Title: Toombs v. Hayes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971951
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 1998

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
 
    Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
ANGELA D. TOOMBS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 971951 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.  
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
BRETT K. HAYES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the jury’s verdict 
is inadequate as a matter of law. 
I 
 
Angela D. Toombs sued Brett K. Hayes to recover damages for 
injuries Toombs sustained in a motor vehicle collision.  Hayes 
admitted liability for the accident.  Following a jury trial on 
June 13, 1997, to determine Toombs’ damages, the jury returned a 
verdict in the amount of $23,282.84.  Toombs moved the trial 
court to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, claiming 
that the verdict was inadequate as a matter of law.  The court 
overruled the motion for the reasons stated in its letter 
opinion dated June 19, 1997, and, on June 25, 1997, the court 
entered judgment on the verdict.  Toombs appeals. 
II 
 
The motor vehicle collision occurred on September 14, 1994, 
in the City of Richmond.  Toombs was a front-seat passenger in 
an automobile operated by Lori J. Curtis.  The automobile 
operated by Hayes struck the passenger side of the Curtis car. 
 
The next day, Toombs received treatment at a hospital 
emergency room.  From September 19, 1994, to April 21, 1995, 
Toombs was under the care of Dr. John T. Carmack, her family 
physician.  Dr. Carmack testified that, as a result of the 
collision, Toombs suffers from chronic mechanical back strain, 
synonymous with sacroiliac joint dysfunction, and muscle spasms 
in the low back.  He further testified that all of the treatment 
he provided was necessary and appropriate. 
 
On April 21, 1995, Dr. Carmack referred Toombs to Dr. Mark 
E. DeBlois, an orthopedic surgeon.  Dr. DeBlois testified that, 
as a result of the collision, Tombs sustained a lumbar or 
sacroiliac strain.  The doctor ordered various tests and 
physical therapy and prescribed pain medications and anti-
inflammatories.  He also referred Toombs to Dr. Douglas A. 
Wayne, a specialist in rehabilitation and physical medicine.  
According to Dr. DeBlois, his treatment of Toombs was necessary, 
reasonable, and directly related to her injuries received in the 
accident. 
 
Dr. Wayne testified that, as a result of the automobile 
collision, Toombs suffers from sacroiliac dysfunction and 
chronic strain of the lumbosacral supraspinous ligaments.  The 
doctor recommended that Toombs continue doing stretching 
exercises and using a sacroiliac belt.  He also prescribed 
electrical stimulation to dull or mask Toombs’ pain. 
 
2
 
Toombs’ medical expenses totaled $18,838.52.  As a result 
of the collision, she incurred $4,444.32 in lost wages.  She 
testified that, as a result of the accident, she has had 
constant low back pain, her once physically active lifestyle is 
now restricted, sexual relations with her husband have been 
affected, and she has had to postpone plans to have other 
children. 
III 
 
The jury returned a verdict in the exact amount of Toombs’ 
medical expenses and lost wages.  Toombs contends that the 
verdict is inadequate as a matter of law.  We agree. 
 
Recently, in Bowers v. Sprouse, 254 Va. 428, 492 S.E.2d 637 
(1997), decided after the trial court ruled in the present case, 
we held that "a jury award in a personal injury action which 
compensates a plaintiff for the exact amount of the plaintiff’s 
medical expenses and other special damages is inadequate as a 
matter of law, irrespective of whether those damages were 
controverted."  Id. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 639.  This is so, we 
said, because such a verdict "indicates that although the jury 
found the plaintiff was injured and had incurred special 
damages, the jury, for whatever reason, failed to compensate 
[the plaintiff] for any other items of damage."  Id., 492 S.E.2d 
at 638.  We noted that, "at a minimum, [the] plaintiff 
 
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experienced pain, suffering, and inconvenience . . . and was 
entitled to compensation for [those] elements of damage."  Id. 
 
Hayes attempts to distinguish the present case from Bowers, 
relying upon certain handwritten notations on the verdict form.  
The notations, immediately below the foreperson’s signature, 
read: 
 
18,838.53 Medical 
 
 4,444.32 Lost Wages 
 
 
     Pain + Suffering 
 
These notations, however, had been scratched out.  Below them 
are the following notations: 
 
1,482.68 Medical 
 
1,204.09 Wages 
 
________ Balance For Pain + Suffering 
 
Hayes argues that "[t]he notations clearly demonstrate that the 
jury awarded the plaintiff damages for her medical expenses, 
earnings lost, pain suffered and inconvenience caused as a 
result of [his] negligence." 
 
We think reliance upon the notations would raise many 
questions and require us to resort to speculation and 
conjecture.  We have no way of knowing who made the notations 
and why or who, if anyone, authorized them.  We can only 
speculate whether the notations were approved by the jury.  More 
perplexing is why, if the jury intended to compensate Toombs for 
pain, suffering, and inconvenience, the verdict is in the exact 
amount of her special damages.  
 
4
 
In Ingles v. Dively, 246 Va. 244, 253, 435 S.E.2d 641, 646 
(1993), we addressed the issue respecting notations on a verdict 
form.  We stated that "[w]e share the virtually unanimous view 
of courts across this country that a court should not engage in 
speculation over the meaning of notations made by jury members 
on the verdict form during the deliberative process." 
 
Previously, however, in DeWald v. King, 233 Va. 140, 354 
S.E.2d 60 (1987), we did consider certain notations on a verdict 
form.  A close reading of DeWald, though, indicates that 
consideration of the notations was unnecessary and not essential 
to our holding.  Before making any reference to the notations, 
we had already determined, based upon Rome v. Kelly Springfield 
Tire Co., 217 Va. 943, 234 S.E.2d 277 (1977), and its progeny, 
that the verdict in DeWald was inadequate as a matter of law.  
Therefore, the reference to the notations on the verdict form 
was merely dictum. 
 
Accordingly, we adhere to what we said in Ingles.  
Notations such as those in the present case, located below the 
signed verdict, simply are not part of the verdict, and a court 
should not speculate about their origin, purpose, or meaning. 
 
We hold, therefore, that Bowers is controlling and that the 
verdict in the present case is inadequate as a matter of law.  
We will reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case 
for a new trial on damages. 
 
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Reversed and remanded. 
 
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