Title: Rodney A. Arneson v. Marcia Jezwinski
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001592
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 1996

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
Rodney A. Arneson, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Marcia Jezwinski, Personnel Coordinator, 
Administrative Data Processing, UW-
Madison, Durwood Meyer, Assistant 
Director, Administrative Data Processing, 
UW-Madison and Dan Thoftne, Computer 
Operations Manager, Administrative Data 
Processing, UW-Madison, 
 
 
Defendants-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 20, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
Rodney A. Arneson, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Marcia Jezwinski, Personnel Coordinator, 
Administrative Data Processing, University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, Durwood Meyer, 
Assistant Director, Administrative Data 
Processing, University of Wisconsin-
Madison and Dan Thoftne, Computer 
Operations Manager, Administrative Data 
Processing, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
2
 
Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Moria Krueger, Judge.  Cause remanded to the court of appeals 
with directions to allow an interlocutory appeal.  
 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61 (1993-94).
1  Petitioners Marcia Jezwinski, Durwood 
Meyer, and Dan Thoftne seek leave to appeal a circuit court order 
denying their claim of qualified immunity from suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994),
2 and alternatively assert that they have a 
right to appeal.  The sole issue on certification is under what  
circumstances the court of appeals should grant a petition for 
interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying a state 
official's claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.  
Pursuant to our constitutional superintending power over lower 
state courts, we direct the court of appeals to grant every 
petition of this kind, so long as the circuit court order is 
based on an issue of law, such as whether the federal right 
allegedly violated was clearly established at the time the action 
was taken, and the defendant initiates the appeal within the time 
specified in Wis. Stat. § 808.04.  We find that the court of 
appeals should grant such petitions as a matter of course because 
they will always fall within the criteria of Wis. Stat. 
§  808.03(2)(a) and (b). 
                                                          
 
1  All further references are to the 1993-94 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2  All further references are to the 1994 Code unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
3
I. 
In granting the present certification, we indicated that we 
would not address any of the underlying issues Petitioners raise 
on appeal.  Nonetheless, we provide a general background of the 
facts surrounding this dispute.  In 1990, Rodney Arneson was a 
permanent employee of the University of Wisconsin on probationary 
status as a newly-promoted supervisor.  On March 19, 1990, an 
employee whom Arneson supervised filed a complaint of sexual 
harassment against him.  As a result, Petitioners placed Arneson 
on unpaid suspension for thirty days and demoted him to a lower 
position. 
On May 15, 1990, Arneson filed an administrative appeal of 
this disciplinary action with the State of Wisconsin Personnel 
Commission (“Commission”).  The Commission found that Petitioners 
had denied Arneson's due process rights to hear the charges 
against him and to present his version of the facts, and that the 
discipline imposed was excessive.  Therefore, the Commission 
voided the disciplinary action and ordered Petitioners to 
reinstate Arneson to his previous position.   
On July 29, 1993, Arneson commenced an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in Dane County Circuit Court, claiming that 
Petitioners did not have “just cause” to impose the disciplinary 
action, and had failed to reinstate him properly.  Petitioners 
moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including 
qualified immunity.  On April 21, 1995, the Honorable Moria G. 
Krueger granted the Petitioners' motion for summary judgment in 
part, but deferred ruling on their claim of qualified immunity. 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
4
 Subsequently, on June 2, 1995, the circuit court judge 
denied Petitioners' motion for summary judgment based on their 
claim of qualified immunity.  Specifically, the circuit court 
judge found that Arneson's due process rights were clearly 
established at the time of his suspension; therefore, Petitioners 
could not maintain a claim of qualified immunity.
3  The circuit 
court judge noted that although there were factual disputes 
between the parties, “even viewing the facts most favorably to 
defendants, due process does not appear to have been afforded Mr. 
Arneson.”  (R. 38 at 2 n.1.) 
On June 12, 1995, Petitioners filed a Petition for Leave to 
Appeal from Nonfinal Order with the court of appeals.  The court 
of appeals denied the petition on July 24, 1995.  On August 2, 
1995, Petitioners submitted a motion for reconsideration of this 
denial with the court of appeals, and also filed a notice of 
appeal from the same circuit court order.  Arneson moved the 
court of appeals for an order dismissing the second appeal.  The 
court of appeals then certified the matter to this court, to 
determine under what circumstances the court of appeals should 
grant an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying 
a state official's claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 
suit.   
                                                          
 
3  “Whether a public official may be protected by qualified 
immunity turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the 
action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly 
established at the time the action was taken.”  Barnhill v. Board 
of Regents, 166 Wis. 2d 395, 407, 479 N.W.2d 917 (1992); accord 
Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 326, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994), 
cert. denied,    U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 1102 (1995). 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
5
II. 
 
Although this certification presents a matter of first 
impression in Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court has 
addressed the same issue on the federal level.  In Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a 
district court order denying a claim of qualified immunity on 
summary judgment is immediately appealable, to the extent it 
turns on an issue of law.  Specifically, the Court relied on the 
“collateral order doctrine”
4 to find that such an order is a 
“final decision,” since 28 U.S.C. § 1291 vests federal courts of 
appeal with jurisdiction over appeals only from “final decisions” 
of district courts.
5 Id. at 524-30.       
 
The Mitchell Court considered several aspects of qualified 
immunity persuasive to its holding.  First, the Court explained 
that qualified immunity is intended to protect government 
officials from “the general costs of subjecting officials to the 
risks 
of 
trial 
–- 
distraction 
of 
officials 
from 
their 
governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and 
deterrence of able people from public service.”  Id. at 526 
                                                          
 
4  Under the collateral order doctrine, “a decision of a 
district court is appealable if it falls within 'that small class 
which finally determine claims of right separable from, and 
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be 
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require 
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is 
adjudicated.'”  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) 
(quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 
(1949)). 
5  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 for an explanation of the limited 
circumstances 
when 
the 
federal 
courts 
of 
appeals 
have 
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
6
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)).  
According to the Court, qualified immunity entitles officials to 
avoid trial, as well as the other burdens of litigation, such as 
broad-reaching discovery.  Id. at 526.  The Court therefore 
determined:  “The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, 
it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go 
to trial.”  Id.  The Court further emphasized that a district 
court's denial of qualified immunity should be subject to 
interlocutory appeal because “the district court's decision is 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  Id. 
at 527.    
Second, the Court determined that an order denying qualified 
immunity should be immediately appealable because it conclusively 
determines the disputed question.  The Court stated, “[T]here are 
simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court 
to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred.”  Id. 
(quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977)).  
Finally, the Court was persuaded by its finding that a claim of 
qualified immunity “is conceptually distinct from the merits of 
the plaintiff's claim” if the claim turns on an issue of law, 
because the reviewing appellate court will not need to consider 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
7
the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, or even 
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim.  Id. 527-28.
6   
III. 
 
Petitioners argue that the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution
7 requires us to find that state officials 
have a right to appeal a circuit court order denying a claim of 
qualified immunity in a § 1983 action in Wisconsin appellate 
courts.  Although we are persuaded by Mitchell, we do not reach 
the issue of whether the Supremacy Clause requires us to follow 
                                                          
 
6  Subsequently, in Johnson v. Jones,    U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 
2151, 2159 (1995), the Court held that a defendant may not 
immediately appeal a district court order denying a claim of 
qualified immunity “insofar as that order determines whether or 
not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for 
trial.”  The Court then clarified this holding in Behrens v. 
Pelletier,    U.S.   , 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996), indicating 
that “if what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is 
nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding 
that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not 
truly 'separable' from the plaintiff's claim, and hence there is 
no 'final decision' under Cohen and Mitchell.”  However, the 
Behrens court held that a defendant may immediately appeal a 
district court order, even if material issues of fact remain, so 
long as an abstract issue of law relating to qualified immunity 
is at issue, typically the issue of whether the federal right 
allegedly infringed was clearly established at the time of the 
action.  Id.    
7  Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides in part: 
“This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of 
the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”  
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
8
it.
8  We also do not consider whether such an order constitutes a 
final order under § 808.03(1).  Instead, we make this decision 
pursuant to our constitutional superintending power over lower 
state courts, set forth in article VII, section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution,
9 and in accord with the power we share 
with the legislature.   
 
We therefore review the nature and scope of this power.  The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution grants 
three 
separate 
and distinct 
branches 
of 
jurisdiction 
to 
this 
Court: 
(1) appellate 
jurisdiction; (2) general superintending control over inferior 
courts; and (3) original jurisdiction at certain proceedings at 
law and in equity.  WIS. CONST. art VII, § 3; State ex rel. 
Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 564, 105 N.W.2d 876 
(1960); In re Brand, 251 Wis. 531, 536, 30 N.W.2d 238 (1947), 
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 802 (1948); State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l 
Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611-12, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899) 
(hereinafter 
“Johnson”). 
The 
constitutional 
grant 
of 
                                                          
 
8  Note that on October 21, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court  
granted certiorari in Johnson v. Fankell, an unpublished Idaho 
Supreme Court case in which the court declined to allow a state 
official to take an immediate appeal from the denial of their 
motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity in a § 
1983 action.  Johnson v. Fankell,    U.S.   ,    S. Ct.   , 65 
USLW 3305, 65 USLW 3308 (1996).  Therefore, although the Supreme 
Court will determine whether the Supremacy Clause requires state 
appellate courts to grant a petition for leave to appeal from a 
lower court order denying a claim of qualified immunity in a 
§ 1983 suit, that decision will have no bearing on the present 
case, because our decision is not grounded on the Supremacy 
Clause.  
9  Article VII, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: “The supreme court shall have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts.” 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
9
superintending authority endows this court with a power that is 
indefinite 
in 
character, 
unsupplied 
with 
means 
and 
instrumentalities, and limited only by the necessities of 
justice.  In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 519-20, 235 N.W.2d 409, 
238 N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975); Reynolds, 11 Wis. 2d at 
564-65; In re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 320-21, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); 
Johnson, 103 Wis. at 611.   In addition, this power enables the 
court to control the course of ordinary litigation in the lower 
courts of Wisconsin.
10  Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320; Johnson, 103 Wis. 
at 613. As we have stated, “The superintending power is as broad 
and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of 
justice in the courts of this state.”  Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 520. 
 
However, we do not use such power lightly.  Phelan, 225 Wis. 
at 321.  As we have indicated, “This court will not exercise its 
superintending power where there is another adequate remedy, by 
appeal or otherwise, for the conduct of the trial court, or where 
the conduct of the trial court does not threaten seriously to 
impose a significant hardship upon a citizen.”  McEwen v. Pierce 
County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979) (citing 
Newlander v. Riverview Realty Co., 238 Wis. 211, 225, 298 N.W. 
603 (1941); State ex rel. Tewalt v. Pollard, 112 Wis. 232, 234, 
87 N.W. 1107 (1901)).  
                                                          
 
10  Note that in In re Phelan, the court, in dicta, stated, 
“The [superintending] power will not be exercised to control the 
discretion of another court.”  225 Wis. 314, 321, 274 N.W. 411 
(1937).  However, Phelan is distinguishable from the present 
case, because it involved a petition for a writ of prohibition to 
restrain further proceedings in the circuit court on the grounds 
that the same issue was being litigated in federal court.   
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
10
We conclude that the present case warrants exercise of this 
power over lower state courts.  As both this court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court have recognized, qualified immunity is immunity 
from suit.  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 
415.  Therefore, the primary benefit of qualified immunity is 
lost if the case is erroneously allowed to proceed to trial.  
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; Barnhill, 166 Wis. at 415.  As we have 
recognized, the issue of qualified immunity “is appropriately 
addressed and resolved at the summary judgment stage . . . .”  
Burkes, 185 Wis. 2d at 327 (citing Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 415).         
Thus, where a court of appeals denies a petition for 
interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, a state 
official is left with no other adequate remedy.  Although the 
official could raise qualified immunity on appeal after the 
circuit court enters a final order, this is not a sufficient 
remedy because the official will lose the primary benefit of 
qualified immunity if the case wrongly proceeds. Mitchell, 472 
U.S. at 526; Barnhill, 166 Wis. at 415.  As one court has stated, 
“[T]he official cannot be 're-immunized' if erroneously required 
to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”  Tucker 
v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 1994).  
 The plaintiff may also be harmed under such circumstances, 
because the plaintiff may go through the expense and hardship of 
a full trial and appeal only to find that the defendant official 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
11
is not liable for damages because of qualified immunity.
11  
Furthermore, if a case wrongly proceeds, society as a whole will 
pay the social costs of expensive litigation, as well as 
“distraction of officials 
from their 
governmental duties, 
inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people 
from public service.”  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.  For all of these 
reasons, this is an appropriate matter for us to address through 
the exercise of our superintending authority.  See McEwen, 90 
Wis. 2d at 269-70 (explaining standards for exercise of this 
power).  
Section 808.03 falls within an area of power shared between 
the legislative and judicial branches.  This is demonstrated by 
the fact that although § 808.03 was enacted by the legislature as 
part of the restructuring of the court system in 1977, this court 
ordered § 808.03(1) amended in 1986.  130 Wis. 2d at xxi.  As we 
have determined:  
 
The separation of powers doctrine was never intended to 
be strict and absolute.  Rather, the doctrine envisions 
a system of separate branches sharing many powers while 
jealously 
guarding 
certain 
others, 
a 
system 
of 
"separateness 
but 
interdependence, 
autonomy 
but 
reciprocity."  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 
at 42-43 . . . . This subtle balancing of shared 
powers, coupled with 
the 
sparing 
demarcation of 
exclusive powers, has enabled a deliberately unwieldy 
system of government to endure successfully for nearly 
150 years. 
                                                          
 
11  We recognize that immediate appellate review of a circuit 
court's denial of qualified immunity may place an additional 
financial burden on the plaintiff.  See Martin A. Schwartz, A 
Discussion about Qualified Immunity, 212 n.94 N.Y. L.J. 3, 9 
(1994).  However, we note that where a state official frivolously 
brings an appeal, the court of appeals may award costs, fees, and 
attorney fees to the plaintiff.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3). 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
12
State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 
Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (per curiam).  Nothing in the 
legislative history of § 808.03 indicates that the legislature 
considered the unique nature of qualified immunity, in that 
substantial or irreparable harm will result if a court has 
wrongly issued an order denying a claim of qualified immunity and 
thereby erroneously allowed a case to proceed.  Recognizing the 
development of the law in regard to qualified immunity, we 
believe that this is an area in which it is necessary to exercise 
our constitutional superintending power.  
In exercising such power, we conclude that an order denying 
a claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 action should be 
immediately appealable.  Just as the United States Supreme Court 
determined in Mitchell, we determine that immediate interlocutory 
appeal will protect state officials from the substantial or 
irreparable injury that will result if the suit is erroneously 
allowed to proceed.  See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525-30; Barnhill, 
166 Wis. 2d at 415-16.  In addition, we conclude that 
determination of this issue at the early stages of litigation 
will clarify the proceedings for all parties involved, as well as 
the public, by resolving it “before extensive measures are taken 
to defend the public officials.”  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 415; 
accord Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527.  We therefore exercise our 
superintending power to direct the court of appeals to grant 
every petition for leave to appeal a circuit court order denying 
a claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 action, if the order 
is based on an issue of law, such as whether the federal right 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
13
allegedly violated was clearly established at the time the action 
was taken, and the defendant initiates the appeal within the time 
specified in Wis. Stat. § 808.04.  We determine that the court of 
appeals should grant these petitions as a matter of course 
because they will always fall within the criteria of Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(2)(a) and (b), for the above-stated reasons.
12  We also 
                                                          
 
12  Section 808.03(2) provides that the court of appeals may 
grant 
an 
interlocutory 
appeal 
if 
the 
appeal 
will:  
“(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or 
clarify further proceedings in the litigation; (b) Protect the 
petitioner 
from 
substantial 
or 
irreparable 
injury; 
or 
(c)  Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration 
of justice.” 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
14
note that our holding is in accordance with the decisions of a 
majority of jurisdictions.
13   
We acknowledge that we have previously declined to exercise 
our superintending power in this manner.  See State v. Jenich, 94 
Wis. 2d 74, 97a n.1, 288 N.W.2d 114, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980).  In 
the past, this court has simply encouraged the court of appeals 
to grant interlocutory appeals from certain circuit court orders. 
                                                          
 
13  A majority of state courts have held that an order 
denying a claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 case is 
immediately appealable, albeit for different reasons.  Some 
courts have followed Mitchell in interpreting their own state 
procedural rules.  See City of Phoenix v. Yarnell, 909 P.2d 377 
(Ariz. 1995) (en banc); Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 
1994); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1986).   
Several courts have indicated they are following Mitchell, 
without explicitly explaining on what grounds they are doing so. 
Virden v. Roper, 788 S.W.2d 470 (Ark. 1990); City of Lakewood v. 
Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996) (en banc); Breault v. Chairman 
of the Bd. Of Fire Comm'rs, 513 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988); Richardson v. Chevrefils, 552 A.2d 
89 (N.H. 1988); Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 
276 (N.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992); Murray v. White, 
587 A.2d 975 (Vt. 1991); Abell v. Dewey, 870 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 
1994).  Others have relied on the collateral order doctrine.  See 
Fulwood v. Porter, 639 A.2d 594 (D.C. 1994); Creamer v. Sceviour, 
652 A.2d 110 (Me. 1995); Carillo v. Rostro, 845 P.2d 130 (N.M. 
1992); Fann v. Brailey, 841 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), 
review denied (Tenn. 1992).  One court has found that such a 
decision is required under the Supremacy Clause.  See McLin v. 
Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1990).  Still others courts have 
granted relief through other means.  See Ex parte Franklin County 
Dep't of Human Resources, 674 So. 2d 1277 (Ala. 1996) (issuing 
writ of mandamus to allow for review); Leake v. Half Price Books, 
Records, Magazines, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1996) (noting that Texas has a statute that specifically allows 
for immediate appeal).  Finally, a minority of states have found 
that such orders are not immediately appealable under the law of 
their respective states.  Samuel v. Stevedoring Servs. of 
America, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Turner v. 
Giles, 450 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied,    U.S.   , 115 
S. Ct. 1959 (1995); Klindtworth v. Burkett, 477 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 
1991); Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Moritz, 529 N.E.2d 
1290 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Walden v. City of Seattle, 892 P.2d 
745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
15
See Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d at 97a-97b (order denying motion to 
dismiss for double jeopardy); State ex rel. A.E. v. Green Lake 
County Circuit Court, 94 Wis. 2d 98, 105d, 288 N.W.2d 125, 292 
N.W.2d 
114 
(1980) 
(order 
waiving 
juvenile 
jurisdiction).  
However, we again emphasize that this power is limited only by 
the necessities of justice, and enables us to control the course 
of litigation in the lower courts of Wisconsin.  Phelan, 225 Wis. 
at 320-21; Johnson, 103 Wis. at 611, 613.  As we have stated, 
“The inherent power of this court is shaped, not by prior usage, 
but by the continuing necessity that this court carry out its 
function as a supreme court.”  Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 519.  In the 
present case, we find that this exercise of our superintending 
power is within the necessities of justice, as it is required to 
insure the due administration of justice in Wisconsin courts.  
Cf. id. at 519-20 (this court exercised our power to promulgate 
Code of Judicial Ethics, even though we had not previously used 
our power in such a manner). 
In conclusion, we hold that the court of appeals should 
grant every petition for interlocutory appeal from a circuit 
court order denying a state official's claim of qualified 
immunity in a § 1983 action, so long as the order is based on an 
issue of law, and the official initiates the appeal within the 
time specified in § 808.04.  Regarding the present case, we note 
that although the circuit court judge indicated factual disputes 
remain, her order denying Petitioners' claim of qualified 
immunity turned on an issue of law.  More specifically, the 
summary judgment order issued turned on whether Arneson's due 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
16
process rights were clearly established at the time of his 
suspension.  Accordingly, since the circuit court order denying 
Petitioners' claim of qualified immunity was based on an issue of 
law, and Petitioners filed their petition for leave to appeal the 
order within the time required by § 808.04, we remand this case 
to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with 
this decision. 
 
By the Court. The cause is remanded to the court of 
appeals with directions to allow an interlocutory appeal. 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
17
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.:  
95-1592-LV and 95-2150 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
95-1592-LV 
 
 
 
 
Rodney A. Arneson,   
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,  
 
 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
Marcia Jezwinski, Personnel Coordinator,  
 
 
 
 
Administrative Data Processing,  
 
 
 
 
UW-Madison, Durwood Meyer, Assistant  
 
 
 
 
Director, Administrative Data Processing,  
 
 
 
 
UW-Madison and Dan Thoftne, Computer  
 
 
 
 
Operations Manager, Administrative Data  
 
 
 
 
Processing, UW-Madison,   
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Petitioners.  
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
95-2150 
 
 
 
 
Rodney A. Arneson,   
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,  
 
 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
Marcia Jezwinski, Personnel Coordinator,  
 
 
 
 
Administrative Data Processing, University 
of  
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin-Madison, Durwood Meyer,  
 
 
 
 
Assistant Director, Administrative Data  
 
 
 
 
Processing, University of Wisconsin-Madison  
 
 
 
 
and Dan Thoftne, Computer Operations  
 
 
 
 
Manager, Administrative Data Processing,  
 
 
 
 
University of Wisconsin-Madison,  
 
 
 
 
Administrative Data Processing, University 
of  
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin-Madison,   
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants.  
  
 
 
______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 20, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 18, 1996 
 
 
 
95-1592-LV & 95-2150 
 
18
 
 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
 
MORIA KRUEGER 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICES:  
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners the 
cause was argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by James C. 
Murray and Jacobson & Macaulay, Madison and oral argument by 
James C. Murray.