Title: Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v. Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC (Opinion - Leave Granted)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 153979
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2018

MARLETTE AUTO WASH, LLC v VAN DYKE SC PROPERTIES, LLC 
 
Docket No. 153979.  Argued November 8, 2017 (Calendar No. 2).  Decided March 19, 
2018. 
 
 
Plaintiff, Marlette Auto Wash, LLC, brought an action in the Sanilac Circuit Court, 
claiming that it had an easement through a parking lot owned by defendant, Van Dyke SC 
Properties, LLC, for customers to access a car wash that plaintiff had purchased in 2007.  
Defendant brought a counterclaim, seeking to quiet title and obtain monetary damages for 
expenses relating to maintenance of the parking lot.  The parties’ parcels were originally owned 
by Bernard and Evelyn Zyrowski as a single unimproved tract of land at the corner of a highway 
and a village street.  In 1988, the Zyrowskis conveyed the land to B & J Investment Company, 
which was owned by Bernard and his son James Zyrowski, and the land was split into two 
parcels.  B & J opened a car wash on the corner parcel in 1989.  Although the car wash was 
initially accessible from both the highway and the street, car wash customers generally used the 
parking lot of the adjoining parcel to get to and from the car wash.  This adjoining parcel was 
sold to Marlette Development Corporation in 1988, which opened a shopping center in 1990.  
When Marlette Development’s deed was recorded, no easement was reserved for the benefit of 
the car wash property, and car wash customers continued to use the parking lot for access.  In 
2000, the village of Marlette closed the street entrance to the car wash, leaving an inconvenient 
turn from the highway as the only access apart from the parking lot.  Car wash customers 
continued to use the parking lot for access without incident until Marlette Development sold its 
property to defendant in 2013.  At this point, defendant’s sole owner—James Zyrowski, former 
co-owner of B & J Investment, which had sold the car wash in 2005—informed plaintiff that 
unless it contributed $1,500 a month to maintain the parking lot, Zyrowski would park trailers at 
the property line, closing off access to the car wash through the parking lot.  Plaintiff refused, 
and this lawsuit followed.  The court, Donald A. Teeple, J., ruled that a prescriptive easement 
benefiting the car wash had vested in 2005, and it rejected defendant’s counterclaim for parking 
lot expenses because the evidence supporting the claim had not been disclosed to plaintiff before 
trial.  In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals, MURPHY, P.J., and 
CAVANAGH and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ., affirmed the trial court’s decision excluding defendant’s 
counterclaim evidence but reversed concerning the easement claim on the grounds that plaintiff 
had failed to establish privity of estate with the previous owner and no previous owner of the car 
wash had asserted a claim of prescriptive easement with regard to defendant’s property.  
Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC, unpublished opinion of the Court of 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
Appeals, issued May 10, 2016 (Docket No. 326486).  The Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s 
application for leave to appeal.  500 Mich 950 (2017). 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice WILDER, the Supreme Court held: 
 
Michigan caselaw establishes that the open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of 
property for the relevant statutory period creates a prescriptive easement that is appurtenant, 
without the need for the claimant to show privity of estate with the prior owner.  Moreover, the 
prior owner of the dominant estate is not required to take legal action to claim the easement in 
order for a vested prescriptive easement to exist.  Because the Court of Appeals erred by 
concluding otherwise, the judgment of Court of Appeals was reversed in part and the case was 
remanded to that Court for consideration of any remaining appellate issues. 
 
 
1.  A party claiming adverse possession must show clear and cogent proof of possession 
that is actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the relevant 
statutory period.  When the elements of adverse possession have been met, the law presumes that 
the true owner, by acquiescence, has granted the land, or interest to the land, so held adversely.  
The elements necessary to give rise to a prescriptive right are the same as those of title by 
adverse possession, with the exception that possession does not have to be exclusive.  If no 
single period of adverse use amounts to the 15-year statutory period, a party claiming a 
prescriptive interest may tack the possessory periods of their predecessors in interest to aggregate 
the 15-year period of prescription if the claimant can show privity of estate.  Privity of estate 
may only be established if the deed includes a description of the disputed property, there was an 
actual transfer or conveyance of the disputed property by parol statements made at the time of 
conveyance, or a property owner is well-acquainted with the previous property owner and had 
visited and used the disputed property for many years before acquiring title.  It was not necessary 
for plaintiff to have used defendant’s property for 15 years or to establish privity of estate 
because Michigan caselaw makes clear that a claimant seeking to prove the existence of a 
prescriptive easement may establish that the requisite elements were met by the claimant’s 
predecessor in interest.  When a prescriptive easement vests with the claimant’s predecessors in 
interest, the easement is appurtenant and transfers to subsequent owners in the property’s chain 
of title without the need for the subsequent owner to establish privity of estate.  The fact that 
property has been used in excess of the prescriptive period for many years is not pertinent to 
whether the requirements of a prescriptive easement have been met, nor is it germane to whether 
the proponent of the easement is required to establish privity of estate with a predecessor in the 
proponent’s chain of title under whose ownership a prescriptive easement had vested.  Rather, 
when the parties seek a judicial determination conclusively settling their respective property 
interests, and the proponent of the alleged easement provides evidence that the easement has 
been used in excess of the 15-year prescriptive period by many years, the burden of production is 
then shifted to the opponent of the easement to establish that the use was merely permissive.   
 
2.  The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that plaintiff’s claim failed because no 
previous owner of the car wash asserted a claim of prescriptive easement over defendant’s 
property.  If a prior property owner had successfully asserted a prescriptive easement claim, 
marketable title of record as a result of the previous judicial decree would already exist for the 
property, and the current property owner would have no reason to file a lawsuit seeking to 
establish record title to the property by prescriptive easement.  Moreover, one gains title by 
adverse possession when the period of limitations expires, not when an action regarding the title 
to the property is brought.  Defendant’s concern that a contrary holding would recognize the 
existence of secret easements not apparent to the purchaser of the servient estate was unfounded 
given that, in order to successfully establish a prescriptive easement, a plaintiff must show clear 
and cogent proof of possession that is so open, visible, and notorious as to raise the presumption 
of notice to the world that the right of the true owner is invaded intentionally in such a way that 
if the true owner remains in ignorance it is that person’s own fault.  In addition, a prescriptive 
easement is extinguished after 15 years of nonuse by the owner of the dominant estate, and a 
purchaser who did not know about the existence of a claim of title will be regarded as a bona fide 
purchaser without notice if the land is not adversely held by a party in possession at the time of 
purchase.   
 
Reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Appeals. 
 
Justice CLEMENT took no part in the decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
 
FILED  March 19, 2018 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MARLETTE AUTO WASH, LLC, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 153979 
 
VAN DYKE SC PROPERTIES, LLC, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CLEMENT, J.) 
 
WILDER, J.  
In this case, plaintiff claims a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over 
defendant’s property on the basis of plaintiff’s open, notorious, adverse, and continuous 
use of that property for at least 15 years.  The question presented here is whether such use 
creates a prescriptive easement that is appurtenant, without regard to whether the 
previous owner of the dominant estate took legal action to claim the easement.  The 
answer to that inquiry is yes.   
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
MCL 600.5801(4), which provides for a 15-year period of limitations, is not 
contingent on whether the prior owner of the dominant estate took legal action to claim 
the prescriptive easement.  Moreover, our caselaw establishes that one seeking to obtain 
record title of a prescriptive easement may establish that the elements were met by a prior 
owner in the claimant’s chain of title.  When a prescriptive easement has vested under a 
previous property owner’s possession, the easement is appurtenant and is conveyed to 
subsequent owners in the chain of title without the need to show privity of estate.  
Wortman v Stafford, 217 Mich 554; 187 NW 326 (1922); Haab v Moorman, 332 Mich 
126; 50 NW2d 856 (1952).   
The Court of Appeals erred by requiring plaintiff to establish privity of estate with 
the previous owner, regardless of whether plaintiff could establish that the elements of a 
prescriptive easement were satisfactorily met by that prior owner.  Moreover, the Court 
of Appeals erred by holding that the previous owner of the dominant estate must have 
taken legal action to claim the prescriptive easement in order for plaintiff to prove that a 
prescriptive easement had vested during the preceding property owner’s tenure.  Title by 
adverse possession is gained when the period of limitations expires, not when legal action 
quieting title to the property is brought.  See Gardner v Gardner, 257 Mich 172, 176; 241 
NW 179 (1932); Matthews v Natural Resources Dep’t, 288 Mich App 23, 37; 92 NW2d 
40 (2010).  We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remand to that Court 
for consideration of any outstanding appellate issues in this case.   
 
 
 
3 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In early 1988, Bernard and Evelyn Zyrowski owned a single unimproved tract of 
land at the corner of M-53 and Enterprise Drive (which later came to be known as Euclid 
Street) in Marlette, Michigan.  The land was conveyed to B & J Investment Company, 
which was owned by Bernard Zyrowski and his son James Zyrowski.  The land was split 
into two parcels. 
In the summer of 1988, B & J Investment began construction of a car wash on one 
of the two parcels.  The remaining parcel was sold to Marlette Development Corporation 
by land contract on October 5, 1988.  The car wash began operating in 1989, and from 
that date onward customers of the car wash used the parking lot of the other parcel as one 
means of ingress to and egress from the car wash.  In March 1990, Marlette 
Development’s land contract was paid off and the deed recorded.  No easement was 
reserved for the benefit of the car wash property.  Several months later, Marlette 
Development Corporation opened a shopping center on their property.  
In March 2000, the village of Marlette closed the north entrance to the car wash 
from Euclid Street.  After the entrance was closed, B & J Investment expanded the car 
wash, adding four additional car wash bays across that newly closed entrance.  Closing 
the north entrance left two ways to access the car wash: (1) from M-53, and (2) through 
the shopping center parking lot.  The M-53 access was problematic, however, because it 
required customers to drive through a (sometimes occupied) semi-truck car wash bay in 
order to access the western portion of the car wash property.  Access to this portion of the 
property was necessary for all those customers wishing to use the automatic car wash 
bays or the four newly built self-service car wash bays.  Local residents testified that they 
 
 
 
4 
never saw anyone access the car wash by the M-53 entrance because it was a dangerous 
turn. 
In April 2005, B & J Investment sold the car wash to Lipka Investments.  At 
closing, Gary Lipka inquired how customers were to access the western portion of the car 
wash property.  He was informed by Zyrowski that the car wash had been accessed 
through the shopping center parking lot since the car wash opened and that the parking 
lot was owned by the “Marlette Business Group.”  After talking to Zyrowski, Lipka 
believed that there would be no issue with the continued use of the parking lot because it 
had “been used for so long and never been blocked off . . . .”  
Approximately one year later, Lipka Investments defaulted on its loan with Tri-
County Bank.  Lipka Investments conveyed the car wash property to the bank in lieu of 
foreclosure on July 14, 2006.  Shortly thereafter, the bank conveyed the property to 
GLCW, LLC, the property-holding entity of the bank.  On September 28, 2006, GLCW 
entered into a lease and purchase agreement with plaintiff Marlette Auto Wash, LLC.   
Six months later, Marlette Auto Wash purchased the property from GLCW.  The 
purchase agreement did not include an easement, and Marlette does not allege that any 
statements were made regarding vehicular access at the time of purchase.  Customers 
continued without interference to access the car wash by driving through the shopping 
center parking lot.   
On May 22, 2013, defendant, Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC, purchased the 
shopping center property from Marlette Development Corporation.  James Zyrowski, 
former co-owner of B & J Investment, is the sole owner of Van Dyke Properties.  After 
undergoing renovations, the shopping center opened in November 2013.  Shortly after 
 
 
 
5 
opening the shopping center, defendant made clear that unless plaintiff contributed 
$1,500 per month to support the overall maintenance of the parking lot, defendant would 
park trailers at the property line, closing off access to the car wash.  Plaintiff refused.  
The following month, the village of Marlette encountered heavy snowfalls.  After 
plaintiff plowed snow from its property onto defendant’s property, defendant blocked the 
western entrance to the car wash with snow, rendering the car wash property inaccessible 
for a day and a half.  After that incident, plaintiff filed the present lawsuit, claiming an 
easement for ingress and egress through defendant’s parking lot.  Defendant filed a 
counterclaim, seeking to quiet title and seeking monetary damages for parking lot 
maintenance, upkeep, and insurance. 
A bench trial was conducted.  At trial, James Zyrowski testified that he believed 
that B & J Investment had permission to use the parking lot for ingress to and egress from 
the car wash during the period that he and his father owned the car wash.  This belief was 
based on a conversation that Zyrowski had with his father.  Zyrowski did not recall when 
the conversation with the elder Zyrowski took place.  Zyrowski was not present when the 
permission was allegedly given to his father, did not recall the year permission was given 
to his father, and did not recall any details regarding the scope of the permission.  He 
acknowledged that B & J Investment never contributed any money toward the upkeep 
and maintenance of the parking lot.   
In a written opinion, the trial court held that plaintiff had established a prescriptive 
easement for ingress and egress over defendant’s property.  The court found, among other 
things, that a prescriptive easement benefiting the car wash had vested in 2005.  The 
court further concluded, given its authority as a court of equity, that the person now 
 
 
 
6 
trying to preclude the current owners of the car wash from using the parking lot access 
was the same person who used this same parking lot for access to his car wash when he 
owned the car wash property.  The trial court excluded defendant’s evidence in support of 
its counterclaim seeking “amounts claimed for contributions for parking lot expenses,” 
because the evidence was not disclosed to plaintiff before trial.   
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded for entry of judgment in defendant’s favor on the 
prescriptive easement issue.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision 
regarding defendant’s counterclaim, concluding that the trial court had not erred by 
excluding defendant’s evidence as a discovery sanction.   
Concerning the easement claim, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
trial court had erred by granting a prescriptive easement because plaintiff had failed to 
establish privity of estate with the previous owner.  Plaintiff argued that privity need not 
be established because the 15-year period elapsed during the time that Zyrowski owned 
the car wash, and a prescriptive easement vested to the benefit of all subsequent property 
owners.  While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that a property interest acquired 
through adverse possession vests when the statutory period expires and not when the 
action was brought, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claim failed because “no 
previous owner of the car wash asserted a claim of prescriptive easement with regard to 
defendant’s property.”  Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC, 
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 10, 2016 (Docket 
No. 326486), p 3.  The panel, being of the view that plaintiff had failed to support its 
assertion that privity of estate need not be established after the 15-year period is met by a 
 
 
 
7 
previous owner with any legal authority, cited Reed v Soltys, 106 Mich App 341, 346; 
308 NW2d 201 (1981), for the proposition that a presumption of a prescriptive easement 
arises only when the property has been used in excess of the statutory period by “many 
years,” and concluded that because the shopping center parking lot had not been used 
adversely for “many years” more than 15, no such presumption arose in this case.  
Marlette, unpub op at 3. 
We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal, asking the parties to address 
“whether open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of property for at least fifteen 
years creates a prescriptive easement that is an easement appurtenant, without regard to 
whether the owner of the dominant estate took legal action to claim the easement.”  
Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC, 500 Mich 950 (2017).  
II.  ANALYSIS 
Whether a predecessor in title to a dominant estate is required to take legal action 
to claim a prescriptive easement in order to create an easement appurtenant is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  See Beach v Lima Twp, 489 Mich 99, 106; 802 NW2d 
1 (2011).  Moreover, an action to quiet title is an equitable action that we also review de 
novo.  Id.  
The adverse-possession statute, first codified in 1846, has a long pedigree in 
Michigan law.1  MCL 600.5801 provides in relevant part: 
                                              
1 Initially, the period of limitations was 20 years.  See 1846 RS, ch 139, § 1; 1857 
CL 5350.  The 15-year period of limitations was first adopted in 1863.  See 1863 PA 227, 
§ 1.  
 
 
 
8 
No person may bring or maintain any action for the recovery or 
possession of any lands or make any entry upon any lands unless, after the 
claim or right to make the entry first accrued to himself or to someone 
through whom he claims, he commences the action or makes the entry 
within the periods of time prescribed by this section. 
*   *   * 
(4) In all other cases under this section, the period of limitation is 15 
years.  
The elements of adverse possession are also well established.  A party claiming 
adverse possession must show clear and cogent proof of possession that is actual, 
continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the relevant 
statutory period.  Yelverton v Steele, 40 Mich 538, 542 (1879); Vanden Berg v De Vries, 
220 Mich 484, 486; 190 NW 226 (1922); Beach, 489 Mich at 106.  When the elements of 
adverse possession have been met, “ ‘the law presumes that the true owner, by his 
acquiescence, has granted the land, or interest to the land, so held adversely.’ ”  Marr v 
Hemenny, 297 Mich 311, 314; 297 NW 504 (1941), quoting Turner v Hart, 71 Mich 128, 
138; 38 NW 890 (1888).  See also Smith v Dennedy, 224 Mich 378, 384; 194 NW 998 
(1923) (concluding that, after 17 years of use, “[t]he statutory period having run, the 
prescriptive right ripened”). 
Just as ownership of land may be acquired through adverse possession, so too may 
an easement be acquired through prescription.  Outhwaite v Foote, 240 Mich 327, 330-
331; 215 NW 331 (1927).  “The elements necessary to give rise to a prescriptive right are 
the same as those of title by adverse possession, with the exception that it does not have 
to be exclusive.”  St Cecelia Society v Universal Car & Serv Co, 213 Mich 569, 576; 182 
NW 161 (1921); see also Barbaresos v Casaszar, 325 Mich 1, 8; 37 NW2d 689 (1949); 
Matthews, 288 Mich App at 37. 
 
 
 
9 
If “no single period” of adverse use amounts to the 15-year statutory period, a 
party claiming a prescriptive interest may tack the possessory periods of their 
predecessors in interest “to aggregate the 15-year period of prescription” if the claimant 
can show privity of estate.  Stewart v Hunt, 303 Mich 161, 164; 5 NW2d 737 (1942); see 
also von Meding v Strahl, 319 Mich 598, 614; 30 NW2d 363 (1948).  Privity of estate 
may only be established in very limited circumstances.  The first is when the deed 
includes a description of the disputed property.  Arduino v Detroit, 249 Mich 382, 384; 
228 NW 694 (1930).  The second circumstance occurs when there is an actual transfer or 
conveyance of the disputed property by parol statements made at the time of conveyance.  
Sheldon v Mich C R Co, 161 Mich 503, 509-510; 126 NW 1056 (1910); Gregory v 
Thorrez, 277 Mich 197, 201; 269 NW 142 (1936).  Lastly, a parol transfer may occur if a 
property owner is “well-acquainted” with the previous property owner and had visited 
and used the disputed property “for many years” before acquiring title.  Under those 
circumstances, “the parties must have understood that an easement was appurtenant to the 
land[.]”  von Meding v Strahl, 319 Mich at 615.   
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s prescriptive easement claim fails because 
plaintiff has not used defendant’s property for 15 years and cannot establish privity of 
estate.  However, Michigan caselaw makes clear that a claimant seeking to prove the 
existence of a prescriptive easement may establish that the requisite elements were met 
by the claimant’s predecessor in interest.  When a prescriptive easement vests with the 
claimant’s predecessors in interest, the easement is appurtenant and transfers to 
subsequent owners in the property’s chain of title without the need for the subsequent 
owner to establish privity of estate. 
 
 
 
10 
In Wortman, 217 Mich 554, La Vern Wortman and George Stafford each owned 
adjoining 40-acre parcels.  The defendant’s property had previously belonged to his 
father, Jonathan Stafford, and for 40 years or so Jonathan Stafford crossed the plaintiff’s 
property in order to access the highway.  Jonathan Stafford paid the previous owner $50 
for a right of passage, but no writing existed to establish the nature of the right.  The 
plaintiff filed suit to quiet title to the property, claiming that the use was “a life lease or 
mere license,” which could not ripen into a prescriptive easement.  Id. at 557.  The 
defendant, on the other hand, claimed that the use was a contractually secured right of 
way “perfected by prescription” that passed with the property.  Id. at 556.  
The Wortman Court held that the facts indicated “an easement rather than a lease 
or a license.”  Id. at 559.  Quoting Berkey & Gay Furniture Co v Valley City Milling Co, 
194 Mich 234, 242; 160 NW 648 (1916), the Court stated that “ ‘the open, notorious, 
continuous[,] and adverse use across the land of another’ ” for the requisite period of 
limitations “ ‘afford[ed] a conclusive presumption of a written grant of such way . . . .’ ”  
Wortman, 217 Mich at 559.  Moreover, “ ‘when the passway has been used for something 
like a half century, it is unnecessary to show by positive testimony that the use was 
claimed as a matter of right, but that after such use[] the burden is on the plaintiff to show 
that the use was only permissive.’ ”  Id., quoting Berkey, 194 Mich at 242.  The Wortman 
Court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant’s use 
was merely permissive.   
The plaintiff next argued that the defendant could not tack the defendant’s period 
of use to that of his predecessor in interest, Jonathan Stafford.  The Court rejected the 
claim that the defendant was required to establish privity of estate, holding: 
 
 
 
11 
The question of the continuity of possession and use[] by successive 
holders in privity to sustain title by prescription is not involved here.  The 
statute of limitations had run its course in his favor long before the elder 
Stafford died.  Like peaceable possession and use[] continued thereafter by 
his successors as of right, and not of suffrance was but confirmatory of his 
established easement.  [Wortman, 217 Mich at 560 (emphasis added).] 
In Haab, 332 Mich 126, four property owners filed suit to prevent the defendants 
from blocking an alley that ran behind the plaintiffs’ properties.  The trial court denied 
injunctive relief.  On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court, concluding that the 
plaintiffs had easements in the alley.  Regarding three of the property owners, the Court 
held that the defendants were estopped from denying a right of way appurtenant to their 
properties in the alley, given that the deeds of the property owners indicated that their 
land was bounded by a private alley or passageway.   
Concerning the fourth property owner, Peter Karson, the Court held that he 
possessed a prescriptive easement in the alley, explaining: 
The trial court in its opinion refers to the case of Zemon v Netzorg, 247 
Mich 563 [226 NW 242 (1929)] which held that one might not tack his 
adverse holdings for less than the prescriptive period of 15 years, even if 
the predecessor’s holdings are shown to be adverse, if there is no 
conveyance to him or in his chain of title purporting to convey such an 
easement.  One Adam Schaner, however, held the Karson parcels for more 
than 30 years and so established in his own name a valid easement without 
tacking.  Once established, the right-of-way was an easement appurtenant 
and therefore passed by the deed of the dominant estate although not 
expressly mentioned in the instrument of transfer, and even without the 
word “appurtenances.”  [Haab, 332 Mich at 143-144 (emphasis added).] 
The Court noted that the testimony of elderly witnesses established that the alley 
had been used by the dominant estates “the entire time they were owned by Schaner, as 
well as continuously up to the present time.”  Id. at 144.  Citing Berkey & Gay Furniture 
 
 
 
12 
Co, the Court held that because the alley had been “used openly and notoriously for over 
a quarter of a century,” the plaintiff was not required to prove that that the use was 
claimed as a matter of right.  Id.  Rather, “the burden would be on the [defendants] to 
show that the use was only permissive.”  Id.  Because “the alley had been used 
continuously, openly, and notoriously,” the alley “became an appurtenant easement to the 
Schaner properties,” and the alley was “used by Karson and his predecessors in title as a 
matter of right, not by permissive use . . . .”  Id. at 145 (emphasis added).  
It is evident that, under both Wortman and Haab, when a claimant can 
demonstrate that a predecessor-in-interest met the requirements for the establishment of a 
prescriptive easement, the vested easement transfers to subsequent property owners in the 
chain of title without the obligation to show privity of estate.  Wortman and Haab also 
hold that, when the property has been adversely used in excess of the prescriptive period 
for a substantial period of time, the burden shifts to the servient estate owner to show that 
the use was merely permissive.  We reaffirm these principles in this case.  
The Court of Appeals purported to rely on Reed, 106 Mich App 341, as support 
for its holding that plaintiff was required to show privity of estate because “a presumption 
of a prescriptive easement” may arise when property has been used in excess of the 
prescriptive period by “ ‘many years.’ ”  Marlette, unpub op at 3, quoting Reed, 106 Mich 
App at 346.  Not only is this conclusion inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 
600.5801(4), Reed simply does not stand for that proposition.  Reed, citing Haab, 
articulated the same burden shifting that was expressed in both Haab and Wortman: 
 
 
 
 
13 
Mutual or permissive use of an area will not mature into a 
prescriptive easement unless the period of mutuality ends and adverse use 
continues for the statutory period.  However, when use has been in excess 
of the prescriptive period by many years, a presumption of a grant arises 
and the burden shifts to the servient estate owner to show that use was 
merely permissive.  [Reed, 106 Mich App at 346 (citations omitted).] 
As noted in both Wortman and Haab, the fact that property has been used in 
excess of the prescriptive period for “many years” is not pertinent to whether the 
requirements of a prescriptive easement have been met; nor is it germane to whether the 
proponent of the easement is required to establish privity of estate with a predecessor in 
the proponent’s chain of title under whose ownership a prescriptive easement had vested.  
Rather, when the parties seek a judicial determination conclusively settling their 
respective property interests, and the proponent of the alleged easement provides 
evidence that the easement has been used in excess of the 15-year prescriptive period by 
“many years,” the burden of production is then shifted to the opponent of the easement to 
establish that the use was merely permissive.  See Berkey & Gay Furniture Co, 194 Mich 
234; Wortman, 217 Mich 554; Engleman v Kalamazoo, 229 Mich 603; 201 NW 880 
(1925); Outhwaite, 240 Mich 327; Beechler v Byerly, 302 Mich 79; 4 NW2d 475 (1942); 
Haab, 332 Mich 126; Myer v Franklin Hotel Co, 354 Mich 552; 93 NW2d 224 (1958); 
Loehr v Cochran, 14 Mich App 345, 347; 165 NW2d 485 (1968) (“The essence of this 
presumption is that long-standing use of another’s property, e.g., over 50 years, shifts the 
burden to the defendant-owner, to show the use was permissive.”); Widmayer v Leonard, 
422 Mich 280, 290; 373 NW2d 538 (1985) (holding that the burden of persuasion 
concerning a prescriptive easement remains with the claimant throughout trial; however, 
 
 
 
14 
after many years of use, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the opponents of the 
easement to establish that the claimant’s use was merely permissive).  
The Court of Appeals’ alternative rationale for rejecting plaintiff’s claim is equally 
without merit.  Quoting Gorte v Dep’t of Transp, 202 Mich App 161; 507 NW2d 797 
(1993), the Court of Appeals held that the person claiming a prescriptive easement must 
“act on the purported acquired right” because “ ‘the expiration of the period of limitation 
terminates the title of those who slept on their rights and vests title in the party claiming 
adverse possession.’ ”  Marlette, unpub op at 3, quoting Gorte, 202 Mich App at 168.  In 
the Court of Appeals’ view, plaintiff’s claim failed because “[i]t is undisputed that no 
previous owner of the car wash asserted a claim of prescriptive easement with regard to 
defendant’s property.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
It is not clear why the Court of Appeals believes a prior property owner must have 
previously asserted a prescriptive easement claim in order for a prescriptive easement to 
vest, because, if a prior property owner had successfully asserted a prescriptive easement 
claim, marketable title of record as a result of the previous judicial decree would already 
exist for the property, and the current property owner would have no reason to file a 
lawsuit seeking to establish record title to the property by prescriptive easement.  See 
Escher v Bender, 338 Mich 1, 8; 61 NW2d 143 (1953).  Moreover, nothing in Gorte 
requires that a prior property owner assert a legal claim in order for a prescriptive 
easement to vest.  In Gorte, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ title to the land did 
not vest upon the expiration of the period of limitations but, instead, plaintiffs’ possession 
of the property simply gave the plaintiffs the ability “to raise the expiration of the period 
 
 
 
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of limitation as a defense to defendant’s assertion of title.”  Gorte, 202 Mich App at 168.  
The Gorte panel concluded: 
Contrary to defendant’s arguments, however, Michigan courts have 
followed the general rule that the expiration of the period of limitation 
terminates the title of those who slept on their rights and vests title in the 
party claiming adverse possession.  Thus, assuming all other elements have 
been established, one gains title by adverse possession when the period of 
limitation expires, not when an action regarding the title to the property is 
brought.  [Id. at 168-169 (citations omitted).] 
Therefore, that portion of Gorte quoted by the Court of Appeals simply describes the 
general effect of an adverse-possession claim, assuming that all the other elements have 
been established.  It does not stand for the proposition that a party must file a legal claim 
for title to vest by adverse possession.  The final sentence of the quoted Gorte language 
specifically provides otherwise: one gains title by adverse possession when the period of 
limitations expires, not when an action regarding the title to the property is brought.2  
Furthermore, as this Court has explained, an adverse possessor acquires legal title to 
property when the statutory period ends, but that title is neither recorded nor marketable 
until the property interest is established by judicial decree: 
                                              
2 The panel also cited Siegel v Renkiewicz Estate, 373 Mich 421, 425; 129 NW2d 876 
(1964), to support its holding that tacking cannot occur without privity of estate.  While it 
is certainly true that tacking cannot occur without privity of estate, Siegel has no 
application to the present case.  In Siegel, the Court held that plaintiff’s prescriptive-
easement claim failed because “neither plaintiff nor any of his predecessors in title 
enjoyed possession or use[] of the parcels in question for the necessary 15-year period,” 
and no proof was offered regarding privity of estate.  Id. at 425-426.  Siegel did not hold 
that privity of estate was required in a case like this, where it is claimed that a 
prescriptive easement vested under a claimant’s predecessors in interest. 
 
 
 
16 
This Court has long recognized the common law doctrine of adverse 
possession, which the Legislature has since codified.  To establish adverse 
possession, the party claiming it must show “clear and cogent proof of 
possession that is actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and 
uninterrupted for the statutory period of 15 years, hostile and under cover 
of claim of right.”  After the statutory period ends, the record owner’s title 
is extinguished and the adverse possessor acquires “legal title” to the 
property.  Acquisition of title in this manner includes “the right to defend 
the possession and to protect the property against the trespass of all others.”  
However, the title acquired by adverse possession is neither record title nor 
marketable title until the adverse possessor files a lawsuit and obtains a 
judicial decree.  Thus, until an adverse possessor obtains the necessary 
judicial decree, there is no record of the adverse possessor’s ownership 
interest to verify whether the possessor actually satisfied the elements of 
adverse possession.  [Beach, 489 Mich at 106-107 (emphasis added; 
citations omitted).] 
In urging the correctness of the Court of Appeals opinion, defendant argues that, if 
this Court does not require a prior property owner to take legal action to claim a 
prescriptive easement, the law would recognize the existence of “secret” easements not 
apparent to the purchaser of the servient estate.  Defendant, having enjoyed the beneficial 
use of the parking lot access to the car wash, certainly has no legitimate argument that the 
claimed easement was in any way “secret.”  Moreover, in order for plaintiff to 
successfully establish a prescriptive easement, plaintiff must show clear and cogent proof 
of possession that is actual, continuous, open, notorious, hostile, and uninterrupted for the 
relevant statutory period.  “ ‘The possession must be so open, visible, and notorious as to 
raise the presumption of notice to the world that the right of the true owner is invaded 
intentionally, and with the purpose to assert a claim of title adversely to his, so that if the 
true owner remains in ignorance it is his own fault.’ ”  Ennis v Stanley, 346 Mich 296, 
301; 78 NW2d 114 (1956), quoting McVannel v Pure Oil Co, 262 Mich 518, 525-526; 
 
 
 
17 
247 NW 735 (1933) (emphasis added).  See also Doctor v Turner, 251 Mich 175, 186; 
231 NW 115 (1930).  
Thus, the very claim that plaintiff is required to prove by clear and cogent proof 
militates against ancient prescriptive easements arising under clandestine circumstances.  
Moreover, defendant’s specter of secret prescriptive easements that “spring to life” many 
decades after their purported creation are allayed by existing legal principles.  A 
prescriptive easement is extinguished after 15 years of nonuse by the owner of the 
dominant estate, without the servient estate being required to prove that its possession 
was hostile or adverse.  McDonald v Sargent, 308 Mich 341, 344; 13 NW2d 843 (1944).  
Furthermore, a purchaser who did not know about the existence of a claim of title will be 
regarded as a bona fide purchaser without notice if the land is not adversely held by a 
party in possession at the time of purchase.  See Russell v Sweezey, 22 Mich 235, 238-
239 (1871).  A bona fide purchaser “takes the property free from, and not subject to,” the 
rights or interests of a third party.  1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed) 
§ 11.21, p 396. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Michigan caselaw establishes that the open, notorious, adverse, and continuous 
use of property for the relevant statutory period creates a prescriptive easement that is 
appurtenant, without the need for the claimant to show privity of estate with the prior 
owner.  Wortman, 217 Mich 554; Haab, 332 Mich 126.  Moreover, the prior owner of the 
dominant estate is not required to take legal action to claim the easement in order for a 
vested prescriptive easement to exist.  Because the Court of Appeals erred by concluding 
 
 
 
18 
otherwise, we reverse the judgment of Court of Appeals in part and remand to that Court 
for consideration of any remaining appellate issues. 
 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
 
CLEMENT, J., took no part in the decision of this case.