Title: Anthony Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc.
Citation: 2001 WI 81
Docket Number: 1998AP002419
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2001

2001 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2419 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Anthony Fuchsgruber, Cynthia Fuchsgruber, Aurora 
Health Care, Inc., Lewis Sullivan, Secretary of 
HHS and United States Attorney Melvin 
Washington, United States Department of Justice,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Custom  Accessories, Inc. and Zurich-American 
Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Appellants,  
China International Aero-Technology Import and 
Export Corporation, The Whitlock Corporation, 
ABC Insurance Company, The Travelers Insurance 
Company and Compcare Health Services Insurance  
Corporation,  
 
Defendants.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Lee E. Wells 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating: PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs 
by Stanley J. Lowe and White & Lowe, Waukesha, and oral argument 
by Stanley J. Lowe. 
 
 
2 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by Michael W. Fleming and Law Offices of Michael W. Fleming, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael W. Fleming. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. 
Gleisner, III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, Milwaukee, 
and Rhonda L. Lanford and Habush, Habush, Davis & Rottier, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg and Laufenberg 
Law Offices S.C., West Allis, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy 
of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2001 WI 81 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2419 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Anthony Fuchsgruber, Cynthia Fuchsgruber,  
Aurora Health Care, Inc., Lewis Sullivan,  
Secretary of HHS and United States  
Attorney Melvin Washington, United States  
Department of Justice,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Custom  Accessories, Inc. and  
Zurich-American Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
China International Aero-Technology  
Import and Export Corporation, The  
Whitlock Corporation, ABC Insurance  
Company, The Travelers Insurance Company  
and Compcare Health Services Insurance  
Corporation,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Lee E. Wells, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  The question in this case is 
whether the 1995 amendment to the comparative negligence 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
2 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) (1999-2000),1 applies to strict 
product liability actions.  The answer is no. 
¶2 Strict liability for injuries caused by defective and 
unreasonably dangerous products, as adopted by this court in 
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), is 
liability in tort, not liability for negligence.  The Dippel 
adaptation of the comparative negligence statute to product 
liability theory was a conceptual expedient intended to ensure 
the availability of the defense of contributory negligence in 
the newly-recognized tort doctrine of strict product liability. 
¶3 Although Dippel analogized strict product liability to 
negligence per se, it did not establish the tort as a species of 
negligence such that the comparative negligence statute applies 
to require a comparison of the plaintiff's negligence to the 
defendant's, as in an ordinary negligence action.  Rather, the 
comparison in a product liability action is plaintiff-to-
product, and secondarily, in multiple defendant cases, the 
defendants to each other, for purposes of contribution.  As 
such, the 1995 amendment to the comparative negligence statute——
codifying the requirement that the negligence of the plaintiff 
is compared against the separate rather than the combined 
negligence of the defendants, and modifying joint and several 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.    
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
3 
liability in negligence cases——does not apply to strict product 
liability actions.2 
I 
¶4 
Anthony Fuchsgruber purchased a Model 58887 Hydraulic 
Jack at the Whitlock Auto Parts store in St. Francis, Wisconsin. 
The jack was manufactured by China International Aero-Technology 
Import and Export Corporation, which sold the jack to Custom 
Accessories, Inc., which in turn sold it to Whitlock.  The jack 
had originally been shipped in a shrink-wrapped box with the 
handle detached.  When Fuchsgruber bought it, the box was 
secured by staples, but no shrink wrap.  Some weeks after making 
the purchase, Fuchsgruber opened the box, grabbed the jack by 
its handle (which was now attached), and attempted to lift it 
out of the box.  The handle broke, injuring him.   
¶5 
Fuchsgruber 
sued 
China 
International, 
Custom 
Accessories and Whitlock (the manufacturer, distributor, and 
retailer, respectively).  He alleged theories of negligence and 
strict product liability.  He was unable, however, to obtain 
service of process on China International, and Whitlock had 
                     
2 Fuchsgruber also argues that if Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), 
as amended by 1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1, applies to strict product 
liability actions, then its retroactive application to this case 
is unconstitutional.  We address the constitutionality of 
retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) in a case 
also mandated today, Matthies v. Positive Safety Manufacturing 
Co., 2001 WI 82, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ____ N.W.2d ___.  In Matthies, 
we hold that retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) 
is unconstitutional. We conclude here that the amended statute 
does not apply to Fuchsgruber's strict product liability claim. 
  
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
4 
previously filed for bankruptcy.  Custom Accessories and its 
insurer, therefore, were the only viable defendants in the case.  
¶6 
Fuchsgruber had the jack examined by an engineering 
expert who concluded that the handle broke because of a 
manufacturing defect.  The expert did not criticize the design 
of the jack, its packaging, or the written materials that 
accompanied it, but did say it would have been better to ship 
the jack with the handle detached rather than attached.   
¶7 
Custom 
Accessories 
moved 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
claiming that the 1995 amendment to the comparative negligence 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), required dismissal.  Custom 
Accessories argued that the new statute required comparison of 
Fuchsgruber's contributory negligence separately against each 
defendant in the chain of distribution, rather than against the 
product, as is usually the case in product liability actions.  
Further, 
Custom 
Accessories 
argued 
that, 
based 
upon 
Fuchsgruber's 
expert's 
opinion, 
no 
reasonable 
jury 
could 
possibly find that it was more than 51 percent causally 
negligent, and so the new statute's elimination of joint and 
several liability for defendants found less than 51 percent 
negligent required dismissal.   
¶8 
Fuchsgruber argued that the 1995 amendment to the 
comparative negligence statute did not apply to strict product 
liability claims.  The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Lee E. Wells, agreed, and denied the motion for 
summary judgment.  Custom Accessories successfully sought leave 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
5 
to file an interlocutory appeal, and the court of appeals 
certified the case to us.                            
II 
 
¶9 
We review a circuit court's decision on a motion for 
summary judgment independently, applying the same methodology as 
the circuit court.  Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 
Wis. 2d 524, 536, 563 N.W.2d 472 (1997).  A motion for summary 
judgment is granted when the pleadings and supporting materials 
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact in 
dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Id. at 537; see also Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶10 The circuit court denied summary judgment, rejecting 
Custom Accessories' interpretation of the amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1).  We review questions of statutory interpretation 
de novo.  Nelson v. McLaughlin, 211 Wis. 2d 487, 495, 565 N.W.2d 
123 (1997).  Statutory interpretation begins with——and, absent 
ambiguity, is confined to——the language of the statute, and that 
language, 
with 
the 
exception 
of 
specifically 
defined 
or 
technical terms, is given its ordinary and accepted meaning.  
Id. 
¶11 Custom 
Accessories 
argues 
that 
the 
legislature's 
enactment of 1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1, amending the comparative 
negligence statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), brought about a 
change in the doctrine of strict product liability as adopted by 
this court in Dippel.   Custom Accessories contends that the new 
statute, as applicable to product liability cases, operates to 
protect from liability a defendant who is merely an "innocent 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
6 
member of the chain of distribution," who did nothing to cause 
or contribute to the defective condition of the product.  We 
disagree.   
¶12 The amended comparative negligence statute provides as 
follows: 
 
(1) COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.  Contributory negligence 
does not bar recovery in an action by any person or 
the person's legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, if that negligence was not greater 
than the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished 
in 
the 
proportion 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
negligence attributed to the person recovering.  The 
negligence 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
shall 
be 
measured 
separately against the negligence of each person found 
to be causally negligent.  The liability of each 
person found to be causally negligent whose percentage 
of causal negligence is less than 51% is limited to 
the 
percentage 
of 
the 
total 
causal 
negligence 
attributed to that person.  A person found to be 
causally 
negligent 
whose 
percentage 
of 
causal 
negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the damages allowed. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045 (emphasis added). 
¶13 The 1995 amendment had two apparent purposes: 1) the 
codification of the pre-existing requirement in negligence 
actions that, where there are multiple defendants, a plaintiff's 
negligence is compared against the separate rather than the 
combined 
negligence 
of 
the 
defendants 
for 
purposes 
of 
determining liability;3 and 2) the modification of joint and 
several liability.  As to the latter, under the new statute, 
                     
3 See  Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 469-74, 290 N.W.2d 
510 (1980). 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
7 
only a defendant found 51 percent or more causally negligent can 
be jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's total damages 
(adjusted for any contributory negligence).  The liability of a 
defendant whose causal negligence is less than 51 percent is 
limited to the percentage of causal negligence attributed to 
that defendant. 
¶14 On the face of it, there is nothing in the language of 
the statutory amendment to indicate that it was intended to work 
a change in product liability law, as distinct from ordinary 
negligence law.  Dippel adopted the rule of strict liability as 
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A) (1965) 
for use in product liability cases in this state.  Under Dippel, 
pursuant to § 402(A), a plaintiff alleging a claim for strict 
product liability must prove the following five elements: 
 
(1) that the product was in defective condition when 
it left the possession or control of the seller, 
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer, 
(3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial 
factor) of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, 
(4) that the seller engaged in the business of 
selling such product or, put negatively, that 
this is not an isolated or infrequent transaction 
not related to the principal business of the 
seller, and 
(5) that the product was one which the seller 
expected to and did reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition it 
was when he sold it.  
Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 460.   
¶15 Strict product liability theory allows recovery where, 
although there is no proof of specific acts of negligence on the 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
8 
part of the seller, the "product was in a defective condition at 
the time it reached the hands of the ultimate consumer."  
Greiten v. La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).  
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the Dippel elements, and 
if he does, all sellers in the chain of distribution——
manufacturer, distributor, retailer——are strictly liable to the 
plaintiff, although they may have contribution rights against 
each other. 
¶16 Strict liability was justified because "the seller is 
in the paramount position to distribute the costs of the risks 
created by the defective product," by purchasing insurance or by 
passing the cost on to the consumer in the price of the product. 
 Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 450.  Further, "the consumer . . . has 
the right to rely on the apparent safety of the product 
and . . . it is the seller in the first instance who creates the 
risk by placing the defective product on the market."  Id. at 
450-51.  Also, "where the manufacturer is concerned . . . the 
manufacturer has the greatest ability to control the risk 
created by his product since he may initiate or adopt inspection 
and quality control measures thereby 
preventing 
defective 
products from reaching the consumer."  Id. at 451.  Finally, 
"the imposition of strict liability avoids circuity of action.  
In a single suit the plaintiff may proceed against all or the 
most affluent member in the distributive chain."  Id.  
¶17 Prior to Dippel, product liability actions generally 
resided in the field of warranty, and were therefore subject to 
various contract defenses; the adoption of the Restatement 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
9 
(Second) of Torts § 402A planted them solidly in the realm of 
tort, although not as negligence actions.  "From the plaintiff's 
point of view the most beneficial aspect of the rule is that it 
relieves him of proving specific acts of negligence and protects 
him from the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer, and lack 
of privity in the implied warranty concepts of sales and 
contracts."  Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 460. 
¶18 Strict liability, however, was not intended to be 
absolute liability, nor did it make sellers insurers.  Id. at 
459-60.  Dippel made it clear that the defense of contributory 
negligence was available, and cited in a footnote to the 
contributory negligence statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045.  Dippel, 
37 Wis. 2d at 460-61, n.10. In doing so, however, the Dippel 
court recognized the conceptual difficulty of interposing a 
negligence defense against a cause of action that is not based 
upon negligence, and reconciled it in this way: 
 
It might be contended that the strict liability 
of the seller of a defective product is not negligence 
and therefore cannot be compared with the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff.  The liability imposed is 
not grounded upon a failure to exercise ordinary care 
with its necessary element of foreseeability; it is 
much more akin to negligence per se.  
Id. at 461 (emphasis added).   
¶19 This language in Dippel analogizing strict product 
liability to negligence per se for purposes of the defense of 
contributory negligence did not establish the newly-recognized 
cause of action as a species of negligence.  It did not, 
therefore, suggest the application of the comparative negligence 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
10
statute in product liability cases in exactly the same manner as 
in ordinary negligence actions. 
¶20 Indeed, in strict product liability cases under Dippel, 
the jury is asked to apportion the extent to which the 
plaintiff's injuries were attributable to his own contributory 
negligence as compared to the product's defectiveness.  See Wis 
JI——Civil 3290.  That is, the initial comparison is plaintiff-
against-product, not plaintiff-against-defendants.  An entirely 
separate question asks the jury to apportion liability for 
contribution 
among 
the 
various 
defendants——manufacturer, 
assembler, dealer, seller——responsible for placing the defective 
product in the stream of commerce.  Id.  The requirement of a 
separate verdict question on the issue of contribution among 
defendants was established by this court in the wake of Dippel, 
in City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 
207 N.W.2d 866 (1973). 
¶21 We emphasize again that the "negligence per se" 
language in Dippel did not establish strict product liability as 
a device for imposing liability for negligence.  Greiten, 70 
Wis. 2d at 603 (Heffernan, J., concurring). In his Greiten 
concurrence,4 Justice Nathan S. Heffernan explained the Dippel 
"negligence per se" language in this way: 
                     
4 Justice Heffernan's concurrence in Greiten v. La Dow, 70 
Wis. 2d 589, 599, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975), was joined by three 
other justices and was therefore a majority opinion of the 
court, and has been treated as such.  Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 
Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976); St. Clare Hosp. of 
Monroe v. Schmidt, Garden, Erickson, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 750, 758, 
437 N.W.2d 228, n.3 (Ct. App. 1989).  
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
11
 
Sec. 
402 
A 
does 
not 
impose 
liability 
for 
negligence at all.  It imposes liability for tort, and 
it is only for the purposes of fitting the Dippel 
rationale 
into the 
framework of 
our 
comparative 
negligence statute that we refer to it as negligence, 
albeit a legal-policy type of negligence per se.  In 
the Dippel type of case, the burden of proof that the 
product was in a defective condition at the time it 
reached the hands of the ultimate consumer is upon the 
plaintiff; and in the event he meets that burden of 
proof, there is liability.  It is not necessary to 
show any specific acts of negligence.  It is not 
necessary to show duty in terms of foreseeability.  It 
is enough to prove, irrespective of due care, that, 
because of its dangerously defective nature, the 
product caused harm. 
Id. at 603 (Heffernan, J., concurring).  
¶22 Drawing on Justice Heffernan's Greiten concurrence, 
Court of Appeals Judge William Eich has offered this analysis: 
 
The occasional, sometimes unexplained, references 
to negligence per se in strict liability cases, and 
the jury instruction and verdict forms which ask 
jurors in strict liability cases to take a leap of 
logic, if not faith, by treating the "defective 
condition" of a product as "negligence," have created 
some confusion in the area, as the supreme court 
itself has recognized.  Howes v. Deere & Company, 71 
Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976).  We are 
satisfied, however, that the occasional references to 
negligence per se in products liability cases and in 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instructions 
do 
not 
 . . . inseparably wed the two theories of liability 
in all circumstances. 
 
Indeed, 
comparing 
strict 
liability and negligence "is . . . comparing apples 
and oranges, for [strict liability] is based upon the 
public-policy 
premise 
that a 
seller is 
socially 
responsible for what he [or she] puts into the stream 
of commerce irrespective of [the] degree of care.... 
On the other hand, negligence is based upon a theory 
of fault.  We look in the ordinary negligence case not 
. . . to the result of the defendant's action, but 
rather to his [or her] conduct in attaining that 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
12
result."  Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 604, 235 N.W.2d at 
686. 
 
St. Clare Hosp. of Monroe v. Schmidt, Garden, Erickson, Inc., 
148 Wis. 2d 750, 758-59, 437 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 
¶23 We do not consider a seller who is liable under Dippel 
to be guilty of negligence at all.  Despite the somewhat 
misleading language of the cases, jury instruction and special 
verdict form, the defective condition of the product does not 
constitute "negligence" on the part of the seller.  There is no 
defendant "negligence" to be apportioned against the plaintiff 
in a strict product liability action, either separately or in 
the aggregate with other defendants.  There may be contribution 
rights to be determined, but that is always a separate question 
and has no bearing on the plaintiff's recovery, which is reduced 
only to the extent of his own negligent conduct. 
¶24 In strict product liability actions, "[t]he 'act' to 
which [the seller's] responsibility attaches is not an act of 
negligence.  If indeed it is an act at all, it is simply the act 
of placing or maintaining a defective product in the stream of 
commerce."  Id. at 757-58.  Therefore, the comparison in strict 
product liability actions is not a comparison of one party's 
conduct against another, but, rather, a comparison of the extent 
to which the plaintiff's injuries were attributable to his own 
contributory negligence as against the product's defective 
condition. 
¶25 It is axiomatic that a statute does not abrogate a 
rule of common law unless the abrogation is clearly expressed 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
13
and leaves no doubt of the legislature's intent.  Kranzush v. 
Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256, 
266 (1981); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 185 Wis. 2d 827, 836, 520 
N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1994).  Statutes in derogation of the common 
law are strictly construed.  Maxey v. Redev. Auth. of Racine, 94 
Wis. 2d 375, 399, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980).  A statute does not 
change the common law unless the legislative purpose to do so is 
clearly expressed in the language of the statute.  Id.  To 
accomplish a change in the common law, the language of the 
statute must be clear, unambiguous, and peremptory.  Id.  
¶26 The language of the new comparative negligence statute 
clearly expresses a legislative purpose to codify the common law 
rule requiring a plaintiff's contributory negligence to be 
compared 
against 
the 
separate 
rather 
than 
the 
aggregate 
negligence of the defendants.  The language of the new statute 
also clearly expresses a legislative purpose to partially 
eliminate joint and several liability in negligence actions.  
The new statute does not, however, explicitly or even implicitly 
suggest a legislative purpose to change the common law of strict 
product liability. 
¶27 As we have emphasized, strict product liability is not 
negligence; the concept of contributory negligence is simply 
borrowed from negligence law and transplanted in product 
liability theory for purposes of making the defense available to 
sellers.  Neither the availability of this defense, nor the 
availability of contribution rights among defendants, means that 
strict product liability is actually negligence for all intents 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
14
and 
purposes, 
including 
application 
of 
the 
comparative 
negligence statute.  The comparative negligence statute has 
never fully applied to strict product liability actions in the 
first place; therefore, the amendment to it, which is silent on 
the subject, does not abrogate or alter the common law of strict 
product liability. 
¶28 The Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee has 
reached essentially the same conclusion, and declined to adapt 
the jury instructions and special verdict form in the manner 
suggested by Custom Accessories:     
 
In October 1998, the Committee reviewed this 
special verdict format suggested above to determine if 
any change was necessary due to the revision to Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045 which modified common law on joint and 
several liability.  In particular, the Committee 
analyzed 
the 
language 
in 
the 
statute 
that 
the 
plaintiff's negligence "shall be measured separately" 
against each defendant.  Some members of the Bar have 
suggested this new statutory language eliminates the 
traditional "person versus product" comparison on 
which this verdict is premised.  The Committee 
believes 
that 
the 
plaintiff 
versus 
the 
product 
approach is still the proper approach in applying 
comparative negligence in a products liability case 
involving 
several 
defendants 
in 
the 
chain 
of 
distribution of the product. See City of Franklin v. 
Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 
866 (1973). 
 
     Based 
on 
the 
Committee's 
review 
of 
both 
subsections to § 895.045 and the clear holding in the 
City of Franklin, supra, decision as to the allocation 
of comparative negligence in a products liability case 
with multiple product sellers, the Committee concluded 
that the special verdict proposed above is correct and 
does not require revision.   
 
Wis JI——Civil 3290 comment at 3-4 (1998).    
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
15
¶29 To interpret the new comparative negligence statute as 
Custom Accessories suggests would bring about a sea change in 
strict product liability law, shifting burdens and altering the 
nature of the proofs, indeed, transforming the very nature of 
product liability 
from strict liability to 
garden-variety 
negligence.  While the 1995 amendment clearly ushered in a 
significant development in negligence law, there is nothing in 
the language of the new statute that even hints at a legislative 
purpose to accomplish such a sweeping change in the common law 
of strict product liability in this state.   
¶30 We conclude, therefore, that the 1995 amendment to the 
comparative negligence statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), does 
not apply to strict product liability claims.  The traditional 
plaintiff-to-product comparison, followed by an apportionment of 
contribution rights among defendants, remains the law in the 
field of product liability.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit 
court's denial of Custom Accessories' motion for summary 
judgment motion.  
 By the Court.—The order of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court is affirmed. 
¶31 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
98-2419 
 
 
1