Title: Baker v. Erbert
Citation: 199 Kan. 59, 427 P.2d 461
Docket Number: 44,729
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 1967

199 Kan. 59 (1967)
427 P.2d 461
RICHARD D. BAKER, Appellee,
v.
HAROLD ERBERT, Appellant.
No. 44,729

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 13, 1967.
Mitchell H. Bushey, of Iola, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
Stanley E. Toland, of Iola, argued the cause, and Frank W. Thompson, of Iola, and William L. Carew, of Colorado Springs, Colorado, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered in an action on a foreign judgment.
A petition was filed in the District Court of Allen County, Kansas, on July 14, 1965, alleging that a judgment was obtained upon a promissory note in the State of Colorado, in favor of Darrell Thomas, trustee in bankruptcy, against Harold Erbert for the sum of $5,338.38, plus costs and interest. The petition further alleges that the plaintiff, Richard Baker, who is the appellee herein, received an assignment of the judgment from the trustee. After some proceedings which are not important to the decision of this controversy the appellant filed an amended answer.
*60 The amended answer was attacked by a motion for summary judgment which was sustained. The defendant has appealed. We must look to the answer for the facts and issues upon which this controversy must be determined.
The amended answer admitted the entry of the judgment in the State of Colorado and alleged as a defense thereto:
..............
The trial court in passing on the motion for summary judgment concluded in part:
We are inclined to agree with the trial court.
The appellant contends in paragraph 3 of his answer that the service of summons upon him was "invalid and void" because when served he was a resident of Kansas attending the United States District Court in Colorado as a witness in a bankruptcy hearing. The allegation contains an erroneous conclusion of law.
*61 Witnesses are encouraged to come forward and voluntarily give testimony by granting them immunity from service of civil process while attending trial in a state other than that of their residence. However, the service on one entitled to immunity is not void, but merely voidable and the immunity may be lost by acts of omission. The rule is stated in 72 C.J.S., Process, § 88 a, p. 1124, as follows:
The above rule is followed in Colorado (Norquist v. Norquist, 89 Colo. 486, 4 P.2d 306) and also in Kansas (Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank v. Eells, 158 Kan. 530, 148 P.2d 732).
We find a statement in 42 Am. Jur., Process, § 156, p. 135, covering facts quite similar to those now before us:
In the present case the petition, from which the controversial judgment stemmed, was filed and service obtained on October 1, 1962. Summary judgment was taken on June 25, 1964. Even the alleged agreement to delay prosecution of the action was not alleged to have been made until March 25, 1963, some six months after service was obtained.
We are forced to conclude that any immunity from service which the appellant may have had was waived or lost by his failure to take timely action.
Appellant next contends that an issue of fact was raised by the answer based on the allegation that the Colorado judgment was based on fraud and trickery. The allegation as contained in paragraph 5 of the answer was to the effect that the plaintiff agreed *62 with and promised defendant's attorneys that he would not take judgment until they had attempted to collect the amount in suit from other parties and if he could not do so he would notify defendant's attorneys so that they could defend. Plaintiff took judgment in violation of his promise and by reason of the false and fraudulent promise defendant was induced to waive his right to challenge jurisdiction and was induced to forego his defense.
We have disposed of the question of waiver of service affecting jurisdiction. There remains only the question of fraud inducing defendant to forego his defense as a basis for challenging the Colorado judgment when action was brought thereon in Kansas.
We must look to the Colorado law for the answer to this question. In an action on a foreign judgment its validity and finality are to be tested by the law of the jurisdiction where such judgment was rendered. In 55 A.L.R.2d, beginning at page 678, we find the following statement:
Cited as authority for the last statement above is Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Unknown Successors, etc., Okla. Royalty Corp., 167 Kan. 432, 443, 207 P.2d 417, where we stated:
*63 The law of Colorado permits a judgment obtained by fraud to be set aside only in a direct proceeding. In A., T. &amp; S.F. Ry. Co. v. Com'rs, 95 Colo. 435, 440, 37 P.2d 761, 763, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated:
The defendant made no attempt to seek relief from the judgment in the court where it was rendered.
We are forced to conclude that the allegations of the answer, with particular reference to paragraph 5, were not sufficient to present a genuine issue of fact on the question of fraud vitiating the original judgment when it was used as the basis for an action in Kansas.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.