Title: State v. Grady
Citation: 281 So. 2d 678
Docket Number: 47361
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 1973

281 So. 2d 678 (1973) STATE of Mississippi v. Paul E. GRADY. No. 47361. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 25, 1973. Rehearing Denied September 11, 1973. *679 Rex K. Jones, Dist. Atty., T. Jack Riley, Hattiesburg, for appellant. Gray, Montague &amp; Jackson, Holmes &amp; Dukes, Simrall, Aultman &amp; Pope, Hattiesburg, for appellee. INZER, Justice: This is an appeal by the State of Mississippi from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Forrest County sustaining a demurrer and a motion to quash an indictment against appellee Paul E. Grady charging him with the crime of embezzlement. We reverse and remand. Appellee was indicted at the November 1972 term of the Circuit Court of Forrest County for embezzling public funds. Omitting the formal parts, the indictment reads as follows: To this indictment appellee interposed a demurrer which alleged that the indictment charged no crime. The motion to quash the indictment charged that the state knew from the evidence in its possession that such evidence was not sufficient to support the indictment. The motion to quash does not allege that the Grand Jury did not have the power to return the indictment or that it was illegal. On the hearing of the motion to quash, the state and appellee stipulated certain facts relative to the evidence to support the indictment; however, in view of the conclusion we have reached, it is not necessary for the purpose of this opinion to detail this stipulation. The state first contends that the trial court was in error in sustaining the demurrer to the indictment. With this contention we agree. In considering the demurrer we cannot consider the stipulation of fact, but must determine whether the indictment on its face charges a crime. The indictment charges a violation of Section 2123, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956), which reads as follows: We pointed out in Autry v. State, 230 Miss. 421, 92 So. 2d 856 (1957), that this section does not undertake to specify in detail the factual situation necessary to constitute the crime of embezzlement. The state asserts that the indictment here is in conformity with the indictment in Autry. The indictment in Autry charged that Autry did knowingly, fraudulently and feloniously embezzle and convert to his own use $630, the property of Benton County while acting in his official capacity as County Superintendent of Education by fraudulently issuing a warrant, knowing at the time no money was owing to the payee of the school warrant, and by the issuance of said school warrant did defraud and cheat Benton County and embezzle the school money of said county. In the case before us the indictment in essence charges that Grady did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously embezzle and convert to his own use $320.74, the property of the City of Hattiesburg, while acting in his official capacity as mayor, and by means of a false entry and claim cause to be paid to him the $320.74 knowing at the time that the same was not due him and did thereby willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud and cheat the City of Hattiesburg and did embezzle $320.74 belonging to the City in violation of Section 2123, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). The gravamen of the charge is not so much the means, but the appropriation of the money knowing at the time that it was not due him. As to the means charged in the indictment, while not in exact words, we think the indictment is sufficient to charge that Grady's hotel bill was paid by a third party, consequently, this was not out of pocket expense to which he was entitled to reimbursement by the city, and that by making a claim for reimbursement and accepting the money knowing it was not due him, he did cheat and defraud the city of public funds. The state is not required to negative any defense that the accused may have to the charge made in the indictment. The indictment on its face charges a crime and the trial court was in error in sustaining the demurrer. We are likewise of the opinion that the trial court was in error in sustaining the motion to quash the indictment. As heretofore pointed out the motion to quash does not question the legality of the indictment or the power of the grand jury to return the indictment, but seeks to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment. While the state in its brief contends that the stipulation of facts is sufficient evidence to support the indictment, and does not contend that a motion to quash cannot be employed to test the sufficiency of the indictment, we must in order to preserve orderly procedure in our courts raise this question on our own motion. If this procedure can be used, it would result in a pretrial hearing in practically every case to determine whether the state has sufficient evidence to support the indictment. This could only result in confusion and delay in the trial of a criminal case. The function of a motion to quash is to test the legality of an indictment for some defect not appearing on the face of the indictment. Section 2450, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). It is well settled in this state that neither a motion to quash nor any other pretrial pleading can be employed to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment. In State v. Peek, 95 Miss. 240, 48 So. 819 (1909), the defendant filed a demurrer and a motion to quash an indictment for manslaughter. The state in answer to the motion to quash filed a bill of particulars showing that the conviction would be sought on practically the same facts as set up in the defendant's motion to quash. The trial court considered the facts set up in the bill of particulars as a part of the charge and sustained the motion to quash. *681 On appeal, this Court held that the demurrer to the indictment and motion to quash should have been overruled. In regard to the motion to quash the Court said: In Blowe v. State, 130 Miss. 112, 93 So. 577 (1922), it was pointed out that the rule in this state is that no inquiry can be made into the evidence on which the grand jury acted in finding the indictment, and the trial court properly refused to consider evidence on a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that no witness appeared before the grand jury on the date the indictment was filed. To the same effect is Price v. State 152 Miss. 625, 120 So. 751 (1929). The case of State v. Bates, 187 Miss. 172, 192 So. 832 (1940), involved a question of the power of the grand jury to indict a person who was required to produce incriminating documentary evidence before the grand jury. The trial court sustained a motion to quash the indictment based upon the self-incriminating evidence rule. This Court in affirming the action of the trial court held that the motion to quash was an appropriate remedy saying among other things: It is clear from the holding in these cases that the trial court should have overruled the motion to quash since its only basis was to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment. The proper time to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support any indictment is when the case is tried on its merits. Then if the evidence on behalf of the state is insufficient to support the charge made in the indictment, on proper motion, the trial court should so hold and direct the jury to *682 find the accused not guilty, otherwise, the case should be submitted to the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. RODGERS, P.J., and PATTERSON, SUGG and BROOM, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, J., and GILLESPIE, C.J., and SMITH and WALKER, JJ., dissent. ROBERTSON, Justice (dissenting): I respectfully dissent. I do not think that the indictment charges an offense under Section 2123, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) and I think that the trial judge was correct in sustaining the demurrer to the indictment. The gravamen of the offense of embezzlement under Section 2123 is that a public officer or public employee embezzles from his public employer. In this case, Grady, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Hattiesburg, was charged with willfully, unlawfully and feloniously embezzling and converting to his own use the sum of $320.74, the property of the City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, a municipal corporation. The indictment states that Grady charged his hotel bill at the Washington Hilton, Washington, D.C., while attending the National Chamber of Commerce meeting as Mayor of the City of Hattiesburg, "to American Express Credit Card No. 502, Account No. 029 156 394 8, issued to L &amp; A Contracting Co., a corporation, and that the said hotel bill was paid by the said L &amp; A Contracting Co." The indictment nowhere charges that Mayor Grady has not reimbursed L &amp; A Contracting Company, nor that he has not made satisfactory arrangements to pay it back. Surely Grady cannot be indicted for merely borrowing a credit card or borrowing the money to pay his hotel bill until he is reimbursed by the City of Hattiesburg for these official expenses of his office. Since the Mayor was on official business for the City of Hattiesburg, the City owed these hotel expenses to somebody. Who would the City of Hattiesburg owe this bill to other than its mayor, who incurred these expenses while on official business for the City? Is the Mayor to be condemned for not securing an advancement of expenses from the City before leaving Hattiesburg and even incurring any expenses? Suppose Mayor Grady, as a matter of convenience or even necessity (if he did not have the available funds), borrowed his neighbor's BankAmericard and charged his hotel bill to his neighbor's BankAmericard. He would still be entitled to reimbursement from the City of Hattiesburg and with that money he could pay his indebtedness to his neighbor. It appears to me that the City of Hattiesburg will be unjustly enriched if it can thus cancel out its reimbursement of necessary expenses by charging that someone else has paid its mayor's expenses and its Mayor is guilty of embezzlement if he seeks reimbursement from the City so he can in turn reimburse L &amp; A Contracting Co. I think the indictment was fatally defective and the Circuit Judge eminently correct in sustaining the demurrer to it. GILLESPIE, C.J., and SMITH and WALKER, JJ., concur in this dissent.