Title: Cokes v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091507
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2010

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
RANDOLPH GEORGE COKES, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 091507  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 10, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the trial court erred 
when it denied the motion of Randolph George Cokes, Jr. 
(“Cokes”) to withdraw his waiver of his right to a jury trial 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond on the day of his 
scheduled bench trial. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Cokes was charged with possession of marijuana in 
violation of Code § 18.2-250.1, as well as possession of heroin 
and cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250(A)(a).  On July 3, 
2008, Cokes appeared before the trial court.1  During that 
appearance, counsel for Cokes represented that during the 
preliminary hearing of April 23, 2008, Cokes requested a jury 
trial.  Counsel then apologized to the trial court “for setting 
it for a bench [trial].” 
                     
1 It appears from the record that the trial court and the 
Commonwealth expected Cokes’ July 3, 2008 appearance to be a 
bench trial.  However, the trial court agreed with counsel for 
Cokes that Cokes was not sufficiently prepared to proceed to 
trial on that day. 
 
Prior to scheduling Cokes’ jury trial, the Commonwealth 
moved the trial court to revoke Cokes’ bond.  In support of its 
motion, the Commonwealth cited the fact that Cokes had been 
subsequently charged with additional drug-related offenses 
while released on bond. 
 
The trial court temporarily set aside the question of bond 
revocation, instead focusing on a suitable trial date.  The 
trial court inquired of Cokes’ counsel, “[w]hat is your best 
estimate of it going forward as a jury trial, your attorney 
assessment, just so I can schedule properly?”  Counsel conceded 
that his only contact with Cokes was a brief discussion with 
him at the preliminary hearing, and another immediately prior 
to the present appearance.  He concluded that he “ha[dn’t] had 
a real chance to evaluate that yet.” 
 
The trial court then admonished Cokes and his counsel that 
if it were to set a jury trial, the trial court would “double 
or triple book it,” adding that the trial court was likely to 
revoke Cokes’ bond.  The trial court noted the practical 
consequence of these actions to Cokes and his counsel:  if the 
case were double- or triple-booked, “if [Cokes is] innocent, he 
will remain in jail much longer . . . than he needs to” in the 
event his case is postponed due to a scheduling conflict. 
 
Cokes addressed the trial court himself, acknowledging 
that he “asked them in the lockup for a jury trial.”  The trial 
 
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court responded, “[y]ou’re going to get one.  I just want to 
make sure you understand what a jury trial is.”  The trial 
court then conducted a colloquy with Cokes, identifying the 
material differences between a bench trial and a jury trial.  
At the conclusion of the colloquy, the clerk offered August 7, 
2008 as a possible trial date. 
 
Counsel for Cokes then stated, “[y]our Honor, Mr. 
Cokes . . . has just informed me that he is prepared to go 
forward today with the bench trial.  I have had very limited 
opportunity to speak with him about the – his right to 
testify.”  The trial court responded, 
I don’t think that’s advisable, sir, because I 
don’t think you’ve had enough time to talk to 
your attorney.  I can schedule this quickly for 
a bench trial, but I don’t think it’s in your 
best interest if your attorney hasn’t had enough 
time to talk to you.  All right.  And you’ve got 
other charges pending anyway. 
 
After discussing whether August 7, 2008 was a viable trial date 
for the parties, the trial court asked Cokes if he wished to be 
tried “in front of the judge or a jury.”  Cokes responded, 
“[i]n front of the judge.” 
 
Once the trial date was established, the trial court again 
addressed Cokes:  “I’ve discussed with you the differences 
between a judge trial and jury trial.  And you discussed it 
with your attorney; is that correct?”  Cokes acknowledged that 
he had, and he again expressed his desire to be tried by a 
 
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judge.  The trial court then revoked Cokes’ bond on the grounds 
that he violated the conditions of his bond when he was charged 
with additional drug-related offenses.  On July 9, 2008, the 
trial court entered an order continuing Cokes’ case to August 
7, 2008.  In that order, the trial court acknowledged that 
Cokes “voluntarily waived his right to a trial by jury” on the 
charged offenses.2 
 
On August 7, 2008, following the clerk’s reading of the 
charges he faced, the trial court asked Cokes whether he wished 
to be tried by the judge or a jury.  After conferring with his 
attorney, counsel for Cokes addressed the trial court.  He 
acknowledged that Cokes had initially requested a jury trial at 
the July 3, 2008 appearance, but then waived his right to a 
jury trial following a colloquy with the trial court.  Counsel 
then stated, “I informed him that he already waived on the 
record, but as we’re still on the record, he would like to say 
he would want to be tried by a jury at this time.  And I 
understand he has waived on the record.” 
 
The Commonwealth responded, “Judge, I have all our 
witnesses here and are ready to go forward based on his prior 
waiver and decision to have a bench trial today.”  The trial 
court denied Cokes’ motion to withdraw his waiver of his right 
                     
2 During oral argument before this Court, Cokes 
acknowledged that he made a voluntary and knowing waiver of his 
right to a jury trial during his July 3, 2008 appearance. 
 
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to a jury trial, noting, “I think that asking for a jury trial 
on the – right at the moment of trial is too late once he’s 
waived a jury trial.”  The case was tried without a jury and 
the trial court found Cokes guilty of all charges. 
 
The Court of Appeals, per curiam, denied Cokes’ petition 
for appeal.  Cokes v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2407-08-2 (April 
23, 2009).  Cokes timely filed his notice of appeal and we 
granted an appeal on the following assignment of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying Cokes’ request to 
withdraw his jury trial waiver and to proceed with a jury 
trial. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
On the day Cokes’ bench trial was set to begin, Cokes made 
a motion to withdraw his waiver of his right to a jury trial.  
The trial court denied Cokes’ motion.  “[O]nce a defendant makes 
a voluntary and intelligent waiver of [his right to a jury 
trial], his request to withdraw that waiver and be tried by a 
jury is subject to the circuit court’s discretion.”  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 262 Va. 661, 670, 553 S.E.2d 760, 764 
(2001).  “In evaluating whether a trial court abused its 
discretion . . . we do not substitute our judgment for that of 
the trial court.  Rather, we consider only whether the record 
fairly supports the trial court’s action.”  Grattan v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
B. 
Withdrawal of a Waiver of the Right to a Trial by Jury 
 
“The right of a defendant to a jury trial in a criminal 
case is secured by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution of 
Virginia,” Williams, 262 Va. at 670, 553 S.E.2d at 764, the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and by 
statute.  See Code §§ 19.2-260 and 8.01-336.  We have 
previously observed, “[t]he right to a jury trial is one of the 
cornerstones of our legal system.”  Norfolk Southern Railway 
Co. v. Bowles, 261 Va. 21, 28, 539 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2001). 
 
Relying upon the analytical framework we first adopted in 
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 553, 238 S.E.2d 834 (1977), in 
Williams we stated the general rule regarding the withdrawal of 
a waiver of jury trial: 
 
Whether one accused of crime who has 
regularly waived a jury trial will be permitted 
to withdraw the waiver and have his case tried 
before a jury is ordinarily within the 
discretion of the [circuit] court.  The rule, as 
expressed in some cases, is that if an accused’s 
application for withdrawal of waiver is made in 
due season so as not to substantially delay or 
impede the cause of justice, the trial court 
should allow the waiver to be withdrawn. 
 
 
The authorities are uniformly to the effect 
that a motion for withdrawal of waiver made 
after the commencement of the trial is not 
timely and should not be allowed.  Whether a 
motion for the withdrawal of a waiver of trial 
by jury made prior to the actual commencement of 
the trial of the case is timely depends 
 
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primarily upon the facts and circumstances of 
the individual case.  Where there is no showing 
that granting the motion would unduly delay the 
trial or would otherwise impede justice, the 
motion is usually held to be timely.  In some 
cases, however, it has been held that a motion 
for withdrawal of a waiver of jury trial, 
although made prior to the trial, was not timely 
and was properly denied by the trial court, the 
decisions in these cases being based primarily 
upon the ground that granting the motion would 
have resulted in an unreasonable delay of the 
trial. 
 
262 Va. at 670, 553 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Thomas, 218 Va. at 
555, 238 S.E.2d at 835) (emphasis added). 
 
In Thomas, although the motion to withdraw the waiver of a 
jury trial was made eleven days prior to the trial date, the 
trial court did not act on the motion at that time.  218 Va. at 
556, 238 S.E.2d at 835.  Upon weighing the facts and 
circumstances in light of the defendant’s constitutional and 
statutory rights to a jury trial, we held that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it denied the defendant the right to 
withdraw his waiver of a jury trial.  Id. at 556, 238 S.E.2d at 
836.  Central to that holding was the fact “[t]he record [wa]s 
devoid of any showing that a jury could not have been impaneled 
for the trial on December 3; that the motion was made solely 
for the purpose of delay; and that a continuance of the cases 
. . . would unduly delay the trial or impede the cause of 
justice.”  Id. at 556, 238 S.E.2d at 835-36. 
 
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Similarly, the record in this case fails to disclose that 
the motion was made solely for the purpose of delay or whether, 
in the ordinary course of the circuit court’s operation, Cokes’ 
request for a jury trial could have been accommodated at the 
time it was made.  The record also fails to disclose the number 
of witnesses who would be inconvenienced by the continuance, or 
the difficulty rescheduling the trial would present to those 
witnesses.  Instead of establishing that granting Cokes’ motion 
“would unduly delay the trial or would otherwise impede 
justice,” id. at 555, 238 S.E.2d at 835, the record leaves this 
Court to speculate whether Cokes’ request could have been 
honored in a timely fashion, thereby vindicating his 
constitutional and statutory rights without impeding the 
administration of justice.  In the absence of such evidence, we 
hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
Cokes’ motion to withdraw his waiver of his right to a jury 
trial. 
 
Our analysis today does nothing to undermine the broad 
discretion vested in trial courts to determine whether justice 
would be impeded by granting a defendant’s motion to withdraw 
his waiver of a jury trial.  It merely confirms that the basis 
of that determination must be established on the record.  In 
Williams, our last decision addressing this issue, we upheld 
the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw 
 
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his waiver of a right to a jury trial.  262 Va. at 671, 553 
S.E.2d at 765.  Unlike the records in Thomas and in this case, 
the record in Williams “show[ed] that if Williams had been 
allowed to withdraw his jury trial waiver and be tried by a 
jury, completion of the trial could have been substantially 
delayed and the cause of justice impeded.”  Id. 
This finding was based upon evidence that Williams’ case 
“originally had been set for trial ten months earlier, and 
already had been substantially delayed during the several 
months that Williams remained a fugitive.” Id.  Further, the 
Commonwealth “intended to call 11 witnesses to testify” and the 
victim “was leaving the United States the following Monday to 
return to his native country for three months.”  Id.  Based on 
those facts and circumstances, we affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that granting Williams’ motion would impede the 
cause of justice, notwithstanding the defendant’s contention 
that the trial court recognized that “the trial would [not] 
have to be rescheduled to another day if the court granted 
Williams’ request,” but rather “Williams’ request for a jury 
trial [might only] delay the case for ‘several hours.’”  Id. at 
669-70, 553 S.E.2d at 764. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Because the trial court abused its discretion when it 
refused Cokes’ request for a jury trial, we will reverse the 
 
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judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the trial court 
for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent.  I do not agree that the circuit 
court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion 
for a jury trial made at the very moment his trial was to begin 
and after he had voluntarily waived his right to such a trial.  
True, this was the waiver of a cornerstone right, but the 
courts uphold waivers of such rights every day.  To me, this is 
more a case of a defendant trying to play fast and loose with 
the court system in order to delay being tried than it is a 
case of an abuse of judicial discretion.  I would affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
 
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