Title: Jeffrey Lee Weaver v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-247
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
No. SC00-247 
____________ 
JEFFREY LEE WEAVER, 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
[December 16, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Jeffrey Lee Weaver appeals his conviction of first-degree murder of a law 
enforcement officer and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  In sentencing Weaver to death, the trial judge overrode the 
jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment.  See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2003) 
(authorizing judicial overrides).  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm 
Weaver’s conviction but reverse the trial judge’s override of the jury’s 
 
 
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recommendation of a life sentence and remand with instructions to enter a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole.1 
I.  FACTS 
On the evening of January 5, 1996, Jeffrey Weaver attempted the armed 
burglary of a car.  When the attempt failed, he headed south.  The victim contacted 
authorities and a BOLO (“be on lookout”) was issued.  Shortly thereafter, someone 
spotted Weaver lurking in the bushes and shoving what appeared to be a gun down 
his pants.  About two hours after the attempted burglary, Officers Bryant Peney 
and Ray Myers saw Weaver near a local vocational school.  Officer Peney saw that 
Weaver was acting suspiciously, activated his patrol car’s lights, and stopped 
Weaver.  Weaver ran.  The officers chased him across a highway.  When Weaver 
reached the other side of the road, and as Officer Peney approached the median, 
Weaver turned around, crouched in a shooting position and shot Officer Peney in 
the chest.  Officer Peney fell to the ground.  Weaver then aimed at Officer Myers, 
who was approaching.  Officer Myers fired one shot, but missed Weaver.  Weaver 
continued to run and eluded capture by making his way into a lake, where he spent 
the night in hiding. 
                                        
1.  As a result of this disposition, we do not address the State’s cross-appeal 
and the issue of proportionality is rendered moot.  
 
 
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When the paramedics placed Officer Peney on a gurney, a bullet fell to the 
ground.  The bullet underwent testing and proved to be a .357 bullet containing 
Officer Peney’s blood and DNA.  At the hospital, doctors discovered that Officer 
Peney had suffered a single gunshot wound that went through his right arm, into 
his chest, and through his lungs, resulting in a perforated aorta and torn vena cava.  
The operating physicians noted that this combination of wounds was uniformly 
fatal.  Officer Peney died the next morning while undergoing surgery for his 
wounds.  That same morning authorities found Weaver near some bushes close to 
the lake. 
Weaver was indicted for first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer 
(Officer Peney), aggravated assault (Officer Myers), armed resisting of an officer 
with violence (Officer Myers), carrying a concealed weapon, and attempted 
burglary of an occupied conveyance.  Before trial, the attempted armed burglary 
charge was severed. 
Officer Myers and various eyewitnesses testified at trial.  Weaver told 
detectives that he was the person who shot Officer Peney.  He performed a walk-
through of the crime scene, where he reenacted how he shot Officer Peney.  At 
trial, Weaver testified that he did not intend to shoot Officer Peney and that he 
fired at the officer in order to stop the foot chase and force Officer Peney to chase 
him in the patrol car. 
 
 
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Weaver was convicted of all charges.  As to the murder conviction, by a vote 
of eight to four the jury recommended that Weaver receive a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  The court held a Spencer hearing,2 denied Weaver’s motion for a 
new trial, and sentenced him to death.  The court found four aggravating factors: 
(1) contemporaneous violent felony convictions involving Officer Myers; (2) that 
the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in his official duties; (3) 
avoiding lawful arrest; and (4) disrupting or hindering a law enforcement officer.  
Aggravators two through four were merged into one.  The court found one 
statutory mitigator, “no significant history of prior criminal activity” (little weight) 
and three nonstatutory mitigators, which included good employment record 
(moderate weight), cooperation with police (moderate weight), and adaptation to a 
life of incarceration/future value to society (little weight).3  This appeal and cross-
appeal followed. 
                                        
2.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993) (requiring trial 
court to conduct separate evidentiary hearing after jury’s recommendation to (a) 
give the defendant, his counsel, and the State an opportunity to be heard; (b) 
afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present 
additional evidence; and (c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information 
in any presentence or medical report). 
3.  The court rejected the following mitigation as not established by the 
greater weight of the evidence: (1) contribution to society/charitable, humanitarian 
deeds; (2) being a good parent; (3) religious devotion; (4) circumstance of the 
offense; (5) potential for rehabilitation; (6) sorrow over the victim’s injury and 
death; (7) pretrial and trial conduct; and (8) any other mitigating circumstance 
within the knowledge of the court.    
 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION OF LAW 
Weaver raises many issues on appeal.  We discuss only the following: (1) 
whether discharge of appellant’s second counsel was a proper exercise of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court conducted proper Faretta4 and Nelson5 
inquiries; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in requiring appellant to 
wear a stun belt; (4) whether the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s eight 
to four life recommendation was proper; and (5) sufficiency of the evidence.6 
A.  Discharge of Appellant’s Second Court-appointed Counsel 
Weaver’s first appointed counsel was dismissed on conflict grounds and 
Hillard Moldof was appointed.  During the course of Mr. Moldof’s tenure as court-
appointed counsel, the trial court granted ten continuances totaling about two 
years.  Mr. Moldof’s busy trial calendar threatened to delay the case even further 
                                        
4.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
5.  Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), followed by 
Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1988). 
6.  We reject the following claims without discussion: (1) the trial court’s 
failure to grant a continuance after Weaver discharged court-appointed counsel, 
Edward Salantrie; (2) the trial court’s denial of Weaver’s motion to disqualify the 
trial court; (3) the trial court’s denial of Weaver’s motion to disqualify the State 
Attorney; (4) the trial court’s decision to exclude alleged evidence of intervening 
medical negligence; (5) the trial court’s decision to allow a jury view of the crime 
scene; (6) the exclusion of Weaver’s statements to the booking officer; (7) the 
admission of Weaver’s confession; (8) the admission of the victim’s statements to 
his brother as dying declarations; (9) the admission of the attempted armed robbery 
as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged crimes; and (10) the denial of 
Weaver’s request for a new trial.  
 
 
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due to a pending retrial in another case (referred to in the record as the Penalver 
case).  Finally, over Weaver’s objection the court removed Mr. Moldof and 
appointed Edward Salantrie.  Weaver appeals that decision. 
The crime occurred on January 5, 1996.  Mr. Moldof was appointed as a 
Special Public Defender on February 27, after Weaver’s first counsel withdrew on 
conflict grounds.  At a March 5 hearing, Mr. Moldof advised the court that the 
State had listed about 120 witnesses and that because this was a death penalty case 
he planned to depose virtually every single witness on the list.  He notified the 
court that he would not be ready for trial in April.  Thereafter, the court granted 
continuances at status conferences held on April 25, September 25, December 6, 
and February 13, 1997. 
At a status conference on March 26, 1997, the State requested a firm trial 
date, but Mr. Moldof responded that the State was going to present DNA evidence 
that could prove crucial.  Defense counsel also noted that he was the only lawyer 
handling the case and he already had conducted about 100 depositions; he had 
taken as many as 20 depositions in one day.  He argued that his inability to go to 
trial was a function of the State’s lengthy witness list, which had approximately 
200 potential witnesses, and the complexity of the case. 
On May 1, 1997, the court granted another continuance.  Defense counsel 
mentioned the pending trial in Penalver and estimated that it would take five to six 
 
 
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weeks.  The court did not set a firm trial date for July because it had not heard any 
pretrial motions and depositions were still ongoing. 
On July 10, defense counsel, who was in the middle of trial in another case, 
received another continuance and the court set a September trial date. 
On September 19, defense counsel noted that the Penalver trial was in its 
sixth month.  He told the court that he would not be ready for Weaver’s trial.  The 
court allowed another continuance. 
On November 20, Mr. Moldof informed the court that he was still in trial, 
but he hoped that the jury deliberations would begin December 15.  The court 
granted another continuance.  The trial judge informed the parties that she was 
leaving the criminal division and would not try the case and that another trial judge 
would take over the case. 
On December 23, 1997, at a status conference before the new trial judge, 
defense counsel informed the court that he still needed to conduct 140 depositions.  
The court continued the case and set a loose trial date for the end of March.  The 
following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: [Mr. Moldof], I’m convinced that the delay in 
this case for two years has nothing to do with your, you know, being 
lackadaisical or not paying attention to this case.  You have been 
involved in another case. 
MR. MOLDOF: That’s all I’m saying . . . 
MR. SATZ: Listen, Your Honor, I just want to put this on the 
record and be clear.  Just because Mr. Moldof cannot control this case, 
if he––when he accepted the appointment in this case or any, you 
 
 
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know, during the portion thereof if he felt that he couldn’t handle it 
with all the other cases, he should have gotten off.  I’m not just going 
to sit here and let the State’s case dissipate because it’s not 
convenient. 
The court asked Mr. Moldof if he wanted to stay on the case and he 
responded: 
MR. MOLDOF: Judge, I’m going to do whatever Mr. Weaver 
wants and I’ve talked to him and he’s comfortable with me 
representing him.  All I’m saying is that this—the trial [in Penalver] 
was unanticipated.  That’s the only problem that it raised. 
THE COURT: Right. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: Okay.  All right.  Then let me pick out a date in 
March.  But, you know, I can sympathize with the plight of the Peney 
family.  But, on the other hand, if we were to just satisfy them and 
rush to trial . . . we all know what the consequences are.  If I hold his 
feet to the fire and force him to go to trial when he’s not ready, if he’s 
convicted it will be right back in my lap or someone else’s lap. 
 
The court then mentioned to Mr. Moldof that after Penalver a host of other 
judges wanted him to start trying cases that he had pending before them.  Defense 
counsel did not dispute this assertion.  The court predicted that this situation 
presented the possibility that Weaver’s case would not get to trial until December 
1998.  The court set a status conference for March 19, 1998. 
On February 6, 1998, defense counsel filed a “Motion for Special Status and 
Determination of Continuous Circumstances.”  A hearing was held on February 16, 
where defense counsel informed the court that the nine-month trial in Penalver had 
ended in a mistrial.  The retrial in Penalver was scheduled for April 1998 and 
 
 
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defense counsel voiced the prospect that the retrial would take another eight 
months, thus delaying his preparation in Weaver’s case.  Mr. Moldof expressed 
that if he were relegated to the role of penalty phase counsel, he would resign.   
The prosecutor acknowledged that defense counsel had conducted 111 depositions.  
The court noted that a lot of work still needed to be done.  Mr. Moldof suggested 
the appointment of another attorney to assist him in discovery matters, but the 
State noted that the contract of representation prohibited a lawyer from “farming 
out some work to other lawyers” so that “the attorney himself presents his case and 
no one else’s.”  At best, the contract allowed for the appointment of separate 
penalty phase counsel, but only one attorney could handle the guilt phase. 
The court noted that Weaver was an indigent defendant and did not have a 
right to choose particular court-appointed counsel and all he could demand was 
effective representation.  It stated that both sides were entitled to a fair trial.  The 
court decided that it would contemplate the issue and make a decision at a later 
hearing.  On February, 23, 1998, the court decided to remove Mr. Moldof.  Weaver 
objected. 
The issue in this case is whether the court’s removal of Mr. Moldof was 
appropriate given that Weaver did not seek discharge of counsel; Weaver objected 
to the removal; the State did not file a motion to remove defense counsel; defense 
 
 
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counsel did not file a motion to withdraw; and there was no conflict of interest.  
This Court has never addressed removal of counsel under these circumstances.7 
A court’s decision involving withdrawal or discharge of counsel is subject to 
review for abuse of discretion.  See Weems v. State, 645 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1994) (stating that denial of appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw will 
not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 
309, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (same); Anderson v. State, 439 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1983) (same).  A trial court’s discretion to discharge counsel without a 
request from either counsel or from either party is, however, narrower than the 
court’s “broad discretion to determine whether a motion to withdraw should be 
granted.”  Sanborn, 474 So. 2d at 314.  Therefore, we review the judge’s decision 
in this case to determine if the judge abused this narrower scope of discretion. 
The general rule is that an indigent defendant has no right to choose a 
particular court-appointed attorney.  See  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United 
States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989); Capehart v. State, 583 So. 2d 1009, 1014 (Fla. 
                                        
7.  Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue in cases where courts have 
replaced an indigent defendant’s conflict-free counsel over the objection of the 
defendant and counsel.  See generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Power of 
Court to Change Counsel Appointed for Indigent, Against Objections of Accused 
and Original Counsel, 3 A.L.R. 4th 1227 (2004).  While Mr. Moldof did not 
formally object to the removal, he also did not file a motion to withdraw.  Mr. 
Moldof believed he did not have a say in the matter because the court had told him 
that Weaver only had a right to competent counsel and not particular court-
appointed counsel.  
 
 
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1991) (citing Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988)); Harold v. 
State, 450 So. 2d 910, 913 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (“An indigent defendant does not 
have the right to pick and choose the lawyer who will represent him.”).  Thus, if a 
trial court decides that court-appointed counsel is providing adequate 
representation, the court does not violate an indigent defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights if it requires him to keep the original court-appointed lawyer or 
represent himself.  Foster v. State, 704 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). 
While this is the general rule, other courts have held that a trial court abused 
its discretion or exceeded its authority in removing a defendant’s court-appointed 
counsel and appointing other counsel over the defendant’s objection.8  Many of 
                                        
8.  See Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C. 1978) (holding 
that only gross incompetence, physical incapacity of counsel, or contumacious 
conduct that the court cannot cure by a contempt citation may justify removal of an 
attorney over defendant’s objection, and stating that mere disagreement as to the 
conduct of the defense is not sufficient to permit removal of appointed attorney); 
Cannon v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 537 P.2d 898, 911 (Cal. 1975) 
(holding that involuntary removal of attorney is a severe limitation on defendant’s 
right to counsel and may be justified, if at all, only in the most flagrant 
circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial 
controls have failed); Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 440 P.2d 
65, 66 (Cal. 1968) (holding that it was beyond the court’s inherent power and 
statutory authority to discharge court-appointed attorney where the attorney was 
removed on the judge’s subjective opinion that the attorney was “incompetent” 
because of ignorance of the law to try defendant’s case); People v. Johnson, 547 
N.W.2d 65, 68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the trial court had no authority 
to remove court-appointed counsel sua sponte because counsel challenged court’s 
discovery order); People v. Durfee, 547 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that trial judge had no authority to remove sua sponte court-appointed 
counsel whom judge accused of spreading falsehoods about the judge in public); In 
 
 
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these cases acknowledge that an indigent defendant is not entitled to choose a 
particular court-appointed attorney, but reason that once counsel is appointed, an 
attorney-client relationship is established and “is no less inviolable than if counsel 
had been retained by the defendant himself.”  McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 24 
(Alaska 1974) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in replacing the 
public defender because of the trial judge’s impatience with the public defender’s 
alleged inadequate preparation and inability to proceed on the date of the 
scheduled court appearances); see also Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 223 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that the power of the trial court to appoint counsel 
to an indigent defendant does not carry with it the concomitant power to remove 
counsel at his whim). 
These cases reject the argument that because a defendant does not pay his 
fee, he has no ground to complain about his counsel’s removal by the court as long 
as the replacement attorney handles the case competently.  See Smith, 440 P.2d at 
74; cf. Finkelstein v. State, 574 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (noting 
that “[o]nce counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or the accused, the 
                                                                                                                              
re Welfare of M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
the trial court abused its discretion in removing juvenile’s appointed counsel 
following counsel’s request for writ of prohibition seeking removal of trial judge); 
Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 223-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that 
the trial court lacked inherent power to remove appointed counsel on grounds that 
he had violated the district attorney’s rule about interviewing state witness, which 
conflicted with counsel’s obligation to seek out and review witnesses). 
 
 
 
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accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial”) (quoting Harling, 387 
A.2d at 1105).  They reason that the attorney-client relationship is independent of 
the source of compensation because an attorney’s responsibility is to the person he 
represents rather than the individual or entity paying for his services.  See Smith, 
440 P.2d at 74.  We agree.  To allow trial courts to remove an indigent defendant’s 
court-appointed counsel with greater ease than a non-indigent defendant’s retained 
counsel would stratify attorney-client relationships based on defendants’ economic 
backgrounds. 
The right to chosen counsel, however, is not absolute.  A trial judge may, in 
the interest of justice, substitute one counsel for another.  Finkelstein, 574 So. 2d at 
1168.  A court would be serving such an interest if it sua sponte removed counsel 
who was grossly incompetent, physically incapacitated, or conducting himself in 
an inappropriate manner that could not “be cured by contempt proceedings.”  Id. 
Where the issue is not defense counsel’s conduct but unexpected difficulties 
in his trial calendar that threaten the State’s right to a fair trial, trial judges may 
also exercise their discretion and remove counsel over defendant’s objection.  Cf. 
United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that if 
counsel’s busy trial calendar causes delay, then the State’s interest in the efficient 
administration of justice allows a trial court to require a defendant to substitute 
other counsel).  In announcing this rule, we emphasize the unique facts of this case.  
 
 
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Trial judges should invoke this discretion with great circumspection and only in 
extraordinary circumstances. 
This case does present such circumstances.  The court was concerned that 
the State’s case could become weaker and harder to try with the increasing passage 
of time.  During the February 19, 1998, hearing, Judge Speiser told the parties:
 
THE COURT: My inclination would have to be to take Mr. 
Moldof off the case in view of what is expressed here today [i.e., the 
pending retrial in Penalver].  This is done for purposes of the, in the 
Court’s view, of maintaining justice in this case, and to insure this 
case does reach a trial date that is within some realm of 
reasonableness from the date this crime allegedly occurred. 
Mr. Moldof is placed in a situation that he’s now in that is 
beyond his control as a result of other individuals’ actions who have 
made, in effect, the decision for him. 
 
The court’s decision to remove Mr. Moldof was based on the fact that the lengthy 
retrial in Penalver prevented him from dedicating the amount of time necessary to 
Weaver’s case. 
The court’s decision is supported by Koblitz, 803 F.2d at 1528, which 
suggests that continuous delays due to counsel’s busy trial calendar can justify a 
trial court’s decision to require a defendant to obtain substitute counsel.  In 
Koblitz, the court held that the trial court violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to choose his counsel when it instructed defendant’s retained counsel, instead 
of the defendant, to find substitute counsel.  Id.  However, the court did note that 
the government’s interest in the efficient administration of justice could require a 
 
 
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defendant to resort to his second choice of counsel where the trial judge had 
granted several continuances and the original counsel continued to tell the court 
that he would not be ready for trial.9 
Weaver argues that a defendant has a right to have his lawyer, with whom he 
develops a relationship, follow the case through to conclusion.  Whatever interest 
an indigent defendant has in maintaining and keeping the attorney-client 
relationship with his court-appointed counsel, however, exists alongside the State’s 
own interest in the efficient administration of justice.  Cf. Martinez v. Court of 
Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (explaining that “the government’s 
interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the 
defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer”); Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 
2d 52, 65 (Fla. 2000) (noting the State’s legitimate interest in the prompt and 
efficient administration of justice in capital cases and the capital defendant’s 
legitimate interest in the fairness of capital postconviction process).  “Article I, 
section 2 of the Florida Constitution provides that justice shall be administered 
without denial or delay” and “[t]he State, as prosecutor, has the same right to 
justice without delay as any other party.”  State v. Antonucci, 590 So. 2d 998, 1000 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (granting writ of certiorari and quashing trial court’s sua 
                                        
9.  While Koblitz involved retained counsel, the case remains instructive.  
As mentioned above, the courts’ power sua sponte to remove counsel is the same 
whether counsel is court-appointed or retained.   
 
 
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sponte order continuing criminal case for one year or until conclusion of related 
civil case where the State’s key witnesses were so elderly that delay would likely 
prejudice the State). 
Here, the State argued that almost two years had passed since the 
commission of the crime and that continuing the case further would undermine its 
case.  The State could no longer locate several witnesses, others had faded 
memories, and some witnesses with direct knowledge of the case had yet to be 
deposed.  At the time of Mr. Moldof’s removal, the court had continued the case 
for approximately two years. 
It is important to note that the court’s decision to remove Mr. Moldof was 
not done out of any animus towards the defense.  In fact, the court, in granting the 
various continuances, acknowledged the complexity and size of the case.  The 
court made its final decision when it was faced with the retrial in Penalver, which 
threatened to delay Weaver’s case by another nine months.  This would have 
meant that the trial would have occurred three years after the crime.  We hold that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging counsel under the unique 
circumstances of this case. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Nelson and Faretta Inquiries 
 
 
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Weaver next argues that he never unequivocally requested that the court 
discharge his counsel and allow him to represent himself, and thus the court abused 
its discretion in discharging his counsel.  We reject this argument. 
Shortly before trial, Weaver filed a motion to discharge Mr. Salantrie, the 
attorney whom the court appointed after it removed Mr. Moldof, over a 
disagreement about defense strategy.  The court held a Nelson hearing,10 where it 
found that Mr. Salantrie was rendering competent assistance of counsel.  
Thereafter, the court conducted a Faretta inquiry11 and allowed Weaver to 
discharge his counsel.  Weaver proceeded pro se in the guilt phase, but retained his 
appointed penalty-phase counsel, Raag Singhal. 
When a defendant seeks to discharge his court-appointed counsel, the trial 
judge should inquire of the defendant as to the reason for the request.  See Nelson 
v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).  If the defendant cites 
incompetency of counsel, the trial judge should determine whether there is 
                                        
10.  In Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 1988), this Court 
adopted the procedure announced in Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1973), for handling a defendant’s complaint that his appointed counsel is 
incompetent.  When this occurs, the trial judge must make a sufficient inquiry of 
the defendant to determine whether appointed counsel is rendering effective 
assistance of counsel. 
11.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (determining that a 
defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right of self-representation 
and may waive the right of assistance of counsel, but requiring trial judge to 
examine the defendant to determine whether the waiver is made knowingly and 
intelligently before allowing the defendant to proceed without counsel). 
 
 
 
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reasonable cause to believe that the court-appointed counsel is rendering 
ineffective assistance.  Id.  If reasonable cause exists, the court should make such a 
finding on the record and appoint a substitute attorney, who should be allowed 
adequate time to prepare the defense.  Id.  If no reasonable basis appears for a 
finding of ineffective representation, the trial court should so state on the record 
and advise the defendant that if he discharges his original counsel, the court may 
not thereafter be required to appoint a substitute.  Id.  If the defendant continues to 
demand dismissal of his court-appointed counsel, the trial judge may in his 
discretion discharge counsel and require the defendant to proceed to trial without 
representation.  Id. 
Weaver filed a pro se “Motion for the Removal of, Replacement of My 
Appointed Counsel Edward G. Salantrie.”  The motion asserted that Mr. Salantrie 
would not present the defense Weaver sought.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Salantrie 
filed a “Motion to Withdraw” asserting that he and Weaver “had a serious 
disagreement regarding the hiring of various experts and what defense should be 
pursued.”  Mr. Salantrie’s motion also stated that he had “performed extensive 
work and hired experts to pursue and develop evidentiary support for the defense 
coveted by the defendant,” but that he had “developed no credible evidentiary 
support for the defendant’s contentions.” 
 
 
- 19 - 
The court held a hearing on the motions.  At the outset, Mr. Salantrie 
withdrew his motion to withdraw, which meant that the only pending motion was 
Weaver’s motion to discharge.  Thus, discharge of Mr. Salantrie was ultimately the 
result of Weaver’s decision to proceed on his motion to discharge.  Weaver 
explained he and Mr. Salantrie could not agree on the particular defense that 
should be presented to the jury.  Weaver wanted to argue that his bullet could not 
have hit Officer Peney, while Mr. Salantrie wanted to argue that Weaver’s bullet 
struck Officer Peney unintentionally.  In essence, Mr. Salantrie’s defense theory 
was that Weaver did not intend to shoot Peney and, therefore, he was only guilty of 
second-degree murder. 
The court found “beyond any doubt” that Mr. Salantrie had spent many 
hours trying to prepare Weaver’s defense and found counsel’s performance in the 
case “impeccable and certainly quite impressive and effective.”  It concluded that 
Mr. Salantrie was rendering effective assistance of counsel and that his proffered 
defense was consistent with the evidence.  Thus, Weaver was not entitled to 
substitute counsel if he discharged Mr. Salantrie. 
After finding that Mr. Salantrie was rendering effective assistance, the court 
asked whether Weaver wanted to keep Mr. Salantrie or discharge him.  The court 
stated: 
Because if you do not want Mr. Salantrie to represent you, this Court 
would not be in a position to appoint you another attorney. . . . If you 
 
 
- 20 - 
can afford an attorney of your own, you have that right to retain 
private counsel. And if you decide not to have Mr. Salantrie represent 
you, then you will need to determine whether or not you are 
competent yourself to represent yourself in this matter. 
Weaver reiterated that he could not proceed with Mr. Salantrie’s defense and did 
not want his assistance if it meant proceeding with the second-degree murder 
defense.  The Nelson hearing adequately safeguarded Weaver’s rights. 
After deciding that Weaver could not afford a private attorney, the court 
explained it would be conducting a Faretta inquiry to determine whether Weaver 
was knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel.  In 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant has an affirmative right to present his own defense.  A trial court may 
not impose counsel on a “literate, competent, and understanding” defendant who 
has voluntarily waived his right to counsel.  Id. at 835.  This requirement is 
reflected in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3), which provides: 
Regardless of the defendant’s legal skills or the complexity of the 
case, the court shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to 
represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of 
record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of the right to counsel. 
The court followed the model colloquy in rule 3.111.  It advised Weaver that by 
giving up his right to counsel he was relinquishing the benefit of having an 
attorney to (1) uncover potential constitutional violations; (2) ensure compliance 
with speedy trial and statute of limitations provisions; (3) uncover favorable 
 
 
- 21 - 
evidence that could be introduced at trial; (4) effectively argue a legal defense on 
his behalf; (5) assist during jury selection and jury instructions; (6) call witnesses 
on his behalf, cross-examine the State’s witnesses, and make closing arguments; 
and (7) properly preserve errors for appellate review.  The court warned Weaver 
that it is “almost always unwise to represent yourself in court”; that self-
representation would not entitle him to any special treatment such as extended 
library privileges; that the State would not treat him any differently because of his 
pro se status; that he was not entitled automatically to a continuance even though 
he was deciding to proceed pro se a week before the trial; that while he was not 
required to have the legal knowledge or skills of an attorney, he was expected to 
abide by the rules of criminal law and procedure; that the trial could continue 
without him if he became disruptive; that his access to the State Attorney would be 
severely reduced in comparison to court-appointed counsel; and that if he was 
convicted, on appeal he would not be able to claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that he lacked legal knowledge or skill. 
The court confirmed that Weaver had received and read the indictment and 
that he understood the charges against him.  The court advised him that the armed 
burglary count had been severed.  The court also explained the possible penalties 
that he was facing under the indictment.  Before discharging Mr. Salantrie, the 
court asked whether Weaver wished to speak with counsel in private.  Weaver 
 
 
- 22 - 
accepted and the court granted a fifteen-minute recess.  Weaver stood firm on his 
decision to proceed without Mr. Salantrie. 
Finally, the court determined that Weaver’s waiver of court-appointed 
counsel was knowing and intelligent.  It confirmed that Weaver read and wrote 
English, was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, had never been diagnosed 
or treated for mental illness, did not have a physical impairment, and had not been 
compelled to forego counsel.  The court found that Weaver was familiar with his 
case and its facts as evidenced by his detailed notes and his familiarity with the 
testimony of various witnesses. 
Weaver argues, however, that the court should not have undertaken a Faretta 
inquiry because he never made an unequivocal request to represent himself.  We 
disagree.  Weaver decided to discharge Mr. Salantrie even though the court found 
that he was providing effective and competent counsel.  A defendant who persists 
in discharging competent counsel after being informed that he is not entitled to 
substitute counsel is presumed to be unequivocally exercising his right of 
self-representation.  See Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988); 
Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253, 258 (Fla. 1984). 
Finally, Weaver claims that he was not competent to represent himself.  The 
focus of a Faretta hearing under rule 3.111 is whether a defendant is competent to 
waive the right to counsel, not whether he is competent to provide an adequate 
 
 
- 23 - 
defense.  See State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. 1997).  “[A] defendant 
does not need to possess the technical legal knowledge of an attorney before being 
permitted to proceed pro se.”  Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 1996). 
During the Faretta inquiry, the court determined that Weaver was competent to 
waive his right to counsel. 
We conclude that the Nelson and Faretta inquiries conducted by the trial 
court adequately safeguarded the defendant’s rights. 
C.  Trial Court’s Decision to Allow Use of a Stun Belt 
Weaver next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
State to fit him with a stun belt.  The trial court determined that courtroom safety 
justified the use of a stun belt and required Weaver to wear one throughout the 
proceedings. 
A trial court’s decision to allow the use of a stun belt is governed by the 
same legal principles developed in our earlier cases regarding the use of physical 
restraints at trial, primarily the use of shackles.  See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 785 So. 
2d 422, 428 (Fla. 2001) (involving use of leg and waist restraints).  As a general 
rule, a defendant has the right to appear before the jury free from physical 
restraints.  See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (mentioning this 
principle in relation to shackles).  However, a criminal defendant’s right to be free 
of physical restraints is not absolute.  See Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 428; United States 
 
 
- 24 - 
v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1225 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. 
Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1976)).  Restraints “may be necessary to 
prevent the defendant from disrupting the trial . . . and to protect the physical well-
being of the jury, lawyers, judge, and other trial participants.”  Israel v. State, 837 
So. 2d 381, 390 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 
(11th Cir. 1983)).  The use of restraints is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  See Elledge v. State, 408 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 1987). 
The trial court discussed the use of a stun belt during a hearing on various 
motions.  A separate evidentiary hearing was not required.  The court articulated 
on the record why the stun belt was necessary.  While the hearing was somewhat 
informal—for example, the sheriff was not under oath when he explained the 
operation and use of the belt—the court’s inquiry was sufficient.  The court 
addressed factual questions related to the stun belt’s operation, explored less 
problematic methods of restraint, and found that the belt was necessary in this 
particular case for reasons articulated on the record.12  
                                        
12.  While the trial court did not address the possibility of accidental 
discharge, that does not rise to the level of error.  Accidental discharges, while 
documented on more than one occasion, can be characterized as rare.  See, e.g., 
State v. Wachholtz, 952 P.2d 396, 398 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998); Hawkins v. 
Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting at least nine 
accidental activations nationwide in initial years of stun belt’s use).  In any event, 
even where an accidental discharge of a stun belt actually occurs, the issue is 
whether the accidental discharge has prejudiced the defendant.   
 
 
- 25 - 
Specifically, a sheriff from the Broward Sheriff’s Office informed the court 
of the belt’s workings and concealability as well as the conditions that would 
require its activation.  While there was no prior history of violent courtroom 
outbursts, the court noted that Weaver’s self-representation would have him 
moving about the courtroom and this presented some safety concerns.  The court 
pointed out that there would be sidebar conferences, access to witnesses and jurors, 
and the State expected to introduce guns and ammunition at the trial.  When 
Weaver asked the court to consider other alternatives, the court replied that it could 
not have him wear leg irons or handcuffs in front of the jury and that leg braces 
would limit his mobility.  The court determined that the stun belt was the best 
device to address the security concerns presented by appellant’s pro se status.  It 
found the stun belt neither visible nor suggestive and ordered that a jacket be made 
available to better conceal the belt. 
Weaver’s argument that the trial court erred in ordering the use of a stun belt 
is especially weak in light of his pro se status.  While prior violent courtroom 
behavior can justify the imposition of restraints, it is not the only circumstance 
justifying their use.  Cf. Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 429 (holding that necessity of 
restraints was justified by trial judge’s first-hand knowledge of defendant’s prior 
violent courtroom behavior).  Weaver’s pro se status meant that he would be 
moving about the courtroom in close proximity to the judge, jurors, prosecutors, 
 
 
- 26 - 
witnesses, and potential firearm evidence.  This closer proximity to various trial 
participants arguably raises greater safety concerns than a defendant who is 
represented by counsel and has no legitimate reason to wander beyond the defense 
table.  Given these circumstances, in which a defendant charged with first-degree 
murder was representing himself and moving about the courtroom in close 
proximity to trial participants, especially adverse witnesses, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion even though Weaver had no prior history of violent courtroom 
behavior.  
Weaver relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Durham, 
287 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).  In Durham, 287 F.3d at 1305-06, the court noted 
that stun belts pose “a far more substantial risk of interfering with a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right” to confer with counsel and direct his own defense than do 
leg shackles and that discharge of a stun belt poses a greater threat to the dignity of 
the courtroom than shackles.  The court reasoned that although stun belts were less 
visible than other restraining devices, they also imposed a substantial burden on a 
defendant’s ability to participate in his own defense because “[i]t is reasonable to 
assume that much of a defendant’s focus and attention when wearing [a stun belt] 
is occupied by anxiety over the possible triggering of the belt.”  In short, the 
defendant would be too busy concentrating on doing everything to prevent the 
belt’s activation at the expense of his participation.  Id. at 1306. 
 
 
- 27 - 
Certain facts distinguish Weaver’s case from Durham.  Durham did not act 
pro se and thus did not present the more pressing safety concerns inherent in the 
pro se context.  Nevertheless, Weaver argues that Durham’s rationale about the 
“substantial burden” that a stun belt imposes on a defendant’s ability to participate 
in his own defense is not limited to defendants represented by counsel and applies 
with even more force to a pro se defendant.  He argues that the “anxiety” caused by 
the possibility of an accidental discharge is arguably more present given that the 
pro se defendant is making more movements that could be perceived as 
threatening, thereby triggering an unwarranted discharge of the stun belt.  See id. at 
1305 (stating that the “fear of receiving a . . . shock for any gesture that could be 
perceived as threatening likely chills a defendant’s inclination to make any 
movements during trial—including those movements necessary for effective 
communication with counsel”). 
The trial court was concerned with the unique security issues posed by 
Weaver’s pro se status and not just with the possibility of disruptive trial antics.  
There is a meaningful distinction between mere verbal disruption and conduct that 
threatens courtroom security.  See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 
1240  (9th Cir. 2001).  Potential threats of violence or escape are sufficiently 
identifiable to allow a defendant to advocate his cause without fear that law 
enforcement will mistake his forceful advocacy for such a threat.  See id.  As a 
 
 
- 28 - 
result, concerns about a stun belt’s potential to prejudice or “chill” a defendant’s 
advocacy are less compelling when the belt’s use is justified on grounds of 
preventing violence or escape.  See id. at 1242 (discussing the prejudice concerns 
posed by shackles and alternative forms of restraint and noting that in shifting the 
focus from preventing disruption to addressing security, the belt’s “chilling” effect 
becomes less prejudicial and the alternatives more so). 
A stun belt’s potential for prejudice must be measured against other 
alternative forms of restraint and whether these alternatives are less prejudicial or 
viable.  In this case, there was virtually no alternative to a stun belt given the 
visibility of other restraints and the security concerns posed by Weaver’s pro se 
status.  As this Court has stated, a criminal defendant’s right to be free of physical 
restraints is not absolute.  Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 428; see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 
1225.  Under these circumstances, the decision to employ a stun belt constitutes a 
rational exercise of the trial court’s discretion that was reasonably necessary to 
ensure order and safety in the courtroom, especially in light of defendant’s pro se 
status. 
Next, we must address the undisputed accidental discharge of the stun belt.  
During voir dire, the stun belt was accidentally discharged outside the presence of 
the jurors.  The belt was activated after a guard accidentally triggered the remote 
control while helping to move a courtroom computer.   The deputy was using an 
 
 
- 29 - 
older model of the belt that did not have a protective guard on the remote control 
unit.  When initially informed about the stun belt, the court was informed that the 
triggering mechanism involved a key rather than a switch.  Thus, the belt that was 
being used differed from the one initially described.  The record suggests that the 
older model was necessary because the model initially described to the court did 
not adequately secure Weaver. 
After the accidental discharge, the deputy removed the stun belt control from 
her belt and placed it in a drawer.  The following exchange occurred between 
appellant and the judge: 
THE COURT: All right.  Mr. Weaver, are you okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Just shaken a little bit, that’s all. 
THE COURT: Are you ready? Are you able to proceed now? 
THE DEFENDANT: Could we wait about 15 more minutes, just 
maybe get this little nervousness calmed down a little bit. 
THE COURT: I overheard your lawyers ask you when you walked in, 
they asked you how you were.  You said you were fine. 
THE DEFENDANT: As far as pain or anything like that, there is no 
pain.  But there is a little bit––you can see— 
Shortly thereafter, a brief recess was taken.  After the recess the court asked 
appellant if he was ready to proceed and he said, “I suppose.”  The jury was 
brought back into the courtroom and defendant proceeded with his voir dire of the 
jurors.  Before the lunch break, the court informed Weaver that a nurse would 
examine him.  The nurse determined that Mr. Weaver was fine. 
 
 
- 30 - 
Weaver now argues that “he became meek and subdued” after having been 
stunned by the electrical bolt and that he was no longer as zealous an advocate for 
himself.  This issue was never raised at trial.  Absent fundamental error, an issue 
will not be considered for the first time on appeal.  Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 
425, 429 (Fla. 1990).  Weaver did not object and did not request a mistrial.  Even 
now he fails to specifically allege how the shock affected his performance. 
While no Florida court has considered the accidental discharge of a stun belt, 
other jurisdictions have held that a defendant is not prejudiced where the discharge 
occurs outside the presence of the jury.  See Wachholtz, 952 P.2d at 398 (affirming 
denial of motion for mistrial based on the accidental discharge of stun belt that 
occurred while potential jurors were assembled but before voir dire had begun, 
where the defendant had offered no evidence that potential jurors actually heard 
the defendant scream after the belt’s discharge); Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987, 994 
(Nev. 2000) (reversing conviction, in part, because of stun belt’s accidental 
discharge before the jury during closing arguments); State v. Filiaggi, 714 N.E.2d 
867, 875 (Ohio 1999) (finding that defendant’s jury waiver was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary even though it occurred on the same day as accidental 
discharge of stun belt where court took a recess directly after accidental discharge 
 
 
- 31 - 
for the remainder of the morning and reconvened in the afternoon).13  In this case, 
the accidental discharge occurred outside the jury’s presence and the trial court 
took a brief recess before continuing voir dire.  Therefore, the accidental discharge 
of the stun belt did not prejudice the defendant. 
D.  Trial Judge’s Override of the Jury’s Life Recommendation 
The jury recommended life imprisonment.  The trial court overrode that 
recommendation and sentenced Weaver to death.  We reverse on this issue and 
remand for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 
Long ago we stated the standard the trial court must use in determining 
whether to override a jury’s recommendation of a life sentence.  In Tedder v. State, 
322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), we held that “[i]n order to sustain a sentence of 
death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of 
death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could 
differ.”  This inquiry and the built-in deference to the jury’s recommendation 
“honors the underlying principle that this jury’s advisory sentence reflect[s] the 
‘conscience of the community’ at the time of [the] trial.”  Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 
263, 283 (Fla. 2000).   As we recently emphasized, “[t]he singular focus of a 
                                        
13.  Durham noted that “[i]f the [stun belt] were to be triggered accidentally, 
the result would be an egregious breach of . . . [the defendant’s] most fundamental 
trial rights.”  287 F.3d at 1307.  However, a fair reading of Durham indicates that 
the court was most likely concerned with the stun belt’s accidental activation while 
the jury was present.  
 
 
- 32 - 
Tedder inquiry is whether there is ‘a reasonable basis in the record to support the 
jury’s recommendation of life,’ rather than the weighing process which a judge 
conducts after a death recommendation.”  Id. (quoting San Martin v. State, 717 So. 
2d 462, 471 (Fla. 1998)); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. 
1990) (reiterating that under Tedder, “the trial court’s role is solely to determine 
whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to form a basis upon which 
reasonable jurors could rely in recommending life imprisonment”).  We explained 
in Keen that “the jury’s life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and 
magnifies the ultimate effect of mitigation on the defendant’s sentence.”  Id. at 
285. 
Before reviewing the trial court’s override analysis, we must discuss the 
validity of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found in this case.  The 
trial court found four aggravating factors, which Weaver does not challenge: (1) 
contemporaneous violent felony convictions; (2) the victim was a law enforcement 
officer engaged in his official duties; (3) avoiding lawful arrest; and (4) disrupting 
or hindering a law enforcement officer.  Aggravators two through four, however, 
were merged into one.  The court found one statutory mitigator of “no significant 
history of prior criminal activity” (given little weight) and three nonstatutory 
mitigators: good employment record (moderate weight), cooperation with police 
 
 
- 33 - 
(moderate weight), and adaptation to a life of incarceration/future value to society 
(little weight). 
Despite Weaver’s arguments, the court properly rejected the following 
mitigation as not established by the greater weight of the evidence: (1) contribution 
to society/charitable, humanitarian deeds;14 (2) being a good parent;15 (3) religious 
devotion;16 (4) circumstances of the offense;17 (5) potential for rehabilitation;18 (6) 
sorrow over the victim’s injury and death;19 (7) pretrial and trial conduct;20 and (8) 
                                        
14.  The court noted that most of the testimony on this mitigator was 
extremely remote in time. 
15.  The court noted that Weaver “abdicated his parental responsibility to 
[his three year-old son] Nicholas, by quitting his job where he was capable of 
financially supporting his son, leaving Nicholas in North Carolina, and ceasing to 
provide the daily care and commitment of love to the child, in order to aimlessly 
travel.”   
16.  The record shows that Weaver had some interest in religion but also 
shows that Weaver was convicted of larceny of a vehicle, speeding, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, DUI, reckless driving, illegal 
discharge of a firearm, and both breaking and entering and larceny at a hotel.  As 
the court noted, Weaver also conceived a child out of wedlock and abandoned him 
as a toddler.  The court determined that this behavior did not evince a significant 
attachment to religion.   
17.  The court noted that Weaver shot Officer Peney in the chest, which was 
a serious and extremely life-threatening injury.  Furthermore, the court reasoned 
that the fact that “Officer Peney was fatally shot once with one bullet when the 
defendant could have unloaded all the bullets in the chamber of this .357 magnum  
. . . fails to convince this Court of the existence of this mitigating factor.”   
18.  The court noted that Weaver had previously committed a series of minor 
offenses, for which he had received light sentences, but did not learn his lesson  
and was now found guilty of murder.   
19.  The court noted that Weaver’s apology was for the victim’s family 
having to endure a trial and for the loss of their son and that Weaver never 
admitted shooting Officer Peney.  The court found Weaver’s sorrow to be over his 
 
 
- 34 - 
any other mitigating circumstance within the knowledge of the court.  Competent, 
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s rejection of these mitigating 
circumstances.  See Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla. 1990) (stating 
that whether a mitigating circumstance has been established by the evidence in a 
given case is a question of fact and subject to the competent substantial evidence 
standard).  Similarly, the weight given to the mitigation does not constitute an 
abuse of discretion.  The sentencing order articulates the court’s rationale 
regarding the weight determinations for the statutory and nonstatutory mitigators.  
See id. (stating that the weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the 
trial court’s discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard). 
Because the central focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is a 
reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s recommendation of life, we 
must examine what was presented during Weaver’s penalty phase.  At the penalty 
phase, the State called two witnesses: Officer Peney’s mother and the former 
captain of the Ft. Lauderdale police department, Paul Urschalitz.  Mr. Urschalitz 
testified about Officer Peney’s effectiveness in carrying out the department’s 
“community policing” initiative.  The State also introduced evidence of prior 
                                                                                                                              
own predicament and noted he expressed no remorse during the guilt or penalty 
phase.  
20.  The court attributed Weaver’s trial behavior and ability to get along and 
be respectful in court to the fact that he was given little chance to act out or 
misbehave.  Weaver wore a stun belt and there was extensive security in the 
courtroom.   
 
 
- 35 - 
criminal convictions in order to rebut the mitigating circumstance of lack of prior 
significant criminal history. 
Weaver’s penalty phase counsel called various witnesses.  The mother of 
Weaver’s son testified that Weaver helped her raise her other two children as if 
they were his own.  She also testified that Weaver provided financially for them 
and that he cashed out his retirement plan so that he could pay off their debts.   
Weaver’s mother testified about how Weaver respected his family and took care of 
his sister and her children when her abusive husband left them. Weaver’s sisters 
also testified.  Weaver’s older sister testified about how Weaver assisted her when 
she had problems and how much he meant to her.   Another sister testified about 
how he helped her after her husband kicked her out of the house and about 
Weaver’s ability to help resolve family disputes even though he was in prison.   
Weaver’s youngest sister testified about their “close bond” and how he still gives 
her “good advice” when he calls her from prison. 
Mr. Decker, a former co-worker, testified that Weaver was a responsible, 
hard worker and characterized him as a generous, honest person who would send 
most of his paycheck to his family.  Brian Putnam, Weaver’s co-worker when he 
worked at a cotton mill, testified that Weaver was a very smart and hardworking 
individual.  He also testified about how Weaver cared for his girlfriend’s two 
 
 
- 36 - 
children as if they were his own.  Mr. Mykitka, Weaver’s former boss for six 
months, testified that Weaver was a good and diligent worker who was reliable. 
William Lehman Eaton, a long-time friend of Weaver, testified about how 
Weaver convinced his father to take Eaton into his home after Eaton’s stepmother 
kicked him out of the house.  He also testified that Weaver was nonviolent and that 
“he was always helping everybody out” and about Weaver’s involvement in a 
prayer group during high school. 
Timothy Madison Denton, Weaver’s friend from high school, also testified 
that Weaver was “very passionate” about religion and the Bible and how he headed 
a Bible study group in high school.  Mr. Madison testified that the time he spent 
with Weaver had a very positive impact on him throughout his entire life.  Betty 
Rabon Scott, another friend of Weaver’s from high school, testified that he was an 
honest individual.  Counsel introduced Weaver’s high school diploma, which he 
earned while at the Broward County Jail.  Finally, Weaver’s counsel pointed out 
that the five convictions on Weaver’s record were misdemeanor offenses, none of 
which involved violence. 
As stated above, “[t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is 
‘a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s recommendation of life,’ 
rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death 
recommendation.”  Keen, 775 So. 2d at 283-84 (quoting San Martin, 717 So. 2d at 
 
 
- 37 - 
471).  The “reasonable basis” analysis must focus on finding support for the jury’s 
recommendation and does not demand that the judge agree with the jury’s 
conclusion.  See id. at 283 (noting that “[r]easonable arguments [could] certainly 
be presented to support [the trial judge’s] order” but overturning trial judge’s 
decision to override jury’s life recommendation). 
The sentencing order does not follow a Tedder analysis.  It does not focus on 
whether there was a reasonable basis to support the jury’s life recommendation.  
Instead, it appears to engage in the “weighing process which a judge conducts after 
a death recommendation.”  Id. at 283.  For example, the sentencing order states: 
In summary, this Court has established, considered, and 
weighed the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors.  
Despite the existence of the four mitigating factors and the weight 
assigned to each by this Court, their nature and quality pale when 
compared to the severity and enormity of the circumstances of this 
case.  Although no two cases are ever completely alike, this Court has 
reviewed the mitigating factors which the Supreme Court of Florida 
has unequivocally identified and determined to be significant and 
commonly present in cases where they have reversed a trial court’s 
override of a jury’s recommendation of a sentence of life 
incarceration.  None are present in this case.  The recommendation by 
the jury in this case of a life sentence was based on minor mitigating 
circumstances when compared to the outrageousness of the crimes 
committed. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The weighing process within this case and the 
proportionality review with other cases require the imposition of the 
ultimate penalty.  There is a reasonable basis to override the jury’s 
recommendation. 
(Citations omitted.) 
 
 
- 38 - 
While the sentencing order is thoughtful and well-written, the order’s 
override analysis appears to violate Tedder and its progeny to the extent that it 
engages in the weighing process that a judge conducts when he receives a death 
recommendation.  The order essentially cites and discusses other judicial override 
cases and seeks to distinguish them on the basis of the aggravating and mitigating 
factors in those cases.  The sentencing order’s override analysis approximates a 
weighing analysis, which is not the standard that should be employed when 
contemplating a judicial override.  See Keen, 775 So. 2d at 283 (overturning a trial 
court’s judicial override of a life recommendation based on the trial court’s 
reasoning that “[t]he mitigating evidence is wholly insufficient to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances in support of a life sentence”).   
As we recently emphasized, “a fundamental distinction exists between a 
defendant who receives an advisory sentence of death from a jury as opposed to 
one who receives an advisory sentence of life.”  Keen, 775 So. 2d at 284 n.19.  In 
the latter context, it must be assumed that at least six members of the twelve-
member jury concluded that based on the record before them, the mitigation 
evidence compelled a life recommendation.   From that starting point, the 
mitigation evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.  
Cf. Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 806 (Fla. 1992) (viewing the mitigation in 
the light most favorable to the defendant but affirming the override in light of four 
 
 
- 39 - 
statutory aggravating circumstances).  The trial court must then consider whether 
the mitigation evidence could serve as a reasonable basis for a life 
recommendation.  See Keen, 775 So. 2d at 284 n.19 (applying this analysis to 
mitigation evidence regarding disparate treatment of an accomplice).  
In this case, there can be no dispute that the jury found the aggravators—the 
aggravators flow from the fact that the jury convicted Weaver of the charged 
crimes and that he murdered a law enforcement officer.  The judge found one 
statutory mitigator (“no significant history of prior criminal activity”) and three 
nonstatutory mitigators (“good employment record,” “cooperation with police” and 
“adaptation to a life of incarceration/future value to society”).   He assigned this 
mitigation moderate to little weight.  For purposes of an override analysis, 
however, the judge’s determinations on the weight attributable to mitigating factors 
should not be seen as the jury’s determinations, nor do they mandate unflinching 
deference.  Cf. Holsworth v. State, 522 So. 2d 348, 354 (Fla. 1988) (agreeing with 
the defendant that in overriding the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge could 
not substitute his view of the evidence and the weight to be given it for that of the 
jury); Parker v. State, 643 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 1994) (rejecting the State’s 
argument that in the context of a Tedder analysis this Court should defer to a trial 
judge’s discretionary decision regarding the weight of mitigation evidence 
regardless of the jury’s recommendation and noting that “[w]hile some persons 
 
 
- 40 - 
may disagree with the weight [of the mitigation evidence presented] . . . clearly 
other reasonable persons would be convinced by it”). 
In Weaver’s case, the trial judge conducted a typical weighing analysis, 
noting that “despite the existence of the four mitigating factors and the weight 
assigned to each by this Court, their nature and quality pale when compared to the 
severity and enormity of the circumstances of this case” and that the jury based its 
life recommendation on “minor mitigating circumstances.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Instead, the trial judge’s override analysis should have proceeded from the premise 
that the jury assigned great weight to the mitigating factors and, if so, whether such 
weighty mitigation could have justified a life recommendation. 
Here, the jury heard testimony from Weaver’s family about his caring 
behavior towards them and how, even from prison, they believe that he could serve 
a purpose in their lives.  The jury also heard testimony about Weaver’s work habits 
and the fact that this was essentially his first violent offense, though not necessarily 
his first encounter with the legal system.  The trial court found that there was “no 
significant history of prior criminal activity,” but assigned that factor little weight. 
The jury certainly could have assigned great weight to the mitigating factors.  
Weaver’s criminal record consisted of five misdemeanor offenses between 1979 
and 1982.  These crimes were not violent and were remote in time to the murder.  
We find it possible that the jury could have placed great weight on the fact that this 
 
 
- 41 - 
was Weaver’s first violent offense.  This, in combination with the nonstatutory 
mitigation presented, provide support for the jury’s life recommendation.21 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the 
trial court conducted an improper override analysis and that there was a reasonable 
basis in the record to support the jury’s life recommendation. 
E.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
This Court must review the record of a death penalty case to determine 
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the murder conviction.  See Fla. R. 
App. P. 9.140(i); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 480 (Fla. 2003).  In conducting 
this review, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State to determine whether “a rational trier of fact could have found the existence 
                                        
21.  We reject Weaver’s argument that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), itself requires reversal of the 
judge’s override.  In this case, the jury convicted Weaver not only of first-degree 
murder of Officer Peney, but also of other contemporaneous violent felonies 
involving Officer Myers, such as aggravated assault and armed resisting of an 
officer with violence.  As we have previously held many times, even if Ring 
applied in Florida, the jury’s unanimous determination that the defendant 
committed other violent felonies involving another victim would make the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty, thus complying with Ring.  See, e.g., 
Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 687 (Fla. 2003) (noting that this Court has 
previously rejected Ring claims “in cases involving the aggravating factor of a 
previous violent felony conviction”); see also Stein v. State, 632 So. 2d 1361, 1366 
(Fla. 1994) (holding that contemporaneous crimes may qualify as prior violent 
felonies). 
 
 
- 42 - 
of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 
2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001); see McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396, 408 (Fla. 2003). 
Weaver waived his Miranda22 rights and told detectives that he was the 
person who shot Officer Peney and did a walk-through of the crime scene where he 
re-enacted for detectives how he shot Officer Peney.  The bullet that struck Officer 
Peney was from a .357.  Weaver identified the .357 as his weapon.  An expert in 
wound ballistics and a firearms examiner testified that the bullet wounds suffered 
by Officer Peney were consistent with a .357 bullet.  A DNA specialist testified 
that the blood found on the .357 bullet matched Officer Peney’s DNA.  The 
frequency of finding someone with the exact DNA profile was roughly 1 in 229 
million.  Officer Myers testified that he saw Weaver turn and fire a shot from his 
weapon.  Various eyewitnesses confirmed his testimony.  Therefore, we conclude 
that competent, substantial evidence supports the verdict. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we affirm Weaver’s conviction but remand to the trial 
court with instructions to enter a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole. 
It is so ordered. 
 
                                        
22.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
- 43 - 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only as to the conviction and concurs as to the 
sentence. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal and a Cross-Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Mark A. Speiser, Judge - Case No. 96001644CFA10A 
 
Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, 
 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Leslie T. Campbell 
and Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant