Title: In Re: T.S.; Indiana Dept. of Child Services, LaPorte County v. LaPorte County CASA, et al
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 46S04-0904-JV-160
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
Autumn Dusk Halaschak  
 
 
Indiana Dep't of Child Services, LaPorte County 
 
Michigan City, In 
diana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Henke 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Dep't of Child Services, Central Admin. 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE LAPORTE CIRCUIT COURT 
 
Nancy L. Gettinger, Magistrate 
Michigan City, Indiana 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE LAPORTE COUNTY CASA 
 
David. K. Payne 
Braje, Nelson & James 
Michigan City, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
No.  46S04-0904-JV-160 
 
IN RE T.S., A CHILD IN NEED OF SERVICES 
 
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, LAPORTE COUNTY, 
Appellant, 
v. 
LAPORTE CIRCUIT COURT, AND  
LAPORTE COUNTY CASA 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellees. 
_________________________________ 
 
Expedited Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court, No. 46C01-0804-JC-48   
The Honorable Thomas Alevizos, Judge 
The Honorable Nancy L. Gettinger, Magistrate 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 46A04-0902-JV-78 
_________________________________ 
 
April 17, 2009 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
To provide an orderly and expedited procedure for appellate review of certain juvenile 
court decisions about placement recommendations made by the Indiana Department of Child 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Apr 17 2009, 11:00 am
 
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Services ("DCS"), this Court promulgated Indiana Appellate Rule 14.1, which became effective 
January 1, 2009.  Today's case presents the first appeal received under this new rule.   
 
We hold that: (1) Rule 14.1 expedited appeals are available to the process of modifying 
dispositional decrees regarding child placement where a juvenile court does not follow DCS's 
recommendation, (2) the juvenile court must accept DCS's placement recommendations unless it 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the recommendation is "unreasonable" or "contrary 
to the welfare and best interests of the child," (3) a finding by the juvenile court that DCS's rec-
ommendation is unreasonable or contrary to the child's welfare and best interests is reviewed on 
appeal for clear error, and (4) the juvenile court's placement determination in this case was not 
clearly erroneous.   
 
T.S., a child, was removed from his mother's care because of allegations of physical 
abuse, found to be a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS"), and placed with his half-brother, 
K.S., in the foster home of K.S.'s paternal grandparents.  After several months, DCS requested 
that T.S. be reunited, but the LaPorte Circuit Court, exercising jurisdiction as a juvenile court, 
decided it would be contrary to T.S.'s best interests to follow DCS's recommendation and imme-
diately return him to his mother's care.  The juvenile court found that T.S. should remain with the 
foster parents until the end of the school year.   
 
 
DCS appealed the juvenile court's decision pursuant to Appellate Rule 14.1, challenging 
the court's placement order and contending that its recommendations had been neither unreason-
able, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, nor contrary to the welfare or best inter-
ests of the child.  Both the juvenile court and the Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") 
responded in support of the juvenile court's decision.  The CASA also filed a motion in the Court 
of Appeals to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the juvenile court's decision was not within the 
category of rulings appealable under Appellate Rule 14.1.  The Court of Appeals held that the 
juvenile court's ruling was subject to Appellate Rule 14.1 but found that the juvenile court "did 
not abuse its discretion in rejecting DCS's placement recommendation."  In re T.S., 902 N.E.2d 
332, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  DCS sought transfer, asserting that the Court of Appeals used the 
incorrect standard of appellate review.  We granted transfer.   
 
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This expedited appeal of the juvenile court's determination thus presents this Court with 
three issues:  (1) whether the juvenile court's order rejecting DCS's placement recommendation is 
eligible for expedited appeal under Rule 14.1, (2) what is the appropriate appellate standard of 
review applicable for such expedited appeals, and (3) whether the juvenile court properly re-
jected DCS's recommendation to immediately return T.S. to his mother's custody.   
 
 
As to whether the juvenile court's decision was appealable under Rule 14.1, we agree 
with DCS and the Court of Appeals that it was.  Rule 14.1 provides that orders entered under In-
diana Code § 31-34-19-6.1(f) are eligible for expedited appeal.  In this case, DCS requested that 
the juvenile court modify its earlier dispositional decree "by removing [T.S.] from his current 
foster placement and immediately returning him to Mother's care and custody."  In re T.S., 902 
N.E.2d at 334.  Section 31-34-23-1(2)(C) gives DCS the authority to request such a modification, 
section 31-34-23-3(b) requires the juvenile court to hold a hearing on such request, and section 
31-34-23-4 provides that section 31-34-19 "appl[ies] to the preparation and use of a modification 
report" and that DCS shall prepare a report in such a hearing.  What may have originally begun 
as a periodic review became a modification hearing on the juvenile court's initial order of dispo-
sition.   
 
Here, the juvenile court reached a result contrary to the DCS recommendations, made 
written findings, and concluded that it "is in [T.S.]'s best interest to remain in current rela-
tive/foster placement until the end of the 2008-2009 school year," and that "[t]o immediately re-
move him from this home at this time would be disruptive, counterproductive to the progress he 
has been making and not in his best interests."  Appellant's App'x at 23  This was consistent with 
sections 31-34-19-6.1(d) and (e), which provide that the court shall enter its dispositional decree 
with written findings and conclusions and specifically state why it is not accepting DCS's final 
recommendations contained in DCS's supplemental report.  Section 31-34-19-6.1(f), in turn, pro-
vides:   
If the juvenile court enters its findings and decree under subsections (d) and (e), the de-
partment may appeal the juvenile court's decree under any available procedure provided 
by the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure or the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
allow any disputes arising under this section to be decided in an expeditious manner. 
 
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Ind. Code § 31-34-19-6.1(f) (emphasis added).  The juvenile court's placement order therefore 
constitutes a new dispositional decree, and DCS is thus appealing the juvenile court's placement 
order entered under § 31-34-19-6.1.  Rule 14.1's clear language permits an expedited appeal in 
cases of disagreement between the juvenile court and DCS under this section.  
 
 
We next consider the proper standard of review to be applied by appellate courts consi-
dering such expedited appeals.  The function of the juvenile court in the underlying determina-
tion is specifically delineated by statute:   
     The juvenile court shall accept each final recommendation of [DCS] . . . unless the ju-
venile court finds that a recommendation is:  
(1) unreasonable, based on the facts and circumstances of the case; or  
(2) contrary to the welfare and best interests of the child. 
Id. § 31-34-19-6.1(d).  But the parties disagree regarding the proper standard of appellate review 
when, as in this case, the juvenile court makes a determination under this statute that is contrary 
to the final DCS recommendation and DCS initiates an expedited appeal.  DCS argues that   
the statute specifically provides the applicable standard of review: the trial court is to ac-
cept DCS's recommendations, unless they are unreasonable or contrary to the welfare 
and best interests of the child.  The statute presumes DCS's recommendations are correct.  
Accordingly, on review, deference must be given DCS, and the onus is upon the trial 
court to show why DCS's recommendations are unreasonable or contrary to the child's 
welfare and best interests.  Given deference to the trial court while on review abrogates 
the clear intent of the statute.   
 
DCS Pet. to Transfer from Ind. App. R. 14.1 Expedited Appeal at 1.   
 
 
We agree with the DCS as to the statute's operation at the trial court level, but find that 
appellate review is guided by existing standards.  The statute makes clear that the juvenile court 
is to accept DCS's recommendations unless the court finds that they are "unreasonable, based on 
the facts and circumstances of the case," or "contrary to the welfare and best interests of the 
child."  Ind. Code § 31-34-19-6.1(d).  And the statute requires, in the event "the juvenile court 
does not accept one (1) or more of [DCS's] final recommendations," that the court enter "written 
findings and conclusions" and "specifically state why the juvenile court is not accepting the final 
recommendations."  Id. § 31-34-19-6.1(e).  Indiana Code § 31-34-12-3 provides that any finding 
 
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by a juvenile court (unrelated to termination of parental rights or child delinquency) must be 
based on a preponderance of the evidence.   
 
 
We thus agree with DCS that the statute creates in the juvenile court a presumption of 
correctness for the DCS final recommendations, relieving DCS of the burden of initially coming 
forward with evidence to support its findings and requiring that any resulting decision contrary to 
the DCS recommendation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  Because of 
the statutory presumption favoring DCS's final recommendations, juvenile courts thus lack unfet-
tered discretion to make a contrary decision.     
 
 
But once the juvenile court has appropriately considered the DCS recommendations in 
light of the relevant evidence and reached a contrary conclusion, the appellate function is go-
verned by Indiana Trial Rule 52, which states that "the court on appeal shall not set aside the 
findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."  Ind. T.R. 52(A).  As acknowledged by 
DCS,1 this review is implemented on appeal by a two-tiered analysis, considering first whether 
the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment.  See Bes-
ter v. Lake County Office of Family and Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (applying 
this standard to the termination of parental rights).  Findings are clearly erroneous when there are 
no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support them.  Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 
102 (Ind. 1996).  A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's 
conclusions or the conclusions do not support the resulting judgment.  Id.  The appellate court 
should not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but should view the evi-
dence and its reasonable inferences most favorably to the judgment.  Dunson v. Dunson, 769 
N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 2002).  It is thus more apt to describe appellate review of determina-
tions under this statute as applying "clearly erroneous" rather than "abuse of discretion" as the 
operative standard.     
 
 
With regard to the DCS's challenge to the juvenile court's decision in this case, we must 
thus evaluate whether the court's departure from the final DCS recommendation was clearly er-
                                                 
1 Appellant's Br. at 1 
 
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roneous.  To support its appellate claim, DCS argues the juvenile court's decision to allow T.S. 
"to remain in foster care until the end of the school year is not in his best interest and was clearly 
erroneous as it was not based on the facts and circumstances before the court."  Appellant's Br. at 
2.  DCS emphasizes evidence tending to support its recommendation and minimizes evidence 
supporting the juvenile court's decision.  It does not, however, identify any of the juvenile court's 
individual written findings as lacking in supporting evidence.  The essential thrust of DCS's ap-
pellate contention, as seen in its concluding summary, is that "the trial court has not shown" that 
DCS's recommendations were unreasonable or contrary to the welfare and best interest of the 
child.  Id. at 8.   
 
 
The juvenile court expressly concluded that DCS's recommendations are "contrary to the 
welfare and best interests of the child and are unreasonable based on the facts and circums-
tances" and then supported this conclusion with specific factual findings.  Appellant's App'x at 
22-23.  The juvenile court discussed the evidence of T.S.'s relationship with his mother, his 
school performance, his relationship with his foster parent, his personal wishes, the history of 
physical abuse to T.S. from his mother, the mother's prior substance abuse, the mother's more 
recent intensive substance abuse treatment, and the advantages of waiting until the end of the 
current school year to begin reunification with his mother.  Id.  DCS has not established or as-
serted that any of the juvenile court's specific factual findings are unsupported by any facts or 
inferences.  Nor has DCS shown that the findings fail to support the juvenile court's determina-
tion contrary to the DCS recommendations.  We decline to find that the juvenile court's determi-
nation was clearly erroneous.   
 
 
We affirm the juvenile court.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.