Title: Secrist v. Turley
Citation: 196 Kan. 572, 412 P.2d 976
Docket Number: 44,426
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1966

196 Kan. 572 (1966)
412 P.2d 976
LESTER SECRIST and NEVA SECRIST, Appellants,
v.
GEORGE W. TURLEY and JOE LEE, Appellees.
No. 44,426

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1966.
A.L. Shortridge, of Joplin, Missouri, argued the cause, and Paul Armstrong, of Columbus, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
John B. Towner, of Pittsburg, argued the cause, and H. Gordon Angwin, of Pittsburg, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in an action growing out of the alleged negligent operation of automobiles resulting in a collision and death.
The chief issue on appeal is whether there remained a genuine issue as to any material fact. With this issue in mind we state the facts which may be gleaned from the pleadings.
On June 21, 1964, at about 12:10 A.M., the defendant, George W. Turley, was driving a 1958 Ford automobile on Langdon Lane about four miles south of Pittsburg in Crawford County, Kansas. Langdon Lane, which was formerly U.S. Highway 69, is a blacktop *573 public highway and is straight and level for several miles from the point involved in this controversy.
The Ford automobile being driven by Turley was towing a 1955 Chevrolet which was equipped for drag racing. The Chevrolet was being steered by the defendant, Bob Berry. Joe Lee was riding as a passenger in the Ford.
At the time and place above mentioned, Gary Duane Secrist, while driving a Chevrolet Corvette in a southerly direction, overtook and collided with the Chevrolet from the rear. As a result of the collision, Patricia Elaine Hughes, a passenger in the Corvette, was thrown on to the east side of the highway and seriously injured. Some ten or fifteen minutes later while Gary, who had been administering to Patricia, was attempting to remove her from the highway or shield her with his body, a Dodge pick-up truck driven by Percy C. Montee toward the north, struck and killed them both.
The parents of Gary filed this action for damages as a result of his death. The petition specifically alleged:
The defendant, Montee, was charged with negligence in numerous particulars. The petition alleged a joint enterprise on the part of the defendants other than Montee. The petition further alleged:
The prayer was for statutory damages in the amount of $25,000 plus funeral expenses.
The defendants, other than Montee, filed separate answers in which they denied negligence; denied that the original collision caused serious injury to Patricia; denied negligence which was the proximate and direct cause of Gary's death; denied that they were engaged in a joint adventure, and alleged as a special defense:
*574 The record does not disclose an answer by the defendant, Montee, but it does appear that in answer to an interrogatory plaintiff admitted that:
The defendants, other than Montee, filed a motion for summary judgment based on the contention that the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The trial court entered summary judgment for defendants.
The plaintiffs have appealed.
The appellants contend that it was error to sustain the motion for summary judgment for the reason there existed a genuine disputed issue of fact as to the negligence of the defendants and whether such negligence concurred to cause the death of plaintiffs' son, Gary.
We are forced to agree with appellants' contention. Considering first the legal approach to the propriety of the summary judgment, we are forced to conclude that there remains a genuine issue as to material facts. A summary judgment may not be issued unless "... the pleadings, dispositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (K.S.A. 60-256 [c].)
This court has had occasion since K.S.A. 60-256 (c) went into effect to pass on the purpose and propriety of the use of motions for summary judgments.
In Herl v. State Bank of Parsons, 195 Kan. 35, 403 P.2d 110, we announced a few basic principles which should govern the use of motions for summary judgments. In Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 403 P.2d 964, the matter was quite thoroughly treated in a well written opinion. In the above cases the judgments granting the motions for summary judgment were reversed on the ground there remained a genuine issue as to a material fact. In Hartman v. Stumbo, 195 Kan. 634, 408 P.2d 693, and also in Board of Satanta v. Grant County Planning Board, 195 Kan. 640, 408 P.2d 655, we held that the record left no genuine issue as to a material fact and *575 that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. These cases would indicate that the propriety of a summary judgment must depend on the application of the clear provisions of the statute to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
The statement of certain general principles applicable to the specific issues in this case may aid in the future application of the statute. However, care will be taken to stay close to the provisions of the statute itself which are quite clear as to procedure and standards to be applied in passing on such motions. An attempt to apply and follow the multitude of cases considering the federal or similar state rules may cause a court to be governed more by aphorisms announced in the opinions than by the unambiguous provisions of the statute.
The purpose of the rule is to obviate delay where there is no real issue of fact. It should do much to eliminate nuisance litigation and save time and expense. However, a summary judgment should never be granted for the single purpose of saving the time and expense of a trial, or be used for the purpose of depriving litigants of a jury trial. The manifest purpose of the rule is to eliminate sham claims which might otherwise cause needless and time consuming litigation.
In the final analysis a court should not determine the factual issues on a motion for summary judgment but should search the record for the purpose of determining whether a factual issue exists. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a material fact a motion for summary judgment will not lie. No matter how the explanation of the rule is phrased we always return to the language of the rule, there must be left "no genuine issue of any material fact."
The proper application of the rule leaves but two rather simple questions for determination, i.e., what is a "genuine issue" and what is a "material fact?" The answer as to what constitutes a "genuine issue as to any material fact" appears to account for most of the voluminous opinions on the question.
It may be said that an issue of fact is not genuine unless it has legal controlling force as to a controlling issue. A feigned or imaginary issue is not a genuine issue. A disputed question of fact which is immaterial to the issues does not preclude summary judgment. If the disputed fact, however resolved, could not affect the judgment, it does not present a genuine issue of a material fact. *576 It has been said that before summary judgment is granted the court must be convinced that the issue is not genuine, or that there are only immaterial or imaginary factual issues.
It would serve no useful purpose to cite the numerous cases touching on the rules above set forth as pronounced by the federal courts and the courts of our sister states, many of which are not in harmony. Those wishing to research the question further than the Kansas cases cited will find the above rules announced and supported by a collection of cases in 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Summary Judgments, § 1231, et seq., and 3 Vernons Kansas Statutes Annotated, § 60-256.
Considering the facts in the instant case to which the rules announced above are to be applied, we find that definite factual issues were framed by the pleadings, i.e., were the appellees guilty of negligence; was the negligence of appellees the proximate cause of the death of appellants' son, Gary, and was the deceased son guilty of contributory negligence? After the issues were formed by the pleadings the parties started discovery proceedings which resulted in affidavits, answers to interrogatories and a deposition.
Ignoring the discovery evidence in favor of the appellees' position, strong though it may be, we find an affidavit by Don Munsell supporting appellants' contentions, which reads:
We have not ignored but find no merit in the attack which appellees make on the affidavit.
We must conclude that the affidavit, although disputed by appellees, presents a genuine issue of a material fact on the question of negligence of the appellees and the contributory negligence of the deceased.
*577 In support of their contention that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law appellees call our attention to the rule announced in Wright v. Nat'l Mutual Cas. Co., 155 Kan. 728, 129 P.2d 271, as follows:
The above rule, like most others, has its exceptions which are governed by a question of fact. A traveler on the highway at night cannot lay a trap for a fellow traveler and escape liability. In Briles v. Hurley, 194 Kan. 414, 399 P.2d 840, we held:
In the opinion we stated at page 417:
Again in Grisamore, Administratrix v. Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Rly Co., 195 Kan. 16, 403 P.2d 93, it was held:
Appellees suggest:
The same contention was made and answered in Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 403 P.2d 964, where it was held:
Appellants may have assumed a heavy burden in undertaking to establish the allegations of their petition, but they have a right to attempt to carry it.
The appellees stress their contention that their negligence, if any, was too remote to constitute the proximate cause of the death. They suggest that where a negligent act creates a condition which is subsequently acted upon by another unforseeable, independent and distinct agency to produce the injury, the original act is the remote and not the proximate cause of the injury, even though the injury would not have occurred except for the original act.
We have no quarrel with appellees' statement of the law. However, we cannot agree with their assumption that there is no genuine issue of substantial facts on the question in this case. The only facts we have as to the extent of injury to Patricia Hughes, necessitating her remaining on the highway, is a deposition of Lida May White, a nurses aid in St. John's Hospital at Joplin, Missouri, and who arrived at the scene about two minutes after the accident. She testified:
We cannot determine at this point whether it was necessary to leave Patricia on the highway for treatment because of appellees' negligence.
As to the negligence of Montee, the nurses aid testified:
..............
Considering the facts which we have before us in the light most favorable to appellants, as we are bound to do, we cannot say as a matter of law that a reasonable person would not have anticipated that as the result of appellees' negligence which placed Patricia upon the traveled part of the highway where she was being administered to by Gary, that the driver of another vehicle on the highway traveling at a high and reckless rate of speed, without a proper lookout and without proper control, would strike and kill the two children.
In Gard v. Sherwood Construction Co., 194 Kan. 541, 400 P.2d 995, we held:
In 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Summary Judgment, § 1232.1, dealing with the feasibility of summary judgments in negligence cases we find the following statement:
*580 The authors go on to state, and we do not mean to imply otherwise, that there are circumstances in which summary judgment may be rendered in a negligence case.
As the record indicates in this case that there remains a genuine issue as to a material fact, the summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a trial of the factual issues.
It is so ordered.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.