Title: City of Virginia Beach v. Giant Square Shopping Ct
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971746
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1998

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 971746                      April 17, 1998 
 
GIANT SQUARE SHOPPING 
CENTER COMPANY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 
 
 
The main appellate issue in this eminent domain case is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike for 
cause a prospective commissioner.  An additional issue involves 
refusal of a proposed instruction. 
 
Appellant City of Virginia Beach instituted in 1994 eminent 
domain proceedings against two parcels of land owned by appellee 
Giant Square Shopping Center Company, a general partnership.  The 
City took the property in connection with the widening of 
Independence Boulevard adjacent to the appellee’s shopping center.  
The two actions were consolidated. 
 
During the April 1997 trial, the court denied the City’s motion 
to strike for cause prospective commissioner George R. C. McGuire.  
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court refused to give 
proposed instruction B, tendered by the City.  Following 
deliberations, the commissioners filed a report fixing the value of 
the land taken at $129,700 and the damage to the residue at 
$335,000.  After overruling the City’s exceptions and denying its 
motion for a new trial, the trial court confirmed the report in a 
May 1997 judgment order, from which we awarded the City this appeal.  
The City assigns error to the seating of McGuire and to the refusal 
of the instruction. 
 
The facts are undisputed.  The partnership (hereinafter, the 
landowners) consisted of a trust and six individuals, including D. 
L. McKnight.  Attorney Grover C. Wright, Jr., represented the 
landowners at trial. 
 
During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective 
commissioners as a group the following two questions in succession:  
“Do any of you have any business associations or are you in any 
joint ventures or business ventures with any of the owners of this 
property?  Have any of you worked in any capacity with any of these 
landowners?”  McGuire responded, “I’ve used Mr. McKnight as an 
appraiser.”  
 
Later, the court asked the group, “Are any of you acquainted 
with any of the lawyers involved in this case?”  McGuire responded, 
“Mr. Wright is my attorney, and I know [the City’s attorney], and I 
don’t think there is anything that would affect my decision.”  The 
court then stated:  “Mr. McGuire I believe said that he has been a 
client of Mr. Wright.  Have any of the rest of you ever been a 
client of Mr. Wright?”  The court immediately asked eight additional 
questions in succession, the first of which was:  “Anybody currently 
 
a client of Mr. Wright?”  McGuire did not respond to any of these 
questions. 
 
Next, the court asked:  “Have you ever had any of your property 
acquired by the city?”  McGuire responded:  “We had some 
negotiations with the city and they acquired some land which they 
paid for.”  To the court’s question:  “Would that experience affect 
your ability to be fair and impartial to both sides in this case,” 
McGuire answered:  “No, sir.”  
 
At this point during the voir dire, the court granted the 
City’s motion for individual examination of the prospective 
commissioners out of the presence of the others.  Then, the City’s 
attorney called McGuire for “follow-up questions.”  During 
examination by the City, McGuire said that his earlier reference to 
prior “negotiations” with the City actually entailed “negotiations 
followed by a purchase” and “a condemnation trial” involving land 
owned by “Indian River Associates,” a partnership in which McGuire 
had a one-third interest.  According to McGuire, attorney Wright 
represented that partnership at trial, held “[t]wo years, three 
years” prior, and “[m]y appraiser was Mr. McKnight.”  McGuire stated 
he sat in the courtroom as the representative of the partnership 
during the “entire” trial of the prior case.  At the conclusion of 
his interrogation, McGuire answered affirmatively the court’s 
question whether he “could be fair and impartial to both sides in 
this case.”  
 
 
As noted, the court denied the City’s request to strike McGuire 
for cause.  He served as one of the five commissioners.  McKnight, 
whose interest in the Giant Square partnership was 12 ½ percent, 
testified as an appraiser for the landowners.  
 
On appeal, the City argues “McGuire should have been struck for 
cause from the panel of commissioners because of his previous, 
close, relationship with the landowner and its counsel in nearly 
identical circumstances.”  The landowners contend the “trial court 
in the instant matter was correct not to disqualify Dr. McGuire 
automatically.  The correct procedure was to conduct a voir dire 
examination and assess from his demeanor and answers to questions 
posed whether he could serve impartially.  Having done so, the trial 
court was well within the bounds of its discretion when it concluded 
that Dr. McGuire was unbiased and impartial.”  We disagree with the 
landowners. 
 
The principles applicable are settled.  Code § 25-46.20 
provides that when, as here, the issue of just compensation is to be 
determined by a commission, “disinterested freeholders” shall act as 
commissioners.  Discussing the disqualification of condemnation 
commissioners for cause, we have said the maintenance of public 
confidence in the integrity of commission reports is vital. “[S]uch 
reports should be kept free from the suspicion that the 
commissioners may have been improperly influenced.”  May v. 
Crockett, 202 Va. 438, 440, 117 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1961).  Accord 
 
Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. DuVal, 238 Va. 679, 683, 385 S.E.2d 
605, 607 (1989).  The eminent domain statutes, designed to implement 
constitutional mandates, “must be administered in a manner which 
promotes confidence in the integrity of the process.”  State Highway 
and Transp. Comm’r v. Dennison, 231 Va. 239, 242, 343 S.E.2d 324, 
326 (1986). 
 
However, the trial court is given discretionary authority to 
decide whether a prospective commissioner should be stricken for 
cause, and the court’s judgment on this issue will not be reversed 
on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion.  
Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Chadwell, 254 Va. 302, 305-06, 491 
S.E.2d 723, 725 (1997). 
 
Considering all the circumstances of this case, we hold the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss McGuire 
from the panel for cause.  First, the record shows that, at the time 
of trial, McGuire was a client of the landowners’ counsel:  “Mr. 
Wright is my attorney.”  The trial court obviously misunderstood 
that response as shown by its statement:  “Mr. McGuire I believe 
said that he has been a client of Mr. Wright.” 
 
We have not overlooked the fact that McGuire subsequently did 
not respond to any of the court’s set of eight questions, the first 
of which was:  “Anybody currently a client of Mr. Wright?”  
Nevertheless, McGuire’s positive, affirmative response, “Mr. Wright 
 
is my attorney,” must be accepted as the truth when measured against 
mere silence that tends to contradict the stated fact. 
 
Second, in the present case, landowner McKnight served as the 
landowners’ appraiser with McGuire sitting as a commissioner.  In 
the prior condemnation case, McKnight served as the appraiser for 
landowner McGuire, who was the landowners’ designated representative 
sitting at counsel table.  In these similar cases tried two or three 
years apart, McGuire has moved from counsel table in the prior case 
to the commissioners’ box in the present case to sit in judgment 
when his former hired appraiser is the present appraiser and one of 
the parties litigant.  This scenario was forecast by the City during 
voir dire and called to the trial court’s attention. 
 
Under these circumstances, it is extremely unlikely the public 
would have confidence in the integrity of the process when a 
commissioner has the identity of interests demonstrated by this 
prospective commissioner.  This is true even though, as the record 
shows, the commissioner is a “respected member of the community” and 
“known to be a man of integrity,” who may be determined to discharge 
his duties in a forthright and unbiased manner. 
 
Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
strike McGuire for cause.  Because the case will be remanded, we 
shall address the other error assigned should the issue arise upon 
retrial. 
 
 
The landowners presented evidence about the value of a portion 
of the shopping center land as an outparcel to be used for a 
restaurant.  They asserted that this portion was suitable for 
separate development before the take, but that the City’s widening 
project had eliminated this development potential by reducing the 
area available for shopping center parking. 
 
Refused instruction B, tendered by the City, was based on 
principles relating to compensability of damages attributed to 
frustration of an owner’s plans for development.  See State Highway 
and Transp. Comm’r v. Lanier Farm, Inc., 233 Va. 506, 510-11, 357 
S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1987).  We reject the City’s contention the 
trial court erred in refusing the instruction.  The subject was 
covered adequately in granted instructions 8 and 11.  
 
Accordingly, the judgment below will be affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for a new trial. 
 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                                and remanded.