Title: Cline v. Berg
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060237
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

Present:  All the Justices 
THOMAS SCOTT CLINE, ET AL. 
v.  Record No. 060237  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
                                   January 12, 2007 
ROY C. BERG, JR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Thomas H. Wood, Judge 
 
Roy C. Berg, Jr. (Berg), filed a bill of complaint 
against Thomas S. Cline and Teresa B. Cline (the Clines), 
seeking an injunction requiring the Clines to dismantle and 
remove a 32-foot high, 200-foot long fence constructed of 
utility poles and plastic wrap because it unreasonably 
interfered with Berg’s use and enjoyment of his real 
property.  After hearing evidence ore tenus, the circuit 
court held the fence was a private nuisance and ordered the 
Clines to remove it.  We, however, conclude the circuit 
court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief 
to Berg because it failed to apply the “clean hands” 
doctrine.  For that reason, we will reverse the circuit 
court’s judgment. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Berg and the Clines are adjacent landowners in Augusta 
County and previously lived next door to one another.  
After several disagreements between the parties, the Clines 
decided to move from their residence adjoining Berg.  They 
 
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built a home on a 76-acre parcel of real estate that also 
joins Berg’s property.  The Clines’ new home is still in 
view of Berg’s residence although it is situated 
approximately 1800 feet away on top of a hill. 
 
Soon after moving into their new home in January 2005, 
the Clines discovered that Berg had constructed a tripod 
about 11 feet tall and equipped with motion sensors and 
seven flood lights.  The flood lights intermittently come 
on when the Clines turn on certain lights in their home.  A 
neighbor, who had been to the Clines’ home on several 
occasions, testified that Berg’s lights are obviously 
directed at the Clines’ home and illuminate their property.  
The neighbor likened the lights to “someone having their 
high beams on their car shining them towards the house.” 
The Clines learned Berg had also installed 
surveillance cameras on his property.  The cameras tracked 
some of the Clines’ movements while on their property.  
When asked at trial if any of the cameras had the Clines’ 
house in view, Berg answered, “Not really. . . . If [the 
cameras] track across – the camera that sits there on 
camera three on the tracker . . . might catch the very top 
of [the Clines’] roof [b]ut [t]hey are not aimed at his 
home or his house.”  The Clines’ evidence, however, 
contradicted Berg’s testimony.  Because Berg’s surveillance 
 
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system uses “wireless . . . cameras” that operate on an 
“open frequency,” the Clines were able to pick up the 
wireless signal from Berg’s cameras.  When the Clines began 
receiving interference on their television, they unplugged 
the wireless transmitter they use with their television, 
and, in Mr. Cline’s words, “low and behold there’s our 
house on the TV.” 
Berg testified he installed the lights because rabid 
raccoons had been spotted in the neighborhood and because 
the Clines had allegedly harassed him.  Berg also 
introduced testimony from a real estate appraiser who 
opined the Clines’ fence has caused a “nine percent 
diminution in [the] value” of Berg’s property.  But, the 
appraiser admitted the market value of Berg’s property 
would increase by nine percent if the Clines remove the 
fence. 
 
In a letter to Berg, the Clines’ attorney warned that 
“[t]he intensity and direction of [the] lights make them 
very noticeable in the Cline[s’] house and are disrupting 
their use and enjoyment of their home.”  He requested Berg 
to “redirect these lights so that they do not illuminate or 
shine in the direction of the Cline[s’] property, or just 
. . . leave them turned off.”  Berg testified that, in 
response to the letter, he changed the wattage of the bulbs 
 
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in the flood lights from 125 watts to 100 watts and 
“double-checked” to insure that the illuminated area is 
within the boundary of his property. 
When Berg failed to comply with the request to 
redirect the lights, the Clines’ attorney again wrote to 
Berg, informing him to 
accept this letter as notice on behalf of the 
Clines that they plan to build a solid fence 
between your property and theirs.  This will be 
high enough to block their view of your property, 
and to address your stated concerns.  They would 
prefer not to incur this expense, but your 
actions leave them no choice.  Unfortunately, to 
be effective, this fence will have to be 35 feet 
high and over 200 feet long and will run close to 
your rear property line.  Frankly, it will be an 
eyesore and probably affect not only their 
property value, but yours as well.  However, 
their undisturbed use of their home and property 
are worth the expense and inconvenience. 
 
Plans will be to start this project in five 
days.  If you do not want this built, simply 
leave the Cline family alone, and turn off your 
light display.  If you continue with your antics, 
they will have no other recourse than to proceed. 
 
A few months later, the Clines built the fence at 
issue.  It is constructed with approximately 20 utility 
poles spaced 10 feet apart.  A type of plastic wrap used to 
cover silage is attached to the poles.  The fence is 32 
feet high and runs approximately 200 feet along the border 
between the Cline property and the Berg property.  The 
Clines initially considered building a 50-foot high, indoor 
 
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horse-riding arena but settled for the fence as a 
compromise to their other neighbors.  Mr. Cline testified 
the fence blocks the lights and other devices Berg 
installed to watch the Cline family and then explained why 
he erected the fence: 
The reason is because Mr. Berg was stalking us.  
He basically used the lights as an intimidation 
factor.  Every time me or my wife would walk out 
to let the dog out, he would sit there and play 
with the lights on and off to let us know that he 
was watching us.  If we would drive up and down 
our own driveway, he would take the lights and 
track us with it.  If my son was down in the 
field taking care of the neighbor’s horses and 
coming back up, then he would be waiting with the 
lights. 
 
When Berg filed his bill of complaint against the 
Clines, he circulated a letter to nine other nearby 
residents, seeking their support in having the Clines’ 
fence removed.1  Berg stated in his letter, “I hate to burst 
[the Clines’] bubble but I am from the city with apartment 
buildings that are 20 and 30 stories high, and no view of 
anything but walls, and trash cans.  I will just install 
higher perimeter lights that will light, track, and record 
movement around my property.” 
 
After considering the evidence introduced by both 
parties, the circuit court, in a letter opinion, rejected 
                                                 
1 Notably, none of these residents testified on Berg’s 
behalf at the trial in this case. 
 
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Berg’s explanation for installing his surveillance system.  
The court explained that, when “compar[ing] the testimony 
of Berg against the evidence introduced by the Clines 
. . . , it becomes apparent that Berg was not truthful with 
the [c]ourt.”  In the circuit court’s view, “[t]he evidence 
introduced by the Clines proved beyond any question that 
Berg’s surveillance system allowed Berg to watch on his 
television anything going on at the Cline residence, 
provided it took place in front of an open window.” 
Continuing, the circuit court expressed the “firm 
. . . opinion that Berg [was] primarily responsible for 
what is an intolerable situation” and stated it was 
“satisfied beyond question that the Clines would never have 
even thought about such a fence had they been left alone.”  
Addressing the Clines’ argument that the “clean hands” 
doctrine barred the equitable relief sought by Berg, the 
circuit court indicated it “could, in good conscience, 
dismiss the [b]ill of [c]omplaint on that doctrine.”  The 
circuit court even stated the “clean hands” doctrine would 
be the “[f]irst and foremost” way to rule in favor of the 
Clines.  But, the circuit court refused to apply the 
doctrine because it believed the fence is “an ugly scar on 
a beautiful area” and should be removed.  The circuit court 
concluded that, although the fence does provide some 
 
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protection to the Clines from Berg’s lights and is not a 
“spite fence,” it is nonetheless a private nuisance.2 
For the reasons stated in its letter opinion, the 
circuit court entered an order directing the Clines to 
remove the fence from their property.  The Clines appeal 
from that judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the circuit 
court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief 
to Berg because it failed to apply the “clean hands” 
doctrine.  With regard to that issue, the Clines argue that 
Berg, as the party seeking an equitable remedy, must have 
“clean hands” in order to prevail.  Continuing, the Clines 
point out that the circuit court found “Berg [was] 
primarily responsible for what is an intolerable situation” 
and that it could dismiss the bill of complaint on the 
“clean hands” doctrine.  Given these findings, the Clines 
contend the circuit court then abused its discretion by 
ignoring Berg’s “unclean hands” and granting him injunctive 
relief. 
 
“The doctrine of ‘unclean hands’ is an ancient maxim 
of equity courts,” Richards v. Musselman, 221 Va. 181, 185, 
                                                 
2 The term “spite fence” is defined as “[a] fence 
erected solely to annoy a neighbor.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1437 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
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267 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1980), and is generally expressed in 
these terms: 
“Pursuant to the equitable maxim that ‘He who 
comes into equity must come with clean hands,’ 
. . . the complainant seeking equitable relief 
must not himself have been guilty of any 
inequitable or wrongful conduct with respect to 
the transaction or subject matter sued on.  
Equity will not give relief to one seeking to 
restrain or enjoin a tortious act where he has 
himself been guilty of fraud, illegality, 
tortious conduct or the like in respect of the 
same matter in litigation.” 
 
Id. at n.1 (quoting W. deFuniak, Handbook of Modern Equity 
§ 24 (2d ed. 1956)); accord Butler v. Hayes, 254 Va. 38, 
43, 487 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1997) (“a litigant who seeks to 
invoke an equitable remedy must have clean hands”); 
Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 526, 443 S.E.2d 134, 138 
(1994) (“[h]e who asks equity must do equity, and he who 
comes into equity must come with clean hands”); McNeir v. 
McNeir, 178 Va. 285, 290, 16 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1941) (“a 
plaintiff must come in with clean hands, that is, he must 
be free from reproach in his conduct”); Walker v. 
Henderson, 151 Va. 913, 927-928, 145 S.E. 311, 315 (1928) 
(same).  Application of the doctrine turns upon the facts 
of each particular case and is therefore left to the sound 
discretion of the fact finder.  Wiglesworth v. Taylor, 239 
Va. 603, 608, 391 S.E.2d 299, 303 (1990). 
 
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Applying these principles, we conclude the circuit 
court abused its discretion by failing to apply the “clean 
hands” doctrine.  At the outset, we note that Berg did not 
assign cross-error to the circuit court’s factual findings 
that he was the party primarily responsible for the 
“intolerable situation” at issue and that the Clines would 
never have constructed the fence if Berg had merely left 
them alone.  Thus, those factual findings are binding on 
appeal.  Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
551, 565, 554 S.E.2d 55, 62 (2001). 
 
Berg, nevertheless, maintains the circuit court was 
correct in refusing to apply the “clean hands” doctrine.  
Characterizing the circuit court’s factual and credibility 
findings as “a severe ad hominem attack” upon his character 
and testimony, Berg argues the application of the “clean 
hands” doctrine in this case would create an inequitable 
result and violate public policy because the fence is a 
private nuisance. 
It is true that the doctrine is not absolute and 
should not be applied when the result would be inequitable 
or violate public policy.  Richards, 221 Va. at 185, 267 
S.E.2d at 167; Harrell v. Allen, 183 Va. 722, 732, 33 
S.E.2d 222, 226 (1945); Waller v. Eanes, 156 Va. 389, 398, 
157 S.E. 721, 725 (1931).  We do not, however, agree with 
 
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Berg’s position that such a result would ensue in this 
case.  Berg ignores the circuit court’s finding that the 
Clines would never have erected the fence if he had left 
them alone as requested in their attorney’s letter to Berg.  
The circuit court further opined “the fence would disappear 
if the surveillance equipment, including the lights, 
disappeared.”  A court of equity “will not relieve against 
conditions brought about by the improper conduct of the 
party seeking relief.”  Wilson v. Wall, 99 Va. 353, 356, 38 
S.E. 181, 182 (1901).  Irrespective whether the fence is a 
private nuisance, Berg was not “free from reproach in his 
conduct,” McNeir, 178 Va. at 290, 16 S.E.2d at 633, and 
that conduct was “in respect of the same matter in 
litigation.”  Musselmann, 221 Va. at 185 n.1, 267 S.E.2d at 
166 n.1 (citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the unchallenged factual findings 
regarding Berg’s conduct, we conclude the circuit court 
abused its discretion in failing to apply the “clean hands” 
doctrine and deny the injunctive relief requested by Berg.  
We will therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and enter final judgment here in favor of the Clines.3 
                                                 
3 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address the Clines’ remaining assignments of error. 
 
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Reversed and final judgment.