Title: In re Scoggins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S253155
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re WILLIE SCOGGINS 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S253155 
 
Third Appellate District 
C084358 
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
08F04643 
 
 
June 25, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.  
 
1 
 
In re SCOGGINS 
S253155 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
In 2008, petitioner Willie Scoggins planned an unarmed 
assault and robbery that resulted in a death.  In 2011, a jury 
convicted Scoggins of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, 
subd. (a)) and attempted robbery (id., §§ 211, 664).  It also 
found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder 
was committed during an attempted robbery (id., § 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)) and the enhancement that a principal was armed 
during 
the 
commission 
of 
the 
offenses 
(id., 
§ 12022, 
subd. (a)(1)).  Scoggins was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  After Scoggins’s conviction 
became final, we decided People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), 
which clarified the meaning of the special circumstances 
statute.  We granted review to determine whether Scoggins’s 
conduct supported a robbery-murder special-circumstance 
finding under Banks and Clark.  We hold that Scoggins did not 
act with reckless indifference to human life and thus the 
special circumstance finding must be reversed. 
I. 
In June 2008, Scoggins purchased what he believed to be 
three large flat-panel televisions from Samuel Wilson for $300 
each.  When Scoggins opened the television boxes, he 
discovered that they contained packaging paper and wood.  
Scoggins was angry that he had been swindled by Wilson. 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
Scoggins’s girlfriend, Shaneil Cooks, and her friend, 
Jennifer Kane, met Wilson a few days later by coincidence.  
After Cooks and Kane told Scoggins about the encounter, 
Scoggins quickly devised a plan to exact revenge against 
Wilson:  Cooks and Kane would pretend to be interested in 
purchasing a television and meet up with Wilson; two of 
Scoggins’s close friends, Randall Powell and James Howard, 
would hide inside Cooks’s van during the meeting; and then 
Powell and Howard would jump out, “beat the shit” out of 
Wilson, and get Scoggins’s money back.  The plan did not call 
for Scoggins to be involved in the attack; Scoggins was 
concerned that Wilson might recognize him from their earlier 
encounter and thought his presence would raise Wilson’s 
suspicions.  There is no evidence that the plan involved the use 
of weapons. 
Soon after, Scoggins and his friends set the plan in 
motion.  Cooks and Kane pretended that Kane’s mother was 
interested in buying a television and arranged a meeting with 
Wilson.  Later that evening, Cooks, Kane, Powell, and Howard 
went to the parking lot of a strip mall to meet Wilson.  Shortly 
after they arrived, Powell and Howard stepped out of the van 
and spoke briefly with Wilson.  Then, Powell pulled out a gun 
and fired several shots at Wilson.  When Wilson ran, Powell 
fired a few more shots and killed Wilson.  After that, Powell 
and Howard got into Cooks’s van, and the van sped away from 
the scene.  Throughout these events, Scoggins, as planned, was 
not present at the crime scene.  He exchanged numerous phone 
calls with Powell and Howard in the hour leading up to the 
shooting and waited at a nearby gas station as the events 
unfolded. 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
After the shooting, Scoggins walked over to Wilson and 
checked if he was still breathing.  At that point, several 
bystanders had already gathered around Wilson and had called 
the police.  After speaking with the bystanders for a while, 
Scoggins moved his car and returned to the crime scene.  The 
police arrived and interviewed Scoggins as a witness.  The 
officer who interviewed Scoggins described him as cooperative.   
Scoggins’s first trial ended in a mistrial.  At the second 
trial in 2011, the jury convicted Scoggins of first degree murder 
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and attempted robbery (id., §§ 211, 
664).  The jury also found true the special circumstance that 
the murder was committed during an attempted robbery (id., 
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and the enhancement that a principal 
was armed during the commission of the offenses (id., § 12022, 
subd. (a)(1)).  The trial court sentenced Scoggins to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The court 
stayed the imposition of the sentence as to the attempted 
robbery conviction and the firearm enhancement.  The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the judgment, rejecting Scoggins’s claim that 
insufficient evidence supported the robbery-murder special-
circumstance finding.  We denied Scoggins’s petition for 
review. 
In 2015 and 2016, Scoggins filed several petitions for writ 
of habeas corpus in the trial court and the Court of Appeal, 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting the special 
circumstance finding.  These petitions were denied.  In May 
2016, Scoggins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 
court, again challenging the special circumstance finding.  We 
issued an order to show cause, returnable to the Court of 
Appeal, as to why Scoggins is not entitled to relief in light of 
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
both of which were filed after Scoggins’s conviction became 
final. 
The Court of Appeal denied relief in a divided opinion.  
The court observed that Banks and Clark clarified the meaning 
of the special circumstances statute as intended by the 
electorate and that the finality of Scoggins’s conviction does 
not bar him from challenging the special circumstance finding 
through a petition for habeas corpus.  If the undisputed facts 
rendered Scoggins ineligible for the special circumstance 
finding, the court explained, then the trial court would have 
imposed the sentence of life without parole “ ‘in excess of its 
jurisdiction’ ” (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396 
(Mutch)), and Scoggins would be entitled to habeas corpus 
relief.  (See id. at pp. 395, 396 [where a defendant has been 
“convicted under a statute which did not prohibit his acts at 
the time he committed them,” “finality for purposes of appeal is 
no bar to relief, and . . . habeas corpus or other appropriate 
extraordinary remedy will lie to rectify the error”].) 
The court then analyzed whether Scoggins satisfied the 
two requirements for the special circumstance: major 
participation in the crime and reckless indifference to human 
life.  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798.)  The court concluded 
that Scoggins was a major participant in the attempted 
robbery resulting in Wilson’s death because Scoggins planned 
the robbery.  The court acknowledged that whether Scoggins 
acted with reckless indifference to human life was a “closer 
call” but ultimately concluded that the record supported such a 
finding.  In the court’s view, the evidence showed that Scoggins 
knew about Powell’s propensity for violence and that Scoggins 
did not take steps to minimize risk of violence during the 
robbery.  Justice Renner, in a concurring and dissenting 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
opinion, agreed that Scoggins was a major participant but 
concluded that the evidence did not show that Scoggins 
exhibited reckless indifference to human life.   
We granted review. 
II. 
 
At the outset, we consider whether Scoggins’s claim is 
procedurally barred.  On direct appeal, Scoggins challenged, as 
he does here, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
special circumstance finding.  Generally, claims that have been 
raised and rejected on direct appeal cannot be raised again in a 
habeas corpus petition.  (In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 
225 [“[H]abeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second 
appeal.”].)  In addition, sufficiency of the evidence claims are 
generally not cognizable on habeas corpus.  (In re Lindley 
(1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 723.) 
 
But, as the Court of Appeal recognized, an exception to 
these procedural bars applies here.  Where a decision clarifies 
the kind of conduct proscribed by a statute, a defendant whose 
conviction became final before that decision “is entitled to post-
conviction relief upon a showing that his [or her] conduct was 
not prohibited by the statute” as construed in the decision.  
(Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 392.)  “In such circumstances, it is 
settled that finality for purposes of appeal is no bar to relief, 
and that habeas corpus or other appropriate extraordinary 
remedy will lie to rectify the error:  ‘Habeas corpus is available 
in cases where the court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction.  
[Citations.]  For purposes of this writ as well as prohibition or 
certiorari, the term “jurisdiction” is not limited to its 
fundamental meaning, and in such proceedings judicial acts 
may be restrained or annulled if determined to be in excess of 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
the court’s powers as defined by constitutional provision, 
statute, or rules developed by courts.  [Citations.]  In 
accordance with these principles a defendant is entitled to 
habeas corpus if there is no material dispute as to the facts 
relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute 
under which he was convicted did not prohibit his conduct.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 396.) 
 
In 
Mutch, 
the 
defendant’s 
conviction 
under 
the 
aggravated kidnapping statute became final before this court 
issued a decision clarifying the type of conduct prohibited by 
that statute.  (Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 392.)  We 
determined that there was no material dispute as to the facts 
relating to his conviction and that his conduct did not 
constitute 
aggravated 
kidnapping 
under 
the 
proper 
construction of the aggravated kidnapping statute.  (Id. at 
pp. 397–399; see id. at p. 399 [“on the undisputed facts 
defendant was convicted of kidnap[ping] under a statute which 
did not prohibit his conduct at the time” he committed the 
acts].)  Thus, the defendant was convicted in excess of the trial 
court’s jurisdiction and was entitled to post-conviction relief.  
(Id. at p. 399.) 
 
In this case, Banks and Clark clarified the meaning of 
the special circumstances statute after Scoggins’s conviction 
became final.  There is no material dispute as to the facts 
relating to Scoggins’s conviction.  The question is whether on 
this record Scoggins’s conduct is proscribed by the special 
circumstances statute, as construed in Banks and Clark.  If it 
is not, then the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction 
when it sentenced Scoggins to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, and habeas corpus relief would be 
available. 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (d), enacted by 
initiative in 1990, provides that “every person, not the actual 
killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a 
major participant” aids or abets an enumerated felony, 
including attempted robbery, that results in death may be 
convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to 
death or to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
The statute, by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, 
major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea 
requirement, reckless indifference to human life.  (Banks, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798.)   
 
In Banks, we explained that the special circumstances 
statute incorporated the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 
U.S. 137 (Tison).  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798.)  In 
Tison, the high court addressed the level of culpability required 
to impose the death penalty on an accomplice to felony murder.  
(Tison, at pp. 145–146.)  It held that “major participation in 
the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to 
human life,” is sufficient to justify the death penalty.  (Id. at 
p. 158.) 
 
Because the language of the special circumstances 
statute is directly borrowed from that holding, it is instructive 
to consider the high court’s analysis in Tison and a related 
decision, Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund).  
In Enmund, the high court ruled that it is unconstitutional to 
impose the death penalty on a getaway driver for an armed 
robbery that results in death.  (Id. at p. 788.)  The court noted 
that Enmund was a minor participant in the crime and did not 
intend to kill or have any other culpable mental state.  (Id. at 
pp. 791, 801; accord, Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 149.) 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
By contrast, the court upheld the death sentences 
imposed on the defendants in Tison, who were major 
participants in the felonies resulting in death and acted with 
reckless indifference to human life.  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at 
p. 158.)  The defendants in that case were brothers who helped 
their father and his cellmate, both convicted murderers, escape 
from prison.  (Id. at p. 139.)  The brothers armed the two 
prisoners, locked up the prison guards, and helped the 
prisoners escape.  (Ibid.)  A few days later, the group got a flat 
tire and flagged down a passing car for help.  (Id. at pp. 139–
140.)  They kidnapped the family that was in the car and 
robbed them.  (Id. at p. 140.)  The two brothers then guarded 
the family while their father considered what to do next.  
(Ibid.)  Eventually, the father shot all of the family members, 
and the group of perpetrators left the victims to die without 
rendering aid.  (Id. at p. 141.) 
 
In Banks, we applied the high court’s analysis in Tison 
and Enmund and concluded that the evidence was insufficient 
to support a robbery-murder special-circumstance finding 
under section 190.2.  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.)  We 
explained that when analyzing a defendant’s culpability under 
the special circumstances statute, it is important to consider 
where the defendant’s conduct falls on the “spectrum of 
culpability” that Enmund and Tison established.  (Id. at 
p. 811.)  On one end of the spectrum is Enmund, “the minor 
actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither 
intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental 
state.”  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 149.)  At the other end is 
“the felony murderer who actually killed, attempted to kill, or 
intended to kill.”  (Id. at p. 150.)  Because the defendant in 
Banks, like Enmund, was a mere getaway driver in an armed 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
robbery, we concluded that the evidence was insufficient to 
show that he was a major participant or acted with reckless 
indifference to human life.  (Banks, at pp. 805, 807.)  We 
therefore reversed the special circumstance finding.  (Id. at 
p. 811.) 
In Clark, we similarly held that insufficient evidence 
supported a robbery-murder special-circumstance finding for a 
defendant who planned a robbery that resulted in a death.  
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 610–611.)  The defendant in 
that case planned and organized the robbery of a computer 
store.  (Id. at p. 536.)  The defendant planned for the robbery to 
take place after the store closed, when there would be few 
people in the store, and to involve only one gun without any 
bullets in it.  (Id. at pp. 621–622.)  But an employee’s mother 
unexpectedly entered the store during the robbery, and the 
defendant’s accomplice shot her with a bullet he had loaded 
into the gun.  (Id. at p. 537.)  Soon after the shooting, the 
defendant fled the scene and abandoned his accomplice.  (Id. at 
p. 620.)  We concluded that although the “defendant had a 
prominent, if not the most prominent, role in planning the 
criminal enterprise that led to the death” (id. at p. 613), the 
record did not establish that he exhibited reckless indifference 
to human life (id. at p. 623).  We therefore vacated the special 
circumstance finding.  (Ibid.) 
III. 
 
Banks and Clark clarified the meaning of the special 
circumstances statute after Scoggins’s conviction became final.  
Thus, Scoggins is entitled to habeas corpus relief “ ‘if there is 
no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction 
and if it appears that the statute under which he was convicted 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
did not prohibit his conduct.’ ”  (Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 
p. 396.)  We find no material dispute as to the basic facts of 
Scoggins’s participation in the attempted robbery resulting in 
Wilson’s death.  The question is whether the special 
circumstances statute as construed in Banks and Clark 
prohibited Scoggins’s conduct.  We conclude on this record that 
Scoggins did not exhibit reckless indifference to human life and 
thus his conduct was not within the scope of the special 
circumstances statute.  (Scoggins does not challenge the Court 
of Appeal’s determination that he was a major participant in 
the crime resulting in Wilson’s death, so we do not address 
that question here.) 
 
Reckless indifference to human life is “implicit in 
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a 
grave risk of death.”  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157.)  
Examples include “the person who tortures another not caring 
whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots 
someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the 
fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended 
consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s 
property.”  (Ibid.)  Reckless indifference “encompasses a 
willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a 
distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire 
that death as the outcome of his actions.”  (Clark, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at p. 617.) 
 
Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and 
an objective element.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)  As 
to the subjective element, “[t]he defendant must be aware of 
and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the 
particular offense is committed,” and he or she must 
consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his or her 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
actions create.”  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801; see Clark, 
at p. 617.)  As to the objective element, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] 
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the 
nature and purpose of the actor’s 
conduct and the 
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ”  (Clark, 
at p. 617, quoting Model Pen. Code, § 2.02, subd. (2)(c).)  
“Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death 
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish 
reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a 
‘grave risk of death’ ” satisfies the statutory requirement.  
(Banks, at p. 808.)  Notably, “the fact a participant [or planner 
of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be 
used” is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to 
human life.  (Ibid.; see Clark, at p. 623.)   
 
We analyze the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether Scoggins acted with reckless indifference to 
human life.  Relevant factors include:  Did the defendant use or 
know that a gun would be used during the felony?  How many 
weapons were ultimately used?  Was the defendant physically 
present at the crime?  Did he or she have the opportunity to 
restrain the crime or aid the victim?  What was the duration of 
the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the 
victims?  What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her 
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using 
lethal force?  What efforts did the defendant make to minimize 
the risks of violence during the felony?  (Clark, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.)  “ ‘[N]o one of these considerations is 
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 618, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
First, Scoggins did not use a gun, nor did he know that a 
gun would be used during the felony.  The record shows that 
Scoggins’s plan did not involve shooting Wilson.  As mentioned, 
Scoggins planned for the assault and robbery of Wilson to be 
unarmed, and there is no evidence that Scoggins knew that 
Powell would use a gun.  With respect to this factor, Scoggins 
was far less culpable than the defendants in Tison, who 
“brought an arsenal of lethal weapons into the Arizona State 
Prison” to help their father and his cellmate escape.  (Tison, 
supra, 481 U.S. at p. 151.)  Indeed, Scoggins was less culpable 
than the defendant in Clark, who expected his accomplice to 
use an unloaded gun to carry out the robbery.  (Clark, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 613; see id. at p. 618 [“The mere fact of a 
defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in the felony is 
not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human 
life.”].) 
 
Second, “[p]roximity to the murder and the events 
leading up to it may be particularly significant where . . . the 
murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of several 
intermediate steps, or where the participant who personally 
commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a 
willingness to use lethal force.  In such cases, ‘the defendant’s 
presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it is fair to 
conclude that he shared in their actions and mental 
state. . . .  [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an 
opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous 
cohorts.  If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, 
then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting 
murders.’ ”  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) 
 
The defendants in Tison were physically present during 
the entire sequence of events that resulted in the victims’ 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
deaths.  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158.)  The Tison brothers 
flagged down the car containing the victims, kidnapped and 
robbed them, guarded them while their father decided what to 
do, and eventually watched their father shoot the victims.  (Id. 
at pp. 139–141.)  During that time, the defendants knew that 
their father was debating whether to kill the victims and had 
ample opportunity to restrain the crime and aid the victims.  
(Id. at p. 140.)  Because the defendants did neither, the high 
court reasoned, they exhibited reckless indifference to human 
life.  (Id. at pp. 151–152.) 
 
Here, by contrast, Scoggins was not physically present at 
the crime scene and was not in a position to restrain Powell 
once the meeting with Wilson began.  Scoggins remained at a 
nearby gas station during the course of the crime and did not 
arrive at the crime scene until after the shooting occurred.  
Moreover, it is not clear whether Scoggins could even see the 
confrontation between his accomplices and Wilson from his 
position at the gas station.  The record contains two pieces of 
evidence regarding Scoggins’s location: cell tower data and 
Scoggins’s statements to the police.  The cell tower data placed 
Scoggins within a half-mile radius of the crime scene but did 
not provide any information on his exact location.  In his 
statements to the police, Scoggins denied that he could see the 
shooting from his location at the gas station.  The evidence at 
trial lends some support to his claim.  According to eyewitnesses, 
Powell and Howard confronted Wilson near Cooks’s van, which 
was parked in the lot next to the gas station.  Shell casings 
recovered after the shooting indicate that Powell was standing on 
the side of the van opposite from the gas station when he first 
shot Wilson.  Thus, the van would have blocked Scoggins’s view of 
the confrontation between his accomplices and Wilson, leaving 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
him unaware in real time that Powell was deviating from the 
original plan.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) 
 
The Attorney General contends that Scoggins could have 
restrained 
the 
crime 
because 
he 
was 
in 
constant 
communication with Powell and Howard before the shooting 
and could have instructed them to avoid using lethal force.  
But Scoggins had no reason to give such an instruction; his 
plan for Powell and Howard to beat up Wilson did not 
contemplate any use of lethal force, and unlike the Tison 
brothers, he had no reason to suspect that his accomplices were 
armed or planning to kill Wilson.  (Post, at pp. 17–20.)  In 
addition, although Scoggins was in close contact with his 
accomplices before the shooting, he lacked control over their 
actions once they arrived on the crime scene, especially given 
how quickly the shooting occurred.  This distinguishes 
Scoggins from the Tison brothers, who were physically present 
at the scene where a long sequence of events culminated in 
murder.  (See Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 139–141.) 
 
We emphasize that “physical presence is not invariably a 
prerequisite to demonstrating reckless indifference to human 
life.”  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)  “Where, for 
example, a defendant instructs other members of a criminal 
gang carrying out carjackings at his behest to shoot any 
resisting victims, he need not be present when his 
subordinates carry out the instruction in order to be found to 
be recklessly indifferent to the lives of the victims.”  (Ibid., 
citing People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281–1282.)  
Especially in light of emerging technologies, a defendant who 
plans and directs a murder from afar may be just as culpable 
as a defendant who is physically present at the scene of the 
crime.  But there is no evidence here that Scoggins instructed 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
his confederates to kill Wilson under any scenario; as noted, 
Scoggins had planned for the beating and robbery to be 
unarmed.  Nor does the record show that he directed his 
accomplices to deviate from the plan once they arrived at the 
crime scene. 
A defendant’s actions after the shooting may also bear on 
the defendant’s mental state.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 619.)  For example, the high court took into account the 
Tison brothers’ failure to render aid to the victims after the 
shooting when it concluded that they acted with reckless 
indifference to human life.  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 151–
152.)  But we have said that when different inferences may be 
drawn from the circumstances, the defendant’s actions after 
the shooting may not be very probative of his mental state.  In 
Clark, the defendant fled the scene and abandoned his 
accomplice immediately after the shooting.  (Clark, at p. 620.)  
We said that the defendant’s actions could have suggested 
either that the defendant rejected his accomplice’s actions in 
committing the shooting or that he wanted to flee the scene as 
quickly as possible to avoid arrest.  (Ibid.)  Ultimately, we 
concluded that the “[d]efendant’s absence from the scene of the 
killing and the ambiguous circumstances surrounding his 
hasty departure make it difficult to infer his frame of mind 
concerning [the victim’s] death.”  (Ibid.) 
Here, Scoggins walked over to the crime scene and 
checked if Wilson was still breathing after the shooting.  At 
that point, other bystanders had already called the police, so 
there was no occasion for Scoggins to seek further assistance.  
After the police arrived, Scoggins gave a statement as a 
witness.  There is conflicting evidence as to exactly when 
Scoggins arrived at the crime scene.  Some accounts suggested 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
that his arrival was delayed, occurring 20 to 30 minutes after 
the shooting.  Other accounts suggested that Scoggins arrived 
soon after the shooting, perhaps two to five minutes later.  
Relying on the latter version of events, the Attorney General 
argues that Scoggins’s quick arrival indicates that he had 
anticipated the shooting and was thus unfazed by it.  If 
Scoggins had not anticipated the outcome, the Attorney 
General contends, “he would have panicked and left.”  The 
Attorney General also argues that Scoggins continued to stay 
until the police arrived in order to gather information from 
other bystanders and deflect suspicion from himself. 
 
In this case, as in Clark, the ambiguity inherent in the 
petitioner’s actions after the shooting “make[s] it difficult to 
infer his frame of mind concerning [the victim’s] death.”  
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.)  As the Attorney General 
asserts, Scoggins’s calm behavior after the shooting might 
indicate that he had anticipated the use of lethal force and was 
thus not entirely shocked by the deadly turn of events.  
Alternatively, Scoggins’s actions might indicate that he in fact 
intended to check on Wilson and render aid.  At the very least, 
his behavior could suggest that he had not planned for his 
accomplices to kill Wilson; that is, he might have stayed at the 
crime scene precisely because he did not think he was culpable 
for Wilson’s death.  Overall, Scoggins’s actions after the 
shooting do not weigh substantially in favor of a finding of 
reckless indifference to human life. 
 
Third, the duration of the interaction between the 
perpetrators and the victim in this case was very limited.  
Courts have considered “whether a murder came at the end of 
a prolonged period of restraint of the victims by defendant” in 
analyzing the defendant’s culpability.  (Clark, supra, 63 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
Cal.4th at p. 620.)  For example, the defendants in Tison 
kidnapped and guarded the victims at gunpoint while their 
father decided whether to kill the victims.  (See Tison, supra, 
481 U.S. at p. 151.)  Because prolonged restraint of the victims 
provides “ ‘a greater window of opportunity for violence’ 
[citation], possibly culminating in murder,” it can indicate that 
the defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life.  
(Clark, at p. 620.) 
In this case, eyewitnesses testified that Powell and 
Wilson had only a brief conversation before Powell pulled out a 
gun and shot Wilson.  The witnesses estimated that the entire 
interaction lasted between a few seconds and three to five 
minutes.  Thus, Wilson was not restrained for a prolonged 
period, and this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that 
Scoggins exhibited reckless indifference to human life. 
 
Fourth, there is no evidence that Scoggins knew Powell 
or Howard was likely to use lethal force.  A defendant’s 
knowledge of a confederate’s likelihood of using lethal force, 
which may be evident before or during the felony, is significant 
to the analysis of the defendant’s mental state.  (Clark, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 621.)  For example, the Tison brothers knew 
they were helping two convicted murderers escape from prison, 
one of whom had killed a prison guard during an earlier 
escape.  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 151.)  In addition, after 
the group kidnapped the victims, the brothers heard that their 
father was “ ‘thinking about’ ” killing the victims.  (Id. at 
p. 140.)  The Tison brothers thus had advance knowledge that 
lethal force might be used and “subjectively appreciated that 
their acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.”  
(Id. at p. 152.) 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
In this case, there is affirmative evidence that Scoggins 
did not plan for his accomplices to kill Wilson.  At trial, the key 
prosecution witness testified that Scoggins “was not part of any 
plan to kill [Wilson].”  The prosecutor essentially conceded as 
much to the jury:  During closing argument, the prosecutor 
said there was no “proof that Scoggins and the group conspired 
to murder Wilson” and no “evidence of intent to kill by 
Scoggins.” 
The Court of Appeal concluded that Scoggins had some 
knowledge that Powell was likely to use lethal force.  It pointed 
out that during one of Scoggins’s police interviews, he claimed 
he did not know Powell was the shooter but said that if Powell 
did shoot Wilson, “his hot head got him in trouble.”  Because 
Scoggins and Powell were close friends, the court explained, 
“the jury could have reasonably concluded he was in a position 
to know Powell was prone to quickly become angry or was 
easily provoked to violence.”  The court also said that because 
Scoggins’s plan called for Powell and Howard to “beat the shit” 
out of Wilson, “using a hothead for that purpose does make a 
resulting murder more likely than using someone with a more 
even disposition.”  The Attorney General echoes those 
assertions as to Powell and argues that Scoggins knew Howard 
was likely to use lethal force as well.  The Attorney General 
notes that Scoggins was also close friends with Howard and 
that Scoggins had said Howard was not one to be “punk[ed]” 
and would “have [Scoggins’s back] through whatever.”   
We conclude that this evidence does not show that 
Scoggins knew Powell or Howard was likely to kill Wilson.  As 
Justice Renner observed in his concurring and dissenting 
opinion, “the fact that after the crime was committed 
[Scoggins] said, if Powell did shoot Wilson, ‘his hot head got 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
him in trouble’ is interesting, but this after-the-fact 
explanation for Powell’s behavior is insufficient to support a 
conclusion that defendant knew before the felony that Powell 
was likely to inflict either a deadly beating or carry and use a 
gun.”  Similarly, Scoggins’s comment after the shooting that 
Howard would “have [Scoggins’s back] through whatever” and 
was not one to be “punk[ed]” is insufficient to show that 
Scoggins knew before the shooting that Howard was likely to 
use lethal force.  
Even if Scoggins knew that Powell and Howard were 
prone to some degree of violence, and even though the planned 
assault of Wilson necessarily contemplated the use of violence, 
the evidence does not support a finding that Scoggins acted 
with reckless indifference to human life.  As noted, 
“[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death 
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient”; reckless 
indifference to human life requires “knowingly creating a 
‘grave risk of death.’ ”  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808, 
italics added.)  The degree of risk to human life is crucial to the 
analysis.  We have said that any person who plans or 
participates in an armed robbery can be said to anticipate that 
lethal violence might be used, given that “roughly 1 in 200 
[armed robberies] results in death.”  (Id. at p. 811.)  But that 
fact, without more, does not establish reckless indifference to 
human life.  (Id. at p. 808; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 623 [finding insufficient evidence of reckless indifference to 
life where “there appears to be nothing in the plan that one can 
point to that elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks 
inherent in any armed robbery”].)  Here, Scoggins planned an 
unarmed robbery and assault.  That the planned beating never 
occurred and Scoggins never got his money back shows his 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
accomplices’ deviation from the original plan.  The record does 
not show that Scoggins knew his accomplices were likely to 
deviate from the plan and use lethal force.  We agree with 
Justice Renner that the evidence in this case “does not suggest 
an elevated risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in 
an unarmed beating and robbery.” 
 
Fifth, a defendant’s efforts to minimize the risk of 
violence in the commission of a felony is relevant to assessing 
reckless indifference to human life.  (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 622.)  In Clark, we found significant the fact that the 
defendant arranged for the robbery to take place after business 
hours, when few employees would be present, and planned for 
the robbery to involve only one unloaded gun.  (Id. at pp. 621–
622.)  But we also noted that the existence of efforts to 
minimize violence does not necessarily foreclose a finding of 
reckless indifference to human life.  (Id. at p. 622 [“a 
defendant’s good faith but unreasonable belief that he or she 
was not posing a risk to human life in pursuing the felony does 
not suffice to foreclose a determination of reckless indifference 
to human life”].)  For example, the Tison brothers made an 
agreement with their father that no one would get hurt during 
the prison escape and expressed surprise and regret when 
their father killed the victims.  (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at 
p. 166 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).)  Despite the brothers’ 
agreement, an objective evaluation of the circumstances 
suggests that the prison escape was likely to pose serious risks 
of violence.  (Clark, at pp. 622–623.)   
The Court of Appeal concluded, and the Attorney General 
argues, that unlike the defendant in Clark, Scoggins made no 
efforts to minimize the risk of violence.  They note that 
Scoggins instructed Powell and Howard to launch a surprise, 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
two-on-one attack on Wilson and to “beat the shit out of him.”  
In their view, Scoggins, instead of minimizing the risk of 
violence, assured that the robbery would include violence.  But, 
as Justice Renner explained, “Scoggins’s plan included 
violence, certainly, but the need to minimize the risk of 
violence when planning an unarmed beating is less pressing 
than the need to minimize the risk of violence when planning 
an armed robbery.  The record does not contain any indication 
the defendant planned a beating involving the use of weapons.  
This fact is, by itself, a significant step towards minimizing the 
likelihood that the plan would result in a ‘grave risk of death.’ ”  
In addition, Scoggins agreed to have the confrontation take 
place in a public parking lot during the daytime, when the 
possible presence of witnesses might reasonably be thought to 
keep his accomplices within the bounds of the plan.  We do not 
suggest that planning an unarmed robbery or a robbery 
involving the use of non-lethal weapons can never, under any 
scenario, show reckless indifference to human life.  But under 
the circumstances here, this factor does not weigh in favor of 
finding that Scoggins acted with reckless indifference to 
human life. 
Determining a defendant’s culpability under the special 
circumstances statute requires a fact-intensive, individualized 
inquiry.  (See Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 798 [when 
analyzing culpability, courts must “focus on ‘relevant facets of 
the character and record of the individual offender’ ”].)  In this 
case, Scoggins planned an unarmed assault and robbery, and 
his accomplices deviated from that plan and shot the victim 
instead.  The evidence does not show that Scoggins knew his 
accomplices were likely to use lethal force.  On the facts here, 
In re SCOGGINS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
we hold that Scoggins did not “knowingly creat[e] a ‘grave risk 
of death.’ ”  (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808.) 
CONCLUSION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Scoggins 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 12/17/18 – 3d Dist.  
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted   
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S253155 
Date Filed:  June 25, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Sacramento 
Judge:  David F. De Alba 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Willie Scoggins. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Tia M. Coronado, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Victor J. Morse 
3145 Geary Blvd., PMB #232 
San Francisco, CA 94118-3316 
(415) 387-5828 
 
Tia Coronado 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I St., Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-7690