Title: STATE ex rel. STATE INSURANCE FUND v. JOA, INC.
Citation: 2003 OK 82, 78 P.3d 534
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 2003

STATE ex rel. STATE INSURANCE FUND v. JOA, INC. Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. STATE INSURANCE FUND v. JOA, INC. 2003 OK 82 78 P.3d 534 Case Number: 96157 Decided: 10/07/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. STATE INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff/Appellant, ON CERTIORARI TO THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I ¶0 The State Insurance Fund brought an action against an employer in the District Court of Oklahoma County for allegedly unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums. After a bench trial the Honorable Glenn M. Jones, Judge of the District Court, denied relief to the Fund, and thereafter granted the employer's motion for attorney's fees and costs against the State Insurance Fund. The Fund appealed the post-judgment order awarding attorney's fees and costs. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, affirmed. The Fund sought certiorari. We hold that CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEES GRANTED W. Rogers Abbott, Abbott & Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Plaintiff/Appellant. Micah D. Knight, Duncan, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellee. SUMMERS, J. ¶1 The controversy involves an action brought by the State Insurance Fund ¶2 The State Insurance Fund appealed the post-judgment order granting attorney's fees and costs. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, affirmed the award. The Fund then sought certiorari in this Court. ¶3 JOA's motion in the trial court for attorney's fees and costs was based upon The trial court determined that: . . . [T]hat the Fund, in filing this lawsuit, was not acting in a governmental; or sovereign capacity. Instead, the Fund was acting in a private or proprietary capacity, in the same manner as any other private insurance company. Therefore, the standard of § 941 is inapplicable to determining whether attorney's fees and costs should be awarded. The Court, however, finds that the Fund was not acting in a frivolous manner or without a reasonable basis in bringing this lawsuit. The Court then accepted the parties stipulation that The State Insurance Fund argues on appeal and on certiorari that the trial court committed error by awarding attorney's fees pursuant to § 936 because the Fund possesses sovereign immunity. ¶4 Generally, Oklahoma does not allow awarding attorneys fees based upon prevailing party status unless such fees are provided for by statute or by contract. ¶5 But in the District Court the Fund stipulated that § 936 applied to this controversy. On certiorari JOA argues that the Fund is now attacking its own stipulation, and that it may not do so. JOA argues that this case is different from State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., ¶6 Generally, stipulations as to facts are binding upon the parties and the courts. State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, ¶7 Personal and private rights may be waived, but law involving the power or structure of government may not be waived. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, I. Sovereign Immunity and ¶8 First, we identify the particular cause of action involved in a controversy, and then determine if immunity bars that type of action. For example, in Sholer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, ¶9 The State Insurance Fund is an "agency" for the purpose of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (51 O.S.2001 § 151 et seq.), and thus possesses sovereign immunity from certain tort actions. Fehring v. State Insurance Fund, ¶10 The State Insurance Fund possesses statutory authority to sue and be sued in state courts. ¶11 In the case before use today the State Insurance Fund brought a cause of action that was based upon alleged contractual obligations of the Fund and its insured. Further, the cause of action was expressly authorized by statute. ¶12 Generally, when a state agency does not possess sovereign immunity with respect to a particular cause of action, then general procedural statutes that apply to that particular cause of action also apply when that action is brought against the state entity. For example, in Sholer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, supra, in addition to concluding that the Governmental Tort Claims Act did not apply to a non-tort action brought against a state agency, we also concluded that a general statute of limitations, ¶13 This concept has also applied when assessing litigation costs. We have said that a state agency must be responsible for the "usual incidents of litigation that fall upon private litigants," and pay costs when the Legislature vests authority in the agency to sue or be sued in the courts of this State. Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, ¶14 It is correct that in State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Marshall, ¶15 Although sovereign immunity does not, as a general principle, bar application of ¶16 Section 936 does not expressly mention actions involving state agencies. It states as follows: In any civil action to recover on an open account, a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject to the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 12 O.S.2001 § 936. Section 941 expressly mentions state agencies and it states in pertinent part as follows: A. The defendant in any civil action brought in any court of this state by any state agency, board, commission, department, authority or bureau authorized to make rules or formulate orders shall be entitled to recover against such state entity court costs, witness fees and reasonable attorney fees if the court determines that the action was brought without reasonable basis or is frivolous. This subsection shall apply to any action commenced on or after October 1, 1982. 12 O.S.2001 § 941(A), emphasis added. While this statute expressly mentions state agencies, it does not mention sovereign immunity or other statutes allowing attorney's fees. ¶17 The argument of the Fund is that the State enjoys a sovereign immunity from paying attorney's fees unless waived to the extent allowed in § 941. Governmental immunity is established by statute. Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, 672 P.2d 1153 , 1157. The Fund must point to some statute that creates this immunity to paying attorney's fees. The Fund relies upon Fehring v. State Insurance Fund, supra. But that case involved sovereign immunity from tort actions and the Governmental Tort Claims Act, § 151 et seq., and an injured worker's claim couched in contract but which was barred by the exclusivity of the remedy afforded employers by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act (WCA). See, Fehring, at ¶¶ 30, 31, 19 P.3d at 285-286. Fehring provides no support for the Fund's claim that it enjoys some type of sovereign immunity in the case before us today. ¶18 The Fund also cites State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services on Behalf of Michael Aaron by McBride v. Perkins, 1995 OK CIV APP 42, 893 P.2d 1019 , 1020, in which that court determined that § 941 did not apply to paternity actions brought by the State. Thereafter in 1997 the Legislature amended 10 O.S. § 89.3 so as to make § 941 applicable to paternity actions. The Fund argues that this amendment shows a legislative intent that § 941 was meant to be a limitation on attorney's fee awards against the State. ¶19 The 1997 amendment does not support the Fund's position, but rather detracts from it. The Legislature did not amend § 941 so as to make it the only attorney's fee statute applicable to every type of cause of action the State or an agency thereof may bring in a District Court. Rather, the Legislature amended a statute relating to a particular cause of action, and made § 941 applicable to that particular cause of action. Further, the amendment occurred after our opinion in Sholer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, supra, where we explained that statute of general application, there a statute of limitations, would apply to an action in the District Court involving a state agency. ¶20 We follow the plain meaning of a statute except in the rare case when literal construction produces a result demonstrably at odds with legislative intent. Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302 , 307. The plain meaning of the language used is that a state agency will be liable for court costs, witness fees and reasonable attorney fees if the court determines that the action was brought without reasonable basis or is frivolous. The plain meaning is that § 941 is a statute of general application, and applies to all actions in the same manner that other statutes of general application also apply to state agencies when they are properly before a District Court. No language in § 941 states that other general or specific statutes on attorney's fees are supplanted by § 941, and we decline to judicially create a governmental immunity from attorney's fees as urged by the State Insurance Fund. II. The Fund's Stipulation and Application of ¶21 We have addressed and rejected the Fund's arguments that sovereign immunity and the alleged exclusivity of § 941 bar the award of attorney's fees and costs against the Fund. We recently released our opinion in State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., ¶22 Generally, a public official acts for the public entity the official represents, and "binds" that entity to those acts. See, e.g., D'Yarmett v. School Dist. No. 27, ¶23 The act that is before us is a stipulation by counsel for a public entity. Counsel may not waive a constitutional mandate relating to the structure of government, such as the location of a District Court. City of Clinton ex rel. Richardson v. Cornell, ¶24 In Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, A party on appeal cannot take a position inconsistent with that maintained before a trial tribunal. While this court may decide a public-law case on dispositive issues, it will not relieve a party of a solemn commitment to a position argued both below and on appeal unless it is so contrary to the applicable law that it would amount to an ultra vires act. We hence hold that the Commission is bound in this case (1) by the Income Tax Division's pre-Harper position, below and on appeal, that Taxpayers are entitled to a refund of overpayment if Davis is retroactive, and (2) by its procedural posture below that the statutory scheme does allow Taxpayers to seek a timely refund of taxes voluntarily paid under a clearly unconstitutional statute. The Commission now attempts to relitigate the remedial correctness of the refund claims on inconsistent theories. It has lulled these Taxpayers into a false sense of security by inducing their belief that the voluntary overpayments claimed to be due would be refunded if Harper gave retroactive effect to Davis. The Commission will not be heard--at this late hour--to deny liability upon a changed interpretation of the state's remedial regime for refunds. The government stands before us on the footing of an ordinary appellee. It will not receive a more favorable treatment than that afforded other appellate litigants in a similar situation. Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Commission ¶25 In the present controversy the Fund filed an action against JOA claiming that it was entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to § 936. We explain in State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., supra, that the non-application of § 936 is based upon the nature of the obligation being enforced, i.e., an express contract for insurance. The non-application of § 936 has no connection to the fact that the Fund is a state entity. The Fund stands before us on the footing of an ordinary appellant. It litigated the application of § 936 before the trial court based upon the stipulation that § 936 would apply to the Fund but for § 941. The Fund has pointed to no authority that its counsel acted ultra vires and thus without power to stipulate to the applicability of § 936. ¶26 The trial court made a finding that the Fund stipulated that § 936 applies to this controversy. The Fund does not point to any evidence or argument before the trial court challenging that finding, or make any argument on appeal that the finding of the stipulation is in error. We conclude that the Fund is bound by that stipulation in this case, although we note the result is inconsistent with that established by our opinion in State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., supra. ¶27 The prevailing party in a § 936 case shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees. GRP of Texas, Inc. v. Eateries, Inc., ¶28 The Opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated, the post-judgment order of the District Court awarding attorney's fees is affirmed, the motion by JOA for reasonable appeal-related attorney's fees is granted, and the trial court shall determine the amount of such fees for appeal and certiorari upon remand. ¶29 OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Concur ¶30 WATT, C.J., KAUGER, J. - Concur in part, dissent in part. FOOT