Title: Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co.
Citation: 362 N.C. 191
Docket Number: 303A07
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2008

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
DOGWOOD DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT COMPANY., LLC v. WHITE OAK
TRANSPORT COMPANY, INC.
No. 303A07 
FILED: 7 MARCH 2008
1.
Appeal and Error–appellate rules–default
The occurrence of default under the appellate rules arises primarily from the
existence of a waiver occurring in the trial court, defects in appellate jurisdiction, and violation
of nonjurisdictional requirements.  
2.
Appeal and Error–preserving issue for appeal–raising in trial court
The requirement that litigants raise an issue in the trial court before presenting it
on appeal plays an integral role in preserving the efficacy and integrity of the appellate process;
however, the imperative to correct fundamental error may necessitate appellate review of the
merits despite the occurrence of default.  
3.
Appeal and Error–jurisdictional default–Rule 2 not applicable
A jurisdictional default precludes the appellate court from acting in any manner
other than to dismiss the appeal.  In the absence of jurisdiction, the appellate courts lack
authority to consider application of Rule 2. 
4.
Appeal and Error–appellate rules–nonjurisdictional violations–sanctions
The nonjurisdictional requirements prescribed by the appellate rules are designed
to keep the appellate process orderly.  Failure to comply with these requirements should not
normally lead to dismissal. In the event of substantial or gross violations, the party responsible
opens the door to appropriate remedial measures under Appellate Rules 25 and 34,  but the court
should impose a sanction other than dismissal in most instances.   If the degree of noncompliance
warrants dismissal, the court may consider invoking Rule 2 to reach the merits.
5.
Appeal and Error–violations of appellate rules–dismissal
inappropriate–other sanctions not considered
An appeal was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether a sanction
other than dismissal is appropriate for appellate rules violations. 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 183N.C. App.
__, 645 S.E.2d 212 (2007), dismissing defendant’s appeal from a
judgment and order entered 3 January 2006 and an order entered 2
March 2006, both by Judge Howard R. Greeson, Jr. in Superior
Court, Forsyth County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 13 November
2007.
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Carruthers & Bailey, P.A., by J. Dennis Bailey, for 
plaintiff-appellee.
Parrish Smith & Ramsey, LLP, by Steven D. Smith; and
Smith Moore, LLP, by J. Donald Cowan, Jr., for
defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Justice.
The Court of Appeals dismissed defendant White Oak
Transport Company, Inc.’s appeal for violations of the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure (“appellate rules” or
“rules”).  We reverse and remand with instructions, and clarify
the manner in which the appellate courts should address
violations of the appellate rules.
On 29 April 2004, plaintiff Dogwood Development and
Management Company, LLC brought a breach of contract action
against defendant in connection with defendant’s waste hauling
business.  At trial, a jury found plaintiff and defendant entered
into a contract, defendant breached the contract, and plaintiff
was entitled to recover $155,365.00 in damages from defendant. 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on 3
January 2006.  Ten days later, defendant moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, both of which
the trial court denied on 2 March 2006.  On 10 March 2006,
defendant filed its notice of appeal from both the judgment and
the order denying its post-trial motions.  On 20 December 2006,
plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal for
failure to comply with the appellate rules.  Defendant did not
respond.
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On 5 June 2007, the Court of Appeals, in a divided
opinion, dismissed defendant’s appeal for violations of Rules 
10(c)(1), 28(b)(4), and 28(b)(6).  Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v.
White Oak Transp. Co., 183 N.C. App. __, __, 645 S.E.2d 212, 217
(2007).  The dissenting judge would have imposed monetary
sanctions under Rules 25(b) and 34(b) and addressed the merits of
the appeal.  Id. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 219 (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).  Defendant appealed to this Court on the basis of
the dissenting opinion.
At the outset we observe that “rules of procedure are
necessary . . . in order to enable the courts properly to
discharge their dut[y]” of resolving disputes.  Pruitt v. Wood,
199 N.C. 788, 790, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (1930).  It necessarily
follows that failure of the parties to comply with the rules, and
failure of the appellate courts to demand compliance therewith,
may impede the administration of justice.  As this Court
explained long ago:
 
Procedure is essential . . . to the
application of principle in courts of
justice, and it cannot be dispensed with.  It
is dangerous to ignore or disregard it. . . . 
[To do so] is not only discreditable to the
administration of public justice, but it
leads eventually to confusion and wrong, and
leaves the rights and estates of many people
in a more or less perilous condition.
Spence v. Tapscott, 92 N.C. 576, 578 (1885).  Compliance with the
rules, therefore, is mandatory.  State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309,
311, 644 S.E.2d 201, 202 (2007); Reep v. Beck, 360 N.C. 34, 38,
619 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2005); Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359
N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 360 (2005) (per curiam);
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Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299
(1999); Craver v. Craver, 298 N.C. 231, 236, 258 S.E.2d 357, 361
(1979); Pruitt, 199 N.C. at 789, 156 S.E. at 127.  As a natural 
corollary, parties who default under the rules ordinarily forfeit
their right to review on the merits.  See Viar, 359 N.C. at 401,
610 S.E.2d at 360 (“‘[F]ailure to follow [the] rules will subject
an appeal to dismissal.’” (quoting Steingress, 350 N.C. at 65,
511 S.E.2d at 299)).
But “[r]ules of practice and procedure are devised to
promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them.”  Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).  We have therefore
emphasized that noncompliance with the appellate rules does not,
ipso facto, mandate dismissal of an appeal.  See Hart, 361 N.C.
at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202 (“[E]very violation of the rules does
not require dismissal of the appeal or the issue . . . .”). 
Whether and how a court may excuse noncompliance with the rules
depends on the nature of the default.  
[1] Our cases indicate that the occurrence of default
under the appellate rules arises primarily from the existence of
one or more of the following circumstances:  (1) waiver occurring
in the trial court; (2) defects in appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) violation of nonjurisdictional requirements.  In the instant
case, defendant’s noncompliance fell within the third category,
violation of nonjurisdictional requirements of the appellate
rules.  Nevertheless, to provide further guidance, we briefly
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1  The genesis of much of the present confusion surrounding
the operation of our appellate rules originated in Viar, 359 N.C.
400, 610 S.E.2d 360, a decision susceptible to several reasonable
interpretations.  Compare Caldwell v. Branch, 181 N.C. App. 107,
110-11, 638 S.E.2d 552, 555 (citing Viar to support imposition of
monetary sanctions, rather than dismissal, when appellant failed
to brief standard of review as required by Rule 28(b)(6)), disc.
rev. denied, 361 N.C. 690, 654 S.E.2d 248 (2007), with State v.
Summers, 177 N.C. App. 691, 700, 629 S.E.2d 902, 908-09 (citing
Viar to support dismissal of issue when appellant failed to brief
standard of review as required by Rule 28(b)(6)), appeal
dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 653, 637 S.E.2d 192
(2006).
discuss all three principal categories of default.1 
[2] The first major category of default, known as the
waiver rule, arises out of a party’s failure to properly preserve
an issue for appellate review.  Rule 10(b)(1) provides that “[i]n
order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must
have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or
motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party
desired the court to make.”  N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).  Rules
10(b)(2) and 10(b)(3) give specific instructions for preserving
questions involving erroneous jury instructions and sufficiency
of the evidence, respectively.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), (3).
The requirement expressed in Rule 10(b) that litigants 
raise an issue in the trial court before presenting it on appeal
goes “to the heart of the common law tradition and [our]
adversary system.”  Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678
F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).  This Court has repeatedly
emphasized that Rule 10(b) “prevent[s] unnecessary new trials
caused by errors . . . that the [trial] court could have
corrected if brought to its attention at the proper time.”  Wall
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v. Stout, 310 N.C. 184, 188-89, 311 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1984).  See
also State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 334, 307 S.E.2d 304, 311
(1983) (stating that “Rule 10 functions as an important vehicle
to insure that errors are not ‘built into’ the record, thereby
causing unnecessary appellate review”); State v. Odom, 307 N.C.
655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (stating that “[t]he purpose
of Rule 10(b)(2) is to encourage the parties to inform the trial
court of errors in its instructions so that it can correct the
instructions and cure any potential errors before the jury
deliberates on the case and thereby eliminate the need for a new
trial”).  Rule 10(b) thus plays an integral role in preserving
the efficacy and integrity of the appellate process. 
We have stressed that Rule 10(b)(1) “is not simply a
technical rule of procedure” but shelters the trial judge from
“an undue if not impossible burden.”  State v. Black, 308 N.C.
736, 740, 303 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1983); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10
drafting comm. comment., para. 2, reprinted in 287 N.C. 698, 700-
01 (1975) [hereinafter Commentary] (“[N]o . . . error ought be
the subject of appellate review unless it has been first
suggested to the trial judge in time for [the judge] to avoid it
or to correct it, or unless it is of such a fundamental nature
that no such prior suggestion should be required of counsel.”). 
See generally 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North
Carolina Evidence § 19, at 76-87 (6th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
Broun].
In light of the practical considerations promoted by
the waiver rule, a party’s failure to properly preserve an issue
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for appellate review ordinarily justifies the appellate court’s
refusal to consider the issue on appeal.  See, e.g., State v.
Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 669, 617 S.E.2d 1, 17 (2005) (refusing to
review admissibility of evidence on appeal when defendant did not
object at trial as required by Rule 10(b)(1)), cert. denied, 547
U.S. 1073 (2006); State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d
809, 814 (1991) (same); see also State v. Truesdale, 340 N.C.
229, 232, 456 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1995) (refusing to review
propriety of jury instructions when defendant did not object at
trial to portion of instruction complained of on appeal as
required by Rule 10(b)(2)); Penley v. Penley, 314 N.C. 1, 26-27,
332 S.E.2d 51, 66 (1985) (same).
The imperative to correct fundamental error, however,
may necessitate appellate review of the merits despite the
occurrence of default.  For instance, plain error review is
available in criminal appeals, Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d
at 378, for challenges to jury instructions and evidentiary
issues, State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 613, 536 S.E.2d 36, 47
(2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997 (2001).  Our decisions have
recognized plain error only “in truly exceptional cases” when
“absent the error the jury probably would have reached a
different verdict.”  State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d
80, 83 (1986) (observing that the heavy burden associated with
plain error review is justified “because the defendant could have
prevented any error by making a timely objection”).
Aside from the possibility of plain error review in
criminal appeals, Rule 2 permits the appellate courts to excuse a
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2  North Carolina law recognizes other exceptions to the
waiver rule codified in Rule 10(b), including when the “trial
court acts contrary to a statutory mandate.”  State v. Jaynes,
353 N.C. 534, 544-45, 549 S.E.2d 179, 189 (2001) (quoting State
v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 39, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985)), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 934 (2002).  For a more comprehensive discussion
of possible exceptions to the waiver rule and a critique of the
Ashe exception, see Broun § 19, at 78 n.278 (“[I]t is wholly
unrealistic to expect trial judges to be familiar with all of the
proliferating statutory provisions making evidence
inadmissible.”).
party’s default in both civil and criminal appeals when necessary
to “prevent manifest injustice to a party” or to “expedite
decision in the public interest.”  N.C. R. App. P. 2.  Rule 2,
however, must be invoked “cautiously,” and we reaffirm our prior
cases as to the “exceptional circumstances” which allow the
appellate courts to take this “extraordinary step.”2  Hart, 361
N.C. at 315-17, 644 S.E.2d at 205-06; see also Steingress, 350
N.C. at 66, 511 S.E.2d at 299-300 (observing that Rule 2 should
only be invoked in “exceptional circumstances”).
[3] In addition to the waiver rule, a default
precluding appellate review on the merits necessarily arises when
the appealing party fails to complete all of the steps necessary
to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court.  It is axiomatic
that courts of law must have their power properly invoked by an
interested party.  See generally John Chipman Gray, The Nature
and Sources of the Law 114-15 (2d ed. 1938) (“The essence of a
judge’s office is . . . not to interfere voluntarily in affairs,
[and] not to act sua sponte, but is to determine cases which are
presented to him.”).  Because “there must be a mode or method of
calling the powers of a court into exercise, . . . rules of
practice are prescribed by the laws of every state.”  Timothy
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3  We recognize that discretionary avenues of appellate
jurisdiction exist in addition to those routes of mandatory
review conferred by statute.  See N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12, cl.
1; In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 547-48, 272 S.E.2d 861, 870
(1981); see also N.C. R. App. P. 21-24.  Nonetheless, a
discussion of the judiciary’s inherent power to issue
extraordinary and remedial writs, and this Court’s general
supervisory authority, is beyond the scope of this opinion. 
Brown, Commentaries on the Jurisdiction of Courts § 3, at 8
(1891).  The appellant’s compliance with the jurisdictional rules
governing the taking of an appeal is the linchpin that connects
the appellate division with the trial division and confers upon
the appellate court the authority to act in a particular case.3 
Moore v. Vanderburg, 90 N.C. 10, 10 (1884) (“The appeal is the
essential means by which this court gets jurisdiction of an
action . . . .  It is the appeal that puts this court in relation
with the case in the court below . . . .”); see Williams v.
Williams, 188 N.C. 728, 730, 125 S.E. 482, 483 (1924) (explaining
that jurisdiction confers upon the court “the power to hear,
determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues before [it]”).  
A jurisdictional default, therefore, precludes the
appellate court from acting in any manner other than to dismiss
the appeal.  See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 156, 540
S.E.2d 313, 322 (2000) (“In order to confer jurisdiction on the
state’s appellate courts, appellants of lower court orders must
comply with the requirements of Rule 3 . . . .  The provisions of
Rule 3 are jurisdictional, and failure to follow the rule’s
prerequisites mandates dismissal of an appeal.” (citations
omitted)); Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey, 328
N.C. 563, 563-64, 402 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (per curiam)
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(holding that because the record did not contain a notice of
appeal in compliance with Rule 3, the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed); In re Lynette H.,
323 N.C. 598, 602, 374 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1988) (holding that the
state’s failure to give timely notice of appeal in compliance
with Rule 3 resulted in a lack of jurisdiction); Booth v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., 308 N.C. 187, 189, 301 S.E.2d 98, 99-100 (1983)
(per curiam) (“Failure to give timely notice of appeal in
compliance with . . . Rule 3 . . . is jurisdictional, and an
untimely attempt to appeal must be dismissed.” (citations
omitted)); see also State v. McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638, 615
S.E.2d 319, 320 (stating correctly that “compliance with the
requirements of Rule 4(a)(2) is jurisdictional and cannot simply
be ignored by [the] Court” (citation omitted)), appeal dismissed,
360 N.C. 73, 622 S.E.2d 626 (2005).  Stated differently, a
jurisdictional default brings a purported appeal to an end before
it ever begins.
Moreover, in the absence of jurisdiction, the appellate
courts lack authority to consider whether the circumstances of a
purported appeal justify application of Rule 2.  See Bailey, 353
N.C. at 157, 540 S.E.2d at 323 (“[S]uspension of the appellate
rules under Rule 2 is not permitted for jurisdictional
concerns.”).  As the Commentary to Rule 2 provides, our appellate
courts have authority to suspend the rules in exceptional
situations “‘except as otherwise expressly provided by these
rules.’”  Commentary to N.C. R. App. P. 2, 287 N.C. at 680.  The
Commentary explains that this “refers to the provision in Rule
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27(c) that the time limits for taking appeal . . . may not be
extended by any court.”  Id.  Accordingly, Rule 2 may not be used
to reach the merits of an appeal in the event of a jurisdictional
default.  E.g., Bailey, 353 N.C. at 157, 540 S.E.2d at 323.
[4] The final principal category of default involves a
party’s failure to comply with one or more of the
nonjurisdictional requisites prescribed by the appellate rules. 
This comprehensive set of nonjurisdictional requirements is
designed primarily to keep the appellate process “flowing in an
orderly manner.”  Craver, 298 N.C. at 236, 258 S.E.2d at 361. 
Two examples of such rules are those at issue in the present
case:  Rule 10(c)(1), which directs the form of assignments of
error, and Rule 28(b), which governs the content of the
appellant’s brief.  Noncompliance with rules of this nature,
while perhaps indicative of inartful appellate advocacy, does not
ordinarily give rise to the harms associated with review of
unpreserved issues or lack of jurisdiction.  And, notably, the
appellate court faced with a default of this nature possesses
discretion in fashioning a remedy to encourage better compliance
with the rules.  
We stress that a party’s failure to comply with
nonjurisdictional rule requirements normally should not lead to
dismissal of the appeal.  See, e.g., Hicks v. Kenan, 139 N.C.
337, 338, 51 S.E. 941, 941 (1905) (per curiam) (observing this
Court’s preference to hear merits of the appeal rather than
dismiss for noncompliance with the rules); 5 Am. Jur. 2d
Appellate Review § 804, at 540 (2007) (“[I]t is preferred that an
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appellate court address the merits of an appeal whenever possible
. . . .  [A]n appellate court has a strong preference for
deciding cases on their merits; and it is the task of an
appellate court to resolve appeals on the merits if at all
possible.” (footnotes omitted)); Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J.
Meador & Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 2 (1976)
(“[A]ppellate courts serve as the instrument of accountability
for those who make the basic decisions in trial courts and
administrative agencies.”).
 
Rules 25 and 34, when viewed together, provide a
framework for addressing violations of the nonjurisdictional
requirements of the rules.  Rule 25(b) states that “the appellate
[court] may . . . impose a sanction . . . when the court
determines that [a] party or attorney or both substantially
failed to comply with these appellate rules.  The court may
impose sanctions of the type and in the manner prescribed by Rule
34 . . . .”  N.C. R. App. P. 25(b) (emphasis added).  Rule
34(a)(3) provides, among other things, that “the appellate
[court] may . . . impose a sanction . . . when the court
determines that . . . a petition, motion, brief, record, or other
paper filed in the appeal . . . grossly violated appellate court
rules.”  N.C. R. App. P. 34(a)(3) (emphasis added).  Rule 34(b)
enumerates as possible sanctions various types of monetary
damages, dismissal, and “any other sanction deemed just and
proper.”  N.C. R. App. P. 34(b).  
Based on the language of Rules 25 and 34, the appellate
court may not consider sanctions of any sort when a party’s
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noncompliance with nonjurisdictional requirements of the rules
does not rise to the level of a “substantial failure” or “gross
violation.”  In such instances, the appellate court should simply
perform its core function of reviewing the merits of the appeal
to the extent possible.
In the event of substantial or gross violations of the
nonjurisdictional provisions of the appellate rules, however, the
party or lawyer responsible for such representational
deficiencies opens the door to the appellate court’s need to
consider appropriate remedial measures.  Rules 25 and 34 vest the
appellate court with the authority to promote compliance with the
appellate rules through the imposition of one or more enumerated
sanctions.
The court’s exercise of remedial discretion under Rules
25 and 34 entails a fact-specific inquiry into the particular
circumstances of each case, mindful of the principle that the
appellate rules should be enforced as uniformly as possible.  See
Hart, 361 N.C. at 317, 644 S.E.2d at 206 (“[O]ur appellate courts
must enforce the Rules of Appellate Procedure uniformly.”);
Pruitt, 199 N.C. at 790, 156 S.E. at 127 (observing that it is
“necessary to . . . enforce [the appellate rules] uniformly”). 
Noncompliance with the rules falls along a continuum, and the
sanction imposed should reflect the gravity of the violation.  We
clarify, however, that only in the most egregious instances of
nonjurisdictional default will dismissal of the appeal be
appropriate.  See Hart, 361 N.C. at 311, 644 S.E.2d at 202
(“[E]very violation of the rules does not require dismissal of
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the appeal or the issue, although some other sanction may be
appropriate, pursuant to Rule 25(b) or Rule 34 . . . .”).  Cf.
Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 551, 319 S.E.2d 912, 922 (1984)
(observing that dismissal for failure to comply with procedural
rules is an “extreme sanction . . . to be applied only when . . .
less drastic sanctions will not suffice”).  In most situations
when a party substantially or grossly violates nonjurisdictional
requirements of the rules, the appellate court should impose a
sanction other than dismissal and review the merits of the
appeal.  This systemic preference not only accords fundamental
fairness to litigants but also serves to promote public
confidence in the administration of justice in our appellate
courts.  
In determining whether a party’s noncompliance with the
appellate rules rises to the level of a substantial failure or
gross violation, the court may consider, among other factors,
whether and to what extent the noncompliance impairs the court’s
task of review and whether and to what extent review on the
merits would frustrate the adversarial process.  See Hart, 361
N.C. at 312, 644 S.E.2d at 203 (noting that dismissal may not be
appropriate when a party’s noncompliance does not “‘impede
comprehension of the issues on appeal or frustrate the appellate
process’” (citation omitted)); Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d
at 361 (discouraging the appellate courts from reviewing the
merits of an appeal when doing so would leave the appellee
“without notice of the basis upon which [the] appellate court
might rule” (citation omitted)).  The court may also consider the
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number of rules violated, although in certain instances
noncompliance with a discrete requirement of the rules may
constitute a default precluding substantive review.  See, e.g.,
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Assignments of error not set out in
the appellant’s brief, or in support of which no reason or
argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as
abandoned.”).
If the court determines that the degree of a party’s
noncompliance with nonjurisdictional requirements warrants
dismissal of the appeal under Rule 34(b), it may consider 
invoking Rule 2.  In this situation, the appellate court may only
review the merits on “rare occasions” and under “exceptional
circumstances,” Hart, 361 N.C. at 316, 644 S.E.2d at 205
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), “[t]o prevent
manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the
public interest,” N.C. R. App. P. 2.  See Steingress, 350 N.C. at
66, 511 S.E.2d at 299-300 (explaining that Rule 2 should only be
invoked under “exceptional circumstances”).
To summarize, when a party fails to comply with one or
more nonjurisdictional appellate rules, the court should first
determine whether the noncompliance is substantial or gross under
Rules 25 and 34.  If it so concludes, it should then determine
which, if any, sanction under Rule 34(b) should be imposed. 
Finally, if the court concludes that dismissal is the appropriate
sanction, it may then consider whether the circumstances of the
case justify invoking Rule 2 to reach the merits of the appeal.
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[5] Having reviewed the general principles for
addressing defaults under the appellate rules, we now turn to the
violations at issue in the present case.  Here, defendant’s
appeal suffered from the following violations of the appellate
rules:  (1) failure to provide record or transcript references
with the  assignments of error in violation of Rule 10(c)(1); (2)
failure to reference the assignments of error pertinent to each
question presented in violation of Rule 28(b)(6); (3) failure to
state the grounds for appellate review in violation of Rule
28(b)(4); and (4) failure to state the applicable standard of
review for each question presented in violation of Rule 28(b)(6). 
With regard to each violation, the Court of Appeals set forth the
applicable appellate rule, stated that defendant failed to comply
with the rule, and concluded that “[d]efendant’s failure to
[comply with the given rule] warrants dismissal of its appeal.” 
Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt., 183 N.C. App. at __, 645 S.E.2d at 214-16. 
The Court of Appeals did not, however, consider sanctions other
than dismissal under Rules 25 and 34.
In failing to conduct any analysis under Rules 25 and
34 before dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeals did not
comply with our admonition in Hart to consider “whether other
sanctions should be imposed pursuant to appellate Rule 25(b) or
Rule 34.”  361 N.C. at 317, 644 S.E.2d at 206.  Accordingly, we
remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration, consistent with
this opinion, of whether the appellate rules violations in this
case implicate Rules 25 and 34, and if so, whether a sanction
other than dismissal is appropriate.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED.