Title: Austin v. Shoney's Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961236
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1997

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DORIS AUSTIN, ADMINISTRATRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF JANE  
PAULINE AUSTIN 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 961236 
JUNE 6, 1997 
 
SHONEY'S, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the trial court properly 
sustained the defendant's renewed motion to strike the 
plaintiff's evidence in a slip and fall case after the jury was 
unable to return a verdict.  Under well settled principles, we 
view the evidence and the inferences reasonably raised thereby in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, whose evidence was 
stricken.  Meador v. Lawson, 214 Va. 759, 761, 204 S.E.2d 285, 
287 (1974). 
 
Jane Pauline Austin, 70 years old, was dining with her 
family on the morning of October 16, 1993 at a restaurant in 
Norfolk owned by Shoney's, Inc.  Austin wore a prosthetic limb on 
her left leg as a result of a below-the-knee amputation and used 
a cane with a four-pronged foot for support when walking.  After 
completing the meal, Austin and the others walked down an aisle 
between two rows of booths toward the front of the restaurant to 
exit. 
 
As Austin proceeded down the aisle, her cane slid forward on 
the floor and then went into the air, causing her to lose her 
balance and to fall.  As a result, she suffered broken bones in 
her left shoulder and left leg.  She was treated for these 
injuries at a local hospital and was later transferred to a 
hospital nearer her home in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Austin 
remained hospitalized there and died five months later from 
causes not directly related to her fall. 
 
In September 1994, Doris Austin, Austin's daughter-in-law 
and personal representative of her estate, filed the present 
action alleging that Austin's fall was directly and proximately 
caused by Shoney's negligent failure to keep the floor of its 
dining area in a dry and safe condition.  After extensive 
pre-trial proceedings, a jury trial was commenced in the trial 
court on November 15, 1995.  Testimony concerning various 
contested issues was received over a period of four days of 
trial.  However, we will recite only that evidence which is 
relevant to the dispositive issues of this appeal. 
 
The floor of the restaurant's dining area consists of red 
quarry tile laid in a brickwork pattern.  Shoney's employed two 
night porters to clean the floors of its dining area and other 
areas of the restaurant each night.  Larry Horton was the regular 
weekday night porter; James Crawford was the weekend night 
porter.  Crawford testified that he regularly used one of two 
commercial cleaning products to clean the restaurant's floors: 
Quarry Tile Cleaner WP-329 and Green Liquid Detergent WP-522, a 
dishwashing detergent.  Horton testified that he always used the 
dishwashing detergent. 
 
Both Crawford and Horton conceded that they used levels of 
concentration of detergent to water considerably lower than was 
recommended by the manufacturer for cleaning a quarry tile floor. 
 In addition to regular cleaning with diluted detergent, the 
instructions for cleaning quarry tile floors with the quarry tile 
cleaner called for weekly "shock treatments" with full strength 
cleaner.  This was not done.  Plaintiff's expert witness 
testified that the concentrations of the two cleaning products 
used by the night porters would not effectively remove grease 
from the floors or emulsify grease picked up by the mops. 
 
Horton testified that it was his practice to clean the 
kitchen floor first and then the dining area floor, rinsing his 
mop and changing the water in his mop bucket six to eight times a 
night.  Crawford testified that it was his practice to clean the 
dining area floor first and then to mop the kitchen floor.  Each 
further testified that they used the same mop to clean the dining 
area floor and the kitchen floor.  The same mop was used by both 
night porters over several nights until it required replacement. 
 
The night before the accident, Crawford was the night 
porter.  He testified that, after completing his duties, he 
inspected the floor to confirm that there were "no wet spots or 
anything like that."  The restaurant manager testified that when 
she inspected the dining area floor on the morning of the 
accident, "[t]here were no problems.  The [floor] was clean." 
 
William Meadows, another restaurant patron on the morning of 
the accident, testified that 20 to 30 minutes prior to the 
accident he slipped twice in the same area where Austin fell.  
Meadows examined the floor and found a "slippery residue on the 
floor. . . .  It wasn't [any] type of water, it was more [a] 
petroleum residue."  Meadows further testified that just before 
Austin fell, he saw her cane "jet[] from her . . . [l]ike it had 
hit something slick."  After Austin fell, Meadows reexamined the 
floor where she had fallen and he had slipped.  He estimated that 
an area about four feet wide and four to six feet long was slick 
with a petroleum residue.  Doris Austin testified that she 
examined the floor after Austin fell and found a "greasy film, 
like a slick greasy film-like substance" on the floor. 
 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, Shoney's 
made a motion to strike the evidence on the ground that the 
evidence did not establish that there was an unsafe condition 
which was the cause of the accident, or that if such a condition 
existed, it was created by Shoney's or known by Shoney's to 
exist.  Although stating that "the evidence of constructive 
notice in this case is awfully thin," the trial court overruled 
the motion. 
 
Shoney's then introduced the testimony of various employees 
of the restaurant that they did not observe any grease on the 
floor the morning of the accident or otherwise have reason to 
suspect that the floor was slippery.  Shoney's also called a 
representative of the manufacturer of the products used to clean 
the floor as an expert witness.  The representative testified 
that the two products in question were appropriate for cleaning 
and removing grease from floors, but that the dishwashing liquid 
"would not be our first recommendation" for cleaning a quarry 
tile floor.  Another expert called by Shoney's testified that the 
cleaning methods used by the night porters were "well within any 
set of [industry] guidelines," but conceded on cross-examination 
that the procedures used were "not exactly what I would have 
recommended." 
 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Shoney's renewed its 
motion to strike.  The trial court took the matter under 
advisement and permitted the case to go to the jury.  After 
several hours the jury informed the trial court that it could not 
reach a verdict.  The trial court directed the jury to continue 
to deliberate in an effort to reach a verdict.  After several 
more hours of deliberation, the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict and was discharged by the trial court.  Shoney's again 
renewed its motion to strike.  Following submission of briefs by 
the parties, the trial court granted the motion and entered 
summary judgment for Shoney's.  Rule 1:11.  We awarded an appeal 
to the plaintiff. 
 
The standard under which a trial court should review the 
evidence adduced at trial before granting a motion to strike the 
case at the end of a plaintiff's evidence is well settled under 
prior decisions of this Court.  That standard requires the trial 
court to accept as true all the evidence favorable to the 
plaintiff as well as any reasonable inference a jury might draw 
therefrom which would sustain the plaintiff's cause of action.  
The trial court is not to judge the weight and credibility of the 
evidence, and may not reject any inference from the evidence 
favorable to the plaintiff unless it would defy logic and common 
sense.  See, e.g., Williams v. Vaughan, 214 Va. 307, 309-10, 199 
S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (1973); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Williams, 202 
Va. 362, 365-66, 117 S.E.2d 93, 95 (1960); Smith v. Carpenter, 
198 Va. 91, 93, 92 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1956). 
 
When a motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence is made or 
renewed at the end of all evidence, the trial court may also 
consider the evidence presented during the defendant's case in 
considering the motion.  Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc., 244 Va. 380, 384 
n.*, 421 S.E.2d 447, 450 n.* (1992).  Nonetheless, it must still 
view the evidence and all its reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.  Id. at 384, 421 S.E.2d at 450; 
see also Estate of Taylor v. Flair Property Associates, 248 Va. 
410, 414, 448 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1994).  When the trial court 
considers a renewed motion to strike after the jury has been 
unable to return a verdict, it should sustain the motion only if 
it "is of opinion that it erred in denying the motion" made 
before the case was submitted to the jury.  Rule 1:11.  Thus, the 
standard for granting a motion to strike in such cases is 
identical to that for granting such motions made during trial.   
 
The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff in this case shows that the area where Austin fell was 
covered with a grease-like film that rendered the surface 
slippery.  Shoney's, however, contends that the evidence failed 
to show what caused the grease-like film to be there and, thus, 
that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of production as to 
that element of her case.  Shoney's further contends that its 
motion to strike was properly sustained since the evidence failed 
to show that Shoney's was on notice as to the dangerous condition 
of its floor.  We disagree. 
 
The evidence favoring the plaintiff shows that Shoney's 
employees failed to follow the recommended procedures for 
cleaning a quarry tile floor.  The procedures used in cleaning 
the floor would not have been adequate to remove grease from the 
floor's surface or to emulsify grease picked up by the mops 
elsewhere in the restaurant.  The inference that the grease-like 
film was placed on the floor by these inadequate cleaning 
procedures does not defy logic or common sense.  The evidence 
showed that the grease-like film covered an area of 16 to 24 
square feet.  The logical inference is that it was placed there 
by the movement of the mops over that area of the floor.  
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that some other foreign 
substance was found in that area that would account for the 
slippery condition of the floor over such a large area.  Indeed, 
both the restaurant manager and the waitress responsible for the 
area where the fall occurred testified that there were no spills, 
food or other debris visible on the floor before Austin's fall.  
Thus, for purposes of reviewing a renewed motion to strike, the 
trial court should have accepted as true the inference which 
supported the plaintiff's prima facie case. 
 
Similarly, with respect to the issue of notice, plaintiff 
need only show that under some reasonable inference from the 
evidence Shoney's duty to warn against or remedy the dangerous 
condition had been triggered.  The plaintiff was not required to 
prove that Shoney's had actual notice of the dangerous condition 
of its floor.  If the jury accepted the plaintiff's theory that 
the grease-like film was the result of the improper cleaning 
methods, the hazardous condition was affirmatively created by the 
property owner.  Thus, Shoney's is charged with constructive 
knowledge of the risk because it "had a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to avoid the genesis of the danger."  Memco 
Stores, Inc. v. Yeatman, 232 Va. 50, 55, 348 S.E.2d 228, 231 
(1986). 
 
Finally, Shoney's contends that the plaintiff failed to show 
that Austin's fall was caused by the condition of the floor.  In 
doing so, Shoney's relies primarily on the assertion that Austin 
herself never stated that her fall had been caused by the 
slippery substance on the floor.  The testimony of Meadows that 
Austin's cane "jetted" out from under her suddenly and without 
warning just before she fell is sufficient to raise the inference 
that Austin's fall was caused by the condition of the floor.
*
 
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in 
sustaining Shoney's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
Only through pure conjecture may one conclude that the 
                     
     
*Shoney's made frequent references on brief and at oral 
argument to evidence tending to show that Austin's cane "wobbled" 
and that her prosthetic limb was not properly attached at the 
time of her fall.  While such evidence may tend to detract from 
the weight given to the plaintiff's theory of the case, the 
standard for reviewing a motion to strike does not permit a 
balancing of the weight of conflicting evidence or the inferences 
drawn therefrom. 
greasy film was on the floor through improper cleaning.  
Certainly that is possible; however, it is just as likely that 
the film collected from other causes, such as an unobserved 
spillage by another customer occurring after the floor had been 
cleaned. 
 
The majority says that "nothing in the record suggests that 
some other foreign substance was found in that area that would 
account for the slippery condition of the floor over such a large 
area."  This argument loses sight of the fact that in a case such 
as this the plaintiff, not the defendant, has the burden to prove 
negligence; the defendant does not have to "account" for the 
happening of an accident. 
 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that defendant had actual 
or constructive notice of the condition.  No customer had 
reported "anything wrong with the floor" to defendant's employees 
during the hours immediately preceding the accident.  Moreover, 
the record shows that Meadows, who slipped 20-30 minutes before 
the accident, did not tell any of the defendant's employees about 
the slippery condition prior to the fall by plaintiff's decedent. 
 
In addition, there was no evidence to show how long the 
slippery condition existed.  The proof merely showed that a 
defect was present on the floor of defendant's premises and that 
it caused the decedent's injury; this does not support a finding 
of constructive notice. 
 
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment.