Title: People v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90383
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2001

Docket No. 90383-Agenda 15-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
								MICHAEL J. JOHNSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	On July 8, 1999, defendant, Michael Johnson, was arrested for
driving under the influence of a drug in violation of section
11-501(a)(4) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(4) (West 1998). Following his arrest, he was advised
of his rights to take or refuse a chemical test which would detect
alcohol or drugs in his bloodstream. The arresting officer read
these rights from a preprinted form entitled "Warning to
Motorist":
			"1. If you refuse or fail to complete all chemical tests
requested and:
			If you are a first offender, your driving privileges will
be suspended for a minimum of 6 months;
			If you are not a first offender, your driving privileges
will be suspended for a minimum of 2 years.
			2. If you submit to a chemical test(s) disclosing an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more or any amount of a
drug, substance or compound resulting from the unlawful
use or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis
Control Act or a controlled substance listed in the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act and:
			If you are a first offender, your driving privileges will
be suspended for a minimum of 3 months, or
			If you are not a first offender, your driving 	privileges
will be suspended for a minimum of one year." (Emphasis
added.)
	Defendant submitted to the chemical test and tested positive
for the presence of drugs in his bloodstream. The Secretary of
State, having determined that defendant was a first offender as
defined under the statute (see 625 ILCS 5/11-500 (West 1998)),
filed with the circuit court a confirmation of statutory suspension
of defendant's driver's license for a period of three months
pursuant to section 6-208.1(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/6-208.1(a)(2) (West 1998)).
	Defendant then filed a petition to rescind his suspension,
arguing that the warnings issued by the officer were erroneous and
that this error merited rescission. Defendant asserted that he was
advised non-first offenders were subject to a two-year suspension
for refusal or failure to complete the chemical test, while the
statute mandates a three-year suspension. 625 ILCS
5/6-208.1(a)(3) (West 1998).
	The parties stipulated that the warning contained inaccurate
information regarding non-first offenders, though the trial court
observed that the error did not "materially affect" defendant
because he was a first offender. The trial court, nonetheless,
granted defendant's petition to rescind because "inaccurate or
deceptive warnings" did not satisfy the mandatory warning
requirement contained in the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.1(c) (West 1998).
	The appellate court affirmed the rescission. 316 Ill. App. 3d 
43. The State appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315, and
we granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. We now reverse the appellate court and remand to the circuit
court for further proceedings on the remaining issues raised in
defendant's petition for rescission.

ANALYSIS
	Before discussing the merits of this appeal, we note that
defendant has not filed an appellee's brief. We decide this issue,
however, without the aid of the appellee brief pursuant to First
Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (where the appellee files no brief  "if the record
is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily
decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief, the court of
review should decide the merits of the appeal").
	The single issue in this appeal is whether a suspension
warning that does not comply with the suspension statute in force
warrants rescission of suspension. Whether trial courts must
rescind summary suspensions if motorists are not properly warned
is a legal issue which we review de novo. See People v. Sims, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 64 (1997).
	Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, commonly
called the "implied-consent law," prohibits operation of a vehicle
anywhere in the state by individuals under the influence of alcohol
or drugs. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 1998). It is called the
implied-consent law because motorists are "deemed" to have
given consent to chemical testing. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West
1998). Motorists are warned that refusal to submit to testing will
result in a suspension of driving privileges that is more severe in
duration than if the individual takes the test and fails. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.1(c) (West 1998). According to section 11-501.1(c), the
warning to motorists shall contain the suspension information
provided in section 6-208.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Section
11-501.1(c) states:
			"A person requested to submit to a test as provided
above shall be warned by the law enforcement officer
requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the test will
result in the statutory suspension of the person's privilege
to operate a motor vehicle as provided in Section 6-208.1
of this Code. The person shall also be warned by the law
enforcement officer that if the person submits to the test
or tests provided in paragraph (a) of this Section and the
alcohol concentration in the person's blood or breath is
0.08 or greater, or any amount of a drug, substance, or
compound resulting from the unlawful use or
consumption of cannabis as covered by the Cannabis
Control Act, a controlled substance listed in the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act, or an intoxicating compound
listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act is
detected in the person's blood or urine, a statutory
summary suspension of the person's privilege to operate
a motor vehicle, as provided in Sections 6-208.1 and
11-501.1 of this Code, will be imposed." (Emphases
added.) 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West 1998).
	Section 6-208.1 classifies motorists into two categories for
purposes of the suspension: (1) "first offenders" or "non-first
offenders" as defined under the statute (see 625 ILCS 5/11-500
(West 1998)), and (2) motorists who submit to testing that
discloses unlawful concentrations of alcohol and/or other
intoxicating compounds listed in section 11-501.1 or,
alternatively, motorists who refuse or fail to complete the
requested testing. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a) (West 1998). Under
section 6-208.1, the following periods of suspension apply: (1) six
months for refusal or failure to complete a test or tests to
determine the unlawful presence of an alcohol, drug, or
intoxicating compound concentration pursuant to section
11-501.1; (2) three months for persons who submit to the
chemical test and that test discloses an alcohol concentration of
0.08 or more, or any amount of a drug, substance, or intoxicating
compound resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of
cannabis, a controlled substance, or an intoxicating compound; (3)
three years for non-first offenders who refuse or fail to complete
a chemical test or tests; and (4) one year for non-first offenders
who submit to the chemical test and that test discloses an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more, or any amount of a drug, substance,
or intoxicating compound resulting from the unlawful use or
consumption of cannabis, a controlled substance, or an
intoxicating compound. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(a) (West 1998).
	In the instant matter, defendant, a first offender, was
misinformed about the period of suspension for non-first offenders
who refuse the chemical testing. The appellate court affirmed
rescission of defendant's suspension on the basis that he was not
warned as provided in section 6-208.1. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 51.
According to the appellate court, the implied-consent statute
imposes a mandatory obligation to provide warnings consistent
with section 6-208.1, and failure to provide warnings consistent
with section 6-208.1 requires rescission of the suspension. 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 50-51.
	The appellate court concluded that suspension warnings are
provided so that motorists may make an "informed choice" about
the consequences of refusing or submitting to the chemical tests.
316 Ill. App. 3d at 51. Inaccurate or erroneous warnings mislead
motorists and deny them the opportunity to make that "informed
choice." 316 Ill. App. 3d at 50-51. According to the appellate
court, section 6-208.1 provides a bright-line test: Was the motorist
"issued a warning that was objectively accurate and informative"?
316 Ill. App. 3d at 49, citing People v. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App.
3d 550, 557 (1992). Under this test, trial courts must only
determine whether the warning complied with section 6-208.1.
	As an initial matter, we observe that the appellate court
recognized a conflict regarding the effect of inaccurate or
erroneous warnings. Some appellate panels have held that
warnings which contain any misinformation are a sufficient basis
to rescind suspension. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 556; People
v. Estrada, 313 Ill. App. 3d 245, 248 (2000). Conversely, other
panels of the appellate court have held that the inaccurate warning
must "prejudice" or "materially affect" the motorist before
rescission can be granted. People v. Diestelhorst, 253 Ill. App. 3d
867, 875-76 (1993); People v. McCollum, 210 Ill. App. 3d 11
(1991); People v. Monckton, 191 Ill. App. 3d 106 (1989); People
v. Znaniecki, 181 Ill. App. 3d 389 (1989). According to these
courts, a defendant is "prejudiced"or "materially affected" if the
inaccurate warning created the false impression that a choice
would result in less suspension, no suspension, or a judicial
driving permit rather than complete suspension. See, e.g.,
Diestelhorst, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 875.
	The State contends this latter approach is more appropriate.
This approach involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the
motorist received a warning that does not comply with section
6-208.1, and (2) whether the inaccurate warning caused
"prejudice" or "materially affected" the motorist. According to the
State, rescission is only appropriate if a motorist can satisfy both
prongs.
	Relying upon Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d 550, the appellate
court rejected this approach. The appellate court noted that a
motorist's intent or subjective understanding is immaterial under
the statute. See 316 Ill. App. 3d at 50, citing People v. Wegielnik,
152 Ill. 2d 418, 427 (1992). See also Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 424
("The statute does not require that a motorist understand the
consequences"). Therefore, the second inquiry, whether the
inaccurate warning caused "prejudice" or "materially affected" the
motorist, leads to inappropriate and "needless litigation regarding
the intent and subjective understanding of the defendant." 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 50-51.
	Under either approach, appellate panels have stated that the
purpose of the warnings is to enable the motorist to make an
"informed choice." Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 555 ("The
purpose of requiring that the motorist be warned of the
consequences of his refusal is to enable him to make an informed
choice"); Estrada, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 248 ("The purpose of a
warning to motorist is to allow the motorist to make an intelligent
decision between being tested and refusing testing"); Diestelhorst,
253 Ill. App. 3d at 870 ("An inadequate warning *** precludes the
motorist from making an informed decision"); Monckton, 191 Ill.
App. 3d at 109 ("Admission of the result [defendant's breath-alcohol content] *** would defeat the legislature's objective of
allowing a defendant to make a knowing and voluntary decision
regarding the test"); Znaniecki, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 392 ("The
absence of this warning of the resulting consequences did not
permit or allow the defendant to make an intelligent, knowing, and
informed decision in this cause").
	Pursuant to our opinion in Wegielnik, which directly
addressed the implied-consent statute and the purpose of its
warnings, we conclude that our appellate court has misconstrued
the purpose of the warnings. Thus, we decline to adopt either test
used by our appellate court and, instead, base our holding upon the
principles set forth by this court in Wegielnik.
	In Wegielnik, the defendant, a permanent resident of the
United States, was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol and advised of his right to take or refuse a Breathalyser
test. He was advised by the officer that if he did not submit to the
test he would lose his driver's license for a period of six months.
On appeal to this court, he argued that the State was required to
rescind his license suspension because his insufficient English
language skills prevented him from understanding or
comprehending the warnings. The defendant did not read or write
English and spoke "just a little." Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 422. The
defendant maintained that motorists have a right to receive
warnings in a language they comprehend so that they may
understand the consequences of their decision to take or refuse the
test.
	We first looked to the statutory language, noting that the
statute requires arresting officer to "warn" motorists. Wegielnik,
152 Ill. 2d  at 423-24. We rejected the defendant's assertion,
however, that the word "warn" implied "subjective understanding
[of the consequences] on the part of the person so advised."
Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 424. Rather, we held that the statute 
requires only that "warnings be given ***. [It] does not require
that a motorist understand the consequences ***." Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 424. We discussed the overall goal and scheme of the
implied-consent statute to support our holding. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425. We recognized that the implied-consent statute was
enacted as a matter of public policy to make highways safer.
Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425. Therefore, the remedial nature of the
statute warranted liberal construction to accomplish its overall
goal of safety. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425.
	Importantly, in Wegielnik we discussed the purpose of the
warnings. Contrary to the "informed choice" purpose stated by our
appellate court, in Wegielnik this court stated:
		"[W]e do not believe the purpose of the implied-consent
statute is to advise drivers as to whether they should take
a blood-alcohol test, or to give them a choice between a
six- and three-month suspension. ***
			The implied-consent statute serves the legislative
purpose of promoting highway safety by assisting in the
determination of whether drivers suspected of intoxication
are in fact under the influence of alcohol. [Citation.] The
threat of summary suspension for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test motivates drivers to take the test, thereby
allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of
intoxication. [Citation.] For this reason it is in the State's
best interest for law enforcement officials to fully explain
the consequences of refusal. [Citation.]" (Emphasis
added.) Wegielnik 152 Ill. 2d  at 425.
	Our reading of Wegielnik reveals that warnings required by
the implied-consent statute are not meant to enable an "informed
choice." In fact, the warnings benefit the State, not the motorists.
Specifically, warnings are an evidence-gathering tool for the State.
The threat of an extended suspension for motorists who refuse the
test motivates individuals to take the test so that the State may gain
objective evidence of intoxication. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425-26. This evidence helps the State achieve the overall goal of the
statute-to help prosecute and remove "problem drivers" from the
highways. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425-26. We note, moreover,
that this court in People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 451-52 (1998),
recently affirmed the principles set forth in Wegielnik. Although
Fisher involved an equal protection and due process challenge to
a different section of the Act, we generally observed that the
suspension provisions exist to motivate submission to testing and,
thereby, promote the overall remedial purpose of the Act. Fisher,
184 Ill. 2d  at 452. Fisher, therefore, affirms that the giving of
warnings serves as a tool to achieve the Act's ultimate goal of
highway safety. Therefore, we reject the appellate court's finding
that the "test to be applied is whether the motorist was given a
warning that was objectively accurate and informative to the
motorist so that she or he could make an informed choice." 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 51.
	Our holding in Wegielnik that motorists need not "understand"
the warning does not mean that law enforcement officers may
misinform motorists, some of whom may understand the
inaccurate warning and rely upon it. The latter proposition would
allow law enforcement officers to freely deceive motorists with
misinformation. Clearly, principles of fairness deny this result.
More importantly, however, the plain language of the statute
balanced with its remedial nature does not compel this result.
	The plain language of section 11-501.1(c) requires officers to
give the warnings contained in section 6-208.1. Section
11-501.1(c) states that motorists "shall be warned." 735 ILCS
5/11-501.1(c) (West 1998). The word "shall" makes the obligation
to warn-"as provided in Section 6-208.1" (735 ILCS
5/11-501.1(c) (West 1998))-mandatory. See Citizens Organizing
Project v. Department of Natural Resources, 189 Ill. 2d 593, 598
(2000); People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997). Therefore, as
a general rule, the warnings given to motorists should be
consistent with the information provided in section 6-208.1. We
must also consider, however, that the implied-consent statute is
remedial in nature and, therefore, "should be liberally construed"
to preserve its overall purpose. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d  at 425.
Accordingly, we conclude that rescission is warranted based on the
receipt of erroneous or inaccurate warnings only if that
misinformation directly affects the motorist's potential length of
suspension. If the motorist was misinformed as to the potential
suspension of an individual in his or her situation, he was not
properly warned as provided in section 6-208.1. To hold that any
misinformation-even misinformation which does not concern the
motorist-warrants rescission defeats the purpose of the statute.
Thus, in reviewing a petition for rescission based on inaccurate
warnings, courts must determine merely whether the motorist is a
member of the group affected by the inaccuracy.
	In the instant case, the record is clear. The trial court's
rescission order contains express findings that defendant was a
first offender, but that the warning which failed to comply with
section 6-208.1 concerned non-first offenders. The
misinformation did not directly affect defendant's potential length
of suspension. Therefore, rescission of his summary suspension is
not warranted.

CONCLUSION 
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the
appellate and circuit courts, and remand to the circuit court for
hearing on the remaining issues in defendant's petition for
rescission.



Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.


	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:


	I agree with the result reached by my colleagues. I write
separately because I do not share the majority's view regarding the
purpose of the warnings required by the implied-consent statute.
My colleagues advance the notion that the warnings have nothing
to do with enabling detained motorists to make an informed choice
about submitting to police testing, but are instead part of a scheme
to help the State extract incriminating evidence of intoxication. In
other words, they construe the warnings not as a normal
admonition of the sort typically given to criminal defendants, but
as a threat, a form of coercion: "let us take your blood or else."
	I see things differently. In my view, the warnings required by
the implied-consent statute must be understood as part of the
legacy of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and its recognition of the need for safeguards
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda is the
paradigm through which all admonitions from the police are now
viewed by our citizenry. In the wake of Miranda, people
understand that they have choices about what they say and do
when detained by the police and they understand that the police
must put them on notice of those choices. Legislators and judges
must therefore assume that when motorists receive warnings from
the police of the type required by the implied-consent statute, they
will interpret those warnings as affording them meaningful
protection and meaningful options.
	That the statutory warnings in the implied-consent law were
intended to enable motorists to make informed decisions regarding
whether they should assent to testing by the police is something
that our appellate court has consistently recognized. See People v.
Estrada, 313 Ill. App. 3d 245, 248 (2000); People v. Diestelhorst,
253 Ill. App. 3d 867, 870 (1993); People v. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill.
App. 3d 550, 555 (1992); People v. Znaniecki, 181 Ill. App. 3d
389, 392 (1989). The adequacy of the warnings, however, does
depend on whether the particular defendant involved in the case
actually understood them. As long as the defendant can
comprehend that he is being asked to take a test (see People v.
Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1992)) and as long as the pretest
warnings are objectively accurate and informative (see
Englebrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 557), the warnings will suffice.
	The inquiry is an objective one. The defendant's actual state
of mind is not a relevant consideration. The situation must be
assessed, instead, from the point of view of a reasonable motorist,
conversant in English, and confronting the same circumstances
faced by the defendant in the case before the court. If such a
motorist would adequately understand the options available to him
and the consequences of those actions, the actual defendant in the
case cannot complain that the warnings were deficient because he,
personally, did not understand them.
	Similarly, the actual defendant in the case cannot assail the
warnings because they were defective in some way that had no
bearing on the facts before the court. The inaccuracies must have
been such that they would have misled a reasonable person
regarding his options or the consequences of those options under
the circumstances presented by the case. In other words, the
inaccuracies, viewed objectively, must have been prejudicial. See
316 Ill. App. 3d at 52 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
	The inaccuracies here were not prejudicial. They would not
have affected the decisionmaking of a reasonable person facing the
circumstances confronted by defendant because they had nothing
whatever to do with defendant's situation. As the majority
correctly notes, the problem cited by the defendant concerned
motorists who were not first offenders. Defendant, himself,
however was a first-time offender. That part of the warning was
therefore irrelevant. Accordingly, I agree that recission of
defendant's suspension was not warranted, that the judgments of
the appellate and circuit courts should be reversed and that the
matter should be remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.