Title: People v. Caffey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86975
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2001

Docket No. 86975-Agenda 3-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								FEDELL CAFFEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	On November 16, 1995, Debra Evans was fatally shot and
stabbed in the Addison apartment where she lived with James
Edwards and her children, Samantha, Joshua, and Jordan. Debra
was nine months pregnant. The baby she was carrying, Elijah, was
cut from her womb. Samantha was killed in the apartment with her
mother. Joshua and Elijah were taken from the apartment. Jordan
was left alone in the apartment with his dead mother and sister.
The next day, police found Joshua's dead body in an alley in
Maywood. Police arrested defendant, Fedell Caffey, that night. In
connection with the murders and kidnappings of the members of
the Evans family, defendant, his live-in girlfriend Jacqueline
Annette Williams, and her cousin Laverne Ward were jointly
indicted on several counts of first degree murder and aggravated
kidnapping. They were tried separately.
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County,
defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Debra Evans
and her daughter Samantha, and the aggravated kidnapping and
murder of Debra's son Joshua. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a), 10-2(a)
(West 1994). At a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury
found defendant eligible for the death penalty and further
determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient
to preclude imposition of that sentence. Accordingly, the trial
court sentenced defendant to death on the murder convictions and
to a consecutive 30-year prison term on the aggravated kidnapping
conviction. The death sentence has been stayed pending direct
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
603, 609(a). We affirm.



BACKGROUND
	The State's evidence at trial was essentially as follows. On
November 16, 1995, Debra Evans was nine months pregnant with
her baby, whom she had named Elijah. Debra was scheduled to be
hospitalized to have labor induced on November 19. Debra had
three additional children: Samantha, age 10; Joshua, age 7; and
Jordan, age 2. Debra and her children lived in an apartment in
Addison with James Edwards.
	Edwards worked across the street from his and Debra's
apartment. On November 16, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., he left the
apartment and went to work. He returned home after leaving his
job at 2:30 a.m. on November 17. The back door to the apartment
was unlocked. When Edwards opened the door, Jordan greeted
him. Edwards found Debra lying on the living room floor
completely covered by a blanket. Edwards lifted the blanket and
saw a large wound to her stomach. Elijah had been cut from
Debra's womb. Edwards ran to the children's bedroom. He found
Samantha lying on the floor completely covered by a blanket. He
lifted the blanket and saw that Samantha's neck had been slashed.
Joshua was missing. Edwards telephoned 911. Several items were
missing from the apartment, including Edwards' Grambling State
University Tigers starter jacket and a pair of poultry shears.
	Also on November 17, between midnight and 1 a.m.,
Williams went to the apartment of Patrice Scott in Villa Park.
Scott lived with Dwight Pruitt and her three daughters; her
youngest daughter, Alexis, was only 1½ months old. Williams and
Scott were friends; they had known each other for two to three
years. Approximately one month prior to that night, Williams had
told Scott that she was pregnant and that Williams was going to
have the baby in November.
	Williams' knock at the door awoke Pruitt. He arose, went to
the door, and saw Williams and a boy. Pruitt returned to bed and
told Scott, who answered the door. Scott saw a gray automobile
parked outside. Williams was wearing Edwards' starter jacket and
a white sweater spotted with blood. Joshua was wearing a T-shirt,
coat, and boots; he was not wearing socks or pants.
	Williams told Scott that Joshua's mother had been shot, and
that Williams was going to visit her in the hospital. Williams
asked Scott if Joshua could spend the night at Scott's apartment;
Scott assented. Williams would retrieve Joshua in the morning.
Williams also claimed to have given birth and would bring the
new baby with her.
	After Williams left, Joshua used the bathroom and removed
his coat and boots. Scott put him to bed on the living room couch.
She heard Joshua whimpering and crying during the night.
	Later that morning, at daybreak, Scott heard Joshua crying.
Scott arose with Alexis and entered the living room. Joshua was
upset. He told Scott that he had to return to his home because
Jordan was there alone, and because Edwards would not know
where he, Joshua, was.
	Joshua explained that four burglars had entered his home
through a window and cut his mother and sister. Scott asked
Joshua who were the burglars, and Joshua answered "Annette,
Levern [sic] and Fedell," and a person Joshua called "Boo-Boo."
Joshua repeated this more than three times. He explained that he
was hiding and, as the burglars were leaving, he ran outside and
bumped into Williams.
	Pruitt was awake in the bedroom watching television with the
volume lowered. He overheard Joshua name the four burglars:
"Annette"; "Vern"; a name that sounded like "Vedelle," "Adelle,"
or "Ladelle"; and a fourth name that Pruitt could not understand.
At that point, Pruitt entered the living room, greeted Joshua, and
returned to the bedroom. Scott's two older daughters arose and
prepared for school. They greeted Joshua; one of them read to him.
After they left for school, Joshua told Scott "to lock the door
because the burglars might come back."
	Around 9 a.m., Williams returned to Scott's apartment.
Williams drove the same gray automobile that Scott saw the
previous night. Scott told Williams what Joshua had said.
Williams became very upset with Joshua. She accused him of
lying, she told him that "he talked too much," and she ordered him
"to shut his damn mouth." In response, Joshua repeatedly asserted
that he was telling the truth, and that Williams knew he was telling
the truth because she was there.
	Williams told Joshua that he had to take the medicine his
mother had left for him. Joshua replied that he did not take any
medicine. Williams asked Scott for a glass of water, which Scott
retrieved from the kitchen. Williams took the water and led Joshua
into the kitchen. Joshua came out of the kitchen gagging, went to
the bathroom and vomited.
	Williams said she had gifts for Alexis and wanted to check on
her own baby. Scott asked Pruitt to watch Alexis, but he refused.
So Scott left the apartment with Alexis, Williams, and Joshua.
	Home alone, Pruitt continued to watch television. On the
midday news, he saw a report regarding the murders. The report
included a photograph of Debra and her children. Pruitt recognized
Joshua in the photograph. Pruitt dressed, left the apartment, and
looked for a telephone. He could not find one that worked and
eventually returned home.
	Williams first drove to a nearby store and then to the
Schaumburg townhouse that she shared with defendant. It was a
three-level residence: garage and laundry room on the bottom
floor, living room and kitchen on the middle floor, and bedrooms
on the top floor. Williams drove into the garage. They left the car
and went up to Williams' living room. Williams invited Scott "to
look around," since it was her first time in Williams' home. Joshua
stayed with Alexis in the living room. On being called by
Williams, Scott went upstairs and into a bedroom. Defendant was
lying on a bed with a "really pale" baby, who had "streams of
blond hair coming down from his cap" and "tape across his navel."
	Scott returned to the living room, where she gave Alexis a
bottle of milk. Later, Scott heard Williams' voice instructing her
to bring Joshua downstairs to the laundry room.
	Scott did so. In the room, Scott saw defendant, Williams, and
an unidentified man who soon thereafter departed. Scott denied
that this man was Bo Wilson. Joshua was directed to sit on a
daybed. Defendant asked Williams why she had brought Scott to
the house and why she had not taken Joshua to "the projects" as
defendant had instructed her. Williams answered that Joshua
"talked too much" and that he knew their names: he knew
defendant, Williams, and Ward.
	Williams picked up a white cord. Joshua was ordered to lean
forward. Defendant and Williams, each pulling on an end of the
cord, began to strangle Joshua. He screamed and clutched at the
cord. Scott screamed and pushed Williams, who released her end.
	As Joshua was crying and rubbing his neck, Williams left the
laundry room, returned with a knife, and placed it on the bed. Scott
screamed and asked Williams to take her and Joshua to Scott's
home. Williams directed Scott to retrieve Alexis. Scott took
Joshua and went upstairs. She tried to leave through the front door,
but it was locked.
	Scott, with Alexis and Joshua, returned downstairs. Defendant
warned Scott not to say anything, or else, according to Scott, he
would "get me and my daughters." Defendant directed Williams
to take Scott home. They all went to the garage and got in the car.
Scott sat in the front passenger seat with Alexis. Joshua sat in the
back seat on the passenger side. Defendant entered the car on the
rear driver side. Scott looked in the back of the car and saw
defendant repeatedly stab Joshua. Williams stood along the
driver's side of the car and appeared to be reaching inside the car
and holding Joshua. He was gasping and kicking the front seat.
	Williams sat in the driver's seat, and defendant told her that
"she knew where to go." They drove to Maywood, where
defendant and Williams took Joshua from the car and helped him
walk to the rear of a building. Defendant and Williams returned
without Joshua. Williams left defendant in Maywood and drove
Scott to her apartment.
	At approximately 12:15 p.m., Williams and Scott returned to
Scott's apartment. At Williams' request, Scott gave her cleaning
supplies for her car. Scott denied helping Williams clean the car.
Greeting Scott, Pruitt told her to lock the door, and that he would
telephone police. When Pruitt left, he saw Williams cleaning her
car. Eventually, Williams drove away.
	Pruitt found a telephone and contacted Addison police.
Several police departments joined in the investigation. A police
car picked Pruitt up and returned him to his apartment. Scott and
Pruitt subsequently left the apartment with police. Scott led police
to the building where defendant and Williams had dumped Joshua.
Police recovered Joshua's corpse. Scott admitted that she did not
initially tell police that Joshua had named defendant and "Boo-Boo" as two of the burglars. She explained that she feared
defendant.
	At 10:45 p.m., police went to defendant's and Williams'
townhouse. They were not at home, but Williams' children and
their friends were there, with her oldest daughter, age 11 or 12,
baby-sitting. At 11:45 p.m., defendant and Williams returned
home. Police arrested them as they entered the dwelling. Williams
was carrying Elijah, who had a bloody piece of gauze taped over
his navel. Defendant was wearing Edwards' starter jacket, the right
cuff of which was stained with Elijah's blood.
	Police recovered the following evidence. In Debra's
apartment, in the living room, a vehicle emissions test notice
addressed to Debra had a bloody fingerprint. The State's expert
opined that it was Williams' fingerprint. The bathroom vanity had
blood on it; the blood was subsequently determined to be Elijah's.
The missing poultry shears were found on the sidewalk in front of
the apartment. There was blood on the shears, and one of its
handles was broken. DNA tests revealed that the blood belonged
to Samantha.
	Police also recovered evidence from Scott's apartment.
Investigators found an empty iodine bottle in the kitchen garbage.
	In a garbage bag in the garage of defendant's and Williams'
townhouse, police found a white coaxial cable with blood on it.
DNA tests revealed that the blood belonged to Joshua. Scott
identified the cable as the one defendant and Williams used to
strangle Joshua. In the dishwasher, police found a "rusty wooden
handled butcher knife," which Scott identified as the knife that
defendant used to stab Joshua. On the backseat carpet of
defendant's and Williams' car, police found blood that had been
treated with cleaner. DNA tests revealed that the blood belonged
to Joshua. In a bedroom closet, police found a bottle of baby lotion
with a stain on it. DNA tests revealed that the stain was a mixture
of the body fluids from Joshua and Elijah. On the kitchen counter,
police found two counterfeit birth certificates indicating, inter alia,
that a baby was born to Williams and defendant at a hospital on
November 16, 1995. The documents had been typed on Vikki
Iacullo's typewriter.
	Also, on November 18, police found a bed sheet, stained with
Joshua's blood, seven blocks from where his body was found. A
matching sheet and pillowcase were found in defendant's and
Williams' townhouse. On December 2, Iacullo and Dorothy Hale
directed police to Herrick Lake in Wheaton, where they found a
.25-caliber pistol. Police determined that the gun had fired the
bullet that was recovered from Debra's head.
	The State presented the following forensic evidence. Dr.
Shaku Teas performed autopsies on Debra and Samantha. The
cause of Samantha's death was multiple stab wounds. Samantha
had seven stab and incised wounds to the neck. Dr. Teas explained
that a stab wound is deeper than it is long, and an incised wound
is longer than it is deep. Samantha also had several incised wounds
to the left arm, which Dr. Teas opined were defense wounds.
	Dr. Teas determined that Debra was shot in the back of the
head. The bullet traveled though the right side of the brain to the
area behind the forehead. This was the main cause of death. Debra
also had four incised wounds to the neck. These wounds
contributed to her death. Also, there was a 13-inch, jagged,
horizontal wound across the lower abdomen. The umbilical cord
was protruding therefrom. This deep wound penetrated the
abdominal cavity and the small bowel. The uterus had been sliced
open. Dr. Teas opined that all of the stab and incised wounds to
Samantha and Debra, including the wound to Debra's abdomen,
could have been caused by the poultry shears found in front of
Debra's apartment.
	Dr. Christopher Olson was Debra's obstetrician-gynecologist.
The blood spatters around Debra's body suggested to Dr. Olson
the presence of blood pressure. He opined that Debra's heart was
still beating when Elijah was cut out of her womb.
	Also, Dr. Olson explained that three persons are required to
perform a Caesarean in an appropriate medical manner. At a
minimum, more than two hands are needed. Dr. Olson opined that
Elijah's removal from Debra's womb required more than one
person.
	Dr. Joseph Cogan performed an autopsy on Joshua. His neck
had ligature marks, which indicated strangulation. The marks were
caused by a cord wrapped around his neck at least twice. Joshua's
neck had several stab wounds, and he had no defensive wounds.
Also, aspiration had occurred, i.e., Joshua had inhaled his own
vomit. Dr. Cogan opined that Joshua was first strangled and then
stabbed, and the aspiration occurred after he was stabbed.
	The ligature marks were consistent with the white coaxial
cable found in defendant's and Williams' garage. The stab wounds
were consistent with the butcher knife found in their dish washer.
The unusual damage to Joshua's lung tissue from the aspirated
stomach contents was consistent with the ingestion of iodine.
Joshua died from multiple injuries: the strangulation, the stab
wounds, and the aspiration of the stomach contents. Joshua would
not have died immediately from his injuries, but he would not
have lived for more than 30 minutes.
	The above evidence describes the circumstances of the
murders and kidnappings of members of the Evans family. In
addition, the State presented evidence concerning defendant,
Williams, and Ward in the months preceding the crimes, and
evidence of their relationships with the Evans family.
	Debra and Edwards had been in a relationship since 1989.
Debra's sister described it as "on again off again." They had
separated several times. In March 1995, Debra and Edwards
reconciled, and he moved back in their apartment.
	While Debra and Edwards had been separated, Laverne Ward
lived with Debra. When Debra and Ward lived together in 1993,
he beat her more than once. Ward was the biological father of
Jordan. Debra told her sister that Edwards fathered Elijah, which
Edwards believed to be the case. However, subsequent DNA tests
revealed that Ward was the biological father of Elijah.
 	Dawn Killeen was a neighbor of defendant and Williams.
Killeen was well acquainted with defendant, Williams, and Ward.
Killeen's husband and defendant sold drugs together. Killeen and
Ward were crack cocaine addicts and took drugs together. Also,
Ward was a courier for defendant.
	In May 1995, Killeen went to the apartment of defendant and
Williams to borrow a vacuum cleaner. Among those in the
apartment was Vikki Iacullo. Ward entered the apartment
screaming that Debra was not allowing him to see Jordan.
According to Killeen, Ward "said that he was tired of her shit and
he wanted to end it. He wanted to solve the problem. He wanted
to kill the bitch." Defendant asked if Ward wanted a knife or a
gun. Williams advised Ward to calm down because he would be
the most likely suspect. In September 1995, Williams told Killeen
that she was pregnant.
	During the last few weeks prior to the murders, Ward
telephoned Debra several times. During these conversations,
Edwards overheard Debra arguing with Ward.
	Approximately one week prior to the murders, Williams went
to Debra's apartment and asked for her. Williams and Edwards
spoke briefly. She asked Edwards about his work schedule.
Edwards told Williams that he went to work at about 6 p.m. and
returned home at about 2:30 a.m.
	On the afternoon of November 16, 1995, John Pettaway,
Williams' cousin, saw defendant, Williams, and Ward together.
As Pettaway and Ward were driving around Wheaton, Ward saw
defendant and asked Pettaway to stop. Defendant and Williams
were in an automobile parked in a lot. Ward left Pettaway's car
and spoke to defendant and Williams for approximately 10 to 15
minutes. Ward returned to Pettaway's car and they left. Pettaway
and Ward went to the home of Pettaway's brother. Ward told
Pettaway that he had to find defendant. When they left the house,
they encountered defendant and Williams driving down a street.
Defendant and Williams pulled to one side. Ward again left
Pettaway's car and spoke with defendant and Williams for
approximately 20 minutes. Defendant and Williams then drove
away. Later that afternoon, Ward again told Pettaway that he had
to meet defendant. Pettaway drove to the school where,
unbeknownst to him, Williams' children attended. They did not
find defendant.
	Tina Martin, Williams' sister, shared a house with their
mother in Wheaton. In April 1995, Williams told Martin that
Williams was pregnant. On November 16, at around 6:50 p.m.,
Ward went to Martin's house. There, Ward had a telephone
conversation with Debra. Martin overheard a portion of the
conversation, during which Ward asked Debra: "Is it his or is it
mine?" Ward left Martin's home at around 8:10 p.m.
	Kasandra Turner had met defendant and Williams in April
1995; Williams then told Turner that Williams was pregnant. On
November 16, between 5:30 and 6 p.m., defendant telephoned
Turner. Defendant told Turner that he and Williams were going to
have the baby.
	On November 16, between 8:30 and 9:30 p.m., Jacci Sullivan,
who lived in Debra's apartment complex, heard a gunshot. At
about 9:15 p.m., Tennie Clay, who also lived in the complex, saw
four persons standing on a sidewalk talking to each other. She
believed that three of them were African-American and one was
a light-skinned Hispanic. One of them was wearing a dark-colored
starter jacket, and the others were wearing black, hooded
sweatshirts or jackets.
	That evening, Joy Wilson, age 15, and Tiffany Wilson, age
16, were baby-sitting at Tiffany's house. Tiffany was Joy's aunt
and also a cousin of Ward and Williams. Tiffany and Joy were
watching the 9 p.m. news when Ward entered the house. He was
carrying a plastic grocery bag that contained something. Ward
went directly to a bathroom.
	According to Tiffany, Ward emerged from the bathroom
wearing different pants and still carrying the grocery bag. He and
Joy left the apartment. Ward later returned to Tiffany's home
without the bag.
	Joy saw more. According to Joy, when Ward entered the
house, his pants had a hole in the knee, and his pants and T-shirt
had bloodstains. When Ward emerged from the bathroom, he was
wearing different clothes, and the grocery bag appeared fuller.
	The family dog then frightened Joy and caused her to run
outside. She saw a four-door gray automobile with three persons
inside-two men in the front seat and a woman in the back seat. Joy
identified them all-two of them were Williams and defendant.
They were sounding the car horn and calling for Ward. Carrying
the bag, he got in the car, and they left.
	Mohammid Siddiqui was a clerk at a Seven-Eleven store at
Golf Road and Walnut Lane in Schaumburg. He saw defendant
and a woman matching the description of Williams enter the store
on November 17, 1995, between 1:30 and 2 a.m. Defendant
bought baby wipes and candy. The store register tape records a
sale at 1:49 a.m. for one item at $1.99, which was the price of
baby wipes, and one item at $0.99 cents.
	At approximately 3:30 a.m., Williams telephoned her sister,
Tina Martin, and told her that she, Williams, had just given birth.
Vikki Iacullo then spoke to Martin to confirm Williams'
announcement. Martin then asked to speak with defendant. She
asked defendant if a baby were really there, and defendant
answered in the affirmative.
	Martin and her mother then drove to Iacullo's house. There,
Martin and her mother saw Iacullo, Williams, defendant, and a
baby. Iacullo explained to Martin and her mother that Williams
came to Iacullo's house and then went into labor. Iacullo said that
she rushed Williams to a hospital, where she gave birth. Iacullo
gave this explanation in defendant's presence. The baby's
complexion was so light that Martin asked Iacullo, who was
Caucasian, if the baby were hers. Martin's mother declared that
she did not believe that the baby belonged to Williams and
defendant, and then asked to leave. The visit of Martin and her
mother lasted only approximately three to five minutes.
	That afternoon, John Pettaway saw Williams and two of her
children at a car wash. One of Williams' daughters was vacuuming
the backseat area of her car.
	Defendant, Williams, and Ward were jointly charged in a 24-count indictment: 21 counts of first degree murder, two counts of
aggravated kidnapping, and one count of armed robbery. The three
charged individuals were tried separately. See People v. Williams,
193 Ill. 2d 306, 314-15 (2000). In defendant's case, the State
entered a nolle prosequi on 10 of the murder counts and the armed
robbery count. At the close of the State's case, the trial court
directed a verdict of not guilty on one of the remaining aggravated
kidnapping counts. Defendant was ultimately tried for the
intentional and knowing murder of Debra, Samantha, and Joshua
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1994)), their felony murder
based on the felonies of aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1994)), and the aggravated
kidnapping of Joshua (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 1994)).
	The defense case was essentially as follows. The theory of the
defense was that Williams was possessive and jealous of
defendant. Williams planned to cement her relationship with
defendant by claiming to be pregnant. Williams, Ward, and Iacullo
conspired to take Elijah. Those three committed the charged
offenses. Defendant was not part of their conspiracy; rather, he
was the purpose of it.
	Defendant was born in 1973. In 1992, defendant quit his job
at United Parcel Service to sell drugs. Defendant began dating
Williams in the spring of 1994. She had three children.
Unbeknownst to defendant and others, Williams had a tubal
ligation in 1986 and could no longer have children.
	Shortly after defendant and Williams began dating, Williams
learned that defendant had a one-year-old daughter by his former
girlfriend Latrina Montgomery. Defendant continued to have a
sexual relationship with Montgomery and other women while he
was living with Williams. Because she was jealous of
Montgomery's relationship with defendant, Williams had physical
and verbal altercations with Montgomery from 1994 through 1995.
	In February 1995, Williams told defendant that she was
pregnant. She had previously feigned pregnancies. In June 1995,
defendant, Williams, and her children moved to their Schaumburg
townhouse.
	At around 7:15 p.m. on the evening of November 16, 1995,
defendant, Williams, and her children returned home from a
school basketball game. Williams left shortly thereafter.
	Defendant admitted that he telephoned Kasandra Turner
earlier that evening. However, he denied announcing to her that he
and Williams were going to have a baby. Defendant explained that
Turner bought drugs from him the previous day and paid for them
with a check. Defendant telephoned Turner to inform her that the
check had bounced. After his arrest, police found the check in the
glove box of defendant's car.
	Between 6:30 and 7 p.m., Joyce Holtz went to defendant's
home and bought cocaine from defendant. She stayed for
approximately three minutes. Between 8 and 9 p.m., defendant
watched a television program with Christina, one of Williams'
daughters. When she went to bed, sometime between 8:05 and 9
p.m., defendant was still home.
	At 1:30 a.m. on November 17, defendant was worried because
Williams had not yet returned home. He went to the nearby Seven-Eleven store to use a payphone. He denied buying baby wipes at
that time. Defendant telephoned Tina Martin and asked her to page
Williams. Defendant then telephoned Iacullo and returned home.
	At approximately 2:30 a.m., Iacullo drove into defendant's
driveway. Defendant went to Iacullo's car; Williams was inside
holding a baby. Indoors, Iacullo told defendant that Williams was
at Iacullo's house when she went into labor. Iacullo drove
Williams to a hospital where she had the baby. Williams had to
leave the hospital because she did not have health insurance.
	Defendant was initially skeptical of Williams' and Iacullo's
story. However, he began to believe it because a baby was there at
2:30 a.m. The three of them took the baby to Iacullo's house to
retrieve Williams' car. At the house, Williams telephoned Tina
Martin and, as described earlier, informed her of the baby.
	Defendant and Williams left Iacullo and drove to the same
Seven-Eleven store where defendant was earlier. He bought baby
wipes at that time. The store register tape records a 4:49 a.m.
purchase of an item costing $1.99, which was the price of baby
wipes. They returned home at around 5 a.m. Defendant lay next to
the baby and fell asleep.
	Defendant awoke at around noon, performed an errand with
Williams and the baby, and returned home between 1:30 and 2
p.m. Williams then left to pick up her children from school.
Defendant stayed home with the baby. Williams returned between
4:30 and 5 p.m.
	At approximately 8:50 p.m., Iacullo paged defendant. He,
Williams, and the baby went to Iacullo's house. Iacullo gave
defendant a Grambling Tigers jacket, calling it a "Daddy's Day
present." Defendant had left home without a coat because their car
was sufficiently heated. They returned home, where they were
arrested, with defendant wearing the jacket, and Williams carrying
the baby.
	Iacullo was charged with obstruction of justice regarding her
involvement in these crimes. Invoking the fifth amendment, she
refused to testify at defendant's trial.
	The defense attacked the credibility of the State's witnesses
and suggested inconsistencies and contradictions in their
testimony. Defendant denied any involvement in these crimes.
	At the close of the evidence, the jury returned general verdicts
of guilty of the first degree murders of Debra, Samantha, and
Joshua. The jury also returned a general verdict of guilty of the
aggravated kidnapping of Joshua.
	In the eligibility phase of the death sentencing hearing, the
jury returned seven separate eligibility verdicts. The jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of the following statutory
aggravating factors. Regarding Debra's murder, the jury found that
defendant was convicted of murdering two or more persons. See
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994). Regarding Samantha's
murder, the jury found that: defendant was convicted of murdering
two or more persons; and the murder of Samantha, who was under
the age of 12, was brutal and heinous. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3),
(b)(7) (West 1994). Regarding Joshua's murder, the jury found
that: defendant was convicted of murdering two or more persons;
Joshua was killed in the course of another felony, either
aggravated kidnapping or armed robbery; the murder of Joshua,
who was under the age of 12, was brutal and heinous; and
defendant murdered Joshua to prevent him from giving material
assistance to the State. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7),
(b)(8) (West 1994).
	At the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, the
State's case in aggravation included the following evidence. In
March 1991, a state trooper stopped defendant for speeding. A
protective pat-down search of defendant revealed a box of
ammunition. Defendant was arrested for unlawful possession of
ammunition and traffic offenses. Defendant received court
supervision.
	In July 1991, police stopped defendant for speeding. He was
driving with two passengers. Hidden under the left side of the
front passenger seat was a loaded pistol with two freshly
discharged cartridges.
	In February 1992, Nakia Weaver, a high school girlfriend of
defendant, witnessed defendant and another student fight in a
classroom. After school that day, defendant found Weaver, who
was sitting in the front passenger side of a car. Weaver rolled
down the window. Blaming her for the fight, defendant slapped
Weaver in the face. Weaver defended herself, and defendant
punched her in the face and then left. Weaver reported the attack
to police, and defendant was charged with battery. However,
Weaver did not appear in court because she was not notified of
defendant's court date.
	In September 1994, defendant, standing in the middle of a
residential street, fired multiple rounds from a handgun. It was
noontime on that particular day, and children were walking and
playing on the street. One bullet shattered an automobile
windshield. Defendant was apprehended and subsequently
convicted of criminal damage to property, unlawful possession of
a firearm, and unlawful use of a weapon. He was sentenced to one
year of conditional discharge and 10 days of community service.
	In December 1994, police encountered defendant and another
man in a parked automobile. Defendant was sitting in the front
passenger seat. A consensual search of the car revealed a loaded
handgun under defendant's seat. A charge of unlawful use of a
weapon was ultimately dismissed.
	In January 1995, defendant struck Gregory Flowers in the
head with a beer bottle, accusing him of stealing a part from
defendant's automobile. Flowers received a three-inch laceration.
He did not sign a criminal complaint, and defendant was not
charged.
	In July 1995, a police officer saw defendant chase a vehicle
down a street. The officer then saw defendant return to and enter
another car. The officer approached; defendant was sitting in the
front passenger seat. The officer knew that there was a warrant for
defendant's arrest for failure to appear in court. The officer
ordered defendant out of the car. As defendant exited the car, the
officer observed a small handgun, a pillowcase, and a digital scale
on the floor in the area where defendant was seated. The gun was
a BB gun, and the pillowcase contained $125.78 in coins.
Defendant also had on his person $235 in currency. Defendant
volunteered that the coins were his, but he denied knowledge of
the BB gun, the scale, or the $235. He was charged on the warrant
for failure to appear in court.
	The State lastly presented victim impact evidence. Sam
Evans, Debra's father; Wendy Williams, Debra's sister; and Scott
Gilbert, Samantha's father, each read a victim impact statement.
	Defendant's case in mitigation included the following
evidence. Sonia Glover, defendant's great aunt, testified as
follows. In his childhood, defendant lived with his maternal
grandfather, James Caffey; his grandmother, Winifred; his mother,
Elaine; and his uncle David. Although they claimed to know the
identity of defendant's father, that man never acknowledged
defendant as his son.
	Defendant grew up in a dysfunctional household. Winifred
was a chronic schizophrenic and was regularly hospitalized at
several institutions. At the time of the death sentencing hearing,
she was in a permanent facility. Winifred attempted suicide
several times both before and after defendant was born. In
defendant's presence, she would see things and hear voices that
were not there. Also, defendant's mother was mentally ill. She
took LSD before and after she gave birth to defendant.
	Defendant had a good relationship with his grandfather, who
was defendant's male role model. In 1991, James Caffey died of
cancer, in his home, with defendant there.
	While in high school, defendant began a relationship with
Latrina Montgomery. They had a daughter, Vanessa. Defendant's
uncle David also had children. Defendant cared for these children
and never lost his temper with them or struck them.
	Glover's thoughts of defendant were "very positive" because
"[h]e grew up through difficult times." Noting defendant's
childhood home, Glover believed that defendant has "somewhat
been a victim." Glover also noted that when defendant reached
high school, he had joined a street gang. According to Glover:
"This introduced him to a lifestyle of fast living, fast money, and
absolute hell."
	Defendant's uncle David amplified much of Glover's
testimony. He added the following. He was raised as defendant's
brother because he was only four years older than defendant. Both
defendant's mother and grandmother were paranoid
schizophrenics. They always argued, which caused defendant to
become withdrawn and quiet. David never saw defendant lose his
temper with his daughter or David's three children.
	Defendant's grandfather treated defendant like a son. His
grandfather's death deeply affected defendant and upset the entire
household. David added that defendant became involved in a street
gang and sold drugs. However, these activities were not connected.
	Defendant's fourth grade teacher, Neacy White, testified that
in her classroom defendant was quiet, helpful, respectful, and
obedient. She believed that defendant knew the difference between
right and wrong and, to her knowledge, defendant was not placed
in learning disability or special education classes.
	Defendant's cousins Gary Smart and Ronalda Robinson each
testified regarding defendant's loving attitude toward his family.
According to Smart, defendant never acted violently toward his
family. Defendant always cared for his mother; he always gave her
money as needed. When defendant became a teenager, he grew
more independent from his extended family. Defendant "all of a
sudden, he had things, and you'd wonder where he got them
from."
	According to Robinson, defendant was the same age as her
two older sons. Defendant visited her home often and spent much
time with them. He also played with her younger children.
Defendant was very loving and caring toward his daughter
Vanessa. Robinson never saw defendant react violently to these
children; he never lost his patience with them or hit them. He also
attended church services with Robinson, who was a church elder.
	George Savarese, Ph.D., a licensed clinical social worker,
prepared a "Psychosocial Developmental Evaluation" of
defendant. In preparing this evaluation, Dr. Savarese interviewed
defendant, his family members, neighbors, and teachers. He also
reviewed various birth, medical, psychiatric, and school records.
The purpose of the evaluation was to determine whether there
were "developmental stressors" that occurred in defendant's life.
Dr. Savarese described a "developmental stressor" as any event or
circumstance that occurred in a person's life that is an obstacle to
normal development. Dr. Savarese searched for possible stressors
through all stages of defendant's life, including prior to his birth.
Dr. Savarese then formed an opinion as to how those stressors
impacted defendant's behavioral functioning, emotional coping,
and cognitive ability.
	In his testimony, Dr. Savarese referred extensively to his
written evaluation. His testimony included all of the information
supplied by the above-mentioned mitigation witnesses.
	Dr. Savarese testified regarding defendant's childhood
household. His testimony supplied additional information
regarding defendant's mother, Elaine: her mental illness, her abuse
of drugs and alcohol, and her resulting inability to care for
defendant. Essentially, all she could do was sleep and abuse
substances, if she were not hospitalized.
	Dr. Savarese provided further details regarding defendant's
grandmother, Winifred: her mental illness, her substance abuse,
her repeated suicide attempts, her repeated physical fights with
defendant's mother, and several examples of her bizarre behavior.
For example, when defendant was a teenager, she would strip
naked and walk into his room; defendant would have to dress her.
	Dr. Savarese supplied additional information regarding the
men in defendant's household. Defendant's grandfather, James,
provided defendant with a model of how to cope with this chaotic
household. James would occasionally leave the household to live
with a girlfriend. However, James would return to take Elaine or
Winifred to a hospital as needed. Defendant's uncle David sold
crack cocaine from their home.
	Also, later in his life, defendant confronted the man family
members claimed was his father. However, the man told defendant
that he and several other men had group sex with his mother.
Thus, Dr. Savarese testified, the man "disavowed he was his
[defendant's] father and said no one was really clear on who his
father was *** [a]nd no one would take credit for who was, in
fact, his father."
	Dr. Savarese formed several opinions regarding how
defendant's childhood household affected him. Due to his chaotic
and dysfunctional household, defendant had the sense of not being
cared for and a fear of abandonment or rejection. The substance
abuse in the household normalized that behavior for defendant and
impacted his decision to sell drugs. Defendant began to sell drugs
and escalated his exposure to street gangs because there was no
one at home to limit that behavior.
	Dr. Savarese testified regarding defendant's adult
relationships. Defendant became involved with two women at the
same time: Latrina Montgomery, the mother of his daughter
Vanessa, and Williams. Dr. Savarese opined that defendant was in
the same triangle between two women as he was between his
mother and grandmother.
	Williams was very manipulative, threatening, and violent. She
used suicide attempts to control defendant's behavior. For
example, when defendant once tried to leave her, she slit her
wrists. Dr. Savarese gave additional examples of Williams'
conduct. She stabbed defendant and then stood vigil over him at
a hospital. She crashed his car and then told police that defendant
had crashed the car and had hit her. Williams told defendant that
if he left her, her children would be on the street without a father.
Defendant felt responsible for her children.
	At the close of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that
there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. The trial court entered judgment
on the verdict.
	After denying defendant's post-trial motion, the trial court
held a sentencing hearing on defendant's aggravated kidnapping
conviction. There, defendant made a statement in allocution.
Defendant expressed sympathy for the Evans family. However, he
claimed complete innocence; he denied any involvement in these
crimes.
	The trial court sentenced defendant to death on the first degree
murder convictions. The court also sentenced defendant to a
consecutive 30-year prison term on the aggravated kidnapping
conviction.
	Defendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be
discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Guilt Phase
I. Exclusion of Hearsay Statements
	Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding out-of-court statements by (A) Ward, (B) Williams, and (C) Iacullo.
Defendant contends that these statements would have supported
his theory at trial that Williams deceived him into believing that
she was pregnant, and that he did not participate in Ward's and
Williams' plan to commit these crimes. "Hearsay evidence is an
out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of
reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule."
People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1997). Defendant argues
that these statements fell within various exceptions to the rule
against hearsay.
	The parties initially disagree as to our standard of review. The
State contends that we should review deferentially the trial court's
exclusion of this testimony. Defendant, however, contends that we
should review de novo the trial court's exclusion of these hearsay
statements. Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed unless the trial court has
abused that discretion. People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 313 (1997);
People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56 (1984). An abuse of
discretion will be found only where the trial court's ruling is
arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Illgen,
145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). Reviewing courts generally use an
abuse-of-discretion standard to review evidentiary rulings rather
than review them de novo. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275,
296 (1994).
	Defendant argues that the evidentiary rulings at issue here
were uniquely legal rulings, which we may review de novo. It is
true that reviewing courts sometimes review evidentiary rulings de
novo. This exception to the general rule of deference applies in
cases where "a trial court's exercise of discretion has been
frustrated by an erroneous rule of law." People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999); see, e.g., People  v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d
105, 109 (1994).
	We reject defendant's argument and review these evidentiary
rulings with deference to the trial court. The decision whether to
admit evidence cannot be made in isolation. The trial court must
consider a number of circumstances that bear on that issue,
including questions of reliability and prejudice. See Childress, 158 Ill. 2d  at 295-96. In this case, the trial court exercised discretion in
making these evidentiary rulings, i.e., the court based these rulings
on the specific circumstances of this case and not on a broadly
applicable rule. See People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2000);
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 313 (1998).

A. Ward's Excluded Hearsay Statement
	Pettaway testified that on the afternoon of November 16,
1995, he was with Ward, who told Pettaway that he had to find
defendant. The State theorized that Ward, defendant, and Williams
met to plan these crimes. On cross-examination, defendant's trial
counsel asked Pettaway: "Did Mr. Ward ever indicate to you that
he wanted to buy drugs from [defendant] on November 16th,
1995?" Over the State's objection, Pettaway answered: "Yes, he
did." The trial court sustained the State's objection on hearsay
grounds. The court would not allow defendant's trial counsel to
elicit the remainder of Ward's hearsay statement-that Ward
needed to find defendant to buy drugs from him.
	The State initially responds that defendant waived review of
this ruling because he failed both to object at trial and to include
the issue in his post-trial motion. The record shows that, during a
sidebar, defendant's trial counsel unsuccessfully asserted the
hearsay exceptions on which he now relies. We will consider this
issue even though defendant failed to include it in his post-trial
motion because defendant raised the issue at trial and the issue
concerns defendant's due process right to present a defense. See
People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63, 99-100 (2000), citing People
v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988); People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1995).
	Defendant argues that the proffered hearsay statement was
admissible because it fell within two exceptions to the hearsay
rule. "Under the 'completion doctrine,' when a portion of a
conversation is related by a witness, the opposing party has a right
to bring out the remainder of that conversation to prevent the trier
of fact from being misled." People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 311
(1992); accord People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 556-57 (1982)
(and cases cited therein). However, the testimony regarding the
conversation must actually be misleading. "A defendant has no
right to introduce portions of a statement which are not necessary
to enable the jury to properly evaluate the portions introduced by
the State." People v. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d 324, 338 (1986).
	In the present case, Pettaway's testimony did not prejudice
defendant, i.e., it was not misleading. Pettaway never indicated
that Ward wanted to meet with defendant and Williams to plan
these crimes. Further, Pettaway testified that: he and Ward had
smoked crack cocaine together; he knew that defendant was a drug
dealer; he had previously bought drugs from defendant; and he had
seen Ward buy drugs from defendant. Thus, there was abundant
testimony by Pettaway from which defendant's trial counsel could
argue that the meetings between Ward and defendant were
motivated by a desire to buy drugs. Moreover, defendant himself
testified that, at the first meeting that Pettaway related, defendant
and Ward left the parking lot, went to the nearby apartment of
Ward's girlfriend, and completed a drug transaction.
Consequently, the proffered hearsay statement was not necessary
to prevent jurors from being misled by Pettaway's testimony. See,
e.g., Ward, 154 Ill. 2d  at 312; People v. Harris, 236 Ill. App. 3d
574, 580-81 (1992).
	Defendant argues that the proffered hearsay statement was
admissible also because it fell within the "state-of-mind"
exception to the hearsay rule. Statements that indicate the
declarant's state of mind are admissible as exceptions to the
hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable to testify, there is a
reasonable probability that the proffered hearsay statements are
truthful, and the statements are relevant to a material issue in the
case. People v. Floyd, 103 Ill. 2d 541, 546 (1984).
	Defendant points to the above-mentioned corroborative
portions of Pettaway's testimony as support for the truthfulness of
Ward's hearsay statement. These facts do indicate that Ward
possibly wanted to buy drugs from defendant. However, they do
not indicate the reliability of Ward's statement to Pettaway; they
do not add up to a reasonable probability of the truthfulness of
Ward's statement. On the one hand, it is not inherently likely that
a drug user would tell the truth to a fellow drug user about wanting
to buy drugs. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Ward
was jointly charged with defendant of committing these crimes. It
is inherently likely that a person would want to conceal from
another the fact that he was meeting with others to plan a murder
and a kidnapping. Ward obviously had a greater reason to lie about
his motive for finding defendant than to tell the truth. There was
no reasonable probability that Ward's hearsay statement was
truthful.
	In any event, if Ward's hearsay statement was admissible to
show his state of mind, the exclusion of the statement was
harmless. Error in the exclusion of hearsay testimony is harmless
where the excluded evidence is merely cumulative of other
evidence presented by the parties. See People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 318-20 (1983); People v. Kline, 92 Ill. 2d 490, 503-04 (1982).
	In this case, Pettaway's testimony itself contained significant
evidence from which defendant could argue that Ward wanted to
find defendant to buy drugs. Further, defendant actually testified
to the subject matter of Ward's hearsay statement. Defendant
testified that he sold crack cocaine to Ward at the first meeting to
which Pettaway testified. This further supports a conclusion that
the exclusion of Ward's testimony was harmless. See People v.
Nyberg, 275 Ill. App. 3d 570, 580-81 (1995); People v. Hudson,
198 Ill. App. 3d 915, 923-25 (1990). Pettaway's testimony
regarding his drug relationship with Ward, combined with
defendant's own testimony that he sold drugs to Ward, was at least
as strong s Ward's excluded hearsay statement. Therefore, any
error in its exclusion was harmless.



B. Williams' Excluded Hearsay Statements
1
	Kimberly Young testified that, on three separate occasions,
Williams falsely told her that Williams was pregnant. Defendant's
trial counsel asked Young if Williams told her why Williams
needed to tell a man she was pregnant. The trial court then
sustained the State's objection on hearsay grounds. Defense
counsel made an offer of proof of Young's testimony. Williams
told Young that Williams would falsely tell a man that she was
pregnant to keep him. Defendant argues that Williams' hearsay
statement to Young fell into the same two hearsay exceptions as
Ward's hearsay statement: the completion doctrine and the state-of-mind exception.
	Neither hearsay exception applies here. The completion
doctrine does not apply because Young was defendant's witness.
All of Young's testimony and her proffered testimony was
presented during defendant's direct examination of her. Thus,
there is no issue of clarifying partial and misleading testimony
elicited by the opposing party. See Ward, 154 Ill. 2d  at 311
(stating rule).
	Also, the state-of-mind exception does not apply here. As
with Ward's excluded hearsay statement, there is no reasonable
probability that this hearsay statement of Williams was truthful.
The record does not disclose any reason to regard the casual
conversation among these acquaintances as inherently reliable.
	If the state-of-mind exception did apply to Williams' hearsay
statement to Young, the exclusion of the statement was harmless.
Defendant presented much additional evidence regarding Williams
deceiving others, including defendant, with her lies of being
pregnant. In the State's case at least three persons-Martin, Turner,
and Killeen-so testified. Moreover, defendant himself so testified.
Defendant also presented additional evidence of her jealous and
possessive nature regarding him. See Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 318-20;
Nyberg, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 580-81.



2
	Pauline Randle was the mother of defendant's former
girlfriend, Latrina Montgomery. Randle testified as follows. In
early 1995, she received 15 to 20 telephone calls from the same
woman. Randle had never heard the woman's voice prior to these
calls, nor had she spoken to Williams in person. The State
objected. During the resulting sidebar, defendant made the
following offer of proof. Randle would testify that, in the first call,
the woman identified herself as Williams' mother. In subsequent
calls, the woman identified herself as Williams. Also, Randle's
"caller ID" indicated that the calls came from Williams' home.
Williams told Randle that she was pregnant with defendant's
child, and that Randle should tell her daughter to stay away from
defendant. The trial court excluded the testimony, finding that
there was no showing as to who made the phone calls.
	Telephone conversations that are relevant to the issues at trial
are competent if a proper foundation is laid. A mere assertion by
the other person as to his or her identity, being hearsay, cannot be
taken as a sufficient showing of the other person's identity. People
v. Poe, 121 Ill. App. 3d 457, 460 (1984); accord M. Graham,
Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §901.7 (7th ed.
1999). Testimony as to a telephone conversation between a
witness and another person is inadmissible in the absence of a
claim by the witness that he or she knows the other person or can
identify the person's voice or other corroborative circumstances
from which the caller can be identified as the person who talked
to the witness. People v. Abrego, 142 Ill. App. 3d 973, 981-82
(1986) (and cases cited therein); accord 2 J. Strong, McCormick
on Evidence §226, at 52 (5th ed. 1999).
	Caller identification ("caller ID") information is one such
corroborative circumstance. While the admissibility of caller ID
evidence appears to be an issue of first impression in Illinois, other
courts have considered the issue. The information displayed on a
caller ID device is not hearsay because there is no out-of-court
asserter (see Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 357 (stating hearsay rule));
" 'the caller ID display is based on computer generated
information and not simply the repetition of prior recorded human
input or observation.' " Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d 156, 162
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995), quoting Tatum v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.
App. 585, 588, 440 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1994). We agree with this
reasoning and hold that the only requirement necessary for the
admission of caller ID evidence is that the caller ID device be
proven reliable. See Culbreath, 667 So. 2d  at 162; Tatum, 17 Va.
App. at 588-89, 440 S.E.2d  at 135-36.
	The reliability of a caller ID device must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the specific facts and circumstances. In
other words, it would not be appropriate to find that a particular
type or brand of caller ID device is always reliable. Reliability may
be established when the witness testifies that when he or she
received telephone calls, the witness checked the caller ID and that
the same number always appeared for the same caller. See
Culbreath, 667 So. 2d  at 162.
	In this case, Randle's caller ID displayed Williams' name for
each of the 15 to 20 telephone calls from the same woman. We
hold that the reliability of Randle's caller ID was established in
this case. The circumstance of Randle's caller ID, with the other
circumstances described in defendant's offer of proof, provided a
sufficient foundation for Randle's testimony regarding the content
of the telephone conversations. Its exclusion constituted error.
	However, this error was harmless because there was other
evidence of Williams' jealousy and animosity toward
Montgomery. Indeed, Montgomery herself testified that she had
verbal and physical altercations with Williams. Thus, there was
testimony to corroborate Williams' jealousy and threats at the time
of Randle's telephone conversations. Therefore, any error was
harmless. See Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d  at 318-20.



C. Iacullo's Excluded Hearsay Statements
	The arrest of defendant and Williams led police to question
Iacullo. She gave statements to police on November 18, 1995, and
several times thereafter, which included the following. Early on
November 17, Williams arrived at Iacullo's house with a baby.
The baby's umbilical cord was dripping blood, so Iacullo gave
Williams gauze and tape. Williams was wearing a light-colored
shirt that had blood on it and she had a fresh cut on her hand.
Williams gave Iacullo Edwards' Grambling Tigers starter jacket
and told her to give it to defendant as a "new daddy present."
Iacullo drove Williams to Williams' house. There, Iacullo showed
defendant the baby and said "surprise, Baby Fedell, Jr." Iacullo
also gave the jacket to defendant. Also, at Williams' behest,
Iacullo prepared a false birth certificate and gave it to Williams
outside of defendant's presence.
	The State charged Iacullo with obstruction of justice relating
to her involvement in these crimes. Invoking the fifth amendment,
she refused to testify on defendant's behalf. The trial court
excluded Iacullo's statements.



1
	Defendant argues that Iacullo's statements fell within the
statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.
Generally, an unsworn extrajudicial declaration that the
declarant committed the crime, and not the defendant on trial,
is inadmissible hearsay, even though the declaration is against
the declarant's penal interest. People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58,
66 (1986). However, where constitutional rights that directly
affect the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule
may not be mechanically applied to defeat the ends of justice.
Therefore, where hearsay testimony bears persuasive assurances
of trustworthiness and is critical to the accused's defense, its
exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with
due process. People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 215-16 (1996),
citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 313, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973). Such testimony may be
admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception
to the hearsay rule. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 66. Chambers
established four factors to help determine the reliability of a
hearsay statement: (1) the statement was spontaneously made
to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the
statement is corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement
is self-incriminating and against the declarant's interests; and
(4) there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the
declarant. Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048-49. The presence of all four factors is not
a condition of admissibility. Rather, the question to be
considered in deciding the admissibility of such an extrajudicial
statement is whether it was made under circumstances which
provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective
indicia of trustworthiness. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d  at 216.
	Iacullo's statements were not made under circumstances that
provide considerable assurance of reliability. The first Chambers
factor was not established. Iacullo's statements were neither
spontaneous nor made to a close acquaintance.
	Defendant cites to People v. Rivera, 915 F.2d 280, 282 (7th
Cir. 1990), where a federal appeals court referred to the first
Chambers factor as a "silly" reason or excluding a third party's
confession. Regardless of that court's opinion of the first
Chambers factor, in passing on federal constitutional questions,
this court is bound only by decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on
state courts, except insofar as the decision of the lower federal
court may become the law of the case. People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 293-94 (1989). Illinois courts have affirmed the
exclusion of hearsay based, in part, upon the fact that the
statements were made to the police rather than to a close
acquaintance. See, e.g., Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d  at 216; People v.
Black, 80 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121 (1980) (spontaneous admissions to
friend or confidant more likely reliable than calculated statements
made to a police officer).
	Also, Rivera, as well as People v. Anderson, 291 Ill. App. 3d
843 (1997), and People v. Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1000
(1986), to which defendant also cites, are distinguishable from this
case. In each of those cases, the hearsay statement was an actual
confession to the same crime for which that defendant was
charged, and there was no indication that the declarant was
attempting to limit his own liability. Rivera, 915 F.2d  at 281;
Anderson, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 847; Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d at
1017. The statements by the declarants in those cases were more
likely to be trustworthy because their confessions, in which they
did not implicate others, would clearly not benefit them and, in
fact, would possibly lead to criminal prosecution. Kokoraleis, 149
Ill. App. 3d at 1020-21, citing Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 301, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 312, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048; Anderson, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 851.
	However, in the present case, Iacullo's statements did not
constitute a confession to the same crimes for which defendant
was charged, nor was it a confession in which she implicated
others. Iacullo's statements indicated that Williams gave Iacullo
the jacket and told her to give it to defendant; that Iacullo and
Williams drove together to Williams' home where Iacullo showed
the baby to defendant; and that Williams was also involved in the
preparation of the false birth certificate. The indicia of
trustworthiness reflected by the first Chambers factor are not
present.
	The second Chambers factor was established. There is
evidence to corroborate Iacullo's statements.
	The third Chambers factor was not established. Whether a
statement is actually against the declarant's interest must be
determined from the circumstances of each case. For example, a
statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made
while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor
with the authorities and, accordingly, fail to qualify as against
interest. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 601-02,
129 L. Ed. 2d 476, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1994) (interpreting
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)).
	In this case, almost all of Iacullo's statements were not self-incriminating and against her interests. There is no crime in:
allowing into one's home a friend who claims to have just given
birth; helping to bandage a baby; driving that friend to her home
and presenting the baby to the alleged father; or giving someone
a jacket. While Iacullo's statement regarding the false birth
certificate was somewhat self-incriminating, it was not against her
interest. Rather, it was against the interests of Williams. The
statement implicated Williams as the central figure. According to
the statement, it was Williams who initiated the quest for the false
paperwork.
	The fourth Chambers factor is not established. Invoking the
fifth amendment, Iacullo was not available for cross-examination
by the State. "Although general practice is to speak loosely of
unavailability of the witness, the critical factor is actually the
unavailability of the witness' testimony. Witnesses may be
physically present in court but their testimony nevertheless
unavailable." 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §253, at 127
(5th ed. 1999). "The exercise of privilege to avoid testifying, as in
the case before us, is a classic example of a witness being
available in person but not [the witness'] testimony." Naylor v.
Gronkowski, 9 Ill. App. 3d 302, 306 (1972).
	The unavailability of a witness based on privilege is
recognized at common law (Naylor, 9 Ill. App. 3d at 306) and the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides:
			"(a) Definition of unavailability. 'Unavailability as a
witness' includes situations in which the declarant-
				(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground
of privilege from testifying concerning the subject
matter of the declarant's statement; or
				(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an
order of the court to do so; or
				(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter
of the declarant's statement; or
				(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental
illness or infirmity; or
				(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of
a statement has been unable to procure the declarant's
attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under
subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance
or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
			A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if
exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or
absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying."
	While this court has not adopted Rule 804(a) as an exhaustive
definition of "unavailability" under Illinois law, this court has
embraced the general principles reflected theren:
		"The general thrust of the rule makes clear that
'unavailability' is a narrow concept, subject to a rigorous
standard. The reasons for unavailability which are
acceptable under Federal Rule 804-privilege, persistent
contemptuous refusal to testify, failure of memory, death
or illness, etc.-are substantial and therefore legally
cognizable." People v. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d 501, 509
(1987).
A witness' exercise of a privilege satisfies the requirement of
unavailability. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1). Accordingly, a declarant
who asserts his or her fifth amendment right not to testify is not
available for cross-examination in the context of the fourth
Chambers factor. People v. Swaggirt, 282 Ill. App. 3d 692, 703
(1996) (collecting cases); People v. Carter, 174 Ill. App. 3d 369,
374 (1988); see People v. Rice, 166 Ill. 2d 35, 44 (1995).
	Defendant argues that Iacullo was available for cross-examination, even though she had invoked her fifth amendment
rights, because the State could have granted her immunity. In
People v. Rivera, 260 Ill. App. 3d 984, 992 (1994), the appellate 
court accepted this argument in finding that the fourth Chambers
factor was established in that case:
			"In People v. Ireland (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 616, 621-22, 348 N.E.2d 277, 281-82, this court ruled that the State
had effectively prevented itself from cross-examing a
declarant who invoked the fifth amendment by refusing to
grant the declarant immunity and that the declarant
therefore could not have been held to have been
unavailable. The precedent in Ireland is applicable to the
present case. The State in effect made [the witness]
unavailable by refusing to grant him immunity."
However, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to
compel the State to confer immunity upon a witness who has
exercised his or her privilege against self-incrimination. Carter,
174 Ill. App. 3d at 375, citing United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1974); People v. Cunningham, 130 Ill. App. 3d
254, 264-65 (1984). To the extent that Rivera and Ireland hold to
the contrary, those cases are overruled. We find that the fourth
Chambers factor has not been met.
	Defendant has failed to establish three of the four Chambers
factors. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding Iacullo's hearsay statements because they lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability.



2
	In a related claim, defendant contends that during closing
argument the prosecutor improperly made three remarks regarding
defendant's failure to call Iacullo as a witness, and one remark
regarding Iacullo's race. A prosecutor remarked: "Don't you get
hung up on Vicky [sic] Iacullo. This isn't about her trial because
she is not on trial. This is the defendant's trial. Don't let that red
hearing [sic] throw you off. Her day in court will come." In
rebuttal, a prosecutor remarked:
		"You heard about Dorothy Hale about being involved in
disposing of this gun. What you heard that was just raised
by [defense counsel], what was her motive? You may
never know. You won't know. You didn't hear any
evidence. Why she got involved in this. Vicky [sic]
Iacullo. Why was she involved in this?"
Subsequently, a prosecutor remarked: "Ladies and gentlemen,
based on all the evidence in this case you cannot and you must not
accept that ridiculous ludicrous explanation that Vicky [sic]
Iacullo for reasons we have never been presented for
circumstances that no one can comprehend planted this evidence
on him." Defendant also assigns as prejudicial error the following
remark early in the State's closing argument:
		"Look at what he [defendant] said. *** The actions of the
defendant at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, his statements
and his actions. His girlfriend comes home from just
having a new baby *** . I'm sure you are exhausted. He
packs up, new wife and kid, and drives back to Wheaton
at 3:00 o'clock in the morning to call relatives to come
see them at this third party's house in Wheaton. Well,
that's ridiculous. That's not what a reasonable person
does. And its because he knew he had to legitimize his lie
because the police hadn't been there yet when these things
are happening. His little lie passing off Elijah to the rest
of the world as Fedell, Jr., was still going to happen. What
better way than to have grandma be the witness test [sic]
if we can pass this off to the world. What better way to
legitimize my lies then [sic] to have this third party, white
woman that nobody has ever seen before named Vicky
[sic] be there and help describe this miracle birth ***."
	However, the record shows that defendant's trial counsel
either failed to object at trial to these remarks, or failed to raise
these specific issues in defendant's post-trial motion. This issue is,
therefore, waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186; People v. Jackson, 84 Ill. 2d 350, 358-59 (1981); People v. Buckner, 121 Ill. App. 3d
391, 395 (1984).
	Defendant invokes the plain error exception to the waiver
rule. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Plain error is a limited and narrow
exception to the waiver rule, to be invoked only where the
evidence is so closely balanced that it might be said that the jury's
verdict may have resulted from the error, or the error is so
substantial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. People v.
Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 209-10 (1990); People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77 (1980).
	The plain error exception to the waiver rule does not save this
issue. First, the evidence was not so closely balanced that the
jury's guilty verdict may have resulted from these remarks. We
previously recounted the evidence adduced at trial; we need not
repeat it in detail. While defendant presented an alibi defense at
trial, he does not now contend that the evidence against him was
insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to Scott's testimony, Joshua stated that defendant was
one of the "burglars" who "cut" his mother and sister. Joy Wilson
saw defendant in his automobile with Williams and Ward, who
was wearing bloodstained clothing. Subsequently, Patrice Scott
saw defendant with Elijah and saw defendant brutally kill Joshua.
This eyewitness testimony was corroborated by compelling
circumstantial evidence, including forensic and other physical
evidence. Months prior to the crime, defendant asked Ward
whether he wanted a knife or a gun when Ward said that he
wanted to kill Debra. Defendant participated in the telephone call
to Tina Martin at 3:30 a.m. the morning after the crimes. The
bedsheet stained with Joshua's blood, found in the area of his
body, came from defendant's and Williams' townhouse. At the
time of his arrest, defendant was wearing a jacket that not only
was stolen from Debra's home, but was stained with Elijah's
blood. We cannot say that the jury's guilty verdict would have
been otherwise had the prosecutor not made the challenged
remarks. See, e.g., Jackson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 360; Buckner, 121 Ill.
App. 3d at 396-97.
	Second, the claimed improper remarks were not so substantial
that they deprived defendant of a fair trial. "In reviewing
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the closing arguments of
both the State and the defendant must be examined in their
entirety, and the complained-of remarks must be placed in their
proper context." People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1994).
	A review of the challenged prosecutorial remarks shows that
they were aimed at the lack of evidence regarding Iacullo's and
Hale's involvement in the case generally; the remarks were not
aimed specifically at defendant's failure to call Iacullo as a
witness. See Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 22-23 (State properly kept its
remarks to the "what" of the evidence and did not stray into the
"who" of the issue).
	In any event, the record shows that the defense injected
Iacullo into the trial, by defendant's testimony, and by defense
counsel's opening statement and closing argument. Where
defendant injected Iacullo's name into the case, the prosecutor's
comments regarding the lack of such evidence was not improper.
See People v. Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d 437, 496-98 (1983).
	The prosecutor's reference to a "red herring" was not
reversible error, much less plain error. In the context of this entire
argument, the phrase was an allowable reference to relevance and
credibility. See People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 525 (1989).
	While the prosecutor's reference to Iacullo's race was
unnecessary and potentially offensive, it was not intended to incite
racial prejudice, nor did it have that effect for several reasons.
First, the remark was isolated. The prosecutor did not dwell on the
issue of race. This remark is distinguishable from prosecutorial
arguments condemned in cases such as People v. Lurry, 77 Ill.
App. 3d 108, 113-14 (1979). Second, the trial court instructed the
jury that it was to consider only the evidence and not counsels'
remarks, and also instructed the jury that it could not be influenced
by race. We cannot say that the guilty verdict would likely have
been different had the prosecutor not made the remark. See, e.g.,
People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 543-44 (1990); People v.
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 199 (1986). Accordingly, we find no
plain error, and defendant's procedural default of this issue is not
excused.
	We note defendant's alternative assertion that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to
preserve this issue for review. To demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) the
attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) the attorney's deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. Because the defendant must satisfy both
prongs of this test, the failure to establish either is fatal to the
claim. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 699, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2069 (1984).
	In this case, we can dispose of defendant's assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel on the "prejudice" prong alone.
We have concluded that the challenged remarks did not constitute
reversible error. The trial court would have rightfully rejected any
defense challenge to the remarks. Consequently, had defendant's
counsel brought these alleged errors to the attention of the trial
court, the result would have been no different than the effect of his
failure to do so. This purported ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel did not prejudice defendant. See, e.g., People v. Kuntu,
196 Ill. 2d 105, 129-30 (2001); People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301,
332 (1998). In sum, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding these hearsay statements.


II. Admissible Hearsay Statements: Iacullo and Hale
	Defendant next points to hearsay statements made by Iacullo
and Hale that the trial court ruled would be admissible. Defendant
claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when
his trial counsel failed to introduce these various statements at
trial.
	The hearsay statements included the following. Ryan Berger
could have testified that on November 16, 1995, a few hours prior
to Debra's murder, Iacullo asked him how to clean fingerprints off
a gun. Also, between midnight and 4 a.m. on November 17,
Iacullo telephoned Berger, asking him how to clean powder burns
off her hand. Patricia Mitchell could have testified that Iacullo told
her that Iacullo saw a gun under the front seat of Iacullo's car and
was concerned that her fingerprints might be on that gun.
	David Drenk could have testified that in the early fall of 1995,
Iacullo asked him to loan her a gun. One day to one week prior to
these crimes, Iacullo asked Drenk if he could obtain a false birth
certificate and he said no. On November 16, 1995, Drenk was at
Iacullo's apartment and saw Williams there. On November 17,
Iacullo asked Drenk for help in obtaining a birth certificate. On
November 18, Iacullo told Drenk that she would alter a birth
certificate by whiting out information and making a photocopy
with the false information. A few days subsequent to these crimes,
Iacullo told Drenk that she was going to throw the gun in the Fox
River. Iacullo told Hale to get cleaner from under the kitchen sink
to wipe fingerprints off a gun.
	Lastly, Detective Joseph Lullo could have testified that he
interviewed Hale on December 1, 1995. She told him that on
November 26, Iacullo told Hale to use vinegar and a cloth diaper
to wipe fingerprints off a gun, six bullets, and a magazine.
	Defendant characterizes these hearsay statements as
exculpatory, or at least corroborative of the defense theory of the
case. He contends that his trial counsel's failure to present them
was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial.
	We can dispose of this assertion on the prejudice prong of
Strickland alone. None of these hearsay statements exclude
defendant from participating in these crimes. At most, they
implicate Iacullo and Hale in the planning or cover up of these
crimes. Implicating Iacullo and Hale does not exculpate defendant,
or diminish the strong evidence of defendant's active participation
in these crimes. Further, the jury knew that Iacullo and Hale were
involved with the gun and the birth certificate. Accordingly,
defendant suffered no prejudice in terms of Strickland. See, e.g.,
People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 431-34 (1999); People v. Ward,
187 Ill. 2d 249, 257-58 (1999).



III. Joshua's Hearsay Statements
	Prior to trial, the State petitioned the trial court to admit
Joshua's out-of-court statements under the statutory hearsay
exception for child declarants found at section 115-10 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West
1994). The State also offered the statements under the spontaneous
declaration exception to the hearsay rule. At the close of a pretrial
hearing on the petition, the trial court found that all of the
statements were admissible under section 115-10. The court also
found that, except for his denial that he took medication, Joshua's
statements were also admissible under the common law
spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.
	Defendant contends that: Joshua's statements were not
admissible (A) under section 115-10 or (B) as spontaneous
declarations; and (C) the trial court failed to instruct the jury
regarding the use of section 115-10 statements. This court recently
discussed this issue in the direct appeal from Williams' trial. We
need only refer to that decision.



A. Section 115-10
	Applying an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's
ruling (see Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 342-44), we agree with the trial
court that Joshua's statements were admissible under section
115-10. They conform to section 115-10(a)(2) (725 ILCS
5/115-10(a)(2) (West 1994)) because Joshua related an act,
matter, or detail pertaining to an act that was an element of an
offense committed against Joshua. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at
344-49. Also, the time, content and circumstances of Joshua's
statements provided sufficient safeguards of reliability to permit
their introduction under section 115-10. In so finding, the trial
court considered and weighed the credibility of the witnesses at the
hearing and was in the best position to do so. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 349-51. For the reasons discussed in our disposition of
Williams' appeal, we also reject defendant's argument that
Joshua's identification of defendant as one of the "burglars" was
unreliable.



B. Spontaneous Declaration
	The trial court correctly decided that Joshua's statements
about the events in the Evans apartment were admissible under the
spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. We reject
defendant's argument that "so much time had passed that the
excitement of the events had dissipated." See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 
at 352-56.



C. Jury Instruction
	Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury as required by section 115-10(c), which provides:
			"If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the
court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to
determine the weight and credibility to be given the
statement and that, in making the determination, it shall
consider the age and maturity of the child, *** the nature
of the statement, the circumstances under which the
statement was made, and any other relevant factor." 725
ILCS 5/115-10(c) (West 1994).
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 11.66 (3d ed. 1992)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d) tracks this statutory language.
	In this case, as in Williams, Joshua's statements about the
events in the Evans apartment were admissible under the
spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, as well as
under section 115-10. IPI Criminal 3d No. 11.66 is not required
when statements are admitted under the spontaneous declaration
exception. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's failure
to give this instruction did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. See
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 356-58.
IV. Prior Consistent Statements
	Defendant next contends that the trial court erroneously
admitted prior consistent statements that improperly bolstered the
testimony of (A) Scott and (B) Pruitt. Evidence of statements
made prior to trial for the purpose of corroborating testimony at
trial is inadmissible unless it has been suggested that the witness
recently fabricated testimony or has a motive to testify falsely and
the prior statement was made before the motive arose. People v.
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 310 (1990); People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501 (1983). The prejudicial nature of evidence of prior
consistent statements is judged on a case-by-case basis.
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 311. These evidentiary rulings are within
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d  at 296.



A. Scott
	Defendant claims that Scott's testimony was improperly
bolstered in three ways. None of these assertions warrant reversal.
	First, Scott testified that she was in the laundry room at
defendant's and Williams' house shortly before she saw defendant
and Williams kill Joshua. A prosecutor asked Scott whether she
heard Williams say anything to defendant about what Joshua said.
Scott answered: "She said that he talked too much and that he
knows their names. He named her, Fedell and Vern."
	The record shows that defendant's trial counsel neither
objected to this testimony nor included this issue in defendant's
post-trial motion. Therefore, the issue is waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186.
	Defendant's invocation of the plain error exception to the
waiver rule is unavailing. As we previously discussed, the
evidence at trial was not so closely balanced that the jury's guilty
verdicts may have resulted from this alleged error. Further, after
reviewing the record, we cannot say that this statement deprived
defendant of a fair trial.
	Second, defendant contends that he was prejudiced when
Detective David Wall gave allegedly unresponsive and incorrect
testimony. On November 18, Detective Wall conducted a tape-recorded interview of Scott. At that interview, Scott said that
Joshua named as the burglars only Williams and Ward; she did not
tell Wall that Joshua named defendant. At trial, during cross-examination of Scott, the defense attempted to impeach her with
that statement. The defense subsequently called Detective Wall as
part of its case. During his testimony, Wall referred to the
transcript of the November 18 interview of Scott. Defense counsel
asked Wall: "And who did Patrice say to you Joshua said to her
was at the apartment?" Wall answered: "Three people: Verne,
Annette and Fedell." Attempting to elicit the correct answer,
defense counsel again asked Wall what Scott had said about who
Joshua had named. Wall answered: "Directly he gave two names.
He knew the name Verne, and he knew the name Annette.
Indirectly later in this statement she gives us Fedell." Defendant
contends that these answers "left the jury with the impression that
during the interview Scott said that Joshua had named Fedell,
which was simply not true."
	Defendant's trial counsel did not object in any way to these
inaccurate statements. Accordingly, the issue is waived. Enoch,
122 Ill. 2d  at 186; Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d  at 576.
	Defendant's invocation of the plain error exception to the
waiver rule is unavailing. The evidence at trial was not so closely
balanced that the jury's guilty verdicts may have resulted from this
error. Also, we cannot say that this excerpt from Wall's testimony
denied defendant a fair trial. Directly after Wall's incorrect
testimony, the following exchange occurred:
			"Q. Did Patrice Scott ever say to you that Joshua Evans
said that Annette, Verne and Fedell were at the apartment
directly?
			A. Not-she did not directly give us Fedell's name.
			Q. She said Verne and Annette; is that correct?
			A. Yes."
We find no plain error.
	Third, defendant claims that Scott's testimony was improperly
bolstered with a prior statement from her November 18 interview
that defendant stabbed Joshua. As noted earlier, defense counsel
attempted to impeach Scott with that interview. Counsel asked
Scott whether she told police "the name Fedell on November
18th." Scott responded that she could not remember. On redirect
examination, the trial court allowed the State to elicit Scott's prior
consistent statement from the interview that defendant stabbed
Joshua.
	The trial court found that defense counsel's question may
have left the jury with the misimpression that Scott had not
mentioned defendant at all during the November 18 interview. We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
State to rebut that inference.



B. Pruitt
	Defendant claims that Pruitt's testimony was improperly
bolstered in two ways. Neither assertion warrants reversal.
	First, on November 17, 1995, Pruitt did not tell any of the
police officers who questioned him that he had heard Joshua name
the "burglars." At trial, Pruitt testified on direct examination that
he overheard Joshua say that four burglars came into his home,
whose names were Annette, Vern, a name that sounded like Adelle
or Ladelle, and a fourth name that Pruitt could not understand. On
cross-examination, defense counsel impeached Pruitt with his
November 17 omission to police. On the State's redirect
examination, over defense objection, Pruitt testified that during an
interview on November 18, he told police that Joshua named four
burglars, including one whose name sounded like "Vadelle,
Adelle, Ladelle."
	Defendant has waived this issue for review. Defense counsel,
in re-cross-examination, further questioned Pruitt regarding his
contact with police on November 17 and the police interview on
November 18. Counsel attempted to raise the inference that Pruitt
may have consulted with Scott prior to the November 18
interview. When a defendant objects to certain testimony on direct
examination, but then questions the witness on cross-examination
concerning that allegedly inadmissible testimony, any error is
waived for purposes of appeal. See People v. Hernandez, 229 Ill.
App. 3d 546, 558 (1992); People v. Bost, 80 Ill. App. 3d 933, 951-52 (1980); People v. Lewis, 75 Ill. App. 3d 259, 287 (1979).
Further, after reviewing the record, we conclude that this issue
does not warrant our consideration under the plain error doctrine.
	Second, without defense objection, the State played to the jury
a tape recording of Pruitt's 911 call to police. The State did not
provide a reason for its admission, and the trial court did not give
the jury a limiting instruction concerning a nonhearsay purpose.
Defendant concedes that the 911 call was admissible for
nonhearsay purposes. See, e.g., Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 312-13.
However, defendant contends that reversible error occurred when
the trial court failed to give the jury a limiting instruction "and
when the prosecutor used the evidence substantively in closing
argument to prove the truth of the matter asserted during the call
and to bolster Pruitt's in-court testimony."
	We cannot accept this contention. When a prosecutor asked
permission to play the tape and distribute transcripts to the jury,
the trial court called for a sidebar. The court specifically asked
defendant's trial counsel if there were any response to the State's
request, and counsel replied: "No objection, Judge." Thus, the
record shows that defendant acquiesced in the admission of this
evidence. When a party procures, invites, or acquiesces in the
admission of evidence, even though the evidence is improper, that
party cannot contest the admission on appeal. People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 50 (1983) (and cases cited therein); accord People v.
Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 571 (2000).



V. Testimony Regarding Soiled Clothing
	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in excluding
Susan Doelker's testimony that she found soiled clothing in the
laundry room of Scott's apartment building soon after the crimes.
The following was adduced at a separate hearing outside the
presence of the jury. Doelker lived in the same apartment building
as Scott. On November 17, 1995, or November 20, she saw
clothing in a garbage can in the laundry room. She found, inter
alia, a black hooded sweatshirt, one pair of men's jeans, and one
pair of women's jeans. On the clothing was a slimy, colorless fluid
that smelled bad. The women's jeans had blood on the inside of
the crotch area, but did not have blood on the outside of them.
	The trial court ruled that Doelker could testify about the black
hooded sweatshirt because there had been testimony that the
possible offenders wore hooded sweatshirts. However, the court
found that evidence regarding both pairs of the jeans were not
relevant and, therefore, inadmissible.
	The controlling principles are settled:
		" 'The test of the admissibility of evidence is whether it
fairly tends to prove the particular offense charged'
[citation], and whether what is offered as evidence will be
admitted or excluded depends upon whether it tends to
make the question of guilt more or less probable; i.e.,
whether it is relevant [citation]. A trial court may reject
offered evidence on grounds of irrelevancy if it has little
probative value due to its remoteness, uncertainty or its
possibly unfair prejudicial nature. [Citations.] The
admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and its ruling should not be reversed absent
a clear showing of abuse of that discretion." Ward, 101 Ill. 2d  at 455-56.
	According to defendant: "It is reasonable to infer that the
clothes Doelker found belonged to Ward and Williams."
Defendant reasons: "The judge found that the hooded sweatshirt
was sufficiently connected to the crime. The other clothes were
found with the sweatshirt; thus, they must have been left there by
the same person."
	We agree with the State that this argument reaches too far for
many reasons. The clear, slimy fluid may not have been associated
with pregnancy or birth; it could have been any number of other
smelly liquids. Further, there was no testimony that the pair of
men's jeans had blood on them. However, Joy Wilson saw Ward
wearing bloodstained pants; she never said anything regarding a
clear, slimy, smelly liquid. Also, the pair of women's jeans had
blood only on the inside crotch area. Blood that came from Debra
or Elijah would have been on the outside of the criminal's pants.
Lastly, the clothing was not sufficiently connected to Scott. It
could have been put there by anyone. There was no testimony that
the laundry room was ever locked. We conclude that the
connections between the jeans and the crime and between the
jeans and Scott were so remote and speculative that the trial court
could find that Doelker's testimony would have little probative
value.
	Defendant adds that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence
was particularly prejudicial because his trial counsel told the jury
in his opening statement that they would hear evidence regarding
soiled clothes found in Scott's laundry room-but the jury did not.
However, the trial court ruled that Doelker could testify regarding
the hooded sweatshirt. Defendant's trial counsel chose not to offer
her testimony regarding that item. Thus, it cannot be said the trial
court's ruling prejudiced defendant. We cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence.



VI. Witness-Accomplice Instruction: Scott
	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on Scott's testimony as an accomplice. At the
jury instruction conference, defendant tendered the pattern
accomplice-witness instruction: "When a witness says he was
involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the
testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be
considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined
in light of the other evidence in the case." IPI Criminal 3d No.
3.17. The trial court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant the instruction.
	The test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice
for purposes of the accomplice witness instruction is whether there
is probable cause to believe that the witness was guilty of the
offense at issue as a principal, or as an accessory under an
accountability theory. Thus, an accomplice witness instruction
should be given to a jury if all the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom establish probable cause to believe not
merely that the witness was present and failed to disapprove of the
crime, but that the witness participated in the planning or
commission of the crime. If probable cause is established, the
instruction should be given despite the witness' protestations that
he or she did not so participate. A reviewing court will not
overturn a trial court's refusal to give an accomplice witness
instruction absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 541 (2000); People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 144-45
(1998).
	In this case, defendant argues that Scott could have been
charged with Joshua's murder on an accountability theory.
However, the trial court found that the evidence did not show
probable cause to believe that Scott was guilty of these offenses,
either as a principal or as an accessory. Our review of the record
supports that finding.
	There is no evidence that Scott participated in the planning or
commission of Joshua's murder. Defendant points to evidence that
Joshua: stated that Williams was one of the burglars who "cut" his
mother and sister; and vomited after Williams gave him
"medicine" that he claimed he did not take. However, we see no
reason to reject the trial court's reasoning that Scott had no reason
to disbelieve her friend Williams, who said that Joshua, whom
Scott had just met, was lying, and that he was on medication.
	Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to render
one liable for the acts of another. A person conscious that a crime
is being committed in his or her presence will not be held
accountable merely for failing to oppose or stop the crime. People
v. Jones, 86 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282 (1980); People v. Tillman, 130
Ill. App. 2d 743, 750 (1971). Rather, an accomplice must take
some part, perform some act, or owe some duty to the person in
danger that makes it incumbent on him or her to prevent the
commission of the crime. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 314. There is
evidence in the record that, at most, makes Scott an accessory to
these crimes after the fact. However, the accomplice witness
instruction need not be given where the witness was not involved
in any way until after the commission of the crime. People v.
Turner, 92 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268 (1980) (and cases cited therein).
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
the accomplice witness instruction regarding Scott's testimony.



VII. Cumulative Error
	Defendant next contends that even if no individual error
warrants reversal of his conviction, the cumulative effect of the
previously alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
We have rejected all but one of defendant's claims of error at the
guilt phase of his trial. We have concluded either that no error
occurred at all, or any error that may have occurred did not rise to
the level of plain error. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a
new trial on the basis of cumulative error. See, e.g., People v.
Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 350-51 (2000).



Eligibility Phase
VIII. Jury Instructions
	The jury, in separate death-eligibility verdicts, found beyond
a reasonable doubt the presence of seven statutory aggravating
factors. Defendant now challenges five of these verdicts,
complaining of language in their correlative jury instructions. He
claims that he is entitled to a new death sentencing hearing.
	However, any error in the five jury instructions did not
deprive defendant of a fair death sentencing hearing. Two death-eligibility verdicts remain, based on the statutory aggravating
factor that Joshua was killed in the course of another felony (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)) and that Joshua was killed to
prevent him from giving material assistance to the State (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(8) (West 1994)). Defendant does not complain of their
correlative jury instructions. It is settled that the Illinois death
penalty statute does not place special emphasis on any single
aggravating factor and does not accord any added significance to
multiple aggravating factors as opposed to a single aggravating
factor. The finding of a statutory aggravating factor at the
eligibility phase serves to narrow the class of persons who may be
sentenced to death; once one such factor is proved, the defendant
is eligible, regardless of whether other factors have been proved.
Thus, where a defendant is found eligible based upon two or more
statutory aggravating factors, the fact that one of those factors may
later be invalidated will not generally impair the eligibility finding
as long as a separate valid aggravating factor supported eligibility.
People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 164-65 (1996); accord Williams,
193 Ill. 2d at 362-63; People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 268-69
(1993).
	We likewise reject defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel argument. Even had defense counsel brought the alleged
errors pertaining to the five death-eligibility verdicts to the
attention of the trial court, two such verdicts remained. Thus, the
result would have been no different from the effect of his failure
to act. This purported ineffective assistance of his trial counsel did
not prejudice defendant. See, e.g., Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 320-22.
	Defendant additionally argues: "Because it cannot be
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's erroneous
consideration of five out of seven statutory aggravating factors did
not contribute to the jury's verdict, [defendant's] death sentence
should be vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing
hearing." We disagree. Resentencing is necessary where the
sentencer, at the penalty phase of the death sentencing hearing,
might have considered an aggravating factor that was not
supported by the evidence. Assuming arguendo that five death-eligibility factors were invalid, the jury was, nevertheless, entitled
to consider any aggravating evidence, including defendant's same
conduct, in determining defendant's sentence. The elimination of
those statutory aggravating factors did not reduce that evidence.
An error in those jury instructions did not diminish the weight of
the evidence to support defendant's death eligibility under sections
9-1(b)(6) and 9-1(b)(8) of the death penalty statute. See, e.g.,
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 321-22; People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133,
188-90 (1992).



IX. Eligibility Verdict Forms: Sections 9-1(b)(6), (b)(8)
	Defendant next contends that each of the seven death-eligibility verdict forms set forth some, but not all, of the elements
of the relevant statutory aggravating factor. Defendant does not
question the propriety of the jury instructions for the death-eligibility verdicts based on sections 9-1(b)(6) and (b)(8) of the
death penalty statute. Thus, we need examine only those two
verdict forms. Defendant would remain eligible for the death
penalty under these two statutory aggravating factors, even if the
other statutory aggravating factors were invalid. See People v.
Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 102-03 (1996).
	The record shows that defendant has waived this issue for
review because his trial counsel failed to offer alternative verdict
forms, or at least object to the forms that defendant now
challenges, or include the issue in a post-sentencing motion.
Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d at 134-35; Redd, 173 Ill. 2d  at 41. However,
defendant invokes the doctrine of plain error. 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(c).
We hold that the verdict forms under review did not omit the
required elements for death eligibility under sections 9-1(b)(6) and
(b)(8). Accordingly, we find no plain error. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 364, citing Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17.
	The death-eligibility verdict form for statutory aggravating
factor 9-1(b)(6) stated that the jury found, inter alia, that "Joshua
Evans was killed in the course of another felony as set forth in
paragraph [4] of the Second Proposition concerning the First
Degree Murder of Joshua Evans." The death-eligibility verdict
form for the statutory aggravating factor 9-1(b)(8) stated that the
jury found, inter alia, that "Joshua Evans was killed to prevent
Joshua Evans from giving material assistance to the State, as set
forth in paragraph [3] of the Second Proposition concerning the
First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans."
	Defendant argues that each verdict form is deficient because
it omits the required element of defendant's mental state for the
offense. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6), (b)(8) (West 1994). In People
v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), this court held that where a verdict
purports to set out the elements of the offense as specific findings,
it must do so completely or be held insufficient. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 538. The Mack court concluded that the verdict form at issue
was defective because it attempted to set forth a statutory
aggravating factor, but did so incompletely by omitting the mental
state element under section 9-1(b)(6). See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at
364-65 (discussing Mack).
	We cannot accept defendant's argument. The test of the
sufficiency of a verdict is whether the intention of the jury can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty from the language used. In
determining the meaning of a verdict, all parts of the record will
be searched and interpreted together. People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 361 (1997), citing People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 537
(1995). Here, each verdict form expressly directed the jury to the
form's corresponding instruction, of which defendant does not
complain, which completely and accurately sets forth all of the
elements of the statutory aggravating factor. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 362-68. By referring to "paragraph [4] of the Second
Proposition concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans,"
the felony-murder eligibility verdict form in defendant's case
incorporated the necessary elements under section 9-1(b)(6),
including the required mental state and defendant's infliction of
injuries on Joshua. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 368. The same
applies to the eligibility verdict form for aggravating factor
9-1(b)(8).
	We concluded in Williams' appeal:
			"As a result, unlike Mack, a conclusion in defendant's
case that the jury found the necessary elements under
section 9-1(b)(6) need not be based on speculation. When
we consider the verdict forms in the context of the record
in defendant's case, we can conclude with reasonable
certainty that the jury found these elements. Accordingly,
we hold that defendant was properly found eligible for the
death penalty based on the felony-murder statutory
aggravating factor premised on Joshua's murder."
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 368.
This conclusion applies to defendant in this case, as to both
statutory aggravating factors 9-1(b)(6) and 9-1(b)(8).
	Since we find no error at all in these two death-eligibility
verdict forms, additional contentions of defendant necessarily fail.
First, defendant was independently eligible for the death penalty
on the grounds that he killed Joshua in the course of another
felony, and that he murdered Joshua to prevent him from giving
material assistance to the State. Thus, the jury's reliance on any
other aggravating factors did not affect its finding that defendant
was eligible for the death penalty. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 368;
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 321; People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321,
345-46 (1989). Second, the jury's consideration of any other
aggravating factor at the penalty phase of the death sentencing
hearing did not require resentencing. See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at
368-73; Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 321-22; Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d  at
347. Third, defendant was not prejudiced in terms of Strickland.
See, e.g., People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63, 107-08 (2000).
Penalty Phase
X. Failure to Present Mitigation Evidence
	Defendant next claims that he did not receive effective
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of the death sentencing
hearing. He contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate and
present certain mitigation evidence.
	The familiar Strickland test is composed of two prongs:
deficiency and prejudice. First, the defendant must prove that
counsel erred so seriously and performed so deficiently that he or
she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. A court measures counsel's performance by an
objective standard of competence under prevailing professional
norms. To establish deficiency, the defendant must overcome the
strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction might
have been the result of sound trial strategy. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). Accordingly, counsel's strategic choices,
made after investigating the law and the facts, are virtually
unchallengeable. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 413
(2000).
	Second, the defendant must establish prejudice. The defendant
must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The prejudice
prong of Strickland entails more than an "outcome-determinative"
test. The defendant must show that counsel's deficient
performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the
proceeding fundamentally unfair. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 411.
	In this case, defendant refers to the record of Ward's trial.
Ward and Wesley Rozema were incarcerated in the Du Page
County jail. They met and spoke of their respective predicaments.
Rozema testified that Ward made inculpatory statements. Ward
specifically told Rozema that he and two "rappies" committed the
crimes. According to Rozema, a "rappie" is "someone that shares
the rap with you, like a codefendant." Ward identified his rappies
as Williams and a friend. According to Rozema, Ward confessed
that he shot Debra in the head and stabbed Samantha, and
Williams cut Elijah out of Debra's stomach.
	Defendant now argues that his trial counsel was
constitutionally deficient for failing to present Rozema's testimony
at the penalty phase of the death sentencing hearing. According to
defendant, this testimony "was significant mitigating evidence that
lessened [defendant's] culpability since it showed he did not inflict
any injuries on two decedents."
	However, assuming that trial counsel was deficient under the
first prong of Strickland, defendant must still show prejudice
under the second prong. In the context of a death sentencing
hearing, a defendant must prove that there is a reasonable
probability that, absent counsel's deficient conduct, the sentencer
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 403 (1998); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 87 (1997). A court must assess prejudice realistically based on
the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, it is improper to focus
solely on the potential mitigating evidence. Rather, a court must
also consider the nature and extent of the evidence in aggravation.
Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 416.
	In this case, the State never presented evidence that defendant
had personally harmed Debra or Samantha. Yet the jury
nonetheless determined that defendant should receive the death
penalty. Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that, had
defendant's trial counsel presented Rozema's testimony, the jury
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.



XI. Limitation of Mitigation Testimony
	Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly
limited the direct examination of Dr. Savarese. We will consider
this issue, even though defendant failed to include it in his post-trial motion, because the issue concerns a constitutional right and
defendant raised the issue at trial. See McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d at
99-100; Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 10.
	To meet constitutional standards, a capital sentencing hearing
must allow for individualized consideration of the offender and the
offense. In conjunction with this requirement, the sentencer in a
capital case may not be precluded from considering, or refuse to
consider as a matter of law, any relevant mitigation evidence
offered by the defense. Allowing the sentencer to consider all
relevant mitigation evidence satisfies the requirement of
individualized sentencing in capital cases. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 454 (1993).
	Accordingly, the ordinary rules of evidence are relaxed at the
aggravation/mitigation stage of a capital sentencing hearing. This
is necessary because it is important that the sentencer possess the
fullest information possible with respect to the defendant's life,
character, criminal record, and the circumstances of the particular
offense. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 171 (1998); People v.
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 236 (1993). As a result, the only
requirement for the admissibility of evidence at this stage of a
capital sentencing hearing is that the evidence be relevant and
reliable. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 236. This determination rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d  at
20-21 (and cases cited therein); People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109,
152 (1991).
	After hearing an offer of proof regarding his testimony, the
trial court went through Dr. Savarese's written evaluation and
ruled on what subjects to which he could and could not testify. The
court ruled that Dr. Savarese could not testify regarding the
psychiatric hospitalizations of defendant's grandmother, Winifred,
that occurred prior to defendant's birth. Dr. Savarese also was not
allowed to testify regarding the schizophrenic behavior of
defendant's mother unless defendant was exposed to such
behavior. Finally, the court ruled that because Dr. Savarese was
not a psychiatrist, he could not testify to anything that appeared to
be a diagnosis.
	We note that we have previously upheld similar limitations on
Dr. Savarese's testimony. See People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 152-54 (1998). Additionally, the jury heard much of the
excluded information from defendant's other mitigation witnesses,
rendering the excluded testimony of Dr. Savarese merely
cumulative. See People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 50-51 (1996). We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in making these
relevancy determinations. See Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d  at 152.



XII. Mercy
	Defendant claims that four errors occurred at the penalty
phase of the death sentencing hearing that restricted the jury's
consideration of mercy as a mitigating factor. Mercy is a relevant
factor for consideration at a death sentencing hearing, to be
considered within the context of all factors in aggravation and
mitigation. People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 46-47 (1995). Defendant
suggests that we should review each purported error de novo.
However, for the reasons stated below, we reject this assertion.



A. Mitigation Testimony
	First, defendant contends that the trial court improperly
limited the mitigation testimony of defendant's great aunt Sonia
Glover. The determination of whether this evidence is relevant and
reliable, and hence admissible, lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court. See People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 171 (1998);
People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 62 (1995).
	Defendant's trial counsel asked Glover: "Ma'am, are you
asking-are you asking the jury to consider mercy for [defendant]?"
The State objected, and the trial court held a brief sidebar. The
court reasoned: "How is this not an appeal for a specific sentence?
This is an issue before the jury and a question for them to decide."
The court sustained the objection.
	We agree with the trial court. A witness' opinion that a
defendant should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a
death sentencing hearing. The decision of whether to impose the
death penalty rests with the sentencing authority. The testimony of
aggravation or mitigation witnesses concerning the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the offender is relevant to the
sentencer's decision. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103,
158 (1991), adopting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (victim impact evidence
admissible). However, the opinions of witnesses regarding what
sentence should be imposed are not. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 162.
"Such opinions are not evidence and therefore are irrelevant and
inadmissible." People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 70 (1994).
Moreover, the sustaining of this objection in no way told
defendant's trial counsel that he could not argue for mercy or told
the jury that it could not consider mercy. We cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion.



B. Jury Instruction
	Second, defendant contends that the trial court improperly
refused his tendered nonpattern jury instruction regarding mercy.
If the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal (3d ed. 1992)
(hereafter IPI Criminal 3d), contain an applicable instruction on a
subject about which the trial court determines the jury should be
instructed, the trial court must use that instruction, unless the court
determines that the instruction does not accurately state the law.
134 Ill. 2d R. 451(a). The decision whether to give a nonpattern
instruction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. A
trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a
nonpattern instruction if the subject matter of the refused
nonpattern instruction is covered by a pattern instruction or other
given instructions. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 232-33 (1999);
People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 519 (1996).
	Defendant tendered the following nonpattern jury instruction:
"Mercy is a proper non-statutory mitigating factor that the jury
may consider as a reason why the defendant should not be
sentenced to death." However, the jury received IPI Criminal 3d
No. 7C.06, of which defendant does not complain. That pattern
instruction reads in part: "Mitigating factors include: *** Any
other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should
not be sentenced to death." This court has repeatedly held that
mercy is one such "other reason[ ]." People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1992); People v. Lear, 143 Ill. 2d 138, 151 (1991). This
pattern instruction permitted the jury to consider mercy, and,
therefore, no additional specific instruction concerning this
nonstatutory mitigating factor was necessary. See, e.g., Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 235.
	Additionally, defendant was allowed to present mitigation
evidence, and, as we will next discuss, defendant's trial counsel
argued for mercy in his closing argument. Thus, the jury was in a
position to consider mercy, or any other mitigating factor, as it saw
fit. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 198-99 (1996). We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
defendant's nonpattern instruction.



C. Closing Argument: Defense
	Third, defendant contends that the trial court restricted his
trial counsel's closing argument regarding mercy. The regulation
of the substance and style of closing argument lies within the trial
court's discretion; the court's determination of the propriety of the
remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995); People v. Ramey,
151 Ill. 2d 498, 554 (1992).
	In his closing argument, defendant's trial counsel argued for
mercy. During his remarks, the following colloquy occurred:
			"If you decide in this case that you should dispense
mercy, it isn't because he deserves it. It's because you
have decided that's what you want to do. That's within
your conscience. That's within your morality. It isn't
about deserving. But mercy is blessed about two times
over. It's blessed to the giver and it's blessed to the
receiver.
			There's a saying most of you are familiar with and that
is, blessed are the merciful, for they shall have mercy. If
you decide that mercy is what you are going to dispense,
you should not feel badly about that. That is your
individual, your conscience decision in this particular
matter.
			[Prosecutor]: Objection to the analysis.
			THE COURT: Approach the bench please.
* * *

			[Prosecutor]: It's an inappropriate line of argument to
ask an individual hold their own personal moral standards
for what the appropriate verdict may be.
			THE COURT: [Defense counsel], your response.
			[Defense counsel]: I don't understand the objection.
			THE COURT: My ruling is as follows, the jurors are to
decide this matter based upon the facts and applying the
law to the facts, what they bring into the courtroom, their
experiences in life. But they're to decide this matter
according to the law, and that is not according to their
own individual religious or moral beliefs, superseding the
law in any way when they decide this matter ***.
			Also, you are not to call for the jury to impose mercy
based upon the fact that they, in fact, themselves endorse
some benefit, whether that be mercy upon themselves or
others in this life or another life or by some means, or any
kind of benefit whatsoever at any time. The jurors are not
deciding this matter based upon some benefit they might
receive in any kind of context whatsoever. That type of
argument is not proper.
* * *
			[Addressing the jury] Ladies and gentlemen, you are to
decide this matter based upon the facts and applying the
law to the facts appropriately. No effect upon yourself is
to be considered."
Defendant's trial counsel then concluded his discussion of mercy
by arguing that the jury could appropriately consider mercy as a
mitigating factor.
	We agree with the trial court's ruling. As stated earlier, mercy
must be considered in the context of all aggravating and mitigating
factors. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 46-47. The trial court did not tell
defendant's trial counsel that he could not argue for mercy and did
not tell the jury that it could not consider mercy. Rather, the court
properly explained that the jury must base its decision on the facts.
This correct oral explanation accords with IPI Criminal 3d Nos.
7C.01, 7C.02, which the jury received and of which defendant
does not complain. We cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion.



D. Closing Argument: State
	Fourth, defendant contends that the State, during its rebuttal
argument, "improperly equated the defense request for mercy as a
request for the jury to ignore the law and violate its oath."
Defendant specifically complains of four remarks, to three of
which his trial counsel failed to object at trial. Therefore, any
complaint regarding these counts is waived. See Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 
at 118; People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 495-96 (1993).
Defendant invokes the plain error exception to the waiver rule.
However, before considering the plain error doctrine, we
determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 621 (2000); People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 17 (1978).
	During the State's rebuttal argument, a prosecutor made the
following remarks:
			"Counsel asks you to ignore your duty and your oath
that you have taken-
			[Defense counsel]: Objection.
			THE COURT: Argue the evidence ***.
			[Prosecutor]: Do not be fooled by the psychology of
asking for mercy, in referring to the defendant as being
born into a situation where he was basically a piece of
garbage. Keep your common sense. So you do bring that
with you to this phase too, your common sense and your
life experiences.
* * *

			The defendant asks you for mercy through his counsel.
That is something he did not show to Debra, Samantha or
Joshua. Mercy is a blessing that is an act of divine favor
and compassion. It's a compassionate treatment of those
in stress.
			Mercy in a courtroom has to be earned. Do not feel
guilty and do not feel guilt for refusing to afford this
defendant mercy. Because by his choices, he has forgone
the opportunity to receive mercy from him [sic] by his
actions and by his conduct. Do not feel guilt for fulfilling
your obligations under the law.
			You as jurors took an oath to follow the law that this
court gives you. You want to follow that law without
being swayed by sympathy or prejudice.
			The law in this defendant[']s horrific conduct and
actions do [sic] not allow you to show him any mercy.
Show this defendant the same mercy he showed Joshua
Evans.
			This defendant stands before you, through his counsel,
and asks for the minimum sentence. There are two
choices in this case. He asks you for the minimum
sentence. Mercy cannot let him avoid his appropriate
measure of justice in this case. The defendant, by his
actions, has not earned a minimum sentence, based on
mercy.
			But based on the law, the defendant's conduct in the
law [sic] requires you to return a verdict of sentencing this
defendant to death."
	Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument,
and a prosecutor's comments in closing argument will result in
reversible error only when they engender substantial prejudice
against a defendant to the extent that it is impossible to determine
whether the jury's verdict was caused by the comments or the
evidence. Closing arguments must be reviewed in their entirety,
and the challenged remarks must be viewed in context. People v.
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 62 (1998) (and cases cited therein). Since
mercy is a relevant mitigating factor, a prosecutor's argument
suggesting that the jury could not consider mercy as a mitigating
factor, or that mercy differed from other mitigating factors,
constitutes error. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 244-45.
	Examining the challenged remarks in context, we determine
that they do not constitute reversible error. We previously quoted
from defendant's closing argument. Defendant's trial counsel
essentially argued to the jury that mercy had nothing to do with
mitigation evidence, and that the jury should dispense mercy with
no regard to the facts of the case.
	The prosecutor responded to defendant's closing argument
with the challenged remarks. If the State's argument suggested that
the jury could not consider mercy as a mitigating factor, it would
be erroneous. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 244-45. However, the 
prosecutor did not argue that mercy was not a mitigating factor, or
that mercy differed from other mitigating factors. Rather, the
prosecutor properly argued that the jury was to dispense mercy
based on the aggravation and mitigation evidence, and that
mitigation evidence was absent in this case. "During the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor may contest the significance
and weight of the defendant's mitigating evidence, and is not
required to agree that the evidence offered in mitigation by
defendant is indeed mitigating." Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 63. Indeed,
the fact that defendant's trial counsel argued that the jury could
appropriately consider mercy as a mitigating factor, and the fact
that the State argued in rebuttal that defendant did not deserve
mercy, indicated to the jury that it had the power to factor mercy
into its sentencing determination. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 245.
Because we find that the challenged prosecutorial remarks do not
constitute reversible error, we also find no plain error. See Keene,
169 Ill. 2d  at 17 (all plain errors are reversible errors).
	We note that even if these prosecutorial remarks are viewed
as erroneous, we cannot say that they constituted plain error. The
jury was instructed that mitigating factors are "[a]ny reason
supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be
sentenced to death" and that "any statement or argument made by
the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be
disregarded." See Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 26-27. In the context of the
parties' arguments as a whole and these instructions, we find that
the State's remarks did not deny defendant a fair sentencing
hearing. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 245.
	Defendant alternatively asserts that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to
object to most of the challenged remarks. We disagree. We have
concluded that the challenged remarks did not constitute reversible
error. The trial court would have rightfully overruled any defense
objection thereto. Consequently, had defense counsel objected, the
result would have been no different from the effect of his failure
to object. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced in terms of
Strickland. See, e.g., Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d at 129-30; Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 332.



Additional Contentions
XIII. Disparate Sentences
	Following separate trials, Williams was sentenced to death,
and Ward was sentenced to a prison term of natural life. Defendant
contends that his sentence was unreasonably disparate to the
sentence of Ward.
	Comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases is
not required by the United Sates Constitution and is not a feature
of the Illinois death penalty statute. Nonetheless, this court has the
constitutional duty to determine whether a death sentence has been
imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly severe,
considering the circumstances of the offense and the character and
rehabilitative prospects of the defendant. To guarantee the
individualized sentencing that the eighth amendment requires, this
court has compared a defendant's death sentence to the sentence
of a codefendant or an accomplice. This court has focused on the
nature of the offense, each individual's relative involvement, his
character and background, and his criminal record and potential
for rehabilitation. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 345 (2000);
People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 133-35 (1990).
	In this case, defendant argues that Ward is at least as culpable
as defendant, if not more so. Defendant points to Rozema's
testimony at Ward's trial. According to Rozema, Ward confessed
that he shot Debra in the head and stabbed Samantha, and
Williams cut Elijah out of Debra's stomach. In contrast, at
defendant's trial, the State presented no evidence that defendant
inflicted any injuries upon Debra or Samantha. According to
defendant, Ward is more culpable because he killed two of the
three victims. Also, defendant notes that Ward generally had a
significant criminal record.
	We cannot accept this contention. We view defendant's
participation in these crimes as not significantly less than that of
Ward. As the State notes, defendant participated in a planned
killing and a kidnapping that resulted in the murder of a pregnant
mother and her two children. Defendant personally killed Joshua
and helped dump the child in an alley to die.
	Although Ward's criminal record may be quantitatively more
severe than defendant's, that is only one factor in our evaluation.
See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 480 (1996). Further, that
defendant and Williams each received a death sentence "persuades
us that defendant's sentence was neither arbitrary nor capricious."
Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 303. We conclude that defendant's death
sentence was not unreasonably disparate to Ward's natural life
prison sentence.



XIV. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant lastly contends that the Illinois death penalty
statute is unconstitutional. U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §§2, 11. Defendant argues that current
procedural safeguards are inadequate to minimize the risk that the
death penalty will be applied to innocent persons, and because it
is inevitable that innocent people will be executed. This court has
repeatedly rejected these arguments. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 558-59; People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 357-58 (2000); People v. Bull,
185 Ill. 2d 179, 211-20 (1998). Defendant has not persuaded us to
overturn these decisions.
	We note the Chief Justice's belief that this court has inflicted
harm on the "integrity of the criminal justice system" by refusing
"to acknowledge deficiencies so egregious that a Republican
governor was forced to step in and suspend the implementation of
every sentence of death we approved." Slip op. at 64 (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting). Once again, the Chief Justice has impugned the
integrity of this court. See, e.g., People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084,
86926 cons., slip op. at 34 (September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting) (accusing this court of having "found ways" to uphold
convictions in capital cases); People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 432
(2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "our court no
longer felt any compunction about illegally dismissing a death row
inmate's appeal and having him summarily put to death"); Bull,
185 Ill. 2d  at 221-22 (Miller, J., specially concurring) (collecting
statements).
	The Chief Justice's statement regarding the Governor's
motives for imposing the moratorium lacks factual support. The
Governor has in no way publicly stated that the moratorium was
based on any action or omission of this court. Press Release,
Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint
Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (George H.
Ryan, Governor) Jan. 31, 2001.
	Further, the Chief Justice's statement also lacks legal support.
In People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 29 (September 27,
2001), this court recently acknowledged the Governor's
moratorium on future executions:
		"While we certainly are aware of those cases in which a
defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death, but
later was exonerated and released from prison, we do not
infer from these cases that the entire system has collapsed.
The Governor declared a moratorium on future executions
after several death row defendants were exonerated. We
do not infer from the moratorium, however, that every
capital trial has been unreliable and that all appellate
review has been haphazard."
	Once again, we must remind the Chief Justice that honorable
people disagree over whether this state should have a death
penalty. His deeply held view against the death penalty does not
give him license to misstate the facts so as to impugn the integrity
of this court. See People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084, 86926 cons., slip
op. at 33 (September 27, 2001) (Freeman, J., specially concurring,
joined by McMorrow, J.).



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Du Page County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to
enter an order setting Thursday, January 24, 2002, as the date on
which the sentence of death entered in the circuit court is to be
imposed. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk of his court
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is now
confined.



Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	This matter is before us on Caffey's direct appeal from his
convictions and sentence of death. During the pendency Caffey's
appeal, our court adopted a comprehensive set of new rules
governing the conduct of all cases in which the State is seeking the
death penalty. With certain exceptions, the new rules took effect
March 1, 2001, and apply to all cases pending on direct review,
including cases commenced before the rules were enacted. People
v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 35-39 (September 27, 2001)
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting); see also People ex rel. Birkett v.
Bakalis, No. 90114, slip op. at 2 (June 21, 2001).
	Although the new rules are procedural in nature, the
innovations they introduce are not mere technicalities. They are
indispensable safeguards for achieving an accurate determination
of innocence or guilt. Whether they will eliminate all of the
constitutional defects in the present death penalty law we cannot
yet say. That must await the test of time and experience. What we
can say now is that any conviction and sentence obtained without
the aid of the new rules cannot be deemed reliable and must be set
aside. Hickey, slip op. at 39 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
	Presently, some 160 defendants face death sentences in this
state. The task of retrying those defendants will be formidable, but
it is no more formidable than dealing with the direct appeals and
post-conviction challenges involving the existing convictions and
sentences. Addressing the problems which have permeated those
convictions and sentences has imposed heavy burdens on the
courts. The morass of litigation attendant to the present system of
capital punishment has become a significant drain on the resources
of this court, the circuit courts, the attorney general, the public
defenders and the local State's Attorneys.
	The costs go beyond budgets and manpower. The dearest cost,
in fact, may have nothing to do with human or financial resources.
It may be in the harm inflicted on integrity of the criminal justice
system by the court's refusal to acknowledge deficiencies so
egregious that a Republican governor was forced to step in and
suspend the implementation of every sentence of death we
approved.
	Protestations by this court that the judiciary is working as it
should are pointless. If we truly believed our system of capital
punishment was working as it should, we would not have
empowered a committee to consider new rules for death cases and
we would not have adopted the comprehensive new rules that
committee proposed.
	The rules we have adopted represent as fundamental a change
in criminal procedure as any in recent Illinois history. Having
possessed the courage and foresight to adopt those rules, we must
not now shrink from our duty to put them into effect. Accordingly,
because Caffey was tried, convicted and sentenced without the
benefit of the new rules, his convictions and death sentence should
be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court
for a new trial.
	Even if Caffey were not entitled to a new trial in accordance
with the new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the
reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty
law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Caffey's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j)
(West 1994). Because he was convicted of murdering more than
one victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural life. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994).
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I agree with Chief
Justice Harrison that defendant's convictions and sentence should
be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted in
accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital
cases. The procedures in capital cases prior to this court's adoption
of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not adequately
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. Consequently, since the
new rules were promulgated to address the deficiencies of
constitutional dimension that regularly occurred under the old
system, the rules must be applied retroactively to all capital cases
currently pending on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328,
93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For those
reasons, I respectfully dissent.