Title: Chadwick D. Banks v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-1153
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
Nos.   SC01-1153 & SC02-63
____________
CHADWICK D. BANKS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________
CHADWICK D. BANKS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR.,
Respondent.
[March 20, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Chadwick D. Banks, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals an order
1.  A more detailed description of the facts of this case is contained in the 
direct appeal opinion.  See Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1997).
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of the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Additionally, he files a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons expressed below, we affirm the decision of the trial court and deny habeas
corpus relief.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chadwick D. Banks (Banks) pled no contest to two counts of first-degree
murder for the shooting deaths of his wife Cassandra Banks and his stepdaughter
Melody Cooper.  Banks also pled no contest to sexual battery on a child under the
age of twelve for acts committed against Melody Cooper.  The jury recommended
death by a vote of nine to three, and the trial court sentenced Banks to death. This
Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling upon direct appeal.  The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 23, 1998. 1
On June 10, 1999, Banks filed a rule 3.850 motion alleging that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel due to the trial counsel’s failure to retain a mental-
health expert to evaluate possible statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence
which was available for presentation to the sentencing jury and judge.  The
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witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing included:  Steve Seliger (Seliger)
and Armando Garcia (Garcia), trial counsel for Banks; and Dr. David Partyka and
Dr. James Larson, expert witnesses retained by Banks’ postconviction  counsel. 
The trial court found no merit to Banks’ claims.  Banks appeals the trial court’s
decision and also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
DISCUSSION
I.      3.850 APPEAL
Banks first claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new penalty
phase after an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Banks argues that had trial counsel fully investigated and prepared for the penalty
phase, they would have found a wealth of mitigation that would have affected the
jury’s decision.  Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), when
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this Court is required to decide
two issues:  (1) whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) whether such
deficiency prejudiced the defendant.  To determine whether counsel was deficient,
this Court looks not only at counsel’s failure to investigate and present possible
mitigating evidence but also at counsel’s reasons for doing so.  See Rose v. State,
675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996).  Moreover, the defendant has the burden to show
that counsel’s ineffectiveness actually “deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty
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phase proceeding.”  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998).  
Specifically, Banks argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because counsel failed to seek the assistance of a mental health expert in order to
explain the potential mitigating evidence concerning beatings Banks received from
his father from the age of three to the age of around eleven or twelve and Banks'
abuse of alcohol.  Banks contends that counsel's decision not to present this type
of evidence was not a strategic decision because counsel did not seek the
assistance of a mental health expert before making the decision.  At the evidentiary
hearing in the trial court, Banks presented the testimony of Dr. Larson who, in
essence, opined that Banks' abuse of alcohol was his method of dealing with the
physical abuse he suffered as a child.  Dr. Larson indicated that this type of
testimony could have been presented as mitigating evidence.  However, on cross-
examination Dr. Larson conceded that this kind of evidence could backfire and
leave the jury with the impression that the defendant was a dangerous individual. 
The defendant also offered the testimony of Dr. Partyka, who testified that he
believed alcohol played a major role in the crimes.  Dr. Partyka indicated that the
consumption of alcohol affected Banks' judgment and inhibitions on the night of
the murders to the extent that it released his anger concerning how he had been
treated as a child.  However, Dr. Partyka also admitted that the degree of
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intoxication was based on information he obtained from Banks and that he was not
familiar with the testimony of the witnesses who said Banks did not exhibit any
signs of intoxication on the night of the murders.
In prior cases, we have found ineffective assistance of counsel where no
attempt was made to investigate mitigation even though substantial mitigating
evidence could have been presented.  See Rose, 675 So. 2d  at 572; Hildwin v.
Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109-10 (Fla. 1995) (ordering a new penalty phase where
counsel's failure to adequately investigate and uncover mitigation evidence,
including prior psychiatric hospitalizations, resulted in an unreliable penalty phase). 
However, we have also found that the trial court properly denied relief where
counsel did conduct a sufficient investigation of mental health mitigation before
trial, but made a strategic decision not to present such evidence.  For example, in
Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1993), where a psychologist determined
the defendant had an antisocial personality disorder, but not an organic brain
disorder, we denied an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s
failure to investigate further.
Although Banks claims that Seliger failed to consult mental health experts, the
record clearly shows that counsel consulted mental health experts and decided on a
strategy after considering his options.  When Seliger was appointed to the case, Dr.
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McClaren, a mental health professional, had already been assigned to the case.  In
preparation for trial, Seliger consulted Dr. McClaren, who interviewed Banks within
twenty-four hours of the murders.  Seliger opted not to call Dr.  McClaren at trial
because he felt that the doctor had rendered an unfavorable report.  Furthermore,
the evidence in the record indicates that Seliger conducted an extensive
investigation in this case.  Seliger acquired Banks’ school records, military records,
employment records, and medical records.  Additionally, Seliger interviewed
Banks' family members and other individuals who knew Banks. 
Seliger also testified that he reviewed the records of Dr. Woodward and was
aware of Banks' childhood physical abuse.  Seliger reviewed Dr. McClaren’s report
which discussed Banks' possible childhood physical abuse.  Seliger also discussed
Banks' child abuse with his parents.  Seliger testified that based upon his prior
experience in Gadsden County, the inability to make a connection between Banks'
abuse, which lasted for a finite period of time during his childhood, and the
murders, and the family's good reputation in the community, he felt that the child
abuse strategy would be ineffectual.  Banks has failed to demonstrate deficient
conduct in failing to present the child abuse evidence. 
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he did not remember Banks
having a documented history of alcoholism.  Further, Seliger felt that introducing
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evidence of Banks’ past criminal acts, which involved the consumption of alcohol,
would be inconsistent with his theory of the case.  Seliger indicated that had he
attempted to establish that Banks was only violent when consuming alcohol, it is
likely that he would have opened the door for the State to present evidence
highlighting Banks' prior criminal history.
Banks' argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to consult a mental
health expert regarding the role that alcohol played in the murders is based primarily
upon the expert opinions of Dr. Partyka and Dr. Larson.  With regard to expert
opinion testimony, this Court has stated: “Opinion testimony gains its greatest force
to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and its weight diminishes to the
degree such support is lacking.”  Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 390-91 (Fla.
1994).  In the instant case, little evidence existed to support Banks’ claim that he
was intoxicated at the time of the murders.  During the penalty phase,  trial counsel
introduced evidence concerning Banks' consumption of alcohol near the time of the
murders.  Annie Pearl and Leonard Collins testified that they had served Banks
between five and seven sixteen-ounce malt liquor beers.  While evidence did show
that Banks had consumed a substantial amount of alcohol on the night of the
murder, the evidence did not support a finding of intoxication at the time of the
murders.  On direct appeal, this Court stated:
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     While voluntary intoxication or drug use might be a mitigator,
whether it actually is depends upon the particular facts of a case.
[Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1992).]  We conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that appellant was under the influence
of alcohol.  Testimony revealed that in the hours preceding the
murders, appellant was present at a local bar, where he was served
between five and seven sixteen-ounce servings of malt liquor over a
period of approximately five or six hours.  Notwithstanding his alcohol
consumption, appellant won several pool games throughout the
evening and displayed no visible signs of drunkenness such as slurred
speech or stumbling.  Also, the circumstances of the crimes
themselves demonstrate that they were committed in a purposeful
manner.  Appellant drove to Cassandra Banks' trailer, entered without
turning on the lights, shot Ms. Banks execution-style while she lay
sleeping, and then proceeded to Melody Cooper's bedroom.
     Thus, although he had ingested a considerable quantity of alcohol
before the murders, appellant's actions both before and during the
murders and the length of time over which the alcohol was consumed
support the trial court's finding that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that appellant was under the influence of alcohol when he
assaulted and killed Melody Cooper.  The trial court found that even if
this nonstatutory mitigator had been established, it would be afforded
only minimal weight.  Thus, any possible error in finding that this
mitigator was not established was harmless.  See also Preston v. State,
607 So. 2d 404, 412 (Fla. 1992) (upholding trial court's finding that
defendant's drug and alcohol use did not even rise to the level of
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance).   
Banks, 700 So. 2d at 368.  
Banks has failed to demonstrate that counsel's strategy for the presentation
of the penalty phase evidence was deficient.  Therefore, he is not entitled to relief
on this issue.
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Finally, Banks argues that Seliger was ineffective for allowing Garcia to
present the closing argument at the penalty phase.  Banks argues that Garcia’s
closing argument shows that he lacked the necessary experience and expertise to
handle a capital case.  Although Banks failed to raise this issue in his motion for
postconviction relief and the trial court did not rule on this issue, the trial court
allowed Seliger to address the issue during his testimony.  Seliger stated that he
opted to allow Garcia to make the closing argument because he was "more
emotional" than Seliger.  Garcia’s closing argument, in accordance with Seliger’s
strategy, repeatedly emphasized that Banks’ life was “worth saving.”  Garcia
emphasized Banks’ school background, his military service, and his job record. 
Garcia also pointed out the role that alcohol played in the murder.  Although Garcia
did not restate the jury instructions during closing argument, he did mention the
factors in the case that were aggravating and those that were mitigating.  The jury
was given instructions which required them to weigh the case’s aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.  
Banks has failed to demonstrate that Garcia's closing argument was deficient. 
Therefore, we deny relief on this issue.
II.     HABEAS PETITION
Banks argues that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because
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the jury was not required to make specific factual findings as to aggravation and
mitigation.  Banks further argues that Florida’s statute is unconstitutional in light of
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 
227 (1999), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Applying these
decisions to the instant case, Banks argues that it is clear that the aggravators under
the Florida death penalty sentencing scheme are arguably elements of the offense
which must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury during the guilt phase,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Banks' Apprendi claim must be considered in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), which
made Apprendi applicable to capital cases.  See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d
693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002).  In Bottoson, we rejected the type
of constitutional challenge Banks presents in this case.  We again reject this claim. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the trial court found as aggravating factors that
Banks had been previously convicted of a violent felony and that the murder was
committed during the course of a felony.  Both factors involve circumstances that
were submitted to the jury and found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.  Habeas
relief based on Apprendi/Ring is hereby denied.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief and
deny Banks' petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW and HARDING,
Senior Justices, concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Gadsden County, 
William L. Gary, Judge - Case No. 92-841-CFA
and an Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Gary L. Printy of the Law Office of Gary L. Printy, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Curtis M. French, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent