Title: Gilbert v. Second Injury Fund
Citation: 616 N.W.2d 161
Docket Number: 115393, 206733
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2000

616 N.W.2d 161 (2000)
Kevin GILBERT, Rodney L. Kerber, Rodney D. Kerber, and Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
SECOND INJURY FUND (Dual Employment Provisions), Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 115393, COA No. 206733.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
September 13, 2000.
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal from the August 13, 1999, decision of the Court of Appeals is considered, and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals decision and REMAND to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999) and Tyler v. Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich. 382, 590 N.W.2d 560 (1999).
In Sun Valley, this Court stated:
Without noting any ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court of Appeals decided not to apply M.C.L. § 418.372(2); MSA 17.237(372)(2) because it did not *162 think that the statutory purpose would be advanced. This mode of analysis contravened the judiciary's limited role of complying with the will of the Legislature as reflected in the plain language of statutes.
On remand, the Court of Appeals shall follow the principles articulated in Sun Valley and Tyler, and shall take note of People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 156, fn. 8, 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999), in which we discussed the problems inherent in the so-called "absurd result" rule of statutory construction. The Court of Appeals must begin by examining the literal language of M.C.L. § 418.372(2); MSA 17.237(372)(2). If it is unambiguous, then the court shall apply the statute as written. The court may engage in judicial construction only if it determines that the statutory language is ambiguous.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J., would grant or deny leave to appeal.
MARILYN J. KELLY, J., would deny leave to appeal.