Title: Wilson v. City of Mountlake Terrace
Citation: 417 P.2d 632, 69 Wash. 2d 148
Docket Number: 38169
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 1966

69 Wn.2d 148 (1966) 417 P.2d 632 A.P. WILSON et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF MOUNTLAKE TERRACE, Respondent.[*] No. 38169. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. August 18, 1966. *149 Hullin, Ehrlichman, Carroll &amp; Roberts, for appellant. William F. Hennessey (of Brumbach &amp; Hennessey), for respondent. DONWORTH, J. Appellant Reese has appealed from the dismissal of his alternative writ of prohibition with prejudice after a trial before the court sitting without a jury. The facts were stipulated by counsel. Therefore, the only issues in the case are questions of law. The basic question is whether the persons who are not residents of the City of Mountlake Terrace can obtain judicial relief to prevent the City of Mountlake Terrace from fluoridating the city's water supply when its so doing will inevitably result in the fluoridation of the water of the nonresidents who wish to have their water remain unfluoridated. The facts are somewhat involved but are not in dispute. The stipulated facts which were accepted verbatim by the trial court as findings of fact are as follows: In addition to these stipulated facts, the trial court added the additional finding which reads: *151 The only conclusion of law entered by the trial court reads as follows: The contract by which the water district sold the water distribution system to the City of Mountlake Terrace was incorporated in the stipulated facts. It provided for the sale of the water pipeline system within the city limits of Mountlake Terrace to the city (except for certain specific exclusions not relevant to the issues in this case). The city agreed to pay a specific sum of money, and to purchase all the water it found necessary for the use of its residents up to the amount which the water district could supply for a period of 7 years. In addition, the agreement contained the following provisions which are pertinent to an understanding of this case: Appellant assigns as error the entry of the judgment by the trial court, and the making of its finding of fact No. 10 and conclusion of law No. 1, quoted earlier in this opinion. We assume that the trial court's reason or reasons for its dismissal of the alternative writ of prohibition are based on the finding and the conclusion of law as supported and explained by respondent city's arguments. Appellant's position can be clearly shown by quoting portions of his brief. Appellant states therein: Appellant's brief also contains the following statement: [1] Appellant cites and quotes from many authorities which state in clear language that, unless the authority is expressly granted by charter or statute, a city cannot exercise its police power outside its boundaries. In particular, appellant relies on Brown v. Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 Pac. 112, 55 A.L.R. 1175 (1927). [2] We agree that appellant is correct in his abstract statement of the law, but we are of the opinion that in this *153 case the City of Mountlake Terrace is not proposing to exercise its police power outside the city limits. The city does not distribute water to appellant. Under the contract, it redelivers water received from the Alderwood Water District, a portion of which is then delivered to appellant through the district's mains. It is true that the city will be the entity which will fluoridate appellant's water, but such fluoridation is not being done for the purpose of supplying fluoridated water to him or to other persons in his class. These persons are customers of the water district, i.e., they buy water from the district, although that water has first passed through the city's water mains consistent with the provisions of the contract. The fact that appellant's water will contain fluoride is the inevitable result of the city's fluoridation program and the passage of the ordinance which implemented the program. In a very meaningful sense, the city is not exercising its police power for the purpose of fluoridating water which it will deliver to persons residing outside the city. Its purpose is to furnish fluoridated water to its own inhabitants. [3] To the extent that the trial court's finding of fact X determines a factual issue, we must accept it as correct, since there is substantial evidence to support it. To the extent that this finding also may be a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law, we believe that it correctly states the legal effect of the ordinance. As stated above, the fluoridation of appellant's water is the incidental, although inevitable, result of the city's exercise of its police power in this respect. Appellant does not claim that he is, in fact, harmed by this incidental result of the fluoridation. Furthermore, the trial court found that the fluoridation would not render the water unfit for human consumption according to the standards of the State of Washington Department of Health. This was one of the stipulated facts in this case. Since, under the contract between the city and the water district, the latter is obligated to deliver to the former a good and wholesome quality of water, approved by the State Department of Health, and since the city further *154 agreed to permit the district's customers residing outside the city to receive water service from mains running through the city, it can only reasonably be inferred that the parties contemplated that appellant and other persons similarly situated were to receive the quality of water approved by the State Department of Health. The trial court, having found on stipulation of the parties that fluoridation will not render the water unfit for human consumption according to health department standards, had no legal basis for holding that appellant will be harmed. Kaul v. Chehalis, 45 Wn.2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954), and Birnel v. Fircrest, 53 Wn.2d 830, 335 P.2d 819, appeal dismissed 361 U.S. 10 (1959). Brown v. Cle Elum, supra, relied on by appellant, does not support his position. In that case (which was twice argued before this court), it was held that a city ordinance purporting to make it unlawful for anyone to swim, fish, or boat on a certain lake situated in the National Forest Reservation, about 6 miles outside the city limits, was an invalid exercise of the city's police power. The facts in the present case, as stated above, make it readily distinguishable from the Brown case. The trial court's conclusion of law No. 1 is correct. Respondent has argued, inter alia, that appellant has no standing to bring this suit. The trial court reached the merits and determined, in effect, that appellant was not harmed. Since we affirm on that ground, there is no need to discuss the standing issue. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., FINLEY and HAMILTON, JJ., and BARNETT, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 417 P.2d 632.