Title: Murray v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 446, 2011, 470, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEPHAN MURRAY,  
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
                     Plaintiff Below, 
          Appellee. 
§ 
§  Nos. 446/470, 2011 
§  Consolidated 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0804021506 
§ 
§ 
§   
 
                                       Submitted:  April 20, 2012 
 
Decided:   June 5, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 5th day of June 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The defendant-appellant, Stephan Murray, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s July 29, 2011 order denying his first motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no 
merit to the appeal and, accordingly, affirm. 
 
(2) The record before us reflects that, in January 2009, following a 
combined jury and bench trial in the Superior Court, Murray was convicted 
of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, two 
counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 
 
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Maintaining a Dwelling for the Keeping of Controlled Substances, 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and 
two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a Person Prohibited.  
Murray was sentenced to a total of 37 years of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after 17 years for decreasing levels of supervision.  This Court 
affirmed Murray’s convictions on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) In this consolidated appeal, Murray claims that a) his trial 
attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the 
evidence until the first day of trial; and b) the Superior Court erred by failing 
to require his trial attorney to file an affidavit in response to the claim of 
ineffective assistance. 
 
(4) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.2  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.3  The 
                                                 
1 Murray v. State, Del. Supr., No. 307, 2009, Holland, J. (Feb. 23, 2010). 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
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defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.4 
 
(5) Murray’s first claim is that his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to move to suppress the evidence until the first day of 
trial.  The record before us shows that, on the first day of trial, Murray’s 
counsel requested the Superior Court to consider a motion to suppress on the 
basis of stipulated facts.  Counsel explained that he had not moved to 
suppress before that time because he did not want to jeopardize ongoing plea 
negotiations.  Counsel had, in fact, succeeded in negotiating a generous plea 
of 5 years at Level V, considering that Murray was facing 17 years of 
mandatory Level V time if he were convicted of all the charges against him.5  
Murray rejected that plea offer.  Given the circumstances, the judge agreed 
to hear counsel’s suppression motion.  The judge’s ruling denying the 
motion was affirmed on direct appeal.6     
 
(6) We agree with the Superior Court’s rationale that Murray’s 
counsel made a reasonable professional decision to forego filing his motion 
to suppress during ongoing plea negotiations—negotiations that would have 
resulted in a positive outcome for Murray had he chosen to accept the State’s 
                                                 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
5 Unfortunately, Murray rejected the State’s plea offer. 
6 Murray v. State, Del. Supr., No. 307, 2009, Holland, J. (Feb. 23, 2010). 
 
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plea offer.  The suppression motion was argued on the basis of stipulated 
facts, none of which Murray disputes.  Murray can show no resulting 
prejudice, because the judge permitted the motion to be heard and the denial 
of the motion was affirmed on appeal.  We, therefore, conclude that 
Murray’s first claim is without merit. 
 
(7) Murray’s second claim is that the Superior Court erred by not 
requiring his counsel to submit an affidavit responding to his claim of 
ineffective assistance.  This Court has ruled that an adequate record for 
appellate review of a postconviction motion containing allegations of 
ineffective assistance generally should include the affidavit of the 
defendant’s trial counsel.7  The situation presented here provides an 
exception to that rule.   
 
(8) Here, Murray’s counsel explained to the judge before trial, his 
reasons for not moving to suppress the evidence in a timely manner.  
Because the same judge was assigned Murray’s first postconviction motion 
and already knew counsel’s reasoning for not filing a timely suppression 
motion, there was no need to expand the record to include counsel’s affidavit 
                                                 
7 Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2009); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (2). 
 
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in response to Murray’s claim of ineffective assistance on that ground.8  We, 
therefore, conclude that Murray’s second claim is without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       Justice    
 
                                                 
8 To the extent Murray argues that the Superior Court’s rulings at trial and this Court’s 
rulings on appeal were erroneous, any such arguments are procedurally barred as 
formerly adjudicated.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).