Title: Commonwealth v. Gibson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12649
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12649 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAX GIBSON. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 10, 2023. - August 10, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Home Invasion.  Armed Assault in 
a Dwelling.  Armed Assault with Intent to Rob.  Firearms.  
Joint Enterprise.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New 
trial, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury, 
Duplicative convictions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 12, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on July 29, 2021, was heard by 
Valerie A. Yarashus, J. 
 
 
Jennifer H. O'Brien for the defendant. 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In February 2016, a Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder and related robbery and firearms 
offenses in connection with the shooting death of Luis Rodriguez 
2 
 
during a botched robbery.  At trial, the Commonwealth alleged 
that the defendant was the shooter, recruited by Dinkue "D" 
Brown,1 who wanted to teach the victim a lesson by robbing him.  
In execution of this plan, the defendant went to the victim's 
apartment, knocked on the door, and pushed past the victim into 
the apartment when the victim answered the door.  A fight 
ensued, after which the defendant fatally shot the victim. 
 
In his direct appeal, consolidated with his appeal from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant raises an 
assortment of arguments.  He first claims that a new trial is 
necessary because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
introduce exculpatory telephone records.  The defendant also 
contends that the predicate felony of armed assault in a 
dwelling merged with the killing of the victim and could not 
support his felony-murder conviction.  Moreover, the defendant 
argues that his conviction of armed assault with intent to rob 
violated his right to be free from double jeopardy.  The 
defendant further claims that the trial judge erred in 
instructing the jury on joint venture and submitting a general 
verdict to the jury.  In addition, the defendant requests that 
we vacate his firearms-related convictions in light of our 
 
1 After a jury trial in September 2016, Brown was convicted 
of murder in the first degree and other offenses.  His direct 
appeal is pending in this court.  Commonwealth vs. Brown, SJC-
12650. 
3 
 
recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 
(2023).  Finally, the defendant asks this court to exercise its 
extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
grant him a new trial or reduce the murder conviction to a 
lesser degree of guilt. 
For the reasons that follow, we vacate the defendant's 
firearms-related convictions.  After having carefully examined 
the record and considered the defendant's arguments, we affirm 
the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree based 
on a theory of felony-murder, as well as his convictions of home 
invasion and armed assault with intent to rob, and we also 
affirm the denial of his motion for a new trial.2 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for later discussion. 
a.  Events prior to the shooting.  At the time of his 
death, the victim lived on the third floor of an apartment 
building in Fitchburg and was a known drug dealer.  A mutual 
friend of both the defendant and the victim, Brown sold drugs 
supplied by the victim. 
 
2 The defendant argues, and the Commonwealth concedes, that 
his conviction of armed assault in a dwelling is a lesser 
included offense that is duplicative of his conviction of murder 
in the first degree based on the theory of felony-murder.  We 
therefore vacate the defendant's conviction of armed assault in 
a dwelling.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 445 Mass. 119, 132 
(2005). 
4 
 
 
On the night of June 20, 2013, the victim and his 
girlfriend, Cendy Mejia-Rincon, met the victim's friends, 
including Brown, Mallory Nooks, and Joseph Dale, to go to a bar, 
and they ended the night at the victim's apartment.  During that 
night, the victim made a disparaging comment to Brown, and 
later, the victim intervened in an altercation between Brown and 
Nooks, telling Brown he needed to show women more respect.  At 
some point, while the group was at the victim's apartment, the 
victim asked Brown to pay a debt.  Brown pulled out a one 
hundred dollar bill and told the victim he would pay him the 
rest later that day.  The gathering ended around 6 A.M., and the 
victim and Mejia-Rincon went to bed. 
 
The next day, at around 9 A.M., Michele Kelley went to 
Brown's apartment in Fitchburg to pick up Brown in her blue 2006 
sport utility vehicle (SUV), so that the two could deliver 
drugs.  Kelley's friend, Jenna Kearchner, and Kelley's twenty 
month old son joined Kelley and Brown on their delivery route.  
They conducted from six to eight drug deliveries over the course 
of one to two hours.  During this time, Brown talked on his cell 
phone and was aggravated because the victim was "badmouthing 
him" and making him look "bad" by saying that Brown had not paid 
money he owed the victim.  Brown stated that "he needed to do 
something about it." 
5 
 
 
Brown telephoned his girlfriend, Gihan Alcantara, and told 
her that he needed his gun.  He instructed Alcantara to leave it 
under the seat of a vehicle parked in front of her house in 
Fitchburg.  Kelley drove to Alcantara's residence, and Brown 
ordered Kearchner to retrieve the "package" from under the seat 
of the parked vehicle.  Kearchner complied and returned to the 
car with a plastic shopping bag containing a revolver wrapped in 
a T-shirt.  Brown inspected the revolver and then telephoned the 
defendant, telling him that Brown "needed him . . . right away" 
to do "something," and that the defendant would "be paid well."  
Brown then ordered Kelley to drive him to pick up the defendant. 
 
At the time, the defendant had been dating and living with 
his girlfriend, Ashley Fruguglietti, and their infant son in an 
apartment in Gardner.  On that day, Fruguglietti had arranged 
for her friend, Alicia Francis, to drive her to an appointment 
at 1 P.M. while the defendant was to stay with their son.  At 
some time between 11 A.M. and 12 P.M., after Francis had arrived 
to meet Fruguglietti, the defendant received a telephone call 
and provided the caller with directions to their home.3  He told 
Fruguglietti that he could no longer watch their son, because 
 
3 Fruguglietti testified that the telephone call occurred 
between 11 A.M. and 11:30 A.M., while Francis testified that the 
telephone call occurred around noon. 
6 
 
"he had to go take care of something."  The defendant left the 
apartment at around 12:10 P.M. 
 
When Kelley's car arrived at the defendant's residence, the 
defendant entered the back seat with a black duffel bag 
containing firearms and knives, and he was wearing a black 
hooded sweatshirt, black pants, sneakers, and a black hat.  
During the twenty-minute car ride to the victim's residence, the 
defendant and Brown discussed how the defendant would rob the 
victim of his drugs and cash, and that Brown would keep the cash 
and the defendant would keep the drugs.  The defendant removed 
the revolver from the bag and examined it.  As Kelley's car 
approached the victim's residence in Fitchburg, Brown provided 
the defendant with instructions and a description of the layout 
of the victim's apartment; Brown warned the defendant that the 
victim's girlfriend, Mejia-Rincon, might be present. 
 
After surveying the apartment and street, the group 
returned to Brown's apartment, where Brown ordered Kearchner and 
Kelley's son to stay with Dale, to be held as "collateral."4  
Kelley, Brown, and the defendant then left for the victim's 
apartment in Kelley's blue SUV; Kelley drove, Brown sat in the 
front passenger's seat, and the defendant sat in the middle seat 
of the row behind Kelley and Brown.  Kelley parked near the 
 
4 Dale was tried jointly with the defendant on three charges 
of kidnapping, on which he was acquitted. 
7 
 
victim's building, with her car angled slightly outward so that 
they could leave quickly.  The defendant wrapped a black T-shirt 
around his head and face, leaving only his eyes visible, stepped 
out of the vehicle, and walked to the victim's apartment. 
b.  The shooting.  Mejia-Rincon testified that at "[a]bout 
twelve" or "noontime," she heard a knock at the door; she 
remained in the bedroom while the victim tossed a gun on the 
bed, left the bedroom, went to the door, and asked who was 
there.  Mejia-Rincon heard, "It's D," but she did not readily 
recognize the man's voice.  The victim opened the door, and a 
fight ensued, causing a couch to shift and a glass to fall on 
the floor.  When Mejia-Rincon peeked from one of the two bedroom 
doors that opened into the living room, the fighting had 
stopped, and she saw a person "wearing all black" with "a black 
hat that covered the whole head" pointing an "old-fashioned gun" 
with a cylinder at the victim, who was standing against the 
wall.  After observing the two individuals "for less than a 
minute," Mejia-Rincon closed the bedroom door and heard people 
running, followed by two or three gunshots.  When Mejia-Rincon 
opened the second door to the bedroom, which provided a view of 
the entrance, she saw the man dressed in black with his head 
covered walk out of the apartment.  She noticed marks on the 
back of the shooter's neck, which appeared to be tattoos, but 
she was not wearing her eyeglasses.  Mejia-Rincon did not see 
8 
 
the victim.  Mejia-Rincon testified that she thought the shooter 
might have been Brown but was not sure because she never saw the 
shooter's face.  The incident "happened quick[ly]," in "a short 
time," over the course of "maybe like ten, fifteen minutes." 
 
On the day of the shooting, at exactly noon, Amanda 
Compton, the victim's first-floor neighbor, heard a "bunch of 
noise," like people wrestling, followed by what sounded like a 
"herd of elephants" coming down the stairs.  She did not recall 
hearing gunshots. 
 
"[A] couple of minutes" after the defendant left her 
vehicle, Kelley heard approximately three gunshots.  About one 
minute later, she observed the victim leave the apartment 
building, shirtless and bleeding from the chest, and "[dive] 
into what looked like bushes."  Right after, the defendant also 
left the residence and got into the back seat of the vehicle, 
stating that his "life [was] over" because his deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) would be in the victim's apartment.  The defendant 
removed his T-shirt, and Kelley believed that the defendant had 
cut his hand, which is why he expressed concern that his DNA 
would be in the apartment.  The defendant cried and said that 
the victim fought back, and that he did not want to kill the 
victim, but that the victim was going to die.  On Brown's 
command, Kelley "peeled out" and left the area. 
9 
 
 
The victim's neighbor, Gary Laaksonen, arrived home from 
work and was outside at around 12:45 P.M.  From his front yard, 
about forty to fifty feet away, he observed a "bluish-gray" 
colored SUV parked across the street with two people in it -- a 
woman with reddish hair in a pulled back style in the driver's 
seat and a man with a shaved head in the front passenger's side.  
Laaksonen then saw his neighbor, the victim, who appeared to be 
scared, come out of his apartment building.  Approximately one 
to two minutes later, Laaksonen observed a second man leave the 
victim's apartment building, go to the vehicle parked across the 
street, enter by the rear passenger's side door, and say, "Let's 
go, let's get out of here." 
c.  Aftermath of the shooting.  Kelley drove to a 
convenience store, where Brown instructed her to park behind the 
store so that they could "get rid of the guns."  He also ordered 
Kelley to clean blood from the back seat where the defendant had 
sat.  The defendant expressed concern that Kelley was a witness 
to the events surrounding the shooting, so Brown made her 
promise not to tell anyone. 
The defendant, Brown, and Kelley then entered Tiffany 
Phillinger's apartment, which was in a building connected to the 
convenience store.  According to Phillinger, a friend of the 
defendant, the defendant and Brown arrived between 1 P.M. and 
1:30 P.M.  The defendant and Brown were "fidgety," and the 
10 
 
defendant appeared nervous.  She also noticed that the defendant 
had "a couple of spots of blood on his leg."  The defendant used 
Phillinger's bathroom to shower, and Phillinger gave the 
defendant and Brown a change of clothes.  They then went to the 
kitchen to listen to a police scanner to see whether anyone had 
reported Kelley's license plate.  While listening to the 
scanner, Brown asked the defendant, "Why did you do that?" and 
the defendant responded, "What did you expect me to do?  He was 
fighting me."  A day or two later, the defendant telephoned 
Phillinger and told her to "say that he wasn't at [her] house" 
and "not to mention [his] name, or else." 
At around 1:20 P.M., while still at the victim's residence, 
Mejia-Rincon telephoned two of the victim's friends and 
explained that she did not know where the victim had gone or 
what had happened to him.5  The victim's two friends arrived 
within the next twenty minutes; they searched for the victim but 
could not locate him.  After they "heard a lady scream" from 
outside, the three decided to stop their search and leave.  They 
left the apartment before police arrived. 
 
5 On the day of the shooting, Nooks received a telephone 
call about the shooting from her brother, one of the victim's 
friends, who had helped search for the victim.  Nooks then 
called Brown to ask him about what had happened; she testified 
that the call occurred between 11:30 A.M. and 12 P.M. 
11 
 
 
After the defendant and Brown cleaned up at Phillinger's 
apartment, the defendant left and went to Fruguglietti's 
mother's house.  The defendant arrived there at around 2:30 P.M.  
He was upset, had tears in his eyes, a cut on his hand, and 
blood on his sneakers.  The defendant told Fruguglietti that he 
had been in a fight, that he had "fucked up," and that he was 
sorry. 
Francis drove the defendant and Fruguglietti back to 
Gardner.  The defendant told Fruguglietti and Francis to provide 
him an alibi and to tell police that he was with them "from 
twelve to five" that day.  The defendant told Francis that he 
had "messed up," that he had been "in a fight for his life," and 
that he had tried to rob someone, but it had gone wrong; he then 
asked her to bring his sneakers to her work and to get rid of 
them in the Dumpster.  Francis complied. 
 
Later that night, the defendant told Francis and 
Fruguglietti that he needed a ride the next morning, June 22, 
2013, to meet a van that would bring him to New York City.  He 
also told them that he was "sorry," and that his intent was to 
rob the victim, but "it went wrong."  After being pressed by 
Fruguglietti, the defendant further explained what had occurred:  
he had knocked on the victim's door, pushed his way into the 
apartment, and pointed a gun at the victim when he realized the 
victim also had a gun.  He then said that "they [had] got[ten] 
12 
 
in a physical fight, and that the gun [had gone] off a few 
times; and he [had] looked around for something to take out of 
the house, and he [had] seen a girl in the house, so he ran 
out."  The defendant admitted that Brown told him the victim had 
drugs and money at his apartment, and "it was too good of an 
opportunity to pass up." 
d.  Police investigation.  At 2:16 P.M., emergency medical 
workers and police officers responded to a telephone call from a 
neighbor indicating that there was a man in need of assistance; 
they found the victim's body on the rear porch of a building 
near his apartment building.  A blood trail went from the 
victim's body, up some steps to a sidewalk and eventually to the 
front exterior stairs, the front porch, and through the interior 
stairs and hallway of the victim's apartment building, leading 
to his third-floor apartment.  The medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy reported that the victim had two gunshot 
wounds and "two graze gunshot wounds."  The victim also had 
abrasions on the side of his left abdomen, on the right side of 
his back, and on his right hip area; abrasions or scratches on 
both knees; and lacerations on his scalp and on the left side of 
his neck.  The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot 
wound to the torso. 
Inside the victim's apartment, police located three scales 
and a knife in the front bedroom, and two intertwined white T-
13 
 
shirts with blood stains, a folding knife, and a .40 caliber 
Smith & Wesson semiautomatic pistol in the living room.  In the 
kitchen, police observed a hole in the door trim to the pantry, 
wooden fragments on the kitchen table, a mark on the wall above 
the sink, a mark on the ceiling, and a projectile on the kitchen 
floor.  Police did not recover any shell casings, which the 
Commonwealth's ballistics expert testified is consistent with 
shots fired from a revolver.  He further opined that the 
projectile found in the kitchen, along with the two projectiles 
removed from the victim's body, could not have been fired by the 
firearm located in the victim's apartment.  Based on the 
markings in the victim's kitchen and the spent projectiles, the 
ballistics expert concluded that the shots were fired from the 
front of the living room into the kitchen area. 
On June 23, 2013, Kelley went to the Fitchburg police 
station and gave statements to police about the murder.  When 
she arrived at the police station, Kelley gave the officers the 
keys to her vehicle and told them that evidence of the murder 
would be in her car. 
Police searched the vehicle, finding blood stains at the 
back of the front passenger's seat "near the bottom of the arm-
rest area," and in the rear passenger's seat toward the middle 
seats on both the seat back and seat bottom.  The major male DNA 
profile obtained from the swab of the rear passenger's seat 
14 
 
matched the victim.  The defendant, Brown, and the victim were 
excluded as the source of the major DNA profile from the swab of 
the back of the front passenger's seat. 
On June 25, 2013, the defendant telephoned Fruguglietti and 
warned her "that the police were going to come to [her] house, 
and not to be stupid."  A few minutes later, police arrived and 
brought Fruguglietti and Francis to the police station for 
questioning.  Per the defendant's request,  Fruguglietti and 
Francis both lied to police officers, telling them that the 
defendant had been with them from 12 P.M. to 5 P.M. on the day 
of the shooting. 
Officers interviewed Francis again on July 9, during which 
she gave a statement that differed from her earlier interview 
when she said that she had been with the defendant on June 21 
from 12 P.M. to 5 P.M.  The defendant fled from Massachusetts, 
and he later was apprehended with Fruguglietti in Virginia on 
July 25. 
 
e.  Prior proceedings.  In August 2013, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with murder in the 
first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; home invasion, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18C; armed assault in a dwelling, G. L. c. 265, § 18A; armed 
assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); three counts 
of kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26; possession of a firearm 
without a firearm identification (FID) card, as a career 
15 
 
criminal, G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (h) (1), 10G (a); possession of 
ammunition without an FID card, as a career criminal, G. L. 
c. 269, §§ 10 (h) (1), 10G (a); unlawfully carrying a loaded 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (n); and 
threatening to commit a crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2.  
 
In January 2016, the defendant's joint trial with his 
codefendant, Dale, commenced and spanned two weeks.  In February 
2016, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of felony-murder, in addition to all the 
remaining charges, except for the three kidnapping charges and 
threatening charge, on which he was acquitted.  The defendant 
filed his notice of appeal soon thereafter, and the Commonwealth 
subsequently entered a nolle prosequi for the unlawful 
possession of ammunition charges. 
 
The defendant's appeal was docketed in this court in 2018.  
The defendant then filed a motion to stay his appeal and a 
motion for a new trial, which was remanded to the Superior 
Court.  The motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied 
the defendant's motion for a new trial after a nonevidentiary 
hearing, and the defendant again appealed.  We allowed the 
defendant's motion to consolidate his direct appeal with his 
appeal from the denial for his motion for a new trial. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
16 
 
failing to introduce three categories of telephone records, 
thereby depriving him of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defense, namely, that Brown was the shooter, while the 
defendant was at home in Gardner the entire time. 
When reviewing a defendant's appeal from the denial of a 
motion for a new trial in conjunction with the direct appeal of 
a conviction of murder in the first degree, "we do not evaluate 
his ineffective assistance claim under the traditional standard 
set forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648, 
656-657 (2022).  Instead, we apply the more favorable standard 
of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and review the defendant's claim for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. at 657.  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C. 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  Under this standard, "we first ask whether 
defense counsel committed an error in the course of trial," and 
if there was error, "we ask whether it was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."   Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 
Mass. 46, 62 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 
463, 472-473 (2018). 
We conclude that any errors by trial counsel did not create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62.  Accordingly, the motion judge did not 
abuse her discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new 
17 
 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 Mass. 189, 195, cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 168 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Phinney, 
446 Mass. 155, 158 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007) ("As the 
motion judge was not the trial judge, and as the motion judge 
conducted a nonevidentiary hearing, we are in 'as good a 
position as the motion judge to assess the trial record'" 
[footnote omitted]). 
Trial counsel explained that the Commonwealth provided him 
with telephone records of various witnesses and involved parties 
prior to trial.  From what he could recall, he did not introduce 
the telephone records because it was unclear to whom the 
telephone numbers belonged or who was using the telephones at 
the relevant times.  Trial counsel nonetheless conceded that his 
decision not to introduce telephone records in furtherance of 
the defendant's alibi defense was an oversight; he did not know 
there were telephone records that could have supported the 
defendant's alibi or "defense in any way." 
There are three categories of telephone records at issue:  
a 12:16 P.M. telephone call from the defendant's landline to 
Brown on the day of the shooting; Kelley's cell phone records 
between 11 A.M. and 1 P.M. on the day of the shooting, 
indicating her ability to access and use her cell phone; and 
Brown's cell phone records, specifically, a twenty-one minute 
18 
 
period of inactivity from 12:22 P.M. to 12:43 P.M. on the day of 
the shooting.  We analyze each in turn. 
 
i.  Telephone call at 12:16 P.M.  The defendant argues that 
the 12:16 P.M. telephone was important alibi evidence; it would 
be impossible for the defendant to be the shooter, where 
multiple witnesses testified that the shooting occurred at or 
around noontime and where the telephone call proves he was still 
at his house in Gardner at that time.  The motion judge 
concluded this information was not material because, even if the 
defendant had made that telephone call, it was possible for him 
still to travel the distance between Gardner and Fitchburg and 
to commit the murder in the time frame described "by at least 
some of the witnesses."  We agree. 
The witnesses provided varying testimony about when exactly 
the shooting occurred, which makes it difficult to discern a 
concrete timeline of events to support the defendant's theory 
that he could not have been in Fitchburg at the time of the 
shooting.  For instance, the victim's girlfriend, Mejia-Rincon, 
and the woman who was in the first-floor apartment on that day, 
Compton, both testified that the events occurred at noon.  
Laaksonen offered differing testimony, telling the jury that he 
saw the victim and an individual in pursuit of him leave the 
victim's residence at around 12:45 P.M.  Nooks recalled calling 
Brown to ask him about the shooting between 11:30 A.M. and 
19 
 
12 P.M., and one of the two friends who helped search for the 
victim received a telephone call from Mejia-Rincon at "around" 
1:20 P.M. immediately after the shooting.  According to 
Phillinger, the defendant and Brown arrived at her apartment 
between 1 P.M. and 1:30 P.M.  Finally, emergency personnel 
responded to a dispatch at 2:16 P.M., and Fruguglietti and 
Francis both testified that the defendant arrived at 
Fruguglietti's mother's house at around 2:30 P.M.  As the motion 
judge noted, all of the trial testimony "is consistent with the 
crucial events occurring between noon and 2 P.M., but beyond 
that, there are multiple differing estimates of the precise time 
of the shooting and surrounding circumstances." 
Considering the timeline evidence in its totality, even if 
trial counsel had introduced the 12:16 P.M. telephone call at 
trial and were able to prove the defendant was the individual 
who made that call, it likely would have had little effect on 
the jury's verdicts.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 
743-745 (2022) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where "cell 
phone records [did] not establish a different timeline from that 
developed at trial").  It cannot be said that trial counsel was 
ineffective where there is nothing that indicates "better work 
might have accomplished something material for the defense."  
Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 764 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977). 
20 
 
Moreover, trial counsel elicited testimony to place the 
alibi defense in front of the jury.  Fruguglietti testified that 
the defendant did not leave their apartment in Gardner until 
12:10 P.M.  Counsel highlighted this fact in his closing 
argument, stating that the defendant "at noontime on June 21, 
2013, is in Gardner, twenty to thirty minutes away from [the 
victim's apartment]."  Although introducing the 12:16 P.M. 
telephone call could have corroborated Fruguglietti's testimony, 
failure to introduce this evidence cannot be said to have 
resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Hensley, 454 Mass. 721, 736 
(2009), citing Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 347 
(1985) ("There is no requirement that trial counsel always 
present . . . documentary evidence to support an argument, 
especially where other evidence is presented to support it"). 
 
ii.  Kelley's cell phone records.  Next, the defendant 
argues that Kelley's cell phone records, showing that she was 
sending and receiving text messages and telephone calls between 
11 A.M. and 1 P.M. on the day of the shooting, indicates that 
she did have access to her cell phone while she was held 
captive, despite testifying that she did not, significantly 
undermining her credibility as a witness.  This argument is 
unavailing. 
21 
 
As an initial matter, "[e]ven [using] the more favorable 
standard of review under § 33E, a claim of ineffective 
assistance based on failure to use particular impeachment 
methods is difficult to establish."  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 
Mass. 340, 357 (2001).  Further, both trial counsel and 
investigating officers explained that it was difficult to 
distinguish who was using which cell phone.  A State police 
detective who investigated the victim's death testified that 
because there was "a lot of handing of cell phones back and 
forth," "there [was] no reliability as to who to associate, 
phone-to-number."  Even if trial counsel introduced Kelley's 
cell phone records to attempt to show that she did have access 
to and used her cell phone while she was being held captive, the 
jury already had heard that the cell phone records were an 
unreliable means of determining who was actually making a given 
telephone call. 
Trial counsel also diligently and thoroughly impeached 
Kelley by questioning her about her differing versions of events 
over time,6 her drug use and her dependency on Brown as her drug 
dealer, and the benefits she received from the prosecution for 
testifying in the defendant's trial.  Further impeachment of 
 
6 At a prior hearing in this case, Kelley testified that 
Brown was the individual who went into the victim's building to 
attempt to rob the victim. 
22 
 
Kelley with her cell phone records likely would not have 
affected the jury's verdict in this case, where "it would have 
been cumulative of the ample information trial counsel already 
had available and used effectively."  Watt, 484 Mass. at 764.  
See Fisher, 433 Mass. at 357 ("absent counsel's failure to 
pursue some obviously powerful form of impeachment available at 
trial, it is speculative to conclude that a different approach 
to impeachment would likely have affected the jury's 
conclusion"). 
 
iii.  Brown's cell phone records.  Finally, the defendant 
maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
introduce Brown's cell phone records, which would have shown a 
twenty-one minute period of inactivity between 12:22 P.M. and 
12:43 P.M. on the day of the shooting.  He argues that this 
period of inactivity supports the theory that Brown was the one 
who shot the victim, and not the defendant. 
We cannot say that introduction of these records would have 
influenced the jury verdict.  See Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62.  As 
the motion judge correctly noted, introduction of Brown's cell 
phone records could have hurt the defense, because they showed 
multiple telephone calls between the defendant and Brown on the 
day of the shooting.  They also corroborated Kelley's and 
Fruguglietti's testimony that the defendant received a telephone 
call from Brown in the time leading up to the shooting.  
23 
 
Although the period of silence in Brown's telephone usage 
supported the defendant's theory that Brown was the shooter, it 
equally would have tied the defendant to Brown, where the 
Commonwealth's theory was the defendant participated in a joint 
venture to rob and kill the victim.  The fact that Brown was not 
using his cell phone actively from 12:22 P.M. to 12:43 P.M. may 
have provided some support for the theory that Brown was the 
shooter, but those same records would have aided a theory that 
the defendant nonetheless was guilty of murder in the first 
degree as a joint venturer.  Where introduction of the cell 
phone records had the simultaneous potential to incriminate and 
exculpate the defendant, there can be no substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 
488 Mass. 597, 604 (2021) (counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to call witnesses where testimony "could cause more harm 
than good to the defense's case"). 
Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, 
we are confident that even if trial counsel had offered the 
telephone records, they would not have influenced the jury's 
conclusion that the defendant shot the victim.  We discern no 
error in the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial on this basis. 
 
b.  Felony-murder merger doctrine.  The defendant was 
convicted of felony-murder with the predicate felonies being 
24 
 
armed home invasion and armed assault in a dwelling.  At oral 
argument before this court, the issue of merger arose 
surrounding the Commonwealth's reliance on these charges to 
serve as the predicates for the charge of felony-murder in the 
first degree.  The parties were permitted to file supplemental 
briefing on this issue.  In his supplemental filing, the 
defendant argues that the trial judge erred by failing to 
instruct the jury on the merger doctrine of felony-murder, where 
armed assault in a dwelling was the predicate offense.  We agree 
that the trial judge should have instructed on merger, but it 
did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
"The merger doctrine functions as a constraint on the 
application of the felony-murder rule by limiting the 
circumstances in which a felony may serve as the predicate for 
felony-murder."  Commonwealth v. Fredette, 480 Mass. 75, 80 
(2018).7  Specifically, "the conduct which constitutes the felony 
must be separate from the acts of personal violence which 
constitute a necessary part of the homicide itself" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 
 
7 As both the murder and the defendant's trial occurred 
before our decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 
(2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), we do not address 
the effect that that decision has on the ongoing vitality of the 
merger doctrine.  See Fredette, 480 Mass. at 80 n.9. 
25 
 
272 (1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480, cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  The doctrine "ensures that not 
every assault that results in death will serve as a basis for 
murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder."  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 819 (2015). 
 
In Fredette, we established a two-step framework to analyze 
whether a felony merges with a subsequent killing in cases that 
predate our decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 
(2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  See Fredette, 480 
Mass. at 81.  The first step is to inquire whether, as a matter 
of law, the felony is capable of merger.  See Commonwealth v. 
Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 118 n.8, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 
(2018).  The second step is a factual inquiry; "[i]f merger is a 
possibility, it is for the jury to determine whether the felony 
that occurred was separate from the killing as a matter of 
fact."  Id., citing Fredette, supra at 84. 
 
i.  Separate intent or purpose.  A predicate felony is 
incapable of merger with the killing itself if it has "an intent 
or purpose separate and distinct from the act causing physical 
injury or death."  Fredette, 480 Mass. at 81.  Kidnapping, armed 
robbery, rape, and arson are examples of predicate felonies that 
are categorically incapable of merging with murder because they 
have an intent or purpose separate and distinct from the act of 
killing.  See id. at 86 ("Because aggravated kidnapping involves 
26 
 
an intent independent from the killing, neither form of 
aggravated kidnapping implicates the merger doctrine"); 
Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 556 (2000) (armed 
robbery does not merge with killing because underlying purpose 
of armed robbery is to steal, which is independent of intent to 
harm victim); Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 153 (1998), 
S.C., 467 Mass. 496 (2014) and 475 Mass. 54 (2016) ("the intent 
to commit the rape, not the intent to inflict serious bodily 
harm, was the substitute for the malice requirement of murder"); 
Commonwealth v. Quigley, 391 Mass. 461, 466 (1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985) (for purposes of merger doctrine, 
"rape, arson, robbery and burglary are sufficiently independent 
of the homicide" [citation omitted]).  If this condition is 
satisfied, no further analysis is required.  Fredette, supra 
at 81. 
Here, however, one of the potential predicate offenses was 
armed assault in a dwelling, which lacks "an independent 
felonious purpose from the intent to cause physical injury or 
death."  Fredette, 480 Mass. at 85.  See Gunter, 427 Mass. 
at 274-275 (there are circumstances "wherein armed assault in a 
dwelling is not a suitably independent felony to support a 
conviction of murder in the first degree").  Therefore, it was 
error for the trial judge not to instruct the jury on merger; it 
was for the jury to decide whether the conduct underlying the 
27 
 
felony was distinct from the act that caused the killing.  See 
Phap Buth, 480 Mass. at 118.  Because the defendant did not 
object at trial to the lack of instruction, we consider whether 
that error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See id. at 119; Gunter, supra at 274. 
 
ii.  Independent acts.  "If the underlying predicate felony 
does not have an independent felonious purpose, the court must 
then undertake a second step in the analysis, to determine 
whether the felony merges with the killing."  Fredette, 480 
Mass. at 84.  We turn next to whether the predicate felony 
merged with the shooting as a matter of fact.  See Phap Buth, 
480 Mass. at 118 n.8.  Armed assault in a dwelling "may serve as 
the predicate for felony-murder so long as the conduct that 
constitutes the armed assault (the underlying felony) is 
separate and distinct from the conduct necessary to kill the 
victim."  Fredette, supra at 85, citing Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 
438 Mass. 356, 358-359 (2003). 
 
Here, the defendant argues that there was a single struggle 
between the defendant and the victim that resulted in the death 
of the victim thereby implicating the merger doctrine.  We 
disagree.  Testimony by Mejia-Rincon, who was present at the 
time of the shooting, in addition to Fruguglietti's testimony 
and evidence of the victim's injuries, support that there were 
at least two separate assaults of the victim. 
28 
 
Mejia-Rincon testified that there was a knock at the door, 
and when the victim opened the door, a fight ensued.  After the 
fighting had ceased, Mejia-Rincon opened the bedroom door and 
looked out into the living room, where she saw the defendant 
pointing a gun at the victim, who was standing against the wall.  
After she closed the door again, she heard running and then two 
or three gun shots.  Fruguglietti also testified at trial, 
recounting the defendant's version of events.  The defendant 
told Fruguglietti that he knocked on the victim's door, pushed 
his way into the apartment, and proceeded to get into a physical 
fight with the victim.  The gun then went off a few times.  
Mejia-Rincon testified that "[e]verything happened quick[ly]," 
in "a short time," over the course of "maybe like ten, fifteen 
minutes." 
Based on the testimony given at trial there was at least 
one, and possibly two, assaults that occurred prior to the shots 
being fired that resulted in the death of the victim.  First, 
the defendant told Fruguglietti that he pushed his way into the 
victim's apartment.  Second, there also was a fight between the 
defendant and the victim and time between the "scuffle" and the 
shooting of the victim -- enough time that Mejia-Rincon closed 
the bedroom door and heard running.  The defendant's and the 
victim's injuries also are consistent with an assault having 
occurred prior to the shooting.  The defendant had a cut on his 
29 
 
hand from the victim "fighting" back, and the victim had 
multiple abrasions and lacerations on his abdomen, back, knees, 
neck, and head.  The evidence was sufficient to establish that 
there were, at a minimum, two discrete assaults.  See Scott, 472 
Mass. at 823 (defendant's conviction of felony-murder in first 
degree with home invasion as predicate felony affirmed where 
defendant's struggle with victim at front door constituted first 
assault, and where gunshot killing victim, which occurred "right 
after," was second independent assault); Kilburn, 438 Mass. 
at 359 (no merger where person in home opened door, gunman 
committed first assault by entering, brandishing gun, and 
pushing victim backward, and after short interlude, gunman then 
shot victim, committing second act).  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Stokes, 460 Mass. 311, 314 & n.8 (2011) (armed home invasion 
could not serve as predicate felony because act of pointing gun 
at victim in course of shooting him was not sufficiently 
separate from shooting itself).  It is not dispositive that the 
shooting occurred within a short period of time after the 
defendant entered the victim's apartment.  See Scott, supra 
at 824 (fact that entry into residence and shooting "occurred 
within a matter of seconds" was not fatal to merger analysis). 
In sum, the trial judge should have instructed the jury on 
merger where the predicate felony for felony-murder was armed 
assault in a dwelling, and there was only one victim.  See Model 
30 
 
Jury Instructions on Homicide 63 (2018) (merger instruction 
required "where [1] the underlying felony contains an element of 
assault and [2] the underlying felony, by its nature, does not 
have an intent or purpose separate and distinct from the act 
causing physical injury or death").  Nevertheless, given the 
evidence at trial, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed at least two distinct 
assaults on the victim; the lack of instruction did not result 
in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Phap Buth, 480 Mass. at 120, citing Gunter, 427 Mass. at 274. 
c.  Armed assault with intent to rob.  The defendant argues 
that his conviction of armed assault with intent to rob must be 
vacated as duplicative of his conviction of armed assault in a 
dwelling where the predicate felony for felony-murder was armed 
assault in a dwelling, and the armed assault with intent to rob 
served as the "fourth element" for armed assault in a dwelling.  
Specifically, the defendant's argument is that, because the 
Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant had the specific 
intent to commit an armed assault with intent to rob, his 
convictions of both armed assault in a dwelling and armed 
assault with intent to rob are duplicative.  Unpacking this 
nested argument requires a review of the elements of both armed 
assault in a dwelling and armed assault with intent to rob. 
31 
 
At trial, the judge correctly instructed the jury that to 
convict the defendant of armed assault in a dwelling, as the 
predicate offense for felony-murder, the Commonwealth must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that "(1) the defendant entered a 
dwelling that was not his own while armed with a dangerous 
weapon; (2) the defendant assaulted another inside the dwelling; 
and (3) the assault was committed with the intent to commit a 
felony."  Commonwealth v. Negron, 462 Mass. 102, 109 (2012), 
citing G. L. c. 265, § 18A.  To convict an individual of armed 
assault with intent to rob, the Commonwealth must prove that the 
defendant (1) was armed with a dangerous weapon; (2) assaulted a 
person; and (3) had a specific or actual intent to rob the 
person assaulted.  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 445 Mass. 119, 130 
n.15 (2005), citing G. L. c. 265, § 18. 
The defendant argues that the actions were related so 
closely that the verdicts are duplicative, citing Commonwealth 
v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 293 (2003), in support of this 
proposition.  Our decision in Santos was overruled by our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 632-633, 
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012), where we explicitly rejected 
the closely related conduct-based approach except where one 
crime is a lesser included offense of the other or where there 
are multiple counts of the same offense.  See id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 431 (2009) ("elements-based 
32 
 
approach remains the standard for determining whether multiple 
convictions stemming from one criminal transaction are 
duplicative").  Because here we do not have multiple counts of 
the same offense and armed assault with intent to rob is not a 
lesser included offense of armed assault in a dwelling, we apply 
the traditional same elements test.  See Vick, supra, citing 
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).  "[A] 
defendant may be properly punished for two crimes arising out of 
the same course of conduct provided that each crime requires 
proof of an element that the other does not."   Vick, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371 (2002). 
The defendant's argument that these two convictions are 
duplicative fails because armed assault in a dwelling and armed 
assault with intent to rob both require proof of an element that 
the other does not -- entry into a dwelling while armed with a 
dangerous weapon and an intent to rob the person assaulted, 
respectively.  While we recognize that the defendant's 
conviction of armed assault in a dwelling rested on proof of the 
defendant's specific intent to commit a robbery, "we consider 
only the elements of the crimes, not the facts to be proved or 
the evidence adduced to prove them."  Vick, 454 Mass. at 431, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 449 Mass. 825, 827 (2007).  See 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 441 Mass. 73, 76 (2004) ("the elements of 
the crimes charged are considered objectively, abstracted from 
33 
 
the facts [of the case]" [citation omitted]).  For the purposes 
of our application of the same elements test involving a 
conviction of armed assault in a dwelling, we do not consider 
the felony that the defendant intended to commit.  See People v. 
Miller, 498 Mich. 13, 19 (2015) (under legal elements test, "two 
offenses will only be considered the 'same offense' where it is 
impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing 
the lesser offense").  We therefore affirm the defendant's 
conviction of armed assault with intent to rob. 
d.  Joint venture jury instructions.  The defendant further 
argues that a new trial is warranted because the judge 
erroneously instructed the jury on joint venture liability and 
allowed the jury to return a general verdict without requiring 
the jury to specify whether the defendant was guilty under 
principal liability or joint venture liability.  At trial, the 
defendant objected to the jury instructions on joint venture, so 
we review the judge's instructions for prejudicial error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 508-509 (2004).  He did 
not otherwise object to the verdict slip used, so we review any 
error with respect to the verdict slip for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Wright, 411 Mass. 
at 681. 
The trial judge informed the jury that "the Commonwealth 
claims that [the defendant] acted individually or as a joint 
34 
 
venturer with . . . Brown in committing the offenses of murder, 
armed assault in a dwelling, armed assault with intent to rob, 
home invasion, and the firearm[s] charges."  He then instructed 
the jury on joint venture in accordance with the then current 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 16 (2013) and our opinion in 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 (2009) (Appendix). 
The defendant argues that the jury instructions on joint 
venture were erroneous because it was possible, based on the 
instruction given, that the jury convicted him of merely being 
present at the time of the shooting.  There was no error in the 
trial judge's joint venture instructions.  He stated: 
"Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not enough to 
find a defendant guilty.  Presence alone does not establish 
a defendant's knowing participation in the crime, even if a 
person knew about the intended crime in advance and took no 
steps to prevent it.  To find a defendant guilty, there 
must be proof that the defendant intentionally participated 
in some fashion in committing that particular crime and had 
or shared the intent required to commit the crime.  It is 
not enough to show that the defendant simply was present 
when the crime was committed, or that she knew about it in 
advance." 
 
The instructions adequately informed the jury that the 
Commonwealth must prove more than mere presence to convict the 
defendant.  See  Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 470 (Appendix).8 
 
8 The defendant requests that we reconsider our holding 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (establishing modified test and jury 
instructions on joint venture).  We decline to do so.  See 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 486 Mass. 78, 94 n.6 (2020). 
35 
 
Nor did the judge err in supplying a general verdict slip 
to the jury.  In Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 466-467, we issued the 
following guidance for trial judges when instructing the jury on 
joint venture liability: 
"(1) instruct the jury that the defendant is guilty if the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the 
crime charged, alone or with others, with the intent 
required for that offense; (2) continue to permit the trial 
judge to furnish the jury with a general verdict even when 
there is differing evidence that the defendant committed 
the crime as a principal or as an accomplice; and (3) on 
conviction, examine whether the evidence is sufficient to 
permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged, with the intent required 
to commit the crime." 
 
Id.  Thus, the Commonwealth "need not establish a defendant's 
precise role in the crime, i.e., whether the defendant acted as 
a principal or accomplice," Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 
269, 277 (2022), only that the defendant knowingly participated 
in the commission of the crime charged with the required 
criminal intent.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 162 
(2021), citing Zanetti, supra at 467.  The defendant concedes 
that there was sufficient evidence of his involvement in the 
shooting as either a joint venturer or a principal.  There is no 
basis, therefore, to grant a new trial on these grounds. 
e.  Defendant's firearms convictions.  The defendant 
requests that we vacate his convictions of unlawful possession 
of a firearm and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm in 
36 
 
light of our recent decision in Guardado, 491 Mass. 666.  In 
that case, we held that the due process clause and the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution require the 
Commonwealth to bear the burden of disproving that a defendant 
had a license to possess a firearm when prosecuting a defendant 
for unlawful possession of a firearm, and the jury instructions 
must relay this burden.  Id. at 692-693.  Where the jury is not 
instructed on this burden, and where there is no record evidence 
on the lack of license, the defendant is entitled to vacatur of 
the conviction.  See id. at 692-694.  The holding in that case 
applies prospectively "and to those cases that were active or 
pending on direct review as of the date of the issuance of [New 
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 
(2022)]."  Id. at 694.  As the defendant's direct appeal was 
pending at the time of the issuance of Bruen on June 23, 2022, 
he is entitled to the benefit of our decision in Guardado. 
The trial judge's jury instruction on the charge of 
unlawful possession of a firearm was as follows: 
"In order to prove the defendant guilty of [unlawful 
possession of a firearm], the Commonwealth must prove three 
things beyond a reasonable doubt:  first, that the 
defendant possessed an item; second, that the item meets 
the legal definition of 'firearm'; and third, that the 
defendant knew that he possessed that firearm." 
 
There was no instruction that required the Commonwealth to 
disprove that the defendant had a license to possess a firearm.  
37 
 
Further, after a review of the record, evidence of the 
defendant's lack of license never was introduced at trial.  
Thus, the defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a 
firearm must be vacated.  Because unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), "is not an 
independent charge but, rather, 'constitute[s] further 
punishment of a defendant who also [has] been convicted under 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a),'" the defendant's conviction of unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm also must be vacated.  See 
Guardado, 491 Mass. at 670 n.4, quoting Commonwealth v. Tate, 
490 Mass. 501, 520 (2022). 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Pursuant to our duty 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have conducted a thorough review 
of the entire record and discern no basis upon which to exercise 
our extraordinary authority to order a new trial or to reduce 
the verdicts. 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions of murder in 
the first degree, home invasion, and armed assault with intent 
to rob, and the order denying his motion for a new trial, are 
affirmed.  The conviction of armed assault in a dwelling is 
vacated, and the charge shall be dismissed.  The convictions of 
38 
 
unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm are also vacated.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
9 The issue whether retrial shall be permitted on the 
firearms convictions vacated pursuant to Guardado, 491 Mass. 
666, is currently pending before this court and is scheduled for 
oral argument in September 2023.  See Commonwealth vs. Guardado, 
No. SJC-13315.  The rescript in this opinion shall be stayed 
pending our decision in that case.