified defense 
counsel.  A week or so later, defense counsel was provided an opportunity to interview 
Acosta. 
 
In the course of the People’s opening statement, the prosecutor began to make 
reference to Kelly’s statement, but was cut off by an objection by defense counsel.  
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel argued that Kelly’s statement was 
inadmissible because it was hearsay and did not fall within any exception to the hearsay 
rule, and also because it amounted to aggravating evidence of other violent criminal 
activity and had not been included in the pretrial notice required by section 190.3 for all 
such evidence except the circumstances of the murder.  In response, the prosecutor 
argued that Kelly’s statement was admissible because it fell within the exception to the 
hearsay rule for a statement of state of mind and also because it was not offered to prove 
other violent criminal activity, but rather constituted aggravating evidence of the 
circumstances of the murder.  The trial court sustained the defense objection, but without 
prejudice to a later request by the People for a ruling as to the admissibility of Kelly’s 
statement.  The trial court then admonished the jury to “disregard the last sentence, the 
last subject of the . . . [prosecutor].”   
 
Later that day, outside the presence of the jury, the People sought a ruling from the 
trial court that Kelly’s statement was admissible.  At an evidentiary hearing conducted 
outside the presence of the jury, the People called Acosta to testify.  Acosta related 
Kelly’s statement, making plain that she had asked Kelly — for 10 or 15 minutes or 
41 
perhaps even longer — what was bothering her, before Kelly spoke of defendant’s past 
fondling.  Acosta added that she had made various suggestions to Kelly leading up to 
Kelly’s expression of her intent to confront defendant.  The prosecutor argued that 
Kelly’s statement was admissible because it fell within the exception to the hearsay rule 
for a statement of state of mind and also within the exception for a spontaneous 
statement.  In addition, the prosecutor argued that Kelly’s statement was not offered to 
prove other violent criminal activity by defendant, but rather constituted aggravating 
evidence of the circumstances of the murder.  In opposition, defense counsel argued that 
Kelly’s statement could not be deemed spontaneous because it was elicited by 
questioning and was not made shortly after the past fondling by defendant to which it 
referred.  Defense counsel also argued that Kelly’s statement, even if it reflected her state 
of mind, was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 
 
The trial court ruled, again without prejudice to a later request by the People, that 
Kelly’s statement was inadmissible.  The trial court determined that Kelly’s statement did 
not fall within the spontaneous-statement exception to the hearsay rule because it was 
elicited by questioning and also because it could not be said to have been made shortly 
after defendant’s past fondling.  The trial court further determined that Kelly’s statement 
did not fall within the state-of-mind exception, essentially because it was preceded by the 
suggestions made by Acosta. 
 
In their case in aggravation, the People proceeded to call Alma Torres.  Torres 
testified before the jury that Kelly was her best friend and a classmate, and that at school 
on the day on which the crimes were committed, Kelly “just was different.  She didn’t 
want to eat lunch, she didn’t want to play, she didn’t want to do nothing.  She wasn’t mad 
at me, she was just upset.  She didn’t want to tell me what was wrong.” 
 
After Torres’s testimony, outside the presence of the jury, the People again sought 
a ruling from the trial court that Kelly’s statement was admissible.  The prosecutor and 
defense counsel made arguments that were substantially similar to those they previously 
42 
had made regarding the admissibility of Kelly’s statements.  At this time, stating that it 
had been “bothered by,” and had “re-thought,” its “prior ruling,” the trial court reversed 
itself and ruled that Kelly’s statement was admissible, determining that it fell within the 
spontaneous-statement and state-of-mind exceptions to the hearsay rule.  
 
In light of the trial court’s ruling, the People called Acosta as a witness.  On direct 
examination, Acosta testified as follows:  Acosta was a friend and classmate of Kelly.  
On the day on which the crimes against Kelly were committed, Acosta discovered Kelly 
in a corner of a school bathroom, attempting to avoid contact and crying so hard that she 
was shaking and unable to catch her breath.  Acosta went over to Kelly and asked what 
was bothering her, but Kelly did not answer immediately.  After Acosta continued her 
inquiry for about 15 or 20 minutes, Kelly, still crying, finally responded that for some 
time defendant “was touching her places where she knew that it was wrong to be 
touched,” and that “when she goes home from school and if . . . [defendant] was going to 
touch her places . . . that she knew . . . wasn’t right, . . . she was going to tell him to quit,” 
and that “if he wasn’t, . . . she was going to . . . tell him that she was going to tell her 
mother.”  After this conversation, Acosta and Kelly returned to class, but thereafter when 
Acosta saw Kelly during the remainder of the school day, Acosta observed that Kelly did 
not act as she usually did, but was quiet and withdrawn.  Defendant did not subject 
Acosta to cross-examination.  In their respective summations to the jury, the prosecutor 
mentioned Kelly’s statement only briefly, and defense counsel did not mention it at all. 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s admission of Kelly’s statement was error.  
The applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion, the test that governs the 
admissibility of evidence generally.  “Underlying that determination [of admissibility] are 
questions of (1) relevance, (2) hearsay rule/state-of-mind exception, and (3) undue 
prejudice.”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264.) 
 
The trial court reasonably determined that Kelly’s statement was not subject to the 
requirement of pretrial notice in section 190.3 for the admissibility of aggravating 
43 
evidence other than the circumstances of the murder.  At the outset, we observe that 
notwithstanding its several clauses, Kelly’s utterances constitute a single and entire 
statement.  The references to defendant’s past fondling of Kelly and Kelly’s intent to 
confront defendant are inextricably linked to each other for their context and meaning.  
Kelly’s statement constituted aggravating evidence of the circumstances of the murder, 
suggesting that later that same day Kelly confronted defendant and that in response 
defendant murdered her wilfully and with premeditation and deliberation in order to 
avoid apprehension for his continuing acts of molestation, and not simply in a senseless 
explosion of violence.  If defendant believed the jury might use Kelly’s statement to find 
he had engaged in violent criminal activity other than the murder and the accompanying 
rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct, he could have moved for an instruction limiting the use 
of the statement (see Evid. Code, § 355), but he was not entitled to have the statement 
excluded pursuant to section 190.3.  Furthermore, even if the People had offered Kelly’s 
statement to prove violent criminal activity other than the murder and the accompanying 
rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct without complying with the pretrial notice requirement 
of section 190.3, it would be difficult to conclude that defendant suffered prejudice from 
the asserted lack of prior notice inasmuch as the prosecutor had notified defense counsel 
about Kelly’s statement more than two weeks prior to the prosecutor’s reference to it in 
his opening statement, and defense counsel did not request a continuance to respond (see, 
e.g., People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 241). 
 
The trial court also reasonably determined that Kelly’s statement was relevant to 
the circumstances of the murder, that is, it had a tendency to prove what transpired (see 
Evid. Code, § 210), because it suggested that Kelly confronted defendant and that in 
response defendant murdered her wilfully and with premeditation and deliberation. 
 
Likewise, the trial court reasonably determined that Kelly’s statement was not 
unduly prejudicial.  Although Kelly’s statement of course was damaging to defendant’s 
position by suggesting that he murdered her wilfully and with premeditation and 
44 
deliberation, such damage does not amount to undue prejudice for purposes of exclusion 
of evidence.  (See People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)  Relevant as it was to the 
circumstances of the murder, Kelly’s statement carried a probative value that was not 
substantially outweighed by any threat to the fairness of the trial or the reliability of the 
outcome.  (See People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 204, fn. 14.) 
 
Finally, whether or not Kelly’s statement fell within the spontaneous statement 
exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court reasonably determined that the statement fell 
within the state-of-mind exception, specifically to prove Kelly’s future conduct in 
confronting defendant prior to the murder in accordance with the intent expressed in her 
statement. 
 
For purposes of the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, a statement of 
state of mind is one that (1) reflects the declarant’s mental state, and (2) is offered, among 
other purposes, to prove the declarant’s conduct (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(2)), 
including the declarant’s future conduct in accordance with his or her expressed intent 
(e.g., People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 404; People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 
177, 185–188), unless the statement was made under circumstances indicating lack of 
trustworthiness (Evid. Code, § 1252; see id., § 1250, subd. (a)).17 
                                             
 
17 
Evidence Code section 1250 provides: 
 
“(a) Subject to [Evidence Code] Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the 
declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a 
statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: 
 
“(1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or 
physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; 
or 
 
“(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. 
 
“(b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or 
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.” 
 
Evidence Code section 1252 provides: 
(footnote continued on next page) 
45 
 
Here, Kelly’s statement reflected her mental state, that is, her intent to confront 
defendant, even though the occurrence of such a confrontation itself depended on 
defendant’s continued fondling (see People v. Conrad (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 308, 325).  
Moreover, Kelly’s statement was offered to prove her future conduct in accordance with 
the intent expressed in her statement, namely that she in fact confronted defendant prior 
to the murder.  Lastly, Kelly’s statement was not made under circumstances indicating a 
lack of trustworthiness, there being no hint of any “motive to misrepresent or to 
manufacture evidence” or any similar circumstance (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 28B 
pt. 4 West’s Annot. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1252, p. 303).  Although evidence like 
Kelly’s statement has been held to be “not admissible if it refers solely to alleged past 
conduct on the part of the accused” (People v. Hamilton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 881, 893–894, 
italics added, overruled on another point by People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442; 
accord, People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 780), Kelly’s statement did not refer solely 
to defendant’s past fondling, but also referred to her own intent to confront him. 
 
Even if we assume for the sake of discussion that Kelly’s statement, although 
admissible to prove her confrontation of defendant, was inadmissible to prove 
defendant’s past fondling, it would not have been rendered inadmissible on that basis.  
“When evidence is admissible . . . for one purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another 
purpose,” a trial court is not required to exclude the evidence, but rather “upon request” is 
required to give a limiting instruction “restrict[ing] the evidence to its proper scope.”  
(Evid. Code, § 355.)  Here, defendant did not request a limiting instruction of any sort.18  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“Evidence of a statement is inadmissible . . . if the statement was made under 
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” 
18  
We note that defendant does not claim that his objection and opposition to the 
admissibility of Kelly’s statement amounted to a request for a limiting instruction, or that 
the trial court erred by refusing any such request. 
46 
Although we have implied that even in the absence of such a request, a trial court 
nevertheless may be required to exclude such evidence when a limiting instruction would 
be ineffective (see People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 104–105), in this case we 
cannot conclude that a limiting instruction would have been ineffective, particularly 
because in their respective summations to the jury the prosecutor mentioned Kelly’s 
statement only briefly and defense counsel did not mention it at all.19 
G.  Admission of Photograph of the Victim’s Body at the Crime Scene 
 
At the guilt phase of the initial trial, outside the presence of the jury, the People 
sought to introduce into evidence People’s exhibit No. 3, a photograph of Kelly’s body at 
the crime scene taken from a distance, depicting Kelly in a pool of blood with articles of 
her clothing displaced and her body exposed, and People’s exhibit No. 4, a similar 
photograph of Kelly’s body at the crime scene taken close up, depicting Kelly with her 
throat slashed and with her body slashed from the chest through the belly and the pubic 
area toward the buttocks, opening the body cavity.  Defendant objected that exhibits 
                                             
 
19 
In addition to claiming that Kelly’s statement was inadmissible under the 
applicable Evidence Code provisions, defendant also claims on appeal that the trial 
court’s asserted error in admitting Kelly’s statement violated his rights under the 
following provisions of the United States and California Constitutions:  (1) the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and article I, sections 7 and 15; 
(2) the impartial jury clause of the Sixth Amendment and analogous clauses of article I, 
sections 15 and 16; (3) the confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment and article I, 
section 15; and (4) the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth Amendment 
and of article I, section 17.  Because these constitutional claims all are premised on the 
assertion that Kelly’s statement was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1250, 
the claims clearly lack merit in light of our conclusion that Kelly’s statement was 
properly admitted under that statute.  Furthermore, although the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington (2004) ___ U.S.___ [124 S.Ct. 
1354] — decided after the briefing in this case — revises the applicable analysis of 
federal confrontation clause claims in some circumstances, Crawford does not affect the 
present case, because the out-of-court statement here at issue (made by the victim to a 
friend at school) is not “testimonial hearsay” within the meaning of Crawford.  (See ___ 
U.S. at pp. ___ [124 S.Ct. at pp. 1364-1365, 1374].) 
47 
Nos. 3 and 4 both were inadmissible as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  The trial court 
sustained defendant’s objection to both exhibits and excluded them, but without prejudice 
to reconsidering their admissibility.  Subsequently, outside the presence of the jury, the 
People again sought to introduce the two photographs, and defendant again objected on 
the same grounds.  On defense counsel’s representation that he would concede before the 
jury that defendant acted with malice aforethought and intent to kill, the trial court 
sustained defendant’s objection to exhibit No. 4 and excluded it, but overruled 
defendant’s objection to exhibit No. 3 and admitted it, determining in effect that it was 
relevant to the circumstances of the murder and not unduly prejudicial. 
 
On appeal in Griffin I, we rejected defendant’s contention that exhibit No. 3 was 
unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded.  In our prior opinion, we observed 
that exhibit No. 3, “although . . . unpleasant and explicit, . . . [was] clinical and was taken 
from quite some distance,” whereas exhibit No. 4, which the trial court excluded, was 
“obviously more graphic and shocking.”  (Griffin I, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1028.) 
 
In the midst of the People’s case in aggravation at the penalty phase retrial, outside 
the presence of the jury, defendant objected in anticipation of the People’s seeking to 
introduce exhibit Nos. 3 and 4, which bore the same designations they had at the guilt 
phase of the initial trial, on the grounds of irrelevance and (especially) undue prejudice.  
The trial court overruled defendant’s objection and stated it would admit both exhibits, in 
effect determining they were relevant to the circumstances of the murder and not unduly 
prejudicial.  In addition, the trial court denied a request by defendant to admit only one of 
the two photographs, apparently exhibit No. 3.  Subsequently, in the presence of the jury, 
the trial court admitted exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. 
 
Defendant now contends that the trial court’s admission of exhibit No. 4 was error.  
We disagree.  The trial court reasonably determined that this exhibit was relevant and not 
unduly prejudicial, and therefore did not abuse its discretion.  As for defendant’s claim of 
irrelevance — which the People argue was not preserved, an assertion controverted by 
48 
the record on appeal — exhibit No. 4 had a strong tendency to prove the circumstances of 
the murder, especially its brutality.  As for defendant’s claim of undue prejudice, exhibit 
No. 4 (as we implied in Griffin I) indeed is graphic and shocking, but so were defendant’s 
crimes.  Other evidence could, and did, depict Kelly’s body at the crime scene, but none 
as clearly or as powerfully as this exhibit.  The trial court reasonably determined that the 
probative value of the exhibit was not substantially outweighed by any threat it posed to 
the fairness of the trial or the reliability of the outcome.  Defendant raises various 
complaints about exhibit No. 4 — for example, that it is large and shows Kelly’s bowels 
distended by gas formed after death — but he fails to demonstrate undue prejudice.20 
H.  Admission of Evidence of Defendant’s Employment at a Slaughterhouse 
 
Prior to the penalty phase retrial, the People notified defendant that they intended 
to introduce evidence, not offered at the initial trial, of defendant’s employment at the 
Palace Meat Company, a slaughterhouse, to establish the circumstances of the murder 
and specifically to prove that defendant slaughtered Kelly like an animal would be 
slaughtered. 
 
Prior to opening statements, defense counsel, taking the position that evidence of 
defendant’s employment at the Palace Meat Company would be inadmissible as 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, asked the trial court to instruct the prosecutor not to 
refer to such evidence in his opening statement in advance of a ruling on its admissibility, 
and the trial court so instructed the prosecutor.  In the course of his opening statement, 
                                             
 
20 
Because we conclude that the admission of exhibit No. 4 was not erroneous, we 
also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s asserted error in admitting exhibit No. 4 
violated his rights under the following provisions of the United States and California 
Constitutions:  (1) the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and, 
apparently, article I, sections 7 and 15; (2) the impartial jury clause of the Sixth 
Amendment and, apparently, the analogous clauses of article I, sections 15 and 16; and 
(3) the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth Amendment and of article I, 
section 17. 
49 
the prosecutor did not mention defendant’s employment at the Palace Meat Company, but 
did make a comment — about which defense counsel later complained — that the 
“evidence will . . . show you that . . . [Kelly] was . . . [slaughtered] much like an animal is 
slaughtered . . . .”   
 
Subsequently, outside the presence of the jury, the People sought a ruling from the 
trial court that evidence of defendant’s employment at the Palace Meat Company was 
relevant to the circumstances of the murder and therefore admissible.  Defendant opposed 
such a ruling on the ground that this evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, the People 
called David Kennedy, the owner of the Palace Meat Company, to give testimony 
relating to the business and defendant’s employment there.  The trial court deferred 
ruling on the admissibility of the evidence until it heard the testimony of Dr. Nelson, the 
pathologist. 
 
As pertinent here, Dr. Nelson testified to the effect that the person who murdered 
Kelly rendered her unconscious by strangulation, stabbed her neck with a very sharp 
knife and then slashed her throat severing the carotid artery and causing exsanguination, 
and finally after death slashed the body in four strokes from the chest through the belly 
and the pubic area toward the buttocks, opening the body cavity.  After hearing the 
testimony of Dr. Nelson, the trial court ruled evidence of defendant’s employment at the 
Palace Meat Company admissible, determining expressly that it was not unduly 
prejudicial and impliedly that it was relevant. 
 
In accordance with the trial court’s ruling, the People, in their case in aggravation, 
called  Kennedy as a witness.  In pertinent part, Kennedy testified he was the owner of 
the Palace Meat Company.  In the mid-1970’s, Palace slaughtered sheep on an open kill-
floor by rendering each animal unconscious with an electrical stun, stabbing its neck with 
a knife and then slashing its throat in order to sever the jugular vein and cause 
exsanguination, and finally after death slashing the body from the area of the hips where 
50 
the legs join through the belly and the brisket toward the neck, opening the body cavity.  
In the mid-1970’s, Palace employed defendant as a general helper, doing clean up and 
similar chores.  Although defendant did not himself slaughter sheep, he had the 
opportunity to observe the process. 
 
Defendant contends the trial court’s admission of the evidence of his employment 
at the Palace Meat Company was error.  We reject his claim. 
 
First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence of 
defendant’s employment at the Palace Meat Company was relevant in this case.  The 
condition in which Kelly’s body was found showed that defendant slaughtered her much 
like an animal would be slaughtered.  The evidence in question had some tendency to 
prove that defendant treated Kelly more like an animal than a human being, and hence 
that he was more blameworthy on that basis. 
 
Second, the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 
evidence of defendant’s employment at the Palace Meat Company was not unduly 
prejudicial.  The evidence was brief, clear, and neutral, and as such its probative value 
properly could be found not to be substantially outweighed by any threat it posed to the 
fairness of the trial or the reliability of the outcome.  Relying on People v. Ortiz (1979) 
95 Cal.App.3d 926, defendant asserts that the evidence was inflammatory.  Ortiz, 
however, is clearly distinguishable.  In the first place, Ortiz involved the admissibility of 
evidence at a noncapital trial, and evidence that is unduly prejudicial when offered at a 
noncapital trial or at the guilt phase of a capital trial is not necessarily unduly prejudicial 
in relation to the issue to be decided by the jury at the penalty phase of a capital trial.  
Second, Ortiz held only that the admission of evidence that a defendant engaged in ritual 
animal sacrifice to attack his credibility as a witness was unduly prejudicial, but the case 
does not suggest to us that the evidence in the present case was unduly prejudicial in 
establishing the circumstances of the murder.  Defendant also asserts that the evidence 
risked confusing and misleading the jury, because it did not establish that defendant 
51 
actually witnessed the slaughtering of sheep or that his killing of Kelly was conducted in 
a manner identical to that employed in the killing of sheep.  But the circumstance that the 
evidence only suggested, and did not conclusively prove, that defendant slaughtered 
Kelly much like an animal is slaughtered goes not to its admissibility, but solely to its 
weight.  Finally, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the evidence was neither cumulative 
nor remote in time or logic.21 
I.  Admission of Evidence of Defendant’s Knowledge of Police Investigatory 
Procedures for Rape Offenses 
 
Outside the presence of the jury at the penalty phase retrial, defendant sought a 
ruling from the trial court that evidence of his knowledge of police investigatory 
procedures for rape offenses, not offered at the initial trial, was inadmissible as irrelevant 
and unduly prejudicial.  The People had indicated their intent to present such evidence 
before introducing evidence suggesting that defendant washed his genital area in a cell 
latrine following his commission of the crimes against Kelly.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court ruled the evidence in question was admissible as relevant and not 
unduly prejudicial. 
 
In their case in aggravation, the People called Edward Singh as a witness.  In 
pertinent part, he testified as follows:  Singh had been a police officer in Kerman for 
about 20 years.  Some months prior to the murder, he and defendant worked at Cal 
Western Patrol, a security agency.  On one occasion, defendant told him of a desire to 
become a police officer, and he and defendant then discussed how crimes including rape 
are investigated, and spoke of the gathering of evidence of pubic hair, semen, blood, and 
saliva from the victim’s body by means of swabs. 
                                             
 
21 
Because we conclude this evidence properly was admitted, we reject defendant’s 
related claims that the trial court’s asserted error in admitting this evidence violated his 
rights under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
52 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s admission of evidence of his knowledge 
of police investigatory procedures for rape offenses was error.  We disagree.  The trial 
court reasonably determined that the evidence in question was relevant and not unduly 
prejudicial, inasmuch as it was brief, clear, and neutral, and that this evidence suggested 
defendant washed his genital area in the cell latrine in order to destroy evidence and 
avoid apprehension.  Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the evidence did not “intimat[e] 
that . . . [he] was planning . . . [his] crimes all along, months before they took place,” but 
only that he sought, after committing the crimes, to escape responsibility.22 
J.  Admission of Evidence of Other Violent Criminal Activity by Defendant Involving 
Lewd Acts Committed Against Lisa B. 
 
Prior to the penalty phase retrial, the People gave notice to defendant of their 
intent to present evidence, not introduced at the initial trial, of other violent criminal 
activity by him involving lewd acts committed against Lisa B.  In reliance on the 
plurality opinion in People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, footnote 25, which was 
decided under the similar 1977 death penalty law, defendant requested that the trial court 
conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether there was substantial evidence to 
prove such other violent criminal activity — a condition for the admissibility of any 
evidence of that sort.  Substantial evidence of other violent criminal activity is evidence 
that would allow a rational trier of fact to find the existence of such activity beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (See People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1167–1168; People 
v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 672–678; see also People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 
778.)  Before an individual juror may consider evidence of other violent criminal activity 
                                             
 
22 
Again, because we conclude this evidence properly was admitted, we reject 
defendant’s related claim that the trial court’s asserted error in admitting this evidence 
violated his rights under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, the impartial jury clause of the Sixth Amendment, and 
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
53 
in aggravation, he or she must find the existence of such activity beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (See People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 809–811.)  There is no requirement, 
however, that the jury as a whole unanimously find the existence of other violent criminal 
activity beyond a reasonable doubt before an individual juror may consider such evidence 
in aggravation.  (See ibid.) 
 
The trial court agreed to conduct a preliminary inquiry under Phillips.  At the 
ensuing evidentiary hearing, Lisa was the sole witness.  On direct examination, she 
testified in substance as follows:  Lisa was a niece by marriage to Marvene Nordin, 
defendant’s wife.  Perhaps a year or two preceding the crimes committed against Kelly, 
when Lisa was four or five years of age, defendant engaged in lewd acts with her on two 
separate occasions.  One time, he touched her around her vagina with his fingers, and the 
other time he penetrated her vagina with his fingers and then flicked open a knife with a 
folding blade; on each occasion, he threatened harm to others if she were to reveal what 
he had done.  On cross-examination, Lisa admitted that defendant had an identical twin 
named Ronald Griffin, but stated she had been able to distinguish between defendant and 
Ronald whenever other persons called either man by his given name and also because 
defendant lived with Nordin and Ronald did not.  She also admitted that at one time her 
mother had dated defendant and at another time Ronald.  She further admitted that at 
some point she had reported that Ronald had sexually molested her, and that at another 
time she had made a similar report about an otherwise unidentified person.  Finally, she 
conceded she could not date either of the two incidents or even state which occurred 
earlier and which later. 
 
In arguing against the admissibility of the evidence of other violent criminal 
activity by defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lisa, defense counsel 
asserted at the outset that substantial evidence did not exist to prove the existence of such 
activity.  Defense counsel alternately asserted that this evidence was unduly prejudicial 
because of its purported unreliability and its similarity to the charges of rape, sodomy, 
54 
and lewd conduct alleged to have been committed by defendant against Kelly.  Defense 
counsel also asserted that because of the purported lack of specificity in the details of the 
crimes, the evidence would violate what People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 295, refers to 
as a defendant’s “right to present a defense” (id. at p. 317, italics omitted), arising from 
the accusation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, 
evidently, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
The trial court ruled that the evidence of other violent criminal activity by 
defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lisa was admissible, stating that “there 
is substantial evidence for this matter to be heard by the jury,” and that the People have 
the “obligation to prove these acts beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
In light of the trial court’s ruling, the People, in their case in aggravation, called 
Lisa as a witness.  
 
On direct examination, Lisa stated that she was 18 years of age.  Marvene Nordin, 
who was Kelly’s mother, was Lisa’s aunt by marriage; Lisa knew Kelly and defendant, 
who then was Nordin’s husband and Kelly’s stepfather.  When Lisa was four or five 
years of age — a year or two prior to the crimes committed against Kelly — she often 
visited defendant and Nordin’s home, where Nordin sometimes would baby-sit for her.  
On two occasions during that period, defendant engaged in sexual conduct with her. 
 
On one of these two occasions — Lisa could not remember which occurred earlier 
and which later — she was visiting defendant and Nordin’s home.  Defendant drove her 
in his truck to a store, pulled behind the establishment, and parked.  Defendant told Lisa 
to take her pants off, and when she declined to do so he pulled them off himself.  
Defendant began to touch Lisa with his fingers in the area around her vagina, causing 
pain, and she began to cry; she asked him to stop, trying to push him away with her feet, 
but he did not.  All of a sudden, defendant stopped, and Lisa apparently pulled up her 
pants; he then turned on the ignition, told her to lie on the floorboard, and she complied.  
Before arriving back at his home, defendant warned Lisa that if she told anyone about the 
55 
incident, he would hurt Kelly, and Lisa became frightened.  Lisa did not tell Nordin about 
the incident because she was afraid that defendant would hurt Kelly. 
 
On the other occasion, Lisa again was visiting defendant and Nordin’s home, 
sleeping in their bedroom in a nightshirt.  When Lisa awoke, she left the room and found 
defendant sitting in a chair.  After defendant told Lisa to sit by him, she drew near, and he 
put her on his lap.  Defendant then fondled Lisa about her chest and legs, laid her down 
on the floor and laid himself nearby, and continued to fondle her, then proceeding to 
place his hand under her nightshirt toward the area around her vagina and finally 
penetrating her vagina with his fingers and causing pain.  After some time, as defendant 
continued in this fashion, Lisa heard an automobile pull up in a driveway outside, and 
defendant stopped.  Lisa heard a door of the vehicle shut.  Defendant returned to the chair 
and flicked open a knife with a folding blade.  Just then, the doorknob started to turn, and 
defendant warned Lisa that if she told the person entering the house about the incident, he 
would hurt her mother and her father.  The door opened, and Nordin came in.  Lisa did 
not tell Nordin about the incident, because she was afraid of defendant.  At some point 
after defendant murdered Kelly, Lisa disclosed both incidents to a person whom she did 
not identify. 
 
On cross-examination, Lisa admitted that defendant had a twin named Ronald 
Griffin, but denied that she remembered defendant and Ronald to be identical twins.  Lisa 
stated that she could distinguish between defendant and Ronald whenever other persons 
called either man by his given name; she also stated she could distinguish between the 
two because defendant lived with Nordin and Ronald did not, and also because she 
believed Ronald to be larger than defendant.  Lisa also admitted that at one time her 
mother had dated defendant and at another time had dated Ronald.  Lisa further admitted 
that at some point she had reported that Ronald had sexually molested her, and that at 
another she had made a similar report about an otherwise unidentified person.  There 
56 
apparently was no independent corroboration of the two incidents that Lisa described as 
occurring in defendant’s truck and at his home. 
 
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of 
other violent criminal activity by him involving lewd acts committed against Lisa.  For 
the reasons that follow, we reject this claim. 
 
As stated, a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence generally is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  This standard applies in the specific context of 
evidence of other violent criminal activity.  (See, e.g., People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 
353, 449; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 676.) 
 
The trial court reasonably determined that substantial evidence existed to prove 
other violent criminal activity by defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lisa.  
A rational trier of fact could have credited Lisa’s testimony, which generally was 
detailed, internally consistent, and not in conflict with any other evidence presented, and 
was sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant touched 
Lisa around her vagina with his fingers in the incident in his truck and penetrated her 
vagina with his fingers in the incident at his home.  Both episodes involved violence by 
means of defendant’s accompanying “express . . . threat[s] to use . . . violence” (§ 190.3, 
factor (b)) — against Kelly in the former incident and against Lisa’s mother and father in 
the latter incident. 
 
The trial court also reasonably determined that the evidence of other violent 
criminal activity by defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lisa was not 
unduly prejudicial.  Although a trial court may not categorically exclude evidence of 
other violent criminal activity on the ground of undue prejudice, inasmuch as evidence of 
this sort is “expressly made admissible” (People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 641; 
accord, People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1200–1201), it may exclude “particular 
items of [such] evidence” on that ground (People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 641, 
fn. 21), insofar as any item might “unfairly persuade[]” the trier of fact to find that the 
57 
defendant engaged in the other violent criminal activity in question (People v. Box, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1201).  The record precludes any characterization of Lisa’s 
testimony as unfairly persuasive, in that it generally was detailed, internally consistent, 
and not in conflict with any other evidence presented. 
 
Lastly, the trial court reasonably determined that the evidence of other violent 
criminal activity by defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lisa would not 
violate defendant’s right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment’s accusation 
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.  In Jones, we concluded that 
a lack of specificity in the details of crimes like those committed by defendant against 
Lisa does not “inevitably preclude a defense.”  (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
p. 319.)  The issue usually turns on the relative credibility of the defendant and the child, 
both generally and in the situation of the so-called resident child molester (id. at p. 319) 
who either lives with, or has continuous access to, the child (id. at p. 299).  “[T]he 
defendant has the option of taking the witness stand and directly denying any 
wrongdoing.  If credible, his testimony should prevail over the unspecific assertions 
of . . . [the child].  In some cases, the very nonspecificity of the child’s testimony, 
especially if uncorroborated, may offer defense counsel fertile field for challenging the 
child’s credibility.”  (Id. at p. 320.)  Here, although Lisa’s testimony was lacking in 
specificity as to the date of the incidents in defendant’s truck and at his home, it 
otherwise was quite specific, with Lisa describing precisely what defendant did to her.  In 
any event, on cross-examination defense counsel challenged Lisa’s credibility by 
suggesting misidentification or perhaps confabulation.  Although defendant did not take 
the witness stand to deny Lisa’s testimony, his choice to proceed in that fashion does not 
58 
reflect any violation of his right to present a defense, but rather a decision to present a 
defense in a certain way, by relying upon defense counsel’s cross-examination of Lisa.23 
K.  Refusal of Request to Instruct on the Penetration Element of Rape and Sodomy 
 
In its charge to the jury at the penalty phase retrial, the trial court instructed, in 
pertinent part, that “[t]he defendant in this case has been found guilty of murder of the 
first degree.  The allegation that the murder was committed under the special 
circumstances that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the 
commission of rape, while the defendant was engaged in the commission of sodomy, and 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a lewd act with a child, has been 
specially found to be true.”24  The trial court also instructed that “[i]f you the Jury, 
individually or collectively, entertains any lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt as 
to the conviction and/or special circumstance findings, you may weigh and consider such 
doubt in deciding what sentence is appropriate.”  The trial court, however, refused a 
request by defendant to instruct on the elements of murder, rape, and sodomy, or in the 
alternative to instruct at least on the penetration element of rape and sodomy, determining 
                                             
 
23 
Because we conclude the evidence of other violent criminal activity against Lisa 
properly was admitted, we reject defendant’s related claims that the trial court’s asserted 
error in admitting this evidence violated his rights under the following provisions of the 
United States and California Constitutions:  (1) the due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and article I, section 15; (2) the accusation clauses of the Sixth Amendment 
and article I, section 14; (3) the confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment and 
article I, section 15; (4) the compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment and 
article I, section 15; (5) the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth 
Amendment and of article I, section 17; and (6) the equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7. 
24 
Prior to jury selection, the trial court had instructed the prospective jurors to the 
effect that, “as a matter of law, . . . the defendant is guilty of murder and the special 
circumstances found true . . . .”   
59 
in substance that to do so might confuse the jury by inviting it to relitigate the related 
special-circumstance findings and underlying convictions. 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s refusal of his request to instruct on the 
penetration element of rape and sodomy was error. 
 
 
We conclude that there is no need to determine whether the trial court erred 
in declining to give the requested instruction on penetration, because assuming without 
deciding, that the trial court did err in failing to give such an instruction on request, we 
conclude that the error was not prejudicial in this case under any standard of prejudice.  
We reach this conclusion because (1) defendant was permitted to present evidence in 
mitigation to support his contention that there was a lingering doubt whether he had 
effected penetration and thereby committed rape and sodomy, (2) both counsel in their 
penalty phase closing arguments clearly discussed the evidence relating to penetration 
and the lingering doubt issue, and (3) there was no suggestion, either by the court or 
counsel, that penetration was not an element or an essential feature of the crimes of rape 
and sodomy.  Under these circumstances, the absence of an instruction informing the 
jury, for purposes of the lingering doubt issue, that penetration is an element of the 
offenses of rape and robbery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.25 
                                             
 
25 
In light of our conclusion that the absence of an instruction on the penetration 
element of rape and sodomy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reject 
defendant’s claim that the trial court’s failure to give such an instruction constituted 
reversible error under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and article I, sections 15, 16, and 17 of the California Constitution. 
 
To the extent defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing his request to 
instruct on the elements of murder, rape, and sodomy generally, and not solely on the 
penetration element of rape and sodomy, we dismiss his claim “as not properly raised:  it 
is perfunctorily asserted without argument in support.”  (People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 
Cal.3d at p. 985, fn. 15.) 
60 
L.  Failure to Instruct Against Double-counting of Assertedly Overlapping Special 
Circumstances and Underlying Crimes 
 
At the penalty phase retrial, the trial court instructed the jury that “[i]n determining 
which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all of the 
evidence . . . [and] shall consider, take into account and be guided by . . . [specified 
penalty] factors” including “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding” — namely, the murder of Kelly and the 
accompanying rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct — and “the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true” — that is, felony-murder rape, felony-murder sodomy, 
and felony-murder lewd conduct.  
 
In his opening brief, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to 
modify the above-quoted instruction in order to prevent the jury from double-counting 
the assertedly overlapping special circumstances — felony-murder lewd conduct vis-à-
vis felony-murder rape and felony-murder sodomy — and the assertedly overlapping 
underlying crimes — lewd conduct vis-à-vis rape and sodomy.  Defendant asserts that 
this error improperly inflated evidence in aggravation over that in mitigation.  In their 
brief, the People argue that defendant did not preserve any such claim for review on 
appeal, because he failed to request any modification to avoid the consequences of which 
he now complains and because the instruction actually given was correct and applicable.  
In his reply brief defendant has withdrawn his contention, in light of the People’s 
argument.  Accordingly, we need not address or resolve this claim. 
M.  Refusal of Request to Instruct on Mercy 
 
At the penalty phase retrial, as stated above, the trial court instructed the jury that 
“[i]n determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all 
of the evidence . . . [and] shall consider, take into account and be guided by . . . [specified 
penalty] factors” including, as pertinent here, “[a]ny sympathetic or other aspect of the 
defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less 
61 
than death.”  The trial court also instructed the jury that “[y]ou are free to assign 
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various 
factors you are permitted to consider.”  The court, however, denied a request by 
defendant to give a number of instructions stating or suggesting that the jury could 
exercise mercy based on the evidence, in part because some of these requested 
instructions were duplicative of those quoted above.  In their respective closing 
arguments, defense counsel explicitly urged the jury to exercise mercy and the prosecutor 
implicitly urged the jury not to do so. 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s denial of his request to instruct the jury 
that it could exercise mercy based on the evidence was error.  We have rejected 
substantially similar claims in the past (see, e.g., People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 
638; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 403; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
334, 393), and we reject the present claim as well.  A trial court, of course, may refuse an 
instruction that is duplicative.  (E.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 560; 
People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 697; see, e.g., People v. Benson, supra, 52 
Cal.3d at p. 805, fn. 12.)  The question of the appropriate standard of review applicable to 
a determination of duplicativeness need not be resolved (see People v. Berryman (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 1048, 1079), because even when scrutinized independently, the trial court’s 
decision was sound.  The instructions requested were clearly duplicative of the 
instructions given, which informed the jury that it had to “consider all of the evidence” 
and could “consider, take into account and be guided by” any factor, including “[a]ny 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant 
offers as a basis for a sentence less than death,” and that the jury was “free to assign 
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various 
factors you are permitted to consider.”  (See, e.g., People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 638; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 403; People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 393.) 
62 
 
Defendant argues that without the instructions he requested, a reasonable 
likelihood exists (see People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) that the jury was misled 
into believing it was precluded from considering and giving effect to at least some of the 
evidence that he presented in mitigation, in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But having received an instruction expressly 
declaring that it had to “consider all of the evidence” and could “consider, take into 
account and be guided by” any factor including “[a]ny . . . aspect of the defendant’s 
character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death,” the 
jury adequately was advised that it could consider and give effect to all of the evidence 
presented by defendant in mitigation.26 
N.  Instruction on the Determination of Penalty 
 
With regard to the determination of penalty, the trial court instructed the jury at 
the penalty phase retrial, apparently at the request of defendant as well as the People, as 
follows: 
 
“It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement 
in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on the 
defendant. 
 
“After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the 
arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the 
applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have 
been instructed. 
                                             
 
26 
To the extent defendant claims the jury could exercise mercy apart from the 
evidence, and should have been instructed accordingly, the contention lacks merit.  A 
jury may not exercise mercy in this fashion, and therefore should not be instructed that it 
could.  (People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 808–809.) 
63 
 
“An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event attending the commission of 
a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which 
is above and beyond the elements of the crime itself.  A mitigating circumstance is any 
fact, condition or event which as such, does not constitute a justification or excuse for the 
crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining 
the appropriateness of the death penalty. 
 
“The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere 
mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary 
assignment of weights to any of them.  You are free to assign whatever moral or 
sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are 
permitted to consider.  In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the 
relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of 
the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.  To 
return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it 
[sic] warrants death instead of life without parole.” 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s giving of the foregoing instruction was 
constitutionally deficient in various respects — each of which, he acknowledges, we have 
rejected in prior decisions in passing upon substantially similar instructions. 
 
The standard of review for the legal correctness of an instruction is independent, 
inasmuch as the “question is one of law, involving as it does the determination of the 
applicable legal principles.”  (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1089.) 
 
First, defendant challenges this sentence of the instruction:  “To return a judgment 
of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so 
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it [sic] warrants death 
instead of life without parole.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant argues, in substance, that the 
Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause and the Fourteenth 
64 
Amendment’s due process clause prohibit vagueness in guiding the jury and require 
reliability for any decision made, that the words “so substantial” rendered the instruction 
vague, and that the word “warrants” made the ensuing verdict of death unreliable.  In 
People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1194, and People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 
281, 315–316, we rejected a similar attack on the asserted operation of the words “so 
substantial” and “warrants,” respectively, and we again do so now. 
 
Second, defendant challenges the failure of the instruction to state that the People 
bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate 
penalty.  Defendant argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause imposes 
such a burden.  In People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at page 1101, however, we held 
to the contrary, and we adhere to that holding. 
 
Third, defendant similarly challenges the failure of the instruction to state that in 
order to return a verdict of death, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that death is the 
appropriate penalty.  Defendant argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause imposes such a requirement on the jury.  But in People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 43, 79, we concluded that the United States Constitution, including implicitly the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, does not impose any requirement of this 
sort, and we so conclude again. 
 
Fourth, defendant challenges the failure of the instruction to state that in order to 
return a verdict of death, the jury must be unanimous in finding any aggravating 
circumstance underlying the verdict and must provide a written statement of reasons.  
Defendant argues, by implication, that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause and/or the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause demand such 
a finding and statement of reasons from the jury.  In People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
195, however, we impliedly held to the contrary, and now do so expressly. 
65 
 
Fifth, defendant challenges the sentence of the instruction defining a mitigating 
circumstance as “any fact, condition or event which as such, does not constitute a 
justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating 
circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.”  Defendant argues 
that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause, as construed in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 
604, generally require that the jury “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death,” but that the 
definition of a mitigating circumstance incorporated in the instruction precluded the jury 
from giving such consideration.  Although we agree with defendant concerning what is 
required by the two federal constitutional provisions in question, we otherwise disagree.  
A mitigating circumstance must not be reviewed in isolation, but rather in the context of 
the charge as a whole.  (See, e.g., People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1013.)   
 
After such review, we conclude that no reasonable likelihood exists that the jury 
misunderstood or misapplied the definition of a mitigating circumstance as argued by 
defendant.  The instruction made clear that “[i]n determining which penalty is to be 
imposed on the defendant,” the jury had to “consider all of the evidence” and could 
“consider, take into account and be guided by” any factor, including “[a]ny sympathetic 
or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death.”  Defendant’s citation of studies purportedly showing or 
suggesting the generally imperfect understanding of the concept of “mitigation” fails to 
establish any reasonable likelihood that the definition of a mitigating circumstance in this 
case misled the jury as to the scope of its responsibility in choosing between the two 
possible punishments. 
 
Defendant asserts that, in light of the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
66 
U.S. 466, we must reconsider any adverse conclusion that we otherwise might be inclined 
to reach on any aspect of his claim. 
 
In Apprendi, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause 
requires the state to submit to a jury, and prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury’s 
unanimous satisfaction, every fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the 
punishment for a crime beyond the maximum otherwise prescribed under state law.  In 
Ring, the court held that Apprendi operates in the capital context. 
 
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, as we recently made plain in People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 262–263, Ring and Apprendi are inapplicable to the determination 
of penalty in a capital case under California law.  Under the law of this state, all of the 
facts that increase the punishment for murder of the first degree — beyond the otherwise 
prescribed maximum of life imprisonment with possibility of parole to either life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole or death — already have been submitted to a 
jury (and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury’s unanimous satisfaction) in 
connection with at least one special circumstance, prior to the commencement of the 
penalty phase.  (See § 190.2.)  Therefore, at the penalty phase itself no further facts need 
to be proved in order to increase the punishment to either death or life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole, because both now are prescribed as potential penalties.  It is 
true that at the penalty phase, the choice between death and life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole depends on a determination as to which of the two penalties is 
appropriate, which in turn depends on a determination whether the evidence in 
aggravation substantially outweighs that in mitigation.  (See, e.g., People v. Brown 
(1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 538–545, & especially fns. 13 & 19 on pp. 541–542 & 545, revd. 
on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1986) 479 U.S. 538.)  But as explained, 
the ultimate determination of the appropriateness of the penalty and the subordinate 
determination of the balance of evidence of aggravation and mitigation do not entail the 
finding of facts that can increase the punishment for murder of the first degree beyond the 
67 
maximum otherwise prescribed.  Moreover, those determinations do not amount to the 
finding of facts, but rather constitute a single fundamentally normative assessment (see, 
e.g., People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 252–255, affd. sub nom. Boyde v. California 
(1990) 494 U.S. 370) that is outside the scope of Ring and Apprendi.  (Cf. Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001) 532 U.S. 424, 432, 437 [holding 
that an “award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of ‘fact[]’:  “imposition 
of punitive damages” is not “essentially a factual determination,” but instead an 
“expression of . . . moral condemnation”].)27 
O.  Constitutionality of the 1978 Death Penalty Law 
 
Defendant contends that the 1978 death penalty law violates the United States and 
California Constitutions, both on its face and as applied, by failing adequately to narrow 
the class of murderers subject to the death penalty, and hence that the sentence of death 
imposed upon him is invalid on that ground.  Specifically, defendant claims that the death 
penalty law fails adequately to narrow the class of death-eligible murderers because the 
law (1) defines murder of the first degree in a vague and overbroad fashion, in violation 
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) impermissibly leaves the 
narrowing function to prosecutorial discretion, in violation of the due process clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
                                             
 
27 
To the extent defendant claims that by giving the instruction on the determination 
of penalty quoted in the text, the trial court erred under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California 
Constitution, as well as under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment 
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, defendant’s argument is 
dismissed as not properly raised, inasmuch as it is perfunctorily asserted without 
argument in support. 
68 
well as the due process clauses of article I, sections 7 and 15, the cruel or unusual 
punishment clause of article I, section 17, and the equal protection clause of article I, 
section 7.   
 
In People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pages 403–404, we concluded that the 
death penalty law in fact adequately narrows the class of death-eligible murderers.  
There, we rejected a claim substantially similar to defendant’s.  Here, defendant adds 
only a bare invocation, without argument, of the federal and state constitutional 
guaranties of equal protection.  Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim as well.  Lastly, 
in light of the crimes of which he was convicted, which included rape, sodomy, and lewd 
conduct in addition to murder and the special circumstances found true (which comprised 
felony-murder rape, felony-murder sodomy, and felony-murder lewd conduct), defendant 
is squarely within the class of death-eligible murderers, no matter how narrowly that class 
reasonably might be defined. 
 
Defendant also contends that the 1978 death penalty law violates the United States 
Constitution, both on its face and as applied, by failing to provide for intercase 
proportionality review — specifically violating the Fifth Amendment’s due process 
clause, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses, and some unidentified clause of 
the Sixth Amendment.  In People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1029, we held that the 
United States Constitution, including explicitly the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, does not require intercase proportionality.  Presented with no reason to 
reconsider our holding, we adhere to it in this case and accordingly reject defendant’s 
claim. 
 
Defendant contends that the 1978 death penalty law violates the United States and 
California Constitutions, both on their face and as applied, in several additional 
particulars, each of which he acknowledges we have rejected in other decisions.  
Defendant also claims that instructions given in this case in conformity with the death 
69 
penalty law are themselves violative of the federal and state Constitutions in various 
respects, each of which he likewise acknowledges we have rejected in passing upon 
substantially similar instructions elsewhere. 
 
First, defendant claims that the 1978 death penalty law, and the instructions given, 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause by failing to identify which penalty factors are 
aggravating and which penalty factors are mitigating.  In People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 
Cal.3d 730, 777–779, we held that the United States Constitution, including implicitly the 
provisions on which defendant relies, does not require any such identification of 
aggravating and/or mitigating penalty factors.  We come to the same conclusion 
expressly in the present case.  Defendant argues that Ring and Apprendi require us to 
reconsider this point, but we conclude they do not, because as we have explained these 
decisions are inapplicable to the determination of penalty in a capital case under 
California law.  Further, in People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1126–1127, we 
upheld substantially similar instructions against a substantially similar attack.  The United 
States Constitution does not require the identification of aggravating and/or mitigating 
penalty factors in the instructions given to the jury, or elsewhere. 
 
Second, defendant claims that the 1978 death penalty law, and the instructions 
given, violate the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel 
and unusual punishment clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal 
protection clauses, by failing to impose on the People the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that any given aggravating circumstance exists, that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and that death is the appropriate 
penalty.  Rejecting a like challenge to the death penalty law in People v. Marshall (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 907, 935–936, where the defendant’s argument differed only in its omission of 
any reference to the Sixth Amendment, we concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not impose any burden of that sort.  We now reject defendant’s 
70 
challenge as well, finding that its invocation of the Sixth Amendment adds nothing of 
substance, because defendant erroneously assumes (as noted above) that Ring and 
Apprendi are applicable to the determination of penalty in a capital case under California 
law.  In Marshall, we also rejected a similar challenge to substantially identical 
instructions.  
 
Third, defendant claims that the 1978 death penalty law, and the instructions 
given, violate the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel 
and unusual punishment clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal 
protection clauses, and the analogous provisions of, apparently, article I, sections 7, 15, 
16, and 17, by failing to require that in order to return a verdict of death, the jury must be 
unanimous in finding any aggravating circumstance underlying the verdict.  In People v. 
Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 691–692, we concluded that neither the United States 
Constitution nor the California Constitution, including implicitly the provisions invoked 
in the present case, imposes any such requirement on the jury, and we adhere to that 
conclusion here.  Moreover, in People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 147, vacated 
on other grounds sub nomine Bacigalupo v. California (1992) 506 U.S. 802, we 
specifically held that the Sixth Amendment does not impose any requirement of this sort.  
Defendant asks us to reconsider our holding in light of Ring and Apprendi.  There is, 
however, no reason for us to do so, because — as we have explained — Ring and 
Apprendi are inapplicable to the determination of penalty in a capital case under 
California law. 
 
Fourth, defendant claims that the 1978 death penalty law, and the instructions 
given, violate the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and apparently the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process clause and the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, by defining two of the 
penalty factors in terms of “[w]hether or not the offense was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” (§ 190.3, 
71 
factor (d), italics added) and “[w]hether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of 
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of 
intoxication” (§ 190.3, factor (h), italics added).  Defendant’s argument is to the effect 
that the terms “extreme” and “impairment at the time of the offense” have a limiting 
effect and therefore are at odds with the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, which as noted 
generally require that the jury “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, 
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (Lockett v. 
Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604).  But in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pages 540–
541, we construed the death penalty law to allow just such consideration.  The 
instructions in the present case, as quoted above, were expressly in accord with these 
requirements.  Notwithstanding defendant’s complaint, there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the jury understood or applied the terms “extreme” or “impairment at the time of the 
offense” in isolation so as to preclude the jury from considering all that it was permitted 
to consider in support of the penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
rather than death.  To the extent defendant argues that the term “extreme” is 
impermissibly vague for purposes of the death penalty law and the instructions given, and 
thus violates the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause among other provisions, we found such an 
argument unpersuasive in People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1179, and adhere to 
that position in the present case. 
 
Fifth, defendant claims that the 1978 death penalty law, and the instructions given, 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause, the due process clauses of article I, sections 7 and 15, 
and the cruel or unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17, by failing to establish 
72 
a presumption that life imprisonment without possibility of parole is the appropriate 
penalty in any given case.  In People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 190, we concluded in 
effect that neither the United States nor the California Constitution requires such a 
presumption.  We adhere to that conclusion and on that basis reject defendant’s reliance 
on the specific federal and state constitutional provisions he cites.  Contrary to 
defendant’s implication, Ring and Apprendi have no bearing on the conclusion we reach, 
because, as explained above, they are inapplicable to the determination of penalty in a 
capital case under California law. 
 
Sixth, defendant claims that the 1978 death penalty law, and the instructions 
given, violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel 
and unusual punishment clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and, 
apparently, the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, to the extent the law allows the 
admission, and the instructions allowed the consideration, of evidence of other violent 
criminal activity that did not result in a conviction.  In People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
619, 701, we explicitly rejected a claim similar to defendant’s, impliedly concluding that 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments do not prohibit the admission or 
consideration of such evidence.  Presented with no reason to do otherwise, we adhere to 
that conclusion and therefore reject defendant’s argument. 
P.  Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant contends that all of the errors assertedly committed at the penalty phase 
retrial, considered together, require reversal of the judgment, because they cumulatively 
resulted in prejudicial violations of both the United States and California Constitutions — 
specifically, the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the 
due process clauses of article I, sections 7 and 15, the equal protection clause of article I, 
section 7, and the cruel or unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17.   
73 
 
With only one exception, we have rejected all of defendant’s claims of error.  With 
respect to the claim that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on penetration 
as an element of rape and sodomy in connection with defendant’s lingering doubt claim, 
we have assumed, without deciding, that the failure was error, and have found that any 
error in this regard was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Ante, pp. 59-60.)  Because 
there is no additional error to “cumulate” with that determination, defendant’s claim of 
cumulative error is clearly without merit.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
74 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Griffin 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S029174 
Date Filed: July 19, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Fresno 
Judge: James L. Quaschnick 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Donald J. Ayoob, Assistant State 
Public Defender, Mary K. McComb and Manuel J. Baglanis, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant 
Attorney General, John G. McLean and George M. Hendrickson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Donald J. Ayoob 
Assistant State Pubic Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
George M. Hendrickson 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5270