Title: Nevin v. Nevin
Citation: 366 So. 2d 266
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 1979

366 So. 2d 266 (1979)
Grover A. NEVIN
v.
Cecil W. NEVIN, et al.
77-443.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 12, 1979.
*267 O. S. Burke, Jr. of Burke &amp; Thigpen, Marion, for appellant.
W. Ryan deGraffenried, Jr. of Hubbard, Waldrop, Tanner &amp; deGraffenried, Tuscaloosa, for appellees.
TORBERT, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the Circuit Court of Hale County. We affirm.
Grover S. Nevin died testate in 1954, survived by his widow, Ila J. Nevin, and four children, Grover A., Julia, Cecil, and Marie. When he died, Nevin owned several parcels of real estate situated in Hale and Tuscaloosa Counties. This appeal concerns a 320 acre parcel situated in Hale County, devised to his widow for life with the power of disposition, and the remainder given to his children.
The pertinent provision of Nevin's will dispositive of this case is:
Assuming that she had authority, under the power contained in the will, to devise the land, Mrs. Nevin executed a will in 1962, giving the land to her four children. Subsequently, she was advised that she did not have the power to convey by will. So, in November, 1965, she executed four deeds conveying to each of her four children 80 acres of land. Grover A. Nevin refused delivery of the deed to him.
Ila J. Nevin died sometime in 1976, and in August, Grover A. Nevin filed suit to declare the deeds ineffective and to order a sale for division. On motion of the defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment, decreeing Ila J. Nevin had absolute power to convey the land by deed to the children.
We affirm the decision of the trial court and hold that Mrs. Nevin had the power to convey the lands to her children and that the deeds were effective.
The first issue is the proper construction of the will of Grover S. Nevin to determine the extent of the power granted his wife. Under Ala.Code § 35-4-292 (1975), an owner of a life estate with an absolute power of disposition may convey a fee absolute as to creditors and purchasers, *268 but if the power is not executed the future estates limited thereon are effective. That statute provides:
That it was Nevin's intent to give his wife an absolute power of disposition is clear from the language of the document.
The law is well settled in Alabama that the touchstone for construction of a will is to ascertain a testator's intention by giving effect to all the provisions of the will as a whole. Perdue v. Roberts, 294 Ala. 194, 314 So. 2d 280 (1975). From an analysis of the testator's language in Item Three of the will set out above, it is difficult to conceive of more exact words which would endow a life tenant with broader powers. Ila Nevin's power is not limited to any ascertainable standard such as maintenance and support, but the testator expresses an intent to give her "full, complete and unlimited" authority as if the property had been given to her absolutely. In furtherance of such intention the testator provides that she may "dispose of or handle" the property in her own discretion and according to her wishes and desires and that she should not be accountable to anyone for its use or disposition.
Appellant contends that in looking to the four corners of the will to determine the testator's intent that the following words, though precatory, must be considered:
Appellant urges that a reasonable construction of this language is that Grover Nevin intended to limit his wife's power of disposition. we disagree. The meaning of precatory words has been stated earlier by this court:
Nevin's expression of his feelings as to the standards for disposition of the property by his wife immediately follows the clear and direct imperative that she have unlimited authority to dispose of it without accountability to anyone. Following this as it does, the precatory phrase should not be read to limit the absolute power of disposition already given. This court said in Austin v. Pepperman, 278 Ala. 551, 562, 179 So. 2d 299, 309 (1965):
This supports the construction of Item Three of the will that after Nevin's grant of absolute discretion to his wife, he intended to express his own feelings about the disposition of the property as a guideline or recommendation. Support and maintenance are merely an advisory standard rather than a limitation under the facts of this case. Thus, the will of Grover S. Nevin granted to his wife an absolute power of disposition.
The second question at issue here is whether Ila Nevin conveyed a fee absolute to her children as purchasers under § 35-4-292. If the children who received deeds from Mrs. Nevin are purchasers under the statute, then they take fee simple title as grantees and not as remaindermen under the will.
*269 Appellant relies heavily on Yockers v. Hackmeyer, 203 Ala. 621, 84 So. 709 (1919), as to the question of who qualifies as a purchaser within the meaning of the statute. The court held there that the life estate with a power of disposition granted testator's widow was not absolute because it could only be exercised (1) in the continuance of a business left by testator and (2) for support and maintenance of the widow. The widow conveyed property to her son in consideration of love and affection. This conveyance was not within the power conferred upon her by the will so that on her death, the remainder took effect. While the Yockers court further observed that the son was not a purchaser within the meaning of § 3423, Code of 1907 (the predecessor of § 35-4-292), because the consideration of love and affection made him a volunteer not a purchaser, such observation is not controlling here. Justice Sayre, writing for the court in Yockers, specifically held that the provision of the will in question "was not an absolute power", and hence the conveyance there was not governed by the statute. Therefore, the discussion of the definition of purchasers for the purpose of the powers statute is dictum since the case did not involve an absolute power of disposition, and the conveyance was disallowed on the basis of limitations set out in the will, not on the basis of the powers statute. Additionally, the Yockers definition of purchaser as one who receives a conveyance by deed for a valuable consideration is no longer applicable in light of current law. Act No. 170, Acts of Alabama 1971, Third Extraordinary Session, p. 4420, codified as Ala. Code § 35-4-34 (1975), reads in part:
Provision is also made for the retroactive operation of this statute. This is further supported by the decision of this court in Ingram v. Horn, 294 Ala. 353, 355, 317 So. 2d 485, 486 (1975). The court said:
The Yockers definition of purchaser is incorrect in view of the current law of this state that consideration is not necessary and in view of the legislative intent in the passage of the powers statutes. The Alabama Supreme Court in Reeves v. Tatum, 233 Ala. 455, 172 So. 247 (1937), recognized that § 35-4-292 and its predecessors were enacted "to relieve against the common-law rule, which often resulted in a clear defeat of the testator's real and evident intention." Reeves at 457, 172 So.  at 249. The Legislature merely confirmed the existing general law as to creditors and purchasers. "The Legislature's concern over preserving the remainder in cases of non-exercise does not import an intention to prohibit a gratuitous exercise, and it seems clear that a volunteer was intended to qualify as a purchaser under these statutes." Note, Powers of Appointment in AlabamaA Plea for Reform, 26 Ala.Law Review 355, 388 (1974). Since consideration is no longer necessary for the validity of a deed and since the powers statutes restate the common law except as to unexercised powers, the legal definition for purchaser as one who takes gratuitously or for value clearly governs. For purposes of § 35-4-292, concerning powers of disposition, a purchaser includes every transferee by deed.
Appellant also contends that the rule in Braley v. Spragins, 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149 (1930), and Bell v. Killian, 266 Ala. 12, 93 So. 2d 769 (1957), is applicable here, that a life tenant with power of disposition cannot exercise the power by an inter vivos gift. A careful reading of the Braley opinion, however, reveals the following appropriate qualification:
The language in the Nevin will could hardly bestow more "ample, sufficiently specific and full" a power of disposition. In Bell as in Yockers, supra, the decision turned on the express limitation of the power of disposition, to a standard of support and maintenance. By virtue of the absolute and unlimited power of disposition granted Ila Nevin in her husband's will, a conveyance made by her during her lifetime would clearly pass fee simple title to the grantee.
For the above stated reasons we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, JONES, ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.
FAULKNER, J., with whom EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., join, dissents.
FAULKNER, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent.
In my opinion, the majority has misconstrued a statute, and the decisions of this Court. The majority holds that the power of appointment given to the testator's wife was general rather than limited.
The statute, that is now § 35-4-292 of the 1975 Code, construed by this Court in Braley v. Spragins, et al., 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149 (1930), held that a donee by deed cannot be a "purchaser", because he is not a purchaser for a valuable consideration. Moreover, the Court said:
The majority, apparently, will agree that the life tenant could not will the property under the terms of this will. (The appellees' mother attempted to convey the land by will on one occasion; she was advised that she could not will the property; subsequently, she had deeds prepared, and delivered them to her children. The appellant refused delivery of the deed to him).
It is obvious the majority has misconstrued Braley. This is evident from its lifting a statement from the opinion out of context. This is what the Court said:
The underlined part of the quotation is quoted in the majority to anchor its position that the power in the Nevin will constituted a general (absolute) power of appointment. The majority has to interpret words "ample", "sufficiently specific" and "full" to constitute a general power of appointment, *271 thus giving the life tenant the power to appoint by will.
Additionally Braley held:
The majority also has misconstrued Yockers v. Hackmeyer, 203 Ala. 621, 84 So. 709 (1919). That case, cited in 27 ALR 1388, holds:
Finally, in Alford v. Alford, 56 Ala. 350, this Court declared:
As already noted in this dissent "purchaser" means "purchaser for a valuable consideration" not an inter vivos gift. By extending the meaning of "purchaser" in § 35-4-292 to include gratuitous donees, the majority has construed the statute is a way never contemplated by the Legislature, and has defeated the testator's intent and purpose.
EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.