Title: In re S.M.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 299A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 299A19 
Filed 17 July 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: S.M.M. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 30 April 
2019 by Judge Christy E. Wilhelm in District Court, Cabarrus County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Hartsell & Williams, PA, by H. Jay White and Austin “Dutch” Entwistle III, for 
petitioner-appellee Cabarrus County Department of Human Services. 
 
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Jacob S. Wharton and Ryan H. Niland, 
for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice.  
 
 
Respondent appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her 
minor child, S.M.M. (Sarah).1 We hold the trial court properly complied with the 
Court of Appeals’ mandate on remand from In re S.M.M., 822 S.E.2d 329, 2019 N.C. 
App. LEXIS 13, 2019 WL 190200 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (unpublished), and the court’s 
                                            
1 The minor child will be referred to throughout this opinion as “Sarah,” which is a 
pseudonym used to protect the child’s identity and for ease of reading. 
 
IN RE S.M.M. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights is in Sarah’s best 
interests does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The Cabarrus County Department of Human Services (CCDHS) obtained non-
secure custody of Sarah and filed a petition alleging she was a neglected juvenile on 
5 November 2015.2  After a hearing on 14 April 2016, the trial court entered an order 
adjudicating Sarah to be a neglected juvenile and continuing her in CCDHS custody. 
On 30 May 2017, CCDHS filed a motion in the cause to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights to Sarah based on the grounds of neglect, failure to make reasonable 
progress, failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Sarah’s care, dependency, 
and abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6)–(7) (2019). The trial court 
entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights on 9 April 2018, 
concluding the grounds alleged by CCDHS existed and termination was in Sarah’s 
best interests. Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s adjudication of grounds based on neglect but reversed the court’s best interests 
determination. In re S.M.M., 822 S.E.2d 329, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 13, 2019 WL 
190200. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact 
did not address Sarah’s likelihood of adoption, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2) (2019), 
which was placed at issue by testimony at the hearing from a social worker and from 
                                            
2 A full recitation of the underlying factual and procedural history of this case can be 
found in the Court of Appeals’ opinion in In re S.M.M., 822 S.E.2d 329, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 
13, 2019 WL 190200. 
IN RE S.M.M. 
 
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Sarah’s guardian ad litem (GAL).  The Court of Appeals remanded for the trial court 
to make findings of fact on this statutory factor. In re S.M.M., 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 
13, at *13, 2019 WL 190200, at *5. 
 On remand, respondent filed a motion to reopen the evidence to present 
additional evidence of Sarah’s likelihood of adoption, including evidence of the 
changes in her and Sarah’s circumstances since the original termination hearing. 
After a 28 March 2019 hearing on the motion to reopen evidence, the trial court 
denied the motion by order entered 23 April 2019.  
The trial court entered its amended order terminating respondent’s parental 
rights on 30 April 2019. The court made multiple new findings of fact regarding 
Sarah’s likelihood of adoption and again concluded termination of respondent’s 
parental rights was in Sarah’s best interests. Respondent appeals.  
We first address respondent’s argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying her motion to reopen the evidence. Respondent contends the 
trial court could not comply with the mandate from the Court of Appeals without 
reopening the evidence, because the trial court could not make the necessary findings 
on Sarah’s adoptability without considering her circumstances at the time of the 
remand hearing. Additionally, respondent contends the trial court was required to 
reopen the evidence despite the Court of Appeals’ mandate leaving it to the trial 
court’s discretion because “[w]henever the trial court is determining the best interest 
of a child, any evidence which is competent and relevant to a showing of the best 
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interest of that child must be heard and considered by the trial court, subject to the 
discretionary powers of the trial court to exclude cumulative testimony.” In re Shue, 
311 N.C. 586, 597, 319 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1984) (emphasis added). Respondent argues 
the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the trial court for a new best interests 
determination, which thus required the trial court to hear any additional evidence 
proffered by the parties.  
Contrary to respondent’s assertion, the trial court was not required to reopen 
evidence on remand on the facts of this case. It is well established that the mandate 
of an appellate court “is binding upon [the trial court] and must be strictly followed 
without variation or departure. No judgment other than that directed or permitted 
by the appellate court may be entered.” Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 323 N.C. 697, 
699, 374 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting D & W, Inc. v. 
Charlotte, 268 N.C. 720, 722, 152 S.E. 2d 199, 202 (1966)). The mandate of the Court 
of Appeals required the trial court to make findings of fact regarding Sarah’s 
likelihood of adoption, a factor that must be considered in determining the best 
interests of a juvenile when terminating parental rights, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2), 
and about which particular findings of fact must be made when conflicting evidence 
places the factor at issue. See, e.g., In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 10–11, 832 S.E.2d 698, 
702–03 (2019) (holding that a trial court is not required to make written findings 
concerning factors set out in section 7B-1110(a) in the absence of conflicting evidence 
relating to the factor in question). The Court of Appeals here held that the evidence 
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at the original hearing placed the likelihood of adoption factor at issue, but the trial 
court failed to make the requisite findings of fact. In re S.M.M., 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 
13, at *13, 2019 WL 190200, at *5.  
The Court of Appeals remanded the matter for the sole purpose of allowing the 
trial court to make the required findings, id., not for a new dispositional hearing 
where the court would have been required to hear any relevant evidence as to Sarah’s 
best interests. Shue, 311 N.C. at 597, 319 S.E.2d at 574. The Court of Appeals did 
note that “[t]he trial court retains the discretion to supplement its order as it sees fit, 
so long as it complies with the statute.” In re S.M.M., 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 13, at 
*13, n3, 2019 WL 190200, at *5, n3.  However, the opinion was silent as to whether 
the trial court should take new evidence on remand and, therefore, the Court of 
Appeals left that decision to the trial court’s sound discretion. See, e.g., In re J.M.D., 
210 N.C. App. 420, 428, 708 S.E.2d 167, 173 (2011) (“Whether on remand for 
additional findings a trial court receives new evidence or relies on previous evidence 
submitted is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” (quoting Hicks v. 
Alford, 156 N.C. App. 384, 389, 576 S.E.2d. 410, 414 (2003))).  
Most significantly, although respondent made general representations about 
the degree to which all children change between the ages of 10 and 12, nothing in 
respondent’s motion identified any specific circumstances or forecast any particular 
changes in Sarah’s life that would have any bearing on the question of the likelihood 
of her adoption.  Mere speculation that some facts may have changed in the eighteen 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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months since the court originally heard the evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to reopen the 
evidence on remand.  Absent any forecast of relevant testimony or other evidence 
bearing upon the Court’s ultimate determination of the child’s best interests, the trial 
court’s decision to refrain from reopening the record is entirely consistent with this 
Court’s general admonition that a trial court must always hear any relevant and 
competent evidence concerning the best interests of the child.  See In re Shue, 311 
N.C. at 597, 319 S.E.2d at 576.  In this case there was simply no further relevant and 
competent evidence to be heard by the trial court on remand. 
The trial court was able to make the required findings concerning the 
likelihood of Sarah’s adoption from the evidence presented at the original hearing. 
The new findings satisfy the mandate of the Court of Appeals, and we hold the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to reopen the 
evidence. 
Respondent further contends the trial court never conducted a dispositional 
hearing and thus, never received proper dispositional evidence.  However, the hearing 
transcript shows the trial court heard dispositional evidence from a CCDHS social 
worker and the GAL and received the GAL’s dispositional report into evidence. 
Although the dispositional evidence was intertwined with adjudicatory evidence, a 
trial court is not required to bifurcate the hearing into two distinct stages. See, e.g., 
In re R.B.B., 187 N.C. App. 639, 643–44, 654 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2007) (“[A] trial court 
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may combine the N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 adjudicatory stage and the N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 
dispositional stage into one hearing, so long as the trial court applies the correct 
evidentiary standard at each stage and the trial court’s orders associated with the 
termination action contain the appropriate standard-of-proof recitations.”), disc. 
review denied, 362 N.C. 235, 659 S.E.2d 738 (2008). 
We next address respondent’s challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact 
regarding Sarah’s likelihood of adoption and her argument that the trial court abused 
its discretion in assessing Sarah’s best interests. 
In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests 
of a juvenile: 
The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay 
evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court 
finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine 
the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court 
shall consider the following criteria and make written 
findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid 
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile 
and 
the 
proposed 
adoptive 
parent, 
guardian, 
custodian, or other permanent placement. 
 
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(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). A trial court’s best interests determination “is reviewed 
solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 6, 832 S.E.2d at 700 (citing 
In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016)). “Abuse of discretion 
results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary 
that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Id. at 6–7, 832 S.E.2d 
at 700–01 (modification omitted) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 
451, 455 (2015)). “[O]ur appellate courts are bound by the trial courts’ findings of fact 
where there is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence 
might sustain findings to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110–11, 316 
S.E.2d 246, 252–53 (1984). 
On remand, the trial court amended its order terminating respondent’s 
parental rights to include the following findings of fact regarding Sarah’s likelihood 
of adoption:  
4. There is a high likelihood of adoption once the juvenile 
can get stable, but she cannot be stable until she has 
closure regarding her relationship with her biological 
family. The juvenile needs permission to not feel guilty and 
to move forward and to allow herself to be loved by someone 
that can care for her appropriately. 
 
5. Although the Juvenile struggles with transition, she is 
also in the process of stepping down from her current 
treatment program. When there are changes in her 
environment it causes the juvenile some stress and 
anxiety, which comes out in her behaviors. 
 
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6. The Juvenile has moderate mental health needs, based 
on a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The juvenile is 
extremely guarded. She is eleven years old and has 
endured years of injurious environment and neglect and 
exposure to substance abuse, domestic violence, and for her 
to be able to process that trauma that she has been 
through, she needs closure and as long as the biological 
family is in the picture, she feels split. Her loyalties are 
divided and she doesn’t know how she should feel and she 
has expressed multiple times that it is her fault that she is 
in foster care. 
 
7. The juvenile needs a little bit more stability before the 
conversation about adoption can occur. She has only been 
in this placement for a month and a half, and the juvenile 
and the foster parents need time to develop a bond before 
a discussion can be had. In addition, the Juvenile needs 
closure to allow for her to develop a bond because she is so 
guarded. 
 
8. The plan to find the juvenile an adoptive home would be 
to start with the current placement and see if they are 
interested in keeping the juvenile. Once parents’ rights are 
terminated, if there is not an identified adoptive home, 
CCDHS would complete adoption recruitment on behalf of 
the juvenile, including building a child profile, detailing the 
child’s likes, dislikes, their needs, and it is submitted to NC 
Kids. NC Kids is a state website and also feeds into Adopt 
U.S. Kids, a national website to recruit for families. Pre-
placement assessments for interested families would go to 
CCDHS and a team reviews them to determine which is 
the best placement for the child, and then the child would 
be placed in that home on a trial basis. 
 
9. If an adoptive home is not located, the juvenile remains 
in CCDHS [custody] and they would continue to recruit to 
find an adoptive home for the juvenile. If the juvenile 
reaches the age of eighteen and is not adopted, the juvenile 
can transition into the LINKS program at CCDHS which 
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helps teens transition into adulthood and develop 
necessary life skills. 
 
Respondent first argues finding of fact four is erroneous. She contends the 
finding implies Sarah’s only obstacle to stability was her relationship with her 
biological family, which is not supported by the evidence. She argues the evidence 
established that “closure” meant more than just severance from her biological family 
and included being able to process past trauma. She additionally contends the 
evidence regarding stability and closure for Sarah was only discussed in the context 
of whether termination of parental rights was in Sarah’s best interests, and not 
specifically whether Sarah had a likelihood of adoption. Respondent further argues 
that without additional findings of fact as to what constitutes “stability” for Sarah 
and whether she would be able to obtain stability before reaching the age of majority, 
the likelihood of adoption is unknown.  
 Finding of fact four does not state that Sarah’s relationship to her family was 
the only barrier to her ability to achieve stability in her life, but rather that severing 
the relationship was a necessary precondition to achieving it. The finding also does 
not suggest that “closure” for Sarah meant only the severance of parental rights. 
Finding of fact four is fully supported by testimony from the social worker, who 
testified, “the likelihood of adoption is high once we get [Sarah] stable, but she cannot 
be stable until she has closure.” The social worker further testified: 
[Sarah] has endured years and years of an injurious 
environment and neglect and exposure to substance abuse, 
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domestic violence, and for her to be able to process that 
trauma that she has been through, she needs closure. And 
as long as biological family are in the picture, . . . she’s split 
and her loyalties are divided and she doesn’t know how she 
should feel, and she’s expressed to me multiple times that, 
“It is my fault that I’m in foster care. I should have never 
said anything.” And so she needs that closure in order to . 
. . allow for her to develop a bond, because she’s so guarded 
right now. 
 
Furthermore, the trial court was not required to make findings of fact showing 
Sarah will attain the necessary stability to be adopted. See, e.g., In re Norris, 65 N.C. 
App. 269, 275, 310 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1983) (“It suffices to say that . . . a finding [of 
adoptability] is not required in order to terminate parental rights.”), cert. denied, 310 
N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 703 (1984). Section 7B-1110 does not require the trial court to 
set forth detailed findings establishing the benchmarks a traumatized child must 
meet to obtain the necessary stability to be adopted. The court had only to make 
findings of fact addressing Sarah’s likelihood of adoption. 
Respondent next contends finding of fact five minimizes Sarah’s mental health 
and behavioral issues and creates an inaccurate perception that her conditions have 
improved enough to enable her to “step down” from her current therapeutic 
placement. Respondent argues there is no evidence Sarah was stepping down from 
her current treatment program, was only experiencing stress and anxiety, or was 
making progress toward her transition.  
Respondent, however, ignores the social worker’s testimony that Sarah was “in 
the process of stepping down from her current treatment program and I think that’s 
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causing some stress and anxiety, which is coming out in her behavior.” The social 
worker testified a more permanent and stable environment would help Sarah, and 
Sarah’s current foster parents, who are participating in her therapeutic care, were 
willing to keep fostering her as she is stepped down to a lower level of care so that 
she does not have to make another disruptive transition. Contrary to respondent’s 
interpretation, this finding does not state Sarah is only experiencing stress or 
indicate her progress in making the transition. The finding also does not minimize 
Sarah’s mental health and behavioral issues and acknowledges her struggles with 
transition as a result of her issues.  
Respondent also argues finding of fact six implies that Sarah’s mental health 
diagnoses caused her guarded and conflicted behavior and that her mental health 
and behavioral issues will go away if parental rights are terminated. The finding that 
Sarah is “extremely guarded” holds no such implication. The statement is supported 
by testimony from the social worker and carries no improper implication merely 
because the relevant testimony followed the social worker’s identification of Sarah’s 
specific mental health diagnoses.  
 Respondent appears to suggest the trial court should have made additional 
findings regarding the nature of Sarah’s disruptive behaviors.  However, a trial court 
is only required to make findings of fact necessary to resolve material issues. See, e.g., 
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 225 N.C. App. 269, 271, 737 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2013) (“[T]he 
trial court need not make a finding as to every fact which arises from the evidence; 
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rather, the court need only find those facts which are material to the resolution of the 
dispute.” (citation omitted)). The nature of Sarah’s mental health and behavioral 
issues was not in dispute, and the trial court was not required to make findings on 
those issues. 
Respondent further argues finding of fact seven takes the social worker’s 
testimony out of context and creates an inaccurate impression that all Sarah needed 
to gain “stability” was termination of parental rights. We conclude the finding is fully 
supported by the social worker’s testimony.  The finding states that Sarah needs more 
stability before a “conversation about adoption can occur,” not that stability will 
automatically cause Sarah to develop a bond with her potential adoptive parents. The 
trial court’s finding merely indicates stability and closure will assist Sarah in 
attaining her permanent plan of adoption, not that adoption is guaranteed. We agree 
with respondent that there is no evidence the foster parents are open to adopting 
Sarah. The record instead establishes that Sarah needs more stability and closure 
before CCDHS initiates that conversation with Sarah and her foster parents.  
Respondent also argues the trial court’s finding of fact that it “accepted the 
[GAL’s] court report into evidence, as it relates to the best interests of the child” is 
erroneous because it does no more than recite the evidence. Respondent takes issue 
with numerous statements in the report and the report’s failure to discuss other 
aspects of the case. Respondent appears to believe the trial court’s finding adopted 
the report’s findings as its own, however, the finding simply acknowledges for the 
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record that the report had been admitted into evidence for dispositional purposes. 
The court did not adopt the report’s findings as its own, and we do not treat the 
report’s findings as anything more than evidence in the case. 
We hold the above challenged findings of fact are supported by competent 
record evidence and are binding on appeal. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110–11, 316 
S.E.2d at 252–53. Respondent does not challenge the remaining dispositional findings 
of fact, and they are thus binding on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 
97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (“Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by 
the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is 
binding on appeal.”).  
Next, respondent argues the trial court did not comply with the remand 
instructions from the Court of Appeals, because its findings do not resolve what 
respondent contends is a conflict between the testimony of the social worker and the 
GAL over whether there is a “high likelihood” that Sarah will be adopted.  Respondent 
asserts that the amended findings ignore the GAL’s report altogether and, as argued 
above, are erroneous.  
However, nothing in the remand order actually states that the two slightly 
different assessments are irreconcilable or determinative of whether termination of 
respondent’s parental rights is in Sarah’s best interests. The Court of Appeals 
remanded this matter for the trial court to address Sarah’s likelihood of adoption, see 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2) (2019), which it held was placed at issue due to testimony 
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from a social worker and from Sarah’s GAL. In re S.M.M., 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS at 
*13, 2019 WL 190200 at *5. The social worker’s testimony that she thought “the 
likelihood of adoption is high once we get [Sarah] stable, but she cannot be stable 
until she has closure” and that “[Sarah] needs a little bit more stability before we can 
have that conversation [about adoption,]” is not contradicted by the GAL’s written 
report, which stated “[t]he likelihood of adoption is good.” Id. The amended findings 
set forth above find Sarah to have a high likelihood of adoption and, as discussed 
above, are supported by competent evidence. The findings therefore complied with 
the Court’s remand instructions.  
Respondent lastly argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding 
termination of her parental rights is in Sarah’s best interests. Respondent contends 
the court’s findings do not support its conclusion and its conclusion is not the result 
of a reasoned decision because the court failed to include an analysis of Sarah’s actual 
likelihood of adoption and possibility that termination of respondent’s parental rights 
will render Sarah a “legal orphan.”  
However, the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact on remand address all 
the relevant criteria required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The findings establish that 
Sarah has a likelihood of adoption only if she obtains stability in her life and closure 
with the traumas of her past, which cannot be obtained absent the termination of 
respondent’s parental rights. The findings make clear that the trial court recognized 
Sarah may never achieve the necessary stability and closure to be adopted, but it is 
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well established that a likelihood of adoption is not necessary for a court to conclude 
termination of parental rights is in a juvenile’s best interests. See, e.g., Norris, 65 
N.C. App. at 275, 310 S.E.2d at 29. 
The trial court’s order shows a well-reasoned weighing of Sarah’s adoptability 
and the obstacles thereto, along with her age, lack of appropriate bond with 
respondent, and need for permanency. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights 
was in Sarah’s best interests, and we affirm the trial court’s order.  
AFFIRMED.