Title: Short v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 182, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAKISHA SHORT, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 182, 2004 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr.A. Nos. IS03-09-0736; 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§      IS03-09-0737; IS03-10-0763; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§      IS03-09-0739 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  November 17, 2004 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  December 30, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
James D. Nutter, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Lakisha Short, appeals from two final 
judgments entered by the Superior Court.  Following a jury trial, Short was 
convicted for committing the offenses of Robbery in the First Degree,1 two 
counts of Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony2 and 
Aggravated Menacing.3  The former and the latter convictions are not being 
challenged. 
 
Short has raised one issue in this appeal.  According to Short, the 
State presented no expert testimony that the object admitted into evidence as 
a “firearm” was capable of discharging a “shot, projectile or other object . . . 
by force of combustion, explosive, gas and/or mechanical means . . . .”4  
Consequently, Short submits that the State failed to prove that the object was 
a firearm, as that term is defined by statute.  Therefore, Short argues that the 
Superior Court erred when it denied the motions for judgments of acquittal 
on the two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony.   
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832 (2002). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A (2002). 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 602 (1974). 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(11) (1974). 
 
3
Short acknowledges that this Court has previously considered and 
rejected similar arguments.5  We have concluded that Short’s argument is 
also without merit.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed. 
Facts 
 
Clorice Adams worked at King’s Market outside of Lincoln.  On 
August 20, 2003, an individual entered the store and asked for a cheese 
steak.  After placing this order, the person walked out of the store and later 
reentered.   
Adams’ co-worker, Khalid Alsmadi, was behind the counter at the 
cash register when Adams heard the person yell, “Open the F-MF’er.”  From 
a distance of about six feet away, Adams saw the barrel of a gun and 
watched Khalid open the register.  The robber grabbed some of the money 
inside the register and ran away.   
 
Khalid was starting to ring up the cheese steak when the robber pulled 
out a gun and aimed it at him.  He described it as a big gun with a long 
barrel, not a semi-automatic, but one of the “old ones.”  After the robber ran 
out of the store with the money, Khalid ran to the door.  He observed the 
                                          
 
5 Bryson v. State, 840 A.2d 631 (Del. 2003); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821 (Del. 
1994); Donophan v. State, 424 A.2d 301 (Del. 1980); Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 87 
(Del. 1979). 
 
4
robber get into a medium-sized American car, gray in color, and drive away.  
Khalid saw only one person in the car. 
 
Adams called 911 to report the robbery.  When the police responded 
to the market, Khalid told them that the robber was a female who could 
easily be mistaken for a man.  He had recognized her as a former customer.  
Officer Harry Litten of the Ellendale Police Department heard the 
description of the suspect and her vehicle over the radio.  He recognized the 
descriptions as similar to Short and the car she drove.   
Litten knew where Short lived outside of Ellendale.  He drove past 
Short’s residence and parked nearby to observe the traffic.  He saw an 
unfamiliar brown Honda Accord pull out of a lane.  Although Litten could 
see clearly a male operator, the passenger seat was in a reclined position.  
Litten could not see who the second person was in the vehicle.  He followed 
the Honda as it drove toward Ellendale, but then he was called back to 
Short’s residence.   
 
Short’s neighbor, Ruth Deshields, had been sitting outside in her front 
yard that afternoon.  She saw Short drive upon the lane in her gray vehicle, 
followed by “Mr. Nathan” in a brown Honda Accord.  Deshields saw Short 
get into the passenger side of the other car, and watched it drive away in the 
 
5
direction of Ellendale.  Deshields described Short to the police as lying back 
in the car as though she did not want to be seen.   
 
The police responded to Short’s residence and found a grey Chevrolet 
with the motor still warm parked next to a trailer.  The vehicle was towed to 
Troop 4.  After obtaining and executing a search warrant, the police 
discovered a tee-shirt on the floor of the front passenger seat, a green hat on 
the back seat, and a gun, wrapped in a light blue, thin material inside the 
trunk. 
 
The police showed Khalid and Adams a photo-lineup containing 
Short’s photograph.  Each eyewitness identified Short’s photograph as that 
of the robber.  At trial, Khalid and Adams identified Short in the courtroom 
as the person who robbed King’s Market.   
Motion For Acquittal 
 
After the State rested its case, Short moved for judgments of acquittal 
on the two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony.  Short argued that the State had failed to present any expert 
testimony to establish that the gun introduced into evidence met the statutory 
definition of a firearm.  In opposition to the motion, the State argued that it 
did not need an expert witness to present this testimony because: 
State’s Exhibit No. 11 is clearly a revolver-type gun where you 
can physically see it.  You don’t need an expert witness to 
 
6
know, like the old cowboy movies, the bullets go in, you click 
back, you pull the trigger and something comes out this end.  I 
[sic] does not take an expert witness or speculation to come up 
with that.  It’s not a complicated type of gun where the jury 
may wonder how does this thing work.  I know every person 
has seen what these things do in the old cowboy movies.  It is 
not rocket science.  It does not have to be an operable gun in 
order for it to meet the definition of a firearm under the statute. 
 
The trial judge denied the motion, agreeing with the State that “we [do not] 
need an expert to come in here and tell us that is a firearm when to me it so 
obviously is.”   
Acquittal Properly Denied 
 
The denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo 
on appeal to determine “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”6  Short argues that the State failed to 
present any expert testimony to establish that the object admitted into 
evidence as a “firearm” comported with the statutory definition of that term: 
(11)  “Firearm” includes any weapon from which a shot, 
projectile or other object may be discharged by force of 
combustion, explosive, gas and/or mechanical means, whether 
operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded.  It does not include 
a BB gun.7 
 
                                          
 
6 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 1999) (citations omitted). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(11) (1974). 
 
7
According to Short, the physical object itself is not enough to 
establish prima facie that the item is a firearm.  Short submits that there must 
be expert testimony about how the firearm worked and what type of 
projectile could be loaded into it.  The State submits that expert testimony 
was unnecessary and that it presented other substantial evidence from which 
a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
object in question was, in fact, a firearm as defined by the statute.   
Two eyewitnesses testified that they saw Short with a gun.  One 
eyewitness, Clorice Adams, described the gun as having a long, narrow, 
black barrel.  The other eyewitness, Khalid Alsmadi, described the gun as 
big, “one of them old ones.”  He described the barrel as “long a little bit, but 
I am not talking about a real rifle.”  Each eyewitness was shown State’s 
Exhibit A for identification, later admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 11.  Each 
one testified that the weapon was the same gun he or she had seen during the 
robbery.   
 
When the prosecutor showed the weapon to the first eyewitness, the 
prosecutor stated:  “Clorice, there is a gun lock put on by the [Superior] 
Court so it can’t fire.  There is another safety that the State Police put on 
this.  Does this look familiar to you?”  Similarly, when the prosecutor 
showed the weapon to the second eyewitness, the prosecutor stated:  “It has 
 
8
a gun lock added down here and then white plastic and it is not loaded, so it 
won’t go off in here.  Does this look familiar to you?”  The State then 
introduced the gun into evidence without any objection from the defense.   
 
Contrary to Short’s argument, an expert witness was not necessary to 
explain to the jury how the gun worked.8  Expert testimony is only necessary 
if “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”9  The 
record supports the Superior Court’s ruling that the handgun, physically 
present in the courtroom with added safety devices, was “obviously” a 
“firearm,” as that term is defined by statute.10 
The evidence in this case included consistent testimony from two 
eyewitnesses describing and identifying the gun they had observed during 
the robbery.11  The gun itself was introduced into evidence, unloaded with 
visible locks affixed by the Superior Court and State Police so that it would 
not be a danger to anyone.  A rational jury, viewing this evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
                                          
 
8 Bryson v. State, 840 A.2d 631 (Del. 2003); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821 (Del. 
1994); Donophan v. State, 424 A.2d 301 (Del. 1980); Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 87 
(Del. 1979). 
9 D.R.E. 702 (2004). 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(11) (1974).  
11 See Fortt v. State, 767 A.2d 799, 802-03 (Del. 2001) (where the victim alone testified 
that the weapon used during the robbery was a real gun, this Court held that was 
sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of Possession of 
a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony).  
 
9
Short was in possession of a “firearm” during the commission of the 
robbery.12 
Conclusion 
The trial judge properly denied Short’s motions for judgments of 
acquittal on two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission 
of a Felony.  The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
12 Id.