Title: Commonwealth v. Nash
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12976, SJC-12990
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 2020

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SJC-12976 
SJC-12990 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL A. NASH. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH ELIBERT. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.  Suffolk.     September 9, 2020. - December 14, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of sentence, Stay of 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 4, 2014. 
 
A motion for a stay of execution of sentence, filed on 
April 9, 2020, was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J.; and a motion 
to revoke the stay of execution of sentence was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Gabrielle R. Wolohojian, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 7, 2014. 
 
A motion for a stay of execution of sentence, filed on 
April 6, 2020, and a motion for reconsideration were heard by 
Jeffrey A. Locke, J.; and a second motion for a stay of 
                                                          
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on these 
cases prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
execution of sentence was heard in the Appeals Court by 
Sookyoung Shin, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for Daniel A. Nash. 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for Joseph Elibert. 
Jennifer L. Sprague & Erin D. Knight, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  We have before us two cases in which the 
defendants have sought stays of execution of their sentences 
pending appeal.  In Daniel Nash's case, the trial judge granted 
a stay, which a single justice of the Appeals Court, on the 
Commonwealth's request, then vacated.  In Joseph Elibert's case, 
the trial judge granted a stay but later revoked it on his own 
initiative, and a single justice of the Appeals Court upheld the 
latter order.  In each case, the defendant appealed to a panel 
of the Appeals Court from the single justice's ruling. 
 
We transferred the cases here so that we could address a 
variety of issues concerning stays of sentences pending appeal, 
including, among others, the important and recurring question of 
how judges who are faced with requests for stays ought to weigh 
the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor in determining whether a stay 
is appropriate in any given case.  Recently, in Christie v. 
Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 401-402 (2020), we held that the 
pandemic is a factor for judges to consider when ruling on 
3 
 
requests for stays.  In the cases now before us, we provide 
additional guidance as to how, specifically, that factor ought 
to be taken into account. 
 
Background.  We set forth the basic facts and the 
procedural background of each case, reserving additional details 
for the discussion section of the opinion. 
 
1.  Nash's case.  Nash was convicted in December 2018 of 
two counts of rape (G. L. c. 265, § 22) and one count each of 
indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older 
(G. L. c. 265, § 13H) and secretly recording a person who is 
nude or partially nude (G. L. c. 272, § 105 [b]).  The victim 
was his future sister-in-law.  He raped her vaginally and anally 
while she was intoxicated and unconscious and recorded the 
events with the camera on his cellular telephone (cell phone).  
He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of from five to seven 
years in State prison for the rapes; a term of two and one-half 
years in a house of correction for the indecent assault and 
battery, to run from and after the sentences for the rapes, 
suspended for two years; and a three-year term of straight 
probation, with various conditions, for the illegal recording, 
to run from and after the sentences for the rapes. 
 
Nash appealed to the Appeals Court from his convictions, 
and in April 2020, soon after we issued our decision in 
Christie, 484 Mass. 397, he moved for a stay of his sentences 
4 
 
pending appeal.  The trial judge issued a memorandum of decision 
analyzing all of the relevant factors, and he granted a stay.  
The Commonwealth sought review of that ruling by filing a 
petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The 
Commonwealth asserted in its petition that it had no other 
available appellate remedy and, therefore, that a petition under 
§ 3 was its only recourse.  A single justice of this court 
disagreed and denied the petition, stating: 
"Both defendants and the Commonwealth must seek relief from 
a trial judge's decision on a motion to stay from 'a single 
justice of the court that will hear the appeal.'  See Mass. 
R. A. P. 6; Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a) & Reporters' Notes to 
Rule 31.  See generally Commonwealth v. Hodge [(No. 1)], 
380 Mass. 851, 853-854 (1980)."2 
 
 
The Commonwealth then followed the single justice's lead by 
filing a motion in the Appeals Court, where Nash's direct appeal 
was pending, asking the Appeals Court to vacate the stay of the 
sentence that the trial judge had granted.3  A single justice of 
the Appeals Court allowed the Commonwealth's motion, Nash 
                                                          
 
 
2 The Commonwealth's petition and the single justice's order 
predated this court's order regarding the transfer of certain 
single justice matters during the COVID-19 pandemic (effective 
June 8, 2020).  Had this matter arisen in the county court after 
the order, it most likely would have been directed to the 
Appeals Court anyway under the terms of the order. 
 
 
3 The Commonwealth purported to file a G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition in the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court, recognizing 
that it does not have power to act under § 3, see McMenimen v. 
Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 191 (2008); Fadden v. Commonwealth, 
376 Mass. 604, 608 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979), 
treated the petition as a motion to vacate the stay. 
5 
 
appealed from that ruling to a panel of the Appeals Court, and 
we allowed Nash's application for direct appellate review.4 
 
2.  Elibert's case.  Elibert was convicted in January 2020 
of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person under 
the age of fourteen (G. L. c. 265, § 13B).5  The victim was the 
twelve year old grandchild of Elibert's then girlfriend, with 
whom Elibert lived.  He was sentenced to a term of from four to 
six years in State prison for the first conviction and a 
consecutive term of five years' probation, with various 
conditions, for the second conviction. 
 
Elibert appealed to the Appeals Court from his convictions 
and immediately moved, in the Superior Court, for a stay of his 
sentences pending appeal.  The trial judge initially denied the 
request for a stay.  In April 2020, shortly after we issued our 
decision in Christie, 484 Mass. 397, Elibert sought 
reconsideration of the denial of the stay, citing as a new 
factor the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and its potential 
effect on him.  The trial judge, on reconsideration, granted a 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Appeals Court single justice allowed a stay of the 
sentence for fourteen days while the defendant sought further 
review.  We allowed the defendant's motion to further stay his 
sentence. 
 
 
5 He was tried on two counts of aggravated rape based on the 
difference in age between himself and the victim (G. L. c. 265, 
§ 23A).  He ultimately was convicted of the lesser included 
offenses of indecent assault and battery. 
6 
 
stay.  The stay proved to be short lived, however, as the judge 
revoked it on his own initiative on June 30, 2020. 
 
Elibert next filed a motion in the Appeals Court pursuant 
to Mass. R. A. P. 6, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1608 (2019), 
entitled "motion to stay sentence pending appeal," in which he 
stated that he was seeking "reinstatement" of the stay that had 
been revoked.  The Appeals Court single justice denied his 
motion, Elibert appealed from that ruling to a panel of the 
Appeals Court, and we allowed his application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  We first address two threshold procedural 
issues concerning these cases:  what appellate remedy is 
available to the Commonwealth when a trial judge grants a 
defendant's request for stay of execution of a sentence pending 
appeal; and what appellate remedy is available to a defendant 
when a judge revokes a stay that previously was granted.  We 
then address the legal standards to be applied by trial judges, 
appellate court single justices, and appellate courts when 
considering stays in these circumstances.  Finally, we turn to 
the rulings that are before us in each case. 
 
1.  Commonwealth's remedy when the trial judge grants a 
stay (Nash's case).6  Nash takes the position that the Appeals 
                                                          
 
 
6 Justice Lowy did not take part in the court's 
consideration of this issue. 
7 
 
Court single justice had no authority to act on the 
Commonwealth's motion to vacate the stay that the trial judge 
granted in his case.7  He does not claim that the Commonwealth 
has no appellate recourse at all when a stay is granted; rather, 
he argues that the Commonwealth's only recourse is to petition a 
single justice of this court for relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, even in those cases where, as here, the Appeals 
Court is the appellate court that will hear and decide the 
defendant's direct appeal.  We disagree. 
 
The Commonwealth did, of course, pursue exactly the route 
suggested by Nash when it initially petitioned for relief in the 
county court under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Its petition was denied, 
however, by a single justice of this court on the ground that 
the Commonwealth had an adequate alternative remedy and, 
therefore, that relief from this court pursuant to § 3 was not 
necessary.  Significantly, the single justice identified as the 
Commonwealth's proper remedy precisely the course that Nash now 
claims was improper, namely, a motion in the Appeals Court to 
vacate the stay.  We agree with our single justice that the 
Commonwealth was not entitled to review under § 3 and instead 
                                                          
 
 
7 Nash makes this argument for the first time in his brief 
to this court.  He did not take this position in his opposition 
to the Commonwealth's motion to vacate the stay when the matter 
was before the Appeals Court single justice. 
8 
 
could have, and should have, sought relief in the Appeals Court, 
as it eventually did.  Some clarification is in order, however. 
 
The single justice relied in part on the 2009 Reporters' 
Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 31, as appearing in 454 Mass. 1501 
(2009), which state in relevant part: 
"Appellate Rule 6 establishes the procedure that is 
available after the trial judge acts on a motion for a 
stay.  Either the defendant or the Commonwealth may seek 
relief from a single justice of the court that will hear 
the appeal concerning the trial judge's decision to deny, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Aviles, 422 Mass. 1008 (1996), or 
grant, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hodge [(No. 1)], 380 Mass. 851 
(1980), a stay.  In the ordinary course of events, for all 
but first degree murder cases a single justice of the 
Appeals Court is the appropriate forum." 
 
Reporters' Notes (2009) to Rule 31, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (LexisNexis 2019).  Similar language 
also appears in the 2009 Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. A. P. 6.  
See Reporters' Notes (2009) to Rule 6, Mass. Ann. Laws Court 
Rules, Rules of Appellate Procedure (LexisNexis 2019).  Contrary 
to the two Reporters' Notes, however, neither rule 31 nor rule 6 
prescribes a course for the Commonwealth to follow when a stay 
is granted in the trial court.  Those rules set forth the 
procedure by which a defendant seeks a stay, the terms and 
conditions on which stays may be granted, the defendant's 
recourse when the trial judge denies a stay, the parties' 
remedies when a single justice of an appellate court grants or 
denies a stay, and the expiration of stays that have been 
9 
 
granted.  The rules are wholly silent as to what the 
Commonwealth should, or may, do to obtain appellate review of a 
trial judge's granting of a stay.8 
 
Although neither rule 31 nor rule 6 expressly governs this 
situation, the source of the Commonwealth's authority to obtain 
review of a trial judge's granting of a stay, and the source of 
an appellate court's authority to provide such review in these 
circumstances, is Mass. R. A. P. 15, as appearing in 481 Mass. 
1627 (2019).  That is the all-purpose rule governing motions in 
pending appeals.  It allows parties in pending or impending 
appeals to request interim relief from the appellate court on a 
broad range of matters related to the case.  It is broad enough 
to encompass a motion by the Commonwealth, in a criminal case, 
to vacate a stay of sentence pending appeal that has been 
granted by the trial judge.  Nothing in rule 15 conflicts with 
either rule 31 or rule 6.  Therefore, because neither rule 31 
nor rule 6 contemplates this situation, we regard rule 15 as the 
                                                          
 
 
8 There is one subsection of Mass. R. A. P. 6, as appearing 
in 481 Mass. 1608 (2019), that governs the revocation of stays 
that have been granted.  Rule 6 (b) (4) provides:  "Revocation 
of Stay Pending Appeal.  If a defendant fails at any time to 
take any measure necessary for the hearing of an appeal or 
report, a stay of execution of a sentence may, on motion of the 
Commonwealth, be revoked."  That provision comes into play when 
a defendant fails to comply with his or her obligations as an 
appellant to prosecute the underlying appeal.  It has no 
application where, as here, the Commonwealth challenges the 
trial judge's initial granting of a stay. 
10 
 
basis for the Commonwealth's motion, and for the Appeals Court's 
authority to act, in these circumstances.9,10 
 
We note further that the appellate rules were amended in 
2009 specifically to eliminate the obsolete, and very 
convoluted, process by which even the most routine stay requests 
could be evaluated by as many as eleven appellate judges, 
including a single justice of the Appeals Court, a panel of the 
Appeals, a single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, and the full court.  See, e.g., Sang Hoa Duong v. 
Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 1006, 1008 n.5 (2001); Commonwealth v. 
Allen, 378 Mass. 489, 496-499 (1979); and id. at 500 (Quirico, 
J., concurring).  As a consequence of the amendment, questions 
concerning stays of execution of sentences are now generally 
confined to the appellate court that will hear the appeal, and 
there is no longer routine consideration by our single justices 
                                                          
 
 
9 Motions under Mass. R. A. P. 15, as appearing in 481 Mass. 
1627 (2019), are brought in the appellate court where the 
underlying appeal is (or will be) pending, which in this case 
was the Appeals Court.  The rule also expressly allows the 
appellate court's single justices to act on such matters, as 
happened here, subject to review by the appellate court.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 15 (c); Kordis v. Appeals Court, 434 Mass. 662, 
664-665 (2001). 
 
 
10 To provide further clarity, we invite this court's rules 
committee to consider an appropriate amendment to Mass. R. A. P. 
6 that would explicitly recognize the Commonwealth's right to 
file a motion, in the appellate court that is to hear and decide 
the underlying appeal, to challenge a trial judge's granting of 
a stay. 
11 
 
(or the full court) of issues concerning stays in cases that are 
pending in the Appeals Court.  See Mass. R. A. P. 6.11  See also 
2009 Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. A. P. 6, fourth par.  It would 
be a step backward were we to accept Nash's contention in this 
case that stays granted by a trial judge could only be reviewed 
by single justices of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3.12 
 
We thus reject Nash's argument and agree with the ruling of 
our single justice.  The Commonwealth is not entitled as of 
right to review in this court under § 3 when it wishes to 
challenge a trial judge's granting of a stay.  It has an 
                                                          
 
 
11 Rule 6 was amended again in 2019 as part of the overhaul 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure.  The changes 
made in 2019 are not relevant here. 
 
 
12 Indeed, if we were to accept Nash's position, we would 
have an anomalous system:  when a trial judge denies a motion to 
stay execution of a sentence pending appeal, the defendant would 
seek relief in the appellate court that is to hear the 
underlying appeal, which is almost always the Appeals Court; but 
when a trial judge allows a stay of execution, the Commonwealth 
would always be required to seek relief before a single justice 
of this court on a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to be 
followed, conceivably, by an appeal to the full court from the 
single justice's ruling by whichever side is aggrieved, all 
regardless of whether the defendant's underlying appeal from his 
or her conviction is to occur in the Appeals Court.  That would 
not only run counter to the spirit of one of the core aspects of 
the 2009 amendments to rule 6 as described above -- i.e., the 
elimination of the routine involvement of our single justices in 
stay issues in Appeals Court cases -- but it also would place an 
unnecessary burden on this court, by requiring our single 
justices (and thereafter the full court) to become involved in 
all orders of trial judges granting stays of execution pending 
appeal, even in cases where the Appeals Court is the court that 
would ultimately hear the underlying appeal. 
12 
 
adequate alternative means of obtaining review of the judge's 
order, namely, a motion to be filed in the appellate court that 
ultimately will hear and decide the defendant's appeal to vacate 
the stay.13 
 
2.  Defendant's remedy when the trial judge revokes a stay 
previously granted (Elibert's case).  Neither Elibert nor the 
Commonwealth expressly addresses the question whether Elibert's 
rule 6 motion in the Appeals Court, after the trial judge 
revoked the stay he previously had granted, was proper 
procedurally.  Nevertheless, a short discussion of the point may 
be helpful for litigants, counsel, and judges who find 
themselves in this position in the future.  As we explain, 
Elibert's motion was within the spirit of the rule. 
 
Rule 6 allows a defendant whose motion for a stay of 
sentence has been denied by a trial judge to apply a second 
                                                          
 
 
13 The case of Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. 851 
(1980), cited in the Reporters' Notes to both Mass. R. Crim. P. 
31 and Mass. R. A. P. 6, which also was cited by the single 
justice of this court when he denied the Commonwealth's G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition, is a good example of the Commonwealth 
properly seeking review of a trial judge's order granting a stay 
of sentence pending appeal by way of a motion filed in the 
appellate court that will hear the underlying appeal, which in 
that particular case was this court.  See Hodge (No. 1), supra 
at 853-857 (affirming single justice's denial of Commonwealth's 
motion to revoke stay granted by trial judge).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 2), 380 Mass. 858 (1980) (defendant's 
direct appeal).  The Hodge (No. 1) case supports our single 
justice's conclusion that the Commonwealth should have sought 
relief from the stay in the Appeals Court in this case. 
13 
 
time, to a single justice of the appropriate appellate court, 
for a stay.  See Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (1) (requiring generally 
that stays of sentences be sought in trial court in first 
instance; "A motion for such relief may be made to the single 
justice of the appellate court to which the appeal is being 
taken, but the motion shall show . . . that the lower court has 
previously denied an application for a stay or has failed to 
afford the relief which the applicant requested . . .").  The 
rule does not speak to the precise fact pattern in this case, 
where a trial judge revokes a stay that he or she previously has 
granted.14  Nevertheless, a trial judge's revocation of a stay in 
these circumstances is the functional equivalent of the denial 
of a stay.  The consequence in either scenario is the same, 
i.e., the defendant would be required to serve the sentence, in 
custody, while his or her appeal is being adjudicated.  We see 
no reason why a defendant in that situation cannot avail himself 
or herself of the option set forth in rule 6 (b) (1) of applying 
to a single justice of the Appeals Court for a stay, as if the 
                                                          
 
 
14 As stated in note 8, supra, rule 6 (b) (4) authorizes a 
judge, on motion of the Commonwealth, to revoke a stay when a 
defendant fails to satisfy his or her obligations as an 
appellant to prosecute the underlying appeal.  That is not what 
happened here.  The judge in this case revoked Elibert's stay 
because he received new information suggesting that the facility 
where Elibert would be incarcerated pending appeal did not pose 
a COVID-19 risk. 
14 
 
request for a stay in the trial court initially had been 
denied.15 
 
3.  Applicable legal standards.  There is no shortage of 
appellate decisions that purport to state the various legal 
standards that apply when a trial judge acts on a motion to stay 
a sentence pending appeal, when a single justice of an appellate 
court considers a stay after the trial judge has declined to 
grant a stay, and when an appellate court reviews its single 
justice's ruling.  The difficulty often lies not in stating the 
standards but in applying them.  We therefore turn to a 
discussion of the applicable standards and attempt to shed some 
light on what may be areas of difficulty and possible confusion 
for attorneys and for judges who deal with such matters. 
 
a.  Standard to be applied by trial judges.  Neither Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 31 nor Mass. R. A. P. 6 indicates what specific 
factors a judge should consider when faced with a defendant's 
motion to stay a sentence pending appeal.  The factors are set 
forth in our decisional law, most notably Commonwealth v. Hodge 
                                                          
 
 
15 Likewise, a defendant in this situation might file a 
motion in the appellate court to vacate the trial judge's order 
revoking the stay, which, if successful, effectively would 
reinstate the stay.  Although that conceptually is different 
from asking an appellate single justice to grant a stay, there 
does not appear to be any tactical advantage to proceeding in 
that fashion.  Elibert's motion in fact had aspects of both of 
these types of requests.  He asked the Appeals Court single 
justice to reinstate the stay that had been revoked; he also 
asked her to grant a stay. 
15 
 
(No. 1), 380 Mass. 851, 855-857 (1980); Commonwealth v. Allen, 
378 Mass. 489, 498 (1979); and Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. 
App. Ct. 501, 505-507 (1979), and more recently, for the 
duration of the COVID-19 pandemic, Christie, 484 Mass. at 398.  
These cases require a judge faced with a defendant's request for 
a stay to evaluate (1) the defendant's likelihood of success on 
appeal, (2) certain security factors, and (3) certain risks 
associated with the pandemic. 
 
i.  First factor.  The classic definition of the first 
factor, which this court has cited with approval many times, 
comes from the Appeals Court's opinion in Levin, 7 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 503-504: 
"It has been customary, on the criminal side of the court, 
to employ the words 'reasonable likelihood of success,' but 
on the civil side of the court to employ the words 
'meritorious issue' or 'meritorious claim' in analogous 
situations.  A 'meritorious claim,' or 'meritorious 
appeal,' has been held to mean 'one which is worthy of 
judicial inquiry because raising a question of law 
deserving some investigation and discussion,' Lovell v. 
Lovell, 276 Mass. 10, 11-12 (1931); Russell v. Foley, 278 
Mass. 145, 148 (1932), 'one that is worthy of presentation 
to a court, not one which is sure of success,' General 
Motors Corp., petitioner, 344 Mass. 481, 482 (1962).  
Despite the difference in terminology, the concepts are, in 
our view, substantially identical.  Although our cases have 
not discussed the relationship between the terms, we can 
assert, on the basis of some familiarity, that . . . the 
concept that our judges have in mind when they apply the 
standard of 'reasonable likelihood of success on appeal' is 
not one of substantial certainty of success, but rather is 
one equivalent to the civil concept of 'meritorious 
appeal'; that is, an appeal which presents an issue which 
is worthy of presentation to an appellate court, one which 
offers some reasonable possibility of a successful decision 
16 
 
in the appeal.  Both the civil and criminal terms import 
the contradictory of the word 'frivolous'; for how can it 
be said that an appeal which has no reasonable likelihood 
of success, which presents no meritorious issue to be 
determined on appeal, is other than 'frivolous'?"  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
While it likely is impossible to formulate a perfect 
definition of what constitutes "some reasonable possibility of a 
successful decision in the appeal," the decisional law provides 
a measure of guidance as to how that term ought to be understood 
and applied.  The cases are clear in saying that success on 
appeal does not need to be certain or even more likely than not.  
The cases also are clear in saying that frivolous appeals will 
not qualify.  See Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. at 857; Allen, 378 
Mass. at 499; Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 504, 507.  What is 
perhaps less clear, and what likely defies precise calculation, 
is just how far along the spectrum between "frivolous" and "more 
likely than not" the appeal must be in order that it can be said 
to present "some reasonable possibility of success."  If we were 
to endeavor to draw out a common theme from the language and the 
results of the many decisions in this area, it would be this:  
the burden on the defendant to establish the requisite 
possibility of success is not onerous; yet the defendant must 
show that there is at least one appellate issue of sufficient 
heft that would give an appellate court pause -- in other words, 
one or more issues that require a legitimate evaluation, that 
17 
 
would engender a dialectical discussion among an appellate panel 
where both sides find some substantive support, and that would, 
if successful, lead to a favorable outcome for the defendant.16 
 
Experience shows that trial judges strive to make this 
preliminary, very practical assessment of the claims that the 
defendant indicates he or she intends to raise on appeal in 
light of what transpired at the trial.  Judges do not, nor are 
they required to, determine how they themselves would decide the 
appellate claims.  The claims are not fully developed at that 
juncture, and in most cases a trial transcript is not yet 
available.  Rather, the judges try to gauge, without attempting 
to decide the claims, whether the asserted claims are legally 
plausible, are supported by the facts of the case, and have the 
                                                          
 
 
16 We disagree with the defendants' suggestion that every 
nonfrivolous appeal necessarily will satisfy the first factor.  
That position is rooted in the final sentence of the passage 
quoted above from Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 
503-504 (1979).  If read literally, it would mean that any 
appeal that is even a smidgen above frivolous would have a 
"reasonable possibility of a successful decision."  But we know 
that is not true.  There are many appeals that are not frivolous 
that are nevertheless so weak and highly unlikely to succeed 
that they will not rise to the level of having a reasonable 
possibility of success. 
 
 
The sentence relied on by Nash and Elibert appears to be a 
rhetorical musing of the court that decided the case and, 
further, dicta in the sense that it was not essential to the 
court's holding.  Moreover, it does not accurately represent the 
standard as it has evolved throughout the years or how trial and 
appellate judges currently apply the standard in practice.  In 
current practice, only the most extreme cases -- those that are 
completely devoid of merit -- are called "frivolous." 
18 
 
requisite heft.  Judges should be mindful, on one hand, that not 
every claim that rises above the "frivolous" barrier will 
qualify; but at the same time a judge should not deny a stay 
simply because he or she predicts that the defendant is likely 
to lose on appeal. 
 
Significantly, this first factor involves "a pure question 
of law or legal judgment," Allen, 378 Mass. at 498, citing 
Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 505, and the judge's determination on 
that factor therefore receives no deference from an appellate 
court on appeal.  The appellate court instead ascertains in its 
own view whether the first factor is satisfied.  See Allen, 
supra; Levin, supra at 505-507. 
 
ii.  Second factor.  Next, the judge must consider the 
so-called security factors, such as "the possibility of flight 
to avoid punishment; potential danger to any other person or to 
the community; and the likelihood of further criminal acts 
during the pendency of the appeal."  Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. at 
855.  Here, the judge takes into account some of the same 
general considerations a judge would consider pretrial when 
deciding an appropriate amount of bail, including a defendant's 
family connections, community roots, employment status, and 
prior criminal record.  Id.  The judge also may consider the 
seriousness of the crime of which the defendant was convicted, 
19 
 
the strength of the evidence presented at trial, and the 
severity of the sentence that the judge imposed. 
 
Unlike the first factor, which presents a "pure question[] 
of law," the security factors "involve determinations of fact."  
Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 505.  They require the judge to 
employ his or her "sound, practical judgment and common sense," 
id., to decide based on the available information whether the 
defendant will be a danger or a flight risk if at liberty during 
the pendency of the appeal.  The judge has considerable leeway 
in making that determination. 
 
iii.  Third factor.  The third factor, which derives from 
our decision in the Christie case, is the COVID-19 factor.  In 
Christie, in order to address the unique, potentially deadly 
consequences that COVID-19 presents for individuals in our 
prisons and jails, we added another variable for judges to 
consider when deciding whether to stay a defendant's sentence 
pending appeal.  We instructed judges henceforth to consider the 
health and safety of those individuals who are serving their 
sentences while pursuing their appeals, in addition to the ever-
present concern of keeping our communities safe if convicted 
defendants are released while their appeals are pending. 
 
Our objective in Christie was to reduce temporarily the 
prison and jail populations, in a safe and responsible manner, 
20 
 
through the judicious use of stays of execution of sentences 
pending appeal.  We said: 
"In ordinary times, in considering the second factor, a 
judge should focus on the danger to other persons and the 
community arising from the defendant's risk of 
reoffense. . . .  In these extraordinary times, a judge 
deciding whether to grant a stay should consider not only 
the risk to others if the defendant were to be released and 
reoffend, but also the health risk to the defendant if the 
defendant were to remain in custody.  In evaluating this 
risk, a judge should consider both the general risk 
associated with preventing COVID-19 transmission and 
minimizing its spread in correctional institutions to 
inmates and prison staff and the specific risk to the 
defendant, in view of his or her age and existing medical 
conditions, that would heighten the chance of death or 
serious illness if the defendant were to contract the 
virus." 
 
Christie, 484 Mass. at 401-402.  Recognizing that this directive 
has become a source of confusion and disagreement among 
litigants, attorneys, and judges, as these cases illustrate, we 
offer the following additional guidance. 
 
Under the traditional, pre-pandemic standard for 
determining motions to stay, as we have described, a defendant 
bears the burden of proving two factors -- likelihood of success 
on appeal and security -- in order to prevail.  By introducing a 
third variable into the equation for such motions, the COVID-19 
factor, we did not say or imply in any way that a defendant must 
now also prove a third factor.  It is not incumbent on a 
defendant seeking a stay to prove that COVID-19 is present, let 
alone rampant, at the facility where he or she is incarcerated, 
21 
 
or that the defendant is at an especially high personal risk 
because of his or her age or medical condition.  If that were 
the case, some defendants who otherwise would qualify for stays 
under the traditional, two-factor analysis would now, 
ironically, find it more difficult to obtain a stay.  That is 
not how the COVID-19 factor was intended to work. 
 
The COVID-19 factor comes into play in those cases in which 
a defendant would not qualify for a stay under the traditional, 
two-factor test.  In those cases, a judge might nevertheless 
decide to grant a stay in light of the pandemic and the risks it 
poses for an incarcerated defendant.  A judge might find, for 
example, that a defendant poses little or no risk of flight or 
danger to the community if released pending appeal, and thus 
satisfies the second (security) factor, but has at best only a 
very marginal claim on appeal, one that ordinarily would not 
satisfy the first (likelihood of success on appeal) factor.  
Under the traditional two-factor test, the judge would not grant 
a stay in that situation.  But taking into account the COVID-19 
factor, and with an eye toward achieving the objective of our 
Christie holding -- to safely and responsibly reduce the 
population of prisons and jails in the face of the pandemic -- 
22 
 
the judge might appropriately determine that this defendant 
ought to have his or her sentence stayed pending appeal.17 
 
As the number of COVID-19 cases rises in a facility where a 
defendant is incarcerated pending appeal, the risk of course 
increases that the defendant might become infected despite the 
best efforts of the facility's administration to control the 
spread of the disease.  Similarly, if a particular defendant is 
especially vulnerable to the effects of infection as a result of 
his or her age or health, the risk to that individual of very 
severe illness or even death increases.  In other words, the 
"general risk" that we spoke of in Christie increases as the 
number of cases in a facility increases, and the "specific risk" 
increases when for personal reasons an individual is especially 
vulnerable.  Those are therefore suitable considerations for a 
judge to take into account. 
 
A judge should not, however, use the absence of or a 
reduction in the number of outbreaks of the virus when 
                                                          
 
 
17 We use this example to illustrate how the COVID-19 factor 
might make a difference in a judge's assessment of whether to 
grant a stay.  We do not suggest that it is the only way a judge 
may weigh the COVID-19 factor in the mix of considerations.  It 
suffices to say that a judge might consider the factor in other 
ways as well, as part of the totality of the circumstances when 
ruling on a request for a stay.  Each case will turn on its own 
particular circumstances.  The guiding principle will be for the 
judge to use the factor as appropriate in each case in order to 
accomplish the ultimate objective of safely and responsibly 
managing confinements pending appeal for the duration of the 
pandemic. 
23 
 
determining the general risk to a defendant.  When we issued our 
decision in Christie, for example, many facilities had low 
COVID-19 case counts.  Since then, we have seen that the COVID-
19 virus spreads rapidly, and that a few cases, or even no 
reported cases, on any given day or in any given place can 
quickly change to many cases.  That has proved to be especially 
true when large numbers of people live in close quarters -- 
e.g., cruise ships, college campuses, nursing homes, and 
prisons.18  Even a low general risk at any given point in time, 
or a low specific risk, does not mean "no risk"; a risk exists 
for all incarcerated individuals, all the time, regardless of 
whether they are young, healthy, or in facilities that at some 
particular moment in time have few or no cases. 
The fact that a facility has no cases or a relatively low 
number of cases should never be taken to mean that a defendant 
                                                          
 
 
18 With respect to prisons, see this court's recent 
decisions in Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 1), 484 
Mass. 698, 718, S.C., 484 Mass. 1059 (2020) ("there can be no 
real dispute that the increased risk of contracting COVID-19 in 
prisons, where physical distancing may be infeasible to 
maintain, has been recognized by the [Centers for Disease 
Control] and by courts across the country"), and Committee for 
Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 1), 
484 Mass. 431, 436, S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020) ("All parties 
agree that, for several reasons, correctional institutions face 
unique difficulties in keeping their populations safe during 
this pandemic"). 
24 
 
is at no risk, and it should never be taken as being 
determinative in and of itself of the COVID-19 factor.19 
 
Our decision in Christie was not intended to add to the 
burden that defendants face in seeking a stay of execution of 
sentence pending resolution of their appeals.  To the contrary, 
when we appointed a special master to collect data and to report 
to this court weekly on COVID-19 cases in State correctional 
facilities, we did so "in order to facilitate any further 
response necessary as a result of this rapidly-evolving 
situation."  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 453, S.C., 484 Mass. 
1029 (2020).  The purpose of this critical monitoring, in other 
words, was to provide information and guideposts to the 
judiciary, as well as to the legislative and executive branches, 
during this unprecedented period, to allow informed decision-
making to best protect incarcerated individuals and staff within 
the various facilities, and to help identify and contain any 
outbreaks as quickly as possible.  The intent was not to furnish 
                                                          
 
 
19 The same can be said about evidence regarding the 
configuration of a particular facility, how many inmates are 
housed in single-person or multiple-person cells, how many share 
a shower at one time, how much time they are permitted to spend 
outdoors, or the efforts that are taken to reduce the risk 
within a facility.  The evidence may be considered in 
appropriate cases, but must be used with great caution.  The 
risk of infection, illness, and even death exists even when 
strict precautions are undertaken. 
25 
 
evidence claimed to be determinative to disprove assertions of 
heightened risk from COVID-19 by incarcerated individuals, or to 
construct additional hurdles to overcome in order to obtain a 
stay.  A judge should not purport to rely on Christie to deny a 
defendant's motion for a stay on the basis of low COVID-19 case 
counts in a particular prison at a specific moment in time; we 
all have seen how rapidly these numbers can change. 
 
Moreover, that an individual defendant is not known to be 
at particularly high risk from the dangers of COVID-19 should 
not be taken as a reason to deny a stay.  Everyone in a prison 
setting is at increased risk due to the difficulty in 
maintaining physical distance from others and in spending time 
outdoors, practices which have met with some success in civilian 
environments.20  Recognizing the constitutional limitations on 
our authority, we must take such steps as are open to us to 
reduce the number of incarcerated individuals, and to protect 
those who remain incarcerated from the dangers of COVID-19, 
                                                          
 
 
20 See, e.g., Adams, Park, Schaub, Brindis, & Irwin, Medical 
Vulnerability of Young Adults to Severe COVID-19 Illness -- Data 
from the National Health Interview Survey, 67 J. Adolescent 
Health 362 (2020); Cunningham, Vaduganathan, Claggett, Jering, 
Bhatt, Rosenthal, & Solomon, Research Letter, Clinical Outcomes 
in Young US Adults Hospitalized with COVID-19, JAMA Internal 
Med. (Sept. 9, 2020); Oxley, Mocco, Majidi, Kellner, Shoirah, 
Singh, De Leacy, Shigematsu, Ladner, Yaeger, Skliut, Weinberger, 
Dangayach, Bederson, Tuhrim, & Fifi, Correspondence, Large-
Vessel Stroke as a Presenting Feature of Covid-19 in the Young, 
New Eng. J. Med. (Apr. 28, 2020). 
26 
 
while at the same time protecting the safety of the public, the 
families of those who are released, and the individuals 
themselves. 
 
We do not mean to suggest that every incarcerated 
individual faces the same danger from COVID-19.  Each 
defendant's risk should be evaluated under the criteria we have 
outlined.  Some inmates face greater risk than others.  Even 
healthy individuals incarcerated in facilities with little or no 
COVID-19 outbreaks at a given moment still remain at risk, and 
such evidence should never be used against a defendant. 
 
b.  Standard to be applied by appellate single justices.  
If a trial judge denies a defendant's motion for a stay of his 
or her sentence pending appeal, Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (1) 
expressly gives the defendant a second bite at the apple, i.e., 
an opportunity to renew his or her request before a single 
justice of the appellate court that will hear the underlying 
appeal.  And as explained in part 1, supra, when a trial judge 
grants a stay, the Commonwealth may file a motion to vacate the 
stay in the appellate court that will hear the appeal. 
 
When a trial judge has denied a stay and the defendant 
renews his or her request with a single justice, the single 
justice can proceed in either of two ways.  The first option is 
for the single justice to conduct his or her own independent 
assessment of the defendant's motion.  See Allen, 378 Mass. at 
27 
 
496 (describing single justice's "power to consider the matter 
anew, taking into account facts newly presented [if any], and to 
exercise his [or her] own judgment and discretion").  Under this 
option, the single justice rules on the matter as if ruling on 
the request for a stay in the first instance, and the defendant 
thus truly has a second bite at the apple.  The second option is 
for the single justice to review the matter only to determine if 
the trial judge made an error of law or abused his or her 
discretion when denying the defendant's motion.  Commonwealth v. 
Cohen (No. 2), 456 Mass. 128, 132-133 (2010) (discussing Allen 
among other cases; concluding that "a single justice may 
undertake an independent review and independent exercise of 
discretion on the question whether a stay should be granted or 
denied, but is not in any way obligated to do so, and may choose 
simply to review the determination of a trial judge for any 
abuse of discretion" [emphasis in original]).  A single justice 
who follows this second course is operating in what might be 
described as an "appellate" mode, searching only for error of 
law or abuse of discretion in the trial judge's ruling, while a 
single justice who follows the first course is operating in what 
might be called an "independent" or "de novo" mode.  But see 
Allen, supra at 497 (suggesting single justice has no option to 
operate in appellate review mode; "single justice of the Appeals 
Court does not review the decision of the sentencing judge, but 
28 
 
considers the matter anew, exercising his [or her] own judgment 
and discretion"). 
Experience shows that single justices sometimes employ both 
standards in an effort to cover all the bases; they say that the 
trial judge did not commit an abuse of discretion when he or she 
denied the stay and, further, that they have also considered the 
matter anew and likewise decline to grant a stay.  Or the single 
justice uses aspects of both standards, measuring the different 
factors in different ways.  See, e.g., Cohen (No. 2), 456 Mass. 
at 133 n.7 ("Of the two considerations relative to a stay 
pending appeal, a single justice will be more likely to decline 
to exercise his [or her] own, independent discretion on the 
issue of security, which involves factual determinations, sound 
judgment, and common sense.  The second consideration, 
likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal, presents 'a 
pure question of law or legal judgment'"). 
 
There is little or no case law, however, that closely 
examines the role of the single justice when the trial judge has 
granted a stay and the Commonwealth moves to vacate.  The 
current state of the law has been that a single justice has the 
same two options as if the trial judge had denied a stay; the 
few cases that even mention the point suggest that the single 
justice can choose either to conduct his or her own independent 
review or to conduct a more limited appellate review of the 
29 
 
trial judge's ruling, or can use some combination of the two.  
In Cohen (No. 2), for example, after mentioning that a single 
justice has the option of entertaining a stay request 
independently, the court went on to quote Commonwealth v. 
Aviles, 422 Mass. 1008, 1009 (1996), which in turn quoted the 
language in Allen, 378 Mass. at 496, stating:  "This principle 
applies at the appellate court level to situations in which a 
stay has been allowed as well as to situation in which a stay 
has been denied."  See Cohen (No. 2), 456 Mass. at 133.  See 
also Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. at 854. 
 
Nash argues in his brief that a single justice faced with a 
trial judge's order granting a stay should be limited to 
reviewing the order only for error of law or abuse of 
discretion, and should not independently assess the request for 
a stay.  Given the result we reach in our analysis of Nash's 
appeal, infra, we need not address the issue here. 
 
c.  Standard to be applied by appellate courts.  Finally, 
Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (3) provides that whichever side is 
aggrieved by the single justice's ruling may appeal from the 
single justice's order to the appropriate appellate court ("the 
appellate court in which the appeal is pending"), in other 
words, the court on which the single justice sits.21  That is 
                                                          
 
 
21 The rule further states that the "order by the appellate 
court . . . , allowing or denying an application for a stay, 
30 
 
what occurred in these cases.  Nash and Elibert appealed to the 
Appeals Court from the adverse rulings of the Appeals Court 
single justices, and, as stated, we then transferred their 
appeals to this court. 
 
The appellate court's role is to review the single 
justice's ruling for error of law or abuse of discretion.  See 
Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. at 853.  The appellate court does not 
exercise its own independent discretion to evaluate the request 
for a stay; rather, it reviews the correctness of the single 
justice's ruling.  We use this standard of appellate review 
regardless of whether the single justice conducted an 
independent assessment of the motion to stay or confined himself 
or herself to reviewing the trial judge's ruling for legal error 
or abuse of discretion. 
                                                          
 
shall be final."  Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (3).  However, the appeal 
to the appellate court is from the single justice's ruling; the 
appellate court affirms, reverses, or vacates that ruling.  The 
appellate court does not actually issue any "order . . . 
allowing or denying [the] application for a stay."  Id. 
 
 
As explained in part 1, supra, the 2009 amendment to the 
rule, which introduced the language that the appellate court's 
decision "shall be final," was intended to change the practice 
by which litigants would shop for stays between the two 
appellate courts and their single justices.  See 2009 Reporters' 
Notes to Mass. R. A. P. 6, fourth par.  See also Polk v. 
Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 251, 254 (2012). 
31 
 
4.  Nash's appeal.22  The single justice of the Appeals 
Court in Nash's case had before her the Commonwealth's motion to 
vacate a stay pending appeal that the trial judge had granted.  
Citing Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. at 854, she stated that she 
would decide the question of a stay anew.  See Cohen (No. 2), 
456 Mass. at 133, and cases cited.  She indicated that she was 
opting to exercise that power.  She did not limit herself to 
evaluating the trial judge's ruling for error of law or abuse of 
discretion. 
With respect to the first factor, the likelihood of success 
on appeal, the single justice stated that she had reviewed the 
parties' submissions, as well as the defendant's brief and 
record appendix in his underlying appeal, which by that time had 
been entered in the Appeals Court.  Nash raised six points in 
his appeal.  Among other things, he challenged the denial of his 
motions to suppress the cell phone recording of his offenses and 
certain statements he made to the police during a recorded 
interview, certain evidentiary rulings, and alleged errors in 
the judge's instructions to the jury.  The single justice 
stated:  "I have considered the decisions on the motions to 
                                                          
 
 
22 The Appeals Court affirmed the defendant's conviction in 
an unpublished memorandum and order.  Commonwealth v. Nash, 98 
Mass. App. Ct. 1120 (2020).  We allowed the defendant's motion 
to continue the stay in order to pursue further appellate review 
and a motion for a new trial. 
32 
 
suppress, the decision on the defendant's motion to admit 
evidence of the victim's conduct, and the proceedings and 
evidence below as reflected in the trial transcripts. . . .  
Without intending to prejudge the outcome of the appeal, in 
light of the strength of the evidence, the suppression judge's 
findings, and the judge's decision on the motion in limine, I 
conclude that the defendant has not shown a reasonable 
possibility of success on appeal." 
 
While the single justice cited the correct standard for 
evaluating the first factor, it appears that she may have 
applied the standard too stringently.  The key, in our view, was 
Nash's challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress the 
cell phone recording.  The cell phone recording was not the only 
evidence against him, but it was powerful incriminating 
evidence, and without it the Commonwealth's case would have been 
substantially weaker.  We have now had the benefit of the 
Appeals Court's decision on the merits of the defendant's 
appeal.  Although the defendant ultimately did not prevail, it 
appears from our review of the unpublished opinion that the 
claims were worthy of presentation to an appellate court and 
required the Appeals Court to engage in a discussion of the 
issues.  This is not to say that the claims were compelling or, 
as we have seen, even likely to succeed.  Indeed, the claims 
ultimately failed.  But for the purposes of this analysis, his 
33 
 
arguments were enough to satisfy the first factor, even if 
barely so, under the standard we have described. 
The single justice may have been in a better position than 
the trial judge when she made her assessment on the first factor 
because she had the benefit of Nash's appellate brief, the 
record appendix, and the trial transcripts.  Indeed, it appears 
from her statements in her order that she engaged in a thorough 
consideration of the case by considering each of those things, 
and by holding a hearing on the matter.  Notwithstanding her 
disclaimer that she was not prejudging the case, however, it is 
difficult for us not to think in the circumstances that she was 
too exacting in her application of the first factor.  In any 
event, as we have said, the first factor presents a question of 
law for which no special deference is owed by us to the judgment 
of the single justice, and we have therefore made our own 
determination of this factor. 
With respect to the second factor, the security concerns, 
the single justice also assessed this factor independently and 
anew.  As explained in part 3.b, supra, it was within her power 
to do so.  In making her assessment of the security factors, the 
single justice relied very heavily on the serious and abhorrent 
nature of Nash's crimes.  She was entitled to do so.  But she 
appears not to have given much weight to several other facts 
that go into the mix of security factors.  For example, it 
34 
 
appears in the record that the defendant had no prior criminal 
history and no other sexual impropriety of any kind; his 
offenses were out of character and completely inconsistent with 
his personal history; he had deep roots in his community and the 
continued support of his wife (the victim's sister), with whom 
he was living, and numerous friends and family members; and he 
was released on bail before trial, appeared on all of his 
scheduled court dates, and abided by all of the terms of his 
release.  These considerations are what led the trial judge to 
conclude that Nash's crimes, "though odious," were nevertheless 
"idiosyncratic" and "one-off"; that he appeared to "pose no 
danger to the community if released"; and that there was "little 
reason to believe that [he would] flee the jurisdiction."  Yet 
these additional considerations do not feature significantly, if 
at all, in the independent assessment on the second factor.  
Instead, as stated, the emphasis is primarily on the severity of 
the crimes.  In these circumstances, we conclude that the single 
justice's assessment of the security factors appears to be 
underinclusive and that she abused her discretion in making her 
assessment. 
 
Because we conclude that the single justice's order 
vacating the stay granted by the trial judge would have been 
reversed because of her determinations on the first and second 
factors, we mention only briefly her consideration of the COVID-
35 
 
19 factor.  It is clear that she considered the type of negative 
evidence described in part 3.a.iii.  First, she considered the 
fact that Nash "presented nothing to suggest (let alone show) 
that -- whether because of age or medical condition -- he is at 
a heightened risk of serious illness or death should he contract 
COVID-19."  Second, she considered that, as of approximately two 
weeks before she issued her order, "virtually the entire inmate 
population at [the facility where Nash would be incarcerated] 
has been tested for COVID-19, with no positive test results."  
Nash argues that the single justice used this evidence 
improperly against him.  We agree. 
 
As we have discussed, such negative evidence should not be 
used against a defendant in these circumstances.  As stated in 
part 3.a.iii, negative evidence of this type is not relevant 
because the COVID-19 situation changes so quickly, and because 
all inmates, even those who are young, healthy, and incarcerated 
at facilities that are relatively free of COVID-19, are subject 
to the general risk of infection that comes with their 
incarceration. 
 
5.  Elibert's appeal.  This case presents an example of how 
negative evidence of COVID-19 cases in a specific facility at a 
specific point in time can be misinterpreted or misused.  As 
stated, shortly after we issued our decision in the Christie 
case, Elibert renewed his request for a stay of his sentence 
36 
 
pending appeal in light of the emergence of the COVID-19 
pandemic, and the trial judge granted a stay.23  The judge 
attached several conditions to the stay to assure that Elibert 
would not be a danger to the community or a flight risk, e.g., 
that Elibert reside at a specific address and remain there 
twenty-four hours a day except for medical appointments, that he 
be subject to global positioning system monitoring, and that he 
have no direct or indirect contact with the victim, her family, 
or any of the witnesses in his case. 
 
The judge's order was brief and did not contain any 
discussion of Elibert's likelihood of success on appeal, his 
potential danger to the community, or his potential risk of 
flight.  It safely can be assumed, however, that in keeping with 
our holding in Christie and taking into account the general and 
specific risks of COVID-19 infection if Elibert were to remain 
incarcerated, the judge was satisfied that a stay of Elibert's 
sentence was merited and that Elibert safely and responsibly 
could be at liberty (subject to the indicated terms and 
restrictions) pending appeal.  The judge issued his order on 
April 28, 2020.  He revoked the stay on his own initiative, 
                                                          
 
 
23 In addition to the general risk of COVID-19 infection for 
Elibert if he were to remain incarcerated, there was evidence 
before the judge that Elibert was sixty-four years old and 
suffers from type 2 diabetes, factors that created a specific 
risk for him. 
37 
 
however, on June 30, 2020, following a video conference with the 
parties. 
 
There apparently is no record of the video conference, and 
the judge did not issue a written order explaining his reasons 
for revoking the stay.  Elibert's counsel represents that the 
judge based his ruling on his belief, which apparently was based 
on our special master's reports, see Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs., 484 Mass. 431, that the COVID-19 risk to Elibert had 
subsided because, as of late May and early June 2020, no new 
COVID-19 cases were reported at the facility where Elibert had 
been serving his sentence.  The Commonwealth does not dispute 
that this was the basis for the judge's revoking the stay.  In 
short, the judge believed it was safe to return Elibert to 
prison to resume serving his sentence pending appeal. 
 
The single justice of the Appeals Court concluded that the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in revoking the stay.24  
That was incorrect because, as we shall explain, the judge's 
reliance on the negative evidence -- that the number of reported 
COVID-19 cases at the prison where Elibert would resume serving 
                                                          
 
 
24 Citing Cohen (No. 2), 456 Mass. at 133, the single 
justice expressly stated that, "given the limited record" before 
her, she declined to "undertake an independent review and 
independent exercise of discretion on the question whether a 
stay should be granted or denied."  Instead, as was her 
prerogative, see part 3.b, supra, she reviewed the judge's order 
only for an abuse of discretion. 
38 
 
his sentence had decreased in the month since the stay was 
granted -- was error. 
 
Our intention in the Christie case was not that inmates be 
moved in and out of prisons and jails on a weekly, monthly, or 
other periodic basis as COVID-19 rates in the specific 
facilities fluctuate over time.  The judge here did not 
determine that Elibert posed any greater risk of flight or 
danger to the community than when he stayed Elibert's sentence 
at the end of April 2020.  Nor was there any evidence that 
Elibert had violated any of the terms of the previously granted 
stay.  The only apparent reason for revoking the stay and 
ordering Elibert back to prison was the decrease, over a 
relatively short period of time, of reported COVID-19 
occurrences at that particular prison.25  There being no evidence 
that Elibert could not remain safely at liberty temporarily, 
subject to the terms and restrictions imposed by the judge, 
during the pendency of his appeal, and there being no evidence 
that he was not diligently pursuing his appeal,26 the negative 
                                                          
 
 
25 Moreover, there is no indication that Elibert's health 
has improved since the stay was granted to a point that he is no 
longer at a heightened specific risk of harm from COVID-19. 
 
 
26 See notes 8 and 13, supra.  The Commonwealth has a remedy 
if Elibert or any other defendant whose sentence has been stayed 
pending appeal fails diligently to pursue the appeal.  The 
Commonwealth also has recourse, of course, if a defendant 
violates the terms of a stay. 
39 
 
evidence relied on by the judge should not have been used to 
justify revoking the stay and ordering Elibert back to prison 
while his appeal is pending. 
 
It is true that the single justice of the Appeals Court 
considered Elibert's likelihood of success on appeal and 
concluded that Elibert did not satisfy the first factor in the 
stay analysis.  Although reasonable minds might differ as to 
whether she applied the first factor too strictly, we do not 
necessarily disagree with her assessment.  That said, as we have 
stated, the single justice did not undertake to conduct an 
independent assessment of the motion for a stay, and only 
reviewed the trial judge's ruling for error or abuse of 
discretion.  It was therefore for the trial judge and not the 
single justice (or us) to decide how to weigh the COVID-19 
factor against the other factors in the totality of the 
circumstances.  Clearly, the judge did not think Elibert 
qualified for a stay under the traditional, two-factor analysis 
because he denied Elibert's initial (pre-Christie) motion for a 
stay.  He must have found that one or both of the two 
traditional factors were missing; perhaps, like the single 
justice, he did not think the first factor was satisfied.  
Equally clear, however, is that the judge determined that the 
COVID-19 factor gave Elibert enough of a boost to merit a stay 
because he granted Elibert's renewed (post-Christie) motion.  
40 
 
That weighing of the COVID-19 factor against the other two 
factors was entitled to deference and should not be upset absent 
an abuse of discretion.  But for the judge's error in 
subsequently considering the negative evidence, and his revoking 
the stay on his own motion based on that evidence, the stay that 
previously was granted (which no one denies was well within the 
judge's discretion) would have been in place. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, in Nash's case, the order 
of the Appeals Court single justice vacating the stay granted by 
the trial judge is reversed, and the stay granted by the trial 
judge on May 18, 2020, shall be reinstated until further order 
of this court. 
 
In Elibert's case, the order of the single justice of the 
Appeals Court is also reversed.  The trial judge's order on 
June 30, 2020, revoking the stay he previously granted shall be 
vacated, the result being that the judge's order on April 28, 
2020, staying Elibert's sentence pending appeal will be 
reinstated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.