Title: Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Attorney General
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12471
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12471 
 
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY 
GENERAL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 8, 2018. - October 11, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Conduct of 
government agents.  Due Process of Law, Disclosure of 
evidence, Conduct of prosecutor.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts.  Practice, Criminal, 
Conduct of prosecutor, Conduct of government agents, 
Postconviction relief.  Evidence, Certificate of drug 
analysis, Disclosure of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 20, 2017. 
 
                     
1 Hampden County Lawyers for Justice, Inc.; Herschelle 
Reaves; and Nicole Westcott. 
 
2 District Attorney for the Berkshire District, District 
Attorney for the Bristol District, District Attorney for the 
Cape and Islands District, District Attorney for the Eastern 
District, District Attorney for the Hampden District, District 
Attorney for the Northern District, District Attorney for the 
Norfolk District, District Attorney for the Northwestern 
District, District Attorney for the Plymouth District, District 
Attorney for the Suffolk District, and District Attorney for the 
Middle District. 
2 
 
 
 
The case was reported by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, also present) for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
 
Matthew R. Segal (Carlton E. Williams & Daniel N. Marx also 
present) for Hampden County Lawyers for Justice, Inc., & others. 
 
Thomas E. Bocian, Assistant Attorney General (Anna E. 
Lumelsky & Thomas A. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General) for 
Attorney General. 
 
Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney (Susanne M. 
O'Neil, Hallie White Speight, Shoshana Stern, & Sara Concannon 
DeSimone, Assistant District Attorneys, also present) for 
District Attorney for the Berkshire District & others. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jessica Ring Amunson, of the District of Columbia, & Andrew 
C. Noll for Legal Ethics and Criminal Justice Scholars & 
another. 
 
Douglas I. Koff, of New York, Adam S. Hoffinger & Nicholas 
A. Dingeldein, of the District of Columbia, & Radha Natarajan 
for The Innocence Project, Inc., & another. 
 
David M. Siegel & Elizabeth A. Ritvo for Boston Bar 
Association. 
 
Clark M. Neily, III, & Jay R. Schweikert, of the District 
of Columbia, Monica Shah, & Emma Quinn-Judge for Cato Institute 
& another. 
 
Steven Fitzgerald, pro se. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  We are called upon, in the exercise of our 
broad powers of superintendence over the courts of the 
Commonwealth, to remedy egregious governmental misconduct 
arising out of the scandal at the State Laboratory Institute in 
Amherst at the campus of the University of Massachusetts 
(Amherst lab or lab).  The misconduct at issue involves evidence 
tampering by a chemist, Sonja Farak, who stole drugs submitted 
to the lab for testing for her own use, consumed drug 
3 
 
 
"standards" that are required for testing, and manipulated 
evidence and the lab's computer system to conceal her actions.  
The government misconduct at issue also involves the deceptive 
withholding of exculpatory evidence by members of the Attorney 
General's office, who were duty-bound to investigate and 
disclose Farak's wrongdoing. 
This is our third decision addressing the Amherst lab 
scandal.  See Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 97 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 85 (2015).  Three years ago, we 
considered evidence that Farak had stolen portions of samples 
from a handful of cases that had been submitted to the lab for 
analysis.  See Cotto, supra at 109-110.  Based on the reported 
limited scope of Farak's misconduct, we concluded that evidence 
tampering at the Amherst lab did not constitute "a systemic 
problem" warranting extraordinary relief.  Id. at 110.  We also 
expressed our dissatisfaction with the Commonwealth's "cursory 
at best" investigation into the timing and scope of Farak's 
misconduct.  Id. at 111-112.  We remanded the matter to the 
Superior Court to provide the Commonwealth an opportunity to 
fulfil its duty to "learn of and disclose . . . any exculpatory 
evidence that is held by agents of the prosecution team, who 
include chemists working in State drug laboratories" (citation 
and quotations omitted).  Id. at 112, 120. 
4 
 
 
 
On remand, on December 7, 2015, the Chief Justice of the 
Superior Court appointed Superior Court Judge Richard J. Carey 
to hear all cases arising from Farak's misconduct.  In December, 
2016, Judge Carey conducted an evidentiary hearing over six 
days, after which he found that the government had vastly 
understated the extent of Farak's misconduct.  Moreover, he 
determined that two assistant attorneys general had perpetrated 
a "fraud upon the court" by withholding exculpatory evidence and 
by providing deceptive answers to another judge in order to 
conceal the failure to make mandatory disclosure to criminal 
defendants whose cases were affected by Farak's misconduct.  The 
judge determined that certain cases in which Farak had signed a 
certificate of drug analysis (drug certificate) during her 
employment at the Amherst lab were subject to dismissal.  He 
found further, however, that Farak's misconduct had not 
undermined testing results reported by other chemists who had 
been assigned to the Amherst lab during the period that Farak 
was employed there. 
 
The petitioners -- the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services; Hampden County Lawyers for Justice, Inc.; and two 
named former criminal defendants -- sought relief in the county 
court through a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and 
G. L. c. 231A, § 1, claiming that the misconduct by the district 
attorneys and members of the Attorney General's office required 
5 
 
 
the imposition of a "global remedy."  The petitioners requested 
that the single justice construct a "global remedy" by vacating 
and dismissing all convictions tainted by the Commonwealth's 
misconduct.  More particularly, the petitioners argued that all 
drug convictions in which the samples had been tested by the 
Amherst lab during Farak's almost nine-year tenure should be 
vacated and dismissed.  In addition, the petitioners asked the 
single justice to exercise the court's superintendence authority 
and to issue prophylactic standing orders designed to ensure 
that, in the future, the Commonwealth timely discloses 
exculpatory evidence, and that procedures are in place to 
prevent a recurrence of a similar situation. 
 
Following a number of hearings, the district attorneys 
agreed to the vacatur and dismissal of approximately 8,000 cases 
in which Farak had signed a drug certificate.  Two district 
attorneys did not agree to dismissal of all charges, in their 
respective counties, in which Farak had signed the drug 
certificate.  The single justice reserved and reported the 
matter to the full court, and issued three questions for the 
parties to answer in their briefs.  The reported questions 
asked: 
"1.  Whether the defendants in some or all of the 
'third letter' cases are entitled to have their convictions 
vacated, and the drug charges against them dismissed with 
prejudice, given the undisputed misconduct of the assistant 
Attorneys General found by Judge Carey in Commonwealth vs. 
6 
 
 
Erick Cotto, Hampden Sup. Ct., No. 2007-770 (June 26, 2017) 
(memorandum and order on postconviction motions), and given 
the conduct of the District Attorneys that the petitioners 
allege was improper. 
 
 
"2.  Whether the definition of 'Farak defendants' 
being employed by the District Attorneys in this case is 
too narrow; specifically, based on the material in the 
record of this case, whether the appropriate definition of 
the class should be expanded to include all defendants who 
pleaded guilty to a drug charge, admitted to sufficient 
facts on a drug charge, or were found guilty of a drug 
charge, if the alleged drugs were tested at the Amherst 
Laboratory during Farak's employment there, regardless [of] 
whether Farak was the analyst or signed the certificates in 
their cases. 
 
 
"3.  Whether, as the petitioners request, the record 
in this case supports the court's adoption of additional 
prophylactic measures to address future cases involving 
widespread prosecutorial misconduct, and whether the court 
would adopt any such measures in this case." 
 
After the matter had been reported to the full court, the 
district attorneys agreed to dismiss all of the so-called "third 
letter"3 cases in which Farak had signed the drug certificates, 
rendering moot the first reported question. 
 
Before this court, however, the respondent district 
attorneys contest the relief sought by the petitioners:  
dismissal of all cases where the drug samples had been tested by 
the other chemists who worked at the Amherst lab during Farak's 
tenure.  The district attorneys argue that there is no factual 
                     
3 "Third letter" cases are "cases that the District 
Attorneys intend to re-prosecute if motions for new trial are 
allowed, and that they represent can be prosecuted independently 
of any drug certificate signed by Farak, or related testimony."  
See Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 
Mass. 298, 328 (2017). 
7 
 
 
basis for a conclusion that Farak's misconduct compromised the 
analyses performed by other chemists at the Amherst lab, and 
that prosecutorial misconduct does not merit dismissal of such a 
large group of cases as is at issue here.  In addition, the 
district attorneys contend that existing rules of criminal 
procedure and professional conduct are adequate to ensure that 
prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence and do so in a timely 
manner. 
 
The respondent Attorney General contests the petitioners' 
proposed remedy, as well as the result suggested by the district 
attorneys.  The Attorney General proposes a different remedy.  
Based on Farak's admission that she began to tamper with other 
chemists' samples in the summer of 2012, the Attorney General 
contends that those defendants whose drug samples were tested 
between June, 2012, and Farak's arrest in January, 2013, should 
be offered the opportunity to obtain relief under the protocol 
established by this court in Bridgeman v. District Attorney for 
the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 316-317 (2017) (Bridgeman II). 
 
We conclude that Farak's widespread evidence tampering has 
compromised the integrity of thousands of drug convictions apart 
from those that the Commonwealth has agreed should be vacated 
and dismissed.  Her misconduct, compounded by prosecutorial 
misconduct, requires that this court exercise its 
superintendence authority and vacate and dismiss all criminal 
8 
 
 
convictions tainted by governmental wrongdoing.  While dismissal 
with prejudice "is a remedy of last resort," it is necessary in 
these circumstances (citation omitted).  Id. at 316.  No other 
remedy would suffice in this case, where the governmental 
misconduct was "egregious, deliberate, and intentional," and 
resulted in a violation of constitutional rights that "give[s] 
rise to presumptive prejudice" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Accordingly, to answer the second reported question, we 
rely on evidence that Farak's misconduct between 2004, when she 
began working at the Amherst lab, and the end of 2008 was 
limited to stealing from a methamphetamine standard, and that, 
in 2009, she began stealing from police-submitted samples and 
otherwise engaging in widespread evidence tampering.  Thus, we 
define the term "Farak defendant" to include, in addition to 
those defendants whose drug certificate was signed by Farak (and 
whose convictions have been vacated), (1) those individuals who 
were convicted of methamphetamine offenses during Farak's tenure 
at the Amherst lab; and (2) those individuals whose convictions 
were based on drugs tested in the Amherst lab on or after 
January 1, 2009, and through January 18, 2013, the date the lab 
closed, regardless of who signed the drug certificate of 
analysis. 
 
In response to the third reported question, we ask this 
court's standing advisory committee on the rules of criminal 
9 
 
 
procedure to draft proposed amendments to rule 14 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure to better define the 
prosecutor's absolute duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in a 
timely manner.4 
 
Background.  The following facts are drawn from the 
findings by Judge Carey in his exhaustive, 127-page memorandum 
and order on the petitioners' motions to dismiss or for 
postconviction relief, based on the evidence before him at the 
six-day hearing. 
 
1.  Amherst lab.  In the 1960s, the Department of Public 
Health (DPH) began operating a laboratory for drug testing on 
the campus of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.  The 
State police took over operation of the lab in July, 2012, and 
oversaw the lab until its closure on January 18, 2013.  The 
Amherst lab served as a satellite laboratory for DPH's William 
A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton lab), which was 
located in the Jamaica Plain area of Boston.  By 1987, the 
Amherst lab's primary function was the analysis of suspected 
controlled substances submitted by law enforcement agencies in 
western Massachusetts. 
                     
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Boston 
Bar Association; the Cato Institute and the Center on the 
Administration of Criminal Law; The Innocence Project, Inc., and 
the New England Innocence Project; Legal Ethics and Criminal 
Justice Scholars and the DKT Liberty Project; and Steven 
Fitzgerald. 
10 
 
 
 
From at least 2008 until the closure of the Amherst lab, 
four employees were assigned to it.  These were chemists Farak 
and Rebecca Pontes; supervisor James Hanchett; and evidence 
officer Sharon Salem.  The Amherst lab was "more laid back [than 
the Hinton lab]," and had "basically . . . no oversight."  Farak 
and Pontes, for example, occasionally would assign evidence 
samples if the evidence officer was not in the office, and every 
employee had unfettered access to drug standards, police-
submitted samples, and the computer inventory system.  Between 
2006 and July, 2012, officials from DPH visited the Amherst lab 
only once or twice. 
 
2.  Farak's employment.  Farak was hired in May, 2003, as a 
Chemist I at the Hinton lab; she transferred to the Amherst lab 
in August, 2004.  Farak worked as a chemist at the Amherst lab 
until the lab closed on January 18, 2013.  The supervisor who 
preceded Hanchett indicated on Farak's annual personnel reviews 
from 2004 to 2008 that she was a thorough analyst with high 
output, who met or exceeded expectations in all performance 
criteria.  In June, 2005, DPH promoted Farak to Chemist II, and 
she was assigned additional responsibilities, including testing 
larger and more complex samples and repairing equipment.  
Hanchett assumed supervision of the Amherst lab in June, 2008, 
and discontinued the practice of conducting annual performance 
reviews.  He and Farak's other coworkers believed that, 
11 
 
 
throughout most of her employment, Farak was an excellent, 
meticulous chemist. 
 
3.  Misuse of lab samples.  Farak began using alcohol and 
marijuana regularly around the year 2000, while she was in her 
first year of a Ph.D. program.  She occasionally experimented 
with other drugs, including cocaine, methylenedioxy 
methamphetamine (also known as "MDMA" or "Ecstasy"), and heroin. 
 
At some point in late 2004 or early 2005, after 
transferring to the Amherst lab, Farak discovered a large bottle 
of methamphetamine oil in the unlocked refrigerator that held as 
many as fifty standards.5  She used a pipette to remove some of 
the methamphetamine from the bottle and squirted it into her 
mouth.  The methamphetamine gave her increased energy and 
alertness, providing "the pep [she had] been looking for."  She 
later testified that she "felt amazing" when using 
                     
5 As used in a drug laboratory, a "standard" is a known 
controlled substance (e.g., cocaine or heroin) against which an 
unknown sample submitted by a law enforcement officer is 
compared to determine its identity.  Using a gas 
chromatographer/mass spectrometer, a chemist compares the mass 
spectral patterns of the tested sample and the standard to 
determine if there is a match. 
 
Two types of standards are used in this testing.  "Primary" 
standards are pure drug samples acquired from pharmaceutical 
companies, and are considered much the better practice.  
"Secondary" standards are manufactured in a laboratory from 
police-submitted samples that tested positive for a controlled 
substance, and were purified to remove any adulterants.  Due to 
budget constraints, the Amherst lab regularly used secondary 
standards until July, 2012, when the State police assumed 
control of the lab. 
12 
 
 
methamphetamine.  Within a short period of time, Farak was 
stealing and consuming portions of the methamphetamine standard 
every morning.  By 2009, her consumption had increased to 
several times per day.  She was under the influence of 
methamphetamine much of the time she was at work, including days 
when she testified in court. 
 
By the end of 2008 or early 2009, Farak had almost 
completely exhausted the methamphetamine standard.  Around the 
same time, Hanchett was planning to conduct an audit of the lab; 
Farak became "slightly paranoid" that he would notice that the 
amount of methamphetamine oil in the jar had decreased 
substantially.  To avoid this eventuality, she added water to 
the jar.  Thereafter, Farak began searching for other standards 
to use.  She discovered a "large jar" of amphetamine and "a 
couple smaller containers of phentermine," and she began to 
consume these drugs.  Additionally, throughout 2009, Farak also 
stole from the lab standards for ketamine, MDMA, methylenedioxy 
ethylamphetamine (MDEA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and 
cocaine. 
 
In early 2009, Farak also began substance abuse 
counselling.  At first, she declined to answer questions about 
her drug use.  On April 28, 2009, she admitted to her therapist 
that she had been using illegal drugs for a long period of time, 
and that she "obtain[ed] the drugs from her job at the [S]tate 
13 
 
 
drug lab, by taking portions of samples that [had] come in to be 
tested."  Farak explained that she initially had begun by taking 
relatively small amounts from police-submitted samples that fell 
within the "acceptable loss" of approximately five per cent that 
ordinarily could be depleted due to testing and evaporation in 
storage.  On August 25, 2009, Farak told her therapist that she 
was "almost out" of her drug supply. 
Farak later explained to her therapist that, in late 2009, 
she had stolen cocaine from a large batch of samples submitted 
by inspectors for the United States Postal Service, and 
maintained that that was the first time she had tampered with a 
submitted sample.  She recalled the sample clearly because of 
its size and its source, but also because that had been the 
first time that she had crossed a line into a new level of lab 
misconduct.  According to Farak, "taking from . . . evidence 
[was] a whole []other level of morality [she] never thought 
[she] would cross and [she] did and it scared [her]." 
 
In 2011, Farak's cocaine use increased at the same time 
that she used up lab standards; in response, she turned to 
police-submitted samples of powder and "crack" cocaine.  By the 
end of 2011, Farak was "totally controlled by [her] addiction."  
Throughout 2012, she was smoking crack cocaine ten to twelve 
times per day, both when she was at work and at home and while 
driving.  Farak smoked crack cocaine in the bathroom of the lab, 
14 
 
 
at her lab bench when no one else was around, in the evidence 
room, and in the lab's fume hood so that she could "get rid 
of . . . the smoke directly."6 
 
To hide her burgeoning drug use from her colleagues, Farak 
began to counterfeit crack cocaine using a variety of 
substances, including rocks, soap chips, candle wax, and 
modeling clay, and to manipulate the inventory list on the 
evidence computer.  By the end of 2011, Farak routinely 
manipulated the computer system to assign herself the samples 
that she wanted.  If she skimmed from a sample before it was 
assigned to anyone, she altered the gross weight on the drug 
receipt so that the chemist who tested the sample would not 
notice; following analysis, she changed the weight back to the 
original amount so that the investigating officers would be 
unaware of the tampering.  Farak also lowered the temperature on 
the heat sealers, so that samples brought in unsealed could not 
be sealed properly, thereby allowing her easier access without 
noticeable tampering. 
 
In one illustrative case, Farak removed "a good hundred 
grams" from a kilogram of cocaine that had been submitted by the 
Chicopee police department.  Unsure whether the missing one 
hundred grams would be noticed, Farak replaced the missing 
                     
6 When crack cocaine was not readily available, Farak 
manufactured it at her work station, using powder cocaine. 
15 
 
 
volume with a mixture of baking powder and baking soda.  On 
another occasion, she removed 200 grams of powder cocaine from a 
Holyoke case and took the drugs home to cook into crack cocaine. 
Judge Carey noted that Farak testified at the grand jury 
that "she began taking other chemists' samples in the summer of 
2012."  Farak testified that she took approximately six of 
Hanchett's samples of crack cocaine from his work station.  
These samples included "3.5 grams submitted by the Northampton 
Police Department, and a 24.5 gram sample from the Pittsfield 
Police Department."  Farak replaced the crack cocaine with 
counterfeit substances and placed the samples in bags that 
Hanchett had pre-initialed to save time.  Farak testified that, 
on another occasion, she took thirty grams of cocaine from a 
seventy-three-gram Springfield police department submission that 
had been assigned to Pontes.  She used it to manufacture crack 
cocaine, and replaced the missing cocaine with a filler 
substance. 
 
After the State police assumed control of the Amherst lab 
in July, 2012, their quality assurance team instructed Hanchett 
to inventory the lab standards.  At that point, Hanchett noticed 
that the standards were more depleted than he had expected, and 
mentioned that observation to Salem, Pontes, and Farak.  In 
September or October, 2012, Hanchett noticed that Farak's 
productivity had dropped, and he encouraged her to focus on her 
16 
 
 
work.  Aside from this single comment by Hanchett, and despite 
Farak's almost daily drug use starting in 2004, her coworkers 
did not question her work.  State police team members who met 
with Farak also did not notice that she was under the influence 
of drugs. 
 
4.  Farak's arrest.  On January 17, 2013, Salem was 
matching drug certificates to corresponding samples and noticed 
that two samples were missing.  She determined that both samples 
had been assigned to Farak, who had identified them as cocaine.  
The next morning, Salem told Hanchett about the missing samples.  
Hanchett searched the lab and discovered at Farak's work station 
an envelope containing the cut-open packaging for the missing 
samples, as well as materials Farak used as fillers to create 
counterfeit drugs.  The substances in the packaging tested 
negative for cocaine.  Hanchett notified the lab director, State 
police Major James Connolly, who instructed Hanchett to close 
the lab immediately.7  State police officers then alerted the 
office of the Attorney General. 
 
On the morning of January 18, 2013, Farak was expected to 
testify in a case in which she had issued a drug certificate.  
                     
7 Hanchett's discovery took place four months after Annie 
Dookhan, a former chemist at the Hinton lab, had been arrested 
for evidence tampering and obstruction of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337, 339 (2014).  By that 
time, the Hinton lab had been closed due to Dookhan's 
misconduct.  See id. at 342. 
17 
 
 
Two State police detectives located her at the court house and 
interviewed her.  Following the interview, Farak refused to 
consent to a search of her vehicle; the vehicle was seized and 
towed to the garage at the State police barracks. 
 
On January 19, 2013, Farak was arrested on charges of 
tampering with evidence, possession of cocaine, and possession 
of heroin.  On the same day, a clerk-magistrate issued a warrant 
to search Farak's vehicle.  Detective Lieutenant Robert Irwin, 
Sergeant Joseph Ballou, and Trooper Randy Thomas, who were 
assigned to the Attorney General's office, executed the search 
warrant; a crime scene services officer photographed the vehicle 
and the evidence found within it.  Among other things, the 
officers discovered bags containing pills, a white powdery 
substance that resembled cocaine, a brown tar-like substance 
that resembled heroin, and crack cocaine.  The vehicle also 
contained empty evidence bags marked with Hanchett's initials, 
and a sheet of paper that bore repeated written instances of 
Pontes's initials.  In addition, there were multiple manila 
envelopes containing hundreds of pages marked with case numbers, 
some dating back to 2008.  Given time restraints and the sheer 
volume of documents, the initial search warrant return listed 
the folders and documents as "assorted lab paperwork"; the 
officers intended to examine the evidence more closely at a 
later time. 
18 
 
 
 
On January 25, 2013, investigators also executed a search 
warrant for Farak's duffel bag, which was found at the Amherst 
lab, and discovered substances that could be used to create 
counterfeit cocaine, including soap, baking soda, candle wax, 
off-white flakes, and modeling clay, as well as plastic lab 
dishes, wax paper, and fragments of a crack cocaine pipe.  In 
addition, they found empty evidence bags that had been cut open; 
one bag was labeled with Pontes's initials, and two were labeled 
with Farak's initials.  On January 28, 2013, State police 
searched Farak's work station and found a vial of white powder 
that tested positive for oxycodone; they also found 11.7 grams 
of cocaine in one of her desk drawers. 
 
Assistant Attorney General Anne Kaczmarek was assigned to 
prosecute the case against Farak.  As with the Attorney 
General's investigation and prosecution of former DPH chemist 
Annie Dookhan, the Attorney General's office agreed to provide 
the district attorneys with information as the case unfolded.  
The district attorneys, in turn, were required to provide any 
such discovery to defendants whose convictions were called into 
question by Farak's misconduct. 
 
5.  Attorney General's investigation.  The Attorney 
General's office initially assumed that Farak's misconduct had 
been limited to the six-month period of time immediately 
preceding her arrest, and had consisted of stealing cocaine 
19 
 
 
samples for her own use, because of her addiction.  An inventory 
conducted at the time of Farak's arrest revealed only four 
missing samples, whereas an inventory that had been conducted 
four months earlier had not uncovered any missing samples. 
 
Judge Carey found that the "assumption [concerning the time 
frame of the misuse] was at odds with the evidence uncovered 
even at that early juncture."  By the end of January, 2013, the 
evidence indicated that "(1) Farak was addicted to and had 
stolen from the lab cocaine, phentermine, oxycodone[,] and 
possibly heroin; (2) her misconduct occurred as early as 2011; 
and (3) she may have tampered with samples assigned to Pontes 
and Hanchett, as she inexplicably had [evidence] bags with their 
initials on them." 
 
On January 23, 2013, Ballou received information from the 
district attorney for the Hampden district concerning two cases 
in which Farak had tested samples and the district attorney 
later had discovered inconsistencies.  In one case, a 
Springfield narcotics officer indicated that he had submitted 
for analysis fifty-one pills that resembled oxycodone; when he 
retrieved the sample after testing, it contained sixty-one pills 
with a different color and different markings.  Farak, who 
signed the drug certificate, had indicated on the certificate 
that the sample contained no illegal substances.  In the other 
case, Farak certified the weight of a sample of cocaine as four 
20 
 
 
grams less than the weight recorded by police after it had been 
seized.  When Ballou brought these cases to Kaczmarek's 
attention, she dismissed the importance of the missing 
prescription pills by stating, "Please don't let this get more 
complicated than we thought.  If she were suffering from back 
injury -- maybe she took some oxys?" 
 
Upon further review of the documents found in Farak's 
vehicle, Ballou discovered that the "assorted lab paperwork" 
contained mental health records.  These records were significant 
because they "(1) disclosed Farak's admission of drug use and 
theft of police-submitted samples while she was working at the 
lab; (2) supported inferences that Farak's misconduct occurred 
as early as 2011; and (3) revealed that Farak was receiving 
treatment for drug addiction and that her treatment providers 
likely would have more information about the scope of Farak's 
drug use and theft at the lab." 
 
On February 14, 2013, Ballou sent an electronic mail 
message titled "FARAK Admissions" to Kaczmarek, Irwin, and John 
Verner, who was then chief of the criminal bureau for the office 
of the Attorney General.  The text of the message provided, 
"Here are those forms with the admissions of drug use I was 
talking about.  There are also news articles with handwritten 
comments about other officials being caught with drugs.  All of 
these were found in her car inside of the lab manila envelopes."  
21 
 
 
Ballou attached the documents he had found to his message.  Both 
Kaczmarek and Verner were aware of the admissions before 
receiving Ballou's message. 
 
In preparation for grand jury proceedings, Kaczmarek 
drafted a prosecution memorandum that referenced the mental 
health records, with a footnote stating, "These [records] were 
not submitted to the grand jury out of an abundance of caution, 
in order to protect possibly privileged information."  The 
memorandum noted that the Attorney General's office was not 
certain of the scope of Farak's misconduct, and that staff were 
"hoping that the defendant, once indicted, [would] detail how 
long she had been abusing drugs and how many cases are 
affected."  Verner and Dean Mazzone, then senior trial counsel 
for the criminal bureau, each reviewed and approved the 
memorandum.  Verner wrote a comment near the footnote noting 
that the mental health records had "not [been] turned over to 
[the district attorney's] [o]ffice yet." 
 
On April 1, 2013, a grand jury returned indictments 
charging Farak with four counts of evidence tampering, four 
counts of theft of a controlled substance, and two counts of 
unlawful possession of cocaine.  When Farak was arraigned on 
April 22, 2013, Kaczmarek provided her defense attorney with the 
entire file, including the mental health records.  Later, 
Kaczmarek told Farak's attorney that the Attorney General's 
22 
 
 
office considered the mental health records to be privileged 
and, therefore, would not turn them over to defendants 
challenging their convictions on the ground of Farak's 
misconduct. 
 
Kaczmarek sent an electronic mail message to Farak's 
attorney on September 10, 2013, asking if Farak would be willing 
to make a proffer to determine the scope of the misconduct.  The 
attorney responded that Farak would cooperate if she were to 
receive a sentence of probation and immunity for additional 
State and Federal charges.  The Attorney General's office 
declined to accept the offer.  On January 6, 2014, Farak pleaded 
guilty to all of the charges. 
 
6.  Amherst lab defendants.  While the Attorney General's 
office focused on prosecuting Farak, defendants whose drug 
certificates had been signed by Farak began to file motions for 
discovery and postconviction relief.  On July 25, 2013, then 
Superior Court Judge C. Jeffrey Kinder consolidated sixteen 
postconviction claims, involving fifteen defendants.  He 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the consolidated cases over 
three days in September and October of 2013.  Another defendant, 
who had filed a motion to dismiss as part of his pretrial 
proceedings, also participated in the hearing.  Judge Kinder 
limited the hearing to information concerning (1) the timing and 
scope of Farak's misconduct; (2) the State police's quality 
23 
 
 
assurance audit from October, 2012; and (3) how Farak's 
misconduct and the conditions at the Amherst lab might have had 
an impact on the results of drug analyses the lab produced.  
Judge Kinder also designated two attorneys as lead counsel for 
the defendants. 
 
From August through October, 2013, numerous defendants 
served subpoenas duces tecum on Ballou and Kaczmarek and filed 
motions in the Superior Court seeking to inspect the evidence 
seized from Farak's vehicle.  They also sought disclosure of the 
Attorney General's office correspondence relating to the scope 
of Farak's misconduct and any indication that a third party had 
had knowledge of Farak's behavior prior to her arrest.  
Assistant Attorney General Kris Foster, a member of the appeals 
division of the criminal bureau, was assigned to respond to the 
subpoenas and motions. 
 
a.  Subpoenas.  After communicating with her superiors, 
Foster filed motions to quash the subpoenas.  She argued that 
the Attorney General's office already had turned over all 
nonprivileged information.  In the alternative, Foster asked the 
court to restrict the scope of the subpoenas by allowing the 
government not to produce documents that contained the criminal 
history of any individual, legal work product, or "[i]nformation 
concerning the health or medical or psychological treatment of 
individuals."  Although internal policies for responding to 
24 
 
 
subpoenas indicated that a review of the file should be the 
first step in responding to a request for a subpoena, and a 
supervisor urged her to confirm the accuracy and truth of her 
representations about the contents of the file, Foster did not 
personally review Ballou's file. 
 
On September 9, 2013, Judge Kinder denied the motion to 
quash the Ballou subpoenas insofar as the documents related to 
Ballou's testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  When he inquired 
of Foster concerning the Attorney General's office's request for 
a protective order, she explained that she had not personally 
reviewed the file and that neither she nor Ballou had brought 
the file to the hearing.  Judge Kinder instructed Foster to 
examine Ballou's file by September 18, 2013, and to present to 
him for in camera review on that date any material the Attorney 
General's office believed was privileged.  In electronic mail 
messages among Foster, Kaczmarek, and Verner discussing the 
hearing, Kaczmarek indicated that Ballou's file contained the 
news articles and mental health records seized from Farak's 
vehicle. 
 
On September 16, 2013, Foster sent Judge Kinder a letter 
stating, "After reviewing Sergeant Ballou's file, every document 
in his possession has been disclosed.  This includes grand jury 
minutes and exhibits, and police reports.  Therefore, there is 
nothing for the Attorney General's office to produce for your 
25 
 
 
review on September 18, 2013."  At that point, however, Foster 
had yet to review Ballou's file, and she intentionally had used 
the passive phrase "after review" so that she would not directly 
misrepresent to Judge Kinder that she had personally examined 
the file.  At a subsequent hearing on October 2, 2013, Foster 
again represented to Judge Kinder that the entire contents of 
Ballou's file had been disclosed. 
 
b.  Motions to inspect.  Within the same time frame, one of 
the appointed defense counsel, Luke Ryan, asked the Attorney 
General's office for permission to inspect the documents; as the 
investigation was still ongoing, Kaczmarek refused.  Kaczmarek 
again rejected Ryan's efforts to examine the documents after 
Ryan received permission from Hampden County Assistant District 
Attorney Frank Flannery, who was in charge of the protocol for 
handling the Amherst lab defendants' cases.  At the hearing on 
September 9, 2013, Ryan asked Judge Kinder for an order allowing 
him access to the documents.  Judge Kinder told Ryan that he 
could file a motion for access if he were unable to make 
arrangements with the Attorney General's office.  Over the next 
few days, Ryan sent Foster electronic mail messages asking for 
permission to review the documents.  Kaczmarek told Foster not 
to allow these requests, because the documents were not relevant 
to Ryan's case. 
26 
 
 
Ryan then filed a motion to inspect, pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979).  At a hearing on the 
motion on October 2, 2013, Foster told Judge Kinder that the 
documents sought were not relevant, and that the Commonwealth 
would be prejudiced by the number of defendants who would seek 
to review them.  Concluding that he was "not persuaded that Rule 
17 (a) (2) permits a third-party to inspect evidence held in a 
pending criminal case . . . [p]articularly under the 
circumstances of this case where the physical evidence has been 
described in detail for the defendant and photographs of that 
evidence have been provided," Judge Kinder denied the motion to 
inspect. 
 
c.  Motions to compel.  A different defendant filed a 
motion to compel production by the Attorney General's office of 
"copies of all inter and intra-office correspondence from 
1/18/13 to present pertaining to the scope of evidence tampering 
and/or deficiencies at the Amherst drug lab."  Foster asserted 
in response that such correspondence was protected by the work 
product doctrine.  At the hearing on October 2, 2013, Foster 
told Judge Kinder that she had not personally examined the 
correspondence, and she agreed that the requested information 
would be exculpatory if it existed.  Judge Kinder allowed the 
motion to compel.  The Attorney General's office then filed a 
motion for clarification and requested that privileged work 
27 
 
 
product and material related to an ongoing investigation be 
excluded; Judge Kinder allowed that motion, and limited the 
scope of his earlier motion as the office of the Attorney 
General had requested. 
 
Another motion to compel, filed by a different defendant, 
requested "any and all evidence suggesting that a third party 
may have been aware of Farak's evidence tampering at the Amherst 
lab prior to Farak's arrest in January 2013."  Although the 
mental health records were responsive to this discovery motion, 
Foster again responded that the Attorney General's office had 
turned over all materials, and claimed that "there [was] no 
reason to believe that a third-party had knowledge of Farak's 
alleged malfeasance prior to her arrest."  Had the documents 
been produced, they would have revealed that Farak's mental 
health care providers knew of her evidence tampering as early as 
2011.  Judge Kinder denied the motion. 
 
d.  Judge Kinder's findings.  Relying on representations 
made by the Attorney General's office, Judge Kinder concluded 
that Farak's misconduct began in July, 2012, and ended with her 
arrest in January, 2013.  He found that although Farak had been 
an agent of the Commonwealth, there was insufficient evidence 
that her misconduct began earlier than July, 2012, and that any 
other deficiencies at the Amherst lab did not have an impact on 
the reliability of her testing.  As a result, Judge Kinder 
28 
 
 
denied the motions for postconviction relief by defendants who 
had pleaded guilty before the summer of 2012; he also denied the 
motion to dismiss filed by the defendant who was still in the 
pretrial phase.  Defendants whose motions were denied, and other 
defendants who had not been part of the hearings before Judge 
Kinder but who had filed motions which subsequently were denied 
on the basis of his rulings, appealed.  See Cotto, 471 Mass. at 
99; Ware, 471 Mass. at 91-92. 
 
7.  Discovery of the mental health records.  In 
March, 2014, following Farak's guilty plea, an Amherst lab 
defendant filed a motion to inspect the evidence from Farak's 
criminal case.  Ryan sent an electronic mail message to Foster 
on June 23, 2014, on behalf of another defendant, asking for 
permission to view that evidence; the message was unanswered.  
On July 21, 2014, that defendant filed a motion for an order to 
allow Ryan to inspect the evidence.  The motion was allowed on 
July 31, 2014. 
 
On October 30, 2014, Ryan reviewed the evidence and 
discovered multiple documents that had not been disclosed 
previously, including the mental health records.  On November 1, 
2014, Ryan sent a letter titled "Newly Discovered Evidence" to 
Assistant Attorney General Patrick Devlin, who had helped to 
arrange the inspection.  Ryan indicated that he had discovered 
proof that Farak had been abusing drugs since at least 2011, in 
29 
 
 
contrast to Judge Kinder's findings, which were based on the 
Attorney General's office's representations that Farak's drug 
abuse and tampering with Amherst lab samples began in July of 
2012.  Ryan indicated that "[i]t would be difficult to overstate 
the significance of these documents."  He asked Devlin to allow 
him to provide the mental health records to another attorney and 
to other defendants who had sought postconviction relief based 
on Farak's misconduct. 
 
On November 5, 2014, Foster sent an electronic mail message 
to Devlin, requesting a copy of the mental health records, which 
she had never seen.  In a letter dated November 13, 2014, the 
Attorney General's office notified the district attorneys that 
it was sending 289 pages of documentary evidence that had not 
been turned over previously, including the mental health 
records. 
 
8.  Decisions in Cotto and Ware.  In December, 2014, this 
court received filings from two defendants whose appeals from 
the denials of their motions for postconviction relief were then 
pending.  See Cotto, 471 Mass. at 97; Ware, 471 Mass. at 85.  
The defendant in Cotto, supra at 99, directly appealed from 
Judge Kinder's ruling, and sought to withdraw the defendant's 
guilty pleas.  He claimed that Farak's misconduct predated his 
guilty pleas in April, 2009, and that he would not have pleaded 
guilty if he had been aware of the misconduct.  Id. at 98-99.  
30 
 
 
The defendant in Ware, supra at 90-92, sought postconviction 
discovery and retesting of suspect drug samples; he argued that 
allowance of his discovery request would be "reasonably likely 
to uncover evidence that might warrant granting [him] a new 
trial."  In addition, he questioned the thoroughness of the 
investigation by the Attorney General's office into the scope of 
Farak's misconduct.  See id. at 92. 
 
On the basis of Judge Kinder's findings, and the eight 
cases of tampering that had surfaced at that point, we 
determined that "the scope of Farak's misconduct [did] not 
appear to be . . . comparable to the enormity of Dookhan's 
misconduct."  See Cotto, 471 Mass. at 111.  We therefore 
declined to extend the conclusive presumption of egregious 
government misconduct that was applicable in cases affected by 
Dookhan's misconduct.  See id., citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 
467 Mass. 336, 352-353 (2014).  We noted, however, "the 
Commonwealth's failure to thoroughly investigate the matter of 
Farak's misconduct," see Cotto, supra at 99, and indicated that 
it was "imperative that the Commonwealth thoroughly investigate 
the timing and scope of Farak's misconduct at the Amherst drug 
lab in order to remove the cloud that has been cast over the 
integrity of the work performed at that facility, which has 
serious implications for the entire criminal justice system."  
Id. at 115.  See Ware, 471 Mass. at 96.  We allowed the 
31 
 
 
Commonwealth one month to decide whether to undertake an 
investigation.  Cotto, supra.  In June, 2015, the Attorney 
General's office notified the Superior Court in Hampden County 
that it would do so. 
 
9.  Velis and Caldwell Reports.  Following this court's 
remand and prior to the hearing before Judge Carey, the Attorney 
General's office conducted its own investigation of the 
situation at the Amherst lab.  In June, 2015, the Attorney 
General appointed retired Judge Peter A. Velis as a special 
assistant attorney general and independent investigator to work 
with Assistant Attorney General Thomas A. Caldwell.  In August, 
2015, the district attorney for the northwestern district 
separately appointed retired Judge Thomas T. Merrigan as a 
special assistant district attorney and independent investigator 
for the northwestern district.  The two judges then consolidated 
their investigation, which was focused on issues raised by Ryan.  
Two State police investigators were assigned to assist the 
judges with the investigation of allegations of misconduct by 
State police officers and prosecutors assigned to the office of 
the Attorney General. 
 
In September, 2015, the Attorney General's office also 
undertook to examine the scope of Farak's misconduct and 
initiated two grand jury investigations, in Hampshire and 
Suffolk Counties, to hear evidence.  Caldwell was assigned to 
32 
 
 
conduct the investigations.  Farak testified before the 
Hampshire County grand jury, over three days, concerning her 
extensive drug use, theft of standards and police-submitted 
samples, tampering with other chemists' samples, and 
manufacturing of crack cocaine at her workbench.8 
 
In November, 2015, Hanchett, Salem, and Pontes testified 
before the Suffolk County grand jury concerning conditions at 
the Amherst lab and their interactions with Farak.  The Attorney 
General's office also reviewed and introduced more than 4,700 
electronic mail messages that Caldwell had obtained from 
multiple sources; the Amherst lab records; and Farak's bank 
records, telephone records, and communications while being held 
in a house of correction awaiting trial. 
 
On March 31, 2016, Judges Velis and Merrigan issued a 
report which concluded, 
 
"After our thorough review of the investigative 
activities and their recommendations, we agree that there 
is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or obstruction 
of justice by the Assistant Attorney[s] General[] and 
[State police] officers in matters related to the Farak 
case." 
 
On April 1, 2016, Caldwell submitted his completed report 
(Caldwell Report) to Judge Carey, who had been assigned to the 
matter after Judge Kinder was appointed to the Appeals Court.  
                     
8 In September, 2015, after she had pleaded guilty to 
tampering charges, Farak testified before the grand jury under a 
grant of immunity for any additional charges, concerning the 
timing and scope of her misconduct. 
33 
 
 
The report summarized the information learned from the grand 
jury investigations, and provided no recommendation on how to 
proceed; the report concluded that "[t]he results of the 
Commonwealth's investigation are now provided to the Court so 
that the Court can determine how to proceed in the matters 
before it" (footnote omitted). 
 
10.  Carey hearing.  In 2015, ten defendants who had been 
convicted of drug offenses between May, 2006, and 
September, 2014, based on substances that had been tested at the 
Amherst lab filed renewed motions to dismiss, to withdraw guilty 
pleas, or for new trials.  They asserted that they should be 
awarded postconviction relief based on Farak's tampering; the 
failure of the office of the Attorney General to disclose 
exculpatory evidence and to conduct an adequate investigation in 
2013 on the nature and extent of Farak's misconduct; and 
inadequate conditions, policies, and procedures at the Amherst 
lab.  The cases were consolidated and assigned to Judge Carey on 
December 7, 2015. 
 
In December, 2016, Judge Carey conducted an evidentiary 
hearing over six days at which Kaczmarek, Foster, Verner, 
Mazzone, Ravitz, and Reardon testified.  Edward Bedrosian 
(former first assistant attorney general), and Sheila Calkins 
(former deputy attorney general) also testified.  In addition, 
Judge Carey heard testimony from Ballou, Irwin, and Thomas of 
34 
 
 
the State police; Flannery; Farak's attorney; former Amherst lab 
employees Hanchett, Salem, and Pontes; Timothy Woods, an 
employee of the State police crime laboratory in Sudbury, who 
conducted some retesting of substances that originally had been 
tested at the Amherst lab; and two laboratory quality experts, 
Robert Powers and Heather Harris.  Although Farak did not 
testify, Judge Carey reviewed her grand jury testimony from the 
investigation by the office of the Attorney General.  Judge 
Carey considered Farak's grand jury testimony to be "generally 
candid," but he did not credit her testimony regarding the 
reliability of her analysis or the extent of her addiction and 
her use of police-submitted samples, given the evidence that she 
had lied to her therapist in order to downplay her substance 
abuse.  He did, however, credit other aspects of her testimony, 
including her statement that she had not succeeded in forging 
Hanchett's or Pontes's initials on evidence bags. 
 
On June 26, 2017, Judge Carey released a memorandum of 
decision in which he found that (i)  Farak's misconduct, 
beginning in 2004, "created a problem of systemic magnitude"; 
(ii) Foster and Kaczmarek exhibited "reprehensible" misconduct 
in continually withholding the mental health records and 
misleading Judge Kinder in a manner that constituted a fraud 
upon the court; and (iii) there was "no evidence that a 
comprehensive, adequate, or even reasonable investigation by any 
35 
 
 
office or agent of the Commonwealth had been attempted, 
concluded, or disclosed prior to issuance of the Caldwell 
Report."  Judge Carey determined that evidence of deficiencies 
at the Amherst lab was not a sufficient basis for postconviction 
relief, but that the egregious misconduct by Farak, Foster, and 
Kaczmarek irreparably harmed some defendants. 
 
Judge Carey did not call into question, however, any of the 
analysis performed by the other Amherst lab employees; he 
concluded that any postanalysis tampering by Farak did not have 
a negative impact on the defendants and thus did not justify 
postconviction relief.  He determined also that the misconduct 
by the office of the Attorney General was limited to Foster and 
Kaczmarek, whose "intentional and deceptive actions ensured that 
justice would certainly be delayed, if not outright 
denied, . . . violat[ing] their oaths as assistant attorneys 
general and officers of the court." 
 
The judge therefore concluded that, "at least with respect 
to selected drug lab defendants, the deliberate misconduct [of 
Kaczmarek and Foster] was so egregious that presumptive 
prejudice arises, so that dismissal with prejudice is the 
appropriate prophylactic remedy to deter similar future 
misconduct."  He limited the class of defendants entitled to 
dismissal with prejudice to cases where (i) Farak had signed the 
drug certificate; (ii) the defendants' had sought postconviction 
36 
 
 
relief or discovery between January 19, 2013, and November 1, 
2014, and their efforts had been unsuccessful; and (iii) the 
defendants' motions had been denied because of the misleading 
evidentiary record presented to Judge Kinder.  Judge Carey 
indicated that the cases where defendants had filed motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas would require a more individualized 
factual inquiry to determine whether the defendant would have 
acted differently if he or she had known of Farak's misconduct 
at the time of the plea.9 
 
11.  Subsequent proceedings.  In September, 2017, the 
petitioners filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and 
G. L. c. 231A, § 1, in the county court, seeking relief based on 
Judge Carey's decision.  Specifically, the petitioners requested 
dismissal with prejudice of all convictions "tainted by the 
Commonwealth's misconduct."  They also asked the single justice 
to order the Commonwealth "to comply with its legal and ethical 
obligations to respond to this lab scandal and any future 
systemic crises." 
 
Following a hearing on October 31, 2017, the single justice 
issued an order on November 2, 2017, requiring the parties to 
identify any cases in which there was agreement to vacate the 
convictions and to dismiss the matters with prejudice.  The 
                     
9 The respondents do not contest Judge Carey's factual 
findings. 
37 
 
 
district attorneys agreed to vacate more than 8,000 convictions 
of individuals whom they classified as "Farak defendants," and 
to dismiss those charges with prejudice.  According to the 
district attorneys, the definition of "Farak defendants" 
included any "defendants who pleaded guilty to a drug charge, 
admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty on a 
drug charge, or were found guilty of a drug charge in any case 
in which Farak signed a drug certificate as an analyst between 
August, 2004[,] and January, 2013, while she was employed at the 
[Amherst lab], except for the so-called 'Ruffin defendants.'"10  
At that point, there were approximately forty-five cases from 
Berkshire and Bristol Counties that the district attorneys had 
not agreed to dismiss; those cases subsequently have been 
dismissed. 
 
On January 26, 2018, the single justice reserved and 
reported the case to the full court, and ordered the parties to 
address three questions: 
 
"1.  Whether the defendants in some or all of the 
'third letter' cases are entitled to have their convictions 
vacated, and the drug charges against them dismissed with 
prejudice, given the undisputed misconduct of the assistant 
Attorneys General found by Judge Carey in Commonwealth vs. 
Erick Cotto, Hampden Sup. Ct., No. 2007-770 (June 26, 2017) 
(memorandum and order on postconviction motions), and given 
the conduct of the District Attorneys that the petitioners 
allege was improper. 
                     
10 "Ruffin defendants" are individuals who pleaded guilty 
before receiving results of the drug analysis in their cases.  
See Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 475 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2016). 
38 
 
 
 
 
"2.  Whether the definition of 'Farak defendants' 
being employed by the District Attorneys in this case is 
too narrow; specifically, based on the material in the 
record of this case, whether the appropriate definition of 
the class should be expanded to include all defendants who 
pleaded guilty to a drug charge, admitted to sufficient 
facts on a drug charge, or were found guilty of a drug 
charge, if the alleged drugs were tested at the Amherst 
Laboratory during Farak's employment there, regardless [of] 
whether Farak was the analyst or signed the certificates in 
their cases. 
 
 
"3.  Whether, as the petitioners request, the record 
in this case supports the court's adoption of additional 
prophylactic measures to address future cases involving 
widespread prosecutorial misconduct, and whether the court 
would adopt any such measures in this case." 
 
 
On April 5, 2018, the single justice vacated and dismissed 
with prejudice all convictions that were identified by the 
district attorneys and the Attorney General on or before March 
30, 2018. 
 
Discussion.  We address each of the reported questions in 
turn. 
 
1.  "Third letter" cases.  The first reported question asks 
whether the defendants in "third letter" cases are entitled to 
have their convictions vacated and dismissed with prejudice due 
to prosecutorial misconduct.  Under the protocol established in 
Bridgeman II in response to Dookhan's misconduct, "third letter" 
cases are "cases that the District Attorneys intend to re-
prosecute if motions for new trial are allowed, and that they 
represent can be prosecuted independently of any drug 
39 
 
 
certificate signed by Farak, or related testimony."  See 
Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 328. 
 
As stated, when the single justice reserved and reported 
this case to the full court, there were approximately forty-five 
"third letter" cases from Berkshire and Bristol Counties in 
which Farak had signed the drug certificates and the district 
attorneys had not agreed to dismiss the convictions with 
prejudice.  Because those cases have now been dismissed, the 
first reported question is moot.  See Lawyers' Committee for 
Civil Rights & Economic Justice v. Court Administrator of the 
Trial Court, 478 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2017) (upholding single 
justice's dismissal of petition as moot where "no further 
effective relief [could] be granted"). 
 
2.  Definition of "Farak defendants."  The second reported 
question asks whether the class of "Farak defendants" includes 
"all defendants who pleaded guilty to a drug charge, admitted to 
sufficient facts on a drug charge, or were found guilty of a 
drug charge, if the alleged drugs were tested at the Amherst 
Laboratory during Farak's employment there, regardless [of] 
whether Farak was the analyst or signed the certificates in 
their cases." 
 
a.  Bridgeman framework.  We confronted a similar challenge 
after the discovery of Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton lab.  
The Dookhan petitioners twice asked this court to utilize its 
40 
 
 
superintendence authority to vacate and dismiss all Dookhan 
cases as a "global remedy."  See Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 321–
322; Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 
Mass. 465, 487 (2015) (Bridgeman I).  The petitioners in those 
cases argued that "the time and expense of proceeding on a case-
by-case basis [was] untenable," Bridgeman I, supra, and that "a 
case-by-case adjudication of so many cases [was] 'doomed to 
fail' given the limited resources of the Commonwealth's indigent 
criminal defense system," so that "the only just and practical 
alternative . . . [was] the global remedy," Bridgeman II, supra 
at 314, 322.  The district attorneys maintained that "individual 
case-by-case adjudication of motions for a new trial brought by 
Dookhan defendants [was] both practical and fair."  Id. at 315. 
 
In considering how best to balance the rights of defendants 
affected by governmental misconduct and society's interest in 
administering justice, we focused on four fundamental principles 
of our criminal justice system.  See Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 
315–318.  See also Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 487, quoting Scott, 
467 Mass. at 352 (declining to implement "global remedy," but 
fashioning procedure intended to "account for the due process 
rights of defendants, the integrity of the criminal justice 
system, the efficient administration of justice in responding to 
such potentially broad-ranging misconduct, and the myriad public 
interests at stake"). 
41 
 
 
 
"First, where there is egregious misconduct attributable to 
the government in the investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
case, the government bears the burden of taking reasonable steps 
to remedy that misconduct."  Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 315.  We 
similarly noted in Cotto, 471 Mass. at 112, that "[t]he 
Commonwealth's obligation to conduct an investigation is 
premised on a prosecutor's duty to learn of and disclose to a 
defendant any exculpatory evidence that is held by agents of the 
prosecution team, who include chemists working in State drug 
laboratories. . . .  It is incumbent on the Commonwealth to 
perform this duty in a timely fashion.  The burden of 
ascertaining whether Farak's misconduct at the Amherst drug lab 
has created a problem of systemic proportions is not one that 
should be shouldered by defendants in drug cases."  (Quotations 
and citations omitted.) 
 
Second, "relief from a conviction generally requires the 
defendant to file a motion for a new trial."  See Bridgeman II, 
476 Mass. at 316.  Such a motion is usually required because, 
without it, "we cannot be sure that a defendant wishes to accept 
the risk that the Commonwealth will retry the defendant rather 
than issue a nolle prosequi."  Id. at 323.  The "uncertainty and 
disruption inherent in being a defendant in a criminal trial" 
should not be forced on anyone who does not desire to be 
retried.  Id. 
42 
 
 
 
Third, "dismissal with prejudice 'is a remedy of last 
resort,'" but may be available in certain limited circumstances.  
Id. at 316, quoting Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 198 
(1985).  "Two parallel legal principles" balance "the rights of 
defendants . . . against the necessity for preserving society's 
interest in the administration of justice."  Cronk, supra at 
198-199.  Under the first principle, "[w]here the prosecutor 
fails to disclose evidence the defendant is entitled to receive 
and the defendant is prejudiced by the failure to disclose, a 
motion to dismiss should not be allowed absent a showing of 
irremediable harm to the defendant's opportunity to obtain a 
fair trial."  Id. at 198.  See Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 
Mass. 301, 314 (1984) ("Such a drastic remedy would be 
appropriate where failure to comply with discovery procedures 
results in irremediable harm to a defendant that prevents the 
possibility of a fair trial").  Alternatively, "prosecutorial 
misconduct that is egregious, deliberate, and intentional, or 
that results in a violation of constitutional rights may give 
rise to presumptive prejudice . . . and the 'drastic remedy' of 
dismissal of charges may become an appropriate remedy."  See 
Cronk, supra at 198-199.  The latter theory should be narrowly 
applied, and confined to situations where the misconduct has 
"cast such doubt . . . as to poison the entire investigation," 
Commonwealth v. Hine, 393 Mass. 564, 571 (1984), and a "stronger 
43 
 
 
deterrent" is warranted to prevent repetition of such 
misconduct.  See Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 322; Commonwealth v. 
Lewin, 405 Mass. 566, 587 (1989) ("The only reason to dismiss 
criminal charges because of nonprejudicial but egregious police 
misconduct would be to create a climate adverse to repetition of 
that misconduct that would not otherwise exist"); Commonwealth 
v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438, 444 (1977) ("The indictment itself is 
so inextricably interwoven with the misconduct which preceded it 
that the only appropriate remedy here is to dismiss the 
indictment"). 
 
Finally, "where large numbers of persons have been wronged, 
the wrong must be remedied in a manner that is not only fair as 
a matter of justice, but also timely and practical."  Bridgeman 
II, 476 Mass. at 317.  "A remedy that is perfect in theory is 
not perfect in fact if it would take too long to be 
accomplished, or if the resources required to implement it would 
overwhelm the limited resources available to the courts."  Id. 
at 317-318. 
 
We stated in Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 322-323, that 
"dismissal with prejudice for government misconduct is very 
strong medicine . . . [that] should be prescribed only when the 
government misconduct is so intentional and so egregious that a 
new trial is not an adequate remedy."  Noting that Dookhan's 
misconduct was not accompanied by misconduct by a prosecutor or 
44 
 
 
an investigator, we ultimately determined that the stronger 
deterrent of dismissal with prejudice was not required.  See id. 
at 322.  Accordingly, we established the Bridgeman II protocol 
to allow efficient case-by-case adjudication of the remaining 
cases affected by Dookhan's misconduct.  Id. at 326. 
 
b.  Appropriate remedy.  The petitioners argue that the 
very strong medicine of dismissal with prejudice is required 
here.  We agree.  The government misconduct by Farak and the 
assistant attorneys general was "so intentional and so 
egregious" that harsher sanctions than the Bridgeman II protocol 
are warranted.  See Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 322.  Indeed, 
before the briefs were filed, the district attorneys had agreed 
to bypass the Bridgeman II protocol and to dismiss with 
prejudice all convictions based on drug certificates signed by 
Farak. 
It is difficult, however, to determine the appropriate 
scope of the dismissal remedy.  In Cronk, 396 Mass. at 199, we 
cautioned that "[r]emedies for prosecutorial misconduct should 
be tailored to the injury suffered and should not unnecessarily 
infringe on competing interests."  See Commonwealth v. Carney, 
458 Mass. 418, 427 (2010) (sanctions "should be limited to truly 
remedial, and not punitive measures" [citation omitted]).  We 
therefore must determine whether the class of defendants whose 
cases are subject to dismissal with prejudice should include 
45 
 
 
individuals whose convictions rest upon samples tested at the 
Amherst lab by chemists other than Farak. 
 
The petitioners contend that all convictions based on drug 
samples tested at the Amherst lab during Farak's tenure should 
be vacated and dismissed with prejudice, regardless of whether 
Farak signed the drug certificate.  They argue that the precise 
scope of Farak's misconduct is "unknown (and at this point, 
unknowable)," because of the Commonwealth's failure to conduct a 
prompt and adequate investigation.11  They contend also that 
dismissals with prejudice are "the only appropriate remedy" for 
the egregious prosecutorial misconduct here, and that such 
dismissals are "a necessary prophylactic in response to the 
Commonwealth's transforming the courts into unwitting agents of 
injustice." 
 
The sweeping extent of this proposed remedy, however, is 
not supported by the record.  The only evidence of misconduct by 
Farak between 2004 and 2009 is her theft of the methamphetamine 
                     
11 The petitioners contend also that the Attorney General's 
office and the district attorneys deliberately impeded 
defendants' appellate rights by failing to inform defendants of 
the misconduct at the Amherst lab while the matter was being 
litigated.  In our determination of the appropriate remedies, we 
have considered the full scope of the misconduct by the office 
of the Attorney General.  We discern no fault, however, in any 
actions by the district attorneys and their offices.  The 
district attorneys properly turned over the evidence they 
received to defendants whose convictions were called into 
question by Farak's misconduct, and engaged in time-consuming 
work promptly to identify and notify individuals whose cases 
were affected by Farak's misconduct. 
46 
 
 
oil standard.  There is no evidence to support a finding that 
Farak's consumption of portions of the methamphetamine standard 
affected other chemists' analyses of other controlled 
substances.  Accordingly, the complete dismissal with prejudice 
of all convictions based upon samples tested at the Amherst lab 
during Farak's employment is not a sufficiently tailored remedy. 
 
The district attorneys would limit the class of "Farak 
defendants" to the individuals whose convictions rested upon 
samples tested by Farak herself, precisely those individuals 
whose cases already have been vacated and dismissed with 
prejudice.  The district attorneys reach their recommendation on 
the basis of Judge Carey's findings that the integrity of the 
analyses by other chemists was "not in question," and that 
defendants who did not seek discovery or postconviction relief 
were not "material[ly] connect[ed]" to the Attorney General's 
office's egregious misconduct. 
 
It is undisputed that Farak tampered with other chemists' 
samples, both before and after they had been tested.  By 2011, 
Farak intentionally was manipulating information in the 
inventory list stored on the lab's computer to assign herself 
samples that involved drugs she wanted for her own use.  In 
order to avoid detection of her theft of drugs before they had 
been analyzed, she altered the gross weight on the drug receipt 
before another chemist tested the sample, and then changed the 
47 
 
 
weight back to the original number before law enforcement 
officers retrieved the samples after testing.  Farak admitted 
that, by the summer of 2012, she also was tampering with other 
chemists' samples after the samples had been tested, by cutting 
into sealed evidence bags to remove portions of the samples and 
then resealing the remainder in pre-initialed evidence bags that 
she had stolen from other chemists.  In addition, she regularly 
replaced stolen drugs with counterfeit substances. 
 
We must remedy these forms of evidence tampering and cannot 
limit relief only to those defendants where Farak signed the 
drug certificate.  Any interference with samples that calls into 
question the accuracy of the drug certificates or prevents later 
retesting of the original substance diminishes the reliability 
and integrity of the forensic testing at the Amherst lab, and 
also reduces public confidence in other drug certificates from 
other laboratories.  The district attorneys' proposal does not 
go far enough to protect the rights of defendants whose 
convictions rest upon samples that were tested at the Amherst 
lab during the period of Farak's misconduct. 
 
The appropriate remedy therefore lies between dismissing 
all cases relying on samples tested at the Amherst lab, 
regardless of the chemist who performed the analysis, and 
dismissing no cases where samples were tested by chemists other 
than Farak.  The Attorney General's office suggests that, 
48 
 
 
because Farak testified that she tampered with other chemists' 
samples in mid-June, 2012, any defendant whose conviction rests 
upon evidence tested at the Amherst lab by any chemist between 
June, 2012, and January, 2013, should be eligible to have the 
conviction vacated and dismissed pursuant to the Bridgeman II 
protocol.  Although the Attorney General's office believes that 
Farak tampered with only a small number of samples during that 
period, Farak herself was unable to identify which samples she 
had misused; the reliability of all samples tested during that 
time period therefore is compromised. 
Before the grand jury, Farak testified that her theft of 
other chemists' samples was limited to a few cases.  In response 
to a question from the assistant district attorney, "At any 
point . . . . did you ever manipulate or take samples from other 
chemists at the laboratory?" she responded, "Yes."  She then 
detailed a few specific instances of having removed amounts from 
other chemists' samples, and said that she would do so generally 
if she was able to obtain an open, signed plastic bag with other 
chemists' initials that the chemists used to reseal the samples 
after they had completed their testing.  She explained that she 
would try not to use others' samples unless she had no "other 
way" to obtain crack cocaine. 
"If it was either me taking from my own evidence I analyzed 
or other people's, I would definitely do my own.  That was 
one of the lines I had thought I would never cross.  I 
49 
 
 
wouldn't tamper with evidence, that I wouldn't smoke crack 
and then wouldn't touch other people's work due to how it 
could look." 
 
This testimony was consistent with Farak's proffer.  "Farak took 
from approximately six of Hanchett's samples; including a 24.5 
gram crack cocaine sample from Pittsfield and a 3.5 gram crack 
cocaine sample from Northampton.  Farak used Hanchett's 
initialed evidence bags to repackage the samples.  Farak took 
from one of Pontes' samples; specifically 30 grams of 73 grams 
of powder cocaine from a Springfield case.  Farak replaced the 
cocaine with a counterfeit substance (baking soda) and made 
crack cocaine with it." 
There are two problems, however, with the assumption that 
Farak did not steal from her colleagues prior to the summer of 
2012.  First, Judge Carey did not credit those portions of her 
testimony that were at odds with what she had reported to her 
therapists about her addiction and her theft of police-submitted 
samples.  In 2009, Farak told her therapist that she had 
obtained drugs from the lab by taking portions of samples that 
had been sent to the lab to be tested.  Farak later testified 
that she was totally controlled by her drug addiction, and that, 
in tampering with police-submitted samples, she had begun 
crossing lines that she never thought she would cross. 
Second, Farak's testimony was not supported by 
postconviction discovery produced by the Attorney General's 
50 
 
 
office as part of its investigation.  The Attorney General was 
unable to corroborate Farak's testimony before the grand jury, 
and as part of her proffer, as to specific samples where she 
said that she had taken portions of a sample that had been 
assigned to another chemist. 
Farak testified that she had skimmed from the samples in 
three particular cases where she remembered the specific amounts 
involved.  She testified in detail as to the amounts that she 
had removed from those samples.  One was a case in which the 
Springfield police department submitted a sample of seventy-
three grams of powder cocaine.  The sample was assigned to 
Pontes.  The second was a case submitted by the Northampton 
police department involving 3.5 grams of crack cocaine that had 
been assigned to Hanchett, and the third was a sample of 24.5 
grams of crack cocaine submitted by the Pittsfield police 
department that had been assigned to Hanchett.  The database 
provided to the office of the Attorney General of all samples 
tested at the Amherst Lab did not directly match any of these 
cases, and the office of the Attorney General was unable to 
confirm the existence of any such samples.  Thus, the record 
indicates that Farak's testimony as to the extent of her 
misconduct was, at least at times, unreliable. 
It is our responsibility, in the exercise of this court's 
supervisory authority, to craft a remedy suitable to the 
51 
 
 
available, reliable evidence.  As far as can be determined on 
this record, Farak's drug use spiraled out of control at the 
beginning of 2009, when she nearly depleted the jar of 
methamphetamine oil and started to search for other sources of 
drugs to satisfy her addiction.  Around that time, Farak began 
manipulating the computer system.  She also started stealing 
from police-submitted samples before and after they were tested, 
and from samples that had been assigned to other chemists. 
In light of the extensive and indeterminable nature of 
Farak's misuse of police samples and the lab's standards, a much 
more inclusive remedy is required than that suggested by either 
the district attorneys or the Attorney General.  In order to 
protect the integrity of the criminal justice system, and to 
afford relief to defendants whose convictions may have rested 
upon tampered evidence, we conclude that, in addition to those 
already dismissed where Farak signed the drug certificate, all 
convictions based on evidence that was tested at the Amherst lab 
on or after January 1, 2009, regardless of the chemist who 
signed the drug certificate, and all methamphetamine convictions 
where the drugs were tested during Farak's tenure at the Amherst 
lab, must be vacated and dismissed.  Accordingly, the class of 
"Farak defendants" includes the defendants in all of these 
cases. 
52 
 
 
 
3.  Prophylactic measures.  Finally, we turn to the third 
reported question:  whether the court should adopt additional 
prophylactic measures to address any future cases involving 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
The petitioners argue that the court should issue three 
standing orders to "create a better mechanism for addressing 
government misconduct [than future lawsuits] and ensur[e] 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence."  The petitioners request 
the court to issue a standing Brady order12 requiring specific 
disclosures, and setting forth specific disclosure deadlines.  
The Attorney General indorses this request; the district 
attorneys argue that Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 
Mass. 1518 (2004), and the rules of professional conduct 
adequately address prosecutors' disclosure obligations.  The 
petitioners suggest that standing Bridgeman II and Cotto orders, 
which would provide a procedure by which district attorneys 
could report and remedy government misconduct, would be 
appropriate so that any future misconduct of this nature could 
be remedied without protracted litigation.13  The district 
                     
12 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 
 
13 The petitioners request that the court fine the Attorney 
General's office to punish its past misconduct adequately, and 
to create an incentive for the Attorney General's office to put 
into place meaningful controls to monitor, detect, and disclose 
future misconduct.  The Attorney General does not dispute that 
the court has the authority, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
53 
 
 
attorneys argue that the Bridgeman II and Cotto protocols would 
be "one size fits all" attempts to resolve unknown future 
misconduct, and that it would be preferable to tailor responses 
to any particular case, should one arise. 
a.  Brady order.  A prosecutor's core duty is "to 
administer justice fairly."  Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 
401, 408 (1992).  To fulfil that duty, a prosecutor is required 
to turn over exculpatory evidence to a defendant without regard 
to its impact on the case.  See generally Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (explaining that failure to disclose 
"evidence favorable to an accused . . . [that] is material 
either to guilt or to punishment" is violation of due process).  
Litigation strategy plays no role in this process. 
                                                                  
14 (c) (1), to impose remedial monetary sanctions for a 
discovery violation.  See Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 
439 (2010) (sanctions may be imposed under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 [c] [1] for failure to comply with discovery obligations); 
Commonwealth v. Carney, 458 Mass. 418, 427 (2010) (rule 
14 [c] [1] sanctions should be "tailored appropriately to cure 
any prejudice resulting from a party's noncompliance" with its 
discovery obligations). 
 
 
The Attorney General argues, however, that monetary 
sanctions are unnecessary because the office of the Attorney 
General has taken steps to avoid future misconduct, including 
revising existing policies and procedures.  We do not agree.  
Based on our experience in Bridgeman II, we are aware of the 
substantial costs associated with providing adequate notice to 
thousands of individuals whose cases will be dismissed, 
including hiring outside vendors to research last known 
addresses.  Because the office of the Attorney General is 
responsible for the prosecutorial misconduct, it shall bear the 
entire financial burden associated with notifying those affected 
defendants that their cases have been dismissed. 
54 
 
 
Under our rules of professional conduct, a prosecutor is 
required to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense."  Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016).  See 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015) 
(attorney prohibited from unlawfully obstructing another party's 
access to evidence or from concealing evidence); Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.8 (g), as appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016) (prosecutor 
may not avoid pursuit of exculpatory evidence); Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.8 (i), as appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016) 
(postconviction disclosure of exculpatory evidence). 
The due process clauses of the Federal Constitution and the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require that the 
Commonwealth disclose to a defendant material, exculpatory 
evidence in its possession or control.  See United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1976); art. 12 of the Declaration 
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution ("every subject 
shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable 
to him"); Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131, 135 
(2001).  "A prosecution that withholds evidence . . . which, if 
made available, would tend to exculpate [a defendant] or reduce 
the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the 
defendant.  That casts the prosecutor in the role of an 
55 
 
 
architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards 
of justice . . . ."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 
Under our rules of criminal procedure, one of the nine 
categories of "automatic discovery" that the Commonwealth must 
provide to the defendant at or before the pretrial conference is 
"[a]ny facts of an exculpatory nature."14  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (iii), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005); E.B. 
Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 26:8 (4th ed. 2014).15  
Rule 14 also requires a prosecutor to disclose certain specific 
categories of potentially exculpatory evidence, including all 
statements made by the defendant, "all promises, rewards or 
inducements made to witnesses the party intends to present at 
trial," and "all statements made in the presence of or by an 
identifying witness that are relevant to the issue of identity 
or to the fairness or accuracy of the identification 
                     
14 At the pretrial conference, the prosecutor and defendant 
are to "consider such matters as will promote a fair . . . 
disposition of the case," including discovery.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 11 (a), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1509 (2004).  We 
emphasize that judges may choose to be active participants, 
where necessary, to ensure compliance with disclosure 
obligations. 
 
15 Rule 14 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure incorporates the constitutional disclosure 
requirements of Brady.  See Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, 
and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1429, 1481 (2011).  See also Reporter's Notes to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 14 (a), Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (Thomson Reuters 2018). 
56 
 
 
procedures."  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), (viii), 
(ix). 
We take this opportunity to reexamine our rules of criminal 
procedure to determine whether they should be modified to better 
facilitate the timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and 
refer the question of an amendment of rule 14 to the court's 
standing advisory committee on the rules of criminal procedure. 
 
Rule 14 broadly defines exculpatory evidence as "[a]ny 
facts of an exculpatory nature" (emphasis added).  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (iii).  See Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 
Mass. 704, 715–716 (2000) (impeachment evidence is exculpatory); 
Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 n.9 (1978) 
("'exculpatory' is not a technical term meaning alibi or other 
complete proof of innocence, but simply imports evidence which 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused . . . or, stated 
affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the defendant" 
[quotations omitted]).  While rule 14 envisions a broad 
disclosure requirement for exculpatory facts, the rule 
explicitly identifies only a few specific categories of 
potentially exculpatory information that a prosecutor must 
disclose.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), (viii), 
(ix) (Commonwealth must disclose defendant's statements, 
"promises, rewards or inducements" given to prosecution 
57 
 
 
witnesses, and statements made during and about identification 
procedures). 
 
To provide more detailed guidance to prosecutors, we ask 
the standing advisory committee to draft a proposed Brady 
checklist to clarify the definition of exculpatory evidence.  A 
practice indorsed by the American Bar Association,16 a Brady 
checklist establishes a more thorough baseline of the most 
likely sources and types of exculpatory information for 
prosecutors to consider.  Brady checklists have been added to 
the local rules in many Federal District Courts, in some 
instances in response to prosecutorial misconduct.  See 
generally Sullivan, Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally-
Required Disclosures:  A Proposed Rule, 2016 Cardozo L. Rev. de 
novo 138 (2016) (describing author's experience as trial judge 
in case where sitting United States Senator was convicted but 
Federal prosecutors concealed evidence favorable to defendant, 
and discussing local rules that incorporate requirements of 
Brady).  See also Rule 26.2 of the Local Rules of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida (eff. 
Nov. 24, 2015); Rule 88.10 of the Local Rules of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (rev. 
Dec. 1, 2017); Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure 
                     
16 See American Bar Association, Resolution (rev. 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/files/104A_Revised_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5T2D-2DCR]. 
58 
 
 
Obligations, 62 Hastings L.J. 1321, 1327-1328, 1346 (2011) 
(describing American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards 
governing "Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor," as well as 
indorsing use of Brady checklists). 
 
No checklist can exhaust all potential sources of 
exculpatory evidence.  It is crucial, therefore, that the 
proposed amendment to rule 14 make clear that the potential 
universe of exculpatory evidence includes, but is not limited 
to, the types of evidence included in the checklist.  See 
generally Jones, Here Comes the Judge:  A Model for Judicial 
Oversight and Regulation of the Brady Disclosure Duty, 46 
Hofstra L. Rev. 87, 113–114 (2018).  See also Sullivan, supra at 
148-149; Rule 116.2 of the Local Rules of the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts (eff. June 1, 
2018).  The committee should consider whether the categories 
used in the Federal District Courts would be useful, and also 
should consider whether any other categories would help 
facilitate the disclosure of Brady materials. 
 
We emphasize, in addition, that where a prosecutor is 
unsure whether exculpatory information should be disclosed, due 
to a concern regarding privilege or work product, or for any 
other reason, the prosecutor must file a motion for a protective 
order and must present the information for a judge to review in 
camera.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (6).  The judge will then 
59 
 
 
decide whether, and under what conditions, the information must 
be disclosed.  Id.  Absent a protective order, no prosecutor, 
whether in the office of the Attorney General or in the office 
of a district attorney, has the authority to decline to disclose 
exculpatory information. 
 
b.  Bridgeman II and Cotto orders.  The petitioners argue 
that the court should adopt standing orders based on the 
procedures formulated in Bridgeman II and Cotto.  A Bridgeman II 
order would require that a prosecutor who knew, or had reason to 
know, that misconduct had occurred in a particular case would 
have ninety days to notify the Chief Justice of the Trial Court 
and the Committee for Public Counsel Services and to provide 
them with a list of cases affected by the misconduct.  See 
Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 328.  The district attorneys then 
would have the burden of establishing, for any case that they 
did not agree to dismiss, that they had untainted evidence to 
support the conviction.  Id.  A Cotto order would require a 
government attorney who knows that attorney misconduct affected 
a criminal case to notify the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and the Office of Bar 
Counsel within thirty days.  See Cotto, 471 Mass. at 114.  The 
petitioners argue that, when misconduct occurs, a lawsuit should 
not be required in order to initiate these protocols.  The 
Attorney General agrees with the petitioners that the requested 
60 
 
 
standing orders should issue.  The district attorneys contend, 
however, that such standing orders do not take into 
consideration that the Bridgeman II protocol placed the burden 
on the district attorneys, in part out of necessity, because of 
the need to adjudicate 20,000 convictions.  The district 
attorneys note also that such standing orders would be 
repetitive of existing professional and ethical obligations for 
attorneys in the Commonwealth. 
 
In fashioning the remedy in Bridgeman II, we took into 
account the scope of the misconduct and the number of 
convictions implicated by the misconduct.  See Bridgeman II, 476 
Mass. at 317 ("where large numbers of persons have been wronged, 
the wrong must be remedied in a manner that is not only fair as 
a matter of justice, but also timely and practical").  While we 
do not "expect defendants to bear the burden of a systemic 
lapse," id., the balance of equities will not always favor a 
departure from the general principle that "relief from a 
conviction generally requires the defendant to file a motion for 
a new trial" (citation omitted).  See id. at 316.  If similar, 
widespread abuse does come to light in the future, the 
appropriate remedy must be complete, and it must correspond to 
the scope of the misconduct.  A court reviewing that misconduct 
in the first instance is best positioned to determine the remedy 
61 
 
 
appropriate to a particular case.  We therefore decline to adopt 
standing Bridgeman II and Cotto orders. 
 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported questions as follows: 
 
1.  The question is moot, as there are no remaining "third 
letter" defendants. 
 
 
2.  The class of "Farak defendants" includes all defendants 
who pleaded guilty to a drug charge, admitted to sufficient 
facts on a drug charge, or were found guilty of a drug charge, 
where (i) Farak signed the certificate of analysis; (ii) the 
conviction was based on methamphetamine and the drugs were 
tested during Farak's tenure at the Amherst lab; or (iii) the 
drugs were tested at the Amherst lab on or after January 1, 
2009, and through January 18, 2013, regardless of who signed the 
certificate of analysis. 
 
 
3.  Prophylactic measures are appropriate based on the 
record in this case.  We recommend that this court's standing 
advisory committee on the rules of criminal procedure propose 
amendments to Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to include a Brady checklist and any other 
modifications the committee believes would be beneficial, 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
The matter is remanded to the county court for entry of a 
declaratory judgment, as set forth in this opinion, vacating and 
dismissing the drug convictions of all "Farak defendants," as 
defined herein, and for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.