Title: Colectivo Coffee Roasters, Inc. v. Society Insurance
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000463
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2022

2022 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP463 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Colectivo Coffee Roasters, Inc., Tandem 
Restaurant, LLC  
d/b/a The Tandem, Wrecking Crew, Inc., Iron 
Grate BBQ  
Company, Inc., East Troy Brewery Company, Logan 
& Potter, Inc.,  
Buckley's Kiskeam Inn, LLC, Other Ones MKE, LLC, 
BCT 5, LLC,  
Company Brewing, LLC, Bryhopper's Bar & Grill, 
LLC,  
The River's Bar, LLC, Etcetera by BLH, LLC, 
REMBS, LLC,  
KRO Bar, Inc., Rivermill, Inc. and Pork's Place 
of Kaukana, LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Society Insurance, a Mutual Company, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 1, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Laura Gramling Perez  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs filed in the 
court of appeals by Janet E. Cain, Heidi L. Vogt, Beth J. 
Kushner, Christopher E. Avallone and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee. There was a brief filed in response to amicus briefs 
 
 
2 
for United Policyholders and the Tavern League of Wisconsin by 
Janet E. Cain, Heidi L. Vogt, Beth J. Kushner, Christopher E. 
Avallone, Laura A. Foggan and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee and Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington D.C. There was an 
oral argument by Laura A. Foggan.  
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief filed in 
the court of appeals by Jay A. Urban, Nicole A. Flemming, 
Richard W. Schulte and Urban & Taylor, S.C., Milwaukee and 
Wright & Schulte, Vandalia.  There was an oral argument by Jay 
A. Urban. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed in the court of appeals by 
Jeffrey D. Colman, Gabriel K. Gillett and Jenner & Block LLP, 
Chicago for The Restaurant Law Center.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew B. Hebl and 
Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison for the Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance, American Property Casualty Insurance Association, and 
the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Patrick Murphy, John S. 
Vishneski III and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee and Reed Smith 
LLP, Chicago for United Policyholders.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Patricia L. Jenness, 
Marshall Gilinsky, Esq., Nicholas M. Insua, Esq., Rhonda Orin, 
Esq. and Michael Best & Friederich LLP, Milwaukee and Anderson 
Kill, New York City for the Tavern League of Wisconsin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 36 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP463 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV2597) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Colectivo Coffee Roasters, Inc.; Tandem 
Restaurant, LLC d/b/a The Tandem; Wrecking 
Crew, Inc.; Iron Grate BBQ Company, Inc.; East 
Troy Brewery Company; Logan & Potter, Inc.; 
Buckley's Kiskeam Inn, LLC; Other Ones MKE, 
LLC; BCT 5, LLC; Company Brewing, LLC; 
Bryhopper's Bar & Grill, LLC; The River's Bar, 
LLC; Etcetera by BLH, LLC; REMBS, LLC, KRO Bar, 
Inc.; Rivermill, Inc.; and Pork's Place of 
Kaukauna, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Society Insurance, a Mutual Company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 1, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Laura Gramling Perez, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Colectivo Coffee Roasters 
and other bars and restaurants experienced substantial losses as 
a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and related government 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
2 
 
restrictions on in-person dining.  This case is about whether 
those losses are covered by a property-insurance policy issued 
by 
Society 
Insurance. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
questions 
here 
are:  (1) whether a bar or restaurant's inability to use its 
dining space for in-person dining because of the pandemic and 
related government restrictions constitutes a direct physical 
loss of or damage to its property under Society's policy; and 
(2) whether the presence of COVID-19 on a bar or restaurant's 
property caused the bar or restaurant to suspend its operations, 
thereby 
entitling 
it 
to 
coverage 
under 
the 
policy's 
contamination provision.  We conclude that the answer to both 
questions is "No," and therefore reverse. 
I 
¶2 
This case began in the early days of the COVID-19 
pandemic.  In early February 2020, Colectivo purchased an 
insurance policy from Society.1  The policy provides that Society 
"will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to" Colectivo's 
buildings, permanently installed equipment, and other "business 
personal property."  When such direct physical harm occurs, the 
policy covers not only that harm but certain other losses 
resulting from it.  Two types of losses are relevant here, each 
                                                 
1 Although several bars and restaurants are plaintiffs here, 
only Colectivo's policy is in the record.  Throughout this 
litigation the parties have treated Colectivo's policy as 
representative of the other plaintiffs' policies.  We do the 
same.  We also refer to all plaintiffs collectively as 
"Colectivo." 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
3 
 
covered by its own provision.  The first is the "business-
income" provision, under which Society is required to pay for 
"the actual loss of business income [Colectivo] sustain[s] due 
to the necessary suspension of [its] 'operations' during the 
'period of restoration.'"2  The second is the "extra-expenses" 
provision, which covers expenses incurred "during the period of 
restoration," that Colectivo would not have incurred but for the 
direct physical harm, and that are "necessary" to "avoid or 
minimize the suspension of business and to continue operations".   
¶3 
The policy also contains provisions that cover lost 
business income and extra expenses incurred as a result of 
contamination on the property or an order by a civil authority 
preventing Colectivo from accessing its property.3  The policy's 
                                                 
2 "Operations" and "period of restoration" are defined in 
the policy.  "Operations" means "[the insured's] business 
activities occurring at the described premises."  "Period of 
restoration" means "the period of time that begins with the date 
of direct physical loss or damage caused by or resulting from a 
covered cause of loss . . . and ends on the date when the 
property . . . should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with 
reasonable speed and similar quality." 
3 The policy uses "business income" and "extra expenses" 
both as titles for coverage provisions and as types of losses.  
When the contamination provision refers to business income and 
extra 
expenses, 
it 
does 
so 
only 
to 
identify 
types 
of 
losses:  "The definitions of Business Income and Extra Expense, 
contained in the Business Income and Extra Expense Additional 
Coverages section shall also apply to the additional coverages 
under this section."  The policy defines lost "business income" 
as the "net income . . . that would have been earned or incurred 
if no physical loss or damage had occurred."  An "extra expense" 
is defined, in relevant part, as an "expense incurred to avoid 
or 
minimize 
the 
suspension 
of 
business 
and 
to 
continue 
operations." 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
4 
 
"contamination" provision covers the costs to "clean and 
sanitize [Colectivo's] premises, machinery and equipment" when 
Colectivo's "operations are suspended due to 'contamination,'" 
defined as a "defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous 
condition in [Colectivo's] products, merchandise, or premises."  
When the contamination "results in an action by a public health 
or other governmental authority that prohibits access" to the 
property 
and 
causes 
Colectivo 
to 
suspend 
its 
business 
operations, the policy covers lost business income and extra 
expenses Colectivo incurs during that suspension period.  The 
"civil-authority" provision provides coverage when a "civil 
authority . . . prohibits access" to Colectivo's property due to 
direct physical harm to a surrounding property, even if 
Colectivo's property itself suffered no such harm.  
¶4 
Not long after Colectivo purchased its policy from 
Society, Department of Health Services Secretary-Designee Andrea 
Palm issued several emergency orders aimed at stopping the 
spread of COVID-19.  Orders Nos. 5 and 12, issued in March 2020, 
prohibited in-person dining at all bars and restaurants, 
although 
take-out 
and 
delivery 
services 
were 
allowed 
to 
continue.  Colectivo lost business income as a result of its 
compliance with those restrictions, and some of the other 
plaintiffs that served only alcohol closed altogether, as local 
laws prohibited them from offering take-out service.  Colectivo 
filed a claim with Society to recover its lost income, which 
Society denied on the grounds that Colectivo had not suffered a 
"direct physical loss."  Rather, in Society's view, Colectivo's 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
5 
 
use of its property was restricted, but the property was not 
lost or damaged. 
¶5 
Colectivo then filed a class-action complaint against 
Society seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as 
damages for breach of contract.  It alleged that it had been 
"forced . . . to cease [its] operations" because of Palm's 
orders and the potential presence of COVID-19 on its property.  
Colectivo asserted that the "presence of any COVID-19 particles 
renders items of physical property unsafe," thereby causing 
"direct physical harm, direct physical damage, and direct 
physical loss to property."  Accordingly, Colectivo argued that 
Society was required to compensate it for that harm as well as 
the business income it lost because of that harm.  Likewise, it 
alleged that Palm's orders "prohibited the public from accessing 
[its] restaurants, thereby causing the necessary suspension of 
[its] operations," which triggered the business-income, extra-
expense, and civil-authority provisions of the policy. 
¶6 
Society filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 
arguing that Colectivo had failed to allege any direct physical 
loss of or damage to its property, so none of the policy's 
coverage provisions applied.  The circuit court denied that 
motion, concluding that Colectivo had sufficiently alleged a 
physical loss of its dining area due to both the likely presence 
of 
COVID-19 
on 
Colectivo's 
property 
and 
Palm's 
orders 
prohibiting in-person dining.  The court of appeals permitted 
Society to appeal the circuit court's non-final order.  Society 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
6 
 
then filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which we 
granted. 
II 
¶7 
We review de novo the circuit court's denial of 
Society's motion to dismiss.  See Data Key Partners v. Permira 
Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶17, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.  
We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in Colectivo's 
complaint, as well as reasonable inferences from those facts, 
but we draw our own legal conclusions regarding how they apply 
to the Society insurance policy.  See id., ¶¶18–19. 
¶8 
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 
N.W.2d 65.  Our goal is to give effect to the parties' intent, 
construing the policy as it would be understood by a reasonable 
person in the same position as the insured.  Id.  If, based on 
the facts in the complaint, "it is clear that the policy was not 
intended to cover the claim asserted, the analysis ends there."  
See id., ¶24.  Only if the complaint establishes an initial 
grant of coverage do we analyze whether any exclusion provisions 
apply.  See id. 
III 
¶9 
Colectivo asserts that Society must cover Colectivo's 
alleged damages under the policy's business-income, extra-
No. 
2021AP463 
 
7 
 
expense, civil-authority, and contamination provisions.4  We 
analyze the former three provisions together because they share 
a similar prerequisite for coverage:  they apply only if there 
has been a physical loss of or damage to either Colectivo's 
property or a surrounding property.  We then address the 
contamination 
provision, 
which 
applies 
if 
a 
"dangerous 
condition" on Colectivo's property caused Colectivo to suspend 
its operations or a governmental authority to "prohibit access" 
to the property. 
A 
¶10 The provisions of Society's policy on which Colectivo 
relies, with the exception of the contamination provision, all 
require Colectivo to allege a direct physical loss of or damage 
to either its property or a surrounding property.  Although 
Society's policy does not define "direct physical loss of or 
damage to" property, our prior cases interpreting similar 
language establish that physical losses and physical damages 
refer to different degrees of tangible harm.  An insured suffers 
a physical "loss" of its property when the property is 
                                                 
4 Colectivo also argues that it is entitled to coverage 
under the policy's "sue and labor" clause, which requires 
Colectivo to keep a record of its expenses related to a covered 
loss or damage and to take reasonable steps to prevent further 
damage.  By its plain text, however, this provision does not 
provide coverage; it merely lays out certain obligations 
Colectivo has "in the event of loss or damage to covered 
property."  See also In re Soc'y Ins. Co. COVID-19 Bus. 
Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 3d 729, 745 (N.D. 
Ill. 2021) (reaching the same conclusion). 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
8 
 
"destroyed" or affected to such an extent that it cannot be 
repaired.  See RTE Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 624, 
247 N.W.2d 171 (1976).  Such a loss occurs, for example, when a 
building burns down and must be rebuilt.  See, e.g., Park 
Terrace, LLC v. Transp. Ins. Co., No. 2010AP2432, unpublished 
op., ¶4 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2011).  Physical "damage" is harm 
to the tangible characteristics of the insured property that 
does not rise to the level of a physical loss.  See Wis. Label 
Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, ¶¶29–31, 
233 Wis. 2d 314, 607 N.W.2d 276; see also Sandy Point Dental, PC 
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2021).  So a 
roof that is dented by hail but remains functional has incurred 
physical damage because "[t]his denting changes [its] physical 
characteristics."  Advance Cable Co., LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. 
Co., 788 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2015).  By contrast, a product 
that is merely mislabeled has suffered no physical damage 
because its tangible characteristics are unchanged.  See Wis. 
Label Corp., 233 Wis. 2d 314, ¶¶31–33. 
¶11 That definition of "direct physical loss of or damage 
to" property is consistent with how the phrase is used in 
Society's policy.  See Day v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 WI 24, 
¶28, 332 Wis. 2d 571, 798 N.W.2d 199 (insurance policy terms are 
interpreted "in the context of the policy as a whole").  The 
policy provides that business-income and extra-expense coverages 
are limited to losses resulting from a physical loss of or 
damage to the property that are incurred during the "period of 
restoration."  The "period of restoration" is the time during 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
9 
 
which the property is "repaired, rebuilt or replaced with 
reasonable speed and similar quality."  Thus, for a harm to 
constitute a physical loss of or damage to the property, it must 
be one that requires the property to be repaired, rebuilt, or 
replaced——that is, it must alter the property's tangible 
characteristics.  See, e.g., Sandy Point Dental, 20 F.4th 
at 333. 
1 
¶12 Colectivo argues that it suffered a physical loss of 
or damage to its property in two ways:  (1) because of the 
"presence of COVID-19 particles" on its premises; and (2) it 
lost the use of at least some of its property because of Palm's 
orders closing restaurants.  We reject both arguments because 
neither alleges a tangible harm to Colectivo's physical property 
necessary to trigger coverage. 
¶13 As the overwhelming majority of the other courts that 
have addressed the same issue have concluded, the presence of 
COVID-19 does not constitute a physical loss of or damage to 
property because it does not "alter the appearance, shape, 
color, structure, or other material dimension of the property."  
See, e.g., Sandy Point Dental PC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 488 
F. Supp. 3d 690, 693–94 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (collecting cases), 
aff'd, 20 F.4th 327 (7th Cir. 2021).  The virus does not 
necessitate structural "repairs or remediation"; it can be 
removed from a surface with a disinfectant.  See Uncork & Create 
LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 3d 878, 883–84 (S.D. W. 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
10 
 
Va. 2020), aff'd, 27 F.4th 926 (4th Cir. 2022).  Likewise, 
COVID-19 does not render property "inherently dangerous" or 
"uninhabitable" in the same way as "ongoing rockfalls" or 
wildfire smoke might, because COVID-19 is not a "physical peril 
that ma[kes merely] entering a structure hazardous."  See 
Biltrite Furniture, Inc. v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-656-
JPS-JPS, 2021 WL 3056191, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Wis. July 20, 2021).  
Rather, the danger of the virus is to "people in close proximity 
to one another," not to the real property itself.  Id.; see also 
Uncork & Create, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
¶14 As 
for 
Palm's 
orders, 
although 
they 
restricted 
Colectivo's use of its property, Society's policy makes clear 
that a loss of use is distinct from physical loss of or damage 
to property.  For instance, in a provision regarding personal 
property, the policy expressly covers damages for both the loss 
of or damage to that property as well as the loss of the use of 
that property:  "We [Society] will pay . . . damages because of 
direct physical loss or damage, including loss of use, to 
[invitees' personal property] caused by accident and arising out 
of any covered cause of loss."  By contrast, the policy 
provisions on which Colectivo relies omit any loss-of-use 
language, instead covering only a "direct physical loss of or 
damage to" the property.  One may think of the business-income 
provision as indirect loss-of-use coverage, but that does not 
change the fact that a prerequisite for that provision is still 
a direct physical loss or damage.  "Loss of use" is thus 
distinct 
from 
a 
"direct 
physical 
loss 
or 
damage," 
and 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
11 
 
Colectivo's argument fails because it conflates the two.  See, 
e.g., 
Green 
Beginnings, 
LLC 
v. 
W. 
Bend 
Ins. 
Co., 
No. 20-CV-1661, 2021 WL 2210116, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 28, 2021) 
("'Direct physical loss' does not include the temporary loss of 
use of the insured's property."), appeal filed, No. 21-2186 (7th 
Cir. June 25, 2021); Real Hosp., LLC v. Travelers Ins. Co. of 
Am., 499 F. Supp. 3d 288, 295–96 (S.D. Miss. 2020). 
¶15 The federal district court case on which Colectivo 
primarily 
relies 
makes 
that 
same 
mistake, 
while 
also 
misinterpreting "period of restoration."  See In re Soc'y Ins. 
Co. 
COVID-19 
Bus. 
Interruption 
Prot. 
Ins. 
Litig., 
521 
F. Supp. 3d 729 (N.D. Ill. 2021).  That case involved similar 
plaintiffs who raised similar claims as in this case:  they were 
restaurants and bars who could not offer in-person dining 
because of COVID-19-related government orders and who had filed 
insurance claims under the same Society policy.  The district 
court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the 
plaintiffs had suffered a "physical loss" under the policy 
because they were "limited from using much of their physical 
space."  See id. at 742.  It also rejected Society's argument 
that the definition of "period of restoration" precluded the 
plaintiffs' claims, explaining that the period of restoration 
defined only the timeframe for which business-income expenses 
would be covered.  Additionally, the court noted that because a 
restaurant could "repair" its dining room by installing certain 
safety features or "replace" its "lost" dining space by 
expanding its dining room, the definition of "period of 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
12 
 
restoration" was "consistent with interpreting direct physical 
loss of property to include the loss of physical use" of that 
property.  See id. at 742–43.   
¶16 We disagree with that reasoning for two reasons.  
First, the district court's interpretation ignores the language 
in Society's policy distinguishing a loss of use from a direct 
physical loss and is inconsistent with our previous cases 
interpreting "physical loss."  And second, to restore property 
is to "bring [it] back to . . . [its] former or original state,"5 
not to alter its condition, as the district court's proposed 
measures would.  So although Colectivo could not use its dining 
room for in-person dining for a period of time, the dining room 
was still there, unharmed——it was not physically lost or 
damaged.  See Sandy Point Dental, 20 F.4th at 332–34.  Without 
such a harm, the policy's business-income and extra-expense 
provisions do not apply.  See 10E, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. 
of Conn., 483 F. Supp. 3d 828, 836 (C.D. Cal. 2020) ("Plaintiff 
only plausibly alleges that in-person dining restrictions 
interfered with the use or value of its property——not that the 
restrictions caused direct physical loss or damage."). 
2 
¶17 The civil-authority provision likewise does not apply.  
Unlike the business-income and extra-expense provisions, which 
require a physical loss of or damage to Colectivo's property, 
                                                 
5 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restore. 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
13 
 
the civil-authority provision requires a physical loss of or 
damage to someone else's.  It also requires an "action of civil 
authority that prohibits access" to Colectivo's property because 
of the physical damage to the other property.  Colectivo argues 
Palm's orders "caus[ed] the necessary suspension of [its] 
operations," thus "triggering" the civil-authority provision.  
Colectivo, however, has identified no other property in the 
"immediately surrounding" area that suffered a physical harm.  
See In re Soc'y Ins. Co., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 743–44.  Plus, 
Palm's orders did not prohibit access to Colectivo's property.  
In fact, the orders explicitly allowed customers to access the 
property to order, pick up, and pay for Colectivo's food or 
drinks, provided that they stay six feet apart from others and 
did not use Colectivo's property for in-person dining. 
¶18 Because Colectivo has identified no physical loss of 
or damage to its property or a surrounding property, the losses 
it alleges are not covered by the business-income, extra-
expense, or civil-authority provisions. 
B 
¶19 We now turn to Colectivo's claim that it has coverage 
under the policy's contamination provision.  The policy defines 
"contamination," in relevant part, as a "dangerous condition in 
your products, merchandise or premises."  If the contamination 
causes Colectivo to suspend its operations and "results in an 
action by a public health or governmental authority that 
prohibits 
access 
to 
the 
[property] 
or 
production 
of 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
14 
 
[Colectivo's] product," Society will pay for related business-
income and extra-expense losses.  Colectivo argues that it is 
entitled to coverage under this provision because the possible 
presence on its property of COVID-19 particles created a 
dangerous condition.  It asserts that Palm's orders responded to 
that condition by barring access to its property, which 
prohibited the production of its product. 
¶20 The contamination provision does not apply here for 
three reasons.  First, as Colectivo concedes in its complaint, 
it did not suspend its operations due to the presence of 
COVID-19; it did so because of Palm's orders.  Indeed, despite 
the 
continuing 
presence 
of 
the 
virus, 
in-person 
dining 
operations were no longer prohibited after the court invalidated 
Palm's orders.6  Thus, assuming the presence of COVID-19 
particles constitutes "contamination," that contamination did 
not cause Colectivo to suspend its operations, as the policy 
requires.  Second, and as discussed above, Palm's orders did not 
prohibit access to Colectivo's property; they restricted how the 
property could be used.  And third, Palm's orders did not 
prohibit Colectivo from producing its products; they prevented 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Legis. v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 
N.W.2d 900. 
No. 
2021AP463 
 
15 
 
it only from serving its products for in-person dining.7  
Accordingly, Colectivo has failed to sufficiently allege an 
initial grant of coverage under the contamination provision.  
See In re Soc'y Ins. Co., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 744–45. 
IV 
¶21 We conclude that Colectivo fails to state a claim for 
coverage under the Society policy's business-income, extra-
expense, 
civil-authority, 
or 
contamination 
provisions.  
Accordingly, we do not address whether any of the policy's 
exclusion provisions apply.  See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 268 
Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.  We therefore reverse the circuit court's order 
and remand the cause with instructions to grant Society's motion 
to dismiss. 
By the Court.—The circuit court's order is reversed, and 
the cause remanded. 
                                                 
7 This third reason applies equally to the plaintiffs here 
that serve only alcohol and, at least at the beginning of the 
pandemic, did not have the option of serving their products via 
take-out or delivery.  As Emergency Order No. 12 stated, so long 
as they were "permitted by state law and municipal ordinance," 
carryout sales of alcohol beverages could continue.  And where 
such sales were prohibited by state law and municipal ordinance, 
it is those laws and ordinances that prohibited the plaintiffs 
from serving their product, not Palm's orders or COVID-19.   
No. 
2021AP463 
 
 
 
1