Title: Commonwealth v. Crayton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11639
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2014

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SJC-11639  
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WALTER CRAYTON. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 2, 2014. - December 17, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Identification of defendant in courtroom.  
Constitutional Law, Identification.  Due Process of Law, 
Identification. Identification.  Evidence, Identification, 
Verbal completeness, Prior misconduct.  Obscenity, Child 
pornography. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 10, 2009.  
 
 
The cases were tried before Maureen B. Hogan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
David B. Hirsch for the defendant. 
 
Robert J. Bender, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
M. Chris Fabricant & Karen Newirth, of New York, Joshua D. 
Rogaczewski & Johnny H. Walker, of the District of Columbia, & 
Kevin M. Bolan, for The Innocence Network, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury on two indictments of possession of child 
pornography, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.1  We granted 
the defendant's application for direct appellate review.  In his 
appeal, the defendant claims that the trial judge made three 
errors that warrant a new trial.  First, he contends that the 
judge erred in admitting in evidence the in-court 
identifications of the defendant by two eyewitnesses who had not 
previously participated in an out-of-court identification 
procedure.  Second, the defendant claims that, where the 
defendant admitted to police that he had used library computers 
on the day in question but denied having used them to view child 
pornography, the judge erred in allowing in evidence the 
admission but excluding from evidence the denial.  Third, he 
argues that the judge erred in admitting in evidence three 
pornographic drawings of children that were found in the 
defendant's possession ten months after he allegedly viewed the 
child pornography charged in the indictments.  We establish a 
new standard for the admission of in-court identifications where 
the eyewitness had not previously participated in an out-of-
                                                 
 
1 At a subsequent bench trial, a judge found that the 
defendant had previously been convicted of an offense in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C, and sentenced the defendant to 
a term of imprisonment in State prison of from five years to 
five years and one day (later corrected to from four and one-
half years to five years), followed by a probationary term of 
three years.  
3 
 
 
court identification procedure and conclude that the in-court 
identifications in this case would not have been admissible 
under that standard.  We also conclude that the judge erred in 
excluding from evidence the defendant's denial and in admitting 
in evidence the drawings, and that the errors and the admission 
of the in-court identifications, considered together, resulted 
in unfair prejudice that requires that the convictions be 
vacated and a new trial ordered.2,3   
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence at trial, reserving 
discussion of the evidence that pertains to the issues on 
appeal.  On January 21, 2009, between approximately 3:30 P.M. 
and 4 P.M., an eighth grade student, M.S., was doing homework at 
a computer in the basement technology center of the Central 
Square branch of the Cambridge Public Library.4  A man she 
described as short, white, and bald, with a "little beard" and 
eyeglasses was sitting at an adjacent computer to the right of 
her.5  She went to the library "[m]ostly every day," but had 
                                                 
 
2 Because we vacate the convictions, we do not consider 
whether the defendant may lawfully be convicted of two 
indictments alleging possession of child pornography on the same 
date.  See Commonwealth v. Rollins, ante 66 (2014). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Innocence 
Network. 
 
 
 
4 M.S. was not certain whether she was in the eighth or 
ninth grade that day, but her best memory was that she was 
"getting ready to graduate" from the eighth grade. 
 
 
4 
 
 
never seen the man before.  When she looked at his computer 
screen, she saw an image of "a girl about ten years old, 
covering her chest."  She could not tell whether the girl was 
wearing any clothes, because she saw only a "top view" and the 
man was "cover[ing] the computer screen" with the "umbrella-
type" cover that was on it.6  She "waved" at her friend, R.M., a 
ninth grade student, who was also in the technology center of 
the library, and urged him to look at the man's computer.  R.M. 
testified that he "just got a quick glimpse of the computer," 
and could only see "a small portion" of the screen, which 
displayed a young child wearing no clothes.  He saw only the 
side of the man's face; he described the man as bald with a 
goatee.  He went to the library every day after school, but had 
not seen the man before.  During trial, both M.S. and R.M. 
identified the defendant as the man that they had seen at the 
computer on January 21.  
 
M.S. and R.M. walked over to Ricardo Negron, a library 
employee who was working at the staff desk in the technology 
center that afternoon, and they told him that a person was 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 When asked how long she looked at the person, M.S. 
answered, "I would say a quick glance."   
 
 
6 M.S. testified that she could see only two or three inches 
of the computer screen.  
5 
 
 
looking at children wearing no clothes on the computer.7  Before 
M.S. and R.M. approached him, Negron had observed M.S. at 
computer no. one and a white male, "perhaps" in his "early 
thirties," bald, with eyeglasses, whom he had seen before at the 
technology center, at computer no. two.8  The police later showed 
Negron an array of photographs, but he was unable to identify 
anyone from the array.9,10  
                                                 
 
7 There was confusion at trial as to which computer the man 
was viewing, but the evidence strongly suggests it was computer 
no. two, even though M.S. testified that she was sitting at 
computer no. two, and that the man was sitting at computer no. 
one.  Both R.M. and Ricardo Negron testified that M.S. was 
sitting at computer no. one, and the man was sitting at computer 
no. two.  There was no dispute in the evidence at trial that the 
man's computer was a "look-down" computer, the screen of which 
provided more privacy than a "look-up" computer, which has a 
flat-screen monitor on a desk.  Negron testified that computer 
no. one was a "look-up" computer and computer no. two was a 
"look-down" computer.  Moreover, Negron testified that a person 
using M.S.'s library card bar code had logged in to computer no. 
one at 3:15 P.M. and logged out at 4:15 P.M. 
 
 
 
8 Negron testified that the man earlier that afternoon had 
been at computer no. four but logged off and asked to move to 
computer no. two. 
 
 
 
9 Defense counsel in her closing argument argued that the 
defendant's photograph was in the array shown to Negron, but 
there was no testimony at trial on this point, and the 
photographic array was not offered in evidence.  We infer that 
the defendant's photograph was in the array, because the array 
would otherwise be irrelevant, and the prosecutor did not object 
to defense counsel's representations in closing argument.   
 
 
10 Negron was not asked to make an in-court identification 
of the defendant at trial. 
 
6 
 
 
 
Library users were required to log on to a computer by 
entering their library bar code, so when the two teenagers 
alerted Negron to what they had seen, Negron looked up the log-
in information for computer no. two.  While he was doing so, the 
man using computer no. two logged off and left the room.  The 
log inquiry revealed that a person using the library card of an 
eighteen year old male, "perhaps of Asian descent," had logged 
on to computer no. two at 3:08 P.M. and logged off at 3:55 P.M.11  
At some time after 3:55 P.M., Negron went upstairs to speak to 
the library manager, Esme Green.  Green went downstairs to the 
technology center, looked at two "video clips" saved on computer 
no. two, saw that they depicted an approximately twelve year old 
girl, "either naked or almost naked, masturbating," and 
telephoned the police. 
 
When Negron went upstairs, another library employee, 
Ricardo Ricard, went downstairs to staff the technology center.  
Having learned of the allegation, Ricard logged on to computer 
no. two, saw a folder on the computer with the label "W," and 
looked at a video file inside the folder, which showed a nude 
                                                 
 
11 The name of the person whose library card was used to log 
on to computer no. two was not elicited at trial, but the 
defense attorney in closing argument told the jury that the name 
was "Fan Woo."  Apart from the closing argument, because of the 
age listed on the card and what we infer was an Asian name 
(suggesting that the person was "perhaps of Asian descent"), a 
reasonable jury would have inferred that the library card was 
not in the name of the defendant.   
7 
 
 
female child.  Because he was concerned that the library 
computers deleted all files when they were shut down for the 
night, Ricard transferred the folder containing the file to a 
universal serial bus (USB) drive, which he later gave to Green.  
He then disabled the computer's "reboot" software so that the 
computer would retain the files that were then on it. 
Ricard had not seen the man who used computer no. two on 
January 21, but he was aware of the man's physical description.  
On January 22, when he saw a man who matched that description in 
the library lobby, he told Green of the man's presence, and 
Green notified the police.  
 
Detectives Brian O'Connor and Pam Clair of the Cambridge 
police department arrived at the library and saw the defendant 
at a computer with another individual.  The detectives observed 
the defendant for approximately twenty to thirty minutes at a 
computer that displayed a "MySpace" profile page, "looking at 
MySpace."  As the defendant was leaving the library, Detective 
O'Connor asked to speak with him, and the defendant agreed.  The 
defendant admitted that he had been in the library's computer 
room the previous day.  He said he had used one of the computers 
for five minutes and then switched to another computer, which he 
identified as computer no. two, to check his electronic mail (e-
mail).  The defendant said that his e-mail address was 
8 
 
 
cblizzard@yahoo.com.  He also said that he did not have his own 
MySpace profile, but used his friend's profile.  
 
After this conversation, Detective O'Connor obtained the 
USB drive that Ricard had given to Green, seized computer no. 
two, and copied the folder labeled "W" onto a compact disc.  
After obtaining a search warrant, Detective O'Connor conducted a 
forensic search of the hard drive of computer no. two.  That 
search revealed twenty-seven "cookies," which O'Connor described 
as "text file[s]" that store information on an Internet browser 
regarding a Web site that a particular user has visited on the 
Internet.12  The first of these cookies, entitled "magic-
Lolita(1).txt," was created at 3:14 P.M. on January 21; the 
last, entitled "www.innocentgirls(1).txt," was created at 3:48 
P.M. that day.  Detective O'Connor also uncovered "Yahoo 
searches" on computer no. two that had been conducted between 
3:14 and 3:25 P.M. on January 21 using such search terms as "One 
hundred percent Lolita" and "Top Lolita."  Detective O'Connor 
also located temporary Internet files on the computer's hard 
drive in which images were automatically downloaded by the 
Internet browser from a Web site that the user visited.  In 
those temporary files, he found approximately 210 photographs 
where children were engaged in sexual acts, of which seven were 
                                                 
 
12 Detective Brian O'Connor described a "cookie" as a 
"digital fingerprint." 
 
9 
 
 
printed out and admitted as exhibits at trial.  These seven 
images were created on the computer between 3:27 and 3:50 P.M. 
on January 21.  The detective also located six video files on 
the hard drive of the computer, of which two video files were 
located in a temporary Internet file folder and four video files 
were located in a folder entitled "W."  The four video files in 
the "W" folder, which were played for the jury, were created on 
the computer between 3:43 and 3:54 P.M. that day.  Detective 
O'Connor also located a MySpace page in the temporary Internet 
files reflecting a log-in date and time of January 21 at 3:13 
P.M.  The MySpace page identifies the user as "Walter"; the e-
mail address associated with the MySpace page was 
C-Blizzard69@MySpace.com. 
Discussion.  1.  In-court identifications of the defendant.  
Before trial, neither the police nor the prosecutor asked M.S. 
or R.M. to participate in an identification procedure to 
determine whether they could identify the man they had seen at 
the computer on January 21, 2009.  They were never shown a 
photographic array or asked to view a lineup.  The first time 
they were asked to identify the man was on April 7, 2011 -- more 
than two years after the first and only time they had seen him -
- when they were asked by the prosecutor on the witness stand at 
trial whether they saw the man in the court room, and each 
identified the defendant.  
10 
 
 
 
The defendant moved before trial to preclude the 
Commonwealth from eliciting an in-court identification of the 
defendant from any witness that had not previously made an out-
of-court identification, including M.S. and R.M.  The defendant 
contended that, under such circumstances, an in-court 
identification of the defendant would be inherently and 
unnecessarily suggestive.  At a pretrial hearing on the motion, 
the defendant requested that a voir dire of the teenagers be 
conducted before any in-court identification was elicited.  On 
the first day of trial, before either M.S. or R.M. had 
testified, the judge denied the motion, and also denied the 
request for a voir dire.  The judge said that she might 
reconsider her ruling if the prosecutor failed to lay an 
adequate foundation through the eyewitnesses' trial testimony 
before eliciting the in-court identifications.  The judge noted 
that the in-court identifications could not be tainted by a 
suggestive pretrial identification procedure where there had 
been none.  The judge recognized that "an in-court 
identification always has some suggestiveness to it," but said 
that defense counsel "[could] highlight that suggestiveness" on 
cross-examination.  The judge noted defense counsel's objection 
to her ruling.  Although the defendant did not renew his 
objection when the in-court identifications of M.S. and R.M. 
were elicited, where the judge noted the earlier objection, we 
11 
 
 
shall treat the claim of error as preserved.  See Commonwealth 
v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 66 (2011), and cases cited. 
 
We look first to our existing case law on the admission of 
eyewitness identification testimony.  "Under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, an out-of-court eyewitness 
identification is not admissible where the defendant proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, that the identification is so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification that 
its admission would deprive the defendant of his right to due 
process."  Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 599 (2011), 
citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458, 463-464 (1995), 
and Commonwealth v. Thornley, 406 Mass. 96, 98 (1989).  In 
contrast with the United States Supreme Court, which has ruled 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
that an out-of-court identification that is unnecessarily 
suggestive will be admissible if it is reliable under "the 
totality of the circumstances," Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
98, 110, 113 (1977), we have said that "the reliability test 
does little or nothing to discourage police from using 
suggestive identification procedures," and that "[o]nly a rule 
of per se exclusion can ensure the continued protection against 
the danger of mistaken identification and wrongful convictions" 
12 
 
 
arising from suggestive identification procedures.  Johnson, 
supra at 468, 472.  See Walker, supra at 599 n.13. 
 
In addition, where an unreliable identification arises from 
"especially suggestive circumstances" other than an 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure conducted by 
the police, we have declared that "[c]ommon law principles of 
fairness" dictate that the identification should not be 
admitted.  Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996).  Our 
reliance on common-law principles of fairness to suppress an 
identification made under "especially suggestive circumstances" 
even where the circumstances did not result from improper police 
activity is also in contrast with the United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  Compare id. with Perry v. New Hampshire, 
132 S. Ct. 716, 720-721 (2012).  
 
We have applied the "unnecessarily suggestive" standard to 
showup identifications, where the police show a suspect to an 
eyewitness individually rather than as part of a lineup or 
photographic array.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 
Mass. 617, 628-629 (2008); Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 
274, 279-281 (2006).  Such "[o]ne-on-one identifications are 
generally disfavored because they are viewed as inherently 
suggestive," Martin, supra at 279, but suggestiveness alone is 
not sufficient to render a showup identification inadmissible in 
evidence; the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 
13 
 
 
evidence that it was "unnecessarily suggestive" (emphasis in 
original).  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 217 (2014), 
quoting Phillips, supra at 627. 
 
A showup identification may be unnecessarily suggestive for 
two reasons.  First, it may be unnecessarily suggestive where 
there was not "good reason . . . for the police to use a one-on-
one identification procedure."  Martin, 447 Mass. at 279, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 361 (1995).  See 
Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 441, cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 150 (2014).  Although "good reason" for a showup 
identification does not require exigent or special 
circumstances, see Martin, supra, quoting Austin, supra, there 
is generally "good reason" where the showup identification 
occurs within a few hours of the crime, because it is important 
to learn whether the police have captured the perpetrator or 
whether the perpetrator is still at large, and because a prompt 
identification is more likely to be accurate when the witness's 
recollection of the event is still fresh.  See Figueroa, 468 
Mass. at 217-218 ("good reason" existed for showup 
identification occurring two and one-half hours after murder); 
Phillips, 452 Mass. at 628-629 (good reason existed for showup 
identification within one hour after murder and armed robbery).   
 
Second, "[e]ven where there is 'good reason' for a showup 
identification, it may still be suppressed if the identification 
14 
 
 
procedure so needlessly adds to the suggestiveness inherent in 
such an identification that it is 'conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification.'"  Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 217, quoting 
Phillips, 452 Mass. at 628.  See Commonwealth v. Leaster, 395 
Mass. 96, 103 (1985) (even where showup occurs promptly after 
crime, "if there are special elements of unfairness, indicating 
a desire on the part of the police to 'stack the deck' against 
the defendant, an identification resulting from such a 
confrontation would be inadmissible"); Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 
Mass. 751, 756-759 (1980) (identification procedure 
unnecessarily suggestive where police suggested name of 
defendant to victim and then showed him single photograph that 
police removed from vehicle that eyewitness thought belonged to 
assailant).13 
                                                 
 
13 Showups pose an additional risk of misidentification that 
is not present with lineups or photographic arrays.  As the 
Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Testimony 
explained:  "[U]nlike lineups, showups have no mechanism to 
distinguish witnesses who are guessing from those who actually 
recognize the suspect.  In an unbiased lineup, an unreliable 
witness will often be exposed by a 'false positive' response 
identifying a known innocent subject.  By contrast, because 
showups involve a lone suspect, every witness who guesses will 
positively identify the suspect, and every positive 
identification is regarded as a 'hit.'  For that reason, 
misidentifications that occur in showups are less likely to be 
discovered as mistakes."  Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices 
76 (July 25, 2013) (SJC Study Group Report).  See generally 
Dysart & Lindsay, Show-Up Identifications:  Suggestive Technique 
or Reliable Method?, in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 137 
(2007).  This increased risk of undetected false identification 
15 
 
 
 
Where, as here, a prosecutor asks a witness at trial 
whether he or she can identify the perpetrator of the crime in 
the court room, and the defendant is sitting at counsel's table, 
the in-court identification is comparable in its suggestiveness 
to a showup identification.  See Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 
855, 877 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Bol Choeurn, 446 Mass. 
510, 519-520 (2006) ("We have long recognized that 'a degree of 
suggestiveness inheres in any identification of a suspect who is 
isolated in a court room'").  See also Perry v. New Hampshire, 
132 S. Ct. at 727 (all in-court identifications "involve some 
element of suggestion").  Although the defendant is not alone in 
the court room, even a witness who had never seen the defendant 
will infer that the defendant is sitting with counsel at the 
defense table, and can easily infer who is the defendant and who 
is the attorney.14  See United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 
941, modified, 756 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Any witness, 
especially one who has watched trials on television, can 
determine which of the individuals in the courtroom is the 
defendant . . .").   
                                                                                                                                                             
is present in every showup identification, whether conducted out 
of court or in court. 
 
 
14 It was particularly simple here to figure out who was the 
defendant and who was the defense attorney, where the defendant 
is a man and the defense attorney is a woman. 
16 
 
 
In fact, in-court identifications may be more suggestive 
than showups.  See Mandery, Due Process Considerations of In-
Court Identifications, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 389, 415 (1996) ("If 
anything, the evidence suggests that in-court identifications 
merit greater protection" than pretrial identifications).  At a 
showup that occurs within hours of a crime, the eyewitness 
likely knows that the police suspect the individual, but unless 
the police say more than they should, the eyewitness is unlikely 
to know how confident the police are in their suspicion.  
However, where the prosecutor asks the eyewitness if the person 
who committed the crime is in the court room, the eyewitness 
knows that the defendant has been charged and is being tried for 
that crime.  The presence of the defendant in the court room is 
likely to be understood by the eyewitness as confirmation that 
the prosecutor, as a result of the criminal investigation, 
believes that the defendant is the person whom the eyewitness 
saw commit the crime.  Under such circumstances, eyewitnesses 
may identify the defendant out of reliance on the prosecutor and 
in conformity with what is expected of them rather than because 
their memory is reliable.  See id. at 417-418 ("The pressure of 
being asked to make an identification in the formal courtroom 
setting and the lack of anonymity . . . create conditions under 
which a witness is most likely to conform his or her 
recollection to expectations, either by identifying the 
17 
 
 
particular person whom he or she knows the authorities desire 
identified, or by acting in conformity with the behavior of 
others they may have seen on television . . .").  
 
Although we have adopted a "rule of per se exclusion" for 
unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identifications, we have 
not adopted such a rule for in-court identifications, despite 
their comparable suggestiveness.  See Bol Choeurn, 446 Mass. at 
519-520, quoting Commonwealth v. Napolitano, 378 Mass. 599, 604 
(1979), S.C., Napolitano v. Attorney General, 432 Mass. 240 
(2000) ("We have long recognized that 'a degree of 
suggestiveness inheres in any identification of a suspect who is 
isolated in a court room' . . . [, but that] 'does not, in 
itself, render the identification impermissibly suggestive'").   
Instead, we have excluded an in-court identification only where 
"it is tainted by an out-of-court confrontation . . . that is 
'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'"  
Carr, 464 Mass. at 877, quoting Bol Choeurn, supra at 520.  In 
essence, we have excluded in-court identifications only where 
their inherent suggestiveness is magnified by the impermissible 
suggestiveness of an out-of-court identification.  Therefore, 
here, where there had been no out-of-court identification to 
taint the in-court identification, the judge's admission of the 
in-court identification conformed to our case law.  We now do 
18 
 
 
what a trial judge cannot do -- revisit the wisdom of our case 
law regarding the admission of in-court identifications where 
the eyewitness has not earlier been asked to make an out-of-
court identification. 
There can be no doubt that, if the police, more than 
twenty-six months after the incident, had brought M.S. or R.M. 
to any room other than a court room on the day of trial,  
identified one of the persons in the room as the defendant, and 
asked whether the person they had seen looking at images of nude 
children in the library that day was in the room, we would 
conclude that the showup identification was unnecessarily 
suggestive and therefore inadmissible in evidence, especially 
where this had been the first identification procedure the 
police had attempted.  The question we must confront is whether 
such an otherwise inadmissible showup identification becomes 
admissible because the showup occurred in the court room. 
A first-time in-court identification differs from an out of 
court showup in three ways, so we must evaluate whether these 
differences justify the admission of an in-court identification 
that would be inadmissible if it occurred out of court.  The 
first difference is that, with an in-court identification, the 
jury see the identification procedure, whereas the jury do not 
see a showup identification procedure unless the police 
videotape the procedure.  "[W]hen a first-time eyewitness 
19 
 
 
identification occurs in court and no suggestive pretrial 
identification procedures were administered by the state, courts 
generally have concluded that the factfinder is better able to 
evaluate the reliability of the identification because he or she 
can observe the witness's demeanor and hear the witness's 
statements during the identification procedure" (emphasis in 
original).  State v. Hickman, 355 Or. 715, 735 (2014), citing 
Byrd v. State, 25 A.3d 761, 766 (Del. 2011), and United States 
v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1038 (1987).  This conclusion appears to be premised on 
the ability of the jury during an in-court identification to see 
"indications of witness certainty or hesitation during the 
identification process, including facial expression, voice 
inflection, and body language," and to make "other observations 
pertinent to assessing the reliability of a person's 
statements."  Hickman, supra.     
 
We agree that a jury may be better able to assess a 
witness's level of confidence during an in-court identification 
than through evidence of a showup, but we do not agree that this 
means that a jury are better able to evaluate the accuracy of an 
in-court identification.  Social science research has shown that 
a witness's level of confidence in an identification is not a 
reliable predictor of the accuracy of the identification, 
especially where the level of confidence is inflated by its 
20 
 
 
suggestiveness.  See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices 
19 (July 25, 2013) (SJC Study Group Report), citing State v. 
Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 777 (2012), and State v. Guilbert, 306 
Conn. 218, 253 (2012).15  Moreover, even if we were persuaded 
that there were evaluative benefits arising from the jury's 
ability to see the identification procedure, it would not 
justify admission of an inherently suggestive identification.  
Certainly, where there was not good reason to conduct an out-of-
court showup, an identification arising from such a showup would 
not be admissible because the police have videotaped it. 
                                                 
 
15 Even among "highly confident witnesses, [studies] 
indicate that 20 to 30% could be in error."  Wells, Memon, & 
Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence:  Improving Its Probative Value, 7 
Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. Interest 45, 66 (2006).  More 
generally, the less-than-perfect correlation between height and 
gender in humans is "considerably greater" than the correlation 
between certainty and accuracy in eyewitness identifications.  
Wells & Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of 
Eyewitness Science:  30 Years Later, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 11-
12 (2009).  Although "psychological scientists have generally 
concluded that eyewitness certainty . . . can have some 
diagnostic value" (even if it is of "limited utility"), its 
diagnostic value is substantially diminished where suggestive 
identification procedures have been used.  Id. at 12.  Studies 
have shown, for instance, that "confirmatory suggestive remarks 
from the lineup administrator [like 'Good, you identified the 
actual suspect'] consistently inflate eyewitness certainty for 
eyewitnesses who are in fact mistaken."  Id.  "[T]his suggestive 
confirmatory effect is stronger for mistaken eyewitnesses than 
it is for accurate eyewitnesses, thereby making inaccurate 
eyewitnesses look more like accurate eyewitnesses and 
undermining the certainty-accuracy relation."  Id. 
21 
 
 
 
The second difference between a first-time in-court 
identification and a showup is that the former occurs in court, 
and therefore "is subject to immediate challenge through cross-
examination."  Hickman, 355 Or. at 735.  Some other courts have 
concluded that "[w]here a witness first identifies the defendant 
at trial, defense counsel may test the perceptions, memory and 
bias of the witness, contemporaneously exposing weaknesses and 
adding perspective in order to lessen the hazards of undue 
weight or mistake."  Id., quoting People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill. 
App. 3d 582, 589 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1089 (1986).  We 
are not persuaded that the immediacy of cross-examination 
materially lessens "the hazards of undue weight or mistake" 
arising from a suggestive identification.  Eyewitnesses are 
routinely subject to cross-examination regarding their showup 
identifications, but that does not render such identifications 
admissible where they are unnecessarily suggestive.  Cf. Walker, 
460 Mass. at 606-608.  Moreover, we have previously recognized 
how difficult it is for a defense attorney to convince a jury 
that an eyewitness's confident identification might be 
attributable to the suggestive influence of the circumstances 
surrounding the identification.  See Jones, 423 Mass. at 110 
("This is not a case in which cross-examination and a judge's 
jury instruction concerning eyewitness testimony can fairly 
protect the defendant from the unreliability of [the 
22 
 
 
eyewitness's] identification").  See also Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), 
quoting Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009) 
("[E]yewitness identifications upend the ordinary expectation 
that it is 'the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of 
competing witnesses.' . . .  [J]urors find eyewitness evidence 
unusually powerful and their ability to assess credibility is 
hindered by a witness' false confidence in the accuracy of his 
or her identification").  Nor is the immediacy of cross-
examination likely to make the cross-examination more effective 
in revealing the risk of inaccuracy.  In fact, such immediacy 
means that defense counsel has little opportunity to prepare an 
effective cross-examination regarding the identification, 
because it occurred minutes earlier.   
 
The third difference between a first-time in-court 
identification and a showup is that, where defense counsel has 
advance warning that the prosecutor intends to ask the 
eyewitness at trial to identify the defendant, defense counsel 
has the opportunity to propose alternative identification 
procedures that are less suggestive, "such as an in-court line-
up, or having the defendant sit somewhere in the courtroom other 
than the defense table."  Domina, 784 F.2d at 1368-1369.  See 
United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1983) 
("[W]hen a defendant is sufficiently aware in advance that 
23 
 
 
identification testimony will be presented at trial and fears 
irreparable suggestivity, as was the case here, his remedy is to 
move for a line-up in order to assure that the identification 
witness will first view the suspect with others of like 
description rather than in the courtroom sitting alone at the 
defense table").   
 
We do not join those courts that have placed the burden on 
the defendant to avoid a suggestive in-court identification by 
proposing alternative, less suggestive identification 
procedures.  See Hickman, 355 Or. at 742-743, citing Brown, 699 
F.2d at 594, and Domina, 784 F.2d at 1369 ("Courts considering 
the admissibility of first-time in-court identifications 
generally have placed the burden of seeking a prophylactic 
remedy on the defendant").  Placing this burden on the defendant 
suggests that the Commonwealth is entitled to an unnecessarily 
suggestive in-court identification unless the defendant proposes 
a less suggestive alternative that the trial judge in his or her 
discretion adopts.  See Domina, supra ("[P]articular methods of 
lessening the suggestiveness of in-court identification . . . 
are matters within the discretion of the court").  We decline to 
grant the Commonwealth such an entitlement where, as here, the 
Commonwealth failed earlier to conduct a less suggestive out-of-
court identification procedure, and the in-court identification 
24 
 
 
is therefore the only identification of the defendant made by an 
eyewitness.   
 
Where an eyewitness has not participated before trial in an 
identification procedure, we shall treat the in-court 
identification as an in-court showup, and shall admit it in 
evidence only where there is "good reason" for its admission.16 
The new rule we declare today shall apply prospectively to 
trials that commence after issuance of this opinion, and shall 
apply only to in-court identifications of the defendant by 
eyewitnesses who were present during the commission of the 
crime.17     
 
We recognize that the "good reason" that generally 
justifies most out-of-court showups -- i.e., "concerns for 
public safety; the need for efficient police investigation in 
the immediate aftermath of a crime; and the usefulness of prompt 
                                                 
16 We base our decision today on "[c]ommon law principles of 
fairness."  Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996).  
See Commonwealth v. Odware, 429 Mass. 231, 235 (1999) 
(explaining that common law provides basis for excluding in-
court identifications).  We do not address whether State 
constitutional principles would also require "good reason" 
before in-court identifications are admitted in evidence.  Nor 
do we address the admissibility of in-court identifications in 
civil cases. 
 
17 We do not address whether this new rule should apply to 
in-court identifications of the defendant by eyewitnesses who 
were not present during the commission of the crime but who may 
have observed the defendant before or after the commission of 
the crime, such as where an eyewitness identifies the defendant 
as the person he or she saw inside a store near the crime scene 
a short time before or after the commission of the crime. 
25 
 
 
confirmation of the accuracy of investigatory information," 
Austin, 421 Mass. at 362 –- depends on the short duration of 
time between the crime and the showup, and will never justify an 
in-court showup.  But there may be other grounds that constitute 
"good reason" for an in-court showup where there has not been a 
nonsuggestive out-of-court identification procedure.  For 
instance, there may be "good reason" for the first 
identification procedure to be an in-court showup where the 
eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the commission 
of the crime, such as where a victim testifies to a crime of 
domestic violence.  Cf. Carr, 464 Mass. at 858, 874, 877 (in-
court identifications not impermissibly suggestive where 
eyewitnesses had known defendant from neighborhood prior to 
murder); Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431, 443 & n.9 
(2005) (in-court identifications not impermissibly suggestive 
where witness knew defendants and identification was not issue 
at trial).  "Good reason" might also exist where the witness is 
an arresting officer who was also an eyewitness to the 
commission of the crime, and the identification merely confirms 
that the defendant is the person who was arrested for the 
charged crime.  In both of these circumstances, the in-court 
showup is understood by the jury as confirmation that the 
defendant sitting in the court room is the person whose conduct 
is at issue rather than as identification evidence.  See People 
26 
 
 
v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445, 449-450 & n.* (1992) ("confirmatory 
identification" exception to requirement of pretrial hearing on 
admissibility of suggestive pretrial identification applies 
where eyewitness and defendant are "known to one another" or 
where defendant's identity is not live issue at trial).  And in 
both of these circumstances, where the witness is not 
identifying the defendant based solely on his or her memory of 
witnessing the defendant at the time of the crime, there is 
little risk of misidentification arising from the in-court 
showup despite its suggestiveness.  
 
Although we generally place the burden on the defendant to 
move to suppress an identification, that makes little sense 
where there is no out-of-court identification of the defendant 
by a witness and only the prosecutor knows whether he or she 
intends to elicit an in-court identification from the witness.  
If the burden were on the defendant to move to suppress an 
identification in these circumstances, a defendant would need to 
file motions to suppress the in-court identification of 
witnesses whom the prosecutor might not intend to ask to make 
such an identification.  To avoid the filing of needless 
motions, we place the burden on the prosecutor to move in limine 
to admit the in-court identification of the defendant by a 
27 
 
 
witness where there has been no out-of-court identification.18  
Once the motion is filed, the defendant would continue to bear 
the burden of showing that the in-court identification would be 
unnecessarily suggestive and that there is not "good reason" for 
it.  See Martin, 447 Mass. at 279-280, 283 n.6, citing 
Commonwealth v. Odware, 429 Mass. 231, 235 (1999).  Although we 
impose no restrictions on when such a motion must be filed, a 
prosecutor would be wise to file it in advance of trial, 
because, if the defendant were to prevail in suppressing the in-
court identification as unnecessarily suggestive, the 
Commonwealth would still have time, if it chose, to conduct a 
less suggestive out-of-court identification procedure.19   
                                                 
 
18 Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (viii), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), a prosecutor is required to 
disclose to defense counsel in automatic discovery "[a] summary 
of identification procedures, and all statements made in the 
presence of or by an identifying witness that are relevant to 
the issue of identity or to the fairness or accuracy of the 
identification procedures."  This required disclosure applies 
only to out-of-court identification procedures; there is no 
comparable obligation on a prosecutor to disclose in automatic 
discovery his or her intention to ask a witness at trial to make 
an in-court identification. 
 
 
19 We recognize that the Commonwealth may not always choose 
this alternative because the passage of time increases the risk 
that an eyewitness may be unable to identify the defendant or, 
more damaging to the prosecution, may identify another person in 
the lineup or photographic array.  See SJC Study Group Report, 
supra at 31-32, quoting State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 778 (2012) 
("The more time that elapses between an initial observation and 
a later identification procedure . . . the less reliable the 
later recollection will be . . .").  But it is in precisely 
these circumstances that an in-court identification would be 
28 
 
 
 
Limiting in-court showups under the "good reason" standard 
need not diminish the important evidentiary role of reliable 
eyewitness identifications.  See Walker, 460 Mass. at 604 n.16 
("eyewitness identification is . . . an invaluable law 
enforcement tool in obtaining accurate convictions").  Reliable 
evidence of eyewitness identification will continue to be 
admissible where it arises from a nonsuggestive out-of-court 
identification procedure.  Where a prosecutor recognizes during 
trial preparation that no lineup or photographic array has been 
shown to an eyewitness who may be able to identify the 
defendant, nothing bars the prosecutor from causing such an 
identification procedure to be conducted out-of-court before the 
witness takes the stand.  All that is lost by barring first-time 
in-court showups where there is no "good reason" for such a 
showup is the unfair evidentiary weight of a needlessly 
suggestive showup identification that might be given more weight 
by a jury than it deserves.  See id. ("eyewitness identification 
is the greatest source of wrongful convictions").20 
                                                                                                                                                             
most unfair to a defendant, because it would be only the 
suggestiveness of the circumstances in the court room that would 
inflate the witness's confidence in the identification.  
 
 
20 The standard we declare regarding the admission of in-
court showup identifications differs from the recommendation on 
in-court identifications offered by the Supreme Judicial Court 
Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence, which recommended that "in-
court identification not be permitted except, in the judge's 
discretion, on redirect examination, in rebuttal, or in other 
29 
 
 
 
In this case, there was no "good reason" for the highly 
suggestive in-court identifications of M.S. and R.M., where the 
Commonwealth had abundant opportunity to attempt to obtain a far 
less suggestive out-of-court identification through a lineup or 
photographic array.  But we cannot conclude that the judge 
abused her discretion in allowing the in-court identifications 
in evidence where their admission was in accord with the case 
law existing at the time of her decision, and where we only 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances where the defendant challenges the witness's 
ability to make such [an] identification."  SJC Study Group 
Report, supra at 48, 113.  The report does not explain the 
reason for this recommendation, or discuss in detail the 
problems specific to in-court identification.  Where there has 
been no out-of-court identification procedure, the "good reason" 
standard we establish for in-court showups is more restrictive 
than the Study Group's recommendation and, we think, more in 
keeping with the serious concerns raised in the report about the 
dangers of suggestive eyewitness identification and the 
difficulty juries have in accurately evaluating the reliability 
of a suggestive identification.  We conclude that the Study 
Group's recommendation is both overbroad and too narrow.  It is 
overbroad in that it might bar the admission of in-court showups 
even where identification is not a contested issue at trial.  It 
is too narrow in that it might permit the admission of in-court 
showups when they are the least reliable:  when the defendant 
has plausibly challenged the ability of an eyewitness to make a 
reliable identification of the defendant. 
 
 
A recently released report from the National Research 
Council of the National Academies notes that "[t]he accepted 
practice of in-court eyewitness identifications can influence 
juries in ways that cross-examination, expert testimony, or jury 
instructions are unable to counter effectively."  Identifying 
the Culprit:  Assessing Eyewitness Identification 75 (2014) 
(pending publication).  The report recommends that eyewitness 
identifications "typically should not occur for the first time 
in the courtroom."  Id.    
  
30 
 
 
today apply the "good reason" standard to first-time in-court 
showups.21  We therefore reserve discussion of what to do about 
                                                 
21 A number of Federal courts have addressed the 
admissibility of in-court identifications that have not been 
preceded by out-of-court identifications.  But even where these 
courts have found that the suggestiveness of first-time in-court 
identifications raised Federal due process concerns, they have 
generally held that the identifications were properly admitted 
in evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 
232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964 (1992) (admissibility 
of first-time in-court identification should be evaluated by 
same constitutional standard as pretrial identification, but 
even if it were impermissibly suggestive, it was reliable under 
totality of circumstances and therefore did not violate due 
process); United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 425, 426-427 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (same).  See also United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 
1166, 1168-1169 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 
(1971) (defendant had no right to in-court lineup or other 
nonsuggestive in-court identification procedure, and therefore, 
denial of defendant's request for in-court procedure upheld 
absent in-court identification so unnecessarily suggestive as to 
deprive defendant of due process). 
   
Several State courts have rejected challenges to first-time 
in-court identifications, holding that "[t]he inherent 
suggestiveness in the normal trial setting does not rise to the 
level of constitutional concern . . .  [and] the remedy for any 
alleged suggestiveness of an in-court identification is cross-
examination and argument."  Byrd v. State, 25 A.3d 761, 767 
(Del. 2011).  See State v. King, 156 N.H. 371, 373-76 (2007) 
(same); State v. Lewis, 363 S.C. 37, 42-43 (2005) (same).  And 
recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon examined two in-court 
identifications by applying the Oregon Evidence Code's parallel 
provision to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and 
concluded that one of the in-court identifications, because of 
its reliability, was more probative than unfairly prejudicial, 
and that the second was harmless even if its admission were 
error.  See State v. Hickman, 355 Or. 715, 734-749 (2014). 
 
Only a few courts have concluded that a first-time in-court 
identification was impermissibly suggestive, but even in these 
cases, the defendant's conviction either was not reversed, or 
was reversed only because of the cumulative effect of other 
trial errors.  See United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 
31 
 
 
the admission of the suggestive in-court showups until later in 
this opinion, where we consider it in the context of the other 
claimed prejudicial errors.  
 
2.  Exclusion of the defendant's statement of denial.  When 
Detectives O'Connor and Clair confronted the defendant in the 
library on January 22 and asked to speak with him about an 
"incident" that had occurred the previous day, the defendant 
admitted that he had been in the library's computer room and had 
used computer no. two to check his e-mail, but denied that he 
had used the library's computers to view child pornography.  The 
jury, however, did not learn of his denial because the judge 
before trial had allowed the Commonwealth's motion in limine to 
exclude this denial as hearsay that was not otherwise admissible 
under the doctrine of verbal completeness.22  
                                                                                                                                                             
941-943, modified, 756 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984) (first-time in-
court identification was impermissibly suggestive where 
defendant was only African-American in court room, but although 
trial judge erred by rejecting defendant's request for in-court 
lineup as inappropriate, error did not prejudice defendant); 
United States v. Warf, 529 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(reversing defendant's conviction where prosecutor 
inappropriately pointed to defendant verbally and physically 
when asking witness to make an in-court identification, where 
prosecutor elicited evidence that defendant had earlier been 
incarcerated in Federal prison, and where case without 
identification rested on "thin" circumstantial evidence). 
 
22 A statement by a defendant offered in evidence by the 
prosecution is not hearsay because it is a statement of an 
adverse party.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2014).  But 
the same statement, if offered by the defendant, is hearsay 
unless the truth of the statement is affirmed by the defendant 
32 
 
 
 
Under the doctrine of verbal completeness, "'[w]hen a party 
introduces a portion of a statement or writing in evidence,' a 
judge has the discretion to 'allow[] admission of other relevant 
portions of the same statement or writing which serve to 
"clarify the context" of the admitted portion.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 75 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 272 (1998).  The purpose of the doctrine 
is "to ensure that a party does not present 'a fragmented and 
misleading version of events' to the fact finder."  Aviles, 
supra, quoting Carmona, supra.  "The doctrine of verbal 
completeness does not open the door for everything in a 
statement or document."  Aviles, supra, citing Kobayashi v. 
Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 498 (1997).  "To be 
admitted, 'the additional portions of the statement must be (1) 
on the same subject as the admitted statement; (2) part of the 
same conversation as the admitted statement; and (3) necessary 
to the understanding of the admitted statement.'"  Aviles, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 350-351 
(2003).    
                                                                                                                                                             
while testifying.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 302 n.8 (2008).  In this 
case, the defendant elected not to testify at trial.  Therefore, 
the defendant’s statement of denial, as hearsay, could have been 
admissible in evidence only under a hearsay exception or, as 
claimed here, under the doctrine of verbal completeness.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 106(a) (2014).   
33 
 
 
 
Here, the defendant's denial that he was using the 
library's computers to view child pornography was on the same 
general subject as the other admitted statements he made to 
Detectives O'Connor and Clair, and was part of the same 
conversation, so its admissibility rested on whether its 
admission was necessary to a fair understanding of the admitted 
statements.  We conclude that it was necessary.  A reasonable 
jury would have understood from Detective O'Connor's testimony 
that the "incident" he spoke to the defendant about was an 
allegation that the defendant had been seen viewing child 
pornography on a library computer.  A reasonable jury might thus 
have expected that if the defendant had not viewed the child 
pornography, he would have denied it.  But here, the defendant 
admitted that he had used library computers the previous day 
and, according to the detective, had specifically admitted to 
having used computer no. two.  By excluding the defendant's 
denial, the judge might have left the jury with the false 
impression that the defendant had not denied viewing the child 
pornography where an innocent person would have denied it, and 
therefore, there was a significant risk that a reasonable jury 
might have understood the other statements the defendant made to 
the detectives as an implied admission to having viewed the 
child pornography.  See Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 
447-449 (1984) (omission of defendant's statements denying 
34 
 
 
awareness that passenger had just committed a robbery 
"distort[ed] the meaning" of statements in which defendant 
admitted to driving getaway vehicle).       
 
Under these circumstances, the defendant's denial should 
have been admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness to 
eliminate that risk.23  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 377 Mass. 
814, 832 (1979), S.C., 409 Mass. 110 (1991) ("If the evidence 
used to prove the admission consists of a part of a statement, 
whether oral or written, by the defendant, he has the right 
[under the verbal completeness doctrine] to offer any other part 
                                                 
 
23 In this context, the doctrine of verbal completeness is 
related to our rule of adoptive admissions, where the silence of 
a defendant in response to the statement of another may come in 
evidence as an admission by the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Babbitt, 430 Mass. 700, 705-706 (2000) (adoptive admissions 
include statements to which defendant responds by silence).  For 
silence to be admissible as an adoptive admission, "it must be 
apparent that the party has heard and understood the statement, 
that he had an opportunity to respond, and that the context was 
one in which he would have been expected to respond to an 
accusation."  Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 321 (2007), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 719 (1993), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 (1994).  Because silence may mean 
something other than assent, "adoption by silence can be imputed 
to a defendant only for statements that 'clearly would have 
produced a reply or denial on the part of an innocent person.'"  
Babbitt, supra at 705-706, quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 394 
Mass. 510, 515 (1985).  Because the doctrine of verbal 
completeness is intended to "'clarify the context' of the 
admitted portion" of a statement or writing, Commonwealth v. 
Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 75 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 272 (1998), we allow a defendant to 
admit in evidence his denial of wrongdoing where there is a 
significant risk that his silence may be viewed as assent, even 
if the circumstances are not so clear as to permit the 
prosecution to admit in evidence his silence as an adoptive 
admission. 
35 
 
 
of the same statement which tends to explain or disprove the 
claimed admission . . .").  The defendant's statement that he 
was not using computer no. two to view child pornography 
contradicts the meaning that a reasonable jury could have 
attributed to the defendant's statement that he used computer 
no. two on a day when other library users had seen someone who 
matched his description looking at child pornography on computer 
no. two (where child pornography was later found).  As a matter 
of fairness to the defendant, his statement of denial should 
have been admitted in evidence, because it is an essential part 
of what the defendant meant to convey to the detectives, and 
because it contradicts the meaning that a reasonable jury might 
otherwise give to the defendant's admitted statements.  We 
therefore conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to grant 
the Commonwealth's motion in limine to exclude the denial from 
evidence. 
 
3.  Admission of "other bad acts" evidence.  Over the 
defendant's objection, the judge allowed in part the 
Commonwealth's motion in limine to admit in evidence three hand-
drawn sketches of young girls that were found on October 29, 
2009, "tucked away" with the defendant's mail and other 
belongings in his cell at the Suffolk County house of correction 
36 
 
 
during a "routine random cell search."24  All three drawings 
depicted very young girls who were nude or partially nude with 
their breasts and genital areas exposed.  Two of the drawings 
depicted girls engaged in sexual acts; one depicted a girl 
performing oral sex on a penis-shaped sex toy,25 and the other 
depicted a girl masturbating with a sex toy.  
 
In her final instructions to the jury, the judge said that 
the evidence was admitted only for the limited purpose "to show 
the defendant's state of mind, his knowledge and intent," and 
not to show "bad character or propensity."26  The defendant 
contends that the judge abused her discretion by admitting these 
drawings in evidence.  
                                                 
 
24 The judge denied that part of the Commonwealth's motion 
that sought to admit in evidence nonpornographic photographs 
depicting young girls and a hand-drawn sketch of a young girl 
posing nude that were found in the defendant's cell at the 
Suffolk County house of correction on April 3, 2009.  The judge 
also denied the Commonwealth's motion to admit in evidence the 
testimony of a correction officer who, earlier on April 3, saw 
the defendant masturbating while holding a photograph of a girl 
who appeared to be four or five years of age.   
 
 
25 This drawing bore the handwritten caption, "Daddy's 
little girl, 'A Kiddie Pornstar,'. . . 8 yrs. old."  
 
 
26 The judge also instructed the jury that "[t]he defendant 
is not charged with any crime because of" the possession of the 
hand-drawn sketches, and that the jury "shall not draw any 
inference" against the defendant from his having been in custody 
on October 29, 2009, and "shall not consider [that fact] in any 
way." 
 
37 
 
 
 
The standard for evaluating the admissibility of "other bad 
acts" evidence is well established.  Evidence of a defendant's 
prior or subsequent bad acts is inadmissible for the purpose of 
demonstrating the defendant's bad character or propensity to 
commit the crimes charged.  See Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 
Mass. 655, 665 (2012); Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 
574 (2005).  However, such evidence may be admissible for some 
other purpose, for instance, "to establish motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or pattern of 
operation."  Walker, 460 Mass. at 613, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 827 (2001).  Even if the evidence is 
relevant to one of these other purposes, the evidence will not 
be admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant.  See Anestal, supra; Butler, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 794 
(1994).27  
                                                 
 
27 Our case law has not always been consistent regarding the 
standard for excluding "other bad acts" evidence.  We have 
frequently said that such evidence should be excluded where the 
risk of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value, but we 
have sometimes said that it should be excluded where the risk of 
prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.  Compare, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 420-421 (2014) 
("outweighs"), with Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 479 
(2014) ("substantially outweighed").  Of course, all "[r]elevant 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 403 (2014).  However, because "other bad acts" evidence is 
"inherently prejudicial," Commonwealth v. Johnson, 35 Mass. App. 
Ct. 211, 218 (1993), S.C., 43 Mass. App. Ct. 509 (1997), it 
38 
 
 
 
As the judge correctly explained to the jury when this 
evidence was admitted, the questions the jury needed to decide 
regarding state of mind and intent were "whether the defendant 
knowingly and intentionally possessed visual material on January 
21st, 2009, whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known the person depicted in such visual material was under the 
age of eighteen, and whether the defendant had knowledge of the 
nature and content of such visual material."  If there were any 
claim that the defendant might have viewed the child pornography 
on January 21 by mistake or accident, without realizing their 
content, or any reasonable possibility that a juror might have a 
reasonable doubt as to whether he did, the evidence that he 
possessed these hand-drawn sketches in his cell more than ten 
months later would have been probative regarding his state of 
mind or intent.  But the defendant's attorney told the judge 
that the defendant was not claiming a defense of mistake, and 
the search inquiries found on computer no. two left no doubt 
that the person using that computer between 3:08 P.M. and 3:55 
P.M. on January 21 was looking for child pornography.   
                                                                                                                                                             
makes sense to impose a more exacting standard on its 
admissibility than the standard applicable to other evidence.  
We therefore clarify that "other bad acts" evidence is 
inadmissible where its probative value is outweighed by the risk 
of unfair prejudice to the defendant, even if not substantially 
outweighed by that risk. 
39 
 
 
 
The main factual issues in dispute during trial were the 
identity of the person using computer no. two during that 
timeframe, whether a person has "possession" of visual materials 
that he accesses on a public computer, and whether the visual 
materials offered in evidence depicted real children or had 
instead been digitally altered to look like children.  The only 
disputed issue for which the drawings might have been probative 
was the issue of identity, but the jury were not permitted to 
consider the drawings as to this issue.  Nor could the jury have 
been permitted to consider the drawings on the issue of 
identity, because "evidence of [other] bad acts is not 
admissible to prove identity unless there is a special mark or 
distinctiveness in the way the acts were committed (i.e., in the 
modus operandi)."  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 417 Mass. 830, 836 
(1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 406 Mass. 501, 505 
(1990).  "It is not enough that there is some 'general, although 
less than unique or distinct, similarity between the 
incidents.'"  Jackson, supra, quoting Brusgulis, supra at 507.  
Where there is only a general similarity, the risk is great that 
a jury will view the similar act as evidence of bad character or 
propensity rather than of identity.  See United States v. 
Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Pattern evidence 
is propensity evidence, and it is inadmissible unless the 
pattern shows some meaningful specificity or other feature that 
40 
 
 
suggests identity or some other fact at issue" [emphasis in 
original]); Brusgulis, supra at 503, 505-507 (defendant's prior 
sexual assaults admitted in evidence to prove "common scheme, 
modus operandi, pattern of conduct and identification" were 
inadmissible "other bad acts" evidence, which "obviously could 
have an improper influence on the jury's fact-finding function," 
because similarities were "common to numerous assaults on women:  
a secluded site; an attempt to drag or force the victim to a 
more secluded area; words of threat having no unique content, 
spoken to obtain compliance; and abandonment of the effort 
because of the assailant's concern over being discovered").  
Here, where the jury were limited to consider the hand-drawn 
sketches only as to issues that were not in dispute, and where 
the drawings had only a general similarity to the child 
pornography found on the computer, the risk was enormous that 
the jury would use the drawings for the forbidden purpose of 
identifying the defendant as the person who viewed the child 
pornography on computer no. two based on his bad character and 
propensity to possess child pornography.   
 
We generally "presume that a jury understand and follow 
limiting instructions, . . . and that the application of such 
instructions ordinarily renders any potentially prejudicial 
evidence harmless" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 (2000).  See Commonwealth v. 
41 
 
 
Jackson, 384 Mass. 572, 579 (1981) ("We presume, as we must, 
that a jury understand[] and follow[] limiting instructions 
. . .").  But we cannot so easily presume this to be true where 
the limiting instruction regarding the "bad acts" evidence 
effectively told the jury not to consider the evidence with 
respect to issues in dispute and to consider it only with 
respect to issues not in dispute.  Faced with such an 
instruction, the danger is great that a jury would make the 
powerful natural (and forbidden) inference that the defendant's 
possession of pornographic drawings of children shows that he 
has an interest in child pornography, so he must have been the 
person viewing child pornography in the library.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 841-842 (2012), citing 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-137 (1968) (where 
judge instructs jury to disregard "powerfully incriminating" 
evidence, "presumption that jurors could follow a judge's 
limiting instruction fail[s] to inspire confidence that such an 
instruction could cure any prejudice or avert the risk that 
jurors nevertheless would consider the [evidence] against the 
defendant"); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987), 
quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987), and 
Bruton, supra at 136 ("We normally presume that a jury will 
follow an instruction . . . unless there is an 'overwhelming 
probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
42 
 
 
instructions . . . and a strong likelihood that the effect of 
the evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant . . .").  
 
Because the probative value of the drawings was so minimal 
with regard to the state of mind, knowledge, or intent of the 
defendant, and because the risk of unfair prejudice was so 
great, this is the unusual case where we conclude that it was an 
abuse of discretion to admit the "bad act," even with a limiting 
instruction.  See Anestal, 463 Mass. at 671-672 (palpable error 
to admit defendant's prior act of child abuse in evidence at 
murder trial); Brusgulis, 406 Mass. at 507 (error to admit 
defendant's prior unrelated acts of assault and attempted rape 
at trial for assault with intent to rape).   
 
4.  Review of the defendant's convictions for prejudicial 
error.  Having concluded that the in-court identifications of 
the defendant by M.S. and R.M. in these circumstances in the 
future should be suppressed as unnecessarily suggestive showup 
identifications without "good reason," and that the judge erred, 
over objection, in excluding from evidence the defendant's 
denial that he had viewed child pornography at the library, and 
in admitting in evidence the unfairly prejudicial hand-drawn 
sketches found in his cell, we turn now to the question whether 
the defendant's convictions should be vacated and a new trial 
ordered.  Where the defendant preserved his objections to each 
of these rulings, we review for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth 
43 
 
 
v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 
430 Mass. 8, 23 (1999) (Greaney, J., concurring).  In the 
unusual circumstances of this case, we include the unreliability 
of the in-court identifications in that calculus.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 736-737 (2007) 
(judge did not abuse discretion in applying new rule that 
applied prospectively to order new trial where judge concluded 
that integrity of verdict was suspect because jury did not have 
benefit of relevant evidence critical to issue of whether 
defendant acted in self-defense). 
 
We recognize the question to be a close one.  If the in-
court identifications and the bad acts evidence had not been 
admitted in evidence, and the defendant's denial not been 
excluded, there would still be powerful evidence that the 
defendant was the person at computer no. two who viewed child 
pornography on the afternoon of January 21, 2009.  The forensic 
examination of computer no. two leaves no doubt that the person 
who used that computer between 3:08 P.M. and 3:55 P.M. on 
January 21 searched for and viewed child pornography.  The 
defendant is strongly tied to that computer by his admissions to 
Detective O'Connor on January 22 that he had used computer no. 
two the previous day to check his e-mail.28  In addition, the e-
                                                 
 
28 Detective O'Connor's testimony that the defendant 
specifically admitted that he had used computer no. two on 
44 
 
 
mail address he gave to the detective was cblizzard@yahoo.com, 
which is very similar to the MySpace e-mail address used on 
computer no. two shortly before the child pornography was 
accessed from that computer.   
 
But we do not determine whether there was prejudicial error 
by examining what a reasonable jury might have done if the 
errors had never happened.  Instead, we determine whether there 
is a "reasonable possibility that the error[s] might have 
contributed to the jury's verdict."  Alphas, 430 Mass. at 23.  
See Cruz, 445 Mass. at 591, quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 
417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994) ("[I]f we cannot find 'with fair 
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping 
the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error,' then it is prejudicial").  
We cannot exclude that reasonable possibility here.  The 
exclusion of the defendant's denial that he had viewed child 
                                                                                                                                                             
January 21 was somewhat equivocal.  In response to the 
prosecutor's question, "And then where did he say he went?" 
Detective O'Connor stated, "He said that he switched to -- I 
believe it was computer number 2."  However, defense counsel on 
cross-examination did not question the detective regarding the 
reliability of his memory that the defendant had specifically 
identified computer no. two.  Nor did she argue that the 
defendant was unlikely to have identified the number of the 
computer where the teenagers, who routinely went to the computer 
laboratory after school, had not seen him before, and where 
Negron, who worked in the computer laboratory, had apparently 
not seen him so often as to be able to identify him from the 
photographic array. 
    
45 
 
 
pornography at the library might have been understood by the 
jury as an implicit admission that he had viewed it.  The 
defendant's hand-drawn sketches showed that he had a propensity 
to view child pornography.  The unnecessarily suggestive in-
court identifications by M.S. and R.M. were the only 
identifications of the defendant.  Considered together, this 
evidence was so powerfully prejudicial that a reasonable jury 
might not have thought it necessary to look closely at the 
circumstantial evidence, and there remains the possibility that 
a jury who took a close look at that evidence might have 
concluded that it fell short of eliminating a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant just happened to be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time.  In short, given the magnitude of the prejudice, we 
shall err in favor of the grant of a new trial.   
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we vacate the defendant's 
judgments of conviction and remand this case to the Superior 
Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.