Title: Farmer v. Jackson
Citation: 553 So. 2d 550
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 1989

553 So. 2d 550 (1989)
James A. FARMER
v.
D.C. JACKSON.
D.C. JACKSON
v.
James A. FARMER.
88-585, 88-902.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 15, 1989.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing November 9, 1989.
*551 Kenneth W. Quattlebaum of Brogden &amp; Quattlebaum, Ozark, for appellant/cross-appellee.
James R. Fuqua of Fuqua &amp; Kominos, Ozark, for appellee/cross-appellant.
SHORES, Justice.
D.C. Jackson filed a complaint against James A. Farmer on June 15, 1987, seeking the redemption of land sold for taxes to Farmer at a tax sale. On November 30, 1987, Jackson filed a motion for summary judgment as to Count I of the complaint, which was granted on August 24, 1988.[1] On September 23, 1988, Farmer filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment. Farmer filed a notice of appeal (No. 88-585) on February 15, 1989. What happened between September 23 and February 15 is the subject of this opinion. On March 28, 1989, Jackson filed a motion with this Court to dismiss Farmer's appeal, contending that Farmer's motion to set aside the summary judgment had been denied on December 22, 1988, by operation of law under A.R.Civ.P. 59.1; that the 42-day limit on filing a notice of appeal had expired on February 2, 1989; and that consequently the February 15, 1989, notice of appeal was not timely filed.
We consider here the question of whether Jackson's motion to dismiss Farmer's appeal as untimely under A.R.App.P. 4 is due to be granted.
The case is complicated by the fact that on the same day Jackson filed his motion to dismiss Farmer's appeal with this Court, Farmer filed with the trial court a motion to correct or modify the record on appeal pursuant to A.R.App.P. 10(f). This motion was granted by the trial court on April 5, 1989. The granting of the motion to modify the record was an attempt to change the previous orders of the trial court in such a way as to make an untimely appeal appear to be timely. Jackson has filed a notice of appeal (No. 88-902) from this ruling of the trial court.
The following is a chronology of the case:
The granting of the motion to correct or modify the record by the trial judge had the effect of "saving" the appeal in that the order of the trial judge of April 5, 1989, changed the chronology of the case as follows:
Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
There are only two methods listed in Rule 59.1 for extending the 90-day period: (1) the express consent of all parties to an extension of the 90-day period, or (2) the grant of an extension of time by an appellate court. A trial court, by issuing an order agreeing to "reconsider" its earlier decision, does not extend the 90-day period, nor will a trial court's decision to rehear the matter be considered a disposition of the post-judgment motion within the meaning of Rule 59.1. The merits of the post-judgment motion must be ruled on within the 90-day period in order to avoid the denial mandated by Rule 59.1.
In the instant action, neither method of extending the 90-day period occurred. Counsel for Jackson made his objection on the record, and no motion was made to the appellate court to extend the time period. Therefore, the post-judgment motion was overruled by operation of law on December 22, 1988, and the final day for filing a notice of appeal was February 2, 1989. Accordingly, the notice of appeal which was filed on February 15, 1989, was too late and the appeal is due to be dismissed.
Ala.R.App.P. 10(f) provides as follows:
This rule was designed to provide a vehicle for correcting the record on appeal to reflect what actually occurred in the trial court. It was not designed to provide a procedure for substituting one judgment for another, as was done here. The record shows that at the hearing on January 6, 1989, the following transpired:
Thereafter counsel for Farmer called two witnesses, Probate Judge William J. Snellgrove and Chief Probate Clerk Eunice Hagler.
We have examined the record that the trial judge modified in his order of April 5, 1989. We find that the record was not "made to conform to the truth" by the trial court's order. Rather, the trial court attempted to change its order of December 22, 1988 (which originally set the post-judgment motion before it for a hearing beyond 90 days from its filing, over the plaintiff's objection), to an order granting that motion. In other words, the trial court attempted to completely change the substance of prior orders by the use of A.R. App.P. 10(f). This it cannot do. Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co., 488 So. 2d 1353 (Ala.1986).
For the above-stated reasons, Jackson's motion to dismiss Farmer's appeal (No. 88-585) is due to be granted, and his own appeal (No. 88-902) is due to be dismissed as moot.
88-585 DISMISSED.
88-902 DISMISSED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, ADAMS, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
STEAGALL, J., concurs in the result.
STEAGALL, Justice (concurring in the result).
For important policy reasons, the Supreme Court's advisory committee recommended, and this Court adopted, Rule 59.1, A.R.Civ.P., to cure what was perceived to be a serious problem, i.e., a trial court's occasional failure to timely rule on post-judgment motions. Our caselaw has strictly applied the 90-day provision of Rule 59.1. As is the case with any "rule," individual hardships may occur, but they are necessary for fulfilling the higher policy concerns. While I concur in the result of this case, I recognize and understand the additional time pressures imposed when a judge serves in a multi-county circuit.
SHORES, Justice.
OPINION MODIFIED; APPLICATION OVERRULED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, ADAMS, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
STEAGALL, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  The holding in this case is also dispositive of Counts II and III. See Taylor v. Taylor, 398 So. 2d 267 (Ala.1981).