Title: C. Porter Vaughan, Inc. v. DiLorenzo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090110
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

Present:  All the Justices 
 
C. PORTER VAUGHAN, INC., REALTORS 
 
v.  Record No. 090110  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
February 25, 2010 
MOST REVEREND FRANCIS X. DILORENZO,  
BISHOP OF THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF RICHMOND 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Beverly W. Snukals, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from the dismissal of an action for real 
estate brokerage commissions, we consider whether the trial 
court erred when it sustained a demurrer of the defendant, the 
Most Reverend Francis X. DiLorenzo (“Bishop DiLorenzo”), to the 
amended complaint of C. Porter Vaughan, Inc., Realtors 
(“Vaughan”) on the grounds that its claim for a breach of an 
oral agreement was barred by the statute of frauds. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Vaughan filed a complaint against Bishop DiLorenzo, the 
Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Richmond, alleging that 
Bishop DiLorenzo had “employed” Vaughan, through its agent 
Marie Beitz (“Beitz”), to act as the real estate broker in the 
offering for sale of several properties located on North Laurel 
Street and South Cathedral Place in the City of Richmond (“the 
Chancery Buildings”).  The complaint further alleged that 
Vaughan marketed the property to several potential purchasers, 
including Virginia Commonwealth University (“VCU”), the 
ultimate purchaser of the property.  As a result of these 
marketing efforts, Vaughan alleged that it was owed a real 
estate commission in the amount of $242,400 for its services 
rendered in procuring a purchaser for the Chancery Buildings. 
 
Bishop DiLorenzo filed a demurrer to Vaughan’s complaint 
in which he argued that the complaint failed to satisfy the 
requirements of Code § 11-2(7), namely because the complaint 
“fail[ed] to allege a writing which complie[d] with the statute 
of frauds and as such any alleged contract is unenforceable.”  
The trial court sustained Bishop DiLorenzo’s demurrer and 
granted Vaughan leave to amend its complaint. 
 
In its amended complaint, Vaughan repeated its assertion 
that it marketed the Chancery Buildings to several potential 
buyers, including VCU, on behalf of Bishop DiLorenzo.  
Additionally, Vaughan alleged that Bishop DiLorenzo “entered 
into an oral agreement” for Vaughan to act as the real estate 
broker in the offering for sale of the Chancery Buildings. 
 
As evidence of the purported oral agreement between the 
parties, Vaughan referred to several writings.  The first was a 
November 28, 2006 letter to Beitz from the director of real 
estate and insurance services for VCU (“the VCU Letter”).  The 
VCU Letter requested Beitz’s “client’s permission to allow VCU 
to order one or more appraisals of the” Chancery Buildings.  On 
a signature line labeled “APPROVED,” Monsignor Thomas F. Shreve 
 
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(“Shreve”) signed the VCU Letter.  In its amended complaint, 
Vaughan refers to Shreve as “Vicar General of the defendant.” 
 
A second writing, dated March 2, 2007, was a letter from 
Bishop DiLorenzo to Beitz in which he thanked her for 
“forwarding the contract from David Solodar to purchase the 
Chancery buildings.”  Bishop DiLorenzo informed Beitz that he 
was “unable to accept [Solodar’s] offer at the current bid.”  
The letter informed Beitz that the Chancery Buildings would be 
“off the market for 14 days from today’s date” so the Cathedral 
of the Sacred Heart could pursue its option to buy the Chancery 
Buildings.  Bishop DiLorenzo then noted that after consultation 
with his staff and attorney, he was “establishing the sale 
price of the Chancery Buildings at $5,600,000.00.”  Bishop 
DiLorenzo signed this letter. 
 
The third writing consisted of a purchase agreement for 
the Chancery Buildings (“the Solodar Agreement”) between Bishop 
DiLorenzo and David Solodar (“Solodar”).  The Solodar Agreement 
identified Bishop DiLorenzo as the seller, and Solodar as the 
buyer, of the Chancery Buildings, which were identified in the 
Basic Terms and Definitions section of the agreement.  The 
writing provided for a purchase price of “approximately Five 
Million Dollars” and set forth the terms of purchase. 
 
The Solodar Agreement also contained a paragraph entitled 
“BROKERAGE COMMISSION,” which stated, in pertinent part, 
 
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[i]t is understood that the Seller has engaged 
Marie Beitz of C. Porter Vaughan to represent 
[Bishop DiLorenzo] in the transaction.  Seller 
shall, so long as Closing occurs, be responsible 
for the commission in the amount of four percent 
(4%).  Other than Marie Beitz, neither party has 
engaged the services of a real estate broker or 
agent in negotiation or consummating the Closing 
of the conveyance of the [Chancery 
Buildings]. . . . This paragraph shall survive 
the Closing or termination of this Agreement. 
 
Bishop DiLorenzo signed the Solodar Agreement on March 8, 2007. 
 
The fourth writing Vaughan introduced was a letter, dated 
August 6, 2007, from Bishop DiLorenzo to Beitz.  The letter 
read, 
Dear Marie: 
 
Thank you for your letter of July 23, 2007 
regarding the withdrawal of the offer to 
purchase the property on Cathedral Place and 
Laurel Street. 
 
Certainly we both regret that the sale did not 
go through.  These things happen, and I just 
want you to know that I appreciate all you did 
on our behalf. 
 
With gratitude and every best wish, I remain, 
 
Sincerely yours in Our Lord, 
 
Most Rev. Francis X. DiLorenzo 
 
The letter bore the signature “Francis X. DiLorenzo.” 
 
Vaughan’s amended complaint alleged that after the Solodar 
Agreement was terminated, Bishop DiLorenzo entered into 
negotiations with the VCU Real Estate Foundation without 
Vaughan’s knowledge, and he sold the Chancery Buildings by deed 
 
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dated December 14, 2007 to the VCU Real Estate Foundation for 
$4,040,000.  Despite Vaughan’s assistance in marketing the 
Chancery Buildings to the VCU Real Estate Foundation, Bishop 
DiLorenzo refused to pay the real estate commission to which 
Vaughan claims it is entitled.  The amended complaint alleged 
that Bishop DiLorenzo owed Vaughan $242,400. 
 
In response to Vaughan’s amended complaint, Bishop 
DiLorenzo filed a demurrer, in which he contended that Vaughan 
failed to plead either “a written []or oral agreement for the 
sale of real estate which sets out the necessary terms to 
include parties, duration and compensation.”  While Bishop 
DiLorenzo conceded that the “documents attached to the Amended 
Complaint evidence the existence of an oral contract for the 
sale of real estate,” he argued that “[n]one of those 
documents, however, read together, constitute a writing 
required by Virginia Code § 11-2(7).” 
 
The trial court sustained Bishop DiLorenzo’s demurrer and 
ordered Vaughan’s amended complaint dismissed with prejudice.  
In its accompanying letter opinion, the trial court found that 
“the only writing signed by the defendant which ostensibly 
relates to the ultimate sale of the property is an August 6, 
2007 letter from Defendant to Marie Beitz, Plaintiff’s agent.”  
The trial court held that the contents of that letter were “not 
sufficient to prove that Defendant intended for Beitz to 
 
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receive a commission for her assistance in the sale of his 
property,” and the statements in the letter “cannot be 
considered the essential terms of the contract.”  Regarding the 
Solodar Agreement, the trial court held that its brokerage 
commission clause “cannot be imputed to the sale” of the 
Chancery Buildings to VCU. 
 
Vaughan timely filed his notice of appeal and we granted 
an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The trial court erred in finding that there were not 
writings between the parties sufficient to overcome the 
requirements of Va. Code § 11-2, commonly referred to as 
the Statute of Frauds.  Such a finding is contrary to the 
intent and requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred in finding that exhibit 5 attached to 
the amended complaint was the “only writing signed by the 
defendant which ostensibly relates to the ultimate purchase 
of the property.” 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standard of Review 
“A demurrer admits the truth of the facts 
contained in the pleading to which it is 
addressed, as well as any facts that may be 
reasonably and fairly implied and inferred from 
those allegations.  A demurrer does not, 
however, admit the correctness of the pleader’s 
conclusions of law.”  Yuzefovsky v. St. John’s 
Wood Apts., 261 Va. 97, 102, 540 S.E.2d 134, 
136-37 (2001) (internal citation omitted).  
Accordingly, we will consider the facts stated, 
and those reasonably and fairly implied and 
inferred, in the [complaint] in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, but we will review 
the sufficiency of the legal conclusions 
ascribed to those facts de novo. 
 
 
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Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 317-18, 626 S.E.2d 
428, 429 (2006), aff’d on reh’g, 273 Va. 269, 270, 641 S.E.2d 
68, 68 (2007).  
B. 
Statute of Frauds 
 
Code § 11-2(7) provides, in pertinent part: 
Unless a promise, contract, agreement . . . or 
some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing 
and signed by the party to be charged or his 
agent, no action shall be brought . . . [u]pon 
any agreement or contract for services to be 
performed in the sale of real estate by a party 
defined in § 54.1-2000 or § 54.1-2101. 
 
Code § 11-2 closes by stating, “[t]he consideration need not be 
set forth or expressed in the writing, and it may be proved 
(where a consideration is necessary) by other evidence.” 
“The purposes of Code § 11-2 are to provide reliable 
evidence of the existence and terms of certain types of 
contracts and to reduce the likelihood that contracts within 
the scope of this statute can be created or altered by acts of 
perjury or fraud.”  Lindsay v. McEnearney Assocs., Inc., 260 
Va. 48, 53, 531 S.E.2d 573, 575 (2000).  Code § 11-2(7) “was 
intended to protect the public from unscrupulous real estate 
agents and brokers.”  H-B Ltd. P’ship v. Wimmer, 220 Va. 176, 
179, 257 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1979). 
 
The issue in this case is whether the writings signed by 
Bishop DiLorenzo or his agent were sufficient evidence of a 
real estate brokerage agreement between Bishop DiLorenzo and 
 
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Vaughan to remove the bar of the statute of frauds.  We hold 
that they were. 
The statute [of frauds] is procedural or remedial 
in nature, and is concerned, not with the validity 
of the contract, but with its enforceability. 
 
The object of the statute of frauds is to prevent 
frauds and perjuries, and not to perpetrate them, 
so that the statute is not enforced when to do so 
would cause a fraud and a wrong to be perpetrated. 
 
T . . . v. T . . ., 216 Va. 867, 871, 224 S.E.2d 148, 151 
(1976) (citations omitted). 
 
In Drake v. Livesay, 231 Va. 117, 341 S.E.2d 186 (1986), 
we reversed the trial court’s decision to sustain the 
defendant’s demurrer, holding that a letter sent by the seller 
of real property, in which he apologized for having sold the 
property to a higher bidder, “was a memorandum of an oral 
contract . . . sufficient to support a breach-of-contract 
action between” the seller and the spurned buyer.  Id. at 121, 
341 S.E.2d at 188.  In Drake, we held, 
the statute [of frauds] does not require that 
contracts within its purview be written.  It 
merely interposes a bar to the enforcement of 
certain oral contracts, which bar may be removed 
by proof of a sufficient written memorandum of 
the transaction.  When the bar is removed, it is 
the oral contract which is subject to 
enforcement, not the memorandum.  Because the 
memorandum serves only to remove a bar to the 
enforcement of the oral contract, the validity 
of the oral contract may be established by other 
evidence. 
 
Id. at 120, 341 S.E.2d at 188 (emphasis added). 
 
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The present case contemplates the application of the 
statute of frauds not to an oral contract for the sale of real 
property, but to an oral real estate brokerage agreement.  “A 
real estate listing agreement is defined as a contract ‘between 
an owner of real property and a real estate agent, whereby the 
agent agrees to secure a buyer or tenant for specific property 
at a certain price and terms in return for a fee or 
commission.’ ”  Murphy v. Nolte & Co., Inc., 226 Va. 76, 81, 
307 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1983) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 840 
(5th ed. 1979)).  “The [statute of frauds] does not require 
that the whole contract be in writing to be enforced when . . . 
the memorandum relied on contains the essential terms of the 
agreement.”  Id. at 82, 307 S.E.2d at 245 (citing Reynolds v. 
Dixon, 187 Va. 101, 106, 46 S.E.2d 6, 8 (1948)). 
 
In Murphy, a real estate broker sought his proportionate 
share of a sales commission based on an oral listing agreement.  
Id. at 78, 307 S.E.2d at 243.  The only written evidence of the 
oral agreement introduced at trial was the sales contract, 
negotiated directly between the sellers and purchasers, for the 
subject property.  Id. at 79-80, 307 S.E.2d at 244.  After 
reviewing the contract, we determined that “[m]anifestly” there 
was “sufficient written evidence, signed by the sellers, 
authorizing [the broker] to act as their agent to secure a 
 
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buyer for the property at a specific price in return for a 
commission.”  Id. at 81, 307 S.E.2d at 245. 
Murphy noted that the written sales agreement before the 
trial court “identifie[d] the parties to that agreement, . . . 
acknowledge[d] the participation of [the broker], identifie[d] 
the property, state[d] a firm price as well as the terms of 
sale, and provide[d] that a commission [would] be paid to the 
brokers.”  Id. at 81-82, 307 S.E.2d at 245.  Accordingly, the 
trial court affirmed the jury’s award of a verdict in favor of 
the broker for his sales commission.  Id. at 78, 83, 307 S.E.2d 
at 243, 246. 
 
Here, as in Murphy, there was a contract for the sale of 
real property – the Solodar Agreement – that “contains the 
essential terms of the [brokerage] agreement.”  Id. at 82, 307 
S.E.2d at 245.  This writing alone is sufficient written 
evidence of an oral agreement between Vaughan and Bishop 
DiLorenzo to remove the bar of the statute of frauds.  The 
Solodar Agreement identified Bishop DiLorenzo and Solodar as 
the parties to the sale, acknowledged Beitz as Bishop 
DiLorenzo’s representative in the transaction, identified the 
Chancery Buildings as the properties to be sold, stated an 
approximate purchase price, identified the terms of sale, and 
provided that a commission would be paid to Vaughan. 
 
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In his demurrer to Vaughan’s amended complaint, Bishop 
DiLorenzo contends that Vaughan failed to “set[] out the 
necessary terms to include parties, duration and compensation.”  
Compensation is not required by the plain language of Code 
§ 11-2, the last paragraph of which expressly eliminates 
consideration as an element of the agreement required in the 
writing.  And as our analysis in Murphy articulates, no written 
durational language is required in order to remove the bar of 
the statute of frauds from a real estate brokerage agreement.  
It bears repeating that the “statute [of frauds] is concerned, 
not with the validity of the contract, but with its 
enforceability.”  T . . . v. T . . ., 216 Va. at 871, 224 
S.E.2d at 151. 
The present case is distinguishable from Murphy because 
here the Solodar Agreement was not consummated.  However, the 
terminated Solodar Agreement is not the contract Vaughan seeks 
to enforce. 
When the bar [of the statute of frauds] is 
removed, it is the oral contract which is 
subject to enforcement, not the memorandum.  
Because the memorandum serves only to remove a 
bar to the enforcement of the oral contract, the 
validity of the oral contract may be established 
by other evidence. 
 
Drake, 231 Va. at 120, 341 S.E.2d at 188.  Just as 
the sales contract in Murphy contained “references 
. . . sufficient to remove the oral [real estate 
 
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brokerage] agreement from the operation of the 
statute of frauds,” 226 Va. at 82, 307 S.E.2d at 245, 
we hold that the Solodar Agreement, by itself, is 
sufficient to overcome a plea of the statute of 
frauds in this case. 
In addition to the Solodar Agreement, Vaughan introduced 
additional writings that bolster its argument that the statute 
of frauds should not operate to bar its claim.  The VCU Letter 
was signed by Shreve, identified in Vaughan’s amended complaint 
as “Vicar General of the defendant.”  By authorizing that 
request, Shreve ratified VCU’s reference to Bishop DiLorenzo as 
Vaughan’s “client.”  Additionally, while not sufficient 
standing alone, the March 2, 2007 and August 6, 2007 letters 
from Bishop DiLorenzo to Beitz further support Vaughan’s claim 
of a contract between the parties.  We have long held that 
multiple writings may be used to defeat a plea of the statute 
of frauds.  See Jordan & Davis v. Mahoney, 109 Va. 133, 136, 63 
S.E. 467, 468 (1909).  Taken together, in this case 
“[m]anifestly” there was “some memorandum . . . in writing and 
signed by the party to be charged or his agent,” Code § 11-2, 
“sufficient to remove the oral agreement from the operation of 
the statute of frauds.”  Murphy, 226 Va. at 81, 82, 307 S.E.2d 
at 245.  
 
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As we held in Murphy, “while the whole services agreement 
is not memorialized by the writing, nevertheless, the 
references in the sales contract are sufficient to remove the 
oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds.”  
Id. at 82, 307 S.E.2d at 245.  The same principles of law hold 
true here.  Of course, Vaughan will bear the burden of proof 
concerning the oral agreement at trial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the trial court erred when it sustained 
Bishop DiLorenzo’s demurrer.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a trial on 
the merits. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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