Title: Jack Dempsey Ferrell v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1498
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC02-1498 
____________ 
 
JACK DEMPSEY FERRELL,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-218 
____________ 
 
 
JACK DEMPSEY FERRELL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 16, 2005] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Jack Dempsey Ferrell, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order 
of the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
 
 
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Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated 
below, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and deny the petition for 
habeas corpus. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Ferrell was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend 
Mary Esther Williams.  Ferrell and Williams lived together in an Orlando 
apartment and their relationship was marked by verbal and physical confrontations.  
During an argument overheard by neighbors on April 18, 1992, Ferrell shot 
Williams in the head twice.  As he exited their apartment, Ferrell told one of the 
neighbors to call the police because he had “just killed my old lady upstairs.”  
Williams died from the brain injury ten days later.  See Ferrell v. State, 653 So. 2d 
367, 369 (Fla. 1995). 
The jury found Ferrell guilty of first-degree murder and recommended a 
death sentence by a vote of ten to two.  The judge followed the jury’s 
recommendation and sentenced Ferrell to death.  The judge found one aggravating 
factor, a prior violent felony conviction which was based on a second-degree 
murder conviction for the killing of a former girlfriend under strikingly similar 
circumstances.  The judge failed to include an evaluation of the mitigating factors 
proposed by Ferrell. 
 
 
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On appeal, Ferrell raised five claims.1  This Court found no merit to Ferrell’s 
claims regarding the admission of evidence of a collateral crime, the failure to 
appoint co-counsel, and the denial of requested special jury instructions.  Id. at 
369-70.  However, we determined that the sentencing order was inadequate as to 
the requisite findings required under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 
1992).2  Thus, we remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing order in 
which each of the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors proposed by Ferrell 
was evaluated as provided in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990), 
receded from on other grounds by Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 
2000).  In light of this remand, the Court declined to address the merits of Ferrell’s 
proportionality claim pending receipt of a new sentencing order.  Ferrell, 653 So. 
2d at 370-71. 
                                          
 
1.  Ferrell asserted that the trial court:  (1) improperly admitted evidence 
relating to a collateral crime; (2) erred in denying his motion to appoint co-counsel; 
(3) erred in denying requested penalty phase jury instructions; (4) erred in 
imposing a death sentence without making the requisite findings of fact in writing; 
and (5) improperly imposed a death sentence based on one aggravating 
circumstance and approximately seven mitigating circumstances.  Ferrell, 653 So. 
2d at 369. 
 
2.  The relevant portion of the 1992 statute is the same as the current statute.  
The statute requires “[i]n each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, 
the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of 
fact based upon the [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances in subsections (5) 
and (6).”  § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).  Further, the court must set forth in 
writing that “sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and that “there are 
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”  
Id. § 921.141(3). 
 
 
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On remand, the trial court once again imposed a death sentence, finding that 
the one aggravating factor outweighed the six nonstatutory mitigating factors. 3   
On appeal, Ferrell argued that the trial court erred in imposing sentence.  Ferrell v. 
State, 680 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1996).  Ferrell claimed the judge had not made the 
required independent determination of the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, but simply changed his mind at the request of the state attorney, 
thereby delegating to the State the judge’s responsibility to make findings on 
mitigation.  Ferrell also argued that the trial court overlooked the testimony of the 
defense mental health expert because the sentencing order rejected the statutory 
mental mitigators “based on testimony from the guilt phase of trial.”  According to 
Ferrell, the defense expert testified only in the penalty phase and thus his testimony 
was not considered in the assessment of mitigation. 
However, this Court found no error in considering the expert’s testimony 
because the record showed that the expert testified at both the guilt and penalty 
phases and that the expert’s brief penalty phase testimony “encapsulated his vastly 
more extensive . . . and detailed guilt phase testimony.”  Id. at 391. The Court also 
                                          
 
3.  On resentencing, the trial court assigned “considerable weight” to the 
aggravating factor of a prior conviction of a violent felony.  The court assigned 
“little weight” to the mitigating circumstances that there was some impairment of 
Ferrell’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time 
of the crime, that Ferrell was under some mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time of the killing, and that Ferrell was under the influence of alcohol at the time of 
the killing.  The court assigned “very little weight” to Ferrell’s record as a good 
worker and prisoner and his remorse for the killing. 
 
 
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rejected Ferrell’s claim that his death sentence was disproportionate in light of the 
single aggravating circumstance found.  Id. at 391-92.  We concluded that the 
sentence was not disproportionate in light of the similar nature of his prior violent 
felony conviction4 and the slight weight assigned to the mitigating circumstances.  
Id. at 391-92.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed Ferrell’s death sentence. 
Ferrell filed an initial postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850 in January 1998, raising thirty-two claims.5  He filed an 
amended 3.850 motion with the trial court in June 2000, raising sixteen claims.6 
                                          
 
4.  Ferrell was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his former 
girlfriend in the head eight times with a rifle after an altercation.  As this Court 
explained, that prior murder bore “many of the earmarks of the present crime.”  
Ferrell, 680 So. 2d at 391. 
 
5.  The order denying postconviction relief only addressed two of the claims 
raised in Ferrell’s initial motion—the adequacy of funding to the Office of Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel and the compliance with his public records requests.  
The order found the remaining thirty claims to be insufficiently pled as each was 
supported only by a statement that counsel had not had time to adequately 
investigate and prepare in order to plead the claim with more specificity. 
 
6.  Ferrell asserted that:  (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
during the guilt phase of trial because he inadequately argued a motion for 
appointment of co-counsel, called an expert witness to testify prematurely at the 
guilt phase, and failed to impeach and effectively cross-examine several witnesses; 
(2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase because 
he failed to present mitigating evidence through lay witnesses and an expert social 
worker, failed to present medical evidence of brain damage, inadequately argued a 
motion for appointment of co-counsel, and failed to object to the evidence of the 
prior conviction; (3) Ferrell was denied due process and equal protection based on 
trial counsel’s failure to engage a competent psychiatrist, to conduct necessary 
testing, and to adequately investigate Ferrell’s background which deprived him of 
 
 
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The trial court held a Huff7 hearing in August 2000 and granted an 
evidentiary hearing on a number of Ferrell’s claims.  These claims included:  
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to impeach or effectively cross-examine 
a witness; ineffective assistance of counsel in the presentation of mitigating 
evidence based on counsel’s failure to adequately investigate mitigating evidence 
and failure to present lay witnesses, expert social work testimony, and medical 
evidence of brain damage during the penalty phase; denial of an individualized 
sentencing because the trial court refused to find the statutory mental mitigators 
                                                                                                                                        
an individualized and reliable sentencing; (4) the State committed violations of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), based on the testimony of several 
witnesses; (5) Ferrell was denied an individualized sentencing and weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors because the trial court refused to find the 
statutory mental mitigators based on off-the-record representations by the 
prosecutor and counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to 
properly object and raise the issue; (6) the judge exhibited bias; (7) the State 
committed a violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), based on 
the presentation of false testimony by one witness; (8) the prosecutor improperly 
excluded jurors on the basis of race and sex; (9) the jury’s sense of responsibility 
for sentencing was diluted in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985), and counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to properly 
litigate the issue; (10) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied and counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to 
properly litigate the issue; (11) the disciplinary rule which prohibits attorneys from 
interviewing jurors is unconstitutional; (12) the standard jury instruction given 
during the penalty phase improperly shifted the burden to Ferrell to prove that 
death is an inappropriate sentence; (13) electrocution is cruel an unusual 
punishment; (14) lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment; (15) Ferrell may 
be incompetent to be executed at the time of execution; and (16) cumulative error 
deprived Ferrell of a fundamentally fair trial. 
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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based on off-the-record representations by the state attorney and that trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in this regard; and judicial bias.  When Ferrell’s 
attorneys informed the court that they would be calling the sentencing judge, 
Circuit Judge Daniel P. Dawson, as a witness at the evidentiary hearing, Judge 
Dawson recused himself.  Circuit Judge Maura T. Smith was assigned to the case.  
The evidentiary hearing was conducted on February 7-8, 2001.  A second hearing 
was conducted on September 4, 2001, on the issue of medical testing.  Final 
documents in support of Ferrell’s claims were filed on April 17, 2002. 
On May 23, 2002, the trial court entered an order denying postconviction 
relief.  All of the claims in the initial motion were denied without an evidentiary 
hearing and all but two of the claims were found to be insufficiently pled.  The trial 
court concluded that Ferrell’s claim that he was being denied effective 
postconviction representation due to lack of funding and understaffing of the 
Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel had not been pled with specificity, 
nor had he shown how he had been prejudiced.  Further, claims of ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel are not a valid basis for relief.  The trial court 
found the public records claim to be moot because all of Ferrell’s outstanding 
public record issues had been resolved in 2000 before his amended motion was 
filed.  The trial court also denied relief on all sixteen claims raised in Ferrell’s 
amended motion. 
 
 
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Ferrell has appealed the denial of his postconviction motion to this Court.  
He has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court. 
RULE 3.850 MOTION ON APPEAL 
Ferrell has appealed the denial of postconviction relief to this Court, raising 
three issues.  He contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase based on counsel’s 
alleged failure to adequately investigate, prepare, and present mitigation evidence 
through lay witness testimony and expert social work testimony; (2) the trial court 
erred in denying relief based on trial counsel’s failure to seek additional expert 
assistance in determining the extent of Ferrell’s brain damage; and (3) he was 
denied an individualized sentencing and reasoned weighing of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in his resentencing proceeding.  We address each claim 
in turn below. 
Mitigating Evidence 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (reaffirming the Strickland two-prong analysis for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).  In reviewing counsel’s performance, 
 
 
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the reviewing court must be highly deferential to counsel, and in assessing the 
performance, every effort must “be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689; see also Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1993).  As to the first 
prong, the defendant must establish that “counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 
1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the prejudice prong, the reviewing court must 
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 695; see also Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1997).  “Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death 
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
With respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, the 
Supreme Court observed in Wiggins that “Strickland does not require counsel to 
investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely 
the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing.  Nor does Strickland 
 
 
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require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every 
case.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533.  Rather, in deciding whether trial counsel 
exercised reasonable professional judgment with regard to the investigation and 
presentation of mitigation evidence, a reviewing court must focus on whether the 
investigation resulting in counsel’s decision not to introduce certain mitigation 
evidence was itself reasonable.  Id. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.  When 
making this assessment, “a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence 
already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. 
In assessing Ferrell’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial 
court applied the Strickland standard and concluded that relief was not warranted.  
However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of 
law and fact which is subject to plenary review by this Court based on the 
Strickland test.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).  This 
requires an independent review of the trial court’s legal conclusions while giving 
deference to the trial court’s factual findings.  See id. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony relating to 
counsel’s alleged failure to present mitigation evidence through lay witnesses.  
Ferrell’s trial counsel, Michael Irwin, testified that he hired an investigator who 
interviewed Ferrell’s mother and former common law wife.  However, the mother, 
 
 
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who lived in North Carolina, suffered from a heart condition that hampered her 
ability to travel to Florida for the trial.  The former common law wife, who was an 
amputee, did not want to travel and refused to testify. 
A childhood friend, Ferrell’s mother, his half-sister, two aunts, and his 
brother-in-law testified on Ferrell’s behalf at the postconviction evidentiary 
hearing.  These witnesses testified about Ferrell’s childhood, including that he was 
a hard worker, had worked as an agricultural laborer from early childhood, and had 
experienced racial prejudice and poverty.  Ferrell’s mother testified that his father 
died when he was three years old, but she did not offer any opinion as to the 
impact of the death on Ferrell’s life.  Ferrell’s half-sister testified that their mother 
drank, but she offered no insight into how this affected Ferrell’s life.  The half-
sister also testified that even at a young age Ferrell worked hard to support the 
family and to enable the other children to attend school.  She stated that no one had 
contacted her to testify at Ferrell’s trial, but that she would have been willing to do 
so. The two aunts testified that Ferrell had fallen from a truck and hit his head 
when he was a child, but did not know the extent of his injuries or how the 
accident affected Ferrell.  The brother-in-law testified that Ferrell had been very 
hospitable when he and his wife (Ferrell’s half-sister) stayed with Ferrell in 
Orlando in 1989. 
 
 
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At Ferrell’s trial, trial counsel presented three lay witnesses who testified 
about mitigating circumstances.  Ferrell’s former employer and his supervisor both 
testified that Ferrell was a good worker and got along well with his coworkers.  A 
friend and former neighbor testified that Ferrell was a good man who helped her 
family, but that he had an alcohol problem and his personality changed when he 
was drinking.  Defense counsel also hired neuropsychologist Dr. James Upson to 
administer tests and evaluate Ferrell on three separate dates before trial.  Dr. Upson 
testified at length about Ferrell’s organic brain damage, his impaired intellectual 
functioning, and his alcoholism.  Based on the mitigating evidence presented, the 
sentencing judge found six nonstatutory mitigators established:  Ferrell was under 
“some mental or emotional disturbance,” was “under the influence of alcohol,” and 
had “some impairment” of his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law at the time of the killing; he was a good worker and prisoner; and he was 
remorseful about the killing. 
In denying Ferrell’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue, 
the trial court applied the two-prong Strickland standard and concluded that Ferrell 
had not satisfied either prong.  The court concluded that defense counsel’s 
“decision not to call additional lay witnesses during the penalty phase was the 
result of reasonable professional judgment” and not deficient performance.  The 
court noted that Ferrell had not presented evidence that the witnesses who testified 
 
 
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at the evidentiary hearing could have been located at the time of trial or would 
have been willing to testify.8  The court also concluded that these lay witnesses did 
not present any evidence that had not been considered by the sentencing judge, nor 
would their testimony at trial “have induced a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”  
Thus, the trial court denied relief on this claim. 
We agree with the trial court’s assessment that trial counsel’s investigation 
and preparation of mitigating evidence for trial was not deficient.  This is not a 
case where counsel conducted no investigation or presented no mitigating 
evidence.  See, e.g., Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1326 (Fla. 1994) 
(finding ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase where counsel made 
no attempt to investigate family history and background and admitted that he had 
no strategic reason for failing to present mitigating evidence during the penalty 
phase).  This is also not a case where “counsel never attempted to meaningfully 
investigate mitigation.”  Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1996) (concluding 
that defendant was entitled to relief in case where trial court found no mitigating 
circumstances and counsel made practically no investigation of mitigation and 
presented little mitigation evidence in the sentencing proceedings despite the 
existence of substantial evidence that would have been revealed by reasonable 
investigation); see Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1515 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating 
                                          
 
 
8.   This factual finding is not supported by the record as Ferrell’s half-sister 
stated that she would have been willing to testify at Ferrell’s trial. 
 
 
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petitioner is prejudiced “where defense counsel was deficient in failing to 
investigate and present psychiatric mitigating evidence”).  Trial counsel hired an 
investigator to inquire about Ferrell’s background and family.  The investigator 
contacted both Ferrell’s mother and his common law wife, but they were either 
unable or unwilling to testify at trial.  Much of the lay witness testimony presented 
at the evidentiary hearing involved mitigating evidence already presented at trial 
and found by the trial court as establishing nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  
Further, almost all of the lay witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing had 
little or no contact with Ferrell for many years and were unable to illuminate how 
the circumstances of Ferrell’s childhood had affected him. 
Although trial counsel could have hired more experts and brought in more 
witnesses, the standard for assessing ineffective assistance claims “is not how 
present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was 
both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.”  
Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1121 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Cherry v. State, 659 
So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“Even the 
best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same 
way.”).  Further, the known mitigating evidence would not necessarily “lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further” in this case.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. 
 
 
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However, we agree with Ferrell that the trial court did not properly assess 
the lay witness evidence under the prejudice prong of Strickland.  The trial court 
concluded that even if counsel had presented these witnesses at the penalty phase 
of Ferrell’s trial, “their testimony would [not] have induced a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt.”  This lay witness testimony was not offered as to guilt, but as 
mitigation in support of a life sentence.  Thus, under the proper analysis the court 
should have determined whether there is a reasonable probability that the sentence 
would have been different if this evidence had been presented at the penalty phase.  
In light of the cumulative nature of this mitigation evidence and the fact that the 
sentencing judge found these same circumstances in mitigation, we conclude that 
Ferrell could not prove prejudice from the failure to present these witnesses. 
Moreover, because the Strickland standard requires establishment of both 
prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not 
necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an 
ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the 
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”); see also Downs v. State, 740 
So. 2d 506, 518 n.19 (Fla. 1999) (finding no need to address prejudice prong where 
defendant failed to establish deficient performance prong).  Thus, the trial court 
was not required to even reach the prejudice prong. 
 
 
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Next, Ferrell claims that the trial court should have granted him relief on his 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to engage a social worker to conduct 
a psychosocial assessment of how Ferrell’s life shaped his behavior on the day of 
the crime.  The trial court conducted two separate evidentiary hearings on Ferrell’s 
postconviction claims:  a February 2001 hearing on all claims except the allegation 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in the presentation of medical evidence of brain 
damage; and a hearing on the medical evidence claim in September 2001.  At the 
close of the February hearing, the judge asked whether the defendant had anything 
else to present.  Ferrell’s postconviction counsel stated that while the defense had 
considered calling more witnesses, they “decided not to proceed with them.”  
When different attorneys took over Ferrell’s representation prior to the September 
evidentiary hearing, the new counsel requested an evidentiary hearing on the social 
worker testimony issue.  However, counsel stated that they had no evidence 
available to present on this issue at the September hearing and requested a new 
hearing at a later date.  At the close of the September hearing, Ferrell’s counsel 
requested permission to file a proffer on the social worker claim.  Counsel renewed 
this request at a December status hearing and the court agreed to accept the proffer. 
The proffer, which was filed in January 2002, included documents from 
three social work experts.  These documents included:  a notarized letter from Dr. 
Marvin Dunn, a social worker and expert witness, detailing the facts of Ferrell’s 
 
 
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childhood and concluding that his criminal behavior was impacted by these factors; 
a fax from social work practitioner Marjorie Hammock detailing how she would 
have gathered information about Ferrell’s background and presented it to the jury; 
and a letter from attorney-psychologist Bill Mosman stating his opinion that a 
licensed clinical social worker should have been appointed to assist counsel with 
the preparation of the penalty phase of the trial and could have illuminated a 
number of clinical issues present in Ferrell’s case. 
After reviewing the proffered documents and defense counsel’s written 
argument, the trial court denied relief on this claim.  First, the court noted that the 
proffered evidence involved circumstances already considered by the sentencing 
judge.  Second, even if counsel had presented the proffered testimony of the social 
workers, it would not have “induced a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”  Third, 
the claim was procedurally barred because the defendant chose not to present any 
evidence on this claim when given the opportunity to do so at the February 
hearing. 
We do not agree with the court’s analysis of this claim.  As explained with 
respect to the lay witness claim above, the trial court applied the wrong standard in 
assessing prejudice from counsel’s failure to present expert social worker 
testimony and evaluation during the trial.  Such testimony would not have had any 
effect on the determination of guilt, but would have been offered in mitigation to 
 
 
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show that life was the appropriate sentence.  Furthermore, the claim was not 
procedurally barred.  However, notwithstanding these errors, we conclude that the 
trial court reached the right conclusion in denying relief on the issue. 
Ferrell’s claim of ineffective assistance based on the failure of trial counsel 
to seek the expert assistance of a social worker is a fact-based issue that required 
development at an evidentiary hearing, as evidenced by postconviction counsel’s 
proffer of testimony from the expert social workers.  See Owen v. State, 773 So. 2d 
510, 515 (Fla. 2000).  However, Ferrell “opted to forego” the presentation of such 
evidence at the scheduled evidentiary hearing and thus waived the claim.  Id.   
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief 
on the both aspects of Ferrell’s claim of ineffective assistance in the investigation 
and presentation of mitigating evidence. 
Medical Testing Evidence 
Ferrell claims that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to seek additional expert assistance in order present medical evidence of brain 
damage.  At trial, neuropsychologist Dr. James Upson testified that Ferrell suffers 
from brain damage and opined that the statutory mental mitigators of extreme 
mental disturbance and substantial impairment were present in Ferrell’s case.  Dr. 
Upson based his opinions on a number of psychological tests he had administered 
 
 
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to Ferrell and on his interviews of Ferrell.  Ferrell contends that trial counsel 
should have supported Dr. Upson’s testimony with medical testing evidence. 
In his motion for postconviction relief, Ferrell claimed that Dr. Upson’s 
testimony and expertise were called into question by the State’s cross-examination 
of Dr. Upson9 and by testimony of the medical examiner who opined that brain 
damage caused by long term alcohol abuse needs to be confirmed by medical 
testing.  The motion also stated that Ferrell had been examined after conviction by 
neuropsychologist Dr. Henry Dee and diagnosed with brain damage that could be 
verified by a PET (Positron Emission Tomography) scan.  Thus, Ferrell asserted, 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to have a PET scan, or equivalent 
testing, conducted in order to support Dr. Upson’s finding of organic brain 
damage.  To the extent that PET scan testing was not available at the time of 
Ferrell’s trial, he argued that it is newly discovered evidence.  Ferrell also claimed 
that counsel was ineffective in never asking the court to find brain damage as a 
mitigating circumstance.  Ferrell also argued that he had the right to have a SPECT 
(Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography) brain scan conducted during the 
postconviction proceedings to show brain damage and to support his claim that 
                                          
 
9.  On cross-examination, Dr. Upson admitted that no medical testing had 
been conducted to ascertain Ferrell’s brain damage and that he had not consulted 
other medical experts about the need for medical testing or about his opinion of 
Ferrell’s condition. 
 
 
 
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counsel could have presented better demonstrative evidence of brain damage at 
trial.  The court bifurcated the evidentiary hearing on this medical testing claim 
from the evidentiary hearing on Ferrell’s other postconviction claims. 
At a status hearing in March 2001, the State argued that Ferrell had to show 
a particularized need for brain scans to be conducted, as required by this Court’s 
decision in Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 999 (Fla. 2001).  While the trial court 
ruled that neuropsychiatrist Dr. Walter Afield could conduct testing of Ferrell and 
the State could depose Dr. Afield after the testing, the court did not order that a 
scan be conducted.  By the next status hearing in May 2001, the parties were 
arguing the merits of a SPECT scan instead of a PET scan.10  At this May hearing, 
the State conceded that, based on the deposition of Dr. Afield, Ferrell had mild to 
moderate brain damage to his frontal lobe and that a SPECT scan would show a 
black and white picture of the damage.  However, the State still objected to the 
SPECT scan being conducted and argued that there was no particularized need for 
the scan because Dr. Afield’s testing confirmed the diagnoses of frontal lobe brain 
damage made by Drs. Dee and Upson; the SPECT scan could not show how the 
                                          
 
10.  In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, diagnostic radiologist Dr. 
Michael Foley explained the difference between PET and SPECT scans.  
According to Dr. Foley, a PET scan shows “hot spots” in the body that are more 
metabolically active and are especially useful in oncology studies because a cancer 
cell is more metabolically active than a normal cell.  In contrast, a SPECT scan 
shows blood flow to a certain area of the body and a lack of blood flow shows 
physical damage to that area.  Thus, a SPECT scan could give a visual image of the 
extent of brain damage based on the lack of blood flow. 
 
 
- 21 -
physical brain damage affected Ferrell’s capacity to function; and the sentencing 
judge had already found brain impairment as a mitigating factor.  Ferrell’s counsel 
responded that the SPECT scan was necessary to confirm the brain damage as 
evidence of counsel’s ineffectiveness at trial.  The trial court ruled that no SPECT 
scan would be conducted, but acknowledged that a SPECT scan would show a 
black and white image of current mild to moderate damage in the frontal lobe of 
Ferrell’s brain. 
At the September evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from 
Ferrell’s trial counsel Michael Irwin, diagnostic radiologist Dr. Michael Foley, 
neuropsychiatrist Dr. Afield, clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Dee, and 
neuropsychologist Dr. Upson, who also testified on Ferrell’s behalf at the trial.  In 
summary, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicated that PET and SPECT 
scans were not widely used at the time of Ferrell’s trial in 1992; while a SPECT 
scan would confirm Ferrell’s brain damage, a clinician would still have to discern 
his level of impairment; the experts were able to diagnose Ferrell as being 
intellectually impaired based on their observations, testing, and Ferrell’s records 
without conducting a SPECT scan; the experts attributed the frontal lobe damage 
to Ferrell’s chronic alcohol abuse; the evaluations and diagnoses of the 
postconviction experts were very similar to Dr. Upson’s pretrial evaluation and 
diagnosis; Dr. Upson did not advise trial counsel to conduct a brain scan; and there 
 
 
- 22 -
was no evidence that such scans were being used in capital cases at the time of 
Ferrell’s trial.11 
At the close of the hearing, Ferrell renewed his motion to have a SPECT 
scan to confirm the testimony of his experts.  The court ordered Ferrell’s 
postconviction counsel to identify cases in which a court had ordered such brain 
scans in 1992, the time of Ferrell’s trial, but the cases cited did not support 
counsel’s assertion.  The court did not order the SPECT scan to be conducted.  The 
court also denied postconviction relief on the claim that counsel was ineffective in 
this regard. 
Ferrell contends that the trial court erred in denying him relief and in 
denying his request to conduct a SPECT scan to confirm the testimony of his 
postconviction experts.  “[A] particularized showing of necessity is the polestar for 
whether any diagnostic test should be authorized by the trial court.”  Rogers v. 
State, 783 So. 2d 980, 999 (Fla. 2001) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying request for PET scan); see also Robinson v. State, 761 So. 2d 
269, 275-76 (Fla. 1999) (same as to SPECT scan).  This Court established the 
following guidelines for evaluating a claim relating to the denial of a diagnostic 
                                          
 
11.  In fact, a capital cases defense manual prepared by the Florida Public 
Defender’s Association and distributed in 1992 did not mention either PET or 
SPECT scans in a list of medical tests used to confirm brain damage.  Furthermore, 
the manual cautioned that even the listed medical tests could be unreliable and did 
not always indicate organic brain damage.  Instead, the manual stated that 
neuropsychological testing was actually more reliable in showing such deficits. 
 
 
- 23 -
test:  (1) the defendant must establish a particularized need for the test, that is, that 
the test is necessary for experts to make a more definitive determination as to 
whether the defendant’s brain is functioning properly and to provide their opinions 
about the extent of the defendant’s brain damage; and (2) this Court must consider 
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of the motion 
requesting a scan.  See Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 999. 
In the instant case, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that there 
was no particularized need for the SPECT scan.  The postconviction experts 
independently determined that Ferrell suffered from the same injury, i.e., mild to 
moderate diffuse brain damage to the frontal lobe caused by chronic alcohol abuse.  
While the scan would have confirmed the experts’ diagnoses, it was not necessary 
in formulating their medical opinions about his brain damage.  Further, Ferrell 
cannot show any prejudice from the trial court’s denial of the SPECT scan.  His 
experts were still able to testify that he had mild to moderate brain damage, which 
was consistent with the testimony presented at trial.  The scan would not have 
provided any additional information about Ferrell’s functional impairment than 
that presented.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this 
request. 
As to Ferrell’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in not 
requesting a SPECT scan in 1992, we agree with the trial court that he is not 
 
 
- 24 -
entitled to relief.  Under the Strickland standard, Ferrell must prove both deficient 
performance by counsel and prejudice from this deficiency.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  There was no evidence that such scans were 
being ordered in capital cases in Florida in 1992.  Thus, counsel’s failure to obtain 
a scan was not deficient performance.  In addition there is no reasonable 
probability that the presentation of a scan would have resulted in a different 
outcome here.  The jury heard Dr. Upson’s testimony and was aware of Ferrell’s 
problems.  The scan results could have confirmed Dr. Upson’s diagnosis of brain 
damage but were not necessary in forming that diagnosis.  Thus, Ferrell was not 
prejudiced by any alleged failure of counsel in this regard.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on this claim. 
Individualized Sentencing 
 
Ferrell claims that he was denied his right to an individualized sentencing 
and an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
his resentencing proceeding.  He also contends that counsel was ineffective in 
failing to object to the proceedings. 
This claim is premised on the proceedings that transpired in the trial court 
during our remand for a new sentencing order.  On remand, the sentencing judge 
discovered that several pages of the original sentencing order had inadvertently 
been omitted from the record on appeal.  The judge informed the parties about this 
 
 
- 25 -
omission at the resentencing hearing.  The judge also gave the parties copies of the 
complete original sentencing order that he had discovered in his computer and 
stated his intention to resubmit the same order in complete form to this Court.  The 
parties stipulated that the complete order found in the judge’s computer accurately 
reflected the transcript of the original sentencing proceeding.  However, the 
prosecutor stated concerns that this order still did not comply with the 
requirements of Campbell and asked the judge to enter a new sentencing order.  
After a short recess, the judge gave the parties copies of another draft order and 
asked for their responses.  The prosecutor once again stated her concern that the 
order did not comply with Campbell, as it did not state with specificity whether the 
judge was finding the proposed statutory mental mitigators or a nonstatutory level 
of mental mitigation.  The judge took another recess and entered the final 
sentencing order, finding that the evidence did not rise to the statutory level of 
mental mitigation, only the nonstatutory level.  “[B]ased on testimony from the 
guilt phase of the trial,” the trial judge rejected the proposed statutory mitigators of 
substantial impairment of the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law and the crime was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, but found that nonstatutory mental mitigators had been 
established.  The judge characterized these mitigators as “some impairment” and 
 
 
- 26 -
under “some mental or emotional disturbance.”  The sentencing order found one 
aggravating circumstance of a prior violent felony conviction and several 
nonstatutory mitigators.  Finding that the aggravation outweighed the mitigation, 
the judge again imposed the death sentence. 
On appeal after resentencing, Ferrell raised a claim that the trial court erred 
in imposing the death sentence.  He argued that the trial judge had not made the 
required independent determination of the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, but simply changed his mind at the request of the state attorney, 
thereby delegating to the State the judge’s responsibility to make findings on 
mitigation.  Ferrell further argued that it was unclear that the judge had considered 
the penalty phase testimony of the defense expert based on the sentencing order 
statement that the expert testified during the guilt phase.  He also contended that 
the final sentencing order was “fraught with inconsistencies and ambiguities.” 
This Court found no error on this point.  See Ferrell, 680 So. 2d at 391.  The 
Court stated that “[t]he record shows that Dr. Upson [the defense expert witness] 
testified in both the guilt and penalty phases and that his brief testimony in the 
penalty phase (ten pages of transcript) merely encapsulated his vastly more 
extensive (ninety-two pages of transcript) and detailed guilt phase testimony.”  Id.  
In a motion for rehearing, Ferrell argued that this Court had overlooked his claim 
that the proceedings on resentencing were improper because the trial judge had 
 
 
- 27 -
found the statutory mental mitigators in two previous sentencing orders and then 
found only nonstatutory mental mitigation in the final order at the urging of the 
State.  This Court denied rehearing, and two justices dissented on these very 
grounds.  Id. at 392 (Anstead, J., dissenting, with Kogan, C.J., concurring in 
dissenting opinion).  Thus, Ferrell’s postconviction claim regarding the sentencing 
order and the proceedings at the resentencing proceeding was raised and rejected 
on direct appeal. 
Despite this fact, however, the trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
this postconviction claim because “it involved allegations concerning information 
which was not a part of the record.”  At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony 
from Judge Dawson, who presided over Ferrell’s trial and his resentencing, defense 
counsel Irwin, and prosecutor Dorothy Sedgwick.  Copies of the three sentencing 
orders12 were also entered into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. 
The evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing is entirely consistent with 
the supplemental record on appeal after the resentencing proceeding.  The records 
of that hearing and of the resentencing proceeding reveal the following facts.  A 
portion of the original sentencing order was inadvertently excluded from the record 
                                          
 
12.  The three orders included the incomplete original order that was 
considered by this Court on direct appeal as well as the complete original order 
that the judge found in his computer after we remanded the case for resentencing; 
the second draft order that the judge proposed during the resentencing; and the 
final order that was entered at resentencing and affirmed by this Court on appeal. 
 
 
- 28 -
on appeal.  On remand, the sentencing judge discovered a complete copy of the 
original sentencing order in his computer and gave copies to the parties and 
discussed this matter with them in chambers.  Both parties stipulated that the 
complete copy conformed to the transcript of the original sentencing proceeding.  
This in-chambers discussion was memorialized for the record.  At the resentencing 
proceeding, the prosecutor expressed her opinion that even with the missing pages 
restored the original sentencing order did not comply with the requirements of 
Campbell.  The prosecutor urged the judge to enter a new sentencing order 
explaining in more detail his findings as to mitigation.  When defense counsel 
objected, the prosecutor responded that she was not asking the judge to change his 
ruling, but simply asking for a proper articulation under Campbell.  The same 
discussion ensued when the judge asked for comment on the second proposed 
sentencing order.  Defense counsel objected to the argument by the prosecutor.   
In denying postconviction relief, the trial court found that the intent of the 
sentencing court never changed over the course of the resentencing proceedings 
and, while the prosecutor urged the court to change the way it expressed its intent, 
this was not improper because no new evidence was presented.  The trial court also 
found that defense counsel’s performance at the resentencing proceeding was not 
deficient because counsel did object to what he considered improper argument 
about mitigation by the prosecutor.  Further, the trial court found no evidence of 
 
 
- 29 -
off-the-record discussions that were not later memorialized on the record.  Thus, 
the trial court concluded, there was nothing else that defense counsel could or 
should have objected to, nor any evidence that further objection would have 
resulted in a different outcome.  The trial court also noted that this Court was 
aware of the circumstances of the resentencing proceedings, based on the 
supplemental record, and yet affirmed Ferrell’s death sentence on appeal.  
Accordingly, the trial court denied relief on this claim. 
We agree with the trial court that Ferrell is not entitled to relief on this 
claim.  Ferrell’s substantive claims regarding the sentencing order and the 
proceedings at the resentencing proceeding were raised and rejected on direct 
appeal and thus are procedurally barred in this postconviction proceeding.  See 
Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1983) (“Issues which either were or could 
have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through 
collateral attack.”); see also Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1262 (Fla. 2003) 
(finding inmate was precluded from raising claim relating to proportionality review 
in habeas petition as claim had already been raised and rejected on direct appeal).  
Ferrell cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this 
regard either.  The record shows that defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s 
argument at the resentencing hearing.  Furthermore, as this Court explained in 
Reese v. State, 728 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1999), when a case is remanded for a new 
 
 
- 30 -
sentencing order based on Campbell error, “the court is to conduct a new hearing, 
giving both parties an opportunity to present argument and submit sentencing 
memoranda before determining an appropriate sentence.”  However, “[n]o new 
evidence shall be introduced at the hearing.”  Id.  The State’s argument as to the 
requirements of a sentencing order under Campbell was entirely consistent with the 
procedure outlined in Reese.  Thus, postconviction relief is not warranted on this 
claim. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Ferrell raises two claims in his petition for habeas corpus filed with this 
Court.  He contends that (1) Florida’s death penalty statutes are unconstitutional 
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002); and (2) he may be incompetent at the time of his execution.  As 
explained below, Ferrell is not entitled to habeas relief on either claim. 
Apprendi and Ring 
Ferrell raises a number of constitutional challenges to Florida’s death 
penalty sentencing statute based on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Apprendi and Ring.  Ferrell claims that Florida’s sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional because it does not charge the aggravating circumstances in the 
indictment; submit the aggravating circumstances to the jury or require a specific 
jury finding that each aggravator has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; 
 
 
- 31 -
require a unanimous jury verdict as to a death sentence recommendation; give the 
jury instruction on what constitutes sufficient aggravators to warrant a death 
sentence; and treat the jury’s sentencing recommendation as final rather than 
advisory. 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 
124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), held that the decision in Ring is not retroactive.  A 
majority of this Court has also concluded that Ring does not apply retroactively in 
Florida to cases that are final, under the test of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 
1980).  See Johnson v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S297, S301 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2005).  
We have similarly concluded that Apprendi is not retroactive in application.  See 
Hughes v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S285, S288 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2005).  Accordingly, 
Ferrell’s Ring and Apprendi claims are procedurally barred in these postconviction 
proceedings. 
However, even if the claims were not barred, they would be without merit.  
This Court has recognized that a defendant is not entitled to relief under the “prior-
conviction exception” to Apprendi13 where the aggravating circumstances include 
a prior violent felony conviction.  See, e.g., Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 49 (Fla. 
2003) (noting rejection of Ring claims in a number of cases involving a prior-
                                          
 
13.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). 
 
 
- 32 -
conviction aggravator), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2023 (2004); Grim v. State, 841 So. 
2d 455, 465 (Fla.) (explaining that defendant was not entitled to relief under Ring 
where aggravating circumstances of multiple convictions for prior violent felonies 
and contemporaneous felony of sexual battery were unanimously found by jury), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 892 (2003).  In Ferrell’s case, the trial court found the 
aggravating circumstance of a prior violent felony conviction based on his second-
degree murder conviction for shooting a previous girlfriend in the head eight times 
after an argument.  A unanimous jury found Ferrell guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of this offense, thereby satisfying the mandates of the United States and 
Florida Constitutions.  See Kimbrough v. State, 886 So. 2d 965, 984 (Fla. 2004); 
Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003). 
Additionally, we have rejected claims that Ring requires the aggravating 
circumstances to be alleged in the indictment or to be individually found by a 
unanimous jury verdict.  See Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 359 nn.9 & 10 (Fla. 
2004); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003); Porter v. Crosby, 
840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003).  Thus, Ferrell is not entitled to habeas relief on his 
Apprendi and Ring claims. 
Competency to Be Executed 
Ferrell claims that he may be incompetent at the time of execution because 
he has been incarcerated since 1992 and statistics show that mental capacity 
 
 
- 33 -
diminishes over a long period of incarceration.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.811(a) provides that “[a] person under sentence of death shall not be executed 
while insane to be executed.”  The rule also provides that “[n]o motion for a stay of 
execution pending hearing, based on grounds of the prisoner’s insanity to be 
executed, shall be entertained by any court until such time as the Governor of 
Florida shall have held appropriate proceedings for determining the issue pursuant 
to the appropriate Florida Statutes.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811(c). 
Ferrell concedes that this claim is not ripe for review as he has not been 
found incompetent and a death warrant has not been signed.  However, Ferrell 
contends that he is raising the issue for preservation purposes.  This Court has 
repeatedly found that no relief is warranted on similar claims.  See State v. Coney, 
845 So. 2d 120, 137 n.19 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim that defendant was insane to 
be executed where he acknowledged that claim was not yet ripe and was being 
raised only for preservation purposes); Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) 
(finding claim that defendant may be insane to be executed was “not ripe for 
review” where defendant had not been found incompetent and a death warrant had 
not been signed; noting that defendant made claim “simply to preserve it for 
review in the federal court system”); Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 
2001) (stating that it is premature for a death-sentenced individual to present a 
 
 
- 34 -
claim of incompetency or insanity, with regard to his execution, if a death warrant 
has not been signed).  Thus, Ferrell is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief and we deny habeas relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Maura T. Smith, Judge - Case No. CR 92-4096 
And an Original Proceedings – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle, Carol C. Rodriguez 
and Robert T. Strain, Assistant CCR Counsels, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Douglas T. Squire, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent