Title: City of Menasha v. Gracia
Citation: 2013 WI 15
Docket Number: 2011AP000814
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2013

2013 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Juan G. Gracia, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
____________________________________________________ 
 
In the matter of the refusal of Juan G. Gracia: 
 
City of Menasha, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Juan G. Gracia, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
           
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 338 Wis. 2d 486, 808 N.W.2d 743 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 31, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON 
BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF 
APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
Circuit   
 COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 JUDGE: 
Barbara H. Key 
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
 
 DISSENTED: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed) Bradley 
and Prosser, JJ., join dissent. 
Prosser, J. dissents (Opinion filed.)Abrahamson, 
C.J., and Bradley, J. join dissent.    
 NOT 
PARTICIPATING:    
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John Holevoet and Holevoet Law Office, LLC, Madison, 
and oral argument by John Holevoet. 
 
 
2
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by David 
H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814 
(L.C. No. 
2010CT424 & 2010TR4428) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Juan G. Gracia, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 31 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
In the matter of the refusal of Juan G. Gracia: 
 
 
 
City of Menasha, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Juan G. Gracia, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
2 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
circuit court.  This case involves two distinct issues.  The 
first issue is whether a warrantless search of Gracia's bedroom2 
was a valid exercise of the community caretaker exception to the 
warrant requirement under the federal and state constitutions.3  
The second issue is factually unrelated and involves whether 
Gracia can successfully collaterally attack his second operating 
a motor vehicle under the influence (OWI)4 from 1998 on the 
grounds that he did not validly waive his right to counsel.   
¶2 
Gracia moved to suppress evidence obtained during and 
resulting from the search on the grounds that the police had 
illegally entered his bedroom despite his objection and without 
a warrant.  The circuit court for Winnebago County, the 
                                                 
1 State v. Gracia, No. 2011AP813-CR, City of Menasha v. 
Gracia, No. 2011AP814, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
28, 2011). 
2 The parties do not dispute that a search occurred for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment when the officers entered 
Gracia's bedroom and talked to him, which led to their discovery 
that Gracia was intoxicated. 
3 The circuit court also found that Gracia unreasonably 
refused to submit to a test for intoxication.  The refusal and 
the appeal from the judgment of conviction for fourth-offense 
OWI have been consolidated.   
4 Wis. Stat. § 346.63, entitled "Operating under influence 
of intoxicant or other drug," prohibits drivers from both 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence  and operating a 
motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63 (2009-10).  To avoid unnecessary confusion, this 
opinion will usually refer to violations of Wis. Stat. § 346.63 
as "OWI" unless specifically noted. 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
3 
 
Honorable Barbara H. Key presiding, denied Gracia's motion to 
suppress, holding that the police officers were exercising their 
community caretaker function when they entered Gracia's bedroom 
after tracking him from a single-car accident, and their actions 
were constitutionally permitted.  Gracia also challenged a prior 
conviction, claiming that he had not validly waived his right to 
counsel in that case.  The circuit court found that Gracia 
validly waived his right to counsel during his 1998 no contest 
plea hearing.  Gracia subsequently pleaded no contest to 
operating with a prohibited alcohol content, fourth offense, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)5 with an alcohol fine 
enhancer under § 346.65(2)(g)1.  The court of appeals affirmed 
on both issues. 
¶3 
We hold that the circuit court properly denied 
Gracia's motion to suppress.  The test for the community 
caretaker exception was recently laid out by this court in State 
v. Pinkard and looks at whether a search or seizure took place, 
whether the police exercised a bona fide community caretaker 
function, and whether the intrusion was reasonable based on the 
attendant circumstances.  State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶29, 327 
Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.  Here, the police were following up 
on a major single-vehicle accident which left the front end of 
the car driven by Gracia extensively damaged and a traffic pole 
completely knocked down.  They validly entered the home on 
                                                 
5 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
4 
 
consent of Gracia's brother and after his brother broke open 
Gracia's bedroom door, without any prompting by the police, 
reasonably exercised their community caretaker function when 
they crossed the threshold into Gracia's bedroom.  The police 
acted on their concern that Gracia might have sustained a 
significant injury in the auto accident.  Given these facts, the 
warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶4 
We further hold that despite a technically deficient 
plea colloquy, Gracia knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel before he pleaded no contest to his 
second OWI in 1998, a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) 
(1997-98), operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration.6  
He understood the difficulties and disadvantages of self-
representation.  He had familiarity with the role of lawyers, 
and he made a cost-benefit decision not to hire an attorney 
because he was guilty and the district attorney offered him the 
minimum penalty.  The circuit court properly denied the 
collateral attack of his earlier conviction and thus considered 
the 1998 conviction in determining that Gracia had three prior 
relevant convictions. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin has a progressive penalty system for OWIs in 
which prior convictions are used to determine the appropriate 
penalties.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65.  The penalty structure for 
these convictions changes depending on the number of prior 
similar convictions the driver has.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307 
enumerates relevant prior conduct for penalties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65.   
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
5 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶5 
This case presents two distinct issues for this court 
to decide.  Each issue has unrelated facts.  The first issue is 
related to a warrantless search, and the second is a collateral 
attack of a prior conviction.  The facts of each will be 
presented in turn.    
¶6 
The City of Menasha Police Department received a 
report of a traffic signal down that was impeding traffic.  The 
signal, located on a median, had been completely ripped from the 
ground, and was lying half in the median and half in the road.  
It appeared from the scene that a vehicle had struck the signal 
and then left.  At the scene, the police found a mangled license 
plate lying next to the damaged traffic signal; the license 
plate number 228JJD was listed as belonging to a 1999 Buick 
Regal LS.   
¶7 
After some investigation,7 the police arrived at a 
trailer home where Juan G. Gracia ("Gracia") lived, and they 
found the Buick Regal in the driveway.  The Buick had clearly 
been in an accident.  Its front license plate was missing.  
There was significant front-end damage with pieces of the front 
                                                 
7 The license plate found at the scene was registered to 
Jesus Gracia-Valenzuela.  The officers went to the address 
connected to the license plate and did not find the vehicle.  
They also checked another address for the car's registered owner 
on Jefferson Street.  The police then learned from the people at 
that address that the Gracias no longer lived there.  The police 
checked another address.  Then a family member of the Gracias 
told police that Juan Gracia usually drove that vehicle and gave 
the police his address on Wendy Way. 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
6 
 
bumper missing.  There were yellow markings on the side of the 
door panel.  The front end had been caved in, as if the car had 
struck a pole, and a pair of eyeglasses and a hat sat on the 
front passenger seat.  According to the officers, the damage 
seemed fresh.   
¶8 
When the police officers arrived at the trailer home, 
the lights were off inside, and no one answered the door.  As 
the police were about to leave, a pickup truck arrived driven by 
Jaime Gracia, who told police he was Gracia's brother and lived 
at that residence with Gracia.  Jaime Gracia stated that his 
brother should be inside.  The officers asked if they could come 
inside, explaining that they were worried about Gracia's 
potential injuries and that they needed to make sure he was 
okay.  Jaime Gracia asked them to wait outside and went into the 
house by himself.  After several minutes, he allowed the 
officers inside and told them that Gracia had locked himself in 
his bedroom.  Jaime Gracia brought the officers to Gracia's 
bedroom door.  Inside his room, Gracia yelled in Spanish and 
English, telling them to "go away."  Both the officers and Jaime 
Gracia tried the door handle.  One of the officers, Officer 
Lenss, testified that Jaime Gracia then "put his shoulder 
through the door and opened the bedroom door."  Once the door 
was open, the officers entered the room and made contact with 
Gracia, who was lying on the bed.  The officers observed 
Gracia's bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the strong odor of 
intoxicants emanating from Gracia.  Gracia eventually admitted 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
7 
 
to driving the Buick.  The officers then arrested Gracia for 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.   
¶9 
Gracia 
moved 
to 
suppress 
the 
evidence 
of 
his 
intoxication obtained after the police entered his bedroom.  At 
the suppression hearing, the State argued that the community 
caretaker exception to the warrant requirement applied.  The 
circuit court agreed and denied the suppression motion.8  Gracia 
pleaded no contest to operating a motor vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol content, fourth offense, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) and then appealed.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of the suppression motion.  
On appeal, Gracia also collaterally attacked a prior conviction 
as the result of an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.  
Additional relevant facts will be incorporated throughout the 
opinion.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 This court reviews motions to suppress by examining 
the constitutional challenge to the search.  "Whether police 
conduct has violated the constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures 
is 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact."  State v. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, ¶16, 334 
                                                 
8 Gracia also refused to take a test for intoxication.  The 
circuit court held a joint suppression and refusal hearing.  The 
only 
grounds 
Gracia 
alleges 
for 
the 
refusal 
is 
the 
constitutionality of the search.  The refusal will not be dealt 
with separately in this opinion because in this situation, it 
rises and falls with the community caretaker exception analysis.  
Because we find the entry a valid exercise of the community 
caretaker function, the refusal was unreasonable.  
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 290, 800 N.W.2d 858 (citations omitted).  We defer to 
the circuit court's findings of facts while "independently 
apply[ing] 
those 
historical 
facts 
to 
the 
constitutional 
standard."  Id.   
¶11 We review de novo "[w]hether a defendant knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel."  State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 
699 N.W.2d 92.  In that review, we apply constitutional 
principles to the facts of the case.  State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, 204, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶12 First we determine if the police exercised a valid 
community caretaker function; if they did not, and no other 
exception applied, the warrantless search would violate both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Second we look at 
whether Gracia can collaterally attack his 1998 conviction for 
second-offense OWI on the grounds that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel 
because he was not aware of the difficulties and disadvantages 
of self-representation.9 
A. Police Search and the Community Caretaker Function 
                                                 
9 If a collateral attack is successful, the prior conviction 
cannot be used to enhance the penalties for the current 
conviction. See State v. Peters, 2001 WI 74, ¶22, 244 
Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797.  
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
9 
 
¶13 There are two searches in this case——the entry of the 
trailer and the entry of the bedroom.  Because Jaime Gracia 
consented to the police entry to the trailer and Gracia does not 
object to that, we look only at the search of the bedroom.10  
Gracia argues that the search of his bedroom was not a valid 
exercise of the police's community caretaker function.  The 
State asks this court to affirm the circuit court's finding that 
the community caretaker function was validly exercised in this 
situation.   
¶14 The community caretaker exception is analyzed in the 
same manner under both the state and federal constitutions.  
State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 
N.W.2d 598; Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶14.  This court looks at 
"the totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time 
of the police conduct."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30.   
                                                 
10 The consensual entry into the trailer home is more like 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), than Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), because when consent was being 
given to enter the home, no one objected.  The United States 
Supreme Court has allowed warrantless entry when police obtain 
voluntary consent of an occupant who shares authority over the 
common area with a co-occupant even when later the co-occupant 
objects to the use of evidence obtained.  See Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177.  In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 
the United States Supreme Court held that "a physically present 
co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering 
the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him."  Id. 
at 106.  See also State v. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, ¶6, 344 Wis. 
2d 290, 800 N.W.2d 858 (holding that "the rule stated in 
Randolph does not apply . . . because we conclude that St. 
Martin was not physically present at what the United States 
Supreme Court called the 'threshold colloquy.'") 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
10 
 
¶15 This 
court 
recently 
interpreted 
the 
community 
caretaker function of police in Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346.  That 
case laid out a three-step test, with four relevant factors in 
deciding the third step, placing the burden of proof on the 
State.  Id., ¶29.  The steps are as follows:  
(1) [W]hether a search or seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, 
whether the police were exercising a bona fide 
community caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether 
the public interest outweighs the intrusion upon the 
privacy of the individual such that the community 
caretaker function was reasonably exercised within the 
context of a home. 
Id., ¶29.  In examining the third step, "we balance the public 
interest or need that is furthered by the officers' conduct 
against the degree and nature of the intrusion on the citizen's 
constitutional 
interest." 
 
Id., 
¶41. 
 
The 
four 
factors 
considered in this balancing test are as follows:  
(1) [T]he degree of the public interest and the 
exigency 
of 
the 
situation; 
(2) 
the 
attendant 
circumstances surrounding the search, including time, 
location, the degree of overt authority and force 
displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and 
(4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Id., ¶42 (citations omitted).  
¶16 The parties do not dispute that the entry into the 
bedroom constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The parties disagree on the second and third steps 
of the community caretaker test.   
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
11 
 
¶17 The second step requires determining whether the 
officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe Gracia 
was hurt and in need of assistance, so that they were exercising 
a bona fide community caretaker function. Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 
346, ¶29.  To make that determination, we look at the totality 
of the circumstances at the time of the conduct.  Id., ¶31. 
¶18 Gracia argues that the police did not have an 
objectively 
reasonable 
basis 
to 
believe 
Gracia 
needed 
assistance.  Gracia cites Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 
(1973), reviewing a writ of habeas corpus from a conviction 
upheld in State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 
(1969), for the proposition that for police conduct to be a bona 
fide community caretaker function it must be "totally divorced 
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 
relating to the violation of a criminal statute."  Cady, 413 
U.S. 
at 
441. 
 Gracia acknowledges that in Kramer, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, we interpreted the "totally divorced" language in 
Cady as requiring only an objectively reasonable basis, but 
Gracia argues that the subjective intent of police that included 
a desire to, in part, investigate the reason for the crash, cuts 
against the reasonableness of the officers' belief that Gracia 
was hurt.  See Id., ¶31.   
¶19 As we explained in Kramer, "in a community caretaker 
context, when under the totality of the circumstances an 
objectively 
reasonable 
basis 
for 
the 
community 
caretaker 
function is shown, that determination is not negated by the 
officer's subjective law enforcement concerns."  Id., ¶30.  
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
12 
 
Kramer described the nature of police work as "multifaceted" and 
explained that "the officer may have law enforcement concerns, 
even when the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for 
performing 
a 
community 
caretaker 
function." 
Id., 
¶32.  
Furthermore, Kramer underscored the perverse nature of not 
allowing police to have any investigatory purpose while carrying 
out their community caretaker function: 
[T]o interpret the "totally divorced" language in Cady 
to mean that an officer could not engage in a 
community caretaker function if he or she had any law 
enforcement concerns would, for practical purposes, 
preclude 
police 
officers 
from 
engaging 
in 
any 
community caretaker functions at all. This result is 
neither sensible nor desirable.  
Id., ¶34.  In light of "the multifaceted nature of police work," 
in the totality of the circumstances, the officers' subjective 
intent does not invalidate an otherwise reasonable exercise of 
the community caretaker function.11  
¶20 Gracia argues that the officers did not have an 
objectively reasonable basis to believe he was hurt.  He thinks 
that this case is more like State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, 331 
Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505, than State v. Pinkard because the 
only evidence the officers used to determine Gracia might have 
been hurt was a damaged car.  In Ultsch, the police investigated 
a traffic accident where a driver had smashed into a brick wall 
                                                 
11 The subjective intent cuts both ways here.  As explained 
above, the officers continually showed their concern for Gracia 
by explaining to Gracia's brother that Gracia might be hurt.  
This 
continued 
concern 
could 
reasonably 
be 
viewed 
as 
demonstrating the subjective belief of the police that Gracia 
was hurt and needing assistance.   
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
13 
 
and fled the scene in the vehicle.  331 Wis. 2d 242, ¶2.  The 
police found the damaged car at the end of a long driveway.  
Id., ¶2.  When the police saw someone leaving the house who 
turned out to be Ultsch's boyfriend, they did not express any 
concern about the driver's safety. See id., ¶3.  The police 
eventually went to the house, entered the unlocked front door, 
and found their way to the driver's bedroom where she was 
sleeping.  Id., ¶4.  They transported her to the sheriff's 
department where they performed both field sobriety and chemical 
breath tests, after which they arrested her.  Id., ¶5.  The 
circuit court denied her motion to suppress evidence on the 
grounds that the police were exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker function.  Id., ¶¶6-7.  The court of appeals 
disagreed, holding that it did not believe that the police had 
"an objectively reasonable basis to believe Ultsch was in need 
of assistance."  Id., ¶¶21, 30 (citations omitted).   
¶21 Although some of the facts here appear similar to 
those in Ultsch, the officers in this case had an objectively 
reasonable basis to believe Gracia needed assistance.  First, 
there was more damage to Gracia's vehicle than there was to 
Ultsch's.  In Ultsch, the damage was confined to the left front 
fender and was described by the court of appeals as "limited 
damage."  Id., ¶¶19, 28.  Here, not only was a traffic signal 
completely knocked down, but the front end of the vehicle was 
essentially caved in, pieces of the bumper were left at the 
scene, and the front license plate was entirely ripped off.  
Second, the police consistently stated their concern for Gracia 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
14 
 
in this case, whereas in Ultsch, the police did not even tell 
Ultsch's boyfriend about their suspicion that Ultsch might be 
injured and in need of assistance.  Although it is only one 
factor to be taken into consideration in judging the objective 
beliefs of police, the subjective intent of the officers is 
relevant.  In this situation, the police immediately told 
Gracia's brother about their concern for Gracia's safety.   
¶22 There were other facts supporting an objectively 
reasonable view that Gracia was hurt.  As discussed above, the 
damage at the scene of the accident and to the car observed at 
Gracia's house was extensive.  In addition, Gracia's brother 
appeared concerned about Gracia's safety.  After going into the 
house without police, he returned to the front door and allowed 
the police inside the house, and he subsequently broke open the 
door to Gracia's bedroom.  The brother's actions provide further 
support that there was a genuine belief that Gracia might be in 
need of assistance.  For all of these reasons, the police were 
exercising a bona fide community caretaker function. 
¶23 Even if the police have a bona fide purpose, the third 
step of the analysis requires that the community caretaker 
function be reasonably exercised by the officers.  Pinkard, 327 
Wis. 2d 346, ¶29.  This determination is made by "balancing a 
public interest or need that is furthered by the officer's 
conduct against the degree of and nature of the restriction upon 
the liberty interest of the citizen," Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶40, 
and 
the 
four 
factors 
discussed 
earlier 
guide 
the 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
15 
 
determination.  None of the factors is, by itself, dispositive.  
See generally, id.   
¶24 In Pinkard the community caretaker function was 
reasonably exercised by the officers because the public interest 
in the search outweighed Pinkard's privacy interests.  In 
Pinkard, the police got an anonymous tip that there were two 
people sleeping near what appeared to be illegal drugs. Pinkard, 
327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶2.  The police went to investigate the tip and 
confirmed its accuracy. Id., ¶3.  After announcing their 
presence with no reaction from the occupants, who appeared to be 
sleeping, the police entered the house.  Id., ¶4.  Once inside, 
police found a digital scale and drugs, along with a firearm. 
Id., ¶5.  Pinkard moved to suppress the evidence because there 
was no warrant. Id., ¶6.  The circuit court found that the 
police conduct was a valid exercise of the community caretaker 
function, and we agreed.  Id., ¶¶7, 11.  We will now examine the 
four factors in regard to Gracia's situation.      
¶25 The first factor in the balancing test is the degree 
of the public interest and the exigency of the situation. Id., 
¶42.  The public has a substantial interest in ensuring the 
safety of drivers in serious traffic accidents.  See State v. 
Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, ¶29, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565 
(finding a significant public interest in a situation where "the 
officers did not know the physical condition of the person and 
reasonably concluded that the situation was an emergency.")  
There was also some exigency in this situation.  The police 
promptly began investigating the accident and were at Gracia's 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
16 
 
home within about 45 minutes of the accident being reported. If 
Gracia had been seriously injured in the accident, quick medical 
assistance would have been necessary.   
¶26 The 
second 
factor 
looks 
at 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding the search, including the "time, location, the 
degree of overt authority and force displayed."  Pinkard, 327 
Wis. 2d 346, ¶42.  This factor also weighs in favor of the 
reasonable exercise of the community caretaker function in this 
case.  Although the search took place in a private place, the 
privacy interests infringed upon were minimized by the facts of 
this situation.  The police displayed significantly less overt 
authority here than in Ultsch.  The police entered Gracia's home 
on the consent of his brother, Jaime Gracia, and did not enter 
Gracia's bedroom to check on him until his brother broke open 
Gracia's door.12  The police were escorted by a seemingly 
concerned co-tenant the entire time they were in Gracia's home.  
In contrast, the police in Ultsch entered the house without 
permission and then walked around unattended until they found 
Ultsch sleeping in bed.  331 Wis. 2d 242, ¶4.  Furthermore, here 
the officers did not use any force throughout the entire 
interaction.  Both the brother and the police tried the handle 
                                                 
12 There is nothing to indicate that the police did anything 
to encourage Jaime Gracia to break open the door.  In fact, 
officer Matthew Lenss testified at a hearing that he did not ask 
Jaime to break open the door, stating, "I actually remember 
looking at Officer Swenson in disbelief thinking to myself, wow, 
he just put his shoulder through the door.  I never asked him to 
do that."  
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
17 
 
of the bedroom door, but when the door did not open, the police 
made no further attempts to gain entry.  The only person to use 
any force in this situation was Gracia's brother, but since 
there was no evidence that the police encouraged that behavior, 
his actions should not be imputed to the police.  No one argues 
that the officers brandished their weapons or threatened anyone 
involved.  Essentially, the officers found themselves in front 
of an open door and walked across the threshold to check on 
someone they thought was injured from a serious car accident, 
which was not unreasonable.   
¶27 The third factor is irrelevant because the search was 
not of an automobile, so we look next at the fourth factor: the 
possible alternatives and their effectiveness to the actual 
intrusion by police.  See Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶42.  Here, 
one possible alternative would have been to have Gracia's 
brother evaluate and monitor his safety.  While this appears 
sensible, 
the 
effectiveness 
of 
such 
an 
alternative 
is 
questionable in this situation.  Gracia's brother was very 
excited by this situation——so excited that he forcibly broke 
open Gracia's bedroom door.  It is unclear that he would have 
been able to safely administer care to an injured person or to 
get the help needed.  Additionally, police officers are trained 
to deal with situations like this, they were already there, and 
they believed that Gracia might be injured; therefore, although 
an alternative existed, it did not itself make this an 
unreasonable exercise of the community caretaker doctrine.   
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
18 
 
¶28 Gracia emphasizes the fact that while inside his 
bedroom, he yelled for the persons outside the door to "go 
away."  Gracia believes that this shows that the officers' 
community caretaker purpose was not bona fide, and also that it 
made what the police did unreasonable.  Therefore, he says, the 
second and third steps of the community caretaker exception 
analysis are not satisfied.  While the fact that Gracia told the 
police to go away does make this case distinguishable from 
Pinkard (where the occupants of the house were unresponsive to 
the police yelling), it does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the police could not exercise a community 
caretaker 
function 
under 
such 
circumstances. 
 
Gracia's 
responsiveness is not dispositive.  In Pinkard, the only reason 
the police had for thinking that the people needed assistance 
was the fact that they were sleeping next to drugs.  See id., 
¶39.  Here, as noted earlier, there was a serious car accident 
that the police were looking into.  Pinkard stressed the 
importance of the occupants' unresponsiveness because in that 
case, if the people were alert, there would have been no reason 
at all to think they would need any assistance.  Here, Gracia 
could still have been seriously hurt even though he wanted 
police to go away.13   
                                                 
13 In a footnote in his brief, Gracia states, "[e]ven if he 
had been injured, Mr. Gracia would have a constitutional right 
to decline unwanted medical assistance," citing Cruzan by Cruzan 
v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) and Lenz 
v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 63, 482 
N.W.2d 60 (1992).  Petitioner's Brief at 17 n.1.  This argument 
is undeveloped, and we do not usually address undeveloped 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
19 
 
¶29 The facts of this case, when balanced in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, lead us to the conclusion that 
this was a reasonable exercise of the community caretaker 
function.  The police were in the home by consent with 
legitimate concern for Gracia.  Although Gracia yelled through 
the door for them to "go away," Gracia's brother broke open the 
bedroom door.  The police crossed the threshold and immediately 
noticed Gracia's intoxication.  This is somewhat akin to a plain 
view situation: the person the police were concerned about was 
right in front of them, and they talked to him.14  This was a 
very different situation than if the police themselves had 
broken open the bedroom door to check on someone they thought 
was injured.  
                                                                                                                                                             
arguments.  See Saddle Ridge Corp. v. Board of Review for Town 
of Pacific, 2010 WI 47, ¶46 n.23, 325 Wis. 2d 29, 784 N.W.2d 
527.  Further, this assertion does not change our analysis of 
whether the police were exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker function and whether they reasonably exercised that 
function.   
14 The plain view exception to the warrant requirement 
requires four things:  
The police must have a prior justification for the 
intrusion which placed them in the position to observe 
the evidence in plain view, the evidence must be in 
plain view, the discovery must be inadvertent, and the 
item seized, in itself or in itself with facts known 
to the officer at the time of the seizure, provides 
probable cause to believe there is a connection 
between the evidence and criminal activity. 
State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 210, 252 N.W.2d 365 (1977).  
The situation the police found themselves in after Jaime Gracia 
broke open the door has many of the same characteristics of a 
plain view discovery.   
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
20 
 
¶30 Under the totality of the circumstances, the community 
caretaker exception to the warrant requirement resulted in 
permissible police conduct.  The community caretaker function 
was reasonably exercised by the police officers because the 
public interest in the search outweighed Gracia's privacy 
interests.   
B. Collateral Attack of 1998 Conviction  
¶31 Due to the fact that the charge was fourth-offense 
OWI, Gracia also collaterally attacks his 1998 no contest plea 
on the grounds that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel.   
¶32 At the July 6, 1998, plea hearing in the circuit court 
for Outagamie County, the Honorable Michael W. Gage presiding, 
Gracia pleaded no contest to second-offense operating with a 
prohibited alcohol content.  At the plea hearing, the ordinary 
question-answer colloquy found in Wis JI–Criminal SM-30 was not 
used.  Instead, the judge asked questions of Gracia and learned 
the following facts:  Gracia was 23 years old at the time, had 
graduated from high school, had attended some college, had been 
working the same job for three years, and was earning $11.50 per 
hour.  The judge also talked to Gracia about his rights, 
explaining that Gracia had a right to an attorney.  He asked if 
Gracia had decided to proceed pro se, explaining that Gracia may 
earn enough money to hire an attorney.  He further explained 
that Gracia may qualify for appointment of an attorney, and if 
he did not qualify, Gracia could still get an appointed lawyer 
but would need to reimburse the court for the costs of the 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
21 
 
appointed attorney.  The judge also confirmed that Gracia had 
not looked into obtaining counsel.  
¶33 On 
August 
3, 
2010, 
the 
circuit 
court 
held 
a 
collateral-attack hearing to determine if Gracia knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel before he pleaded no contest to his second OWI in 
1998.  Both Gracia and the State agree that Gracia made a prima 
facie showing that the 1998 waiver was invalid because the judge 
accepting the waiver of counsel did not use a colloquy which 
included an explanation of the ways that an attorney might be 
helpful to him.  In other words, there was not a significant 
explanation of the difficulties and disadvantages of self-
representation.  At the collateral attack hearing, Gracia stated 
that he did not hire an attorney in 1998 because he was guilty 
and the State had recommended the minimum.  Gracia also asserted 
that he did not know during the 1998 hearing that a lawyer could 
look into defenses other than innocence.  Gracia admitted that 
in 1998 he understood that a lawyer could "go to court" for him 
and 
that 
he 
had 
some 
familiarity 
with 
lawyers 
through 
television.  He was also aware of the O.J. Simpson trial. 
¶34 At the hearing, the circuit court found that Gracia's 
testimony was "forthright to an extent . . . [a]lthough somewhat 
self-serving when indicating that he had no idea what an 
attorney could do."  The court noted that Gracia had finished 
high school and did not have education deficiencies.  The 
circuit court stated:  
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
22 
 
I'm going to find in this case that he made the 
conscious decision.  He knew basically that a lawyer 
would be able to possibly help him out but he decided 
not to because he just didn't think that in the end 
result – it was more of a cost benefit analysis and 
that's why he didn't consider talking to the lawyer. 
Because of these findings, the circuit court held that Gracia 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to an 
attorney in his 1998 plea hearing; therefore, his collateral 
attack to his second OWI conviction failed, making the charge 
that he faced a fourth offense.  Gracia appealed.  The court of 
appeals affirmed.   
¶35 This court reviews de novo whether a defendant validly 
waived his or her right to counsel although we benefit from the 
analysis of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Ernst, 
283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶10.  This court illustrated the requirements 
for a valid waiver of counsel in Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194.   
To prove such a valid waiver of counsel, the circuit 
court must conduct a colloquy designed to ensure that 
the defendant: (1) made a deliberate choice to proceed 
without counsel, (2) was aware of the difficulties and 
disadvantages of self-representation, (3) was aware of 
the seriousness of the charge or charges against him, 
and (4) was aware of the general range of penalties 
that could have been imposed on him. 
Id. at 206.  A defendant makes a prima facie showing by showing 
a violation of these colloquy requirements and can then attempt 
to collaterally attack that prior conviction.  Ernst, 283 Wis. 
2d 300, ¶25.  After the prima facie case is made, the State must 
then prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was 
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Id., ¶27.   
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
23 
 
¶36 As noted above, the State and Gracia agree that he 
made a prima facie showing because the judge accepting his 
waiver did not sufficiently cover the requirements in the 
colloquy.  Gracia specifically challenges whether he was made 
aware 
of 
"the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation," and therefore did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in 1998.  Gracia 
cites Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), 
for the proposition that to satisfy that requirement he must 
"have an awareness of the technical rules governing the 
proceedings and an attorney's role during them."  Petitioner's 
Reply Brief at 9.  Pickens states only that the defendant must 
have "an awareness that there are technical rules . . . and that 
presenting a defense is not a simple matter of telling one's 
story." Id. at 563 (emphasis added).  We are persuaded by the 
court of appeals' recent interpretation of Pickens that the law 
requires that the defendant "understand the role counsel could 
play in the proceeding," not that the defendant must understand 
every possible defense.  State v. Schwandt, No. 2011AP2301-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶14 (Wis. Ct. App. May 16, 2012).   
¶37 The 1998 and 2010 hearings demonstrate that Gracia 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel in 1998.  At the 2010 hearing, Gracia explained that he 
did not hire an attorney in 1998 because he was guilty and the 
recommendation was for the minimum.  This demonstrates a 
calculated decision on Gracia's part not to spend the money to 
hire an attorney in such a situation.  The judge in 2010 found 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
24 
 
that 
Gracia's 
testimony 
was 
"somewhat 
self-serving 
when 
indicating that he had no idea what an attorney could do," 
pointing to the fact that Gracia had no educational deficiencies 
and he had completed high school and attended college briefly.  
Gracia testified 12 years after he initially waived his right to 
counsel, he had additional convictions in the intervening years, 
and at that point he faced an enhanced penalty for his 1998 
conviction.  We agree with the circuit court's determination 
that when he waived his right to counsel Gracia made a cost-
benefit decision and knew what he was giving up.   
¶38 Gracia also briefly raises the point that the court in 
1998 did not make a finding of competency to proceed pro se.  As 
the court of appeals noted, he does not argue that he was not 
competent to proceed pro se.  There is nothing in the record 
that would support such a determination.  Gracia graduated from 
high school and attended college for a brief period of time 
studying engineering.  He does not appear to have any problems 
that would cause him to lack competence to proceed pro se.  
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 212.  
¶39 Because he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel, his waiver was valid, and the prior 
conviction stands.    
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶40 We hold that the circuit court properly denied 
Gracia's motion to suppress.  The test for the community 
caretaker exception was recently laid out by this court in 
Pinkard and looks at whether a search or seizure took place, 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
25 
 
whether the police exercised a bona fide community caretaker 
function, and whether the intrusion was reasonable based on the 
attendant circumstances.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶29.  Here, 
the police were following up on a major single-vehicle accident 
which left the front end of the car driven by Gracia extensively 
damaged and a traffic pole completely knocked down.  They 
validly entered the home on consent of Gracia's brother and 
after his brother broke open Gracia's bedroom door, without any 
prompting by the police, reasonably exercised their community 
caretaker function when they crossed the threshold into Gracia's 
bedroom.  The police acted on their concern that Gracia might 
have sustained a significant injury in the auto accident.  Given 
these facts, the warrantless search was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶41 We further hold that despite a technically deficient 
plea colloquy, Gracia knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel before he pleaded no contest to his 
second OWI in 1998, a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) 
(1997-98), operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration.  
He understood the difficulties and disadvantages of self-
representation.  He had familiarity with the role of lawyers, 
and he made a cost-benefit decision not to hire an attorney 
because he was guilty and the district attorney offered him the 
minimum penalty.  The circuit court properly denied the 
collateral attack of his earlier conviction and thus considered 
No. 
2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814  
 
26 
 
the 1998 conviction in determining that Gracia had three prior 
relevant convictions. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Prosser's dissent.  I write separately to discuss the 
interplay of the consent doctrine and the community caretaker 
function.  I recognize that consent and community caretaker are 
two distinct exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement.   
¶43 An unaddressed issue in the present case is how the 
defendant's unequivocal refusal to permit the search of his 
bedroom 
affects 
the 
community 
caretaker 
analysis. 
 
More 
specifically, I ask whether the community caretaker exception 
can justify a warrantless search when there is an explicit and 
unequivocal refusal by the defendant to permit entry so that he 
may be taken care of——thus thwarting the justification for the 
community caretaker exception. 
¶44 The defendant clearly and explicitly told police 
officers to "go away."  This is the same unequivocal refusal to 
permit entry at the threshold for which the United States 
Supreme Court rendered a warrantless search unreasonable in 
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).   
¶45 Notwithstanding the unaddressed issue of the effect of 
refusal on the analysis of the caretaker function, in the 
present case, we have neither consent nor a valid community 
caretaker exception. 
¶46 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DAVID T. PROSSER join this opinion. 
 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶47 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The primary 
issue presented in this case is whether police entry into the 
defendant's bedroom without a warrant was lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment.1  The majority concludes that the entry, 
resulting in a search and an arrest, was permitted by the 
community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement.  I 
disagree and respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶48 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads as follows:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.   
¶49 Although the Fourth Amendment protects a variety of 
privacy interests in a variety of settings, the chief evil 
identified in the text is the unauthorized physical entry of a 
person's home.  United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 
U.S. 297, 313 (1972).   
                                                 
1 This court has ordinarily interpreted the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
as 
coextensive.  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶28, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 
786 N.W.2d 430, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010) (citing 
State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶20, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 
N.W.2d 182).  Hence, the analysis in this dissent also applies 
to Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶50 Warrantless searches are deemed per se unreasonable, 
"subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions."2  Thus, police may not enter a person's 
home without a warrant unless they are operating under one of 
the well-delineated exceptions.  This is true even when a person 
in the home would be subject to arrest without a warrant if the 
person stepped outside. 
¶51 The most obvious exceptions to the warrant requirement 
for the search of a home are consent3 and exigent circumstances,4 
including 
hot 
pursuit. 
 
The 
warrantless 
search 
of 
a 
probationer's home by a probation officer also is an established 
exception.5  None of these exceptions apply to the search of the 
defendant's bedroom in this case. 
¶52 Thus, the police rely on another exception: community 
caretaker.  The community caretaker exception allows law 
enforcement officers, under certain circumstances, to use 
                                                 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (footnotes 
omitted); see also Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶29 (citing State v. 
Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶11, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371). 
3 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  When 
relying upon consent to justify a lawful search, the government 
"has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely 
and voluntarily given."  Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).  This court has adopted the 
Schneckloth standard for voluntariness.  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 
¶32 (citing State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 
N.W.2d 794 (1998)). 
4 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (citing 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948)); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967).   
5 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).  
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
3 
 
evidence they acquire while they are conducting "preventative 
patrol," "assist[ing] those who cannot care for themselves," 
"creat[ing] and maintain[ing] a feeling of security in the 
community," and "provid[ing] other services on an emergency 
basis."6  3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.6, at 595 
(5th ed. 2012) (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1–
2.2 (2d ed. 1980)).  The evolution of this exception in 
Wisconsin case law is instructive. 
¶53 The seminal case for the community caretaker principle 
is Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).  In Cady, a case 
with Wisconsin origins, police officers arrested the defendant 
for drunk driving after a one-car accident.  Id. at 435–36.  The 
defendant informed the officers that he was a Chicago police 
officer, and the local officers began to act on the belief that 
"Chicago police officers were required by regulation to carry 
their service revolvers at all times."  Id. at 436.  The 
officers' initial check of the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle and of the defendant's person did not produce a 
revolver.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, police had the defendant's 
car towed from the accident scene to a privately owned garage.  
Id.  Later, an officer returned to the car to continue looking 
                                                 
6 See also State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 169 n.3, 417 
N.W.2d 411 (1987) (citing State v. Chisholm, 696 P.2d 41, 43 
(Wash. App. 1985)) (describing community caretaking functions as 
law enforcement performing services in addition to traditional 
enforcement activities).   
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
4 
 
for the service revolver.7  Id. at 436–37.  While examining the 
passenger compartment, the officer spotted an object with blood 
on it, and then found more evidence of a possible crime in the 
car's trunk.  Id. at 437.   
¶54 At his first-degree murder trial, the defendant argued 
that certain evidence found in the passenger compartment and 
trunk when the local officer searched for the service revolver 
was unconstitutionally seized.  See id. at 434.  The Supreme 
Court ultimately disagreed, holding that law enforcement's 
actions in towing the vehicle and attempting to locate the 
service revolver did not require a warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Court said: 
Because of the extensive regulation of motor 
vehicles 
and 
traffic, 
and 
also 
because 
of 
the 
frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or 
involved in an accident on public highways, the extent 
of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will 
be substantially greater than police-citizen contact 
in a home or office.  Some such contacts will occur 
because the officer may believe the operator has 
violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be 
of that nature.  Local police officers, unlike federal 
officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in 
which there is no claim of criminal liability and 
engage in what, for want of a better term, may be 
described as community caretaking functions, totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute. 
Id. at 441 (emphasis added).   
                                                 
7 Police officers attempted to retrieve the revolver "to 
protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would 
fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands."  Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973). 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶55 Cady stressed the "distinction between motor vehicles 
and dwelling places."  Id. at 447.  This distinction was 
repeated in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976), 
where the Court observed that it had "traditionally drawn a 
distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in relation 
to the Fourth Amendment."  Thus, "warrantless examinations of 
automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in which a search 
of a home or office would not."  Id. (citations omitted).  As a 
result, numerous courts have ruled that the community caretaker 
exception applies only to motor vehicle searches.  LaFave, 
§ 6.6, at 595 n.4 (citing Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170 
(3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982)).  
However, when this court recognized the community caretaker 
exception for the first time in Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 
471, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), it applied the exception to a much 
different set of facts than those in Cady.   
¶56 In Bies, a police officer patrolled an alley in the 
middle of the night in response to a noise complaint about a 
garage in the alley.  Id. at 460–61.  A light in a garage went 
out as the officer's car approached.  Id. at 461.  Because the 
main door of the garage was shut, the officer walked to the rear 
of the garage where he found an open doorway with a missing 
door.  Id.  After shining his flashlight into the garage, the 
officer saw 25 to 50 feet of three-inch telephone cable on the 
ground.  Id.  He went back to his car to inform police 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
6 
 
headquarters.  Id. at 461–62.  After another officer arrived, 
the officers went into the garage, took a piece of the cable, 
and left.  Id. at 462.    The officers realized that they had 
stumbled upon cable that only telephone companies could legally 
obtain.  Id. at 475.   
¶57 The Bies court stated that the community caretaker 
exception justified the first officer checking on the noise 
complaint and going from the alley to the rear of the garage——in 
the curtilage of the defendant's home——to further investigate 
the source of the reported noise.  Id. at 471.  "Checking noise 
complaints bears little in common with investigation of crime," 
the court said.  Id.  Thus, it was not unreasonable for the 
officer to walk to the rear of the garage, where he discovered 
the rear door missing, rather than stop at the closed overhead 
automobile door.  Id. at 472.  At that point, the officer was 
justified in going into the open garage under the plain view 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement, 
not 
the 
community 
caretaker exception.  Id. at 471–72.  In other words, the 
community caretaker exception brought the officer in Bies to the 
threshold of the garage door in the curtilage of the home, but 
it was the plain view exception that allowed officers to cross 
the threshold into the garage.   
¶58 The court of appeals examined the community caretaker 
function ten years later in State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 
417 N.W.2d 411 (1987).  Two police officers noticed Anderson's 
vehicle approaching their car while they were on patrol.  Id. at 
164.  One of the officers had previously received complaints 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
7 
 
about Anderson parking his car in private parking spots, so that 
the officer wanted to talk to him about this issue.  Id. at 164–
65. When Anderson turned away down an alley, the officers 
followed and pulled him over.  Id. at 165.  After Anderson 
stopped, the officers noticed that he was trying to conceal 
something, and they saw a leather object protruding from under 
the seat.  Id.  The officers ordered Anderson out of the car and 
found a loaded gun and several knives after a search of the car.  
Id.  Like Bies, the Anderson facts involved routine police 
conduct, not focused examination of criminal activity, that led 
inadvertently to the discovery of criminal evidence.   
¶59 The court of appeals in Anderson set out a three-step 
test for evaluating claims of community caretaker functions:  
[W]hen a community caretaker function is asserted as 
justification for the seizure of a person, the trial 
court must determine: (1) that a seizure within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred; (2) if 
so, whether the police conduct was bona fide community 
caretaker activity; and (3) if so, whether the public 
need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the 
privacy of the individual. 
As to the last factor——weighing the public need 
and 
interest 
against 
the 
intrusion——relevant 
considerations include: (1) the degree of the public 
interest and the exigency of the situation; (2) the 
attendant 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
seizure, 
including 
time, 
location, 
the 
degree 
of 
overt 
authority 
and 
force 
displayed; 
(3) 
whether 
an 
automobile is involved; and (4) the availability, 
feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives to the 
type of intrusion actually accomplished. 
Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d at 169–70 (footnotes omitted).   
¶60 In State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 
626 N.W.2d 777, this court applied the community caretaker 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
8 
 
exception, leading to the warrantless search or pat-down of a 
juvenile.  Two police officers found Kelsey alone in the dark in 
a high-crime area of Milwaukee and they were concerned that she 
was a runaway.  Id., ¶1.  She had her hood up and was huddled in 
front of a closed store.  Id., ¶4.  The officers asked Kelsey 
some questions and thought that her answers were evasive.  Id., 
¶5.  They told her to stay where she was, but she fled.  Id.  
The officers caught up to Kelsey, and later called a female 
officer to conduct a pat-down search, before giving the juvenile 
a ride home in a squad car.  Id., ¶¶6–7.  To the officers' 
surprise, the pat-down search revealed a loaded handgun.  Id., 
¶7.  Kelsey moved the circuit court to suppress the results of 
the search.  Id., ¶8.  The court held that the initial encounter 
with Kelsey was not a seizure but that if it was, it was 
permissible under the community caretaker exception.  Id., ¶51. 
¶61 The lead opinion in Kelsey C.R. applied the three-step 
process laid out by the court of appeals in Anderson.  Id., 
¶¶36–37.  The lead opinion assumed for the purposes of analysis 
that a seizure of the juvenile occurred within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, satisfying step one of the three-step 
test.  Id., ¶36.  In considering step two, the juvenile 
apparently conceded "that the police were, at least at some 
point, performing a bona fide community caretaker activity by 
checking to see if Kelsey was a runaway."  Id.  Finally, in 
considering the four factors within the third step of the test, 
the Kelsey C.R. court concluded that the public need and 
interest 
outweighed 
the 
privacy 
of 
Kelsey. 
 
Id., 
¶37.  
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
9 
 
Specifically, the court pointed to the strong public interest in 
locating runaway children, the discovery of a juvenile alone in 
a dangerous neighborhood after dark, the lack of alternatives to 
the officers asking the juvenile direct questions about her 
situation, and her disobedience of their order to "stay put."  
Id.  Thus, the lead opinion determined there was a valid 
exercise of the community caretaker exception to a warrantless 
seizure of an individual.   
¶62 Eight years later, in State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, this court once again applied the 
community caretaker exception in the context of an automobile 
parked on the side of a county road.  The hazard lights were 
flashing on Kramer's vehicle, which was legally parked on the 
side of the highway after dark.  Id., ¶4.  A sheriff's deputy 
activated his police car’s emergency lights and stopped behind 
Kramer’s vehicle so that he could check to make sure Kramer was 
all right.  Id., ¶5.  The deputy walked up to Kramer's vehicle 
and asked if Kramer needed help.  Id., ¶7.  Kramer's response 
suggested that he was intoxicated, so the deputy arrested him.  
Id.  Kramer moved to suppress evidence of his intoxication on 
the ground that the deputy had seized him without probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion.  Id., ¶8.   
¶63 In Kramer, we concluded that the "totally divorced" 
language in Cady did not require that the attending officer must 
rule out any possibility of criminal activity before the 
community caretaking action is bona fide——the second step of the 
Anderson test.  Id., ¶¶21, 30.  Rather, we held "that in a 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
10 
 
community caretaker context, when under the totality of the 
circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the community 
caretaker function is shown, that determination is not negated 
by the officer's subjective law enforcement concerns."  Id., 
¶30.  "To conclude otherwise would ignore the multifaceted 
nature of police work and force police officers to let down 
their guard and unnecessarily expose themselves to dangerous 
conditions."  Id., ¶33 (citation omitted).  Furthermore, the 
Kramer court, noting that Kelsey C.R. used the Anderson test in 
its community caretaker analysis, specifically adopted the 
three-part test.  Id., ¶21 n.8. 
¶64 After considering all three steps of the test, the 
Kramer court concluded that the sheriff's deputy had an 
objectively reasonable basis for stopping his car behind the 
defendant's car parked on the side of a road.  Id., ¶¶36–37.  
Furthermore, the deputy's first contact with the defendant was 
an offer of help.  Id., ¶37.   
¶65 In State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592, 
this 
court 
revisited 
the 
community 
caretaker 
exception.  In that case, Milwaukee police received an anonymous 
tip about a house where two people were reported to be sleeping 
next to cocaine, money, and a digital scale, while the rear door 
was standing open.  Id., ¶2.  Five officers from the Gang Crimes 
Unit of the Milwaukee Police Department responded to the tip and 
investigated, although one of the responding officers admitted 
that the residence "sounded like a drug house."  Id., ¶3.  The 
officers knocked on the open rear door, announced their 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
11 
 
presence, and waited 30–45 seconds.  Id., ¶¶3–4.  Receiving no 
response, the officers entered the residence, saw the sleeping 
individuals, and again loudly announced police presence.  Id., 
¶5.  Again, there was no response.  Id.  When the officers 
entered the bedroom, they saw cocaine, money, and a scale, just 
as the anonymous tipster had described.  Id.  The officers 
arrested one of the sleeping individuals, Pinkard, and seized 
evidence in plain view and a gun under the mattress.  Id.   
 
¶66 The circuit court denied Pinkard's motion to suppress 
a majority of the seized evidence because the officers' entry 
into the residence was a lawful community caretaker function; 
the court found the officer's testimony at the suppression 
hearing to be credible in that the officers were "'inquir[ing] 
as to the health and safety of the individuals that were 
sleeping.'"  Id., ¶7.   
¶67 The Pinkard majority affirmed the circuit court and 
court of appeals, determining that there was a valid exercise of 
the community caretaker function.  Id., ¶¶10-11.  Applying 
Anderson's three-step test, the majority first concluded that a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred.  
Id., ¶30.  Second, although "this is a close case," the court 
also concluded that there had been a bona fide community 
caretaker function because police received a reliable anonymous 
tip, the police were concerned about the welfare of the 
occupants, the information contained in the tip was true, and no 
one responded to the officers announcing their presence.  Id., 
¶¶32–33.  On the facts of the case, the majority contended, an 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
12 
 
officer would be reasonably concerned about the possibility of a 
drug overdose.  Id., ¶35.  Finally, the Pinkard majority 
determined that the exercise of the community caretaker function 
was reasonable.  Id., ¶60.  Essentially, the officers were faced 
with the possible exigencies of a drug overdose and individuals 
unable to look after themselves, no overt force was used, and no 
feasible alternatives existed.  Id., ¶¶46–60.   
¶68 However, three members of the court were unwilling to 
go along with this expansion of the community caretaker 
exception. 
 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
¶98 
(Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting).  The Pinkard dissenters noted that, for the first 
time, this court expanded the community caretaker exception to a 
warrantless entry and search of a home.  Id.   
¶69 The Pinkard dissent contended that the officers' 
alleged concern about the safety of the occupants was really 
following up a complaint about criminal activity.  Id., ¶83.  
Thus, the officers entered the Pinkard residence to conduct an 
investigation, not to perform a community caretaker function.  
Finally, the dissent argued that the execution of any community 
caretaker function in Pinkard's case was unreasonable: the entry 
was invasive and "consistent with a drug bust rather than a 
rescue."  Id., ¶¶95–96.  Additionally, the dissent observed that 
the officers did not seem to consider any alternatives to a 
warrantless entry.  Id., ¶96.   
¶70 This 
historical review shows that the community 
caretaker exception was first recognized in the unsuspecting 
search of a towed vehicle.  Until our decision in Pinkard, this 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
13 
 
court had never justified an unwarranted, unrequested police 
entry of a home on a community caretaker basis.  What appeared 
to some members of the Pinkard court as a significant departure 
from the core principles of the exception is now being stretched 
and extended even more. 
II 
¶71 In this case, a Menasha police officer, Matthew Lenss, 
was dispatched to investigate a yellow traffic light pole that 
was down at an important intersection.  He found a dislodged 
license plate at the site of the smashed pole.  A computer check 
showed that the plate belonged to a Buick Regal owned by Jesus 
Gracia-Valenzuela.  Police went to three different addresses 
attempting to find the owner.  At the third address, they were 
told that the vehicle they were searching for was usually driven 
by Juan Gracia (Juan) who lived at an address on Wendy Way. 
¶72 At that address officers found the vehicle with 
extensive front-end damage, streaks of yellow paint, and a 
missing license plate.  The officer looked inside the vehicle 
but saw no blood.  The windshield was intact.  The airbags had 
not been deployed. 
¶73 The officer later testified that at this point, based 
on his experience, the possibility that an accident had been 
caused by an intoxicated driver "would be in the back of [his] 
mind."  Thus, the police had evidence of a driver who hit and 
damaged public property but fled the scene without reporting an 
accident, and they suspected that the driver had been drinking.   
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶74 At the residence the police attempted to make contact 
with someone inside, but there were no lights on and no one 
answered the door.  Just as police were getting ready to leave, 
Jaime Gracia (Jaime) drove up to the residence.  Jaime informed 
the police that he lived at the residence with his brother Juan, 
that Juan normally drove the Buick Regal, and that he believed 
Juan was inside the residence. 
¶75 Police asked Jaime if they could go inside the 
residence to make sure Juan was okay "based on the damage to the 
vehicle."  Jaime told the officers to wait outside while he went 
inside the residence.  Shortly thereafter, Jaime came back out 
and gave police permission to enter the residence.  It was 
approximately 9:20 p.m. when police entered——nearly 40 minutes 
after police were dispatched to investigate the downed traffic 
light pole. 
¶76 Jaime led police to a closed bedroom door.  On the 
other side of the door, Juan was yelling in Spanish and English 
that he wanted everyone to "go away."  Officer Lenss testified 
that both he and Jaime tried to open the bedroom door, but it 
was locked.8  Officer Lenss then testified that Jaime, without 
prompting from the police, put his shoulder to the bedroom door 
and forced it open.  Almost immediately, police crossed the 
threshold of the door into the bedroom and discovered Juan lying 
on the bed. 
                                                 
8 While Jaime gave police permission to come into the common 
areas of the house, neither Jaime nor Juan gave police 
permission to open the bedroom door. 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶77 Officer Lenss testified that it was difficult to 
understand what Juan was saying, but that he could tell Juan 
"was highly intoxicated."  Juan's breath smelled of intoxicants, 
his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred.  Juan 
admitted to the police that he drove the white Buick Regal.  
Officer Lenss administered several tests both inside and outside 
of the residence to determine Juan's level of intoxication.  
After failing several of these tests, Juan was placed under 
arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 
¶78 Several major points are evident from these facts. 
¶79 First, this case involves the entry of a private 
bedroom, not the search of a motor vehicle.  Warrantless entry 
of a residence is more suspect and subject to stricter scrutiny 
than entry and search of a motor vehicle.  State v. Ultsch, 2011 
WI App 17, ¶18, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505 (citing Pinkard, 
327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶20).   
¶80 Second, police did not enter the bedroom with consent.  
On the contrary, Juan loudly told the officers to go away.  This 
fact 
distinguishes 
Juan's 
case 
from 
Pinkard, 
where 
the 
inhabitants of the house did not respond at all to the loud 
announcement of police presence.   
¶81 Third, Juan never opened a door.  He did not answer 
the door when the police came to his residence, and he locked 
the door to his bedroom.  This distinguishes this case from 
Pinkard, where the door to the house was open and the door to 
the bedroom was open.   
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶82 Fourth, although the door to Juan's bedroom was open 
when the police entered, it was open only because Jaime forced 
it open.  Jaime had authority to invite the officers into the 
house,9 but he did not have authority to invite police to enter 
Juan's bedroom.10  A person who lacks authority to consent to an 
entry does not gain authority by forcing in a door.   
¶83 Fifth, the officers were investigating one offense and 
suspected the commission of another——drunk driving.  They 
pursued the driver of the hit-and-run vehicle to four different 
addresses.  No argument can be made that their actions were 
"totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute."  Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. 
¶84 Sixth, although the officers repeatedly professed 
concern about the driver's medical condition, their expressions 
of concern always facilitated the investigation of the accident.  
Their expressions of concern helped them learn the identity of 
the driver and obtain his home address.  They helped induce the 
cooperation of Jaime.  There is no evidence, however, that the 
officers ever contacted local hospitals to see if a patient 
named Juan Gracia had come to the emergency room.11  When they 
                                                 
9 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).   
10 See State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 
(1998) (father-in-law lacked authority to consent to search of 
loft area above garage that was under exclusive control of 
defendant and wife); State v. Amrine, 157 Wis. 2d 778, 783, 460 
N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1990) (police invited into home are 
presumed limited to the room they are brought into).   
11 The distance between the accident site and Juan's home——
about two miles——is the same distance to the nearest hospital.   
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
17 
 
entered the residence with consent, they knew that Jaime was 
there to help his brother if his brother needed help.  They 
never asked Juan personally if he needed medical assistance and 
did not see anything in the bedroom that impelled them to enter 
the room to provide medical assistance.  In short, a crime-
investigating, crime-solving purpose dominated any other purpose 
in the officers' conduct, thereby disqualifying the police from 
using the community caretaker exception. 
¶85 In terms of the traditional Anderson test: 
1. 
A search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment occurred when the police entered a private bedroom 
without a warrant and without consent to obtain evidence of a 
crime and obtained evidence that would justify the arrest of the 
defendant. 
2. 
Even if a portion of police conduct could be described 
as "bona fide community caretaker activity," that portion was 
completely overshadowed by the law enforcement objectives of 
finding and arresting the person responsible for the traffic 
light pole accident.  At some point before police entered Juan's 
bedroom, any "objective reasonable basis" to believe that Juan 
needed medical assistance disappeared. 
3. 
The public need and interest did not outweigh the 
intrusion into the privacy of the defendant in his bedroom.   
A. 
The police had Juan cold on a hit-and-run.  They 
could have asked him to come out of his bedroom to discuss the 
accident.  If he refused, they could have attempted to get a 
warrant while they stayed in the house.  They had a witness in 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
18 
 
Jaime, who could have testified as to his brother's sobriety.  
There was simply no exigency that justified bursting into the 
bedroom. 
 
B. 
In addition, the search and seizure occurred in a 
private residence.  The police knew they could not enter the 
house without permission and did not.  They tried the bedroom 
door but knew they could not themselves break it in.  When Jaime 
acted, they abandoned their caution and barged in. 
 
C. 
No automobile was involved in the search of the 
bedroom. 
D. 
Alternatives were available, starting with a 
simple request to come out and talk.  If Juan did not comply, 
again, the officers could have obtained a warrant for entry into 
the bedroom.   
¶86 As noted above, warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.  The Supreme Court has declared that 
these exceptions "have been jealously and carefully drawn."  
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).  They must be 
"confined in scope," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968), and 
"strictly circumscribed."  La Fournier v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 61, 
68, 280 N.W.2d 746 (1979) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26). 
¶87 The dogged determination of the Menasha officers to 
find and arrest the person responsible for the light pole 
accident is expected and completely commendable.  However, this 
laudable objective is necessarily governed by traditional Fourth 
No.  2011AP813-CR & 2011AP814.dtp 
 
19 
 
Amendment principles.  A legitimate end did not justify the 
means employed with respect to warrantless entry of the bedroom. 
¶88 The community caretaker exception to the warrant 
requirement is sound constitutional doctrine and will be 
vigorously defended so long as it is applied within reasonable 
limits.  These limits protect individual liberty and preserve 
the interests of law enforcement.  When the community caretaker 
exception is applied without these limits, both liberty and the 
interests of law enforcement are bound to suffer. 
¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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