Title: Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90647
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2012

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
Beverly Brewer, 
 
 
 
 
)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)    
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90647 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Missouri Title Loans, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of City of St. Louis 
The Honorable David L. Dowd, Judge  
 
Opinion issued March 6, 2012 
 
Missouri Title Loans, Inc. appeals a judgment finding that a class arbitration 
waiver contained in its loan agreement, promissory note and security agreement 
(agreement) is unenforceable.  In Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18 
(Mo. banc 2010), this Court affirmed the judgment insofar as it held that the class 
arbitration waiver is unconscionable and reversed that part of the judgment ordering that 
the claim be submitted to an arbitrator to determine suitability for class arbitration.  This 
Court held that the appropriate remedy was to strike the entire arbitration agreement.   
The United States Supreme Court vacated Brewer in Missouri Title Loans, Inc. v. 
Brewer, No. 10-1027, 2011 WL 531553 (U.S. May 2, 2011), and remanded the case to 
this Court for further consideration in light of AT&T Mobility, LLC, v. Concepcion, 131 
S.Ct. 1740 (2011).  Applying Concepion, this Court finds that the presence and 
enforcement of the class arbitration waiver does not make the arbitration clause 
unconscionable.  This Court instead applies traditional Missouri contract law in looking 
at the agreement as a whole to determine the conscionability of the arbitration provision.  
This Court holds that Brewer has demonstrated unconscionability in the formation of the 
agreement.  The appropriate remedy is revocation of the arbitration clause contained 
within the agreement.  Consequently, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in 
part, and the case is remanded.  
FACTS 
Beverly Brewer borrowed $2,215 from the title company.  The loan was secured 
by the title to Brewer’s automobile.  The annual percentage rate on the loan was 300 
percent.  The agreement provided that Brewer must resolve any claim against the title 
company in binding, individual arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the 
act).  No customer ever successfully has renegotiated the terms of the contract, including 
the arbitration provisions.  Although the agreement provided that Brewer waived her 
right to litigate a dispute in court, the title company specifically retained its “right to seek 
possession of the Collateral in the event of default by judicial or other process including 
self-help repossession.”  In other words, the title company may utilize the courts to 
repossess the customer’s vehicle, but the customer must go to arbitration to complain 
about violations of its rights under the contract.   
 In addition, the agreement stated that “[t]he parties agree to be responsible for 
their own expenses, including fees for attorneys, experts and witnesses.”   Unlike some 
arbitration contracts, such as the contract at issue in Concepcion, the agreement did not 
provide an attorney fee multiplier or guaranteed minimum recovery if the consumer is 
awarded more than the title company’s last offer.  The arbitration contract in Concepcion 
provided that a consumer who is awarded more than AT&T’s last offer is entitled to a 
minimum recovery of $7,500 and to double his or her attorney’s fees.  Concepcion, 131 
S.Ct. at 1744.  The cumulative real-world effect of the arbitration provisions in this case 
is that a consumer’s minimum and maximum recovery from the title company are 
identical – $0.00 – for no consumer ever has filed an individual claim for arbitration 
against the title company.  
Brewer made two payments to the title company of more than $1,000, but the 
payment only reduced her loan principal by 6 cents.  Brewer filed a class action petition 
against the title company alleging violations of numerous statutes, including the state 
merchandising practices act.   The title company filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the 
claims and to compel Brewer to arbitrate her claims individually.  The trial court held a 
hearing and entered a judgment finding the class arbitration waiver in the loan agreement 
unconscionable and unenforceable.  The trial court also considered a number of the other 
aspects of the clause, finding that it would be difficult for a consumer to understand that 
there was a disparity of bargaining power, that the provision was one-sided because only 
customers gave up their rights while the title company could pursue self-help or relief in 
the courts, and that the title company had admitted that the provision that each party be 
responsible for its own costs and attorney’s fees in arbitration placed a high burden on 
consumers.  It also found that they too rendered the agreement unconscionable when 
 
3
considered as an individual action.  The court ordered the claim to proceed to arbitration 
to determine whether it was suitable for class arbitration. 
The title company appealed, asserting that the act preempted the trial court’s 
decision, that the class arbitration waiver was not unconscionable, and that the waiver 
was a valid and permissible exculpatory clause under Missouri law.  This Court held that 
the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable and struck the arbitration agreement in its 
entirety.   
 
The United States Supreme Court granted the title company’s petition for writ of 
certiorari.  Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S.Ct. 2875 (2011).  The Court vacated 
Brewer I and remanded the case to this Court for further consideration in light of 
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740.   
 
On remand, the title company asserts that the act wholly preempts Missouri’s 
common law of unconscionability.  Alternatively, the title company asserts that the 
availability of statutory attorney’s fees negates Brewer’s unconscionability defense 
because the fee provisions make it possible for consumers with small dollar claims to 
obtain counsel.  Before addressing the title company’s arguments, this Court must first 
address the law established in Concepcion. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  AT&T v. Concepcion 
Determining the law established in Concepcion is complicated.  Justice Scalia 
authored an opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and justices Kennedy, Alito and 
Thomas, but Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion in which he indicated that, 
 
4
although he concurred in Justice Scalia’s opinion, he suggested a slightly different 
analysis than Justice Scalia.  Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which justices Ginsbug, Sotomayor and 
Kagan joined.   
As a result, Concepion is best understood by considering Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion as further informed by Justice Thomas’ concurrence.  Both opinions, for slightly 
different reasons, stand for the proposition that the act generally does not permit a state to 
bar class action waivers by finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable on the basis 
of a class action waiver alone.  The Scalia opinion does not state, however, that the 
federal act otherwise preempts traditional state law defenses to contract formation such as 
unconscionability, duress or fraud, and Justice Thomas is clear that he would apply those 
defenses.  But Concepcion teaches these defenses cannot be used in a way that would 
hold otherwise valid arbitration agreements unenforceable for the sole reason that they 
bar class relief.  That was what had happened in Concepcion.  
In Concepcion, the plaintiffs sued AT&T in federal district court alleging they 
improperly were charged sales tax on the retail value of cellular phones provided for free 
under the terms of their service contract.  Id. at 1744.  The plaintiffs’ suit was 
consolidated with a class action alleging in part that AT&T had engaged in false 
advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on the phones it had advertised as free.  Id.  
AT&T filed a motion to compel individual arbitration pursuant to its contract with the 
plaintiffs.  The district court specifically found that the arbitration agreement “was 
‘quick, easy to use’ and likely to ‘promp[t] full or … even excess payment to the 
 
5
customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate.’”  Id. at 1745.  The district court also 
found that the provision of a $7,500 premium in the event the consumer was awarded 
more than AT&T’s final written settlement offer served as “substantial inducement” for 
the consumer to pursue individual arbitration as opposed to class arbitration.  Id.  
Although individual arbitration was more beneficial to a consumer than class arbitration, 
the district court held that the arbitration provision was unconscionable under the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 
(Cal. 2005).  Id. 
   Given this factual context, the question framed by the Scalia opinion is “whether 
§ 2 [of the ACT] preempts California’s [Discover Bank] rule classifying most collective-
arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”  Id. at 1746.  Discover 
Bank held that a class action waiver in a consumer contract of adhesion is unconscionable 
when consumer claims against the defendant are predictably small and the plaintiff 
alleges a scheme to cheat consumers.  Id.  Notably absent from the formulation of the 
Discover Bank rule is any finding that the consumer is worse off under individual 
arbitration as opposed to class arbitration or that the individual terms of the arbitration 
agreement are otherwise onerous or unfair.  Id. at 1750, 1753.  The practical effect of the 
Discover Bank rule, therefore, is to invalidate class arbitration waivers in most consumer 
contracts even if traditional factors of unconscionability are absent.1   
                                                 
1 Missouri courts have identified a number of factors indicating unconscionability.  For 
instance, high pressure sales tactics, unreadable fine print, misrepresentation or unequal 
bargaining positions all indicate deficiencies in the making of a contract.  See Whitney v. 
Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Mo. App.  2005). Courts also consider 
 
6
The lack of any requirement of showing actual unconscionability meant that 
Discover Bank created an essentially categorical requirement of class arbitration, which 
resulted in class arbitration being “manufactured by Discover Bank, rather than 
consensual ….”  Id. at 1750.  Requiring class arbitration under these circumstances 
sacrifices the federal act’s goals of facilitating the prompt, informal resolution of disputes 
while also substantially disadvantaging defendants who did not consent to class 
arbitration in the first instance.   Id. at 1751-52.2  In addition to disadvantaging 
defendants, the Discover Bank rule can disadvantage consumers by requiring a court to 
find individual arbitration unconscionable even if, like the arbitration contract in 
Concepcion, the consumer is provided with favorable terms for individual arbitration.  Id. 
at 1753.  The net result of applying Discover Bank is that class arbitration waivers are 
rarely enforced.  Instead, defendants are required to submit to procedures to which they 
did not consent, and consumers may be required to participate in class arbitration even if 
individual arbitration is more favorable to their interests.  Consequently, the majority 
                                                                                                                                                             
whether the terms of an arbitration agreement are unduly harsh.  Id.  This is a fact- 
specific inquiry focusing on whether the contract terms are so one-sided as to oppress or 
unfairly surprise an innocent party or which reflect an overall imbalance in the rights and 
obligations imposed by the contract at issue.  Woods v. QC Financial Services, Inc., 280 
S.W.3d 90, 96 (Mo. App. 2008). 
 
 
2 As with any contract, the legally enforceable obligations of the parties are defined by 
mutual consent.  “[I]t follows that a party may not be compelled under the ACT to submit 
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding the party agreed to 
do so.”  Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal-Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).  
Therefore, a fundamental problem with the Discover Bank rule is that it requires courts to 
invalidate contractual provisions requiring individual arbitration and to order class 
arbitration even though the defendant, by including a class waiver, expressly withheld 
consent to class arbitration.   
 
7
opinion held that the act preempted California’s Discover Bank rule “[b]ecause it ‘stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress ….’”  Id. (citations omitted).   
Although the majority held that the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the 
federal act, it does not follow, as the title company contends, that all state law 
unconscionability defenses are preempted by the federal act in all cases.  First, the 
expressly stated issue in Concepcion was whether California’s Discover Bank rule was 
preempted, not whether all state law unconscionability defenses are preempted.  The 
Discover Bank rule imposed a unique obstacle to arbitration because, in practice, it 
conditioned “the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of 
class wide arbitration procedures,” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, even if the arbitration 
contract at issue provides a consumer with more favorable terms in individual arbitration 
than in class arbitration.  Not all state law contract defenses require class wide arbitration 
to the detriment of both the defendant and the plaintiff consumer.   Accordingly, 
consistent with the stated issue in Concepcion, the Supreme Court’s holding was 
expressly limited to finding that “California’s  Discover Bank rule is preempted by the 
act.” Id. at 1753.   
Second, the majority specifically acknowledged that the § 2 saving clause “permits 
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such 
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration 
or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”  Id. at 
1746, (citing Doctors Assoc’s., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652 
 
8
(1996)).  Holding that the § 2 saving clause preempts all state law unconscionability 
defenses would be inconsistent with both the saving clause and the majority’s express 
recognition of unconscionability as one of the generally applicable contract defenses that 
retains vitality under the § 2 saving clause.   
Finally, the majority opinion discusses in detail the many ways in which the 
arbitration provisions at issue in Concepcion are fair and reasonable and do not lead to an 
unconscionable result.  Id. at 1753.  This discussion would be superfluous if the majority 
intended to establish a rule completely preempting all state law unconscionability 
defenses.  Therefore, the Concepcion majority recognizes that a case-by-case approach 
provides the appropriate analytical framework for assessing the applicability of state law 
contract defenses pursuant to the § 2 saving clause. 
  For these reasons, title cmopany is incorrect in its assertion that the majority 
opinion compels the conclusion that the federal act requires state courts to replace the 
essentially categorical Discover Bank rule requiring class arbitration with another 
categorical rule requiring individual arbitration in every case, irrespective of the 
application of generally applicable contract defenses specifically retained by the § 2 
saving clause.   Instead, analysis of whether a particular state contract defense is 
preempted because it “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the act’s 
objectives” depends on the factual posture of individual cases.  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agrees that the federal act preempts 
state law contract defenses rooted in public policy concerns regarding arbitration, even if 
the policy nominally applies to contracts generally.  Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 
9
Like the majority opinion, Justice Thomas notes that state law contract defenses 
including “fraud, duress, and unconscionability ‘may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
agreements without contravening § 2.’”  Id. at 1755, n. 1 (quoting Doctors Assoc’s., Inc., 
517 at 687).  But Justice Thomas focuses his analysis on the text of the § 2 saving clause.  
The saving clause refers only to defenses that result in “revocation” of a contract and 
omits any reference to the “invalidation” or “nonenforcement” of a contract.  Id. at 1754.  
Justice Thomas reasons that the text of the saving clause suggests that “the exception 
does not include all defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those 
defenses.”  Id.   In other words, the federal act requires “enforcement of an agreement to 
arbitrate unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of the 
agreement ….”  Id. at 1755 (emphasis added).  “Contract defenses that are unrelated to 
the making of the agreement—such as public policy—are not valid grounds for declining 
to enforce an arbitration agreement.”  Id. at 1755.  Because the Discover Bank rule relies 
on a public policy rationale and does not concern the making of the arbitration 
agreement, Justice Thomas concludes that the act requires preemption of the Discover 
Bank rule and enforcement of the arbitration provision in AT&T’s agreement.  Id. at 
1756. 
After setting out this discussion, Justice Thomas nonetheless concurs in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion because the twin foundations of both analyses are the same.  First, the 
federal act does not preempt state law contract defenses pertaining to the formation of a 
contract.  Justice Thomas recognizes this point explicitly, while the majority does so 
inferentially.   The majority holds that the federal act preempts Discover Bank because it 
 
10
“stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress ….”  Id. at 1753.  Application of the Discover Bank rule has 
nothing to do with contract formation.  Consequently, the Supreme Court’s preemption of 
Discover Bank does not preempt all state law defenses to contract formation.  
The second and related proposition supported by both opinions is that the federal 
act preemption analysis requires a case-specific assessment of the arbitration contract at 
issue.  The majority opinion holds that state law contract defenses, including 
unconscionablity, are preempted only if the defense “stand[s] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the act’s objectives.” Id. at 1748.  The question of whether a state law 
unconscionablity defense stands as “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the act’s 
objectives” requires analysis of the particular facts of the case.  Likewise, Justice 
Thomas’ focus on contract formation defenses such as fraud, duress, and 
unconscionability necessarily requires an analysis of the facts leading to the alleged 
formation of the contract at issue.  Therefore, at a minimum, the rationales of both the 
majority opinion and Justice Thomas’ concurrence permit state courts to apply state law 
defenses to the formation of the particular contract at issue.    
This interpretation is confirmed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Marmet Health 
Care Center, Inc., v. Brown, 565 U.S. ___ (2012).   In Marmet, a state court held that the 
federal act does not preempt state public policy against pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
that apply to personal injury and wrongful death claims against nursing homes.  Slip op. 
at 3.  Alternatively, the state court held that the arbitration agreements were 
unconscionable.  Slip op. at 4.  The Supreme Court reversed the judgment because the 
 
11
state court’s public policy rationale is the type of “categorical rule” prohibiting arbitration 
of a particular type of claim identified in Concepcion as “contrary to the terms and 
coverage of the FAA.”  Slip op. at 4.  The Supreme Court remanded the case for 
consideration of whether, absent the public policy rationale, the arbitration clauses at 
issue “are unenforceable under state common law principles that are not specific to 
arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA.”  Slip op. at 5.  The Supreme Court’s remand for 
consideration of generally applicable state law contract defenses, such as 
unconscionablity, confirms that Concepcion permits state courts to apply state law 
defenses to the formation of the particular contract at issue.    
For these reasons -- and as this Court also holds in Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 
___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2012)(No. SC91728, decided concurrently with this case) -- 
Concepcion permits state courts to apply state law defenses to the formation of the 
particular contract at issue on a case-by-case basis.   Accordingly, this Court will analyze 
the issues in this appeal to determine if, under the factual record presented, Brewer has 
established a defense to the formation of the agreement’s arbitration clause.  Because no 
party has requested remand, and because, unlike in Robinson, here the trial court did 
reach other factual issues in determining that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, 
the record is sufficient in this case for this Court to determine the conscionability of the 
arbitration clause. 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The judgment will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, it is not 
against the weight of the evidence, and does not erroneously declare or apply the law.  
 
12
Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Mo. App. 2008).  The issue of 
whether a dispute is subject to arbitration is subject to de novo review.  Id.   
III. Defenses to Contract Formation 
Unlike Concepcion, which concerned the enforceability of a class waiver, the 
issue in this case is whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable.3  The 
purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to guard against one-sided contracts, 
oppression and unfair surprise.  Cowbell, LLC v. Borc Building and Leasing Corp., 328 
S.W.3d 399, 405 (Mo. App. 2010); see also Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 96.  Oppression and 
unfair surprise can occur during the bargaining process or may become evident later, 
                                                 
3 While Missouri courts traditionally have discussed unconscionability under the lens of 
procedural unconscionability, Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 94-95, and substantive 
unconscionability, State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. banc 
2006), Concepcion instead dictates a review that limits the discussion to whether state 
law defenses such as unconscionability impact the formation of a contract.  In fact, in his 
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas specifically delineated past precedent of the Supreme 
Court applying defenses relevant to the formation of a contract.  131 S.Ct. at 1755 
(Thomas, J. concurring) (noting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996) (defenses of fraud, duress and unconscionability could be applied to 
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening section 2); Morgan Stanley 
Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 547 
(2008) (describing fraud and duress as “traditional grounds for the abrogation of [a] 
contract” that speaks to “unfair dealing at the contract formation stage”); Hume v. United 
States, 132 U.S. U.S. 406, 411, 414 (1889) (describing an unconscionable contract as one 
“such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make” and suggesting that 
there may be “contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on their face as to raise the 
presumption of fraud in their inception” (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
Accordingly, the analysis in this Court’s ruling today -- as well as this Court's ruling in 
Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., SC 91728 -- no longer focuses on a discussion of 
procedural unconscionability or substantive unconscionability, but instead is limited to a 
discussion of facts relating to unconscionability impacting the formation of the contract.   
Future decisions by Missouri’s courts addressing unconscionability likewise shall limit 
review of the defense of unconscionability to the context of its relevance to contract 
formation. 
 
 
13
when a dispute or other circumstances invoke the objectively unreasonable terms.  In 
either case, the unconscionability is linked inextricably with the process of contract 
formation because it is at formation that a party is required to agree to the objectively 
unreasonable terms.  
The evidence in this case supports a determination that the agreement’s arbitration 
clause is unconscionable.  There was evidence that the entire agreement -- including the 
arbitration clause -- was non-negotiable and was difficult for the average consumer to 
understand and that the title company was in a superior bargaining position.  Brewer 
could not negotiate the terms of the agreement, including the terms of the arbitration 
clause.  Indeed, the evidence further demonstrated that no consumer ever successfully 
had renegotiated the terms of the title company’s arbitration contract.   
The evidence also demonstrated that the terms of the agreement are extremely 
one-sided.  Unlike in Concepcion, in which AT&T shouldered the costs of arbitration and 
would pay double the customer’s attorney’s fees if the customer recovered more than 
AT&T had offered prior to arbitration, the agreement here provides that the parties are to 
bear their own costs.   In Concepcion, the arbitration clause waived AT&T’s right to seek 
reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred in defending against a consumer’s claim.  In 
contrast, the title company did not waive its right to seek attorney’s fees and, therefore, 
could seek to recover attorney’s fees incurred in defending a claim.  The fact that no 
consumer ever has arbitrated a claim against the title company under these terms makes it 
clear that the agreement stands as a substantial obstacle not just to arbitration but also to 
the resolution of any consumer disputes against the title company.  
 
14
The evidence in this case is also fundamentally different from that in Concepcion 
because Brewer presented expert testimony from three consumer lawyers who testified it 
was unlikely that a consumer could retain counsel to pursue individual claims.  There was 
no such record in Concepcion.  A claim such as Brewer’s would require significant 
expertise and discovery, and it would not be financially viable for an attorney because of 
the complicated nature of the case and the small damages at issue.  The title company 
presented no contrary evidence from attorneys who said they were willing to take such 
cases other than on a pro-bono or rare voluntary basis.    
While the majority opinion in Concepcion makes it clear that the unavailability of 
counsel is not alone sufficient to invalidate the requirement of individual arbitration, it 
remains one of the relevant considerations in assessing the overall conscionability of an 
arbitration contract.  The Discover Bank rule was not preempted because it conditioned 
the enforceability of an arbitration contract on the availability of an attorney.  Instead, the 
critical flaw leading to the preemption of the Discover Bank rule was that it required class 
arbitration even if class arbitration disadvantaged consumers and was unnecessary for the 
consumer to obtain a remedy.  Discover Bank, therefore, was inconsistent with the core 
purpose of the federal act, which is to ensure enforcement of private arbitration 
agreements to promote informal, efficient dispute resolution.  Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 
1748-1749.  Because the purpose of the act is to ensure efficient dispute resolution, the 
analysis in Concepcion assumes the availability of a practical, viable means of 
individualized dispute resolution through arbitration.  In some cases, the availability of 
counsel is a relevant consideration for determining whether the act’s interest in dispute 
 
15
resolution will be satisfied.  As noted above, the totality of Brewer’s evidence, including 
the lack of available counsel, demonstrates that there is no practical, viable means of 
individualized dispute resolution.   
The title company asserts that the availability of attorney’s fees and punitive 
damages under the state merchandising practices act negates Brewer’s argument that 
attorneys are unwilling to handle claims such as hers.  The title company notes that 
reported cases indicate that some lawyers are willing to handle cases brought under the 
federal truth in lending and fair debt collection practices acts and that this proves that 
statutory damages provide sufficient financial incentive for attorneys to assist consumers 
in individual, small dollar claims.  The deficiency in the title company’s argument is that 
it presents a totally theoretical position that attorneys should want to take such cases.  
Speculation is not a substitute for evidence.  In this case, there was specific and 
uncontradicted evidence before the trial court demonstrating that attorneys were unlikely 
to take claims such as Brewer’s on an individual basis.  Even if some attorneys may take 
some cases because of the potential availability of fees under the merchandising practices 
act, this does not prove that Brewer would have the benefit of counsel in attempting to 
obtain a remedy on an individual basis.  
Finally, the agreement does not bilaterally provide that any and all disputes 
between the parties arising out of or related to the agreement must be decided by binding, 
individual arbitration under the federal act.  Instead, the title company drafted the 
agreement to bind the consumer to individual arbitration for all claims against the title 
company, but it specifically reserved its right to forego arbitration “to seek possession of 
 
16
the Collateral in the event of default by judicial or other process including self-help 
repossession.”  In the context of a title loan transaction, this is a particularly onerous 
provision because among the lender’s chief remedies in the event of default is either 
judicial or self-help repossession.  The title company reserves its right to obtain its 
primary remedies through the court system while requiring Brewer to obtain her only 
meaningful remedy – monetary compensation for the alleged violation of consumer 
protection laws – through individual arbitration.4  
The disparity in bargaining power, in addition to the disparity between Brewer’s 
remedial options and the title company’s remedial options, constitutes strong evidence 
that the agreement is unconscionable.  The title company requires Brewer to arbitrate all 
of her claims in the interests of efficient, streamlined dispute resolution.  However, when 
the title company’s interests are at stake, the title company is free to discard the 
efficiencies of arbitration in favor of litigating a claim against Brewer.  It is unlikely that 
the ramifications of such provisions are comprehended by the average consumer or 
comport with the reasonable expectations of an average member of the public.    
The arbitration contract at issue in Concepcion is fundamentally different from the 
agreement in this case.  In Concepcion, the contract provided an informal 30-day dispute 
                                                 
4 Not only does the title company retain the right to seek judicial remedies, the title 
company further protects its interests by charging an extremely high interest rate to 
compensate for the risks inherent in its lending practices.  While there is no allegation 
that the 300-percent annual interest rate that the title company charges is illegal, it plainly 
illustrates the fact that the agreement is drafted to limit substantially the remedial options 
of often financially distressed consumers while allowing the title company substantial 
latitude in protecting its financial interests.  
 
 
17
resolution procedure.  Id. at 1744.  If the consumer was dissatisfied, he or she could seek 
arbitration by filling out a form provided on AT&T’s website.  Id.  AT&T would pay all 
costs of arbitration of any non-frivolous claim.  Id. Arbitration would occur in the 
customer’s home county and could be by telephone, in person or on paper for small 
claims.  Id.  AT&T never could seek attorney’s fees, while the consumer was entitled to 
double fees if awarded more than AT&T’s last offer.  Id.  Customers who utilized the 
opportunity to resolve their claims either informally or through this arbitration process, 
were “essentially guarantee[d] to be made whole.” Id. at 1753, citing Laster v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849 856, n. 9 (9th Cir. 2009).    
In contrast, the agreement at issue in this case does not provide for informal 
complaint resolution.  Arbitration is required for any dispute, at the cost of the customer, 
while the title company has a choice of simply repossessing the collateral by force or 
through suit in court rather than using arbitration.  The title company never pays the costs 
of arbitration or attorney’s fees for the customer, even if the customer wins.  The obstacle 
to dispute resolution posed by these provisions is illustrated by the simple fact that no 
customer has utilized the arbitration clause to recover.  As arbitration is the only remedy, 
this means that no customer has obtained relief.  As a result, far from fulfilling the 
purpose of the federal act of providing a prompt and informal method of resolving 
disputes, the arbitration clause here is itself “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
act’s objectives.”  
For these reasons, this Court finds that the unconscionable aspects of the 
agreement indicate that it is a contract that no person “in his senses and not under 
 
18
 
19
delusion would make.”  Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1755 (Thomas, J. concurring)(citing 
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411, 10 S.Ct. 134, 33 L.Ed. 393 (1889)).  Brewer 
has established, therefore, that the circumstances under which the agreement was made 
are unconscionable.  The arbitration clause of the agreement is unconscionable and 
unenforceable.   
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment finding the class arbitration waiver unconscionable is affirmed 
because the entire arbitration agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The 
judgment is reversed, however, to the extent that it severs the class arbitration waiver and 
requires an arbitrator to determine the propriety of class arbitration.  The case is 
remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice  
 
 
Stith, J., Pfeiffer, Sp.J., and Wolff, Sr.J., 
concur; Fischer, J., dissents in separate 
opinion filed: Breckenridge, J., concurs 
in opinion of Fischer, J.; Price, J.,  
dissents in separate opinion filed.  Russell 
and Draper, JJ., not participating.  
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
BEVERLY BREWER, 
 
 
 
)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)    
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC90647 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MISSOURI TITLE LOANS, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION  
 
The circuit court entered its judgment in this case on August 5, 2009.  That 
judgment, which struck down the prohibition of the class arbitration, was affirmed by a 
majority of this Court, but I joined the dissent authored by Judge Price.   The United 
States Supreme Court thereafter issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2010), granted certiorari, vacated this Court's opinion in 
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 232 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. banc 2010) (Brewer I) and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with Concepcion.  In my view, and to be 
consistent with Concepcion and this Court's unanimous opinion in Robinson v. Title 
Lenders, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2012) (No. SC91728, decided concurrently with this 
case), the circuit court's judgment must be reversed and remanded to the circuit court for 
further factual determinations because the circuit court admittedly and explicitly 
"considered only the arbitration clause of defendant's contract, and [did] not consider the 
contract as a whole."  Circuit court judgment at 2.   
 
The circuit court's judgment was very specific as to the issue it decided.  "The 
issue to be decided is whether the arbitration clause of Missouri Title Loans, Inc. is 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable."  Circuit court judgment at 1.  The circuit 
court, as specifically stated above, did not consider whether the contract as a whole was 
unconscionable.   
 
The principal opinion expressly considered "traditional Missouri contract law in 
looking at the agreement as a whole to determine the conscionability of the arbitration 
provision," and then went on to factually determine plaintiff "has demonstrated 
unconscionability in the formation of the Agreement."  Slip op. at 2. 
 
The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Price recognizes section 2 of the FAA 
preserves agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated only by "'generally applicable contract 
defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,' but not by defenses that 'apply only 
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.'"  Slip op. at 1-2.  Therefore, the opinion authored by Judge Price would "enforce 
the contract as written."  Id. at 2.  
 
In my view, if the circuit court would have had the benefit of the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion in Concepcion and this Court's unanimous opinion in Robinson, 
it would have realized the legal necessity to consider the contract as a whole under 
applicable state law concepts of unconscionability to resolve this case.  I am of the view 
it is the circuit court's prerogative and function to determine all the facts necessary and 
then apply the law in accordance with these recent case decisions to those facts.  
 
2
 
3
                                             
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
Concepcion and Robinson.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
1 The requirement to remand this case is also consistent with the recent United States Supreme 
Court case in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. ____ (2012). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
BEVERLY BREWER, 
 
 
 
)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)    
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC90647 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MISSOURI TITLE LOANS, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION  
 
The circuit court entered its judgment in this case on August 5, 2009.  That 
judgment, which struck down the prohibition of the class arbitration, was affirmed by a 
majority of this Court, but I joined the dissent authored by Judge Price.   The United 
States Supreme Court thereafter issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2010), granted certiorari, vacated this Court's opinion in 
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 232 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. banc 2010) (Brewer I) and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with Concepcion.  In my view, and to be 
consistent with Concepcion and this Court's unanimous opinion in Robinson v. Title 
Lenders, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2012) (No. SC91728, decided concurrently with this 
case), the circuit court's judgment must be reversed and remanded to the circuit court for 
further factual determinations because the circuit court admittedly and explicitly 
"considered only the arbitration clause of defendant's contract, and [did] not consider the 
contract as a whole."  Circuit court judgment at 2.   
 
The circuit court's judgment was very specific as to the issue it decided.  "The 
issue to be decided is whether the arbitration clause of Missouri Title Loans, Inc. is 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable."  Circuit court judgment at 1.  The circuit 
court, as specifically stated above, did not consider whether the contract as a whole was 
unconscionable.   
 
The principal opinion expressly considered "traditional Missouri contract law in 
looking at the agreement as a whole to determine the conscionability of the arbitration 
provision," and then went on to factually determine plaintiff "has demonstrated 
unconscionability in the formation of the Agreement."  Slip op. at 2. 
 
The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Price recognizes section 2 of the FAA 
preserves agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated only by "'generally applicable contract 
defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,' but not by defenses that 'apply only 
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.'"  Slip op. at 1-2.  Therefore, the opinion authored by Judge Price would "enforce 
the contract as written."  Id. at 2.  
 
In my view, if the circuit court would have had the benefit of the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion in Concepcion and this Court's unanimous opinion in Robinson, 
it would have realized the legal necessity to consider the contract as a whole under 
applicable state law concepts of unconscionability to resolve this case.  I am of the view 
it is the circuit court's prerogative and function to determine all the facts necessary and 
then apply the law in accordance with these recent case decisions to those facts.  
 
2
 
3
                                             
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
Concepcion and Robinson.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
1 The requirement to remand this case is also consistent with the recent United States Supreme 
Court case in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. ____ (2012).