Title: State v. Darrin D. Burns
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003615-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3615-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Darrin D. Burns,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  217 Wis. 2d 289, 577 N.W.2d 386 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 22, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 25, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca 
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Hoffmann 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (Opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Glenn L. Cushing, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3615-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Darrin D. Burns,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. Burns, No. 96-3615-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
February 5, 1998), affirming the judgment of conviction and the 
order of the Circuit Court for Waupaca County, John P. Hoffmann, 
Jr., Judge, denying the post-conviction motion of the defendant 
Darrin D. Burns for relief from the judgment. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 972.13(1) 
(1993-94)
1 requires that a defendant expressly and personally 
articulate a plea of guilty or no contest on the record in open 
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.13(1)(1993-94) provides: "A judgment 
of conviction shall be entered upon a verdict of guilty by the 
jury, a finding of guilty by the court in cases where a jury is 
waived, or a plea of guilty or no contest." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1993-94 text unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
2 
court in order for a judgment of conviction to be entered on the 
plea.  The record in this case is clear that the defendant was 
never directly asked in open court "How do you plead?" to the 
charged offense and that he never stated his plea to the charged 
offense on the record. 
¶3 
We affirm the judgment of conviction in this case, 
even though the defendant did not expressly and personally 
articulate a plea of no contest on the record in open court, 
because the only inference possible from the totality of the 
facts and circumstances in the record is that the defendant 
intended to plead no contest.  Indeed in this case the defendant 
acknowledges, as he must, that the record amply and clearly 
demonstrates that he intended to enter a plea of no contest when 
he came to court on January 16, 1996.
2  Defendant's brief at 6. 
¶4 
Despite our decision in this case, this court has deep 
and continuing concerns about affirming a conviction based on a 
plea of guilty or no contest when the defendant has not 
expressly and personally articulated the plea on the record in 
open court. Pleading guilty or no contest is a serious event, a 
"serious and sobering occasion."
3  By entering such pleas, 
defendants relieve the state of the heavy burden of proving 
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  They also give up 
                     
2 The defendant does not contest his understanding of the 
proceedings and accordingly has not filed a motion to withdraw 
his plea in this case.  His position instead is that he never 
entered a plea.  
3 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, 
J., concurring).  
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
3 
important constitutional rights and expose themselves to 
conviction and incarceration.  A defendant expressly and 
personally pleading guilty or no contest on the record in open 
court is the best way for a circuit court to assure itself that 
the defendant has personally made the decision to so plead. 
¶5 
Circuit courts have many obligations during a plea 
hearing to ensure that statutory and constitutional requirements 
are met and that justice is done.  We recognize that circuit 
courts are at the same time under tremendous pressure to handle 
ever-increasing 
caseloads 
and 
to 
manage 
the 
caseloads 
efficiently.  The circuit courts may therefore feel compelled to 
usher defendants through the court process as quickly as 
possible.  Despite the time pressures, however, no circuit court 
can invite or condone a less than adequate plea hearing in the 
name of expediency. 
¶6 
Recognizing the circuit courts' responsibility to do 
justice and to manage caseloads efficiently, this court urges 
circuit courts to follow the usual and strongly preferred 
practice of asking defendants directly and personally in open 
court and on the record how they plead to the charged offenses 
and of entering the pleas on the record.
4  In that way, justice 
                     
4 SM-32, Wis. JI Criminal (Rel. No. 33-6/95) sets forth the 
questions a circuit court should ask in accepting a plea of 
guilty.  One such question is "How do you plead?"  Although we 
have admonished circuit courts "to give substantial heed to the 
explicit directions contained [in SM-32] when accepting a plea 
of guilty or no contest," we have not required circuit courts to 
follow SM-32.  State v. Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d 467, 484 n.3, 334 
N.W.2d 91 (1983); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 270-71, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
4 
is administered by circuit courts and appeals that might 
otherwise result are averted. 
 
I 
 
¶7 
The facts necessary to this review are undisputed.  On 
October 16, 1995, the defendant was charged with homicide by 
operation of a vehicle contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) and 
(1)(b).  On November 7, 1995, the defendant pled not guilty to 
these charges. 
¶8 
On January 16, 1996, in open court and in the presence 
of the defendant, defense counsel informed the circuit court 
that with respect to the charge of homicide by operation of a 
vehicle while having a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration, 
the defendant was prepared to change his plea from not guilty to 
no contest. 
¶9 
The 
defendant 
completed 
and 
signed 
a 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form on the morning of the 
hearing, and the form was filed with the circuit court.  The 
completed plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form states, 
among other matters, the following: I, the defendant, "wish to 
enter a plea of no contest" to the charge; "I understand that I 
am giving up the following [enumerated] rights by this plea"; I 
"understand that I can be found guilty by the Judge if my plea 
is accepted"; "I have "discuss[ed} this case with my lawyer"; "I 
have read or had read to me this questionnaire, understand it, 
and [have] answered all questions truthfully"; and "I am making 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
5 
this decision to enter this plea of my own free will."  Defense 
counsel also signed the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights 
form, checking the box stating that counsel has read the 
questionnaire to the client and believes that the "client does 
in fact understand this questionnaire and is entering this plea 
of his own free will." 
¶10 Although the written plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form contains language indicating that a defendant is 
pleading no contest by signing the form, the totality of the 
form reflects the signatory's intention to enter a plea of no 
contest in the future and an understanding of the consequences 
of the future plea should it be accepted and entered by the 
court.  The intention at the signing of the form to enter a plea 
in the future is not the same as stating in the present tense "I 
plead no contest." 
¶11 The circuit court engaged in an on-the-record colloquy 
with the defendant to establish that the defendant understood 
the written plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form; that 
the defendant was entering the plea voluntarily; that the 
defendant was aware of the potential penalties; and that the 
defendant understood that by entering a plea he would waive 
important constitutional rights. 
¶12 The colloquy on January 16, 1996, was as follows: 
 
MR. JOHNSON [defense counsel]:  . . . My client 
is prepared today to change his plea to Count 2 of the 
information to that of no contest, and we anticipate 
that subsequent to that, to the acceptance of that 
plea that Count 1 would be dismissed. 
 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
6 
THE COURT:  Will there be a request for a pre-
sentence? 
 
Mr. JOHNSON:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
Mr. SNIDER [prosecuting attorney]:  Yes, your 
Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you have a plea questionnaire? 
 
MR. JOHNSON:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Burns, you completed the plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form today? 
 
MR. BURNS:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  And did you understand that form? 
 
MR. BURNS:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  Have you had enough time to discuss 
this matter with Attorney Johnson? 
 
Mr. BURNS:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
. . . .  
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand the various rights, 
including constitutional rights, that are set forth in 
the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form? 
 
MR. BURNS:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand that you are giving 
up those rights by entry of your plea? 
 
Mr. BURNS:  Yes, sir. 
 
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand you would give up a 
constitutional 
right 
to 
trial 
by 
jury, 
a 
constitutional right to confront or to face your 
accusers, a constitutional right not to incriminate 
yourself, which means that you have a right to remain 
silent, and a right to present evidence on your own 
behalf and to require witnesses to come to court and 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
7 
testify on your behalf?  Do you understand those 
rights that you are giving up? 
 
 
MR. BURNS:  Yes, sir. 
 
. . . .  
 
THE COURT:  Do you have any questions that you 
wish 
to 
ask 
the 
court 
in regard to 
the 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form? 
 
MR. BURNS:  No, sir. 
 
THE 
COURT: 
 
Have 
you 
had 
enough 
time 
to 
thoroughly discuss this case and the effects of your 
plea to this offense with Attorney Johnson? 
 
MR. BURNS:  Yes. 
 
. . . .  
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Johnson, have you had enough time 
to thoroughly discuss this case and the effects of the 
plea with your client? 
 
 
MR. JOHNSON:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
 
THE COURT:  Do you believe that his plea is being 
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently? 
 
MR. JOHNSON:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you believe he understands the 
nature of the charges against him, the effect of his 
plea, and the elements of the crime? 
 
MR. JOHNSON:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
. . . .  
 
THE COURT:  The court will find that the 
defendant's 
plea 
to 
Count 
2 
is 
being 
entered 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  I believe 
the defendant has had sufficient time to confer with 
his attorney.  I believe the defendant understands the 
nature of the charge against him, the effect of his 
plea, and the elements of the crime. . . . I will 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
8 
accept the defendant's plea and find the defendant 
guilty of Count 2 . . . . 
 
¶13 The circuit court never mentioned in this plea 
colloquy that the proposed plea was a plea of no contest and 
never asked the defendant for his plea.  At no time did the 
circuit court ask the defendant how he pleads to the charge, 
whether his plea to the charge is no contest, or whether his 
attorney's statement that the defendant "is prepared today to 
change his plea" of not guilty to that of no contest is correct. 
 It is beyond dispute that neither the defendant nor the defense 
counsel nor the circuit court ever said on the record that the 
defendant was in fact then and there pleading no contest to the 
charged offense.  Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the 
defendant did not expressly and personally plead to the charged 
offense on the record in open court. 
¶14 It is clear, however, from the record in this case, 
that is, from the written plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form and the plea colloquy, that the defendant intended 
to plead no contest to the charged offense.  The circuit court 
accepted what the defendant, his counsel and the circuit court 
assumed was the defendant's plea of no contest, dismissed one of 
the charges,
5 and set the matter over for sentencing.  On April 
24, 1996, the circuit court sentenced the defendant to an 
indeterminate prison term not to exceed ten years. 
                     
5 The charge under Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) was dismissed 
by the circuit court.  
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
9 
¶15 On October 10, 1996, the defendant filed a motion to 
vacate the judgment of conviction of homicide by operation of a 
vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration on the ground 
that he was never directly asked at the plea hearing whether he 
wished to enter a plea and he never stated his plea to the 
charged offense on the record in open court.  The defendant 
argues that because he did not expressly and personally state on 
the record that he was pleading no contest, no valid judgment of 
conviction could be entered.  The defendant rests his argument 
on Wis. Stat. § 972.13(1), which provides that a judgment of 
conviction shall be entered upon a plea of guilty or no contest. 
¶16 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
defendant's 
post-
conviction motion.  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of conviction and the order of the circuit court.  The 
court of appeals declared that a valid plea under Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.13(1) does not require "a specific utterance such as 'I 
plead no contest.'"
6 
                     
6 The court of appeals relied on State v. Salentine, 206 
Wis. 2d 418, 426-27, 557 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1996), which held 
that the utterance "I plead no contest" was not required. 
Three unpublished decisions of the court of appeals present 
a substantially similar factual situation as presented in this 
case.  State v. Gordon, Case No. 95-0496-CR (Ct. App. 1995); 
State v. Carson, Case. No. 95-2526-CR (Ct. App. 1996); and State 
v. Lamson, Case No. 96-0003-CR (Ct. App. 1996).  In Gordon, the 
court of appeals held that the failure of the defendant to 
personally enter a plea of guilty or no contest warranted 
vacating the judgment of conviction.  In Larson and Carson, the 
court of appeals held that the judgments of conviction should be 
affirmed.  In all three cases, the circuit court referred to the 
defendant's guilty plea.  
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
10
 
II 
 
¶17 We agree with the State and the defendant that the 
decision to plead guilty or no contest must be made personally 
by the defendant and that the defendant in this case did 
personally make that decision.  The issue of law presented in 
this case is, however, whether the defendant must expressly and 
personally state that personal decision to plead no contest on 
the record in open court or whether the defendant's intent to 
plead no contest may be inferred from the record. 
¶18 The defendant urges that a strict rule of procedure be 
adopted 
requiring 
defendants 
to 
personally, 
directly 
and 
specifically state their pleas of guilty or no contest on the 
record in open court in order for the circuit court to enter a 
judgment of conviction.  Inasmuch as the defendant, as we stated 
previously, acknowledges that the record in this case amply and 
clearly demonstrates that he intended to enter a plea of no 
contest when he came to court on January 16, 1996, the 
                                                                  
In the present case, the circuit court never mentioned that 
the defendant's plea was no contest.  At no time did the circuit 
court personally verify with the defendant what plea he was 
going to enter or even that he "wished" to enter a no contest or 
guilty plea.  Although defense counsel stated at the outset of 
the hearing that his client "is prepared to change his 
plea . . . to that of no contest," the circuit court failed to 
take even the rudimentary step of asking the defendant if that 
was true. 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
11
defendant's position in this case is one of form rather than of 
substance. 
¶19 The defendant cites no statutory or case authority 
specifically requiring defendants to expressly and personally 
state their pleas of guilty or no contest on the record in open 
court.  Nor do we find any such direct authority to support the 
defendant's position.
7 
¶20 For instance, Wis. Stat. § 971.06(1) merely sets out 
the types of pleas a defendant may make: guilty, not guilty, no 
contest, or not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  
This provision is silent about how defendants are to make their 
pleas.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.06(2) provides that if a defendant 
stands mute, or refuses to plead, the circuit court may direct 
the entry of a plea of not guilty on the defendant's behalf.  In 
this case the defendant did not stand mute or refuse to plead, 
but also did not expressly and personally plead to the charged 
offense. 
                     
7 The 
defendant 
also 
claims, 
without 
developing 
the 
argument, that in this case the circuit court's entry of the 
judgment of conviction without first obtaining the defendant's 
personal articulation of the plea of no contest in open court on 
the record constituted a violation of due process.  We agree 
with the State that the defendant has confused the due process 
requirement that a defendant's decision to plead guilty or no 
contest be "knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently" made by a 
defendant, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), with the defendant's asserted position in this case that 
defendants must expressly and personally convey their pleas in 
open court on the record.  
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
12
¶21 Further, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) requires the circuit 
court to take the following steps before accepting a guilty or 
no contest plea: 
1) address the defendant personally and determine that the 
plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the potential punishment if convicted, 
2) make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in 
fact committed the crime charged, and  
3) advise the defendant who is not a United States citizen 
of the possibility of deportation if the defendant pleads guilty 
or no contest. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) does not require the 
circuit court to ask the defendant to state his or her plea 
expressly and personally in open court. 
¶23 Finally, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.13(1), 
upon 
which the 
defendant relies, states that "a judgment of conviction shall be 
entered upon a verdict of guilty by the jury, a finding of 
guilty by the court in cases where a jury is waived, or a plea 
of guilty or no contest.”  Again, the statute does not describe 
how defendants should make their pleas. 
¶24 We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court's failure to ask the defendant, "how do you plead?," and 
the defendant's failure to answer on the record, "I plead no 
contest," are not fatal to the conviction in the present case in 
which it is clear that the only inference possible from the 
totality of the facts and circumstances in the record is that 
the defendant intended to plead no contest. 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
13
¶25 Here, the defendant completed and signed a plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form in which he stated he 
"wished" to plead no contest to the charged offense.  After 
signing the form and immediately prior to the on-the-record plea 
colloquy between the circuit court and the defendant, the form 
was filed with the circuit court.  At the opening of the 
proceeding, defense counsel informed the circuit court in the 
presence of the defendant that the defendant was "prepared" to 
change his plea to no contest.  The defendant responded 
affirmatively to the circuit court's numerous questions about 
the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form and about 
whether he understood the charges, the effects of the plea, and 
what rights he was giving up.  It is clear, and the defendant 
does 
not 
dispute, 
that 
this 
record 
amply 
and 
clearly 
demonstrates that he intended to enter a plea of no contest when 
he came to court on January 16, 1996. 
¶26 We agree with the court of appeals that the magic 
words "I plead no contest" are not necessarily required for a 
valid conviction based on a plea of no contest under Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.13(1).  Although circuit courts must be vigilant in 
ensuring that defendants expressly and personally state their 
pleas on the record, in this case we can reliably and without 
doubt conclude that the circuit court's oversight in not asking 
the defendant "how do you plead?" and in not having the 
defendant respond to this question did not overcome the 
defendant's obvious intent to plead no contest.  The record 
demonstrates that the only inference possible from the totality 
No. 
96-3615-CR 
 
14
of the facts and circumstances of this case is that this 
defendant intended to plead no contest. 
¶27 In sum, although the strongly preferred practice is 
that circuit courts elicit from defendants a response of 
"guilty" or "no contest" to the question "how do you plead?," 
when a circuit court has failed to do so, a reviewing court may 
hold that a defendant made such a plea when the only inference 
possible from the totality of the facts and circumstances in the 
record is that the defendant intended to plead no contest (or 
guilty, as the case may be). 
¶28 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
96-3615.awb 
 
1 
¶29 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (Dissenting).  The ultimate 
question in many cases is where do you draw the line.  Because I 
draw the line differently than does the majority, I respectfully 
dissent.  
¶30 I begin with a basic premise:  that the purpose of a 
plea hearing is to have the defendant enter a plea.  Here, the 
record reflects that the defendant never entered a plea so the 
majority is forced to infer the entry of a plea from the 
circumstances.  
¶31 I agree that we can appropriately infer all of the 
requirements of a validly made plea, save one:  that the plea 
was actually made.  We can infer that the plea is freely and 
voluntarily made.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 
389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  We can infer that the defendant knowingly 
waives his rights.  State v. Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d 823, 
826-28, 416 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1987).  We can infer that the 
defendant understands the nature of the offense.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 268.  We can infer that the defendant understands the 
potential punishment.  State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 143, 
569 N.W.2d 577 (1997).  But I draw the line here.  Where no plea 
has been made, I would not infer a plea.   
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 sets forth the procedures a 
circuit court must follow in order to insure that a defendant’s 
plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily.  The majority is 
correct that the statute does not explicitly require “the 
circuit court to ask the defendant to state his or her plea 
expressly and in open court.”  Majority op. at 12.   
96-3615.awb 
 
2 
¶33 However, I do not find that fact to be instructive 
since the statute is written presupposing that a plea has been 
stated: 
 
Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal thereof.  
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
 
(a) 
Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted . . . . 
 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise 
the defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen 
of the United States of America, you are advised that 
a plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law." 
 
(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1) (c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. 
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds. 
 
(3) Any plea of guilty which is not accepted by 
the court or which is subsequently permitted to be 
withdrawn shall not be used against the defendant in a 
subsequent action.  Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (emphasis 
added). 
It really makes little sense to speak of “the plea” or 
“accept[ing] the plea” or “withdraw[ing] the plea and enter[ing] 
another plea” unless the defendant actually enters a plea.   
96-3615.awb 
 
3 
¶34 The majority draws the line too low.  Here the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term not to 
exceed ten years without ever having pled to the offense.  
Because 
I 
believe 
that 
a 
minimum 
standard 
of 
criminal 
jurisprudence requires that the defendant enter a plea before he 
is found guilty and sentenced, I dissent. 
96-3615.awb 
 
1