Title: Yusef Ali v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-68-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). VERNIERO, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In Montells v. Haynes, this Court held that claims arising under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries rather than the six-year general statute of limitations. Because it represented new law, the Court further held that its holding would be applied prospectively to cases where the operative facts arose after the date of the decision, July 27, 1993. In the present case, the Court must determine whether, in an action where the operative facts arose prior to and after the holding in Montells, a court must apply the six-year limitations period recognized by some pre-Montells courts or the post-Montells two- year limitations period. In 1981, Yusef Ali was hired on a permanent basis at the Paul Robeson Cultural Center, Rutgers University, New Brunswick campus. By letter from the Associate Provost of the University, Ali was appointed to the position of Director of the Cultural Center with a starting annual salary of $20,224. In June 1992, after a report on the organizational structure of the Center was issued, Rutgers established the position of Director of the Paul Robeson Cultural Center, which previously had not been listed as an official title on its payroll. On November 24, 1992, Ali learned that Rutgers considered him the Administrative Coordinator of the Center, not its Director. Ali served as the highest-ranking employee at the Center until Rutgers hired a Director in September 1993. Ali continued to work at the Center as Administrator until the summer of 1995 without a change in salary. From September 1, 1995 until June 30, 1996, Ali was on unpaid leave to pursue an adjunct faculty position at another institution. He did not return to Rutgers. Instead, Ali filed suit against Rutgers, alleging that, notwithstanding the Director designation expressed in his letter of hire, he was paid only as an Administrative Coordinator. He claimed breach of contract and racial discrimination in violation of the LAD. Rutgers filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing Ali's complaint. At the hearing on that motion, Ali's attorney noted that she could not pursue a claim under the LAD because of the two-year stature of limitations. Accordingly, counsel focused on the contract claim. The court granted Rutgers' motion, finding that the contract claim could not be sustained, that Ali had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the contract claim, as well as the LAD claim were barred by the statute of limitations. Ali quickly filed a motion for reconsideration solely on the LAD statute-of-limitations issue. In a letter to the court, Ali's attorney stated that she may have been incorrect in her concession expressed at the motion hearing. She corrected her position, stating that Montells did not bar Ali's complaint because the underlying facts had arisen prior to the date of that decision. The trial court denied the motion. Ali appealed to the Appellate Division, asserting that the trial court erred in determining that there was no sustainable contract claim, in holding that Ali did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and in denying Ali's application for reconsideration in respect of the LAD claim. In response, Rutgers contended that: there was no contract between the parties or, alternatively, that the claim was time-barred; Ali had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and the LAD claim was time-barred. Rutgers also argued that Ali was judicially estopped from asserting his LAD claim in view of his attorney's concession during the motion hearing. The Supreme Court granted certification to address the Montells issue. After oral argument, the Court asked the parties to submit additional briefs concerning whether Ali's LAD claim was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. HELD: In cases in which the operative facts arise both before and after the date of the decision in Montells v. Haynes, aggrieved parties must file their claims under the LAD prior to the expiration of the six-year limitations period or within two years from the date of this opinion, whichever is earlier. 1. A fair reading of the express language of Montells instructs litigants that the holding in that case would not apply to any case the operative facts of which arose prior to July 27, 1993. Because Ali may have reasonably relied on that literal language, the Court should not depart from it. Here, some operative facts arose prior to July 27, 1993; therefore, the two-year statute of limitations does not govern. (Pp. 7-8) 2. The dissent argues that Ali's cause of action did not accrue until the hiring of his replacement in September 1993, which is after the July 27, 1993 date of the Montells decision; therefore, the two-year statute of limitations would apply. The Court disagrees. In the context of this matter, accrual should not be considered synonymous with operative facts. Accrual denotes the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. The term operative facts signifies events or facts relevant to a cause of action. Thus, the two concepts are legally distinct. (Pp. 8-9) 3. There is a concern that claims may be stale. Thus, for LAD actions accruing after the date of the Montells decision but before the date of this opinion, in which operative facts are alleged to have arisen prior to July 27, 1993, the limitations period is the earlier of six years from the date of accrual or two years from the date of this opinion. For LAD actions accruing after the date of this opinion, the limitations period is two years from the accrual date. This holding reasonably accommodates the equitable principles undergirding the prospective application of Montells. (Pp. 9-10) 4. The judicial estoppel doctrine only arises when a party advocates a position contrary to a position it successfully asserted in the same or prior proceeding. However, a party is not bound to a position it unsuccessfully maintained. Moreover, the estoppel doctrine is an extraordinary remedy that should be invoked only when a party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, Ali should not be estopped from asserting his LAD claim. He did not litigate the Montells issue before the trial court and there is no threat to the integrity of the judicial system in allowing the LAD claim to proceed. (Pp. 10-12) 5. Litigants should not be able to retract waivers freely or force other litigants to confront issues considered resolved in an earlier stage of litigation. Rather, courts must analyze each case by considering the totality of circumstances to determine whether the extraordinary remedy of judicial estoppel should be invoked. (p. 12) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED to the extent that it rejects the timeliness of Ali's LAD claim and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a trial of that claim. JUSTICE LAVECCHIA, dissenting, disagrees with the majority's interpretation of the term operative facts in Montells to mean that all facts must postdate the issuance of that decision in order for the two-year limitations period to apply. According to Justice LaVecchia, it is incongruous and inequitable to treat differently one litigant whose continuing-violation claim of discrimination started years before the Montells decision and ended years after that decision and another litigant whose claim of discrimination involves facts that all occurred on the same day as the first litigant's ended. Both had their causes of action accrue on the same day. Yet the majority's holding would treat more indulgently the litigant whose claim is more stale. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate dissenting opinion. YUSEF ALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 12, 2000 -- Decided November 30, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Mary J. Maudsley argued the cause for appellant (April, Maudsley &amp; Goloff, attorneys). Aron M. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith, Ravin, Davis &amp; Himmel, attorneys; Mr. Schwartz and Rachel M. Coe, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. In Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993), this Court held that claims arising under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 (LAD), are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries found at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, rather than the general six-year limitations period established under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. We further concluded that, because the holding in Montells represented a new rule of law, it would not apply to cases the operative facts of which arose before the date of [that] decision. Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at 298. In this LAD case, plaintiff alleges facts arising both prior to and after the date of the Montells decision, July 27, 1993. We conclude that in cases in which the operative facts arise both before and after the date of Montells, plaintiffs must file their actions prior to the expiration of the six-year limitations period or within two years from the date of this opinion, whichever is earlier. Under that standard, plaintiff's complaint was timely filed and may proceed. Accordingly, we hold that for LAD actions accruing after the date of the Montells decision but before the date of this opinion, in which plaintiffs allege operative facts arising prior to July 27, 1993, the limitations period is the earlier of six years from the date of accrual or two years from the date of this opinion. For LAD actions accruing after the date of this opinion, the limitations period is two years from the accrual date. We conclude that our holding reasonably accommodates the equitable principles undergirding the prospective application of Montells. Most importantly, today's clarification will avoid the unfairness associated with litigants being placed in a position of having to guess the trigger date for the statute of limitations[.] Lacey Mun. Util. Auth. v. NJ DEP, 162 N.J. 30, 39 (1999). It is also generally recognized that judicial estoppel is an extraordinary remedy, which should be invoked only when a party's inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice. Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 424 (3d Cir.) (Stapleton, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S. Ct. 495, 102 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1988)); see also [Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990)] ( Judicial estoppel is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement. ). Thus, as with other claim and issue preclusion doctrines, judicial estoppel should be invoked only in those circumstances required to serve its stated purpose, which is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. [Kimball Int'l, Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prod., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2000) (footnote omitted).] Applying those tenets, we are satisfied that plaintiff should not be estopped from asserting his LAD claim. Plaintiff did not litigate the Montells issue before the trial court, successfully or otherwise, but rather waived the issue entirely. Plaintiff's counsel quickly sought to withdraw that waiver and requested the trial court to reconsider its prior decision. Before the Appellate Division, both parties briefed and argued the Montells question, which the court resolved in favor of defendant. Against that procedural background, we discern no threat to the integrity of the judicial system in allowing plaintiff's LAD claim to proceed. Lastly, we do not suggest that a litigant should be permitted to retract waivers freely or force other litigants to confront issues considered resolved in an earlier stage of litigation. Rather, courts must analyze each case by considering the totality of circumstances to determine whether the extraordinary remedy of estoppel should be invoked. In so doing here, we see no compelling circumstances or injustice to defendant to warrant our invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this appeal. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 68 September Term 1999 YUSIF ALI, Plaintiff, v. RUTGERS STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant. ________________________ LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. I disagree with the majority and would affirm the Appellate Division's holding that plaintiff's continuing-violation complaint against Rutgers, brought pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 5-42, is barred by the two-year statute of limitations determined to be applicable in Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993). NO. A-68 YUSEF ALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED November 30, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz