Title: Polston v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971536
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1998

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SHERRI ANN POLSTON, s/k/a 
SHERRI ANNE POLSTON 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 971536 
April 17, 1998 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Sherri Ann Polston entered a conditional plea of guilty 
to the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.  Pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-254, she reserved her right to appeal that portion of 
the Chesterfield Circuit Court’s judgment denying her motion 
to suppress the marijuana which she claims was the fruit of an 
unlawful search.  The trial court accepted her guilty plea and 
fixed her punishment at 10 years’ imprisonment, which was 
suspended subject to certain conditions.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, Polston v. 
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 738, 485 S.E.2d 632 (1997), and we 
awarded the defendant an appeal. 
 
The following facts are relevant to our disposition of 
this appeal.  Stuart G. Powell, a Chesterfield County 
detective, along with an unidentified informant, appeared 
before a magistrate on January 6, 1995.  Detective Powell 
submitted an affidavit to the magistrate which stated in 
relevant part: 
“On this date 1-6-95, a citizen appeared before the 
magistrate of the Twelth [sic] Judicial District 
Court and stated the following facts under oath and 
the penalty of purgery [sic].  This citizen stated 
that within the past 72 hours he/she observed a 
quantity of marijuana being stored and being offered 
for sale at the apartment mentioned in section two 
of this document. 
 
* * * 
 
“I was advised of the facts set forth in this 
affidavit, in whole or in part, by an informer.  
This informer’s credibility or the reliability of 
the information may be determined from the following 
facts: 
 
“The citizen mention[ed] in section 4 of this 
document made these statements while under oath and 
after being advised of the penalty of purgery [sic] 
by your affiant.  Your affiant has been a police 
officer for over six years and is currently employed 
in the Vice and Narcotics Unit of the Chesterfield 
County Police Department.  Your affiant has made 
several drug arrests and is familiar with the drug 
culture in and around Chesterfield County.  The 
citizen has decided to remain anonymous for fear of 
retaliation.”  
 
 
The magistrate questioned the informant under oath, and 
the informant stated that he was familiar with the local drug 
culture and that he had used marijuana at least once per week 
for a number of years.  The magistrate or Detective Powell 
added the following sentence to the affidavit:  “This citizen 
is a self-admitted drug user and is familiar with the drug 
culture in and around Chestserfield [sic] County.” 
 
The magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of 
the defendant’s apartment.  When Detective Powell, along with 
 
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Chesterfield County police officers, conducted the search, the 
defendant directed them to a dresser in her bedroom which 
contained approximately one pound of marijuana.  The officers 
also found a “bong” in the defendant’s apartment, and the 
defendant told the officers that she sold marijuana. 
 
The defendant argues that the magistrate did not have a 
substantial basis to find probable cause necessary for the 
issuance of the search warrant.  The defendant observes that 
the “citizen” referred to in the affidavit was actually an 
individual who had been arrested by police officers earlier on 
the day that the search warrant was issued.  Continuing, the 
defendant says that Detective Powell “conceded that he had 
made no effort of any kind to investigate or verify either the 
informant’s credibility or the reliability of the information” 
contained in the affidavit.  Responding, the Commonwealth 
asserts that the magistrate did have a substantial basis for 
finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 
warrant and that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant 
was also admissible on another basis, the good faith exception 
to the warrant requirement established in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that 
“suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should 
be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those 
 
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unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of 
the exclusionary rule.”  468 U.S. at 918; see also 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 (1984).  The 
Supreme Court also stated that “the exclusionary rule is 
designed to deter police misconduct . . . .”  Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 916.  This deterrent is not present when a police officer, 
acting in objective good faith, obtains a search warrant from 
a magistrate and conducts a search within the scope of the 
warrant.  Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 422, 410 S.E.2d 
662, 667 (1991).  We have embraced and applied the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Id. at 422-23, 410 S.E.2d 
at 667; McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 232, 321 S.E.2d 
637, 644 (1984). 
 
The Supreme Court stated the following test which we must 
apply to determine whether suppression of evidence is an 
appropriate remedy: 
 
“Suppression therefore remains an appropriate 
remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a 
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit 
that the affiant knew was false or would have known 
was false except for his reckless disregard of the 
truth. . . .  The exception we recognize today will 
also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate 
wholly abandoned his judicial role. . . .  [I]n such 
circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer 
should rely on the warrant.  Nor would an officer 
manifest objective good faith in relying on a 
warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause as to render official belief in 
its existence entirely unreasonable’ . . . .  
Finally, depending on the circumstances of the 
 
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particular case, a warrant may be so facially 
deficient -- i.e., in failing to particularize the 
place to be searched or the things to be seized -- 
that the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 
(citations omitted).   
 
 
We hold that, regardless of the actual validity of the 
search warrant, the evidence seized during the search of the 
defendant’s apartment is admissible because of the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  The evils identified in 
the Leon test are simply not present here.  When the police 
officers conducted the search of the defendant’s apartment, 
they acted in good faith, reasonably, and under the authority 
of an apparently valid search warrant.  The magistrate was not 
misled by any information in the affidavit, and he did not 
abandon his judicial role.  Rather, acting in his judicial 
role, the magistrate questioned the informant about the 
informant’s knowledge of drug activity in Chesterfield County.  
Additionally, the warrant is not so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable, and the warrant is not facially 
deficient.   
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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