Title: Thornton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S02-1512-PL-709
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2015

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES MARION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTY, INDIANA, CITY OF  
 
Robert M. Oakley 
 
 
 
 
 
INDIANAPOLIS, MATTHEW PIETRZAK, 
Daniel K. Dilley  
 
 
 
 
 
STEPHANIE BUTTZ, ERIC LEE, AND 
Carmel, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
DIANNA JOHNSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benjamin J. Church 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Office of Corporation Counsel  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES STATE OF  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDIANA AND THE INDIANA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrea E. Rahman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1512-PL-709 
 
RANDY L. THORNTON,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, INDIANA  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,  
MARION COUNTY, INDIANA,   
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, MATTHEW  
PIETRZAK, STEPHANIE BUTTZ, 
ERIC LEE, AND DIANNA JOHNSON,   
 
 
 
 
 
Appellees (Defendants below).  
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D11-1402-PL-003833  
The Honorable John F. Hanley, Judge  
Dec 22 2015, 11:39 am
 
2 
 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1409-PL-662 
_________________________________ 
 
December 22, 2015 
 
Per Curiam. 
Plaintiff Randy Thornton brought multiple claims against several defendants arising out 
of his incarceration for a probation violation that allegedly occurred after his term of probation 
had expired. The trial court dismissed his claims against all defendants.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed in a memorandum decision.  Thornton v. State of Indiana, No. 49A02-1409-PL-662 
(Ind. Ct. App. August 14, 2015).  Thornton seeks transfer, contending only that his claim against 
four individual probation officers (the “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was improperly 
dismissed. 1 
 
The Defendants moved to dismiss Thornton’s § 1983 claim pursuant to Indiana Trial 
Rule 12(B)(6), contending Thornton failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
because his claim was barred by the statute of limitations.  (Appellant’s App. 19, 29-30).  The 
trial court summarily granted the Defendants’ motion.  Affirming that decision, the Court of 
Appeals did not address the parties’ arguments for and against dismissal, but sua sponte 
determined, “Thornton has wholly failed to state a claim against [the Defendants] even assuming 
his claims were timely filed.”  Thornton, No. 49A02-1409-PL-662, slip op. at 6.    
 
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the claim, 
not the facts supporting it.” Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (Ind. 2013) (internal 
quotation omitted).  When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must “view the pleadings in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in 
the non-movant’s favor.”  Id.  We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) 
motion de novo.  Id.  We will not affirm such a dismissal “unless it is apparent that the facts 
                                                 
1 Under Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of record in the trial court is a party on appeal.  However, Thornton does not 
challenge the dismissal of his claims against the State defendants on appeal.  Also, Thornton does not directly appeal 
the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against Marion County or the City of Indianapolis.  The Court of Appeals 
accordingly reviewed only the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claim against the individually-
named probation officers.  We do the same.   
 
3 
 
alleged in the challenged pleading are incapable of supporting relief under any set of 
circumstances.”  City of E. Chicago, Indiana v. E. Chicago Second Century, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 
611, 617 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). 
 
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which “provides a 
civil remedy against any ‘person’ who, under color of state law, subjects a ‘citizen of the United 
States’ to the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the federal 
Constitution or federal laws.”  Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind. 1991) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 1983).  “By the plain terms of § 1983, two—and only two—allegations are required in 
order to state a cause of action under that statute.”  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).  
A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal 
right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial law.”  Id.  See In re Tina T., 579 
N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind. 1991) (recognizing that to sufficiently plead a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “need 
allege only that some person acting under color of state law has deprived the claimant of a 
federal right.”  (citing Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir. 1983))).  Among other 
things, Thornton’s complaint alleged the Defendants, Marion County probation officials, took 
actions which constituted “unconstitutional deprivations of liberty and violations of due 
process.”  (Appellant’s App. 13).  Thornton’s complaint stated a claim for relief under § 1983. 
  
In the lower courts, Defendants offered two alternative arguments in support of dismissal: 
(1) Thornton’s claim was filed after the statute of limitations expired; and (2) the Defendants are 
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.  We may affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss if 
it is sustainable on any basis in the record.  See City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 
374, 378 (Ind. 2001) (citing Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 
We note the Defendants do not reassert their statute of limitations argument on transfer, 
and, regardless, we find the argument unpersuasive.  As to quasi-judicial immunity, such a 
determination requires an inquiry into “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of 
the person who performed it.” Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1999) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)), trans. denied.  The record 
before us is insufficient to permit such an inquiry.  
 
4 
 
   
We find the trial court erred when it determined Thornton’s complaint did not state a 
claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individually-named probation officers.  
Accordingly, we grant transfer and reverse dismissal of Thornton’s § 1983 claim against the 
Defendants and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.  In doing so, we express no 
opinion on the merits of Thornton’s claim.  In all other respects we summarily affirm the Court 
of Appeals’ decision.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).  
 
  
         
Rush, C.J., and Rucker and David, JJ., concur. 
Dickson and Massa, JJ., dissent without opinion.