Title: Hopkins v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 540, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ARTEL HOPKINS, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 540, 2004 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. Nos. S04-02-06531 through 06571 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  ID No. 0402002032 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  February 1, 2006 
Decided:  March 2, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
John S. Malik, Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
The defendant, Artel Hopkins, appeals his convictions in Superior Court for 
Trafficking in Cocaine of 100 Grams or Greater, Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Cocaine, Maintaining a Building for Keeping Controlled Substances, Conspiracy 
Second Degree, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Before trial, Hopkins made 
a discovery request. The State responded that it intended to call an expert witness 
to testify that the drugs were possessed with the intent to distribute rather than for 
personal use. During the course of trial, the State played a surveillance videotape 
of the drug transaction in which Hopkins uttered a phrase in the vernacular of the 
drug trade. The State later recalled its expert to testify to the meaning of the phrase. 
The defendant objected that the expert’s testimony on recall was outside the scope 
of the State’s discovery response and asked the trial judge to exclude the testimony 
as a sanction for the State’s alleged discovery violation. After hearing arguments 
from both sides, the trial judge ruled that the proposed expert testimony 
interpreting the vernacular drug phrase was within the scope of the State’s 
discovery response and that the State did not violate its discovery obligations. 
Hopkins appeals this ruling. He also claims that there was insufficient evidence for 
a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he maintained a 
building for keeping controlled substances. We agree with the trial judge that the 
State did not violate its discovery obligations and that the proposed expert 
testimony was within the scope of the State’s discovery response. We further 
 
3
conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting the maintaining a building 
conviction. Therefore, we affirm the convictions. 
Fact and Procedural History 
In February 2000, police arrested Pedro Marte for cocaine trafficking at the 
Best Western Hotel in Seaford, Delaware. Marte pleaded guilty to trafficking in 
cocaine and was sent to the Sussex Correctional Institute in September 2000. 
While Marte was incarcerated, he met Raymond Bacon.  Marte told Bacon that he 
was a “kingpin” with access to “a lot of drugs.” The two also discussed the 
possibility of future drug transactions. On December 11, 2003, after serving thirty-
nine months, Marte was released from prison.  
Less than two months after his release from prison, Marte arranged the 
delivery of two kilograms of cocaine in Delaware.  Detective Dan Wright, a 
member of the Delaware State Police Special Investigation Unit, initiated an 
investigation of Marte.  On January 30, 2004, Wright arrested Marte for possession 
of the two kilograms of cocaine. Marte agreed to assist the DSP in their cocaine 
trafficking investigations in the hope of a favorable plea and sentencing 
recommendation. Marte informed Wright that he knew two people in Delaware 
who were actively seeking to buy large quantities of cocaine. One was Raymond 
Bacon.  The DSP decided to conduct a “reverse” sting operation using Marte and 
 
4
cocaine provided by the police to set up a drug deal with Bacon.  To set the 
operation in motion, Wright instructed Marte to contact Bacon.  
On February 2, 2004, while Wright monitored the conversation, Marte 
placed a call to Bacon. Marte asked Bacon if he or anybody he knew might want to 
buy drugs. Bacon responded that his friend, “Artel” was interested.  Artel Hopkins, 
the defendant below and appellant here, understood the conversation because he 
was with Bacon at the time Bacon spoke with Marte.  Moreover, Bacon related 
portions of the conversation to Hopkins during the course of the telephone call. 
The parties agreed that Marte would sell Bacon and Hopkins two kilograms of 
cocaine for $47,000 with the understanding that Hopkins would provide the 
money.  Marte informed Bacon that he would travel to Seaford the next day and 
call Bacon when he arrived. Bacon, in turn, informed Hopkins that Marte was 
coming down the next day. Marte and Bacon also discussed getting a hotel room to 
carry out the transaction. Bacon seemed to like the idea of getting a hotel room 
because there they would be able to “cook” the cocaine to test its quality.  
On February 3, 2004, the DSP rented two adjoining hotel rooms at the Best 
Western Hotel in Seaford, Delaware. The DSP set up video and audio surveillance 
of Room 307. They then picked Marte up from prison and escorted him to the hotel 
room. Once there, Marte placed a telephone call to Bacon, who was riding in a car 
with Hopkins at the time, and told Bacon to meet him at the Best Western. After 
 
5
the phone call, Hopkins turned the car around and went south to Georgetown to get 
the $47,000. Hopkins went into a house on a back road and came out with a black 
bag containing the money. Hopkins and Bacon then drove to the Best Western.  
When they arrived at the hotel, Bacon called Marte and asked Marte for his 
room number. Bacon then went to Room 307 while Hopkins remained in the 
vehicle in the parking lot. After entering the room, Bacon called Hopkins to tell 
him the room number. Either Bacon or Hopkins asked if there was a stove in the 
room. After finding out that there was not, Hopkins left the Best Western and 
drove to Wal-Mart and purchased a hot plate.  Shortly thereafter, Hopkins returned 
to the Best Western and joined Bacon and Marte in Room 307.  Hopkins entered 
Room 307 with a blue Wal-Mart bag and the black bag he picked up from the 
house in Georgetown.  Hopkins also brought a digital scale, some baking soda he 
bought at another store, and a bag of rubber bands.  After Hopkins entered the 
room he placed the black bag on the bed.  He opened it, grabbed a grocery bag that 
was inside the black bag and opened the grocery bag.  The grocery bag contained 
the $47,000.  Marte flipped through the stacks of money to make sure that there 
were no single dollars in the middle.  Satisfied that there was actually $47,000 in 
the bag, Marte called a DSP detective who brought the drugs into the room and 
handed them to Marte.  Hopkins indicated that he needed to test the cocaine 
because he had previously been “beat for six” (lost a large amount of money when 
 
6
he purchased drugs that were “not good.”).  While preparing to cook the cocaine, 
Hopkins reached into the bag with the cocaine while Bacon was plugging in the 
hot plate.  At that point, the DSP came into the room and arrested everyone 
present.  
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(a)1, Hopkins’s defense 
attorneys filed two pre-trial discovery requests asking the State to disclose any 
expert testimony that it planned to introduce under D.R.E. 702, 703 and 705 
including the names of any experts and a summary of the substance of their 
testimony.  The State responded by indicating that it planned to call Wright “to 
testify as an expert that the drugs were possessed with the intent to deliver rather 
than for personal use.”  The State also advised that Wright’s opinion would be 
“based upon his training and experience as well as the attendant circumstances 
with respect to this particular case.”  
During the course of Marte’s direct testimony at trial, the State played the 
surveillance videotape of Room 307. In the videotape, Hopkins made the statement 
that he had previously been “beat for six.” The State later recalled Wright.  In 
questioning Wright, the prosecutor asked “do you recall a conversation about being 
                                                 
1  
SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL RULE 16(a)(1)(E) provides that “Upon request of a 
defendant, the state shall disclose to the defendant any evidence which the state may present at 
trial under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence. This disclosure 
shall be in the form of a written response that includes the identity of the witness and the 
substance of the opinions to be expressed.” 
 
 
7
‘beat for six’?”  Wright began to explain what “beat for six” meant.  Defense 
counsel then objected that the State had not laid the foundation to support Wright’s 
expertise in interpreting drug code or lingo.  The trial judge permitted the 
prosecutor to question Wright outside the presence of the jury to establish whether 
the detective was qualified as an expert to testify as a translator of the lingo of the 
drug trade.  
After the questioning, defense counsel acknowledged that Wright was 
qualified to testify about the meaning of “beat for six” but objected to the 
testimony on the grounds that it was outside the scope of the State’s response to the 
defense’s Rule 16 request because the State’s Rule 16 response only indicated that 
Wright would testify on the issue of whether the cocaine was possessed with the 
intent to deliver or for personal use.  Defense counsel objected that this testimony 
surprised the defense and that had the defense known in advance of trial that 
Wright would so testify the defense would have sought an expert to counter 
Wright’s “beat for six” interpretation.  Accordingly, defense counsel urged the trial 
judge to sanction the State for the alleged discovery violation by excluding 
Wright’s proposed testimony regarding the meaning of the vernacular phrase “beat 
for six.”  
After hearing arguments from each party and after a weekend break in the 
trial, the trial judge ruled that the Wright could testify about the meaning of “beat 
 
8
for six.”  In the presence of the jury, Wright explained that “beat for six,” meant 
that Hopkins had previously been “ripped off” in a drug deal.  More specifically, 
Wright elaborated:  
The “beat” means that whatever – the “beat for six”, six is a number. 
“Beat” means that whatever Mr. Hopkins was intending to get, he did 
not get. In that case, he was saying he was beat for six….We were in 
the middle of a two-kilo cocaine deal and Mr. Hopkins is being 
apologetic to a subject he had never met before. He doesn’t want to 
offend a possible supplier in the future, so he is apologizing and 
stating that he wants to test it because he had been beat or ripped off 
or did not get exactly what he wanted, and the six would be the kilos 
of cocaine. 
 
Hopkins appeals from the trial judge’s ruling allowing the State to present the 
testimony interpreting “beat for six” claiming that the trial judge erred because the 
facts support the conclusion that the State violated Superior Court Criminal Rule 
16 and the trial judge erroneously concluded that there was no discovery violation.  
Hopkins also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of 
Maintaining a Building for Keeping Controlled Substances.  Using a narrow 
dictionary definition of “maintain,” Hopkins contends that because the DSP rented 
the hotel room and because he was only in the room for “several fleeting minutes 
before he was arrested,” his conviction for Maintaining a Building cannot stand.   
 
 
 
 
9
1. The State’s alleged Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 discovery 
violation.  
 
We review alleged discovery violations and will reverse a trial judge’s ruling 
only “if the substantial rights of the accused are prejudicially affected.”2  When 
reviewing a discovery violation, we apply a three part test examining: (1) the 
centrality of the error to the case; (2) the closeness of the case; and (3) the steps 
taken to mitigate the results of the error.3  When a trial judge finds that the State 
has committed a discovery violation, he has “broad discretion to fashion the 
appropriate sanction.”4  In this case, however, we must first determine whether or 
not the trial judge correctly held that the State committed no Rule 16 violation.  
Both parties suggest that our review is de novo.  We will, however, review this 
decision for an abuse of discretion.5  Because we agree with the trial judge that the 
                                                 
2  
Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 63 (Del. 1996) (citing Ray v. State, 587 A2d. 439, 441 
(Del. 1991)).  
 
3  
Ray, 587 A.2d at 441 (quoting Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1126 (Del. 1990)). 
 
4  
Cabrera v. State, 840 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. 2004). 
 
5  
Hopkins cites Secrest, 679 A.2d at 63, n.7 to support the proposition that our review is de 
novo. The State did not contest that this standard applies. In Secrest, the defendant claimed that 
the State violated Rule 16 by failing to disclose that it intended to offer certain expert testimony. 
Citing Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439 (1991) Secrest argued that we should review the issue under an 
abuse of discretion standard. In footnote 7, we explained that in Ray we “appeared to apply, 
however, plenary review.” Secrest’s footnote 7 creates some confusion about the appropriate 
standard of review in cases like this one. To clear up that confusion, we set forth the general rule: 
while we review a trial judge’s interpretation of the Superior Court Rules relating to discovery 
de novo, we review the trial judge’s application of those rules for an abuse of discretion. See 
Jackson v. State, 654 A.2d 829, 832 (Del. 1995) (“[A]s a Court of last resort, this Court's 
interpretation of the applicability of rules of court, as well as statutes, must control.”); ABB 
Flakt, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 731 A.2d 811, 815 (Del. 1999) (“This Court reviews 
 
10
State did not violate Rule 16, we need not engage in the three-part test to determine 
whether Hopkins’s substantial rights were prejudicially affected.  Accordingly, 
Hopkins’s appeal on this issue must fail.6  
As noted above, the State responded to the Hopkins’s pre-trial Rule 16(a) 
discovery request regarding expert opinions and the substance thereof by 
informing Hopkins that it intended to call Wright to:  
testify as an expert that the drugs were possessed with the intent to 
deliver rather than for personal use. Det. Wright’s opinion will be 
based upon his training and experience as well as the attendant 
circumstances with respect to this particular case.  
 
The trial judge concluded that Wright’s expert testimony about the meaning of 
“beat for six” fell within the scope of the State’s discovery response.  We agree 
with the trial judge’s ruling and rationale.  In explaining his decision the trial judge 
noted:  
In the context of the drug trade where significant weight transactions 
are involved and in the context of the evidence in this case, Detective 
Wright’s opinion is that “beat for six” means that the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                             
a trial court's application of discovery rules for abuse of discretion.”); Pepsico, Inc. v. Pepsi-Cola 
Bottling Co., 261 A.2d 520, 521 (Del. 1969) (“[A]ll discovery rulings are interlocutory and 
discretionary.”) 
 
6  
Because we find that the State did not violate its obligations under Rule 16, we need not 
discuss Hopkins’s conclusory claim that he was “denied his state and federal constitutional rights 
to a fair trial when the trial court admitted into evidence expert testimony interpreting the drug 
lingo….” See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)) (“Criminal defendants do not have a general 
constitutional right to discovery [citation]. In most circumstances, then, a defendant must point to 
a statute, rule of criminal procedure, or other entitlement to obtain discovery from the 
government.”) 
 
 
11
previously had been hoodwinked on a kilo transaction. This explains 
why the defendant appeared to be apologetic and why the two kilos of 
cocaine would be tested, all of which shows the defendant’s 
commercial interest and intent.  
 
Without expert opinion to translate it, the phrase would be 
meaningless to the jury. The defendant contends that the evidence 
should be excluded under Criminal Rule 16. Criminal Rule 16 
requires that experts be identified and the substance and grounds of 
their opinions be disclosed upon request.  
 
The State did respond to the defense request on this subject. Wright 
was identified as an expert in the Special Investigations Unit. The 
subject matter of the opinion was that the defendant possessed cocaine 
with the intent to deliver cocaine. Further, that the defendant did not 
intend the cocaine for personal use.  
 
The phrase “beat for six” supports the commercial nature of the 
transaction. It is within the umbrella of the disclosed area of Wright’s 
opinion. The defendant’s words, as translated, are part and parcel of 
the commercial venture and enterprise. 
 
Further, the defendant had also been supplied with the video-tape 
which had the recorded statement. Both defendant’s present and 
former counsel had access to them. It should come as no surprise that 
the defendant made the statement. It should also come as no surprise 
that the disclosed expert would be asked questions as to what the 
phrase meant from a commercial or personal perspective in the 
context of this case….I do not find a Rule 16 violation in this case.  
 
Given that the defense had access to the tape before trial, that the State disclosed 
that Wright was going to testify at trial about the commercial nature of the 
transaction, and that Hopkins apparently uttered the phrase “beat for six” 
apologetically to explain why he wanted to test the quality of the two kilograms of 
cocaine in this case, we agree with the trial judge that “beat for six” supports the 
 
12
commercial nature of the transaction and is thus within the scope of the State’s 
discovery response that Wright would be called to offer his view on why the 
transaction was “commercial” and not personal.  Thus it was not error to allow 
Wright to interpret the phrase “beat for six” for the jury.7   
 
Hopkins suggests that permitting the State to make overly broad statements 
about the subject matter of an expert witness’s proposed testimony and then to 
argue that a very specialized and specific area of expert testimony falls within the 
scope of the overly broad disclosed areas of the expert’s opinion makes a mockery 
of Rule 16 and renders it meaningless to discovery’s goals of avoiding surprise and 
streamlining substantive trial preparation.  As a general matter we agree. Indeed, 
we have emphasized this same concern in the past: “When the defense makes 
specific authorized discovery demands, the State should make specific and 
accurate replies….When the State provides a casual reply in answer to specific 
defense demands, the State is to be held accountable for any inaccuracies in its 
                                                 
7  
Although the trial judge determined that there was no Rule 16 violation, he also engaged 
in an alternative and hypothetical prejudice analysis and concluded that even if there was a 
violation, it was “technical and no more than inadvertent....Nothing supports the idea that the 
State had a motive to hide and sandbag the defendant with this evidence. Indeed, there are other 
statements and evidence which suggest that the defendant was previously involved with drugs 
commercially.” The trial judge also concluded that the defendant suffered no prejudice: “the 
defendant had reason to know, from all the evidence, that his prior commercial involvement with 
drugs was known and in play for this trial.”  As we noted, however, because we agree that no 
Rule 16 violation occurred, we need not reach the issue of prejudice.  
 
 
13
general reply.”8 In this case, however, the State’s response was neither casual nor 
inaccurate.9  Importantly, in our view, defense counsel had access to the videotape 
before the trial, could hear the “beat for six” comment in the tape, and could assess 
before trial its implication for the scope and context of Wright’s expected 
testimony about the commercial nature of the thwarted transaction and Hopkins’s 
explanation about why he needed to test the cocaine.  Defense counsel knew or 
should have suspected that Wright’s testimony concerning the commercial nature 
of the transaction might include comments explaining why Hopkins needed to test 
the cocaine.  Thus, we conclude that defense counsel was neither unfairly surprised 
nor did the State’s response render defense counsel’s substantive trial preparation 
meaningless. 
 
Hopkins relies on several cases to support his argument that the State 
violated its Rule 16 discovery obligations here.  These cases are factually 
distinguishable.  He relies most heavily on United State v. Cruz.10 In Cruz, also a 
case involving a drug sting operation, the government disclosed that it planned to 
                                                 
8  
Johnson v. State, 550 A.2d 903, 910-911 (Del. 1988).  
 
9  
While a more precise discovery response might have been more helpful to the defense, 
the State did not intentionally nor inadvertently disguise the basis for and nature of Wright’s 
proposed testimony. As a matter of best practices, the State can and should easily avoid litigating 
these issues at trial and on appeal by erring on the side of more precise and detailed discovery 
responses.   
 
10  
363 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2004).  
 
 
14
call one DEA agent to testify as an expert in the distribution and pricing of 
heroin.11  During trial, in addition to calling the first DEA agent as an expert 
witness, the government called a second DEA agent as a fact witness to testify 
“about what he had seen during [the] surveillance operation.”12  The second DEA 
agent testified about several statements the defendant made after his arrest. 
Specifically, the defendant explained that he was present at the location “to watch” 
the “back” of a participant in the drug deal. After the second DEA agent related the 
defendant’s statement, the prosecutor asked the agent to explain the meaning of the 
phrase “to watch someone’s back.”  The second DEA agent responded that an 
individual who “watches someone’s back” is synonymous with a “lookout” in a 
“narcotics transaction.”13  The government agreed that this interpretation was 
expert testimony from a fact witness.  
The Second Circuit explained that it is:  
well settled that the government may elicit expert testimony from a 
properly qualified expert witness regarding the parlance of the 
narcotics trade and the meaning thereof [because] drug dealers often 
camouflage their discussions… [Therefore] expert testimony 
explaining the meaning of code words may assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.14 
                                                 
11  
Id. at 196, n.2.  
 
12  
Id. at 193.  
 
13  
Id.  
 
14  
Id. at 194.  
 
 
15
 
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the trial judge erred by allowing the 
government to overreach by admitting expert testimony from a fact witness not 
disclosed as an expert in pre-trial discovery responses, particularly when the 
interpreted phrase did not fall within the ambit of drug jargon.15  There was no 
evidence in the record that the meaning of the phrase “to watch someone’s back” 
constituted a drug code.16  “In the absence of such evidence, this is an ambiguous 
phrase that, without more, may refer to any number of situations that are not 
related to narcotics transactions.”17  Under the circumstances, the second DEA 
agent “strayed from the scope of his expertise when he offered expert opinions 
regarding the meaning” of the ambiguous phrase.18 
 
Unlike the government in Cruz, here the State did disclose that it was going 
to call Wright as an expert witness in pretrial discovery.  Moreover, the meaning of 
the unambiguous phrase “beat for six” was intertwined with the commercial nature 
of the transaction and Hopkins’s explanation for why he needed to cook the 
                                                 
15  
Id. at 195-196, 199.  
 
16  
Id. at 196.  
 
17  
Id.  
 
18  
Id. at 197. The Second Circuit also chastised the government for failing to adhere to its 
representation regarding compliance with the federal version of Rule 16, noting that the 
prosecution did not notify the defense counsel that it would call the second DEA agent as an 
expert witness at all. Thus, the district court erred in allowing the second DEA agent to testify as 
an expert witness in the face of the defendant’s objections. Id. at 196, n2.   
 
 
16
cocaine.  Finally, Wright neither strayed from the scope of his expertise nor from 
the scope of the State’s pretrial discovery.  Cruz is distinguishable and, therefore, 
not persuasive.  
 
Hopkins also relies on Secrest v. State.19 In Secrest, a second degree murder 
case arising out of a automobile collision, the State’s expert initially testified about 
“accident reconstruction.”  On rebuttal, the State recalled the expert to testify based 
on his knowledge of “occupant kinematics” that the defendant was the driver and 
the victim was the passenger.  The defendant objected to the admission of the 
testimony based on “occupant kinematics” because the state failed to disclose that 
it intended to offer that expert opinion.20  While reversing on other grounds, we 
agreed that there was a disclosure violation.21  
Secrest provides very little guidance in the case at bar.  As should be 
obvious, determining whether the State violated its discovery obligations by failing 
to make required Rule 16 disclosures is a fact-intensive inquiry that must 
conducted on a case-by-case basis.  Similarly, the other cases Hopkins cites stand 
for the correct general rule of law but provide little help in engaging in the 
                                                 
19  
679 A.2d 58 (Del. 1996).  
 
20  
Id. at 61-63.  
 
21  
Id. at 64.  
 
 
17
contextual inquiry about whether the State violated its discovery obligations in this 
case.22 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State neither violated its Rule 
16 discovery obligation nor offered testimony outside the scope of its discovery 
response.  Accordingly, Hopkins first claim on appeal fails.  
2. Hopkins’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
Maintaining a Building for Keeping Controlled Substances.  
 
 
Hopkins argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict 
him of Maintaining a Building for Keeping Controlled Substances in its case in 
chief.  We review de novo a trial judge’s denial of a defendant’s motion for a 
judgment of acquittal to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.23  In this case, Hopkins 
never moved for a judgment of acquittal before the trial judge.  Therefore, our 
                                                 
22  
Hopkins also cites Condon v. State, 597 A.2d 7 (Del. 1991) (State could not have 
presented expert testimony concerning gradual disclosure by victims of sexual abuse on direct 
examination because it failed to give adequate pre-trial notice of the intent to use the testimony, 
but the State could offer the expert testimony on redirect after the defense opened the door.); 
Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987) (To use expert testimony to provide trier of fact 
background cornering behavior of an alleged child abuse victim based on expert’s experience the 
State must provide notice of its intention to use such a witness sufficiently in advance of trial to 
enable the defendant to prepare to cross-examine the witness.); United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 
356 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (Trial judge compensated defendants for government’s failure to 
adhere to technical requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 by certifying the witness only as a 
ballistics expert and refusing to certify him as a firearms expert.).  
 
23  
Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 2005) (citing Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 989 
(Del. 2004)). 
 
 
18
standard of review is plain error.24  “Under the plain error standard of review, the 
error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”25  Even under a de novo 
standard, however, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence for a rational 
finder of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, to find 
Hopkins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Hopkins argues that the word “maintain” is not defined in the statute and 
that, therefore, we must use the “common dictionary definition.”  He defines 
“maintain” very narrowly suggesting that “to maintain” “is to make a situation 
continue in the same way as before.”  Because the DSP leased the hotel room and 
he was only in the room for fleeting minutes before he was arrested, Hopkins 
suggests that his presence in the room was “merely incidental.”  As such, Hopkins 
concludes, a rational trier of fact could not have found that he did anything to 
“maintain” or “keep” Room 307 for the purpose of delivering or keeping 
controlled substances.  We disagree.  
 
Hopkins was convicted under 16 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5), which provides that it 
is a crime for a person: 
                                                 
24  
Hainey v. State, 878 A.2d 430, 433 (Del. 2005). 
 
25  
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
 
19
Knowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, 
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure or place which is 
resorted to by persons using controlled substances … for the purpose 
of using these substances or which is used for keeping or delivering 
them …. 
 
In Priest v. State26, we examined the application of this statute to the crime of 
“Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances.” After examining the 
relevant “Maintaining a Vehicle” jurisprudence, we set forth the general rule that 
“the critical benchmark for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a 
Maintaining a Vehicle prosecution has been the degree of the defendant’s control 
or use of the vehicle in connection with the possession of drugs.”27  We also noted 
that “the crucial inquiry [was] whether [the defendant] knew that he was using the 
car to facilitate … [the] attempted drug deal.”28  Thus we held, that to “sustain a 
finding of guilt on a Maintaining a Vehicle charge, the State must offer evidence of 
some affirmative activity by the defendant to utilize the vehicle to facilitate the 
possession, delivery, or use of controlled substances.”29 
                                                 
26  
879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005).  
 
27  
Id. at 579-580 (emphasis added) (discussing State v. Rhinehardt, 1990 Del Super. LEXIS 
9 (Del. Super 1990), Lonergan v. State, 590 A.2d 502 (Del. 1991); McNulty v. State, 655 A.2d 
1214 (Del. 1995); Watson v. State, 755 A.2d 390 (Del. 2000)(TABLE); and Fletcher v. State, 
2005 Del. LEXIS 124 (Del. 2005)).  
 
28  
Id. at 580.  
 
29  
Id. at 576.  
 
 
20
 
Given the structure of the statute and our interpretation in Priest with 
respect to vehicles, we see no need to resort to the dictionary definition of the word 
“maintain” to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Hopkins’s 
conviction for “Maintaining a Building.”  Instead, we will apply the Priest inquiry 
to analyze the sufficiency of evidence for all “Maintaining” charges under 
§4755(a)(5) regardless of the type of vehicle or structure involved.  Thus, in this 
case, we must determine whether the State offered evidence of some affirmative 
activity by Hopkins to use the hotel room to facilitate the possession, delivery, or 
use of cocaine.  In conducting this inquiry we note that “ownership of the 
[building] is not required under the statute” and that a single incident of using a 
building to facilitate a drug deal is sufficient to convict.30  Thus, the crucial inquiry 
here is whether Hopkins knew that he was using the hotel room to facilitate the 
attempted drug deal.  
 
The companion cases of Priest and Fletcher provide useful guides in 
making this determination.  The cases both arose out of the same incident. Deborah 
Powell drove to the Manchester Square Apartments in Dover looking for a friend. 
Fletcher, who was seeking transportation to buy crack cocaine, approached Powell 
                                                 
30  
Fletcher v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 124, *8 (Del. 2005). Because Hopkins did not make 
the argument on appeal, there is no need for us to address footnote 22 of Priest in which we 
explained that most, if not all, other Uniform Controlled Substances Act jurisdictions reject the 
“single occurrence” approach to “Maintaining” convictions that Delaware endorses.  As in 
Priest, “we have no occasion to reassess our position vis-à-vis the other states.”  
 
 
21
and asked to borrow her car.  He promised Powell a small amount of money or 
cocaine in return for the use of the car.  Powell refused to lend Fletcher her car, but 
agreed to drive him to a nearby Bob Evans restaurant. Priest, who was not present 
during this conversation, arrived later and joined Fletcher in Powell’s car. With 
Fletcher sitting in the front passenger seat and Priest in the rear, Powell drove both 
men to the Bob Evans.  Once there, Powell and Priest waited in the car while 
Fletcher went into the restaurant.  Thirty or forty seconds later, Fletcher returned to 
the car and told Powell, “they’re not here.”31  
 
 
As they were leaving the restaurant parking lot, Powell failed to 
signal when she made a turn. A police officer who was conducting 
undercover surveillance in the area pulled them over. Powell testified 
that when the police pulled them over Fletcher told Priest "you better 
run." As the police were approaching the car, Powell heard her glove 
box open and close and she saw Fletcher fumbling with something. 
She also observed Priest shoving something down into the back seat 
cushion. When the police searched the car they found cocaine in the 
glove box, a digital scale in the side pocket of the passenger door, and 
a loaded handgun in the crevice of the back seat.32 
 
 
Both Priest and Fletcher were convicted of Maintaining a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances.  Both appealed.  We affirmed Fletcher’s 
convictions and reversed Priest’s.  In so doing, we noted that Fletcher had “actual 
possession and control over the cocaine, and that he personally solicited Powell to 
                                                 
31  
See Fletcher, 2005 Del. LEXIS 124 at*2-*3, Priest, 879 A.2d at 576-577. 
 
32  
Fletcher, 2005 Del LEXIS 124 at*2-3.  
 
 
22
give him a ride.”33  Thus, there was “significant evidence of [Fletcher’s] direct 
involvement in maintaining the vehicle.”  
 
Conversely, in Priest, we explained that the crucial inquiry was whether 
Priest knew he was using the car to facilitate Fletcher’s drug deal, “not whether 
Priest knew only that Fletcher was about to buy drugs, with Priest happenstance 
being present in the car alongside Fletcher.”34  We acknowledged that it is possible 
“to imagine a scenario where a passenger’s actions might adequately demonstrate 
his knowledge that the vehicle was kept or maintained for illegal drug activity,” 
but that the facts did not support that scenario.35 
 
In this case, although Bacon and Marte spoke about leasing the hotel room 
and the DSP actually leased it, Hopkins had sufficient involvement and knowledge 
that the room was to be used to facilitate the attempted drug deal.  Upon finding 
out that there was no stove in the room, Hopkins left to purchase a hot plate.  After 
purchasing the hot plate, Hopkins returned to the room with the hot plate, baking 
soda, a digital scale, and $47,000.  Right before the DSP burst into the room, 
Hopkins was handling the cocaine while Bacon was plugging in the hot plate. 
                                                 
33  
Id. at *9-*10.  
 
34  
Priest, 879 A.2d at 580.  
 
35  
Id.  See e.g., Thomas v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 457 (Del. 2005). 
 
 
23
 
The facts here are closer to Fletcher than Priest.  Hopkins is like the 
passenger in the scenario we imagined in Priest.  He had knowledge that the room 
was leased for illegal drug activity, his presence was not happenstance, and he, 
himself, was getting ready to spend $47,000 to buy cocaine.  He brought drug 
paraphernalia in order to test the quality of the cocaine and to facilitate the 
transaction.  The hotel room was essential to Hopkins in order to consummate the 
drug deal. The fact that the DSP paid the bill and actually leased the room is of no 
consequence.  Moreover, here, as in Fletcher, there was significant evidence of 
Hopkins’s “direct involvement” in maintaining the hotel room.  Hopkins had 
knowledge that the room would facilitate the illegal drug activity by serving as a 
convenient locale where the drugs could be “cooked” to determine their 
authenticity.  Even under a de novo standard of review, we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence to support Hopkins’s conviction for Maintaining a Building for 
Keeping Controlled Substances.36  
                                                 
36  
The jury instructions in this case first set forth the offense of Maintaining a Dwelling by 
quoting the relevant portion of § 4755(a)(5). The instructions then stated that in order to find 
Hopkins guilty of the offense that the jury must find that the State established beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  
 
(1) That the defendant kept or maintained a dwelling, in this case, Room 307…; 
and, 
(2) The dwelling was used to keep controlled substances in violation of the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act; namely, for the purposes of using these 
substances or for the purpose of keeping or delivering controlled substances; 
and , 
(3) The defendant acted knowingly with regard to such activity at Room 307…. A 
person acts knowingly when the person knows or is aware of such activity….  
 
24
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED.   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
These jury instructions captured the essence of the holding in Priest. We wish to emphasize that 
in all cases involving charges for “maintaining” under § 4755(a)(5) the jury instructions should 
include some language setting forth the rule we articulated in Priest: “the State must offer 
evidence of some affirmative activity by the defendant to utilize the vehicle [building, dwelling, 
etc.] to facilitate the possession, delivery, or use of controlled substances.”