Title: Sullivan v. Eichmann
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 96931
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2004

Docket No. 96931-Agenda 23-September 2004.
JANET D. SULLIVAN, Appellant, v. ROBERT E. EICHMANN, 							M.D., Appellee.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this medical malpractice case, the circuit court of Winnebago
County denied plaintiff's request to substitute counsel immediately
preceding arguments on defendant's motion for summary judgment,
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and subsequently
denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Plaintiff appealed these rulings,
and the appellate court affirmed. No. 2-01-1386 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed plaintiff's petition for
leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. The principal issue we consider in
this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
substitution of counsel prior to arguments on defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
	In September 1996, defendant, Dr. Robert Eichmann, a board-certified specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, performed abdominal
surgery on plaintiff, Janet Sullivan. Sullivan experienced complications
following surgery, including a perforated bowel. In September 1998,
Sullivan filed a medical malpractice complaint against Dr. Eichmann,
and alleged that Dr. Eichmann's negligent conduct caused her medical
complications. A letter attached to the complaint, signed by Dr.
Harrith M. Hasson, provided that Dr. Eichmann deviated from the
standard of care during his treatment of Sullivan. See 735 ILCS
5/2-622 (West 1998). At the time of filing her complaint, Sullivan was
represented by trial counsel Gregory Barrett.
	Subsequently, the parties conducted discovery. Several times
during discovery, court orders were amended to extend the time to
disclose and depose fact and expert witnesses. The trial court
repeatedly ordered Sullivan to formally disclose the name of her
expert and the expert's opinions, and to make the expert available to
be deposed. On February 15, 2001, during a routine status hearing,
Barrett informed the court that Dr. Hasson was withdrawing as an
expert and was not willing to testify that Dr. Eichmann was negligent.
Barrett requested additional time to seek a new expert. The court
granted the request, and ordered Sullivan to disclose an expert and
answer all interrogatories by March 19, 2001. Sullivan did not comply
with the trial court's order. On April 6, 2001, Dr. Eichmann filed his
"Combined Motions to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment."
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219, Dr. Eichmann sought the
dismissal of Sullivan's complaint due to Sullivan's failure to comply
with the trial court's discovery orders. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).
Alternatively, Dr. Eichmann sought summary judgment as a matter of
law because Sullivan failed to identify or provide the opinion of an
expert witness who would state that Dr. Eichmann deviated from the
standard of care. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2002). Dr. Eichmann
argued that without an expert Sullivan was not able to establish a
prima facie case of medical negligence.
	On May 4, 2001, the motion for summary judgment was heard by
the trial court. A court reporter was not present during the hearing
and, therefore, the record does not contain a transcript. However,
Sullivan's motion to reconsider and petition for leave to appeal to this
court, together with Dr. Eichmann's brief to this court and the
transcript from the hearing on Sullivan's motion to reconsider, provide
a sketch of what transpired on May 4, 2001. The transcript discloses
that Sullivan's new counsel, Michael Holoka, provided an oral
account of what occurred in court on May 4, 2001. Dr. Eichmann did
not contest the facts as orally detailed by Sullivan's attorney. Further,
Dr. Eichmann did not contest the facts as outlined by Sullivan in her
petition for leave to appeal to this court or during oral argument
before this court. It is evident, therefore, that the following occurred
on May 4, 2001.
	Sullivan's original trial counsel, Barrett, appeared at the summary
judgment hearing. Sullivan herself was not personally present.
Additionally, a new attorney, Michael Holoka, of the law firm of
Kralovec, Jambios &amp; Schwartz, appeared at the hearing. Prior to the
arguments, Holoka tendered to the court a document entitled
"Substitution of Attorneys," which appears in the record. The
document, signed by Sullivan and a member of Holoka's law firm,
designated the firm of Kralovec, Jambois &amp; Schwartz as Sullivan's
new attorneys. The document was also signed by Barrett and
purported to withdraw Barrett's law firm from the matter. Holoka
informed the court that he did not have an expert affidavit available
with him in court, but that he had retained an expert who would testify
that Dr. Eichmann deviated from the standard of care in his treatment
of Sullivan. Holoka provided the name of the expert to both defense
counsel and the court. Holoka explained that because he was only
retained in mid-April, and the expert was also newly retained, he was
not able to obtain the new expert's opinion in writing prior to the
hearing. Defense counsel objected to the substitution and argued that,
absent an expert's counteraffidavit, substitution should be denied. The
trial court denied Sullivan's substitution request, and proceeded to
hear the motion for summary judgment. Defense counsel presented the
motion, Barrett informed the court that he had no response to the
motion, and the court entered summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Eichmann. The order provided in part:
		"There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that
defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
By reason of the granting of defendant's motion for summary
judgment, defendant's motion to dismiss, with prejudice,
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure and SCR 219(c) is moot.
			Substitution of counsel should not be allowed to delay the
entry of an order allowing defendant's dispositive motion but
defendant has no objection to the substitution with respect to
any post-judgment proceedings."
	This same order allowed Holoka's substitution for purposes of
any postjudgment proceedings. On May 23, 2001, Sullivan filed a
motion for reconsideration. The motion explained that a personal
tragedy impaired Barrett's ability to represent her in the matter.
Sullivan attached to the motion her own affidavit providing that
Barrett first informed her on April 11, 2001, "that he did not have
enough time to retain an expert" to oppose summary judgment and
that she immediately sought other counsel to represent her. Sullivan
also attached to the motion an amended answer to Dr. Eichmann's
Supreme Court Rule 213 interrogatories, as well as a report, affidavit,
and curriculum vitae of her new expert witness, Dr. Howard Topel.
Dr. Topel's affidavit stated that he received materials regarding
Sullivan's medical condition on April 17, 2001, reviewed the
materials, and orally communicated his opinion to Sullivan's attorney
on May 2, 2001: Dr. Topel's opinion was that Dr. Eichmann did not
meet the standard of care required in the pertinent medical field. The
motion informed defense counsel and the court that Dr. Topel was
prepared to proceed with his deposition, and dates were tendered for
the taking of his deposition.
	The court denied the motion to reconsider and entered the
following written memorandum of decision:
		"I have considered at great length the arguments of counsel
and tried very hard to weigh the equities involved. I will first
say that I disagree with the procedural history as recited by
Mr. Holoka. I did not do so on the record because I did not
see the value in doing so in the limited time available.
			However, my recollection of the history of this case is that
the plaintiff's counsel who preceded Mr. Holoka on the file
appeared at or near the discovery cut off and indicated that
his expert now declined to testify. The clear implication was
not that it was now inconvenient due to delays as suggested
by Mr. Holoka, but that he now declined to swear that there
was negligence. It was further suggested that counsel felt
finding an expert would be difficult but that he would like the
discovery date extended in order to try to find someone who
'would be willing to testify on her behalf.' Again, the
implication was that he doubted that anyone would be found
for that purpose. The time to disclose came and went without
an expert having been found. The summary judgment motion
was thirty days later and there was no sworn attestation to
the availability of an expert. The motion to reconsider is
denied."
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court. No. 2-01-1386
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate
court noted that leave is not required when an attorney seeks to enter
an appearance. The appellate court declined, however, to consider
whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for substitution
because the record on appeal was inadequate to determine "the
precise nature" of what occurred during the proceedings. The
appellate court noted Sullivan's various failures to meet discovery
deadlines and held that "lacking any record from the hearing, we must
presume that the trial court's order denying plaintiff's request to
substitute attorneys was in conformity with the law and supported by
the record." No. 2-01-1386, citing Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 433-34 (2001). Further, because Sullivan failed to present an
affidavit of an expert witness regarding Dr. Eichmann's standard of
care, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. This
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS	We first address Dr. Eichmann's argument that the record is
insufficient to permit our review of whether the denial of substitution
of counsel constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It is
correct that on appeal the appellant must present a complete record to
review the claim of error. Webster, 195 Ill. 2d  at 432. Here, as
discussed previously, the factual circumstances are evident in
Sullivan's motion to reconsider summary judgment, the transcript of
the arguments from the motion to reconsider, and the parties' briefs
to this court. These facts are not refuted or contested. Accordingly,
the record is sufficiently complete to review the issue.
	We further address Dr. Eichmann's contention that this court
"must assume the new attorney was not in any way hampered in his
appearance." Specifically, Dr. Eichmann argues that the new attorney
must have been permitted to "appear" because the record contains
information about the newly retained expert witness, and this expert
was retained by the new attorney. Simply stated, Dr. Eichmann argues
that if the new attorney did not appear, this information would not be
in the record.
	It thus appears that Dr. Eichmann equates Holoka's physical
presence in court with an "appearance." We refuse to engage in such
linguistic gymnastics. The record is clear: the trial court denied the
motion for substitution, and Holoka was not permitted to appear.
Therefore, we now address whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying substitution.
	Under Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(1), an "attorney shall file his
written appearance or other pleading before he addresses the court
unless he is presenting a motion for leave to appear by intervention or
otherwise." 134 Ill. 2d R. 13(c)(1). Leave is not required when an
attorney seeks to enter an appearance. Firkus v. Firkus, 200 Ill. App.
3d 982, 990 (1990). We "recognize the established right of a party to
discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause, and to
substitute other counsel, for a client is entitled to be represented by an
attorney in whose ability and fidelity he has confidence." Savich v.
Savich, 12 Ill. 2d 454, 457-58 (1957). Further, as properly noted by
the appellate court, an attorney may enter his or her appearance even
if the client is currently represented by another law firm or attorney.
See Firkus, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 990.
	Despite these general principles, however, some limitations do
apply. The right to substitute counsel is not absolute. People v.
Franklin, 415 Ill. 514, 516-17 (1953). The trial court may deny
substitution if the "substitution of counsel would unduly prejudice the
other party or interfere with the administration of justice." Filko v.
Filko, 127 Ill. App. 2d 10, 17 (1970); Franklin, 415 Ill.  at 516-17. In
making this determination, trial courts may consider the detriment to
the moving party caused by the denial of substitution. Filko, 127 Ill.
App. 2d at 17. We will not reverse a trial court's decision to deny
substitution absent an abuse of discretion.
	Dr. Eichmann argues that the "history of the case," referring to
Sullivan's failure to meet discovery deadlines, justified the trial court's
denial of substitution. Dr. Eichmann argues that unless trial courts
have discretion to deny substitution of counsel, litigants will be able
to unfairly prolong the entry of summary judgment. The trial court's
own order conveys that this was, in fact, the basis for its decision:
"[s]ubstitution of counsel should not be allowed to delay the entry of
an order allowing defendant's dispositive motion." Further, the
appellate court appears to partly justify the trial court's decision to
deny substitution based upon Sullivan's failure "to meet numerous
discovery deadlines."
	While we agree that trial courts must have discretion to deny
substitution, especially when substitution is used as an attempt to
prolong or delay the entry of a dispositive motion, there is no
indication in the record to support that this was Sullivan's motive
here. Rather, the record reveals that Barrett failed to properly
prosecute Sullivan's case, and new counsel was retained to better
represent her interests. Specifically, Sullivan learned on April 11, five
days after the motion for summary judgment was filed, that Barrett
would not seek to retain another expert to support her cause, and she
immediately sought other counsel. Six days later, Sullivan had retained
new counsel, and this attorney had contacted an expert to review the
matter. The record further reveals that, immediately prior to
arguments on the motion for summary judgment, Holoka orally
informed the court that he had retained an expert, provided the name
of this expert, and stated that this expert would offer an opinion and
testify that Dr. Eichmann deviated from the standard of care. Whether
Dr. Eichmann deviated from the standard of care, and whether
Sullivan could offer an expert to testify on this issue, was the subject
of the motion for summary judgment, which had been filed less than
30 days earlier. The record simply does not support Dr. Eichmann's
contention that the substitution of a new attorney at this stage in the
litigation would delay the administration of justice. Cf. Filko, 127 Ill.
App. 2d at 17 (refusing substitution at the time a divorce decree was
to be entered was not an abuse of discretion where settlement decree
had been agreed upon and all that was required to conclude the matter
was entry of the written decree).
	We further note that a trial court is obligated to consider both the
prejudice to the defendant and the detriment caused to the moving
party by denial of substitution. It is clear that the retention of an
expert was relevant to the outcome of the summary judgment motion,
and information regarding the expert was only available if the court
allowed Sullivan's new attorney to appear. Here, the trial court
identified no specific undue prejudice to defendant caused by
permitting substitution. Yet, the record reveals significant prejudice to
Sullivan by denial of the motion. Sullivan was deprived of counsel
who represented her interests, denied the attorney of her choice, and
robbed of the opportunity to tender an expert opinion when the court
was advised that one existed. The denial of counsel of her choice in
this case denied Sullivan representation by an attorney in whose
"ability and fidelity" she had confidence. Without Holoka's
participation in the arguments, she was unable to respond to the
motion for summary judgment and unable to prosecute her cause of
action.
	Dr. Eichmann asserts that Sullivan was not prejudiced by the
denial of substitution because even if the trial court had allowed the
substitution prior to arguments, new counsel lacked an expert's
counteraffidavit to defeat summary judgment. All parties acknowledge
that Holoka did not possess a counteraffidavit on May 4, 2001, but
rather only had an expert's oral opinion prior to the hearing. Dr.
Eichmann further argues that even if Sullivan could not present an
expert's affidavit at the time of the hearing, she also failed to avail
herself of other procedural mechanisms to defeat summary judgment.
Specifically, Dr. Eichmann argues that Sullivan failed to file an
affidavit pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 191(b) (134 Ill. 2d R.
191(b)). Dr. Eichmann thus argues that Sullivan was not prejudiced
because the outcome would have been the same with Holoka's
participation.
	We disagree. We do not know what would have occurred had the
trial court allowed the substitution. As noted during oral arguments
before this court, it is clear that Sullivan's new counsel had the
necessary evidence to overcome summary judgment and could easily
have provided his own affidavit to the court if called upon to do so
once his appearance was permitted. It is possible that Sullivan's new
counsel would have requested a short continuance to obtain the
expert's written affidavit and that this continuance would have been
granted. Such speculation, however, is neither appropriate nor
necessary here. Under the circumstances in this case, the decision to
deny substitution foreclosed the possibility of any measures to
overcome summary judgment. Dr. Eichmann's assertion that Sullivan
was not prejudiced ignores the reality that the act of denying
substitution barred events that would have likely led to the denial of
summary judgment or, alternatively, would now serve as evidence of
prejudice. We will not let one incorrect ruling-the denial of
substitution-justify another-the grant of summary judgment.
	Accordingly, we find that the denial of substitution prior to
arguments on Dr. Eichmann's motion for summary judgment
constituted an abuse of discretion and that, under the facts of this
case, this abuse of discretion constituted reversible error. For this
reason, we need not consider additional issues raised by the litigants.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the judgments of the
circuit and appellate courts and remand the matter to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.