Title: Briggs v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families/Division of Family Services
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 446, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CELINE BRIGGS, 
  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
No. 446, 2022 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below—Family Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
File No. 22-06-08TN 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
§ 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND 
§ 
Petition No. 22-11940 
THEIR FAMILIES/DIVISON OF 
§ 
FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 20, 2023 
Decided:  
October 30, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
On this 30th day of October, 2023, after consideration of the briefs and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Celine Briggs1 (“Mother”), appeals from a Family Court 
order dated November 4, 2022, terminating her parental rights as to her child born 
March 27, 2021 (the “Child”).  Mother raises two issues on appeal.  First, she argues 
that the Family Court abused its discretion when it found that she failed to plan for 
 
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
7(d). 
 
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the Child’s “physical needs or mental and emotional health and development” under 
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).  Second, she contends the Family Court abused its discretion 
by improperly weighing the evidence while evaluating best interests factors three, 
five, six, and eight under 13 Del. C. § 722(a) and ultimately finding that termination 
was in the best interests of the Child.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that 
the Family Court’s judgment is affirmed. 
(2) 
On June 2, 2021, when the Child was less than four months old, the 
Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families/Division of Family 
Services (“DFS”) sought and received custody of the Child via an emergency ex 
parte order.  The Family Court granted the emergency order because the Child was 
exposed to fentanyl as a result of Mother’s substance abuse.  Following a preliminary 
protective hearing on June 9, 2022, DFS retained custody with a permanency plan 
of reunification and placed the Child with a foster family.  The Child remained in 
the care of her foster family throughout Mother’s Family Court proceedings. 
(3) 
Prior to the dispositional hearing on October 1, 2021, DFS provided 
Mother with a case plan.  The case plan outlined the goals Mother needed to achieve 
before reunification with the Child could occur.  These goals included:  (1) 
completing a mental health evaluation and following any recommended treatment; 
(2) completing a substance abuse evaluation and following any recommended 
treatment; (3) completing a parenting class and providing DFS with a certificate of 
 
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completion; (4) exhibiting appropriate parenting behaviors; (5) obtaining and 
maintaining consistent legal employment; and (6) securing and maintaining stable 
housing. 
(4) 
Mother made progress on her case plan.  But, at the time of the second 
review hearing on February 18, 2022, she had tested positive for fentanyl and had 
yet to obtain stable housing.  Accordingly, on March 11, 2022, DFS filed a motion 
to change the permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights.  
And on June 14, 2022, DFS filed a petition for the termination and transfer of 
parental rights against Mother.  The grounds for termination of Mother’s parental 
rights were failure to plan for the Child’s physical needs or mental and emotional 
health and development under 13 Del C. § 1103(a)(5). 
(5) 
The Family Court held a two-day termination and transfer of parental 
rights hearing on September 19, 2022, and October 7, 2022.  Testimony was taken 
from Mother as well as DFS employees who had worked with Mother while the 
Child was in DFS custody.  At the hearing, DFS conceded that Mother had 
completed the mental health and employment elements of her case plan but 
explained that she had failed to maintain stable housing, failed to consistently test 
negative for illegal substances, and failed to complete a parenting class.  DFS argued 
that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the Child’s best interests 
because it would allow the Child to be adopted by her long-term foster family.  In 
 
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her testimony, Mother maintained that she had been substance free for nearly six 
months at the time of the hearing and was making steady progress on all facets of 
her case plan. 
(6) 
On November 4, 2022, the Family Court issued an order terminating 
Mother’s parental rights to the Child.  The court found that statutory grounds for 
termination existed under 13 Del C. § 1103(a)(5) because the Child had been in DFS 
custody for at least one year and Mother had failed to obtain stable housing, failed 
to remain substance free, and had failed to exhibit appropriate parenting behaviors 
as required by her case plan.  The Family Court further found that termination of 
Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests after weighing each of the 
13 Del. C. § 722(a) best interests factors and finding that factors three, four, five, 
six, and eight all weighed heavily in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights. 
(7) 
When reviewing a decision of the Family Court to terminate parental 
rights, this Court conducts a “review of the facts and law, as well as the inferences 
and deductions made by the trial court.”2  “Conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo.”3  When the trial judge has correctly applied the appropriate law, our review 
is limited to an abuse of discretion.4  “To the extent that the issues on appeal 
 
2 Powell v. Dep’t. of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 963 A.2d 724, 730 (Del. 2008). 
3 George v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 150 A.3d 768, 2016 WL 6302525, at 
*4 (Del. Oct. 27, 2016) (ORDER). 
4 Powell, 963 A.2d at 731. 
 
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implicate rulings of fact, we conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the 
trial court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not 
clearly wrong.”5  “[T]his Court will not substitute its own opinion for the inferences 
and deductions made by the [t]rial [j]udge where those inferences are supported by 
the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”6 
(8) 
Under Delaware law, the Family Court must conduct a two-step 
analysis when deciding whether to grant a DFS petition for termination of parental 
rights.7  First, the court must determine whether there is clear and convincing 
evidence that one of the grounds for termination enumerated in 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) 
has been met.8  If one of the grounds has been met, the trial judge must next 
determine if there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights 
is in the best interests of the child.9  Mother challenges both steps of the Family 
Court’s analysis. 
(9) 
First, because Mother does not dispute the Family Court’s finding that 
she failed to exhibit appropriate parenting behaviors as required by her case plan, 
Mother waives the issue and concedes that the Family Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it found she failed to plan under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).  Under 
 
5 Id. 
6 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
7 Powell, 963 A.2d at 731. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
 
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Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(2), “[t]he merits of any argument that is not raised in 
the body of the opening brief [is] deemed waived and will not be considered by the 
Court on appeal.”10  Accordingly, this Court has held that an appellant’s opening 
brief must fully state the grounds for appeal, as well as the “arguments and 
supporting authorities on each issue or claim of reversible error.”11  An appellant’s 
failure to “present and argue a legal issue in the text of an opening brief constitutes 
a waiver of that claim on appeal.”12 
(10) Further, under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5), a parent has failed to plan for a 
child in DFS custody when there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent “is 
not able or has failed to plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or mental and 
emotional health and development . . . .”13  Where the statutory basis for termination 
is a failure to plan, the Family Court must also find the existence of at least one 
additional condition enumerated in Section 1103(a)(5).14  In a “proper decision on 
the termination of parental rights[,]” “the crucial factor should be the child’s welfare, 
 
10 Sup. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(2). 
11 Roca v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 842 A.2d 1238, 1242-43 (Del. 2004) (citing Turnbull 
v. Fink, 644 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Del. 1994)). 
12 Id. (quoting Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
13 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5); Powell, 963 A.2d at 731. 
14 Boyer-Coulson v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 45 A.3d 148, 2012 WL 1944868, at *2 (Del. May 30, 
2012) (ORDER).  Here, the Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Child 
had been in DFS custody for at least one year.  App. to Opening Br. at A505.  Mother has not 
appealed this aspect of the court’s ruling. 
 
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both material and psychological.”15  Therefore, if a parent has failed to fulfill any 
requirement of their DFS case plan necessary to provide adequate care for their child, 
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) will be satisfied even where a parent has otherwise 
completed their case plan.16 
(11) Here, Mother’s failure to dispute the Family Court’s determinations as 
to each failed element of her case plan constitutes a waiver of the issue.  In its order, 
the Family Court found Mother’s parenting behaviors did not comport with her case 
plan due to Mother’s belief that she did not need to take a parenting class despite the 
Child’s exposure to an “illicit substance” during a previous supervised visit.17  The 
court found that Mother’s attitude and behaviors constituted a failure to 
“demonstrate[] parenting practices that create safety for Child . . . .”18  At no point 
does Mother’s opening brief attempt to challenge the court’s finding or make 
specific mention of her parenting practices and behaviors.  Because making “no 
 
15 In re Three Minor Child., 406 A.2d 14, 17 (Del. 1979) (quoting Homer H. Clark, Jr., Law of 
Domestic Relations § 18.5 (1968)). 
16 See, e.g., Griffin v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 296 A.3d 882, 2023 WL 
3046056, at *2 (Del. Apr. 21, 2023) (ORDER) (holding termination of parental rights supported 
by the record where parent failed only to obtain stable housing as required by case plan); Arthur-
Lawrence v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 884 A.2d 511, 2005 WL 2397523, at *3-6 (Del. Sept. 27, 2005) 
(ORDER) (holding termination of parental rights supported by the record where parent failed to 
complete two parts of a seven-part case plan); George, 2016 WL 6302525, at *4-5 (holding 
termination of parental rights supported by the record where parent completed twenty-five percent 
of their case plan); Whitmore v. Robinson, 223 A.3d 417, 425-26 (Del. 2019) (Seitz, C.J., 
concurring) (noting Family Court often terminates parental rights solely on a failure to satisfy their 
DFS provided case plan). 
17 App. to Opening Br. at A497-98. 
18 Id. 
 
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specific mention of a legal issue is insufficient” to preserve an issue for appeal, 
Mother has conceded she failed to complete the parenting behaviors portion of her 
case plan and, as a result, that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) satisfied.19 
(12) Second, the Family Court did not abuse its discretion when it held that 
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests because its 
determinations under 13 Del. C. § 722(a) were the product of an orderly and logical 
deductive process and are supported by the record.  “Under the best interests 
standard, there must be ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that termination of parental 
rights is essential to the child’s welfare.”20  Section 722(a) “governs the Family 
Court’s best interests determination in a termination of parental rights proceeding 
and provides factors that the court must consider in making its decision.”21  
However, 13 Del. C. § 722(a)’s factors should not be applied in a “narrow, inflexible 
manner,” and the Family Court must “consider all relevant factors” as well as the 
eight enumerated factors in making the best interests determination.22  In applying 
 
19 Roca, 842 A.2d at 1242-43; see also Rogers v. Christina Sch. Dist., 73 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. 2013). 
20 Powell, 936 A.2d at 733. 
21 Id. (citing In re Hanks, 533 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989)).  The 13 Del. C. § 722(a) best interests 
factors are:  (1) “[t]he wishes of the child’s parents[;]” (2) “[t]he wishes of the child[;]” (3) the 
strength of child’s familial and personal relationships, (4) “[t]he child’s adjustment to [their] home, 
school and community;” (5) “[t]he mental and physical health of all individuals involved;” (6) 
each parent’s compliance with their rights and responsibilities as to child; (7) “[e]vidence of 
domestic violence[;]” and (8) “[t]he criminal history of any party of any other resident” of their 
household.  13 Del. C. § 722(a). 
22 Brock v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 272 A.2d 781, 790 (Del. 2022). 
 
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these factors, the Family Court “may give weight to different factors when balancing 
the best interests factors.”23 
(13) Here, the Family Court’s decision-making process was orderly and 
logical.  It made detailed factual findings as to each of the eight enumerated best 
interests factors contained in 13 Del. C. § 722(a) and stated whether each factor 
weighed for or against termination of Mother’s parental rights.24  Additionally, it 
indicated the factors to which it gave greater weight in making its decision.25  The 
court concluded its analysis by finding that DFS had established by clear and 
convincing evidence that termination was in the Child’s best interests.26  We have 
regularly found similar processes sufficient in the past, and do so again here.27 
(14) Further, the Family Court’s determination as to each of the best 
interests factors Mother challenges is supported by the record.  As to factor three—
the strength of the Child’s familial and personal relationships—multiple DFS 
employees testified that the Child had an extremely close bond with her foster 
family.  Regarding factors five and six—the health of all individuals involved and 
Mother’s compliance with her rights and responsibilities to the Child, respectively—
 
23 Bower v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 142 A.3d 505, 2016 WL 3382353, at 
*4 (Del. June 9, 2016) (ORDER). 
24 App. to Opening Br. at A511-16. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Powell, 963 A.2d at 733; Barr v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 974 A.2d 88, 100 (Del. 2009); 
Frost v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 61 A.3d 1223, 2013 WL 989363, at *8 (Del. Mar. 12, 2013) 
(ORDER). 
 
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testimony established that Mother struggled with substance abuse while the Child 
was in DFS care and never obtained stable housing as required by her case plan.  
Finally, as to factor eight, the Family Court reviewed Mother’s Delaware criminal 
history and found that she had several criminal convictions, including convictions 
for assault in 2020; promoting prison contraband (a felony) in 2012; forgery in 2012; 
and resisting arrest in 2011.  Additionally, the court’s review of Mother’s record 
revealed she had pending criminal charges at the time of the hearing.28 
(15) Therefore, because its findings were the product of an orderly and 
logical deductive process and are supported by the record, the Family Court did not 
abuse its discretion when it found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was 
in the Child’s best interests. 
      
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
28 Mother’s pending criminal charges included one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, one count of Conspiracy Second Degree – Agreement to Engage in Felony 
Criminal Conduct, and three counts of Possession of Controlled Substance without Prescription.  
App. to Opening Br. at A515.