Title: ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR PATIENTS V AUTO CLUB INSUR ASSN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124639
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 8, 2005 
ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR 
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
 
No. 124639 
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
This declaratory judgment action concerns obligations 
under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., to pay 
 
 
 
 
medical expenses. 
Plaintiffs are individual medical 
providers, 
two 
guardians 
of 
catastrophically 
injured 
victims of automobile accidents, and an organization of 
health-care providers and patients that principally seeks 
to protect the legal rights of both groups. Defendants are 
either no-fault insurance companies that have issued 
policies to Michigan motorists or the review companies 
employed by one or more of those insurers to review medical 
bills arising from automobile accidents. 
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires that an insurer pay “all 
reasonable 
charges 
incurred 
for 
reasonably 
necessary 
products, services and accommodations for an injured 
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” 
MCL 500.3157 
provides that a medical provider “may charge a reasonable 
amount for the products, services and accommodations 
rendered. 
The charge shall not exceed the amount the 
person 
or 
institution 
customarily 
charges 
for 
like 
products, 
services 
and 
accommodations 
in 
cases 
not 
involving insurance.” 
After a hearing on the parties’ respective motions for 
summary disposition, the trial court ruled that defendants 
were entitled to review any medical charges and pay only 
those determined to be reasonable. The trial court further 
ruled that even though a medical provider’s charge does not 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
exceed the amount that provider customarily charges in 
cases not involving insurance, that fact alone does not 
establish that the charge is reasonable. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
257 Mich App 365; 670 
NW2d 569 (2003). It ruled that it is for the trier of fact 
to determine whether a medical charge, albeit “customary,” 
is also reasonable. 257 Mich App 379. 
Because we agree with the Court of Appeals resolution 
of this issue, and the others presented to it, we affirm. 
MCL 7.302(G)(1). 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Stephen J. Markman 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR 
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 124639 
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 
At oral argument it became very clear that defendants’ 
methodologies in determining reasonableness were never at 
issue at the trial court level, which accounts for the 
dearth of evidence regarding those methodologies. 
Counsel 
for plaintiff admitted that the reason discovery was not 
more directed toward illuminating the methodologies was 
 
 
 
 
 
 
because no one asked plaintiffs before this Court’s leave 
order to discuss how reasonableness should be assessed. 
Although I agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that 
“reasonable” and “customary” are two separate inquires, I 
view its reference to the 80th percentile test, given this 
record, 
as 
dicta. 
Given 
that 
the 
question 
of 
reasonableness was not before the lower courts, and, 
consequently, discovery did not center on the question, I 
would be apprehensive about sanctioning any method without 
knowing its full details. 
I agree also with the Court of 
Appeals concurrence that urged our Legislature to address 
this issue and implement some guidelines in this area, as 
other no-fault states have done. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR 
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 124639 
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I join fully in Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence. 
I write separately because this case is further 
evidence that this Court needs to address and open for 
public comment the specific procedures to be followed when 
a justice decides whether or not to participate in a case, 
and whether Const 1963, art 6, § 6 requires justices to 
 
 
 
give written reasons for their decisions whether or not to 
participate in a case. 
When this Court entered its order granting leave to 
appeal on June 25, 2004, Justice Young was shown as not 
participating; he is also shown as not participating in 
this memorandum opinion. 
No public or written explanation 
for Justice Young’s decision not to participate in the case 
has been given to the Court, the parties, or the public. 
A justice’s nonparticipation in a case may arise in 
one of two ways. 
A justice may decide, on his own 
initiative, not to participate in a case, and be shown as 
not participating. 
Alternatively, a party may request the 
recusal of a justice from a case. 
Recusal is defined as 
“[t]he process by which a judge is disqualified on 
objection of either party (or disqualifies himself or 
herself) from hearing a lawsuit because of self interest, 
bias or prejudice.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). 
It is now clear to me that there is a right and an 
expectation of the people of Michigan that a justice will 
participate in every case unless there is a valid publicly 
known reason why the justice should not participate in a 
particular case. 
Traditionally, in this Court a justice’s 
decision on whether to participate or not participate in a 
case has been a secret matter, and justices have not made 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
public the reasons for that decision.1
 But a justice’s 
decision whether to participate or not participate in a 
case and the reasons for that decision should not be 
governed by tradition and secrecy; they should be governed 
by the law, the Constitution, and the Michigan Court Rules 
made in conformance with the Constitution; and they should 
be made publicly and in writing for the record. This Court 
should set the highest standards for clear, fair, orderly, 
and public procedures. 
The question whether a justice should participate or 
1From January 1, 1995, when I began serving on the
Michigan Supreme Court, until May 2003, when I first stated
that justices should publish in the record of the case the
reason(s) for the justice’s decision whether to participate
or not participate in a case, I was shown as not 
participating approximately 251 times, with no explanation
given. 
In almost all these cases, I did not participate
because I had been on the Court of Appeals panels that
earlier decided the cases and I was informed that justices
“traditionally” did not participate in such cases. 
In 
retrospect, I believe that reasons for my decisions not to
participate should have been made part of the Court’s
orders or opinions. 
I filed a detailed explanation of my decision not to
participate in In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003). 
In Gilbert 
v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749; 685 NW2d 391 (2004),
reconsideration den 472 Mich 1201 (2005), the plaintiff’s
attorney moved to disqualify then-Chief Justice Corrigan
and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman. 
I 
attached to the order denying that motion a written 
explanation for my decision to participate in the case.
Similarly, in Graves v Warner Bros, 669 NW2d 552 (2003),
the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, asking 
that then-Chief Justice Corrigan and Justices Weaver,
Taylor, 
Young, 
and 
Markman 
recuse 
themselves 
from 
participating in the case. 
I filed a statement giving
reasons for my decision to participate in the case. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
not participate in a case arises with regularity. 
Since 
May 2003, when I proposed opening an administrative file on 
the recusal procedure in In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003), a 
justice has been shown as not participating, with no reason 
given, in at least 31 cases.2 
The questions raised in this and any other case in 
which a justice’s participation or nonparticipation arises 
are: 
1) Are individual justices bound by the 
requirements of art 6, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan
Constitution 
that 
states, 
“Decisions 
of 
the 
supreme court . . . shall be in writing and shall
contain a concise statement of the facts and 
reasons for each decision . . .”?   
2) 
Do 
the 
procedures 
regarding 
the 
disqualification of judges set forth in Michigan
Court Rule 2.003 apply to Supreme Court justices? 
Const 1963, art 6, § 6, which states that “Decisions 
of the supreme court . . . shall be in writing and shall 
contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for 
each decision . . .” requires that justices give written 
reasons for each decision.3
 There is no more fundamental 
2 The list of cases in which the various justices were
shown as not participating is attached as Appendix A. 
3 Art 6, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution states,
in full: 
Decisions of the supreme court, including all
decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing
and shall contain a concise statement of the facts 
and reasons for each decision and reasons for each 
4  
 
 
                                                 
purpose for the requirement that the decisions of the Court 
be in writing than for the decisions to be accessible to 
the citizens of the state. Because a justice’s decision to 
not participate in a case can, itself, change the outcome 
of a case, the decision is a matter of public significance 
and public access and understanding regarding a justice’s 
participation or nonparticipation is vital to the public’s 
ability to assess the performance of the Court and the 
performance of the Court’s individual justices. 
Thus, the 
highest and best reading of art 6, § 6 requires that a 
justice’s self-initiated decision not to participate, or a 
challenged 
justice’s 
decision 
to 
participate 
or 
not 
participate, should be in writing and accessible to the 
public. 
Further, Michigan Court Rule 2.003, which regulates 
the procedures for the disqualification of judges, applies 
to Michigan Supreme Court justices.4
 Michigan Court Rule 
2.001 provides that the rules in chapter 2, which includes 
MCR 
2.003, 
apply 
to 
all 
courts 
established 
by 
the 
Constitution and laws of the state of Michigan.5
 The 
denial of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in 
whole or in part he shall give in writing the
reasons for his dissent. 
4 The full text of MCR 2.003 is attached as Appendix B. 
5 MCR 2.001 states: 
5  
 
 
                                                 
 
Michigan Supreme Court is a court established by the 
Michigan Constitution. 
Thus, a plain reading of the court 
rule shows that 
MCR 2.003 governs the procedures for the 
disqualification of Michigan Supreme Court justices. 
Almost two years ago, in May 2003, this Court’s 
longstanding failure to follow and apply MCR 2.003 to 
itself became apparent to me.6  As a result, I proposed an 
amendment of MCR 2.003 that would clarify the applicability 
of MCR 2.003 and bring MCR 2.003 into conformance with the 
requirements of Const 1963, art 6, § 6. 
The amendment I 
proposed requires a justice to publish in the record of the 
case the reason(s) for the justice’s decision whether to 
participate or not participate in a case.7  In response to 
my recommendation that the Court open an administrative 
file and take public comments on such a rule, the Court 
opened an administrative file, ADM 2003-26, on May 20, 
The rules in this chapter govern procedure
in 
all 
civil 
proceedings 
in 
all 
courts 
established by the constitution and laws of the
State of Michigan, except where the limited 
jurisdiction of a court makes a rule inherently
inapplicable or where a rule applicable to a
specific court or a specific type of proceeding
provides a different procedure. 
6 In In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003), my participation
in a case became an issue, which led me to research the 
procedures governing the participation and disqualification
of justices. 
7 See In re JK, 468 Mich 1239 (2003). 
6  
 
 
 
 
2003. 
But almost two years later, the Court has not yet 
placed the proposed amendment or the issue on any of the 
public hearing agendas on administrative matters held 
during that time. 
There have been five such public 
hearings since May 2003: 
September 23, 2003, January 29, 
2004, May 27, 2004, September 15, 2004, and most recently 
January 27, 2005. Nor has the Court taken any other action 
regarding a clear, fair, orderly, and public procedure for 
the participation or nonparticipation of justices of the 
Supreme Court. 
A justice’s decision whether to participate or not 
participate in a case and the reasons for that decision 
should not be governed by tradition and secrecy; they 
should be governed by the law, the Constitution, and the 
Michigan 
Court 
Rules 
made 
in 
conformance 
with 
the 
Constitution; and they should be made publicly and in 
writing for the record. 
This Court should set the highest 
standards for clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures. 
I continue to urge the Court to recognize, open for 
public comment, and address this ongoing need to have 
clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures concerning the 
participation or nonparticipation of justices. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A  
Chief Justice Taylor was shown as not participating in
two cases. Booker v Detroit, 469 Mich 892 (2003), and Neal 
v Dep't of Corrections, 471 Mich 928 (2004). 
Justice Cavanagh was shown as not participating in two
cases. 
Konieczka v Dep’t of Transportation, 468 Mich 912 
(2003), and Herwig-Tucker v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 471 
Mich 873 (2004). 
Justice Kelly was shown as not participating in seven
cases. 
Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 1249 (2003),
Woodman v Miesel Sysco Food Service Co, 469 Mich 855 
(2003), Grievance Administrator v Raaflaub, 668 NW2d 146 
(2003), People v Wright, 469 Mich 880 (2003), People v
White, 
469 
Mich 
877 
(2003), 
Sonsynath 
v 
Dep’t 
of 
Transportation, 668 NW2d 153 (2003), and People v Herbert,
470 Mich 857 (2004). 
Justice Corrigan was shown as not participating in one
case. 
Shaya v Universal Standard Medical Laboratories,
Inc, 469 Mich 994 (2004). 
Justice Young was shown as not participating in 8
cases. Bomarko, Inc v Mercy Health Services No 2, 468 Mich 
915 (2003), Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Juncaj, 468 Mich 923 
(2003), Brooks v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 469 Mich 
874 (2003), Blamer v Guiang, 469 Mich 899 (2003), People v 
Shook, 469 Mich 911 (2003), Fournier v Mercy Community
Health Care System-Port Huron, 469 Mich 921 (2003), Warber 
v Trinity Health Corp, 
469 Mich 1001 (2004), and Lawrence 
v Battle Creek Health Systems, 469 Mich 1051 (2004). 
Justice Markman was shown as not participating in
eleven cases. 
People v Nevers, 469 Mich 881 (2003),
People v Bahoda, 469 Mich 945 (2003), Shacket Developments,
Inc v Labana, 469 Mich 909 (2003), Shaya v Universal 
Standard Medical Laboratories, Inc, 469 Mich 994 (2004),
Hughes v Hall, 469 Mich 1016 (2004), People v Harwell, 469 
Mich 1017 (2004), Grievance Administrator v Zipser, 469 
Mich 1307 (2004), People v Zakar, 470 Mich 854 (2004),
Landes v Equity Resource Environmental, 470 Mich 864 
(2004), People v Nevers, 683 NW2d 674 (Mich, 2004), and
American Bumper and Mfg Co v Nat'l Union Fire Ins Co of 
Pittsburgh, 471 Mich 948 (2004). 
8  
 
 
APPENDIX B 
MCR 2.003, Disqualification of Judge, provides: 
(A) Who May Raise. A party may raise the
issue of a judge's disqualification by motion, or
the judge may raise it. 
(B) Grounds. A judge is disqualified when
the 
judge 
cannot 
impartially 
hear 
a 
case,
including but not limited to instances in which: 
(1) The judge is personally biased or 
prejudiced for or against a party or attorney. 
(2) The judge has personal knowledge of 
disputed 
evidentiary 
facts 
concerning 
the 
proceeding. 
(3) The judge has been consulted or employed
as an attorney in the matter in controversy. 
(4) The judge was a partner of a party,
attorney for a party, or a member of a law firm
representing a party within the preceding two
years. 
(5) 
The 
judge 
knows 
that 
he 
or 
she,
individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's
spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any
other member of the judge's family residing in
the judge's household, has an economic interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding or has any other more
than 
de 
minimis 
interest 
that 
could 
be 
substantially affected by the proceeding. 
(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(a) is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party; 
(b) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(c) is known by the judge to have a more
than 
de 
minimis 
interest 
that 
could 
be 
9  
 
 
substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(d) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be
a material witness in the proceeding. 
A judge is not disqualified merely because
the judge's former law clerk is an attorney of
record for a party in an action that is before
the judge or is associated with a law firm 
representing a party in an action that is before
the judge. 
(C) Procedure. 
(1) Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial
and inconveniencing the witnesses, a motion to
disqualify must be filed within 14 days after the
moving 
party 
discovers 
the 
ground 
for 
disqualification. If the discovery is made within
14 days of the trial date, the motion must be
made forthwith. If a motion is not timely filed,
untimeliness, including delay in waiving jury 
trial, is a factor in deciding whether the motion
should be granted. 
(2) All Grounds to be Included; Affidavit. 
In any motion under this rule, the moving party
must include all grounds for disqualification
that are known at the time the motion is filed. 
An affidavit must accompany the motion. 
(3) 
Ruling. 
The 
challenged 
judge 
shall 
decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies
the motion, 
(a) in a court having two or more judges, on
the request of a party, the challenged judge
shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who
shall decide the motion de novo; 
(b) in a single-judge court, or if the 
challenged judge is the chief judge, on the 
request of a party, the challenged judge shall
refer the motion to the state court administrator 
for assignment to another judge, who shall decide
the motion de novo. 
(4) 
Motion 
Granted. 
When 
a 
judge 
is 
disqualified, the action must be assigned to 
10  
 
 
 
another judge of the same court, or, if one is
not available, the state court administrator 
shall assign another judge. 
(D) Remittal of Disqualification. If it 
appears 
that 
there 
may 
be 
grounds 
for 
disqualification, the judge may ask the parties
and their lawyers to consider, out of the 
presence 
of 
the 
judge, 
whether 
to 
waive 
disqualification. If, following disclosure of any
basis for disqualification other than personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties
without participation by the judge, all agree
that the judge should not be disqualified, and 
the judge is then willing to participate, the
judge may participate in the proceedings. The
agreement shall be in writing or placed on the
record. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION FOR 
PATIENTS & PROVIDERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 124639 
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY,
FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, IMPERIAL MIDWEST
INSURANCE COMPANY, SECURA
INSURANCE MUTUAL COMPANY, STATE
FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE GROUP,
WOLVERINE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, LAHOUSSE-BARTLETT
DISABILITY, MANAGEABILITY, INC.,
MEDCHECK MEDICAL AUDIT SERVICES,
RECOVERY UNLIMITED, INC., and
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority opinion in this case and 
write separately to respond to Justice Weaver’s now­
familiar views regarding this Court’s recusal procedures. 
(See 
In 
re 
JK, 
468 
Mich 
1239 
[2003]; 
Gilbert 
v 
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 Mich 889 [2003].) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
  
All the members of this Court serve with the knowledge 
that “[t]he Due Process Clause requires an unbiased and 
impartial decisionmaker.” Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 
Mich 470, 497; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). 
It is therefore 
standard practice for each justice of this Court to 
voluntarily recuse himself or herself when the justice 
cannot participate impartially. 
In her concurring statement, Justice Weaver correctly 
points out that a justice may choose whether to publish his 
or her reasons for recusal. 
There is nothing secretive or 
sinister 
in 
this 
tradition. 
Indeed, 
Justice 
Weaver 
acknowledges that over an eight-year period she herself 
declined to publish reasons for her nonparticipation in 
approximately 251 cases.1 
Like justices of the Michigan Supreme Court, the 
justices of the United States Supreme Court sometimes do 
and sometimes do not state their reasons for determining 
whether to participate in a decision. 
See, e.g., Cheney v 
United States Dist Court for the Dist of Columbia, ___ US 
___; 124 S Ct 1391; 158 L Ed 2d 225 (2004); Intel Corp v 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, ___ US ___; 124 S Ct 2466; 159 
L Ed 2d 355 (2004); United States v Hatter, 532 US 557; 121 
1 Ante at 3 n 1. 
2  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
S Ct 1782; 149 L Ed 2d 820 (2001); Fed Election Comm v NRA 
Political Victory Fund, 513 US 88; 115 S Ct 537; 130 L Ed 
2d 439 (1994); Arizona v United States Dist Court for the 
Dist of Arizona, 459 US 1191; 103 S Ct 1173; 75 L Ed 2d 425 
(1983); Laird v Tatum, 409 US 824; 93 S Ct 7; 34 L Ed 2d 50 
(1972). 
Several of our sister states follow a similar 
recusal procedure.2 
Like Justice Weaver’s 251 pre-2003 recusal decisions 
without explanation, the thirty-one recusal decisions by 
the remaining six members of the Court over the past two 
years comport with our Constitution3 and the Michigan Court 
2 Much like Michigan, many states have adopted judicial
canons informed by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See 
Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, Ch 24, Canon 3(C) and
(E); Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Ch 51, Canon 3(C) and
(D); Fla Stat Ann Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) and
(F); New York Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) and (F);
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(G) and (H). 
3 The recusal standards that Justice Weaver advances 
rest on her interpretation of Const 1963, art 6, § 6.
Justice Weaver’s own prior positions are inconsistent in
this regard. 
For instance, in Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler 
Corp, 469 Mich 883 (2003), she chose to not participate
with 
respect 
to 
other 
justices 
on 
motions 
for 
disqualification because she felt it appropriate to decide
only whether she herself should participate, and not 
whether other justices should do so. 
Such a posture can
only be understood as characterizing a denial of a motion
for disqualification as an individualized determination 
made by each justice, and not as a “[d]ecision[] of the
supreme court” for purposes of art 6, § 6. 
Interestingly,
in a number of what are indisputably “[d]ecisions of the
supreme court,” Justice Weaver chose to offer no reasons or 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
Rules. 
Justice Weaver is, of course, entitled to now 
disagree with our traditional recusal procedures, and as 
she notes, ADM 2003-26 was opened on May 20, 2003, in 
response to her concerns. That file is being considered by 
this Court. 
The same is true for its predecessor, ADM 
2003-24, which this Court opened on April 30, 2003, to 
consider 
the 
disqualification 
rule 
when 
a 
justice 
participated in a case at the Court of Appeals. 
In addition, in now-closed administrative files, this 
Court 
has 
already 
considered 
local 
judicial 
disqualification rules, justices’ participation in cases, 
and amending or interpreting MCR 2.003. 
See ADM 2002-41 
(opened October 1, 2002, and closed April 2, 2003); ADM 
1999-60 (opened November 30, 1999, and closed October 6, 
2000); ADM 1999-28 (opened April 30, 1999, and closed 
January 4, 2001; reopened May 1, 2001, and closed April 18, 
2002); ADM 1992-18 (discussed June 4, 1992, and closed 
September 1994); ADM 1991-22 (reported November 7, 1991, 
explanation for her own positions. 
See, e.g., Taylor v
Gate Pharmaceuticals, 468 Mich 1, 19; 658 NW2d 127 (2003)
(Weaver, J., "concurred in the result only”); People v 
Yost, 468 Mich 122, 134; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (“concurred in
the result only”); Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich
16, 44; 576 NW2d 641 (1998) (“concurred only in the 
result”); People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 521; 566
NW2d 530 (1997) (“concurred only in the result”). 
4  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
and closed September 1, 1995). 
In short, like Justice 
Weaver, the rest of this Court is cognizant of the “need to 
have clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures” in place 
with respect to the administration of justice.4 
Maura D. Corrigan 
YOUNG, J., took no part in the decision of this case. 
4 Ante at 7. 
5