Title: Edwards v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120569
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2013

REL:10/18/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120569
____________________
Luke Edwards et al.
v.
Bruce L. Johnson et al.
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court
(CV-10-0032)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
This appeal is from a default judgment entered in the
Greene Circuit Court. For the reasons discussed below, we
dismiss the appeal as untimely. 
1120569
I. Facts and Procedural History
On October 4, 2010, Bruce L. Johnson, Michael L. King,
and William Harrison sued Luke Edwards, the Apostolic
Advancement Association, Heritage Real Investment, Inc.,
Alabama-Mississippi 
Farm, 
Inc., 
and 
certain 
officers 
and 
board
members of those corporations and that association in the
Greene Circuit Court (the corporations, the association, the
officers, and the board members are hereinafter referred to
collectively as the "corporate defendants"). Given the
disposition of this appeal, a recitation of the plaintiffs'
factual allegations is unnecessary. 
On November 22, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an application
for the entry of a default judgment against Edwards pursuant
to Rule 55, Ala. R. Civ. P., for his failure to plead or
otherwise to defend the allegations in the complaint. See Rule
55(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. On July 11, 2011, the plaintiffs filed
another application for the entry of a default judgment along
with supporting affidavits, requesting the trial court to
enter default judgments against both Edwards and 
the 
corporate
defendants (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
defendants") for their failure to plead or defend. 
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1120569
On August 25, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on
plaintiffs' second application for a default judgment. The
trial court thereafter entered a default judgment against the
defendants and awarded damages in the amount of $6,599,648 and
court costs. The same day, Edwards filed a motion styled "Deny
Application for Entry of Default and Motion to Dismiss,"
maintaining that he had not been personally served with the
summons and complaint. Edwards also asserted that the
plaintiffs' action failed to state a claim, that it was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The trial
court never ruled on Edwards's August 25, 2011, motion. 
On September 20, 2011, Edwards and the corporate
defendants jointly moved to set aside the default judgment.
See Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. On December 19, 2011, 90 days
after the motion was filed, the defendants' Rule 55(c) motion
was deemed denied by operation of law, pursuant to Rule 59.1,
Ala. R. Civ. P.1
"No postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule[] ... 55
1
... shall remain pending in the trial court for more than
ninety (90) days .... A failure by the trial court to render
an order disposing of any postjudgment motion within the time
permitted hereunder, or 
any 
extension 
thereof, 
shall
constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of the
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1120569
Subsequently, the plaintiffs attempted to execute on the
default judgment. On May 4, 2012, the defendants filed a
motion to quash the writ of execution, stating that their
September 20, 2011, motion to set aside the default judgment
was still pending and was due to be set for a hearing. On that
basis, they argued, the default judgment was not a final
judgment that could be enforced by a writ of execution. 
On May 7, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike
or to deny the defendants' motion to quash the writ of
execution, arguing that the defendants' Rule 55(c) motion to
set aside the default judgment had been denied by operation of
law 90 days after its filing. The plaintiffs also noted that
the 42-day period in which to appeal the denial of defendants'
Rule 55(c) motion had expired on January 30, 2012. See Rule
4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. The plaintiffs argued that, because
the time for appeal had expired, the defendants' motion to
quash the writ of execution should be stricken or denied.
On July 2, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to vacate
the trial court's default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P. In their motion, the defendants acknowledged
expiration of the period." 
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that their September 20, 2011, Rule 55(c) motion to set aside
the default judgment "was deemed denied 90 days after its
filing."
On January 5, 2013, the trial court denied defendants'
Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment and concluded that
"defendants' contention that the default judgment is void is
without merit." On February 15, 2013, the defendants filed a
notice of appeal of the order denying their Rule 60(b) motion
to vacate and of the denial by operation of law of their Rule
55(c) motion to set aside the default judgment.
II. Analysis
The defendants concede they did not file a timely appeal
from the Rule 59.1 denial by operation of law of their Rule
55(c) motion. In an effort to circumvent the requirement of
Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P., that a notice of appeal be filed
within 42 days of the judgment or order being appealed, the
defendants argue that only a portion of their Rule 55(c)
motion to set aside the default judgment was deemed denied by
operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1 and that this Court
should construe the portion that was not denied after the
passage of 90 days as a Rule 60(b) motion. They also argue
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1120569
that their July 2, 2012, Rule 60(b) motion was merely a
resubmission that should relate back to the filing of their
September 20, 2011, motion to set aside the default judgment. 
The defendants cite no authority for the proposition that
a Rule 59.1 denial by operation of law could operate on only
a portion of their Rule 55(c) motion. The Court of Civil
Appeals has rejected such piecemeal application of Rule 59.1.
See Carnes v. Carnes, 365 So. 2d 981, 983 (Ala. Civ. App.
1978): 
"Defendant 
now 
attempts 
to 
escape 
the
consequences of Rule 59.1 by asking this court to
treat portions of his motion for new trial as a
motion for relief from judgment under [Ala. R. Civ.
P.] 60(b)(6) which provides:
"'On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal 
representative 
from 
a 
final 
judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: 
... 
(6) 
any 
other 
reason
justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.'
"Our cases hold that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot
be used to extend the time for appeal. Personnel
Board for Mobile County v. Bronstein, 354 So. 2d 8
(Ala. Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 12
(Ala. 1978); State v. Wall, 348 So. 2d 482 (Ala.
1977). Similarly, we do not believe that defendant
should be allowed to argue now for the first time
that his motion for new trial was in reality a Rule
60(b) motion simply to avoid the applicability of
Rule 59.1. While our Rules of Civil Procedure
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1120569
contemplate a liberal construction of pleadings and
motions, we do not think they envision the kind of
construction defendant now urges."
In order to evade the effects of the 90-day denial by
operation of law under Rule 59.1 and the 42-day filing
requirement for a notice of appeal under Rule 4, the
defendants advance a very liberal construction of their own
motions. As did the defendant in Carnes, the defendants argue
that a part of their Rule 55(c) motion "could and should be
deemed a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) since it clearly
raised the issue of service of process on all of the
[defendants]." We agree with the analysis in Carnes, and we do
not believe that the defendants should be allowed to argue for
the first time on appeal that a portion of their Rule 55(c)
motion was in reality a Rule 60(b) motion simply to avoid the
applicability of Rule 59.1. 
We note that the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not
necessarily preclude a defendant from filing alternative Rule
55(c) and Rule 60(b) motions with the trial court. "[T]he
Rules do not, at the present time, preclude the filing of
alternative Rule 55(c) and 60(b) motions; however, the better
practice is to file a Rule 60(b) motion only when there is a
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1120569
final judgment in the case." Ex parte Vaughan, 539 So. 2d
1060, 1061 (Ala. 1989). See Ex parte Lang, 500 So. 2d 3, 4
(Ala. 1986) ("Notwithstanding the designation in its title,
the document ... was clearly a Rule 60(b) motion (albeit,
prematurely filed) seeking relief under grounds (1) and (6);
the trial court properly treated it as such."). However, the
defendants' Rule 55(c) motion does not clearly seek
alternative relief under Rule 60(b) that might warrant
treating the defendants' Rule 55(c) motion as an alternative
or bifurcated Rule 55(c) motion and Rule 60(b) motion. On July
2, 2012, the defendants admitted that their Rule 55(c) motion
to set aside the default judgment was deemed denied 90 days
after its filing. The defendants cannot avoid the operation of
Rule 59.1 where their Rule 55(c) motion does not clearly seek
Rule 60(b) relief in the alternative.
A denial of a postjudgment motion by operation of law
pursuant to Rule 59.1 triggers the 42-day period in which to
file a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P.
The defendants admit they did not file a timely notice of
appeal from the Rule 59.1 denial of their Rule 55(c) motion.
Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the
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1120569
defendants' appeal. "The appeal, taken after the time
prescribed by statute, will be dismissed ex mero motu, because
this court is without jurisdiction to consider same." Irwin v.
Weil, 228 Ala. 489, 490, 153 So. 746, 746 (1934). See Meeks v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 286 Ala. 513, 514, 243 So. 2d
27, 28 (1970). 
The defendants ask this Court to construe their Rule
60(b) motion as a request to reconsider or as a supplement to
a portion of their Rule 55(c) motion. Rule 60(b), however, is
not a substitute for a timely filed notice of appeal. "[A]
Rule 60(b) motion may not be used to seek reconsideration of
a trial court's denial of a postjudgment motion, nor are Rule
60 motions substitutes for appeal." Landers v. Landers, 812
So. 2d 1212, 1216 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). We have stated that
a Rule 60(b) motion 
"'cannot serve as a basis for a motion that, in
effect, seeks a reconsideration of matters already
considered by the trial court in a previous post-
judgment motion when the facts alleged in the Rule
60(b) motion "were known by the moving party at the
time of his original [post-judgment] motion." Ex
parte Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. 1985). Such
a Rule 60(b) motion, and a subsequent appeal of the
denial of such a motion, cannot be used as a
substitute for an appeal of the trial court's
original judgment.'"
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1120569
Ex parte Haynes, 58 So. 3d 761, 765 (Ala. 2010) (some emphasis
omitted). Because the defendants' Rule 60(b) motion is a
nullity, the only order the defendants could appeal from was
the Rule 59.1 denial of their Rule 55(c) motion by operation
of law. The time to appeal that Rule 59.1 denial expired on
January 29, 2012. 
III. Conclusion
We conclude that the defendants' notice of appeal was
untimely. We are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and
we therefore dismiss it.
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
Bolin, Murdock, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
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