Title: In Care & Protection of M.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12652
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12652 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF M.C. 
 
 
 
Franklin-Hampshire.     March 4, 2019. - October 28, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Impoundment.  Minor, Care and protection.  Parent and Child, 
Care and protection of minor.  Constitutional Law, 
Impoundment order, Waiver of constitutional rights, Self-
incrimination.  Witness, Self-incrimination.  Evidence, 
Communication between patient and psychotherapist, 
Testimony at prior proceeding.  Practice, Civil, Care and 
protection proceeding, Impoundment order, Waiver.  
Practice, Criminal, Impoundment order, Waiver.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Franklin and Hampshire Counties 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on May 5, 2015. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 479 Mass. 246 (2018), 
motions for relief from impoundment were heard by James G. 
Collins, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeanne M. Kaiser for the mother. 
 
Mark H. Bluver (John R. Godleski also present) for the 
father. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
 
David J. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the child. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we consider the application of 
the standard set forth in Care & Protection of M.C., 479 
Mass. 246, 248-249 (2018) (M.C. I), governing requests for 
limited relief from impoundment of records in a care and 
protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court by a party in a 
related criminal proceeding.  In M.C. I, supra, we concluded 
that "the requestor bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
records should be released under the good cause standard of Rule 
7 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure." 
 
When the matter previously was before this court, we 
vacated a Juvenile Court judge's decision allowing the father's 
and the Commonwealth's motions for release from impoundment, and 
remanded the case to the Juvenile Court, so that the motion 
judge could consider any renewed motions for release from 
impoundment in light of our then newly announced standard.  See 
M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 263-264. 
 
On remand, the Commonwealth and the father filed renewed 
motions for relief from impoundment.  The child changed position 
and filed a motion in support of their requests.  The same judge 
conducted a hearing on the renewed motions, and then allowed 
both motions in part.  The mother commenced an appeal 
challenging the judge's decision in its entirety, and the father 
3 
 
 
sought relief from so much of his request as had been denied.  
We allowed the mother's petition for direct appellate review; 
the petition includes both the mother's and the father's appeal. 
 
We conclude that the judge properly applied the "good 
cause" standard required by M.C. I and Rule 7 of the Uniform 
Rules of Impoundment Procedure, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure, at 968 (LexisNexis 2018) 
(Rule 7), with respect to the father's motion, and much of the 
Commonwealth's motion, but that the Commonwealth's request for 
transcripts of the mother's and her psychotherapist's testimony 
should have been allowed contingent on the occurrence of 
specific events at the mother's trial. 
 
1.  Background.  In August 2015, the father was indicted on 
charges of attempted murder, G. L. c. 265, § 16; aggravated 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (c) (iv); and assault and battery on a child 
causing substantial bodily harm, G. L. c. 265 § 13J (b), for an 
incident involving his daughter that occurred one day in April 
2015.  See M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 250 & n.1.  In November 2015, he 
was indicted on three additional counts of assault and battery 
on a child permitting substantial bodily harm, G. L. c. 265 
§ 13J (b), for conduct from July 2013 through April 2015.  At 
the same time, the mother was indicted on two counts of assault 
and battery on a child permitting substantial bodily harm and 
4 
 
 
two counts of assault and battery on a child causing substantial 
bodily harm, G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b), for related conduct on the 
same day in April 2015, as well as for conduct from July 2013 
through April 2015. 
 
The Department of Children and Families (department) filed 
a care and protection petition in the Juvenile Court on behalf 
of the child.  See M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 250.  A Juvenile Court 
judge conducted a trial on the department's petition for 
termination of parental rights, at which the mother and her 
psychotherapist testified.  On the advice of his criminal 
attorney, the father took the stand but invoked his rights under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 
response to virtually all of the Commonwealth's questions.  Both 
parents were found unfit, and their parental rights were 
terminated.  See Adoption of Henrietta, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1130 
(2018).  Pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 38, and standing orders of 
the Juvenile Court, the records of the trial on the termination 
of parental rights are impounded, as are all the other documents 
in the case.  See Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-84, Mass. Ann. 
Laws Court Rules, Standing Orders of the Juvenile Court, at 1158 
(LexisNexis 2018). 
 
a.  Motions for relief from impoundment.  In June and July 
2016, the father and the Commonwealth, respectively, first 
sought relief from impoundment in order to prepare for the 
5 
 
 
pending criminal trials.  The child and the mother each opposed 
the release from impoundment, on different grounds.1  In April 
2018, after this court's remand in M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 263-264, 
the same Juvenile Court judge allowed the parties to withdraw 
their motions and to file renewed motions in light of that 
decision. 
 
The Commonwealth's renewed motion requested access to the 
transcripts of testimony and admitted evidence from the care and 
protection proceeding that concern or relate to 
"any medical treatment sought for or provided to M.C.; 
written or verbal reports by either parent to medical 
providers, school personnel, or anyone else, of medical 
symptoms and/or descriptions of any physical ailments or 
impairments allegedly suffered by M.C.; any medical or 
other therapeutic measures administered to or performed on 
M.C. by the parents; [and] the conduct, actions, and 
movements of the parents during the time period from April 
15 through April 18, 2015," 
 
including applicable testimony of the mother and her 
psychotherapist.  As grounds for its request, the Commonwealth 
asserted that the alleged conduct underlying the indictments is 
                     
 
1 In their oppositions, both the mother and the child cited 
privacy concerns.  The mother also cited, inter alia, 
circumvention of Rule 11 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment 
Procedure, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Standing Orders of the 
Juvenile Court, at 974-975 (LexisNexis 2018); failure to follow 
the procedures for discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 378 
Mass. 885 (1979); lack of relevance because the testimony would 
not be admissible at a future trial; violations of the patient-
psychotherapist privilege; the rights of parents to raise their 
own children and the chilling of their efforts to protect those 
rights; and the mother's privilege against self-incrimination at 
a criminal trial.  M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 251. 
6 
 
 
largely the same as the conduct at issue in the care and 
protection proceeding, and that the parties' privacy interests, 
which they relinquished to a certain extent at the trial on the 
termination of parental rights, should yield to public interest 
in the just resolution of the criminal prosecutions of the 
parents.  The Commonwealth argued that "[t]he reason for the 
Commonwealth's request is two-fold.  First, any information and 
evidence regarding the conduct of the parents that is related to 
the harm suffered by M.C. is relevant and likely admissible at 
the criminal trials.  Second, the sought-after information or 
evidence also may provide further investigatory links to other 
heretofore unknown relevant evidence." 
 
The father requested relief from impoundment with respect 
to the same documents that he had sought in his first motion: 
"1) [a] complete unredacted copy of the trial 
transcript . . . ; 2) [a]ll exhibits received by the Court 
in the referenced trial; 3) [t]he Court investigator's 
[report(s)]; 4) [t]he [guardian ad litem (GAL)] report(s); 
5) [a]ll pleadings filed in the referenced case; and 6) [a] 
copy of the Court's Order in the Care and Protection case 
as well as its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
 
The father argued that the allegations in both the care and 
protection proceeding and the criminal cases are closely 
related; many of the same witnesses will be appearing in the 
criminal cases; the mother's expectation of privacy is 
relinquished for the purposes of discoverability as to the 
father because he was a party in the care and protection 
7 
 
 
proceeding; and his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to 
confrontation require relief from impoundment.  The father, who 
intends to assert a defense that the mother committed the acts 
at issue, also argued that the community has a right to see that 
justice is done, and that the record of the proceedings may be 
exculpatory as to him. 
 
The mother opposed the Commonwealth's motion on the grounds 
that the Commonwealth did not carry its burden under Rule 7; her 
testimony and evidence of her mental state is not relevant at 
her criminal trial unless she decides to testify or pursues a 
mental health defense; and the Commonwealth did not act in good 
faith.  The mother opposed all requests for release by the 
father, with the exception of the transcript of the testimony of 
Dr. Rebecca Moles, who is expected to testify as the 
Commonwealth's expert in both criminal trials.  The mother 
maintained that the father did not meet his burden of 
establishing good cause under Rule 7 because he did not explain 
which portions of the requested evidence would be exculpatory. 
 
In June 2018, the child filed a motion in support of both 
the father's and the Commonwealth's request for release from 
impoundment.2 
                     
 
2 Citing this court's opinion in M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 261, 
the child noted that she believed the father was "mistaken" that 
his receipt of the transcripts of the mother's testimony would 
8 
 
 
 
b.  Proceedings on remand.  Applying the new standard, 
after a hearing, on August 22, 2018, the same judge found that 
the Commonwealth and the father had established good cause for 
relief from impoundment of (a) the entirety of the care and 
protection trial transcript; (b) access to the child's medical 
records (for review but not copying); and (c) medical records 
that were entered in evidence at the care and protection 
proceeding, for review only, upon a showing of their 
unavailability through discovery in the Superior Court. 
 
As stated, the transcripts include testimony of the mother 
and her psychotherapist.  While the judge allowed the release 
from impoundment of transcripts describing communications 
between the mother and her psychotherapist, the judge did not 
allow release of "the documentary evidence of communications 
between Mother and her therapist."  He qualified this ruling by 
stating that "if Mother's mental health becomes an element of 
her defense, the parties may again move this Court to determine 
if good cause exists to release such documents."  The judge 
denied the release of all other documents requested.  The judge 
placed limitations on the use of the material that was released, 
which was to be held protectively and confidentially, and to be 
returned to the Juvenile Court at the conclusion of the criminal 
                     
mean that those transcripts could be introduced at his criminal 
trial regardless of whether the mother decided to testify. 
9 
 
 
trials.  He noted also that release to the requestors had no 
bearing on the question of admissibility at trial.  The judge 
then allowed the mother's motion for a stay to permit her to 
pursue an appeal. 
 
The mother and father each filed timely notices of appeal.  
In December 2018, we allowed the mother's petition for direct 
appellate review of the case; that petition includes both the 
mother's and the father's appeal.  On appeal, the mother 
contends that the Juvenile Court judge's order does not 
sufficiently consider and weigh her constitutional rights in its 
good cause determination; the order provides no justification 
for releasing the transcripts of the mother's psychotherapist's 
testimony at this point; and the judge abused his discretion in 
not giving proper consideration to the mother's privacy rights.  
The father argues that the judge erred in denying his motion for 
relief from impoundment of the trial exhibits, GAL reports, and 
court investigator reports.3 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Juvenile Court 
Standing Order 1-84 provides: 
"All [J]uvenile [C]ourt case records and reports are 
confidential and are the property of the court.  
Reports loaned to or copied for attorneys of record, 
or such other persons as the court may permit, shall 
be returned to the court after their use or at the 
                     
 
3 On appeal, the father no longer seeks access to copies of 
pleadings or the judge's order and findings of fact and 
conclusions of law following the care and protection trial. 
10 
 
 
conclusion of the litigation, whichever occurs first.  
Said reports shall not be further copied or released 
without permission of the court." 
 
Although all records of Juvenile Court proceedings are 
impounded, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Uniform Rules of 
Impoundment Procedure, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Standing 
Orders of the Juvenile Court, at 974 (LexisNexis 2018), "[a]ny 
party or interested nonparty may file a motion supported by 
affidavit for relief from impoundment."  In M.C. I, this court 
adopted the good cause standard of Rule 7 as the appropriate 
standard to use in evaluating requests by the parties or the 
Commonwealth for access to the impounded records of care and 
protection proceedings.  See M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 254.  In 
adopting this standard, we recognized that "[b]ecause Rule 7 
requires a Juvenile Court judge to balance the rights of the 
parties based upon the specific facts presented in each case, 
there is no need to adopt standards and protocols similar to 
those set forth in [Commonwealth v.] Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122 
[(2006)]."  Id. 
 
Rule 7(b) provides that, "[i]n determining good cause, the 
court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not 
limited to, (i) the nature of the parties and the controversy, 
(ii) the type of information and the privacy interests involved, 
(iii) the extent of the community interest, (iv) constitutional 
rights, and (v) the reason(s) for the request."  In analyzing 
11 
 
 
the good cause standard, a trial judge must "balance the rights 
of the parties based on the particular facts of each case."  
M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 254, quoting Boston Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 
432 Mass. 593, 604 (2000). 
 
"The purposes of a care and protection proceeding, and the 
evidence introduced in such proceedings, are entirely different 
from the concerns of a criminal trial."  M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 
255.  Care and protection proceedings "are not designed to be 
discovery mechanisms for criminal proceedings," and do not 
afford as many procedural protections as do criminal trials.  
See id. at 256.  Investigations in care and protection 
proceedings involve "the most intimate details of the parents' 
and child's lives, and reports undertaken by the department may 
well include much that is hearsay, not relevant to the events at 
issue in a criminal case, and specifically intended to attack a 
parent's character."  Id. at 255, citing Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 
Mass. 598, 604-606 (1976).  Investigative reports, including GAL 
reports, almost inevitably contain unsupported assertions by 
third parties, and a judge will not rely upon them as evidence 
in a care and protection proceeding unless a parent has the 
opportunity to contest the report.  M.C. I, supra at 255-256 
("Such concerns, and the lack of relevance of these types of 
materials in a criminal proceeding, should guide judges in 
weighing whether good cause exists for the release of such 
12 
 
 
materials").  See Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 710 (1993) 
(addressing parents' right to contest GAL report). 
 
Because of the Hobson's choice that confronts a parent in 
deciding whether to testify at a care and protection proceeding 
(where the department routinely draws adverse inferences if a 
parent declines to testify, see Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 
610, 616 [1986]), and risk self-incrimination at a later 
criminal trial, a parent's testimony at a care and protection 
proceeding ordinarily is inadmissible at a subsequent criminal 
proceeding.  M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 262.  Such testimony may be 
introduced only if the parent decides to testify, and then only 
as impeachment evidence.  The testimony of the parent's 
psychotherapist is not admissible at that parent's criminal 
trial unless the parent "puts [his or] her mental health at 
issue in [his or] her defense."  Id. at 263. 
 
With these standards in mind, we turn to the challenges to 
the judge's decision on remand. 
 
b.  Finding of good cause.  In finding good cause for 
release of the transcript and limited release of the medical 
records, the judge analyzed the enumerated factors set forth in 
Rule 7(b), as examined by this court in M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 
249.  He also analyzed other "relevant factors" and undertook to 
balance, as required, all the parties' interests.  The judge 
found that the nature of the parties in the cases is nearly 
13 
 
 
identical, with the district attorney's office stepping into the 
department's role as a representative of the Commonwealth, and 
that the parents have the advantage of having gone through 
previous proceedings concerning the allegations in the criminal 
cases.  The judge noted that the purposes of care and protection 
proceedings are entirely different from those of a criminal 
trial, and the information sought by the father and the 
Commonwealth is "of the most personal nature."  The judge 
observed, however, that "[t]he extent of community interest in 
this case cannot be understated," the public has an interest in 
seeing that justice is done in a case dealing with charges of 
serious injury to a child, and the information would permit more 
"expedient use of court resources" and would "promot[e] judicial 
economy." 
 
The judge also discussed the important, and sometimes 
conflicting, constitutional rights that are implicated in a 
motion to release impounded documents in care and protection 
proceedings, including parents' fundamental rights to raise 
their child, the right of a criminal defendant to put forth a 
defense, and the right against self-incrimination, as well as 
the child's and the parents' rights to privacy. 
 
Ultimately, the judge determined that the father's right to 
access prior sworn statements of potential witnesses outweighed 
the mother's argument that release of the transcript would 
14 
 
 
infringe upon her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, as the mother had been adequately represented by 
criminal counsel in deciding to testify at the care and 
protection trial.  Moreover, the judge observed, the mother 
maintains the right against self-incrimination in the criminal 
cases, where she cannot be compelled to testify.4,5  The judge 
did not explicitly set forth his reasoning regarding the denial 
of the release from impoundment of the other requested 
documents. 
 
c.  Application of Rule 7(b) factors.  In her appeal, the 
mother focuses on the portions of the order allowing release of 
her own testimony and that of her psychotherapist.  Because the 
mother does not appear to challenge the limited release of 
portions of the child's medical records, and the release of the 
other trial testimony, we consider those issues to be waived.  
See Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 449 (1980) 
                     
 
4 The judge did not state explicitly, but we presume that he 
properly determined implicitly, that the mother's testimony at 
the care and protection proceeding also could not be introduced 
in lieu of her testimony, should she decide not to testify at 
the pending criminal trials. 
 
 
5 In addition to discussion of the stated factors, the judge 
looked to the position of the child with respect to release from 
impoundment.  Notwithstanding that the documents contain 
intimate details of the child's trauma, the child now supports 
their release.  The judge noted correctly that access to the 
transcript does not ensure admissibility at the criminal trials. 
15 
 
 
("issues not . . . pursued in available appellate proceedings 
are treated as waived"). 
 
Even assuming that those issues have not been waived, we 
discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decisions that 
good cause has been established with respect to the release of 
the other trial transcripts and the limited release from 
impoundment of the child's medical records, to both the father 
and the Commonwealth.  Accordingly, we focus our discussion on 
the transcripts of the mother's testimony and the testimony of 
her psychotherapist. 
 
i.  Mother's testimony.  The mother argues that, in 
allowing release of the transcripts of her testimony, the judge 
abused his discretion and misapplied the factors to be 
considered in deciding a motion for release from impoundment; 
focused far too heavily on judicial efficiency (not one of the 
factors to be considered under Rule 7[b]), and speculated 
inappropriately that "[b]oth sides having access to the 
necessary information may allow for a more expedient use of 
court resources, such as stipulating to the likely testimony of 
certain witnesses based on their prior testimony."  The mother 
also argues that the judge did not sufficiently weigh the 
mother's constitutional rights to privacy and to raise her own 
child, and her right against self-incrimination, and instead 
focused impermissibly on the "efficient resolution" of the 
16 
 
 
criminal cases.  Even given the limitations on admissibility, 
the mother maintains, permitting release of a parent's testimony 
in a care and protection proceeding for examination by the 
Commonwealth, regardless of whether that parent testifies at a 
subsequent criminal trial, would have a "chilling effect" on 
parents' decisions whether to testify in an effort to maintain a 
parental role with their children.  Hence, notwithstanding this 
court's decision in M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 262 & n.9 ("prior 
testimony at the care and protection proceeding would be 
admissible as impeachment evidence"), the mother maintains that, 
in considering the good cause standard, a Juvenile Court judge 
"should regard the testimony of a parent in a care and 
protection proceeding as presumptively out of bounds."6 
 
The mother's argument is somewhat misguided.  The fact that 
a parent's prior testimony might be used for impeachment 
purposes at a criminal trial necessitates that it be released 
from impoundment in certain circumstances.  See M.C. I, 479 
Mass. at 254, 262 & n.9. 
                     
 
6 Indeed, while acknowledging this court's determination in 
M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 262 & n.9, that a parent's testimony in a 
care and protection proceeding is inadmissible against that 
individual in a later criminal trial, other than for purposes of 
impeachment in the event that the parent decides to testify, the 
mother nonetheless maintains that "[t]his [c]ourt did not 
comment specifically . . . on whether the parent's testimony 
could ever be subject to relief from impoundment." 
17 
 
 
 
On the other hand, with respect to the reasons given by the 
Commonwealth for the release of the transcripts of the mother's 
testimony, we agree with the mother that the arguments advanced 
by the Commonwealth do not establish good cause for release to 
the Commonwealth prior to the mother's decision to testify. 
 
A.  Father's motion for release.  With respect to the 
father's argument that he needs the transcripts to prepare for 
his third-party culprit defense and the cross-examination of 
witnesses at his pending criminal trial, we agree with the 
Juvenile Court judge that the father has established good cause 
for the limited release the judge allowed. 
 
The judge's decision indicates clearly that he considered 
and weighed the parties' reasons for their requests for relief 
from impoundment, along with the other Rule 7 factors, see 
M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 249, as well as several additional 
considerations.  In addressing the reasons for the request, the 
judge acknowledged the father's right to "fully mount a defense 
in his criminal case," and the Commonwealth's argument regarding 
the relevancy and materiality of the items sought in relation to 
harm to the child, as well as the inability to obtain the 
mother's testimony by ordinary means of discovery. 
 
The judge carefully considered all the factors in the Rule 
7(b) balancing test set forth in M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 249. He 
noted that the nature of the parties in the cases is nearly 
18 
 
 
identical, with the district attorney's office, rather than the 
department, serving as a representative of the Commonwealth at 
the criminal trials.  The decision properly indicated that the 
proceedings in a care and protection case are entirely different 
from those in a criminal trial, highlighted the differing 
purposes and potential outcomes of the two, and addressed those 
differing concerns.  The judge began his analysis of the 
interests of the parties by noting that the information sought 
"is of the most personal nature."  He recognized that access to 
the records of care and protection proceedings implicates 
privileges such as the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the 
attorney-client privilege (such as with respect to electronic 
mail messages between the mother and her attorney), as well as 
confidential medical information.  At the same time, the judge 
emphasized that "[t]he extent of community interest" in this 
case "cannot be overstated," where a serious injury has been 
inflicted on a child.  He noted that the public, along with the 
parties to the criminal cases, has a "vested interest in seeing 
that justice is done." 
 
The mother argues that the judge did not sufficiently weigh 
her constitutional rights, and the implications of relief from 
impoundment:  the chilling effect that the mother argues would 
ensue in regards to a parent testifying at a care and protection 
proceeding if the testimony could be discoverable by the 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth.  M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 262.  Indeed, to some 
extent, the father could argue that the prospect of the use of 
his testimony at his criminal trial did have a chilling effect 
on his initial decision not to testify at the care and 
protection proceeding, where he testified only to the extent of 
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.  At this point, 
however, the interests of the father and the mother are adverse, 
and the release from impoundment of the mother's testimony, for 
the father's use in preparing for his own criminal trial and his 
third-party defense, does not place him in the impossible 
position of having to choose between two constitutionally 
protected rights. 
 
As the mother chose to offer her testimony at the care and 
protection proceeding where the father was a party and heard all 
the mother's statements, she has a lessened privacy interest 
with respect to limited, confidential release of transcripts of 
that testimony to the father.  M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 261-262.  To 
obtain confidential access to the mother's testimony, the father 
need not, as the mother suggests, indicate which specific 
information in the mother's testimony might be exculpatory, and 
receive only those portions of the transcript.  The mother's 
constitutional rights are protected by the limitation that her 
testimony in the care and protection proceeding may be 
introduced solely at her own criminal trial, if she decides to 
20 
 
 
testify at that proceeding, and then only for impeachment 
purposes "should her testimony differ significantly from her 
testimony at the care and protection proceeding."  Id. at 262 
n.9.  With respect to her testimony concerning her 
communications with her psychotherapist, that testimony would be 
admissible at the mother's criminal trial only if she chooses to 
introduce a mental health defense.  The father's suggestion, in 
his brief on appeal, that he could introduce transcripts of the 
mother's testimony as exhibits at his own criminal trial is 
unavailing. 
 
B.  Commonwealth's motion for release.  Although the judge 
determined that the Commonwealth had established good cause in 
support of its request for relief from impoundment of the 
mother's testimony, we conclude that the judge's determination 
concerning that testimony was premature.  The Commonwealth 
stated that it requested relief from impoundment in order to 
assist the parties in preparation for trial, and to ensure that 
all parties in the criminal cases understand "previous testimony 
of likely witnesses."  In its motion, the Commonwealth asserted 
that the requested evidence "likely" was "relevant" to the 
criminal cases and that "the sought-after information or 
evidence also may provide further investigatory links to other 
heretofore unknown relevant evidence." 
21 
 
 
 
Undoubtedly, "the mother has a diminished privacy interest 
in the records of [the care and protection] proceeding, with 
respect to the parties seeking the records."  M.C. I, 479 Mass. 
at 259.  The father was present throughout the care and 
protection hearing, so her privacy interests are greatly 
diminished with respect to him; that is not entirely the case 
with the assistant district attorney.  The motion judge properly 
pointed out that the mother's privileges would not be deemed 
waived in the criminal proceeding unless she chose to testify in 
the criminal trial. 
 
The mother argues that the judge did not sufficiently weigh 
her constitutional rights, implicating the fourth factor of 
Rule 7:  the chilling effect that the mother argues would ensue 
in regards to a parent testifying at a care and protection 
hearing if that testimony could be discoverable by the 
Commonwealth.  M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 262.  We made clear in 
M.C. I that the waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination at a care and protection proceeding does not 
result in a waiver of that privilege at the subsequent criminal 
trial.  Id. at 261-262.  As the mother has the ability to 
reassert that privilege at the criminal trial, any chilling 
effect should be minimized.  The mother's testimony would be 
admissible at the criminal trial, in the event that she decides 
to testify, only for impeachment purposes, if her testimony at 
22 
 
 
the criminal trial is inconsistent with her statements under 
oath at the care and protection hearing.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 637-638 (1997). 
 
While the judge allowed the release of the mother's 
testimony to the Commonwealth as a more "efficient" process, in 
the event that the mother did choose to testify, in the 
balancing of constitutional and privacy interests at this stage, 
where the mother has not indicated that she will testify, the 
Commonwealth's assertion that "the sought-after information or 
evidence also may provide further investigatory links to other 
heretofore unknown relevant evidence" remains a "vague and 
general fishing expedition," M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 259, that does 
not meet the good cause standard set forth in M.C. I, supra 
at 262.  See Rule 7(b) of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment 
Procedure. 
 
The Commonwealth's concerns with efficiency and the smooth 
operation of the criminal trials can be met by allowing the 
Commonwealth's motion for access to transcripts of the mother's 
testimony, to be provided to the Commonwealth upon notice that 
the mother has stated her intention to testify at the criminal 
trials.7 
                     
 
7 If the mother does not decide whether to testify until 
after the Commonwealth rests, the Commonwealth should be given a 
brief recess to examine the mother's care and protection 
testimony in order to prepare for cross-examination. 
23 
 
 
 
ii.  Psychotherapist's testimony.  The mother argues that 
the judge abused his discretion in allowing the release of her 
psychotherapist's testimony to the Commonwealth where she has 
not stated an intention to pursue a mental health defense at 
trial.  See G. L. c. 233, § 20B (patient-psychotherapist 
privilege); M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 263.  We agree. 
 
The judge properly limited access to information ordinarily 
protected by the patient-psychotherapist privilege by denying 
relief from impoundment of documentary evidence related to 
communications between the mother and her therapist.  While 
there was no error in that ruling, it did not go far enough.  As 
with the release of the mother's testimony, in allowing the 
release of the psychotherapist's testimony to the Commonwealth, 
the judge clearly expressed his concerns about efficiency.  This 
concern, alone, does not serve to tip the balance toward release 
from impoundment where the mother's Fifth Amendment rights and 
the patient-psychotherapist privilege are both at play.  Unless 
and until the mother provides notice that she intends to pursue 
a mental health defense, her psychotherapist's testimony should 
not be released to the Commonwealth.  Should she do so, at that 
point the Commonwealth should be provided the transcripts of the 
psychotherapist's testimony upon notice to the Juvenile Court of 
the mother's intention. 
24 
 
 
 
iii.  Trial exhibits, GAL reports, and court investigator 
reports.  The father asserts that the GAL reports and 
investigative reports likely contain information about the 
family circumstances that will aid him in his defense in the 
criminal trial.  The father argues that the judge abused his 
discretion in denying the motion for relief from impoundment of 
the trial exhibits, the GAL reports, and the court investigator 
reports.  The father maintains that his constitutional right to 
present a defense establishes that he met the good cause 
standard of Rule 7 with respect to all the requested documents, 
and that his due process right to receive exculpatory evidence 
has been violated by the denial of the motion for release from 
impoundment. 
 
We conclude that there was no error and no denial of due 
process in the denial of the motion.  The father was present 
throughout the care and protection proceeding, received copies 
of many of the documents introduced in that proceeding, and is 
well aware of the tenor of the testimony insofar as it might 
suggest a basis of his defense.  Contrary to the father's 
arguments, in denying the request for release, the judge 
properly balanced the competing constitutional concerns at issue 
in the context of allowing access to impounded records in care 
and protection proceedings.  See M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 248-249.  
The judge's decision did not preclude the defendant from 
25 
 
 
pursuing a third-party culprit defense or from introducing 
relevant evidence in his defense. 
 
In M.C. I, 479 Mass. at 257, we observed that "[the 
judge's] decision not to disclose the GAL report was 
appropriate . . . .  Where it was likely that the reports 
contained information that not only was irrelevant to the 
criminal proceedings, but also would not be admissible as 
evidence, the trial judge properly withheld their disclosure."  
Our reasoning in that case, regarding the same GAL reports 
requested here, applies equally to the same request in the 
father's renewed motion.  Similarly, as with the GAL reports, 
the investigative reports likely contain multiple-level hearsay 
that will not be relevant at the criminal trial.  Id., citing 
Adoption of Georgia, 433 Mass. 62, 68 (2000).  There was no 
error in the judge's decision not to allow the father's request 
for access to the GAL reports and the investigative reports. 
 
In addition to his assertion that his motion for relief 
from impoundment met the good cause standard, the father argues 
that the trial exhibits are necessary in order to understand the 
trial testimony, and the transcript will be difficult to 
understand without the exhibits.  While this argument may have 
superficial appeal, the judge did not find good cause to release 
the documents, and we do not disturb his decision absent a clear 
error of judgment.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
26 
 
 
n.27 (2014).  As stated, the father was present throughout the 
care and protection proceeding and able to see and hear the 
witnesses testify.  To disturb the judge's finding, the party 
seeking to do so must demonstrate to our satisfaction that "no 
conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have 
taken the view expressed by him."  Commonwealth v. Ira I., 439 
Mass. 805, 809 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Bys, 370 Mass. 
350, 361 (1976). 
 
The father's assertion that he will be relying upon a 
third-party culprit defense that the mother was the person 
responsible for the child's injuries does not alter our view 
that the exhibits8 that the father seeks likely contain 
unsubstantiated hearsay that will not be admissible in a 
criminal trial.  The father is correct that, generally, a third-
party culprit defense supports the "admission of relevant 
evidence that a person other than the defendant may have 
committed the crime charged."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 
453 Mass. 782, 800-801 (2009).  This "latitude," however, "is 
not unbounded."  Id. at 801.  The evidence "must have a rational 
                     
 
8 Should a specific portion of the testimony be determined 
to be incomprehensible without access to a referenced exhibit, 
the party making such an assertion may file a separate motion in 
the Juvenile Court demonstrating that the testimony is indeed 
not able to be understood absent that exhibit, and otherwise 
establishing that confidential and limited release of that 
exhibit would meet the requirements of good cause for relief 
from impoundment under Rule 7(b). 
27 
 
 
tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and the evidence 
cannot be too remote or speculative."  Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 
Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  Investigative and GAL reports likely are 
too speculative, full of lay opinion, and rife with hearsay to 
be admissible at a criminal trial.  We discern no error in the 
judge's decision to deny the father's motion for access to the 
GAL and investigative reports. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  As stated, the judge allowed release from 
impoundment of the entirety of the care and protection trial 
transcript (at which numerous witnesses testified) to both the 
father and the Commonwealth; access to the child's medical 
records (for review but not copying) by both the father and the 
Commonwealth; and access by both the father and the Commonwealth 
to medical records that were entered in evidence at the care and 
protection proceeding, for review only, upon a showing of their 
unavailability through discovery in the Superior Court.  The 
judge properly placed limitations on the use of the documents 
released, which were to be held protectively and confidentially, 
and returned to the Juvenile Court at the conclusion of the 
criminal trials.  He noted that the limited release was for 
trial preparation, and did not imply in any way admissibility at 
trial. 
 
The order allowing, in part, and denying, in part, the 
father's motion for limited relief from impoundment is affirmed.  
28 
 
 
The father shall have access to the entire unredacted transcript 
of the testimony at the care and protection proceeding, subject 
to the limitations on confidentiality and release to others, and 
return to the Juvenile Court at the end of the criminal trial, 
that the motion judge ordered.  The motion judge properly denied 
the father's motion for release of exhibits, court 
investigators' reports, GAL reports, all pleadings filed in the 
care and protection case, and a copy of the court's findings and 
rulings in that case. 
 
With respect to the Commonwealth's motion for relief from 
impoundment, the judge's order is affirmed except for so much of 
the order as allows limited relief from impoundment of the 
testimony of the mother and her psychotherapist.  The 
Commonwealth shall have access to the entirety of the transcript 
of the care and protection proceeding, absent the mother's and 
her psychotherapist's testimony, which the Commonwealth may 
obtain contingent upon the mother's decision to testify or to 
put her mental health at issue.  By the terms of the judge's 
order, the Commonwealth may examine without copying the child's 
medical records, as well as all medical records that were 
entered in evidence at the care and protection trial. 
 
The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for entry of a 
modified order (1) allowing the Commonwealth access to 
transcripts of the mother's testimony if she should decide to 
29 
 
 
testify at trial, under the same conditions as the other 
documents that have been released by the terms of the order; and 
(2) allowing the Commonwealth to obtain transcripts of the 
psychotherapist's testimony should the mother give notice that 
she intends to pursue a mental health defense, under the same 
conditions as the other documents that have been released. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.