Title: Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 326573 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12182
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2017

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SJC-12182 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 326573  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD (and a consolidated case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 7, 2017. - June 23, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Internet. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 21, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for preliminary injunction was heard by Gregg J. 
Pasquale, J., and the case was reported by him to the Appeals 
Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 22, 2015. 
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Heidi E. 
Brieger, J. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was allowed in the 
Appeals Court by Judd J. Carhart, J.  The Supreme Judicial Court 
granted an application for direct appellate review. 
                                                          
 
1 John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 15890 vs. Sex 
Offender Registry Board. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board 
No. 326573, & another. 
 
John P. Bossé for the defendant. 
 
Dana Goldblatt, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 
598, 616 (2014), we permanently enjoined the Sex Offender 
Registry Board (SORB) "from publishing on the Internet the 
registry information of any individual who was finally 
classified as a level two sex offender on or before July 12, 
2013, unless the individual is subsequently reclassified a level 
two or level three sex offender."  SORB contends in these two 
cases that, when it unsuccessfully seeks after July 12, 2013, to 
reclassify a level two sex offender as a level three sex 
offender, the individual is reclassified a level two sex 
offender for purposes of Moe, and SORB may therefore publish the 
individual's registry information on the Internet.  We disagree.  
We conclude that, under Moe, a sex offender is "reclassified" 
only where a hearing officer allows SORB's motion to increase 
his or her classification based on new information indicating an 
increased risk of sexual recidivism, not, as here, where the 
hearing officer denied SORB's motion for reclassification and 
retained the earlier level two classification.  We therefore 
remand these cases to the Superior Court for the issuance of a 
 
 
3 
permanent injunction barring publication of each plaintiff's 
registry information on SORB's Web site on the Internet unless 
and until the offender is reclassified a level three sex 
offender.2 
 
Background.  For over two decades, the Commonwealth has 
maintained a registration system for individuals convicted of a 
sex offense as defined by the sex offender registry law, G. L. 
c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.  See St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  A sex offender 
is required to register with SORB upon release from custody or, 
if not sentenced to confinement, upon notification by the court 
of the obligation to register.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (a), (c).  
"Upon review of any information useful in assessing the risk of 
reoffense and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public by 
the sex offender, including . . . any materials submitted by the 
sex offender," SORB prepares a "recommended classification" of 
each offender.  G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  The offender has the 
right to challenge SORB's recommended classification, and where 
the offender chooses to exercise that right, a panel of three 
SORB members or a hearing examiner designated by SORB finally 
classifies the offender into one of three "levels of 
notification depending on the degree of risk of reoffense and 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
4 
the degree of dangerousness posed to the public by the sex 
offender."  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178K (2), 178L (1) (a), (2). 
 
The three levels of notification are defined as follows: 
 "Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is 
low and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public 
is not such that a public safety interest is served by 
public availability, it shall give a level [one] 
designation to the sex offender."  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (a). 
 
 "Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is 
moderate and the degree of dangerousness posed to the 
public is such that a public safety interest is served 
by public availability of registration information, it 
shall give a level [two] designation to the sex 
offender."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b). 
 
 "Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is 
high and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public 
is such that a substantial public safety interest is 
served by active dissemination, it shall give a level 
[three] designation to the sex offender."  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (c). 
 
 
Over time, the Legislature has revised the required forms 
of public notification for the different levels of sex offender 
classification.  As amended in 1999, the sex offender registry 
law mandated that information regarding level two offenders 
could only be obtained by a member of the public through a 
request to SORB or a police department.  St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  
See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178I, 178J, 178K (2) (b).  In contrast, a 
level three sex offender's registry information was subject to 
"active dissemination" by way of a "community notification 
plan," in which the police department in the community where the 
 
 
5 
level three sex offender resided or worked was required to 
notify individuals and community organizations that were likely 
to encounter the sex offender.  St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K (2) (c). 
 
In 2003, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 6, § 178D, to 
require Internet publication of registry information for level 
three sex offenders only.  St. 2003, c. 140, § 5.  A decade 
later, effective on July 12, 2013, the Legislature again amended 
§ 178D, this time to require Internet publication of registry 
information for both level two and three sex offenders.  See St. 
2013, c. 38, §§ 7, 9.  Plaintiffs who were classified as level 
two sex offenders prior to the 2013 amendments filed suit, 
arguing that retroactive application of the statute to mandate 
Internet publication of their registry information would be 
unreasonable, and therefore violate their right to due process 
under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See 
Moe, 467 Mass. at 599, 616.  We agreed and declared 
unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments 
"to the extent they would require the Internet publication of 
the registry information of individuals who were finally 
classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 
2013."  Id. at 616. 
 
In our Moe decision, we highlighted the inequity that would 
result from retroactive application of the 2013 amendments.  The 
 
 
6 
imposition of a "substantial new legal consequence" in the form 
of Internet publication would transform offenders classified as 
level two prior to the amendments "into something akin to level 
'two and one-half' offenders."  Moe, 467 Mass. at 609.  But when 
SORB gave such an offender a level two classification prior to 
the amendments, it had "implicitly determined that the offender 
was not so dangerous" that Internet publication was necessary to 
protect the public.  Id. at 614.  "Thus, the practical 
consequence of the [2013] amendments is that offenders whose 
degree of dangerousness, according to SORB, was not so 
substantial that Internet publication of their information was 
needed to protect the public safety would now be subject to 
Internet publication of their registry information."  Id.  The 
unfairness of such retroactive application of the amendments was 
compounded by the likelihood that some offenders classified as 
level two prior to the amendments had decided not to challenge 
that classification based on an accurate understanding that a 
level two classification did not carry the consequence of 
Internet publication.  Id. at 614-615.  Accordingly, we remanded 
the case for entry of an order "permanently enjoining SORB from 
publishing on the Internet the registry information of any 
individual who was finally classified as a level two sex 
offender on or before July 12, 2013, unless the individual is 
 
 
7 
subsequently reclassified a level two or level three sex 
offender."  Id. at 616. 
 
The sex offender registry law permits a sex offender's 
final classification to be reclassified in one of two ways.  
First, SORB may seek reclassification where new information is 
received "which is relevant to a determination of a risk of re-
offense or degree of dangerousness."  G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3).  
Although the statute would permit SORB to seek a higher or lower 
reclassification level where new information is received that 
would suggest either an increase or a decrease in the risk of 
sexual recidivism, the SORB regulations authorize it to seek 
only a higher classification level based on the "[r]eceipt of 
any information that indicates the offender may present an 
increased risk to reoffend or degree of dangerousness."  803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(10)(a) (2013).3  Where SORB does so, the 
sex offender may reject the recommended reclassification level 
and request a reclassification hearing that follows the same 
procedures as a classification hearing.  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
                                                          
 
 
3 After the denial of reclassification in these two cases, 
the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) promulgated new 
regulations, which continue to provide that SORB may seek only a 
higher classification based on new information relevant to a sex 
offender's risk of sexual recidivism.  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.32(1) (2016).  In addition to substantive changes, the 2016 
regulations are also numbered differently.  In order to avoid 
confusion, we refer to the 2016 regulations only in footnotes.  
Unless otherwise noted, the language in the 2013 regulations 
that we discuss is also present in the 2016 regulations. 
 
 
8 
§ 1.37C(10)(c) (2013).  Second, a sex offender may seek 
reclassification based on a showing that the offender's risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness has decreased since his or 
her final classification.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(1) 
(2013).4 
 
Both plaintiffs, John Doe, SORB No. 326573 (Doe No. 
326573), and John Doe, SORB No. 15890 (Doe No. 15890), pleaded 
guilty to sex offenses and received a final classification as a 
level two offender before the 2013 amendments to the sex 
offender registry law.  In separate proceedings, SORB sought to 
reclassify each as a level three offender after the amendments 
based on new information.  In each case, the hearing officer 
concluded that a reclassification of the original classification 
was not warranted and that the offender remained a moderate risk 
to reoffend.  As to Doe No. 326573, the hearing officer found 
that the "reclassification record does not provide any new or 
                                                          
 
 
4 A sex offender who is classified as a level two or level 
three offender may file a motion for reclassification no sooner 
than three years after the final classification, but a sex 
offender who has been convicted of a new sex offense may not 
file such a motion until ten years after the final 
classification.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2) (2013).  The 
2013 regulations also provide that a sex offender who has 
experienced a material change in circumstances related to a 
medical condition may file a motion for reclassification "sooner 
than five years after the date of his or her prior 
classification."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(3) (2013).  Under 
the 2016 regulations, an offender may file such a motion "sooner 
than three years after the date of his or her prior 
classification."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(3) (2016). 
 
 
9 
different insight into his capacity to sexually reoffend or the 
danger he poses to the community as a sex offender than was the 
case at the time of his original classification."  As to Doe No. 
15890, the hearing officer found that, although much of SORB's 
evidence was "credible and concerning, [she did] not find these 
events are enough to warrant [him] to now present a high risk to 
reoffend or high degree of danger."5 
 
After the hearing, SORB informed Doe No. 326573 that, 
because of the hearing officer's decision, his registry 
information would be made available on the SORB Web site.  Doe 
No. 326573 filed, in the Superior Court, a complaint for 
declaratory and injunctive relief and a motion for a preliminary 
injunction seeking a stay of the Internet publication.  A 
Superior Court judge allowed the motion and issued an order 
enjoining SORB from publishing Doe No. 326573's registry 
information until further notice.  The parties then filed a 
joint motion to report the case to the Appeals Court, pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), 
which the Superior Court judge allowed.  After the case was 
                                                          
 
 
5 After SORB moved to reclassify John Doe, SORB No. 15890 
(Doe No. 15890), upward to a level three sex offender, he moved 
for reclassification downward to a level one offender.  The 
hearing officer denied both motions in the same decision.  As to 
Doe No. 15890's motion, the hearing officer found that his "risk 
to sexually reoffend and his degree of dangerousness have not 
decreased since his last classification." 
 
 
10 
docketed in the Appeals Court, we granted Doe No. 326573's 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Doe No. 15890 filed a complaint in the Superior Court for 
judicial review of the hearing officer's decision, as well as a 
motion for a preliminary injunction to stay Internet publication 
of his registry information.  After a judge denied the motion 
for a preliminary injunction, a single justice of the Appeals 
Court allowed Doe No. 15890's request for interlocutory relief, 
stating that allowing Internet publication of Doe No. 15890's 
registry information would effectively permit SORB to 
"circumvent" this court's holding in Moe.  After the case was 
entered in the Appeals Court, we granted Doe No. 15890's 
application for direct appellate review.  We then consolidated 
the appeals because of the common issue they present. 
 
Discussion.  SORB contends that, where it moves to 
reclassify a level two offender as a level three offender based 
on new information relevant to the offender's risk of sexual 
recidivism and where the hearing officer issues a decision after 
July 12, 2013, that the new information does not warrant any 
change in the offender's classification, the offender has been 
"subsequently reclassified a level two . . . sex offender" and 
therefore falls outside the scope of the injunction in Moe, 467 
Mass. at 616, that bars Internet publication of the offender's 
registry information.  The premise of SORB's argument is that 
 
 
11 
its motion for reclassification triggers a review of the 
offender's classification and, where that occurs after July 12, 
2013, a determination by the hearing officer that the offender's 
classification should remain at level two is made with knowledge 
that such a classification will trigger Internet publication, 
thus curing the violation of due process identified in Moe. 
 
The flaw in SORB's premise is that a decision in a 
reclassification hearing, in contrast with the original 
classification, is not written on a clean slate.  Where 
initiated by SORB, it is essentially a hearing on a motion to 
increase the classification from level two to level three based 
on new information allegedly indicating an increased risk of 
sexual recidivism.  The burden rests with SORB to prove that the 
new information warrants a reclassification to a higher offense 
level.6  Where, as here, the hearing officer determines that SORB 
failed to meet that burden, the motion for reclassification is 
denied and the original level two classification remains.  
                                                          
 
 
6 SORB's burden of proof in these two cases was proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.10(1), 1.37C(10)(c) (2013).  The regulations were amended 
after we held in John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 314-315 (2015), 
that because the consequences of registration as a sex offender 
have become more severe, SORB must prove the appropriateness of 
an offender's risk classification by "clear and convincing 
evidence" in order to satisfy due process.  SORB's burden under 
the new regulations for an upward classification is now proof by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.03, 1.14(1) (2016). 
 
 
12 
Because the original classification issued on or before July 12, 
2013, has not changed, the denial does not result in the 
offender's subsequent reclassification as a level two offender 
within the meaning of Moe. 
 
Similarly, where the offender moves to reduce his or her 
classification from a level two to a level one, the burden rests 
with the offender to prove that his or her risk of sexual 
recidivism has decreased since final classification.  803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(1), (2)(c) (2013).7  "Motions for 
reclassification shall be based on new and updated information 
not available at the time of the original classification," 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(5)(e) (2013), but the hearing officer 
is not foreclosed from considering the information relied on in 
determining the original classification level.  Id.  Where the 
offender fails to meet this burden, the motion for 
reclassification is denied and the original level two 
classification remains in place. 
                                                          
 
 
7 The offender's burden of proof had been proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.37C(1), (2)(c) (2013).  But under the new SORB regulations, 
the offender must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
his or her risk of sexual recidivism has decreased since the 
final classification.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(c) (2016).  
Consequently, even where the offender proves by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a lower classification is warranted in 
light of his or her reduced risk of sexual recidivism, the 
offender's motion for reclassification will be denied.  Because 
the constitutionality of this regulation is not at issue in this 
case, we do not address it. 
 
 
13 
 
SORB argues that, where it moves for reclassification to a 
higher level and the offender rejects the recommended 
reclassification, the regulations provide that "he or she may 
request a hearing that follows the procedures detailed in [803  
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.08 through 1.25 (2013)]," 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.37C(10)(c), which include the provision in § 1.10(1) 
that the hearing "shall be a de novo review" limited to 
determine whether SORB has met its burden to prove the 
offender's final classification.  SORB contends that, because 
the reclassification hearing is a "de novo review," the denial 
of reclassification should be treated as a new final 
classification.  But the regulations make clear that SORB may 
initiate a reclassification hearing only based on its receipt of 
new information and only to increase the offender's 
classification.  The hearing officer upon SORB's application for 
reclassification decides only whether to increase the original 
classification based on the new information; where the 
regulations give SORB no authority to apply for a lower 
classification, the hearing officer, in the absence of a motion 
by the offender for reclassification, has no reason to reach 
beyond the scope of SORB's motion and reduce the classification.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 As a technical matter, the regulations permit the hearing 
officer to "maintain, decrease, or increase" the SORB 
recommendation in a reclassification hearing.  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.22(2) (2013).  But where only SORB seeks 
 
 
14 
 
In essence, SORB's argument is that, when it moves to 
reclassify a level two offender who was classified on or before 
July 12, 2013, it is "heads, we win, tails, you (the offender) 
lose."  If SORB prevails on its motion to reclassify the 
offender from level two to level three based on its new 
information, it may publish the offender's registry information 
on its Web site on the Internet.  If it fails to prevail on its 
motion, the offender will be reclassified a level two offender, 
and it may publish the offender's registry information on its 
Web site on the Internet.  We decline to adopt such a rule.  The 
denial of SORB's motion to reclassify level two offenders who 
were finally classified on or before July 12, 2013, cannot 
transform them "into something akin to level 'two and one-half' 
offenders."  See Moe, 467 Mass. at 609.  Such a result would not 
respect our conclusion in Moe that retroactive application of 
the 2013 amendments requiring Internet publication of registry 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reclassification, the regulations render a decrease in 
classification virtually impossible, because they only permit 
SORB to seek reclassification based on an increased risk.  See 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(10).  At oral argument, SORB's 
attorney was asked if a hearing officer had ever reclassified a 
level two offender as a level one offender after SORB moved to 
reclassify an offender from level two to level three.  SORB 
replied in a letter pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), as 
amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982), that it had located one case 
where this had occurred.  However, in the decision attached to 
the letter, the hearing officer noted that, after SORB moved to 
reclassify the level two offender at level three, the offender 
moved for reclassification as a level one sex offender.  The 
hearing officer essentially denied SORB's motion to reclassify 
upward and allowed the offender's motion to reclassify downward. 
 
 
15 
information for these level two offenders "would be unreasonable 
and inequitable, and therefore unconstitutional as a violation 
of due process."  Id. at 615.  Nor does it respect the gravity 
of Internet publication of an offender's registry information, 
which magnifies the "risk of serious adverse consequences to 
that offender, including the risk that the sex offender will 
suffer discrimination in employment and housing, and will 
otherwise suffer from the stigma of being identified as a sex 
offender, which sometimes means the additional risk of being 
harassed or assaulted."  Id. at 604.  See Doe v. Attorney Gen. 
(No. 2), 425 Mass. 217, 221-222 (1997).9 
 
We also decline to adopt SORB's argument that, where a 
level two offender who was classified on or before July 12, 
2013, moves to be reclassified as a level one offender, the 
denial of his or her motion means that the offender has been 
subsequently reclassified a level two offender and his or her 
                                                          
 
 
9 Our opinion in Moe identified three reasons why this is 
so:  first, Internet publication allows the offender's registry 
information to be accessed anonymously by persons from the 
comfort of their own home; second, once published on the SORB 
Web site, an offender's registry information will likely be 
republished elsewhere on the Internet and remain publicly 
available even if SORB were later to reduce or eliminate the 
offender's registration requirement; and third, search engines 
may reveal the registry information even to those persons who 
searched the offender's name for other reasons.  Moe v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 605 (2014), citing D.J. 
Solove, The Future of Reputation:  Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on 
the Internet 78 (2007) ("When one puts information on the 
Internet, it can easily become like Frankenstein's monster, 
escaping the dominion of its master"). 
 
 
16 
registry information may now be published on the SORB Web site.  
Under the regulations in effect when Doe No. 15890 moved to 
reduce his classification, his failure to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his classification should be 
reduced based on new information does not transform his level 
two classification into "something akin" to a level two and one-
half classification.  It means simply that his motion for 
reclassification is denied.  If it meant more, level two 
offenders who were classified on or before July 12, 2013, would 
be deterred from ever seeking to move to reduce their 
classification level, because the denial of that motion would 
result in publication of their registry information on the SORB 
Web site on the Internet.10 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that, under Moe, a sex offender is 
"reclassified" only where a hearing officer allows SORB's motion 
to increase his or her classification based on new information 
indicating an increased risk of sexual recidivism, not, as here, 
where the hearing officer denied SORB's motion for 
reclassification and retained the earlier level two 
classification.  We affirm the judge's allowance of the motion 
                                                          
 
 
10 That deterrent would be even stronger under the new 
regulations, where an offender's motion for a lower 
classification will be denied unless the offender proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that his or her risk of sexual 
recidivism has decreased since final classification.  See 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(c).  See note 7, supra. 
 
 
17 
for a preliminary injunction in Doe No. 326573's case and 
reverse a different judge's denial of the motion in Doe No. 
15890's case, and remand these cases to the Superior Court for 
the issuance of a permanent injunction barring publication of 
each plaintiff's registry information on SORB's Web site on the 
Internet unless and until the offender is reclassified a level 
three sex offender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.