Title: Dagwell v. Thornton
Citation: 199 Or. 8, 259 P.2d 125
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 1953

Ballot title corrected July 8, 1953.
Don S. Willner, of Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were David Robinson and Sidney I. Lezak, of Portland.
Lloyd G. Hammel, Assistant Attorney General of Salem, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, of Salem.
Before LATOURETTE, Chief Justice, and WARNER, ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND and PERRY, Justices.
*9 PETITION ALLOWED AND CORRECTED BALLOT TITLE CERTIFIED TO SECRETARY OF STATE.
LATOURETTE, C.J.
This is an appeal by Benjamin D. Dagwell, Philip S. Hitchcock, E.J. Ireland, Julius J. Nodel and Thomas J. Tobin, from the action of the Attorney General in fixing a ballot title of a proposed referendum which attacks chapter 495, Oregon Laws 1953, the same being as follows:
The ballot title prepared by the Attorney General is as follows:
Appellants assert that the said ballot title
The 1953 legislature amended § 81-2106, OCLA, relating to ballot titles where the initiative or referendum is invoked. By such amendment the short ballot title is reduced from ten to six words and is designated a "caption", and the general ballot title is reduced from 100 to 50 words, and it is incumbent upon the Attorney General, in providing the general ballot title, to set forth in abbreviated form the chief purpose of the measure. In addition to this the Attorney General is directed to include a descriptive summary of *11 the measure distinct from the ballot title, expressing, in not more than 150 words, the purpose of the measure. It is further provided:
The question before us is whether or not the ballot title, as prepared by the Attorney General, is insufficient, unfair, misleading or confusing. See Allen v. Van Winkle, Attorney General, 136 Or 173, 298 P2d 241; Wieder v. Hoss, 143 Or 122, 21 P2d 780; Richardson v. Neuner, 183 Or 558, 194 P2d 989; Blitz v. Neuner, 194 Or 1, 240 P2d 1193.
In preparing the general ballot title the Attorney General embraced the language used in § 1 of the act, i.e., "any place of public accommodation," etc. Section 1 of the act was limited by § 2 in that a place of public accommodation, etc., was specifically defined.
1. To determine the chief purpose of the measure under consideration the act must be construed in its entirety rather than by piecemeal, and, from such construction, it is clear to us that the ballot title prepared by the Attorney General is too broad and comprehensive and therefore insufficient, unfair and misleading.
*12 2. It is understandable that the Attorney General would cleave as closely as possible to the language of the statute; however, as hereinbefore pointed out, an isolated section of the statute may not be employed to determine the main purpose of the act.
For the above reasons the following ballot title, which is in the language of the title of the act itself, is certified by us to the Secretary of State:
WARNER, J., dissenting.
Addressing myself to the matter before us as an abstract proposition, I find myself in complete accord with the holding of the majority that the ballot title prepared by the attorney general is misleading. I also agree that the one designated by the court makes for a sufficient and fair statement of the purpose of the act to which it refers.
As a legal matter, however, and the occasion for this dissent, it is my position that it is our duty to refuse to take jurisdiction in this proceeding.
The reason for this conclusion is simple and direct. Section 81-2106, OCLA, as amended, mandates this court to rewrite a contested ballot title in the event it determines that the one devised by the attorney general is insufficient or unfair. In so doing, the legislature has attempted to impose upon this court duties of a nonjudicial character and obligations having a political import.
*13 The state constitution gives positive recognition to the concept of three separate branches of government and lays upon us the heavy and clear duty to void the encroachments of one department upon the domain and traditional independence of the others. Art III, § 1, provides:
Moreover, this court has already recognized the character of § 81-2106, OCLA, as potential legislative trespass upon the judicial department of this state. Richardson v. Neuner, 183 Or 558, 563, 194 P2d 989 (decided in 1948), was one wherein a ballot title, drawn pursuant to § 81-2106, was challenged. There this court very properly said:
However, in avoidance of the cogent observations there made, the court then proceeded to accept jurisdiction of the pending matter. In justification for this action, it gave the following as its reason therefor (183 Or 564): "* * * Since the attorney general acts judicially when he writes a ballot title, his action may properly be subjected to judicial scrutiny."
With that part of the opinion in the Richardson case I cannot agree. I find no warrant in precedent *15 (and none is cited) nor in reason for holding that the attorney general, when engaged in the preparation of a ballot title, is acting judicially or even in a quasi-judicial capacity. To hold otherwise does violence to our earlier definitions of what constitutes a "judicial act". School District No. 2 v. Lambert, 28 Or 209, 223, 42 P 221. Also see State v. Nagel, 185 Or 486, 499, 202 P2d 640. To the contrary, the attorney general, when responding to the directions of § 81-2106, OCLA, is acting ministerially. State v. Nagel, supra; Patterson v. Portland Smelting Works, 35 Or 96, 106 56 P 407.
In Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or 118, 150, 74 P 710, 75 P 222, Mr. Justice ROBERT S. BEAN makes this observation:
To this last expression there might be appropriately added, "nor a sufficient reason to attempt to transfer the authority of one department of the government to another."
It is a matter of paramount importance to the preservation of our system of republican form of government that our courts be ever vigilant to detect and ever quick to prevent the invasion of one department *16 of government into the fields reserved exclusively by the constitution as the area of activity of another department. It is an age-old thesis of departmental independence. If, perchance, we have in the past been inadvertently remiss in this respect, we should not hesitate to correct our error, rather than compound it as I am convinced is now being done, and rid the record of any imbalance between departments created by any earlier opinions and, to that end, unhesitatingly overrule previous decisions at odds with the precepts of Art III, § 1, of our constitution. In the instant matter this would be and should be accomplished by refusing to take jurisdiction of this appeal. Principle should not be perverted by precedent.
For these reasons, I dissent.