Title: Cook v. State
Citation: 284 N.E.2d 81
Docket Number: 1271S366
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 1972

284 N.E.2d 81 (1972)
Larry Owen COOK, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1271S366.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 28, 1972.
*82 Lorin H. Kiely, and Phillip L. Kiely, Evansville, for appellant.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with second degree burglary. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of entering to commit a felony. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for not less than one nor more than five years.
The record reveals the following:
Mary Monarch, owner of the Monarch Lunch Room in Evansville, Indiana, locked the premises at about 6:00 P.M. on January 28, 1971. At approximately 1:00 A.M. on January 29, 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wayne Smith, who were in a shop across the street, saw a person later identified as the appellant break the glass in the door of the Monarch Lunch Room.
In response to a call by Mr. and Mrs. Smith, Police Officers Althoff and Stembridge arrived and apprehended the appellant standing behind the counter in the lunch room. At the time of his arrest appellant was wearing gloves and had a long screw driver. The cigarette machine on the premises had been pried open and the coin box emptied.
Prior to trial appellant requested a psychiatric examination. In response to this request the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine appellant. Both psychiatrists reported that appellant was competent to stand trial.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing prior to trial on the issue of appellant's competency to stand trial and further that the court also erred in failing to make a judicial finding and determination of appellant's competency. Appellant's contentions are based upon Burns' Ind. Stat., 1971 Supp., § 9-1706a, IC 1971, 35-5-3-2, which reads as follows:
Appellant cites People v. Heidman (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 466, 231 N.E.2d 457 and People v. Chatman (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110 for the proposition that if the court has reason to suspect that an accused is incompetent a hearing must be conducted. In the Heidman case appellant urged that matters occurring at the trial raised a sufficient doubt as to her competency to stand trial. The Illinois court held that what had occurred was not enough to raise such a doubt. In the Chatman case the court stated that where there was a doubt as to the accused's competency it was the duty of the trial court either on its own motion or motion of counsel to determine whether there was sufficient facts to raise a bona fide question of the accused's mental capacity, and in the event of a finding of the existence of such a question the court was required to impanel a jury to resolve such question. We note that in both of the above cited cases there was evidence which might have indicated that the accused was incompetent. However, in the case at bar there was no evidence whatsoever that the accused was incompetent. The mere fact that the accused himself requested a psychiatric examination constitutes no evidence of his mental condition. When his request was granted, psychiatrists were appointed and their report to the trial court was that appellant was competent to stand trial.
Appellant cites Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, for the proposition that he was entitled to a hearing on his sanity. We would point out, however, that in the Pate case the court held that there must be a hearing when the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency to stand trial. In the case at bar there was no such evidence. The only evidence before the trial court concerning appellant's competency to stand trial was that he was in fact competent. We, therefore, hold the trial court did not err when it did not conduct a hearing on the matter.
Appellant also contends that a copy of the medical reports of the psychiatrists were not furnished him. The record reveals that three copies of each report were ordered by the court. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant requested a copy nor is there anything in the record to indicate the trial court refused to give him a copy. There is, therefore, nothing in this record upon which any determination can be made as to appellant's contention. We would also further note that appellant does not allege nor does the record in any way show that he was harmed in any way if he in fact failed to obtain a copy of the report.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to give his tendered instructions numbered 3 and 4, which instructions read as follows:
An accused is not entitled to an instruction with reference to an offense which is not a lesser included offense. Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 188 N.E.2d 537, 1 Ind.Dec. 158. The elements of malicious trespass are (a) maliciously or mischievously (b) injuring or causing to be injured (c) the property of another. The elements of second degree burglary are (a) breaking and entering into (b) any building other than a dwelling house (c) with the intent to commit a felony therein. The test of determining whether a particular offense is a lesser included offense is that the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser offense. Nye v. State (1971), Ind., 267 N.E.2d 842, 25 Ind.Dec. 174; Thomas v. State (1970), Ind., 261 N.E.2d 588, 22 Ind.Dec. 535. In applying these principles we conclude that malicious trespass is not a lesser included offense of second degree burglary. Although malicious trespass may have been committed by the appellant, it was not charged. The state exercised its prerogative in charging the crime of second degree burglary. There is ample evidence in this record to support the jury's verdict of the lesser included offense of entering to commit a felony. The trial court did not err in refusing appellant's tendered instructions numbered 3 and 4.
The trial court is affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.