Title: Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131754
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2014

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JO ANN KNIGHTEN TEMPLE, ADMINISTRATOR 
AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF ELLIS ETHELBERT TEMPLE, SR., 
DECEASED 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131754 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 
MARY WASHINGTON HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 
Gordon F. Willis, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the discovery rulings 
made by the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg ("trial 
court") in a prior, nonsuited action are properly before us on 
appeal. 
I. Facts and Proceedings 
 
Jo Ann Knighten Temple ("Temple"), as Administrator of the 
Estate of Ellis Ethelbert Temple ("decedent"), filed a complaint 
in the trial court on February 2, 2010 (the "2010 action"), 
alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against Mary 
Washington Hospital, Inc. ("MWH"), Fredericksburg Hospitalist 
Group, P.C. ("FHG"), and Fredericksburg Emergency Medical 
Alliance, Inc. ("FEMA")(collectively "defendants").  According 
to the complaint, decedent arrived at MWH's emergency room 
complaining of shortness of breath and chest pain.  He died from 
cardiac arrest approximately four hours after arriving at the 
hospital. 
 
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During the course of pretrial discovery, certain disputes 
arose.  Temple filed her first motion to compel in January 2011, 
in which she requested production of MWH's policies and 
procedures related to the management, care and treatment of 
patients presenting with conditions such as the decedent, 
including cardiac monitoring.  Temple also sought additional 
electronically stored information regarding decedent's 
evaluation and treatment. 
 
MWH responded that its policies and procedures were 
irrelevant, inadmissible, and privileged under Code §§ 8.01-
581.16 and 8.01-581.17.  MWH also responded that every aspect of 
decedent's electronic medical record had already been produced, 
but to the extent Temple wanted additional information regarding 
the electronic charting system, MWH offered to make a corporate 
designee available for deposition. 
 
The trial court denied the motion to compel, holding that 
MWH's policies and procedures were not relevant, would not lead 
to discoverable evidence, and were privileged under the 
statutes.  Regarding the electronic data, the trial court found 
that all relevant documents had been disclosed.  It noted that 
if Temple wanted additional information on the electronic 
storage and data, she was free to depose a corporate designee on 
that matter.  It does not appear from the record that Temple 
 
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ever sought to depose a corporate designee regarding the 
electronic data issue. 
 
Temple filed a second motion to compel on October 13, 2011, 
in which she asked the trial court to order MWH to produce its 
laboratory's reference range for test results measuring 
troponin, a protein complex indicating cardiac damage and the 
possibility of an impending heart attack.  MWH responded that a 
document it had already produced, the manufacturer's guidelines, 
was the only document responsive to the request that did not 
fall under the trial court's previous ruling that MWH did not 
have to produce any of its policies or protocols.  The trial 
court denied the motion to compel, and stated that it would 
accept counsel's representations that no other responsive 
documents existed. 
 
Prior to trial, Temple took a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-380.  The trial court entered an order nonsuiting 
the action on January 19, 2012.  Temple then filed a new 
complaint in the same court and against the same defendants, 
alleging the same cause of action, on February 8, 2012 (the 
"2012 action").  On September 24, 2012, the trial court entered 
an agreed order to incorporate the discovery conducted and taken 
in the 2010 action.  The order stated, "All discovery conducted 
and taken in the previous action that the Plaintiff brought 
 
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against the Defendants, bearing Case No.: CL10-47, is hereby 
incorporated into the instant action." 
 
The case proceeded to trial in June 2013, and a jury 
returned a defense verdict.  On July 15, 2013, Temple filed a 
motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary 
rulings.  In this motion, Temple challenged the evidentiary 
rulings the trial court made in the nonsuited action when it 
denied her two motions to compel.  She attached as exhibits her 
motions to compel, MWH's opposition thereto, the transcripts of 
the hearings on the motions to compel, and the trial court's 
orders denying the motions to compel. 
 
The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and Temple 
appealed to this Court.  We granted Temple's appeal on the 
following assignments of error: 
1. 
The trial court erroneously sustained defense objections to 
the widow's discovery requests for the hospital's troponin 
reference ranges and internal policies. 
 
2. 
The trial court erroneously sustained defense objections to 
the widow's discovery requests for data and metadata 
regarding the decedent's electronically stored medical 
records. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
The effect of the nonsuit and interpretation of the trial 
court's September 24, 2012 order are questions of law which we 
consider de novo.  See Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
 
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Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007). 
Generally, we review the trial court's grant or denial of 
discovery requests under an abuse of discretion standard.  
O'Brien v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 552, 507 S.E.2d 363, 366 
(1998).  A trial court's decisions on such matters will 
generally not be reversed on appeal unless the action taken was 
improvident and affected substantial rights.  Id. 
B.  Effect of Nonsuit 
 
The defendants argue that Temple cannot appeal the trial 
court's rulings on the discovery disputes in the 2010 action 
because the agreed order only incorporated the "discovery 
conducted and taken" in the prior action, but not the motions, 
objections, rulings and orders from the 2010 action.  They 
contend that without an order incorporating the trial court's 
rulings from the 2010 action into the 2012 action, those rulings 
are not part of the 2012 action and therefore are not before the 
Court in this appeal. 
 
Temple responds that the agreed order incorporating "all 
discovery conducted and taken" was sufficient to also 
incorporate all of the parties' motions and objections, as well 
as the trial court's rulings related to the discovery disputes.  
She also argues that the parties' comments in a hearing on May 
21, 2013, which was part of the 2012 action, demonstrated their 
 
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understanding that all arguments and rulings from the nonsuited 
action were binding in the 2012 action. 
 
Code § 8.01-380 governs nonsuits, and allows a plaintiff to 
take one nonsuit as a matter of right if done "before a motion 
to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the jury 
retires from the bar or before the action has been submitted to 
the court for decision."  Code § 8.01-380(A).  We have always 
characterized a refiled action after a nonsuit as a "new" 
action.  Laws v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594, 600, 724 S.E.2d 699, 702 
(2012).  A "new action stands independently of any prior 
nonsuited action."  Id. (quoting Antisdel v. Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 
47, 688 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2010)).  The "action" that remains 
subject to a plaintiff's nonsuit request is comprised only of 
the claims and parties remaining in the case after any other 
claims and parties have been dismissed with prejudice or 
otherwise eliminated from the case.  Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 
511, 513-14, 499 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1998). 
 
The right to take a nonsuit is a powerful tactical weapon 
in the hands of a plaintiff.  See Inova Health Care Servs. v. 
Kebaish, 284 Va. 336, 344, 732 S.E.2d 703, 707 (2012)(citation 
omitted).  Temple chose to exercise her right to take a 
voluntary nonsuit.  However, once she did so, it was as if the 
2010 action had never been filed, as a nonsuit "leaves the 
situation as if the suit had never been filed."  Winchester 
 
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Homes Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053, 1058 
(4th Cir. 1994)(applying Code § 8.01-380).  For any aspect of 
the 2010 action to be incorporated into the 2012 action, an 
order had to explicitly permit it. 
 
The trial court entered an agreed order in the 2012 action 
that incorporated "all discovery conducted and taken" in the 
2010 action.  Discovery is the process by which facts resting 
within the knowledge of one party are disclosed to another party 
in a suit or proceeding in court.  See Lyons v. Miller, 47 Va. 
(6 Gratt.) 427, 442 (1849)(monographic note).  Our rules dictate 
that parties "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action."  Rule 4:1(b)(1).  Rule 4:1(a) explains 
that: 
Parties may obtain discovery by one or more 
of the following methods: depositions upon 
oral examination or written questions; 
written interrogatories; production of 
documents, electronically stored 
information, or things or permission to 
enter upon land or other property, for 
inspection and other purposes; physical and 
mental examinations; and requests for 
admission. 
 
 
Although parties may file motions to compel and raise 
objections while they are engaged in the discovery process, the 
motions, objections, and trial court orders do not constitute 
discovery.  When the trial court incorporated "all discovery 
 
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conducted and taken" in the 2010 action, the interrogatories, 
depositions, documents, and requests for admissions from the 
2010 action were incorporated into the 2012 action.  This had 
the obvious and salutary effect of avoiding the need to repeat 
the discovery activities and reproduce the same information 
previously exchanged between the parties.  However, the order 
did not incorporate the motions to compel, the objections, 
transcripts of the hearings or the trial court's rulings on the 
motions.  Without such incorporation following a nonsuit, it is 
as if those motions, objections, and rulings never existed since 
the 2012 action is "new" and "stands independently of any prior 
nonsuited action."  Laws, 283 Va. at 600, 724 S.E.2d at 702. 
 
Temple argues that the parties' and the trial court's 
comments in a hearing on May 21, 2013 demonstrated their 
understanding that all arguments and rulings from the nonsuited 
action were binding in the 2012 action.  This Court has stated 
on numerous occasions, however, that trial courts speak only 
through their written orders and that such orders are presumed 
to reflect accurately what transpired.  Petrosinelli v. PETA, 
Inc., 273 Va. 700, 709, 643 S.E.2d 151, 156 (2007); McMillion v. 
Dryvit Systems, Inc., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 
(2001); see also Waterfront Marine Constr., Inc. v. North End 
49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B, and C, 251 Va. 417, 427 
n.2, 468 S.E.2d 894, 900 n.2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 
 
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220 Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979).  The September 
24, 2012 agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, 
objections, or rulings made by the trial court in the 2010 
nonsuited action into the 2012 action; consequently those 
rulings cannot be challenged in this appeal.  Accordingly, we 
cannot reach the merits of Temple's assignments of error. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed.