Title: Grisso v. Nolan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002927
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SANDRA NOLEN GRISSO 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002927 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 2, 2001 
DILLARD LAWSON NOLEN 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
William N. Alexander, II, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a decedent’s former 
spouse had standing to petition the circuit court to have the 
decedent’s body disinterred and reburied in accord with what he 
contended was the decedent’s expressed wish regarding her final 
resting place. 
BACKGROUND 
Dillard Lawson Nolen and Lorraine Chitwood Nolen were 
married in 1955.  The couple had one child, Sandra Nolen Grisso.  
Dillard Nolen and Lorraine Nolen were divorced in 1993, but 
continued to cohabit intermittently for the next six years until 
Lorraine’s death on August 4, 1999. 
Lorraine Nolen died intestate and left no written 
instructions concerning the disposition of her body.  Grisso, as 
her mother’s next of kin and sole heir, had her mother’s body 
interred at Sandy Ridge Baptist Church in Franklin County. 
On January 7, 2000, Dillard Nolen filed a petition in the 
Circuit Court of Franklin County, styled In Re: Lorraine 
Chitwood Nolen, seeking an order to have Lorraine Nolen’s body 
disinterred and reburied in one of two adjoining burial plots at 
Franklin Memorial Park in Franklin County.  In the petition, 
Dillard Nolen alleged that Lorraine Nolen had “at all times 
indicated her desire to be buried in Franklin Memorial Park,” 
and for that reason in 1998 he had purchased the two burial 
plots and a headstone engraved with his name and that of his 
former spouse.  Dillard Nolen also alleged that he had purchased 
a pre-paid funeral service contract for Lorraine Nolen in 1993 
prior to the couple’s divorce.  He further alleged that Grisso 
had been estranged from both her parents “for a long period of 
time.”  Grisso was made a party to the proceeding.   
On March 16, 2000, Grisso filed a demurrer to the petition.  
Grisso contended that Dillard Nolen lacked standing to petition 
for the disinterment and reburial of Lorraine Nolen’s body 
because, as a result of the couple having divorced, he was a 
legal stranger to Lorraine Nolen at the time of her death.  
Grisso conceded that her parents were cohabiting at the time of 
her mother’s death, but contended that this did not confer upon 
her father the necessary standing to bring the petition for 
disinterment because Virginia does not recognize common law 
marriage.  Grisso further contended that because Dillard Nolen 
had failed to obtain a written statement from Lorraine Nolen 
authorizing him to arrange for the disposition of her remains 
 
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upon her death, in accordance with Code § 54.1-2825, he could 
not seek through equity what he had failed to accomplish at law.1
In an opinion letter dated June 27, 2000, the chancellor 
ruled that although Dillard Nolen “is legally a stranger to 
Lorraine [Nolen], in fact he is not.”  The chancellor reasoned 
that the couple’s long marriage and continued intermittent 
cohabitation following their divorce created a sufficient 
relationship to provide Dillard Nolen with standing to assert in 
the petition Lorraine Nolen’s alleged expressed wish with regard 
to the disposition of her body.  Upon reaching this conclusion, 
the chancellor then relied on Goldman v. Mollen, 168 Va. 345, 
356, 191 S.E. 627, 632 (1937), for the proposition that it is 
the duty of the court to see to it that the decedent’s expressed 
wish is given effect and, accordingly, overruled the demurrer.  
The chancellor’s ruling was memorialized in an order dated July 
24, 2000.  That order gave leave for Grisso to file an answer to 
the petition within fifteen days. 
                     
1Grisso also filed a motion seeking sanctions against 
Dillard Nolen, alleging that he had filed the petition for 
disinterment in order to “get even” with her for obtaining a 
judgment against him to recover her mother’s personal property.  
The chancellor’s denial of the motion for sanctions is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
 
 
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Grisso filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
chancellor’s ruling, noting that Goldman involved a dispute 
between the surviving next of kin of the decedent and the 
trustees of the cemetery where the decedent’s remains were 
interred and, thus, the equity authority of the court had been 
properly invoked by persons with standing to bring the action to 
disinter those remains.  In the present case, by contrast, 
Grisso contended that the equity authority of the court should 
not be invoked based upon the petition of a legal stranger 
regardless of the factual relationship between that legal 
stranger and the decedent.  The chancellor took no action on the 
motion for reconsideration. 
On August 2, 2000, Grisso filed an answer in which she 
denied that she and her mother had been estranged.  She further 
denied that her mother’s expressed wish had been to be buried in 
Franklin Memorial Park and that the purchase of the burial plots 
and the pre-paid funeral services had been done to accomplish 
her mother’s wish with regard to her place of burial. 
On August 30, 2000, the chancellor held an ore tenus 
hearing on the petition.  Because this appeal is limited to the 
question of standing, we need not recount in detail the evidence 
on the merits of the petition developed at that hearing.  It 
will suffice to say that the record shows that the evidence was 
in conflict regarding whether Lorraine Nolen had expressed a 
 
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wish to be buried at Franklin Memorial Park.  There was evidence 
that following the couple’s divorce and a subsequent violent 
confrontation between her husband and daughter, Lorraine Nolen 
had expressed a vehement desire not to be buried next to her 
husband, but she did not expressly state where she would prefer 
to be buried.  However, there was evidence that, during one 
period when the couple had reconciled, Lorraine Nolen had 
accompanied her former husband to Franklin Memorial Park when he 
purchased the burial plots and headstone.  There was also 
evidence that she later told several relatives and friends that 
she would be buried in Franklin Memorial Park next to her former 
husband. 
Although Dillard Nolen had attempted to have his former 
wife “make somebody power of attorney” because Grisso was 
“liable to bury [her] anywhere,” Lorraine Nolen declined to make 
such an election.  There was no dispute that the relationship 
between Dillard Nolen and Grisso was strained beyond the point 
of foreseeable reconciliation. 
The chancellor resolved the conflict in the evidence and 
ruled that Lorraine Nolen’s wish had been to be buried at 
Franklin Memorial Park next to her former husband.  By final 
order entered on September 10, 2000, the chancellor ordered that 
Dillard Nolen be permitted to have the body of Lorraine Nolen 
 
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“disinterred from Sandy Ridge Baptist Church and reinterred at 
Franklin Memorial Park.”  We awarded Grisso this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
As noted above, the issue raised in this appeal is limited 
to whether the chancellor erred in ruling that Dillard Nolen had 
standing to bring the petition seeking the disinterment and 
reburial of his former wife’s body.  In general terms, “[t]he 
concept of standing concerns itself with the characteristics of 
the person or entity who files suit.  The point of standing is 
to ensure that a person who asserts a position has a substantial 
legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the 
disposition of the case.  In asking whether a person has 
standing, we ask, in essence, whether he has a sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the case so that the parties 
will be actual adversaries and the issues will be fully and 
faithfully developed.”  Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 
580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984) (internal citation 
omitted); see also Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371, 552 
S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001).  These general terms regarding standing 
develop a more precise meaning and resulting application within 
the context of the factual circumstances and the legal 
proceeding involved in a specific case. 
In the present case, it is not disputed that Lorraine Nolen 
made no testamentary provision regarding her desired final 
 
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resting place and did not “make arrangements for [her] burial or 
the disposition of [her] remains” in accordance with Code 
§ 54.1-2825.  Under such circumstances, there also can be no 
dispute that upon her death, the proper determination of the 
place of her burial rested with her personal representative, her 
surviving spouse, or her next of kin.  Goldman, 168 Va. at 354, 
191 S.E. at 631.  Thus, Grisso, as her mother’s next of kin, was 
vested with the authority to determine the place of her mother’s 
burial.2
By contrast, it is apparent that Dillard Nolen had no 
authority to arrange for the disposition of his former wife’s 
body upon her death.  He was not authorized to make such 
arrangements by a designation made pursuant to Code § 54.1-2825, 
and he was not a person entitled to preferential appointment as 
the personal representative of Lorraine Nolen’s estate under 
Code § 64.1-118.  Dillard Nolen was not Lorraine Nolen’s 
“surviving spouse” as contemplated in Goldman, nor was he among 
Lorraine Nolen’s “next of kin” as that term is defined with 
reference to who may make such arrangements because he was not 
                     
2Although the record is not clear on this point, it would 
appear that Grisso also qualified as the personal representative 
of her mother’s estate.  Certainly, as next of kin and sole 
heir, she would have been the preferred person to so qualify.  
Code § 64.1-118. 
 
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the “legal spouse” of the decedent at the time of her death.  
See Code § 54.1-2800. 
For these reasons, beyond question Lorraine Nolen’s body 
was properly buried at Sandy Ridge Baptist Church, 
notwithstanding the subsequent revelation that her wish may have 
been to have her body buried at Franklin Memorial Park.  This is 
particularly true in light of the fact that no challenge to the 
selection of the place of burial at Sandy Ridge Baptist Church 
was raised prior to the burial there, and no assertion is made 
that Grisso knowingly selected that place of burial against her 
mother’s wish.  It is in this factual context that we consider 
the issue of Dillard Nolen’s standing to petition for 
disinterment and reburial of his ex-wife’s body.  Our focus is 
on whether he had a sufficient legal interest in Lorraine 
Nolen’s wish regarding her final resting place so as to permit 
the court to invoke its equity authority to grant his petition. 
Placing great reliance on the statement in Goldman that the 
chancellor had a duty to determine and give effect to the wish 
of the decedent with respect to the her place of burial, Dillard 
Nolen contends that he had standing because the suit was not 
adversarial in nature, but was brought “in rem” in order to 
permit the court to determine and give effect to Lorraine 
Nolen’s wish regarding her final resting place.  In effect, 
Dillard Nolen contends that the suit was not brought by him as 
 
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an adversarial party, but merely filed by him in his capacity as 
an interested person with evidence on the issue to be decided by 
the court.  We cannot agree with this novel premise regarding 
standing to invoke the authority of the court in equity to 
consider such a weighty and sensitive matter as whether to allow 
the disinterment of a body from a proper grave. 
There can be no question of the authority of the court in 
equity to authorize the disinterment of a body for reburial in 
another place.  See, e.g., Grinnan v. Fredericksburg Lodge, 118 
Va. 588, 592, 88 S.E. 79, 80 (1916).  Among other reasons, this 
authority is necessary in order to give effect to the principle, 
based upon a long-standing societal belief in the sanctity of 
giving effect to a decedent’s wishes, that “the expressed wish 
of one, as to his final resting place, shall, so far as it is 
possible, be carried out.”  Goldman, 168 Va. at 356, 191 S.E. at 
632 (citation omitted). 
However, that authority must be tempered by the principle, 
based upon an equally long-standing societal belief in the 
sanctity of graves, that “[i]nterments once made should not be 
disturbed except for good cause.”  Id. at 355, 191 S.E at 631.  
Indeed, even where the party seeking disinterment was also the 
party responsible for selecting the initial gravesite, courts 
will not allow a violation of the final place of interment 
 
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without good cause.  See, e.g., Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe 
Deposit and Trust Company, 387 A.2d 244, 246-47 (Md. 1978). 
Contrary to the chancellor’s opinion, the circumstances of 
the couple’s thirty-eight year marriage and continued periods of 
cohabitation following their divorce are insufficient to confer 
upon Dillard Nolen any cognizable interest or legal standing 
with respect to matters concerning his former wife.  See, e.g., 
Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 535, 153 S.E. 879, 886 (1930) 
(following divorce “the marriage bond is completely severed”).  
One of the principal effects of a decree of divorce is to sever 
the property interests of the two parties including the 
extinguishing of all contingent property rights of one spouse to 
the property of the other.  Code § 20-111.  Similarly, to the 
extent that the authority to determine the disposition of a 
decedent’s remains is a quasi-property right of a surviving 
spouse, Goldman, 168 Va. at 354, 191 S.E. at 631, that right 
would not survive the entry of a divorce decree.  Cf. Vaughan v. 
Vaughan, 200 N.E. 912, 913-14 (Mass. 1936) (holding that wife 
had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband 
occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce). 
In short, under the specific facts of this case, Dillard 
Nolen was a legal stranger to Lorraine Nolen as the result of a 
divorce decree.  As such, and notwithstanding what evidence he 
might have regarding Lorraine Nolen’s wish as to the final 
 
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resting place of her body, he had no cognizable interest in the 
place of her burial and, thus, no standing to seek the 
disinterment of her body for reburial.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the chancellor erred in overruling the demurrer to the 
petition filed by Grisso, a person with legal standing to 
challenge the requested disinterment and reburial. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
chancellor and enter final judgment dismissing the petition for 
disinterment and reburial. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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